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Balance of power theory reconsidered : the distribution of capabilities and alliances 1816-1939 Fergusson, James Gordon 1989

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BALANCE OF POWER THEORY RECONSIDERED: The Distribution of Capabilities and Alliances 1816-1939 By JAMES GORDON FERGUSSON B.A.(Hons.), The U n i v e r s i t y of Manitoba, 1982 M.A., The U n i v e r s i t y of Manitoba, 1985 A THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY i n THE FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIES (Department of P o l i t i c a l Science) We accept t h i s t h e s i s as conforming to the r e q u i r e d standard THE UNIVERSITY OF BRITISH COLUMBIA October 1989 © James Gordon Fergusson, 1989 In presenting this thesis in partial fulfilment of the requirements for an advanced degree at the University of British Columbia, I agree that the Library shall make it freely available for reference and study. I further agree that permission for extensive copying of this thesis for scholarly purposes may be granted by the head of my department or by his or her representatives. It is understood that copying or publication of this thesis for financial gain shall not be allowed without my written permission. Department of The University of British Columbia Vancouver, Canada Date Oct. DE-6 (2/88) ABSTRACT T h i s s t u d y examines the European I n t e r n a t i o n a l system from 1816 t o 1939. f o c u s i n g on the r e l a t i o n s h i p between the d i s t r i b u t i o n of capa- b i l i t i e s and a l l i a n c e s . Two d i s t i n c t v e r s i o n s of B a l a n c e of Power t h e o r y a r e employed t o t e s t t h i s r e l a t i o n s h i p . The manual v e r s i o n p o s i t s a d i r e c t or p o s i t i v e r e l a t i o n s h i p between an unequal d i s t r i b u - t i o n and the number of a l l i a n c e s i n the system. The s e m i - a u t o m a t i c or b a l a n c e r v e r s i o n p o s i t s t he same r e l a t i o n s h i p but l i m i t s i t s a p p l i c a - b i l i t y t o a s i n g l e G r e a t Power, G r e a t B r i t a i n . The f i n d i n g s s u p p o r t t h e s e m i - a u t o m a t i c v e r s i o n and a l s o i n d i c a t e an i n v e r s e r e l a t i o n s h i p between e q u a l i t y and a l l i a n c e s . F i n a l l y , an e x a m i n a t i o n of the r e l a - t i o n s h i p between p o l a r i z a t i o n , d e f i n e d as the p a t t e r n o f a l l i a n c e s i n the s y s t e m , and the d i s t r i b u t i o n o f c a p a b i l i t i e s i s u n d e r t a k e n . No c l e a r r e l a t i o n s h i p i s found between p o l a r i z a t i o n and an unequal d i s - t r i b u t i o n , a l t h o u g h some e v i d e n c e p o i n t s towards a r e l a t i o n s h i p between p o 1 a r i z a t i o n and war. The a n a l y s i s c o n c l u d e s by p o s i t i n g con- f l i c t i n g , i f not c o n t r a d i c t o r y , s e c u r i t y demands and thus c o n f l i c t i n g b e h a v i o r f o r c o n t i n e n t a l and i n s u l a r Powers. T h i s f i n d i n g sheds some l i g h t on c o n f l i c t i n g e v i d e n c e i n t h e q u a n t i t a t i v e 1 i t e r a t u r e on the r e l a t i o n s h i p between the d i s t r i b u t i o n of c a p a b i 1 i t i e s and war, and may p r o v i d e an a d d i t i o n a l e x p l a n a t i o n f o r the l e v e l of h o s t i l i t y between the S o v i e t Union and the U n i t e d S t a t e s s i n c e World War I I. CONTENTS ABSTRACT i i LIST OF TABLES v LIST OF FIGURES . . . . v i i ACKNOWLEDGMENTS . . i x Chapter page. INTRODUCTION 1 I. BALANCE OF POWER THEORY 12 C o n c e p t u a l i z i n g the Theory . . 13 B a l a n c e of Power as System Type 2h B a l a n c e of Power Theory and I t s C r i t i c s 33 I I . THE DISTRIBUTION OF CAPABILITIES AND ALLIANCES kk E x i s t i n g S t u d i e s on the D i s t r i b u t i o n of Power and A l i i ances . .' 45 I n t e r n a l and E x t e r n a l P o l i c y O p t i o n s . . 60 Hypotheses 68 I I I . ESTABLISHING THE BOUNDARIES OF ANALYSIS . Jk Temporal B o u n d a r i e s , P o l a r i t y and N u c l e a r Weapons . . . . 75 S e c u r i t y I n t e r d e p e n d e n c e and S t a t e Membership i n the System 87 I d e n t i f y i n g P e r i o d s w i t h i n t h e Gener a l B o u n d a r i e s . . . . 95 IV. THE GREAT POWERS AND MEASURING THE DISTRIBUTION 100 The Case f o r M e a s u r i n g G r e a t Power S t a t u s 102 C a p a b i l i t y I n d i c a t o r s and the H i s t o r i c a l Record . . . . 110 The European G r e a t Powers 1816-1939 . . 122 M e a s u r i n g the D i s t r i b u t i o n of C a p a b i l i t i e s 131 V. ALLIANCES AND POLARIZATION 13$ A l i i ances 138 M o d i f i c a t i o n s , Measures, and A l l i a n c e P a t t e r n s . . . . 147 P o l a r i z a t i o n . . . 159 VI . DATA ANALYSIS 169 The R e g r e s s i o n R e s u l t s from the Unt r a n s f o r m e d Data . . 176 Removing A u t o - C o r r e l a t i o n and the Transformed Data R e s u l t s 191 H i s t o r i c a l E x p l a n a t i o n and War . 208 P o l a r i z a t i o n . 218 V I I . THE CASE FOR THE BALANCER VERSION 236 V I I I . CONCLUSION . . . 252 - i v - LIST OF TABLES T a b l e I - Comparison of Pre-World War One C a p a b i l i t y S h a r e s . . . 52 T a b l e II - System Members 9̂ T a b l e I I I - Temporal P e r i o d s f o r Subsequant A n a l y s i s 97 T a b l e IV - Comparison of A l i g n m e n t , A l l i a n c e , and C o a l i t i o n . . . . 139 T a b l e V - Average P r o p o r t i o n of S t a t e s i n A l l i a n c e s , Defence P a c t s , E n t e n t e s , and N e u t r a l i t y / N o n - A g g r e s s i o n P a c t s By V a r i o u s P e r i o d s of Time 15̂ + T a b l e VI - Average P r o p o r t i o n of System Dyads Subsumed by A l l i a n c e s , Defence P a c t s , E n t e n t e s , and N e u t r a l i t y / N o n - A g g r e s s i o n P a c t s by V a r i o u s P e r i o d s of Time 15^ T a b l e VII - Minimum/Maximum D i s t r i b u t i o n S c o r e s and U n d e r l y i n g G r e a t Power Shares 171 T a b l e V I I I - B i v a r i a t e C o e f f i c i e n t s Between C a p a b i l i t y I n d i c i e s and P r o p o r t i o n of S t a t e s A l l i e d and P r o p o r t i o n of A l l i a n c e Dyads 183 T a b l e IX - B i v a r i a t e C o e f f i c i e n t s Between C a p a b i l i t y I n d i c i e s and P r o p o r t i o n of S t a t e s i n Defence P a c t s and P r o p o r t i o n of Defence P a c t Dyads 183 T a b l e X - B i v a r i a t e C o e f f i c i e n t s of Both C a p a b i l i t y I n d i c i e s and A l l Measures o f the Dependent V a r i a b l e s by Temporal P e r i o d s 185 T a b l e XI - B i v a r i a t e C o e f f i c i e n t s f o r I n t e r - C e n t u r y B r e a k . . . . . . I 8 9 - v - T a b l e XII - A u t o r e g r e s s i v e P arameters of the Dependent V a r i a b l e Time S e r i e s 196 T a b l e X I I I - Parameters of the Independent V a r i a b l e s Time S e r i e s . 198 T a b l e XIV - B i v a r i a t e C o e f f i c i e n t s of the Tra n s f o r m e d Data, A l l Measures of t h e Dependent V a r i a b l e 201 T a b l e XV - B i v a r i a t e C o e f f i c i e n t s of the Tra n s f o r m e d Data by Temporal P e r i o d s 203 T a b l e XVI - B i v a r i a t e C o e f f i c i e n t s of Tra n s f o r m e d Data by I n t e r - C e n t u r y Break 204 T a b l e XVII - B i v a r i a t e C o e f f i c i e n t s of Tra n s f o r m e d Data by V a r i o u s L a t e - N i n e t e e n t h C e n t u r y Breaks 206 T a b l e X V I I I - Beta C o e f f i c i e n t s w i t h War as an Independent Dummy V a r i a b l e . . . . . 216 T a b l e XIX - S t a t e A b b r e v i a t i o n s 219 T a b l e XX - A u t o r e g r e s s i v e Parameters f o r the Independent V a r i a b l e 244 T a b l e XXI - P r o b i t R e s u l t s E mploying the Unt r a n s f o r m e d Data 1816 -1939 245 T a b l e XXII - P r o b i t R e s u l t s , U ntranformed Data by Temporal P e r i o d s . . . . . 246 T a b l e X X I I I - P r o b i t R e s u l t s , T r a n s f o r m e d Data 1816-1939 247 T a b l e XXIV - P r o b i t R e s u l t s , T r a n s f o r m e d Data by Temporal P e r i o d s 249 - v i - LIST OF FIGURES F i g u r e 4.1 - Comparison of the Impact of S e l e c t I n d u s t r i a l I n d i c a t o r s on S t a t e Shares 119 F i g u r e 4.2 - S t a t e Shares of European System C a p a b i l i t e s , 1816-1870 . 123 F i g u r e 4.3 ~ S t a t e Shares of European System C a p a b i l i t e s , 1871-1914 • • 124 F i g u r e 4.4 - S t a t e S h a r e s of European System C a p a b i l i t e s , 1920-1938 126 F i g u r e 4.5 _ D i s t r i b u t i o n S c o r e s o f the Four and F i v e Power Data S e t s 1818-1938 135 F i g u r e 5-1 ~ P r o p o r t i o n of S t a t e s i n A l l i a n c e s , Defence P a c t s , E n t e n t e s and N e u t r a l i t y / N o n - A g g r e s s i o n P a c t s 156 F i g u r e 5-2 - P r o p o r t i o n of Dyads i n A l l i a n c e s , Defence P a c t s , E n t e n t e s and N e u t r a l i t y / N o n - A g g r e s s i o n P a c t s 158 F i g u r e 5-3 _ Schematic Diagrams of System P o l a r t i z a t i o n 167 F i g u r e 6.1 - S c a t t e r g r a m of 4 Power Index by P r o p o r t i o n of S t a t e s Al 1 i ed 1 78 F i g u r e 6.2 - S c a t t e r g r a m of 5 Power Index by P r o p o r t i o n of S t a t e s Al 1 i ed 179 F i g u r e 6.3 - S c a t t e r g r a m of 4 Power Index by P r o p o r t i o n of Dyads i n A l l i a n c e s 180 F i g u r e 6.4 - S c a t t e r g r a m of 5 Power Index by P r o p o r t i o n of Dyads i n A l l i a n c e s l8l - v i i - F i g u r e 6.5 - S c a t t e r g r a m Comparison of 5 Power Index by P r o p o r t i o n of S t a t e s A l l i e d by S e l e c t Time P e r i o d s , 1849-1870,1871-1913 .'. 186 F i g u r e 6.6 - S c a t t e r g r a m o f 4 Power Index by P r o p o r t i o n o f S t a t e s A l 1 i e d , l 8 l 6 - 1 8 4 8 . ; 187 F i g u r e 6.7 - C o r r e l o g r a m s o f P r o p o r t i o n of S t a t e s i n A l l i a n c e Time S e r i e s 195 F i g u r e 6.8 - Comparison o f D i s t r i b u t i o n and P o l a r i z a t i o n 1816-1853 222 F i g u r e 6.9 ~ Comparison o f D i s t r i b u t i o n and P o l a r i z a t i o n 1854-1870 224 F i g u r e 6.10 - Comparison o f D i s t r i b u t i o n and P o l a r i z a t i o n I87I-I89O.... 226 F i g u r e 6.11 - Comparison of D i s t r i b u t i o n and P o l a r i z a t i o n 1890-1914 228 F i g u r e 6.12 - Comparison of D i s t r i b u t i o n and P o l a r i z a t i o n 1920-1930 230 F i g u r e 6.13 - Comparison of D i s t r i b u t i o n and P o l a r i z a t i o n 1931-1936. 232 F i g u r e 6.14 - Comparison of D i s t r i b u t i o n and P o l a r i z a t i o n 1936-1939 234 F i g u r e 7-1 - D i s t r i b u t i o n S c o r e s f o r C o n t i n e n t a l Powers 18916-1938 243 - .vi i i - ACKNOWLEDGMENTS I would f i r s t l i k e t o e x p r e s s my d e e p e s t thanks t o L a u r a . W i t h o u t her s u p p o r t , t h i s d i s s e r t a t i o n and my e n t i r e academic u n d e r t a k i n g s would have been i m p o s s i b l e . I would a l s o l i k e t o beg f o r g i v e n e s s from Owen, John, and Meg who had t o put up w i t h me d u r i n g t h i s endeavour. Thanks a l s o must be g i v e n t o Mike W a l l a c e , my s u p e r v i s o r , who h e l p e d me over many of the rough s p o t s , p a r t i c u 1 a r i 1 y when the numbers were o v e r - whleming. A s p e c i a l thanks t o Dave S t e w a r t , my former o f f i c e mate, who l i s t e n e d ad nauseum t o my r a m b l i n g s , Marc D e s j a r d i n , who I always c o u l d d i s t u r b w i t h a new thoug h t , Ken C a r t y , who kep t me a c a d e m i c a l l y sane, and Danny Savas, my c o m p e t i t o r i n the computer d o l l a r sweep- s t a k e s . I must a l s o note the c o n t r i b u t i o n of M a r t i n G r i f f i t h s who t r i e d t o keep me p h i l o s o p h i c a l l y h o n e s t . F i n a l l y , my Mother and F a t h e r d e s e r v e s p e c i a l r e c o g n i t i o n f o r t h e i r a s s i s t a n c e o ver the long haul . INTRODUCTION How s a l i e n t i s the d i s t r i b u t i o n o f c a p a b i l i t i e s f o r u n d e r s t a n d i n g e l i t e d e c i s i o n s and s t a t e b e h a v i o r i n the s e c u r i t y realm? Is the r e l a t i o n s h i p between the d i s t r i b u t i o n and b e h a v i o r e x p l i c a b l e by B a l - ance of Power t h e o r y ? These two q u e s t i o n s i n f o r m the c o r e o f t h i s s t u d y . A l t h o u g h g r e a t e r w e i g h t i s p l a c e d on the B a l a n c e o f Power q u e s t i o n , f o r re a s o n s o u t l i n e d below, the answer t o t h e second ques- t i o n i s p a r t i a l l y dependent on the answer t o the f i r s t . Many s t u d i e s , p a r t i c u l a r l y emanating from the C o r r e l a t e s of War p r o j e c t , f a i l t o make the c l e a r l i n k between s y s t e m i c t h e o r i e s and e l i t e d e c i s i o n s . I t i s t r u e t h a t some v a r i a b l e s employed i n t h e s e s t u d i e s a r e complex and m u 1 t i - d i m e n s i o n a 1 . They a r e l i k e l y t o have l i t t l e r e l e v a n c e t o a c t u a l e l i t e s g r a p p l i n g w i t h the s e c u r i t y p r oblem. Moreover, the t h r u s t o f t h e s e s t u d i e s i s t o i d e n t i f y e m p i r i c a l markers i n time and space which w i l l improve our a b i l i t y as o b s e r v e r s and p o l i c y a d v o c a t e s t o warn e l i t e s of s i t u a t i o n s which may i n c r e a s e the p r o b a b i l i t y o f war. How- e v e r , some v a r i a b l e s , p a r t i c u l a r l y t h e d i s t r i b u t i o n of c a p a b i l i t i e s , r e p r e s e n t key components which d e c i s i o n - m a k e r s a r e l i k e l y t o use. The i m p o r t a n c e of the d i s t r i b u t i o n t o d e c i s i o n - m a k e r s , i n t h e s e c u r i t y c a l c u l u s f o l l o w s from the environment i n which they o p e r a t e ; the a n a r c h i c s t a t e system. The s e c u r i t y , and u l t i m a t e l y s u r v i v a l , of th e s t a t e i s the hands of t h e s e d e c i s i o n - m a k e r s . The g r e a t e s t t h r e a t - 1 - 2 t o s t a t e s e c u r i t y from t he e x t e r n a l environment i s o t h e r s t a t e s . T h i s t h r e a t i s u l t i m a t e l y m a n i f e s t e d i n terms of m i l i t a r y f o r c e . I t f o l - lows t h a t s e c u r i t y becomes a f u n c t i o n of the amount of f o r c e h e l d by one s t a t e r e l a t i v e t o o t h e r s . The d i s t r i b u t i o n of c a p a b i l i t i e s r e p r e - s e n t s a way t o c o n c e p t u a l i z e and o p e r a t i o n a 1 i z e the con c e p t of r e l a - t i v e c a p a b i l i t i e s . In so d o i n g , one i s a b l e t o ac c o u n t f o r the i n t e r - a c t i v e n a t u r e of i n t e r n a t i o n a l p o l i t i c s . F i n a l l y , t he n o t i o n of r e l a t i v e c a p a b i l i t i e s i s i n t u i t i v e l y r e a s o n a b l e . E l i t e s , c o n f r o n t e d by the complex and o f t e n c o n f l i c t i n g i n f o r m a t i o n f l o w i n g from a v a r i e t y of s o u r c e s w i t h v a r y i n g d e grees o f r e l i a b i l i t y , a r e l i k e l y t o f i n d s o l a c e i n the r e l a t i v e l y 'hard' d a t a w h i c h c o m p r i s e s c a p a b i l i - t i e s . 1 B e f o r e p l a c i n g B a l a n c e of Power t h e o r y w i t h i n t h i s d i s c u s s i o n , i t i s n e c e s s a r y t o engage b r i e f l y i n the 'contemporary' debate on the s u b s t a n c e and f u t u r e d i r e c t i o n of the f i e l d known as I n t e r n a t i o n a l R e l a t i o n s . T h i s d e b a t e , b e t t e r known as the 'paradigm' d e b a t e , con- c e r n s the most u s e f u l means t o u n d e r s t a n d phenomena i n t h e f i e l d . 2 E c h o i n g e l e m e n t s of the b e h a v i o r a l i s t or s o c i a l s c i e n c e e p i s t e m o l o g y , the d e b a t e s e r v e s as an o c c a s i o n f o r i n d i v i d u a l s t o i d e n t i f y t h e i r p e r s o n a l v a l u e s and b e l i e f s and c l a i m adherence t o one of s e v e r a l com- p e t i n g 'paradigms'. However, the v a l u e of engag i n g i n t h i s d ebate i s r a r e l y q u e s t i o n e d , i t s p r e s e n c e as a d e t r a c t o r from t h e o r e t i c a l and 1 C h o u c r i and North (1972: 100) p r o v i d e c o n c r e t e s u p p o r t f o r t h i s con- t e n t i o n t hrough r e f e r e n c e t o l a t e N i n e t e e n t h C e n t u r y B r i t i s h p a r l i - mentary d e b a t e s . Others who f o l l o w t h i s l i n e o f r e a s o n i n g i n c l u d e G u l l i c k (1955) , K i s s i n g e r (1957) , Morgenthau (1973) , and Buzan (1983) . 2 A v a l u a b l e summary of t h e debate i s found i n Maghoori and Ramberg (1982). A more d e t a i l e d d i s c u s s i o n o f n e o r e a l i s m w i t h i n t h i s d ebate i s a v a i l a b l e i n Keohane (1986) . 3 e m p i r i c a l r e s e a r c h i g n o r e d , and i t s r e l a t i o n s h i p t o e a r l i e r f u t i l e d e b a t e s i s o b s c u r e d . At the s i m p l e s t l e v e l , the 'paradigm' debate f l o w s from the the c o m p l e x i t y of the ' r e a l ' w o r l d . From a system's p e r s p e c t i v e , one can i d e n t i f y s e v e r a l systems which a r e s i m u l t a n e o u s l y independent and i n t e r d e p e n d e n t . They i n c l u d e the i n t e r n a t i o n a l s e c u r i t y .system, eco- nomic system, s o c i a l / c u l t u r a l system, and e c o l o g i c a l system t o c i t e the most p r o m i n e n t . To debate w h i c h of t h e s e systems i s the key t o u n d e r s t a n d i n g the f i e l d as a whole i s as f u t i l e as the c h i c k e n and egg d e b a t e . At a minimum, the i m p o r t a n c e of each system i s a f u n c t i o n of i d i o s y n c r a t i c c o n s i d e r a t i o n s . To argue the supremacy of one system over the o t h e r , as t o argue the supremacy of one method over a n o t h e r , i s t o deny the c o m p l e x i t y of the 'beast' and the d i v e r s i t y of human i n q u i r y . The r e s u l t becomes a w a s t e l a n d of v e r b i a g e i n which some of the b e s t minds c r e a t e 'strawmen' f o r h u m i l i a t i o n and/or t a l k p a s t each o t h e r t o t h e d e t r i m e n t of more i m p o r t a n t e m p i r i c a l and t h e o r e t i c a l l y r e l e v a n t work. C e r t a i n l y , one needs to be aware of the p e r s p e c t i v e u n d e r t a k e n by any w r i t e r i n the f i e l d . But, t h i s i s o b v i o u s from each i nd i v i dua1's work. A f i n a l p o i n t i n t h i s r e g a r d c o n c e r n s t h e o b s c u r i n g of the r e l a - t i o n s h i p between t h e p r e s e n t d e b a t e and e a r l i e r d e b a t e s i n the f i e l d , such as t h e r e a 1 i s t / i d e a 1 i s t and t r a d i t i o n a 1 i s t / b e h a v i o r a 1 i s t . The p r e s e n t d e b a t e i s l a r g e l y an e x t e n s i o n of t h e s e e a r l i e r d e b a t e s i n w h i c h t h e c e n t r a l d i v i d e c o n c e r n s a ' p e s s i m i s t i c ' or ' o p t i m i s t i c ' v i e w about the f u t u r e of i n t e r n a t i o n a l r e l a t i o n s , i f not mankind as a w h o l e . 3 The former v i e w s 'man' as s t a t i c , whereas the l a t t e r v i e w s 'man' as a l e a r n i n g and growing a n i m a l . Now, t h i s i s an i n t e r e s t i n g p h i 1 o s o p h i c a l q u e s t i o n which s h o u l d not be i g n o r e d . But, l e t us engage i n t h i s d ebate from an e m p i r i c a l base, r a t h e r than q u e s t i o n s r e g a r d i n g s o - c a l l e d 'paradigms'. The r e l a t i o n s h i p between the above d i s c u s s i o n and t h i s a n a l y s i s i s s i m p l e . The p e r s p e c t i v e of t h i s s t u d y i s c l e a r from the o p e n i n g p a r a - g r a p h . I t c o n c e r n s i s s u e s i n the s e c u r i t y system and seeks t o examine e m p i r i c a l l y a r e l a t i o n s h i p between two v a r i a b l e s over a l a r g e p e r i o d of t i m e , w h i c h can not h e l p but speak i n d i r e c t l y t o the a f o r e m e n t i o n e d p h i l o s o p h i c a l q u e s t i o n . However, t h e l e g i t i m a c y or v a l u e of t h i s s t u d y on B a l a n c e of Power t h e o r y comes from the e x i s t i n g body of r e s e a r c h on the t h e o r y , not the 'paradigm' d e b a t e . T h i s r e s e a r c h r e v e a l s t h a t B a l a n c e of Power t h e o r y , d e s p i t e i t s w i d e s p r e a d usage i n the f i e l d , s t i l l c o n f r o n t s major d i f f i c u l t i e s r e g a r d i n g i t s t h e o r e t i - c a l p r o p e r t i e s and e m p i r i c a l u t i l i t y . T h i s s t u d y a d v o c a t e s t h e need f o r consensus on the p r o p e r t i e s of B a l a n c e of Power t h e o r y and draws from the e x i s t i n g l i t e r a t u r e t h e f o u n d a t i o n of a consensus w h i c h l i n k s the t h e o r y d i r e c t l y w i t h the d i s t r i b u t i o n o f c a p a b i l i t i e s . T h i s s t u d y i s a l s o c o n c e r n e d w i t h an e x i s t i n g gap i n t h e e m p i r i c a l l i t e r a t u r e , w hich i s a f u n c t i o n of t h e c e n t r a l i t y o f 'war' as the dependent v a r i a b l e i n t h e s e e m p r i c a l e x a m i n a t i o n s . T h i s gap i s t h e absence of any e m p i r i c a l s t u d i e s on a l l i a n c e s u s i n g B a l a n c e of Power t h e o r y . As many prominent w r i t e r s n o t e , a l l i a n c e s a r e c e n t r a l , i f not 3 The c o n t i n u i n g most r e l e v a n t and d e t a i l e d s t u d y remains C a r r ' s (1939) e x a m i n a t i o n of the d e b a t e w i t h r e f e r e n c e t o t h e I n t e r w a r p e r i o d . n e c e s s a r y , mechanisms f o r the o p e r a t i o n of the ' b a l a n c e o f power'. They s e r v e as a means t o enhance the s e c u r i t y o f i n d i v i d u a l s t a t e s t h r o u g h the a g g r e g a t i o n of m i l i t a r y c a p a b i l i t i e s . A l l i a n c e s a r e a means t o r e d r e s s an u n f a v o r a b l e or unequal d i s t r i b u t i o n of c a p a b i l i - t i e s . From a system's p e r s p e c t i v e , B a l a n c e of Power t h e o r y p o s i t s t h a t the r e l a t i o n s h i p between an unequal d i s t r i b u t i o n of power and a l l i a n c e s w i l l be p o s i t i v e . That i s , more a l l i a n c e s w i l l be found a t h i g h e r l e v e l s of d i s t r i b u t i o n a l i n e q u a l i t y Chapter One examines the p r o p e r t i e s of B a l a n c e o f Power t h e o r y and i t s t r e a t m e n t i n the f i e l d . I t shows t h a t a t t e m p t s t o t r e a t B a l a n c e of Power t h e o r y from a W a l t z i a n system's p e r s p e c t i v e or i n terms o f Morgenthau's power p o l i t i c s v i e w a r e m i s p l a c e d . R a t h e r , the t h e o r y p o s i t s t h a t e l i t e s a c t i v e l y seek ' b a l a n c e ' or an equal d i s t r i b u t i o n of c a p a b i l i t i e s as the o p t i m a l g u a r a n t e e o f s e c u r i t y and s u r v i v a l . As such , B a l a n c e of Power t h e o r y p r o v i d e s e x p l a n a t i o n s f o r s t a t e b e h a v i o r or p o l i c i e s . As a r e s u l t , t he two r e l e v a n t v e r s i o n s of the t h e o r y , the manual and s e m i - a u t o m a t i c o r . b a l a n c e r v e r s i o n s , a r e i d e n t i f i e d f o r subsequant e m p i r i c a l a n a l y s i s . The c h a p t e r a l s o r e v e a l s t h a t a t t e m p t s t o t r e a t B a l a n c e o f Power as a system type a r e p r o b l e m a t i c . T h i s approach has produced major d i s c r e p e n c i e s among a u t h o r s on the 'neces- s a r y ' c o n d i t i o n s f o r the B a l a n c e of Power and thus the temporal and s p a t i a l b o u n d a r i e s of such a system. Moreover, t h e s e t r e a t m e n t s a r e inf o r m e d by a c o n c e r n f o r system s t a b i l i t y , u s u a l l y d e f i n e d w i t h r e f - e r e n c e t o the absence of war, and not B a l a n c e of Power. F i n a l l y , t he c h a p t e r examines i n some d e t a i l t h r e e groups o f c r i t i c i s m o f the t h e o - r y ; i n c o n s i s t e n t usage, contemporary r e l e v a n c e , and m e t h o d o l o g i c a l 6 impediments. I t argues t h a t none of t h e s e c r i t i c i s m s s u f f i c e t o neg- a t e the u t i l i t y o f B a l a n c e of Power t h e o r y . The t h e o r e t i c a l r e l a t i o n s h i p between the d i s t r i b u t i o n and a l l i a n c - e s , a l o n g w i t h t h e h y p o t h e s e s drawn from the manual v e r s i o n , a r e p r e - s e n t e d i n the n e x t c h a p t e r . I t b e g i n s w i t h an i d e n t i f i c a t i o n of the r e l e v a n t e m p i r i c a l s t u d i e s on e i t h e r the d i s t r i b u t i o n of c a p a b i l i t i e s or a l l i a n c e s , and shows t h a t t h e r e l a t i o n s h i p between the two v a r i - a b l e s has not been examined d i r e c t l y . T h i s p r e s e n t a t i o n i s f o l l o w e d by an e x a m i n a t i o n of the f u n c t i o n of a l l i a n c e s as a t o o l of s t a t e p o l - i c y r e l a t i v e t o B a l a n c e of Power t h e o r y . I t d e t a i l s the a b s t r a c t r e l a t i o n s h i p between t h e a l l i a n c e o p t i o n and the o p t i o n t o i n c r e a s e i n t e r n a l r e s o u r c e s d e v o t e d t o s e c u r i t y needs and argues t h a t t he c o s t s / b e n e f i t s of one o p t i o n a r e m i r r o r e d r e l a t i v e l y by the o t h e r . I t i m p l i e s t h a t e l i t e s may be l e d t o an e i t h e r / o r d e c i s i o n i n t h i s r e g a r d . The c h a p t e r cone 1udes w i t h a p r e s e n t a t i o n of the h y p o t h e s e s . The f i r s t two h y p o t h e s e s c o n c e r n the r e l a t i o n s h i p i d e n t i f i e d above. The f i n a l h y p o t h e s i s draws from an a d j a c e n t body of l i t e r a t u r e con- c e r n i n g a l l i a n c e s ; p o l a r i z a t i o n . P o l a r i z a t i o n i s d e f i n e d as t h e p a t - t e r n of l i n k a g e s a t the system l e v e l produced by a l l i a n c e s . I t i s h y p o t h e s i z e d t h a t d i s t r i b u t i o n a l i n e q u a l i t y i s p o s i t i v e l y r e l a t e d t o hi g h l e v e l s of p o l a r i z a t i o n , c o n c e p t u a l i z e d as two m u t u a l l y e x c l u s i v e c l u s t e r s of s t a t e s i n a l l i a n c e . C hapter Three s e t s the temporal and s p a t i a l b o u n d a r i e s of t h e s y s - tem i n w h i c h t h e h y p o t h e s e s a r e t e s t e d . The temporal l i m i t s a r e s e t t o the p e r i o d of 1816-1939- These l i m i t s a r e f u n c t i o n of d a t a a v a i l - a b i l i t y (l8l6) and c o n c e r n s r e l a t e d t o t h e p o t e n t i a l i n f l u e n c e of 7 background v a r i a b l e s on the a n a l y s i s . These v a r i a b l e s r e l a t e t o s t r u c t u r a l and t e c h n o l o g i c a l changes which o c c u r a f t e r World War Two. T h e , s p a t i a l l i m i t s a r e s e t t o g e o g r a p h i c Europe. T h i s l i m i t i s drawn from c o n s i d e r a t i o n s r e l a t e d t o s e c u r i t y i n t e r d e p e n d e n c e , which i s a n e c e s s a r y c o n d i t i o n f o r a B a l a n c e of Power e x p l a n a t i o n . F i n a l l y , s e v - e r a l s m a l l e r p e r i o d s of time w i t h i n the b o u n d a r i e s as a whole a r e i d e n t i f i e d . These p e r i o d s r e p r e s e n t prominent d i v i s i o n s or b r e a k - p o i n t s i n the l i t e r a t u r e on European h i s t o r y and a r e used t o t e s t t h e t hypotheses i n g r e a t e r d e t a i l . C h a p t e r s Four and F i v e s e r v e t o o p e r a t i o n a 1 i z e t h e independent and dependent v a r i a b l e s r e s p e c t i v e l y . In the f o r m e r , t h e c o n s t r u c t i o n of a d i s t r i b u t i o n index i s shown t o be i n t e r t w i n e d w i t h the i d e n t i f i c a - t i o n of G r e a t Powers. U s i n g the C o r r e l a t e s of War c a p a b i l i t y d a t a s e t , and a d j u s t i n g i t s c a p a b i l i t y i n d i c a t o r s t o a c c o u n t f o r t h e h i s - t o r i c a l r e c o r d , two d i s t i n c t s e t s of Great Powers a r e i d e n t i f i e d and employed. The f i r s t r e p r e s e n t s the t r a d i t i o n a l f i v e a c t o r s e t of G r e a t Powers i n the l i t e r a t u r e . The second s e t i s based on t h e p e r - c e n t a g e s h a r e of system c a p a b i l i t i e s h e l d by s t a t e s i n which a minimum of t e n p e r c e n t i s r e q u i r e d t o a t t r i b u t e G r e a t Power s t a t u s t o a s t a t e . The s t u d y p r o c e e d s t o r e l a t e the f i n d i n g s here t o e x i s t i n g h i s t o r i c a l s t u d y s on t h e G r e a t Powers, r e v e a l i n g some measure of s u p p o r t f o r the f o u r s e t . The f i n a l s e c t i o n i d e n t i f i e s the s p e c i f i c s t a t i s t i c a l p r o - c e d u r e used t o c o n s t r u c t the d i s t r i b u t i o n i n d i c i e s f o r the two s e t s and the r e s u l t s between the two G r e a t Power s e t s a r e b r i e f l y compared. The d i s c u s s i o n on a l l i a n c e s d i f f e r e n t i a t e s between a l l i a n c e , a l i g n - ment, and c o a l i t i o n . In r e s t r i c t i n g the measure t o a l l i a n c e s , the 8 c l a s s i f i c a t i o n scheme d e v e l o p e d by S i n g e r and Small i s employed. The t h r e e c l a s s e s of a l l i a n c e s , d e f e n c e p a c t s , e n t e n t e s , and n e u t r a l i t y / n o n - a g g r e s s i o n p a c t s a r e shown t o be f u n c t i o n a l r e l a t i v e t o B a l a n c e of Power t h e o r y . Two d i s t i n c t measures of a l l i a n c e s as a whole and d e f e n c e p a c t s o n l y a r e i d e n t i f i e d and d e s c r i b e d f o r the system. The f i r s t c o n s i s t s of the p r o p o r t i o n o f s t a t e s i n a l l i a n c e / d e f e n c e p a c t s a t y e a r l y i n t e r v a l s . The second c o m p r i s e s the p r o p o r t i o n of system dyads subsumed by a l l i a n c e s / d e f e n c e p a c t s . The f i n a l s e c t i o n of the c h a p t e r d e a l s w i t h the concept of p o l a r i z a t i o n . B e g i n n i n g w i t h a con- c e p t u a l a n a l y s i s of the need t o d i f f e r e n t i a t e between p o l a r i t y and p o l a r i z a t i o n , a s c h e m a t i c approach t o the measurement of p o l a r i z a t i o n i s a d o p t e d . A l t h o u g h t h i s approach l i m i t s t he subsequent a n a l y s i s t o a c o m p a r a t i v e mode, a t t e m p t s t o p r o v i d e a 'hard' measure of p o l a r i z a - t i o n a r e shown, t o have major problems r e l a t i v e t o the h i s t o r i c a l r e c o r d . In p r e s e n t i n g the f i n d i n g s of the d a t a a n a l y s i s , Chapter S i x , con- c e r n i s g i v e n t o the problem of employ i n g l o n g i t u d i n a l or t i m e s s e r i e s d a t a . Two d i s t i n c t t e s t s a r e employed i n t e s t i n g t he f i r s t two h y p o t h e s e s . The f i r s t c o n s i s t s of the s t a n d a r d d a t a . The second con- s i s t s of the t r a n s f o r m e d d a t a a f t e r the removal of s e r i a l o r a u t o - c o r - r e l a t i o n from the v a r i o u s d a t a s e t s u s i n g the B o x - J e n k i n s method. The f i n d i n g s i n d i c a t e t h a t the r e l a t i o n s h i p between t h e d i s t r i b u t i o n and a l l i a n c e s i s o p p o s i t e t o the p r e d i c t i o n s made i n B a l a n c e of Power t h e o r y . However, the s t r e n g t h o f the n e g a t i v e a s s o c i a t i o n between i n e q u a l i t y and a l l i a n c e s / d e f e n c e p a c t s v a r i e s between the s t a n d a r d and t r a n s f o r m e d d a t a s e t s . The former produce s i g n i f i c a n t l e v e l s of a s s o - 9 c i a t i o n , whereas the l a t t e r i n d i c a t e a v e r y weak and n e g l i g i b l e degree o f a s s o c i a t i o n . i n t e s t i n g the v a r i o u s s m a l l e r temporal p e r i o d s , no r e l a t i o n s h i p i s found i n a l l c a s e s f o r the p e r i o d 1816-1848. A r e l a t i v e l y s t r o n g neg- a t i v e r e l a t i o n s h i p i s found i n a l l c a s e s f o r the p e r i o d 1849-1890. E v i d e n c e f o r the immediate y e a r s p r e c e d i n g World War One and the Int e r w a r p e r i o d i s ambiguous. These f i n d i n g s a r e s u b s e q u e n t l y d i s - c u s s e d i n r e l a t i o n t o th e h i s t o r i c a l r e c o r d and th e im p o r t a n c e o f war as a l e g i t i m a t e p o l i c y t o o l , even though t h e i n c l u s i o n o f war as a dummy v a r i a b l e i n the r e g r e s s i o n e q u a t i o n does not produce s i g n i f i c a n t r e s u l t s . The absence o f a r e l a t i o n s h i p i n the p e r i o d l8 l6 - l848 i s r e l a t e d t o the p e r c e p t u a l l i n k between war and r e v o l u t i o n among e l i t e s . T h i s l i n k s e r v e s t o reduce t h e s a l i e n c e of the d i s t r i b u t i o n because war, and i t s a t t e n d e n t t h r e a t t o s e c u r i t y , i s not a v i a b l e o p t i o n . In c o n t r a s t , the p e r i o d 18^9-189O w i t n e s s e s a r e t u r n o f war as a l e g i t i m a t e and v i a b l e o p t i o n , and thus the i n c r e a s e d s a l i e n c e o f the d i s t r i b u t i o n . F i n a l l y , the ambiguous f i n d i n g s f o r t h e f i n a l p e r i - ods a r e l i n k e d t o the b e h a v i o r o f a s i n g l e s t a t e ; G r e a t B r i t a i n . Here, e v i d e n c e i n d i c a t e s t h a t t h e . b a l a n c e r v e r s i o n of B a l a n c e of Power t h e o r y may have u t i l i t y , w h i c h i s t e s t e d i n the n e x t c h a p t e r . The f i n a l s e c t i o n p r o v i d e s a co m p a r i s o n o f system p o l a r i z a t i o n and the d i s t r i b u t i o n i n d i c e s . L i t t l e e v i d e n c e i s found t o s u p p o r t the h y p o t h e s i s on p o l a r i z a t i o n . E v i d e n c e does i n d i c a t e a p o t e n t i a l l i n k between p o l a r i z a t i o n and war, and a common p a t t e r n i n c o m p a r i s o n of the e v o l u t i o n o f a l l i a n c e p a t t e r n s a f t e r I87I and 1919- Above a l l , e v i d e n c e p r o v i d e s a f u r t h e r i n d i c a t i o n of th e v i a b i l i t y o f the b a l a n c - er t r e a t m e n t of B a l a n c e o f Power t h e o r y . 10 Chapter Seven examines the s e m i - a u t o m a t i c or b a l a n c e r v e r s i o n o f the t h e o r y , f i r s t i d e n t i f i e d i n Chapter One. M e a s u r i n g the d i s t r i b u - t i o n by emp l o y i n g o n l y t h e f o u r c o n t i n e n t a l Great Powers and d i c h o t o m - i z i n g the dependent v a r i a b l e t o r e p r e s e n t y e a r s G r e a t B r i t a i n i s i n / out a l l i a n c e s , a p o s i t i v e r e l a t i o n s h i p i s found between i n e q u a l i t y and B r i t i s h a 1 1iance membership. A g a i n , the s t r e n g t h of t h i s r e l a t i o n s h i p v a r i e s w i d e l y between t h e s t a n d a r d and t r a n s f o r m e d d a t a . A l s o , t he c o n s i s t e n t absence o f a r e l a t i o n s h i p i s found f o r the p e r i o d 1816—1848. The s t r o n g e s t c o n s i s t e n t r e l a t i o n s h i p i s found f o r the p e r i o d 1890-1939 • The c o n c l u s i o n o f the s t u d y f o c u s e s on two i m p o r t a n t p o i n t s . F i r s t , p r e v i o u s e m p i r i c a l t e s t s a t the a g g r e g a t e l e v e l r e q u i r e r e c o n - s i d e r a t i o n . The i n c l u s i o n of G r e a t B r i t a i n , w i t h i t s a p p a r e n t d i s - t i n c t , B a l a n c e of Power, b e h a v i o r , w i t h c o n t i n e n t a l Powers, w i t h t h e i r d i s t i n c t , 'preponderance of power', b e h a v i o r may u n d e r l i e major d i f - f e r e n c e s i n the f i n d i n g s r e g a r d i n g t h e r e l a t i v e u t i l i t y o f B a l a n c e o f Power t h e o r y and Preponderance of Power o r Power T r a n s i t i o n t h e o r y . Moreover, r e c o n s i d e r a t i o n i s r e q u i r e d i n terms o f the t r e a t m e n t o f ti m e . At a minimum, p r e v i o u s t e s t s e m p l o y i n g a v a r i e t y o f independent and dependent v a r i a b l e s s h o u l d be examined r e l a t i v e t o the s t r o n g tem- p o r a l break found i n 1849• Second and most i m p o r t a n t , the q u e s t i o n of contemporary r e l e v a n c e i s c o n s i d e r e d . A l t h o u g h the s t r e n g t h of the f i n d i n g s can be de b a t e d , they do p r o v i d e an i n d i c a t i o n of d i s t i n c t s e c u r i t y r e q u i r e m e n t s f o r c o n t i n e n t a l and i n s u l a r s t a t e s . G i v e n t h a t the U n i t e d S t a t e s i s a n a l - ogous t o G r e a t B r i t a i n v i s - a - v i s t h e E u r o - A s i a n landmass, i t i s p o s s i - 11 b l e t h a t the t r a d i t i o n a l b i p o l a r and/or i d e o l o g i c a l image and i n f l u - ence on e x p l a n a t i o n has o b s c u r e d a more s a l i e n t image and e x p l a n a t i o n . T h i s image i s one of g e o p o l i t i c s i n which the n a t u r e of t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s - S o v i e t R u s s i a c o n f l i c t i s e x a c e r b a t e d by the c o n f l i c t i n g s e c u r - i t y needs of a i n s u l a r and c o n t i n e n t a l power. The st u d y c o n c l u d e s by a d v o c a t i n g a r e e x a m i n a t i o n o f common ass u m p t i o n s r e g a r d i n g the contem- p o r a r y e r a from t h i s g e o p o l i t i c a l p e r s p e c t i v e . Chapter I BALANCE OF POWER THEORY The use of the term 'Balance of Power', d e s c r i p t i v e l y or t h e o r e t i - c a l l y , i s w i d e s p r e a d i n the f i e l d o f I n t e r n a t i o n a l P o l i t i c s . I t s use i n e i t h e r manner has been s u b j e c t t o l a r g e s c a l e c r i t i c i s m . S c h o l a r s p o i n t out the i n c o n s i s t e n t and c o n t r a d i c t o r y use of the term, and q u e s t i o n i t s t h e o r e t i c a l u t i l i t y f o r e x p l a i n i n g contemporary w o r l d p o l i t i c s . D e s p i t e t h e s e c r i t i c i s m s , t h e r e e x i s t s a l a r g e measure of agreement on the t h e o r y ' s u n d e r l y i n g p r o p e r t i e s , e v i d e n t i n bo t h t h e a b s t r a c t and h i s t o r i c a l l i t e r a t u r e . F u r t h e r m o r e , a l a r g e body of e m p i r i c a l r e s e a r c h has emerged w h i c h draws from a s p e c i f i c c o n c e p t u a l - i z a t i o n of the t h e o r y . T h i s body of l i t e r a t u r e and r e s e a r c h e n a b l e s one t o go beyond the e n d l e s s d e b a t e s on the meaning of the B a l a n c e o f Power and t e s t i t s e m p i r i c a l u t i l i t y . T h i s d i s c u s s i o n examines the b a s i c p r o p e r t i e s o f B a l a n c e o f Power t h e o r y . In so d o i n g , I wi11 show t h a t many of the c r i t i c i s m s of B a l - ance o f Power t h e o r y a r e q u e s t i o n a b l e . They r e s u l t from d i s a g r e e m e n t s r e g a r d i n g i t s s t a n d i n g as a systems t h e o r y , p o l i c y t h e o r y , and typ e of i n t e r n a t i o n a l system. T h i s d i s c u s s i o n argues t h a t B a l a n c e of Power i s a p o l i c y t h e o r y which e x p l a i n s changes i n s t a t e b e h a v i o r i n t h e a r e a of s e c u r i t y and u n i t s u r v i v a l . Changes i n s t a t e b e h a v i o r a r e thus s u s c e p t i b l e t o e m p i r i c a l measurement and v e r i f i c a t i o n . - 12 - 13 1.1 CONCEPTUALIZING THE-THEORY There a r e t h r e e i n t e r - r e l a t e d e x p l a n a t i o n s i n B a l a n c e o f Power t h e o r y . The f i r s t e x p l a i n s t he c o n t i n u e d e x i s t e n c e of the i n t e r n a - t i o n a l s t a t e system. The second e x p l a i n s the r e c u r r e n c e of b a l a n c e s over time among the system's a c t o r s . B a l a n c e s , i n t h i s c o n t e x t , a r e d e f i n e d as a r e l a t i v e l y equal d i s t r i b u t i o n of power or c a p a b i l i t i e s among s t a t e s . F i n a l l y , B a l a n c e o f Power t h e o r y e x p l a i n s t he a c t i o n s or p o l i c i e s of i n d i v i d u a l s t a t e s . 