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Reconceptualizing the theory of local autonomy Brown, Michael Peter 1990

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RECONCEPTUALIZING THE THEORY OF LOCAL AUTONOMY By MICHAEL PETER BROWN B.A., Cl a r k U n i v e r s i t y , 1988 THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF MASTER OF ARTS in THE FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIES Department of Geography We accept t h i s t h e s i s as conforming to the r e q u i r e d standard THE UNIVERSITY OF BRITISH COLUMBIA August, 1990 © MICHAEL PETER BROWN In presenting this thesis in partial fulfilment of the requirements for an advanced degree at the University of British Columbia, I agree that the Library shall make it freely available for reference and study. I further agree that permission for extensive copying of this thesis for scholarly purposes may be granted by the head of my department or by his or her representatives. It is understood that copying or publication of this thesis for financial gain shall not be allowed without my written permission. Department of Geography The University of British Columbia Vancouver, Canada D a t e 28 August, 1990 DE-6 (2/88) i i ABSTRACT C o n c e p t u a l i z a t i o n s of l o c a l autonomy to date are c r i t i q u e d and an a l t e r n a t i v e theory i s o f f e r e d . Three i d e a l types of l o c a l autonomy are r e c o n s t r u c t e d from e x i s t i n g l i t e r a t u r e : f i s c a l , p o l i t i c a l , and l e g a l autonomy. Two s p e c i f i c c r i t i c i s m s are made: that each holds a d e f i c i e n t c o n c e p t u a l i z a t i o n of the l o c a l ; and th a t each has a negative and c o n s t r a i n e d view of power and autonomy. E x i s t i n g l i t e r a t u r e o v e r s i m p l i f i e s s t a t e s ' domination at the expense of l o c a l autonomy. A theory of l o c a l autonomy, I argue, must begin with the q u e s t i o n of how l o c a l i t i e s can and cannot be autonomous r a t h e r than a p r e v a i l i n g focus on what they stand autonomous from. In t h i s way, l o c a l autonomy and i t s absence (heteronomy) become d i a l e c t i c a l c o n c e p t s . I develop these p o i n t s through a d i s c u s s i o n of Massachusetts' i n c l u s i o n a r y housing p o l i c y . The p o l i c y ' s d r a f t i n g and i t s c u r r e n t impact i n four suburbs p r o v i d e the e m p i r i c a l b a s i s f o r t h e o r e t i c a l r e c o n s t r u c t i o n . " L o c a l " i s viewed from a place-making p e r s p e c t i v e : p l a c e s are seen as meaningful s e t s of s o c i a l r e l a t i o n s r e l a t i v e to a geographic c o n t e x t . Meaning i s produced, reproduced, and c o n t e s t e d w i t h i n those c o n t e x t s . A p l a c e ' s autonomy i s r e l a t e d to the way i n which meaningful s e t s of s o c i a l r e l a t i o n s are made to be "powerful" or "powerless" through a process of r e i f i c a t i o n . R e l a t i n g " l o c a l " to "autonomy" demands a r e l a t i o n a l and c i r c u l a t o r y theory of power r a t h e r than p r e v a i l i n g c o r p o r e a l t h e o r i e s . T h i s r e c o n c e p t u a l i z a t i o n i s b e n e f i c i a l i n t h e o r e t i c a l l y r e l a t i n g power and p l a c e because i t emphasizes the complexity and dynamics of r e l a t i o n s of domination and r e s i s t a n c e ; because i t h i g h l i g h t s the r e l a t i o n between p l a c e making and truth/knowledge c l a i m s ; and because i t does not h e u r i s t i c a l l y d i s e n t a n g l e s o c i a l processes whose very i n t e r a c t i o n i s t h e o r e t i c a l l y s i g n i f i c a n t . i v TABLE OF CONTENTS A b s t r a c t i i L i s t of Tables v i L i s t of F i g u r e s v i i Acknowledgements v i i i Chapter One: Power, Place and L o c a l Autonomy 1 a. I n t r o d u c t i o n 1 b. Autonomy and Power 4 c. Place and P o l i t i c s 12 d. L o c a l Autonomy i n Suburban Massachusetts 18 i . P r e v i o u s d i s c u s s i o n s of Chapter 40B 19 Chapter Two: F i s c a l and P o l i t i c a l Autonomy 23 a. I n t r o d u c t i o n : T y p o l o g i e s of L o c a l Autonomy 23 b. C o n c e p t u a l i z a t i o n s of F i s c a l Autonomy 25 i . C r i t i q u e of F i s c a l Autonomy L i t e r a t u r e 30 c. P o l i t i c a l C o n c e p t u a l i z a t i o n s of Autonomy 35 • i . F e d e r a l i s m 36 i i . Urban Managerialism and S t r e e t - L e v e l Bureaucracy 39 i i i . Suburban Autonomy 41 d. The Power of P o l i t i c a l Communities 45 e. Space and P o l i t i c a l Power 46 i . P l a c e and P o l i t i c a l I d e n t i t y 48 f. Summary and Comments 49 Chapter Three: L e g a l Autonomy 53 a. I n t r o d u c t i o n 53 b. L e g a l Autonomy Through D i l l o n ' s Rule 54 i . L e g a l Autonomy Through the Cooley Doctrine...59 i i . C r i t i q u e 62 c. C l a r k ' s Theory of L o c a l Autonomy 63 i . C r i t i q u e 66 d. The I n t e r p r e t i v e Turn i n the Geography of Law 69 i . C r i t i q u e 71 e. Summary and Comments 74 f. S y n t h e s i s 77 V Chapter Four: L o c a l Autonomy: Law Making as Place Making 81 a. L o c a l Autonomy i n Massachusetts Reconsidered 81 b. Method 82 c. Chapter 40B: S t r u c t u r e and Novelty 83 d. Power, Autonomy and Heteronomy Through Chapter 40B..87 e. Place Making Through Law Making: Chapter 40B's Genesis 94 f. Summary and Comments 109 Chapter F i v e : L o c a l Autonomy: Suburban Experience as Place Making 112 a. Place Making Through S t a t e - l o c a l R e l a t i o n s 112 b. Method 113 c. Massachusetts i n the Mid 1980s 115 d. L o c a l Autonomy: R e s i s t a n c e s , S t r a t e g i e s , and Tac-t i c s 1 20 e. L o c a l Autonomy: Place Making Through Place In-t e r a c t i o n 125 i . The St a t e 125 i i . Weston 127 i i i . L i n c o l n 135 i v . Dracut 141 v. Hanson 146 f. Summary and Comments 153 Chapter S i x : C o n c l u s i o n : A Re c o n c e p t u a l i z e d Theory 157 a. E p i l o g u e : Chapter 40B i n 1990 157 b. L o c a l Autonomy Re c o n c e p t u a l i z e d 159 c. The U t i l i t y of a P l a c e - P e r s p e c t i v e f o r L o c a l Autonomy S t u d i e s 163 B i b l i o g r a p h y 1 66 a. Books and A r t i c l e s 166 b. Newspapers 184 c . Interviews 185 d. Court Cases 186 e. Conferences 186 Appendix 187 a. Chapter 40B An Act P r o v i d i n g f o r the C o n s t r u c t i o n of Low and Moderate Income Housing 187 b. E x e c u t i v e Order 215 193 v i L i s t of Tables Table I. Appeals to H.A.C. 1969-1989 122 Table I I . Summary S t a t i s t i c s f o r Weston, Massachusetts 130 Table I I I . Summary S t a t i s t i c s f o r L i n c o l n , Massachusetts 136 Table IV. Summary S t a t i s t i c s f o r Dracut, Massachusetts 142 Table V. Summary S t a t i s t i c s f o r Hanson, Massachusetts 147 VI 1 L i s t of F i g u r e s F i g u r e 1. Case-Study Suburbs i n Greater Boston 1 29 v i i i Acknowledgements I wish to express g r a t i t u d e to my s u p e r v i s o r G e r a l d i n e P r a t t f o r her guidance and c o n s t r u c t i v e c r i t i c i s m throughout t h i s p r o j e c t . She a l o n g with N i c h o l a s Blomley p r o v i d e d c h a l l e n g i n g and i n s i g h t f u l comments on previous d r a f t s of t h i s document. In a d d i t i o n , my thanks extend to Dawn Bonnevie, T e r r y Brown, Susan Hanson, Sharon K r e f e t z , and C y n t h i a P h i l l i p s . Each p r o v i d e d me with h o s p i t a l i t y , r e s o u r c e s , and support without which I c o u l d not have executed my f i e l d w o r k competently. Tony Cheong, Robyn Dowling, and C a t h e r i n e Souch a s s i s t e d me i n f i n a l p r e p a r a t i o n s of the manuscript. They, al o n g with Marie McRae, c r e a t e d an environment of support and encouragement that enabled me to s u s t a i n t h i s endeavour. F i n a l l y , I am indebted to the people I i n t e r v i e w e d throughout the Commonwealth of Massachusetts. Without t h e i r wisdom, i n s i g h t s , and l o c a l knowledge; as w e l l as a w i l l i n g -ness to share them with me; I c o u l d not have garnered the competent understanding of p l a c e so necessary i n w r i t i n g a geography. 1 CHAPTER ONE POWER, PLACE AND LOCAL AUTONOMY a. I n t r o d u c t i o n My o b j e c t i v e i n t h i s t h e s i s i s to i n f u s e the longst a n d -ing debates over l o c a l autonomy with a d e c i d e d l y geographic p e r s p e c t i v e : that of how p l a c e s are c o n s t i t u t i v e l y made and remade through p o l i t i c a l and c u l t u r a l d i s c o u r s e 1 . Fundamen-t a l l y , the concept of l o c a l autonomy p o i n t s up the c o n t r o l t h a t l o c a l i t i e s have over t h e i r governance, t h e i r g e n e r a l being and t h e i r d e s t i n i e s v i s - a - v i s higher t i e r s of the s t a t e . T h i s b a s a l c o n c e p t u a l i z a t i o n i s r e t a i n e d throughout t h i s work, and b r o a d l y r e f l e c t s the tone of p e r t i n e n t l i t e r a t u r e to date. Narrower debates over l o c a l autonomy, however, have o r b i t e d around i s s u e s such as which f u n c t i o n s l o c a l govern-ments ought to have (Maas, 1959; Wickwar, 1970; Frug, 1980), or how best to c o n c e p t u a l i z e and o p e r a t i o n a l i z e the concept ( C l a r k , 1973; Saunders, 1979; C l a r k , 1984; Gurr & King, 1987). A l l l e a d up t o the gene r a l q u e s t i o n of whether or not l o c a l autonomy r e a l l y e x i s t s ( C l a r k , 1984; Dear & C l a r k , 1980, 1981; C l a r k & Dear, 1984). O v e r a l l , the l i t e r a t u r e tends to s t r e s s the s i g n i f i c a n c e of the c o n s t r a i n t s on l o c a l government, hence the tenor of the debate emphasizes a di m i n i s h e d or p r e c a r i o u s l o c a l autonomy, d e s p i t e important e x c e p t i o n s and ca v e a t s (Danielson, 1976b; E l a z a r , 1986) that 1 D e f i n e d as, "a system of p o s s i b i l i t y of knowledge." See ( P h i l p , 1985). 2 suggest problems w i t h the concept. T h i s c o n c e p t u a l d e f i c i e n c y , I argue, stems p r i m a r i l y from a treatment of the l o c a l autonomy q u e s t i o n as l a r g e l y an e m p i r i c a l , r a t h e r than a t h e o r e t i c a l issue (e.g., Saunders, 1979). Moreover, when the concept has been t h e o r i z e d (e.g., C l a r k , 1984, 1985; Frug, 1980; Syed, 1966), i t s scope has been fragmented i n t o d i s j o i n t e d treatments of law, p o l i t i c s or f i s c a l r e l a t i o n s . Given the m u l t i d i m e n s i o n a l i t y of s o c i a l r e l a t i o n s (Geertz, 1983) and the i n c r e a s i n g acknowledgement of t h i s p o i n t i n s o c i a l s c i e n c e , other aspects of the c o n s t i t u t i o n of l o c a l power must be teased out s i m u l t a n e o u s l y to ensure adequate c o n c e p t u a l i z a t i o n . In t h i s t h e s i s , I suggest that the concept must be r e c o n c e p t u a l i z e d f o r a more complex and s u b t l e grasp of power r e l a t i o n s ; and t h a t the presence of p a t t e r n s of autonomy or t h e i r absence (heteronomy) are not mutually e x c l u s i v e but 2 d i a l e c t i c a l c a t e g o r i e s . In a d d r e s s i n g the l i t e r a t u r e s , two novel c o n t r i b u t i o n s are made: a r e c o n c e p t u a l i z a t i o n of the a d j e c t i v e " l o c a l " to c apture the r e l a t i o n s between p l a c e and power i n p o l i t i c s , and a r e c o n c e p t u a l i z a t i o n of "autonomy" based on a r e l a t i o n a l and c i r c u l a t o r y theory of power: one that a r t i c u l a t e s the way i n which the power evin c e d i n the making and remaking of p l a c e s causes the autonomy and/or 2 The term heteronomy i s based on L i n d l e y (1986). I use the term " d i a l e c t i c " i n the sense of two o p p o s i t e phenomena i n t e r a c t i n g to produce a t h i r d , d i s t i n c t one. See (Abercrom-b i e , H i l l & Turner, 1984). 3 heteronomy p a t t e r n e d i n s t a t e - l o c a l p o l i t i c s . Through a more s u b t l e c o n c e p t u a l i z a t i o n of power (F o u c a u l t , 1980a,b), combined with a d i s c u s s i o n of the s t r u c t u r a t i o n process of place-making through p o l i t i c s and c u l t u r e (Agnew, 1987; Geertz, 1973, 1983; Pred, 1983), I o f f e r an a l t e r n a t i v e theory of l o c a l autonomy more capable of c a p t u r i n g the m u l t i p l i c i t y of i n t e r a c t i n g f o r c e s which produce p a t t e r n s of autonomy and heteronomy. I develop my argument by t r a c i n g the formation and r e f o r m a t i o n of a Massachusetts housing p o l i c y designed to encourage the p r o d u c t i o n of s u b s i d i z e d housing i n suburbia. The p o l i c y - c o l l o q u i a l l y known as "The Massachusetts A n t i Snob Zoning Law"- i s u s e f u l f o r my endeavour s i n c e i t i s a s t a t e move e x p l i c i t l y aimed at d i m i n i s h i n g l o c a l autonomy i n suburban land use r e g u l a t i o n , one of the most sacrosanct areas of l o c a l c o n t r o l i n the U n ited S t a t e s . Yet as I demonstrate i n Chapters Four and F i v e , there are a l s o processes i m p l i c a t e d by t h i s p o l i c y which produce v a r i e d p a t t e r n s of autonomy as w e l l . These p a t t e r n s are made v i s i b l e by emphasizing the way i n which agents and s o c i a l s t r u c t u r e s make p l a c e s they i n t e r a c t with as w e l l as those i n which they are s i t u a t e d . The argument i s more than a c o n t r i b u t i o n to the debate over l o c a l autonomy's o n t o l o g i c a l s t a t u s . I p o s i t that the way i n which p l a c e s are c o n s t i t u t e d as s e t s of meaningful s o c i a l r e l a t i o n s , and i n turn how they are r e i f i e d as they 4 " i n t e r a c t " with one another p r o v i d e s the conceptual key to gr a s p i n g the d i a l e c t i c of autonomy and heteronomy i n p o l i t i -c a l and c u l t u r a l d i s c o u r s e . I t i s the source of t h e i r autonomy. The focus i s on the i n t e r a c t i o n process because i t i s t h i s network of f o r c e r e l a t i o n s amongst i n d i v i d u a l s and i n s t i t u t i o n s which i s where power l i e s ( F o u c a u l t , 1980a). L o c a l autonomy should be seen as stemming from the i n t e r a c -t i o n of p l a c e s , which are r e i f i e d s e t s of s o c i a l r e l a t i o n s . T h i s i n t e r a c t i o n i s the power imbr i c a t e d i n " l o c a l autonomy." For t h i s t h e s i s , l o c a l autonomy i s not simply a r i g h t granted by a s t a t e or judge, i t i s not a task a l l o c a t e d to the bottom rung of the f e d e r a l i s t l a d d e r , nor s t i l l i s i t a value or hegemonic d e v i c e i n t e g r a l to the American regime or the c a p i t a l i s t s t a t e apparatus. Instead, as i t i s re c o g n i z e d to be a l l these t h i n g s i n d i s c u r s i v e p r a c t i c e s , i t i s a micro-m a n i f e s t a t i o n of power. The remainder of t h i s chapter i s d e d i c a t e d to develop-ing key concepts and debates germane to c r i t i q u e s i n l a t e r c h a p t e r s . F i r s t i s an e x p l i c a t i o n of power and autonomy, f o l l o w e d by a d i s c u s s i o n of the concepts of p l a c e and p o l i t i c s . F i n a l l y , an i n t r o d u c t i o n to and j u s t i f i c a t i o n of the Massachusetts case study are o f f e r e d . b. Autonomy and Power The c o n c e p t u a l i z a t i o n s of "autonomy" and power must be refo r m u l a t e d because, as Chapters Four and F i v e demonstrate, e x i s t i n g t h e o r i e s of l o c a l autonomy too r e a d i l y deny a l o c a l 5 e x e r c i s e of power. "Autonomy" l i t e r a l l y means " s e l f r u l e " and hence r e f e r s to a c a p a c i t y to dominate and c o n t r o l o n e s e l f and one's d e s t i n y d e s p i t e e x t e r n a l dominating f o r c e s ( L i n d l e y , 1988; Dworkin, 1986). T y p i c a l l y , autonomy has been t h e o r i z e d as c a t e g o r i c a l l y d e s c r i b i n g the r e s u l t of " l o c a l " a c t i o n s or a c t i v i t i e s . If the l o c a l s t a t e "got what i t wanted," d e s p i t e the presence of p o t e n t i a l c o n s t r a i n t s from s t a t e or f e d e r a l t i e r s , i t had power and thus was autonomous (Sbr a g i a , 1983; E l a z a r , 1986). I f the s t a t e "took away power" or "granted power" to promote l i b e r a l i s m or c a p i t a l -ism, the l o c a l s t a t e l o s t autonomy and was powerless (Winter, 1969; C l a r k & Dear, 1984) 3. Part of the problem surrounding the ambiguity i n t h e o r i e s of l o c a l autonomy is that the term "autonomy" u s u a l l y r e f e r s to an i n d i v i d u a l - not a group ( A d e l l , 1974; Thomas, 1978; L i n d l e y , 1988; Dworkin, 1986). I t i s o f t e n s a i d that i n s t i t u t i o n s " a c t " autonomously, or that i n a given i n s t a n c e they "had" autonomy (e.g. B a i l e y , 1984). But the l o c a l cannot be simply thought of as an i n d i v i d u a l that a c t s or holds (see below). T h i s t h e o r e t i c a l p o s i t i o n is danger-3 These a t t i t u d e s towards power can be t r a c e d to e x i s t i n g models where the term has been used to d e s c r i b e the c a p a c i t y to a f f e c t outcomes or change behaviour ( A d e l l , 1974). They have been d e s c r i b e d as the three 'faces' of power: decisionmaking (e.g. Dahl, 1963); nondec isionmaking (Bachratz & Baratz, 1970) and the d e n i a l l a t e n t i n t e r e s t s (Lukes, 1974). A d e l l (1974) and Thomas (1978) have suggested that autonomy is u s e f u l to balance the i n c r e a s i n g l y author-i t a r i a n emphases i n the study of power i n the second and t h i r d faces of power, without reducing the complexity of power to the p l u r a l i s m of the f i r s t f a c e . 6 cms, f o r i t reproduces an anthropomorphic e r r o r that reduces p l a c e to an i n d i v i d u a l . T h i s e r r o r has consequences f o r how power i s t r e a t e d t h e o r e t i c a l l y i n t u r n . As I demonstrate i n Chapters Two and Three, most t h e o r i e s of l o c a l autonomy c l a i m that power i s h e l d , granted or r e s c i n d e d . The c e n t r a l image of power i s that of a d i s c r e e t e n t i t y being exchanged between s e l f e v i d e n t o b j e c t s l i k e a s t a t e and a l o c a l government. What i s o b f u s c a t e d by t h i s p o r t r a y a l i s how power operates i n the c o n s t i t u t i o n of those groups and i n s t i t u t i o n s that d e f i n e the l o c a l ( i n c l u d i n g the l o c a l s t a t e ) and the s t a t e o v e r a l l i n a s o c i a l c o n t e x t . None of the 'three faces of power' can adequately capture the r e l a t i o n a l or c i r c u l a t o r y dimensions of power that are endemic to a term l i k e "autonomy", hence an a l t e r n a -t i v e concept of power must be used i f "autonomy" i s to have any t h e o r e t i c a l u t i l i t y . Acknowledging the presence of broader s o c i a l f o r c e s v i s - a - v i s an o b j e c t (as "autonomy" does) should not n e c e s s a r i l y mean denying a p r i o r i the e f f i c a c y of that o b j e c t merely because i t stands i n r e l a t i o n to another "powerful" e n t i t y . An a l t e r n a t i v e theory of power has been developed by F o u c a u l t , and i s used i n t h i s t h e s i s f o r i t s s u b t l e t y . C onventional c o n c e p t u a l i z a t i o n s of power, Foucault (1980a,b) has argued, r e l y too h e a v i l y on ways of t h i n k i n g about s o c i a l processes u n c r i t i c a l l y borrowed p r i m a r i l y from economics. 7 These modes of thought on power are i n a p p r o p r i a t e f o r the s u b t l e t y demanded by a concept l i k e l o c a l autonomy. I f autonomy i s s a i d to be granted from the s t a t e to the l o c a l , power becomes e s s e n t i a l l y commodified: a r i g h t p ossessable as i f i t were a good. Any e x e r c i s e of power by "the l o c a l " i s understood only through a grant of power from "the s t a t e " . Power, as i t informs c o n v e n t i o n a l t h e o r i e s of l o c a l autonomy, becomes something which i s embodied, had, or exchanged ( i n t h i s case the r i g h t to s e l f r u l e ) . If autonomy i s s a i d to a r t i c u l a t e with the s t r u c t u r a l demands of the c a p i t a l i s t s t a t e , power i s p r i m a r i l y t e l e o -l o g i c a l and i n s t r u m e n t a l . I t e x i s t s to serve some purpose, o f t e n an o v e r a l l , c o o r d i n a t i n g one. Power i s something that merely serves as a means to an end. I t does nothing to c o n t r i b u t e to d e f i n i n g the means-ends r e l a t i o n between the s t a t e and the l o c a l . Nor s t i l l does i t appear to p l a y any r o l e i n the way i n which those e n t i t i e s become separate and d i s t i n g u i s h a b l e from, yet i n e v i t a b l y r e l a t e d t o , each o t h e r . M i s s i n g these c o n s t i t u t i v e dimensions of power, i t s d e f i n i -t i o n a l and r e l a t i o n a l s i g n i f i c a n c e i s the c o s t , F o u c a u l t argues, of borrowing theory u n c r i t i c a l l y . In F o u c a u l t 1 s a l t e r n a t i v e , power i s seen as a u b i -q u i t o u s network of f o r c e r e l a t i o n s throughout s o c i e t y . Every s o c i a l r e l a t i o n m a nifests these f o r c e s . Power i s i n no sense separate from other s o c i a l r e l a t i o n s ; i t i s a dimension of those i n t e r a c t i o n s . Thus power i s not that which gets h e l d , 8 exchanged or t r a n s f e r r e d . Rather, i t i s a f o r c e which i s e x e r c i s e d both on and by i n d i v i d u a l s , who themselves r e -present i n t e r s e c t i o n s i n a g r i d of s o c i a l power. S u b j e c t s who e x e r c i s e power are thus c o n s t i t u t e d as both the products and agents of power (F o u c a u l t , 1986; Baynes, Bowman & McCarthy, 1988). C o n s e q u e n t i a l l y , power underscores the r e l a t i o n between o b j e c t s , which i n turn h e lps us to under-stand how those o b j e c t s become r e a d i l y i d e n t i f i a b l e as such. Understanding power t h i s way i n t e g r a t e s the v a r i o u s m a n i f e s t a t i o n s and instruments of power throughout s o c i a l i n t e r a c t i o n . Thus one of the valu e s of t h i s theory i s that i t r e c o g n i z e s that the power between s t a t e and l o c a l can be e x e r c i s e d through a v a r i e t y of r e l a t i o n s and that these r e l a t i o n s are c o n s t a n t l y i n process, simultaneous, and o f t e n c o n t r a d i c t o r y . Most important to a theory of l o c a l autonomy, i t h i g h -l i g h t s the immanence of r e s i s t a n c e where there are r e l a t i o n s of power (e.g. ( F i s k e , I989a,b)), c h a l l e n g i n g the author-i t a r i a n , n egative or top-down emphasis standard to conven-t i o n a l a n a l y s e s of power ( c f . Thomas, 1978). Wherever there i s domination, there must a l s o be some form of r e s i s t a n c e . Each v e c t o r of f o r c e i m p l i c a t e s the way i n which the other becomes ma n i f e s t . Power c i r c u l a t e s between t h i n g s , i n pa r t because the way i n which " t h i n g s " are d e f i n e d and u n i f i e d p o i n t s up the s t r a t e g i e s and techniques of domination and r e s i s t a n c e . With respect to l o c a l autonomy, then, r e c o g n i z -9 ing that s t a t e s dominate l o c a l governments begs an under-standing of the l o c a l r e s i s t a n c e to s t a t e domination and how " s t a t e " and " l o c a l " become d e f i n e d ( v i s - a - v i s power) r e l a t i v e to each other. Foucault c a l l s such o b j e c t s d i s c u r s i v e . . 4 formations or u n i t i e s . Thus the r e l a t i o n between the autonomy of a p l a c e that e x e r t s c o n t r o l over i t s e l f and i t s d e s t i n y and a Foucauldian c o n c e p t u a l i z a t i o n of power i s one which acknowledges the domination by higher t i e r s of the s t a t e through v a r i o u s s t r a t e g i e s and the p e r m e a b i l i t y of l o c a l s o c i a l r e l a t i o n s by broader f o r c e s , but i t a l s o c o n s i d e r s the s i m u l t a n e i t y of the " l o c a l " r e s i s t a n c e s and evasions to that domination or c o n t r o l . To date, the r e l a t i o n between f o r c e s has been understood with a n e g a t i v e , c o n s t r a i n e d , and top-down- thus a one-sided- notion of power. Because "autonomy" s i g n i f i e s s e l f c o n t r o l w i t h i n a broader context of p o t e n t i a l domination and c o n s t r a i n t , i t would be most f r u i t f u l l y grounded i n the r e l a t i o n a l , c i r c u l a t o r y theory of power Foucault o f f e r s . In a d d i t i o n , F o u c a u l t ' s theory of power emphasizes the c r i t i c a l r e l a t i o n between power, knowledge and t r u t h , c r u c i a l 4 A d i s c u r s i v e formation " c o n s i s t s of p r a c t i c e s and i n s t i t u t i o n s that produce knowledge c l a i m s that the system of power f i n d s u s e f u l . A s p e c i f i c d i s c o u r s e serves a maieutic f u n c t i o n : i t b r i n g s Objects i n t o being by i d e n t i f y i n g them d e l i m i t i n g t h e i r f i e l d , and s p e c i f y i n g them....Objects of knowledge are d e f i n e d i n ways that converging p r a c t i c e s can use. Thus a d i s c u r s i v e formation u n i t e s thought and p r a c t i c e i n a seamless and c i r c u l a r web: P r a c t i c e s set the c o n d i t i o n s f o r d i s c o u r s e and d i s c o u r s e feeds back statements that w i l l f a c i l i t a t e p r a c t i c e . " (Wolin, 1988, p.184) 10 i n the place-making process (see below). Foucault suggests, "Truth' i s to be understood as a system of ordered procedures f o r the p r o d u c t i o n , r e g u l a t i o n , d i s t r i b u t i o n , c i r c u l a t i o n and o p e r a t i o n of statements....Truth i s l i n k e d i n a c i r c u l a r r e l a t i o n with systems of power which produce and s u s t a i n i t , and to e f f e c t s of power which i t induces and which extend i t . " (1980a, p.133) Thus how "the s t a t e " and "the l o c a l " are d e f i n e d as u n i t i e s mutually (through the place-making p r o c e s s ) , as w e l l as how t h e i r r e s p e c t i v e t a s k s , d u t i e s , r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s and indeed very o n t o l o g i e s are h e l d to be proper and true are a l l processes which are c r i t i c a l to an understanding of l o c a l autonomy, because "the l o c a l " and "the s t a t e " are s o c i a l l y c o n s t r u c t e d as "powerful" and/or "powerless" o b j e c t s . I seek to understand how the l o c a l has become o b j e c t i f i e d through power by f o c u s i n g on how the s t a t e and the l o c a l - as p l a c e s -become such s e l f evident " d i s c u r s i v e u n i t i e s " ( F o u c a u l t , 1972; Baynes, Bowman & McCarthy, 1988). Chapters Two and Three w i l l demonstrate l i n e s of c o n s i s t e n c y as w e l l as i n c o n s i s t e n c y i n the t r u t h s about the l o c a l autonomy of p l a c e s towards t h i s end. T h i s view of power a l s o emphasizes a method of i n v e s -t i g a t i n g l o c a l autonomy that hones i n on the micro i n s t a n c e s of power: the " c a p i l l a r y " (that which takes p l a c e at the i n d i v i d u a l or everyday l e v e l s ) because i t i s here where they are understood not through grand theory but as a p a r t of the s t r a t e g i e s and c a l c u l a t i o n s endemic to everyday l i f e . Such s t r a t e g i e s and t a c t i c s , as w e l l as the techniques of domina-t i o n and r e s i s t a n c e are a l l made v i s i b l e i n an i n t e r a c t i v e 1 1 s e t t i n g . For t h i s reason, Chapters Four and F i v e t r a c e the way i n which i n d i v i d u a l s c r e a t e d and r e c r e a t e d p l a c e s through e x e r c i s e s of power i n an everyday, o r d i n a r y , l o c a l c o n t e x t . The Foucauldian c o n c e p t u a l i z a t i o n of power i s u s e f u l , then, to the reworking of l o c a l autonomy i n t h i s t h e s i s f o r a number of reasons. I t moves us beyond a s i m p l i s t i c dualism of, ' i f the l o c a l has power then i t i s autonomous, i f i t does not, then i t i s not'. I t all o w s us to t h e o r i z e a d i a l e c t i c of autonomy and heteronomy i n s t a t e - l o c a l r e l a t i o n s , as domination and r e s i s t a n c e are both underscored and s i m u l -taneous. Because of the m u l t i d i m e n s i o n a l i t y of power, the v a r i o u s r e l a t i o n s of f o r c e that are i m p l i c a t e d i n the c o n t r o l over and d e f i n i t i o n of p l a c e s are captured much more e f f e c -t i v e l y than c o n c e p t u a l i z a t i o n s of l o c a l power to date, p r e c i s e l y because i t accommodates a l l of the i n s i g h t s these l i t e r a t u r e s glean, but r e j e c t s t h e i r s o l e concern with the "negative" or top-down v e c t o r s of power f o r a more complete and r e c i p r o c a l p o r t r a y a l . F i n a l l y , the r e l a t i o n between power and t r u t h s h i g h l i g h t the need to understand the d e f i n i t i v e r e l a t i o n between the " l o c a l " and "autonomy." To c l a i m autonomy, the need f o r autonomy, or the l a c k of autonomy i n p o l i t i c a l d i s c o u r s e does not merely demand a c o n t e x t u a l i z e d e x p l a n a t i o n , but a l s o a d e s c r i p t i o n of how the f o r c e r e l a t i o n s i n p l a y are being p r o b l e m a t i z e d v i s - a - v i s s e t s of t r u t h s and i d e a l s about the way p l a c e s ought to be, about the way they are, and about the ways they c o u l d never 1 2 be. c. P l a c e and P o l i t i c s For a geographic i n q u i r y i n t o l o c a l autonomy, a more f a m i l i a r way to understand the d i s c u r s i v e u n i t i e s of "the s t a t e " and "the l o c a l " i s to view them as p l a c e s . The c r e a t i o n and maintenance of a p l a c e e n t a i l s the a c t i v a t i o n of r e l a t i o n s of power i n human i n t e r a c t i o n (Weber, 1968; Mann, 1984; Sack, 1983). Thus a r e c o n c e p t u a l i z a t i o n of power and autonomy n e c e s s i t a t e s an understanding of the way i n which the s t a t e , the l o c a l and t h e i r r e l a t i o n are made and h e l d to be t r u e . The concept of p l a c e i s a p p r o p r i a t e to t h i s t a s k . Place i s a way of bounding and s i g n i f y i n g a people i n r e l a t i o n to a geographic c o n t e x t . Through p l a c e , meaning i s c u l t u r a l l y a s c r i b e d to the a b s t r a c t s o c i a l r e l a t i o n s , l i n k i n g them to the m a t e r i a l world (Tuan, 1976; Relph, 1976; Pred, 1983; E y l e s , 1985). I t i s through an u n d e r s t a n d i n g of p l a c e t h a t t r u t h s are c l a i m e d about the way t h i n g s are or the way they ought to be. S c h o l a r s h i p on l o c a l autonomy, however, has l a r g e l y t h e o r i z e d the " l o c a l " not as a p l a c e , but as the l o c a l 5 . . . s t a t e . I f i n d t h i s s p e c i f i c a t i o n p r o b l e m a t i c because i t 5 Agnew (1987) has argued that the d e v a l u a t i o n of p l a c e as a t h e o r e t i c a l c a t e g o r y can be understood i n terms of 1. the d i s s a t i s f a c t i o n with a t h e o r e t i c a l community s t u d i e s of the s i x t i e s and s e v e n t i e s where p l a c e e q u a l l e d "community"; and 2. the subsequent r e a c t i o n i n s o c i a l theory to s t r e s s the s i g n i f i c a n c e of broader s o c i a l f o r c e s and t h e i r p e n e t r a t i o n i n t o each and every p l a c e (and i n t u r n to r e l y more on a b s t r a c t c a t e g o r i e s r a t h e r than c o n t e x t u a l i z e d c o n c e p t s ) . The r e d u c t i o n of " l o c a l " to the l o c a l s t a t e i s no doubt 13 a r t i f i c i a l l y separates l o c a l government from c i v i l s o c i e t y -e s p e c i a l l y i n arguments over l o c a l autonomy that s i t u a t e the semi-autonomous l o c a l s t a t e i n between c o n s t r a i n t s from above (the s t a t e ) and below (the p o l i t y or broader s o c i a l f o r c e s ) (e.g., Gurr & King, 1987, 1988; Saunders, 1979). The l o c a l has been reduced to merely a l e v e l of the s t a t e . In t u r n , t h i s c o n c e p t u a l i z a t i o n has d i s e n t a n g l e d the l o c a l s t a t e too f o r c e f u l l y from the other s o c i a l r e l a t i o n s which a l s o c o n s t i t u t e the l o c a l as a p l a c e . As the t h e o r i z a t i o n of the l o c a l s t a t e r e c e n t l y has em-p h asized the l i n k s w i t h i n the s t a t e apparatus over those between the l o c a l s t a t e and c i v i l s o c i e t y (e.g. C l a r k & Dear, 1984 6; c f . Wood, 1958; B a n f i e l d & Wilson, 1963; Gans, 1967), the deemphasis of the s t a t e - p o l i t y r e l a t i o n s b e t r a y s a t h e o r i z a t i o n of the s t a t e i t s e l f which i s f a r too a b s t r a c t (e.g. Cockburn, 1977; Dear, 1981; Dear & C l a r k , 1981). The l o c a l s t a t e should be seen as an i n s t i t u t i o n which i s n e i t h e r separate from the l a r g e r s t a t e nor from c i v i l s o c i e t y (Duncan & Goodwin, 1982; Blomley, 1989a; Chouinard, 1989). By r e c a s t i n g the concept of l o c a l autonomy with a c l e a r r e f -erence to what i s f u l l y meant i n p o l i t i c a l and c u l t u r a l d i s c o u r s e s by " l o c a l " , t h i s s t a t i c p a r t i t i o n i n g i s removed. evidence of both these t h e o r e t i c a l t e n d e n c i e s . ^ T h i s work r e f l e c t s a broader t r e n d i n s c h o l a r s h i p emphasizing a " s t a t e - c e n t r e d " approach. See ( N o r d l i n g e r , 1981; Benjamin & E l k i n , 1985). The purpose i n emphasizing the i n t e r n a l r e l a t i o n s of the s t a t e i s to emphasize the r e l a t i v e autonomy of the s t a t e from c a p i t a l i s m . 14 Recent work by Agnew (1987) p r o v i d e s an o p p o r t u n i t y to r e c o n c e p t u a l i z e l o c a l autonomy by emphasizing the " l o c a l " . H is work i s grounded i n s t r u c t u r a t i o n theory and emphasizes the m e r i t s of c o n t e x t u a l e x p l a n a t i o n i n conveying the s p a t i a l i z a t i o n of a b s t r a c t s o c i a l p r o c e s s e s . Place has s h i f t e d from an emotive term (e.g. Relph, 1976; Tuan, 1976) or a stage f o r a b s t r a c t processes (Saunders, 1980) to a mediating concept between the a b s t r a c t and the concrete (Giddens, 1985; Pred, 1983). P l a c e , a c c o r d i n g to Agnew, i s t h e o r e t i c a l l y comprised of three elements: l o c a t i o n , the g e o g r a p h i c a l d e l i n e a t i o n which encompasses the s e t t i n g s f o r s o c i a l a c t i o n ; l o c a l e the s e t t i n g s and i n s t a n c e s i n which s o c i a l r e l a t i o n s are con-s t i t u t e d ; and sense of p l a c e which p o i n t s up the " s t r u c t u r e s of f e e l i n g s " people evoke as they i n t e r a c t i n c e r t a i n l o c a l e s i n v a r i o u s l o c a t i o n s - the l o c a l c u l t u r e . T h i s p l a c e - p e r s p e c -t i v e , then, i s u s e f u l i n c a p t u r i n g both the c o n t e x t u a l and t h e o r e t i c a l s i g n i f i c a n c e of s o c i a l r e l a t i o n s , as w e l l as t h e i r own m u l t i d i m e n s i o n a l i t y . Yet to date, Agnew's e m p i r i c a l work has been c r i t i c i z e d f o r not a c h i e v i n g i t s t h e o r e t i c a l aims of c o n t e x t u a l i z i n g a b s t r a c t s o c i a l processes and t r a n s g r e s s i n g the s t r u c t u r e -agency dualism which has plagued s o c i a l s c i e n c e (Savage, 1988; Mair, 1989). Pred (1984) f o r i n s t a n c e has s t r e s s e d the c o n t i n u a l becoming of p l a c e s : the way i n which p l a c e i s part of both a seamless h i s t o r i c a l path and time/space s p e c i f i c 1 5 i n t e r a c t i o n (what I r e f e r to as p l a c e making). The very u t i l i t y of the s t r u c t u r a t i o n a l approach i s to accept the v a l i d i t y of both s t r u c t u r e and agency i n the making of s o c i a l l i f e . I would suggest that p a r t of Agnew's shortcomings stem from h i s i n a b i l i t y to capture the i n t e r a c t i v e process of p l a c e making i n p o l i t i c a l and c u l t u r a l p r a c t i c e s . The e m p i r i c a l focus of t h i s t h e s i s , then, i s on the way i n which p l a c e s are made, and i n t u r n , how they i n t e r a c t . Agnew's work s u f f e r s from a "cookbook" approach to conveying p l a c e : there i s more of a concern with s p e c i f y i n g the elements themselves r a t h e r than t h e i r i n t e r a c t i o n and combination. For i n s t a n c e , h i s d i s c u s s i o n of four l o c a l i t i e s i n American p o l i t i c s i s s a i d to o f f e r a " h i s t o r i c a l c o n s t i t u -t i o n of p o l i t i c a l behaviour i n p l a c e s " (1987, p. 190). In each account, one can i s o l a t e Agnew's d e s c r i p t i o n of l o c a -t i o n , l o c a l e and even sense of p l a c e , but because he- as an a u t h o r - r e - p r e s e n t s these t h e o r e t i c a l elements, t h e i r "becom-in g " i s never captured. Instead, h i s d e s c r i p t i o n s of those elements are underscored. - I t i s upstaged by h i s manipulation of the elements of p l a c e . What needs to be c o n s i d e r e d , I argue, i s the way i n which these meaningful s e t s of s o c i a l r e l a t i o n s are made to be p l a c e s through p o l i t i c a l and c u l t u r a l d i s c o u r s e . By f o c u s i n g on the p l a c e making process, not only are the d i s c r e t e elements of place interwoven, they r e t a i n t h e i r t h e o r e t i c a l s i g n i f i c a n c e s i m u l t a n e o u s l y . More r e l e v a n t to a theory of l o c a l autonomy, how the l o c a l becomes 16 d e f i n e d i s a l s o braced by a theory of power that can e x p l a i n not only outcomes i n p l a c e s , but a l s o how those p l a c e s have come to be h e l d as "powerful" or "powerless". To t h i s end, a c r u c i a l step i n both r e c o n c e p t u a l i z i n g l o c a l autonomy and amending Agnew's work i s an emphasis on the r e i f i c a t i o n of p l a c e by agents and i n s t i t u t i o n s . T h i s i s the focus of the place-making process a l l u d e d to e a r l i e r . Through r e i f i c a t i o n , s u b j e c t i v e l y intended meanings become o b j e c t i v e f a c i l i t i e s (Berger & P u l l b e r g , 1964; Berger & Luckmann, 1967). Thus, through the r e i f i c a t i o n of p l a c e s (as g e o g r a p h i c a l l y l i n k e d s e t s of s o c i a l r e l a t i o n s ) , people o b j e c t i f y the s t a t e and the l o c a l with s p e c i f i c r e f e r e n c e to l o c a t i o n , l o c a l e and senses of p l a c e . Places become separate meaningful e n t i t i e s from those who represent them. Places begin to be seen as a f f e c t i v e and c a u s a l . T h i s r e i f i c a t i o n i n t u r n a f f e c t s agents and i n s t i t u t i o n s as p l a c e s begin to be t r e a t e d as powerful or powerless. Thus the way i n which p l a c e s are d e f i n e d by agents and i n s t i t u t i o n s i m p l i c a t e how and whether they are autonomous. O v e r a l l , t h i s process t r a n s p i r e s i n a geographic c o n t e x t . L o c a t i o n , l o c a l e and sense of p l a c e are a l l drawn upon and reproduced as p l a c e s become s o c i a l c o n s t r u c t i o n s . Images of types of p l a c e s become pa r t of the p o l i t i c a l s t r u g g l e between groups. L o c a l autonomy, i n t h i s way, stems from the r e i f i c a t i o n of p l a c e s as they are made to be autonomous or heteronomous. T h i s p o i n t i s developed e m p i r i c a l l y i n Chapters Four and F i v e as 17 the place-making process i s demonstrated. Wider t h e o r e t i c a l debates are a l s o addressed by r e f i n i n g the p l a c e p e r s p e c t i v e . The concept of p l a c e , as developed by Agnew, all o w s the l i n k s between c i v i l s o c i e t y and l o c a l s t a t e to be h i g h l i g h t e d . I t answers the c a l l f o r a c o n t e x t u a l i z e d yet s t i l l t h e o r e t i c a l understanding of s o c i a l p rocesses from contemporary l o c a l i t y and r e g i o n a l s t u d i e s ( K i r b y , 1985, 1986, 1988; O'Loughlin, 1988; Massey, 1985; Blomley, 1989b; T h r i f t & W i l l i a m s , 1987; Rose, 1988, 1989). The u t i l i z a t i o n of c o n t e x t u a l modes of e x p l a n a t i o n endemic to the pl a c e p e r s p e c t i v e a l s o wed c u l t u r e and p o l i t i c s , as s t r u g g l e over how p l a c e s become d e f i n e d can only be understood i n terms of broader though common "webs of meaning" (Geertz, 1983; a l s o Agnew, Mercer & Sopher, 1984). The meaningfulness of p l a c e i s drawn through l o c a l c u l t u r e from both geographic and h i s t o r i c a l templates, and a v a r i e t y of media are used ( S u t t l e s , 1984). The process i s always a n e g o t i a t e d , c o n t e s t e d one. A d d i t i o n a l l y , the p l a c e - p e r s p e c t i v e c o n t r i b u t e s to the push away from the dominant strands of p o l i t i c a l i n q u i r y f o c u s i n g s o l e l y on the c l a s s i c q u e s t i o n , "who wanted what, where, when, why and how" (see Downes, 1973; c f E l k i n , 1985). I t does not deny the s i g n i f i c a n c e of t h i s q u e s t i o n (nor would I ) ; r a t h e r i t s i t u a t e s t h i s important q u e s t i o n w i t h i n a s o c i a l - t h e o r e t i c a l framework that underscores the r e l a t i o n between p o l i t i c s and s o c i a l r e p r o d u c t i o n . R e c a l l that 18 A r i s t o t l e (1951) d e f i n e d p o l i t i c s as foremost an a s s o c i a t i o n of i n d i v i d u a l s commonly o r i e n t e d toward a noble end. To paraphrase E l k i n (1985; 1987), p o l i t i c s i s not j u s t a means 7 to an ends- i t i s an ends i n i t s e l f . P o l i t i c s i s not j u s t about how i n d i v i d u a l s or groups get what they d e s i r e , i t i s a l s o about the i n t e r a c t i v e process of a people c o n s t i t u t i n g themselves as a s o c i e t y (through v a r i o u s p l a c e s ) ; the way s o c i e t y ought to be. C o n c e p t u a l i z i n g p o l i t i c s i n t h i s way f o r g e s l i n k s between p o l i t i c a l and s o c i a l theory, as w e l l as a r t i c u l a t i n g with a more s u b t l e , l e s s i n s t r u m e n t a l view of power. d. L o c a l Autonomy i n Suburban Massachusetts Suburban e x c l u s i o n a r y zoning techniques have been c l a s s i c examples of l o c a l autonomy i n the U n i t e d S t a t e s (Danielson, 1976b). Through v a r i o u s r e s t r i c t i o n s or fees i n l o c a l land-use r e g u l a t i o n s , suburbanites have e f f e c t i v e l y managed to block the c o n s t r u c t i o n of low and moderate income housing w i t h i n t h e i r p l a c e s . In 1969, the Commonwealth of Massachusetts passed Chapter 774 (or 40B): The A n t i Snob Zoning Law. The law i s more f u l l y e x p l a i n e d i n Chapter F i v e . B r i e f l y s t a t e d , however, i t i s a mechanism whereby a d e v e l -oper (through the s t a t e ) can o v e r r i d e a l l l o c a l zoning ordinances f o r a s u b s i d i z e d development in a town i f that 7 H e r e , . E l k m d i s t i n g u i s h e s p o l i t i c a l r a t i o n a l i t y from economic r a t i o n a l i t y , and f u r t h e r c o n s t i t u t i v e p o l i c y a n a l y s i s from economizing p o l i c y a n a l y s i s . For a d i s c u s s i o n see ( E l k i n , 1985). 