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The origins of an illusion: British policy and opinion, and the development of Prussian liberalism, 1848-1871 Murray, Scott W. 1990

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THE ORIGINS OF AN ILLUSION: BRITISH POLICY AND OPINION, AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF PRUSSIAN LIBERALISM, 1848-1871 by SCOTT W. MURRAY B.A., The U n i v e r s i t y of Calgary, 1988 A THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF MASTER OF ARTS In THE FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIES DEPARTMENT OF HISTORY We accept t h i s t h e s i s as conforming to the r e g u l r e d standard THE UNIVERSITY OF BRITISH COLUMBIA June 1990 © S c o t t W. Murray, 1990 In presenting this thesis in partial fulfilment of the requirements for an advanced degree at the University of British Columbia, I agree that the Library shall make it freely available for reference and study. I further agree that permission for extensive copying of this thesis for scholarly purposes may be granted by the head of my department or by his or her representatives. It is understood that copying or publication of this thesis for financial gain shall not be allowed without my written permission. Department of H i s t o r y  The University of British Columbia Vancouver, Canada Date J u l y 14, 1990  DE-6 (2/88) i i ABSTRACT The massive h i s t o r i o g r a p h y d e a l i n g with the problem of Germany's development In the f i r s t h a l f of t w e n t i e t h century has been s t r o n g l y Influenced by the n o t i o n that c e r t a i n p e c u l i a r n a t i o n a l c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s l e d Germany down a Sonderweq, or " s p e c i a l path," which diverged from that of other Western European n a t i o n s . However, by h e l p i n g to focus s c h o l a r l y a t t e n t i o n on v a r i o u s p o l i t i c a l , s o c i a l and I n t e l l e c t u a l developments which took place i n Germany i n the nine t e e n t h century, the Sonderweq t h e s i s has d i s t r a c t e d s c h o l a r s from examining more c l o s e l y the p o s s i b l e Impact which the I n t e r p l a y of I n t e r n a t i o n a l r e l a t i o n s had on Germany's development d u r i n g t h i s p i v o t a l p e r i o d . The present study examines the extent to which B r i t i s h f o r e i g n p o l i c y a f f e c t e d the growth of a u t h o r i t a r i a n i s m and the d e c l i n e of l i b e r a l i s m In P r u s s i a d u r i n g the p e r i o d 1848-1871, and how c e r t a i n I n t e l l e c t u a l c u r r e n t s In England at the time a f f e c t e d both the f o r m u l a t i o n and the e x p r e s s i o n of B r i t i s h p o l i c y r e g a r d i n g P r u s s i a . By examining both the p o l i c i e s pursued by B r i t i s h statesmen at c e r t a i n key p o i n t s d u r i n g the p e r i o d 1848-1871, and the views expressed by a group of h i g h l y I d e a l i s t i c B r i t i s h l i b e r a l commentators who watched a f f a i r s In P r u s s i a c l o s e l y d u r i n g t h i s p e r i o d , I have attempted to demonstrate the f o l l o w i n g : f i r s t l y , t h a t e x i s t i n g I n t e r p r e t a t i o n s of B r i t i s h p o l i c y r e g a r d i n g P r u s s i a have overemphasized the r o l e of l i b e r a l Idealism In the c a l c u l a t i o n s of B r i t i s h p o l lcy-makera, who appear I n s t e a d to have c o n s i s t e n t l y pursued pragmatic p o l i c i e s aimed at a P r u s s i a n - l e d u n i f i c a t i o n of Germany; and secondly that l t was t h i s l a t t e r group of B r i t i s h commentators who provided policy-makers with a s t y l e of r h e t o r i c which obfuscated the pragmatic c o n s i d e r a t i o n s u n d e r l y i n g B r i t i s h p o l i c y . Moreover, l t was t h i s same corpus of l i b e r a l , "Whig" commentary which l a i d the conceptual foundations f o r what was to become the standard I n t e r p r e t a t i v e approach to German h i s t o r y , p a r t i c u l a r l y amongst Anglo-American h i s t o r i a n s w r i t i n g s i n c e 1945 - the Sonderweq t h e s i s . Thus, by s e p a r a t i n g the r h e t o r i c from the a c t u a l p r a c t i c e of B r i t i s h p o l i c y , and by I d e n t i f y i n g the l i b e r a l b i a s e s which pervaded B r i t i s h l i b e r a l d i s c o u r s e on P r u s s i a d u r i n g t h i s p e r i o d , I have attempted to c l a r i f y B r i t a i n ' s r o l e In the I m p o r t a n t developments t a k i n g place In Germany at t h i s time, while broadening our a p p r e c i a t i o n of how and why subsequent s c h o l a r s h i p on the German q u e s t i o n has so r e a d i l y embraced the n o t i o n that German h i s t o r y Is " p e c u l i a r " . i v CONTENTS Abs t r a c t 11 Acknowledgements v 1. I n t r o d u c t i o n : Anglo-Prussian R e l a t i o n s and the Sonderweq Thesis 1 2. B r i t i s h F o r e i g n P o l i c y , P r u s s i a , and the German Question, 1848-1871 21 3. P r u s s i a I d e a l i s e d : B r i t i s h L i b e r a l Commentary 82 4. Conclus i o n s 132 Notes 139 B i b l i o g r a p h y 164 ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS I would l i k e to thank. Dr. John S. Conway f o r h i s I n s i g h t f u l comments and sage advice, both of which proved i n v a l u a b l e In the p r e p a r a t i o n of t h i s paper. I would a l s o l i k e to acknowledge the h e l p f u l comments of Dr. James H. Winter, and the t i r e l e s s support of Dr. C h r i s t o p h e r F r l e d r i c h s . CHAPTER 1 I n t r o d u c t i o n : Anglo-Prussian R e l a t i o n s and the Sonderweq Thes 1 Germany Is the heart of Europe, and the limbs must adjust themselves to t h e h e a r t , not the heart to the limbs. Hans C h r l s t o p h Seebohm BRD Transport M i n i s t e r , 1951. We seek, a European Germany, not a German Europe. H a n s - D l e t r l c h Genscher BRD F o r e i g n M i n i s t e r , 1990. The c o n t i n u i n g attempts by s c h o l a r s to e x p l a i n why Germany twice attempted In the present century to achieve world domination through m i l i t a r y conquest has c e r t a i n l y been one of the most p r o d u c t i v e and c o n t r o v e r s i a l areas of tw e n t i e t h century h i s t o r i o g r a p h y . Indeed, even at the d i s t a n c e of a h a l f c entury the Nazi regime's legacy of t o t a l i t a r i a n i s m and genocide, which were p e r p e t r a t e d under the Influence of a p e r n i c i o u s d o c t r i n e of n a t i o n a l i s t racism, continues to c a s t an unpleasant shadow over not o n l y the changing face of modern Germany, but a l s o the whole course of German h i s t o r y up to 1933. One predominant Influence on t h i s massive h i s t o r i o g r a p h y d e a l i n g with the problem of Germany's development In the tw e n t i e t h century has been the n o t i o n t h a t c e r t a i n p e c u l i a r n a t i o n a l c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s l e d Germany down a Sonderweq, or " s p e c i a l path," which diverged from that of other western European natio n s - a n o t i o n which has helped to focus s c h o l a r l y a t t e n t i o n on v a r i o u s p o l i t i c a l , s o c i a l and I n t e l l e c t u a l developments which took place In Germany i n the nine t e e n t h century. The p e r i o d between 1848 and 1871 Is viewed by some h i s t o r i a n s , such as A.J.P. T a y l o r , as being of p a r t i c u l a r s i g n i f i c a n c e s i n c e l t was d u r i n g t h i s p i v o t a l p e r i o d that German h i s t o r y " f a i l e d to t u r n " , as a u t h o r i t a r i a n i s m and m i l i t a r i s m triumphed over the l i b e r a l f o r c e s In Germany, thus 2 e s t a b l i s h i n g at the outset the p o l i t i c a l c h a r a c t e r of the German Empire which emerged In 1871. 1 T h i s s c h o l a r s h i p has l a r g e l y Ignored, however, the impact which the I n t e r p l a y of I n t e r n a t i o n a l r e l a t i o n s had on these developments. The present study w i l l examine t h i s very guestlon; namely, the r o l e which Germany's European neighbours played In the p o l i t i c a l development of Germany d u r i n g that c r u c i a l p e r i o d l e a d i n g up to German u n i f i c a t i o n i n 1871. More s p e c i f i c a l l y , l t w i l l examine the extent to.which B r i t i s h f o r e i g n p o l i c y a f f e c t e d the growth of a u t h o r i t a r i a n i s m and the d e c l i n e of l i b e r a l i s m In P r u s s i a d u r i n g the p e r i o d 1848-1871, and how c e r t a i n I n t e l l e c t u a l c u r r e n t s i n England at the time a f f e c t e d both the f o r m u l a t i o n and the e x p r e s s i o n of B r i t i s h p o l i c y r e g a r d i n g P r u s s l a . E x i s t i n g I n t e r p r e t a t i o n s of the goals and conseguences of England's mld-nlneteenth c e n t u r y German p o l i c y maintain that B r i t i s h policy-makers were s t r o n g l y i n f l u e n c e d by l i b e r a l Idealism, but that t h e i r goal of b r i n g i n g about the u n i f i c a t i o n of Germany under the auspices of a l i b e r a l c o n s t i t u t i o n a l P r u s s i a n s t a t e was u l t i m a t e l y f r u s t r a t e d by Bismarck, who used n a t i o n a l i s t passions to defeat German l i b e r a l i s m and forge together an a u t h o r i t a r i a n German Empire. What I hope to show, however, i s that such l i b e r a l Idealism was not of primary importance In the f o r m u l a t i o n and Implementation of B r i t i s h p o l i c y , which sought Instead to strengthen the e x i s t i n g a u t h o r i t i e s In P r u s s i a In order to ensure that German u n i f i c a t i o n a c t u a l l y took plac e - a p o l i c y which was l a r g e l y 3 s u c c e s s f u l , although the d e c l i n e of German l i b e r a l i s m was an unintended consequence. S e v e r a l f a c t o r s are r e s p o n s i b l e f o r the f a c t t h at previous s c h o l a r s h i p has f a i l e d to recognize t h i s Important dimension to n i n e t e e n t h century B r i t i s h f o r e i g n p o l i c y . One of these Is the ge n e r a l , although erroneous assumption made by Anglo-American h i s t o r i a n s w r i t i n g s i n c e the F i r s t World War that a l l B r i t i s h policy-makers i n the mld-nlneteenth century a c t i v e l y pursued p o l i c i e s aimed at f a c i l i t a t i n g a l i b e r a l s o l u t i o n to the German que s t i o n s i n c e o n l y t h i s would guarantee the presence In c e n t r a l Europe of a "western, p a r l i a m e n t a r y and predominantly P r o t e s t a n t " bulwark a g a i n s t "Russian despotism, French encroachments and the spread of C a t h o l i c Influence."' 2 Another e q u a l l y important f a c t o r , however, was B r i t i s h l i b e r a l commentary on P r u s s i a d u r i n g t h i s c r u c i a l p e r i o d . As w i l l be shown, the I d e a l i s e d view of P r u s s i a which B r i t i s h l i b e r a l commentators on P r u s s i a maintained d u r i n g t h i s p e r i o d provided B r i t i s h statesmen with a s t y l e of r h e t o r i c which obfuscated the pragmatic c o n s i d e r a t i o n s u n d e r l y i n g B r i t i s h p o l i c y . At the same time, these commentators' almost unanimous lamentations about Bismarck's suppression of the l i b e r a l s ' goals overrode c r i t i c i s m s of the l i m i t e d Impact B r i t i s h p o l i c y might have had. Moreover, l t was t h i s same corpus of l i b e r a l commentary which l a i d the conceptual foundations f o r what was to become the standard I n t e r p r e t i v e approach to German h i s t o r y , p a r t i c u l a r l y since 1945 - the Sonderweq t h e s i s . I r o n i c a l l y , l t Is t h i s same t h e s i s which has Induced s c h o l a r s to look almost e x c l u s i v e l y to 4 i n t e r n a l f a c t o r s when s e a r c h i n g f o r the source of l i b e r a l i s m ' s weakness In Germany. As a r e s u l t , few s c h o l a r s stopped to co n s i d e r e i t h e r the pragmatic, n o n - l d e o l o g l c a l motives which shaped B r i t i s h p o l i c i e s d u r i n g t h i s p e r i o d , or the extent to which such p o l i c i e s a c t u a l l y a f f e c t e d these portentous developments In nine t e e n t h century Germany. What f o l l o w s , t h e r e f o r e , Is an examination both of the p o l i c i e s pursued by B r i t i s h statesmen at c e r t a i n key p o i n t s d u r i n g the p e r i o d 1848-1871; and the views of B r i t i s h l i b e r a l I d e a l i s t s , who c l u n g t e n a c i o u s l y to an unmitigated and I n c r e a s i n g l y u n j u s t i f i e d optimism r e g a r d i n g the p o l i t i c a l f u t u r e of P r u s s i a . It i s due to the apparent c e n t r a l l t y of P r u s s i a i n German u n i f i c a t i o n that both of these two groups took a s t r o n g I n t e r e s t In P r u s s i a n a f f a i r s d u r i n g t h i s p e r i o d . The f i r s t group, comprised of those who a c t u a l l y formulated B r i t i s h p o l i c y with r e s p e c t to P r u s s i a , maintained that n o t h i n g ought to be permitted to t h r e a t e n the s e c u r i t y and s t a b i l i t y of the P r u s s i a n s t a t e , at l e a s t u n t i l such time as Germany was c o n s o l i d a t e d . The second group, comprised of v a r i o u s members of the educated l i b e r a l e l i t e - Judges, J o u r n a l i s t s , minor diplomats, M.P.'s -engaged In a c t i v e l y v o i c i n g the o p i n i o n that the e v o l u t i o n of P r u s s i a i n t o an E n g l i s h - s t y l e c o n s t i t u t i o n a l p a r l i a m e n t a r y s t a t e was I n e v i t a b l e , an I d e a l i s t i c o p i n i o n which was based on an e x c l u s l v l s t "Whig" p e r s p e c t i v e of German a f f a i r s . F i r s t , t h e r e f o r e , we must examine the a c t u a l course of B r i t i s h p o l i c y r e g a r d i n g P r u s s i a i n order to r e c t i f y previous m i s i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s of the motives behind t h i s p o l i c y , and to 5 consider' the extent to which these p o l i c i e s a f f e c t e d the course of Germany's p o l i t i c a l development p r i o r to 1871. But no study of B r i t i s h p o l i c y r e g a r d i n g P r u s s i a d u r i n g t h i s p e r i o d would be complete without a follow-up examination of the views of the second group, which not o n l y provided policy-makers with a s t y l e of r h e t o r i c w e l l - s u i t e d to the demands of B r i t i s h p o l i t i c s , but which a l s o formed the b a s i s of an I n t e r p r e t i v e approach to Germany which p e r s i s t s even today. The extent to which B r i t i s h policy-makers c o n t r i b u t e d to the f a i l u r e w i t h i n Germany to f i n d a l i b e r a l s o l u t i o n Is s t i l l an open qu e s t i o n . But the mlsperceptIons of B r i t i s h I d e a l i s t s undoubtedly c o n t r i b u t e d to the b e l i e f at the time, and Indeed s i n c e , t h at Germany's "departure" from the l i b e r a l - d e m o c r a t i c t r a d i t i o n of the West was a d i s a s t r o u s , I f temporary development w i t h i n the wider European context. A A A Before going on to examine these d i p l o m a t i c and I n t e l l e c t u a l contours to mld-nlneteenth century Anglo-Prussian r e l a t i o n s , a c l o s e r look at that h i s t o r l o g r a p h l c a l t r a d i t i o n -the Sonderweq t h e s i s - which has h i t h e r t o e x e r c i s e d such a profound i n f l u e n c e over the s c h o l a r s h i p on modern Germany Is f i r s t necessary In order to determine whether It Is Indeed p o s s i b l e to f i t t h i s q u e s t i o n of Anglo-Prussian r e l a t i o n s Into the l a r g e r debate r e g a r d i n g the course of German h i s t o r y In the twentieth century. 6 Although the idea of a German Sonderweg o r i g i n a t e d i n Germany i t s e l f , t h i s n o t i o n that there e x i s t s a s i g n i f i c a n t d i f f e r e n c e between German and "Western" thought, and that the p o l i t i c a l and s o c i a l consequences of t h i s d i f f e r e n c e have set Germany apart from the other n a t i o n s of Western Europe, has been most f u l l y developed s i n c e 1945 by Anglo-American s c h o l a r s seeking to e x p l a i n that " i n t e l l e c t u a l conundrum", the o r i g i n s of N a t i o n a l S o c i a l i s m . 3 Hajo Holborn's c l a i m that the " s p l i t between Germany and the West w i l l of n e c e s s i t y always be an Important theme f o r h i s t o r i a n s , " has been borne out by the massive e f f o r t exerted In t h i s d i r e c t i o n , and by the pervasiveness of t h i s theme In the h i s t o r i o g r a p h y on Germany w r i t t e n s i n c e 1945. In attempting to account f o r Germany's " p e r s i s t e n t f a i l u r e to give a home to democracy In i t s l i b e r a l sense," - the Idea which l i e s at the heart of the Sonderweg t h e s i s - h i s t o r i a n s have d i v i d e d themselves i n t o two general groups that can be d i s t i n g u i s h e d from one another by the date which each assigns to Germany's "departure" from the mainstream of Western thought. 5' In the f i r s t can be found those s c h o l a r s who maintain t h a t , because of c e r t a i n p e c u l i a r i t i e s In the German n a t i o n a l c h a r a c t e r , Germany has always warred ag a i n s t the West. The work of such s c h o l a r s as Rohan O'Butler and A.J.P. T a y l o r , although more s u b t l e and c o n v i n c i n g than S i r Robert V a n s l t t a r t ' s t i r a d e s in 1941 a g a i n s t the German " b u t c h e r - b i r d " , nonetheless r e a f f i r m e d that there e x i s t e d a " t r a d i t i o n a l l y and t y p i c a l l y German" l i n e of thought, and that as a r e s u l t , the Germans had 7 e x p e r i e n c e d " e v e r y t h i n g except n o r m a l i t y " throughout t h e i r h i s t o r y . 6 . Nor d i d t h i s q u e s t i o n a b l e argument, which ho lds tha t the German r e v o l t a g a i n s t the West stemmed from the " b a r b a r i c Saxon" embedded In the b r e a s t o f e v e r y German, d i s a p p e a r as the a n i m o s i t y a g a i n s t Germany s l o w l y faded a f t e r 1945; l t has s i n c e been e l u c i d a t e d , o f t e n by I n f e r e n c e , In numerous works devoted to f i n d i n g the o r i g i n s o f the Nazi phenomenon. 7 The second group Is comprised o f those h i s t o r i a n s who l o c a t e the p h i l o s o p h i c a l o r i g i n s o f Germany's Sonderweq In the l a t e e i g h t e e n t h and e a r l y n i n e t e e n t h c e n t u r i e s , and who then d e s c r i b e the p o l i t i c a l and s o c i a l m a n i f e s t a t i o n s o f t h i s " d e p a r t u r e " from the West as they began to appear In Germany d u r i n g the course o f the n i n e t e e n t h and t w e n t i e t h c e n t u r i e s . 8 In the f i r s t I n s t a n c e , l t Is b e l i e v e d both the weakness o f the J u d e o - C h r 1 s t l a n t r a d i t i o n o f n a t u r a l law In Germany, and a g e n e r a l acceptance o f the H e g e l i a n m e t a p h y s i c a l c o n c e p t i o n of the s t a t e prevented the Ideas o f the En l lghtment from p e n e t r a t i n g I n t o the p o l i t i c a l l y - f r a c t u r e d German community.'5* Hence, It Is h e l d , the Romantic r e v o l t a g a i n s t the r a t i o n a l i s m of both the Enl ightenment and the French R e v o l u t i o n s t r u c k a deep chord In Germany, and t h i s was r e i n f o r c e d throughout the n i n e t e e n t h c e n t u r y by the h l s t o r l c l s t t r a d i t i o n i n German h i s t o r i o g r a p h y which I n c r e a s i n g l y came to r e j e c t the p r i n c i p a l t e n e t s o f l i b e r a l i s m . 1 0 Moreover , the l i b e r a l reforms of P r u s s i a n a r i s t o c r a t s became confused a f t e r 1806 wi th the s t r u g g l e a g a i n s t Napoleon, and thus began the f a t a l s u b o r d i n a t i o n o f l i b e r a l i s m to German n a t i o n a l i s m . 1 1 M o r t a l l y 8 weakened by a l l of these developments, and by the absence In the Vorma'rz p e r i o d of a "numerous and powerful middle c l a s s that would be attached by both m a t e r i a l I n t e r e s t and accompanying temperament to a p r a c t i c a l p o l i t i c a l movement" of l i b e r a l reform, German l i b e r a l i s m f a i l e d to s e i z e the moment i n 1848. 1 5 2 From the b e l i e f t h a t they had to r e l y on P r u s s i a n arms to achieve t h e i r ends - a consequence of the 1848 r e v o l u t i o n s -sprang the German l i b e r a l s ' growing f a s c i n a t i o n with power. This was to be the f i n a l n a i l In the c o f f i n of German l i b e r a l i s m , as middle c l a s s preoccupation with economic Issues, and Bismarck's whirlwind v i c t o r i e s ensured that most German l i b e r a l s would complacently accept the Iron C h a n c e l l o r ' s s o l u t i o n In 1871 of a pseudo-const 1 t u t l o n a l - p a r l l a m e n t a r y German Reich which s a t i s f i e d German d e s i r e s f o r both u n i t y and the p r e s e r v a t i o n of a u t h o r i t y . 1 3 T h i s i s , of course, o n l y a h i g h l y s i m p l i f i e d s y n t h e s i s of the main p o i n t s comprising t h i s group's I n t e r p r e t a t i o n of Germany's Sonderweg as It began to appear i n the n i n e t e e n t h century; n a t u r a l l y , much of the Sonderweg l i t e r a t u r e c o n c e n trates on developments In the t w e n t i e t h century, s i n c e i t Is here that Germany's "departure" from the l i b e r a l - d e m o c r a t i c t r a d i t i o n s of the West was most t r a g i c a l l y manifested. Nonetheless, t h i s summary demonstrates how, as Blackbourn and E l e y have d e s c r i b e d l t , " s u c c e s s i v e h i s t o r l o g r a p h l c a l c u r r e n t s flowed with s u f f i c i e n t f o r c e In one d i r e c t i o n to cut out a f a i r l y deep bed." 1* 9 Upon c l o s e r examination, however, It appears that t h i s attempt to I d e n t i f y the source of l i b e r a l i s m ' s I n a b i l i t y to e s t a b l i s h I t s e l f In Germany, which Is In t u r n o f f e r e d as an e x p l a n a t i o n f o r Germany's a u t h o r i t a r i a n and m i l i t a r i s t i c tendencies In the t w e n t i e t h century, Is I t s e l f based upon s e v e r a l erroneous assumptions. The most obvious of these stems from an overanxious d e s i r e to I d e n t i f y the c o n t i n u i t i e s e x i s t i n g In German h i s t o r y , which has sometimes r e s u l t e d In the a n a c h r o n i s t i c t r a n s p o s i t i o n of c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s of the l a t e Wllhelmlne and Nazi eras onto the h i s t o r y of the e i g h t e e n t h and n i n e t e e n t h c e n t u r i e s . 1 " ' And as has been amply demonstrated by the two s c h o l a r s c i t e d above, the a t t r i b u t i o n of a German Sonderweq to Germany's f a i l u r e to pass through a Western-style bourgeois r e v o l u t i o n l i k e t h a t of 1688 and 1789, which In t u r n r e s u l t e d In the c o e x i s t e n c e In Germany of modern economic s t r u c t u r e s with pre-modern p o l i t i c a l and s o c i a l s t r u c t u r e s , r a i s e s important questions about the v a l i d i t y of both the Western "model" and Germany's " f a i l u r e " to experience such a r e v o l u t Ion. 1* > But l t Is the most fundamental assumption u n d e r l y i n g t h i s I n t e r p r e t a t i o n of Germany's past that Is of most I n t e r e s t to us here; I.e. the b e l i e f that there e x i s t s a u n i v e r s a l p a t t e r n of " l i b e r a l - d e m o c r a t i c " development - best r e v e a l e d In the h i s t o r i e s of England and France - which Is a p p l i c a b l e to a l l c o u n t r i e s Cas opposed to the b e l i e f that a l l nations have t h e i r own Sonderweq, and that each experiences a wholly unique p a t t e r n of organic, i n d i v i d u a l development In response to v a r i e d circumstances}. Hence the l i b e r a l b i a s of these Sonderweg h i s t o r i a n s f i n d s them e v a l u a t i n g Germany's past e x c l u s i v e l y through a set of p o l i t i c a l and moral preconceptions In which progress and E n g l i s h - s t y l e p a r l i a m e n t a r y democracy are con s i d e r e d normative. 1 7' When a p p l i e d i n the wake of two world wars, t h i s approach was sure to produce r e s u l t s In which the development of German l i b e r a l i s m would appear to have gone awry, which In t u r n focused a t t e n t i o n on those aspects of the German l i b e r a l movement which d i d not conform to the "Western" p a t t e r n - i n o r d i n a t e r e s p e c t f o r the a u t h o r i t y of the s t a t e and the monarchy, a fondness f o r a b s t r a c t p h i l o s o p h i z i n g , p o l i t i c a l Immaturity, and an extremely powerful attachment to the Idea of n a t i o n a l u n i t y . What Is s i g n i f i c a n t about t h i s Is th a t c r i t i c i s m s remarkably s i m i l a r to these appeared In mld-nlneteenth century B r i t i s h e v a l u a t i o n s of contemporary P r u s s i a n and German l i b e r a l i s m , evidence of the extent to which E n g l i s h - s p e a k i n g proponents of a German Sonderweg are s t i l l h o l d i n g b i a s e s common a century ago amongst B r i t i s h l i b e r a l I d e a l i s t s . As w i l l be shown l a t e r , however, these n i n e t e e n t h century B r i t i s h commentators on German l i b e r a l i s m , r a t h e r than r e g a r d i n g such d e v i a t i o n s from the B r i t i s h norm as evidence of a malignant cancer growing In the body of the German l i b e r a l movement, con s i d e r e d them merely to be temporary a b e r r a t i o n s - a r e f l e c t i o n of the unbounded l i b e r a l optimism of the p e r i o d In which they were w r i t i n g . One might e a s i l y m i s i n t e r p r e t such s i m i l a r i t i e s as proof that the Sonderweq h i s t o r i a n s ' a s s e r t i o n s are simply accurate restatements of ob s e r v a t i o n s made by f i r s t - h a n d observers i n England a cen t u r y e a r l i e r . What Is a c t u a l l y demonstrated here, however, Is that In both the nineteenth and the twent i e t h c e n t u r i e s German circumstances have been measured e x c l u s i v e l y a g a i n s t a B r i t i s h norm In a c l a s s i c a p p l i c a t i o n of the "Whig" I n t e r p r e t a t i o n of h i s t o r y ; I.e. the tendency to write "on the side of P r o t e s t a n t s and Whigs, to p r a i s e r e v o l u t i o n s provided they have been s u c c e s s f u l , to emphasise c e r t a i n p r i n c i p l e s of progress In the past and to produce a s t o r y which Is a r a t i f i c a t i o n I f not a g l o r i f i c a t i o n of the present." 1® Indeed, some of the "Whig" h i s t o r i a n s c i t e d above even f e l l v i c t i m to what B u t t e r f l e l d d e s c r i b e d as the " p a t h e t i c f a l l a c y " - I.e. the p r a c t i c e of " a b s t r a c t i n g t h i n g s from t h e i r h i s t o r i c a l context a n d . . . o r g a n l s l n g the h i s t o r i c a l s t o r y by a system of d i r e c t r e f e r e n c e to the present." 1' 5' For example, Koppel Pinson d e s c r i b e s Germany's " c l a s s i c a l humanist t r a d i t i o n " of the l a t e e i g h t e e n t h c e n t u r y as part of the "noble" I n t e l l e c t u a l t r a d i t i o n of the Weimar Republic, while Hans Kohn's treatment of Germany's divergence from the West Is informed throughout by h i s understanding of West and East as these concepts e x i s t e d In post-1945 Europe, I.e. the West of NATO and the EEC vs. the Eastern communist b l o c . 2 0 It Is, of course, easy to c r i t i c i z e a l o n g s t a n d i n g h i s t o r l o g r a p h l c a l t r a d i t i o n l i k e the Sonderweq t h e s i s . F i n d i n g answers f o r the questions that o r i g i n a l l y impelled i t s proponents to formulate such a t h e s i s Is not so simple however. For unless we are prepared to accept that N a t i o n a l S o c i a l i s m was an " a c c i d e n t " , or a l t e r n a t i v e l y , that l t was the I n e v i t a b l e outcome of Germany's perverse n a t i o n a l c h a r a c t e r , we are l e f t f a c i n g the f a c t that N a t i o n a l S o c i a l i s m emerged from the r u i n s of the Weimar Republic, and that the demise of Weimar was In t u r n d i c t a t e d , In part at l e a s t , by the weakness of the German l i b e r a l t r a d i t i o n , I r r e s p e c t i v e of whether or not that t r a d i t i o n conformed to any "Western" model. 2 1 Thus the d e c i s i o n by Sonderweg t h e o r i s t s to concentrate on the fortunes of German l i b e r a l i s m In the n i n e t e e n t h century Is a good one, even If the Whig bi a s e s of these h i s t o r i a n s has Induced them to s e i z e almost e x c l u s i v e l y upon German l i b e r a l i s m ' s d e v i a t i o n s from the Western model as evidence of developmental weaknesses w i t h i n the movement. There are, however, two other Important Issues which have been l a r g e l y overlooked by t h i s s c h o l a r s h i p on Germany's Sonderweg• The f i r s t of these i s the v i t a l i t y of the German l i b e r a l movement i n the n i n e t e e n t h century. Although s e v e r a l Sonderweg t h e o r i s t s have I m p l i c i t l y r e c o g n i z e d t h i s s t r e n g t h , much more common Is the tendency to a n t i c i p a t e German l i b e r a l i s m ' s d e c l i n e by p o r t r a y i n g l t as being Inconsequential a f t e r 1848. 2 2 However, the s t u d i e s of Sheehan, S n e l l and Schmidt, which have attempted to "take Into proper c o n s i d e r a t i o n the v i t a l i t y of both German l i b e r a l i s m and democracy" In the n i n e t e e n t h century, r e v e a l that the German l i b e r a l movement, at l e a s t u n t i l 1867, was s t i l l an Important f o r c e In German p o l i t i c s . - - 3 The p o i n t here Is not to suggest that t h i n g s would have turned out d i f f e r e n t l y f o r Germany had not German l i b e r a l i s m surrendered/been defeated In the n i n e t e e n t h century; that Is a moot p o i n t . Moreover, nin e t e e n t h century German l i b e r a l i s m undoubtedly contained s t r o n g e x p a n s i o n i s t and e t h n o c e n t r i c elements, n e i t h e r of which were conducive to the maintenance of peace and s t a b i l i t y In Europe. But If we are to p r o p e r l y examine a l l of the p o s s i b l e f a c t o r s a f f e c t i n g Germany's p o l i t i c a l development in that important t h i r d q u a r t e r of the n i n e t e e n t h century, then we must shake t h i s n o t i o n that a d e c l i n e of l i b e r a l i s m In Germany was p r e d e s t i n e d by the " p e c u l i a r i t y " of German h i s t o r y up to 1871. Hence any a p p r e c i a t i o n of the magnitude of German l i b e r a l i s m ' s d e c l i n e d u r i n g t h i s p e r i o d can o n l y come about through a r e c o g n i t i o n of I t s a c t u a l s t r e n g t h p r i o r to such d e c l i n e . But there s t i l l remains to be e x p l a i n e d the growing preponderance, In P r u s s i a at l e a s t , of a u t h o r i t a r i a n i s m and m i l i t a r i s m a f t e r 1862, and the v i r t u a l " c a p i t u l a t i o n " of l i b e r a l i s m a f t e r 1867, d e s p i t e any p o l i t i c a l v i t a l i t y i t may have possessed p r i o r to that time. 3 1* This then b r i n g s us to the second Issue overlooked by most Sonderweg t h e o r i s t s , and that Is the extent to which e x t e r n a l f o r c e s , r a t h e r than simply I n t e r n a l weaknesses, may have c o n t r i b u t e d to t h i s p a r t i c u l a r s i t u a t i o n -a s i t u a t i o n d e s c r i b e d by Sheehan as having "narrowed l i b e r a l s ' c h o i c e s and o f t e n precluded a l t e r n a t i v e s that might have enabled them to save themselves and t h e i r I d e a l s . "*!!S As has a l r e a d y been suggested, the subject of Germany's r e l a t i o n s with I t s European neighbours, s p e c i f i c a l l y w i t h i n the context of the r i s e of a u t h o r i t a r i a n i s m and the d e c l i n e of German l i b e r a l i s m i n the p e r i o d l e a d i n g up to u n i f i c a t i o n , has been l a r g e l y n e g l e c t e d by h i s t o r i a n s Calthough the a t t i t u d e s of f o r e i g n powers to c e r t a i n other Issues, such as Bismarck's wars and Germany's c o n s o l i d a t i o n , have been amply s t u d i e d ) . 2 t e " Admittedly, l t Is extremely d i f f i c u l t to a c c u r a t e l y gauge the Impact which the p o l i c i e s of f o r e i g n c o u n t r i e s had on p o l i t i c a l a f f a i r s In Germany - the c o n t i n u i n g h i s t o r i c a l debate over the a c t u a l e f f e c t on Germany of B r i t i s h and French p o l i c i e s of appeasement i n the 1930's i s testimony to t h i s . Such d i f f i c u l t i e s , however, are not Insurmountable. And Indeed, Germany's Immediate neighbours, France and Russia, must be c o n s i d e r e d obvious candidates f o r a study of t h i s kind. An argument can c e r t a i n l y be made th a t , d e s p i t e the r i c h l i b e r a l h e r i t a g e of the French enlightenment, the d i s t a s t e f u l memories of Germany's occupation by French r e v o l u t i o n a r y armies b o l s t e r e d support f o r c o n s e r v a t i v e and r e a c t i o n a r y f o r c e s In Germany at l e a s t u n t i l 1848, and that the ambitious, and f r e q u e n t l y t h r e a t e n i n g f o r e i g n p o l i c i e s of Napoleon III ensured that n a t i o n a l i s t passions would continue to outweigh l i b e r a l c o n s i d e r a t i o n s i n Germany in the p e r i o d a f t e r 1850. And Russia, homeland to the a r c h i t e c t of the u l t r a - r e a c t i o n a r y Holy A l l i a n c e , continued to take a s t r o n g I n t e r e s t In German a f f a i r s throughout the nineteenth century, and was known to w i e l d a p a r t i c u l a r l y s t r o n g Influence In B e r l i n . A study of how the a c t i o n s of both these c o u n t r i e s Impacted on the fortunes of German l i b e r a l i s m In the nine t e e n t h century would, t h e r e f o r e , prove i l l u m i n a t i n g . In t h i s study, however, I have chosen England to t e s t t h i s n o t i o n r e g a r d i n g the extent to which f o r e i g n powers a f f e c t e d Germany's p o l i t i c a l development In the nineteenth century. Numerous reasons J u s t i f y t h i s c h o i c e . F i r s t l y , England's world preeminence was at I t s z e n i t h In the mid-nineteenth century; I ts maritime and commercial supremacy was as yet unchallenged and i t s d i p l o m a t i c p r e s t i g e was s t i l l i n d i s p e n s i b l e i n p r e s e r v i n g European s t a b i l i t y . When combined these f a c t o r s t r a n s l a t e d Into the kind of genuine Influence and power necessary to f a c i l i t a t e the a c t i v e r o l e which England took In p r o t e c t i n g what l t pe r c e i v e d to be I t s n a t i o n a l I n t e r e s t s abroad. And although England was not In such c l o s e p r o x i m i t y to Germany as France and Russia, circumstances In the mid-nineteenth c e n t u r y were such that the I s l a n d s t a t e was i n a b e t t e r p o s i t i o n than most European c o u n t r i e s to e x e r c i s e a c e r t a i n degree of i n f l u e n c e over Germany, and P r u s s i a In p a r t i c u l a r . For example, England was viewed more or l e s s f a v o u r a b l y by most s e c t o r s of German s o c i e t y d u r i n g t h i s p e r i o d , although the reasons f o r t h i s v a r i e d tremendously. The German landowning c l a s s e s r e c o g n i z e d England not o n l y as the p r i n c i p a l market f o r t h e i r corn, but a l s o as a t r a d i t i o n a l a l l y a g a i n s t France, a symbol of s o c i a l s t a b i l i t y , and home to the "proudest a r i s t o c r a c y of the world". 2 7' For German I n d u s t r i a l i s t s and f r e e - t r a d e r s , both the theory and the p r a c t i c e of England's economic system were r e g a r d e d w i t h g r e a t a d m i r a t i o n . And f o r the " p r o g r e s s i v e " p o l i t i c a l f o r c e s In Germany, England r e p r e s e n t e d the " f o u n t o f c o n s t i t u t i o n a l l i b e r t y " Calthough the s o c i a l i s t s , a l o n g w i t h peasants and h a n d i c r a f t s m e n , d i s l i k e d the I m p l i c a t i o n s o f B r i t i s h I n d u s t r i a l c a p i t a l 1 sm} • ^  The German l i b e r a l movement In p a r t i c u l a r was s t r o n g l y I n f l u e n c e d by the B r i t i s h c o n s t i t u t i o n a l p a r l i a m e n t a r y model, as the v a r i o u s l i b e r a l g r o u p i n g s throughout Germany s e l e c t i v e l y I n t e r p r e t e d B r i t i s h c o n s t i t u t i o n a l h i s t o r y a c c o r d i n g t o t h e i r own p o s i t i o n on the spectrum o f German l i b e r a l i s m . 2 , 5 * When combined w i t h the p e r c e p t i o n t h a t England was g e n e r a l l y s y m p a t h e t i c t o the cause o f German n a t i o n a l u n i t y , t h e s e f a c t o r s s e r v e d t o h e i g h t e n German e x p e c t a t i o n s o f support from England, a sentiment which was f u r t h e r augmented by the Important d y n a s t i c t i e s e x i s t i n g between Germany and England. G l a d s t o n e ' s c l a i m t h a t such t i e s p r o v i d e d " o p e n i n g s , i n d e l i c a t e c a s e s , f o r s a y i n g more, and s a y i n g l t at once more g e n t l y and more e f f i c a c i o u s l y , than c o u l d be v e n t u r e d In the more f o r m a l c o r r e s p o n d e n c e , and r u d e r c o n t a c t s , o f Governments," Is amply demonstrated by the e p i s t o l a r y and matchmaking a c t i v i t i e s o f Queen V i c t o r i a and P r i n c e A l b e r t , both o f whom sought t i r e l e s s l y t o Insure t h a t German p e r c e p t i o n s o f England remain f a v o u r a b l e , and t h a t B r i t i s h I n f l u e n c e t h e r e not be d i m i n i s h e d . 3 0 Together, t h e r e f o r e , t h e s e c i r c u m s t a n c e s would appear t o J u s t i f y f o c u s i n g on England as a t e s t of the e x t e n t t o which e x t e r n a l f o r c e s a f f e c t e d Germany's p o l i t i c a l development In the p e r i o d l e a d i n g up to u n i f i c a t i o n . I t s h o u l d , however, be noted t h a t w h i l e the d e c l i n e o f l i b e r a l i s m Is one o f the dominant themes In Germany's p o l i t i c a l h i s t o r y i n the m l d - n l n e t e e n t h c e n t u r y , most o f the f a c t o r s c i t e d above suggest t h a t c i r c u m s t a n c e s d u r i n g t h i s p e r i o d were p r o p i t i o u s f o r an attempt by the B r i t i s h t o s t r e n g t h e n the German l i b e r a l movement, an a c t i o n which would have been c o n s i s t e n t w i t h r e c e n t P a l m e r s t o n i a n d i p l o m a c y elsewhere i n Europe. I t Is t h i s l a t t e r p o i n t which may w e l l have h e l p e d t o d i s s u a d e s c h o l a r s from l o o k i n g t o England i n t h e i r s e a r c h f o r the s o u r c e s of German l i b e r a l i s m ' s d e c l i n e ; a t the v e r y l e a s t I t has d u l l e d the r e c e p t 1 v e n e s s of those B r i t i s h s c h o l a r s who have s t u d i e d Anglo-German r e l a t i o n s d u r i n g t h i s p e r i o d t o the p o s s i b i l i t y t h a t B r i t i s h p o l i c y was not g u i d e d by I d e o l o g i c a l c o n s l d e r a t i o n s . But what about the B r i t i s h p e r c e p t i o n o f Germany? Was i t f e l t t h a t t h e r e was any need f o r England t o e x e r c i s e i t s i n f l u e n c e o v er t h i s f r a c t i o u s European e n t i t y ? C e r t a i n l y t h e r e e x i s t e d In m i d - c e n t u r y England a f a i r l y w i d e s p r e a d a f f i n i t y f o r Germany and t h i s was r e i n f o r c e d by s e v e r a l f a c t o r s . One o f t h e s e , as has been mentioned, was d y n a s t i c . Others I n c l u d e d a s t r o n g B r i t i s h a d m i r a t i o n f o r German c u l t u r e - a c u l t u r e which the B r i t i s h r e g a r d e d as s a t i s f y i n g most of the c r i t e r i a by which a l l p r o g r e s s i v e n a t i o n s s h o u l d be Judged: " r e f i n e d s c h o l a r s h i p , s c i e n t i f i c endeavours, w o r l d l e a d e r s In so many academic s u b j e c t s , f i n e a r t i s t i c and m u s i c a l t r a d i t i o n s , an u n e q u a l l e d e d u c a t i o n a l system, [and] commercial and t e c h n o l o g i c a l a d v a n c e s . " 3 1 D u r i n g t h i s p e r i o d t h e r e was a l s o g r owing emphasis p l a c e d on the common Teutonic o r i g i n s of England and Germany, as w e l l as t h e i r r e l i g i o u s commonality. 3 2 On the subject of German p o l i t i c s , however, B r i t i s h o p i n i o n was d i v i d e d ; to suggest, as Sontag does, that everyone In England regarded Germany as a r e g i o n where " c o n s e r v a t i v e s were black, r e a c t i o n a r i e s , l i b e r a l s were red r e p u b l i c a n s , and everyone was more anxious to s e i z e the t e r r i t o r y of other c o u n t r i e s than to strengthen h i s own country by c o n s t i t u t i o n a l reform," Is to g r o s s l y o v e r s i m p l i f y B r i t i s h views d u r i n g t h i s p e r i o d . 3 3 It Is c e r t a i n l y true t h a t , aside from " I d e o l o g i c a l germanophlles" l i k e C a r l y l e who b e l i e v e d that Germany represented "a more r e f i n e d , o r g a n i c , i d e a l i s e d s o c i e t y , i n which 'good government' was p r o p e r l y given preference over ' r e p r e s e n t a t i v e government'," the general f e e l i n g In England was that Germany's p o l i t i c a l development lagged behind that of " L i b e r a l " E n g l a n d . 3 * Beyond t h i s , however, there e x i s t e d a broad range of opini o n s on German p o l i t i c s , many of which were tempered by the kinds of d y n a s t i c , c u l t u r a l , r a c i a l and r e l i g i o u s Influences c i t e d above. Moreover, B r i t i s h views of P r u s s i a , which are of p a r t i c u l a r i n t e r e s t to us here, were e q u a l l y d i v i d e d . Again, l t Is an o v e r s i m p l i f i c a t i o n to suggest, as Kennedy does, that most B r i t i s h l i b e r a l s made a c l e a r and simple d i s t i n c t i o n between " c u l t u r e d " Germany and " r e a c t i o n a r y " P r u s s i a Calthough l t i s true that many looked with d i s p l e a s u r e upon the preponderance of Junker Influence In P r u s s i a n p o l 11 l e s } . 3 5 3 The fond memory of P r u s s i a ' s p a r t i c i p a t i o n In the defeat of Napoleon, and the growing b e l i e f t h a t P r u s s i a alone possessed the means of u n i t i n g Germany so as to c r e a t e that much d e s i r e d impregnable c e n t r a l European bulwark a g a i n s t France and Russia went a long way towards moderating B r i t i s h views of the Hohenzollern s t a t e . Just e x a c t l y how f a r w i l l be examined i n much g r e a t e r d e t a i l below. At t h i s p o i n t l t s u f f i c e s to note that the B r i t i s h were not i n d i f f e r e n t to P r u s s i a n and German a f f a i r s - a f a c t which, when combined with England's above c i t e d p o t e n t i a l f o r e x e r t i n g a degree of i n f l u e n c e i n Germany, f u r t h e r j u s t i f i e s the need f o r a reexamination, w i t h i n the context of Germany's p o l i t i c a l development p r i o r to u n i f i c a t i o n , of B r i t i s h p o l i c y and o p i n i o n r e g a r d i n g P r u s s i a . CHAPTER 2 B r i t i s h F o r e i g n P o l i c y , P r u s s i a , and the German Question, 1848-1871 One of the most noteworthy f e a t u r e s of the h i s t o r i o g r a p h y on Anglo-German r e l a t i o n s d u r i n g the p e r i o d 1848-1871 Is Its r e c u r r e n t r e f e r e n c e s to the r o l e of l i b e r a l Idealism In the f o r m u l a t i o n of B r i t i s h f o r e i g n p o l i c y . Such i d e a l i s m , which Implies an " I n a b i l i t y or d i s i n c l i n a t i o n to t e s t the value of Ideas [as d i s t i n c t from f a c t s ] by a c a r e f u l comparison with r e a l and m a t e r i a l c o n d i t i o n s , " Is g e n e r a l l y c i t e d In t h i s s c h o l a r s h i p as a shortcoming because l t t r u s t e d too much In the I n e v i t a b l e , or at l e a s t the e v e n t u a l , triumph of l i b e r a l Ideas In Germany. 