Open Collections

UBC Theses and Dissertations

UBC Theses Logo

UBC Theses and Dissertations

Balance of power theory reconsidered : the distribution of capabilities and alliances 1816-1939 Fergusson, James Gordon 1989

Your browser doesn't seem to have a PDF viewer, please download the PDF to view this item.

Item Metadata

Download

Media
831-UBC_1989_A1 F47.pdf [ 12.25MB ]
Metadata
JSON: 831-1.0098295.json
JSON-LD: 831-1.0098295-ld.json
RDF/XML (Pretty): 831-1.0098295-rdf.xml
RDF/JSON: 831-1.0098295-rdf.json
Turtle: 831-1.0098295-turtle.txt
N-Triples: 831-1.0098295-rdf-ntriples.txt
Original Record: 831-1.0098295-source.json
Full Text
831-1.0098295-fulltext.txt
Citation
831-1.0098295.ris

Full Text

BALANCE OF POWER THEORY RECONSIDERED: The D i s t r i b u t i o n of C a p a b i l i t i e s and A l l i a n c e s 1816-1939  By JAMES GORDON FERGUSSON B.A.(Hons.), The U n i v e r s i t y o f M a n i t o b a , 1982 M.A., The U n i v e r s i t y o f M a n i t o b a , 1985  A THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY in THE FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIES (Department o f P o l i t i c a l S c i e n c e )  We a c c e p t t h i s t h e s i s as c o n f o r m i n g to the required  standard  THE UNIVERSITY OF BRITISH COLUMBIA October 1989 ©  James Gordon F e r g u s s o n , 1989  In  presenting  degree freely  at  this  the  thesis  in  partial  fulfilment  University  of  British  Columbia,  available for reference  copying  of  department publication  this or of  thesis by  this  for  his thesis  and  or for  her  Department of  Date  DE-6 (2/88)  Oct.  Columbia  requirements that the  agree that  may  be  It  is  representatives.  financial  the  I agree  I further  scholarly purposes  permission.  The University of British Vancouver, Canada  study.  of  gain shall  not  an  advanced  Library shall  permission for  granted  by  understood be  for  the that  allowed without  head  make  it  extensive of  copying  my or  my written  ABSTRACT  This  study  1939.  examines t h e  focusing  bilities  and  European  on t h e r e l a t i o n s h i p alliances.  are  employed  posits  a d i r e c t or p o s i t i v e  bility  posits  to a single  the semi-automatic between e q u a l i t y tionship  Great  version  tribution,  is  although  between p o 1 a r i z a t i o n  behavior  Great  and a l s o  between  p r o v i d e an a d d i t i o n a l the S o v i e t  Union  distribu-  but l i m i t s i t s a p p l i c a The f i n d i n g s  an  inverse  support  relationship  as t h e p a t t e r n  of a l l i a n c e s in  of c a p a b i l i t i e s i s undertaken.  between p o l a r i z a t i o n and  an unequal  some  evidence points  a  The a n a l y s i s security  and i n s u l a r  c o n f l i c t i n g evidence  relationship  version  The s e m i - a u t o m a t i c o r  Britain.  indicate  defined  i f not c o n t r a d i c t o r y ,  on  manual  found  and w a r .  f o r continental  The  F i n a l l y , an e x a m i n a t i o n o f t h e r e l a -  and t h e d i s t r i b u t i o n  relationship  flicting,  relationship  and a l l i a n c e s .  to  o f Power  b e t w e e n an u n e q u a l  i n the system.  Power,  between p o l a r i z a t i o n ,  the system,  light  relationship  t h e same  1816  from  versions of Balance  this relationship.  and t h e number o f a l l i a n c e s  balancer version  clear  to test  system  between t h e d i s t r i b u t i o n o f capa-  Two d i s t i n c t  theory  tion  International  in  towards  and t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s  con-  demands a n d t h u s c o n f l i c t i n g  Powers.  This finding  s h e d s some  1iterature  the quantitative  for  dis-  relationship  c o n c l u d e s by p o s i t i n g  the d i s t r i b u t i o n of c a p a b i 1 i t i e s explanation  No  and w a r , a n d may  the l e v e l of h o s t i l i t y since  World  War  on t h e  I I.  between  CONTENTS  ABSTRACT  i i  L I S T OF TABLES  v  L I S T OF FIGURES  . . . .  vi i  ACKNOWLEDGMENTS .  .  Chapter  page. 1  INTRODUCTION I.  II.  12  BALANCE OF POWER THEORY C o n c e p t u a l i z i n g t h e Theory . . B a l a n c e o f Power a s S y s t e m T y p e  13 2h  B a l a n c e o f Power T h e o r y a n d I t s C r i t i c s  33  THE DISTRIBUTION Existing  III.  ix  kk  OF C A P A B I L I T I E S AND ALLIANCES  S t u d i e s on t h e D i s t r i b u t i o n  A l i i a n c e s . .' I n t e r n a l and E x t e r n a l P o l i c y Options Hypotheses ESTABLISHING THE BOUNDARIES OF ANALYSIS  o f Power a n d  .  45 . . 60 68 Jk  T e m p o r a l B o u n d a r i e s , P o l a r i t y a n d N u c l e a r Weapons . . . . 75 S e c u r i t y I n t e r d e p e n d e n c e and S t a t e Membership i n t h e System 87 I d e n t i f y i n g P e r i o d s w i t h i n t h e G e n e r a l B o u n d a r i e s . . . . 95 IV.  THE GREAT POWERS AND MEASURING THE DISTRIBUTION The C a s e f o r M e a s u r i n g G r e a t Power S t a t u s C a p a b i l i t y I n d i c a t o r s and t h e H i s t o r i c a l Record The E u r o p e a n G r e a t P o w e r s 1816-1939 . . Measuring the D i s t r i b u t i o n of C a p a b i l i t i e s  V.  100  . . . .  13$  ALLIANCES AND POLARIZATION A l i i ances M o d i f i c a t i o n s , Measures, and A l l i a n c e Polarization . . .  102 110 122 131  Patterns  . . . .  138 147 159  VI .  169  DATA ANALYSIS The R e g r e s s i o n R e s u l t s f r o m t h e U n t r a n s f o r m e d R e m o v i n g A u t o - C o r r e l a t i o n and t h e T r a n s f o r m e d Results H i s t o r i c a l E x p l a n a t i o n a n d War Polarization  VII.  THE CASE FOR THE BALANCER VERSION  VIII.  CONCLUSION  . .  Data Data  . .  176  . .  191 208 218 236  .  - iv -  252  L I S T OF  TABLES  Table  I  - Comparison of Pre-World  War  Table  II  - S y s t e m Members  Table  III  - Temporal  Table  IV  - Comparison of Alignment,  Table  V  - Average P r o p o r t i o n of S t a t e s  One  Capability  Table Great  P e r i o d s f o r Subsequant  97  Analysis  A l l i a n c e , and C o a l i t i o n . . . .  in Alliances, Pacts  By 15^+  - A v e r a g e P r o p o r t i o n o f S y s t e m Dyads Subsumed D e f e n c e P a c t s , E n t e n t e s , and N e u t r a l i t y / N o n P a c t s by V a r i o u s P e r i o d s o f T i m e  VII - Minimum/Maximum D i s t r i b u t i o n S c o r e s Power S h a r e s  and  by  171  T a b l e IX - B i v a r i a t e C o e f f i c i e n t s Between C a p a b i l i t y and P r o p o r t i o n o f S t a t e s i n D e f e n c e P a c t s and P r o p o r t i o n o f D e f e n c e P a c t Dyads  Indicies  Table X - B i v a r i a t e C o e f f i c i e n t s of Both C a p a b i l i t y and A l l M e a s u r e s o f t h e D e p e n d e n t V a r i a b l e s by Temporal P e r i o d s  Indicies  - Bivariate  Coefficients  - v -  15^  Underlying  Indicies  XI  139  Defence  T a b l e V I I I - B i v a r i a t e C o e f f i c i e n t s Between C a p a b i l i t y and P r o p o r t i o n o f S t a t e s A l l i e d and P r o p o r t i o n o f A l l i a n c e Dyads  Table  52  9^  P a c t s , E n t e n t e s , and N e u t r a l i t y / N o n - A g g r e s s i o n V a r i o u s P e r i o d s of Time T a b l e VI Alliances, Aggression  Shares...  183  183  185  f o r Inter-Century Break...... I89  Table XII Variable  - A u t o r e g r e s s i v e P a r a m e t e r s o f t h e Dependent 196  Time S e r i e s  Table XIII  - Parameters of t h e Independent  Variables  Time S e r i e s .  Table XIV  - B i v a r i a t e C o e f f i c i e n t s of the Transformed  A l l Measures of t h e Dependent V a r i a b l e T a b l e XV - B i v a r i a t e C o e f f i c i e n t s of the Transformed by T e m p o r a l P e r i o d s  T a b l e XVI - B i v a r i a t e C o e f f i c i e n t s of Transformed by I n t e r - C e n t u r y B r e a k  Data  T a b l e XVII - B i v a r i a t e C o e f f i c i e n t s of T r a n s f o r m e d by V a r i o u s L a t e - N i n e t e e n t h C e n t u r y B r e a k s  Data  Table XVIII-  Beta C o e f f i c i e n t s with  War as an  198  Data, 201 Data 203  204  206  Independent  Dummy V a r i a b l e . . . . .  216  219  T a b l e XIX  - State  Abbreviations  T a b l e XX  - Autoregressive  Parameters  Variable T a b l e XXI 1816-1939  - Probit  Employing  f o r t h e Independent 244  Results  the Untransformed  Data 245  T a b l e XXII - P r o b i t Periods.....  Results,  Untranformed  D a t a by T e m p o r a l  Table XXIII-  Probit  Results,  Transformed  Data  T a b l e XXIV - P r o b i t Periods  Results,  Transformed  D a t a by T e m p o r a l  246  1816-1939  247  249  - vi -  L I S T OF FIGURES  F i g u r e 4.1 Indicators  - C o m p a r i s o n o f t h e Impact o f S e l e c t on S t a t e Shares  F i g u r e 4.2  - S t a t e Shares o f European  1816-1870  System  Industrial 119  Capabilites,  .  F i g u r e 4.3  123  ~ S t a t e Shares o f European  1871-1914  •  F i g u r e 4.4  System  Capabilites,  •  124  - S t a t e Shares o f European  System  Capabilites,  1920-1938  126  F i g u r e 4.5 D i s t r i b u t i o n Scores D a t a S e t s 1818-1938 _  o f t h e F o u r and  135  F i g u r e 5-1 ~ P r o p o r t i o n o f S t a t e s i n A l l i a n c e s , E n t e n t e s and N e u t r a l i t y / N o n - A g g r e s s i o n P a c t s  F i g u r e 5-2 - P r o p o r t i o n o f Dyads i n A l l i a n c e s , E n t e n t e s and N e u t r a l i t y / N o n - A g g r e s s i o n P a c t s  F i g u r e 5-3  _  Schematic Diagrams  o f System  F i g u r e 6.1 - S c a t t e r g r a m S t a t e s A l 1 i ed  o f 4 Power  F i g u r e 6.2 - S c a t t e r g r a m S t a t e s A l 1 i ed  o f 5 Power  F i g u r e 6.3 Scattergram Dyads i n A l l i a n c e s -  F i g u r e 6.4 - S c a t t e r g r a m Dyads i n A l l i a n c e s  F i v e Power  Defence  Pacts, 156  Defence  Pacts,  Polartization  158  167  Index b y P r o p o r t i o n o f 1 78  Index b y P r o p o r t i o n o f 179  o f 4 Power  Index b y P r o p o r t i o n o f 180  o f 5 Power  Index by P r o p o r t i o n o f l8l  - vii -  F i g u r e 6.5 - S c a t t e r g r a m C o m p a r i s o n o f 5 Power I n d e x by P r o p o r t i o n o f S t a t e s A l l i e d by S e l e c t T i m e P e r i o d s , 1849-1870,1871-1913  .'.  F i g u r e 6.6 - S c a t t e r g r a m o f 4 Power States A l 1 i e d , l8l6-1848. ;  F i g u r e 6.7 - C o r r e l o g r a m s Time S e r i e s  186  Index by P r o p o r t i o n o f 187  of Proportion of States  in Alliance 195  F i g u r e 6.8 - C o m p a r i s o n o f D i s t r i b u t i o n  and P o l a r i z a t i o n  1816-1853  222  F i g u r e 6.9 ~ C o m p a r i s o n o f D i s t r i b u t i o n  and  Polarization  1854-1870  224  F i g u r e 6.10 - C o m p a r i s o n o f D i s t r i b u t i o n  and P o l a r i z a t i o n  I87I-I89O....  226  F i g u r e 6.11 - C o m p a r i s o n o f D i s t r i b u t i o n  and P o l a r i z a t i o n  1890-1914  228  F i g u r e 6.12 - C o m p a r i s o n o f D i s t r i b u t i o n  and P o l a r i z a t i o n  1920-1930  230  F i g u r e 6.13  -  Comparison of D i s t r i b u t i o n  and P o l a r i z a t i o n  1931-1936.  232  F i g u r e 6.14 - C o m p a r i s o n o f D i s t r i b u t i o n  and P o l a r i z a t i o n  1936-1939  F i g u r e 7-1  234  -  Distribution  Scores  f o r Continental  18916-1938  Powers 243  - .vi i i -  ACKNOWLEDGMENTS  I would  first  like  t o e x p r e s s my d e e p e s t  thanks t o Laura.  support,  t h i s d i s s e r t a t i o n a n d my  e n t i r e academic  have been  impossible.  like  I would  also  this  a l s o must be g i v e n t o M i k e W a l l a c e , my s u p e r v i s o r , t h e rough  whleming. who  A special  listened  a n d Danny  stakes.  I  tried  k e e p me  to  t h a n k s t o Dave  Stewart,  Savas,  must a l s o  who I a l w a y s  dollar  sweep-  G r i f f i t h s who  honest.  Finally,  for  a s s i s t a n c e over  their  mate,  who k e p t me a c a d e m i c a l l y  note t h e c o n t r i b u t i o n of M a r t i n  recognition  were o v e r -  my f o r m e r o f f i c e  my c o m p e t i t o r i n t h e c o m p u t e r  philosophically  Thanks  who h e l p e d me o v e r  when t h e numbers  a new t h o u g h t , Ken C a r t y ,  Father deserve s p e c i a l haul .  particu1ari1y  f r o m Owen,  endeavour.  ad nauseum t o my r a m b l i n g s , M a r c D e s j a r d i n ,  could disturb with sane,  spots,  u n d e r t a k i n g s would  t o beg f o r g i v e n e s s  J o h n , and Meg who had t o p u t up w i t h me d u r i n g  many o f  Without her  my  M o t h e r and t h e long  INTRODUCTION  How s a l i e n t elite  is  decisions  the d i s t r i b u t i o n  and s t a t e  of c a p a b i l i t i e s  behavior  i n the  r e l a t i o n s h i p between t h e d i s t r i b u t i o n ance o f  Power t h e o r y ?  study.  Although  question, tion  particularly  outlined  link  from  elites  They a r e l i k e l y  our a b i l i t y  elites  of s i t u a t i o n s which  ever,  some v a r i a b l e s ,  Many  o f War p r o j e c t ,  t o have l i t t l e problem.  ques-  studies, fail  may  importance  of  security  calculus  system.  from  policy  decision-makers  the  It  to  advocates  - 1 -  How-  of c a p a b i l i t i e s , to use.  decision-makers, i n which  and u l t i m a t e l y  i s t h e hands o f t h e s e d e c i s i o n - m a k e r s .  which  t o warn  of war.  are l i k e l y  environment  The s e c u r i t y ,  the thrust of  i n time and space  the d i s t r i b u t i o n  the d i s t r i b u t i o n  follows  markers  increase the p r o b a b i l i t y  particularly  The  to  relevance to actual  Moreover,  as o b s e r v e r s and  key components which  the s t a t e  o f Power  i n t h e s e s t u d i e s a r e c o m p l e x and  empirical  represent  the a n a r c h i c s t a t e  the Balance  of this  t h e answer t o t h e second  the Correlates  g r a p p l i n g with the s e c u r i t y  improve  inform the core  i s p l a c e d on  employed  these s t u d i e s i s to i d e n t i f y will  Is t h e  b e h a v i o r e x p l i c a b l e by B a l -  questions  below,  realm?  b e t w e e n s y s t e m i c t h e o r i e s and e l i t e d e c i s i o n s .  t r u e t h a t some v a r i a b l e s  mu1ti-dimensiona1.  security  d e p e n d e n t on t h e a n s w e r t o t h e f i r s t .  emanating  make t h e c l e a r is  greater weight  f o r reasons  is partially  T h e s e two  and  f o r understanding  they  i n the operate;  s u r v i v a l , of  The g r e a t e s t t h r e a t  2  to s t a t e s e c u r i t y threat  from  i sultimately  t h e e x t e r n a l environment  manifested  lows t h a t s e c u r i t y  becomes  one  to others.  state relative  sents tive  a way  nature  relative by  of sources  solace  ties.  1  Before is  This debate,  personal  serves  values  as  Finally,  the notion  reasonable.  'paradigms'.  rarely  questioned,  Elites,  'hard'  information flowing  data which  i n the  from  capabili-  discussion, i t  'contemporary' debate  of the f i e l d  known  means t o u n d e r s t a n d  an o c c a s i o n f o r  to  con-  in the f i e l d .  science  individuals  on t h e  as I n t e r n a t i o n a l  phenomena  or social  a  are likely to  comprises  theory w i t h i n t h i s  of  confronted  b e t t e r known a s t h e ' p a r a d i g m ' d e b a t e ,  and b e l i e f s  peting  of r e l a -  politics.  elements of the b e h a v i o r a l i s t  the debate  1  briefly  repre-  for the inter-  o f Power  future direction  t h e most u s e f u l  Echoing  f o r c e h e l d by  of c a p a b i l i t i e s  with v a r y i n g degrees o f r e l i a b i l i t y ,  t o engage  and  Relations.  It fol-  t o account  conflicting  i n the r e l a t i v e l y  necessary  cerns  often  This  one i s a b l e  is intuitively  p l a c i n g Balance  substance  The d i s t r i b u t i o n  of i n t e r n a t i o n a l  capabilities  find  force.  a f u n c t i o n o f t h e amount o f  In s o d o i n g ,  t h e complex and  variety  of m i l i t a r y  states.  t o c o n c e p t u a l i z e and o p e r a t i o n a 1 i z e t h e c o n c e p t  capabilities.  active  i n terms  i sother  2  epistemology, identify  their  a n d c l a i m a d h e r e n c e t o o n e o f s e v e r a l com-  However, t h e v a l u e o f e n g a g i n g i t s presence  as a d e t r a c t o r  inthis  from  debate i s  t h e o r e t i c a l and  C h o u c r i a n d N o r t h (1972: 100) p r o v i d e c o n c r e t e s u p p o r t f o r t h i s c o n t e n t i o n through r e f e r e n c e t o l a t e Nineteenth Century B r i t i s h p a r l i mentary debates. O t h e r s who f o l l o w this line of reasoning include G u l l i c k (1955), K i s s i n g e r (1957), Morgenthau (1973), and Buzan (1983).  2  A valuable summary o f t h e d e b a t e i s found i n Maghoori a n d Ramberg (1982). A more d e t a i l e d d i s c u s s i o n o f n e o r e a l i s m w i t h i n t h i s d e b a t e i s a v a i l a b l e i n K e o h a n e (1986) .  3 empirical debates  research  ignored,  simplest  level,  c o m p l e x i t y of the  'real'  identify  systems  several  interdependent. nomic system,  understanding debate.  t o deny  'paradigm'  world.  To  debate  From a s y s t e m ' s  which  include  the f i e l d  are  the  to  earlier  futile  as a w h o l e  and  as t o argue  to the  one  argue  system is  ecocite  t h e key  as t h e c h i c k e n and system  one  to egg  is a function  the supremacy of  of  system  t h e s u p r e m a c y o f one m e t h o d o v e r a n o t h e r , ' b e a s t ' and  the d i v e r s i t y  'strawmen' f o r h u m i l i a t i o n  d e t r i m e n t o f more i m p o r t a n t Certainly,  u n d e r t a k e n by any w r i t e r  and  to  o f human  r e s u l t becomes a w a s t e l a n d o f v e r b i a g e i n w h i c h  r e l e v a n t work.  can  s e c u r i t y .system,  ecological  i s as f u t i l e  To  the the  perspective,  debate which of t h e s e systems  the c o m p l e x i t y of the The  f l o w s from  s i m u l t a n e o u s l y independent  international  system,  considerations.  b e s t minds c r e a t e  other  the  social/cultural  the o t h e r ,  inquiry. the  relationship  A t a minimum, t h e i m p o r t a n c e o f e a c h  idiosyncratic  is  They  most p r o m i n e n t .  over  its  is obscured.  At the  the  and  one  empirical  needs to  i n the f i e l d .  and/or  talk  and  past  each  theoretically  be a w a r e o f t h e  But, t h i s  some o f  perspective  i s obvious from  each  i nd i v i d u a 1 ' s w o r k .  A final  point  in this  regard  concerns the o b s c u r i n g of  t i o n s h i p b e t w e e n t h e p r e s e n t d e b a t e and such as  the r e a 1 i s t / i d e a 1 i s t  present debate  is largely  which  the c e n t r a l  about  the  and  international  debates  i n the  relafield,  traditiona1ist/behaviora1ist.  an e x t e n s i o n o f  d i v i d e concerns a  f u t u r e of  earlier  the  these e a r l i e r  'pessimistic' relations,  or  debates  'optimistic'  i f not  The  mankind  in  view as  a  whole. 'man'  3  The  former views  as a l e a r n i n g and  phi1osophical engage  regarding  The  static,  which  should  The  graph.  issues  philosophical  question.  However,  o f Power  B a l a n c e o f Power t h e o r y ,  cal  p r o p e r t i e s and  for  consensus  on  study  literature, dependent absence theory.  3  the  c o n f r o n t s major empirical  literature  the t h e o r y d i r e c t l y w i t h  This  not  which  variable  despite  utility.  para-  seeks t o examine a large  period  or v a l u e  of  this  existing  body  of  This research  i t s w i d e s p r e a d usage regarding  in  i t s theoreti-  T h i s study advocates the  need draws  the f o u n d a t i o n of a consensus which  links  the d i s t r i b u t i o n  of  capabilities.  an e x i s t i n g  of the  gap  centrality  these emprical examinations.  empirical  is  t h e o r y and  is a function in  the opening  debate.  difficulties  i s a l s o concerned with  o f any  from the  'paradigm'  analysis  to the aforementioned  t h e p r o p e r t i e s o f B a l a n c e o f Power  from the e x i s t i n g  l e t us  than q u e s t i o n s  this  s y s t e m and  indirectly  t h e o r y comes  reveals  still  from  the legitimacy  the t h e o r y ,  the f i e l d ,  is clear  and  b e t w e e n two v a r i a b l e s o v e r  r e s e a r c h on that  views  interesting  But,  rather  discussion  study  can not h e l p but speak  on B a l a n c e  i s an  ignored.  base,  i n the s e c u r i t y  a relationship  of t i m e , which  this  latter  'paradigms'.  p e r s p e c t i v e of t h i s  It concerns  empirically  Now,  d e b a t e f r o m an e m p i r i c a l  so-called  whereas the  n o t be  r e l a t i o n s h i p between t h e above  simple.  study  as  growing animal.  question  in this  'man'  s t u d i e s on a l l i a n c e s  As many p r o m i n e n t w r i t e r s  of  empirical  'war'  This  using  note, a l l i a n c e s  i n the  gap  Balance of  are c e n t r a l ,  as  the  i s the Power i f not  The c o n t i n u i n g most relevant and d e t a i l e d study remains Carr's (1939) e x a m i n a t i o n of the debate w i t h reference to the Interwar period.  necessary,  mechanisms  f o r the o p e r a t i o n  They s e r v e  a s a means  t o enhance  through  the  ties. that  From a the  of  perspective,  be p o s i t i v e .  That  Power  i n the f i e l d .  It  shows  posits  seek  capabilities  or  as t h e  policies.  As a r e s u l t ,  to  treat  approach sary'  empirical  the  conditions  spatial  erence  ry;  be f o u n d a t  t h e o r y and  p e r s p e c t i v e or i n  misplaced.  Rather,  of security  as a  major  terms o f  the theory  and s u r v i v a l .  As  behavior  are identified for  system  type a r e  that  attempts  problematic.  This  d i s c r e p e n c i e s among a u t h o r s o n t h e ' n e c e s -  f o r system  i n some d e t a i l  i n c o n s i s t e n t usage,  Balance  d i s t r i b u t i o n of  Power a n d t h u s Moreover,  stability,  the  t h r e e groups  contemporary  usually  defined with  of c r i t i c i s m  relevance,  temporal  and  these treatments are  t o t h e a b s e n c e o f w a r , and n o t B a l a n c e o f P o w e r .  chapter examines  power a n d  to treat  The c h a p t e r a l s o r e v e a l s  of such a system.  i n f o r m e d by a c o n c e r n  of  posits  two r e l e v a n t v e r s i o n s o f t h e t h e o r y ,  f o r the Balance of  boundaries  that attempts  or.balancer versions,  analysis.  B a l a n c e o f Power has p r o d u c e d  theory  theory provides explanations f o r state  t h e manual and s e m i - a u t o m a t i c subsequant  distribution  ' b a l a n c e ' o r an e q u a l  optimal guarantee  B a l a n c e o f Power  Power  of c a p a b i l i -  B a l a n c e o f Power  system's  view are  actively  are a  inequality  t h e o r y from a W a l t z i a n  that e l i t e s  Alliances  i s , more a l l i a n c e s w i l l  M o r g e n t h a u ' s power p o l i t i c s  such,  Balance of  One e x a m i n e s t h e p r o p e r t i e s o f  treatment  states  distribution  an u n e q u a l  l e v e l s of d i s t r i b u t i o n a l  Chapter its  system's  o f power'.  individual  capabilities.  an u n f a v o r a b l e o r u n e q u a l  r e l a t i o n s h i p between  alliances will higher  the s e c u r i t y of  a g g r e g a t i o n of m i l i t a r y  means t o r e d r e s s  of the 'balance  ref-  F i n a l l y , the of the theo-  and m e t h o d o l o g i c a l  6 impediments. ate  It argues  the u t i l i t y  The es,  of  B a l a n c e o f Power  theoretical  along  sented  with  i n the  t h a t none o f  relationship  the  these  between  ables by  has  I t begins  a n d shows t h a t t h e  not  been examined  an e x a m i n a t i o n  icy  relative  internal  of  between  resources  c o s t s / b e n e f i t s of implies  the  to Balance  relationship  the  one  The  chapter  The  first  two  The  final  hypothesis  cerning t e r n of  high  levels  clusters  of  that  to  may be l e d  in  the p e r i o d of (l8l6)  two  vari-  pol-  abstract  t o increase  and argues t h a t t h e  r e l a t i v e l y by t h e o t h e r . decision in  relationship  the  this  above.  literature  is defined  as  is positively  con-  the  produced by a l l i a n c e s .  a s two  It  hypotheses.  identified  body o f  inequality  the  is followed  the  the o p t i o n  needs  conceptualized  patIt is  related t o  mutually  exclusive  alliance.  the  temporal  hypotheses are 1816-1939and  and  Polarization level  pre-  o fstate  It d e t a i l s  draws from an a d j a c e n t  system  are  the  as a tool  a p r e s e n t a t i o n of  the  allianc-  capabilities  presentation  to an e i t h e r / o r  c o n e 1udes w i t h  of p o l a r i z a t i o n ,  i n which the  ability  option  t o security  distributional  Chapter Three s e t s tem  and  of  between  o f Power t h e o r y .  polarization.  states  This  o p t i o n are mirrored  l i n k a g e s at the  hypothesized  the d i s t r i b u t i o n  directly.  alliance  to neg-  an i d e n t i f i c a t i o n of  relationship  hypotheses concern  alliances;  with  f u n c t i o n of a l l i a n c e s  devoted  that e l i t e s  regard.  the d i s t r i b u t i o n  h y p o t h e s e s d r a w n f r o m t h e manual v e r s i o n ,  next chapter.  alliances,  suffice  theory.  r e l e v a n t e m p i r i c a l s t u d i e s on e i t h e r or  criticisms  concerns  and  spatial  tested.  These  The  l i m i t s are  related  to  b o u n d a r i e s of temporal  the  l i m i t s are  f u n c t i o n of d a t a  the p o t e n t i a l  sysset  avail-  i n f l u e n c e of  7 background  v a r i a b l e s on  structural  and  The,spatial  the a n a l y s i s .  technological  These  changes which  l i m i t s are set to geographic  from c o n s i d e r a t i o n s  related  variables relate  o c c u r a f t e r W o r l d War  Europe.  This  limit  to s e c u r i t y interdependence,  n e c e s s a r y c o n d i t i o n f o r a B a l a n c e o f Power e x p l a n a t i o n . eral  smaller  periods  of  time w i t h i n  identified.  These  points  l i t e r a t u r e on  i n the  hypotheses  periods  represent European  detail.  Four and  Five serve  history  t i o n of set,  adjusting  record,  employed.  The  Great Powers centage of  cedure used  The  to r e l a t e the  final  section  to construct  ment,  indicators  coalition.  a r e used  or  are  break-  to test  the  the  independent  and  with  the  to account  the t r a d i t i o n a l The  second held  identifica-  capability  G r e a t Powers a r e five  f o r the  identified actor  s e t i s based  by  states  on  i n which  data hisand  s e t of the per-  a minimum  to a state.  f i n d i n g s here to e x i s t i n g  identifies  the s p e c i f i c  the d i s t r i b u t i o n  indicies  historical  statistical f o r the  G r e a t Power s e t s a r e b r i e f l y  d i s c u s s i o n on a l l i a n c e s d i f f e r e n t i a t e s and  whole  r e v e a l i n g some m e a s u r e o f s u p p o r t f o r t h e  t h e r e s u l t s b e t w e e n t h e two  The  sev-  t o a t t r i b u t e G r e a t Power s t a t u s  the Great Powers,  set.  Finally, as a  C o r r e l a t e s o f War  capabilities  is required  intertwined  s e t s of  represents  share of system  s t u d y s on  and  first  study proceeds  four  distinct  i n the l i t e r a t u r e .  ten percent  The  Using the  i t s capability  two  is a  In t h e f o r m e r , t h e c o n s t r u c t i o n o f  i s shown t o be  G r e a t Powers.  and  torical  index  and  i s drawn  which  divisions  to operationa1ize  dependent v a r i a b l e s r e s p e c t i v e l y . a distribution  prominent  Two.  t  in greater  Chapters  the boundaries  to  In r e s t r i c t i n g  pro-  two  sets  compared.  between a l l i a n c e ,  align-  the measure t o a l l i a n c e s ,  the  8 classification  scheme d e v e l o p e d  three classes of a l l i a n c e s ,  by S i n g e r and S m a l l  defence  pacts,  ententes,  n o n - a g g r e s s i o n p a c t s a r e shown t o b e f u n c t i o n a l Power t h e o r y . defence first at  Two d i s t i n c t  measures o f  pacts only are i d e n t i f i e d  c o n s i s t s of  yearly  and  The s e c o n d  deals with  ceptual  analysis  polarization, is adopted.  of the  comprises  need t o  t o have  a whole  the  and The pacts  p r o p o r t i o n of system  The f i n a l  s e c t i o n of the  Beginning with  a con-  p o l a r i t y and  t o t h e measurement o f p o l a r i z a t i o n  Although t h i s approach  a r e shown,  as  d i f f e r e n t i a t e between  a schematic approach  attempts  to Balance of  in alliance/defence  the concept of p o l a r i z a t i o n .  a c o m p a r a t i v e mode, tion  relative  d e s c r i b e d f o r the system.  d y a d s subsumed by a l l i a n c e s / d e f e n c e p a c t s . chapter  The  and n e u t r a l i t y /  alliances  the proportion of states  intervals.  i s employed.  limits  the subsequent  analysis to  t o p r o v i d e a 'hard' measure o f p o l a r i z a -  major  problems  relative  to the  historical  record.  In cern  presenting the f i n d i n g s of the data a n a l y s i s , i s g i v e n t o the problem  data.  Two d i s t i n c t  hypotheses. sists  The f i r s t  of employing  tests are  employed  Chapter  longitudinal in testing  c o n s i s t s of the standard d a t a .  of the transformed data a f t e r  t h e removal  Six,  or times  conseries  the f i r s t  two  The s e c o n d  con-  of s e r i a l  or auto-cor-  relation  from t h e v a r i o u s d a t a s e t s u s i n g t h e B o x - J e n k i n s method.  findings  indicate  that  the r e l a t i o n s h i p between t h e  alliances  i s opposite to  theory.  However,  inequality  the  the predictions  made i n  strength of the negative  The  d i s t r i b u t i o n and Balance of  association  Power between  and a l l i a n c e s / d e f e n c e p a c t s v a r i e s b e t w e e n t h e s t a n d a r d a n d  transformed data sets.  The f o r m e r  produce  significant  l e v e l s of asso-  9 c i a t i o n , whereas the l a t t e r of  indicate  the various smaller  found  i n a l l cases f o r the period  ative  relationship  Evidence Interwar cussed  i s found  f o r the period  results. related  because war,  link  a legitimate  ods  are  linked  Here, evidence  indicates  section  that  b e t w e e n p o l a r i z a t i o n and  subsequently  dis-  as a  war and r e v o l u t i o n  tosecurity,  i s not a v i a b l e  and thus t h e i n c r e a s e d  of a  single  o f war  salience of  f o r the f i n a l  state;  peri-  Great B r i t a i n .  o f B a l a n c e o f Power  i n the next  chapter.  c o m p a r i s o n o f s y s t e m p o l a r i z a t i o n and evidence  E v i d e n c e does  i s found t o support the indicate  a potential  w a r , a n d a common p a t t e r n  of a l l i a n c e patterns after  theory.  link  i n comparison of  I87I a n d 1919-  indication of the v i a b i l i t y  t r e a t m e n t o f B a l a n c e o f Power  among  of the d i s t r i b u t i o n  18^9-189O w i t n e s s e s a r e t u r n  Little  evidence provides a further  the  l8l6-l848 i s  i n the period  the salience  i s tested  provides a  indices.  One a n d  and t h e i m p o r t a n c e o f war  the.balancer version  which  h y p o t h e s i s on p o l a r i z a t i o n .  evolution  are  1849-1890.  t h e i n c l u s i o n o f war  between  option,  t o the behavior  distribution  W o r l d War  F i n a l l y , t h e ambiguous f i n d i n g s  t h e o r y may h a v e u t i l i t y ,  final  link  the period  and v i a b l e  period  neg-  e q u a t i o n does not produce s i g n i f i c a n t  serves t o reduce  In c o n t r a s t ,  distribution.  er  record  and i t s a t t e n d e n t t h r e a t  the  the  preceding  The absence o f a r e l a t i o n s h i p  This  option.  f o r the  even though  i n the regression  no r e l a t i o n s h i p i s  A r e l a t i v e l y strong  These f i n d i n g s  tool,  t o the perceptual  elites.  the  i n a l l cases  ambiguous.  policy  periods,  1816-1848.  immediate years  is  a legitimate  The  temporal  i n r e l a t i o n t othe h i s t o r i c a l  dummy v a r i a b l e  as  degree  association.  in t e s t i n g  as  a v e r y weak a n d n e g l i g i b l e  Above a l l ,  o f the balanc-  10  Chapter the  Seven  theory, f i r s t  tion  by e m p l o y i n g  izing  examines the semi-automatic  or balancer  identified  Measuring  in Chapter  only the four  the dependent v a r i a b l e  out a l l i a n c e s ,  a positive  a 11iance  British  continental  relationship  membership.  absence  1816—1848. period  ferences  i n the f i n d i n g s  theory  relationship  study  i s found  relationship  tests  focuses  is i n /  inequality  and  relationship Also, the  f o r the period i s found  f o r the  on t w o i m p o r t a n t  points.  a t the aggregate Britain,  and  o f power',  Preponderance  reconsideration  of  dependent v a r i a b l e s break  most  considered.  they do  continental  relative  recon-  i t s apparent Powers,  utility  Power o r Power  is required  i n terms  employing  s h o u l d be examined  important,  with  Transition o f the  a variety  relative  distheir dif-  o f Balance o f theory.  treatment o f o f independent  t o the strong  Although  t h e q u e s t i o n o f contemporary  the s t r e n g t h o f the f i n d i n g s  p r o v i d e an i n d i c a t i o n  continental  with  require  tem-  i n 1849•  found  and  level  b e h a v i o r may u n d e r l i e m a j o r  regarding the  A t a minimum, p r e v i o u s t e s t s  Second is  Britain  and t r a n s f o r m e d d a t a .  The i n c l u s i o n o f G r e a t  'preponderance  Moreover,  poral  dichotom-  Again, the s t r e n g t h o f t h i s  B a l a n c e o f Power, b e h a v i o r , w i t h  distinct,  and  o f the  previous empirical  sideration.  time.  G r e a t P o w e r s and  i s found between  The s t r o n g e s t c o n s i s t e n t  conclusion  First,  Power  distribu-  1890-1939 •  The  tinct,  of a  the  t orepresent years Great  v a r i e s w i d e l y between t h e s t a n d a r d consistent  One.  version of  and i n s u l a r  ogous t o G r e a t B r i t a i n  states. vis-a-vis  ofdistinct Given that  security  relevance  can be d e b a t e d , requirements for  the U n i t e d S t a t e s i s a n a l -  the E u r o - A s i a n landmass,  i t is possi-  11 ble  that the  traditional  bipolar  e n c e on e x p l a n a t i o n h a s o b s c u r e d This  image  i s one o f  States-Soviet ity  Russia  geopolitics conflict  needs of a i n s u l a r  advocating porary  ideological  a more s a l i e n t i n which  i s exacerbated  image and  of  the United  by t h e c o n f l i c t i n g The s t u d y  o f common a s s u m p t i o n s r e g a r d i n g  geopolitical  perspective.  influ-  image and e x p l a n a t i o n .  the nature  and c o n t i n e n t a l p o w e r .  a reexamination  era from t h i s  and/or  secur-  concludes  by  the contem-  Chapter I BALANCE OF POWER THEORY  The u s e o f t h e t e r m cally,  i s widespread  in e i t h e r  i n the f i e l d  the i n c o n s i s t e n t i t stheoretical  politics.  Despite  these  agreement on t h e t h e o r y ' s abstract empirical  and  historical  research  Power a n d t e s t  theory  system.  theory  security  susceptible  properties,  literature.  Scholars  of the  term,  T h i s body  of l i t e r a t u r e  debates  and world  a l a r g e measure o f evident  Furthermore,  i n both t h e  a large  body o f  conceptual-  and r e s e a r c h  enables  on t h e meaning o f t h e B a l a n c e o f  utility.  the basic properties of  Balance  I w i 1 1 show t h a t many o f t h e c r i t i c i s m s  are questionable.  i t sstanding  international  there exists  underlying  i t sempirical  In s o d o i n g ,  a n c e o f Power  of  I t s use  f o r e x p l a i n i n g contemporary  criticisms,  T h i s d i s c u s s i o n examines  a policy  or t h e o r e t i -  of International P o l i t i c s .  and c o n t r a d i c t o r y u s e  utility  o n e t o go b e y o n d t h e e n d l e s s  regarding  descriptively  h a s emerged w h i c h d r a w s f r o m a s p e c i f i c  i z a t i o n of the theory.  theory.  o f Power',  manner h a s b e e n s u b j e c t t o l a r g e s c a l e c r i t i c i s m .  point out question  'Balance  They  as a systems t h e o r y ,  result policy  from  o f Power of B a l -  disagreements  theory,  and t y p e o f  This d i s c u s s i o n argues that Balance  o f Power i s  which e x p l a i n s changes i n s t a t e b e h a v i o r  and u n i t s u r v i v a l .  Changes  t o e m p i r i c a l measurement  -  i n s t a t e behavior  and v e r i f i c a t i o n .  12 -  i n the area a r e thus  13  1.1  CONCEPTUALIZING THE-THEORY  There theory. tional over  arethree  inter-related  The f i r s t  explains  s t a t e system.  the continued  The second  as  a relatively  equal  among s t a t e s .  Finally,  or  individual  policies  of  systemic  o r group  Balances,  B a l a n c e o f Power 4  assumption that balances  theory  The f i r s t  behavior.  inthis  o f power  the actions repre-  are v i t a l , t o the maintenance  of t h e system.  which  e x p l a n a t i o n s and  i s a s t a t e / p o l i c y theory,  i snot e x p l i c i t  the literature.  Waltz  (1979:119)  form of e x p l a n a t i o n . application,  testing,  many c o n t e n t i o u s the  6  or c a p a b i l i t i e s  i n sharing the  explanation,  5  are  They a r e s i m i l a r  the  4  context,  two e x p l a n a t i o n s  t h e r e l a t i o n s h i p between t h e s e two s y s t e m i c  in  of balances  explains  However, final  Power  of the interna-  the recurrence  distribution  states.  i n Balance of  existence  explains  t i m e among t h e s y s t e m ' s a c t o r s .  defined  sent  explanations  argues that State  B a l a n c e o f Power  level  or c r i t i q u e .  5  analyses This  i s s u e s stemming from  levels of a n a l y s i s problem.  6  are  theory  is a  systemic  inappropriate to i t s  argument e n a b l e s one t o a v o i d  thep o l i c y perspective,  A t t h e same t i m e ,  such as  i t c a n be seen as  B u l l (1977) i d e n t i f i e s two a d d i t i o n a l e x p l a n a t i o n s ; the protection and p r e s e r v a t i o n o f l e s s e r s t a t e s , and t h e e x i s t e n c e o f such i n s t i t u t i o n s as d i p l o m a c y and i n t e r n a t i o n a l l a w . However, i t w i l l be shown b e l o w t h a t t h e p r e s e r v a t i o n o f l e s s e r s t a t e s may o r may n o t r e s u l t f r o m B a l a n c e o f Power behavior. Whether t h e t h e o r y e x p l a i n s the e x i s t e n c e o f such i n s t i t u t i o n s o r such i n s t i t u t i o n s are v i t a l f o r t h e o p e r a t i o n o f t h e B a l a n c e o f Power i s l a r g e l y a moot p o i n t . The t h e o r y p r o v i d e s no i n f o r m a t i o n r e l a t e d t o t h e s e i n s t i t u t i o n s . T h i s argument c o n t r a d i c t s a n e a r l i e r t r e a t m e n t o f B a l a n c e o f Power by W a l t z 0 9 & 7 ) i n h i s a n a l y s i s o f p o l a r i t y a n d s t a b i l i t y . Balance o f Power i s t r e a t e d a s a t h e o r y a b o u t s t a t e b e h a v i o r , s i m i l a r t o i t s conceptualization inthis study. I t i s such contradictory treatments w h i c h a i d t o t h e c o n f u s i o n s u r r o u n d i n g t h e B a l a n c e o f Power. Levels  of analysis represent  t h e forms  of explanation  inthe f i e l d ,  14 part of the general disdain 1971)'  The f i e l d  limited this  scopes,  of grand  h a s moved t o w a r d s  or islands of  development  theory i n the f i e l d  raises  t h e development  theory  concerns about  Holsti,  of theories 1966).  (McClelland, t h e need  (See  with  However,  and means t o l i n k  such  islands.  As with  a systemic explanation, theories  about  to  conceptualize  in  particular,  ignored tic  i f the central  1983)-  would  systemic  explanation  tautology.  state  system  f o r the maintenance  states,  are  W a l t z ' s v i e w eschews because  to  do s o  The t h e o r y , as a  of the s t a t e the state  empir-  system,  becomes  system because t h e  exists.  confuses a t h e o r e t i c a l  and e m p i r i c a l  state can not t e l l analysis  analysis  us about  But,  such  state  i sexplicable  still  s y s t e m i c i n t h e sense  in which  and b a l a n c e s  c a n o n l y be m e c h a n i s -  t o the u n i t s o f t h e system.  o n e . As a m e t h o d o l o g i c a l p r o b l e m ,  theories  i ngeneral,  n o t be m e a s u r e d  B a l a n c e o f Power e x p l a i n s  Waltz e s s e n t i a l l y gical  i ti s d i f f i c u l t  components o f b o t h ,  Finally,  Balances can  reference  system  a conceptualization  i n nature.  verification. require  Such  B a l a n c e o f Power t h e o r y  More i m p o r t a n t l y ,  how t h e i n t e r n a t i o n a l  and d e t e r m i n i s t i c  ical  a  state behavior?  exist  (Buzan,  how c a n o n e l i n k  about  t h e group  can t e l l  problem w i t h  he i s c o r r e c t  thebehavior  a state operates.  that behavior System,  o f any p a r t i c u l a r  thebehavior  i n B a l a n c e o f Power t e r m s .  methodolo-  i n arguing that  and t h u s t h e s y s t e m  us w h e t h e r  a  as a whole.  of a p a r t i c u l a r  This explanation i s  i s a f u n c t i o n of t h e system  inthis  context,  simply refers to  encompassing t h e i n d i v i d u a l , t h e s t a t e a n d t h e s y s t e m (See W a l t z , 1959; S i n g e r , 1961). P r o b l e m s a r i s e i n t h i s a r e a when i n v a l i d a s s e r t i o n s a r e a p p l i e d t o one l e v e l f r o m a n a l y s i s done a t a n o t h e r , comm o n l y known a s an e c o l o g i c a l f a l l a c y . (See M o u l , 1 9 7 3 ) -  15  the e x t e r n a l of  how t h i s  environment. environment  Balance of  affects  state behavior.  sists  o f o t h e r s t a t e s whose b e h a v i o r  ences  t h e a c t i o n s o f any p a r t i c u l a r  There of  i s one c a s e , however,  (Claude,  among  actors.  This version  evident  8  states,  1966; W i g h t ,  politics.  to maximize  the c o n d i t i o n of treated  8  9  in which  thecentral  element  to  influ-  of Balance  Waltz.  from  although not always  without the intention  i sexplained with theperiod  This i s  anarchy  as an i n e v i t a b l e  any o f t h e  of theenlightenment  balances result  i n response  of  (1973) from each  to thesecurity  i n the international  law, as (see B u t -  t h e o r y o f powactor  seeking  d i l e m m a p r o d u c e d by  system.  feature of international  theo-  d e f i n e d as  reference t o natural  1973). o r b y M o r g e n t h a u ' s  For Morgenthau, i t s power  o f anarchy  con-  state.  Balances,  7  occur  i n the w r i t i n g s  terfield,  7  ina condition  o n e o f t h r e e v e r s i o n s o f B a l a n c e o f Power  1962:46-47).  equality  er  T h i s environment  Power t h e o r y i s c o n c e i v e d i n a manner s i m i l a r  the automatic v e r s i o n , ry  Power t h e o r y i s a n e x p l a n a t i o n  Balances a r e  politics.  9  R e y n o l d s (1975) provides a s i m i l a r set of categories f o r Balance of Power t h e o r y . He d i f f e r s f r o m t h e a u t o m a t i c v e r s i o n b y f o c u s i n g o n the system's approach o f Kaplan (1957). who i s more a p t l y d i s c u s s e d i n t h e s u b s e q u e n t a n a l y s i s o f t r e a t m e n t s o f B a l a n c e o f Power as a system type. B u l l (1977:104) c l a s s i f i e s t h e t h e o r y i n t o t h e c a t e g o r i e s o f f o r t u i t o u s and c o n t r i v e d . In t h e f o r m e r , a balance arises w i t h o u t t h e c o n s c i o u s e f f o r t o f any o f t h e a c t o r s , usually in a s i t u a t i o n o f o n l y two r e l e v a n t s t a t e s . In t h e l a t t e r c a s e , a balance r e s u l t s from t h e c o n s c i o u s p o l i c y o f a t l e a s t one o f t h e a c t o r s in a s i t u a t i o n of several s t a t e s . The l a c k o f i n t e n t i s t h e key s i m l a r i t y between W a l t z and Morgenthau. They d i f f e r , however, i n t h e f u n d a m e n t a l f o c u s and c o m p l e x i ties of their positions. Whereas W a l t z ' s t h e o r y i srestricted to the b a s i c c h a r a c t e r i s t i c o f anarchy as t h ekey e x p l a n a t i o n , Morgent h a u i n c o r p o r a t e s a s s u m p t i o n s r e g a r d i n g t h e n a t u r e o f man. Claude (1962:48) notes t h a t Morgenthau i s i n c o n s i s t e n t on this point. He f e e l s t h a t M o r g e n t h a u w o u l d a g r e e t h a t b a l a n c e s a r e manua l l y produced i n t h e r e a l w o r l d . Morgenthau (1973) indicates that i n e v i t a b i l i t y i s n o t r e a l l y based on an i r o n law o f p o l i t i c s , but a  16  The  second v e r s i o n o f Balance  differs  from  thef i r s t  the behavior sion its  relations  maintained  i n that  o f one p a r t i c u l a r  i s closely  tied  o f Power t h e o r y , balances  w i t h s t a t e s on  isolated  actually  or insulated  creates equality  the s i d e of the balancer that  in  this  one  from t h e other  of Great  This  ver-  Britain in Balances a r e  1 0  imbalance negative  context,  of  the Balance  1973)  (Morgenthau,  provides  interven-  Nonetheless,  i t is  i n t e r v e n t i o n i s based  the remaining  an e x p l a n a t i o n  alli-  o r preponderance on  1968:287).  power among  such  actors,  e f f e c t o n t h e b a l a n c e r ' s own s e c u r i t y .  and  i t s  The t h e o r y ,  of the behavior  i s p o s i t e d as c e n t r a l  on a  of a t least  to the operation of  o f Power.  manual v e r s i o n  the bulk o f s t a t e s . distribution  a c t o r s , through  I t i s u n c l e a r whether  (Organski,  a c t o r , and t h i s b e h a v i o r  The  behavior  the motive f o r the balancer's  perceived potential  the balancer.  t h e European c o n t i n e n t .  ances w i t h t h e weaker s t a t e ( s ) .  clear  product of  o r c r e a t e d by t h e i n t e r v e n t i o n o f t h e b a l a n c e r , who i s g e o -  graphically  tion  a r e the intended  type of s t a t e ;  to the historical  the semi-automatic,  simply  Balances  optimal  condition  thesemi-automatic  The e x i s t e n c e o f a b a l a n c e ,  of c a p a b i l i t i e s ,  states.  extends  i stheresult  a r e t h e goal  of states  f o r the security  and  treatment t o  d e f i n e d as an equal  of the w i l l e d because they  survival  actions of provide the  of the state  (Bull,  basic p r e s c r i p t i v e r u l e of wise policy. H o w e v e r , many h i s t o r i c a l observers s t r e s s the i n e v i t a b l e nature of t h ebalance, and Organski (1968) f o r m u l a t e s h i s c r i t i c i s m o f t h e theory from t h i s r e s t r i c t i v e v i e w o f M o r g e n t h a u . T h i s b r i e f n o t e a l s o d e m o n s t r a t e s how i n c o n s i s t e n t u s a g e p r o v i d e s an a v e n u e o f c r i t i q u e w h i c h h i n d e r s t h e u t i l i t y of t h e t h e o r y . 1 0  G u l l i c k (1955) a n d W i g h t (1966) indicate that o t h e r s t a t e s have played the role of the balancer i n regional contexts. However, i t i s g e n e r a l l y agreed t h a t Great B r i t a i n i sthe basic referent for the b a l a n c e r v e r s i o n .  17  1977;  1955)'  Gu1 l i c k ,  This  version  No i n d i v i d u a l s t a t e c a n be t r u s t e d  power c o n s t i t u t e s  in predictable  threat.  