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The future of Soviet domestic reform : an analysis of three sovietologists' views Bruyneel, Stephen Alan 1988

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THE FUTURE OP SOVIET DOMESTIC REFORM: AN ANALYSIS OF THREE SOVIETOLOGISTS' VIEWS By STEPHEN ALAN BRUYNEEL B.Sc, The University of B r i t i s h Columbia, 1984 A THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF MASTER OF ARTS i n THE FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIES (Department of P o l i t i c a l Science) .We accept th i s thesis as conforming to the required standard THE UNIVERSITY OF BRITISH COLUMBIA February 1988 @ Stephen Alan Bruyneel, 1988 In presenting this thesis in partial fulfilment of the requirements for an advanced degree at the University of British Columbia, I agree that the Library shall make it freely available for reference and study. I further agree that permission for extensive copying of this thesis for scholarly purposes may be granted by the head of my department or by his or her representatives. It is understood that copying or publication of this thesis for financial gain shall not be allowed without my written permission. Department The University of British Columbia 1956 Main Mall Vancouver, Canada V6T 1Y3 D a t e . ItftS DE-6(3/81) i i A b s t r a c t . Thia thesis had two related purposes: to compare, contrast and c r i t i q u e three scholars' views of the Soviet domestic reform process, and to use these analyses as the means by which to examine the emerging Soviet domestic reform program. The arguments1 of Stephen F. Cohen, Timothy J. Colton and Richard Pipes served as the primary subject matter of t h i s t hesis, with t h e i r i n d i v i d u a l views determined by a c r i t i c a l analysis of the writing which each has recently done on t h i s subject. Investigated i n p a r t i c u l a r was each in d i v i d u a l s ' interpretation of the reform process, i t s component parts and the kind of change that was expected to be involved in any new domestic reforms. The f i n a l chapter dealing with the contemporary Soviet s i t u a t i o n r e l i e d upon as much primary source material as possible in an attempt to provide an accurate picture of the state of a f f a i r s within the country at t h i s time. The r e s u l t s of my analysis indicate that Richard Pipes' interpretations and conclusions do not receive much support from either Soviet history or the contemporary s i t u a t i o n within the country. His one dimensional view of Soviet e l i t e i n terests and his " c r i s i s / r e f o r m " theory of Soviet reform were found to be generally unsubstantiated. Stephen Cohen's arguments, on the other hand, received a good deal of support, es p e c i a l l y with regards to his emphasis on the pro b a b i l i t y of moderate change and the existence of reformist i i i and conservative constituencies within the Soviet Union, constituencies which do appear to have been involved i n the domestic reform process. At the same time, however, the terminology which he employed to describe the reform process was found to be somewhat problematic. Timothy Colton's arguments, f i n a l l y , were also found to have a good deal of e f f i c a c y , e s p e c i a l l y with respect to his view of the country's new generation of p o l i t i c a l leadership and the r o l e that i t would play in the reform process. In conclusion, the new domestic reform program i t s e l f was found to be i n d i c a t i v e of generally moderate economic and p o l i t i c a l change, change that was embraced f o r the moat part by a good segment of the new leadership, but which had found s i g n i f i c a n t resistance at the lower l e v e l s of the bureaucracy and among the working c l a s s . i v Table of Contents Abstract • i i Acknowledgment v i Introduction 1 Endnotes 6 Chapter One: The Nature and Severity of the C r i s i s 7 The Nature and Severity of the C r i s i s 7 Critique IB Endnotes 27 Chapter Two: Forces and Factors Promoting Change in the Soviet Union 30 Forces and Factors Promoting Change .31 Criti q u e 37 Endnotes 52 Chapter Three: The Barriers to Change i n the Soviet Union 55 The Barriers to Change 56 Critique 66 Endnotes 75 Chapter Four: The New Soviet Domestic Reform Program 77 The New Economic Reform Program 78 The Degree and Character of Change. .78 Forces and Factors Affecting Change 84 The Reinterpretation of S t a l i n ' s Role in Soviet History 104 The Degree and Character of Change 104 Forces and Factors Affecting Change 112 V Endnotes 131 Conclusion 135 Bibl iography 145 v i Acknowledgement Three sets of individuals deserve recognition f o r t h e i r help with t h i s t h e s i s . Academically, my thanks go out to the members of my committee, Professors Paul Marantz, Pete Chamberlain and Bob Jackson. I owe a p a r t i c u l a r l y large academic debt to Professor Marantz, who has offered a good deal of advice and shown an even greater amount of patience during the writing of t h i s thesis. Without h i s counselling t h i s thesis would not have turned out the way that i t did. For help i n the actual preparation of the thesis I wish to thank three people. Facing a c r i s i s when my computer broke down. Earl and Marlene Preece were generous enough to allow me access to t h e i r unit and Rick Seely was s i n g u l a r l y responsible for both diagnosing and repairing the problems with my own computer. Without the help of these i n d i v i d u a l s the f i n a l draft of t h i s thesis would have been delayed i n d e f i n i t e l y . F i n a l l y , I owe a large personal debt to my friends and family for t h e i r support over the past months. My f r i e n d s , both at school and p a r t i c u l a r l y at home, have put up with my moods and my hermit-like existence and I thank them fo r that. My greatest debt i s to my family, however, and e s p e c i a l l y to my mother and father, for providing the environment i n which t h i s thesis could be completed. Without t h e i r love and support t h i s work would have been impossible to complete, and as a r e s u l t I dedicate t h i s thesis to them. Introduction There has always been a great deal of i n t e r e s t in the evolution and development of the Soviet system, i f only because the system i t s e l f i s so d i f f e r e n t from the democracies of many European and North American countries. Attention became even more focused in the l a t e 1970'a and early 1980's, however, for two related reasons. F i r s t , the Soviet Union was at that time beginning to experience a number of apparently serious domestic problems. The high economic growth rates of the I960'a were quickly t a i l i n g o f f and a number of the leading western i n d u s t r i a l powers were once again increaaing the gap between t h e i r productivity and that of the Soviet Union. At the same time a number of domestic p o l i t i c a l problems -- ranging from widespread corruption to an increase in the tension l e v e l s between the country's many ethnic groups -- were becoming sources of obvious concern for the Soviet leadership. The seriousness o many of these ailments was such that some western analysts were seriously questioning the a b i l i t y of the U.S.S.R. to survive in the form i t was then i n , l and almost a l l experts had become increasingly interested i n both when and how changes would be i n s t i t u t e d to address some of these problems. The second reason for t h i s renewed interest, i n Soviet reform had to do with the leadership succession that was rapidly approaching at that time. The Soviet leadership unde 2 Leonid Brezhnev was becoming old even by Soviet standards, with a high percentage of i t s members i n t h e i r l a t e s i x t i e s or seventies. This kind of age d i s t r i b u t i o n was p a r a l l e l e d within much of the Party and governmental e l i t e . As a r e s u l t , the succession i t s e l f was expected to take on a spe c i a l significance because of the massive generational change that would necessarily have to accompany i t . Expectations were running p a r t i c u l a r l y high because of the potential personality differences that some thought might be re f l e c t e d in t h i s new generation, a generation which would be the f i r s t to come to power with few memories and/or d i r e c t t i e s to Vladimir Lenin, Joseph S t a l i n and many of the hardships of the Soviet past. A good deal of academic i n t e r e s t was therefore generated in regai'd to the question of whether any of t h i s group's new t r a i t s might be translated into new approaches to domestic reform, approaches which might provide new or more far-reaching solutions to some of the country's internal economic and p o l i t i c a l problems.2 One r e s u l t of t h i s increased i n t e r e s t in the future of Soviet reform was the publication of a good deal of l i t e r a t u r e on t h i s topic. With the Brezhnev succession now in i t s f i n a l stages and a new generation of leaders beginning to address some of i t s domestic problems, I decided that i t would be inter e s t i n g to go back and c r i t i c a l l y examine some of t h i s l i t e r a t u r e . This enterprise w i l l be directed by two related purposes. The f i r s t i s to analyze and c r i t i q u e the arguments of a number of prominent s o v i e t o l o g i s t s to help determine what has been the basic nature of the domestic reform process within the Soviet Union. Once t h i s i s done, the c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s of the recently i n s t i t u t e d Soviet domestic reform program w i l l be compared with the expectations of these same scholars i n an e f f o r t to both provide more current j u s t i f i c a t i o n and/or refutation for their arguments, and to better understand what i s actually going on within the country. Because there was a considerable amount written about the future of Soviet reform, and because the scope of t h i s thesis was limited from the outset, the views of only three scholars w i l l be analyzed here. The c r i t e r i a for selection were quite straightforward. The i n d i v i d u a l s had to have written f a i r l y s p e c i f i c a l l y and s u b s t a n t i a l l y on the topic o Soviet domestic reform and be s u f f i c i e n t l y d i f f e r e n t i n thei interpretations that a comparative analysis would be f r u i t f u l . In the end I decided that the three scholars whose views best f i t these descriptions were Stephen F. Cohen, Timothy J. Colton, and Richard Pipes. To aid in the development of t h i s paper, an a n a l y t i c a l framework was designed which w i l l both bring out the important assumptions and ideas within each author's p a r t i c u l a r viewpoint and at the same time f a c i l i t a t e a comparative c r i t i q u e of these same views. To do t h i s a set o three basic questions were applied to each scholar's written 4 work, the answers to which w i l l not only form the basis for the f i r s t three chapters in t h i s thesis, but w i l l also lay down the theoret i c a l framework for a l a t e r comparison of these views with what i s now occurring within the country. The f i r s t of these questions w i l l deal with what each scholar sees to be the nature and severity of the domestic problems within the Soviet Union, and the kind of change which each f e e l s i s both needed and to be expected i n the near future. It i s important to begin with an analysis of the s i t u a t i o n within the country i t s e l f so as to not only e s t a b l i s h where change and reform are f e l t to be needed, but more importantly to determine what " d e f i n i t i o n of change" each scholar i s working with. An understanding of these d e f i n i t i o n s i s essential because one's conception of the conditions which are "necessary and s u f f i c i e n t " to bring about reform w i l l depend heavily on the kind of change that one expects to occur. The second part of the framework w i l l examine each scholar's interpretation of the forces and factors which, by way of the pressure they generate, w i l l be promoting change within the country. In effect t h i s chapter w i l l be aimed at dissecting and piecing together each i n d i v i d u a l ' s view of the nature of the reform process i t s e l f and the constituent parts which make i t up. The f i n a l piece of the framework w i l l be the l o g i c a l counterpart to previous one in that i t w i l l provide information on the barr i e r s which each scholar f e e l s 5 w i l l a r i s e to both i n h i b i t and provide opposition to change. A s i g n i f i c a n t portion of both of these l a s t two chapters w i l l be devoted to establishing each i n d i v i d u a l ' s view of the nature, organization and role of e l i t e i n t e r e s t s i n t h i s reform process because i t i s within t h i s group that one would expect to f i n d the kind of support and/or resistance which w i l l fundamentally determine the outcome of any new domestic reforms. Once the scholars' views on these topics have been established and analyzed, they w i l l then be used as standards against which to compare what has transpired thus f a r within the U.S.S.R. in the area of domestic reform. The f i n a l chapter w i l l i s o l a t e two f a i r l y s p e c i f i c aspects of the current domestic reform program -- the economic reform program and the reevaluation of the S t a l i n question -- and examine how well the authors' d i f f e r e n t conclusions incorporate and explain the events surrounding the development and progress of these reforms. Bringing in contemporary events to t h i s analysis w i l l not only serve to further c l a r i f y the r e l a t i v e e f f i c a c y of the d i f f e r e n t scholars' views, i t w i l l also provide a better understanding of how these recent events f i t into the h i s t o r i c a l context of Soviet reform. 