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The future of Soviet domestic reform : an analysis of three sovietologists' views Bruyneel, Stephen Alan 1988

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THE FUTURE OP SOVIET DOMESTIC REFORM: AN ANALYSIS OF THREE SOVIETOLOGISTS' VIEWS By STEPHEN ALAN BRUYNEEL B.Sc,  The U n i v e r s i t y of B r i t i s h Columbia, 1984  A THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF MASTER OF ARTS in THE FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIES (Department o f P o l i t i c a l  Science)  .We accept t h i s t h e s i s as conforming to the r e q u i r e d  standard  THE UNIVERSITY OF BRITISH COLUMBIA February  1988  @ Stephen A l a n Bruyneel, 1988  In  presenting  degree  at  this  the  thesis in  University of  partial  fulfilment  of  of  department publication  this or of  thesis for by  his  or  her  Department The University of British Columbia 1956 Main Mall Vancouver, Canada V6T 1Y3  DE-6(3/81)  representatives.  for  an advanced  Library shall make  it  agree that permission for extensive  It  this thesis for financial gain shall not  . ItftS  that the  scholarly purposes may be  permission.  D a t e  requirements  British Columbia, I agree  freely available for reference and study. I further copying  the  is  granted  by the  understood  that  be allowed without  head of copying  my or  my written  i i Abstract.  T h i a t h e s i s had two r e l a t e d purposes:  t o compare,  c o n t r a s t and c r i t i q u e t h r e e s c h o l a r s ' views o f the S o v i e t domestic reform p r o c e s s , and t o use these a n a l y s e s as the means by which t o examine t h e emerging S o v i e t domestic  reform  program. The arguments o f Stephen F. Cohen, Timothy J . C o l t o n 1  and Richard Pipes served as the primary s u b j e c t matter o f t h i s t h e s i s , with t h e i r i n d i v i d u a l views determined critical  by a  a n a l y s i s o f the w r i t i n g which each has r e c e n t l y done  on t h i s s u b j e c t . I n v e s t i g a t e d i n p a r t i c u l a r was each i n d i v i d u a l s ' i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f the reform p r o c e s s , i t s component p a r t s and t h e k i n d o f change t h a t was expected t o be i n v o l v e d i n any new domestic  reforms. The f i n a l  chapter  d e a l i n g with the contemporary S o v i e t s i t u a t i o n r e l i e d upon as much primary source m a t e r i a l as p o s s i b l e i n an attempt t o p r o v i d e an a c c u r a t e p i c t u r e o f t h e s t a t e o f a f f a i r s w i t h i n the country a t t h i s  time.  The r e s u l t s o f my a n a l y s i s i n d i c a t e t h a t R i c h a r d P i p e s ' i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s and c o n c l u s i o n s do not r e c e i v e much support from e i t h e r S o v i e t h i s t o r y o r the contemporary  situation  w i t h i n the country. H i s one dimensional view o f S o v i e t e l i t e i n t e r e s t s and h i s " c r i s i s / r e f o r m " theory o f S o v i e t reform were found t o be g e n e r a l l y u n s u b s t a n t i a t e d . Stephen Cohen's arguments, on the other hand, r e c e i v e d a good d e a l o f support, e s p e c i a l l y with regards t o h i s emphasis on the p r o b a b i l i t y o f moderate change and t h e e x i s t e n c e o f r e f o r m i s t  iii and c o n s e r v a t i v e c o n s t i t u e n c i e s w i t h i n the S o v i e t Union, c o n s t i t u e n c i e s which do appear t o have been i n v o l v e d i n the domestic  reform p r o c e s s . At the same time, however, the  terminology which he employed t o d e s c r i b e the reform was  process  found t o be somewhat p r o b l e m a t i c . Timothy C o l t o n ' s  arguments, f i n a l l y ,  were a l s o found t o have a good d e a l of  e f f i c a c y , e s p e c i a l l y with r e s p e c t t o h i s view of the country's new  g e n e r a t i o n of p o l i t i c a l  l e a d e r s h i p and the r o l e  t h a t i t would p l a y i n the reform p r o c e s s . In c o n c l u s i o n , the new of  domestic  found t o be  g e n e r a l l y moderate economic and p o l i t i c a l  t h a t was new  reform program i t s e l f was  indicative  change, change  embraced f o r the moat p a r t by a good segment of the  l e a d e r s h i p , but which had found s i g n i f i c a n t r e s i s t a n c e a t  the lower l e v e l s of the bureaucracy class.  and among the working  iv Table of Contents Abstract  •  Acknowledgment  i i vi  Introduction  1  Endnotes  6  Chapter One: The Nature and S e v e r i t y o f the C r i s i s The Nature and S e v e r i t y o f the C r i s i s  7 7  Critique  IB  Endnotes  27  Chapter Two:  F o r c e s and F a c t o r s Promoting Change i n the S o v i e t Union  Forces and F a c t o r s Promoting Change  30 .31  Critique  37  Endnotes  52  Chapter Three: The B a r r i e r s t o Change i n the S o v i e t Union  55  The B a r r i e r s t o Change  56  Critique  66  Endnotes  75  Chapter Four: The New The New  S o v i e t Domestic Reform Program  77  Economic Reform Program  78  The Degree and Character o f Change.  .78  Forces and F a c t o r s A f f e c t i n g Change  84  The R e i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of S t a l i n ' s Role in Soviet History The Degree and Character o f Change Forces and F a c t o r s A f f e c t i n g Change  104 104 112  V  Endnotes  131  Conclusion  135  B i b l iography  145  vi Acknowledgement Three s e t s of i n d i v i d u a l s deserve help with t h i s t h e s i s . Academically, members o f my  my  recognition for their thanks go out t o the  committee, P r o f e s s o r s Paul Marantz, Pete  Chamberlain and  Bob  Jackson.  I owe  a particularly  academic debt to P r o f e s s o r Marantz, who deal of advice and  large  has o f f e r e d a good  shown an even g r e a t e r amount of  patience  d u r i n g the w r i t i n g of t h i s t h e s i s . Without h i s c o u n s e l l i n g t h i s t h e s i s would not have turned out the way  that i t did.  For h e l p i n the a c t u a l p r e p a r a t i o n of the t h e s i s I wish to  thank t h r e e people.  down. E a r l and  Facing a c r i s i s when my  computer broke  Marlene Preece were generous enough t o allow  me access to t h e i r u n i t and Rick Seely was  singularly  r e s p o n s i b l e f o r both diagnosing and r e p a i r i n g the problems with my  own  computer. Without the help of these  the f i n a l d r a f t of t h i s t h e s i s would have been  individuals delayed  indefinitely. Finally,  I owe  a l a r g e personal debt t o my  f a m i l y f o r t h e i r support both at s c h o o l and moods and  my  mother and  over the past months. My  h e r m i t - l i k e e x i s t e n c e and  my  I thank them f o r t h a t .  f a m i l y , however, and  e s p e c i a l l y to  f a t h e r , f o r p r o v i d i n g the environment i n which  t h i s t h e s i s c o u l d be completed. Without t h e i r l o v e support  friends,  p a r t i c u l a r l y at home, have put up with  My g r e a t e s t debt i s t o my my  f r i e n d s and  and  t h i s work would have been i m p o s s i b l e to complete,  as a r e s u l t I d e d i c a t e t h i s t h e s i s t o them.  and  Introduction There has e v o l u t i o n and  always been a great deal of i n t e r e s t i n the  development of the S o v i e t system, i f only  because the system i t s e l f i s so d i f f e r e n t from democracies of many European and  North American  A t t e n t i o n became even more focused early  1980's, however, f o r two  S o v i e t Union was  the countries.  i n the l a t e 1970'a  and  r e l a t e d reasons. F i r s t ,  the  a t t h a t time beginning to e x p e r i e n c e a  number of apparently  s e r i o u s domestic problems. The  high  economic growth r a t e s of the I960'a were q u i c k l y t a i l i n g and  off  a number of the l e a d i n g western i n d u s t r i a l powers were  once again  i n c r e a a i n g the gap  between t h e i r p r o d u c t i v i t y  and  t h a t of the S o v i e t Union. At the same time a number of domestic p o l i t i c a l problems -- ranging c o r r u p t i o n to an i n c r e a s e  from widespread  i n the t e n s i o n  l e v e l s between  the  country's many e t h n i c groups -- were becoming s o u r c e s of obvious concern f o r the S o v i e t l e a d e r s h i p . The many of these a i l m e n t s  was  such t h a t some western  were s e r i o u s l y q u e s t i o n i n g  the a b i l i t y  s u r v i v e i n the form i t was  then i n , l and  experts how  had  seriousness analysts  of the U.S.S.R. to almost a l l  become i n c r e a s i n g l y i n t e r e s t e d i n both when  changes would be  o  and  i n s t i t u t e d to address some of these  problems. The reform had  second reason f o r t h i s renewed i n t e r e s t , i n S o v i e t to do with the l e a d e r s h i p s u c c e s s i o n  r a p i d l y approaching at t h a t time. The  Soviet  that  was  l e a d e r s h i p unde  2  Leonid  Brezhnev was becoming o l d even by S o v i e t  standards,  with a high percentage of i t s members i n t h e i r l a t e  sixties  or s e v e n t i e s . T h i s kind of age d i s t r i b u t i o n was p a r a l l e l e d w i t h i n much o f the Party and governmental e l i t e . As a r e s u l t , the s u c c e s s i o n  i t s e l f was expected t o take on a s p e c i a l  s i g n i f i c a n c e because o f the massive g e n e r a t i o n a l  change t h a t  would n e c e s s a r i l y have t o accompany i t . E x p e c t a t i o n s running  were  p a r t i c u l a r l y high because o f the p o t e n t i a l  p e r s o n a l i t y d i f f e r e n c e s t h a t some thought might be r e f l e c t e d i n t h i s new g e n e r a t i o n , t o come t o power with  a generation  which would be the f i r s t  few memories and/or d i r e c t t i e s t o  V l a d i m i r Lenin, Joseph S t a l i n and many o f t h e h a r d s h i p s o f the S o v i e t p a s t . A good deal of academic i n t e r e s t was t h e r e f o r e generated i n regai'd t o the q u e s t i o n of t h i s group's new t r a i t s  of whether any  might be t r a n s l a t e d i n t o new  approaches t o domestic reform, approaches which might  provide  new or more f a r - r e a c h i n g s o l u t i o n s t o some o f the country's i n t e r n a l economic and p o l i t i c a l  problems.2  One r e s u l t o f t h i s i n c r e a s e d S o v i e t reform  i n t e r e s t i n the f u t u r e of  was the p u b l i c a t i o n o f a good deal o f  l i t e r a t u r e on t h i s t o p i c . With the Brezhnev s u c c e s s i o n its final  stages  and a new generation  now i n  o f l e a d e r s beginning t o  address some o f i t s domestic problems, I decided  that i t  would be i n t e r e s t i n g t o go back and c r i t i c a l l y examine some of t h i s l i t e r a t u r e . T h i s e n t e r p r i s e w i l l be d i r e c t e d by two r e l a t e d purposes. The f i r s t  i s t o analyze  and c r i t i q u e the  arguments of a number of prominent s o v i e t o l o g i s t s t o determine what has been the b a s i c nature of the reform  process  domestic reform  provide  domestic  w i t h i n the S o v i e t Union. Once t h i s i s done,  the c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s of the r e c e n t l y i n s t i t u t e d  expectations  help  program w i l l be compared with  Soviet the  of these same s c h o l a r s i n an e f f o r t to both  more c u r r e n t  j u s t i f i c a t i o n and/or r e f u t a t i o n f o r  t h e i r arguments, and  t o b e t t e r understand what i s a c t u a l l y  going  country.  on w i t h i n the  Because t h e r e was  a considerable  the f u t u r e of S o v i e t reform, and t h e s i s was  amount w r i t t e n about  because the scope of  this  l i m i t e d from the o u t s e t , the views of o n l y  scholars w i l l  be analyzed  here. The  three  c r i t e r i a for selection  were q u i t e s t r a i g h t f o r w a r d . The  i n d i v i d u a l s had  written f a i r l y  s u b s t a n t i a l l y on the t o p i c o  s p e c i f i c a l l y and  S o v i e t domestic reform  and  t o have  be s u f f i c i e n t l y d i f f e r e n t  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s t h a t a comparative a n a l y s i s would fruitful.  In the end  I decided  in thei  be  t h a t the t h r e e s c h o l a r s whose  views best f i t these d e s c r i p t i o n s were Stephen F. Cohen, Timothy J . C o l t o n , and  Richard  Pipes.  To a i d i n the development of t h i s paper, an framework was  designed which w i l l both b r i n g out  important assumptions and p a r t i c u l a r viewpoint  and  analytical the  ideas w i t h i n each author's at the same time f a c i l i t a t e a  comparative c r i t i q u e of these same views. To do t h i s a s e t o three b a s i c q u e s t i o n s  were a p p l i e d to each s c h o l a r ' s w r i t t e n  4 work, the answers t o which w i l l the f i r s t  not only form the b a s i s f o r  t h r e e c h a p t e r s i n t h i s t h e s i s , but w i l l  also lay  down the t h e o r e t i c a l framework f o r a l a t e r comparison these views with what i s now  of  o c c u r r i n g w i t h i n the c o u n t r y .  The f i r s t of these q u e s t i o n s w i l l  deal with what each s c h o l a r  sees t o be the nature and s e v e r i t y of the domestic  problems  w i t h i n the S o v i e t Union, and the kind of change which each f e e l s i s both needed and t o be expected  i n the near  future.  I t i s important t o begin with an a n a l y s i s of the s i t u a t i o n w i t h i n the country i t s e l f so as to not o n l y e s t a b l i s h where change and reform are f e l t to be needed, but more i m p o r t a n t l y to determine working  what " d e f i n i t i o n of change" each s c h o l a r i s  with. An understanding of these d e f i n i t i o n s i s  e s s e n t i a l because one's conception of the c o n d i t i o n s which are "necessary and s u f f i c i e n t " to b r i n g about reform  will  depend h e a v i l y on the kind of change t h a t one expects t o occur. The second  p a r t of the framework w i l l  examine each  s c h o l a r ' s i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of the f o r c e s and f a c t o r s which, by way  of the p r e s s u r e they generate, w i l l be promoting  w i t h i n the c o u n t r y . In e f f e c t t h i s chapter w i l l d i s s e c t i n g and p i e c i n g together each  change  be aimed at  i n d i v i d u a l ' s view of the  nature of the reform process i t s e l f and the c o n s t i t u e n t p a r t s which make i t up. The f i n a l p i e c e of the framework w i l l the l o g i c a l c o u n t e r p a r t to p r e v i o u s one  be  in that i t w i l l  provide i n f o r m a t i o n on the b a r r i e r s which each s c h o l a r f e e l s  5 will  a r i s e to both i n h i b i t and p r o v i d e o p p o s i t i o n t o change.  A s i g n i f i c a n t p o r t i o n of both of these l a s t  two  chapters  will  be devoted to e s t a b l i s h i n g each i n d i v i d u a l ' s view of the nature, o r g a n i z a t i o n and r o l e of e l i t e  interests in this  reform process because i t i s w i t h i n t h i s group t h a t  one  would expect t o f i n d the kind of support and/or r e s i s t a n c e which w i l l domestic  fundamentally determine  the outcome of any  new  reforms.  Once the s c h o l a r s ' views on these t o p i c s have been e s t a b l i s h e d and analyzed, they w i l l  then be used as standards  a g a i n s t which t o compare what has t r a n s p i r e d thus f a r w i t h i n the U.S.S.R. i n the area of domestic reform. The chapter w i l l  final  i s o l a t e two f a i r l y s p e c i f i c a s p e c t s of the  c u r r e n t domestic reform program -- the economic reform program and the r e e v a l u a t i o n of the S t a l i n q u e s t i o n -- and examine how  w e l l the authors' d i f f e r e n t c o n c l u s i o n s  i n c o r p o r a t e and e x p l a i n the events surrounding the development and progress of these reforms. B r i n g i n g i n contemporary events t o t h i s a n a l y s i s w i l l not o n l y serve t o further c l a r i f y s c h o l a r s ' views, of  how  Soviet  the r e l a t i v e e f f i c a c y of the d i f f e r e n t i t w i l l also provide a better  understanding  these r e c e n t events f i t i n t o the h i s t o r i c a l c o n t e x t of reform.  6  Endnotes 1. See, f o r example R i c h a r d P i p e s , S u r v i v a l I s Not Enough (New York: Simon and S c h u s t e r , 1984); W i l l i a m E. Odum, "Whither the S o v i e t Union?", The Washington Q u a r t e r l y . V o l . 4, No. 2, (Spring 1982), pp. 30-49; and Robert Conquest, "A New Russia? A New World?", F o r e i g n A f f a i r s . V o l . 53, No. 3, ( A p r i l 1975), pp. 482-497 2. Two prominent s o v i e t o l o g i s t s wrote books which d e a l t q u i t e s p e c i f i c a l l y with the t o p i c o f g e n e r a t i o n a l change. See J e r r y F. Hough, S o v i e t L e a d e r s h i p i n T r a n s i t i o n (Washington: Brookings I n s t i t u t i o n , 1980), and Seweryn B i a l e r , S t a l i n ' s S u c c e s s o r s (Cambridge: Cambridge U n i v e r s i t y Press, 1980).  7 Chapter  One  The Nature and S e v e r i t y of the  Crisis  Before beginning an a n a l y s i s of the f u t u r e of S o v i e t reform one must f i r s t determine i s now  the s t a t e which the country  i n . T h i s being the case, the purpose of t h i s chapter  w i l l be t o examine the t h r e e a u t h o r s ' views of the nature s e v e r i t y of the domestic  problems i n the S o v i e t Union.  and  The  s c h o l a r s ' arguments w i l l f i r s t be comparatively analyzed so as t o d i s c o v e r and e x p l a i n areas of consensus and disagreement.  The second  p a r t o f the chapter w i l l  then  i n v o l v e a c r i t i q u e of the main theses of each author. C r i t i c i s m s w i l l be o f the l o g i c a l and s t r u c t u r a l c o n s i s t e n c y of  the arguments only so t h a t any r e c e n t developments i n the  country which might be germane can be i n c l u d e d as p a r t of the f i n a l chapter i n t h e s i s , one which w i l l d e a l with the new  S o v i e t domestic  specifically  reform program.  The Nature and S e v e r i t y of the  Crisis  R i c h a r d P i p e s b e l i e v e d t h a t the S o v i e t Union f a c e d i n c r e a s i n g l y alarming domestic political  and socio-economic  difficulties  i n both  spheres. These problems were  regarded as s e r i o u s enough t o i n d i c a t e a s t a t e of and economic c r i s i s w i t h i n the country. In the sphere, f o r example, he argued a g r i c u l t u r a l system was  the  political  socio-economic  t h a t an i n h e r e n t l y flawed  f a s t becoming an unbearable  upon the economy, a burden t h a t was  second  burden  only t o t h a t  8 played  by the c o s t of m i l i t a r y e x p e n d i t u r e s . !  Similarly,  he compared l i v i n g standards w i t h i n the S o v i e t Union t o those i n T h i r d World c o u n t r i e s , arguing i n s t a n c e s c o n d i t i o n s had  not  t h a t i n many  improved s u b s t a n t i a l l y s i n c e  time of the Tsars.2 F i n a l l y , P i p e s b e l i e v e d t h a t combined e f f e c t s  the  of an i n c r e a s e i n the m o r t a l i t y r a t e and  decrease i n the b i r t h r a t e of the Russian p o r t i o n o f population  the  a  the  would soon r e s u l t i n severe l a b o r shortages i n the  country which would l a s t w e l l through the end  of the next  century.3 The  problems i n the p o l i t i c a l sphere were seen t o  i n d i c a t i v e of a s t a t e of c r i s i s no  be  l e s s severe than the  one  i n the economic realm. In p a r t i c u l a r . P i p e s b e l i e v e d t h a t l e a d e r s h i p had population Party  d e l i b e r a t e l y become estranged from  i t r u l e d and  members and  the e x c e p t i o n .  the  t h a t widespread c o r r u p t i o n among  l e a d e r s h i p had  become the r u l e r a t h e r than  Both problems were thought t o have reached  p o i n t where the l e g i t i m a c y of the l e a d e r s h i p had  to be  into question,  the  i n t h a t "...the former robs i t of  knowledge e s s e n t i a l to e f f e c t i v e a d m i n i s t r a t i o n . . . the deprives  the  the  called  latter  i t of the moral a u t h o r i t y i t needs f o r the purpose  of m o b i l i z i n g the population.'"*  The  other  significant  p o l i t i c a l problem which P i p e s emphasised was  the s t a t e of  r e l a t i o n s between the c o u n t r y ' s v a r i o u s n a t i o n a l i t i e s .  He  argued t h a t the p o t e n t i a l f o r p o l i t i c a l v i o l e n c e among these e t h n i c groups had  become so high t h a t "...underneath  the  9 s k i r m i s h i n g , t h e r e smoulders resentment and i n some areas, hatred t h a t can explode i n t o g e n o c i d a l f u r y should the heavy hand o f Russian a u t h o r i t y ever weaken."5 These k i n d s o f political  problems, combined  with the ones i n t h e s o c i o -  economic realm, were what caused P i p e s t o maintain such a dim view o f the s t a t e o f domestic a f f a i r s w i t h i n the S o v i e t Union. P i p e s b e l i e v e d the causes o f these problems t o be very b a s i c : they were the r e s u l t o f i n h e r e n t f l a w s i n the S o v i e t political example,  and economic system. In the economic realm, f o r o v e r c e n t r a l i z a t i o n and the u n r e a l i s t i c  w o r k - i n c e n t i v e s were seen t o be fundamental c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s of  the S t a l i n i s t economic system, a system t h a t would never  be a b l e t o work w e l l i n i t s present form.&  Politically,  he q u e s t i o n e d the e f f i c a c y o f a S o v i e t system which had generated a l e a d e r s h i p which was more i n t e r e s t e d i n the maintenance o f i t s own power and p r i v i l e g e s than i t was i n the  g e n e r a l w e l f a r e o f the p o p u l a t i o n t h a t i t r u l e d . 7  P i p e s ' arguments were t h e r e f o r e i n d i c a t i v e o f a b e l i e f i n an o v e r a l l " c r i s i s o f system" w i t h i n the S o v i e t Union, one t h a t c o u l d only be r e s o l v e d by r a d i c a l measures. As he h i m s e l f concluded: T h i s does not mean t h a t t h e S o v i e t empire i s about to c o l l a p s e ; i t does mean t h a t i n t e r n a l p r e s s u r e s are b r i n g i n g the day nearer when the nomenklatura w i l l have t o choose between moderating i t s ambitions and a l t e r i n g i t s economic and p o l i t i c a l regime o r , indeed, when i t may be f o r c e d t o do both.&  10 Because of t h i s bleak assessment of the nature and s e v e r i t y o f the problems w i t h i n the country, major s t r u c t u r a l changes were f e l t t o be necessary t o overcome the numerous a i l m e n t s . As a r e s u l t , the k i n d o f change which P i p e s d e a l t with i n h i s framework was e s s e n t i a l l y systemic i n n a t u r e . He argued, f o r example, t h a t r a d i c a l economic and a d m i n i s t r a t i v e d e c e n t r a l i z a t i o n were necessary w i t h i n the country i f the economy was ever t o have a chance a t any k i n d o f s i g n i f i c a n t , s u s t a i n e d growth.9 He saw the need f o r a s i m i l a r degree of change i n the p o l i t i c a l  sphere,  i n that:  ...meaningful change would r e q u i r e the i n s t i t u t i o n of some...procedures by means of which the p o p u l a t i o n c o u l d i n f l u e n c e the s e l e c t i o n of the Communist P a r t y ' s d i r e c t i n g personnel and t h e i r conduct of i n t e r n a l affairs. 1 0  One can see t h a t P i p e s h e l d out l i t t l e hope t h a t the system would ever operate e f f e c t i v e l y i n i t s present form. The views of Timothy C o l t o n were s i m i l a r t o those o f P i p e s , i n only two a r e a s . He d i d r e c o g n i z e a number of the same p o l i t i c a l  and aocio-ecnomic  problems t h a t P i p e s d i d ,  such as those t o do with a g r i c u l t u r e , p o p u l a t i o n and demographic t r e n d s , p o l i t i c a l c o r r u p t i o n and e t h n i c relationa.il £  a  w e l l , some of the f a c t o r s which C o l t o n  b e l i e v e d were r e s p o n s i b l e f o r these a i l m e n t s were s i m i l a r to those given by P i p e s . He t o o , f o r example, emphasized the d e t r i m e n t a l r o l e s played by a h y p e r c e n t r a l i z e d economic system, outdated p r o d u c t i o n p r i o r i t i e s and  increasingly  i r r e l e v a n t work i n c e n t i v e s . 1 2 Most of C o l t o n ' s a n a l y s i s d i d d i v e r g e s u b s t a n t i a l l y from P i p e s ' , however. T h i s  was  p a r t i c u l a r l y the case with h i s i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of the s e v e r i t y of the U.S.S.R.'s domestic  p o l i t i c a l and economic problems.  While r e c o g n i z i n g many of these a i l m e n t s as s e r i o u s and cumulative  i n t h e i r e f f e c t s , he f a i l e d t o i n t e r p r e t any  of  them as having yet reached c r i s i s p r o p o r t i o n s . For example, he argued  t h a t the t h r e a t s t o Russian hegemony and  the  p r o s p e c t s of labour shortages, while p o t e n t i a l l y s e r i o u s political  problems, c o u l d not even t h e o r e t i c a l l y occur  until  the t u r n of the century and as such d i d not r e p r e s e n t urgent concerns  f o r the l e a d e r s h i p . 1 3 C o l t o n maintained  a  s i m i l a r view with r e s p e c t t o the p o s s i b i l i t y o f e t h n i c v i o l e n c e i n the country, i n t h a t : The S o v i e t regime has i n the past been e x t r a o r d i n a r i l y adept a t using s t i c k s and c a r r o t s to keep non-Russian m i n o r i t i e s i n l i n e . Two or t h r e e g e n e r a t i o n s i n t o the f u t u r e , p o p u l a t i o n dynamics alone may make fundamental change i n e s c a p a b l e . Over the next ten years or so, however, and even s e v e r a l decades beyond, the problem seems r e a d i l y manageable.I 4  C o l t o n d i d not even see the country's economic problems as i n d i c a t o r s of imminent c r i s i s . Although  he f e l t t h a t these  a i l m e n t s were the ones with the most p o t e n t i a l t o become critical,  he was  quick t o p o i n t out t h a t r e c e n t economic  f a i l u r e s had o n l y been a t the margins. As such, while the economy may  have slowed  down, i t had c e r t a i n l y not ceased  to  grow a l t o g e t h e r . In summing up h i s views about the s e v e r i t y  12 of the S o v i e t domestic problems, C o l t o n concluded: As t h e post-Brezhnev e r a t a k e s shape, the s u r v i v a l of the S o v i e t system i s not i n q u e s t i o n , but t h e u t i l i t y o f many o f i t s p o l i c i e s i s . The accumulation of i n t e r n a l problems, w h i l e l e a v i n g the regime w e l l s h o r t o f a l l - o u t c r i s i s , c o n f r o n t s i t with c h o i c e s more vexing than any i t has faced i n decades.16 C o l t o n a l s o had a s i g n i f i c a n t l y interpretation the  different  o f not only the nature o f the problems  within  S o v i e t Union, but a l s o o f t h e k i n d o f change which was  necessary t o overcome them. Rather than being i n d i c a t i v e o f an o v e r a l l s y s t e m i c c r i s i s the  w i t h i n t h e c o u n t r y , he argued t h a t  many domestic problems simply demonstrated t h a t the  S o v i e t p o l i c i e s and approaches t o government which had developed during t h e Brezhnev e r a were no longer under contemporary  effective  c o n d i t i o n s . 1 7 The p o l i c i e s were seen  to be t h e source of t h e problems, then, and not t h e system itself.  Because o f t h i s view, the domestic a i l m e n t s o f the  S o v i e t Union were not seen t o r e f l e c t t h a t badly upon the potential  e f f i c a c y o f t h e system. Indeed, r a t h e r than  q u e s t i o n i n g t h e system's p o t e n t i a l ,  Colton instead  emphasized  a number o f i t s s t r e n g t h s and a s s e t s , i n c l u d i n g i t s l o n g e v i t y , t h e accomplishments  i t had produced i n s c i e n c e and  technology, and i t s l a c k o f a number o f the s i g n i f i c a n t problems seemingly c h a r a c t e r i s t i c  o f many Western democratic  c o u n t r i e s . I B i n c o n c l u s i o n , C o l t o n argued t h a t even i f the  S o v i e t system "...has been j a r r e d  by r e c e n t events, b a s i c  support f o r S o v i e t i n s t i t u t i o n s has thus f a r not r e a l l y been  13 loosened... d i s c o n t e n t i s d i r e c t e d a t the performance of the S o v i e t system and not a t i t s e x i s t e n c e . " ^ Based on these i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s of the domestic s i t u a t i o n , Colton argued t h a t the degree of change necessary to  overcome the c o u n t r y ' s many problems was  l e s s than the amount f e l t  significantly  t o be needed by P i p e s . He believed,  t h a t what was i n order was a program of "moderate reform", a program whose p o l i c i e s ...would not transform S o v i e t s o c i e t y or r e v o l u t i o n i z e p o l i t i c a l i n s t i t u t i o n s and i d e o l o g y . I t would, however, put a p e r c e p t i b l e dent i n the S o v i e t Union's problems, which i s a l l t h a t most of l e a d e r s expect of i t . 2 0 The changes which C o l t o n expected were t h e r e f o r e s i m i l a r t o P i p e s ' only with r e s p e c t t o where they might occur. While a g r e e i n g , f o r example, on the need f o r a g e n e r a l i n c r e a s e i n law and order w i t h i n the country, C o l t o n argued t h a t such reforms would be aimed s p e c i f i c a l l y at e l i m i n a t i n g the v i o l a t i o n s i n the work p l a c e and the most g l a r i n g cases of c o r r u p t i o n among Party and government  officials.21  S i m i l a r l y , he f e l t t h a t while economic d e c e n t r a l i z a t i o n c e r t a i n l y needed, i t would have to be gradual and  was  limited  because the P a r t y would want t o maintain the b a s i c l e v e r s o f c o n t r o l . 2 2 These k i n d s o f examples show t h a t i t was d i f f e r e n t i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s of the nature and s e v e r i t y o f the problems w i t h i n the country which caused P i p e s and C o l t o n t o a r r i v e a t d i f f e r e n t c o n c l u s i o n s about the kind of changes  14 which might take p l a c e . Stephen Cohen's views were s i m i l a r i n some r e s p e c t s those of Pipes and  C o l t o n . He,  too, recognized  a number of  the same problems i n both the socio-economic and spheres, problems such as the c o u n t r y ' s general stagnation, trends.23 £ his  ethnic tensions a  and  negative  to  political economic  demographic  w e l l , he appeared t o share the views of both  colleagues  with r e s p e c t  to what was  b e l i e v e d to be  b a s i c cause of many of the S o v i e t ailments  i . e . , the  the  hyper-  c e n t r a l i z e d , S t a l i n i s t , economic system.24 Cohen's arguments were a l s o s i m i l a r t o C o l t o n ' s  (and  thus d i f f e r e n t from Pipes') with regards to h i s i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of the s e v e r i t y of these problems and  the  kind  of change which would be needed to overcome them. L i k e Colton,  he b e l i e v e d t h a t although the domestic p o l i t i c a l  economic d i f f i c u l t i e s  of the U.S.S.R. had  become c r i t i c a l decades from now,  the p o t e n t i a l t o  they would not do so i n the  near term. For example, i n p l a c e of P i p e s ' doubts about c a p a c i t y of the l e a d e r s h i p to provide provided  and  the  f o r i t s c i t i z e n s , Cohen  arguments which defended t h e i r b a s i c a c t i o n s .  He  proposed t h a t the S o v i e t l e a d e r s h i p s i n c e S t a l i n had a c t u a l l y fulfilled  the " b a s i c premises of S o v i e t communism at home",  premises which i n c l u d e d the p r e s e r v a t i o n of n a t i o n a l s e c u r i t y and  nationalism,  welfarism  and  p r o t e c t i o n from anarchy,  a better material  generation.25 As such, he was  cradle-to-grave  l i f e f o r each  a b l e to conclude:  15 ...these and other ... problems ... may one day erode the government's s o c i a l c o n t r a c t with the people, and hence i t s s t a b i l i t y . But t o assume t t h a t w i l l happen soon, or must happen, i s t o underestimate the system's r e f o r m i s t p o t e n t i a l and popular support.26 The other s i m i l a r i t y between Cohen's and arguments was f e l t was  Colton's  with r e s p e c t t o the kind of change which each  needed i n the c o u n t r y . Cohen a l s o argued t h a t i t was  moderate reform which was  needed, reform t h a t would i n v o l v e  " . . . p o l i c i e s t h a t seek...to improve the e x i s t i n g c o n d i t i o n s without f u n c t i o n a l l y t r a n s f o r m i n g e x i s t i n g s o c i a l ,  political  and economic f o u n d a t i o n s or going beyond p r e v a i l i n g i d e o l o g i c a l values."27 While s e e i n g the p o t e n t i a l f o r moderate change i n many of the same areas t h a t C o l t o n d i d , Cohen a l s o expected the f u t u r e domestic reforms t o have a number of s p e c i f i c c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s . He b e l i e v e d , f o r example, t h a t they would have an " a n t i - S t a l i n i s t " component, and  that  any economic reforms would be patterned a f t e r those i n Lenin's New  Economic P o l i c y  see t h a t Cohen was  <N.E.P.).28 One  can t h e r e f o r e  a l s o q u i t e d i f f e r e n t from P i p e s i n terms  of the kind of change t h a t he thought was  necessary i n the  country. P o t e n t i a l l y more i n t e r e s t i n g than the  similarities  between Cohen and C o l t o n , however, i s the one  apparent  d i f f e r e n c e i n t h e i r argument's. Although Cohen agreed t h a t the problems of the country were not r e p r e s e n t a t i v e of a systemic crisis,  he had a somewhat d i f f e r e n t i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f what  16 the nature of the problems was. what was  at stake was  Where Colton had argued t h a t  the e f f e c t i v e n e s s of the  previous  S o v i e t l e a d e r s h i p ' s s t y l e and approach to government and p o l i t i c s i n l i g h t of the changing c o n d i t i o n s i n the Cohen took t h i s view one  step f u r t h e r and  placed the blame  f o r these problems on a general f o r c e w i t h i n the which he c a l l e d philosophy, two  "conservatism".  