The r e a c t i o n t o a balanced  condition,  al  state  of  individual states,  vive  behavior  of states,  is also  contain  the  In a s s u m i n g t h a t  el  ular the  level  provides  the linkage  that  the state  among t h e t h r e e  condition  assumption that  states  versions  of s e c u r i t y . security  this  individu-  the security  system w i l l  a state  i s the basic  In v a r y i n g i s a function  held  by  seek  to maximize t h e i r  In c o n t r a s t ,  sur-  relative  assump-  degrees,  differs  preferred  this version,  condition.  While other  to i t s competitors.  power,  among them.  o n e c a n assume t h a t  behavior of the balancer  class  the automatic  that  The f i n a l  the majority,  s e e k e q u a l i t y as t h e p r e f e r e d  posits  For a  levthat  partic-  insulated, equality i s a r e not d e a l t  with i n  t h e y seek p r e p o n d e r a n c e because t h e  i s a function  of a preponderant s t a t e . and p o s i t s  states  they  o f t h e amount  the semi-automatic version  o f power s o u g h t by s t a t e s  distinction  which  the d i s t r i -  between  In o p t i m i z i n g  c l a s s or type of s t a t e , the g e o g r a p h i c a l l y  cally,  to counteract  a p r e p o n d e r a n t amount o f power a p p e a r s t o be t h e o p t i m a l  of s e c u r i t y .  the  part  states  i n the sense of r e t u r n i n g  the l i k e l i h o o d  power o r c a p a b i l i t i e s  version,  a preponderant  optimized.  t i o n of the optimal  of  on.their  states.  or preponderant  to the remaining  s e c u r i t y and s y s t e m p r e s e r v a t i o n .  A central difference  all  an i n o r d i n a t e  The a p p e a r a n c e o f  an immediate t h r e a t  results  bution  with  (C1aude,19&2:42).  amount o f power  p o s i t s a c o n s e n s u s among  security  of the presence, version  i f not a l l ,  condition.  histori-  r e j e c t s the class states actively  18  There  are  several  reasons  B a l a n c e o f Power t h e o r y . theory  in which  dition  as t h e  whether lack  states  the resources to  does not n e c e s s a r i l y through  produce  underlying behavior ers  seek  the  seek  Powers.  tently  reappear  action,  such  as  ers.  The  presence  to  Altough because state, is  in  and  con-  is  of  states  t r u e even f o r i f attainable,  r e a c t i o n s of other the  use of  force,  Furthermore,  byproducts  i n g e n e r a l , or base,  of  state  the Great  a highly  the  Pow-  unlikely consis-  the product of  willful  the a g g r e g a t i o n of s t a t e c a p a b i l i t i e s  through  t h e y c a n o n l y be  perhaps  theoretical  behavior  most  important, the concept  relevance  or absence of a byproducts,  in a situation  for either  'balance' can i t i s hard  of  a c t o r s or h a v e no  'bal-  observ-  effect  on  t o c o n c e i v e how  they  where a l l s t a t e s c o n s t a n t l y  seek  power.  the  semi-automatic  f o c u s i n g on a  no c l e a r  still  The  naturally.  a  I f b a l a n c e s do  time,  As u n i n t e n d e d  maximize  Th i s  preponderance,  capability  not e x i s t  in labeling  majority  f o r the preponderant.  h a v e an e q u a l  Finally, h a v e no  Moreover,  of  i t is questionable  The  a goal.  Unless a l l states  through  can  Also,  that balances are unintended  through  ances'  such  version  as t h e o p t i m a l s e c u r i t y  f o r m a t i o n of a l 1 i a n c e s and/or  occurrence, balances w i l l  affect  common s e n s e  preponderance.  entertain  i s dubious.  in particular,  would  little  the automatic  create greater security.  assumption  behavior.  is  preponderance  greater insecurity  alliances.  rejecting  ' B a l a n c e o f Power' t h e o r y .  the m a j o r i t y of Great  may  There  states actually  states,  for  version  is  s i n g l e c l a s s of  too r e s t r i c t i v e states,  in fact  in nature, a  single  e x p l a n a t i o n i s p r o v i d e d f o r the m a j o r i t y of a c t o r s , i t  consistent  w i t h the treatment of Balance of  Power t h e o r y  as  19  an  explanation  can  provide  of state behavior.  further  Nonetheless, balancer  provides there  version  a  i s disposed  others. with  conceptual  ate  to states  of the balancer  states  t h e manual v e r s i o n ,  provides  a reasonable explanation  balances over  of  intuitive  actors.  time,  1 1  to  b e f e l t by  provides i t geographi-  i s much more  immedi-  i n encompassing  Their  Power t h e o r y .  for state policies,  a r e as f o l l o w s .  primary goal  available  are the military  comparative  the majority  t o defend  States  oneself.  distribution  of  The p r i m a r y military  The  which  i sprimary a function  capabilities of states, 1 1  It  a r e the only  i s self-preservation Security  of  the recurrences  and t h e maintenance o f t h e s t a t e system.  and/or p o t e n t i a l c a p a b i l i t i e s . the  islikely  to survival  an o p t i m i z a t i o n o f s e c u r i t y .  the resources  resources  oth-  p o s e d by a p o t e n t i a l  form o f Balance of  assumptions of t h i s v e r s i o n  requires  I f one  immediately adjacent t o a preponderant.  i s t h e most  relevant  focus.  reasonable t o expect  b e c a u s e o f t h e added  The t h r e a t  states,  basic  level  reasons f o r d e a l i n g with t h e  Moreover, the t h r e a t  leeway than o t h e r  element o f s e c u r i t y .  of  f o r a state  the insular p o s i t i o n of the balancer  cal  Moreover,  theory.  t o aggregate o r group a n a l y s i s ,  i s i tnot i n t u i t i v e l y  to thesecurity  In f a c t ,  greater  of the  version  a f t e r t h e e x a m i n a t i o n o f t h e manual v e r s i o n .  t o a l s o seek b a l a n c e s .  preponderant  theu t i l i t y  theoretical basis  areseveral  s t a t e seeks a balance, ers  an e x a m i n a t i o n o f t h i s  evidence regarding  W h e r e a s t h e manual v e r s i o n this version  Also  Ultimately, either  these  immediate  indicator of security i s  capabilities  among s t a t e s .  R e y n o l d s ( 1 9 7 5 : 3 5 6 - 3 5 8 ) p o i n t s o u t t h a t i t i s t h e t r e a t m e n t o f power as c a p a b i l i t i e s i n which B a l a n c e o f Power t h e o r y i sa t i t s c l e a r e s t . Power a s i n f l u e n c e i s t o o v a g u e f o r a p r e c i s e a n a l y s i s o f B a l a n c e o f Power t h e o r y .  20 It  i s the nature of the d i s t r i b u t i o n which determines  states  related  indicators  The  an  of,  by e l i t e s  an e q u a l  as t h e optimal  i nthe literature.  equal  As s u c h , c a p a b i l i t i e s a r e p r i o r . t o ,  the intent of states  assumption that  ceived ways  to security.  vis-a-vis  level  First,  i na clash  i n which e l i t e s  to  can  1972).  1 2  Elites  t h e outcome  a r e assumed  of war between s t a t e s , ly,  elites  are  such s e c u r i t y state elites or  The  threat  t h e preponderant with  create  a  condition  (Singer  t h e chance  which  may a f f e c t a with  an  inordinate  S u c h power  is likely a poten-  states.  to transform through  other  b e l i e f h e l d by  to the security of other  o f permanent s e c u r i t y  like-  the price of  i t s i n t e r e s t s and r e p r e s e n t s  theopportunity  et.al,  When w a r i s l e s s  identifies  1962).  produces  It results  In r e d u c i n g  c a n n o t be t r u s t e d (Claude,  i n two  areunlikejy to resort  s e c u r e even though  assumption  t o advance  i f n o t immediate,  provides  1 2  second  any i n d i v i d u a l s t a t e  t o b e u s e d by a s t a t e  and  more  p r e p o n d e r a n t amount o f power  tial,  averse.  i soptimized.  to feel  o f arms.  predicted  i s an a t m o s p h e r e o f u n c e r t a i n t y  interests. that  security  likely  n o t be  t o be r i s k  i saddressed  b e t w e e n two s t a t e s  in an atmosphere o f u n c e r t a i n t y because  c a p a b i l i t i e s i s per-  of security  equality  and  others.  d i s t r i b u t i o n of  chance of v i c t o r y o r d e f e a t  force  thep o l i c i e s of  It  t h e system  the elimination  They argue t h a t d e c i s i o n a l u n c e r t a i n t y i s an i n t e r v e n i n g , unmeasureable, v a r i a b l e w i t h i n t h e i r general case regarding the u t i l i t y o f B a l a n c e o f Power t h e o r y i n e x p l a i n i n g w a r , a n i s s u e d i s c u s s e d a t l e n g t h i n t h e f i n a l s e c t i o n o f t h i s C h a p t e r . I t i s n o t d e v e l o p e d by the authors t o extend n e c e s s a r i l y t o other explanations of state b e h a v i o r f r o m a B a l a n c e o f Power p e r s p e c t i v e . K a p l a n (1971) makes a s i m i l a r a r g u m e n t . However, i t i s b a s e d on t h e p o l a r i t y / s t a b i l i t y d e b a t e w h i c h i s n o t t h e same a s t h e B a l a n c e o f Power p e r s p e c t i v e ; a point which i sg e n e r a l l y overlooked i n the literature. Kaplan argues that m u l t i p o l a r s y s t e m s a r e more s t a b l e b e c a u s e t h e r i s k o f war i s t o o g r e a t i n terms o f i t s p o t e n t i a l e x p a n s i o n t o t h e w h o l e s y s t e m . As s u c h , p e a c e i s more l i k e l y .  21 of  a l l other  existing  T o g e t h e r , the at  two  the extremes.  states.  assumptions  E q u a l i t y produces optimal  d a m p e n i n g e f f e c t on  the use  system to  a single  b e c a u s e no  t h r e a t s can  presaging  exist  transformation, devoted  coalition  to deter  for  to  i t , serves  elites  are  ferred  c o n d i t i o n of  To  do  attempts  not  imply  resources  products  intent,  manner t h a n  security  process  and  This  forth  t h e amount o f  unite  in a  r e a c t i o n , or  e q u a l i t y as  by  Preponderance,  increase  away f r o m a g o a l  t h a t no  of  single  the  poten-  preponderance.  the optimal  But,  history.  relative  and  His attempt to a t t a i n  attempt to permanent  noted  pre-  reject  states  A s t a t e endowed w i t h  the b e n e f i t s of e q u a l i t y ,  preponderance  misperception.  of o t h e r s  and,  of  Elites  as a r e s u l t ,  capabilities  i s found  in  a  partially  may such may mis-  different  i n Germany u n d e r  i n E u r o p e was  a  in conjunction  i t is a l s o p o s s i b l e to conceive  extreme case  obtain  security.  earlier,  to a l l others,  o f m i s c a l c u l a t i o n and  An  As  resources.  or c a l c u l a t e r e l a t i v e  others.  state will  precondition for  r e a d i l y m i s c a l c u l a t e the c a p a b i l i t i e s perceive  the  states.  t h e weak t o  i n terms of  such a path. as  remaining  to accept  t h e a p p e a r a n c e o f e l i t e s who  embark on  permanent  state  of permanent s e c u r i t y c a l l s  the s t r o n g .  the n e c e s s a r y  of  the  security.  c r e a t e d equal  greater wealth  because of i t s  However,  capabilities  so w o u l d f l y i n t h e f a c e o f  a r e not  with  the  optimized  t r a n s f o r m a t i o n of  form c r e a t e s  goal  t o push e l i t e s  likely  The  security  security  definition.  military  T h i s argument does p r e p o n d e r a n c e as  by  causes  or d e f e a t  Thus,  force.  the  a c t i o n s from  resources  tial  of  a c t o r or empire  w h i c h a s t a t e moves t o w a r d countervailing  l e a d t o a model o f  Hitler.  motivated  22  by  his belief  American West,  inferiority  a n d S o v i e t power  i t was a c l e a r  Attempts or  o f German  military  Whatever  attempt  to attain  1980).  such  may  either  an attempt  recreate a 'balance'  i n t h e system.  resources allocated  t o the m i l i t a r y .  oppose t h e p o t e n t i a l force ant.  1  to  obtain  either  absence  system.  of superiaccidental.  thebehavior or p o l i c i e s of  They  may s e e k  and s i g n a l  preponderant. and/or  states  i s to  t h e amount o f  alliances  their  as a  willingness to  Finally,  s t a t e s may u s e  defeat  t h e preponder-  Depending  a r etheexplanatory core of  on t h e d i s t r i b u t i o n  o f t h e above a c t i o n s  restricted implies,  to a specific Great  c a n be p r e d i c t e d .  system.  of  They a r e t h e e l i t e  they a r e the o n l y s t a t e s preponderance. preponderant  ranks.  a r e gener-  Because  As t h e  an i n o r d i n a t e  of states of their  reasonably entertain  Conversely, only theGreat  f r o m among t h e i r  possess  t o the m a j o r i t y  t h e system.  that can  policies  t h e G r e a t Powers.  Powers a r e s t a t e s w h i c h relative  the presence/  However, t r e a t m e n t s o f  f o r such  set of states;  amount o f p o w e r / c a p a b i l i t i e s  B a l a n c e o f Power  of c a p a b i l i t i e s ,  B a l a n c e o f Power t h e o r y a s a n e x p l a n a t i o n  1 3  i n the  3  theory.  label  or  S t a t e s may i n c r e a s e  more r e s o u r c e s  These t h r e e p o l i c i e s  ally  theacquisition  The goal o f t h e s e  capabilities  or actual  state  be p u r p o s e f u l  alters  i n t h e system.  augment t h e i r  But, to thea l l i e s  through  the remaining s t a t e s  means t o  t o be d o m i n a t e d by  t o t r a n s f o r m t h e European  preponderance  capabilities  thecase,  (Calleo,  i n a w o r l d soon  a  i n the power,  policy of  Powers c a n a c t t o c o u n t e r a  Thus,  lesser  states  are largely  Sveral other options are also i d e n t i f i e d i n the l i t e r a t u r e , see C h a p t e r Two, Fn 2 8 . F o r a g e n e r a l a n a l y s i s s e e M o r g e n t h a u (1973) > O r g a n s k i (1968) , C l a u d e (1962) a n d R o s e c r a n c e ( 1 9 6 3 ) -  23  irrelevant  to the 'balance . 1  However, t h e above a s s e r t i o n s be  excluded  true  that  security system,  do n o t mean t h a t  lesser states  f r o m a n y a n a l y s i s b a s e d o n B a l a n c e o f Power t h e o r y .  the d i s t r i b u t i o n of for individual  power/capabilities,  states  states  are l i k e l y  and t h e d e g r e e o f t h r e a t  bution  and r e a c t ,  Great Powers.  t o be a l s o c o n c e r n e d at least  While  i n terms  an i n c r e a s e  with  of a l l i a n c e s ,  in military  with  a G r e a t Power t h r o u g h an a l l i a n c e .  er  states  not only  to t h e i r geographic  This and  discussion  also  p r o v i d e s an  capabilities,  location  1 4  1 4  theory  the p o l i -  of c a p a b i l i t i e s ,  f o r the appearance of  hypotheses which  o f Power  In e x p l a i n i n g  a s d e p e n d e n t on t h e d i s t r i b u t i o n  developing e x p l i c i t  of power.  t h e c a s e o f war by p r o -  the nature of Balance  s y s t e m and t h e m a i n t e n a n c e o f t h e s t a t e s y s t e m . for  bloc  less-  b u t a l s o key f a c i 1 i t i e s due  i t as a p o l i c y t h e o r y .  explanation  have  i n the system.  illustrates  t h e need t o t r e a t  c i e s of states  may b e s i g n i f i c a n t i n  way a s  when a g g r e g a t -  Furthermore, several  t o g e t h e r may p r o d u c e a s i g n i f i c a n t  additional  lesser  capabilities will  ed  lesser states  But,  t h e same  i f a n y , e f f e c t , t h e i r r e s o u r c e s may be v a l u a b l e  viding  to the state  the nature of the d i s t r i -  little,  allied  It is  as an i n d i c a t o r o f  i s l e g i t i m a t e l y r e s t r i c t e d t o t h e Great Powers.  Finally,  should  'balances'  It provides  are susceptible  i t  i n the  the basis  to empirical  T h i s a r g u m e n t d o e s n o t mean t h a t , f o r e x a m p l e , three lesser states a l l i e d together make a G r e a t Power. Certainly, the a b i l i t y to b r i n g t h e b l o c t o b e a r as a u n i f i e d a c t o r i s p r o b l e m a t i c , as t h e c a s e w i t h any a l l i a n c e ( s e e S a b r o s k y , 1980 on t h e e m p i r i c a l r e l i a b i l i t y o f a l l i a n c e commitments and Kann, 1976 on t h e t h e o r e t i c a l argument). B u t , as Kann (19&9) p o i n t s o u t , t h e r e h a s b e e n o n e c a s e where an a l l i a n c e between t h r e e l e s s e r s t a t e s was i n i t i a l l y perc e i v e d a s a power b l o c r e p l a c i n g t h e A u s t r o - H u n g a r i a n E m p i r e . This was t h e L i t t l e E n t e n t e c o n s i s t i n g o f C z e c h o s l o v a k i a , Rumania, and Yugoslavia.  2k  verification our  case,  either  a t t h e group  aggregate  level  manual v e r s i o n and s t a t e balancer  version.  the next chapter for of  hypotheses  level  Before  or individual  to  c a n be d e v e l o p e d  these hypotheses,  i n t h e c a s e o f t h e manual  version  In  test the  to test the  a task l e f t t o  and Chapter  Seven  t h e b a l a n c e r , i t i s n e c e s s a r y t o examine o t h e r a s p e c t s o f 'Balance Power'  1.2  i n the l i t e r a t u r e .  BALANCE OF POWER AS SYSTEM TYPE  One  of t h e predominant  to a p a r t i c u l a r (1965). the  analytic  tem  type of  systems'  (1962)  notes  type  record,  scheme that  implying  usages o f  B a l a n c e o f Power  international  conceptualizations and h i s t o r i c a l  system.  A c c o r d i n g t o Hoffmann  demand a  correspondence  reality.  Furthermore,  that  not abstract but a product this  type o f system  of the  this  system  i s bound  historical  inhistory.  It  t e m p o r a l l y t o t h e modern  and a synonym f o r i t , o r a p p l i c a b l e o n l y t o some s p e c i f i c  set of time w i t h i n fication  t h e modern s t a t e  among s c h o l a r s  conditions t o agree  presence/absence  approach  system.  o f a ' B a l a n c e o f Power' s y s t e m  necessary  their  Claude  i n t h e l i t e r a t u r e on  t h e e x a c t b o u n d a r i e s o f t h e B a l a n c e o f Power s y s t e m  system  between  h a s some m e a s u r e o f c o n c r e t e  t h e r e i s 1 i t t 1 e agreement  However,  u n c l e a r whether  i s i t s reference  B a l a n c e o f Power t h e o r y a n d i t s t r e a t m e n t a s a s y s -  i s usually  boundaries.  of  of analysis.  c a n be i d e n t i f i e d  hypotheses  identifying  level  for i t s  i n time,  implies  existence.  n o t o n l y on  Furthermore,  state sub-  the identi-  theexistence of a s e t However,  thenecessary  undermines  is  an i n a b i l i t y  conditions,  the value of thjs  t o t h e c o n c e p t o f t h e B a l a n c e o f Power.  Moreover,  but  type o f  Balance of  25  Power,  as d e f i n e d  contemporary  by  value.  o u t s i d e of the  these necessary c o n d i t i o n s , T h i s r a i s e s doubts  distant  past.  about  Finally,  i s shown t o h a v e  i t s theoretical  the  system  type  adds t o t h e c o n f u s i o n s u r r o u n d i n g ' B a l a n c e of Power'. ponents the  of t h i s  p e r s p e c t i v e assume t h a t  b e h a v i o r of s t a t e s .  sary conditions s c a l e war. either  As a r e s u l t ,  Several  units  Balance  cerned with  survival  Second,  among s y s t e m  purpose defined  as t h e a b s e n c e  t r a t i o n of  T h i s consensus system.  the absence  label  large  lacking  policy  making  needs a d e g r e e o f  consensus  i n v o l v e s an a c c e p t a n c e Third,  a degree of  hands of  Homogeneity,  elites  t o moderate  the  behavior  attempts to  destroy competitors  and  transform  of m i l i t a r y  not o n l y e n a b l e s e l i t e s and  base p o l i c y  on s u c h  homogeneity  and  concen-  relatively  unres-  of e l i t e s  away  the system  relatively  to c a l c u l a t e  of  a  through the use of f o r c e .  t e c h n o l o g y m u s t be  the  in conjunction with value  serves  sought  of  to the e x i s t e n c e  cleavages,  consensus,  of the o b j e c t i v e s  autonomous  capabili-  ideological  i n the  iden-  for relative  Homogeneity r e f e r s of  t r a i n e d by d o m e s t i c f a c t o r s .  bilities  of  value.  a concern  a B a l a n c e o f Power s y s t e m  a common c u l t u r e ,  bility  neces-  In s u c h a s y s t e m , a c t o r s a r e c o n -  which d i c t a t e s  elites.  pro-  explains  i s to examine the  i t r e q u i r e s a system of  of anarchy.  m u s t be p r e s e n t i n t h e s y s t e m .  level  Generally,  o f Power becomes a  First,  i n h e r e n t v a l u e of the s t a t e  the  perspective  n e c e s s a r y c o n d i t i o n s o f a B a l a n c e o f Power s y s t e m a r e  i n an e n v i r o n m e n t  limitation  utility  t h e B a l a n c e o f Power  r e l e v a n c e or d e s c r i p t i v e  i n the l i t e r a t u r e .  ties.  actual  f o r system s t a b i l i t y ,  theoretical  tified  Their  no  stable.  through a Fourth, Such  reasonably relative  calculations,  which  itself  from  stacapa-  is aided  26  by  homogeneity,  force  but also acts  to transform  requires  the system.  a relatively  cal'  ity  a Balance  o f Power  t o use system  power b e t w e e n a minimum num-  Great Powers.  T h i s minimum  thehistorical  i s normally  states areable to adjust  i n response  I t s presence  'magi-  record.  This  to distributional  capa-  among them t h r o u g h a l l i a n c e b e h a v i o r .  comes i n t o p l a y .  partners  of  t o be c o n s i s t e n t w i t h  minimum e n s u r e s t h a t changes  of states  a l t h o u g h most t r e a t m e n t s f o c u s on t h e p r e s u p p o s e d  number o f f i v e  bility  thea b i l i t y  Finally,  equal d i f f u s i o n  ber o f s t a t e s o r s p e c i f i c a l l y set a t three,  to inhibit  enables states  A g a i n , homogenet o change  alliance  to the d i s t r i b u t i o n without concern f o r domestic  acceptab i1i t y .  There  i s no g e n e r a l a g r e e m e n t among  tance of  each  condition.  autonomy a n d a n a r c h y (1977).  Wight several  The m a j o r i t y  refers  thee a r l i e r  a t t r i b u t e s which  my.  Yet, Bernholz  eval  period.  conflict  (1985)  argues  Independent  using  identifies system,  The tem,  actors  including  period with  competed  city  at least  up  conditions of e l i t e as Wight  (1977),  Hoffmann  history  contains  system  f o r power,  prior  medi-  prestige,  actors,  Bernholz state  of China.  a s a B a l a n c e o f Power i sfirmly  and  Further-  t o t h e modern  homogeneity.  Rosecrance  autono-  i sevident i n the  s t a t e and W a r r i n g p e r i o d  and system  (1965),  According to  t o Pope a n d E m p e r o r .  to, the French R e v o l u t i o n , consensus  system.  minimum number o f  t r e a t m e n t o f t h e modern s t a t e  impor-  the condition of  thecondition of actor  B a l a n c e o f Power s y s t e m s t h e Greek  that  i n European  t h a t autonomy  obligations  thecondition of a  several  agree  t o t h e modern s t a t e  medieval  d o m i n a t i o n d e s p i t e nominal more,  a u t h o r s on t h e r e l a t i v e  sys-  linked  to the  Authors,  such  (1963) , C l a u d e  (1962) a n d  27  (1955)  Gullick  behavioral transform war.  norms.  These  t h e system  the these norms  towards  include  (1976),  the total  theexistence  The  use of consensus  Balance of with  and l e g i t i m a c y  illustrates  interpretation.  and  homogeneity  its  appeal  disappear?  to the nation  sought  the three  A t what p o i n t  For Hoffmann,  and t h e c r e a t i o n between  area of t h e a c c e p t a b i 1 i t y  gives this  as an a c t o r witness to  sense  Soviet  problems  on E u r o p e a n  Perhaps  i s t h e p o s t W o r l d War the United  number c o n d i t i o n ,  imbedded  and s o c i a l i s t  States,  related  i n h i s t o r y d i d consensus  the French R e v o l u t i o n , dynastic  with  rule,  break.  society, particularly  is  the only  Two p e r i o d . which a l s o  a struggle  The i n the  an i n s t r u m e n t o f p o l i c y and t h e of Bolshevik  r e j e c t i n g the very legitimacy of the state a new e r a .  for a  o f t h e c o l l a p s e o f c o n s e n s u s and  of f o r c e as  Union and  capitalism  adjustment,  concerns problems  r i s e o f i n t e r n a l i n f l u e n c e s on p o l i c y , and t h e appearance Russia  states i n  fundamental  One p r o v i d e s a n o t h e r p l a u s i b l e  totatilty  through  as n e c e s s a r y c o n d i t i o n s  i n arms a n d r e j e c t i o n o f  W o r l d War  impact o f the war's  opponent  conflicts  The f i r s t  the b e g i n n i n g , i f n o t t h e c o n c l u s i o n , homogeneity.  objectives  of c e r t a i n states.  t h e system type p e r s p e c t i v e .  to h i s t o r i c a l  of attempts t o  issues of t e r r i t o r i a l  and homogeneity  Power s y s t e m  certain  ear 1 i e r systems e x h i b i t t h e ten-  In c o n t r a s t ,  modern s t a t e system a r e l a r g e l y o v e r  create  therejection  e l i m i n a t i o n o f one's  a s i n g l e hegemonic a c t o r .  not  two c o n d i t i o n s  and t h e m o d e r a t i o n o f  A c c o r d i n g t o Northedge  dency of  agree that  area of  system,  agreement i n  The dominance  of the  v i o l a t e s t h e minimum  t o the death  d i c t a t o r s h i p i n t h e system.  between  liberal  28  However, and  one s h o u l d be c a u t i o u s  homogeneity  Power  even  thefinal  a predominant entailed  a  position  life  more myth t h a n ries,  and  tain  and b e h a v i o r a l  The  Even  illegitimacy itself.  between  East  However,  paradoxical to  such systems  system.  on c e r -  Republican  S o v i e t R u s s i a and t h e  the appearance o f  a tacit  west.  a n d homoge-  As n o t e d a b o v e , embodies  claims  the eschaabout  the  systems and t h e i n t e r n a t i o n a l  , i snot equally,  contain greater  threats  i f n o t more,  rele-  related to  t o s t a t e and s y s t e m  t h r e a t s a r e t h e c o r e o f B a l a n c e o f Power t h e o r y .  of history,  study of t h eBalance of  Power d u r i n g  label,  as e v i d e n t  sys-  i n t h e sense  In p r o d u c i n g c o n f l i c t s  periods  era.  a l l i a n c e between  way, t h e t h e o r y , a n d t h u s s y s t e m  heterogeneous  affect  i t i s u n c l e a r why s t a t e b e h a v i o r ,  a heterogeneous  Such  and T w e n t i e t h C e n t u -  system and t h e r e b y t h e contem-  West  of the opposing social  vant  survival.  and  (1963)  t h e G o l d e n Age i s  t o have l i t t l e  an  international  i n theprevious section  legitimacy,  i n theNinteenth appears  (1756-1763)  t o t h e absence o f consensus  outlined to  that century  As L i s k a  moderation during  o f B a l a n c e o f Power t h e o r y .  clash  of  Y e a r s War  Communist C h i n a a n d t h e c a p i t a l i s t  i n t h e contemporary  tological  The Seven  i t has n o t h i n d e r e d  second problem r e l a t e s  porary u t i l i t y  decade  R u s s i a o r an a l l i a n c e b e t w e e n  Furthermore,  a l l i a n c e between  first  Age o f t h e B a l a n c e o f  for Prussia.  I t d i d not hinder  France and T s a r i s t West.  death s t r u g g l e  o f homogeneity  behavior.  Golden  The  i n t h e system.  reality.  an a b s e n c e  the degree of consensus  c l a s h e s o f L o u i s XIV's p e r c e i v e d attempt t o a t t a i n  argues, homogeneity  tem  i n the so c a l l e d  i n the Eighteenth Century.  witnessed  neity  stressing  i s more  In a  applicable  inGullick's  (1955)  t h e French R e v o l u t i o n / N a p o l e o n i c  29  The  final  conditions  problem  o f consensus  about system ing  i salso evident  stability  the behavior  of  prospects of stable the Balance  i n t h e above  and homogeneity a r e r e l a t e d than  the Balance  states,  these c o n d i t i o n s  r e l a t i o n s among s t a t e s .  o f Power a n d s t a t e b e h a v i o r  a function  of consensus  and  i s more a f u n c t i o n  ers.  I t r e s u l t s from  t h e need  allies  i n a complex multi-power  which  doing,  thea b i l i t y  relatively tively  (Claude,  1962).  ty  impediments t o assess  (1985) Pow-  enemies as f u t u r e  technology  simiIn s o  of c a p a b i l i t i e s  up t o  a l s o enhanced  the industrial  relative  A t t h e same t i m e ,  technology  condition,  among s t a t e s .  impediment t o d r i v e s  in a  the rela-  the mid  to late  f o r preponderance  thesimplicity  revolution, not only  of the  the  were  t o p r e p o n d e r a n c e removed s u b s t a n t i a l l y , b u t t h e a b i l i -  the 'balance'  and r e a c t  words, t h e dynamic o f t e c h n o l o g i c a l the  organizations  i sfacilitated. military  With  stability, is  Bernholz  Homogeneity ensures  S t a t i c technology  itself.  It  system.  and  a c t e d a s an  about  o f t h e number o f G r e a t  to calculate thedistribution  nature of  Century  calculation the  structures  s i m i l a r manner  static  Nineteenth  underpins  i salso a t the core of t h e m i l i t a r y  i nm i l i t a r y  us l i t t l e 1  t o preserve present  i s r e l a t e d t o homogeneity.  larity  enhance t h e  of the 'balance .  homogeneity.  that moderation  In m o d e r a t -  to  Ittells  which  argues  Stability  serve  in light  The  more t o c o n c e r n s  o f Power p e r s e .  is a l s o q u e s t i o n a b l e whether moderation, simply  discussion.  t o i t were undermined. change undermined  In o t h e r  the s t a b i l i t y of  system.  Returning that  static  t o Balance  o f Power t h e o r y ,  technology  i sa necessary  there  i s no r e a s o n  condition  t o expect  for the behavior of  30  states within states  tend  actual  of  have used  and  ski11ed  personnel  to  general  interests.  capabilities  s u c h an  in  the  the  system  of  in time.  condition. power o r  The  bipolar  first  confused with  revolves  The  differ  continues  Also,  the  due  t o be  an  complexity  as  a  the  l a r g e body  weapons can It  utility  of  element  by  a technology  be that  force  to consider  limitations  of  not  is true  a  to  state in  the  hindering  which  makes  present.  1957;  equal  d i f f u s i o n of (Bernholz,  Gullick, 1955).  for  1 5  i d e n t i f y i n g the  power among  1985; I t s use  Balance  Gilpin, provides of  Power  a n a l y t i c a l components u n d e r l y i n g the  irrelevance  second  around  B a l a n c e of  While  i n t e g r a l component of  G r e a t Powers  concerns  system.  an  i s the  two  successfully.  'balance'.  replaced  marker  others,  nuclear  technological  i n the  There are  theory which a l s o ally  the  Kaplan,  historical  well  l a r g e l y a new  states;  1965;  the  they are  necessary condition  Hoffmann, clearest  costly  as  Finally,  p a s t have been  a minimum number 1981;  Also,  attempt too  final  are  of  there  area.  significantly  Yet,  and  'balance'.  hegemony  The  altered  technology  c h a n g e h a v e b e e n a c c o m p a n i e d by  information i t .  homogeneity,  d e p l o y m e n t s may  in this  c a l c u l a t i o n s of  weapons have  and  factors,  technological  to analyze  and  their military  political  obtain  R e g a r d l e s s of  structures  among s t a t e s  to  from b a s i c  advance s t a t e  1 5  other  similarity  ability  military  theory.  s t r u c t u r e s , weapon s y s t e m s ,  greater  these  the  t h o s e who  c a l c u l a t i o n s due  divorced  of  military  to geographical underlying  confines  to copy the  particularly the  the  the  Power  is  of  this  a l l i a n c e s in a  l i n k e d t o a s e p a r a t e body  stability  p r o b l e m and  two of  is gener-  theory.  Both H o f f m a n n and G u l l i c k arguments follow the s t a b i l i t y line. B o t h i d e n t i f y t h e p o s s i b i l i t y o f o n l y two G r e a t P o w e r s i n a B a l a n c e o f Power s y s t e m , b u t a r g u e t h a t t h i s f o r m i s h i g h l y unstable.  31  Several  writers  argue  t h a t a minimum number o f G r e a t P o w e r s  essary  f o r the operation of thea l l i a n c e  Waltz,  19^7; K a p l a n , 1 9 5 7 ) -  ineffective  other  the  o f Power  have  o n e must  theory.  It  little  effect  ineffectiveness  of alliances  theory. does  t h e B a l a n c e o f Power; t h e d i s t r i b u t i o n a two power tribution by  system  (Bull,  reducing  i sthesimplest  1977)-  This  capabilities are  and  alliances  with  between  them.  on t h e d i s t r i b u t i o n component  i s o n l y one i n a s e r i e s  v a r i a b l e s w i t h i n B a l a n c e o f Power the  sense because  q u e r y why t h e a l l i a n c e  i snecessaryf o r  o f components  simplicity  points out,  thebasic property of  of capabi1ities.  forum  or dependent  O967)  As W a l t z  not negate  Furthermore,  for calculations may i t s e l f  of the d i s -  enhance  stability  t h e chance o f m i s c a l c u l a t i o n and m i s p e r c e p t i o n .  the q u e s t i o n  o f whether  system  be t r e a t e d as an  should  alliances  1985;  (Bernholz,  system, a l l i a n c e s a r e  i n t h e h a n d s o f t h e two S u p e r p o w e r s  states will  However,  In t h e c o n t e m p o r a r y  i n theBalance  concentrated  mechanism  i s nec-  aree f f e c t i v e  Finally,  i n t h e contemporary  e m p i r i c a l o n e , and n o t s i m p l y  assumed  away.  The  second  focuses  on  system s t a b i l i t y .  d e b a t e between relative includes  component r e l a t e s  Waltz  stability Kaplan's  (1967) of  (1957)  T h i s body and Qeutsch  bipolar  and  ber  i srelated  to stability  the  linkage of m u l t i p o l a r i t y  body o f  of theory and S i n g e r  multipolar  work o n s y s t e m ' s  Powers a c t t o c r e a t e c e r t a i n  c o n f u s i o n o f two  to a separate  i n which  (1964)  systems.  over t h e It also  t h e number o f G r e a t  i s a mute q u e s t i o n h e r e .  Whether  More  t o a B a l a n c e o f Power s y s t e m The  which  c e n t e r s on t h e  r u l e s o r norms o f b e h a v i o r .  unique bodies o f theory.  theory  polarity  num-  important,  represents a debate con-  32  c e r n s t h e r e l a t i o n s h i p b e t w e e n number and b e h a v i o r . concerns While  the  relationship  t h e f o r m e r may  between t h e  affect  the l a t t e r ,  B a l a n c e o f Power  distribution  and  and v i c e v e r s a ,  behavior.  an  empirical  q u e s t i o n , one s h o u l d n o t c o n f u s e two s e p a r a t e b o d i e s o f t h e o r y .  The u s e o f B a l a n c e It  produces  through record  unnecessary  problems  elements  related  to  the  In some i n s t a n c e s ,  is present. particularly  in which  Advocates  a  of a  of such  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of  the  Above a l l ,  not have  non-ideological  this  validated  a priori  confusion  to  by,  validity,  the u t i l i t y  of  I t i s about  based  set  as t h e European While t h e i r  t h e y s h o u l d n o t be  B a l a n c e o f Power  theory.  t h e c o n c e p t and  with  the p e r s p e c t i v e i s  of  sta-  motive  policies,  t e c h n o l o g y and t h e 'arms r a c e ' ,  body o f r e s e a r c h .  historical  directly  the i n s t i t u t i o n a l i z a t i o n  such  system  historical  s t r o n g n o r m a t i v e and p r e s c r i p t i v e  new power c e n t e r s ,  Japan, draw from  a  t o each of t h e a f o r e m e n t i o n e d  the c o n d i t i o n s c o n f l i c t  f o r the United States,  a s a means t o c o n t r o l  promotion of  belongs.  i s extremely flawed.  t h e ' B a l a n c e o f Power' and s t a t e b e h a v i o r .  conditions  control  type  on t h e b o u n d a r i e s  o f B a l a n c e o f Power t h e o r y .  not about  may  debates  and t h e r e l a t i v e w e i g h t a s s i g n e d  conditions.  bility  o f Power a s a s y s t e m  o f arms and t h e  Community  and  a r g u m e n t s may o r linked  to,  or  To do s o o n l y a d d s  the theory i n  which i t  33  1.3  BALANCE OF POWER THEORY AND ITS C R I T I C S  Critiques nature.  They  draws from  Power  theory  c a n be r o u g h l y g r o u p e d  problems  concerns  temporary  Balance of  inconsistent  on p a r t i c u l a r second  of  usage  into  o f t h e term  within  the three  the theory's implications  international  methodological.  politics.  It relates  areextremely  varied  three areas.  in  The f i r s t  ' B a l a n c e o f Power'  to focus  versions of the theory.  The  f o r , and r e l e v a n c e t o ,  con-  The t h i r d ,  and most p r o b l e m a t i c ,  t o c o n c e r n s e m b o d i e d , t o some d e g r e e ,  is \n  l  Waltz's c o n c e p t u a l i z a t i o n of the theory.  There ance  i s no need  of  Power'.  This  (1953)  and Claude  problem  i s that  of  theoretical  concepts,  ground  (1962) .  clarity.  The  problem  c a n n o t be r e a d i l y reflects  lem d o e s r e q u i r e  1 6  s h o u l d be this  stemming from  eliminated  problem  suffer  thedearth of  literature,  concepts  politics.  which  i n t h e manner p r e s e n t e d h e r e .  this  Many  from t h e  The i n c o n s i s -  i n thef i e l d  t o cover  A t t h e same t i m e , t h e p r o b consen-  of cumulation i n the f i e l d .  consensus  Haas  'Balance o f  some m e a s u r e o f d i s c i p l i n a r y  likelihood  i n t h e next c h a p t e r , t h i s  or replaced.  'Bal-  f o r purposes  i snot unique.  and i m p e r i a l i s m ,  discarded  thecreation of  ensure a greater  the q u a n t i t a t i v e theory  implication  c o v e r e d by  Nonetheless, they a r e concepts, along with  t h e phenomena o f i n t e r n a t i o n a l  shown  major  However,  uses o f t h e term  been a d e q u a t e l y  such as power, democracy,  Power', w h i c h  sus t o  the varied  has  ' B a l a n c e o f Power'  same p r o b l e m .  tency  to recapitulate  i s emerging,  conceptualizes  As  particularly in  Balance  o f Power  1 6  One must be c a r e f u l i n making t h i s assertion. I t i s true that quantitative studies t e s t B a l a n c e o f Power h y p o t h e s e s related to the d i s t r i b u t i o n of c a p a b i l i t i e s . However, t h e y a l s o u s u a l l y c o n t a i n some r e f e r e n c e t o M o r g e n t h a u ' s power p o l i t i c s t h e o r y w h i c h h a s  34  There  i s a l s o no  lems c r e a t e d (1959)  a mechanistic  matic of  t o re-examine  by t h e a u t o m a t i c  critique  ignore  need  of Kaplan  and  the ' s t u f f  and s e m i - a u t o m a t i c  and Morgenthau  states,  (1968:285)  British  versions.  is well  taken  o f w h i c h p o l i t i c s i s made; m a n .  but  t h e major  i t s lack  of  criticism  suffices  to  negate  1 7  However,  Hoffmann's  here.  To a r g u e  politics i s to  In t h e s e m i - a u t o -  i snot the omission  link  its utility.  1  t o Great With  8  power a n d t h e e m e r g e n c e o f r i g i d b i p o l a r i t y ,  er a balancer  t h e prob-  contemporary v a l u e .  argues that t h i s v e r s i o n ' s d i r e c t  the b a l a n c e r  detail  d e t e r m i n i s t i c view of i n t e r n a t i o n a l  version, interestingly,  other  i n any g r e a t  Organski B r i t a i n as  the decline of  there  i s no l o n g -  i n t h e system.  this  a r g u m e n t h a s two f l a w s .  any  e m p i r i c a l evidence  the  theory  which  supports  or B r i t i s h behavior  tion  Organski's  post  W o r l d War Two e r a .  First,  either  this  as t h e b a l a n c e r .  assumption about t h e absence The U n i t e d  States  i t i s n o t b a s e d on conceptualization of  Second, one c a n quesof a 'balancer'  shares  i n the  thebasic character- .  b e e n shown t o be p r o b l e m a t i c i n l i g h t o f t h e t h e o r y . Also, this l i t e r a t u r e does n o t c l e a r l y s p e c i f y t h e l i n k between t h e t h e o r y and state p o l i c y / b e h a v i o r . This lack of s p e c i f i c a t i o n i sa f u n c t i o n of the m e t h o d o l o g i c a l problem o u t l i n e d below. 1 7  T h i s c r i t i q u e a l s o l i e s a t t h e h e a r t o f problems stemming from t h e 'neo-rea1ist' approach. It i sthepoint made by A s h e l y , once one goes beyond h i s v e r b o s i t y .  1 8  Organski a l s o c r i t i c i z e s t h e argument t h a t B r i t a i n ever a c t e d as a balancer. He a r g u e s t h a t B r i t a i n a c t e d i n h e r s e l f - i n t e r e s t , r a t h er than t h e i n t e r e s t s o f t h e c o l l e c t i v e . As shown i n C h a p t e r S e v en, theBalancer, i.e. Britain, by a c t i n g i n i t s s e l f - i n t e r e s t simultaneously acts i n thec o l l e c t i v e interest. A f i n a l note i n regards t o B r i t a i n i sOrganski's view o f B r i t a i n as t h e p r e p o n d e r ant i n t h e N i n e t e e n t h Century, which u n d e r l i e s h i s Preponderance o f Power o r Power T r a n s i t i o n t h e o r y . H i s argument i s c l o s e t o c y c l e theorists i n thef i e l d ; s e e Thompson a n d R a s l e r (1988) , Thompson ( 1 9 8 6 ) , M o d e l s k i a n d M o r g a n ( 1 9 8 5 ) , D o r a n (1983) a n d G i l p i n (1981) . The f u n d a m e n t a l problem w i t h t h e i r approach i s i t s c l e a r d i v o r c e from h i s t o r i c a l r e a l i t y .  35 istic  of  the balancer;  defection  no l o n g e r  such as t h e European be b i p o l a r .  some r e l e v a n c e tional rect  now,  politics,  one.  o r i n t h e near  assuming that  Regardless,  He a r g u e s  that  d r a m a t i c changes wrought central  notion  of c a p a b i l i t i e s  states  can only  territorial of the  ability  to changes  psychological,  of  states  does n o t account  t o change f r e e l y  capabilities  for either  and n a t i o n a l i s m  However, t h e r e  prior  atively  static  restricted Prussian  Thus,  on a l l i a n c e  behavior.  alliance  adjust  means, s u c h a s a subtle  partners  he b e l i e v e s  for  the d i s t r i -  l i n k s which  set  hinder  i n response  that  the theory  industrialization  on s t a t e  flexibility.  the theory  industrialization.  cannot  incor-  I t i s true of states  thed i s t r i b u t i o n  But, with  w a r s o f German u n i f i c a t i o n ,  account  interpretation,  exists  revolution thec a p a b i l i t i e s  and a t t e m p t s t o  t o external  to his  and s o c i a l  of theo-  and t h a t t h e  by e x t e r n a l  i s no r e a s o n t o assume t h a t  to the industrial  rejection.  There  t h e impact of  p o r a t e t h e dynamic elements o f  evidence t o  revolution,  According  capabilities  i n thed i s t r i b u t i o n .  i s the cor-  a s a means t o a l t e r  economic,  interna-  t h e manual v e r s i o n  a g g r a n d i z e m e n t and a l l i a n c e s .  political,  image may h a v e  i s s t a t i c and u n a b l e t o  flexibility  their  t h e system  for empirical  also c r i t i c i z e s  f o r new  for understanding  than a p r i o r i  i s a myth.  increase  future  by t h e i n d u s t r i a l  of alliance  bution  the 'balancer'  i s a need  the theory  With t h e  and t h e p o t e n t i a l  the semi-automatic v e r s i o n  there  (1968:288-291)  Organski  location.  Community a n d J a p a n ,  As a r e s u l t ,  a s s e s s t h e above argument, r a t h e r  ry.  geographic  o f China from t h e s o c i a l i s t b l o c ,  power c e n t e r s , may  an i n s u l a r  theclear  are rel-  were lessons  e l i t e s came t o r e a l i z e  that  largely of the  the v i t a l  36 l i n k between ecution  industrialization,  of war.  capabilities,  Once r e a l i z e d ,  Similarly,  restriction al  and  bility  But,  input  L i and  behavior  consistent with  has  related  to the  because  it fails  argues  explained  not  one  last  The a  the  by  relative  the  the  measure of  power.  ponderant entation.  is dubious. Its  in which  British  1972;  i s thus  the  restric-  The  1981)  by  wars of  from a c o n t i n e n t a l Britain  power  has  which  no  is  utility reality.  century  is  presence of  the T w e n t i e t h  a  cen-  preponderance.  is a function  i s the  perspective, standing  as  which a  the  pre-  in o r i -  significantly  D e p e n d i n g on  of  underlying  i s l a r g e l y naval  always been  continent.  .  the  preponderant s t a t e economic s t r e n g t h  two  strongly related  Nineteenth  systemic  power,  show s u p p o r t  inconsistent with  The  and  Moreover,  theory  the  flexi-  (McGowan  Power t h e o r y  but  g r o u n d c o m p o n e n t has  domestic  1987)  Walt,  B a l a n c e of  military  industri-  not  a balance,  pure m i l i t a r y  t h a n t h e d o m i n a n t P o w e r s on  they are  of  is a  However,  i n c l u d e s measures of  and  little  to the  flexibility.  c o n d i t i o n of b a l a n c e not  argument t h a t B r i t a i n perspective  that  distribu-  act with  Century  Midlarsky,  peace d u r i n g  existence  by  Nineteenth  and  of  greater  prosof i t s  reason to b e l i e v e that  critiques.  t o e x p l a i n war  occasioned  global  the  criticism  preponderant: Great B r i t a i n . tury are  of  et.al.,  of  component t o the  r i s e of  i s no  a l l i a n c e s reveal  second area  that  the  alliance  (Holsti  because  i n most c a s e s p r i o r  Thompson, 1978;  ideological factors  Organski  He  Studies  successful  d o m i n a t e p o l i c y and  into p o l i c y , there  major s t u d i e s of to  even w i t h  i s undermined.  R o o d , 1975; for  elites  from domestic sources  revolution.  tions  societal  the  industrialization,  u n e v e n a f f e c t among s t a t e s , becomes a v i t a l tion.  and  less  distribu-  37  tion,  which would  Ninteenth It  C e n t u r y may  century  attachment  occurred  ina  t o the Franco-Russian  to France p r i o r  summary  s i t u a t i o n of  of the l i t e r a t u r e  The  inthis  regard  theory.  t o World  by t h e r i s i n g  to attain  this  Gullick  issue (1955),  Claude  politics.  This  derant,  but also small  of  through  entails  c a n be  As shown  (1973)  i n the on t h e argue  ensure a r e l a t i v e  adds t h a t war as a l e g i t i m a t e  for theoperation systemic  of t h e 'Balance o f  war t o d e f e a t  wars which c a n  a prepon-  increase  state  aggrandizement.  i s quite clear.  the theory,  questioned  of Balance of  and Morgenthau  scale limited  territorial  In s o d o i n g ,  differences  (1962),  notonly  i m p l i c a t i o n o f the theory  force.  makers,  policy  Jervis  i s necessary  Power .  The  between t h e  of empirical research  (1985)  of state policy  i n their  t h ebulk  'balance'  capabilities  (1983)1  of u t i l i t y  u s e d by s t a t e s t o  1  a preponder-  t o t h e i m p l i c a t i o n s B a l a n c e o f Power  international  informs  i n t h e system.  power  a r g u e t h a t no c o n c l u s i o n c a n be  t h a t war i s one o f t h e p o l i c i e s  tool  War One a n d  r e m a i n s an open o n e .  has f o r contemporary  next chapter,  of the  Britain's  the r e l a t i o n s h i p  s t u d i e s . Thus, t h e q u e s t i o n  i s s u e o f war a l s o r e l a t e s  theory  wars  r e l a t i o n s h i p because o f major m e t h o d o l o g i c a l  among t h e v a r i o u s Power t h e o r y  prior  and S u l l i v a n  on  d i s t r i b u t i o n o f c a p a b i 1 i t i e s . a n d war, drawn on t h i s  systemic  c a n be e x p l a i n e d  Siverson  on t h e c o n t i n e n t .  'balance'.  o f a German a t t e m p t  p o s i t i o n on t h e c o n t i n e n t .  valuable  t h e two  alliance  t o W o r l d War Two  Germany a n d a p e r c e p t i o n  ant  power, peace d u r i n g t h e  be a f u n c t i o n o f a ' b a l a n c e '  i s a l s o not n e c e s s a r i l y true that  Twentieth  of  i n c l u d e measures o f m i l i t a r y  on moral  It j u s t i f i e s  as a p r e s c r i p t i v e t o o l grounds.  