19 l o c a l i t y has been unreasonable i n i t s stance on a f f o r d a b l e housing. 40B would a p p a r e n t l y p r o v i d e a f a s c i n a t i n g e m p i r i -c a l c h a l l e n g e to the wide t h e o r e t i c a l consensus on a l a c k of l o c a l autonomy. The d i s c r e p a n c y between theory and e m p i r i c s , then, p r o v i d e s the space i n which the theory of l o c a l autonomy can be r e c o n c e p t u a l i z e d from both d i r e c t i o n s . d . i . P r e v i o u s D i s c u s s i o n s of Chapter 40B Three d i s t i n c t trends can be i d e n t i f i e d i n the work on the A n t i Snob Zoning Law to date. The f i r s t i s a d e c i d e d l y l e g a l approach, which s i t u a t e s 40B i n the e x i s t i n g context of the s t a t e and n a t i o n a l cases surrounding e x c l u s i o n a r y zoning (Sherher, 1969; Vaughn, 1974; Ovrut, 1976; Reed, 1981). The l i t a n y of cases which have c h a l l e n g e d v a r i o u s a s p e c t s of the law's l e g i t i m a c y has a l s o been reviewed (see Reed, 1981). Often the 40B's n o v e l t y as a l e g i s l a t i v e i n i t i a t i v e to p r o h i b i t e x c l u s i o n a r y zoning i s s t r e s s e d . Most attempts (and most debate over these attempts) to open up the suburbs are i n the j u d i c i a l arena (Sherher, 1969; D a n i e l s o n , 1976b; King, 1982) 8 . Another s t r a n d of work on 40B assesses the p o l i c y ' s T h i s general approach has been c r i t i q u e d as l e g a l o b j e c t i v i s m . Unger (1983) argues that the d i s t i n c t i o n between l e g i s l a t i v e and j u d i c i a l p o l i t i c s r e a f f i r m s a s e p a r a t i o n between ' o r d i n a r y ' p o l i t i c s of l e g i s l a t i v e policymaking and ' f o u n d a t i o n a l ' p o l i t i c s of j u d i c i a l p olicymaking. The p a r t i t i o n a l l o w s o r d i n a r y p o l i t i c s t o be s i t u a t e d i n s o c i a l p rocesses, r e f l e c t i n g i d e o l o g i c a l d i v i s i o n s , while s i m u l -taneously r e s e r v i n g an o b j e c t i v e , p r i v i l e g e d space f o r j u r i d i c a l p o l i t i c s . C l e a r l y the d i s c u s s i o n i n chapter three a f f i r m s the dangers of t h i s p r i v i l e g i n g . 20 outcomes (Reed, 1981; Ovrut, 1976; K r e f e t z , 1977, 1979, 1980; Lacasse & Kane, 1987; Guzman, 1989). Inherent i n t h i s s t r a i n i s a debate between those arguing that the law w i l l have/has had no r e a l e f f e c t on low and moderate income housing p r o d u c t i o n i n suburbia (Reed, 1981; Ovrut, 1976; L i s t o k i n , 1976; C a n e l l o s , 1989; Worcester Telegram, 1987), and those who maintain that such f i n d i n g s are o v e r t l y p e s s i m i s t i c ( K r e f e t z 1977, 1979, 1980; Vaughn, 1981; Lacasse & Kane, 1987; Guzman, 1989; K r e f e t z , Guzman & Brown, 1990). The l a t t e r argue that f a r l e s s suburban a f f o r d a b l e housing would be b u i l t without the law. The predominance of e l d e r l y housing complexes ( K r e f e t z , 1980), and the importance of a r c h i t e c t u r a l a e s t h e t i c s (Guzman, 1989) have a l s o been documented. The means/ends r a t i o n a l i t y of 40B's p o l i t i c s has been overemphasized r e l a t i v e to i t s c o n s t i t u t i v e dimension. A p l a c e p e r s p e c t i v e can remedy t h i s problem. F i n a l l y , a t h i r d focus hones i n on the p o l i t i c s of 40B. Margaret Power (1974) uses 40B to understand s t a t e l e g i s l a -t u r e s a b i l i t y to c r e a t e m e t r o p o l i t a n - s c a l e "urban" p o l i c y , through a c o n t r a s t with a f a i l e d New J e r s e y m e t r o p o l i t a n p l a n n i n g b i l l . Schneider (1970) and K r e f e t z (1977) have concluded that the process of l e g i s l a t i v e i n n o v a t i o n has a d i r e c t and s i g n i f i c a n t impact on the a c t u a l law i t s e l f , and i t s e f f e c t s . Schneider pays c l o s e r a t t e n t i o n to the law's d r a f t i n g while K r e f e t z looks a t . t h e law's e f f e c t s over an 21 g e i g h t - y e a r p e r i o d . The l i n k s between plac e making, law making and l o c a l autonomy, however, remain to be developed v i s - a - v i s the b i l l . T h e o r e t i c a l l y , Chapter 40B r e p r e s e n t s an a t t a c k on l o c a l autonomy in the area of land-use c o n t r o l . I t i s a l e g a l tack, as i t i s through a l e g a l d i s c o u r s e that power c i r c u l a t e s to abate l o c a l d i s c r e t i o n . There are a l s o f i s c a l s a n c t i o n s a s s o c i a t e d with noncompliance, e r o d i n g the f i n a n -c i a l c a p a c i t y f o r l o c a l autonomy (see E x e c u t i v e Order 215 i n the Appendix). And as the q u e s t i o n of whether or not suburbia ought to be opened up by the s t a t e has been non-decided, then there i s a l s o a lac k of autonomy i n the p l a c e -d e f i n i t i o n p rocess. At f i r s t glance Chapter 40B seems l i k e a c l e a r cut e m p i r i c a l case of d i m i n i s h i n g l o c a l autonomy. But to see suburbs as l o s i n g power, or the s t a t e as t a k i n g power away (as many have p o r t r a y e d 40B) f a i l s to t h e o r i z e the r e s i s t a n c e s suburbs exert to the p o l i c y that i s simultaneous to t h e i r domination. The complexity of f o r c e r e l a t i o n s - the d i a l e c t i c between autonomy and heteronomy i s l e f t unacknowledged and u n t h e o r i z e d . Such a reading of power a l s o misses the c r u c i a l t h e o r e t i c a l p o i n t that how suburbs can be "autonomous"- how they can e x e r c i s e power- i s to be 9 Much of the d e t a i l surrounding the d r a f t i n g of 40B which I put f o r t h can o r i g i n a l l y be found i n p a i n s t a k i n g d e t a i l i n Schneider (1970). Indeed, my own o r i g i n a l f i e l d w o r k i n t o the b i l l ' s l e g i s l a t i v e h i s t o r y l a r g e l y served to c o n f i r m the thorough accuracy of her n a r r a t i v e . The n o v e l t y of Chapter Four, then, i s not i n i t s h i s t o r i c a l account, but r a t h e r i n the t h e o r e t i c a l treatment of t h i s n a r r a t i v e . 22 found i n how the suburbs and the s t a t e make and remake themselves and each other. The autonomy of a p l a c e stems from the way i n which i t d e f i n e s i t s e l f and i s d e f i n e d by the other which seeks to dominate i t . The two e m p i r i c a l chapters of t h i s t h e s i s examine the networks of f o r c e i n the place-making process of Mas-sachusetts and i t s suburbs. Chapter Four t r a c e s the d r a f t i n g of the law i t s e l f . My p o i n t i s to show that the c a p a c i t y f o r autonomy was a c t u a l l y w r i t t e n i n t o the law and- more impor-t a n t l y - t h at t h i s p o t e n t i a l i t y p a r t i a l l y stemmed from the way i n which d r a f t e r s saw the suburbs and c e n t r a l c i t i e s as p l a c e s and the way i n which they c o u l d be b e t t e r p l a c e s i n a democratic and f e d e r a l i s t regime. Chapter F i v e reviews the experience of four Massachusetts suburbs with the law through the 1980s. I demonstrate a v a r i a b i l i t y i n the autonomy/heteronomy d i a l e c t i c , and a l s o t h e o r e t i c a l l y o u t l i n e the place-making process that s t r u c t u r e s t h i s d i a l e c t i c . Concluding comments are made in Chapter S i x . Chapters Two and Three examine the three modes of c o n c e p t u a l i z i n g l o c a l autonomy that dominate contemporary thought. F i s c a l and p o l i t i c a l autonomy are d i s c u s s e d i n Chapter Two, and l e g a l autonomy- which has been the most p e r v a s i v e d i s c o u r s e on l o c a l autonomy- i s o u t l i n e d i n Chapter Three. These chapters continue my attempts to draw out the d e f i c i e n c i e s i n e x i s t i n g c o n c e p t u a l i z a t i o n s of l o c a l autonomy. 23 CHAPTER TWO FISCAL AND POLITICAL AUTONOMY a. I n t r o d u c t i o n : T y p o l o g i e s of L o c a l Autonomy The purpose of t h i s chapter i s to l a y the f o u n d a t i o n f o r r e c o n c e p t u a l i z i n g l o c a l autonomy by emphasizing the manner i n which autonomy i s evinced r a t h e r than s t r e s s i n g the autonomy from phenomena. I s y n t h e s i z e and review two p e r s i s t e n t s t r a i n s i n the l i t e r a t u r e : one marking the f i s c a l r e l a t i o n s between s t a t e and l o c a l i t y , the second f e a t u r i n g the p o l i t i c a l r e l a t i o n s between the two. In reviewing these l i t e r a t u r e s , I am c r i t i c a l of t h e i r d e f i c i e n c i e s i n concep-t u a l i z i n g " l o c a l " and "autonomy", and power, though I attempt to b u i l d upon t h e i r s t r e n g t h s i n order to develop a recon-s t i t u t e d understanding of l o c a l autonomy. T y p o l o g i e s of l o c a l autonomy have tended to h i g h l i g h t what the l o c a l i t y stands autonomously from ( c f . C l a r k , 1984). Saunders (1979) f o r i n s t a n c e d e f i n e s l o c a l autonomy i n terms of the r e s i d u a l l e f t from c o n s t r a i n t s on the l o c a l s t a t e from three phenomena: e c o l o g i c a l f o r c e s , p o l i t i c a l f o r c e s , and market f o r c e s . S i m i l a r l y Gurr & King (1987) draw a d i s t i n c -t i o n between autonomy from higher t i e r s of the s t a t e and autonomy from broader s o c i a l f o r c e s (see a l s o C l a r k e , 1987). What "autonomy" i s , then, depends on how the l o c a l (always d e f i n e d as the l o c a l s t a t e ) f a r e s i n r e l a t i o n t o other s o c i a l f o r c e s . The problem with d e f i n i n g l o c a l autonomy merely i n r e l a t i o n to or as separate from other 24 f o r c e r e l a t i o n s i s that the e x i s t e n c e of p a t t e r n s of autonomy i s t r e a t e d as an e m p i r i c a l l y , r a t h e r than a t h e o r e t i c a l l y answerable q u e s t i o n (Saunders, 1979). The broader s o c i a l f o r c e s are t h e o r i z e d , but the power of the l o c a l , and indeed what "the l o c a l " i s , are processes which remain ignored because i n l o c a l autonomy l i t e r a t u r e , the l o c a l i s t r e a t e d as a stage on which s o c i a l r e l a t i o n s ebb and flow (e.g., Saunders, 1980, 1981). Ignored i s the s p a t i a l i z a t i o n of s o c i a l processes as they are manifested l o c a l l y (Giddens, 1984; Gregory & Urry, 1985). Instead of seeing the relevance of "autonomy" i n terms of what i t e m p i r i c a l l y s i g n i f i e s , I would underscore i t s t h e o r e t i c a l u t i l i t y i n p o i n t i n g up the way i n which power c i r c u l a t e s between the s o c i a l c o n s t r u c t i o n s of " s t a t e " and " l o c a l " . In t h i s way, not only i s the p a r t i t i o n between p a t t e r n s of l o c a l autonomy and s o c i a l process removed, but the q u e s t i o n of l o c a l autonomy becomes both an e m p i r i c a l and t h e o r e t i c a l one. Whether or not l o c a l autonomy e x i s t s l a r g e l y depends on how " l o c a l " and "autonomy" are both o p e r a t i o n a l i z e d and how they are c o n c e p t u a l i z e d . How l o c a l autonomy becomes or does not become manifest thus becomes the o r d e r i n g framework f o r the l i t e r a t u r e review s t r a d d l i n g t h i s chapter and the next. F i s c a l , p o l i t i c a l , and l e g a l forms of l o c a l autonomy are t r e a t e d as i d e a l types f o r s y n t h e s i z i n g the l i t e r a t u r e (Weber, 1963). The types come from s t r e s s e s and emphases i n the l i t e r a t u r e v i s - a - v i s the 25 way i n which l o c a l autonomy i s evinced, hence t h e i r t h e o r e t i -c a l r e l e v a n c e . These types should not be seen as mutually e x c l u s i v e . Rather, they are h e u r i s t i c d e v i c e s used to order and bound the fragmented and d i s j o i n t e d work on t h i s e l u s i v e concept. The i d e a l types are u s e f u l because they overem-phasize the d i s t i n c t i v e c o n c e p t u a l i z a t i o n s of l o c a l autonomy, h i g h l i g h t i n g the weak or o f t e n absent i n t e r n a l l i n k s among the d i f f e r e n t t h e o r i e s . I f a c i r c u l a t o r y theory of power i s employed, however, the l i n k s can be strengthened and f i r m l y r e l a t e d to "the l o c a l " . Thus my aim i s to r e c o n c e p t u a l i z e l o c a l autonomy i n order to i n t e g r a t e these l i t e r a t u r e s . b. C o n c e p t u a l i z a t i o n s of F i s c a l Autonomy By " f i s c a l autonomy", I mean the r e l a t i o n s of f o r c e and r e s i s t a n c e between s t a t e and l o c a l agencies d e f i n e d by the t r a n s f e r of funds from the former to the l a t t e r . Since the Depression, the t r e n d i n the U n i t e d S t a t e s has been f o r c i t i e s to become i n c r e a s i n g l y dependent on f e d e r a l and or s t a t e monies to balance t h e i r budgets (Gelfand, 1980; S b r a g i a , 1983). Concomitantly, f e d e r a l and s t a t e agencies have i n c r e a s i n g l y found i t u s e f u l to achieve p o l i c y g o als by funding proper l o c a l agencies ( E l a z a r , 1986; Stone, Whelan & Murin, 1986). Three broad trends capture the urban experience with f e d e r a l and s t a t e funds: c a t e g o r i c a l a i d , revenue s h a r i n g , and retrenchment. The i n c r e a s e i n f e d e r a l a i d to c i t i e s throughout the 1960s was most o f t e n i n the form of c a t e g o r i -26 c a l , or grants i n a i d , as p a r t of Johnson's "New F e d e r a l i s m " . These were s p e c i f i c a l l o t m e n t s of money used f o r t a r g e t e d purposes, o f t e n bypassing state-government c o n t r o l . Authors have g e n e r a l l y t r e a t e d c a t e g o r i c a l a i d as an abatement of l o c a l autonomy f o r two reasons. Grants in a i d had a narrow range of t a r g e t s f o r which they c o u l d be used. I f the l o c a l i t y d i d not e x h i b i t the s p e c i f i c need the grant was intended to s a t i s f y , the c i t y or town would l i k e l y be deemed i n e l i g i b l e by the f e d e r a l government. Thus a l o c a l -i t y ' s a b i l i t y to decide i f a c e r t a i n grant i s the best way to s o l v e a l o c a l problem was p o t e n t i a l l y undermined ( B u r c h e l l , C a r r , F l o r i d a & Nemeth, 1984; Shannon & W a l l i n , 1980; Nathan, 1980). More to the p o i n t , which l o c a l i s s u e s deemed problem-a t i c and thus worthy of funding was decided at the f e d e r a l , not the l o c a l l e v e l ( S b r a g i a , 1983; Stone, 1986; Nathan, 1980). L o c a l autonomy i s a l s o s a i d to be eroded by f i s c a l means i n c a t e g o r i c a l a i d because of the i n e v i t a b l e s t r i n g s a t t a c h e d to such programmes ( P f i f f n e r , 1983; Dear & C l a r k , 1980, 1981; C l a r k & Dear, 1984; Schneider, 1989). Acc e p t i n g f e d e r a l (or s t a t e ) d o l l a r s f o r a programme meant a c c e p t i n g the accompanying l i s t of r u l e s and r e g u l a t i o n s concerning such i s s u e s as a u d i t i n g , b i d d i n g , h i r i n g , and s a l a r y guide-l i n e s . Nixon's "New F e d e r a l i s m " of the 1970s marked a s i g -n i f i c a n t change i n f e d e r a l - l o c a l funding r e l a t i o n s . C a t e g o r i -27 c a l a i d was r e p l a c e d by General Revenue Sharing i n 1972. These f e d e r a l d o l l a r s were more br o a d l y earmarked, as f e d e r a l money f o r use at l o c a l d i s c r e t i o n ( S b r a g i a , 1983). Monies were a l l o c a t e d by formula r a t h e r than annual debate, and d i s c u s s i o n about how t h i s money should be spent s h i f t e d from the f e d e r a l to the l o c a l arena (Shannon & W a l l i n , 1980; Owen, 1983). New F e d e r a l i s m t h e o r e t i c a l l y represented an i n c r e a s e i n l o c a l autonomy through f i s c a l means ( L i n e b e r r y & Sharkansky, 1978; S b r a g i a , 1983). The power to decide how revenue-s h a r i n g money would be spent was co n c e n t r a t e d at the l o c a l l e v e l , hence autonomy was augmented. Since the program opened up l o c a l c o m p e t i t i o n to get these funds, more and more l o c a l communities had the c a p a b i l i t y to access t h i s p o t e n t i a l revenue as w e l l (Nathan, 1980). F i n a l l y , the l i t e r a t u r e suggests that fewer s t r i n g s were a t t a c h e d to revenue s h a r i n g monies, though some c e r t a i n l y remained (Owen, 1983). Both c a t e g o r i c a l a i d and revenue s h a r i n g , however, have been seen as o v e r a l l trends i n s t a t e c e n t r a l i z a t i o n ( L o v e l l , 1981). T h i s c e n t r a l i z a t i o n i s s a i d to i n h i b i t l o c a l autonomy in so f a r as i t has c r e a t e d a sense of dependency on higher t i e r s of the s t a t e ( L o v e l l , 1981; Stephens, 1974; Bahl & Vogt, 1975; Wolman, 1982). The c o n n o t a t i o n i s that the f i n a n c i a l t i e s are by f a r the most s i g n i f i c a n t ones between l o c a l and f e d e r a l or s t a t e governments (Owen, 1983). Often, the connection between autonomy and f i s c a l t i e s i s l e s s a 28 t h e o r e t i c a l than a m ethodological one. C e r t a i n authors, i n seeking to measure amounts of l o c a l autonomy, have merely used t r a n s f e r r e d funds as o p e r a t i o n a l v a r i a b l e s f o r l o c a l autonomy (Stephens, 1974). Dear and C l a r k (1980, 1981), f o r i n s t a n c e , measure the l i m i t s on l o c a l s t a t e autonomy by c a l c u l a t i n g the amount of t r a n s f e r payments from f e d e r a l and s t a t e c o f f e r s . They compare the v a r i a b i l i t y of l o c a l s t a t e autonomy by c a l c u l a t -ing the net t r a n s f e r to the l o c a l s t a t e as a percentage of i t s t o t a l budget. They summarize: " C o n t r o l over l o c a l s t a t e f u n c t i o n and f i n a n c e i s a p p l i e d i n a g e n e r a l r a t h e r than a s p e c i f i c manner. While i t may be p o l i t i c a l l y expedient to be a b l e to demonstrate the ' n e u t r a l -i t y ' of f e d e r a l State a l l o c a t i o n s , the f a c t remains that v a r i a t i o n s i n l o c a l s t a t e economy and p o l i c y have very l i t t l e impact on i t s f u n c t i o n a l and f i n a n c i a l requirements. In essence, c o n t r o l over the l o c a l s t a t e i s q u i t e r i g i d . " (Dear & C l a r k , 1980, p. 22) Through the 1980s, retrenchment represented the Reagan a d m i n i s t r a t i o n ' s p o l i c y on f e d e r a l a i d . Promising to i n c r e a s e l o c a l autonomy and reduce the s i z e of the f e d e r a l government, Reagan s l a s h e d l o c a l a i d c o n t i n u a l l y throughout the decade ( C l a r k , 1985; G r e i n e r & Peterson, 1986; Peterson & Lewis, 1986). In g e n e r a l , the r e s u l t was that l o c a l budgets were reduced and, wherever p o s s i b l e , s t a t e governments stepped i n to o f f s e t the f e d e r a l withdrawal. Because of the well-documented f i s c a l c r i s i s of the l o c a l s t a t e through the 1970s and 1980s ( S c h e f t e r , 1978), f e d e r a l retrenchment was d e p i c t e d as yet another e r o s i o n of l o c a l autonomy. L o c a l governments were l e s s a b l e to d e a l with harsher c o n s t r a i n t s 29 from s o c i a l and economic f o r c e s (King, 1988). Sbragia (1983) notes that i n the t r a n s i t i o n from c a t e g o r i c a l a i d to revenue s h a r i n g , l o c a l s f e a r e d a l o s s of l o c a l autonomy s i n c e the f e d e r a l government c h a n n e l l e d the money through s t a t e a g e n c i e s . The t h e o r e t i c a l p o i n t of i n t e r e s t i s that l o c a l s have more to fear from t h e i r s t a t e s v i s - a - v i s l o s s of autonomy than from the f e d e r a l government. Part of the reason f o r t h i s no doubt stems from the f a c t t h a t , d e s p i t e widespread suburban p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n revenue s h a r i n g , the bulk of the t r a n s f e r payments were made to c i t i e s r a t h e r than r u r a l communities (Markusen, Saxenian, & Weiss, 1980). Many s t a t e l e g i s l a t u r e s were r u r a l l y o r i e n t e d , and hence c i t i e s had much to f e a r from the a n t i - u r b a n b i a s i n t h e i r s t a t e s . Such an a n t i - u r b a n b i a s c o u l d a l s o be d e t e c t e d i n the s o - c a l l e d tax r e v o l t of the 1980s, another event that can be seen as l i m i t i n g l o c a l f i s c a l autonomy. P r o p o s i t i o n 2 1/2 i n Massachusetts f o r c e d most c i t i e s and some suburbs to r o l l back pr o p e r t y assessments to 2 1/2% of t h e i r f u l l market v a l u e . A d d i t i o n a l l y , i t r e s t r i c t e d the a b i l i t y of l o c a l government to i n c r e a s e property tax r a t e s to no more than 2 1/2% per year without a l o c a l o v e r r i d e referendum. Passed i n 1980, P r o p o s i t i o n 2 1/2- l i k e i t s C a l i f o r n i a predecessor, P r o p o s i t i o n 13- has been t h e o r i z e d as one of the ways i n which s t a t e s c o n t r o l and r e g u l a t e the r e v e n u e - r a i s i n g c a p a b i l i t i e s of l o c a l i t i e s , and hence a source of impingement 30 on t h e i r autonomy (Ladd & Wilson, 1981; MacManus, 1983; P f i f f n e r , 1983). The p o i n t most o f t e n s t r e s s e d , however, about s t a t e -l o c a l r e l a t i o n s i s that s t a t e s have the a b i l i t y to determine the means by which l o c a l governments can r a i s e revenues. In t h i s way, s t a t e s are s a i d to c o n s t r a i n l o c a l autonomy by l i m i t i n g t a x a t i o n and borrowing powers of c i t i e s ( K i l p a t r i c k , 1941; King, 1988; Shannon & W a l l i n , 1980; B a i l e y , 1984; S h e f l e r , 1980; Stone, 1986; L i n e b e r r y & Sharkansky, 1978; Dear & C l a r k , 1980, 1981). The presence of f e d e r a l or s t a t e money or enablements may or may not augment l o c a l c o n t r o l , but l o c a l autonomy i s thought to be c o n s t r a i n e d because of the f i s c a l r e l a t i o n between f e d e r a l , s t a t e , and l o c a l l e v e l s . b. i . C r i t i q u e of F i s c a l Autonomy L i t e r a t u r e The f i r s t p o i n t to be made i s that t h i s l i t e r a t u r e e x h i b i t s a s i m p l i s t i c - and i n some cases c o n t r a d i c t o r y -c o n c e p t u a l i z a t i o n of l o c a l autonomy o v e r a l l . Whether or not there i s autonomy depends on e i t h e r how much money i s r e c e i v e d , what s t r i n g s are a t t a c h e d , or from which t i e r i t o r i g i n a t e s . T h i s i s a f a r too s i m p l i s t i c means to approach the broad q u e s t i o n of how much c o n t r o l l o c a l communities have over t h e i r d e s t i n i e s . Even case s t u d i e s which have examined how l o c a l communities d e a l with t r a n s f e r payments i n times of f i s c a l s t r e s s tend to concur that acceptance of money that i s not i n t e r n a l l y generated a u t o m a t i c a l l y reduces autonomy (Levine, Rubin, Wolohojian, 1981). 31 Yet even i f one looks at the textbook assessments of programmes l i k e revenue s h a r i n g , such a c o n c l u s i o n becomes somewhat ad hoc. Much of the c r i t i c i s m of revenue s h a r i n g was based on the f a c t that many a f f l u e n t m u n i c i p a l i t i e s were using i t along with block grants to fund r a t h e r s u p e r f l u o u s budgetary items while c i t i e s were v y i n g f o r the money to b u i l d housing and maintain s o c i a l s e r v i c e s (Markusen, Saxenian & Weiss, 1980). Both c i t y and suburb were 'con-s t r a i n e d ' but the relevance of the c o n s t r a i n t s d i f f e r e d because the p l a c e s v a r i e d d i f f e r e n t with respect to needs, d e s i r e s and c a p a c i t i e s to achieve those ends (Schneider, 1989). The f i s c a l autonomy l i t e r a t u r e i s a l s o h e a v i l y b i a s e d towards c i t i e s and urban government at the n e g l e c t of suburban and exurban areas ( B u r c h e l l , C a r r , F l o r i d a , Nemeth, 1984; S h e f l e r , 1980; Tarrow, K a t z e n s t e i n & Greziano, 1978; M e l t z e r , 1971; B a i l e y , 1984). Place i s immediately concep-t u a l i z e d u n c r i t i c a l l y as c i t y or urban. The context i s a u t o m a t i c a l l y one of f i s c a l s t r a i n or c r i s i s , and hence only c e r t a i n types of p l a c e s with c e r t a i n types of problems are d i s c u s s e d . L o c a l autonomy must be conceived as a broader and more s u b t l e category f o r i t to be of any g e n e r a l , t h e o r e t i c a l u t i l i t y . I nstead of suggesting that there i s a t h e o r e t i c a l d i f f e r e n c e between urban and suburban autonomy as some have i m p l i e d (see D a n i e l s o n , 1976b), or simply r e l a t i n g the 32 m a n i f e s t a t i o n of autonomy to the e m p i r i c a l d i f f e r e n c e s between c i t y and suburb ( i . e . , p l a c e s with more resources and fewer problems have more autonomy), I am b u i l d i n g towards a reworking of the concept of autonomy that admits e m p i r i c a l v a r i e t y a c r o s s p l a c e s . My second p o i n t of c r i t i q u e i s that " l o c a l " cannot be reduced to the l o c a l s t a t e (Bahl & Vogt, 1975; Sbragia, 1983; King, 1982; B u r c h e l l , C a r r , F l o r i d a & Nemeth. 1984). Consider the tax r e v o l t d i s c u s s e d above. C i t i z e n s f o r L i m i t e d T a x a t i o n , a s s i s t e d by the Massachusetts High Tech C o u n c i l succeeded through a p e t i t i o n d r i v e to f o r c e the s t a t e l e g i s l a t u r e to pl a c e P r o p o s i t i o n 2 1/2 on the b a l l o t . The b i l l r e q u i r e s the s t a t e to exert c o n t r o l over l o c a l budgets i n p e r p e t u i t y , but the impetus of the b i l l came from "the l o c a l s " themselves. The conc e p t u a l d i s t i n c t i o n between " s t a t e " and " l o c a l " i s not always c a t e g o r i c a l l y u s e f u l . Where does the seemingly simple d i v i s i o n between the s t a t e and c i v i l s o c i e t y end (Sbragia, 1983; F r i e d l a n d & Wong, 1983; Gel f a n d , 1980; S h e f t e r , 1980; Teaford, 1981)? A t h i r d p o i n t of c r i t i q u e concerns t h i s l i t e r a t u r e ' s theory of power. Simply put, power equals money or c o n t r o l over money (Wolman, 1982; Stephens, 1974, Hansen & K j e l l b e r g , 1976; Bahl & Vogt, 1975; Sb r a g i a , 1983). F e d e r a l d o l l a r s spent by l o c a l i t i e s means a c e n t r a l i z a t i o n of s t a t e power. While on a crude l e v e l such a c o n c l u s i o n seems common-s e n s i c a l , i t i s based on the commodified and thus e s s e n t i a l l y 33 economistic reading of power. Power i s granted to be-leaguered c i t i e s v i a f e d e r a l or s t a t e d o l l a r s . The e r o s i o n of autonomy comes from the p o t e n t i a l s e q u e s t e r i n g of funds-the dependency. T h i s i s a crude measure of autonomy which may be convenient f o r simple p o l i c y a n a l y s i s but l a c k s the complexity of a r e l a t i o n a l view of power. I t l a r g e l y ignores the s t r a t e g i e s and r e s i s t a n c e s of the poor l o c a l communities dominated by a wealthy f e d e r a l government. I t overemphasizes the l a r g e s s of the f e d e r a l t i e r at the expense of the p l e t h o r a of r e l a t i o n s of f o r c e between the e n t i t i e s recog-n i z a b l e as "the f e d e r a l government" and "the c i t y " (e.g. F r i e d l a n d & Wong, 1983) How do they d e f i n e themselves and each other, and through which d i s c o u r s e s of power? Money i s a r e p r e s e n t a t i o n of c e r t a i n r e l a t i o n s of power, but i t i s not the only one. As such, an o v e r - r e l i a n c e on f i s c a l concep-t u a l i z a t i o n s of l o c a l autonomy l e a d to a c o n s i d e r a b l y o v e r s i m p l i f i e d understanding of the concept. F i n a l l y , t h i s l i t e r a t u r e can be c r i t i q u e d f o r i t s u n c r i t i c a l adoption of the term "autonomy". With res p e c t to l o c a l autonomy, the authors debate over i t s ebb and flow p a r a l l e l l i n g f e d e r a l or s t a t e d o l l a r s and budgetary a l l o c a -t i o n s and methods. But a l l agree that autonomy i s d i m i n i s h e d as a context of i n c r e a s i n g intergovernmental f i n a n c e e v o l v e s . There i s no way f o r l o c a l i t i e s to remain autonomous i f they touch a f e d e r a l or s t a t e d o l l a r , because that d o l l a r does not come from the l o c a l i t y . Before the Depression, l o c a l i t i e s 34 were l a r g e l y f i n a n c i a l l y independent, and hence there i s some h i s t o r i c a l v a l i d i t y to the assessment. But there i s a conceptual danger accompanying a word l i k e autonomy. E s s e n t i a l l y , i t i s a term whose purest form i s h a r d l y a t t a i n a b l e i n s o c i a l l i f e . Regardless of what i s a t t a c k i n g or c o n s t r a i n i n g or impinging, there w i l l never be complete autonomy i n any s o c i a l r e l a t i o n , p r e c i s e l y because the r e l a t i o n s are s o c i a l . L o c a l communities can never a c t u a l l y be completely f r e e from the o r b i t of s t a t e s or na t i o n s (and v i c e v e r s a ) . I t thereby becomes easy to say that autonomy i s being "taken away" or reduced, but n e a r l y impossible to argue that a community has s u f f i c i e n t autonomy. Regardless of t h e i r p o l i t i c s few authors f i n d t h a t l o c a l communities have enough autonomy (though again there i s an urban b i a s o p e r a t i n g ) ( C l a r k , 1985). A c i r c u l a t o r y theory of power recognizes the f a l s e promise of a term l i k e autonomy i n two ways. F i r s t , i t h i g h l i g h t s the power r e l a t i o n s i m p l i c a t e d i n d i s c o u r s e s over t r u t h that serve as a backdrop to the p o t e n t i a l , c h i m e r i c a l complete autonomy. Often arguments c i t i n g a d i m i n i s h i n g autonomy can be t r a c e d to b a s a l " t r u t h s " about the way s o c i a l r e l a t i o n s ought to be s t r u c t u r e d . A c i r c u l a r theory of power underscores the t e n s i o n s i n these t r u t h c l a i m s , t h e i r i n s t r u m e n t a l use, and t h e i r r e c u r s i v e reinforcement by opponents and c r i t i c s as i t h i g h l i g h t s the s i l e n c e s on "what's agreed upon." 35 Second, a r e l a t i o n a l view of power emphasizes the p r e c i s e l a c k of autonomy of any phenomenon, as power i s d e f i n e d as the network of f o r c e r e l a t i o n s i n s o c i e t y . In coming to g r i p s with any s e r i e s of f o r c e r e l a t i o n s , i t i s imperative to acknowledge f o r c e s of domination, but s t r a t -e g i e s f o r r e t a l i a t i o n and r e s i s t a n c e are 'always a l r e a d y ' present i n the face of any domination and the a r t i c u l a t i o n between these s e t s of f o r c e s must be conveyed a c c u r a t e l y because i t i s t h e i r d i a l e c t i c which i s most important. Despite these inadequacies, f i s c a l autonomy l i t e r a t u r e i d e n t i f i e s an important t e r r a i n on which l o c a l autonomy i s c o n t e s t e d . Part of the way i n which a l o c a l s t a t e d e f i n e s a p l a c e i s through i t s c a p a c i t y to provide s e r v i c e s and attempt to formulate s o c i a l agendas. C e r t a i n l y adequate f i n a n c i a l resources are necessary f o r such endeavors. We should not, however, l o s e s i g h t of the other simultaneous manners i n which l o c a l autonomy i s c o n t e s t e d . c. P o l i t i c a l C o n c e p t u a l i z a t i o n s of Autonomy In s p e c i f y i n g " p o l i t i c a l autonomy", I bracket a l i t e r a t u r e that emphasizes the r e l a t i o n s between the l o c a l s t a t e and i t s s t a t e or f e d e r a l government i n the context of a l i b e r a l democratic regime. Two g e n e r a l themes can be seen: one examines the d i v i s i o n of powers d e f i n e d as t a s k s , and the second i d e n t i f i e s p l a c e as a source of power ( d e f i n e d as i d e n t i t y - c r e a t i n g ) . Three sub l i t e r a t u r e s comprise t h i s tack on l o c a l 36 autonomy: the works on f e d e r a l i s m , urban managerialism, and the suburban autonomy l i t e r a t u r e . Each i d e n t i f i e s the presence or absence of l o c a l autonomy i n r e l a t i o n to the s t r u c t u r e of the intergovernmental r e l a t i o n s , or to the agency of key l o c a l agents reproducing i n that s t r u c t u r e . c. i . F e d e r a l i s m Contemporary t h e o r i e s of f e d e r a l i s m have s t r e s s e d the " p i c k e t fence" or "marble cake" a n a l o g i e s (Nice, 1987; Grodzins, 1966; E l a z a r , 1986; c f . Peterson, 1981). T h e i r p o i n t i s that there i s by no means a c l e a r - c u t d i s t i n c t i o n between f e d e r a l , s t a t e , and l o c a l government f u n c t i o n s any more. With respect to l o c a l autonomy, however, most authors agree that c i t i e s are extremely c o n s t r a i n e d , though they s t i l l r e t a i n a modicum of power w i t h i n a l i m i t e d purview such as home r u l e . Thus the source of autonomy or heteronomy i s t r a c e a b l e to the e x i s t i n g a l l o c a t i o n and d i s t r i b u t i o n of d u t i e s between f e d e r a l , s t a t e and l o c a l governments, or any s h u f f l i n g t h e r e o f . L o c a l communities have the power to tax i n c e r t a i n areas, run t h e i r own e l e c t i o n s , a d m i n i s t e r b u r e a u c r a c i e s , provide c e r t a i n s e r v i c e s , e t c . T h i s bundle of tasks i s juxtaposed with the tasks of the s t a t e and f e d e r a l govern-ments, hence debate f l o u r i s h e s over the "proper" d i v i s i o n of powers amongst the three t i e r s (Maas, 1959). Again, I note an inadequate c o n c e p t u a l i z a t i o n of "power" with respect to l o c a l autonomy. Regardless of how i t 37 i s o p e r a t i o n a l i z e d , there i s a danger in equating "power" with "task" or "duty". I t r e f l e c t s a c o r p o r e a l , r e i f i e d t h e o r i z a t i o n of power, wherein power as tasks can be a l l o -c ated and d i s t r i b u t e d . Even when autonomy i s seen as stemming from the d i s t r i b u t i o n p r o c e s s , the c o n c e p t u a l i z a t i o n does not change, f o r i t over s t r e s s e s the c o n t r o l c e n t r a l governments have over l o c a l s , while i g n o r i n g the r e l a t i o n s between " c e n t r a l " and " l o c a l " governments where each becomes d e f i n e d as a d i s c u r s i v e u n i t y . One dimension of these r e l a t i o n s i s t h e i r l e g a l - or more p r e c i s e l y t h e i r c o n s t i t u t i o n a l - m a n i f e s t a t i o n , taken up in the next chapter. But another dimension i s the s t r u c t u r -ing f o r c e of the i n s t i t u t i o n a l arrangement i t s e l f , as i n d i v i d u a l s i n v a r i o u s r o l e s produce and reproduce i n s t i t u -t i o n s (or " l i v e the law"). E l a z a r perhaps o f f e r s the most i n s i g h t f u l understanding of t h i s l i m i t e d autonomy through h i s concept of the c i v i l community. He i d e n t i f i e s the c i v i l community as a p o l i t i c a l system which i s , "the o r g a n i z e d sum of the p o l i t i c a l i n s t i t u t i o n s that f u n c t i o n i n a given l o c a l i t y to p r o v i d e the bundle of governmental s e r v i c e s and a c t i v i t i e s that can be manipulated l o c a l l y to serve l o c a l needs in l i g h t of the l o c a l value system." ( E l a z a r , 1986, p. 207) The s i g n i f i c a n c e of the systems analogy i s , he h o l d s , that we can acknowledge that d e s p i t e l e g a l l i m i t a t i o n s on l o c a l autonomy l o c a l communities do i n f a c t "carve important niches fo r themselves i n the s t r u c t u r e of s t a t e p o l i t i c s . " 38 S t r e s s i n g the o r g a n i z a t i o n a l e f f i c a c y w i t h i n and amongst the v a r i o u s i n s t i t u t i o n s that comprise the c i v i l community, E l a z a r moves s u b t l y towards a more r e f i n e d theory of l o c a l autonomy when he s t a t e s t h a t , "Even in those s t a t e s with no c o n s t i t u t i o n a l p r o v i s i o n s f o r home r u l e , l o c a l governments o f t e n gain the e q u i v a l e n t i n autonomy through t h e i r a b i l i t y to carve important niches f o r themselves i n the s t r u c t u r e of s t a t e p o l i t i c s . ( E l a z a r , 1986, p. 206)" Here, he i s d e f i n i n g autonomy as " the a b i l i t y of a c i v i l community to e x e r c i s e c o n t r o l over the bundle of governmental ac-t i v i t i e s and s e r v i c e s w i t h i n i t s boundaries." Power i s e r r o n e o u s l y equated with task, but the ' c a p a c i t y or a b i l i t y to e x e r c i s e c o n t r o l ' over the performance of those t a s k s a l l o w s f o r a more s u b t l e understanding that can grasp s t r a t e g i e s of r e s i s t a n c e or c o o p t a t i o n . Thus he w r i t e s , " I t i s a massive task j u s t to l i s t the a i d s and s e r v i c e s a v a i l a b l e to the c i v i l community- from model plumbing codes to c o n s t r u c t i o n of marinas to d i s a s t e r r e l i e f . And these a c t i v i t i e s , even the f e d e r a l ones, are not viewed l o c a l l y as a f o r c i b l e i n t r u s i o n of a d i s t a n t government but almost i n v a r i a b l y as the s u c c e s s f u l consequence of l o c a l a c t i v i t y i n o b t a i n i n g f e d e r a l and s t a t e programs to serve l o c a l ends in a manner good f o r community, s t a t e , and n a t i o n . " (p. 209) E l a z a r ' s s t r e s s on the c i v i l community only begins to a l i g n autonomy with the l o c a l d e f i n i t i o n process, f o r d e s p i t e i t s equation with l o c a l government, the term h i g h l i g h t s what the community wants, the suggestion of l o c a l v a l u e s , and the p a r t i c i p a t i o n of l o c a l r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s i n higher t i e r s of the s t a t e . His work f a l l s s h o r t , however, i n i t s r e l i a n c e on d e f i n i n g the l o c a l s y s t e m i c a l l y . Such a c o n c e p t u a l i z a t i o n 39 s t r e s s e s the input/output f u n c t i o n s at the expense of c a p t u r i n g the c o n s t i t u t i v e dimension of p o l i t i c s and p l a c e making. c. i i . Urban Managerialism and S t r e e t - L e v e l Bureaucracy Yet another s t r a i n of l i t e r a t u r e which focuses on l o c a l autonomy stemming from p o l i t i c a l r e l a t i o n s i s the manag-e r i a l i s t l i t e r a t u r e . Pahl's (1975) r e v i s e d urban manager-i a l i s t t h e s i s argued that a mediating independent v a r i a b l e i n the access to scare urban resources (such as housing) was the agency of bureaucrats w i t h i n the context of a l a r g e r govern-mental s t r u c t u r e . These "gatekeepers" as he c a l l e d them c h a l l e n g e d the e c o l o g i c a l c o n s t r a i n t s on B r i t i s h l o c a l a u t h o r i t i e s and p o t e n t i a l l y countered f o r c e s stemming from r e l a t i o n s of p r o d u c t i o n . While c r i t i q u e s of urban managerialism have c h a l l e n g e d the d i s c r e t i o n a r y a b i l i t y of gatekeepers to s i g n i f i c a n t l y o v e r r i d e the consequences of p r o d u c t i o n r e l a t i o n s ( f o r reviews see Harloe, 1977; Saunders, 1981; Wilson, 1989), the t h e s i s n e v e r t h e l e s s suggests that there i s the p o s s i b i l i t y of l o c a l autonomy from higher t i e r s of the s t a t e as w e l l as s o c i a l f o r c e s through the agency of l o c a l bureaucrats and the s t r u c t u r a l arrangement of the s t a t e . C l a r k e , f o r i n s t a n c e , has emphasized the way i n which the s t r u c t u r e of p o l i t i c a l i n s t i t u t i o n s shapes autonomy through " i n s t i t u t i o n a l v i a b i l -i t y . " In other words, the c a p i t a l i s t c l a s s and s t a t e agents can both d e s i r e a p o l i c y , but f o r very d i f f e r e n t reasons 40 given t h e i r d i f f e r e n t l o c a t i o n s . C o n s e q u e n t i a l l y , the s t a t e has autonomy from c a p i t a l i s m ' s " f o r c e s " because i t ' s o r i e n t a -t i o n i s not r e d u c i b l e to the l a t t e r . T h i s source of autonomy i s f u r t h e r underscored by L i p s k y ' s (1980) work on the s t r e e t - l e v e l bureaucrat. L i p s k y demonstrates the permutation of p u b l i c p o l i c y as a given p o l i c y i s made, unmade, and remade d a i l y by those who have to a d m i n i s t e r the p o l i c i e s to c l i e n t s . Thus while i t may be o f f i c i a l p o l i c y to a d m i n i s t e r t i c k e t s f o r jaywalking, whether or not those t i c k e t s get w r i t t e n i s to a l a r g e extent at the d i s c r e t i o n of the o f f i c e r on the beat. Because of the "marble cake" nature of f e d e r a l i s m , as w e l l as the p l e t h o r a of o f f i c i a l p o l i c y i n the face of time and money c o n s t r a i n t s , such s t r e e t - l e v e l bureaucrats can c r e a t e s u b s t a n t i a l p a t t e r n s of l o c a l autonomy with res p e c t to a f e d e r a l or s t a t e p o l i c y . Managerialism i s u s e f u l to t h e o r i e s of l o c a l autonomy i n s o f a r as i t has h i s t o r i c a l l y s t r e s s e d the agency i n v o l v e d i n producing p a t t e r n s of autonomy, whereas f i s c a l and l e g a l l i t e r a t u r e s tend to s t r e s s the s t r u c t u r a l c o n s t r a i n t s which d i m i n i s h autonomy from higher t i e r s of the s t a t e . However, as Wilson (1989) has argued, the lack of autonomy l o c a l i t i e s have from broader s o c i e t a l r e l a t i o n s must be understood through the agents' and i n s t i t u t i o n s ' a r t i c u l a t i o n of those s t r u c t u r e s , otherwise the s t r u c t u r e / a g e n c y dualism i s reproduced. Moreover, the s t r u c t u r a t i