4 The f i r s t two e x p l a n a t i o n s r e p r e - s e n t s y s t e m i c or group b e h a v i o r . They a r e s i m i l a r i n s h a r i n g t he as s u m p t i o n t h a t b a l a n c e s a r e v i t a l , t o the maintenance of the system. However, the r e l a t i o n s h i p between t h e s e two s y s t e m i c e x p l a n a t i o n s and the f i n a l e x p l a n a t i o n , which i s a s t a t e / p o l i c y t h e o r y , i s not e x p l i c i t i n t he l i t e r a t u r e . W a l t z (1979:119) argues t h a t B a l a n c e of Power t h e o r y i s a s y s t e m i c form of e x p l a n a t i o n . S t a t e l e v e l a n a l y s e s a r e i n a p p r o p r i a t e t o i t s a p p l i c a t i o n , t e s t i n g , or c r i t i q u e . 5 T h i s argument e n a b l e s one t o a v o i d many c o n t e n t i o u s i s s u e s stemming from the p o l i c y p e r s p e c t i v e , such as the l e v e l s of a n a l y s i s p r o b l e m . 6 At t h e same t i m e , i t can be seen as 4 B u l l (1977) i d e n t i f i e s two a d d i t i o n a l e x p l a n a t i o n s ; t he p r o t e c t i o n and p r e s e r v a t i o n of l e s s e r s t a t e s , and the e x i s t e n c e of such i n s t i - t u t i o n s as d i p l o m a c y and i n t e r n a t i o n a l law. However, i t w i l l be shown below t h a t the p r e s e r v a t i o n of l e s s e r s t a t e s may or may not r e s u l t from B a l a n c e of Power b e h a v i o r . Whether t h e t h e o r y e x p l a i n s t h e e x i s t e n c e of such i n s t i t u t i o n s or such i n s t i t u t i o n s a r e v i t a l f o r the o p e r a t i o n of the B a l a n c e o f Power i s l a r g e l y a moot p o i n t . The t h e o r y p r o v i d e s no i n f o r m a t i o n r e l a t e d t o t h e s e i n s t i t u t i o n s . 5 T h i s argument c o n t r a d i c t s an e a r l i e r t r e a t m e n t of B a l a n c e of Power by W a l t z 09&7) i n h i s a n a l y s i s o f p o l a r i t y and s t a b i l i t y . B a l a n c e of Power i s t r e a t e d as a t h e o r y about s t a t e b e h a v i o r , s i m i l a r t o i t s c o n c e p t u a l i z a t i o n i n t h i s s t u d y . I t i s such c o n t r a d i c t o r y t r e a t - ments which a i d t o the c o n f u s i o n s u r r o u n d i n g t he B a l a n c e of Power. 6 L e v e l s o f a n a l y s i s r e p r e s e n t t he forms of e x p l a n a t i o n i n t h e f i e l d , 14 p a r t of t h e g e n e r a l d i s d a i n of grand t h e o r y i n the f i e l d (See H o l s t i , 1971) ' The f i e l d has moved towards t h e development of t h e o r i e s w i t h l i m i t e d s c o p e s , or i s l a n d s of t h e o r y ( M c C l e l l a n d , 1966) . However, t h i s development r a i s e s c o n c e r n s about the need and means t o l i n k such i s l a n d s . As a s y s t e m i c e x p l a n a t i o n , how can one l i n k B a l a n c e of Power t h e o r y w i t h t h e o r i e s about s t a t e b e h a v i o r ? More i m p o r t a n t l y , i t i s d i f f i c u l t t o c o n c e p t u a l i z e how t h e i n t e r n a t i o n a l system i n g e n e r a l , and b a l a n c e s i n p a r t i c u l a r , e x i s t i f the c e n t r a l components of b o t h , s t a t e s , a r e i g n o r e d (Buzan, 1983)- Such a c o n c e p t u a l i z a t i o n can o n l y be mechanis- t i c and d e t e r m i n i s t i c i n n a t u r e . F i n a l l y , W a l t z ' s v i e w eschews e m p i r - i c a l v e r i f i c a t i o n . B a l a n c e s can not be measured because t o do so would r e q u i r e r e f e r e n c e t o the u n i t s o f the system. The t h e o r y , as a s y s t e m i c e x p l a n a t i o n f o r the maintenance of the s t a t e system, becomes a t a u t o l o g y . B a l a n c e o f Power e x p l a i n s t he s t a t e system because the s t a t e system e x i s t s . W a l t z e s s e n t i a l l y c o n f u s e s a t h e o r e t i c a l problem w i t h a methodolo- g i c a l one. As a m e t h o d o l o g i c a l problem, he i s c o r r e c t i n a r g u i n g t h a t t h e o r i e s and e m p i r i c a l a n a l y s i s about the b e h a v i o r of any p a r t i c u l a r s t a t e can not t e l l us about the group and th u s the system as a whole. But, such a n a l y s i s can t e l l us whether the b e h a v i o r of a p a r t i c u l a r s t a t e i s e x p l i c a b l e i n B a l a n c e of Power terms. T h i s e x p l a n a t i o n i s s t i l l s y s t e m i c i n the sense t h a t b e h a v i o r i s a f u n c t i o n of t h e system i n w h i c h a s t a t e o p e r a t e s . System, i n t h i s c o n t e x t , s i m p l y r e f e r s t o encompassing the i n d i v i d u a l , the s t a t e and the system (See W a l t z , 1959; S i n g e r , 1961). Problems a r i s e i n t h i s a r e a when i n v a l i d a s s e r - t i o n s a r e a p p l i e d t o one l e v e l from a n a l y s i s done a t a n o t h e r , com- monly known as an e c o l o g i c a l f a l l a c y . (See Moul, 1973)- 15 the e x t e r n a l e n v i r o n m e n t . B a l a n c e of Power t h e o r y i s an e x p l a n a t i o n of how t h i s e nvironment a f f e c t s s t a t e b e h a v i o r . T h i s e n v i r o n m e n t con- s i s t s o f o t h e r s t a t e s whose b e h a v i o r i n a c o n d i t i o n o f anarchy i n f l u - ences t h e a c t i o n s of any p a r t i c u l a r s t a t e . T here i s one c a s e , however, i n w h i c h the c e n t r a l element o f B a l a n c e of Power t h e o r y i s c o n c e i v e d i n a manner s i m i l a r t o W a l t z . T h i s i s the a u t o m a t i c v e r s i o n , one of t h r e e v e r s i o n s o f B a l a n c e of Power t h e o - ry (Claude, 1962:46-47). 7 B a l a n c e s , a l t h o u g h not always d e f i n e d as e q u a l i t y among s t a t e s , o c c u r w i t h o u t the i n t e n t i o n of any of the a c t o r s . 8 T h i s v e r s i o n i s e x p l a i n e d w i t h r e f e r e n c e t o n a t u r a l law, as e v i d e n t i n the w r i t i n g s from the p e r i o d of the e n l i g h t e n m e n t (see But- t e r f i e l d , 1966; Wight, 1973). or by Morgenthau's (1973) t h e o r y o f pow- er p o l i t i c s . For Morgenthau, b a l a n c e s r e s u l t from each a c t o r s e e k i n g t o maximize i t s power i n res p o n s e t o the s e c u r i t y dilemma produced by the c o n d i t i o n of an a r c h y i n the i n t e r n a t i o n a l system. B a l a n c e s a r e t r e a t e d as an i n e v i t a b l e f e a t u r e of i n t e r n a t i o n a l p o l i t i c s . 9 7 R e y n o l d s (1975) p r o v i d e s a s i m i l a r s e t of c a t e g o r i e s f o r B a l a n c e of Power t h e o r y . He d i f f e r s from the a u t o m a t i c v e r s i o n by f o c u s i n g on the system's approach of K a p l a n (1957) . who i s more a p t l y d i s c u s s e d i n t he subsequent a n a l y s i s o f t r e a t m e n t s of B a l a n c e of Power as a system t y p e . B u l l (1977:104) c l a s s i f i e s the t h e o r y i n t o t he c a t e g o - r i e s of f o r t u i t o u s and c o n t r i v e d . In the f o r m e r , a b a l a n c e a r i s e s w i t h o u t t h e c o n s c i o u s e f f o r t of any of the a c t o r s , u s u a l l y i n a s i t u a t i o n o f o n l y two r e l e v a n t s t a t e s . In the l a t t e r c a s e , a b a l - ance r e s u l t s from the c o n s c i o u s p o l i c y of a t l e a s t one of the a c t o r s i n a s i t u a t i o n of s e v e r a l s t a t e s . 8 The l a c k of i n t e n t i s the key s i m l a r i t y between W a l t z and Morgen- t h a u . They d i f f e r , however, i n t h e fundamental f o c u s and c o m p l e x i - t i e s of t h e i r p o s i t i o n s . Whereas W a l t z ' s t h e o r y i s r e s t r i c t e d t o the b a s i c c h a r a c t e r i s t i c o f anarchy as the key e x p l a n a t i o n , Morgen- thau i n c o r p o r a t e s a s s u m p t i o n s r e g a r d i n g the n a t u r e o f man. 9 Claude (1962:48) n o t e s t h a t Morgenthau i s i n c o n s i s t e n t on t h i s p o i n t . He f e e l s t h a t Morgenthau would agree t h a t b a l a n c e s a r e manu- a l l y produced i n the r e a l w o r l d . Morgenthau (1973) i n d i c a t e s t h a t i n e v i t a b i l i t y i s not r e a l l y based on an i r o n law of p o l i t i c s , but a 16 The second v e r s i o n of B a l a n c e of Power t h e o r y , the s e m i - a u t o m a t i c , d i f f e r s from the f i r s t i n t h a t b a l a n c e s a r e the i n t e n d e d p r o d u c t of the b e h a v i o r of one p a r t i c u l a r t y p e of s t a t e ; the b a l a n c e r . T h i s v e r - s i o n i s c l o s e l y t i e d t o the h i s t o r i c a l b e h a v i o r of Gr e a t B r i t a i n i n i t s r e l a t i o n s w i t h s t a t e s on the European c o n t i n e n t . 1 0 B a l a n c e s a r e m a i n t a i n e d or c r e a t e d by the i n t e r v e n t i o n of the b a l a n c e r , who i s geo- g r a p h i c a l l y i s o l a t e d or i n s u l a t e d from the o t h e r a c t o r s , t h r o u g h a l l i - ances w i t h t h e weaker s t a t e ( s ) . I t i s u n c l e a r whether such i n t e r v e n - t i o n a c t u a l l y c r e a t e s e q u a l i t y (Morgenthau, 1973) or preponderance on the s i d e of the b a l a n c e r ( O r g a n s k i , 1968:287) . N o n e t h e l e s s , i t i s c l e a r t h a t the m o t i v e f o r the b a l a n c e r ' s i n t e r v e n t i o n i s based on a p e r c e i v e d imbalance of power among the r e m a i n i n g a c t o r s , and i t s p o t e n t i a l n e g a t i v e e f f e c t on the b a l a n c e r ' s own s e c u r i t y . The t h e o r y , i n t h i s c o n t e x t , p r o v i d e s an e x p l a n a t i o n of the b e h a v i o r of a t l e a s t one a c t o r , and t h i s b e h a v i o r i s p o s i t e d as c e n t r a l t o the o p e r a t i o n o f the B a l a n c e of Power. The manual v e r s i o n s i m p l y e x t e n d s the s e m i - a u t o m a t i c t r e a t m e n t t o the b u l k of s t a t e s . The e x i s t e n c e of a b a l a n c e , d e f i n e d as an equal d i s t r i b u t i o n of c a p a b i l i t i e s , i s t h e r e s u l t of the w i l l e d a c t i o n s o f s t a t e s . B a l a n c e s a r e the goal o f s t a t e s because they p r o v i d e t h e o p t i m a l c o n d i t i o n f o r the s e c u r i t y and s u r v i v a l o f the s t a t e ( B u l l , b a s i c p r e s c r i p t i v e r u l e o f w i s e p o l i c y . However, many h i s t o r i c a l o b s e r v e r s s t r e s s t he i n e v i t a b l e n a t u r e of t h e b a l a n c e , and Or g a n s k i (1968) f o r m u l a t e s h i s c r i t i c i s m of the t h e o r y from t h i s r e s t r i c t i v e v i e w o f Morgenthau. T h i s b r i e f note a l s o d e m o n s t r a t e s how i n c o n s i s - t e n t usage p r o v i d e s an avenue o f c r i t i q u e w hich h i n d e r s t h e u t i l i t y of t he t h e o r y . 1 0 G u l l i c k (1955) and Wight (1966) i n d i c a t e t h a t o t h e r s t a t e s have p l a y e d t h e r o l e of the b a l a n c e r i n r e g i o n a l c o n t e x t s . However, i t i s g e n e r a l l y agreed t h a t G r e a t B r i t a i n i s the b a s i c r e f e r e n t f o r the b a l a n c e r v e r s i o n . 17 1977; Gu1 l i c k , 1955) ' T h i s v e r s i o n p o s i t s a consensus among s t a t e s . No i n d i v i d u a l s t a t e can be t r u s t e d w i t h an i n o r d i n a t e or p r e p o n d e r a n t amount of power (C1aude,19&2:42). The appearance of a p r e p o n d e r a n t power c o n s t i t u t e s an immediate t h r e a t t o the r e m a i n i n g s t a t e s which r e s u l t s i n p r e d i c t a b l e b e h a v i o r o n . t h e i r p a r t t o c o u n t e r a c t t h i s t h r e a t . The r e a c t i o n o f s t a t e s , i n the sense o f r e t u r n i n g the d i s t r i - b u t i o n t o a b a l a n c e d c o n d i t i o n , p r o v i d e s the l i n k a g e between i n d i v i d u - a l s t a t e s e c u r i t y and system p r e s e r v a t i o n . In o p t i m i z i n g t h e s e c u r i t y of i n d i v i d u a l s t a t e s , the l i k e l i h o o d t h a t the s t a t e system w i l l s u r - v i v e i s a l s o o p t i m i z e d . A c e n t r a l d i f f e r e n c e among the t h r e e v e r s i o n s i s the b a s i c assump- t i o n o f the o p t i m a l c o n d i t i o n of s e c u r i t y . In v a r y i n g d e g r e e s , they a l l c o n t a i n the a s s u m p t i o n t h a t s e c u r i t y i s a f u n c t i o n of the amount of power or c a p a b i l i t i e s h e l d by a s t a t e r e l a t i v e t o i t s c o m p e t i t o r s . In assuming t h a t s t a t e s seek t o maximize t h e i r power, the a u t o m a t i c v e r s i o n , a p r e p o n d e r a n t amount of power appears t o be the o p t i m a l l e v - e l of s e c u r i t y . In c o n t r a s t , t h e s e m i - a u t o m a t i c v e r s i o n p o s i t s t h a t the l e v e l o f power sought by s t a t e s d i f f e r s among them. For a p a r t i c - u l a r c l a s s or ty p e o f s t a t e , the g e o g r a p h i c a l l y i n s u l a t e d , e q u a l i t y i s the p r e f e r r e d c o n d i t i o n . W h i l e o t h e r s t a t e s a r e not d e a l t w i t h i n t h i s v e r s i o n , one can assume t h a t they seek p r e p o n d e r a n c e because the b e h a v i o r of the b a l a n c e r c l a s s i s a f u n c t i o n o f the p r e s e n c e , h i s t o r i - c a l l y , of a p r e p o n d e r a n t s t a t e . The f i n a l v e r s i o n r e j e c t s the c l a s s d i s t i n c t i o n and p o s i t s t h a t the m a j o r i t y , i f not a l l , s t a t e s a c t i v e l y seek e q u a l i t y as the p r e f e r e d s e c u r i t y c o n d i t i o n . 18 There a r e s e v e r a l r e a s o n s f o r r e j e c t i n g the a u t o m a t i c v e r s i o n of B a l a n c e of Power t h e o r y . There i s l i t t l e common sense i n l a b e l i n g a t h e o r y i n w h i c h s t a t e s seek preponderance as the o p t i m a l s e c u r i t y con- d i t i o n as t h e 'Balance of Power' t h e o r y . A l s o , i t i s q u e s t i o n a b l e whether s t a t e s a c t u a l l y seek p r e p o n d e r a n c e . The m a j o r i t y of s t a t e s l a c k t h e r e s o u r c e s t o e n t e r t a i n such a g o a l . Th i s i s t r u e even f o r the m a j o r i t y of G r e a t Powers. Moreover, p r e p o n d e r a n c e , i f a t t a i n a b l e , does not n e c e s s a r i l y c r e a t e g r e a t e r s e c u r i t y . The r e a c t i o n s of o t h e r s t a t e s , t h rough the f o r m a t i o n of a l 1 i a n c e s and/or the use of f o r c e , may produce g r e a t e r i n s e c u r i t y f o r t h e p r e p o n d e r a n t . F u r t h e r m o r e , the u n d e r l y i n g a s s u m p t i o n t h a t b a l a n c e s a r e u n i n t e n d e d b y p r o d u c t s of s t a t e b e h a v i o r i s d u b i o u s . U n l e s s a l l s t a t e s i n g e n e r a l , or the Great Pow- e r s i n p a r t i c u l a r , have an equal c a p a b i l i t y b ase, a h i g h l y u n l i k e l y o c c u r r e n c e , b a l a n c e s w i l l not e x i s t n a t u r a l l y . If b a l a n c e s do c o n s i s - t e n t l y r eappear t h r o u g h t i m e , they can o n l y be t h e p r o d u c t of w i l l f u l a c t i o n , such as through the a g g r e g a t i o n of s t a t e c a p a b i l i t i e s t h r o u g h a l l i a n c e s . F i n a l l y , and perhaps most i m p o r t a n t , the c o n c e p t of ' b a l - ances' can have no t h e o r e t i c a l r e l e v a n c e f o r e i t h e r a c t o r s or o b s e r v - e r s . The p r e s e n c e or absence of a 'balance' can have no e f f e c t on b e h a v i o r . As u n i n t e n d e d b y p r o d u c t s , i t i s hard t o c o n c e i v e how they would a f f e c t b e h a v i o r i n a s i t u a t i o n where a l l s t a t e s c o n s t a n t l y seek t o maximize power. A l t o u g h the s e m i - a u t o m a t i c v e r s i o n i s too r e s t r i c t i v e i n n a t u r e , because i n f o c u s i n g on a s i n g l e c l a s s of s t a t e s , i n f a c t a s i n g l e s t a t e , no c l e a r e x p l a n a t i o n i s p r o v i d e d f o r the m a j o r i t y of a c t o r s , i t i s s t i l l c o n s i s t e n t w i t h the t r e a t m e n t of B a l a n c e of Power t h e o r y as 19 an e x p l a n a t i o n of s t a t e b e h a v i o r . A l s o an e x a m i n a t i o n o f t h i s v e r s i o n can p r o v i d e f u r t h e r e v i d e n c e r e g a r d i n g t he u t i l i t y o f t h e t h e o r y . Whereas the manual v e r s i o n i s d i s p o s e d t o a g g r e g a t e or group a n a l y s i s , t h i s v e r s i o n p r o v i d e s a t h e o r e t i c a l b a s i s f o r a s t a t e l e v e l f o c u s . N o n e t h e l e s s , t h e r e a r e s e v e r a l c o n c e p t u a l r e a s o n s f o r d e a l i n g w i t h t he b a l a n c e r v e r s i o n a f t e r t he e x a m i n a t i o n of the manual v e r s i o n . If one s t a t e s e e ks a b a l a n c e , i s i t not i n t u i t i v e l y r e a s o n a b l e t o e x p e c t o t h - e r s t o a l s o seek b a l a n c e s . Moreover, the t h r e a t posed by a p o t e n t i a l p r e p o n d e r a n t t o the s e c u r i t y of t h e b a l a n c e r i s l i k e l y t o be f e l t by o t h e r s . In f a c t , t he i n s u l a r p o s i t i o n of the b a l a n c e r p r o v i d e s i t w i t h g r e a t e r leeway than o t h e r s t a t e s because of t h e added g e o g r a p h i - c a l element o f s e c u r i t y . The t h r e a t t o s u r v i v a l i s much more immedi- a t e t o s t a t e s i m m e d i a t e l y a d j a c e n t t o a p r e p o n d e r a n t . Moreover, t h e manual v e r s i o n , i n encompassing the m a j o r i t y of s t a t e s , i s t h e most i n t u i t i v e form o f B a l a n c e of Power t h e o r y . I t p r o v i d e s a r e a s o n a b l e e x p l a n a t i o n f o r s t a t e p o l i c i e s , t he r e c u r r e n c e s of b a l a n c e s over t i m e , and the maintenance o f the s t a t e system. The b a s i c a s s u m p t i o n s of t h i s v e r s i o n a r e as f o l l o w s . S t a t e s a r e t h e o n l y r e l e v a n t a c t o r s . T h e i r p r i m a r y g o a l i s s e l f - p r e s e r v a t i o n which r e q u i r e s an o p t i m i z a t i o n of s e c u r i t y . S e c u r i t y i s p r i m a r y a f u n c t i o n of t h e r e s o u r c e s a v a i l a b l e t o defe n d o n e s e l f . U l t i m a t e l y , t h e s e r e s o u r c e s a r e the m i l i t a r y c a p a b i l i t i e s o f s t a t e s , e i t h e r immediate and/or p o t e n t i a l c a p a b i l i t i e s . 1 1 The p r i m a r y i n d i c a t o r of s e c u r i t y i s the c o m p a r a t i v e d i s t r i b u t i o n of m i l i t a r y c a p a b i l i t i e s among s t a t e s . 1 1 R e y n o l d s (1975:356-358) p o i n t s o ut t h a t i t i s the t r e a t m e n t of pow- er as c a p a b i l i t i e s i n wh i c h B a l a n c e of Power t h e o r y i s a t i t s c l e a r e s t . Power as i n f l u e n c e i s too vague f o r a p r e c i s e a n a l y s i s of B a l a n c e of Power t h e o r y . 20 I t i s the n a t u r e o f the d i s t r i b u t i o n w h i c h d e t e r m i n e s the p o l i c i e s of s t a t e s r e l a t e d t o s e c u r i t y . As such , c a p a b i l i t i e s a r e p r i o r . t o , and i n d i c a t o r s o f , the i n t e n t of s t a t e s v i s - a - v i s o t h e r s . The a s s u m p t i o n t h a t an equal d i s t r i b u t i o n o f c a p a b i l i t i e s i s p e r - c e i v e d by e l i t e s as the o p t i m a l l e v e l o f s e c u r i t y i s a d d r e s s e d i n two ways i n t h e l i t e r a t u r e . F i r s t , e q u a l i t y between two s t a t e s produces an e q ual chance of v i c t o r y or d e f e a t i n a c l a s h o f arms. I t r e s u l t s i n an atmosphere of u n c e r t a i n t y i n whi c h e l i t e s a r e u n l i k e j y t o r e s o r t t o f o r c e because t h e outcome can not be p r e d i c t e d ( S i n g e r e t . a l , 1 9 7 2 ) . 1 2 E l i t e s a r e assumed t o be r i s k a v e r s e . In r e d u c i n g t he chance of war between s t a t e s , s e c u r i t y i s o p t i m i z e d . When war i s l e s s l i k e - l y , e l i t e s a r e l i k e l y t o f e e l more s e c u r e even though t h e p r i c e o f such s e c u r i t y i s an atmosphere of u n c e r t a i n t y which may a f f e c t o t h e r s t a t e i n t e r e s t s . The second a s s u m p t i o n i d e n t i f i e s a b e l i e f h e l d by e l i t e s t h a t any i n d i v i d u a l s t a t e can not be t r u s t e d w i t h an i n o r d i n a t e or p r e p o n d e r a n t amount of power (C l a u d e , 1962). Such power i s l i k e l y t o be used by a s t a t e t o advance i t s i n t e r e s t s and r e p r e s e n t s a p o t e n - t i a l , i f not immediate, t h r e a t t o the s e c u r i t y of o t h e r s t a t e s . I t p r o v i d e s t h e p r e p o n d e r a n t w i t h t he o p p o r t u n i t y t o t r a n s f o r m the system and c r e a t e a c o n d i t i o n of permanent s e c u r i t y t h r o u g h t h e e l i m i n a t i o n 1 2 They argue t h a t d e c i s i o n a l u n c e r t a i n t y i s an i n t e r v e n i n g , unmea- s u r e a b l e , v a r i a b l e w i t h i n t h e i r g e n e r a l c a s e r e g a r d i n g t he u t i l i t y o f B a l a n c e of Power t h e o r y i n e x p l a i n i n g war, an i s s u e d i s c u s s e d a t l e n g t h i n the f i n a l s e c t i o n of t h i s C h a p t e r . I t i s not d e v e l o p e d by the a u t h o r s t o ex t e n d n e c e s s a r i l y t o o t h e r e x p l a n a t i o n s of s t a t e b e h a v i o r from a B a l a n c e of Power p e r s p e c t i v e . K a p l a n (1971) makes a s i m i l a r argument. However, i t i s based on the p o l a r i t y / s t a b i l i t y d ebate w h i c h i s not the same as the B a l a n c e of Power p e r s p e c t i v e ; a p o i n t w h i c h i s g e n e r a l l y o v e r l o o k e d i n the l i t e r a t u r e . K a p l a n argues t h a t m u l t i p o l a r systems a r e more s t a b l e because the r i s k of war i s t o o g r e a t i n terms o f i t s p o t e n t i a l e x p a n s i o n t o the whole system. As such , peace i s more l i k e l y . 21 of a l l o t h e r e x i s t i n g s t a t e s . T o g e t h e r , the two a s s u m p t i o n s l e a d t o a model of s e c u r i t y o p t i m i z e d a t the e x t r e m e s . E q u a l i t y produces o p t i m a l s e c u r i t y because of i t s dampening e f f e c t on the use of f o r c e . The t r a n s f o r m a t i o n of t h e s t a t e system t o a s i n g l e a c t o r or empire form c r e a t e s permanent s e c u r i t y because no t h r e a t s can e x i s t by d e f i n i t i o n . However, the p r o c e s s by w hich a s t a t e moves toward the goal of permanent s e c u r i t y c a l l s f o r t h c o u n t e r v a i l i n g a c t i o n s from the r e m a i n i n g s t a t e s . P r e p o n d e r a n c e , p r e s a g i n g t r a n s f o r m a t i o n , causes the weak t o i n c r e a s e t h e amount of r e s o u r c e s d e voted t o m i l i t a r y c a p a b i l i t i e s and u n i t e i n a s i n g l e c o a l i t i o n t o d e t e r or d e f e a t the s t r o n g . T h i s r e a c t i o n , or the p o t e n - t i a l f o r i t , s e r v e s t o push e l i t e s away from a goal of p r e p o n d e r a n c e . Thus, e l i t e s a r e l i k e l y t o a c c e p t e q u a l i t y as the o p t i m a l and p r e - f e r r e d c o n d i t i o n of s e c u r i t y . T h i s argument does not imply t h a t no s t a t e w i l l a t t e m p t t o o b t a i n p reponderance as the n e c e s s a r y p r e c o n d i t i o n f o r permanent s e c u r i t y . To do so would f l y i n the f a c e of h i s t o r y . As noted e a r l i e r , s t a t e s a r e not c r e a t e d equal i n terms of r e s o u r c e s . A s t a t e endowed w i t h a g r e a t e r w e a l t h of r e s o u r c e s r e l a t i v e t o a l l o t h e r s , i n c o n j u n c t i o n w i t h t h e appearance of e l i t e s who r e j e c t t h e b e n e f i t s of e q u a l i t y , may embark on such a p a t h . But, i t i s a l s o p o s s i b l e t o c o n c e i v e of such a t t e m p t s as p r o d u c t s of m i s c a l c u l a t i o n and m i s p e r c e p t i o n . E l i t e s may r e a d i l y m i s c a l c u l a t e the c a p a b i l i t i e s of o t h e r s and, as a r e s u l t , m i s - p e r c e i v e i n t e n t , or c a l c u l a t e r e l a t i v e c a p a b i l i t i e s i n a d i f f e r e n t manner than o t h e r s . An extreme ca s e i s found i n Germany under H i t l e r . H i s attempt t o a t t a i n p reponderance i n Europe was p a r t i a l l y m o t i v a t e d 22 by h i s b e l i e f of German i n f e r i o r i t y i n a w o r l d soon t o be dominated by American and S o v i e t power ( C a l l e o , 1980) . But, t o the a l l i e s i n the West, i t was a c l e a r a t t e m p t t o t r a n s f o r m t he European s t a t e system. A t t e m p t s t o a t t a i n p r e p o n d e r a n c e t h r o u g h the a c q u i s i t i o n of s u p e r i - or m i l i t a r y c a p a b i l i t i e s may e i t h e r be p u r p o s e f u l or a c c i d e n t a l . Whatever the c a s e , such an atte m p t a l t e r s t he b e h a v i o r or p o l i c i e s of the r e m a i n i n g s t a t e s i n the system. The goal of t h e s e s t a t e s i s t o r e c r e a t e a ' b a l a n c e ' i n the system. S t a t e s may i n c r e a s e t he amount of r e s o u r c e s a l l o c a t e d t o th e m i l i t a r y . They may seek a l l i a n c e s as a means t o augment t h e i r c a p a b i l i t i e s and s i g n a l t h e i r w i l l i n g n e s s t o oppose t h e p o t e n t i a l o r a c t u a l p r e p o n d e r a n t . F i n a l l y , s t a t e s may use f o r c e t o o b t a i n e i t h e r more r e s o u r c e s and/or d e f e a t t he prep o n d e r - a n t . 1 3 These t h r e e p o l i c i e s a r e the e x p l a n a t o r y c o r e of B a l a n c e of Power t h e o r y . Depending on the d i s t r i b u t i o n of c a p a b i l i t i e s , t he p r e s e n c e / absence o f the above a c t i o n s can be p r e d i c t e d . However, t r e a t m e n t s of Ba l a n c e o f Power t h e o r y as an e x p l a n a t i o n f o r such p o l i c i e s a r e gener- a l l y r e s t r i c t e d t o a s p e c i f i c s e t of s t a t e s ; t h e G r e a t Powers. As the l a b e l i m p l i e s , G r e a t Powers a r e s t a t e s which p o s s e s s an i n o r d i n a t e amount o f p o w e r / c a p a b i l i t i e s r e l a t i v e t o the m a j o r i t y of s t a t e s i n the system. They a r e the e l i t e of the system. Because of t h e i r power, they a r e th e o n l y s t a t e s t h a t can r e a s o n a b l y e n t e r t a i n a p o l i c y of pre p o n d e r a n c e . C o n v e r s e l y , o n l y the Gr e a t Powers can a c t t o c o u n t e r a pr e p o n d e r a n t from among t h e i r r a n k s . Thus, l e s s e r s t a t e s a r e l a r g e l y 1 3 S v e r a l o t h e r o p t i o n s a r e a l s o i d e n t i f i e d i n t h e l i t e r a t u r e , see Chapter Two, Fn 28 . For a g e n e r a l a n a l y s i s see Morgenthau (1973) > O r g a n s k i (1968) , Claude (1962) and R o s e c r a n c e (1963)- 23 i r r e l e v a n t t o the ' b a l a n c e 1 . However, the above a s s e r t i o n s do not mean t h a t l e s s e r s t a t e s s h o u l d be e x c l u d e d from any a n a l y s i s based on B a l a n c e of Power t h e o r y . I t i s t r u e t h a t t h e d i s t r i b u t i o n of p o w e r / c a p a b i l i t i e s , as an i n d i c a t o r of s e c u r i t y f o r i n d i v i d u a l s t a t e s and the degree o f t h r e a t t o the s t a t e system, i s l e g i t i m a t e l y r e s t r i c t e d t o the Great Powers. But, l e s s e r s t a t e s a r e l i k e l y t o be a l s o c o n c e r n e d w i t h t he n a t u r e of the d i s t r i - b u t i o n and r e a c t , a t l e a s t i n terms of a l l i a n c e s , the same way as G r e a t Powers. W h i l e an i n c r e a s e i n m i l i t a r y c a p a b i l i t i e s w i l l have l i t t l e , i f any, e f f e c t , t h e i r r e s o u r c e s may be v a l u a b l e when a g g r e g a t - ed w i t h a G r e a t Power through an a l l i a n c e . F u r t h e r m o r e , s e v e r a l l e s s - er s t a t e s a l l i e d t o g e t h e r may produce a s i g n i f i c a n t b l o c of p o w e r . 1 4 F i n a l l y , l e s s e r s t a t e s may be s i g n i f i c a n t i n the case of war by p r o - v i d i n g not o n l y a d d i t i o n a l c a p a b i l i t i e s , but a l s o key f a c i 1 i t i e s due t o t h e i r g e o g r a p h i c l o c a t i o n i n the system. T h i s d i s c u s s i o n i l l u s t r a t e s t he n a t u r e of B a l a n c e of Power t h e o r y and the need t o t r e a t i t as a p o l i c y t h e o r y . In e x p l a i n i n g t he p o l i - c i e s of s t a t e s as dependent on t h e d i s t r i b u t i o n of c a p a b i l i t i e s , i t a l s o p r o v i d e s an e x p l a n a t i o n f o r the appearance of ' b a l a n c e s ' i n the system and the maintenance of the s t a t e system. I t p r o v i d e s the b a s i s f o r d e v e l o p i n g e x p l i c i t h ypotheses which a r e s u s c e p t i b l e t o e m p i r i c a l 1 4 T h i s argument does not mean t h a t , f o r example, t h r e e l e s s e r s t a t e s a l l i e d t o g e t h e r make a G r e a t Power. C e r t a i n l y , t he a b i l i t y t o b r i n g t h e b l o c t o bear as a u n i f i e d a c t o r i s p r o b l e m a t i c , as the case w i t h any a l l i a n c e (see S a b r o s k y , 1980 on the e m p i r i c a l r e l i - a b i l i t y of a l l i a n c e commitments and Kann, 1976 on the t h e o r e t i c a l a rgument). But, as Kann (19&9) p o i n t s o u t , t h e r e has been one case where an a l l i a n c e between t h r e e l e s s e r s t a t e s was i n i t i a l l y p e r - c e i v e d as a power b l o c r e p l a c i n g t he A u s t r o - H u n g a r i a n Empire. T h i s was the L i t t l e E n t e n t e c o n s i s t i n g of C z e c h o s l o v a k i a , Rumania, and Y u g o s l a v i a . 2k v e r i f i c a t i o n e i t h e r a t the group or i n d i v i d u a l l e v e l of a n a l y s i s . In our c a s e , a g g r e g a t e l e v e l h ypotheses can be i d e n t i f i e d t o t e s t t he manual v e r s i o n and s t a t e l e v e l h y p otheses can be d e v e l o p e d t o t e s t t he b a l a n c e r v e r s i o n . B e f o r e i d e n t i f y i n g t h e s e h y p o t h e s e s , a t a s k l e f t t o the next c h a p t e r i n the case of the manual v e r s i o n and Chapter Seven f o r the b a l a n c e r , i t i s n e c e s s a r y t o examine o t h e r a s p e c t s of 'Balance of Power' i n the l i t e r a t u r e . 1.2 BALANCE OF POWER AS SYSTEM TYPE One of the predominant usages of B a l a n c e of Power i s i t s r e f e r e n c e t o a p a r t i c u l a r t y p e of i n t e r n a t i o n a l system. A c c o r d i n g t o Hoffmann (1965) . systems' c o n c e p t u a l i z a t i o n s demand a c o r r e s p o n d e n c e between the a n a l y t i c scheme and h i s t o r i c a l r e a l i t y . F u r t h e r m o r e , Claude (1962) n o t e s t h a t B a l a n c e of Power t h e o r y and i t s t r e a t m e n t as a s y s - tem type i s u s u a l l y not a b s t r a c t but a p r o d u c t of the h i s t o r i c a l r e c o r d , i m p l y i n g t h a t t h i s type of system has some measure of c o n c r e t e b o u n d a r i e s . However, t h e r e i s 1 i t t 1 e agreement i n the l i t e r a t u r e on the e x a c t b o u n d a r i e s o f t h e B a l a n c e of Power system i n h i s t o r y . I t i s u n c l e a r whether t h i s system i s bound t e m p o r a l l y t o the modern s t a t e system and a synonym f o r i t , or a p p l i c a b l e o n l y t o some s p e c i f i c sub- s e t of ti m e w i t h i n t he modern s t a t e system. F u r t h e r m o r e , the i d e n t i - f i c a t i o n of a 'Balance of Power' system i m p l i e s t he e x i s t e n c e of a s e t of n e c e s s a r y c o n d i t i o n s f o r i t s e x i s t e n c e . However, an i n a b i l i t y among s c h o l a r s t o agree not o n l y on the n e c e s s a r y c o n d i t i o n s , but t h e i r p r e s e n c e / a b s e n c e i n t i m e , undermines the v a l u e o f t h j s type o f approach t o the con c e p t of the B a l a n c e of Power. Moreover, B a l a n c e o f 25 Power, as d e f i n e d by t h e s e n e c e s s a r y c o n d i t i o n s , i s shown t o have no contemporary v a l u e . T h i s r a i s e s d o u b t s about i t s t h e o r e t i c a l u t i l i t y o u t s i d e of the d i s t a n t p a s t . F i n a l l y , the system t y p e p e r s p e c t i v e adds t o the c o n f u s i o n s u r r o u n d i n g 'Balance of Power'. G e n e r a l l y , p r o - ponents of t h i s p e r s p e c t i v e assume t h a t the B a l a n c e of Power e x p l a i n s the b e h a v i o r of s t a t e s . T h e i r a c t u a l purpose i s t o examine the n e c e s - s a r y c o n d i t i o n s f o r system s t a b i l i t y , d e f i n e d as the absence of l a r g e s c a l e war. As a r e s u l t , B a l a n c e of Power becomes a l a b e l l a c k i n g e i t h e r t h e o r e t i c a l r e l e v a n c e or d e s c r i p t i v e v a l u e . S e v e r a l n e c e s s a r y c o n d i t i o n s of a B a l a n c e of Power system a r e i d e n - t i f i e d i n the l i t e r a t u r e . F i r s t , i t r e q u i r e s a system of autonomous u n i t s i n an environment of a n a r c h y . In such a system, a c t o r s a r e con- c e r n e d w i t h s u r v i v a l w h i c h d i c t a t e s a c o n c e r n f o r r e l a t i v e c a p a b i l i - t i e s . Second, a B a l a n c e of Power system needs a d e g r e e of consensus among system e l i t e s . T h i s consensus i n v o l v e s an a c c e p t a n c e of the i n h e r e n t v a l u e of the s t a t e system. T h i r d , a d e g r e e of homogeneity must be p r e s e n t i n the system. Homogeneity r e f e r s t o the e x i s t e n c e of a common c u l t u r e , the absence of i d e o l o g i c a l c l e a v a g e s , and a c o n c e n - t r a t i o n of p o l i c y making i n the hands of e l i t e s r e l a t i v e l y u n r e s - t r a i n e d by d o m e s t i c f a c t o r s . Homogeneity, i n c o n j u n c t i o n w i t h v a l u e c o n s e n s u s , s e r v e s t o moderate the b e h a v i o r of e l i t e s away from a t t e m p t s t o d e s t r o y c o m p e t i t o r s and t r a n s f o r m the system t h r o u g h a l i m i t a t i o n of t h e o b j e c t i v e s sought t h r o u g h the use of f o r c e . F o u r t h , the l e v e l of m i l i t a r y t e c h n o l o g y must be r e l a t i v e l y s t a b l e . Such s t a - b i l i t y not o n l y e n a b l e s e l i t e s t o c a l c u l a t e r e a s o n a b l y r e l a t i v e c a p a- b i l i t i e s and base p o l i c y on such c a l c u l a t i o n s , w h i c h i t s e l f i s a i d e d 26 by homogeneity, but a l s o a c t s t o i n h i b i t t h e a b i l i t y of s t a t e s t o use f o r c e t o t r a n s f o r m the system. F i n a l l y , a B a l a n c e of Power system r e q u i r e s a r e l a t i v e l y equal d i f f u s i o n of power between a minimum num- ber of s t a t e s or s p e c i f i c a l l y G r eat Powers. T h i s minimum i s n o r m a l l y s e t a t t h r e e , a l t h o u g h most t r e a t m e n t s f o c u s on the presupposed 'magi- c a l ' number o f f i v e t o be c o n s i s t e n t w i t h t he h i s t o r i c a l r e c o r d . T h i s minimum e n s u r e s t h a t s t a t e s a r e a b l e t o a d j u s t t o d i s t r i b u t i o n a l c a p a- b i l i t y changes among them t h r o u g h a l l i a n c e b e h a v i o r . A g a i n , homogene- i t y comes i n t o p l a y . I t s p r e s e n c e e n a b l e s s t a t e s t o change a l l i a n c e p a r t n e r s i n re s p o n s e t o the d i s t r i b u t i o n w i t h o u t c o n c e r n f o r d o m e s t i c a c c e p t a b i 1 i t y . There i s no g e n e r a l agreement among a u t h o r s on the r e l a t i v e impor- t a n c e of each c o n d i t i o n . The m a j o r i t y agree t h a t t he c o n d i t i o n o f autonomy and anarchy r e f e r s t o the modern s t a t e system. A c c o r d i n g t o Wight (1977) . the e a r l i e r m e d i e v a l p e r i o d i n European h i s t o r y c o n t a i n s s e v e r a l a t t r i b u t e s w h i c h c o n f l i c t w i t h t he c o n d i t i o n of a c t o r a u t o n o - my. Y e t , B e r n h o l z (1985) argues t h a t autonomy i s e v i d e n t i n th e medi- e v a l p e r i o d . Independent a c t o r s competed f o r power, p r e s t i g e , and d o m i n a t i o n d e s p i t e nominal o b l i g a t i o n s t o Pope and Emperor. F u r t h e r - more, u s i n g t he c o n d i t i o n of a minimum number o f a c t o r s , B e r n h o l z i d e n t i f i e s s e v e r a l B a l a n c e of Power systems p r i o r t o the modern s t a t e system, i n c l u d i n g the Greek c i t y s t a t e and W a r r i n g p e r i o d o f C h i n a . The t r e a t m e n t o f the modern s t a t e system as a B a l a n c e o f Power s y s - tem, a t l e a s t up to, the French R e v o l u t i o n , i s f i r m l y l i n k e d t o the c o n d i t i o n s o f e l i t e consensus and system homogeneity. A u t h o r s , such as Wight (1977) , Hoffmann (1965) , R o s e c r a n c e (1963) , Claude (1962) and 27 G u l l i c k (1955) a g r e e t h a t t he th e s e two c o n d i t i o n s c r e a t e c e r t a i n b e h a v i o r a l norms. These norms i n c l u d e t he r e j e c t i o n o f a t t e m p t s t o t r a n s f o r m the system and the m o d e r a t i o n of o b j e c t i v e s sought through war. A c c o r d i n g t o Northedge (1976) , ear 1 i e r systems e x h i b i t t h e t e n - dency towards the t o t a l e l i m i n a t i o n of one's opponent and the c r e a t i o n of a s i n g l e hegemonic a c t o r . In c o n t r a s t , c o n f l i c t s between s t a t e s i n modern s t a t e system a r e l a r g e l y o ver i s s u e s of t e r r i t o r i a l a d j u s t m e n t , not t he e x i s t e n c e and l e g i t i m a c y of c e r t a i n s t a t e s . The use of consensus and homogeneity as n e c e s s a r y c o n d i t i o n s f o r a B a l a n c e of Power system i l l u s t r a t e s t he t h r e e fundamental problems w i t h t he system type p e r s p e c t i v e . The f i r s t c o n c e r n s problems r e l a t e d t o h i s t o r i c a l i n t e r p r e t a t i o n . At what p o i n t i n h i s t o r y d i d consensus and homogeneity d i s a p p e a r ? For Hoffmann, the French R e v o l u t i o n , w i t h i t s a p peal t o the n a t i o n i n arms and r e j e c t i o n of d y n a s t i c r u l e , i s the b e g i n n i n g , i f not the c o n c l u s i o n , of the c o l l a p s e of consensus and homogeneity. World War One p r o v i d e s a n o t h e r p l a u s i b l e b r e a k . The impact of the war's t o t a t i l t y on European s o c i e t y , p a r t i c u l a r l y i n the ar e a of the a c c e p t a b i 1 i t y of f o r c e as an i n s t r u m e n t of p o l i c y and the r i s e of i n t e r n a l i n f l u e n c e s on p o l i c y , and the appearance of B o l s h e v i k R u s s i a as an a c t o r r e j e c t i n g t he v e r y l e g i t i m a c y of the s t a t e system, g i v e s w i t n e s s t o a new e r a . Perhaps the o n l y a r e a of agreement i n t h i s sense i s the p o s t World War Two p e r i o d . The dominance of the S o v i e t Union and the U n i t e d S t a t e s , w h i c h a l s o v i o l a t e s the minimum number c o n d i t i o n , imbedded a s t r u g g l e t o the death between l i b e r a l c a p i t a l i s m and s o c i a l i s t d i c t a t o r s h i p i n the system. 