6 Endnotes 1. See, f o r example Richard Pipes, Survival Is Not Enough (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1984); William E. Odum, "Whither the Soviet Union?", The Washington Quarterly. Vol. 4, No. 2, (Spring 1982), pp. 30-49; and Robert Conquest, "A New Russia? A New World?", Foreign  A f f a i r s . Vol. 53, No. 3, (April 1975), pp. 482-497 2. Two prominent s o v i e t o l o g i s t s wrote books which dealt quite s p e c i f i c a l l y with the topic of generational change. See Jerry F. Hough, Soviet Leadership in Transition (Washington: Brookings I n s t i t u t i o n , 1980), and Seweryn B i a l e r , S t a l i n ' s Successors (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1980). 7 Chapter One  The Nature and Severity of the C r i s i s Before beginning an analysis of the future of Soviet reform one must f i r s t determine the state which the country i s now i n . This being the case, the purpose of t h i s chapter w i l l be to examine the three authors' views of the nature and severity of the domestic problems in the Soviet Union. The scholars' arguments w i l l f i r s t be comparatively analyzed so as to discover and explain areas of consensus and disagreement. The second part of the chapter w i l l then involve a c r i t i q u e of the main theses of each author. C r i t i c i s m s w i l l be of the l o g i c a l and s t r u c t u r a l consistency of the arguments only so that any recent developments in the country which might be germane can be included as part of the f i n a l chapter in thesis, one which w i l l deal s p e c i f i c a l l y with the new Soviet domestic reform program. The Nature and Severity of the C r i s i s Richard Pipes believed that the Soviet Union faced increasingly alarming domestic d i f f i c u l t i e s i n both the p o l i t i c a l and socio-economic spheres. These problems were regarded as serious enough to indicate a state of p o l i t i c a l and economic c r i s i s within the country. In the socio-economic sphere, f o r example, he argued that an inherently flawed a g r i c u l t u r a l system was f a s t becoming an unbearable burden upon the economy, a burden that was second only to that 8 played by the cost of m i l i t a r y expenditures.! S i m i l a r l y , he compared l i v i n g standards within the Soviet Union to those in Third World countries, arguing that in many instances conditions had not improved s u b s t a n t i a l l y since the time of the Tsars.2 F i n a l l y , Pipes believed that the combined e f f e c t s of an increase in the mortality rate and a decrease i n the b i r t h rate of the Russian portion of the population would soon r e s u l t in severe labor shortages i n the country which would l a s t well through the end of the next century.3 The problems i n the p o l i t i c a l sphere were seen to be i n d i c a t i v e of a state of c r i s i s no less severe than the one in the economic realm. In p a r t i c u l a r . Pipes believed that the leadership had deliberately become estranged from the population i t ruled and that widespread corruption among Party members and leadership had become the rule rather than the exception. Both problems were thought to have reached the point where the legitimacy of the leadership had to be c a l l e d into question, i n that "...the former robs i t of the knowledge essential to e f f e c t i v e administration... the l a t t e r deprives i t of the moral authority i t needs fo r the purpose of mobilizing the population.'"* The other s i g n i f i c a n t p o l i t i c a l problem which Pipes emphasised was the state of r e l a t i o n s between the country's various n a t i o n a l i t i e s . He argued that the potential f o r p o l i t i c a l violence among these ethnic groups had become so high that "...underneath the 9 skirmishing, there smoulders resentment and i n some areas, hatred that can explode into genocidal fury should the heavy hand of Russian authority ever weaken."5 These kinds of p o l i t i c a l problems, combined with the ones i n the socio-economic realm, were what caused Pipes to maintain such a dim view of the state of domestic a f f a i r s within the Soviet Union. Pipes believed the causes of these problems to be very basic: they were the r e s u l t of inherent flaws in the Soviet p o l i t i c a l and economic system. In the economic realm, for example, overcentralization and the u n r e a l i s t i c work-incentives were seen to be fundamental c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s of the S t a l i n i s t economic system, a system that would never be able to work well in i t s present form.& P o l i t i c a l l y , he questioned the e f f i c a c y of a Soviet system which had generated a leadership which was more interested i n the maintenance of i t s own power and p r i v i l e g e s than i t was i n the general welfare of the population that i t ruled.7 Pipes' arguments were therefore i n d i c a t i v e of a b e l i e f i n an ove r a l l " c r i s i s of system" within the Soviet Union, one that could only be resolved by r a d i c a l measures. As he himself concluded: This does not mean that the Soviet empire i s about to collapse; i t does mean that in t e r n a l pressures are bringing the day nearer when the nomenklatura w i l l have to choose between moderating i t s ambitions and a l t e r i n g i t s economic and p o l i t i c a l regime or, indeed, when i t may be forced to do both.& 10 Because of t h i s bleak assessment of the nature and severity of the problems within the country, major s t r u c t u r a l changes were f e l t to be necessary to overcome the numerous ailments. As a r e s u l t , the kind of change which Pipes dealt with in his framework was e s s e n t i a l l y systemic in nature. He argued, f o r example, that r a d i c a l economic and administrative decentralization were necessary within the country i f the economy was ever to have a chance at any kind of s i g n i f i c a n t , sustained growth.9 He saw the need f o r a s i m i l a r degree of change in the p o l i t i c a l sphere, in that: ...meaningful change would require the i n s t i t u t i o n of some...procedures by means of which the population could influence the s e l e c t i o n of the Communist Party's d i r e c t i n g personnel and t h e i r conduct of inte r n a l a f f a i r s . 1 0 One can see that Pipes held out l i t t l e hope that the system would ever operate e f f e c t i v e l y in i t s present form. The views of Timothy Colton were si m i l a r to those of Pipes,in only two areas. He did recognize a number of the same p o l i t i c a l and aocio-ecnomic problems that Pipes did, such as those to do with agriculture, population and demographic trends, p o l i t i c a l corruption and ethnic r e l a t i o n a . i l £ a well, some of the factors which Colton believed were responsible f o r these ailments were s i m i l a r to those given by Pipes. He too, for example, emphasized the detrimental roles played by a hypercentralized economic system, outdated production p r i o r i t i e s and increasingly i r r e l e v a n t work incentives.12 Most of Colton's analysis did diverge substantially from Pipes', however. This was p a r t i c u l a r l y the case with his interpretation of the severity of the U.S.S.R.'s domestic p o l i t i c a l and economic problems. While recognizing many of these ailments as serious and cumulative in t h e i r e f f e c t s , he f a i l e d to interpret any of them as having yet reached c r i s i s proportions. For example, he argued that the threats to Russian hegemony and the prospects of labour shortages, while p o t e n t i a l l y serious p o l i t i c a l problems, could not even t h e o r e t i c a l l y occur u n t i l the turn of the century and as such did not represent urgent concerns for the leadership.13 Colton maintained a s i m i l a r view with respect to the p o s s i b i l i t y of ethnic violence in the country, in that: The Soviet regime has i n the past been extra-o r d i n a r i l y adept at using s t i c k s and carrots to keep non-Russian minorities i n l i n e . Two or three generations into the future, population dynamics alone may make fundamental change inescapable. Over the next ten years or so, however, and even several decades beyond, the problem seems readi l y manageable.I 4 Colton did not even see the country's economic problems as indicators of imminent c r i s i s . Although he f e l t that these ailments were the ones with the most potential to become c r i t i c a l , he was quick to point out that recent economic f a i l u r e s had only been at the margins. As such, while the economy may have slowed down, i t had c e r t a i n l y not ceased to grow altogether. In summing up his views about the severity 12 of the Soviet domestic problems, Colton concluded: As the post-Brezhnev era takes shape, the su r v i v a l of the Soviet system i s not in question, but the u t i l i t y of many of i t s p o l i c i e s i s . The accumulation of in t e r n a l problems, while leaving the regime well short of a l l - o u t c r i s i s , confronts i t with choices more vexing than any i t has faced in decades.16 Colton also had a s i g n i f i c a n t l y d i f f e r e n t interpretation of not only the nature of the problems within the Soviet Union, but also of the kind of change which was necessary to overcome them. Rather than being i n d i c a t i v e of an o v e r a l l systemic c r i s i s within the country, he argued that the many domestic problems simply demonstrated that the Soviet p o l i c i e s and approaches to government which had developed during the Brezhnev era were no longer e f f e c t i v e under contemporary conditions.17 The p o l i c i e s were seen to be the source of the problems, then, and not the system i t s e l f . Because of t h i s view, the domestic ailments of the Soviet Union were not seen to r e f l e c t that badly upon the potential e f f i c a c y of the system. Indeed, rather than questioning the system's po t e n t i a l , Colton instead emphasized a number of i t s strengths and assets, including i t s longevity, the accomplishments i t had produced i n science and technology, and i t s lack of a number of the s i g n i f i c a n t problems seemingly c h a r a c t e r i s t i c of many Western democratic countries.IB i n conclusion, Colton argued that even i f the Soviet system "...has been jarred by recent events, basic support f o r Soviet i n s t i t u t i o n s has thus f a r not r e a l l y been 13 loosened... discontent i s directed at the performance of the Soviet system and not at i t s e x i s t e n c e . " ^ Based on these interpretations of the domestic s i t u a t i o n , Colton argued that the degree of change necessary to overcome the country's many problems was s i g n i f i c a n t l y less than the amount f e l t to be needed by Pipes. He believed, that what was i n order was a program of "moderate reform", a program whose p o l i c i e s ...would not transform Soviet society or revolutionize p o l i t i c a l i n s t i t u t i o n s and ideology. It would, however, put a perceptible dent i n the Soviet Union's problems, which i s a l l that most of leaders expect of it.20 The changes which Colton expected were therefore s i m i l a r to Pipes' only with respect to where they might occur. While agreeing, for example, on the need for a general increase i n law and order within the country, Colton argued that such reforms would be aimed s p e c i f i c a l l y at eliminating the v i o l a t i o n s in the work place and the most glaring cases of corruption among Party and government o f f i c i a l s . 2 1 S i m i l a r l y , he f e l t that while economic decentralization was c e r t a i n l y needed, i t would have to be gradual and limited because the Party would want to maintain the basic levers of control.22 These kinds of examples show that i t was d i f f e r e n t interpretations of the nature and severity of the problems within the country which caused Pipes and Colton to ar r i v e at d i f f e r e n t conclusions about the kind of changes 14 which might take place. Stephen Cohen's views were s i m i l a r i n some respects to those of Pipes and Colton. He, too, recognized a number of the same problems i n both the socio-economic and p o l i t i c a l spheres, problems such as the country's general economic stagnation, ethnic tensions and negative demographic trends.23 £ a well, he appeared to share the views of both his colleagues with respect to what was believed to be the basic cause of many of the Soviet ailments i . e . , the hyper-centralized, S t a l i n i s t , economic system.24 Cohen's arguments were also similar to Colton's (and thus d i f f e r e n t from Pipes') with regards to his interpretation of the severity of these problems and the kind of change which would be needed to overcome them. Like Colton, he believed that although the domestic p o l i t i c a l and economic d i f f i c u l t i e s of the U.S.S.R. had the potential to become c r i t i c a l decades from now, they would not do so i n the near term. For example, in place of Pipes' doubts about the capacity of the leadership to provide f o r i t s c i t i z e n s , Cohen provided arguments which defended t h e i r basic actions. He proposed that the Soviet leadership since S t a l i n had actually f u l f i l l e d the "basic premises of Soviet communism at home", premises which included the preservation of national security and nationalism, protection from anarchy, cradle-to-grave welfarism and a better material l i f e for each generation.25 As such, he was able to conclude: 15 ...these and other ... problems ... may one day erode the government's s o c i a l contract with the people, and hence i t s s t a b i l i t y . But to assume tthat w i l l happen soon, or must happen, i s to underestimate the system's reformist potential