1 Much of t h i s c r i t i c i s m was w r i t t e n a f t e r 1914 by Anglo-American s c h o l a r s whose i n t e n t i o n l t was to p i l l o r y B r i t i s h policy-makers f o r t h e i r f a i l u r e to r e c o g n i z e , even p r i o r to Germany's u n i f i c a t i o n , t h at c o n f l i c t between an a u t h o r i t a r i a n and e x p a n s i o n i s t Germany and England's l i b e r a l I n t e r e s t s was I n e v i t a b l e In the long run. T h i s q u e s t i o n of whether or not B r i t i s h p o l i c i e s r e g a r d i n g P r u s s i a d u r i n g the p e r i o d 1848-1871 were a f f e c t e d by such Idealism, and what e f f e c t , If any, B r i t i s h p o l i c y had on the p o l i t i c a l circumstances e x i s t i n g In P r u s s i a at that time w i l l be the s u b j e c t s of the present chapter. As with so much of B r i t i s h f o r e i g n p o l i c y , England's l a r g e l y n o n - l n t e r v e n t l o n i s t approach to the German qu e s t i o n d u r i n g the t h i r d q u a r t e r of the n i n e t e e n t h century has been subject to numerous d i f f e r e n t I n t e r p r e t a t i o n s . Most p r e v a l e n t , however, i s the type of I n t e r p r e t a t i o n a l l u d e d to above; I.e. one which maintains that an I d e a l i s e d view of Germany was widespread In England, p a r t i c u l a r l y among policy-makers who shaped t h e i r German p o l i c y a c c o r d i n g l y . In her study of mld-nlneteenth 22 century Anglo-German and Anglo-French r e l a t i o n s , w r i t t e n In 1925, A.A.W. Ramsay was the f i r s t to expound t h i s Idea. Ramsay claimed that the e i g h t e e n t h century pragmatlsts In the F o r e i g n O f f i c e had given way In the n i n e t e e n t h to men who allowed moral and p o l i t i c a l Ideals to govern t h e i r a c t i o n s , men who were "guided by a b s t r a c t ideas of the Right and the B e s t . " 2 C l a i m i n g that a " u n i t e d Germany In which P r u s s i a was merged, a L i b e r a l c o n s t i t u t i o n a l s t a t e governed by the v o i c e of the people a c t i n g through r e p r e s e n t a t i v e i n s t i t u t i o n s , was one to a t t r a c t a l l the hopes of the V i c t o r i a n i d e a l i s t , " Ramsay accused mld-nlneteenth c e n t u r y B r i t i s h statesmen of being "absorbed, and misled, p a r t l y by the romantic idea of Germany, p a r t l y by l i b e r a l t e ndencies, and p a r t l y a l s o by f e a r of F r a n c e . " 3 Disappointed by the p a s s i v i t y of B r i t i s h p o l i c y d u r i n g t h i s p e r i o d , Ramsey was s c a r c e l y able to conceal her contempt f o r such dangerous Idealism: There Is something p a t h e t i c In that c o n v i c t i o n of the most high-minded men i n the B r i t i s h p o l i t i c a l world - men l i k e Morler and Clarendon - t h a t complete success c o u l d never att e n d a n y t h i n g so immoral as the p o l i c y of Bismarck: that r i g h t must triumph In the end, and that 'blood and Iron' having r u l e d a while must pass away before the stronger f o r c e s of J u s t i c e , l i b e r t y , and peace.''* Raymond Sontag's study of Anglo-German r e l a t i o n s d u r i n g the l a s t h a l f of the n i n e t e e n t h century, w r i t t e n In 1938, a l s o proceeded on the assumption that the creed of mid-century B r i t i s h l i b e r a l i s m , as p r a c t i s e d by such men as Palmerston and Gladstone, was one of Inexorable and i r r e s i s t i b l e "Progress towards I n d i v i d u a l i s m and cosmopolitanism, progress towards freedom, with England l e a d i n g and the Continent f o l l o w i n g . " * 5 In t h e years f o l l o w i n g 1848, however, German l i b e r a l i s m g r a d u a l l y "sloughed o f f the l a s t remnants of i n d i v i d u a l i s m and cosmopolitanism," embracing I n s t e a d the I d e a l of the n a t i o n a l s t a t e . Watching from across the Channel, B r i t i s h statesmen "knew that i f the r e s t of Europe accepted the s t a t e I d e a l dominant In Germany, l i b e r a l i s m was doomed." T h e i r response, t h e r e f o r e , was to rush to the defence of t h e i r I d e a l s ; " E n g l i s h l i b e r a l s r e f u s e d to b e l i e v e that Bismarck c o u l d win; when he d i d win u n i t y , they r e f u s e d to b e l i e v e that the s t a t e he had c r e a t e d c o u l d endure; when It d i d endure, they i n s i s t e d Germans were s l a v e s . " 6 The most p e r s u a s i v e statement of the case that England's mld-nlneteenth c e n t u r y German p o l i c y was shaped l a r g e l y by l i b e r a l i d e a l i s m can be found In W.E. Mosse's I m p o r t a n t study of the European powers and the German que s t i o n , w r i t t e n In 1958. In seeking to e x p l a i n why l t was that P r u s s i a was able to "achieve her triumphs without provoking a c o a l i t i o n of the type which had a l l but destroyed her In the days of F r e d e r i c k the Great," Mosse argued that " B r i t i s h p o l i c y was I n f l u e n c e d to no small extent by I d e o l o g i c a l promptings": It was German c o n s t i t u t i o n a l i s m as much as n a t i o n a l c o n s o l i d a t i o n which had found favour i n England. The Court and s e c t i o n s of p u b l i c o p i n i o n thought of the German problem In terms which were almost e x c l u s i v e l y I d e o l o g i c a l . What they saw was a s t r u g g l e between ordered freedom and despotism, the B r i t i s h and Russian 'ways of l i f e ' . . . . A c o n s t i t u t i o n a l r e o r g a n i z a t i o n of Germany would strengthen the European c e n t r e . A l i b e r a l Germany was expected to adopt a l i b e r a l commercial p o l i c y . Idealism and s e l f - i n t e r e s t . . . happi l y c o i n c i d e d . 7 ' Although events between 1848 and 1871 gave r i s e to s e r i o u s doubts In England about the p o s s i b i l i t y of a u n i t e d Germany becoming an E n g l i s h - s t y l e l i b e r a l c o n s t i t u t i o n a l s t a t e , B r i t i s h statesmen r e f u s e d to c o n s i d e r a l t e r n a t i v e s o l u t i o n s s i n c e , as Mosse cl a i m s , such a l t e r n a t i v e s would I n e v i t a b l y " f a l l short of B r i t i s h i d e a l s . ' " 3 Although s e v e r a l a l t e r n a t i v e i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s of Anglo-German r e l a t i o n s i n the mld-nlneteenth century w i l l be d i s c u s s e d below, the q u e s t i o n to be asked at t h i s p o i n t i s are these s c h o l a r s , whose works are c e n t r a l to the s c h o l a r s h i p In t h i s area, j u s t i f i e d i n having p l a c e d so much emphasis on the r o l e which l i b e r a l Idealism played i n the decision-making process i n England? Do the words, and/or the a c t i o n s of those In power In England d u r i n g t h i s p e r i o d suggest that B r i t i s h p o l i c y r e g a r d i n g Germany was shaped by l i b e r a l i d e a l s and a romantic view of Germany? As w i l l be shown, l t i s p o s s i b l e to answer "yes" to the l a t t e r of these two q u e s t i o n s , owing to the language f r e q u e n t l y used by B r i t i s h statesmen In t h e i r p u b l i c statements r e g a r d i n g Germany. The answer to the former, however, Is not so obvious and depends In part upon how one chooses to I n t e r p r e t the a v a i l a b l e evidence. What would appear to be c e r t a i n Is that Ramsay, Sontag and Mosse, with the b e n e f i t of h i n d s i g h t , took B r i t i s h statesmen's ut t e r a n c e s oh the German qu e s t i o n at face value, and that they then I n t e r p r e t e d B r i t i s h p o l i c y on the b a s i s of t h i s , m istakenly b e l i e v i n g t h a t l i b e r a l Idealism was the p r i n c i p a l determinant of B r i t a i n ' s mid-nineteenth c e n t u r y German p o l i c y . There Is l i t t l e q u e s t i o n , as we s h a l l see, that most B r i t i s h policy-makers d u r i n g t h i s p e r i o d maintained In p u b l i c the appearance of s t r o n g support f o r a l i b e r a l s o l u t i o n to the German ques t i o n , which i n c l u d e d promoting l i b e r a l development i n P r u s s i a In p a r t i c u l a r . Moreover, both the crown and the v a r i o u s B r i t i s h governments c o n t i n u a l l y d e c l a r e d l t t h e i r I n t e n t i o n to ensure that England's f o r e i g n p o l i c y be guided s t r i c t l y by the t e n e t s of l i b e r a l Ideology, which e n t a i l e d f i n d i n g that d e l i c a t e balance between adherence to n o n - i n t e r v e n t i o n on the one hand, and what G r a n v i l l e d e s c r i b e d as the c u l t i v a t i o n of s p e c i a l l y Intimate r e l a t i o n s "with c o u n t r i e s which have adopted I n s t i t u t i o n s s i m i l a r In l i b e r a l i t y to our own," on the other." 5' But t h i s was o n l y h a l f the s t o r y . The other h a l f i n v o l v e d e n s u r i n g that B r i t i s h I n t e r e s t s , which were I n e x t r i c a b l y Interconnected with c o n t i n e n t a l a f f a i r s , not be d i s r u p t e d by Germany's growing pains. Despite the f a c t both the F o r e i g n O f f i c e and the d i p l o m a t i c corps remained almost e x c l u s i v e l y i n the hands of Whig a r i s t o c r a t s - men who agreed In p r i n c i p l e to the spread of l i b e r a l I n s t i t u t i o n s on the c o n t i n e n t , and to the Idea of s e l f - d e t e r m i n a t i o n Cexcept In I r e l a n d , of c o u r s e ) , but who abhorred the Idea of going to war In the defense of such p r i n c i p l e s - England's f o r e i g n p o l i c y tended In f a c t to be based on pragmatic, r a t h e r than i d e a l i s t i c c o n s i d e r a t i o n s . 1 0 Nonetheless, the " r h e t o r i c of a l i b e r a l e x t e r n a l p o l i c y was never abandoned," thus I n v e s t i n g England's a c t i o n s d u r i n g t h i s p e r i o d with a dualism that has l e d s c h o l a r s l i k e Ramsay, Sontag and Mosse to conclude t h a t l i b e r a l Idealism was the most Important p r i n c i p l e u n d e r l y i n g B r i t i s h p o l i c y , while more c y n i c a l h i s t o r i a n s such as Kenneth Bourne have argued that B r i t i s h statesmen simply "made Idealism a cloak, f o r t i m i d i t y and i n a c t i o n . " 1 1 A reexamination of the B r i t i s h government's p o l i c i e s with regard to P r u s s i a at c e r t a i n key p o i n t s d u r i n g the p e r i o d 1848-1871 r e v e a l s t h a t , In a l l l i k e l i h o o d , n e i t h e r l i b e r a l Idealism nor " t i m i d i t y " fundamentally a l t e r e d the a c t u a l goals of B r i t a i n ' s German p o l i c y . These goals were to ensure that P r u s s i a n s t r e n g t h and s t a b i l i t y , so v i t a l to Germany's u n i f i c a t i o n and hence to the peace of c e n t r a l Europe, not be diminished; any e f f e c t which England's p u r s u i t of these goals had on the German l i b e r a l movement was l a r g e l y Ignored. Moreover, t h a t ominous element of democratic extremism o f t e n a s s o c i a t e d with c o n t i n e n t a l l i b e r a l i s m convinced some B r i t i s h statesmen Cas w e l l as the p u r p o r t e d l y l i b e r a l P r i n c e A l b e r t ) that p o l i c i e s a c t u a l l y I n i m i c a l to P r u s s i a n l i b e r a l i s m sometimes had to be pursued. The events of 1871 t h e r e f o r e represented f o r B r i t i s h statesmen the s u c c e s s f u l consummation of B r i t i s h p o l i c y ; the f a c t t h a t the P r u s s i a n l i b e r a l movement's prospects f o r success had been dim i n i s h e d d u r i n g the course of events, although lamented by some, went l a r g e l y unnoticed by many others who were c o n f i d e n t t h a t the d i s p o s a l of the n a t i o n a l q u e s t i o n c l e a r e d the way f o r Germany's l i b e r a l e v o l u t i o n , and would lead to the r e a l i z a t i o n of a l i b e r a l c o n s t i t u t i o n a l German s t a t e . P o s s i b l e sources f o r such a complacent a t t i t u d e w i l l be d i s c u s s e d l a t e r . Here l t s u f f i c e s to note that l i b e r a l Idealism was not the o n l y f a c t o r In the c o n s i d e r a t i o n s of B r i t i s h p o l i c y - m a k e r s . 1 2 B r i t i s h p o l i c y r e g a r d i n g P r u s s i a can be roughly d i v i d e d Into four p e r i o d s : the f i r s t , running from 1848-1851, was one In which the n a t i o n a l i s t f e r v o u r of German l i b e r a l s was p e r c e i v e d by B r i t i s h statesmen to be the p r i n c i p a l t h r e a t to P r u s s i a ' s s t a b i l i t y ; the second covers the p e r i o d of the Crimean c o n f l i c t , 1854-1856, and was c h a r a c t e r i z e d by England's attempts to secure P r u s s i a ' s support i n the war a g a i n s t Russia; the t h i r d p e r i o d , 1856-1862, was a r e l a t i v e l y calm I n t e r v a l In Anglo-Prussian r e l a t i o n s ; and the f o u r t h p e r i o d , which extends from Bismarck's appointment as P r u s s i a n m l n l s t e i — p r e s i d e n t In 1862 to Germany's u n i f i c a t i o n In 1871, was one In which B r i t i s h policy-makers c o n s i s t e n t l y sought to remove p o t e n t i a l e x t e r n a l t h r e a t s to P r u s s i a which arose out of Bismarck's ambitious f o r e i g n p o l i c y . It Is to an examination of these four p e r i o d s that our d i s c u s s i o n w i l l now t u r n . F e a r f u l of the r e v o l u t i o n a r y f o r c e s unleashed by the February r e v o l u t i o n In France In 1848, King F r e d e r i c k W i l l i a m IV of P r u s s i a appealed to Queen V i c t o r i a to J o i n with him i n employing the power of " u n i t e d speech", so as to "Let France f e e l by sea and by land, as In the years '13, '14, and '15, what our union may mean." 1 3 T h i s dubious request was u n l i k e l y to gain much support In B r i t a i n , p a r t i c u l a r l y s i n c e both the crown and the c a b i n e t had a l r e a d y urged F r e d e r i c k W i l l i a m IV to c o n s i d e r p o l i t i c a l reform w i t h i n h i s own kingdom as a means of a v e r t i n g a p o t e n t i a l l y d i s a s t r o u s r e v o l u t i o n . 1 * A c t u a l l y , the F o r e i g n S e c r e t a r y , Palmerston, was pleased with the f a l l of Louis P h i l i p p e , and hence, employing the " r h e t o r i c of high-flown l i b e r a l i s m , " suggested to F r e d e r i c k W i l l i a m IV that he take heed of the example of h i s I l l - f a t e d neighbour; aside from admonishing the P r u s s i a n k i n g f o r h i s attempt to get England to j o i n In a c o n s e r v a t i v e a l l i a n c e d i r e c t e d a g a i n s t France, Palmerston l e c t u r e d F r e d e r i c k W i l l i a m IV on the use of r e f o r m i s t c o n s t i t u t i o n a l concessions as a way to a v o i d r e v o l u t i o n , and strengthen the P r u s s i a n s t a t e . 1 5 5 L i k e P r i n c e A l b e r t , Palmerston was concerned that F r e d e r i c k W i l l i a m I V s sentimental attachment to the p o l i t i c a l t r a d i t i o n s of the Holy A l l i a n c e threatened P r u s s i a n s t a b i l i t y . The f a c t t h a t these f e a r s were J u s t i f i e d became obvious w i t h i n days, as the r e v o l u t i o n a r y f e r v o u r that was growing throughout Germany swept Into B e r l i n , c o m p e l l i n g the k i n g to make c o n s t i t u t i o n a l concessions to the r e v o l u t i o n a r i e s , as w e l l as f o r c i n g the king's brother W i l l i a m , the f u t u r e emperor, to f l e e to England. It would seem that the mood of the B r i t i s h government r e g a r d i n g the d i r e c t i o n taken by events d u r i n g these f i r s t days of the r e v o l u t i o n was not a hopeful one, Inducing Baron Bunsen, the P r u s s i a n ambassador to London, to comment: "No one In England any longer b e l i e v e s In our f u t u r e . " 1 & However, Bunsen's pessimism r e g a r d i n g the B r i t i s h government's a t t i t u d e to these events In P r u s s i a was not n e c e s s a r i l y J u s t i f i e d , at l e a s t not at t h i s p o i n t . Although Palmerston expressed concerns that the growing p o l i t i c a l I n s t a b i l i t y In c e n t r a l Europe might encourage Russian ambitions, and perhaps lead to a general war, he a l s o responded more or l e s s p o s i t i v e l y to F r e d e r i c k W i l l i a m IV's concessions of 18 March, and he Issued the f o l l o w i n g i n s t r u c t i o n s f o r the B r i t i s h r e p r e s e n t a t i v e In F r a n k f u r t : "[W]e wish you to support as f a r as you p r o p e r l y can without any d i r e c t or u n f i t t i n g I n t e r f e r e n c e any plan which has f o r Its o b j e c t to c o n s o l i d a t e Germany and give i t more u n i t y and p o l i t i c a l vigour.'"' 7 P r i n c e A l b e r t too took heart from the P r u s s i a n king's attempts to c o n c i l i a t e the r e v o l u t i o n a r i e s , which he I n t e r p r e t e d as an attempt to prevent t h i n g s In P r u s s i a from g e t t i n g any more out of hand: He [ F r e d e r i c k W i l l i a m IV] has done e v e r y t h i n g that was l e f t to him to do, and has thereby done an Immense s e r v i c e to Germany. She w i l l and must be c o n s t i t u t e d anew, and I f some Important P r i n c e f a l l s to undertake the task, l t w i l l f a l l i n t o the hands of c l u b s , s o c i e t i e s , p r o f e s s o r s , t h e o r i s t s and humbugs; and I f the work Is not begun soon, the masses w i l l s e i z e c o n t r o l of I t . " 1 6 3 Here too then l t would appear t h a t , Insofar as P r u s s i a n a f f a i r s were concerned, both the B r i t i s h f o r e i g n s e c r e t a r y and the P r i n c e Consort were preoccupied with the q u e s t i o n of German st r e n g t h and s t a b i l i t y ; at t h i s p a r t i c u l a r Juncture they were s t i l l convinced t h a t l i b e r a l reform remained as a v i a b l e means of s e c u r i n g t h i s end. B r i t i s h concerns f o r P r u s s i a n s t a b i l i t y were, however, l i n k e d to the d e s i r e f o r a p e a c e f u l c o n s o l i d a t i o n of Germany, and hence England r e a c t e d unfavourably to the more extravagant e x p a n s i o n i s t designs of the German l i b e r a l s . Thus, while the new German n a t i o n a l assembly In F r a n k f u r t soon came to occupy the centre stage In the German r e v o l u t i o n s , B r i t i s h a t t e n t i o n s were drawn to the growing problem In the Elbe duchies, which had brought Denmark and P r u s s i a Into c o n f l i c t . Responding to requests from both the F e d e r a l D i e t and the F r a n k f u r t Parliament, Frederick. W i l l i a m IV had ordered P r u s s i a n troops to invade South J u t l a n d i n support of the r e v o l u t i o n a r y German government that had been e s t a b l i s h e d at K i e l . This a c t i o n , which met with a stormy r e c e p t i o n In the B r i t i s h press, a l s o prompted D i s r a e l i to thunder In the House of Commons aga i n s t P r u s s i a ' s boldness. C i t i n g not o n l y the l a c k of j u s t i f i c a t i o n f o r such an a t t a c k C"[T]he o n l y means by which a v i n d i c a t i o n has been sought to be e s t a b l i s h e d has been In a weak a d a p t a t i o n of some of the dreamy e f f u s i o n s of German p r o f e s s o r s " ) , and the ominous i m p l i c a t i o n s of German n a t i o n a l i s m C " I f wheresoever the German language Is spoken, the German f l a g should wave, why do not the P r u s s i a n s Invade A l s a c e ? " ) , D i s r a e l i c a l l e d upon the B r i t i s h government to Intervene In the d i s p u t e : It Is f o r the I n t e r e s t of England, and not of England alone, but a l l of Europe, that peace be maintained. And peace cannot, I t h i n k , be maintained I f the p o l i c y of P r u s s i a be permitted to pass unnoticed and uncensured....[M]ay the peace of Europe be maintained by the J u s t i c e and the power of England! Palmerston, however, was much more concerned with the s t r a t e g i c and p o l i t i c a l I m p l i c a t i o n s of P r u s s i a ' s a c t i o n s , which, by s e r v i n g the e x p a n s i o n i s t d e s i r e s of the German l i b e r a l s , threatened to undermine Prussian/German s t a b i l i t y . Nor were h i s concerns r e g a r d i n g P r u s s i a r e s t r i c t e d s o l e l y to the S c h l e s w i g - H o l s t e I n problem. The new l i b e r a l P r u s s i a n F o r e i g n M i n i s t e r , H e l n r l c h von Arnlm-Suckow, had launched an ambitious f o r e i g n p o l i c y which Involved promoting the r e s t o r a t i o n of des ' A l t e n Polen', not o n l y so that the r e v i v e d P o l i s h s t a t e might act as a bulwark a g a i n s t Russia, but a l s o as a means of both appeasing the French, and d i s t r a c t i n g them from P r u s s i a ' s aggressions i n the duchies. Conscious of the f a c t t h a t the Zo11vere1n represented a s e r i o u s c h a l l e n g e to the economic i n t e r e s t s of England, Arnim was working towards e s t a b l i s h i n g a F r a n c o - P r u s s i a n a l l i a n c e which he hoped would f a c i l i t a t e h i s attempts to p l a c e P r u s s i a at the head of u n i t e d Germany. 2 0 Hence P r u s s i a ' s f o r e i g n p o l i c y presented Palmerston with s e v e r a l problems; a s i d e from the obvious t h r e a t to B r i t i s h commercial i n t e r e s t s which P r u s s i a ' s p o s s e s s i o n of the Elbe duchies would repr e s e n t , there was a l s o the l e s s - t h a n - r e a s s u r i n g prospect of a r e v o l u t i o n a r y F r a n c o - P r u s s i a n a l l i a n c e , which c o u l d o n l y I n c i t e Russia, perhaps l e a d i n g to general war. Palmerston t h e r e f o r e attempted to f o l l o w a middle path, adopting a n e u t r a l a t t i t u d e r e g a r d i n g S c h l e s w i g - H o l s t e i n , and u r g i n g Arnlm not to undertake any a c t i o n which might provoke R u s s i a . 2 1 Meanwhile, In response to F r e d e r i c k W i l l i a m I V s claims that he was a p r i s o n e r of h i s popular F o r e i g n M i n i s t e r ' s P o l i s h p o l i c y , Palmerston, through S t r a t f o r d Canning, advised the P r u s s i a n k i n g to " r a l l y the c o n s e r v a t i v e county d i s t r i c t s , l n v e t e r a t e l y h o s t i l e to the Poles, a g a i n s t the B e r l i n mob and the m i n i s t e r i a l demagogues." 2 2 Prompted by Arnlm's evasiveness, and growing p u b l i c support In England f o r the Danes, Palmerston f i n a l l y abandoned n e u t r a l i t y and Joined with Russia In u r g i n g P r u s s i a to withdraw from the Duchies, a p o l i c y s h i f t which was rendered l e s s dangerous by the r e s i g n a t i o n of Arnlm In June, 1848. 2 3 It Is c l e a r t h e r e f o r e that B r i t i s h i n t e r e s t s favoured peace and s t a b i l i t y In c e n t r a l Europe Cbest secured through Germany's c o n s o l l d a t i o n ) , and not the k i n d of i d e a l i s t i c r e u n i f i c a t i o n of a l l Germans - to be accomplished at the expense of Germany's neighbours - advocated by German l i b e r a l - n a t i o n a l i s t s . The remainder of the c r i s i s was a n t 1 - c l l m a c t i c . Bowing to d i p l o m a t i c pressure, and hoping to a l l e v i a t e the e f f e c t s of the Danish naval blockade, F r e d e r i c k W i l l i a m IV agreed to the terms of the f a t e f u l Malmo a r m i s t i c e . Although war broke out again a year l a t e r , pressure from Czar N i c h o l a s Induced F r e d e r i c k W i l l i a m IV to conclude yet another a r m i s t i c e , which was f o l l o w e d by n e g o t i a t i o n s l e a d i n g to the 1852 London Treaty. Not s u r p r i s i n g l y , the B r i t i s h government's pragmatism d u r i n g t h i s d i s p u t e was not a p p r e c i a t e d by those P r u s s i a n s who assumed that B r i t i s h l i b e r a l p o l i c i e s would a u t o m a t i c a l l y be compatible with German-Prussian n a t i o n a l i s t g o a l s ; hence England was blamed f o r the d e v a s t a t i n g e f f e c t which these proceedings had on the German l i b e r a l - n a t i o n a l movement, prompting P r i n c e A l b e r t ' s mentor, Baron Stockmar, to c l a i m : "Our o n l y n a t u r a l f r i e n d has acted as an enemy bent on pur d e s t r u c t i o n . " 2 * Bunsen, who r e f u s e d to a f f i x h i s s i g n a t u r e to the London P r o t o c o l In 1850, was e q u a l l y c r i t i c a l of B r i t i s h p o l i c y . Although he f e l t t h a t the B e r l i n l e a d e r s had been I n s u f f i c i e n t l y l i b e r a l to secure England's c r u c i a l support f o r the r e v o l u t i o n , he nonetheless complained to Palmerston t h a t , as a r e s u l t of England's f a i l u r e to support P r u s s i a : "[Y]ou d r i v e us to throw o u r s e l v e s Into the arms of A u s t r i a , and t h e r e f o r e Into those of Russia. "2"'1 But how J u s t i f i e d were these complaints? Palmerston h i m s e l f admitted that the B r i t i s h c a b i n e t had "purposely a b s t a i n e d from d e p a r t i n g , with r e s p e c t to these [German] a f f a i r s , from the p o s i t i o n of anxious observers of what was p a s s i n g . " 2 6 But t h i s a b s t e n t i o n a p p l i e d p r i m a r i l y to questions of German u n i t y as d e l i b e r a t e d upon by the F r a n k f u r t Parliament, which had, as a r e s u l t of I t s Intransigence over S c h l e s w l g - H o l s t e l n , long s i n c e l o s t what l i t t l e support i t had from the B r i t i s h government. P r u s s i a , however, remained c e n t r a l to Palmerston's d e s i r e to see the r e v o l u t i o n a r y f e r v o u r of the c o n t i n e n t dampened so that some kind of a balance might be r e s t o r e d among the powers of Europe. Hence W h i t e h a l l ' s p r a i s e f o r the appointment In November 1848 of Count F r l e d r l c h von Brandenburg as P r u s s i a n m i n i s t e r — p r e s i d e n t , even though he was a c o n s e r v a t i v e landowner whose l l l l b e r a l l t y should have been abhorrent to "any good Whig at Westminster." 2 7' The government's d e s i r e to d i s t a n c e I t s e l f from the d i s r u p t i v e tendencies of the F r a n k f u r t l i b e r a l s was r e i t e r a t e d In parliament by Lord Brougham, who b e l i e v e d t h a t the conduct of F r e d e r i c k W i l l i a m IV d u r i n g the d i s p u t e over S c h l e s w l g - H o l s t e l n had been " d i c t a t e d more by the F r a n k f o r t Assembly than by h i s own wishes." Brougham was c o n f i d e n t that In the f u t u r e the P r u s s i a n k i n g would be "governed by h i s own sound Judgement. "2'2' C l e a r l y It was the d e s t a b i l i z i n g r a d i c a l i s m of both Arnlm and the F r a n k f u r t Parliament that had alarmed B r i t i s h policy-makers, and f u r t h e r evidence of t h i s Is the subsequent support which the B r i t i s h crown and c a b i n e t a f f o r d e d to the E r f u r t p r o p o s a l f o r German u n i f i c a t i o n , advanced by Joseph Maria von Eadowitz, the new c o n s e r v a t i v e P r u s s i a n F o r e i g n M i n i s t e r . Although Palmerston questioned P r u s s i a ' s a b i l i t y to Implement Radowltz's plan, which c a l l e d f o r the c r e a t i o n of a P r u s s i a n - l e d f e d e r a l German s t a t e e x c l u d i n g A u s t r i a , he nonetheless gave the pla n h i s b l e s s i n g , as he b e l i e v e d I t would "no doubt be advantangeous to the German people, with r e f e r e n c e to both t h e i r i n t e r n a l I n t e r e s t s , and to t h e i r f o r e i g n r e l a t i o n s , and l t would consequently be advantageous to Europe at l a r g e . " 2 5 * Even more supp o r t i v e was Pr i n c e A l b e r t , who was emphatic about the need f o r P r u s s i a to a c t : " I t Is high time that a d e f i n i t e settlement was made of the German c o n s t i t u t i o n a l q u e s t i o n , and a s t r o n g homogenous c e n t r a l a u t h o r i t y set up, capable of defending law and order. T h i s can and w i l l be found o n l y In P r u s s i a . " 3 0 In a l e t t e r to P r i n c e W i l l i a m In May, 1850, A l b e r t not o n l y expressed h i s s a t i s f a c t i o n t h a t the E r f u r t Parliament had "proven as Conservative as l t Is p a t r i o t i c , " but he a l s o d e c l a r e d that the "urgent n e c e s s i t y of t h i s [ E r f u r t ] settlement Is c l e a r l y shown." 3 1 What i t was that A l b e r t feared from d e l a y Is c l e a r : three months l a t e r , when the E r f u r t Union was on the verge of c o l l a p s e , he lamented, " I f o n l y A u s t r i a and the P r i n c e s would r e a l i z e t h a t the R e v o l u t i o n of 1848 Is by no means f i n i s h e d ! " 3 2 Both Palmerston and A l b e r t , although f o r d i f f e r e n t reasons, had come to look, askance at P r u s s i a n and German l i b e r a l i s m of the 1848 v a r i e t y , s h i f t i n g t h e i r support to the more c o n s e r v a t i v e f o r c e s In P r u s s i a which were resurgent by the end of 1849. For A l b e r t l t was the f e a r of "Red r e v o l u t i o n " which d i c t a t e d t h i s s h i f t , while Palmerston, anxious to prevent both r a d i c a l realignments of the European powers, and the abrogation of i n t e r n a t i o n a l agreements, was s u s p i c i o u s of the " k i n e t i c " c h a r a c t e r of P r u s s i a n l i b e r a l i s m : "As a p r a c t i c a l E n g l i s h statesmen, he c o u l d not do other than oppose a l i b e r a l P r u s s i a , however badly such a l i n e accorded with h i s a c t i o n s e l s e w h e r e . " 3 3 These same c o n s i d e r a t i o n s shaped B r i t i s h r e a c t i o n s to the Hessian c r i s i s of 1850, which destroyed the E r f u r t Union and ended In P r u s s i a ' s h u m i l i a t i o n at Olmvitz. Frederick. William's attempt to secure an Anglo-Prussian a l l i a n c e In the face of the impending danger of a c o n f l i c t with A u s t r i a e l l c t e d a s t r i k i n g v a r i e t y of views. On the one hand, Queen V i c t o r i a I m p u l s i v e l y demanded t h a t England throw I t s weight " i n t o the s c a l e of C o n s t i t u t i o n a l P r u s s i a and Germany."3'* P r i n c e A l b e r t , on the other hand, r e f u s e d to answer F r e d e r i c k W i l l i a m I V s request one way or another C'An Anglo-Prussian a l l i a n c e Is a matter of such Immense Import that none but the r e s p o n s i b l e c o n s t i t u t i o n a l a d v i s o r s of the two Crowns can p r o p e r l y handle l t " ) , while warning P r i n c e W i l l i a m that the " l a s t v e s t i g e s of Conservatism may be s h a t t e r e d by d i s t u r b a n c e s such as are going on In Hesse...and poisoned by the germ of a f r e s h Revolution." 3"' 1 F i n a l l y , there was F o r e i g n S e c r e t a r y Palmerston, who, while idea 1 1 s t i c a l l y c l a i m i n g t h a t he r e f u s e d to b e l i e v e " i t p o s s i b l e In the present day to r e - e s t a b l i s h d e s p o t i c government In a n a t i o n so e n l i g h t e n e d , and so attached to f r e e I n s t i t u t i o n s " as P r u s s i a , was e n t i r e l y r e a l i s t i c when e v a l u a t i n g the European-wide I m p l i c a t i o n s of the c r i s i s : "Russia on one s i d e and France on the other...must be Inwardly c h u c k l i n g at s e e i n g 36 Germany come down In so short a time from E l n h e l t to Intense e x a s p e r a t i o n and to. the brink, of c i v i l war." 3 6 Although Palmerston harboured no i l l u s i o n s about P r u s s i a ' s r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r b r i n g i n g about such a lamentable s i t u a t i o n , or about the n e c e s s i t y of B r i t i s h n e u t r a l i t y In any ensuing c o n f l i c t C p a r t i c u l a r l y s i n c e such a c o n f l i c t might a l s o Involve France and R u s s i a ) , he was c l e a r l y a t t r a c t e d by the p o t e n t i a l b e n e f i t s of a P r u s s i a n v i c t o r y : The l i k e l i h o o d i s t h a t I f such a war should break out the sympathies of t h i s n a t i o n would be In favour of P r u s s i a , P r o t e s t a n t and l i b e r a l ; but there i s a wide d i s t a n c e between sympathy and a c t i v e a s s i s t a n c e . The I n t e r e s t of England and I should say of Europe g e n e r a l l y would be that out of such a war P r u s s i a should come unscathed and 1f  p o s s i b l e enlarged and s t r e n g t h e n e d . 3 y [Emphasis mine] Such an outcome, however, was not to be. Although r e l a t i v e l y unscathed, P r u s s i a emerged from Olmutz under the t u t e l a g e of the r e a c t i o n a r y M a n t e u f f e l m i n i s t r y . Hence Mosse concludes that the 1851 r e s t o r a t i o n settlement represented "a major B r i t i s h d e f e a t , " not the l e a s t g a l l i n g of which was "the f a i l u r e of the German l i b e r a l movement." 3 0 The above account of the B r i t i s h government's a t t i t u d e towards P r u s s i a d u r i n g the p e r i o d 1848-1851, however, suggests that the B r i t i s h government never a c t i v e l y prosecuted any German p o l i c y other than one which sought to ensure c e n t r a l European s t a b i l i t y ; I f the exigences of t h i s p o l i c y demanded that England a b s t a i n from s u p p o r t i n g e x p a n s i o n i s t P r u s s i a n and German l i b e r a l i s m , so be l t . It would seem, t h e r e f o r e , that pragmatism r a t h e r than " I d e o l o g i c a l promptings" was the p r i n c i p a l determinant of B r i t i s h p o l i c y d u r i n g t h i s tumultuous p e r i o d . 37 The second p e r i o d opens e a r l y In 1854 with the growing antagonism between B r i t a i n , France and Russia i n the Crimea. During t h i s p e r i o d , however, l t was B r i t a i n who was l o o k i n g to P r u s s i a f o r support, r a t h e r than the r e v e r s e , and thus Anglo-Prussian r e l a t i o n s once again became an Issue of some Importance. As e x p l a i n e d by P r i n c e A l b e r t , the s t r a t e g i c Importance of P r u s s i a and A u s t r i a In a war a g a i n s t Russia was enormous: The worst of the war Is that we cannot b r i n g i t to an e f f e c t i v e c o n c l u s i o n . Russia Is a great and clumsy mass and the blows we can s t r i k e her In the few p l a c e s which we can reach, w i l l not make a great Impression on her. If A u s t r i a and P r u s s i a go with us, matters are d i f f e r e n t and war becomes impossible f o r R u s s i a . 3 1 " F r e d e r i c k W i l l i a m IV, however, having spurned Czar N i c h o l a s ' earnest attempts to win the support of P r u s s i a , a l s o r e s i s t e d the western powers' advances. Manteuffel d e c l a r e d that he d i d not want to embroil P r u s s i a i n a c o n f l i c t which "does not a f f e c t the I n t e r e s t s of our f a t h e r l a n d . " * 0 Not even Queen V i c t o r i a ' s Impassioned plea that the P r u s s i a n k i n g not abdicate P r u s s i a ' s p o s i t i o n as "one of the Great Powers, which, since 1815, have been guarantors of t r e a t i e s , guardians of c i v i l i s a t i o n , defenders of the r i g h t , and r e a l a r b i t e r s of the Nations," was s u f f i c i e n t to d e f l e c t F r e d e r i c k W i l l i a m IV from h i s " f l a g i t i o u s p o l i c y " of n e u t r a l i t y . * 1 Within weeks of the B r i t i s h and French d e c l a r a t i o n s of war a g a i n s t Russia, P r u s s i a ' s n e u t r a l i t y became the subject of s c r u t i n y In the B r i t i s h p arliament. R e a c t i n g to rumours that P r u s s i a had broken completely with the western powers and J o i n e d Russia, the government was asked If e i t h e r the h o s t i l e tone of the debates In the P r u s s i a n Chambers, or the r e c a l l o f Baron Bunsen from h i s post i n London had any " p o l i t i c a l meaning with regard to the r e l a t i o n s between P r u s s i a and t h i s c o u n t r y ? " * 2 Clarendon, the F o r e i g n S e c r e t a r y In Aberdeen's government, dismi s s e d the rumours as b e i n g unfounded, and d e c l a r e d t h a t l t was " q u i t e I m p o s s i b l e " t h at P r u s s i a would pass over to R u s s i a . * 3 But while l t was true that there was l i t t l e danger of P r u s s i a j o i n i n g f o r c e s with Russia, e s p e c i a l l y given F r e d e r i c k W i l l i a m I V s J u s t i f i a b l e f e a r of a French a t t a c k on the Rhine, what Clarendon d i d not apprehend was that the P r u s s i a n k i n g was a f f e c t i n g a d i s t i n c t , although l a r g e l y symbolic change of p o l i c y with regards to P r u s s i a ' s r e l a t i o n s with England, and that Bunsen's r e c a l l was Indeed a part of t h i s . Moreover, l t was P r u s s i a n l i b e r a l i s m which s u f f e r e d as a r e s u l t of t h i s p o l i c y s h i f t . In o p p o s i t i o n to M a n t e u f f e l and the r e a c t i o n a r y C a m a r i l l a which surrounded the king, there had r e c e n t l y appeared In P r u s s i a a " k i n d of German Whig p a r t y " c a l l e d the Wochenblattparte 1. T h i s group was l e d by Bunsen, supported by P r i n c e W i l l i a m , and comprised of pro-Western l i b e r a l s . * * F o l l o w i n g the c o n c l u s i o n of an A u s t r o - P r u s s l a n t r e a t y of a l l i a n c e In A p r i l In which the German powers r e a s s e r t e d t h e i r Independence from St. Petersburg, F r e d e r i c k W i l l i a m IV moved ag a i n s t the Wochenblattparte1, thus making e q u a l l y c l e a r h i s I n t e n t i o n to remain o u t s i d e any concert of Europe d i r e c t e d a g a i n s t Russia. Thus Bunsen's r e c a l l from London was a part of the P r u s s i a n king's p l a n to s t e e r h i s country down a middle path, d e s p i t e the B r i t i s h government's anxious attempts to d e f l e c t F r e d e r i c k W i l l i a m from h i s p o l i c y of n e u t r a l i t y , which was deemed I n j u r i o u s to England's I n t e r e s t s . * = The f a c t t h a t the s i g n i f i c a n c e of these events was l o s t on B r i t i s h statesmen, as i s suggested by Clarendon's response In Parliament, Is confirmed by the P r i n c e Consort's u n c h a r a c t e r i s t i c r e a c t i o n to the news about Bunsen. Although he had come to Bunsen's defense four years e a r l i e r when l t was rumoured then that the l i b e r a l - m i n d e d P r u s s i a n ambassador would be r e c a l l e d , A l b e r t now concluded that "Bunsen's f a l l . . . Is best f o r a l l p a r t i e s . " M t > It was not long, however, before the p o l i t i c a l contours of P r u s s i a ' s n e u t r a l i t y , and the s i g n i f i c a n c e of the Wochenblattparte 1's suppression became apparent In England, t a x i n g the patience of B r i t i s h policy-makers to the f u l l e s t . When the terms of the A u s t r o - P r u s s l a n t r e a t y f i n a l l y came to l i g h t In May 1854, there was some debate over whether or not t h i s t r e a t y , under any c o n d i t i o n s , pledged e i t h e r p a r t y to e f f e c t i v e c o o p e r a t i o n with France and England i n the war. In the House of Lords the Marquess of C l a n r l c a r d e concluded that those c l a u s e s which set out the circumstances under which the German powers would J o i n with the west were "absurb" and wholly u n r e a l i s t i c Ca statement the f u l l Irony of which would o n l y become apparent twelve years l a t e r when the E a r l of Derby o f f e r e d h i s i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of England's commitments under the 1867 c o l l e c t i v e guarantee of Luxembourg).* 7' Within two months of t h i s P r i n c e A l b e r t c o u l d be heard to comment: " P r u s s i a ' s conduct Is t r u l y r e v o l t i n g , and the King Is looked upon by a l l p o l i t i c a l 40 men here with profound contempt. Nor was t h i s s i t u a t i o n about to Improve. There e x i s t s , however, no evidence to suggest that B r i t a i n made any attempt to encourage the l i b e r a l pro-Western f o r c e s In P r u s s i a to r e b e l a g a i n s t the " r e v o l t i n g " conduct of t h e i r monarch. By the time Palmerston was c a l l e d upon to form a new government in February 1855, the Issue of P r u s s i a ' s n e u t r a l i t y had become much more c o n t e n t i o u s , owing l a r g e l y to r e p o r t s that P r u s s i a was p r o v i d i n g Russia with arms and s u p p l i e s . In parliament the Russophoblc Lord Lyndhurst launched a s c a t h i n g a t t a c k on P r u s s i a ' s r o l e In the Crimean war to date - a r o l e which he f e l t was "derogatory to her c h a r a c t e r , d e s t r u c t i v e to her I n f l u e n c e , and r e d u c i n g her, In f a c t , f o r a time, to the s t a t e of a second-rate Power." Lyndhurst, who a t t r i b u t e d P r u s s i a ' s treacherous and p o s s i b l y s u i c i d a l a c t i o n s to the Influence which St. P e t e r s b u r g exerted over the P r u s s i a n king, c l o s e d h i s t i r a d e with a summary of the e s s e n t i a l c h a r a c t e r of P r u s s i a n f o r e i g n p o l i c y : It Is a s i n g u l a r circumstance i n the h i s t o r y of n a t i o n s . . . that t h e i r d i p l o m a t i c c h a r a c t e r and t h e i r f o r e i g n p o l i c y have f r e q u e n t l y a permanent form, s u r v i v i n g s u c c e s s i v e monarchs and s u c c e s s i v e a d m l n i s t r a t I o n s . . . . I n t r a c i n g the f o r e i g n p o l i c y of P r u s s i a from the r e i g n of [ F r e d e r i c k II] down to the present time, l t w i l l be found ever to e x h i b i t the same f e a t u r e s of unblushing fr a u d and unscrupulous s e l f 1 s h n e s s . . . . I have no f a i t h In the P r u s s i a n Government, and If my noble F r i e n d [Clarendon] should be tempted to enter Into any engagement with that Power, I should be disposed to address him with words of c a u t i o n , 'Hunc t u ,  Romane, caveto' . Clarendon's response to these Inflammatory remarks r e v e a l s the dilemma In which the government found I t s e l f as a r e s u l t of P r u s s i a ' s n e u t r a l i t y . F r u s t r a t e d by P r u s s i a ' s i n a c t i o n , but 41 u n w i l l i n g to widen the breach that was forming between B e r l i n and London, Clarendon chose to empathize with the P r u s s i a n s ' d e s i r e f o r peace, while lamenting the consequences f o r P r u s s i a , and f o r England, of F r e d e r i c k W i l l i a m IV's p o l i c i e s : We can have no o b j e c t or I n t e r e s t but to be on terms of f r i e n d l y r e l a t i o n with P r u s s l a . . . . F o r n e a r l y a c e n t u r y she has taken part In a l l the great questions of Europe; she has aided In m a i n t a i n i n g the e q u i l i b r i u m of power In Europe; and l t has been a melancholy s p e c t a c l e to see P r u s s i a a b d i c a t i n g the high p o s i t i o n she has h i t h e r t o held....The general r e s u l t of P r u s s i a n p o l i c y has, I f e a r , been to f r u s t r a t e the union [of Germany], and to prevent the vigorous tone and the uniform language on the part of Germany, which would have gone so f a r to secure f o r us that peace we are so anxious to o b t a I n . . . . [ I ] t must be keenly f e l t by the e n l i g h t e n e d , the brave, and the p a t r i o t i c people of P r u s s i a . 