o n of the s t a t e i t s e l f i s ignored i n these works while c o n s t r a i n i n g s t r u c t u r e s and 41 s o c i a l i z e d agents are c l o s e l y s c r u t i n i z e d w i t h i n the s t r u c -t u r a t i o n p r o c e s s . The e r r o r i s one s t r e s s i n g autonomy from broader s o c i a l f o r c e s . The s t a t e and the l o c a l are never autonomous from those f o r c e s because they are c o n s t i t u t e d through them. Here again remains the danger of equating l o c a l autonomy with t a s k s , f o r autonomy can be c o n n o t a t i v e l y l i n k e d with the b u r e a u c r a t i c means by which resource d i s t r i b u t i o n proceeds. While " c o n t r o l over access to scarce urban resour-ces" suggests a r e l a t i o n a l view of power (e.g., i n the r e l a t i o n between bureaucrat and c l i e n t or s t r e e t l e v e l and s e n i o r b u r e a u c r a t s ) , the emphasis on "urban r e s o u r c e s " i s p r o b l e m a t i c . The s p e c i f i c i t y of the urban context i s u n c l e a r . A more c a t e g o r i c a l understanding of the s p a t i a l i t y of power can be garnered by s i t u a t i n g the a c t i v i t i e s of managers and s t r e e t l e v e l bureaucrats and t h e i r i n s t i t u t i o n s w i t h i n the process of place-making. In t h i s way, they do not act merely as gatekeepers, t h e i r a c t i o n s and i n a c t i o n s h e l p to d e f i n e and r e d e f i n e p l a c e s . c. i i i . Suburban Autonomy As noted e a r l i e r , much of the l i t e r a t u r e bemoaning a lack of l o c a l autonomy i n American s c h o l a r s h i p tends to have an urban b i a s . The c o n n o t a t i o n i s that c i t i e s , p r e c i s e l y because of t h e i r s t r u c t u r a l c o n s t r a i n t s , a l l have d i f f i c u l t times managing and governing themselves ( B a n f i e l d , 1968; Yates, 1972; Peterson, 1981; Judd, 1988). Indeed, more 42 recent work on urban p o l i t i c a l economy that s t r e s s e s i n t r a -c i t y c o m p e t i t i o n , p u b l i c and p r i v a t e p a r t n e r s h i p s , and i n t e r n a l developmental p o l i t i c s (that i s , a mastering of the s t r u c t u r a l f o r c e s ) as ways f o r c i t i e s to s u r v i v e r e i n f o r c e s t h i s p o i n t (Mollenkopf, 1983; Logan & Molotch, 1987; F a i n -s t e i n & F a i n s t e i n , 1988; Kantor, 1987; Cox & Mair, 1988; Stone and Sanders, 1987). While t h i s new l i t e r a t u r e has only begun to delve beyond the c i t y borders i n t o the suburbs (Baldassare, 1986; Schneider, 1989), there a l r e a d y e x i s t s a h e f t y amount of l i t e r a t u r e p u r p o r t i n g the s i g n i f i c a n c e of suburban l o c a l autonomy (Wood, 1958; D a n i e l s o n , 1971; 1976b; M a s s o t t i & Hadden, 1974; Dolce, 1976; Jackson, 1972, 1985; Downs, 1973; Babcock, 1966; Schneider, 1983). Nowhere i s t h i s p o i n t made more c l e a r than with respect to l a n d use r e g u l a t i o n ( D a n i e l -son, 1976a,b; P e r i n , 1977; P l o t k i n , 1987). E x c l u s i o n a r y p r a c t i c e s , whether they be e x c e s s i v e frontage requirements, e x c e s s i v e connection and s e r v i c e i n i t i a t i o n f e e s , or p r o h i b i t i o n of m u l t i - f a m i l y s t r u c t u r e s , a l l r e present m a n i f e s t a t i o n s of l o c a l autonomy t y p i c a l l y a s s o c i a t e d with a suburban co n t e x t . Regardless of motive or s t r a t e g y , the e f f e c t has been l a r g e l y to exclude low and moderate income persons from U.S. suburbs ( c f . Kramer, 1972). The sources of t h i s autonomy are t h r e e f o l d . F i r s t , the o s t e n s i b l e r e l a t i v e homogeneity i n s o c i a l c l a s s and e t h n i c i t y and s m a l l e r s c a l e of suburbia r e l e a s e s l o c a l government from 43 the c o n s t r a i n t of debate on a f f o r d a b l e housing (Danielson, 1976b). Thus there i s a f a v o r a b l e a r t i c u l a t i o n or m o b i l i z a -t i o n of b i a s - i n s t e a d of c o n s t r a i n t from- broader s o c i e t a l and e c o l o g i c a l f o r c e s , though c e r t a i n l y many suburbanites argue that market c o n s t r a i n t s p r e c l u d e any i n c r e a s e i n s o c i a l expenditure requirements (Schneider, 1980). Second, there i s an a r t i c u l a t i o n of l e g a l , p o l i t i c a l and f i s c a l autonomy w i t h i n suburbs from higher t i e r s of the s t a t e that r e i n f o r c e s t h e i r a b i l i t y to c l o s e t h e i r doors (Danielson, 1976b). Land use r e g u l a t i o n has h i s t o r i c a l l y been a delegated p o l i c e power of the s t a t e . Communities' r i g h t to use zoning to block unwanted land uses has l a r g e l y been upheld c o n s t i t u t i o n a l l y , as w e l l as p o l i t i c a l l y through a number of c o u r t cases ( E u c l i d , A r l i n g t o n Heights most notably) and s t a t e l e g i s l a t u r e s ' u n w i l l i n g n e s s to f o r c e suburbs to change t h e i r e x c l u s i o n a r y ways (Babcock and Siemon, 1985). De s p i t e s i g n i f i c a n t c h a l l e n g e s from c o u r t s and l e g i s l a t u r e s (Mt. L a u r e l i n New J e r s e y , and Mas-sa c h u s e t t s ' Chapter 40B), suburbs are r e c o g n i z e d as l e g a l and p o l i t i c a l e n t i t i e s i n and of themselves throughout v a r i o u s l e v e l s of government and s o c i e t y , and as such have the a b i l i t y to u t i l i z e t h e i r d elegated " p o l i c e power" to c o n t r o l land usage. F i n a l l y , suburbs are t y p i c a l l y more f i n a n c i a l l y s e l f -s u f f i c i e n t than t h e i r c e n t r a l c i t i e s , making s t r i n g s a t t a c h e d to s t a t e and f e d e r a l d o l l a r s e a s i e r to d i s r e g a r d . Thus 44 suburban policy-making o f t e n can be much more cogent r e l a t i v e to t h at formulated i n c i t i e s . Once again, however, t h i s c o n c e p t u a l i z a t i o n of power i s l i m i t e d . Suburbs have autonomy because they are granted or have the power to maintain e x i s t i n g s e t s of s o c i a l r e l a t i o n s . The autonomy i s evinced i n a c t i o n s which e f f e c t i v e l y c o n t r o l access s p a t i a l l y to the American suburban dream: a decent p l a c e to l i v e . Ignored are the processes which have con-s t i t u t e d suburbia as an autonomous or "powerful" p l a c e . The evidence of suburban autonomy in zoning p r e s e n t s another demand to adequately grasp the " l o c a l " dimension of l o c a l autonomy as i t i s woven i n t o power r e l a t i o n s c u l t u r a l -l y . C l e a r l y the tendency i s f o r c l a s s and r a c i a l f o r c e s to a r t i c u l a t e d i f f e r e n t l y i n " c i t y " and "suburb" (e.g. Check-oway, 1984; Walker, 1981; Gans, 1969). Suburbia has been c r i t i q u e d by many as a s i t e of c o n s e r v a t i v e white male p r i v i l e g e (Fava, 1975, 1980; Hayden, 1984; Nelson, 1986). S c h o l a r s have a l s o recorded p r e v a i l i n g ethos i n suburban p o l i t i c s and c u l t u r e which, r e g a r d l e s s of t h e i r a c t u a l v a l i d i t y , have come to c o l o u r the way i n which s c h o l a r s and suburbanites c o n c e p t u a l i z e suburban p o l i t i c s . Intense l o c a l i s m , an a p a t h e t i c but arousable p o l i t y , n o n p a r t i s a n s h i p , v o l u n t a r i s m or ' a l t r u i s t i c democracy', c o n s e n s u s - o r i e n t a t i o n , and piece-meal p o l i c y making have a l l been c i t e d as markers f o r d i s t i n c t i v e l y suburban p o l i t i c s (Wood, 1958; Gans, 1967; W i l l i a m s , 1971; Wirt, Walt, Rabinowitz & Hensler, 1972; 45 Dowries, 1973; Schwartz, 1975; Zickmund, 1 975; F i s c h e r , 1984; Kaplan, 1976). Suburbia has been c o n s t i t u t e d as a s i t e of p o s i t i v e power and c o n t r o l through a wide v a r i e t y of d i s c o u r s e s . A theory of l o c a l autonomy must recognize the v a r i o u s c u l t u r a l t r a d i t i o n s and p r a c t i c e s and a c t i v i t i e s which have come to make p l a c e s powerful or powerless. The t r u t h of suburban power has been h e l d i n c o n t r a d i c t i o n , rather than as a c h a l l e n g e to e x i s t i n g t h e o r i e s of l o c a l autonomy. Yet there i s a danger i n t r e a t i n g suburban p o l i t i c s and c u l t u r e m o n o l i t h i c a l l y i n order to c a t e g o r i z e p l a c e s (Dobrin-er , 1963; Berger, 1968; Donaldson, 1969; Gans, 1969; Kramer, 1972; Jackson, 1985 c f . Lemann, 1989). I emphasize the need to understand the nexus of processes through which suburbs are c o n s t i t u t e d both t h e o r e t i c a l l y and e m p i r i c a l l y . How they are s t r u c t u r a t e d as s e t s of s o c i a l r e l a t i o n s s i t e d i n a s p e c i f i c p o i n t i n space and time, l i n k e d to m a t e r i a l a r -t i f a c t s and a b s t r a c t i d e a l s , webbed i n a s t r a t a of c u l t u r e s , becomes paramount to understanding the process through which p a t t e r n s of autonomy are produced. In t h i s way, c u l t u r e and p o l i t i c s cannot be d i v o r c e d as processes producing p a t t e r n s of autonomy. d. The Power of P o l i t i c a l Communities The f i n a l s t r a i n s of l i t e r a t u r e that h i g h l i g h t p o l i t i -c a l autonomy are those that s t r e s s the sources of s o c i a l power stemming from the s p a t i a l i t y of p o l i t i c a l communities, 46 and the i n f l u e n c e of p o l i t i c a l community on p o l i t i c a l i d e n t i t y and s o c i a l i z a t i o n . These l i t e r a t u r e s are somewhat d i s t i n c t i v e from those which I have reviewed so f a r i n that they have been more informed by a r e l a t i o n a l conception of power. They are e s p e c i a l l y h e l p f u l because they f a s t e n a l i n k between p o l i t i c s and c u l t u r e , and another between p l a c e and power. e. Space and P o l i t i c a l Power Weber's (1958) d e f i n i t i o n of the c i t y h e l d that a c r i t i c a l component of i t s nature was the a b i l i t y to adminis-t e r i t s own law and govern i t s e l f - at l e a s t to a l i m i t e d e x t e n t . Concomitantly, he h e l d that a c r u c i a l f e a t u r e of any p o l i t i c a l community i s the a b i l i t y to exert f o r c e over a l l people w i t h i n a bounded t e r r i t o r y , r e g a r d l e s s of t h e i r r e l a t i o n s h i p to that area (Weber, 1968). Simple as they are, these ideas r e i n f o r c e the s i g -n i f i c a n c e of complex power r e l a t i o n s through the s p a t i a l m a n i f e s t a t i o n of s t a t e s and l o c a l i t i e s . While Weber s t r e s s e d the use of s t a t e f o r c e as c o e r c i v e v i o l e n c e a c r o s s a bounded t e r r i t o r y , others have broadened that f o r c e to encompass a myriad r e l a t i o n of power ( f o r i n s t a n c e , Gidden's (1987a) " s u r v e i l l a n c e " or Gramsci's (1988) s t a t e hegemony). These l a t t e r developments h i g h l i g h t the d i v e r s i t y and complexity of ways i n which space (as a p o l i t i c a l u n i t ) i s s a t u r a t e d with r e l a t i o n s of power. Places (as a m e a n i n g f u l l y demarcated space) become means of domination as people and i n s t i t u t i o n s 47 become d e f i n e d and c o n t r o l l e d through and i n r e l a t i o n to them. Herein, we can begin to see how the d i s t i n c t i o n between s t a t e and c i v i l s o c i e t y i s b l u r r e d by t h e i r mutual-i t y . Mann (1984 p. 185) goes as f a r as to suggest that " s t a t e autonomy... flows p r i n c i p a l l y from the s t a t e ' s unique a b i l i t y t o p r o v i d e a t e r r i t o r i a l l y - c e n t r a l i z e d form of o r g a n i z a t i o n . " T h i s , Mann argues, i s what d i s t i n g u i s h e s s t a t e s ' power from economic, i d e o l o g i c a l or m i l i t a r y group's power i n s o c i e t y . These l a t t e r groups e n t r u s t power resources w i t h i n the s t a t e . If the s t a t e uses these resources to augment s o c i a l u t i l i t y , there w i l l be an i n c r e a s e i n what Mann c a l l s i n f r a s t r u c t u r a l power (the c a p a c i t y of the s t a t e to penetrate c i v i l s o c i e t y ) . Through t h i s process of permeation, s o c i a l r e l a t i o n s become more and more t e r -r i t o r i a l i z e d , so long as the s t a t e can promote s o c i a l u t i l i t y through processes of c e n t r a l i z a t i o n . The p o i n t I would s t r e s s from the works of Weber and Mann i s that the i n h e r e n t l y and o s t e n s i b l y s p a t i a l i z e d nature of the s o c i a l r e l a t i o n s w i t h i n the arena c a l l e d "a s t a t e " i s a c r u c i a l m a n i f e s t a t i o n and reinforcement of power r e l a t i o n s that d e f i n e and order s t a t e s from each other, from c i v i l s o c i e t y , and even t h e i r composite t i e r s . Thus there i s autonomous power w i t h i n the l o c a l s t a t e p r e c i s e l y because of i t s s i m u l t a n e i t y as a bounded t e r r i t o r i a l e n t i t y and as an arena of dominant and c o n t e s t i n g s o c i a l f o r c e s . By meaning-48 f u l l y bounding space, a s t a t e (as an e n t i t y c o n t a i n i n g power) i s made. e. i . Place and P o l i t i c a l I d e n t i t y A f i n a l example of the r e l a t i o n between power and p l a c e i s i n the way that c i t i z e n s h i p (personal or group p o l i t i c a l i d e n t i t y ) i s c o n s t r u e d through a r e l a t i o n with p l a c e . I t has been long argued that l o c a l government- e s p e c i a l l y i n a s m a l l l o c a l i t y i s the p r i n c i p l e means by which i n d i v i d u a l s l e a r n about and a c c u l t r a t e to a democratic s o c i e t y (Long, 1987; P o r t i s , 1985; on J e f f e r s o n ' s a t t i t u d e s see Whyte & Whyte 1962). Indeed, debates over the "proper" d i v i s i o n of powers i n f e d e r a l i s m have l o c a t e d the democratizing r o l e of the l o c a l s t a t e i n i t s p r o x i m i t y to 'the people' (Maas, 1959; M i l l , 1958). The l o c a l i s the " l e v e l " at which one l e a r n s to be an American. The c l a s s i c example in American p o l i t i c s i s of c o u r s e , the New England town meeting (Lockhard, 1965; Wood, 1958). T h e r e i n , the p o l i t y of a town would come assemble a n n u a l l y (at l e a s t ) to c o n s t i t u t e the l e g i s l a t i v e branch of l o c a l government. Besides i t s tremendous symbolic importance the custom has a s t r u c t u r a t i o n a l e f f e c t on p o l i t i c s and i d e n t i t y . As T o c q u e v i l l e c h a r a c t e r i z e d the p o l i t i c a l New Englander, "The n a t i v e of New England i s a t t a c h e d to h i s [ s i c ] township because i t i s independent and f r e e : t h i s c o o p e r a t i o n i n i t s a f f a i r s i n s u r e s h i s attachment to i t s i n t e r e s t ; the w e l l -being i t a f f o r d s him secures h i s a f f e c t i o n ; and i t s w e l f a r e i s the aim of h i s ambition and of h i s f u t u r e e x e r t i o n s . He takes a p a r t i n every occurrence i n the p l a c e ; he p r a c t i c e s the a r t of government i n the small sphere w i t h i n h i s reach; he accustoms h i m s e l f to those forms without which l i b e r t y can 49 only advance by r e v o l u t i o n s ; he imbibes t h e i r s p i r i t ; he a c q u i r e s a t a s t e f o r order, comprehends the balance of powers, and c o l l e c t s c l e a r p r a c t i c a l n o t i o n s on the nature of h i s d u t i e s and the extent of h i s r i g h t s . (1956, p. 61) The general p o i n t I wish to draw out i s that c i t i z e n -s h i p - the way i n which i n d i v i d u a l s d e f i n e themselves thorough t h e i r a c t i o n i n the s t a t e arena- i s a process embedded not simply i n an a b s t r a c t l e v e l of the s t a t e , but r a t h e r i n a l o c a l place-making p r o c e s s . The c i t i z e n s are r e l a t e d to d i s c o u r s e s of power and l o c a l autonomy as t h e i r i d e n t i t y i s c o n s t r u c t e d from t h e i r r e l a t i o n to p l a c e s . The New Englander becomes an a c t i v e agent reproducing semi autonomous l o c a l -i t i e s as w e l l as q u i n t e s s e n t i a l American valu e s ( l i b e r t y , freedom, democracy among others) because of h e r / h i s i n t e r a c -t i o n i n l o c a l p o l i t i c s and c u l t u r e . f. Summary and Comments Through t h i s chapter I have sought to s h i f t the arena of debate from e m p i r i c a l to t h e o r e t i c a l ground by p r e s e n t i n g a c r i t i q u e of the means by which l o c a l autonomy i s evinc e d . T h i s was done by r e j e c t i n g c l a s s i f a c t o r y schemes that s t r e s s what a l o c a l s t a t e might be autonomous from, as such a tack has not problematized what i s meant by " l o c a l " and r e t a i n s an economistic theory of power. I have c o n s t r u c t e d two i d e a l types so f a r : f i s c a l autonomy and p o l i t i c a l autonomy. F i s c a l autonomy s c h o l a r s h i p has s t r e s s e d an important means through which c e r t a i n l o c a l governments are c o n s t r a i n e d i n t h e i r a b i l i t y to c o n t r i b u t e to the p l a c e - d e f i n i t i o n p r o c e s s . I t h i g h l i g h t s the s t r u c t u r a l 50 l i m i t a t i o n s l o c a l governments inevitably hold within a f e d e r a l i s t context of broadly increasing, though narrowly fluc t u a t i n g intergovernmental f i n a n c i a l a i d . At a very s i m p l i s t i c l e v e l , t h i s work captures the dominance of higher t i e r s of the state v i s - a - v i s f i s c a l resources. F i s c a l autonomy scholarship can be held d e f i c i e n t p r e c i s e l y because of t h i s s i m p l i c i t y , however. Local i s unproblematically conceptualized as "the l o c a l state". In fact, various forces through a l o c a l i t y must a r t i c u l a t e with l o c a l state a c t i v i t i e s for the issue of l o c a l autonomy to have any relevance at a l l . For example, the unwritten urban bias in t h i s vein of scholarship r e f l e c t s the fact that i t i s only in the urban context that s o c i a l relations a r t i c u l a t e with the l o c a l state to abate autonomy. In a suburban context, the loss of l o c a l autonomy i s not t y p i c a l l y seen as a problem. Further, the aphorism "money equals power" i s a far too s i m p l i s t i c manner in which to conceptualize "autonomy". It i s a crude operational measure of the term. It stresses the dominance of the state or federal government at the expense of the l o c a l . Moreover, i t i s based on a theory of power as an exchangeable commodity, rather than as a r e l a t i o n of force. P o l i t i c a l autonomy scholarship can be c r i t i q u e d on similar grounds. Federalism, urban managerialism, and suburban autonomy l i t e r a t u r e s a l l equate power with task, 5 1 duty, or the r i g h t to perform them (such as the power to zone l a n d ) . These d u t i e s and r i g h t s are deemed to be d e l e g a t e d or t r a n s f e r r e d by the s t a t e , u n d e r s c o r i n g the l o c a l i t y ' s l o c a t i o n i n the f e d e r a l i s t s t r u c t u r e as i t s source of autonomy, as w e l l as the p r e c a r i o u s nature of any autonomy i t might " h o l d " . More s o p h i s t i c a t e d work h i g h l i g h t s the l i n k s between autonomy and the s t r u c t u r e of i n s t i t u t i o n s or the agency of key gatekeepers, but the c o n c e p t u a l i z a t i o n remains o v e r l y s i m p l i s t i c . A d d i t i o n a l l y , these works l a r g e l y ignore the i m p l i c i t p l a c e making that i s a p a r t of the s o c i a l r e l a t i o n s they a n a l y z e . At the same time, s e v e r a l p o s i t i v e a t t r i b u t e s of t h i s l i t e r a t u r e have been i d e n t i f i e d . These works do tend to s t r e s s the p o s s i b i l i t y of l o c a l autonomy through agency, as compared to the s t r u c t u r a l c o n s t r a i n t s marked by the f i s c a l autonomy s c h o l a r s even i f the s t r u c t u r e / a g e n c y dualism i s r e p l i c a t e d . An a p p r e c i a t i o n of suburban autonomy ( s p e c i f i -c a l l y e x c l u s i o n a r y zoning) a l s o balances urban heteronomy ( s p e c i f i c a l l y f i s c a l c r i s i s ) by c h a l l e n g i n g the u n i t y of l o c a l autonomy. He r e i n , we can begin to see the need to c o n c e p t u a l i z e p a t t e r n s of l o c a l autonomy as stemming from d i a l e c t i c a l p r o c e s s e s - though processes i m p l i c i t l y bound up i n p l a c e making. E l a z a r ' s work begins to l i n k the d e f i n i t i o n of the l o c a l with the autonomy of that l o c a l i t y . He recognizes the i n t e r p e n e t r a t i o n of the l o c a l s t a t e and c i v i l s o c i e t y . More 52 s o p h i s t i c a t e d work on the s p a t i a l m a n i f e s t a t i o n of s o c i a l power r e i n f o r c e s h i s work. Weber and Mann d i s c u s s the way i n which the p l a c e i s a source of power f o r the s t a t e , while w r i t e r s such as Long p o i n t up the way i n which p e r s o n a l and s o c i a l i d e n t i t i e s are c o n s t r u c t e d and adopted v i s - a - v i s the s t a t e and p l a c e . The meaningful nature of these i d e n t i t i e s and t h e i r permeation i n our broader c u l t u r a l understanding of suburbia underscores the need to recognize the weave of c u l t u r a l and p o l i t i c a l p rocesses of power imbedded i n p l a c e s . A t h i r d dimension of l o c a l autonomy i s the l e g a l means through which l o c a l autonomy i s ^ e v i n c e d i n s o c i a l l i f e . I t i s i s o l a t e d as an i d e a l type i n Chapter Three because by f a r the bulk of work on l o c a l autonomy ( i n c l u d i n g many works d i s c u s s e d here) frames the q u e s t i o n as u l t i m a t e l y a l e g a l one, as so o f t e n the power of a s t a t e i s expressed through i t s law. 53 CHAPTER THREE LEGAL AUTONOMY a. I n t r o d u c t i o n Law i s both an i n s t r u m e n t a l f o r c e i n and a normative v i s i o n of s o c i e t y (Blomley, 1988; Blomley & C l a r k , forthcom-i n g ) . I t i s not merely a process of c o n t e n t i o n , but a d i s c o u r s e of power and knowledge (F o u c a u l t , 1980a). As such i t i s a s o c i a l i n s t i t u t i o n t h a t owes i t s s o c i a l l e g i t i m a c y to an a l l e g e d c a p a c i t y to r e s o l v e c o n f l i c t i n s o c i e t y ( D i e s i n g , 1962). T h i s a l l e g e d c a p a c i t y has caused debates over l o c a l autonomy to be expressed p r i m a r i l y through l e g a l d i s c o u r s e i n American law, p o l i t i c s , and s c h o l a r s h i p . There i s widespread and l o n g s t a n d i n g agreement that law i s the r o u t i n e forum to debate q u e s t i o n s of l o c a l autonomy (Syed, 1966; Winter, 1969; Frug, 1980; Michelman, 1977a,b; C l a r k , 1981, 1984; 1985; C l a r k & Dear, 1981, 1984; Johnston, 1981). Given such consensus, the purpose of t h i s chapter i s t h r e e f o l d . F i r s t , I review the l e g a l debates framing l o c a l autonomy. Second, I work on the d i a l e c t i c between law and space as a means of c r i t i q u e and update. T h i s l i t e r a t u r e s t r e s s e s the s p a t i a l i t y of law as a s o c i a l p r o c e s s , moving the r e c o n c e p t u a l i z a t i o n of l o c a l autonomy towards a geo-graphic p e r s p e c t i v e . T h i r d , I s y n t h e s i z e an otherwise fragmented l i t e r a t u r e by suggesting the m e r i t s of a theory of power and p l a c e , s t r e s s i n g the need to t h i n k about autonomy and heteronomy d i a l e c t i c a l l y . In t h i s way, the three i d e a l types of l o c a l autonomy are s y n t h e s i z e d . 54 b. L e g a l Autonomy Through D i l l o n ' s Rule No i n t r o d u c t o r y t e x t on American urban government i s complete without a d i s c u s s i o n of the s i g n i f i c a n c e of " D i l -l o n ' s Rule" (e.g. B a n f i e l d & Wilson, 1963; L i n e b e r r y & Sharkansky, 1978; E l d e r & R i s e r , 1983; Stone, Whelan & Murin, 1986). In 1872, Iowa S t a t e Supreme Court J u s t i c e John F. D i l l o n found h i m s e l f p r e s i d i n g over a case i n v o l v i n g the d u t i e s of a m u n i c i p a l i t y which l a c k e d a secure f o u n d a t i o n i n the law. D i l l o n looked to the C o n s t i t u t i o n , and s i n c e he c o u l d f i n d no e x p l i c i t mention of the s t a t u s of l o c a l governments, he set out to i n f e r t h e i r l e g a l s t a t u s from the C o n s t i t u t i o n ' s s i l e n c e on the l o c a l r e l a t i v e the d i v i s i o n of powers e x p l i c a t e d i n the Tenth Amendment 1. D i l l o n espoused a f o r m a l i s t or o b j e c t i v i s t mode of l e g a l reasoning i n h i s t r e a t i s e on m u n i c i p a l governments ( D i l l o n , 1872). Furthermore, he t r e a t e d law i n an e s s e n t i a l -l y p o s i t i v i s t f a s h i o n . H i s formalism and o b j e c t i v i s m meant he b e l i e v e d , " . . . a u t h o r i t a t i v e l e g a l m a t e r i a l s - the system of s t a t u t e s , cases and a c c e p t e d l e g a l i deas- embody and s u s t a i n a d e f e n s i b l e scheme of human a s s o c i a t i o n " ( C l a r k , 1989, p. 323). H i s l e g a l p o s i t i v i s m i m p l i e d he saw ( i n the C o n s t i t u -t i o n ) an u n d e r l y i n g s t r u c t u r e or order to law, making i t e m p i r i c a l l y unambiguous. The system of law i n s o c i e t y was seen as consensual, c l e a r and o b j e c t i v e . 1 "The Powers not d e l e g a t e d to the U n i t e d S t a t e s by the C o n s t i t u t i o n , nor p r o h i b i t e d by i t to the S t a t e s , are r e s e r v e d to the s t a t e s r e s p e c t i v e l y , or to the people." 55 Because of the assumed c l a r i t y of law- and consequently of l e g a l reasoning- he c o n s t r u c t e d h i s d e c i s i o n s s t r i c t l y : only that which was deemed l e g a l , or that which l e g a l d i s c o u r s e has d e f i n e d as a p p r o p r i a t e was allowed to f a c t o r i n t o a d j u d i c a t i o n (Gere, 1982). T h i s c i r c u m s c r i p t i o n emphasized the lack of C o n s t i t u t i o n a l mention of l o c a l governments while i g n o r i n g with f u l l l e g i t i m a c y the h i s t o r i -c a l r e a l i t y of l o c a l power. Law, not h i s t o r y , was the proper b a s i s on which to determine the v a l i d i t y of c i t y power. As a l e g a l precedent, D i l l o n ' s Rule stands as the hallmark of American l o c a l autonomy: " I t i s a general undisputed p r o p o s i t i o n of law that a mu n i c i p a l c o r p o r a t i o n possesses and can e x e r c i s e the f o l l o w -ing powers and not o t h e r s : F i r s t , those granted i n express words; second, those necessary or f a i r l y i m p l i e d i n or i n c i d e n t to the powers e x p r e s s l y granted; t h i r d , those e s s e n t i a l to the accomplishment of the d e c l a r e d o b j e c t s and purposes of the c o r p o r a t i o n - not simply convenient but i n d i s p e n s i b l e . Any f a i r , reasonable, s u b s t a n t i a l doubt concerning the e x i s t e n c e of power i s r e s o l v e d by the c o u r t s a g a i n s t the c o r p o r a t i o n , and the power i s denied." ( D i l l o n , 1911, p. 448) D i l l o n ' s Rule r e i n f o r c e s the dominant f o r c e s of s t a t e power over l o c a l power. I t s t r e s s e s the "top-down" v e c t o r s of power through a s t r u c t u r e of f e d e r a l i s m . Moreover, t h i s emphasis i s r e i n f o r c e d and v a l i d a t e d through the hegemony of l e g a l d i s c o u r s e . C l e a r l y , s p e c i f i c t h e o r i e s of p l a c e and power are evident i n D i l l o n ' s t h i n k i n g . These are not innocent. He c o n c e p t u a l i z e s the l o c a l as a c o r p o r a t i o n , not uncommon t h i n k i n g f o r h i s day (Gere, 1982; Frug, 1980). Ratepayers 56 were seen as s h a r e h o l d e r s i n the c i t y . The c o r p o r a t e model c l a r i f i e d l e g a l t h i n k i n g about the c i t y , s i n c e there were g r e a t e r precedents f o r d e a l i n g with c o r p o r a t i o n s i n law than c i t i e s . M u n i c i p a l i t i e s were an otherwise muddling concept between the i n d i v i d u a l and the s t a t e i n l i b e r a l i s m (Frug, 1980; Michelman, 1978). N e v e r t h e l e s s , m u n i c i p a l i t i e s were t r e a t e d as p u b l i c r a t h e r than p r i v a t e c o r p o r a t i o n s . T h i s d i s t i n c t i o n was t r e a t e d as s i g n i f i c a n t as p u b l i c c o r p o r a t i o n s threatened the p r i v a t e p u r s u i t s of c o r p o r a t i o n s , hence l e g i t i m a t i n g the i n e f f i c a c y of c i t y power. Power i s o s t e n s i b l y r e l a t e d to tasks or r i g h t s through D i l l o n ' s work. Moreover, i t i s sourced at the s t a t e l e v e l . Powers are granted by the s t a t e through law. They are denied by the c o u r t s i n u n c e r t a i n i n s t a n c e s . They are h e l d t e n u o u s l y by the l o c a l s t a t e . But t h i s c o n c e p t u a l i z a t i o n of power feeds back i n t o the c o n c e p t u a l i z a t i o n of the l o c a l . L o c a l i t -i e s - not merely t h e i r governments- become " c r e a t u r e s of the s t a t e . " The r u l e of law c o u l d negate not merely l o c a l power, but a l s o the o n t o l o g i c a l s t a t u s of the l o c a l . T h i s manner of t h i n k i n g i s most e v i d e n t i n a Supreme Court r u l i n g which c o n t r i b u t e d to D i l l o n ' s precedence: "The C i t y i s a p o l i t i c a l s u b d i v i s i o n of the S t a t e , c r e a t e d as a convenient agency f o r the e x e r c i s e of such of the governme-n t a l powers of the s t a t e as may be e n t r u s t e d to i t . . . T h e S t a t e , t h e r e f o r e , at i t s p l e a s u r e may modify or withdraw a l l such powers...expand or c o n t r a c t the t e r r i t o r i a l a rea, u n i t e the whole or a p a r t of i t with another m u n i c i p a l i t y , r e p e a l the c h a r a c t e r , and d e s t r o y the c o r p o r a t i o n . A l l t h i s may be done, c o n d i t i o n a l l y or u n c o n d i t i o n a l l y , with or without the consent of the c i t i z e n s , or even a g a i n s t t h e i r p r o t e s t . In a l l these r e s p e c t s , the S t a t e i s supreme, and i t s l e g i s l a t i v e 57 body, conforming i t s a c t i o n to the s t a t e c o n s t i t u t i o n , may do as i t w i l l , u n r e s t r a i n e d by any p r o v i s i o n of the C o n s t i t u t i o n of the U n i t e d S t a t e s (Trenton v s . New Je r s e y , 262 US 182 195-196, 1923). The power of the l o c a l i t y , then was u l t i m a t e l y u l t r a  v i r e s , or beyond i t s own ambit. Winter (1970), f o r i n s t a n c e , notes how mu n i c i p a l r e g u l a t i o n s have been d i s t i n g u i s h e d from the laws of the s t a t e and f e d e r a l l e v e l s . The c l a i m , was that the l o c a l s t a t e does not a c t u a l l y make law. L o c a l power has been p l a c e d i n t o a s l i p p e r y category on i t s own through l e g a l d i s c o u r s e as attempts to r e s o l v e the c o n t r a d i c -t i o n s w i t h i n and between d e c i s i o n s have proceeded s i n c e D i l l o n ' s t r e a t i s e . One such r e s o l u t i o n i n v o l v e d c l a r i f y i n g the process whereby power c o u l d be l e g a l l y t r a n s f e r r e d from the s t a t e to the l o c a l i t y . T e c h n i c a l l y under D i l l o n ' s Rule, l o c a l s would have to p e t i t i o n t h e i r s t a t e governments each time they needed to execute d u t i e s , or were co n f r o n t e d with new problems to s o l v e . The s o l u t i o n to t h i s i n e f f i c i e n c y was home r u l e ( B a n f i e l d & Wilson, 1963; Teaford, 1982). Through the accepted l e g a l d o c t r i n e of imperio i n imperium, c e r t a i n r i g h t s and d u t i e s were l e g a l l y demarcated as l o c a l - those r e l a t i n g to e x p l i c i t l y l o c a l i s s u e s . S t a t e s would r e t a i n power over l o c a l i s s u e s that had a state-wide impact (Vanlan-dingham, 1968, 1975). Most o f t e n home r u l e s t a t u t e s d e a l with l o c a l e l e c t o r a l procedures, and have been t i g h t l y r e g u l a t e d by the c o u r t s s e r v i n g t h e i r c o n f l i c t - r e s o l v i n g f u n c t i o n ( c f . B a n f i e l d & Wilson, 1963; J e r r i s o n , 1982) 58 Although i t i s adverse to the idea of l o c a l autonomy and s e v e r e l y c i r c u m s c r i b e s i t , D i l l o n ' s Rule does s i m u l -taneously carve out l o c a l power from the s t a t e . Thus i t should not be seen as a p e r s p e c t i v e which completely denies l o c a l autonomy. I t i s a d i s c o u r s e , however, that gains i t s f o r c e from i t s thorough l e g a l i t y (Gere, 1982) r e f l e c t i n g i t s formalism, f o r the way i n which l o c a l autonomy i s taken away and simultaneously granted s t r e s s e s the top-down l e g a l power of the s t a t e . For i n s t a n c e , Sandalow (1964) not only equates l o c a l autonomy with home r u l e , but suggests that i t i s up to the c o u r t s to decide how much power ought to be granted 2 through home r u l e s t a t u t e s . D e s p i t e the spate of annexations through the n i n e t e e n t h and e a r l y t w e n t i e t h c e n t u r i e s (e.g. Bass Warner, 1962) the a b i l i t y of the s t a t e to rework l o c a l boundaries through t h i s l e g a l means has met with f i e r c e o p p o s i t i o n i n suburbs with i n c r e a s i n g frequency- e s p e c i a l l y i n the northeast (Teaford, 3 1982; Jackson, 1972) . Indeed, the suburban arguments have r e s t e d on what I have c a l l e d a p o l i t i c a l l o c a l autonomy- the 2 In Massachusetts, J e r r i s o n (1982) has argued that s t a t e c o u r t s have been e x c e e d i n g l y s t r i c t i n t h e i r i n t e r -p r e t a t i o n of the 1966 home r u l e amendment, u n n e c e s s a r i l y l i m i t i n g l o c a l power a l a D i l l o n ' s Rule. 3 I r o n i c a l l y i n Boston, p r e c i s e l y the o p p o s i t e i s o c c u r r i n g . Residents of the black neighborhood of Roxbury have been attempting to ceceed from the c i t y proper to e s t a b l i s h t h e i r own autonomous m u n i c i p a l i t y to be c a l l e d "Mandella." T h e i r motion was d e f e a t e d i n a 1986 c i t y - w i d e r e f e r e n d a . See (Kenney, 1987a,b). 59 concern over s m a l l - s c a l e l o c a l democracy and l o c a l i d e n t i t y ( Danielson, 1971; Jackson, 1972; Wood, 1958, 1959; Schneider, 1980). The l i m i t a t i o n s of D i l l o n ' s l e g a l d i s c o u r s e are evi d e n t i n j u x t a p o s i n g p o l i t i c a l autonomy with l e g a l autono-my. F e a r f u l suburbanites express power through m a i n t a i n i n g t h e i r towns' i n t e g r i t y v i a t h e i r r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s i n the s t a t e l e g i s l a t u r e s , making the f a c i l e l e g a l d i s t i n c t i o n between " s t a t e " and " l o c a l " l e s s s t r a i g h t f o r w a r d . b. i . Legal Autonomy Through the Cooley D o c t r i n e Although i t never gained much s t a t u r e , the Cooley d o c t r i n e of 1871 re p r e s e n t s an a l t e r n a t i v e ( a l b e i t a decided-l y l e g a l one) to D i l l o n ' s Rule, (see a l s o Eaton, 1900; Mc Q u i l l a n , 1911; McBain, 1916). Cooley h e l d that m u n i c i p a l -i t i e s are premised on an inherent r i g h t of self-government. His decisionmaking can be c l a s s i f i e d as l i b e r a l c o n s t r u c -t i o n i s m (Syed, 1966), where broader concerns are allowed to f a c t o r i n t o decisionmaking. P h i l o s o p h i c a l l y , Cooley may be l a b e l l e d a n a t u r a l r i g h t s t h e o r i s t , one who holds the foundation of law to be i n a moral order of s o c i e t y . To Cooley's mind, c i t i e s and towns were not simply " c r e a t u r e s of the s t a t e " , but e m p i r i c a l f a c t s which had e x i s t e d s i n c e at l e a s t the medieval e r a . L o c a l government was the attempt of a group of people to c o n t r o l themselves: a foundation of any human a s s o c i a t i o n . As people h e l d a fundamental r i g h t to c o n t r o l t h e i r a s s o c i a t i o n s , t h i s was where the power of l o c a l government c o u l d be found. The 60 l o c a l r epresented the moral attempts at the s e l f c o n t r o l of i n d i v i d u a l s , the goodness of community, and pro g r e s s through human a s s o c i a t i o n s . S t a t e s were l a t t e r day e n t i t i e s , to which l o c a l i t i e s agreed to surrender p o r t i o n s of t h e i r 4 autonomy f o r the common good . For Cooley, the l o c a l r e p r esented such a fundamental component of human i n t e r a c t i o n t h a t documents l i k e the C o n s t i t u t i o n made no mention of c i t i e s and towns because the were s e l f e v i d e n t , m o r a l l y r i g h t e o u s s o v e r e i g n e n t i t i e s (Syed, 1966). N o t i c e that power i s s t i l l c o n f i g u r e d as a t h i n g - a r i g h t to a s s o c i a t i o n , not the a s s o c i a t i o n i t s e l f . Both Cooley and D i l l o n , e v i n c e a model of power s t r o n g l y rooted i n the concept of s o v e r e i g n t y , or an u l t i m a t e source of power. Cooley d i f f e r s from D i l l o n i n h i s o p e r a t i o n a l i z a t i o n of s o v e r e i g n t y : the former l o c a t e s i t i n the i n d i v i d u a l , the l a t t e r i n the s t a t e . Both j u r i s t s emphasize a l e g a l means of debating the o r i g i n s of power however much they d i s a g r e e on 5 methods of l e g a l d e c i s i o n m a k i n g . Fo u c a u l t , however, has s t r o n g l y r e j e c t e d t h e o r i e s of power that r e s t on n o t i o n s of so v e r e i g n t y (1980b). B e s i d e s r e t a i n i n g a f a r too a b s t r a c t d e s c r i p t i o n of the networks of power, these approaches h o l d a 4 Hence s o v e r e i g n l o c a l i t i e s i n Massachusetts are s a i d to come together and sur r e n d e r a p o r t i o n of t h e i r s o v e r e i g n t y f o r the "common wealth" of Massachusetts. For a d i s c u s s i o n , see ( P e t e r s , 1978). 5 I should note that D i l l o n d i d not deny the moral foundation of law. Rather, he h e l d moral arguments at bay du r i n g the decisionmaking p r o c e s s whereas Cooley allowed such arguments to e x p l i c i t l y a f f e c t h i s judgement (Syed, 1966). 