28 However, one s h o u l d be c a u t i o u s s t r e s s i n g t h e degree of consensus and homogeneity even i n the so c a l l e d Golden Age of the B a l a n c e o f Power i n the E i g h t e e n t h C e n t u r y . The f i r s t decade of t h a t c e n t u r y w i t n e s s e d t he f i n a l c l a s h e s o f L o u i s XIV's p e r c e i v e d a t t e m p t t o a t t a i n a predominant p o s i t i o n i n t h e system. The Seven Y e a r s War (1756-1763) e n t a i l e d a l i f e and de a t h s t r u g g l e f o r P r u s s i a . As L i s k a (1963) a r g u e s , homogeneity and b e h a v i o r a l m o d e r a t i o n d u r i n g t h e Golden Age i s more myth th a n r e a l i t y . Even i n the N i n t e e n t h and T w e n t i e t h Centu- r i e s , an absence of homogeneity appears t o have l i t t l e a f f e c t on c e r - t a i n b e h a v i o r . I t d i d not h i n d e r an a l l i a n c e between R e p u b l i c a n France and T s a r i s t R u s s i a or an a l l i a n c e between S o v i e t R u s s i a and t h e West. F u r t h e r m o r e , i t has not h i n d e r e d the appearance o f a t a c i t a l l i a n c e between Communist China and the c a p i t a l i s t w est. The second problem r e l a t e s t o t h e absence of consensus and homoge- n e i t y i n the contemporary i n t e r n a t i o n a l system and t h e r e b y t h e contem- p o r a r y u t i l i t y of B a l a n c e of Power t h e o r y . As noted above, the e s c h a - t o l o g i c a l c l a s h between E a s t and West embodies c l a i m s about t h e i l l e g i t i m a c y o f the o p p o s i n g s o c i a l systems and the i n t e r n a t i o n a l s y s - tem i t s e l f . However, i t i s u n c l e a r why s t a t e b e h a v i o r , i n the sense o u t l i n e d i n the p r e v i o u s s e c t i o n , i s not e q u a l l y , i f not more, r e l e - v a n t t o a heterogeneous system. In p r o d u c i n g c o n f l i c t s r e l a t e d t o l e g i t i m a c y , such systems c o n t a i n g r e a t e r t h r e a t s t o s t a t e and system s u r v i v a l . Such t h r e a t s a r e the c o r e of B a l a n c e of Power t h e o r y . In a p a r a d o x i c a l way, t h e t h e o r y , and thus system l a b e l , i s more a p p l i c a b l e t o h e terogeneous p e r i o d s of h i s t o r y , as e v i d e n t i n G u l l i c k ' s (1955) s t u d y of t h e B a l a n c e of Power d u r i n g t he French R e v o l u t i o n / N a p o l e o n i c e r a . 29 The f i n a l problem i s a l s o e v i d e n t i n the above d i s c u s s i o n . The c o n d i t i o n s o f consensus and homogeneity a r e r e l a t e d more t o c o n c e r n s about system s t a b i l i t y than the B a l a n c e of Power per s e . In moderat- in g the b e h a v i o r of s t a t e s , t h e s e c o n d i t i o n s s e r v e t o enhance the p r o s p e c t s o f s t a b l e r e l a t i o n s among s t a t e s . I t t e l l s us l i t t l e about the B a l a n c e o f Power and s t a t e b e h a v i o r i n l i g h t of the ' b a l a n c e 1 . I t i s a l s o q u e s t i o n a b l e whether m o d e r a t i o n , which u n d e r p i n s s t a b i l i t y , i s s i m p l y a f u n c t i o n of consensus and homogeneity. B e r n h o l z (1985) argues t h a t m o d e r a t i o n i s more a f u n c t i o n o f the number o f Gr e a t Pow- e r s . I t r e s u l t s from t h e need t o p r e s e r v e p r e s e n t enemies as f u t u r e a l l i e s i n a complex m u l t i - p o w e r system. S t a b i l i t y i s a l s o a t the c o r e o f t h e m i l i t a r y t e c h n o l o g y c o n d i t i o n , w h i c h i s r e l a t e d t o homogeneity. Homogeneity e n s u r e s r e l a t i v e s i m i - l a r i t y i n m i l i t a r y s t r u c t u r e s and o r g a n i z a t i o n s among s t a t e s . In so d o i n g , t he a b i l i t y t o c a l c u l a t e t he d i s t r i b u t i o n of c a p a b i l i t i e s i n a r e l a t i v e l y s i m i l a r manner i s f a c i l i t a t e d . At the same t i m e , t he r e l a - t i v e l y s t a t i c n a t u r e of m i l i t a r y t e c h n o l o g y up t o the mid t o l a t e N i n e t e e n t h Century a c t e d as an impediment t o d r i v e s f o r p r e p o n d e r a n c e (Claude, 1962). S t a t i c t e c h n o l o g y a l s o enhanced the s i m p l i c i t y of the c a l c u l a t i o n i t s e l f . W i t h the i n d u s t r i a l r e v o l u t i o n , not o n l y the were the impediments t o preponderance removed s u b s t a n t i a l l y , but t h e a b i l i - t y t o a s s e s s the 'b a l a n c e ' and r e a c t t o i t were undermined. In o t h e r words, the dynamic of t e c h n o l o g i c a l change undermined the s t a b i l i t y of the system. R e t u r n i n g t o B a l a n c e of Power t h e o r y , t h e r e i s no re a s o n t o e x p e c t t h a t s t a t i c t e c h n o l o g y i s a n e c e s s a r y c o n d i t i o n f o r t he b e h a v i o r o f 30 s t a t e s w i t h i n the c o n f i n e s of the t h e o r y . R e g a r d l e s s of homogeneity, s t a t e s tend t o copy the m i l i t a r y s t r u c t u r e s and t e c h n o l o g y of o t h e r s , p a r t i c u l a r l y t h o s e who have used t h e i r m i l i t a r y s u c c e s s f u l l y . W h i l e th e a c t u a l s t r u c t u r e s , weapon systems, and deployments may d i f f e r due t o g e o g r a p h i c a l and o t h e r p o l i t i c a l f a c t o r s , t h e r e c o n t i n u e s t o be an u n d e r l y i n g s i m i l a r i t y among s t a t e s i n t h i s a r e a . A l s o , the c o m p l e x i t y o f c a l c u l a t i o n s due t o t e c h n o l o g i c a l change have been accompanied by a g r e a t e r a b i l i t y t o o b t a i n i n f o r m a t i o n as w e l l as a l a r g e body of s k i 1 1 e d p e r s o n n e l t o a n a l y z e i t . F i n a l l y , n u c l e a r weapons can not be d i v o r c e d from b a s i c c a l c u l a t i o n s of the ' b a l a n c e ' . I t i s t r u e t h a t t h e s e weapons have a l t e r e d s i g n i f i c a n t l y the u t i l i t y o f f o r c e t o advance s t a t e i n t e r e s t s . Y e t , they a r e an i n t e g r a l component of s t a t e m i l i t a r y c a p a b i l i t i e s and a r e l a r g e l y a new element t o c o n s i d e r i n the g e n e r a l ' b a l a n c e ' . A l s o , the t e c h n o l o g i c a l l i m i t a t i o n s h i n d e r i n g hegemony i n the p a s t have been r e p l a c e d by a t e c h n o l o g y w h i c h makes such an a t t e m p t too c o s t l y i n the p r e s e n t . The f i n a l n e c e s s a r y c o n d i t i o n i s t h e equal d i f f u s i o n of power among a minimum number of s t a t e s ; G r e a t Powers ( B e r n h o l z , 1985; G i l p i n , 1981; Hoffmann, 1965; K a p l a n , 1957; G u l l i c k , 1 9 5 5 ) . 1 5 I t s use p r o v i d e s the c l e a r e s t h i s t o r i c a l marker f o r i d e n t i f y i n g the B a l a n c e of Power system i n t i m e . There a r e two a n a l y t i c a l components u n d e r l y i n g t h i s c o n d i t i o n . The f i r s t c o n c e r n s the i r r e l e v a n c e of a l l i a n c e s i n a two power or b i p o l a r system. The second i s l i n k e d t o a s e p a r a t e body of t h e o r y w h i c h a l s o r e v o l v e s around t h e s t a b i l i t y p roblem and i s g ener- a l l y c o n f u s e d w i t h B a l a n c e of Power t h e o r y . 1 5 Both Hoffmann and G u l l i c k arguments f o l l o w t h e s t a b i l i t y l i n e . Both i d e n t i f y the p o s s i b i l i t y of o n l y two G r e a t Powers i n a B a l a n c e of Power system, but argue t h a t t h i s form i s h i g h l y u n s t a b l e . 31 S e v e r a l w r i t e r s argue t h a t a minimum number of Gr e a t Powers i s nec- e s s a r y f o r the o p e r a t i o n of t h e a l l i a n c e mechanism ( B e r n h o l z , 1985; W a l t z , 19^7; K a p l a n , 1957)- In the contemporary system, a l l i a n c e s a r e i n e f f e c t i v e i n the B a l a n c e of Power sense because c a p a b i l i t i e s a r e c o n c e n t r a t e d i n the hands of the two Superpowers and a l l i a n c e s w i t h o t h e r s t a t e s w i l l have l i t t l e e f f e c t on the d i s t r i b u t i o n between them. However, one must query why the a l l i a n c e component i s n e c e s s a r y f o r the t h e o r y . I t i s o n l y one i n a s e r i e s o f components or dependent v a r i a b l e s w i t h i n B a l a n c e of Power t h e o r y . As Wal t z O967) p o i n t s o u t , the i n e f f e c t i v e n e s s o f a l l i a n c e s does not negate the b a s i c p r o p e r t y of the B a l a n c e of Power; the d i s t r i b u t i o n of c a p a b i 1 i t i e s . F u r t h e r m o r e , a two power system i s the s i m p l e s t forum f o r c a l c u l a t i o n s of the d i s - t r i b u t i o n ( B u l l , 1977)- T h i s s i m p l i c i t y may i t s e l f enhance s t a b i l i t y by r e d u c i n g the chance of m i s c a l c u l a t i o n and m i s p e r c e p t i o n . F i n a l l y , t he q u e s t i o n of whether a l l i a n c e s a r e e f f e c t i v e i n t h e contemporary system s h o u l d be t r e a t e d as an e m p i r i c a l one, and not s i m p l y assumed away. The second component r e l a t e s t o a s e p a r a t e body o f t h e o r y w h i c h f o c u s e s on system s t a b i l i t y . T h i s body o f t h e o r y c e n t e r s on t h e deba t e between W a l t z (1967) and Qeutsch and S i n g e r (1964) over t h e r e l a t i v e s t a b i l i t y of b i p o l a r and m u l t i p o l a r systems. I t a l s o i n c l u d e s K a p l a n ' s (1957) work on system's i n which the number of G r e a t Powers a c t t o c r e a t e c e r t a i n r u l e s o r norms o f b e h a v i o r . Whether num- ber i s r e l a t e d t o s t a b i l i t y i s a mute q u e s t i o n h e r e . More i m p o r t a n t , the l i n k a g e of m u l t i p o l a r i t y t o a B a l a n c e of Power system r e p r e s e n t s a c o n f u s i o n o f two uniqu e b o d i e s o f t h e o r y . The p o l a r i t y d ebate c o n - 32 c e r n s the r e l a t i o n s h i p between number and b e h a v i o r . B a l a n c e of Power c o n c e r n s the r e l a t i o n s h i p between t h e d i s t r i b u t i o n and b e h a v i o r . W h i l e the former may a f f e c t the l a t t e r , and v i c e v e r s a , an e m p i r i c a l q u e s t i o n , one s h o u l d not c o n f u s e two s e p a r a t e b o d i e s of t h e o r y . The use of B a l a n c e of Power as a system type i s e x t r e m e l y f l a w e d . I t p roduces u n n e c e s s a r y debates on the b o u n d a r i e s of such a system through problems r e l a t e d t o the i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of the h i s t o r i c a l r e c o r d and the r e l a t i v e w e i g h t a s s i g n e d t o each of the a f o r e m e n t i o n e d c o n d i t i o n s . In some i n s t a n c e s , the c o n d i t i o n s c o n f l i c t d i r e c t l y w i t h e l ements of B a l a n c e of Power t h e o r y . Above a l l , the p e r s p e c t i v e i s not about the 'Balance of Power' and s t a t e b e h a v i o r . I t i s about s t a - b i l i t y c o n d i t i o n s i n w h i c h a s t r o n g n o r m a t i v e and p r e s c r i p t i v e m o t i v e i s p r e s e n t . Advocates of a n o n - i d e o l o g i c a l based s e t of p o l i c i e s , p a r t i c u l a r l y f o r the U n i t e d S t a t e s , the i n s t i t u t i o n a l i z a t i o n of arms c o n t r o l as a means t o c o n t r o l t e c h n o l o g y and the 'arms r a c e ' , and the p r o m o t i o n of new power c e n t e r s , such as the European Community and Japan, draw from t h i s body of r e s e a r c h . W h i l e t h e i r arguments may or may not have h i s t o r i c a l v a l i d i t y , they s h o u l d not be l i n k e d t o , or v a l i d a t e d a p r i o r i by, B a l a n c e of Power t h e o r y . To do so o n l y adds c o n f u s i o n t o the u t i l i t y of the c o n c e p t and the t h e o r y i n which i t b e l o n g s . 33 1.3 BALANCE OF POWER THEORY AND ITS CRITICS C r i t i q u e s of B a l a n c e of Power t h e o r y a r e e x t r e m e l y v a r i e d i n n a t u r e . They can be r o u g h l y grouped i n t o t h r e e a r e a s . The f i r s t draws from i n c o n s i s t e n t usage of the term 'Balance of Power' t o f o c u s on p a r t i c u l a r problems w i t h i n t he t h r e e v e r s i o n s of the t h e o r y . The second c o n c e r n s the t h e o r y ' s i m p l i c a t i o n s f o r , and r e l e v a n c e t o , con- temporary i n t e r n a t i o n a l p o l i t i c s . The t h i r d , and most p r o b l e m a t i c , i s m e t h o d o l o g i c a l . I t r e l a t e s t o c o n c e r n s embodied, t o some d e g r e e , \nl W a l t z ' s c o n c e p t u a l i z a t i o n of t h e t h e o r y . There i s no need t o r e c a p i t u l a t e the v a r i e d uses of the term ' B a l - ance o f Power'. T h i s ground has been a d e q u a t e l y c o v e r e d by Haas (1953) and Claude (1962) . The major i m p l i c a t i o n stemming from t h i s p roblem i s t h a t 'Balance of Power' s h o u l d be e l i m i n a t e d f o r purposes of t h e o r e t i c a l c l a r i t y . However, t h i s problem i s not u n i q u e . Many c o n c e p t s , such as power, democracy, and i m p e r i a l i s m , s u f f e r from the same problem. N o n e t h e l e s s , t h e y a r e c o n c e p t s , a l o n g w i t h 'Balance o f Power', w h i c h cannot be r e a d i l y d i s c a r d e d or r e p l a c e d . The i n c o n s i s - t e n c y problem r e f l e c t s t he d e a r t h o f c o n c e p t s i n the f i e l d t o c o v e r the phenomena of i n t e r n a t i o n a l p o l i t i c s . At t h e same t i m e , the p r o b - lem does r e q u i r e t he c r e a t i o n of some measure of d i s c i p l i n a r y c o nsen- sus t o ens u r e a g r e a t e r l i k e l i h o o d of c u m u l a t i o n i n the f i e l d . As shown i n the next c h a p t e r , t h i s consensus i s emerging, p a r t i c u l a r l y i n the q u a n t i t a t i v e l i t e r a t u r e , w h i c h c o n c e p t u a l i z e s B a l a n c e of Power t h e o r y i n the manner p r e s e n t e d h e r e . 1 6 1 6 One must be c a r e f u l i n making t h i s a s s e r t i o n . I t i s t r u e t h a t q u a n t i t a t i v e s t u d i e s t e s t B a l a n c e of Power hypotheses r e l a t e d t o the d i s t r i b u t i o n of c a p a b i l i t i e s . However, they a l s o u s u a l l y con- t a i n some r e f e r e n c e t o Morgenthau's power p o l i t i c s t h e o r y w h i c h has 34 There i s a l s o no need t o re-examine i n any g r e a t d e t a i l the prob- lems c r e a t e d by the a u t o m a t i c and s e m i - a u t o m a t i c v e r s i o n s . Hoffmann's (1959) c r i t i q u e of Ka p l a n and Morgenthau i s w e l l t a k e n h e r e . To argue a m e c h a n i s t i c and d e t e r m i n i s t i c v i e w of i n t e r n a t i o n a l p o l i t i c s i s t o i g n o r e t he ' s t u f f o f whi c h p o l i t i c s i s made; man. 1 7 In the s e m i - a u t o - m a t i c v e r s i o n , i n t e r e s t i n g l y , the major c r i t i c i s m i s not the o m i s s i o n o f o t h e r s t a t e s , but i t s l a c k of contemporary v a l u e . O r g a n s k i (1968:285) argues t h a t t h i s v e r s i o n ' s d i r e c t l i n k t o G r e a t B r i t a i n as the b a l a n c e r s u f f i c e s t o negate i t s u t i l i t y . 1 8 With t h e d e c l i n e o f B r i t i s h power and the emergence of r i g i d b i p o l a r i t y , t h e r e i s no l o n g - e r a b a l a n c e r i n the system. However, t h i s argument has two f l a w s . F i r s t , i t i s not based on any e m p i r i c a l e v i d e n c e which s u p p o r t s e i t h e r t h i s c o n c e p t u a l i z a t i o n of the t h e o r y o r B r i t i s h b e h a v i o r as the b a l a n c e r . Second, one can ques- t i o n O r g a n s k i ' s a s s u m p t i o n about the absence of a ' b a l a n c e r ' i n the pos t World War Two e r a . The U n i t e d S t a t e s s h a r e s t he b a s i c c h a r a c t e r - . been shown t o be p r o b l e m a t i c i n l i g h t o f the t h e o r y . A l s o , t h i s l i t e r a t u r e does not c l e a r l y s p e c i f y the l i n k between the t h e o r y and s t a t e p o l i c y / b e h a v i o r . T h i s l a c k of s p e c i f i c a t i o n i s a f u n c t i o n of the m e t h o d o l o g i c a l problem o u t l i n e d below. 1 7 T h i s c r i t i q u e a l s o l i e s a t the h e a r t of problems stemming from the ' n e o - r e a 1 i s t ' a p p r o a c h . I t i s the p o i n t made by A s h e l y , once one goes beyond h i s v e r b o s i t y . 1 8 O r g a n s k i a l s o c r i t i c i z e s the argument t h a t B r i t a i n e v e r a c t e d as a b a l a n c e r . He argues t h a t B r i t a i n a c t e d i n her s e l f - i n t e r e s t , r a t h - er than t he i n t e r e s t s o f the c o l l e c t i v e . As shown i n Chapter Sev- en, t he B a l a n c e r , i . e . B r i t a i n , by a c t i n g i n i t s s e l f - i n t e r e s t s i m u l t a n e o u s l y a c t s i n the c o l l e c t i v e i n t e r e s t . A f i n a l note i n r e g a r d s t o B r i t a i n i s O r g a n s k i ' s v i e w of B r i t a i n as the pr e p o n d e r - ant i n t h e N i n e t e e n t h C e n t u r y , w h i c h u n d e r l i e s h i s P r eponderance o f Power or Power T r a n s i t i o n t h e o r y . H i s argument i s c l o s e t o c y c l e t h e o r i s t s i n the f i e l d ; see Thompson and R a s l e r (1988) , Thompson (1986) , M o d e l s k i and Morgan (1985) , Doran (1983) and G i l p i n (1981) . The fundamental problem w i t h t h e i r approach i s i t s c l e a r d i v o r c e from h i s t o r i c a l r e a l i t y . 35 i s t i c of t h e b a l a n c e r ; an i n s u l a r g e o g r a p h i c l o c a t i o n . W i t h the d e f e c t i o n of China from the s o c i a l i s t b l o c , and the p o t e n t i a l f o r new power c e n t e r s , such as the European Community and Japan, the system may no l o n g e r be b i p o l a r . As a r e s u l t , t he ' b a l a n c e r ' image may have some r e l e v a n c e now, or i n the near f u t u r e f o r u n d e r s t a n d i n g i n t e r n a - t i o n a l p o l i t i c s , assuming t h a t t he s e m i - a u t o m a t i c v e r s i o n i s the c o r - r e c t one. R e g a r d l e s s , t h e r e i s a need f o r e m p i r i c a l e v i d e n c e t o a s s e s s t h e above argument, r a t h e r than a p r i o r i r e j e c t i o n . O r g a n s k i (1968:288-291) a l s o c r i t i c i z e s t he manual v e r s i o n of t h e o - r y . He argues t h a t the t h e o r y i s s t a t i c and u n a b l e t o a c c o u n t f o r d r a m a t i c changes wrought by the i n d u s t r i a l r e v o l u t i o n , and t h a t t h e c e n t r a l n o t i o n o f a l l i a n c e f l e x i b i l i t y as a means t o a l t e r t he d i s t r i - b u t i o n of c a p a b i l i t i e s i s a myth. A c c o r d i n g t o h i s i n t e r p r e t a t i o n , s t a t e s can o n l y i n c r e a s e t h e i r c a p a b i l i t i e s by e x t e r n a l means, such as t e r r i t o r i a l a g g r a n d i z e m e n t and a l l i a n c e s . There e x i s t s a s u b t l e s e t of p o l i t i c a l , p s y c h o l o g i c a l , economic, and s o c i a l l i n k s w h i c h h i n d e r the a b i l i t y o f s t a t e s t o change f r e e l y a l l i a n c e p a r t n e r s i n re s p o n s e t o changes i n the d i s t r i b u t i o n . Thus, he b e l i e v e s t h a t t he t h e o r y does not a c c o u n t f o r e i t h e r the impact of i n d u s t r i a l i z a t i o n on s t a t e c a p a b i l i t i e s and n a t i o n a l i s m on a l l i a n c e f l e x i b i l i t y . However, t h e r e i s no reas o n t o assume t h a t t he t h e o r y cannot i n c o r - p o r a t e t h e dynamic elements of i n d u s t r i a l i z a t i o n . I t i s t r u e t h a t p r i o r t o the i n d u s t r i a l r e v o l u t i o n t he c a p a b i l i t i e s of s t a t e s a r e r e l - a t i v e l y s t a t i c and a t t e m p t s t o a d j u s t the d i s t r i b u t i o n were l a r g e l y r e s t r i c t e d t o e x t e r n a l b e h a v i o r . B ut, w i t h the c l e a r l e s s o n s o f the P r u s s i a n wars o f German u n i f i c a t i o n , e l i t e s came t o r e a l i z e the v i t a l 36 l i n k between i n d u s t r i a l i z a t i o n , c a p a b i l i t i e s , and the s u c c e s s f u l p r o s - e c u t i o n of war. Once r e a l i z e d , i n d u s t r i a l i z a t i o n , because of i t s uneven a f f e c t among s t a t e s , becomes a v i t a l component t o the d i s t r i b u - t i o n . S i m i l a r l y , s o c i e t a l e l i t e s dominate p o l i c y and a c t w i t h l i t t l e r e s t r i c t i o n from d o m e s t i c s o u r c e s i n most c a s e s p r i o r t o the i n d u s t r i - a l r e v o l u t i o n . But, even w i t h the r i s e of g r e a t e r d o m e s t i c r e s t r i c - t i o n s and i n p u t i n t o p o l i c y , t h e r e i s no r e a s o n t o b e l i e v e t h a t f l e x i - b i l i t y i s undermined. S t u d i e s of the N i n e t e e n t h C e n t u r y (McGowan and Rood, 1975; L i and Thompson, 1978; and M i d l a r s k y , 1981) show s u p p o r t f o r b e h a v i o r c o n s i s t e n t w i t h a l l i a n c e f l e x i b i l i t y . Moreover, two major s t u d i e s of a l l i a n c e s r e v e a l t h a t they a r e not s t r o n g l y r e l a t e d t o i d e o l o g i c a l f a c t o r s ( H o l s t i e t . a l . , 1972; W a l t , 1987) . Organski has one l a s t c r i t i c i s m of B a l a n c e of Power t h e o r y w h i c h i s r e l a t e d t o t h e second a r e a of c r i t i q u e s . The t h e o r y has no u t i l i t y because i t f a i l s t o e x p l a i n war and i s thus i n c o n s i s t e n t w i t h r e a l i t y . He argues t h a t the r e l a t i v e peace d u r i n g the N i n e t e e n t h c e n t u r y i s e x p l a i n e d not by the e x i s t e n c e of a b a l a n c e , but by t h e p r e s e n c e of a p r e p o n d e r a n t : G r e a t B r i t a i n . The s y s t e m i c wars of the T w e n t i e t h c e n - t u r y a r e o c c a s i o n e d by the c o n d i t i o n of b a l a n c e not p r e p o n d e r a n c e . The argument t h a t B r i t a i n i s a p r e p o n d e r a n t s t a t e i s a f u n c t i o n of a g l o b a l p e r s p e c t i v e i n which economic s t r e n g t h i s t h e u n d e r l y i n g measure of power. However, from a c o n t i n e n t a l p e r s p e c t i v e , w h i c h i n c l u d e s measures of pure m i l i t a r y power, B r i t a i n s t a n d i n g as a p r e - p o nderant i s d u b i o u s . B r i t i s h m i l i t a r y power i s l a r g e l y n a v a l i n o r i - e n t a t i o n . I t s ground component has always been s i g n i f i c a n t l y l e s s than the dominant Powers on the c o n t i n e n t . Depending on the d i s t r i b u - 37 t i o n , w h i c h would i n c l u d e measures of m i l i t a r y power, peace d u r i n g the N i n t e e n t h C e n t u r y may be a f u n c t i o n of a 'ba l a n c e ' on the c o n t i n e n t . I t i s a l s o not n e c e s s a r i l y t r u e t h a t t h e two s y s t e m i c wars of the T w e n t i e t h c e n t u r y o c c u r r e d i n a s i t u a t i o n of ' b a l a n c e ' . B r i t a i n ' s a t t a c h m e n t t o the F r a n c o - R u s s i a n a l l i a n c e p r i o r t o World War One and to F r a n c e p r i o r t o World War Two can be e x p l a i n e d by the r i s i n g power of Germany and a p e r c e p t i o n of a German attempt t o a t t a i n a preponder- ant p o s i t i o n on the c o n t i n e n t . S i v e r s o n and S u l l i v a n (1983 )1 i n t h e i r v a l u a b l e summary of the l i t e r a t u r e on the r e l a t i o n s h i p between the d i s t r i b u t i o n of c a p a b i 1 i t i e s . a n d war, argue t h a t no c o n c l u s i o n can be drawn on t h i s r e l a t i o n s h i p because of major m e t h o d o l o g i c a l d i f f e r e n c e s among th e v a r i o u s s t u d i e s . Thus, the q u e s t i o n of u t i l i t y of B a l a n c e of Power t h e o r y i n t h i s r e g a r d remains an open one. The i s s u e of war a l s o r e l a t e s t o the i m p l i c a t i o n s B a l a n c e o f Power t h e o r y has f o r contemporary i n t e r n a t i o n a l p o l i t i c s . As shown i n the next c h a p t e r , t h i s i s s u e i n f o r m s t he b u l k of e m p i r i c a l r e s e a r c h on the t h e o r y . G u l l i c k (1955) , Claude (1962) , and Morgenthau (1973) argue t h a t war i s one of the p o l i c i e s used by s t a t e s t o e n s u r e a r e l a t i v e ' b a l a n c e ' i n the system. J e r v i s (1985) adds t h a t war as a l e g i t i m a t e t o o l o f s t a t e p o l i c y i s n e c e s s a r y f o r the o p e r a t i o n of t h e 'Balance o f Powe r 1 . T h i s p o l i c y e n t a i l s not o n l y s y s t e m i c war t o d e f e a t a prepon- d e r a n t , but a l s o s m a l l s c a l e l i m i t e d wars which can i n c r e a s e s t a t e c a p a b i l i t i e s t h rough t e r r i t o r i a l a g g r a n d i z e m e n t . The i m p l i c a t i o n o f the t h e o r y i s q u i t e c l e a r . I t j u s t i f i e s the use of f o r c e . In so d o i n g , the t h e o r y , as a p r e s c r i p t i v e t o o l f o r p o l i c y makers, can be q u e s t i o n e d on moral grounds. If 'Balance of Power' 38 b e h a v i o r r e q u i r e s the use of f o r c e , such b e h a v i o r i s h i g h l y u n d e s i r e - a b l e , p a r t i c u l a r l y i n a w o r l d of n u c l e a r weapons. But, i t i s d i f f i - c u l t t o c o n c e p t u a l i z e a w o r l d i n w h i c h a l l s t a t e s a r e s a t i s f i e d w i t h the s t a t u s quo or the p a c i f i c r h e t o r i c of a p o t e n t i a l p r e p o n d e r a n t ( C a r r , 1939)• As long as an a n a r c h i c community of s t a t e s e x i s t s , s e c u r i t y w i l l be a paramount g o a l o f the a c t o r s i n which f o r c e may be r e q u i r e d . To i g n o r e B a l a n c e o f Power t h e o r y , because of i t s i n h e r e n t l i n k t o war i s t o undermine an a b i l i t y t o u n d e r s t a n d s t a t e b e h a v i o r . One cannot l e t a n o r m a t i v e b i a s towards peace undermine r e s e a r c h on a t h e o r y r e l a t e d t o s y s t e m / s t a t e s u r v i v a l . The m o r a l i t y problem i s a l s o r e l e v a n t t o t h e q u e s t i o n of the p r e s - e r v a t i o n of s t a t e s ( B u l l , 1977) • 'Balance of Power' b e h a v i o r may l e a d t o the e l i m i n a t i o n of some s t a t e s , even though such b e h a v i o r i s i n t e n d e d t o enhance the s u r v i v a l o f s t a t e s and the s t a t e s y s tem. How- e v e r , i n p o s i t i n g the maintenance of t h e s t a t e system as an u l t i m a t e g o a l , the t h e o r y a l s o p r o v i d e s f o r the s a c r i f i c e of some s t a t e s t o e n s u r e t h i s g o a l . For example, l e s s e r s t a t e s may be d i v i d e d among the G r e a t Powers t o en s u r e a ' b a l a n c e ' , as e v i d e n c e d by the p a r t i t i o n s of P o l a n d . F u r t h e r m o r e , the t h e o r y does not h o l d t h a t a l l the G r e a t Pow- e r s w i l l s u r v i v e . S u r v i v a l o f any s t a t e i s u l t i m a t e l y dependent on the i n d i v i d u a l s k i l l of i t s e l i t e s . F a i l u r e t o a c t p r o p e r l y i n l i g h t of t h e d i s t r i b u t i o n may l e a d t o the e l i m i n a t i o n of even a G r e a t Power. The t h e o r y s i m p l y p o s i t s c e r t a i n p r e d i c t a b l e p a t t e r n s of b e h a v i o r i n re s p o n s e t o the d i s t r i b u t i o n o f c a p a b i l i t i e s as a means t o enhance s t a t e s e c u r i t y and system s u r v i v a l . Whether s t a t e s a c t i n the p r e - d i c t e d ways i s a q u e s t i o n open t o e m p i r i c a l a n a l y s i s . 39 The m o r a l i t y q u e s t i o n i s o n l y one of the elements of the c r i t i q u e of B a l a n c e of Power t h e o r y r e l a t i v e t o the contemporary e r a . The s e c - ond element i n t h i s r e g a r d i s t h e o r e t i c a l r e l e v a n c e . T h i s element can be d i v i d e d i n t o t h r e e c a t e g o r i e s . The f i r s t has been d e a l t w i t h i n t h e p r e v i o u s s e c t i o n and c o n c e r n s the s t r u c t u r a l r e q u i r e m e n t of a min- imum number of G r e a t Powers f o r the o p e r a t i o n of the t h e o r y . The s e c - ond f o c u s e s on the impact of n u c l e a r weapons on s t a t e b e h a v i o r . The f i n a l c a t e g o r y c o n c e r n s the i d e n t i f i c a t i o n o f major changes r e l a t e d t o t h e presupposed growth of i n t e r d e p e n d e n c e and a s c e n s i o n of economic c o n s i d e r a t i o n s i n e x p l a i n i n g s t a t e b e h a v i o r . The n u c l e a r weapons c a s e r e l a t e s back t o the importance of war t o t h e t h e o r y . F o r c e i s no l o n g e r a v i a b l e o p t i o n because of t h e c a t a - s t r o p h i c i m p l i c a t i o n s of a n u c l e a r exchange between the Superpowers. Thus, t h e use of war as a means t o a l t e r the g e n e r a l d i s t r i b u t i o n i s no l o n g e r r e a s o n a b l e . But, the d e c l i n e i n the u t i l i t y o f war does not i n i t s e l f undermine the b a s i c p r o p e r t y of B a l a n c e of Power t h e o r y . S t a t e s a r e s t i l l c o n c e r n e d w i t h the d i s t r i b u t i o n of c a p a b i l i t i e s . T h i s c o n c e r n i s e v i d e n t w i t h i n the s u b - f i e l d of s t r a t e g i c s t u d i e s and i n the r e c o r d of arms c o n t r o l n e g o t i a t i o n s between the superpowers. F u r t h e r m o r e , n u c l e a r weapons a r e l i m i t e d t o a s m a l l number of e l i t e s t a t e s i n t h e system. For the r e m a i n i n g s t a t e s , war i s s t i l l a p l a u - s i b l e means t o a l t e r r e g i o n a l d i s t r i b u t i o n s , as w e l l as f o r the a c hievement of o t h e r o b j e c t i v e s i n t h e s e a r c h f o r a more s e c u r e e n v i - ronment. L a c k i n g e m p i r i c a l e v i d e n c e , n u c l e a r weapons a r e not an a p r i o r i r e a s o n f o r r e j e c t i n g B a l a n c e of Power t h e o r y . ko A s t r o n g e r case f o r r e j e c t i n g t he t h e o r y i s made on the b a s i s of the u n i q u e n e s s of t h e contemporary system. I n c r e a s i n g i n t e r d e p e n d e n c e among s t a t e s , the importance of economic f a c t o r s i n s t a t e b e h a v i o r i n c o n j u n c t i o n w i t h t he d e c l i n e of t r a d i t i o n a l m i l i t a r y f a c t o r s , and the i n f l u e n c e of do m e s t i c f o r c e s on p o l i c y combine t o undermine the a b i l i - t y o f s t a t e s t o f o l l o w B a l a n c e o f Power d i c t a t e s . Interdependence c r e a t e s complex webs of r e l a t i o n s among s t a t e s which can not e a s i l y be put a s i d e on the b a s i s of pure ' m i l i t a r y ' c a l c u l a t i o n s (Keohane and Nye, 1977)- The w e l f a r e s t a t e of today d i c t a t e s a c e n t r a l c o n c e r n f o r economic f a c t o r s w h i c h may c o n f l i c t w i t h m i l i t a r y c o n s i d e r a t i o n s . F u r t h e r m o r e , the a b i l i t y t o measure r e l a t i v e c a p a b i l i t i e s and i d e n t i f y t h r e a t s a r e much more complex due t o the i n c o n g r u i t y of m i l i t a r y and economic power. For example, Japan i s an economic power of t h e f i r s t r a n k , but has r e l a t i v e l y minor m i l i t a r y c a p a b i l i t i e s . F i n a l l y , the a b i l i t y of e l i t e s t o change p o l i c y a c c o r d i n g t o the 'ba l a n c e ' i s h i n d - e r e d g r e a t l y by d o m e s t i c f a c t o r s . A good example i s p r o v i d e d i n the r e c e n t ' I r a n g a t e ' a f f a i r where an at t e m p t e d rapproachment w i t h I r a n by the U n i t e d S t a t e s was g r e a t l y h i n d e r e d by the b a c k l a s h of d o m e s t i c o p i n i o n . However, the degree of i n t e r d e p e n d e n c e today, i n comparison t o the p a s t , remains an u n r e s o l v e d q u e s t i o n (see W a l t z , 1982; T e t r e a u l t , 1980; R o s e c r a n c e , e t . a l , 1977) ' Moreover, economic f a c t o r s a r e not n e c e s s a r i l y beyond the scope of B a l a n c e of Power t h e o r y . Perhaps the venue of B a l a n c e of Power t h e o r y has s h i f t e d from the m i l i t a r y a r e n a to t h e economic one. But, i t i s p o s s i b l e t o c o n c e i v e of the t h e o r y w i t h i n t he more l i m i t e d c o n f i n e s of economic f a c t o r s . F i n a l l y , domes- h] t i c i n f l u e n c e s a r e l a r g e l y o v e r - e m p h a s i z e d . W h i l e d o m e s t i c f o r c e s have grown w i t h m o d e r n i z a t i o n and the appearance of s o p h i s t i c a t e d spe- c i a l i n t e r e s t l o b b i e s , one s h o u l d not u n d e r e s t i m a t e t h e r o l e d o m e s t i c f o r c e s p l a y e d even i n the heyday of c a b i n e t d i p l o m a c y . A l s o , p u b l i c o p i n i o n i s s t i l l r e l a t i v e l y m a l l e a b l e . Perhaps the ground f o r dramat- i c p o l i c y changes must be l a i d more c a r e f u l l y t o d a y . But, e l i t e s s t i l l have a f a i r degree of leeway i n t h i s r e g a r d . The d r a m a t i c i n c r e a s e i n American d e f e n c e s p e n d i n g d u r i n g the Reagon a d m i n i s t r a - t i o n , a t the c o s t of a s i g n i f i c a n t i n c r e a s e i n the s i z e of the Ameri- can d e f i c i t , b ears w i t n e s s t o t h i s f a c t . The contemporary r e l e v a n c e c r i t i q u e , a l o n g w i t h the m a j o r i t y of c r i t i q u e s of B a l a n c e of Power t h e o r y , have l i t t l e e m p i r i c a l m e r i t . They imply an a p r i o r i r e j e c t i o n of the t h e o r y . U n d e r l y i n g t h i s r e j e c t i o n i s a m e t h o d o l o g i c a l problem. In t r e a t i n g the t h e o r y as a e x p l a n a t i o n of s t a t e b e h a v i o r , one p o s i t s the a b i l i t y t o measure the d i s t r i b u t i o n of c a p a b i 1 i t i e s i n a manner s i m i l a r t o the e l i t e s them- s e l v e s . In so d o i n g , one must c o n f r o n t the p l a u s i b l e gap between the o p e r a t i o n a l and p s y c h o l o g i c a l e n v i r o n m e n t s of e l i t e s (see B r e c h e r , 1972; Snyder, Bruck and S a p i n , 1962) . The former i s the a c t u a l s t a t e of a f f a i r s from the p e r s p e c t i v e of an o b s e r v e r . I t i s the r e s e a r c h - er 1 s measurement of the d i s t r i b u t i o n . The l a t t e r i s t h e s t a t e of a f f a i r s as p e r c e i v e d by the e l i t e s t h e m s e l v e s . There i s no a s s u r a n c e t h a t the two e n v i r o n m e n t s a r e s y m m e t r i c a l . Thus, the measurement of t h e d i s t r i b u t i o n and the accompanying b e h a v i o r can o n l y p r o v i d e an a p p r o x i m a t i o n of t h e r e a l w o r l d and e l i t e p e r c e p t i o n s w i t h i n . i*2 The problem i s c l e a r i n the c a s e of war. S y s t e m i c war may o c c u r a t e i t h e r r e l a t i v e e q u a l i t y or i n e q u a l i t y and s t i l l be subsumed, i n one s e n s e , under B a l a n c e of Power t h e o r y . At r e l a t i v e e q u a l i t y from t h e o b s e r v e r v i e w p o i n t , war may o c c u r because of a m i s c a l c u l a t i o n on t h e p a r t of e l i t e s , the use of d i f f e r e n t measures between o b s e r v e r and a c t o r , and/or an e l i t e p r e c e p t i o n of a f u t u r e s h i f t i n the b a l a n c e . As such, the ' o p e r a t i o n a l ' b a l a n c e i s one of e q u a l i t y , but the domi- nant ' p s y c h o l o g i c a l ' b a l a n c e i s one of i n e q u a l i t y . In t h i s c a s e , war i s e x p l a i n e d by the t h e o r y , but r e f u t e d by the e v i d e n c e d e r i v e d by t h e r e s e a r c h e r . Now, t h e above example r e p r e s e n t s a problem of t h e o r e t i c a l s p e c i f i - c a t i o n , above and beyond the measurement problem. I t i s s o l v e d by s p e c i f y i n g , as shown i n the f i r s t s e c t i o n , t h a t B a l a n c e of Power t h e o - ry p r e d i c t s s y s t e m i c war i n a s i t u a t i o n of i n e q u a l i t y . The c o n t r a d i c - t o r y e v i d e n c e would r e q u i r e a d i f f e r e n t t h e o r e t i c a l e x p l a n a t i o n , not B a l a n c e of Power, i n w h i c h the d i s t r i b u t i o n of c a p a b i l i t i e s i s s t i l l t h e key independent v a r i a b l e . N o n e t h e l e s s , the d i f f e r e n c e between t h e o p e r a t i o n a l and p s y c h o l o g i c a l e n v i r o n m e n t s i s a m e t h o d o l o g i c a l problem w h i c h d e f i e s any u l t i m a t e s o l u t i o n . O u t s i d e of s p e c i f y i n g t h e meas- urement p r o c e d u r e i n l i g h t of the dominant i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s by h i s t o r i - ans, who i n d i c a t e the most p r o b a b l e i n d i c a t o r s of power i n the p a s t , t h e o n l y s o l u t i o n i s t o examine a l a r g e enough body of t i m e t o uncover any c o n s i s t e n t p a t t e r n of b e h a v i o r . In so d o i n g , some c o n f i d e n c e can be p l a c e d i n one's f i n d i n g s t h a t t h e r e l a t i o n s h i p s u n covered a r e r e a - s o n a b l y r e p r e s e n t a t i v e of the r e a l w o r l d from w h i c h the o b s e r v a t i o n s ar e t a k e n . 