and popular support.26 The other s i m i l a r i t y between Cohen's and Colton's arguments was with respect to the kind of change which each f e l t was needed i n the country. Cohen also argued that i t was moderate reform which was needed, reform that would involve " . . . p o l i c i e s that seek...to improve the e x i s t i n g conditions without fu n c t i o n a l l y transforming exi s t i n g s o c i a l , p o l i t i c a l and economic foundations or going beyond p r e v a i l i n g i d e o l o g i c a l values."27 While seeing the potential for moderate change in many of the same areas that Colton did, Cohen also expected the future domestic reforms to have a number of s p e c i f i c c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s . He believed, for example, that they would have an " a n t i - S t a l i n i s t " component, and that any economic reforms would be patterned aft e r those in Lenin's New Economic Policy <N.E.P.).28 One can therefore see that Cohen was also quite d i f f e r e n t from Pipes i n terms of the kind of change that he thought was necessary i n the country. Po t e n t i a l l y more int e r e s t i n g than the s i m i l a r i t i e s between Cohen and Colton, however, i s the one apparent difference i n t h e i r argument's. Although Cohen agreed that the problems of the country were not representative of a systemic c r i s i s , he had a somewhat d i f f e r e n t interpretation of what 16 the nature of the problems was. Where Colton had argued that what was at stake was the effectiveness of the previous Soviet leadership's s t y l e and approach to government and p o l i t i c s i n l i g h t of the changing conditions i n the country, Cohen took t h i s view one step further and placed the blame for these problems on a general force within the country which he c a l l e d "conservatism". More than just a p o l i t i c a l philosophy, Cohen argued that conservatism was one of the two fundamental, permanent tendencies or impulses which had constituencies at a l l l e v e l s of Soviet p o l i t i c s and society. Its tenets included: ...a deep reverence for the past; a sentimental defense of ex i s t i n g i n s t i t u t i o n s , routines and orthodoxies that l i v e on from the past; and an abiding fear of change as a harbringer of disorder and of a future that w i l l be worse than the present as well as a sacrilege of the past. P o l i t i c a l conservatism i s . . . i n the Soviet Union, a cogent philosophical j u s t i f i c a t i o n of the status quo as the culmination of everything good i n the h i s t o r i c a l past and thus the only sturdy bridge to the future.29 The i n e f f e c t i v e p o l i c i e s of the Soviet leadership since Nikita Khrushchev -- the ones emphasized by Colton -- were therefore seen to be just symptoms of the r e a l problem, which was conservatism i t s e l f . What Cohen therefore f e l t was at stake was the effectiveness (and perhaps eventually even the e f f i c a c y ) of t h i s conservative tendency within Soviet p o l i t i c a l l i f e . The differences between Cohen and Colton on t h i s subject are not as fundamental as those between Pipes and these two authors. Both Colton and Cohen have s i m i l a r basic perceptions of the Soviet system and i t s leadership ( i . e . a system that i s stable, whose problems are numerous but not irreparable, and which has generated at least a segment of the p o l i t i c a l e l i t e that i s interested i n v o l u n t a r i l y addressing these problems). The differences in t h e i r views can instead be put down to two f a c t o r s . The f i r s t has to with the f a c t that they are operating from d i f f e r e n t l e v e l s of analysis. Cohen's arguments are part of his larger "friends and foes of change" thesis, in which Soviet p o l i t i c s and society are seen to be divided into two fundamental impulses or tendencies, labelled conservatism and reformism.30 The paradigm i t s e l f i s very h i s t o r i c a l and places the emphasis on the c o n t i n u i t i e s which have evolved in Soviet p o l i t i c s . For example, although Cohen recognizes the problems of the country to be growing increasingly serious, t h e i r character i s seen to have remained e s s e n t i a l l y the same over the years in that they have always been the r e s u l t of flaws within the approach of the usually dominant conservative tendency. As such, although he recognized the problems themselves as becoming increasingly serious, he can conclude that the problems may be less important than what they are representative of. Colton, on the other hand, while i m p l i c i t l y accepting the basic premises of Cohen's thesis,31 takes an approach which places more emphasis on 18 the contemporary s i t u a t i o n , and on how p a r t i c u l a r factors have changed. He chose to concentrate s p e c i f i c a l l y upon the t r a d i t i o n a l p o l i c i e s and methods of the Soviet leadership, and on why modern conditions are making them increasingly i r r e l e v a n t today. The second difference i s a terminological one, and one which w i l l re-occur throughout t h i s t h e s i s . Because of his h i s t o r i c a l approach, Cohen chose to use the broad d e f i n i t i o n reformism and conservatism to describe the physical forces which have always been present within Soviet p o l i t i c s and society and involved in the reform process. Colton, on the other hand, avoided such d e f i n i t i o n s because he was dealing s p e c i f i c a l l y with the forces which were now present within Soviet society and how they are involved i n the reform process. As a r e s u l t , while both scholars often dealt with the same subject matter -- i . e . , the conservative nature of the Brezhnev era and d i f f e r e n t interests within the e l i t e they have used d i f f e r e n t methods to describe i t . While the differences between these authors w i l l become increasingly important i n the l a t e r stages of analysis, f o r now i t i s enough to say that they both s t i l l ended up generating b a s i c a l l y s i m i l a r conclusions about the nature and severity of the problems within the Soviet Union. Critigue This c r i t i q u e w i l l concentrate on three main areas: th authors' d i f f e r e n t views of the severity of the problems within the Soviet Union and what they r e f l e c t about the nature of the c r i s i s faced by the country, and the diverging interpretations of the kind of change f e l t needed to overcome the problems. With respect to the f i r s t subject, i t would seem that Pipes' analysis suffers from a number of problems. A l l r e l a t e to his problematic and inconsistent use of the term " c r i s i s " . C r i s i s , by d e f i n i t i o n , implies a state of imminent disaster, disaster that can only be avoided by immediate, r a d i c a l changes. Pipes, however, seems to imply that c r i s i s i s a gradual phenomenon, one that w i l l not involve d i r e c t threats to the s t a b i l i t y of the country, but which w i l l s t i l l somehow force the leadership to i n s t i t u t e r a d i c a l changes.32 S i m i l a r l y confusing i s the f a c t that while e x p l i c i t l y stating that none of the country's problems represent imminent threats to the leadership's control of the country,33 he s t i l l chooses to t i t l e two of the chapters in his l a t e s t book the "Economic C r i s i s " and the " P o l i t i c a l C r i s i s " of the Soviet Union.34 As a r e s u l t , we are l e f t with a very vague idea of exactly what constitutes a c r i s i s for Pipes and how his d e f i n i t i o n applies in the Soviet s i t u a t i o n . Pipes' time-frame for c r i s i s i s also inconsistent and unclear. A number of times, for example, he states that the r e a l danger from many of the country's ailments w i l l come "twenty to t h i r t y years down the road".35 At other times, however, he uses such terms as "soon" and "jus t around the 20 corner" to describe when domestic conditions w i l l force change upon the leadership.36 Once again, the end r e s u l t i s that we are l e f t with no clear idea as to what Pipes means when he talk s about c r i s i s . These d e f i n i t i o n a l and time-frame problems adversely a f f e c t the c r e d i b i l i t y of his conclusions about the severity of the problems of the Soviet Union. One also has to c r i t i c i z e Pipes" int e r p r e t a t i o n of a systemic c r i s i s within the country. He gives l i t t l e factual evidence to support his view that the e f f i c a c y of the system i s in question. Perhaps more importantly, he ignores or dismisses many of the l o g i c a l arguments which are i n favor of the survival of the system. Many of these sources of systemic s t a b i l i t y were elaborated upon by Colton and Cohen, the most obvious of which was the f a c t that the system had already survived f o r almost seventy years, overcoming problems along the way that have been at least as s i g n i f i c a n t as those of today. For example, i t has demonstrated the a b i l i t y to change and adapt to such extreme conditions as the ravages of Stalinism and the upheaval of Khrushchev's reform program. I t would therefore seem that Pipes' c r i t i c i s m s of the system's e f f i c a c y lack a certain amount of h i s t o r i c a l perspective. Pipes also dismisses too quickly the r o l e that the country's bureaucracy has played i n causing a number of the problems and preventing the solutions to others.37 P o l i t i c a l and governmental bureaucracy, by i t s very nature. 21 serves to distance a leadership from i t s people. E f f o r t s at communication from both ends can be blocked by the sheer mass of people and paper-work that stand in the way. As well, the amount of time and e f f o r t that i s necessary to "wade through" the bureaucratic apparatus often means that s o c i a l problems are l e f t unattended and/or allowed to grow worse. Because of the incredible s i z e and extent of the bureaucracy within the Soviet Union, there can be l i t t l e doubt that i t must cause these kinds of problems there. As a r e s u l t , a number of the f a u l t s which Pipes' found i n the a b i l i t y and intentions of the leadership, and which he interpreted as being i n d i c a t i v e of systemic i n s t a b i l i t y , can be p a r t i a l l y attributed to the bureaucratic b a r r i e r s in the country (something which w i l l be discussed i n more d e t a i l i n chapter three). Pipes' arguments about systemic c r i s i s also have a number of l o g i c a l problems. The most basic one re l a t e s to the question of how well a system i s supposed to perform before i t can be considered to be viable. No system, aft e r a l l , i s perfect, and an examination of some of the problems seemingly c h a r a c t e r i s t i c of many western democratic countries, but not found i n the Soviet Union (such as unemployment, i n f l a t i o n , budget d e f i c i t s and recessions) would seem to indicate that systemic v i a b i l i t y i s r e l a t i v e to the s p e c i f i c example one i s discussing. This i s p a r t i c u l a r l y the case with the Soviet s i t u a t i o n . The Soviet h i s t o r i c a l record of extremely harsh 22 and unstable domestic conditions has meant that the most important c r i t e r i o n f o r the average Soviet c i t i z e n has been whether or not there have been any p o s i t i v e , recognizable increases i n l i v i n g standards and material possessions i n his l i f e t i m e , and not necessarily what le v e l these indices have reached.3® This may become less of a factor among a younger generation of Soviets who have fewer memories of S t a l i n or even Khrushchev, but i t w i l l remain an important consideration for a good percentage of the population for many years. F i n a l l y , the evidence which Colton provides to show that any d i s s a t i s f a c t i o n which does exi s t among the people i s directed toward the p o l i c i e s of the leadership, and not at the i n s t i t u t i o n s of the system, leaves one with the conclusion that the country does not appear to be facing a c r i s i s which i s systemic in nature. The kind of change which Pipes f e e l s i s needed i s also susceptible to c r i t i c i s m on a number of grounds. To begin with, i t i s l o g i c a l that i f the country i s not facing a systemic c r i s i s there i s no need for changes which are r a d i c a l and systemic i n nature. Therefore i f Pipes' basic interpretations are incorrect, then so i s his view of the amount of change that i s needed i n the country. There i s also a problem associated with expecting t h i s degree of change in any country. The kinds of reforms which Pipes f e e l s are needed in the U.S.S.R. to make i t s system viable are the type normally associated with the outcome of revolutions or coups 23 and c e r t a i n l y not the kind that usually r e s u l t from any kind of a leadership/populous compromise. History has shown that governments do not vol u n t a r i l y change to t h i s degree, and to anticipate such changes i n the Soviet Union i s to necessarily expect and even require the most severe of domestic circumstances, the type of circumstances which even Pipes did not foresee in the Soviet future. The l a s t problem with concentrating on the need f o r systemic change rel a t e s to what one often omits while doing so. By recognizing or emphasizing only major reforms Pipes ignores many of the smaller changes that can occur and which have already been of such immense importance within the framework of the system. One cannot dispute the f a c t that the r e h a b i l i t a t i o n of the Communist Party i n s t i t u t i o n s a f t e r the death of Joseph S t a l i n had a s i g n i f i c a n t e f f e c t on the process of government, i f only because i t gave more than one