61 too negative and c o n s t r a i n i n g emphasis on power through law and p r o h i b i t i o n . Cooley's focus on the l o c a l as a s s o c i a t i o n of i n -d i v i d u a l s might at f i r s t seem amenable to a theory of l o c a l autonomy through p l a c e making. U n l i k e D i l l o n , he c o n s i d e r s more than l e g a l d i s c o u r s e i n c l a i m i n g t r u t h s about the r e l a t i o n between s t a t e and the l o c a l . But he coopts the other s e t s of knowledges to r e i n f o r c e the l e g a l s t a t u s of the l o c a l o v e r a l l . I t i s not simply the case that the l o c a l i s a m o r a l - h i s t o r i c a l r i g h t of a s s o c i a t i o n which i s so because i t i s r e c o g n i z e d through Cooley's law. The emphasis on the moral foundations of community a l s o e s s e n t i a l l y reduces those other d i s c o u r s e s to a - r a t h e r u n i t a r y c o n c e p t u a l i z a t i o n of the l o c a l i n s t e a d of s t r e s s i n g the s i g n i f i c a n c e of m u l t i -dimensional s o c i a l r e l a t i o n s . C r i t i q u e s of f o u n d a t i o n a l i s m i n law from the C r i t i c a l S t u d i e s Movement have made a p a r a l l e l , more general p o i n t i n s t r e s s i n g the c o n t r a d i c t o r y and ambiguity of concepts and foundations throughout l e g a l d i s c o u r s e , i n s p i t e of i t s t r u t h c l a i m s to the c o n t r a r y ( K a i r y s , 1979; Unger, 1983; Kelman, 1987; C l a r k , 1989). Although D i l l o n and Cooley g i r d e r the l e g a l debate on l o c a l autonomy, D i l l o n ' s Rule has been f a r more hegemonic over the past century. Gere (1982) i s o l a t e s three f a c t o r s c o n t r i b u t i n g to t h i s precedence. D i l l o n ' s argument in i t s day was viewed as l o g i c a l l y s u p e r i o r - i t was argued b e t t e r , was more i n t e r n a l l y c o n s i s t e n t and was l e s s ambiguous. Thus 62 i t became a t r u t h c l a i m about l o c a l autonomy because i t a r t i c u l a t e d so w e l l with the powerful d i s c o u r s e of l e g a l formalism. D i l l o n ' s r u l e c o u l d a l s o a r t i c u l a t e with other important d i s c o u r s e s of l i b e r a l i s m and American democracy. The s i g n i f i c a n c e of p r i v a t e p r o p e r t y r i g h t s , as w e l l as the sharp a l l e g e d l y unambiguous d i s t i n c t i o n between " p u b l i c " and " p r i v a t e " spheres, and i n d i v i d u a l / c o r p o r a t e freedom from the s t a t e i n the United S t a t e s were a l l c r u c i a l supports f o r D i l l o n ' s r u l e i n the l a t e n i n e t e e n t h century a c c o r d i n g to Gere. As the r o l e of the s t a t e was seen as p r o t e c t i n g those p r i v a t e r i g h t s ( s p e c i f i c a l l y , those of the expanding r a i l r o a d monopolies), the p u b l i c c o r p o r a t i o n s ' power had to be kept i n check by the s t a t e . F i n a l l y , there was an o v e r a l l concern with s t a t e l e g i s l a t u r e ' s "enthronement". Fears of c o r r u p t i o n and patronage f u e l e d e f f o r t s by p r o g r e s s i v e f o r c e s to l e g a l l y c o n s t r a i n the power of l e g i s l a t u r e s who would u n s c r u p u l o u s l y grant l o c a l autonomy to n e f a r i o u s c i t y machines. b. i i . C r i t i q u e The D i l l o n - C o o l e y debate forms much of the t r u t h by which l a t t e r arguments over l o c a l autonomy proceed. Indeed, debates i n f i s c a l and p o l i t i c a l autonomy o f t e n reduce themselves to the tremendous precedence of D i l l o n ' s r u l e i n American f e d e r a l i s m ( E l d e r & R i s e r , 1983; S b r a g i a , 1983; Stone, Whelan & Murin, 1986; Johnston, 1981; L i n e b e r r y & Sharkansky, 1978). I have a l r e a d y c r i t i q u e d both i n terms of t h e i r t h e o r i e s of autonomy and the l o c a l , but no doubt these 63 c o n c e p t u a l i z a t i o n s framed much of the l a t e r debate. The tremendous hegemony of t h i s l e g a l d i s c o u r s e v i s - a - v i s l o c a l autonomy throughout a l l s t r a i n s of s c h o l a r s h i p suggests not only the s i g n i f i c a n c e of l e g a l dimensions of s o c i a l r e l a -t i o n s , but a l s o a r e d u c t i o n i s m i n the way i n which those s o c i a l r e l a t i o n s are h e l d to be. L o c a l autonomy i s p r i m a r i l y c o n t e s t e d i n and through law because of t h i s b i a s . As such, c e r t a i n arguments and ways of debating come to be seen as u n i v e r s a l l y v a l i d , or e s s e n t i a l l y l i n k e d to t r u t h . Other m o d a l i t i e s that are no l e s s s i g n i f i c a n t (such as those c u l t u r a l l y j u s t i f y i n g and e x p l a i n i n g suburban autonomy) are downplayed, ignored, p a t r o n i z e d or s i l e n c e d . The hegemonic f o r c e of l e g a l d i s -course through l o c a l autonomy, however, should not p r e c l u d e the term's r e c o n c e p t u a l i z a t i o n i f i t does c l o u d or deny important c o n s t i t u t i v e dimensions of s o c i a l p r o c e s s . The danger of r e p l i c a t i n g the formalism and hegemony of law i n s c h o l a r s h i p has been emphasized most r e c e n t l y i n geography ( C l a r k , I989a,b; Blomley & C l a r k , forthcoming). I t i s to the work of geographers, then, that I now t u r n . c. C l a r k ' s Theory of L e g a l Autonomy C l a r k ' s work s t r a d d l e s a break between f o u n d a t i o n a l and i n t e r p r e t i v e c o n c e p t u a l i z a t i o n s of l o c a l autonomy- and law i n g e n e r a l . His e a r l i e r work ( C l a r k , 1981; 1984; Dear & C l a r k , 1980, 1981; C l a r k & Dear, 1984) p r o v i d e d an e s s e n t i a l l y l e g a l d e f i n i t i o n of l o c a l autonomy. H i s l a t e r work (1985; I989a,b) 64 c o n v e r s e l y s t r e s s e s the c o n t e x t u a l , hence i n t e r p r e t i v e nature of law making (both i n the formal a d j u d i c a t o r y sense, and through the p r a c t i c e of everyday l i f e ) . L o c a l autonomy, he (1984) argues, should be seen as the i n t e r s e c t i o n of two t h e o r e t i c a l axes of power. These axes are based on Bentham's (1970) theory of law as the power of imperation, and the power of c o n t r e c t a t i o n . C l a r k t r a n s l a t e s these r e s p e c t i v e l y i n t o the power of l o c a l governments to i n i t i a t e t h e i r own p o l i c i e s and the power to become immune from p o l i c i e s of higher t i e r s of the s t a t e . I n i t i a t i v e and immunity form the crux of l o c a l autonomy a c r o s s urban p o l i t i c a l and l e g a l a n a l y s i s , he suggests. C l a r k c r e a t e s four i d e a l types of autonomy as a taxonomy of l o c a l power: Type I: I n i t i a t i v e and Immunity Type I I : I n i t i a t i v e and No Immunity Type I I I : No I n i t i a t i v e and Immunity Type IV: No I n i t i a t i v e and No Immunity C l a r k uses t h i s scheme to understand the nature of the American l o c a l s t a t e i n terms of State D e r i v a t i o n theory (see Holloway and P i c c i o t t o , 1978). He notes an i n c r e a s i n g s p a t i a l i n t e g r a t i o n through law i n the U.S. ( C l a r k , 1981), and i n l i g h t of the f o r c e of D i l l o n ' s r u l e concludes t h a t , "...the American r e a l i t y of l o c a l government autonomy seems much c l o s e r to a b s o l u t e l y no autonomy (Type 4 ) . E s s e n t i a l l y l o c a l governments are the b u r e a u c r a t i c e x t e n s i o n s of s t a t e governments. (1984, p. 205)." Yet C l a r k and Dear (1984) do p l a c e law and l o c a l autonomy w i t h i n a broader p o l i t i c a l and s o c i a l c o n t e x t . As 65 an apparatus of the c a p i t a l i s t s t a t e , the l o c a l s t a t e becomes one means by which the s t a t e can p r o p e r l y channel debate and c o n f l i c t as w e l l as consensus over r e l a t i o n s of p r o d u c t i o n . The autonomy of the l o c a l s t a t e i s a c t u a l l y a sham, but the p a r t i t i o n i n g between f e d e r a l s t a t e and l o c a l i t y and the i d e o l o g y of l o c a l autonomy in the language of democratic l i b e r a l i s m both serves to c o n s t r u c t c o n t a i n e r s of c o n f l i c t through which the s t a t e can f l e x i b l y s h i f t and manipulate c i v i l s o c i e t y as needed. T h i s f u n c t i o n a l , channeling aspect of l o c a l autonomy e f f e c t i v e l y d e f l e c t s and n i p s c r i s i s and d i s c o n t e n t a r i s i n g from the inherent c r i s i s e s of c a p i t a l i s m . S t r e s s i n g the u l t i m a t e l y i n t e r p r e t i v e nature of a d j u d i c a t i o n , C l a r k (1985) examines the way i n which l o c a l autonomy and heteronomy are produced through the c o u r t s . Drawing on the work of the c r i t i c a l l e g a l s t u d i e s movement, he h i g h l i g h t s the indeterminacy of law with i t s foundations i n o f t e n c o n t r a d i c t o r y i d e o l o g i e s of l i b e r a l i s m and c a p i t a l -ism, and hence the r o l e of the c o u r t s as i n t e r p r e t i v e communities in manufacturing determinacy. His e m p i r i c a l cases together r e f l e c t , f a r from the u n i t a r y formalism of D i l l o n ' s r u l e , c o n t r a d i c t o r y and indeterminate j u d i c i a l f i a t on l o c a l autonomy as w e l l as a more gen e r a l s o c i a l i n d e t e r -minacy over l o c a l autonomy's s i g n i f i c a t i o n . The reason f o r f o c u s i n g on the j u d i c i a r y , C l a r k h o l d s , i s that the p r i n c i p l e means of s o c i a l d e t e r m i n a t i o n i n the U.S. i s through the c o u r t s . 66 c. 1. C r i t i q u e C l a r k ' s work i s a tremendous c o n t r i b u t i o n to the c o n c e p t u a l i z a t i o n of l o c a l autonomy. Fundamentally, he s h i f t s the debate from the i s s u e of what the l o c a l i t y i s autonomous from, to how i t i s autonomous or heteronomous. His d i a l e c t i c of i n i t i a t i v e and immunity s t r e s s the impor-tance of context of s t a t e - l o c a l r e l a t i o n s , and t h e i r open-endedness allow them to be used narrowly a c r o s s many d i f -f e r e n t p o l i c y areas, r e f l e c t i n g the complexity of f e d e r a l i s m in the U.S. H i g h l i g h t i n g the sheer indeterminacy of l o c a l autonomy i s a l s o a c o n t r i b u t i o n not to be ignored. The concept, as h i s l a t e r work suggests, i s not simply about the D i l l o n -Cooley debate or home r u l e d o c t r i n e . I t draws i n wider debates about how a democratic regime should c o n s t i t u t e i t s e l f and the p o s s i b i l i t i e s of emancipatory change through l o c a l p o l i t i c s . As such, i t i s s a t u r a t e d with i d e o l o g i c a l debate w i t h i n and between the p o l i t i c a l l e f t and r i g h t . His work a l s o c o n t r i b u t e s to a growing l i t e r a t u r e on the need f o r c o n t e x t u a l i z e d understanding of law and s o c i e t y (see below). Such an approach not only removes law from i t s f o r m a l i s t i c p e d e s t a l and p l a c e s i t squarely i n s o c i a l p r o c e s s , i t a l s o r e q u i r e s the need f o r a s p a t i a l i z e d under-standing of s o c i a l p rocesses, to which geography can con-t r i b u t e . In t h i s way, the m u l i t i d i m e n s i o n a l i t y and s p a t i a l -i t y of l o c a l autonomy are h i n t e d a t . 67 There are, however, shortcomings i n h i s work. C l a r k o v e r s t r e s s e s the value-dimension of l o c a l autonomy i n s o c i e t y . He h a r d l y denies i t i s a p a t t e r n of s o c i a l proces-ses, but h i s emphasis i s on the indeterminacy of t h i s i d e a l or p r i n c i p l e . In t h i s way, l o c a l autonomy can be a sham, becoming e f f i c a c i o u s o f t e n (though not s o l e l y ) when the c a p i t a l i s t s t a t e deems i t necessary. The indeterminacy of i t s meaning and c o n t e x t u a l r e l e v a n c e , i t s widespread support on both the l e f t and the r i g h t i d e a l i s t i c a l l y a l l p o i n t towards t h i s o r i e n t a t i o n . His p o i n t i s w e l l taken, and c e r t a i n l y pushes the debate over l o c a l autonomy forward, beyond a debate s o l e l y h e l d on l e g a l t e r r a i n . The c u l t u r a l and p o l i t i c a l s i g -n i f i c a n c e of l o c a l autonomy, however c o n t e x t u a l l y opera-t i o n a l i z e d , should not be denied when examining the processes by which the l o c a l i s h i s t o r i c a l l y and a c t i v e l y c o n s t r u c t e d . But i t i s e q u a l l y u s e f u l to c o n c e p t u a l i z e l o c a l autonomy as a p a t t e r n e d e x p r e s s i o n of power r e l a t i o n s i n v o l v e d i n the making and remaking of p l a c e s . In t h i s way, the m a t e r i a l and the i d e a l s i g n i f i c a n c e of l o c a l autonomy are b r i d g e d and the myriad of f o r c e r e l a t i o n s through s o c i a l processes can be seen as producing those p a t t e r n s . As w e l l , C l a r k tends to o p e r a t i o n a l i z e the l o c a l as the l o c a l s t a t e , though one c o u l d argue h i s emphasis on l o c a l autonomy's value-dimension i n t r o d u c e s a broader s o c i e t a l component. He acknowledges the s p a t i a l i z a t i o n of law, but 68 does not problematize the ontology of the l o c a l being debated on t h i s t e r r a i n . H is s t a t e - c e n t r e d approach i s o l a t e s l i n k s w i t h i n the c a p i t a l i s t - s t a t e apparatus while i t deemphasizes l o c a l s t a t e - p o l i t y r e l a t i o n s . His theory of power i s a l s o l a c k i n g , r e l y i n g on the t a s k / d u t y / r i g h t o r i e n t a t i o n . T h i s stems from h i s d i r e c t use of Bentham's (1970) work. C l a r k t r a n s l a t e s Bentham's theory of p e r s o n a l power to i n s t i t u t i o n a l power. Thus power i s c o r p o r e a l : h e l d by the l o c a l s t a t e as an agent. In t h i s way, C l a r k u n c r i t i c a l l y r e p l i c a t e s the r e i f i c a t i o n of the l o c a l . Thus not only i s the l o c a l merely l o c a l government, i t i s l o c a l government as i f i t were powerful l i k e an i n d i v i d u a l . A more r e l a t i o n a l view of power i s h i n t e d at through h i s emphasis on debasing the t r u t h c l a i m s of l e g a l i n s t i t u t i o n s , but i t does not permeate h i s work. More g e n e r a l l y these d e f i c i e n c i e s are r e i n f o r c e d by h i s t i g h t c i r c u m s c r i p t i o n of l o c a l autonomy as a value c o n t e s t e d through l e g a l d i s c o u r s e . Values, c u l t u r e , c a p i t a l i s m , l i b e r a l i s m , democracy are a l l drawn i n t o a l e g a l d i s c o u r s e on l o c a l autonomy; the only arena i n which they are c o n s i d e r e d v i s - a - v i s l o c a l autonomy i s that of the c o u r t s , when i n r e a l i t y each c o n t r i b u t e s to l o c a l autonomy m a n i f e s t a t i o n both i n and out of the law. By f o c u s i n g s o l e l y on l e g a l t e r r a i n , C l a r k has p a r t i a l l y reproduced the hegemony of l e g a l d i s -course on l o c a l autonomy. C l a r k ' s (1985) u n w i l l i n g n e s s to s p e c i f y the o r i g i n s of 69 l o c a l autonomy h i n t s at t h i s c r i t i c i s m . He i s more i n t e r -e s t e d i n how i t i s t r a n s l a t e d from value to p a t t e r n v i a l e g a l d i s c o u r s e than the r e l a t i o n s of power w i t h i n that s p a t i a l nexus. N e v e r t h e l e s s he p o i n t s to the importance of p l a c e when he concludes: " I f arguments are r e l a t i v e and i f j u d i c i a l d e c i s i o n making has the c a p a c i t y to s t r u c t u r e s o c i a l d i s c o u r s e , can we imagine any l i m i t s to l o c a l autonomy? At one l e v e l , the answer i s no. The s t r u c t u r e of i n t e r e s t s , arguments and decisionmaking a l l i n t e r s e c t at s p e c i f i c p l a c e s to c r e a t e l o c a l autonomy. (1985, p. 191)" T h i s t h e s i s , then, should be seen as c o n t r i b u t i n g to C l a r k ' s work by emphasizing the way i n which l o c a l autonomy i s e v i n c e d not j u s t through law, but through p l a c e . d. The I n t e r p r e t i v e Turn i n the Geography of Law Both C l a r k (1989b) and Blomley (1988, I989a,b, f o r t h -coming) have s t r e s s e d the methodological s i g n i f i c a n c e of an i n t e r p r e t i v e approach to law and l o c a l autonomy. The i n t e r p r e t i v e approach emphasizes the h e t e r o g e n e i t y and c o n t e s t a b i l i t y of meanings i n s o c i a l l i f e . Thus i t compels an understanding of how otherwise e m p i r i c a l l y e v ident elements of a c u l t u r a l world are understood i n a c e r t a i n context through o r d i n a r y p r a c t i c e s of everyday l i f e (Geertz, 1983). A focus on what F i s h (1980) has c a l l e d i n t e r p r e t i v e communities has become a hallmark of t h i s work. I n t e r p r e t i v e communities bound i n d i v i d u a l s who share s t r a t e g i e s of producing meaning i n a s o c i a l world. There are d i s t i n c t procedures of i n t e r p r e t a t i o n and i n t e r n a l l y - d e f i n e d standards of v a l i d i t y . The s t r e s s i s not on r e c e i v i n g an i n t e r p r e t a -70 t i o n p a s s i v e l y , but a c t i v e l y producing i t . Thus i n Blomley's work on the B r i t i s h Shops Act, he i d e n t i f i e d d i f f e r e n t i n t e r p r e t i v e communities: the l o c a l s t a t e and the c o u r t s , as w e l l as t e n s i o n s w i t h i n them. The c o u r t s were more concerned with the normative v i s i o n of law, whereas the l o c a l s t a t e as an a d m i n i s t r a t i v e agency honed i n on the enforcement of the r u l e of law. Moreover, the indeterminacy of the former caused debate for the l a t t e r . The i n t e r p r e t i v e approach a l s o underscores the impor-tance of c o n t e x t u a l understanding and e x p l a n a t i o n . Debates over meanings can only make sense when they are r e l a t e d s i t u a t i o n a l l y . They are always produced somewhere. In t h i s way, the s p a t i a l i t y of d i s c o u r s e and meaning becomes c e n t r a l to the e x p l a n a t i o n of the i n t e r p l a y of otherwise a b s t r a c t f o r c e s , l i k e law. Blomley's work i n t h i s v e i n has r e c o g n i z e d l o c a l autonomy as p a r t i a l l y stemming from the l o c a l s t a t e ' s s t a t u s as an i n t e r p r e t i v e community. As i t a p p l i e s law i n the context of i t s own i n t e r n a l o r g a n i z a t i o n a l t e n s i o n s , l o c a l concerns and i t s own l o c a t i o n between the demands of the higher s t a t e and those of the e l e c t o r a t e , the l o c a l s t a t e ' s experience with law becomes markedly d i f f e r e n t than the r u l e of law which the c o u r t s and l e g i s l a t u r e s hand down. As he puts i t , "The top down h i e r a r c h y i s not n e c e s s a r i l y so i n s t r u m e n t a l as may be i m p l i e d . L o c a l i n t e r p r e t i v e p r a c t i c e s . . . . c l e a r l y have a r o l e i n shaping the process of s o c i a l r e p r o d u c t i o n and cannot simply be reduced to t e c h n o l o g i e s of the higher s t a t e . 71 (p. 192)" The most r e l e v a n t c o n t r i b u t i o n i s an emphasis on the r e l a t i o n s h i p between space and the p r o d u c t i o n of meaning. By emphasizing the s p a t i a l i t y of a l l knowledge and s o c i a l p r o c e s s e s , the s i g n i f i c a n c e of law's t r a n s f o r m a t i o n through i t s s p a t i a l i t y i s underscored. d. i . C r i t i q u e The i n t e r p r e t i v e turn i n the geography of law i s b e n e f i c i a l to a r e c o n c e p t u a l i z e d theory of l o c a l autonomy f o r a number of reasons. As a s t r o n g c r i t i q u e of l e g a l f o r -malism, i t p r o v i d e s a s u b s t a n t i a l c h a l l e n g e to merely e x p l a i n i n g l o c a l autonomy through D i l l o n ' s Rule. L i k e the c r i t i c a l l e g a l s t u d i e s movement, i t s t r e s s e s the endogenous and exogenous c o n t r a d i c t i o n s of law. These f a c t o r s make a "seamless web" c o n c e p t u a l i z a t i o n of law deeply p r o b l e m a t i c . As one aspect of t h i s , seamless l e g a l t h e o r i e s of l o c a l autonomy (and t h e i r o p e r a t i o n a l i z a t i o n i n s t a t e - l o c a l r e l a t i o n s ) become f a r more complex than at f i r s t g l a n ce. R e l a t e d l y , i n r e j e c t i n g a top-down approach to law t h i s l i t e r a t u r e moves towards a more micro, " l o c a l " or c a p i l l a r y approach to power, as the law i s one such mode of f o r c e i n s o c i e t y . Such an emphasis p r o v i d e s a means by which the d i f f e r e n t p e r s p e c t i v e s and c o n c l u s i o n s on l o c a l autonomy can be t h e o r e t i c a l l y harmonized and r e c o n c i l e d . Again, the s t r e s s i s on the means to autonomy, ra t h e r than the 'from what' emphasis. 72 Most im p o r t a n t l y the i n t e r p r e t i v e t urn s t r e s s e s the s i g n i f i c a n c e of space and context i n understanding law. Questions of l o c a l autonomy evi n c e d through laws thus demand a geographic p e r s p e c t i v e as law i s no longer seen as poured down onto a stage of space, but mediated c o n t e x t u a l l y . T h i s approach l i n k s with Agnew's theory of p l a c e and p o l i t i c s as w e l l . Thus the m a n i f e s t a t i o n of l o c a l autonomy must be c o n s i d e r e d with respect to not merely l e g a l " i n t e r p r e t i v e communities" but a l s o p o l i t i c a l , c u l t u r a l and s p a t i a l ones as w e l l . The work to date has been e s s e n t i a l l y pathbreaking. More work i n t h i s v e i n needs to be done. Towards t h i s end I i d e n t i f y a number of concerns. F i r s t l y , there has been a heavy e m p i r i c a l emphasis on case law as s o c i a l t e x t s to be i n t e r p r e t e d (Blomley, 1990, forthcoming; C l a r k , 1981, 1985, 1989). T h i s weight can be balanced by a focus on l e g i s l a t i v e law making or p u b l i c p o l i c y . T h i s focus i s p a r t i c u l a r l y important to t h e o r i z i n g l o c a l autonomy s i n c e h i s t o r i c a l l y i t has been s t a t e - l o c a l r e l a t i o n s r a t h e r than f e d e r a l - l o c a l r e l a t i o n s which have been c o n s i d e r e d . Secondly, a r e l a t i o n a l view of power needs to be employed more s e l f c o n s c i o u s l y i n the study of i n t e r p r e t i v e s t r a t e g i e s . In s p i t e of a r e j e c t i o n of top-down t h e o r i z i n g , these works r e t a i n a top-down theory of power as an o b j e c t h e l d and t r a n s f e r r e d . Thus there p e r s i s t e n t p o r t r a y a l of power as a n e g a t i v e , c o n s t r a i n i n g phenomenon. 73 T h i r d l y , there needs to be a move away from s t r e s s i n g 'the s p a t i a l i t y of law mediated through a geographic context' towards the mediation of a multitude of s o c i a l f o r c e s as h e l p i n g to comprise that c o n t e x t . The danger i s that p l a c e i s black boxed as context i n s t r e s s i n g the s p a t i a l i t y of law a l o n e . The s t r e s s was understandable given the p o i n t to be made. Future work on l o c a l autonomy should not strengthen the p a r t i t i o n between law and other aspects of p l a c e making. The same p o i n t can be made with respect to p o s i t i o n i n g the l o c a l s t a t e between the l o c a l p o l i t y and the higher t i e r of the s t a t e . I f meaning i s f l u i d , then so are such p a r t i -t i o n s i n p o l i t i c s . Where there are such p a r t i t i o n s , there are a l s o s t r o n g and s i g n i f i c a n t l i n k s . These must not be overlooked i n coming to g r i p s with how the l o c a l becomes d e f i n e d . A theory of p l a c e making can accommodate such f l e x i b i l i t y . F i n a l l y , we should not ignore the emerging anthro-p o l o g i c a l c r i t i q u e s of i n t e r p r e t i v e s c h o l a r s h i p . Indeed, these concerns p a r a l l e l F o u c a u l t ' s i n t e r e s t i n n o t i o n s of d i s c o u r s e and the r e l a t i o n between power and knowledge. Ge e r t z ' s method has s u s t a i n e d a p o i n t e d c r i t i q u e q u e s t i o n i n g whether or not we can a c t u a l l y ever know the o t h e r ' s subject p o s i t i o n through our own i n t e r p r e t i v e means ( C l i f f o r d , 1988; Crapanzano, 1986). The s u b j e c t i v i t y of ethnographer and s u b j e c t are t e x t u a l l y b l u r r e d . In t h i s way, the d i s t i n c t i o n between the s c h o l a r ' s understanding of context and c u l t u r e 74 becomes i n d i s t i n g u i s h a b l e from that of the agents indigenous to that c o n t e x t . In a u t h o r i t a t i v e l y r e l a y i n g important elements of c u l t u r e and context, the p o s i t i o n of the s c h o l a r r e l a t i v e to those o b j e c t s - themselves webbed i n a network of power- and t h e i r s u b j e c t s should not be obfuscated i n the wake of a s s e r t i n g a t h e o r e t i c a l p o i n t - knowledge. My work, as i t r e l i e s on an i n t e r p r e t i v e approach to law and p u b l i c p o l i c y , as w e l l as on the s i g n i f i c a n c e of c u l t u r e and p o l i t i c s i n the process of placemaking must be s e n s i t i v e to t h i s m e thodological c r i t i c i s m . e. Summary and Comments T h i s chapter b u i l d s upon i t s predecessor. Through i t I have c o n s t r u c t e d an i d e a l type of l o c a l autonomy by c u l l i n g s c h o l a r s h i p which has emphasized the l e g a l d i m e n s i o n a l i t y of the concept. I t has been widely adopted as the p r i n c i p a l means through which l o c a l autonomy i s c o n t e s t e d , hence as a mode of c o n c e p t u a l i z i n g the term i t has been hegemonic throughout f i s c a l and p o l i t i c a l autonomy debates (Dear & C l a r k , 1980, 1981; Syed, 1966; Pierndak, 1989). I t has become common s e n s i c a l to think of l o c a l autonomy as p r i m a r i -l y a l e g a l q u e s t i o n . D i l l o n ' s Rule and the Cooley d o c t r i n e serve as p o l e s of the l e g a l debate over what l o c a l autonomy i s , whether i t should e x i s t , and how i t meshes with the e m p i r i c a l world. Although Cooley's d o c t r i n e i s more sympathetic to the c a l l s f o r and the e x i s t e n c e of l o c a l autonomy, the r e l a t i o n s h i p 75 between power and knowledge w i t h i n law have s u s t a i n e d D i l l o n ' s precedence, l e a v i n g the e x i s t e n c e of l o c a l autonomy in a p r e c a r i o u s t h e o r e t i c a l limbo. D i l l o n o v e r s t r e s s e s the top-down domination of the s t a t e by h o l d i n g the o n t o l o g i c a l s t a t u s of the l o c a l i n a tenuous p o s i t i o n as w e l l . I have c r i t i q u e d both D i l l o n and Cooley, and the more gen e r a l l e g a l approach f o r inadequate c o n c e p t u a l i z a t i o n s of both the l o c a l and power. L o c a l i s p e r s i s t e n t l y i s o l a t e d as the l o c a l s t a t e , and power i s r e i f i e d as a phenomenon that gets exchanged by, t r a n s f e r r e d from, and t e t h e r e d to the s t a t e . I n t e r n a l i n c o n s i s t e n c i e s i n l e g a l d i s c o u r s e , such as Cooley's l o c a l s t a t e as a m a n i f e s t a t i o n of i n d i v i d u a l s i n a community e x e r c i s i n g the r i g h t of s e l f c o n t r o l , are deemed i r r e l e v a n t to l e g a l arguments. They are denied the s t a t u s of knowledge and t r u t h . While I have a l s o c r i t i q u e d Cooley's moral foun-d a t i o n a l i s m , h i s theory p o i n t s not merely to the i n c o n s i s t e n -cy of l e g a l d i s c o u r s e which we should be wary of, but a l s o to the p o s s i b i l i t y of a l t e r n a t i v e c o n c e p t u a l i z a t i o n s of l o c a l autonomy. Furthermore, as t h i s a l t e r n a t i v e has been pre-sented w i t h i n a bounded d i s c o u r s e of law, the multidimen-s i o n a l i t y of what has been otherwise t r e a t e d as a s t r a i g h t -forward concept i s a l s o underscored. C l a r k ' s taxonomy of l o c a l autonomy through i n i t i a t i v e and immunity pushes the debate i n t h i s d i r e c t i o n . He s t r e s s e s the value dimension in order to s i t u a t e the concept 76 i n i d e o l o g i e s of c a p i t a l i s m , democracy and l i b e r a l i s m . As i t i s c o n t e s t e d through law, these i d e o l o g i e s concur and c o n f l i c t , as evinced i n judge's d e c i s i o n s . More g e n e r a l l y , however, l o c a l autonomy i s argued to be c h i m e r i c a l - a ruse by which the c a p i t a l i s t s t a t e apparatus can f l e x i b l y j uggle c o n f l i c t s burgeoning from r e l a t i o n s of p r o d u c t i o n . Again, l o c a l and power are inadequately t h e o r i z e d , and the l e g a l nature of the qu e s t i o n of l o c a l autonomy i s l a r g e l y repro-duced. With the r i s e of an i n t e r p r e t i v e approach towards law and space, the d e n i a l of a " t r u e " l o c a l autonomy i n these l e g a l s t u d i e s i s c a l l e d i n t o q u e s t i o n . T h i s school of thought has s t r e s s e d the s p a t i a l i t y of law as a s o c i a l p r o c e s s . As such, i t demonstrates the r i s e of l o c a l autonomy stemming from the i n t e r a c t i o n of a b s t r a c t law with geographi-c a l context and i n t e r p r e t i v e communities r o l e i n t h i s t r a n s f o r m a t i o n . T h i s p o i n t c l o s e l y f o l l o w s the works of L i p s k y and Pahl that suggest l o c a l autonomy i s c l o s e l y r e l a t e d with the p o l i t i c a l s t r u c t u r e of the s t a t e , as the l o c a l i s the p o i n t of a p p l y i n g p o l i c y to a r e a l world c o n t e x t . T h i s work pr o v i d e s a str o n g foundation on which to r e c o n c e p t u a l i z e l o c a l autonomy. However, i t s strong e m p i r i -c a l focus on case law, l a c k of a s e l f - c o n s c i o u s l y r e l a t i o n a l view of power, focus on law r a t h e r than p l a c e , and p o s s i b l e c o n f l a t i o n of s c h o l a r and o b j e c t s u b j e c t i v i t y a l l present 77 c h a l l e n g e s to my r e c o n c e p t u a l i z a t i o n . f . S y n t h e s i s Through Chapters Two and Three, I have r e l a y e d the e x i s t i n g c o n c e p t u a l i z a t i o n s and o p e r a t i o n a l i z a t i o n s of l o c a l autonomy. These works remain t h e o r e t i c a l l y segregated, though o f t e n they reduce down to a l e g a l e x p l a n a t i o n . Hence a more g e n e r a l i z a b l e theory of l o c a l autonomy i s r e q u i r e d to capture the breadth endemic to the concept. I argue foremost that these i d e a l types of autonomy remain, n e v e r t h e l e s s , m a n i f e s t a t i o n of the same phenomenon: the s p a t i a l a r t i c u l a -t i o n of f o r c e r e l a t i o n s i n s o c i e t y best understood through a place-making pro c e s s . To summarize the l i t e r a t u r e , l o c a l autonomy i s s a i d to e x i s t because of D i l l o n ' s Rule and i n c r e a s i n g f e d e r a l and s t a t e i n t e r v e n t i o n at the l o c a l l e v e l f i s c a l l y and p o l i t i c a l -l y . S c a t t e r e d r e s i s t a n c e s to t h i s c o n c l u s i o n h i n t that l o c a l autonomy e x i s t s i n c e r t a i n p l a c e s (suburbs) under c e r t a i n c o n d i t i o n s ( a f f l u e n c e , as the s t a t e sees f i t ) , through c e r t a i n e m p i r i c a l means (money without s t r i n g s attached, home r u l e d o c t r i n e s , s t r e e t l e v e l b u r e a u c r a t i c d e c i s i o n s and i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s ) . A l t e r n a t i v e work on p o l i t i c a l communities and i d e n t i t y c o n v e r s e l y h i n t at power r e s o n a t i n g from the s o c i a l c o n s t r u c t i o n of p l a c e and i d e n t i t y . One cannot d i v o r c e the q u e s t i o n of whether or not l o c a l autonomy e x i s t s from that of how s o c i a l processes a r t i c u l a t e with one another to produce g r i d s of power- e s p e c i a l l y s i n c e 78 t h i s l i t e r a t u r e review has demonstrated an ambiguity on the o n t o l o g i c a l s t a t u s of l o c a l autonomy. T h i s i s why taxonomies of l o c a l autonomy cannot s t r e s s the from what qu e s t i o n over the how q u e s t i o n . Most work does not capture the p l a c e - p e r s p e c t i v e on the l o c a l r e g a r d l e s s of i t s c o n c l u s i o n on l o c a l autonomy. I argue the l o c a l i s f i r s t and foremost a p l a c e ; i t i s not f o u n d a t i o n a l l y a p u b l i c c o r p o r a t i o n or a " c r e a t u r e of the s t a t e . " I t i s a m e a n i n g f u l l y bounded set of s o c i a l r e l a t i o n s i n a s p a t i a l c o n t e x t . The l o c a l s t a t e , and the s t a t e i n g e n e r a l together p l a y an i n t e g r a l r o l e i n producing and reproducing the meanings (which are o f t e n c o n t r a d i c t o r y ) of the l o c a l . They are by no means alone i n t h i s endeavour. Both dominant and marginal groups i n s i d e and o u t s i d e of that p l a c e c o n t r i b u t e to t h i s a s c r i p t i o n of meaning. The meaning-f u l n e s s of p l a c e i s always in a c u l t u r a l context as s o c i a l r e l a t i o n s - the way t h i n g s a r e - make sense and become i n t u i -t i v e . By adopting a p l a c e p e r s p e c t i v e , then, the p o i n t s of the l i t e r a t u r e are a l s o s y n t h e s i z e d . I f we see the e m p i r i c a l i s s u e s d i s c u s s e d as c o n t r i b u t i o n s to the place-making processes of the s t a t e , they can be l i n k e d with others from c u l t u r a l l i t e r a t u r e to d e s c r i b e the s p a t i a l nexus of t h i s p l e t h o r a of s o c i a l r e l a t i o n s . L i n k s between s t a t e and the l o c a l s t a t e are not severed, nor are l i n k s between l o c a l s t a t e and l o c a l p o p u l a t i o n and c u l t u r e . Moreover, the 79 l o c a l i t y can be seen as a p l a c e w i t h i n a p l a c e : both denying and c o n t r i b u t i n g to the meaning of the l a r g e r e n t i t y . Autonomy i s c o n c e p t u a l i z e d as s e l f - c o n t r o l v i s - a - v i s higher t i e r s of the s t a t e . Complete autonomy i s a t h e o r e t i -c a l l y u s e l e s s category, as i s complete heteronomy. S e l f -c o n t r o l demands a means of s e l f - d e f i n i t i o n as w e l l as e x p r e s s i o n , but always made c l e a r by h i g h l i g h t i n g what the s e l f i s not. In t h i s way, l o c a l autonomy can become a cogent category. How the l o c a l i s d e f i n e d and expressed v i s - a - v i s higher t i e r s of the s t a t e becomes the c e n t r a l q u e s t i o n . Because of the complexity of meaning im b r i c a t e d i n " l o c a l " a c i r c u l a t o r y , r e l a t i o n a l view of power must be used. T h i s c o n c e p t u a l i z a t i o n of power acknowledges the r e l a t i o n s of domination w i t h i n the s t a t e that produce p a t t e r n s of h e t e r -onomy that the l e g a l and f i s c a l l i t e r a t u r e s have emphasized, but i t a l s o s t r e s s e s the "bottom up" v e c t o r s of power- the s t r a t e g i e s of r e s i s t a n c e and a l t e r n a t i v e d i s c o u r s e s of power as w e l l . The l i t e r a t u r e on p l a c e and power, and p l a c e making can thus be l i n k e d to the heteronomy found in other l i t e r a -t u r e s . My r e c o n c e p t u a l i z a t i o n of l o c a l autonomy i s developed e m p i r i c a l l y i n the next two c h a p t e r s . I do not use these chapters to deny that l o c a l i t i e s i n Massachusetts are c o n s t r a i n e d by f i s c a l r e l i a n c e on the s t a t e , t h e i r p o l i t i c a l s t a t u s i n a f e d e r a l i s t system, D i l l o n ' s r u l e , or l e g a l c l a r i f i c a t i o n of t h e i r r i g h t s , d u t i e s , and r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s 80 as Dear, C l a r k , and J e r r i s o n have concluded. Indeed, my e m p i r i c a l work s u b s t a n t i a t e s each one of these c l a i m s . Rather, I wish to demonstrate the simultaneous and complex ways i n which l o c a l autonomy become manifest. In t h i s way, l o c a l autonomy and heteronomy become a d i a l e c t i c : through the process of p l a c e making. 81 CHAPTER FOUR LOCAL AUTONOMY WITHIN THE LAW a. L o c a l Autonomy i n Massachusetts Reexamined With resp e c t to the l o c a l autonomy q u e s t i o n i n Mas-sa c h u s e t t s , Dear and C l a r k conclude: "The autonomy of l o c a l s t a t e s i n Massachusetts i s s e v e r e l y c u r t a i l e d by c o n s t i t u t i o n a l arrangements and by the t i g h t l y d e f i n e d c a t e g o r i c a l grant system of that S t a t e . C o n s t i t u -t i o n a l and l e g a l arrangements e s t a b l i s h the l o c a l s t a t e as a " c r e a t u r e " of the f e d e r a l and u l t i m a t e l y , the c e n t r a l s t a t e . Both the e x i s t e n c e and f u n c t i o n i n g of the l o c a l s t a t e are subsumed under the c e n t r a l c o n s t i t u t i o n . Other forms of a d m i n i s t r a t i v e p r a c t i c e c o n s o l i d a t e the g r i p of the c e n t r a l s t a t e . In p a r t i c u l a r , c a t e g o r i c a l grants a v a i l a b l e as t r a n s f e r payments from higher t i e r s of s t a t e a u t h o r i t y e f f e c t i v e l y l i m i t the q u a l i t y and q u a n t i t y of l o c a l s t a t e a c t i v i t i e s . " (1980, p. 22.) Basing t h e i r f i n d i n g s on the e s s e n t i a l l y c o n s t r a i n e d p o l i t i c a l , f i s c a l and l e g a l c o n c e p t u a l i z a t i o n s c r i t i q u e d i n the p r e v i o u s c h a p t e r s , they have o f f e r e d a ra t h e r one-sided p o r t r a i t of l o c a l autonomy's "dimensions". Even a c u r s o r y c o n s i d e r a t i o n of l o c a l autonomy i n Massachusetts h i g h l i g h t s the ambiguity of the evidence. S e v e r a l authors have noted the s t a t e ' s s t r o n g i n t e r f e r e n c e i n l o c a l a f f a i r s , e s p e c i a l l y i n regards to school spending and pr o p e r t y t a x a t i o n ( E l a z a r , 1986; Meyerson & B a n f i e l d , 1966; Levy, 1971). On the other hand, l o c a l autonomy i s f i e r c e l y valued i n New England and i s a str o n g r h e t o r i c a l d e v i c e e s p e c i a l l y i n the suburbs (Zucker-man, 1970; Wood, 1958). The s t a t e d i d pass a ra t h e r l i b e r a l home r u l e amendment i n 1966 ( J e r r i s o n , 1982). Many suburbs s t i l l h o l d town meetings, the l a s t v e s t i g e of Athenian democracy i n the U.S. ( T o c q u e v i l l e , 1956). Thus on e m p i r i c a l 82 as w e l l as t h e o r e t i c a l grounds, a reexamination of l o c a l autonomy i n Massachusetts would appear warranted. Towards t h i s end, I h o l d two o b j e c t i v e s i n t h i s c h a p t e r . F i r s t , I d e s c r i b e the Massachusetts A n t i Snob Zoning law as a p o l i c y s i m u ltaneously i m p l i c a t i n g autonomy and heteronomy, thereby demonstrating the complex and d i a l e c t i c q u a l i t i e s of power r e l a t i o n s . I do t h i s by d i s c u s s i n g the s p e c i f i c s of the law. Second, I suggest that a p l a c e - p e r s p e c t i v e can answer why, i n l i g h t of D i l l o n ' s r u l e and other c o n s t r a i n t s , l o c a l autonomy was a c t u a l l y w r i t t e n i n t o a law e x p l i c i t l y d i m i n i s h i n g such power. The p l a c e -p e r s p e c t i v e suggests r e f i n e d c a t e g o r i e s of " l o c a l " and "autonomy". C o n t e s t i n g p o l i t i c a l , c u l t u r a l and l e g a l p l a c e -making s t r a t e g i e s through Chapter 40B r e l a t e a c i r c u l a t o r y theory of power to the d e f i n i t i o n of the l o c a l . b. Method Personal i n t e r v i e w s were conducted with two i n d i v i d u a l s who d r a f t e d the b i l l . These i n t e r v i e w s were based on broad, open-ended q u e s t i o n s about l o c a l autonomy. Secondary sources r e c o u n t i n g the b i l l ' s passage were used as w e l l (Schneider, 1970; Power, 1974). My method emphasizes i n d u c t i v e category development as a p r e c u r s o r to theory c o n s t r u c t i o n (Glaser & S t r a u s s , 1967). Interviewees and secondary sources were chosen nonrandomly p r e c i s e l y because of t h e i r t h e o r e t i c a l r e l e v a n c e to the r e s e a r c h q u e s t i o n . Given that the purpose of my t h e s i s i s to r e c o n c e p t u a l i z e l o c a l autonomy, t h i s t a c t 83 was more a p p r o p r i a t e than systematic and q u a n t i t a t i v e data c o l l e c t i o n s t r a t e g i e s best employed i n theory t e s t i n g . Treatment of the c a t e g o r i e s e x e m p l i f i e s the i n t e r p r e t i v e method d i s c u s s e d i n Chapter Three, emphasizing c o n t e x t u a l i t y . Respondents are quoted at l e n g t h to m i t i g a t e the o b f u s c a t i o n between t h e i r s u b j e c t i v i t y and my own. c. Chapter 40B: S t r u c t u r e & Novelty Passed i n 1969, Chapter 40B remains the only s t a t e l e g i s l a t i o n i n the U.S. a d d r e s s i n g suburban e x c l u s i o n a r y zoning p r a c t i c e s 1 . The b i l l l e g a l l y n u l l i f i e d l o c a l i n i t i a -t i v e to exclude s u b s i d i z e d housing by p r o v i d i n g a means 2 through which q u a l i f i e d developers of low and moderate 3 income housing c o u l d bypass l o c a l zoning r e g u l a t i o n s and the myriad of l o c a l road b l o c k s p r e v e n t i n g c o n s t r u c t i o n . The The Connecticut l e g i s l a t u r e voted on a b i l l s i m i l a r to 40B i n 1988. I t would have c r e a t e d a set of "land use judges" who would "roam the s t a t e and o v e r r u l e , under t i g h t l y r e s t r i c t e d circumstances, l o c a l d e c i s i o n s on housing and zoning." (Johnston, 1989). The b i l l was "soundly d e f e a t e d . " (Guzman, 1988, p. 26.). 2 . . . The law d e f i n e s q u a l i f i e d developers as l i m i t e d d i v i d e n d c o r p o r a t i o n s , such as non p r o f i t groups and housing a u t h o r i t i e s . L a t e r , i n the 1980s when the s t a t e opened up the c o n s t r u c t i o n grants to p r i v a t e d e v e l o p e r s , a q u a l i f i e d developer would be one who agreed to r e s t r i c t h e r / h i s p r o f i t s . The exact p r o f i t margin allowed was to be determined by the s t a t e . 3 "low and moderate income housing" was d e f i n e d i n 40B as "...any housing s u b s i d i z e d by the f e d e r a l or s t a t e government under any program to a s s i s t the c o n s t r u c t i o n of low or moderate income housing as d e f i n e d i n the a p p l i c a b l e f e d e r a l or s t a t e s t a t u t e , whether b u i l t or operated by any p u b l i c agency or any n o n p r o f i t or l i m i t e d d i v i d e n d o r g a n i z a -t i o n . " (MA General Laws Chapter 40 B. s u b s e c t i o n 20.) 84 means was embodied i n the novel "Comprehensive Permit." A comprehensive permit allows developers of low and moderate income housing to apply to a s i n g l e town board (the p r e - e x i s t i n g Zoning Board of Appeals) f o r one c o n s t r u c t i o n permit. Previous to 40B (and i n the cases of n o n - s u b s i d i z e d housing c o n s t r u c t i o n ) developers apply to a l i t a n y of l o c a l boards and commissions f o r v a r i o u s permits (heath, p u b l i c s a f e t y , zoning, p l a n n i n g s e l e c t m e n [ s i c ] , e t c . ) . By c r e a t i n g one d e c i s i o n p o i n t , the law r e s t r u c t u r e s the p o l i t i c a l autonomy of l o c a l bureaucracy and bureaucrats that c o u l d have otherwise h a l t e d a p r o j e c t with impunity. The r e l a t i v e amount of l o c a l i n i t i a t i v e i s curbed by the law e x p l i c i t l y . The l o c a l Zoning Board of Appeals becomes the p o i n t of decisionmaking f o r the town; a l l other boards make 4 recommendations to i t i n l i e u of g r a n t i n g t h e i r own permits . The only permit not granted under 40B i s that of the Conser-5 v a t i o n Commission . One infamous t a c t i c that Massachusetts l o c a l s employ to block c o n s t r u c t i o n i s to delay meetings or motion f o r continuances so that boards and commissions draw out the l e a d 4 Z.B.A. members are appointed by the Board of S e l e c t -m e n [ s i c ] / C i t y C o u n c i l . The number of members v a r i e s from town to town. 5 Conservation Commissions i n Massachusetts c i t i e s and towns are i n charge of determining wetlands areas before c o n s t r u c t i o n commences. Developers do have appeal power from l o c a l commissions' d e c i s i o n s to the s t a t e Department of Environmental Q u a l i t y E n g i n e e r i n g (D.E.Q.E.), whereas other boards' d e c i s i o n s are immune from s t a t e o v e r r i d e . 85 time before making a decision. For a developer who most l i k e l y does not own but has an option on a piece of property such time delays- in the face of a limited construction season- have been e f f e c t i v e deterrents to construction. 40B counters t h i s l o c a l i n i t i a t i v e by imposing s t r i c t deadlines in the decisionmaking process behind a comprehensive permit. The Z.B.A. has t h i r t y days in which to hold a hearing a f t e r receiving application for a comprehensive permit. After that hearing has ended, i t has forty days to render a decision in the form of: acceptance, acceptance with conditions, or r e j e c t i o n . These time constraints can be forgiven only i f both parties agree. Should the developer's comprehensive permit be rejected by the Z.B.A., but the project under consideration i s "consistent with l o c a l needs''^ or i f conditions of approval 7 are attached by the Z.B.A. which are "uneconomic" , the ^ "...requirements and regulations s h a l l be considered consistent with l o c a l needs i f they are reasonable in view of the regional need for low and moderate income housing considered with the number of low income persons in the c i t y or town affected and the need to protect the health or safety of the occupants of the proposed housing or of the residents of the c i t y or town, to promote better s i t e and building design in r e l a t i n g to the surroundings, or to preserve open spaces, and i f such requirements and regulations are applied as equally as possible to both subsidized and unsubsidized housing." (Mass. General Laws, Chapter 40 B subsection 20). 