If  for  the use policy  ' B a l a n c e o f Power'  38  behavior able, cult the  requires  the use of f o r c e ,  particularly  in a world  to conceptualize status  quo o r  1939)•  (Carr,  security will required. link  theory  rhetoric  as an  of  l e t a normative bias  problem  of states  i s also  (Bull,  relevant  1977)  •  i n which  f o r c e may be  because of i t s  understand  state  to the question  even though  t o enhance t h e s u r v i v a l o f s t a t e s  goal,  the  ensure t h i s  theory  also provides  goal.  For example,  for  inherent behavior. on a  Poland.  Furthermore,  ers w i l l  survive.  individual skill the d i s t r i b u t i o n theory  simply  response t o  may  lead  the state  as e v i d e n c e d  o f any s t a t e  is  o f some  ultimate  among t h e  by t h e p a r t i t i o n s o f  that  a l l the Great  system s u r v i v a l .  Whether  open t o e m p i r i c a l  Pow-  u l t i m a t e l y dependent on in light  t o t h e e l i m i n a t i o n o f even a G r e a t  of c a p a b i l i t i e s  How-  states to  Failure to act properly  posits certain predictable  i s a question  s y s t e m as a n  the s a c r i f i c e  may  such b e h a v i o r i s  and t h e s t a t e s y s t e m .  does not hold  of i t s e l i t e s .  the d i s t r i b u t i o n  s e c u r i t y and ways  the theory Survival  of the pres-  l e s s e r s t a t e s may be d i v i d e d  G r e a t Powers t o e n s u r e a ' b a l a n c e ' ,  dicted  states e x i s t s ,  ' B a l a n c e o f Power' b e h a v i o r  states,  i n p o s i t i n g the maintenance of  state  to  with  preponderant  towards peace undermine r e s e a r c h  ever,  The  potential  the actors  i t is diffi-  are s a t i s f i e d  community o f  B a l a n c e o f Power t h e o r y ,  t o t h e e l i m i n a t i o n o f some  intended  of  of a  anarchic  be a p a r a m o u n t g o a l  morality  ervation  the  But,  undesire-  related to system/state s u r v i v a l .  The  lead  weapons.  i s t o u n d e r m i n e an a b i l i t y  One c a n n o t  is highly  i n which a l l states  the p a c i f i c  To i g n o r e  t o war  of nuclear  a world  As l o n g  such b e h a v i o r  patterns as  of behavior i n  a means  states  analysis.  Power.  act  t o enhance i n the pre-  39 The of  Balance  ond be  morality question of  element  Power t h e o r y  in this  divided  into  the previous  focuses  final the  the  category  considerations  The the  strophic Thus,  the use  longer  in  itself  States  in  as  identification  longer  a nuclear a  n u c l e a r weapons  states  in the  system.  sible  means t o  priori  Lacking  reason  been  the  the  regional  for rejecting  the  of  The  sec-  state behavior.  The  ascension  of  to  economic  importance  o f war  the  general  the  Superpowers.  distribution does  is not  Power  distribution  of  capabilities.  limited  of  strategic  to a small s t a t e s , war  distributions,  of  cata-  of  sub-field  evidence,  to  Balance  remaining  Balance  in  of a min-  theory.  exchange between  o b j e c t i v e s in the  empirical  can  dealt with  v i a b l e o p t i o n because of  the  are  sec-  element  requirement  c o n t r o l n e g o t i a t i o n s between  Furthermore,  achievement of o t h e r  This  The  behavior.  basic property  For  critique  t h e d e c l i n e i n t h e u t i l i t y o f war  i s e v i d e n t w i t h i n the  alter  and  means t o a l t e r  concerned with  r e c o r d o f arms  ronment.  a  the  of major changes r e l a t e d  interdependence  But,  undermine the  concern  the  o f war  still  structural  c a s e r e l a t e s back t o the  i s no  reasonable.  are  f i r s t has  n u c l e a r weapons on  in explaining state  i m p l i c a t i o n s of  no  This  growth of  Force  The  concerns the  impact of  of  relevance.  Powers f o r the o p e r a t i o n of  n u c l e a r weapons  theory.  the elements  is theoretical  concerns the  presupposed  of  t o the contemporary e r a .  three categories.  s e c t i o n and  on  relative  regard  imum number o f G r e a t ond  i s o n l y one  search  the  studies  number o f is s t i l l  as w e l l  as  elite  a plaufor  f o r a more s e c u r e  theory.  and  superpowers.  n u c l e a r weapons a r e Power  theory.  not  the envian  a  ko  A s t r o n g e r case the  uniqueness  for rejecting  of t h e contemporary  among s t a t e s ,  states  f o r c e s on p o l i c y  to follow  put a s i d e  on t h e b a s i s o f  1977)-  Nye,  economic  pure  may  thea b i l i t y  factors,  dictates.  Interdependence  among s t a t e s w h i c h  c a n n o t e a s i l y be  'military'  calculations  conflict  with m i l i t a r y  F o r example,  b u t has r e l a t i v e l y of e l i t e s  ered g r e a t l y recent the  minor  by d o m e s t i c  S t a t e s was  i s an e c o n o m i c  military  t o change p o l i c y factors.  'Irangate' a f f a i r  United  Japan  and i d e n t i f y  o f m i l i t a r y and  power o f t h e f i r s t  capabilities.  Finally,  according t o the 'balance' A  good e x a m p l e  w h e r e an a t t e m p t e d greatly  concern for  considerations.  t o measure r e l a t i v e c a p a b i l i t i e s  economic  ability  (Keohane a n d  a central  more c o m p l e x d u e t o t h e i n c o n g r u i t y  rank,  and t h e  combine t o undermine t h e a b i l i -  t h r e a t s a r e much power.  interdependence  i n state behavior i n  military  The w e l f a r e s t a t e o f t o d a y d i c t a t e s  f a c t o r s which  Furthermore,  factors  B a l a n c e o f Power  c r e a t e s c o m p l e x webs o f r e l a t i o n s  i s made on t h e b a s i s o f Increasing  thedecline of t r a d i t i o n a l  i n f l u e n c e of domestic of  system.  t h e importance o f economic  conjunction with  ty  the theory  i s hind-  i sprovided i n the  rapproachment  h i n d e r e d by  the  the backlash  with  I r a n by  of domestic  opinion.  However, t h e d e g r e e past,  remains  1980;  Rosecrance,  necessarily  an  beyond  venue o f Balance to  t h e economic  within  of interdependence today,  i n comparison 1982;  u n r e s o l v e d q u e s t i o n (see W a l t z , et.al,  1977)'  Moreover,  economic  one.  t h e more l i m i t e d  from  Tetreault,  factors a r e not  t h e s c o p e o f B a l a n c e o f Power t h e o r y . o f Power t h e o r y h a s s h i f t e d  t o the  Perhaps t h e  them i l i t a r y  arena  But, i t i s possible t o conceive of the theory c o n f i n e s o f economic  factors.  Finally,  domes-  h] tic  influences  are  largely  over-emphasized.  have grown w i t h m o d e r n i z a t i o n cial  interest  forces  played  opinion ic  increase  can  in the  in  should  laid  degree of  American defence  bears  witness  contemporary  critiques  of  imply  rejection  Balance an  a  of  state behavior,  er  and  from  s measurement  affairs that  the  as  approximation  along  of  have the  and  of the  real  with  little  the  and  Ameri-  .  The  to  this  the  as  to measure  elite  research-  i s the  There  Thus,  the  Brecher,  It i s the  latter  themselves.  the  them-  between  (see  a  i s the a c t u a l s t a t e  an o b s e r v e r . The  theory  the e l i t e s  elites  former  m a j o r i t y of  Underlying  the a b i l i t y  accompanying behavior world  the  empirical merit.  theory.  posits  distribution.  the  dramatic  Reagon a d m i n i s t r a -  In t r e a t i n g  environments are symmetrical.  the d i s t r i b u t i o n  elites  fact.  e n v i r o n m e n t s of  the e l i t e s  f o r dramat-  The  must c o n f r o n t t h e p l a u s i b l e gap  1962)  public  But,  regard. the  domestic  Also,  today.  i n a manner s i m i l a r  Sapin,  the  p e r c e i v e d by  two  one  the p e r s p e c t i v e of of  role  i n c r e a s e i n the s i z e of  problem.  psychological  S n y d e r , B r u c k and  affairs 1  of c a p a b i 1 i t i e s  In so d o i n g , one  operational  this  during  theory,  rejection  e x p l a n a t i o n of  selves.  in  spending  Power  priori  the  Perhaps the ground  relevance c r i t i q u e ,  methodological  of  leeway  forces  s o p h i s t i c a t e d spe-  underestimate  more c a r e f u l l y  to t h i s  is a  distribution  not  malleable.  a t the c o s t of a s i g n i f i c a n t  The  1972;  the appearance of  domestic  heyday of c a b i n e t d i p l o m a c y .  relatively  a fair  deficit,  They  one  c h a n g e s must be  have  tion,  even  is s t i l l  policy  still  lobbies,  and  While  s t a t e of  i s no  assurance  the measurement can  perceptions  only  provide  within.  of an  i*2 The  problem  either  is clear  relative equality  sense,  p a r t of actor,  is  elites, and/or  such,  nant  or  inequality  and  u n d e r B a l a n c e o f Power t h e o r y .  observer viewpoint,  As  i n the c a s e of war.  the  war  may  an  elite  e x p l a i n e d by  be  balance  i s one  the t h e o r y , but  i s one of  by  i n one the  o f a m i s c a l c u l a t i o n on  the  observer  and  i n the b a l a n c e .  of e q u a l i t y ,  inequality.  refuted  at  from  d i f f e r e n t measures between  balance  occur  subsumed,  p r e c e p t i o n of a f u t u r e s h i f t  'operational'  'psychological'  still  may  At r e l a t i v e e q u a l i t y  occur because  the use of  S y s t e m i c war  but  the domi-  In t h i s  case,  war  t h e e v i d e n c e d e r i v e d by  the  researcher.  Now,  t h e above example r e p r e s e n t s a problem  cation,  a b o v e and  beyond  specifying,  as shown  ry  s y s t e m i c war  predicts  tory  e v i d e n c e would  B a l a n c e o f Power, t h e key  independent  operational which  and  d e f i e s any  who  any  consistent  be p l a c e d sonably are  require a  in light  It  inequality.  theoretical  Nonetheless, environments  specifi-  i s s o l v e d by  t h a t B a l a n c e o f Power  distribution  The  explanation,  of c a p a b i l i t i e s  is  i n one's f i n d i n g s  that  is a methodological  still  i n d i c a t o r s o f power  problem  histori-  i n the p a s t , uncover  In s o d o i n g , some c o n f i d e n c e  w o r l d from  uncovered  which  the  t h e meas-  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s by  the r e l a t i o n s h i p s  the real  not  the d i f f e r e n c e between  i s t o e x a m i n e a l a r g e e n o u g h body o f t i m e t o  p a t t e r n of b e h a v i o r .  theo-  contradic-  O u t s i d e of s p e c i f y i n g  of the dominant  t h e most p r o b a b l e  r e p r e s e n t a t i v e of  taken.  the  variable.  of  different  ultimate solution.  indicate  the only s o l u t i o n  section,  in a situation  psychological  urement p r o c e d u r e ans,  the measurement problem.  i n the f i r s t  i n which  of t h e o r e t i c a l  are  can rea-  the o b s e r v a t i o n s  43 The  final  the e l i t e s about the  p o i n t concerns  themselves. importance  c i e s undertaken bilities.  One  chapter,  there are  an  piece, after  policy  single variable  expect  role  replication,  addressed.  For  theory  i s an  and  assumption  in understanding  the  poli-  is the d i s t r i b u t i o n  of  capa-  t h a t the  ignored  above  f o r reasons  variable will  example, the theory As b r i e f l y  noted  can  i n the c a l c u l u s of e l i t e s . the o v e r a l l  But  of  only provide  i n the  explanations f o r a l l i a n c e s which  a p i e c e of  next are  in provid-  p u z z l e emerges.  The  p r o v i d e s a b u i l d i n g b l o c o f an o v e r a l l  grand  about s t a t e b e h a v i o r . the  theory  other v a r i a b l e s are  several other  explanation,  theory,  the  explanation for alliances.  to p l a y a major  ing such  theory  the h e a r t of  This variable  doing, should  r e l a t i o n s h i p between the  some p o r t i o n o f b e h a v i o r .  only a p a r t i a l  likely  o f one  elites.  In so  parsimony. explain  by  At  the  In t r e a t i n g  problems  of  Balance  putting  o f Power t h e o r y  pieces  together  can  as  a be  Chapter THE  In  the search  distribution states  in  u s e d by  of  general,  and  policies  states for  CAPABILITIES  How  capabilities  the Great  Powers  of s t a t e s . the purpose of  resources  to security  needs  seek a l l i e s  a l s o use  The  central  attain  either  of t h i s  of c a p a b i l i t i e s  relationship  i s a f u n c t i o n of  as  the  options  are  distribution. '  The  policy  1  one o f  allocation  the form of e x p l i c i t - m i 1 i t a r y  more r e s o u r c e s  study  i s the  and a l l i a n c e s . several  the c e n t r a l  need  in  States may  territorial  state.  relationship The  capa-  States  through  considerations.  elements  based.  capabilities.  or to reduce the c a p a b i l i t i e s of another  concern  among  affect  t h i r d options are e x t e r n a l l y  distribution  identified  the  relative  are d i s t r i b u t e d  I t encompasses the  as a means t o augment t h e i r  force to  aggrandizement  in  the  in particular,  altering  to the s t a t e .  s e c o n d and  ALLIANCES  Three d i s t i n c t  is internal  The  AND  s t a t e s are concerned with  option  bilities. may  for security,  of c a p a b i l i t i e s .  b e h a v i o r and  first  DISTRIBUTION OF  I I  2 0  between  t o examine Alliances  the o p e r a t i o n  of  the this are the  1 5  Several additional ( M o r g e n t h a u , 1973; 1963)However, most p r o m i n e n t .  options are also i d e n t i f i e d i n the l i t e r a t u r e O r g a n s k i , 1968; C l a u d e , 1962; and R o s e c r a n c e , resource a l l o c a t i o n , alliances and war a r e t h e  2 0  The three options are not s t r i c t l y independent of each other. S t a t e s may s i m u l t a n e o u s l y a d o p t a l l t h r e e p o l i c i e s . In p a r t i c u l a r , the d e c i s i o n t o use f o r c e g e n e r a l l y e n t a i l s a marked increase in m i l i t a r y c a p a b i l i t i e s t h r o u g h m o b i l i z a t i o n and an a t t e m p t to gain a l l i e s as a means to increase the p r o b a b i l i t y of v i c t o r y . The inter-relationship between t h e use of f o r c e and the other two o p t i o n s i s p r i m a r i l y a f u n c t i o n o f t y p e o f war b e i n g e n t e r t a i n e d . -  hh  -  ' B a l a n c e o f Power' have  not been  research  19&2:  (Claude,  empirically  linked  directly  have f o c u s e d  alliance  in  have  As shown  i n t r a and  inter-alliance Empirical  ignored a Balance  examining the r e l a t i o n s h i p  based concept o f p o l a r i z a t i o n .  tern  of a l l i a n c e s  debate,  theory i s  rather.than  based  d i s t r i b u t i o n of t o shed  Although  i n a system,  of p o l a r i z a t i o n ,  are  susceptible  forma-  explanation.  l i g h t on  polarization  i n d e p e n d e n t body o f t h e o r y ,  levels  i n gen-  s t u d i e s of a l l i a n c e  e v i d e n c e c a n be g e n e r a t e d  to a r e l a t i v e l y  mentioned p o l a r i t y  Power  between the  the  linked  empirical  behavior,  o f Power  and a l l i a n c e s ,  directly  below,  regard,  Moreover, s t u d i e s of a l l i a n c e  capabilities alliance  in this  or i n d i r e c t l y to Balance of  formation/dissolution.  tion/dissolution Finally,  on  Alliances,  examined.  d o m i n a t e d by t h e i s s u e o f w a r . eral  89).  defined  is  the aforeas t h e p a t -  t o a B a l a n c e o f Power  explanation.  2.1  E X I S T I N G STUDIES ON THE  Before d e t a i l i n g of  Power  to place  research  large portion the  this  analysis  concept  to  firmly  of t h i s  B a l a n c e o f Power.  h y p o t h e s e s f r o m B a l a n c e o f Power t i o n of c a p a b i l i t i e s ,  is  the u t i l i t y  within  theory It  formulated with  Also,  of Balance  on  I t i s both  i s true some  In s o d o i n g ,  in a variety  studies  i s the foundation  some a u t h o r s  theory.  operationa1ized  existing  and a l l i a n c e s .  and a l l i a n c e s .  research  ALLIANCES  formation/dissolution, i t  s a y t h a t B a l a n c e o f Power  on c a p a b i l i t i e s  POWER AND  to test  d i s t r i b u t i o n o f power o r c a p a b i l i t i e s  t r u e and f a l s e for  the hypotheses used  OF  t h e o r y as a e x p l a n a t i o n o f a l l i a n c e  is necessary the  DISTRIBUTION  because a  reference to  explicitly  draw  the d i s t r i b u -  of d i f f e r e n t  ways,  46 serves  as the  independent  theory  is often treated  In p a r t i c u l a r , Power t h e o r y Balance  of  proceed  w h i c h can  regards  distribution  to Balance  of  equality-peace  hypothesis  i t s opponents  ed by s u b s t a n t i v e  of  2 1  of  this  Balance  In o t h e r  research  of  cases,  of research, a multiplan ade-  to argue that there  c a p a b i l i t i e s and  v a r i a b l e in this  o f Power  exists theory,  i n which measures of  is directly  The  F u r t h e r m o r e , S i v e r s o n and research  to  linked  incorporate  of w a r ,  although  regard  and  2 1  Kugler,  directly  o f Power  Stuckey, 1980;  of  ratio, the  1972;  theo-  Ferris,  Garnham,  1976;  the f i n d i n g s are  limit-  various  (1983) a l s o c i t e  alliances.  the  the d i s t r i b u t i o n  d i f f e r e n c e s among t h e Sullivan  used as  i s not  to Balance  c o m p a r a t i v e m e r i t of  methodological  are  aggregate or d y a d i c  ( S i n g e r , B r e m e r , and  (Organski  alliances  In t h e c a s e o f  as a s y s t e m  by i t s p r o p o n e n t s  1976b; Weede, 1976).  ies.  of  bodies  be r e l a t e d to Balance  Power t h e o r y .  measured  and  i s not  o r more a c c u r a t e l y c o r r e l a t e s ,  capabilities,  1973)  treatments  to other  to e m p i r i c a l  o f a l l i a n c e s as a s e p a r a t e  ry, both  a s u b s t a n t i v e manner.  t e s t d i s t i n c t models w i t h o u t This  the  the dependent v a r i a b l e .  explanations,  linked  their  linked  to  foundation.  particulari1y with  use  r a t h e r than  because  (1957) work o n s y s t e m s , o r s c h o l a r s a c c e p t  a p a u c i t y of e v i d e n c e  Both the  also false  conceptualization.  Power h y p o t h e s e s a r e  as  It is  to l i n k 1  o f v e r s i o n s and  serve  tend  to the Morgenthau s  quate t h e o r e t i c a l  war  in a cursory  authors  s u c h as K a p l a n ' s icity  variable.  the  They c o r r e c t l y  stud-  failure  point  out  War i s g e n e r a l l y c o n c e p t u a l i z e d i n t e r m s o f i t s o c c u r r e n c e , durat i o n , and o r m a g n i t u d e , a l t h o u g h s t u d i e s v a r y c o n s i d e r a b l y i n t e r m s of which measure i s chosen. Some s t u d i e s , s u c h as Garnham (1976b) a l s o i n c l u d e major d i s p u t e s c o n t a i n i n g the p o t e n t i a l f o r war. For a critique o f the o p e r a t i o n a 1 i z a t i o n of war s e e M o s t and Starr (1983) and D u v a l 1 (1976) .  47  that:  "Neglecting  balance  this factor  o f power  theory  nations use a l l i a n c e s  Similarly, alliances Singer  variety  erature, two  membership.  options within  studies  have  2 2  2 3  Midlarsky  (1975),  (1981),  using a  test  proposi-  and Levy  arerelated  from  t o war.  While  t h e B a l a n c e o f Power  In  his  t h e two  theory.  variables  so d o i n g ,  thec a p a b i l i t i e s Bueno d e M e s q u i t a  operationa1ization of  equivalent  (1973)  polarity  2 3  for  of states  a sum-  alliance  in alliance  integrates  to test  lit-  between  to create  d i s t r i b u t i o n of c a p a b i l i t i e s adjusted  equality-peace as  B a l a n c e o f Power  integrated  a r e aggregated.  into  defined  drawn  between  capabi1itiies.  methods, time frames, and a c t o r s , that a l l i a n c e s  that  2 2  (1972),  (1980) ,  of the  is  on t h e r e l a t i o n s h i p  and Hoole  Sabrosky  arenote x p l i c i t l y  mary m e a s u r e o f t h e  tioned  (p.492).  tenets  the d i s t r i b u t i o n of  Ostrom  (1979).  central  t h e y p r o v i d e some e v i d e n c e o f t h e i n t e r - r e l a t i o n s h i p  Several  together  of i t s  research  ignored  to thenotion  of thepolicy  ities  have  of different  these studies  body o f  (1968),  and K i n g  related  s i n c e one  i n an a d e q u a t e t e s t  t o augment p o w e r . "  large  and war  and Small  Siverson  tions  a  i s unfair  capabil-  t h e aforemen-  proposition.  Polarity,  inthis  t o t h e number  o f independent Great  context,  is  Powers and  Moul ( I 9 8 6 ) also raises the issue of a l l i a n c e s i n his comparative analysis of the l i t e r a t u r e i n this area. He a r g u e s t h a t t h e f a i l ure t o take i n t o account t h e h i s t o r i c a l c o n t e x t , i n c l u s i v e of considerations related to political capabilities (i.e. internal stab i l i t y ) , hinders t h evalue of these studies. W a l l a c e (1973) a l s o examines t h i s r e l a t i o n s h i p , but includes configurational properties of a l l i a n c e groupings and non-military a l i g n m e n t d i m e n s i o n s t o examine t h e r e l a t i o n s h i p between p o l a r i z a tion, cross-cutting, and w a r . As s u c h , thestudy i s e x p l i c i t l y b a s e d o n t h e D e u t s c h a n d S i n g e r (1967) t h e s i s , n o t B a l a n c e o f Power. Several other studies arealso p a r t i a l l y relevant, but are not d i r e c t l y r e l a t e d t o B a l a n c e o f Power T h e o r y . F o r e x a m p l e , s e e Waymon e t . a l . (1983) a n d S a b r o s k y ( 1 9 8 5 ) -  48 blocs  (alliances)  same d e f i n i t i o n provided equal He  by  containing  of  argues  polarity,  Balance of  distribution  Great  of  Powers.  examines one o f  Power t h e o r y ;  capabilities  disruptions  movement b a c k  index,  blocs)  varying  relative  inalliances,  capabilities.  b a l a n c e o f power with  Stol1 in  system from  some r e s t r i c t i o n s  and Champion  the literature  (1985)  with  G r e a t Power  key  issue  the  extent  status. the  key  (1962);  i n the  debate over  any s t a t e  score.  their  and  held  clusters,  i t s continued  and war.  e q u a l i t y versus  n o t be t r u s t e d w i t h  inclusive  and  They add a measure and  power o r  argue t h a t t h e  s a t i s f i e d with  is explicitly  linked  identified  inordinate thesis  findings  p r e p o n d e r a n c e depends on  Power t h e o r y  theequality-peace  opera-  2 4  t h e s t a t u s quo,  states can  and  thepresence of a  to the distribution,  argument  by a l l  i s sensitive  to explain thec o n f l i c t i n g  i n Balance of  that  i n one b l o c ) ,  evidence t o support  assumptions  They c o n c l u d e  The r e s u l t -  amount o f c a p a b i l i t i e s  c a n be t r u s t e d w i t h  In s o d o i n g ,  by  concentration  up t o 1 9 6 5 •  with  followed  he e m p l o y s Bueno d e  for alliances,  satisfaction  time.  In so d o i n g ,  1824 t o 1914,  regard  a relative  Powers o v e r  thetightness of a l l i a n c e  seek  of  equilibrium,  concentrated  He f i n d s  e x c l u s i v e of adjustments of  (an e q u a l  to 1 (all capabilities  to a l t e r a t i o n s  tion,  from 0  explanations  i s c h a r a c t e r i z e d by p e r i o d -  i n thed i s t r i b u t i o n  towards e q u i l i b r i u m .  using the  the major  the recurrence  system  M e s q u i t a ' s methods t o d e v e l o p a b l o c ing  (1984),  among t h e G r e a t  t h a t a ' b a l a n c e o f power'  ic major  Stol1  its  t o one o f by C l a u d e  amounts o f power.  i ssupported  i n condi-  It should be n o t e d t h a t S t o l l ' s test i sr e s t r i c t e d t o the Great Powers, a s s u m i n g t h a t m i n o r power c a p a b i l i t i e s have l i t t l e e f f e c t on t h e G r e a t Power c l u s t e r s . This r e s t r i c t i o n l i m i t s the study's o v e r a l l a b i l i t y t o c a p t u r e t h e e s s e n c e o f B a l a n c e o f Power t h e o r y .  49  tions is  of general  supported  The  dissatisfaction,  i n conditions of preponderant  above s t u d i e s ,  ship  between  one s t u d y  within  a  much  period  1820-191.  alter  tions in his  to  regression  different which  model  Cusak  o f t h i s model,  a state's  and  of Great  (1978)  ignored  which  the other  desired  Power s e c u r i t y  The v a r i a t i o n s aspirations: of  time and a s t a t e ' s b e h a v i o r  tive  i s altered;  its  2 5  desired  needs a c c o r d i n g  He t e s t s  i n the  a power  three  varia-  capabilities  independent v a r i a b l e s  attempt a  other  fluctuates  aspiration  in  t o account f o r three  constant  power v i s - a - v i s  constant over position  relationship  dynamics  a s p e c t s o f a Power's  P o w e r s among s e v e n  level  relation-  formation/dissolution.  commitments.  include  of security  2 5  thea p r i o r i  alliance  thesis  e x a m i n e s t h e c o n d i t i o n s w h e r e b y a Power  of a l l i a n c e  equation.  types  have  satisfaction.  has u n d e r t a k e n an e x a m i n a t i o n o f t h i s  larger  i t s level  relation  as a whole,  thed i s t r i b u t i o n  However,  will  and t h e preponderance-peace  aspiration powers  only  in  remains  as i t s r e l a -  whereby a s t a t e  t o t h e u p w a r d o r downward movement  adjusts in i t s  The above t h r e e s t u d i e s c a n be c r i t i q u e d on s e v e r a l c o u n t s , inclus i v e o f problems w i t h t h e c o n c e p t u a l i z a t i o n of p o l a r i t y , t h e t r e a t ment o f a l l i a n c e s , a n d , a s W a l l a c e (1985) p o i n t s o u t , t h e method for identifying poles. In p a r t i c u l a r , t h e s t u d i e s f a i l t o d i s t i n guish the level of alliance bonding s u f f i c i e n t f o r aggregating c a p a b i l i t i e s , inclusive of the d i f f e r e n t classes of a l l i a n c e s ident i f i e d by S i n g e r a n d S m a l l (1968) . S c h r o e d e r (1975) a n d Moul (1983) r a i s e s u b s t a n t i a l q u e s t i o n s about the l e g i t i m a c y o f aggregating capabilities for certain historical alliances. They p o i n t out t h a t s e v e r a l s t a t e s formed a l l i a n c e s w i t h powerful s t a t e s as a means t o r e s t r a i n t h e i r b e h a v i o r . The c o n c e p t u a l and o p e r a t i o n a l questions, where relevant, are dealt with i n Chapters Four and Five. The q u e s t i o n o f a g g r e g a t i o n i s o u t s i d e t h e p u r v i e w o f t h i s analysis. The p u r p o s e here i s to establish the relationship between t h e d i s t r i b u t i o n and a l l i a n c e f o r m a t i o n / d i s s o l u t i o n . Bala n c e o f Power t h e o r y d o e s make a d i r e c t l i n k between a l l i a n c e s and capability aggregation. However, this link i snot necessary f o r this analysis. Alliances, f o r t h e purpose o f a g g r e g a t i o n and/or restraint, s h o u l d f o l l o w t h e same l o g i c i n r e l a t i o n t o t h e d i s t r i bution.  50  r e l a t i v e power p o s i t i o n ; propensity of  for a state  and a peer based  t o emulate  a l l t h e Great Powers.  tion  assumptions  o v e r a 11  model s 1  the average  He f i n d s  are superior ab i 1 i t y  defined  perceived  that neither  t o any  to  aspiration  other,  power  position  of the three a s p i r a -  and c o n c l u d e s  p r e d i c t changes  as t h e  in  a l i i ance  that the t i es  is  suspect.  Although are  there i s  several  great merit i n the breadth of  problems,  particularly  t h e o r y and t h e r e l a t i o n s h i p vide  little,  i f any,  Power t h e o r y .  under  in  relation  examination here.  b a l a n c e o f power,  t h e r e i s no  of i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s  model.  as  problem, which  Moreover,  the attempt  becomes l o s t  and er  problem  lesser  with  states.  a l l i a n c e s among them. states  from  and s e c u r i t y .  G r e a t Powers  never  less  than  and o f f e r s  1  incorporated  his negligible in alliance  stems from  perspective, contribution  This assumption held  from t h e l i t e r -  a  into h i s li-  results.  commitments  and r e s u l t i n g e q u a t i o n s .  W h i l e he i d e n t i f i e s  i n terms of t h e i r  of Balance of  accepts the m u l t i p l -  i s only concerned w i t h  a geo-political  inconsequential ities  alterations  his analysis  Cusak  pro-  i s a t t h e base o f h i s m u l t i - c o l  t o some d e g r e e  to explain  o f Power  formulated linkage  Power  s e t of f a c t o r s  however,  explains  of  i n t h e c o m p l e x i t y o f h i s model  further  include  Cusack  the 'Balance  f o r the  This synthesis,  nearity  A  the basis  of  clear  there  His findings  indication of the r e l a t i v e u t i l i t y  between t h e t h e o r y and h i s p r o p o s i t i o n s .  synthesis  to Balance  W h i l e he d o e s d i s c u s s and d r a w e l e m e n t s  a t u r e on t h e  icity  h i s study,  i s based  his failure the Great  the importance of he a r g u e s  to  Powers less-  that  they a r e  t o G r e a t Power  capabil-  on h i s f i n d i n g  that the  60% o f t o t a l  system  capabilities,  51  and  lesser  state  participation  percentage of total  alliances.  ties  states  held  by l e s s e r  distributed  among them.  in t h e upper e c h e l o n bution total  to  Great  alliances  ticipated This  fact  es,  security.  some  t o G r e a t Power  Finally,  by s t a t i s t i c a l  given  his rejection  substantive  states  Furthermore,  a low p e r c e n t a g e o f  of  1911.  until at  least  a role  lesser one  contri-  states  Great  f o r lesser  non-aggression/neutrality  treatment  requirements  par-  Power.  2 6  states i n  of lesser  states.  between  of a l l i a n c pacts,  may h a v e b e e n p a r t i a l l y  f o r a large  enough  sample  But t h ef a i l u r e  them may  significant relationship.  based  i s equally  a substantial  indication  This  differences  Two o t h e r  explain  moti-  especially  t o address the  his inability  It i s possible  is explicable  and  that  to  o n l y one  i n terms o f a Balance  explanation.  studies  the  relationship  sky  (1975)  the  two  2 6  this portion  have p r o v i d e d  that,  of a l l i a n c e s , defense pacts,  Power  than 40% c a p a b i l i -  a r e n o t e q u a l , and those  containing  defensive pacts,  vated  of  thefact  a small  security.  e n t e n t e s as i d e n t i c a l .  class  the less  only  Cusack does n o t d i f f e r e n t i a t e between c l a s s e s  and t r e a t s  uncover a  states  readily  i nalliances  provides  relation  Lesser  obscures  only  However,  represented  d o e s n o t mean t h a t  could  Power  inalliances  p r o v i d e some  between  a n d Kennedy  G r e a t Powers  interesting  information  t h e d i s t r i b u t i o n and a l l i a n c e s .  (1984)  relative to Both  Sabro-  e x a m i n e t h e d i s t r i b u t i o n o f power  and t h e i r  r e s p e c t i v e dominant  among  a l l i a n c e groups  T h e f i r s t a l l i a n c e among o n l y l e s s e r s t a t e s was t h e B a l k a n a l l i a n c e c o n s i s t i n g o f B u l g a r i a , S e r b i a , and Roumania. The a s s u m p t i o n a l s o c o n t r a d i c t s M i d l a r s k y ' s (1981) f i n d i n g s o n t h e i m p o r t a n c e o f l e s s e r states t o the balance. H o w e v e r , C u s a c k ' s s t u d y was c o m p l e t e d p r i o r to t h e M i d l a r s k y work.  52  Table I Comparison  o f P r e - W o r l d War  One  Capability  S a b r o s k y (a) 1905  1909  1913  1900  1913  F ranee Russ i a  10.1 16. 1  9.8 16.5  9-6  10.4 I6.5  36.8  16.5  47.5  57-3 76.6  Fr-Rus  26.1  26.3  26.1  26.9  84.3  Br i t a i n  20.6  16.5  15.0  14.1  41.1  40.1  16.9 6.2  17.2 6.4  18.2  71.2 25.6  137.7  6.1  23.1  23.6  24.3  96.8  178.4  Germany Aus/Hun  16.7  Ger-A/H  22.8  6.1  a) - P e r c e n t a g e o f T o t a l b) - T o t a l  prior  by  Industrial  to World  COW  War  project  individual  c o - R u s s i a n and the  Kennedy (b)  1900  Tr.Ent.  the  Triple  Capabi1itiies  1913»  One  and  ( Table  I).  Great Powers,  finds  127.2  —  f o r the  he f i n d s  a  in  i n 1900  relying  1905-  significant Industrial  alliances  which  40.7  on  100  at  the data  from  of c a p a b i l i t i e s  held  a r e l a t i v e b a l a n c e between the F r a n -  Austro-German a l l i a n c e  Franco-Russian a l l i a n c e ,  261.1  System  Sabrosky,  Austro-German a l l i a n c e s  Entente,  133.9  100.0  u s i n g the percentage shares  b a l a n c e b e t w e e n t h e two the  .  Production r e l a t i v e to B r i t a i n  Kennedy, u s i n g a measure o f T o t a l ative  Shares  has  and  With  imbalance Potential,  the c r e a t i o n in  i t s favor.  reveals  Great B r i t a i n  a  rel-  i n 1900.  In  a marked s u p e r i o r i t y  is significantly altered  of  in  over favor  the of  53 the  later with  the addition of  Great  Britain  through  the  Triple  Entente.  The  conflicting  findings  s t u d i e s may b e a t t r i b u t e d ever, is  the findings  i t intuitively  manner a s  on t h e degree  two i n t e r e s t i n g  reasonable t o treat While  few authors  would  i n focus.  co-Russian Second,  may  be  questionable  data  show  adherence both  from  a situation  among  t h e same  againstthe t h e two s e p a -  E n t e n t e were  non-Eu-  of r e l a t i v e  equality  show B r i t a i n to a position  moving  inrelation  show t h e f o r m a t i o n d a t e o f t h e a l l i a n c e s  2 7  to Bal-  s u p p o r t a B a l a n c e o f Power  alliances.  in a  Sabrosky's  a t t h e time  of B r i t a i n ' s  From a d y a d i c  perspective,  into a l l i a n c e with the rise  of s u p e r i o r i t y .  Fran-  historical . perspective.  thecontinental  t o the Franco-Russian a l l i a n c e .  studies  First,  capabi1ities with  evidence  Kennedy's f i n d i n g s  How-  B r i t a i n moves i n t o a l l i a n c e w i t h F r a n c e a n d R u s s i a  of inequality  capabilities  2 7  a  provide c o n f l i c t i n g  a n c e o f Power t h e o r y .  situation  the T r i p l e  As s u c h , a g g r e g a t i n g B r i t i s h  thefindings  explanation.  created  in  argue  alliances,  (  r a t e e n t e n t e agreements which  questions.  t h e two a l l i a n c e s  a g g r e g a t i o n o f c a p a b i l i t i e s f o r t h e two m a j o r  ropean  b e t w e e n t h e two  t o d i f f e r e n t measures of c a p a b i l i t i e s .  as a whole r a i s e  the Entente?  of balance  o f German  However, t h e d a t a does n o t  relative  to the distribution.  Two d i s t i n c t a r g u m e n t s c a n b e made i n this regard. F i r s t , the e n t e n t e d i d n o t c l a r i f y B r i t a i n ' s o p p o s i t i o n t o Germany, a n d i n t h e events o f August 1914 Germany q u e s t i o n e d B r i t a i n ' s willingness to f i g h t along side the Franco-Russian a l l i a n c e . S e c o n d , Germany r e c o g n i z e d t h e l i n k a g e , b u t c a l c u l a t e d that B r i t i s h c a p a b i l i t i e s would have a n e g l i g i b l e impact i n a q u i c k war. Both f i n d s u p p o r t w i t h i n the voluminous l i t e r a t u r e on t h e o r i g i n s o f W o r l d War One. The m o s t r e c e n t s t u d i e s i n t h i s r e g a r d i n c l u d e Kagan (1987)> L y n n - J o n e s (1986), S a g a n (1986) , Snyder (1984), L a y n e (1981) , and K a h l e r (1979-80). D e p e n d i n g on o n e ' s i n t e r p r e t a t i o n , a c a s e c a n b e made e i t h e r way f o r a g g r e g a t i o n . As n o t e d i n C h a p t e r F o u r , a case can be made f o r t r e a t i n g t h e A n g l o - F r e n c h e n t e n t e i n more f o r m a l t e r m s , but not t h e Anglo-Russian e n t e n t e .  54 W i t h o u t such m e r i t of  The  evidence,  Balance  final  o f Power  body o f  (19b8)  2 8  ance of  formation.  Power e x p l a n a t i o n .  remains ano u t l i n e the most  examines  situation  relevant  imbalance  Balance  o f Power  t h e o r y and theory  to  aggressive  theory.  Using  f o r the  foundation  goes beyond the c a p a b i l i t y  intent.  his  Russett  operational (1987)  Walt  on a l l i a n c e  provides  o r 'bandwagon'  the Middle  'balancing'  differs  in a  E a s t as  significantly  dimension  of Balance  offensive intent  his  hypothesis.  'Balance  aggressive  theory  formation.  i s based on  proximity,  In p a r t i c u l a r ,  1980), some s t u d -  Power t h e o r y .  t o'balance'  His study  include geographic  a p a u c i t y of  is consistent with a Bal-  e m p i r i c a l study  i n the system.  Walt's t h e o r e t i c a l  concerns  t h e r e l a t i v e power p o s i t i o n s o f  Unfortunately,  t e s t e n v i r o n m e n t , he f i n d s s u p p o r t  However,  of.  H i s argument  the tendency of s t a t e s  of  there e x i s t s  lacking empirical evidence.  r e c e n t and  theoretical  analysis  (Ward, 1981; J o b ,  w h i c h a r e germane t o B a l a n c e  alliance  on the  to t h i s  Although  p o s i t s a r e l a t i o n s h i p between  s t a t e s and  He  formation.  relevant  s t u d i e s on t h i s q u e s t i o n  i e s do e x i s t  be reached  theory.  literature  research on a l l i a n c e empirical  no c o n c l u s i o n c a n  of  from  Threat' o f Power  c a p a b i l i t y , and is central  to h i s  An e n t i r e l y d i s t i n c t c o n c e p t u a l i z a t i o n , more germane t o t h e p o l a r i ty debate, of Balance o f Power i s f o u n d i n t h e w o r k o f H e a l y and S t e i n (1973), R o s e c r a n c e e t . a l . (1974), and M c D o n a l d and R o s e c r a n c e (1985)• Both t e s t p r o p o s i t i o n s drawn from a v a r i e t y of a u t h o r s . However, i n terms of an adequate t e s t of Balance of Power, t h e s t u d i e s h a v e two m a j o r d e f e c t s . First, several p r o p o s i t i o n s are n o t a m e n a b l e , and i n f a c t a r e n o t t e s t e d t o any g r e a t d e g r e e , u s i n g their interval scale. P r o p o s i t i o n s concerned w i t h the degree of b a l a n c e i n the system can not be a d e q u a t e l y examined because of the e x c l u s i o n of c a p a b i l i t i e s . S e c o n d , o t h e r p r o p o s i t i o n s more a p p r o p r i a t e l y b e l o n g t o a n o t h e r body of t h e o r y . These p r o p o s i t i o n s concern the i n f l u e n c e of a l l i a n c e formation on subsequent i n t r a and i n t e r - a l l i a n c e behavior, t o some e x t e n t l i n k e d t o t h e D e u t s c h and S i n g e r (1964) t h e s i s o n m u l t i p o l a r i t y and s y s t e m s t a b i l i t y .  55 analysis.  He a r g u e s  s u b j e c t i v e element of capabilities.  that a 1liance formation threat,  McGowan a n d  Rood  Kaplan's  in e f f e c t , theory. other tors,  and a l l i a n c e  (1975).  L i a n d Thompson  Although  (1957) work a s t h e s o u r c e testing  a traditional  This proposition posits  system  member,  s h o u l d b e random  no a p r i o r i  2 9  analysis, Balance  they a r e , o f Power  t o a l l y w i t h any  and i d i o s y n c r a t i c  (Wight,  1966).  fac-  Thus, t h e  a c c o r d i n g t o McGowan and R o o d , p r e s e n t and f u t u r e  by p a s t a l l i a n c e s .  r e s t r i c t i o n s which  of ran-  McGowan a n d Rood  t h e need f o r s t a t e s  level,  and M i d l a r s k y  using a variety  p r o p o s i t i o n from  i n nature because  i n f l u e n c e d or determined  (1978),  for their  t o m a i n t a i n t h e ' b a l a n c e ' o f power  relationship  2 9  study of  regardless of i d e o l o g i c a l  a l l i a n c e p r o c e s s a t t h e system  not  the i n i t i a l  a 'balance' o f  the d i r e c t  formation.  examine a s p e c t s of a l l i a n c e f l e x i b i l i t y  dom p r o c e s s m o d e l s . cite  in a s i t u a t i o n of  As a r e s u l t , W a l t d o e s n o t t e s t  between t h e d i s t r i b u t i o n  (198l)  even  can be e x p l a i n e d by the  influence their  That alliance  alliances are i s , states  have  decisions.  H i s f o c u s on t h r e a t undermines t h e q u a n t i t a t i v e a s p e c t of h i s a n a l ysis. Threat, a purely qualitative and s u b j e c t i v e component, enables him t o e x p l a i n anomalyies i n a l l i a n c e b e h a v i o r i n t h e Midd l e E a s t ( s e e p.265). I t c o u l d be argued t h a t t h e c h o i c e o f t h e M i d d l e E a s t i s n o t a good one i n t e r m s o f B a l a n c e o f Power t h e o r y . A t a minimum, t h e endemic A r a b - I s r a e l i c o n f l i c t v i o l a t e s t h e p r i n c i p l e o f a l l i a n c e f l e x i b i l i t y p o s i t e d i n B a l a n c e o f Power t h e o r y . A more important problem i s w i t h h i s treatment of the theory. First, he a r g u e s t h a t B a l a n c e o f T h r e a t t h e o r y i s s i m p l y a more c o m p l e x v e r s i o n o f B a l a n c e o f Power t h e o r y . However, the latter c o n t r a d i c t s the former. Threat theory implies that perceptions of i n t e n t precede c a p a b i l i t y d i s t r i b u t i o n s . B a l a n c e o f Power t h e o r y posits the d i s t r i b u t i o n a s t h e i n d i c a t o r o f i n t e n t and thereby threat. Second, Walt argues t h a t both t h e o r i e s a r e e q u a l l y p a r s i monious. But, the incorporation of a d d i t i o n a l elements, along with the measurement problem e n t a i l e d by t h e concept o f t h r e a t , brings t h i s argument i n t o q u e s t i o n .  56  McGowan  and Rood's  where they f i n d replicated  initial  support  a n d e x p a n d e d by L i  acteristics  of polarity  from  ative  thealliance equality  Ninteenth ports  in alliance  Century.  the basic  partners  process.  configurations  proposition  t o ensure  of states  a relative  importance o f lesser  states  to tight  about  time,  the Twentieth char-  support f o r the  structural  bipolarity  (post  (1981) t e s t s  a t t h e system  changes  freely  'balance'.  level  moving between  He a l s o equality  notes  19**5)  for reli n the  t h e presence of equality  i n ensuring  is  1815-1914 and 1919-1939, b u t  Finally, Midlarsky  His findings  Europe,  the structural  They c o n c l u d e t h a t  ( p r e 19^5)  over  Including  they f i n d  f o r the periods  1945~19^5•  Century  process  representing  and p o l a r i z a t i o n ,  l o o s e mu 11 i p o l a r i t y  alters  Nineteenth  a n d Thompson.  variables  McGowan a n d Rood p o s i t i o n f o r the period  on  f o r a random a l l i a n c e  C e n t u r y and two a d d i t i o n a l  not  study  sup-  alliance  the central  of a l l i a n c e  configu-  rat i ons.  These s t u d i e s  provide  based e x p l a n a t i o n o f regard. er  alliances.  The d i s t r i b u t i o n  theory,  i seither  with  superficially  ski,  that  However,  of c a p a b i l i t i e s ,  ignored  G r e a t Power c a p a b i l i t i e s  and any a l t e r a t i o n s  If  correct,  ances over  time.  evidence provided in  are static  theory  However, t h i s by S t o l 1  the proportion  i n one  t h e c o r e o f B a l a n c e o f PowMidlarsky)  Midlarsky  to thed i s t r i b u t i o n  B a l a n c e o f Power  a l lare d e f i c i e n t  (McGowan a n d Rood;  ( L i and Thompson).  ry  changes  some d e g r e e o f s u p p o r t f o r a B a l a n c e o f Power  or dealt  assumes, a l a Organ-  i n theNineteenth  Centu-  i sa function of a l l i a n c e s .  can n o t e x p l a i n changes i n a l l i -  assumption  and Champion  i shighly  (1985)-  dubious  They f i n d  of system c a p a b i l i t i e s  held  by  given the  significant the Great  57 Powers d u r i n g fying  the  the N i n t e e n t h  importance  system p o l e s .  sense knowledge ascension and  of  Their of  simply  results,  (1970)  fies  s e v e r a l key  r i e s deal members  therefore,  and  participate, total  situations  where  do not  of  greater  t h a n 51% o f s y s t e m r e s o u r c e s . t h e o r i e s of  some B a l a n c e  3 1  system are  involved,  coalitions  common  due  to  the  to superpower s t a t u s ,  between a l l i a n c e s  work o n c o a l i t i o n s . schools.  winning  In c o n t r a s t ,  subsets  ogical  the  coalitions  defined  reiterate  size  and She  where the concludes  Bal-  identitheo-  where a l l system of  Balance  necessarily  She  in  Coalition  w h e r e t h e y must f o r m ,  and where the  resources.  opera-  .  sociological  only with situations  Powers,  flexibility  Soviet Russia  identi-  process,  simply  alliance  d i f f e r e n c e s b e t w e e n t h e two  51% o f  equals  3 0  t o the a l l i a n c e  examines the r e l a t i o n s h i p  a n c e o f Power t h e o r y  Thompson, a l b e i t  t h e number o f G r e a t  the breakdown of  t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s and  L i and  t h e e m e r g e n c e o f t h e C o l d War.  Zinnes  in  3 0  of c a p a b i l i t i e s  t i o n a l i z e t h i s v a r i a b l e as as  Century.  the  coalition  o f Power  exist,  exists  where o n l y  coalition size  is  t h a t some s o c i o l -  p r o v i d e an i n d i c a t i o n  o f Power s y s t e m s , w h e r e a s o t h e r s d o n o t .  of  stability  for  3 1  S t o l 1 and C h a m p i o n (1985) p r o v i d e a graph of c a p a b i l i t y s c o r e s f o r t h e E u r o p e a n G r e a t P o w e r s f r o m 1820 t o 1960I t r e v e a l s the domin a n c e o f G r e a t B r i t a i n w h i c h d e c l i n e s f r o m a peak i n i860. It also shows s i g n i f i c a n t a l t e r a t i o n s i n t h e p o s i t i o n s of R u s s i a , France, and P r u s s i a / G e r m a n y , with the l a t t e r s u r p a s s i n g Great B r i t a i n in 1900. P e r c e n t a g e s h a r e s a r e d r a w n f r o m d a t a p r o v i d e d by t h e C o r r e l a t e s o f War p r o j e c t and a r e b a s e d o n an a g g r e g a t e o f t h r e e d i m e n s i o n s ; d e m o g r a p h i c , i n d u s t r i a l , and m i l i t a r y . As shown i n C h a p t e r F o u r , a g r e a t d e a l o f movement i n c a p a b i l i t y s h a r e s i s e v i d e n t when the i n d i c a t o r s are a d j u s t e d f o r the h i s t o r i c a l context throughout the Ninteenth century. I t can b e added t h a t Z i n n e s ' f o r m u l a t i o n of Balance of Power i s suspect because of the a s s e r t i o n t h a t a l l i a n c e s are t r e a t e d as i n d e p e n d e n t v a r i a b l e s and her c o n c e r n w i t h s y s t e m s t a b i l i t y w i t h o u t due r e g a r d f o r c a p a b i l i t y d i s t r i b u t i o n s . Nonetheless, the a p p l i c a t i o n of s o c i o l o g i c a l c o a l i t i o n t h e o r i e s i n the e m p i r i c a l study of  58 Turning  to the general  l i t e r a t u r e on a l l i a n c e s ,  lack of e m p i r i c a l s t u d i e s on a l l i a n c e to  J o b (198l), t h e l a c k o f s t u d i e s o n a l l i a n c e  due  to the perceived declining  world  politics,  contradictions Also,  between t h e  Holsti, theory  of a l l i a n c e s  i s not adequate they  cite  d e v i a n t cases. To support and R o s e c r a n c e  study  relationship after  that  t h e w a r t i m e and e a r l y i n terms o f Balance  distribution  of conventional  the United S t a t e s weakness, to  be a t  of  odds w i t h B a l a n c e  t h e o r y does n o t p u r p o r t ance b e h a v i o r ,  on the  only  formation. Balance of number o f  e t .a l . c i t e  t h e Daw-  relationship, cannot e x p l a i n  war A n g l o - A m e r i c a n a l l i a n c e  of this  o f Power  Dawson and R o s e c r a n c e  Given  admit  is expli-  the general  static  between t h e S o v i e t Union and as w e l l  as B r i t i s h  r e l a t i o n s h i p does n o t appear  o f Power t h e o r y .  