UBC Theses and Dissertations

UBC Theses Logo

UBC Theses and Dissertations

The growth of superpower naval rivalry in the Indian Ocean and Sri Lankan response Keerawella, Gamini Bandara 1988

You don't seem to have a PDF reader installed, try download the pdf

Item Metadata

Download

Media
UBC_1988_A1 K43.pdf [ 20.66MB ]
[if-you-see-this-DO-NOT-CLICK]
[if-you-see-this-DO-NOT-CLICK]
Metadata
JSON: 1.0098060.json
JSON-LD: 1.0098060+ld.json
RDF/XML (Pretty): 1.0098060.xml
RDF/JSON: 1.0098060+rdf.json
Turtle: 1.0098060+rdf-turtle.txt
N-Triples: 1.0098060+rdf-ntriples.txt
Original Record: 1.0098060 +original-record.json
Full Text
1.0098060.txt
Citation
1.0098060.ris

Full Text

THE  GROWTH OF SUPERPOWER NAVAL RIVALRY IN THE INDIAN OCEAN AND SRI LANKAN RESPONSE By G A M I N I BANDARA  KEERAWELLA  B.A., U n i v e r s i t y o f S r i L a n k a , 1 9 7 5 M.A., U n i v e r s i t y o f W i n d s o r , 1 9 8 2 A T H E S I S SUBMITTED  I N P A R T I A L F U L F I L L M E N T OF  THE R E Q U I R E M E N T S  F O R THE DEGREE OF  DOCTOR OF P H I L O S O P H Y  in THE F A C U L T Y OF GRADUATE (Department  We a c c e p t t h i s to  STUDIES  of History)  thesis  as conforming  the required standard  THE U N I V E R S I T Y OF B R I T I S H  COLUMBIA  September 1988 (o)Gamini Bandara  K e e r a w e l l a , 1988  In  presenting  degree freely  at  this  the  available  copying  of  department publication  thesis  in  partial  fulfilment  University  of  British  Columbia,  for  this or of  reference  thesis by  this  for  his  and  scholarly  or  thesis  her  for  of  H I-S  T g * ^  The University of British Columbia Vancouver, Canada  Date  DE-6  (2/88)  A3  -  IO  -  I  I further  purposes  gain  the  shall  requirements  agree  that  agree  may  representatives.  financial  permission.  Department  study.  of  be  It not  is be  that  the  for  Library  an shall  permission for  granted  by  understood allowed  the  advanced make  extensive  head  that  without  it  of  copying my  my or  written  ABSTRACT The change  Indian  Ocean  has e x p e r i e n c e d  in i t s political  and  strategic  a process map  of profound  since World War I I .  This began with the B r i t i s h withdrawal from East of Suez, and was followed by the entry of the superpowers i n t o the Indian the growth of superpower naval r i v a l r y , security  Ocean,  and the p r o l i f e r a t i o n of  problems of the s t a t e s i n the region.  The  essence of  these developments i s the transformation of the Indian Ocean from the  stability  superpower  o f one-power d o m i n a t i o n t o t h e i n s t a b i l i t y  rivalry.  transformation  and  The t h e s i s the  examines  S r i Lankan  the process  response  from  a  of  of  this  historical  perspective. The Ocean  transformation  was  of the  essentially  an  power s t r u c t u r e i n the  outcome  configurations  i n world  rivalry  Indian Ocean must be  i n the  politics.  of  the  The  changes  growth  Indian  i n power  of  superpower  understood i n r e l a t i o n t o  the  e v o l u t i o n of p o l i t i c a l , economic, and s t r a t e g i c i n t e r e s t s of  the  superpowers,  technology, The elements, for  advances  in  weapons  systems  and  naval  and p o l i t i c a l developments i n the region.  superpower v i z , naval  bases/logistic  naval  rivalry  has  three  deployments, weapons deals,  support  i n the region.  phases: from 1968 to the 1973 o i l c r i s i s ;  interrelated and  jockeying  I t evolves  i n three  from the o i l c r i s i s t o  1978; and since 1978. There are d e f i n i t e linkages between superpower naval and the c o n f l i c t  patterns  i n the ii  region.  The  states  rivalry i n the  region count on the superpowers f o r t h e i r s e c u r i t y because of the inherent  weaknessess  of the  l i m i t s of t h e i r s e c u r i t y invariable  outcome  ruling  options,  is a  chain  elites  and  pacts, puppet governments, p o l i t i c a l which forms the  texture  region,  the  economic dependence.  The  reaction  i n the  resulting  supression,  of the i n t e r n a t i o n a l  in  military  and proxy war, politics  of the  Indian Ocean r e g i o n . Sri  Lankan  responses to  superpower  explained  in relation  strategic  t h i n k i n g , and h e r i n t e r n a l  processes.  In the  naval  to the g e o - p o l i t i c a l  rivalry  can  framework  political  and  be  of her economic  p e r i o d 1948-56, S r i Lanka i d e n t i f i e d h e r s e l f  with the B r i t i s h defence s t r u c t u r e i n the Indian Ocean.  With the  changes introduced by the M.E.P. regime, non-alignment became the foreign policy  approach of S r i Lanka a f t e r  1956.  with the growth of superpower naval presence, more s e n s i t i v e After  1970,  more  coherent  with  Ocean  S r i Lankan p o l i c y  considerations deal  t o Indian  form  - first,  India;  and  strategic  In accordance  S r i Lanka  issues  became  i n the  1960s.  towards the Indian  Ocean  took a  was  balance  designed  to  at the the sub-regional  and at the Indian  Ocean  level,  level,  how  two  how  to  to check  superpower naval r i v a l r y and the i n c r e a s i n g m i l i t a r i z a t i o n of the Indian Ocean. This was Indian  Ocean  Peace  r e f l e c t e d i n S r i Lanka's proposal  Zone  (IOPZ). A f t e r 1977,  under  the  f o r an changed  i n t e r n a l and i n t e r n a t i o n a l s i t u a t i o n , S r i Lanka s o f t - p e d a l l e d her earlier  more  articulated  position  r i a v l r y i n the Indian Ocean.  iii  regarding  superpower  naval  T A B L E OF CONTENTS  ABSTRACT  i i  TABLE OF CONTENTS  iv  LIST OF TABLES  '  ABBREVIATIONS MAP  v vi  OF THE INDIAN OCEAN  vii  ACKNOWLEDGEMENT  ix  CHAPTER I. II. III.  IV. V. VI. VII. VIII.  The H i s t o r i c a l and T h e o r e t i c a l S e t t i n g  1  The B r i t i s h Withdrawal from the Indian Ocean, 1945-68  25  The United States i n the Indian Ocean - 1945-68: from the B r i t i s h Umbrella to the A p p l i c a t i o n of Naval Power  81  The Soviet Naval Entry i n t o the Indian Ocean The Beginning of Superpower Naval R i v a l r y i n the Indian Ocean, 1968-73  126 181  The S t a b i l i z a t i o n of Superpower Naval P o s i t i o n s i n Indian Ocean: From the O i l C r i s i s to the NALT 242 The New Wave o f Superpower N a v a l R i v a l r y and M i l i t a r i z a t i o n of the Indian Ocean Conclusion.  297 350  BIBLIOGRAPHY  382  iv  L I S T OF  I. II. III. IV. V. VI. VII. VIII.  TABLES  The U.S. S t r a t e g i c SLBMs  164  Reported Soviet Naval Presence by Months (1968-71) .  198  Deployment of General Purpose U.S. and U.S.S.R. Naval Ships i n the Indian Ocean (1968-73)......200 The U.S. and U.S.S.R Naval Presence i n the Indian Ocean (1968-73)  201  Major Sources of Arms Purchase by P e r s i a n Gulf Countries 1975-79...  251  the  The Soviet Naval Presence i n the Indian Ocean (1973-77)  266  Arms Transfers to the Indian Ocean Region (1973-77)  270  FY 1981-84 MILCON Expansion of Diego Garcia  321  v  Abbreviations ABM  - Anti-Ballistic Missiles  ADGES - A i r Defence Ground Environment System  (India)  AGOR - Oceanographic Research Ship AGS  - Survey Ship  AREN - Army Radio Engineering Network (of India) ASEAN - A s s o c i a t i o n of South-East  Asian  Nations  AWACS - Airborne Warning and C o n t r o l System BARC - Bhabha Atomic Research Center BIOT - B r i t i s h Indian Ocean T e r r i t o r y CGN  - Guided  M i s s i l e Submarines  CIA - C e n t r a l I n t e l l i g e n c e Agency CINCLANT - Commander-in-Chief A t l a n t i c CINCPAC  - Commander-in-Chief P a c i f i c  CENTO - C e n t r a l Treaty Organization CENTCOM - C o n t r a l Command CER CP  (U.S)  - Circular Error Brobability (S.L) - Communist Party of S r i Lanka  FRELIMO - Frente de L i b e r a c c a de Mozambique HAL  - Hindustan  Aeronautics L t d  ICBM - I n t e r - C o n t i n e n t a l B a l l i s t i c M i s s i l e s IOPZ - Indian Ocean Peace Zone proposal JVP  - Janatha Vimukthi  Peramuna (People's L i b e r a t i o n Front)  LSSP - Lanka Sama Samaja Party MAD  - Mutual Assured D e s t r u c t i o n vi  MEP - Mahajana Eksath Peramuna (People's United Front) MILCON - M i l i t a r y Construction Programme MIRV - M u l t i p l e Independently  Targetable Re-entry V e h i c l e  MSO - Minesweepers NALT - Naval Arms L i m i t a t i o n Talks NAM - Non-Alligned Movement OAU - Organization of A f r i c a n Unity OAPEC - Organization of Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries OPEC - Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries RAF - Royal A i r Force RDJTF - Rapid Deployment J o i n t Task Force SAARC - South Asian A s s o c i a t i o n f o r Regional  Co-operation  SAC - S t r a t e g i c A i r Command SAM - S u r f a c e - t o - A i r M i s s i l e s SEATO - South East Asian Treaty Organization SLBM - Sea-Launched B a l l i s t i c  Missiles  SANFZ - South Asian Nuclear Free Zone SLFP - S r i Lanka Freedom Party SPR - S t r a t e g i c Petroleum Reserve SSBN - B a l l i s t i c M i s s i l e Submarines SSC  - Second S t r i k e C a p a b i l i t y  SSM - Surface-to-Surface  Missile  UNCLOS I I I - T h i r d U.N. Conference on UNP - United N a t i o n a l Paty ZANU - Zimbabwe A f r i c a n N a t i o n a l Union ZAPU - Zimbabwe A f r i c a n People's  vii  Union  the Law of the Sea  BO*  T5*E  SeaUnea, Strahd & Services ^ >r  m  IndW Ocean Region  Pof I SudanT - „' Thanwit •  ,J /  ARABIAN  Aseft  SEA>  tSecotra  Djibouti  Mogadishu * I  f  •  * Maha Is SEYCHELLES  CHRISTMAS <*7 v<  INDIAN  OCEAN  ,f  '.•rlf0'  MAURtTIUS  "mmoii  •A>  TRACKING * COMMUNICATION  —  STRAIT  ^  NAVAL BASE / FACILITY  4  AIR  ''"•»  AMSTERDAM  SE ALANS  I* VLFartwa. Rarth I M S  Source:  V i v L. F o r b e s , "Of S e a l a n e s , S t r a i t s and ( M i l i t a r y ) S e r v i c e s : Indian Ocean Region", The Indian Ocean Review, 1:2 (June 1988), p. 13.  vi i i  ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS I wish to express my g r a t i t u d e and thanks, f i r s t of a l l , to P r o f . Peter Harnetty, my t h e s i s s u p e r v i s o r . I a l s o wish to express my g r a t i t u d e to Prof. John Conway, and Prof. John Wood, members of my t h e s i s committee. T h e i r valuable comments and suggestions are g r e a t l y appreciated. Prof.Mark Zacher always encouraged me and I b e n e f i t t e d from frequent d i s c u s s i o n s with him. I owe g r a t i t u d e and thanks to Drs. Rohan Samarajiwa, Dr. P.V.J. Jayasekera, (Mrs) Needra Karunaratne and Veranja K a r u n a r a t n e f o r t h e i r encouragement and help in my research. My s t u d i e s at the U n i v e r s i t y of B r i t i s h Columbia have been made p o s s i b l e by s u c c e s s i v e awards o f Teaching A s s i s t a n t s h i p s from the Department of H i s t o r y . I express my g r a t i t u d e to the F e d e r i c H. Soward Memorial Fellowship Fund and to P r o f . Unger, Chairman of the Department of H i s t o r y , f o r granting me the 1987-88 f e l l o w s h i p . WUS-Canada and WUSUBC shared the cost of my a i r - t r a v a l and other expenses to come back to U BC f o r the t h e s i s defence. I am g r a t e f u l to the Department of H i s t o r y of the U n i v e r s i t y of Peradeniya f o r g r a n t i n g me r e q u i r e d study leave. My f r i e n d s , C h i t r a and Nimal Rajapakse, Mala and K e e r t i Fernando who very k i n d l y took care of me during the f i n a l stage of my stay at UBC. The warmness and c o r d i a l i t y with which they welcome me at t h e i r homes i s g r e a t l y appreciated. Not l e a s t am I g r e a t f u l t o my Wife, N a l i n i , and daughter, A s v i n i , f o r the understanding and patience with which they created an i d e a l domestic environment to persue my academic work.  ix  Chapter  The  Historical  I  and T h e o r e t i c a l  Setting  I t has always been a r e s t l e s s g i a n t , t h i s Indian Ocean; b e a u t i f u l , v i o l e n t , o f t e n m y s t i f y i n g . But t o d a y , s y m b o l i c a l l y a t l e a s t , i t simmers as n e v e r before.1 In  the  fundamental and has the  last  few  change  decades  the  Indian  in i t s internal  and  Ocean  external  come t o t h e f o r e f r o n t a s a p i v o t a l  of  the  o l d forms  growing  strength  II  birth  gave  The  to  a  host  i n regional  and  O c e a n f o r m o r e t h a n one from the  associated vitality, period this  with new  state  political  •'•Bart M c D o w e l l , National Geographic,  new  world The  affairs  and  naval  and  War  had  a  formation and  problems  new  dimension the  finally the  to  Indian to  regime  losing i t s  inherent  the  state  decided  oceanic  was  engulf  strategic milieu,  region.  