43 The f i n a l p o i n t c o n c e r n s the r e l a t i o n s h i p between the t h e o r y and the e l i t e s t h e m s e l v e s . At the h e a r t of t h e t h e o r y i s an a s s u m p t i o n about the importance of one s i n g l e v a r i a b l e i n u n d e r s t a n d i n g the p o l i - c i e s u n d e r t a k e n by e l i t e s . T h i s v a r i a b l e i s t h e d i s t r i b u t i o n of capa- b i l i t i e s . In so d o i n g , o t h e r v a r i a b l e s a r e i g n o r e d f o r r e a s o n s of p a r s i m o n y . One s h o u l d e x p e c t t h a t the above v a r i a b l e w i l l o n l y e x p l a i n some p o r t i o n of b e h a v i o r . For example, the t h e o r y can p r o v i d e o n l y a p a r t i a l e x p l a n a t i o n f o r a l l i a n c e s . As b r i e f l y noted i n the next c h a p t e r , t h e r e a r e s e v e r a l o t h e r e x p l a n a t i o n s f o r a l l i a n c e s w h i c h a r e l i k e l y t o p l a y a major r o l e i n the c a l c u l u s of e l i t e s . But i n p r o v i d - i n g such an e x p l a n a t i o n , a p i e c e of the o v e r a l l p u z z l e emerges. The p i e c e , a f t e r r e p l i c a t i o n , p r o v i d e s a b u i l d i n g b l o c of an o v e r a l l grand t h e o r y about s t a t e b e h a v i o r . In t r e a t i n g B a l a n c e of Power t h e o r y as a p o l i c y t h e o r y , the problems of p u t t i n g p i e c e s t o g e t h e r can be a d d r e s s e d . Chapter I I THE DISTRIBUTION OF CAPABILITIES AND ALLIANCES In the s e a r c h f o r s e c u r i t y , s t a t e s a r e c o n c e r n e d w i t h the r e l a t i v e d i s t r i b u t i o n o f c a p a b i l i t i e s . How c a p a b i l i t i e s a r e d i s t r i b u t e d among s t a t e s i n g e n e r a l , and t h e Great Powers i n p a r t i c u l a r , a f f e c t the b e h a v i o r and p o l i c i e s of s t a t e s . Three d i s t i n c t p o l i c y o p t i o n s a r e used by s t a t e s f o r the purpose of a l t e r i n g the d i s t r i b u t i o n . 1 ' The f i r s t o p t i o n i s i n t e r n a l t o the s t a t e . I t encompasses the a l l o c a t i o n of r e s o u r c e s t o s e c u r i t y needs i n t h e form of e x p l i c i t - m i 1 i t a r y capa- b i l i t i e s . The second and t h i r d o p t i o n s a r e e x t e r n a l l y b a sed. S t a t e s may seek a l l i e s as a means t o augment t h e i r c a p a b i l i t i e s . S t a t e s may a l s o use f o r c e t o a t t a i n e i t h e r more r e s o u r c e s t hrough t e r r i t o r i a l a g g randizement or t o reduce the c a p a b i l i t i e s of a n o t h e r s t a t e . 2 0 The c e n t r a l c o n c e r n of t h i s s t u d y i s the r e l a t i o n s h i p between the d i s t r i b u t i o n of c a p a b i l i t i e s and a l l i a n c e s . The need t o examine t h i s r e l a t i o n s h i p i s a f u n c t i o n of s e v e r a l c o n s i d e r a t i o n s . A l l i a n c e s a r e i d e n t i f i e d as one of the c e n t r a l e l ements i n the o p e r a t i o n of the 1 5 S e v e r a l a d d i t i o n a l o p t i o n s a r e a l s o i d e n t i f i e d i n the l i t e r a t u r e (Morgenthau, 1973; O r g a n s k i , 1968; C l a u d e , 1962; and R o s e c r a n c e , 1963)- However, r e s o u r c e a l l o c a t i o n , a l l i a n c e s and war a r e the most p r o m i n e n t . 2 0 The t h r e e o p t i o n s a r e not s t r i c t l y independent of each o t h e r . S t a t e s may s i m u l t a n e o u s l y adopt a l l t h r e e p o l i c i e s . In p a r t i c u l a r , the d e c i s i o n t o use f o r c e g e n e r a l l y e n t a i l s a marked i n c r e a s e i n m i l i t a r y c a p a b i l i t i e s t h r o u g h m o b i l i z a t i o n and an a t t e m p t t o g a i n a l l i e s as a means t o i n c r e a s e the p r o b a b i l i t y of v i c t o r y . The i n t e r - r e l a t i o n s h i p between t h e use of f o r c e and the o t h e r two o p t i o n s i s p r i m a r i l y a f u n c t i o n of type of war b e i n g e n t e r t a i n e d . - hh - 'Balance of Power' (Claude, 19&2: 8 9 ) . A l l i a n c e s , i n t h i s r e g a r d , have not been e m p i r i c a l l y examined. As shown below, e m p i r i c a l r e s e a r c h l i n k e d d i r e c t l y or i n d i r e c t l y t o B a l a n c e of Power t h e o r y i s dominated by the i s s u e o f war. Moreover, s t u d i e s o f a l l i a n c e i n gen- e r a l have f o c u s e d on i n t r a and i n t e r - a l l i a n c e b e h a v i o r , r a t h e r . t h a n a l l i a n c e f o r m a t i o n / d i s s o l u t i o n . E m p i r i c a l s t u d i e s of a l l i a n c e forma- t i o n / d i s s o l u t i o n have i g n o r e d a B a l a n c e of Power based e x p l a n a t i o n . F i n a l l y , i n e x a m i n i n g the r e l a t i o n s h i p between the d i s t r i b u t i o n of c a p a b i l i t i e s and a l l i a n c e s , e v i d e n c e can be g e n e r a t e d t o shed l i g h t on the a l l i a n c e based concept of p o l a r i z a t i o n . A l t h o u g h p o l a r i z a t i o n i s d i r e c t l y l i n k e d t o a r e l a t i v e l y independent body of t h e o r y , the a f o r e - mentioned p o l a r i t y d e b a t e , l e v e l s o f p o l a r i z a t i o n , d e f i n e d as the p a t - t e r n of a l l i a n c e s i n a system, a r e s u s c e p t i b l e t o a B a l a n c e of Power e x p l a n a t i o n . 2.1 EXISTING STUDIES ON THE DISTRIBUTION OF POWER AND ALLIANCES B e f o r e d e t a i l i n g the hypotheses used t o t e s t the u t i l i t y of B a l a n c e of Power t h e o r y as a e x p l a n a t i o n o f a l l i a n c e f o r m a t i o n / d i s s o l u t i o n , i t i s n e c e s s a r y t o p l a c e t h i s a n a l y s i s f i r m l y w i t h i n e x i s t i n g s t u d i e s on the d i s t r i b u t i o n o f power or c a p a b i l i t i e s and a l l i a n c e s . I t i s b o t h t r u e and f a l s e t o say t h a t B a l a n c e of Power t h e o r y i s the f o u n d a t i o n f o r r e s e a r c h on c a p a b i l i t i e s and a l l i a n c e s . I t i s t r u e because a l a r g e p o r t i o n of t h i s r e s e a r c h i s f o r m u l a t e d w i t h some r e f e r e n c e t o the c o n cept B a l a n c e of Power. A l s o , some a u t h o r s e x p l i c i t l y draw hypotheses from B a l a n c e of Power t h e o r y . In so d o i n g , the d i s t r i b u - t i o n of c a p a b i l i t i e s , o p e r a t i o n a 1 i z e d i n a v a r i e t y of d i f f e r e n t ways, 46 s e r v e s as the independent v a r i a b l e . I t i s a l s o f a l s e because the t h e o r y i s o f t e n t r e a t e d i n a c u r s o r y r a t h e r than a s u b s t a n t i v e manner. In p a r t i c u l a r , a u t h o r s tend t o l i n k t h e i r t r e a t m e n t s of B a l a n c e of Power t h e o r y t o the M o r g e n t h a u 1 s c o n c e p t u a l i z a t i o n . In o t h e r c a s e s , B a l a n c e of Power hypotheses a r e l i n k e d t o o t h e r b o d i e s of r e s e a r c h , such as K a p l a n ' s (1957) work on sys t e m s , or s c h o l a r s a c c e p t a m u l t i p l - i c i t y of v e r s i o n s and proceed t o t e s t d i s t i n c t models w i t h o u t an ade- quate t h e o r e t i c a l f o u n d a t i o n . T h i s i s not t o argue t h a t t h e r e e x i s t s a p a u c i t y of e v i d e n c e which can be r e l a t e d t o B a l a n c e of Power t h e o r y , p a r t i c u l a r i 1 y w i t h r e g a r d s t o e m p i r i c a l r e s e a r c h i n w h i c h measures of war s e r v e as the dependent v a r i a b l e . Both the d i s t r i b u t i o n of c a p a b i l i t i e s and a l l i a n c e s a r e used as e x p l a n a t i o n s , or more a c c u r a t e l y c o r r e l a t e s , of w a r , 2 1 a l t h o u g h the use of a l l i a n c e s as a s e p a r a t e v a r i a b l e i n t h i s r e g a r d i s not d i r e c t l y l i n k e d t o B a l a n c e of Power t h e o r y . In the c a s e of the d i s t r i b u t i o n of c a p a b i l i t i e s , measured as a system a g g r e g a t e or d y a d i c r a t i o , t he e q u a l i t y - p e a c e h y p o t h e s i s i s d i r e c t l y l i n k e d t o B a l a n c e of Power t h e o - r y , both by i t s p r o p o n e n t s ( S i n g e r , Bremer, and S t u c k e y , 1972; F e r r i s , 1973) and i t s opponents (Organski and K u g l e r , 1980; Garnham, 1976; 1976b; Weede, 1976). The c o m p a r a t i v e m e r i t of the f i n d i n g s a r e l i m i t - ed by s u b s t a n t i v e m e t h o d o l o g i c a l d i f f e r e n c e s among the v a r i o u s s t u d - i e s . F u r t h e r m o r e , S i v e r s o n and S u l l i v a n (1983) a l s o c i t e t h e f a i l u r e of t h i s r e s e a r c h t o i n c o r p o r a t e a l l i a n c e s . They c o r r e c t l y p o i n t out 2 1 War i s g e n e r a l l y c o n c e p t u a l i z e d i n terms of i t s o c c u r r e n c e , d u r a - t i o n , and or magnitude, a l t h o u g h s t u d i e s v a r y c o n s i d e r a b l y i n terms of which measure i s chosen. Some s t u d i e s , such as Garnham (1976b) a l s o i n c l u d e major d i s p u t e s c o n t a i n i n g the p o t e n t i a l f o r war. For a c r i t i q u e of the o p e r a t i o n a 1 i z a t i o n of war see Most and S t a r r (1983) and Duval 1 (1976) . 47 t h a t : " N e g l e c t i n g t h i s f a c t o r i s u n f a i r i n an adequate t e s t of the b a l a n c e o f power t h e o r y s i n c e one of i t s c e n t r a l t e n e t s i s t h a t n a t i o n s use a l l i a n c e s t o augment power." ( p . 4 9 2 ) . 2 2 S i m i l a r l y , a l a r g e body of r e s e a r c h on the r e l a t i o n s h i p between a l l i a n c e s and war have i g n o r e d t he d i s t r i b u t i o n o f c a p a b i 1 i t i i e s . S i n g e r and Small (1968), Ostrom and Hoole (1972) , M i d l a r s k y (1975) , S i v e r s o n and K i n g (1979) . Sabrosky (1980) , and Levy (1981), u s i n g a v a r i e t y o f d i f f e r e n t methods, time f r a m e s , and a c t o r s , t e s t p r o p o s i - t i o n s r e l a t e d t o the n o t i o n t h a t a l l i a n c e s a r e r e l a t e d t o war. W h i l e t h e s e s t u d i e s a r e not e x p l i c i t l y drawn from the B a l a n c e of Power l i t - e r a t u r e , they p r o v i d e some e v i d e n c e of the i n t e r - r e l a t i o n s h i p between two of t h e p o l i c y o p t i o n s w i t h i n B a l a n c e of Power t h e o r y . 2 3 S e v e r a l s t u d i e s have i n t e g r a t e d the two v a r i a b l e s t o c r e a t e a sum- mary measure of the d i s t r i b u t i o n of c a p a b i l i t i e s a d j u s t e d f o r a l l i a n c e membership. In so d o i n g , the c a p a b i l i t i e s of s t a t e s i n a l l i a n c e t o g e t h e r a r e a g g r e g a t e d . Bueno de M e s q u i t a (1973) i n t e g r a t e s c a p a b i l - i t i e s i n t o h i s o p e r a t i o n a 1 i z a t i o n of p o l a r i t y t o t e s t t he aforemen- t i o n e d e q u a l i t y - p e a c e p r o p o s i t i o n . P o l a r i t y , i n t h i s c o n t e x t , i s d e f i n e d as e q u i v a l e n t t o the number o f independent G r e a t Powers and 2 2 Moul ( I 9 8 6 ) a l s o r a i s e s the i s s u e of a l l i a n c e s i n h i s c o m p a r a t i v e a n a l y s i s of the l i t e r a t u r e i n t h i s a r e a . He argues t h a t t he f a i l - u r e t o t a k e i n t o a c c o u n t the h i s t o r i c a l c o n t e x t , i n c l u s i v e of con- s i d e r a t i o n s r e l a t e d t o p o l i t i c a l c a p a b i l i t i e s ( i . e . i n t e r n a l s t a - b i l i t y ) , h i n d e r s t h e v a l u e of t h e s e s t u d i e s . 2 3 W a l l a c e (1973) a l s o examines t h i s r e l a t i o n s h i p , but i n c l u d e s con- f i g u r a t i o n a l p r o p e r t i e s of a l l i a n c e g r o u p i n g s and n o n - m i l i t a r y a l i g n m e n t d i m e n s i o n s t o examine the r e l a t i o n s h i p between p o l a r i z a - t i o n , c r o s s - c u t t i n g , and war. As such , t he s t u d y i s e x p l i c i t l y based on the Deutsch and S i n g e r (1967) t h e s i s , not B a l a n c e of Pow- e r . S e v e r a l o t h e r s t u d i e s a r e a l s o p a r t i a l l y r e l e v a n t , but a r e not d i r e c t l y r e l a t e d t o B a l a n c e o f Power Theory. For example, see Way- mon e t . a l . (1983) and Sabrosky (1985)- 48 b l o c s ( a l l i a n c e s ) c o n t a i n i n g G reat Powers. S t o l 1 (1984), u s i n g t h e same d e f i n i t i o n of p o l a r i t y , examines one of the major e x p l a n a t i o n s p r o v i d e d by B a l a n c e of Power t h e o r y ; t he r e c u r r e n c e of a r e l a t i v e equal d i s t r i b u t i o n of c a p a b i l i t i e s among the G r e a t Powers over t i m e . He argues t h a t a 'bala n c e of power' system i s c h a r a c t e r i z e d by p e r i o d - i c major d i s r u p t i o n s i n the d i s t r i b u t i o n e q u i l i b r i u m , f o l l o w e d by movement back towards e q u i l i b r i u m . In so d o i n g , he employs Bueno de M e s q u i t a ' s methods t o d e v e l o p a b l o c c o n c e n t r a t i o n s c o r e . The r e s u l t - i n g i n d e x , v a r y i n g from 0 (an equal amount of c a p a b i l i t i e s h e l d by a l l b l o c s ) t o 1 ( a l l c a p a b i l i t i e s c o n c e n t r a t e d i n one b l o c ) , i s s e n s i t i v e t o a l t e r a t i o n s i n a l l i a n c e s , the t i g h t n e s s of a l l i a n c e c l u s t e r s , and r e l a t i v e c a p a b i l i t i e s . He f i n d s e v i d e n c e t o s u p p o r t t he p r e s e n c e of a b a l a n c e of power system from 1824 t o 1914, and i t s c o n t i n u e d o p e r a - t i o n , w i t h some r e s t r i c t i o n s up t o 1 9 6 5 • 2 4 S t o l 1 and Champion (1985) seek t o e x p l a i n t he c o n f l i c t i n g f i n d i n g s i n t h e l i t e r a t u r e w i t h r e g a r d t o the d i s t r i b u t i o n , i n c l u s i v e and e x c l u s i v e o f a d j u s t m e n t s f o r a l l i a n c e s , and war. They add a measure of G r e a t Power s a t i s f a c t i o n w i t h t he s t a t u s quo, and argue t h a t t h e key i s s u e i n the d e b a t e over e q u a l i t y v e r s u s preponderance depends on the e x t e n t any s t a t e can be t r u s t e d w i t h power or s a t i s f i e d w i t h i t s s t a t u s . In so d o i n g , t h e i r argument i s e x p l i c i t l y l i n k e d t o one of the key a s s u m p t i o n s i n B a l a n c e of Power t h e o r y i d e n t i f i e d by Claude (1962); s t a t e s can not be t r u s t e d w i t h i n o r d i n a t e amounts of power. They c o n c l u d e t h a t t he e q u a l i t y - p e a c e t h e s i s i s s u p p o r t e d i n c o n d i - I t s h o u l d be noted t h a t S t o l l ' s t e s t i s r e s t r i c t e d t o the Gr e a t Powers, assuming t h a t minor power c a p a b i l i t i e s have l i t t l e e f f e c t on t he G r e a t Power c l u s t e r s . T h i s r e s t r i c t i o n l i m i t s t he s t u d y ' s o v e r a l l a b i l i t y t o c a p t u r e t he ess e n c e of B a l a n c e of Power t h e o r y . 49 t i o n s o f g e n e r a l d i s s a t i s f a c t i o n , and the preponderance-peace t h e s i s i s s u p p o r t e d i n c o n d i t i o n s of p r e p o n d e r a n t s a t i s f a c t i o n . 2 5 The above s t u d i e s , as a whole, have i g n o r e d t he a p r i o r i r e l a t i o n - s h i p between the d i s t r i b u t i o n and a l l i a n c e f o r m a t i o n / d i s s o l u t i o n . However, one stu d y has u n d e r t a k e n an e x a m i n a t i o n of t h i s r e l a t i o n s h i p w i t h i n a much l a r g e r model of Gr e a t Power s e c u r i t y dynamics i n the p e r i o d 1820-191. Cusak (1978) examines the c o n d i t i o n s whereby a Power w i l l a l t e r i t s l e v e l of a l l i a n c e commitments. He t e s t s t h r e e v a r i a - t i o n s o f t h i s model, which i n c l u d e a s p e c t s of a Power's c a p a b i l i t i e s i n r e l a t i o n t o the o t h e r Powers among seven independent v a r i a b l e s i n h i s r e g r e s s i o n e q u a t i o n . The v a r i a t i o n s a ttempt t o acc o u n t f o r t h r e e d i f f e r e n t t y p e s of s e c u r i t y a s p i r a t i o n s : a c o n s t a n t a s p i r a t i o n i n wh i c h a s t a t e ' s d e s i r e d l e v e l of power v i s - a - v i s o t h e r powers remains c o n s t a n t over time and a s t a t e ' s b e h a v i o r f l u c t u a t e s o n l y as i t s r e l a - t i v e p o s i t i o n i s a l t e r e d ; a power a s p i r a t i o n whereby a s t a t e a d j u s t s i t s d e s i r e d needs a c c o r d i n g t o the upward or downward movement i n i t s 2 5 The above t h r e e s t u d i e s can be c r i t i q u e d on s e v e r a l c o u n t s , i n c l u - s i v e of problems w i t h the c o n c e p t u a l i z a t i o n of p o l a r i t y , t he t r e a t - ment of a l l i a n c e s , and, as W a l l a c e (1985) p o i n t s o u t , the method f o r i d e n t i f y i n g p o l e s . In p a r t i c u l a r , t he s t u d i e s f a i l t o d i s t i n - g u i s h the l e v e l o f a l l i a n c e b o n d i n g s u f f i c i e n t f o r a g g r e g a t i n g c a p a b i l i t i e s , i n c l u s i v e of the d i f f e r e n t c l a s s e s o f a l l i a n c e s i d e n - t i f i e d by S i n g e r and Small (1968) . Schroe d e r (1975) and Moul (1983) r a i s e s u b s t a n t i a l q u e s t i o n s about the l e g i t i m a c y o f aggre - g a t i n g c a p a b i l i t i e s f o r c e r t a i n h i s t o r i c a l a l l i a n c e s . They p o i n t ou t t h a t s e v e r a l s t a t e s formed a l l i a n c e s w i t h p o w e r f u l s t a t e s as a means t o r e s t r a i n t h e i r b e h a v i o r . The c o n c e p t u a l and o p e r a t i o n a l q u e s t i o n s , where r e l e v a n t , a r e d e a l t w i t h i n C h a p t e r s Four and F i v e . The q u e s t i o n o f a g g r e g a t i o n i s o u t s i d e the p u r v i e w o f t h i s a n a l y s i s . The purpose here i s t o e s t a b l i s h t he r e l a t i o n s h i p between the d i s t r i b u t i o n and a l l i a n c e f o r m a t i o n / d i s s o l u t i o n . B a l - ance of Power t h e o r y does make a d i r e c t l i n k between a l l i a n c e s and c a p a b i l i t y a g g r e g a t i o n . However, t h i s l i n k i s not n e c e s s a r y f o r t h i s a n a l y s i s . A l l i a n c e s , f o r t h e purpose of a g g r e g a t i o n and/or r e s t r a i n t , s h o u l d f o l l o w t he same l o g i c i n r e l a t i o n t o the d i s t r i - b u t i o n . 50 r e l a t i v e power p o s i t i o n ; and a peer based a s p i r a t i o n d e f i n e d as the p r o p e n s i t y f o r a s t a t e t o emulate the average p e r c e i v e d power p o s i t i o n of a l l the Great Powers. He f i n d s t h a t n e i t h e r of the t h r e e a s p i r a - t i o n a ssumptions a r e s u p e r i o r t o any o t h e r , and c o n c l u d e s t h a t t h e o v e r a 11 model 1 s ab i 1 i t y t o p r e d i c t changes i n a l i i ance t i es i s s u s p e c t . A l t h o u g h t h e r e i s g r e a t m e r i t i n the b r e a d t h of h i s s t u d y , t h e r e a r e s e v e r a l problems, p a r t i c u l a r l y i n r e l a t i o n t o B a l a n c e of Power t h e o r y and the r e l a t i o n s h i p under e x a m i n a t i o n h e r e . H i s f i n d i n g s p r o - v i d e l i t t l e , i f any, i n d i c a t i o n o f the r e l a t i v e u t i l i t y of B a l a n c e of Power t h e o r y . W h i l e he does d i s c u s s and draw elements from the l i t e r - a t u r e on the b a l a n c e of power, t h e r e i s no c l e a r f o r m u l a t e d l i n k a g e between the t h e o r y and h i s p r o p o s i t i o n s . Cusack a c c e p t s the m u l t i p l - i c i t y of i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s of t h e 'Balance o f Power 1 and o f f e r s a s y n t h e s i s as the b a s i s f o r the s e t of f a c t o r s i n c o r p o r a t e d i n t o h i s model. T h i s s y n t h e s i s , however, i s a t the base of h i s m u l t i - c o l l i - n e a r i t y problem, w h i c h e x p l a i n s t o some degree h i s n e g l i g i b l e r e s u l t s . Moreover, the att e m p t t o e x p l a i n a l t e r a t i o n s i n a l l i a n c e commitments becomes l o s t i n the c o m p l e x i t y of h i s model and r e s u l t i n g e q u a t i o n s . A f u r t h e r problem w i t h h i s a n a l y s i s stems from h i s f a i l u r e t o i n c l u d e l e s s e r s t a t e s . Cusak i s o n l y c o n c e r n e d w i t h the Great Powers and a l l i a n c e s among them. W h i l e he i d e n t i f i e s t h e impo r t a n c e of l e s s - er s t a t e s from a g e o - p o l i t i c a l p e r s p e c t i v e , he argues t h a t they a r e i n c o n s e q u e n t i a l i n terms of t h e i r c o n t r i b u t i o n t o G r e a t Power c a p a b i l - i t i e s and s e c u r i t y . T h i s a s s u m p t i o n i s based on h i s f i n d i n g t h a t t h e Gr e a t Powers never h e l d l e s s than 60% of t o t a l system c a p a b i l i t i e s , 51 and l e s s e r s t a t e p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n a l l i a n c e s r e p r e s e n t e d o n l y a s m a l l p e r c e n t a g e of t o t a l a l l i a n c e s . However, the l e s s than 40% c a p a b i l i - t i e s h e l d by l e s s e r s t a t e s does not mean t h a t t h i s p o r t i o n i s e q u a l l y d i s t r i b u t e d among them. L e s s e r s t a t e s a r e not e q u a l , and thos e s t a t e s i n t h e upper e c h e l o n c o u l d r e a d i l y have p r o v i d e d a s u b s t a n t i a l c o n t r i - b u t i o n t o G r e a t Power s e c u r i t y . F u r t h e r m o r e , a low p e r c e n t a g e of t o t a l a l l i a n c e s o b s c u r e s t he f a c t t h a t , u n t i l 1911. l e s s e r s t a t e s p a r - t i c i p a t e d o n l y i n a l l i a n c e s c o n t a i n i n g a t l e a s t one Gr e a t P o w e r . 2 6 T h i s f a c t p r o v i d e s some i n d i c a t i o n of a r o l e f o r l e s s e r s t a t e s i n r e l a t i o n t o Gr e a t Power s e c u r i t y . F i n a l l y , Cusack does not d i f f e r e n t i a t e between c l a s s e s of a l l i a n c - e s , and t r e a t s d e f e n s i v e p a c t s , n o n - a g g r e s s i o n / n e u t r a l i t y p a c t s , and e n t e n t e s as i d e n t i c a l . T h i s t r e a t m e n t may have been p a r t i a l l y m o t i - v a t e d by s t a t i s t i c a l r e q u i r e m e n t s f o r a l a r g e enough sample e s p e c i a l l y g i v e n h i s r e j e c t i o n o f l e s s e r s t a t e s . But the f a i l u r e t o a d d r e s s t he s u b s t a n t i v e d i f f e r e n c e s between them may e x p l a i n h i s i n a b i l i t y t o uncover a s i g n i f i c a n t r e l a t i o n s h i p . I t i s p o s s i b l e t h a t o n l y one c l a s s of a l l i a n c e s , d e f e n s e p a c t s , i s e x p l i c a b l e i n terms of a B a l a n c e of Power based e x p l a n a t i o n . Two o t h e r s t u d i e s p r o v i d e some i n t e r e s t i n g i n f o r m a t i o n r e l a t i v e t o the r e l a t i o n s h i p between t h e d i s t r i b u t i o n and a l l i a n c e s . Both Sabro- sky (1975) and Kennedy (1984) examine the d i s t r i b u t i o n of power among the two G r e a t Powers and t h e i r r e s p e c t i v e dominant a l l i a n c e groups 2 6 The f i r s t a l l i a n c e among o n l y l e s s e r s t a t e s was the B a l k a n a l l i a n c e c o n s i s t i n g of B u l g a r i a , S e r b i a , and Roumania. The ass u m p t i o n a l s o c o n t r a d i c t s M i d l a r s k y ' s (1981) f i n d i n g s on the importance of l e s s e r s t a t e s t o the b a l a n c e . However, Cusack's s t u d y was completed p r i o r t o t he M i d l a r s k y work. 52 T a b l e I Comparison of P r e - W o r l d War One C a p a b i l i t y Shares Sabrosky (a) Kennedy (b) 1900 1905 1909 1913 1900 1913 F ranee 10.1 9 .8 9-6 10.4 36 .8 57-3 Russ i a 16. 1 16.5 16.5 I 6 . 5 47 .5 76 .6 Fr-Rus 26.1 26 .3 26 .1 2 6 . 9 84 . 3 . 133.9 Br i t a i n 20 .6 16.5 15.0 14.1 100.0 127.2 T r . E n t . 41 . 1 40.1 — 261.1 Germany 16.7 16 .9 17.2 18.2 71 .2 137.7 Aus/Hun 6.1 6.2 6 .4 6.1 25 .6 40 . 7 Ger-A/H 22 .8 23.1 23 .6 24 . 3 9 6 . 8 178.4 a) - P e r c e n t a g e of T o t a l C a p a b i 1 i t i i e s f o r the System b) - T o t a l I n d u s t r i a l P r o d u c t i o n r e l a t i v e t o B r i t a i n i n 1900 a t 100 p r i o r t o World War One ( T a b l e I ) . S a b r o s k y , r e l y i n g on the d a t a from the COW p r o j e c t and u s i n g the p e r c e n t a g e s h a r e s of c a p a b i l i t i e s h e l d by i n d i v i d u a l G r e a t Powers, f i n d s a r e l a t i v e b a l a n c e between the F r a n - c o - R u s s i a n and Austro-German a l l i a n c e s i n 1905- W i t h t h e c r e a t i o n of the T r i p l e E n t e n t e , he f i n d s a s i g n i f i c a n t imbalance i n i t s f a v o r . Kennedy, u s i n g a measure o f T o t a l I n d u s t r i a l P o t e n t i a l , r e v e a l s a r e l - a t i v e b a l a n c e between the two a l l i a n c e s and G r e a t B r i t a i n i n 1900. In 1913» the Austro-German a l l i a n c e has a marked s u p e r i o r i t y over the F r a n c o - R u s s i a n a l l i a n c e , which i s s i g n i f i c a n t l y a l t e r e d i n f a v o r of 53 the l a t e r w i t h the a d d i t i o n o f Great B r i t a i n t h rough t he T r i p l e E n t e n t e . The c o n f l i c t i n g f i n d i n g s on the degree of b a l a n c e between the two s t u d i e s may be a t t r i b u t e d t o d i f f e r e n t measures of c a p a b i l i t i e s . How- e v e r , the f i n d i n g s as a whole r a i s e two i n t e r e s t i n g q u e s t i o n s . F i r s t , i s i t i n t u i t i v e l y r e a s o n a b l e t o t r e a t t he two a l l i a n c e s i n the same manner as the E n t e n t e ? W h i l e few a u t h o r s would argue a g a i n s t t he a g g r e g a t i o n of c a p a b i l i t i e s ( f o r the two major a l l i a n c e s , t he two sepa- r a t e e n t e n t e agreements which c r e a t e d the T r i p l e E n t e n t e were non-Eu- ropean i n f o c u s . As such , a g g r e g a t i n g B r i t i s h c a p a b i 1 i t i e s w i t h F r a n - c o - R u s s i a n may be q u e s t i o n a b l e from a h i s t o r i c a l . p e r s p e c t i v e . 2 7 Second, t h e f i n d i n g s p r o v i d e c o n f l i c t i n g e v i d e n c e i n r e l a t i o n t o B a l - ance o f Power t h e o r y . Kennedy's f i n d i n g s s u p p o r t a B a l a n c e of Power e x p l a n a t i o n . B r i t a i n moves i n t o a l l i a n c e w i t h France and R u s s i a i n a s i t u a t i o n of i n e q u a l i t y among the c o n t i n e n t a l a l l i a n c e s . S a b r o s k y ' s d a t a show a s i t u a t i o n of r e l a t i v e e q u a l i t y a t the time of B r i t a i n ' s adherence t o the F r a n c o - R u s s i a n a l l i a n c e . From a d y a d i c p e r s p e c t i v e , b oth s t u d i e s show B r i t a i n moving i n t o a l l i a n c e w i t h the r i s e of German c a p a b i l i t i e s t o a p o s i t i o n of s u p e r i o r i t y . However, the d a t a does not show the f o r m a t i o n d a t e o f the a l l i a n c e s r e l a t i v e t o t h e d i s t r i b u t i o n . 2 7 Two d i s t i n c t arguments can be made i n t h i s r e g a r d . F i r s t , t he e n t e n t e d i d not c l a r i f y B r i t a i n ' s o p p o s i t i o n t o Germany, and i n the e v e n t s o f August 1914 Germany q u e s t i o n e d B r i t a i n ' s w i l l i n g n e s s t o f i g h t a l o n g s i d e the F r a n c o - R u s s i a n a l l i a n c e . Second, Germany r e c - o g n i z e d the l i n k a g e , but c a l c u l a t e d t h a t B r i t i s h c a p a b i l i t i e s would have a n e g l i g i b l e impact i n a q u i c k war. Both f i n d s u p p o r t w i t h i n t h e v o l u m i n o u s l i t e r a t u r e on th e o r i g i n s of World War One. The most r e c e n t s t u d i e s i n t h i s r e g a r d i n c l u d e Kagan (1987)> Lynn-Jones (1986) , Sagan (1986) , Snyder (1984), Layne (1981) , and K a h l e r (1979-80) . Depending on one's i n t e r p r e t a t i o n , a case can be made e i t h e r way f o r a g g r e g a t i o n . As noted i n Chapter Four, a case can be made f o r t r e a t i n g the A n g l o - F r e n c h e n t e n t e i n more f o r m a l terms, but not the A n g l o - R u s s i a n e n t e n t e . 54 W i t h o u t such e v i d e n c e , no c o n c l u s i o n can be reached on the t h e o r e t i c a l m e r i t of B a l a n c e of Power t h e o r y . The f i n a l body of l i t e r a t u r e r e l e v a n t t o t h i s a n a l y s i s c o n c e r n s r e s e a r c h on a l l i a n c e f o r m a t i o n . 2 8 A l t h o u g h t h e r e e x i s t s a p a u c i t y of e m p i r i c a l s t u d i e s on t h i s q u e s t i o n (Ward, 1981; Job, 1980), some s t u d - i e s do e x i s t which a r e germane t o B a l a n c e of. Power t h e o r y . R u s s e t t (19b8) p o s i t s a r e l a t i o n s h i p between t h e r e l a t i v e power p o s i t i o n s of s t a t e s and a l l i a n c e f o r m a t i o n . H i s argument i s c o n s i s t e n t w i t h a B a l - ance of Power e x p l a n a t i o n . U n f o r t u n a t e l y , h i s o p e r a t i o n a l t h e o r y remains an o u t l i n e l a c k i n g e m p i r i c a l e v i d e n c e . Walt (1987) p r o v i d e s the most r e c e n t and r e l e v a n t e m p i r i c a l s t u d y on a l l i a n c e f o r m a t i o n . He examines the tendency of s t a t e s t o 'b a l a n c e ' or 'bandwagon' i n a s i t u a t i o n of imbalance i n the system. U s i n g the M i d d l e E a s t as h i s t e s t e n v i r o n m e n t , he f i n d s s u p p o r t f o r the ' b a l a n c i n g ' h y p o t h e s i s . However, W a l t ' s t h e o r e t i c a l f o u n d a t i o n d i f f e r s s i g n i f i c a n t l y from B a l a n c e of Power t h e o r y . H i s s t u d y i s based on 'Balance of T h r e a t ' t h e o r y and goes beyond the c a p a b i l i t y d i m e n s i o n of B a l a n c e of Power t h e o r y t o i n c l u d e g e o g r a p h i c p r o x i m i t y , o f f e n s i v e c a p a b i l i t y , and a g g r e s s i v e i n t e n t . In p a r t i c u l a r , a g g r e s s i v e i n t e n t i s c e n t r a l t o h i s An e n t i r e l y d i s t i n c t c o n c e p t u a l i z a t i o n , more germane t o the p o l a r i - t y d e b a t e , of B a l a n c e of Power i s found i n the work of Healy and S t e i n (1973), R o s e c r a n c e e t . a l . (1974), and McDonald and R o s e c r a n c e (1985)• Both t e s t p r o p o s i t i o n s drawn from a v a r i e t y of a u t h o r s . However, i n terms of an adequate t e s t of B a l a n c e o f Power, t h e s t u d i e s have two major d e f e c t s . F i r s t , s e v e r a l p r o p o s i t i o n s a r e not amenable, and i n f a c t a r e not t e s t e d t o any g r e a t d e g r e e , u s i n g t h e i r i n t e r v a l s c a l e . P r o p o s i t i o n s c o n c e r n e d w i t h t h e degree of b a l a n c e i n the system can not be a d e q u a t e l y examined because of the e x c l u s i o n of c a p a b i l i t i e s . Second, o t h e r p r o p o s i t i o n s more app r o - p r i a t e l y b e l o n g t o a n o t h e r body of t h e o r y . These p r o p o s i t i o n s con- c e r n the i n f l u e n c e of a l l i a n c e f o r m a t i o n on subsequent i n t r a and i n t e r - a l l i a n c e b e h a v i o r , t o some e x t e n t l i n k e d t o t h e Deutsch and S i n g e r (1964) t h e s i s on m u l t i p o l a r i t y and system s t a b i l i t y . 55 a n a l y s i s . He argues t h a t a 1 l i a n c e f o r m a t i o n can be e x p l a i n e d by the s u b j e c t i v e element of t h r e a t , even i n a s i t u a t i o n of a 'b a l a n c e ' of c a p a b i l i t i e s . As a r e s u l t , Walt does not t e s t the d i r e c t r e l a t i o n s h i p between the d i s t r i b u t i o n and a l l i a n c e f o r m a t i o n . 2 9 McGowan and Rood (1975). L i and Thompson (1978), and M i d l a r s k y (198l) examine a s p e c t s of a l l i a n c e f l e x i b i l i t y u s i n g a v a r i e t y of r a n - dom p r o c e s s models. A l t h o u g h the i n i t i a l s t u d y of McGowan and Rood c i t e K a p l a n ' s (1957) work as the s o u r c e f o r t h e i r a n a l y s i s , they a r e , i n e f f e c t , t e s t i n g a t r a d i t i o n a l p r o p o s i t i o n from B a l a n c e of Power t h e o r y . T h i s p r o p o s i t i o n p o s i t s t h e need f o r s t a t e s t o a l l y w i t h any o t h e r system member, r e g a r d l e s s of i d e o l o g i c a l and i d i o s y n c r a t i c f a c - t o r s , t o m a i n t a i n the ' b a l a n c e ' of power (Wight, 1966). Thus, the a l l i a n c e p r o c e s s a t the system l e v e l , a c c o r d i n g t o McGowan and Rood, s h o u l d be random i n n a t u r e because p r e s e n t and f u t u r e a l l i a n c e s a r e not i n f l u e n c e d or d e t e r m i n e d by p a s t a l l i a n c e s . That i s , s t a t e s have no a p r i o r i r e s t r i c t i o n s w h i c h i n f l u e n c e t h e i r a l l i a n c e d e c i s i o n s . 2 9 H i s f o c u s on t h r e a t undermines t h e q u a n t i t a t i v e a s p e c t of h i s a n a l - y s i s . T h r e a t , a p u r e l y q u a l i t a t i v e and s u b j e c t i v e component, e n a b l e s him t o e x p l a i n a n o m a l y i e s i n a l l i a n c e b e h a v i o r i n the Mid- d l e E a s t (see p.265). I t c o u l d be argued t h a t t h e c h o i c e o f the M i d d l e E a s t i s not a good one i n terms of B a l a n c e of Power t h e o r y . At a minimum, the endemic A r a b - I s r a e l i c o n f l i c t v i o l a t e s the p r i n - c i p l e of a l l i a n c e f l e x i b i l i t y p o s i t e d i n B a l a n c e o f Power t h e o r y . A more i m p o r t a n t problem i s w i t h h i s t r e a t m e n t of the t h e o r y . F i r s t , he argues t h a t B a l a n c e of T h r e a t t h e o r y i s s i m p l y a more complex v e r s i o n of B a l a n c e of Power t h e o r y . However, the l a t t e r c o n t r a d i c t s the f o r m e r . T h r e a t t h e o r y i m p l i e s t h a t p e r c e p t i o n s of i n t e n t p r e c e d e c a p a b i l i t y d i s t r i b u t i o n s . B a l a n c e of Power t h e o r y p o s i t s t h e d i s t r i b u t i o n as th e i n d i c a t o r of i n t e n t and t h e r e b y t h r e a t . Second, Walt argues t h a t both t h e o r i e s a r e e q u a l l y p a r s i - monious. But, the i n c o r p o r a t i o n o f a d d i t i o n a l e l e m e n t s , a l o n g w i t h the measurement problem e n t a i l e d by the concept of t h r e a t , b r i n g s t h i s argument i n t o q u e s t i o n . 56 McGowan and Rood's i n i t i a l s t u d y on N i n e t e e n t h C e n t u r y Europe, where they f i n d s u p p o r t f o r a random a l l i a n c e p r o c e s s over t i m e , i s r e p l i c a t e d and expanded by L i and Thompson. I n c l u d i n g the T w e n t i e t h C e n t u r y and two a d d i t i o n a l v a r i a b l e s r e p r e s e n t i n g the s t r u c t u r a l c h a r - a c t e r i s t i c s o f p o l a r i t y and p o l a r i z a t i o n , they f i n d s u p p o r t f o r the McGowan and Rood p o s i t i o n f o r the p e r i o d s 1815-1914 and 1919-1939, but not f o r the p e r i o d 1945~19^5• They c o n c l u d e t h a t s t r u c t u r a l changes from l o o s e mu 11 i pol ar i t y (pre 19^5) t o t i g h t b i p o l a r i t y (post 19**5) a l t e r s t h e a l l i a n c e p r o c e s s . F i n a l l y , M i d l a r s k y (1981) t e s t s f o r r e l - a t i v e e q u a l i t y i n a l l i a n c e c o n f i g u r a t i o n s a t the system l e v e l i n the N i n t e e n t h C e n t u r y . H i s f i n d i n g s about t h e pr e s e n c e of e q u a l i t y sup- p o r t s the b a s i c p r o p o s i t i o n of s t a t e s f r e e l y moving between a l l i a n c e p a r t n e r s t o ens u r e a r e l a t i v e ' b a l a n c e ' . He a l s o notes the c e n t r a l i m p o r t a n c e o f l e s s e r s t a t e s i n e n s u r i n g e q u a l i t y of a l l i a n c e c o n f i g u - r a t i ons. These s t u d i e s p r o v i d e some degree of s u p p o r t f o r a B a l a n c e of Power based e x p l a n a t i o n of a l l i a n c e s . However, a l l a r e d e f i c i e n t i n one r e g a r d . The d i s t r i b u t i o n of c a p a b i l i t i e s , t he c o r e of B a l a n c e of Pow- er t h e o r y , i s e i t h e r i g n o r e d (McGowan and Rood; M i d l a r s k y ) or d e a l t w i t h s u p e r f i c i a l l y ( L i and Thompson). M i d l a r s k y assumes, a l a Organ- s k i , t h a t G r e a t Power c a p a b i l i t i e s a r e s t a t i c i n the N i n e t e e n t h Centu- ry and any a l t e r a t i o n s t o the d i s t r i b u t i o n i s a f u n c t i o n of a l l i a n c e s . If c o r r e c t , B a l a n c e of Power t h e o r y can not e x p l a i n changes i n a l l i - ances over t i m e . However, t h i s a s s u m p t i o n i s h i g h l y d u b i o u s g i v e n t he e v i d e n c e p r o v i d e d by S t o l 1 and Champion (1985)- They f i n d s i g n i f i c a n t changes i n the p r o p o r t i o n of system c a p a b i l i t i e s h e l d by the Great 57 Powers d u r i n g the N i n t e e n t h C e n t u r y . 3 0 L i and Thompson, a l b e i t i d e n t i - f y i n g the importance of c a p a b i l i t i e s t o the a l l i a n c e p r o c e s s , o p e r a - t i o n a l i z e t h i s v a r i a b l e as s i m p l y the number of Great Powers, d e f i n e d as system p o l e s . T h e i r r e s u l t s , t h e r e f o r e , s i m p l y r e i t e r a t e common sense knowledge of the breakdown of a l l i a n c e f l e x i b i l i t y due t o the a s c e n s i o n of the U n i t e d S t a t e s and S o v i e t R u s s i a t o superpower s t a t u s , and the emergence of t h e C o l d War. . Zi n n e s (1970) examines the r e l a t i o n s h i p between a l l i a n c e s i n B a l - ance of Power t h e o r y and s o c i o l o g i c a l work on c o a l i t i o n s . She i d e n t i - f i e s s e v e r a l key d i f f e r e n c e s between the two s c h o o l s . C o a l i t i o n t h e o - r i e s d e a l o n l y w i t h s i t u a t i o n s where they must form, where a l l system members p a r t i c i p a t e , and where t h e w i n n i n g s i z e of the c o a l i t i o n e q u a l s 51% of t o t a l r e s o u r c e s . In c o n t r a s t , B a l a n c e of Power e x i s t s i n s i t u a t i o n s where c o a l i t i o n s do not n e c e s s a r i l y e x i s t , where o n l y s u b s e t s of the system a r e i n v o l v e d , and where the c o a l i t i o n s i z e i s g r e a t e r t h a n 51% of system r e s o u r c e s . She c o n c l u d e s t h a t some s o c i o l - o g i c a l t h e o r i e s of c o a l i t i o n s p r o v i d e an i n d i c a t i o n of s t a b i l i t y f o r some B a l a n c e of Power systems, whereas o t h e r s do n o t . 