to explain the detailed  the basic  to alterations  alliance  o f Power t h e o r y  capabilities  studies.  f o r m a t i o n from a  Anglo-American  Power t h e o r y .  presence  empirical  a sizeable  i n Europe s i n c e t h e l a t e f o r t i e s ,  the continued  r e l i a b i l i t y , and  largely  theory of  However,  cold  i n contemporary  p r o p o s i t i o n s drawn from  Balance  1949-  this  i n general i s  argue that Balance  this assertion, Holsti  (1966)  According  world.  that there e x i s t s  which argues that conventional  cable  be a t t r i b u t e d  f o ra general  they b e l i e v e  and/or  t o examine a l l i a n c e  i n t h e post-1945  several alliance  formation  existing  a n d S u l l i v a n . (1973)  Hopmann,  Power t h e o r y ,  son  f i n d i n g s of  i s a curious  as a whole.  of a l l i a n c e s  problems o f data a v a i l a b i l i t y  o f Power p e r s p e c t i v e c a n  the nature  While  importance  i t appears that the f a i l u r e  Balance in  formation  there  More i m p o r t a n t l y , t h e aspects  conditions of a l l i a n c e  of  intra-alli-  f o r m a t i o n and  a l l i a n c e s has n o t been u n d e r t a k e n i n t h e f i e l d . Her e a r l i e r s t u d y (1967) p r o v i d e s o n l y a c a t e l o g u e of p r o p o s i t i o n s from t h e l i t e r t a t u r e i n w h i c h many a r e n o t c l e a r l y B a l a n c e o f Power b a s e d .  '59 d is s o l u tion.  Final  c o n s i d e r a t i o n must  t i o n s of a l l i a n c e ances  work 1982;  this Walt,  ment w i t h i n p a r t of  fails  Schroeder  f o r m a t i o n of  rising  military  states.  As shown b e l o w ,  Balance  o f Power  potential  ideological,  alliances  w h i c h have  198l). H e r e , R u s s e t t f a c t o r s may  theory. social, found  (1962)  be important  In c o n c l u s i o n , the c e n t r a l  expenditures  by a i m s o f  to restrain  Concern  (1962) p o i n t s  in support  in  the behavior  p r o p e r t i e s of B a l a n c e  the  has  but  been c o n c e r n e d  this the  other  incompatible to  the  explanations of literature  largely  (Job,  that  not d i r e c t  failed  these  causes.  to deal  o f Power t h e o r y w i t h r e g a r d s t o  r e l a t i o n s h i p between the d i s t r i b u t i o n of c a p a b i l i t i e s I t has  of  be g i v e n  correct in arguing  c o n t e x t u r a l elements,  of  (1983) » e m p h a s i z e  must a l s o  support  for a  n a t i o n a l expan-  and economic based  literature  latter  explanation  argument i s not e n t i r e l y  is probably  the e x i s t i n g  Liska  systematic evidence  ele-  and a l l i a n c e s ,  distributional  motivated  little  threat the  of  (Ward,  a measure of s u p p o r t  l a t e r work by Moul  this  security  ideographic  examine the  o f Power t h e o r y .  as a means  alli-  the bulk  i n Europe d u r i n g  i s g i v e n t o the  (1976), and  or perceived  (1975)  explana-  consensus that  s p e c u l a t i v e and  They f i n d  t o p r o v i d e any  alliances  alternative  o f Power t h e o r y ,  conflict  century.  between  existing  North  a l l i a n c e s may b e a l s o  but  view.  es.  of  i s at the h e a r t of Balance  sion,  the  and  study  no c o n s i d e r a t i o n  that  with  largely  Choucri  the Nineteenth  although  with  1987).  to  with Balance  remains  a broader  relationship  out  area  to  Beyond t h e g e n e r a l  i n response  a view compatible  in  which  formation.  a r e formed  threats,  be g i v e n b r i e f l y  predominantly  w i t h the  and  allianc-  i s s u e of war, a n d  60 the  relationship  issue.  Even  have f a i l e d  the  to examine the  and  importance  ,as  and  of  shown b e l o w ,  INTERNAL AND  behavior  of  is  states.  theory  the  many o f o f Power  A state's  alliance  them c a n  as  time.  resources  literature  has  limited be  in  empirical  related  or  and  neglected Comsupport  i n t e g r a t e d to a  capabilities  posits  relative its  to  that other  e l i t e s with  t h r e a t emanating from the environment. to s e c u r i t y  particular  Regardless  significant  requirements.  internal  p o s i t i o n or s t a n d i n g p r o v i d e s  s t a n d i n g a t any  o r d e c l i n e s , any  theory  distributions  previously formulated,  of a s t a t e ' s  the d e g r e e of  p o s i t i o n over  Power  theory.  decisions related  capability  of  this  EXTERNAL POLICY OPTIONS  a function  so d o i n g ,  Balance  to  in explaining al1iance formation.  Power t h e o r y ,  i n d i c a t i o n of  test  alliances  r e l a t i o n s h i p between  a l t e r n a t i v e e x p l a n a t i o n s are  Balance  ity  Finally,  the  degree with Balance  2.2  central  to  and  s t a t e r e a c t i o n s i n terms of  formation.  p e t i n g or  distributions  s t u d i e s which purport  of c a p a b i l i t i e s alliance  of c a p a b i l i t y  made a c c o r d i n g  i n time  and  changes  in state  in i t s  improves  leads to a re-assessment of  re-assessment,  In  to i t s  changes  of whether a s t a t e ' s p o s i t i o n  change  From t h i s  point  are  an  secur-  behavior  result.  The ity  theory a l s o posits e q u a l i t y  position.  ultimately  B e h a v i o r a l change,  two  fundamental  and  other  mechanisms,  e x t e r n a l to  the o p t i m a l  i t s nature  to the maintenance and/or  of war, the  as  the s t a t e ,  and  and  preferred secur-  direction,  assurance  of e q u a l i t y .  or p o l i c y  options,  are a v a i l a b l e  to  one  is tied Outside internal  ensure  this  61  position. devoted  First,  3 2  to  e l i t e s can  alter  security  needs  in general  Second,  e l i t e s can  alter  their  external  environment  Abstractly,  elite  assumption. increase allies.  A decline  i n the  with  As  theory;  the  actors,  there  the  the  is  needs  in  with other  p r e d i c t a b l e because relative  interna1 is  lead  particular.  states  of  position  to  resources  of  in  the  alliances.  the  equality  will  r e s o u r c e s and/or  likely  preferred  is gross theory  central  is qualified  p r e s e r v a t i o n of  the  by  able  of  reason to  anarchy.  the  state to  to  in  the  lead  to  search  to b e h a v i o r  an for  in  the  of  life  in  capabilities  qualification by  system.  is  Despite  this  the the  Power  basic only  the sys-  actors  qualification,  Power t h e o r y  lesser  consistent  G r e a t Powers are  they are  of  particular  B a l a n c e of  unilaterally  B a l a n c e of of  fact  c o v e r o n l y one  Conversely,  behavior  the the  provided  alter  alteration.  assume t h a t  understanding  This  explanations  definition,  position,  disparities  Great Powers.  p r e v e n t s u c h an  i s no  vance for  3 2  the  characteristic  w h i c h can  be  politics  states; of  tem  military  creation/dissolution  improvement  may  s u c h , the  one  only  and  internal  direction.  international states.  the  of  amount o f  relationships  in a s t a t e ' s  allocation  While equality  of  response  Conversely,  opposite  set  through  the  has  no  rele-  states.  The l i t e r a t u r e a l s o i d e n t i f i e s s e v e r a l other responses (Morgenthau, 1973) • They i n c l u d e s u c h e l e m e n t s as the c o n c e p t of divide and r u l e , t e r r i t o r i a l compensation, and t h e c r e a t i o n o f b u f f e r states. These e l e m e n t s are d i r e c t l y l i n k e d t o the d i s t r i b u t i o n in t h a t t h e y concern t e r r i t o r i a l possessions. As s u c h , t h e y a r e m o r e . a p t l y s e e n as p a r t o f t h e e v o l v i n g d i s t r i b u t i o n , rather than s p e c i f i c responses t o i t s a l t e r a t i o n . As shown b e l o w i n t h e c o n t e x t o f t h e internal r e s p o n s e , t h e i r measurement i s i n h e r e n t i n any m e a s u r e m e n t o f the d i s t r i b u t i o n of c a p a b i l i t i e s .  62  Lesser  states  position.  Their  are also  concerned with  relative  p o s i t i o n may be d e f i n e d  reflecting  their  immediate  environment  prominent. of  also  threats  with  their  in  which  threats  existence.  geographic  when a l l i e d  lesser states with security  c a n have  with a  may a l w a y s  s e e k a G r e a t Power  the a v a i l a b i l i t y  the general  their  will  their most  distribution system a r e  capabilities,  Such  Finally,  along  an a l l i a n c e enhances  protheir  lesser states are  distribution.  as a p r o t e c t o r ,  of a protector  are  to the  which necessari1y  1968) .  (Rothstein,  survival  terms  an i n f l u e n c e o n t h e g e n e r a l '  more d e p e n d e n t on t h e n a t u r e o f t h e g e n e r a l  that  i n t h e s y s t e m and  a G r e a t Power.  protector  capability  in regional  Threats  Moreover,  position,  relative  to their  among t h e G r e a t P o w e r s .  to their  distribution  individual  geographic p o s i t i o n  But, they a r e a l s o concerned with  capabilities  vides  specific  their  the  While  theory  they  indicates  be a f u n c t i o n o f t h e d i s t r i -  but i on.  Returning the  general  t o the Great Powers, distribution  Great Powers. Powers  i s not only  assumption equal.  It also  i n the  exception,  ers  a r e not able  individual that  these  result  of c a p a b i l i t i e s implies  possible, literature  Yet, the h i s t o r i c a l  the  in  t h e above d i s c u s s i o n  not the r u l e .  that  relative  e q u a l i t y among t h e G r e a t There  t h a t Great Powers, clearly  states are not a radically  truly  different  i n time,  or p o t e n t i a l . Great Powers. picture  a n 'a p r i o r i ' are  indicates that equality i s  A t many p o i n t s  actual  is  by d e f i n i t i o n ,  t o e n t e r t a i n any hope o f e q u a l i t y  capabilities,  that  i s drawn e x c l u s i v e l y from t h e  b u t t h e norm.  record  indicates  some G r e a t  i n terms of  Now,  one c o u l d  B u t t o do  of h i s t o r y than  Powtheir argue  so would  provided  by  63  historians.  The  the c e n t r a l  It  r e l a t i v e weakness of  importance of  i s how  capabilities  group which determines and  thus  alliances  motivates  the degree of behavior  containing  two  relatively  straightforward.  Powers, t h i s from  the  standing all  other  tence  Powers,  calculation  requirement vis-a-vis  elites  each o t h e r ,  unequal  a general  with  to but  Elites ty.  3 3  for behavioral  have  two  I t i s not  option precludes military  a t i o n would occur itself other it  3 3  other.  to o f f s e t  and  a  system  the d i s t r i b u t i o n  This  other  complexity  only  relative  their  is  Great arises  relative  standing  between  the  d e p e n d i n g on  i t s degree,  indicates  This  indication  a v a i l a b l e to  serves  in a similar  redress  case that a d e c i s i o n  E l i t e s may  choose  exis-  as  the  to  increase  response  the p r e p o n d e r a n t .  manner,  or m u l t i l a t e r a l  inequali-  i n f a v o r of  simultaneously.  when n e i t h e r  the c a p a b i l i t i e s of  requires a bilateral  states  complexity,  obtain a l l i e s  most l i k e l y  states react  In  a  change.  n e c e s s a r i l y the  capabilities  of  this  immediate o p t i o n s  the  sense.  of  not  a l s o the Despite  distribution,  individual  the a d d i t i o n of  assess  the e x i s t e n c e of a p r e p o n d e r a n t Power. explanation  the  becomes more c o m p l e x .  of  us  among t h e G r e a t P o w e r s as  t h r e a t to  in  But,  informs  a means t o e n s u r e e q u a l i t y .  the c a l c u l a t i o n  p a i r s of Great Powers.  o f an  as  are d i s t r i b u t e d  their  Great  some G r e a t P o w e r s  one  internal  This  situ-  is sufficient  by  Given that a l l  the a l l i a n c e o p t i o n , decision, is likely  because  t o be  more  The t h i r d o p t i o n i s t h e u s e o f f o r c e a g a i n s t t h e p r e p o n d e r a n t Power. However, this option a l s o demands a p r e v i o u s d e c i s i o n to increase internal m i l i t a r y c a p a b i l i t i e s , u s u a l l y through m o b i l i z a t i o n , and p o s s i b l y t h e s e a r c h f o r a l l i e s t o i n c r e a s e t h e p r o b a b i l i ty of v i c t o r y . Thus, t h e c h o i c e o f t h e war o p t i o n i s l i k e l y to follow decisions r e l a t e d to t h e o t h e r two o p t i o n s and be c o n d i t i o n e d by them.  64 p r o m i n e n t when t h e d e g r e e o f s i t u a t i o n where limited t o an  e i t h e r r e s p o n s e may  degree of d i s t r i b u t i o n a l  either/or decision.  capabilities  may  the  availability  n e e d and  cessful  be  In f a c t ,  of  o f an  an  sitions  B a l a n c e of  in t h i s  a l l i a n c e may  o p t i o n over  the o t h e r ,  may  the  ability  or  economic reasons.  lack  political  in t h i s  case.  f o r a v a r i e t y of  examining  an  o p t i o n and  with  only  a  predisposed military  to e q u a l i t y , thereby  negating  partner. negate  Similarly, the  need  the  to  the  suc-  increase  the m a j o r i t y  of  two  capabilities  an  be  (see H o l s t i  et.al,  inverse r e l a t i o n s h i p  other.  devoted  t o s e c u r i t y n e e d s may  I t may  a l s o enhance d o m e s t i c  support not  undermined  alliance.  unavailMoreover,  in resources  o p t i o n does  ine-  reasonable  option,  this  like-  for domestic  the o n l y  options  , reveal  are  lesser states,  a l l i a n c e o p t i o n may  the  predispo-  to the degree of  internal  popular  an  relative  i n t e r n a t i o n a l reasons.  1968)  Russett,  increase  be  as  the  c o s t s of  t h e d o m e s t i c economy.  g o a l s w h i c h may  encompass e l i t e  A l l i a n c e s are  d o m e s t i c and  the  increase  stimulate  taining  In a  increase  increase m i l i t a r y  Conversely,  1970;  Freidman,  Beginning  Second,  to  t h e b e n e f i t s and  b e t w e e n one  t y and  be  c e r t a i n factors indicate that e l i t e s  Some G r e a t P o w e r s , as w e l l  First,  implying  does not  quality.  1.973;  sufficient,  a d e c i s i o n to  alliance  Power t h e o r y  regard,  t o p r e f e r one  able  in nature.  capabilities.  Although  option  is explicit  i n e q u a l i t y , e l i t e s may  r e t u r n the d i s t r i b u t i o n  consumation  military  ly  inequality  Third,  in  the b e n e f i t s  f o r the government affect the  directly process  are  and  other  as f o l l o w s . serve  stabili-  its policies. foreign  o f n e g o t i a t i n g and  i t enables e l i t e s  to avoid  to  policy main-  any p o t e n t i a l  6 5  domestic problem  resulting  state.  the problems e n t a i l e d  Finally,  avoided. ibility with  nature.  i n other  As n o t e d  contemplate t h i s resources  areas  likely  by t h e i n t e r n a l  earlier,  a state  option.  to devote elites  Any  a whole.  devoted  be c o u n t e r p r o d u c t i v e .  phenomenon  an a l l i a n c e a r e  inequality  and i n s e c u r i t y ,  In c o n t r a s t ,  the  l a r g e l y domestic i n lack the resources  a finite  to security  total  of m o b i l i z a -  to security.  In t h i s  damage c a u s e d  by  be g i v e n  to domestic regardless  r e l i a n c e on t h e i n t e r n a l  not reduce d i s t r i b u t i o n a l states.  option  inequali-  This action-  'arms r a c e ' .  s t a t e cannot compete, and p o s s i b l y t h e o u t b r e a k  or a l l i a n c e  t o augment  a state's  inequality,  thereby  The n e t  of war.  option.  capabilities,  but a l s o  serves  econ-  increasing  o p t i o n enables  the i n t e r n a l  an  health of the  capabilities,  response from other  the external  redress d i s t r i b u t i o n a l  Short  needs t o t h e  in security  Finally,  amount o f  to  consequences, e l i t e s are  potential  some o f t h e c o s t s a s s o c i a t e d w i t h not only  conflicts  be an i n c r e a s e d b u r d e n on t h e d o m e s t i c  a s i t u a t i o n whereby a  serve  simply  i s more commonly known as an  r e s u l t o f s u c h a r a c e may  es  may  has d r a s t i c  I t may  t y , b u t c r e a t e an e q u i v a l e n t  avoid  option are  C o n s i d e r a t i o n must a l s o  t h e s t a t e o f t h e economy.  omy,  an u n p o p u l a r  o f t h e commitment, t h e compat-  a l l p o s s i b l e resources  o p p o s i t i o n a g a i n s t any i n c r e a s e  reaction  in maintaining  s t a t e has  itself  must c o n s i d e r  i n resources  economy a s  may  with  w h i c h c a n be d i r e c t e d t o w a r d s s e c u r i t y .  regard,  of  ally  of f o r e i g n p o l i c y .  f o r war, a step which  increase  to  o f armed f o r c e s and p l a n n i n g , and t h e a f o r e m e n t i o n e d  The c o s t s e n t a i l e d  not  attempts  These i n c l u d e the r e l i a b i l i t y  allies  tion  from  elites  to  Allianc-  and  t o d e n y an  thereby ally's  66 capabilities side benefits trade  to other such  states.  A t t h e same t i m e , a l l i a n c e s c a n  as i n c r e a s e d  opportunities.  legitimacy,  The e x t e r n a l  option  alignment s t r u c t u r e of the system. er  i n d i c a t i o n of  also  In s o d o i n g ,  f r i e n d s and e n e m i e s ,  project  p o w e r , and h a v e a d e t e r r e n t  resolve  to states.  behavior of other  prestige,  increase  provide  and e n h a n c e d  serves to c l a r i f y the they provide a  state's  a clear-  ability  to  value  i n s i g n a l l i n g commitment a n d  An a l l i a n c e c a n a l s o  s e r v e as a r e s t r a i n t on t h e  states  (Shroeder,  1977;  Moul,  1983).  even a p o t e n -  t tial  p r e p o n d e r a n t , by r e d u c i n g  the degree of threat  and  c o n t r o l l i n g any a g g r e s s i v e  intentions  ly,  i n a s i t u a t i o n w h e r e war i s p e r c e i v e d  this  s p o i l s of v i c t o r y , while The c o s t s  discussion al  cost  e n t a i l e d by  of b e n e f i t s  ensuring  the  which  nature  of  bonding with  to the formation option,  of  a superior  benefit  states  in redressing  counter-alliance. to share  i f the state's  An a d d i t i o n -  another  state.  A s t a t e which values the drawn  into  a conflict in  an a l l i a n c e may  lead  As i n t h e c a s e o f t h e i n t e r n a l to a l l i a n c e formation  may  i n e q u a l i t y due t o t h e  Finally,  i n the  predictions  itself  i n the  t h e r e l a t i o n s h i p may be  Initiating  of counter-alliances.  war a n d t h e d e s i r e aster  interests.  the reaction of other  mine t h e i n i t i a l  purposes.  e l s e may f i n d  i t h a s no i n t r i n s i c  dealt with  from t h e i n t e r n a l o p t i o n .  f o r other  r e l a t i o n s h i p above a l l  an a l l i a n c e w i t h  its survival.  D e p e n d i n g on t h e t y p e o f a l l i a n c e c o m m i t m e n t , m a n i p u l a t e d by an a l l y  Final-  f o r t h e weak t o s h a r e i n  alliances are p a r t i a l l y  accrued  r e s u l t s from  Power may h a v e .  as l i k e l y ,  a p r e p o n d e r a n t Power p r o v i d e s an o p p o r t u n i t y the  i n i t s environment  under-  formation  t h e s i t u a t i o n of impending  s p o i l s o f v i c t o r y may  lead  to dis-  about t h e outcome a r e i n c o r r e c t .  67  As  i n d i c a t e d i n t h e above d i s c u s s i o n , e l i t e  response to d i s t r i b u t i o n a l blematic.  Although  costs of the other, world  rationally  either/or  undertake  detailed  there  weigh  decision.  which e l i t e s To  the  In  examination  elites  any c a s e ,  over  the  distribution  for state  some d e g r e e  behavior,  i n the a n a l y s i s ,  and  mirror the i n the real  are led  t o an  the s i t u a t i o n i n  require,  at  a minimum,  state's foreign policy,  Balance  time.  variables.  Furthermore,it  over  time  Finally,  and i t s whether  no e f f e c t on t h e a n a l y s i s .  of c a p a b i l i t i e s the internal although  economic  o f Power t h e o r y w i t h i t s  patterns of behavior  has  a  d i s p o s i t i o n s and b i a s e s o f  period of  d o m e s t i c and i d i o s y n c r a t i c  identifying  that e l i t e s  and p r o -  a r e not r e l e v a n t t o t h i s a n a l y s i s .  a small  options  complex  explanations of  the scope of  e x p l a i n i n g general  i n terms of a  partially  together  and t h e p e r s o n n e l  c h o o s e one o r b o t h  variable  two o p t i o n s  o f an i n d i v i d u a l  e n t a i l s movement b e y o n d  neglect of  evidence  e x p l a n a t i o n would  select decision-makers  on  i s no c l e a r  choose between o p t i o n s s u c h an  are extremely  b e n e f i t s o f one o p t i o n  the  s t r u c t u r e and c o n d i t i o n ,  focus  inequality  decisions  i t  as t h e  option  In  key e x p l a n a t o r y  i s incorporated to  i s not analyzed  i n any s y s -  temat i c manner.  Any  measure of t h e d i s t r i b u t i o n  state capabilities. independent v a r i a b l e . tributional relation there  is  conscious  equality  As a r e s u l t ,  the internal  option  i s part of the  T h u s , movement away f r o m a n d b a c k t o w a r d s i s an i n d i r e c t  to the resources no means t o  i s b a s e d on i n d i c a t o r s r e p r e s e n t i n g  devoted  measure o f i n t e r n a l  to security.  a s c e r t a i n whether changes  d e c i s i o n by o n e o r s e v e r a l G r e a t  dis-  behavior  It i s indirect  because  are a function  Powers t o i n c r e a s e  in  of a  security  68 resources. decision  2.3  In c o n t r a s t ,  the property of a conscious  more t h a n o n e  actor.  HYPOTHESES  ry,  two i s s u e s  who a l l y  Our  t h e hypotheses used  require  together  towards a  and t h e  particular  concern  i s with  to test  brief discussion.  the  a r e beyond  general  c a p a b i l i t i e s and t h e p r e s e n c e o f a l l i a n c e s  'balance'  the strong,  when p r e p o n d e r a n c e  s u c h an  alliance predilection. weak w i l l  ally  'bandwagon' w i t h share ing'  the  this  Moreover,  to 'balance'  The  which  the r e l a t i o n s h i p  presence of a l l i a n c e s  represents a unique  i n the system. will  ally  Although  with  t h e weak  i s 1 i k e l y 'to. r e s u l t o n l y  In s i t u a t i o n s  o f an a m b i g i n d i c a t i o n of  i t may n o t a l w a y s be t h e c a s e  the strong.  Some s t a t e s  influence  between t h e i s a clear  issue.  It  the a l l i a n c e  that  may o p t t o and  question of 'balancing' versus  contribution  analysis.  between t h e d i s t r i b u t i o n  t h e t h e o r y p r o v i d e s no c l e a r  a separate theoretical  for other variables trast,  occurrence  states  predilections  t h e s t r o n g a s a means t o e n s u r e s u r v i v a l  i n any s p o i l s . i s largely  individual  states  i s a c h i e v e d by a s t a t e .  uous d e g r e e o f i n e q u a l i t y ,  the  that  theo-  the s p e c i f i c  the scope of  relationship  indicates  B a l a n c e o f Power  First,  reasons u n d e r l y i n g  partner  B a l a n c e o f Power t h e o r y to  contain  simply because they r e q u i r e  Before o u t l i n i n g  of  alliances  possibly  'bandwagon-  e n t a i l s a concern  decision.  In c o n -  d i s t r i b u t i o n o f c a p a b i l i t i e s and o f B a l a n c e o f Power t h e o r y .  t o an u n d e r s t a n d i n g  of state  It  behav-  i or.  The  second  issue  concerns  t h e o b s e r v a t i o n s used  t r i b u t i o n of c a p a b i l i t i e s at yearly  intervals.  t o measure t h e d i s F o r many s c h o l a r s i n  69  this  area of research,  alliances ers  in  observations are adjusted  among t h e G r e a t P o w e r s .  a l l i a n c e are aggregated  struction  f o r the existence of  The c a p a b i l i t i e s o f two G r e a t t o form  o f the d i s t r i b u t i o n measure.  one o b s e r v a t i o n Theoretically,  in  the con-  elites  a r e con-  cerned with  the aggregate c a p a b i l i t i e s of a l l i a n c e c l u s t e r s .  the  motivation  initial  Power t h e o r y , Powers. tor  a function  ity  is vital  to ensure that  may n o t be e x p l i c a b l e  apparent  distribution this  of  analysis.  r e s p o n s e t o an that equality  states  i s a clear  3 4  alliances  terms  func-  alliances  a r e c o n c e i v e d as  security  as a  I t i s assumed a n d movement threat  Thus, e q u a l i t y  to indi-  should  result  They a r e d y s f u n c t i o n a l  States are unwilling  may  focus of  i n t o by s t a t e s  of increasing  i n the system.  which  between t h e  are the central  level of security,  indication  because t h e i r  Such  3 4  the r e l a t i o n s h i p  and t h e s y s t e m as a w h o l e .  B a l a n c e o f Power t e r m s . with  discussion,  the optimal  t o moni-  remain  issue,  d i s t r i b u t i o n of capabi1ities.  the absence of a l l i a n c e s  ciated  alliances  aggregation which a r e entered  provides  away f r o m e q u a l i t y vidual  i n B a l a n c e o f Power  In B a l a n c e o f Power t h e o r y ,  unequal  continue  The d e g r e e o f e q u a 1 i t y / i n e q u a 1 -  c a p a b i l i t i e s and a l l i a n c e s  agents of c a p a b i l i t y  to Balance of  c a p a b i l i t i e s of Great  i s a separate theoretical  i n t h e above  However,  G r e a t Power p e r s p e c t i v e .  a state's  i n t h e B a l a n c e o f Power s e n s e .  between a 11iance groups  As  according  of the individual  t h e d i s t r i b u t i o n f r o m an i n d i v i d u a l  tional  in  creation,  I t i s r e a s o n a b l e t o assume t h a t e l i t e s w i l l  monitoring  or  is  for alliance  Pow-  t o bear  the costs  i s at i t s optimal  in  assolevel.  T h e c o r e o f t h i s p r o b l e m i s n o t e d i n C h a p t e r One. Morgenthau and O r g a n s k i d i f f e r on whether a l l i a n c e s produce e q u a l i t y or i n e q u a l i ty. The former a r g u e s t h a t a l l i a n c e s a r e sought t o c r e a t e e q u a l i t y in a s i t u a t i o n of i n e q u a l i t y whereas t h e l a t e r argues t h a t such a l l i a n c e s simply a l t e r the actor/s that are preponderant.  70  As  i n e q u a l i t y appears,  sought to o f f s e t position either  state security  this decline.  improves r e l a t i v e  spread w i t h i n  Thus,  number o f  the  d e g r e e of  As  the  dicted er  number o f  i n the  insecurity,  ments.  At  low  vague/general efits  of  defection  on  coordination the  de  of  and  costs  goals,  in  defined al1iance a l s o be  an  ally.  This  the  o f f s e t by of  Singer  and  commitment, positively  Small the  to  their  al1iance  seek o n l y receive  and  costs  thus  used.  (1972), number o f  commit-  partial  against  ben-  the  greater  identification result.  The inter-  s e c u r i t y stemming from identification  Given  that defence the  defence pacts  a  possible  entail  force w i l l  represent  or  e n t a i l e d by  the  r e l a t e d to d i s t r i b u t i o n a l  great-  insecurity rises,  to guard  of  pre-  imprecise  the  commitment w i l l  enhanced and  the  is also  e s p e c i a l l y r e l a t e d to other  capabilities be  related  a change  greater  combined use  the  alli-  i n e q u a l i t y produces  they  the  to  system.  relationships  such commitment,  which force w i l l by  avoid  a means  i n e q u a l i t y appears.  among a 1 1 i a n c e members and  in which  are  to form  tendency  to formalize  inequality,  formalized  facto aggregation  tions  As  policy  of  The  is d i r e c t l y  As  In so d o i n g ,  s e c u r i t y , but  p a r t of  conditions  greater ests  the  as  i n e q u a l i t y , s t a t e s may  commitments.  are  alliances  a l l i a n c e s or  in a l l i a n c e increase,  seek  alliances  consider  greater  in a l l i a n c e  will  l e v e l s of  desire  as  a l l i a n c e s formed.  commitment.  states will  system  and  Power w h o s e i n d i v i d u a l  will  forming  i n e q u a l i t y i n the  states  states  increased  formalized  of  states  type of  others  from o t h e r s . the  distributional  all  states  deny a s t a t e ' s c a p a b i l i t i e s ances w i l l  Even a G r e a t  to  in response to other  declines  the  in  the  inequality.  condi-  pacts,  strongest  level  system In a  the  as of will  compar-  71  ati.ve the  sense, defence pacts are expected  d i s t r i b u t i o n than a l l i a n c e s  The  final  phenomenon  capabilities defined  by  concerns  structure  is  generally  system.  Putting  changes  polarized the  system p e r s p e c t i v e  exclusive is  clusters  tied formally  ized  system  exhibits  Given that p o l a r i z a t i o n  polarization torically, XIV, an  are a will the  Napoleon, attempt  should  levels  the  foundation for  the with  i n the  Five),  highly  (see Chapter  t h e p r e s e n c e o f two  of  level,  a  from  o r more m u t u a l l y  Every s t a t e  of a l l i a n c e s  the d i s t r i b u t i o n ,  t o the  state  p a t t e r n s produced  to  alter  the presence of  of i n e q u a l i t y ,  a potential system  problems  i n the system A non-polarclusters.  and t h e p r e s e n c e i tfollows  that  of the d i s t r i b u t i o n .  His-  during  the eras  and H i t l e r a r e examples o f p o l a r i z a t i o n  low  with  methodological  a myriad of p a t t e r n s .  be r e l a t e d  not neglect  as This  p a t t e r n o f a l l i a n c e commitments  i s a function  by t h e s e a c t o r s  of  i n the  as t h e a b s e n c e o f any a l l i a n c e  function  alliance  system  alliances.  t o one, and o n l y one, o f t h e c l u s t e r s .  lies  to  degree of p o l a r i z a t i o n  in alliance.  is conceptualized  alliances  and  distribution  of the  existence of  as t h e  when t h e  unequal  structure  f o r t h e moment  of states  Between t h e s e extremes  of  an  the  by t h e  aside conceptual  system e x i s t s  from  in  defined  l i t e r a t u r e on p o l a r i z a t i o n  related  as a a whole.  resulting  p a t t e r n s produced  t o be more s t r o n g l y  states  the s t a t e  may s e e k  informal  t h e f u t u r e o r e v e n s e e k some  explanation.  At  commitments t o l a y relationship  i t s behavior.  p r o d u c e d may be o n e o f s e v e r a l  l i n k s b e t w e e n members o f t h e c l u s t e r s .  from  a l t h o u g h one  form of  p r e p o n d e r a n t a s a means t o r e s t r a i n the pattern  resulting  system,  war a s a r e l a t e d  of Louis  As i n e q u a l i t y  At  clusters increases,  72 the  threat  for  formalized  of  any  t o t h e s y s t e m and  ance  commitments.  contradictory  confidence  alliance  p o l a r i z a t i o n of  and  the system.  the presence of  In c o n c l u s i o n , ing.  Two  theory.  In  to  the  degree  of  alli-  to which  states  'bandwagoning', polarization  relationship  dissolution  respective  the c l u s t e r  or  a demand  provide a  t o meet t h e i r  effect,  leads is  to the  a  natural  between d i s t r i b u t i o n a l  ine-  alliances.  three hypotheses  of the hypotheses The  of s t a t e s  'balancing'  byproduct of the fundamental quality  relationships  In s u c h a s i t u a t i o n ,  i n the sense of  members c r e a t e  These commitments e n t a i l  in the w i l l i n g n e s s  commitments.  adhere,  i t s individual  are  are  i d e n t i f i e d for empirical  test-  drawn d i r e c t l y from B a l a n c e of  third hypothesis, polarization,  is linked  to the  Power  theory,  although  t h e t h e o r y a s p r e s e n t e d d o e s n o t c o v e r t h e phenomenon d i r e c t -  ly.  hypotheses  The  are;  H I : T h e r e i s a d i r e c t o r p o s i t i v e r e l a t i o n s h i p b e t w e e n an u n e q u a l d i s t r i b u t i o n o f c a p a b i l i t i e s and t h e p r e s e n c e o f a l l i a n c e s . H2:  T h e r e i s a p o s i t i v e r e l a t i o n s h i p b e t w e e n i n e q u a 1 i t y and t h e t y p e o f a l l i a n c e c o m m i t m e n t . As i n e q u a l i t y i n c r e a s e s , the number o f d e f e n c e p a c t s i n t h e s y s t e m w i l l increase.  H3:  T h e r e i s a p o s i t i v e r e l a t i o n s h i p b e t w e e n i n e q u a l i t y and s y s t e m p o l a r i z a t i o n . As i n e q u a l i t y i n c r e a s e s , two m u t u a l l y exclusive a l l i a n c e c l u s t e r s w i l l appear i n the system.  There  are  several  major  have been  avoided in t h i s  subsequent  chapters.  ability over  that  time.  conceptual discussion.  However, a f i n a l  the above r e l a t i o n s h i p s The  and  e x i s t e n c e of such a  operational  They  will  consideration  will  n o t be  l a g i s due  issues  be d e a l t relates  immediate, to  which with  to prob-  but  several  in  appear  factors.  73 The r e c o g n i t i o n o f likely and  t o be g r a d u a l  assess  entail  dicted  i n the d i s t r i b u t i o n  in nature.  associated. with  m u s t be t e s t e d  general identify  trend i s the trend  E l i t e s must a l s o w e i g h t h e  t h e two o p t i o n s .  n e g o t i a t i o n s which a r e time consuming.  behavior  as a  E l i t e s must f i r s t  whether or not i t i s permanent.  b e n e f i t s and c o s t s es  changes  Finally,  allianc-  Therefore,  the pre-  f o r the presence of a time l a g .  Chapter  III  ESTABLISHING THE BOUNDARIES OF ANALYSIS  The  question  Boundaries  of boundaries  s e t the parameters  t i o n a l i z a t i on.  is vital for  Naturally,  f o r any  empirical  analysis.  d a t a c o l 1 e c t i o n and v a r i a b l e  boundary  i d e n t i f i c a t i o n may s i m p l y  f u n c t i o n of data a v a i l a b i l i t y .  In t h i s s t u d y , d a t a o n s t a t e  ties,  o f War p r o j e c t ,  drawn from  the C o r r e l a t e s  post  l8l6 e r a .  tial  l i m i t s which  erations. that  The  f o r the  the a n a l y s i s . Europe,  the study to the  r e m a i n i n g b o u n d a r i e s , t h e c o n c l u d i n g y e a r and  considerations  resulting analysis  spurious.  limit  are function  and  study,  i n f l u e n c e of n o n - i n c l u d e d or S t a t e membership,  i s a function  o f t h e need  f i n d i n g s are r e l i a b l e ,  c o n c l u d i n g year o f t h i s  1939.  35  background  restricted largely  ofsecurity  interdependence  be a  capabi1i-  i n d i c a t e s t a t e membership, f o l l o w from o t h e r  These  the  concern  The  opera-  spa-  consid-  to  ensure  rather i s based  than on a  v a r i a b l e s on to  which  geographic is  a t the  h e a r t o f B a l a n c e o f Power t h e o r y .  A final  concern,  treatments o f time to  1939-  tified and  3 5  in t h i s regard, within  stems  from e x i s t i n g  the g e n e r a l b o u n d a r i e s o f Europe from  These are the v a r i o u s p e r i o d s o r temporal  i n the l i t e r a t u r e .  historical  These p e r i o d s are found  international relations texts,  and  sub-systems in both  are a f u n c t i o n  l8l6 iden-  historical  of a v a r i e t y o f  The r a t i o n a l e f o r e n d i n g t h e s t u d y i n 1939 a c t u a l l y is related to key s t r u c t u r a l c h a n g e s i n t h e i n t e r n a t i o n a l system f o l l o w i n g World War One. 1939. r a t h e r t h a n 19^5. i s c h o s e n b e c a u s e o f t h e l a c k o f d a t a on s t a t e c a p a b i l i t i e s d u r i n g t h e war. S i m i l a r l y , the years 1914 t o 1918 a r e a l s o e x c l u d e d . -  7k  -  75  theoretical general  While  century  these  f o r understanding  testing  regarding  t o Balance  short,  o f Power  three  some d i s a g r e e m e n t , a  temporal  for  restricting  the  task  their  key p e r i o d s  the Nineteenth  application  of Balance  o f Power  c a n be theory. provide  themselves,  rela-  theory.  in this  chapter.  first  The s e c o n d e n c o m p a s s e s t h e r a t i o n a l e  the the United  S t a t e s and  in  general,  Japan  to the choice of periods which  these  The  o f key background v a r i a b l e s w h i c h v a l i d a t e  in conjunction with  In f u l f i l l i n g  t h e v a r i a b l e s and  of the p e r i o d s  a n a l y s i s t o European s t a t e s  relates  separately,  tem.  the u t i l i t y  tasks a r e undertaken  reasons f o r excluding third  i n d u r a t i o n from  in length,  b o u n d a r y o f 1939-  the  lyzed  range  the u t i l i t y  concerns the i d e n t i f i c a t i o n  The  Despite  the hypotheses w i t h i n these v a r i o u s periods w i l l  some e v i d e n c e  In  periods  as a w h o l e t o two d e c a d e s  beneficial  tive  concerns.  c o n s e n s u s on t h e e x i s t e n c e a n d d u r a t i o n o f c e r t a i n  exists.  Also,  and m e t h o d o l o g i c a l  and t h e  in particular. should  be a n a -  t h e a n a l y s i s on t h e e n t i r e  sys-  t a s k s , the subsequent o p e r a t i o n a l i z a t i o n of  statistical  analysis will  have a  greater degree of  reli abli ty.  3.1  TEMPORAL  Any  BOUNDARIES, POLARITY AND NUCLEAR WEAPONS  research  ence o f  endeavour  m u s t be c o n c e r n e d w i t h  background v a r i a b l e s .  The  failure  these v a r i a b l e s can lead t o spurious for  dealing with  argues that choosing  findings.  the possible  to identify  a sufficient  body o f t i m e  v a r i a b l e s c a n be  and s p a c e .  and c o n t r o l  T h e r e a r e two m e t h o d s  the problem of background v a r i a b l e s .  the e f f e c t of background  influ-  Levy  (1985:43)  c o n t r o l l e d by  This choice  serves to  76  randomize t h e i n f l u e n c e o f these v a r i a b l e s . that  a small  discrete  body o f t i m e and s p a c e s h o u l d  which background v a r i a b l e s limits  of t h e study.  Concerning ficient  time span  approach, data  of time.  and data  More  set  background v a r i a b l e s . lates ment set  o f War d a t a i s based  on  therelatively  Final1y  3  reliablity may  (I816-I98O)  set  I t i s unclear  sufficient. '  The  1966) .  3  certain costs.  i t i s unclear  t h e time span  the remaining  phenomena a t  how l a r g e a  time  However, h i s  span  argu-  i n the data weap-  (1816> — 19^+5)  is  s e t may u n d e r m i n e t h e  phenomena. different  of  of the Corre-  t h e emergence o f n u c l e a r  a l a r g e time span and d a t a  different  to define the  span o f b i p o l a r i t y  congruence w i t h whether  and s e r v e  is insufficient. short  be i d e n t i f i e d i n  t o ensure t h e randomization  that  of indicators to represent  represent  Alker,  importantly,  argues  argues  may n o t be a v a i l a b l e f o r a s u f -  i s necessary Levy  and it's h i s t o r i c a l  ons.  constant  Each a p p r o a c h c o n t a i n s  thef i r s t  period  areheld  (1986:31)  Saunders  T h e same i n d i c a t o r  points  i n time.  (see  7  use o f a small  generate statements generalizations,  t i m e span and d a t a which  have w i d e r  arerestricted  no means t o a s c e r t a i n t h e i r  set undermines t h ea b i l i t y t o  applicability.  to the period  general  utility.  Findings,  and  under e x a m i n a t i o n  with  Also,  s u c h an a p p r o a c h  3 6  Levy u s e s a much l a r g e r time span t o examine t h e r e l a t i o n s h i p between p o l a r i t y and s t a b i l i t y . I n s o d o i n g , he i d e n t i f i e s s e v e r a l d i f f e r e n t eras of p o l a r i t y . However, the main p r o b l e m w i t h L e v y ' s view l i e s i nhis d e f i n i t i o n and o p e r a t i o n a 1 i z a t i o n o f p o l a r i t y . This problem i s discussed a t l a t e r point i n t h i s s e c t i o n .  3 1  T h i s p r o b l e m i s known i n t h e l i t e r a t u r e a s s t a t i s t i c a l non-additivity (Alker, 1964). The s t a t i s t i c a l m a n i f e s t a t i o n o f t h i s p r o b l e m is noted i n the data a n a l y s i s p a r t o f t h i s study, e s p e c i a l l y as i t r e l a t e s t o theaggregation of various sub-systems or h i s t o r i c a l p e r i ods - t o g e t h e r .  77 is  inadequate  for testing  behavior,  and c o n f l i c t s  discipline  as a w h o l e .  key b a c k g r o u n d  hypotheses with  the nomothetic  Finally,  variables  t o t h e temporal  i s a system focuses  based  Moreover,  informs t h i s  social  systems  theory  l e a d s t o an 'a p r i o r i  internal  Rather,  capabilities  external  i scentral,  approach  variables  forms  of states  results  from a m u l t i p o l a r  behavior.  p o l i t i c a l and This  type of  factors  does n o t  h a v e no that  cabinet diplomacy,  are  played a  role i n  the d i s t r i b u t i o n of  ensures  Furthermore, the that  the influence  t o be e v e n t s p e c i f i c , In t h e a b o v e  case,  will  have  t h e Levy  i s found.  1  c o n c l u s i o n o f t h e s t u d y : 1939-  from t h e  imply  i nwhich  1816-1939.  A t t h e same t i m e , t h e S a u n d e r s  environment  This  a r e assumed t o p r e d o m i n a t e .  on t h e a n a l y s i s .  t o background  internal  have a l w a y s  factors,  f a c t o r s , which a r e l i k e l y  no s y s t e m a t i c a f f e c t  that  t h e heyday o f  adoption of a large time span, internal  internal  1986:44).  behavior.  rela-  theory which  inexplaining  (Garnett,  Such f a c t o r s  follows  t o t h a t body o f  assumption  during  irrelevant.  behavior.  1  on s t a t e  even  to identify the  B a l a n c e o f Power t h e o r y  to the state  behave s i m i l a r l y  factors,  completely  of  analysis.  I tbelongs  external  influence  t h e f i e l d and  legitimizes the  whose e x c l u s i o n a l s o  i t e x p l a i n s why s t a t e s w i t h d i f f e r e n t  systematic  patterns of  The Levy a p p r o a c h ,  span o f t h e s t u d y as a whole,  theory.  on f a c t o r s  thrust of  i t may be d i f f i c u l t  i s adopted.  exclusion of certain variables, type of theory which  to general  t o be h e l d c o n s t a n t .  A m i x o f t h e two a p p r o a c h e s tive  related  approach  A major from World  structure  i s a l s o used  transformation War Two.  to a bipolar  one.  to define the  i n the external  The system Also,  trans-  t h e emer-  78  gence o f adjust  the d i s t r i b u t i o n  elites  to  logical which  n u c l e a r weapons a l t e r s  calculate  ability  to test  alliances  i t .  To i n c l u d e  independent  System  structure  state behavior  from  is  affects  relatively  the  a primary  variable  and t e c h n o from  Structure  i s defined  level  as the arrangement  undermine our  in  the understanding In f a c t ,  are structural  of system  32).  The v e r t i c a l I t i s based  l y on t h e b a s i s o f c a p a b i l i t i e s , conceptualized with  explicit  top of the h i e r a r c h y ; defined  in  largely  concerned with  ances  among  patterns.  terms o f  actors  in nature. in relation  As w i t h  and i s c o m p a r a t i v e  reference to the  the Great Powers.  the v e r t i c a l  in nature.  usual3 8  Iti s  subset of states a t the  states.  This  dimension i s dimension i s  r e l a t i o n s h i p s or  alli-  i t can i n c l u d e economic  and/or  social  dimension, the central  concern  i sthe  G r e a t P o w e r s and l i n k a g e p a t t e r n s among  3 8  is the hierarchical  The h o r i z o n t a l  the pattern of p o l i t i c a l although  and h o r -  on t h e r a n k i n g o f s t a t e s ,  t h e l i n k a g e s among  states,,  dimension  of  the bulk of  t o one a n o t h e r and c o n c e p t u a l i z e d i n two d i m e n s i o n s ; v e r t i c a l  s t r u c t u r e of the system.  that  t h e d i s t r i b u t i o n and  1979).  Waltz,  examinations a t the system's  ( R a y , 1980:  of  t h e e f f e c t s o f s t r u c t u r e and t e c h n o l o g y .  empirical  izontal  means t o  ability  unique  i t i n the a n a l y s i s would  r e l a t i o n s h i p between  1968;  (Young,  f o r c e as a  This structural  c r e a t e s a system  the 'true'  of  fundamentally  the d i s t r i b u t i o n .  transformation  precedes  and  the u t i l i t y  them.  In t h i s c a s e , c o m p a r a t i v e r e f e r s t o t h e c o n s t r u c t i o n o f r a n k o r d e r s due t o t h e n a t u r e o f t h e d a t a and a p p l i e d method. The r a n k o f any i n d i v i d u a l s t a t e depends on t h e s c o r e s o f a l l o t h e r s t a t e s .  79  Polarity However, tion  there  i<s no c o n s e n s u s  of polarity  ferent of  i s the dominant concept  elements  polarity  limit  chiefly  because  strict  system's  hierarchy  reference  bilities doing, The  among system  final  dimensions ligned  defines  3  ior. the  polarity  definition  key background  Power  3 5  defines  so d o i n g ,  polarity  i s the  among a l l a c t o r s w i t h i n a In c o n t r a s t ,  the v e r t i c a l  equated  o f capa-  hierarchy.  encompasses both  and a l l i a n c e s  polar-  of states a t the topof the  t o t h e number o f  Great  i n so Powers.  and  horizontal  t o t h e number  o f non-a-  between Great  Powers  (Haas,  1970;  1973)-  represents  a potential explanation  variable.  The o t h e r  of s t r u c t u r e which  for thef i e l d  definitions  on t h e b a s i s o f t h e d i s t r i b u t i o n  H o w e v e r , f o r r e a s o n s shown b e l o w ,  only  (1979)  t o t h e number o f G r e a t P o w e r s .  Polarity  dif-  two d e f i n i t i o n s  i s not equal  structure.  G r e a t Powers  arate elements  Three  t h e s t a t e s a t t h e top o f t h e system's  Bueno d e M e s q u i t a ,  Each  Waltz  of c a p a b i l i t i e s  polarity  definition of  dimension.  structure.  incorporate  The f i r s t  o f c a p a b i 1 i t i e s . ' In  and i s i d e n t i c a l  (1985)  of s t r u c t u r e .  t o t h e number  function of thed i s t r i b u t i o n  Levy  scholars  i n the literature.  t o the v e r t i c a l  ity with  system,  different  system  and o p e r a t i o n a 1 i z a -  on t h e d e f i n i t i o n  o f t h e two d i m e n s i o n s  dominate  polarity  representing  as a whole,  leads  only  f o r s t a t e behav-  thef i r s t definition i s  two d e f i n i t i o n s t o conceptual  i n t e g r a t e sepconfusion,  not  but a l s o f o r examinations of Balance of  theory.  W a l t z , however, does n o t o p e r a t i o n a l i z e p o l a r i t y s t r i c t l y a c c o r d i n g t o t h e number o f G r e a t P o w e r s . He u s e s a o r d i n a l s c a l e i n w h i c h no d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n i s made b e t w e e n s y s t e m s w i t h t h r e e o r more G r e a t Powers. As H a r t (1985:25) p o i n t s o u t , t h i s i s t h e o r t h o d o x t r e a t ment of. p o l a r i t y .  8o Beginning with there with  thef i r s t  i s a consensus changes  i n thef i e l d  i n t h e number o f  argues t h a t changes of  definition,  alliances.  bilities alliances  tribution in  his  argument w i t h  In s o d o i n g ,  of capabilities  t h e number,  type,  lead  the  to spurious could  vary  (19&7)  the function  distribution or bipolar  Lesser  distribution  no r e l a t i o n s h i p  and a l l i a n c e s  ina bipolar  states  (mul-  of capasystem, do n o t  between t h e two  independent from changes  findings. be a l t e r e d  The s t r e n g t h by t h e f a i l u r e  to  system.  