More than  Cohen argued t h a t conservatism  country,  country  just a p o l i t i c a l was  one  fundamental, permanent tendencies or impulses  of the which  had  c o n s t i t u e n c i e s at a l l l e v e l s of S o v i e t p o l i t i c s and s o c i e t y . Its tenets included: ...a deep reverence f o r the past; a s e n t i m e n t a l defense of e x i s t i n g i n s t i t u t i o n s , r o u t i n e s and o r t h o d o x i e s t h a t l i v e on from the past; and an a b i d i n g f e a r of change as a h a r b r i n g e r of d i s o r d e r and of a f u t u r e t h a t w i l l be worse than the present as w e l l as a s a c r i l e g e of the past. P o l i t i c a l conservatism i s . . . i n the S o v i e t Union, a cogent p h i l o s o p h i c a l j u s t i f i c a t i o n of the s t a t u s quo as the c u l m i n a t i o n of e v e r y t h i n g good i n the h i s t o r i c a l past and thus the only sturdy b r i d g e to the future.29 The  i n e f f e c t i v e p o l i c i e s of the S o v i e t l e a d e r s h i p s i n c e  N i k i t a Khrushchev -- the ones emphasized by C o l t o n -- were t h e r e f o r e seen to be j u s t symptoms of the r e a l problem, which was  conservatism  stake was  i t s e l f . What Cohen t h e r e f o r e f e l t was  the e f f e c t i v e n e s s (and perhaps e v e n t u a l l y even the  e f f i c a c y ) of t h i s c o n s e r v a t i v e tendency w i t h i n S o v i e t political  at  life.  The d i f f e r e n c e s between Cohen and C o l t o n on  this  s u b j e c t are not as fundamental as those between P i p e s and these two a u t h o r s . Both C o l t o n and Cohen have s i m i l a r p e r c e p t i o n s of the S o v i e t system and i t s l e a d e r s h i p  basic  (i.e. a  system t h a t i s s t a b l e , whose problems are numerous but not i r r e p a r a b l e , and which has generated a t l e a s t a segment of the  p o l i t i c a l e l i t e that i s interested i n v o l u n t a r i l y  a d d r e s s i n g these problems). The d i f f e r e n c e s i n t h e i r  views  can i n s t e a d be put down t o two f a c t o r s . The f i r s t has t o with the  f a c t t h a t they are o p e r a t i n g from d i f f e r e n t l e v e l s of  a n a l y s i s . Cohen's arguments  are p a r t of h i s l a r g e r  "friends  and f o e s of change" t h e s i s , i n which S o v i e t p o l i t i c s  and  s o c i e t y are seen t o be d i v i d e d i n t o two fundamental impulses or  t e n d e n c i e s , l a b e l l e d conservatism and reformism.30  paradigm the  i t s e l f i s very h i s t o r i c a l  The  and p l a c e s the emphasis  on  c o n t i n u i t i e s which have e v o l v e d i n S o v i e t p o l i t i c s . For  example,  although Cohen r e c o g n i z e s the problems of the  country t o be growing i n c r e a s i n g l y s e r i o u s , t h e i r  character  i s seen t o have remained e s s e n t i a l l y the same over the y e a r s i n t h a t they have always been the r e s u l t of f l a w s w i t h i n the approach o f the u s u a l l y dominant  c o n s e r v a t i v e tendency. As  such, although he r e c o g n i z e d the problems themselves as becoming  i n c r e a s i n g l y s e r i o u s , he can conclude t h a t the  problems may  be l e s s important than what they are  r e p r e s e n t a t i v e o f . C o l t o n , on the o t h e r hand, w h i l e implicitly  a c c e p t i n g the b a s i c premises of Cohen's  t h e s i s , 3 1 takes an approach which p l a c e s more emphasis  on  18 the contemporary s i t u a t i o n , and on how  particular  factors  have changed. He chose t o c o n c e n t r a t e s p e c i f i c a l l y upon the t r a d i t i o n a l p o l i c i e s and methods of the S o v i e t l e a d e r s h i p , and on why  modern c o n d i t i o n s are making them i n c r e a s i n g l y  irrelevant  today.  The second d i f f e r e n c e i s a t e r m i n o l o g i c a l one, and which w i l l r e - o c c u r throughout h i s t o r i c a l approach, reformism  one  t h i s t h e s i s . Because of h i s  Cohen chose t o use the broad  definition  and conservatism t o d e s c r i b e the p h y s i c a l f o r c e s  which have always been present w i t h i n S o v i e t p o l i t i c s s o c i e t y and  and  i n v o l v e d i n the reform p r o c e s s . C o l t o n , on the  other hand, avoided such d e f i n i t i o n s because he was d e a l i n g s p e c i f i c a l l y with the f o r c e s which were now S o v i e t s o c i e t y and how  present w i t h i n  they are i n v o l v e d i n the reform  p r o c e s s . As a r e s u l t , while both s c h o l a r s o f t e n d e a l t with the same s u b j e c t matter -- i . e . , the c o n s e r v a t i v e nature of the Brezhnev era and d i f f e r e n t i n t e r e s t s w i t h i n the they have used d i f f e r e n t methods t o d e s c r i b e i t .  elite  While  the  d i f f e r e n c e s between these authors w i l l become i n c r e a s i n g l y important i n the l a t e r stages of a n a l y s i s , f o r now enough t o say t h a t they both s t i l l  i t is  ended up g e n e r a t i n g  b a s i c a l l y s i m i l a r c o n c l u s i o n s about the nature and  severity  of the problems w i t h i n the S o v i e t Union. Critigue T h i s c r i t i q u e w i l l c o n c e n t r a t e on t h r e e main a r e a s : t h a u t h o r s ' d i f f e r e n t views of the s e v e r i t y of the problems  w i t h i n the S o v i e t Union and  what they r e f l e c t about  nature of the c r i s i s f a c e d by the country, and  the  the diverging  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s of the kind of change f e l t needed to overcome the problems. With r e s p e c t t o the f i r s t  subject,  i t would  seem t h a t P i p e s ' a n a l y s i s s u f f e r s from a number of problems. All  r e l a t e t o h i s problematic  term " c r i s i s " . C r i s i s ,  and  i n c o n s i s t e n t use of  by d e f i n i t i o n , i m p l i e s a s t a t e of  imminent d i s a s t e r , d i s a s t e r t h a t can only be avoided immediate, r a d i c a l changes. Pipes, t h a t c r i s i s i s a gradual  still  phenomenon, one  represent  that w i l l  institute  i s the f a c t  that  imminent t h r e a t s to the l e a d e r s h i p ' s c o n t r o l of chooses to t i t l e two  i n h i s l a t e s t book the "Economic C r i s i s "  of the and  the  of the S o v i e t Union.34 As a r e s u l t , we  P i p e s and  how  h i s d e f i n i t i o n a p p l i e s i n the  the  chapters "Political  are  left  with a very vague idea of e x a c t l y what c o n s t i t u t e s a for  but  s t a t i n g t h a t none of the c o u n t r y ' s problems  country,33 he s t i l l  Crisis"  not  of the country,  somehow f o r c e the l e a d e r s h i p to  r a d i c a l changes.32 S i m i l a r l y c o n f u s i n g while e x p l i c i t l y  by  however, seems t o imply  i n v o l v e d i r e c t t h r e a t s to the s t a b i l i t y which w i l l  the  crisis  Soviet  situation. P i p e s ' time-frame f o r c r i s i s i s a l s o i n c o n s i s t e n t unclear.  A number of times, f o r example, he s t a t e s t h a t  r e a l danger from many of the c o u n t r y ' s ailments  the  w i l l come  "twenty to t h i r t y years down the road".35 At other however, he uses such terms as "soon" and  and  times,  " j u s t around  the  20 c o r n e r " to d e s c r i b e when domestic c o n d i t i o n s w i l l f o r c e change upon the l e a d e r s h i p . 3 6 Once again, the end  result  i s t h a t we are l e f t with no c l e a r i d e a as t o what Pipes means when he t a l k s about c r i s i s . These d e f i n i t i o n a l  and  time-frame problems a d v e r s e l y a f f e c t the c r e d i b i l i t y of h i s c o n c l u s i o n s about the s e v e r i t y of the problems of the S o v i e t Union. One  a l s o has t o c r i t i c i z e P i p e s " i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of a  systemic c r i s i s w i t h i n the country. He g i v e s l i t t l e evidence  t o support  factual  h i s view t h a t the e f f i c a c y of the system  i s i n q u e s t i o n . Perhaps more i m p o r t a n t l y , he i g n o r e s or d i s m i s s e s many of the l o g i c a l arguments which are i n f a v o r of the s u r v i v a l of the system. Many of these sources of  systemic  s t a b i l i t y were e l a b o r a t e d upon by C o l t o n and Cohen, the most obvious  of which was  the f a c t t h a t the system had  s u r v i v e d f o r almost seventy the way  already  years, overcoming problems along  t h a t have been a t l e a s t as s i g n i f i c a n t as those  of  today. For example, i t has demonstrated the a b i l i t y t o change and  adapt to such extreme c o n d i t i o n s as the ravages of  S t a l i n i s m and the upheaval of Khrushchev's reform  program. I t  would t h e r e f o r e seem t h a t P i p e s ' c r i t i c i s m s of the system's e f f i c a c y l a c k a c e r t a i n amount of h i s t o r i c a l p e r s p e c t i v e . Pipes a l s o d i s m i s s e s too q u i c k l y the r o l e t h a t the country's bureaucracy problems and  has played i n causing a number of the  p r e v e n t i n g the s o l u t i o n s to  P o l i t i c a l and governmental bureaucracy,  others.37 by i t s very  nature.  21 s e r v e s t o d i s t a n c e a l e a d e r s h i p from i t s people. E f f o r t s at communication from both ends can be blocked by the sheer mass of people and paper-work t h a t stand i n the way.  As w e l l , the  amount of time and e f f o r t t h a t i s necessary t o "wade through" the b u r e a u c r a t i c apparatus o f t e n means t h a t problems are l e f t unattended  social  and/or allowed t o grow worse.  Because of the i n c r e d i b l e s i z e and extent of the bureaucracy w i t h i n the S o v i e t Union, t h e r e can be l i t t l e doubt t h a t i t must cause these k i n d s of problems t h e r e . As a r e s u l t , a number of the f a u l t s which P i p e s ' found i n the a b i l i t y  and  i n t e n t i o n s of the l e a d e r s h i p , and which he i n t e r p r e t e d  as  being i n d i c a t i v e of systemic i n s t a b i l i t y , can be  partially  a t t r i b u t e d t o the b u r e a u c r a t i c b a r r i e r s i n the country (something which w i l l be d i s c u s s e d i n more d e t a i l i n chapter three). P i p e s ' arguments about systemic c r i s i s a l s o have a number of l o g i c a l problems. q u e s t i o n of how  The most b a s i c one r e l a t e s t o the  w e l l a system  i s supposed  t o perform b e f o r e  i t can be c o n s i d e r e d t o be v i a b l e . No system,  after a l l , i s  p e r f e c t , and an examination of some of the problems seemingly c h a r a c t e r i s t i c of many western democratic c o u n t r i e s , but not found i n the S o v i e t Union  (such as unemployment,  inflation,  budget d e f i c i t s and r e c e s s i o n s ) would seem t o i n d i c a t e t h a t systemic v i a b i l i t y i s r e l a t i v e t o the s p e c i f i c example one i s d i s c u s s i n g . T h i s i s p a r t i c u l a r l y the case with the S o v i e t s i t u a t i o n . The S o v i e t h i s t o r i c a l r e c o r d of extremely harsh  22 and u n s t a b l e domestic  c o n d i t i o n s has meant t h a t the most  important c r i t e r i o n f o r the average S o v i e t c i t i z e n has been whether or not there have been any p o s i t i v e , r e c o g n i z a b l e i n c r e a s e s i n l i v i n g standards and m a t e r i a l p o s s e s s i o n s i n h i s l i f e t i m e , and not n e c e s s a r i l y what l e v e l these i n d i c e s have reached.3® T h i s may become l e s s o f a f a c t o r among a younger g e n e r a t i o n of S o v i e t s who have fewer memories of S t a l i n or even Khrushchev, but i t w i l l remain an c o n s i d e r a t i o n f o r a good percentage  important  of the p o p u l a t i o n f o r  many y e a r s . F i n a l l y , the evidence which C o l t o n p r o v i d e s t o show t h a t any d i s s a t i s f a c t i o n which does e x i s t among the people i s d i r e c t e d toward the p o l i c i e s o f the l e a d e r s h i p , and not a t the i n s t i t u t i o n s of the system, l e a v e s one with the c o n c l u s i o n t h a t the country does not appear t o be f a c i n g a c r i s i s which i s systemic i n nature. The k i n d of change which P i p e s f e e l s i s needed i s a l s o susceptible to c r i t i c i s m  on a number of grounds. To begin  with, i t i s l o g i c a l t h a t i f the country i s not f a c i n g a systemic c r i s i s t h e r e i s no need f o r changes which are r a d i c a l and systemic i n nature. T h e r e f o r e i f P i p e s ' b a s i c i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s are i n c o r r e c t , then so i s h i s view of the amount o f change t h a t i s needed i n the country. There i s a l s o a problem a s s o c i a t e d with e x p e c t i n g t h i s degree of change i n any c o u n t r y . The k i n d s o f reforms which P i p e s f e e l s are needed i n the U.S.S.R. t o make i t s system v i a b l e are the type normally a s s o c i a t e d with the outcome of r e v o l u t i o n s or coups  23 and c e r t a i n l y not t h e k i n d t h a t u s u a l l y r e s u l t from any k i n d o f a l e a d e r s h i p / p o p u l o u s compromise. H i s t o r y has shown t h a t governments do not v o l u n t a r i l y change t o t h i s  degree,  and t o a n t i c i p a t e such changes i n the S o v i e t Union i s t o n e c e s s a r i l y expect and even r e q u i r e t h e most severe o f domestic  circumstances, t h e type o f circumstances which even  Pipes d i d not f o r e s e e i n the S o v i e t f u t u r e . The l a s t problem with c o n c e n t r a t i n g on t h e need f o r systemic change r e l a t e s t o what one o f t e n omits while doing so. By r e c o g n i z i n g or emphasizing  o n l y major reforms  Pipes  i g n o r e s many o f the s m a l l e r changes t h a t can occur and which have a l r e a d y been o f such immense importance framework o f the system. One cannot  within the  d i s p u t e the f a c t t h a t the  r e h a b i l i t a t i o n o f t h e Communist P a r t y i n s t i t u t i o n s a f t e r t h e death o f Joseph S t a l i n had a s i g n i f i c a n t e f f e c t on t h e process o f government, i f only because i t gave more than one i n d i v i d u a l a v o i c e i n the policy-making p r o c e s s . S i m i l a r l y , a S o v i e t c i t i z e n who compares t h e domestic  c o n d i t i o n s under  S t a l i n t o those under N i k i t a Khrushchev or Leonid Brezhnev cannot  help but see, and a p p r e c i a t e , t h e changes i n h i s  everyday  life.  As such, while Pipes may be c o r r e c t t o argue  t h a t these k i n d s o f changes have l i t t l e  e f f e c t on t h e o v e r a l l  nature o f the system, t h e i r "within-system" e f f e c t s a r e t o o important t o i g n o r e . A c r i t i q u e o f t h e views o f Cohen and C o l t o n must begin with an emphasis on t h e degree of e f f i c a c y which many o f  24 t h e i r i n t r e p r e t a t i o n s and c o n c l u s i o n s appear t o have. T h e i r combined arguments, both with r e s p e c t t o the s e v e r i t y o f the country's domestic  political  and economic problems, and what  the problems imply about the nature o f the c r i s i s which the country f a c e s , do seem t o r e f l e c t a very r e a l i s t i c and f a c t u a l i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f the a c t u a l s i t u a t i o n w i t h i n the country. The s t a t i s t i c a l  evidence which both s c h o l a r s p r o v i d e  to s u b s t a n t i a t e t h e i r views i s a c t u a l l y q u i t e s i m i l a r t o t h a t given by P i p e s , as a r e t h e i r arguments t h a t any k i n d o f "crisis" will  probably not occur f o r decades.39 I t i s the  ambiguous r e l a t i o n s h i p which P i p e s sees between the present and the f u t u r e which s e r v e s t o d i s t i n g u i s h the views o f the t h r e e authors, and not the f a c t s themselves. Cohen's arguments about systemic s t a b i l i t y  C o l t o n ' s and  are a l s o  not o n l y because they a r e e x t e n s i o n s o f t h e i r i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s , but because they a l s o r e f l e c t and wide-ranging  credible,  previous comprehensive  a n a l y s e s . Again, i t i s P i p e s ' f a i l u r e t o  r e c o g n i z e any s t r e n g t h s w i t h i n the S o v i e t system, o r t o do more o b j e c t i v e and e x t e n s i v e comparisons with  western  c o u n t r i e s t h a t a r e the problems here. A p o r t i o n o f both s c h o l a r s ' arguments which may become somewhat problematic i s the way i n which each d e f i n e s the degree o f change f e l t t o be needed i n the country.  Although  changes contained w i t h i n both s c h o l a r s ' reform frameworks are c e r t a i n l y not r a d i c a l by any means, one has t o realistically  ask j u s t how much change can occur w i t h i n the  25 S o v i e t Union b e f o r e i t has t o be l a b e l l e d number of the reforms proposed  "systemic". A  by these s c h o l a r s are  a c t u a l l y q u i t e s i m i l a r t o those presented by P i p e s , being only of a l e s s e r degree.  The gradual i n t r o d u c t i o n of market  f o r c e s i n t o the economy, the i n c r e a s i n g r o l e of f a c t o r y managers and workers i n p l a n n i n g and p r o d u c t i o n , and general  the  ( i f very gradual) d e c e n t r a l i z a t i o n of any of the  aspects of the country can be i n t e r p r e t e d as changes which would make s i g n i f i c a n t i n r o a d s i n t o a number of the b a s i c t e n e t s o f S o v i e t s o c i a l i s m . Staunch M a r x i s t i d e o l o g u e s might even argue t h a t these kinds of changes, though moderate and gradual i n scope, are none the l e s s i n c r e a s i n g l y systemic i n nature, a t l e a s t i n terms of the d o c t r i n e of Marxism-Leninism. U l t i m a t e l y , of course, whether change i s seen t o be systemic or not w i l l depend on what one b e l i e v e s t o be the fundamentals of Marxism-Leninism and s o c i a l i s m , and or not these have been a l t e r e d by the reforms. My  whether  criticism  here, t h e r e f o r e , i s a d e f i n i t i o n a l one, but a p o t e n t i a l l y important one a l l the same. A S o v i e t Union which  institutes  the k i n d s of reforms and changes d e s c r i b e d by Cohen and C o l t o n would not be fundamentally  transformed,  but i t would  be a s i g n i f i c a n t l y d i f f e r e n t e n t i t y when compared t o i t s present s e l f . As a r e s u l t , the grounds f o r e v a l u a t i n g i t s performance -- both e c o n o m i c a l l y and p o l i t i c a l l y  -- would  have t o be adjusted t o take i n t o c o n s i d e r a t i o n these  new  26 c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s . More i m p o r t a n t l y , i f these reforms  resulted  i n very obvious s i g n i f i c a n t and p o s i t i v e e f f e c t s , or i f they lead the country i n t o more comprehensive changes along the same l i n e s , then one might be tempted t o say t h a t the themselves  reforms  had been more systemic i n nature, even i f they  were i n t i t a l l y q u i t e l i m i t e d i n scope. Should e i t h e r of these s c e n a r i o s occur, C o l t o n ' s and Cohen's p r e v i o u s c h a r a c t e r i z a t i o n of the k i n d s of change i n v o l v e d might be somewhat m i s l e a d i n g . F i n a l l y , we are l e f t t o analyze the one area i n which Cohen and C o l t o n appeared  t o d i s a g r e e . T h i s was  with r e s p e c t  to t h e i r views of the s t r u c t u r e and make-up of the S o v i e t e l i t e , and the e f f e c t t h a t t h i s arrangement has had on  the  development and maintenance of the country's problems. U n f o r t u n a t e l y , such a c r i t i q u e would r e q u i r e an  in-depth  i n v e s t i g a t i o n i n t o each author's view of the nature of reform process i n the country, something t h a t i s not the t o p i c of t h i s c h a p t e r . Because the next two  chapters w i l l  deal  s p e c i f i c a l l y with t h i s s u b j e c t they are probably b e t t e r p l a c e s t o conduct  such a n a l y s e s .  27 Endnotes 1. Richard P i p e s , S u r v i v a l i s Not Enough (New and Schuster, 1984), pp. 126-127 2. P i p e s , p.  York: Simon  128  3. P i p e s , p. 131 4. P i p e s , p.  152  5. P i p e s , p. 185 6. P i p e s , pp. 113-120 7. P i p e s , pp. 148-158 8. P i p e s , p. I l l 9. Richard P i p e s , "Can the S o v i e t Union Reform?", A f f a i r s . V o l . 63, No. 1, ( F a l l 1984), p. 58 10. Richard P i p e s , "Mr. X Revises", No. 4, ( A p r i l 1978), p. 18  Foreign  Encounter. V o l . L,  11. Timothy J . C o l t o n , The Dilemma of Reform i n the S o v i e t Union (New York: C o u n c i l on F o r e i g n R e l a t i o n s , Inc. , 1984) f PP . 14 12. C o l t o n  f  PP- 16- 26  13. C o l t o n  f  P- 29  14. C o l t o n  t  P- 29  15. C o l t o n  p  P- 27  16. C o l t o n , P- 14 17. C o l t o n > PP- 16- 17 18. C o l t o n > PP- 26- 27 19. C o l t o n , P- 27 20. C o l t o n  t  P- 78  21. C o l t o n » P- 65 22. C o l t o n  t  P- 71  28 23. Stephen F. Cohen, S o v l e t i c u a (New and Co., 1985), pp. 24-29  York: W.  W.  Norton  24. Cohen, pp. 24-29 25. Cohen, p.  26  26. Cohen, p.  27  27. Stephen F. Cohen, R e t h i n k i n g the S o v i e t Experience (London: Oxford U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s , 1985), p. 131 28. Cohen, R e t h i n k i n g , pp. 122-127 ( a n t i - S t a l i n i s m ) and pp. 89-92 (N.E.P.) 29. Cohen, R e t h i n k i n g , p.  132  30. T h i s t h e s i s , which s e r v e s as the b a s i s f o r Cohen's book R e t h i n k i n g the S o v i e t Experience, w i l l be d i s c u s s e d i n g r e a t e r depth i n the next c h a p t e r . S u f f i c e t o say here t h a t i t proposes a h i s t o r i c a l b a t t l e w i t h i n the S o v i e t Union between the f o r c e s promoting reform and those who are a g a i n s t change. Cohen d i s c u s s e s t h i s t h e s i s i n depth i n h i s l a s t chapter, pp. 128-157 31. C o l t o n ' a views of the reform process w i t h i n the S o v i e t Union do accept the presence of d i f f e r e n t c o n s t i t u e n c i e s and i n t e r e s t s w i t h i n s o c i e t y . However, r a t h e r than s t r e s s i n g t h e i r importance as q u a s i - d i s t i n c t e n t i t i e s i n v o l v e d i n the f i g h t over reform, he i n s t e a d emphasizes t h a t the growth of conservatism has been a gradual phenomenon, with i t s important f u n c t i o n a l sources having come from the post-Khrushchev l e a d e r s h i p ' s approach t o p o l i t i c s and government. These d i f f e r e n c e s w i l l a l s o be d i s c u s s e d i n some d e t a i l i n the next c h a p t e r . See a l s o C o l t o n , pp. 16-17 32. P i p e s d i s c u s s e s t h i s i n a number of p l a c e s , i n c l u d i n g i n S u r v i v a l . pp. 13, 111 and 199-208 33. P i p e s , S u r v i v a l . pp. 199-208 34. P i p e s , S u r v i v a l , Chapter pp. 110-148, and Chapter PP. 148-208  I I I "The Economic C r i s i s " , IV "The P o l i t i c a l C r i s i s " ,  35. P i p e s makes t h i s statement, f o r example, with r e s p e c t t o the expected r e s u l t s of negative demographic t r e n d s and p o p u l a t i o n growth r a t e s i n P i p e s , S u r v i v a l . pp. 185 and 135, r e s p e c t i v e l y .  29 36. See, f o r example. P i p e s , S u r v i v a l , p. 12 " . . . S o v i e t government...will have t o choose b e f o r e l o n g . . . " , and p. I l l " . . . i n t e r n a l p r e s s u r e s are b r i n g i n g the day nearer...". 37. P i p e s , S u r v i v a l . p.  150  38. See the f i r s t hand accounts of j o u r n a l i s t Hedrick Smith i n Hedrick Smith, The Russians (New York: New York Times Book Co., 1976), pp. 68-69 39. The s t a t i s t i c s and f i g u r e s showing the b a s i c s i m i l a r i t i e s i n the authors' p e r c e p t i o n s of the problems can be found i n P i p e s , S u r v i v a l , pp. 131 and 185; C o l t o n , pp. 26-27, and Cohen, S o v i e t i c u a . pp. 24-28  Chapter Forcea and F a c t o r a Promoting In  order t o understand  Two Change i n the S o v i e t Union  the s t r u g g l e over reform  country, i t i s important t o e s t a b l i s h what agents  in a  are  i n v o l v e d i n the reform p r o c e s s . With t h i s i n mind, the g o a l s of  t h i s chapter are t o present and analyze the t h r e e a u t h o r s '  views of the f o r c e s and f a c t o r s t h a t are promoting  change  w i t h i n the S o v i e t Union. The terms " f o r c e s and f a c t o r s " be used,  will  i n t h i s c o n t e x t , t o d e s c r i b e those t h i n g s w i t h i n the  S o v i e t Union which are pushing the country and i t s l e a d e r s h i p i n the d i r e c t i o n of p o s i t i v e domestic  change. "Change or  reform" w i l l be d e f i n e d as p o l i c i e s aimed a t s o l v i n g problems themselves. i n the l a s t  As became apparent  the  from the c o n c l u s i o n s  chapter, the s c h o l a r s are a l l working with  s e p a r a t e i d e a s of the kind of change needed t o s o l v e these problems. These d i f f e r e n t "working d e f i n i t i o n s of change" w i l l be taken  i n t o c o n s i d e r a t i o n d u r i n g the a n a l y s e s here.  The chapter i t s e l f w i l l once again be organized two p a r t s . The f i r s t w i l l  i n v o l v e a comparative  into  presentation  and d i s c u s s i o n of the arguments of the t h r e e authors i n order to determine disagreement.  and then e x p l a i n areas of agreement and T h i s w i l l then be f o l l o w e d by a c r i t i q u e of the  b a s i c theses of each author. As was  the case i n the p r e v i o u s  chapter, the c r i t i q u e w i l l be o f the l o g i c a l and a p p l i c a b i l i t y of the a u t h o r s ' arguments.  historical  31 Forcea and F a c t o r a Promoting Richard P i p e s argued S o v i e t Union's domestic  Change i n the Soviet. Union  t h a t the pressure generated  political  by  the  and economic c r i s e s would  be the o n l y s i g n i f i c a n t f a c t o r promoting  change w i t h i n the  country.1 He reached t h i s c o n c l u s i o n f o r t h r e e r e l a t e d reasons, a l l of which grew out of h i s i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of the domestic reform p r o c e s s . To begin with, he c o u l d see no other comparable f o r c e s w i t h i n the S o v i e t system t h a t would be s i m i l a r l y a c t i v e and e f f e c t i v e i n promoting  domestic  change.  A number of the p l a c e s i n which one would normally expect to f i n d these k i n d s of f a c t o r s -- such as from  interests within  the l e a d e r s h i p or from s o c i e t a l groups i n favour of reform P i p e s saw  --  as e i t h e r n o n - e x i s t e n t w i t h i n the country or e l s e  i n a p p l i c a b l e to the S o v i e t s i t u a t i o n . 2 Even i f other such f a c t o r s c o u l d be found, he argued still  t h a t domestic  c r i s e s were  e s s e n t i a l because only they c o u l d demonstrate t o the  l e a d e r s h i p the k i n d of change which was  r e q u i r e d . As we have  seen, P i p e s f e l t t h a t r a d i c a l , s t r u c t u r a l changes were needed to overcome what he c o n s i d e r e d t o be the g e n e r a l l y systemic problems of the U.S.S.R.. Because changes of t h i s  type  ( e s p e c i a l l y i n the case of Communist s o c i e t i e s ) would not normally be agreed t o by governments, he argued a demonstration  of the systemic nature of the  t h a t only by domestic  problems would the S o v i e t l e a d e r s h i p r e a l i z e the k i n d of change which was  needed t o r e s o l v e them.3  F i n a l l y , the r o l e i n the reform process which P i p e s  e n v i s i o n e d f o r the S o v i e t e l i t e a l s o l e d t o h i s emphasis the  on  importance of domestic c r i s e s . He argued t h a t the  c h a r a c t e r o f the e l i t e  Cor nomenklatura)  was such t h a t  i t s members were more concerned with m a i n t a i n i n g t h e i r  own  p r i v i l e g e s and p o s i t i o n s o f power than they were with a d d r e s s i n g the c o u n t r y ' s problems. As a r e s u l t , P i p e s f e l t t h a t domestic c r i s e s were necessary because "...reforms are only as a r e s u l t o f major i n t e r n a l and e x t e r n a l s e t b a c k s , t h a t they w i l l come about only when the nomenklatura concludes they are the p r i c e i t must pay f o r s u r v i v a l " .  4  In c o n c l u s i o n , i t was t h i s " c r i s i s / r e f o r m t h e s i s " o f P i p e s ' which caused him t o see only one s i g n i f i c a n t f o r c e promoting change w i t h i n the S o v i e t Union. Timothy Colton shared few of P i p e s ' assumptions  and  b e l i e f s about e i t h e r the nature o f the reform p r o c e s s w i t h i n the  S o v i e t Union or about the f o r c e s and f a c t o r s i n v o l v e d i n  i t . He d i d b e l i e v e t h a t the c o u n t r y ' s domestic a i l m e n t s would p r o v i d e a s i g n i f i c a n t amount of p r e s s u r e as f o r c e s promoting change.5 At the same time, two reasons kept him from p l a c i n g the k i n d o f emphasis  upon them t h a t P i p e s d i d . F i r s t ,  because o f h i s view o f the nature and s e v e r i t y o f these problems, Colton d i d not f e e l t h a t domestic c r i s i s  was  necessary f o r change t o come about. As a r e s u l t , he was  free  to choose from a wider range of l e s s powerful f o r c e s t h a t would s t i l l  be a b l e t o p r o v i d e adequate p r e s s u r e f o r change.  More i m p o r t a n t l y , h i s i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f e l i t e  i n t e r e s t s meant t h a t he expected  t h i s group t o p l a y a much  more a c t i v e , p o s i t i v e r o l e i n the reform p r o c e s s . Indeed, he b e l i e v e d t h a t the l e a d i n g f o r c e which would be  promoting  reform i n t h e country would r e s u l t from a change i n t h e c h a r a c t e r and a t t i t u d e o f the new, younger g e n e r a t i o n o f S o v i e t l e a d e r s . C o l t o n argued  t h a t a number o f a s p e c t s o f  t h i s group's s o c i a l and p o l i t i c a l r e s u l t e d i n the simultaneous  background would have  development o f an " i t c h f o r  improvement" among many o f i t s members and the c a p a c i t y t o r e c o g n i z e the c o u n t r y ' s problems as s e r i o u s and i n need o f immediate a t t e n t i o n . & Such h i s t o r i c a l f a c t o r a as a l a c k of d i r e c t a s s o c i a t i o n with S t a l i n and h i s crimes, development and maturation d u r i n g the upheaval  political  o f the  Khrushchev years and the experience o f the b u r e a u c r a t i c s t a g n a t i o n o f the Brezhnev e r a were mentioned i n t h i s r e g a r d . Because o f t h i s view o f the new l e a d e r s h i p , C o l t o n b e l i e v e d t h a t as s e r i o u s as the c o u n t r y ' s domestic  problems were  becoming, they would not have t h e i r g r e a t e s t e f f e c t s by themselves.  Instead, they would be more important by the way  i n which they i n t e r a c t e d with a new l e a d e r s h i p t h a t would be more predisposed t o a " p r o b l e m - s o l v i n g " approach t o S o v i e t p o l i t i c s . He concluded: The accumulation o f i n t e r n a l problems, while l e a v i n g the regime w e l l s h o r t o f a l l - o u t c r i s i s , c o n f r o n t s i t with c h o i c e s more vexing than any i t has f a c e d i n decades. One hallmark o f the changing l e a d e r s h i p i s i t s sobre r e a l i s m about the extent o f these t r o u b l e s . . . . What we a r e l i k e l y t o see, r a t h e r than d e s t a b i l i z a t i o n o r b l a c k - t o - w h i t e change, i s a  34  reshading of the grays, a gradual s h i f t i n the p o l i t i c a l c l a s s ' c e n t e r of g r a v i t y . ' F i n a l l y , C o l t o n b e l i e v e d t h a t one other  significant  f a c t o r should be expected to i n t e r a c t with the l e a d e r s h i p , and  new  the domestic problems which i t f a c e d ,  to  promote change. Because of h i s emphasis on the contemporary S o v i e t s i t u a t i o n and  the changes which had brought i t about,  he f e l t t h a t the r a p i d l y changing p o l i t i c a l environment w i t h i n the country  and  social  i t s e l f would p l a y an  important  r o l e i n promoting change. Colton argued t h a t such f a c t o r s as the i n c r e a s i n g s i z e and new  s o c i a l values and  the p o p u l a t i o n and expectations  complexity  of the S o v i e t economy, the  p r i o r i t i e s among the younger members of  the general i n c r e a s e i n m a t e r i a l  throughout s o c i e t y were a l l q u i c k l y making  o b s o l e t e the p r e v i o u s l e a d e r s h i p ' s approach to government  and  domestic problem-solving.& These changing c o n d i t i o n s were expected t o become p a r t i c u l a r l y important p r o v i d e the necessary l e a d e r s h i p , and  because they would  environment i n which the  new  the domestic problems which i t f a c e d , could  i n t e r a c t t o b r i n g about reform.  T h i s emphasis on  importance of the changes w i t h i n the country  was  the in stark  c o n t r a s t t o P i p e s ' arguments about the i d e o l o g i c a l a t t i t u d i n a l c o n t i n u i t i e s w i t h i n the e l i t e and  the  and general  p o p u l a t i o n , c o n t i n u i t i e s which the l a t t e r f e l t would make domestic c r i s i s e s s e n t i a l t o generate any  kind of r e a l  domestic change. In c o n c l u s i o n , C o l t o n ' a view of the p o s i t i v e  35  f o r c e s w i t h i n the reform process meant t h a t the p o t e n t i a l success of the reforms themselves political  skill  was  more dependent upon the  of the reformers than i t was  imminent, systemic  on the need f o r  crisis.9  Stephen Cohen's i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of the f o r c e s which would be promoting  reform  i n the country was  once again somewhat  d i f f e r e n t from h i s c o l l e a g u e s ' . The s i m i l a r i t i e s present were with r e s p e c t to the r o l e t h a t the c o u n t r y ' s problems would play i n promoting argued  change. L i k e C o l t o n and P i p e s , he  also  t h a t as the number and s e v e r i t y of the a i l m e n t s  i n c r e a s e d , the p r e s s u r e they would generate c o u l d a c t d i r e c t l y upon the l e a d e r s h i p t o demonstrate the need f o r change. 10 Once again, however., t h e r e were two reasons  why  Cohen d i d not p l a c e the k i n d of emphasis on these problems t h a t P i p e s d i d . L i k e C o l t o n , he a l s o f e l t t h a t because these problems were not systemic i n nature, they d i d not r e q u i r e the k i n d of f o r c e a promoting  change t h a t were needed i n  P i p e s ' framework. As a r e s u l t he, too, r e c o g n i z e d a g r e a t e r number of f a c t o r s w i t h i n the country which c o u l d have significant positive  effects.  