5 3 0 Employing the r h e t o r i c of a l i b e r a l i d e a l l s - t which h e l d that the " e n l i g h t e n e d " P r u s s i a n people were more or l e s s innocent v i c t i m s of the p o l i c i e s of t h e i r r u l e r s , Clarendon thus r e i t e r a t e d the idea that P r u s s i a n s t r e n g t h , whether i t be In the hands of l i b e r a l s or c o n s e r v a t i v e s , was a matter of great i n t e r e s t to England. Clarendon's suggestion that s t r o n g language might have had a p o s i t i v e Influence on the course of events i s a l s o noteworthy s i n c e l t a n t i c i p a t e d the complaints l a t e r d i r e c t e d at England I t s e l f a f t e r the outbreak of both the A u s t r o - P r u s s l a n and the F r a n c o - P r u s s i a n w a r s . 3 1 But because P r u s s i a was the o n l y major European power that had r e f r a i n e d from adopting a h o s t i l e a t t i t u d e towards Russia d u r i n g the Crimean c o n f l i c t , Palmerston's government contemplated e x c l u d i n g P r u s s i a from the peace conference which opened In the s p r i n g of 1856.^ In the House of Commons the government was f o r c e d to defend t h i s p o l i c y a g a i n s t arguments 42 which were the very opposite of those advanced by Lyndhurst a year e a r l i e r . Benjamin D i s r a e l i ' s comments on t h i s q u e s t i o n are of p a r t i c u l a r i n t e r e s t as they demonstrate the f u t u r e Prime M i n i s t e r ' s a p p r e c i a t i o n f o r the pragmatic c o n s i d e r a t i o n s i n f l u e n c i n g B r i t i s h p o l i c y with regard to P r u s s i a . He too, however, u t i l i z e d i d e o l o g i c a l l y - w e i g h t e d language to emphasize the importance of good Anglo-Prussian r e l a t i o n s : [ I ] f l t be of European i n t e r e s t that P r u s s i a should be present at the C o n f e r e n c e s . . . i t i s , I say, e q u a l l y d e s i r a b l e , i n my o p i n i o n , f o r E n g l i s h I n t e r e s t s . . . . From the time when P r u s s i a entered Into the highest c l a s s of s o v e r e i g n t y , with one b r i e f e xception, when she acted n o t o r i o u s l y under compulsion, she has been our a l l y ; and from h i s t o r i c a l a s s o c i a t i o n s , from her g e o g r a p h i c a l p o s i t i o n , from the nature of her produce, from the c h a r a c t e r of her I n h a b i t a n t s , and, I may say, of her r e l i g i o n , P r u s s i a i s a power which w i l l always be regarded with great sympathy by the people of England, and with profound I n t e r e s t by the statesmen of E n g l a n d . 5 3 3 In h i s response, Palmerston made no q u a r r e l with D i s r a e l i ' s sentiments r e g a r d i n g P r u s s i a : " P r u s s i a Is undoubtedly a Power with whom l t must always be the I n t e r e s t of t h i s country to maintain the most intimate r e l a t i o n s of f r i e n d s h i p . " As f o r the q u e s t i o n of P r u s s i a ' s e x c l u s i o n from the peace conference, here too the Prime M i n i s t e r tempered h i s answer, remarking t h a t England was "not e n t i t l e d to c r i t i c i s e " P r u s s i a ' s reasons f o r remaining n e u t r a l i n the c o n f l i c t ; having attempted " p e r f e c t n e u t r a l i t y " , however, P r u s s i a c o u l d " p l a y no part In the Conference." 5 1 5* In the end P r u s s i a was admitted to the Congress of P a r i s , but played o n l y a minor r o l e In the n e g o t i a t i o n s . Within the context of Anglo-Prussian r e l a t i o n s d u r i n g t h i s p e r i o d , the s i g n i f i c a n c e of the Crimean c o n f l i c t Is that l t represented the o n l y time when B r i t i s h i n t e r e s t s turned so d e c i s i v e l y on P r u s s i a ' s response to a B r i t i s h i n i t i a t i v e . At every other important Juncture between 1848 and 1871, the l e i t m o t i f was England's response to a P r u s s i a n i n i t i a t i v e , whether It Involved c o n f l i c t i n S c h l e s w l g - H o l s t e l n , Hesse-Kassel, A u s t r i a , Luxembourg or France. Given t h i s r e v e r s a of r o l e s , one might expect the B r i t i s h government to have acted i n g r e a t e r earnest, and Indeed, such was the case, p a r t i c u l a r l y d u r i n g the opening months of the war. But once P r u s s i a ' s response was e s t a b l i s h e d Cln t h i s case through Its d e c l a r a t i o n of n e u t r a l i t y ) , B r i t i s h statesmen r e s i g n e d themselves to t h i s response, and engaged henceforth i n damage-control o p e r a t i o n s , which Involved r e a s s e r t i n g the n o t i o n that P r u s s i a was England' " n a t u r a l a l l y " , and that no purpose would be served by " p o u r i n g obloquy" on the e n l i g h t e n e d P r u s s i a n n a t i o n . 2 5 3 Here too then i t would seem that pragmatic c o n s i d e r a t i o n s guided the B r i t i s h government's p o l i c y r e g a r d i n g P r u s s i a , while I d e o l o g i c a l p o s t u r i n g dominated the d i s c o u r s e . The p e r i o d between the end of the Crimean war and Bismarck's appointment as P r u s s i a n m i n i s t e r — p r e s i d e n t In 1862 was one of r e l a t i v e quiescence f o r Anglo-Prussian r e l a t i o n s , punctuated o n l y o c c a s i o n a l l y by d i s r u p t i v e events. Indeed, In the years immediately f o l l o w i n g the Congress of P a r i s , circumstances appeared extremely p r o p i t i o u s f o r e f f e c t i n g In P r u s s i a the kinds of l i b e r a l c o n s t i t u t i o n a l changes which B r i t i s h i d e a l i s t s b e l i e v e d were I n e v i t a b l e . The marriage of Queen V i c t o r i a ' s e l d e s t daughter to the P r i n c e of P r u s s i a ' s son In 1858 Cboth of whom were thought to h o l d l i b e r a l views), and the appointment that same year of P r i n c e W i l l i a m as regent f o r h i s m e n t a l l y Incompetent brother both seemed to s i g n a l a change i n d i r e c t i o n f o r P r u s s i a . Manteuffel's replacement by the "New E r a " m i n i s t r y of P r i n c e K a r l Hohenzollern-Slgmarlngen confirmed t h i s l i b e r a l i z i n g t r e n d . While the B r i t i s h press remained wary of these changes, the B r i t i s h government responded p o s i t i v e l y , presumably because reform was being e f f e c t e d In a p e a c e f u l manner. 1 5 *• The outbreak of the I t a l i a n war In 1859 had l i t t l e b e a r i n g on Anglo-Prussian r e l a t i o n s . The p r i n c i p a l concern of Palmerston's government was to ensure that the war not spread, unduly encouraging e i t h e r Russia or France. It was from t h i s t h a t sprang F o r e i g n S e c r e t a r y R u s s e l l ' s b e l i e f t h a t "Upon the temperate and e n l i g h t e n e d conduct of P r u s s i a depends... whether the present war s h a l l be c o n f i n e d w i t h i n the l i m i t s of I t a l y , or whether l t s h a l l be extended to the whole of Germany, and perhaps to other p a r t s of Europe." 0 7' But the unfortunate consequence of the Peace of V l l l a f r a n c a was t h a t , having been sidestepped by A u s t r i a and France, the "New E r a " m i n i s t r y had a l i e n a t e d I t s e l f from P r i n c e W i l l i a m by preaching n e u t r a l i t y . Hence the embittered P r i n c e W i l l i a m Cwho was a l s o d i s t u r b e d by r e v e l a t i o n s of the B r i t i s h crown's Inside knowledge of P r u s s i a n a f f a i r s ) d e r i v e d l i t t l e c o n s o l a t i o n from Queen V i c t o r i a ' s assurances that P r u s s i a ' s r e s t r a i n t had proven that there was "fundamentally no reason why our p o l i c i e s should not march hand in hand." 5 5' 3 It Is i n t e r e s t i n g to note that the one o c c a s i o n upon which the B r i t i s h government chose to p u b l i c l y censure the P r u s s i a n government f o r t h e i r conduct was one i n which no c l e a r B r i t i s h I n t e r e s t s were threatened, and there e x i s t e d no danger that t h i s censure would In any way impair the P r u s s i a n government's p o s i t i o n at home or In Europe. The s o - c a l l e d MacDonald a f f a i r , which In 1860 arose out of the a r r e s t and Imprisonment i n P r u s s i a of a B r i t i s h army c a p t a i n because of a q u a r r e l on a t r a i n , prompted the press and the governments In both England and P r u s s i a to h u r l a f l u r r y of I n s u l t s at one another. Incensed by the P r u s s i a n p r o s e c u t o r ' s c l a i m t h a t "The E n g l i s h r e s i d i n g and t r a v e l l i n g abroad are n o t o r i o u s f o r the rudeness, Impudence, and b o o r i s h arrogance of t h e i r behaviour," the Times launched a s e r i e s of v i c i o u s a t t a c k s a g a i n s t P r u s s i a , which Palmerston f o l l o w e d up with these t h r e a t e n i n g , but harmless remarks: It Is Impossible to c a s t your eye over the face of Europe and to note the r e l a t i o n s of the d i f f e r e n t Powers to each other without see i n g that l t Is to the I n t e r e s t of P r u s s i a to c u l t i v a t e , not the f r i e n d s h i p of the E n g l i s h Government only, but the good o p i n i o n and the g o o d w i l l of the E n g l i s h n a t i o n ; and, t h e r e f o r e , I should say that t h e i r conduct In t h i s a f f a i r has been...a blunder as w e l l as a c r i m e . 5 9 As the P r u s s i a n l i b e r a l l e a d e r George von Vlnke was quick to p o i n t out, "the a l l i a n c e with P r u s s i a Is l i k e w i s e a n e c e s s i t y f o r England, on account of the p o s i t i o n s taken up by the other Great Powers." T h i s i n t u r n prompted P r i n c e A l b e r t to respond In a manner that betrayed not o n l y h i s I d e a l i s t i c view of Anglo-Prussian r e l a t i o n s and h i s growing estrangement from h i s German r o o t s , but a l s o h i s I n s i g h t s into the workings of the B r i t i s h p o l i t i c a l mind: 46 The Idea that the B r i t i s h Government c o u l d s a c r i f i c e an I n d i v i d u a l c i t i z e n who Is supposed to have been Injured and I l l - t r e a t e d , i n order that It might continue on a more convenient, f r i e n d l y f o o t i n g with another Government, which might some day be of use to England In time of need, would be regarded here as t r e a s o n and contemptible cowardice... P r u s s i a has always been t a l k i n g of being the o n l y n a t u r a l and r e a l a l l y of England....I repeat, however, that a l a r g e , l i b e r a l , generous p o l i c y Is the p r e l i m i n a r y c o n d i t i o n f o r an a l l i a n c e with England. 4" 0 But d e s p i t e a l l of the r h e t o r i c , the MacDonald a f f a i r never amounted to anything more than Just words, although l t Is not Impossible that t h i s unpleasant i n c i d e n t helped to prepare Palmerston f o r what was to be h i s l a s t encounter with P r u s s i a when the S c h l e s w i g - H o l s t e i n problem r e a r e d I t s ugly head once again i n 1863. & 1 The f o u r t h and f i n a l p e r i o d to be examined, although c e r t a i n l y the most e v e n t f u l , was a l s o one of the most c o n s i s t e n t i n terms of B r i t i s h p o l i c y r e g a r d i n g P r u s s i a . B r i t i s h policy-makers between 1863 and 1871 s t e a d f a s t l y adhered to a course which helped to safeguard P r u s s i a ' s p o s i t i o n In c e n t r a l Europe amidst a l l of the momentous changes wrought by Bismarck and the P r u s s i a n army In the years l e a d i n g up to u n i f i c a t i o n . B r i t i s h statesmen, with some notable exceptions, followed such a course because they b e l i e v e d B r i t i s h I n t e r e s t s would best be served through the p r e s e r v a t i o n of P r u s s i a n s t a b i l i t y and the c o n s o l i d a t i o n of Germany. Although P r u s s i a ' s aggrandizement and the s u b o r d i n a t i o n of the P r u s s i a n l i b e r a l movement were unintended consequences of the f u l f i l l m e n t of these goals, B r i t i s h p o l i c y c o n t r i b u t e d to t h e i r f u l f i l l m e n t nonetheless. P o s s i b l e reasons why t h i s l a t t e r development in p a r t i c u l a r r e c e i v e d so l i t t l e c o n s l d e r a t i o n from B r i t i s h policy-makers w i l l be d i s c u s s e d i n the f o l l o w i n g chapter. The p e r i o d opens with the r e v i v a l In the I860's of that p e r e n n i a l European Issue, the S c h l e s w l g - H o l s t e l n problem. The most c o n t r o v e r s i a l aspect of B r i t i s h f o r e i g n p o l i c y d u r i n g the d i s p u t e over S c h l e s w l g - H o l s t e l n In 1863-1864 i s I t s apparent d u a l i t y - s t r o n g support f o r the Danes on the one hand, and a r e f u s a l to undertake any a c t i o n whatsoever to demonstrate t h a t support on the other. But while t h i s has l e d to the a c c u s a t i o n that B r i t i s h p o l i c y was conducted "with an I n c r e d i b l e l a c k of s k i l l and c o n s i s t e n c y " d u r i n g the Danish war, B r i t i s h policy-makers were not e n t i r e l y r e s p o n s i b l e f o r t h i s c h a r a c t e r i z a t i o n of t h e i r a c t i o n s as "meddle and muddle". Palmerston's government, f o r example, can o n l y be p a r t i a l l y blamed f o r the p e r c e p t i o n that England was pro-Danish In t h i s d i s p u t e . Only once d i d Palmerston p u b l i c l y suggest that England would come to the support of Denmark, while f a r more f r e q u e n t l y d i d he and R u s s e l l d e c l a r e England's I m p a r t i a l i t y In response to o p p o s i t i o n demands t h a t England act In Denmark's defense. The press, on the other hand, m e r c i l e s s l y a t t a c k e d the p o l i c i e s of the German powers, P r u s s i a In p a r t i c u l a r , and when Gladstone added h i s v o i c e to t h i s through an anonymous a r t i c l e In the Q u a r t e r l y Review, l t was not s u r p r i s i n g that " o f f i c i a l " B r i t i s h p o l i c y w a 3 thought to favour a c t i v e l y opposing the German powers.*' 3 The f a c t t h a t Palmerston's government never undertook such a c t i v e o p p o s i t i o n prompted c r i t i c i s m s of the government's p a s s i v i t y - charges which took on much g r e a t e r weight when l t was l a t e r suggested, somewhat w i s h f u l l y , that the Danish war had been the best, and perhaps the l a s t o p p o r t u n i t y to f r u s t r a t e Bismarck's p l a n s . e * It Is no doubt true that the B r i t i s h government was Incensed at having to take a c t i o n In a d i s p u t e which was thought to have been s e t t l e d i n 1852. It Is a l s o c e r t a i n t h a t Queen V i c t o r i a played an Important r o l e In moderating the B r i t i s h government's response to the Danish war, which was blamed l a r g e l y on the a c t i o n s of the German powers. But l t Is e q u a l l y c e r t a i n t h a t , as Palmerston h i m s e l f claimed, "there was no q u e s t i o n whatever of England going to war." 6 5 The same motives that had Impelled Palmerston to blunt R u s s e l l ' s I d e o l o g i c a l I n d i g n a t i o n over the Alvensleben convention i n 1863 Cby which P r u s s i a had pledged I t s support to Russia i n suppressing the P o l e s ) a l s o helped to guide the B r i t i s h government's a c t i o n s d u r i n g the long and complicated S c h l e s w l g - H o l s t e I n d l s p u t e . & & These motives - the d e s i r e to preserve P r u s s i a n and German st r e n g t h by not p r o v i d i n g France with an excuse to seek aggrandizement on the Rhine - were, of course, accompanied by many other Important o b j e c t i v e s , not the l e a s t of which was the p r e s e r v a t i o n of the Danish monarchy. But as R u s s e l l h i m s e l f noted Just a week before h o s t i l i t i e s began, "by encouraging Denmark and Germany by t u r n s , " Napoleon III sought throughout the c o n f l i c t "to b r i n g on a war by which France may p r o f i t . " * - 7 ' Thus, on l y by c o n s i s t e n t l y p u r s u i n g a p o l i c y aimed at the p r e s e r v a t i o n , and l a t e r the r e s t o r a t i o n of peace c o u l d the B r i t i s h government hope to f r u s t r a t e the French emperor, and a v e r t a c o n f l a g r a t i o n the consequences of which would be much more s e r i o u s than the l o s s of the Elbe duchies by Denmark. As e a r l y as 1861 B r i t i s h concerns were v o i c e d r e g a r d i n g the r e a c t i o n of France to P r u s s i a n I n t e r f e r e n c e In Schleswlg-H o l s t e l n . The E a r l of Ellenborough Cwho, I r o n i c a l l y , was to become one of the most v o c i f e r o u s defenders of Denmark) commented In the House of Lords that the German Confederation's demands In the duchies r a i s e d the p o s s i b i l i t y of a French a t t a c k on P r u s s i a . His p r o p h e t i c advice was, " l e t [ P r u s s i a ] not provoke h o s t i l i t i e s , l e t her wait t i l l she Is attacked, and then l e t her r a l l y around her the whole of Germany In defense of r i g h t . " Were P r u s s i a to a t t a c k Denmark f i r s t , she might w e l l have been " p e r i l l i n g her own e x i s t e n c e . " 6 9 Amidst both the Danish monarchy's attempts g r a d u a l l y to separate Schleswlg from H o l s t e l n Ca v i o l a t i o n of the 1852 agreement), and repeated t h r e a t s of f e d e r a l e x ecution, the B r i t i s h government proposed s e v e r a l d i f f e r e n t s o l u t i o n s to the problem In the duchies In the hopes of p r e v e n t i n g j u s t such a s i t u a t i o n from occurring. 6' 5' Such proposals were r e j e c t e d by both the German D i e t and the Danes, the l a t t e r of whom exacerbated the s i t u a t i o n with the Patent of 30 March 1863 c a l l i n g f o r the I n c o r p o r a t i o n of Schleswlg Into the Danish s t a t e . Meanwhile, In response to o p p o s i t i o n claims that a l l d i f f i c u l t i e s would " v a n i s h " I f the B r i t i s h government, In c o n j u n c t i o n with France, l e t l t be d i s t i n c t l y understood that they would not permit a German Invasion of Denmark, R u s s e l l argued: "I am sure that the best p o s i t i o n f o r the E n g l i s h Government to h o l d i s to maintain and adhere to t r e a t i e s t h at have been made, and not to advance on t h i s dangerous and q u e s t i o n a b l e path of denying to Germany those r i g h t s which f a i r l y belong to her." 7" 0 Hence the government's aim, which was to preserve peace and s t a b i l i t y In c e n t r a l Europe, appeared to be threatened on a l l s i d e s - by the o b s t i n a c y of the Danes, by the growing n a t i o n a l i s t f e r v o u r In Germany, and by Napoleon I l l ' s d e s i r e f o r aggrandizement on the Rh1ne. Palmerston's unfortunate Commons speech of 23 J u l y 1863, In which he d e c l a r e d that anyone attempting a v i o l e n t overthrow of Danish r i g h t s and independence would f i n d t h a t " l t would not be Denmark alone with which they would have to contend," can perhaps be b e t t e r understood In l i g h t of correspondence r e c e i v e d and d i s p a t c h e d by the F o r e i g n O f f i c e around the same time. 7' 1 On 19 J u l y the Swedish F o r e i g n M i n i s t e r had Informed London that h i s government would f e e l Impelled to provide Denmark with a s s i s t a n c e In the face of f e d e r a l e x ecution, and he urged the same course of a c t i o n on England and F r a n c e . 7 2 Moreover, R u s s e l l wrote to h i s ambassador In Vienna on the 29th and t o l d him to inform the A u s t r i a n F o r e i g n M i n i s t e r not o n l y of Sweden's apparent w i l l i n g n e s s to a c t i v e l y support Denmark, but more Importantly, that f e d e r a l e x ecution might w e l l Induce France to Intervene: "Such a p r e t e n s i o n might be as dangerous to the  Independence and i n t e g r i t y of Germany as the Invasion of Schleswlg might be to the Independence and I n t e g r i t y of Denmark." 7 3 [Emphasis mine] Hence l t Is p o s s i b l e that Palmerston's words, r a t h e r than t h r e a t e n i n g B r i t i s h i n t e r v e n t i o n In the d i s p u t e , were i n s t e a d meant to warn the German powers of the growing p o s s i b i l i t y of I n t e r v e n t i o n from some other q u a r t e r . In the time between Palmerston's speech and the P r u s s i a n and A u s t r i a n Invasion of the duchies on 24 January 1864, the B r i t i s h government worked c o n s i s t e n t l y to avert the outbreak of h o s t i l i t i e s , both by u r g i n g the Danish k i n g to abrogate the c o n s t i t u t i o n which so offended German n a t i o n a l i s t s , and by t r y i n g to convince the F e d e r a l Diet to stop I t s s a b r e - r a t t l i n g . Palmerston remained convinced that the problem was "capable of amicable adjustment," but he was caught between the pro-German sentiments of the Queen, and B r i t i s h p u b l i c o p i n i o n , which was s t r o n g l y pro-Danish. 7'* R u s s e l l , on the other hand, was not q u i t e so pragmatic; alarmed by the sentiments being expressed throughout the country, he thought l t best to remind the Queen that any surrender of Denmark's I n t e g r i t y would be h i g h l y unpopular, and that l t would be impossible f o r her government to "consent to a German occupation of Schleswlg."^^ There was, however, a b i g d i f f e r e n c e between w i t h h o l d i n g "consent" f o r such an Invasion, and a c t u a l l y t a k i n g a c t i o n to reverse I t . Moreover, both the government and the crown were In agreement that a r e a l danger e x i s t e d of Napoleon III u s i n g the d i s p u t e over the duchies as a means of a g g r a n d i z i n g France, and thus the government's o f f i c i a l p o s i t i o n was that they had no immediate I n t e r e s t i n the S c h l e s w l g - H o l s t e i n d i s p u t e , and that t h e i r I n t e r e s t was "bound up with the general I n t e r e s t of Europe," as Indeed l t was. 7 4 s 52 The German Invasion of the duchies, which P r u s s i a J u s t i f i e d by p o i n t i n g to the c o n s t i t u t i o n of 18 November as Denmark's "formal and f i n a l v i o l a t i o n " of the 1852 London Treaty, d i d not s e r i o u s l y a l t e r the B r i t i s h government's p o s i t i o n , as l t was f e l t t h a t both s i d e s would now be prepared to n e g o t l a t e . ^ R u s s e l l , who b e l i e v e d that a s l i g h t push might be necessary to I n i t i a t e such n e g o t i a t i o n s , suggested a J o i n t Anglo-French o f f e r of mediation which, I f r e f u s e d , would be fo l l o w e d by the d i s p a t c h of a B r i t i s h squadron to Copenhagen, and a French army contingent to the Rhenish border. Palmerston's response to t h i s s uggestion Is c h a r a c t e r i s t i c of h i s a t t i t u d e throughout the di s p u t e , and l t demonstrates how, u n l i k e h i s more e n t h u s i a s t i c F o r e i g n S e c r e t a r y , he r e f u s e d to l e t p r i n c i p l e s o v e r r i d e h i s concern f o r the s t a b i l i z i n g p o s i t i o n which P r u s s i a h e l d In Europe: I share f u l l y your I n d i g n a t i o n . The conduct of A u s t r i a and P r u s s i a Is d i s c r e d i t a b l y bad, and one or both of them w i l l s u f f e r f o r It before these matters are s e t t l e d . I r a t h e r doubt, however, the expediency of t a k i n g at the present moment the steps p r o p o s e d . . . . [ I ] t might not be a d v i s a b l e nor f o r our own I n t e r e s t to suggest to France an a t t a c k upon the P r u s s i a n Rhenish t e r r i t o r y . It would serve P r u s s i a r i g h t I f such an a t t a c k were made; and I f P r u s s i a remains In the wrong we c o u l d not take p a r t with her a g a i n s t France. But the conquest of t h a t t e r r i t o r y by France would  be an e v i l f o r us, and would s e r i o u s l y a f f e c t the p o s i t i o n of Holland and Belgium. 7'' 9 [Emphasis mine] With the c r o s s i n g of a P r u s s i a n detachment Into J u t l a n d , and rumours t h a t an A u s t r i a n f l e e t on i t s way to Copenhagen would s a i l past the shores of Great B r i t a i n , t e n s i o n s In England rose c o n s i d e r a b l y . Once again the Queen urged moderation, R u s s e l l urged Anglo-French mediation, while Palmerston doubted that A u s t r i a and P r u s s i a a c t u a l l y Intended to a t t a c k Copenhagen. He was i n s t e a d concerned with the a t t i t u d e o f the French emperor who he b e l i e v e d was keeping h i m s e l f f r e e from engagements "to be enabled e i t h e r to s e i z e the Rhenish provinces of P r u s s i a , or to occupy the P a l a t i n a t e of B a v a r i a , or to put hi m s e l f at the head of a Confederacy o f the Rhine," a l l of these schemes and others needing o n l y the r i g h t circumstances to be Implemented.7"'* In the face of England, France and Russia's I n a b i l i t y to agree on any other common course of a c t i o n , a peace conference was c a l l e d f o r 25 A p r i l . In parliament l t was argued that the government should take steps, such as d i s p a t c h i n g a B r i t i s h f l e e t to the B a l t i c , to reduce the p o s s i b i l i t y of t h i s conference being u n s u c c e s s f u l , which c o u l d o n l y "menace the general t r a n q u i l l i t y of Europe" Ca sentiment which a n t i c i p a t e d D i s r a e l i ' s censure three months l a t e r of the government's p o l i c y ) . The government responded that such an a c t i o n would run c o n t r a r y to t h e i r I n t e n t i o n of e n t e r i n g the conference "not as p a r t i s a n s o f one side or the other, but I m p a r t i a l l y . " Above a l l the government wished "the balance of power In Europe to be maintained, and the r i g h t s of a l l the p a r t i e s p r e s e r v e d . " 5 9 0 H o s t i l i t i e s were t e m p o r a r i l y suspended, and on 20 A p r i l the conference o f f i c i a l l y opened In London. It was q u i c k l y agreed that the 1852 settlement had to be abandoned as a b a s i s f o r d i s c u s s i o n s at the conference, and the B r i t i s h c a b i n e t t h e r e f o r e began to e n t e r t a i n proposals f o r the p a r t i t i o n of the duchies. But Bismarck's d u p l i c i t y , as w e l l as h i s o p p o s i t i o n to the B r i t i s h government's proposals prevented any progress from being made, which prompted R u s s e l l to agree to the Queen's suggestion that she write to King W i l l i a m and encourage him to moderate h i s demands. S 1 T h i s proved i n e f f e c t i v e , however, and l t soon appeared p o s s i b l e that the conference would Indeed break up and h o s t i l i t i e s be resumed. This In t u r n induced R u s s e l l to renew once again h i s demands that the c a b i n e t o f f e r England's a s s i s t a n c e to Denmark, with or without the c o o p e r a t i o n of the French. But i n the days l e a d i n g up the 24 June c a b i n e t meeting In which England's f u t u r e p o l i c y was to be determined, Napoleon III suddenly appeared overanxious f o r an Anglo-French understanding, which heightened B r i t i s h s u s p i c i o n s . A f t e r meeting with the French f o r e i g n m i n i s t e r , Cowley r e p o r t e d : "The upshot Is that h i s Majesty wishes to t u r n present circumstances to account 1) to t u r n the A u s t r l a n s out of Venetla 2j to get a b i t of the Rhine. " e a He then wrote to Clarendon: " I t Is c l e a r , I t h i n k , that the French a l l i a n c e Is to be bought, but the p r i c e w i l l be perhaps more than l t Is w o r t h . " e 3 For Palmerston t h i s was simply a c o n f i r m a t i o n of f e a r s he had e n t e r t a i n e d throughout the d i s p u t e , and he t o l d a d e l i g h t e d Queen V i c t o r i a as much: "The g r e a t e s t danger he [Palmerston] saw from France J o i n i n g us was dragging us Into a war, In which she would c l a i m the Rhine, and p o s s i b l y r e v o l u t i o n i z e the whole of I t a l y . " 6 * * But even more s i g n i f i c a n t was the e f f e c t which France's v o l t e - f a c e had on R u s s e l l , who had p r e v i o u s l y been convinced that France's p a r t i c i p a t i o n was c r u c i a l to any attempt to come to the a i d of Denmark: "But then comes the q u e s t i o n , what w i l l France r e q u i r e as the p r i c e of her a l l i a n c e with England In checking the 55 ambition of Germany, and Is l t the I n t e r e s t of England to pay  that p r i c e ? " 9 5 [Emphasis mine] C l e a r l y the c a b i n e t f e l t t h a t l t was not, and on 24 June l t was decided that England would remain a l o o f from the h o s t i l i t i e s which were resumed almost Immediately. Within a month the Danes had surrendered, and by the T r e a t y of Vienna, signed In October 1864, they l e f t the duchies f o r P r u s s i a and A u s t r i a to f i g h t over. Ob v i o u s l y the above Is o n l y a small c r o s s e c t l o n of B r i t i s h p o l i c y d u r i n g the complicated S c h l e s w l g - H o l s t e l n d i s p u t e . However i t shows that B r i t i s h p o l i c y may not have been so I r r e s o l u t e as i s commonly b e l i e v e d , and that pragmatic concerns about the European balance, of which P r u s s i a was an I n t e g r a l p a r t , c o n s i s t e n t l y took precedence over a l l e l s e . Numerous other Important Issues, such as the p o s i t i o n of Russia In the d i s p u t e , the i n t e g r i t y and Independence of the Danish monarchy, and c o n t r o l over the entrance to the B a l t i c , a l l had t h e i r place In the f o r m u l a t i o n of B r i t i s h p o l i c y ; but i t was the p o s s i b l e consequences of a French a t t a c k on P r u s s i a which proved d e c i s i v e when l t came to d e c i d i n g whether or not England would oppose P r u s s i a and A u s t r i a ' s a c t i o n s In the duchies. Accusations that Palmerston's government had "lowered the J u s t i n f l u e n c e " of England i n the c o u n c i l s of Europe, thereby d i m i n i s h i n g the " s e c u r i t i e s f o r peace," and that v i c e and crime seemed now to " s t a l k unchallenged from one end of Europe to another," were a p r e d i c t a b l e e x p r e s s i o n s a t i s f y i n g the anger of some groups In B r i t i s h p u b l i c o p i n i o n , and were In f a c t to be repeated again and again by l a t e r h i s t o r i a n s . * 3 6 Nor was 56 Palmerston o b l i v i o u s to the s t a t e of B r i t i s h o p i n i o n r e g a r d i n g P r u s s i a In the wake of the war: " [ I ] f our good f r i e n d and neighbour at P a r i s were to take l t i n t o h i s head to deprive P r u s s i a of her Rhenish p r o v i n c e s , not a f i n g e r i n England would be s t i r r e d , nor a v o i c e r a i s e d , nor a man nor a s h i l l i n g voted to r e s i s t such r e t r i b u t i o n upon the P r u s s i a n l o n a r c h , ' " 3 7 But l t was j u s t such an a t t a c k which Palmerston had sought to a v e r t , as the h i g h l y dangerous consequences of French a g g r e s s i o n a g a i n s t P r u s s i a were more r e l e v a n t f o r England than P r u s s i a ' s a c t i o n s i n Denmark. The I l l i b e r a l m i n i s t r y i n B e r l i n had i n a d v e r t e n t l y been strengthened by having s u c c e s s f u l l y prosecuted the Danish war Cwhlch l a t e r encouraged Bismarck to c h a l l e n g e h i s l i b e r a l o p p o s i t i o n over the matter of army reform); Palmerston, however, was prepared to accept t h i s outcome f o r the sake of a wider European peace. Hence l t Is not s u r p r i s i n g to f i n d that In h i s l a s t l e t t e r on f o r e i g n a f f a i r s , a f t e r the duchies had been disposed of at Gasteln, Palmerston wrote the f o l l o w i n g : It was dishonest and unjust to deprive Denmark of S l e s w i g and H o l s t e i n . It Is another q u e s t i o n how those two Duchies, when separated from Denmark, can be disposed of f o r the best I n t e r e s t s of Europe. I should say t h a t , with that view, It Is b e t t e r that they should go to Increase the power of P r u s s i a than they should form another l i t t l e s t a t e to be added to the c l u s t e r of small bodies p o l i t i c which encumber Germany, and render It of l e s s f o r c e than l t ought to be In the g e n e r a l balance of power In the world. P r u s s i a Is too weak as she now Is ever to be honest and independent In her a c t i o n ; and with a view to the f u t u r e , l t i s d e s i r a b l e that Germany In the aggregate, should be strong, In order to c o n t r o l those two ambitious and a g g r e s s i v e powers, France and Russia..••[A] s t r o n g P r u s s i a Is e s s e n t i a l to German strength. 0 1" 3 If B r i t i s h statesmen had le a r n e d a n ything from the Danish war i t was t h a t , In the hands of Bismarck, P r u s s i a n diplomacy had taken on a whole new c h a r a c t e r , a f a c t which was d r i v e n home by the way he subsequently used the duchies as a means of provoking A u s t r i a i n the tug of war that ensued a f t e r the s i g n i n g of the T r e a t y of Vienna. However, Palmerston's complacency r e g a r d i n g Bismarck's conduct i n the duchies a f t e r the Danish war was not shared by a l l . As l t slo w l y became c l e a r d u r i n g 1865 that Bismarck Intended to annex the duchies, I r r e s p e c t i v e of the p o p u l a r i t y of A u s t r i a ' s p l a n to i n s t a l l Duke F r e d e r i c k of Augustenberg as t h e i r r u l e r , o b j e c t i o n s were r a i s e d i n the House of Commons that the "ambitious aggressions of P r u s s i a " t h r e a t e n the " t r a n q u i l l i t y of Europe." More s p e c i f i c a l l y , l t was f e l t t h a t Bismarck's aim was to "add the Duchies to the Kingdom [of P r u s s i a ] as a means of g a i n i n g p o p u l a r i t y f o r h i m s e l f , r e c o n c i l i n g the P r u s s i a n s to h i s r u l e , and d i v e r t i n g t h e i r a t t e n t i o n from home p o l i t i c s and c o n s t i t u t i o n a l privileges.*" 3' 5' Only Bismarck h i m s e l f c o u l d have s t a t e d t h i s more c l e a r l y . It soon became evident, however, that, d e s p i t e such p r o t e s t a t i o n s In parliament, few B r i t i s h statesmen were prepared to place the needs of the P r u s s i a n c o n s t i t u t i o n a l movement ahead of those of European s t a b i l i t y . The G a s t e l n convention, which appeared to have averted war by awarding H o l s t e l n to A u s t r i a and Schleswlg to P r u s s i a , appeared to be a step In the d i r e c t i o n of such s t a b i l i t y , but was nonetheless I n t e r p r e t e d i n d i f f e r e n t ways i n England. As we have seen, Palmerston thought that both of the duchies should have gone to P r u s s i a . Queen V i c t o r i a , on the other hand, f e l t t hat world o p i n i o n demanded that England l e t the German powers, 58 and P r u s s i a In p a r t i c u l a r , know how they f e l t about t h i s " I n i q u i t y " . ' 5 ' 0 The Queen no doubt f e a r e d the ch a l l e n g e which G a s t e l n represented to the p r i n c i p l e of l e g i t lmacy.<5'1 But the government's o n l y response was to be one of q u i e t , t a c t f u l d i s a p p r o v a l . Having Informed England's d i p l o m a t i c r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s abroad that the government c o n s i d e r e d the Ga s t e l n convention to be Inappropriate, the f o l l o w i n g d e l i c a t e l y - p h r a s e d c i r c u l a r memo was dispatched: T h i s i n s t r u c t i o n does not a u t h o r i z e you to address o b s e r v a t i o n s on t h i s subject to the Court to which you are a c c r e d i t e d , but Is Intended o n l y to p o i n t out, when the o p p o r t u n i t y s h a l l present i t s e l f , what i s the language you are expected to hold." 5' 2 With the G a s t e l n convention a f a i t accompli, and war ap p a r e n t l y averted, l i t t l e p r a c t i c a l good would have been served by B r i t i s h remonstrances a g a i n s t t h i s d i s p l a y of p o w e i — p o l i t i c s . But the " t r a n q u i l l i t y " which G a s t e l n had a f f o r d e d Europe proved to be s h o r t - l i v e d , and by the s p r i n g of 1865 R u s s e l l ' s new government, In which Clarendon was F o r e i g n S e c r e t a r y , once again faced the prospect of a German c i v i l war d i s r u p t i n g the peace of Europe. But while the aim of B r i t i s h p o l i c y remained the same -tha t of p r e s e r v i n g peace - the emphasis which Palmerston had for m e r l y p l a c e d on the s e c u r i t y of P r u s s i a was d r a m a t i c a l l y reduced as a r e s u l t of Clarendon's presence In the F o r e i g n O f f i c e In the p e r i o d l e a d i n g up to the outbreak of h o s t i l i t i e s In June. The new F o r e i g n S e c r e t a r y had l i t t l e sympathy f o r P r u s s i a i n the wake of the Danish war, p r i v a t e l y s t a t i n g that " i f she [ A u s t r i a ] c o u l d give the P r u s s i a n s a l i c k i n g , I am sure that 5 9 Europe would be glad."-** Nonetheless, Clarendon t r i e d to n i p the growing German problem In the bud by u n o f f i c i a l l y conveying to Bismarck, h i s concerns about P r u s s i a ' s c o n f r o n t a t i o n a l p o l i c y In the duchies. F e a r f u l that a German war would d i s r u p t the "present e q u i l i b r i u m of power," Clarendon wrote: S e t t i n g a s i d e f a m i l y t i e s , P r u s s i a Is the great P r o t e s t a n t Power of Europe, with which we n a t u r a l l y have kind r e d f e e l i n g s , and l t would be with deep r e g r e t that we should see her regarded as a common enemy, because a w i l f u l d i s t u r b e r of the peace of Europe; and s t i l l more I f , In the course of events, we found o u r s e l v e s compelled to take any part a g a i n s t h e r . . . . I t would r e f l e c t great c r e d i t upon P r u s s i a If before she went out In t h i s duel with A u s t r i a she v o l u n t e e r e d to place h e r s e l f In the hands of seconds upon whose I m p a r t i a l i t y she c o u l d rely."*** R u s s e l l too saw the p r e s e r v a t i o n of peace as England's p r i n c i p a l concern In the d i s p u t e , and that B r i t i s h p o l i c y was not " e i t h e r to put P r u s s i a In p o s s e s s i o n of t e r r i t o r i e s In the North of Germany not now belonging to her, or to look with favour upon her h u m i l i a t i o n . " But while he hoped to avoi d both of these two e v i l s by proposing t h a t the two duchies go to the Grand-Duke of Oldenburg, h i s proposal u n f o r t u n a t e l y Ignored the c l a i m s of Duke F r e d e r i c k of Augustenberg, which, a c c o r d i n g to Queen V i c t o r i a , were the " o n l y claims which accord with the wishes of the People of the Duchies.'""1 2' It would appear that In t h i s p a r t i c u l a r Instance V i c t o r i a ' s Idealism o v e r r u l e d the Prime M i n i s t e r ' s pragmatism. Nonetheless, Queen V i c t o r i a was anxious to o f f e r B r i t i s h mediation i n the d i s p u t e . But as she made c l e a r In her correspondence with the Crown P r i n c e of P r u s s i a , the course pursued by Bismarck made l t extremely d i f f i c u l t f o r the B r i t i s h government to o f f e r such mediation: "I must say, as much as I 60 should lament war between P r u s s i a and A u s t r i a , I should g r i e v e s t i l l more If my government made themselves p a r t i e s . . . t o so gross a v i o l a t i o n of a l l the p r i n c i p l e s on which we p r i d e o u r s e l v e s In England, as the v i o l e n t annexation of the duchies to P r u s s i a . '"^^ Upon being informed by the Prime M i n i s t e r that the government would not " g i v e any advice, or i n t e r f e r e with P r u s s i a i n any way" while Bismarck, was the M i n i s t e r of the King, V i c t o r i a decided to make one l a s t e f f o r t , w r i t i n g d i r e c t l y to the P r u s s i a n king, and a d v i s i n g him t h a t , Indeed, he was being deceived and dishonoured by the r e c k l e s s n e s s of "one man" whose a c t i o n s threatened to plunge Germany Into a f r a t l c l d a l w a r . 9 7 But now l t was V i c t o r i a ' s t u r n to be r e b u f f e d , as the c a b i n e t , concerned about the consequences of a P r u s s i a n r e f u s a l of England',s o f f e r of mediation, d e c l a r e d the German q u a r r e l to be one In which " n e i t h e r E n g l i s h honour nor E n g l i s h I n t e r e s t s are c o n c e r n e d . " 9 8 T h i s , of course, was not e n t i r e l y t r u e , f o r the c a b i n e t r e c o g n i z e d that a German war c o u l d w e l l r e s u l t In a r e l a t i v e Increase In the s t r e n g t h of France, thereupon encouraging Napoleon III to reap some advantage. But u n l i k e h i s predecessor, Clarendon does not appear to have been concerned about French designs on P r u s s i a . In c o n v i n c i n g the ca b i n e t of the need f o r England to remain a l o o f from the German q u a r r e l , the F o r e i g n S e c r e t a r y argued that the " m i l i t a r y and pecuniary resources of England" had to be c a r e f u l l y managed. Not o n l y was t h i s necessary because of the s t a t e of I r e l a n d , but a l s o , as he Informed Cowley: "Our great care must be f o r Belgium and our resources of a l l kinds must be husbanded f o r f u l f i l l i n g our T r e a t y engagements r e s p e c t i n g that Country. "•s"* Xo f u r t h e r t h i s end, Clarendon even l e n t h i s support to French n e g o t i a t i o n s with A u s t r i a and I t a l y , which were aimed at the I s o l a t i o n of P r u s s i a , hoping perhaps thereby to c o n t r i b u t e to a P r u s s i a n " l i c k i n g " . C l e a r l y , Clarendon had h i s own Ideas about P r u s s i a ' s place In the European balance, and they were d i s t i n c t l y d i f f e r e n t from those of Palmerston. Clarendon had r e s i g n e d h i m s e l f to the f a c t of a German war being fought over the s p o i l s of 1864, hoping o n l y t h a t i t be c o n f i n e d to Germany. However, when questioned In parliament about B r i t i s h o f f e r s of mediation, the F o r e i g n S e c r e t a r y promptly assumed a proper l i b e r a l a t t i t u d e and responded thus: [W]e have stood alone, and alone we c o u l d do n o t h i n g a g a i n s t the d e t e r m i n a t i o n t h a t war was...the most e f f e c t i v e means of g i v i n g e f f e c t to an ambitious p o l I c y . . . . More than a m i l l i o n men are now armed and prepared f o r c o n f l i c t . And I must say that It Is a melancholy s i g h t In t h i s e n l i g h t e n e d age, and the present s t a t e of c i v i l i s a t i o n and progress, that Europe should even be menaced with a war f o r which no casus b e l l i can be s a i d to e x i s t . 1 0 0 As would be the case four years l a t e r f o l l o w i n g the outbreak of the F r a n c o - P r u s s i a n war, some people argued.in 1866 that "a l i t t l e e n e r g e t i c language from London" would have prevented the war between P r u s s i a and A u s t r i a . 1 0 1 In the mind of the P r u s s i a n Crown P r i n c e s s there was no doubt that a " l i b e r a l , German-feeling, reasonable P r u s s i a n government would have prevented l t a l l ! " ; although no such government was to be found in o f f i c e In B e r l i n p r i o r to the outbreak of h o s t i l i t i e s , the circumstances immediately p r e c e d i n g the war d i d appear p r o p i t i o u s f o r Bismarck's r e m o v a l . 