7 "...any condition brought about by any single factor or combination of factors to the extent that t i makes i t impossible for a public agency or nonprofit organization to proceed in building or operating low or moderate income housing without f i n a n c i a l l o s s , or for a limited dividend organization to proceed and s t i l l r e a l i z e a reasonable return in building or operating such housing within the l i m i t a t i o n s 86 developer has recourse to a s t a t e Housing Appeals Committee (H.A.C.). That i s , the l o c a l community l o s e s i t s immunity from s t a t e o v e r s i g h t a u t h o r i t y . N o t i c e that " l o c a l needs" i s s p a t i a l l y d e l i m i t e d on a r e g i o n a l not on a l o c a l b a s i s . Such p h r a s i n g l e g a l l y circumvents what Daniel s o n (1976b) sees as two of the components of suburban autonomy in the zoning sphere: the l a c k of a s t r o n g i n t e r n a l c o a l i t i o n f o r a f f o r -dable housing, and the l a c k of l o c a l p o l i t i c a l e f f i c a c y o u t s i d e r s have i n a town. The H.A.C.'s only determines i f the Z.B.A's d e c i s i o n was " c o n s i s t e n t with l o c a l needs" or i f a t t a c h e d c o n d i t i o n s were "uneconomic." The committee i s comprised of f i v e members: one from the s t a t e Department of Community A f f a i r s (D.C.A.), two l o c a l r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s who are appointed by the governor, and two people a p p o i n t e d by the D.C.A. commis-s i o n e r . Should the H.A.C. f i n d i n favour of the developer, the Z.B.A.'s d e c i s i o n i s "vacated" and the comprehensive permit i s granted by the H.A.C. L o c a l communities can a c h i e v e immunity from the a p p e l l a t e d e c i s i o n i f one of t h r e e c r i t e r i a i s met. S a t i s f y -i n g one of these c o n d i t i o n s a u t o m a t i c a l l y renders the Z.B.A. d e c i s i o n (whether i t i s pro or con) " c o n s i s t e n t with l o c a l set by the s u b s i d i z i n g agency of government on the s i z e or c h a r a c t e r of the development or on the amount or nature of the subsidy or on the t e n a n t s , r e n t a l s and income permis-s a b l e , and without s u b s t a n t i a l l y changing the rent l e v e l s and u n i t s s i z e s proposed by the p u b l i c , n o n p r o f i t or l i m i t e d d i v i d e n d o r g a n i z a t i o n s . " (Chapter 40B s u b s e c t i o n 20) 87 needs": "[1.] low or moderate income housing e x i s t s which i s i n excess of ten per cent of the housing u n i t s r e p o r t e d i n the l a t e s t d e c e n n i a l census of the c i t y or town or [2.] [ i f low or moderate income housing e x i s t s ] on s i t e s comprising one and one h a l f per cent of the t o t a l land area zoned f o r r e s i d e n t i a l , commercial, or i n d u s t r i a l use or [3.] the a p p l i c a t i o n before the board would r e s u l t i n the commencement of c o n s t r u c t i o n of such housing on s i t e s comprising more than three tenths of one per cent of such la n d area or ten a c r e s , whichever i s l a r g e r ; p r o v i d e d however, that land area owned by the U n i t e d S t a t e s , the commonwealth, or any p u b l i c a u t h o r i t y s h a l l be excluded from the t o t a l l a n d area r e f e r r e d to above when making such d e t e r m i n a t i o n of c o n s i s t e n c y with l o c a l needs." (Mass. General Laws, Chapter 40B, s u b s e c t i o n 20) I r o n i c a l l y , then, Chapter 40B p r o h i b i t s h e r e t o f o r e l e g a l and p o l i t i c a l processes by which l o c a l governments c o u l d f o s t e r p a t t e r n s of autonomy, yet i t simultaneously grants or opens up the p o s s i b i l i t y f o r p o l i t i c a l processes through which communities c o u l d a s s e r t t h e i r autonomy. d. Power, Autonomy & Heteronomy Through Chapter 40B Consider the comprehensive permit component of the law. While i t does attempt to prevent l o c a l s from s t a l l i n g or a b o r t i n g the development process, i t n e v e r t h e l e s s allows the d e c i s i o n to remain at the l o c a l l e v e l . The s t a t e does not simply remove the decisionmaking r e s p o n s i b i l i t y from the l o c a l agency. N o t i c e as w e l l the comprehensive permit only a p p l i e s to c e r t a i n types of s u b s i d i z e d housing c o n s t r u c t i o n . I t should be remembered that such land uses are not the only ones that l o c a l zoning o f t e n p r o h i b i t s (Babcock & Siemon, 1985), thus 40B a t t a c k s l o c a l autonomy of zoning, s i g -88 n i f i c a n t l y though r a t h e r narrowly. 40B does allow l o c a l Z.B.A.s to a t t a c h c o n d i t i o n s or deny the permit o u t r i g h t i n the best i n t e r e s t s of h e a l t h and s a f e t y . Thus even w i t h i n the scope of r e s i d e n t i a l zoning, the D b i l l a l l o w s a l o c a l d e n i a l i f i t i s made on proper grounds . Moreover, the d e c i s i o n c o u l d have been p l a c e d i n the hands of the Planning Board, r a t h e r than the Z.B.A. which i s a much more c o n s e r v a t i v e , l o c a l l y - o r i e n t e d i n s t i t u t i o n i n Mas-sa c h u s e t t s p o l i t i c s ( K r e f e t z 1977; Nolan, 1989; S t a a f , 1989; Brown, 1989; Stockard & E n g l e r , 1989). Furthermore, the time c o n s t r a i n t s on the p u b l i c hearings and Z.B.A. d e c i s i o n can be waived should both p a r t i e s agree. Such an agreement may not Although one might e a s i l y make the argument that a l l the s t a t e has done i s simply narrowed the grounds on which a l e g i t i m a t e permit d e n i a l may be executed, t h i s i s a c t u a l l y not the case. Zoning power had been upheld by the U.S. Supreme Court i n the famous E u c l i d d e c i s i o n . The c o u r t h e l d that zoning i s a l e g i t i m a t e e x e r c i s e of the p o l i c e power of the s t a t e (delegated to the l o c a l i t i e s ) . As a p o l i c e power, i t i s intended to promote the g e n e r a l w e l f a r e , and r a t i o n a l development p a t t e r n s (Danielson, 1976b, p. 51.). D a n i e l s o n goes on to quote from the Massachusetts General Laws: "Zoning r e g u l a t i o n s and r e s t r i c t i o n s s h a l l be designed among other purposes to l e s s e n congestion i n the s t r e e t s ; to conserve h e a l t h ; to secure s a f e t y from f i r e , p a n i c , and other dangers; to p r o v i d e adequate l i g h t and a i r ; to prevent overcrowding of l a n d ; to a v o i d undue c o n c e n t r a t i o n of p o p u l a t i o n ; to f a c i l -i t a t e the adequate p r o v i s i o n of t r a n s p o r t a t i o n , water, sewerage, sc h o o l s , parks, and other p u b l i c requirements; to conserve the value of land and b u i l d i n g s ; to encourage the most a p p r o p r i a t e use of land throughout the c i t y or town; and to p r o v i d e and i n c r e a s e i t s a m e n i t i e s . " (Massachusetts General Laws, Chapter 40A s u b s e c t i o n 3.). Thus Daniel s o n makes the t h e o r e t i c a l p o i n t that i t was the s t a t e s ' ( n a t i o n -wide) r e l u c t a n c e to s p e c i f i c a l l y d e f i n e the r e l a t i v e impor-tance of a f f o r d a b l e suburban housing and r a c i a l i n t e g r a t i o n , along with c o u r t d e c i s i o n which r e i n f o r c e d r a c i a l and "community c h a r a c t e r " l e g i t i m a t i o n s f o r e x c l u s i o n a r y prac-t i c e s t h a t have l e d to the abuse of the delegated zoning power. 89 always be to developers' l i k i n g , but they w i l l o f t e n ac-quie s c e i n order to appease and c a t e r to the town. Turning to the c r e a t i o n of the Housing Appeals Commit-tee, i t dominates the l o c a l s t a t e by d i s s o l v i n g the immunity of l o c a l zoning d e c i s i o n s . The scope i s again, however, narrow: only 40B d e c i s i o n s can be vacated. H.A.C.'s mandate . . 9 i s not to o v e r r i d e the l o c a l d e c i s i o n s per se ; ra t h e r i t s f u n c t i o n i s to mediate between the suburbs and the developer. That i s , i t f o r c e s the suburbs to n e g o t i a t e - not simply deny o u t r i g h t - a permit a p p l i c a t i o n . H.A.C. compels l o c a l s t a t e s and the communities to a r t i c u l a t e d i s c u r s i v e l y what they want in a development, what they do not want, and why. H.A.C. negates nondecisionmaking i n a very narrow bandwidth of p o l i c y making. I t i s not merely the developer who has recourse to H.A.C. I f the town f e e l s that the developer i s using the comprehensive permit n e f a r i o u s l y to threaten the l o c a l community i n t o approving a v a r i a n c e 1 ^ f o r the development Though i n the bulk of the d e c i s i o n s H.A.C. has rendered over the l a s t two decades, i t has vacated l o c a l d e c i s i o n s f o r not being c o n s i s t e n t with l o c a l needs. Documentation can be found i n : (Guzman,1988; Lacasse & Kane 1987; Korman, 1989). 1 ^ A zoning v a r i a n c e i s granted by the Zoning Board of Appeals i n non 40B land use cases where a development does not conform to e x i s t i n g land use p l a n s . U n l i k e a comprehen-s i v e permit, which tends to be more of a c a r t e blanche f o r deve l o p e r s , the zoning v a r i a n c e o u t l i n e s i n s p e c i f i c d e t a i l the elements of a development which are allowed to vary from the e x i s t i n g p l a n . The approval of a v a r i a n c e by the Z.B.A. does not mean that a l l other necessary permits w i l l be granted. (See Massachusetts General Laws, Chapter 40A 90 s/he r e a l l y wishes to b u i l d - and t h i s has not been uncommon-the town can request the H.A.C. to a f f i r m i t s d e n i a l before the developer appeals. The H.A.C. can be used as a guide and in f o r m a t i o n resource by l o c a l s to ensure that unscrupulous developers do not abuse the p r i v i l e g e s 40B grants them. H.A.C. i s nested i n the Governor's E x e c u t i v e O f f i c e of Communities and Development (E.O.C.D.). As a prominent s t a t e bureaucracy, i n s t i t u t i o n a l l y i t i s not i n t e r e s t e d i n com-p l e t e l y a l i e n a t i n g the towns, who are i t s primary c l i e n t base. I t w i l l recognize l e g i t i m a t e l o c a l concerns, such as h e a l t h and s a f e t y . The p o i n t to be s t r e s s e d i s that these concerns must be l e g i t i m a t e to H.A.C, not merely excuses. H.A.C. f o r c e s l o c a l government to acknowledge the r e l a t i v e s i g n i f i c a n c e of housing to t r a f f i c , water and sewerage c a p a c i t i e s , which have been t r a d i t i o n a l reasons towns oppose c o n s t r u c t i o n 1 1 . F i n a l l y , the law c l e a r l y a l l o w s f o r l o c a l r e p r e s e n t a -t i o n on the H.A.C, and hence al l o w s members of the l o c a l s t a t e to take the i n i t i a t i v e and f i g h t f o r l o c a l autonomy i n d i s p u t e d 40B cases. s u b s e c t i o n 10). 1 1 The s i g n i f i c a n c e of the law's a b i l i t y to put housing on the l o c a l agenda was summarized i n a p e r s u a d i n g l y geo-gr a p h i c f a s h i o n by Housing S p e c i a l i s t Rachel B r a t t i n a recent Boston Globe i n t e r v i e w " I f i t ' s not everyone's r e s p o n s i b i l i t y , whose i s i t ? . . . A s o c i e t y has to take respon-s i b i l i t y f o r i t s c i t i z e n s and the s t a t e can't d i v i d e i t s e l f i n t o areas and say some p l a c e s bear that r e s p o n s i b i l i t y and oth e r s don't." ( C a n e l l o s , 1989 p. 36.) 91 By i d e n t i f y i n g three s i t u a t i o n s which can be met to s a t i s f y the " c o n s i s t e n t with l o c a l needs" c r i t e r i o n , the law's ambivalence to l o c a l autonomy i s s p e c i f i e d . C l e a r l y , f o r suburbs to be immune from an H.A.C. o v e r r i d e they do have to open themselves up; they do have to comply with the s p i r i t of the law. 40B i s f a s c i n a t i n g , however, i n that i t a c t u a l l y p r o v i d e s means by which suburbs can escape from the t a l o n s of the law and yet remain i n compliance with i t . Should one of the three c r i t e r i a be met, comprehensive permit a p p l i c a t i o n s and hearings s t i l l must be d e a l t with, but the town i s f r e e to deny the permit with immunity on any grounds. Chapter 40B, then, i s e s s e n t i a l l y a p a s s i v e law. I t i s only a c t i v a t e d when other f o r c e s s et i t i n motion. I t does not- on i t s own- f o r c e the suburbs to accept s u b s i d i z e d housing; i t does not f o r c e them to r e l i n q u i s h t h e i r autonomy. How then, can t h i s law be r e c o n c i l e d with the t h e o r e t i c a l treatment of l o c a l autonomy? I f e x i s t i n g theory suggests we should examine l o c a l autonomy as those tasks the law says l o c a l communities can and cannot perform, or as how l o c a l -i t i e s are at the u t t e r mercy of t h e i r s t a t e s , how do we e x p l a i n Chapter 40B's " c a r r o t and s t i c k approach"? Seemingly a l l the s t a t e would have to do i s to r e q u i r e by law that suburbs execute the task of s e c u r i n g t h e i r f a i r share of low and moderate income housing, s i n c e c l e a r l y 40B i s a p o l i t i c a l statement about how the s o c i a l and p o l i t i c a l geography of the Commonwealth ought to be. Why does the law not make stronger 92 motions to that ends? The t e x t of the law prevents i t from completely e r a d i c a t i n g l o c a l autonomy. I i n s i s t that the reason f o r t h i s i s because there are elements of l o c a l autonomy a c t u a l l y w i t h i n the law i t s e l f . The law c r e a t e s the i n i t i a t i v e to pla n f o r and be ready f o r a comprehensive permit a p p l i c a t i o n ; i t a l s o p r o v i d e s the p o t e n t i a l f o r communities to achieve immunity from i t , once a modicum of e f f o r t i s made. C e r t a i n l y Massachusetts suburbs are r e q u i r e d by law to open up. But the i s s u e s of how, when, and to whom are l a r g e l y l e f t to l o c a l d i s c r e t i o n . These are immensely powerful q u e s t i o n s . They are not t r i v i a l c o n cessions on the s t a t e ' s p a r t , hence 40B i s not about g r a n t i n g a meaningless l o c a l autonomy as some t h e o r i s t s would expect (Danielson, 1976b; Dear & C l a r k , 1980, 1981; C l a r k & Dear, 1984). The s t r u c t u r e of the law i t s e l f , I have demonstrated i n t h i s s e c t i o n , cannot be understood through c o n v e n t i o n a l p e r s p e c t i v e s on l o c a l autonomy. The t a s k / r i g h t a n a l o g i e s simply do not f i t the s i m u l t a n e i t y of autonomy and h e t e r -onomy. I t i s f a r too s i m p l i s t i c to say that the s t a t e has re s c i n d e d some of the l o c a l ' s power, f o r the p a s s i v i t y of 40B suggests otherwise as w e l l . The b i l l e v i n c e s a d i a l e c t i c a l p a t t e r n of autonomy and heteronomy- a b a t t l e through r e l a -t i o n s of f o r c e by the s t a t e and l o c a l . The law t r a c e s the c i r c u l a t o r y paths of power between s t a t e and l o c a l . I t re p r e s e n t s n e g o t i a t i o n and s i g n i f i c a n t l o c a l r e s i s t a n c e 93 r a t h e r than o p p r e s s i v e s t a t e domination. That i s to say there are t r a c e s of domination and r e s i s t a n c e i n the wording of the b i l l . These f o r c e s were at odds with each other d u r i n g the b i l l ' s d r a f t i n g . 40B's ambivalence suggests that the s t a t e had no easy time of a b a t i n g l o c a l autonomy, and furthermore that the d e f i n i t i o n of s t a t e and l o c a l d u r i n g the d r a f t i n g was not e n t i r e l y s t r a i g h t f o r w a r d e i t h e r . I do not, however, wish to repeat the e r r o r of r e i f i c a -t i o n . I n d i v i d u a l s i n r o l e s that were s i t u a t e d s p a t i a l l y -r e l a t e d to s o c i a l l y , p o l i t i c a l l y , and c u l t u r a l l y c o n s t r u c t e d p l a c e s were the c o n t e s t a n t s d u r i n g the b i l l ' s d r a f t i n g . They produced and reproduced r e i f i e d p l a c e s ( i n t e n t i o n a l l y and u n i n t e n t i o n a l l y ) which they endowed with a c a p a c i t y to a c t . They were d i s c u r s i v e l y a r t i c u l a t i n g the way p l a c e s - as se t s of s o c i a l r e l a t i o n s r e l a t i v e to l o c a t i o n , l o c a l e and senses of p l a c e - not only were, but a l s o the way they were supposed  to be: t r u t h c l a i m s about the way they acted and were supposed to act encoded i n r e l a t i o n s of f o r c e and r e s i s t a n c e . To make matters more complex, the d r a f t e r s were not j u s t concerned with suburban p l a c e s , but the Commonwealth and the n a t i o n . A c i r c u l a t o r y theory of power p o i n t s to the c r i t i c a l means by which p l a c e s were endowed with "power" through v a r i o u s i n t e r s e c t i n g d i s c o u r s e s . I t i s u s e f u l to understand those i n v o l v e d i n the b i l l ' s 94 1 2 d r a f t i n g as authors of a t e x t . These authors are i n -d i v i d u a t i o n s of broader f o r c e s and ideas, as w e l l as agents i n and of themselves (Giddens, 1987b; Fo u c a u l t , 1979; Barthes, 1979). T h e i r s u b j e c t p o s i t i o n as authors p r i v i l e g e and l e g i t i m a t e the t r u t h c l a i m s they seek to make through t h e i r work (F o u c a u l t , 1979). Yet these t e x t u a l t r u t h c l a i m s were c o n t e x t u a l l y mediated and understood by the a u t h o r s . Chapter 40B, then, i s a p a r t of these authors' work and understanding of t h e i r c o n t e x t , but i t i s a l s o the s i g n of a broader t e x t : the t r u t h s about p l a c e s . e. P l a c e Making Through Law Making: Chapter 40B's Genesis In the l a t e 1960s, l i b e r a l s t a t e l e g i s l a t o r s , housing l o b b y i s t s , and academics i n Massachusetts a r r i v e d at the consensus that the s t a t e ' s housing c r i s i s was p r i m a r i l y caused by a lack of supply (Power, 1974). Moreover t h i s d e a r t h of a f f o r d a b l e housing was d i r e c t l y t i e d to the o v e r l y r e s t r i c t i v e zoning o r d i n a n c e s i n towns whose r e s t r i c t i v e p o l i c i e s had been on the r i s e s i n c e the 1950s (Schneider, 1970). Requirements such as a minimum two acre l o t s i z e , p r o h i b i t i o n s on m u l t i - s t o r y b u i l d i n g s or apartments, exces-s i v e f r o n t a g e requirements on p r o p e r t i e s were j u s t some of the ways i n which l o c a l zoning power enabled the e x c l u s i o n of 1 2 In Barthes' (1979) sense of the term: a methodologi-c a l f i e l d e x perienced as i t i s produced i n work. I t subverts o l d e r c l a s s i f i c a t i o n s ; i t i s approached and experienced r e l a t i v e to the s i g n ; i t i s i r r e d u c i b l y , s t e r e o g r a p h i c a l l y p l u r a l ; the te x t i s orphaned from the author; and i t l i n k s the w r i t i n g and d i s s e m i n a t i o n of the work. 95 low income people from suburbia (Downs, 1973; Babcock, 1966; Babcock & Bosselman, 1973; M a s o t t i & Hadden, 1974; Linowes & A l l e n s w o r t h , 1973; Haar & I a t r i d e s , 1974; Windsor & James, 1975; D a v i d o f f & Brooks, 1976; D a n i e l s o n , 1976 a,b; Schneider, 1980; F r i e d e n , 1983; P l o t k i n , 1987). M i r r o r i n g nationwide t r e n d s , there had been an i n c r e a s i n g r a c i a l and c l a s s d i s s i m i l a r i t y between Boston and i t s suburbs by 1969 (Schneider, 1970; Power, 1974). Even before the completion of Route 128, Boston's c i r c u m f e r e n t i a l highway, numerous high-technology s t a r t - u p companies were l o c a t i n g on i t s northeast s t r i p ( E d e l , S c l a r & L u r i a , 1984; Saxenian, 1985). S e r v i c e s e c t o r employment was on the r i s e throughout the r e g i o n , while m i l l s , farming and t r a d i t i o n a l manufacturing i n d u s t r i e s were c l o s i n g down or r e l o c a t i n g south ( P e i r c e , 1976; Saxenian, 1985). Route 128, and l a t e r Route 495 areas experienced booms i n s i n g l e - f a m i l y housing c o n s t r u c t i o n (Saxenian, 1985). Zoning laws through-out Boston's suburbs had become i n c r e a s i n g l y r e s t r i c t i v e s i n c e the 1950s, f a v o u r i n g s i n g l e f a m i l y d w e l l i n g s on l a r g e l o t s of 2 acres or more (Schneider, 1970). Boston's d e t e r -i o r a t i n g inner c i t y neighborhoods became more d i f f i c u l t to ignore i n the face of s u b u r b a n i z a t i o n and urban renewal (Lucas, 1985). P o l i t i c a l l y , the most noted cleavage i n s t a t e p o l i t i c s has been between Yankee e l i t e r e p u b l i c a n s and I r i s h working c l a s s democrats (e.g. Lucas, 1985, Lockhard, 1965; P e i r c e , 96 1976; White, 1983) though L i t t (1965) a l s o s i g n i f i e s the Yeomen [ s i c ] (small town r e p u b l i c a n ) and the Managers (urbane t e c h n i c a l and p r o f e s s i o n a l types l i v i n g i n the Route 128 a r e a ) . The p o l i t i c a l c u l t u r e of the s t a t e has long been h e l d as one of the most l i b e r a l i n the country, the Yankee Brahmins notwithstanding ( P e i r c e , 1976; McGrory, 1988). In 1969 Democrats c o n t r o l l e d both the House and Senate, though the Governor was a moderate r e p u b l i c a n . "The most important f a c t o r , " concludes Schneider, " c o n t r i b u t i n g to the passage of the law was the p o l i t i c a l prudence of i t s a r c h i t e c t s (1970, p. 115)." T h e i r w i l l i n g -ness to compromise- made meaningful by t h e i r understanding of Massachusetts' p o l i t i c a l c o n t e x t - was c r u c i a l to the b i l l ' s s u c cess. There were two p r i n c i p a l a uthors: R e p r e s e n t a t i v e M a r t i n L i n s k y , a l i b e r a l r e p u b l i c a n from the p r o g r e s s i v e inner suburb of B r o o k l i n e ; and Alex Kovel, a young attache from the Massachusetts Law Reform I n s t i t u t e , an a n t i - p o v e r t y agency i n Boston. The two men represented broader s o c i a l f o r c e s and concerns, as w e l l as agents embedded i n the context of Massachusetts s t a t e p o l i t i c s . T h e i r r e c o l l e c t i o n s p r o v i d e i n s i g h t s i n t o how the l o c a l was d e f i n e d through c i r c u l a t o r y , c a p i l l a r y f o r c e r e l a t i o n s . MB: Why wasn't the b i l l s tronger? ML: "There are two answers why the b i l l wasn't s t r o n g e r : 1.) that was j u s t the way we wanted i t . 2.) once i t appeared there was a chance that the law c o u l d get passed and i t came time f o r n e g o t i a t i o n , people who wanted a stronger b i l l c o u l d n ' t get more....There were s e v e r a l [other] reasons why the b i l l wasn't s t r o n g e r . F i r s t , the q u e s t i o n of should or 97 shouldn't the b i l l be stronger has to do with the assumption of what a good law i s . If you were f o r screwing the suburbs, then i t wasn't a strong law. I t depends on your p e r s p e c t i v e . Those of us who were most s e r i o u s l y i n v o l v e d with the law had the idea of ' p u t t i n g the suburbs on n o t i c e or the s t a t e would take more d r a s t i c a c t i o n . . . " MB: But there was the sense that t h i s was a b i g deal? ML: " I t was a b i g d e a l because i t was symbolic, not because i t would change the suburbs. The r h e t o r i c of the o p p o s i t i o n was based on symbolic s i g n i f i c a n c e of [40B's a t t a c k on l o c a l autonomy]...It was a camel under the t e n t . Some l i n e got c r o s s e d and t h a t ' s what got people's emotions engaged." ML: "Those o r i g i n a l l y i n v o l v e d f e l t t h i s was not to be the u l t i m a t e s a n c t i o n ; i t was a s i g n a l t h at the c l o c k was running. [There were two reasons f o r the way the b i l l was s t r u c t u r e d ] : a.) I had a l o t of experience d u r i n g t h i s p e r i o d i n f e d e r a l and s t a t e l e g i s l a t u r e s i n w r i t i n g much more draconian s a n c t i o n s and then when the crunch came they never d i d a nything too draconian; b.) f o r me the use of zoning as a socioeconomic r e s t r i c t i v e d e v i c e stuck i n our craws [ s i c ] . So zoning was not an unappealing way to go about i t . I f e l t q u i t e good about t h a t . I was i t as having a l i m i t e d , symbolic, prodding purpose. I never though i t would do the job a l o n e . . . . " ML: "We never suspected that there was gonna be tons of [40B] housing. More expected people i n suburbs who wanted to b u i l d low and moderate income housing would now have a t h r e a t or a t o o l . [40B] would make the d i f f e r e n c e at the margins." ( L i n s k y , 1989) Compare these statements to Kovel's assessment of the law's d r a f t i n g : MB: Could you t e l l me about the committee that d r a f t e d the b i l l ? AK: "The atmosphere was one of r a c i a l r e c t i f i c a t i o n . A major push f o r the b i l l was the s e g r e g a t i o n issue....The suburbs seemed l i l y white to us....I had no experience with t h i s d r a f t i n g a law. I was twenty-eight years o l d , f r e s h out of law s c h o o l . Roughly what happened was three or four people sat i n a room. I wrote most of i t . . . " MB: "Was there a s e n s i t i v i t y to l o c a l concerns? AK: "There was somewhat of a s e n s i t i v i t y to l o c a l concerns. 98 There was a sense of...we took a census t r a c t and t r i e d to get a hig h number [of u n i t s to come up with the 10% c r i -t e r i a ] . I t was somewhat of an attempt to be f a i r . There was a reward f o r e f f o r t . There was that [ s t i p u l a t i o n about] not too much [ c o n s t r u c t i o n ] i n one year. We purposely made [the c o n d i t i o n s ] very high so that i t would keep going. I t wasn't [ s a r c a s t i c a l l y ] 'Oh, those poor suburbs, l e t s get em.' Quite the c o n t r a r y . We had t h i s idea that t h i s was good f o r them. They were too t i m i d about the c i t i e s . And so we benighted o u r s e l v e s through the snob zoning b i l l . " MB: "What about the e f f e c t s of 40B i n suburbia?" AK: " B a s i c a l l y , the a t t i t u d e was fuck 'em. How much housing c o u l d we get out there...Today, they're more s o p h i s t i c a t e d with t h e i r zoning laws. They're smarter and they a ct b e t t e r . But back then, y'see that was the problem. I t was l i k e , 'Who are these a s s h o l e s ? ' Why i s so much c o n t r o l d e l e g a t e d to these schlepps? That's the bi g g e s t cop out i n Massachusetts p o l i t i c s - t h a t there's so much c o n t r o l at the l o c a l l e v e l . " MB: "So how d i d you see the r o l e of the l o c a l boards?" AK: "The problem was some types of housing that ought to be excluded wouldn't be. Towns should not l o s e c o n t r o l no matter what type of housing i t i s - l i k e design problems, and s e p t i c systems.... But nobody l i k e d the suburbs. They had t h i s smug a t t i t u d e . No one thought there was p o l i t i c a l merit i n keeping l o c a l c o n t r o l [over zoning f o r h o u s i n g ] . It wasn't l i k e the school committee. I do remember arguing over how much l o c a l c o n t r o l there ought to be. There r e a l l y were l e g i t i m a t e reasons to t u r n [developers] down. But once you acknowledged t h a t , i t sent you down a s l i p p e r y s l o p e . How do you set up a process that d e a l s with [these i s s u e s ] ? " (Kovel, 1989) L i n s k y and Kovel i n d i v i d u a l l y and together seem to represent a c o a l i t i o n of opposing f o r c e s u n i t e d to pass the law. Li n s k y was a l i b e r a l suburban r e p u b l i c a n s t r e s s i n g the normative v i s i o n of law and the c o n s t i t u t i v e dimension of p o l i t i c s . He wanted to "put the suburbs on n o t i c e " with the law; he was a l s o t r y i n g to r e a r t i c u l a t e day to day p o l i t i c s 99 1 3 with the American regime . Kovel, c o n v e r s e l y , underscored the i n s t r u m e n t a l f o r c e of law and the means/ends economic r a t i o n a l i t y of p o l i t i c s ( E l k i n , 1985). For him, 40B was meant to r e c t i f y the i n e q u a l i t y between c i t y and suburb. He was i n t e r e s t e d i n who got what, when, where and why. In p l a c e s , h i s comments emphasize r e t r i b u t i o n f o r what the suburbs had and why. His p o l i t i c s were p a s s i o n a t e as he seems to have embodied the "do something" f e e l i n g of p o l i t i -c a l a c t i o n p r e v a l e n t i n the 1960s. For Kovel, 40B was not j u s t a warning as L i n s k y would have i t . More to the p o i n t , both men r e i f y p l a c e s through t h e i r p o l i t i c a l d i s c o u r s e s . N o t i c e that n e i t h e r s i n g l e s out the l o c a l s t a t e . T h e i r tones are much more g e n e r a l . I t was not j u s t that the p a i r had a problem with the d u t i e s , a c t i v i t i e s , or spending p r a c t i c e s of l o c a l government, they took issue with the way suburbs were, v i s - a - v i s the c i t i e s : the m o b i l i -z a t i o n of b i a s f a v o u r i n g suburban autonomy, the suburban s u b c u l t u r e , and the broader acceptance through American s o c i e t y of both. L i n s k y and Kovel a n t i c i p a t e d a r e a c t i o n from the suburbs, not j u s t t h e i r governments. L i n s k y wanted the suburbs to take a h i n t , to l a y the groundwork f o r subur-b a n i t e s themselves to change t h e i r p l a c e s . Kovel spoke a g g r e s s i v e l y of the law that would change the way suburbs 1 3 In E l k i n ' s (1987, p. 110) sense of the term: "the d e s i r e d p o l i t i c a l way of l i f e " of a s o c i e t y . 1 00 " a c t " - to c h a l l e n g e t h e i r "smug a t t i t u d e . " L i n s k y and Kovel both a c t i v a t e d and embodied the suburbs with "power" i n the c o n v e n t i o n a l sense of the term through the way they c i r -cumscribed and d e f i n e d those p l a c e s . T h e i r a c t i o n s p o i n t up t h e i r j u n c t u r e s i n a network of broader f o r c e s that construe suburbia as such. I n t e r e s t i n g l y , L i n s k y and Kovel were seeking to r e d e f i n e the l o c a l , but " r e d e f i n i n g " presumes a d e f i n i t i o n a l r e a d y e x i s t s . T h e i r t r u t h was s a t u r a t e d by a r a t h e r s t e r e o t y p i c a l image: the myth of subu r b i a . T h i s does not mean that such p l a c e s d i d n ' t e x i s t i n Massachusetts, c l e a r l y they d i d . But the p a i r were drawing on " i n v a l i d " t r u t h c l a i m s about the way suburbia was and the way i t ought to be. They might have been t h i n k i n g of a f f l u e n t suburbs l i k e L i n c o l n or Weston, but the b i l l would a f f e c t working c l a s s suburbs l i k e Dracut, Lynn and Revere as w e l l (see Chapter F i v e ) . T h e i r l o c a l p l a c e s - as r e i f i c a t i o n s - were s o c i a l c o n s t r u c t i o n s t r u t h f u l l y f u e l i n g t h e i r r h e t o r i c . I would argue as w e l l that i t was not merely the l o c a l which the p a i r was c o n c e p t u a l i z i n g . Both understood 40B i n a broader context of n a t i o n a l and s t a t e p l a c e making. I t was 1969, the a i r of r a c i a l r e c t i f i c a t i o n was strong i n l i g h t of the recent a s s a s s i n a t i o n of Ma r t i n Luther King. The Douglas Commission (1968) warned that the n a t i o n - as a p l a c e - was becoming two d i s t i n c t s o c i e t i e s : one white and one b l a c k . Urban-suburban d i s p a r i t i e s played a v i s i b l e r o l e i n s p l i t t i n g 101 the country apart i t argued. L i n s k y himself f o r i n s t a n c e , notes that zoning had become a moderate n a t i o n a l i s s u e by 1969, and t h i s was one reason f o r the b i l l ' s admonishment to s u b u r b i a . As p a r t of the s t a t e - l e v e l p l a c e making, 40B has been seen as a component of the l i b e r a l l e g i s l a t i o n i n the Commonwealth. I t i s grouped with the famous R a c i a l Imbalance Law, a b i l l r e f u s i n g to send Massachusetts men to Vietnam, s t r i c t gun c o n t r o l and consumer-protection laws, and the c r e a t i o n of a f i n a n c i n g agency f o r low and moderate income housing p r o d u c t i o n by p r i v a t e developers ( P e i r c e , 1976). Witness Kovel's d i s t a s t e over l o c a l autonomy as a "cop out" i n Massachusetts p o l i t i c s . His argument c e r t a i n l y confirms C l a r k and Dear's s t a t e apparatus argument, but more impor-t a n t l y i t suggests Kovel's a c t i o n s sought to r e d e f i n e the way i n which " l o c a l " and " s t a t e " mutually d e f i n e d each o t h e r . For both men, there was a problem with the way the r e l a t i o n suppressed the s t a t e ' s r e s p o n s i b i l i t y towards the l o c a l . 40B was not j u s t an e x p r e s s i o n of a p a r t i c u l a r p o l i t i -c a l philosophy, or a c o r r e c t i v e f o r the s t a t e apparatus nor was i t a d i r e c t and simple e x p r e s s i o n of the Commonwealth's p o l i t i c a l c u l t u r e . I t was a nexus of r a t h e r strong expres-s i o n s about the way s o c i e t y : n a t i o n a l , s t a t e , and l o c a l both i s and ought to be. More p r e c i s e l y , 40B made a statement about how l o c a l i t i e s should act with respect to low income people and m i n o r i t i e s such that they, the s t a t e s and the 1 02 na t i o n would be b e t t e r p l a c e s i n the f u t u r e : they would aim toward the American regime. Suburban opponents to the Anti-Snob Zoning B i l l a l s o r e i f i e d p l a c e s through t h e i r t r u t h c l a i m s about the way th i n g s r e a l l y were v i a the Boston papers: " . . . i t i s a b a s i c r i g h t of each community to determine the q u a l i t y of i t s own environment. I t i s much more important to maintain that r i g h t than i t i s to f u l f i l l a r b i t r a r y per-centages and quotas. The c i t i e s may indeed be s i c k , but there i s no cure i n i n j e c t i n g the surrounding c o u n t r y s i d e . " Peck, 1969, p. 32) " . . . i t i s only these towns [with s t r i n g e n t zoning] that have been w i l l i n g and able to tax themselves h e a v i l y to buy great t r a c t s of land f o r conservation-most of i t open to everyone. Even now i t i s d i f f i c u l t to muster the r a t e to do t h i s . Can these towns continue to i n c r e a s e open space or even keep what they have ( t h e i r unique c o n t r i b u t i o n to m e t r o p o l i t a n Boston) i f they must a l s o pay f o r s e r v i c e s given to those who cannot c a r r y t h e i r f u l l share of town expenses. " C e r t a i n l y , people of low and moderate income cannot a f f o r d to l i v e i n these ' a f f l u e n t , e l e g a n t , f a s t i d i o u s ' suburbs (Herald T r a v e l e r e d i t o r i a l ) but n e i t h e r can they l i v e on p a r t s of Beacon H i l l , Commonwealth Avenue and Memorial Dr i v e where there i s no 'snob zoning'." (Anderson, 1969) "I cannot understand why any s t a t e l e g i s l a t u r e should now pass laws which c o u l d f o r c e me to gi v e up a l i f e t i m e ac-complishment and move to a l e s s d e s i r a b l e community i n order to make way f o r people who have not expended the e f f o r t and made the s a c r i f i c e s to 'make i t ' on t h e i r own. T h i s i s c o n t r a r y t o a l l the p r i n c i p l e s on which our country was founded." (Hobkirk, 1969) "How i s suburbia going to supply u n s k i l l e d or s e m i - s k i l l e d ghetto migrants with jobs? The inner c i t y w i l l not be o f f the hook. How about a l l those people, even more encouraged, moving from the r u r a l and southern areas?" ( C o l l e t t e , 1969) Each of these p o s i t i o n s r e a f f i r m s many of the t r u t h c l a i m s about suburbia L i n s k y and Kovel were s t a k i n g . A l l s t r e s s e d the d i f f e r e n c e and the l o g i c of the c a t e g o r i e s " c i t y " and "suburb", with only one c h a l l e n g i n g t h e i r v a l i d -103 i t y . The process of placemaking i s an i n t e r a c t i v e one. L o c a t i o n , l o c a l e and sense of p l a c e are a l l s i g n i f i c a n t , but t h e i r s i g n i f i c a n c e l i e s p r e c i s e l y i n the way they are a l l made meaningful and c o n t e s t a b l e i n a context. An a f f l u e n t Boston suburb with no employment o p p o r t u n i t i e s may or may not be the best p l a c e f o r a low income person, but a l l agreed that the community had- to date- the a b i l i t y to decide whether or not that kind of person c o u l d l i v e t h e r e . Both L i n s k y and h i s opponents reco g n i z e d the r e a l i t y of that i n v i o l a t e l i n e . A l l agreed that the network of f o r c e r e l a t i o n s t h at allowed t h i s c a p a c i t y were numerous and mult i f a c e t e d - but the paramount i s s u e to a l l p a r t i e s was: what would these suburbs be l i k e a f t e r 40B? How would the b i l l a l t e r (the s o c i a l r e l a t i o n s c o n s t i t u t i n g ) these p l a c e s ? I t would b e t t e r a r t i c u l a t e them with the American regime, and i f the suburbs were as v i r t u o u s as r h e t o r i c had claimed, i t would a f f e c t them very l i t t l e . As L i n s k y and f e l l o w State R e p r e s e n t a t i v e Maurice Frye J r . r e p l i e d to t h e i r c r i t i c s i n the p r e s s : " T h i s i s a f a i r b i l l . I t a c t u a l l y s t r i k e s a blow i n favor of towns c o n t i n u i n g to have b a s i c c o n t r o l over t h e i r own d e s t i n i e s through zoning and a g a i n s t the more d r a s t i c s o l u t i o n s to the housing problems which have been adopted i n such s t a t e s as New York and Hawaii." (Linsky & Frye, 1969) The r e l a t i o n between " l o c a l autonomy" and 40B then was mutually r e i n f o r c i n g , i r o n i c a l l y . T h i s p o i n t e x p l a i n s why, at one l e v e l , the b i l l was not s t r o n g e r . R e c a l l L i n s k y ' s e a r l i e r comments reg a r d i n g both h i s motive f o r d r a f t i n g the 104 b i l l and the l e g i s l a t i v e c o ntext. As a suburban l e g i s l a t o r h i m s e l f , L i n s k y was only out to warn the suburbs, not to punish them. Lins k y was not out to negate l o c a l autonomy. He, i n f a c t , h e l d that he respected the n o t i o n that "govern-ment that governs c l o s e s t governs b e s t " moreso than those l e g i s l a t o r s who used l o c a l autonomy r h e t o r i c a l l y : ML: " I f you look o b j e c t i v e l y at the law: i s there anything that i t takes away? Yes. Now, whether i t takes away anything t h a t ' s powerful or important i s s u b j e c t to a n a l y s i s . At the time, there was a sense that i t was a b i g d e a l . Zoning had taken on a s p e c i a l p l a c e . I t was d i f f e r e n t than even c o l l e c t i v e b a r g a i n i n g . And we had a s p e c i a l c a s t of people [ d r a f t i n g the b i l l ] : people who cared about l o c a l autonomy....Those of us most i n v o l v e d f e l t that we had c r o s s e d i n t o a h e r e t o f o r e i n v i o l a t e line...We a p p r e c i a t e d the s i g n i f i c a n c e of breaching the zoning l i n e . That wasn't u n i n t e n t i o n a l , t h o u g h t l e s s c h o i c e . I t was d e l i b e r a t e . Driven by the o r i g i n a l b i l l s f i l e d , but a l s o a sense of purpose... Zoning had been abused." Zoning i s i n t r i n s i c a l l y r e l a t e d to the l o c a l autonomy of s u b u r b i a - p o l i t i c a l l y and c u l t u r a l l y . L i n s k y underscores t h i s as he grapples with i s s u e s of p o l i t i c a l and s o c i a l t h e o r y : how to p l a c e a check and balance on an abused p r i v i l e g e and how to p r o v i d e a means by which the unequal s o c i a l geography of the American m e t r o p o l i s c o u l d be changed while l o c a l autonomy was preserved. To L i n s k y , l o c a l autonomy too o f t e n meant the r h e t o r i -c a l value a s c r i b e d by C l a r k (1985): "In my experience and o b s e r v a t i o n s , l o c a l autonomy i s a s u b s i d i a r y argument that i s wheeled out i n response to some other s e r v i c e . I t i s not on the short l i s t of p r i n c i p l e s . " Elsewhere he s t a t e s more b l u n t l y , "People resent the r i g h t e o u s argument f o r l o c a l c o n t r o l when they t h i n k i t ' s a 105 cover f o r racism, c l a s s i s m or something e l s e . " ( C a n e l l o s 1989). R e c a l l i n g l o c a l autonomy's s i g n i f i c a n c e i n the l e g i s l a -t i v e debate over 40B, L i n s k y remarks: " L o c a l autonomy was a very b i g i s s u e , but i t wasn't a m a j o r i t y i s s u e . I t was s a l i e n t to a l a r g e m i n o r i t y . I t was lower on the l i s t than race. I f I had to take a rough guesstimate, I would say that f o r about 1/3 [of the l e g i s -l a t o r s ] i t made a d i f f e r e n c e , i t made the short l i s t . And about 1/6 i t made the long l i s t . But everyone says they're f o r home r u l e . I t wasn't a m a j o r i t y [motive]. I t was a surrogate f o r something e l s e . L i k e I s a i d , f o r 1/3 l o c a l autonomy was a g u i d i n g p r i n c i p l e . In and of i t s e l f [however] i t doesn't have any s a l i e n c y . I t ' s a res p e c t e d v a l u e . I t ' s the 97th value out of 100...People r h e t o r i c a l l y d e f e r to l o c a l autonomy but whenever you h i t the crunch p o i n t , i t doesn't have any weight." L a t e r , L i n s k y acknowledges the s i g n i f i c a n c e of t h i s v a l u e : "But I don't devalue or d i s m i s s the s t r e n g t h of f e e l i n g those people who thought something awful had happened. Not that the suburbs would be inundated with [low and moderate income housing], but that the l e g i s l a t u r e had v i o l a t e d t h i s impor-tant value and i f i t c o u l d do i t here, where would i t stop? [ T h e i r concerns] had nothing to do with housing." Kovel a l s o respected the value of l o c a l autonomy. He p r a g m a t i c a l l y understood the need f o r and s i g n i f i c a n c e of l o c a l autonomy: "We ought to be proud of the j u d i c i o u s n e s s of r e s t r a i n t [we e x e r c i s e d i n d r a f t i n g the law]. I t was not a mindless o v e r r i d e of l o c a l autonomy." Des p i t e the f a c t that he d i s a g r e e d with the j u s t i f i c a t i o n s f o r l o c a l autonomy, he reco g n i z e d i t s e x i s t e n c e w i t h i n the p o l i t i c a l c u l t u r e of the s t a t e and i n t u r n , the c o n t e x t u a l m a n i f e s t a t i o n of the law: "Remember what the s t a t e l e g i s l a t u r e i s c a l l e d : The Great and General Court of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts. I t i s the source of a l l power. I t comes from a n o t i o n of sov-e r e i g n t y that dates back to the seventeenth c e n t u r y . Towns are i r r e l e v a n t u p s t a r t s . And i t i s the great s i n of the 106 l e g i s l a t u r e - i t ' s cowardly the way the s t a t e kowtows to the towns. There's a l o s s of c o n f i d e n c e and a l o s s of argument. I t ' s a copout." MB: "Would you say l o c a l autonomy e x i s t s v i s - a - v i s Chapter 40B?" AK: "Yes, l o c a l autonomy e x i s t s . Because remember how development goes. The developer s t i l l has to go to the town. And no one wants t r o u b l e with the town. Although i t may look l i k e the town i s o v e r r i d d e n , the t r u t h i s that the developer has a l r e a d y t a i l o r e d h i s [ s i c ] p l a n as c l o s e to l o c a l zoning as p o s s i b l e . No developer ignores l o c a l zoning. I t ' s hard to assemble such p a r c e l s . [The p r o v i s i o n o f ] s e r v i c e s i s an i s s u e . People by and l a r g e want to a v o i d problems... People t r y not to buy t r o u b l e f o r themselves. Market p r e s s u r e s are a g a i n s t s e n s e l e s s o v e r r i d e s [from a developer's perspec-t i v e ] . " H erein again, we can see how networks of f o r c e r e l a -t i o n s d e f i n e and r e d e f i n e the l o c a l such that i t i s p a r t i a l l y autonomous. The l o c a l i s something that i s c h e r i s h e d c u l t u r a l l y and p o l i t i c a l l y . I t can be used as an excuse to "cop out", or a convenient cover f o r u l t e r i o r motives, n e v e r t h e l e s s i t i s s a l i e n t enough to argue a p o i n t with some degree of l e g i t i m a c y . Both L i n k s y and Kovel as authors reproduce t h i s l e g i t i m a c y themselves as the deny o t h e r s ' s l e g i t i m a t e adoption of i t s value dimension. I t was the abuse of c o n t r o l t hat p erturbed the two- not n e c e s s a r i l y l o c a l c o n t r o l i t s e l f . Even Kovel admitted there was a purview f o r l o c a l land-use decisionmaking. But as a c u l t u r a l v a l u e , l o c a l autonomy was not r e d u c i b l e to s o l i p s i s m . I t had been i n s t i t u t i o n a l i z e d h i s t o r i c a l l y : through the town meeting, and an o v e r r e p r e s e n -t a t i o n i n the House and Senate ( P e i r c e , 1976). I t had a m a t e r i a l e x p r e s s i o n i n the c u l t u r a l geography of the s t a t e . 