3 1 3 0 S t o l 1 and Champion (1985) p r o v i d e a graph of c a p a b i l i t y s c o r e s f o r the European G r e a t Powers from 1820 t o 1960- I t r e v e a l s the domi- nance of Great B r i t a i n w hich d e c l i n e s from a peak i n i860. I t a l s o shows s i g n i f i c a n t a l t e r a t i o n s i n the p o s i t i o n s of R u s s i a , F r a n c e , and P r u s s i a / G e r m a n y , w i t h t h e l a t t e r s u r p a s s i n g G r e a t B r i t a i n i n 1900. P e r c e n t a g e s h a r e s a r e drawn from d a t a p r o v i d e d by the C o r r e - l a t e s of War p r o j e c t and a r e based on an a g g r e g a t e of t h r e e dimen- s i o n s ; demographic, i n d u s t r i a l , and m i l i t a r y . As shown i n Chapter Four, a g r e a t d e a l of movement i n c a p a b i l i t y s h a r e s i s e v i d e n t when the i n d i c a t o r s a r e a d j u s t e d f o r the h i s t o r i c a l c o n t e x t t h r o u g h o u t t h e N i n t e e n t h c e n t u r y . 3 1 I t can be added t h a t Z i n n e s ' f o r m u l a t i o n of B a l a n c e of Power i s s u s p e c t because of the a s s e r t i o n t h a t a l l i a n c e s a r e t r e a t e d as independent v a r i a b l e s and her c o n c e r n w i t h system s t a b i l i t y w i t h o u t due r e g a r d f o r c a p a b i l i t y d i s t r i b u t i o n s . N o n e t h e l e s s , the a p p l i c a - t i o n of s o c i o l o g i c a l c o a l i t i o n t h e o r i e s i n the e m p i r i c a l s t u d y of 58 T u r n i n g t o the g e n e r a l l i t e r a t u r e on a l l i a n c e s , t h e r e i s a c u r i o u s l a c k of e m p i r i c a l s t u d i e s on a l l i a n c e f o r m a t i o n as a whole. A c c o r d i n g t o Job (198l), the l a c k of s t u d i e s on a l l i a n c e f o r m a t i o n i n g e n e r a l i s due t o t h e p e r c e i v e d d e c l i n i n g i m p o r t a n c e of a l l i a n c e s i n contemporary w o r l d p o l i t i c s , problems o f d a t a a v a i l a b i l i t y and/or r e l i a b i l i t y , and c o n t r a d i c t i o n s between the f i n d i n g s of e x i s t i n g e m p i r i c a l s t u d i e s . A l s o , i t appears t h a t the f a i l u r e t o examine a l l i a n c e f o r m a t i o n from a Bal a n c e of Power p e r s p e c t i v e can be a t t r i b u t e d l a r g e l y t o a l t e r a t i o n s i n t he n a t u r e of a l l i a n c e s i n the post-1945 w o r l d . H o l s t i , Hopmann, and S u l l i v a n . (1973) argue t h a t B a l a n c e of Power t h e o r y i s not adequate f o r a g e n e r a l t h e o r y of a l l i a n c e f o r m a t i o n . W h i l e they c i t e s e v e r a l a l l i a n c e p r o p o s i t i o n s drawn from B a l a n c e of Power t h e o r y , they b e l i e v e t h a t t h e r e e x i s t s a s i z e a b l e number of d e v i a n t c a s e s . To s u p p o r t t h i s a s s e r t i o n , H o l s t i e t . a l . c i t e t he Daw- son and Rosecrance (1966) s t u d y on the An g l o - A m e r i c a n r e l a t i o n s h i p , w h i c h argues t h a t c o n v e n t i o n a l B a l a n c e of Power t h e o r y cannot e x p l a i n t h i s r e l a t i o n s h i p a f t e r 1949- However, Dawson and Ros e c r a n c e admit t h a t t he w a r t i m e and e a r l y c o l d war A n g l o - A m e r i c a n a l l i a n c e i s e x p l i - c a b l e i n terms of B a l a n c e of Power t h e o r y . G i v e n t h e g e n e r a l s t a t i c d i s t r i b u t i o n of c o n v e n t i o n a l c a p a b i l i t i e s between the S o v i e t Union and the U n i t e d S t a t e s i n Europe s i n c e t h e l a t e f o r t i e s , as w e l l as B r i t i s h weakness, the c o n t i n u e d p r e s e n c e o f t h i s r e l a t i o n s h i p does not appear t o be a t odds w i t h B a l a n c e of Power t h e o r y . More i m p o r t a n t l y , t he th e o r y does not p u r p o r t t o e x p l a i n the d e t a i l e d a s p e c t s of i n t r a - a l l i - ance b e h a v i o r , o n l y the b a s i c c o n d i t i o n s of a l l i a n c e f o r m a t i o n and a l l i a n c e s has not been u n d e r t a k e n i n the f i e l d . Her e a r l i e r s t u d y (1967) p r o v i d e s o n l y a c a t e l o g u e of p r o p o s i t i o n s from the l i t e r t a - t u r e i n which many a r e not c l e a r l y B a l a n c e o f Power based. '59 d i s s o l u t i o n . F i n a l c o n s i d e r a t i o n must be g i v e n b r i e f l y t o a l t e r n a t i v e e x p l a n a - t i o n s of a l l i a n c e f o r m a t i o n . Beyond the g e n e r a l consensus t h a t a l l i - ances a r e formed i n resp o n s e t o e x i s t i n g or p e r c e i v e d s e c u r i t y t h r e a t s , a v i e w c o m p a t i b l e w i t h B a l a n c e of Power t h e o r y , t h e b u l k of work i n t h i s a r e a remains l a r g e l y s p e c u l a t i v e and i d e o g r a p h i c (Ward, 1982; W a l t , 1987). C h o u c r i and N o r t h (1975) examine the t h r e a t e l e - ment w i t h i n a bro a d e r s t u d y of c o n f l i c t i n Europe d u r i n g the l a t t e r p a r t of the N i n e t e e n t h c e n t u r y . They f i n d a measure of s u p p o r t f o r a r e l a t i o n s h i p between r i s i n g m i l i t a r y e x p e n d i t u r e s and a l l i a n c e s , a l t h o u g h no c o n s i d e r a t i o n i s g i v e n t o the d i s t r i b u t i o n a l e x p l a n a t i o n w h i c h i s a t the h e a r t of B a l a n c e of Power t h e o r y . L i s k a (1962) p o i n t s out t h a t a l l i a n c e s may be a l s o m o t i v a t e d by aims of n a t i o n a l expan- s i o n , but f a i l s t o p r o v i d e any s y s t e m a t i c e v i d e n c e i n s u p p o r t of t h i s v i e w . S c h r o e d e r (1976), and l a t e r work by Moul (1983) » emphasize t h e f o r m a t i o n of a l l i a n c e s as a means t o r e s t r a i n the b e h a v i o r of o t h e r s t a t e s . As shown below, t h i s argument i s not e n t i r e l y i n c o m p a t i b l e w i t h B a l a n c e of Power t h e o r y . Concern must a l s o be g i v e n t o t h e p o t e n t i a l i d e o l o g i c a l , s o c i a l , and economic based e x p l a n a t i o n s of a l l i a n c e s w h i c h have found l i t t l e s u p p o r t i n the l i t e r a t u r e (Job, 198l). Here, R u s s e t t (1962) i s p r o b a b l y c o r r e c t i n a r g u i n g t h a t t h e s e f a c t o r s may be i m p o r t a n t c o n t e x t u r a l e l e m e n t s , but not d i r e c t c a u s e s . In c o n c l u s i o n , t h e e x i s t i n g l i t e r a t u r e has l a r g e l y f a i l e d t o d e a l w i t h t h e c e n t r a l p r o p e r t i e s of B a l a n c e of Power t h e o r y w i t h r e g a r d s t o the r e l a t i o n s h i p between the d i s t r i b u t i o n of c a p a b i l i t i e s and a l l i a n c - e s . I t has been c o n c e r n e d p r e d o m i n a n t l y w i t h the i s s u e of war, and 60 the r e l a t i o n s h i p of c a p a b i l i t y d i s t r i b u t i o n s and a l l i a n c e s t o t h i s i s s u e . Even s t u d i e s w h i c h p u r p o r t t o t e s t B a l a n c e of Power t h e o r y have f a i l e d t o examine the c e n t r a l r e l a t i o n s h i p between d i s t r i b u t i o n s o f c a p a b i l i t i e s and s t a t e r e a c t i o n s i n terms of i n t e r n a l r e s o u r c e s and a l l i a n c e f o r m a t i o n . F i n a l l y , the a l l i a n c e l i t e r a t u r e has n e g l e c t e d the i m p o r t a n c e of the t h e o r y i n e x p l a i n i n g a l 1 i a n c e f o r m a t i o n . Com- p e t i n g or a l t e r n a t i v e e x p l a n a t i o n s a r e l i m i t e d i n e m p i r i c a l s u p p o r t and ,as shown below, many of them can be r e l a t e d or i n t e g r a t e d t o a degree w i t h B a l a n c e of Power t h e o r y . 2.2 INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL POLICY OPTIONS B a l a n c e of Power t h e o r y , as p r e v i o u s l y f o r m u l a t e d , p o s i t s t h a t b e h a v i o r i s a f u n c t i o n of a s t a t e ' s c a p a b i l i t i e s r e l a t i v e t o o t h e r s t a t e s . A s t a t e ' s p o s i t i o n or s t a n d i n g p r o v i d e s i t s e l i t e s w i t h an i n d i c a t i o n of the degree of t h r e a t emanating from the e n v i r o n m e n t . In so d o i n g , d e c i s i o n s r e l a t e d t o s e c u r i t y a r e made a c c o r d i n g t o i t s c a p a b i l i t y s t a n d i n g a t any p a r t i c u l a r p o i n t i n time and changes i n i t s p o s i t i o n o ver t i m e . R e g a r d l e s s of whether a s t a t e ' s p o s i t i o n improves or d e c l i n e s , any s i g n i f i c a n t change l e a d s t o a r e - a s s e s s m e n t of s e c u r - i t y r e q u i r e m e n t s . From t h i s r e - a s s e s s m e n t , changes i n s t a t e b e h a v i o r r e s u l t . The t h e o r y a l s o p o s i t s e q u a l i t y as the o p t i m a l and p r e f e r r e d s e c u r - i t y p o s i t i o n . B e h a v i o r a l change, i t s n a t u r e and d i r e c t i o n , i s t i e d u l t i m a t e l y t o the maintenance and/or a s s u r a n c e of e q u a l i t y . O u t s i d e of war, two fundamental mechanisms, or p o l i c y o p t i o n s , one i n t e r n a l and the o t h e r e x t e r n a l t o the s t a t e , a r e a v a i l a b l e t o e n s u r e t h i s 61 p o s i t i o n . 3 2 F i r s t , e l i t e s can a l t e r the amount of i n t e r n a l r e s o u r c e s d e v o t e d t o s e c u r i t y needs i n g e n e r a l and m i l i t a r y needs i n p a r t i c u l a r . Second, e l i t e s can a l t e r t h e i r r e l a t i o n s h i p s w i t h o t h e r s t a t e s i n t h e e x t e r n a l environment t h r o u g h the c r e a t i o n / d i s s o l u t i o n of a l l i a n c e s . A b s t r a c t l y , e l i t e r e s p o n s e i s p r e d i c t a b l e because of the e q u a l i t y a s s u m p t i o n . A d e c l i n e i n a s t a t e ' s r e l a t i v e p o s i t i o n w i l l l e a d t o an i n c r e a s e i n the a l l o c a t i o n of i n t e r n a 1 r e s o u r c e s and/or the s e a r c h f o r a l l i e s . C o n v e r s e l y , improvement i s l i k e l y t o l e a d t o b e h a v i o r i n the o p p o s i t e d i r e c t i o n . W h i l e e q u a l i t y may be the p r e f e r r e d p o s i t i o n , the f a c t of l i f e i n i n t e r n a t i o n a l p o l i t i c s i s g r o s s d i s p a r i t i e s i n the c a p a b i l i t i e s o f s t a t e s . As s u c h , the t h e o r y i s q u a l i f i e d t o c o v e r o n l y one p a r t i c u l a r s e t of s t a t e s ; the G r e a t Powers. T h i s q u a l i f i c a t i o n i s c o n s i s t e n t w i t h one of the c e n t r a l e x p l a n a t i o n s p r o v i d e d by B a l a n c e of Power t h e o r y ; the p r e s e r v a t i o n of the s t a t e system. G r e a t Powers a r e t h e o n l y a c t o r s , by d e f i n i t i o n , a b l e t o a l t e r u n i l a t e r a l l y the b a s i c s y s - tem c h a r a c t e r i s t i c of a n a r c h y . C o n v e r s e l y , they a r e the o n l y a c t o r s w h i c h can p r e v e n t such an a l t e r a t i o n . D e s p i t e t h i s q u a l i f i c a t i o n , t h e r e i s no r e a s o n t o assume t h a t B a l a n c e of Power t h e o r y has no r e l e - vance f o r u n d e r s t a n d i n g the b e h a v i o r of l e s s e r s t a t e s . 3 2 The l i t e r a t u r e a l s o i d e n t i f i e s s e v e r a l o t h e r r e s p o n s e s (Morgenthau, 1973) • They i n c l u d e such elements as the c o n c e p t of d i v i d e and r u l e , t e r r i t o r i a l c o m p e n s a t i o n , and the c r e a t i o n of b u f f e r s t a t e s . These elements a r e d i r e c t l y l i n k e d t o the d i s t r i b u t i o n i n t h a t t h e y c o n c e r n t e r r i t o r i a l p o s s e s s i o n s . As s u c h , they a r e m o r e . a p t l y seen as p a r t of the e v o l v i n g d i s t r i b u t i o n , r a t h e r than s p e c i f i c r e s p o n - ses t o i t s a l t e r a t i o n . As shown below i n the c o n t e x t of the i n t e r - nal r e s p o n s e , t h e i r measurement i s i n h e r e n t i n any measurement of the d i s t r i b u t i o n of c a p a b i l i t i e s . 62 L e s s e r s t a t e s a r e a l s o c o n c e r n e d w i t h t h e i r r e l a t i v e c a p a b i l i t y p o s i t i o n . T h e i r r e l a t i v e p o s i t i o n may be d e f i n e d i n r e g i o n a l terms r e f l e c t i n g t h e i r s p e c i f i c g e o g r a p h i c p o s i t i o n i n the system and t h e i r immediate environment i n which t h r e a t s t o t h e i r s u r v i v a l a r e most p r o m i n e n t . But, they a r e a l s o c o n c e r n e d w i t h t h e g e n e r a l d i s t r i b u t i o n of c a p a b i l i t i e s among the Great Powers. T h r e a t s t o the system a r e a l s o t h r e a t s t o t h e i r e x i s t e n c e . Moreover, t h e i r c a p a b i l i t i e s , a l o n g w i t h t h e i r g e o g r a p h i c p o s i t i o n , can have an i n f l u e n c e on the g e n e r a l ' d i s t r i b u t i o n when a l l i e d w i t h a G r e a t Power. Such an a l l i a n c e p r o - v i d e s l e s s e r s t a t e s w i t h a p r o t e c t o r which n e c e s s a r i 1 y enhances t h e i r i n d i v i d u a l s e c u r i t y ( R o t h s t e i n , 1968) . F i n a l l y , l e s s e r s t a t e s a r e more dependent on the n a t u r e of the g e n e r a l d i s t r i b u t i o n . W h i l e they may always seek a G r e a t Power as a p r o t e c t o r , the t h e o r y i n d i c a t e s t h a t t h e a v a i l a b i l i t y o f a p r o t e c t o r w i l l be a f u n c t i o n o f t h e d i s t r i - but i on. R e t u r n i n g t o the G r e a t Powers, t h e above d i s c u s s i o n i n d i c a t e s t h a t the g e n e r a l d i s t r i b u t i o n o f c a p a b i l i t i e s i s drawn e x c l u s i v e l y from the Gr e a t Powers. I t a l s o i m p l i e s t h a t r e l a t i v e e q u a l i t y among the G r e a t Powers i s not o n l y p o s s i b l e , but t h e norm. There i s an 'a p r i o r i ' a s s u m p t i o n i n the l i t e r a t u r e t h a t G r e a t Powers, by d e f i n i t i o n , a r e e q u a l . Y e t , the h i s t o r i c a l r e c o r d c l e a r l y i n d i c a t e s t h a t e q u a l i t y i s the e x c e p t i o n , not t h e r u l e . At many p o i n t s i n t i m e , some G r e a t Pow- e r s a r e not a b l e t o e n t e r t a i n any hope of e q u a l i t y i n terms of t h e i r i n d i v i d u a l c a p a b i l i t i e s , a c t u a l or p o t e n t i a l . Now, one c o u l d argue t h a t t h e s e s t a t e s a r e not t r u l y G r e a t Powers. But t o do so would r e s u l t i n a r a d i c a l l y d i f f e r e n t p i c t u r e of h i s t o r y t h a n p r o v i d e d by 63 h i s t o r i a n s . The r e l a t i v e weakness of some G r e a t Powers i n f o r m s us of t h e c e n t r a l importance of a l l i a n c e s as a means t o e n s u r e e q u a l i t y . I t i s how c a p a b i l i t i e s a r e d i s t r i b u t e d among the G r e a t Powers as a group which d e t e r m i n e s the degree of t h r e a t t o the i n d i v i d u a l s t a t e s and thus m o t i v a t e s t h e i r b e h a v i o r i n a g e n e r a l s e n s e . In a system c o n t a i n i n g two G reat Powers, the c a l c u l a t i o n of the d i s t r i b u t i o n i s r e l a t i v e l y s t r a i g h t f o r w a r d . But, w i t h the a d d i t i o n of o t h e r G r e a t Powers, t h i s c a l c u l a t i o n becomes more complex. T h i s c o m p l e x i t y a r i s e s from the r e q u i r e m e n t of e l i t e s t o a s s e s s not o n l y t h e i r r e l a t i v e s t a n d i n g v i s - a - v i s each o t h e r , but a l s o the r e l a t i v e s t a n d i n g between a l l o t h e r p a i r s of G r e a t Powers. D e s p i t e t h i s c o m p l e x i t y , t h e e x i s - t e n c e of an unequal d i s t r i b u t i o n , d epending on i t s d e g r e e , i n d i c a t e s t h e e x i s t e n c e of a p r e p o n d e r a n t Power. T h i s i n d i c a t i o n s e r v e s as the e x p l a n a t i o n f o r b e h a v i o r a l change. E l i t e s have two immediate o p t i o n s a v a i l a b l e t o r e d r e s s i n e q u a l i - t y . 3 3 I t i s not n e c e s s a r i l y the c a s e t h a t a d e c i s i o n i n f a v o r of one o p t i o n p r e c l u d e s the o t h e r . E l i t e s may choose t o i n c r e a s e i n t e r n a l m i l i t a r y c a p a b i l i t i e s and o b t a i n a l l i e s s i m u l t a n e o u s l y . T h i s s i t u - a t i o n would o c c u r most l i k e l y when n e i t h e r r e s p o n s e i s s u f f i c i e n t by i t s e l f t o o f f s e t t h e c a p a b i l i t i e s of the p r e p o n d e r a n t . G i v e n t h a t a l l o t h e r s t a t e s r e a c t i n a s i m i l a r manner, the a l l i a n c e o p t i o n , because i t r e q u i r e s a b i l a t e r a l or m u l t i l a t e r a l d e c i s i o n , i s l i k e l y t o be more 3 3 The t h i r d o p t i o n i s the use of f o r c e a g a i n s t the p r e p o n d e r a n t Pow- e r . However, t h i s o p t i o n a l s o demands a p r e v i o u s d e c i s i o n t o i n c r e a s e i n t e r n a l m i l i t a r y c a p a b i l i t i e s , u s u a l l y t h r o u g h m o b i l i z a - t i o n , and p o s s i b l y the s e a r c h f o r a l l i e s t o i n c r e a s e the p r o b a b i l i - t y of v i c t o r y . Thus, t h e c h o i c e of the war o p t i o n i s l i k e l y t o f o l l o w d e c i s i o n s r e l a t e d t o the o t h e r two o p t i o n s and be c o n d i - t i o n e d by them. 64 p r o m i n e n t when the degree of i n e q u a l i t y i s e x p l i c i t i n n a t u r e . In a s i t u a t i o n where e i t h e r r e s p o n s e may be s u f f i c i e n t , i m p l y i n g o n l y a l i m i t e d degree of d i s t r i b u t i o n a l i n e q u a l i t y , e l i t e s may be p r e d i s p o s e d t o an e i t h e r / o r d e c i s i o n . In f a c t , a d e c i s i o n t o i n c r e a s e m i l i t a r y c a p a b i l i t i e s may r e t u r n the d i s t r i b u t i o n t o e q u a l i t y , t h e r e b y n e g a t i n g the need and a v a i l a b i l i t y of an a l l i a n c e p a r t n e r . S i m i l a r l y , the s u c - c e s s f u l c o n sumation of an a l l i a n c e may negate the need to i n c r e a s e m i l i t a r y c a p a b i l i t i e s . A l t h o u g h B a l a n c e of Power t h e o r y does not encompass e l i t e p r e d i s p o - s i t i o n s i n t h i s r e g a r d , c e r t a i n f a c t o r s i n d i c a t e t h a t e l i t e s a r e l i k e - l y t o p r e f e r one o p t i o n over the o t h e r , r e l a t i v e t o t h e degree of i n e - q u a l i t y . Some Great Powers, as w e l l as the m a j o r i t y of l e s s e r s t a t e s , may l a c k the a b i l i t y t o i n c r e a s e m i l i t a r y c a p a b i l i t i e s f o r d o m e s t i c p o l i t i c a l or economic r e a s o n s . A l l i a n c e s a r e the o n l y r e a s o n a b l e o p t i o n i n t h i s c a s e . C o n v e r s e l y , the a l l i a n c e o p t i o n may be u n a v a i l - a b l e f o r a v a r i e t y of d o m e s t i c and i n t e r n a t i o n a l r e a s o n s . Moreover, e x a m i n i n g t h e b e n e f i t s and c o s t s of the two o p t i o n s (see H o l s t i e t . a l , 1.973; Freidman, 1970; R u s s e t t , 1968) , r e v e a l an i n v e r s e r e l a t i o n s h i p between one o p t i o n and the o t h e r . B e g i n n i n g w i t h the i n t e r n a l o p t i o n , the b e n e f i t s a r e as f o l l o w s . F i r s t , an i n c r e a s e i n r e s o u r c e s d e v o t e d t o s e c u r i t y needs may s e r v e t o s t i m u l a t e t h e d o m e s t i c economy. I t may a l s o enhance d o m e s t i c s t a b i l i - t y and i n c r e a s e p o p u l a r s u p p o r t f o r the government and i t s p o l i c i e s . Second, t h i s o p t i o n does not a f f e c t d i r e c t l y o t h e r f o r e i g n p o l i c y g o a l s w h i c h may be undermined i n the p r o c e s s of n e g o t i a t i n g and main- t a i n i n g an a l l i a n c e . T h i r d , i t e n a b l e s e l i t e s t o a v o i d any p o t e n t i a l 6 5 d o m e s t i c problem r e s u l t i n g from a t t e m p t s t o a l l y w i t h an u n p o p u l a r s t a t e . F i n a l l y , the problems e n t a i l e d i n m a i n t a i n i n g an a l l i a n c e a r e a v o i d e d . These i n c l u d e the r e l i a b i l i t y of the commitment, t h e compat- i b i l i t y o f armed f o r c e s and p l a n n i n g , and the a f o r e m e n t i o n e d c o n f l i c t s w i t h a l l i e s i n o t h e r a r e a s of f o r e i g n p o l i c y . The c o s t s e n t a i l e d by the i n t e r n a l o p t i o n a r e l a r g e l y d o m e s t i c i n n a t u r e . As noted e a r l i e r , a s t a t e may s i m p l y l a c k the r e s o u r c e s t o c o n t e m p l a t e t h i s o p t i o n . Any s t a t e has a f i n i t e amount of t o t a l r e s o u r c e s w h i c h can be d i r e c t e d towards s e c u r i t y . S h o r t of m o b i l i z a - t i o n f o r war, a s t e p which i t s e l f has d r a s t i c consequences, e l i t e s a r e not l i k e l y t o de v o t e a l l p o s s i b l e r e s o u r c e s t o s e c u r i t y . In t h i s r e g a r d , e l i t e s must c o n s i d e r the p o t e n t i a l damage caused by an i n c r e a s e i n r e s o u r c e s d e voted t o s e c u r i t y needs t o the h e a l t h o f the economy as a whole. C o n s i d e r a t i o n must a l s o be g i v e n t o d o m e s t i c o p p o s i t i o n a g a i n s t any i n c r e a s e i n s e c u r i t y c a p a b i l i t i e s , r e g a r d l e s s of t h e s t a t e of the economy. F i n a l l y , r e l i a n c e on t h e i n t e r n a l o p t i o n may be c o u n t e r p r o d u c t i v e . I t may not reduce d i s t r i b u t i o n a l i n e q u a l i - t y , but c r e a t e an e q u i v a l e n t r e s p o n s e from o t h e r s t a t e s . T h i s a c t i o n - r e a c t i o n phenomenon i s more commonly known as an 'arms r a c e ' . The net r e s u l t o f such a r a c e may be an i n c r e a s e d burden on the d o m e s t i c econ- omy, a s i t u a t i o n whereby a s t a t e cannot compete, t h e r e b y i n c r e a s i n g i n e q u a l i t y and i n s e c u r i t y , and p o s s i b l y the o u t b r e a k of war. In c o n t r a s t , the e x t e r n a l or a l l i a n c e o p t i o n e n a b l e s e l i t e s t o a v o i d some of the c o s t s a s s o c i a t e d w i t h the i n t e r n a l o p t i o n . A l l i a n c - es s e r v e not o n l y t o augment a s t a t e ' s c a p a b i l i t i e s , and t h e r e b y r e d r e s s d i s t r i b u t i o n a l i n e q u a l i t y , but a l s o s e r v e s t o deny an a l l y ' s 66 c a p a b i l i t i e s t o o t h e r s t a t e s . At the same t i m e , a l l i a n c e s can p r o v i d e s i d e b e n e f i t s such as i n c r e a s e d l e g i t i m a c y , p r e s t i g e , and enhanced t r a d e o p p o r t u n i t i e s . The e x t e r n a l o p t i o n a l s o s e r v e s t o c l a r i f y t he a l i g n m e n t s t r u c t u r e of the system. In so d o i n g , they p r o v i d e a c l e a r - er i n d i c a t i o n of f r i e n d s and enemies, i n c r e a s e a s t a t e ' s a b i l i t y t o p r o j e c t power, and have a d e t e r r e n t v a l u e i n s i g n a l l i n g commitment and r e s o l v e t o s t a t e s . An a l l i a n c e can a l s o s e r v e as a r e s t r a i n t on the b e h a v i o r of o t h e r s t a t e s (Shroeder, 1977; Moul, 1983) . even a p o t e n - t t i a l p r e p o n d e r a n t , by r e d u c i n g the degree of t h r e a t i n i t s environment and c o n t r o l l i n g any a g g r e s s i v e i n t e n t i o n s t h i s Power may have. F i n a l - l y , i n a s i t u a t i o n where war i s p e r c e i v e d as l i k e l y , an a l l i a n c e w i t h a p r e p o n d e r a n t Power p r o v i d e s an o p p o r t u n i t y f o r the weak t o s h a r e i n the s p o i l s o f v i c t o r y , w h i l e e n s u r i n g i t s s u r v i v a l . The c o s t s e n t a i l e d by a l l i a n c e s a r e p a r t i a l l y d e a l t w i t h i n the d i s c u s s i o n of b e n e f i t s a c c r u e d from the i n t e r n a l o p t i o n . An a d d i t i o n - a l c o s t r e s u l t s from the n a t u r e of bonding w i t h a n o t h e r s t a t e . Depending on the type of a l l i a n c e commitment, the r e l a t i o n s h i p may be m a n i p u l a t e d by an a l l y f o r o t h e r p u r p o s e s . A s t a t e w h i c h v a l u e s the r e l a t i o n s h i p above a l l e l s e may f i n d i t s e l f drawn i n t o a c o n f l i c t i n whi c h i t has no i n t r i n s i c i n t e r e s t s . I n i t i a t i n g an a l l i a n c e may l e a d t o the f o r m a t i o n o f c o u n t e r - a l l i a n c e s . As i n the case of the i n t e r n a l o p t i o n , the r e a c t i o n of o t h e r s t a t e s t o a l l i a n c e f o r m a t i o n may under- mine t h e i n i t i a l b e n e f i t i n r e d r e s s i n g i n e q u a l i t y due t o t h e f o r m a t i o n of a s u p e r i o r c o u n t e r - a l l i a n c e . F i n a l l y , t he s i t u a t i o n of impending war and the d e s i r e t o s h a r e i n the s p o i l s o f v i c t o r y may l e a d t o d i s - a s t e r i f the s t a t e ' s p r e d i c t i o n s about the outcome a r e i n c o r r e c t . 67 As i n d i c a t e d i n the above d i s c u s s i o n , e l i t e d e c i s i o n s i n terms of a re s p o n s e t o d i s t r i b u t i o n a l i n e q u a l i t y a r e e x t r e m e l y complex and p r o - b l e m a t i c . A l t h o u g h the b e n e f i t s of one o p t i o n p a r t i a l l y m i r r o r the c o s t s of the o t h e r , t h e r e i s no c l e a r e v i d e n c e t h a t e l i t e s i n the r e a l w o r l d r a t i o n a l l y weigh the two o p t i o n s t o g e t h e r and a r e l e d t o an e i t h e r / o r d e c i s i o n . In any c a s e , e x p l a n a t i o n s of the s i t u a t i o n i n which e l i t e s choose between o p t i o n s a r e not r e l e v a n t t o t h i s a n a l y s i s . To u n d e r t a k e such an e x p l a n a t i o n would r e q u i r e , a t a minimum, a d e t a i l e d e x a m i n a t i o n of an i n d i v i d u a l s t a t e ' s f o r e i g n p o l i c y , economic s t r u c t u r e and c o n d i t i o n , and the p e r s o n n e l d i s p o s i t i o n s and b i a s e s of s e l e c t d e c i s i o n - m a k e r s over a s m a l l p e r i o d of t i m e . F u r t h e r m o r e , i t e n t a i l s movement beyond the scope of B a l a n c e o f Power t h e o r y w i t h i t s f o c u s on e x p l a i n i n g g e n e r a l p a t t e r n s of b e h a v i o r over time and i t s n e g l e c t o f d o m e s t i c and i d i o s y n c r a t i c v a r i a b l e s . F i n a l l y , whether e l i t e s choose one or bo t h o p t i o n s has no e f f e c t on the a n a l y s i s . In i d e n t i f y i n g the d i s t r i b u t i o n of c a p a b i l i t i e s as the key e x p l a n a t o r y v a r i a b l e f o r s t a t e b e h a v i o r , t h e i n t e r n a l o p t i o n i s i n c o r p o r a t e d t o some degree i n the a n a l y s i s , a l t h o u g h i t i s not a n a l y z e d i n any s y s - temat i c manner. Any measure of the d i s t r i b u t i o n i s based on i n d i c a t o r s r e p r e s e n t i n g s t a t e c a p a b i l i t i e s . As a r e s u l t , t he i n t e r n a l o p t i o n i s p a r t of the independent v a r i a b l e . Thus, movement away from and back towards d i s - t r i b u t i o n a l e q u a l i t y i s an i n d i r e c t measure of i n t e r n a l b e h a v i o r i n r e l a t i o n t o the r e s o u r c e s d e v o t e d t o s e c u r i t y . I t i s i n d i r e c t because t h e r e i s no means t o a s c e r t a i n whether changes a r e a f u n c t i o n of a c o n s c i o u s d e c i s i o n by one or s e v e r a l G r e a t Powers t o i n c r e a s e s e c u r i t y 68 r e s o u r c e s . In c o n t r a s t , a l l i a n c e s c o n t a i n the p r o p e r t y o f a c o n s c i o u s d e c i s i o n s i m p l y because they r e q u i r e more than one a c t o r . 2.3 HYPOTHESES B e f o r e o u t l i n i n g the hypotheses used t o t e s t B a l a n c e o f Power t h e o - r y , two i s s u e s r e q u i r e b r i e f d i s c u s s i o n . F i r s t , the s p e c i f i c s t a t e s who a l l y t o g e t h e r and the reason s u n d e r l y i n g i n d i v i d u a l p r e d i l e c t i o n s towards a p a r t i c u l a r p a r t n e r a r e beyond the scope of t h i s a n a l y s i s . Our c o n c e r n i s w i t h the g e n e r a l r e l a t i o n s h i p between the d i s t r i b u t i o n o f c a p a b i l i t i e s and the pr e s e n c e of a l l i a n c e s i n the system. A l t h o u g h B a l a n c e of Power t h e o r y i n d i c a t e s t h a t s t a t e s w i l l a l l y w i t h the weak t o ' b a l a n c e ' the s t r o n g , such an o c c u r r e n c e i s 1 i k e l y 'to. r e s u l t o n l y when preponderance i s a c h i e v e d by a s t a t e . In s i t u a t i o n s of an ambig- uous degree of i n e q u a l i t y , t h e t h e o r y p r o v i d e s no c l e a r i n d i c a t i o n of a l l i a n c e p r e d i l e c t i o n . Moreover, i t may not always be the case t h a t the weak w i l l a l l y t o 'b a l a n c e ' t h e s t r o n g . Some s t a t e s may opt t o 'bandwagon' w i t h t h e s t r o n g as a means t o en s u r e s u r v i v a l and p o s s i b l y s h a r e i n any s p o i l s . The q u e s t i o n o f ' b a l a n c i n g ' v e r s u s 'bandwagon- i n g ' i s l a r g e l y a s e p a r a t e t h e o r e t i c a l i s s u e . I t e n t a i l s a c o n c e r n f o r o t h e r v a r i a b l e s w hich i n f l u e n c e t he a l l i a n c e d e c i s i o n . In con- t r a s t , t he r e l a t i o n s h i p between t h e d i s t r i b u t i o n of c a p a b i l i t i e s and the p r e s e n c e of a l l i a n c e s i s a c l e a r of B a l a n c e of Power t h e o r y . I t r e p r e s e n t s a uni q u e c o n t r i b u t i o n t o an u n d e r s t a n d i n g of s t a t e behav- i o r . The second i s s u e c o n c e r n s the o b s e r v a t i o n s used t o measure the d i s - t r i b u t i o n o f c a p a b i l i t i e s a t y e a r l y i n t e r v a l s . For many s c h o l a r s i n 69 t h i s a r e a o f r e s e a r c h , o b s e r v a t i o n s a r e a d j u s t e d f o r t h e e x i s t e n c e of a l l i a n c e s among the G r e a t Powers. The c a p a b i l i t i e s of two G r e a t Pow- e r s i n a l l i a n c e a r e a g g r e g a t e d t o form one o b s e r v a t i o n i n the con- s t r u c t i o n o f the d i s t r i b u t i o n measure. T h e o r e t i c a l l y , e l i t e s a r e con- c e r n e d w i t h the a g g r e g a t e c a p a b i l i t i e s of a l l i a n c e c l u s t e r s . However, the i n i t i a l m o t i v a t i o n f o r a l l i a n c e c r e a t i o n , a c c o r d i n g t o B a l a n c e of Power t h e o r y , i s a f u n c t i o n of the i n d i v i d u a l c a p a b i l i t i e s of G r e a t Powers. I t i s r e a s o n a b l e t o assume t h a t e l i t e s w i l l c o n t i n u e t o moni- t o r t he d i s t r i b u t i o n from an i n d i v i d u a l G r eat Power p e r s p e c t i v e . Such m o n i t o r i n g i s v i t a l t o e n s u r e t h a t a s t a t e ' s a l l i a n c e s remain f u n c - t i o n a l i n t h e B a l a n c e of Power s e n s e . The degree of e q u a 1 i t y / i n e q u a 1 - i t y between a 11iance groups i s a s e p a r a t e t h e o r e t i c a l i s s u e , w h i c h may or may not be e x p l i c a b l e i n B a l a n c e of Power t e r m s 3 4 As a p p a r e n t i n t h e above d i s c u s s i o n , the r e l a t i o n s h i p between t h e d i s t r i b u t i o n of c a p a b i l i t i e s and a l l i a n c e s a r e the c e n t r a l f o c u s of t h i s a n a l y s i s . In B a l a n c e of Power t h e o r y , a l l i a n c e s a r e c o n c e i v e d as agents of c a p a b i l i t y a g g r e g a t i o n which a r e e n t e r e d i n t o by s t a t e s as a re s p o n s e t o an unequal d i s t r i b u t i o n o f c a p a b i 1 i t i e s . I t i s assumed t h a t e q u a l i t y p r o v i d e s the o p t i m a l l e v e l o f s e c u r i t y , and movement away from e q u a l i t y i s a c l e a r i n d i c a t i o n of i n c r e a s i n g t h r e a t t o i n d i - v i d u a l s t a t e s and the system as a whole. Thus, e q u a l i t y s h o u l d r e s u l t i n t he absence of a l l i a n c e s i n the system. They a r e d y s f u n c t i o n a l i n B a l a n c e o f Power terms. S t a t e s a r e u n w i l l i n g t o bear the c o s t s a s s o - c i a t e d w i t h a l l i a n c e s because t h e i r s e c u r i t y i s a t i t s o p t i m a l l e v e l . 3 4 The c o r e o f t h i s problem i s noted i n Chapter One. Morgenthau and Or g a n s k i d i f f e r on whether a l l i a n c e s produce e q u a l i t y o r i n e q u a l i - t y . The former argues t h a t a l l i a n c e s a r e sought t o c r e a t e e q u a l i t y i n a s i t u a t i o n o f i n e q u a l i t y whereas the l a t e r a rgues t h a t such a l l i a n c e s s i m p l y a l t e r t he a c t o r / s t h a t a r e p r e p o n d e r a n t . 70 As i n e q u a l i t y a p p e a r s , s t a t e s e c u r i t y d e c l i n e s and a l l i a n c e s a r e sought t o o f f s e t t h i s d e c l i n e . Even a G r e a t Power whose i n d i v i d u a l p o s i t i o n improves r e l a t i v e t o a l l o t h e r s w i l l c o n s i d e r a l l i a n c e s e i t h e r i n r esponse t o o t h e r s t a t e s f o r m i n g a l l i a n c e s or as a means t o deny a s t a t e ' s c a p a b i l i t i e s from o t h e r s . The tendency t o form a l l i - ances w i l l s p r e a d w i t h i n the system as g r e a t e r i n e q u a l i t y a p p e a r s . Thus, the number of s t a t e s i n a l l i a n c e i s d i r e c t l y r e l a t e d t o t h e d egree of d i s t r i b u t i o n a l i n e q u a l i t y i n the system. As the number of s t a t e s i n a l l i a n c e i n c r e a s e , a change i s a l s o p r e - d i c t e d i n the t y p e of a l l i a n c e s formed. As i n e q u a l i t y produces g r e a t - er i n s e c u r i t y , s t a t e s w i l l seek t o f o r m a l i z e t h e i r a l 1 i a n c e commit- ments. At low l e v e l s of i n e q u a l i t y , s t a t e s may seek o n l y i m p r e c i s e or v a g u e / g e n e r a l commitments. In so d o i n g , they r e c e i v e the p a r t i a l ben- e f i t s of i n c r e a s e d s e c u r i t y , but a v o i d the g r e a t e r c o s t s e n t a i l e d by a f o r m a l i z e d commitment. As i n e q u a l i t y , and thus i n s e c u r i t y r i s e s , s t a t e s w i l l d e s i r e f o r m a l i z e d r e l a t i o n s h i p s t o guard a g a i n s t p o s s i b l e d e f e c t i o n on the p a r t of an a l l y . T h i s commitment w i l l e n t a i l g r e a t e r c o o r d i n a t i o n of p o l i c y among a 1 1iance members and t h e i d e n t i f i c a t i o n of the c o n d i t i o n s i n which the combined use of f o r c e w i l l r e s u l t . The g r e a t e r c o s t s of such commitment, e s p e c i a l l y r e l a t e d t o o t h e r i n t e r - e s t s and g o a l s , a r e o f f s e t by the enhanced s e c u r i t y stemming from the de f a c t o a g g r e g a t i o n of c a p a b i l i t i e s and the i d e n t i f i c a t i o n the c o n d i - t i o n s i n w h i c h f o r c e w i l l be used. G i v e n t h a t d e f e n c e p a c t s , as d e f i n e d by S i n g e r and Small (1972) , r e p r e s e n t t h e s t r o n g e s t l e v e l of a l 1 i a n c e commitment, the number of d e f e n c e p a c t s i n the system w i l l a l s o be p o s i t i v e l y r e l a t e d t o d i s t r i b u t i o n a l i n e q u a l i t y . In a compar- 71 ati.ve s e n s e , d e f e n c e p a c t s a r e e x p e c t e d t o be more s t r o n g l y r e l a t e d t o the d i s t r i b u t i o n t h a n a l l i a n c e s as a a whole. The f i n a l phenomenon r e s u l t i n g from an unequal d i s t r i b u t i o n of c a p a b i l i t i e s c o n c e r n s changes i n the s t r u c t u r e of the system as d e f i n e d by p a t t e r n s produced by t h e e x i s t e n c e of a l l i a n c e s . T h i s s t r u c t u r e i s g e n e r a l l y d e f i n e d as t h e degree of p o l a r i z a t i o n i n the system. P u t t i n g a s i d e c o n c e p t u a l and m e t h o d o l o g i c a l problems i n the l i t e r a t u r e on p o l a r i z a t i o n f o r the moment (see Chapter F i v e ) , a h i g h l y p o l a r i z e d system e x i s t s when the p a t t e r n of a l l i a n c e commitments from th e system p e r s p e c t i v e e x h i b i t s the p r e s e n c e of two or more m u t u a l l y e x c l u s i v e c l u s t e r s o f s t a t e s i n a l l i a n c e . Every s t a t e i n the system i s t i e d f o r m a l l y t o one, and o n l y one, of the c l u s t e r s . A n o n - p o l a r - i z e d system i s c o n c e p t u a l i z e d as the absence of any a l l i a n c e c l u s t e r s . Between t h e s e extremes l i e s a m y r i a d of p a t t e r n s . G i v e n t h a t p o l a r i z a t i o n i s a f u n c t i o n o f a l l i a n c e s and the p r e s e n c e of a l l i a n c e s a r e a f u n c t i o n of the d i s t r i b u t i o n , i t f o l l o w s t h a t p o l a r i z a t i o n w i l l be r e l a t e d t o the s t a t e o f the d i s t r i b u t i o n . H i s - t o r i c a l l y , t he a l l i a n c e p a t t e r n s produced d u r i n g t h e e r a s of L o u i s XIV, N apoleon, and H i t l e r a r e examples of p o l a r i z a t i o n r e s u l t i n g from an a t t e m p t by t h e s e a c t o r s t o a l t e r the s t a t e system, a l t h o u g h one s h o u l d not n e g l e c t t h e p r e s e n c e of war as a r e l a t e d e x p l a n a t i o n . At low l e v e l s of i n e q u a l i t y , s t a t e s may seek i n f o r m a l commitments t o l a y the f o u n d a t i o n f o r the f u t u r e or even seek some form of r e l a t i o n s h i p w i t h a p o t e n t i a l p r e p o n d e r a n t as a means t o r e s t r a i n i t s b e h a v i o r . At the system l e v e l , t h e p a t t e r n produced may be one of s e v e r a l c l u s t e r s w i t h l i n k s between members of t h e c l u s t e r s . As i n e q u a l i t y i n c r e a s e s , 72 the t h r e a t t o the system and i t s i n d i v i d u a l members c r e a t e a demand f o r f o r m a l i z e d commitments. These commitments e n t a i l the d i s s o l u t i o n of any c o n t r a d i c t o r y a l l i a n c e r e l a t i o n s h i p s t o p r o v i d e a degree of c o n f i d e n c e i n the w i l l i n g n e s s of s t a t e s t o meet t h e i r r e s p e c t i v e a l l i - ance commitments. In such a s i t u a t i o n , t h e c l u s t e r t o which s t a t e s a d h e r e , i n the sense of ' b a l a n c i n g ' or 'bandwagoning', l e a d s t o the p o l a r i z a t i o n o f the system. In e f f e c t , p o l a r i z a t i o n i s a n a t u r a l b y p r o d u c t of t h e fundamental r e l a t i o n s h i p between d i s t r i b u t i o n a l i n e - q u a l i t y and the p r e s e n c e of a l l i a n c e s . In c o n c l u s i o n , t h r e e h y potheses a r e i d e n t i f i e d f o r e m p i r i c a l t e s t - i n g . Two of the hypotheses a r e drawn d i r e c t l y from B a l a n c e of Power t h e o r y . The t h i r d h y p o t h e s i s , p o l a r i z a t i o n , i s l i n k e d t o the t h e o r y , a l t h o u g h the t h e o r y as p r e s e n t e d does not c o v e r the phenomenon d i r e c t - l y . The hypotheses a r e ; HI: There i s a d i r e c t or p o s i t i v e r e l a t i o n s h i p between an unequal d i s t r i b u t i o n of c a p a b i l i t i e s and the p r e s e n c e of a l l i a n c e s . H2: There i s a p o s i t i v e r e l a t i o n s h i p between i n e q u a 1 i t y and the t y p e of a l l i a n c e commitment. As i n e q u a l i t y i n c r e a s e s , the number of d e f e n c e p a c t s i n the system w i l l i n c r e a s e . H3: There i s a p o s i t i v e r e l a t i o n s h i p between i n e q u a l i t y and system p o l a r i z a t i o n . As i n e q u a l i t y i n c r e a s e s , two m u t u a l l y e x c l u s i v e a l l i a n c e c l u s t e r s w i l l appear i n the system. There a r e s e v e r a l major c o n c e p t u a l and o p e r a t i o n a l i s s u e s w h i c h have been a v o i d e d i n t h i s d i s c u s s i o n . They w i l l be d e a l t w i t h i n subsequent c h a p t e r s . However, a f i n a l c o n s i d e r a t i o n r e l a t e s t o prob- a b i l i t y t h a t t h e above r e l a t i o n s h i p s w i l l not be immediate, but appear over t i m e . The e x i s t e n c e of such a l a g i s due t o s e v e r a l f a c t o r s . 