1 0 2 B r i t i s h d i p l o m a t i c sources In Germany had Informed Clarendon d u r i n g the s p r i n g of 1866 that the q u e s t i o n of war with A u s t r i a was d e c i s i v e f o r Bismarck's f u t u r e . And more encouraging s t i l l was the warm r e c e p t i o n King W i l l i a m a f f o r d e d to both the B r i t i s h ambassador's and Queen V i c t o r i a ' s recommendations f o r peace, prompting the Crown P r i n c e s s to w r i t e : "You again, dearest Mama, may be the means of a v e r t i n g a European c o n f l a g r a t i o n . " 1 0 3 Indeed, there was even a l a s t minute e f f o r t made by the Queen's brother—In-law, the Duke of Coburg, to d r i v e a wedge between King W i l l i a m and Bismarck. However t h i s attempted I n t e r v e n t i o n on the part of the B r i t i s h r o y a l f a m i l y was rendered i n e f f e c t i v e by Clarendon, who was r e s e n t f u l of such " r o y a l diplomacy," and who t h e r e f o r e discouraged the Queen's p a r t i c i p a t i o n . The poi n t here Is not to show that England c o u l d have brought about Bismarck's d i s m i s s a l and thereby a v e r t e d the A u s t r o - P r u s s l a n war; t h i s k i n d of w i s h f u l t h i n k i n g t e l l s us n o t h i n g about the events which a c t u a l l y t r a n s p i r e d . What Is evident here, however, Is that the course pursued by Clarendon produced r e s u l t s which were c o n s i s t e n t with previous B r i t i s h p o l i c y r e g a r d i n g P r u s s i a . The f a c t that Clarendon harboured a s t r o n g d i s l i k e f o r P r u s s i a , and that p e r s o n a l f e e l i n g s had Induced him to r e s t r a i n the Queen Is I r r e l e v a n t Calthough not a l i t t l e I r o n i c ) . What Is Important Is that Clarendon's a c t i o n s , l i k e Palmerston's d u r i n g the Danish war, helped to remove p o t e n t i a l o b s t a c l e s from Bismarck's path, and thereby c o n t r i b u t e d to the favourable I n t e r n a t i o n a l s i t u a t i o n e x i s t i n g at the time when h o s t i l i t i e s between P r u s s i a and A u s t r i a commenced. 63 Soon a f t e r the outbreak, of war i n June 1866 there took place i n England not o n l y a change of government, but a l s o a s h i f t i n focus with regards to German a f f a i r s , as anger at Bismarck's I n i q u i t i e s gave way to concerns about the f u t u r e of Germany i t s e l f . By the time the new F o r e i g n S e c r e t a r y , Lord S t a n l e y , made h i s f i r s t p o l i c y statement on the c o n f l i c t , s t a t i n g t h a t he Intended to maintain "a s t r i c t and I m p a r t i a l n e u t r a l i t y between a l l the contending p a r t i e s , " the war was a l r e a d y decided, the most c r u c i a l b a t t l e having been fought at Konlggratz a week e a r l i e r . 1 0 * But as the magnitude of P r u s s i a ' s v i c t o r y became apparent, there took place a remarkable t r a n s f o r m a t i o n amongst B r i t i s h policy-makers, who now saw that P r u s s i a was In a p o s i t i o n to r e o r g a n i z e Germany. As S t a n l e y s u c c i n c t l y s t a t e d : "We must make up our minds to c o n s i d e r P r u s s i a as a l e a d i n g - perhaps as the l e a d i n g - m i l i t a r y power of E u r o p e . " 1 0 X 3 The I m p l i c a t i o n s of t h i s were not l o s t on e i t h e r the B r i t i s h government, or the B r i t i s h crown. In parliament both the o p p o s i t i o n and the government q u i c k l y a d j u s t e d to the p o s s i b i l i t y of there coming Into e x i s t e n c e a u n i t e d Germany from which A u s t r i a would be excluded. Noteworthy Is the I d e a l i s t i c tone which was adopted to express these sentiments. No longer bent p l u n g i n g Europe Into war, the Germans were d e s c r i b e d by one l i b e r a l M.P. as " l i k e o u r s e l v e s a sober and p e a c e - l o v i n g people, and, however w a r l i k e on a great o c c a s i o n , more l i k e l y to prosecute the p u r s u i t of p e a c e f u l Industry than of g r a s p i n g ambition." C o n j u r i n g up v i s i o n s of P r u s s i a at the head of a u n i t e d Germany, W i l l i a m Horsman spoke i 64 of an " I n t e l l e c t u a l and a s p i r i n g n a t i o n , awaking from a long l e t h a r g y , and working out i t s p o l i t i c a l freedom with new n a t i o n a l l i f e , a great new power In Europe, and a guarantee f o r the peace of Europe. This Is the consummation to be d e s i r e d by the E n g l i s h m i n i s t r y . " Even Gladstone, d e s p i t e h i s deep-seated s u s p i c i o n of Bismarck, endorsed the Idea of a P r u s s i a n - l e d u n i f i c a t i o n of Germany: Germany c o n t a i n s the most numerous race In Europe; one of the most I n t e l l i g e n t , and perhaps the most I n t e l l e c t u a l - a race u n i t e d by I t s j u x t a p o s i t i o n , famous In h i s t o r y , having t r a d i t i o n s i n f e r i o r to those of no other p e o p l e . . . . I t may be p o s s i b l e when the r i v a l r y In Germany Is at an end there may be e s t a b l i s h e d between Prussla...and the Minor s t a t e s such r e l a t i o n s as w i l l do J u s t i c e to these S t a t e s , and give Germany her proper p o s i t i o n In Europe. That, I t h i n k , i s the problem to be s e t t l e d In Germany; and we should not by a c t , or even by word, o f f e r any o b s t a c l e to the s o l u t i o n of t h a t problem. 10'--Nor was l t the government's I n t e n t i o n to oppose such a s o l u t i o n . S t a n l e y ' s p o s i t i o n on the new s i t u a t i o n was c l e a r , and was c o n s i s t e n t with B r i t i s h p o l i c y In the past: "What harm co u l d a u n i t e d Germany do us?" he a s k e d . 1 0 7 And t h i s , of course, accorded f u l l y with the views of the Queen, who asked o n l y that the government not "appear u t t e r l y I n d i f f e r e n t to what passes In Germany," the e f f e c t of such I n d i f f e r e n c e perhaps being " i n j u r i o u s to the p o s i t i o n and Influence of England." True to the memory of the P r i n c e Consort, V i c t o r i a d e c l a r e d t h a t , "A strong, u n i t e d , l i b e r a l Germany would be a most u s e f u l a l l y to E n g l a n d . " 1 0 0 A l l of t h i s , of course, Ignored the f a c t t h a t P r u s s i a ' s v i c t o r y over A u s t r i a , the d i s s o l u t i o n of the Germanic Conf e d e r a t i o n , and the establishment of the North German C o n f e d e r a t i o n had o n l y strengthened Bismarck's p o s i t i o n i n P r u s s i a , with no c o r r e s p o n d i n g advance being made towards l i b e r a l c o n s t i t u t i o n a l government i n that country. The v e r d i c t of the B a t t l e of Koniggratz, t h e r e f o r e , appears to have had the same e f f e c t on the B r i t i s h as l t d i d on the N a t i o n a l L i b e r a l s In P r u s s i a - that of r e c o n c i l i n g them to a Blsmarcklan s o l u t i o n to the German problem. Derby's government continued to demonstrate a Palmerstonlan-1Ike concern f o r P r u s s i a d u r i n g t h e i r h a n d l i n g of the Luxembourg c r i s i s In 1867 Cwhlch n e a r l y r e s u l t e d In a F r a n c o - P r u s s i a n war as a r e s u l t of Napoleon I l l ' s attempts to a c q u i r e t h i s duchy). S t r e n u o u s l y u r g i n g moderation on Bismarck and the P r u s s i a n k i n g , and e v e n t u a l l y a g r e e i n g to a s o l u t i o n of the problem which allowed P r u s s i a to withdraw with honour and Belgium to escape unscathed, B r i t i s h p o l i c y throughout the d i s p u t e once again sought to preserve peace and s t a b i l i t y In c e n t r a l Europe as Germany continued to move In the d i r e c t i o n of u n i f i c a t i o n . 5 0 ' 3 ' Although " r i g i d l y I m p a r t i a l n e u t r a l i t y " was to be the p o l i c y pursued I f war were to break out, the B r i t i s h government a s s i d u o u s l y worked to prevent such an occurrence s i n c e i t was thought that war c o u l d o n l y damage the prospects f o r Germany's c o n s o l i d a t i o n , thereby a l s o damaging what were p e r c e i v e d to be B r i t i s h I n t e r e s t s on the c o n t i n e n t . E a r l y i n the c r i s i s , f o l l o w i n g P r u s s i a ' s h o s t i l e r e a c t i o n to France's o f f e r to purchase Luxembourg from the King of Holland, S t a n l e y claimed not to understand why England should act to prevent France from a c q u i r i n g the duchy when the government and the people of England had a l r e a d y acquiesced to, and even applauded P r u s s i a ' s own aggrandlzment the previous y e a r . 1 1 0 However, as the danger of war became more apparent, both the crown and the government took, a more a c t i v e part In attempting to r e s t r a i n P r u s s i a . Queen V i c t o r i a , In a l e t t e r to King W i l l i a m u r g i n g him to agree to withdraw the P r u s s i a n g a r r i s o n at Luxembourg In exchange f o r the French withdrawal of t h e i r o f f e r of purchase, claimed that the world would accuse P r u s s i a of d e s i r i n g war i f the French request was d e n i e d . 1 1 1 S t a n l e y o f f e r e d the same advice to Bismarck, c l a i m i n g t h a t , "Her Majesty's Government would see with deep r e g r e t the b r e a k i n g out of a war, f o r an o b j e c t a p p a r e n t l y so t r i f l i n g , which c o u l d not  but r e t a r d the c o n s o l i d a t i o n of Germany." 1 1 2 [Emphasis mine] Hence while the B r i t i s h government c l e a r l y a n t i c i p a t e d and welcomed the impending u n i f i c a t i o n of Germany, they sought through t h e i r p o l i c i e s to hinder, I f p o s s i b l e , any rash e x p l o s i v e P r u s s i a n p o l i c i e s p o t e n t i a l l y d e l e t e r i o u s to t h i s g o a l . Thus, In the hopes of a v e r t i n g war, a conference was c a l l e d In London In June, whereupon i t was proposed that Luxembourg's Independence be preserved by means of a c o l l e c t i v e guarantee. But since such a guarantee would contravene the government's d e c l a r e d p o l i c y of n o n - i n t e r v e n t i o n , the Idea met with s t r o n g o p p o s i t i o n , S t a n l e y h i m s e l f having doubts about the wisdom of such a commitment. 1 1 3 However, bowing to pressure from the Prime M i n i s t e r and the Queen, S t a n l e y agreed to the proposed guarantee. Though he was aware that the agreement In q u e s t i o n was flawed and that Luxembourg's Independence was not any more secure as a r e s u l t , S t a n l e y agreed to the c o l l e c t i v e guarantee nonetheless since l t helped to defuse the s i t u a t i o n , and permitted P r u s s i a to withdraw without backing down. 1 1* S a t i s f i e d with t h i s r e s u l t , S t a n l e y wrote In h i s J o u r n a l : "We have ave r t e d war here f o r the moment - f o r the year I t h i n k c e r t a i n l y . " 1 1 2 5 And In the House of Commons he sought to provide assurances that war was even more u n l i k e l y now, and that P r u s s i a h e r s e l f was the best guarantee of t h i s : What P r u s s i a r e a l l y wants Is time and repose to secure her a c q u i s i t i o n s , to c o n s o l i d a t e the t e r r i t o r y she has obtained, to a s s i m i l a t e the laws and i n s t i t u t i o n s of her newly-gained pr o v i n c e s , and to fuse the whole of that newly-acquired country Into one homogenous whole. A l l that war c o u l d do f o r P r u s s i a would be to give an o p p o r t u n i t y f o r p l o t s and c o n s p i r a c i e s of a r e a c t i o n a r y n a t u r e . . . f o r attempts to undo what has been d o n e . 1 1 6 S t a n l e y ' s words seemed to be borne out by the p e r i o d of r e l a t i v e calm i n Anglo-Prussian r e l a t i o n s t h at f o l l o w e d the Luxembourg c r i s i s . Although Queen V i c t o r i a was f e a r f u l that the appointment of Clarendon as F o r e i g n S e c r e t a r y In Gladstone's new m i n i s t r y "would have a bad e f f e c t at B e r l i n , where h i s o p i n i o n s are w e l l known as h o s t i l e to Germany," Clarendon a l l a y e d the Queen's f e a r s by meeting with the King and Queen of P r u s s i a , whereupon he r e c e i v e d assurances t h a t P r u s s i a would be " c a r e f u l not to give o f f e n c e and very slow to take i t . " 1 1 7 The prospects of war appeared to be d i m i n i s h e d even f u r t h e r by Napoleon I l l ' s suggestions t h a t a European peace conference be held, and by growing t a l k of European disarmament. 1 1® It was Into t h i s p e a c e f u l atmosphere that the news of the Hohenzollern candidature f o r the Spanish throne f e l l l i k e a bomb. 68 In examining B r i t i s h p o l i c y and the Fran c o - P r u s s i a n war, one of the p r i n c i p a l q uestions r a i s e d Is: c o u l d England have prevented the outbreak, of h o s t i l i t i e s ? Although Mosse has argued that "no a c t i o n p s y c h o l o g i c a l l y or c o n s t i t u t i o n a l l y open to B r i t i s h m i n i s t e r s " c o u l d have averted t h i s war between France and P r u s s i a , many people at the time b e l i e v e d o t h e r w i s e . 1 1 ' " H i s t o r i c a l l y , however, l t Is p o i n t l e s s to ask whether or not England c o u l d have prevented the war; the f a c t of the matter i s the war was not prevented. What should Instead be examined Is the B r i t i s h government's a c t u a l response to the t h r e a t of war, which can then be compared with a l t e r n a t i v e courses of a c t i o n . The p o i n t here Is not to argue that England should have pursued a d i f f e r e n t course than i t d i d , or that war would have been ave r t e d had England done so. But by e v a l u t l n g England's a c t i o n s i n l i g h t of the a l t e r n a t i v e courses of a c t i o n s a v a i l a b l e to policy-makers at the time, c e r t a i n Important questions are r a i s e d r e g a r d i n g those p o l i c i e s that were a c t u a l l y Implemented -p o l i c i e s which, at f i r s t glance, appear to be I n c o n s i s t e n t with those p r e v i o u s l y pursued by B r i t i s h statesmen. The B r i t i s h government f i r s t l e arned of the Hohenzollern candidature i n March 1870 when the Crown P r i n c e s s of P r u s s i a , at the request of King W i l l i a m , wrote to her mother f o r advice on the s u b j e c t . 1 2 0 Although Clarendon ventured the o p i n i o n that "the proposed arrangement would produce an unfavourable impression In France," h i s advice to the Queen was that " l t would not be expedient f o r Your Majesty to give any advice upon a matter In which no B r i t i s h I n t e r e s t Is c o n c e r n e d . " 1 2 1 Four months passed, however, before news of the candidature broke i n P a r i s , producing a v i o l e n t r e a c t i o n In the French chamber, and Inducing G r a n v i l l e , who had succeeded Clarendon upon the l a t t e r ' s death, to urge that the "French government avoid a c t i n g with p r e c i p i t a t i o n . " G r a n v i l l e a l s o a dvised the a p p l i c a t i o n of " f r i e n d l y pressure, without any appearance of d i c t a t i o n , on the Governments of P r u s s i a and Spain, to Induce them s e r i o u s l y to c o n s i d e r the q u e s t i o n at issue i n a l l i t s Important bearings . " 1 5 a a Events began to move q u i c k l y a f t e r t h i s , as the P r u s s i a n withdrawal of the candidature and the P r u s s i a n king's encounter with the French Ambassador at Ems l e d to the p u b l i c a t i o n of the famous Ems telegram on 13 J u l y . By now the B r i t i s h government r e a l i s e d t h a t l i t t l e c o u l d be done to r e s t r a i n the two b e l l i g e r e n t s , and l t began to look Instead to the consequences of the Impending war. Gladstone was a f r a i d t h a t p r e s e r v i n g B r i t i s h n e u t r a l i t y i n such a war would be "a most arduous task", given the v u l n e r a b i l i t y of Belgium, and thus he began to i n q u i r e as to England's a b i l i t y to t r a n s p o r t troops to Antwerp on very short n o t i c e . 1 2 3 In the parliament, however, both Gladstone and G r a n v i l l e r e f r a i n e d from commenting, while from the o p p o s i t i o n bench D i s r a e l i condemned the a c t i o n s of the French government, and claimed, somewhat dubiously, that " n e i t h e r France nor P r u s s i a has a moral r i g h t to enter Into any war without f u l l y and r e a l l y c o n s u l t i n g Great B r i t a i n . " 1 2 * On 18 J u l y G r a n v i l l e made one l a s t e f f o r t to o f f e r P r u s s i a the s e r v i c e s of B r i t i s h mediation, but they were r e f u s e d on the grounds t h a t any n e g o t i a t i o n s at t h i s p o i n t would be "misunderstood by the n a t i o n a l f e e l i n g s of Germany, e x c i t e d as they have been by the menaces of France." 1 2' 2 5 France d e c l a r e d war on P r u s s i a the next day. It i s p o s s i b l e to i d e n t i f y two occasions upon which the B r i t i s h government chose a p o l i c y of I n a c t i o n r a t h e r than p u r s u i n g more a c t i v e p o l i c i e s aimed at the p r e s e r v a t i o n of peace. The f i r s t of these was In March when the government f i r s t l e a r n e d of the Hohenzollern candidature, and F o r e i g n S e c r e t a r y Clarendon asked the Queen to r e f r a i n from o f f e r i n g the P r u s s i a n k i n g any advice on the s u b j e c t , d e s p i t e W i l l i a m ' s request f o r such a d v i c e . We can o n l y surmise that Clarendon e i t h e r d i d not comprehend the i m p l i c a t i o n s of the Hohenzollern candidature Cwhlch Is u n l i k e l y ) , or that h i s d i s l i k e f o r " r o y a l diplomacy" Induced him to Immediately d i s c o n t i n u e the Queen's i n t e r v e n t i o n In t h i s Important m a t t e r . 1 2 6 The second o c c a s i o n arose f o l l o w i n g P r u s s i a ' s withdrawal of the candidature, at which p o i n t the B r i t i s h government o f f e r e d to mediate i n the d i s p u t e , but r e f r a i n e d from more s t r e n u o u s l y u r g i n g the French government to accept the withdrawal. There are numerous p o s s i b l e e x p l a n a t i o n s f o r the B r i t i s h government's r e l u c t a n c e to apply g r e a t e r pressure to France In t h i s second ins t a n c e , the most obvious of these being the d e s i r e to remain I m p a r t i a l , the speed with which events unfolded, and/or f e a r of provoking Napoleon I I I , perhaps at the expense of Belgium. 1 2' 7 But I f we r e c a l l t h a t B r i t i s h policy-makers had endeavoured s i n c e 1848 to d e t e r P r u s s i a from war, and s i n c e 1863 In p a r t i c u l a r to prevent a French a t t a c k on P r u s s i a , t h i s apparent r e s i g n a t i o n to the f a c t of a Fran c o - P r u s s i a n war In J u l y 1870 becomes somewhat more p u z z l i n g . The composition of the c a b i n e t may have been a f a c t o r . The sympathies of the new F o r e i g n S e c r e t a r y l a y with France Calthough he was l e s s h o s t i l e to P r u s s i a than Clarendon), while Gladstone was more of an i d e a l i s t than were h i s predecessors, as would soon become evident In h i s r e a c t i o n to P r u s s i a ' s i n t e n t i o n to annex A l s a c e - L o r r a i n e . Another e x p l a n a t i o n , however, Is that confidence both i n P r u s s i a ' s a b i l i t y to withstand a French a t t a c k , and In the l i k e l i h o o d of German u n i t y being advanced In the process, enabled B r i t i s h policy-makers to accept with g r e a t e r complacency a Fr a n c o - P r u s s i a n c o n f l i c t , long thought to be I n e v i t a b l e . Although many T o r i e s and veterans of the Crimean c o n f l i c t were c o n f i d e n t o f a French v i c t o r y , the memory of P r u s s i a ' s impressive performance a g a i n s t A u s t r i a four years e a r l i e r was s t i l l s trong, thanks i n part to the e f f o r t s of w r i t e r s l i k e Edward Dicey who had r e p o r t e d g l o w i n g l y of P r u s s i a ' s v i c t o r y at the t i m e . 1 2 ® Moreover, when Bismarck had announced the e x i s t e n c e of P r u s s i a ' s d e f e n s i v e a l l i a n c e s with the south German s t a t e s In 1867., the government had responded p o s i t i v e l y , c l a i m i n g that l t was " g l a d In the I n t e r e s t o f European peace to hear of the union of Germany f o r de f e n s i v e purposes being e f f e c t e d . " 1 2 ' 5 ' T h i s Is not to suggest that the B r i t i s h government looked forward to a Fra n c o - P r u s s i a n war, f o r o b v i o u s l y t h i s was not the case. But given the I n t e r e s t which B r i t i s h policy-makers had h i t h e r t o taken In the q u e s t i o n of German u n i t y , the present government's w i l l i n g n e s s to avert a c o n f l i c t by i n t e r p o s i n g i t s e l f between I the two b e l l i g e r e n t s was probably d u l l e d by the knowledge that such a war might help to f a c i l i t a t e a r e s o l u t i o n to the German quest i o n , much l i k e the one e n v i s i o n e d by Lyndhurst almost a decade e a r l i e r . 1 3 0 Having r e f r a i n e d from a c t i v e l y attempting to prevent the war, the B r i t i s h government was c e r t a i n l y not about to take s i d e s once h o s t i l i t i e s began, and thus B r i t i s h n e u t r a l i t y was d e c l a r e d almost I m m e d i a t e l y . 1 3 1 Upon l e a r n i n g of B e n e d e t t l ' s infamous d r a f t t r e a t y , which the French ambassador had imprudently l e f t In the hands of Bismarck, the B r i t i s h government moved q u i c k l y to p r o t e c t Belgium, and t r e a t i e s g uaranteeing B e l g i a n n e u t r a l i t y were concluded with both France and P r u s s i a In August 1870. In an e f f o r t to f u r t h e r minimize the war's Impact, the B r i t i s h government encouraged the formation of a League of N e u t r a l s , which a l s o Included I t a l y and A u s t r i a . P r u s s i a ' s non-committal response to England's n e u t r a l i t y soon turned sour, however, amidst r e p o r t s that the B r i t i s h were h e l p i n g to supply the French army. This development prompted the f o l l o w i n g comment from S i r Robert Morler, a B r i t i s h diplomat with an " u n r i v a l l e d Intimacy with German p o l i t i c s " : "The copper capsule of a chassepot c a r t r i d g e engraved with the trademark of a Birmingham f i r m - should such, God f o r b i d , chance to be e x t r a c t e d In a German h o s p i t a l - might, In the present temper of men's minds, r a i s e a storm of n a t i o n a l v i n d i c t 1 v e n e s s In the German people which l t may take generations to a l l a y . " 1 3 2 Nor d i d the government deny the a c c u s a t i o n that England's a c t i o n s were a form of r e t a l i a t i o n f o r P r u s s i a ' s conduct i n the Crimean war; G r a n v i l l e simply r e p l i e d t h a t , u n l i k e P r u s s i a ' s e x p o r t a t i o n of arms 15 years e a r l i e r , England's was at l e a s t "open and u n d i s g u i s e d . " 1 3 3 France's c r u s h i n g defeat at Sedan on 2 September was Immediately f o l l o w e d by the capture of Napoleon III and the c o l l a p s e of the Second Empire, which l e d the B r i t i s h government to b e l i e v e that the war c o u l d now be ended more e a s i l y . These hopes soon evaporated, however, when Bismarck announced on 27 September t h a t the annexation of Alsace and L o r r a i n e was a n e c e s s i t y f o r P r u s s i a , which i n t u r n prompted the French P r o v i s i o n a l Government to c a r r y on the war i n the hopes of moderating P r u s s i a ' s demands. The B r i t i s h government's response to these demands - I t s l a s t major p o l i c y d e c i s i o n r e s p e c t i n g P r u s s i a p r i o r to the c r e a t i o n of the German Empire - would seem to confirm that l t was Indeed pragmatism r a t h e r than l i b e r a l Idealism which governed B r i t i s h p o l i c y d u r i n g t h i s p e r i o d , although the presence of Gladstone now threatened to change a l l of t h i s . Because the German press had been campaigning f o r the annexation of A l s a c e - L o r r a i n e s i n c e the beginning of the war, Bismarck's announcement d i d not c a t c h the B r i t i s h government e n t i r e l y by s u r p r i s e . Perhaps hoping to s o f t e n up the government In a n t i c i p a t i o n of P r u s s i a ' s demands, Queen V i c t o r i a Informed Gladstone on 9 September: The great danger f o r us In i n t e r f e r i n g Is to have the appearance of wishing to prevent Germany from making a l a s t i n g peace, and from o b t a i n i n g such s e c u r i t i e s from her [France] as may r e a l l y prevent the recurrence of a s i m i l a r war....A powerful Germany can never by dangerous to England but the very reverse and our great o b j e c t should t h e r e f o r e be to have her f r i e n d l y and c o r d i a l towards u s . 1 3 * Much to the Queen's d e l i g h t , t h i s was the very p o l i c y which the government Intended to f o l l o w upon l e a r n i n g of Bismarck's demands. The Prime M i n i s t e r , however, d i s a g r e e d with such a course of a c t i o n : " I t seems to me that Count Bismarck's paper r a i s e s q uestions of p u b l i c r i g h t , In which a l l Europe has a common I n t e r e s t , and l t would be Impossible f o r us to r e c e i v e In s i l e n c e matters r e l a t i n g to such q u e s t i o n s . " 1 3 3 Gladstone's moral I n d i g n a t i o n c o u l d o n l y be s a t i s f i e d by a B r i t i s h remonstrance, In c o n j u n c t i o n with Russia I f necessary, and he once again r e s o r t e d to w r i t i n g an anonymous a r t i c l e In the Edinburgh Review to help support t h i s p o s i t i o n . 1 3 6 In the c a b i n e t Gladstone's proposal was endorsed by George Goschen, who argued t h a t B r i t i s h o p p o s i t i o n to P r u s s i a ' s demands would possess three advantages: "CI!) being r i g h t and Just In I t s e l f ; C2) opening a moral campaign In Europe a g a i n s t Blsmarcklsm, m i l i t a r i s m , and r e t r o g r a d e p o l i t i c a l m o r a l i t y ; C 3 ) g i v i n g l e a d to o p i n i o n In t h i s country at a moment when everybody Is at sea, and grounding our a c t i o n and our sympathies not on p'reference f o r one of the combatants, but on p o l i t i c a l t r u t h . " 1 3 7 G r a n v i l l e , however, succeeded In' c o n v i n c i n g the c a b i n e t that l t would be impossible to do what Gladstone proposed "without being c o n s i d e r e d to throw our weight Into the French s c a l e a g a i n s t Germany." Above a l l , G r a n v i l l e was a f r a i d of "wasting t h a t which we at present d e r i v e from moral causes, by 75 l a y i n g down general p r i n c i p l e s when nobody w i l l a t t e n d them, and when i n a l l p r o b a b i l i t y they w i l l be d i s r e g a r d e d . " 1 3 6 ' Hence Gladstone was prevented from a c t i n g upon h i s l i b e r a l c o n v i c t i o n s , d e s p i t e the f a c t t h a t l t was o n l y moral pressure v i a d i p l o m a t i c channels t h a t he had suggested be a p p l i e d . Once again, t h e r e f o r e , a B r i t i s h p o l i c y of i n a c t i o n , born out of p o l i t i c a l expediency, helped to f a c i l i t a t e Bismarck's plans. C l e a r l y , the concerns expressed here by one l o n e l y i d e a l i s t In the B r i t i s h parliament had l i t t l e place- In the f o r m u l a t i o n of B r i t i s h p o l i c y : Whatever I f e e l about the German Government, I have too great a r e s p e c t and too great an esteem f o r the great mass of the German people not to wish to see them saved from the great I n j u r y which annexation would I n f l i c t upon themselves.... The annexation of the p r o v i n c e s no man can doubt w i l l prevent c o n s t i t u t i o n a l development In Germany. 1 3' s' A A A Not s u r p r i s i n g l y , the u n i f i c a t i o n of Germany In January 1871 brought f o r t h a wide v a r i e t y of responses In England, ra n g i n g from C a r l y l e ' s e f f u s i v e accolades to the ominous rumblings of D i s r a e l i . 1 * 0 But the f o l l o w i n g comments from John Corrance In the House of Commons are p a r t i c u l a r l y I n s t r u c t i v e with r e s p e c t to p e r c e p t i o n s of P r u s s i a i n England, and how the h i s t o r y of Anglo-Prussian r e l a t i o n s s i n c e 1848 had a f f e c t e d these p e r c e p t i o n s : I know that the great German people are both I n t e l l e c t u a l and peaceable; but I b e l i e v e the very c o n t r a r y to be true of the Prussians...Was [ P r u s s i a ] not a p a r t n e r i n the p a r t i t i o n of Poland? Was she not a p a r t n e r In the c o n s p i r a c y a g a i n s t Schleswig-HolsteIn? And i s she not at the present moment a determined candidate f o r the p o s s e s s i o n of Alsace and L o r r a i n e ? . . . Added to t h a t , when we f i n d t h a t she set h e r s e l f up as a great m i l i t a r y dynasty -76 Is not that a p o l i c y In u t t e r o p p o s i t i o n to the p r i n c i p l e s of the L i b e r a l p a r t y of t h i s country? What has been the c a r e e r of P r u s s i a s i n c e 1848? It has been one In d i r e c t antagonism to the c o n s t i t u t i o n a l i s m of Europe and Immediately to the c o n s t i t u t i o n of F r a n k f o r t . . . . Count Bismarck has suppressed a p o r t i o n of Denmark because he found i t too L i b e r a l In i t s p r i n c i p l e s . He has a l s o suppressed the Diet of F r a n k f o r t because l t was too L i b e r a l . Is l t l i k e l y t h a t he w i l l continue to t o l e r a t e S w i t z e r l a n d and H o l l a n d ? 1 * 1 As evidence of the growing r e a l i z a t i o n that perhaps a Germany u n i f i e d at the behest of P r u s s i a would t u r n out to be an a g g r e s s i v e e x p a n s i o n i s t European power - a development which was c e r t a i n l y not In the best I n t e r e s t s of England - these comments r e v e a l the c o n f u s i o n that was c r e a t e d by the d u a l i t y of B r i t i s h p o l i c i e s r e g a r d i n g P r u s s i a . O s t e n s i b l y , good r e l a t i o n s were sought with P r u s s i a because, among other t h i n g s , the purported p o l i t i c a l enlightenment of the P r u s s i a n people made P r u s s i a a " n a t u r a l a l l y " of England. However the v a r i o u s B r i t i s h governments' a c t u a l r e l a t i o n s with P r u s s i a d i d l i t t l e or nothing to strengthen the spokesmen f o r t h i s supposedly p o l i t i c a l l y e n l i g h t e n e d segment of P r u s s i a n s o c i e t y ; i . e . the P r u s s i a n l i b e r a l s . On the c o n t r a r y , l t was the e x i s t i n g a u t h o r i t i e s In P r u s s i a - the s t a t e and the monarchy - which appeared to have b e n e f i t e d most from the consequences of B r i t i s h p o l i c y s i n c e 1848. Couched In the language of l i b e r a l Idealism, but shaped almost e x c l u s i v e l y by Tory r e a l i s m , l t Is l i t t l e wonder then t h a t such p o l i c i e s were c r i t i c i z e d f o r t h e i r i n c o n s i s t e n c y . But what then were the a c t u a l goals of B r i t i s h p o l i c y with regard to P r u s s i a ? As we have seen, P r u s s i a ' s p o s i t i o n In c e n t r a l Europe was of preeminent concern to most B r i t i s h policy-makers d u r i n g t h i s p e r i o d , p a r t i c u l a r l y as the German q u e s t i o n loomed i n importance a f t e r 1848. Although B r i t i s h statesmen were predisposed, l a r g e l y by s t r a t e g i c c o n s i d e r a t i o n s , to favour the idea of German u n i f i c a t i o n , i d e a l i s t i c Ideas of s e e i n g P r u s s i a transformed Into a l i b e r a l c o n s t i t u t i o n a l s t a t e which would then take the l e a d In u n i f y i n g Germany Invoked memories of the d e s t a b i l i z i n g n a t i o n a l i s m and democratic extremism a s s o c i a t e d with 1848-49. B r i t i s h statesmen thus concluded t h a t the p r e s e r v a t i o n of p o l i t i c a l s t a b i l i t y In P r u s s i a - a goal best achieved a f t e r 1862 through adherence to n o n - i n t e r v e n t i o n - was the s a f e s t means of f a c i l i t a t i n g German u n i f i c a t i o n . A v o i d i n g d i s r u p t i o n s of the s t a t u s quo In P r u s s i a t h e r e f o r e l a y at the heart of B r i t i s h p o l i c y d u r i n g t h i s p e r i o d . The d i f f i c u l t y Involved i n determining the extent to which B r i t i s h p o l i c y d u r i n g t h i s p e r i o d a f f e c t e d P r u s s i a ' s l i b e r a l development stems from the I n s e p a r a b i l i t y of two strands i n n i n e t e e n t h c e n t u r y P r u s s i a n and German h i s t o r y ; i . e . the growing success, p a r t i c u l a r l y a f t e r 1862, of a s t a t e - c e n t e r e d , a u t h o r i t a r i a n , p a t e r n a l i s t i c p o l i t i c a l I d e a l , and the d e c l i n e and eventual e c l i p s e of the l i b e r a l one. Although no c l e a r and simple c a u s a l r e l a t i o n s h i p e x i s t s between these two processes, the breakaway of the N a t i o n a l L i b e r a l s i n 1867 Is c l e a r evidence that the d e c l i n i n g f o r t u n e s of the l a t t e r cannot be understood without r e f e r e n c e to the v i c t o r y of what might l o o s e l y be termed "Blsmarcklsm." Hence l t i s not s u f f i c i e n t to simply argue that B r i t i s h p o l i c y was i n c o n s e q u e n t i a l because England f a i l e d to more a c t i v e l y promote P r u s s i a ' s l i b e r a l development, In c o n t r a s t to t h e i r support of such goals In Greece and I t a l y . B r i t i s h policy-makers' r o l e i n s h e l t e r i n g P r u s s i a from p o s s i b l e sources of i n s t a b i l i t y - be they i n t e r n a l , as was p e r c e i v e d from 1848 to 1851, or e x t e r n a l , as d u r i n g the p e r i o d f o l l o w i n g 1862 - must a l s o be taken into c o n s i d e r a t i o n s i n c e l t undoubtedly helped e i t h e r to moderate, or a v o i d a l t o g e t h e r the p o s s i b l e consequences of a s e r i o u s c h a l l e n g e to the a u t h o r i t y of the s t a t e and the monarchy i n P r u s s i a . In the former of these two per i o d s t h i s attempt to r e s t o r e or preserve s t a b i l i t y In P r u s s i a was accomplished both through B r i t i s h o p p o s i t i o n to the d e s t a b i l i z i n g p o l i c i e s of Arnlm, and through support f o r the resurgence of c o n s e r v a t l v l s m under Brandenburg and Radowltz Calthough t h i s support f e l l short of a B r i t i s h m i l i t a r y commitment to P r u s s i a d u r i n g the Hessian c r i s i s ) . It was as a consequence of Bismarck's a c t i v e f o r e i g n p o l i c y t h at the p r i n c i p a l t h r e a t s to P r u s s i a n s t a b i l i t y a f t e r 1862 were e x t e r n a l ; r e g a r d l e s s , however, of the u n d e r l y i n g cause of these t h r e a t s , B r i t i s h policy-makers p e r s i s t e n t l y sought to remove them. There Is l i t t l e doubt that such e f f o r t s met with success d u r i n g both the Danish war and the Luxembourg c r i s i s . And l t can c e r t a i n l y be argued that In t h e i r a n t i c i p a t i o n of Germany's u n i f i c a t i o n , B r i t i s h policy-makers f u r t h e r strengthened Bismarck's hand by a c q u i e s c i n g to the Alvensleben Convention, the G a s t e l n Convention, and the annexation of A l s a c e - L o r r a i n e . C l e a r l y , the l i b e r a l movement i n P r u s s i a stood to g a i n l i t t l e from B r i t i s h p o l i c y d u r i n g t h i s p e r i o d . One i n c i d e n t In p a r t i c u l a r I l l u s t r a t e s how averse B r i t i s h statesmen were to the Idea of pur s u i n g p o t e n t i a l l y d i s r u p t i v e p o l i c i e s i n P r u s s i a . In 1867 the post of B r i t i s h ambassador to B e r l i n became vacant, the second such vacancy In two y e a r s . 1 * 2 The task, of f i l l i n g t h i s p a r t i c u l a r post was complicated by the presence In B e r l i n of P r i n c e s s V i c t o r i a , who took an a c t i v e I n t e r e s t i n these appointments, and who attempted to Influence them through her correspondence with her mother, Queen V i c t o r i a . As something of a l i b e r a l I d e a l i s t , the P r u s s i a n Crown P r i n c e s s was c r i t i c a l of previous appointments to t h i s post. Having ob j e c t e d to S i r Andrew Buchanan because he was a high Tory who " d i s l i k e s e v e r y t h i n g l i b e r a l " , and who "has a s e c r e t l i k i n g f o r Bismarck," P r i n c e s s V i c t o r i a a l s o accused Buchanan's successor, Lord L o f t u s , of being a "very great admirer of Bismarck" with whom he was on f r i e n d l y f o o t i n g . 1 * 3 Thus when the post became a v a i l a b l e i n 1867, she immediately sought to ensure the appointment of someone who would be sympathetic to the l i b e r a l movement, and who would a i d her and her husband i n t h e i r attempts to undermine Bismarck's p o s i t i o n with the king; her choice was S i r Robert Morler, whose views on Germany, as we s h a l l see l a t e r , were extremely I d e a l i s t i c . The Queen supported P r i n c e s s V i c t o r i a ' s endorsement of "good e x c e l l e n t Morler", but t h i s c h o i ce was r e j e c t e d by Lord Stanley, who d i d not l i k e the Idea of a p p o i n t i n g someone who was so c l e a r l y opposed to the P r u s s i a n Premier. Despite pressure from the Queen, S t a n l e y h e l d h i s ground, c l a i m i n g that England had nothing whatever to do with the I n t e r n a l p o l i t i c s of P r u s s i a , and that by "meddling In these, we o n l y d e s t r o y our proper and l e g i t i m a t e i n f l u e n c e i n matters a f f e c t i n g Europe." 1** 80 Although S t a n l e y thought h i g h l y of Morier, once d e s c r i b i n g him as " v e r y - c l e v e r , very hard-working: something of a dreamer, f u l l of German Ideas", h i s reasons f o r r e j e c t i n g him f o r t h i s Important post were c l e a r : Morier was "too much In earnest, and earnest men with Ideas and great a b i l i t i e s are sometimes unsafe men."1""' Any c l e a r e r r e j e c t i o n of l i b e r a l i d e a l i s m - as manifest i n the person of Morier - In favour of Tory pragmatism aimed at p r e s e r v i n g s t a b i l i t y In P r u s s i a Is d i f f i c u l t to imagine. CHAPTER 3 P r u s s i a I d e a l i s e d : l s h L i b e r a l Commentary 82 The f a c t t h a t s e v e r a l prominent B r i t i s h h i s t o r i a n s of Anglo-German r e l a t i o n s came to regard l i b e r a l Idealism as one of the p r i n c i p a l determinants of England's mid-nineteenth century German p o l i c y may w e l l account f o r such s c h o l a r s ' f a i l u r e to c o n s i d e r more c a r e f u l l y the q u e s t i o n r a i s e d at the beginning of t h i s paper; i . e . the extent to which B r i t i s h p o l i c y a f f e c t e d the d e c l i n i n g f o r t u n e s of German l i b e r a l i s m In the p e r i o d l e a d i n g up to u n i f i c a t i o n . However the above account of Anglo-Prussian r e l a t i o n s d u r i n g t h i s p e r i o d suggests that the Influence of such l i b e r a l Idealism was n e g l i g i b l e . Moreover, l t demonstrates that B r i t i s h statesmen, by p u r s u i n g a German p o l i c y thought to be In the best I n t e r e s t s of England, helped to f a c i l i t a t e the c r e a t i o n of that a u t h o r i t a r i a n German Empire which E n g l i s h - s p e a k i n g h i s t o r i a n s w r i t i n g s i n c e World War I have so lamented. This t h e r e f o r e r a i s e s the q u e s t i o n : why d i d h i s t o r i a n s l i k e Ramsay, Sontag and Mosse come to such a c o n c l u s i o n about the b a s i c p r i n c i p l e s u n d e r l y i n g B r i t i s h p o l i c y In the f i r s t place? C e r t a i n l y , England's r e p u t a t i o n as the world's o l d e s t and most s t a b l e c o n s t i t u t i o n a l p a r l i a m e n t a r y s t a t e was a f a c t o r In t h i s , as was England's support f o r l i b e r a l - n a t i o n a l movements elsewhere In Europe d u r i n g the n i n e t e e n t h century. There d i d e x i s t , however, more concrete evidence than t h i s to help convince these s c h o l a r s that l i b e r a l i d e a l i s m was an Important p r i n c i p l e g u i d i n g B r i t i s h statesmen i n t h e i r r e l a t i o n s with Germany Cand subsequently, that German l i b e r a l i s m stood o n l y to p r o f i t from such r e l a t i o n s ) . 83 Such evidence Is to be found i n the statements r e g a r d i n g Germany made d u r i n g t h i s p e r i o d by B r i t i s h policy-makers themselves. Aside from the P r i n c e Consort's and Queen V i c t o r i a ' s p r o f e s s e d dreams of seei n g Germany transformed - v i a P r u s s i a -I n t o a l i b e r a l , c o n s t i t u t i o n a l , p a r l i a m e n t a r y s t a t e Cand the s t o r i e s of the s o - c a l l e d "Coburg P l a n " which r e s u l t e d from the r o y a l couple's attempts to r e a l i z e t h i s dream), B r i t i s h statesmen were p r o l i f i c when l t came to making i d e a l i s t i c statements about the " e n l i g h t e n e d , the brave, and the p a t r i o t i c people of P r u s s i a , " t h e i r unshakable "attachment to f r e e I n s t i t u t i o n s , " t h e i r p o s i t i o n as the "great P r o t e s t a n t Power of Europe," t h e i r p o s s e s s i o n of " t r a d i t i o n s i n f e r i o r to those of no other people," and, above a l l , t h e i r r o l e as England's " n a t u r a l ally."- 1- Such statements as these undoubtedly helped to convince the B r i t i s h e l i t e at the time and h i s t o r i a n s s i n c e that a g e n e r a l l y p o s i t i v e and o p t i m i s t i c view.of the f u t u r e prospects f o r a u n i t e d Germany l a y at the root of B r i t i s h p o l i c y d u r i n g t h i s p e r i o d . But where d i d t h i s s t y l e of d i s c o u r s e r e g a r d i n g P r u s s i a and Germany o r i g i n a t e ? Was i t simply a convenient means f o r a v o i d i n g p o t e n t i a l c r i t i c i s m s of the F o r e i g n O f f i c e ' s accomodating a t t i t u d e towards an i n c r e a s i n g l y a u t h o r i t a r i a n and m i l i t a r i s t i c P r u s s i a ? Or does I t s use by B r i t i s h statesmen t e l l us something about the e x i s t i n g tone of B r i t i s h commentary on P r u s s i a d u r i n g t h i s p e r i o d , to which B r i t i s h policy-makers had to respond? I f so, what were the contours of t h i s commentary, who were I t s c o n t r i b u t o r s , and what e f f e c t d i d i t have on the f o r m u l a t i o n of 84 B r i t i s h p o l i c y r e g a r d i n g P r u s s i a , aside from that of p r o v i d i n g a r h e t o r i c a l s t y l e w e l l - s u i t e d to the needs of B r i t i s h p o l i t i c s ? It Is to these questions that we must now t u r n our a t t e n t i o n s In order to round out t h i s p i c t u r e of England's r e l a t i o n s with P r u s s i a d u r i n g the p e r i o d 1848-1871. While many European l i b e r a l s i n the mid-nineteenth century regarded England as the touchstone of c o n s t i t u t i o n a l and p a r l i a m e n t a r y government, none d i d so with more c o n v i c t i o n than the B r i t i s h themselves. 