global  dominated  While  began t o  i n the  the  overlordship  security  disso-  movements a f t e r W o r l d  to  face  in  the  a half centuries,  Ocean i n 1968.  The  i n the  added  who  region  of  entrants  British,  British  defence  of nation  changed  Indian  politics.  empires  a  power r e l a t i o n s  of p o s t - c o l o n i a l s t a t e s  these  international politics.  withdraw  colonial  of n a t i o n a l l i b e r a t i o n  s e l f - a s s e r t i o n of  system  of  undergone  geostrategic  power c o n f i g u r a t i o n o f m t e r t e r n a t i o n a l  lution  has  the  in  region.  United  "Crosscurrents Sweep a S t r a t e g i c 160:4 ( O c t o b e r 1 9 8 1 ) , p. 4 2 3 .  the In  States  Sea,"  F o l l o w i n g S a u l Cohen, g e o s t r a t e g i c r e g i o n i s d e f i n e d h e r e as " t h e e x p r e s s i o n o f t h e i n t e r r e l a t i o n s h i p o f a large part of t h e w o r l d i n t e r m s o f l o c a t i o n , movement, t r a d e o r i e n t a t i o n , and c u l t u r e or i d e o l o g i c a l bonds". See, S a u l Cohen, Geography and P o l i t i c s i n a W o r l d D i v i d e d (New Y o r k , 1 9 7 3 ) , p . 64.  1  and  the  own  Soviet Union entered  political,  transforming superpower processes the  economic,  the  superpower  the  of  ^British  interests,  lake'  This  into  Thesis  and  domination  will  to  explain  growth of superpower naval  Ocean.  argue t h a t changes t h a t took  It will  Ocean  in  the  outcome o f Lankan  changes  response  perceptions in  period  the  political  be  conceived  and  contribution  to  explained  i n her  landscape  economic to  1945  I n d i a n Ocean  from  instability  rivalry  1982  the  in  place were  of the  Indian  dynamics.  study  relation  geo-political  of  This  the  Ocean,  Lankan  i n the  Indian  i n the  Indian  politics.  to  her  Sri  security  her  internal  intended  international  an  developments  and is  of  Sri  essentially  context,  study  of the  i n power c o n f i g u r a t i o n i n w o r l d  will  strategic  from  thereby arena  analyse  responses to the  their  examine  the  and  an  will  t r a n s f o r m a t i o n of the  one-power  rivalry;  I n d i a n Ocean t o p u s h  strategic  competition.  i n v o l v e d i n the  stability  and  former  naval  into  as  a  relations  of  relations  of  regions. The regions the  growth is a  Second  Relations  World who  of  War.  worked  dinate  systems.  t o use  the  was  the  result  geographically  he  of  study the At  with  of  the  proliferation  first, a  some  systems  distinct  groups  of  Leonard  Binder  can  subsystem approach to  followed  by  a  number  A  Brecher,  Michael  be  of  of  area  scholars  as  subsystems  of  scholars  as  Zartman,  Brecher,  such  subor pioneer  regions.^  Later,  as  Michael r  and  Larry  W.  Bowman.  Today  E a s t as a S u b o r d i n a t e Interna ( A p r i l 1 9 5 8 ) , pp. 408-29.  "International Relations 2  or  the  EC  William  after  conceptualized  considered study  studies  in International  perspective  states  the  ^Leonard Binder, "The M i d d l e t i o n a l S y s t e m , " W o r l d P o l i t i c s , 10 4  international  (conti..to  p.  3)  the  study  and  of the  recognized  International Dowdy h a s tion  of  as  pointed  a  an  important  Relations.  intense  towards  international relations  out,  These  in  regional  the  i n one  particular  interest  in  the  constitutes  academic  studies,  "have gone b e y o n d t h e  interest  heightened  branch  of regions  as  area  area  study  William  studies  L.  tradi-  f o r i t s own  relationship  of  sake  between  the  7  global  s y s t e m and  In  the  volatile the  1970s,  subsequent (OAPEC)  of  political  Ocean  politics.  The  Bangladesh  o i l embargo in  Africa, of and  point  in  of  the  strategic  of g l o b a l concern.  a t t e n t i o n of  the  unit  Indian  of  the  in  third the  many  of  revolution  as  the and  repeatedly  and  a  made  the  analysis. Writing  war  and and  Portuguese the  Soviet  changed  the  Ocean  importance of  and on  highly  Countries  Indian  geostrategic  scholars  the  Exporting  collapse  1979,  of  A r a b - I s r a e l i war  In view of the  Ocean,  one  Indo-Pakistan  Petroleum  landscape  attracted  viable  Arab  Afghanistan  became  1971,  Iranian  the  a  in  1973,  developments,  as  subsystems".  Indian  Organization  occupation  focal  the  areas i n world  emergence  Empire  regional  region,  a  these has  gained  recognition  regional  subsystems,  ( c o n t i . . f r o m p . 2) a n d A s i a n S t u d i e s : The S u b o r d i n a t e State S y s t e m o f S o u t h e r n A s i a , " W o r l d P o l i t i c s , 15 ( J a n u a r y 1 9 6 3 ) , p p . 213-35. W i l l i a m Z a r t m a n , " A f r i c a as a S u b o r d i n a t e S t a t e System i n I n t e r n a t i o n a l R e l a t i o n s , " I n t e r n a t i o n a l O r g a n i z a t i o n , 21 (Summer 1967), pp. 545-64. ^ L a r r y W. Bowman, "The S u b o r d i n a t e S t a t e System of Southern Africa," International Studies Quarterly, 13 ( S e p t e m b e r 1 9 6 8 ) , pp. 231-63. 7  W i l l i a m L. Dowdy, "The I n d i a n Ocean R e g i o n as C o n c e p t and Reality," i n The I n d i a n O c e a n - P e r s p e c t i v e s on a S t r a t e g i c A r e n a , W i l l i a m L. Dowdy and R u s s e l l B. Trood, eds. (Durham: D u k e U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s , 1 9 8 5 ) , p . 4. 3  William  R.  regional and  Thompson  Subsystem.^  sufficient  Buzan c h a l l e n g e region and  as  an  ty  Besides, the  the  The be  powers,  scholars  concept  from  the  r e s o l v e d by  the  expert  in  1974. the  the  a  identify  a  four  necessary  such  as  of the  Barry  Indian  "problems of  scale  of  and  Ocean  omission  diversity  Indian  of  committee Accepting  1 1  Indian  Ocean  clearly  between the  theatre  appointed  of  been  body  of  the  Ocean and  and the  operation'. a  this by  perceive  moot  point  question  the  U.N.  definition,  marked by  Indian  has  However,  the  subsystems.  superpowers,  this  as  diversi-  Ocean s t a t e s t h e m s e l v e s  definition Ocean.  i t s e x p a n s e and  sub-regional  'distinctive  Indian  of which are line  out  identifying  geographical the  dividing  by  a unit,  of  frontiers  the  e s p e c i a l l y the  discussions  identifies  of  problems a r i s i n g  more i m p o r t a n t l y ,  precise  General  However,  arise  to  Ocean meets t h e s e  u n i t because of the  which  handled  Ocean as  A  conditions  n  external  Indian  four  Indian  validity  analytical  area". could  The  conditions.^  superficiality 1  the  presented  Asian  was  Secretary this  water  in  the  study northern  l a n d mass.  the A t l a n t i c  should  The be  °They a r e : 1, The a c t o r s ' p a t t e r n o f r e l a t i o n s o r i n t e r a c t i o n e x h i b i t a p a r t i c u l a r d e g r e e o f r e g u l a r i t y and i n t e n s i t y t o t h e e x t e n t t h a t a c h a n g e a t one p o i n t i n t h e s u b s y s t e m a f f e c t s o t h e r p o i n t s ; 2, The a c t o r s a r e g e n e r a l l y p r o x i m a t e ; 3, I n t e r n a l and e x t e r n a l o b s e r v e r s and a c t o r s r e c o g n i z e t h e s u b s y s t e m as a d i s t i n c t i v e a r e a o r ' t h e a t r e o f o p e r a t i o n ' ; 4,The s u b s y s t e m l o g i c a l l y c o n s i s t s o f a t l e a s t two and q u i t e p r o b a b l y more a c t o r s . See W i l l i a m R. T h o m p s o n , "The Regional Subsystem-A C o n c e p t u a l E x p l i c a t i o n and a P r o p o s i t i o n a l I n v e n t o r y , " Internat i o n a l S t u d i e s Q u a r t e r l y , 17 ( M a r c h 1 9 7 3 ) , p . 101. q  op.  ^ F o r a g o o d d i s c u s s i o n on c i t . , pp. 4-23.  this  point  see,  Dowdy  and  Trood,  i o  B a r r y Buzan, P o l i t i c s o f Bowman 1 9 8 2 ) , p. 44. 13  -U.N. Doc  "Book R e v i e w and Clark,"  A/AC.159/1. 4  - The Indian S u r v i v a l , 24  Ocean i n G l o b a l (January-February  the  Meridian  Ocean  and  o f Cape A g u l h u s  the Pacific  (20.0'E),  s h o u l d be t h e M e r i d i a n  Cape o f T a s m a n i a  (147.O'E), t h e w e s t e r n  and  line  the Meridian  Peninsula.  F o r t h e south,  and t h e A n t a r c t i c  great  b a y s on e i t h e r  arms,  i n the east the Gulf  Hence,  the dividing  should  attains  side of the Indian and t h e Arabian  o f Aden  a n d Oman,  of the Indian  Ocean.  r i n g t h e deployment o f n u c l e a r  Strait,  and t h e Malay  between  the Indian  Gulf  The  t h e two  t h e Bay o f  Sea i n t h e west,  with i t s  t o the Indian may  be  Ocean.  considered  bed of t h e Indian important  when  as  Ocean  conside-  s u b m a r i n e s . The w a t e r s p a c e o f t h e  I n d i a n Ocean i s a l s o d o t t e d w i t h about a t h o u s a n d  The  Southeast  sub-continent,  belong  Indian  o f t h e Bass  line  d e p t h s u p t o 2,000 f a t h o m s , v e r y  Historical  the  b e 6 0 . 0 ' S. A c c o r d i n g l y ,  t h e Red Sea and t h e P e r s i a n  extensions  exit  of  between north-west A u s t r a l i a  Ocean  Bengal  and between t h e  islands.  Setting  beginning  o f n a v i g a t i o n i n t h e I n d i a n Ocean goes b a c k t o  1 7 protohistory. loped Indian and  As t r a d e  between  centres  Ocean,  attempts  to control  and other  of  of ancient  empires,  from  one c e n t r e  t o another.  the  made  sea areas.  fall  to dominate t h e e n t i r e  ancient  were  adjacent  forms  of communication  civilizations t o develop In keeping  t h e imperium However,  bordering  the  sea communications with  the rise  i n the Indian no i m p e r i a l  I n d i a n Ocean p r i o r  deve-  Ocean  power  moved  was  t o the establishment  P o r t u g u e s e t h a l a s s o c r a c y i n t h e I n d i a n Ocean a r e a  and  able of  i n the 16th  century. It  i s a well  established fact that the discovery  o f t h e Cape  F o r a good s u r v e y o f t h e h i s t o r y o f t h e I n d i a n Ocean p a s t see A u g u s t T o u s s a i n t , History o f t h e I n d i a n Ocean (London: R o u t l e d g e a n d K e g a n P a u l , 1961) . x  5  route  was  a  major  turning  Ocean.  From  single  strategic  vities  t o one r e g i o n .  Mozambique in  the very  the Arabian  began  with  eastern  part,  taken  In t h e Western  moved  to  approached  Nagapatam  Malacca,  about  two  the  of India  naval  and b u i l d i n g bases  along  the  the trade important  masters  their  they  and  Kingdom east  a  acti-  captured and  Ormuz  Diu. In the i n S r i Lanka,  coast  and,  Ocean.  to discover t o secure  Alfonso  more  " I thad the  Cape  a l l t h e key  d'Albuquerque,  the  ( 1 5 0 8 - 1 5 1 5 ) , was t h e a r c h i t e c t  strategy  i n the  Portuguese  routes,  or strongholds  making  f o r trade.  was  not  constantly  alliances  I t was  o f the' I n d i a n  thalassocracy  Ocean  always  On  the African  Mombasa.  In the western  coast Indian  true  Indian  Ocean.  Sultan  of Achin  •^Toussaint,  stronghold  i n Sumatra.  that  the  His  a  territo-  century  were  but  their  effective.  from  some  The  regional  resistance  was  could  not prevent  the  Malacca by  of  of  Sumatra.  However,  points  the Portuguese  center  Ocean t h e y  of  rulers  everywhere  History of the Indian 6  with  resistance  G u j a r a t i merchants from t r a d i n g w i t h the Portuguese  at s t r a t e g i c  f o r over  and  confronted  forces.  sula  i t as  s t r a t e g y e n t a i l e d e s t a b l i s h i n g bases a t t h e gateways t o t h e  Ocean  ries  maritime  Daman,  years  J  Indian  of India, the Portuguese  i n the Indian  fifteen  second Portuguese V i c e r o y the Portuguese  Ocean,  centuries  Ocean".  conceived  and S o c o t r a  Indian  an A l e x a n d r i a  Indian  of  of  Indian  Goa,  the  of the  d i d not l i m i t  the Kotte  on  I t t o o k them l e s s t h a n  positions  they  on t h e A f r i c a n c o a s t  the Portuguese  route.  the Portuguese  Therefore,  and  they  and  importantly,  i n the history  S e a . On t h e W e s t e r n c o a s t  Cochin  Masulipatam  outset  unit.  and K i l w a  point  In t h e Malay was  using  opposed superior  Ocean, p. 104.  Peninby  the  ships,  well  developed  rivalries prevail  to their  over  At  powers  Danes  purpose  the  advantage,  times  formed  their  British  into own  power  were  Ocean  affect The  carried  at  i n  local  i n their  "marked  on  post  near Madras. Looking  failed 1 4  Toussaint,  and  According  was  really  some r e g i o n a l ruler  rivalries  one  long  rulers  such  o f Sumatra r e The s t r u g g l e following  of t h e use of t h e  among  extra-regional  to  t o the completion  the beginning  foreign  wars  and  of the Indian  and t h e French.  