73 The r e c o g n i t i o n of changes i n the d i s t r i b u t i o n as a g e n e r a l t r e n d i s l i k e l y t o be g r a d u a l i n n a t u r e . E l i t e s must f i r s t i d e n t i f y t he t r e n d and a s s e s s whether or not i t i s permanent. E l i t e s must a l s o weigh the b e n e f i t s and c o s t s a s s o c i a t e d . w i t h the two o p t i o n s . F i n a l l y , a l l i a n c - es e n t a i l n e g o t i a t i o n s which a r e time consuming. T h e r e f o r e , the p r e - d i c t e d b e h a v i o r must be t e s t e d f o r the p r e s e n c e of a time l a g . Chapter I I I ESTABLISHING THE BOUNDARIES OF ANALYSIS The q u e s t i o n of b o u n d a r i e s i s v i t a l f o r any e m p i r i c a l a n a l y s i s . B o u n d a r i e s s e t the p a r a m e t e r s f o r d a t a c o l 1 e c t i o n and v a r i a b l e o p e r a - t i o n a l i z a t i on. N a t u r a l l y , boundary i d e n t i f i c a t i o n may s i m p l y be a f u n c t i o n o f d a t a a v a i l a b i l i t y . In t h i s s t u d y , d a t a on s t a t e c a p a b i 1 i - t i e s , drawn from the C o r r e l a t e s of War p r o j e c t , l i m i t the s t u d y t o the p o s t l8l6 e r a . The r e m a i n i n g b o u n d a r i e s , the c o n c l u d i n g year and s p a - t i a l l i m i t s w h i c h i n d i c a t e s t a t e membership, f o l l o w from o t h e r c o n s i d - e r a t i o n s . These c o n s i d e r a t i o n s a r e f u n c t i o n of the need t o e n s u r e t h a t t h e r e s u l t i n g a n a l y s i s and f i n d i n g s a r e r e l i a b l e , r a t h e r than s p u r i o u s . The c o n c l u d i n g year of t h i s s t u d y , 1939.35 i s based on a co n c e r n f o r t h e i n f l u e n c e of n o n - i n c l u d e d or background v a r i a b l e s on the a n a l y s i s . S t a t e membership, r e s t r i c t e d l a r g e l y t o g e o g r a p h i c Europe, i s a f u n c t i o n of s e c u r i t y i n t e r d e p e n d e n c e w h i c h i s a t the h e a r t of B a l a n c e of Power t h e o r y . A f i n a l c o n c e r n , i n t h i s r e g a r d , stems from e x i s t i n g h i s t o r i c a l t r e a t m e n t s of time w i t h i n the g e n e r a l b o u n d a r i e s of Europe from l8l6 t o 1939- These a r e the v a r i o u s p e r i o d s or temporal sub-systems i d e n - t i f i e d i n t h e l i t e r a t u r e . These p e r i o d s a r e found i n b o t h h i s t o r i c a l and i n t e r n a t i o n a l r e l a t i o n s t e x t s , and a r e a f u n c t i o n of a v a r i e t y of 3 5 The r a t i o n a l e f o r e n d i n g the s t u d y i n 1939 a c t u a l l y i s r e l a t e d t o key s t r u c t u r a l changes i n the i n t e r n a t i o n a l system f o l l o w i n g World War One. 1939. r a t h e r than 19^5. i s chosen because of the l a c k of da t a on s t a t e c a p a b i l i t i e s d u r i n g t h e war. S i m i l a r l y , the y e a r s 1914 t o 1918 a r e a l s o e x c l u d e d . - 7k - 75 t h e o r e t i c a l and m e t h o d o l o g i c a l c o n c e r n s . D e s p i t e some d i s a g r e e m e n t , a g e n e r a l consensus on the e x i s t e n c e and d u r a t i o n of c e r t a i n key p e r i o d s e x i s t s . W h i l e thes e p e r i o d s range i n d u r a t i o n from the N i n e t e e n t h c e n t u r y as a whole t o two decades i n l e n g t h , t h e i r a p p l i c a t i o n can be b e n e f i c i a l f o r u n d e r s t a n d i n g the u t i l i t y of B a l a n c e o f Power t h e o r y . A l s o , t e s t i n g t he hypotheses w i t h i n t h e s e v a r i o u s p e r i o d s w i l l p r o v i d e some e v i d e n c e r e g a r d i n g the u t i l i t y of the p e r i o d s t h e m s e l v e s , r e l a - t i v e t o B a l a n c e o f Power t h e o r y . In s h o r t , t h r e e t a s k s a r e u n d e r t a k e n i n t h i s c h a p t e r . The f i r s t c o n c e r n s the i d e n t i f i c a t i o n of key background v a r i a b l e s which v a l i d a t e t h e temporal boundary of 1939- The second encompasses t h e r a t i o n a l e f o r r e s t r i c t i n g t he a n a l y s i s t o European s t a t e s i n g e n e r a l , and the r e a s o n s f o r e x c l u d i n g the the U n i t e d S t a t e s and Japan i n p a r t i c u l a r . The t h i r d t a s k r e l a t e s t o the c h o i c e of p e r i o d s w h i c h s h o u l d be ana- l y z e d s e p a r a t e l y , i n c o n j u n c t i o n w i t h t h e a n a l y s i s on the e n t i r e s y s - tem. In f u l f i l l i n g t h e s e t a s k s , the subsequent o p e r a t i o n a l i z a t i o n of the v a r i a b l e s and s t a t i s t i c a l a n a l y s i s w i l l have a g r e a t e r degree of r e l i a b l i t y . 3.1 TEMPORAL BOUNDARIES, POLARITY AND NUCLEAR WEAPONS Any r e s e a r c h endeavour must be con c e r n e d w i t h the p o s s i b l e i n f l u - ence of background v a r i a b l e s . The f a i l u r e t o i d e n t i f y and c o n t r o l t h e s e v a r i a b l e s can l e a d t o s p u r i o u s f i n d i n g s . There a r e two methods f o r d e a l i n g w i t h the problem of background v a r i a b l e s . Levy (1985:43) a r g u e s t h a t the e f f e c t of background v a r i a b l e s can be c o n t r o l l e d by c h o o s i n g a s u f f i c i e n t body of time and space. T h i s c h o i c e s e r v e s t o 76 randomize the i n f l u e n c e of these v a r i a b l e s . Saunders (1986:31) argues t h a t a s m a l l d i s c r e t e body of ti m e and space s h o u l d be i d e n t i f i e d i n which background v a r i a b l e s a r e h e l d c o n s t a n t and s e r v e t o d e f i n e t h e l i m i t s of t h e s t u d y . Each approach c o n t a i n s c e r t a i n c o s t s . C o n c e r n i n g the f i r s t a p p r o a c h , d a t a may not be a v a i l a b l e f o r a s u f - f i c i e n t p e r i o d of t i m e . More i m p o r t a n t l y , i t i s u n c l e a r how l a r g e a time span and d a t a s e t i s n e c e s s a r y t o e n s u r e t h e r a n d o m i z a t i o n of background v a r i a b l e s . Levy argues t h a t t he time span of the C o r r e - l a t e s of War d a t a s e t (I816-I98O) i s i n s u f f i c i e n t . However, h i s a r g u - ment i s based on the r e l a t i v e l y s h o r t span of b i p o l a r i t y i n the d a t a s e t and it's h i s t o r i c a l congruence w i t h t he emergence o f n u c l e a r weap- ons. I t i s u n c l e a r whether the r e m a i n i n g t i m e span (1816> — 19̂ +5) i s s u f f i c i e n t . 3 ' F i n a l 1 y a l a r g e t i m e span and d a t a s e t may undermine t h e r e l i a b l i t y o f i n d i c a t o r s t o r e p r e s e n t phenomena. The same i n d i c a t o r may r e p r e s e n t d i f f e r e n t phenomena a t d i f f e r e n t p o i n t s i n t i m e . (see A l k e r , 1966) . 3 7 The use of a s m a l l time span and d a t a s e t undermines the a b i l i t y t o g e n e r a t e s t a t e m e n t s w h i c h have w i d e r a p p l i c a b i l i t y . F i n d i n g s , and g e n e r a l i z a t i o n s , a r e r e s t r i c t e d t o the p e r i o d under e x a m i n a t i o n w i t h no means t o a s c e r t a i n t h e i r g e n e r a l u t i l i t y . A l s o , such an approach 3 6 Levy uses a much l a r g e r time span t o examine the r e l a t i o n s h i p between p o l a r i t y and s t a b i l i t y . In so d o i n g , he i d e n t i f i e s s e v e r a l d i f f e r e n t e r a s of p o l a r i t y . However, the main problem w i t h Levy's v i e w l i e s i n h i s d e f i n i t i o n and o p e r a t i o n a 1 i z a t i o n of p o l a r i t y . T h i s problem i s d i s c u s s e d a t l a t e r p o i n t i n t h i s s e c t i o n . 3 1 T h i s problem i s known i n the l i t e r a t u r e as s t a t i s t i c a l n o n - a d d i t i v - i t y ( A l k e r , 1964) . The s t a t i s t i c a l m a n i f e s t a t i o n of t h i s problem i s noted i n the d a t a a n a l y s i s p a r t of t h i s s t u d y , e s p e c i a l l y as i t r e l a t e s t o the a g g r e g a t i o n of v a r i o u s sub-systems or h i s t o r i c a l per i ods - t o g e t h e r . 77 i s i n a d e q u a t e f o r t e s t i n g h y p otheses r e l a t e d t o g e n e r a l p a t t e r n s of b e h a v i o r , and c o n f l i c t s w i t h the n o m o t h e t i c t h r u s t o f t h e f i e l d and d i s c i p l i n e as a whole. F i n a l l y , i t may be d i f f i c u l t t o i d e n t i f y t he key background v a r i a b l e s t o be h e l d c o n s t a n t . A mix of the two approaches i s ad o p t e d . The Levy a p p r o a c h , r e l a - t i v e t o the temporal span of the s t u d y as a whole, l e g i t i m i z e s t he e x c l u s i o n of c e r t a i n v a r i a b l e s , whose e x c l u s i o n a l s o f o l l o w s from the type of t h e o r y which i n f o r m s t h i s a n a l y s i s . B a l a n c e o f Power t h e o r y i s a system based t h e o r y . I t b e l o n g s t o t h a t body of t h e o r y w h i c h f o c u s e s on f a c t o r s e x t e r n a l t o the s t a t e i n e x p l a i n i n g b e h a v i o r . Moreover, i t e x p l a i n s why s t a t e s w i t h d i f f e r e n t i n t e r n a l p o l i t i c a l and s o c i a l systems behave s i m i l a r l y ( G a r n e t t , 1986:44 ) . T h i s t y p e o f t h e o r y l e a d s t o an 'a p r i o r i 1 a s s u m p t i o n t h a t i n t e r n a l f a c t o r s have no s y s t e m a t i c i n f l u e n c e on s t a t e b e h a v i o r . T h i s does not imply t h a t i n t e r n a l f a c t o r s , even d u r i n g t he heyday of c a b i n e t d i p l o m a c y , a r e c o m p l e t e l y i r r e l e v a n t . Such f a c t o r s have always p l a y e d a r o l e i n b e h a v i o r . R a t h e r , e x t e r n a l f a c t o r s , i n which the d i s t r i b u t i o n o f c a p a b i l i t i e s i s c e n t r a l , a r e assumed t o pr e d o m i n a t e . F u r t h e r m o r e , the a d o p t i o n of a l a r g e time span, 1816-1939. e n s u r e s t h a t t he i n f l u e n c e of i n t e r n a l f a c t o r s , w h i c h a r e l i k e l y t o be event s p e c i f i c , w i l l have no s y s t e m a t i c a f f e c t on the a n a l y s i s . In the above c a s e , the Levy approach t o background v a r i a b l e s i s found. At the same t i m e , the S a u n d e r 1 s approach i s a l s o used t o d e f i n e t he c o n c l u s i o n of the s t u d y : 1939- A major t r a n s f o r m a t i o n i n the e x t e r n a l e n v ironment of s t a t e s r e s u l t s from World War Two. The system t r a n s - forms from a m u l t i p o l a r s t r u c t u r e t o a b i p o l a r one. A l s o , t he emer- 78 gence of n u c l e a r weapons a l t e r s t he u t i l i t y o f f o r c e as a means t o a d j u s t the d i s t r i b u t i o n and f u n d a m e n t a l l y a f f e c t s t h e a b i l i t y of e l i t e s t o c a l c u l a t e t he d i s t r i b u t i o n . T h i s s t r u c t u r a l and t e c h n o - l o g i c a l t r a n s f o r m a t i o n c r e a t e s a system r e l a t i v e l y u n i q u e from t h a t which p r e c e d e s i t . To i n c l u d e i t i n the a n a l y s i s would undermine our a b i l i t y t o t e s t the ' t r u e ' r e l a t i o n s h i p between the d i s t r i b u t i o n and a l l i a n c e s independent from the e f f e c t s of s t r u c t u r e and t e c h n o l o g y . System s t r u c t u r e i s a p r i m a r y v a r i a b l e i n the u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f s t a t e b e h a v i o r (Young, 1968; W a l t z , 1979) . In f a c t , the b u l k o f e m p i r i c a l e x a m i n a t i o n s a t the system's l e v e l a r e s t r u c t u r a l i n n a t u r e . S t r u c t u r e i s d e f i n e d as the arrangement of system a c t o r s i n r e l a t i o n t o one a n o t h e r and c o n c e p t u a l i z e d i n two d i m e n s i o n s ; v e r t i c a l and h o r - i z o n t a l (Ray, 1980: 3 2 ) . The v e r t i c a l d i m e n s i o n i s t h e h i e r a r c h i c a l s t r u c t u r e o f the system. I t i s based on the r a n k i n g o f s t a t e s , u s u a l - l y on the b a s i s of c a p a b i l i t i e s , and i s c o m p a r a t i v e i n n a t u r e . 3 8 I t i s c o n c e p t u a l i z e d w i t h e x p l i c i t r e f e r e n c e t o t h e s u b s e t of s t a t e s a t the top of the h i e r a r c h y ; the G r e a t Powers. The h o r i z o n t a l d i m e n s i o n i s d e f i n e d i n terms of the l i n k a g e s among s t a t e s . T h i s d i m e n s i o n i s l a r g e l y c o n c e r n e d w i t h the p a t t e r n of p o l i t i c a l r e l a t i o n s h i p s or a l l i - ances among s t a t e s , , a l t h o u g h i t can i n c l u d e economic and/or s o c i a l p a t t e r n s . As w i t h the v e r t i c a l d i m e n s i o n , the c e n t r a l c o n c e r n i s the Gr e a t Powers and l i n k a g e p a t t e r n s among them. 3 8 In t h i s c a s e , c o m p a r a t i v e r e f e r s t o the c o n s t r u c t i o n of rank o r d e r s due t o t h e n a t u r e of t h e d a t a and a p p l i e d method. The rank o f any i n d i v i d u a l s t a t e depends on the s c o r e s of a l l o t h e r s t a t e s . 79 P o l a r i t y i s the dominant concept r e p r e s e n t i n g system s t r u c t u r e . However, t h e r e i<s no consensus on t h e d e f i n i t i o n and o p e r a t i o n a 1 i z a - t i o n of p o l a r i t y c h i e f l y because d i f f e r e n t s c h o l a r s i n c o r p o r a t e d i f - f e r e n t e lements of the two d i m e n s i o n s of s t r u c t u r e . Three d e f i n i t i o n s o f p o l a r i t y dominate i n the l i t e r a t u r e . The f i r s t two d e f i n i t i o n s l i m i t p o l a r i t y t o the v e r t i c a l d i m e n s i o n . W a l t z (1979) d e f i n e s p o l a r - i t y w i t h s t r i c t r e f e r e n c e t o the number of s t a t e s a t the top of t h e system's h i e r a r c h y of c a p a b i 1 i t i e s . 3 ' In so d o i n g , p o l a r i t y i s the f u n c t i o n of the d i s t r i b u t i o n of c a p a b i l i t i e s among a l l a c t o r s w i t h i n a system, and i s i d e n t i c a l t o the number of G r e a t Powers. In c o n t r a s t , Levy (1985) d e f i n e s p o l a r i t y on the b a s i s of the d i s t r i b u t i o n o f ca p a - b i l i t i e s among t h e s t a t e s a t the top o f t h e system's h i e r a r c h y . i n so d o i n g , system p o l a r i t y i s not equal t o t h e number of G r e a t Powers. The f i n a l d e f i n i t i o n encompasses b o t h the v e r t i c a l and h o r i z o n t a l d i m e n s i o n s of s t r u c t u r e . P o l a r i t y equated t o the number of non-a- l i g n e d G r e a t Powers and a l l i a n c e s between G r e a t Powers (Haas, 1970; Bueno de M e s q u i t a , 1973)- Each d e f i n i t i o n r e p r e s e n t s a p o t e n t i a l e x p l a n a t i o n f o r s t a t e behav- i o r . However, f o r r e a s o n s shown below, o n l y t he f i r s t d e f i n i t i o n i s the key background v a r i a b l e . The o t h e r two d e f i n i t i o n s i n t e g r a t e sep- a r a t e e lements of s t r u c t u r e w h i c h l e a d s t o c o n c e p t u a l c o n f u s i o n , not o n l y f o r the f i e l d as a whole, but a l s o f o r e x a m i n a t i o n s o f B a l a n c e o f Power t h e o r y . 3 5 W a l t z , however, does not o p e r a t i o n a l i z e p o l a r i t y s t r i c t l y a c c o r d i n g t o t he number of Gr e a t Powers. He uses a o r d i n a l s c a l e i n which no d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n i s made between systems w i t h t h r e e or more G r e a t Powers. As H a r t (1985:25) p o i n t s o u t , t h i s i s the o r t h o d o x t r e a t - ment of. p o l a r i t y . 8o B e g i n n i n g w i t h t he f i r s t d e f i n i t i o n , W a l t z (1979) r e p o r t s t h a t t h e r e i s a consensus i n the f i e l d t h a t i n t e r n a t i o n a l outcomes v a r y w i t h changes i n the number of G r e a t Powers. E a r l i e r , W a l t z (19&7) argues t h a t changes i n the number of Great Powers a l t e r s t he f u n c t i o n of a l l i a n c e s . In a system c o n t a i n i n g t h r e e or more G r e a t Powers (mul- t i p o l a r ) , a l 1 i ances f u n c t i o n t o a l t e r an unequal d i s t r i b u t i o n of capa- b i l i t i e s among the G r e a t Powers. In a two power or b i p o l a r system, a l l i a n c e s can no l o n g e r s e r v e t h i s f u n c t i o n . L e s s e r s t a t e s do not have s u f f i c i e n t c a p a b i l i t i e s t o a l t e r the d i s t r i b u t i o n between the two Gr e a t P o w e r s . * 0 W a l t z p h r a s e s h i s argument w i t h e x p l i c i t r e f e r e n c e t o B a l a n c e of Power t h e o r y . In so d o i n g , he p o s i t s no r e l a t i o n s h i p between the d i s - t r i b u t i o n o f c a p a b i l i t i e s and a l l i a n c e s i n a b i p o l a r system. Changes i n t he number, t y p e , and g e n e r a l p a t t e r n of a l l i a n c e s i n a b i p o l a r system a r e s t a t i s t i c a l l y independent from changes i n the d i s t r i b u t i o n . Thus, c o m b i n i n g o b s e r v a t i o n s from a b i p o l a r and m u l t i p o l a r system may l e a d t o s p u r i o u s f i n d i n g s . The s t r e n g t h and d i r e c t i o n of t h e r e l a - t i o n s h i p c o u l d be a l t e r e d by the f a i l u r e t o c o n t r o l f o r s t r u c t u r a l change. 4 0 R o t h s t e i n (1968) n o t e s t h a t l e s s e r s t a t e c a p a b i l i t i e s may become r e l e v a n t i n s i t u a t i o n s where the d i s t r i b u t i o n i s not t o o wide between two powers. For example, i n a f i v e Power system where t h e r e i s a wide c a p a b i l i t y gap between the top two and the bottom t h r e e and where the top two d i f f e r e n c e i s s l i g h t , the c a p a b i l i t i e s of l e s s e r s t a t e s may become v i t a l . T h i s c a s e p r o v i d e s a f u r t h e r r e a s o n f o r i n c l u d i n g the l e s s e r s t a t e s . However, i n g e n e r a l , l e s s - er s t a t e c a p a b i l i t i e s , by d e f i n i t i o n , cannot have a major impact on the d i s t r i but i on. 81 P o l a r i t y , i n the second d e f i n i t i o n , i s l a r g e l y independent of the number of Great Powers and based o n l y on how c a p a b i l i t i e s a r e d i s t r i b - u t e d among them. However, t h i s d e f i n i t i o n has 1 i t t 1 e u t i 1 i t y f o r the t a s k a t hand. One cannot s e p a r a t e o u t the e f f e c t o f p o l a r i t y i n t h i s sense from our independent v a r i a b l e w h i c h i s the d i s t r i b u t i o n of capa- b i l i t i e s among the Gr e a t Powers. As such, i t i s not an independent background v a r i a b l e . 4 1 A l s o , t he s p e c i f i c means t o d i s t i n g u i s h p o l a r i - t y from the Great Power s e t i s p r o b l e m a t i c . Levy uses a s o f t i n d i c a - t o r t o i d e n t i f y p o l a r i t y over a l a r g e p e r i o d of t i m e , w h i c h l e a d s t o problems of r e l i a b i l i t y and i n t e r s u b j e c t i v e agreement ( W a l l a c e , 1985:109) . For example, h i s i d e n t i f i c a t i o n of the N a p o l e o n i c e r a as u n i p o l a r i g n o r e s the c a p a b i l i t i e s and r o l e s of R u s s i a and Gr e a t B r i t - a i n . The t h i r d d e f i n i t i o n , i n which p o l a r i t y i s a d j u s t e d f o r a l l i a n c e l i n k a g e s among the Gr e a t Powers, i s a l s o i n a p p r o p r i a t e . M e t h o d o l o g i - c a l problems n o t w i t h s t a n d i n g (see W a l l a c e , 1985) » p o l a r i t y i n c l u d e s p a r t o f our dependent v a r i a b l e ; a l l i a n c e s . S i m i l a r t o the case f o r the second d e f i n i t i o n , our a b i l i t y t o examine c l e a r l y our h y p o t h e s i z e d r e l a t i o n s h i p s s e p a r a t e from background i n f l u e n c e s i s ne g a t e d . Concep- t u a l l y , t h i s d e f i n i t i o n l e a d s t o the t r e a t m e n t of a system w i t h s e v e r - a l G r e a t Powers a l i g n e d i n t o two m u t u a l l y e x c l u s i v e groups as s t r u c - t u r a l l y i d e n t i c a l t o a system c o n t a i n i n g o n l y two G r e a t P o w e r s . 4 2 4 1 In e f f e c t , t he r e l a t i o n s h i p between t h i s d e f i n i t i o n and our i n d e - pendent v a r i a b l e i s t h e c o n c e p t u a l e q u i v a l e n t o f the s t a t i s t i c a l phenomenon of m u l t i c o l 1 i n e a r i t y . For a d i s c u s s i o n o f m u l t i c o l l i - n e a r i t y , see B l a l o c k (1964:87-90) . 4 2 As Levy 0985:47-48) p o i n t s o u t , Haas 1 (1970) use of t h i s d e f i n i - t i o n l e a d s t o a c h a r a c t e r i z a t i o n of both the p e r i o d 1891—1918 and 1946-1965 as t i g h t b i p o l a r . 82 A l l i a n c e groups a r e t r e a t e d as n a t i o n a l a c t o r s w i t h o u t r e g a r d f o r the d i f f e r e n c e s between t h e m . 4 3 F i n a l l y , p o l a r i t y i n t h i s sense c o l l i d e s w i t h the c o n c e p t of p o l a r i z a t i o n as d e f i n e d i n Chapter Two. In con- c l u s i o n , the importance of a l l i a n c e c o n f i g u r a t i o n s , e s p e c i a l l y when e x p l a i n i n g war, s h o u l d not be i g n o r e d . But, p o l a r i t y s h o u l d not be used t o r e p r e s e n t two s e p a r a t e s t r u c t u r a l phenomena. To do so leads t o c o n c e p t u a l c o n f u s i o n . 4 4 In a d o p t i n g W a l t z ' s c o n c e p t i o n of p o l a r i t y , the number of Great Powers i s assumed t o have an independent e f f e c t on s t a t e b e h a v i o r . G r e a t Powers, as w e l l as l e s s e r s t a t e s , a r e assumed t o behave d i f f e r - e n t l y i n m u l t i p o l a r and b i p o l a r s y s t e m s . Thus, t o t a k e o b s e r v a t i o n s from t h e s e two d i s t i n c t s t r u c t u r a l e n v i r o n m e n t s i n a s i n g l e a n a l y s i s w i l l undermine the v a l i d i t y of t h e subsequent f i n d i n g s . One c o u l d 4 3 Fedder (1968) c o r r e c t l y argues t h a t a s t a t e e n t e r i n g i n t o an a l l i - ance does not t r a n s f o r m i n t o a c o a l i t i o n a c t o r . Such a s t a t e r e t a i n s i t s i n d i v i d u a l i t y . A l l i a n c e s a r e o n l y a type of b e h a v i o r and o n l y through r e i f i c a t i o n can they be t r e a t e d as a c t o r s . 4 4 However, a f u r t h e r problem e x i s t s which i s not d i r e c t l y germane t o t h i s s t u d y because of a co n s t a n c y i n the number of G r e a t Powers i n the system from l8l6 t o 1939» as shown i n Chapter Four. There i s not an e x a c t c o r r e s p o n d e n c e between t h i s d e f i n i t i o n and i t s o p e r a - t i o n a l i z a t i on . For example, W a l t z o p e r a t i o n a 1 i z e s p o l a r i t y i n o n l y two forms; b i p o l a r i t y and m u 1 t i p o l a r i t y . In so d o i n g , m u 1 t i p o l a r i - t y encompasses any system c o n t a i n i n g a t l e a s t t h r e e G reat Powers, w h i c h i s the o r t h o d o x a p p l i c a t i o n of p o l a r i t y i n the f i e l d r e g a r d - l e s s of d e f i n i t i o n ( f o r example Haas, 1970; M o d e l s k i , 1973; and Levy, 1985)- Deutsch and S i n g e r (1967) appear t o i n d i c a t e t h a t 5 i s the minimum number of G r e a t Powers f o r m u 1 t i p o l a r i t y , a l t h o u g h t h e i r c o n c e r n i s w i t h the p o l a r i t y - s t a b i l i t y i s s u e . B e r n h o l z (1986) r e p l a c e s m u l t i p o l a r w i t h B a l a n c e of Power, keeps the 3 Power minimum, and a p p l i e s m u l t i p o l a r t o a system c o n t a i n i n g more than 7 Powers. But, t h e r e i s r e a s o n t o b e l i e v e t h a t p o l a r i t y s h o u l d be a p p l i e d w i t h s p e c i f i c r e f e r e n c e t o the a c t u a l number of G r e a t Pow- e r s . To i g n o r e v a r i a t i o n s w i t h i n m u l t i p o l a r i t y c o n t r a d i c t s t h e con- s e n s u s a l b e l i e f t h a t outcomes v a r y w i t h changes i n the number of G r e a t Powers. A p o r t i o n of the l i t e r a t u r e on the r e l a t i o n s h i p 83 argue t h a t s t r u c t u r e , i n the above sense, s h o u l d be used as an e x p e r i - mental c o n t r o l . Both systems, p r e and po s t World War One s h o u l d be used as s e p a r a t e t e s t environments.. E v i d e n c e can then be g e n e r a t e d on the independent e f f e c t o f p o l a r i t y . However, such an approach i s q u e s t i o n a b l e because o f the r e l a t i v e l y s h o r t time span of the p o s t World War One p e r i o d and, as Levy (1985) n o t e s c o r r e c t l y , t he con- f o u n d i n g f a c t o r of n u c l e a r weapons. Moreover, the impact o f n u c l e a r weapons on t h i n k i n g i n the s e c u r i t y r e a l m c o n f l i c t s w i t h c e r t a i n a s s u m p t i o n s o f B a l a n c e of Power t h e o r y . F i n a l l y , n u c l e a r weapons c r e - a t e a major measurement problem. R e c a l l t h a t B a l a n c e of Power t h e o r y i s p r i m a r i l y about the Gr e a t Powers i n w h i c h the use of f o r c e t o r e d r e s s an unequal d i s t r i b u t i o n of c a p a b i l i t i e s i s c e n t r a l . With t h e advent of n u c l e a r weapons i n gener- a l , and i n v u l n e r a b l e second s t r i k e f o r c e s i n ' p a r t i c u l a r , f o r c e i s no lo n g e r a v i a b l e means t o r e d r e s s i n e q u a l i t y . War between the U n i t e d S t a t e s and S o v i e t R u s s i a e n t a i l s t he p r o b a b l e d e s t r u c t i o n of bo t h s o c i e t i e s . The c i t i z e n s of bo t h s t a t e s can be p r o v i d e d w i t h no r e a - s o n a b l e d e f e n c e from a s t r a t e g i c exchange. Thus, the t r a d i t i o n a l use of f o r c e as a means t o enhance s e c u r i t y and s t a t e / s y s t e m s u r v i v a l i s c o n f r o n t e d by an outcome of s t a t e / s y s t e m d e s t r u c t i o n . War between the two G r e a t Powers has no v a l u e because the b e n e f i t , e q u a l i t y and system between number and s t a b i l i t y i n d i c a t e s t h a t the l a t t e r d i f f e r s i n a two, t h r e e , f o u r , and f i v e power system (see Deutsch and S i n g e r , 1967; Yalem, 1972; S i m o w i t z , 1982: Wagner, 1986). In terms o f a l l i a n c e s , the f a i l u r e t o d i s c u s s the p o t e n t i a l i n f l u e n c e of v a r i a - t i o n s w i t h i n m u l t i p o l a r i t y i s due t o t h e a s s u m p t i o n t h a t o n l y a l l i - ances among G r e a t Powers a r e germane t o B a l a n c e of Power t h e o r y . But, s i n c e the degree o f i n e q u a l i t y w i t h i n t h e d i s t r i b u t i o n v a r i e s , a l l i a n c e s w i t h l e s s e r s t a t e s may have u t i l i t y . More i m p o r t a n t l y , the a d d i t i o n or s u b t r a c t i o n o f one Gr e a t Power i n an o v e r a l l m u l t i - p o l a r system may a f f e c t G r e a t Power a l l i a n c e p r e f e r e n c e s and behav- i o r . 8k p r e s e r v a t i o n , i s always outweighed by. the c o s t , a s s u r e d d e s t r u c t i o n . The G r e a t Powers s t i l l have the o p t i o n of u s i n g f o r c e i n the second manner o u t l i n e d i n the t h e o r y . The d i s t r i b u t i o n can be a l t e r e d t h r o u g h the a c q u i s i t i o n of t e r r i t o r y , the t r a d i t i o n a l 'goods' of i n t e r n a t i o n a l p o l i t i c s . Even h e r e , n u c l e a r weapons have had an impact. A l i m i t e d war i n the p e r i p h e r i e s , even between G r e a t Power p r o x i e s , can l e a d t o d i r e c t c o n f r o n t a t i o n between the Powers and e s c a - l a t i o n . The f e a r of n u c l e a r war, i n r e l a t i o n t o i t s e f f e c t on the a c c e p t a b i l i t y of f o r c e and t e r r i t o r i a l a c q u i s i t i o n , has undermined the d o m e s t i c s u p p o r t f o r t h e use of f o r c e , p a r t i c u l a r l y i n the West. Moreover, g i v e n the t e c h n o l o g i c a l , not t e r r i t o r i a l , b a s i s of the n u c l e a r r e v o l u t i o n , a d d i t i o n a l r e s o u r c e s p r o v i d e d by t e r r i t o r i a l a c q u i s i t i o n i s not l i k e l y t o have a major impact on the d i s t r i b u t i o n . In sum, t h e use of f o r c e and the a c q u i s i t i o n of t e r r i t o r y i n r e l a t i o n t o t h e d i s t r i b u t i o n i s no l o n g e r p r o f i t a b l e . I t c o u l d be argued t h a t the e f f e c t of n u c l e a r weapons on b e l i e f s s h o u l d i n c r e a s e the u t i l i t y of a l l i a n c e s as a means t o r e d r e s s an u n f a v o r a b l e d i s t r i b u t i o n . O u t s i d e o f i n t e r n a l a c t i o n s , a l l i a n c e s appear t o be the o n l y p r o f i t a b l e means. If a n y t h i n g , the a l l i a n c e 'mania' i n t h e p o s t 19^5 w o r l d a t t e s t s t o t h i s c o n t e n t i o n . However s i m i l a r t o t h e d e c l i n e i n t h e v a l u e of t e r r i t o r y , i t i s d o u b t f u l t h a t a l l i a n c e s even w i t h o t h e r n u c l e a r s t a t e s can have any m e a n i n g f u l e f f e c t on the d i s t r i b u t i o n between the two Great Powers. How can the a d d i t i o n a l of s e v e r a l d i v i s i o n s or even s m a l l independent n u c l e a r f o r c e s have any s i g n i f i c a n t impact on the d i s t r i b u t i o n between the U n i t e d S t a t e s and S o v i e t R u s s i a w i t h t h e i r m a s s i v e n u c l e a r s t o c k p i l e s . 85 A l l i a n c e s c o n t i n u e t o have v a l u e as i n s t r u m e n t s d e f i n i n g s p h e r e s of i n f l u e n c e and s i g n a l l i n g commitment and r e s o l v e , v i t a l e l e ments f o r a d e t e r r e n t p o s t u r e , but they cannot s i g n i f i c a n t 1y a 1ter the d i s t r i b u - t i o n ( f o r a g e n e r a l d i s c u s s i o n , see Fedder, 1968; D i n e r s t e i n , 1965) • N a t u r a l l y an 'a p r i o r i 1 e x p l a n a t i o n of a l l i a n c e s r e q u i r e s e m p i r i c a l v e r i f i c a t i o n and the above d i s c u s s i o n s h o u l d not be i n t e r p r e t e d t o imply t h a t B a l a n c e of Power e x p l a n a t i o n s f o r a l l i a n c e s s h o u l d be r e j e c t e d out of hand f o r the n u c l e a r age. I t s i m p l y r e v e a l s t h a t the r e l a t i v e s i m p l i c i t y of a B a l a n c e of Power e x p l a n a t i o n i n the p r e - n u - c l e a r age p r o v i d e s a f i r m e r s t a r t i n g p o i n t f o r a n a l y s i s . F u r t h e r m o r e , the d i s c u s s i o n a l s o r e v e a l s the major m e t h o d o l o g i c a l problem engen- d e r e d by n u c l e a r weapons. How does one measure the n u c l e a r ' b a l a n c e ' i n c o n j u n c t i o n w i t h t h e c o n v e n t i o n a l ' b a l a n c e 1 . P r i o r t o t h e n u c l e a r age, c a p a b i l i t i e s , from both the o b s e r v e r and a c t o r p e r s p e c t i v e , can be r e a s o n a b l y measured through an amalgam of m i l i t a r y and i n d u s t r i a l r e s o u r c e s . However, t h e n u c l e a r d i m e n s i o n i s a c o n f o u n d i n g element. I t i s t r u e t h a t n u c l e a r c a p a b i l i t i e s a r e h i g h - l y c o r r e l a t e d w i t h t r a d i t i o n a l c a p a b i l i t i e s . The G r e a t Power rank of the U n i t e d S t a t e s and S o v i e t R u s s i a a r e a f u n c t i o n of n u c l e a r and con- v e n t i o n a l c a p a b i l i t i e s . Moreover, both G r e a t Powers have shown con- c e r n f o r b o t h the n u c l e a r and c o n v e n t i o n a l d i s t r i b u t i o n and t h e i n t e r - r e l a t i o n s h i p between t h e s e two d i m e n s i o n s . Problems a r i s e i n the c o n t e x t of o t h e r s t a t e s and the d i s t i n c t i o n between the two dimen- s i o n s . 86 S e v e r a l second rank s t a t e s , G r e a t B r i t a i n , F r a n c e , and C h i n a , p o s s - ess b o t h n u c l e a r and c o n v e n t i o n a l c a p a b i l i t i e s . However, two p r o m i - nent s t a t e s , West Germany and Japan, rank a t the top of economic i n d i - c a t o r s of c a p a b i l i t y , but o n l y the former p o s s e s s e s any s i g n i f i c a n t c o n v e n t i o n a l m i l i t a r y c a p a b i l i t i e s and n e i t h e r has n u c l e a r w e a p o n s . 4 5 The problem becomes not o n l y the s i m p l e i d e n t i f i c a t i o n o f G r e a t Powers from a c a p a b i l i t y p e r s p e c t i v e , but the a p p r o p r i a t e mix of c a p a b i l i t y i n d i c a t o r s f o r t h i s t a s k . In one sense, n u c l e a r weapons a r e the g r e a t e q u a l i z e r . Even a s m a l l s t a t e w i t h a minimum d e t e r r e n t c a p a b i l i t y can e n s u r e a degree s e c u r i t y u n a v a i l a b l e i n t h e p r e - n u c l e a r age. N u c l e a r weapons a r e not s i m p l y a n o t h e r component of m i l i t a r y c a p a b i l i t i e s . One can n o t s i m p l y add l a u n c h e r s or warheads as an o t h e r component i n the b a s i c e q u a t i o n . As R o t h s t e i n (1968:112) p o i n t s o u t : " N o t h i n g as r e v o l u t i o n a r y as n u c l e a r weapons i n t r u d e d t o make t r a d i t i o n a l c a l c u l a t i o n s o f power ( c a p a b i l i t i e s ) p u r e l y n o n - s e n s i c a 1 " . Nor can n u c l e a r weapons be i g n o r e d i n any c o n s i d e r a t i o n of the d i s t r i b u t i o n . The problem i s s i m - p l y the w e i g h t i n g of the v a r i o u s elements of s t a t e c a p a b i l i t i e s w h i c h , i n the n u c l e a r age, r e q u i r e a major r e s e a r c h f o c u s i n i t s e l f . A g a i n , t h e measurement problem s h o u l d not be viewed as a r e a s o n f o r c o m p l e t e l y r e j e c t i n g B a l a n c e of Power t h e o r y . I t s i m p l y r e v e a l s t h a t the n u c l e a r age r e q u i r e s a s e p a r a t e a n a l y s i s i n i t s own r i g h t . More- o v e r , e m p i r i c a l e v i d e n c e from the p r e - n u c l e a r age may p r o v i d e i n s i g h t s w h i c h can i n f o r m a subsequent a n a l y s i s of the n u c l e a r age. S i m p l y , 4 5 A l t h o u g h s t i 1 1 r e l a t i v e l y s m a l l when compared t o the Superpowers, the s i z e of Japanese c o n v e n t i o n a l f o r c e s i s i n c r e a s i n g s i g n i f i c a n t - l y a l o n g w i t h i t s m i l i t a r y e x p e n d i t u r e s . 87 t h e s t r u c t u r a l t r a n s f o r m a t i o n from m u l t i p o l a r i t y t o b i p o l a r i t y and t h e complex n u c l e a r e n vironment of the contemporary w o r l d d i c t a t e i t s e x c l u s i o n from t h i s a n a l y s i s . In a one sen s e , , the m u l t i p o l a r system of Europe and the r e l a t i v e l y s t a t i c n a t u r e o f c a p a b i l i t i e s p r o v i d e a 'be s t ' c a s e f o r e x a m i n i n g the u t i l i t y of B a l a n c e o f Power t h e o r y as an e x p l a n a t i o n f o r a l l i a n c e s . 4 6 3.2 SECURITY INTERDEPENDENCE AND STATE MEMBERSHIP J_N THE SYSTEM I d e n t i f y i n g t he s p a t i a l scope o f s e c u r i t y i n t e r d e p e n d e n c e as the means t o i d e n t i f y t he members of the system i s an i m p o r t a n t i s s u e i n i t s own r i g h t . The f a i l u r e t o e s t a b l i s h adequate c r i t e r i a f o r s t a t e membership can l e a d t o the i n c l u s i o n of s t a t e s who a r e not r e l e v a n t p l a y e r s i n the s e c u r i t y e q u a t i o n . As a r e s u l t , t he q u e s t i o n of s p a - t i a l b o u n d a r i e s i s v i t a l t o e n s u r e a v i a b l e r e p r e s e n t a t i o n of t h e h i s - t o r i c a l r e c o r d . U n f o r t u n a t e l y , t h e s p a t i a l boundary i s s u e has drawn l i t t l e a t t e n t i o n i n r e l a t i o n t o the t e s t i n g o f hypotheses on g e n e r a l b e h a v i o r a l p a t t e r n s . I t i s t r u e t h a t a g r e a t d e a l of work has been done on r e g i o n a l sub-systems (see Thompson, 1973) . But, t h i s work i s l a r g e l y b i a s e d towards a c o n c e r n f o r i n t e r a c t i o n p a t t e r n s d e f i n e d w i t h r e f e r e n c e t o economic v a r i a b l e s . When i t comes t o s e c u r i t y i s s u e s , t h e l i t e r a t u r e i s v e r y l i m i t e d . B r e c h e r (1967) i s co n c e r n e d p r i m a r i l y w i t h i d e n t i f y i n g s u b o r d i n a t e systems t o examine s t a t e b e h a v i o r o u t s i d e of t he dominant system ( i . e . contemporary B i p o l a r i t y ) . Deutsch e t . a l . (1957) . and C l i n e (1978) d e f i n e s e c u r i t y sub-systems by a l l i a n c e r e l a - 4 6 The r e f e r e n c e t o 'be s t ' c a s e i s drawn from P r e z w o r s k i and Teune 0975) • They argue t h a t two r e s e a r c h c h o i c e s , b e s t o r w o r s t c a s e , a r e a v a i l a b l e . In c h o o s i n g t h e b e s t c a s e , one assumes t h a t an i n a b i l i t y t o r e j e c t t h e ' n u l l h y p o t h e s i s a l l o w s one t o i n f e r t h a t t h i s i nab i 1 i t y would h o l d i n o t h e r , i . e . w o r s t c a s e , s c e n a r i o s . 