2 B r i t i s h f a i t h In the s u p e r i o r i t y of England's system of government was an e x p r e s s i o n of "complete c e r t a i n t y t h a t wherever l i b e r t y and r e p r e s e n t a t i v e government were to be found, they must be guaranteed by I n s t i t u t i o n s modelled on these evolved by the mother of P a r l i a m e n t s . " 3 Moreover, B r i t i s h l i b e r a l s a l s o used the B r i t i s h model of p o l i t i c a l development as the standard by which the soundness of f o r e i g n p o l i t i c a l i n s t i t u t i o n s was measured. The B r i t i s h c o n s t i t u t i o n a l system of government had been " s e l e c t e d by Providence as the model of fr e e and o r d e r l y government to mankind," claimed the Edinburgh Review. Furthermore, l t was seen to possess an expans1veness which ensured I t s continued e x i s t e n c e , d e s p i t e the p e r s i s t e n c e of r e v o l u t i o n a r y waves which continued to engulf e s t a b l i s h e d governments throughout Europe In the f i r s t h a l f of the n i n e t e e n t h c e n t u r y . * B r i t i s h l i b e r a l s were not alone i n t h i s r e s p e c t . German l i b e r a l s i n p a r t i c u l a r were drawn to the example of B r i t a i n , and although t h e i r i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s of B r i t i s h c o n s t i t u t i o n a l h i s t o r y r e f l e c t e d the more c o n s e r v a t i v e complexion of German p o l i t i c a l 8 5 c u l t u r e , they f u l l y a p p r e c i a t e d those f e a t u r e s of the B r i t i s h c o n s t i t u t i o n which a t t r a c t e d them. As Alexander Meyer wrote i n the P r e u s s i s c h e Jahrbiicher i n 1864: If the l i b e r a l p a r t y of the c o n t i n e n t wishes to summarize in one slogan the v a r i o u s demands l t makes i n a l l areas of p o l i t i c a l l i f e - f o r m i n i s t e r i a l r e s p o n s i b i l i t y , p a r l i a m e n t a r y c o n t r o l of the budget, f i r m r e g u l a t i o n of the a d m i n i s t r a t i o n , and s e c u r i n g of fundamental r i g h t s - there i s h a r d l y any other one than the c r y heard so o f t e n and so J u s t i f i a b l y : give us an E n g l i s h c o n s t i t u t i o n ! " 1 2 ' Nevertheless, the c o n v i c t i o n expressed here by Pr i n c e A l b e r t that England was "the sole r e p r e s e n t a t i v e of L i b e r a l and c o n s t i t u t i o n a l i n s t i t u t i o n s i n Europe" was f a r and away str o n g e s t i n England i t s e l f . 6 Moreover, there i s l i t t l e q u e s t i o n that many people In m i d - V i c t o r i a n England f e l l v i c t i m to the " i l l u s i o n " Cmistakenly a t t r i b u t e d to Palmerston) that B r i t i s h I n s t i t u t i o n s were "a panacea f o r a l l the p o l i t i c a l e v i l s In the world."' 7 But l e s s well-understood Is how such notions a f f e c t e d B r i t i s h attempts to i n t e r p r e t f o r e i g n l i b e r a l movements. More s p e c i f i c a l l y , how d i d t h i s m i d - V i c t o r i a n Whig p e r s p e c t i v e , with I t s " P r o t e s t a n t , e m p i r i c a l , p r o g r e s s i v e , bourgeois, and democratic b i a s e s , " a f f e c t B r i t i s h views on the p o l i t i c a l f u t u r e of P r u s s i a d u r i n g the p e r i o d 1848-1871, a time which was c l e a r l y a watershed In the c o n s t i t u t i o n a l and p a r l i a m e n t a r y h i s t o r y of Germany?82' Moreover, what was the r e a c t i o n of B r i t i s h l i b e r a l s when events d u r i n g t h i s p e r i o d " f a i l e d " to develop In the manner expected? The answers to such questions not onl y help to e x p l a i n the o r i g i n s of the s t y l e of p o l i t i c a l d i s c o u r s e r e g a r d i n g P r u s s i a used at the time, but they a l s o shed v a l u a b l e l i g h t on the h i s t o r i c a l t r a d i t i o n out of which sprang the modern 86 Sonderweg t h e s i s , which seeks to e x p l a i n German uniqueness from the p e r s p e c t i v e of Western "normalcy." A survey of B r i t i s h l i b e r a l s ' views on P r u s s i a n p o l i t i c s from the p e r i o d Just p r i o r to the 1848 r e v o l u t i o n s up to Germany's u n i f i c a t i o n In 1871 r e v e a l s that there e x i s t e d a small, yet a c t i v e group of the educated l i b e r a l e l i t e - men who stood, f o r the most par t , o u t s i d e the c o r r i d o r s of power - who were most concerned with developments in Germany. In t h e i r correspondence, and In a r t i c l e s w r i t t e n f o r such L i b e r a l J o u r n a l s as the Edinburgh Review, the Westminster Review, MacMlllan's Magazine, the North B r i t i s h Review, F r a s e r ' s  Magazlne and St. Paul's, these B r i t i s h l i b e r a l s set f o r t h what was a remarkably c o n s i s t e n t I n t e r p r e t a t i o n of P r u s s i a n and German a f f a i r s . Some of the most prominent f i g u r e s i n t h i s group were R.M. Milnes and S i r Austen Layard, both of whom were L i b e r a l M.P.'s; S i r Robert Morier and Lord Augustus L o f t u s , who served as B r i t i s h diplomats In Germany; and J o u r n a l i s t s such as Edward Dicey and David Masson. Pr i n c e A l b e r t , although c l e a r l y e x c e p t i o n a l because of both h i s o f f i c i a l p o s i t i o n and h i s German background, a l s o shared many of the views h e l d by t h i s v o c a l group of B r i t i s h l i b e r a l s . T h i s group's assessments of P r u s s i a n a f f a i r s went w e l l beyond simply determining P r u s s i a ' s approximate p o s i t i o n on the B r i t i s h s c a l e of p r o g r e s s i v e l i b e r a l development, and e x h o r t i n g l e a d e r s In P r u s s i a to support, r a t h e r than Impede, the "advancing" l i b e r a l t i d e . They a l s o contained the f o l l o w i n g f e a t u r e s : assessments of P r u s s i a ' s preparedness both f o r 87 " g e n u i n e " c o n s t i t u t i o n a l i s m and p a r l i a m e n t a r i s m , and f o r t h e l e a d e r s h i p r o l e w h i c h P r u s s i a was e x p e c t e d t o t a k e In t h e u n i f i c a t i o n o f Germany un d e r l i b e r a l a u s p i c e s ; r e a p p r a i s a l s o f th e P r u s s i a n monarchy and how P r u s s i a n a t t a c h m e n t s t o monarchlsm a f f e c t e d a t t e m p t s t o l i b e r a l i z e t h e P r u s s i a n p o l i t i c a l s y s t e m ; c o m p a r a t i v e e x a m i n a t i o n s o f B r i t i s h and P r u s s i a n h i s t o r y w i t h a view t o c o n f i r m i n g t h a t a p a t t e r n o f l i b e r a l d e v e l o p m e n t e x i s t e d ; and f i n a l l y , c r i t i c a l d i s c u s s i o n s r e g a r d i n g how c o n s t i t u t i o n a l i s m and p a r l i a m e n t a r i s m were a c t u a l l y b e i n g employed i n P r u s s i a , and how much o r how l i t t l e t h e s e p r o c e s s e s d e v i a t e d from t h e " h e a l t h y " example o f B r i t a i n . In a s s e s s i n g P r u s s i a n p o l i t i c s on t h e b a s i s o f t h e s e themes, t h i s a c t i v e g r o u p o f B r i t i s h l i b e r a l o b s e r v e r s p u t f o r t h v i e w s w h i c h , a s i d e from t h e i r c o n s i s t e n c y , s u c c e e d e d In d o m i n a t i n g t h e s c h o l a r l y commentary on German a f f a i r s d u r i n g t h i s p e r i o d . Upon c l o s e r e x a m i n a t i o n , however, t h e vi e w s o f t h i s g r o u p d e m o n s t r a t e more t h a n s i m p l y t h e I n t e l l e c t u a l i n s u l a r i t y o f England. These a s s e s s m e n t s o f P r u s s i a n and German p o l i t i c s r e v e a l how most B r i t i s h l i b e r a l commentators m a i n t a i n e d t h e I l l u s i o n t h a t E n g l i s h - s t y l e l i b e r a l I n s t i t u t i o n s would e v e n t u a l l y emerge i n P r u s s i a , d e s p i t e g r o w i n g e v i d e n c e t o t h e c o n t r a r y . The f a c t t h a t s u c h I n s t i t u t i o n s f a i l e d t o m a t e r i a l i z e d u r i n g and a f t e r t h e 1848 r e v o l t s was r a t i o n a l i z e d away by means o f v a r i o u s a n a l y t i c a l d e v i c e s w h i c h h e l d o u t t h e p o s s i b i l i t y t h a t l i b e r a l r e f o r m o f t h e B r i t i s h stamp was J u s t a r o u n d t h e c o r n e r . Moreover, t h e i n a b i l i t y o f t h e s e B r i t i s h o b s e r v e r s t o r i s e above t h e i r own I n s t i t u t i o n a l l y - i n c u l c a t e d i d e a s o f what 88 c o n s t i t u t e d "normal" c o n s t i t u t i o n a l and p a r l i a m e n t a r y p r a c t i c e s r e s u l t e d i n one-sided analyses of P r u s s i a ' s p o l i t i c a l development. While acknowledging the c i r c u m s t a n t i a l d i f f e r e n c e s that d i v i d e d P r u s s i a n and B r i t i s h p o l i t i c a l h i s t o r y , these B r i t i s h l i b e r a l s g e n e r a l l y regarded as aberrant those f e a t u r e s of P r u s s i a n l i b e r a l i s m which d i d not f i t the B r i t i s h mould. The a t t i t u d e of condescension which accompanied such analyses was matched by a t y p i c a l l i b e r a l confidence i n the I n e v i t a b i l i t y of progress towards E n g l i s h - s t y l e l i b e r a l i s m . Seldom were any attempts made to recognize what Geoff E l e y has d e s c r i b e d as the "necessary d i v e r s i t y In l i b e r a l movements' n a t i o n a l c o n d i t i o n s of e x i s t e n c e " Cdespite the e f f o r t s of some Germans who sought to make B r i t i s h l i b e r a l s aware that such d i v e r s i t y Indeed e x l stedD. Hence l t was an unshakable Idealism that c h a r a c t e r i z e d t h i s group's views of P r u s s i a n p o l i t i c s . As we have seen, such Idealism seldom p r e v a i l e d over Tory r e a l i s m In the a c t u a l f o r m u l a t i o n of B r i t i s h f o r e i g n p o l i c y . However, the extremely p o s i t i v e , almost d e t e r m i n i s t i c tone of t h i s l i b e r a l commentary on P r u s s i a helped to f o s t e r a complacent a t t i t u d e In England r e g a r d i n g the f u t u r e of P r u s s i a . 1 0 In the longer term, such i d e a l i s m e s t a b l i s h e d a way of l o o k i n g at German a f f a i r s which even today p e r s i s t s among Anglo-American s c h o l a r s of German h i s t o r y . It should be noted t h a t there e x i s t e d a vast d i f f e r e n c e between the kinds of Issues commented on by t h i s group of B r i t i s h l i b e r a l i d e a l i s t s , and those which occupied the 89 a t t e n t i o n s of B r i t i s h policy—makers. The l i b e r a l i d e a l i s t s d e s c r i b e d below r e s t r i c t e d themselves l a r g e l y to domestic Issues In t h e i r commentary on the l i b e r a l development of P r u s s i a and Germany, although f o r e i g n a f f a i r s o f t e n provided the o c c a s i o n f o r t h i s commentary. B r i t i s h policy-makers, on the other hand, l i m i t e d t h e i r o f f i c i a l pronouncments on l y to those Issues connected with P r u s s i a ' s f o r e i g n a f f a i r s ; on the subject of the i n t e r n a l a f f a i r s of P r u s s i a - although f r e q u e n t l y addressed i n the b r i s k correspondence c a r r i e d on between the B r i t i s h and P r u s s i a n r o y a l f a m i l i e s , and perhaps the subject of an o c c a s i o n a l t a c t f u l comment from the B r i t i s h ambassador to B e r l i n - B r i t i s h policy-makers had to be more circumspect. As w i l l be shown, Important d i f f e r e n c e s of o p i n i o n concerning the s i g n i f i c a n c e of P r u s s i a ' s p o l i t i c a l development, and England's r o l e In attempting to Influence t h i s development r e s u l t e d from the d i f f e r e n c e between these two p e r s p e c t i v e s . Sympathy f o r P r u s s i a n l i b e r a l i s m and e x p e c t a t i o n s of Its eventual triumph are what c h a r a c t e r i z e d the views of t h i s group of B r i t i s h l i b e r a l s who concerned themselves with P r u s s i a n a f f a i r s ; B r i t i s h popular o p i n i o n r e g a r d i n g P r u s s i a , on the other hand, was much l e s s c o n s i s t e n t , and was I t s e l f o f t e n c h a r a c t e r i z e d by s t r o n g f e e l i n g s of a n t i p a t h y towards the s t a t e of P r u s s i a and Its people. In seeking to e x p l a i n why B r i t i s h p u b l i c o p i n i o n favoured A u s t r i a d u r i n g the A u s t r o - P r u s s i a n war, Edward Dicey concluded somewhat g r i e v o u s l y t h a t , aside from the f a c t of P r u s s i a ' s aggressions In the h i g h l y unpopular Danish war, l t was simply because the B r i t i s h p u b l i c " d i d not l i k e the 90 P r u s s i a n s p e r s o n a l l y . " i i j t i s c e r t a i n l y true that what had once been a g e n e r a l l y p o s i t i v e p e r c e p t i o n o f P r u s s i a i n England began to sour i n the 1860s, slowly at f i r s t , as a r e s u l t of such unpleasant Incidents as the MacDonald a f f a i r and the new P r u s s i a n king's c l a i m to hold h i s throne by d l v i n e - r i g h t , and l a t e r more q u i c k l y , f o l l o w i n g the appearance of Bismarck at the helm of the P r u s s i a n ship of s t a t e . Even Queen V i c t o r i a , who o n l y a year e a r l i e r had been accused of p r o - P r u s s i a n sympathies, exclaimed In 1865 upon l e a r n i n g of the G a s t e l n convention: "Odious people the P r u s s i a n s are, that I must s a y ! " 1 2 But while much of the B r i t i s h p u b l i c a f t e r 1862 regarded Bismarck's I n t e r n a l and e x t e r n a l p o l i c i e s with a growing sense of unease, throughout most of the t h i r d q u a r t e r of the n i n e t e e n t h century B r i t i s h l i b e r a l I d e a l i s t s c o n s i s t e n t l y h e l d the German people, and the P r u s s i a n s In p a r t i c u l a r , In very high regard. Indeed, l t was t h i s same confidence i n the e n l i g h t e n e d c h a r a c t e r of the P r u s s i a n people which I n s t i l l e d I n t o these observers the b e l i e f t h a t P r u s s i a would soon abandon absolutism, and embrace " c i v i l i z e d p o l i t i c s " by e n t e r i n g I n t o what John Morley d e s c r i b e d In the F o r t n i g h t l y Review as "the normal path of p r o g r e s s i v e I n t e r n a l development." 1 3 Such w i s h f u l t h i n k i n g on the part of B r i t i s h I d e a l i s t s was In evidence even before the l i b e r a l outburst of 1848-49. Already i n 1845 the F o r e i g n Q u a r t e r l y Review c o u l d c l a i m : "We t h i n k the Germans are a people by t h e i r whole temper and h a b i t of mind p e c u l i a r l y c a l c u l a t e d f o r the e x e r c i s e of p o l i t i c a l r i g h t s and the enjoyment of p u b l i c 1iberty....The c o o l , sober, systematic 91 German Is, of a l l the species of genus Homo, the best c a l c u l a t e d to d e l i b e r a t e w i s e l y on p u b l i c a f f a i r s , and to achieve s u c c e s s f u l l y the problem of self-government." 1* Thus, these B r i t i s h l i b e r a l s found l t r e p r e h e n s i b l e and "not a l i t t l e Incomprehensible" that the P r u s s i a n monarchy went to such great lengths to s t i f l e p u b l i c o p i n i o n and l i m i t self-government In a country so w e l l - s u i t e d f o r c o n s t i t u t i o n a l i s m on the B r i t i s h model. But whatever were the P r u s s i a n government's motives f o r r e s i s t i n g l i b e r a l reform, l t was c l e a r to R.M. Mllnes even before the outburst of 1848 what the consequences of c o n t i n u i n g t h i s " o b s t r u c t i o n i s m " would be: Free to t h i n k , ready to f e e l , able to f i g h t , - what can be wanting to the h e a l t h y s o c i a l s t a t e of t h i s great people? ...What Is s t i l l the u n s a t i s f i e d d e s i r e that r a n k l e s at the heart of the n a t i o n - t u r n i n g i t s k i n d l i e s t f e e l i n g s Into g a l l , and b l u n t i n g the edge of p a t r i o t i s m ; changing the poet Into the s a t i r i s t , and the p h i l o s o p h e r Into the pamphleteer; making wise men f o o l i s h , and wicked men mad; d i s t o r t i n g graces Into b r i b e s and k i n d words into falsehoods? What Is the o b j e c t of hopes so long delayed, of prayers so long n e g l e c t e d , now f a s t a c c u l m u l a t i n g f o r the e v i l day of vengeance and d e s p a i r ? We answer, and they answer - P o l i t i c a l development under L i b e r a l I n s t i t u t i o n s . x~' Nor was t h i s c e r t a i n t y t h at success would u l t i m a t e l y " a t t e n d the cause of c o n s t i t u t i o n a l l i b e r t y In North Germany," s e r i o u s l y diminished by the setbacks s u f f e r e d In B e r l i n and F r a n k f u r t i n 1848-49. 1 6 Indeed f o r some In England, l i k e P r i n c e A l b e r t , the events of 1848 were a c o n f i r m a t i o n that the P r u s s i a n s were s e n s i b l e to where t h e i r f u t u r e l a y , and that the a c t i o n s of F r e d e r i c k W i l l i a m IV had prevented the r e v o l u t i o n from f a l l i n g i n t o the hands of r a d i c a l s . Nor was t h i s confidence shaken by the f e a r that despotism was about to be "relmposed by 92 A u s t r i a n arms upon Germany" In 1850. a-v ^e have seen how Palmerston used t h i s same I d e a l i s t i c r h e t o r i c when he dismissed out of hand Queen V i c t o r i a ' s f e a r s that " r a t i o n a l and sound C o n s t i t u t i o n a l government" In Germany was threatened, p a r t i c u l a r l y s i n c e P r u s s i a was "so e n l i g h t e n e d , and so attached to f r e e I n s t i t u t i o n s . " 1 0 P r i n c e A l b e r t echoed these same sentiments, c l a i m i n g t h a t , I f Frederick. W i l l i a m IV openly d e c l a r e d P r u s s i a ' s r o l e In the Hesse-Kassel c r i s i s to be "a matter of m a i n t a i n i n g the c o n s t i t u t i o n a l p r i n c i p l e , " then he would "not be anxious about i t s success." 1' 5' This assumption that P r u s s i a would continue to move towards E n g l i s h - s t y l e c o n s t i t u t i o n a l i s m even managed to s u r v i v e the dark, p e r i o d of the Manteuffel-Westfalen m i n i s t r y , thanks p r i m a r i l y to the b e l i e f , expressed here by S i r Robert Morier, that the P r u s s i a n s were "a people f a r too h e a l t h y at the core to be permanently a f f e c t e d by...so s h o r t - l i v e d a departure from the p r i n c i p l e s " which the B r i t i s h l l b e r a l - m l n d h e l d so d e a r . 2 0 Although the great hopes that were pinned on the "New E r a " Hohenzollern-Auerswald m i n i s t r y , formed In 1858, soon vanished In the face of Bismarck's appointment as m i n i s t e r — p r e s i d e n t i n 1862, B r i t i s h I d e a l i s m stood f a s t . In f a c t , the alarming c h a r a c t e r of Bismarck's p o l i c i e s both at home and abroad d u r i n g the 1860s, r a t h e r than I n d u c i n g these B r i t i s h l i b e r a l s to abandon the cause of l i b e r a l i s m In P r u s s i a , had the opposite e f f e c t : l t r e a f f i r m e d t h e i r c o n v i c t i o n that l t was the P r u s s i a n people, as opposed to the k i n g and h i s government, who were the solemn r e p o s i t o r y of the P r u s s i a n 93 l i b e r a l s p i r i t . 2 3 - In u r g i n g c l o s e r t i e s between B r i t a i n and P r u s s i a , the B r i t i s h ambassador to B e r l i n , Lord L o f t u s , d e c l a r e d : "She [ P r u s s i a ] represented the I n t e l l i g e n c e , the progress and wealth o f Germany.... She w i l l g r a d u a l l y advance In a c o n s t i t u t i o n a l system of government, and she w i l l p l a y the part of a moderator In E u r o p e . " 2 2 In response to B r i t i s h f e a r s of P r u s s i a r a i s e d by her defeat of A u s t r i a In 1866, S i r A u s t i n Layard responded: "We cannot b e l i e v e that the German race, so e n l i g h t e n e d and so p r o g r e s s i v e , would renounce t h e i r l i b e r t i e s even to accomplish t h e i r n a t i o n a l u n i t y . " 2 3 Nor d i d the outbreak. of the F r a n c o - P r u s s i a n war l e s s e n that optimism which was i n s p i r e d In these B r i t i s h l i b e r a l s by the knowledge that " N e i t h e r the King nor Count Bismarck can l i v e f o r e v e r " ; Morley maintained that l t was " I m p o s s i b l e to b e l i e v e that the t e n a c i t y , vigour, eagerness, which have made Germany a n a t i o n , w i l l not i n t h e i r due season and course take l i b e r a l f o rm." 2* Obv i o u s l y not everyone who watched German a f f a i r s u n f o l d d u r i n g t h i s p e r i o d was as c o n f i d e n t as t h i s r e g a r d i n g the Imminent v i c t o r y of l i b e r a l I n s t i t u t i o n s t h e r e . J o u r n a l i s t Edward Dicey, a staunch advocate of an Anglo-Prussian a l l i a n c e and a keen observer of German p o l i t i c s , r a i s e d doubts about the hopes which l i b e r a l s both i n England and P r u s s i a were p l a c i n g upon the f a c t of W i l l i a m I's advanced age, and the Crown P r i n c e ' s a p p a r e n t l y l i b e r a l t u r n of mind: I can r e c o l l e c t e x a c t l y the same hope being placed on the supposed l i b e r a l i s m of the present King, when he was h e i r presumptive to the throne. P e r s o n a l l y , I a t t a c h very l i t t l e c o nfidence to the p a r l i a m e n t a r y p r o c l i v i t i e s of P r u s s i a n p r i n c e s . . . . I doubt whether the cause of p a r l i a m e n t a r y government, In the way which we understand the word, w i l l 94 p r o f i t much by the aggrandizement of P r u s s i a . ^ B S [Emphasis mine ] Others too expressed t h e i r concerns r e g a r d i n g the supposedly " p r o g r e s s i v e " nature of P r u s s i a n and German p o l i t i c s , e s p e c i a l l y In the wake of the Fra n c o - P r u s s i a n w a r . 2 6 But Dicey's s c e p t i c i s m r e g a r d i n g the d i r e c t i o n and d i s t a n c e which P r u s s i a had t r a v e l l e d down the path l e a d i n g to E n g l i s h - s t y l e c o n s t i t u t i o n a l i s m was c l e a r l y e x c e p t i o n a l , and was not at a l l In keeping with the g e n e r a l l y p o s i t i v e tone of B r i t i s h l i b e r a l commentary on P r u s s i a n p o l i t i c s d u r i n g t h i s p e r i o d . Although discouraged by both F r e d e r i c k W i l l i a m IV and W i l l i a m I's "unn a t u r a l I n t e r p r e t a t i o n s " of the c o n s t i t u t i o n of 1850 Ca document which was seen as "a f a i r embodiment of even the more advanced p o s i t i o n s of the L i b e r a l Party").! and by t h e " c a p i t u l a t i o n " of the N a t i o n a l L i b e r a l s to Bismarck a f t e r 1867, t h i s I d e a l i s t i c group of B r i t i s h l i b e r a l s c l u n g to the n o t i o n that t h e i r German bre t h r e n would e v e n t u a l l y succeed In t h e i r s t r u g g l e with the dark f o r c e s of despotism; l t was a f t e r a l l , claimed Morley, I n e v i t a b l e t h a t "the same s p l e n d i d a c t i v i t y which has made her foremost In l i t e r a r y and s c i e n t i f i c achievement w i l l a l s o , when other c o n d i t i o n s are ready, I d e n t i f y her with a r a t i o n a l p h i l o s o p h y , " l i k e that of England. 2 7" Such views were i n f a c t r e i n f o r c e d by the w r i t i n g s of prominent German l i b e r a l s , whose work was o f t e n p u b l i s h e d i n Jou r n a l s l i k e the Home and Fo r e i g n Review and the F o r t n i g h t l y  Rev lew. H e l n r i c h von Sybel, f o r example, a s s e r t e d In 1871: "[ T j h e y cannot s e r i o u s l y b e l i e v e , that a S t a t e , whose m i l i t a r y power r e s t s c h i e f l y on an i n t e l l e c t u a l b a s i s , on the personal 95 s e r v i c e s of a l l the educated i n h a b i t a n t s - a State which possesses a grand l i t e r a t u r e , a f r e e press, and two debating parliaments, c o u l d r e a l l y , In the long run, maintain a p o l i t i c a l system which was r e p u d i a t e d by a vast m a j o r i t y of i t s population." 2® Such statements were e a g e r l y i n t e r p r e t e d i n England,as proof that P r u s s i a , d e s p i t e the unpleasant Blsmarckian i n t e r l u d e , was poised to embrace a c o n s t i t u t i o n a l p a r l i a m e n t a r y system of government. This B r i t i s h i n t e r e s t In the progress of l i b e r a l i n s t i t u t i o n s In P r u s s i a , while In part brought about by l i b e r a l mlllenarlan1sm, was a l s o I n s p i r e d by the r e a l i z a t i o n t h a t German u n i f i c a t i o n would most l i k e l y be accomplished under P r u s s i a n a u s p i c e s . Already p r e j u d i c e d In favour of a u n i t e d German s t a t e by t h e i r "enthusiasm" f o r Greek and I t a l i a n u n i f i c a t i o n , B r i t i s h I d e a l i s t s hoped that a l i b e r a l c o n s t i t u t i o n a l P r u s s i a n s t a t e c o u l d b r i n g about German u n i f i c a t i o n In a way which would f a c i l i t a t e the spread of l i b e r a l i n s t i t u t i o n s throughout Germany. The a l t e r n a t i v e to u n i f i c a t i o n brought about by means of " p r o g r e s s i v e , J u s t i f i a b l e pressure from below," was I t s Imposition from above, which, a c c o r d i n g to Paul Kennedy, l e f t many i n B r i t a i n a sking: "What blows might be d e a l t to L i b e r a l I deals, to s u p e r i o r L i b e r a l methods of f o r e s t a l l i n g unrest and c o n f l i c t , to the economic p r o s p e r i t y of the age, by v i o l e n t and I r r e s p o n s i b l e deeds?" 2' 5* In 1866 Morier was among those who expressed the c o n v i c t i o n that the Blsmarckian method of u n i f i c a t i o n from above was e n t i r e l y unnecessary, e s p e c i a l l y given the mature s t a t e of P r u s s i a ' s l i b e r a l development: 96 [ I ] f Bismarck succeeds the world w i l l c l a p I t s hands and say that he was the o n l y man who knew how to b r i n g about what the world, which worships success, w i l l say was a consummation l t always d e s i r e d . Whereas what i s r e a l l y proved i s that P r u s s i a w a s . . . r e a l l y the heart and lungs of Germany, [and] that she c o u l d , by her mere n a t u r a l development with, Instead of aqaInst, the l i b e r a l and n a t i o n a l f o r c e s of Germany, have e f f e c t e d what r e q u i r e d to be done by p e a c e f u l means and without bloodshed. 3'-' Hence, on the subject of a P r u s s i a n - l e d u n i f i c a t i o n of Germany, the hopes of B r i t i s h I d e a l i s t s appeared to c o i n c i d e with the goals of B r i t i s h policy-makers; i f the former were convinced that P r u s s i a , and thus Germany, was d e s t i n e d f o r E n g l i s h - s t y l e l i b e r a l i s m , the l a t t e r was r e a s s u r e d that B r i t i s h I n t e r e s t s , r a t h e r than being threatened, would a c t u a l l y be safeguarded by the c r e a t i o n of a P r u s s i a n - l e d German n a t i o n a l s t a t e . 3 1 Given the expressed d e s i r e of a l l B r i t i s h governments d u r i n g t h i s p e r i o d to see peace p r e v a i l In Europe, i t i s not s u r p r i s i n g t hat many of these B r i t i s h I d e a l i s t s maintained t h a t the promotion of c o n s t i t u t i o n a l i s m and parliamentarism i n P r u s s i a was i t s e l f the s u r e s t method of i n s u r i n g such peace. As r e a c t i o n began to descend on Europe In 1849, Mllnes, who was sympathetic to the cause of c o n t i n e n t a l l i b e r a l i s m , stood f a s t by h i s b e l i e f that the " s o l i d establishment of a German Empire on a c o n s t i t u t i o n a l and r e p r e s e n t a t i v e b a s i s would soon make European despotism Impossible and Europe r e a l l y s e c u r e . " 3 2 With P r u s s i a ' s h u m i l i a t i o n at Olmu'tz c l o s e at hand at the end of 1850, F r e d e r i c k W i l l i a m IV appealed to England f o r support, o n l y to r e c e i v e the f o l l o w i n g advice from P r i n c e A l b e r t : [A] P r u s s i a prepared to come forward as a genuine p a t t e r n of c o n s t i t u t i o n a l monarchy.on the c o n t i n e n t and with 97 u n s e l f - s e e k i n g p a t r i o t i s m to p r o t e c t the c o n s t i t u t i o n a l [ E r f u r t ] union and f o s t e r the development of the S t a t e s of Germany, w i l l possesses a moral f o r c e s u f f i c i e n t by I t s e l f to r e p e l any attack. - a f o r c e which w i l l meet with England's sympathy and support.... It w i l l be the s u r e s t guarantee to Europe of u n i v e r s a l p e a c e . 3 3 When W i l l i a m I succeeded h i s brother In 1861, A l b e r t r e i t e r a t e d t h i s p o l i c y , b e l i e v i n g that confidence In the king, achieved by an honest I n t e r p r e t a t i o n of the c o n s t i t u t i o n , was the " p o l i t i c a l summum bonum of humanity," and "the core and k e r n e l of European s a f e t y . " 3 * A l b e r t ' s daughter V i c t o r i a , the Crown P r i n c e s s of P r u s s i a , on the other hand, took a more narrow view of the problem, lamenting the p o s s i b l e consequences of her f a t h e r - i n - l a w ' s f a i l u r e to embrace the p r i n c i p l e s of c o n s t i t u t i o n a l i s m , which she b e l i e v e d "alone can be the s a v i n g -not o n l y of P r u s s i a ' s p o s i t i o n In Europe and i n Germany - but of the P r u s s i a n monarchy." 3 5 5 C l e a r l y , her concern here l a y not with European peace, but with the f a t e of the throne, which she expected her husband to possess one'day soon. Un l i k e the Crown P r i n c e s s , however, Lord L o f t u s took a continent-wide view of % t h i s q u e s t i o n ; he was c o n f i d e n t that a c o n s t i t u t i o n a l P r u s s i a would become "a Power of great Importance In m a i n t a i n i n g the peace of C e n t r a l Europe." 3*- And back in England, anyone who feared the appearance of t h i s P r u s s i a n - l e d German s t a t e In c e n t r a l Europe was reassured by Layard that such a s t a t e , d e s t i n e d as i t was to develop l i b e r a l i n s t i t u t i o n s , "should be a source' of s a t i s f a c t i o n " to the B r i t i s h , " a f f o r d i n g a d d i t i o n a l s e c u r i t y f o r the maintenance of peace. " 3 >" Sentiments such as these r e g a r d i n g both the I n e v i t a b i l i t y of a l i b e r a l v i c t o r y In P r u s s i a , and the p o s i t i v e Impact which t h i s was sure to have on 98 European s t a b i l i t y undoubtedly helped to a l l a y B r i t i s h concerns about the c h a r a c t e r of P r u s s i a ' s p o l i t i c a l development, while q u e l l i n g o p p o s i t i o n to the accomodating a t t i t u d e towards P r u s s i a adopted by most B r i t i s h statesmen d u r i n g t h i s p e r i o d . There a l s o e x i s t e d , however, a growing concern that the B r i t i s h were n e g l e c t i n g P r u s s i a n a f f a i r s , l a r g e l y because l t was f e l t they d i d not understand them. The l a c k of success in s e e i n g t h e i r goals r e a l i s e d In P r u s s i a l e d some of the more v o c i f e r o u s B r i t i s h l i b e r a l spokesmen to b e l i e v e that the f a u l t l a y not so much In P r u s s i a , as i n the l a c k of s u f f i c i e n t support from w i t h i n England I t s e l f . Mllnes, i n p a r t i c u l a r , was Incensed by the p a s s i v i t y and I n d i f f e r e n c e of England to the c o n s t i t u t i o n a l s t r u g g l e s going on i n Germany In 1848-1849. He argued t h a t , " I f we had the t r u s t In our n a t i o n a l i n s t i t u t i o n s we so g l i b l y express... and i f we comprehended them a r i g h t , we should see t h a t . . . i t Is the u n y i e l d i n g systematic nature of c o n t i n e n t a l governments which proved t h e i r r u i n . " 3 3 U n f o r t u n a t e l y , argued Mllnes, the B r i t i s h seemed b l i n d to the duty they had to support c o n s t i t u t i o n a l movements on the c o n t i n e n t , and i n P r u s s i a In p a r t i c u l a r . Morler was another who r e p e a t e d l y upbraided the B r i t i s h p u b l i c and the B r i t i s h press f o r f a i l i n g to remember that the p r i v i l e g e of t a l k i n g f r e e l y about the p o l i t i c a l problems of other c o u n t r i e s Involved the " c o r r e s p o n d i n g duty of understanding, or at l e a s t t r y i n g to understand, the s u b j e c t s we discuss." 3' 5' It was to t h i s shortcoming that Morler a t t r i b u t e d the f a c t t h at "the process towards the development of f r e e I n s t i t u t i o n s i n P r u s s i a has been watched with l e s s i n t e r e s t and 99 sympathy i n England than have been accorded to s i m i l a r phenomena e x h i b i t e d on the f a r l e s s c o n g e n i a l s o i l occupied by the L a t i n races of Southern Europe."* 0 Morier's I n s i g h t s Into the f o i b l e s of the B r i t i s h p u b l i c are even more evident In t h i s somewhat longer passage, i n which he seeks to e x p l a i n B r i t a i n ' s a l o o f n e s s from P r u s s i a n p o l i t i c s : To the Englishman, In the happy enjoyment of the p r i v i l e g e s secured to him by h i s I n s u l a r p o s i t i o n , the study of f o r e i g n p o l i t i c s has always been...more or l e s s of a d l l e t t a n t e kind. It Is as a r e c r e a t i o n r a t h e r than as an earnest part of a day's work that he turns to the columns of the newspaper r e c o r d i n g the ' f o r e i g n I n t e l l i g e n c e . ' From h i s p o i n t of view the proclamation, f o r Instance, by a Spanish Junta of the E i g h t s of Man has more of p i c t u r e s q u e circumstance connected with l t than can ever e n l i v e n a debate r e s p e c t i n g the r i g h t of an I n d i v i d u a l I s r a e l i t e to s i t at q u a r t e r s e s s i o n s i n the province of Brandenburg, or a d i s c u s s i o n of the t i t l e by which an I n d i v i d u a l clergymen In Back Pomeranla r e f u s e s to marry p a r t i e s l e g a l l y d i v o r c e d by the c i v i l t r i b u n a l . And yet l t Is from m a t e r i a l s l i k e these, r a t h e r than from such as the former, that the C o n s t i t u t i o n a l metal which passes c u r r e n t In England has been wrought.* 1 The f a c t t h a t l t was the B r i t i s h p u b l i c and the B r i t i s h press, as opposed to B r i t i s h governments, which bore the brunt of these c r i t i c i s m s suggests that the u n d e r l y i n g goal of B r i t i s h p o l i c y d u r i n g t h i s p e r i o d - the p r e s e r v a t i o n of s t a b i l i t y In P r u s s i a - met with the t a c i t approval of these B r i t i s h l i b e r a l I d e a l i s t s , whose confidence In the f u t u r e of a l i b e r a l Germany was unshakable. C e r t a i n l y some, l i k e Morier, were t r o u b l e d by the apparent c a p r l c l o u s n e s s of B r i t i s h p o l i c y d u r i n g the Danish war, and by the ambiguous c h a r a c t e r of B r i t i s h n o n - i n t e r v e n t i o n a f t e r 1864. But even here l t was to the apathy and Ignorance of the B r i t i s h p u b l i c that such p o l i c i e s were a t t r i b u t e d . In w r i t i n g to Lady S a l i s b u r y i n 1864, Morier exclaimed: "You can 100 form no conception of the i n t r i c a c y of the p o l i t i c a l gymnastics which an E n g l i s h d i p l o m a t i s t has to go through in h i s attempt to v i n d i c a t e the wisdom and c o n s i s t e n c y of the f o r e i g n p o l i c y of h i s country, or perhaps, more c o r r e c t l y speaking, of the p u b l i c o p i n i o n of which that p o l i c y Is but an echo."* 2 Nonetheless there p e r s i s t e d among these B r i t i s h observers of Germany the b e l i e f t h a t P r u s s i a n c o n s t i t u t i o n a l development had " s t r o n g c l a i m s " on the i n t e r e s t of England, as the I n t e r e s t s of the two n a t i o n s were co n s i d e r e d to be I n t i m a t e l y bound up with one another. As e a r l y as 1832 Palmerston had d e c l a r e d that the Independence of c o n s t i t u t i o n a l s t a t e s i n Germany co u l d "never be a matter of I n d i f f e r e n c e to the B r i t i s h P arliament," and that he c o n s i d e r e d such c o n s t i t u t i o n a l s t a t e s to be the " n a t u r a l a l l i e s " of E n gland.* 3 Queen V i c t o r i a ' s daughter i n B e r l i n echoed these same sentiments t h i r t y years l a t e r d u r i n g the P r u s s i a n c o n s t i t u t i o n a l c o n f l i c t , as she i n d i c a t e d that the " s a f e t y and peace of Germany and England depend on England and P r u s s i a going c o r d i a l l y together, advocating the same p r i n c i p l e s - c o n s t i t u t i o n a l l i b e r t y and p r o t e s t a n t i s m . " * * It was from t h i s , the b e l i e f that the p o l i t i c a l i n t e r e s t s of P r u s s i a and England "should be I d e n t i c a l , " that arose the c o n v i c t i o n among such B r i t i s h l i b e r a l s as David Masson that nothing "ought to hinder P r u s s i a n L i b e r a l i s m from having f u l l sympathy from Britain."*™' It should be noted t h i s "sympathy" f o r P r u s s i a n l i b e r a l i s m was o f t e n t a i n t e d by e x p r e s s i o n s of s u p e r i o r i t y which f r e q u e n t l y accompanied B r i t i s h I n t e r p r e t a t i o n s of f o r e i g n .countries' p o l i t i c a l p r a c t i c e s . Thus, while the P r u s s i a n s were regarded by 101 the Westminster Review to "deserve w e l l of the world" f o r the c o n s t i t u t i o n a l advances they had made, the P r u s s i a n s were nonetheless thought to l a c k the "keen s a g a c i t y and bold I n i t i a t i v e of t h e i r b rother Teutons." Hence l t c o u l d not be s a i d of them, "as of t h e i r b r e t h r e n across the sea," e i t h e r that " t h e i r sound Is gone out Into a l l lands, and t h e i r words Into the ends of the world," or t h a t they had "Invented the form of p o l i t i c a l government, to w h i c h . . . a l l modern na t i o n s must conform or d i e . " * 6 What can be seen emerging here Is a growing I n c o n s i s t e n c y between, on the one hand, the Idealism of B r i t i s h l i b e r a l s who embraced the l n e v l t a b i 1 1 1 I t y of P r u s s i a n l i b e r a l development, and the kind of e t h n o c e n t r i c hauteur which permeated B r i t i s h p o l i t i c a l c u l t u r e on the other. For more c o n s e r v a t i v e commentators l i k e the h i s t o r i a n A r c h i b a l d A l i s o n , the t e n s i o n s a r i s i n g from t h i s I n c o n s i s t e n c y were e a s i l y d i s s o l v e d Into the mists of time: When England became a man, she put away c h i l d i s h t h i n g s . France, by the s p o l i a t i o n s and d e s t r u c t i o n of the f i r s t R e v o l u t i o n , has l o s t the elements of freedom. But Germany yet possesses them; and I f she does not abuse her advantages, In two hundred years she may possess the mingled freedom and s t a b i l i t y which now c o n s t i t u t e at once the g l o r y and happiness of England.* 7. Not a l l B r i t i s h observers of German a f f a i r s , however, were so e a s i l y able to r e s o l v e these t e n s i o n s , p a r t i c u l a r l y when i t came to the q u e s t i o n of how much or how l i t t l e P r u s s i a n l i b e r a l s should Imitate the B r i t i s h model. Nor, as w i l l be shown, was t h i s the o n l y such c o n t r a d i c t i o n Inherent In B r i t i s h l i b e r a l s ' assessments of P r u s s i a n l i b e r a l i s m d u r i n g t h i s p e r i o d . 102 Let us t u r n now to examine i n g r e a t e r d e t a i l t h i s group's e v a l u a t i o n s of P r u s s i a n p o l i t i c s and s o c i e t y . Having e s t a b l i s h e d that the P r u s s i a n people were eminently w e l l - s u i t e d f o r l i b e r a l forms of government, and t h a t , out of c o n s i d e r a t i o n s f o r European s e c u r i t y , P r u s s i a was d e s e r v i n g of England's a t t e n t i o n Ceven If she d i d not always get such a t t e n t i o n ) , l t remained to be determined whether circumstances In P r u s s i a were a c t u a l l y p r o p i t i o u s f o r the Immediate "growth" of h e a l t h y l i b e r a l I n s t i t u t i o n s . * 3 Morier, ever o p t i m i s t i c of the f u t u r e prospects of German l i b e r a l i s m , f e l t t h a t , by v i r t u e of P r u s s i a ' s "enormous s u p e r i o r i t y In every p o l i t i c a l element," she was f u l l y prepared f o r the kinds of reforms P r u s s i a n l i b e r a l s were s e e k i n g . ^ As proof of t h i s , he r e c a l l e d the fundamental p r i n c i p l e s at stake In the c o n s t i t u t i o n a l c o n f l i c t of the 1860's, p r i n c i p l e s which were " a s s e r t e d and defended with an a b i l i t y , a determination, and a perseverance p l a i n l y denoting how the L i b e r a l p a r t y In P r u s s i a had r i p e n e d In P a r l i a m e n t a r y t r a i n i n g , and how sound l t was i n c o n s t i t u t i o n a l d o c t r 1 ne. '"!Sa P r i n c e A l b e r t was a l s o convinced of P r u s s i a ' s readiness f o r c o n s t i t u t i o n a l p a r l i a m e n t a r y government. Rebuking P r i n c e W i l l i a m In 1853 f o r doubting "whether c o n d i t i o n s i n P r u s s i a are s u f f i c i e n t l y matured f o r r e p r e s e n t a t i v e i n s t i t u t i o n s to be p o s s i b l e , " he d e c l a r e d that P r u s s i a was " r i p e f o r nothing e l s e " than a " r e p r e s e n t a t i v e C o n s t i t u t i o n with r e s p o n s i b l e M i n i s t e r s and u n f e t t e r e d e x p r e s s i o n of p u b l i c o p i n i o n . " 5 5 * Disappointed by the outcome of 1848-1849, yet f i r m In t h e i r c o n v i c t i o n t hat P r u s s i a would e v e n t u a l l y embrace E n g l i s h - s t y l e 103 p o l i t i c a l i n s t i t u t i o n s , some B r i t i s h i d e a l i s t s , however, concluded that the hour of P r u s s i a n l i b e r a l i s m had been postponed, the time not yet being r i p e f o r P r u s s i a to embrace c o n s t i t u t i o n a l self-government. A glance at P r u s s i a ' s p o l i t i c a l h i s t o r y r e v e a l e d that the necessary p r e p a r a t i o n s f o r the e x e r c i s e of r e s p o n s i b l e r e p r e s e n t a t i v e government had not yet been made, with c e r t a i n aspects of P r u s s i a ' s past a c t u a l l y working at c r o s s purposes to such l i b e r a l development. P r u s s i a n h i s t o r y was synonymous with the r i s e of the Hohenzollern f a m i l y , and above a l l with the mystique surrounding the achievements of F r e d e r i c k I I . According to the B r i t i s h Q u a r t e r l y Review, P r u s s i a was a s t a t e In which e v e r y t h i n g I n s t i t u t i o n a l had been " c o n s t r u c t e d and worked so as to exhaust p u b l i c s p i r i t , and place the men and the means of a l l f a m i l i e s at the d i s p o s a l of one f a m i l y . " ^ ^ Having c r e a t e d "the most p e r f e c t despotism," F r e d e r i c k II was seen to have "destroyed a l l those I n s t i t u t i o n s and a u t h o r i t i e s c o n s e r v a t i v e of freedom, on which a pa r l i a m e n t a r y c o n s t i t u t i o n c o u l d have a r i s e n . " " ' 3 John O'Hagan, an I r i s h Judge and a l i b e r a l J o u r n a l i s t , t h e r e f o r e concluded that In the face of a c r i s i s P r u s s i a would l a c k experienced statesmen "equal to the t a s k of c o n v e r t i n g the popular d e s i r e f o r peace and f o r a strengthened a u t h o r i t y Into a means of s e c u r i n g l i b e r t y on the a n c i e n t foundations of self-government." 