indi v i d u a l a voice in the policy-making process. S i m i l a r l y , a Soviet c i t i z e n who compares the domestic conditions under S t a l i n to those under Nikita Khrushchev or Leonid Brezhnev cannot help but see, and appreciate, the changes i n h i s everyday l i f e . As such, while Pipes may be correct to argue that these kinds of changes have l i t t l e e f f e c t on the o v e r a l l nature of the system, t h e i r "within-system" e f f e c t s are too important to ignore. A c r i t i q u e of the views of Cohen and Colton must begin with an emphasis on the degree of e f f i c a c y which many of 24 th e i r intrepretations and conclusions appear to have. Their combined arguments, both with respect to the severity of the country's domestic p o l i t i c a l and economic problems, and what the problems imply about the nature of the c r i s i s which the country faces, do seem to r e f l e c t a very r e a l i s t i c and factual interpretation of the actual s i t u a t i o n within the country. The s t a t i s t i c a l evidence which both scholars provide to substantiate t h e i r views i s actually quite si m i l a r to that given by Pipes, as are t h e i r arguments that any kind of " c r i s i s " w i l l probably not occur f o r decades.39 I t i s the ambiguous re l a t i o n s h i p which Pipes sees between the present and the future which serves to distinguish the views of the three authors, and not the fa c t s themselves. Colton's and Cohen's arguments about systemic s t a b i l i t y are also credible, not only because they are extensions of t h e i r previous interpretations, but because they also r e f l e c t comprehensive and wide-ranging analyses. Again, i t i s Pipes' f a i l u r e to recognize any strengths within the Soviet system, or to do more objective and extensive comparisons with western countries that are the problems here. A portion of both scholars' arguments which may become somewhat problematic i s the way in which each defines the degree of change f e l t to be needed i n the country. Although changes contained within both scholars' reform frameworks are c e r t a i n l y not r a d i c a l by any means, one has to r e a l i s t i c a l l y ask just how much change can occur within the 25 Soviet Union before i t has to be l a b e l l e d "systemic". A number of the reforms proposed by these scholars are actually quite s i m i l a r to those presented by Pipes, being only of a lesser degree. The gradual introduction of market forces into the economy, the increasing role of factory managers and workers i n planning and production, and the general ( i f very gradual) decentralization of any of the aspects of the country can be interpreted as changes which would make s i g n i f i c a n t inroads into a number of the basic tenets of Soviet socialism. Staunch Marxist ideologues might even argue that these kinds of changes, though moderate and gradual i n scope, are none the less increasingly systemic i n nature, at least in terms of the doctrine of Marxism-Leninism. Ultimately, of course, whether change i s seen to be systemic or not w i l l depend on what one believes to be the fundamentals of Marxism-Leninism and socialism, and whether or not these have been altered by the reforms. My c r i t i c i s m here, therefore, i s a d e f i n i t i o n a l one, but a p o t e n t i a l l y important one a l l the same. A Soviet Union which i n s t i t u t e s the kinds of reforms and changes described by Cohen and Colton would not be fundamentally transformed, but i t would be a s i g n i f i c a n t l y d i f f e r e n t e n t i t y when compared to i t s present s e l f . As a r e s u l t , the grounds for evaluating i t s performance -- both economically and p o l i t i c a l l y -- would have to be adjusted to take into consideration these new 26 c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s . More importantly, i f these reforms resulted in very obvious s i g n i f i c a n t and p o s i t i v e e f f e c t s , or i f they lead the country into more comprehensive changes along the same l i n e s , then one might be tempted to say that the reforms themselves had been more systemic in nature, even i f they were i n t i t a l l y quite limited i n scope. Should either of these scenarios occur, Colton's and Cohen's previous characterization of the kinds of change involved might be somewhat misleading. F i n a l l y , we are l e f t to analyze the one area i n which Cohen and Colton appeared to disagree. This was with respect to t h e i r views of the structure and make-up of the Soviet e l i t e , and the e f f e c t that t h i s arrangement has had on the development and maintenance of the country's problems. Unfortunately, such a c r i t i q u e would require an in-depth investigation into each author's view of the nature of reform process in the country, something that i s not the topic of t h i s chapter. Because the next two chapters w i l l deal s p e c i f i c a l l y with t h i s subject they are probably better places to conduct such analyses. 27 Endnotes 1. Richard Pipes, Survival i s Not Enough (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1984), pp. 126-127 2. Pipes, p. 128 3. Pipes, p. 131 4. Pipes, p. 152 5. Pipes, p. 185 6. Pipes, pp. 113-120 7. Pipes, pp. 148-158 8. Pipes, p. I l l 9. Richard Pipes, "Can the Soviet Union Reform?", Foreign  A f f a i r s . Vol. 63, No. 1, ( F a l l 1984), p. 58 10. Richard Pipes, "Mr. X Revises", Encounter. Vol. L, No. 4, (April 1978), p. 18 11. Timothy J. Colton, The Dilemma of Reform in the  Soviet Union (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, Inc. , 1984) f PP . 14 12. Colton f PP- 16-26 13. Colton f P- 29 14. Colton t P- 29 15. Colton p P- 27 16. Colton , P- 14 17. Colton > PP- 16- 17 18. Colton > PP- 26- 27 19. Colton , P- 27 20. Colton t P- 78 21. Colton » P- 65 22. Colton t P- 71 28 23. Stephen F. Cohen, Sovleticua (New York: W. W. Norton and Co., 1985), pp. 24-29 24. Cohen, pp. 24-29 25. Cohen, p. 26 26. Cohen, p. 27 27. Stephen F. Cohen, Rethinking the Soviet Experience (London: Oxford University Press, 1985), p. 131 28. Cohen, Rethinking, pp. 122-127 (anti-Stalinism) and pp. 89-92 (N.E.P.) 29. Cohen, Rethinking, p. 132 30. This thesis, which serves as the basis for Cohen's book Rethinking the Soviet Experience, w i l l be discussed in greater depth i n the next chapter. S u f f i c e to say here that i t proposes a h i s t o r i c a l b a t t l e within the Soviet Union between the forces promoting reform and those who are against change. Cohen discusses t h i s thesis i n depth in his l a s t chapter, pp. 128-157 31. Colton'a views of the reform process within the Soviet Union do accept the presence of d i f f e r e n t constituencies and in t e r e s t s within society. However, rather than stressing t h e i r importance as q u a s i - d i s t i n c t e n t i t i e s involved i n the f i g h t over reform, he instead emphasizes that the growth of conservatism has been a gradual phenomenon, with i t s important functional sources having come from the post-Khrushchev leadership's approach to p o l i t i c s and government. These differences w i l l also be discussed in some d e t a i l in the next chapter. See also Colton, pp. 16-17 32. Pipes discusses t h i s i n a number of places, including in Survival. pp. 13, 111 and 199-208 33. Pipes, Survival. pp. 199-208 34. Pipes, Survival, Chapter III "The Economic C r i s i s " , pp. 110-148, and Chapter IV "The P o l i t i c a l C r i s i s " , PP. 148-208 35. Pipes makes t h i s statement, f o r example, with respect to the expected r e s u l t s of negative demographic trends and population growth rates i n Pipes, Survival. pp. 185 and 135, respectively. 29 36. See, for example. Pipes, Survival, p. 12 "...Soviet government...will have to choose before long...", and p. I l l " . . . i n t e r n a l pressures are bringing the day nearer...". 37. Pipes, Survival. p. 150 38. See the f i r s t hand accounts of j o u r n a l i s t Hedrick Smith in Hedrick Smith, The Russians (New York: New York Times Book Co., 1976), pp. 68-69 39. The s t a t i s t i c s and figures showing the basic s i m i l a r i t i e s in the authors' perceptions of the problems can be found in Pipes, Survival, pp. 131 and 185; Colton, pp. 26-27, and Cohen, Sovieticua. pp. 24-28 Chapter Two Forcea and Factora Promoting Change i n the Soviet Union In order to understand the struggle over reform in a country, i t i s important to est a b l i s h what agents are involved in the reform process. With t h i s i n mind, the goals of t h i s chapter are to present and analyze the three authors' views of the forces and factors that are promoting change within the Soviet Union. The terms "forces and f a c t o r s " w i l l be used, in t h i s context, to describe those things within the Soviet Union which are pushing the country and i t s leadership in the d i r e c t i o n of p o s i t i v e domestic change. "Change or reform" w i l l be defined as p o l i c i e s aimed at solving the problems themselves. As became apparent from the conclusions in the l a s t chapter, the scholars are a l l working with separate ideas of the kind of change needed to solve these problems. These d i f f e r e n t "working d e f i n i t i o n s of change" w i l l be taken into consideration during the analyses here. The chapter i t s e l f w i l l once again be organized into two parts. The f i r s t w i l l involve a comparative presentation and discussion of the arguments of the three authors i n order to determine and then explain areas of agreement and disagreement. This w i l l then be followed by a c r i t i q u e of the basic theses of each author. As was the case in the previous chapter, the c r i t i q u e w i l l be of the l o g i c a l and h i s t o r i c a l a p p l i c a b i l i t y of the authors' arguments. 31 Forcea and Factora Promoting Change i n the Soviet. Union Richard Pipes argued that the pressure generated by the Soviet Union's domestic p o l i t i c a l and economic c r i s e s would be the only s i g n i f i c a n t factor promoting change within the country.1 He reached t h i s conclusion f o r three related reasons, a l l of which grew out of h i s interpretation of the domestic reform process. To begin with, he could see no other comparable forces within the Soviet system that would be s i m i l a r l y active and e f f e c t i v e i n promoting domestic change. A number of the places in which one would normally expect to f i n d these kinds of factors -- such as from i n t e r e s t s within the leadership or from s o c i e t a l groups in favour of reform --Pipes saw as either non-existent within the country or else inapplicable to the Soviet situation.2 Even i f other such factors could be found, he argued that domestic c r i s e s were s t i l l e ssential because only they could demonstrate to the leadership the kind of change which was required. As we have seen, Pipes f e l t that r a d i c a l , s t r u c t u r a l changes were needed to overcome what he considered to be the generally systemic problems of the U.S.S.R.. Because changes of t h i s type (especially i n the case of Communist societ i e s ) would not normally be agreed to by governments, he argued that only by a demonstration of the systemic nature of the domestic problems would the Soviet leadership r e a l i z e the kind of change which was needed to resolve them.3 F i n a l l y , the r o l e i n the reform process which Pipes envisioned for the Soviet e l i t e also led to his emphasis on the importance of domestic c r i s e s . He argued that the character of the e l i t e Cor nomenklatura) was such that i t s members were more concerned with maintaining t h e i r own p r i v i l e g e s and positions of power than they were with addressing the country's problems. As a r e s u l t , Pipes f e l t that domestic c r i s e s were necessary because "...reforms are only as a r e s u l t of major i n t e r n a l and external setbacks, that they w i l l come about only when the nomenklatura concludes they are the price i t must pay f o r s u r v i v a l " . 4 In conclusion, i t was t h i s " c r i s i s / r e f o r m t h e s i s " of Pipes' which caused him to see only one s i g n i f i c a n t force promoting change within the Soviet Union. Timothy Colton shared few of Pipes' assumptions and b e l i e f s about either the nature of the reform process within the Soviet Union or about the forces and factors involved in i t . He did believe that the country's domestic ailments would provide a s i g n i f i c a n t amount of pressure as forces promoting change.5 At the same time, two reasons kept him from placing the kind of emphasis upon them that Pipes did. F i r s t , because of h i s view of the nature and severity of these problems, Colton did not f e e l that domestic c r i s i s was necessary f o r change to come about. As a r e s u l t , he was free to choose from a wider range of less powerful forces that would s t i l l be able to provide adequate pressure f o r change. More importantly, h i s interpretation of e l i t e i n t e r e s t s meant that he expected t h i s group to play a much more active, p o s i t i v e r o l e i n the reform process. Indeed, he believed that the leading force which would be promoting reform i n the country would r e s u l t from a change i n the character and attitude of the new, younger generation of Soviet leaders. Colton argued that a number of aspects of t h i s group's s o c i a l and p o l i t i c a l background would have resulted i n the simultaneous development of an " i t c h f o r improvement" among many of i t s members and the capacity to recognize the country's problems as serious and i n need of immediate attention.