1 07 Zoning, as L i n s k y emphasized, was i n v i o l a t e . 40B was the f i r s t s u c c e s s f u l c h a l l e n g e to suburban autonomy i n the s t a t e . Suburbs then as they were made and remade by those who l i v e d t h ere and those who d i d not, was i n s t i t u t i o n a l i z e d as auton-omous. The way i n which the law was (Linsky) or had to be (Kovel) d r a f t e d to pass a f f i r m s t h i s i n s t i t u t i o n a l i z a t i o n of the value of l o c a l autonomy. The process of p l a c e making can a l s o be teased out of the l e g i s l a t i v e t r a j e c t o r y of the b i l l . The b i l l was c o n t r o v e r s i a l enough that i t c o u l d not have come out of committee too strong before i t went to the House f l o o r f o r debate. I t had to be p a l a t a b l e enough so that the "do good l i b e r a l s from the 'burbs" (as Kovel c a l l e d them) c o u l d support i t . The b i l l s t i l l had to be p o l i t i c a l l y f e a s i b l e , d e s p i t e the urban-democratic nature of the General Court. Indeed, d u r i n g the debate s e v e r a l attempts were made at f a s t e n i n g h o s t i l e c l a u s e s to the b i l l (Schneider, 1970). In Massachusetts, the House Speaker and Senate P r e s i d e n t s can s i n g l e h a n d e d l y decide the f a t e of a b i l l . In 1969, both l e a d e r s were urban democrats. With some adept p o l i t i c a l manoeuvering, they were able to move the b i l l out of com-mitte e and across the House and Senate f l o o r s without s e r i o u s l y j e o p a r d i z i n g i t s import. They were f u r t h e r a b l e to whip enough suburban democrats i n t o p a r t y l i n e to secure the b i l l ' s passage. A major motive f o r support was urban l e g i s l a t o r ' s 108 r e t a l i a t i o n a g a i n s t the strong suburban i n i t i a t i v e that passed the 1965 R a c i a l Imbalance law. That law f o r c e d p r i m a r i l y urban school d i s t r i c t s to desegregate i n t e r n a l l y -without fe e d i n g m i n o r i t y students i n t o the suburbs (Lucas, 1985; Levy, 1971). Many l i b e r a l suburban l e g i s l a t o r s were awkwardly pressured i n t o s u p p o r t i n g 40B l e s t they seem janus-faced. As Senate P r e s i d e n t Maurice Donahue (from the c i t y of Holyoke) put i t , "I got a s o r t of savage p l e a s u r e out of [ i t ' s ] passage," (Power, 1974, p. 112). The governor i n 1969 was F r a n c i s Seargent, a moderate r e p u b l i c a n from the a f f l u e n t suburb of Dover. Though otherwise l i k e l y to veto such a b i l l , he signed i t i n order to gain support i n urban areas f o r an upcoming g u b e r n a t o r i a l race a g a i n s t Senate P r e s i d e n t Donahue or Boston Mayor Kevin White. He was a l s o pressed i n t o making the b i l l law by an a g g r e s s i v e a i d e ; and a r e p u b l i c a n supporter reminded him, "You're the Governor of Massachusetts, not Dover!" (Sch-n e i d e r , 1970, p. 88.). Seargent d i d , of course, s i g n the b i l l . N e v e r t h e l e s s , we can see how suburban f o r c e s were r e -presented through the l e g i s l a t i v e and e x e c u t i v e branches of the s t a t e . The l o c a l was "always a l r e a d y " i n the s t a t e . T h i s l e g i s l a t i v e process can a l s o be c o n s i d e r e d from a p l a c e p e r s p e c t i v e . The e n t i r e debate was c h a r a c t e r i z e d as an urban versus suburban i s s u e i n the context of who would be most a f f e c t e d by 40B, much l i k e the debate over the R a c i a l Imbalance Law. These debates focused on the l i n k s between 109 the r e - p r e s e n t a t i o n of ideology and p a r t y l i n e and the r e -p r e s e n t a t i o n of the l o c a l c o n s t i t u e n c y . In the context of 40B, suburban l i b e r a l s had to admit that what was good f o r the c i t i e s had to be good f o r the suburbs as w e l l through t h e i r p l a c e making. They had to r e c o g n i z e that the atmo-sphere of "do something" p o l i t i c s of the era n a t i o n a l l y t r a n s l a t e d i n t o how they c o u l d a f f e c t the c o n s t i t u t i o n of t h e i r own l o c a l i t i e s . L o c a l placemaking d i d a f f e c t n a t i o n a l placemaking. For urban l e g i s l a t o r s , i t was an a t t a c k on the way suburbs were, and the way c i t i e s were as a r e s u l t of s u b u r b i a . The governor had to re-present the i n t e r e s t s of the Commonwealth, not j u s t a s i n g l e p l a c e or s e l e c t group of i n t e r e s t . f . Summary and Comments D i s p e l l i n g c o n v e n t i o n a l t h e o r i e s of l o c a l autonomy, I have e m p i r i c a l l y set out to i n v e s t i g a t e the i s s u e with an eye on the way i n which a u t h o r i n g and l e g i s l a t i n g a law makes and remakes p l a c e s . Three p o i n t s are made. F i r s t , the authors of the Massachusetts A n t i Snob Zoning Law were at a nexus of broader f o r c e r e l a t i o n s i n s o c i e t y . Thus a r e l a t i o n a l view of power d i s p e l l e d the academic c a t e g o r i z a t i o n of urban and suburban while i t e x p l a i n e d the m a n i f e s t a t i o n of those c a t e g o r i e s t e x t u a l l y and through d i s c o u r s e . Yet the authors were a l s o knowledgeable agents i n a geographic c o n t e x t . They were s t r u c t u r a t i n g p o l i t i c a l and c u l t u r a l d i s c o u r s e s . 40B r e p r e s e n t s a d i s c u r s i v e medium between those broader f o r c e s 1 1 0 and t h e i r l o c a l m a n i f e s t a t i o n s . Second, the law demonstrates the presence of not only s t a t e domination, but a l s o l o c a l r e s i s t a n c e . Again, a more s u b t l e theory of power can e x p l a i n t h i s d i a l e c t i c i n power. These f o r c e s were r e l a t e d to one another i n t h i s b i l l as i t was a s i t e of t h e i r c o n t e s t . They mutually d e f i n e d each other and the l i n e s of debate as they drew upon and repro-duced c o n c e p t u a l i z a t i o n s of p l a c e s . Theories of l o c a l autonomy that s t r e s s power as a task, r i g h t or duty, or those that reduce power to f i n a n c e or those that emphasize the l e g a l c o n s t r a i n t s on autonomy suppress and negate the fun-damental way i n which r e s i s t a n c e p l a y s a p a r t i n what otherwise would be c a l l e d " s t a t e domination" of the l o c a l . T h i r d , I teased out the place-making dimensions of those f o r c e r e l a t i o n s i m p l i c a t e d i n the b i l l ' s d r a f t i n g and passage. L e g i s l a t o r s not only make law, they make p l a c e s as they re-present them. Place s were o b j e c t i f i e d as they were d i s t a n c e d from agents and i n s t i t u t i o n s ; they became r e i f i c a -t i o n s . Kovel, f o r i n s t a n c e , r e c r e a t e s the c o n v e n t i o n a l theory of so v e r e i g n t y problematized by Fo u c a u l t , as he him s e l f r e a c t s a g a i n s t i t i n Massachusetts p o l i t i c s . Places were c o n s t r u c t e d c u l t u r a l l y with l o c a l knowledge and s t e r e o -types, p o l i t i c a l p hilosophy and pa s s i o n a t e r h e t o r i c . A v a r i e t y of resources were employed i n t h e i r c o n s t r u c t i o n . They were anthropomorphized with p e r s o n a l i t i e s . They were t h i n g s made "powerful". Moreover, the process was an 111 i n t e r a c t i v e one, based on the r e l a t i o n between power and knowledge/truth. Understanding how " l o c a l " i s d e f i n e d such that i t i s or i s not powerful through a c i r c u l a t o r y theory of power pr o v i d e s a much more complex p o r t r a y a l of l o c a l autonomy than p r e v i o u s authors have mustered. E m p i r i c a l l y , the Mas-sa c h u s e t t s context of l o c a l autonomy i s not as c a t e g o r i c a l l y heteronomous as others have suggested, i f a more nuanced theory of p l a c e and power i s used. The way i n which p l a c e and power are webbed as 40B i s a c t i v e l y produced i n everyday l i f e w i l l be d i s c u s s e d next. 1 1 2 CHAPTER FIVE LOCAL AUTONOMY: SUBURBAN EXPERIENCE AS PLACE MAKING a. P l a c e Making Through S t a t e - L o c a l R e l a t i o n s Chapter Four r e l a t e d the way i n which law making through l e g i s l a t i o n and r e p r e s e n t a t i o n was a component of the place-making p r o c e s s . In t h i s c h a p t e r , I continue to develop the c a t e g o r i e s " l o c a l " and "autonomy" by c o n c e n t r a t i n g on how p l a c e s are c o n s t i t u t e d through p o l i t i c a l d i s c o u r s e so as to d e f i n e t h e i r "powerfulness" or "powerlessness". P l a c e s are made autonomous and heteronomous as they are r e i f i e d and d i s t a n c e d from the agents and i n s t i t u t i o n s d e f i n i n g them. T h i s chapter examines that p r o c e s s w i t h i n the context of everyday s t a t e - l o c a l r e l a t i o n s r e g a r d i n g the A n t i Snob Zoning Law s p e c i f i c a l l y , and Massachusetts housing p o l i c y g e n e r a l l y . Four suburbs' e x p e r i e n c e with the s t a t e and i t s a f f o r d a b l e housing p o l i c y d u r i n g the mid 1980s are d i s c u s s e d . The aim i s to focus on the mutual d e f i n i t i o n process between these r e i f i e d " p l a c e s " as t h e i r agents and i n s t i t u t i o n s i n t e r a c t i n a p o l i t i c a l and c u l t u r a l context v i s - a - v i s l o c a l autonomy. These f o r c e s r e l a t e l o c a l autonomy to t r u t h as s o c i a l r e l a t i o n s through the p l a c e making process r e i n f o r c e or c o n t r a d i c t one a n o t h e r 1 . 1 In a d d i t i o n , a more modest c o n t r i b u t i o n of t h i s c hapter i s to o f f e r case-study data on 40B to what has been an c o n s i s t e n t l y state-wide treatment of the law ( c f . Haar and I a t r i d e s , 1974). 1 13 b. Method Nine suburbs and v a r i o u s agencies were i n v e s t i g a t e d . The p l a c e s and agencies were chosen, f o l l o w i n g the l o g i c of t h e o r e t i c a l sampling, f o r t h e i r p o t e n t i a l to e x p l a i n s i g -n i f i c a n t dimensions of l o c a l autonomy (Glaser & S t r a u s s , 1967). A recent r e t r o s p e c t i v e on 40B i n the Boston Globe ( C a n e l l o s , 1989), along with data on the amount of low and moderate income housing i n each town (E.O.C.D., 1985) were used to develop the sampling frame of p o t e n t i a l l y i n t e r e s t i n g suburbs (see below). The goal was to sample the widest p o s s i b l e v a r i e t y of Greater Boston suburbs to cover the range of p o l i c y v a r i a t i o n h i n t e d at by the data and news coverage. The nine suburbs sampled were: B e v e r l y , C a r l i s l e , Concord, Dracut, Hanson, L i n c o l n , Needham, S c i t u a t e , and Weston (see f igure one). In t h i s chapter I only d i s c u s s accounts taken from Dracut, Hanson, L i n c o l n and Weston because of space l i m i t a -t i o n s . They represent the d i v e r s i t y of experience with 40B, and t h e i r data encompass much of the d i s c u s s i o n s from the other towns. Weston was chosen because of i t s a l l e g e d obstinance towards a f f o r d a b l e housing p r o d u c t i o n . I t c a r r i e d a s t e r e o t y p i c a l a f f l u e n t "snobtown" image through the s t a t e ( C a n e l l o s , 1989; Korman, 1989). L i n c o l n was touted as the a g g r e s s i v e l i b e r a l yet a f f l u e n t suburb that i s e a g e r l y meeting i t s 10% quota, but i n i t s own way (Graham, l989;Kor-man, 1989; C a n e l l o s , 1989). Hanson was s a i d to a l s o be 1 14 a c t i v e i n producing a f f o r d a b l e housing, but i t has a more working - c l a s s image. F i n a l l y Dracut r e p r e s e n t s those towns which have been deluged with comprehensive permit a p p l i c a -t i o n s ( C a n e l l o s , 1989). L i k e Hanson, i t i s a working-class a r e a . L e t t e r s r e q u e s t i n g an i n t e r v i e w were sent to each town's Zoning Board of Appeals. Because that board meets i n f r e q u e n t l y and o f t e n has no s e c r e t a r y , my requests were forwarded to d i f f e r e n t departments a c r o s s the town h a l l s . Consequently I spoke with an assortment of suburban bureau-c r a t s and e l e c t e d o f f i c i a l s . T h i s d i v e r s i t y has b e n e f i t e d category development, as d i f f e r e n t p e r s p e c t i v e s were tapped, e n s u r i n g a more s o p h i s t i c a t e d understanding of l o c a l autonomy (see l i s t of i n t e r v i e w s i n the b i b l i o g r a p h y ) . Developers, lawyers, housing l o b b y i s t s and c o n s u l t a n t s were a l s o i n t e r -viewed along with s t a t e l e g i s l a t o r s and bureaucrats to achieve a complete and accurate understanding of l o c a l autonomy i n Massachusetts. The t h e o r e t i c a l p o i n t I would s t r e s s i s that each of these i n d i v i d u a l s i s a r e p r e s e n t a t i v e of a p l a c e . In t h e i r d i s c u s s i o n s they re-present i t as a cogent whole. They i n h a b i t d i f f e r e n t r o l e s through s t a t e and l o c a l governments and the p o l i t y i t s e l f , but t h e i r r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s are a l l r e i f i c a t i o n s . Through t h e i r i n t e r v i e w s , they claimed t r u t h s about the way t h i n g s were i n towns and the s t a t e such that these s e t s of s o c i a l r e l a t i o n s became r e a l e n t i t i e s . To 1 1 5 paraphrase Ley (1977) these g e o g r a p h i c a l f a c t s take on p e r s o n a l i t i e s through an i n s i d e r ' s p e r s p e c t i v e . I r i s k the charge of u n i v e r s a l f a l l a c y by t e x t u a l l y a t t r i b u t i n g t h e i r c l a i m s to t h e i r p l a c e they r e - p r e s e n t . I r e c o g n i z e l o c a l d i v i s i o n and debate, and the reader should be c r i t i c a l of the comprehensiveness of the commentaries. But I r e t a i n t h i s s t r a t e g y because my focus i s on the way i n which p l a c e i s a r t i c u l a t e d i n d i s c o u r s e . Pred (1989), f o r i n s t a n c e , has r e c e n t l y argued the s i g n i f i c a n c e of the " l o c a l " s t r u g g l e s over language and r e p r e s e n t a t i o n , and meaning more g e n e r a l l y . In order to underscore the r e i f i c a t i o n aspect of p l a c e making that l i n k s the d e f i n i t i o n of the l o c a l to r e l a t i o n s of domination and r e s i s t a n c e , I allow the i n d i v i d u a l to speak f o r and c a t e g o r i z e the e n t i r e p l a c e at i s s u e . c. Massachusetts i n the Mid 1980s The 1980s were the days of the s o - c a l l e d "Massachusetts M i r a c l e , " a p e r i o d of economic expansion and extremely low unemployment on average through the s t a t e . Debate remains over what a c t u a l l y caused the m i r a c l e , but most agree that the Route 128- 1-495 area was where most of the growth was l o c a t e d , though Boston i t s e l f e xperienced a surge of r e v i t a l -i z a t i o n as w e l l ( H a r r i s o n , 1985; Saxsenian, 1985; Dukakis & Ranter, 1988; Lampe, 1988). The r i s e i n defence c o n t r a c t s through the 1970s and 1980s, the growing s e r v i c e s e c t o r , and the o r c h e s t r a t i n g moves of the s t a t e to h e l p d i r e c t i n v e s t -ments g e o g r a p h i c a l l y shaped the c u l t u r e of the area i n t o "the 1 16 high tech highway" (Graham & Ross, 1989). The boom e s c a l a t e d land v a l u e s throughout the Greater Boston area e s p e c i a l l y c a using a v i s i b l e and p o l i t i c a l l y t r o u b l i n g a f f o r d a b l e housing c r i s i s f o r the s t a t e (Keyes, 1990). The Reagan a d m i n i s t r a t i o n ' s r e f u s a l to fund the c o n s t r u c t i o n of s u b s i d i z e d housing, capping a ten year retrenchment of the f e d e r a l government from housing produc-t i o n exacerbated the c r i s i s . The i s s u e of homelessness, r e c e i v i n g n a t i o n a l media a t t e n t i o n , p l a c e d housing i s s u e s on the agenda, but as a s t a t e problem to s o l v e (Nolan, 1989). In 1984 Michael Dukakis r e p l a c e d Ed King as Governor of the Commonwealth, campaigning on a s t r o n g housing p l a t f o r m . Through the mid 1980s, h i s E x e c u t i v e O f f i c e of Communities and Development (E.O.C.D.) i n s t i t u t e d a broad p o l i c y of encouraging p r i v a t e c o n s t r u c t i o n of low and moderate income housing. I t e n t a i l e d s e v e r a l components. E.O.C.D. c r e a t e d a v a r i e t y of subsidy programmes f o r developers through the Massachusetts Housing Finance Agency (M.F.H.A.) which had been dormant s i n c e the l a t e 1960s. The economic w i n d f a l l of the mid 1980s f i l l e d s t a t e c o f f e r s with enough funds to b o l s t e r M.H.F.A.'s r o l e . M.H.F.A. guarantees p r i v a t e developers funding f o r developments so long as at 2 l e a s t 25% of the u n i t s are d e s i g n a t e d as " a f f o r d a b l e " (Yinger, 1984; Keyes, 1990). The developments are g e n e r a l l y 2 E.O.C.D. d e f i n e s a f f o r d a b l e d i f f e r e n t l y depending on the subsidy programme and the l o c a t i o n of the development w i t h i n the s t a t e . 1 17 mixed income, c l u s t e r developments; they are not the "pro-j e c t s of the 1950s". Funding rounds were h e l d q u a r t e r l y so that developers compete with one another f o r the s t a t e s ubsidy. A second p o r t i o n of the p o l i c y i s the Massachusetts Housing P a r t n e r s h i p , a branch of E.O.C.D. that a c t s as a c o o r d i n a t i n g and a d v i s o r y agency f o r l o c a l housing p a r t n e r -s h i p s . L o c a l housing p a r t n e r s h i p s are l o o s e l y d e f i n e d , broad c o n s e n s u s - b u i l d i n g c o a l i t i o n s of, f o r example: town r e s i -dents, r e a l e s t a t e agents, and bankers. The task of the Housing P a r t n e r s h i p i s to make recommendations to the town Board of Selectmen [ s i c ] who must endorse a developer's a p p l i c a t i o n . T h i s l o c a l approval (through l e t t e r s of recommendation and a s i t e approval plan) i s a c r i t i c a l com-ponent i n a b i d f o r s t a t e funds. Housing p a r t n e r s h i p s are a l s o given grants to conduct needs analyses through towns. C l e a r l y , however, t h e i r b i g g e s t r o l e i s to l e g i t i m a t e and b o l s t e r l o c a l support f o r s u b s i d i z e d housing (Herr, 1989). They keep housing on the l o c a l agenda and i n a p o s i t i v e l i g h t . Recognizing the need and c a l l i n g f o r a f f o r d a b l e housing has thus become a l e g i t i m a t e component of suburban c u l t u r e i n Massachusetts. As one suburbanite person s a i d at a recent E.O.C.D. (1988) conference, "God seems to be s m i l i n g on the poor people." A t h i r d component of s t a t e housing p o l i c y r e f l e c t s the r e d u c t i o n of the f i s c a l autonomy d i s c u s s e d i n Chapter Two. 118 In 1982, Governor King signed E x e c u t i v e Order 215 i n t o law (see Appendix). I t d i r e c t s E.O.C.D. to determine whether or not l o c a l i t i e s are encouraging the c o n s t r u c t i o n of a f f o r d a b l e housing. I f not, E.O.C.D. i s d i r e c t e d - at i t s d i s c r e t i o n - to wit h h o l d any s t a t e d i s c r e t i o n a r y funds u n t i l a l e t t e r of agreement i s signed. The order does not a f f e c t g e n e r a l s t a t e a i d , but depending on the town, can block from thousands to m i l l i o n s of d o l l a r s (Nolan, 1989). The A n t i Snob Zoning Law completes the p i c t u r e . R e c a l l t h at 40B can only be used to b u i l d housing that i s sub-s i d i z e d . Since there i s no f e d e r a l money, M.H.F.A. has become the source of money f o r developers wishing to use 40B. Through the 1970s, the law remained r a t h e r obscure due to t h i s l a c k of funds. I t s only p u b l i c i t y came from a smatter-ing of c o u r t cases, a l l of which a f f i r m e d the s t a t e ' s p o l i c y towards suburban e x c l u s i o n , and the c o n s t i t u t i o n a l i t y of the law (see Reed, 1981). The subsidy mechanism o u t l i n e d above c a t a p u l t e d 40B from the law books i n t o the heart of suburban p o l i t i c s through the mid 1980s. Suddenly, l o c a l zoning boards were deluged with comprehensive permit a p p l i c a t i o n s , shocked that t h e i r zoning laws c o u l d be n u l l i f i e d (anon., 1987). Fear, misunderstanding and anger permeated suburbia. Yet the suburbs were changing as w e l l . They were g r a y i n g , housing c o s t s were s k y r o c k e t i n g , the e l d e r l y , c h i l d r e n of the suburbs and town employees were f i n d i n g i t d i f f i c u l t to remain i n 119 towns ( c f . Gutowski & F i e l d , 1979; M a s o t t i & Hadden, 1974). Many suburbs were u r b a n i z i n g and running i n t o f i s c a l c r i s e s more f a m i l i a r to urban governments. The need f o r f u l l time, p r o f e s s i o n a l s t a f f was pervading suburbia; p r e v i o u s l y the work was done by committed v o l u n t e e r s i n the s p i r i t of ' a l t r u i s t i c democracy' (see Gans, 1967). The r i s i n g c o s t of land, i n c r e a s i n g demand f o r commercial zoning, the i n f l u x of comprehensive permit a p p l i c a t i o n s , and the l i m i t a t i o n s of P r o p o s i t i o n 2 1/2 comprised the s i g n i f i c a n t elements of suburban p o l i t i c s through the Route 128- 1-495 area. The overflow of permit a p p l i c a t i o n s was at f i r s t met with an onslaught of d e n i a l s i n the mid 1980s. H.A.C. responded as i t g e n e r a l l y d i d : v a c a t i n g the l o c a l d e n i a l and approving the permit d e s p i t e l o c a l concerns (Korman, 1989; Lacasse & Kane, 1987; Guzman, 1989). T h i s exacerbated suburban f e a r and resentment over the apparent u s u r p a t i o n of zoning c o n t r o l . Unscrupulous developers compounded the s i t u a t i o n by t h r e a t e n i n g towns with high d e n s i t y 40B p r o j e c t s i f they d i d not get to b u i l d what they a c t u a l l y wanted. Since 1987, the s t a t e has o f f e r e d more a s s i s t a n c e to l o c a l i t i e s p a r t i a l l y c o u n t e r i n g the a i r of powerlessness i n subur b i a . V a r i o u s grants are a v a i l a b l e f o r t e c h n i c a l and pla n n i n g r e s e a r c h . Annual seminars are h e l d to e x p l a i n the law, d i s p e l l i n g rumors, and myths to misinformed v o l u n t e e r zoning o f f i c i a l s . As the towns' education process c o n t i n u e s , H.A.C. demands that Z.B.A.s and developers attempt to 120 n e g o t i a t e a compromise before i t w i l l a d j u d i c a t e (Korman, 1989; Nolan, 1989). There i s a l s o a p r i v a t e mediation s e r v i c e and c o n s u l t a n t s who w i l l h e l p towns a r t i c u l a t e r e a l i s t i c requests, as w e l l as s t a t e grants to l o c a l i t i e s to use these s e r v i c e s (Stockard & E n g l e r , 1989). d. L o c a l Autonomy: R e s i s t a n c e s , S t r a t e g i e s and T a c t i c s In s p i t e of the c l e a r s t a t e domination of suburbs through the 1980s, commentators have noted the s c a t t e r e d r e s i s t a n c e s suburbs use d u r i n g the p e r m i t - g r a n t i n g p r o c e s s . F i r s t , r e c a l l that the l o c a l s t a t e i s h a r d l y removed from the p r o c e s s . L o c a l zoning s t i l l e x i s t s i n Massachusetts, and developers must present a plan to the Z.B.A. As Kovel noted (above) no developer completely ignores e x i s t i n g l o c a l zoning. No developer walks i n t o a town without some under-standing of l o c a l r e g u l a t i o n s . The l e s s the developer v i o l a t e s e x i s t i n g r e g u l a t i o n s with the comprehensive permit, the l e s s h o s t i l i t y s/he can expect from l o c a l boards (Stock-ard & E n g l e r , 1989; Brown, 1989). At a more gen e r a l l e v e l , i t does not behoove developers to approach the town with a c o n f r o n t a t i o n a l a t t i t u d e . The f r i e n d l i e r and more amicable the permit process, the e a s i e r i t w i l l be to s o l v e the i n e v i t a b l e problems faced by both developers and l o c a l boards (S t a a f , 1989; Stockhard & E n g l e r , 1989; Nolan, 1989; Brown, 1989). Second, time i s on the s i d e of the suburb. Developers o f t e n only have o p t i o n s to buy a p a r c e l of land and are thus 121 i n v o l v e d i n a purchase-and-sale agreement every few months. An extended p u b l i c h e a r i n g process can prevent them from a c q u i r i n g the l a n d . Regardless of the d e a d l i n e s s p e c i f i e d i n the t e x t of 40B, Z.B.A's o f t e n draw out p u b l i c hearings by motioning f o r continuances (Cohen, 1989; Stockhard & E n g l e r , 1989; Brown, 1989; Connoly, 1989; Staaf, 1989). Heavy p u b l i c turnout can drag the h e a r i n g s f o r months. Developers do not r e s i s t these t a c t i c s because they must r e c e i v e a s i t e a p proval plan and l o c a l support to compete f o r s t a t e funds, and they want as smooth of an approval process as p o s s i b l e (Brown, 1989; Connoly, 1989; Stockhard & E n g l e r , 1989; S t a a f , 1989). During the spate of permit a p p l i c a t i o n s i n the mid 1980s, H.A.C. i t s e l f was deluged with h e a r i n g s . Often they, too would r e q u i r e continuances thus even i f a developer appealed with a l l l i k e l i h o o d of winning, the appeal c o u l d add months on what might have a l r e a d y been a 6 month l o c a l h e aring process (Korman, 1989). T h i r d , the l o c a l i s not j u s t the l o c a l s t a t e . A b u t t e r s can do t h e i r p a r t (and can always be counted on) to r e s i s t a development. As one development lawyer put i t , "We t r y to go i n and get the worst s i t e i n the best town. You want the l e a s t amount of a b u t t e r o b j e c t i o n " (Cohen, 1990). Abu t t e r s can take a developer to c o u r t with a p r i v a t e s u i t . G e n e r a l l y t h i s has not been s u c c e s s f u l d i r e c t l y , and i t does i n v i t e c o u n t e r s u i t . N e v e r t h e l e s s , i t serves to draw the l e a d time out (Stockhard & E n g l e r , 1989; Cohen, 1989). If wetlands 1 22 Table I. Appeals to the H.A.C. 1969-1989 1969- 1 986 1986- 1989 T o t a l # % # % # c 1 '5 O v e r r u l e d 46 34 . 1 14 34 .2 60 34. , 1 Su s t a i n e d 7 5 .2 0 0 .0 7 3. ,9 Settled/H.A.C. 13 9 .6 9 21 .9 22 12. .5 St i p u l a t ion 26 19 .3 6 14 .6 32 18. ,2 Withdrawn/Z.B.A 43 31 .8 1 2 29 .3 55 31 . ,3 A c t i v e * 55 Appeals Decided 1 35 41 176 T o t a l Appeals 1 35 96 231 * A c t i v e appeals at H.A.C: i n h e a r i n g stage as of A p r i l , 1989 (most recent data a v a i l a b l e ) . Source: Guzman, 1989, p. 123 are at i s s u e , a b u t t e r s have the r i g h t to appeal a developer's wetlands d e l i n e a t i o n l i n e to the s t a t e Department of E n v i r o n -mental Q u a l i t y E n g i n e e r i n g (D.E.Q.E.). Fourth, the Conservation Commission can h a l t the p r o j e c t as i t i s the only permit not covered by the com-prehensive permit. Abuse of t h i s c o n t r o l i s c o n s i d e r e d h i g h l y u n l i k e l y by most p a r t i e s I i n t e r v i e w e d (Stockhard & E n g l e r , 1989; Nolan, 1989; Brown, 1989; O'Toole, 1989; Fargo, 1989; Pierndak, 1989; U h l i r , 1989). Commissions' purview i s s o l e l y wetlands. I f there i s a disagreement over s o i l perk-a b i l i t y or the d e l i n e a t i o n l i n e , D.E.Q.E. can s e t t l e the i s s u e by r e t e s t i n g . F i f t h , as the s t a t e has s t r e s s e d b a r g a i n i n g and n e g o t i a t i o n , t h i s t a c t i c can a l s o be e f f e c t i v e not so much i n b l o c k i n g a p r o j e c t but modifying i t s u b s t a n t i a l l y . L o c a l s have l e a r n e d not to approach a 40B development as c a t e g o r i -c a l l y bad, and i n s t e a d n e g o t i a t e over s p e c i f i c problems, f o r example: road widths, s e p t i c systems, and a r c h i t e c t u r e (Nolan, 1989; Korman, 1989; Cohen, 1989). As 40B becomes more f a m i l i a r to l o c a l boards, many have become q u i t e zealous i n t h e i r n e g o t i a t i o n s ( S t a a f , 1989; Stockhard & E n g l e r , 1989; Brown, 1989). Some have claimed that t h i s p rocess can be i l l e g a l t e c h n i c a l l y . By law, l o c a l governments i n Mas-sachusetts cannot ask a developer f o r items s/he i s not r e q u i r e d to p r o v i d e otherwise; the developer must i n i t i a t e the o f f e r ( S t a a f , 1989). H.A.C. has even admitted that i t 124 w i l l l e t towns "get away with murder" i f l o c a l s are t r u l y n e g o t i a t i n g with a developer and want the p r o j e c t (see below, Korman, 1989). S i x t h , l o c a l s can a l s o use the law to a c t u a l l y b u i l d c e r t a i n kinds of a f f o r d a b l e housing. K r e f e t z (1979, 1980) f o r example has documented the overwhelming approval of 40B permits f o r e l d e r l y housing, seen by l o c a l s as benign and t o l e r a b l e . Others (Brown, 1989; Stockard & E n g l e r , 1989; S t a a f , 1989) have noted the p o p u l a r i t y of a c c e p t i n g moderate as opposed to low income housing. The H.O.P. or homeowner-s h i p o p p o r t u n i t y programme has been extremely w e l l r e c e i v e d by developers and l o c a l s a l i k e because of s u b u r b i a 1 s c u l t u r a l p r e f e r e n c e f o r homeownership. E.O.C.D. does, however, keep tabs on these p r e f e r e n c e s , and i s now encouraging more low income and f a m i l y u n i t s ( C a n e l l o s , 1989; Nolan, 1989). Re l a t e d to t h i s s t r a t e g y i s the intense b a r g a i n i n g over l o c a l p r e f e r e n c e i n a l l o c a t i n g the housing u n i t s . G e n e r a l l y M.H.F.A. e s t a b l i s h l o c a l quotas, however commentators have noted n e g o t i a t i o n s on l o c a l tenancy (Stockard & E n g l e r , 1989). I n t e r e s t i n g l y , no data e x i s t on who a c t u a l l y i n h a b i t s Chapter 40B housing ( K r e f e t z , Guzman & Brown, 1990). The d e s i r e f o r l o c a l p r e f e r e n c e and the l a c k of state-wide hard data on tenancy suggests that suburbia might be e x e r c i s i n g c o n s i d e r a b l e autonomy in complying with the l e t t e r of the law, but not i t s s p i r i t . The l o c a l s I i n t e r v i e w e d guessed that most of the u n i t s were occupied by town r e s i d e n t s or 1 2 5 employees. The awareness of a v a i l a b l e a f f o r d a b l e u n i t s i n a town l o g i c a l l y i s sharpest around that area, g i v i n g the town an edge i n f i l l i n g a p r o j e c t with i t s own people. Moreover, i f a l o c a l p u b l i c housing a u t h o r i t y manages the development, the m a j o r i t y of those u n i t s must be o f f e r e d f i r s t to town r e s i d e n t s or t h e i r r e l a t i v e s . My i n t e n t i o n i n t h i s s e c t i o n was to demonstrate the r e s i s t a n c e s the l o c a l has at i t s d i s p o s a l to block or modify a 40B p r o j e c t . They are s t r a n d s of l o c a l autonomy through s t a t e and l o c a l p o l i t i c s . How e f f e c t i v e these e f f o r t s can be i s i n d e t e r m i n a t e : housing advocates found them to be oc-c a s i o n a l l y e f f i c a c i o u s while l o c a l r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s downplayed t h e i r e f f e c t i v e n e s s . N e v e r t h e l e s s these s t r a t e g i e s , t a c t i c s and r e s i s t a n c e s cannot be ignored. They can only be theor-e t i c a l l y accounted f o r by the r e l a t i o n a l view of power d i s c u s s e d i n Chapter One. They must be understood as p a t t e r n s of l o c a l autonomy stemming from the processes of p l a c e d e f i n i t i o n and r e d e f i n i t i o n . These processes are d e t a i l e d i n the case s t u d i e s below. Four i s s u e s are drawn out to demonstrate the d i a l e c t i c of l o c a l autonomy and heteronomy: how the s t a t e d e f i n e s i t s e l f , how the s t a t e d e f i n e s the towns, how the town d e f i n e s i t s e l f and how the towns d e f i n e the s t a t e . e. L o c a l Autonomy: Place Making Through Place I n t e r a c t i o n  e. i . The S t a t e The Commonwealth has long maintained that l o c a l 126 autonomy remains d e s p i t e Chapter 40B. Indeed, one of i t s conferences was e n t i t l e d , "40B: A Tool f o r L o c a l C o n t r o l . " What has been r e s c i n d e d i s l o c a l nondecisionmaking, the s t a t e argues (Korman, 1989; Nolan, 1989). A d i s c u s s i o n with an E.O.C.D. o f f i c i a l b r i n g s t h i s p o i n t to the f o r e : MB: "Do l o c a l communities have autonomy i n terms of 40B?" LN: "I t h i n k they do. New r e g u l a t i o n s have r e i n f o r c e d the f a c t t h at communities are responding- they are p r o v i d i n g f o r needed housing. The s t a t e p l a y s an a p p r o p r i a t e r o l e i n terms of the f a c t that there i s a need f o r housing. We're not t r y i n g to say you need two u n i t s of "x" by t h i s date. The problem a r i s e s when they're not p r o a c t i v e but r e a c t i v e . I t ' s been twenty y e a r s , get o f f the s t i c k . But i f you're doing the job, the c o n t r o l i s t h e r e . " (Nolan, 1989). The C h a i r of H.A.C makes a s i m i l a r p o i n t : "The e s s e n t i a l purpose of the s t a t u t e when passed was d e f i n i t e l y a crackdown on l o c a l autonomy. For the f i r s t time l o c a l ' s u n l i m i t e d power was cut down. They now had d e c i s i o n s to make s u b j e c t to review...At the beginning they were t o t a l l y unreasonable. N i n e t y - f i v e per cent of the time they j u s t turned i t down. A f t e r a w h i l e , that changed. [40B developments] were b u i l t and they weren't slums. In f a c t they turned out to be the n i c e s t developments i n town. A l l the b l a c k s people f e a r e d never moved i n . They got a l o t of n i c e a t t r a c t i v e u n i t s f o r t h e i r own people. The next time they went along f u r t h e r . I f they d i d go along we l e t them get away with murder- as k i n g f o r road widening and l i g h t i n g . A f t e r awhile the percentage of appeals went down, the number of cases went down and the number of over r u l e s decreased." (Korman, 1989) (see Table One) From these d i s c u s s i o n s , we can see that the way i n which the s t a t e d e f i n e s the l o c a l i t i e s o v e r a l l has s h i f t e d . E a r l y on, i t was a g g r e s s i v e to the p o i n t of a l i e n a t i n g the l o c a l . L o c a l s p r o t e s t e d , but they a l s o complied. The s t a t e then began to p l a y up the l o c a l as a r e s p o n s i b l e e n t i t y . "Any suburb with a community p l a n n i n g o f f i c e r e a l i z e s autonomy. Communities won't understand u n t i l they are 127 threatened. We h o l d workshops every year, the Massachusetts M u n i c i p a l A s s o c i a t i o n i t ' s always mentioned [ s i c ] . S t i l l , they p a n i c . L o c a l autonomy means v o l u n t e e r boards with l i m i t e d a t t e n t i o n a v e r t e d to c r i s i s . They're going to focus on t h e i r own agenda. I t ' s only r a r e when housing comes up i n town, l i k e when t h e r e ' s an i n t e r n a l need. That's common to any p u b l i c f a c i l i t y . 40B allows communities to recognize that there are ways they can have c o n t r o l over development because i f a community has an i d e a , a plan...a l o c a l housing p l a n , t h i s i s what i t ' s a l l about. Do that p l a n ! I f you do, the burden f a l l s on the developer. He [ s i c ] has to i n d i c a t e how h i s development f i t s i n t o the p l a n . " (Nolan, 1989) In t h i s way, the l o c a l i t y i s made autonomous to the extent that i t s governance can be r e l a t e d to the v i r t u e of respon-s i b i l i t y . The r e l a t i o n between t h i s v i r t u e and the s t a t u s of l o c a l government i s a p o l i t i c a l l y powerful t r u t h c l a i m i n the American regime. Thus the s t a t e ' s argument i s that the v i r t u o u s , American suburb would p l a n f o r and c o n t a i n a f f o r -dable housing and s i m u l t a n e o u s l y be autonomous. The s t a t e d e f i n e s i t s e l f as " p l a y i n g an a p p r o p r i a t e r o l e " . I t i s implementing p o l i c y f o r the "common wealth", and as such i t r e c o g n i z e s that i t sometimes a l i e n a t e s member l o c a l i t i e s . But i t does not wish to take on a strong or heavy-handed image towards the l o c a l p r e c i s e l y because the l o c a l i s a v a l i d and i n t e g r a l component of the s t a t e . By encouraging n e g o t i a t i o n , making s t a t e funds a v a i l a b l e to l o c a l s as w e l l as d e v e l o p e r s , h o l d i n g seminars, p r o v i d i n g i n f o r m a t i o n i t goads the l o c a l i n t o conforming to the broader p o l i c y g o a l . In t h i s way we can see both the i n s t r u m e n t a l and c o n s t i t u t i v e dimensions of p o l i c y : the s t a t e becomes a p l a c e where a f f o r d a b l e housing gets c o n s t r u c t e d and i t i s a p l a c e where the l o c a l i t y can p l a y an a c t i v e r o l e i n that 128 process, e v i n c i n g i t s autonomy. e. i i . Weston The town of Weston i s l o c a t e d at the i n t e r s e c t i o n of the Massachusetts Turnpike and Route 128, surrounded by s t r e t c h e s of high technology p l a n t s and producer s e r v i c e s (see F i g u r e One). Yet i t has s h i e l d e d i t s e l f from o f f i c e and f a c t o r y c o n s t r u c t i o n that has swept through n e i g h b o r i n g suburbs l i k e Waltham, Needham and Newton. Weston i s s a i d to be the most a f f l u e n t community i n the s t a t e , and indeed i t s median f a m i l y income i n 1979 was $51,339 (see Table Two). C u l t u r a l l y , i t i s seen as a p l a c e of o l d Yankee money, however i t s south s i d e i s home to t r a n s i e n t Route 128 owners and managers ( U h l i r , 1989; c f . Whyte, 1956). I t p a i n t s i t s e l f as a small town (1986 p o p u l a t i o n 10,700) compared to nearby suburbs. I t holds open town meetings and townspeople are q u i t e a c t i v e i n l o c a l i s s u e s ( U h l i r , 1989). Republicans s l i g h t l y outnumber democrats (see Table Two), making i t an extremely c o n s e r v a t i v e town by Massachusetts' standards, though o v e r a l l the ethos of suburban n o n p a r t i s a n s h i p weighs h e a v i l y through the case-study suburbs. Weston has been p a i n t e d s t e r e o t y p i c a l l y as a snobtown (Korman, 1989; Connoly, 1989; S t a a f , 1989), and the l o c a l r e p r e s e n t a t i v e acknowledges t h i s ( U h l i r , 1989). I t has s t r i c t zoning r e g u l a t i o n s and s i n g l e - f a m i l y housing predom-i n a t e s . I t a l s o takes p r i d e i n governing i t s e l f e f f i c i e n t l y . E x e c u t i v e Order 215 has been invoked on the town, and the 129 F i g u r e 1. C a s e - S t u d y S u b u r b s In G r e a t e r B o s t o n Massachusetts New Hampsh i re .DRACUT Lowe 11 Chelmsford C a r l i s l e Lawrence B e v e r l y kMarlborough ' 2 )^ . C o n c o r d LINCOLN * ( U a l t h a m 1 WESTON "Cambr i dge^ rookLi ne Frami nghan Needham D o v e r * J -93 Quincy Massachusetts Bay S c i Euate J - 9 5 • Case-Study Suburb -Ss^ Interstate (7) State Highway 0 2 i 6 8 H i l e s 1 i '> i1 • 'i •' 0 h 8 12 K i l o m e t e r s B r o c k t o n HANSON Plymouth 130 Table I I . Summary S t a t i s t i c s f o r Weston, Massachusetts 1980 P o p u l a t i o n 11,169 1986 P o p u l a t i o n . 10,700 1990 P r o j e c t e d Pop 10,646 Percent Non White 1 980 4% Percent Households R e c e i v i n g P u b l i c A i d 1979 0.009% Persons i n Poverty, 1 979 308 Median Family Income, 1979 $51,339 % Managers & P r o f e s s i o n a l s 1979 57% % T e c h n i c a l , Sales & Admin-i s t r a t i v e Support 28% S e r v i c e Occupations... 