More i m p o r t a n t l y , he had a very w e l l - d e f i n e d c o n c e p t i o n of  not o n l y the domestic  reform p r o c e s s , but e s p e c i a l l y of  the r o l e which the e l i t e would p l a y i n i t . Cohen argued t h i s process should be "...best understood  i n terms t h a t are  p l a i n , h i s t o r i c a l and u n i v e r s a l , as w e l l as s o c i a l political  that  and  -- as a c o n f r o n t a t i o n between the f o r c e s of  reformism  and conservatism".11  This reformist  then, was  expected t o be the l e a d i n g f a c t o r promoting  w i t h i n the c o u n t r y . T h i s tendency  was  impulse, change  the i d e o l o g i c a l  and  p h i l o s o p h i c a l a l t e r n a t i v e t o the one e l a b o r a t e d upon i n the f i r s t chapter,12 and he b e l i e v e d t h a t i t r e p r e s e n t e d the many sources of support f o r change t h a t e x i s t e d w i t h i n the S o v i e t Union. Cohen argued t h a t because t h i s tendency proponents  had  a t a l l l e v e l s of S o v i e t s o c i e t y and p o l i t i c s , i t  would p l a y a more Important  r o l e i n the s t r u g g l e f o r reform  than would e i t h e r the p r e s s u r e from the c o u n t r y ' s  domestic  problems or a s p e c i f i c g e n e r a t i o n of l e a d e r s h i p . From out of Cohen's conception of the reform  process  came the f i n a l f a c t o r which he f e l t would a c t as a s i g n i f i c a n t f o r c e promoting  change. He argued  t h a t i t was  w i t h i n the h i s t o r i c a l c o n t i n u i t i e s of the domestic  reform  process i n g e n e r a l , and the r e f o r m i s t impulse i n p a r t i c u l a r , t h a t the g r e a t e s t p o t e n t i a l f o r reform lay.13 He saw  this  reform process t o be c y c l i c a l i n nature, with the r e l a t i v e s t r e n g t h and o r g a n i z a t i o n of these i n t e r e s t s a t any one  time  determining the composition and c h a r a c t e r of the l e a d e r s h i p . F o r c e s which were promoting by the way  change were t h e r e f o r e important  i n which they e i t h e r strengthened or weakened the  two fundamental  impulses i n v o l v e d . In t h i s way,  Cohen c o u l d  argue t h a t the problems o f the country were j u s t as by the way  important  i n which they r e f l e c t e d the problems of the  c o n s e r v a t i v e approach,  as t h i s would i n d i r e c t l y i n c r e a s e the  a t t r a c t i v e n e s s and s i z e o£ the r e f o r m i s t S i m i l a r l y , a p a r t i c u l a r generation  constituency.1^  o f l e a d e r s h i p was seen  w i t h i n t h i s framework t o be l e s s important because i t would be d i v i d e d i n t h e same way t h a t generations and  always had been,  thus only be one i n d i c a t i o n o f t h e r e l a t i v e s t r e n g t h o f  the two fundamental c o n s t i t u e n c i e s . 1 5  A l l o f these  h i s t o r i c a l c o n t i n u i t i e s made up t h e environment i n which Cohen expected a l l o f the f o r c e s t o i n t e r a c t t o b r i n g about change. Cohen's emphasis on c o n t i n u i t y i s i n t e r e s t i n g when i t i s compared t o the p e r s p e c t i v e s  o f h i s two c o l l e a g u e s . H i s  approach i s even more h i s t o r i c a l than P i p e s ' was, though h i s b a s i c i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s a r e o f course fundamentally d i f f e r e n t . T h i s same approach i s q u i t e d i f f e r e n t from C o l t o n ' s , and  however,  here i n l i e s the nature o f t h e i r d i f f e r e n c e s . D i f f e r e n t  l e v e l s o f a n a l y s i s have r e s u l t e d i n q u i t e d i f f e r e n t expectations,  even i f the b a s i c i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s and  assumptions o f the two s c h o l a r s a r e q u i t e s i m i l a r . As w e l l , the terminology used t o d e s c r i b e these f o r c e s w i t h i n the country was a l s o d i f f e r e n t so as t o take i n t o account the d i f f e r e n t emphases o f each s c h o l a r . To conclude, i t can be s a i d t h a t i t i s w i t h i n these t e r m i n o l o g i c a l and p e r c e p t i o n a l d i f f e r e n c e s t h a t the main d i f f e r e n c e s o f o p i n i o n  between  Cohen and C o l t o n l i e . Critique To begin t h i s c r i t i q u e , i t must be s a i d t h a t  Pipes'  " c r i s i s / r e f o r m " t h e s i s seems to s u f f e r from a number o f problems and  i n c o n s i s t e n c i e s . One  has  to f i r s t question i t s  h i s t o r i c a l v a l i d i t y . In P i p e s ' defense, t h e r e have been occasions  i n the S o v i e t past where reform a p p a r e n t l y  response to domestic c r i s e s . Such may the i n i t i a t i o n of V.I. L e n i n ' s New program i n the e a r l y 1920's. The  was  in  have been the case with  Economic P o l i c y (N.E.P.)  S o v i e t Union had  through a time t h a t has been a p t l y dubbed "War the r e s u l t s of which were p o l i t i c a l  and  j u s t been  Communism",  economic c o n d i t i o n s  i n the country t h a t were of c r i s i s p r o p o r t i o n s .  These  c o n d i t i o n s were no doubt primary c o n s i d e r a t i o n s  i n Lenin's  d e c i s i o n t o implement the d e c i d e d l y associated The  more moderate p o l i c i e s  with the N.E.P.. reforms of the new  Soviet leadership  immediately  a f t e r the death of Joseph S t a l i n could be construed s i m i l a r terms. S t a l i n ' s death had  in  l e f t the i n s t i t u t i o n s of  the Communist Party apparatus i n d i s a r r a y , due  t o a l a c k of  use d u r i n g h l a v i r t u a l d i c t a t o r i a l r u l e over the c o u n t r y . w e l l , the i n f l u e n c e and  power of the s e c r e t p o l i c e had  t o such l e v e l s t h a t i t s head ( L a v r e n t i B e r i a ) was  a  contender f o r the l e a d e r s h i p of the c o u n t r y . These examples are i n d i c a t i v e of the p o l i t i c a l c o n d i t i o n s the country a t t h a t time which may changes and  reforms upon the new  As  risen  serious two within  have helped to f o r c e leadership.  "Reform from c r i s i s " has not always been the case i n the S o v i e t Union, however. The  reform program o f N i k i t a  Khrushchev, which i n v o l v e d d e - S t a l i n i z a t i o n , economic r e s t r u c t u r i n g , and the e a s i n g o£ r e s t r i c t i o n s i n the c u l t u r a l sphere, occurred i n a domestic environment  t h a t was  beginning t o r e c o v e r from the e f f e c t s of S t a l i n i s m .  already Rather  than being f o r c e d by c r i s i s , these changes were much more v o l u n t a r y i n nature, r e f l e c t i n g Khrushchev's e v a l u a t i o n of the changing c o n d i t i o n s and needs of S o v i e t s o c i e t y . H i s a g r i c u l t u r a l reforms, f o r example, were designed p r i m a r i l y t o i n c r e a s e the o v e r a l l standard of l i v i n g w i t h i n the c o u n t r y . As w e l l , the c o n c e s s i o n s he made w i t h i n the p o l i t i c a l  sphere  were meant t o assure both the masses and the e l i t e t h a t  "...a  new  e r a of p e r s o n a l s e c u r i t y from a r b i t r a r y t e r r o r i s t i c  rule  had  arrived."1^ In a s i m i l a r way,  the reform program a s s o c i a t e d with  A l e x e i Kosygin d u r i n g the middle 1960's d i d not appear t o grow out of an environment  of c r i s i s . Although the c o u n t r y ' s  economic growth r a t e s had been f a l l i n g f o r a number of years b e f o r e t h i s time, t h i s problem  had c e r t a i n l y not reached  c r i s i s l e v e l s . Again, the proposed program appeared  economic d e c e n t r a l i z a t i o n  t o be more the r e s u l t o f d i f f e r i n g  p e r c e p t i o n s of what was  best f o r the f u t u r e of s o c i a l i s m  w i t h i n the country.17 F i n a l l y , Stephen Cohen has t h a t even Lenin's N.E.P  argued  can be seen t o be as much an  " i d e o l o g i c a l a l t e r n a t i v e f o r s o c i a l i s m " as i t was  a  pragmatic  response t o the s i t u a t i o n i n the country a t the t i m e . I T h i s sampling of the h i s t o r i c a l evidence would seem t o  s  40  promote t h e argument t h a t reform  i n t h e S o v i e t Union can be  i n i t i a t e d by t h e l e a d e r s h i p , and be t h e r e s u l t o f f a c t o r s other than  crisis.  P i p e s would no doubt r e p l y t o these examples i n two ways. F i r s t , he would argue t h a t because n e i t h e r o f t h e above reform programs were u l t i m a t e l y s u c c e s s f u l , c r i s i s i s needed f o r s u c c e s s f u l reform. Second, he might not even r e c o g n i z e e i t h e r o f them as examples o f attempted  reform because they  d i d not i n v o l v e any plana t o r e s t r u c t u r e t h e system  itself,  which he b e l i e v e s i s t h e main source o f t h e c o u n t r y ' s problems. P i p e s ' l a t t e r argument, and t h e problems with i t , were d e a l t with i n t h e p r e v i o u s c h a p t e r . As f o r h i s f i r s t p o s s i b l e r e p l y , i t would seem t h a t " s u c c e s s " i s a very poor c r i t e r i o n a g a i n s t which t o judge t h e m e r i t s o f a reform program, e s p e c i a l l y i n the S o v i e t case. Too many f a c t o r s can I n t e r f e r e with t h e p o t e n t i a l success of reforms, many of which have l i t t l e t o do with t h e p o t e n t i a l e f f i c a c y o f the program i t s e l f . The death or removal o f an important l e a d e r (one o f t h e problems with t h e Khrushchev case) or bureaucratic i n e r t i a  (a f a c t o r i n t h e f a i l u r e o f t h e Kosygin  reforms) a r e but two examples o f these k i n d s o f f a c t o r s . As such, i t i s more c o n s t r u c t i v e t o c o n c e n t r a t e on t h e content of the reform program, and what i t proposed  t o change, when  one i s t r y i n g t o assess i t s s i g n i f i c a n c e . P i p e s ' arguments a l s o appear t o s u f f e r from a l o g i c a l d e f e c t . T h i s i s with r e s p e c t t o how t h e c o u n t r y ' s problems  are supposed t o f o r c e change upon the l e a d e r s h i p . I t would seem t h a t the k i n d o f pressure  necessary f o r t h i s t o occur  c o u l d be generated i n only two ways. One would economic and p o l i t i c a l  involve  problems becoming so s e r i o u s  c o l l a p s e appeared imminent t o the l e a d e r s h i p  that  without  immediate, r a d i c a l changes. As we saw i n the p r e v i o u s chapter,  however. P i p e s h i m s e l f  argued t h a t although the  problems o f the country may soon reach c r i s i s l e v e l s , i t i s h i g h l y u n l i k e l y t h a t they w i l l soon reach these k i n d s o f dimensions.19 P r e s s u r e o f the kind necessary t o f o r c e change upon the l e a d e r s h i p could a l s o be generated by popular a c t i o n s and demonstrations t h a t would cause the l e a d e r s h i p t o f e a r the prospects  o f a " r e v o l u t i o n from below". P i p e s a l s o s t a t e s ,  however, t h a t t h e necessary p r e r e q u i s i t e s f o r r e v o l u t i o n do not e x i s t i n the country a t the present  time, and probably  never w i l l , because o f some p a r t i c u l a r c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s o f the Soviet population. political  Among these a r e a general  aversion to  and s o c i a l v i o l e n c e and a w i l l i n g n e s s t o endure the  status-quo because o f an o v e r i d l n g f e a r o f the anarchy and i n s t a b i l i t y that are associated  with the concept o f  change.20 The r e s u l t i s t h a t P i p e s i s l e f t with no r e a l mechanism by which change w i l l be f o r c e d upon the l e a d e r s h i p . The  problems here a r e s i m i l a r t o those he encountered i n the  previous  chapter with r e s p e c t t o h i s use o f the term  " c r i s i s " . As was the case then, we a r e l e f t confused about  the exact meaning of P i p e s ' arguments, and how  they  are  supposed t o work. Without a p l a u s i b l e working mechanism  and  more d e f i n i t e time frame w i t h i n which i t i s supposed t o work h i s e n t i r e " c r i s i s / r e f o r m " t h e s i s l a c k s two  significant  sources of c r e d i b i l i t y . Timothy C o l t o n ' s views of the reform process a l s o have number of p o t e n t i a l problems. In g e n e r a l , one can the b a s i c premises  criticize  of the " g e n e r a t i o n a l c h a n g e / p o l i c y change  t h e s i s from both h i s t o r i c a l and  l o g i c a l perspectives. This 1  indeed what both Cohen and P i p e s have done (though  i n very  d i f f e r e n t ways).21 Such c r i t i c i s m s are not a p p l i c a b l e t o C o l t o n ' s arguments, however. The f a c t i s t h a t he does not argue t h a t change w i l l come simply because o f the upcoming g e n e r a t i o n a l change w i t h i n the country and  the  l e a d e r s h i p . 2 2 Rather, h i s t h e s i s i s t h a t because of a number of the p a r t i c u l a r developmental t h i s new  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s of  g e n e r a t i o n , some of i t s members might be more  predisposed t o a "problem-solving approach"  than was  the  case with t h e i r p r e d e c e s s o r s . As w e l l , the p o t e n t i a l d i f f e r e n c e s i n t h i s g e n e r a t i o n are f e l t t o be because they w i l l be expressed  important  i n an environment t h a t  i n c l u d e s a number of s e r i o u s domestic  problems. The argument  i s t h e r e f o r e t h a t i t i s the r e l a t i o n s h i p between the above f a c t o r s t h a t has the p o t e n t i a l t o generate change, and j u s t the g e n e r a t i o n a l / l e a d e r s h i p change. What should i n s t e a d be assessed i s whether the  not  d i f f e r e n c e s and  changes which C o l t o n  c o u n t r y ' s problems, i n the new  perceives  generation  -- i n the  of l e a d e r s and  the domestic c o n d i t i o n s w i t h i n the country i t s e l f -s i g n i f i c a n t enough t o i n t e r a c t and already  in  are  promote change. There  has  been a good deal of agreement among the authors t h a t  the c o u n t r y ' s problems are s e r i o u s and  growing worse q u i c k l y .  As such, i t would appear t h a t a t l e a s t they are  already  s i g n i f i c a n t enough t o promote change w i t h i n the  country.  C l o s e l y r e l a t e d to t h i s t o p i c are the c o n d i t i o n s the country i t s e l f . Although P i p e s and  Cohen f i n d a l a r g e  number of c o n t i n u i t i e s i n modern S o v i e t p o l i t i c s and ( a l b e i t from very d i f f e r e n t i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s of h i s t o r y ) , the changes i n both may  within  society,  Soviet  become i n c r e a s i n g l y  Important as subsequent g e n e r a t i o n s  develop. As the average  S o v i e t c i t i z e n becomes f u r t h e r removed from the harshness of some p e r i o d s of the S o v i e t p a s t , and becomes more aware i n an age i n c r e a s e d communication and new  as he  simultaneously  that i s characterized  i n t e r c o u r s e among a l l c o u n t r i e s ,  problems are bound to emerge. P o l i t i c a l  and  s t r a t e g i e s developed f i f t y t o s i x t y years ago, apply  by  under those c o n d i t i o n s , w i l l no longer  i f a t a l l . Perhaps more i m p o r t a n t l y ,  governmental and  meant t o  apply  as w e l l ,  an i n c r e a s e i n the  number of comparisons between c o n d i t i o n s i n the S o v i e t Union and  the West w i l l be i n e v i t a b l e , and  s o l u t i o n s may  t r a d i t i o n a l excuses  not be as e f f e c t i v e anymore i n s a t i s f y i n g  Soviet population.  In sum,  I have t o agree with C o l t o n  and the  that  44  the longer p o l i c i e s remain unchanged, and c o n d i t i o n s the the country c o n t i n u e t o e v o l v e ,  the g r e a t e r  within  w i l l be the  p o t e n t i a l e f f e c t t h a t these c o n d i t i o n s can have as f o r c e s promoting change. The  moat c o n t e n t i o u s  p a r t o f Colton's  the d i f f e r e n c e s i n the new generation enough t o predispose  t h e s i s i s whether  o f l e a d e r s h i p w i l l be  some o f them t o change and whether these  p a r t i c u l a r i n d i v i d u a l s w i l l be a b l e t o f i n d t h e i r way i n t o the upper echelons o f t h e l e a d e r s h i p . A complete answer t o t h i s question  w i l l , o f course, need the t e a t o f time. Even  so, aome i n v e a t i g a t l o n i n t o the c h a r a c t e r i a t i c a o f t h i a group haa  been done by using the p u b l i s h e d  statements o f some o f  i t s members, as w e l l as through i n t e r v i e w s with some o f i t s r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s . One s c h o l a r was a b l e t o i n c o r p o r a t e information  this  i n t o an e s t a b l i s h e d , t h e o r e t i c a l approach t o  generational  analysis.23  He t e n t a t i v e l y concluded t h a t  such h i s t o r i c a l e x p e r i e n c e s as the excesses o f S t a l i n i s m , the r i s e and f a l l stagnation  o f Khrushchev's reform program, and the  o f the Brezhnev p e r i o d have r e s u l t e d i n :  ...a g e n e r a t i o n t h a t d e p l o r e s the backwardness o f S o v i e t s o c i e t y , the f u n c t i o n a l d e f i c i e n c i e s o f the system, the i n a b i l i t y o f t h e present a d m i n i s t r a t i o n to make progress i n r e c t i f y i n g the s i t u a t i o n , and a t t h e same time i t probably stands c o n f i d e n t i n i t s a b i l i t y t o do s o . I t i s a generation t h a t i s l e s s l i k e l y t o accept a c t u a l or p o t e n t i a l i n t e r n a t i o n a l achievements as s u b s t i t u t e s f o r i n t e r n a l development. I t i s a g e n e r a t i o n t h a t may be more w i l l i n g t o pay a higher p r i c e i n terms o f p o l i t i c a l and s o c i a l change i f persuaded t h a t such a p r i c e would assure s u b s t a n t i a l improvement i n the growth and e f f i c i e n c y o f t h e p r o d u c t i v e and  45 distributive  processes.25  Some of these g e n e r a t i o n a l d i f f e r e n c e s are s i m i l a r t o which C o l t o n f e l t would be c h a r a c t e r i s t i c of the  those  new  generation of S o v i e t l e a d e r s . Whether or not i n d i v i d u a l s with such i d e a s can t h e i r way another for  i n t o the higher echelons  of the l e a d e r s h i p i s  q u e s t i o n , however. There are s i g n i f i c a n t  c o n t i n u i t y and conformity  find  pressures  throughout the Party  and  l e a d e r s h i p which w i l l always a c t as b a r r i e r s t o the development of r e f o r m i s t p o l i c i e s and  the advancement of  I n d i v i d u a l s who  might embrace such i d e a s . C o l t o n h i m s e l f  argued t h a t how  important  the new  g e n e r a t i o n of l e a d e r s w i l l  be as a f o r c e promoting change w i l l depend a g r e a t d e a l on how  q u i c k l y and thoroughly  entrance  i t s r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s can  gain  i n t o the l e a d e r s h i p . 2 6 There are, however, t h r e e  aspects of the S o v i e t s i t u a t i o n which I b e l i e v e w i l l not favour the cause of the younger g e n e r a t i o n i n g e n e r a l ,  only  but  the more reform-minded members o f i t i n p a r t i c u l a r . The  first  i s the nature of the l e a d e r s h i p change t h a t i s o c c u r r i n g w i t h i n the S o v i e t Union.26 i  n  the e a r l y 1980's the  average age of P o l i t b u r o members was been, and  i t was  s p e c i a l power and  higher than i t had  ever  even higher f o r those i n the p o s i t i o n s o f influence.27 A  s  such,  i t was  only a  matter of time b e f o r e younger i n d i v i d u a l s began t o move i n t o the upper ranks of the P a r t y . One  f a c t o r which f a v o r s the cause o f  individuals  i n t e r e s t e d i n change i s the very nature of the problems i n the country. One difficulties  would t h i n k t h a t as these  domestic  c o n t i n u e t o worsen, those i n d i v i d u a l s  a s s o c i a t e themselves Soviet p o l i t i c s  who  with a "problem-solving approach"  to  (provided i t i s couched i n terms t h a t do not  completely a l i e n a t e them from t h e i r more c o n s e r v a t i v e s u p e r i o r s ) would be favoured i n the P a r t y . T h i s view i s not necessarily i d e a l i s t i c a s s o c i a t e themselves "liberalization"  because such i n d i v i d u a l s need not  with i d e a s of "moderation"  or  t o be i n t e r e s t e d i n change. Rather,  the  emphasis would only have t o be on "the h e a l i n g of the a i l m e n t s of s o c i e t y f o r the betterment  of s o c i a l i s m . "  I n t e r e s t i n g l y , i n d i v i d u a l s with these types of  political  programs are those which C o l t o n f e e l s w i l l advance i n t o the leadership. F i n a l l y , i t would appear t h a t C o l t o n ' s r e a s o n i n g may  be  c o r r e c t i f only because some kind of a " c a t a l y s t " or " j o l t " seems t o be needed t o break the S o v i e t Union out of the economic and b u r e a u c r a t i c s t a g n a t i o n t h a t i t has been i n f o r so many y e a r s . In an environment t h a t i s a p p a r e n t l y devoid o f domestic may  c r i s i s , a new  "policy-change" oriented leadership  be the s o l u t i o n . I t would not guarantee  implementation  the s u c c e s s f u l  of reforms, but i t might be the e x t r a "push"  necessary t o a t l e a s t get t h i n g s s t a r t e d i n the c o u n t r y . Stephen Cohen's arguments must a l s o be examined more c l o s e l y i n a number of a r e a s . S p e c i f i c a l l y , one has t o  i n v e s t i g a t e h i s b e l i e f i n the d i v i s i o n of S o v i e t p o l i t i c s s o c i e t y i n t o two  fundamental, p h i l o s o p h i c a l t e n d e n c i e s or  impulses. C r i t i c i s m s of t h i s approach have, i n the concentrated  and  past,  on t h i s d e f i n i t i o n , e s p e c i a l l y with r e s p e c t  to  whether h i s c a t e g o r i z a t i o n i s e i t h e r too narrow or too broad f o r a n a l y t i c a l purposes.28 Although Cohen  has  s a t i s f a c t o r i l y responded to t h i s c r i t i c i s m s , 2 9 he always be l e f t with two  problems. The  attempting t o d e f i n e reformism and  first  will  i s that  conservativism  by  as the  fundamental d i v i s i o n s w i t h i n S o v i e t s o c i e t y , but not d i s t i n c t , f u n c t i o n a l groups i n t h e i r own always be u n c l e a r tendencies,  as t o the exact  more i m p o r t a n t l y ,  as  right, i t will  o r g a n i z a t i o n of these  which a s p e c t s of S o v i e t p o l i t i c s and  i n v o l v e d and,  two  how  they can  cohesively  to promote change. One's p o l i t i c a l  after a l l ,  only one  society  are  a c t semibelief i s ,  f o r c e a c t i n g t o i n f l u e n c e behaviour.  Although i t can a f f e c t one's b u r e a u c r a t i c  or  institutional  i n t e r e s t s , i t w i l l not always be the prime f a c t o r  motivating  one's a c t i o n s . Cohen's u l t i m a t e problem, however, i s t h a t he  will  never be a b l e to i r r e f u t a b l y e s t a b l i s h the e f f i c a c y of h i s approach. There i s no way  t o determine f o r sure what v a r i e t y  of i n t e r e s t s e x i s t w i t h i n the S o v i e t Union or how s t r u c t u r e d , mostly because of the c l o s e d nature of system and  i t s l e a d e r s ' emphasis on an outer  they the  conformity  views. As a r e s u l t u n t i l S o v i e t s o c i e t y opens up  are  of  46  s i g n i f i c a n t l y , h i s approach w i l l remain open t o c r i t i c i s m  on  d e f i n i t i o n a l and f a c t u a l grounds. For the purposes of t h i s chapter, however, we can e s s e n t i a l l y circumvent these problems by c o n c e n t r a t i n g on the q u e s t i o n o f whether or not t h e r e have always been f o r c e s or f a c t o r s promoting change w i t h i n S o v i e t p o l i t i c s .  Historical  evidence would seem t o support a t l e a s t t h i s p o r t i o n o f Cohen's t h e s i s . The arguments t h a t were p r e v i o u s l y used t o r e f u t e some o f P i p e s ' assumptions about the nature o f the l e a d e r s h i p are good examples o f such evidence. The cases o f Khrushchev and Kosygin would seem t o i n d i c a t e t h a t t h e r e have been w i t h i n the l e a d e r s h i p views which have not always f a v o r e d the s t a t u s quo. Cohen strengthens h i s own case with the argument t h a t even d u r i n g the darkest days f o r reform, i . e . the S t a l i n years, t h e r e e x i s t e d i n d i v i d u a l s S e r g e i K i r o v and N i k o l a i Voznesensky) who s t i l l  (such as promoted the  cause o f change.30 Although those promoting change have not always been s u c c e s s f u l , i t would appear t h a t the f o r c e s have a t l e a s t always e x i s t e d i n the upper ranks o f the P a r t y . A more c o n t e n t i o u s p a r t o f Cohen's argument  i s the  evidence which he g i v e s t o support h i s c l a i m t h a t the problems of conservatism w i l l  i n d i r e c t l y strengthen the  r e f o r m i s t impulse i t s e l f . For i n s t a n c e , h i s argument t h a t the memory o f S t a l i n and h i s crimes w i l l always deny the c o n s e r v a t i v e s the h i s t o r i c a l source o f l e g i t i m a c y they need t o j u s t i f y a continued defence o f the s t a t u s quo i s t r u e only  t o a point.31  One must remember t h a t t h e r e a r e many  a s p e c t s o f S t a l i n i s m -- i n p a r t i c u l a r t h e man's strong l e a d e r s h i p and emphasis on order -- which w i l l continue t o appeal  t o a g r e a t many people w i t h i n the S o v i e t Union, and  which can t h e r e f o r e always be used t o j u s t i f y some o f t h e t e n e t s o f a c o n s e r v a t i v e approach.32 Cohen's argument t h a t the growing.discrepancy the r e a l i t y o f everyday l i f e  between  i n the country and the Utopian  c l a i m s o f Communist and M a r x i s t - L e n i n i s t i d e o l o g y w i l l i n c r e a s i n g l y g i v e the r e f o r m i s t impulse  an i d e o l o g i c a l  advantage over i t s c o n s e r v a t i v e c o u n t e r p a r t i s a l s o suspect.33 The problem here i s t h a t while i d e o l o g y and d o c t r i n e undoubtedly s t i l l  p l a y some r o l e i n the country, i t  has been shown t h a t the S o v i e t people have a l r e a d y become pragmatic,  and even c y n i c a l , about both.34 /\ such, s  whether or not one s i d e i n t h e reform/status-quo  b a t t l e has  an i d e o l o g i c a l advantage over the other may be l e s s  important  to those i n s o c i e t y than Cohen might argue. The most a t t r a c t i v e p i e c e o f evidence  which Cohen  p r e s e n t s i s t h e one r e g a r d i n g t h e e x i s t e n c e o f an a l t e r n a t i v e " r e f o r m i s t i d e o l o g y " t h a t might not only gain i n s t r e n g t h as i t s S t a l i n i s t c o u n t e r p a r t develops  c r e d i b i l i t y problems, but  which c o u l d a l s o serve t o a i d the r e f o r m i s t cause by j u s t i f y i n g any changes t h a t might be made.35 He argued t h a t such an i d e o l o g i c a l a l t e r n a t i v e e x i s t e d i n the form o f the i d e a s and p o l i c i e s a s s o c i a t e d with the N.E.P., and i t s  c r e a t o r s Lenin and did  e x i s t , and  N i k o l a i Bukharin.  i f some of i t s t e n e t s are s t i l l  r e l e v a n t by those who could be important and  T h i s program  obviously  considered  promote change w i t h i n the country  f o r two  reasons.  p o l i c i e s of S t a l i n i s m continue  they  F i r s t , as the premises to f a i l  to s o l v e  the  problems of a modern S o v i e t s o c i e t y , a l t e r n a t i v e p o l i c i e s would n a t u r a l l y become more popular. More however, and  e s p e c i a l l y i n l i g h t of the  importantly,  questionable  importance of i d e o l o g y to the general p o p u l a t i o n , such an a l t e r n a t i v e c o u l d be important  a t the l e a d e r s h i p  level.  S o v i e t l e a d e r s have h i s t o r i c a l l y f e l t the need to j u s t i f y changes i n the system, no matter how  s m a l l , and  an  any  ideology  which a l r e a d y p r o v i d e s such j u s t i f i c a t i o n could make the i n s t i t u t i o n of changes e a s i e r from t h e i r p o i n t of view. The  f i n a l p o r t i o n of Cohen's argument t h a t i s open to  c h a l l e n g e i s h i s b e l i e f t h a t the r e f o r m i s t impulse through the n a t u r a l h i s t o r i c a l c y c l e of reform conservatism  w i t h i n the country,  of course,  c o r r e c t . Time, however, may i n v o l v e d here.  and  become s t r o n g enough to form  the c o a l i t i o n he f e e l s i s necessary Only time w i l l t e l l ,  will,  to b r i n g about change.  i f Cohen's arguments are  be the most important  factor  I t has been over twenty years s i n c e r e f o r m i s t  i n t e r e s t s were s t r o n g enough to i n s t i t u t e a program of change. Since t h a t time, the c o n s e r v a t i v e and  bureaucratic  b a r r i e r s to change have i n c r e a s e d s u b s t a n t i a l l y and  the  problems of the country have become more numerous and  s e r i o u s . As such, one wonders just, how  long the l e a d e r s h i p ,  and the country, can a f f o r d t o wait t o address these problems b e f o r e they do get out of c o n t r o l . As I argued  with r e s p e c t  t o C o l t o n ' s t h e s i s , i t seems t h a t a c a t a l y s t i s needed t o "get the country going a g a i n " . Without reformism  and conservatism may  it,  Cohen's c y c l e of  become f u n c t i o n a l l y  irrelevant  i n the f a c e of problems e i t h e r too s e r i o u s t o s o l v e by moderate reform, or too d i f f i c u l t t o address because of b u r e a u c r a t i c and/or c o n s e r v a t i v e b a r r i e r s t o the implementation  of change.  52 Endnotes 1- For an i l l u s t r a t i o n of P i p e s ' views about the nature and importance of the country's problems as f o r c e s promoting change, see Richard P i p e s , S u r v i v a l i s Not Enough (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1984), pp. 110-148, f o r economic problems, and P i p e s , pp. 149-198 f o r p o l i t i c a l problems. 2. P i p e s , pp.  148-158, and  199-203  3. P i p e s , p. 111. Indeed, Pipes f e l t t h a t both of these f o r c e s were a c t u a l l y b a r r i e r s t o change i n the country. His arguments i n t h i s area w i l l be d e a l t with e x t e n s i v e l y i n the next chapter. 4. P i p e s , p.  204  5. Timothy J . C o l t o n , The Dilemma of Reform i n the S o v i e t Union (New York: C o u n c i l on F o r e i g n R e l a t i o n s , Inc., 1984), pp. 16-27 6. C o l t o n , p.  64  7. C o l t o n , p. 64 and 8. C o l t o n , pp. 9. C o l t o n , p.  p. 48, r e s p e c t i v e l y .  16-17 78  10. Stephen F. Cohen, S o v l e t i c u a (London: W. and Company, 1985), pp. 24-28  W.  Norton  11. Stephen F. Cohen, R e t h i n k i n g the S o v i e t Experience (London: Oxford U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s , 1985), p. 129 12. See  Chapter one  of t h i s work, p. 35, f n . 28  13. Cohen, R e t h i n k i n g ,  pp.  129-157  14. Cohen, R e t h i n k i n g ,  pp.  150-154  15. Cohen i s q u i t e e x p l i c i t about t h i s p o i n t . See Cohen, R e t h i n k i n g . pp. 155-6. I t should be p o i n t e d out t h a t C o l t o n does not d i s a g r e e with t h i s b a s i c p o i n t i . e . r e f o r m i s t / c o n s e r v a t i v e I n t e r e s t s w i t h i n s o c i e t y . He argues t h a t the c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s of the new g e n e r a t i o n are such t h a t i t s members, i n c l u d i n g those who might be more c o n s e r v a t i v e , w i l l be more predisposed to change.  53 16. For an examination of Khrushchev's motives, and the s i t u a t i o n i n the country a t the time, see S t a n l e y Rothman and George W. B r e s l a u e r , S o v i e t P o l i t i c s and S o c i e t y (New York: West P u b l i s h i n g Co., 1978), pp. 44-46. The p a r t i a l quote i s from p. 44 17. For a s i m i l a r examination of Kosygin's reforms, see Rothman and B r e s l a u e r , pp. 242-244. 18. Cohen, pp. 71-92. 19. P i p e s , p.  111.  20. P i p e s , pp. 200-202. 21. Cohen, R e t h i n k i n g , p. 155, R i c h a r d P i p e s , "Can the S o v i e t Union Reform?", F o r e i g n A f f a i r s , V o l . 63, No. No. 1, ( F a l l 1984), p. 57 and P i p e s , S u r v i v a l . pp. 29-32 22. C o l t o n , pp. 46-52. 23. The theory used was the " e x p e r e n t i a l " v a r i a n t of Samuel Huntington's t h r e e - t i e r e d theory of g e n e r a t i o n a l a c t i v i t y and d i f f e r e n c e s . For a summary of t h i s t h e o r y , and the o r i g i n a l source of t h i s note, see Seweryn B i a l e r , S t a l i n ' s Successors (Cambridge: Cambridge U n i v e r s i t y Press, 1980), p. 106. Huntington's work was o r i g i n a l l y presented i n Samuel P. Huntington, "Generations, C y c l e s , and T h e i r Role i n American Development" i n Richard J . Samuels, ed., P o l i t i c a l Generations and P o l i t i c a l Development (Lexington, Mass.: D. C. Heath, 1977), pp.9-16 24. B i a l e r , pp.  103-4  25. C o l t o n , pp. 78-79. 26. A l l of the work of these t h r e e authors t h a t i s analyzed i n t h i s t h e s i s was w r i t t e n b e f o r e M i k h a i l Gorbachev came t o power. As such, a c r i t i q u e of the p r o s p e c t s f o r g e n e r a t i o n a l change must be made with r e s p e c t t o how the s i t u a t i o n was then, so as t o a v o i d l e t t i n g h i n d s i g h t p r e j u d i c e such c r i t i c i s m s . 27. Brezhnev was the General S e c r e t a r y , V. Tihkonov was the Chairman of the C o u n c i l of M i n i s t e r s , M.A. Suslov was i n charge of i d e o l o g y , and D. F. Ustinov was the Defence M i n i s t e r . A l l were i n excess of seventy years o l d .  54 28. Cohen's ideas about the " f r i e n d s and f o e s o f change" were f i r s t p u b l i s h e d i n a r t i c l e form i n 1979, as "The F r i e n d s and Foes o f Change: Reformism and Conservatism i n the S o v i e t Union", S l a v i c Review. 