& Such h i s t o r i c a l factora as a lack of d i r e c t association with S t a l i n and his crimes, p o l i t i c a l development and maturation during the upheaval of the Khrushchev years and the experience of the bureaucratic stagnation of the Brezhnev era were mentioned i n t h i s regard. Because of t h i s view of the new leadership, Colton believed that as serious as the country's domestic problems were becoming, they would not have t h e i r greatest e f f e c t s by themselves. Instead, they would be more important by the way in which they interacted with a new leadership that would be more predisposed to a "problem-solving" approach to Soviet p o l i t i c s . He concluded: The accumulation of inter n a l problems, while leaving the regime well short of a l l - o u t c r i s i s , confronts i t with choices more vexing than any i t has faced in decades. One hallmark of the changing leadership i s i t s sobre realism about the extent of these troubles.... What we are l i k e l y to see, rather than d e s t a b i l i z a t i o n or black-to-white change, i s a 34 reshading of the grays, a gradual s h i f t in the p o l i t i c a l c l a s s ' center of g r a v i t y . ' F i n a l l y , Colton believed that one other s i g n i f i c a n t factor should be expected to inte r a c t with the new leadership, and the domestic problems which i t faced, to promote change. Because of h i s emphasis on the contemporary Soviet s i t u a t i o n and the changes which had brought i t about, he f e l t that the rapidly changing p o l i t i c a l and s o c i a l environment within the country i t s e l f would play an important r o l e in promoting change. Colton argued that such factors as the increasing s i z e and complexity of the Soviet economy, the new s o c i a l values and p r i o r i t i e s among the younger members of the population and the general increase i n material expectations throughout society were a l l quickly making obsolete the previous leadership's approach to government and domestic problem-solving.& These changing conditions were expected to become p a r t i c u l a r l y important because they would provide the necessary environment i n which the new leadership, and the domestic problems which i t faced, could interact to bring about reform. This emphasis on the importance of the changes within the country was in stark contrast to Pipes' arguments about the i d e o l o g i c a l and a t t i t u d i n a l c o n t i n u i t i e s within the e l i t e and the general population, c o n t i n u i t i e s which the l a t t e r f e l t would make domestic c r i s i s essential to generate any kind of re a l domestic change. In conclusion, Colton'a view of the p o s i t i v e 35 forces within the reform process meant that the potential success of the reforms themselves was more dependent upon the p o l i t i c a l s k i l l of the reformers than i t was on the need for imminent, systemic c r i s i s . 9 Stephen Cohen's inter p r e t a t i o n of the forces which would be promoting reform in the country was once again somewhat d i f f e r e n t from h i s colleagues'. The s i m i l a r i t i e s present were with respect to the role that the country's problems would play i n promoting change. Like Colton and Pipes, he also argued that as the number and severity of the ailments increased, the pressure they would generate could act d i r e c t l y upon the leadership to demonstrate the need for change. 10 Once again, however., there were two reasons why Cohen did not place the kind of emphasis on these problems that Pipes did. Like Colton, he also f e l t that because these problems were not systemic i n nature, they did not require the kind of forcea promoting change that were needed i n Pipes' framework. As a r e s u l t he, too, recognized a greater number of factors within the country which could have s i g n i f i c a n t p o s i t i v e e f f e c t s . More importantly, he had a very well-defined conception of not only the domestic reform process, but e s p e c i a l l y of the r o l e which the e l i t e would play i n i t . Cohen argued that t h i s process should be "...best understood in terms that are p l a i n , h i s t o r i c a l and universal, as well as s o c i a l and p o l i t i c a l -- as a confrontation between the forces of reformism and conservatism".11 This reformist impulse, then, was expected to be the leading factor promoting change within the country. This tendency was the i d e o l o g i c a l and philosophical a l t e r n a t i v e to the one elaborated upon i n the f i r s t chapter,12 and he believed that i t represented the many sources of support f o r change that existed within the Soviet Union. Cohen argued that because t h i s tendency had proponents at a l l l e v e l s of Soviet society and p o l i t i c s , i t would play a more Important r o l e i n the struggle f o r reform than would either the pressure from the country's domestic problems or a s p e c i f i c generation of leadership. From out of Cohen's conception of the reform process came the f i n a l factor which he f e l t would act as a s i g n i f i c a n t force promoting change. He argued that i t was within the h i s t o r i c a l c o n t i n u i t i e s of the domestic reform process in general, and the reformist impulse in p a r t i c u l a r , that the greatest potential for reform lay.13 He saw t h i s reform process to be c y c l i c a l i n nature, with the r e l a t i v e strength and organization of these in t e r e s t s at any one time determining the composition and character of the leadership. Forces which were promoting change were therefore important by the way i n which they either strengthened or weakened the two fundamental impulses involved. In t h i s way, Cohen could argue that the problems of the country were just as important by the way in which they r e f l e c t e d the problems of the conservative approach, as t h i s would i n d i r e c t l y increase the attractiveness and s i z e o£ the reformist constituency.1^ S i m i l a r l y , a p a r t i c u l a r generation of leadership was seen within t h i s framework to be less important because i t would be divided i n the same way that generations always had been, and thus only be one indication of the r e l a t i v e strength of the two fundamental constituencies.15 A l l of these h i s t o r i c a l c o n t i n u i t i e s made up the environment i n which Cohen expected a l l of the forces to intera c t to bring about change. Cohen's emphasis on continuity i s i n t e r e s t i n g when i t i s compared to the perspectives of his two colleagues. His approach i s even more h i s t o r i c a l than Pipes' was, though h i s basic interpretations are of course fundamentally d i f f e r e n t . This same approach i s quite d i f f e r e n t from Colton's, however, and here in l i e s the nature of t h e i r differences. Different l e v e l s of analysis have resulted i n quite d i f f e r e n t expectations, even i f the basic interpretations and assumptions of the two scholars are quite s i m i l a r . As well, the terminology used to describe these forces within the country was also d i f f e r e n t so as to take into account the d i f f e r e n t emphases of each scholar. To conclude, i t can be said that i t i s within these terminological and perceptional differences that the main differences of opinion between Cohen and Colton l i e . Critique To begin t h i s c r i t i q u e , i t must be said that Pipes' " c r i s i s / r e f o r m " thesis seems to suffer from a number of problems and inconsistencies. One has to f i r s t question i t s h i s t o r i c a l v a l i d i t y . In Pipes' defense, there have been occasions i n the Soviet past where reform apparently was i n response to domestic c r i s e s . Such may have been the case with the i n i t i a t i o n of V.I. Lenin's New Economic Policy (N.E.P.) program in the early 1920's. The Soviet Union had just been through a time that has been aptly dubbed "War Communism", the r e s u l t s of which were p o l i t i c a l and economic conditions in the country that were of c r i s i s proportions. These conditions were no doubt primary considerations in Lenin's decision to implement the decidedly more moderate p o l i c i e s associated with the N.E.P.. The reforms of the new Soviet leadership immediately af t e r the death of Joseph S t a l i n could be construed in si m i l a r terms. S t a l i n ' s death had l e f t the i n s t i t u t i o n s of the Communist Party apparatus in disarray, due to a lack of use during hla v i r t u a l d i c t a t o r i a l r u l e over the country. As well, the influence and power of the secret police had r i s e n to such l e v e l s that i t s head (Lavrenti Beria) was a serious contender for the leadership of the country. These two examples are i n d i c a t i v e of the p o l i t i c a l conditions within the country at that time which may have helped to force changes and reforms upon the new leadership. "Reform from c r i s i s " has not always been the case i n the Soviet Union, however. The reform program of N i k i t a Khrushchev, which involved d e - S t a l i n i z a t i o n , economic restructuring, and the easing o£ r e s t r i c t i o n s i n the c u l t u r a l sphere, occurred in a domestic environment that was already beginning to recover from the e f f e c t s of Stalinism. Rather than being forced by c r i s i s , these changes were much more voluntary i n nature, r e f l e c t i n g Khrushchev's evaluation of the changing conditions and needs of Soviet society. His a g r i c u l t u r a l reforms, f o r example, were designed primarily to increase the o v e r a l l standard of l i v i n g within the country. As well, the concessions he made within the p o l i t i c a l sphere were meant to assure both the masses and the e l i t e that "...a new era of personal security from a r b i t r a r y t e r r o r i s t i c r u l e had arrived."1^ In a s i m i l a r way, the reform program associated with Alexei Kosygin during the middle 1960's did not appear to grow out of an environment of c r i s i s . Although the country's economic growth rates had been f a l l i n g for a number of years before t h i s time, t h i s problem had c e r t a i n l y not reached c r i s i s l e v e l s . Again, the proposed economic decentralization program appeared to be more the r e s u l t of d i f f e r i n g perceptions of what was best f o r the future of socialism within the country.17 F i n a l l y , Stephen Cohen has argued that even Lenin's N.E.P can be seen to be as much an "id e o l o g i c a l a l t e r n a t i v e f o r socialism" as i t was a pragmatic response to the s i t u a t i o n in the country at the time.I s This sampling of the h i s t o r i c a l evidence would seem to 40 promote the argument that reform in the Soviet Union can be i n i t i a t e d by the leadership, and be the r e s u l t of fa c t o r s other than c r i s i s . Pipes would no doubt reply to these examples i n two ways. F i r s t , he would argue that because neither of the above reform programs were ultimately successful, c r i s i s i s needed for successful reform. Second, he might not even recognize either of them as examples of attempted reform because they did not involve any plana to restructure the system i t s e l f , which he believes i s the main source of the country's problems. Pipes' l a t t e r argument, and the problems with i t , were dealt with i n the previous chapter. As f o r h i s f i r s t possible reply, i t would seem that "success" i s a very poor c r i t e r i o n against which to judge the merits of a reform program, es p e c i a l l y in the Soviet case. Too many facto r s can Interfere with the potential success of reforms, many of which have l i t t l e to do with the potential e f f i c a c y of the program i t s e l f . The death or removal of an important leader (one of the problems with the Khrushchev case) or bureaucratic i n e r t i a (a factor i n the f a i l u r e of the Kosygin reforms) are but two examples of these kinds of fac t o r s . As such, i t i s more constructive to concentrate on the content of the reform program, and what i t proposed to change, when one i s t r y i n g to assess i t s s i g n i f i c a n c e . Pipes' arguments also appear to suffer from a l o g i c a l defect. This i s with respect to how the country's problems are supposed to force change upon the leadership. I t would seem that the kind of pressure necessary f o r t h i s to occur could be generated in only two ways. One would involve economic and p o l i t i c a l problems becoming so serious that collapse appeared imminent to the leadership without immediate, r a d i c a l changes. As we saw i n the previous chapter, however. Pipes himself argued that although the problems of the country may soon reach c r i s i s l e v e l s , i t i s highly unlikely that they w i l l soon reach these kinds of dimensions.19 Pressure of the kind necessary to force change upon the leadership could also be generated by popular actions and demonstrations that would cause the leadership to fear the prospects of a "revolution from below". Pipes also states, however, that the necessary prerequisites f o r revolution do not e x i s t in the country at the present time, and probably never w i l l , because of some p a r t i c u l a r c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s of the Soviet population. Among these are a general aversion to p o l i t i c a l and s o c i a l violence and a willingness to endure the status-quo because of an overidlng fear of the anarchy and i n s t a b i l i t y that are associated with the concept of change.20 The r e s u l t i s that Pipes i s l e f t with no r e a l mechanism by which change w i l l be forced upon the leadership. The problems here are s i m i l a r to those he encountered i n the previous chapter with respect to his use of the term " c r i s i s " . As was the case then, we are l e f t confused about the exact meaning of Pipes' arguments, and how they are supposed to work. Without a plausible working mechanism and more d e f i n i t e time frame