8% Farming, F i s h i n g , F o r e s t r y 0.004% P r e c i s i o n Production C r a f t and Repair 4% Operators, F a b r i c a t o r s & Labourers 2% Self-Employed Persons 13% % Democrat 1988 22% % Republican 25% % Independent 53% V a l u a t i o n of R e s i d e n t i a l Taxable Property 1988 ( i n m i l l i o n s ) $1 ,308.70 Rate (per $1,000 of assessed v a l u a t i o n ) $11.30 T o t a l Land Area 17.36 sq. mi, 1989 Status V i s - a - V i s E.O. 215*."UNREASONABLY RESTRICTIVE" 1985 % Low & Moderate Income Housing* 1.26% Source: 1989 Massachusetts M u n i c i p a l P r o f i l e s Unless other-wise noted. C a t e g o r i e s d e r i v e d from U.S. Census data unless otherwise noted. * Source: E.O.C.D. l a t e s t a v a i l a b l e d a t a . "These communities are i n e l i g i b l e f o r most s t a t e d i s c r e t i o n a r y grants u n t i l they s i g n a Memorandum of Agree-ment with EOCD and/or demonstrate s i g n i f i c a n t l o c a l e f f o r t s to f a c i l i t a t e the development of housing f o r low and moderate income f a m i l i e s . " (E.O.C.D., 1989, p.2) 131 town i s a l s o denied s t a t e funds because i t p r a c t i c e s u n f a i r h i r i n g p r a c t i c e s . Much of the problem stems from the domin-ance of an o l d town guard which i s slowly being r e p l a c e d ( U h l i r , 1989). Weston i s a f i s c a l l y r e s p o n s i b l e town. Not s u r p r i s i n g -l y , i t i s the town with the most s u c c e s s f u l number of P r o p o s i t i o n 2 1/2 o v e r r i d e s ( U h l i r , 1989). There i s a pay-as-you-go m e n t a l i t y , and l a c k of s t a t e funds i s not a problem to the town. Indeed, i t i s b o a s t f u l about t h i s f a c t : Weston does not need a handout. I t can manage w i t h i n i t s own r e s o u r c e s . T h i s f i s c a l r e s p o n s i b i l i t y i s , however, becoming more and more d i f f i c u l t as s e r v i c e c o s t s r i s e . As the r e p r e s e n t a t i v e from the Planning Board put i t : "Chapter [40B] was enacted i n 1969 to c l e a r away o b s t a c l e s f o r d e v elopers who would c r e a t e housing u n i t s with below market r e n t s . The need f o r such u n i t s was great then; i t s t i l l i s now. "This law i s c u r r e n t l y being used as a t o o l to wipe away l o c a l l a n d use c o n t r o l s . I t produces c o n f l i c t s among s t a t e agencies with d i f f e r e n t p r i o r i t i e s such as water p o l l u t i o n c o n t r o l and a q u i f e r p r o t e c t i o n . I t c r e a t e s very l i t t l e a f f o r d a b l e housing f o r a very short time." ( U h l i r , 1988) Caught between c o n f l i c t i n g s t a t e p r i o r i t i e s i s how Weston p o r t r a y s i t s e l f i n the context of the s t a t e and a f f o r d a b l e housing. A 1986 comprehensive development p r o p o s a l t h r e a t -ened the q u a l i t y of a town a q u i f e r . Under Massachusetts Water Resources A u t h o r i t y g u i d e l i n e s , towns are r e s p o n s i b l e f o r p r o t e c t i n g n a t i v e water s u p p l i e s . Despite the a q u i f e r i s s u e , the Z.B.A f e l t compelled to grant the permit. A b u t t e r s d i s a g r e e d over the wetlands d e l i n e a t i o n l i n e and 132 requested a hea r i n g with D.E.Q.E. The Department of E n v i r o n -mental Q u a l i t y E n g i n e e r i n g c o u l d f i n d "no f a c t s i n d i s p u t e " and r e f u s e d an a d j u d i c a t o r y h e a r i n g . The a b u t t e r s are s t i l l working on an appeal. In the meantime the town has extended the permit's e x p i r a t i o n . A c c o r d i n g to the Planning Board member, another c o n f l i c t i n g set of p r i o r i t i e s i s i n the focus on the sub-s i d i z a t i o n of c o n s t r u c t i o n , rather than what happens i n the f u t u r e . With respect to the development at stake i n town: "Those apartments w i l l be r i p e f o r c o n d o - i z a t i o n . I t i s so c l e a r t h at they w i l l be yuppie apartments. Maximum d e n s i t y equals maximum p r o f i t i n the long run. "L i m i t e d d i v i d e n d c o r p o r a t i o n " only r e f e r s to the paydown of a l o a n . That loan i s to be p a i d o f f i n l e s s than f i f t e e n years time. We can't c o n t r o l the l o c k - i n d e c i s i o n . 1:1, 50/50 market r a t e to a f f o r d a b l e : that would serve the p u b l i c purpose. But the Z.B.A. d i d n ' t choose to say the town had the r i g h t s to the a f f o r d a b l e u n i t s . I asked Mr. Korman [Chair of the H.A.C.] i f such a c o n d i t i o n would impact [ s i c ] on the economic f e a s i b i l i t y of a development. As f a r as H.A.C. was con-cerned, he had never been asked. He s a i d i t was o u t s i d e the p e r i o d of the law. That's how towns and c i t i e s don't have autonomy." "Presumably the i n t e n t of the s t a t u t e i s to c r e a t e a f f o r d a b l e housing. I t does very l i t t l e and i t ' s a subsidy program f o r huge p r i v a t e d e v e l o p e r s . " ( U h l i r , 1989). Weston acknowledges a need f o r "greater housing d i v e r s i t y . " L i k e a l l towns i t sees the growing i n t e r n a l need f o r a f f o r d a b l e housing. Weston seems to agree with the s t a t e p o l i c y . I t has granted a comprehensive permit. I t has r e l a x e d r e s t r i c t i o n s on accessory apartments. A housing p a r t n e r s h i p has even been formed, though the town l a c k s an o v e r a l l housing p l a n . The process of opening up Weston, however, has not been 1 33 easy. There i s l o c a l r e s i s t a n c e , and the town has h a r d l y been as a g g r e s s i v e as i t c o u l d be. The town had u t i l i z e d the s t a t e open space program to buy up vacant l o t s . T h i s , along with the g e n e r a l r e a l e s t a t e boom and the f l i p p i n g by t r a n s i e n t 128 managers and p r o f e s s i o n a l s helped r a i s e land p r i c e s i n town, making the s t a t e subsidy programmes o f t e n unworkable because of such high land c o s t s ( U h l i r , 1989; Cohen, 1989). To argue that Weston i s a p e r f e c t l y autonomous snob town, using a v a r i e t y of resources and e x t e r n a l f o r c e s to maintain i t s e l f misses the complexity of power r e l a t i o n s e n v e l o p i n g the i s s u e . The t r u t h s claimed about " s u b s i d i z e d housing" have changed to the extent that "low and moderate income housing" has a p l a c e i n every town, even Weston. Thus the town p o r t r a y s i t s e l f as p a r t of the common-wealth, doing i t s share. But s i m u l t a n e o u s l y i t d e f i n e s i t s e l f i n terms of how i t i s not l i k e the s t a t e . State government seems to be i n the pockets of b i g developers ( U h l i r , 1989). The c o n n o t a t i o n i s that Weston might not be the most open a c c e s s i b l e community i n the s t a t e , but i t can at l e a s t govern i t s e l f r e s p o n s i b l y - u n l i k e the s t a t e . 40B was a h a s t i l y conceived law that was not w e l l thought out. T h i s i s not r e s p o n s i b l e government; i t smacks of c o r r u p t i o n and f a v o r i t i s m . As the S t a t e R e p r e s e n t a t i v e f o r the area put i t , "40B took too much power away- v i z what a town i s l i k e . They have the r i g h t to have some kind of say i n what goes on i n t h e i r town!" (Marsh, 1989). Weston i s the v o i c e of reason 1 34 in a c r i s i s atmosphere. In t h i s way, the s t a t e ' s t r u t h c l a i m s and i t s own, d e s p i t e t h e i r c o n t r a d i c t i o n , are both a f f i r m e d . The s t a t e along with o t h e r s , p o r t r a y s Weston s t e r e o -t y p i c a l l y . The town uses i t s guise of p r o g r e s s i v e government to s h i r k i t s r e s p o n s i b i l i t y . Weston i s a p o l i t e , f i e r c e l y i n t e l l i g e n t and r e s o u r c e f u l town. I t never caused problems d i r e c t l y , u n l i k e more working c l a s s towns deluged with comprehensive permits, but i t has been i n c r e d i b l y slow i n responding to the c r i s i s . As one E.O.C.D. o f f i c i a l put i t , "We keep hoping with Weston" (Nolan, 1989). In Weston, then, we see the s t a t e slowly e r o d i n g the town's c a p a c i t y to d e f i n e and ignore i t s r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s . Weston has, however, managed to r e s i s t that p o l i c y . R e s u l t s -o r i e n t e d p o l i c y a n a l y s t s would make t h i s p o i n t : Weston has merely chosen to be "more concerned" about i t s water than about a f f o r d a b l e housing. Watersheds are a r d e n t l y p r o t e c t e d while l i p - s e r v i c e i s p a i d to 40B. But examine the power r e l a t i o n s : there i s a r e d e f i n i t i o n process o c c u r r i n g i n town. Slowly, s u b s i d i z e d housing i s becoming a l e g i t i m a t e p a r t of t h i s kind of town (see Table Two) while simultaneous-l y , Weston cl a i m s i t s autonomy: i t r e s i s t s by using a v a i l a b l e c u l t u r a l and p o l i t i c a l resources that s i g n i f y i t as not being p a r t of the s t a t e . These resources can be q u i t e e f f e c t i v e i n i t s c o n t e x t . The way Weston i s d e f i n e d and d e f i n e s i t s e l f e x e m p l i f i e s the autonomy/heteronomy d i a l e c t i c . 135 e. i i i . L i n c o l n "Remember, L i n c o l n i s the town t h a t , a few years back, made Winter S t r e e t on the Lincoln-Waltham border one-way - l e a d i n g out of L i n c o l n - to keep the r i f f r a f f out. " I t was a l s o the town where the F i r s t P a r i s h Church was deeply d i v i d e d over whether to continue a p a i n t job or sc r a p i t when i t was almost complete because some congregants wanted to get away from the nickname of "the white church," s o - c a l l e d due to the c o l o r of i t s facade. Seems they were a f r a i d of a l i e n a t i n g people of c o l o r , so they took a vote on whether to p a i n t the church a n o n r a c i s t gray..." ( E n g l i s h , 1990) Located on the infamous route between Lexington and Concord, j u s t f o u r t e e n m i l e s o u t s i d e of Boston, L i n c o l n s i g n i f i e s the "do good l i b e r a l s from the 'burbs" Kovel d e s c r i b e d (see F i g u r e One). L i k e Weston, i t remains a ru r a l e s q u e , r e s i d e n t i a l suburb of r e l a t i v e l y a f f l u e n t people e a s i l y w i t h i n commuting d i s t a n c e of Route 128 and Boston. Through the r e g i o n , however, i t does not have the conserva-t i v e ethos of i t s n e i g h b o r i n g towns. L i n c o l n i s a small p l a c e (1986 p o p u l a t i o n : 7,710) s a i d to be f i l l e d with academics who teach i n Boston and Cambridge and other such " l i b e r a l s " . The data i n Table Three bear out these p o i n t s . U n l i k e Weston, however, L i n c o l n has been extremely a g g r e s s i v e i n the a f f o r d a b l e housing area: so much so that when i t s B a t t l e Road Farm development has been completed, i t w i l l have reached i t s 10% quota. A member of the Board of Selectmen [ s i c ] e x p l a i n s : " L i n c o l n ' s housing e f f o r t s began i n 1967. The town was concerned with the r i s i n g c o s t of l a n d . I t wanted a h e t e r -ogeneous community. I t wanted to do i t ' s t h i n g , you know: i t s s o c i a l r e s p o n s i b i l i t y . So, i t appointed an a f f o r d a b l e housing commission. Selectmen [ s i c ] and Pla n n i n g Board 1 36 Table I I I . Summary S t a t i s t i c s f o r L i n c o l n , Massachusetts 1980 P o p u l a t i o n 7,098 1986 P o p u l a t i o n 7,710 1990 P r o j e c t e d Pop .7,954 Percent Non White 8% Percent Households R e c e i v i n g P u b l i c A i d 2% Persons i n Poverty, 1979 304 Median Family Income, 1979 $31,543 % Managers & P r o f e s s i o n a l s 1979 51% % T e c h n i c a l , Sales & Admin-i s t r a t i v e Support 28% S e r v i c e Occupations 8% Farming, F i s h i n g , F o r e s t r y 0.006% P r e c i s i o n P r o d u c t i o n C r a f t & Repair .5% Operators, F a b r i c a t o r s & Labourers 5% Self-Employed Persons 10% % Democrat 1988 28% % Republican 20% % Independent 50% V a l u a t i o n of R e s i d e n t i a l Taxable Property 1 988 ( i n m i l l i o n s ) $629.90 Rate (per $1,000 of assessed v a l u a t i o n ) $9.08 T o t a l Land Area 14.92 sq. mi. 1989 S t a t u s V i s - a - V i s E.O. 215* "FULFILLING COMMITMENTS" 1985 % Low & Moderate Income Housing* .....5.19% Source: 1989 Massachusetts M u n i c i p a l P r o f i l e s Unless o t h e r -wise noted. C a t e g o r i e s d e r i v e d from U.S. Census data unless otherwise noted. * Source: E.O.C.D. l a t e s t a v a i l a b l e data. " i n d i c a t e s that a c i t y or town has executed a Memoran-dum of Agreement with EOCD or made other formal commitments r e l a t i n g to l o c a l housing p o l i c y . These communities w i l l remain i n compliance with E x e c u t i v e Order 215 as long as they f u l f i l l the terms of these commitments." (E.O.C.D. 1989, p . l ) 137 worked c l o s e l y t o g e t h e r . They recommended a l o c a l non p r o f i t development c o r p o r a t i o n to use s t a t e and f e d e r a l funds c a l l e d 'the L i n c o l n Foundation.' I t sponsored L i n c o l n Woods: 125 coops i n 1976. "We are not a bedroom suburb. There i s a s t r o n g , d i r e c t open town meeting. There i s an a b i d i n g sense of stewardship i n town, i n c o n s e r v a t i o n , environmental i s s u e s , and housing as w e l l . The idea i s to leave t h i n g s i n b e t t e r shape than when you got them. There are a great many independents i n town. I t ' s w e l l educated, c a r i n g r e s p o n s i b l e town - very respon-s i b l e towards l o c a l government. There i s not much apathy here." Since 1967 land-use conferences have been h e l d i n town every f i v e y e a r s . Such a process i s extremely r a r e i n Mas-sac h u s e t t s suburbs, and served to equate a f f o r d a b l e housing with more c o n v e n t i o n a l i s s u e s l i k e t r a f f i c , open space p r e s e r v a t i o n and town p l a n n i n g i n g e n e r a l . D e s p i t e t h i s p r o g r e s s i v e atmosphere, an agreement to s e l l town lan d f o r a mixed income development was b a r e l y defeated at a town meeting i n 1981. That d e c i s i o n , combined with a lack of a c t i o n on a f f o r d a b l e housing through the e a r l y 1980s r e s u l t e d i n E x e c u t i v e Order 215 being a p p l i e d to L i n c o l n . The s t a t e f e l t the town had "reneged on a promise" to support a f f o r -dable housing. A c c o r d i n g to the Planning Board member, l o s i n g the money r e a l l y was not the i s s u e . U n l i k e Weston, L i n c o l n was embarrassed by being on the l i s t . Yet L i n c o l n w i l l be the only suburb to achieve i t s 10% quota without ever i s s u i n g a comprehensive permit. I t d i d so by a consensus-driven p o l i t i c a l process behind a l a r g e mixed-use development i n 1986. The town had an o p t i o n on 47 ac r e s of land i n nor t h L i n c o l n . The a l t e r n a t i v e s was to l o s e the 1 38 land to a r e l i g i o u s i n s t i t u t i o n , or to the Massachusetts Port A u t h o r i t y (Massport). "At the June 86 town meeting, people gave us the green l i g h t . Town l i k e s to do t h i n g s i t s own way. The a t t i t u d e i s 'don't t e l l us we can't do i t . T e l l us how we can do i t ! ' Things l i k e t h i s were being s a i d to town c o u n s e l . People d i d not want to loose that 47 a c r e s . If we d i d n ' t a c t then, we'd l o s e c o n t r o l . There were a n t i MassPort f e e l i n g s as w e l l . We had s i x months before the next town meeting to work t h i n g s out. Very next day met with Stockhard and E n g l e r , who c o n s u l t on a f f o r d a b l e housing. They helped us d r a f t a request f o r p r o p o s a l f o r commercial and r e s i d e n t i a l develop-ment. We i s s u e d the R.F.P. by August, c a l l i n g f o r 75% low/mod and 25% market r a t e . Some developers were scared. Some were c a u t i o u s l y i n t e r e s t e d . Only got one s p e c i f i c p r o p o s a l . They s a i d they c o u l d do i t at 60/40 r a t i o , and we d i d l i k e t h e i r p r o p o s a l , so we agreed.... "We proceeded to work f o r November town meeting. We met with l o c a l newspapers to educate the p u b l i c . We h e l d meetings. We made a promise on the e d i t o r i a l page that we would be open about t h i s p r o j e c t . We p r o v i d e d them with the hard copy and photos, each week there was a d i f f e r e n t aspect d i s c u s s e d i n the newspaper: t r a f f i c , n oise study, a r c h i t e c t u r e . We scheduled a s e r i e s of neighborhood meetings h e l d i n people's homes. We e x p l a i n e d what we were b r i n g i n g to town meeting. In t h i s way we d i d three t h i n g s : 1. we reached l o t s of people n e i g h b o r l y ; 2. we got to f i n d out the r e a l and hidden concerns; 3. i t was a p r a c t i c e time to smooth the bugs out of the p r o j e c t . " (Fargo, 1989) Town meeting approved the spot zoning (not a comprehen-s i v e permit) by a 9:1 margin. The developer used s t a t e funding to cover the c o s t of the a f f o r d a b l e u n i t s , and the town worked out a f u t u r e purchase p l a n to keep the u n i t s a f f o r d a b l e i n p e r p e t u i t y . C o n s t r u c t i o n i s underway and the town was promptly removed from the E x e c u t i v e Order 215 l i s t . The case of L i n c o l n demonstrates that the way i n which a p l a c e d e f i n e s i t s e l f a f f e c t s the way i n which i t i s auton-omous. C e r t a i n l y the "consensus-driven" p o l i t i c s t h a t preceded town meeting suggests an a c t i v e agenda of the way i n 139 which the town ought to be, however i r o n i c t h a t agenda might be. Such conse n s u s - o r i e n t e d p o l i t i c s have long been an element of suburban p o l i t i c a l c u l t u r e i n the U.S (Kaplan, 1976; W i l l i a m s , 1971). But that agenda f i t with the l o c a l c u l t u r e of "stewardship" and l i b e r a l n e s s as w e l l . Even i f one p a i n t s the is s u e as the " l e a s t worst" o p t i o n , f a v o u r i n g s u b s i d i z e d housing over an a i r s t r i p or a church suggests a t t i t u d e s were somewhat more welcoming than would be expected i n s u b u r b i a . The i s s u e was not over what would be on the land, but whether the town would have c o n t r o l . Savvy l o c a l l e a d e r s -both bureaucrats and e l e c t e d o f f i c i a l s - r e c o g n i z e d that to r e t a i n l o c a l c o n t r o l over land use, they had to appease the s t a t e , and that t h i s was not n e c e s s a r i l y a p e j o r a t i v e p o s i t i o n : "I b e l i e v e l o c a l autonomy e x i s t s . You c e r t a i n l y see i t here. I t h i n k L i n c o l n has shown that you can e x e r c i s e i t and s t i l l be a p a r t i c i p a t i n g member of the Commonwealth. I t ' s not n e c e s s a r i l y s t a t e c o n t r o l . I t can be a very p o s i t i v e position....We e x e r c i s e d l o c a l autonomy i n a ' l e t ' s do i t our way' sense." (Fargo, 1989) N o t i c e that the emphasis i s more on the s t a t e as a commonwealth than a t i e r of government. The only other comment made about the s t a t e was that i t (E.O.C.D.) had been "extremely h e l p f u l " when L i n c o l n was i n d i s p u t e with MassPort over the 47 a c r e s . C e r t a i n l y L i n c o l n acknowledged i t s s u b s e r v i e n t p o s i t i o n by i t s embarrassment at being p l a c e d on the 215 l i s t , but the town d i d not t r a n s l a t e i t s p o s i t i o n i n t o "powerlessness" as Weston seems to have. I t saw i t s e l f 140 as an "powerful" e n t i t y , but one t h a t was i n a p a r t n e r s h i p to which i t owed a r e s p o n s i b i l i t y . Moreover, L i n c o l n d e f i n e d i t s e l f such that being i n those two p o s i t i o n s was not n e c e s s a r i l y c o n t r a d i c t o r y . In t u r n , the s t a t e d e f i n e s L i n c o l n as the example of how to r e t a i n l o c a l autonomy v i s - a - v i s Chapter 40B (Graham, 1989; Nolan, 1989). At annual seminars and l e c t u r e s a c r o s s the s t a t e , L i n c o l n i s touted as a t a n g i b l e success (Stockhard & E n g l e r , 1989). I t has not been o v e r r i d d e n by crime and degenerates. I t n e g o t i a t e d the k i n d of development i t wanted. I t was not abused by d e v e l o p e r s . And now, i f i t wants t o , i t can r e c k l e s s l y r e j e c t any new comprehensive permit. L i n c o l n becomes amenable to both other suburbs' and the s t a t e ' s images of suburbia s i m u l t a n e o u s l y . L i n c o l n perhaps rep r e s e n t s Saunder's (1979) p o i n t about the e m p i r i c a l nature of the l o c a l autonomy q u e s t i o n . A f t e r a l l , the town was autonomous to the extent that i t got what i t wanted. But at a more complex l e v e l , L i n c o l n demands a much more s o p h i s t i c a t e d understanding of l o c a l autonomy i n terms of how communities come to be- or not be- autonomous. The way i n which L i n c o l n d e f i n e d i t s e l f and was d e f i n e d a f f e c t e d the way i n which i t gained and r e l i n q u i s h e d auton-omy. 141 e. i v . Dracut More a suburb of Lowell than Boston, Dracut l i e s j u s t o f f Route 495 on the New Hampshire border (see F i g u r e One). I t i s an overwhelmingly white, working c l a s s town h i s t o r i c a l -l y . I t i s a r a t h e r l a r g e suburb with a 1986 p o p u l a t i o n of 24,040 (see Table F o u r ) . Dracut i s h e a v i l y democratic, though somewhat " c o n s e r v a t i v e " a c c o r d i n g to those i n t e r v i e w e d (Pierndak, 1989; T u l l y , 1989). Dracut and i t s neighbors were h e a v i l y h i t with com-prehensive permit a p p l i c a t i o n s i n the mid 1980s. T h i s was perhaps due to the r e l a t i v e l y low c o s t of la n d ( f o r m e r l y farms), the spread of economic a c t i v i t y from Route 128 outwards toward 1-495 (Pierndak, 1989) and the r e v i t a l i z a t i o n of Lowell ( T u l l y , 1989; see Lampe 1988). Dracut i t s e l f r e c e i v e d three a p p l i c a t i o n s i n 24 months, "None of which were easy." ( T u l l y , 1989). The town i s between 4 and 5% low and moderate income housing, with most of i t run by the housing a u t h o r i t y . Most of i t i s e l d e r l y housing. L i k e Weston, Dracut f e e l s s e v e r e l y c o n s t r a i n e d by the s t a t e , though there i s an acknowledgement that t h i s i s slowly changing with r e s p e c t to 40B. As the Town Manager comments: "The q u e s t i o n i s are [towns] r e a c t i v e or p r o a c t i v e . Ours was r e a c t i v e . In our case we were caught with i t . We were put at a disadvantage....We never d i d anything and then we r e a l l y got whacked. The m a j o r i t y of towns are s i m i l a r . We maybe put our a c t together more q u i c k l y . "The town took the p o s i t i o n t h at we c o u l d n ' t a v o i d i t . 40B was t h e r e ; you can't put your head i n the sand. Someone recommended we become a [housing] p a r t n e r s h i p community ahead of the board of appeals stage so that we c o u l d m i t i g a t e 142 Table IV. Summary S t a t i s t i c s f o r Dracut, Massachusetts 1980 P o p u l a t i o n 21,249 1986 P o p u l a t i o n 24,040 1990 P r o j e c t e d Pop 25,406 Percent Non White 1% Percent Households R e c e i v i n g P u b l i c A i d 1979 7% Persons i n Poverty, 1979 1 ,127 Median Family Income, 1979 $22,790 % Managers & P r o f e s s i o n a l s 1979 19% % T e c h n i c a l , S a les & Admin-i s t r a t i v e Support 25% S e r v i c e Occupations 11% Farming, F i s h i n g , F o r e s t r y 0.006% P r e c i s i o n P r o d u c t i o n C r a f t & Repair 18% Operators, F a b r i c a t o r s & Labourers .22% Self-Employed Persons 0.03% % Democrat 1988 61% % Republican 12% % Independent 27% V a l u a t i o n of R e s i d e n t i a l Taxable Property 1988 ( i n m i l l i o n s ) $1,006.90 Rate (per $1,000 of assessed v a l u a t i o n ) $11.00 T o t a l Land Area 21.30 sq. mi, 1989 Status V i s - a - V i s E.O. 215* "SATISFACTORY" 3 1985 % Low & Moderate Income Housing* 1.97% Source: 1989 Massachusetts M u n i c i p a l P r o f i l e s Unless other-wise noted. C a t e g o r i e s d e r i v e d from U.S. Census data unless otherwise noted. * Source: E.O.C.D. l a t e s t a v a i l a b l e data. " i n d i c a t e s that a c i t y or town's housing p o l i c i e s have been reviewed by EOCD and, based upon demonstrated l o c a l housing e f f o r t s , the community was determined to be i n compliance with E x e c u t i v e Order 215. T h i s s t a t u s may change as a r e s u l t of subsequent EOCD review." (E.O.C.D. 1989, p.1) 143 impacts on a b u t t e r s . That d i d happen with one comprehensive permit. Rather than meeting with the p a r t n e r s h i p , they [the d e v e l o p e r s ] went r i g h t f o r the board of appeals. On the p a r t n e r s h i p , l o t s of people got i n v o l v e d . A wish l i s t gets put together, so that when i t comes to the p u b l i c h e a r i n g -. . . ' i f i t were next to my house' that s o r t of t h i n g gets addressed."(Pierndak, 1989) MB: "In what sense i s 40B a t o o l f o r l o c a l c o n t r o l ? " DP:"I don't see i t [40B] as a t o o l f o r l o c a l c o n t r o l . You have a t o o l a l r e a d y without the law. I t ' s g i v i n g developers e x t r a d e n s i t y . MB: "How f o r c e f u l has the s t a t e been with l o c a t i n g a f f o r d a b l e housing i n suburban communities?" DP: " I t depends on your p e r s p e c t i v e . I t ' s a runaway t r a i n s o r t of t h i n g . They c o u l d have been more f o r c e f u l . I don't t h i n k they've been o v e r l y f o r c e f u l . . . . T h e community has to have some say. But h i s t o r i c a l l y towns and s t a t e s were separated out l e g a l l y . Towns were c r e a t u r e s of the s t a t e to perform the s e r v i c e s sovereign to the s t a t e . They were c h i l d r e n of the s t a t e . . . A t the same time, there are e l e c t e d o f f i c i a l s at the s t a t e l e v e l to do something. I t ' s a f a c t of l i f e . " (Pierndak, 1989) The C h a i r of the Housing P a r t n e r s h i p ( a l s o the d i r e c t o r of the Housing A u t h o r i t y ) adds: JT: "Once funds were a v a i l a b l e , developers j u s t jumped i n . The s t a t e i t s e l f never had a working r e l a t i o n s h i p with d e v e l o p e r s . Some r e g u l a t i o n s were changed d a i l y . I t was an ongoing p r o c e s s . At one p o i n t i t appeared that the develop-ers had an upper hand. Then there was a change i n the law or i t s i n t e r p r e t a t i o n and towns' i n f l u e n c e became g r e a t e r , or at l e a s t became more eq u a l . I t was about 2 years ago....then i t became obvious that the developer d i d n ' t have i n f l u e n c e , though I'd say that the town thought they d i d . For example, i n i t i a l l y i f a developer went to the board of appeals and they r e j e c t e d him [ s i c ] , the developer went to the s t a t e and the s t a t e would grant the permit. That happened. But then the developer went to the s t a t e and the s t a t e s a i d go back and work out an agreement, you knew they weren't rubber stamping permits any more." ( T u l l y , 1989) The Town Manager p l a c e s 40B i n the context of an o v e r a l l process of s t a t e c e n t r a l i z a t i o n that i s l i m i t i n g l o c a l autonomy. He would l i k e more d i s c r e t i o n i n d e c i d i n g 1 4 4 what gets counted towards the 10% t h r e s h o l d . He f u r t h e r argues that the combination of Chapter 40B and P r o p o s i t i o n 2 1/2 i n c r e a s e s demand f o r l o c a l s e r v i c e s while i t decreases the a b i l i t y of Dracut to pay f o r them. " [ L o c a l autonomy] i s the a b i l i t y to c h a r t your owg d e s t i n y . From a comparative p o i n t of view between Maryland and here, There's l e s s home r u l e i n Massachusetts than Maryland. I t ' s an i s s u e of s e l f c o n t r o l . Massachusetts c h a r t e r s r e q u i r e referenda to be approved by the l e g i s l a t i v e body. The s t r u c t u r e of government: you can't i s s u e a tax b i l l without r a t e a p p r o v a l . Bond i s s u e s are r e g u l a t e d by the s t a t e . Property tax assessments are s u b j e c t to s t a t e review." (Pierndak, 1989) Dracut r e p r e s e n t s the c o n t r a d i c t i o n s i n any simple mapping of l o c a l autonomy onto a p o l i t i c a l community. While i t d e f i n e s i t s e l f r a t h e r h e l p l e s s l y as l a r g e l y a c r e a t u r e of the s t a t e - and a f i s c a l l y and p o l i t i c a l l y c o n s t r a i n e d one at t h a t - i t a l s o r e c o g n i z e s i t s l e g i s l a t i v e r e p r e s e n t a t i o n as par t of i t s r e s i s t a n c e to that f o r c e . The Housing P a r t n e r -s h i p C h a i r makes t h i s p o i n t most s t r o n g l y : " [ l o c a l autonomy] e x i s t s i n d i f f e r e n t ways i n d i f f e r e n t areas. The s t a t e i s i n f l u e n t i a l when i t comes to the p u b l i c school system or l o c a l a i d . Town always r e l i e s on the s t a t e . The town has as much i n f l u e n c e as i t c o u l d on zoning. There are t h i n g s that the town can do. How do we use l o c a l a i d ? Where are the c u t s made? The town has a s t a t e r e p r e s e n t a t i v e who can v o i c e town i s s u e s . . . I f you've s i n g l e d out a problem i n town, you go to the s t a t e rep." ( T u l l y , 1989) T h i s has a c t u a l l y happened with Chapter 40B. The Senators and R e p r e s e n t a t i v e s from the area have been a c t i v e i n c r e a t i n g a review committee on 40B to give communities more f l e x i b i l i t y and d i s c r e t i o n ( M i c e l l i , 1989; Gambon, The Dracut Town Manager used to work i n Maryland. 145 1987). P r e s e n t l y , amendments to that end are being d r a f t e d (Berry & Grace, 1989). Dracut d e f i n e s the s t a t e then as a dominant and o p p r e s s i v e f o r c e , seeing i t s r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s and Senators l e s s as a component of s t a t e power and more of t h e i r l o c a l r e s i s t a n c e . Yet c l e a r l y those i n d i v i d u a l s stand as both i n a network of f o r c e r e l a t i o n s between s t a t e and l o c a l . I t a l s o acknowledges that the s t a t e i s o b l i g e d to grant some modicum of l o c a l c o n t r o l , even i f i t l e g a l l y does not have t o . The c o n t r a d i c t i o n between l e g a l and p o l i t i c a l types of autonomy i s p o r t r a y e d as the d i s c r e p a n c y between p o l i t i c a l theory and r e a l i t y by the Town Manager. I would suggest that together they t h e o r e t i c a l l y represent a d i a l e c t i c of autonomy through l o c a l l y - d e f i n e d s o c i a l r e l a t i o n s . Even w i t h i n p o l i t i c a l autonomy there i s c o n t r a d i c t i o n f o r Dracut. Both the Housing P a r t n e r s h i p D i r e c t o r and the Town Manager acknowledged the symbolic s i g n i f i c a n c e of town meeting in Dracut. Town a d m i n i s t r a t i o n , however, has many problems with t h i s form of d i r e c t r e p r e s e n t a t i o n v i s - a - v i s autonomy "As p o p u l a t i o n [ i n town] goes up, problems go up, revenue has to go up. You need to be more c r e a t i v e . Smaller towns have town meetings, but town meeting i s a r c h a i c . We have a town of 25,000 and we're h o l d i n g town meeting i n the high school a u d i t o r i u m . Maybe 500 people show up- a m i n o r i t y r e p r e -sented. Town meeting i s c o n t r o l l e d by s p e c i a l i n t e r e s t groups. I t ' s more important to people who have been here-the n a t i v e s who grew up i n Dracut. I t ' s a b i g i n s t i t u t i o n . " (Pierndak, 1989) 1 46 The Town C l e r k agrees: "Town meetings are going through an e v o l u t i o n a r y p r o c e s s , because you're always g r a s p i n g at straws at town meetings. B i l l e r i c a has moved to a r e p r e s e n t a t i v e town meeting. Methuen has become the C i t y of Methuen with no town meeting and a c i t y c o u n c i l . As time goes on [the n a t i v e s ] they want to h o l d onto t h i s day and age that doesn't e x i s t any more. You j u s t can't have an e f f i c i e n c y with a budget. They can move t h i n g s around [ t h a t bureaucrats have spent months bud g e t i n g ] . (McCarthy, 1989) These quotes r e p r e s e n t the danger i n s o l e l y a s c r i b i n g an economic r a t i o n a l i t y t o p o l i t i c a l i n t e r a c t i o n . J u s t as the p o l i t i c a l , l e g a l and f i s c a l r e l a t i o n s of autonomy have been bracketed i n Dracut, as i n the s c h o l a r l y l i t e r a t u r e , the l i n k s between the way i n which i n d i v i d u a l s a s s o c i a t e to d e f i n e themselves as a p o l i t i c a l community i s r e l e g a t e d to a l e v e l of i n e f f i c i e n t symbolism by town management. T h i s c o n t e s t demonstrates the c o n t r a d i c t o r y f o r c e s w i t h i n suburban p o l i t i c a l c u l t u r e that h e l p to c o n s t i t u t e that p l a c e : are New England suburbs meant to be e f f i c i e n t s e r v i c e p r o v i d e r s or v e s t i g e s of d i r e c t democracy? How that q u e s t i o n i s answered i n Dracut r e l a t e s d i r e c t l y to whether or not the town i s p o t e n t i a l l y autonomous. e. v. Hanson Hanson i s l o c a t e d o f f Route 128 South, near Route 3 (see F i g u r e One). L i k e Dracut, i t i s more of a blue c o l l a r community than Weston or L i n c o l n . Much of the town used to work i n c r a n b e r r y h a r v e s t i n g or i n the Brockton shoe f a c -t o r i e s before both i n d u s t r i e s r e l o c a t e d . Pockets of a former Yankee a r i s t o c r a c y are s c a t t e r e d through Hanson, but few 147 Table V. Summary S t a t i s t i c s f o r Hanson, Massachusetts 1980 P o p u l a t i o n 8,617 1986 P o p u l a t i o n 9,010 1990 P r o j e c t e d Pop 9,426 Percent Non White 4% Percent Households R e c e i v i n g P u b l i c A i d 1979 7% Persons i n Poverty, 1979 366 Median Family Income, 1979 $21,658 % Managers & P r o f e s s i o n a l s 1979 23% % T e c h n i c a l , Sales & Admin-i s t r a t i v e Support 29% S e r v i c e Occupations 13% Farming, F i s h i n g , F o r e s t r y 0.004% P r e c i s i o n P r o d u c t i o n C r a f t & Repair 14% Operators, F a b r i c a t o r s & Labourers 13% Self-Employed Persons 5% % Democrat 1 988 29% % Republican 16% % Independent 56% V a l u a t i o n of R e s i d e n t i a l Taxable Property 1988 ( i n m i l l i o n s ) $205.60 Rate (per $1000 of assessed v a l u a t i o n ) $17.62 T o t a l Land Area 15.82 sq. mi. 1989 Status V i s - a - V i s E.O. 215* "FULFILLING COMMITMENTS" 1985 % Low & Moderate Income Housing* 2.61% Source: 1989 Massachusetts M u n i c i p a l P r o f i l e s Unless other-wise noted. C a t e g o r i e s d e r i v e d from U.S. Census data u n l e s s otherwise noted. * Source: E.O.C.D. l a t e s t a v a i l a b l e data. See supra note 4 f o r d e f i n i t i o n . 148 Route 128 e x e c u t i v e s c a l l the town home (Brown, 1989; C o l l i n s , 1989). Small and r u r a l i s how the town c a s t s i t s e l f . I t l i e s j u s t o u t s i d e of the h i g h t e c h highway purview. Hanson has a 1986 p o p u l a t i o n of 9,010. I t i s a l s o l a b e l l e d " c o n s e r v a t i v e " and p o l i t i c a l l y a p a t h e t i c . Independents dominate, while democrats s l i g h t l y edge r e p u b l i c a n s i n town. S t a t i s t i c s i n Table F i v e demonstrate these p o i n t s . L i k e Weston, Hanson views i t s e l f as f i s c a l l y r e s p o n s i b l e but more out of neces-s i t y than to any deep commitment to p o l i t i c a l p hilosophy ( C o l l i n s , 1989). Hanson went through an education process on a f f o r d a b l e housing i n the 1980s. I t a l r e a d y had a housing a u t h o r i t y and a p r o j e c t f o r the e l d e r l y , but i t was not q u i t e ready f o r i t s f i r s t comprehensive permit a p p l i c a t i o n i n 1980. Indeed, when the developer submitted the a p p l i c a t i o n , the Zoning Board of Appeals had to turn to the General Laws and look up whether such a permit a c t u a l l y e x i s t e d . Hearing that H.A.C. r a r e l y found i n favour of the towns, the Z.B.A. acq u i e s c e d and granted the permit, t h i n k i n g i t had no standing whatsoever i n denying the permit. There was a sense of panic and fear i n the town. People worried Hanson would become "another Columbia P o i n t , " an infamously t r o u b l e d p u b l i c housing p r o j e c t i n Boston ( C o l l i n s , 1989). F i n a n c i n g never came through, so the development was never a c t u a l l y b u i l t . With no other a c t i o n s taken on 149 a f f o r d a b l e housing, by 1986 Hanson r e c e i v e d a warning from E.O.C.D. th a t i t was i n danger of l o s i n g s t a t e funds v i a E x e c u t i v e Order 215. One of the f i r s t steps the town took was to h i r e a f u l l time e x e c u t i v e s e c r e t a r y and a town planner. Part of the problem i n Hanson ( l i k e Weston) was t h a t i t was r e l y i n g too h e a v i l y on p a r t time i n e x p e r i e n c e d s t a f f or v o l u n t e e r s . The E x e c u t i v e S e c r e t a r y r e c a l l s : "When I f i r s t came to town we were i n limbo/hot water with 215. One of the f i r s t t h i n g s I d i d was to meet with the s t a t e . We needed the money. Consequently, we bargained. I needed a town planner. We a p p l i e d f o r a grant, got i t , and h i r e d the planner. Then we made an agreement with the s t a t e . Hanson would make a c o n c e r t e d e f f o r t to do low and moderate income housing. We would t r y to reach the goal of 250 u n i t s . At the time we had 68... The next step was to put together a p l a n . The s t a t e was pushing the H.O.P. (homeownership o p p o r t u n i t y plan) so we became a housing p a r t n e r s h i p com-munity. "Me and the town planner put together a p l a n . We were not going to wait f o r a developer to come along. There was a l o t of f e a r and apprehension. We wanted to set the agenda. We d i d n ' t f e e l that the town c o u l d donate the land; we f i g u r e d we c o u l d do i t under a p r i v a t e developer." (Nugent, 1990) The Town Planner echoed t h i s c a l l f o r autonomy: "We put together an R.F.P. We wanted to have the c o n t r o l . We got f i v e a p p l i c a n t s , none were a c c e p t a b l e : no experience, no t r a c k r e c o r d , none had done housing. We sent i t out a second time and got three p r o p o s a l s back, and agreed on the one. (O'Toole, 1989) " A f t e r they went before the Board of Selectmen [ s i c ] they came before the Planning Board. They gave a p r e s e n t a t i o n on what the p r o j e c t would c o n s i s t o f , how many u n i t s , what they wanted to do. To be p e r f e c t l y honest with you, the Planning Board d i d not think that they were showing us enough. Under that Chapter [40b] the developer only has to submit a very, very p r e l i m i n a r y sketch; and t h i s was very, very p r e l i m i n a r y . And we wanted more meats and potatoes, we r e a l l y d i d . So we asked them to come back. They weren't r e a l l y p l e a s e d . " "The board of appeals h i r e d an engineer and we s t a r t e d from the beginning, reviewing t h i s . The developers were not very 150 happy, now because we were e s t a b l i s h i n g c o n t r o l . I f you're gonna b r i n g e i g h t y - e i g h t u n i t s i n t o our community and impact us we want a c l a s s p r o j e c t : a p r o j e c t that i f we ever decide to accept t h i s , we don't want a headache out t h e r e , we don't f i s c a l l y have the money to handle t h i s p r o j e c t . " Each of the town boards met with the developers and made i t c l e a r that there were s e r i o u s i s s u e s ( c h i e f l y over wetlands). D e s p i t e pressure from the Board of Selectmen [ s i c ] , eager to "do something" about housing to maintain s t a t e a i d , the town boards h e l d t h e i r ground and the develop-e r s m o d i f i e d t h e i r p r o p o s a l s . Town government had shown e f f o r t , as per agreement with the s t a t e . The town u t i l i z e d E.O.C.D grants to study s p e c i f i c s of the plan which i t c o u l d not have done f i s c a l l y on i t s own. The s t a t e r e c o g n i z e d Hanson was r a i s i n g l e g i t i m a t e concerns, and supported i t s i n s i s t e n c e on more d e t a i l s from the developer. The town boards were even making concerted e f f o r t s ( l i k e L i n c o l n ) to educate the l o c a l p u b l i c as to what the development would be, and what i t would look l i k e . Had the developers f o r c e d the process and Hanson denied the permit, the town would have been i n very good standing with H.A.C. because of i t s s i n c e r e e f f o r t s . The d i a l e c t i c of autonomy and heteronomy i n 40B i s a l s o e v ident i n the Hanson case. The town recognized that i t c o u l d no longer ignore the i s s u e of a f f o r d a b l e housing. Given that broad c o n s t r a i n t , however, the town has fought to c o n t r o l w i t h i n that boundary: MB: "Is Chapter 40B a t o o l f o r l o c a l c o n t r o l ? " 1 5 1 NO: "We've used i t as a t o o l f o r l o c a l c o n t r o l . I'm not sure that i t i s . I think i t ' s more or l e s s a t o o l f o r s t a t e c o n t r o l . I t h i n k i t s t a r t e d out as a s t a t e t o o l . And I t h i n k that the d i s c r e t i o n a r y power depends on the town. And I t h i n k the s t a t e set f o r t h a s i t u a t i o n where the town does have more power today. In the beginning i t was b a s i c a l l y the s t a t e : you do t h i s and t h a t ' s i t . But now with the s i t e plan approval process and l e t t e r s of recommendation I t h i n k the town has more c o n t r o l today, and the s t a t e has given t h a t . In the beginning I t h i n k the s t a t e had a l l the power. I t h i n k the town has fought f o r that power, though. The more educated towns ar e - the towns that happen to know more about the law- the b e t t e r o f f they a r e . I t h i n k the town of Hanson r e a l l y fought f o r t h a t . We fought f o r our s t a n d i n g . We've educated o u r s e l v e s . So i t probably i s a c o n t r o l i s s u e f o r us. But we f e e l l i k e the s t a t e i s our back up. We don't f e e l l i k e they're the l e a d e r . We're the leader and they're our back up, because i t ' s our community. And I t h i n k the s t a t e wants the towns to take c o n t r o l because they don't want the headache. They want you to c r e a t e that housing. We have had tremendous support from the s t a t e . We've worked hand i n hand with the s t a t e . I've used a l l the programs. I've r e c e i v e d funding from a l l the programs.... So we were so a g g r e s s i v e and they were respo n s i v e to us. We have a super r e l a t i o n s h i p . And people say that Hanson i s a great town to work with." (O'Toole, 1989) Hanson has l e a r n e d not only that i t needs to do something, but a l s o ( u n l i k e Dracut and Weston) that i t can w i l l f u l l y and e f f e c t i v e l y c o n t r o l the process to an a c c e p t a b l e degree. Town boards can do t h e i r jobs i n s p i t e of pressure to get the housing b u i l t "or e l s e " . "We never f e l t f o r c e d on t h i s [development]. We never f e l t t hat we had to c r e a t e a f f o r d a b l e housing. I t h i n k t h a t ' s important because a l o t of towns f e e l that they have to do t h i s . We never f e l t l i k e that because we f e l t we had e v e r y t h i n g i n l i n e , and i f t h i s d i d n ' t work out t h e r e ' d be another p r o j e c t to come along that