t h e Coromandal  navies  alliances  Ocean  The B r i t i s h  was  began  i n t h e G u l f o f Cambay a n d o n e coast.  Later  they  The c h i e f F r e n c h b a s e was  moved  to  Pondichery  f o r a h a l t i n g p l a c e o n t h e way t o I n d i a , t h e  attempted they  Companies.  respective areas.  at Surat  Bombay, M a d r a s a n d C a l c u t t a .  this  to  other  t h e French,  i n the p e r i o d of interregnum  on b e t w e e n t h e B r i t i s h  first  able  security".^  a small trading  French  1815  s t r u g g l e f o r t h e mastery  Masulipatam  were  c o m p e t i t i o n and f o r t h i s  and t h e A c h i n  o u t and where  real  regional  17th century,  of Malacca  interregnum  as a t h e a t r e where  thrashed  could  from  decline  India  the f a l l  this  among t h e E u r o p e a n p o w e r s  Indian  East  o f Muscat  their  Portuguese  exploiting  the British,  commercial  conquest  During  the  t h e Dutch,  t h e p e r i o d from  established  and  the Portuguese  throughout  namely,  t h e Omani r u l e r  the  strategy,  rulers.  entered  interregnum.^ as  own  also  Toussaint, of  local  various  European the  maritime  t o expel  t h e Dutch  occupied Mauritius, "Shifting  from  t h e Cape.  where t h e y  found  After  a natural  P o w e r B a l a n c e s , " p . 7.  ^ M e l i n d a W. C o o k e , " S t r a t e g i c C o n s i d e r a t i o n s , " i n I n d i a n Ocean: F i v e I s l a n d C o u n t r i e s , F r e d e r i c a Bunge, e d . (Washington: American U n i v e r s i t y , 1983), p. 252. 7  harbour-Port  Louis.  Chandernagore  In the  while  f o r the  mastery  18th  century  and  After  firmly  adhered to the in  this  in  great  Freedom  of  that  the  had  industrial  oceans  end  The  lasted  i n 1815  b u r i e d 200 catch-word  throughout  the  were  has  Europe of the  Rene-Jean able  been  make  19th  to  'freedom  century;  use  of of  in effect  It  and  was Mare  freedom  supremacy.  observed,  to  akin  sea.  Grotius  naval  Dupuy  naval  British  p r e v i o u s l y . Now,  British  the  Ocean.  rediscovered  of  was  Anglo-French  established,  years  base  when B r i t i s h  Indian  was  British  powers sea  an  British.  assumption of freedom of the  as  the  world's  supremacy  reality,  maritime  the  e s t a b l i s h e d i n the  became t h e  historical  was  came t o  classical  context  sea  the  naval  Liberum which they of the  of  only  their  of Bengal the main French  Calcutta  duel  s u p r e m a c y was  Bay  "only  i t  the  (freedom) .  labour' the  But  right  in  the  of  the  1 6  great the  was  licence,  superpowers  that  of  the  themselves  endorse  the  Indian  Nations  after  1971.  Ocean  Peace  From t h e  Zone  Peace  Proposal  Settlement  Suez  canal  Ocean  in  i n 1868  was  of  order at  not  the  Vienna  and  practically  the  • ^ R e n e - J e a n D u p u y , The Law of the Sea: ( L e i d e n : O c e a n a P u b l i c a t i o n s I n c . , 1 9 7 4 ) , p . 3.  in  Toussaint,  H i s t o r y of the 8  a  I n d i a n Ocean, p.  188.  to  1815  British  widespread  Current  on,  United  Toussaint observes: A d o p t i n g d ' A l b u q u e r q u e ' s i d e a s and e v e n g i v i n g t h e m a new twist, f o r d' A l b u q u e r q u e h a d not f o r e s e e n i n d u s t r i a l c a p i t a l i s m , t h e E n g l i s h were t o s e t up i n t h e I n d i a n O c e a n t h e m o s t a b s o l u t e hegemony o f a l l t i m e , and were t o i m p o s e upon Asia a y o k e w h i c h was t o be shaken only by J a p a n e s e cannon a c e n t u r y and a h a l f l a t e r . 1 7 the  Indian  concept  lake.  of  the  this  Later  D  World  opening  II  used  submission."  until  The  War  p o o r was  use  of  Problems  steamships  i n the  history  the  of  late  Indian  Europe  with  these  Malta,  Port  Said  and  of  control  of  Britain.  entered  into  time  of  was  the  capable  hegemony  enter  the  routes  attempted  to  the  part  of  race  became  Suez  the  an  Indian  route  Indian  fray,  effective Ocean.  the  were  Indian  Berlin-Baghdad Germans  Ocean  railway  "to  Atlantic  line.  and  late  the  Red  outflank  strategically  posed  a  formidable  early  20th  the  to Sea they  planned an  the  British  Thus,  and  I t was  at  was  closed.  overland  with  the  which  firm  Italians  power to  the  the  Ocean a r e a  Germany,  virtually  and  the  no  to  Gibraltar,  under and  the  closer  Egypt  challenge  found that the  Ocean  even  of  Germans  i n the  phase i n  c o n t r o l over  acquisition  the  1870,  of posing  Indian  the  the  a new  imperialism". Nevertheless,  reach  controversial  ocean  British  brought  i n the  the  o p e n e d up  The  and  colonial  colonial  to  Aden  After  "new  naval  Ocean.  Cyprus  the  century  developments.  annexation  thrust  19th  the  attempt British  on sea  1 R control". British  Though  naval  effectively The  1935, growth Royal  in  frustrated  the  the  however, In the  the focus  United  Conference  affect  period  between  of  Japanese  Navy  i n 1941  naval  the the  a t t e n t i o n was naval and  century,  i n 1922  supremacy,  States'  d i d not  of  challenge World  War  to I  German p l a n s .  e x c l u s i v e maritime  establishing  Ocean.  power  Washington Naval  Britain's  That,  Germany  power.  at  end East  in  with  World  Asia  signalled  theory,  I of  Indian about  the  rapid by  beginning  ^ M o n o r a n j a n B e z b o r u a h , U.S. Strategy i n the Indian The I n t e r n a t i o n a l R e s p o n s e (New Y o r k : P r a e g e r P u b l i s h e r s , p . 5. 9  by  to  suffered the  of  Britain.  i n the  War  i n view  losses  end  Great  position  of  Severe  e a r l y i n 1942  least  parity  British  marked the  the of  Ocean: 1977),  the  end  of the  In Indian the  the  years  Ocean  once  f o l l o w i n g World again  days of B r i t i s h  Under the it  B r i t i s h phase i n I n d i a n Ocean  was  new  that  of the  As  was  British  It  set  is  in  not  The  the  that  states  h a v e b e c o m e an  the  Indian  the  acquisition  "blue  Ocean.  water"  pattern going  of  on  One  by  the  naval  potential in  the  power  i n r e g i o n a l as w e l l as  ficance  of t h i s  the  more  of  war  role  of  waning  of  new  this  the  super-  of  a  single  of  the  supealso  r e g i o n . As  such,  power b a l a n c e power  is  India,  of  notably  making  Therefore,  constitutes  an  politics.  the  what  Ocean  in  is  important The  signi-  viewed against the backdrop Indian  in  equation  capability,  complex.  other  independently  i n the  international  the  parity  and  the  i t was  states,  region  s h o u l d be  i n c r e a s i n g importance  of  nuclear  Ocean  subject  question  affairs  littoral  conflict  Indian  strategic  aspect  and  over.  the  the  among  hegemony  element i n the  striking  certain  practice,  after  to play  time  naval  collectively  important  politics  competition  the  began t o a s s e r t themselves i n the they  in  the  long.  Ocean; t h i s  r e p l a c e d by  littoral  but,  of  I n d i a n Ocean were  continue  naval  Indian  simply  defence  Portuguese d e c l i n e , the  motion  i n the  d o m i n a n t p o w e r was powers.  c o u l d not  case a f t e r  powers  powers.  Britain  the  Britain  t h a l a s s o c r a c y i n the  I n d i a n Ocean f o r  the  power  external  with  II  power c o n f i g u r a t i o n i n w o r l d  clear  guardian  remained  War  history.  of  international  politics.  P o l i t i c a l and The in ces  S t r a t e g i c Importance of the  I n d i a n Ocean has  contemporary world of  the  Indian  b e c o m e an  politics.  Ocean,  though 10  The  Indian Ocean  important  geostrategic  s t r e n g t h of the  i t ranks  third  human  in size  region resour-  in  world  oceans, World  should War  be n o t e d  II  changes  national  liberation As  independence autonomous one-third region.  Indian  by  which  one  and  One-third  both  entered  brought  was  the  the  about  tide  of  de-colonization  gained  into  post-  world  political politics  as  of the global  population  states  t o the Indian  Ocean  of the Indian  Ocean  belong  strength  superpowers  i n their  region  colonies  of the numerical  states,  that  expedited  former  of t h e independent  should  geographical  x  one  Ocean  factor i n the  effort  give  to wield  high  and  priority  power  and  also  to the  influence  in  politics. It  and  forces  important  environment  Indian  result,  actors.  Ocean  world  i n the  a  Because  littoral  One  international  decisive  process.  first.  be n o t e d , however, t h a t most system  politically  third  vulnerable.  World'  region  of the Indian  Ocean  because  are economically  colonial.  There  In a  i s no  Ocean sense,  virtually  located  i n the  are economically  weak  the Indian a l lthe  underdeveloped  single  states  regional  Ocean  states  i n the  and p o l i t i c a l l y  state  that  i s a  post-  i s capable  of  e x t e n d i n g i t s power o v e r t h e e n t i r e I n d i a n  Ocean. I n t h e r e g i o n a l  sub-systems,  India  medium  considerable however, Many  the many has  preponderance  does  littoral  political  powers  not  extend  states  such  o f power. beyond  are  weak  as Their  their  of these become  a  post-colonial  countries pervasive attempts  The  i n relation  that  sub-systems.  their  internal  i n the primary  political  of the region.  at national  11  to  exercise  of influence,  internal political  a r e s o weak feature  sphere  respective  s t r u c t u r e s , t o o . They a r e s t i l l  s t a t e - b u i l d i n g process.  may  stage i n  structures  of  instability  I n many  i n t e g r a t i o n have p r o v e d  cases, t o be  less  than  s u c c e s s f u l . These  features  contributed to i t s vulnerability The is  h i s t o r y of the Indian  fraught  solely  with  ethnic  i n t e g r a t i o n and s t a t e divisions,  the context  integrate part  them  cut across loyalties  into  minority linkages  example  of these  War  cannot  be  i f  s t r a t e g i e s and processes  national  lines.  disputes  conflicts  and  In addition, the  minorities, especially  system,  play  prevalent  a  India.  i n the region.  with  Because  the central  regional conflicts  to  considerable  i s the relationship of the  with  not of  of the post-colonial states  conflicts  between t h e superpowers,  World  Shortcomings,  of the ethnic  of this  They  b u i l d i n g , boundary  the political  i n S r i Lanka  conflicts.  have  machinations.  t h e Second  sources.  of the failure  i n the violent  outstanding  since  violent political  extra-territorial in  Ocean  i n the post-independence  national  t o the region  to extra-regional  attributed to external  failures,  inherent  An  Tamil  of the multiple strategic  balance  have g l o b a l  repercus-  i s not at a l l p o l i t i c a l l y  passive,  sions . The  Indian  submitting fall  Ocean  itself  i n line  region  t o extra-regional pressures.  with  Cold  War  polarization,  Indian  Ocean t o o k t h e l e a d i n d e v e l o p i n g  action  identified  non-aligned role  of  movement g a i n e d  an a l t e r n a t i v e c o u r s e  momentum a n d b e g a n t o p l a y  m a j o r i t y ' . The h e r i t a g e  region  have  of the of  as non-alignment. With t h e passage o f time, t h e  underdevelopment,  centers  refused t o  the countries  i n i n t e r n a t i o n a l forums t o push forward  'neglected  Having  given  and economic a  common  dependence  i n s p i t e of the presence of c l e a r  12  leading  the interests ofthe  of the colonial  identity  a  past,  on t h e  problems industrial  to the countries divisions  of the  on p o l i t i c a l ,  religious The  and  ethnic  economic  lines.  importance  of  the  region  estimated because of i t s widespread of the  I n d i a n O c e a n r e g i o n i s an  the  world  economic  the  colonial  industrial economic world  past  of  organization  independence, their  organic  Economic  and  relations  national  economic  in  Since  attempt  economic  i s embodied  order  and  in  major  economic  order  pattern.  