within which i t i s supposed to work his e n t i r e " c r i s i s / r e f o r m " thesis lacks two s i g n i f i c a n t sources of c r e d i b i l i t y . Timothy Colton's views of the reform process also have number of potential problems. In general, one can c r i t i c i z e the basic premises of the "generational change/policy change thesis from both h i s t o r i c a l and l o g i c a l perspectives. This 1 indeed what both Cohen and Pipes have done (though i n very d i f f e r e n t ways).21 Such c r i t i c i s m s are not applicable to Colton's arguments, however. The f a c t i s that he does not argue that change w i l l come simply because of the upcoming generational change within the country and the leadership.22 Rather, h i s thesis i s that because of a number of the p a r t i c u l a r developmental c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s of t h i s new generation, some of i t s members might be more predisposed to a "problem-solving approach" than was the case with t h e i r predecessors. As well, the potential differences in t h i s generation are f e l t to be important because they w i l l be expressed i n an environment that includes a number of serious domestic problems. The argument i s therefore that i t i s the r e l a t i o n s h i p between the above facto r s that has the potential to generate change, and not just the generational/leadership change. What should instead be assessed i s whether the differences and changes which Colton perceives -- in the country's problems, i n the new generation of leaders and i n the domestic conditions within the country i t s e l f -- are s i g n i f i c a n t enough to i n t e r a c t and promote change. There has already been a good deal of agreement among the authors that the country's problems are serious and growing worse quickly. As such, i t would appear that at l e a s t they are already s i g n i f i c a n t enough to promote change within the country. Closely related to t h i s topic are the conditions within the country i t s e l f . Although Pipes and Cohen f i n d a large number of c o n t i n u i t i e s in modern Soviet p o l i t i c s and society, (a l b e i t from very d i f f e r e n t interpretations of Soviet h i s t o r y ) , the changes in both may become increasingly Important as subsequent generations develop. As the average Soviet c i t i z e n becomes further removed from the harshness of some periods of the Soviet past, and as he simultaneously becomes more aware in an age that i s characterized by increased communication and intercourse among a l l countries, new problems are bound to emerge. P o l i t i c a l and governmental strategies developed f i f t y to s i x t y years ago, and meant to apply under those conditions, w i l l no longer apply as well, i f at a l l . Perhaps more importantly, an increase i n the number of comparisons between conditions in the Soviet Union and the West w i l l be i n e v i t a b l e , and t r a d i t i o n a l excuses and solutions may not be as e f f e c t i v e anymore in s a t i s f y i n g the Soviet population. In sum, I have to agree with Colton that 44 the longer p o l i c i e s remain unchanged, and conditions within the the country continue to evolve, the greater w i l l be the potential e f f e c t that these conditions can have as forces promoting change. The moat contentious part of Colton's thesis i s whether the differences in the new generation of leadership w i l l be enough to predispose some of them to change and whether these p a r t i c u l a r i n d i v i d u a l s w i l l be able to f i n d t h e i r way into the upper echelons of the leadership. A complete answer to t h i s question w i l l , of course, need the teat of time. Even so, aome inveatigatlon into the ch a r a c t e r i a t i c a of t h i a group haa been done by using the published statements of some of i t s members, as well as through interviews with some of i t s representatives. One scholar was able to incorporate t h i s information into an established, t h e o r e t i c a l approach to generational analysis.23 He te n t a t i v e l y concluded that such h i s t o r i c a l experiences as the excesses of Stalinism, the r i s e and f a l l of Khrushchev's reform program, and the stagnation of the Brezhnev period have resulted i n : ...a generation that deplores the backwardness of Soviet society, the functional d e f i c i e n c i e s of the system, the i n a b i l i t y of the present administration to make progress i n r e c t i f y i n g the s i t u a t i o n , and at the same time i t probably stands confident i n i t s a b i l i t y to do so. It i s a generation that i s less l i k e l y to accept actual or potential international achievements as substitutes for int e r n a l development. I t i s a generation that may be more w i l l i n g to pay a higher price in terms of p o l i t i c a l and s o c i a l change i f persuaded that such a price would assure substantial improvement i n the growth and e f f i c i e n c y of the productive and 45 d i s t r i b u t i v e processes.25 Some of these generational differences are s i m i l a r to those which Colton f e l t would be c h a r a c t e r i s t i c of the new generation of Soviet leaders. Whether or not i n d i v i d u a l s with such ideas can f i n d t h e i r way into the higher echelons of the leadership i s another question, however. There are s i g n i f i c a n t pressures for continuity and conformity throughout the Party and leadership which w i l l always act as b a r r i e r s to the development of reformist p o l i c i e s and the advancement of Individuals who might embrace such ideas. Colton himself argued that how important the new generation of leaders w i l l be as a force promoting change w i l l depend a great deal on how quickly and thoroughly i t s representatives can gain entrance into the leadership.26 There are, however, three aspects of the Soviet s i t u a t i o n which I believe w i l l not only favour the cause of the younger generation in general, but the more reform-minded members of i t i n p a r t i c u l a r . The f i r s t i s the nature of the leadership change that i s occurring within the Soviet Union.26 i n the early 1980's the average age of Politburo members was higher than i t had ever been, and i t was even higher for those in the positions of special power and influence.27 A s such, i t was only a matter of time before younger in d i v i d u a l s began to move into the upper ranks of the Party. One factor which favors the cause of i n d i v i d u a l s interested in change i s the very nature of the problems i n the country. One would think that as these domestic d i f f i c u l t i e s continue to worsen, those i n d i v i d u a l s who associate themselves with a "problem-solving approach" to Soviet p o l i t i c s (provided i t i s couched in terms that do not completely alienate them from t h e i r more conservative superiors) would be favoured in the Party. This view i s not necessarily i d e a l i s t i c because such i n d i v i d u a l s need not associate themselves with ideas of "moderation" or " l i b e r a l i z a t i o n " to be interested i n change. Rather, the emphasis would only have to be on "the healing of the ailments of society f o r the betterment of socialism." Interestingly, in d i v i d u a l s with these types of p o l i t i c a l programs are those which Colton f e e l s w i l l advance into the leadership. F i n a l l y , i t would appear that Colton's reasoning may be correct i f only because some kind of a " c a t a l y s t " or " j o l t " seems to be needed to break the Soviet Union out of the economic and bureaucratic stagnation that i t has been in for so many years. In an environment that i s apparently devoid of domestic c r i s i s , a new "policy-change" oriented leadership may be the sol u t i o n . I t would not guarantee the successful implementation of reforms, but i t might be the extra "push" necessary to at l e a s t get things started i n the country. Stephen Cohen's arguments must also be examined more clo s e l y i n a number of areas. S p e c i f i c a l l y , one has to investigate his b e l i e f in the d i v i s i o n of Soviet p o l i t i c s and society into two fundamental, philosophical tendencies or impulses. C r i t i c i s m s of t h i s approach have, in the past, concentrated on t h i s d e f i n i t i o n , e s p e c i a l l y with respect to whether hi s categorization i s either too narrow or too broad for a n a l y t i c a l purposes.28 Although Cohen has s a t i s f a c t o r i l y responded to t h i s criticisms,29 he w i l l always be l e f t with two problems. The f i r s t i s that by attempting to define reformism and conservativism as the two fundamental d i v i s i o n s within Soviet society, but not as d i s t i n c t , functional groups in t h e i r own r i g h t , i t w i l l always be unclear as to the exact organization of these tendencies, which aspects of Soviet p o l i t i c s and society are involved and, more importantly, how they can act semi-cohesively to promote change. One's p o l i t i c a l b e l i e f i s , aft e r a l l , only one force acting to influence behaviour. Although i t can a f f e c t one's bureaucratic or i n s t i t u t i o n a l i n t e r e s t s , i t w i l l not always be the prime factor motivating one's actions. Cohen's ultimate problem, however, i s that he w i l l never be able to i r r e f u t a b l y establish the e f f i c a c y of his approach. There i s no way to determine f o r sure what variety of i n t e r e s t s e x i s t within the Soviet Union or how they are structured, mostly because of the closed nature of the system and i t s leaders' emphasis on an outer conformity of views. As a r e s u l t u n t i l Soviet society opens up 46 s i g n i f i c a n t l y , his approach w i l l remain open to c r i t i c i s m on d e f i n i t i o n a l and fa c t u a l grounds. For the purposes of t h i s chapter, however, we can e s s e n t i a l l y circumvent these problems by concentrating on the question of whether or not there have always been forces or factors promoting change within Soviet p o l i t i c s . H i s t o r i c a l evidence would seem to support at least t h i s portion of Cohen's t h e s i s . The arguments that were previously used to refute some of Pipes' assumptions about the nature of the leadership are good examples of such evidence. The cases of Khrushchev and Kosygin would seem to indicate that there have been within the leadership views which have not always favored the status quo. Cohen strengthens his own case with the argument that even during the darkest days f o r reform, i . e . the S t a l i n years, there existed ind i v i d u a l s (such as Sergei Kirov and Nikolai Voznesensky) who s t i l l promoted the cause of change.30 Although those promoting change have not always been successful, i t would appear that the forces have at le a s t always existed i n the upper ranks of the Party. A more contentious part of Cohen's argument i s the evidence which he gives to support h i s claim that the problems of conservatism w i l l i n d i r e c t l y strengthen the reformist impulse i t s e l f . For instance, h i s argument that the memory of S t a l i n and h i s crimes w i l l always deny the conservatives the h i s t o r i c a l source of legitimacy they need to j u s t i f y a continued defence of the status quo i s true only to a point.31 One must remember that there are many aspects of Stalinism -- in p a r t i c u l a r the man's strong leadership and emphasis on order -- which w i l l continue to appeal to a great many people within the Soviet Union, and which can therefore always be used to j u s t i f y some of the tenets of a conservative approach.32 Cohen's argument that the growing.discrepancy between the r e a l i t y of everyday l i f e in the country and the Utopian claims of Communist and Marxist-Leninist ideology w i l l increasingly give the reformist impulse an ideological advantage over i t s conservative counterpart i s also suspect.33 The problem here i s that while ideology and doctrine undoubtedly s t i l l play some r o l e in the country, i t has been shown that the Soviet people have already become pragmatic, and even c y n i c a l , about both.34 /\s such, whether or not one side i n the reform/status-quo b a t t l e has an i d e o l o g i c a l advantage over the other may be less important to those i n society than Cohen might argue. The most a t t r a c t i v e piece of evidence which Cohen presents i s the one regarding the existence of an alte r n a t i v e "reformist ideology" that might not only gain in strength as i t s S t a l i n i s t counterpart develops c r e d i b i l i t y problems, but which could also serve to aid the reformist cause by j u s t i f y i n g any changes that might be made.35 He argued that such an i d e o l o g i c a l a l t e r n a t i v e existed i n the form of the ideas and p o l i c i e s associated with the N.E.P., and i t s creators Lenin and Nikolai Bukharin. This program obviously did e x i s t , and i f some of i t s tenets are s t i l l considered relevant by those who promote change within the country they could be important f o r two reasons. F i r s t , as the premises and p o l i c i e s of Stalinism continue to f a i l to solve the problems of a modern Soviet society, a l t e r n a t i v e p o l i c i e s would naturally become more popular. More importantly, however, and e s p e c i a l l y in l i g h t of the questionable importance of ideology to the general population, such an alternative could be important at the leadership l e v e l . Soviet leaders have h i s t o r i c a l l y f e l t the need to j u s t i f y any changes i n the system, no matter how small, and an ideology which already provides such j u s t i f i c a t i o n could make the i n s t i t u t i o n of changes easier from t h e i r point of view. The f i n a l portion of Cohen's argument that i s open to challenge i s h i s b e l i e f that the reformist impulse w i l l , through the natural h i s t o r i c a l cycle of reform and conservatism within the country, become strong enough to form the c o a l i t i o n he f e e l s i s necessary to bring about change. Only time w i l l t e l l , of course, i f Cohen's arguments are correct. Time, however, may be the most important factor involved here. I t has been over twenty years since reformist int e r e s t s were strong enough to i n s t i t u t e a program of change. Since that time, the conservative and bureaucratic b a r r i e r s to change have increased s u b s t a n t i a l l y and the problems of the country have become more numerous and serious. As such, one wonders just, how long the leadership, and the country, can afford to wait to address these problems before they do get out of control. As I argued with respect to Colton's thesis, i t seems that a c a t a l y s t i s needed to "get the country going again". Without i t , Cohen's cycle of reformism and conservatism may become f u n c t i o n a l l y i r r e l e v a n t in the face of problems either too serious to solve by moderate reform, or too d i f f i c u l t to address because of bureaucratic and/or conservative b a r r i e r s to the implementation of change. 