38, No. 2, (June, 1979), pp. 187-202. T h i s a r t i c l e was the b a s i s f o r the l a s t chapter of h i s subsequent book R e t h i n k i n g the S o v i e t E x p e r i e n c e. In the same i s s u e , a number o f c r i t i c a l reviews were a l s o p u b l i s h e d , i n c l u d i n g ones by T. H. Rigby ("Forward From "Who Gets What, When, How"", pp. 203-207), F r e d e r i c k Barghoorn ("Problems o f P o l i c y and P o l i t i c a l Behaviour", pp. 211-215), and George W. B r e s l a u e r ("Reformism and Conservatism", pp. 216-219). 29.  Cohen responded i n k i n d t o these c r i t i c i s m s i n the same i s s u e o f S l a v i c Review. "Reply", pp. 220-223  30. Cohen, R e t h i n k i n g , pp. 141-142. 31.  Cohen, R e t h i n k i n g , p. 150.  32. See, f o r example, the f i r s t hand r e p o r t o f a j o u r n a l i s t i n Hedrick Smith, The Russians (New York: New York Times Book Co., 1976), pp. 325-330. 33.  Cohen, R e t h i n k i n g , pp. 151-153.  34. Smith, pp. 371-401. 35.  Cohen, R e t h i n k i n g , pp. 89-92.  55 Chapter  Three  The B a r r i e r s t o Change i n the S o v i e t Union J u s t as t h e r e a r e f o r c e s and f a c t o r s promoting w i t h i n t h e S o v i e t Union,  so t h e r e a r e s i m i l a r  change  agents  r e t a r d i n g the reform p r o c e s s . The aim o f t h i s chapter  will  t h e r e f o r e be t o d i s c u s s and c r i t i q u e the t h r e e a u t h o r s ' views of  what b a r r i e r s t o reform and change e x i s t w i t h i n the  country. " B a r r i e r s " , i n t h i s c o n t e x t , w i l l r e f e r t o those f o r c e s or f a c t o r s w i t h i n the S o v i e t Union t h a t a r e i n t e r f e r i n g with the pace and/or the u l t i m a t e success o f r e f orm. Throughout t h i s chapter t h e term  "conservatism" w i l l be  employed t o d e s c r i b e and e x p l a i n the b a r r i e r s t o change i n the country. I t w i l l be used  i n two somewhat d i f f e r e n t  c o n t e x t s , however, which must be kept separate i n t h e mind of the r e a d e r . When used by Timothy C o l t o n , and by myself critiques, i t will  i n my  take on i t s t r a d i t i o n a l meaning, i . e . a  philosophy or outlook which i s averse t o t h e i d e a o f change. When used by Stephen Cohen, however, i t w i l l  take on a much  broader meaning. I t w i l l be meant t o r e f e r t o one o f t h e two fundamental,  permanent tendencies or impulses t h a t has always  e x i s t e d i n S o v i e t s o c i e t y and p o l i t i c s ,  a f o r c e which i s l e s s  than a d i s t i n c t e n t i t y but more than j u s t a p o l i t i c a l p h i l o s o p h y . The d i f f e r e n c e s between these c o n c e p t i o n s o f conservativism w i l l progresses.  be e l a b o r a t e d upon f u r t h e r as the chapter  56 F i n a l l y , the term c o n s e r v a t i v i s m w i l l be used i n r e f e r e n c e t o the S o v i e t e l i t e , Although  l e a d e r s h i p and  bureaucracy.  these groups are i n t e r r e l a t e d , they w i l l , i n t h i s  context, have s p e c i f i c c o n n o t a t i o n s . The most g e n e r a l term will  be the e l i t e which, broadly construed,  will  be used to  r e f e r to the Communist P a r t y o f f i c i a l s i n the upper of  the Party and governmental apparatus.  The  echelons  bureaucracy  r e f e r the e x t e n s i v e o r g a n i z a t i o n a l network t h a t has w i t h i n the country, and  s p e c i f i c a l l y to those  developed  lesser  d i s t i n g u i s e d members of the e l i t e of whom i t i s made up. most s p e c i f i c d e f i n i t i o n w i l l  be the one  will  The  a p p l i e d to the  l e a d e r s h i p , which w i l l be meant t o r e f e r t o the members of the e l i t e who  are a c t u a l l y i n the P o l i t b u r o and  S e c r e t a r i a t , the two  most powerful  political  the  organs i n the  country. The B a r r i e r s to Change i n the S o v i e t Union Richard Pipes pointed out t h r e e i n t e r r e l a t e d f o r c e s which he b e l i e v e d were a c t i n g as b a r r i e r s t o change i n the U.S.S.R.. The most important Communist P a r t y establishment  of these was  f e l t to be  the  i t s e l f . Pipes b e l i e v e d t h a t the  Party had become an impediment to change because i t had d e v i a t e d from i t s h i s t o r i c a l r o l e i n s o c i e t y . Instead  of  being a f o r c e to m o b i l i z e the p o p u l a t i o n , he argued t h a t i t had evolved  i n t o a "...  a self-seeking privileged class that  i n i t s h i g h e s t echelons,  the s o - c a l l e d nomenklatura.  turned  p a r a s i t i c stratum."!  i n t o a completely  The  has  Party  57 was now seen t o be concerned only with t h e j u s t i f i c a t i o n and preservation  o f the s t a t u s quo, both o f which would p r e s e r v e  the p r i v i l e g e s and p o s i t i o n s o f i t s members. P i p e s b e l i e v e d t h a t t h e P a r t y had become such a s i g n i f i c a n t b a r r i e r t o change because o f the nature o f i t s f u n c t i o n a l e l i t e , t h e nomenklatura. He argued t h a t t h e p r i v i l e g e s and "perks" o f t h e i r p o s i t i o n s -- such as high official  (and u n o f f i c i a l ) s a l a r i e s and a c c e s s t o s p e c i a l  s t o r e s and s o c i a l a c t i v i t i e s -- had r e s u l t e d i n t h e i r becoming greedy, c o r r u p t , and i n t e r e s t e d only i n t h e i r own well being.2 p i p e s went even f u r t h e r t o s t a t e t h a t t h e p u r s u i t o f " s e l f - i n t e r e s t " was the only human motive recognized  and understood by t h e S o v i e t e l i t e and t h e one  accepted as r e p r e s e n t a t i v e  o f the n a t u r a l s t a t e o f human  r e l a t i o n s . 3 P i p e s was r e a l l y q u e s t i o n i n g character  not only t h e  and i n t e r e s t s o f the e l i t e , but t h e very  of i t s l e a d e r s h i p , arguing  legitimacy  t h a t i t "... knows how t o  i n t i m i d a t e and manipulate them <the people>, but not how t o govern them, i n as much as government always e n t a i l s some measure o f persuasion  and c o m p u l s i o n . "  4  Reform was  t h e r e f o r e f e l t t o be i n h i b i t e d because t h e S o v i e t e l i t e were seen t o be a c t i v e "en masse" i n t h e s t r u g g l e t o avoid  change  i n t h e country. P i p e s a l s o argued t h a t t h e nature o f t h e S o v i e t economic system made i t a p h y s i c a l b a r r i e r t o change. He b e l i e v e d t h a t i t had been developed and now  functioned  58 l a r g e l y t o enaure the s e c u r i t y and power of the nomenklatura.5 As a r e s u l t , any attempts t o reform i t -- whether they i n v o l v e d the d e c e n t r a l i z a t i o n of economic p l a n n i n g or the s h a r i n g of the means of p r o d u c t i o n -- would n e c e s s a r i l y have t o i n c l u d e a concomitant decrease i n the o v e r a l l c o n t r o l and power enjoyed by the e l i t e and l e a d e r s h i p . P i p e s b e l i e v e d t h a t because  the  such changes would be  completely a t odds with the g o a l s and p r i o r i t i e s of the e l i t e , they would never be v o l u n t a r i l y undertaken  by them. He  argued: ...the b u r e a u c r a t i c e s t a b l i s h m e n t , p r e s s u r e d t o do something to enhance p r o d u c t i v i t y , would r a t h e r improve the c e n t r a l p l a n n i n g system than dismantle i t . . . t h e p l a n n i n g bureaucracy i s f i g h t i n g both t o o t h and n a i l a g a i n s t any r e d u c t i o n of i t s a u t h o r i t y , and i t s o l i c i t s i n i t s endeavor the a s s i s t a n c e of anxious Party officials.^ F i n a l l y , P i p e s saw w i t h i n Russian s o c i e t y and c u l t u r e a number of endemic b a r r i e r s t o change and reform. One most s i g n i f i c a n t of these was  of the  thought t o be the g e n e r a l  p o p u l a t i o n ' s overwhelming f e a r of the c o l l a p s e of a u t h o r i t y and the t h r e a t of anarchy, both of which had come t o be a s s o c i a t e d with the concept of change because of the harsh domestic p o l i t i c a l and s o c i a l h i s t o r y of the S o v i e t P i p e s argued t h a t because of t h i s f e a r , the  Union.  nomenklatura  a c t u a l l y had the p o p u l a t i o n on i t s " s i d e " i n the b a t t l e over change i n t h a t even though  the people were d i s s a t i s f i e d ,  were more i n t e r e s t e d i n c i r c u m v e n t i n g the e s t a b l i s h e d  they  59 a u t h o r i t y of the Party than they were i n overthrowing r e p l a c i n g it."? In c o n c l u s i o n . P i p e s c o u l d see s i g n i f i c a n t sources of support itself, to  or  no  f o r change w i t h i n s o c i e t y  the l a c k of which he f e l t t o be a s t r o n g impediment  the p r o s p e c t s of reform  i n the  country.  An examination of Timothy C o l t o n ' s views i n d i c a t e s t h a t he appeared to share only one was  the one  concerning  b a r r i e r s to reform  of P i p e s ' i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s . T h i s  the e x i s t e n c e of s o c i e t a l and  w i t h i n the S o v i e t Union. He argued t h a t  these i n c l u d e d the c o n s e r v a t i v e nature country's  present e l i t e and  the country  cultural  of much of the  the weak democratic t r a d i t i o n  of  itself.® C o l t o n d i d not go so f a r as t o argue  t h a t the c o n s e r v a t i v e nature of the p o p u l a t i o n  actually  placed i t on the same a i d e as the nomenklatura i n the b a t t l e f o r reform,  but he d i d f e e l t h a t the concept of change  would not n e c e s s a r i l y be u n i v e r s a l l y embraced by  the  population. C o l t o n d i d not b e l i e v e , however, t h a t the S o v i e t would p l a y the kind of completely process  n e g a t i v e r o l e i n the  reform  t h a t P i p e s e n v i s i o n e d f o r them. He d i d r e c o g n i z e  good deal of conservatism t h i s he saw  completely  a  w i t h i n the o l d e r e l i t e , but even  t o be more of a by-product of the Brezhnev regime  than an i n d i c a t i o n of a c o r r u p t and  illegitimate  leadership  u n i n t e r e s t e d i n change. Indeed, he argued t h a t  t h e r e were l o g i c a l reasons f o r t h i s conservatism, such as:  elite  reasons  60 F i r s t , i t was r e a c t i n g d e l i b e r a t e l y t o what i t saw as the r e f o r m i s t excesses of the Khrushchev y e a r s . Second, Brezhnev, the man at the top, was...an i d e o l o g i c a l c o n s e r v a t i v e . . . . T h i r d , t h e r e was from the e a r l i e s t days a power e q u i l i b r i u m w i t h i n the i n n e r l e a d e r s h i p . . . creating strong i n h i b i t i o n s against serious changes.... Fourth, top p o s i t i o n s were f i l l e d by members of an aged g e n e r a t i o n ....And f i f t h , Brezhnevism worked at the o u t s e t , making i t harder to change when i t ceased t o worked.10 As a r e s u l t , although he expected s i g n i f i c a n t o p p o s i t i o n from the o l d e r members of the e l i t e to any the reasons which he saw of t h i s conservatism  domestic changes, the  f o r the development and  maintenance  were f a r l e s s s i n i s t e r than those given  by P i p e s . T h i s i s another i n d i c a t i o n of the b a s i c d i f f e r e n c e s between the two  scholars' perceptions  of the e l i t e and  their  interests. Because o f t h i s k i n d of view of even the o l d e r S o v i e t e l i t e , Colton b e l i e v e d t h a t one  of the major p h y s i c a l  b a r r i e r s t o change t h a t would e x i s t w i t h i n the country be the s t y l e of government and  the kind of p o l i c i e s which  a r i s e n d u r i n g the Brezhnev regime and the causes of i t s conservatism.  would  which had  He argued q u i t e  been one  had of  emphatically:  As a r u l e , the S o v i e t Union addresses i t s personal problems with remarkably s t a b l e formulas and approaches. I t l i v e s by t i m e - t e s t e d p r a c t i c e . The catch i s t h a t sooner or l a t e r a l l o l d h a b i t s generate d e c l i n i n g returns.10 The b a r r i e r t o change, then, would be the d i f f i c u l t y t h a t new  S o v i e t l e a d e r s h i p would have i n breaking  had  become t r a d i t i o n a l methods and  the  away from what  approaches. Such t h i n g s  as  61 the emphasis on minimal attempts a t reform, the f e a r (or i n a b i l i t y ) t o check i n s t a n c e s o f p o l i t i c a l  c o r r u p t i o n , the  p o l i c y o f i n c r e a s i n g the s i z e o f the bureaucracy as a means of a d d r e s s i n g  domestic problems and the use o f i d e o l o g y and  propaganda as excuses f o r the c o u n t r y ' s problems had a l l become such s a f e and e s t a b l i s h e d means o f o p e r a t i o n  that just  t r y i n g t o break out o f t h i s p a t t e r n would be a s i g n i f i c a n t b a r r i e r t o change. Colton b e l i e v e d t h a t these entrenched approaches would not only be hard t o break out o f , they would a l s o  adversely  a f f e c t attempts a t reform w i t h i n t h e i r l i m i t s . He argued t h a t because o f the conservatism t h a t had been generated by t h i s s t y l e o f government, comprehensive "master p l a n s " f o r reform had  not been developed w i t h i n the e l i t e . Any reform program  would t h e r e f o r e have t o ambiguous and h e s i t a n t a t beat, with both q u a l i t i e s s e r v i n g t o hinder  the p o t e n t i a l success o f the  reforms t h e m s e l v e s . H More i m p o r t a n t l y ,  he argued t h a t a  probable response t o t h i s problem would be more emphasis on t r y i n g t o re-implement o l d s o l u t i o n s , s o l u t i o n s t h a t had been p r e v i o u s l y endorsed but not s u c e s s f u l l y executed -- such as inducements f o r t e c h n o l o g i c a l breakthroughs, help f o r p r i v a t e p l o t s or p e n a l t i e s f o r d r i n k i n g on the j o b -- than would be on c r e a t i n g new, untested  there  ones. By doing so,  however, the same problems which may have r e s u l t e d i n the o r i g i n a l f a i l u r e o f these s o l u t i o n s c o u l d come i n t o p l a y again  and newer, p o t e n t i a l l y more s u c c e s s f u l s o l u t i o n s might  62 be eshewed  f o r f e a r of t h e i r unknown r e s u l t s . 1 2  C o l t o n a l s o argued t h a t a number o f the s p e c i a l c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s of the reform process i n the S o v i e t Union would slow the pace of change and make reform more d i f f i c u l t to implement. To begin with, he b e l i e v e d t h a t t h e r e were a number o f a s p e c t s of S o v i e t p o l i t i c s and s o c i e t y t h a t might appear r i p e f o r change but which would never, or c o u l d never, be reformed. Mentioned i n t h i s r e s p e c t were such i d e a s as the primacy of the s t a t e , the r e l e v a n c y o f the M a r x i s t - L e n i n i s t i d e o l o g y , and the r o l e of the P a r t y as the vanguard of the people.13 Such c o n t i n u i t i e s meant t h a t the p o s s i b i l i t i e s f o r p o l i t i c a l change were s e r i o u s l y  limited.  C o l t o n b e l i e v e d t h a t the major r e s u l t o f t h i s would be t h a t the l e a d e r s h i p would have an "ends and means" problem t h a t c o u l d serve as a f u r t h e r b a r r i e r t o change.1^ Because r a d i c a l changes and methods would not be i n v o l v e d i n the reform process, the t o o l s which the reformers would have a v a i l a b l e t o implement change would n e c e s s a r i l y have t o be the t r a d i t i o n a l ,  l a r g e l y a u t h o r i t a r i a n methods o f the past  <i.e. the KGB and the c e n s o r s h i p of the p r e s s ) . As a r e s u l t , the p u r s u i t of changes i n the economic sphere might i n v o l v e a t i g h t e n i n g o f c o n d i t i o n s i n other realms, such as i n the area of c i v i l  and human r i g h t s . In t h i s way the methods o f the  reform process i t s e l f c o u l d s e r v e as a b a r r i e r t o more widespread changes i n the country. F i n a l l y , C o l t o n b e l i e v e d t h a t the S o v i e t reform  process  63 would have to i n c l u d e an I n o r d i n a t e amount of c a u t i o n on p a r t of the l e a d e r s h i p , c a u t i o n which c o u l d slow the of reform  and  the  course  l i m i t i t s p o t e n t i a l e f f e c t s . He argued t h a t  l e a d e r s h i p would be f a c e d with the constant to balance the amount of change t h a t was with the f e a r of going  dilemma of t r y i n g  f e l t t o be needed  too f a r too q u i c k l y and  of the country-15 For example, popular  the  losing control  expectations  would  have to be t i g h t l y c o n t r o l l e d so as not t o c r e a t e a s i t u a t i o n i n which the l e a d e r s h i p could not s a t i s f y these needs. S i m i l a r l y , while many a s p e c t s embraced by the p o p u l a t i o n , had  of domestic reform  would  be  the a i d e e f f e c t s of some reforms  the p o t e n t i a l to b r i n g with them c o n t r o v e r s y .  Social  i n e q u a l i t i e s , f o r example, were i n e v i t a b l e from changes i n the wage s c a l e and  s t r u c t u r e , and  a more r e a l i s t i c  pricing  system would no doubt r e s u l t i n s i g n i f i c a n t l y  increased  p r i c e s f o r f o o d s t u f f s and  result  m a t e r i a l goods. The  t h e r e f o r e be t h a t the scope, and speed of reform  could  perhaps more i m p o r t a n t l y  the  would be l a r g e l y dependent upon the  leadership's perception  of the magnitude of the p o t e n t i a l  negative s i d e - e f f e c t s . One  can see an i n t e r e s t i n g and  between P i p e s ' and  Colton's  r e v e a l i n g c o n t r a s t here  perceptions  the l e a d e r s h i p v i s - a - v i s the general  population.  b e l i e v e d t h a t the l e a d e r s h i p m i s t r u s t e d avoided  any  of the i n t e r e s t s of The  former  the p o p u l a t i o n  and  p o t e n t i a l reforms i n t h e i r favour because both  were t h r e a t s to t h e i r main p r i o r i t y  -- the maintenance of  64 t h e i r p r i v i l e g e d p o s i t i o n s w i t h i n S o v i e t s o c i e t y . C o l t o n , by comparison, i n t e r p r e t s the emotional  s t a t e of the l e a d e r s h i p  as being more one of f e a r , f e a r of how p o p u l a t i o n ' s changing needs without  to best meet the  going too f a r and  u n r a v e l l i n g the f a b r i c of the system and  the  Colton's views not only l a c k P i p e s ' e x p l i c i t i n t e r e s t s and g o a l s of the l e a d e r s h i p and  country. doubts about the  the e l i t e , but  a l s o sees a s o c i e t a l c o n t i n u i t y between the e l i t e and people  he  the  t h a t i s missing from P i p e s ' arguments. By doing  so,  the " f e a r of change" t h a t permeates the S o v i e t people can understood  to have had  s i m i l a r e f f e c t s upon the l e a d e r s h i p as  w e l l , e f f e c t s which may  cause i t t o be a f r a i d t o go too f a r  too q u i c k l y . Colton does not completely t h a t p e r s o n a l ambition  be  d i s r e g a r d the  role  p l a y s i n the s t r u g g l e f o r change among  the e l i t e , but he does not see i t to be the o v e r r i d i n g f a c t o r t h a t P i p e s does. F i n a l l y , Stephen Cohen's views a l s o contained which were s i m i l a r to those of h i s c o l l e a g u e s . He,  aspects too,  emphasized the many s o c i a l and c u l t u r a l b a r r i e r s t o change which e x i s t e d w i t h i n the country, country's t s a r i s t  b a r r i e r s which i n c l u d e d the  past, with i t s b u r e a u c r a t i c and  c o n s e r v a t i v e legacy, and  the e f f e c t t h a t the " r o l l e r  coaster"  r e c o r d of S o v i e t domestic achievments and d i s a s t e r s has  had  on the general p o p u l a t i o n i n l e a v i n g them with mixed emotions about the concept  of change.16'  Cohen a l s o r e c o g n i z e d  i n t e r e s t s w i t h i n the e l i t e t h a t  65 would not be i n favour  of change and  a c t i v e l y oppose i t . He,  l i k e Colton,  which would even d i f f e r e d from P i p e s  h i s view o f a l e s s homogeneous e l i t e , one  with  i n which only a  segment would be a c t i n g as an a c t u a l p h y s i c a l b a r r i e r t o c h a n g e . I ' S i m i l a r l y , Cohen d i d not see the p h i l o s o p h i c a l and  a t t i t u d i n a l g u l f between the e l i t e and  t h a t P i p e s d i d . The  the  population  s o c i o - c u l t u r a l b a r r i e r s t o change which  he emphasized were seen to be a p p l i c a b l e a t a l l l e v e l s of S o v i e t p o l i t i c s and  s o c i e t y . I B F i n a l l y , Cohen a l s o agreed  with C o l t o n t h a t many of the circumstances and w i t h i n the country had  contributed  to the s t r e n g t h e n i n g  conservatism w i t h i n both the e l i t e and  the c o u n t r y .  emphasized such f a c t o r s as the s t a g n a t i o n years and  the gradual  over the past two strength  conditions of  He  of the Brezhnev  b u r e a u c r a t i z a t i o n of S o v i e t  politics  decades as f a c t o r s which have added to  of c o n s e r v a t i v e  i n t e r e s t s w i t h i n the  the  country.19  As a r e s u l t , he a l s o d i d not f e e l t h a t the e l i t e would be s o l e b a r r i e r to change w i t h i n the Where Cohen's analyses colleagues',  however, was  country.  r e a l l y d i f f e r e d from h i s  i n the p e r s p e c t i v e  viewed these b a r r i e r s t o change and  incorporated  he  them. A l l of h i s views  i n t o h i s " f r i e n d s and  change" t h e s i s , i n t h a t he viewed  foes  "the main o b s t a c l e  reform i n the S o v i e t Union...Enot to be] generation,  from which  e s p e c i a l l y the  terminology t h a t he used to d e s c r i b e were once again  the  one  to  or another  i n s t i t u t i o n , e l i t e , group or l e a d e r , but  the  of  66 profound  conservatism t h a t seems t o dominate a l l of them,  from the f a m i l y t o the P o l i t b u r o . " 2 0 T h i s conservatism i s the same f o r c e whose t e n e t s Cohen f e l t were the cause of the c o u n t r y ' s many domestic  problems.21 Here, however, i t i s  the a c t u a l p h y s i c a l a c t i v i t y o f i t s proponents  t h a t i s seen  t o be the major b a r r i e r t o change i n the country. He  argued  t h a t conservatism would be a b a r r i e r t o change not because i t s f o l l o w e r s cannot  accept any k i n d of change, but because  the k i n d of change which they w i l l accept must be  "...slow  and t i g h t l y c o n t r o l l e d by e s t a b l i s h e d a u t h o r i t y , based and order, and conform t o p r e v a i l i n g  on  law  orthodoxies...".22  Cohen's i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s are i n t e r e s t i n g because they once again i n c o r p o r a t e almost a l l of C o l t o n ' s arguments w i t h i n them. Because of the h i s t o r i c a l approach he takes t o the a n a l y s i s of S o v i e t reform, Cohen has viewed the c o n s e r v a t i v e a s p e c t s of Brezhnevism as o n l y e x t e n s i o n s of what has always been the s i t u a t i o n i n the country i . e . , the presence o f wide-ranging  c o n s e r v a t i v e impulse. S i m i l a r l y , h i s  use of the term conservatism t o d e s c r i b e the b a r r i e r s t o change w i t h i n the country i s understandable  because of h i s  need t o somewhow d e f i n e the c o n s e r v a t i v e i n t e r e s t s which appear t o have always e x i s t e d a t a l l l e v e l s of the c o u n t r y . In c o n c l u s i o n , Cohen and C o l t o n once again cover  similar  s u b j e c t m a t e r i a l , but because o f d i f f e r e n t p e r s p e c t i v e s and emphases, they have used d i f f e r e n t terminology t o analyze i t . Critique  67 One  can  begin t h i s c r i t i q u e by n o t i n g  t h a t the amount  of consensus among the t h r e e s c h o l a r s with r e g a r d s t o  the  endemic b a r r i e r s t o change w i t h i n S o v i e t s o c i e t y i s a good i n d i c a t i o n of the e f f i c a c y of t h e i r arguments. There can l i t t l e doubt t h a t a number of i n c i d e n t s i n the past  --  I n c l u d i n g the ravages of r e v o l u t i o n , a bloody c i v i l  war,  the d i r e c t , d e v a s t a t i n g played  e f f e c t s of two  and  s o c i a l change. The  nature of the m i d d l e - t o - o l d e r  generations  c e r t a i n l y r e f l e c t t h i s f a c t . One range of p e r s o n a l  w i t h i n the  stability  i n t e r v i e w s with S o v i e t c i t i z e n s and  even hardship  a deeply i n g r a i n e d  the c e n t r i f u g a l f o r c e s t h a t tug at the of t h e i r vast state."23 Although  i t would seem t h a t the prospect  economic and  s o c i a l change (and  of  fear unity  the  s t r e n g t h of t h i s a v e r s i o n t o change i s i m p o s s i b l e  reaching  country  very r e l e v a n t today. He concluded t h a t  of anarchy and  quantify,  and  author, working from a wide  "...Russians have t r a d i t i o n a l l y had  and  side  character  prominent d i s s i d e n t s , found t h a t many of these past were s t i l l  and  world wars -- have  a r o l e i n s e n s i t i z i n g the S o v i e t people t o the  e f f e c t s of p o l i t i c a l  be  to  political,  e s p e c i a l l y r a p i d and  change) does not have a huge c o n s t i t u e n c y  far  within  Soviet society. The  most c r i t i c a l q u e s t i o n  t o analyze here, however, i  the nature of the b a r r i e r t o change played  by  elite  i n t e r e s t s . P i p e s ' arguments were the most extreme on t o p i c , and  yet he appears to be unable to  this  convincingly  68 j u s t i f y h i s views. To begin with,  his character  p o r t r a i t of  the e l i t e i s made without t h e b e n e f i t o f a great amount o f evidence. Pipes l a y s no f a c t u a l foundation  f o r such  a d j e c t i v e s as "greedy, s e l f - i n t e r e s t e d and power-hungry". H i s only r e a l source i s t h e w r i t i n g o f one S o v i e t emigre, an i n d i v i d u a l who no doubt had l i t t l e reason t o f e e l g r a t e f u l towards t h e S o v i e t e l i t e . 2 4 P i p e s t h e r e f o r e g i v e s no r e a l evidence t h a t such d e s c r i p t i o n s are a c c u r a t e of the c h a r a c t e r If Pipes' questionable,  representations  o f an average member o f t h e S o v i e t i n d i v i d u a l character  elite.  p o r t r a i t s are  then t h e f a c t t h a t he uses them as t h e b a s i s  f o r g e n e r a l i z a t i o n s about the e n t i r e membership o f the Communist P a r t y and t h e e l i t e i s even more suspect.  Pipes  assumes an almost complete homogeneity o f views and c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s throughout t h e e l i t e and t h e l e a d e r s h i p  that  i s h i s t o r i c a l l y and l o g i c a l l y unfounded. I t i s f i r s t o f a l l u n l i k e l y t h a t i n a Party with m i l l i o n s o f i n d i v i d u a l s i n p o s i t i o n s o f power and p r i v i l e g e t h a t a l l o f them would have such narrowly d e f i n e d  p e r s o n a l i t y t r a i t s and i n t e r e s t s . I f  such were the case nothing country because t h e P a r t y  c o u l d be accomplished i n the i s concerned with most o f t h e  day-to-day f u n c t i o n i n g o f s o c i e t y . As w e l l , i t has a l r e a d y been shown t h a t h i s t o r i c a l l y t h e r e have been d i v i s i o n s even w i t h i n t h e top echelons o f t h e l e a d e r s h i p which r e f l e c t , a t the minimum, d i v e r g i n g i n t e r e s t s and g o a l s . There can c e r t a i n l y be no doubt t h a t although the views o f K i r o v ,  69 Voznesensky, Khrushchev and Kosygin were not n e c e s s a r i l y r a d i c a l i n nature, they were s u f f i c i e n t l y d i f f e r e n t from those o f t h e i r c o l l e a g u e s  t o demonstrate t h a t e l i t e and  l e a d e r s h i p homogeneity has not been the case i n t h e S o v i e t Union. I f anything,  the reform programs o f the l a t t e r two  I n d i v i d u a l s were i n d i c a t i v e o f a concern f o r t h e i n t e r e s t s o f the p o p u l a t i o n ,  thus c h a l l e n g i n g P i p e s ' b a s i c  character  p o r t r a i t o f t h e e l i t e and t h e l e a d e r s h i p . These arguments a r e not meant t o make l i g h t o f the problems w i t h i n t h e P a r t y , and e s p e c i a l l y o f t h e widespread c o r r u p t i o n among Party o f f i c i a l s .  I t has been w e l l documented  t h a t such c o r r u p t i o n e x i s t s and i s a s e r i o u s problem. The o b j e c t here i s t o d i s p u t e P i p e s ' c l a i m s o f an almost complete homogeneity o f i n t e r e s t s among t h e S o v i e t e l i t e . Such a view, i f substantiated,  would mean t h a t t h e b a t t l e f o r change i n  the country has a l r e a d y been i r r e t r i e v a b l y l o s t because o f the fundamental b a r r i e r t h a t i s being illegimate  played  by a completely  leadership.  Even more suspect  than P i p e s ' d e s c r i p t i o n o f t h e e l i t e  i s the r e l a t i o n s h i p which he sees between i t s i n t e r e s t s and the negative  r o l e which they p l a y i n t h e reform process. H i s  b a s i c argument appears t o be t h a t because there has y e t t o be s u c c e s s f u l "reform from above", t h e e l i t e must be a c t i v e l y impeding such attempts a t change and should  therefore  receive  the l i o n ' s share o f t h e blame f o r t h i s l a c k o f success. again,  however, such an assumption i s much too general  Once and i s  70 flawed  i n a number of p l a c e s . H i s t o r i c a l l y we  have seen  t h a t although the dominant i n t e r e s t s i n the e l i t e have u s u a l l y been a g a i n s t change, t h e r e have been those i n favour of a l t e r i n g the s t a t u s quo.  Indeed, i n s t e a d of  r e s i s t i n g change, the reform  actively  programs of both Khrushchev  Kosygin were more i n d i c a t i v e of a l e a d e r s h i p  (or at l e a s t a  p o r t i o n of i t ) a c t i v e l y i n v o l v e d i n promoting change. r e c o r d of S o v i e t domestic p o l i t i c s s i n c e S t a l i n has caused one  and  The  even  prominent American S o v i e t o l o g i s t t o argue t h a t a  " p o s t - S t a l i n consensus" has subsequent a d m i n i s t r a t i o n s  developed both w i t h i n and  between  i n which " . . . t h e r e has been  r e l a t i v e l y broad agreement among the S o v i e t p o l i t i c a l  elite  that "post-Stalinism" requires continuing attention to consumer s a t i s f a c t i o n and  welfare."25 At l e a s t  since  S t a l i n , then, i t would appear t h a t P i p e s ' view of a unanimous l e a d e r s h i p which i s a c t i v e l y f i g h t i n g t o prevent any  kind  of  changes has been i n c o r r e c t . P i p e s a l s o f a i l s t o mention a number of other f a c t o r s p a r t i a l l y r e s p o n s i b l e f o r the f a i l u r e of reform not n e c e s s a r i l y the f a u l t of the l e a d e r s h i p . For although he emphasizes the general  population's  which were instance, f e a r of  a i d e - e f f e c t s of domestic change, he does not r e c o g n i z e  the this  emotion w i t h i n the S o v i e t e l i t e . T h i s p h i l o s o p h i c a l and a t t i t u d i n a l " g u l f " he sees between these groups i s somewhat illogical  i n t h a t the i n d i v i d u a l s on both s i d e s have s i m i l a r  c u l t u r a l and  developmental backgrounds. Again, the argument  71 here i s not t h a t p e r s o n a l ambition and power a r e not m o t i v a t i n g f a c t o r s f o r the e l i t e -  Rather, i t i s t h a t some o f  these s o c i e t a l and c u l t u r a l f e a r s o f change do a l s o e x i s t a t t h i s l e v e l and t h e r e f o r e cannot h e l p but a f f e c t the speed and u l t i m a t e scope of the changes which a r e attempted. S i m i l a r l y , P i p e s ' view o f the S o v i e t e l i t e as the fundamental b a r r i e r t o change w i t h i n the country Ignores the b a r r i e r t o change which the c o u n t r y ' s p o l i t i c a l and governmental bureaucracy has p l a y e d . Already mentioned p r e v i o u s l y as a cause o f a number o f the p o l i t i c a l  problems  i n the country,26 i t may p l a y an even more s i g n i f i c a n t r o l e as a b a r r i e r t o any k i n d o f p o l i c y change. Bureaucracy, and the "red t a p e " t h a t i t generates, has been a b a r r i e r t o e f f e c t i v e government i n a l l Western democracies by the way i n which i t slows down or even i n h i b i t s a l t o g e t h e r t h e s u c c e s s f u l implementation o f p o l i c y changes aimed a t r e s o l v i n g s o c i a l problems. There i s no reason t o b e l i e v e t h a t i t does not p l a y a s i m i l a r r o l e i n the S o v i e t Union. Indeed, the  s i z e and e x t e n t o f the p o l i t i c a l  and governmental  bureaucracy i n the U.S.S.R. i s such t h a t i t i s o f t e n the  beyond  c o n t r o l o f the l e a d e r s h i p i t s e l f , as was seen by i t s r o l e  i n h e l p i n g t o sabotage even the minimal reforms of the Brezhnev era.27 i t i s t r u e , o f c o u r s e , t h a t i t i s i n d i v i d u a l s who make up the bureaucracy. At the same time, however, t h e i n e r t i a which i s oftened generated by a l a r g e bureaucracy may i t s e l f be more t o blame f o r p o l i c y  stagnation  72 than the i n d i v i d u a l s who comprise i t . I t would t h e r e f o r e seem t h a t although  the l e a d e r s h i p  has been g e n e r a l l y c o n s e r v a t i v e i n the p a s t , i t has a l s o been more heterogeneous i n i t s make-up than P i p e s would have us b e l i e v e . T h i s f a c t makes the b a s i c arguments of C o l t o n and Cohen more a t t r a c t i v e . Both, a f t e r a l l , r e c o g n i z e d a v a r i e t y of  i n t e r e s t s w i t h i n the l e a d e r s h i p and the e l i t e . What  still  must be analyzed, however, are the d i f f e r e n c e s between  these  two s c h o l a r s over the nature of the c o n s e r v a t i v e  interests  w i t h i n the e l i t e . To repeat the p o i n t o f c o n t e n t i o n , i t i s whether the s p e c i f i c conservatism  among the e l i t e which w i l l  impede change has grown p r i m a r i l y out of the Brezhnev i  a d m i n i s t r a t i o n ' s s t y l e and approach t o government, or whether t h i s conservatism  i s the e x t e n s i o n of a c o n s e r v a t i v e  impulse  t h a t has h i s t o r i c a l l y pervaded the e l i t e and t r a d i t i o n a l l y dominated the e n t i r e  country.  