88 t i o n s h i p s . F i n a l l y , Buzan (1986; 1983) d e f i n e s s e c u r i t y sub-systems i n r e l a t i o n t o major nodes of c o n f l i c t . W h i l e t h i s l i t e r a t u r e a g r ees on t h e impor t a n c e of geography i n d e f i n i n g s e c u r i t y i n t e r d e p e n d e n c e , t h e r e i s no agreed upon s e t o f c r i t e r i a t o measure the l i n k a g e between the two. The f o c u s on s e c u r i t y , i n a po l i t i c a 1 / m i 1 i t a r y sense, stems from B a l a n c e of Power t h e o r y . S t a t e b e h a v i o r i s e x p l a i n e d i n r e l a t i o n t o the p r i m a r y g o a l of s t a t e s u r v i v a l . S e c u r i t y r e p r e s e n t s t h e a b i l i t y o f a s t a t e t o meet t h i s g o a l and i s p r i m a r i l y dependent on t h e i r m i l i - t a r y c a p a b i l i t i e s r e l a t i v e t o o t h e r s t a t e s . N a t u r a l l y , economic f a c - t o r s p l a y a r o l e i n the d e t e r m i n a t i o n o f any s t a t e ' s s e c u r i t y r e q u i r e - ments. A l s o , they a r e components i n the d e t e r m i n a t i o n of any s t a t e ' s c a p a b i l i t i e s , and can not be e n t i r e l y i g n o r e d . B ut, economic e l e - ments, such as t r a d e and a c c e s s t o m a r k e t s , have o n l y a secondary r e l a t i o n s h i p t o b a s i c s e c u r i t y needs. A c c o r d i n g t o Buzan (1986), eco- nomic r e l a t i o n s h i p s have a d i f f e r e n t dynamic than p o l i t i c a l / m i 1 i t a r y r e l a t i o n s h i p s . He p o i n t s o u t , f o r example, t h a t the contemporary S o v i e t - A m e r i c a n r i v a l r y i s accompanied by l i t t l e economic i n t e r c h a n g e . The d i f f e r e n c e i n the two d i m e n s i o n s , Buzan a r g u e s , i s due t o the g r e a t e r i n f l u e n c e o f geography on p o l i t i c a l / m i l i t a r y r e l a t i o n s h i p s . The c e n t r a l i t y of geography f o r d e f i n i n g a r e a s of s e c u r i t y i n t e r d e - pendence i s c r u c i a l . I t i s t r u e t h a t changes i n m i l i t a r y t e c h n o l o g y have a f f e c t e d t he s e c u r i t y b e n e f i t s d e r i v e d from g e o g r a p h i c l o c a t i o n and have e n a b l e d some s t a t e s t o p r o j e c t power over l a r g e d i s t a n c e s . But, the b a s i c d e f i n i n g c h a r a c t e r i s t i c of s t a t e s e c u r i t y remains geo- g r a p h i c . Depending on the t y p e o f g e o g r a p h i c f e a t u r e s w h i c h e x i s t a t 89 or w i t h i n a s t a t e ' s b o r d e r s , s t a t e s may f e e l more or l e s s s e c u r e . A s t a t e s u r r o u n d e d by mountains or water has g r e a t e r i n i t i a l s e c u r i t y than s t a t e s which r e s i d e on f l a t l a n d s . Geography s t i l l p l a y s a key r o l e i n d e f i n i n g the type of m i l i t a r y f o r c e s a s t a t e a c q u i r e s and d e p l o y s . The a b i l i t y t o p r o j e c t power over l o n g d i s t a n c e s i s a l s o not a s a t - i s f a c t o r y r e a s o n f o r i g n o r i n g the g e o g r a p h i c element of s t a t e s e c u r i - t y . D e s p i t e t e c h n o l o g i c a l change, even the most p o w e r f u l s t a t e s e x p e r i e n c e a d e c l i n e i n s t r e n g t h and i n f l u e n c e over d i s t a n c e ( B o u l d - i n g , 1963; Bueno de M e s q u i t a , 198l). A l s o , the a b i l i t y t o p r o j e c t power over wide d i s t a n c e s s h o u l d not be equated s i m p l y w i t h t h e a b i l i - t y t o p r o j e c t p h y s i c a l punishment. For example, i t i s not the n u c l e a r c a p a b i l i t i e s of the S o v i e t Union and the U n i t e d S t a t e s a l o n e which makes them Superpowers, but t h e i r a b i l i t y t o occupy or a t t a c k p h y s i - c a l l y the t e r r i t o r y of o t h e r s t a t e s by v i r t u e of t h e i r c o n v e n t i o n a l c a p a b i 1 i t i e s . The c o n c e p t of i n t e r d e p e n d e n c e l i e s a t the h e a r t of t h i s i s s u e . G e n e r a l l y , i n t e r d e p e n d e n c e i s c o n c e i v e d as a s i t u a t i o n between s t a t e s c h a r a c t e r i z e d by r e c i p r o c a l e f f e c t s (Nye and Keohane, 1977; see a l s o W a l t z , 1979)- In s e c u r i t y terms, i t r e l a t e s t o the s e t of s t a t e s whose m i l i t a r y / p o l i t i c a l b e h a v i o r has some e f f e c t on the c o n t i n u e d s u r v i v a l of any i n d i v i d u a l s t a t e . R e c i p r o c i t y can be s y m m e t r i c a l or as y m m e t r i c a l depending on the c a p a b i l i t i e s of one s t a t e r e l a t i v e t o a n o t h e r . I t i s a s y m m e t r i c a l r e l a t i o n s h i p f o r the G r e a t Powers. I t i s a s y m m e t r i c a l between the G r e a t Powers and a l l the o t h e r s t a t e s . F u r t h e r m o r e , g i v e n the e x i s t e n c e of marked d i s p a r i t i e s i n r e l a t i v e 90 c a p a b i l i t i e s among s t a t e s as a whole, the scope of s e c u r i t y i n t e r d e - pendence f o r each s t a t e i s l i k e l y t o v a r y w i d e l y . R e l a t i v e c a p a b i 1 i t i e s and g e o g r a p h i c p o s i t i o n a r e t h e b a s i c f a c t o r s w h i c h e n a b l e d e c i s i o n - m a k e r s t o i d e n t i f y and p r i o r i z e s e c u r i t y t h r e a t s and needs. But, i t i s of l i t t l e v a l u e f o r t h i s s t u d y t o i d e n t i f y t he scope of s e c u r i t y i n t e r d e p e n d e n c e from t h e p e r s p e c t i v e o f i n d i v i d u a l s t a t e s . As noted above, the complex i n t e r a c t i o n between a s t a t e ' s r e l a t i v e c a p a b i l i t i e s and g e o g r a p h i c p o s i t i o n i s l i k e l y t o produce d i v e r g e n t a r e a s of s e c u r i t y i n t e r d e p e n d e n c e . S p e c i f i c a l l y , t he scope of any i n d i v i d u a l s t a t e ' s p e r c e i v e d s e c u r i t y i n t e r d e p e n d e n c e w i l l d i f - f e r from any o t h e r s t a t e . The g e o g r a p h i c l i m i t s of t h i s s t u d y i s Europe. T h i s l i m i t i s con- s i s t e n t w i t h h i s t o r i c a l c o n s i d e r a t i o n s which p o i n t o ut Europe as the c e n t r e and b i r t h p l a c e of i n t e r n a t i o n a l p o l i t i c s , and t h e e m p i r i c a l r e f e r e n t f o r B a l a n c e o f Power t h e o r y . Moreover, the r e l a t i o n s h i p between European s t a t e s and t h e p e r i p h e r y , w i t h two e x c e p t i o n s noted below, i s one of dominance and s u b s e r v i e n c e . T e c h n o l o g i c a l l y , t he a b i l i t y t o p r o j e c t power f o r the m a j o r i t y of s t a t e s i s l i m i t e d t o the c o n t i n e n t , and c a p a b i l i t i e s among the c o n t i n e n t a l s t a t e s a r e l a r g e l y dominated by land f o r c e s . Thus, s e c u r i t y c o n c e r n s f o r t h e European s t a t e s i s r e s t r i c t e d t o t h e c o n t i n e n t i t s e l f . H a v i ng e s t a b l i s h e d t h e g e o g r a p h i c b o u n d a r i e s of the s t u d y , we can now i d e n t i f y the r u l e s f o r membership. For a European s t a t e t o be i n c l u d e d , i t must meet the c o n d i t i o n s o u t l i n e d by S i n g e r and Small (1972:20) . These c o n d i t i o n s a r e a minimum p o p u l a t i o n of 500 ,000 and 91 the r e c e p t i o n of a d i p l o m a t i c m i s s i o n from e i t h e r G r e a t B r i t a i n or Fra n c e f o r t he p e r i o d 1816-1919- A f t e r 1919. s t a t e s must e i t h e r be members of the League of N a t i o n s , o r meet the p o p u l a t i o n measure and r e c e i v e d i p l o m a t i c m i s s i o n s from any two Great Powers. D e s p i t e t he g e o g r a p h i c l i m i t a t i o n t o Europe, c o n s i d e r a t i o n must be g i v e n t o two non-European s t a t e s , t he U n i t e d S t a t e s and Japan, which have been t r e a t e d as members of the European system f o r p a r t of the p e r i o d under e x a m i n a t i o n ( S i n g e r and S m a l l , 1972) . The c e n t r a l ques- t i o n i n r e l a t i o n t o t h e i r membership i s . w h e t h e r t h e s e s t a t e s a r e p a r t of t he European s e c u r i t y e q u a t i o n . Three c r i t e r i a c an be used t o i n d i c a t e membership i n t h i s r e g a r d : 4 7 the o c c u p a t i o n or c o n t r o l of t e r r i t o r y w i t h i n Europe; the e x i s t e n c e of a s e c u r i t y r e l a t i o n s h i p w i t h one of the g e o g r a p h i c members; and/or a h i s t o r i c a l w i l l i n g n e s s t o use f o r c e t o de f e n d or expand t h e i r i n t e r e s t s i n Europe. F u r t h e r m o r e , two of the t h r e e c r i t e r i a must be met f o r i n c l u s i o n . O t h e r w i s e , s t a t e s w h i c h have a s e c u r i t y r e l a t i o n s h i p w i t h a g e o g r a p h i c member f o r p u r - poses o u t s i d e of t h e i r r e g i o n can not be e x c l u d e d . The s p e c i f i c case f o r t h e i n c l u s i o n o f t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s and Japan stems from t h e a s c e n s i o n t o Great Power rank on the b a s i s o f t h e i r r e s p e c t i v e v i c t o r i e s i n l a t e N i n e t e e n t h C e n t u r y ' w a r s 1 . 4 8 However, th e s e v i c t o r i e s a r e non-European i n l o c a t i o n and a r e r e l a t e d t o con- 4 7 The d i s c u s s i o n of American and Japanese membership c o u l d r e a d i l y be done w i t h o u t r e f e r e n c e t o c r i t e r i a . However t h e r e i s a need t o e s t a b l i s h a s e t of r u l e s f o r s t a t e membership i n g e n e r a l . These c r i t e r i a have v a l u e i n p r o v i d i n g a c l e a r method f o r i d e n t i f y i n g s t a t e s who p a r t i c i p a t e i n n o n - c o n t i g u o u s r e g i o n s i n the contempo- r a r y p e r i o d . 4 8 For Japan, i t was the d e f e a t of China i n 1895• The U n i t e d S t a t e s d e f e a t e d S p a i n i n 1898. Membership i s a l s o based on t h e i r m i l i t a r y c a p a b i l i t i e s r e l a t i v e t o o t h e r s t a t e s . 92 c e r n s i n t h e i r r e s p e c t i v e g e o g r a p h i c r e g i o n s . When a p p l y i n g the above c r i t e r i a , n e i t h e r s t a t e can be t r e a t e d as a member of the European s e c u r i t y system from l8l6-1939> Japan had s e v e r a l p o l i t i c a l l i n k s w i t h European s t a t e s , d a t i n g back t o the A n g l o - J a p a n e s e a l l i a n c e i n 1902. A l s o , Japan p a r t i c i p a t e d i n both World Wars o f t h i s c e n t u r y . However, the A n g l o - J a p a n e s e a l l i a n c e was l a r g e l y an A s i a n a f f a i r . Subsequent p o l i t i c a l l i n k s between Japan and Germany i n the 1930s were not f o r m a l i n the sense o f J i n k i n g s e c u r i t y or c o - o r d i n a t i n g p o l i c y ( T a y l o r , 1964:1kS~ 146) . In f a c t , Japan became a n e u t r a l d u r i n g t he Russo-German war (1941-1945)' Japan's p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n World War One was l i m i t e d t o the a c q u i s i t i o n of German c o l o n i a l p o s s e s s i o n s i n A s i a . As noted above, Japan d i d not p a r t i c i p a t e i n the European t h e a t r e d u r i n g World War Two. 4' In c o n c l u - s i o n , Japan does not meet the c r i t e r i a f o r membership i n the European sub-system. I t i s a r e g i o n a l p l a y e r whose r e l a t i o n s h i p w i t h the Euro- peans, i s s t r i c t l y a f u n c t i o n of the European p r e s e n c e i n A s i a . 5 0 S i m i l a r l y , t he U n i t e d S t a t e s does not meet the c r i t e r i a f o r i n c l u - s i o n . A l t h o u g h the U n i t e d S t a t e s p a r t i c i p a t e d i n the l a t e r s t a g e s o f World War One, t h i s p a r t i c i p a t i o n was an anomaly r e l a t i v e t o t r a d i - t i o n a l b e h a v i o r . Immediately a f t e r t he war, the U n i t e d S t a t e s r e j e c t - ed any ty p e of s e c u r i t y l i n k w i t h Europe, as e v i d e n c e d by her r e f u s a l 4 9 World War Two i s t r a d i t i o n a l l y t r e a t e d as one war. However, a t c l o s e r e x a m i n a t i o n , t h e r e a r e a c t u a l l y two s e p a r a t e wars, a P a c i f i c War and a European war. From a lo n g e r h i s t o r i c a l p e r s p e c t i v e , h i s - t o r i a n s may come t o t r e a t World War One as two s e p a r a t e wars, as argued by Wight (1977= 38) . 5 0 H i s t o r i a n s s u p p o r t t h i s v i e w . For example, b o t h Adamthwaite (1977) and Ross (1983) argue t h a t Japan was an A s i a n a c t o r , and not a p l a y e r i n t h e European s e c u r i t y e q u a t i o n . 93 t o r a t i f y the Versai 1 1es T r e a t y and her u n i l a t e r a l e n u n c i a t i o n of neu- t r a l i t y i n 1935 - 5 1 The U n i t e d S t a t e s n e i t h e r o c c u p i e d t e r r i t o r y f o r any s i g n i f i c a n t p e r i o d of t i m e , nor m a i n t a i n e d a s e c u r i t y l i n k w i t h European s t a t e s over t i m e . A f i n a l c o n c e r n i s the c o l o n i a l p o s s e s s i o n s of the European Powers. In g e n e r a l , the m a j o r i t y of p o s s e s s i o n s a r e d i r e c t l y c o n t r o l l e d by the m e t r o p o l i t a n Power and, thus do not meet th e membership c o n d i t i o n s o u t l i n e d by S i n g e r and S m a l l . The e x c e p t i o n here i s t h e v a r i o u s d o m i n i o n s of the B r i t i s h Empire. P r i o r t o World War One, t h e f o r e i g n / d e f e n c e p o l i c i e s of t h e s e s t a t e s a r e c o n t r o l 1ed by Gre a t B r i t a i n . Thus, they can not be t r e a t e d as t r u l y independent s t a t e s . However, b e g i n n i n g w i t h t h e i r major c o n t r i b u t i o n s t o the B r i t i s h war e f f o r t d u r i n g World War One, t h e s e d ominions sought an independent v o i c e , l e g i t i m a t e d by the S t a t u t e of W e s t m i n i s t e r . Only Canada among th e d ominions i s g i v e n membership, l i m i t e d t o t h e I n t e r w a r y e a r s . A l t h o u g h Canada w i t h d r e w i n t o an i s o l a t i o n i s t p o s i - t i o n s i m i l a r t o the U n i t e d S t a t e s , i t s i g n e d t h e V e r s a i l l e s T r e a t y , p a r t i c i p a t e d i n the League of N a t i o n s , and d e c l a r e d war on Germany i n 1939 i m m e d i a t e l y f o l l o w i n g G r e a t B r i t a i n . A l t h o u g h the o t h e r domin- io n s a c t e d s i m i l a r t o Canada, t h e i r l o c a t i o n , i n c o n j u n c t i o n w i t h the r i s i n g J apanese t h r e a t i n the 1930s, p l a c e s them o u t s i d e of the equa- 5 1 O f f n e r (1975: 116) p o i n t s out t h a t American s e c u r i t y c o n c e r n s were s t r i c t l y f o c u s e d on the P a c i f i c r e g i o n . A l s o , i t was t h e German d e c l a r a t i o n of war i n 19̂ 1 which. b r o u g h t t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s i n t o the European war and not v i c e - v e r s a . The problem of e n t r y , as sought by F.D.R., was s o l v e d . As Graebner (1961) n o t e s , a u t o m a t i c U.S. p a r - t i c i p a t i o n i n Europe was f a r from a f o r e g o n e c o n c l u s i o n . F i n a l l y , A l b r e c h t - C a r r i e (1958) r e c o g n i z e s the f a c t t h a t t h e U n i t e d S t a t e , was the s t r o n g e s t power a t the t i m e , but because of her i s o l a t i o n - i s t s t a n c e , she was not p a r t of European s e c u r i t y c a l c u l a t i o n s . 94 t i o n . 5 2 T a b l e II System Members G r e a t B r i t a i n 1 r e l a n d (1922) Hoi l a n d Be 1g i urn (1830) Luxemborg (1920) F r a n c e Swi tzer 1 and Spa i n P o r t u g a l Hanover (1838- 1866) Bavar i a (1816- 1870) P r u s s i a/Germany Baden (1816- 1870) Saxony (1816- 1867) Wurtemborg (1816- 1870) Hesse E l e c t . (1816- 1866) Hesse Gr.Duc. (1816- 1866) M e c k l e n b e r g (1843- 1866) P o l a n d (1919) A u s t r - H u n g a r y (1816- 1918) A u s t r i a (1919- 1938) Hungary (1919) Czecos1ovak i a (1919- 1938) Sard i n i a/1ta1y Papal S t a t e s (1-816- i860) Two S i c i 1 i es (1816- i860) Modena (1842- i860) Parma (1851- i860) Tuscany (1816- i860) A l b a n i a (1914- 1938) S e r b i a / Y u g o . (1878) Greece (1828) Bu1 gar i a (1908) Ruman i a (1878) Russ i a E s t o n i a (1918) L a t v i a (1918) L i thuan i a (1918) F i n l a n d (1919) Sweden Norway (1905) Denmark Canada (1919) In c o n c l u s i o n , t h i s s t u d y i s l i m i t e d t o the g e o g r a p h i c b o u n d a r i e s of Europe,, w i t h the e x c e p t i o n o f the i n c l u s i o n of Canada i n the I n t e r w a r p e r i o d . The s t a t e s , w h i c h meet the c o n d i t i o n s f o r membership a r e p r e s e n t e d i n T a b l e I I , a l o n g w i t h t h e d a t e s of membership. These s t a t e s p r o v i d e the b a s i c o b s e r v a t i o n s f o r the independent and depen- 5 2 A r e l a t e d i s s u e i s the c o n t r i b u t i o n of c o l o n i a l p o s s e s s i o n s t o the c a p a b i l i t i e s of the m e t r o p o l i t a n s t a t e s . T h i s i s s u e i s d i s c u s s e d i n t he subsequent Chapter which s e r v e s t o o p e r a t i o n a l i z e the i n d e - pendent v a r i a b l e . 95 dent v a r i a b l e s . 3-3 IDENTIFYING PERIODS WITHIN THE GENERAL BOUNDARIES Europe i n the p e r i o d 1816-1939 i s i d e n t i f i e d as t h e e m p i r i c a l b o u n d a r i e s f o r t h i s a n a l y s i s . These b o u n d a r i e s a r e a f u n c t i o n of s t r u c t u r a l and t e c h n o l o g i c a l changes which o c c u r e d f o l l o w i n g World War One, and the s e c u r i t y i n t e r d e p e n d e n c e among European s t a t e s . The r e s u l t i s a system o f i n t e r n a t i o n a l p o l i t i c s w h i c h e x h i b i t s r e l a t i v e c o n t e x t u a l c o n s i s t e n c y over t i m e . The e f f e c t of o t h e r f a c t o r s , p a r - t i c u l a r l y r e l a t e d t o i n d i v i d u a l s t a t e s , on b e h a v i o r i s assumed t o be t e m p o r a l l y l i m i t e d . They a r e l i k e l y t o have o n l y a random, r a t h e r than s y s t e m a t i c , e f f e c t on our subsequent a n a l y s i s . However, c o n c e r n must s t i l l be g i v e n t o changes w i t h i n t h i s system as a whole which c o u l d a f f e c t our a n a l y s i s . Change, as d i s t i n c t from t r a n s f o r m a t i o n , r e f e r s t o a l t e r a t i o n s i n the environment w h i c h may a f f e c t b e h a v i o r and thus a l t e r t he p r e d i c t e d r e l a t i o n s h i p between the d i s t r i b u t i o n and a 1 1 i a n c e s . 5 3 In R o s e c r a n c e ' s (1963) s t u d y o f h i s t o r i c a l s ystems, change i s l i n k e d a l t e r a t i o n s i n the mode, o b j e c t i v e s , and t e c h n i q u e s of d i p l o m a c y . A l t h o u g h he f a i l e d t o p r o v i d e an adequate means t o measure such changes, r e l y i n g i n s t e a d on h i s t o r i c a l t r a c t s and a c o n c e r n f o r s t a b i l i t y d e f i n e d as war, he c o r r e c t l y i n d i c a t e s t h a t s y s t e m a t i c e m p i r i c a l a n a l y s i s must be con- c e r n e d w i t h changes t h a t sweep a c r o s s the system. Such changes a l t e r 5 3 C h o u c r i and No r t h (1975) d e f i n e such changes as b r e a k p o i n t s w h i c h a r e a f u n c t i o n of changes i n the r e l a t i o n s h i p among v a r i a b l e s . However, one must f i r s t i d e n t i f y b r e a k p o i n t s and t e s t f o r such changes, w h i c h s e r v e t o v a l i d a t e t he b r e a k p o i n t s , r a t h e r than the o t h e r way around. 96 outcomes of s t a t e i n t e r a c t i o n and thus a f f e c t e x p e c t a t i o n s i n terms of p r e d i c t e d r e l a t i o n s h i p s among phenomena. One key t o the i d e n t i f i c a t i o n of such changes, t h e i r d u r a t i o n , and t h e r e f o r e , temporal sub-systems o r p e r i o d s , i s the t h e o r y under exami- n a t i o n . As noted e a r l i e r , B a l a n c e of Power t h e o r y i s d i r e c t e d t o the problem o f s e c u r i t y i n an a n a r c h i c e n v i r o n m e n t . The fundamental form of t h e s e c u r i t y t h r e a t i s the use of f o r c e or war. War i s th e u l t i - mate a r b i t e r of s u r v i v a l . I t f o l l o w s t h a t B a l a n c e of Power e x p l a n a - t i o n s a r e s t r o n g e s t when war has u t i l i t y i n the system as a w h o l e . 5 4 I t s u t i l i t y u n d e r l i e s t h e impor t a n c e of the d i s t r i b u t i o n of c a p a b i l i - t i e s i n e x p l a i n i n g b e h a v i o r . Whereas the u t i l i t y o f f o r c e i s d i r e c t l y and pe r m a n e n t l y a f f e c t e d by t h e emergence o f n u c l e a r weapons, i t s u t i l i t y i n the n o n - n u c l e a r age i s a f f e c t e d by o t h e r f a c t o r s . J e r v i s (I985) p o i n t s out t h a t a f t e r a major s y s t e m i c war, such as N a p o l e o n i c Wars and World War One, t h e w i l l i n g n e s s of s t a t e s t o bear the c o s t s of an o t h e r war i s v e r y low f o r a p e r i o d of t i m e . S t a t e s a r e e x h a u s t e d by the c o s t s o f the p r e v i o u s war. The g e n e r a t i o n a 1 / s o c i e t a 1 t h e o r y of war a l s o d i r e c t s our a t t e n - t i o n t o changes i n the w i l l i n g n e s s o f s t a t e s t o use f o r c e . The gener- a t i o n s w h i c h e x p e r i e n c e d a major war a r e l e s s l i k e l y t o s u p p o r t a n o t h e r war, whereas s u c c e s s i v e g e n e r a t i o n s who have not e x p e r i e n c e d war a r e more l i k e l y t o s u p p o r t the use of f o r c e . Moreover, s o c i e t i e s w hich g l o r i f y c o n f l i c t , such as Nazi Germany, a r e more l i k e l y t o use the war o p t i o n (Howard, 1984) , w h i c h w i l l have r a m i f i c a t i o n s f o r b e h a v i o r i n the r e s t of the system. Another f a c t o r w h i c h may a f f e c t 5 4 J e r v i s (1985) argues t h a t war as a l e g i t i m a t e t o o l of s t a t e p o l i c y i s a n e c e s s a r y c o n d i t i o n f o r B a l a n c e of Power b e h a v i o r . 97 t h e w i l l i n g n e s s o f s t a t e s t o use f o r c e i s the r e l a t i v e b a l a n c e between o f f e n s i v e and d e f e n s i v e c a p a b i l i t i e s ( Q u e s t e r , 1977; Levy, 1984). When the o f f e n s e d o m i n a t e s , t he p o s i t i v e u t i l i t y of f o r c e i n c r e a s e s . C o n v e r s e l y a dominant d e f e n c e produces a n e g a t i v e u t i l i t y . T a b l e I I I Temporal P e r i o d s f o r Subsequent A n a l y s i s 1816-1914 1816-1848 1816-1870 1849-1914 1849-1870 1871-1914 1919-1939 I816-1899 1900-1939 N a t u r a l l y , any 'a p r i o r i ' d e c i s i o n r e g a r d i n g the d i v i s i o n of time i s a f u n c t i o n of one's i n t e r e s t and i s thus r e l a t i v e l y a r b i t r a r y . S u r v e y i n g b o t h the h i s t o r i c a l and i n t e r n a t i o n a l r e l a t i o n s l i t e r a t u r e , a p l e t h o r a of temporal d i v i s i o n s can be found and r a t i o n a l i z e d w i t h i n the p e r i o d l8l6-1939- N o n e t h e l e s s , some consensus does e x i s t . R a t h e r than e x a m i n i n g the d i v e r s e r a t i o n a l e f o r t h e s e p e r i o d s , an i n t e r e s t i n g but p r o b l e m a t i c endeavour, i t i s s u f f i c i e n t t o i d e n t i f y them and a p p l y them i n our d a t a a n a l y s i s . In so d o i n g , t he e m p i r i c a l f i n d i n g s from t h e i r a p p l i c a t i o n w i l l s e r v e as a v a l i d a t i o n check. E x p l a n a t i o n of p e r i o d s w i l l o n l y be n e c e s s a r y where the e v i d e n c e r e l a t i n g t o t h e r e l a t i o n s h i p between d i s t r i b u t i o n and a l l i a n c e s r e q u i r e s i t . However, c e r t a i n s p e c i f i c s i n the c h o i c e of p e r i o d s do r e q u i r e b r i e f c o n s i d e r a - t i o n . 98 T a b l e I I I p r e s e n t s t he p e r i o d s w h i c h w i l l be a p p l y e d i n the s t a t i s - t i c a l a n a l y s i s . As e v i d e n t , many of the s m a l l e r p e r i o d s i d e n t i f i e d by Rosec r a n c e (1963) a r e a b s e n t . T h e i r absence i s p a r t i a l l y a f u n c t i o n of t h e i r s m a l l d u r a t i o n i n t i m e . W i t h a s m a l l number of o b s e r v a t i o n s , the c o n f i d e n c e one can p l a c e i n the f i n d i n g s i s l a r g e l y l i m i t e d . There a r e , however, two e x c e p t i o n s . The p e r i o d s 1849~1870 and 1919-1939 a r e i n c l u d e d . In the case of the f o r m e r , t he d e f e a t of the r e v o l u t i o n s i n 1848-49 have a major e f f e c t on the scope of s t a t e b e h a v i o r (see d i s c u s s i o n i n Chapter S i x ) . The wars of n a t i o n a l u n i f i - c a t i o n c o n c l u d e i n I87O-7I w i t h the d e f e a t of France and t h e u n i f i c a - t i o n of Germany. As a r e s u l t , t he s t r u g g l e over the d o m i n a t i o n of Germany, an i s s u e s t r e t c h i n g back t o the o r i g i n s of the s t a t e system, i s c o n c l u d e d . A g a i n , t h i s r e p r e s e n t s a d i s t i n c t change w h i c h may a f f e c t t he h y p o t h e s i z e d r e l a t i o n s h i p s . S i m i l a r l y , the In t e r w a r p e r i o d cannot be i g n o r e d . To do so would f l y i n the f a c e of h i s t o r y and the impact of World War One on subsequent s t a t e b e h a v i o r . A f i n a l c o n c e r n i n t h i s r e g a r d i s the c h o i c e of the i n t e r - c e n t u r y b r e a k p o i n t (1899 /1900) . A l t h o u g h no h i s t o r i a n s i d e n t i f y a break a t t h i s p o i n t i n t i m e , S i n g e r e t . a l . (1972) uncover a s i g n i f i c a n t change i n t h e d i r e c t i o n of the r e l a t i o n s h i p between the d i s t r i b u t i o n and war a t t h i s p o i n t . T h e i r c h o i c e p a r t i a l 1 y f l o w s from the l i m i t a t i o n i n o b s e r v a t i o n s on the c a p a b i l i t y i n d e x , w h i c h were q u i n q u e n n i a l a t the t i m e . Moreover, t h e i r a n a l y s i s i n c l u d e d o b s e r v a t i o n s from the p o s t - World War Two e r a , as w e l l as a w i d e r s p a t i a l l i m i t . N o n e t h e l e s s , t h i s break i s employed f o r the s i m p l e r e a s o n of r e p l i c a t i o n , g i v e n our use of t h e i r expanded d a t a s e t . As shown i n Chapter S i x , e v i d e n c e l e a d s us t o re-examine the v a l i d i t y of t h i s d e c i s i o n . 99 In c o n c l u s i o n , n i n e d i s t i n c t p e r i o d s a r e employed t o t e s t the h y p o t h e s e s . In so d o i n g , a more d e t a i l e d and h i s t o r i c a l l y e x a c t a n a l - y s i s w i l l r e s u l t . N a t u r a l l y the c h o i c e of p e r i o d s , b o t h the system as a whole and s m a l l e r p e r i o d s i d e n t i f i e d above, can be c o n t e s t e d . How- e v e r , the l e g i t i m a c y of t h e c h o i c e s i s b e s t a d d r e s s e d by the e v i d e n c e i t s e l f . In so d o i n g , the c o n f i d e n c e one can p l a c e i n t h e subsequent f i n d i n g s w i l l be much h i g h e r than the case would be i f the boundary problem i s i g n o r e d . • Chapter IV THE GREAT POWERS AND MEASURING THE DISTRIBUTION The purpose of t h i s c h a p t e r i s t o d i s c u s s the methods used t o o p e r - a t i o n a l i z e t h e independent v a r i a b l e : t he d i s t r i b u t i o n o f c a p a b i l i t i e s . To do so r e q u i r e s a t t e n t i o n not o n l y t o the r e l e v a n t i n d i c a t o r s of s t a t e c a p a b i l i t i e s and the s t a t i s t i c a l t e c h n i q u e n e c e s s a r y t o con- s t r u c t a d i s t r i b u t i o n s c o r e , but a l s o t o the s e t of s t a t e s - - t h e G r e a t P o w e r s — w h o p r o v i d e the o b s e r v a t i o n s f o r t h i s v a r i a b l e . A G r e a t Power i s a s t a t e w h i c h h o l d s a s i g n i f i c a n t p r o p o r t i o n of system c a p a b i l i - t i e s . Thus, G r e a t Power s t a t u s i s s u s c e p t i b l e t o e m p i r i c a l v e r i f i c a - t i o n based on the i d e n t i f i c a t i o n of r e l e v a n t c a p a b i l i t y i n d i c a t o r s and the e s t a b l i s h m e n t o f a minimum s h a r e r e q u i r e m e n t f o r G r e a t Power s t a - t u s . T h i s s e t of i n d i c a t o r s s i m u l t a n e o u s l y s e r v e s as the b a s i s f o r the c a l c u l a t i o n o f the independent v a r i a b l e . 5 5 T h e r e f o r e , the o p e r a - t i o n a l i z a t i on of the independent v a r i a b l e i s i n t e r t w i n e d w i t h G r e a t Power i d e n t i f i c a t i o n . The f i r s t s e c t i o n o f t h i s c h a p t e r p r e s e n t s the case f o r u s i n g a q u a n t i t a t i v e approach f o r Great Power i d e n t i f i c a t i o n . I t examines the t r a d i t i o n a l approach t o G r e a t Power i d e n t i f i c a t i o n , problems c o n t a i n e d t h e r e i n , and a d d r e s s e s the c r i t i c i s m s l e v e l e d a t the q u a n t i t a t i v e 5 5 The key d i f f e r e n c e , o u t s i d e of t h e a d d i t i o n a l c a l c u l a t i o n of a d i s - t r i b u t i o n s c o r e , i s the s e t of o b s e r v a t i o n s r e l e v a n t t o each t a s k . S t a t e s h a r e s f o r the purpose o f G r e a t Power i d e n t i f i c a t i o n a r e based on t h e sum of the c a p a b i l i t i e s of a l l s t a t e s i n t h e system. Shares used i n t h e c a l c u l a t i o n o f the d i s t r i b u t i o n s c o r e a r e based on the sum of c a p a b i l i t i e s o f the Great Powers o n l y . - 100 - 101 approach t o t h i s i s s u e . The next s e c t i o n p r e s e n t s the i n d i c a t o r s and s p e c i f i c method used t o measure G r e a t Power s t a t u s . In so d o i n g , i t argues f o r the ad j u s t m e n t of c e r t a i n i n d i c a t o r s t o ens u r e g r e a t e r a c c u r a c y . The t h i r d s e c t i o n r e p o r t s t he f i n d i n g s f o r t h e European i n t e r n a t i o n a l system (1816-1939)- These f i n d i n g s a r e v e r i f i e d a g a i n s t the h i s t o r i c a l r e c o r d . F i n a l l y , t he l a s t s e c t i o n p r e s e n t s t he s p e c i f - i c t e c h n i q u e used i n c a l c u l a t i n g a d i s t r i b u t i o n s c o r e from the G r e a t Power s u b s e t . T h i s s c o r e ranges from 0 . 0 , p e r f e c t e q u a l i t y among the Great Powers, t o 1 .0 , a s i t u a t i o n i n whi c h a s i n g l e s t a t e . h o l d s 100% of s u b s e t c a p a b i l i t i e s . B e f o r e u n d e r t a k i n g t h e s e t a s k s , two u n d e r l y i n g and r e l a t e d i s s u e s r e q u i r e b r i e f d i s c u s s i o n . F i r s t , i t i s p r o b a b l y e v i d e n t t o the re a d e r by now t h a t t h e term power has been c a r e f u l l y a v o i d e d i n r e f e r e n c e t o the measurement of c a p a b i l i t i e s . Power c a r r i e s w i t h i t a g r e a t d e a l of c o n c e p t u a l baggage. There i s l i t t l e , i f any, v a l u e i n r e - e n g a g i n g i n t h i s w e l l t r o d d e n a r e a o f c o n c e p t u a l i z a t i o n i n which power i s l a r g e l y r e l a t e d t o i n f l u e n c e and o u t c o m e s . 5 6 Power as c a p a b i l i t i e s c o n c e r n s the means or r e s o u r c e s , human and m a t e r i a l , w h i c h e l i t e s t a p i n a t t e m p t s t o i n f l u e n c e and o b t a i n f a v o r a b l e outcomes ( S i n g e r and S t u c k e y , 1973) • Power, i n t h i s form, i s n e i t h e r e q u i v a l e n t t o , nor n e c e s s a r i l y c o r r e l a t e d w i t h , a c a p a c i t y t o e x e r c i s e i n f l u e n c e and o b t a i n f a v o r a b l e outcomes. N o n e t h e l e s s , power as c a p a b i l i t i e s has been c o n s i s t e n t l y a c e n t r a l c o n c e r n f o r e l i t e s i n the c a l c u l a t i o n of 5 6 For a d e t a i l e d a n a l y s i s of t r e a t m e n t s o f 'power' i n the l i t e r a t u r e ; see B a l d w i n (1979)- For a g e n e r a l d i s c u s s i o n , see Dougherty and P f a l t z g r a f f ( 1 9 8 1 : 8 6 - 9 2 ) . For an a n a l y s i s of the dominant approaches t o the measurement of power, see H a r t (1976) . F i n a l l y , the c l a s s i c a l t r e a t m e n t of power as c a p a b i l i t i e s i s Knorr (1975; 1956) . 102 s e c u r i t y and thus a key v a r i a b l e i n u n d e r s t a n d i n g b e h a v i o r , p a r t i c u - l a r l y from a B a l a n c e o f Power t h e o r y p e r s p e c t i v e ( G u l l i c k , 1955; K i s - s i n g e r , 1957; S i n g e r e t . a l . , 1973; C h o u c r i and N o r t h , 1975; and Buzan, 1983) . Second, the o v e r a l l t h r u s t of t h i s a n a l y s i s i s q u a n t i t a t i v e . How- e v e r , t h i s does not mean t h a t the importance of the more i m p r e s s i o n i s - t i c h i s t o r i c a l r e c o r d i s n e g l e c t e d . I t p l a y s a v i t a l r o l e not o n l y as a c o n f i d e n c e check f o r our f i n d i n g s , but a l s o as a g u i d e i n t h e con- s t r u c t i o n o f our i n d i c e s . To u n d e r t a k e a q u a n t i t a t i v e approach w i t h - o u t an eye on h i s t o r y i s t o d i v o r c e o n e s e l f from the a c t u a l m a t e r i a l under a n a l y s i s . C o n v e r s e l y , t o engage i n i m p r e s s i o n i s t i c a n a l y s i s a l o n e e i t h e r l i m i t s one t o an i d e o g r a p h i c mode of t h e o r i z i n g or t o an e n d l e s s debate on whose e v i d e n c e and i n t e r p r e t a t i o n i s c o r r e c t . 4.1 THE CASE FOR MEASURING GREAT POWER STATUS There i s an overwhelming consensus i n the f i e l d on the imp o r t a n c e of t h e Gr e a t Powers f o r u n d e r s t a n d i n g and e x p l a i n i n g I n t e r n a t i o n a l P o l i t i c s . G r e a t Powers a r e consensusa11y d e f i n e d as s t a t e s w h i c h p l a y a fundamental r o l e i n a l l s e c u r i t y i s s u e s which a r i s e in. a s y s t e m . S 7 5 7 T h i s b a s i c d e f i n i t i o n i s drawn from Levy (1983)- However, i t i s c o n s i s t e n t i n meaning w i t h most d e f i n i t i o n s . Wight (1978) d e f i n e s a G r e a t Power as a s t a t e w i t h g e n e r a l i n t e r e s t s whereas l e s s e r s t a t e s have o n l y l i m i t e d i n t e r e s t s . A 1 b r e c h t - C a r r i e ( 1 9 5 8 : 7 1 _ 7 2 ) , u s i n g t he i n d i c a t o r of r e c o g n i t i o n , a l s o argues t h a t G r e a t Powers have g e n e r a l i n t e r e s t s , "meaning by t h i s one whi c h has a v o i c e i n a l l a f f a i r s i n c o n t r a s t w i t h a Power o f lower r a n k , or a Power w i t h l i m i t e d i n t e r e s t s . " I n t e r e s t s , i n t h i s c o n t e x t , i s synonymous w i t h a G r e a t Power's c o n c e r n f o r a l l s e c u r i t y i s s u e s . As shown below, d i f f e r i n g d e f i n i t i o n s and q u a l i f i e r s a r e a c t u a l l y a t t e m p t s t o o p e r - a t i o n a l i z e , and t h e r e b y measure, G r e a t Power r a n k . They a r e n o t , i n t he pure sense, competing d e f i n i t i o n s . F i n a l l y , t he h i s t o r i c a l r o o t s of the d i s t i n c t i o n between G r e a t 103 W h i l e d i f f e r e n t c r i t e r i a e x i s t , t h e r e i s convergence among p o l i t i c a l s c i e n t i s t s and h i s t o r i a n s a l i k e c o n c e r n i n g w h i c h s t a t e s have been G r e a t Powers. However, d e s p i t e t h i s agreement, t h e r e a r e two reasons why a q u a n t i t a t i v e approach s h o u l d be a p p l i e d t o t h i s i s s u e . F i r s t , a q u a n t i t a t i v e approach w i l l s e r v e t o c l a r i f y the ambiguous p o s i t i o n of some s t a t e s i n the h i s t o r i c a l l i t e r a t u r e . T h i s a m b i g u i t y i s e s p e c i a l l y e v i d e n t i n the case of I t a l y d u r i n g t h e N i n e t e e n t h and ear 1y. T w e n t i e t h C e n t u r i e s . U n l e s s such a m b i g u i t y i s r e s o l v e d , t he measurement of our independent v a r i a b l e may be a d v e r s e l y a f f e c t e d . Second, t h e r e i s an i m p l i c i t , i f not e x p l i c i t , consensus t h a t c a p a b i l - i t i e s a r e the b a s i c c r i t e r i o n o f G r e a t Power s t a t u s . 5 8 U n f o r t u n a t e l y , some s c h o l a r s have a v o i d e d u s i n g and t h e r e b y m e a suring c a p a b i l i t i e s . I n s t e a d , they have r e l i e d on s e v e r a l s u r r o g a t e c r i t e r i a t o l e g i t i m i z e t h e i r G r eat Power s e t s . However, t h e r e i s s u f f i c i e n t s l i p p a g e between t h e s e s u r r o g a t e s and a c t u a l G r e a t Power s t a t u s t o c a l l i n t o q u e s t i o n the i r va1ue. and l e s s e r Powers i s w o r th n o t i n g . R o t h s t e i n (1968:196) notes t h a t the a c t o r s made t h i s d i s t i n c t i o n a t the c o n c l u s i o n of the Napoleon- i c Wars. A Gr e a t Power was a s t a t e a b l e t o c o n t r i b u t e a t l e a s t 60 ,000 t r o o p s a g a i n s t any f u r t h e r French a g g r e s s i o n . T h i s amount en s u r e d t h a t o n l y t he f o u r p r o m inent c o a l i t i o n members, G r e a t B r i t - a i n , A u s t r i a , R u s s i a , and P r u s s i a , would p a r t i c i p a t e a t the Con- g r e s s o f V i e n n a . In e x c l u d i n g l e s s e r s t a t e s , the problems of r e d r a w i n g the map of Europe was s i m p l i f i e d . 5 8 Our s t r i c t t h e o r e t i c a l f o c u s on s e c u r i t y v a l i d a t e s t he t r e a t m e n t of s t a t u s i n terms of c a p a b i l i t i e s . However, W a l l a c e (1973) p o i n t s o u t t h a t the p o r t r a y a l of s t a t u s as s i m p l y a p r o d u c t of the capa- b i l i t y h i e r a r c h y i s a c o n s i d e r a b l e o v e r s i m p l i f i c a t i o n . The h i e r - a r c h y of s t a t e s w i l l d i f f e r i n v a r i o u s g e o g r a p h i c r e g i o n s , i s s u e a r e a s , t y p e s o f i n f l u e n c e , and o t h e r n o n - c a p a b i l i t y f a c t o r s such as s o c i a l and p o l i t i c a l a t t r a c t i v e n e s s . N a t i o n s a r e more a p t l y con- c e i v e d as h a v i n g d i f f e r e n t s t a n d i n g s on a v a r i e t y of s t a t u s dimen- s i o n s o r h a v i n g a s t a t u s s e t . As noted above, t h i s s t u d y i s o n l y c o n c e r n e d w i t h one d i m e n s i o n , s e c u r i t y , i n which c a p a b i l i t i e s a r e the prime d e t e r m i n a n t o f s t a t u s . 104 Many s c h o l a r s , such as Northedge (1976) , B u l l (1977) , Wight (1978) , and Levy (1983) . use t h e c r i t e r i a o f r e c o g n i t i o n , and s p e c i a l r i g h t s and p r i v i l e g e s . A s t a t e i s a Gr e a t Power when i t i s r e c o g n i z e d as such by i t s own e l i t e s , as w e l l as the e l i t e s o f o t h e r s t a t e s and when i t i s g i v e n s p e c i a l d u t i e s and p r i v i l e g e s . However, r e c o g n i t i o n , d e s p i t e i t s l i n k t o a c t o r p e r c e p t i o n s , i s r a r e l y a p p l i e d i n the manner i n w h i c h i t i s d e f i n e d . 