52 Endnotes 1- For an i l l u s t r a t i o n of Pipes' views about the nature and importance of the country's problems as forces promoting change, see Richard Pipes, Survival i s Not Enough (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1984), pp. 110-148, for economic problems, and Pipes, pp. 149-198 fo r p o l i t i c a l problems. 2. Pipes, pp. 148-158, and 199-203 3. Pipes, p. 111. Indeed, Pipes f e l t that both of these forces were actually b a r r i e r s to change i n the country. His arguments in t h i s area w i l l be dealt with extensively in the next chapter. 4. Pipes, p. 204 5. Timothy J. Colton, The Dilemma of Reform i n the Soviet  Union (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, Inc., 1984), pp. 16-27 6. Colton, p. 64 7. Colton, p. 64 and p. 48, respectively. 8. Colton, pp. 16-17 9. Colton, p. 78 10. Stephen F. Cohen, Sovleticua (London: W. W. Norton and Company, 1985), pp. 24-28 11. Stephen F. Cohen, Rethinking the Soviet Experience (London: Oxford University Press, 1985), p. 129 12. See Chapter one of t h i s work, p. 35, f n . 28 13. Cohen, Rethinking, pp. 129-157 14. Cohen, Rethinking, pp. 150-154 15. Cohen i s quite e x p l i c i t about t h i s point. See Cohen, Rethinking. pp. 155-6. I t should be pointed out that Colton does not disagree with t h i s basic point i . e . reformist/ conservative Interests within society. He argues that the c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s of the new generation are such that i t s members, including those who might be more conservative, w i l l be more predisposed to change. 53 16. For an examination of Khrushchev's motives, and the s i t u a t i o n i n the country at the time, see Stanley Rothman and George W. Breslauer, Soviet P o l i t i c s  and Society (New York: West Publishing Co., 1978), pp. 44-46. The p a r t i a l quote i s from p. 44 17. For a s i m i l a r examination of Kosygin's reforms, see Rothman and Breslauer, pp. 242-244. 18. Cohen, pp. 71-92. 19. Pipes, p. 111. 20. Pipes, pp. 200-202. 21. Cohen, Rethinking, p. 155, Richard Pipes, "Can the Soviet Union Reform?", Foreign A f f a i r s , Vol. 63, No. No. 1, ( F a l l 1984), p. 57 and Pipes, Survival. pp. 29-32 22. Colton, pp. 46-52. 23. The theory used was the "experential" variant of Samuel Huntington's three-tiered theory of generational a c t i v i t y and differences. For a summary of t h i s theory, and the o r i g i n a l source of t h i s note, see Seweryn B i a l e r , S t a l i n ' s Successors (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1980), p. 106. Huntington's work was o r i g i n a l l y presented in Samuel P. Huntington, "Generations, Cycles, and Their Role in American Development" in Richard J. Samuels, ed., P o l i t i c a l Generations and P o l i t i c a l  Development (Lexington, Mass.: D. C. Heath, 1977), pp.9-16 24. B i a l e r , pp. 103-4 25. Colton, pp. 78-79. 26. A l l of the work of these three authors that i s analyzed in t h i s thesis was written before Mikhail Gorbachev came to power. As such, a c r i t i q u e of the prospects for generational change must be made with respect to how the s i t u a t i o n was then, so as to avoid l e t t i n g hindsight prejudice such c r i t i c i s m s . 27. Brezhnev was the General Secretary, V. Tihkonov was the Chairman of the Council of Ministers, M.A. Suslov was in charge of ideology, and D. F. Ustinov was the Defence Minister. A l l were in excess of seventy years old. 54 28. Cohen's ideas about the "friends and foes of change" were f i r s t published i n a r t i c l e form i n 1979, as "The Friends and Foes of Change: Reformism and Conservatism in the Soviet Union", S l a v i c Review. 38, No. 2, (June, 1979), pp. 187-202. This a r t i c l e was the basis for the l a s t chapter of h i s subsequent book Rethinking the  Soviet Experience. In the same issue, a number of c r i t i c a l reviews were also published, including ones by T. H. Rigby ("Forward From "Who Gets What, When, How"", pp. 203-207), Frederick Barghoorn ("Problems of Poli c y and P o l i t i c a l Behaviour", pp. 211-215), and George W. Breslauer ("Reformism and Conservatism", pp. 216-219). 29. Cohen responded in kind to these c r i t i c i s m s in the same issue of S l a v i c Review. "Reply", pp. 220-223 30. Cohen, Rethinking, pp. 141-142. 31. Cohen, Rethinking, p. 150. 32. See, for example, the f i r s t hand report of a j o u r n a l i s t i n Hedrick Smith, The Russians (New York: New York Times Book Co., 1976), pp. 325-330. 33. Cohen, Rethinking, pp. 151-153. 34. Smith, pp. 371-401. 35. Cohen, Rethinking, pp. 89-92. 55 Chapter Three The Barriers to Change i n the Soviet Union Just as there are forces and factors promoting change within the Soviet Union, so there are si m i l a r agents retarding the reform process. The aim of t h i s chapter w i l l therefore be to discuss and c r i t i q u e the three authors' views of what barri e r s to reform and change e x i s t within the country. "Barriers", i n t h i s context, w i l l r e f e r to those forces or factors within the Soviet Union that are in t e r f e r i n g with the pace and/or the ultimate success of ref orm. Throughout t h i s chapter the term "conservatism" w i l l be employed to describe and explain the ba r r i e r s to change in the country. I t w i l l be used i n two somewhat d i f f e r e n t contexts, however, which must be kept separate in the mind of the reader. When used by Timothy Colton, and by myself i n my c r i t i q u e s , i t w i l l take on i t s t r a d i t i o n a l meaning, i . e . a philosophy or outlook which i s averse to the idea of change. When used by Stephen Cohen, however, i t w i l l take on a much broader meaning. I t w i l l be meant to refer to one of the two fundamental, permanent tendencies or impulses that has always existed i n Soviet society and p o l i t i c s , a force which i s less than a d i s t i n c t entity but more than just a p o l i t i c a l philosophy. The differences between these conceptions of conservativism w i l l be elaborated upon further as the chapter progresses. 56 F i n a l l y , the term conservativism w i l l be used in reference to the Soviet e l i t e , leadership and bureaucracy. Although these groups are i n t e r r e l a t e d , they w i l l , in t h i s context, have s p e c i f i c connotations. The most general term w i l l be the e l i t e which, broadly construed, w i l l be used to refer to the Communist Party o f f i c i a l s i n the upper echelons of the Party and governmental apparatus. The bureaucracy w i l l r efer the extensive organizational network that has developed within the country, and s p e c i f i c a l l y to those lesser distinguised members of the e l i t e of whom i t i s made up. The most s p e c i f i c d e f i n i t i o n w i l l be the one applied to the leadership, which w i l l be meant to refer to the members of the e l i t e who are actually in the Politburo and the Secretariat, the two most powerful p o l i t i c a l organs i n the country. The Barriers to Change in the Soviet Union Richard Pipes pointed out three i n t e r r e l a t e d forces which he believed were acting as b a r r i e r s to change i n the U.S.S.R.. The most important of these was f e l t to be the Communist Party establishment i t s e l f . Pipes believed that the Party had become an impediment to change because i t had deviated from i t s h i s t o r i c a l r o l e i n society. Instead of being a force to mobilize the population, he argued that i t had evolved into a "... a self-seeking p r i v i l e g e d c l a s s that in i t s highest echelons, the so-called nomenklatura. has turned into a completely p a r a s i t i c stratum."! The Party 57 was now seen to be concerned only with the j u s t i f i c a t i o n and preservation of the status quo, both of which would preserve the p r i v i l e g e s and positions of i t s members. Pipes believed that the Party had become such a s i g n i f i c a n t b a r r i e r to change because of the nature of i t s functional e l i t e , the nomenklatura. He argued that the p r i v i l e g e s and "perks" of t h e i r positions -- such as high o f f i c i a l (and u n o f f i c i a l ) s a l a r i e s and access to special stores and s o c i a l a c t i v i t i e s -- had resulted in t h e i r becoming greedy, corrupt, and interested only in t h e i r own well being.2 pipes went even further to state that the pursuit of " s e l f - i n t e r e s t " was the only human motive recognized and understood by the Soviet e l i t e and the one accepted as representative of the natural state of human relations.3 Pipes was r e a l l y questioning not only the character and interests of the e l i t e , but the very legitimacy of i t s leadership, arguing that i t "... knows how to intimidate and manipulate them <the people>, but not how to govern them, i n as much as government always e n t a i l s some measure of persuasion and compulsion." 4 Reform was therefore f e l t to be i n h i b i t e d because the Soviet e l i t e were seen to be active "en masse" in the struggle to avoid change in the country. Pipes also argued that the nature of the Soviet economic system made i t a physical b a r r i e r to change. He believed that i t had been developed and now functioned 58 largely to enaure the security and power of the nomenklatura.5 As a r e s u l t , any attempts to reform i t -- whether they involved the decentralization of economic planning or the sharing of the means of production -- would necessarily have to include a concomitant decrease in the ov e r a l l control and power enjoyed by the e l i t e and the leadership. Pipes believed that because such changes would be completely at odds with the goals and p r i o r i t i e s of the e l i t e , they would never be v o l u n t a r i l y undertaken by them. He argued: ...the bureaucratic establishment, pressured to do something to enhance productivity, would rather improve the central planning system than dismantle i t . . . t h e planning bureaucracy i s f i g h t i n g both tooth and n a i l against any reduction of i t s authority, and i t s o l i c i t s in i t s endeavor the assistance of anxious Party o f f i c i a l s . ^ F i n a l l y , Pipes saw within Russian society and culture a number of endemic ba r r i e r s to change and reform. One of the most s i g n i f i c a n t of these was thought to be the general population's overwhelming fear of the collapse of authority and the threat of anarchy, both of which had come to be associated with the concept of change because of the harsh domestic p o l i t i c a l and s o c i a l history of the Soviet Union. Pipes argued that because of t h i s fear, the nomenklatura actually had the population on i t s "side" i n the b a t t l e over change in that even though the people were d i s s a t i s f i e d , they were more interested i n circumventing the established 59 authority of the Party than they were in overthrowing or replacing it."? In conclusion. Pipes could see no s i g n i f i c a n t sources of support for change within society i t s e l f , the lack of which he f e l t to be a strong impediment to the prospects of reform in the country. An examination of Timothy Colton's views indicates that he appeared to share only one of Pipes' interpretations. This was the one concerning the existence of s o c i e t a l and c u l t u r a l b a r r i e r s to reform within the Soviet Union. He argued that these included the conservative nature of much of the country's present e l i t e and the weak democratic t r a d i t i o n of the country itself.