In terms of a s s e s s i n g these arguments, we are f a c e d with a s i m i l a r dilemma as the one i n the p r e v i o u s chapter, i n t h a t our b a s i c l a c k o f f a c t u a l i n f o r m a t i o n about the i n t e r n a l politics  of the S o v i e t Union renders a d e f i n i t i v e " r i g h t or  wrong" answer i m p o s s i b l e a t t h i s time. L o g i c , of course, and even a p a s s i n g knowledge of S o v i e t p o l i t i c a l t h a t both  h i s t o r y show  i n d i v i d u a l s ' arguments have been c o r r e c t . As a  r e s u l t , an e x t e n s i v e l i s t of the h i s t o r i c a l examples o f political  conservatism  i n the country  i s not needed t o  s u b s t a n t i a t e these views. Both arguments do have t h e i r  73 p a r t i c u l a r strengths  and weaknesses, however. C o l t o n , f o r  example, by c o n c e n t r a t i n g  h i s arguments on the contemporary  sources of these c o n s e r v a t i v e provided  i n t e r e s t s among the e l i t e , has  evidence t h a t i s c o n v i n c i n g  because i t can be e a s i l y  i n v e s t i g a t e d and a n a l y z e d . The legacy  o f the Brezhnev regime  i s q u i t e apparent, and i t s e f f e c t s w i l l be p a r t i c u l a r l y r e l e v a n t as a new l e a d e r s h i p attempts t o address i t s domestic problems. At the same time, by emphasizing the most r e c e n t sources o f t h i s conservatism, C o l t o n ' s kind o f h i s t o r i c a l p e r s p e c t i v e  arguments l a c k the  t h a t i s necessary t o  understand the reasons f o r t h i s conservatism not only among the e l i t e , but a t the lower l e v e l s o f S o v i e t p o l i t i c s and s o c i e t y as w e l l . T h i s l a t t e r p o i n t i s one o f the most a t t r a c t i v e a s p e c t s of Cohen's arguments. H i s use o f a broad, h i s t o r i c a l  l e v e l of  a n a l y s i s has allowed him t o capture many o f the fundamental r o o t s of e l i t e conservatism. S i m i l a r l y , i t i s d i f f i c u l t t o c r i t i c i z e h i s arguments because when S o v i e t reform i s looked a t from a h i s t o r i c a l p e r s p e c t i v e , always been c o n s e r v a t i v e  there do appear t o have  and r e f o r m i s t f o r c e s i n v o l v e d ,  with  the former u s u a l l y dominant. At the same time, Cohen's use of the term conservatism t o d e s c r i b e the main b a r r i e r t o change could become somewhat problematic. greater  d e t a i l i n the next chapter,  of o r g a n i z a t i o n  As w i l l be shown i n t h i s term i m p l i e s a sense  and i d e o l o g i c a l / p o l i t i c a l  u n i t y t h a t does not  always c h a r a c t e r i z e the i n t e r e s t s o f those among t h e e l i t e  74 who  might oppose change. There are many d i f f e r e n t reasons f o r  r e s i s t i n g change -- i . e . , p e r s o n a l , p r o f e s s i o n a l , i n s t i t u t i o n a l , bureaucratic, p o l i t i c a l , 2 8 -- and w i t h i n one  general  than good. One  i d e o l o g i c a l and  t o attempt t o i n c o r p o r a t e them a l l d e f i n i t i o n may  do more a n a l y t i c a l harm  runs the r i s k of s i m p l i f y i n g the  motives behind these i n t e r e s t s and of e l i t e i n t e r e s t s t h a t may  different  thus p r o v i d i n g a p i c t u r e  not be e n t i r e l y a c c u r a t e  .As  w e l l , by emphasizing the h i s t o r i c a l c o n t i n u i t i e s w i t h i n i n t e r e s t s , one  might miss a l t o g e t h e r the p o s s i b i l i t y  contemporary changes -- w i t h i n S o v i e t s o c i e t y , the e l i t e , and  the world as a whole -- may  developing  e l i t e , but  of the i n t e r e s t s themselves. In c o n c l u s i o n ,  Cohen's i n t e p r e t a t i o n s and  only  the while  arguments do seem to have a good  deal of e f f i c a c y , h i s a n a l y t i c a l p e r s p e c t i v e and terminology  that  have a f f e c t e d not  the d i s t r i b u t i o n of i n t e r e s t s among the new composition  these  the  which he employs w i t h i n i t have the p o t e n t i a l to  become problematic  i n the near f u t u r e .  75 Endnotes 1. R i c h a r d P i p e s , "Can the S o v i e t Union Reform?" A f f a i r s , V o l . 64, No. 1, ( F a l l 1984), p. 50 2. Richard P i p e s , S u r v i v a l i s Not Enough (New and Schuster, 1984), p. 30  Foreign  York: Simon  3. P i p e s , S u r v i v a l , p. 45 4. P i p e s , S u r v i v a l , p. 46 5. P i p e s , Reform?, p. 50 6. P i p e s , S u r v i v a l , p. 137 7. P i p e s , S u r v i v a l , p. 51 8. Timothy J . C o l t o n , The Dilemma of Reform i n the S o v i e t Union (New York: C o u n c i l on F o r e i g n R e l a t i o n s , Inc., 1984), pp. 59-60 9. C o l t o n , p. 63 10. C o l t o n , p. 16 11. C o l t o n , p. 76 12. C o l t o n , p. 75 13. C o l t o n ,  p.49  14. C o l t o n , p. 76 15. C o l t o n , p. 75 16. Stephen F. Cohen, R e t h i n k i n g the S o v i e t Experience (London: Oxford U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s , 1985), p. 147 17. Cohen, P- 147 18. Cohen, P- 133 19. Cohen, P- 147 20. Cohen, p. 146 21. See chapter one, pp. 9-12 22. Cohen, p.  132  and chapter two, pp. 29-32  76 23.  Hedrick Smith, The Russians (New York: The New York Times Book Co., 1976), pp. 333-340. The quote i s from p. 333  24. P i p e s , S u r v i v a l . pp. 47-4S. The author i s Michael Voalenskl1. 25.  S.  George W. B r e s l a u e r , " P o l i t i c a l Succession and t h e S o v i e t P o l i c y Agenda", Problems o f Communism. 29, 3, (May-June, 1980), p. 44  26. See chapter  one, pp. 20-21  27. A b r i e f but e f f e c t i v e examination o f t h e reasons f o r the f a i l u r e of these reforms can be found i n S t a n l e y Rothman and George B r e s l a u e r , S o v i e t P o l i t i c s and S o c i e t y (New York: West P u b l i s h i n g Co., 1978), pp. 242-244 28.  The a r r a y o f i n t e r e s t s , be they p o l i t i c a l , b u r e a u c r a t i c or s o c i a l , has been the s u b j e c t o f many books and a r t i c l e s . Two examples i n c l u d e t h e seminal work o f H. Gordon S k i l l i n g and Franklyn G r i f f i t h s , eds. I n t e r e s t Groups i n S o v i e t P o l i t i c s ( P r i n c e t o n : P r i n c e t o n U n i v e r s i t y Press, 1971), and a chapter i n Rothman and B r e s l a u e r , pp. 208-225  77 Chapter  Four  The new S o v i e t domestic reform program M i k h a i l Gorbachev has been the General S e c r e t a r y o f the Communist P a r t y o f the S o v i e t Union f o r almost t h r e e y e a r s . During t h i s time, he and h i s c o l l e a g u e s i n t h e P o l i t b u r o have both proposed  and i n i t i a t e d a wide range o f reforms and  changes under the g e n e r a l headings o f g l a a n o s t and p e r e s t r o i k a still  (openness)  ( r e s t r u c t u r i n g ) . Although i t i s o b v i o u s l y  t o o e a r l y t o e v a l u a t e what the u l t i m a t e s i g n i f i c a n c e  and success o f these reforms w i l l be, i t i s a l r e a d y p o s s i b l e to  observe and a n a l y z e the v a r i o u s components o f the reform  process i n the c o u n t r y . The purpose  o f t h i s chapter  will  t h e r e f o r e be t o examine some o f these domestic changes t o d i s c o v e r how w e l l they can be i n c o r p o r a t e d i n t o the reform frameworks which were analyzed i n the the p r e v i o u s c h a p t e r s . A complete  a n a l y s i s o f Gorbachev's reform program  would, because o f i t s widespread  e f f e c t s , have t o be both  e x c e e d i n g l y lengthy and d e t a i l e d . Because t h a t degree o f a n a l y s i s i s beyond the scope o f t h i s t h e s i s , I w i l l  instead  c o n c e n t r a t e on two f a i r l y s p e c i f i c areas t h a t h o p e f u l l y w i l l serve as case s t u d i e s r e p r e s e n t a t i v e o f the nature and degree of  the changes t h a t a r e going on i n the c o u n t r y . These two  areas a r e the economic reform program r e c e n t l y put forward by the new S o v i e t l e a d e r s h i p and t h e r e - e v a l u a t i o n o f S o v i e t h i s t o r y , and i n p a r t i c u l a r the S t a l i n e r a , t h a t appears t o be going on r i g h t now among the e l i t e .  78 The framework f o r comparative  a n a l y s i s that, w i l l  used here i s s i m i l a r t o the one t h a t was  be  employed i n the  f i r s t t h r e e c h a p t e r s . Each case study w i l l  analyze the kind  of change r e p r e s e n t e d by the reforms and the f o r c e s and f a c t o r s which are a p p a r e n t l y s u p p o r t i n g and r e t a r d i n g  these  changes. The e f f i c a c y of a p a r t i c u l a r author's viewpoint be determined  by how  will  c l e a r l y and s u b s t a n t i a l l y i t can e x p l a i n  what i s going on i n the p a r t i c u l a r s u b j e c t area. Obviously some of the events surrounding the reforms w i l l  p r o v i d e more  s u b s t a n t i a l j u s t i f i c a t i o n or r e f u t a t i o n o f the authors' views than o t h e r s w i l l . Because of t h i s , my  conclusions w i l l  be  d i v i d e d i n t o those which can be made with a f a i r degree of c e r t a i n t y and those which are more open t o i n t e r p r e t a t i o n . An attempt  w i l l be made t o e l a b o r a t e f u r t h e r upon these  a n a l y s e s t o help determine  last  even more c l e a r l y which authors'  views appear t o be more a p p l i c a b l e now  and why  t h i s i s so.  The Economic Reform Program A.  The Degree and Character of the Changes The s e r i e s of reforms which have been proposed  new  S o v i e t l e a d e r s h i p r e f l e c t an attempt  by  t o i n j e c t new  the energy  and v i t a l i t y i n t o a badly sagging economy. I n c o r p o r a t i n g aspects of d e c e n t r a l i z a t i o n , market reform and r e s t r u c t u r i n g , the reforms themselves  economic  appear t o be aimed  d i r e c t l y a t some of the c o u n t r y ' s more s e r i o u s economic problems with the hope t h a t t a n g i b l e r e s u l t s w i l l r e l a t i v e l y q u i c k l y . Rather  be  seen  than simply l i s t i n g these changes.  79 I will  i n s t e a d compare the k i n d of change which they  r e p r e s e n t with t h a t which was i n t h i s study as a way  expected by the t h r e e s c h o l a r s  of i n t r o d u c i n g the nature and  substance of the reforms themselves. One t h a t the scope of the proposed  can begin by s a y i n g  economic reforms  indicates  t h a t we are d e a l i n g with moderate change here, as opposed t o t h a t which i s e i t h e r minimal  or r a d i c a l and systemic.1  At  a very g e n e r a l l e v e l , f o r example, i t i s not the e n t i r e S o v i e t economy t h a t w i l l be a f f e c t e d by these changes. The plana c a l l f o r s i x t y percent of S o v i e t i n d u s t r y t o be converted t o the s e l f - f i n a n c i n g and s e l f - a c c o u n t i n g system  by  January of 1988.2 while t h i s i s not an i n s i g n i f i c a n t move by any means, i t i s s t i l l  not as r a d i c a l a reform as would  have been expected i n P i p e s ' c o n c e p t i o n of change. More s p e c i f i c a l l y , one of the major components of the reform program i t s e l f -- a l s o demonstrates  -- the r e c e n t l y passed E n t e r p r i s e Law the moderate scope of these  changes.3 Many of the changes which t h i s law  institutes  do r e p r e s e n t s i g n i f i c a n t departures from past S o v i e t p r a c t i c e s . The e n t e r p r i s e s which are a f f e c t e d by i t s s t a t u t e s , f o r example, w i l l  i n the near f u t u r e r e c e i v e a good  d e a l more autonomy i n s e t t i n g t h e i r own  quotas than has been  the case i n the p a s t . The employees of these companies are a l s o expected t o r e c e i v e a number of new  rights  and  i n c e n t i v e s . The most s i g n i f i c a n t appears t o the d i r e c t v o i c e which they w i l l have i n the decision-making process of each  80  e n t e r p r i s e , a v o i c e which seems d e s t i n e d of t h e i r new  to be heard because  m a j o r i t y r e p r e s e n t a t i o n on each e n t e r p r i s e ' s  c o n t r o l l i n g "general  assembly" (a body which i t s e l f w i l l f o r  the f i r s t time be e l e c t e d by s e c r e t b a l l o t ) -  The p o t e n t i a l l y  r a d i c a l e f f e c t s of these changes are l i m i t e d , however, because some of the t r a d i t i o n a l " c o n t r o l s from above" w i l l remain i n p l a c e . The must s t i l l  top management p o s i t i o n s , f o r example,  be approved by the governmental branch m i n i s t r y  i t s e l f . More Importantly, is  still  the e n t e r p r i s e Party  organization  expected t o be i n v o l v e d as a d i r e c t i n g and  guiding  f o r c e from above. As a r e s u l t , while these reforms w i l l s i g n i f i c a n t l y a f f e c t many areas of the S o v i e t economy, they do not go as f a r i n " m a r k e t i z i n g expected i f they were r a d i c a l The  the economy" as would  be  changes.  f a c t t h a t some aspects  of the new  reform  program  are expected t o be implemented g r a d u a l l y w i l l a l s o serve limit  t h e i r p o t e n t i a l e f f e c t s . Changes i n the kind of work  which i s a v a i l a b l e and two  to  the e l i m i n a t i o n of food s u b s i d i e s  necessary components of the general  "shift  i n emphasis"  from the a g r o - i n d u s t r i a l s e c t o r t o the s e r v i c e s e c t o r -be c l o s e l y c o n t r o l l e d and  --  will  monitored by the Party over an  extended p e r i o d of time. In the case of the former, f o r example, an e x t e n s i v e  worker r e l o c a t i o n program i s expected  to be i n s t i t u t e d by the Party t o deal with such problems as l a y o f f s and/or the i n a b i l i t y  of some workers to f i n d  employment amid the economic changes. The  deregulation  new of  81 food p r i c e s i s i t s e l f expected t o be phased  i n gradually to  allow the g e n e r a l p u b l i c time t o a d j u s t . ^ The p o i n t here i s not t o use the r e l a t i v e speed of implementation  of the  changes as a c r i t e r i o n f o r judging whether they are r a d i c a l or not. Instead, i t i s t o s t r e s s t h a t these reforms are being i n s t i t u t e d g r a d u a l l y because complete  the Party wants t o r e t a i n  c o n t r o l over a l l a s p e c t s of the changes and  e s p e c i a l l y over how e f f e c t s are f e l t .  f a r they go and how  strongly their  side-  I t i s t h e r e f o r e the i n h e r e n t c a u t i o n of  the reforms themselves which i s another i n d i c a t i o n of t h e i r moderate n a t u r e . A somewhat d i f f e r e n t i n d i c a t i o n of the moderate nature of these reforms can be seen from the S o v i e t l e a d e r s h i p ' s pronouncements c o n c e r n i n g why  the changes have been  formulated and what t h e i r g o a l s a r e . Gorbachev has a t times used the s t r o n g e s t of terms t o d e s c r i b e both the s e v e r i t y of the c o u n t r y ' s economic problems and the kind of change which he f e e l s i s needed t o r e s o l v e them (the need f o r " r a d i c a l fundamental  change" t h a t w i l l b r i n g about a "profound  t r a n s f o r m a t i o n of the economic mechanism and the e n t i r e management system").5  A c l o s e r look, however, a t what he  c o n s i d e r s t o be the l i m i t s of the "ends and means" of these economic reforms i l l u s t r a t e s t h a t the k i n d of systemic change d e s c r i b e d i n P i p e s ' reform framework i s not e n v i s i o n e d here. There have a p p a r e n t l y been very d e f i n i t e l i m i t s s e t with r e s p e c t t o both the methodology and content of the  82 economic reform program. Gorbachev, i n a speech f o l l o w i n g the June 1987 plenum o f the C e n t r a l Committee,  specifically  pointed out: There were some people who suggested t h i n g s t h a t went beyond the borders of our system, i n p a r t i c u l a r , t h a t we should remove the instruments o f the planned economy. We d i d not accept t h i s , nor w i l l we ever accept i t , s i n c e i t i s our i n t e n t i o n t o strengthen s o c i a l i s m , not t o r e p l a c e i t with another system.^ Although one would not expect Gorbachev t o admit t o the f a i l u r e o f the s o c i a l i s t system, i t appears t h a t the changes themselves a r e not expected t o i n c l u d e a complete r e c o n s t r u c t i o n o f an " i r r e p a r a b l y damaged system". Instead, " r a d i c a l change" i s understood t o r e f e r t o the s i g n i f i c a n c e of the changes t h a t w i l l , w i t h i n the framework o f the e x i s t i n g system, overcome these problems. These i d e a s were made c l e a r e r i n Gorbachev's r e c e n t speech commemorating the s e v e n t i e t h a n n i v e r s a r y o f the B o l s h e v i k r e v o l u t i o n when he d e s c r i b e d the u l t i m a t e g o a l s o f the economic reform program to be t h e c r e a t i o n o f an economic system which would be "...an optimum combination o f c e n t r a l i z a t i o n and self-management."7 As a r e s u l t , the r a d i c a l d e c e n t r a l i z a t i o n which Pipes d e s c r i b e d i n h i s reform framework has f a i l e d t o occur because i t i s does not appear t o be one o f the g o a l s o f the reforms. F i n a l l y , some o f the g e n e r a l c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s o f the reforms themselves a r e s i m i l a r t o the kind o f moderate changes which both C o l t o n and Cohen expected. These proposed  S3 economic changes, f o r example, c o n t a i n a number of a s p e c t s which are s i m i l a r t o those i n L e n i n ' s N.E.P., and Gorbachev did  spend a good deal of time i n h i s r e c e n t speech comparing  the  s t r u c t u r e and s i g n i f i c a n c e o f these new reforms t o the  ones which were made by Lenin i n the e a r l y 1920s.& These are  the k i n d s o f s t r u c t u r a l changes which Cohen f e l t  would  c h a r a c t e r i z e any new S o v i e t economic reform program. At the same time, the changes a l s o appear t o r e p r e s e n t the k i n d of "compromise  reforms" which Colton had expected t o a c t  d i r e c t l y upon some o f the c o u n t r y ' s more s e r i o u s economic problems. The E n t e r p r i s e Law,  f o r example, appears d e s t i n e d  to have i t s g r e a t e s t e f f e c t s on two or the more s e r i o u s problem areas of the S o v i e t economy -- the farm s e c t o r and the  non-food consumer goods s e c t o r . 9 S i m i l a r l y , a  s i g n i f i c a n t reason f o r a l l o f the reforms appears t o have been t o g i v e employees b e t t e r work i n c e n t i v e s i n the hope that t h i s w i l l  i n c r e a s e the q u a l i t y o f p r o d u c t i o n and  decrease a number of the labour d i s c i p l i n e problems w i t h i n the  c o u n t r y . Reforms of t h i s c h a r a c t e r i n d i c a t e t h a t  grandiose reform schemes or more c a u t i o u s " t i n k e r i n g " with the  system have been eschewed  changes t h a t w i l l the  i n f a v o r of more moderate  h o p e f u l l y have quick, observable e f f e c t s on  problem areas o f the economy. As one s o v i e t o l o g i s t has  r e c e n t l y concluded: ...the b a s i c o b j e c t i v e o f crlaanost and p e r s t r o i k a i s not t o dismantle the one-Party S o v i e t s t a t e , but t o improve i t , t o render i t  84 s t r o n g e r , more e f f e c t i v e and more c r e d i b l e i n the eyes of a p o p u l a t i o n no longer w i l l i n g t o t o l e r a t e ...the c o n t r a d i c t i o n s between word and deed.10 T h i s s h o r t i n t r o d u c t i o n t o the new  economic reforms  would seem t o i n d i c a t e t h a t the kind of change which these reforms r e f l e c t i s q u i t e d i f f e r e n t from t h a t expected  by  P i p e s . I t i s s i m u l t a n e o u s l y l e s s r a d i c a l than the k i n d which he expected t o r e s u l t from c r i s i s and more s u b s t a n t i a l he thought was  p o s s i b l e from a c o r r u p t and  than  illegitimate  l e a d e r s h i p . At the same time, the reforms are c l o s e r t o the k i n d of moderate, "within-aystem" changes which were expected by both C o l t o n and Cohen. There are other a s p e c t s of t h i s economic reform program -- i n p a r t i c u l a r the q u e s t i o n of whether the reforms themselves w i l l be s i g n i f i c a n t enough t o be s u c c e s s f u l and,  i f so, how  t h i s w i l l a f f e c t the nature and  c h a r a c t e r of the S o v i e t Union -- t h a t are s t i l l  very much  open t o i n t e r p r e t a t i o n . Because a proper a n a l y s i s of these q u e s t i o n s r e q u i r e s the passage o f time, however, any d i s c u s s i o n of them now  would be pure s p e c u l a t i o n . As a  r e s u l t , i t i s b e t t e r t o l i m i t the a n a l y s i s here t o what has occurred so f a r . With t h i s i n mind, i t i s s a f e t o conclude t h a t the i n i t i a l stages of these economic reforms do  indicate  t h a t they are examples of moderate change. B. F o r c e s and F a c t o r s i n the Reform Process J u s t as I n t e r e s t i n g as the content and scope of the economic reform program i s what the development and p r o g r e s s  85 of the reforms themselves says about the c o n s t i t u e n t p a r t s of the domestic reform process.  In p a r t i c u l a r , i t i s apparent  t h a t a number of the f o r c e s and and  r e t a r d these changes are s i m i l a r to those p r e v i o u s l y  elaborated can be one We  f a c t o r s which both promote  upon by a l l three s c h o l a r s . To begin with,  there  l i t t l e doubt t h a t the c o u n t r y ' s economic problems were  of the l e a d i n g f o r c e s which brought about these changes. have a l r e a d y  seen i n the p r e v i o u s  emphasis Gorbachev has  placed  speeches. T h i s viewpoint was  s e c t i o n how  much  on these problems i n h i s reinforced i n h i s recent  speech  when he q u i t e f r a n k l y concluded t h a t a " b u i l d - u p  of  negative  processes i n the economy...had i n e f f e c t c r e a t e d  a precrisis  situation."11 Even more i n t e r e s t i n g i s the f a c t t h a t a number of  the  causes of these problems which were p r e v i o u s l y emphasized Cohen, Colton  and  P i p e s -- i n p a r t i c u l a r the  by  overcentralized  nature of the S t a l i n i s t economic system -- have come under s p e c i f i c c r i t i c i s m from members of the e l i t e . Gorbachev spoke repeatedly  i n h i s speech about what he c a l l e d the problem of  a " c e n t r a l i z e d command s t r u c t u r e " i n the economy,12 and recently called  Soviet  a number of prominent S o v i e t s c h o l a r s have i n t o question  contemporary r e l e v a n c e  the t h e o r e t i c a l and  of many of the S t a l i n i s t a s p e c t s of  the economy t h a t p e r s i s t to t h i s day.13 N i k o l a i Ryzhkov, P o l i t b u r o member and has  Chairman of the C o u n c i l of M i n i s t e r s ,  even gone so f a r as to conclude t h a t so much of  the  86 c e n t r a l management o f S o v i e t e n t e r p r i s e s i s now f u n c t i o n a l l y obsolete  t h a t minimal reforms can no longer r e s o l v e t h e  problems h e r e . 1  4  These kinds o f statements would appear  t o s i g n i f y t h a t the economic problems themselves have the important r o l e p r o v i d i n g pressure  played  f o r change t h a t a l l  three s c h o l a r s expected. How much pressure  the problems provided  i s open t o  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n i f only because of the l a c k o f d i r e c t information  about the policy-making process i n the c o u n t r y .  I t would seem, however, based on the f a c t t h a t the new l e a d e r s h i p undertook these reforms v o l u n t a r i l y and without pressure  from f u l l  blown domestic c r i s e s , and because the  changes themselves a r e moderate i n scope (both by the standards used i n t h i s paper and a c c o r d i n g means e n v i s i o n e d  t o the ends and  by the l e a d e r s h i p ) , t h a t the economic  problems d i d not play the s i n g u l a r l y important r o l e t h a t P i p e s expected. There i s nothing  t o i n d i c a t e t h a t the new  l e a d e r s h i p was " f o r c e d " t o i n s t i t u t e changes i n the way which he expected they would be. Some o f the b a r r i e r s t o change d i s c u s s e d  by t h e t h r e e  s c h o l a r s have a l s o a r i s e n t o r e t a r d the progress o f the new economic reform program. I t has q u i c k l y become apparent, f o r example, t h a t the general  population  has not u n i v e r s a l l y  embraced e i t h e r the proposed economic reforms or the economic r e s t r u c t u r i n g t h a t i s going along t h i s r e s i s t a n c e apparently  with them.15 Much o f  stems from the f e a r o f change t h a t  8,7 pervades s o c i e t y as a whole. Gorbachev h i m s e l f r e f e r r i n g t o t h i s problem i n speeches and case e x p r e s s i n g  Is c o n s t a n t l y  interviews, i n  a great deal of f r u s t r a t i o n over the  one  fact  t h a t so many of the people i n the S o v i e t Union e i t h e r cannot or w i l l not understand the n e c e s s i t y and  importance of  p e r e a t r o l k a because of t h e i r f e a r of abandoning comfort of e s t a b l i s h e d and i n e f f e c t i v e , methods and  the  accepted, yet i n c r e a s i n g l y  p o l i c i e s . 1 6 That the  leadership  appears t o understand the depth of t h i s " f e a r of change" among the people i s shown by the f a c t t h a t most d i s c u s s i o n s of the economic reforms i n the S o v i e t press have i n c l u d e d assurances to the general  population  about the gradual  i n which the most s i g n i f i c a n t of the changes w i l l  manner  be  i n s t i t u t e d . On the i s s u e of the d e r e g u l a t i o n of food p r i c e s , f o r example, Leonid  A b a l k i n , the D i r e c t o r of the Moscow  I n s t i t u t e of Economics, has emphasized t h a t such changes w i l l only be i n t r o d u c e d  a f t e r a "campaign s p e c i f i c a l l y  with p u b l i c concerns about change."17 These kinds  dealing of  statements show t h a t a l l t h r e e s c h o l a r s were c o r r e c t i n emphasizing the negative  r o l e that s o c i o - c u l t u r a l f a c t o r s  could p l a y i n the reform  process.  The  conservative  r o l e played  by Party and  governmental  bureaucracy -- something emphasized s t r o n g l y by C o l t o n and a l e s s e r extent  to  by Cohen as w e l l -- has a l s o r e c e i v e d a good  deal of a t t e n t i o n i n the pronouncements of the l e a d e r s h i p i n the p r e s s . Most western experts have concluded t h a t  and  this  ss f a c t o r has been the l e a d i n g b a r r i e r i n the e a r l y attempts to r e s t r u c t u r e the economy not o n l y because  the i n d i v i d u a l s  make up the bureaucracy have the most t o f e a r from  who  the  economic r e s t r u c t u r i n g , but a l s o because they are o f t e n i n the best p o s i t i o n -- i . e . , a t the p o i n t of implementation  --  t o a c t i v e l y i n h i b i t the changes themselves.1® T h i s b a r r i e r has a l s o been the one most emphasized  by Gorbachev i n  h i s speeches, a b a r r i e r f e l t t o be so p r o b l e m a t i c t h a t i t has a c t u a l l y become a f o c a l p o i n t f o r a number of the reforms. At h i s most s t r i d e n t , f o r example, he has t a l k e d  about  . . . t e a r i n g up the economic r o o t s of b u r e a u c r a t i z a t i o n . . . the moat e v i l , most dangerous enemy of pereatrolka....We need t o cut down the apparatus....We should only have the people who are r e a l l y needed....Now, I t h i n k , t h e r e are one and a h a l f to two times more people than needed.1^ As a r e s u l t , i t seems t h a t the emphasis p l a c e d by Cohen and C o l t o n on the importance  of bureaucracy was  j u s t i f i e d . At the  same time, the r o l e t h a t t h i s f a c t o r has played c a l l s q u e s t i o n P i p e s ' premature d i s m i s s a l of i t .  Pipes had  into argued  t h a t the e l i t e p u r p o s e f u l l y used the term bureaucracy as an excuse f o r i t s p o l i t i c a l  i n a c t i v i t y , an excuse which covered  up i t s u n w i l l i n g n e s s t o address many of the c o u n t r y ' s domestic problems.  The  i n f o r m a t i o n presented here would seem  t o i n d i c a t e t h a t the bureaucracy i n s t e a d does p l a y a n e g a t i v e r o l e i n impeding  change because of i t s s i z e and  the  d i f f i c u l t y with which p o l i c y changes are implemented i t s channels, and not because  through  i t s members are u n i f o r m l y  89 a g a i n s t any kind o f p o s i t i v e change. While these f o r c e s and f a c t o r s are q u i t e present,  what i s s t i l l  very much open t o i n t e r p r e t a t i o n i s  the r o l e which e l i t e i n t e r e s t s have played and  progress  i n the development  o f these reforms, and e s p e c i a l l y how the  d i f f e r e n t i n t e r e s t s w i t h i n the country t h i s process.  obviously  have been i n v o l v e d i n  There i s ambiguity here because although  views o f these i n t e r e s t s can be almost completely much o f what has occurred incorporated  Pipes'  refuted,  so f a r w i t h i n t h i s area can be  i n t o both Cohen's and C o l t o n ' s  reform  frameworks. There do appear t o e x i s t , f o r example, the kind of s i g n i f i c a n t c o n s t i t u e n c i e s w i t h i n S o v i e t s o c i e t y which Cohen expected. At the same time, the new l e a d e r s h i p , as a whole, seems t o be p r o v i d i n g the main impetus f o r economic change. T h i s , i n t u r n , was expected by C o l t o n . In an attempt to d i s t i n g u i s h which p a r t s o f these s c h o l a r s ' i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s best d e s c r i b e the progress  o f the economic reform  program, a  c l o s e r examination o f the e l i t e i n t e r e s t s , and the r o l e they have played,  i s necessary.  At the l e v e l o f the l e a d e r s h i p there has been considerable  p u b l i c enthusiasm f o r most aspects  economic reforms. Strong  support  o f the new  has come not only from  Gorbachev and Ryzkhov, but a l s o from N i k o l a i Slyunkov, the l e a d i n g economic s p e c i a l i s t on the P o l i t b u r o , 2 0  a n c  j  even  from Yegor Ligachev, the i n d i v i d u a l i n charge o f i d e o l o g y w i t h i n the l e a d e r s h i p . The l a t t e r , seen by many i n the west  90 to represent  a conservative  a l t e r n a t i v e t o Gorbachev i n the  P o l i t b u r o , s t r o n g l y emphasized t h e fundamental s i g n i f i c a n c e of p e r e a t r o i k a  i n general,  and economic reform i n  p a r t i c u l a r , when he s t a t e d t h a t these a r e "not minor, p a r t i c u l a r improvements, but a r a d i c a l change i n t h e way of a c t i n g , a r a d i c a l change i n a l l spheres o f a c t i v i t y . " 2 1 T h i s k i n d o f support i s not i n and o f i t s e l f  that  s u r p r i s i n g due t o the degree of emphasis which every l e a d e r s h i p p l a c e s on p o l i t i c a l u n i f o r m i t y ,  Soviet  and i t should not  be taken t o mean t h a t there has been complete, u n q u a l i f i e d support f o r these reforms a t t h i s l e v e l . There has been a kind of o p p o s i t i o n from w i t h i n the l e a d e r s h i p , but r a t h e r than being focussed  d i r e c t e d a t t h e reforms themselves i t has been  upon some o f the s u p p o r t i n g  a s p e c t s and s i d e e f f e c t  of t h e reform program. V i k t or Chebrlkov and  (the head o f t h e KGB  a member o f the P o l i t b u r o ) has, f o r example, been more  h e s i t a n t than some o f h i s c o l l e a g u e s  i n c r i t i c i z i n g the  S t a l i n i s t elements o f the economy and has i n s t e a d  stressed  the problems which could a r i s e from t h e i n c r e a s e d  l e v e l s of  criticism  t h a t have come t o be a s s o c i a t e d  with the new  economic reforms.22 Llgachev has made s i m i l a r arguments and  has been p a r t i c u l a r l y concerned about the amount of  s e l f - c r i t i c i s m and negative  r e p o r t i n g t h a t has begun t o  appear i n t h e S o v i e t press.23 As a r e s u l t , although some r e s i s t a n c e among the l e a d e r s h i p i s e v i d e n t ,  the source o f th  disagreements does not seem t o i n v o l v e the more fundamental  91 a s p e c t s of the reforms  themselves.  