5 9 R a t h e r , p o l i t i c a l s c i e n t i s t s draw from the l i s t o f s t a t e s r e c o g n i z e d by h i s t o r i a n s . B ut, r e c o g n i t i o n from an a c t o r p e r s p e c t i v e may be m o t i v a t e d by p o l i t i c a l r e a s o n s o u t s i d e of t h e a c t u a l r o l e a s t a t e p l a y s i n s e c u r i t y i s s u e s . For example, i t i s I t a - l y ' s membership i n the T r i p l e A l l i a n c e a f t e r 1882 w h i c h e n a b l e s i t t o a t t a i n a measure o f a c c e p t a n c e as a Gr e a t Power ( B r i d g e and B u l l e n , 1980) . F i n a l l y , a s t a t e may be r e c o g n i z e d as a Gr e a t Power due t o t r a d i t i o n and i t s past, r o l e i n the system. T h i s i s the argument u n d e r l y i n g G i l b e r t ' s (1979) a s s e r t i o n t h a t S p a i n remained a Great Pow- er i n the N i n e t e e n t h C e n t u r y . There i s a d i f f i c u l t y i n d i f f e r e n t i a t i n g between nominal and subs- t a n t i v e G r eat Powers when u s i n g t h e c r i t e r i o n o f r e c o g n i t i o n . ' 0 5 9 T h i s i n c o n s i s t e n c y i s p a r t l y a f u n c t i o n of the d i s t i n c t i o n between a s e m a n t i c and s c i e n t i f i c e x p l a n a t i o n as noted by K a p l a n (19&4). The former type r e f e r s t o e x p l a n a t i o n from the p e r s p e c t i v e of t h e a c t o r and h i s i n t e r p r e t a t i o n i n t h i s r e g a r d . The l a t t e r t y p e i s the o b s e r v e r s i n t e r p r e t a t i o n w h i c h i s open t o v e r i f i c a t i o n . I t appears t h a t u s e r s of r e c o g n i t i o n as a c r i t e r i a l a r g e l y c o n f u s e t h e s e two ty p e s of e x p l a n a t i o n . In f a c t , they a c t u a l l y use the l a t - t e r i n t h e g u i s e o f the f o r m e r . 6 0 In the most r e c e n t s t u d y , B u r r i d g e and Young (1988) make a s i m i l a r argument, but use t h e terms c o u r t e s y and unambiguous. Problems i n t h e i r t r e a t m e n t a r i s e from i n c o n s i s t e n c y i n d e f i n i t i o n and a p p l i c a - t i o n w h i c h l e a d s them t o i n c l u d e P r u s s i a and A u s t r i a i n t h e i r l i s t . They s t a t e ; A G r e a t Power i s one whose r e p u t a t i o n or l a t e n t m i l i - t a r y s t r e n g t h may be e q u a l e d , but not s u r p a s s e d by t h a t of any o t h - er power;... (p . 2 3 3 )• As shown i n F i g u r e s 4 .2 and 4 . 3 . P r u s s i a and A u s t r i a do not p o s s e s s c a p a b i l i t i e s w h i c h f i t t h e d e f i n i t i o n . 105 Another c r i t e r i o n a p p l i e d t o the i s s u e of G r e a t Power i d e n t i f i c a t i o n i s t he l i n k a g e between G r e a t Powers and s p e c i a l d u t i e s and p r i v i l e g e s ( B u l l , 1977)- However, s p e c i a l d u t i e s and p r i v i l e g e s a r e s u f f i c i e n t l y vague as t o f o r c e s c h o l a r s t o r e l y on the membership of key s t a t e s i n i n t e r n a t i o n a l forums and o r g a n i z a t i o n s . In f a c t , t he h i s t o r i c a l b a s i s f o r t h i s c r i t e r i o n i s the C o n c e r t of Europe. Yet s i m p l e membership i n the C o n c e r t can not be d i r e c t l y equated t o a c t u a l G reat Power s t a t u s . For example, P r u s s i a ' s membership i n the C o n c e r t i s a mere c o u r t e s y extended by the o t h e r powers, l a r g e l y due t o R u s s i a ' s p a t r o n a g e of the H o h e n z o l l e r n crown (Anderson, 1972) . At the Congress of P a r i s (1856) , P r u s s i a i s o n l y g r u d g i n g l y a d m i t t e d on the w i s h e s of A u s t r i a and a g a i n s t t h e w i s h e s of Gr e a t B r i t a i n ( T a y l o r , 195^:86) . T u r n i n g t o the contemporary e r a , one f i n d s f i v e s t a t e s which meet t h i s c r i t e r i o n a t the U n i t e d N a t i o n s . Y e t , i t i s o b v i o u s t h a t o n l y two a r e a c t u a l l y G r e a t Powers i n the o r i g i n a l s e n s e . 6 1 F i n a l l y , such o r g a n i z a t i o n s a r e the e x c e p t i o n r a t h e r than t h e norm i n the h i s t o r y of i n t e r n a t i o n a l p o l i t i c s and t h e i r s u b s t a n t i v e i m p o r t a n c e i s q u e s t i o n a b l e o ver t i m e . Any v a l u e i n the use of t h e s e c r i t e r i a i s s i m p l y the p r o d u c t of a s u r r o g a t e r e l a t i o n s h i p w i t h s t a t e c a p a b i l i t i e s . Any r e c o g n i t i o n , and/ or s p e c i a l d u t i e s and p r i v i l e g e s s t a t e s may r e c e i v e stem from t h e i r a b i l i t y t o a f f e c t i n d e p e n d e n t l y any i s s u e s or outcomes i n the s e c u r i t y r e a l m . T h i s a b i l i t y i s a f u n c t i o n o f the dominant c a p a b i l i t i e s w hich Moreover, both s t a t e ' s r e p u t a t i o n was s e v e r l y t a r n i s h e d by major d e f e a t s ; P r u s s i a i n 1806 and A u s t r i a i n 1866. 6 1 B u l l (1977:203) argues t h a t the d i s t i n c t i o n between Superpowers and Gre a t Powers i s a p a r t i a l a t t e m p t t o overcome t h i s p r o b l e m . He b e l i e v e s t h a t t h i s d i s t i n c t i o n has l i t t l e v a l u e . Only the S o v i e t Union and the U n i t e d S t a t e s , by v i r t u e of t h e i r o verwhelming m i l i - t a r y s u p e r i o r i t y , a r e G r e a t Powers i n the t r u e sense of the con- c e p t . 106 G r e a t Powers possess r e l a t i v e t o o t h e r s t a t e s . T h i s dominance e n a b l e s them t o e n t e r t a i n the use of f o r c e t o a l t e r outcomes w h i c h c o n f l i c t w i t h t h e i r i n t e r e s t s . T h i s a b i l i t y t o use or e n t e r t a i n the use of f o r c e l e a d s us t o con- s i d e r t h e v a l u e of a n o t h e r prominent s u r r o g a t e c r i t e r i o n of G r e a t Pow- er s t a t u s ; war. V i c t o r y or d e f e a t a r e t r e a t e d by many o b s e r v e r s as the b e s t measure of G r e a t Power s t a t u s . 6 2 R u s s i a and P r u s s i a became G r e a t Powers by v i r t u e of t h e i r d e f e a t of o t h e r G r e a t Powers. Con- v e r s e l y , Sweden, and t h e A u s t r o - H u n g a r i a n Empire l o s t t h i s s t a t u s because of d e f e a t . But, the r e l a t i o n s h i p between v i c t o r y / d e f e a t and t h e r i s e / f a l l o f Gre a t Powers i s h i s t o r i c a l l y i n e x a c t (Wight, 1978:49). For some, Fr a n c e (1815) » arid Germany (1918) , d e f e a t has o n l y meant, a t a minimum, a temporary l o s s of G r e a t Power s t a t u s . Even i n v i c t o r y , a Gre a t Power may f i n d i t s e l f overwhelmed by the s t r e n g t h of an a l l y , as was Great B r i t a i n r e l a t i v e t o the U n i t e d S t a t e s i n 19̂ *5» i f not e a r l i e r . F i n a l l y , the i d e n t i f i c a t i o n of t h e wars w h i c h r e s u l t e d i n a l t e r a t i o n s i n t h e r a n k s of the G r e a t Powers i s p r o b l e m a t i c i n i t s e l f . 6 3 P a r a d o x i c a l l y , the a m b i g u i t y i n u s i n g s u r r o g a t e s t o measure G r e a t Power s t a t u s i s a f u n c t i o n of a r e l i a n c e by p o l i t i c a l s c i e n t i s t s on h i s t o r i a n s . I n d i c a t o r s a r e e i t h e r a b s t r a c t e d from h i s t o r i c a l works 6 2 Some s c h o l a r s v i e w the s i m p l e measure of p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n war as the h a l l m a r k of a Gre a t Power. Model s k i (1973) p o i n t s out t h a t war i s a G r e a t Power phenomenon and not e v e n l y d i s t r i b u t e d over a l l s t a t e s . F u r t h e r m o r e , T a y l o r (1954) emphasizes the a b i l i t y t o wage war as the b a s i c t e s t of a Great Power. 6 3 Levy (1985b) shows the l a c k of consensus among m a c r o - t h e o r i s t s i n the i d e n t i f i c a t i o n of major s y s t e m i c w a r s . T h i s l a c k of consensus bodes i l l f o r any a t t e m p t t o i d e n t i f y the wars which a l t e r e d t h e ranks of t h e G r e a t Rowers. 107 d i r e c t l y or a p p l i e d a f t e r t he f a c t t o l e g i t i m i z e h i s t o r i c a l o b s e r v a - t i o n s . In e f f e c t , p o l i t i c a l s c i e n t i s t s have r e l i e d on the judgement of h i s t o r i a n s , who, f o r reasons of d i s c i p l i n e b i a s , eschew b o t h a con- c e r n f o r c o n c e p t d e f i n i t i o n and o p e r a t i o n a l i z a t i o n , and a d i r e c t quan- t i t a t i v e approach t o t h e i s s u e . 6 4 T h i s r e l i a n c e on h i s t o r i a n s p a r t i a l - l y stems from doubts about t he u t i l i t y of d i r e c t l y m e a s u r i n g c a p a b i 1 i t i i e s t o i d e n t i f y G r eat Powers, a l s o e v i d e n t among many p o l i t - i c a l s c i e n t i s t s . Levy (1983:15-16) e x t e n s i v e l y c r i t i c i z e s a q u a n t i t a t i v e approach t o Gr e a t Power i d e n t i f i c a t i o n . He argues t h a t i t i s not l i k e l y t o meet the minimum t e s t of f a c e v a l i d i t y . F o c u s i n g on the work of S t u c k e y and S i n g e r (1973)» he c i t e s two f a i l u r e s i n t h i s r e g a r d . F i r s t , one s h o u l d e x p e c t a s t a t e w i t h g r e a t e r c a p a b i l i t i e s , and t h e r e b y a h i g h e r s t a t u s , t o p r e v a i l i n war a g a i n s t a weaker s t a t e . But t h i s i s not always the c a s e . For example, I s r a e l ' s m i l i t a r y s u c c e s s e s have o c c u r r e d a g a i n s t s t a t e s w i t h much g r e a t e r c a p a b i 1 i t i e s . Second, he f i n d s t h a t t h e rank o r d e r s g e n e r a t e d i n the above s t u d y a r e o f t e n c o u n t e r - i n t u i t i v e . Both the U n i t e d S t a t e s and Turkey i n 1845 ranked h i g h e r than P r u s s i a , y e t o n l y P r u s s i a i s seen as a Great Power by h i s - 6 4 S e v e r a l B r i t i s h p o l i t i c a l s c i e n t i s t s , such as Wight and B u l l , pay g r e a t a t t e n t i o n t o the i s s u e o f G r e a t Power s t a t u s . However, t h e i r a pproach i s s i m i l a r t o h i s t o r i a n s . S i n g e r and Small (19&6) l i n k e d s t a t u s t o d i p l o m a t i c r e c o g n i t i o n . A l s o , W a l l a c e (1973) f o c u s e d d i r e c t l y on the s t a t u s p roblem, a l t h o u g h not w i t h t h e i n t e n t o f Gr e a t Power i d e n t i f i c a t i o n . At t he same t i m e , h i s t o r i a n s have p r o v i d e d hard measures o f s t a t e c a p a b i l i t i e s i n t h e i r d i s c u s s i o n s on the Great Powers. The most prominent example i s found i n T a y l o r ' s (1954) i n t r o d u c t i o n t o h i s s t u d y o f European d i p l o m a c y from 1848 t o 1918. However, as shown l a t e r on i n t h e C h a p t e r , h i s t o r i a n s f a i l t o a p p l y c o n s i s t e n t - l y t h e s e f i n d i n g s . Powers shown t o l a c k t he c a p a b i l i t i e s f o r G r e a t Power s t a t u s a r e s t i l l l a b e l e d as Great Powers t h r o u g h o u t t h e t e x t s . 108 t o r i a n s . S i m i l a r l y , i n 1913. C h i n a ranks h i g h e r than f o u r o f the o r t h o d o x G r e a t Powers ( I t a l y , F r a n c e , Japan, and A u s t r i a - H u n g a r y ) . Levy's f i r s t p o i n t l a r g e l y m i s s e s t h e mark. The r e l a t i o n s h i p between war and G r e a t Power s t a t u s i s p r o b l e m a t i c . G r e a t e r m i l i t a r y c a p a b i l i t i e s may i n c r e a s e the l i k e l i h o o d of v i c t o r y , but s e v e r a l o t h e r f a c t o r s a l s o a f f e c t t h e outcome of war. In the case of I s r a e l , p r e - emption i n 1967 e n a b l e d i t t o overcome her i n f e r i o r i t y , w h i l e l i m i t e d E g y p t i a n m i l i t a r y g o a l s i n 1973 saved I s r a e l from a p o t e n t i a l l y c a t a - s t r o p h i c d e f e a t . The r e s u l t s of t h e S i n g e r and S t u c k e y s t u d y a re a p r o d u c t of t h e i r f a i l u r e t o demarcate adequate b o u n d a r i e s . They i n c l u d e s e v e r a l s t a t e s , e s p e c i a l l y China and t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s , when they a r e not t r u l y members of the European s e c u r i t y system. Thus, t h e i r f i n d i n g s , and Levy's c r i t i c i s m , a r e q u e s t i o n a b l e . A l s o , the rank of P r u s s i a i s not t h a t s u r p r i s i n g g i v e n i t s weakness t h r o u g h o u t the f i r s t h a l f of the N i n e t e e n t h c e n t u r y . Most h i s t o r i a n s would agree t h a t P r u s s i a was the weakest Great Power d u r i n g t h i s p e r i o d . F i n a l l y , i t i s not a s t a t e ' s s t a n d i n g i n any s i n g l e year which makes i t a Great Power. I t s s t a n d i n g , because i t i s c o m p a r a t i v e i n n a t u r e , may f l u c t u - a t e o v er s h o r t p e r i o d s of time f o r a v a r i e t y of r e a s o n s . For example, a s t a t e may m o b i l i z e i t s r e s o u r c e s f o r war and t h e r e b y a f f e c t the r e l - a t i v e s t a n d i n g of o t h e r s t a t e s . I t i s the s t a n d i n g of s t a t e s over a s u f f i c i e n t p e r i o d of time w h i c h i n d i c a t e s i t s a c t u a l p l a c e i n the h i e r a r c h y . A more i m p o r t a n t c r i t i c i s m l e v e l e d a t q u a n t i t a t i v e s t u d i e s i s t h e i r i n a b i l i t y t o c a p t u r e and measure a d e q u a t e l y a l l the el e m e n t s of s t a t e c a p a b i l i t i e s . Levy p o i n t s t o v a r i o u s e l e m e n t s , such as l e a d e r s h i p , 109 m o r a l e , and t r a i n i n g , w hich evade measurement. As a r e s u l t , he con- c l u d e s t h a t o n l y a g e n e r a l e s t i m a t e of s t a t e c a p a b i l i t i e s i s p o s s i b l e . However, a r e l i a n c e on g e n e r a l e s t i m a t e s i s not a s i g n i f i c a n t problem i n i t s e l f . R e c a l l from Chapter One t h a t one of the g o a l s of t h i s s t u d y i s t o c a p t u r e as a c c u r a t e l y as p o s s i b l e the h i s t o r i c a l c o n d i - t i o n s c o n f r o n t e d by the a c t o r s . 6 5 In so d o i n g , i t i s r e a s o n a b l e t o e x p e c t t h a t d e c i s i o n - m a k e r s a r e a l s o f o r c e d t o r e l y on e s t i m a t e s . For example, R u s s i a n c a p a b i l i t i e s were o v e r v a l u e d i n 1914 by t h e m a j o r i t y of d e c i s i o n - m a k e r s a t the time (Kennedy, 1984; f o r an g e n e r a l a n a l y s i s see W o h l f o r t h , 1987) ' In o t h e r words, as long as q u a n t i t a t i v e i n d i c a - t o r s a r e a d j u s t e d f o r major changes i n h i s t o r i c a l c o n d i t i o n s , e s t i - mates a r e l i k e l y t o be g e n e r a l l y r e p r e s e n t a t i v e of the a c t u a l p i c t u r e o f r e l a t i v e c a p a b i l i t i e s as seen t h r o u g h t he eyes o f the a c t o r s them- s e l v e s . The f i n a l c o n c e r n i n t h i s a r e a r e l a t e s t o the co m m e n s u r a b l i t y of d i f f e r e n t i n d i c a t o r s o f c a p a b i l i t i e s . As Schroed e r (1977) p o i n t s o u t , geography has an e f f e c t on r e l a t i v e c a p a b i 1 i t i i e s . Land power and seapower a r e not commensurate. F u r t h e r m o r e , d i s t a n c e a l s o a f f e c t s c a p a b i l i t i e s . For example, R u s s i a i s a s t r o n g e r power d e f e n s i v e l y because of i t s g e o g r a p h i c detachment from the o t h e r Powers of Europe. S i m i l a r l y , B r i t a i n ' s i n s u l a r s t a t u s p r o v i d e s g r e a t e r d e f e n s i v e capa- 6 5 One s h o u l d not c o n s t r u e t h i s p o i n t t o mean an a b i l i t y on our p a r t t o c a p t u r e t he same p i c t u r e as d e c i s i o n - m a k e r s . R a t h e r , i t under- l i e s t he need t o make key m e t h o d o l o g i c a l d e c i s i o n s w i t h an eye on the h i s t o r i c a l c o n t e x t and the a c t o r s i n v o l v e d . O u t s i d e of a r a d i - c a l l y d i f f e r e n t approach which would examine i n d i v i d u a l e l i t e p e r - c e p t i o n s t h r o u g h p r i m a r y s o u r c e s , d e c i s i o n s a r e made from a c o n c e r n f o r e x i s t i n g h i s t o r i c a l i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s . In e f f e c t , one must be s i m u l t a n e o u s l y a p o l i t i c a l s c i e n t i s t and a h i s t o r i a n . In t h i s way, the h i s t o r i c a l c o n t e x t can be b e s t i n t e g r a t e d w i t h t he t h e o r e t i c a l t h r u s t o f t h i s a n a l y s i s . 1 10 b i l i t y , but a l s o h i n d e r s i t s o f f e n s i v e c a p a b i l i t y because of a r e l i - ance on na v a l f o r c e s . N a t u r a l l y , t h e s e f a c t o r s a r e v i t a l i n c o n s i d e r a t i o n s of war. How- e v e r , they a r e a l s o d i f f i c u l t t o a s s e s s i n a g e n e r a l c o n s i d e r a t i o n of c a p a b i l i t i e s w i t h o u t p l a c i n g them i n t h e c o n t e x t of s p e c i f i c s i t u - a t i o n s . One f a c t o r , such as na v a l a s s e t s may be p o s i t i v e i n one s i t u - a t i o n , but n e g a t i v e i n a n o t h e r . W h i l e such c o n s i d e r a t i o n s can not be ig n o r e d i n e x p l a n a t i o n s of s p e c i f i c a c t i o n s i n ti m e and space, they a r e not v i t a l f o r g e n e r a l c o n s i d e r a t i o n s r e g a r d i n g t he r e l a t i v e capa- b i l i t i e s of s t a t e s as a whole and the g e n e r a l d i s t r i b u t i o n of c a p a b i l - i t i e s . Our e s t i m a t e s a r e o n l y d e s i g n e d t o a c c o u n t f o r the g e n e r a l s i t u a t i o n and not the nuances of p a r t i c u l a r i n s t a n c e s i n the h i s t o r i - c a l r e c o r d . The l a t t e r i s a d i f f e r e n t t h e o r e t i c a l , c o n c e r n . 4.2 CAPABILITY INDICATORS AND THE HISTORICAL RECORD Gi v e n t h e c e n t r a l need t o ac c o u n t f o r changes i n h i s t o r i c a l c o n d i - t i o n s over t i m e , t he s p e c i f i c i n d i c a t o r s of s t a t e c a p a b i l i t i e s can be i d e n t i f i e d and a d j u s t e d . 6 6 The i n d i c a t o r s , and d a t a f o r t h i s s t u d y a r e 6 6 Two competing approaches t o t h e measurement of s t a t e c a p a b i l i t i e s a r e r e j e c t e d f o r h i s t o r i c a l and m e t h o d o l o g i c a l r e a s o n s . F e r r i s (1972) uses f a c t o r a n a l y s i s t o c o n s t r u c t an index of r e l a t i v e s t a t e c a p a b i l i t i e s . In so d o i n g , he admits t h a t h i s f i n d i n g s go beyond th e h i s t o r i c a l r e c o r d , and att e m p t t o e l u c i d a t e o b j e c t i v e r a n k i n g s w hich may have been m i s p e r c e i v e d by h i s t o r i c a l e l i t e s (p. 55)- Moreover, t he v a l i d i t y of f a c t o r a n a l y s i s has been c a l l e d i n t o q u e s t i o n ( W a l l a c e , 1975). O r g a n s k i and K u g l e r (1980) a p p l y GNP as the b a s i c i n d i c a t o r of s t a t e c a p a b i l i t i e s . But as Wayman e t . a l . (1983) and Moul (1986) p o i n t o u t , GNP, as a measure of economic p e r f o r m a n c e , appeared i n the l a t e 1940s. B e f o r e the 1940s, the s p e c i f i c i n f o r m a t i o n n e c e s s a r y t o c a l c u l a t e GNP i s not a v a i l a b l e . Thus, e a r l i e r e s t i m a t e s of GNP a r e q u e s t i o n a b l e . T h i s problem f o r c e s O r g a n s k i and K u g l e r t o r e s t r i c t t h e i r domain t o the t r a d i - t i o n a l G r e a t Powers from 1850 onward, w i t h t h e n o t a b l e e x c l u s i o n of Austro-Hungary u n t i l 1914. As a r e s u l t , t h e c o m p a r a t i v e r a n k i n g of 111 drawn from the C o r r e l a t e s of War (COW) p r o j e c t . In t h i s p r o j e c t , i n d i v i d u a l s t a t e c a p a b i l i t i e s a r e d i v i d e d i n t o t h r e e d i m e n s i o n s , w i t h each d i m e n s i o n c o n t a i n i n g two i n d i c a t o r s . The m i l i t a r y d i m e n s i o n con- s i s t s of armed f o r c e s p e r s o n n e l and m i l i t a r y e x p e n d i t u r e s . The i n d u s - t r i a l d i m e n s i o n c o n t a i n s energy consumption and i r o n / s t e e l p r o d u c t i o n . F i n a l l y , t he demographic d i m e n s i o n i n c l u d e s t o t a l p o p u l a t i o n and urban p o p u l a t i o n . I n d i v i d u a l s t a t e c a p a b i l i t i e s on the s i x i n d i c a t o r s a r e p r o v i d e d , where a v a i l a b l e , on a y e a r l y b a s i s f o r time frame under e x a m i n a t i o n here (1816-1939) - 7 The v a l u e of t h i s d a t a s e t f o r our t a s k i s f o u r f o l d . The i n d i c a - t o r s a r e r e a s o n a b l y r e p r e s e n t a t i v e of the c a p a b i l i t i e s n e c e s s a r y f o r a s t a t e t o meet i t s b a s i c g o a l s o f s e c u r i t y , t e r r i t o r i a l i n t e g r i t y , and s u r v i v a l . The i n d i c a t o r s a l s o meet the c o n d i t i o n o f h i s t o r i c a l r e l e - v a n c e . W i t h i n c e r t a i n l i m i t a t i o n s d i s c u s s e d below, h i s t o r i c a l d e c i - s i o n - m a k e r s a r e l i k e l y t o have had a c c e s s t o s i m i l a r i n f o r m a t i o n on whic h t o base t h e i r i n d i v i d u a l c a l c u l a t i o n s . The d a t a on t h e v a r i o u s i n d i c a t o r s a r e r e a d i l y c o m p a r a b l e . 6 8 F i n a l l y , t he a v a i l a b i l i t y o f d a t a s t a t e s i s not p o s s i b l e . A l s o , i t i s l i k e l y t h a t t h e use of GNP e s t i m a t e s w i l l undermine our a b i l i t y t o e s t i m a t e t h e h i s t o r i c a l r e c o r d . D e c i s i o n - m a k e r s would not have made such c a l c u l a t i o n s , and thus f i n d i n g s may be l a r g e l y d i v o r c e d from the h i s t o r i c a l r e c o r d . F i n a l l y , Wayman e t . a l . note t h a t GNP may not be an a p p r o p r i a t e measure o f s t a t e m i l i t a r y c a p a b i l i t y . GNP measures a good d e a l of economic a c t i v i t y i r r e l e v a n t or d e t r i m e n t a l t o a s t a t e ' s m i l i t a r y capac i t y . 6 7 The d e t a i l e d c o d i n g r u l e s f o r the v a r i o u s i n d i c a t o r s have been p r e - s e n t e d e l s e w h e r e . (See W a l l a c e , 1973; S i n g e r , e t . a l . , 1973) The p u b l i c a t i o n of the code book f o r t h i s d a t a s e t i s f o r t h c o m i n g from the COW p r o j e c t . S p e c i f i c s w i l l be p r e s e n t e d i n the t e x t where war- r a n t e d i n the subsequent d i s c u s s i o n . 6 8 C o m p a r a b i l i t y does not mean, f o r example, t h a t a d o l l a r spent i n R u s s i a buys the same amount of goods as a d o l l a r s p e n t i n Eng l a n d . I t i s u n l i k e l y t h a t v a l u e s i n t h i s a r e a can ever be a c c u r a t l y com- pared and thus r e p r e s e n t s one s o u r c e of p o t e n t i a l e r r o r . 112 on a y e a r l y b a s i s p e r m i t s a c l e a r r e p r e s e n t a t i o n of b e h a v o r i a l p a t - t e r n s , not o n l y f o r t h e purpose of G r e a t Power i d e n t i f i c a t i o n , but a l s o f o r m e a s u r i n g a l t e r a t i o n s i n the d i s t r i b u t i o n of c a p a b i l i t i e s , and t e s t i n g t h e h y p o t h e s i z e d r e l a t i o n s h i p s . However, one must r e c o g n i z e t he i n h e r e n t l i m i t a t i o n s i n t h e d a t a s e t . These l i m i t a t i o n s can be d i v i d e d i n t o two gro u p s : a v a i l a b i l i t y and r e l i a b i l i t y ; and the r e l e v a n c y / w e i g h t i n g o f the v a r i o u s i n d i c a - t o r s . In terms o f a v a i l a b i l i t y and r e l i a b i l i t y , t h e d a t a s e t c o n t a i n s a number of m i s s i n g v a l u e s , p a r t i c u l a r l y i n t h e case of s m a l l e r s t a t e s , i n bo t h t h e N i n e t e e n t h and T w e n t i e t h c e n t u r i e s . In some c a s - e s , m i s s i n g v a l u e s can be overcome th r o u g h t h e c a l c u l a t i o n o f e s t i - mates. For example, when a s t a t e has one or two c o n s e c u t i v e y e a r s of m i s s i n g m i l i t a r y e x p e n d i t u r e s w i t h i n a s e r i e s o f r o u g h l y twenty y e a r s of r e p o r t e d v a l u e s , an e s t i m a t e can be c o n s t r u c t e d by ex a m i n i n g the p a t t e r n of v a l u e s p r i o r and subsequent t o the m i s s i n g y e a r s , and by u s i n g r e p o r t e d m i l i t a r y f o r c e s as a r e a s o n a b l e c o n f i d e n c e c h e c k . " Only when a s t a t e has a s u b s t a n t i a l number of c o n s e c u t i v e m i s s i n g v a l - ues a r e e s t i m a t e s a v o i d e d and the s t a t e d e l e t e d f o r purposes of a n a l y - s i s . F o r t u n a t e l y , t h i s d i d not o c c u r f o r any of the l a r g e s t a t e s and the d e l e t i o n o f some s m a l l e r s t a t e s f o r b r i e f p e r i o d s of time does not s i g n i f i c a n t l y a f f e c t our r a n k i n g outcomes. " At t e m p t s t o use m i l i t a r y f o r c e s over t i m e t o e s t i m a t e m i s s i n g e x p e n d i t u r e s was not found u s e f u l . The two i n d i c a t o r s a r e found t o be o n l y w eakly r e l a t e d (r=.305) f o r the European system. T h e r e - f o r e , f o r c e s can o n l y p r o v i d e a check f o r t h e e s t i m a t e s . That i s , the p a t t e r n can be examined t o see i f t h e r e was any d r a m a t i c change i n r e p o r t e d f o r c e s t h a t would l e a d one t o e x p e c t a break i n the h i s t o r i c a l p a t t e r n . T h i s was not t h e case i n any of t h e r e l e v a n t c a s e s . 113 R e l i a b i l i t y , i n c o n t r a s t , i s a l i m i t a t i o n w hich e s c a p e s s o l u t i o n . T h e r e i s no a s s u r a n c e t h a t the f i g u r e s r e p o r t e d f o r the s t a t e s a r e c o r r e c t . U s i n g a v a r i e t y of p u b l i c s o u r c e s , t h e COW p r o j e c t , and by i m p l i c a t i o n t h i s s t u d y , can o n l y assume t h a t the v a l u e s a r e r e a s o n a b l e e s t i m a t e s . A c c o u n t i n g p r o c e d u r e s , p a r t i c u l a r l y i n the c a s e of the d i s t a n t p a s t , may n e i t h e r be r e l i a b l e nor comparable t o any g r e a t d e g r e e . A l s o , s t a t e s , a t d i f f e r e n t p o i n t s i n t i m e , may f i n d i t p o l i t - i c a l l y u s e f u l t o u n d e r / o v e r v a l u e t h e i r r e p o r t e d f i g u r e s on the v a r i o u s i n d i c a t o r s . F i n a l l y , s t a t e i n t e l l i g e n c e networks may have p r o v i d e d d e c i s i o n - m a k e r s w i t h s u b s t a n t i a l l y d i f f e r e n t v a l u e s , as w e l l as r e l e - v a n t i n d i c a t o r s , on which to base t h e i r a s s e s s m e n t s . T u r n i n g t o the r e l e v a n c y / w e i g h t i n g i s s u e , i t i s q u e s t i o n a b l e wheth- er a l l the i n d i c a t o r s a r e n e c e s s a r y or u s e f u l f o r t h e r a n k i n g of s t a t e s and Great Power i d e n t i f i c a t i o n . A c c o r d i n g t o Moul (1986), the COW c a p a b i l i t y index r e p r e s e n t s t h r e e d i f f e r e n t t y p e s of c a p a b i l i t i e s : immediate ( m i l i t a r y ) ; i n t e r m e d i a t e ( i n d u s t r i a l ) ; and l o n g term (demo- g r a p h i c ) . He argues t h a t the use of any or a l l the i n d i c a t o r s depends on the s u b j e c t m a t t e r under e x a m i n a t i o n . " I f t h e i n t e r e s t were w i t h power p o t e n t i a l , t o i n c l u d e c u r - r e n t power c a p a b i l i t i e s would d i s t r a c t from a p r o p e r appre- c i a t i o n of the l o n g run p o s s i b i l i t i e s . S i m i l a r l y , i f the i n t e r e s t were i n c o n f l i c t s a t any g i v e n t i m e . . . what mat- t e r s would be the s h o r t e r term, not the l o n g r u n . To i n c l u d e t o t a l p o p u l a t i o n and t o t a l urban p o p u l a t i o n i n an a n a l y s i s of war/peace i n any g i v e n y e a r , a t b e s t , would be t o i n c l u d e n o i s e i n the assessment of the b a l a n c e of power c a p a b i l i t i e s . " (p.10-11) The r a n k i n g of s t a t e s , based on t h e i r i n d i v i d u a l s h a r e of t o t a l system c a p a b i l i t i e s , i n i t i a l l y appears t o r e q u i r e the f u l l s e t of i n d i c a t o r s . M i l i t a r y i n d i c a t o r s a r e , of c o u r s e , v i t a l components i n 114 any assessment of s t a t e c a p a b i l i t i e s . The i n d u s t r i a l i n d i c a t o r s , r e p - r e s e n t i n g the b a s i c i n p u t (energy consumption) and o u t p u t ( i r o n / s t e e l p r o d u c t i o n ) elements of development, a r e a l s o v i t a l components i n t h e c a p a b i l i t y e q u a t i o n , e s p e c i a l l y i n r e l a t i o n t o the a b i l i t y o f s t a t e s t o p r o s e c u t e s u c c e s s f u l l y war s i n c e the m i d - N i n e t e e n t h c e n t u r y . F i n a l l y , t he demographic i n d i c a t o r s , g i v e n t h e i r r e p r e s e n t a t i o n of the lo n g term c a p a b i l i t i e s of s t a t e s , speak t o the n o t i o n of G r e a t Power rank r e s u l t i n g from a l o n g term p e r s p e c t i v e . However, the v a l i d i t y of the demographic i n d i c a t o r s i s p r o b l e m a t i c . N e i t h e r one c a p t u r e s s i m p l y the long term element of c a p a b i l i t i e s . They a l s o s e r v e t o i n c r e a s e the i n f l u e n c e o f the o t h e r i n d i c a t o r s i n the c a l c u l a t i o n . T o t a l p o p u l a t i o n adds w e i g h t t o the m i l i t a r y s i d e o f the e q u a t i o n . The s i z e of a s t a t e ' s armed f o r c e s i s g e n e r a l l y a f u n c - t i o n of i t s p o p u l a t i o n base. N a t u r a l l y , t h i s r e l a t i o n s h i p depends on the s p e c i f i c demographic breakdown of a s t a t e over t i m e which d e t e r - mines the a v a i l a b l e pool o f manpower. But, w i t h the emergence of con- s c r i p t a r m i e s , t h i s pool i s a l r e a d y p a r t i a l l y i n t e g r a t e d w i t h i n t h e p e r s o n n e l i n d i c a t o r . As e x p e c t e d , a s t r o n g p o s i t i v e r e l a t i o n s h i p i s found between t o t a l p o p u l a t i o n and armed f o r c e s p e r s o n n e l (r=.8l55)• By a d d i n g w e i g h t t o the m i l i t a r y component, the impo r t a n c e of t h e i n d u s t r i a l elements i n s t a t e c a p a b i l i t i e s i s r e d u c e d , w h i c h may l e a d t o o v e r v a l u i n g the c a p a b i l i t i e s of s t a t e s w i t h a weak i n d u s t r i a l b ase, y e t a v e r y l a r g e p o p u l a t i o n base. Urban p o p u l a t i o n has s i m i l a r problems.. U r b a n i z a t i o n i s p a r t i a l l y a f u n c t i o n of i n d u s t r i a l i z a t i o n . Thus, t h i s i n d i c a t o r adds w e i g h t t o the i n f l u e n c e of the i n d u s t r i a l component i n the c a l c u l a t i o n . One 115 f i n d s t h a t t o t a l urban p o p u l a t i o n i s s t r o n g l y c o r r e l a t e d w i t h b o t h energy consumption (r=.831) and i r o n / s t e e l p r o d u c t i o n (r=.893) • Con- v e r s e l y , i n some c a s e s , h i g h s c o r e s on t o t a l urban p o p u l a t i o n may s i m - p l y be the f u n c t i o n of a l a r g e p o p u l a t i o n base. In t h i s c a s e , the i n d i c a t o r i s i n d i r e c t l y l i n k e d t o the m i l i t a r y s i d e of t h e c a l c u l a - t i o n . The c o n f o u n d i n g i n f l u e n c e of t h e s e two i n d i c a t o r s w a r r a n t s t h e i r e x c l u s i o n from t h e a n a l y s i s . For our p u r p o s e s , t h e i d e n t i f i c a t i o n of G r e a t Powers i s d e r i v e d o n l y from the two m i l i t a r y and i n d u s t r i a l i n d i c a t o r s . At y e a r l y i n t e r v a l s and on each i n d i c a t o r , t h e p e r c e n t a g e s h a r e of t o t a l system c a p a b i l i t i e s i s c a l c u l a t e d f o r e v e r y s t a t e . The mean s h a r e i s t a k e n f o r e v e r y s t a t e a c r o s s a l l r e l e v a n t i n d i c a t o r s t o e s t a b l i s h i t s r e l a t i v e s t a n d i n g i n the system. As Moul (1986) p o i n t s o u t , the equal w e i g h t i n g of t h e i n d i c a t o r s i s a " s t u d i e d c o n f e s s i o n of i g n o r a n c e c o n c e r n i n g t h e ' t r u e ' p r o p o r t i o n s i n w h i c h the v a r i o u s components s h o u l d be m i x e d " (p.12). But, he a rgues t h a t t h i s s i m p l e s o l u t i o n i s p r e f e r a b l e t o a c o m p l i c a t e d w e i g h t i n g scheme. Any complex m a n i p u l a t i o n i s l i k e l y t o i n c r e a s e t h e amount of e r r o r a l r e a d y imbedded i n the d a t a i t s e l f . F u r t h e r m o r e , equal w e i g h t i n g of the i n d i c a t o r s does not amount t o an equal w e i g h t - ing of i n d u s t r i a l and m i l i t a r y c a p a b i l i t i e s . Depending on the h i s t o r - i c a l c o n t e x t , one can w e i g h t the r e s p e c t i v e c a p a b i l i t i e s by e x c l u d i n g one or more of the i n d i c a t o r s f o r d i f f e r e n t time frames and/or a d j u s t - in g the amount of i n d i v i d u a l s t a t e c a p a b i l i t i e s d i r e c t e d towards the system. 116 Both i n d u s t r i a l i n d i c a t o r s a r e e x c l u d e d from 1816 t o 1870 and one i n d u s t r i a l i n d i c a t o r , energy c o n s u m p t i o n , i s e x c l u d e d from I87I t o 1914. The d e c i s i o n t o e x c l u d e t h e s e i n d i c a t o r s i s based on the h i s t o r - i c a l r e c o r d . A change i n the components of m i l i t a r y c a p a b i l i t i e s and the n a t u r e of war o c c u r r e d i n the m i d - N i n e t e e n t h c e n t u r y . P r i o r t o the wars of German u n i f i c a t i o n , m i l i t a r y armaments and the means t o move m i l i t a r y f o r c e s remained r e l a t i v e l y s t a t i c f o r two c e n t u r i e s . P r u s s i a ' s v i c t o r i e s over t he A u s t r i a n Empire (1866) and France ( I87O - I87I ) were a t t r i b u t e d t o the new 'breech loa d e d ' armaments and the e f f e c t i v e use of i t s r a i l w a y system t o m o b i l i z e , t r a n s p o r t , and s u p p l y her a r m i e s . 1 0 A f t e r t h e s e e v e n t s , t he importance of i n d u s t r i a l - i z a t i o n t o s t a t e mi 1 i t a r y c a p a b i l i t i e s was r e c o g n i z e d by the h i s t o r i - c a l a c t o r s . T h i s change i n c a p a b i l i t i e s i n d i c a t e s a need t o a d j u s t our i n d i c a - t o r s . P r i o r t o I87O, the two m i l i t a r y i n d i c a t o r s have the g r e a t e s t u t i l i t y f o r t he c o m p a r a t i v e r a n k i n g of s t a t e s . A l t h o u g h w i t h h i n d - s i g h t one can q u e s t i o n t h e a c t u a l m i l i t a r y s t r e n g t h o f s t a t e s such as R u s s i a , the main c o n c e r n i s t o p r o v i d e a r e a s o n a b l e r e p r e s e n t a t i o n of the h i s t o r i c a l s i t u a t i o n . For example, Anderson (1972:7) speaks d i r e c t l y t o the b e l i e f s a t the tim e when d i s c u s s i n g R u s s i a n s t r e n g t h ; " t h e d e e p - r o o t e d and c r i p p l i n g weaknesses of R u s s i a d u r i n g t he decades 1 0 Howard (1976; 97*105) d i s c u s s e s the r e v o l u t i o n i n m i l i t a r y f o r c e s and war d u r i n g t h i s p e r i o d . He no t e s t h a t many of the t e c h n o l o g i c - a l changes appeared p r i o r t o the wars of German u n i f i c a t i o n . How- e v e r , f o r a v a r i e t y of r e a s o n s , s t a t e s had e i t h e r i g n o r e d t he developments o r employed them p o o r l y . He a t t r i b u t e s the P r u s s i a n s u c c e s s i n e m p l o y i n g t h e s e changes t o the development o f a perma- nent a d m i n i s t r a t i v e s t r u c t u r e ; t h e G e n e r a l S t a f f . T h i s s t r u c t u r e , a l o n g w i t h the changes employed by the P r u s s i a n s , were s u b s e q u e n t l y c o p i e d by a l l t he European powers a t v a r i o u s p o i n t s i n time a f t e r 1 8 7 1 . .See a l s o Bond (1983) and B r o d i e (1976) . 117 a f t e r 1813 were l a r g e l y h i d d e n from c o n t e m p o r a r i e s . To them t h e g l i t - t e r i n g f a c a d e of m i l i t a r y power wh i c h she p r e s e n t e d t o the o u t s i d e w o r l d s t i l l c a r r i e d c o n v i c t i o n " . A f t e r 1870, t h e r e i s a c l e a r r e c o g n i t i o n of the importance o f i n d u s t r i a l i z a t i o n t o m i l i t a r y power. However, t h i s r e c o g n i t i o n does not mean t h a t d e c i s i o n - m a k e r s weighed e q u a l l y the importance of m i l i - t a r y and i n d u s t r i a l c a p a b i l i t i e s . The b e l i e f s of m i l i t a r y e l i t e s p r i - or t o World War One p r o v i d e e v i d e n c e about the r e l a t i v e i mportance o f m i l i t a r y and i n d u s t r i a l c a p a b i l i t i e s . As Howard (1961), Anderson (1972), and Bond (1983) p o i n t o u t , m i l i t a r y e l i t e s d i d not u n d e r s t a n d the l e s s o n s of i n d u s t r i a l war f o r g e n e r a t i o n s a f t e r the 1870s. 7 1 W h i l e not d i s r e g a r d i n g the i n d u s t r i a l component, t h e s e e l i t e s c o n t i n u e d t o s t r e s s t r a d i t i o n a l b e l i e f s about t h e importance of b a s i c m i l i t a r y c a p a b i l i t i e s . G i v e n the p o l i t i c a l r e l a t i o n s h i p between m i l i t a r y and p o l i t i c a l e l i t e s , i t i s l i k e l y t h a t p o l i t i c a l d e c i s i o n - m a k e r s a l s o u n d e r v a l u e d the t r u e importance of t he i n d u s t r i a l component u n t i l W orld War O n e . 7 2 7 1 For example, Howard (1961:119) s t a t e s : "But the l e s s o n s w h i c h now seem so e v i d e n t i n r e t r o s p e c t the a r m i e s of Europe were t o t a k e f i f t y y e a r s t o l e a r n . Only the v e r y c l e a r s i g h t e d c o u l d have seen the t r i p l e s i g n i f i c a n c e of 6 August 1870: the c o l l a p s e of the cav- a l r y ; the t r a n s f o r m a t i o n of t h e i n f a n t r y ; and the t r i u m p h of the gun". H a r t (i960) a r g u e s : "Yet even i n the f i r s t g r e a t war of the t w e n t i e t h c e n t u r y , i t was s t i l l customary t o measure c o m p a r a t i v e s t r e n g t h of a r m i e s i n 'x-thousand r i f l e s ' and 'y-thousand s a b r e s ' , - so p e r s i s t e n t i s the g r i p of t r a d i t i o n a l h a b i t s of t h o u g h t . " 7 2 T h i s i s e s p e c i a l l y t r u e of the European s t a t e s p r i o r t o 1914. War p l a n s were the domain of m i l i t a r y e l i t e s and they a c t e d as the main, i f not o n l y , venues of i n f o r m a t i o n i n t h i s r e g a r d f o r p o l i t i - c a l e l i t e s , (see Synder, 1984; Kennedy, 1979)- 11-8 I t i s a l s o u s e f u l t o show the e f f e c t t h a t the v a r i o u s components o f s t a t e c