i n the  and d i r e c t i o n  Changes  i na  bipolar  distribution.  and m u l t i p o l a r  to control  Balance of  between t h e d i s -  pattern of alliances  combining o b s e r v a t i o n s from a b i p o l a r  tionship  outcomes Waltz  e x p l i c i t reference  he p o s i t s  and g e n e r a l  system a r e s t a t i s t i c a l l y Thus,  an u n e q u a l  function.  to alter  that  0  Waltz phrases Power t h e o r y .  Earlier,  In a two power  c a n no l o n g e r s e r v e t h i s  Powers.*  international  reports  t h r e e o r more G r e a t P o w e r s  to alter  among t h e G r e a t P o w e r s .  capabilities  (1979)  o f G r e a t Powers a l t e r s  In a s y s t e m c o n t a i n i n g  have s u f f i c i e n t Great  that  Great Powers.  i n t h e number  t i p o l a r ) , a l 1 i ances f u n c t i o n  Waltz  s y s t e m may  of the r e l a for  structural  change.  4 0  R o t h s t e i n (1968) notes that lesser state c a p a b i l i t i e s may become relevant insituations where the d i s t r i b u t i o n i s n o t t o o wide b e t w e e n two p o w e r s . For example, i n a f i v e Power system where there i s a wide c a p a b i l i t y g a p b e t w e e n t h e t o p two a n d t h e b o t t o m t h r e e a n d w h e r e t h e t o p two d i f f e r e n c e i s s l i g h t , the c a p a b i l i t i e s of l e s s e r s t a t e s may become v i t a l . This case provides a further reason for including the lesser states. However, i n g e n e r a l , l e s s e r s t a t e c a p a b i l i t i e s , by d e f i n i t i o n , c a n n o t h a v e a m a j o r i m p a c t o n t h e d i s t r i b u t i on.  81  Polarity,  i n t h e second  definition,  i s largely  independent of t h e  number o f G r e a t P o w e r s a n d b a s e d o n l y o n how c a p a b i l i t i e s uted  among them.  t a s k a t hand.  separate out theeffect  sense from our independent v a r i a b l e bilities  ty  which  among t h e G r e a t P o w e r s .  background  has 1 i t t 1 e u t i 1 i t y  However, t h i s d e f i n i t i o n One c a n n o t  variable.  Also,  4 1  As  such,  thespecific  toidentify  problems  over a l a r g e  of r e l i a b i l i t y  1985:109). unipolar  polarity  For example,  ignores  and  f o r the  of polarity  i s thed i s t r i b u t i o n  in this of capa-  i t i s not an independent  means t o d i s t i n g u i s h  f r o m t h e G r e a t Power s e t i s p r o b l e m a t i c .  tor  are distrib-  polari-  Levy uses a s o f t  period  of time,  intersubjective  which  agreement  indicaleads t o (Wallace,  h i si d e n t i f i c a t i o n of theNapoleonic e r a as  thec a p a b i l i t i e s  and r o l e s  o f R u s s i a and G r e a t  Brit-  ain.  The  third  definition,  i n which  l i n k a g e s among t h e G r e a t P o w e r s , cal  problems  notwithstanding  p a r t o f o u r dependent the  relationships tually, al  4 1  4 2  our a b i l i t y  this definition aligned  identical  i s adjusted  inappropriate.  alliances.  1985) »  influences  for alliance Methodologi-  polarity  Similar  t o examine c l e a r l y  s e p a r a t e from background  G r e a t Powers  turally  i salso  (see Wallace,  variable;  second d e f i n i t i o n ,  polarity  includes  t o t h ecase f o r our hypothesized  i snegated.  Concep-  leads t o t h e treatment o f a system w i t h into  two m u t u a l l y  t o a system  exclusive  containing only  groups  two G r e a t  sever-  as s t r u c Powers.  4 2  In e f f e c t , t h e r e l a t i o n s h i p between t h i s d e f i n i t i o n and o u r i n d e pendent v a r i a b l e i s theconceptual equivalent of the s t a t i s t i c a l phenomenon o f m u l t i c o l 1 i n e a r i t y . For a discussion of m u l t i c o l l i n e a r i t y , s e e B l a l o c k (1964:87-90) . As L e v y 0985:47-48) p o i n t s o u t , t i o n leads t o a c h a r a c t e r i z a t i o n 1946-1965 a s t i g h t bipolar.  Haas (1970) use of t h i s d e f i n i o f b o t h t h e p e r i o d 1891—1918 a n d 1  82 A l l i a n c e groups are  t r e a t e d as n a t i o n a l  d i f f e r e n c e s between t h e m . with  Finally,  polarity  t h e c o n c e p t o f p o l a r i z a t i o n as  clusion,  the  importance of  e x p l a i n i n g war,  should  used to r e p r e s e n t to  4 3  conceptual  In  adopting  Powers  is  two  defined  not be i g n o r e d .  confusion.  Waltz's  conception h a v e an  i n m u l t i p o l a r and  from these will  two  undermine  distinct  sense  collides In c o n -  e s p e c i a l l y when  polarity  phenomena.  the  should  not be  To do so  leads  4 4  of  polarity,  independent  G r e a t P o w e r s , as w e l l a s l e s s e r s t a t e s , ently  for  i n C h a p t e r Two.  But,  structural  regard  in this  alliance configurations,  separate  assumed t o  actors without  b i p o l a r systems. structural  the v a l i d i t y of  the  t h e number  e f f e c t on s t a t e  of  behavior.  a r e assumed t o b e h a v e Thus,  environments  to take in  Great  differ-  observations  a single analysis  subsequent f i n d i n g s .  One  could  4 3  F e d d e r (1968) c o r r e c t l y a r g u e s t h a t a s t a t e e n t e r i n g i n t o a n a l l i ance does not t r a n s f o r m into a c o a l i t i o n actor. Such a s t a t e retains i t s individuality. A l l i a n c e s are o n l y a type of b e h a v i o r and o n l y t h r o u g h r e i f i c a t i o n c a n t h e y b e t r e a t e d as a c t o r s .  4 4  H o w e v e r , a f u r t h e r p r o b l e m e x i s t s w h i c h i s n o t d i r e c t l y germane t o t h i s s t u d y b e c a u s e o f a c o n s t a n c y i n t h e number o f G r e a t P o w e r s i n t h e s y s t e m f r o m l8l6 t o 1939» a s shown i n C h a p t e r F o u r . There i s not an e x a c t c o r r e s p o n d e n c e between t h i s d e f i n i t i o n and i t s o p e r a t i o n a l i z a t i on . For e x a m p l e , W a l t z o p e r a t i o n a 1 i z e s p o l a r i t y i n o n l y two f o r m s ; b i p o l a r i t y and m u 1 t i p o l a r i t y . In so d o i n g , m u 1 t i p o l a r i t y e n c o m p a s s e s any system c o n t a i n i n g at l e a s t t h r e e Great Powers, which i s the o r t h o d o x a p p l i c a t i o n of p o l a r i t y i n the f i e l d r e g a r d l e s s of d e f i n i t i o n ( f o r example Haas, 1970; M o d e l s k i , 1973; a n d L e v y , 1985)D e u t s c h and S i n g e r (1967) a p p e a r t o i n d i c a t e t h a t 5 i s t h e minimum number o f G r e a t Powers f o r m u 1 t i p o l a r i t y , although their concern i s with the p o l a r i t y - s t a b i l i t y issue. Bernholz (1986) r e p l a c e s m u l t i p o l a r w i t h B a l a n c e o f P o w e r , k e e p s t h e 3 Power minimum, and a p p l i e s m u l t i p o l a r t o a s y s t e m c o n t a i n i n g more t h a n 7 Powers. But, there i s reason to b e l i e v e t h a t p o l a r i t y should be a p p l i e d w i t h s p e c i f i c r e f e r e n c e to the a c t u a l number o f G r e a t Powers. To i g n o r e v a r i a t i o n s w i t h i n m u l t i p o l a r i t y c o n t r a d i c t s the consensusal b e l i e f t h a t outcomes v a r y w i t h changes i n the number o f Great Powers. A p o r t i o n o f the l i t e r a t u r e on the r e l a t i o n s h i p  83  argue  that  mental used the  structure,  control.  Both  as s e p a r a t e t e s t independent  systems,  founding  factor  weapons  on t h i n k i n g  and,  a t e a major  measurement  Powers  in which  capabilities al,  States  confronted two  span o f  the post  notes c o r r e c t l y ,  realm  t h e con-  t h e impact o f n u c l e a r conflicts  Finally,  with  certain  n u c l e a r weapons  theory  the use of force  t o r e d r e s s an u n e q u a l  i scentral.  and S o v i e t  With  second  i sprimarily  t h e advent  strike  forces  cre-  of both s t a t e s  i n gener-  force  and  i s no  War b e t w e e n t h e U n i t e d destruction  c a n be p r o v i d e d w i t h  exchange.  of  both  no r e a -  Thus, t h e t r a d i t i o n a l use state/system survival i s  by an o u t c o m e o f s t a t e / s y s t e m d e s t r u c t i o n .  G r e a t P o w e r s h a s no v a l u e b e c a u s e  the Great  d i s t r i b u t i o n of  in'particular,  theprobable  a means t o e n h a n c e s e c u r i t y  about  o f n u c l e a r weapons  inequality.  Russia entails  The c i t i z e n s  f o r c e as  time  approach i s  problem.  sonable defence from a s t r a t e g i c of  such an  Moreover,  theory.  a v i a b l e means t o r e d r e s s  societies.  War One s h o u l d b e  B a l a n c e o f Power  and i n v u l n e r a b l e  longer  short  (1985)  i n the security  o f B a l a n c e o f Power  that  Levy  o f n u c l e a r weapons.  assumptions  Recall  However,  relatively  as  post World  a s an e x p e r i -  E v i d e n c e c a n t h e n be g e n e r a t e d on  of polarity.  of the  War One p e r i o d  p r e and  environments..  effect  q u e s t i o n a b l e because World  i n t h e a b o v e s e n s e , s h o u l d be u s e d  thebenefit,  War b e t w e e n t h e  equality  and system  b e t w e e n number a n d s t a b i l i t y i n d i c a t e s t h a t t h e l a t t e r d i f f e r s i n a two, three, four, a n d f i v e power s y s t e m ( s e e D e u t s c h a n d S i n g e r , 1967; Y a l e m , 1972; S i m o w i t z , 1982: Wagner, 1986). In terms o f a l l i a n c e s , the f a i l u r e to discuss the potential influence of v a r i a t i o n s w i t h i n m u l t i p o l a r i t y i s due t o t h e assumption t h a t o n l y a l l i a n c e s among G r e a t P o w e r s a r e germane t o B a l a n c e o f Power t h e o r y . But, s i n c e t h edegree o f i n e q u a l i t y w i t h i n t h e d i s t r i b u t i o n v a r i e s , a l l i a n c e s w i t h l e s s e r s t a t e s may h a v e u t i l i t y . More i m p o r t a n t l y , t h e a d d i t i o n o r s u b t r a c t i o n o f o n e G r e a t Power i n an o v e r a l l m u l t i p o l a r s y s t e m may a f f e c t G r e a t Power a l l i a n c e p r e f e r e n c e s a n d b e h a v i or.  8k preservation,  The  Great  manner  i s a l w a y s o u t w e i g h e d by. t h e c o s t , a s s u r e d  Powers s t i l l  outlined  through  the  limited  can  lation.  to  the  use  of  the d i s t r i b u t i o n  It c o u l d should  be  increase  unfavorable appear  argued  use  t o be  of  the o n l y  effect  profitable  to the d e c l i n e i n the value  on  world  the d i s t r i b u t i o n  additional  of s e v e r a l  forces  have  any  United  S t a t e s and  of  attests  nuclear  of  has  provided i m p a c t on of  an  on  the  undermined  the  i n the  West.  b a s i s of by  the  the  territorial distribution.  territory  in  divisions  or  internal If to  states two even  i m p a c t on  Soviet Russia with  n u c l e a r weapons  this  can Great small  relation  beliefs  redress  actions, the  alliance However  i t is doubtful h a v e any Powers.  that  meaningful How  independent  massive nuclear  an  alliances  contention.  the d i s t r i b u t i o n  their  on  means t o  anything,  territory,  between the  significant  h a v e had  effect  territorial,  as a  means.  similar  effect  of  of a l l i a n c e s Outside  other  not  a major  i n the  even w i t h  of  profitable.  t h a t the  19^5  its  particularly  the a c q u i s i t i o n  longer  to  acquisition,  resources  'mania'  alliances  post  in r e l a t i o n  force,  t o have  distribution.  weapons  'goods'  esca-  territorial  the u t i l i t y  nuclear  altered  c o n f r o n t a t i o n b e t w e e n t h e P o w e r s and  f o r c e and i s no  traditional  be  Power  additional likely  can  second  even between Great  technological ,  revolution,  i n the  the  peripheries,  n u c l e a r war,  the  force  distribution  here,  i n the  f o r the  i s not  The  territory,  Even  f o r c e and  given  acquisition In sum,  of  support  nuclear  war  fear of  acceptability  Moreover,  of  lead to d i r e c t  The  domestic  theory.  politics.  A  proxies,  the  acquisition  international impact.  in  have t h e o p t i o n o f u s i n g  destruction.  can  the  nuclear  between  the  stockpiles.  85  Alliances  continue  i n f l u e n c e and  t o have v a l u e  signalling  as  c o m m i t m e n t and  deterrent posture,  but  tion  d i s c u s s i o n , see  (for a general  Naturally  an  verification imply  rejected  out  relative  simplicity  age  in  by  provides  of  actor  and  the  United  ventional cern  sions.  other  these  states  and  should  be  reveals that  the  i n the  pre-nu-  Furthermore,  problem nuclear  engen-  'balance'  1  from both  measured  the o b s e r v e r  through  an  However, t h e n u c l e a r  of  dimension  is  capabilities The  Great  both  Great  are  the d i s t i n c t i o n  high-  Power r a n k and  of  con-  P o w e r s have shown c o n -  distribution  dimensions.  and  amalgam  are a f u n c t i o n of nuclear  conventional  two  •  i n t e r p r e t e d to  alliances  measure the  capabilities.  Moreover,  distribu-  'balance .  reasonably  and  be  point for analysis.  It is true that nuclear  the n u c l e a r between  not  It simply  capabilities,  Soviet Russia  the  requires empirical  major methodological  resources.  capabilities.  relationship of  be  of  elements f o r a  Power e x p l a n a t i o n  d o e s one  traditional  S t a t e s and  f o r both  context  age,  can  element.  correlated with  How  spheres  D i n e r s t e i n , 1965)  for  age.  the conventional  industrial  a confounding  of  a l s o r e v e a l s the  perspective,  military  nuclear  a Balance  to the nuclear  1968;  Fedder,  d i s c u s s i o n should  a firmer starting  conjunction with  vital  s i g n i f i c a n t 1y a 1 t e r  Power e x p l a n a t i o n s  n u c l e a r weapons.  Prior  ly  of  resolve,  defining  e x p l a n a t i o n of a l l i a n c e s  1  o f hand f o r t h e  the d i s c u s s i o n dered  cannot  the above  that Balance  clear  they  'a p r i o r i  and  instruments  Problems  and  the  arise  between the  two  interin  the  dimen-  86 Several ess  both  second  nuclear  rank s t a t e s , Great and c o n v e n t i o n a l  n e n t s t a t e s , West Germany c a t o r s of c a p a b i l i t y , conventional  from a c a p a b i l i t y indicators  for this  In one small  state  security simply add  sense,  component o f m i l i t a r y  points  intruded to  (capabilities)  purely  in  Again,  the  nuclear  over,  4 5  weapons.  4 5  Powers  capability  capability  can ensure  a degree  age.  Nuclear  component  out:  non-sensica1".  weapons a r e not  One c a n n o t  i n the basic  "Nothing  make t r a d i t i o n a l  as r e v o l u t i o n a r y calculations  Nor c a n  research  rejecting  Balance  e m p i r i c a l evidence  focus  of  power  n u c l e a r weapons The p r o b l e m  as  be  i s simwhich,  in itself.  n o t be v i e w e d a s a r e a s o n f o r  o f Power t h e o r y .  age r e q u i r e s a s e p a r a t e  simply  equation.  of the v a r i o u s elements of s t a t e c a p a b i l i t i e s  age, r e q u i r e a major  which can inform  significant  Even a  t h e measurement p r o b l e m s h o u l d  completely  indi-  equalizer.  i n any c o n s i d e r a t i o n o f t h e d i s t r i b u t i o n .  the nuclear  promi-  the great  capabilities.  or warheads as another  the weighting  any  the a p p r o p r i a t e mix of  deterrent  n u c l e a r weapons  ply  but  possesses  i d e n t i f i c a t i o n of Great  n u c l e a r weapons a r e  (1968:112)  As R o t h s t e i n  two  n e i t h e r has n u c l e a r  unavailable i n the pre-nuclear  launchers  However,  poss-  task.  w i t h a minimum  another  ignored  and  the simple  perspective,  and C h i n a ,  rank a t t h e t o p o f economic  the former  capabilities  The p r o b l e m becomes n o t o n l y  France,  capabilities.  and J a p a n ,  but only  military  Britain,  It simply  a n a l y s i s i n i t s own  from the p r e - n u c l e a r  age may  a subsequent a n a l y s i s of the  reveals  right.  provide  nuclear  age.  that More-  insights Simply,  Although s t i 1 1 r e l a t i v e l y s m a l l when c o m p a r e d t o t h e S u p e r p o w e r s , the s i z e of Japanese c o n v e n t i o n a l f o r c e s i s i n c r e a s i n g s i g n i f i c a n t ly along w i t h i t s m i l i t a r y expenditures.  87  the  structural  complex  nuclear  exclusion of  transformation environment  from t h i s  analysis.  case f o r examining  explanation  3.2  nature  of  d i c t a t ei t s  themultipolar capabilities  system  provide a  o f B a l a n c e o f Power t h e o r y  a s an  4 6  the spatial  means t o i d e n t i f y its  own r i g h t .  players tial  little  i sv i t a l  Unfortunately,  patterns.  biased  reference the  literature  with  i svery  identifying  the spatial  to the testing  and C l i n e  for state  the question  boundary of  o f spa-  limited.  deal  (1967)  o f work h a s b e e n B u t , t h i s work i s  patterns  When i t comes Brecher  i s s u e has drawn  h y p o t h e s e s on g e n e r a l  (see Thompson, 1973).  variables.  subordinate  t h e dominant system  (1957).  As a r e s u l t ,  towards a concern f o r i n t e r a c t i o n  t o economic  issue i n  o f s t a t e s who a r e n o t r e l e v a n t  I t i s true that a great  done on r e g i o n a l s u b - s y s t e m s largely  important  as t h e  t o ensure a v i a b l e r e p r e s e n t a t i o n of the h i s -  attention in relation  behavioral  i s an  t o e s t a b l i s h adequate c r i t e r i a  i n the s e c u r i t y equation.  record.  s e c u r i t y interdependence  t h e members o f t h e s y s t e m  lead t o the i n c l u s i o n  boundaries  torical  scope o f  The f a i l u r e  membership can  4 6  static  world  and t h e  SECURITY INTERDEPENDENCE AND STATE MEMBERSHIP J_N THE SYSTEM  Identifying  of  In a one s e n s e , ,  the u t i l i t y  for alliances.  tobipolarity  of t h e contemporary  Europe and t h e r e l a t i v e l y  'best'  from m u l t i p o l a r i t y  defined  with  t o security issues,  i s concerned p r i m a r i l y  systems t o examine s t a t e b e h a v i o r  ( i . e . contemporary B i p o l a r i t y ) .  outside  Deutsch  (1978) d e f i n e s e c u r i t y s u b - s y s t e m s by a l l i a n c e  et.al. rela-  The r e f e r e n c e t o 'best' c a s e i s drawn from Prezworski and Teune 0975) • T h e y a r g u e t h a t two r e s e a r c h c h o i c e s , b e s t o r w o r s t c a s e , are a v a i l a b l e . In c h o o s i n g t h e b e s t case, one assumes t h a t an i n a b i l i t y t o r e j e c t the'null hypothesis a l l o w s one t o i n f e r t h a t t h i s i nab i 1 i t y w o u l d h o l d i n o t h e r , i . e . w o r s t c a s e , s c e n a r i o s .  88  tionships.  (1986;  F i n a l l y , Buzan  1983)  i n r e l a t i o n t o major nodes o f c o n f l i c t . on  t h e importance  there  o f geography  i s no a g r e e d upon s e t  defines While  i ndefining  of c r i t e r i a  security this  sub-systems  l i t e r a t u r e agrees  security  interdependence,  t o measure t h e l i n k a g e  between  the two.  The  i n a pol i t i c a 1/mi1itary sense,  f o c u s on s e c u r i t y ,  B a l a n c e o f Power t h e o r y .  State behavior  the  survival.  of  primary goal a state  of state  t o meet t h i s g o a l  c a p a b i l i t i e s r e l a t i v e t o other  tors  play  ments.  Also,  ments,  and c a n n o t be  such  relationship  t o basic  nomic r e l a t i o n s h i p s relationships.  security  t o markets,  needs.  o u t , for  The  i n t h e two d i m e n s i o n s ,  The  pendence  have a f f e c t e d and But,  have the  graphic.  I t i s true  that  the security benefits  e n a b l e d some s t a t e s basic  t o Buzan  (1986), e c o -  that  defining  to  the contemporary  economic  Buzan a r g u e s ,  for defining  project  interchange.  i s due  in m i l i t a r y  from  Depending on t h e t y p e o f g e o g r a p h i c  large  security  features  interde-  technology  geographic  power o v e r  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c of state  to the  relationships.  areas of s e c u r i t y  changes  derived  ele-  a secondary  o f g e o g r a p h y on p o l i t i c a l / m i l i t a r y  i sc r u c i a l .  require-  have o n l y  i s a c c o m p a n i e d by l i t t l e  c e n t r a l i t y o f geography  security  fac-  than p o l i t i c a l / m i 1 i t a r y  example,  rivalry  influence  economic  B u t , economic  According  Soviet-American  greater  mili-  i n t h e d e t e r m i n a t i o n o f any s t a t e ' s  have a d i f f e r e n t dynamic  He p o i n t s  difference  Naturally,  e n t i r e l y ignored.  as t r a d e and a c c e s s  the a b i l i t y  dependent on t h e i r  states.  from  inrelation to  represents  i n t h e d e t e r m i n a t i o n o f any s t a t e ' s  they a r e components  capabilities,  Security  and i s p r i m a r i l y  tary  a role  i sexplained  stems  location distances.  remains  geo-  which e x i s t a t  89 or w i t h i n  a state's  s t a t e surrounded  in  s t a t e s may f e e l  by mountains or  than s t a t e s which role  borders,  defining  reside the  water  has  on f l a t l a n d s .  type of  more o r  less secure.  greater  initial  Geography s t i l l  m i l i t a r y forces  security  plays  a state  A  a key  acquires  and  deploys.  The  ability  isfactory ty.  to p r o j e c t  reason for  Despite  ignoring  technological  experience a decline 1963;  ing,  capabilities  physical of  the  Soviet  the  territory  and  not  of  even the  most p o w e r f u l  states  influence  over d i s t a n c e  (Bould-  Also,  For  the  example, the  their ability  other  states  a satsecuri-  ability  be equated simply  U n i o n and  but  i s a l s o not state  198l).  should  distances  g e o g r a p h i c element of  punishment.  makes them S u p e r p o w e r s ,  long  change,  Bueno d e M e s q u i t a ,  to project  cally  the  in strength  power o v e r w i d e d i s t a n c e s ty  power o v e r  with  i t i s not  United  States  to occupy or  by v i r t u e of  to  project  the the  abilinuclear  alone which attack  their  physi-  conventional  capabi1i t i e s .  The  concept  Generally,  interdependence  characterized Waltz,  o f interdependence  1979)-  of  another. is  behavior  depending  on the  asymmetrical  between the  given  the  at  this  issue.  as a s i t u a t i o n between  states  and  the  h e a r t of  some e f f e c t  Reciprocity  capabilities  of  can one  r e l a t i o n s h i p f o r the G r e a t P o w e r s and  existence  of  1977;  Keohane,  i t r e l a t e s to the  has  individual state.  It i s a symmetrical  Furthermore,  (Nye  In s e c u r i t y t e r m s ,  any  asymmetrical  is conceived  by r e c i p r o c a l e f f e c t s  whose m i l i t a r y / p o l i t i c a l survival  lies  see  set of  on the  also states  continued  be s y m m e t r i c a l o r state  relative to  Great Powers.  a l l the  other  marked d i s p a r i t i e s  It  states.  in r e l a t i v e  90  capabilities  among s t a t e s a s a w h o l e ,  pendence f o r each s t a t e  is likely  capabi1ities  Relative  needs.  But,i t  scope of s e c u r i t y states.  As n o t e d  relative  of fer  above,  geographic  sistent with centre  t h e complex  and  referent  perceived  limits  of t h i s  historical  B a l a n c e o f Power  study  ability  to project  likely  to  produce  t h e scope dif-  limit  which point  out  Europe as t h e  politics,  and  the empirical  Moreover, with  and s u b s e r v i e n c e .  power f o r t h e m a j o r i t y  forces.  Having e s t a b l i s h e d  Thus,  two e x c e p t i o n s  the  i s limited to the states  are largely t h e European  itself.  i t must meet t h e c o n d i t i o n s area  noted  Technologically,  of states  thegeographic boundaries  These c o n d i t i o n s  i s con-  the relationship  s e c u r i t y concerns for  i d e n t i f y t h e r u l e s f o r membership.  (1972:20).  between a s t a t e ' s  This  theory.  i s r e s t r i c t e d t o thecontinent  included,  of individual  interdependence w i l l  a n d c a p a b i l i t i e s among t h e c o n t i n e n t a l  d o m i n a t e d by l a n d  threats  to identifythe  Specifically,  i s Europe.  and t h e p e r i p h e r y ,  i s one o f dominance  now  security  considerations  below,  states  interdependence.  is  factors  state.  between European s t a t e s  continent,  position  birthplace of international  for  study  interaction  and g e o g r a p h i c  any i n d i v i d u a l s t a t e ' s  The  value for this  interdependence from t h e p e r s p e c t i v e  areas of s e c u r i t y  from any o t h e r  widely.  t o i d e n t i f y and p r i o r i z e s e c u r i t y  is of l i t t l e  capabilities  divergent  t o vary  interde-  and g e o g r a p h i c p o s i t i o n a r e t h e b a s i c  which enable decision-makers and  t h e scope o f s e c u r i t y  of the study,  For a European  state  o u t l i n e d by S i n g e r  minimum p o p u l a t i o n  we c a n t o be  and Small  o f 500,000 and  91  the  reception  of a  diplomatic mission 1816-1919-  France f o r the period  Despite given  the geographic  period tion of  under  inrelation  t h e European s e c u r i t y  equation.  w i t h i n Europe;  of the geographic  force  the three  which  criteria  have a  security  poses o u t s i d e o f t h e i r  The  specific  and/or  their  met f o r  relationship with  case f o r t h e i n c l u s i o n  victories  late Nineteenth  4 8  a r e non-European  states are part c a n be or  used t o  control of with  F u r t h e r m o r e , two Otherwise,  states  member f o r  pur-  excluded.  of the United  respective  ques-  w i l l i n g n e s s t o use  a geographic  r e g i o n c a n n o t be  of the  relationship  i n Europe.  inclusion.  to  4 7  these  a historical  interests  Great  which  The c e n t r a l  the occupation  4 7  the ascension  victories  1972).  Three c r i t e r i a  stems from  these  S t a t e s and J a p a n ,  the existence of a s e c u r i t y  must be  in  c o n s i d e r a t i o n must b e  is.whether  regard:  members;  t o d e f e n d o r expand  Powers.  European system f o r p a r t  ( S i n g e r and S m a l l ,  in this  B r i t a i n or  s t a t e s must e i t h e r be  t o Europe,  the United  membership  territory  of  limitation  to their  i n d i c a t e membership  one  f r o m a n y two G r e a t  a s members o f t h e  examination  Great  o r meet t h e p o p u l a t i o n m e a s u r e a n d  t o two n o n - E u r o p e a n s t a t e s ,  have been t r e a t e d  either  1919.  After  members o f t h e L e a g u e o f N a t i o n s , receive diplomatic missions  from  Power r a n k  States  and Japan  on t h e b a s i s  of their  Century  in location  'wars . 1  4 8  and a r e r e l a t e d  However, t o con-  The d i s c u s s i o n o f A m e r i c a n and J a p a n e s e membership c o u l d r e a d i l y be done w i t h o u t reference to c r i t e r i a . However t h e r e i s a need t o e s t a b l i s h a s e t o f r u l e s f o r s t a t e membership i ngeneral. These c r i t e r i a have v a l u e i n p r o v i d i n g a c l e a r method f o r identifying s t a t e s who p a r t i c i p a t e i n n o n - c o n t i g u o u s r e g i o n s i n t h e contemporary period. For Japan, i t was t h e d e f e a t o f C h i n a i n 1895• T h e U n i t e d S t a t e s d e f e a t e d S p a i n i n 1898. M e m b e r s h i p i s a l s o b a s e d o n t h e i r m i l i t a r y c a p a b i l i t i e s r e l a t i v e t o other s t a t e s .  92 cerns  in their  respective geographic regions.  criteria,  neither  s t a t e can be t r e a t e d  security  system from  Japan had s e v e r a l  political  b o t h W o r l d Wars o f t h i s largely  security Japan  i n the  a  o f German c o l o n i a l participate  Japan does  Similarly,  5 0  In f a c t ,  w a r (1941-1945)'  i n W o r l d War One was l i m i t e d  t othe a c q u i s i t i o n  As n o t e d a b o v e ,  Japan d i d not  t h e a t r e d u r i n g W o r l d War T w o . ' 4  n o t meet t h e c r i t e r i a  f o r membership  i n the later  p a r t i c i p a t i o n was a n a n o m a l y  link with  the Euro-  presence i n A s i a .  S t a t e s d o e s n o t meet t h e c r i t e r i a  Immediately a f t e r  In c o n c l u -  i n the European  p l a y e r whose r e l a t i o n s h i p w i t h  a f u n c t i o n o f t h e European  ed a n y t y p e o f s e c u r i t y  4 9  Japan  sense o f J i n k i n g  1964:1kS~ 146) .  Although the United States p a r t i c i p a t e d  behavior.  alliance  l i n k s between  i n the  (Taylor,  possessions i n Asia.  this  Japan p a r t i c i p a t e d i n  political  not formal  back  t h e Russo-German  the United  W o r l d War One,  states, dating  However, t h e A n g l o - J a p a n e s e  Subsequent  I t i s a regional  peans, i s s t r i c t l y  tional  Also,  during  i n t h e European  sub-system.  sion.  i n 1902.  1930s w e r e  neutral  Japan's p a r t i c i p a t i o n  sion,  European  or co-ordinating policy  became  a s a member o f t h e E u r o p e a n  links with  century.  an A s i a n a f f a i r .  and Germany  t h e above  l8l6-1939>  to the Anglo-Japanese a l l i a n c e  was  When a p p l y i n g  relative  for inclustageso f to tradi-  the war, the United S t a t e s  Europe,  5 0  reject-  as e v i d e n c e d by her r e f u s a l  W o r l d War Two i s t r a d i t i o n a l l y t r e a t e d a s one w a r . However, a t c l o s e r e x a m i n a t i o n , t h e r e a r e a c t u a l l y two s e p a r a t e w a r s , a P a c i f i c War a n d a E u r o p e a n w a r . From a l o n g e r h i s t o r i c a l p e r s p e c t i v e , h i s t o r i a n s may come t o t r e a t W o r l d War One a s t w o s e p a r a t e w a r s , a s a r g u e d b y W i g h t (1977= 38) . H i s t o r i a n s support t h i s view. F o r e x a m p l e , b o t h A d a m t h w a i t e (1977) and R o s s (1983) a r g u e t h a t J a p a n was a n A s i a n a c t o r , and not a p l a y e r i n t h e European s e c u r i t y e q u a t i o n .  93 to  the Versai11es T r e a t y  ratify  trality any  1935 -  in  5  significant  The  1  period  European s t a t e s over  A final In  concern  general,  Power  dominions of  beginning  o ftime,  and, and  the B r i t i s h  can  with  d u r i n g World  not  thus  nor  possessions  similar  participated  to  ions acted  truly  rising  5 1  for with  the U n i t e d  One,  various  the f o r e i g n /  by Great  Britain.  the B r i t i s h  However, war  effort  d o m i n i o n s s o u g h t an i n d e p e n d e n t v o i c e , Westminister.  i s g i v e n membership, l i m i t e d  Canada w i t h d r e w States,  t o Canada, t h e i r i n the  i s the  independent s t a t e s .  i t signed and  1930s,  the V e r s a i l l e s  d e c l a r e d war  location, places  to  i n t o an i s o l a t i o n i s t  f o l l o w i n g Great B r i t a i n .  Japanese t h r e a t  Powers.  c o n t r o l l e d by the  t o W o r l d War  c o n t r i b u t i o n s to  these  European  here  a r e c o n t r o l 1ed  states  b e t r e a t e d as  Although  similar  territory  membership c o n d i t i o n s  Prior  i n the League of N a t i o n s ,  1939 i m m e d i a t e l y  are d i r e c t l y  d o n o t meet t h e  O n l y C a n a d a among t h e d o m i n i o n s  tion  neu-  security link  of the  Empire.  these  One,  years.  a  The exception  l e g i t i m a t e d by the S t a t u t e of  Interwar  maintained  Small.  t h e i r major War  e n u n c i a t i o n of  time.  p o l i c i e s of they  unilateral  States neither occupied  i s the c o l o n i a l  o u t l i n e d by S i n g e r  Thus,  her  the m a j o r i t y of p o s s e s s i o n s  metropolitan  defence  United  and  Although  posi-  Treaty,  o n Germany  the other  the  in  domin-  in conjunction with them o u t s i d e o f  the  the  equa-  O f f n e r (1975: 116) p o i n t s o u t t h a t A m e r i c a n s e c u r i t y c o n c e r n s w e r e s t r i c t l y f o c u s e d on t h e P a c i f i c r e g i o n . Also, i t was t h e German d e c l a r a t i o n o f war i n 19^1 w h i c h . b r o u g h t t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s i n t o t h e E u r o p e a n war and n o t v i c e - v e r s a . The p r o b l e m o f e n t r y , a s s o u g h t b y F.D.R., was s o l v e d . As G r a e b n e r (1961) n o t e s , a u t o m a t i c U.S. part i c i p a t i o n i n E u r o p e was f a r f r o m a f o r e g o n e c o n c l u s i o n . Finally, A l b r e c h t - C a r r i e (1958) recognizes the f a c t t h a t the United State, was t h e s t r o n g e s t power a t t h e t i m e , b u t b e c a u s e o f her i s o l a t i o n i s t s t a n c e , she was n o t p a r t o f E u r o p e a n s e c u r i t y c a l c u l a t i o n s .  94 tion.  5 2  T a b l e II System  Members  1reland (1922) Be 1g i urn (1830) France Spa i n Hanover (1838- 1866) P r u s s i a/Germany Saxony (1816- 1867) Hesse E l e c t . (1816- 1866) Mecklenberg (1843- 1866) Austr-Hungary (1816- 1918) Hungary (1919) S a r d i n i a/1ta1y Two S i c i 1 i e s (1816- i860) Parma (1851- i860) Albani a (1914- 1938) Greece (1828) Ruman i a (1878) Eston i a (1918) L i thuan i a (1918) Sweden Denmark  Great B r i t a i n Hoi l a n d Luxemborg (1920) Swi t z e r 1 and Portugal Bavar i a (1816- 1870) Baden (1816- 1870) Wurtemborg (1816- 1870) H e s s e G r . D u c . (1816- 1866) Poland (1919) Austr i a (1919- 1938) C z e c o s 1 o v a k i a (1919- 1938) P a p a l S t a t e s (1-816- i860) Modena (1842- i860) Tuscany (1816- i860) (1878) Serbia/Yugo. Bu1 g a r i a (1908) Russ i a Latvi a (1918) F i nland (1919) Norway (1905) Canada (1919)  In c o n c l u s i o n , of  Europe,,  with the  Interwar p e r i o d . are presented  this  is  limited  exception of  The s t a t e s , w h i c h  i n Table  s t a t e s provide the  5 2  study  t o the geographic  the i n c l u s i o n  boundaries  o f Canada  i n the  meet t h e c o n d i t i o n s f o r m e m b e r s h i p  I I , a l o n g w i t h t h e dates of membership.  b a s i c observations f o r the  independent  These  and d e p e n -  A related issue i s the c o n t r i b u t i o n of c o l o n i a l possessions to the c a p a b i l i t i e s of the m e t r o p o l i t a n s t a t e s . This issue i s discussed in the subsequent Chapter which serves t o o p e r a t i o n a l i z e the independent v a r i a b l e .  95  dent  variables.  3-3  IDENTIFYING PERIODS WITHIN THE GENERAL  Europe  1816-1939  i nthe period  boundaries f o r  this  analysis.  structural  and t e c h n o l o g i c a l  One,  thesecurity  result  and i sa  contextual ticularly  related  temporally  i s identified  These b o u n d a r i e s  changes  interdependence  over  time.  to individual  limited.  They  could  be g i v e n t o  politics  affect  Change,  states,  as d i s t i n c t  on  w h i c h may a f f e c t  t h e mode, o b j e c t i v e s ,  The  relative  a random,  analysis.  this  par-  rather  However, c o n c e r n  system as a  on h i s t o r i c a l  tracts  indicates changes  refers  whole  which  to alterations in  b e h a v i o r and thus a l t e r  systems,  and a 1 1 i a n c e s . change  and a concern f o r s t a b i l i t y  that  the predicted  In R o s e c r a n c e ' s alterations in  A l t h o u g h he f a i l e d  means t o m e a s u r e s u c h c h a n g e s ,  that systematic empirical  5 3  i s linked  and t e c h n i q u e s of d i p l o m a c y .  t o p r o v i d e an a d e q u a t e  5 3  states.  b e h a v i o r i s assumed t o b e  from t r a n s f o r m a t i o n ,  study of h i s t o r i c a l  cerned with  W o r l d War  exhibits  t o have o n l y  within  r e l a t i o n s h i p between t h e d i s t r i b u t i o n  correctly  function of  our a n a l y s i s .  the environment  (1963)  which  empirical  The e f f e c t o f o t h e r f a c t o r s ,  are likely  changes  a r ea  among E u r o p e a n  t h a n s y s t e m a t i c , e f f e c t on o u r s u b s e q u e n t must s t i l l  as t h e  which occured f o l l o w i n g  system o f i n t e r n a t i o n a l  consistency  BOUNDARIES  relying  defined  as war,  a n a l y s i s must  sweep a c r o s s t h e s y s t e m .  Such  instead he  be c o n -  changes  alter  C h o u c r i a n d N o r t h (1975) define such changes as b r e a k p o i n t s w h i c h are a function o f changes i n t h e r e l a t i o n s h i p among variables. However, o n e must f i r s t i d e n t i f y b r e a k p o i n t s and t e s t f o r such changes, which serve t o v a l i d a t e t h ebreakpoints, rather than t h e o t h e r way a r o u n d .  96  outcomes o f s t a t e predicted  One  interaction  relationships  nation.  temporal  thesecurity  mate a r b i t e r tions Its  threat  underlies  is affected  a period  that  war h a s u t i l i t y  and  examito the  The fundamental War i s t h e  form ulti-  B a l a n c e o f Power e x p l a n a -  i n t h e system  as a w h o l e .  of thed i s t r i b u t i o n  5 4  of c a p a b i l i -  of force  is directly  o f n u c l e a r weapons, by o t h e r f a c t o r s .  of states  of time.  and p e r m a n e n t l y  itsutility  Jervis  (I985)  tion  t o changes  ations  which  a n o t h e r war,  points out that  which  glorify  war  t o bear  t h e c o s t s o f a n o t h e r war i s v e r y  States a r eexhausted  experienced  behavior  a  major  war  (Howard,  are less  s u c h a s N a z i Germany, 1984),  which  i n t h e r e s t of t h e system.  our atten-  t o use f o r c e .  will  Another  likely  The generto  support  who h a v e n o t e x p e r i e n c e d  t o support the use of f o r c e .  conflict,  low f o r  by t h e c o s t s o f t h e p r e v i o u s  whereas s u c c e s s i v e g e n e r a t i o n s  option  after  s u c h a s N a p o l e o n i c Wars a n d W o r l d War One, t h e  i n the w i l l i n g n e s s o f s t a t e s  a r e more l i k e l y  affected  i n the non-nuclear  The g e n e r a t i o n a 1 / s o c i e t a 1 t h e o r y o f war a l s o d i r e c t s  war.  5 4  i s t h e t h e o r y under  f o r c e o r war.  Itfollows  t h e importance  s y s t e m i c war,  willingness  the  duration,  i nexplaining behavior.  a major  war  their  B a l a n c e o f Power t h e o r y i s d i r e c t e d  of s u r v i v a l .  the emergence  age  or periods,  i s theuse of  Whereas t h e u t i l i t y by  o f such changes,  i n an a n a r c h i c environment.  a r e s t r o n g e s t when  utility  ties  sub-systems  As n o t e d e a r l i e r ,  problem o f s e c u r i t y  e x p e c t a t i o n s i n terms o f  among phenomena.  key t o the i d e n t i f i c a t i o n  therefore,  of  and thus a f f e c t  Moreover,  societies  a r e more l i k e l y have  t o use  ramifications for  f a c t o r w h i c h may a f f e c t  J e r v i s (1985) a r g u e s t h a t war as a l e g i t i m a t e t o o l o f s t a t e i s a n e c e s s a r y c o n d i t i o n f o r B a l a n c e o f Power b e h a v i o r .  policy  97 the  willingness  offensive  and  of states  t o use force  defensive c a p a b i l i t i e s  When t h e o f f e n s e d o m i n a t e s , Conversely  Periods  1816-1914  1816-1848  1816-1870  1849-1870 I816-1899  1871-1914 1900-1939  a  o f one's  function  Surveying both  a p l e t h o r a o f temporal period  l8l6-1939-  than examining  their  i n our data a n a l y s i s . application  periods w i l l relationship certain tion.  will  can  increases.  utility.  the d i v i s i o n o f time  rationale  relations  arbitrary. literature,  be found and r a t i o n a l i z e d  within  some c o n s e n s u s d o e s e x i s t . for  Rather  these p e r i o d s , an i n t e r e s t i n g  i ti ssufficient to identify In s o d o i n g ,  the empirical  serve as a v a l i d a t i o n  o n l y be n e c e s s a r y where  check.  the evidence  between d i s t r i b u t i o n and a l l i a n c e s  specifics  of force  and i s thus r e l a t i v e l y  Nonetheless,  the diverse  regarding  and i n t e r n a t i o n a l  divisions  p r o b l e m a t i c endeavour,  them  decision  interest  the h i s t o r i c a l  1984).  Levy,  Analysis  1849-1914 1919-1939  a n y 'a p r i o r i '  between  II I  f o r Subsequent  Naturally,  but  utility  a dominant defence produces a n e g a t i v e  Temporal  the  1977;  (Quester,  the positive  Table  is  i s the r e l a t i v e balance  them a n d a p p l y findings  from  Explanation of relating  requires  it.  i n t h e c h o i c e o f p e r i o d s do r e q u i r e b r i e f  to  the  However, considera-  98  Table tical  III presents  analysis.  Rosecrance of  their  the  a r e absent.  duration  confidence  There  one  i n time.  cation  i n 1848-49  Germany,  have a  the hypothesized  c a n n o t be i g n o r e d .  this  represents  relationships.  inthis  breakpoint  (1899/1900).  this  i n time,  point  in  thed i r e c t i o n  at  this  point.  observations time.  use  their  uncover  flows  as a wider  f o r the simple set.  leads us t o re-examine t h e v a l i d i t y  the Interwar  period and t h e  of theinter-century identify  a  break a t  a significant  from  spatial  reason  limit.  from  a n d war  i n Chapter  at the  the post-  Nonetheless,  of r e p l i c a t i o n ,  of t h i s d e c i s i o n .  change  the limitation i n  observations  As shown  unifi-  w h i c h may  which were q u i n q u e n n i a l  analysis included  expanded d a t a  change  between t h e d i s t r i b u t i o n  index,  state  behavior.  no h i s t o r i a n s (1972)  of the  of t h e s t a t e system,  Similarly,  choice partial1y  e r a , as w e l l  i s employed  of their  et.al.  and  thedomination of  a distinct  i sthechoice  of the relationship Their  Moreover,  break  Singer  thedefeat  f l y i n the face of history  Although  on t h e c a p a b i l i t y  W o r l d War Two this  regard  1849~1870  on t h e s c o p e o f  to theorigins  T o do s o w o u l d  concern  periods  limited.  o f France and t h e u n i f i c a -  i m p a c t o f W o r l d War One o n s u b s e q u e n t s t a t e  A final  i s largely  t h e s t r u g g l e over  back  a function  The wars o f n a t i o n a l  the defeat  As a r e s u l t ,  Again,  The  Six).  i d e n t i f i e d by  number o f o b s e r v a t i o n s ,  thefindings  major e f f e c t  with  an i s s u e s t r e t c h i n g  concluded.  affect  in  i n the s t a t i s -  i spartially  In t h e c a s e o f t h e f o r m e r ,  i n I87O-7I  t i o n o f Germany.  is  With a small  (see d i s c u s s i o n i n C h a p t e r  conclude  absence  two e x c e p t i o n s .  1919-1939 a r e i n c l u d e d .  behavior  Their  can place  a r e , however,  revolutions  be a p p l y e d  As e v i d e n t , many o f t h e s m a l l e r p e r i o d s  (1963)  small  the periods which w i l l  Six,  given our evidence  99 In  conclusion,  hypotheses. ysis will  nine  distinct  In s o d o i n g ,  result.  a more d e t a i l e d  In s o d o i n g ,  findings will problem  identified  the l e g i t i m a c y of the choices  itself.  be  to test  and h i s t o r i c a l l y  exact  than  the  addressed  one c a n p l a c e  the anal-  t h e system as  a b o v e , c a n be c o n t e s t e d .  i s best  the confidence  much h i g h e r  i s ignored. •  a r e employed  N a t u r a l l y the c h o i c e of p e r i o d s , both  a whole and s m a l l e r p e r i o d s ever,  periods  How-  by t h e e v i d e n c e i n the subsequent  c a s e w o u l d be i f  the boundary  Chapter  IV  THE GREAT POWERS AND MEASURING THE  The p u r p o s e  of t h i s  chapter  i s to discuss  a t i o n a l i z e t h e independent v a r i a b l e : To do  so r e q u i r e s a t t e n t i o n  state capabilities struct  a distribution  Powers—who is a  and t h e  statistical but also  holds a  significant  T h u s , G r e a t Power s t a t u s  t i o n based  on t h e i d e n t i f i c a t i o n  This set  the c a l c u l a t i o n  of indicators  t o the s e t of s t a t e s - - t h e  proportion of  A Great  variable  5 5  Great Power  system  capabili-  to empirical  verifica-  requirement  variable.  con-  i n d i c a t o r s and  f o r G r e a t Power  sta-  the basis f o r  Therefore,  the opera-  i s intertwined  with  Great  identification.  The f i r s t  section of this  quantitative traditional therein,  5 5  i n d i c a t o r s of  s i m u l t a n e o u s l y s e r v e s as  the independent  to oper-  necessary to  of relevant c a p a b i l i t y  of the independent  t i o n a l i z a t i on o f Power  technique  i s susceptible  t h e e s t a b l i s h m e n t o f a minimum s h a r e tus.  to the relevant  provide the observations f o r this v a r i a b l e .  s t a t e which  ties.  t h e methods used  the d i s t r i b u t i o n of c a p a b i l i t i e s .  not only  score,  DISTRIBUTION  approach approach  and  chapter presents  f o r G r e a t Power t o G r e a t Power  addresses  the  the case f o r u s i n g a  identification.  identification,  criticisms  leveled  I t examines the  problems  at the  contained  quantitative  The k e y d i f f e r e n c e , o u t s i d e o f t h e a d d i t i o n a l c a l c u l a t i o n o f a d i s tribution score, i s t h e s e t o f o b s e r v a t i o n s r e l e v a n t t o each t a s k . State shares f o r the purpose of Great Power i d e n t i f i c a t i o n a r e b a s e d o n t h e sum o f t h e c a p a b i l i t i e s o f a l l s t a t e s i n the system. Shares used i n t h e c a l c u l a t i o n o f t h e d i s t r i b u t i o n s c o r e a r e based on t h e sum o f c a p a b i l i t i e s o f t h e G r e a t P o w e r s o n l y . - 100 -  101  approach  to this  specific  method used  argues  The  international  ic  third  subset.  Great  Powers,  subset  section  by the  This  score  conceptual  in  this well  t o 1.0,  for  greater  t h e European  are v e r i f i e d  section  presents  perfect  against  the specif-  from  the Great  equality  among t h e  a s i t u a t i o n i n which a s i n g l e state.holds  these  baggage.  tasks, First,  1973) •  necessarily  Power,  correlated  favorable  been c o n s i s t e n t l y  100%  central  a  concern  favorable  power  is  which e l i t e s t a p  outcomes  i sneither  (Singer and  equivalent  exercise  power a s  for elites  deal  i n re-engaging  i n which  human a n d m a t e r i a l ,  Nonetheless,  to  Power a s c a p a b i l i t i e s  5 6  to  t o t h e reader  i t a great  i f any, v a l u e  capacity  issues  i n reference  with  conceptualization  i n t h i s form,  outcomes. a  Power c a r r i e s  and o b t a i n  with,  and r e l a t e d  i ti sprobably evident  and o u t c o m e s .  t h e means o r r e s o u r c e s , to influence  underlying  islittle,  of  to influence  two  been c a r e f u l l y a v o i d e d  There  trodden area  related  in attempts  5 6  These f i n d i n g s  ranges from 0.0,  t h e t e r m power h a s  of  obtain  the findings  the last  measurement o f c a p a b i l i t i e s .  Stuckey,  t o ensure  i t  capabilities.  now t h a t  concerns  In s o d o i n g ,  indicators  reports  Finally,  brief discussion.  largely  t h e i n d i c a t o r s and  i n c a l c u l a t i n g a d i s t r i b u t i o n score  Before undertaking require  certain  (1816-1939)-  record.  t e c h n i q u e used  presents  t o m e a s u r e G r e a t Power s t a t u s .  system  historical  Power  of  The n e x t s e c t i o n  f o r the adjustment of  accuracy.  the  issue.  