5 5* Even Morier was f o r c e d to conclude that P r u s s i a a f t e r 1848 was In a s t a t e which was "one Inseparable from a l l P a r l i a m e n t a r y systems r e c e n t l y Introduced, and where s u f f i c i e n t time has not ela p s e d to r e c o n c i l e and harmonize the 104 o l d a b s o l u t i s t t r a d i t i o n s with the new popular f r a n c h i s e s . " Hence P r u s s i a had " n e i t h e r time nor o p p o r t u n i t y to form a school of p a r l i a m e n t a r y statesmen . Perhaps more s e r i o u s than such p o l i t i c a l Inexperience was the f a c t t h a t "the popular h a b i t s of thought o u t s i d e Parliament" had yet to undergo Important m o d i f i c a t i o n s In P r u s s i a . In order f o r p a r l i a m e n t a r y I n s t i t u t i o n s to f u n c t i o n p r o p e r l y as organs of n a t i o n a l e x p r e s s i o n , l t was f i r s t necessary, a c c o r d i n g to the Westminster Review, that the " I n d i v i d u a l s composing the n a t I o n . . . c r y s t a l l l z e themselves by the f o r c e of some p o l i t i c a l dogma, s t r o n g enough to c o n s t i t u t e an a r t i c l e of fa 1 t h . B u t i n P r u s s i a the process of I d e n t i f y i n g such a " p o l i t i c a l dogma" was complicated by the pervasiveness of the " o l d a b s o l u t i s t t r a d i t i o n s " r e f e r r e d to above, t r a d i t i o n s which were c e n t r a l to P r u s s i a ' s n a t i o n a l i d e n t i t y . Since B r i t i s h c o n s t i t u t i o n a l h i s t o r y demonstrated Cat l e a s t to the s a t i s f a c t i o n of the B r i t i s h ) t h a t such a b s o l u t i s t t r a d i t i o n s were I r r e c o n c i l a b l e with h e a l t h y p a r l i a m e n t a r y government, B r i t i s h I d e a l i s t s concluded that the r e t a r d a t i o n of l i b e r a l reform In P r u s s i a was, In part at l e a s t , the r e s u l t of the P r u s s i a n people's s t r o n g attachment to the o r i g i n a l source of P r u s s i a n a b s o l u t i s m - the Hohenzollern monarchy. This B r i t i s h concern over the p o s s i b i l i t y of s u p p l a n t i n g P r u s s i a n monarchlsm with a new " p o l i t i c a l dogma" embracing the p r i n c i p l e s of c o n s t i t u t i o n a l i s m and p a r l i a m e n t a r i s m r e q u i r e d , t h e r e f o r e , a c a r e f u l assessment of the Hohenzollerns' place In P r u s s i a ' s p o l i t i c a l c u l t u r e . 105 Although i t was not u n t i l the outbreak of the c o n s t i t u t i o n a l c o n f l i c t i n the e a r l y 1860's that l t became c l e a r Just e x a c t l y how d i f f i c u l t i t would be to r e c o n c i l e P r u s s i a n monarchlsm with c o n s t i t u t i o n a l p a r l i a m e n t a r y government, some B r i t i s h l i b e r a l s r e c o g n i z e d p r i o r to t h i s that a c l a s h between these p r i n c i p l e s was Imminent. C a r e f u l l y preserved by those c l a u s e s of the Vienna settlement which had e s t a b l i s h e d the German Confederation, d y n a s t l c l s m remained as a powerful f o r c e to be reckoned with by both n a t i o n a l i s t s and l i b e r a l s throughout Germany, prompting Baron Stockmar, P r i n c e A l b e r t ' s mentor, to d e s c r i b e " d y n a s t i c sentiments" as the " s p e c i a l and c h i e f Impediment to a genuine and necessary development of German n a t i o n a l l i f e . " 5 3 7 In P r u s s i a t h i s attachment to d y n a s t i c t r a d i t i o n s was e s p e c i a l l y s t r o n g because of the Intimate r e l a t i o n s h i p which was seen to e x i s t between the h i s t o r y of the P r u s s i a n s t a t e and the e x p l o i t s of the Hohenzo1lerns. The tendency among Prussi a n s to regard the s t a t e as v i r t u a l l y commensurate with the Hohenzollern f a m i l y even l e d the B r i t i s h Q u a r t e r l y Review to conclude that the P r u s s i a n s t a t e was " a l t o g e t h e r a product of f a m i l y ambition," and t h a t l t e x i s t e d " p u r e l y f o r the sake of i t s princes." 0® The problem, t h e r e f o r e , was to determine how, s p e c i f i c a l l y , P r u s s i a ' s s t r o n g monarchical t r a d i t i o n s had a f f e c t e d that country's preparedness f o r p o l i t i c a l reform. How d i d the P r u s s i a n people conceive of the monarch's r o l e In the governing of P r u s s i a ? And what about the monarchy I t s e l f ; had It h i t h e r t o promoted or hindered the development of l i b e r a l I n s t i t u t i o n s i n P r u s s i a , and how l i k e l y was i t that the monarchy would adapt 106 I t s e l f to such I n s t i t u t i o n s once they were e s t a b l i s h e d ? Not s u r p r i s i n g l y , the answers which B r i t i s h l i b e r a l s formulated f o r each of these questions were a r e f l e c t i o n of England's own experiences with c o n s t i t u t i o n a l monarchy. It was immediately obvious to a l l t h a t the P r u s s i a n people he l d t h e i r monarch In higher regard than d i d the B r i t i s h , who had long s i n c e grown accustomed to the f a c t that the r i g h t s of the B r i t i s h crown had " l a i n p r a c t i c a l l y In abeyance" f o r at l e a s t a century and half.'-'"5' Stockmar's c l a i m that the P r u s s i a n m i d d l e - c l a s s e s were " a n t 1 - d y n a s t i c " was c l e a r l y an exaggeration of the s o c i a l d i s c o n t e n t which preceded the outburst of 1848, and was h a r d l y i n keeping with the deep l o y a l t y which most Pr u s s i a n s f e l t f o r the c r o w n . 6 0 Most B r i t i s h l i b e r a l s were extremely s u s p i c i o u s of these sentiments, as they c o n s i d e r e d them o b s t a c l e s to the development of popular r e s p e c t f o r such fundamental l i b e r a l p r i n c i p l e s as c o n s t i t u t i o n a l r e s t r i c t i o n s on r o y a l p r e r o g a t i v e s , m i n i s t e r i a l r e s p o n s i b i l i t y , and pa r l i a m e n t a r y supremacy, a l l of which flew In the face of P r u s s i a n Ideas of monarchlsm. Indeed, l t was p o i n t e d l y argued by O'Hagan that i n the p e r i o d a f t e r 1850 P r u s s i a might have "obtained a sound c o n s t i t u t i o n a l system" were l t not f o r the P r u s s i a n people's attachment to the monarchy. The events of 1848-49, and blows s u s t a i n e d by the crown d u r i n g t h i s p e r i o d had shocked the s e n s i b i l i t i e s of P r u s s i a n s , who r e a c t e d to t h i s by r e j e c t i n g the l i b e r a l s ' I n t e r p r e t a t i o n s of the new c o n s t i t u t i o n In favour of the r e a c t i o n a r y i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s of M a n t e u f f e l . Of t h i s unfortunate development, O'Hagan wrote: " [ I ] t i s riot easy 107 f o r a m i n i s t e r to f o s t e r freedom when the people are eager to strengthen the sovereign power." 6 1 Here we have an e x c e l l e n t example of the w i s h f u l t h i n k i n g of B r i t i s h i d e a l i s t s ; the P r u s s i a n l i b e r a l s ' i n a b i l i t y to c a p i t a l i z e on the d i s r u p t i o n s of 1848-49, and t h e i r acquiescence In the face of t h e f M a n t e u f f e l m i n i s t r y c o u l d be e x p l a i n e d o n l y by a t t r i b u t i n g such developments to an overexaggerated attachment to the monarchy. Nor was t h i s Inordinate attachment to the monarchy simply a temporary r e a c t i o n to the d i s t u r b i n g d i s r u p t i o n s of the s o c i a l order which attended the 1848 r e v o l u t i o n i n P r u s s i a . Morier's examination of the P r u s s i a n parliament In 1859 r e v e a l e d that the Mathlas f a c t i o n - one of the two p a r t i e s composing the " m i n i s t e r i a l m a j o r i t y " - based Its popular support on an advocacy of p o l i t i c a l p r i n c i p l e s which were co-exte n s l v e with t r a d i t i o n a l P r u s s i a n n o t i o n s of monarchlsm: "Going back to the o l d days of P r u s s i a n h i s t o r y , and to the P r u s s i a of F r e d e r i c k the Great, a s t r o n g s e l f - t r u s t i n g p o l i c y on the part of the Crown, not based on the D i v i n e Right p r i n c i p l e , but on the  h i s t o r i c a l r e l a t i o n of the Hohenzollern Dynasty to the n a t i o n , i s more than any other the goal aimed at In t h e i r prograime."*- 2 [Emphasis mine] Although we are not t o l d to what extent the sentiments expressed i n Mathlas' programme were those of the P r u s s i a n p o p u l a t i o n In g e n e r a l , l t was c l e a r that Morier regarded them as a r c h a i c , p r i m a r i l y because the p o l i c i e s of t h i s f a c t i o n were h o s t i l e to the " l o g i c a l consequences" of the c o n s t i t u t i o n a l and p a r l i a m e n t a r y programme advocated by the P r u s s i a n A l t L l b e r a l e n . 6 3 108 It was, of course, d u r i n g the c o n s t i t u t i o n a l c o n f l i c t t h a t the P r u s s i a n people were f i n a l l y f o r c e d to con f r o n t t h e i r a n a c h r o n i s t i c attachments to the P r u s s i a n monarchy. It was hoped by B r i t i s h l i b e r a l s that from t h i s experience the P r u s s i a n people would l e a r n to d i s t i n g u i s h between what Morler d e s c r i b e d as t h e i r " g e n e r a l duty of l o y a l t y " and t h e i r " s p e c i a l duty as c i t i z e n s , " a d i s t i n c t i o n long s i n c e understood i n England. U n f o r t u n a t e l y , i n P r u s s i a there was a " f a r g r e a t e r danger than elsewhere of a f a l s e p e r s o n a l sentiment i n f l u e n c i n g p o l i t i c a l a c t i o n s , " and l t was p r e c i s e l y t h i s k i n d of problem which convinced some B r i t i s h l i b e r a l s t h a t P r u s s i a was not yet ready f o r the e x e r c i s e of r e s p o n s i b l e self-government. When the c o n f l i c t reached c r i s i s p r o p o r t i o n s i n 1863, the pervasiveness of the crown's Influence remained i n evidence, prompting Morler to exclaim, " I t Is I n c r e d i b l e how deep-seated Is s t i l l the f e e l i n g of l o y a l t y to the Crown, and how intense i s the a c t u a l f e e l i n g of pa i n caused even to men of very advanced opi n i o n s by having been branded by the king's own l i p s as 11loy a l  s u b j e c t s . " f e ! S B r i t i s h i d e a l i s t s regarded such l o y a l t y as one of the p r i n c i p a l causes of P r u s s i a ' s , and l a t e r Germany's, d e v i a t i o n s from the B r i t i s h example of c o n s t i t u t i o n a l government. As Dicey e x p l a i n e d I t , the B r i t i s h c o n s t i t u t i o n f u n c t i o n e d on the "unexpressed understanding t h a t . . . I f l t came to a co n t e s t , the n a t i o n would support the Parliament In preference to e i t h e r Peers or Sovereign." But i n P r u s s i a the crown a'rgued that i t possessed the d e c i d i n g vote when l t came to an I r r e c o n c i l a b l e Issue, a theory based upon the c o n v i c t i o n that "the n a t i o n would In the end support the Crown r a t h e r than the Parliament"; u n f o r t u n a t e l y , the C o n s t i t u t i o n a l p a r t y always shrank from d i s p r o v i n g t h i s theory by the " t e s t of e x p e r i e n c e . " 6 6 This r e l u c t a n c e to f o r c e the Issue because of the p r e s t i g e of the P r u s s i a n crown served w e l l the purposes of the defacto w l e l d e r of I t s power, Bismarck, who was e a s i l y able to manipulate a Chamber which f e l t i t s e l f "Impotent" i n the face of the monarchy's o p p o s i t i o n . Demonstrations of t h i s lmpotency, however, were In evidence at l e a s t a decade before Bismarck's appointment as M i n i s t e r - P r e s i d e n t , p r o v i d i n g what the Br1t1sh  Q u a r t e r l y Review d e s c r i b e d as "an i n s t r u c t i v e I l l u s t r a t i o n of the c o n s t i t u t i o n a l i s m of men who f e e l at every step that to q u a r r e l with the d y n a s t i c o r g a n i z a t i o n of the body p o l i t i c , Is, In e f f e c t , to q u a r r e l with the means of t h e i r very own p r i v i l e g e d existence." 6"'' Hence many of these B r i t i s h l i b e r a l s concluded that l i b e r a l reform In P r u s s i a , while I n e v i t a b l e In the long run, would remain stunted u n t i l such time as the Pr u s s i a n people showed themselves w i l l i n g to chall e n g e t h e i r own sentimental Cand m a t e r i a l ) attachments to the monarchy. 6' 3 But what about the P r u s s i a n monarchy I t s e l f ? Did B r i t i s h i d e a l i s t s t h i n k i t p o s s i b l e that a Hohenzollern k i n g would submit h i s a u t h o r i t y to e i t h e r c o n s t i t u t i o n a l r e s t r i c t i o n s , or the s c r u t i n y of a p a r l i a m e n t a r y m a j o r i t y , as was the case In England?6'*' In g e n e r a l , l t would seem that Dicey's s c e p t i c i s m r e g a r d i n g the " p a r l i a m e n t a r y p r o c l i v i t i e s of P r u s s i a n p r i n c e s " was shared by most B r i t i s h observers of P r u s s i a . Although, as Dicey noted, some people looked with favour upon W i l l i a m I when he was s t i l l the P r i n c e of P r u s s i a , and l a t e r h i s son F r e d e r i c k when he became the Crown P r i n c e , most agreed with F r a s e r ' s  Maqazine that c o n s t i t u t i o n a l p r i n c i p l e s were not "the most con g e n i a l to a s c i o n of H o h e n z o l l e r n . " 7 0 It was f e l t , f o r example, that the " f a i l u r e " of c o n s t i t u t i o n a l i s m In P r u s s i a In 1848 and i n subsequent years was caused not by any shortcomings on the part of I t s advocates, but was Instead the r e s u l t of c o n s t i t u t i o n a l i s m ' s i n c o m p a t i b i l i t y with the "Inherent maxims of such a monarchy as obtained i n P r u s s i a , " founded as l t was the a b s o l u t i s t and m l l t a r l s t i c t r a d i t i o n s of F r e d e r i c k I I . 7 1 N e i t h e r F r e d e r i c k W i l l i a m IV nor W i l l i a m I ever proved themselves able to break f r e e of these maxims, e l i c i t i n g from the Westminster  Review the f o l l o w i n g comment In 1871 about the l a t t e r of these " w a r l i k e Hohenzollerns": "The present King i s c h i e f l y remarkable f o r the d r i l l sergeant view he takes of p o l i t i c s , and save r e v i s i n g the P r u s s i a n army system, he has done nothi n g to e n t i t l e him to the g r a t i t u d e of an e n l i g h t e n e d people. " 7 = i It was, t h e r e f o r e , the c h a r a c t e r of the P r u s s i a n monarchy I t s e l f , and not j u s t the people's attachment to l t , which was seen to be h i n d e r i n g l i b e r a l development i n P r u s s i a . Nor was any kind of s i g n i f i c a n t change expected In t h i s s i t u a t i o n , at l e a s t u n t i l there appeared some evidence, a c c o r d i n g to Morler, that the " s t e r e o t y p e a b s o l u t i s t m i l i t a r y n o t i o n s of the Hohenzollern s c h o o l " had been abandoned. 7 3 Since there appeared to be l i t t l e chance of t h i s happening, some In England concluded that i t d i d not matter who occupied the throne of P r u s s i a ; there was no hope f o r l i b e r t y In Europe as long the P r u s s i a n Cand A u s t r i a n ) monarchies were allowed to e x i s t . 7 * Although t h i s p a r t i c u l a r view was an extreme one, l t too expressed the general f e e l i n g of pessimism which pervaded these d i s c u s s i o n s of the P r u s s i a n monarchy's r o l e In the e v o l u t i o n of l i b e r a l I n s t i t u t i o n s i n P r u s s i a . A l l of t h i s c o n t r i b u t e d to the B r i t i s h I d e a l i s t ' s b e l i e f t h a t P r u s s i a was not yet f u l l y prepared f o r the consequences of adopting such i n s t i t u t i o n s . Such a view o b v i o u s l y c o n t r a s t e d s h a r p l y with kind of optimism d e s c r i b e d above r e g a r d i n g the i n e v i t a b l e progress of P r u s s i a i n a l i b e r a l d i r e c t i o n owing to " e n l i g h t e n e d " c h a r a c t e r of the P r u s s i a n people. Having e s t a b l i s h e d t h a t It would on l y be a matter of time u n t i l P r u s s i a n l i b e r a l s achieved t h e i r goals Cas such " g o a l s " were p e r c e i v e d In England), the B r i t i s h c a u t i o u s l y avoided p r e d i c t i n g e x a c t l y when t h i s would t r a n s p i r e i n P r u s s i a ; i n s t e a d they hedged t h e i r bets by drawing a t t e n t i o n to the kinds of " d e v i a t i o n s " d e s c r i b e d above. And In order to confirm that such " d e v i a t i o n s " were indeed d e t r i m e n t a l to the cause of c o n s t i t u t i o n a l i s m and parliamentarism In P r u s s i a one had o n l y to f i n d analogous events i n the p o l i t i c a l h i s t o r i e s of P r u s s i a and England. It was thought that through such comparisons both the c o r r e c t n e s s of the E n g l i s h model, and the harm caused by departures from l t cou l d be I r r e f u t a b l y demonstrated. Perhaps the best evidence of the degree to which the B r i t i s h embraced the b e l i e f that England was Indeed the "mother of Par l i a m e n t s , " and that the h i s t o r i c a l e v o l u t i o n of B r i t i s h l i b e r a l I n s t i t u t i o n s was somehow paradigmatic Is the way In which developments In P r u s s i a were set al o n g s i d e the h i s t o r i c a l B r i t i s h "model", and judgements made on the b a s i s of P r u s s i a ' s c o n f o r m i t y to t h i s model. Few commentators on P r u s s i a n p o l i t i c s were so naive as to demand that the Prussi a n s s l a v i s h l y attempt to r e p l a y B r i t i s h c o n s t i t u t i o n a l h i s t o r y , i r r e s p e c t i v e of c i r c u m s t a n t i a l d i f f e r e n c e s . Indeed, some were q u i t e prepared to rec o g n i z e , and make p r o v i s i o n s f o r the unique c o n d i t i o n s under which P r u s s i a n l i b e r a l i s m labored Calthough the g r a n t i n g of such magnanimity became grudging a f t e r the N a t i o n a l L i b e r a l s broke with the P r o g r e s s i v e s In 1867). But the c o n s t i t u t i o n a l and pa r l i a m e n t a r y " g o a l s " f o r which P r u s s i a n l i b e r a l s were s t r u g g l i n g were u l t i m a t e l y those of V i c t o r i a n England, or so the B r i t i s h b e l i e v e d . Thus, while the B r i t i s h commentators examined so f a r appear to have been t r o u b l e d by those aspects of P r u s s i a ' s p o l i t i c a l development which d e v i a t e d from that of England Ce . q. the absence of p r a c t i c a l experience amongst P r u s s i a n p o l i t i c i a n s , t h e i r dependence on the s t a t e f o r renumerat1on, and the prevalence of monarchlsm i n P r u s s i a ) , they were a l s o keen to I d e n t i f y , f o r the sake of f u r t h e r comparison, p a r a l l e l s between the p o l i t i c a l h i s t o r y of P r u s s i a and England. The t r a n s f o r m a t i o n of the di s p u t e over army reform i n P r u s s i a I n t o a c o n s t i t u t i o n a l c o n f l i c t In the e a r l y 1860s was t h e r e f o r e h e a r t i l y embraced by contemporary B r i t i s h a n a l y s t s as the P r u s s i a n c o u n t e r p a r t to the beginnings of the E n g l i s h r e v o l u t i o n of the seventeenth century, an event which w e l l - n i g h embodied the B r i t i s h l i b e r a l s ' Cand the Sonderweq h i s t o r i a n s ' ) conception of p o l i t i c a l progress. 7-' 5 113 Hence, how P r u s s i a n l i b e r a l s and the P r u s s i a n monarchy conducted themselves In t h e i r own c o n s t i t u t i o n a l c o n f l i c t was, f o r the B r i t i s h , a good measure of P r u s s i a ' s " p r o g r e s s " towards E n g l i s h - s t y l e l i b e r a l i s m . It Is q u i t e c e r t a i n that s i m i l a r i t i e s were seen to e x i s t between these two s t r u g g l e s : " H i s t o r y Is not apt, any more than nature, to repeat I t s e l f very e x a c t l y . But t h i s P r u s s i a n s t r u g g l e . . . i s m a r v e l l o u s l y l i k e the beginning of the s t r u g g l e of our own Charles the F i r s t with the E n g l i s h people," d e c l a r e d David Masson. 7 6 And yet l t was more the actions' of the P r u s s i a n monarchy than those of P r u s s i a n l i b e r a l s which convinced the B r i t i s h t h a t the P r u s s i a n c o n s t i t u t i o n a l c o n f l i c t was comparable to that of England. 7 7' In P r u s s i a , as In England two and a h a l f c e n t u r i e s e a r l i e r , a c o n s t i t u t i o n a l monarch had committed a breach of the c o n s t i t u t i o n , and remained unrepentent. C h a r a c t e r i s t i c a l l y , the B r i t i s h regarded as s a c r i l e g e such a c h a l l e n g e to the p r i n c i p l e of p a r l i a m e n t a r y supremacy Cdespite the f a c t t h at In P r u s s i a such a n o t i o n , as l t was understood i n England, s c a r c e l y e x i s t e d In theory, never mind In p r a c t i c e ) . As Masson s t a t e d : That any k i n g under a C o n s t i t u t i o n , were he the wisest that l i v e s , should, f o r the support of an Increased army, or any other purpose, i n s i s t on having more of h i s people ' 3 money than they through t h e i r r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s w i l l vote him, and, when these r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s are f i r m , should announce h i s i n t e n t i o n of t a k i n g the money without t h e i r consent 'by means beyond the C o n s t i t u t i o n ' - t h i s i s a course of r o y a l conduct a n t i p a t h y to which, and the c o n v i c t i o n that l t ought to be opposed and f r u s t r a t e d , may s u r e l y be assumed as Incorporate with E n g l i s h nerve and blood. The r i g h t of the Commons over the n a t i o n a l purse Is a fundamental p r i n c i p l e In our o w n . p o l i t l e s , and we can h a r d l y a v o i d  extending l t to P r u s s i a . y g < [Emphasis mine] Even Lord S a l i s b u r y was among those who acknowledged that W i l l i a m I's " p e r t i n a c i t y " had " e x c i t e d the g r e a t e s t apprehension In England," where l t was f e l t that i f he p e r s i s t e d In " a r r o g a t i n g powers wholly i n c o n s i s t e n t with h i s p o s i t i o n , " then he c o u l d expect nothing e l s e but the " f a t e of Charles I." S a l i s b u r y h i m s e l f , on the other hand, r e c o g n i z e d that W i l l i a m had more r e s p e c t f o r the " t r a d i t i o n s of F r e d e r i c k the Great than f o r those of the B r i t i s h C o n s t i t u t i o n . " 7 " 5 ' But while W i l l i a m I was seen to be adhering dangerously to the example set by Charles I of England, and although i t d i d seem that among P r u s s i a n l i b e r a l s there was a h e a l t h y sense of those "wrongs of the g e n e r a l k i n d " being committed by the P r u s s i a n crown, most B r i t i s h observers f e l t t h a t a d i f f e r e n t outcome than that achieved by England would probably r e s u l t from P r u s s i a ' s c o n s t i t u t i o n a l corif 1 l e t . 1 3 0 Furthermore, l t was because of the same kinds of "weaknesses" d e s c r i b e d above that these B r i t i s h I d e a l i s t s tempered t h e i r optimism r e g a r d i n g the p o s s i b i l i t y of P r u s s i a ' s l i b e r a l s s e c u r i n g a p a r l i a m e n t a r y v i c t o r y , at l e a s t from the present c o n f l i c t , l i k e that achieved i n England two c e n t u r i e s e a r l i e r . It was obvious, f o r example, as was noted e a r l i e r , t h a t P r u s s i a had had " n e i t h e r time nor o p p o r t u n i t y to form a school of p a r l i a m e n t a r y statesmen"; a c c o r d i n g to O'Hagan, the a c t i o n s of the P r u s s i a n p a r l i a m e n t a r i a n s d u r i n g the c o n s t i t u t i o n a l c o n f l i c t c l e a r l y demonstrated both the "incomplete development of the c o n s t i t u t i o n a l system," and the kind of "Imperfect m a t u r i t y of p o l i t i c a l judgement" which proceeded from t h i s l a c k of p r a c t i c a l experience.® 1 S i m i l a r to t h i s was the p o l i t i c a l impotency which B r i t i s h l i b e r a l s f e l t had r e s u l t e d from the " p r i v i l e g e d e x i s t e n c e " of P r u s s i a n p a r l i a m e n t a r i a n s , a s i t u a t i o n which e f f e c t i v e l y strengthened the hand of the crown In the c o n f l i c t : " I f we remember how hard was the s t r u g g l e between the Long Parliament and the K i n g . . . l t Is evident that the Crown must p r e v a i l i n any s i m i l a r c o n f l i c t with the P r u s s i a n parliament, which has not the m a t e r i a l foundation of independence, and would be d i s a b l e d by the s t o p p i n g of the s u p p l i e s which each member r e c e i v e s from the s t a t e . " 3 2 F i n a l l y , there were the problems c r e a t e d by the prevalence of monarchlsm In P r u s s i a . A c c o r d i n g to F r a s e r ' a Magazine, the P r u s s i a n people's s t r o n g attachments to the Hohenzollern monarchy d i d not bode w e l l f o r the f u t u r e of the P r u s s i a n c o n s t i t u t i o n a l c o n f l i c t : "The P r u s s i a n s of the present day are l i t t l e l i k e the E n g l i s h of the time of Hampden. Submissive and c r e s t f a l l e n , a f t e r t h e i r defeat by F r e d e r i c W i l l i a m IV and h i s c o a d j u t o r s , Manteuffel and Westphalen - no sooner does W i l l i a m I ascend the throne than the s t r i n g s of p o p u l a r i t y rebound and are again In o v e r s t r a i n e d v i g o u r . " 3 3 Nor d i d such c r i t i c i s m s end here. The very nature of P r u s s i a ' s c o n s t i t u t i o n a l c o n f l i c t was seen to l a c k the kind of d i s t i n c t i o n and high-mlndedness which s l n g l e d - o u t as unique the B r i t i s h s t r u g g l e a g a i n s t the S t u a r t s . Absent from the cause of the P r u s s i a n l i b e r a l s was " a l l that accumulation of noble i n g r e d i e n t s " which Masson claimed had once d i g n i f i e d "the E n g l i s h l i b e r a l i s m of E l i o t , and Pym, and Hampden." Hence the P r u s s i a n c o n f l i c t was thought to c o n t a i n more of the mere "Tonnage and Poundage" que s t i o n , and l e s s of those other great q u e s t i o n s of " I n t e l l e c t u a l and s p i r i t u a l l i b e r t y with which the Tonnage and Poundage q u e s t i o n i n England was then i n e x t r i c a b l y associated."®* Here once again, t h e r e f o r e , we f i n d evidence of that s u p e r i o r B r i t i s h a t t i t u d e a l l u d e d to above. These comparisons of the P r u s s i a n c o n t e s t with the E n g l i s h r e v o l u t i o n served, t h e r e f o r e , a dual purpose; they r e a f f i r m e d f o r B r i t i s h l i b e r a l s t h e i r b e l i e f i n the s u p e r i o r i t y of the B r i t i s h p o l i t i c a l system, while c o n f i r m i n g t h e i r s u s p i c i o n s that the "abnormal" development of P r u s s i a n l i b e r a l i s m , In evidence since 1848, was simply the r e s u l t of t r a n s i t o r y Influences p e c u l i a r to P r u s s i a - foremost among these being the P r u s s i a n people's marked attachment to the monarchy, and t h e i r p o l i t i c a l i n e x p e r i e n c e . Hence there arose the q u e s t i o n of how c l o s e l y was P r u s s i a to p a t t e r n I t s e l f on the model of England, where c o n s t i t u t i o n a l i s m and parliamentarism were c o n s i d e r e d f u l l y developed, but where such p e c u l i a r i t i e s of circumstance d i d not e x i s t . C l e a r l y , the B r i t i s h b e l i e v e d they had a duty to impart to others the b e n e f i t s of t h e i r own system: "Can we to men benighted The true lamp of l i f e deny?'"2""' But while the B r i t i s h model remained foremost In t h e i r minds, p a r t i c u l a r l y d u r i n g t h e i r assessments of e x i s t i n g c o n s t i t u t i o n a l and p a r l i a m e n t a r y p r a c t i c e s In P r u s s i a , B r i t i s h i d e a l i s t s were chary to suggest the wholesale adoption of B r i t i s h I n s t i t u t i o n s by P r u s s i a . Although u n w i l l i n g to abandon t h e i r b e l i e f In the eventual triumph of l i b e r a l i s m i n P r u s s i a , B r i t i s h I d e a l i s t s were f o r c e d to acknowledge, at l e a s t i m p l i c i t l y , the e x i s t e n c e 117 of t h a t chasm which separated the p o l i t i c a l c u l t u r e s of England and P r u s s i a . It Is odd that B r i t i s h observers of Germany, having expressed such an I n t e r e s t In the s u i t a b i l i t y of P r u s s i a f o r l i b e r a l p o l i t i c a l reform as they conceived l t , should then back away from the l o g i c a l consequence of t h e i r arguments, which was that P r u s s i a take to I t s e l f E n g l i s h - s t y l e l i b e r a l I n s t i t u t i o n s . Yet t h i s was e x a c t l y what some d i d , although, I r o n i c a l l y , they r e s e r v e d f o r themselves the r i g h t to c r i t i c i z e , on the b a s i s of t h e i r own system of government, any reforms a c t u a l l y undertaken by P r u s s i a n politicians.' 3" 5-- Of t h i s l a t t e r tendency, Morler c y n i c a l l y remarked: [ I ] t happens that P r u s s i a , while weaving her C o n s t i t u t i o n a l woof a f t e r a p a t t e r n of her own, not copied from that of any of our schools of p o l i t i c a l design, appears to us In so f a r to be g u i l t y of a p o l i t i c a l heresy, as being orthodox n e i t h e r i n her dogmas nor i n her d i s s e n t from those dogmas, - f o r an Englishman, i n p o l i t i c s no l e s s than in r e l i g i o n , l i k e s h i s very heterodoxy to be orthodox.® 7 But not a l l B r i t i s h l i b e r a l s were e n t i r e l y ignorant of e i t h e r the unique circumstances i n which P r u s s i a n l i b e r a l s found themselves, or the p o t e n t i a l l y d i s a s t r o u s consequences of attempting to f i t P r u s s i a f o r what F r e d e r i c k W i l l i a m IV once d e s c r i b e d as "unqerman n o t i o n s " of p o l i t i c a l reform.®' 3 When the p e c u l i a r formation of the P r u s s i a n s t a t e was considered, with It s "combination of peoples and I n t e r e s t s under one n a t i o n a l name - Its s t r u g g l i n g form and strange d i v i s i o n s - and I t s absence of common h i s t o r i c a l a s s o c i a t i o n s , " l e s s i d e a l i s t i c l i b e r a l s l i k e Mllnes came to the c o n c l u s i o n that l t was not n e c e s s a r i l y to the B r i t i s h p o l i t y t h a t " P r u s s i a should look f o r [ c o n s t i t u t i o n a l ] I n s t r u c t i o n and analogies.''^' E s p e c i a l l y I n s t r u c t i v e appear to be the views expressed In the B r i t I s h  Q u a r t e r l y Review by a s e l f - d e s c r i b e d c o n s t i t u t i o n a l i s t a f t e r the " o l d E n g l i s h f a s h i o n , " who s t a t e d : "We are f a r from t h i n k i n g that anything l i k e a counter p a r t of the I n s t i t u t i o n s so designated among us, i s e i t h e r d e s i r a b l e or p o s s i b l e In the case of the great m a j o r i t y of people of Europe." Arguing t h a t the Pru s s i a n s , among others, should be more concerned about the " p r a c t i c a b l e and reasonable In t h e i r own s p e c i a l c ircumstances" and " l e s s about the h i s t o r i c a l c o n s t i t u t i o n of the E n g l i s h , " he goes on to po i n t out t h a t , while l t might be very agreeable to B r i t i s h v a n i t y "to suppose that England Is d e s t i n e d to become the normal school In p o l i t i c s f o r a l l the world," the B r i t i s h should a l s o remember that the " s t r u g g l e f o r c o n s t i t u t i o n a l l i b e r t y on the c o n t i n e n t " c o u l d never be the same as i t had been i n England, owing to the i n s u l a r p o s i t i o n of the l a t t e r . 'r="° T h i s , of course, d i d not mean that the u l t i m a t e success o f t h i s s t r u g g l e , as i t was played out i n P r u s s i a , was thought to be any l e s s assured, f o r such was not the case. But what t h i s does show i s t h at some B r i t i s h l i b e r a l s p e r c e i v e d what most d i d not; namely, that l i b e r a l i s m i n P r u s s i a had a c h a r a c t e r a l l I t s own, and that such a c h a r a c t e r was not n e c e s s a r i l y conformable to E n g l i s h - s t y l e I n s t i t u t i o n s . ' 3 1 It Is I n t e r e s t i n g to note that In 1871 c e r t a i n P r u s s i a n l i b e r a l s a l s o attempted to make t h i s same p o i n t , a d d r e s s i n g themselves to a B r i t i s h audience i n an attempt to secure B r i t i s h support f o r the new German Empire. Among these was Reinhold 119 P a u l l , who, while l e c t u r i n g at the P h i l o s o p h i c a l I n s t i t u t i o n of Edinburgh, acknowledged both the Importance, and the l i m i t a t i o n s of England's r o l e as an example f o r other c o n s t i t u t i o n a l s t a t e s , and P r u s s i a In p a r t i c u l a r : D i f f e r e n t In I t s o r i g i n from the a n c i e n t crown of England, and of a l a t e r date, [ P r u s s i a ] has had to solve d i f f e r e n t problems too. In t h e i r s t r u g g l e s f o r p o l i t i c a l l i b e r t y the n a t i o n s of Europe w i l l ever look up to the c o n s t i t u t i o n a l p r i n c i p l e s of your country. But can they be adopted In t h e i r f u l l extent as a u n i v e r s a l model, as a panacea f o r every place and every time? - 5 8 2 P a u l l e v i d e n t l y f e l t that they c o u l d not. K a r l H ildebrand was another who saw f i t to q u e s t i o n the u n r e f l e c t i v e employment i n P r u s s i a of p o l i t i c a l concepts which were, e s s e n t i a l l y , "composed of E n g l i s h elements adapted to French forms." What t r o u b l e d Hildebrand In p a r t i c u l a r was that nobody ever r e a l l y questioned whether i t was a d v i s a b l e to "apply I n d i s c r i m i n a t e l y the same form of government to a l l nations of the globe, from Englishmen to negroes." Thus, while h i m s e l f owning to a preference f o r self-government "when e x e r c i s e d under l o c a l and a r i s t o c r a t i c I nfluence, as In England," Hildebrand r e j e c t e d suggestions that the new Germany h a s t i l y adopt B r i t i s h p o l i t i c a l p r a c t i c e s : Would l t not be In v a i n to attempt founding a s t a t e a r t i f i c i a l l y upon the E n g l i s h plan, In a country l i k e Germany, p o l i t i c a l l y the r e s u l t of 1648? Would l t be p o s s i b l e , even were l t a d v i s a b l e , to o b l i t e r a t e the t r a c e s of three c e n t u r i e s of Roman Law and French a b s o l u t i s m from the pages of her h i s t o r y , and l i n k her present p o l i t i c a l forms to those of Luther's time?...Who can deny that [ i t s bureaucracy] has c o n t r i b u t e d to the power and greatness of P r u s s i a ? And i s not the saying, 'Ye s h a l l know the t r e e by Its f r u i t , ' a p p l i c a b l e to p o l i t i c a l 1nst1tut i o n s ? " 9 3 P a u l l and Hildebrand's o p p o s i t i o n to the r e f o u n d l n g of the P r u s s i a n s t a t e " a r t i f i c i a l l y upon the E n g l i s h p l a n , " was the 120 r e s u l t of a d i f f i c u l t problem to which many in England a l s o addressed t h e i r concerns. What was r e a l l y at issue here was the p r o p r i e t y of r i g i d l y a p p l y i n g a b s t r a c t c o n s t i t u t i o n a l and pa r l i a m e n t a r y d o c t r i n e s to a country l i k e P r u s s i a , r a t h e r than a l l o w i n g f o r the " n a t u r a l " development of these d o c t r i n e s w i t h i n the s e t t i n g i n which they were expected to s u r v i v e and f l o u r i s h . For H i l d e b r a n d t h i s was a q u e s t i o n of p a r t i c u l a r concern, as he saw In l t the key to both the past and f u t u r e development of p o l i t i c a l i n s t i t u t i o n s In P r u s s i a and Germany. Hildebrand acknowledged that the P r u s s i a n c o n s t i t u t i o n of 1850 had been " a r t i f i c i a l l y g r a f t e d " upon the body p o l i t i c of P r u s s i a "In consequence of the r i o t s of 1848 and 1849," and that the pa r l i a m e n t a r y i n s t i t u t i o n s of northern Germany had been " t r a n s p l a n t e d de toutes p i e c e s to a s o i l u t t e r l y unprepared f o r t h e i r r e c e p t i o n , i n s t e a d of s p r i n g i n g up by n a t u r a l processes at a season p r o p i t i o u s f o r t h e i r growth." But In s p i t e of t h i s , P r u s s i a had preserved i n t a c t her o r i g i n a l c h a r a c t e r as a m i l i t a r y and b u r e a u c r a t i c s t a t e , and had succeeded i n f u l f i l l i n g what Hil d e b r a n d regarded as "the fundamental c o n d i t i o n s of a l l modern S t a t e s , " - the maintenance of order, n a t i o n a l Independence, and I n d i v i d u a l l i b e r t y . Having f u l f i l l e d these c o n d i t i o n s Calthough "by d i f f e r e n t means and under other forms" than those which the B r i t i s h were accustomed t o ) , he asked whether England was j u s t i f i e d i n " r e j e c t i n g the b e n e f i t s c o n f e r r e d . " Even more Importantly, he noted that the " r e i g n of a b s t r a c t theory" was seen to be drawing to a c l o s e i n P r u s s i a n p o l i t i c s , which i n t u r n guaranteed the " f u t u r e development of 121 German p a r l i a m e n t a r y I n s t i t u t i o n s . ' " " * Thus, Hildebrand regarded the c o n s t i t u t i o n a l and p a r l i a m e n t a r y h i s t o r y of P r u s s i a as a c u r i o u s blend of the t h e o r e t i c a l and the p r a c t i c a l , with the l a t t e r g r a d u a l l y s u p p l a n t i n g the former, and e n s u r i n g both the f i t n e s s and d u r a b i l i t y of P r u s s i a n p o l i t i c a l institutions.'"™' B r i t i s h i d e a l i s t s , however, tended to see P r u s s i a as embracing e i t h e r one or the other of these two approaches. P r u s s o p h i l e s l i k e Morler and Dicey were anxious to demonstrate that P r u s s i a ' s c o n s t i t u t i o n a l and p a r l i a m e n t a r y I n s t i t u t i o n s r e s t e d on a s t r o n g p r a c t i c a l foundation that was w e l l - s u i t e d to the country's needs. Only under these circumstances c o u l d i t be hoped that l i b e r a l i s m would f l o u r i s h In P r u s s i a , thus e a r n i n g her the g o o d w i l l of England. In the c o n s t i t u t i o n a l h i s t o r y of P r u s s i a , t h e r e f o r e , Morler saw evidence of a " l i v i n g process d e r i v e d from a p o s t e r i o r i experiences Instead of from a p r i o r i d o c t r i n e s . " T h i s he c o n s i d e r e d the o n l y method by which " p o l i t i c a l f r u i t s of a permanent k i n d " c o u l d be matured i n P r u s s i a : , A n a t u r a l growing upwards of a l i v i n g organism i n obedience to laws w r i t t e n In the h i s t o r y of the past and In the c h a r a c t e r of the people, Instead of an a r t i f i c i a l and Inorganic mechanism imposed from above, and obeying no Impulse but that given to i t by the c a p r i c e s of an I n d i v i d u a l or the stereotype t r a d i t i o n s of a d y n a s t i c p o l i c y : such Is the c o n t r a s t presented by P r u s s i a n I n s t i t u t i o n s as compared with those of the three g i g a n t i c neighbours on whose f r o n t i e r s her own abut. 1" 6 S i m i l a r l y , the new German s t a t e which Dicey saw being formed a f t e r Sadowa - a s t a t e which would be " v i r t u a l l y P r u s s i a under new c o n d i t i o n s of e x i s t e n c e " - was n e i t h e r Utopian, nor t h e o r e t i c a l . It .was Instead, he argued, "eminently 122 m a t t e r — o f - f a c t , p r o s a i c , and common p l a c e , " and was thus " w e l l s u i t e d to commend i t s e l f to the i n s t i n c t s of the German n a t i o n . " 9 7 Hence both of these men were o p t i m i s t i c about the f u t u r e of a P r u s s i a n - l e d German s t a t e , given the f a c t u a l and concrete foundation on which P r u s s i a ' s p o l i t i c a l I n s t i t u t i o n s were seen to r e s t . And indeed, r a t h e r than being an e x p r e s s i o n of d i s a p p r o b a t i o n , Dicey's warning t h a t P r u s s i a n p a r l i a m e n t a r i s m might appear u n f a m i l i a r to B r i t i s h observers was simply an acknowledgement of the " o r g a n i c " , a p o s t e r i o r i o r i g i n of P r u s s i a ' s p a r l i a m e n t a r y p r a c t i c e s . 9 8 Other B r i t i s h observers, on the other hand, feared that P r u s s i a n l i b e r a l s were making the same mistakes which Burke had accused the French of making In 1790 - that of p u r s u i n g p o l i t i c a l reform s o l e l y on the b a s i s of a b s t r a c t schemes which had no b a s i s In e x p e r i e n c e . 9 9 And as Milnes had p o i n t e d out In 1849, "[T]he whole a r t and mystery of c o n s t i t u t i o n a l government Is to teach men to govern themselves, - and t h i s can be l e a r n e d by experience alone." The f a c t of the matter was that In " f a c i l i t a t i n g and p e r f e c t i n g l i b e r a l I n s t i t u t i o n s , " r a t i o c i n a t i o n wielded an i n d i r e c t i n f l u e n c e at b e s t . 1 0 0 While i t was true that the German had a n a t u r a l penchant f o r philosophy which in t u r n predisposed him to Imbibe c o n s t i t u t i o n a l d o c t r i n e s , t h i s In no way prepared P r u s s i a n s f o r the a c t u a l a p p l i c a t i o n of such d o c t r i n e s i n the p o l i t i c a l arena: Hence In r e a d i n g the speeches of any c o n s t i t u t i o n a l leaders...one Is s t r u c k with the d o c t r l n a I r e complacency which comes out In almost every sentence, Imparting to a l l they do In t h i s way the c a s t of an e s o t e r i c s c i e n c e . 1 0 1 123 Even Morier lamented that the p u r p o r t e d l y l i b e r a l H o h enzollern-Auerswald m i n i s t r y , which e x e r c i s e d such Influence over W i l l i a m I when he f i r s t became Regent In 1858, was composed l a r g e l y of " d o c t r i n a i r e s r a t h e r than men t r i e d i n the f i r e of r e a l p a r t y s t r i f e . " Such men had never r e a l l y taken part i n the p a r l i a m e n t a r y l i f e of P r u s s i a , and were connected to the P r u s s i a n l i b e r a l movement s o l e l y by the f o r c e of " a b s t r a c t d o c t r i n e s " and s o c i a l t i e s , which perhaps accounted f o r the m i n i s t r y ' s p r e c i p i t o u s d e m i s e . 