In  issue and  the  economies  powers  colonies  in  metropolitan remained  the  tion  and such  conducted  way  hub.  that During  littoral  to  the  made  on  were  would  the  new  i s the of  the  in  past,  Once to  as  these  the  with  trade  sufficiently  ASEAN,  GCC,  and  SAARC,  i n t e r - c o n n e c t e d so  remain h e a v i l y  dependent  on  13  But  that the  ocean  these  for  to  a  spokes  yoke  was  intra-regional coopera-  spokes  are  countries i n the  waters  The  their  spokes  colonial  develop  supply  countries.  e s t a b l i s h e d o r g a n i z a t i o n s of r e g i o n a l economic as  which  colonial  structured to  period,  s t a t e s attempted  inter-  trade  serve  other.  industrial  unequal  latter  each  restru-  international  relations  colonial  to  the  trade  the  have  political  debate  industrialized  the  the  role.  dialogue  their  the  in  demand f o r a new  orientation  to  with  of  during  with  gained  North-South  debate  part  change  region  they  i n the  countries  goods  unconnected  removed, t h e  the  economy  i n motion  any  relations  north-south  these  agricultural  colonial  trade  the  the  import-export of  a  in  under-  essential  economically  Therefore,  the- I n d i a n Ocean s t a t e s p l a y a l e a d i n g  primary  an set  region  west.  subordinate  This  the  be  I n d i a n Ocean s t a t e s have been a t t e m p t i n g  centres.  The  and  changes  the  significance.  not  u n d e r d e v e l o p m e n t . The  i n t e g r a t e d the  centres  wide  cture  order.  should  their  not  region  external  trade. some  Similarly, important  raw  s h o u l d be n o t e d the  littorals  industrialised materials  derives  from  scarcity  o f good o v e r l a n d t r a d e  i s t h e major  Indian  not  only  Ocean  availability  on  f o r them.  have  raw  manganese,  region  i n the world  c o n t r i b u t e s n e a r l y 40 p e r c e n t  of t h e i r  resources  extensively  littoral  states  control  through  forward the  nearly  After  policies Another  they  attempted  but also  those  85 p e r c e n t  controlled attained to bring  resources  i nthe  contributes  to the  bordering  of nearly  among  them  chromite,  Today,  of the t o t a l  the  twenty  uranium,  nickel,  and  Ocean  Indian  o i l production  a  Ocean of the  a n d W e s t e r n E u r o p e 75 p e r For a long period  by  these  these  Western m u l t i n a t i o n a l  independence,some resources  Furthermore,  economic resources  of t h e major important  controls  h a v e made t h e I n d i a n  economy.  nationalization.  t o use t h e i r  the  and t h e r e f o r e  Countries  stocks  o i l from t h e P e r s i a n Gulf.  were  enterprises.  Ocean.  t i n , mica,  pivotal  cent  mineral  materials,  In addition, o i l resources  Japan imports  Ocean i s  whoever  countries  considerable  cobalt.  world.  It  p o i n t s . Due t o t h e  factors that  of the Indian  important  bauxite,  exit  Indian  of the region  o f some i m p o r t a n t  Ocean  strategically thorium,  region.  countries.  importance  the Indian  The  Therefore,  of the l i t t o r a l  i s one o f t h e i m p o r t a n t  geostrategic  Ocean  routes between t h e l i t t o r a l s ,  controls the trade  o f many i n d u s t r i a l i s e d  region  Indian  few s t r a t e g i c  artery  t h e economies  The  the  i t s geography.  as a huge b a y w i t h  the  on  t h a t t h e importance o f t h e ocean f o r t h e t r a d e o f  situated  ocean  c o u n t r i e s a r e a l s o dependent f o r  they  of the  under  their  have  come  as a weapon t o i n f l u e n c e  powers.  dimension o f t h e economic resources  14  of the  Indian  Ocean i s deep s e a b e d m i n e r a l  nodules  a r e t h e most  promising  known  other minerals  such  also  i n large quantities.  available  Ocean  region  position convention  zones.  off-shore  o i l and sea-bed  assistance  i n t h e form  from t e c h n i c a l l y The  developed  the  attractive  ships with resources  extra-regional and  South  has  sonar  fleets  made  into  notably  especially technical  joint  the  ventures  Ocean  Indian  powers  comprised  of  Securing  fishing  Union,  fleets  Ocean  who  have  hundreds  i s important  the Soviet  operate  the Indian  high.  Australia,  Only  Ocean  region  of  access  to  to several  Japan,  Taiwan,  i n the high  provides  In order  account;  an  seas  important  o f t h e superpowers and other conflict-ridden  a few s t a t e s i n t h e r e g i o n , namely  and I n d i a , have t h e i r  and superpower  grounds  exclusive  the area.  extremely  trade  or  maritime  a r m s e x p o r t e r s . T h e demand f o r a r m s i n t h i s  structures.  UNCLOS I I I  s t a t e s need  t o locate the catch.  m a r k e t f o r t h e arms i n d u s t r i e s  Africa,  The  200-mile  contracts  also  of the Indian  which  Furthermore,  is  are not i n a  resources,  these  t o t h e major  fishing  powers,  Korea,  throughout  to exploit  of royalty  they  resources. states  minerals,  industry  world-wide  fish  and c o b a l t a r e  advanced c o u n t r i e s .  fishing  economically  o f t h e sea-bed,  nickel,  so t h a t  such  littoral  But i n order  manganese  B u t most s t a t e s i n t h e I n d i a n  weak  or control  Though  resources  aluminium,  are technologically  i n 1982 g r a n t e d  economic  factory  as copper,  to exploit  resources.  own  economic  i t i s a lucrative  two  features  between should  and m i l i t a r y - s t r a t e g i c . source  15  of p r o f i t .  area South  military-industrial  to trace the relationship involvement,  major  On  On  t h e arms be  taken  economic  the other  hand,  arms d e a l s to  are  a major  lend l o g i s t i c  instrument  support  relation  Indian  Ocean  countries hard  to  of  inflow  region. the  currency The  the  For  region  solving balance  of  essential  the  Soviet  are  a  plans  related  aspects  i s well of  the  phenomenon  of the  I n d i a n Ocean f o r t h e  at the  regional level,  figure  t o be  powers.  have  systems,  made  military  the  and  added m i l i t a r y  in the  Indian  strategies  naval  should  be  political, largest  the  solving  her  economic i n t e r e s t s  and  deals for  viewed  i n the  an  and  military  of the  the  past  should  be  that  major has  noted  of  the the  superpowers background  military  body.  16  in of  importance  the  super  this and  the  this of the  the  in  navies global  tendency  given  at  of c o n t i n e n t a l shelves  Ocean  especially  superpowers'  A  i t is  Secondly,  Indian  in  a  First,  between the  factor  superpowers.  basis.  muscle.  in  is  importance  powerful,  technology,  essential  recent  importance  economic,  a dual  inter-  which  military  s t r a t e g i c balance  the  against  The  politically  g l o b a l reach  of  politics  positions  weapons  Ocean  competition  water  with  arms  power  flex  military  increasing militarization The  the  three elements are  relations.  to  central  strategies  military an  i n the  of  i n o r d e r t o be  level,  Developments  missile  problems from  superpowers has  in a position  global largely  Supplying  materials  device  and  e s t a b l i s h e d . The  c e n t r a l theme i n i n t e r n a t i o n a l  the  plans.  states  problem.  military  at  raw  principal  littoral  o f payment  Union,  i n t e r a c t i o n between p o l i t i c a l  necessary  on  f o r superpower m i l i t a r y  a r m s i s a l s o a m a j o r means o f in  of pressure  in  Ocean  point:  the  ocean  floors.  Indian  Ocean  survey world's  of  the third  D e s c r i p t i v e and The  changes  politics II  can  Analytical and  i n the  be  main  Indian  of the  and  the  finally,  the  intrusion  lake  concerns  of the  retreated  In  and  of the i n the  consequent aspect  of  the  years  object  of t h i s  The  later,  power  i s the  by  the  study  was  and  and  as  the  Ocean  superpowers,  naval  of  the  Indian  Ocean  in  the  Indian  Ocean.  competition  t o be  and  answered  by  another  competition. of  of  To  the  be  of  the  f o r c e s from  the  on  the  the  became The  specific,  Indian  a  and  major  essence  of  regime  hegemony  of The  processes. British  external,  namely  what were t h e i n the  the  Garcia  superpowers.  the  of  the  in  Diego  naval  i s why  superpowers  into  competition  e x p l a i n these  form  Britain  international  the  a  of  forces into  earlier  be  reflected  superpower n a v a l  and,  strategic  entered  f o r a base  naval  to  guardian  as  the  affairs  i n 1968,  naval  the  replacement  of  region;  primary  later,  position  i s to analyse  interests  the  War  British  entry  continued  the  Indian  naval  followed  superpower, n a v a l objectives  decades  demise of the  basic question  withdrawal  Two  i n 1978,  politics  Ocean  of  Ocean  within  Staff plan  militarization  Britain  f o l l o w i n g World  Suez; the  the  of  power  growth of superpower  fall  Soviet d e c i s i o n to deploy  Indian  of  poised to withdraw her  Chiefs  in  f o u r broad themes: the  Indian  traditional  was  U.S.  processes  Great  not  c a l c u l a t i o n s of  O c e a n . Ten  in  did  place  p o s t - c o l o n i a l states i n the  the  Simultaneously,  strategic  these  of the  1947,  her  I n d i a n Ocean and region.  period  from East  superpowers.  from  took  increasing militarization  region.  British  and  i n the of  Navy  that  I n d i a n Ocean; t h e  rivalry  plan  Ocean  Royal  superpowers i n t o the  the  processes  summarized i n terms  withdrawal  of  Questions  Indian  main Ocean  and  also  action order a  what  have  been  o f superpower t o answer t h e s e  broader  t h e major  naval  competition  questions  historical,  components  and  courses  i n the Indian  i t i s necessary  politico-economic,  and  of  Ocean?  to place  In  them i n  military-strategic  context. The the  point  British  question defence  withdrawal  i n this system  post-imperial and  of departure  from  context  the Indian  i s why  designed order  o f t h e a n a l y s i s i s an e x a m i n a t i o n Ocean.  the British  The  after  immediate  d i d not adjust the  i n t h e i m p e r i a l framework  soon  of  t h e war u n d e r  a new  to  suit  the  international  r e g i o n a l p o w e r c o n f i g u r a t i o n ? T h u s , w h a t was t h e r e l a t i o n s h i p  between  the p o l i t i c a l  British  policy  withdrawal  i n the Indian  questions  i t i s necessary  withdrawal  and t h e reasons  and t h e defence  Ocean? to  In order  trace  the  f o r t a k i n g each  contraction i n to  answer  stages  step.  of  This  these  British  i s done i n  chapter two. The begin the  a n a l y s i s o f t h e U.S. e n t r y  with  Indian  the question Ocean  into  o f why t h e A m e r i c a n s  i n the early  years  following  assumed t h e l e a d e r s h i p o f t h e w e s t e r n world. more  At the height  or less  Americans leading policy under  from  d i d not enter  role  i n the Asian  t o the area. the British  decades. A f t e r decided  of Cold  insulated  War  navally  naval  into  t h e w a r when  they  umbrella  conflict.  t h e Ocean,  power  18  f o r about  t h e U.S. directly  areas  the Indian  States pursued  of the  Ocean  was  Though t h e  they  played  a  t h e containment  a policy one  of acting  and'  changed t h i s into  should  d i d not enter  c o n t i n e n t by e x t e n d i n g  The U n i t e d naval  tension  into  Ocean  camp i n o t h e r  the US-Soviet  t h e Suez c r i s i s ,  to project  the Indian  a  policy  the region.  half and What  accounts f o rt h i s three,  change i s a b a s i c q u e s t i o n  which provides  addressed i n chapter  a n a n a l y s i s o f t h e US e n t r y  into the Indian  Ocean. The  western  monopoly  o f seapower  decisively  challenged  the  Indian  Ocean  the  Indian  Ocean has t o b e g i n  was t h e r e and If  by t h e e n t r y  i n 1968 . A n y a n a l y s i s  (under  explain  the Soviet  chapter  four  between and  the military  naval  Soviet  i n the Indian  the Soviet  political  strategy  addressing  we  come  the  superpower naval conceptualises  rivalry  theme  of  this,  achieving  the relationship  vis-a-vis  of  the  i n the Indian  superpower naval of that  rivalry  rivalry.  t h e growth o f superpower naval  to  t r a c i n g t h e stages  the third  five,  study  Ocean.  world  -  i n the evolution  and t h e e v o l u t i o n  t h e growth  The a n a l y s i s  As t h e f o c u s  rivalry,  withdrawal  s i x , and seven  by a t t e m p t i n g  of this  of  first  to identify  of the study i s  attention will  c o n t r i b u t i n g t o i t . The c o r r e l a t i o n the region  t o determine  was  i n chapters  on  within  entry?  r e s p o n s e s on t h e o t h e r ?  