I t I s , of course, somewhat p r o b l e m a t i c t o r e l y on  the  S o v i e t p r e s s and the l e a d e r s h i p ' s pronouncements f o r a c c u r a t e i n f o r m a t i o n about the extent of the d i f f e r e n c e s w i t h i n the P o l i t b u r o . These are the only r e a l sources which we have f o r such i n f o r m a t i o n , however, so i t must be used, a l b e i t with a good deal of c a u t i o n . What one can say, however, i s t h a t the d i f f e r e n c e s which are observable appear t o be over q l a s n o s t p o r t i o n of the reforms, r a t h e r than over  the the  more s u b s t a n t i v e p e r e a t r o i k a component. There i s , indeed, almost complete p u b l i c unanimity  on the s u b j e c t of the  latter  and p a r t i c u l a r l y on the degree of change which i s necessary, the kind of r e s t r u c t u r i n g t h a t i s needed, and how  significant  both are i n the S o v i e t c o n t e x t . I t does seem t h a t the concerns over the l e v e l s of c r i t i c i s m and the l i m i t s of debate are separate from any problems with the more fundamental aspects of these economic reforms. As a r e s u l t , while q l a s n o s t and p e r e a t r o i k a . as concepts, c l o s e l y i n t e r r e l a t e d , i t appears  are  t h a t i t i s necessary  separate them d u r i n g t h i s a n a l y s i s so as t o avoid  to  conveying  the wrong impression of what e x a c t l y the sources of the d i f f e r e n c e s between the l e a d e r s a r e . With these k i n d s of d i f f e r e n c e s i n mind, i t would seem t h a t R i c h a r d P i p e s ' conception of the l e a d e r s h i p ' s i n t e r e s t s , and the r o l e he expected  them to p l a y , has been  almost  completely r e f u t e d . He had c h a r a c t e r i z e d these i n d i v i d u a l s as  92 being  t o t a l l y c o r r u p t and u n i f i e d i n t h e i r r e s i s t a n c e t o any  kind o f changes which might i n f r i n g e upon t h e i r power and p r i v i l e g e s . In c o n t r a s t t o h i s i n t e r p r e t a t i o n , t h e r e does appear t o be a s i g n i f i c a n t segment w i t h i n the new which i s i n favour  leadership  o f economic change, and what r e s i s t a n c e  has been observable i s not o f t h e c h a r a c t e r  or scope which  Pipes had t h e o r i z e d . Indeed, h i s e n t i r e " c r i s i s / r e f o r m " t h e s i s , i n c l u d i n g the r o l e t h a t the l e a d e r s h i p i s seen t o play i n i t , has t o be c a l l e d  i n t o question  because o f the  moderate nature o f the changes and the a c t i v e r o l e t h a t the l e a d e r s h i p , as a whole, has taken i n promoting them. Cohen's conception  o f the nature and o r g a n i z a t i o n o f  these i n t e r e s t s a l s o appears t o run i n t o some problems i f i t i s used t o d e s c r i b e the contemporary s i t u a t i o n , but they a r e problems with the terminology which he would use t o d e s c r i b e the i n t e r e s t s . I t does not seem, a t l e a s t from what can be seen, t h a t the d i f f e r e n c e s between the new l e a d e r s on the t o p i c o f economic reform a r e s i g n i f i c a n t enough t o i n d i c a t e the kind o f c o n s e r v a t i v e / r e f o r m i s t  d i v i s i o n s w i t h i n the  P o l i t b u r o t h a t Cohen's framework i n c l u d e s . As was shown, the d i f f e r e n c e s appear t o be l i m i t e d t o some o f the s u p p o r t i n g aspects o f t h e new economic reforms. As w e l l , when these c r i t i c i s m s have a r i s e n they a r e o f t e n made a l o n g s i d e  strong  support f o r the b a s i c premises o f the economic reforms, the type o f agreement on the fundamental nature o f the changes t h a t one would not expect from one of Cohen's  93 " c o n s e r v a t i v e s " . The d i f f e r e n c e s over the q l a s n o s t p o r t i o n s o f the reforms a r e undoubtedly own r i g h t  important i n t h e i r  (as w i l l be seen more c l e a r l y i n the next case  s t u d y ) . At the same time, i t a l s o appears t h a t Cohen's use o f the terms conservatism and reformism may not be the b e s t way t o d e s c r i b e t h e reasons f o r these d i f f e r e n c e s . To d e s c r i b e some o f the i n t e r e s t s w i t h i n the l e a d e r s h i p as g e n e r a l l y " c o n s e r v a t i v e " i n nature would a l s o be a problem because they may be p a r t i a l l y a t t r i b u t a b l e t o i n s t i t u t i o n a l p o s i t i o n s and r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s w i t h i n the P o l i t b u r o . Ligachev and Chebrikov, the two persons who a r e g e n e r a l l y c o n s i d e r e d to r e p r e s e n t t h e o p p o s i t i o n t o any changes,  are also the  I n d i v i d u a l s i n charge o f Ideology and s t a t e s e c u r i t y , r e s p e c t i v e l y . As a r e s u l t , an Increase i n t h e g e n e r a l l e v e l s of c r i t i c i s m and/or openness c o u l d r e p r e s e n t more o f a t h r e a t t o t h e i r p a r t i c u l a r i n t e r e s t s than the a c t u a l economic reforms would. These i n d i v i d u a l s do seem t o be n a t u r a l l y more c a u t i o u s and c o n s e r v a t i v e than someone l i k e Gorbachev i s , but t h e i r i n s t i t u t i o n a l r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s may have had some e f f e c t on t h e i r statements. Although Cohen has made h i s d e f i n i t i o n of a c o n s e r v a t i v e broad enough t o take i n t o c o n s i d e r a t i o n these k i n d s o f i n s t i t u t i o n a l i n f l u e n c e s , t o use i t here  might  be m i s l e a d i n g because o f i t s very breadth. Ignored would be the d i f f e r e n t reasons and m o t i v a t i o n s behind these a p p a r e n t l y c o n s e r v a t i v e i n t e r e s t s . As a r e s u l t , the use o f the term c o n s e r v a t i v e t o d e s c r i b e some o f t h e i n t e r e s t s w i t h i n t h e  94  present l e a d e r s h i p would not p r o v i d e a completely a c c u r a t e p i c t u r e o f the nature of the i n t e r e s t s  themselves.  The l a s t f a c t o r which shows t h a t Cohen's d e f i n i t i o n s nay not be the b e s t f o r c h a r a c t e r i z i n g the i n t e r e s t s w i t h i n the l e a d e r s h i p i s the amount o f change t h a t the economic reforms themselves radical  a c t u a l l y r e p r e s e n t . Although l e a s than  i n both t h e i r content and apparent g o a l s , these  reforms s t i l l  demonstrate  S o v i e t p r a c t i c e s . Indeed,  important d e p a r t u r e s from  past  these changes are s i g n i f i c a n t  enough t h a t i t i s d o u b t f u l a P o l i t b u r o fundamentally  divided  between r e f o r m i s t and c o n s e r v a t i v e i n t e r e s t s would have allowed, even through some k i n d o f a " c o a l i t i o n o f i n t e r e s t s " , such reforms t o see the l i g h t o f day. the scope of these changes i s more I n d i c a t i v e o f a  Instead, new  l e a d e r s h i p which i s b a s i c a l l y u n i f i e d i n i t s support f o r economic change. T h i s support does not seem t o be coming only form a " r e f o r m i s t impulse" w i t h i n the P o l i t b u r o . Thus, these arguments r e i n f o r c e the c o n c l u s i o n t h a t although Cohen has o b v i o u s l y been c o r r e c t i n proposing the e x i s t e n c e o f d i f f e r e n t i n t e r e s t s w i t h i n the l e a d e r s h i p , h i s d e f i n i t i o n s o f conservatism and reformism beat way  do not n e c e s s a r i l y r e p r e s e n t the  t o d e s c r i b e e i t h e r them or the r o l e t h a t they are  playing. Cohen's r e b u t t a l t o these arguments would probably s t a t e t h a t what one i s simply s e e i n g here i s the r e f o r m i s t s i n power, with the c o n s e r v a t i v e s w a i t i n g i n the wings t o take  95  over a t some l a t e r date ( i . e . , the way i n which Brezhnev f o l l o w e d Khrushchev). There a r e problems with t h i s argument, however. To begin  with,  the Brezhnev regime appeared t o be  r e a c t i n g t o one man -- i . e . , Khrushchev -- and h i s i n d i v i d u a l p o l i c i e s , p o l i c i e s which i n the l a t e r years o f h i s r u l e were almost u n i l a t e r a l l y developed and implemented without t h e input o f h i s c o l l e a g u e s supporters  i n the Praesidium. Gorbachev and h i s  not only do not seem t o have Khrushchev's degree  of power and c o n t r o l , but the new economic p o l i c i e s have found support  from so much o f t h e l e a d e r s h i p t h a t i t i s hard  to f i n d the kind o f fundamental r e s i s t a n c e t h a t  occurred  during Khrushchev's l a t e r years and which formed t h e b a s i s f o r the Brezhnev regime. S i m i l a r l y , the kind o f support pereatroika  which  has r e c e i v e d does n o t seem t o be o n l y " l i p -  s e r v i c e ' from a cowed c o n s e r v a t i v e  constituency  w i t h i n the  l e a d e r s h i p , but i n s t e a d seems t o be i n d i c a t i v e o f emphatic b e l i e f and i n t e r e s t i n the need f o r economic reform. F i n a l l y , as was mentioned i n t h e p r e v i o u s reforms themselves r e p r e s e n t  paragraph, the economic  such departures  from past  Soviet  p r a c t i c e t h a t i t i s d o u b t f u l they c o u l d have a r i s e n from a c o n s e r v a t i v e / r e f o r m i s t c o a l i t i o n w i t h i n the l e a d e r s h i p . F i n a l l y , , i t appears t h a t C o l t o n ' s conception  o f both  the i n t e r e s t s w i t h i n the l e a d e r s h i p and the r o l e t h a t the l e a d e r s themselves would p l a y i n promoting change has been s t r o n g l y s u b s t a n t i a t e d by the events o f t h i s case study. Without r e p e a t i n g t h e evidence which has been presented  here,  96 it  i s q u i t e c l e a r t h a t we a r e s e e i n g a more dynamic,  "problem-solving o r i e n t e d " new g e n e r a t i o n o f l e a d e r s h i p , one which has p r o v i d e d the main impetus  f o r change. I t a l s o  appears t o be u n i f i e d over one f a c t o r : the need f o r s i g n i f i c a n t , y e t within-system economic changes t h a t  will  d i r e c t l y address some o f the problems w i t h i n the c o u n t r y . The d i f f e r e n c e s among the l e a d e r s a l s o r e f l e c t the k i n d C o l t o n expected i n t h a t they a r e over t h e methodology and means o f implementation o f the reforms. As such, they a r e h i n d e r i n g somewhat t h e p r o g r e s s o f t h e changes without i n t e r f e r i n g with the b a s i c i d e a o f t h e need f o r change. In c o n c l u s i o n , then, C o l t o n ' s c o n c e p t i o n o f the nature and c h a r a c t e r o f t h e new l e a d e r s h i p appears t o have been almost completely s u b s t a n t i a t e d by the events o f t h i s case study. The one event which c h a l l e n g e s these c o n c l u s i o n s i s the B o r i s Y e l t s i n " a f f a i r " . The former Moscow P a r t y boss, who was both an a l t e r n a t e member o f the P o l i t b u r o and one o f the l e a d i n g proponents o f economic reform and p e r e s t r o i k a . was unceremoniously  ousted from h i s high l e v e l p o s i t i o n s i n  November o f 1987 amid mysterious c i r c u m s t a n c e s . The reasons f o r h i s removal  a p p a r e n t l y r e v o l v e around a s c a t h i n g speech  he gave a t a meeting o f the C e n t r a l Committee, a speech i n which he i s rumored t o have s h a r p l y c r i t i z e d not o n l y the pace o f the r e s t r u c t u r i n g p r o c e s s i n g e n e r a l , but a l s o the r o l e s t h a t a number o f s p e c i f i c i n d i v i d u a l s ,  including  Ligachev, Chebrikov and even Gorbachev have p l a y e d i n t h i s  97 slow down.21 These events were seen by many t o be a d i r e c t blow to the cause of reform and a v i c t o r y f o r endemic c o n s e r v a t i v e i n t e r e s t s i n the l e a d e r s h i p and the T h i s , however, may  elite.  not n e c e s s a r i l y be the case. Both  Colton and Cohen, i n t h e i r s e p a r a t e w r i t i n g s , have employed a d e f i n i t i o n of a " r a d i c a l reformer" which may why  help to explain  Y e l t s i n r e c e i v e d the treatment he d i d . R a d i c a l change,  d e f i n e d i n one case as "all-encompassing change c o n t a i n i n g as an e s s e n t i a l component the r e s t r u c t u r i n g o f the c o u n t r y ' s political  i n s t i t u t i o n s and c e n t r a l  myths",25 a y  legitimizing beliefs  be the k i n d of change which Y e l t s i n  m  advocating based on the extremely emotional and nature of h i s a c t i o n s both a t t h a t meeting  and  was rhetorical  and up u n t i l  that  time. Although b a s i c a l l y s u p p o r t i v e of the reforms themselves,  he had been much more outspoken  in his criticism  of the problems which the country f a c e s , the slow pace of the implementation  of these changes, and e s p e c i a l l y of the  o p p o s i t i o n t o these changes r e g a r d l e s s o f where i t manifested i t s e l f . As a r e s u l t , while Y e l t s i n ' s a c t i o n s were probably a g r e a t e r source of concern f o r those i n d i v i d u a l s i n the P o l i t b u r o who  have been more c a u t i o u s i n t h e i r support f o r  economic reform, t h e r e i s a l s o an argument t o be made t h a t Gorbachev and h i s c o l l e a g u e s had l i t t l e c h o i c e but t o expel Y e l t s i n because h i s words and deeds ran counter t o the k i n d of moderate change which the reforms were themselves a t . I f t h i s i s the case then the Y e l t s i n a f f a i r ,  aimed  though  98 undoubtedly  a disappointment f o r those i n the West and i n the  l e a d e r s h i p who were hoping f o r q u i c k changes, important f o r the way  may be more  which i t r e - d e f i n e s the moderate  g o a l s o f the new S o v i e t economic reform program.  Understood  i n t h i s way, i t does not have, t o be seen as i n d i c a t i v e  of a  c o n s e r v a t i v e impulse w i t h i n the l e a d e r s h i p t h a t i s succeeding i n i t s s t r u g g l e t o sabotage these reforms. Below t h e l e v e l o f the l e a d e r s h i p t h e r e has a l s o been noticeable interest  i n the new economic reform program. The  i n t e l l i g e n t s i a has been the the group which has v o i c e d the g r e a t e s t support f o r these changes,  as both S o v i e t and  western r e s e a r c h has shown.26 The s e n s i t i v e nature o f t h i s t o p i c has no doubt l i m i t e d  c r i t i c i s m from members o f  t h i s group, but t h i s r e s e a r c h does show t h a t a s i g n i f i c a n t p o r t i o n o f the i n t e l l i g e n t s i a i s i n f a v o u r o f reform. There has a l s o been c o n s i d e r a b l e r e s i s t a n c e t o these economic changes below the l e v e l o f the l e a d e r s h i p , however. As was mentioned  a t the beginning o f t h i s s e c t i o n , the two  s t r o n g e s t sources o f o p p o s i t i o n t o these reforms appear t o have come from the Party and governmental "rank and f i l e " .  bureaucracy and the  Gorbachev has e l a b o r a t e d s p e c i f i c a l l y upon  both the o r g a n i z a t i o n o f t h i s r e s i s t a n c e and on how i t has a r i s e n . On the l a t t e r s u b j e c t , f o r example, he appeared borrowing from C o l t o n ' s arguments when he s t a t e d : R e s t r u c t u r i n g means not o n l y shaking o f f the s t a g n a t i o n and conservatism o f the preceding p e r i o d and c o r r e c t i n g the mistakes committed.  t o be  99  but a l s o overcoming h i s t o r i c a l l y l i m i t e d and o b s o l e t e f e a t u r e s of s o c i a l o r g a n i z a t i o n and working methods.27 At the same time, Gorbachev has  also talked s p e c i f i c a l l y  a t some length about " c o n s e r v a t i v e  forces" within  and  the  country, f o r c e s which appear t o have s i m i l a r c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s t o the ones t h e o r i z e d by Cohen. He has emphasized: . . . i t would be wrong not t o see a c e r t a i n s t r e n g t h e n i n g of r e s i s t a n c e from c o n s e r v a t i v e f o r c e s who regard r e s t r u c t u r i n g as merely a t h r e a t t o t h e i r own s e l f i s h i n t e r e s t s and aims. T h i s i s o c c u r r i n g not o n l y i n v a r i o u s l e v e l s of a d m i n i s t r a t i o n but i n labour c o l l e c t i v e s as w e l l . Nor can one be i n any doubt t h a t the f o r c e s of conservatism... w i l l not f a i l to e x p l o i t any d i f f i c u l t i e s i n order to attempt t o d i s r u p t r e s t r u c t u r i n g and arouse d i s s a t i s f a c t i o n among the wrong people.28 Where the d i f f e r e n c e s w i t h i n the l e a d e r s h i p appeared t o be over some of the glaanost  a s p e c t s of the  economic reforms, the support and l e v e l s of S o v i e t p o l i t i c s and  new  r e s i s t a n c e a t the  lower  s o c i e t y i n s t e a d seem t o  be  d i r e c t e d s p e c i f i c a l l y at the e f f e c t s of the r e s t r u c t u r i n g i . e . , over p e r e s t r o i k a . As w e l l , the m o t i v a t i o n s  behind  these I n t e r e s t s appear t o be q u i t e v a r i e d . Those i n f a v o r these changes -- s e l e c t e d members of the  intelligentsia  have v o i c e d t h e i r support f o r what appears t o predominantly personal  and  of  be  p r o f e s s i o n a l reasons, reasons  which are q u i t e c o n s i s t e n t with a number o f t h e i r p e r s o n a l i t y c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s . The  f a c t that creative,  I n t e l l e c t u a l p u r s u i t and academla would predispose  in-depth,  academic debate are the t o o l s of many s c h o l a r s to any  changes t h a t  100 might allow them t o i n c r e a s e the acope of t h e i r Because a s c h o l a r ' s personal  and  atudiea.  professional livelihood  r e p u t a t i o n are o f t e n t i e d t o h i s or her  l i n e of academic  i n q u i r y , s t r u c t u r a l reforms which might p r o v i d e research  and  increased  and/or p u b l i c a t i o n o p p o r t u n i t i e s would n a t u r a l l y be  supported by a number of them. In c o n c l u s i o n , i t does seem t h a t s i g n i f i c a n t i n t e r e s t s i n f a v o r of economic reform  do  e x i s t w i t h i n t h i s group, t h a t these i n d i v i d u a l s are p a r t i c u l a r l y i n t e r e s t e d i n the h e l p f u l s i d e - e f f e c t s of economic r e s t r u c t u r i n g , and are heterogeneous i n  t h a t the reasons f o r t h i s  the support  nature.  T h i s c h a r a c t e r i z a t i o n of the support  and  the reasons  f o r i t i s r e i n f o r c e d by Gorbachev's a c t i o n s towards the i n t e l l i g e n t s i a . I t appears t h a t he has both r e c o g n i z e d  and  attempted to take advantage of these k i n d s of i n t e r e s t s w i t h i n t h i s group. Robert Tucker, the emminent American s o v i e t o l o g i s t , has even proposed t h a t Gorbachev has r e c r u i t e d members o f t h i s group t o gain support reforms.29 In support  of such an argument i s the  t h a t Gorbachev has on many o c c a s i o n s  purposely  for his fact  h e l d c l o s e d meetings or  b r i e f i n g s with p a r t i c u l a r groups of s c h o l a r s t o d i s c u s s i n g r e a t e r d e t a i l the l e a d e r s h i p ' s economic reforms.30 A r e s u l t , some of t h i s support i n t e l l i g e n t s i a may encouraged and  f o r economic reform  S  A  amongst the  be more e v i d e n t because i t has been  perhaps even s o l i c i t e d by the new  leadership.  I t has a l s o been q u i t e apparent t h a t the o p p o s i t i o n  to  101 the economic changes among the bureaucracy and the working c l a s s has been d i r e c t e d towards the p e r e s t r o i k a component of  the changes,  as i t i s t h i s r e s t r u c t u r i n g which has the  p o t e n t i a l f o r d e t r i m e n t a l e f f e c t s on these i n d i v i d u a l s . The members o f the bureaucracy a r e r e s i s t i n g because  structural  changes which a r e implemented on t h e b a s i s o f competency and skill  l e v e l would s e r i o u s l y t h r e a t e n t h e i r s e c u r i t y , power  and p r i v i l e g e s . At the same time, workers who a r e suddenly faced with the p r o s p e c t o f unemployment w i l l enthusiasm one hundred  a l s o have  little  f o r such reforms. A r e c e n t l y p u b l i s h e d survey o f commuters on a Moscow subway showed t h a t only  f i f t e e n percent o f them were a c t u a l l y i n f a v o r o f t h e economic r e s t r u c t u r i n g and almost t w o - t h i r d s o f them s a i d they were m a i n t a i n i n g a very "watchful eye" over the changes themselves.31  Although t h i s i n f o r m a t i o n d i d come from a  S o v i e t source, the f a c t t h a t such n e g a t i v e f i g u r e s would be p r i n t e d i n the S o v i e t p r e s s i n d i c a t e s t h a t they might be s i g n i f i c a n t . One can thus see t h a t although t h e r e does e x i s t a s i z a b l e c o n s e r v a t i v e c o n s t i t u e n c y w i t h i n the lower of  S o v i e t s o c i e t y and p o l i t i c s ,  levels  i t s a c t i o n s appear t o be  d i r e c t e d towards the p e r e s t r o i k a component o f the reforms and these a c t i o n s do not appear t o n e c e s s a r i l y be ideologically  motivated.  With these k i n d s o f m o t i v a t i o n s and i n t e r e s t s i n mind, i t would appear t h a t Pipes* views a r e once again not very a p p l i c a b l e . While i n d i v i d u a l members o f the bureaucracy may  102 have some of the p e r s o n a l i t y t r a i t s which he expected,  these  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s are not u n i f o r m l y r e p r e s e n t e d throughout  the  e l i t e , nor i s t h i s r e s i s t a n c e t o change always motivated only by such emotions  as greed and power. S i m i l a r l y , t h e r e appears  to e x i s t more support f o r these changes a t these lower  levels  of S o v i e t p o l i t i c s and s o c i e t y than P i p e s e n v i s i o n e d . A l t o g e t h e r , the r o l e t h a t these v a r i o u s i n t e r e s t s seem to play i n the reform process i s a t odds with many of the b a s i c t e n e t s of h i s " c r i s i s / r e f o r m "  thesis.  Cohen's views o f these i n t e r e s t s , on the other hand, have r e c e i v e d much more s u b s t a n t i a l j u s t i f i c a t i o n from r e c e n t events. There can be l i t t l e doubt t h a t h i s r e f o r m i s t  and  c o n s e r v a t i v e c o n s t i t u e n c i e s do e x i s t w i t h i n the country and t h a t they have the breadth and depth which he expected. These i n t e r e s t s have a l s o had an important e f f e c t on the p r o g r e s s of the economic reforms themselves, both a t the p o i n t of t h e i r implementation  and through the debate which has been  generated w i t h i n the S o v i e t p r e s s . As a r e s u l t , r e f o r m i s t  and  c o n s e r v a t i v e I n t e r e s t s have played the kind of r o l e i n the reform process which Cohen had t h e o r i z e d they would. At the same time, h i s use of the terms reformism and c o n s e r v a t i v i s m to e n s c a p s u l a t e the i n t e r e s t s might once again be somewhat i n n a p r o p r i a t e . There appear t o be so many d i f f e r e n t  reasons  f o r both s u p p o r t i n g and opposing these changes t h a t t o apply such g e n e r a l terms t o them may  s i m p l i f y the t r u e nature of  the i n t e r e s t s a t the lower l e v e l s of S o v i e t p o l i t i c s  and  103 s o c i e t y . S i m i l a r l y , t o imply the e x i s t e n c e of  two  q u a s i - d i s t i n c t groups here g i v e s the impression t h a t i n t e r e s t s are somehow organized around or p o l i t i c a l banners o f "reformism  these  the i d e o l o g i c a l  and/  and c o n s e r v a t i s m " . T h i s  does not appear t o be the case based on the i n f o r m a t i o n provided i n t h i s study. The problem, t h e r e f o r e , i s not with Cohen's b a s i c assumptions terminology and the way  and i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s but with h i s  he would have t o employ i t t o  d e s c r i b e the nature and o r g a n i z a t i o n of the i n t e r e s t s w i t h i n the S o v i e t Union. F i n a l l y , C o l t o n ' s views on the o r g a n i z a t i o n and r o l e of these i n t e r e s t s have a l s o been shown t o be a t l e a s t somewhat c o r r e c t . H i s use of a d i f f e r e n t " l e v e l of a n a l y s i s " meant t h a t he spent l i t t l e time i n v e s t i g a t i n g the i n t e r e s t s below the l e a d e r s h i p , but what he d i d have t o say has been shown t o be c o r r e c t . As expected, the l e a d e r s h i p has provided the impetus f o r the changes even a t t h i s l e v e l , as the  apparent  r e c r u i t m e n t of some segments of the i n t e l l i g e n t s i a has shown. As f o r the r e s i s t a n c e a t t h i s l e v e l , he was  also right  that  the adherence to o l d ways, p o l i c i e s and b e l i e f s would be a s p e c i f i c source of o p p o s i t i o n t o change and an impediment t o the p r o g r e s s of any reforms. The f a c t t h a t C o l t o n f a i l e d deal i n g r e a t e r d e t a i l with the i n t e r e s t s a t these  to  lower  l e v e l s i s u n f o r t u n a t e i n t h a t i t has caused h i s arguments to develop a somewhat "one-sided" nature, one i n which a l l of the emphasis has been p l a c e d on the l e a d e r s h i p . By doing so  104 he has missed the o b v i o u s l y i n t e r e s t s have had  important e f f e c t s which these  on the progress  of the new  economic  reform  program. I I . The r e l n t e r p r e t a t i o n of S t a l i n ' s r o l e i n S o v i e t history The  second aspect  of S o v i e t domestic reform  which w i l l  be used as a case study i s the r e e v a l u a t i o n of S o v i e t h i s t o r y , and  i n p a r t i c u l a r the S t a l i n e r a , t h a t i s now  on w i t h i n the S o v i e t press and  going  leadership. This t o p i c i s  p o t e n t i a l l y even more i n t e r e s t i n g than the p r e v i o u s  one  because i t demonstrates i n g r e a t e r d e t a i l the range of I n t e r e s t s t h a t e x i s t s w i t h i n the S o v i e t e l i t e and and  how  they might be i n v o l v e d i n the domestic  process.  A s i m i l a r format t o the one  reform  used i n the  study w i l l be used here with the exception  leadership,  previous  t h a t the t e x t of  Gorbachev's r e c e n t commemorative speech w i l l be r e l i e d upon much more as an i n d i c a t o r of the c u r r e n t s t a t e of d i s c u s s i o n s on the S t a l i n q u e s t i o n , degree of e x p e c t a t i o n The Degree and The  i  r  the  mainly because of  the  which preceded i t .  Character  of the Changes  c u r r e n t attempt a t a r e l n t e r p r e t a t i o n of S t a l i n ' s  r o l e i n S o v i e t h i s t o r y i s the the most s i g n i f i c a n t of i t s kind s i n c e Khrushchev's o r i g i n a l d e - S t a l i n i z a t i o n . The e f f e c t s of these changes can be seen i n the  leadership's  pronouncements, the substance of the debate amongst the i n t e l l i g e n t s i a , the c r i t i c a l e v a l u a t i o n i n the p r e s s  and  105 e s p e c i a l l y i n the " c u l t u r a l thaw" t h a t i s being  f e l t at a l l  l e v e l s o f t h e a r t i s t i c community- Before a s s e s s i n g  t h e type  of change r e f l e c t e d by the c u r r e n t r e v i s i o n i s t trend i n S o v i e t h i s t o r y , t h e d e f i n i t i o n s o f change t h a t have been employed i n t h i s paper must be adapted somewhat t o t h i s t o p i c . T h i s i s necessary because only Cohen wrote s p e c i f i c a l l y about t h e p o s s i b i l i t y o f a r e e v a l u a t i o n o f the S t a l i n question The  adaptation  misrepresenting  as a p a r t o f a new domestic reform program. i t s e l f can be made without f e a r o f t h e a u t h o r s ' views because S t a l i n i s m i s such  an i n t e g r a l component o f many o f t h e p o l i t i c a l and economic problems o f t h e S o v i e t Union t h a t any r e l n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f i t r e a l l y represents  attempts a t reforms i n these areas.  Since  many o f these problems and reforms were t h e ones d i s c u s s e d by the t h r e e authors, t h e i r " d e f i n i t i o n s o f change" can a l s o apply  almost d i r e c t l y t o t h i s t o p i c . R a d i c a l change -- the kind which P i p e s f e l t was both  needed and t o be expected because o f h i s " c r i s i s / r e f o r m t h e s i s " -- i n t h i s context  would i n v o l v e a complete, f a c t u a l  r e l n t e r p r e t a t i o n of Soviet h i s t o r y , including a discussion of all  o f t h e excesses o f S t a l i n i s m and t h e t o t a l  rehabilitation  of h i s p o l i t i c a l v i c t i m s . Minimal change -- t h e only k i n d o f change which P i p e s b e l i e v e d t h e l e a d e r s h i p might agree t o without t h e pressure be represented conservative  o f domestic c r i s e s -- i n t h i s case would  by only s u p e r f i c i a l d e p a r t u r e s from t h e "Brezhnev l i n e " on S t a l i n and h i s r o l e i n S o v i e t  106 history  (perhaps i n the form of v e i l e d , very  general  c r i t i c i s m s of such t o p i c s of the " c u l t of p e r s o n a l i t y " or abuse of personal questioning  power), but with no s p e c i f i c c r i t i c i s m  of S t a l i n i s m and  fall  or  i t s main concepts. F i n a l l y ,  moderate change -- the kind expected t o occur by both and  the  Colton  Cohen i n a l l areas of S o v i e t domestic p o l i t i c s -- would somewhere i n the middle of these two  i t would simultaneously of S t a l i n i s m a l o n g s i d e  incorporate  d e f i n i t i o n s i n that  s i g n i f i c a n t reassessments  the maintenance of c e r t a i n t r a d i t i o n a l  "truths" of Soviet h i s t o r y . With these d e f i n i t i o n s i n mind, an a n a l y s i s of  the  c u r r e n t h i s t o r i c a l debate i n both the S o v i e t p r e s s and speeches and  pronouncements of the l e a d e r s h i p would seem to  i n d i c a t e t h a t i t i s moderate change t h a t i s o c c u r r i n g . conclusion  i n the  This  i s baaed on the f a c t t h a t although the l i m i t s  c r i t i c i s m and  on  d i s c u s s i o n have been broadened c o n s i d e r a b l y  the past year, t h e r e are s t i l l  in  many s p e c i f i c t o p i c s t h a t have  yet to be e i t h e r r e v i s e d or even mentioned f o r the o v e r a l l changes t o be c a l l e d r a d i c a l i n nature. Such a c o n c l u s i o n  is  not meant to downplay e i t h e r the importance or the p o t e n t i a l s i g n i f i c a n c e of the r e v i s i o n s t h a t have o c c u r r e d . i s a f a c t u a l assessment of how  much haa  Instead, i t  changed ao f a r i n the  d i s c u s s i o n of S t a l i n ' s r o l e i n S o v i e t h i s t o r y , an asseaament which makes p o s s i b l e the comparison of t h i s kind of change with t h a t which was The  expected by the three  moderate c h a r a c t e r  scholars..  of the h i s t o r i c a l r e v i s i o n s can  107 be seen i n two general Stalin's political  areas. On the general  t o p i c of  and economic p o l i c i e s , f o r example,  number o f d i r e c t c r i t i c i s m s have s u r f a c e d  a  i n the S o v i e t  press  which demonstrate t h a t the changes on t h i s s u b j e c t have c e r t a i n l y been more than minimal i n scope. Recent  articles  have c a r r i e d remarkably s c a t h i n g c r i t i c i s m o f not o n l y the excesses o f S t a l i n ' s p e r s o n a l i t y but o f h i s p o l i c i e s as w e l l . Such n o t a b l e S o v i e t s c h o l a r s as A n a t o l i i Butenko, N i k o l a i Shmelev and V i k t o r Tikhonov have even gone so f a r as to question  the t h e o r e t i c a l r e l a t i o n s h i p o f S t a l i n i s m t o  Marxism/Leninism and S o v i e t s o c i a l i s m . 3 2 e f f e c t o f the new  S i m i l a r l y , one  " c u l t u r a l q l a s n o s t " has been the  p u b l i c a t i o n of a number o f s p e c i f i c a l l y a n t i - S t a l i n i s t and p l a y s , the most prominent having Arbat  books  been C h i l d r e n o f  by A n a t o l i Rybakov and The B r e s t Peace by  M i k h a i l Shatrov.33 T h i s k i n d o f d i r e c t , p u b l i c c r i t i c i s m of S t a l i n has not been seen s i n c e d e - S t a l i n i z a t i o n program along  Khrushchev's  and the c u l t u r a l thaw which went  with i t . Gorbachev h i m s e l f has provided  official  some o f the  harshest  c r i t i c i s m o f S t a l i n and h i s p o l i c i e s s i n c e  Khrushchev's speeches t o the Twentieth and  Twenty-Second  Party Congresses. In h i s much a n t i c i p a t e d speech commemorating the s e v e n t i e t h a n n i v e r s a r y  of the  r e v o l u t i o n , he spoke s p e c i f i c a l l y about the problems o f S t a l i n i s m , q u e s t i o n i n g  Bolshevik  methodological  the "mechanical  108 maintainance o f o l d p o l i c i e s under fundamentally new c o n d i t i o n s " as w e l l as t h e development o f a "system o f administration  by command" and an " i n c r e a s e  i n t h e l e v e l s of  bureaucracy", a l l o f which were seen t o be f o r e i g n t o L e n i n i s t p r i n c i p l e s . 3 4 Gorbachev a l s o l e f t no q u e s t i o n as to e i t h e r how s i g n i f i c a n t he b e l i e v e d t h e n e g a t i v e these p o l i c i e s had been or how d i r e c t l y r e s p o n s i b l e  e f f e c t s of Stalin  was f o r them. He s t a t e d : . . . s e r i o u s damage was done t o t h e cause o f s o c i a l i s m and t h e a u t h o r i t y o f the p a r t y . . . t h e gross p o l i t i c a l e r r o r s and a r b i t r a r i n e s s permitted t o occur by him and those around him...had s e r i o u s consequences f o r the l i f e o f our s o c i e t y . Sometimes i t i s s a i d t h a t S t a l i n d i d not know about the i n s t a n c e s o f l a w l e s s n e s s . Documents now i n our p o s s e s s i o n say t h a t t h i s i s not so. The g u i l t o f S t a l i n and those c l o s e s t t o him b e f o r e t h e p a r t y and t h e people f o r t h e mass r e p r e s s i o n s and lawlessness t h a t were permitted a r e immense and unpardonable. T h i s i s a l e s s o n f o r generations.35 While these c r i t i c i s m s o f S t a l i n ' s p e r s o n a l i t y and methods were s i g n i f i c a n t i n t h e i r own r i g h t , they cannot be considered  r a d i c a l i n nature because Gorbachev f a i l e d t o  f o l l o w them up with s i m i l a r c r i t i c i s m s o f t h e main concepts and  tenets of Stalinism. Indicative of the l i m i t s of t h i s  reassessment were t h e d i s c u s s i o n s o f S t a l i n ' s most contentious  p o l i c y innovation  Although he d i d f o r the f i r s t handling  -- f o r c e d  time c r i t i c i z e S t a l i n ' s  o f t h e peasant p o p u l a t i o n  c o l l e c t i v i z a t i o n process,  collectivization.  during the  Gorbachev s t i l l  provided  almost  complete j u s t i f i c a t i o n f o r t h e concept i t s e l f when he  109 concluded  that " . . . i f  we  are to assess the importance of  c o l l e c t i v i z a t i o n , o v e r a l l , i n the s t r e n g t h e n i n g of the p o s i t i o n s of s o c i a l i s m i n the c o u n t r y s i d e , then i n the a n a l y s i s i t was  final  a t u r n i n g p o i n t of fundamental  importance."36 Perhaps most s i g n i f i c a n t , however, was  the  continued  l a c k of a d i s c u s s i o n of the economic and p o l i t i c a l causes of S t a l i n i s m , or of the e f f i c a c y of the S t a l i n i s t mode o f s o c i a l i s t development. Gorbachev a c t u a l l y provided a s t r o n g v i n d i c a t o n of the path chosen by S t a l i n , and o f S t a l i n ' s i n t e g r a l r o l e i n S o v i e t h i s t o r y , when he s t a t e d : Could a course have been chosen i n the circumstances other than t h a t path f o l l o w e d by the party? I f we wish t o remain on a s t a n d p o i n t of h i s t o r i c method and t r u t h of l i f e , t h e r e can only be one answer. No, i t could not.37 The other major example of how  these  historical  r e v i s i o n s have been s i g n i f i c a n t but at the same time f a l l e n s h o r t of r a d i c a l change i s the way i s s u e of S t a l i n ' s p o l i t i c a l addressed.  i n which the  and s o c i a l  specific  "purges" has been  P r i o r t o Gorbachev's speech t h e r e had been a  number of unprecedented openings i n t h i s area which i n d i c a t e d t h a t t r u l y r a d i c a l changes might be forthcoming.  