1 0 2 Moreover, F r a s e r ' s Magazine argued that c e r t a i n f e a t u r e s of P r u s s i a ' s p a r l i a m e n t a r y p r o t o c o l , such as the "mischievous h a b i t " of s e l e c t i n g , as p r e s i d e n t s of the Chambers, the l e a d e r s of prominent p a r t i e s , demonstrated that P r u s s i a n p a r l i a m e n t a r i a n s p r e f e r r e d the " t h e o r e t i c a l l y p e r f e c t " French p a t t e r n of o r g a n i z a t i o n to that of the " t r i e d p r a c t i c a l r u l e s by which the E n g l i s h houses are g u i d e d . " 1 0 3 Hence the B r i t i s h continued to o f f e r the model of England as an example to be emulated, even while emphasizing that l t was necessary f o r the P r u s s i a n s to a v o i d being too d o c t r i n a i r e i n the a r t i c u l a t i o n of t h e i r own l i b e r a l i n s t i t u t i o n s and p r a c t i c e s . It seems t h a t by a t t a c h i n g such importance to t h i s German penchant f o r a p r i o r i thought, p a r t i c u l a r l y In p o l i t i c s , B r i t i s h I d e a l i s t s were employing yet another s t r a t e g y designed to account f o r the d i s a p p o i n t i n g progress of l i b e r a l i s m In P r u s s i a . However, i f we look at how c l o s e l y they a c t u a l l y adhered to t h e i r advocacy of Indigenous, n o n - d o c t r l n a I r e l i b e r a l development In P r u s s i a , the t r a n s p a r e n c y of t h i s s t r a t e g y immediately becomes obvious. For while the B r i t i s h c r i t i c i z e d P r u s s i a n l i b e r a l s f o r being o v e r l y - a t t a c h e d to the p o l i t i c a l d o c t r i n e s of other c o u n t r i e s , France i n p a r t i c u l a r , they r e f u s e d to recognize that some of P r u s s i a ' s d e v i a t i o n s from the h e a l t h y example of England were the d i r e c t r e s u l t of a p o s t e r i o r i experiences d e r i v e d from the e x c e p t i o n a l circumstances In which P r u s s i a n l i b e r a l s found themselves. Foremost among these " d e v i a t i o n s " was the e x i s t e n c e of u n e l e c t e d m i n i s t e r s and the absence of a law of m i n i s t e r i a l r e s p o n s i b i l i t y - f e a t u r e s of P r u s s i a ' s p o l i t y which were d e s c r i b e d as being " t o t a l l y opposed to the most l i m i t e d a p p l i c a t i o n of the p r i n c i p l e s of popular government." 1 0* Even those i n England, l i k e A l b e r t and Morler, who b e t t e r understood than most the e s s e n t i a l c h a r a c t e r of P r u s s i a ' s p o l i t i c a l c u l t u r e balked at the suggestion that m i n i s t e r i a l r e s p o n s i b i l i t y was a concept u n s u i t a b l e f o r P r u s s i a . Indeed, A l b e r t was convinced that such a concept, c e n t r a l as l t was to the o p e r a t i o n of p a r l i a m e n t a r y government In England, was o even more necessary on the Continent, where governments were an "outgrowth of a r e l a t i o n of supremacy and s u b o r d i n a t i o n between Sovereign and s u b j e c t " : [As] the servant, t r a i n e d i n Ideas n a t u r a l to t h i s r e l a t i o n , does not know which to obey - the law or the Sovereign - the e x i s t e n c e of such a law [of r e s p o n s i b i l i t y ] would deprive him of the excuse which, should he o f f e n d the law, and so be g u i l t y of a crime, Is ready to h i s hand i n the phrase 'The Sovereign ordered It so - I have merely obeyed!'; while l t would be p r o t e c t i o n to the Sovereign t h a t h i s servants, I f g u i l t y of a crime, should not be able to saddle him with the blame of i t . 1 0 8 5 Morler, on the other hand, saw, running throughout the whole c o n s t i t u t i o n a l c o n f l i c t , a thread of u n r e a l i t y s i n c e the l i b e r a l 125 m a j o r i t y was not a c t i n g with the "Damocles-sword of r e s p o n s i b i l i t y " hanging over i t s head. Like A l b e r t , Morler regarded such a law as the " r e g u l a t i n g f o r c e of P a r l i a m e n t a r y l i f e - the having on the morrow to give p r a c t i c a l e f f e c t to the vote of y e s t e r d a y . " 1 0 6 . Here once again the claims of B r i t i s h I d e a l i s t s appear to have been c o n t r a d i c t o r y . For Just as l t Is d i f f i c u l t to r e c o n c i l e the Implied s u b l i m i t y and matchlessness of B r i t a i n ' s c o n s t i t u t i o n a l h i s t o r y with the . suggest ion that the B r i t i s h experience was a l s o normative, so does l t appear I n c o n s i s t e n t f o r B r i t i s h l i b e r a l s to have c r i t i c i z e d P r u s s i a n l i b e r a l s f o r t h e i r u n r e f l e c t l v e adoption of f o r e i g n p o l i t i c a l d o c t r i n e s on the one hand, while being e q u a l l y c r i t i c a l of t h e i r f a i l u r e to a f f e c t a law of m i n i s t e r i a l r e s p o n s i b i l i t y on the other. Since such a law was considered a cornerstone i n the B r i t i s h c o n s t i t u t i o n a l - p a r l i a m e n t a r y e d i f i c e , l t Is not s u r p r i s i n g that most B r i t i s h l i b e r a l s were r e l u c t a n t to see P r u s s i a forego I t s development, even though such a law was f o r e i g n to P r u s s i a . At best P r u s s i a and Germany were con s i d e r e d l u c k y f o r not having " c o n t r a c t e d the v i c e s which g e n e r a l l y r e s u l t from an absence of r e s p o n s i b i l i t y . " 1 0 ' 7 Any suggestion t h a t such a s e r i o u s compromise of "normal" p a r l i a m e n t a r y p r a c t i c e s was somehow J u s t i f i a b l e i n P r u s s i a c l e a r l y i m p l i e d a r e p u d i a t i o n of England's r o l e as the vanguard of European l i b e r a l i s m - an idea which was t o t a l l y unacceptable to B r i t i s h I d e a l i s t s . * * * Almost without exception, the views d e s c r i b e d above r e f l e c t the degree to which the p o l i t i c a l "consciousness of B r i t i s h l i b e r a l s was permeated with the b e l i e f that England had been " s e l e c t e d by Providence as a model of free and o r d e r l y government to mankind." And Just as many of the h i s t o r i c a l I n t e r p r e t a t i o n s d i s c u s s e d In the opening chapter Involved the e v a l u a t i o n of German h i s t o r y with a view to a f f i r m i n g the p r o p r i e t y of the Western l i b e r a l t r a d i t i o n , so a l s o , l t would seem, d i d B r i t i s h l i b e r a l s In the mid-nineteenth century keep one eye f i r m l y a f f i x e d on B r i t i s h I n s t i t u t i o n s when a s s e s s i n g the p o l i t i c a l development of P r u s s i a . But whereas h i s t o r i a n s w r i t i n g s i n c e World War II have been preoccupied l a r g e l y with t r y i n g to e x p l a i n why German l i b e r a l i s m f a i l e d , B r i t i s h l i b e r a l s w r i t i n g about P r u s s i a d u r i n g the p e r i o d 1848-1871 contemplated no such f a i l u r e ; on the c o n t r a r y , they were convinced that the progress of l i b e r a l I n s t i t u t i o n s In P r u s s i a was assured. U n f o r t u n a t e l y , events In P r u s s i a f o l l o w i n g 1848 m i l i t a t e d a g a i n s t the I d e a l i s t s ' optimism. But r a t h e r than accept t h i s unpleasant r e a l i t y , B r i t i s h i d e a l i s t s set about s h o r i n g up t h e i r I l l u s i o n s c o n c e r n i n g P r u s s i a ' s p o l i t i c a l f u t u r e through the employment of those kinds of a n a l y t i c a l s t r a t e g i e s d e s c r i b e d above - s t r a t e g i e s which d e r i v e d t h e i r e x p l a n a t o r y power from the p e c u l i a r i t y of P r u s s i a n circumstances, but which, most Importantly, permitted B r i t i s h l i b e r a l s to h o l d f a s t to t h e i r b e l i e f i n the eventual triumph of t h e i r Ideas, even If such a consummation was seen to be coming l a t e r r a t h e r than sooner. Convinced t h a t P r u s s i a represented the " i n t e l l i g e n c e , the progress and the wealth of Germany," and that a l i b e r a l t r a n s f o r m a t i o n of P r u s s i a was t h e r e f o r e i n e v i t a b l e , B r i t i s h i d e a l i s t s e a g e r l y embraced as proof of t h i s such developments as the l i b e r a l c h a r a c t e r of the 1848 r e v o l t s ; Frederick. W i l l i a m I V s apparent defense of c o n s t i t u t i o n a l i s m In Hesse-Cassel i n 1850; the "New E r a " m i n i s t r y and the a c c e s s i o n of W i l l i a m I; and the r e s i s t a n c e of the P r u s s i a n Chamber, with the support of the Crown P r i n c e , d u r i n g the c o n s t i t u t i o n a l c o n f l i c t . Upon r e c o g n i z i n g that such developments, the l a t t e r In p a r t i c u l a r , had not r e s u l t e d i n a l i b e r a l "breakthrough" i n P r u s s i a ' s c o n s t i t u t i o n a l and p a r l i a m e n t a r y development, B r i t i s h I d e a l i s t s , r a t h e r than r e t r e a t i n g , found excuses f o r the delayed r e a l i z a t i o n of t h e i r g o a ls, a p p e a l i n g to the p a r l i a m e n t a r y inexperience of P r u s s i a n s , t h e i r attachments to the monarchy, and the P r u s s i a n penchant f o r a b s t r a c t p o l i t i c a l d o c t r i n e s . The f a c t t h at each of these s t r a t e g i e s c a l l e d a t t e n t i o n to P r u s s i a n a t t i t u d e s and p r a c t i c e s which were s p e c i f i c a l l y " u n - E n g l i s h " demonstrates that B r i t i s h I d e a l i s t s had adopted what l a t e r came to be c a l l e d a "Whig" p e r s p e c t i v e In t h e i r e v a l u a t i o n of P r u s s i a n l i b e r a l i s m . The prevalence of t h i s p e r s p e c t i v e i s confirmed by t h e i r w i l l i n g n e s s to suspend t h e i r c r i t i c i s m of P r u s s i a n s as being too d o c t r i n a i r e j u s t long enough to demand that they adopt, u n t r i e d , a law of m i n i s t e r i a l r e s p o n s i b i l i t y , s i n c e such a law was Indispensable to B r i t i s h p a r l i a m e n t a r y government. At best, t h e r e f o r e , the views of these B r i t i s h i d e a l i s t s gave r i s e to that p a r t i c u l a r s t y l e of d i s c o u r s e which, as we have seen, was f r e q u e n t l y adopted by 128 B r i t i s h statesmen when d i s c u s s i n g England's r e l a t i o n s with P r u s s i a ; at worst, It f o s t e r e d a complacent a t t i t u d e In England r e g a r d i n g the development of l i b e r a l I n s t i t u t i o n s i n P r u s s i a and Germany - a complacency which permitted B r i t i s h policy-makers to set a s i d e any concerns they might have had r e g a r d i n g t h e i r p u r s u i t of p o l i c i e s which f a c i l i t a t e d P r u s s i a ' s u n i f i c a t i o n of Germany. But while l t seems f a i r l y c l e a r as to how B r i t i s h I d e a l i s t s maintained t h e i r i l l u s i o n s r e g a r d i n g the f u t u r e of P r u s s i a n l i b e r a l i s m , l e s s obvious i s why such I l l u s i o n s were maintained. Was It out of an unshakable b e l i e f In the i n e v i t a b i l i t y of l i b e r a l development on the c o n t i n e n t , I r r e s p e c t i v e of any a c t i v e support from England? C e r t a i n l y some B r i t i s h l i b e r a l s demanded th a t people In England take a g r e a t e r i n t e r e s t In P r u s s i a n and German a f f a i r s which were l a r g e l y thought to be misunderstood by the B r i t i s h p u b l i c . However, demands that the B r i t i s h government take a more a c t i v e r o l e In promoting l i b e r a l i s m on the c o n t i n e n t are almost e n t i r e l y absent from the many views d e s c r i b e d above, a p p a r e n t l y c o n f i r m i n g t h i s n o t i o n that the I d e a l i s t s regarded the progress of l i b e r a l I n s t i t u t i o n s In P r u s s i a to be Inexorable. The f o l l o w i n g passage taken from the Westmlnlster Review In 1851 i s c l e a r l y an e x c e p t i o n to the i d e a l i s t s ' g e neral acceptance of B r i t i s h p o l i c y r e g a r d i n g P r u s s i a and Germany: 'The ,continent Is not yet r i p e f o r c o n s t i t u t i o n a l freedom. Brought up under the t u t e l a g e of a p o l i c e , the bulk of the people do not even wish to be c o n s t i t u t i o n a l l y governed, and the s l i g h t e s t r e l e a s e from a b s o l u t i s m would plunge them Into anarchy. A s t r o n g German c o n f e d e r a t i o n or union, founded upon popular r i g h t s and l i b e r a l p r i n c i p l e s would derange the balance of power; but while Germany Is governed upon a b s o l u t i s t p r i n c i p l e s , there Is l i t t l e f e a r of even y 129 commmercial competition, and i t s s t a t e o f p o l i t i c a l d a r k n e s s w i l l make our Whig t w i l i g h t look l i k e a noon-day of l i b e r t y , and the mouths of r a d i c a l s w i l l e a s i l y be stopped.' Thus runs the r e a s o n i n g of that s h o r t - s i g h t e d p o l i c y t h a t drags England down from the height of her g l o r i o u s mission, to a s s i s t i n d e v e l o p i n g the l i b e r t i e s of E u r o p e . x o e There i s , however, another r e l a t e d e x p l a n a t i o n f o r the I d e a l i s t s ' p r e o c c u p a t i o n with u s i n g what they conceived to be P r u s s i a ' s " d e v i a t i o n s " from the B r i t i s h model as an e x p l a n a t i o n f o r the course of P r u s s i a ' s p o l i t i c a l development d u r i n g and a f t e r 1848j such an approach r e l e a s e d them from the need to q u e s t i o n the u n i v e r s a l i t y of the B r i t i s h l i b e r a l Ideal - an Ideal which was r e l i g i o u s l y Invoked both as the source of England's p r o s p e r i t y and s t a b i l i t y In the mid-nineteenth century, and as J u s t i f i c a t i o n f o r e v e r y t h i n g from the p o s s e s s i o n of a g l o b a l empire to demands f o r f r e e trade with the German Z o l l v e r e I n . Thus, r a t h e r than c h a l l e n g e the n o t i o n that B r i t i s h l i b e r a l i s m was based on p r i n c i p l e s of n a t u r a l law which operated u n i v e r s a l l y , B r i t i s h i d e a l i s t s concluded that P r u s s i a had simply s t r a y e d t e m p o r a r i l y from the path of normal development. It i s from t h i s u n w i l l i n g n e s s to q u e s t i o n the v a l i d i t y of e i t h e r the concept of "normal development", or England's own h i s t o r i c a l Journey down such a path that there emerged the foundations f o r the Sonderweg e x p l a n a t i o n f o r Germany's past, which Is simply a c o n t i n u a t i o n - a l b e i t under wholly new circumstances - of t h i s same attempt at producing a p i c t u r e of German h i s t o r y t h at f u r n i s h e s the l i b e r a l mind with acceptable e x p l a n a t i o n s f o r the "un-Western" c h a r a c t e r of German development. Also w r i t i n g under the i n f l u e n c e of a s t r o n g 130 l i b e r a l b i a s C i n s p i r e d In t h i s case by a r e v u l s i o n f o r the consequences of the T h i r d R e i c h ) , Sonderweq h i s t o r i a n s made many of the same assumptions about Germany's h i s t o r i c a l development as those made by B r i t i s h i d e a l i s t s a century e a r l i e r . For t h i s group of B r i t i s h I d e a l i s t s , however, the homeland of Bach and Goethe was as yet unstained by the butchery of two world wars, and was s t i l l s u b j e c t , t h e r e f o r e , to the s e l f - c o r r e c t i n g f o r c e s thought to be at work. In those n a t i o n s , l i k e Germany, which had a l r e a d y taken the f i r s t t e n t a t i v e steps towards the development of l i b e r a l i n s t i t u t i o n s . Thus f o r B r i t i s h i d e a l i s t s of the nin e t e e n t h century the p e c u l i a r i t i e s of P r u s s i a n h i s t o r y lacked that ominousness and malignancy which much of the h i s t o r i o g r a p h y on Germany s i n c e 1945 has a t t r i b u t e d to these s o - c a l l e d " d e v i a t i o n s " from the West. • \ CHAPTER 4 Conclus ions 132 A.A.W Ramsay's examination of the dilemma c o n f r o n t i n g the B r i t i s h government on the eve of the A u s t r o - P r u s s l a n war In 1866 c o n t a i n s the f o l l o w i n g s p e c u l a t i o n s on the course which German h i s t o r y would have taken had England acted d i f f e r e n t l y d u r i n g the Danish war: Armed I n t e r v e n t i o n i n 1864 would i n e v i t a b l y have l e d to the f a l l of Bismarck. Had h i s Danish p o l i c y f a i l e d , as when s i n c e r e l y opposed by Great B r i t a i n l t must have done, h i s p o s i t i o n i n B e r l i n , a l r e a d y dangerous, would have become untenable.... The f a l l of Bismarck would have c l e a r e d the way f o r the L i b e r a l p a r t y . The King would have been o b l i g e d to surrender to them at l a s t . . . . [ A ] b s o l u t e government In P r u s s i a would have been at an end, and Germany would have been f r e e to develop along L i b e r a l and c o n s t i t u t i o n a l l i n e s . . . . T h e gospel of 'Blood and Iron' would have met, In Its very beginnings, the on l y r e p l y t hat might have checked Its p rogress. The Inborn tendencies of the n a t i o n a l c h a r a c t e r towards the worship of f o r c e and the l u s t of conquest would have been stamped down Just as they were begin n i n g to show themselves a f r e s h . It would have been w e l l f o r the world had t h i s l e s s o n been l e a r n t In 1864, and not In 1918. 1 I f f o r a moment we allow o u r s e l v e s to engage In t h i s same type of s p e c u l a t i o n , we can conclude t h a t , had Ramsay w r i t t e n t h i s In 1945 Instead of 1925, she would have argued that B r i t i s h o p p o s i t i o n to Bismarck In 1864 would a l s o have prevented the r i s e of Nazism and the h o r r o r s of the Second World War. Or to put l t another way, had C l e o p a t r a ' s nose been longer, e t c . Ramsay's s p e c u l a t i o n s are not unique. Indeed, i t i s t h i s same kind of w i s h f u l t h i n k i n g which can be found i n much of the h i s t o r i o g r a p h y on modern Germany, p a r t i c u l a r l y i n Sonderweg I n t e r p r e t a t i o n s of Germany's past. I m p l i c i t In the Sonderweg t h e o r i s t s ' c l a i m that Germany departed from the "normal" path of Western development Is the assumption t h a t , had such a departure never occurred, German, and subsequent world h i s t o r y would have 133 turned out very d i f f e r e n t l y ; R a l f Dahrendorf's query "Why wasn't Germany England?" c l e a r l y Implies that Germany would have been England Cand perhaps s t i l l c o u l d be) were i t not f o r the aberrant p a t t e r n of Germany's development. 2 Unable to reverse the t r o u b l e d course of German h i s t o r y i n the t w e n t i e t h century, many h i s t o r i a n s have t h e r e f o r e r e g i s t e r e d t h e i r p r o t e s t s a g a i n s t i t by u s i n g the more agreeable n a t i o n a l h i s t o r i e s of England and France as the b a s i s f o r a "what i f " r e c o n s t r u c t Ion"of Germany's past. Of t h i s f a l l a c y E.H. Carr once wrote: "The t r o u b l e with contemporary h i s t o r y Is that people remember the time when a l l options were s t i l l open, and f i n d l t d i f f i c u l t to adopt the a t t i t u d e of the h i s t o r i a n f o r whom they have a l l been c l o s e d by the f a i t a c c o m p l i . " 3 It has not been my I n t e n t i o n i n t h i s paper to use t h i s k i n d of r e d u c t i v e a n a l y s i s i n an attempt to "demonstrate" that l i b e r a l i s m would u l t i m a t e l y have p r e v a i l e d i n Germany had not B r i t i s h policy-makers, l u l l e d Into a s t a t e of complacency by men l i k e Morler, Dicey and Mllnes, pursued a course which served b e t t e r the goals of Bismarck than of P r u s s i a n l i b e r a l s . Nor has l t been my I n t e n t i o n to, somehow absolve Germany of r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r the Nazi era by p o i n t i n g to the r o l e which England may or may not have played i n the d e c l i n e of German l i b e r a l i s m In the n i n e t e e n t h century. It would be absurd to suggest that B r i t i s h p o l i c y s i n g l e - h a n d e d l y brought about triumph of a u t h o r i t a r i a n i s m and m i l i t a r i s m over l i b e r a l i s m In the new German Empire; or that l t was simply the weakness of the 134 German l i b e r a l t r a d i t i o n which l e d to N a t i o n a l S o c i a l i s m ' s v i c t o r y In Germany. My I n t e n t i o n has been q u i t e simply to broaden the debate r e g a r d i n g Germany's p o l i t i c a l development, and I have attempted to accomplish t h i s by r a i s i n g the p o s s i b i l i t y t h a t i n t e r n a t i o n a l r e l a t i o n s a l s o a f f e c t e d the outcome of Germany's p o l i t i c a l s t r u g g l e s In the t h i r d q u a r t e r of the nine t e e n t h century. By demonstrating that England's P r u s s i a n p o l i c y d u r i n g the p e r i o d 1848-1871 was shaped p r i m a r i l y by the d e s i r e to see Germany u n i f i e d - a goal I n s p i r e d by pragmatic concerns r e g a r d i n g the maintenance of peace, as w e l l as England's I n t e r e s t s i n Europe, and best thought to be served through the p r e s e r v a t i o n of s t a b i l i t y In P r u s s i a - I have attempted to c a l l i n t o q u e s t i o n c e r t a i n t r a d i t i o n a l assumptions r e g a r d i n g the r o l e which l i b e r a l i d e a l i s m played In the f o r m u l a t i o n of B r i t i s h p o l i c y . It i s these assumptions Cas w e l l as the no t i o n that German l i b e r a l i s m ' s defeat was preordained by the p e c u l i a r i t y of Germany's h i s t o r i c a l development) which have h i t h e r t o discouraged h i s t o r i a n s from c o n s i d e r i n g more c a r e f u l l y the extent to which B r i t i s h p o l i c y c o n t r i b u t e d to the untenable s i t u a t i o n In which German l i b e r a l i s m found i t s e l f d u r i n g and a f t e r 1848. Furthermore, i t i s c l e a r from the above a n a l y s i s of the views of B r i t i s h l i b e r a l i d e a l i s t s that the Impact of t h i s group has been twofold with regard to t h i s q u e s t i o n . F i r s t l y , the i d e a l i s t s ' v o c a l I n t e r p r e t a t i o n s of P r u s s i a n and German a f f a i r s c o n t r i b u t e d an important p o l i t i c a l dimension to the e x i s t i n g r h e t o r i c about the shared i n t e r e s t s and common l i n k s between Germany and B r i t a i n . It i s the pervasiveness of t h i s r h e t o r i c , and i t s employment by B r i t i s h policy-makers which has helped to s a t i s f y B r i t i s h h i s t o r i a n s of Anglo-German r e l a t i o n s that B r i t i s h p o l i c y was indeed shaped l a r g e l y by l i b e r a l Idealism and a romantic view of Germany. And secondly, by p e r m i t t i n g t h e i r e v a l u a t i o n s of German a f f a i r s to be h e a v i l y c o l o r e d by d i s t i n c t l y l i b e r a l , e t h n o c e n t r i c b i a s e s , these same B r i t i s h I d e a l i s t s helped to e s t a b l i s h an enduring I n t e l l e c t u a l p e r s p e c t i v e on German h i s t o r y which continues to d i r e c t Anglo-American s c h o l a r s ' a t t e n t i o n s to the I n t e r n a l sources of German 111lberal1sm, and away from the m i l i e u of i n t e r n a t i o n a l r e l a t i o n s w i t h i n which German monarchs and p o l i t i c i a n s operated. A c c o r d i n g to Dahrendorf, questions are l i k e r e v o l u t i o n s : "Once one gets s t a r t e d , l t Is hard to f i n d an end; both seem to breed I n c e s s a n t l y . I n attempting to e x t r i c a t e the German qu e s t i o n from the k i n d of tendentious atmosphere w i t h i n which l t has g e n e r a l l y been posed by h i s t o r i a n s w r i t i n g s i n c e World War Two, the present study n a t u r a l l y r a i s e s more questions than It answers. Moreover, l t o n l y goes halfway towards answering the most Important of these questions - to what extent d i d B r i t i s h p o l i c y a c t u a l l y a f f e c t P r u s s i a ' s and Germany's p o l i t i c a l development d u r i n g the p e r i o d 1848-1871. It Is c l e a r from the above a n a l y s i s that there was more to B r i t i s h p o l i c y than simply n o n - i n t e r v e n t i o n , and that B r i t a i n ' s impact on P r u s s i a cannot be viewed e x c l u s i v e l y i n terms of what B r i t a i n d i d not do d u r i n g t h i s p e r i o d . Palmerston, R u s s e l l , G r a n v i l l e and S t a n l e y a l l 136 pursued a c t i v e p o l i c i e s aimed at e n s u r i n g that P r u s s i a remain a bulwark a g a i n s t "Red and a n a r c h i c a l government" in Europe, which was n a t u r a l l y regarded as a p o t e n t i a l t h r e a t to B r i t i s h i n t e r e s t s ; even Clarendon was I n c l i n e d to favour an " u n p r i n c i p l e d Bismarck" over a "democratic L a s a l l e " s i n c e he b e l i e v e d that "democracy i n Germany means s o c i a l i s m , I.e. the subversion of a l l those laws by which S o c i e t y i s h e l d t o g e t h e r . " 5 5 Furthermore, such concerns were matched, and at times overldden by B r i t i s h f e a r s of a renewal of French a g g r e s s i o n In Europe, or even by the danger of a-more powerful Russia. In order to determine whether B r i t a i n ' s a c t i o n s r e a l l y mattered, however, r e a c t i o n s i n P r u s s i a to B r i t i s h p o l i c y must a l s o be examined, and t h e i r place e s t a b l i s h e d w i t h i n the s h i f t i n g sands of P r u s s i a n p o l i t i c s d u r i n g t h i s p e r i o d . It may w e l l be that B r i t i s h d i p l o m a t i c support f o r the resurgence of conservatism In P r u s s i a In 1849-1850, and B r i t a i n ' s attempts to n e u t r a l i z e p o t e n t i a l t h r e a t s to P r u s s i a a r i s i n g out of Bismarck's m i l i t a r y and d i p l o m a t i c I n i t i a t i v e s were of r e l a t i v e l y l i t t l e consequence to the f a t e of P r u s s i a n l i b e r a l i s m . But i n order to examine p r o p e r l y , from the P r u s s i a n p e r s p e c t i v e , the extent to which B r i t i s h p o l i c y a f f e c t e d P r u s s i a ' s p o l i t i c a l h i s t o r y , l t has f i r s t been necessary to c l a r i f y B r i t a i n ' s r o l e In these events by s e p a r a t i n g the r h e t o r i c from the a c t u a l p r a c t i c e of B r i t i s h p o l i c y . And by i d e n t i f y i n g the l i b e r a l b i a s e s which pervaded the r h e t o r i c of mld-nlneteenth century B r i t i s h i d e a l i s t s , we are b e t t e r able to a p p r e c i a t e how and why subsequent s c h o l a r s h i p on the German que s t i o n has so r e a d i l y embraced the n o t i o n that German h i s t o r y i s " p e c u l i a r " . A l l of t h i s h o p e f u l l y helps to c l e a r the way f o r a more balanced-approach to the formation of the German Empire w i t h i n the wider context of ni n e t e e n t h century European h i s t o r y NOTES AND BIBLIOGRAPHY 139 NOTES CHAPTER 1 1. A.J.P. T a y l o r , The Course of German H i s t o r y CNew York: C a p r i c o r n Books, 1962), p. 68. 2. W.E. Mosse, The European Powers and the German Question,  1848-1871 CLondon: Cambridge U n i v e r s i t y Press, 1958), p. 5. 3. F r i t z S t e r n , " I n t r o d u c t i o n , " The Path to D i c t a t o r s h i p t r a n s , by John Conway CGarden C i t y : Doubleday, 1966), p. v l i l . For an e x c e l l e n t I n t r o d u c t i o n to the e v o l u t i o n of the Sonderweq Idea, see David Blackbourn and Geoff E l e y , The P e c u l i a r i t i e s of German H i s t o r y CNew York: Oxford U n i v e r s i t y Press, 1984) pp. 2-10. Among the f i r s t to ques t i o n the p o s i t i v e assumptions which German s c h o l a r s g e n e r a l l y a s s o c i a t e d with Germany's Sonderweq was Erns t T r o e l t s c h . W r i t i n g i n 1920, T r o e l t s c h argued that German thought, "whether i n p o l i t i c s , or In h i s t o r y , or i n e t h i c s , Is based on the Ideas of the Romantic Counter—Revolution," which seeks to c l e a r away the "e x p o s t u l a t e s of west-European thought," and e r e c t i n s t e a d the "o r g a n i c Ideal of the group mind CGemeInge 1 s t ) . " Ernst T r o e l t s c h , "The Ideas of Na t u r a l Law and Humanity i n World P o l i t i c s , " N a t u r a l Law and the Theory of S o c i e t y ed. by Otto Gierke, t r a n s , by Ernest Barker CLondon: Cambridge U n i v e r s i t y Press, 1950), 1, pp. 201-215. 4. Hajo Holborn, Germany and Europe CGarden C i t y : Doubeday, 1971), p. 1. 5. R a l f Dahrendorf, S o c i e t y and Democracy In Germany CWestport: Greenwood Press, 1967), p. 14. There Is a l s o a Marxist i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of the Sonderweg t h e s i s Csee Isaac Deutscher, "Germany and Marxism," Marxism i n Our Time, ed. by Tamara Deutscher [Berkeley: Ramparts Press, 1971]; Nlcos Poulantzas, P o l i t i c a l Power and the S o c i a l C l a s s e s [London: NLB, 1974]), but l t has not had n e a r l y the same Impact on the h i s t o r i o g r a p h y on modern Germany as the l i b e r a l i n t e r p r e t a t I o n . 6. F.L. Carsten, "The H i s t o r i c a l Roots of N a t i o n a l S o c i a l i s m , " Upheaval and C o n t i n u i t y : A Century of German H i s t o r y ed. by E.J. Feuchtwanger CLondon: Oswald Wolff, 1973), pp. 116-117; T a y l o r , The Course of German H i s t o r y , p. 13.; Rohan 0'Butler, The Roots of N a t i o n a l S o c i a l i s m , 1783-1933 CLondon: Faber and Faber, 1941). 7. The most thorough a p p l i c a t i o n of t h i s view can be found i n Peter V l e r e c k ' s M e t a p o l l t l c s : The Roots of the Nazi Mind CNew York: C a p r i c o r n Books, 1961). Although V l e r e c k o r i g i n a l l y p u b l i s h e d Metapol1tles i n 1941, i t was p o o r l y r e c e i v e d at the time, and was r e - r e l e a s e d more s u c c e s s f u l l y 140 a f t e r the end of the war. See a l s o W i l l i a m S h i r e r , The Rise  and F a l l of the T h i r d Reich CNew York.: Simon and Schuster, I960); Louis Snyder, German Na t i o n a l i s m : The Tragedy of a  People CPort Washington: Kennlkat Press, 1969). 8. Blackbourn and E l e y c l a i m that the s c h o l a r s h i p on the Sonderweg qu e s t i o n has "moved on to more s o c i o l o g i c a l and s t r u c t u r a l t e r r a i n , " having Incorporated a l l of the val u a b l e elements from the arguments In favq,ur of the "German mind." This t r e n d Is p a r t i c u l a r l y true among German h i s t o r i a n s . Yet the idea of the "German mind" continues to e x e r c i s e an Important Influence on the h i s t o r i o g r a p h y on modern Germany. P e c u l i a r i t i e s of German H i s t o r y , pp. 5-9. 9. George G. Iggers, The German Conception of H i s t o r y CConneticut: Wesleyan U n i v e r s i t y Press, 1968}, pp. 272-273; Koppel Plnson, Modern Germany: I t s H i s t o r y and C i v i l i z a t i o n CNew York: The Macmillan Co., 1954), p. 9; Gordon C r a i g , The Germans CNew York: Putnam's Sons, 1982), pp. 33-34. For T r o e l t s c h , t h i s same idea was the source of the " f i n a l and deepest d i f f e r e n c e between Germany and Western Europe." "Ideas of N a t u r a l Law and Humanity," p. 210. For a u s e f u l summary of t h i s Idea that the processes of "bourgeois modernization" were, by the end of the ei g h t e e n t h century, r e t a r d e d In Germany r e l a t i v e to the development of these processes In France and England Ca f a c t o r which i s thought to have c o n t r i b u t e d to the growth a p o l i t i c a l a t t i t u d e s i n Germany), see Anthony La Vopa, "The P o l i t i c s of Enlightenment: F r e d e r i c k Gedlke and the German P r o f e s s i o n a l Ideology," J o u r n a l of Modern H i s t o r y 62 C1990), 34-35. 10. E.J. Feuchtwanger, " I n t r o d u c t i o n , " Upheaval and C o n t i n u i t y , pp. 12-13; T a l c o t t Parsons, "Democracy and S o c i a l S t r u c t u r e In Pre-Nazi Germany," Essays In S o c i o l o g i c a l Theory C H l l n o l s : The Free Press, 1954), p. 119; F r i t z Stern, The  P o l i t i c s of C u l t u r a l Despair CLondon: Cambridge U n i v e r s i t y Press, 1961), pp. x v i l - x i x ; Craig,-The Germans, pp. 26-30; Iggers, The German Conception of H i s t o r y , pp. 5-7. 11. Snyder, German Natio n a l i s m , p. 102; Iggers, The German  Conception of H i s t o r y , pp. 21-22. Although touted as a study which has avoided f a l l i n g back on a Sonderweg e x p l a n a t i o n , Harold James's A German I d e n t i t y , 1770-1990 CNew York: Routledge, 1989), simply revamps the no t i o n that Germany diverged from the West by f o c u s i n g on the e c l e c t i c c h a r a c t e r of German n a t i o n a l i s m : "There i s nothin g s l n g u l a r l l y or p e c u l i a r l y German about the idea of an invented n a t i o n a l i t y : but what i s unusual about Germany Is that a n a t i o n - s t a t e generated In t h i s 'eastern' way developed i n t o a Great Power on the European and world stage." p. 32. 12. Leonard K r i e g e r , The German Idea of Freedom CBoston: Beacon H i l l , 1957), pp. 288-289; K a r l Bracher, The German 141 D i c t a t o r s h i p t r a n s , by Jean S t e i n b e r g CMlddlesex: Penguin Books, 1973), pp. 32-33. 13. Iggers, The German Conception of H i s t o r y , p. 23; Hans Kohn, The Mind of Germany: The Education of a Nation CNew York: Harper and Row, 1960), pp. 139-150; K r l e g e r , The German  Idea of Freedom, pp. 401-405; C r a i g , The Germans, p. 32; James Sheehan, German L i b e r a l i s m In the Nineteenth Century CChlcago: U n i v e r s i t y of Chicago Press, 1978), pp. 280-283. Blackbourn and E l e y are a l s o prepared to admit t h a t , as a consequence of Germany's p o l i t i c a l h e r i t a g e , German l i b e r a l s demonstrated a "modestly s a t i s f i e d acceptance" In 1870 of "a c o n s t i t u t i o n a l i s m . . . t h a t f e l l short of f u l l p a r l i a m e n t a r i s m . " The P e c u l i a r i t i e s of German H i s t o r y , p. 255. 14. Blackbourn and E l e y , The P e c u l i a r i t i e s of German H i s t o r y , pp. 4-5. 15. As a good example of t h i s , observe Theodore Hamerow's c l a i m that the p e n a l t y f o r the l i b e r a l s ' f a i l u r e In 1848 was " p a i d not i n 1849, but In 1918, In 1933 and i n 1945." R e s t o r a t i o n , R e v o l u t i o n and Reaction: Economics and  P o l i t i c s i n Germany, 1815-1871 CPrlnceton: P r i n c e t o n U n i v e r s i t y Press, 1958), p. v l l l . See a l s o Iggers, The  German Conception of H i s t o r y , p. 277; Snyder, German Natlonal1sm, p. 104. More s e r i o u s , however, than t h i s tendency to see c o n t i n u i t y where perhaps none e x i s t s are the many f a l l a c i e s common to the f i e l d of Nazi pedigree-hunting, n i c e l y summarized by Klaus E p s t e i n In " S h l r e r ' s H i s t o r y of Nazi Germany," Review of P o l i t i c s , 23 C1961), 230. Although c e r t a i n l y a more balanced a p p r a i s a l of the " r o o t s " of N a t i o n a l S o c i a l i s m than that of V l e r e c k and S h i r e r , F r i t z Stern's The P o l i t i c s of C u l t u r a l Despair i s not e n t i r e l y f r e e from such f a l l a c i e s . See pp. 294-295. 16. Blackbourn and E l e y , The P e c u l i a r i t i e s of German H i s t o r y . 17. Klaus P. F i s c h e r , "The L i b e r a l Image of German H i s t o r y , " Modern Age, 22 C1978), 371-383. 18. Herbert B u t t e r f l e l d , The Whig I n t e r p r e t a t i o n of H i s t o r y CLondon: G. B e l l and Sons, 1931), p. v. 19. I b i d . , p. 30-31. 20. Pinson, Modern Germany, p. 19; Kohn, The Mind of Germany, p. 352. 21. Carsten, "The H i s t o r i c a l Roots of N a t i o n a l S o c i a l i s m , " p. 116. 22. For T a l c o t t Parsons the f a c t t h at Germany's a d m i n i s t r a t i v e bureaucracy was not i n c o n f l i c t with l i b e r a l - d e m o c r a t i c 142 ideas, and that the p a t e r n a l i s t i c s o c i a l welfare system was i n a p o s i t i o n to help m i t i g a t e the consequences of extreme i n d i v i d u a l i s t i c c a p i t a l i s m suggested that a l i b e r a l - d e m o c r a t i c s o l u t i o n In Germany was very p o s s i b l e . "Democracy and S o c i a l S t r u c t u r e In Pre-Nazl Germany," pp. 115-116. See a l s o C r a i g , The Germans, p. 32; K r l e g e r , The  German Idea of Freedom, pp. 401-402. Kohn argues that In mld-nlneteenth Germany, as i n the r e s t of western Europe, " l i b e r a l i s m was i n the ascendancy," but that the German l i b e r a l s " w i t t i n g l y and w i l l i n g l y " r e v e r s e d t h i s " p r e v a i l i n g t r e n d " In exchange f o r n a t i o n a l power. The Mind  of Germany, pp. 11, 128-19. For Koppel Plnson, on the other hand, i t was p r e c i s e l y the a p o l i t i c a l nature of the German " c l a s s i c a l humanist t r a d i t i o n " which presaged the defeat of l i b e r a l i s m i n Germany. Modern Germany, pp. 12-22. 23. Juergen Doerr, "Democracy and L i b e r a l i s m i n Nineteenth Century Germany," Canadian J o u r n a l of H i s t o r y , 14 C1979), 437; Sheehan, German L i b e r a l i s m In the Nineteenth Century; J.L S n e l l and H. Schmltt, The Democratic Movement In  Germany, 1789-1914 CChapel H i l l , N.C.: U n i v e r s i t y of North C a r o l i n a Press, 1976). 24. G.R. Mork, "Bismarck, and the ' C a p i t u l a t i o n ' of German L i b e r a l i s m , " J o u r n a l of Modern H i s t o r y , 43 C1971), 59-75. 25. Sheehan, German L i b e r a l i s m In the Nineteenth Century, p. 3. 26. Not s u r p r i s i n g l y , German h i s t o r i a n s have been the l a r g e s t c o n t r i b u t o r s to t h i s l a t t e r q u e s t i o n . For an e x c e l l e n t summary of such work, see Mosse, The European Powers and  the German Question, Appendix A, pp. 375-381. 27. Paul Kennedy, The Rise of Anglo-German Antagonism, 1860- 1914 CLondon: George A l l e n and Unwin, 1980), p. 7; Eugene Anderson, The S o c i a l and P o l i t i c a l C o n f l i c t i n  P r u s s i a , 1858-1864 C L l n c o l n : U n i v e r s i t y of Nebraska Press, 1954), p. 22. 28. Kennedy, The Rise of Anglo-German Antagonism, p. 7. 29. S n e l l and Schmidt, The Democratic Movement In Germany, pp. 54, 140-141; C E . M c C l e l l a n d , The German H i s t o r i a n s and  England ([Cambridge: Cambridge U n i v e r s i t y Press, 1971), pp. 78-79, 139-140; James, A German I d e n t i t y , pp. 21-22. 30. W i l l i a m E. Gladstone, " L i f e and Speeches of the P r i n c e Consort," Contemporary Review, 26 C1875), 12. See a l s o Frank Hardle, The P o l i t i c a l Influence of Queen V i c t o r i a , 1861- 1901• CLondon: Humphrey M l l f o r d , 1935). On the e x i s t e n c e of the s o - c a l l e d "Coburg p l a n " i n which A l b e r t , Stockmar, King Leopold and others p u r p o r t e d l y sought to ensure t h a t Germany be u n i f i e d under the auspices of a l i b e r a l c o n s t i t u t i o n a l P r u s s i a n s t a t e , see L. Farago and A. 143 S i n c l a i r , The Royal Web CNew York: MacGraw H i l l , 1982), p. 4. 31. Kennedy, The Rise of Anglo-German Antagonism, pp. 103-123. 32. Raymond Sontag, Germany and England: Background of  C o n f l i c t , 1848-1894 CLondon: D. Appleton, 1938), p. 32. 33. I b i d . 34. Kennedy, The Rise of Anglo-German Antagonism, pp. 118-119. 35. I b i d . CHAPTER 2 1. A.A.W. Ramsay, Idealism and Fo r e i g n P o l i c y : A Study of the  r e l a t i o n s of Great B r i t a i n with Germany and France,  1860-1878 CLondon: John Murray, 1925) pp. 4-5. 2. I b i d . , pp. 2-4. 3. I b i d . , p. 53. 4. I b i d . , p. 148.. 5. Raymond Sontag, Germany and England: Background of  C o n f l i c t , 1848-1894, pp. v l l l - l x . 6. I b i d . , pp. x - x l . 7. W.E. Mosse, The European Powers and the German Question,  1848-1871, p. 46. 8- I b i d . , p. 362. 9. Lord E. F l t z m a u r i c e , L i f e of Second E a r l G r a n v i l l e ,  1815-1891 CNew York, Longmans, Green and Co., 1905), p. 49. 10. Bernard P o r t e r , B r i t a i n Europe and the World, 1815-1891 CLondon: George A l l e n and Unwin, 1983), p. 8; Kennedy, The  Rise of Anglo-German Antagonism, pp. 60-61. 11. I b i d • ; Kenneth Bourne, The Fore i g n P o l i c y of V i c t o r i a n  England COxford: Clarendon Press, 1970), p. 122. 12. Palmerston epitomized t h i s Janus-faced approach of B r i t i s h policy-makers to the German q u e s t i o n . Having claimed i n 1832 t h a t the "Independence of c o n s t i t u t i o n a l s t a t e s . . . c a n never be a matter of i n d i f f e r e n c e to the B r i t i s h P a rliament," Palmerston contin u e s : "[M]y o p i n i o n Is that as long as our commerce Is of importance to us, as long as c o n t i n e n t a l armies are i n e x i s t e n c e , as long as i t Is p o s s i b l e that a power In one qu a r t e r may become dangerous 144 to a power In another - so long must England look with I n t e r e s t upon the t r a n s a c t i o n s of the Continent, and so long as i t i s proper f o r t h i s country, In the maintenance of Its own Independence, not to shut Its eyes to anything that t h r e a t e n s the Independence of Germany." R.W. Seton-Watson, B r i t a i n In Europe, 1789-1914 CLondon: Cambridge U n i v e r s i t y Press, 1945}, p. 463. 13. L e t t e r s of Queen V i c t o r i a [QVL], 1st s e r i e s , l i , pp. 177-178. 14. In response to F r e d e r i c k W i l l i a m I V s a n t 1 - c o n s t i t u t i o n a l stance the previous year, P r i n c e A l b e r t warned the P r u s s i a n k i n g : "The o n l y way to deal with t h i s onrush t h r e a t e n i n g d e s t r u c t i o n Is to bind that part of the people which has the means and the I n t e l l i g e n c e C l - e . the r e a l people) to the government by t r u s t f u l l y a d m i t t i n g l t to p a r t i c i p a t i o n In the a d m i n i s t r a t i o n of i t s own l i f e . " Frank Eyck, The  P r i n c e Consort: A P o l i t i c a l Biography CBoston: Houghton M i f f l i n , 1959), p. 73. 15. Frank Weber, "Palmerston and P r u s s i a n L i b e r a l i s m , 1848," J o u r n a l of Modern H i s t o r y , 35 C1963), 125; W i l l i a m Orr J r . , " B r i t i s h Diplomacy and the German Problem, 1848-1850," A l b i o n , 10 C1978), 210. 16. Memoirs of Baron Bunsen CLondon: Longman's, Green and Co., 1869), l i , p. 101. 17. Mosse, The European Powers, p. 16 18. L e t t e r s of the P r i n c e Consort, 1831-1861, ed. by Kurt Jagow CNew York: E.P. Patton, 1938) p. 139. 19. Hansard's P a r l i a m e n t a r y Debates CCommons), 3rd s e r i e s , 98:515-525. 20. Mosse, The European Powers, p. 13; Weber, "Palmerston and P r u s s i a n L i b e r a l i s m , " pp. 129-131. Although Mosse contends that Arnlm's plans Involved c r e a t i n g a kind of Grand A l l i a n c e of Germany, France, Poland and England, which would "In the name of l i b e r t y and the happiness of peoples" lead a l i b e r a l crusade a g a i n s t ".despotic R u s s i a , " Weber views Arnlm's plans as being much more pragmatic, and as being shaped by h i s f e a r that c o n f l i c t with England was " I n e v i t a b l e " . In support of Weber's view Is Palmerston's memo to A l b e r t In which he argues that the Z o l l v e r e l n " Is Intended to c r i p p l e the trade and manufactures of England." Hence B r i t i s h p o l i c y c o u l d o n l y look upon the Z o l l v e r e I n as "a league founded In h o s t i l i t y to England." Theodore Martin, L i f e of H.R.H. The P r i n c e Consort CLondon: Smith, E l d e r & Co., 1880), 1, pp. 447-451. 145 21. Mosse, The European Powers, p. 20; Orr, " B r i t i s h Diplomacy," p. 212. As part of h i s p o l i c y of n e u t r a l i t y , Palmerston forwarded s e v e r a l proposals f o r compromise s o l u t i o n s to the S c h l e s w l g - H o l s t e l n problem. See Mosse, p. 20, n. 3. 22. Weber, "Palmerston and P r u s s i a n L i b e r a l i s m , " p. 132. 23. I b i d . , p. 134; Orr, " B r i t i s h Diplomacy," p. 215. Among the reasons f o r t h i s , growth In p u b l i c support f o r the Danish cause was the p u b l i c a t i o n by Bunsen of a specious memo re g a r d i n g the S c h l e s w l g - H o l s t e l n q u e s t i o n . Memoirs of Baron  Bunsen, 1 1 . p. 105. 24. L a t e r Correspondence of Lord John R u s s e l l , ed. by G.P. Gooch CLondon: MacMlllan and Co., 1925), 1 1 , 32. Also damaging to the n a t i o n a l program of P a u l s k i r c h e was Palmerston's r e f u s a l to recognize the c h a r a c t e r of the new Relchverweser as anything other than " p r o v i s i o n a l and temporary." Mosse, The European Powers, p. 33. For the t e x t of the d i v i s i v e Malmo a r m i s t i c e , see B r i t i s h F o r e i g n and  State Papers. CLondon: H.M. S t a t i o n a r y O f f i c e , 1841-1934), 40 C1850), 1333. 25. Weber, "Palmerston and P r u s s i a n L i b e r a l i s m , " p. 136; Memoirs of Baron Bunsen, 1 1 , pp. 148-149. 