entries,  central  major elements  factors  Russian  naval  issues pertaining to the B r i t i s h  American and S o v i e t to  into  question:  imperial  and goals  What  move  s t r a t e g i c moves on t h e one h a n d a n d t h e A m e r i c a n  and  the  Ocean.  into  r e l e v a n t , how c a n we  In order  objectives  advances and S o v i e t n a v a l After  partially  was  forces  one p r i m a r y  the earlier  i n 1968?  Ocean  of the Soviet  by answering  or only  move  examines  power  naval  S t a l i n ) m o v e s a n d t h e 1968 S o v i e t  t h e answer i s n e g a t i v e  naval  of Soviet  any r e l a t i o n s h i p between  Soviet  i n the Indian  rivalry  between  o f superpower  be p a i d and t h e  developments naval  rivalry  also  n e e d s t o b e e x a m i n e d . What w e r e t h e f a c t o r s c o n t r i b u t i n g t o  the  decision  of  the  superpowers  19  i n this  regard?  Which  was  primary: center,  the the  regional these  general  political  decisions  of  the  decisions  adversary,  l e v e l ? I t i s important  factors  contributed  finally  take  us  to  namely,  the  relationship  to  to  another  of or  the  developments  e s t a b l i s h the  each  decision.  important between  policy-making  aspect  of  regional  at  the  extent  to  These  questions  the  which  problematic,  dynamics  and  global  mechanisms. Sri Indian  Lankan responses t o the Ocean  regional the  have  responses.  external  depend due  on  to  to  converge  at  proposal. origins,  i t  defence  is and  gically  imperative internal  and  to  the  will  divergent examine trace  Indian  geo-politics and  broader  of  for  to  the  the Is  a  politics?  Ocean  Ocean to  Ocean. Sri  elements small  issue  Peace  Zone  examining of  the  of  the Peace  first  of  Sri  Lanka's  island state  strate-  This  will  Lanka's  economic processes  this  internal  S r i Lankan responses,  as  region  security  intepretations  major  to  of  Indian  paid  of  react  security?  Indian be  in  limits  their  the  context and  states  the  i s , the  security perceptions  political  to  powers  attention  necessary  foreign policy  An  that  to  of  some  search  or  point,  in  the  l i m i t a t i o n s of  order  located  do  in their  regional  evolution, In  Why  the  such,  Zone c o n c e p t . all,  powers  in  presence i n  r e g i o n a l powers p e r c e i v e  dependence,  of  one As  do  inherent  approaches  examined  presence?  external  or  be  How  naval  economic  options, The  to  superpower naval  show  how  the  location  and  the  influence  Sri  Lanka's  decisions.  Overview of E x i s t i n g T h e o r e t i c a l / A n a l y t i c a l Trends Many c o n s t i t u e n t  Indian  aspects  of  Ocean have been s u b j e c t e d  20  superpower to  naval  rivalry  in  the  detailed investigation in  the  last  two  d e c a d e s . However, t h e  generally  been  confined  extra-regional on  the  powers  regional  presence  are  to  or  main focus  the  the  done  of  security dimensions  on  this  security is  subject the  by  those  to  f i l l  trend  superpower naval  concept,  point  states  i n the  gap  by  of  i n the the  area.  Studies  superpower  scholars  who  naval  represent  the  of  s u b s t a n t i a l has view  of  Indian  examining  the  i n the  existing  the  Ocean.  the  been  peace This  problem  Indian  naval  reciprocal  to  escalation. to  explain  into  i n t o the  u  to the  According  from  Ocean  power  the  literature  in relation  withdrawal  Ocean f a l l  related  sufficient  rivalry  British  to project t h e i r Indian  i n the  reciprocal escalation.  power vacuum  Closely  of  Nothing  the  this  interests  Q  powers.  from  smaller  dominant  vacuum and  the  medium  security  in  and  thesis a  Sri  perspective.  The the  of  intended  Lankan  of  has  medium p o w e r s  overwhelmingly  view  studies  national  1 point  of e x i s t i n g  the  which the  to the  prompted  region  action  of  action the  other  Ocean the  adversary  of  one  power  power vacuum created  a  superpowers  i n order  power vacuum c o n c e p t The  explain  concepts of  Indian  hands of the  i s to  not by  i s the  to l e t  default. theory  of  superpower  is  superpower,  according  •^For the P a k i s t a n p o s i t i o n see, P. I q b a l Cheema, C o n f l i c t and C o o p e r a t i o n i n t h e I n d i a n Ocean; P a k i s t a n ' s Interests and Choices ( C a n b e r r a : S t r a t e g i c and D e f e n c e S t u d i e s C e n t r e , 1 9 8 0 ) , and Raul Bux Rais, The Indian Ocean and the Superpowers: E c o n o m i c , P o l i t i c a l , and S t r a t e g i c P e r s p e c t i v e s (London: Croom H e l m , 1 9 8 6 ) . F o r t h e I n d i a n p o s i t i o n s e e K. S u b r a h m a n y a m , I n d i a n Security Perspectives (New D e l h i : ABC P u b l i s h i n g H o u s e , 1 9 8 2 ) , a n d K.R. Singh, The I n d i a n Ocean: B i g Power P r e s e n c e and Local Response (New D e l h i : M a n o h a r , 1 9 7 7 ) . ^For example see, Anthony Harrigan, " S o v i e t s may 'own' I n d i a n O c e a n i f US D o e s N o t Make C o u n t e r m o v e , " N a v y : The m a g a z i n e o f S e a P o w e r , ( D e c e m b e r 1 9 6 9 ) , p . 15.  21  to  this  escalation theory.  The is  c o n f r o n t a t i o n a l paradigms  fraught  with  many  serious  First  of a l l , the theory  ption  that  neither Indian World that was  the Indian  explains  why  associated with  conceptual  and e m p i r i c a l  o f power vacuum  Ocean  should  the B r i t i s h  i s based  be d o m i n a t e d decided  II.  clearly taking  Ocean.  thesis will  reveals  place  withdrawal. political  This  that  well  In  addition,  dimensions  of  I t i s important  theory  superpower t o note  the  superpowers  i n the region  but  not  t h e power  least,  the British  this  vacuum  regional  security  dynamics and superpower n a v a l and S o v i e t  policies  from  position  into  the after  evidence  the region  announcement  ignores  of  their  t h e economic  involvements t h e economic  concept  linkages  entry  entry  are not always  examine  Soviet  between  that  one. I t  the historical  t h e superpower  before  on t h e assum-  b y some  military  present  vacuum  pitfalls.  t o withdraw  Ocean, n o r t h e e v o l u t i o n o f t h e i r War  power  i n the Indian interests  conflictual.  does  economic,  and  not  Last,  attempt  political,  of  to and  strategy. i n the Indian  Ocean  have  9 9  generated  an  impressive  body o f l i t e r a t u r e .  One s c h o o l  still  The m a j o r i t y o f w r i t i n g s i n t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s represent t h i s view. Nevertheless, some s e r i o u s s c h o l a r s h a v e challenged c o n f r o n t a t i o n a l p a r a d i g m s . F o r example, Howard W r i g g i n s argues that American e f f o r t s t o increase i t snaval force i n the I n d i a n Ocean a r e u n d e s i r a b l e b o t h f o r t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s and t h e c o u n t r i e s o f t h e r e g i o n . S e e , H o w a r d W r i g g i n s , " H e a d i n g O f f a New Arms Race: L e t ' s T r y t o N e u t r a l i z e t h e I n d i a n Ocean," War/Peace Report, (September 1971), pp. 7-11. 9 9  For a good i n t r o d u c t i o n t o t h e l e a d i n g hypotheses t h a t h a v e b e e n a d v a n c e d t o e x p l a i n S o v i e t m o t i v a t i o n s s e e , R o b e r t H. D o n a l d s o n , "The USSR, t h e S u b c o n t i n e n t , and t h e I n d i a n Ocean: Naval Power and P o l i t i c a l I n f l u e n c e , " i n The S u b c o n t i n e n t in W o r l d P o l i t i c s z. I n d i a , I t s Neighbors,and t h e Great Powers, Lawrence Z i r i n g , e d . (New Y o r k : P r a e g e r P u b l i s h e r s , 1 9 7 8 ) , p p . 168-93. 22  maintains  that the the  Soviet  Russians  entry to  i s an  desire  of  Soviet  intervention i n Afghanistan  orthodox  cold  a l a r g e p o r t i o n of the  to  acquire  supply  military  and  scholars which  other  i n the  attempts  political of the  the  attention defence  of  and  country.  ted  economic  revisionist are  made  of  scholars  order and  tradition to  also strategic  to  war the  light  Soviet  on  disrupt  interests;^  Soviet  United  analyses  economic  n e c e s s i t i e s as  pertaining  to  growing  the  a  a  few  a v a i l a b l e , i t s defence The  only  studies and  on  strategically  S r i Lankan  s e c u r i t y dimensions  published  work  is  one  in and out  of  the  located  foreign are  the  country's  of  such  but  States.^  e s p e c i a l l y i n view  to  into  western o i l  i t i s s u r p r i s i n g t o know t h a t  issues  subject  s t i l l  intention  s e c u r i t y have been meagre the  this  entry  Soviet  have p r e s e n t e d  with the  The  approach  the  to  historical  waters.  new  political  understand  S r i Lanka,  Although  area.  in  Union's competition  part  importance  are  western  w o r k s on  w r i t i n g s emphasise  capability  i n t e r e s t s and  Soviet  On  These  warm  shed  constitute  Ocean.  to  has  Writings  Indian  an  access  approach.  the  with  have  outgrowth of the  policy  a  written  neglecby  S.U.  35 Kodikara.  I t i s a general  survey  of  strategic  factors in  inter-  s' ^ ^ S e e A l v i n J C o t t e r e l l a n d R.M. B u r r e l l , " The S o v i e t N a v y t h e I n d i a n O c e a n , " S t r a t e g i c R e v i e w , 2:4 ( F a l l 1 9 7 4 ) , p. 25J  and 35.  T h i s i s t h e w i d e l y p r e v a l e n t v i e w i n t h e U.S. D e p a r t m e n t s . The w r i t i n g s of Robert J.Hanks, R o n a l d I a n d W i l l i a m F. H i c k m a n c o u l d be c i t e d a s a x a m p l e s .  Service Spiers,  p c  See w o r k s by Jukes, Oles Smolansky, McConnell, MccGwire c i t e d i n the b i b l i o g r a p h y of t h i s t h e s i s . .  and  ^S.U. Kodikara, Strategic Factors i n Interstate Relations i n South A s i a (Canberra, S t r a t e g i c and D e f e n c e S t u d i e s Centre, 1979) . 2  state  relations  i n South A s i a .  The m a j o r  existing  works  deal  with  and S r i Lanka's  role  o 7  the in  evolution  of Indo-Sri  non-alignment  Lanka  or present  relations general  surveys  of  S r i Lanka's  O Q  foreign  relations.  No  substantial  carried  o u t on S r i L a n k a ' s  context  of Indian  study  political  has h i t h e r t o  and s e c u r i t y and s t r a t e g i c  i s an a t t e m p t i n t h e d i r e c t i o n  lacuna e x i s t i n g  The  Ocean  defence  study  of f i l l i n g  i n the area of security  studies  problems  been  i n the  framework. a strikingly  This felt  i n S r i Lanka.  o 7 ^ I b i d . , Indo-Ceylon Relations S i n c e Independence Ceylon I n s t i t u t e o f World A f f a i r s , 1965).  (Colombo:  ^°Ibid., F o r e i g n P o l i c y o f S r i L a n k a . A T h i r d W o r l d P e r s p e c tive (New D e l h i : C h a n a k y a P u b l i s h e r s , 1 9 8 2 ) , H.S.S. N i s s a n k a , S r i Lanka's F o r e i g n P o l i c y - A Study of Non-Alignment (New D e l h i : V i k a s P u b l i s h i n g House, 1984).  24  Chapter  The  time  B r i t i s h Withdrawal from the  The  Indian  the  British  After  firmly  Britain the  sea'  out  was  defeated  an  was  and  the  French  Britain  by  decide  and  i n the  political colonial  larger design  Ocean.  advantages  in  and  The  accruing  her  to  states  as  their this naval  result this  forces  process  and  politics of  the  The  from  regime British  the  British  the  Indian  defence  25  Ocean  the  marked  Ocean.  policy  in  the  the  Indian  constel-  in  emergence i n the to  1968 the  the  Navy,  predominant to  began  was  carry  i n power  the  decision  was  challenge  gradually  Indian  i t symbolically in  and  an  a serious  changes  politics  The  nearly  Britain  Royal  de-colonization process  oceanic  1945.  naval  evolution  of  world  O c e a n was  of  'Mare L i b e r u m '  gateways  i n the  post-war  'freedom  r u l e s and  the as  lation  the  Ocean,  regime. For  and  Britain  However, w i t h  period.  after  Indian  of  this  vitality  Indian  supremacy.  norms,  c o n t r o l over the  century.  naval  during  region,  the  the  on  defence s t r u c t u r e without  Ocean  18th  S e c o n d W o r l d War,  strength  from  based  Ocean s u s t a i n e d t h e  a  late  of oceanic  the  lake  procedures a s s o c i a t e d w i t h the  Indian  power,  the  British  impose p r i n c i p l e s ,  decision-making  concept  in  r a i s e d i n the  a half centuries, until  to  British  hegemony  underwritten  of t h i s  a  i n t e r n a t i o n a l regime  structure that part  Indian Ocean, 1945-1968  practically  e s t a b l i s h i n g her  which  integral  able  Ocean  maintained  defence  one  II  end  of  Indian  lose  to  an  era  An  examination  of  the  period  1945  from  its  withdraw  culmination of  new  of in the to  1968  provides  power n a v a l  the point  rivalry  of departure  f o r the inquiry  into  i n t h e I n d i a n Ocean and S r i Lanka's  superresponse  to i t .  