The  press,  f o r example, had f o r the f i r s t time p u b l i s h e d a c t u a l s t a t i s t i c s r e g a r d i n g the magnitude of these r e p r e s s i o n s the s p e c i f i c e f f e c t s which they had members,3S but on the m i l i t a r y and  and  had on not only Party the g e n e r a l  population  110 as well.39 S i m i l a r l y , a number of prominent academics and with s t r o n g  s c h o l a r s had  r e c e n t l y come out  i n the  press  defences of S t a l i n ' s v i c t i m s . Y u r i Polyakov, a  S o v i e t h i s t o r i a n , had majority  Soviet  even gone so f a r as to s t a t e t h a t  the  of Joseph S t a l i n ' s purge v i c t i m s were innocent of  the a n t i - S t a l i n i s t crimes f o r which they were e x e c u t e d . Along the same l i n e s , some of the "non-persons" i n S o v i e t h i s t o r y had r e h a b i l i t a t e d i n the p r e s s ,  4 0  important  a l s o been p a r t i a l l y  as had  the i n d i v i d u a l s who  wrote  e i t h e r about them or about the excesses of S t a l i n i s m . Most s i g n i f i c a n t among these "non-persons" was c l o s e a s s o c i a t e of Lenin h i s N.E.P., who received and  had  and  N i k o l a i Bukharin, a  the major t h e o r e t i c i a n behind  i n the months p r i o r t o the  increasingly favorable  speech  treatment i n both the  i n a number of l i t e r a r y w o r k s . ! i t was  press  t h i s kind  4  p r o g r e s s on the r e h a b i l i t a t i o n i s s u e which was  one  of  of  the  main reasons f o r the tremendous degree of e x p e c t a t i o n preceded Gorbachev's a n n i v e r s a r y Once again,  emphatically  speech.  however, Gorbachev's speech d i d not  the hopes o f many i n the West and  s t a t i n g t h a t "many thousands of the p a r t y and to mass r e p r e s s i o n s " . 2 4  same time, too many t o p i c s and basically traditional  fulfill  the S o v i e t Union. He  r e a s s e r t the "Khrushchev l i n e " on the  members were subjected  that  did  purges,  non-party At  the  individuals retained t h e i r  interpretations. S t i l l  not d e a l t with,  f o r example, were the famous "show t r i a l s " o f the e a r l y 1930s  i n which many of the o r i g i n a l B o l s h e v i k s were u n j u s t l y  tried  and  executed by S t a l i n as he manouevered f o r power. N e i t h e r  was  the a s s a s s i n a t i o n  o f former Leningrad Party boss S e r g e i  K i r o v , or S t a l i n ' s r o l e i n i t , d i s c u s s e d i n Gorbachev's speech. Most s i g n i f i c a n t , however, i s t h e f a c t t h a t the historical  interpretation  o f such i n d i v i d u a l s as G r i g o r y  Z i n o v i e v , Lev Kamenev and Leon T r o t s k y was almost  strictly  maintained, thus d e c r e a s i n g the s i g n i f i c a n c e o f t h e progress which had been made on these i n d i v i d u a l s i n both t h e p r e s s and  the a r t i s t i c community.43 Even Bukharln, who many  Soviet  and Western sources expected t o r e c e i v e  r e h a b i l i t a t i o n because o f h i s a s s o c i a t i o n  almost  full  with L e n i n ' s  N.E.P., was seen i n only a moderately sympathetic l i g h t by Gorbachev. P r a i s e d "Trotskyites",  f o r h i s r o l e i n helping t o defeat the  he was then c r i t i c i z e d because he and h i s  supporters: ...underestimated t h e s i g n i f i c a n c e o f t h e time f a c t o r i n the c o n s t r u c t i o n o f s o c i a l i s m i n t h e t h i r t i e s . . . [they maintained al p o s i t i o n dominated by dogmatic t h i n k i n g , by a lack o f d i a l e c t i c approach i n the t h e i r a p p r a i s a l o f the s p e c i f i c s i t u a t i o n . * * 4  As a r e s u l t , while Gorbachev's assessment o f the purges and t h e i r e f f e c t s was a welcome r e t u r n  t o the kinds o f c r i t i c i s m s  used by Khrushchev, i t d i d not go f a r enough t o be i n d i c a t i v e of r a d i c a l change on the general i s s u e o f S t a l i n ' s r o l e i n Soviet  history.  In c o n c l u s i o n ,  the kind o f change which i s r e f l e c t e d i n  t h i s r e l n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f the S t a l i n e r a -- s i g n i f i c a n t l e v e l s of c r i t i c i s m , some extension and  o f the parameters o f c r i t i c i s m  d i s c u s s i o n , but a d e f i n i t e maintenance o f the t r a d i t i o n a l  S o v i e t l i n e on many t o p i c s -- i s both c o n s i s t e n t with the d e f i n i t i o n o f moderate change p r o f f e r e d i n the i n t r o d u c t i o n and  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c o f the kind o f change expected by both  Cohen and C o l t o n . While these k i n d s o f changes c e r t a i n l y j u s t i f y the views o f these s c h o l a r s . P i p e s ' views do not r e c e i v e the same v i n d i c a t i o n . The r e a s s e r t i o n (and i n some cases extension) o f the Khrushchev l i n e on S t a l i n and h i s p o l i c i e s i s i n d i c a t i v e o f changes t h a t a r e a s s u r e d l y  greater  than the minimal ones he expected were v o l u n t a r i l y p o s s i b l e from the l e a d e r s h i p . At the same time, these reforms a r e a l s o not as r a d i c a l i n nature as the ones P i p e s have expected t o r e s u l t from domestic p o l i t i c a l Forces and F a c t o r s  crisis.  i n the Reform Process  A number o f t h e f o r c e s and f a c t o r s which appear t o be involved  i n t h i s renewed c r i t i q u e o f S t a l i n i s m a r e s i m i l a r t o  those expressed by the t h r e e s c h o l a r s . There i s , f o r instance,  l i t t l e doubt t h a t the t r a d i t i o n a l i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of  S o v i e t h i s t o r y has come t o be seen as an i n c r e a s i n g l y important p o l i t i c a l problem by some members o f the l e a d e r s h i p and  e l i t e , a problem t h a t had been p r o v i d i n g a t l e a s t some  pressure  f o r change. L o g i c a l l y , o f course, one would have  expected some h i s t o r i c a l r e v i s i o n because so much o f what i s  113 being  reformed i n the country  (and  e s p e c i a l l y i n the economic  realm) i s t i e d so i n t i m a t e l y t o S t a l i n i s m . The l e a d e r s h i p has  Soviet  t r a d i t i o n a l l y not undertaken domestic changes  without j u s t i f y i n g them i n some way,  and  because of  i n t i m a t e r e l a t i o n s h i p between S t a l i n i s m and  the  the s t r u c t u r e of  the S o v i e t system, p a r t of t h i s " j u s t i f i c a t i o n " would n e c e s s a r i l y have to i n v o l v e some reassessment of both S t a l i n and  the r o l e which he played  i n the development of S o v i e t  society. The  evidence t h a t the t r a d i t i o n a l i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of  S t a l i n i s m has  a c t u a l l y become a p o l i t i c a l  problem can be  from the views expressed by such s c h o l a r s as Y u r i i  seen  Afanaaiev.  A S o v i e t h i s t o r i a n , he has been quoted i n a number of  the  l e a d i n g S o v i e t p u b l i c a t i o n s about the need f o r a more f a c t u a l and  r e a l i s t i c i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of the past,  r e s t o r e c r e d i b i l i t y t o the s t a t e of historiography.45  Afanaaiev may  from Gorbachev h i m s e l f , evolved  one  which would  Soviet  have been t a k i n g h i s  cue  whose views on t h i s t o p i c have  t o the p o i n t where he appears to see i t as a s e r i o u s  problem. Gorbachev r e i n f o r c e d t h i s viewpoint i n h i s  recent  speech when he s a i d : ...even now we s t i l l encounter attempts to ignore s e n s i t i v e questions of our h i s t o r y , to hush them up, to pretend t h a t nothing s p e c i a l happened. We cannot agree with t h i s . I t would be a n e g l e c t of h i s t o r i c a l t r u t h , d i s r e s p e c t f o r the memory of those who found themselves innocent v i c t i m s of lawlessness and arbitariness.46  114 As a problem i t s e l f , h i s t o r y has  the t r a d i t i o n a l  t h e r e f o r e provided  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of S o v i e t  a t l e a s t some pressure  change. T h i s i s c o n s i s t e n t with  for  the kind of r o l e which a l l  three s c h o l a r s expected the country's  domestic  political  problems to p l a y . Because the changing h i s t o r i c a l S t a l i n i s m has had  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of  s p e c i f i c e f f e c t s on a r a t h e r narrow segment  of the S o v i e t p o p u l a t i o n ,  the major f o r c e s both promoting  opposing these changes have come from w i t h i n the and  and  leadership  the i n t e l l e c t u a l / a r t i s t i c community. What i s l e s s c l e a r ,  however, i s how the depth and  s i g n i f i c a n t these d i f f e r e n c e s are and  extent  what  of the r e s p e c t i v e i n t e r e s t s i n v o l v e d  says about t h e i r o r g a n i z a t i o n w i t h i n the reform  process.  Adding t o the ambiguity i s the somewhat c o n f u s i n g developmental process  that t h i s h i s t o r i c a l reevaluation  gone through. Gorbachev's personal  views are a good example  of t h i s . 4 7 Upon assuming the r o l e of General S e c r e t a r y was  has  he  q u i t e r e l u c t a n t to p u b l i c l y c r i t i c i z e e i t h e r S t a l i n  h i s p o l i c i e s . As he began to c o n s o l i d a t e h i s power a u t h o r i t y , however, h i s speeches and  and  pronouncements s l o w l y  began t o i n c l u d e i n c r e a s i n g l y n e g a t i v e  references  to  S t a l i n i s m . There were even some grounds f o r expecting e x t e n s i v e c r i t i q u e of the man seventieth anniversary  and  speech. The  or  an  h i s methods i n the speech i t s e l f , however,  can only be d e s c r i b e d as d i s a p p o i n t i n g by these S i m i l a r l y , although the impetus f o r g r e a t e r  standards. criticism  of  S t a l i n i s m has c e r t a i n l y been p r o v i d e d by the l e a d e r s h i p ,  the s t r o n g e s t p r e s s u r e s both f o r and a g a i n s t these changes appear t o e x i s t below the l e v e l o f the l e a d e r s h i p i . e . w i t h i n the i n t e l l i g e n t s i a , among whom the l i m i t s f o r d i s c u s s i o n o f S t a l i n ' s r o l e i n S o v i e t h i s t o r y appear t o a c t u a l l y be wider than they a r e i n the " o f f i c i a l try  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n " . In order t o  t o e x p l a i n these a m b i g u i t i e s and t o determine which  author's c o n c e p t i o n o f the i n t e r e s t s i n v o l v e d i n the reform process i s b e t t e r s u i t e d t o t h i s case study, i t i s once again necessary t o look i n g r e a t e r d e t a i l a t both the nature o f the debates themselves and the apparent reasons f o r the depth o f these i n t e r e s t s a t the d i f f e r e n t l e v e l s o f S o v i e t At  politics.  the l e v e l o f the l e a d e r s h i p , t h e r e has been both  s t r o n g support f o r and c a u t i o u s c r i t i c i s m o f t h i s r e - i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f S t a l i n ' s r o l e i n S o v i e t h i s t o r y . Most of the former, as can be seen from the examples i n the p r e v i o u s s e c t i o n , has come from Gorbachev h i m s e l f . T h i s i n i t s e l f i s not t h a t s u r p r i s i n g c o n s i d e r i n g h i s i n s t i t u t i o n a l  position,  i n t h a t the General S e c r e t a r y i s u s u a l l y the l e a d i n g proponent  o f any reforms. The o p p o s i t i o n t o these changes, on  the other hand, has been i n the form o f c r i t i c i s m i n d i v i d u a l s as Ligachev and Chebrikov, c r i t i c i s m  from  such  which  appears t o be much s t r o n g e r and more s i g n i f i c a n t than  that  v o i c e d on the s u b j e c t o f the new economic reform program. Ligachev, f o r example, has been q u i t e emphatic  about the  harmful r e s u l t s which can a r i s e from u n c o n t r o l l e d l e v e l s o f  h i s t o r i c a l c r i t i c i s m and has expressed a p a r t i c u l a r  concern  t h a t S o v i e t h i s t o r y not be d e p i c t e d as a " c h a i n of e r r o r s " . 4 8 Chebrikov has been more e x p l i c i t i n h i s o p p o s i t i o n t o these r e v i s i o n s , i n one  i n s t a n c e even  p r e s e n t i n g a staunch defence of the t r a d i t i o n a l i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of S o v i e t h i s t o r y and r e f u s i n g t o p l a c e a l l of the blame on S t a l i n f o r many of the past problems.49 These c r i t i c i s m s are s i m i l a r i n s t y l e t o those on the s u b j e c t of economic reform -- i . e . , they deal with the dangers of public s e l f - c r i t i c i s m  -- but they have a l s o been more  f r e q u e n t and s p e c i f i c i n t h i s a r e a . The nature of these disagreements between the l e a d e r s i s more d i f f i c u l t t o d i s c e r n , however. The main t e n e t s of q l a a n o s t -- i . e . , s e l f - c r i t i c i s m and i n c r e a s e d debate  --  have c e r t a i n l y been one source of concern. At the same time, one has a l s o been a b l e t o see a mixture of both support f o r and c r i t i c i s m of the more fundamental  historical  r e s t r u c t u r i n g t h a t appears t o be going on.5° As a r e s u l t , i t does not appear p o s s i b l e t o l a b e l the c r i t i c i s m  as  r e p r e s e n t a t i v e of d i f f e r e n c e s over e i t h e r the g l a s n o s t or the p e r e s t r o i k a components of the h i s t o r i c a l  revisions.  T h i s would seem t o i n d i c a t e t h a t the d i f f e r e n c e s w i t h i n the l e a d e r s h i p on t h i s s u b j e c t are more fundamental  than they  were on the t o p i c of economic reform. The e x i s t e n c e of these k i n d s of i n t e r e s t s w i t h i n the l e a d e r s h i p , when compared t o those expected by the t h r e e  117 s c h o l a r s , generates some i n t e r e s t i n g c o n c l u s i o n s . of Richard  In the  case  P i p e s ' arguments, i t would seem t h a t although  t h e r e do appear to be c o n s e r v a t i v e  i n t e r e s t s within  the  P o l i t b u r o which are opposed t o a broad h i s t o r i c a l r e v i s i o n , they are n e i t h e r as homogeneous nor as s i n i s t e r as those which e x i s t i n h i s i n t e r p r e t a t i o n . Indeed, the f a c t  that  there do appear to be s i g n i f i c a n t f o r c e s w i t h i n the  new  l e a d e r s h i p which are i n favour c a l l s i n t o question conclusions  of these p o l i t i c a l  changes  not only P i p e s ' b a s i c assumptions  about the l e a d e r s h i p and  and  t h e i r i n t e r e s t s , but  a l s o h i s view of the reform process as w e l l . Cohen's arguments* on the other hand, r e c e i v e d much stronger  v i n d i c a t i o n from the events surrounding these  changes. The  very s u b j e c t area which has  d i f f e r e n c e s among the l e a d e r s h i p  -- i . e . , S o v i e t h i s t o r y --  i s a t o p i c which Cohen b e l i e v e d was conservatives  and  one  caused these  c l o s e s t t o the h e a r t s  which they would e m p h a t i c a l l y  defend.  S i m i l a r l y , the d i f f e r e n c e s themselves over t h i s s u b j e c t seem to be more fundamental than they were i n the case study i n t h a t some of them have been over the  of  do  previous basic  reasons f o r the h i s t o r i c a l r e v i s i o n i t s e l f . Because of these two  p o i n t s , i t would appear t h a t the k i n d of i n t e r e s t s which  Cohen t h e o r i z e d about may  have a r i s e n w i t h i n the  new  leadership. At the same time, however, there i s some evidence which i n d i c a t e s t h a t the d i v i s i o n s w i t h i n the l e a d e r s h i p may  not  be  118 completely d i s t i n c t and t h a t Cohen's terminology may not be e n t i r e l y u s e f u l f o r d e s c r i b i n g them. The members o f the l e a d e r s h i p , f o r example, have not been as f a r a p a r t i n t h e i r pronouncements as i t would appear. A l l o f the i n d i v i d u a l s have e i t h e r supported or opposed these h i s t o r i c a l have attempted t o make the d i s t i n c t i o n between  who  revisions  criticizing  S t a l i n and h i s methods on the one hand and l a u d i n g the g e n e r a l l y triumphant nature o f S o v i e t h i s t o r y on the o t h e r . For example, even i n some of h i s h a r s h e s t c r i t i c i s m s of the S t a l i n i s t r e p r e s s i o n s , Gorbachev has s a i d t h a t although "...those who were i n power a t the time were r e s p o n s i b l e . . . comrades, t h a t does not d i s t r a c t from what we have today."51 These types of d i s t i n c t i o n s were a l s o c h a r a c t e r i s t i c of h i s c r i t i c i s m s of S t a l i n i n the r e c e n t commemorative  speech. At the same time, they are s i m i l a r i n  s t r u c t u r e to those which have been put forward by some of h i s p u r p o r t e d l y more c o n s e r v a t i v e c o l l e a g u e s . The d i f f e r e n c e has been t h a t where Gorbachev has placed a good deal o f emphasis on S t a l i n ' s mistakes, i n d i v i d u a l s such as Ligachev have tended t o emphasize the l a t t e r p a r t o f the d i s t i n c t i o n  i.e.,  the triumphs o f S o v i e t h i s t o r y . I f some o f these d i f f e r e n c e s have been over the semantics of the pronouncements themselves, then Cohen's d e f i n i t i o n s may not apply as w e l l here. S i m i l a r l y , some o f the i n s t i t u t i o n a l concerns which were d i s c u s s e d i n the p r e v i o u s case study might be even more  119 applicable  here. Ligachev, aa the member o f the l e a d e r s h i p i n  charge of s e t t i n g t h e i d e o l o g i c a l parameters f o r t h e new reform programs, would have s p e c i f i c i n s t i t u t i o n a l concerns and  f e a r s about t h e scope o f h i s t o r i c a l c r i t i c i s m because o f  the  extremely d e l i c a t e i n t e r r e l a t i o n s h i p t h a t e x i s t s between  Stalinism,  the structure  Marxist-Leninist  of the Soviet  p o l i t i c a l system, and  i d e o l o g y . Chebrikov's l a c k o f enthusiasm  about t h e i n c r e a s e d l e v e l s o f S t a l i n i s t c r i t i c i s m i s even easier  t o understand because o f h i s p o s i t i o n  KGB. Any kind  o f "openness' w i t h i n  to i n c r e a s e the s e c u r i t y  s o c i e t y has the p o t e n t i a l  problems f o r the s e c r e t  a more f a c t u a l i n t e r p r e t a t i o n t h r e a t e n the l e g i t i m a c y  as head o f the  of Soviet  and p o s i t i o n  p o l i c e , and  h i s t o r y might even  o f the i n s t i t u t i o n  i t s e l f . As was the case i n the p r e v i o u s study, then, even though Cohen's d e f i n i t i o n o f conservatism does take i n t o consideration  these k i n d s o f reasons, the d e f i n i t i o n i t s e l f  may become somewhat t o o general because o f t h i s . F i n a l l y , the changes t h a t have a l r e a d y occurred i n the official  interpretation  of S t a l i n i s m  the nature o f the i n t e r e s t s w i t h i n  do say something about  the leadership.  Gorbachev's r e c e n t speech was c e r t a i n l y s i g n i f i c a n t i n i t s reaasertion the  o f t h e Khrushchev l i n e on S t a l i n i s m ,  and although  p r e p a r a t i o n o f the speech was a p p a r e n t l y t h e source o f a  lengthy and heated debate, i t s f i n a l form was s u b j e c t t o t h e approval o f the e n t i r e l e a d e r s h i p  b e f o r e i t was given.52  When one combines t h i s f a c t o r with the f a c t t h a t  even  120 i n d i v i d u a l s l i k e Ligachev p o l i c i e s and  have c r i t i c i z e d many of S t a l i n ' s  emphasized the need f o r some h i s t o r i c a l  r e v i s i o n i s m , the o v e r a l l changes i n t h i s area do seem to have been p a r t i c u l a r l y important. study,  one  As was  the case i n the  wonders i f these k i n d s of o f f i c i a l  come about from a P o l i t b u r o which was i n t o Cohen's c o n s e r v a t i v e s and  previous  changes c o u l d  fundamentally  divided  r e f o r m i s t s , r e g a r d l e s s of  the  k i n d of c o a l i t i o n t h a t might be formed. The k i n d of change which has occurred  i s t h e r e f o r e another i n d i c a t i o n t h a t  Cohen's d e f i n i t i o n s may  not e n t i r e l y apply t o the  d i s t r i b u t i o n of i n t e r e s t s w i t h i n the l e a d e r s h i p on  this  subject. Cohen c o u l d argue, of course, P o l i t b u r o may  t h a t although  the  current  not c l e a r l y r e f l e c t c o n s e r v a t i v e / r e f o r m i s t  d i v i s i o n s , these d i v i s i o n s c e r t a i n l y s t i l l general S o v i e t e l i t e and  exist within  the  t h a t t h i s i s where the b a t t l e over  these p o l i t i c a l changes i s going on. T h i s l i n e of argument i s somewhat p r o b l e m a t i c ,  however. To begin with, there i s no  to g a i n an a c c u r a t e p o r t r a i t of the e n t i r e e l i t e , not  way  only  because i t i s such a l a r g e , amorphous group but a l s o because the only i n d i v i d u a l s whose views we who  can d i s c e r n are  those  are very c l o s e to the r e i g n s of power. As such Cohen's  argument would remain t h e o r e t i c a l at beat. Perhaps more importantly,  however, on would wonder how  P o l i t b u r o c o u l d have been formed i f the  such a r e f o r m i s t conservative  i n t e r e s t s w i t h i n the general e l i t e are as s t r o n g and  as  121 extensive  as Cohen's arguments seem to i n f e r . I t would seem  l o g i c a l t h a t the power and  i n t e r e s t s w i t h i n the  leadership  would more c l o s e l y r e f l e c t the d i s t r i b u t i o n of i n t e r e s t s w i t h i n the g e n e r a l e l i t e . T h i s e s p e c i a l l y t r u e now the g e n e r a t i o n a l  turnover  e n t i r e e l i t e , a process  because of  t h a t i s o c c u r r i n g throughout  during which one  f i e r c e r s t r u g g l e between any  would expect an even  i d e o l o g i c a l d i v i s i o n s t h a t might  e x i s t w i t h i n the new  generation.  have been observable  even over the S t a l i n q u e s t i o n  appear t o r e p r e s e n t  the k i n d of d i v i s i o n s contained  Cohen's reform  As a r e s u l t , d i f f e r e n c e s do  not  within  framework.  F i n a l l y , Colton's and  the  view of the l e a d e r s h i p , i t s i n t e r e s t s  the r o l e t h a t they would both play i n the reform  process  has a l s o r e c e i v e d a good d e a l of j u s t i f i c a t i o n from these events.  Impetus f o r these changes has  a c t u a l l y come from  w i t h i n the l e a d e r s h i p i t s e l f . At the same time, d i f f e r e n c e s which appear to d i v i d e the new u n l i k e those which C o l t o n had attempted r e s o l u t i o n of any  l e a d e r s are  expected t o occur  political  the  over  the  problem. What agreement  i s apparent on t h i s i s s u e of h i s t o r i c a l r e v i s i o n has  been  over the k i n d s of changes t h a t are needed to supplement new  economic reforms. T h i s i s c o n s i s t e n t with C o l t o n ' s  of the main purpose of the new  past should  the view  l e a d e r s h i p . At the same time,  the d i f f e r e n c e s have r e v o l v e d around how political  not  much of  the  be r e v i s e d , a t o p i c of d i s c u s s i o n  w i t h i n the l e a d e r s h i p which C o l t o n s p e c i f i c a l l y expected to  122 cause a great, deal of d i s s e n s i o n and one which would  limit  the p r o g r e s s o f any p o l i t i c a l reforms. As a r e s u l t , w h i l e the d i f f e r e n c e s w i t h i n the P o l i t b u r o may not appear t o be c o n s i s t e n t with h i s view o f a g e n e r a l l y uniform leadership,  new  i t must be remembered t h a t i t was the need f o r  d i r e c t economic changes which was expected t o be the u n i f y i n g f a c t o r among t h i s group, and not the need t o change s i g n i f i c a n t a s p e c t s o f the p o l i t i c a l s t r u c t u r e o f the system. T h i s kind of i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of the i n t e r e s t s w i t h i n the l e a d e r s h i p -- i . e . , as d i v i d e d but perhaps not as fundamentally as Cohen's d e f i n i t i o n s would imply -- could help t o e x p l a i n the apparently Gorbachev's recent  d i s a p p o i n t i n g nature o f  speech. Looked a t from t h i s  perspective,  the a c t u a l c r i t i c i s m s which Gorbachev d i d make would be c o n s i s t e n t with the kinds which he had been making a l l along i . e . , attempts t o d i s t i n g u i s h between S t a l i n i s m and S o v i e t h i s t o r y . What i s perhaps more important, however, i s t h a t the degree o f c r i t i c i s m on the S t a l i n q u e s t i o n  which he d i d o f f e r  i . e . , moderate changes i n i n t e r p r e t a t i o n , i s c o n s i s t e n t with the k i n d o f changes being  attempted i n other areas o f the  domestic reform program. One has t o wonder why a more r a d i c a l reassessment o f S o v i e t h i s t o r y would have been i n the i n t e r e s t s o f a reform program t h a t i s c l e a r l y moderate i n i t s g o a l s . There i s even an argument t o be made t h a t these h i s t o r i c a l and p o l i t i c a l changes are being  made p r i m a r i l y t o  supplement the main goal o f the l e a d e r s h i p i . e . , the economic  123 reform program. I f t h i s  i s t r u e , then i t i s not hard t o  understand the d i f f e r e n c e s between these p o l i t i c a l  the l e a d e r s over some o f  changes, as they would be s u b j e c t s upon which  there was the l e a s t amount o f agreement. In terms o f the speech i t s e l f ,  i t must be remembered  t h a t a r a d i c a l r e e v a l u a t i o n o f S t a l i n and h i s r o l e i n S o v i e t h i s t o r y was expected not so much because o f what was contained  i n the l e a d e r s h i p ' s p r i o r pronouncements, but  r a t h e r because o f the words and w r i t i n g s o f some o f the more prominent b e n e f a c t o r s o f the c o u n t r y ' s new c u l t u r a l q l a s n o s t . As we w i l l  see i n the next s e c t i o n ,  these i n d i v i d u a l s may not n e c e s s a r i l y have the kind o f " d i r e c t p i p e l i n e " t o the l e a d e r s h i p which some i n the West might b e l i e v e . In c o n c l u s i o n ,  t h i s k i n d o f an e x p l a n a t i o n o f  the substance o f Gorbachev's speech would appear t o be j u s t as p l a u s i b l e as one which p o s i t s the e x i s t e n c e d i s t i n c t "conservative  of r e l a t i v e l y  f o r c e s " a t work w i t h i n the P o l i t b u r o ,  f o r c e s which l e f t Gorbachev l i t t l e c h o i c e but t o tone down h i s speech. As was mentioned e a r l i e r , the amount o f i n t e r e s t i n t h i s h i s t o r i c a l r e v i s i o n i s m a t the l e v e l o f the i n t e l l i g e n t s i a appears t o have been g r e a t e r  and gone deeper  than has been the case w i t h i n the l e a d e r s h i p . The i n i t i a l s e c t i o n demonstrated j u s t how much emphatic, p u b l i c support has a r i s e n out o f t h i s group f o r the changes. At the same time, however, the i n c r e a s e d  l e v e l of S t a l i n i s t  revisionism  124 i n both the p r e s s and l i t e r a t u r e has evoked  a number o f  e q u a l l y c r i t i c a l responses from i n d i v i d u a l s who a r e i n support o f the more t r a d i t i o n a l  interpretation of Soviet  h i s t o r y . For example, a f t e r a r e c e n t l e t t e r by the r e v i s i o n i s t h i s t o r i a n A f a n a s i e v was p r i n t e d i n Moscow News, the paper was inundated with c r i t i c i s m s from  such  l u m i n a r i e s as Fedor Vaganov, the head o f the U.S.S.R.'s main a r c h i v a l agency, as w e l l as from the heads o f t h r e e u n i v e r s i t y h i s t o r y departments.53 ^11 e m p h a t i c a l l y defended  the present s t a t e o f S o v i e t h i s t o r i o g r a p h y . As w e l l ,  a l e a d i n g opponent o f r e v i s i o n i s t l i t e r a t u r e -- the w r i t e r P e t r P r o a k u r i n -- has j u s t r e c e n t l y become t h e chairman o f the RSFR branch o f the S o v i e t C u l t u r a l Foundation,  thus  a p p a r e n t l y f u r t h e r i n g the cause o f the more t r a d i t i o n a l s c h o l a r s and w r i t e r s . 5 4 One can t h e r e f o r e see t h a t the amount o f open disagreement  among t h i s group  i s much s t r o n g e r  than i t was w i t h i n the l e a d e r s h i p . Where the source o f the d i f f e r e n c e s a t t h i s l e v e l i n the p r e v i o u s study had p r i m a r i l y been the v i s i b l e e f f e c t s o f the p e r e s t r o i k a component o f the new reforms, the disagreement  here appears t o be over the s i d e - e f f e c t s o f both  the g l a s n o s t and the p e r e s t r o i k a a s p e c t s o f the new h i s t o r i c a l r e v i s i o n i s m . The former has been the main reason f o r the " c u l t u r a l thaw" w i t h i n the country, the e f f e c t s o f which have been both p o s i t i v e and n e g a t i v e throughout the i n t e l l e c t u a l and a r t i s t i c community. At the same time, the  125 r e s t r u c t u r i n g has  begun to change what kind of  historical  views r e c e i v e a t t e n t i o n not only i n the press but, importantly,  i n l i t e r a t u r e and  the i n s t i t u t i o n a l and  previous  the a r t s . As a r e s u l t , some of  p r o f e s s i o n a l reasons f o r  reform which were d i s c u s s e d  sense. The  supporting  i n a p o s i t i v e sense i n the  study are a l l the more apparent and  i n the negative  a p p l i c a b l e here  f a c t i s t h a t the most v o l a t i l e  disagreements have been between the members of p r o f e s s i o n s which have had  the h i g h e s t  stakes  h i s t o r i c a l debates. Many h i s t o r i a n s and the decrease i n c e n s o r s h i p  and  f i n d t h e i r l i v e l y h o o d s at stake.  and  i n these  w r i t e r s , because o f  authors, w i l l T h i s p o i n t was  q u i t e c l e a r by F e l i k s Kuznetsov of the Moscow who,  the  the r e h a b i l i t a t i o n  p r e v i o u s l y banned i n d i v i d u a l s and  Organization  more  i n response to a question  of  effectively r e c e n t l y made  Writer's  about academic  j o u r n a l i s t i c resistance to perestroika. r e p l i e d : Whatever r e s i s t a n c e t h e r e i s to p e r e s t r o i k a i s r a t h e r of a p s y c h o l o g i c a l than a p o l i t i c a l nature. One of the reasons f o r t h i s i s t h a t p e r e s t r o i k a leads to the s t r i p p i n g of the t i t l e s and p o s i t i o n s of many w r i t e r s and p u b l i c f i g u r e s . They may be deprived of t h e i r p r e v i o u s posts and jobs, they may be deprived of t h e i r fame and t h e i r m a t e r i a l wealth, which o f t e n was a c q u i r e d not through t h e i r accomplishments i n l i t e r a t u r e and a r t s but simply by v i r t u e of the post they o c c u p i e d . ^ 5  In c o n c l u s i o n ,  t h e r e once again  do appear to be d i f f e r e n t  c o n s t i t u e n c i e s w i t h i n t h i s segment of S o v i e t s o c i e t y which are a c t i v e l y i n f a v o r of and  in opposition  to these  h i s t o r i c a l r e v i s i o n s . S i m i l a r l y , the reasons f o r these  126 i n t e r e s t s are o f t e n personal and p r o f e s s i o n a l , and n e c e s s a r i l y r e l a t e d t o i d e o l o g i c a l or p o l i t i c a l  not  beliefs.  Because these i n t e r e s t s appear t o be of a s i m i l a r nature t o those which were analyzed i n the p r e v i o u s case study, Richard P i p e s ' views are once again not t h a t a p p l i c a b l e here. There appears t o be more support f o r reform at t h i s l e v e l than he expected. S i m i l a r l y , the r e s i s t a n c e , though o f t e n s t r o n g and deep, has been f o r a v a r i e t y of reasons, only some of which are d i r e c t l y r e l a t e d t o such m o t i v a t i o n s as greed and the maintenance of power. F i n a l l y , because these i n t e r e s t s have had such a s i g n i f i c a n t e f f e c t  on  the progress of these reforms, most of the t e n e t s of P i p e s ' " c r i s i s / r e f o r m " t h e s i s do not appear t o apply here. Cohen's views, on the other hand, have r e c e i v e d even s t r o n g e r j u s t i f i c a t i o n from these events than they d i d i n the p r e v i o u s case study. The i n t e r e s t s here have run very deep on both s i d e s of the h i s t o r i c a l debate and they have had  the  k i n d s of e f f e c t s on the reform process which he expected  they  would have. As w e l l , the s t r e n g t h of these i n t e r e s t s does make i t appear t h a t i t i s these f o r c e s which have p r o v i d e d the main impetus f o r the changes, e s p e c i a l l y because the debate has been s t r o n g e s t a t t h i s l e v e l . However, because the reasons f o r both s u p p o r t i n g and r e s i s t i n g t h i s  historical  r e v i s i o n are q u i t e v a r i e d , Cohen's use of the terms reformism and conservatism to d e f i n e them may  s i m p l i f y the t r u e nature  of the i n t e r e s t s themselves. Although h i s terms are broad  127 enought t o take a l l o f these d i f f e r e n t m o t i v a t i o n s i n t o c o n s i d e r a t i o n , the l a b e l s "reformism  and c o n s e r v a t i s m "  i d e a s o f o r g a n i z a t i o n and i d e o l o g i c a l / p o l i t i c a l  infer  u n i t y which  once again do not seem t o e x i s t w i t h i n the i n t e r e s t s here- As has been the case throughout  the t h e s i s , the problems with  Cohen's reform framework a r e r e l a t e d t o h i s terminology and not t o h i s b a s i c o b s r v a t i o n s and i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s . F i n a l l y , C o l t o n ' s views can r e c e i v e o n l y p a r t i a l j u s t i f i c a t i o n here because he d i d not deal e x t e n s i v e l y with the d i f f e r e n t i n t e r e s t s a t the lower l e v e l s o f S o v i e t s o c i e t y . Even more so than was the case i n the p r e v i o u s study, h i s arguments i n t h i s context have appeared  somewhat  skewed i n the d i r e c t i o n o f the r o l e t h a t the new l e a d e r s h i p has p l a y e d . T h i s i s u n f o r t u n a t e because even though some impetus f o r the changes on the S t a l i n q u e s t i o n has once again come from above, the s t r e n g t h o f the i n t e r e s t s on t h i s i s s u e appears  t o be g r e a t e r w i t h i n the i n t e l l i g e n t s i a than i t i s  w i t h i n the l e a d e r s h i p . As a r e s u l t , these i n t e r e s t s have had a s i g n i f i c a n t e f f e c t on the progress o f these changes the debate which they have generated  through  i n the S o v i e t p r e s s .  