26. Mosse, The European Powers, p. 29. 27. In B e r l i n Westmoreland echoed t h i s support by r e s i s t i n g democrats' requests that he pressure F r e d e r i c k W i l l i a m IV to d i s m i s s Brandenburg. Weber, "Palmerston and P r u s s i a n L i b e r a l i s m , " p. 135. 28. Hansard CLords), 3rd s e r i e s , 100:1149. 29. Mosse, The European Powers, p. 30. 30. L e t t e r s of the P r i n c e Consort, p. 151. 31. I b i d . , pp. 159-160. 32. I b i d . , pp. 163-164. i 33. "Weber and P r u s s i a n L i b e r a l i s m , " p. 135. 34. QVL, 1st s e r i e s , 11, pp. 328-329. 35. L e t t e r s of the P r i n c e Consort, pp. 169-170, 174. 36. QVL, 1st s e r i e s , i l , p. 329; E. Ashley, L i f e of Henry John  Temple, Viscount Palmerston, 1846-1864 CLondon: Richard Bentley, 1876), 1. pp. 242-243. 146 37. The L a t e r Correspondence of Lord John R u s s e l l , 11, p. 35. 38. Mosse, The European Powers, p. pp. 42-43. 39. I b i d . , p. 55. 40. QVL, 1st s e r i e s , p. 21. 41. I b i d . , pp. 22-23; Martin, L i f e of the P r i n c e Consort, 111. p. 14. 42. Hansard CLords), 3rd s e r i e s , 132:815-816. 43. I b i d . , c o l . 818. - 44. Lothar G a l l , Bismarck: The White R e v o l u t i o n a r y t r a n s , by J.A. Underwood CLondon: Unwin and A l l e n , 1986), 1, p. 120. 45. I b i d . ; Mosse, The European Powers, p. 58. 46. L e t t e r s of the P r i n c e Consort, pp. 165, 213. A l b e r t goes on to remark, "He [Bunsen] knows t h a t he has o f t e n done me a l o t of harm." 47. Hansard CLords), 3rd s e r i e s , 133:976-977. 48. Martin, L i f e of the P r i n c e Consort, 111, p. 92. 49. Hansard CLords), 3rd s e r i e s , 137:858-871. 50. I b i d . , c o l s . 876-878. 51. In w r i t i n g to her uncle, the King of Belgium, Queen V i c t o r i a expressed these same sentiments, m a i n t a i n i n g that, " i f P r u s s i a and A u s t r i a had h e l d s t r o n g and decided language to Russia In '53, we should never have had t h i s war!" QVL, 1st s e r i e s , 111, p. 215. 52. Perhaps p r e p a r i n g the ground f o r t h i s e x c l u s i o n , Clarendon proposed a s t r o n g l y worded d r a f t be sent to P r u s s i a In January 1856, c r i t i c i z i n g that country f o r i t s ambiguous p o s i t i o n In the Crimean c o n f l i c t . Although no doubt I n s p i r e d by her pro-German sentiments, Queen V i c t o r i a Cprobably on the advice of A l b e r t ) adopted the prudent and pragmatic a t t i t u d e d i s p l a y e d by Clarendon the previous year, demanding'the tone of t h i s d r a f t be softened: " I t i s q u i t e n a t u r a l and excusable that our patience should at l a s t be worn out by the miserable p o l i c y which P r u s s i a Is pursuing, but l t can never our I n t e r e s t to openly q u a r r e l with her." I b i d . , p. 205. 53. Hansard CCommons), 3rd s e r i e s , 141:157-158. 54. I b i d . , c o l . 161. 147 55. C h a r a c t e r i s t i c a l l y , P r i n c e A l b e r t r e c o g n i z e d t h i s soon a f t e r the war broke out. To P r i n c e W i l l i a m he wrote: "I f e a r . . . t h a t p a s s i o n w i l l l e a d to i n j u s t i c e , as the a t t a c k s of our press on P r u s s i a a l r e a d y show that they provoke the same f e e l i n g s i n P r u s s i a ; and, no doubt, before long, n a t i o n s which have every reason and every I n t e r e s t to maintain the warmest mutual f r i e n d s h i p , w i l l be misled into the f o o l i s h n o t i o n that they should In f a c t be enemies and hate each o t h e r . " Martin, L i f e of the P r i n c e Consort, i l l , pp. 137-138. 56. The Times of London, 3 October 1855; QVL, 1st s e r i e s , i l l , p. 187; Eyck, The P r i n c e Consort, p. 243. G r a n v i l l e ' s response to the engagement Is p a r t l c u l a r 1 l y i n t e r e s t i n g : "There Is no doubt, my Lords, that i n f r e e c o u n t r i e s , where r e p r e s e n t a t i v e i n s t i t u t i o n s p r e v a i l , Royal a l l i a n c e s have not the same e f f e c t on the happiness or the p r o s p e r i t y of the people, which they have i n c o u n t r i e s under more absolute government.... In the l a t t e r c o u n t r i e s l t f r e q u e n t l y happens that the power of a kingdom i s i n c r e a s e d or d i m i n i s h e d by a Royal a l l i a n c e , sometimes l e a d i n g to happiness, sometimes to misery; but on the present o c c a s i o n there i s need to a n t i c i p a t e anything of that k i n d . " Hansard CLords), 3rd s e r i e s , 148:753. 57. B r i t i s h S e s s i o n a l Papers: House of Commons, ed. by E.J. E r l k s o n . 32 C1859):559-60; B r i t i s h and F o r e i g n State  Papers, 49 C1860): 1143. Paul Hayes has i n t e r p r e t e d the E a r l of Malmesbury's recommendation that the B r i t i s h and P r u s s i a n governments seek d u r i n g the I t a l i a n war to "encourage as much as p o s s i b l e the good f e e l i n g and amity of a l l the German powers," as aiming at the c r e a t i o n of an a n t i - R u s s i a n c o a l i t i o n . Modern B r i t i s h F o r e i g n P o l i c y : The  Nineteenth Century, 1814-1880 CLondon: Adam and Charles Black, 1975), p. 41. P r i n c e A l b e r t a l s o preached moderation, a r g u i n g that l t was c r u c i a l f o r P r u s s i a to maintain a " w a i t i n g p o s i t i o n , I f l t does not want to expose I t s e l f and Europe to great dangers." Eyck, The P r i n c e  Consort, p. 244. 58. F u r t h e r L e t t e r s of Queen V i c t o r i a , ed. by Hector B o l l t h o CLondon: Thornton-Butterworth, 1976), p. 109. P r i n c e A l b e r t learned through h i s daughter V i c t o r i a of the P r u s s i a n ' s m o b i l i z a t i o n e f f o r t s f o l l o w i n g A u s t r i a ' s e a r l y d e f e a t s , and he Imprudently r e v e a l e d t h i s to P r i n c e W i l l i a m when he wrote to urge a g a i n s t P r u s s i a n m o b i l i z a t i o n . L. Farago and A. S i n c l a i r , The Royal Web, pp. 59-60. 59. Richard Barkeley, The Empress F r e d e r i c k , the Daughter of  V i c t o r i a CLondon: MacMillan and Co., 1956) p. 81; The  Times, 23 Octobei—1,6 November 1860; Hansard CLords), 3rd s e r i e s , 162:1187-1189. 148 60. B r i t i s h and F o r e i g n State Papers, 52 C1861), 64; Martin, L i f e of the P r i n c e Consort, v, pp. 348-350. 61. P r i n c e s s V i c t o r i a complained that the press and the government's a t t a c k s upon P r u s s i a f u r t h e r a l i e n a t e d her from the P r u s s i a n c o u r t , which a l r e a d y viewed her with some s u s p i c i o n as an Enqla'nder. More s e r i o u s , however, are S i r Robert Morler's claims that the "promiscuous s c u r r i l i t y " of the Times a t t a c k s had " t o t a l l y demoralized" P r u s s i a n l i b e r a l s , such that they came to t h i n k " a l l hope of an understanding with England Impossible." Memoirs and L e t t e r s  of the Right Hon. S i r Robert Morler, ed. by Rosslyn Wemyss CLondon: Edward Arnold, 1911) 1, p. 247. 62. Mosse, The European Powers, p. 211. 63. W.E. Gladstone, "The Danish Duchies," Q u a r t e r l y Review, 115 C1964), 236-287. 64. See chapter 4, note 1. 65. QVL, 2nd s e r i e s , 1, p. 142. 66. Upon l e a r n i n g of the Alvensleben convention, R u s s e l l proposed sending the f o l l o w i n g d i s p a t c h to P r u s s i a : "Her Majesty's Government are f o r c e d to a r r i v e at the c o n c l u s i o n that i t Is an Act of I n t e r v e n t i o n , which Is not J u s t i f i e d by n e c e s s i t y . . . a n d which may be quoted by other Powers of Europe to J u s t i f y I n t e r v e n t i o n In favour of the Insurgents." However, Palmerston and the Queen p r e v a i l e d on the F o r e i g n S e c r e t a r y to concentrate on Russia as the c u l p r i t . T h i s prompted King W i l l i a m to thank V i c t o r i a f o r the " c o n c i l i a t o r y and f r i e n d l y conduct of Her Majesty's Government," and f o r the "moderation with which the French Government under the i n f l u e n c e of Her Majesty's Govenient" had acted. Mosse, The European Powers, pp. 112, 116; QVL, 2nd s e r i e s , 1, pp. 66-67. S e v e r a l months l a t e r Palmerston came to the defense of P r u s s i a In the face of a c c u s a t i o n s that l t was v i o l a t i n g I n t e r n a t i o n a l law by s u p p l y i n g arms and t r a n s p o r t to Russian troops In Poland. Hansard CCommons), 3rd s e r i e s , 170:1955-1956. 67. The L a t e r Correspondence of Lord John R u s s e l l , l i , p. 306. Henry Cowley, the B r i t i s h ambassador to P a r i s , a l s o b e l i e v e d t hat Napoleon I l l ' s a c t i o n s were shaped by the " p o s s i b i l i t y that out of the c o m p l i c a t i o n s something may t u r n up advantageous to France." Mosse, The European  Powers, p. 164. Although e a r l y In the d i s p u t e the B r i t i s h government probed the French about the p o s s i b i l i t y of an a l l i a n c e designed to p r o t e c t the Danish monarchy from dismemberment, t h i s query f o l l o w e d so c l o s e l y on the heels of the P o l i s h a f f a i r t h a t l t stood l i t t l e chance of success. 149 68. Hansard CLords), 3rd s e r i e s , 161:2138-2139. 69. Having a l r e a d y advanced a p a r t i t i o n proposal the previous year, o n l y to be r e b u f f e d by Copenhagen, R u s s e l l was again urged by the Queen to c o n s i d e r p a r t i t i o n as a s o l u t i o n to the "Interminable q u a r r e l " between P r u s s i a and Denmark. QVL, 2nd s e r i e s , 1, pp. 23-24. For the t e x t of R u s s e l l ' s e a r l i e r p r o p o s a l s , see B r i t i s h S e s s i o n a l Papers 64 C1861):85-87. 70. Hansard CLords), 3rd S e r i e s , 170:1748-1749, 1754-1755. 71. Hansard CCommons), 3rd S e r i e s , 172:1252. 72. Mosse, The European Powers, p. 152. 73. I b i d . , pp. 152-153. 74. QVL, 2nd s e r i e s , 1, pp. 103-104. 75. Palmerston was even f o r c e d to defend h i s F o r e i g n S e c r e t a r y when he angered the Queen by Implying to the P r u s s i a n ambassador that England would come to Denmark's a i d In case of a German Invasion: "Lord R u s s e l l Is of course w e l l aware that an a c t u a l d e c i s i o n on a matter such as that In qu e s t i o n does not r e s t with any s i n g l e member of the Government, but with the Cabinet and your Majesty." I b i d . , pp. 120, 132, 145. 76. I b i d . , p. 116; B r i t i s h S e s s i o n a l Papers, 64 C1863):222. 77. B r i t i s h S e s s i o n a l Papers, 65 C1864):636. Palmerston was c o n f i d e n t t h a t the German powers' assurances that they were o n l y seeking to r e s t o r e the c o n d i t i o n s of the 1852 t r e a t y were genuine. Mosse, The European Powers, pp. 174-175. 78. Ashley, L i f e of Lord Palmerston, i l , pp. 247-248. It Is I n t e r e s t i n g that Palmerston appears to r e g r e t the f a c t that i n the event of a F r a n c o - P r u s s i a n war England would be unable to p a r t i c i p a t e because of P r u s s i a ' s conduct i n the duchies. 79. QVL, 2nd s e r i e s , i , p. 161. 80. Hansard CLords), 3rd s e r i e s , 174:722-727, 739. 81. QVL, 2nd s e r i e s , i , p. 203. 82. Mosse, The European Powers, p. 204. 83. I b i d . , p. 205. 84. QVL, 2nd s e r i e s , 1, p. 223. 150 85. I b i d . , p. 228. 86. Hansard CCommons), 3rd s e r i e s , 176:826, 2084 87. Ashley, L i f e of Lord Palmerston, 11, pp. 255-256. 88. I b i d . , pp. 270-271. 89. Hansard CCommons), 3rd s e r i e s , 178:926-929. The speaker In t h i s case was S i r Harry Verney, a pro-German M.P. whose comments r e v e a l a c u r i o u s blend of Palmerstonlan r e a l i s m and the kind of i d e a l i s m d e s c r i b e d i n chapter 3. He was c o n f i d e n t that Bismarck c o u l d not permanently a l t e r the P r u s s i a n s ' " t r u e c h a r a c t e r - that of a mighty c o n s e r v a t i v e Power in the midst of Europe, with p o p u l a t i o n s prosperous, well-governed, and contented, able to curb the ambition of France on the one s i d e , and the aggressions of Russia on the other, and g r a d u a l l y , but s u r e l y , advancing in m a t e r i a l welfare, and In a l l that a p p e r t a i n s to true freedom and the b l e s s i n g s of c o n s t i t u t i o n a l o r d e r l y government." 90. QVL, 2nd s e r i e s , i , p. 276. 91. Of the Queen's i n d i g n a t i o n , Palmerston wrote to R u s s e l l : "The f a c t i s , as f a r as the Queen Is concerned, that so long as the I n j u s t i c e committed appeared c a l c u l a t e d to the b e n e f i t of Germany and the Germans i t was a l r i g h t and proper; but now that an example Is about to be set of e x t i n g u i s h i n g p e t t y s t a t e s l i k e Coburg, her sense of r i g h t and wrong has become wo n d e r f u l l y keen." Foundations of  B r i t i s h F o r e i g n P o l i c y , ed. by H. Temperley and L.M. Penson CLondon: Frank Cass and Co., 1966), pp.. 279-280. 92. Bourne, F o r e i g n P o l i c y , p. 383. 93. Richard Millman, B r i t i s h F o r e i g n P o l i c y and the Coming of  the F r a n c o - P r u s s i a n War CLondon: Oxford U n i v e r s i t y Press, 1965), p. 8. 94. Augustus L o f t u s , Diplomatic Reminiscences CLondon: C a s s e l l , 1894), 2nd s e r i e s , 11, pp. 43-45. 95. W.E. Mosse, "The Crown and F o r e i g n P o l i c y : Queen V i c t o r i a and the A u s t r o - P r u s s l a n C o n f l i c t , March-May, 1866," Cambridge H i s t o r i c a l J o u r n a l , 10 C1951), 208-209. 96. QVL, 2nd s e r i e s , 1, p. 311. 97. I b i d . , p. 317. 98. I b i d . , pp. 314-315. In a c i r c u l a r memo of 9 A p r i l to B r i t i s h r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s i n the v a r i o u s German c o u r t s , Clarendon wrote: "[HJowever much t h i s country may r e g r e t to see Germany a prey to c i v i l war, yet so long as the war i s 151 c o n f i n e d to Germany there Is not a B r i t i s h I n t e r e s t of s u f f i c i e n t magnitude to render Imperative the tender of B r i t i s h good o f f i c e s . " Millman, B r i t i s h F o r e i g n P o l i c y , p. 25. 99. I b i d . ; Mosse, The European Powers, p. 231. 100. Hansard CLords), 3rd s e r i e s , 183:573. 101. Morier, Memo 1 r 3 , 1 1 , p. 61. 102. Your Dear L e t t e r : P r i v a t e Correspondence Between the Queen  V i c t o r i a and the Crown P r i n c e s s of P r u s s i a , 1865-1871, ed. by Roger F u l f o r d CLondon: Evans Bros., 1971), pp. 87-88. Farago and S i n c l a i r , The Royal Web, pp. 129-131; Morier, Memo I r s , i i , p. 58. Ib i d . , 184:736-737. Mosse, The European Powers, p. 241. Hansard CCommons), 3rd s e r i e s , 184:1223-1225, 1235, 1247-1251. D i s r a e l i , Derby and the Conservative Party: J o u r n a l s and  Memoirs of Edward Henry, Lord Stanley, 1849-1869 ed. by John Vincent (Sussex: Harvester Press, 1978),' p. 273. In the House of Lords he responded s i m i l a r l y , s t a t i n g : "I cannot see that the e x i s t e n c e of such a [North German] Power would be to us any Injury, any menace, or any detriment." Hansard CCommons), 3rd s e r i e s , 184:1256. 108. QVL, 2nd s e r i e s , 1 , p. 364. 109. N a t u r a l l y Queen V i c t o r i a was most alarmed at the p o s s i b l e consequences f o r Belgium of a Franco-Prussian war, and demanded that England not stand a l o o f : "England must show the world that she i s not prepared to abdicate her p o s i t i o n as a great Power." QVL, 2nd s e r i e s , 1 , p. 419. 110. Hansard CCommons), 3rd s e r i e s , 186:1255. 111. F u r t h e r L e t t e r s of Queen V i c t o r i a , pp. 163-164. 112. Millman, B r i t i s h F o r e i g n P o l i c y , p. 78. 113. S t a n l e y was c r i t i c i s e d In the House of Commons f o r having " d i s c o u n t e d our fu t u r e p r o s p e r i t y f o r the present t r a n q u i l i t y of Europe. This i s not statesmanship, i t Is a mere hand-to-mouth p o l i c y . " Hansard, 3rd s e r i e s , 187:1911. In h i s d i a r y S t a n l e y wrote: " I t would be repugnant to the p r i n c i p l e s and f e e l i n g s of Parliament and the P u b l i c to do more, and surely...we cannot be expected to forego a l l our 103. 104. 105. 106. 107. 152 own p r i n c i p l e s , and views to accomodate the f a n c i e s of P r u s s i a . " C h r i s t o p h e r Howard, B r i t a i n and-the Casus B e l l i ,  1822-1902 CLondon: Althone Press, 1974), p. 69. 114. The Undersecretary f o r F o r e i g n A f f a i r s assured the inexperienced S t a n l e y that the guarantee "amounted to n o t h i n g . " Millman, B r i t i s h F o r e i g n P o l i c y , p. 89. In commenting on Derby's " u n f o r t u n a t e " I n t e r p r e t a t i o n of the guarantee i n the House of Lords, S t a n l e y wrote: "He r e p r e s e n t e d l t as n e a r l y worthless, which l t i s , but a l i t t l e more ambiguity at t h i s moment would have been prudent." J o u r n a l s and Memoirs of Lord Stanley, p. 312. 115. Howard, B r i t a i n and the Casus B e l l i , p. 73. 116. Hansard CCommons), 3rd s e r i e s , 187:1920. Compare t h i s to D i s r a e l i ' s sardonic r e p l y to the P r u s s i a n ambassador's c l a i m that P r u s s i a d e s i r e d o n l y to be l e f t In peace: "Yes, c e r t a i n l y . . . t e l l Count Bismarck, that we don't wish her [ P r u s s i a ] to be d i s t u r b e d In her d i g e s t i o n . " Mosse, The  European Powers, p. 295. 117. I b i d . ; D.N. Raymond, B r i t i s h P o l i c y and Opinion In the  F r a n c o - P r u s s i a n War CNew York: Longman's and Green, 1921), p. 33. 118. It was through the B r i t i s h government that the French F o r e i g n M i n i s t e r i n i t i a t e d n e g o t i a t i o n s on disarmament with P r u s s i a . Clarendon, however, remained s c e p t i c a l of P r u s s i a ' s r o l e i n such a venture: "His Majesty [King William] does not d e s i r e war...but h i s army i s h i s i d o l , and he w i l l not l i s t e n to any proposal f o r i t s r e d u c t i o n . " QVL, 2nd s e r i e s , 11, p. 5. 119. Mosse, The European Powers, p. 388. The P r u s s i a n Crown P r i n c e s s wrote to her mother soon a f t e r the war began, c l a i m i n g : "England c o u l d have and should have prevented the war - by a rebuke and a t h r e a t to the p a r t y who was the aggressor." QVL, 2nd s e r i e s , l i , pp. 79-80. Morler argued that England should have o f f i c i a l l y backed P r u s s i a i n the war, as Napoleon III would "never face a c o a l i t i o n between England and Germany." Memo Ir s , i l , p. 154. And i n parliament the government was taken to task on s e v e r a l occasions f o r not speaking out a g a i n s t the war more e n e r g e t i c a l l y . Hansard CCommons), 3rd s e r i e s , 203:1299; 204:387-388. In h i s study of B r i t i s h p o l i c y , Millman, l i k e Mosse, argues that England c o u l d not have prevented the war. B r i t i s h F o r e i g n P o l i c y , p. 198. 120. QVL, 2nd s e r i e s , 11, p. 10. 121. I b i d . 122. B r i t i s h S e s s i o n a l Papers, 70 C1870):2, 13. 1 5 3 123. John Morley, L i f e of Gladstone, CLondon: MacMlllan and Co., 1902), 11, p. 338-339. 124. Hansard CCommons), 3rd s e r i e s , 203:343-347. Raymond argues that t h i s must have been an uncomfortable s e s s i o n f o r Gladstone: " I t must have been g a l l i n g to s i t f e t t e r e d by the chains of o f f i c e and hear the D l s r a e l l a n thunder a g a i n s t the French Monarch who so wantonly d i s t u r b e d the peace of Europe." B r i t i s h P o l i c y and Opinion, p. 72. 125. B r i t i s h S e s s i o n a l Papers, 70 C1870):68. 126. Although Mosse claims t h a t Clarendon's "almost Incomprehensible negligence had thus not a l i t t l e to do with the outbreak of the war," he o f f e r s no e x p l a n a t i o n s f o r the a i l i n g F o r e i g n S e c r e t a r y ' s behavior. Mosse, The  European Powers, p. 303, n. 1. 127. QVL, 2nd s e r i e s , l i , pp. 34-35; Millman, B r i t i s h F o r e i g n  P o l i c y , p. 177. 128. Raymond, B r i t i s h P o l i c y and Opinion, p. 107. The I d e a l i s t i c Dicey, of course, a t t r i b u t e d P r u s s i a ' s v i c t o r y to more than Just the needle-gun; he saw P r u s s i a ' s homogeneity and e x c e l l e n t adm1nstratIon c o n t r i b u t i n g to a genuine sense of n a t i o n a l consciousness: "That a n a t i o n i s always more powerful than an army - t h i s , I t h i n k , Is the true l e s s o n to be l e a r n t from the war." "The Campaign i n Germany," MacMlllan's Magazine 14 C1866): 386-394. 129. Millman, B r i t i s h F o r e i g n P o l i c y , p. 55. 130. A year e a r l i e r Clarendon had a l s o noted that " i f France was a g g r e s s i v e , l t would do more to cement Germany together than Bismarck c o u l d achieve In f i v e y e a r s . " QVL, 2nd s e r i e s , i , pp. 624-626. 131. The government's r e s i g n a t i o n to the f a c t of t h i s long-expected war Is evident In G r a n v i l l e ' s d e c l a r a t i o n of B r i t i s h n e u t r a l i t y : "I am convinced that i n order to maintain the honor of t h i s country, and i n order to be of the g r e a t e s t use In r e s t o r i n g peace - of such r e s t o r a t i o n i s p o s s i b l e - the best course we can pursue Is i n words and i n a t t i t u d e to maintain a d i g n i f i e d and calm r e s e r v e . " Hansard CLords), 3rd s e r i e s , 203:1056-1057. 132. Morier, Memo I r s , 11, p. 158. King W i l l i a m complained to Queen V i c t o r i a t h a t , " n o t w i t h s t a n d i n g England's d e c l a r a t i o n of n e u t r a l i t y , horses, c o a l , and even ammunition In the shape of m i l l i o n s of c a r t r i d g e s are being shipped to France from England....This g r i e v e s me deeply." QVL, 2nd s e r i e s , i l , pp. 50-52. 133. B r i t i s h S e s s i o n a l Papers, 71 C1870): 38-39, 77-81. 154 134. The Queen and Mr. Gladstone, ed. by P h i l i p Guedalla CLondon: Hodder and Stoughton, 1933), p. 277. Queen V i c t o r i a d i d , however, t e l e g r a p h King W i l l i a m Cwlth G r a n v i l l e ' s b l e s s i n g ) , a s k i n g him "as a f r i e n d " i f he c o u l d "so shape h i s demands so as to enable the French to accept them." QVL, 2nd s e r i e s , 1 1 , p. 71. 135. Deryck Schreuder, "Gladstone as 'Troublemaker': L i b e r a l F o r e i g n P o l i c y and the German Annexation of A l s a c e - L o r r a i n e , 1870-1871," J o u r n a l of B r i t i s h S t u d i e s , 17 C1978):111. 136. "Germany, France and England," Edinburgh Review, 132 C1870):550-572. 137. Mosse, The European Powers, pp. 338-339. 138. F l t z m a u r l c e , L i f e of G r a n v i l l e , 1 1 , p. 63. 139. Hansard CCommons), 3rd s e r i e s , 204:395. 140. Although the aging "sage of Chelsea" was widely c r i t i c i z e d f o r h i s extreme views on the consequences of France's defeat Csee Raymond, B r i t i s h P o l i c y and Opinion, pp. 251-252), D i s r a e l i ' s comments were much more balanced: " T h i s war represent the German r e v o l u t i o n - a g r e a t e r p o l i t i c a l event that the French R e v o l u t i o n of the l a s t c entury.... not a s i n g l e p r i n c i p l e i n the management of our f o r e i g n a f f a i r s , accepted by a l l statesmen f o r guidance up to s i x months ago, any longer e x i s t s . There Is not a d i p l o m a t i c t r a d i t i o n t h a t has not been swept away....The balance of power has been e n t i r e l y destroyed, and the country which s u f f e r s most, and f e e l s the e f f e c t s of the great change most, Is England." Hansard CCommons), 3rd s e r i e s , 204:70. 141. I b i d . , c o l s . 438-439. 142. When the post was vacant In 1865 and the F o r e i g n O f f i c e was l o o k i n g f o r a candidate, Punch s a r d o n i c a l l y remarked, "We have hanged almost everybody f i t to be sent t h e r e . " Hayes, Modern B r i t i s h F o r e i g n P o l i c y , p. 49. 143. F u l f o r d , Dearest Mama: L e t t e r s between Queen V i c t o r i a and  the Crown P r i n c e s s of P r u s s i a , 1861-1864, ed. by Roger F u l f o r d CLondon: Evans Bros., 1968), pp. 336-338; Your Dear  L e t t e r , pp. 150-151. 144. QVL, 2nd s e r i e s , i , pp. 461-466. In h i s p r i v a t e J o u r n a l , S t a n l e y remarked that the Queen's suggestion was " m a n i f e s t l y an i n t r i g u e a g a i n s t Bismarck, conducted by the Crown P r i n c e s s . " J o u r n a l s and Memoirs of Lord Stanley, p. 316. 155 145. I b i d . ; Seton-Watson, B r i t a i n In Europe, p. 487. Millman has I n t e r p r e t e d S t a n l e y ' s r e j e c t i o n of Morler as proof that S t a n l e y was h i m s e l f "more German or P r u s s i a n than V i c t o r i a . " B r i t i s h F o r e i g n P o l i c y , p. 107. CHAPTER 3 1. See Chapter 2 above. 2. T h i s b e l i e f amongst the B r i t i s h that t h e i r p o l i t i c a l system was incomparable r e s u l t e d i n a "conscious s u p e r i o r i t y and s e l f - c o n f i d e n c e which the f o r e i g n e r found e x c e s s i v e l y I r r i t a t i n g . " A.A.W. Ramsay, Idealism and F o r e i g n P o l i c y p. 6. 3. D.R. Watson, "The B r i t i s h P a r l i a m e n t a r y System and the Growth of C o n s t i t u t i o n a l Government In Western Europe," In C.J. B a r t l e t t , ed. B r i t a i n Preeminent CLondon: MacMillan, 1969) p. 101. 4. R.M. Milnes, " R e f l e c t i o n s on the P o l i t i c a l S tate of Germany," Edinburgh Review, 89 C1849), 543. 5. M c C l e l l a n d , The German H i s t o r i a n s and England, p. 131. 6. L e t t e r s of the P r i n c e Consort, p. 181. 7. R.W. Seton-Watson, B r i t a i n i n Europe, 1789-1914 CLondon: Cambridge U n i v e r s i t y Press, 1945) p. 463. 8. F i s c h e r , "The L i b e r a l Image of German H i s t o r y , " p. 372. 9. Geoff E l e y and David Blackbourn, The P e c u l i a r i t i e s of  German H i s t o r y , p. 78. 10. T h i s idea that i d e a l i s m c h a r a c t e r i z e d the B r i t i s h l i b e r a l s ' view of Germany, although f i r s t suggested by Ramsay, was l a t e r m o d i f i e d by Paul Kennedy, who d e s c r i b e s B r i t i s h p o l i c y r e g a r d i n g Germany a f t e r 1864 as being shaped by c o n f l i c t between I d e a l i s t s and r e a l i s t s . " I d e a l i s t s and R e a l i s t s : B r i t i s h Views of Germany, 1864-1939," T r a n s a c t i o n s of the Royal H i s t o r i c a l S o c i e t y , 5th s e r i e s , 25 C1975), 137-155. 11. Edward Dicey, "The Campaign In Germany," MacMlllan's  Magazine, 14 C1866), 387. 12. QVL 2nd S e r i e s , i , p. 271. 13. John Morley, "France and Germany," F o r t n i g h t l y Review, 8 C1870), 370. Of t h i s tendency to assume that E n g l i s h - s t y l e l i b e r a l development was I n e v i t a b l e , Ramsay wrote: " [ I ] n B r i t a i n the i d e a l form of government was a c o n s t i t u t i o n a l 156 or l i m i t e d monarchy on the s t r i c t E n g l i s h s t y l e , and the B r i t i s h h a b i t u a l l y assumed that a l l f o r e i g n s t a t e s with L i b e r a l tendencies were moving In t h i s d i r e c t i o n . " Ideal1sm  and F o r e i g n P o l i c y p. 22. 14. [Anonymous], " P o l i t i c a l Rights of the German People," F o r e i g n Q u a r t e r l y Review, 36 C1945), 168. 15. R.M. Mllnes, "The P o l i t i c a l State of P r u s s i a , " Edinburgh  Review, 83 C1846), 224-225. 16. Mllnes, " R e f l e c t i o n s on Germany," p. 540. 17. QVL 1st S e r i e s , i l , p. 328. 18. I b i d . , p. 329. 19. L e t t e r s of the Pr i n c e Consort, p. 167. 20. Morier, Memoirs, 1, p. 221. 21. F o l l o w i n g the f r i g h t e n i n g s p e c t a c l e of P r u s s i a n - l e d armies bombarding P a r i s In 1871, t h i s d i s t i n c t i o n began to be modified by many In England, and was now made between P r u s s i a , "which was m i l i t a r i s t i c , r e a c t i o n a r y , and unscrupulous, and Germany, which was l i b e r a l , bourgeois and c u l t u r e d , I f o n l y i t c o u l d r i d I t s e l f of the poisonous Influences of the Hohenzollern Machtstaat." Paul Kennedy, " I d e a l i s t s and R e a l i s t s : B r i t i s h Views of Germany, 1864-1939," p. 141. 22. L o f t u s , D i p l o m a t i c Reminiscences, 2nd s e r i e s , 1, p. 99. 23. S i r A u s t i n Layard, "England's Place In Europe," St. Paul's, 1 C1867D, 291. 24. Morley, "France and Germany," p. 370. 25. Edward Dicey, "The New Germany," MacMlllan's Magazine, 14 C1866), 487. 26. For example A. Eubule-Evans, a l i b e r a l d i v i n e , a l s o questioned Germany's supposed l i b e r a l development. In examining the h i s t o r y of " c o n s t i t u t i o n a l Germany" from 1815 to 1871, he concluded t h a t , "however changed may be the present p o s i t i o n of Germany viewed In Its I n t e r n a t i o n a l r e l a t i o n s , no p r o p o r t i o n a t e advance has been made In I n t e r n a l development," e s p e c i a l l y In matters p e r t a i n i n g to c o n s t i t u t i o n a l change. " C o n s t i t u t i o n a l Germany," Contemporary Review, 20 C1871), 839-853. 27. Morier, Memo I r s 1, p. 216; Morley, "France and Germany," p. 370. 157 28. H e l n r l c h von Sybel, "The German Empire," F o r t n i g h t l y  Review, 9 C1871D, 5. 29. Paul Kennedy, The Rise of Anglo-German Antagonism, pp. 7-8. 30. Morler, Memoirs, 11, pp. 71-72. 31. It was t h i s concern with not only the ends but a l s o the means r e g a r d i n g German u n i f i c a t i o n which Queen V i c t o r i a was ex p r e s s i n g when she informed F r e d e r i c k W i l l i a m IV that "Much would depend upon the manner which t h i s [new German] Power was re p r e s e n t e d " among the powers of Europe. QVL, 1st S e r i e s , I I , p. 164. 32. Mllnes, " R e f l e c t i o n s on Germany," p. 552. 33. L e t t e r s of the Pr i n c e Consort, pp. 169-170. 34. L i f e of the Pr i n c e Consort, v, pp. 313-314. 35. Dearest Mama: L e t t e r s between Queen V i c t o r i a and the Crown  P r i n c e s s of P r u s s i a , 1861-1864 ed. by R. F u l f o r d CLondon: Evans Bros., 1968), p. 5. 36. L o f t u s , Diplomatic Reminiscences, 2nd s e r i e s , 1, p. 99. 37. Layard, "England's Place i n Europe," pp. 290-291. 38. Mllnes, " R e f l e c t i o n s on Germany," pp. 540-543. 39. Morler, Memo I r s , 1, p. 393. 40. I b i d . , p. 180. 41. I b i d . 42. Morler, Memo I r s , i . pp. 401-402. 43. Seton-Watson, B r i t a i n In Europe, p. 463. 44. Dearest Mama, pp. 128-129. 45. David Masson, "The P r u s s i a n Contest and the French Emperor's Roman P o l i c y , " MacMlllan's Magazine, 7 C1862), 76. 46. [Anonymous], "The P o l i t i c a l R e c o n s t r u c t i o n of Germany," Westminster Review, 97 C1872), 344-345. 47. A r c h i b a l d A l i s o n , "The Re v o l u t i o n i n Europe," Blackwood's  Magazine, 63 C1848), 652. 48. The use of orga n i c metaphors, so common to B r i t i s h d e s c r i p t i o n s of t h e i r own p o l i t i c a l system, was c a r r i e d 158 over i n t o t h e i r treatment of P r u s s i a n p o l i t i c s . In d i s c u s s i n g t h i s issue of preparedness, B r i t i s h w r i t e r s were fond of u s i n g the image of " s o l i " Into which c o n s t i t u t i o n a l / p a r l i a m e n t a r y " r o o t s " needed to be sunk i n order to s u r v i v e . Morier, whose prose was e x c e p t i o n a l l y eloquent, f u r n i s h e s but one example of t h i s , as he de s c r i b e d the P r o v i n c i a l E s t a t e s of P r u s s i a , Introduced by F r e d e r i c k W i l l i a m I I I , as "a p a r a s i t i c a l p l a n t f o r c e d a r t i f i c i a l l y over the naked masonry of the o f f i c i a l system, and tended to c l u s t e r g r a c e f u l l y about l t , but unable to a f f o r d i t support, or d e r i v e nourishment from i t . . . . D u r i n g the twenty-odd years of It s e x i s t e n c e i t never s t r u c k r o o t . " Memo Irs 1, p. 213. See a l s o note 96 below. 49. Morier, Memoirs, 11, 72. 50. S i r Robert Morier, "The Re c o n s t r u c t i o n of Germany," North  B r i t i s h Review, 50 C1869), 285-286. 51. L e t t e r s of the Pr i n c e Consort, pp. 188-189. 52. [Anonymous], " A u s t r i a and P r u s s i a - Monarchies v. N a t i o n a l i t i e s , " B r i t i s h Q u a r t e r l y Review, 14 C1851}, 282. 53. Onno Klopp, " P r u s s i a and the Gotha P a r t y , " Home and Fo r e i g n  Review, 1 C1864D, 104-105. 54. John O'Hagan, "The M i n i s t e r i a l C r i s i s i n P r u s s i a , " Home and F o r e i g n Review, 1 C1864D, 570. 55. Morier, "The Re c o n s t r u c t i o n of Germany," pp. 285-286. Sybel too regarded that the r e l a t i v e youth of pa r l i a m e n t a r y I n s t i t u t i o n s In P r u s s i a as a handicap, as the b r i e f p e r i o d d u r i n g which they had e x i s t e d was "too short to a f f o r d the po p u l a t i o n of a country a p r a c t i c a l t r a i n i n g f o r p a r l i a m e n t a r y government." Sybel, "The German Empire," p. 13. 56. [Anonymous], "The P o l i t i c a l R e c o n s t r u c t i o n of Germany," p. 341 57. Martin, L i f e of the Pri n c e Consort, I, pp. 452-453. 58. [Anonymous], " A u s t r i a and P r u s s i a , " p. 280. 59. Robert C e c i l , " P o l i t i c a l Lessons of the War," Q u a r t e r l y  Review, 13 C18713, 274-275. 60. Martin, L i f e of the Pr i n c e Consort, I, p. 547. 61. John O'Hagan, "The M i n i s t e r i a l C r i s i s , " p. 570. 62. Morier, Memo I r s , 1, 177. 159 63. I b i d . 64. I b i d . , p. 312. 65. I b i d . , p. 361. 66. Dicey, "The New Germany," p. 487. Dicey a l s o suggests that l t was j u s t as w e l l that such a t e s t was never made, f o r even at the height of the c o n s t i t u t i o n a l c o n f l i c t there was "never the s l i g h t e s t t a l k of any d i s r u p t i o n of the monarchy." Dicey, "The Campaign In Germany," p. 288. 67. Morler, Memoirs, 11, pp. 114-115; [Anonymous], " A u s t r i a and P r u s s i a , " p. 284. 68. Mllnes was a c u r i o u s e x c e p t i o n to t h i s , as he saw In the c h a r a c t e r of the P r u s s i a n monarchy much of what the B r i t i s h saw In t h e i r s . Hence he d i d not c o n s i d e r P r u s s i a n monarchlsm an o b s t a c l e to l i b e r a l reform i n P r u s s i a : "A c o n s t i t u t i o n a l King of P r u s s i a has none of that a n c e s t r a l majesty to abandon, which might have made the r u l e r s of France, or Spain, or A u s t r i a c l i n g f a s t to a b s o l u t i s t t r a d i t i o n s . The proud r e c o l l e c t i o n s of h i s f o r e f a t h e r s are a l l persona 1... and which, under c o n s t i t u t i o n a l forms of government, preserve to the Crown a s a f e r and more l e g i t i m a t e a u t h o r i t y than could, perhaps, be e x e r c i s e d In c o u n t r i e s where the throne has been r a t h e r the o b j e c t of f e a r than of love, of b l i n d homage than of r a t i o n a l r e g a r d . " Mllnes, "The P o l i t i c a l State of P r u s s i a , " pp. 231-232. 69. Sybel, d i s t r a u g h t by the stalemate which had developed i n the c o n s t i t u t i o n a l c o n f l i c t , hoped that " l t might be that we should have the good fo r t u n e , l i k e that of the E n g l i s h In 1688 In the P r i n c e of Orange, [of] a s p i l t In the l e a d i n g c i r c l e s themselves; f o r example, a d e c l a r a t i o n of the Crown Pr i n c e f o r the c o n s t i t u t i o n . " Anderson, The  S o c i a l and P o l i t i c a l C o n f l i c t i n P r u s s i a , 1858-1864, p. 237. 70. [Anonymo u s ] , "The P r u s s i a n C r i s i s , " F r a s e r ' s Magazine, 68 C1863), 418. 71. [Anonymous], " A u s t r i a and P r u s s i a , " p. 290. 72. [Anonymous], "France and Germany," Westminster Review, 95 C1871), 206-207. o 73. Morler, Memo I r s , 1, p. 304. 74. [Anonymous], " A u s t r i a and P r u s s i a , " p. 309. 75. Otto P f l a n z e d e s c r i b e s t h i s t r a n s i t i o n from an army c o n f l i c t to a c o n s t i t u t i o n a l c o n f l i c t as t a k i n g place i n 160 September, 1862. Bismarck and the Development of Germany:  The P e r i o d of U n i f i c a t i o n , 1815-1871 CPrinceton: P r i n c e t o n U n i v e r s i t y Press, 1963}, p. 171. 76. Masson, "The P r u s s i a n Contest," p. 75. 77. Wrote one observer: "In c o n s i d e r i n g the behavior of the King, one cannot help being s t r u c k with the s i m i l a r i t y , which may be t r a c e d , between James S t u a r t and Cha r l e s , and the l a t e and present Kings of P r u s s i a . " [Anonymous], "The P r u s s i a C r i s i s , " p. 416. 78. Masson, "The P r u s s i a n Contest," p. 76. 79. C e c i l , " P o l i t i c a l Lessons," pp. 267-268. 80. Masson, "The P r u s s i a n Contest," p. 76. Among such "wrongs" was the "systematic and long-continued r e p r e s s i o n s of many of the v a r i o u s l i b e r t i e s and j u s t d e s i r e s of an i n t e l l i g e n t and well-educated n a t i o n . " 81. O'Hagan, "The M i n i s t e r i a l C r i s i s i n P r u s s i a , " p. 570 82. Klopp, " P r u s s i a and the Gotha P a r t y , " p. 105. 83. [Anonymous], "The P r u s s i a n C r i s i s , " p. 417. 84. Masson, "The P r u s s i a n Contest," pp. 75-76. 85. Dearest C h i l d : L e t t e r s Between Queen V i c t o r i a and the P r i n c e s s Royal, 1858-1861, ed. by R. F u l f o r d . CLondon: Evans Bros., 1964), p. 19. 86. Masson, "The P r u s s i a n Contest," p. 76. 87. Morier, Memo I r s , I, 181. 88. I b i d . , p. 215. 89. Mllnes, "The P o l i t i c a l S t a t e , " p. 231. Mllnes h e l d t h a t , because of the need to e n t r u s t " l a r g e and d i s t i n c t powers" to l o c a l i n t e r e s t s , the American example might prove most a p p l i c a b l e to P r u s s i a . 90. [Anonymous], " A u s t r i a and Prussia,!' pp. 272-274. 91. Morier i s c e r t a i n l y the best example of such e n l i g h t e n e d observers of Germany. For example, i n commenting on the d i f f i c u l t i e s which the Grand Duke of Baden encountered In e x p r e s s i n g h i m s e l f on p o l i t i c a l i s s u e s , Morier remarked that anyone In Germany who becomes "possessed of l i b e r a l i d e a s " does so by such " p e r f e c t l y d i f f e r e n t avenues and such p e r f e c t l y d i f f e r e n t t r a i n s of thought from those which are used by us, whose lungs have been f i l l e d with f r e e a i r 161 / ever s i n c e we cou l d breathe at a l l , that l t Is o f t e n very d i f f i c u l t to t r a c e the process by which the common goal has been a t t a i n e d . " Memo I r s , 1, p. 243. 92. Relnhold P a u l i , " P r u s s i a and Germany," F r a s e r ' s Magazine, 83 C1871D, 216-217. 93. K. Hlldebrand, "Prospects of L i b e r a l i s m i n Germany," F o r t n i g h t l y Review, 10 C1871), 389-390, 398-399. 94. I b i d . , pp. 391, 413-418. 95. Hlldebrand f e l t that i t was through t h i s development of Indigenous ideas that emerged the c o n s t i t u t i o n a l law of the Western hemisphere's three "most du r a b l e " s t a t e s - Rome, Venice and England: " T h e i r i n s t i t u t i o n s were not the work of conscious r e f l e c t i o n or of a f o r c i b l e act of the w i l l ; t h e i r o r i g i n was n a t u r a l and t h e i r development the r e s u l t of the changes which s u c c e s s i v e events g r a d u a l l y brought about In f a c t s and I n t e r e s t s , r a t h e r than i n the r e a l i s a t i o n of a b s t r a c t Ideas and preconceived t h e o r i e s . " I b i d . , p. 414. 96. Morler, Memo I r s , 1, p. 181. 97. Dicey, "The New Germany," pp. 485, 487. 98. See note 25 above. 99. S i m i l a r to Burke's o b j e c t i o n s were those of Onno Klopp, the Hanoverian c o n s e r v a t i v e who r a i l e d a g a i n s t the "v u l g a r l i b e r a l i s m " of the Gotha p a r t y i n Germany: "They look to England as the model to be im i t a t e d ; and h e r e i n l i e s the great p o l i t i c a l and h i s t o r i c a l e r r o r of the party, which resembles that of the French l i b e r a l s i n 1790....The Gotha p a r t y Imagine that the s e l f - g o v e r n i n g bodies can be re p l a c e d by e l e c t i o n s a c c o r d i n g to m a j o r i t i e s , or some new scheme of government unknown to the t r a d i t i o n s , and not founded upon the m a t e r i a l s , which the country has pres e r v e d . " " P r u s s i a and the Gotha P a r t y , " pp. 104-105. 100. Mllnes whole a n a l y s i s of the 1848 r e v o l u t i o n s hinged upon t h i s very i s s u e , which he expounded i n the f o l l o w i n g manner: "Men have been so accustomed to speaking of nations being prepared f o r l i b e r a l i n s t i t u t i o n s before they o b t a i n them, of something which was to be the i n s t r u c t i o n and the d i s c i p l i n e , of the p o l i t i c a l catechumen, of some moral and I n t e l l e c t u a l foundation to be l a i d , upon which the p o l i t i c a l e d i f i c e was to r i s e i n p r o p o r t i o n a t e and o r d e r l y beauty, that l t Is w e l l that so c l e a r an example has been e x h i b i t e d of the competency of any but p o l i t i c a l c u l t u r e to adapt mankind to the d u t i e s and c a p a c i t i e s of p o l i t i c a l l i f e . The o l d analogy of l e a r n i n g to swim without going into the water remains a c c u r a t e l y c o r r e c t . . . . N e l t h e r man 162 nor a c t i o n can be taught s e l f c o n t r o l and the c o n d i t i o n s by which the r e s u l t i s obtained are as complicated and as mysterious, i n the n a t i o n a l , as i n the i n d i v i d u a l mind." " R e f l e c t i o n s on Germany," p. 538. 101. [Anonymous], " A u s t r i a and P r u s s i a , " p. 284. 102. Morier, Memoirs, 1, pp. 315-315. 103. [Anonymous], "The P r u s s i a n C r i s i s , " p. 418. 104. I b i d . 105. L e t t e r s of the P r i n c e Consort pp. 354-355. 106. Morier, "The R e c o n s t r u c t i o n of Germany," p. 286. 107. [Anonymous], "The P o l i t i c a l R e c o n s t r u c t i o n of Germany," p. 334. Only a few r e a l i s t s , l i k e Lord S a l i s b u r y , were prepared to accept t h a t , i n P r u s s i a at l e a s t , i t was most opportune that a m i n i s t e r d i d "not depend f o r h i s o f f i c i a l e x i s t e n c e upon the n i g h t l y c a p r i c e s of a popular assembly." C e c i l , " P o l i t i c a l Lessons of the War," pp. 276-277. Conscious of the f a c t t h a t the B r i t i s h regarded the absence of such a law as a p o l i t i c a l v i c e , P r u s s i a n l i b e r a l s themselves J u s t i f i e d t h i s s i t u a t i o n on the grounds that l t had "grown up h i s t o r i c a l l y , " t h a t l t expressed the " a c t u a l s i t u a t i o n , " and that l t corresponded "on the whole with p u b l i c o p i n i o n " ; i n short, that I t was based on the §_ p o s t e r i o r i experiences of P r u s s i a h e r s e l f . P a u l i , " P r u s s i a and Germany," p. 217. Sybel J u s t i f i e d the absence of p a r l i a m e n t a r y government In the new German Reich on the f o l l o w i n g grounds: " P a r l i a m e n t a r y government means the government of the m a j o r i t y , f o r the time being, of the R e p r e s e n t a t i v e s of the People. It Is e s s e n t i a l , t h e r e f o r e , to I t s e x i s t e n c e that there should be a homogenous m a j o r i t y In the parliament, and that l t should be able to form a m i n i s t r y from I t s own members. Now both these requirements have h i t h e r t o been wanting lri Germany, and I see ,no prospect, at present, of the want being s p e e d i l y s u p p l i e d . " "The German Empire," p. 12. 108. [Anonymous], " R e v o l u t i o n and C o u n t e r - R e v o l u t i o n , " Westminster Review, 55 C1851), 92-93. Conclusions 1. Ramsay, Idealism and F o r e i g n P o l i c y , pp. 218-219. 2. Dahrendorf, S o c i e t y and Democracy In Germany, p. 15. 163 3. E.H.Carr, What Is H i s t o r y ? CLondon: Penguin, 1964), pp. 97-98. 4. Dahrendorf, S o c i e t y and Democracy In Germany, p. 16. 5. Millman, B r i t i s h P o l i c y and the Fran c o - P r u s s i a n War, pp. 221-222; QVL, 2nd s e r i e s , 1, p. 624. BIBLIOGRAPHY 1. 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