B r i t i s h Defence Structure i n the Indian Ocean Before 1947 The  defence  historically  system B r i t a i n  designed  f o rthe strategic  her  colonial  empire  New  Zealand.  As t h e B r i t i s h  the  Malay  British  t o maintain  in Asia finally Indian  i n Asia  Peninsula,  Ocean.  developed  empire  the security into  Throughout  requirements  and t h e sea lanes  the isolated  evolved  expanded defence  an u n i f i e d  the period  was  location  considered  a  prime  encompassed both  was  Mediterranean  system o f defence Empire,  The  unique  India  strategic  British  o f I n d i a c o u l d be B r i t a i n ' s East as w e l l  Russia.  policy  As  sought  a to  result, check  defence policy-  threatened  o f Suez  as t h e  around  I n d i a was a means o f n e u t r a l i s i n g  as o c e a n i c  defence  land-based likely  Balkan  expansion  and  to the  o f m a i n t a i n i n g p r o t e c t o r a t e s and b u f f e r s t a t e s  s t r a t e g y was  concerned,  upon two f u n d a m e n t a l c o n c e p t i o n s : power t o e s t a b l i s h bases second,  British  Russian  The p o l i c y  Ocean;  i n the  empire; hence i t s p r o t e -  south.  great  p a r t s of t h e empire  experience,  the oceanic  and  by t h e  a r r a n g e m e n t s . As f o r t h e o v e r l a n d t h r e a t , t h e most  challenger  far  taken  o f I n d i a made h e r t h e n a t u r a l c e n t e r p i e c e o f t h e  from l a n d and s e a . T h e r e f o r e ,  defence  measures  necessity.  makers were aware t h a t t h e s e c u r i t y  strategy  defending  t h e Red Sea t o  o f t h e Second  o f t h e I n d i a n Ocean. From h i s t o r i c a l  both  of  to Australia  from  of different  was c o n s i d e r e d t h e j e w e l o f t h e B r i t i s h ction  i n t h e I n d i a n O c e a n was  that  Britain  the overland British  first,  was  based  t h a t o f n o t a l l o w i n g any  and f o r t i f i e d should  policy  t h r e a t . As  always  ports  i n the Indian  control  the  naval  gateways t o t h e r e g i o n . Throughout defence based  t h e p e r i o d I n d i a was t h e k e y s t o n e  i n the Indian  on B r i t i s h  naval  the  ocean were f i r m l y  the  defence  system,  importance. Middle over  For  East  time.  With  assimilation  its  workings, of  no  namely,  rather  the oceanic  than  concerns  t h e hub  the eastern  itself,  and  assumed  western  of a colonial  defence  bases,  flanks,  activity  economic  order  order".  On  Indian  Ocean  territorial  the  became of  diplomatic  whole,  comprised  commands,  units  the three  right and into  o f i t s own. A s a  arrangements  and  the  own  and, as Darby p o i n t s o u t , " t h e d e t a i l maritime  greater  i n their  a c q u i r e d an i m p o r t a n c e  developments  i n the  regime  o f t h e spokes o f  o f c o l o n i e s as o r g a n i c b u t dependent  each colony  neat  structure  latched, security  t h e development  annexation,  admits  once  of  p o w e r was e s t a b l i s h e d a n d t h e g a t e w a y s t o  example,  later  complicated, and  However,  a n d t h e F a r E a s t , became i m p o r t a n t  the  result  Ocean.  of the arch  more  settlement manoeuvring  British  defence  basic  elements,  and t h e t r a n s p o r t a t i o n o f  t r o o p s by s e a . It the  i s important  British  appeared  were  maintained  and t h a t  fortified  however, t h a t t h e defence  t o o much  Stability  f o r granted.  of B r i t i s h  as i t  p o s i t i o n s had not a l l been  and s e c u r i t y  W o r l d War, t h e I n d i a n O c e a n d e f e n c e autonomously  structure  i n t h e I n d i a n O c e a n was n o t a s t i g h t  t h e key s t r a t e g i c  adequately.  taken  t o note,  of the Indian  At the outbreak  Ocean  of the  First  s y s t e m c o u l d n o t be s u s t a i n e d  forces i n other  a r e a s . As A d m i r a l  Terence  i  P h i l i p Darby, B r i t i s h Defence P o l i c y U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s , 1 9 7 3 ) , p . 3.  Oxford 2  Ibid.,  p . 2. 27  East  o f Suez  (London:  Lewin pointed of  what  too  could  much  system dealt  with  Indian  decisive  the  British  Prince  the  sudden and  fragility face the  of  real  the  end.^  the  war.  return to  HMS  the  the  issues the  defence  tended  Indian  that  naval  Second  area  Repulse  to  Ocean  supremacy  World  defence  as  at  War  jeopardy.  soon a f t e r  c o l l a p s e of  Singapore  Empire,  the  time  taken  be did  in  the  after  the  W i t h a s i n g l e s t r o k e , J a p a n was  threat. According  going  Defence  British  p o s i t i o n i n the  British  British  Without  to  came d u r i n g  J a p a n e s e Army t o o k  war,  not  a  of  manner. However,  cataclysmic  the  s e c u r i t y were  passage  compulsion.  o f Wales and  of  the  and  warning  a single unit in strategic thinking.  finally  HMS  stability  challenge  into  G e r m a n c r u i s e r Emden g a v e  With  isolated  s t a t u s of  Japanese e n t r y t o put  i f that  i t s original  Ocean  the  granted".  i n an  the  The  " i n 1914  happen  for  lost  retain  out  to  along  Kipling  f a r , i t was  i n the  Michael  had  the  Ocean  in  the  day  on  130,000 p r i s o n e r s  known  obvious  pre-war p o s i t i o n i n the  Indian  i t , came  that  Indian  of and  illustrated  Howard,  with  loss  P e a r l Harbour  Singapore  posture  The  able  to  Britain  of an  could  Ocean a f t e r  the  war. The empires gained  in  World  Asia.  War  was  not  most o f t h e i r be  a  N a t i o n a l i s t and  a h u g e momentum d u r i n g  regained could  Second  restored  the  territories  severe  setback  anti-colonial war.  Though t h e  soon a f t e r  i n i t s pre-war  form.  the  The  to  the  forces  war,  Asia  powers  their  rule  nationalist  tide  3 Lewin, "The I n d i a n Ocean and Beyond: B r i t i s h Yesterday and Today," A s i a n A f f a i r s , IX: 3 (October, 250.  28  in  colonial  J  ^Howard, " B r i t a i n ' s S t r a t e g i c Problems International Affairs, 42:2 (April, 1 9 6 6 ) , p.  colonial  East 179.  Interests 1978), p. of  Suez,"  could  not  dramatic  be as  evolution in  the  form.  reversed.  that  Though  political South  'violent'  the  same p r o c e s s . had  defence  extremely  policies  These forms  The  of  came t o b e States the rely  C o l d War. on  the  as  Britain's changed become a Union.  an  face  Britain  of  position  a position had  done  i n world  t o p l a y an  South Asian and  South  Indian  consequence  for  Ocean  British  of  United  to  as  Western  later  i n t h e post-war p e r i o d , had militarily.  power b a l a n c e  War to  with  the  independent r o l e  U.S.  severe  payments  In t h i s  significantly  II. Firstly,  became a key  affairs.  that  context, the the  were  in  world  of  old  Bloc  as w e l l  of  process  In t h i s  leader  of  nationalism,  polarization  beset  balance  dissolution  resurgent  World  was  the  factor  i n the  and  the  economic  crisis.  context  Britain  had  Soviet  problems  The  declining  that  determined  Britain  was  not  in  I n d i a n Ocean as  she  independence  the  earlier.  Therefore,  nal  term  in relation  economic s t r e n g t h of B r i t a i n her  power  conflictive  s t a t e s i n the  C o l d War.  i n the  power  acute  less  'peaceful'  i.e.  undisputed  aftermath  secondary  from  long  Asia,  economically  Secondly,  arising  in  position  i n the  a  of  and  and  European powers,  U.S.,  development  transfer  take  as  A s i a n d e v e l o p m e n t s w e r e p a r t s o f one  East-West  the  The  the  not  and  d e s c r i b e d as t h e  emerged  gradual  was  area.  the  contemporaneous t o the  Asia  Asian  important  developments in  form,  South  made t h e  e m e r g e n c e o f new  i n the  empire  The  possessions  in  South-East  Asia.  in  processes  Asian  different  the  region  change  i n South-East  i n the  British  The  i t i s important  to place  c o l o n i e s i n the broader  global political  context  environment  29  the  of the  i n order  to  of  changed r e g i o gauge  its  real  significance. colonies and  The  was  ending  of  colonial  a  landmark  both  in British  colonial  policy  rule  i n the history  significant  administration in  the  pre-independence  released  played  i n maintaining  independence.  this  role  The  nearly  period  withdrawal  50,000  men  was  of  who  It signified  colonial  Ocean  defence  structure  forces  deployed  army w h i c h a c t e d  as a p e a c e t i m e s t r a t e g i c  reserve  tion  p o s i t i o n s i n the Middle  East  Indian  i n d e p e n d e n c e meant  not only  Indian  manpower  the  fields,  but  military  According o n i t s own,  British  India  imperial  power  was  i n the f u l l  be  certain  that  Zealand, East,  East  Pakistan,  power  Far  from  of  a  of the  gone.  great  Suez.  With  basis  of  "Without  power  sense  but  of that  responsibilities assisting  maintaining their  in  op. c i t . p.  i t was  even  the  after  defence  30  independence,  of  policy.  and  of  an  British  to  as  empire,  longer  source  power  position  Indian  air-  facilities.  object  Indian  The  East.  resources,  an  Britain imperial  had,  i tis  independence,  Australia  dominance i n t h e M i d d l e  15.  the Far  transfer  no  the Indian  I n d i a n Ocean  Britain's the  But  of the reservoir of  both  the  term".  and p r o t e c t i n g t h e l i n e s  ^ Darby,  and  argument, I n d i a n in British  India  f o r the protec-  economic  i t , I n d i a was t o some e x t e n t  still  i.e.  of  after  elsewhere.  and communications  to the conventional  might  argued,  the loss  loss  installations,  power  and  also  was t h e t u r n i n g p o i n t  As Darby p u t s of  absent  a d v a n t a g e was n e g a t e d b y t h e l o s s o f c o n t r o l o v e r  of B r i t i s h  the  Indian  naturally  be  countries  the  British  could  Asian  politics.  by  the Indian  the South  of these  i n the region.  e m e r g e n c e o f a new m i l i e u i n I n d i a n O c e a n The  over  East  and  New  and t h e  o f c o m m u n i c a t i o n . The t r a n s f e r  of power i n South A s i a n e c e s s i t a t e d role  and t h e r e a d j u s t m e n t o f t h e B r i t i s h  Indian  Ocean  imperial  in  order.  reappraisal  accordance In t h i s  took place.  patterns making  Darby  of thought which  question  spokes  and  also  and  their  answered  economic Indian  empire  the hub.  Britain  this  lost  not  out  only  In  as  that  around  i t was  used  defence  One  to  of  the  failure  as  post-  no  due  their  hold  on  such to  "a and  decision  i n the that a  the  whether sense,  security  a half  an i n d e p e n d e n t  overemphasis  system  an  of  most  of  the  spokes  of  the  the Eastern developed  as  and  spokes  no  centuries  of  development  i m p o r t a n c e and  still  a place  on t h e s i g n i f i c a n c e o f I n d i a n  of  of  had  in this  or an  metaphor  flanks the  these  means t h a t  had  actually  Western  I n d i a and  as  independent  was  by  31  also  hub-spokes  was  ^ Loc c i t .  but  British  The  of a l l be  s t i l l  the  position  needs t o  t h e y were  analyse the  s t r u c t u r e i n 1947  unit  were  littoral.  first  i s raised  First  empire  economies  Ocean  were  Ocean.  the B r i t i s h  1947  hub,  that  the r o l e of  a f t e r 1947  Indian  the r e l a t i o n s h i p between  and  hub  political  political  Indian  to reappraise  misreading the B r i t i s h  after  I t i s true  system  However, defence  formal  the  i n 1945.  colonies  by  sense,  countries  in a  failed  of the Indian  i m p e r i a l economic  spokes.  The  conditions  i t i s surprising that  slowly  security objectives  Ocean  Even  valid  structure i n the  factors, external circumstances  incorrectly  entity.  British  the  o f why  i n the absence  conceptualised  as  the  explains  only  i s necessary to point  not.  defence  imperial  in Whitehall".^  The the  with  situation  combination of i n s t i t u t i o n a l  it  a r e a p p r a i s a l of the  of  Indian  flanks a hub  given  not  in and  these  structure.  