t o , nor  influence  and  c a p a b i l i t i e s has  i n thec a l c u l a t i o n of  F o r a d e t a i l e d a n a l y s i s o f t r e a t m e n t s o f 'power' i n t h e l i t e r a t u r e ; see B a l d w i n ( 1 9 7 9 ) For a general d i s c u s s i o n , s e e Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff (1981:86-92). For an analysis o f t h e dominant a p p r o a c h e s t o t h e measurement o f power, s e e H a r t (1976). Finally, the c l a s s i c a l t r e a t m e n t o f power a s c a p a b i l i t i e s i s K n o r r (1975; 1956).  102  security larly  1957;  tic  Singer et.  this  theoverall  record  a c o n f i d e n c e check struction  and  is quantitative.  I tplays a v i t a l  How-  impressionis-  role  not o n l y as  b u t a l s o as a g u i d e  i n t h e con-  To u n d e r t a k e a q u a n t i t a t i v e a p p r o a c h  i s t o d i v o r c e o n e s e l f from  Conversely,  limits  endless debate  t o engage  theactual  material  impressionistic  analysis  mode o f t h e o r i z i n g  o r t o an  in  o n e t o an i d e o g r a p h i c  with-  o n whose e v i d e n c e a n d i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  i s correct.  THE CASE FOR MEASURING GREAT POWER STATUS  There  i s an  overwhelming  t h e G r e a t Powers  Politics.  consensus  i n the f i e l d  for understanding  G r e a t Powers a r e consensusa11y  a fundamental  5 7  Kis-  1975;  C h o u c r i and N o r t h ,  analysis  f o r our f i n d i n g s ,  history  analysis.  alone either  of  1955;  (Gullick,  t h e i m p o r t a n c e o f t h e more  i sneglected.  of our indices.  o u t an eye on  4.1  thrust of this  d o e s n o t mean t h a t  historical  under  a l . , 1973;  particu-  1983).  Second, ever,  i nunderstanding behavior,  f r o m a B a l a n c e o f Power t h e o r y p e r s p e c t i v e  singer, Buzan,  and thus a key v a r i a b l e  role  ina l l security  on t h e i m p o r t a n c e  and e x p l a i n i n g defined  issues which  International  as s t a t e s which arise  in. a  play  system.  S 7  This basic definition i s drawn f r o m Levy (1983)However, it is c o n s i s t e n t i n meaning w i t h most d e f i n i t i o n s . W i g h t (1978) d e f i n e s a Great Power a s a s t a t e with general i n t e r e s t s whereas lesser s t a t e s have o n l y l i m i t e d i n t e r e s t s . A1brecht-Carrie (1958:71 72), using the indicator of recognition, a l s o argues t h a t G r e a t Powers have g e n e r a l i n t e r e s t s , " m e a n i n g by t h i s one which has a v o i c e i n a l l a f f a i r s i n c o n t r a s t w i t h a Power o f l o w e r r a n k , o r a Power w i t h limited interests." I n t e r e s t s , i n t h i s c o n t e x t , i s synonymous w i t h a G r e a t Power's c o n c e r n f o r a l l s e c u r i t y i s s u e s . As shown b e l o w , d i f f e r i n g d e f i n i t i o n s and q u a l i f i e r s a r e a c t u a l l y a t t e m p t s t o o p e r a t i o n a l i z e , and t h e r e b y measure, G r e a t Power r a n k . They a r e n o t , in t h e pure sense, competing d e f i n i t i o n s . _  Finally,  thehistorical  roots of  thed i s t i n c t i o n  between  Great  103  While d i f f e r e n t c r i t e r i a scientists  and h i s t o r i a n s  Great Powers. why  exist,  there  alike  However, d e s p i t e  concerning this  a q u a n t i t a t i v e approach should  First,  is e s p e c i a l l y evident  measurement o f Second, there  some s c h o l a r s  their  i s an i m p l i c i t ,  they  avoided  have r e l i e d  G r e a t Power s e t s .  these surrogates  and  literature.  t h e ambiguous This  i s resolved,  i f not e x p l i c i t ,  consensus  o f G r e a t Power s t a t u s . and thereby surrogate  However, t h e r e  5 8  the  affected.  that c a p a b i l -  Unfortunately,  measuring  capabilities.  criteria  to legitimize  i ssufficient  G r e a t Power s t a t u s  ambiguity  t h e N i n e t e e n t h and  be a d v e r s e l y  on s e v e r a l  actual  issue.  v a r i a b l e may  using  been  a r e two r e a s o n s  to clarify  during  political  s t a t e s have  to this  U n l e s s such a m b i g u i t y  our independent  have  serve  i n the case of I t a l y  are thebasic c r i t e r i o n  Instead,  be a p p l i e d  i nthehistorical  e a r 1y. T w e n t i e t h C e n t u r i e s .  which  agreement, there  a q u a n t i t a t i v e approach w i l l  p o s i t i o n o f some s t a t e s  ities  i s c o n v e r g e n c e among  to  slippage  call  into  between question  the ir va1ue.  and l e s s e r P o w e r s i s w o r t h n o t i n g . R o t h s t e i n (1968:196) n o t e s t h a t t h e a c t o r s made t h i s d i s t i n c t i o n a t t h e c o n c l u s i o n o f t h e N a p o l e o n i c Wars. A G r e a t Power was a s t a t e a b l e t o c o n t r i b u t e at least 60,000 t r o o p s a g a i n s t any f u r t h e r French aggression. T h i s amount e n s u r e d t h a t o n l y t h e f o u r p r o m i n e n t c o a l i t i o n members, G r e a t B r i t ain, Austria, Russia, a n d P r u s s i a , w o u l d p a r t i c i p a t e a t t h e Congress of Vienna. In e x c l u d i n g l e s s e r states, the problems of r e d r a w i n g t h e map o f E u r o p e was s i m p l i f i e d . 5 8  Our s t r i c t t h e o r e t i c a l f o c u s o n s e c u r i t y v a l i d a t e s t h e t r e a t m e n t o f s t a t u s i n terms o f c a p a b i l i t i e s . H o w e v e r , W a l l a c e (1973) points out that t h e p o r t r a y a l o f s t a t u s as s i m p l y a product of t h e capab i l i t y hierarchy i s a considerable oversimplification. The h i e r archy of states w i l l differ i n various geographic regions, issue a r e a s , t y p e s o f i n f l u e n c e , and o t h e r n o n - c a p a b i l i t y f a c t o r s such as s o c i a l and p o l i t i c a l a t t r a c t i v e n e s s . Nations a r e more a p t l y c o n c e i v e d as h a v i n g d i f f e r e n t s t a n d i n g s on a v a r i e t y o f s t a t u s dimensions o r having a s t a t u s s e t . As n o t e d a b o v e , t h i s study i s only concerned w i t h one d i m e n s i o n , security, i n which c a p a b i l i t i e s a r e the prime determinant o f s t a t u s .  104 Many s c h o l a r s , s u c h a s N o r t h e d g e (1983).  and  Levy  and  privileges.  use t h ec r i t e r i a A  state  s u c h b y i t s own e l i t e s , it  i s given  despite in  of  actor  i t is defined. states  a  1980).  recognized  by  and  i n the  There  i n the T r i p l e A l l i a n c e  a state  i t s past,  Nineteenth  after  a Great  applied  i n the  manner  draw from t h e f r o m an  reasons outside For example,  of the  i t i s Ita-  1882 w h i c h e n a b l e s  Power  may be r e c o g n i z e d  (Bridge  as a Great  r o l e i n t h e system. assertion that  recognition,  scientists  by p o l i t i c a l  This  Spain  as  s t a t e s a n d when  But, recognition  in security issues.  G i l b e r t ' s (1979)  i t to  and B u l l e n , Power d u e t o  i s t h e argument  remained a Great  Pow-  Century.  is a d i f f i c u l t y Great  political  (1978),  special rights  However,  i srarely  historians.  may be m o t i v a t e d  Finally,  underlying  tantive  Rather,  5 9  Wight  i t i s recognized  of other  privileges.  measure o f a c c e p t a n c e as  tradition  er  and  and  Power when  as t h e e l i t e s  perceptions,  role a state plays  membership  attain  duties  (1977),  Bull  of recognition,  i s a Great  as w e l l  to actor  perspective  actual ly's  i t s link  which  list  special  (1976),  Powers  in differentiating when u s i n g  between nominal  the criterion  of  and subs-  recognition.'  0  5 9  T h i s i n c o n s i s t e n c y i s p a r t l y a f u n c t i o n o f the d i s t i n c t i o n between a semantic and s c i e n t i f i c e x p l a n a t i o n a s n o t e d by K a p l a n (19&4). The f o r m e r t y p e r e f e r s t o e x p l a n a t i o n from t h e p e r s p e c t i v e o f t h e a c t o r and h i s i n t e r p r e t a t i o n i n t h i s regard. The l a t t e r t y p e i s the observers i n t e r p r e t a t i o n which i s open to verification. It appears that users o f r e c o g n i t i o n as a c r i t e r i a largely confuse t h e s e two t y p e s o f e x p l a n a t i o n . In f a c t , t h e y a c t u a l l y u s e t h e l a t ter i n t h eguise of the former.  6 0  I n t h e m o s t r e c e n t s t u d y , B u r r i d g e a n d Y o u n g (1988) make a s i m i l a r argument, b u t u s e t h e terms c o u r t e s y and unambiguous. Problems i n t h e i r t r e a t m e n t a r i s e from i n c o n s i s t e n c y i n d e f i n i t i o n and a p p l i c a t i o n w h i c h l e a d s them t o i n c l u d e P r u s s i a a n d A u s t r i a i n t h e i r list. They s t a t e ; A G r e a t Power i s o n e w h o s e r e p u t a t i o n o r l a t e n t m i l i t a r y s t r e n g t h may be e q u a l e d , b u t n o t s u r p a s s e d b y t h a t o f a n y o t h er power;... (p.233)• As shown i n F i g u r e s 4 . 2 a n d 4 . 3 . P r u s s i a a n d Austria do n o t p o s s e s s capabilities which f i t t h e d e f i n i t i o n .  105  Another c r i t e r i o n is  applied  t o the issue of  t h e l i n k a g e between G r e a t Powers  (Bull,  1977)-  scholars  to rely  this  the  C o n c e r t c a n n o t be d i r e c t l y  For  example,  criterion  Prussia's  H o h e n z o l l e r n crown is only  the  politics  value  surrogate or  ability realm.  than  to actual  i n the Concert  1972).  on  6 1  i s a mere  courtesy  t h e norm  i n the history  importance  of Austria Turning  and  t o the  criterion at  two a r e a c t u a l l y  of i n t e r n a t i o n a l  is questionable  i s simply  state capabilities.  and p r i v i l e g e s s t a t e s  ability  (1856),  such o r g a n i z a t i o n s a r e  over  time.  the product of a  Any r e c o g n i t i o n , a n d /  may r e c e i v e  t o a f f e c t i n d e p e n d e n t l y any i s s u e s o r outcomes This  patronage of the  w h i c h meet t h i s  stem  from  their  i n the security  i s a f u n c t i o n o f t h e dominant c a p a b i l i t i e s  Moreover, both s t a t e ' s r e p u t a t i o n was s e v e r l y d e f e a t s ; P r u s s i a i n 1806 a n d A u s t r i a i n 1866. 6 1  status.  195^:86).  Finally,  i n the use of these c r i t e r i a  duties  membership i n  G r e a t Power  the w i s h e s  (Taylor,  states  sense.  basis  At t h e Congress of P a r i s  admitted  substantive  r e l a t i o n s h i p with  special  Yet simple  Y e t , i t is obvious that only  rather  and t h e i r  thehistorical  l a r g e l y due t o R u s s i a ' s  one f i n d s f i v e  i n theoriginal  exception  Any  powers,  grudgingly  Nations.  G r e a t Powers  In f a c t ,  equated  the wishes of Great B r i t a i n  United  and p r i v i l e g e s a r e s u f f i c i e n t l y  on t h e m e m b e r s h i p o f k e y s t a t e s i n  membership  (Anderson,  contemporary era, the  and p r i v i l e g e s  i s t h e Concert o f Europe.  e x t e n d e d by t h e o t h e r  against  and s p e c i a l d u t i e s  forums and o r g a n i z a t i o n s .  for  Prussia  identification  However, s p e c i a l d u t i e s  vague as t o f o r c e international  G r e a t Power  tarnished  which  by m a j o r  B u l l (1977:203) a r g u e s t h a t t h e d i s t i n c t i o n b e t w e e n S u p e r p o w e r s a n d G r e a t Powers i sa p a r t i a l attempt t o overcome t h i s problem. He b e l i e v e s t h a t t h i s d i s t i n c t i o n has l i t t l e v a l u e . Only t h e S o v i e t Union and t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s , by v i r t u e o f t h e i r o v e r w h e l m i n g m i l i t a r y s u p e r i o r i t y , a r e G r e a t Powers i n t h e t r u e sense of t h e concept.  106 G r e a t Powers p o s s e s s them t o with  entertain  their  er  the use of  force to a l t e r  t o use or e n t e r t a i n  the v a l u e of another  status;  the best  to other s t a t e s .  T h i s dominance outcomes  war.  the  prominent  use of f o r c e  are treated  status.  the  Sweden, of d e f e a t .  rise/fall  1978:49).  in  o f Great  victory,  an a l l y ,  i n 19^*5»  wars which  Powers  France  a Great  problematic  in  (1815) » a  Paradoxically,  Power may  as was  the ambiguity  i s a f u n c t i o n of  historians.  Indicators  6 3  Great Powers.  Con-  Empire  lost  this  status  inexact (1918) ,  l o s s of Great  find  itself  Great B r i t a i n Finally,  and  (Wight, defeat  has  Power  status.  overwhelmed  by t h e  relative  to  the United  the i d e n t i f i c a t i o n of  the  i n t h e r a n k s of the G r e a t Powers i s  6 3  Power s t a t u s  6 2  became  arid Germany  temporary  in alterations  itself.  Prussia  i s historically  i f not e a r l i e r .  resulted  by many o b s e r v e r s a s  the r e l a t i o n s h i p between v i c t o r y / d e f e a t  a t a minimum,  s t r e n g t h of States  the Austro-Hungarian  But,  F o r some,  o n l y meant, Even  and  l e a d s us t o c o n -  R u s s i a and  6 2  G r e a t P o w e r s by v i r t u e o f t h e i r d e f e a t o f o t h e r  because  conflict  s u r r o g a t e c r i t e r i o n o f G r e a t Pow-  V i c t o r y or d e f e a t  m e a s u r e o f G r e a t Power  versely,  which  enables  interests.  This a b i l i t y sider  relative  in using  s u r r o g a t e s t o measure  a r e l i a n c e by p o l i t i c a l  are e i t h e r  abstracted  from  Great  s c i e n t i s t s on  historical  works  Some s c h o l a r s v i e w t h e s i m p l e m e a s u r e o f p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n war a s t h e h a l l m a r k o f a G r e a t P o w e r . Model s k i (1973) p o i n t s o u t t h a t war i s a G r e a t Power phenomenon and n o t evenly d i s t r i b u t e d over a l l states. F u r t h e r m o r e , T a y l o r (1954) e m p h a s i z e s t h e a b i l i t y t o wage war a s t h e b a s i c t e s t o f a G r e a t P o w e r . L e v y (1985b) shows t h e l a c k o f c o n s e n s u s among m a c r o - t h e o r i s t s i n the i d e n t i f i c a t i o n of major s y s t e m i c wars. T h i s l a c k of consensus bodes i l l f o r any a t t e m p t t o i d e n t i f y the wars which a l t e r e d the ranks of t h e G r e a t Rowers.  107  directly  or applied  after  tions.  In e f f e c t ,  political  of h i s t o r i a n s ,  thefact  ly  approach  stems  from  capabi1itiies ical  scientists  6 4  about  to identify  (1983:15-16)  G r e a t Power  bias,  the u t i l i t y  of  observa-  on t h e j u d g e m e n t  eschew b o t h a conand a d i r e c t  T h i s r e l i a n c e on h i s t o r i a n s  Great Powers,  Singer  should  directly  quan-  partialmeasuring  a l s o e v i d e n t among many  (1973)» he c i t e s  to prevail  always  thecase.  occurred  He a r g u e s  t h e rank  polit-  i t i s not l i k e l y  inthis  greater c a p a b i l i t i e s ,  regard.  t o meet  Israel's  First,  But  military  Both  higher  y e t only Prussia  and Turkey  i s not have  Second,  i n t h e above study  theUnited States  this  successes  greater capabi1ities.  orders generated  one  and t h e r e b y a h i g h e r  i n war a g a i n s t a w e a k e r s t a t e . For example,  approach t o  F o c u s i n g on t h e work o f S t u c k e y  counter-intuitive. than P r u s s i a ,  a quantitative  that  two f a i l u r e s  a g a i n s t s t a t e s w i t h much  that  criticizes  of face v a l i d i t y .  expect a s t a t e with  status,  finds  extensively  identification.  t h e minimum t e s t  6 4  have r e l i e d  and o p e r a t i o n a l i z a t i o n ,  to the issue. doubts  historical  scientists.  Levy  and  legitimize  who, f o r r e a s o n s o f d i s c i p l i n e  cern f o r concept d e f i n i t i o n titative  to  he  are often  i n 1845  ranked  i s s e e n a s a G r e a t Power b y h i s -  Several B r i t i s h p o l i t i c a l s c i e n t i s t s , such g r e a t a t t e n t i o n t o t h e i s s u e o f G r e a t Power approach i s s i m i l a r t o h i s t o r i a n s . Singer status to diplomatic recognition. Also, d i r e c t l y on t h e s t a t u s problem, although G r e a t Power i d e n t i f i c a t i o n .  as Wight and B u l l , pay status. However, t h e i r a n d S m a l l (19&6) l i n k e d W a l l a c e (1973) focused notwith the intent of  A t t h e same t i m e , h i s t o r i a n s have p r o v i d e d hard measures o f state capabilities i ntheir discussions on t h e Great Powers. The m o s t p r o m i n e n t e x a m p l e i s f o u n d i n T a y l o r ' s (1954) introduction to h i s s t u d y o f E u r o p e a n d i p l o m a c y f r o m 1848 t o 1918. However, as shown l a t e r on i n t h e C h a p t e r , h i s t o r i a n s f a i l t o a p p l y c o n s i s t e n t ly these f i n d i n g s . P o w e r s shown t o l a c k t h e c a p a b i l i t i e s f o r G r e a t Power status are s t i l l labeled as Great Powers t h r o u g h o u t t h e texts.  108  torians.  Similarly,  in  o r t h o d o x G r e a t Powers  Levy's  first  1913.  (Italy,  point  may  also affect  emption  i n 1967  enabled  i n 1973  strophic defeat.  The  product  failure  of t h e i r  states,  not t r u l y  findings,  the  first  half  to  Power. ate  especially  i s not that  In t h e c a s e o f I s r a e l ,  pre-  adequate  period  European  boundaries.  security  They  system.  are questionable.  Thus,  Most h i s t o r i a n s w o u l d period.  agree  Finally, i t a Great  i n n a t u r e , may  of reasons.  the  throughout  For  i t s r e s o u r c e s f o r war and t h e r e b y a f f e c t It i s  when  Also,  i t s weakness  i t i s comparative  which  cata-  study are a  s t a n d i n g i n any s i n g l e y e a r w h i c h makes  of time  limited  C h i n a and t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s ,  s h o r t p e r i o d s of time f o r a v a r i e t y  sufficient  while  from a p o t e n t i a l l y  G r e a t Power d u r i n g t h i s  s t a n d i n g of o t h e r s t a t e s .  military other  of the N i n e t e e n t h c e n t u r y .  a s t a t e may m o b i l i z e ative  Greater  but several  surprising given  I t s s t a n d i n g , because  over  demarcate  members o f t h e  i s not a s t a t e ' s  relationship  r e s u l t s o f t h e S i n g e r and S t u c k e y  t h a t P r u s s i a was t h e w e a k e s t it  The  of v i c t o r y ,  Israel  and L e v y ' s c r i t i c i s m ,  rank of P r u s s i a  mark.  i s problematic.  saved  four of the  and A u s t r i a - H u n g a r y ) .  i t t o overcome her i n f e r i o r i t y ,  goals  their  status  the  t h e outcome o f war.  Egyptian m i l i t a r y  they a r e  France, Japan,  increase the l i k e l i h o o d  factors  include several  ranks higher than  largely misses  b e t w e e n war and G r e a t Power capabilities  China  fluctuexample, the r e l -  the s t a n d i n g of s t a t e s over a  indicates  i t s actual  place in  the  hierarchy.  A more i m p o r t a n t c r i t i c i s m inability  leveled  at quantitative  t o c a p t u r e and m e a s u r e a d e q u a t e l y  capabilities.  Levy  points to various  studies  is their  a l l the elements  of s t a t e  elements,  such as  leadership,  109  morale,  and t r a i n i n g ,  cludes  that only a general  However, in  itself.  Recall  i s to capture  tions  confronted  expect  Russian  of decision-makers Wohlforth,  mates a r e l i k e l y  6 5  he c o n -  i s possible.  i s not a s i g n i f i c a n t  One t h a t o n e  as a c c u r a t e l y  by t h e a c t o r s .  of the goals  problem of this  as p o s s i b l e t h e h i s t o r i c a l In  so doing,  condi-  i ti s reasonable t o  arealso forced to rely  on e s t i m a t e s .  For  c a p a b i l i t i e s were o v e r v a l u e d  i n 1914 b y t h e m a j o r i t y  1984;  f o r an g e n e r a l a n a l y s i s  a t t h e time  1987)'  tors areadjusted  estimates  Chapter  that decision-makers  example,  of  from  As a r e s u l t ,  estimate of state c a p a b i l i t i e s  a r e l i a n c e on g e n e r a l  study  see  w h i c h evade measurement.  (Kennedy,  In o t h e r w o r d s , a s l o n g a s q u a n t i t a t i v e  f o r major changes t o be g e n e r a l l y  relative capabilities  in historical  conditions,  representative of the actual  as seen through  indicaestipicture  t h e eyes o f t h e a c t o r s  them-  selves.  The  final  different  concern  in this  area  indicators of capabilities.  geography has  an e f f e c t  on  relative  seapower a r e n o t commensurate. capabilities.  For example,  because of i t s geographic Similarly,  6 5  relates  Britain's  As S c h r o e d e r capabi1itiies.  Furthermore,  Russia  status  (1977)  the other  of  points out,  Land  distance  i s a stronger  detachment from  insular  t o the commensurablity  power a n d  also  affects  power d e f e n s i v e l y Powers o f Europe.  provides greater defensive  capa-  One s h o u l d n o t c o n s t r u e t h i s p o i n t t o mean an a b i l i t y on o u r p a r t t o c a p t u r e t h e same p i c t u r e a s d e c i s i o n - m a k e r s . Rather, i t underl i e s t h e need t o make k e y m e t h o d o l o g i c a l d e c i s i o n s w i t h an e y e on the h i s t o r i c a l c o n t e x t and t h e a c t o r s i n v o l v e d . O u t s i d e o f a r a d i c a l l y d i f f e r e n t approach which would examine i n d i v i d u a l e l i t e perc e p t i o n s t h r o u g h p r i m a r y s o u r c e s , d e c i s i o n s a r e made f r o m a c o n c e r n for existing h i s t o r i c a l interpretations. In e f f e c t , o n e must be s i m u l t a n e o u s l y a p o l i t i c a l s c i e n t i s t and a h i s t o r i a n . In t h i s w a y , t h e h i s t o r i c a l c o n t e x t c a n be b e s t i n t e g r a t e d w i t h t h e t h e o r e t i c a l thrust of this analysis.  1 10 bility,  but also hinders  a n c e on n a v a l  Naturally, ever,  they  ation,  these  are  factors are vital  are also d i f f i c u l t  One f a c t o r , but negative  ignored  such as naval i n another.  in the  context  actions  Our e s t i m a t e s  4.2  and n o t t h e nuances o f  CAPABILITY  Given  are only designed  The l a t t e r  specific  situ-  i n one s i t u -  they  the r e l a t i v e  capa-  distribution  t o account for  particular  isa different  and s p a c e ,  instances  theoretical,  of c a p a b i l the general  i n the h i s t o r i -  concern.  INDICATORS AND THE HISTORICAL RECORD  the central  need t o a c c o u n t  t i o n s over  time,  identified  and a d j u s t e d .  6 6  i n time  considerations regarding  ities.  record.  of  W h i l e such c o n s i d e r a t i o n s c a n n o t be  o f s t a t e s a s a w h o l e and t h e g e n e r a l  cal  How-  c o n s i d e r a t i o n of  a s s e t s may b e p o s i t i v e  of s p e c i f i c  f o rgeneral  i n a general  bilities  situation  because of a r e l i -  i n c o n s i d e r a t i o n s of war.  t o assess  p l a c i n g them  i n explanations  not v i t a l  capability  forces.  c a p a b i l i t i e s without ations.  its offensive  the specific 6 6  f o r changes  in historical  i n d i c a t o r s of s t a t e c a p a b i l i t i e s  The i n d i c a t o r s ,  and d a t a  for this  condic a n be  study a r e  Two c o m p e t i n g a p p r o a c h e s t o t h e measurement o f s t a t e c a p a b i l i t i e s are r e j e c t e d f o rh i s t o r i c a l and m e t h o d o l o g i c a l reasons. Ferris (1972) u s e s f a c t o r a n a l y s i s t o c o n s t r u c t a n i n d e x o f r e l a t i v e s t a t e capabilities. In s o d o i n g , he a d m i t s t h a t h i s f i n d i n g s go b e y o n d the h i s t o r i c a l r e c o r d , and a t t e m p t t o e l u c i d a t e o b j e c t i v e r a n k i n g s w h i c h may have b e e n m i s p e r c e i v e d by h i s t o r i c a l e l i t e s (p. 55)Moreover, t h e v a l i d i t y o f f a c t o r a n a l y s i s has been called into q u e s t i o n ( W a l l a c e , 1975). O r g a n s k i and K u g l e r (1980) a p p l y GNP a s the basic indicator of state capabilities. B u t a s Wayman e t . a l . (1983) and Moul (1986) p o i n t o u t , GNP, a s a m e a s u r e o f e c o n o m i c performance, appeared i n the l a t e 1940s. B e f o r e t h e 1940s, t h e s p e c i f i c information necessary t o c a l c u l a t e GNP i s n o t a v a i l a b l e . Thus, earlier e s t i m a t e s o f GNP a r e q u e s t i o n a b l e . This problem f o r c e s O r g a n s k i and K u g l e r t o r e s t r i c t t h e i r d o m a i n t o the t r a d i t i o n a l G r e a t P o w e r s f r o m 1850 o n w a r d , w i t h t h e n o t a b l e e x c l u s i o n o f A u s t r o - H u n g a r y u n t i l 1914. As a r e s u l t , t h e c o m p a r a t i v e r a n k i n g o f  111  drawn from individual  t h e C o r r e l a t e s o f War state capabilities  each d i m e n s i o n c o n t a i n i n g sists  o f armed f o r c e s  trial  dimension contains  Finally,  provided,  tors  where here  value  vance.  into three  dimensions,  The m i l i t a r y  and m i l i t a r y  this  project,  dimension  e n e r g y c o n s u m p t i o n and i r o n / s t e e l  production.  includes  on a y e a r l y  total on  population  basis  for time  frame under  7  s e tfor  goals  and urban  the s i x indicatorsare  our task  i sfourfold.  r e p r e s e n t a t i v e of the c a p a b i l i t i e s  The i n d i c a -  necessary  of security, t e r r i t o r i a l  certain limitations likely  t o base t h e i r  indicators  discussed  t o have had  individual  are readily  con-  The i n d u s -  integrity,  T h e i n d i c a t o r s a l s o meet t h e c o n d i t i o n o f h i s t o r i c a l Within  with  expenditures.  (1816-1939) -  i t s basic  sion-makers a r e which  personnel  of t h i s data  t o meet  survival.  In  two i n d i c a t o r s .  available,  a r e reasonably  state  project.  Individual state capabilities  examination  The  aredivided  t h e demographic dimension  population.  (COW)  access  6 8  historical  to similar  calculations.  comparable.  below,  Finally,  The d a t a  for a and reledeci-  i n f o r m a t i o n on on t h e v a r i o u s  thea v a i l a b i l i t y  of data  states i s not p o s s i b l e . Also, i t i s l i k e l y t h a t t h e u s e o f GNP estimates w i l l undermine our a b i l i t y t o e s t i m a t e t h e h i s t o r i c a l record. D e c i s i o n - m a k e r s w o u l d n o t h a v e made s u c h c a l c u l a t i o n s , a n d t h u s f i n d i n g s may be l a r g e l y d i v o r c e d f r o m the h i s t o r i c a l record. Finally, Wayman e t . a l . n o t e t h a t GNP may n o t be a n a p p r o p r i a t e measure o f s t a t e m i l i t a r y c a p a b i l i t y . GNP m e a s u r e s a good d e a l o f economic a c t i v i t y i r r e l e v a n t or detrimental t o a state's m i l i t a r y capac i t y . 6 7  The d e t a i l e d c o d i n g r u l e s f o r t h e v a r i o u s i n d i c a t o r s have been p r e sented elsewhere. (See W a l l a c e , 1973; Singer, e t . a l . , 1973) The p u b l i c a t i o n o f t h e c o d e book f o r t h i s data s e t i s forthcoming from t h e COW p r o j e c t . S p e c i f i c s w i l l be p r e s e n t e d i n t h e t e x t where warranted i n the subsequent d i s c u s s i o n .  6 8  C o m p a r a b i l i t y d o e s n o t mean, f o r example, that R u s s i a b u y s t h e same amount o f g o o d s as a d o l l a r It i s u n l i k e l y that values i n t h i s area can ever p a r e d and thus r e p r e s e n t s one s o u r c e o f p o t e n t i a l  a d o l l a r spent i n spent i n England. b e a c c u r a t l y comerror.  112 on  a  yearly basis permits  terns, also and  not only  for  testing  one must  These  and  reliability;  and  missing  mates.  pattern of values  particularly and T w e n t i e t h  reported  within a  an e s t i m a t e prior  of c a p a b i l i t i e s ,  two g r o u p s :  i n t h e data availability  of the various t h edata  centuries.  military  forces  as a  areestimates  avoided  Fortunately, this  significantly  cas-  the calculation of e s t i -  s e r i e s of roughly  t o the missing reasonable  and t h e s t a t e d e l e t e d  years of  twenty  years  by e x a m i n i n g t h e years,  confidence  a n d by check."  missing  val-  f o r purposes of analy-  f o r any o f t h e l a r g e s t a t e s and  states for brief  a f f e c t our ranking  smaller  I n some  number o f c o n s e c u t i v e  d i d not occur  indica-  set contains  i n t h e case of  c a n be c o n s t r u c t e d  and subsequent  t h e d e l e t i o n o f some s m a l l e r  "  but  limitations  and r e l i a b i l i t y ,  O n l y when a s t a t e h a s a s u b s t a n t i a l  sis.  into  c a n be o v e r c o m e t h r o u g h  expenditures  reported values,  ues  identification,  F o r e x a m p l e , when a s t a t e h a s o n e o r two c o n s e c u t i v e  missing m i l i t a r y  using  the inherent  the relevancy/weighting  theNineteenth  values  pat-  thed i s t r i b u t i o n  c a n be d i v i d e d  missing values,  i n both  Power  behavorial  relationships.  recognize  limitations  number o f  states,  of  in  In terms o f a v a i l a b i l i t y  tors.  representation of  f o r t h e purpose of Great  thehypothesized  set.  es,  clear  measuring a l t e r a t i o n s  However,  a  a  periods  o f time does n o t  outcomes.  Attempts t o use m i l i t a r y f o r c e s over time to estimate missing e x p e n d i t u r e s was n o t f o u n d u s e f u l . T h e two i n d i c a t o r s a r e f o u n d t o be o n l y w e a k l y r e l a t e d ( r = . 3 0 5 ) f o r t h e European system. Theref o r e , f o r c e s c a n o n l y p r o v i d e a check f o r t h e e s t i m a t e s . That i s , t h e p a t t e r n c a n be e x a m i n e d t o s e e i f t h e r e was a n y d r a m a t i c c h a n g e in r e p o r t e d f o r c e s t h a t would l e a d one t o expect a break i n the historical pattern. T h i s was n o t t h e c a s e i n a n y o f t h e r e l e v a n t cases.  113  Reliability, There  is  no  correct.  assurance  Using  implication  this  estimates. distant  the f i g u r e s of p u b l i c  can  neither  with  and  be  capability  reliable  Power  index  He  are  i n t i m e , may  under  of  any  find  n e t w o r k s may  by  reasonable  comparable to  issue,  the  great  i t polit-  the  have  as w e l l  various provided as  or  i t is questionable  useful for According  three d i f f e r e n t  a r g u e s t h a t the use  are  and  are  rele-  assessments.  identification.  intermediate  states  i n the case  different values,  necessary  solution.  project,  r e p o r t e d f i g u r e s on  to base t h e i r  represents  s u b j e c t matter  nor  points  their  substantially  (military);  graphic). the  particularly  state intelligence  on w h i c h  t h e COW  o n l y assume t h a t t h e v a l u e s  at d i f f e r e n t  indicators Great  r e p o r t e d f o r the  sources,  to the r e l e v a n c y / w e i g h t i n g  a l l the  immediate  l i m i t a t i o n which escapes  procedures,  Finally,  indicators,  states  on  is a  u s e f u l to under/overvalue  Turning  COW  study,  Also, states,  decision-makers  er  a variety  may  indicators.  vant  that  Accounting  past,  degree. ically  in contrast,  o f any  or  t o Moul  types  (industrial);  the  and  a l l the  of  wheth-  ranking  of  (1986), t h e  capabilities:  long  term  indicators  (demodepends  examination.  " I f t h e i n t e r e s t w e r e w i t h power p o t e n t i a l , to include curr e n t power c a p a b i l i t i e s w o u l d d i s t r a c t from a proper apprec i a t i o n of the long run possibilities. Similarly, i f the i n t e r e s t were i n c o n f l i c t s a t any g i v e n t i m e . . . w h a t matt e r s would be t h e s h o r t e r term, not the long run. To include total p o p u l a t i o n and t o t a l urban p o p u l a t i o n i n an a n a l y s i s o f w a r / p e a c e i n any g i v e n y e a r , at best, w o u l d be to i n c l u d e n o i s e i n the assessment of the b a l a n c e o f power capabilities." (p.10-11)  The  ranking  of  states,  b a s e d on  system c a p a b i l i t i e s ,  initially  indicators.  indicators  Military  their  appears a r e , of  individual  to require course,  share the f u l l  vital  of  total set  of  components  in  114 any  assessment of s t a t e c a p a b i l i t i e s .  resenting  the basic  production)  equation,  prosecute  Finally,  successfully  the demographic  term c a p a b i l i t i e s  rank  resulting  They a l s o s e r v e  the e q u a t i o n .  Total  personnel  this  indicator.  found between t o t a l By  adding  industrial  yet  a very  elements  Power  indicators i s problematic.  term element  of c a p a b i l i t i e s .  other  Naturally, this  As e x p e c t e d ,  side of  i s generally a  func-  r e l a t i o n s h i p d e p e n d s on  But, with  i s already  partially  time which  deter-  t h e emergence o f conintegrated w i t h i n the  a strong p o s i t i v e r e l a t i o n s h i p i s  and armed f o r c e s  the m i l i t a r y  indicators in  adds w e i g h t t o t h e m i l i t a r y  o f manpower.  component,  in state capabilities  large population  personnel  (r=.8l55)•  the importance  i s reduced, a weak  of the  w h i c h may industrial  lead base,  base.  has s i m i l a r  f u n c t i o n of i n d u s t r i a l i z a t i o n . influence  r e p r e s e n t a t i o n of the  t o the n o t i o n of Great  the c a p a b i l i t i e s of s t a t e s with  Urban p o p u l a t i o n  the  century.  the influence of the  population  weight to  to overvaluing  mid-Nineteenth  breakdown o f a s t a t e over  pool  in the  of states  The s i z e o f a s t a t e ' s armed f o r c e s  mines the a v a i l a b l e pool armies,  the long  base.  components  perspective.  population  s p e c i f i c demographic  script  speak  (iron/steel  to the a b i l i t y  their  of the demographic  simply  t i o n of i t s population the  term  to increase  the c a l c u l a t i o n .  the  i n d i c a t o r s , given  from a long  captures  since  of s t a t e s ,  However, t h e v a l i d i t y one  war  i n d i c a t o r s , rep-  and o u t p u t  are also v i t a l  especially in relation  long  Neither  (energy consumption)  elements of development,  capability to  input  The i n d u s t r i a l  of the i n d u s t r i a l  problems.. Thus,  Urbanization  this  component  is partially  a  i n d i c a t o r adds w e i g h t t o i n the  calculation.  One  115  finds  that  total  urban  energy consumption versely, ply  be  population  (r=.831) and  i n some c a s e s ,  the  indicator  function is  high  of  a  indirectly  is  strongly correlated  iron/steel  scores  on  large population linked  to the  both  (r=.893) •  production  total  with  Con-  u r b a n p o p u l a t i o n may  base.  military  In  this  s i d e of  sim-  case,  the  the  calcula-  tion.  The  confounding  exclusion Great  from the  Powers  indicators. s h a r e of  establish  Moul  analysis.  is derived At y e a r l y  total  mean s h a r e  As  i n f l u e n c e of  these  For  only  our  from  intervals  i s taken  f o r every  its relative  (1986)  points out,  on  i n the  the equal  in which  components s h o u l d  that  weighting amount o f equal ing ical  this  scheme.  Any  of  industrial  the and  solution  imbedded  each  indicator,  weighting  is  of  the  percentage state.  The  i n d i c a t o r s to  the  indicators is  'true'  is likely  i n the data not  one  can  one  o r more o f  the  indicators for different  ing  t h e amount  of  individual  the  p r e f e r a b l e to  capabilities. the  of  industrial  proportions  be m i x e d " ( p . 1 2 ) .  context,  system.  weight  and  a l l relevant  concerning  i n d i c a t o r s does military  identification  military  complex m a n i p u l a t i o n  error already  weighting  of  simple  ignorance  their  system.  of  argues  warrants  i s c a l c u l a t e d for every  a "studied confession the v a r i o u s  the  two  state across  standing  indicators  purposes, the  and  system c a p a b i l i t i e s  two  But,  a  complicated  to  increase  itself.  amount t o an  equal  weight-  the by  histor-  excluding  time frames and/or  state capabilities  the  Furthermore,  D e p e n d i n g on  respective capabilities  he  adjust-  d i r e c t e d towards  the  116  Both  industrial  industrial 1914.  indicator,  record. nature  A change  of  the wars o f  Prussia's  cal  these  i n the mid-Nineteenth military  armaments and  1 0  After  system  to mobilize,  these events,  t o s t a t e mi 1 i t a r y c a p a b i l i t i e s  t h e means t o  f o r two  loaded'  theAustrian  Prior to  centuries. and  France  armaments and  transport,  and  t h e importance of i n d u s t r i a l was r e c o g n i z e d  by t h e h i s t o r i -  actors.  This  change  incapabilities t o I87O,  indicates a  tors.  Prior  utility  for the comparative ranking  sight  one c a n q u e s t i o n  Russia, the  "the  t h e two  theactual  the main c o n c e r n  historical  directly  1 0  century.  relatively static  use o f i t s r a i l w a y  I87I t o  from  c a p a b i l i t i e s and  w e r e a t t r i b u t e d t o t h e new ' b r e e c h  over  1870 a n d o n e  i n d i c a t o r s i s b a s e d on t h e h i s t o r -  (1866)  her a r m i e s .  ization  i s excluded  Empire  effective  supply  consumption,  remained  victories  (I87O-I87I)  from  German u n i f i c a t i o n , forces  1816 t o  a r e excluded  i n t h e components o f m i l i t a r y  war o c c u r r e d  move m i l i t a r y  the  energy  The d e c i s i o n t o e x c l u d e  ical the  indicators  t o the  deep-rooted  situation. beliefs  military  need  to adjust  i n d i c a t o r s have t h e g r e a t e s t  of s t a t e s .  military  i st o provide  Although with  strength  a reasonable  For example,  our indica-  Anderson  o f s t a t e s such as representation of (1972:7)  a t t h e t i m e when d i s c u s s i n g R u s s i a n  and c r i p p l i n g  weaknesses o f Russia  hind-  during  speaks strength;  t h e decades  Howard (1976; 97*105) discusses therevolution i nm i l i t a r y forces and w a r d u r i n g t h i s p e r i o d . He n o t e s t h a t many o f t h e t e c h n o l o g i c a l c h a n g e s a p p e a r e d p r i o r t o t h e w a r s o f German u n i f i c a t i o n . However, f o r a v a r i e t y of reasons, states had e i t h e r ignored the d e v e l o p m e n t s o r e m p l o y e d them p o o r l y . He a t t r i b u t e s t h e P r u s s i a n success i n employing these changes t o the development o f a permanent a d m i n i s t r a t i v e s t r u c t u r e ; the General S t a f f . This s t r u c t u r e , a l o n g w i t h t h e changes employed by t h e P r u s s i a n s , were subsequently c o p i e d by a l l t h e E u r o p e a n p o w e r s a t v a r i o u s p o i n t s i n time a f t e r 1 8 7 1 . . S e e a l s o Bond (1983) a n d B r o d i e ( 1 9 7 6 ) .  117 after  1813  tering world  were l a r g e l y  facade still  of m i l i t a r y  carried  1870,  After  hidden from c o n t e m p o r a r i e s . power w h i c h  presented to  a clear  to m i l i t a r y  r e c o g n i t i o n of  power.  However,  this  recognition  equally  the  t a r y and  beliefs  of m i l i t a r y  or  t o World  military  and  (1972), and the  War  One  l e s s o n s of  capabilities.  W o r l d War  7 1  7 2  the  beliefs  importance of  the r e l a t i v e  As Howard  military  component,  about  the  the p o l i t i c a l  milipri-  importance of  (1961),  Anderson  understand  t h e 1870s.  71  While  these e l i t e s continued to  importance  of b a s i c  military  r e l a t i o n s h i p between m i l i t a r y  that p o l i t i c a l  importance of  does  elites  e l i t e s d i d not  for generations after  i t is likely  the true  One.  war  industrial  Given  elites,  undervalued  e v i d e n c e about  capabilities.  industrial  traditional  political  provide  The  (1983) p o i n t o u t ,  not d i s r e g a r d i n g stress  capabilities.  industrial Bond  the o u t s i d e  the importance o f  n o t mean t h a t d e c i s i o n - m a k e r s w e i g h e d industrial  glit-  conviction".  there is  industrialization  she  T o them t h e  decision-makers  the industrial  component  and also until  7 2  F o r e x a m p l e , Howard (1961:119) states: " B u t t h e l e s s o n s w h i c h now seem so evident in retrospect the armies o f Europe were to take f i f t y years to learn. Only the v e r y c l e a r s i g h t e d c o u l d have seen t h e t r i p l e s i g n i f i c a n c e o f 6 A u g u s t 1870: t h e c o l l a p s e o f t h e c a v alry; the t r a n s f o r m a t i o n of the i n f a n t r y ; and t h e t r i u m p h o f t h e gun". H a r t (i960) a r g u e s : " Y e t e v e n i n t h e f i r s t g r e a t war o f t h e twentieth century, i t was s t i l l c u s t o m a r y t o m e a s u r e c o m p a r a t i v e s t r e n g t h of armies i n 'x-thousand r i f l e s ' and ' y - t h o u s a n d s a b r e s ' , - so p e r s i s t e n t i s t h e g r i p o f t r a d i t i o n a l h a b i t s o f t h o u g h t . " T h i s i s e s p e c i a l l y t r u e o f t h e E u r o p e a n s t a t e s p r i o r t o 1914. War p l a n s were the domain of m i l i t a r y e l i t e s and they acted a s the main, i f not o n l y , venues of i n f o r m a t i o n i n t h i s r e g a r d f o r p o l i t i c a l e l i t e s , ( s e e S y n d e r , 1984; K e n n e d y , 1979)-  11-8  It  i salso useful  state capabilities ure  4.1  the  percentage  t o show t h e e f f e c t  have on t h e r e l a t i v e  shows how t h e a d d i t i o n share of  reveal  that  theaddition  effects  for  Great B r i t a i n  share  addition of declines tors  t h e v a r i o u s components o f  s t a n d i n g o f key s t a t e s .  of the i n d u s t r i a l  system c a p a b i l i t i e s  F r a n c e , Germany, a n d R u s s i a  Britain's  that  of the  industrial  and R u s s i a ,  the industrial  s i g n i f i c a n t l y with  indicators  Britain,  has o p p o s i t e  significantly  Conversely,  t h e above changes.  a l s o h a v e an o p p o s i t e a f f e c t  Great  a s Germany a n d F r a n c e .  rises  indicators.  affects  Comparing t h e p a t t e r n s  as w e l l  of system c a p a b i l i t i e s  indicators  h e l d by  I87O t o 1914.  from  Fig-  with the  Russia's  The i n d u s t r i a l  share indica-  on F r a n c e a n d Germany, a l b e i t  insig-  nificant.  Given these f i n d i n g s , indicator the  (iron/steel)  military  using both ties. lead  industrial  1984). study,  1870-1914  inflates  indicators  isreinforced.  thereby  reflecting  states outside of  overemphasizes B r i t a i n ' s t h e second  industrial this  a l l four  indicators  but  capabili-  indicator  inflation  Using  may  i s consis-  (See Kennedy,  a r e used  for the  the lessons of t o t a l war.  must a l s o  be  given  to  t h e European c o n t i n e n t .  the relative  7 3  the Russian c a p a b i l i t i e s ,  i n the Russian share,  W o r l d War One,  Consideration  7 3  alone  t o i n c l u d e o n l y one i n d u s t r i a l  t h e perceptions of the actors a t the time. After  consider  the period  theexclusion of  t o an i n f l a t i o n  tent with  for  indicators  Although  thedecision  impact of c o l o n i a l  the security In  interests  particular,  p o s s e s s i o n s on s t a t e  of  o n e must capabil-  The u s e o f t h e i r o n / s t e e l i n d i c a t o r , rather than energy consumption i s b a s e d on t h e p r o b l e m of data a v a i l a b i l i t y . Energy consumption f i g u r e s a r e o n l y a v a i l a b l e f o r t h e t r a d i t i o n a l s e t o f G r e a t Powers f r o m I 8 7 O - I 8 8 O . As s u c h , i t s u s e c o u l d b i a s t h e r a n k i n g s .  Select  FIGURE 1 . 1 C o m p a r i s o n o f t h e Impact o f I n d u s t r i a l I n d i c a t o r s on S t a t e  Shares.  France  Great Britain  L»9«nd  L*c)«nd  O II  t\  Year  Russia  Prussia/Germany  22 30 _ C o o in  18 -  § ,JW|  16 -  a.  A,/ ,0,  ' ~.  v  V  A f  A A:  £>  •to' 0  Year  Mtw.Nwiw  120  ities.  This  ability  and measurement.  deployed  i s a complex  military  i s s u e , compounded For example,  forces outside of  empires.  A t t h e same t i m e ,  Great  power p o o l  of their  i n both  nies d i d represent also provided  colonies a financial  tive  costs  However, t h e r e from other  are already  Japan  in  included  state,  they  is difficult,  we  I twould assume  require  a major  t h a t c o s t s equal  rule:  Russia.  ben-  It differs  virtue of i t s geo-political  i n d i c a t i o n o f these In 1 9 0 4 - 0 5 ,  l a n d m a s s . As s u c h ,  position,  the benefits  costs, Russia  fought  i n terms o f  a major  forces until  regime e s t a b l i s h e d i t s f i r s t  immediately  following the-Civil  followed  a s e r i e s of 1931-1939.  particularly  pro-  war w i t h  A f t e r t h e 1917 r e v o l u t i o n , A s i a n R u s s i a was a  i n several clashes with  from  It  colo-  i n thedata, but thecosts are not. History  The B o l s h e v i k  by  respective  While c e r t a i n  stuffs.  to this  a l s o engaged  troops  food  of c o u n t e r - r e v o l u t i o n a r y White  area, Mongolia,  their  on t h e m e t r o p o l i t a n  the Euro-Asian  i n the Far East.  1922.  drain  i s one e x c e p t i o n  deployments.  major center  and F r a n c e  adjustments.  i tastride  vides a general military  World Wars.  Therefore,  E u r o p e a n s t a t e s by  which places  Britain  a v a i l a b i l i t y problems, t o weigh p r o p e r l y t h e r e l a -  on i t s own.  a n d make no  Great  avail-  B r i t a i n a n d F r a n c e d i d u s e t h e man-  and b e n e f i t s o f t h e c o l o n i e s .  undertaking efits  both  Europe t o defend  k e y raw m a t e r i a l s a n d  independent of data  by p r o b l e m s o f d a t a  major m i l i t a r y  defeat  s a t e l l i t e in this  War.  Chinese warlords  their  The B o l s h e v i k s i n the Twenties,  confrontations  with  Japanese  121 It  i s necessary  for this drain  system.  But,  such  an adjustment  Figures are a v a i l a b l e on Russian 1909).  (Kuropatkin,  However,  deployments p r i o r  and  bilities  adjusted  Soviet  a r e not  nel  prior  forces there  not d e p l o y e d  (1976) .  7  *  7 5  7 6  capabilities  for  i n the Far  East.  Europe-  availability.  i n t h e war  against  Japan  no r e l i a b l e d a t a o n R u s s i a n  74  7 5  As s u c h ,  Russian  capa-  1919.  estimates of  from Japanese  intelligence  After  These e s t i m a t e s  the p e r i o d  we c a l c u l a t e t h e p e r c e n t a g e  a l s o t o a d j u s t the r e p o r t e d v a l u e s Russ i a .  is  t o 1919.  relevant coefficients  figures,  used  areavailable  as r e p o r t e d by Ikuhiko  p r o v i d e the  i s hampered b y d a t a  s u b s e q u e n t t o the war.  troop deployments  estimates  these  on R u s s i a n  t o a c t u a l amount o f c a p a b i 1 i t i e s d i r e c t e d t o w a r d s t h e  relative an  to account  a r e used t o  1919 1939• —  ofSoviet military  The r e s u l t i n g on the o t h e r  coefficients  Using personare  used  indicators for Soviet  7 6  The d e c i s i o n t o a d j u s t S o v i e t c a p a b i l i t i e s i n t h e I n t e r w a r p e r i o d i s b o l s t e r e d by the g e n e r a l u n r e l i a b i l i t y of reported c a p a b i l i t i e s on t h e f o u r indicators. It appears e v i d e n t i n the raw d a t a t h a t certain values, particularly iron/steel production, are. highly inflated. Thus, a d j u s t i n g f o r the c o s t s o f S o v i e t i n t e r e s t s i n the Far East a l s o s e r v e s t o m o d i f y the e f f e c t o f r e p o r t e d S o v i e t v a l ues. These estimates a r e e v e n more v i t a l g i v e n the border clashes b e t w e e n t h e s e two Power i n t h e l a t e T h i r t i e s (see Coox, 1977; L e e , 1983; and T i n c h , 1951) • I k u h i k o (1976:131) reports 100,000 S o v i e t t r o o p s i n t h e F a r E a s t p r i o r t h e M a n c h u r i a n i n c i d e n t i n 1931' B e g i n n i n g i n 1932, Soviet t r o o p s i n c r e a s e f r o m 230,000 t o 450,000 (1938). The r e s u l t i n g coe f f i c i e n t s a r e .8 (1922-1931), -75 (1932-1935), .74 (1936), .75  (1937) , and  .72 (1938) .  