perhaps would. But we wanted to c r e a t e the housing.... I f you don't have your act together you f e e l i n secure about anything you do, but i f you have your act together you can set t h i n g s i n l i n e . -... I n t e r e s t i n g l y enough when the developer came i n , he was very s u r p r i s e d at what the boards knew. They j u s t thought they would f l y through; they were shocked they were asked f o r a d d i t i o n a l i n f o r m a t i o n . " (O'Toole, 1989) 152 Evidence from Hanson c o u l d support C l a r k and Dear's t h e s i s t hat l o c a l autonomy i s e s s e n t i a l l y a sham- that r e a l l y the s t a t e holds a l l the power. But t h a t i n t e r p r e t a t i o n d e l i b e r a t e l y s i l e n c e s the way i n which s t a t e and l o c a l were " r e a l l y " made to be i n a geographic c o n t e x t . The s t a t e p o r t r a y s Hanson as formerly scared and i l l - e q u i p p e d to d e a l with d e v e l o p e r s . In a ra t h e r p a r e n t a l f a s h i o n , i t o f f e r e d a s s i s t a n c e and advice to Hanson. The town took a s u b s e r v i e n t r o l e to the s t a t e , f e a r i n g the l o s s of money. But i t a l s o e x h i b i t e d i n i t i a t i v e and c o n t r o l i n i t s own r i g h t . I t rec o g n i z e d the r e a l i t y of f i s c a l c o n s t r a i n t s as w e l l as l o c a l demand f o r housing and a c t e d a c c o r d i n g l y . S t a t e a s s i s t a n c e was c o n t i n g e n t on t h i s i n i t i a t i v e . The s t a t e was reproduced as dominant only i n a general sense; Hanson carved out an autonomy of i t s own s p e c i f i c a l l y . The town now sees i t s e l f as a b i t more r e s p o n s i b l e and a s s e r t i v e . I t i s not h e l p l e s s , backward p l a c e with i l l -d e f i n e d g o a l s . There i s a co n f i d e n c e that i t can d e a l with developers and an acknowledgement that the town does need a f f o r d a b l e housing. In t u r n , Hanson i s c i t e d as an example of how towns can e x h i b i t l o c a l autonomy ( C a n e l l o s , 1989). The p o i n t made i s that there i s the p o t e n t i a l f o r autonomy i f the law i s not ignored or misunderstood. Hanson has thus earned a r e p u t a t i o n throughout the Commonwealth (e.g. Brown, 1989). T h i s d e f i n i t i o n and r e d e f i n i t i o n process was a dimension of the town's experience with Chapter 40B; the town 153 was not simply duped by the s t a t e . f . Summary and Comments Dear and C l a r k (1980, 1981) conclude that l o c a l autonomy does not a c t u a l l y vary from p l a c e to p l a c e . T h e o r e t i c a l l y , the s t a t e r e i g n s supreme. More recent work on the geographic v a r i a b i l i t y of p u b l i c p o l i c y would c h a l l e n g e such a c o n c l u s i o n based on i t s r e l i a n c e on a c o n t e x t u a l , a s p a t i a l s o c i a l theory. The evidence presented here s p e c i f i -c a l l y c onfirms the v a r i a b i l i t y of l o c a l autonomy, and v a l i d a t e s the use of c o n t e x t u a l , s p a t i a l i z e d s o c i a l theory. I t does more. I t demonstrates the d i a l e c t i c of autonomy and heteronomy through the d i v e r s i t y of experiences with 40B. That i s , how l o c a l communities were or were not autonomous v a r i e d c o n t e x t u a l l y . What remained c o n s i s t e n t was the way i n which the d i a l e c t i c was e v i n c e d . How p l a c e s - as r e i f i e d s e t s of s o c i a l r e l a t i o n s - were made and remade as powerful or powerless produced p a t t e r n s of autonomy/-heteronomy. The s t a t e has d e f i n e d autonomous towns as r e s p o n s i b l e ones. I t has c r e a t e d t h i s t r u t h . I t has d e f i n e d i t s own r o l e and d e f i n e s towns as having t h e i r own r o l e to p l a y as w e l l . L o c a l debate over these t r u t h s p e r s i s t s i n s u b u r b i a , but most people i n t e r v i e w e d agreed that l o c a l i t i e s do have the p o t e n t i a l f o r autonomy under c u r r e n t housing p o l i c i e s . The l o c a l i t i e s a c t i v e l y made themselves as w e l l . In Weston, the town c l a i m s i t has l i t t l e autonomy. Yet a b u t t e r s 1 5 4 have s u c c e s s f u l l y drawn out the p r o j e c t where the l o c a l s t a t e c o u l d not h a l t i t . Weston i s opening up very s l o w l y while c l a i m i n g a moral high ground that stakes i t s autonomy. I t w i l l have l i t t l e to do with i r r e s p o n s i b l e laws. L i n c o l n ' s l o c a l c u l t u r e a l s o d e f i n e d the way i n which i t responded to the housing c r i s i s , and i n turn t h i s context allowed the town to c o n t r o l the development process and escape from f u t u r e H.A.C. o v e r r i d e s . Dracut's beleaguered l o c a l s t a t e c l a i m s l i t t l e autonomy- d e f i n i n g i t as the l i t e r a t u r e has, and thus denies any i n i t i a t i v e . Yet the a b i l i t y of i t s S t a t e Re-p r e s e n t a t i v e to review and amend the law suggests Dracut has a modicum of autonomy. F i n a l l y , the education process i n Hanson was not a simple duping by the s t a t e , but an accom-modation of s t a t e p o l i c y with an understanding of l o c a l i s s u e s and demands. Armed with that knowledge, Hanson c o u l d e f f e c t i v e l y exert c o n t r o l over the development p r o c e s s . D e f i n i n g the l o c a l as s o l e l y the l o c a l s t a t e e r e c t s somewhat a r b i t r a r y and s t a t i o n a r y p a r t i t i o n s between l o c a l government, s t a t e government and the l o c a l p o l i t y . T h i s kind of d e f i n i t i o n was of l i t t l e use i n i n v e s t i g a t i n g Mas-sac h u s e t t s suburbs, where a l t r u i s t i c democracy means many town r e s i d e n t s " o f f e r themselves up" f o r p u b l i c s e r v i c e i n the s p i r i t of community. As each of the towns h e l d town meetings, the l o c a l c i t i z e n s a l s o played the r o l e of the town l e g i s l a t u r e . The a c t i v i t i e s of a b u t t e r s b l u r s t h i s d i s t i n c -t i o n as w e l l . Where the l o c a l s t a t e cannot a c t , the p o l i t y 155 can i n the i n t e r e s t of the l o c a l . The l o c a l i s a l s o r e -presented at the s t a t e l e v e l i n the House of R e p r e s e n t a t i v e s and the Senate. Simultaneously, the l o c a l s t a t e i s p a r t of a c a p i t a l i s t s t a t e apparatus. For example, I have heard of cases where the l o c a l s t a t e was a c t u a l l y i n favour of the development, c o n t r a r y to the wishes of the l o c a l p o l i t y . They purposely denied the permit, and encouraged the developer to appeal. In t h i s way, the s t a t e "takes the d i v e " while l o c a l o f f i c i a l s r e t a i n t h e i r l o c a l support (Korman, 1989; Nolan, 1989). In a l l cases, the l o c a l d i d conform to Massachusetts housing p o l i c y - i t s e l f d e r i v e d from a c o n t r a d i c t i o n i n the c a p i t a l i s t economy. These three s e t s of s o c i a l r e l a t i o n s (the l o c a l s t a t e , the s t a t e and the p o l i t y ) are not neces- s a r i l y d i s c r e t e and d i s t i n c t , though they can be r e i f i e d as separate, d i s t i n c t and autonomous. Hence the emphasis on the way i n which " l o c a l " i s c r e a t e d i s the optimal way to i n v e s t i g a t e " l o c a l " autonomy. A c o r p o r e a l , commodified theory of power c o u l d not accommodate the e m p i r i c a l evidence above. To be sure l o c a l i t i e s were r e i f i e d as powerful or powerless, but that process was executed through a network of f o r c e r e l a t i o n s . There was c l e a r l y s t a t e domination (through l e g a l , p o l i t i c a l and f i s c a l means), but there were a l s o l o c a l s t r a t e g i e s , t a c t i c s and r e s i s t a n c e s to that domination. Power was eminently t i e d to t r u t h c l a i m s . I t s e x e r c i s e was f a r more 1 5 6 complex than the s t a t e merely g r a n t i n g or r e s c i n d i n g power, because the way i n which the e n t i t i e s " s t a t e " and " l o c a l " were d e f i n e d - a c t i v e l y and i n s t i t u t i o n a l l y - were not grand t h e o r i e s but c a p i l l a r y and " l o c a l " e x e r c i s e s of power. 157 CHAPTER SIX CONCLUSION: A RECONCEPTUALIZED THEORY a. E p i l o g u e : Chapter 40B i n 1990 In the face of mounting pressure from suburbs deluged with comprehensive permit a p p l i c a t i o n s , a s p e c i a l l e g i s l a t i v e task f o r c e on 40B was commissioned i n 1988 (Berry & Grace, 1989). A f t e r months of p u b l i c h earings a c r o s s the Common-wealth, i t concluded i t s study with four recommendations: 1. E.O.C.D would recognize " l o c a l i n i t i a t i v e s " whereby l o c a l -i t i e s themselves c o n s t r u c t housing; 2. L o c a l i t i e s c o u l d d e v i s e a l o c a l housing p l a n . Such a plan would e s t a b l i s h " l o c a l needs" c r i t e r i a by which Z.B.As c o u l d r e j e c t a comprehensive permit i f i t was not c o n s i s t e n t with a reason-a b l e l o c a l p l a n ; 3. E.O.C.D would c l a r i f y the 40B process and educate l o c a l boards and commissions. I t would monitor the pr o d u c t i o n of a f f o r d a b l e housing more c o n s i s t e n t l y than i t has i n the pa s t ; 4. The Governor would make a f f o r d a b l e housing p r o d u c t i o n a p r i o r i t y , d i m i n i s h i n g the l i k e l i h o o d t h a t l o c a l i t i e s would be caught between c o n f l i c t i n g s t a t e aims. These recommendations are being implemented p r e s e n t l y . An economic downturn i n the s t a t e , and an ensuing f i s c a l c r i s i s i n s t a t e government, however, f o r c e d M.H.F.A and E.O.C.D. to cut subsidy programmes (Nolan, 1989). There i s no longer a spate of comprehensive permit a p p l i c a t i o n s i n sub u r b i a . What i s so i n t e r e s t i n g about the committee's recommen-158 d a t i o n s i s that they are not new p o i n t s or i d e a s . Chapter F i v e o f f e r s evidence f o r the implementation of each one of those recommendations. L i n c o l n and Hanson developed t h e i r own housing p l a n s . L i n c o l n i s b u i l d i n g i t s own development without r e l y i n g on the s t a t e . The Commonwealth f e l t i t made housing p r o d u c t i o n a top p r i o r i t y through the 1980s through a v a r i e t y of p o l i c i e s , though Weston d i s a g r e e s . Hanson u t i l i z e d the a v a i l a b l e resources and data from E.O.C.D., while p l a c e s l i k e Dracut and Weston d i d not. What i s novel about the recommendations i s the manner in which they b o l s t e r c r e d i b i l i t y to l o c a l i n i t i a t i v e s . The recommendations are nothing new, but they represent a new, l e g i t i m a t e way f o r the s t a t e and l o c a l i t i e s to d e f i n e the l o c a l as autonomous. Whereas before these p o i n t s were s t a t e recommendations to the l o c a l s , now they have been a r r i v e d at  through consensus. The d i f f e r e n c e i s not merely i n p o l i t i c a l s t r a t e g i e s , i t i s a l s o i n the d i f f e r e n t way that power r e l a t i o n s between s t a t e and l o c a l i t y are used to d e f i n e those p l a c e s . In the former case, the s t a t e holds a negat i v e , co-o p t i v e and manipu l a t i n g power. In the l a t t e r case the s t a t e i s made powerful i n a c o - o p t i v e and manipu l a t i n g way, but so too i s the l o c a l made powerful through c o u n t e r p o i n t and c h a l l e n g e . I t becomes l e g i t i m a t e f o r the l o c a l to c o n t r i b u t e to the amendment of 40B, i t s nemesis. The power of the s t a t e i s not denied, but i t i s c h a l l e n g e d and r e s i s t e d by the l o c a l . 159 b. L o c a l Autonomy Re c o n c e p t u a l i z e d The update to the 40B s t o r y above b r i n g s t h i s t h e s i s f u l l c i r c l e . The major p o i n t I propose i s that concep-t u a l i z a t i o n s of l o c a l autonomy must begin not with the q u e s t i o n "what are l o c a l i t i e s autonomous from?" but r a t h e r "how are l o c a l i t i e s autonomous or heteronomous?". S t a r t i n g with the l a t t e r q u e s t i o n allows the i s s u e of l o c a l autonomy to be p l a c e d s q u a r e l y w i t h i n a t h e o r e t i c a l r a t h e r than an e m p i r i c a l realm. Such p o s i t i o n i n g i s important because too great of an e m p i r i c a l focus on l o c a l autonomy has u s e l e s s l y bracketed "types" of autonomy: f i s c a l , p o l i t i c a l , and l e g a l without c o n c e p t u a l l y i n t e g r a t i n g them. They are not d i f -f e r e n t autonomies, but d i f f e r e n t dimensions of the same phenomenon. Hence there i s a danger i n c o n c e p t u a l l y d i s e n -t a n g l i n g phenomena whose very i n t e g r a t i o n i s t h e o r e t i c a l l y s i g n i f i c a n t (Ley, 1989). F u r t h e r , these brackets l e a d to f a l s e l y s t r a i g h t f o r w a r d c o n c l u s i o n s about the extent of autonomy i n U.S. l o c a l i t i e s . I do not deny that l o c a l i t i e s l a c k autonomy from the law, c a p i t a l i s m or the c a p i t a l i s t s t a t e , p o l i t i c s or f e d e r a l i s m . C e r t a i n l y they do not. But t h e i r p o s i t i o n v i s - a - v i s s t a t e s cannot be reduced down to a d m i n i s t r a t i v e sub apparatuses, c o n f l i c t - d e f l e c t i o n mechanisms, or convenient l a c k e y s . The l o c a l holds a p l e t h o r a of meanings as i t s i d e n t i t y i s woven through a v a r i e t y of d i s c o u r s e s . Simply put, there i s more than one set of t r u t h c l a i m s o p e r a t i n g over "the l o c a l " . 1 6 0 These c l a i m s , sometimes r e i n f o r c i n g but o f t e n c o n t r a d i c t o r y , f o s t e r d i s p u t e and debate over the e x i s t e n c e of " l o c a l autonomy". B u i l d i n g on t h i s p o i n t , I demonstrated the need to r e c o n c e p t u a l i z e l o c a l autonomy such that the terms " l o c a l " and "autonomy" r e l a t e d to one another. " L o c a l " r e f e r s to p l a c e : a meaningful set of s o c i a l r e l a t i o n s r e l a t i v e to a geographic c o n t e x t . The l o c a l s t a t e , the t y p i c a l purview of e x i s t i n g t h e o r i e s of l o c a l autonomy, i s one set of those s o c i a l r e l a t i o n s , but i t does not stand i n i s o l a t i o n . "Autonomy" i s s e l f - r u l e . I t i s a term which should be used not to deny or negate an o b j e c t s ' p o s i t i o n i n a web of f o r c e r e l a t i o n s . The concept suggests that i n a d d i t i o n to being p a r t of a network of power, the l o c a l a l s o has i n t e g r i t y i n and of i t s e l f . That i s , a l o c a l i t y cannot be reduced to the network i n which i t i s l o c a t e d . How the l o c a l c o n t r o l s or r u l e s i t s e l f i s fundamentally wrapped up i n the i s s u e of how i t d e f i n e s i t s e l f v i s - a - v i s a concept of power. I l a b e l l e d t h i s d e f i n i t i o n process "place making": a s o c i a l process by which s e t s of s o c i a l r e l a t i o n s bound to a geographic concept are bundled with meaning and i d e n t i t y through power. A c r u c i a l step i n t h i s process i s r e i f i c a t i o n , i n which the a b s t r a c t p l a c e i s d i s t a n c e d and o b j e c t i f i e d from those who c o n s t i t u t e i t s r e l a t i o n s . By d i s t a n c i n g p l a c e from i n d i v i d u a l or group r o l e s , the p l a c e becomes a d i f f e r e n t e n t i t y ; i t takes on i t s own o n t o l o g i c a l 161 s t a t u s . Truths about the r e l a t i o n between power and p l a c e inform t h i s a c t i v e process of p l a c e making. In order to capture these r e l a t i o n s of power, conven-t i o n a l t h e o r i e s of power were abandoned. Power was t r e a t e d as a network of f o r c e r e l a t i o n s i n s o c i e t y . Although the r e i f i c a t i o n process demonstrates a c t o r s ' and i n s t i t u t i o n s ' w i l l to t r e a t power as an exchangeable, c o r p o r e a l e n t i t y , the place-making process i t s e l f i s best understood through a c i r c u l a t o r y and r e l a t i o n a l theory of power. T h i s p e r s p e c t i v e does not deny the o p p r e s s i v e , domineering "top-down" v e c t o r s of f o r c e . Rather, i t s i t u a t e s those f o r c e s r e l a t i v e t o s t r a t e g i e s of r e s i s t a n c e , c h a l l e n g e , r e c l a m a t i o n , and ignorance (the "bottom-up" v e c t o r s ) . T h i s r e l a t i o n a l view of power captures the importance of t r u t h c l a i m s which are used to d e f i n e p l a c e s and t h e i r proper r e l a t i o n s between each another. Power and t r u t h inform the a c t i v e place-making process and the r e i f i c a t i o n s of s o c i a l r e l a t i o n s , as the l o c a l becomes d e f i n e d i n both "powerful" and "powerless" ways. The s i m u l t a n e i t y of these f o r c e s thus suggests that autonomy and heteronomy must be viewed as d i a l e c t i c a l , not mutually e x c l u s i v e c a t e g o r i e s . The Massachusetts A n t i Snob Zoning Law p r o v i d e d a v e h i c l e to probe the i n t r i c a c i e s of t h i s d i a l e c t i c . Conven-t i o n a l t h e o r i e s of l o c a l autonomy would recognize i t and E x e c u t i v e Order 215 as means by which a s t a t e r e s c i n d s l o c a l autonomy. They would appear to be abatements of l e g a l and 1 62 f i s c a l autonomy i n a t y p i c a l l o c a l purview: land use r e g u l a -t i o n . The l i t e r a t u r e on suburban p o l i t i c s and i d e n t i t y , as w e l l as the t e x t of the b i l l and i t s outcome i n four towns c h a l l e n g e d such a s i m p l i s t i c r e a d i n g . Suburbia i s a s i t e of power and p r i v i l e g e i n American c u l t u r e and p o l i t i c s to the extent t h a t i t confounds the s i m p l i c i t y of D i l l o n ' s Rule. L o c a l autonomy, as I demonstrated i n Chapter Four, was a c t u a l l y w r i t t e n i n t o the t e x t of Chapter 40B. The b i l l ' s outcome must be understood as a n e g o t i a t e d outcome of c o n t e x t u a l c u l t u r a l and p o l i t i c a l f o r c e s of the day and the a r e a . I t s authors a l s o represented broader s o c i a l f o r c e s i n a more a b s t r a c t sense. Through 40B, they debated the proper s o c i a l o r g a n i z a t i o n of American s o c i e t y . More to the p o i n t , t h e i r arguments represented a dimension of the place-making process, as t h e o r i e s of p l a c e s informed these debates and, i n t u r n , became i n s t r u m e n t a l i z e d through the l e g i s l a t i v e p r o c e s s . That p l a c e s were and ought to be autonomous was h e l d to be t r u e throughout these debates. The "law-space nexus" was examined i n Chapter F i v e (Blomley, 1989b). How a b s t r a c t law becomes l i v e d i n a geographic context was thus conveyed. The p o i n t of the chapter was to demonstrate that the r e i f i c a t i o n process inherent i n the i n t e r a c t i o n between s t a t e and l o c a l i t y i s imbued with l o c a l power. C e r t a i n l y there i s s t a t e domina-t i o n , and hence l o c a l heteronomy; but there are a l s o l o c a l 1 6 3 s t r a t e g i e s of r e s i s t a n c e , reclamation and ignorance that underscore a l o c a l autonomy. The i n t e r a c t i o n between p l a c e s makes and remakes the l o c a l v i s - a - v i s power and t r u t h c l a i m s . The four case study suburbs demonstrate a v a r i a b i l i t y i n the autonomy/heteronomy d i a l e c t i c to be sure, but they a l l demonstrate that d i a l e c t i c n e v e r t h e l e s s . c. The U t i l i t y of the Place P e r s p e c t i v e f o r L o c a l Autonomy  S t u d i e s T h i s r e c o n c e p t u a l i z e d theory of l o c a l autonomy i s u s e f u l f o r a number of reasons. F i r s t , i t e x p l i c i t l y l i n k s d i s p a r a t e e m p i r i c a l work on l o c a l power. F i s c a l , p o l i t i c a l , and l e g a l autonomies were t r e a t e d as i d e a l types because they are the consequences of ad hoc t h e o r i e s of l o c a l autonomy which I wished to i n t e g r a t e . Second, l o c a l p o l i t i c a l a n a l y s i s can b e n e f i t from a r e f i n e d theory of l o c a l autonomy because i t more a c c u r a t e l y c a p t u r e s not only the p o l i t i c a l dimensions to these r e l a -t i o n s , but a l s o t h e i r geographic s i d e as w e l l . American l o c a l p o l i t i c a l a n a l y s i s o f t e n l a c k s a c o n t e x t u a l i z e d t h e o r e t i c a l approach, s e r v i n g to reproduce an unnecessary chasm between theory and em p i r i c s (witness the community power debates of the s i x t i e s and s e v e n t i e s , or the urban heteronomy/suburban autonomy problematic d i s c u s s e d i n chapter two). C o n t e x t u a l i z e d s o c i a l theory and a p l a c e - p e r s p e c t i v e on p o l i t i c s can transcend t h i s dualism. T h i r d , t h i s theory a l s o e x p l i c i t l y r e l a t e s power to 1 6 4 t h a t which the term " l o c a l autonomy" s p e c i f i e s : the l o c a l . In t h i s way the term d e f i n e s what i t ought t o : the autonomy  of the l o c a l , r a t h e r than the l o c a l s t a t e or some key agent t h e r e i n . T h i s theory thus j o i n s geographic and p o l i t i c a l t h e o r i e s of p l a c e and p o l i t i c s . P l a c e s are s o c i a l l y con-s t r u c t e d r e l a t i v e to t r u t h and knowledge cl a i m s about the s t a t u s quo i n s o c i e t y . T h i s o f t e n t a c i t process i s h a r d l y n e u t r a l , even i f the subsequent debate over how p l a c e s should be i s rooted i n consensual themes of American p o l i t i c a l t h eory. R e c a l l that nowhere i n the e m p i r i c a l c h a p t e r s d i d any interviewee deny a s i g n i f i c a n c e to l o c a l autonomy, even i f they debated how, when, or why i t should be e v i n c e d . For these reasons, t h i s r e c o n c e p t u a l i z e d theory of l o c a l autonomy i s u s e f u l i n c a p t u r i n g the complexity, s u b t l e t y , d i v e r s i t y , and v a r i a b i l i t y of s t a t e - l o c a l r e l a t i o n s i n U.S. p o l i t i c s , where more c o n v e n t i o n a l t h e o r i e s have g l o s s e d over these p o i n t s . Most i m p o r t a n t l y , t h i s t h e s i s c h a l l e n g e s e x i s t i n g c o n c l u s i o n s about l o c a l autonomy. I t renders them incomplete and o v e r s i m p l i f i e d . Power must be viewed r e l a t i o n a l l y to understand both the descending and ascending v e c t o r s of f o r c e i n any s o c i a l r e l a t i o n . The q u e s t i o n , "who got what, when, where, why, and how?"; the mainstay of c o n v e n t i o n a l p o l i t i c a l a n a l y s i s ; leads to a s o l e focus on the nega t i v e , dominant, and c o n s t r a i n i n g f o r c e s i n p o l i t i c s . To complete the accuracy of p o l i t i c a l i n q u i r y , the c o n s t i t u t i v e dimension of 165 p o l i t i c s and i t s r o l e i n reproducing the s o c i a l f a b r i c must a l s o be c o n s i d e r e d . In t h i s way, the complexity and dynamics inherent i n p o l i t i c s are not trodden, and a t h e o r e t i c a l space i s c r e a t e d f o r l o c a l autonomy i n U.S. p o l i t i c s . In the study of l o c a l p o l i t i c s , Stone, Whelan & Murin (1979, p.187) remind us t h a t : " [ t ] h e t e s t of a theory i s not i t s a b i l i t y to account f o r e v e r y t h i n g that happens but i t s a b i l i t y to p i n p o i n t what i s most important." 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(1969) "What Suburban Zoning Law W i l l Do," l e t t e r to the e d i t o r , Boston H e r a l d  T r a v e l e r , p. 19. McGrory, M. 1988) "Note to Bay S t a t e : I t ' s Time to P o l i s h Mud-Spattered Reputation," Worcester Gazette, 22 November. Peck, D. (1969) "Snob Zoning Curb f o r B e n e f i t of P r i v a t e Land Developers," l e t t e r to the e d i t o r , Boston H e r a l d  T r a v e l e r , 19 August, 1969, p. 32. c. Interviews Brown, L. (1989) P r o j e c t Manager, South Shore Housing Development C o r p o r a t i o n , Kingston, Massachusetts, p e r s o n a l i n t e r v i e w , December 27. Cohen, H. (1989), Attorney, Minsk, L e v i n & Assoc., Attorneys at Law, Boston, Massachusetts, p e r s o n a l i n t e r v i e w , August 17. C o l l i n s , J . (1989) S e c r e t a r y , Hanson Zoning Board of Appeals, Hanson, Massachusetts, p e r s o n a l i n t e r v i e w , 11 August. Connoly, T. (1989) D i r e c t o r , Massachusetts Chapter of the N a t i o n a l A s s o c i a t i o n of Housing and Redevelopment O f f i c i a l s , Boston Massachusetts, p e r s o n a l i n t e r v i e w , 31 J u l y . Fargo, S. (1989) Member of L i n c o l n Board of Selectmen [ s i c ] , L i n c o l n , Massachusetts, p e r s o n a l i n t e r v i e w , 4 August, 1989. Korman, M. (1989) C h a i r , Housing Appeals Committee, Boston, Massachusetts, p e r s o n a l i n t e r v i e w , 10 August. Kovel, A. (1989) former a s s i s t a n t counsel to the Massachusetts Law Reform I n s t i t u t e , Boston, Mas-sa c h u s e t t s , p e r s o n a l i n t e r v i e w , 1 August. 186 L i n s k y , M. (1989) former Republican State R e p r e s e n t a t i v e B r o o k l i n e , Massachusetts, p e r s o n a l i n t e r v i e w , 4 August. Marsh, R (1989) Republican State R e p r e s e n t a t i v e , W e l l e s l e y , Massachusetts, p e r s o n a l i n t e r v i e w , 1 August. McCarthy, J . (1989) Town C l e r k , Dracut, Massachusetts, p e r s o n a l i n t e r v i e w , 26 J u l y . M i c e l i , J . (1989) Democratic State R e p r e s e n t a t i v e , Wilmington Massachusetts, phone i n t e r v i e w , 24 J u l y . Nolan, L. (1989) Commonwealth of Massachusetts, E x e c u t i v e O f f i c e of Communities and Development, Boston, Massachusetts, p e r s o n a l i n t e r v i e w , 31 December. O'Toole, N. (1989) Town Planner, Hanson, Massachusetts, p e r s o n a l i n t e r v i e w , 11 August. Pierndak, D. (1989) Town Manager, Dracut, Massachusetts, p e r s o n a l i n t e r v i e w , 26 J u l y . S t a a f , M. (1989) Massachusetts Home-Builders A s s o c i a t i o n , p e r s o n a l i n t e r v i e w , 9 August. Stockard, R.; E n g l e r , R. (1989) Housing and Development C o n s u l t a n t s , Cambridge, Massachusetts, p e r s o n a l i n t e r v i e w , 16 August. T u l l y , J . (1989) Dracut Housing P a r t n e r s h i p , Dracut Housing A u t h o r i t y , p e r s o n a l i n t e r v i e w , 26 J u l y . U h l i r , I. (1988) p e r s o n a l l e t t e r to Chapter 40B l e g i s l a t i v e Review Committee, (1989) Member of Weston Town Planning Board, Weston, Massachusetts, 3 August. d. Court Cases Trenton vs. New J e r s e y , 262 US 182 1923. e. Conferences "Chapter 40B: A Tool For L o c a l C o n t r o l , " sponsored by E.O.C.D., Westwood High School, Westwood Massachusetts, March 9, 1988. 1 8 7 APPENDIX a. Massachusetts General Laws, Chapter 40B, Regional  Pla n n i n g , Subsections 20-23, Low and Moderate Income  Housing 20. D e f i n i t i o n s The f o l l o w i n g words, wherever used i n t h i s s e c t i o n and i n s e c t i o n s twenty-one to twenty-three, i n c l u s i v e , s h a l l , u nless a d i f f e r e n t meaning c l e a r l y appears from the context, have the f o l l o w i n g meanings:-"Low and moderate income housing", any housing sub-s i d i z e d by the f e d e r a l or s t a t e government under any program to a s s i s t the c o n s t r u c t i o n of low or moderate income housing as d e f i n e d i n the a p p l i c a b l e f e d e r a l or s t a t e s t a t u t e , whether b u i l t or operated by any p u b l i c agency or any n o n p r o f i t or l i m i t e d d i v i d e n d o r g a n i z a t i o n . "Uneconomic", any c o n d i t i o n brought about by any s i n g l e f a c t o r or combination of f a c t o r s to the extent that i t makes i t impossible f o r a p u b l i c agency or n o n p r o f i t o r g a n i z a t i o n to proceed i n b u i l d i n g or o p e r a t i n g low or moderate income housing without f i n a n c i a l l o s s , or f o r a l i m i t e d d i v i d e n d o r g a n i z a t i o n to proceed and s t i l l r e a l i z e a reasonable r e t u r n i n b u i l d i n g or o p e r a t i n g such housing w i t h i n the l i m i t a t i o n s set by the s u b s i d i z i n g agency of government on the s i z e or c h a r a c t e r of the development or on the amount or nature of the subsidy or on the tenants, r e n t a l s and income permis-s i b l e , and without s u b s t a n t i a l l y changing the rent l e v e l s and u n i t s s i z e s proposed by the p u b l i c , n o n p r o f i t or l i m i t e d 188 d i v i d e n d o r g a n i z a t i o n s . " C o n s i s t e n t with l o c a l needs", requirements and r e g u l a t i o n s s h a l l be c o n s i d e r e d c o n s i s t e n t with l o c a l needs i f they are reasonable i n view of the r e g i o n a l need f o r low and moderate income housing c o n s i d e r e d with the number of low income persons i n the c i t y or town a f f e c t e d and the need to p r o t e c t the h e a l t h and s a f e t y of the occupants of the proposed housing or of the r e s i d e n t s of the c i t y or town, to promote b e t t e r s i t e and b u i l d i n g design i n r e l a t i o n to the surroundings, or to preserve open spaces, and i f such requirements and r e g u l a t i o n s are a p p l i e d as e q u a l l y as p o s s i b l e to both s u b s i d i z e d and u n s u b s i d i z e d housing. Requirements or r e g u l a t i o n s s h a l l be c o n s i s t e n t with l o c a l needs when imposed by a board of zoning appeals a f t e r comprehensive h e a r i n g i n a c i t y or town where (1) low or moderate income housing e x i s t s which i s i n excess of ten per cent of the housing u n i t s r e p o r t e d i n the l a t e s t d e c e n n i a l census of the c i t y or town or on s i t e s comprising one and one h a l f per cent or more of the t o t a l land area zoned f o r r e s i d e n t i a l , commercial or i n d u s t r i a l use or (2) the a p p l i c a -t i o n before the board would r e s u l t i n the commencement of c o n s t r u c t i o n of such housing on s i t e s comprising more than three tenths of one per cent of such land area or ten a c r e s , whichever i s l a r g e r , i n any one c a l e n d a r year; p r o v i d e d , however, that land area owned by the U n i t e d S t a t e s , the commonwealth or any p o l i t i c a l s u b d i v i s i o n t h e r e o f , the 189 m e t r o p o l i t a n d i s t r i c t commission or any p u b l i c a u t h o r i t y s h a l l be excluded from the t o t a l l a n d area r e f e r r e d to above when making such d e t e r m i n a t i o n of c o n s i s t e n c y with l o c a l needs. " L o c a l Board", any town or c i t y board of survey, board of h e a l t h , board of s u b d i v i s i o n c o n t r o l appeals, p l a n n i n g board, b u i l d i n g i n s p e c t o r , or the o f f i c e r or board having s u p e r v i s i o n of the c o n s t r u c t i o n of b u i l d i n g s or the power of e n f o r c i n g m u n i c i p a l b u i l d i n g laws, or c i t y c o u n c i l or board of selectmen [ s i c ] , 21. Low or moderate income housing; a p p l i c a t i o n s f o r approval  of proposed c o n s t r u c t i o n ; h e a r i n g ; appeal Any p u b l i c agency or l i m i t e d d i v i d e n d or n o n p r o f i t o r g a n i z a t i o n proposing to b u i l d low or moderate income housing may submit to the board of appeals, e s t a b l i s h e d under s e c t i o n twelve of chapter f o r t y A, a s i n g l e a p p l i c a t i o n to b u i l d such housing i n l i e u of separate a p p l i c a t i o n s to the a p p l i c a b l e l o c a l boards. The board of appeals s h a l l f o r t h -with n o t i f y each such l o c a l board, as a p p l i c a b l e , of the f i l i n g of such a p p l i c a t i o n by sending a copy thereof to such l o c a l boards f o r t h e i r recommendations and s h a l l , w i t h i n t h i r t y days of the r e c e i p t of such a p p l i c a t i o n , h o l d a p u b l i c h earing on the same. The board of appeals s h a l l request the appearance at s a i d h e a r i n g of such r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s of s a i d l o c a l boards as are deemed necessary or h e l p f u l i n making i t s d e c i s i o n upon such a p p l i c a t i o n and s h a l l have the same power to i s s u e permits or approvals as any l o c a l board or o f f i c i a l 1 9 0 who would otherwise a c t with r e s p e c t to such a p p l i c a t i o n , i n c l u d i n g but not l i m i t e d to the power to a t t a c h to s a i d permit or approval c o n d i t i o n s and requirements with respect to h e i g h t , s i t e p l a n , s i z e or shape, or b u i l d i n g m a t e r i a l s as are c o n s i s t e n t with the terms of t h i s s e c t i o n . The board of appeals, i n making i t s d e c i s i o n on s a i d a p p l i c a t i o n , s h a l l take i n t o c o n s i d e r a t i o n the recommendations of the l o c a l boards and s h a l l have the a u t h o r i t y to use the testimony of c o n s u l t a n t s . The p r o v i s i o n s of s e c t i o n eleven of chapter f o r t y A s h a l l apply to a l l such h e a r i n g s . The board of appeals s h a l l render a d e c i s i o n , based upon a m a j o r i t y vote of s a i d board, w i t h i n f o r t y days a f t e r the t e r m i n a t i o n of the p u b l i c h e a r i n g and, i f f a v o r a b l e to the a p p l i c a n t , s h a l l f o r t h w i t h i s s u e a comprehensive permit or a p p r o v a l . I f s a i d h e a r i n g i s not convened or a d e c i s i o n i n not rendered w i t h i n the time allowed, unless the time has been extended by mutual agreement between the board and the a p p l i c a n t , the a p p l i c a -t i o n s h a l l be deemed to have been allowed and the comprehen-s i v e permit or approval s h a l l f o r t h w i t h i s s u e . Any person a g g r i e v e d by the issuance of a comprehensive permit or a p p r o v a l may appeal to the c o u r t as provided i n s e c t i o n seventeen of chapter f o r t y A. 22. Appeal to housing appeals committee; procedure; j u d i c i a l  review Whenever an a p p l i c a t i o n f i l e d under the p r o v i s i o n s of s e c t i o n twenty-one i s denied, or i s granted with such c o n d i t i o n s and requirements as to make the b u i l d i n g or 1 9 1 o p e r a t i o n of such housing uneconomic, the a p p l i c a n t s h a l l have the r i g h t to appeal to the housing appeals committee i n the department of community a f f a i r s f o r a review of the same. Such appeal s h a l l be taken w i t h i n twenty days a f t e r the date of the n o t i c e of the d e c i s i o n by the board of appeals by f i l i n g with s a i d committee a statement of the p r i o r proceed-ings and the reasons upon which the appeal i s based. The committee s h a l l f o r t h w i t h n o t i f y the board of appeals of the f i l i n g of such p e t i t i o n f o r review and the l a t t e r s h a l l , w i t h i n ten days of the r e c e i p t of such n o t i c e , t r a n s m i t a copy of i t s d e c i s i o n and the reasons t h e r e f o r to the commit-te e . Such appeal s h a l l be heard by the committee w i t h i n twenty days a f t e r r e c e i p t of the a p p l i c a n t ' s statement. A stenographic r e c o r d of the proceedings s h a l l be kept and the committee s h a l l render a w r i t t e n d e c i s i o n , based upon a m a j o r i t y vote, s t a t i n g i t s f i n d i n g s of f a c t , i t s c o n c l u s i o n s and the reasons t h e r e f o r w i t h i n t h i r t y days a f t e r the t e r m i n a t i o n of the h e a r i n g , u n l e s s such time s h a l l have been extended by mutual agreement between the committee and the a p p l i c a n t . Such d e c i s i o n may be reviewed i n the s u p e r i o r c o u r t i n accordance with the p r o v i s i o n s of chapter t h i r t y A. 23. Hearing by housing appeals committee; i s s u e s ; powers of  d i s p o s i t i o n ; o r d e r s ; enforcement The h e a r i n g by the housing appeals committee i n the department of community a f f a i r s s h a l l be l i m i t e d to the i s s u e of whether, i n the case of the d e n i a l of an a p p l i c a t i o n , the d e c i s i o n of the board of appeals was reasonable and c o n s i s -1 9 2 tent with l o c a l needs and, i n the case of an ap p r o v a l of an a p p l i c a t i o n with c o n d i t i o n s and requirements imposed, whether such c o n d i t i o n s and requirements make the c o n s t r u c t i o n or o p e r a t i o n of such housing uneconomic and whether they are c o n s i s t e n t with l o c a l needs. If the committee f i n d s , i n the case of a d e n i a l , that the d e c i s i o n of the board of appeals was unreasonable and not c o n s i s t e n t with l o c a l needs, i t s h a l l vacate such d e c i s i o n and s h a l l d i r e c t the board to is s u e a comprehensive permit or approval to the a p p l i c a n t . If the committee f i n d s , i n the case of an a p p r o v a l , with c o n d i t i o n s and requirements imposed, that the d e c i s i o n of the board makes the b u i l d i n g or o p e r a t i o n of such housing uneconomic and i s not c o n s i s t e n t with l o c a l needs, i t s h a l l order such board to modify or remove any such c o n d i t i o n or requirement so as to make the p r o p o s a l no longer uneconomic and to is s u e any necessary permit or appr o v a l ; p r o v i d e d , however, that the committee s h a l l not issue any order that would permit the b u i l d i n g or o p e r a t i o n of such housing i n accordance with standards l e s s safe than the a p p l i c a b l e b u i l d i n g and s i t e p lan requirements of the f e d e r a l Housing A d m i n i s t r a t i o n or the Massachusetts Housing Finance Agency, whichever agency i s f i n a n c i a l l y a s s i s t i n g such housing. D e c i s i o n s or c o n d i t i o n s and requirements imposed by a board of appeals that are c o n s i s t e n t with l o c a l needs s h a l l not be vacated, m o d i f i e d , or removed by the committee notwithstand-ing t h a t such d e c i s i o n s or c o n d i t i o n s and requirements have 193 the e f f e c t of making the a p p l i c a n t ' s proposal uneconomic. The housing appeals committee or the p e t i t i o n e r s h a l l have the power to enforce the orders of the committee at law or i n e q u i t y i n the s u p e r i o r c o u r t . The board of appeals s h a l l c a r r y out the order or the h e a r i n g appeals committee w i t h i n t h i r t y days of i t s entry and, upon f a i l u r e to do so, the order of s a i d committee s h a l l , f o r a l l purposes, be deemed to be the a c t i o n of s a i d board, unless the p e t i t i o n e r consents to a d i f f e r e n t d e c i s i o n or order by such board. b. Commonwealth of Massachusetts, E x e c u t i v e Order 215, Disbursement of State Development A s s i s t a n c e , March,  1 982 The development of a f f o r d a b l e housing i s c r i t i c a l to meeting the needs of the Commonwealth's p o p u l a t i o n . In order to accommodate the growing housing needs of our p o p u l a t i o n , Massachusetts needs to add to i t s housing supply over the next decade. Without a supply of a f f o r d a b l e housing, Massachusetts w i l l f i n d i t more d i f f i c u l t to a t t r a c t and r e t a i n i n d u s t r y . Massachusetts p r o v i d e s funding to i t s c i t i e s and towns through a v a r i e t y of programs designed to f o s t e r sound growth and development. The d i s t r i b u t i o n of d i s c r e t i o n a r y funds should, to the maximum extent f e a s i b l e , promote the balanced growth of the Commonwealth. In some c i t i e s and towns, l o c a l r e g u l a t i o n s and r e s t r i c t i o n s have the e f f e c t of e x c l u d i n g the development of 194 a f f o r d a b l e housing. In so doing, they have imposed develop-ment c o s t s i n e q u i t a b l y on other communities and have impaired the a b i l i t y of our c i t i z e n s to l o c a t e a f f o r d a b l e housing. I t i s a p p r o p r i a t e , t h e r e f o r e , i n the review of l o c a l a p p l i c a -t i o n s f o r s t a t e development a s s i s t a n c e that the c i t y ' s or town's housing p o l i c i e s and p r a c t i c e s be taken i n t o con-s i d e r a t i o n . T h i s s h a l l be accomplished so as not to i n f r i n g e upon the c o n s t i t u t i o n a l r i g h t to home r u l e . WHEREAS, housing growth, economic development, and environmental p r o t e c t i o n are statewide needs which are not mutually e x c l u s i v e and are each v i t a l to the balanced growth and development of the Commonwealth; and WHEREAS, an ample supply of housing, with d i v e r s i t y i n p r i c e , and l o c a t i o n , i s necessary both f o r the w e l l being of our c i t i z e n s and f o r a strong s t a t e economy; and WHEREAS, s t a t e development a s s i s t a n c e should be awarded to c i t i e s and towns which are not unreasonably r e s t r i c t i v e of housing growth; NOW THEREFORE, I, Edward J . King, Governor of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, by v i r t u e of the a u t h o r i t y v e s t e d i n me by the C o n s t i t u t i o n and by the s t a t u t e s of t h i s Commonwealth do hereby order and d i r e c t t h a t : 1. A l l s t a t e agencies d i s b u r s i n g development-related f i n a n c i a l a s s i s t a n c e to c i t i e s or towns should c o n s i d e r , i n making such d i s c r e t i o n a r y awards, the a p p l i c a n t c i t y ' s or town's housing p o l i c i e s and p r a c t i c e s . I t should be the 1 9 5 general p o l i c y of a l l s t a t e agencies not to award d i s c r e t i o n -ary funds to c i t i e s or towns which have been determined to be unreasonably r e s t r i c t i v e of new housing growth. For the purposes of the E x e c u t i v e Order, "development-related a s s i s t a n c e " may i n c l u d e (but i s not l i m i t e d t o ) : economic development a s s i s t a n c e ; open space and r e c r e a t i o n funds; t e c h n i c a l a s s i s t a n c e g r a n t s ; s o - c a l l e d "urban systems" t r a n s p o r t a t i o n improvements; c o n s e r v a t i o n land g r a n t s ; e l d e r l y housing; sewer c o l l e c t i o n system and water system g r a n t s ; p a r k i n g f a c i l i t y funds; convention c e n t e r f a c i l i t y g r a n t s ; f e d e r a l grant funds f o r development-related ac-t i v i t i e s ; and the review of f e d e r a l grant a p p l i c a t i o n s f o r development a s s i s t a n c e . For the purposes of t h i s E x e c u t i v e Order, "development-related a s s i s t a n c e " does not i n c l u d e l o c a l a i d fund reimbursements or d i s t r i b u t i o n s . 

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