independence  is  b a s e d upon a m i s c o n c e p t i o n Indian to  Ocean d e f e n c e  redefine  interests why  the  change  the  and  commitments  just in  the  reality,  then  the  p o s i t i o n of  because  region.  period  continuing  after  1947,  interests  i t  and  India i n  Britain  In  defence s t r u c t u r e continued  some  Britain's  s t r u c t u r e . In  structure  British for  regarding  of  d i d not  her  order  is  understand  a substantial  necessary  commitments  need  continuing  to  without  the  to  in  examine  the  Indian  Ocean.  B r i t i s h I n t e r e s t s and Commitments i n Indian Ocean a f t e r 1947 The  transfer  beginning region  of  and  These  of  the  power  did  not  as  colonies  a  East  Zanzibar,  Britain  had  colonies  in  the  Eastern  Indian  Sabah,  Sarawak  and  immediate problems win  the  Malayan  addition to these responsibilities Middle Bahrain,  East.  Ocean  the  cease  to  Ocean  colonies  of  Kong. other  and  i n her  the  the  to  put  colonial  committed  to  the  T r u c i a l Coast, Muscat, 32  1947.  balance  Indian  Ocean and  Brunei,  considered likely the  i t was Mau  that  in  the  specific  required in  Persian defence Oman, a n d  a  Uganda,  power  with  Mau  had  Seychelles,  not  e.g.  i n the  colonial  Singapore,  was  the  a  after  commitments B r i t a i n  protectorates was  the  the  grapple  down  even  i t was  the Ocean  in fact,  Western  1947,  colonies  be  Tanganyika,  Malaya,  territories  to  formal  In  had  colonial  war  in  marked Indian  Britain,  Indian  region,  Britain  Britain  Qatar,  the  1947.  only  in  of M a u r i t i u s , Aden,  these  these  in  Moreover,  Hong  future. of  Asia  w h o s e s e c u r i t y d e p e n d e d on  Ocean.  for  whole  African  Indian  independence  South  immediately  bordering  the  the  in  decolonization process  region  included  Kenya and in  the  Britain  power i n the number  of  the  Kenya. had  Gulf of  to In  certain and  the  Kuwait,  other  South  Arabian  States  through  various  nineteenth  century  defence  agreements. Even not  in  South  disappear  dered,  with  though  not  responsibility  to  countries. power  In  was  the  the  provide  security  for  case  Burma  the  signed  mission  to  of  out,  of by  and  formal Britain  Burma  of  those  newly  "to provide  and  training  was  transfer  1947.  The  of  treaty  Government  According  Military  facilities  consi-  independent  the  a Naval,  did  Britain's  Provisional  October  was  It  agreements.  the  17th  empire  i t was  S r i Lanka  and  the  power.  that  defence  i n L o n d o n on  agreement, B r i t a i n  Force  transfer  spelled  Government of  o f B u r m a was  responsibilities  formal  clearly  accompanied  between the  this  Asia  in his  to  and  Air  Majesty's  7  establishments Burma a g r e e d from the  for personnel  o f Burma F o r c e " .  "to receive a Naval,  U.Kl  Government  and  not  Military from  any  The  and  Government  A i r Force  government  of  Mission  outside  the  Q  British  Commonwealth".  In  S r i Lanka, the  to  the  tted  security  Defence Agreement 15th  November  Proposal the  Agreement,  defence  1947  of  the  the at  Commonwealth both  Colombo Ceylon of  for  through  as  fully  "will  security  external aggression  8  Ibid.,  p'ara  8. 33  commi-  treaties  Agreement to  -  -  the  signed  the  on  Ceylon:  responsible status within According give  of  to  and  to  each  their  United Kingdom, Foreign office, Government o f t h e U n i t e d Kingdom and t h e o f B u r m a (Cmd 7 2 4 0 ) , 1947, p a r a 4. 7  two  appendices  Nations.  governments  assistance against  country  e v e n more d e e p l y  External Affairs  f o r C o n f e r r i n g on  British  military  and  U n i t e d K i n g d o m was  f o r the  the  Defence  other  territories protection  such for of  Treaty between the P r o v i s i o n a l Government  essential to  communications  p r o v i d e " . ^ As  said  agreement  a s i t may  f o r Indian  be  Ocean  i n their  defence,  mutual  article  interests two  of the  states:  The Government of Ceylon will grant to the Government o f t h e U n i t e d Kingdom a l l t h e n e c e s s a r y f a c i l i t i e s f o r t h e o b j e c t s mentioned i n A r t i c l e I a s may b e m u t u a l l y a g r e e d . T h e s e f a c i l i t i e s will i n c l u d e t h e use o f n a v a l and a i r bases and p o r t s and military establishments and t h e use o f telecommunications facilities, and t h e r i g h t o f s e r v i c e c o u r t s and a u t h o r i t i e s t o e x e r c i s e such c o n t r o l and j u r i s d i c t i o n o v e r members o f t h e s a i d F o r c e s as t h e y e x e r c i s e a t p r e s e n t . 1 0 In  addition  British  to military  and p o l i t i c a l  had wide economic i n t e r e s t s  relationship economic South  between  interests  Asia  military  interests.  These  and p o l i t i c a l apparent.  the British  necessitated  Persian Gulf  enclave  and B r i t a i n ' s  plainly  reveal  example, crude and  o i l from  imports  from i  million.  i  main  Britain's  i n the  a t £25.4  remained  Kuwait million the  . British  year  and B a h r a i n from  rest  Saudi  of  the  and East,  economic  presence  i n the  commitments.  of  dependence  financial  In the Middle  military  basically  source  commitments  had d i f f e r e n t  British  area and s t r e n g t h e n e d t h e i r p o l i t i c a l The  the  i n t h e I n d i a n O c e a n a r e a . The  was n o t a l w a y s  and F a r East  commitments,  a  British  economic  o i l . O i l import on  Persian  1949-50, were  Britain's  valued  Arabia, world  Gulf  Iraq  at  figures o i l .  imports  £22.1  only  of  million  and I r a n .  amounted  For  Total  t o £8.4  d e p e n d e n c e u p o n P e r s i a n G u l f o i l was o n e  ^ U n i t e d Kingdom, C o l o n i a l Office, Cevlon: Proposal f o r Conferring on C e y l o n Fully Responsible Status within the C o m m o n w e a l t h o f N a t i o n s (Cmd 7 2 5 7 ) , 1 9 4 7 , p a r a 1. 1 0  Ibid.,  para  2.  •^Economic C o o p e r a t i o n A d m i n i s t r a t i o n , 34  The S t e r l i n g A r e a :  an  American A n a l y s i s aspect the  of  the  major  companies  picture.  such  Middle  The  as  the  home. I t was  The  o i l s u p p l i e s and  economic  interests  explained  i n terms  of  the  case  was  significant.  even  more  with  the  data  not  security 17  there.  not  other  These  trade.  In  S r i Lanks's transfer per  cent  relating  to  areas the  export  of  and  on  a l l tea  British  i.e  to  trade  in  lands  can  be  trade.  in  as  India  economy was  S r i Lanka's  even  hurt  Britain  investment  i n d u s t r y , which  earnings,  way  foreign  came t o m o r e t h a n  tea  power,  of  back  British  interests  export-import  p e r i o d 1935-1947,  sterling 1 3  of  i n any  h e a v i l y dependent  island's  In the  part  i n danger.  dominance i n the  total  o w n e d 2 6.46  the  p r i v a t e investment  The  large  profits  British  cent  the  huge  S r i Lankan case,  and  after  a  British  obvious.  of  Oil  whereas  Britain  thirds  Anglo-Iranian  S r i Lanka  London-centered.  of  o i l  i n South A s i a d i d not  Britain's  was  in  British  controlled  brought  stake  i f A r a b n a t i o n a l i s m were p e r m i t t e d  o f power  was  investment.  and  i n o i l c o m p a n i e s w o u l d be  foreign trade  Britain's  O i l Company,  o i l supplies  India's  257. was  Corporation,  believed that  transfer  In the  aspect  direct  Kuwait  run unchecked, B r i t a i n ' s investments  by  Iraq Petroleum  Eastern  1 9 5 1 ) , p.  other  o i l companies  Company, a n d of  ( L o n d o n : ECA,  was  heavily  trade  with  sixty-five generated  twenty-four  per two-  years  1972,  Sterling  Companies  i n the  country.  Though  investment  in  South-East  Asia  is  satisfactory, t h e r e was no d o u b t that investment i n Malaya, 17 D a r b y , o p . c i t . , p . 26 • ^ C e y l o n , House o f R e p r e s e n t a t i v e s , H a n s a r d ' s P a r l i a m e n t a r y D e b a t e s , V o l . 3 , 9 J u l y 1948, c c . 984-94 A d m i n i s t r a t i v e Report of the Tea Controller 1972 1 4  (Colombo:  Govt. P r i n t e r ,  especially calculated  i n t i n and r u b b e r p l a n t a t i o n s , that  i n 1939  a b o u t U.S.$455 m i l l i o n After Labour  total  in  i n the  Western  was  i m m e n s e . A.C.  of India,  Britain  Indian  Pakistan  believed  Ocean  region  and  that  was  a  insider,  Crossman,  Parliamentary  caucus t h a t B r i t a i n 1  purely  economic  Continued countries  The  had t o h o l d  Bevin  Labour  reminded  the  on E a s t o f S u e z f o r  7  reasons. economic  in  Ernest  the  reason f o r  1  that  the  Indian  protect trade routes on D e f e n c e s t a t e s :  and  interests Ocean  and  trade  region  communication  relations  resulted lines.  The  in  with  efforts  1953  the to  Statement  No m a t t e r w h a t t h e f u t u r e may h o l d , t h e O c e a n s o f t h e w o r l d m u s t a l w a y s be k e p t f r e e f o r t h e p a s s a g e o f o u r m e r c h a n t s h i p p i n g . No n a t i o n i n t h e W e s t e r n w o r l d can a f f o r d t o f o r g e t t h a t the l i f e and commerce o f i t s i n d u s t r i a l and t r a d i n g societies d e p e n d s on u n m o l e s t e d movement o f s h i p p i n g on t h e h i g h seas.18 The  fact  Zealand  that lay  the  across  communication the  Indian  lines Ocean  to  Australia  further  added  and  New  to  the  G.C. A l l e n and A . D o n n i t h o r n e , Western E n t e r p r i s e s I n d o n e s i a a n d M a l a y a (New Y o r k : M a c m i l l a n , 1 9 5 7 ) , p . 2 9 0 . 1 5  in  6 B e z b o r u a h b r i n g s out t h i s p o i n t c l e a r l y , see Monoranjan B e z b o r u a h , U.S. S t r a t e g y i n t h e I n d i a n O c e a n - The International R e s p o n s e (New Y o r k : P r a e g e r P u b l i s h e r s , 1 9 7 7 ) , p . 15 l  1 D  R i c h a r d H.S. Crossman, "Western Defence i n t h e 1960's" J o u r n a l o f t h e R o y a l U n i t e d S e r v i c e s I n s t i t u t e , ( A u g u s t 19 6 1 ) , p . 238. 1 7  1  1 5  economic  good  of a B r i t i s h presence East of Suez. ^ recalls  British.  British  offered  were  S r i Lanka  the continuation Richard  Allen  investments i n Malaya  and s e v e n t y p e r c e n t o f t h i s  the independence  leaders  interests  1974).  ft  °United K i n g d o m , M i n i s t r y o f D e f e n c e , S t a t e m e n t on D e f e n c e 1963 - R e p o r t on t h e N a v y (Cmnd 1 9 3 6 ) , 1 9 6 3 , p a r a 4. 36  importance  of  controlling  Commonwealth and both  a  communication maintenance integrally  The  the  t r a n s p l a n t a t i o n s of E n g l i s h s o c i e t y , B r i t a i n  had  and  a  lines  to  of  a  o c e a n . As  moral  British  and  presence  to  New  in  these  Zealand.  Thus,  the  Indian  Ocean  was  the  s e c u r i t y of these  protect  countries.  E a r l y Post-War Defence Scheme  Indian  Britain  Ocean  B r i t i s h presence.  had  after  L a n k a , a n d Burma. But  enduring  the  there  In the  Cold  War  duty  was  strategists to  keep the  a  were  other  British  sphere  Ocean s a f e  e a r l y post-war B r i t i s h p o l i c y  the  Soviet  a s s u m e d t h a t a war subsequent  p o s s i b l e war  was  abandoned  w i t h the  Defence  with the  f o r the  of a world  was  the  Papers  Sri  divided by  into  western  of  influence.  Britain's  from  Communist  expansion.  end  were  S o v i e t U n i o n . The  in  continued  considered  of attempting  at  commitments  India, Pakistan,  of  S o v i e t U n i o n was  White  and  reasons  I n d i a n Ocean  Indian  of  context  The  Union  interests  independence  C o l d War  spheres of i n f l u e n c e , the  and  original  obligation  Australia  r e l a t e d to the  Plainly, the  members o f  formal  that  to cooperate 1947.  a strong  presented  Then  with  i t  was  possibility in  terms  Defence White Paper  of  1953,  f o r example, s t a t e s : The e f f o r t we a r e m a k i n g f a l l s b r o a d l y i n t o two parts, though these to a considerable extent o v e r l a p . F i r s t , t h e r e are our overseas o b l i g a t i o n s and our commitments i n r e s i s t i n g t h e Communist c a m p a i g n known a s t h e C o l d War; and s e c o n d , t h e r e a r e t h e p r e p a r a t i o n s w h i c h we m u s t make t o g e t h e r w i t h our Commonwealth p a r t n e r s and our allies a g a i n s t t h e r i s k t h a t Communist p o l i c y , w h e t h e r by a c c i d e n t o r d e s i g n , m i g h t f o r c e us t o defend ourselves against a direct attack. Into the first part fall the forces which the United Kingdom m a i n t a i n s i n overseas t h e a t r e s ...20 2 0  Ibid.,  S t a t e m e n t on  Defence, 37  1953  (Cmd  8768),  1953,  pr.  31  Thus, Ocean  the  i n the  defence  post-war  initiatives years  general  framework  defence  thinking in this  very  plainly  fixed to  in  of  a  upon K o r e a  close  the  explained the lucidly  ...  