122  4.3  JHi  EUROPEAN GREAT POWERS 18l6-1939  Having the  outlined  the v a r i o u s adjustments  G r e a t P o w e r s c a n be  minimum  'f i ve'  shares are c a l c u l a t e d  figure  reveals  two  P r u s s i a , Turkey, of system  level.  Spain,  France,  its  share of c a p a b i l i t i e s  Conversely, Austria  this  The  on  states.  level  in  covers  consisting t h e 10  of  percent  the percentage  i n t o the upper  shares  Prussia increases cluster  of  states.  the ten percent Although due  the A u s t r o - P r u s s i a n  the next p e r i o d  the a d d i t i o n of  exact c o n t i n u i t y  u r e k.2.  Russia,  substantially  This  containing Russia,  1860s,  time d e c l i n e s below  in  capa-  to the War,  level.  Italy  climbs  unification it  declines  1866.  after  though  7 7  change  largely  participation  a  found above the t e n p e r c e n t  During the  and moves  at this  g e n e r a l p a t t e r n and  hold  is  above the t e n p e r c e n t l e v e l ,  F i g u r e 4-3 based  Austria,  below  cluster,  in i860.  p r o c e s s and below  second  state  indicators.  cluster,  e n t e r s into the p i c t u r e  Italy  initially  The  shows a s i g n i f i c a n t  t h e r a n k i n g o f two  One  holding  are present-  i n which  t h e two m i l i t a r y  measures,  states  capabilities  resides consistently  and  and  Only  I8l6-l870  c l u s t e r s of s t a t e s .  and  It also  Finally,  from  capabilities.  Great B r i t a i n ,  system  r e p r e s e n t s the p e r i o d  bility  level  empirically.  percent share of t o t a l  Figure 4.2  ed.  identified  t o our c a p a b i l i t y  a third  rank of  (1870-1914).  indicator;  Great B r i t a i n , more t h a n  ten percent  is replicated  i s absent  F r a n c e and  are  iron/steel production.  the v a r i o u s s t a t e s  in reported shares  State shares  Germany  of system  relative  to  (Prussia)  even Figeach  capabilities.  7 7  The c o m p a r a t i v e s t a n d i n g f o r Germany and F r a n c e r e p l i c a t e t h e f i n d i n g s o f H e a l y and S t e i n ( 1 9 7 4 ) f o r t h e 1 8 7 0 s . The F r e n c h s h a r e i n t h i s d e c a d e i s shown t o be h i g h e r t h a n t h e German; a point c r i t i q u e d by S c r o e d e r ( 1 9 7 7 ; 1 9 7 7 b ) He a r g u e s t h a t t h i s f i n d i n g c o n -  Figure 4.2 State Shares of European System Capabilities 1816-1870  Legend A  Great Britain  X  France  •  Prussia  B  Austro-Hungory  2  Rus_sjp_  X  ltaly_  $  Jurkey_  © Spain  1816  ! 1822  ! 1828  , 1834  1840 1846 Year  1852  1858  1864  1870  1  -_ .  Figure 4.3 State Shares of European System Capabilities 1871-1914 30-i  28262422-* 20 c <D O CD Q_  1816  i\  * # * t * t  Legend  14  A  Great Britain  12  X  France  •  Germany  0  Austro-Hungory  10 8 H  6 4 •* 1870  /x  1874  /\  1878  r  188?  1886  18S0 v  1894  ear  .  1898  1902  1906  1910  1914  S  Russia  X  ltaly_  0  Turkey  •  125  Austro-Hungary percent.  Turkey  does n o t r i s e  Figure  ain  and I t a l y  a l s o makes a b r i e f  above t h e seven  4.4  (1919-1939)' tern  (Austria)  contains  hold s i g n i f i c a n t l y appearance  percent  found on t h e p r e v i o u s f i g u r e s  (1876-1880).  for the  ona l l four  period.  Soviet Russia,  civil  war, enters with  below  the tenpercent  percent  i n 1924.  threshold, period.  this  d e c l i n e s below  absent  level  By 1926,  begins this  All  7 8  period,  prior  to  1922 d u e t o  Its share  attains  declines  low o f seven  the ten percent  theperiod  a t the ten percent l e v e l ,  but  level  for the remaining years, Finally,  from  Brit-  two y e a r s o f t h e  i n 1923. a n d r e a c h e s a p e r i o d Union  Great  of the  with  an average  P o l a n d m e e t s t h e minimum  require-  1924 t o 1934.  This level  G r e a t Power s t a t u s .  thefinal  t h e graph  the Soviet  The p a t -  above i t f o r t h e remainer  three Figures reveal  capabilities.  from  here.  period  significantly  share of eight percent. ments f o r i n c l u s i o n  during  Interwar  for the e n t i r e  an e i g h t e e n p e r c e n t s h a r e .  and remains Italy  level  I t s share  indicators.  i s less apparent  a n d Germany a r e a b o v e t h e t e n p e r c e n t l e v e l  w h i l e France drops below  than t e n  level.  t h e measures  S t a t e shares a r e based  less  a break  a t the tenpercent level  appears  t o b e t h e minimum r e q u i r e m e n t f o r  A lower p e r c e n t a g e would  lead  o f system  to the inclusion  t r a d i c t s t h e s m a s h i n g d e f e a t o f F r a n c e i n 1870-71 and subsequent diplomatic record. A l e x a n d r o f f e t . a l (1977) r e s p o n d w i t h a d i f f e r ent i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of the h i s t o r i c a l record. The r e l a t i v e m e r i t s of t h e two arguments a r e l e f t t o t h e r e a d e r . I t i salso possible that t h e French s t a n d i n g i s a f u n c t i o n of the i n c l u s i o n of c o l o n i a l f o r c e s , although t h edata i su n c l e a r on t h i s p o i n t . It i s suffice to note t h a t our f i n d i n g s a r e n o t g r e a t l y d i v e r g e n t from t h e l i k e l y s t a t e of a f f a i r s a t t h i s time. 7 8  This  level  differs  substantially  from  the level  proposed  by Model-  Figure 4.4 State Shares of European System Capabilities 1920-1938 36 -j  34-^ 32-\  1920  1922  1924  1926  1928 Year  1930  1932  1934  1936  ^938  127  of  such  states  as Turkey,  G r e a t Powers a t v a r i o u s requirement also been seen  Also,  and/or  actual  may  b e more a p p a r e n t  tem  elements  which  who h a v e  are  with  Prussia  (1860-1939)•  and I t a l y  179  system  the orthodox view o f a f i v e  between these  lead  they  I t i s true  hold  Y e t ,historians,  qualify  their  arguments.  related  t o the f a i l u r e  traditional  t o c a p t u r e and m e a s u r e a l l  t o G r e a t Power s t a t u s ,  Austro-Hungary  in which  f i n d i n g s and  inability  than r e a l .  Prussia,  t h e time span  capabilities.  These s t a t e s  share  system.  the  during  of certain states  Powers.  in contrast  the d i s c r e p a n c y  identify  However, a t e n p e r c e n t  (1870-1914),  a r g u m e n t s may b e a p r o d u c t o f a n  torians  the ranks o f the  r e s u l t s i n the t r e a t m e n t o f the European  power s y s t e m ,  Although  in time.  as Great  Austro-Hungary  s i x power  and Poland w i t h i n  leads t o the e x c l u s i o n  their exclusion  as a f o u r  points  traditionally  (1816-1870),  Spain,  and  that  the discrepancy  the m a j o r i t y  Italy  as Great  of hisPowers  l e s s than ten p e r c e n t o f sysa s shown b e l o w ,  In p a r t i c u l a r ,  these  o f the aforementioned  significantly  q u a l i f i c a t i o n s are  states  t o have  system  wide o r general s e c u r i t y i n t e r e s t s .  s k i (1974) and a p p l i e d b y R a p k i n e t . a l . (1979) and Thompson O986). They a r g u e t h a t f i v e p e r c e n t i s t h e minimum r e q u i r e m e n t f o r a G r e a t Power. B u t , t h i s minimum a s shown a b o v e i s n o t e m p i r i c a l l y s a t i s factory. I t s h o u l d a l s o be noted that the Modelski proposal a l s o i n c l u d e s a b a s i c d i s t r i b u t i o n a l r e q u i r e m e n t among t h e s e t o f s t a t e s w i t h more t h a n f i v e p e r c e n t o f s y s t e m c a p a b i l i t i e s . The f i v e perc e n t minimum, a s shown a b o v e , d o e s n o t meet t h e t e s t o f h i s t o r i c a l validity. The use o f an a d d i t i o n a l d i s t r i b u t i o n a l r e q u i r e m e n t conf l i c t s w i t h t h e r e l a t i o n s h i p b e t w e e n G r e a t P o w e r s and p o l a r i t y (see d i s c u s s i o n o n p o l a r i z a t i o n i n C h a p t e r 5) and c a n n o t c o v e r t h e w i d e variety of possible d i s t r i b u t i o n s without ambiguity. 7 9  T h e d e c i s i o n t o u s e I87O a s t h e operational date t h e l i k e l y l a g b e t w e e n t h e e v e n t s o f 1866 and I87O, change i n the i n d i c a t o r s which o c c u r s a t t h i s d a t e .  i s a product of as w e l l as the  128 s t a t u s p r i o r t o t h e 1860s,  Concerning Prussia's i n d i c a t e her l i m i t e d a realistic four  view  r o l e and i n t e r e s t s .  o f Europe a t t h i s  and Russia.  Anderson  G r e a t Power s t a n d i n g a courtesy he  identifies  a t the time of  the b e l i e f  Anderson a l s o p o i n t s eign  policy  this  period  Powers ited  indicates  198O) . • •  historians. Bond  t a r i l y with labels  a general  was o n l y  years  divided  into  that  Aus-  Prussia's  Metternich  a second  (See a l s o  simply  i n 1833»  rate  actor.  four  h i s t o r i e s of  aforementioned  the Prussian  presence  see A1brect-Carrie,  (For example,  for1951;  Holborn,  survey of d i p l o m a t i c  t h e dominance o f t h e  Great lim1958;  •  in  s t a t u s a f t e r t h e 1860s i s a l s o  Echoing our f i n d i n g s ,  (1983)  that  unassuming nature of P r u s s i a n  next t h i r t y  German t h e a t r e  Austria's decline  and  that Prussia  Finally,  suggests  France,  indicates  Citing  i n system wide s e c u r i t y a f f a i r s w i t h  to the  Cragg,  the  historians  t h e C o n g r e s s o f V i e n n a was  Powers.  to the limited  during  Thomson, 1958).  by G r e a t B r i t a i n ,  (1972:10-11)  extended by t h e other  0979:8)  Sked  t i m e shows a E u r o p e  spheres of influence c o n t r o l l e d  tria,  several  point out that  the other  t h e E m p i r e as  Taylor  (1954),  A u s t r i a could  Great Powers. a mere s h e l l  81  duly  Anderson  no l o n g e r  Power.  (1972),  compete  More s p e c i f i c a l l y ,  of a Great  noted by  mili-  Anderson  He a r g u e s  that  8 0  A u s e f u l way t o c h e c k o u t t h i s b e l i e f w o u l d be t h r o u g h a content a n a l y s i s of major h i s t o r i c a l t e x t s . In f a c t , a comparison of our f i n d i n g s w i t h s u c h an a n a l y s i s w o u l d go f a r i n s e t t l i n g t h e p r o b l e m of t h e ambigious s t a t u s of c e r t a i n s t a t e s .  8 1  The a r g u m e n t s made by T a y l o r i n h i s p r e f a c e and t h e subsequent a r g u m e n t s made i n the text are a classic example of t h e lack o f concern by many h i s t o r i a n s a b o u t t h e d e f i n i t i o n and c o n s i s t e n t a p p l i c a t i o n of concepts. The p r e f a c e c l e a r l y s t r e s s e s t h e second r a t e s t a t u s o f t h e A u s t r o - H u n g a r i a n E m p i r e a n d I t a l y . The t e x t c o n s i s t e n t l y l a b e l s t h e s e two s t a t e s a s G r e a t P o w e r s . T h i s i s a l s o t h e c a s e f o r R o s s (1983) and t h e o t h e r a u t h o r s c i t e d a b o v e .  129 Austria  r a p i d l y became a c l i e n t o f  cessful  war  also  implies a  designs  i n the  Austria. the  only  od.  h a v i n g been e x p e l l e d  argue  ing the  that  the  a t Adowa  ing to a c t o r s 1914, ble  Central  Ottomann Empire  ing defeat  and  followed influence  Italy's  military  Italy  Powers (Bridge  second  Versailles. the  b y her  Russian  German s u p p o r t  and  Central  Balkans  to  Europe,  (Burridge  rate status  of  As Thomson Italian  (1958:579)  (1972), and  and  Bullen,  and  political  weaknesses  a Great  of  issues  regard-  Italian  rate  n e u t r a l i t y in  s i d e , had  In f a c t ,  stand-  a negligi-  Italy  (Kennedy, 1984:15).  rapidly Finally,  in I t a l y ' s l i m i t e d role  remarks about d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g  Premier Orlando  in April  taken avowedly,  its  Italy's humiliat-  i t s second  allied  clearly  Power.  is a function  I98O).  war.  peri-  (1983) a n d  Furthermore,  the  this  Bond  l i m i t e d to  demonstrates  resources  is apparent  Italy during  an equal  p a r t i c i p a t i o n on the  on the outcome  d e p a r t u r e of  as  and  observers a l i k e .  t a n t d e c i s i o n s were h e n c e f o r t h  6 2  that  a s p i r a t i o n s t o be  (1882)  (1896) c l e a r l y  became a n o t h e r d r a i n o n A l l i e d its  (1951:45)  Holborn  notes  Italy  for  (1964), A n d e r s o n  a n y t r e a t m e n t of  a l l i a n c e with  and  to the  findings  ensured a second r a t e s t a t u s , d e s p i t e Moreover,  state.  because of  from  is limited  to e n t e r t a i n a suc-  82  (1954) , L e s l i e  (1983)  Ross  deterred  e v i d e n c e s u p p o r t s our  Taylor  able  relationship  Balkans were o n l y  foreign policy  1988).  Similar  another second r a t e  client-patron  Finally,  Empire's  Young,  against  Germany,  1919;  "Most  a s t h e y had  at  after impor-  previously  Many h i s t o r i a n s c i t e t h e i n t e r n a l w e a k n e s s e s o f t h e E m p i r e as shown be p o l i t i c a l concessions to the Hungarian a r i s t o c r a c y . Taylor (1954:358) also i d e n t i f i e s a b e l i e f held by s e v e r a l e l i t e s at the t u r n of the c e n t u r y t h a t the Empire would c o l l a p s e on the death of F r a n z J o s e p h and b e d i v i d e d b e t w e e n Germany and R u s s i a . In p a r t i c u l a r , R u s s i a a c t i v e l y p r o m o t e d s u c h a scheme.  130 been t a k e n s u b s t a n t i v e l y , by t h e famous B i g  While  t o 1919 c a n b e r e a d i l y  I t a l y ' s G r e a t Power s t a t u s p r i o r  missed,  its  shown a b o v e ,  status  i n the  Italy,  until  Interwar  period  the f i n a l  capabilities.  guarantor  (1925)•  in  1930s a r e c o n c e r n e d  the e a r l y  as a n a l l y Austria  Pact  t o d e t e r German  (Stresa  ment of  The  decline  Bolshevik Russia  security  issues.  becomes g r e a t l y is c l e a r l y  With  this  One.  nature is  is d i f f i c u l t  Italy  cases f o r Prussia  of Italy  Austria,  i n c l u s i o n of P r u s s i a  1914 and  Italy  f o r the  and  seek  By t h e  her  relation  to  is partially the T r e a t y of  German  and  rearma-  the  isolation  role  i n system  late  Any  Italy  1930s,  limited  caused  i t s key g e o - p o l i t i c a l as a G r e a t Power  Italy  leads us to a p p l y  two  status  by W o r l d  War  position, i t  i n the  However, t h e a m b i g u i t y , a l o n g w i t h and  France  Spanish adventures,  i s not a G r e a t Power.  Power s e t s f o r t h e t e s t i n g o f o u r  The  and  and  is a  Germany.  important because of  here.  share  Italy's  a f u n c t i o n of the the upheaval  to conceive  sense d e f i n e d  1920s i n f l a t e s  of  in  share begins with  the A b y s i n n i a n  rate c l i e n t  Italy  and  stemming from  d e p e n d e n t o n German s u p p o r t .  a second  Although  Italian  A l s o , German r e s t r i c t i o n s  d u r i n g the  In t h e t r u e s e n s e , of  restrictions  in Italy's  i n the m i d - T h i r t i e s .  especially  However, t h e  a f u n c t i o n o f German m i l i t a r y Versailles.  I t a l i a n behavior  As  averages an  Both Great B r i t a i n  about  dis-  issue.  Politically,  expansionism,  Conference).  i s a complex  years of the p e r i o d ,  e i g h t p e r c e n t share of system i n the Locarno  Three..."  the  capability respective  distinct  Great  hypotheses.  Austria  I n t e r w a r e r a has  f o r the e n t i r e p e r i o d some h i s t o r i c a l  merit.  prior t o In t h e  131 cases of  Prussia prior  must be g i v e n t o t h e i r Power p r i o r according It  is this  belief  and  earlier  status.  t o o u r own f i n d i n g s A u s t r i a  Prussia  is  a state's  example,  both  F r a n c e and  In t h e c a s e o f I t a l y ,  World  War One w h i c h  as a G r e a t P o w e r . claim of Italian  warrant  Great B r i t a i n  Two.  period  i t i s t h e abnormal  p r o v i d e s some d e g r e e However,  there  In s o d o i n g ,  we c a n c o m p a r e o u r  Power d e b a t e  distributions  and a l l i a n c e s .  of Great B r i t a i n , from  adds  affects  France,  1816 t o I87O, and  Prussia  this  I n a more c o n -  c o n t i n u e t o be r e c o g -  situation  W o r l d War  stemming  from  t o i t s treatment  no e v i d e n c e t o s u p p o r t  the  sets of Great  Powers.  to judge the e x t e n t to which capability  s e t o f G r e a t Powers  R u s s i a f o r the  Germany f r o m  (1816-1870),  it.  r e l a t i o n s h i p between  The f i r s t and  to m a i n t a i n  earlier.  findings the  t o 1870.  of time a f t e r  T h e s e c a v e a t s s u p p o r t t h e u s e o f two d i s t i n c t  set  N a p o l e o n i c e r a , and  of support  exists  G r e a t Power s t a t u s any  a Great  a G r e a t Power p r i o r  capabilities  a s G r e a t Powers f o r a s i g n i f i c a n t  Austria  is clearly  p r e v i o u s r e c o g n i t i o n w h i c h may b i a s e l i t e s  nized  the Great  I87O c o n s i d e r a t i o n  Austria after  t o the d i s a s t e r s experienced i n the  long a f t e r  temporary  t o I87O  Austria  entire  consists  temporal  span,  I87O t o 1939.  The second  (1870-1914),  and I t a l y  (1919-1939).  k.h  MEASURING THE DISTRIBUTION OF C A P A B I L I T I E S  The both  procedure  f o r measuring  s e t s o f G r e a t Powers  the  i s found  c u s s e d a t l e n g t h b y Ray and  Singer  distribution  of c a p a b i l i t i e s for  in Singer e t . a l . (1979).  (1972)  S i n g e r and  and  dis-  Ray a r g u e  that  132 any  measure of  readily the  distribution  i n t e r p r e t a b l e and  proportions  units  i n the  s e t must be concern at the  first  hand. three  as  specific  Singer  constant  units within  number o f lead  by  c a s e s or  to the  p r o c e d u r e p r o v i d e s an actor  dominance.  and  Ray,  of  cases.  two  sets  The  i f the  but  and  Ray,  e a c h s e t do  range of  of  the  the  adopted  G r e a t Powers  s e t of  is  each  two  the  theoretical  condition.  c a s e s or s e n s i t i v The  0,  Ray  to  The  index  the the  which  single  by  Singer  the  number  findings  consistent.  of  This  1,  identified  t o compare the  is calculated.  in  procedure.  equality,  individual actor's  though  difference  i n r a n g e d e p e n d i n g on  i s not  number  G r e a t Power s e t s  and  distribution  then c a l c u l a t e d .  cases w i t h i n  case.  procedures,  difficult indices  the  final  It i s the  Singer  other  the  i n our  change.  the  in  G r e a t Powers even  index ranging from  within  shares  of  t o movement  to the  number o f  i s moot of  be  m e a s u r e m e n t p r o c e d u r e s meet  between the  in part,  First,  these  i n the  I t must  represent a l l  number o f  to s a t i s f y  in both sets  straightforward.  of  fail  changes  i t w o u l d be  creation  the  in the  i n d i c e s which d i f f e r  Thus,  I t must r e a c t  t h a t most t h e  In c o n t r a s t ,  produce  conditions.  i n a manner a p p r o p r i a t e  observations  adoption,  four  I t must a c c u r a t e l y  changes  They f i n d  problem of  defined  cases remains  for  conditions,  However, the ity,  units.  Finally,  accounted  must meet  comparable.  among t h e  set.  8 3  for  our  8 4  is  relatively  s h a r e of c a p a b i l i t i e s The  standard  resulting  score  deviation is  then  8 3  They r e f e r t o t h e i r a p p r o a c h as t h e measurement of concentration, not d i s t r i b u t i o n . T h i s i s o n l y a s e m a n t i c d i f f e r e n c e . For r e a s o n s o f c l a r i t y , t h e s t u d y w i l l c o n s i s t e n t l y r e f e r t o t h e m e a s u r e as one of the d i s t r i b u t i o n of c a p a b i l i t i e s .  8 4  S i n g e r and Ray p o i n t o u t mathematical p r o p e r t i e s .  that  a l l the  procedures  contain  similar  133 divided hoids  by  all  the  poss i b l e c a p a b i 1 i t i es.  power s e t and ing  .80  The  when one  state  i s .75  in  a four  square r o o t of  the  result-  which can  r a n g e f r o m 0,  complete i e q u a l i t y . This procedure  is  per-  repeated  each y e a r l y o b s e r v a t i o n .  /  n  / / / DIST=  1 \ /_ i=l  /  (Si) n  /  For  limit  V  /  n  index, the y e a r l y scores are adjusted  of a t h r e e year  the e f f e c t s  1 —  1 -  each d i s t r i b u t i o n  the use  moving average.  of b r i e f  shocks  on  the m o b i l i z a t i o n of s t a t e r e s o u r c e s the Great year. tional  The  Powers would  the d i s t r i b u t i o n .  significantly  moving average s e r v e s  This adjustment  in response skew t h e  score for of  through  serves  For  to a c r i s i s  to reduce the e f f e c t  to  example, by  one  of  any  single  these  excep-  occurrences.  In g e n e r a l , t h e p a t t e r n s shown on atively  -  2  /  \  es  deviation  denominator  d i s t r i b u t i o n score  1.0,  to  The  power s e t .  in a f i v e  value produces a  feet equality, for  standard  maximum p o s s i b l e  identical.  i t s lowest  significantly  The  distribution  p o i n t at the away  t u r n of  from e q u a l i t y  F i g u r e h.S  f o r both  moves t o w a r d s e q u a l i t y  the century. up  sets are  to the  From h e r e ,  break at World  and  rel-  reach-  i t moves War  One.  134 After  the war, the d i s t r i b u t i o n  quality  is  mid-1930s. the  f o l l o w e d by At t h i s  two i n d i c e s  index for  a trend  point,  the former  i s . 198,  whereas the  i s expected given the  The  of a s t a t e ,  tively should Six.  lead  to  higher  However, c e r t a i n  During index;  the Interwar  a reversal  i n the  levels  placed  ailles.  With the i n c l u s i o n  German  creation  inequality  tern reversal.  until  In  Italian  F r a n c e and G r e a t B r i t a i n  The s c o r e s index  f o r the  i n the late  composition of the until  1870,  four  the rapid  sets.  with  relaindex  i n Chapter  h i g h e r on t h e f o u r  largely  Power  levels,  in  of the  lim-  i n the Treaty  of Vers-  i n d e x , and weak  to  pat-  cross at the  the case because of the r e l a -  are  capabilities only  at this  slightly  less  same than  1930s.  Power  This r i s e  decline  .148.  two  one s h o u l d e x p e c t t h i s  capabilities  Power  The mean  in t h i s comparison. ,  These higher  military  i n the late  1860s.  discussed  i n t h e F i v e Power  i t i s not  four Great  Power  f i v e Power  one w o u l d e x p e c t t h e l i n e s  re-armament,  fact,  as  resources  of I t a l y  t i v e d e c l i n e o f F r e n c h and B r i t i s h time.  of the  is  t h e mid-1930s,  Although  the  expected,  the f i v e  t o I87I,  index, are a f u n c t i o n  on German m i l i t a r y  capabilities  p o i n t o f German  Prussia prior  o f t h e pre-1914 p a t t e r n .  itations  ine-  mean f o r t h e l a t t e r s e t i s  anomalies are present  c o m p a r i s o n t o t h e f i v e Power  Also,  As  G r e a t Power o n e .  of i n e q u a l i t y ,  years,  increases.  of  until  d i f f e r e n c e between t h e  s u c h as  weak c a p a b i l i t i e s  level  equality  r=.9l46.  than than four  This finding inclusion  rapidly  correlated;  higher  A high  towards g r e a t e r  inequality  are highly  is consistently  is curvilinear.  index.  index  r i s e above  is a function With the  the other  of changes i n the  e x c l u s i o n of P r u s s i a  of Austrian c a p a b i l i t i e s  (see F i g u r e  FIGURE 4.5 Distribution  Scores of  the  Four and F i v e Power Data S e t s .  0.300-1  1818-1938  Four Power F i v e Power  0.075 0.050  1818  1833  1938  CO  136  4.2)  pushes the  replacement  b y Germany,  other words, Austria,  i n d e x up.  whereas a r i s i n g  of  inequality,  It  in  more d r a m a t i c evident  .060 i n t h e e a r l y from  .18 t o  final  former  Again,  similar, result our  hypotheses.  to operationa1ize  p a t t e r n resumes.  In  weak  state,  i n the  1860s.  it  to higher  levels  i n 1871 -  by P r u s s i a  The  index  Nineteenth  .125 i n  respective decline  f o r the  in the f i v e  reflects  Power  But, b e f o r e examining dependent  sets  l870s t o  latter  set is  i n c l u s i o n of a  are  relatively  These d i f f e r e n c e s relationships  these f i n d i n g s ,  variable.  the  The  index.  t h e two  v a r i a n c e i n the s t r e n g t h of  the  i s most  Century.  approximately  this difference  i s much  This difference  of the  the p a t t e r n s between  our  its  relatively  index pushes  a l t h o u g h some d i f f e r e n c e s d o e x i s t .  i n some  and  i s excluded  power o n e .  decades  weak P o w e r , A u s t r i a - H u n g a r y ,  In c o n c l u s i o n ,  Prussia,  d e c l i n e from  l890s.  .14.  of Austria  t h a t movement o n t h e f o u r power  than on the f i v e  d u r i n g the  s c o r e s on the  state,  i t s replacement  i s a l s o apparent  removal  index c o n t a i n s a  t h e f o u r Power  until  the  the general comparative  t h e f o u r Power  A u s t r i a n weakness  With  should  tested  from  i t i s necessary  Chapter ALLIANCES AND  This chapter i s  concerned with  t i o n of the dependent ances  variable:  are conceptualized  general  V  POLARIZATION  the d e f i n i t i o n  alliances.  i n t h r e e ways.  c a t e g o r y of s t a t e b e h a v i o r ,  capabi1ities  over time.  defence pacts,  which  ship states w i l l bilities.  seek  Finally,  ments from t h e  are viewed  Alliances are  are  as  limited  t o one  t o an u n e q u a l  a l l i a n c e s a r e examined  system p e r s p e c t i v e ,  with  alli-  t r e a t e d as a  on t h e d i s t r i b u t i o n  t h e most l i k e l y  i n response  operationaliza-  In o u r h y p o t h e s e s ,  dependent  Alliances  and  specific  form of  type,  relation-  distribution  of  as t h e p a t t e r n of  r e f e r e n c e to  of  capa-  commit-  the concept of  polari2ation.  The  chapter  definition  and  is divided  into three  classification  of a l l i a n c e s ,  s h i p between the c l a s s i f i c a t i o n a n c e o f Power t h e o r y . c a t i o n s made t o project. this  our a n a l y s i s . spective of  system  P a r t one as w e l l  scheme a d o p t e d  second  part  by  identifies  the a l l i a n c e data set developed  It also  s t u d y and  The  parts.  identifies  final  as the  this  the  relation-  s t u d y and  the v a r i o u s  i n i t i a 11y  modifiCOW  t h e two m e a s u r e s o f a l l i a n c e s e m p l o y e d  in  results  part addresses a l l i a n c e s  i n the c o n t e x t of the debate over polarization.  -  137  -  by  Bal-  the  p r o v i d e s the d e s c r i p t i v e The  examines  f o r t h e s e measures i n from the system  t h e m e a n i n g and  per-  measurement  138 5.1  ALLIANCES  A l l i a n c e s a r e not only  integral  a l s o a fundamental  element  in  many  Chapter  research.  Two,  exist, This  in  however,  An a l l i a n c e  man, 1970; O s g o o d ,  in  realm.  c o n c e r t a t X time  T h e r e does  l i t e r a t u r e on a l l i a n c e s .  information  on t h e r e l e v a n t  of a l l i a n c e s .  o r bond b e t w e e n s t a t e s . intrinsic  (Ward, 1982; H o l s t i 1963; L i s k a ,  that an a l l i a n c e  et.al., 1962) .  r e g a r d i n g t h e mutual  It differs  relationship with 1973;  defi-  s e t of states  enhancement  1968:68).  Freed-  Although  i s "a l i m i t e d  o f the  military  s e c u r i t y o f t h e members"  alliance  r e q u i r e s a f o r m a l i z e d r e l a t i o n s h i p between s t a t e s embodied i n  a treaty.  This requirement  (Fedder,  empirical  formation are  198l).  and c l a s s i f i c a t i o n  1968;. Mode 1 s k i ,  most a g r e e  have escaped  Job,  o f bonds b e c a u s e o f i t s  the m i l i t a r y / s e c u r i t y  acting  wealth of  i s one t y p e o f l i n k  from o t h e r types  nitions vary,  1982;  (Ward,  to the d e f i n i t i o n  Y e t , as noted  studies of a l l i a n c e  a l a r g e body o f t h e o r e t i c a l a  theory, but are  politics.  alliances  empirical  the f i e l d  1iterature provides  issues related  of i n t e r n a t i o n a l  facets of  In p a r t i c u l a r ,  notably absent  t o B a l a n c e o f Power  Furthermore an  serves to d i f f e r e n t i a t e a l l i a n c e  from t h e  more g e n e r i c c a t e g o r y o f a l i g n m e n t .  Alignments  are informal  i n n a t u r e and  t i o n among s t a t e s  towards  As shown i n T a b l e  IV, a l i g n m e n t d i f f e r s  t a n t i v e ways.  However,  circumstances analignment  others over  Morgenthau  a r e d e f i n e d as a p r e d i s p o s i -  a h o s t o f i s s u e s (Ward, from a l l i a n c e  (1973)  indicates  in several  such  subs-  that in certain  can be t h e e q u i v a l e n t of an a l l i a n c e .  i n t e r e s t s o f s t a t e s may be o b v i o u s and i d e n t i c a l  1982).  that j o i n t  The poli-  139  T a b l e IV Comparison  of Alignment,  Alliance,  and C o a l i t i o n  A l i i ance  A l i gnment  C o a 1 i t i on  Tempora1 S i gn i ng  No S i m p l i f i ed Way  Techniques from formation i t s e l f t o game s o l u t i o n  Mi 1i t a r y Defence Sector  B e y o n d Mi^l i t a r y to Economic, Pol-Stabi1i ty  Single Area  E x c l u s i v i ty of Membership  C r o s s - C u t t i ng Possible  Overlapping 6 C r o s s - C u t t i ng  NO O v e r l a p p i n g 6 C r o s s - C u t t i ng  Goal s  Increased Secur i t y  Non-Spec i f i c  Uti1i ty Max i m i z a t i on  Resources  A g g r e g a t i on  Same  Same  E/W v s . N/S Reg v s . G l o b a l  Mi n ima1 Wi n n i ng N  Ind i c a t i o n of Formation  ssues  Types  Issue  Temporal Structure  Dramatic Temporal D i s c o n t i n u i t i es Di s s o l v e / F o r m  F l u i d but S l o w Change  Timebound t o Game S i t u a t i o n  Re 1 a t i o n s h i p to Intl. Envi r o n .  Specific to Mi 1i t a r y Balance  R e f l e c t s or Compr i s e s  S i t u a t i on determ i nes Outcome o f  Consequences of Changes  Outcomes  Non-Spec i f i c  Outcome 6 Payoffs  Potential Impli c a t i ons  E l i c i t Forma 1 Spec i f i c Deduct i ons  Unc1 e a r  Same a s A l i i ances  Source  - Ward  (1982)  140  cies  and  actions  such as  B u t , such  is u n l i k e l y identical converge  that  informal  state  malized  co-ordination.  Table  Even when  likely  While states  t o be r a r e . issues  lead  IV a l s o  does not  shows t h e  will  mean t h a t  conditions  i s more a p t l y  as w e l l  allied  scope of  and p o l -  A  during  terms.  Simi-  and i n t e r -  of a l l i a n c e .  as i t s a p p l i c a t i o n  o f Power,  t o g e t h e r under  a r e the presence of a s t a t e  France  the  equivalent  seen as a k i n d  l i t e r a t u r e on t h e B a l a n c e  of war.  in oth-  s e e k s t i 1 1 some  i n game t h e o r e t i c  t h e two c o n c e p t s a r e  i t s game t h e o r y r o o t s ,  of s t a t e s  states  s e e k some f o r -  to limit  t h e y wi11  be  s i m i l a r i t y b e t w e e n a l l i a n c e and c o a l i t i o n ,  sistent with  to a s e t  to  It  8 5  Coalition  traditional  states  t o e n s u r e an a d e q u a t e d e g r e e o f c e r t a i n t y  changeable.  against  S t a t e s and  t h e i n t e r e s t s o f two  may s e e k  even though t h e l a t t e r i s f o r m u l a t e d  8 5  are likely  i n t e r e s t s over a wide range of  policy will  relationship.  outbreak  relationship,  between t h e U n i t e d  c o m m i t m e n t when s u c h c o n f l i c t s e x i s t ,  larity  formal  i n the m i l i t a r y / s e c u r i t y realm, c o n f l i c t i n g i n t e r e s t s  degree of f o r m a l i t y icy  need f o r a  relationships  with another s t a t e .  areas of foreign  their  the  the contemporary r e l a t i o n s h i p  Israel.  er  result without  Coni n the  c o a l i t i o n i s applied  certain conditions.  These  s e e k i n g s y s t e m hegemony a n d t h e  prominent example  is  the various  the Revolutionary/Napoleonic era  coalitions (For.example,  Naturally, t h e r e w i l l be t h e o c c a s i o n a l c a s e w h e r e an a l l i a n c e r e l a t i o n s h i p i s n o t e m b o d i e d by a f o r m a l t r e a t y . One e x a m p l e i s t h e A n g l o - F r e n c h r e l a t i o n s h i p d u r i n g t h e 1930s. In t h i s c a s e , t h e a l l i a n c e bond b e t w e e n F r a n c e and B r i t a i n i s evident i n the holding o f s t a f f t a l k s , b r i e f l y i n 193& a n d e x t e n s i v e l y i n 1939» and t h e c o o r d i n a t i o n o f p o l i c y i n such s i t u a t i o n s as t h e Munich C r i s i s (see Adamthwaite,1977; Howard, 1972; Tay1 or,1SGk). In t h e s e r a r e c a s e s , one m u s t be a w a r e o f t h e h i s t o r i c a l r e c o r d . However, t o speak o f such r e l a t i o n s h i p s as i n f o r m a l a l l i a n c e s i s to misrepresent the historical record.  141 see  1955).  Gullick,  With  the  defeat  Great B r i t a i n , France, Prussia, ple  Russia  the  coalition  i s r e p l a c e d by  the  of  Quadru-  8  the  this  example,  war  s e r v e s as  anti-Napoleon a l l i a n c e  war,  the  label.  coalition  However,  the  coalition  successor  and  exile  F r e n c h hegemony.  key  of  a  Napoleon.  alliance  appears  condition for  i n the  differentiating  condition  With an  the  as  or  defence  f u n c t i o n of  identical;  well  labeling the pact  s y s t e m hegemon d o e s  Thus, the  is  for  c o n c l u s i o n of  alliance  potential  In t h i s c a s e , as  in which c o a l i t i o n  defining  i s r e p l a c e d by  p r e s e n c e of  the  the  a coalition.  label  disappear with  the  the  both  the  prevention  of  m a j o r i t y of  situations  historical•1iterature, between c o a l i t i o n s  not  war  and  is  other  the  kinds  a l i i ances.  The  decision  not  s t e m s f r o m our in response will  be  effect states.  on  to  of the The  the  use  war  perspective.  in that  territory alters  It  the  as  also related  is true  alters  wartime a l l i a n c e s , to  the  basic  or  that  the and are  the  alliances  distribution  d e f e a t embodied  distribution.  b e t w e e n war  alliances  States enter/leave  victory  d i s t r i b u t i o n which relationship  in operationa1izing  coalition  distribution.  by  Thus, c o a l i t i o n s , They are  to  theoretical  affected  gain/loss  8 6  Napoleon,  A l i i ance. '  In  of  and  of  But,  alliance alliances not  B a l a n c e of  it  is  the this  calculus is  conceptually Power  in  for  indirect. unique.  explanation  of  I t i s t r u e t h a t the Q u a d r u p l e A l l i a n c e i s more f o r m a l and e x p l i c i t than the c o a l i t i o n i t r e p l a c e d . However, t h e most p r o m i n e n t d i f f e r e n c e b e t w e e n t h e a l l i a n c e and e a r l i e r c o a l i t i o n i s the treaty's p r o v i s i o n w h i c h commited i t s a d h e r e n t s to r e g u l a r meetings. This p r o v i s i o n became t h e b a s i s f o r t h e C o n g r e s s or C o n c e r t s y s t e m w h i c h has r e c e i v e d s p e c i a l attention i n the l i t e r a t u r e (see R o s e c r a n c e , 1963; E l r o d , 1976; J e r v i s , 1985) •  142 a l i i ances.  For our  purposes,  t h e COW p r o j e c t according  we a d o p t  ( S i n g e r and  t o t h e k i n d and  t r e a t i e s of a l l i a n c e .  A  level  Defence pacts  the f i n a l  and  in this  s t a t e commitments several  other  of  scheme,  war  been examined context war, ers  of  commit-  militarily  i f they  the next  level of  i f i t s p a r t n e r (s)  level  engage  of commitment, commits  are  (1976)  and  However,  reference  alliances  s t r e s s e s t h e key  c o n f l i c t management, (1983; 1986) -  to  play  function which  and  i n c l u s i o n o f a l l i a n c e s w h i c h f u n c t i o n as c o n f l i c t  questionable. examine the  to t h i s  ances which is,  study,  f i t the  one  should  They  should  true  r e l a t i o n s h i p between a l l i a n c e s  their  case  general only  use  increase state c a p a b i l i t i e s  However,  They a r g u e ,  has  of e m p i r i c a l s t u d i e s on the r e l a t i o n s h i p between a l l i a n c e s  Relative  b y Moul  framed w i t h  the  attempt to  complex  pact,  level  various  in  t h a t the is  That  i n some d e t a i l  classified  l a i d down i n t h e  its allies  occurs.  Schroeder  o f a l l i a n c e s as a g e n t s o f c o n t r o l  A l l i a n c e s are  i t s members i s a t t a c k e d .  alliances  i f , o r when,  functions.  lowest  scheme d e v e l o p e d b y  the h i g h e s t  a s t a t e to remain n e u t r a l  An e n t e n t e ,  evident  are  to support  a s t a t e t o c o n s u l t a t i o n i f one  As  o f commitment  Non-Aggression/Neutrality  commitment, p l e d g e s in war.  1966).  Small,  ment i n w h i c h a s t a t e p l e d g e s are attacked.  the c l a s s i f i c a t i o n  the a b i l i t y  in the  be excluded,  i m p l i e s the use  c o n d i t i o n s of  a priori,  of o n l y  Balance  of  managin  and  those  Power  any war.  allitheory.  a l l i a n c e s w h i c h a r e f o r m e d as a means t o  and  alter  the  to d i s t i n g u i s h  above s c e n a r i o .  distribution.  among a l l i a n c e s  It is true that  is  specific  extremely s t a t e s may  143 seek  ana l l i a n c e  to restrain  ensure that a competitor w i l l case of I t a l y c i t e d  t h e behavior of not i n t e r f e r e  (1983)-  b y Moul  related  t o t h r e a t and t h e use o f  sense,  i t i s not n e c c e s a r i l y  m o t i v e t o seek inequality  whereas t h e  traditional less,  an a l l i a n c e  'balancing'  one s h o u l d  alliances  may s t i l l  specific  be a  remember t h a t a l l i a n c e s  choice of a l l i a n c e  same t i m e ,  the c e n t r a l i t y  re-distribution  genthau, ally  1973;  together,  (see,  ity  Liska,  cause.  on t h e b a s i s  scheme,  and thus  t o B a l a n c e o f Power  Treatments  theory.  on B a l a n c e o f criterion  of alliances i n  f u n c t i o n as a g e n t s o f c a p a b i l i -  19&2; W a l t z ,  they a r e commiting  affects  a l s o may p e r f o r m  commitment a s t h e d e f i n i n g  et.al,  1973)• their  19&7; Z i n n e s ,  When t w o , individual  Thus, a l l i a n c e s  a g g r e g a t i o n among members.  alliances  ofits  e x t r e m e l y complex and p o t e n t i a l l y  f o r our tasks.  and H o l s t i  common o r c o l l e c t i v e  from t h e p e r s p e c t i v e  To c l a s s i f y a l l i a n c e s  B a l a n c e o f Power t h e o r y f o c u s o n t h e i r ty  dyadic  the c l a s s i f i c a t i o n  of  Nonthe-  a r e , a t a minimum,  c l a s s i f i c a t i o n scheme i s n o t b a s e d  relatively applicable  In t h i s  (1987)'  An a l l i a n c e  c a s e s , must b e r e l a t e d  t h e COW  Power t h e o r y , is  simultaneously.  At the  Although  differ widely.  s t a t e m o t i v e s becomes  arbitrary.  it.  d i v e r g e from the  a s s u m p t i o n , a s noted by Walt  members may  individual  is still  function of d i s t r i b u t i o n a l  c h o i c e may somewhat  individual  of  as i n t h e  argument  t o deal with  and/or  i n c o n f l i c t w i t h B a l a n c e o f Power. The  The m o t i v e s f o r t h e a l l i a n c e  functions  in its actions,  Moreover, t h e i r  affairs.  several  a competitor  19&7;  o r more,  Morstates  capabilities  naturally  entail  toa  capabil-  H o w e v e r , d i f f e r e n c e s among t h e t y p e o f  any t r e a t m e n t o f a g g r e g a t i o n .  144 The e x t e n t the  type  to which c a p a b i l i t i e s  o f commitment.  c a n be a g g r e g a t e d  Accordingly,  defence pacts,  commitment by i t s members t o u s e f o r c e entails  formal  countries,  policy  planning  among  a r e de f a c t o a g g r e g a t i o n t o defence pacts,  i s a f u n c t i o n of  in  defined  military pacts.  situations,  elites  from t h e v a r i o u s  Ententes,  although  less  relative  tion.  In p r o v i d i n g f o r c o n s u l t a t i o n among members, t h e p o s s i b i l i t y o f  fact,  support  (1976)  Kann  argues that  ententes  time.  ententes, o f Power  and appear theory.  are  pacts,  one c a n n o t  states  involved.  affect  the d i s t r i b u t i o n  But, Power tion.  This  8 7  p a c t s and  the role of a l l i a n c e s  i n Balance  logically  undermine  pacts  are negative  are positive.  and s h o u l d  negative  to other  the a b i l i t y  They a r e comresourc-  aggregate the c a p a b i l i t i e s  t h u s be e x c l u d e d  pacts  c a n be  commitment w i l l  states.  commit-  a c t o r commit m i l i t a r y  e f f e c t amounts t o t h e removal  ance p a r t n e r s can  from defence  In B a l a n c e o f Power t e r m s , t h e y w o u l d  A  commit-  i n t h e COW  and e n t e n t e s  neutrality/non-aggression  theory.  In  type  Neutrality/non-aggression  mitments whereby s t a t e s pledge not t o As s u c h ,  towards g r e a t e r  the f i n a l  markedly d i s t i n c t  to c o n f l i c t with  ments, whereas defence pacts  es.  tend  high.  8 7  However, n e u t r a l i t y / n o n - a g g r e s s i o n scheme,  some d e g r e e o f a g g r e g a -  in certain situations is relatively  m e n t s among a d h e r e n t s o v e r  classification  imply  which  formal  active military  also  by v i r t u e o f a  also  not appear t o  from the a n a l y s i s .  r e l a t e d to Balance of affect  the d i s t r i b u -  of the a v a i l a b i l i t y  of  By r e m o v i n g a l l i a n c e p a r t n e r s ,  of others  of the  t o f o r m an a l l i a n c e  with  alli-  a state suffi-  P a r a d o x i c a l l y , Kann a r g u e s the reverse f o r defence pacts. They tend toward t h e l o o s e n i n g o f commitments over t i m e . He f e e l s t h a t i t was t h e f e a r o f d e f e c t i o n i n 1914 t h a t l e d t h e P o w e r s o f E u r o p e t o commit t h e m s e l v e s t o w a r .  145 cient  capabilities  to a l t e r  neutrality/non-aggression tively  equal  alliances,  by  simultaneously  they  into  undermining  positive  In s h o w i n g  gression  general ever,  and  pacts  He  8 8  concern  type.  a r e more  pacts.  is  Specifically,  question,  general  to  pacts  are unique i s whether  simply  of  observers  two  positive  alliance  p a c t s and  to  cre-  ententes  When s t a t e s  capability  of  such  as  aggregation,  explicable  given  state  to the 588),  p a c t s as  treat  p a r t of  non-aggression  to the  pre-World  War  uniqueness  than  similar  to  Howpacts  agreements  the h i s t o r i c a l  pacts are unique  the temporal  non-ag-  the Ke11ogg-Briand P a c t . To  in  their  obligations  perhaps meaningless,  important  to the  are  (1981:  t o Levy  non-aggression  is questionable.  i g n o r e an  rela-  to o u t s i d e r s .  i n terms  record.  Interwar p e r i o d .  One  era.  The  of  t h e two  key  i s subs-  rhetorical.  It appears t h a t the d i f f e r e n c e tion  entail  must be b r i e f l y  classifies  non-aggression  thus,  t a n t i v e or  defence  of  n e g a t i v e components.  t h e same c l a s s as g e n e r a l , and  Neutrality  both  According  a g r e e m e n t s on b e h a v i o r ,  on b e h a v i o r  formation  o f an o p p o s i n g  Finally,  capabilities  theory,  this distinction  within  initial  Moreover,  to maintain a  that neutrality/non-aggression pacts  as a s i n g l e  neutrality  the  the a b i l i t y  positive  the d i s t r i b u t i o n .  also function  commitments w h i c h  their  o f Power  treatment  after  alliance.  exhibit  are denying  Balance  p a c t s can  distribution,  ate a preponderant  enter  significantly  is  f a c t o r s emerging from  identified  alliances,  primarily the World  rhetorical  War  One.  and  a  func-  First,  many  in conjunction with secret  diplomacy,  The more g e n e r a l n a t u r e o f non-aggression r e l a t i v e to n e u t r a l i t y p a c t s i s a l s o r e c o g n i z e d by S i n g e r and S m a l l . H o w e v e r , t h e y do n o t a d d r e s s t h e p r o b l e m and make no a d j u s t m e n t s i n t h e i r a n a l y s i s .  H6 as  a b a s i c cause of World  alliance case  agreements  of n e u t r a l i t y  ments t o  pacts  S o v i e t Union,  w h i c h was  pariah.  been the  may  In sum,  and  t h e COW  of a l l i a n c e s  commitment  o b s e r v a t i o n s of in the f i r s t  to t e s t  5  type of  have l e d  govern-  their  bent.  Second,  t o the appearance Power and  general  an  the  the  ideologi-  wording,  relationship with  of  may  have  Soviet  Union  t h e S o v i e t U n i o n as a means t o w e a k e n  from a Balance this  scheme  scheme i s r e a d i l y of  are  enables  adequately  alliances.  us  i n our  to  Thus,  It concerns limiting  Finally,  hypothesis.  relatively  this  the  the  basic  Alliances  through  the The  inclusec-  formal  mili-  to defence  pacts  is a reasonable  means  alliances  c o m m i t m e n t among s t a t e s ,  the second h y p o t h e s i s .  identify  represented  to  Moreover,  hypotheses.  I t i s t h e most g e n e r a l  i s more s p e c i f i c .  adaptable  Power p e r s p e c t i v e .  the dependent v a r i a b l e  the most f o r m a l  i n the  8  s i o n of a l l t h r e e t y p e s .  tary/security  may  as  sanitaire" . '  hypothesis  hypothesis  due  o p p o s i t i o n to  t o war,  a more p a c i f i s t  because of  classification  b a s i s of  One,  simultaneously a Great  f a v o r e d by  "cordon  domestic  reference  t o W o r l d War  have o c c u r r e d  only acceptable  the c a p i t a l i s t  only,  prior  Such p a c t s ,  f o r many s t a t e s ,  ond  Potential  s i g n pacts which contained pacts  study  One.  worded w i t h d i r e c t  non-aggression  cal  War  differentiating  between  types  It is i n t e r e s t i n g to note t h a t 36% o f a l l non-aggression pacts i n c l u d e d the S o v i e t Union. A l s o , a f u r t h e r 36% c o n t a i n e d e i t h e r F r a n c e , Germany, o r I t a l y . The a b o v e e x p l a n a t i o n s c a n a l s o be s e e n as f a c t o r s w h i c h u n d e r m i n e t h e r e l a t i o n s h i p s p o s i t e d i n B a l a n c e of Power t h e o r y . The i m p a c t o f W o r l d War One and t h e e x i s t e n c e o f t h e S o v i e t Union are d o m i n a n t f a c t o r s i n many historical explanations which i n d i c a t e the f a i l u r e of the s t a t e s t o f o l l o w the d i c t a t e s of t h e B a l a n c e o f Power (Neuman, 1968; see a l s o the g e n e r a l l i t e r a t u r e on a p p e a s e m e n t ) . They a r e a l s o dominant i n arguments w h i c h l i m i t t h e r e l e v a n c e o f B a l a n c e o f Power e x p l a n a t i o n s t o t h e p r e - W o r l d War One w o r l d . Both of t h e s e p o s i t i o n s have been d i s c u s s e d i n e a r l i e r C h a p t e r s and p l a y a f u n d a m e n t a l r o l e i n e s t a b l i s h i n g s u b - p e r i o d s t o t e s t our hypotheses.  