T h i s kind o f a c h a r a c t e r i z a t i o n o f the i n t e r e s t s w i t h i n the i n t e l l i g e n t s i a h e l p s t o e x p l a i n the other major of these reforms,  ambiguity  i . e . , the reason f o r the s t r e n g t h o f the  debate among t h i s group. What has made i t appear even s t r o n g e r , however, i s the way i n which t h i s debate has been presented i n the S o v i e t p r e s s . A new s t y l e o f S o v i e t  128 j o u r n a l i s m has developed w i t h i n the p r e s s , one which  has  a p p a r e n t l y taken t o h e a r t some of the l e a d e r s ' b e l i e f s i n debate, s e l f - c r i t i c i s m  and a more r e a l i s t i c and  factual  p r e s e n t a t i o n of the news. The i n c r e a s e d i n t e l l e c t u a l  debate  i n the country has been the prime b e n e f a c t o r of these changes i n the S o v i e t p r e s s i n t h a t i t has been conducted more comprehensively Two  than ever b e f o r e .  problems have a r i s e n because  j o u r n a l i s m , however, both of which may  of t h i s new make these  s t y l e of debates  appear more s i g n i f i c a n t than they r e a l l y a r e . The f i r s t to do with the f a c t t h a t because  traditional  has  Soviet  j o u r n a l i s m c o n t a i n e d very l i t t l e of t h i s type of debate  and  c r i t i c i s m , the importance of the i n c r e a s e d l e v e l s of both of these f a c t o r s can be exaggerated. Not only does i t sometimes look l i k e the p r e s s i s d i v i d e d along i d e o l o g i c a l political  and  l i n e s , the s t r e n g t h of the debate t h e r e has  caused  some i n the West to see a d i r e c t r e l a t i o n s h i p between them and the k i n d of d i f f e r e n c e s which e x i s t between the l e a d e r s themselves. T h i s k i n d of t h i n k i n g was  i n evidence p r i o r to  Gorbachev's r e c e n t speech, d u r i n g which time many western p u b l i c a t i o n s based t h e i r s p e c u l a t i o n s about the content of the speech upon the views  and e x p e c t a t i o n s of S o v i e t  s c h o l a r s and academics  were p u r p o r t e d l y " c l o s e " to  Gorbachev, and who  who  had been prominently i n v o l v e d i n the  academic debate i n the press.52 Although we do not know f o r sure the exact r e l a t i o n s h i p between what i s p r i n t e d i n  129 the press and the d i v i s i o n o£ i n t e r e s t s w i t h i n the l e a d e r s h i p , i t would seem t h a t much o f the i n c r e a s e d and  debate  c r i t i c i s m w i t h i n the press i s much more a r e f l e c t i o n o f  the new s t y l e o f j o u r n a l i s m than i t i s o f deep d i v i s i o n s w i t h i n the new l e a d e r s h i p . The journalism  second problem with t h i s new s t y l e o f S o v i e t has been t h a t i t has o f t e n been taken too f a r .  Many p u b l i c a t i o n s have taken the new emphasis on self-criticism  t o extremes by only p u b l i s h i n g the c r i t i c a l  s i d e o f these i n t e l l e c t u a l and s c h o l a r l y debates and t h e r e f o r e g i v i n g the press a d e c i d e d l y  negative  outlook. Not  only has t h i s once again tended t o exaggerate the s i g n i f i c a n c e o f t h i s i n c r e a s e d degree o f c r i t i c i s m ,  i t has  a l s o been one o f the g r e a t e s t sources o f concern f o r i n d i v i d u a l s l i k e Ligachev. Indeed, almost a l l o f h i s c r i t i c i s m o f h i s t o r i c a l r e v i s i o n i s m has come i n the context of d i s c u s s i o n s about the changes i n the press and l i t e r a t u r e . As a r e s u l t , t h e i n c r e a s i n g l y n e g a t i v e  press and some o f the  l e a d e r s h i p ' s responses t o i t have made i t appear as i f r e l a t i v e l y d i s t i n c t conservative d e f i n e d by Cohen, a r e doing  and r e f o r m i s t f o r c e s , as  b a t t l e through the p r e s s .  Although the d i f f e r e n t l e a d e r s h i p i n t e r e s t s do undoubtedly f i l t e r down i n t o the p r e s s ,  i t would seem t h a t the s t r e n g t h  of the i n t e l l e c t u a l debate i s i n s t e a d b e t t e r e x p l a i n e d  by a  new s t y l e o f S o v i e t j o u r n a l i s m and by the nature o f the s u b j e c t o f the debate i t s e l f ,  a t o p i c which has a p p a r a n t l y  130 s t r u c k a number o f s e n s i t i v e chords among the i n t e l l i g e n t s i a .  131 Endnotes 1. The d e f i n i t i o n s o f change used by the t h r e e a u t h o r s , and d e s c r i b e d i n d e t a i l i n the f i r s t chapter, w i l l s e r v e as the bases f o r a comparision o f the k i n d o f change t h a t has occurred here. 2. The Christian) S c i e n c e Monitor. World E d i t i o n , (December 7-13, 1987), p. 18 3. The i n f o r m a t i o n on the s p e c i f i c a s p e c t s o f t h e E n t e r p r i s e Law was taken from an e x c e l l e n t summary by P h i l i p Hanson i n "The E n t e r p r i s e Law and the Reform P r o c e s s " , Radio L i b e r t y Research B u l l e t i n . Supplement 269/87 ( J u l y 14, 1987), pp. 1-9 4. These r e f e r e n c e s were made by Leonid A b a l k i n , the D i r e c t o r of the Moscow I n s t i t u t e o f Economics, as r e p o r t e d i n "The U.S.S.R. T h i s Week", Radio L i b e r t y Research B u l l e t i n . Supplement 268/87 ( J u l y 10, 1987), p. 13 5. F o r e i g n Broadcast I n f o r m a t i o n S e r v i c e (FBIS): S o v i e t Union. 212, (3 November 1987), pp. 49-50 6. C i t e d i n E l i z a b e t h Teague, "Gorbachev Answers H i s C r i t i c s " , Radio L i b e r t y Research B u l l e t i n . Supplement 280/87 ( J u l y 15, 1987), p. 5 7  -  FBIS. (3 November 1987), p. 50  8. I b i d . , pp. 40-41 9. Hanson, p. 6 10. Teague, p. 6 11. FBIS. (3 November 1987), p. 48 12. I b i d . , p. 48 13. Vera T o l z , "Debates Over S t a l i n ' s Legacy on the Eve o f the S e v e n t i e t h A n n i v e r s a r y o f the October R e v o l u t i o n " Radio L i b e r t y Research B u l l e t i n . Supplement 407/87 (Oct. 15, 1987), pp. 3-4 14. C i t e d i n "The U.S.S.R. T h i s Week", Radio L i b e r t y Research B u l l e t i n . Supplement 253/87 ( J u l y 3, 1987), p. 10 15. The C h r i s t i a n Science Monitor. World E d i t i o n , (December 7-13, 1987), pp. 18-19  132 16. C i t e d i n Robert C. Tucker, "Gorbachev and the F i g h t f o r S o v i e t Reform", World P o l i c y J o u r n a l . V o l . 4, No. 2, (Spring 1987), pp. 181-2 17. "The U.S.S.R. T h i a Week", Radio L i b e r t y Research B u l l e t i n . Supplement 268/87 ( J u l y 10, 1987), p. 13 18. Examples o f these k i n d s of c o n c l u s i o n s can be found i n Tucker, pp. 183-4; Michael Kaser, "One economy, two systems: p a r a l l e l s between S o v i e t and Chinese reform", I n t e r n a t i o n a l A f f a i r s . V o l . 63, No. 4, (Summer 1987), p. 402, and i n The C h r i s t i a n S c i e n c e Monitor. World E d i t i o n , (December 7-13, 1987), pp. 18-19 19. C i t e d i n E l i z a b e t h Teague, "Gorbachev Bounces Back", Radio L i b e r t y Research B u l l e t i n . Supplement 406/87 (Oct. 14, 1987), pp. 5-6 20. C i t e d i n P h i l i p Hanson and E l i z a b e t h Teague, "Text of Gorbachev's and Slyunkov's speeches t o the P a r t y Conference on the S o v i e t Economy", Radio L i b e r t y Research B u l l e t i n . Supplement 223/87 (June 12, 1987), p. 8 21. Tucker, p.  181  22. Chebrikov expressed these views i n a Sept. 11 speech t o s e c u r i t y and p o l i c e o f f i c e r s and Party o f f i c i a l s , as r e p o r t e d i n The C h r i s t i a n S c i e n c e Monitor. World E d i t i o n , (Sept. 21-27, 1987), p. 13 23. T o l z , p. 7 24. For i n f o r m a t i o n of the Y e l t s i n a f f a i r see The C h r i s t i a n S c i e n c e Monitor. World E d i t i o n , (December 14-20, 1987), p. 5 25. The q u o t a t i o n i s from Timothy J . C o l t o n , The Dilemma of Reform i n the S o v i e t Union (New York: C o u n c i l on F o r e i g n R e l a t i o n s , Inc., 1984), p. x. For a s i m i l a r d e f i n i t i o n of r a d i c a l change see Stephen F. Cohen, R e t h i n k i n g the S o v i e t E x p e r i e n c e (Oxford: Oxford U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s , 1985), p. 131 26. S o v i e t sources, u n r e l i a b l e as they may be, have r e p o r t e d t h a t up t o n i n e t y - f o u r percent o f the i n t e l l i g e n t s i a who were questioned voiced support f o r these changes. See The C h r i s t i a n S c i e n c e Monitor. World E d i t i o n , (December 7-13, 1987), p. 18. For more r e l i a b l e a n a l y s i s see Tucker, pp. 183-189  133 27. FBIS. <3 November 1987), p. 49 28. I b i d . , p. 53 29. Tucker, p. 185 30. Hanson and Teague, p. 1 31. The Vancouver Sun. (January 4, 1988), p. A12 32. T o l z ,  "Debates", p. 4  33. For i n f o r m a t i o n on Rybakov and Shatrov see The C h r i s t i a n S c i e n c e Monitor. World E d i t i o n , (May 4-10, 1987), p. 10 and ( A p r i l 13-19, 1987), p.21, respectively. 34. FBIS. (3 November 1987), p. 45 35. I b i d . 36. I b i d . , p. 44 37. I b i d . 38. The C h r i s t i a n S c i e n c e Monitor. World E d i t i o n , (June 22-28, 1987), p. 7 39. "The U.S.S.R. T h i s Week", Radio L i b e r t y Research B u l l e t i n . Supplement 253/87 ( J u l y 3, 1987), p. 10 40. "The U.S.S.R. T h i s Week", Radio L i b e r t y Research B u l l e t i n . Supplement 400/87 (Oct. 9, 1987), p. 12 41. Bukharin has r e c e n t l y been seen i n a more p o s i t i v e l i g h t i n M i k h a i l Shatrov's p l a y "The B r e s t Peace", d e s c r i b e d i n The C h r i s t i a n Science M o n i t o r . World E d i t i o n , ( A p r i l 13-19, 1987), p. 21, and a l s o by h i s t o r i a n s l i k e Y u r i i A f a n a s i e v i n the S o v i e t press as r e p o r t e d i n "The U.S.S.R. T h i s Week", Radio L i b e r t y Research B u l l e t i n . Supplement 366/87 ( J u l y 17, 1987), p. 14 42. FBIS. (3 November 1987), p.45 43. I b i d . , p. 43 44.  Ibid.  45. C i t e d i n Vera T o l z , "The Current D i s c u s s i o n o f S t a l i n i s m and the S t y l e o f Debates Among S o v i e t H i s t o r i a n s " , i n Radio L i b e r t y Research B u l l e t i n . Supplement 282/87 ( J u l y 20, 1987), p. 1  134 46. FBIS. <3 November 1987), p. 45 47. T o l z ,  "Debates Over S t a l i n " , p. 2  48. T o l z , "Debates Over S t a l i n " , p. 2 49. The C h r i s t i a n S c i e n c e Monitor. World E d i t i o n , (September 21-27, 1987), p. 13 50. T o l z , "Debates Over S t a l i n " , p. 2 51. Teague, "Gorbachev Answers H i s C r i t i c s " , p. 5 52. E l i z a b e t h Teague, "Gorbachev Opens S e v e n t i e t h Anniversary C e l e b r a t i o n s " , Radio L i b e r t y Research B u l l e t i n . Supplement 432/87 (November 2, 1987), p. 2 53. T o l z , "Current D i s c u s s i o n " ,  p. 2  54. "The U.S.S.R. T h i s Week ".Radio L i b e r t y Research B u l l e t i n Supplement 255/87 (June 8, 1987), p. 11 55. C i t e d i n Roland E g g l e s t o n , " W r i t e r ' s Union O f f i c i a l s D i s c u s s S o v i e t Authors", i n Radio L i b e r t y Research B u l l e t i n . Supplement 247/87 (June 30, 1987), pp. 4-5 56. The C h r i s t i a n S c i e n c e Monitor. World E d i t i o n , (November 9-15, 1987), p. 28  135 Conclusion T h i s t h e s i s has attempted t o p r o v i d e a good deal of i n f o r m a t i o n on both the r e l a t i v e e f f i c a c y of the s c h o l a r s ' views of the reform  process  i n the S o v i e t Union  on some of the c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s of the new reform  three  S o v i e t domestic  program. Rather than use t h i s s e c t i o n f o r a  summary of these a n a l y s e s , which w i l l examine how been f u l f i l l e d .  I will  lengthy  instead o f f e r a conclusion  w e l l the purposes of t h i s paper have  In the process,  the r e l a t i v e s t r e n g t h s  weaknesses of each s c h o l a r ' s arguments w i l l be  c h a r a c t e r of the c u r r e n t domestic  and  and  presented  along with some r e l a t e d c o n c l u s i o n s about the nature  The  and  and  reforms.  main purpose of t h i s paper was  to compare, c o n t r a s t  c r i t i q u e the views of the t h r e e s c h o l a r s i n an e f f o r t to  determine which arguments were the most c r e d i b l e . T h i s been done and  some c o n c l u s i o n s can be o f f e r e d on the  To begin with, Richard h i s t o r i c a l and  P i p e s ' arguments -- from a  i n c o r r e c t . The  s t r e n g t h of h i s a n a l y s i s was  and  results.  logical,  contemporary p e r s p e c t i v e -- can only  d e s c r i b e d as i n c o n s i s t e n t , u n s u b s t a n t i a t e d  be  generally  l i m i t e d to h i s  r e c o g n i t i o n of some of the more obvious problems w i t h i n country,  t h e i r b a s i c s t r u c t u r a l causes and  has  a few  of  endemic f o r c e s which a c t as b a r r i e r s to impede the  the  the progress  of change. The f l a w s i n h i s i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s are f a r g r e a t e r i n number, however, and  they a l l can be t r a c e d back to  two  r e l a t e d problems: an o f t e n e x p l i c i t d i s b e l i e f i n s o c i a l i s m as  136 a functional p o l i t i c a l  and economic model combined with a  very narrow, one-dimensional  view of S o v i e t e l i t e  interests.  P i p e s ' p e r c e p t i o n of these i n d i v i d u a l s as completely c o r r u p t and u n i f o r m l y opposed t o any k i n d of " p o s i t i v e " reform w i t h i n the country has caused  him to develop f a u l t y  interpretations  from otherwise c o r r e c t o b s e r v a t i o n s of many a s p e c t s of the S o v i e t s i t u a t i o n . H i s conception of the nature of the S o v i e t Union's  domestic problems,  the k i n d of change needed t o  overcome them and the reform process i t s e l f have a l l been c o l o r e d , and thus made l e a s c r e d i b l e , by h i s u n s u b s t a n t i a t e d views of both the e l i t e and the system. more b a s i c o b s e r v a t i o n s may  Although some of h i s  have been c o r r e c t , P i p e s ' o v e r a l l  arguments on the t o p i c of S o v i e t reform have not only been r e f u t e d , they have been shown t o be of l i t t l e use as t o o l s for  analysis. Cohen's and C o l t o n ' s arguments f a r e d much b e t t e r  than  P i p e s ' d i d i n t h a t the m a j o r i t y of the i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s and c o n c l u s i o n s w i t h i n them were shown t o be c o r r e c t . There were two major s t r e n g t h s i n Cohen's reform framework. The was  first  with r e s p e c t t o h i s i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of the s e v e r i t y of the  c o u n t r y ' s problems and the kind of change which was  needed to  overcome them. H i s d e s c r i p t i o n of both t o p i c s i n moderate terms was  not only s u b s t a n t i a t e d by a r e a l i s t i c  the s t a t i s t i c s  a p p r a i s a l of  and f a c t s a v a i l a b l e on the domestic  situation,  i t has a l s o been r e i n f o r c e d by the scope and apparent of the new  domestic reforms themselves. More  goals  specifically,  137 h i s expectation  t h a t f u t u r e S o v i e t reform programs would  i n c l u d e a n t i - S t a l i n i s t and  N.E.P•-related components has  c o r r e c t , demonstrating t h a t he a l s o had the p a r t i c u l a r c h a r a c t e r Cohen's s t r o n g e s t existence  some i n s i g h t i n t o  of f u t u r e reforms. argument was  the one  r e l a t i n g to  of s i g n i f i c a n t c o n s t i t u e n c i e s w i t h i n the  which were both f o r and  a g a i n s t any  both case s t u d i e s analyzed  i n t e r e s t s are o b v i o u s l y  country  been the  case  here demonstrated t h a t these  q u i t e widespread, at times even  showing up i n the l e a d e r s h i p . Cohen was about the e x i s t e n c e  the  kind of changes. Past  examples of S o v i e t reform showed t h a t t h i s had and  been  not only  correct  of the c o n s t i t u e n c i e s themselves,  but  a l s o about the s i g n i f i c a n t r o l e s t h a t these i n t e r e s t s would have i n the reform process,  r o l e s which were demonstrated  q u i t e c l e a r l y i n the case study on h i s t o r i c a l The  flaw  revisionism.  i n Cohen's framework, however, was  the  terminology which he used i n h i s attempts to d e f i n e these same i n t e r e s t s . The  terms "conservatism" and  shown to be somewhat problematic Used to d e s c r i b e the e x i s t e n c e  f o r two  of two  "reformism" were  r e l a t e d reasons.  fundamental,  i d e o l o g i c a l d i v i s i o n s at a l l l e v e l s of S o v i e t p o l i t i c s  and  s o c i e t y , they were found to be too general  full  s i g n i f i c a n c e and supporting  to g i v e the  importance of the range of reasons f o r  or r e s i s t i n g change. T h i s problem was  t r y i n g to d e f i n e the spectrum of i n t e r e s t s w i t h i n i n t e l l i g e n t s i a and  seen when the  a l s o when attempting to c h a r a c t e r i z e  the  138 general nature o f the problems w i t h i n S o v i e t p o l i t i c s .  While  Cohen's d e f i n i t i o n s do propose t o i n c o r p o r a t e w i t h i n them a l l of the reasons f o r s u p p o r t i n g or r e s i s t i n g change, the spectrum  o f these reasons -- r a n g i n g from p e r s o n a l t o  p r o f e s s i o n a l and i n s t i t u t i o n a l as w e l l as i d e o l o g i c a l and political  -- i s so broad t h a t one has t o wonder whether  g e n e r a l i z i n g them under two headings i s the best way t o present them. In other words, by u s i n g the terms reformism and conservatism, r e g a r d l e s s o f the q u a l i f i c a t i o n s attached to the d e f i n i t i o n s , one runs t h e r i s k o f s i m p l i f y i n g t h e t r u e nature and range o f the i n t e r e s t s themselves. Cohen's d e f i n i t i o n s o f reformism and conservatism a l s o presented some problems when they were used t o e x p l a i n the apparent d i s t r i b u t i o n o f i n t e r e s t s w i t h i n the present  i  l e a d e r s h i p . There appears t o be more o f a general consensus w i t h i n the P o l i t b u r o than Cohen might have expected, e s p e c i a l l y over the kind o f economic changes t h a t a r e needed. The s i g n i f i c a n c e o f the reforms t h a t have a l r e a d y o c c u r r e d r e i n f o r c e s t h i s i n t e r p r e t a t i o n i n t h a t they r e f l e c t a g r e a t e r degree o f change than one would expect from a l e a d e r s h i p t h a t was e i t h e r d i v i d e d on the b a s i s o f Cohen's d e f i n i t i o n s , or which had reached the k i n d o f " r e f o r m i s t / c o n s e r v a t i v e c o a l i t i o n " e n v i s i o n e d by him. S i m i l a r l y , the k i n d s of d i f f e r e n c e s which have a r i s e n among the l e a d e r s ,  though  r e l a t e d t o some o f those which would e x i s t i n Cohen's framework, do not appear t o be s i g n i f i c a n t enough t o j u s t i f y  139 d e f i n i n g them as r e p r e s e n t a t i v e o f the e x i s t e n c e o f a d i s t i n c t c o n s e r v a t i v e c o n s t i t u e n c y . While such i n d i v i d u a l s as Ligachev criticism  have voiced concerns over the l e v e l o f h i s t o r i c a l and even about the pace o f some o f the changes  themselves, these kinds o f arguments have not stopped same i n d i v i d u a l s from simultaneously  agreeing  these  on the  fundamental importance o f p e r e s t r o i k a i n general and on some o f the s p e c i f i c economic and S t a l i n i s t reforms i n p a r t i c u l a r . As a r e s u l t , while there do appear t o be I n d i v i d u a l s w i t h i n the l e a d e r s h i p who a r e more c a u t i o u s and c o n s e r v a t i v e than Gorbachev, they do not appear t o have a l l of the c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s t h a t one would expect from a " c o n s e r v a t i v e " . I t i s t h e r e f o r e the terminology  t h a t i s the  problem here and not the b a s i c argument about d i f f e r e n t i n t e r e s t s w i t h i n the l e a d e r s h i p . In c o n c l u s i o n ,  although  Cohen's arguments have c e r t a i n l y r e c e i v e d a good d e a l o f j u s t i f i c a t i o n from both past and present events, the d e f i n i t i o n a l problems i n h e r e n t i n h i s reform d e t r a c t somewhat from h i s o v e r a l l  framework do  approach.  C o l t o n , on the other hand, was much more s p e c i f i c i n h i s arguments and because o f t h i s avoided  some o f the  d e f i n i t i o n a l problems t h a t c h a r a c t e r i z e d Cohen's views. The s t r e n g t h o f h i s arguments r e s i d e d i n three b a s i c areas.  Like  Cohen he, t o o , was c o r r e c t i n both h i s i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f t h e s i t u a t i o n w i t h i n the country  and the kind o f change which  might be i n v o l v e d i n overcoming some o f the problems t h e r e .  140 As w e l l , where Cohen had  been c o r r e c t i n a n t i c i p a t i n g some of  the s p e c i f i c f e a t u r e s of the reforms,  C o l t o n has a l s o been  r i g h t about what the general c h a r a c t e r of the reforms look l i k e -  would  The changes themselves do appear t o r e f l e c t  "compromises" aimed d i r e c t l y a t some of the country's more s e r i o u s problems. At the same time they are a l s o a p p a r e n t l y l i m i t e d i n t h e i r scope by such t h i n g s as the use of a number of o l d s o l u t i o n s , the "untouchable  n a t u r e " of some a s p e c t s of  S o v i e t p o l i t i c s and by an excess of c a u t i o n on the p a r t of the l e a d e r s h i p - In a d i f f e r e n t way was  from Cohen, then, C o l t o n  a l s o c o r r e c t i n h i s e x p e c t a t i o n s of what the nature  c h a r a c t e r of the changes would  and  be.  The s t r o n g e s t p a r t of C o l t o n ' s arguments has o b v i o u s l y been the amount of emphasis which he p l a c e d on the t h a t a new  effects  g e n e r a t i o n of l e a d e r s h i p would have on the reform  process i n g e n e r a l and on the progress of the changes i n p a r t i c u l a r . The new  S o v i e t l e a d e r s h i p under Gorbachev  provided t h i s Impetus f o r change and " p r o b l e m - s o l v i n g " one.  Although  has  i t s approach has been a  Gorbachev has been i t s main  spokesman, pronouncements from a number of d i f f e r e n t i n d i v i d u a l s suggest  t h a t some of the g e n e r a t i o n a l  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s which C o l t o n expected  t o be present i n t h i s  group do indeed e x i s t , with the most obvious one being a d e s i r e to "get the country going The f i n a l was  again".  area of s t r e n g t h i n C o l t o n ' s reform  framework  h i s conception of the c o n s e r v a t i v e r e s i s t a n c e w i t h i n the  country  and  problems and  the r o l e t h a t i t has played as a source of  a b a r r i e r to change. By c o n c e n t r a t i n g on some of  the s p e c i f i c sources of conservatism  and how  they have acted  to impede the progress of change -- sources such as approach of the Brezhnev a d m i n i s t r a t i o n and increasingly  the  the  in particular  o b s o l e t e nature of i t s methods and  polices  the  --  he  has avoided  using the general term "conservatism"  the reasons  f o r these problems. By doing so, the a n a l y s i s of  h i s arguments was factors although  to d e s c r i b e  made s i m p l e r because these are the kinds of  which can be d i s c o v e r e d and  examined. As  such,  Colton chose not to expand upon a l l of the  reasons  f o r the e x i s t e n c e of these c o n s e r v a t i v e i n t e r e s t s , the ones he d i d d i s c u s s could be analyzed, avoided  and  i n the process  he  some of the d e f i n i t i o n a l problems which Cohen ran  i n t o i n t r y i n g to i n c o r p o r a t e a l l of these i n t e r e s t s one general  under  heading.  The only r e a l flaw i n C o l t o n ' s arguments was f a i l u r e to deal i n g r e a t e r d e t a i l with the  his  extensive  i n t e r e s t s which e x i s t at the lower l e v e l s of S o v i e t s o c i e t y and  p o l i t i c s and  which have been shown to play a s i g n i f i c a n t  r o l e i n the reform  p r o c e s s . By f a i l i n g to do so h i s arguments  were somewhat one-sided  i n t h a t they placed almost a l l of the  emphasis on the r o l e which would be played by the  new  l e a d e r s h i p i n t h i s p r o c e s s . Even though t h i s group has been the most important  f o r c e p r o v i d i n g impetus f o r change, the  d i f f e r e n t i n t e r e s t s s u p p o r t i n g and opposing  the v a r i o u s  142 changes have s i g n i f i c a n t l y a f f e c t e d the progress of the reforms themselves. Admittedly p a r t of t h i s ommission on C o l t o n ' s p a r t can be a t t r i b u t e d t o h i s use of a d i f f e r e n t " l e v e l of a n a l y s i s " , one which d i d not  specifically  c o n c e n t r a t e on these f a c t o r s . Even so, h i s d e c i s i o n not to emphasise the r o l e played by these d i f f e r e n t i n t e r e s t s d i d d e t r a c t somewhat from the o v e r a l l a p p l i c a b i l i t y of h i s arguments. The secondary  purpose  of t h i s paper was  t o gain a  b e t t e r understanding of the c u r r e n t S o v i e t domestic  reform  program. T h i s , too, has h o p e f u l l y been accomplished  by u s i n g  the s c h o l a r s ' d i f f e r e n t reform frameworks as t o o l s to i n v e s t i g a t e the nature of the c u r r e n t changes. Rather  than  completely r e s t a t e the emerging c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s of these  new  reforms, i t i s more u s e f u l t o present the most important a s p e c t s of these changes, some of which were not n e c e s s a r i l y expected by the t h r e e authors. To begin with, a dynamic l e a d e r has a r i s e n a t the helm of t h i s reform program i n the person of M i k h a i l Gorbachev, a man  who  has p r o v i d e d the  g r e a t e s t p u b l i c support f o r the changes. Based on h i s i n s t i t u t i o n a l p o s i t i o n t h i s i s not t h a t s u r p r i s i n g , but i t i s a sharp c o n t r a s t t o the kind of l e a d e r s h i p t h a t  was  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c of the l a t e r Brezhnev y e a r s . The  new  l e a d e r s h i p does seem to be u n i f i e d over one main i d e a : the need f o r s i g n i f i c a n t , y e t within-system economic reforms which w i l l d i r e c t l y address some of the c o u n t r y ' s more  143 s e r i o u s problems. The d i f f e r e n c e s w i t h i n the l e a d e r s h i p appear t o be, f o r the most p a r t , over the g l a s n o s t p o r t i o n o f the reforms, with the p e r e s t r o i k a  component  r e c e i v i n g s u b s t a n t i a l support from a l l members. Although these d i f f e r e n c e s over g l a s n o s t  do seem t o have c r e a t e d  some d i v i s i o n s w i t h i n the P o l i t b u r o , they a r e not c l e a r enough (even on the s u b j e c t o f the S t a l i n question) t o i n d i c a t e any i d e o l o g i c a l l y d i s t i n c t groups or f a c t i o n s w i t h i n the l e a d e r s h i p . The S t a l i n disturbance  i s s u e has apparently  caused such a  because o f the extremely s e n s i t i v e nature o f i t s  s u b j e c t matter and because o f the p a r t i c u l a r e f f e c t s i t has had  on some segments o f S o v i e t p o l i t i c a l  life.  Below the l e v e l of the l e a d e r s h i p , the changes have met with lukewarm enthusiasm, t o say the l e a s t , with the main source of the problems being  the s p e c i f i c e f f e c t s t h a t the  economic r e s t r u c t u r i n g a r e expected t o have on many groups w i t h i n the country. More s p e c i f i c a l l y , the i n t e l l i g e n t s i a , as a group, have a l s o played  a f a r g r e a t e r r o l e i n the reform  process than was expected. T r a d i t i o n a l l y e i t h e r ignored or f o r c e d i n t o submission by the Party,  some members o f t h i s  group have i n s t e a d been a c t i v e l y r e c r u i t e d by members o f the l e a d e r s h i p t o gain support f o r these changes and other more conservative  s c h o l a r s and academics have a l s o provided the  most p u b l i c o p p o s i t i o n t o these changes t o date. F i n a l l y , t h e S o v i e t press has i t s e l f f e l t the e f f e c t s of g l a s n o s t , with the r e s u l t s being  a medium t h a t f o r the f i r s t time has  144 brought a t l e a s t some c r e d i b i l i t y t o S o v i e t j o u r n a l i s m . One r e s u l t o f these new changes has been a new emphasis on self-criticism  and debate w i t h i n the p r e s s , both of which  have a p p a r e n t l y been the sources o f t e n s i o n w i t h i n the l e a d e r s h i p . These c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s ,  then, while not always  expected by the t h r e e s c h o l a r s , a r e i n t e r e s t i n g  i n t h e i r own  r i g h t and have helped t o account f o r some o f the a m b i g u i t i e s of the reform p r o c e s s . To conclude, I hope t h a t t h i s paper has been s u c c e s s f u l in f u l f i l l i n g something especially  i t s purposes.  In the process I hope t h a t  has been l e a r n e d not o n l y about S o v i e t reform, but about how t o analyze and i n t e r p r e t  i t . What the  f u t u r e h o l d s f o r the present reform program i s , o f course, unknown, but i t s progress w i l l no doubt continue t o be related  t o and a f f e c t e d by some o f the concepts and arguments  e l a b o r a t e d upon i n t h i s paper. Because of t h i s i t should continue t o be analyzed from these p e r s p e c t i v e s .  145 BibIiaqraphy  Barghoorn, F r e d e r i c k . "Problems of P o l i c y and P o l i t i c a l Behavior." S l a v i c Review. 38, No. 2, (June 1979), pp. 211-15 B i a l e r , Seweryn. S t a l i n ' s Succeaaora Cambridge: U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s , 1980.  Cambridge  B r e s l a u e r , George W. "Reformism and Conservatism." S l a v i c Review. 38, No. 2, (June 1979), pp. 216-219 " P o l i t i c a l Succession and the S o v i e t P o l i c y Agenda." Problems of Communism. 29, 3, (May-June 1980), pp. 34-52 The C h r i s t i a n Science Monitor. (World E d i t i o n ) , issues  various  Cohen, Stephen F. "The F r i e n d s and Foes o f Change: Reformism and Conservatism i n the S o v i e t Union." S l a v i c Review 38, No. 2, (June 1979), pp. 187-202 "Reply." S l a v i c Review. 38, No. 2, pp. 187-202  (June 1979),  R e t h i n k i n g the S o v i e t E x p e r i e n c e London: Oxford U n i v e r s i t y Press,  1985.  S o v l e t l c u s London: W. W. Norton and Company,  1985.  C o l t o n , Timothy J . The Dilemma of Reform i n the S o v i e t Union New York: C o u n c i l on F o r e i g n R e l a t i o n s , Inc., 1984. Conquest, Robert. "A New Russia? A New World?" F o r e i g n A f f a i r s . V o l . 53, No. 3, ( A p r i l 1975), pp. 482-97 Eggleston, Roland. " W r i t e r ' s Union O f f i c i a l s D i s c u s s S o v i e t Authors." Radio L i b e r t y Research B u l l e t i n . Supplement 247/87, (June 30, 1987), pp. 1-5 Encounter, v a r i o u s i s s u e s Foreign A f f a i r s , various issues Foreign Broadcast Information S e r v i c e : S o v i e t Union  146 Hanson, P h i l i p . "The E n t e r p r i s e Law and the Reform P r o c e s s . " Radio L i b e r t y Research B u l l e t i n , Supplement 269/87 (July 14, 1987), pp. 1-9 and Teague, E l i z a b e t h . "Text of Gorbachev's and Slyunkov's speeches t o the Party Conference on the S o v i e t Economy." Radio L i b e r t y Research B u l l e t i n . Supplement 223/87 (June 12, 1987), pp. 1-12 Hough, J e r r y F. S o v i e t L e a d e r s h i p i n T r a n s i t i o n Washington: Brookings I n s t i t u t i o n , 1980. Huntington, Samuel P. "Generations, C y c l e s and T h e i r Role i n American Development" In P o l i t i c a l Generations and P o l i t i c a l Development Ed. by Richard J . Samuels. Lexington, Mass.: D.C. Heath, 1977. International A f f a i r s , various issues. Kaser, M i c h a e l . "One economy, two systems: p a r a l l e l s between S o v i e t and Chinese r e f o r m . " I n t e r n a t i o n a l A f f a i r s , V o l . 63, No. 4, (Summer 1987), pp. 395-412 The New  York  Times  Odum, W i l l i a m E. "Whither the S o v i e t Union?" The Washington Q u a r t e r l y . V o l . 4, No. 2, (Spring 1982), pp. 30-49 Pipes, R i c h a r d . "Mr. X R e v i s e s . " Encounter, V o l . L, No. 4, ( A p r i l 1978), pp. 18-21 "Can the S o v i e t Union Reform?" F o r e i g n V o l . 63, No. 1, ( F a l l 1984), pp. 47-61 S u r v i v a l i s Not Enough New Schuster,  Affairs.  York: Simon and  1984.  Problems o f Communism, v a r i o u s i s s u e s . Radio L i b e r t y Research B u l l e t i n , v a r i o u s supplements. Rigby, T. H. "Forward From "Who Gets What, When, How?" S l a v i c Review. 38, No. 2, (June 1979), pp. 203-7 Rothman, S t a n l e y and B r e s l a u e r , George W. S o v i e t P o l i t i c s and S o c i e t y New York: West P u b l i s h i n g Co., 1978. S k i l l i n g , H. Gordon and G r i f f i t h s , F r a n k l y n , eds. I n t e r e s t Groups i n S o v i e t P o l i t i c s P r i n c e t o n : P r i n c e t o n U n i v e r s i t y Press, 1971.  147 S l a v i c Review, v a r i o u s  issues.  Smith, Hedrick. The Russians New York: The New Times Book Co., 1976.  York  Teague, E l i z a b e t h . "Gorbachev Answers H i s C r i t i c s . " Radio L i b e r t y Research B u l l e t i n . Supplement 280/87 ( J u l y 15, 1987), pp. 1-8 "Gorbachev Bounces Back." Radio L i b e r t y Research B u l l e t i n . Supplement 406/87 (October 14, 1987), pp. 1-7 "Gorbachev Opens S e v e n t i e t h A n n i v e r s a r y C e l e b r a t i o n s . " Radio L i b e r t y Research B u l l e t i n . Supplement 432/87 (November 2, 1987), pp. 1-3 T o l z , Vera. "The Current D i s c u s s i o n o f S t a l i n i s m and the S t y l e o f Debates Among S o v i e t H i s t o r i a n s . " Radio L i b e r t y Research B u l l e t i n . Supplement 282/87 (July 20, 1987), pp. 1-6 "Debates Over S t a l i n ' s Legacy on the Eve o f the S e v e n t i e t h A n n i v e r s a r y o f the October R e v o l u t i o n . " Radio L i b e r t y Research B u l l e t i n . Supplement 407/87 (October 15, 1987), pp. 1-11 Tucker, Robert C. "Gorbachev and the F i g h t f o r S o v i e t Reform." World P o l i c y J o u r n a l . V o l . 4, No. 2, (Spring 1987), pp. 179-206 World P o l i c y J o u r n a l ,  various  The Washington Q u a r t e r l y , The Vancouver Sun, v a r i o u s  issues.  various issues.  issues.  

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