talk  hideous  was  the  this  in  be  Europe. 1950,  the  The  in  the  concern  in  Churchill "My  put  eyes  perception  front"  on  the  this  are  i s i n E u r o p e . We  European  Indian  placed  strategy.  i n August  on  took  should  War  supreme p e r i l  gap of  1956  Cold  context  the  impact  until  British  BBC  Britain  not  must t r y  Philip  2 1  Indian  Darby  Ocean  very  : The v a r i o u s m o v e s on t h e I n d i a n O c e a n chess-board w e r e v i e w e d [by B r i t a i n ' s p o l i c y makers] a g a i n s t a background o f E u r o p e , o f t h e Communist t h r e a t , and of the f e a r of g l o b a l war. The picture that emerges i s o f t h e t h r e e s e r v i c e s t a k i n g up the remnant of the i m p e r i a l system, making such adjustments as the post-war developments n e c e s s i t a t e d , and a t t e m p t i n g t o r e l a t e the whole t o t h e g l o b a l war t h e m e . 2 2  Accordingly,  Britain  Ocean  depended  which  transporting validity, However,  this the  necessitated the  were  upon  by  sea.  scheme  loss  of  certain  independence  rights was  troops  maintained  of  Calcutta.  Above  overcome  by  all,  the  Indian  adjustments and  with  territorial  the  Suez  without bases to  those  two  the  loss  of  27 p.  August 10.  38  At  transit  bases  1950,  Quoted  of  agreement  Dum-Dum  S r i Lanka  time  overflight  An  was  change. commands  the  and  countries.  Indian  and  challenged i t s  territorial  the  Indian  commands,  crisis  scheme.  Pakistan,  i n the  substantial  and  the  Defence Agreement w i t h  cit  strategy  I n d i a n Government over  21 O b s e r v e r ( L o n d o n ) , o p . c i t .., p . 4 5 . 22 D a r b y , o p .  Until  India  past  bases,  continued  the  negotiated  signed w i t h the  her  base  at  substantially which  in  ensured  Darby,  continued use o f naval f a c i l i t i e s located natural The of  harbour,  basic  the three  problem  at Trincomalee,  and t h e a i r f a c i l i t y  i n t h e F a r E a s t was  services.  The n a v a l  it  was  decided  t o move  Singapore.  In the Middle  canal  a n d t h e Army  area  there. in  Naval East  this  area.  Simonstown sentinels  base  Ocean  Commonwealth  Headquarters  i n South  was  defence  Africa  headquarters  which  to play  structure  1940s  into  countries  fortified  situated  sub-commands analo-  retained the  one  an u n i l a t e r a l  of  t h e two  Australia,  of the area  stationed  .  a n d New New  Zealand,  i n 1950. B r i t a i n  i n South  and t h e A u s t r a l i a n  a conference  ^ F o r d e t a i l s see Royal I n s t i t u t e C o l l e c t i v e Defence i n South East A s i a : I m p l i c a t i o n s (London: R I I A , 1958). 39  Malaya  and  East Asia, f o r  Flight  of  A i r Force  hoped t o g e t A u s t r a l i a  Middle East, too. After  signed the  t o a c tcooperative-  I n 1 9 4 9 , a New Z e a l a n d  at Singapore  between  was d i s c u s s e d i n  Zealand  agreed  instability  i n the  cooperation  cooperation  defence  covered A u s t r a l i a ,  J  close  role  Commonwealth c o n f e r e -  f o r close  i n I n d i a n Ocean  i n t h e context o f growing  the  I n 1948,  were  five  was  and expected  t h e need  I n 1948 B r i t a i n ,  i n Malaya  Kong  t h e c o n c e n t r a t i o n was i n t h e S u e z  t h e a d j a c e n t a r e a . The t h r e e c o u n t r i e s  defence  t o newly  i n the Far East. Further, B r i t a i n  ANZAM a g r e e m e n t w h i c h  ly,  i n Hong  E a s t , Aden p l a y e d a k e y r o l e  d i d not intend  i n the late  detail.  was  at Singapore.  w i t h Commonwealth p a r t n e r s . A t e v e r y a n n u a l nce  of coordination  o f t h e I n d i a n Ocean.  Britain Indian  strategically  Katunayake.  lack  (R.A.F.) m a i n t a i n e d  In the Middle  gous t o S i n g a p o r e  were  and A i r f o r c e  The R o y a l A i r F o r c e  at  headquarters  w h i l e ,the A i r a n d Army h e a d q u a r t e r s  a  a n d New  Dakotas arrived Zealand  i n London i n 1951  of International A f f a i r s , t h e M a n i l a Treaty and I t s  Australia allied and  and  to  opposition despite  Air  Zealand  command i n t h e  Turkey  Unit  New  was  Middle  Egypt,  the  opposition  The 1951  Conservative  questioned  initiated that  by  the  1952,  the  only  limited  the  economic  the  of  emphasized  the  section could  be  section  of  the  dealt  Staff  with  the  NATO by  that  of  the  was  In  France,  the  face  1951  an  of  However,  Commonwealth  Air  Australian  power  rely a  in  rearmament  new  on  Britain's  weapons.  In  defence  at  of  the  report  deterrence.  The  second  first  concluded  part  that  nuclear  Britain's  on  believed  with  nuclear  October  programme  government  report  nuclear  examined  to  requirements  The  of  came  The  presented  and  U.S.,  In  a  costly  to  introducing  report  East.  military  importance  the  there.  government.  solved  of  match  an  implemented.  states,  government.  capability  Chiefs  invitation  sent  in  base.  not  Arab  Middle  viability  to  Suez  was  government  Labour  way  the  the  e s t a b l i s h e d i n the  participate  with Britain,  plan  of  F o r c e F i g h t e r W i n g was  to  East  internationalize  from  the  agreed  manpower  weapons.  Indian  problems  The  Ocean  the  third  and  other  OA  overseas beginning time to strategy  responsibilities. of  the  era  1959,  the  focal  was  nuclear  of  British theme  heavy  calculations Ocean  in  military  reliance the  on  nuclear  of  marked  deterrence.  discussions  of  From  the this  British  defence  in British  defence  1950s  C o l l e c t i v e Defence  nuclear meant  requirements  deterrence  that  was  the  specificity  overlooked.  of  However,  Indian British  For d e t a i l s of t h i s unpublished r e p o r t see. 'Defence Strategy,' Fortune, (December 1 9 5 3 ) , pp. 77-84, and D a r b y , c i t . , pp. 46-47. 2 4  and op.  presentation  deterrence.  Regional A l l i a n c e Systems and The  This  40  participation the  United  Treaty  British  (SEATO)  point  of Indian  o f view.  S t a t e s and they  alliances  Ocean,  t h e South  Ocean  security  I t i s important of strength  the  as a t r a d i t i o n a l l y junior  partner  participation normal order Even unit  the past began  its  the Indian  In  as s e p a r a t e  and they  should  the context  be  dealt  was  of the  NevertheOcean and  strategy,  Britain's  came a s p a r t o f t h e  still  taken  as  East  i n the  early  problems  separately  and  single  and t h e F a r East,  entities  with  a  t h e wings o f  had s p e c i f i c  threats  of the Cold  were  significance. alleged  responsibility which  alliances  requirements,  area  War b o t h  considered  with  f o r the  Britain  and t h e i r Therefore,  Communist  but that had played  of due  prevalent  the Middle  important  to the policy  defence  was t h u s  East  i n security  of containing  a matter  of world  t h e p r e s e r v a t i o n o f t h e s t a t u s quo  subversions  o f t h e West a unilateral  41  areas,  vitally  They were h e l d t o be c r u c i a l  against  the  climate.  communist e x p a n s i o n wide  was  strategic  each  for specific  the Far East,  terms.  War  from  that  i n the Indian  Cold  Ocean  I t was b e l i e v e d t h a t  political  note  o f Communism.  system, namely t h e Middle  consideration  and  i n the western  because o f communications  defence  own  to  the  of things.  t o reappear  1950s.  i m p e r i a l power  Asian  requirements  s h o u l d be v i e w e d i n t h e c o n t e x t  i n SEATO a n d t h e B a g h d a d P a c t  though  mainly  East  by  addressed  of these  U.S. C o l d War s t r a t e g y o f t h e c o n t a i n m e n t less,  sponsored  and t h e Baghdad P a c t ,  f o r c e and t h e source  United  defence  i n the Indian  of specificity  driving the  States  Organization  issue the  i n the collective  was  as a role  not whole.  only  Britain's  The  period i n  h a d come  t o an end.  The  time  h a d come f o r B r i t a i n  the  Indian  Ocean.  Both alliances policy.  of  the Conservative as a s i g n i f i c a n t SEATO  British  danger  against  other  Even Baghdad  area,  commitments  and  recognition  resources  nuclear  main  concern  Communists; evaluated The  of defence  various  i n the context  1954 D e f e n c e  framed Union.  moves  White  the issues Paragraph  the  a  into  was  strategy  make  partly  Even  nor allocated those  due t o t h e  over-  though  Defence  of the  taking the  there Ocean  Ministry,  was  a  military this  bomb.  was Still,  was t h e g l o b a l w a r w i t h t h e  i n the Indian  Ocean  theatre  and n u c l e a r  like  that  a  nuclear  were  deterrence.  of the previous war  with  the  year, Soviet  9 of t h e White Paper s t a t e s :  F i r s t , we m u s t m a i n t a i n o u r r e s i s t a n c e t o communism and to communist adventures  Treaty  area  honouring  of the Indian  thinking  of  IV  t o the Indian  account  to  o f g l o b a l war  i n terms  Article  i n the treaty  with the thermonuclear  Paper,  increased  (the successor  formulated  neglect  of  o f Suez  t o " a c t t o meet  commitments  necessary  overshadowed by p r e o c c u p a t i o n the  CENTO  deterrence.  quarters  the  J  of the distinctiveness  some  attack  needs o f t h e area  p o s s i b l e . This  on  F o r i n s t a n c e , under  and  neither  East  substantially  furthered British  military  material  i n  t h e SEATO  Britain  acclaimed  of B r i t i s h  Pact  o f armed  signatory states."  pacts  parties  as a s i g n a t o r y agreed  i n t h e event  pact)  emphasis  Britain  though  distinctive  role  achievement  o b l i g a t i o n s i n the area.  common  the  and Labour  and t h e Baghdad  t h e SEATO P a c t  Ocean  t o go i n t o t h e a l l i a n c e b u s i n e s s i n  ^ U n i t e d Kingdom, F o r e i g n O f f i c e , (Cmnd 2 6 5 ) , 1 9 5 7 , a r t i c l e i v .  South East A s i a  world and Collective  discharge our other peace time obligations overseas. Secondly, we m u s t , w i t h o t h e r allies, b u i l d up t h e most e f f e c t i v e p o s s i b l e d e t e r r e n t a g a i n s t a major aggression which would l e a d t o a g l o b a l w a r . T h i r d l y , we m u s t do a l l we c a n , w i t h i n t h e l i m i t s o f o u r r e s o u r c e s , t o be p r e p a r e d to meet s u c h an a g g r e s s i o n should our efforts to prevent i t f a i l . 2 6 At  this  become  time the  the  central  established. could  be  1946.  Since  the  The  idea  then,  withdrawal  of  Lord  C.S.R. on  27  The  troops  from the  Alexander,  January  on  Defence  But  extremely  limited  obsolete  Beverleys was  not  programme and reason  2  9075),  the  for  the  the  needed  Central  goes  i t  was  The  plan  which  Reserve The  Korea  gave  Secretary  to  to  discussed  deferred.  Zone and  Reserve. the  had  was  back  Strategic  Canal  C.S.R.  airlifting  at  this  The  i t was  the  reserve  Secretaries  Suez  announced  the R.A.F.  not  establish  The  of  problem was  Defence,  of  transport  of  of the  to  the  The was  Though  to  R.A.F.  with  overseas  provide  on  the role.  mobility  Defence  Hansard's  be was  about  another  t r a n s p o r t i n g the  Statement  1955  command h a d  preoccupied  U n i t e d Kingdom, House o f L o r d s , D e b a t e s , V o l . 1 9 0 , 17 M a r c h 1954, c. 4 6 5 . 43  C.S.R.  Valettas.  reluctance  2 7  mobility.  the  k e e n t o a s s u m e an  R.A.F.'s  ^Ibid., Ministry 1954, p a r a . 9.  50  that  was  capability  time.  and  ordered,  resolved.  when  to  scheme,  strategic  shortage  announced  with  Hastings  were  a  defence  later  1954.  problem  airlifted.  40  establish  a  areas  Defence  manpower  (C.S.R.),  British  establishing  to  Reserve  establishing  troubled  main  Statement  the  to  opportunity  Defence,  to  due  of  of  of  successive  possibility but  Strategic  element  airlifted  (C.S.R.),  the  Central  20  C.S.R.  V-bomber Another to  1954'  the  (Cmd  Parliamentary  C.S.R.  was  It  was  provide