147 of  alliances  three  is central  t y p e s , and  the  to  the  patterns  final  they produce at  v i d e a more a c c u r a t e d e p i c t i o n  5-2  h y p o t h e s i s on p o l a r i z a t i o n .  of  the  n a t u r e of  system's  level,  pro-  polarization.  MODIFICATIONS, MEASURES, AND ALLIANCE PATTERNS  In u s i n g also  the  c l a s s i f i c a t i o n scheme d e v e l o p e d by t h e  r e l y on t h e i r  list  tain modifications  are  include alliances  of  alliances  made t o  formed w i t h i n  for  this  ances  are  derived  between system alliances, partially  and  such a s the to  B a l a n c e of  above example,  the  Power d i c t a t e s  in Europe.  Whereas the  c a s e of leads  an  analysis  the and  inclusion  a minimum o f  of  issues,  two  Unless t h i s spatial  of inter-system alliances  undermine the  reliability  additional  of  our  alli-  Alliances Certain related  However, a s i n including  a r o l e as  d i s t r i b u t i o n for  the  continues t o  excluded.  played  with  Cer-  expanded t o  may h a v e b e e n  Asian  likely  must d e a l  inter-system a l l i a n c e .  to e x p a n s i o n at  ysis,  one  is but  The  also  i n 1902,  cannot be  identical,  war,  Ang1o-Japanese  capabilities,  is  list  5 0  we  l8l6—1939-  (1973:234-235)-  members a r e  independent e f f e c t  ignored.  The  One.  et.al.  A s i a n d i s t r i b u t i o n of  alliance  War  COW p r o j e c t ,  period  t h r e e months of  from H o l s t i non-system  the  list.  e x c l u d e a l 1 i a n c e s formed d u r i n g World  9 0  the  The  system  and  members  in  is addressed,  could  the  well  distributions  b o u n d a r i e s of  the  the  in  the  which anal-  contaminate  our  findings.  These a l l i a n c e s are e x c l u d e d from the o r i g i n a l d a t a s e t because of a belief that their inclusion would contaminate the analysis b e t w e e n a l l i a n c e s and war. Our t h e o r e t i c a l v i e w l e a d s u s t o a r g u e t h a t p r e s e n c e or a b s e n c e o f a l l i a n c e s w i l l n o t b e a f f e c t e d by t h e o c c u r r e n c e o f war, w i t h t h e e x c e p t i o n of a l l i a n c e s formed d u r i n g W o r l d War One. T h e y a r e e x c l u d e d b e c a u s e of t h e l a c k of c a p a b i l i t y data for states during t h i s war.  148 Several tions.  other modifications  Alliances  b a s e d on t h e However,  technical  provisions  cases  excluded,  or  Austria  are deleted.  federation,  a r e not  confederation Austria  which enabled by  playing  the  accurately actual half an  lesser  the h i s t o r i c a l  state  erroneous  rivals  until  record.  alliance  loose  competition  Conknit  between  E u r o p e , and a m e c h a n i s m independence (see C a r r ,  enhances our a b i l i t y  to capture  and  account f o r the  Prussia  in  I f t h e C o n f e d e r a t i o n were  in  1911.  Ostensibly,  for a  single  year.  b e t w e e n F r a n c e and A u s t r i a  5 1  This  enhance t h e i r  between A u s t r i a  be c o d e d f o r  the f i r s t included, these  I t s duration  In  this alliance war w i t h  1866,  i s included.  i s also  and a c h a n g e  two  i s made i n t h e  The A u s t r o - P r u s s i a n d e f e n c e  C o n f e d e r a t i o n and t h e s u b s e q u e n t  1958).  known a s t h e German  the l 8 6 0 s .  1864 i s i n c l u d e d .  is only  Prussia  defence pact r e l a t i o n s h i p would  coding of another  man  incorrectly  German s t a t e s ,  I t e n a b l e s us t o  Century.  treaties.  o f f a g a i n s t each o t h e r  Two a l l i a n c e s a r e a d d e d f o r t h e l 8 6 0 s ,  of  either  set are  defence  Central to  data  The m u l t i l a t e r a l  an a r e n a f o r t h e  German s t a t e s  of r e l a t i o n s  of the Nineteenth  the various  defence r e l a t i o n s h i p s .  Its exclusion  1  in  These p a c t s , b e t t e r  f o r dominance over  1977)•'  t h e COW  between t h e small  actual  considera-  in  a l l i a n c e s are  t h e two c o m p e t i n g s t a t e s  T969;Werner,  down  misc1 a s s i f i e d .  i s simultaneously  and P r u s s i a  laid  certain  pacts (l8l6-l847;1849-1866) and  from h i s t o r i c a l  and t h e i r c l a s s i f i c a t i o n  i n some  included,  a r e made  limited to  the  is linked  pact  t o t h e Ger-  Denmark.  Its duration  neutrality  relationship  (Taylor,  1954;Albrect-Carrie,  a s i n g l e year.  T a y l o r ( 1 9 5 4 ) i d e n t i f i e s t h e German C o n f e d e r a t i o n a s a national set of r e l a t i o n s h i p s .  The  Anglo-  quasi-inter-  149 (1904)  French  entente  change  i s b a s e d on t h e a l t e r a t i o n o f t h e i n i t i a l  a  d e f e n c e agreement  their  respective  i s changed  as s i g n a l e d  military  governments a f t e r  see  1981:310).  Several The  agreement  excluded  f r o m t h e COW  as  by  of  Berlin,  u s e d as t h e  a non-aggression date  points out,  signalled  Czechoslovakia.  w o u l d honour t h e i r  9 2  and S o v i e t  initiated It  was i n c l u d e d pact.  held  between  of  letters 1986:7?  (Moul,  the r e s u l t s  the death  of the  It i s clear  This  i s replaced  i n the Rather  Singer than  agreement,  and m i l i t a r y i n 1 9 2 6 by t h e and  S m a l l and  1939.  1938 i s  defence pact.  of Munich  (September,  Franco-Russian  of a l l other  period. (1922),  Russia  political  of the Franco-Russian  Munich a l s o s i g n a l s t h e d i s s o l u t i o n with  crisis  i s coded as an e n t e n t e .  (1977:89).  which  concluding  (1964:188)  effectively  list,  Germany  b e t w e e n t h e two o u t c a s t s .  r e m a i n s c o d e d as  Taylor  agreement t o  and an exchange  the Morroco  This  9 2  between  Adamthwaite  cooperation Treaty  colonial  conversations  (1906)  19M.  in  s i g n i f i c a n t m o d i f i c a t i o n s a r e made f o r t h e I n t e r w a r  Rappallo  noted  a defence pact  by t h e  staffs  b e t w e e n t h e two a l s o Lebow,  to  As 1938)  relationship.  defence r e l a t i o n s h i p s  t h a t none o f C z e c h o s l o v a k i a ' s  allies  c o m m i t m e n t s , as b o r n e o u t i n M a r c h o f 1 9 3 9 -  The A n g l o - R u s s i a n e n t e n t e of 1907 remains an e n t e n t e . Taylor ( 1 9 5 4 : 3 2 2 ) s t r e s s e s t h e l i m i t e d n a t u r e o f t h e B r i t i s h commitment t o Russia. F o r e x a m p l e , he q u o t e s B r i t i s h F o r e i g n M i n i s t e r G r e y , who stated; " . . . B u t i t was n o t l i k e l y t h a t Germany w o u l d make an a g g r e s s i v e and m e n a c i n g a t t a c k upon R u s s i a ; and even i f she d i d , p e o p l e i n G r e a t B r i t a i n w o u l d be i n c l i n e d t o s a y t h a t , though Germany w o u l d have s u c c e s s e s at f i r s t , Russia's resources were so g r e a t t h a t , i n t h e l o n g r u n , Germany w o u l d be e x h a u s t e d w i t h o u t o u r helping Russia."  150 The  Anglo-French r e l a t i o n s h i p  upgraded  to  politics  of the time  the b r i e f  1939-  a defence pact in  relationship entirely.  is missing.  staff  including  COW p r o j e c t  a key e l e m e n t  talks  and  held  1983;  relatively  of  this  international  their  the Munich  b y t h e two  fundamental  affair.  identical  to a  states  in  co-ordination  In r e s p o n s e t o G e r 1939) >  many's s e i z u r e o f t h e rump o f C z e c h o s l o v a k i a ( M a r c h , t i o n s h i p becomes  excludes  I t s c o d i n g as a n e n t e n t e i s b a s e d o n  Rhineland c r i s i s  o f p o l i c y up t o and  a n e n t e n t e i n 193&, a n d  as  The  In s o d o i n g ,  s e r i e s of m i l i t a r y  response to the  i s coded  the  defence pact  rela-  (see Bond,  H o w a r d , 1972).  the Anglo-Polish defence pact. extended  A l t h o u g h t h e bond  by B r i t a i n  out that  relationship  to Poland,  i t is a prelude 1939-  August,  In t h i s  lateral  an a l t e r a t i o n  alliances  to other states,  among B a l k a n s t a t e s  Non-Aggression  Yugoslavia,  Pact.  Prior  pact r e l a t i o n s h i p .  the l a t e  and T u r k e y  t o 1938, t h i s  the e x c e p t i o n of B u l g a r i a , were l i n k e d To a v o i d c o u n t i n g  from  s u c h as  a Non-Aggression  remain coded  as D e f e n c e  pacts.  between  Similarly,  the B u l g a r i a n  Greece  and  with  defence  l i n k a g e s between s t a t e s  states  as the l i n k  In 1938,  through a mu11i-1ateral  the above  such  multi-  set of s t a t e s ,  each of  linkages,  of  concluded a m u l t i -  only  remaining  of  1930s.  t y p e s of a l l i a n c e s , as  points  Roumania.  t o t h e two  coded  guarantee  the s e r i e s  relative  is  as a  consummated i n  coding for a set  in  coded  (1956:532,539)  t h e bond d i f f e r s  i s made i n t h e  and  is a unilateral  Albrecht-Xarrie  sense,  B u l g a r i a , Greece, Rumania, lateral  initially  included  to a f u l l fledged a l l i a n c e ,  guarantees extended by B r i t a i n  Finally,  i n 1939 i s  twice,  linkage pact.  to  The  Yugoslavia,  the r e l a t i o n s h i p  between  151 H u n g a r y and presence  Italy  i s c o d e d as  of a Non-Aggression  an e n t e n t e ,  link  b e t w e e n them.  c o n s i s t e n t w i t h the measures employed a b l e , as  The first  noted  first  noted  of  two  because they consistent between  the  and  represents  theory.  entail with  two  two  the dependent  Defence pacts  formal  distinct  section.  of formal  security  states  Whi1e  in a l l i a n c e s  multilateral  i t does not  alliance  ure  i s a l s o employed.  tem  d y a d s subsumed by  t h i s measure,  accurately s t a t e may  address  the  measure  i n each year  simple  For  this  reason,  presence  of of  a s e c o n d meas-  the p r o p o r t i o n of  a l l i a n c e / d e f e n c e p a c t s each year.  Dyads e n a b l e  us  t h e phenomena o f a l l i a n c e s / d e f e n c e p a c t s . participate  first  For  t h e phenomena o f m u l t i p l e and  T h i s measure c o n s i s t s of  relationships.  are  relationship  The  mu11i- 1atera1 a 1 1 i a n c e s / d e f e n c e p a c t s  s e r i e s of b i l a t e r a l  pacts,  c o m m i t m e n t s among s t a t e s .  represents  relationships.  as  commitment,  posits a  measures are employed.  t h i s measure  posited in  Defence  military  which  The  second v a r i a b l e ,  the p r o p o r t i o n of s t a t e s i n a l l i a n c e s / d e f e n c e p a c t s 3  vari-  variables.  relationship  i s the  the p r e v i o u s  second h y p o t h e s i s  and  dependent  the general  a high degree  the  inequality  study.'  simultaneous  These d e c i s i o n s are  to represent  identify  c o n c l u s i o n of  each v a r i a b l e , is  hypotheses  Power  at the  the  below.  is alliances  Balance  despite  in a single alliance  In  sys-  employing  a r e t r e a t e d as to capture For  more  example,  f o r a long p e r i o d of  a  a  time.  In c o n t r a s t t o t h e i n d e p e n d e n t v a r i a b l e i n w h i c h d a t a f o r t h e r e l e vant i n d i c a t o r s are r e f e r e n c e d to January 1, the a l l i a n c e data i s r e f e r e n c e d t o December 31 o r as r e a s o n a b l e as p o s s i b l e i n t h e c a s e s of a l l i a n c e s l a s t i n g a s i n g l e year. In m a k i n g this decision, a p a r t i a l lag i s b u i l t i n t o the a n a l y s i s . A l s o , the c o n c l u d i n g time f o r a l l i a n c e s i s S e p t e m b e r , 1939; t h e o u t b r e a k o f war. A l l a l l i a n c es c o d e d by S i n g e r and S m a l l as t e r m i n a t i n g i n 1939 are included in t h e 1939 data.  152 During  this  same p e r i o d ,  ance.  In t e r m o f t h e f i r s t  a l s o have o t h e r measure w i l l sensitive  this  t o changes  e n t e r and  leave another  measure, assuming t h a t t h i s  relationships,  account  s t a t e may  no  change w i l l  f o r these changes. in s t a t e behavior  result.  Thus, in this  state's But,  allies  the  t h i s measure  realm,  alli-  second i s more  relative  to  the  first.  It  should  direct  be u n d e r s t o o d  a l l i a n c e / d e f e n c e pact  are excluded.  a l l i a n c e bonds  link  (B-C)  (A-B;  A-C),  is excluded.  a l s o shows  of  two m e a s u r e s  the f o l l o w i n g Tables  and  Figures provide  time.  Although  9 4  A l s o , the  ententes  components of snapshot of  9 4  and  results  100%  of  as w e l l  t h e two  presence  over  bilat-  the  example  While  the  example,  variables,  a b a s i c d e s c r i p t i o n of as f o r t h r e e s m a l l e r  f o r a l l types of a l l i a n c e s  their  bonds  secondary  i n the  dependent  neutrality/non-aggression pacts  the study,  their  measure,  to  66%  the  of  p o s s i b l e bond o r  t h r e e a c t o r s y s t e m w o u l d be  i n t h e s y s t e m as a w h o l e ,  two  the dyad measure.  identified  ances  limited  (A,B,C) w i t h  R e l a t i v e to the f i r s t  t h e d y a d m e a s u r e w o u l d o n l y be  Having  the t h i r d  is  Secondary , 1 i n k s or  three states  the g r e a t e r s e n s i t i v i t y  measure f o r a  c o u n t i n g of dyads  relationships.  For e x a m p l e , g i v e n  eral  first  t h a t the  presentation provides  are  alli-  periods  presented.  a r e not the reader  separate with  a  time.  S e v e r a l o t h e r s m a l l e r p e r i o d s w e r e i d e n t i f i e d f o r a n a l y s i s i n Chapter Three. They a r e not p r e s e n t e d here f o r reasons of b r e v i t y . Only t h r e e prominent h i s t o r i c a l d i v i s i o n s are employed t o i n d i c a t e the d e g r e e of change i n the the prominence of a l l i a n c e s over t i m e .  153 Table V presents the average whole,  and  i n each  an a v e r a g e  o f -316  Defence  Pacts  (.227)  followed  (.10)  individual of  type of a l l i a n c e .  states  a r e t h e most  prominent (.109)  by E n t e n t e s  to the three p e r i o d s ,  The  average  the  first  final  number o f s t a t e s period  (.177).  (.549).  period  For t h e e n t i r e  in alliances  form of  alliance  of  system  any  type.  participation  Neutra1ity/Non-aggression  and  and  egory,  this  middle  (.148)  pattern  In c o m p a r i n g  defence  pacts  in  Here  slightly  alliance  This pattern  i s broken.  pacts  the f i r s t  we f i n d  shows  period  two  (.362)  the average The  ance dyads between the m i d d l e  the  first  trast  c a s e of  i n the defence  (.025)  t o T a b l e V,  In t h e E n t e n t e  (.059)  the  i s down-  the dominance of  i s not repeated  than Defence  p a t t e r n s here  cat-  change from  its direction  p r o p o r t i o n of system  there i s a s l i g h t difference  pattern  e v i d e n t i n the  in  Neutra1ity/Non-aggression pacts  relationships.  the  and  from  to the  across categories,  of s t a t e s  apparent.  (.381),  is negligible  (.145),  p a t t e r n s onthe p r e v i o u s t a b l e ,  First,  is also  periods  are  increases substantially  middle period  There  the periods  g r e a t e r average  T a b l e VI  in alliances  through the  to the f i n a l  ward.  period.  significant differences  Neutra1ity/Non-aggression agreements.  Defence  ry.  participate  i n a l l i a n c e s as a  .  Turning  the  p r o p o r t i o n of s t a t e s  the.final  containing a  pacts  (338).  d y a d s subsumed b y  do not d i f f e r  w i d e l y from  e x c e p t f o r two  notable exceptions.  in the average  p r o p o r t i o n of  and  final  p e r i o d s (.066)  Second,  difference  between  The  middle period,  i n con-  c o n t a i n s the h i g h e s t average  i n the Defence  catego-  and  final  c a t e g o r y shows l i t t l e  alli-  period  (.026).  154  Table V Average P r o p o r t i o n of S t a t e s i n A l l i a n c e s , Defence P a c t s , Ententes, and N e u t r a l i t y / N o n - A g g r e s s i o n P a c t s by V a r i ous P e r i o d s o f T i m e  A l i i ances  Defence Pacts  Ententes  N e u t r a 1i t y N o n - a g g r e s s i on  I8I6-I939  .316  .227  .109  .100  1816-1870  .177  .133  .064  .002  1871-1914  .381  .288  .148  .104  1920-1939  .549  • 339  • 145  .362  N o t e : P r o p o r t i o n o f s t a t e s i n v a r i o u s a l l i a n c e t y p e s d o n o t a d d up to t h e p r o p o r t i o n i n a l l i a n c e s . S t a t e s p a r t i c i p a t i n g i n s e v e r a l a l l i a n c e s s i m u l t a n e o u s l y a r e counted o n l y once i n the a l l i a n c e c a t e g o r y .  T a b l e VI A v e r a g e P r o p o r t i o n o f S y s t e m Dyads Subsumed by A l l i a n c e s , E n t e n t e s a n d N e u t r a l i t y / N o n - A g g r e s s i o n P a c t s by P e r i o d s Al1iances  Defence Pacts  1816-1939  .041  .025  .009  .008  1816-1870  .018  .014  .005  .0001  1871-1914  .059  .038  .013  .008  1920-1939  .066  .026  .010  .029  These  f i n d i n g s as a whole  Ententes  indicate  Defence  Pacts,  Neutrali t y / Non-aggression  substantial  d i f f e r e n c e s between  155 the  three periods.  cation than  of  However, they  the p a t t e r n s on the  p r o v i d i n g other  standard graphic  The  two  p e r c e n t a g e of  smaller  periods,  d e c l i n e over tern.  Conceptualizing  time.  The  next  T h e l a r g e s t and  period,  two  surpassing  the  indi-  time.  Rather  s u c h as minimum, maximum, F i g u r e s 5-1 a n d '5.2  and  provide  measures.  states in a l l i a n c e s  thefirst  us w i t h a c l e a r  a l l i a n c e measures over  to expose v a r i a n c e ,  r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s f o r the  5«1).  provide  summary s t a t i s t i c s ,  deviation,  (Figure  do not  fluctuates  the p a t t e r n  i n terms  (1816-1870)  period  steadiest increase highest value  time  of our  three general  shows a r e v e r s e  is revealed  recorded  over  reveals a  (1871-1914)  period  widely  in  pat-  the  final  i n the p r e v i o u s  period  i n 1930.  The  pattern for  alliances the  as  initial  time.  a whole. period  Second, the  ed.  The  states  Entente  avoid  fluctuate  Defence Pacts  sible  the f i n d i n g s f o r  are noted.  period  i s more g r a d u a l  i s marked by s i g n i f i c a n t  to a constant  First,  level  and  The  and  periods  values  back a g a i n .  significant  the  1870s.  increase  They a l s o a p p e a r  i n the v a l u e s  reported  over limit-  in which  here tend t o Finally,  r e l a t i o n s h i p s a r e shown t o b e a phenomena  to the e r a a f t e r  f o r the  exceptions  such r e l a t i o n s h i p s a l t o g e t h e r .  from zero  only  replicates  e x h i b i t s more o f a h o r i z o n t a l l i n e  i n the f i n a l  category  trality/Non-Aggression vant  Two i n t e r e s t i n g  (I816-I870) rise  largely  t o be  Neurele-  respon-  i n the  final  period.  Turning to  those  t o the dyad measures  found on the p r e v i o u s  ( F i g u r e 5.2), measure.  the p a t t e r n s are  However,  similar  the p a t t e r n s  here  FIGURE 5.1 Proportion of States i n A l l i a n c e s , Defence P a c t s , Ententes, and N e u t r a l i t y / N o n - A g g r e s s l o n 1816-1939  Alliances  Ententes  157  show much  less f l u c t u a t i o n .  There  ences.  For example, the percentage  period  (1871-1914)  Defence Pacts sion  Pacts  trayed  reveal a constant  show  a significant  as a l e v e l i n g  In c o n c l u s i o n , degree of v a r i a n c e cant  levels o f f ,  i n the middle  w h e r e a s t h e f i n d i n g s o n F i g u r e 5-1 f o r increase. Also,  Neutrality/Non-Aggres-  d e c l i n e i n the mid-1930s  o f f i n the previous  our measurements i n t h e measures  I t i s apparent  ture d i f f e r e n t  Figure  time,  i s por-  (5-1).  i n d i c a t e not over  which  only a  sufficient  b u t a l s o some  t h a t t h e two m e a s u r e s a r e n o t i d e n t i c a l  aspects  findings also provide  , s  of Defence Pact dyads  differ-  signifi-  d i f f e r e n c e s b e t w e e n t h e two b a s i c m e a s u r e s o f t h e d e p e n d e n t  able.  set  a r e a l s o some s i g n i f i c a n t  of  the a l l i a n c e  t e n t a t i v e support  into smaller p e r i o d s .  phenomenon.  and c a p -  Finally,  f o r our d i v i s i o n  vari-  our  of the data  , s  We a l s o t e s t e d f o r t h e m o s t s i g n i f i c a n t break i n the a l l i a n c e data u s i n g an oneway a n a l y s i s o f v a r i a n c e . The h i g h e s t F r a t i o was f o u n d u s i n g 1884 a s a b r e a k . T h i s f i n d i n g s c o n f l i c t s somewhat w i t h t h e a r g u m e n t s made by S i n g e r and S m a l l , as w e l l as s e v e r a l o t h e r s t u d i e s u s i n g COW d a t a , w h i c h i n d i c a t e a n a t u r a l b r e a k somewhere i n the 1890s. T h i s d i s c r e p a n c y i s e x a m i n e d i n more d e t a i l i n t h e d a t a analysis chapter.  1 o •o o  n  -i CT  CT O CD  3  O n> •-> CT  CO  -  o «<  n> = CD: o . c  rr  0) >-*  Co  H*-  5»  o  *< t—»  a w  HCT  M2 : Bi  \  o  1 J> CR CTO -1 CD CO CO  o  z> o  CD CO  »  o  CD CD  O  CD T)  &) O CT  Co  9^1  >  159  5-3  POLARIZATION  Polarization It  is a  tion of  r e p r e s e n t s the f i n a l  concept which  i n the f i e l d .  and  between  theoretical  r o o t s of  polarization  as  The  ing  a  third  both.  Any for  can  of p o l a r i z a t i o n  to  How  account f o r  as t h e a r r a n g e m e n t  1980),  on  and  polarization. two  polarization  in  conthe  and  the  the treatment  of  which  incorporated  socio-economic  along with  allianc-  associated with  develop-  t h e complex  requires a  forms  i n which  In i t s s i m p l e s t Polarization  simultaneous concern  polarity  polarization. the  reside  largely  t o one  Polarity  extent to  stem  structure,  another  (Ray,  i s t h e number  a t the top of the system's i s equated  deter-  concepts  of system  in relation  form p o l a r i t y i s the  Both  influence  the behavior of c o n s t i t u e n t u n i t s .  Powers.  of  i s a f u n c t i o n of  concerns  one d e f i n e s  of a c t o r s  key a c t o r s or p o l e s w h i c h  Great  applica-  take i n the real w o r l d .  defined  hierarchy.  issue  concept  p r o c e d u r e t o measure  c o n c e p t u a l i z a t i o n of  a desire  first  second  patterns are  the concept of p o l a r i t y .  from  variable.  and e m p i r i c a l  i t s treatment;  i s s u e stems from t h e problems  understanding  mines one's  of  The  a multi-dimensiona1  sophisticated  polarization  The  affect  the concepts p o l a r i t y  s p e c i f i c behavioral  es.  inter-related,  one m e t h o d o l o g i c a l .  relationship  and  theoretical  t h e d e f i n i t i o n and m e a s u r e m e n t  issues, p a r t i a l l y  ceptual  of the dependent  D e s p i t e i t s widespread use, t h e r e i s a g r e a t deal  disagreement over  Three  enjoys wide  index  social  t o t h e number o f  which  the  remaining  160  states  a r e drawn  towards system poles  bonds between p o l e s a simple  physics  However,  a  and o t h e r s  Several  scholars  a system pole  They  that  bond.  between Great  point  i n time;  analogy.  argue that  alliance  s t a t e s a t any p a r t i c u l a r  problem a r i s e s o u t of  polarization.  argue  and t h e r e s u l t a n t t h e p a t t e r n o f  a  this  (Haas,  i s not  treatment of  1970; Bueno de M e s q u i t a ,  directly  equivalent  p o l e may a l s o b e s e v e r a l  Great  Thus, t h e adjustment o f p o l a r i t y Powers p r o v i d e s  a more  p o l a r i t y and  accurate  t o a Great  Powers  1973) Power.  linked  f o ralliance  by a n  linkages  p i c t u r e of the state of  affairs.  (1970)  Haas  defines  er o r c a p a b i l i t i e s . attributes together  argues  the  states  must b e g i n  mous c e n t e r s  Underlying  bility  6  alike.  in alliance  5 6  can  options  alliance with  a single  Similarly,  of m i l i t a r y  capabilities  i t follows that as  center  Bueno  no l o n g e r  are the basic  two G r e a t center  Powers  o f power  allied t o both (1973)  de M e s q u i t a  be t r e a t e d a s a u t o n o m o u s  of these s t a t e s a r e l i m i t e d  commitments.  pow-  Thus,  an a s s e s s m e n t o f t h e a c t u a l  due t o  a t r u e measure o f number o f a u t o n o -  o f mi 1 i t a r y p o w e r .  these arguments i s a separate  concerns  as d e b a t e d  (1967),  '  actors  demands o f t h e i r  theory  that m i l i t a r y  appear  The f o r e i g n p o l i c y  polarity  of  logically  and  that  actors.  Given  as a s i g n i f i c a n t  o f a G r e a t Power,  will  observers  a pole  the relationship  body o f t h e o r y .  between p o l a r i t y  o r i g i n a l l y by D e u s t c h a n d S i n g e r  and b r i e f l y  discussed  above.  This  body  and system  sta-  (1964)  A underlying  and W a l t z reason  for  S t a b i l i t y i n t h i s debate i s generally defined as t h e absence o f large s c a l e war. The p r o b l e m o f p o l a r i t y d i s c u s s e d h e r e and a r g u ments t o expands i t s o p e r a t i o n a l measure a r e a f u n c t i o n of this  161  adjusting this  polarity  theoretical  historical stability  debate,  record.  (circa  the  p o s t - W o r l d War  the  contemporary any  nuclear effects I983).'  polarity the  Thus,  era,  bipolar  It  arise  of a p o l e . relative  the  of v a r i a t i o n  system  some b a s i s  and  theoretical  body o f t h e o r y ,  by  i n the  i t s European  the exception Even  of  though anal-  the  presence of  out the  independent  stability and  1983)-  (Levy,  empirical  value  i t i s necessary to  i n so d o i n g ,  t o B a l a n c e o f Power  to  polarity-  for comparative  to separate w e a p o n s on  the  structure.  are confounded  However,  relative  for testing  a multipolar  era  nuclear  to resurrect  a lack  T h i s system, w i t h  is difficult and  of  d a t a base  era provides  from t h i s  Great Powers,  modern s t a t e  has  f o r purposes of t h i s  definition  problems  i s the  Two  of b i p o l a r i t y 7  dominant  1500-Present).  findings  weapons.  between  is a function  The  relationship  predecesser  ysis,  for alliances  serious  of  alter  conceptual  theory.  d e f i n i t i o n of s t a b i l i t y . Moreover, t h i s body o f t h e o r y has l e d researchers to include the d i s t r i b u t i o n of c a p a b i l i t i e s as a e l e ment o f t h e i n d e p e n d e n t v a r i a b l e . F o r e x a m p l e , b o t h Bueno de Mesquita and W a l l a c e integrate this element into their respective measures of p o l a r i t y and polarization. In s o d o i n g , they are a t t e m p t i n g t o t e s t a body o f t h e o r e t i c a l p r o p o s i t i o n s l a r g e l y indep e n d e n t o f B a l a n c e o f Power t h e o r y . 9 7  As n o t e d i n Chapter Three, Levy's proposal f o r p o l a r i t y d i f f e r s significantly from the positions cited above. He a r g u e s that polarity represents the d i s t r i b u t i o n of m i l i t a r y power among t h e G r e a t P o w e r s , r e l a t i v e l y i n d e p e n d e n t o f t h e number o f G r e a t P o w e r s . This operational d e f i n i t i o n is similar to t h a t body o f work i n t h e f i e l d which c o n c e p t u a l i z e s s t r u c t u r e i n terms o f t h e r i s e and f a l l o f s y s t e m hegemons ( s e e M o d e l s k i and M o r g a n 1985; G i l p i n , 1981; and Thompson, 1986). The p r o b l e m w i t h L e v y ' s a p p r o a c h , as w e l l a s t h e hegemon p r o p o n e n t s , is their ahistorical results. For example, they argue that the p o s t - N a p o l e o n i c era e x h i b i t s a u n i p o l a r struct u r e , w h i c h r e f l e c t s t h e g l o b a l power o f G r e a t B r i t a i n , r a t h e r t h a n the European s t r u c t u r e . To a r g u e t h a t t h i s era i s unipolar is to f l y i n the f a c e of h i s t o r y .  162 The  adjustment  (1968)  transformed  polarity  for  p o i n t s out,  states  also  systems a s s t r u c t u r a l l y  identical.  structurally  to a f i v e  p r o b l e m of  and  identification  which the similar"  i s "the are  greater  degree similar  are  not  two  distinct  power s y s t e m  in which each (Levy,  is  o f the  1985:48).'*  methodologica1/empirica1  d i s t i n c t from (1973)  a simple  alli-  second a t t r i b u t e  to each o t h e r , in d i f f e r e n t  s i m i l a r i t y within reliability  As  individuality.  t o which f o r e i g n  nations the  their  a l l i a n c e groups.  Bueno d e M e s q u i t a ' s  d e t e r m i n e s the  various clusters.  power s y s t e m  the  actors.  t r e a t m e n t of  the  in  into alliances  e x a m p l e , a two  important,  p o l i c i e s of  ( 1 8 8 ) . " The  between c l u s t e r s  two  For  a s y s t e m p o l e as  a cluster  foreign  of  i n the  results  to n a t i o n a l  They r e t a i n  result  p e r h a p s most  exists.  nations within  the  i n t o one  identifying  ance c l u s t e r pole  identical  is aligned  Finally,  linkages  entering  into c o a l i t i o n actors.  S u c h a n a d j u s t m e n t may  powers  alliance  a 11iance g r o u p s a s e q u i v a l e n t  t r e a t m e n t of Fedder  of  and  policies of the  clusters and  ofstate  I t i s thus an i n d i r e c t measure  of  degree t o are  dis-  dissimilarity commitments t o o f the  actual  5 8  T h i s d o e s n o t mean t h a t one s h o u l d i g n o r e t h e e f f e c t o f s u c h s t r u c t u r a l i n f l u e n c e s on b e h a v i o r . I t o n l y p o i n t s t o the g r a v e c o n c e p t u a l e r r o r of u s i n g p o l a r i t y to d e s c r i b e t h i s s t r u c t u r e .  "  One must b e c a r e f u l i n a s s e s s i n g Bueno d e M e s q u i t a ' s a r g u m e n t . He i d e n t i f i e s three attributes of p o l a r i t y of w h i c h the f i r s t i s the number o f n o n - a l i g n e d G r e a t Powers and a l l i a n c e groups between Great Powers. It is d i f f i c u l t t o know t h e r e l a t i o n s h i p between t h i s a t t r i b u t e and t h e s e c o n d a t t r i b u t e c i t e d a b o v e . That i s , one d o e s n o t know i f p o l e s are i d e n t i f i e d p r i o r to the e x a m i n a t i o n of similarity/dissimilarity or are a simultaneous f u n c t i o n of both attributes. If i t i s the f o r m e r , then the smi1iarity/dissimi1arity attribute is actually a p o l a r i z a t i o n m e a s u r e and s h o u l d have been i d e n t i f i e d as s u c h . I assume t h a t t h e l a t t e r i s the case f o r the p u r p o s e s of i l l u s t r a t i o n h e r e . The s t a t i s t i c a l t e c h n i q u e e m p l o y e d by Bueno d e M e s q u i t a i n t h i s r e a l m w i l l be b r i e f l y d i s c u s s e d i n p r e s e n t a t i o n of our m e a s u r e o f system p o l a r i z a t i o n where i t more aptly belongs.  163 loss  of  decision-making  However, d e g r e e of is  the  larity  similarity/dissimilarity tells  state  commitment t o  differentiates  simple cluster  candidates notes,  for  Certainly,  One  Not  o n l y does the  difficult  The  pass other  as  Defence pacts  a pole.  have a b u i l t  Y e t , as  in tendency  evident  i n the  France  is r e l a t i v e l y firm,  W h i l e Bueno de  of  ability  system  a s p e c t s of  socio-economic  p o l e s as  the  state and  of  the  or  to of  a pole? but  i t does not  distinct  its  from  provide clusters.  i d e n t i f y a p o l e become e x t r e m e l y and  polarization  become  1 0 0  t r e a t m e n t of  polarization  p o l a r i t y - s t a b i l i t y theoretical  out  towards  M e s q u i t a ' s measurement  field,  butpolarity  'confusion'.  the  the  to a c t u a l l y  regarding  i s moved  in  Kann  example  commitment t o i s weak.  are  have a t e n d e n c y  Entente a c l u s t e r  picture  to  i s more  there  Initially, i t  Triple  second concern related  pole.  Is the  in conceptual  Polarization  1 0 0  to  problem  in above f o r m u l a t i o n ,  partially  largely  tend  i s a s i g n i f i c a n t advance a clear  enmeshed  The  Europe.  commitment t o R u s s i a  with  a cluster  actual  similarity/dissimi-  member c o m m i t m e n t w h e r e a s e n t e n t e s  Britain's  technique  what d e g r e e of from a  about the  Furthermore,  a l l i a n c e commitment.  treating  commitment.  p r e - W o r l d War  us  type of  defence pacts  r e d u c t i o n of  increased  a  us l i t t l e  alliance cluster.  problem of  (1976) the  an  obvious empirical  w o u l d depend o n the likely  autonomy.  strict  r e a l m of  to s t a t e  relationships.  include  attempts to  is  also  propositions.  alliances  to  encom-  These a s p e c t s incorporate  are  specific  W a l l a c e (1985) r a i s e s q u e s t i o n s about the a c t u a l v a l u e of i d e n t i f y i n g system p o l e s . These q u e s t i o n s , I believe, are l a r g e l y a f u n c t i o n of the problems i d e n t i f i e d above r e g a r d i n g t h e movement o f p o l a r i t y i n t o t h e r e a l m o f a l l i a n c e s and polarization.  164 s t a t e behavi or doing,  polarization  Moreover, support era of  alliance  economic  Although of post  ic  for this  the United  alliances  Two  little,  i f any,  on pure  capability  influence.  polarization,  ceptual  1 0 1  1 0 2  1 0 2  Also,  c h o s e n one Finally,  one  c a n more  i n such areas  contemporary  their  the  respec-  s e t of  socio-  absence of  such  to account f o r t h i s the m a j o r i t y of  Balance  o f Power  from socio-economic  c o n s i d e r a t i o n s and would expect  reference  without  a  historical  theory  in  leads t o  States the  distinction  their  engaging  are  realm  l i n k s would  to a l l i a n c e s ,  a c c u r a t e l y assess  as s t a b i l i t y  even  aspect  socio-econom-.  ties.  t h a t such  by m a i n t a i n i n g  defined with s t r i c t  economic bonds, tribution  the t o t a l  appears u s e f u l ,  effect  alignment.  1985)-  (Wallace,  1985)•  the a c t u a l p a r t n e r s little  a c c o m p a n i e d by a n o v e r l a p p i n g  era  In s o  1 0 1  t o preeminent s t a t u s of  the appearance of  a l l i a n c e and  of  in the  c o v a r i a t i o n b e t w e e n a l l i a n c e b o n d s and  (Wallace,  motivated  rise  1979) •  category  i s found  the f o r m u l a t i o n of p o l a r i z a t i o n  show l i t t l e  expect  The  S t a t e s and  w i t h i n each  W o r l d War  links  is  the g e n e r i c  interpretation  politics.  systems  links  links across  cases  i s equated to  international  S o v i e t U n i o n and tive  (see Rapk i n, e t . a 1.,  i nto polar i zat ion  and  of  have  between socio-  individual  con-  i n f u r t h e r con-  confusion.  The R a p k i n e t . a l . study i n c o r p o r a t e s the elements of c o n f l i c t a l and c o o p e r a t i v e b e h a v i o r i n m e a s u r i n g p o l a r i z a t i o n . Within this c a t e g o r y one c a n i n c l u d e a l s o W a l l a c e ' s (1973b) first study of p o l a r i z a t i o n w h i c h i n c l u d e d m e m b e r s h i p i n I n t e r n a t i o n a l Government a l O r g a n i z a t i o n s and D i p l o m a t i c E x c h a n g e s . As noted e a r l i e r , both H o l s t i e t . a l . (1973) and W a l t (1987) find t h a t i d e o l o g y p l a y s o n l y a weak r o l e i n a l l i a n c e f o r m a t i o n , while B u z a n (1983) p o i n t s o u t t h a t e c o n o m i c r e l a t i o n s h i p s h a v e a d i f f e r ent dynamic than p o l i t i c a l / s e c u r i t y ones.  165 In c o n c l u s i o n , Polarization  is  a  defined  a l l i a n c e bonds w i t h bonds e x i s t tion,  pole is operationally as the degree  Great  a system would  to which  P o w e r s as w e l l  among G r e a t P o w e r s . exhibit  Power o r s e t o f G r e a t P o w e r s  defined  alliance  in which  lesser  as the degree  In t h e e x t r e m e  two  as a Great states  have  to which  such  case of high  groups  Power.  polariza-  c e n t e r e d on a Great  every other s t a t e  is  exclusively  linked  t o one o f t h e two  groups  t h r o u g h t h e most f o r m a l t y p e o f  alli-  ance;  a defence pact.  A t t h e o t h e r end o f t h e s p e c t r u m , a s y s t e m  in t  which tion.  no a l l i a n c e  t i e s e x i s t would  In b e t w e e n t h e s e e x t r e m e s  t i o n which  must b e a d j u s t e d  alliances  between s t a t e s ,  groups  clusters.  or  development  v i d e an i n t e r v a l the  third Two  t h e r e i s a complex  f o r t h e number and  the  I t is this  of an adequate level  s c a l e of  polariza-  ofpoles,  exclusiveness  statistical  t h e types o f  o f the has  technique to  s c a l e of system  techniques dominate  identify  polarization,  The  attempts to provide  first  technique,  clusters  among s t a t e s .  of  resulting  hindered t h e  m e a s u r e and  pro-  and r e p r e s e n t s  d e v e l o p e d b y Bueno  clustering,  The  second  technique, (SSA-II)  and  surrounding  score  is available  measuring i t within  typal  by i d e n t i f y i n g  the d i s t a n c e s between the r e l e v a n t  space.  of  de M e s q u i t a  factor  analysis,  of alliance  d e v e l o p e d by W a l l a c e  to create a n-dimensional  g e o m e t r i c map o f s t a t e s b a s e d o n t h e c o m m o n a l i t y polarization  a measure of system  s t a t e s based on the s i m i l a r i t y  (1973b), u s e s S m a l l S p a c e A n a l y s i s  tions  polariza-  complexity that  (1973). u s e s a f o r m o f h i e r a r c h i c a l  bonds  of  i s s u e of concern.  polarization.  to  be the l o w e s t l e v e l  of a l l i a n c e bonds. geometric  t h e c e n t e r and  A  configurathe  points  166 The  fundamental  inability torical  problem w i t h  to a c c u r a t e l y  record.  both techniques  represent  the  m i n g f r o m Bueno de M e s q u i t a ' s use decision  t o a l l o w membership  state.  Wallace  (108)  also  due  t o the  the  r e s u l t i n g measure.  es  t h a t the  indicate  At  the  This complexity  alliance  with  data.  the  the  three cases.  i n 1885.  present. 1835» one  (1985)  states  i d e n t i f i e s fundamental  authors.  a t any  is  particular  Although o f the  'softer , 1  the  in  time.  means t o  represented. drawn from  varies  the  signifi-  tied  closely two both  alliance  of  together the  Great  1835 and  1911  linkage.  In  h i g h e s t degree o f p o l a r i -  t i g h t l y bonded by p r e d o m i n a n t l y  e v e n t h o u g h weak  consists  shapes  of polarization i s  cluster,  more t h a n one  inter-cluster  clusters  are  In c o n t r a s t ,  1911 e x h i b i t s  relationships,  point  of polarization  t o the  l i n k s are  differenc-  complex  schematically  states  links a ta l l .  cases,  These  numerous and  The lowest degree  G r e a t Powers w i t h  reality  G r e a t Powers on  degree o f p o l a r i z a t i o n  linked  his  incommensurate.  i s the  Although four  The i n t r a - c 1 u s t e r  defence pact  of  problems  As e v i d e n t ,  stem-  any i n d i v i d u a l  non-allied  two  shows t h r e e d i f f e r e n t c a s e s  c o m p a r i n g t h e s e two  are  o f the  for  technique d i s t o r t s  and the  Polarization  P o w e r s h a v e no a l l i a n c e  zation.  notes that his  may be m a n i f e s t e d  two a d d i t i o n a l  show a l l  cluster  leads us to adopt a s i m p l e r , a l b e i t  among t h e  exhibited  one  measures are  polarization.  F i g u r e 5-3  cantly  two  r o o t o f the  which p o l a r i z a t i o n  measure  in only  findings  his-  identifies distortions  F i n a l l y , Garnham  between the  their  o f a s i m i l a r i t y c o e f f i c i e n t and  effect of alliance size  differences  from  phenomenon r e l a t i v e t o t h e  O985: 103-104)  Wallace  results  1inkages  inter-c1uster are  absent  only of entente  1inkages  i n the  linkages.  case  FIGURE Schematic  Diagrams  of  5-3  System  1835  PR  Polarization  GB  STATE LABELS  A  N=23  AU  \  RU  po  sp  s  FR se  1885  it=ltaly se=Serbia  it 1911 -  ro  ro=Rumania  FR  GB ro  N=18  KU  GE  AU N = 16  P l l  GB = Great Britain FR = France PR = Prussio GE=Germany AU=Austria RU = Russia f u=Turkey  GB  sp = Spain po=Portugal  po sp  ALLIANCE LINKAGES DEFENCE ENTENTE --NEUTRAL  168  This one  f i g u r e shows t h e c o m p l e x i t y  could  d e v e l o p an o r d i n a l s c a l e o f  purposes such a s c a l e  represented  findings will eses.  be  less  Nonetheless,  r e l a t i o n s h i p between  scores  they w i l l  1 0 3  To  test  the  w i t h major s h i f t s  schematically, rigorous  scaling polarization. polarization.  is unnecessary.  a comparison of d i s t r i b u t i o n ization,  of  than  will  be  provide  the d i s t r i b u t i o n  most,  However, f o r third  Of our  polar-  course, other  and  the  hypoth-  us w i t h v a l u a b l e e v i d e n c e on of c a p a b i l i t i e s  our  hypothesis,  i n system  used.  i n the case of  At  the  polariza-  tion.  1 0 3  The d e v e l o p m e n t of such a scale for use i n the f i e l d at large w o u l d r e q u i r e an i n t e r - c o d e r r e l i a b i l i t y t e s t to c r e a t e a measure of i n t e r - s u b j e c t i v e agreement. The c o s t s of such a test are b e y o n d t h e n e e d s o f t h i s s t u d y and. a r e l e f t t o f u t u r e r e s e a r c h .  C h a p t e r VI DATA ANALYSIS  This  chapter  presents  the empirical  between t h e d i s t r i b u t i o n the  dependent  discussion  v a r i a b l e as i d e n t i f i e d  as a t o o l  h y p o t h e s e s , as r e s t a t e d The f i r s t  smaller  temporal  regressions  problems r e l a t e d  i s divided  presents  reference  initial  to the  use of  linear  tionships  among t h e v a r i o u s  o f war a s an i n t e r v e n i n g the  hypothesis  tion  that  there  and p o l a r i z a t i o n .  changes  distributional  The  first  explains  periods.  exists This  the  and second  two sec-  regres-  and t o v a r i o u s r e s u l t s from the  The t r a n s f o r m a t i o n s identified  differences  The  The f i r s t  t h e r e s u l t s from t h e b a s i c  found  are  i n t h e raw  i n the r e l a -  I t a l s o examines t h e i n f l u e n c e  variable.  i n a l l i a n c e patterns  relationships.  i n the f i r s t  The s e c o n d p r o v i d e s  section  measures of The  sections.  the transformed data sets.  The t h i r d  various Five.  a product of the e l i m i n a t i o n of a u t o - c o r r e l a t i o n data sets.  the r e l a t i o n s h i p  t o t h e system as a whole  periods.  using  into four  below, a r e t e s t e d  section  sion analysis with  i n Chapter  f o r summarizing the relevant  remainder of the Chapter  tions.  o f c a p a b i l i t i e s and t h e  examines v a r i o u s  regression  e v i d e n c e on  The f o u r t h  and f i n a l  section  tests  a r e l a t i o n s h i p between t h e d i s t r i b u -  test  is  at the  b a s e d on a v i s u a l c o m p a r i s o n o f  system  level  with  movement o n t h e  indices.  hypothesis  p o s i t s a d i r e c t or  s h i p between d i s t r i b u t i o n a l i n e q u a l i t y and  -  169  -  positive linear relationthe presence of a l l i a n c e s .  170 The  second  hypothesis posits.similar  es t o one p a r t i c u l a r measures of  type:  defence pacts.  the dependent  variable,  members a n d s y s t e m d y a d s w i l l inequality involved extreme the  i s high.  be found  capabilities  allianc-  proportion  o f system  i n a l l i a n c e s / d e f e n c e p a c t s when  fewer  s t a t e s and  p a c t s when  inequality  alliances/defence pacts w i l l  s y s t e m when  but l i m i t s  In t e r m s o f t h e two b a s i c  a greater  Conversely,  in alliances/defence case,  relationship,  dyads w i l l  is  low.  In t h e  be c o m p l e t e l y absent  are equally distributed  be  from  among t h e G r e a t  Powers.  These  hypotheses  independent variable, four  and  tested  dependent  identified  as well  i s a powerful  among r a t i o  scales.  which d e s c r i b e the d i r e c t i o n , s h i p between v a r i a b l e s .  power s e t o f  variable,  and t h e p r o p o r t i o n o f  procedure which I t produces  summary  I t has,  however,  certain  in this  b e t w e e n two o r more v a r i a b l e s ,  the  statistics  limitations  In s u m m a r i z i n g  study.  the s t a t i s t i c a l  result  b a s i s of the range of observed v a l u e s w i t h i n  r e l a t i o n s h i p between  dyads i n  s t r e n g t h and s i g n i f i c a n c e o f a r e l a t i o n -  type o f d a t a employed  19795l6b-l67).  above,  summarizes  to the procedure  er,  s t a t e s as  as noted  must b e r e c o g n i z e d i n i t s u s e r e l a t i v e  the  independent  i s measured u s i n g b o t h t h e  five  The d e p e n d e n t  The  and i n d e f e n c e p a c t s o n l y .  Regression analysis relationships  of c a p a b i l i t i e s ,  Four.  measures of t h e  respectively.  the proportion of states  as a whole  two d i s t i n c t  as the t r a d i t i o n a l  i n Chapter  c o n s i s t s of  using  variables  the d i s t r i b u t i o n  power,  alliances  are  The r e s u l t d o e s the v a r i a b l e s  and t h e  the r e l a t i o n s h i p i s d e t e r m i n e d on  the data sets  not n e c e s s a r i l y  given a  itself  which  (Young-  represent the  s e t of values  outside of  171  T a b l e VI1 Minimum/Maximum D i s t r i b u t i o n S c o r e s and U n d e r l y i n g G r e a t Power S h a r e s  Score Four  G r e a t Power  Shares  Power  1893  .055  G r e a t Br i t a i n France Russia Germany  .27 .22 .23 .27  1823  .223  G r e a t Br i t a i n France Russia Austria  . 18 .22 .43 .19  1893  132  Great B r i t a i n France Russia Germany Aus/Hun  .25 .20 .21 .25 .09  1833  • 255  Great B r i t a i n France Russia Prussia Austria  .14 .26 .37 .08 .16  Five  this the  Power  range.  Thus,  to generalize  two v a r i a b l e s c a n o n l y  tistical  assurance  theoretically  that  findings to a l l values  be s p e c u l a t i v e  the r e l a t i o n s h i p  possible values  i n nature. will  of the r e s p e c t i v e  or cases f o r  One h a s no s t a -  be r e p l i c a t e d variables.  for a l l  172 With  this  in  values within  mind,  the  i t is useful  respective  independent v a r i a b l e , t h i s inequality  nor  perfect  one  should  not  expect the  our  d e f i n i t i o n of  data sets.  range  the  indices  or  two  briefly  the  neither  distributional equality  p o l a r i t y and  hands o f one  For  includes  the  two an  range  i n d i c e s of  (Table V I I ) .  Great Powers, as  states.  extreme  of  However, Given  i n e q u a l i t y would  c a p a b i l i t i e s become  A multipolar  of the  extreme degree  t o encompass t h e s e e x t r e m e s .  imply a s t r u c t u r a l t r a n s f o r m a t i o n in  to d i s c u s s  system  concentrated  i s thus  trans-  t formed  into a unipolar  trum, p e r f e c t over  equality  t i m e among t h e  itself,  or  b i p o l a r one.  is also unlikely.  that  the  equal  al1  held  range,  the  .223  on  .225  and  two the  s h a r e s between the Between the to  the  top  lowest  weakest  and  b o t t o m on the  On and  time.  the  two  l e v e l s of  the  and five  Excluding  dependent  defence  Powers,  of