® Colton did not go so f a r as to argue that the conservative nature of the population actually placed i t on the same aide as the nomenklatura i n the b a t t l e for reform, but he did f e e l that the concept of change would not necessarily be uni v e r s a l l y embraced by the population. Colton did not believe, however, that the Soviet e l i t e would play the kind of completely negative r o l e in the reform process that Pipes envisioned f o r them. He did recognize a good deal of conservatism within the older e l i t e , but even t h i s he saw to be more of a by-product of the Brezhnev regime than an indica t i o n of a corrupt and i l l e g i t i m a t e leadership completely uninterested i n change. Indeed, he argued that there were l o g i c a l reasons for t h i s conservatism, reasons such as: 60 F i r s t , i t was reacting deliberately to what i t saw as the reformist excesses of the Khrushchev years. Second, Brezhnev, the man at the top, was...an ideo l o g i c a l conservative....Third, there was from the e a r l i e s t days a power equilibrium within the inner leadership... creating strong i n h i b i t i o n s against serious changes.... Fourth, top positions were f i l l e d by members of an aged generation ....And f i f t h , Brezhnevism worked at the outset, making i t harder to change when i t ceased to worked.10 As a r e s u l t , although he expected s i g n i f i c a n t opposition from the older members of the e l i t e to any domestic changes, the the reasons which he saw f o r the development and maintenance of t h i s conservatism were fa r less s i n i s t e r than those given by Pipes. This i s another i n d i c a t i o n of the basic differences between the two scholars' perceptions of the e l i t e and t h e i r i n t e r e s t s . Because of t h i s kind of view of even the older Soviet e l i t e , Colton believed that one of the major physical b a r r i e r s to change that would e x i s t within the country would be the s t y l e of government and the kind of p o l i c i e s which had arisen during the Brezhnev regime and which had been one of the causes of i t s conservatism. He argued quite emphatically: As a r u l e , the Soviet Union addresses i t s personal problems with remarkably stable formulas and approaches. I t l i v e s by time-tested practice. The catch i s that sooner or l a t e r a l l old habits generate declining returns.10 The b a r r i e r to change, then, would be the d i f f i c u l t y that the new Soviet leadership would have in breaking away from what had become t r a d i t i o n a l methods and approaches. Such things as 61 the emphasis on minimal attempts at reform, the fear (or i n a b i l i t y ) to check instances of p o l i t i c a l corruption, the policy of increasing the s i z e of the bureaucracy as a means of addressing domestic problems and the use of ideology and propaganda as excuses for the country's problems had a l l become such safe and established means of operation that just try i n g to break out of t h i s pattern would be a s i g n i f i c a n t b a r r i e r to change. Colton believed that these entrenched approaches would not only be hard to break out of, they would also adversely a f f e c t attempts at reform within t h e i r l i m i t s . He argued that because of the conservatism that had been generated by t h i s s t y l e of government, comprehensive "master plans" f o r reform had not been developed within the e l i t e . Any reform program would therefore have to ambiguous and hesitant at beat, with both q u a l i t i e s serving to hinder the potential success of the reforms themselves.H More importantly, he argued that a probable response to t h i s problem would be more emphasis on tryin g to re-implement old solutions, solutions that had been previously endorsed but not sucessfully executed -- such as inducements f o r technological breakthroughs, help f o r private plots or penalties for drinking on the job -- than there would be on creating new, untested ones. By doing so, however, the same problems which may have resulted in the o r i g i n a l f a i l u r e of these solutions could come into play again and newer, p o t e n t i a l l y more successful solutions might 62 be eshewed for fear of t h e i r unknown results.12 Colton also argued that a number of the special c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s of the reform process i n the Soviet Union would slow the pace of change and make reform more d i f f i c u l t to implement. To begin with, he believed that there were a number of aspects of Soviet p o l i t i c s and society that might appear r i p e for change but which would never, or could never, be reformed. Mentioned i n t h i s respect were such ideas as the primacy of the state, the relevancy of the Marxist-Leninist ideology, and the r o l e of the Party as the vanguard of the people.13 Such c o n t i n u i t i e s meant that the p o s s i b i l i t i e s f o r p o l i t i c a l change were seriously l i m i t e d . Colton believed that the major r e s u l t of t h i s would be that the leadership would have an "ends and means" problem that could serve as a further b a r r i e r to change.1^ Because r a d i c a l changes and methods would not be involved i n the reform process, the tools which the reformers would have available to implement change would necessarily have to be the t r a d i t i o n a l , largely authoritarian methods of the past <i.e. the KGB and the censorship of the press). As a r e s u l t , the pursuit of changes in the economic sphere might involve a tightening of conditions i n other realms, such as i n the area of c i v i l and human r i g h t s . In t h i s way the methods of the reform process i t s e l f could serve as a b a r r i e r to more widespread changes in the country. F i n a l l y , Colton believed that the Soviet reform process 63 would have to include an Inordinate amount of caution on the part of the leadership, caution which could slow the course of reform and l i m i t i t s potential e f f e c t s . He argued that the leadership would be faced with the constant dilemma of t r y i n g to balance the amount of change that was f e l t to be needed with the fear of going too f a r too quickly and losing control of the country-15 For example, popular expectations would have to be t i g h t l y controlled so as not to create a s i t u a t i o n in which the leadership could not s a t i s f y these needs. S i m i l a r l y , while many aspects of domestic reform would be embraced by the population, the aide e f f e c t s of some reforms had the potential to bring with them controversy. Social i n e q u a l i t i e s , f o r example, were inev i t a b l e from changes i n the wage scale and structure, and a more r e a l i s t i c p r i c i n g system would no doubt r e s u l t i n s i g n i f i c a n t l y increased prices f o r foodstuffs and material goods. The r e s u l t could therefore be that the scope, and perhaps more importantly the speed of reform would be largely dependent upon the leadership's perception of the magnitude of the potential negative s i d e - e f f e c t s . One can see an i n t e r e s t i n g and revealing contrast here between Pipes' and Colton's perceptions of the i n t e r e s t s of the leadership v i s - a - v i s the general population. The former believed that the leadership mistrusted the population and avoided any potential reforms i n t h e i r favour because both were threats to t h e i r main p r i o r i t y -- the maintenance of 64 t h e i r privileged positions within Soviet society. Colton, by comparison, interprets the emotional state of the leadership as being more one of fear, fear of how to best meet the population's changing needs without going too f a r and unravelling the f a b r i c of the system and the country. Colton's views not only lack Pipes' e x p l i c i t doubts about the i n t e r e s t s and goals of the leadership and the e l i t e , but he also sees a s o c i e t a l continuity between the e l i t e and the people that i s missing from Pipes' arguments. By doing so, the "fear of change" that permeates the Soviet people can be understood to have had s i m i l a r e f f e c t s upon the leadership as well, e f f e c t s which may cause i t to be a f r a i d to go too far too quickly. Colton does not completely disregard the r o l e that personal ambition plays i n the struggle f o r change among the e l i t e , but he does not see i t to be the overriding factor that Pipes does. F i n a l l y , Stephen Cohen's views also contained aspects which were si m i l a r to those of his colleagues. He, too, emphasized the many s o c i a l and c u l t u r a l b a r r i e r s to change which existed within the country, b a r r i e r s which included the country's t s a r i s t past, with i t s bureaucratic and conservative legacy, and the e f f e c t that the " r o l l e r coaster" record of Soviet domestic achievments and disasters has had on the general population in leaving them with mixed emotions about the concept of change.16' Cohen also recognized i n t e r e s t s within the e l i t e that 65 would not be in favour of change and which would even a c t i v e l y oppose i t . He, l i k e Colton, d i f f e r e d from Pipes with his view of a less homogeneous e l i t e , one in which only a segment would be acting as an actual physical b a r r i e r to change.I' S i m i l a r l y , Cohen did not see the philosophical and a t t i t u d i n a l gulf between the e l i t e and the population that Pipes did. The s o c i o - c u l t u r a l b a r r i e r s to change which he emphasized were seen to be applicable at a l l l e v e l s of Soviet p o l i t i c s and society.IB F i n a l l y , Cohen also agreed with Colton that many of the circumstances and conditions within the country had contributed to the strengthening of conservatism within both the e l i t e and the country. He emphasized such factors as the stagnation of the Brezhnev years and the gradual bureaucratization of Soviet p o l i t i c s over the past two decades as factors which have added to the strength of conservative interests within the country.19 As a r e s u l t , he also did not f e e l that the e l i t e would be the sole b a r r i e r to change within the country. Where Cohen's analyses r e a l l y d i f f e r e d from h i s colleagues', however, was in the perspective from which he viewed these b a r r i e r s to change and e s p e c i a l l y the terminology that he used to describe them. A l l of h i s views were once again incorporated into his "friends and foes of change" thesis, in that he viewed "the main obstacle to reform i n the Soviet Union...Enot to be] one or another generation, i n s t i t u t i o n , e l i t e , group or leader, but the 66 profound conservatism that seems to dominate a l l of them, from the family to the Politburo."20 This conservatism i s the same force whose tenets Cohen f e l t were the cause of the country's many domestic problems.21 Here, however, i t i s the actual physical a c t i v i t y of i t s proponents that i s seen to be the major b a r r i e r to change in the country. He argued that conservatism would be a b a r r i e r to change not because i t s followers cannot accept any kind of change, but because the kind of change which they w i l l accept must be "...slow and t i g h t l y controlled by established authority, based on law and order, and conform to pre v a i l i n g orthodoxies...".22 Cohen's interpretations are i n t e r e s t i n g because they once again incorporate almost a l l of Colton's arguments within them. Because of the h i s t o r i c a l approach he takes to the analysis of Soviet reform, Cohen has viewed the conservative aspects of Brezhnevism as only extensions of what has always been the s i t u a t i o n in the country i . e . , the presence of wide-ranging conservative impulse. S i m i l a r l y , h i s use of the term conservatism to describe the b a r r i e r s to change within the country i s understandable because of h i s need to somewhow define the conservative i n t e r e s t s which appear to have always existed at a l l l e v e l s of the country. In conclusion, Cohen and Colton once again cover s i m i l a r subject material, but because of d i f f e r e n t perspectives and emphases, they have used d i f f e r e n t terminology to analyze i t . Critique 67 One can begin t h i s c r i t i q u e by noting that the amount of consensus among the three scholars with regards to the endemic b a r r i e r s to change within Soviet society i s a good ind i c a t i o n of the e f f i c a c y of t h e i r arguments. There can be l i t t l e doubt that a number of incidents in the past --Including the ravages of revolution, a bloody c i v i l war, and the d i r e c t , devastating e f f e c t s of two world wars -- have played a r o l e i n s e n s i t i z i n g the Soviet people to the side e f f e c t s of p o l i t i c a l and s o c i a l change. The character and nature of the middle-to-older generations within the country c e r t a i n l y r e f l e c t t h i s f a c t . One author, working from a wide range of personal interviews with Soviet c i t i z e n s and even prominent dissidents, found that many of these past hardship were s t i l l very relevant today. He concluded that "...Russians have t r a d i t i o n a l l y had a deeply ingrained fear of anarchy and the c e n t r i f u g a l forces that tug at the unity and s t a b i l i t y of t h e i r vast state."23 Although the strength of t h i s aversion to change i s impossible to quantify, i t would seem that the prospect of p o l i t i c a l , economic and s o c i a l change (and e s p e c i a l l y rapid and f a r reaching change) does not have a huge constituency within Soviet society. The most c r i t i c a l question to analyze here, however, i the nature of the b a r r i e r to change played by e l i t e i n t e r e s t s . Pipes' arguments were the most extreme on t h i s topic, and yet he appears to be unable to convincingly 68 j u s t i f y his views. To begin with, his character p o r t r a i t of the e l i t e i s made without the benefit of a great amount of evidence. Pipes lays no factual foundation for such adjectives as "greedy, s e l f - i n t e r e s t e d and power-hungry". His only r e a l source i s the writing of one Soviet emigre, an indi v i d u a l who no doubt had l i t t l e reason to f e e l grateful towards the Soviet elite.24 Pipes therefore gives no r e a l evidence that such descriptions are accurate representations of the character of an average member of the Soviet e l i t e . If Pipes' individual character p o r t r a i t s are questionable, then the f a c t that he uses them as the basis for generalizations about the entire membership of the Communist Party and the e l i t e i s even more suspect. Pipes assumes an almost complete homogeneity of views and ch a r a c t e r i s t i c s throughout the e l i t e and the leadership that i s h i s t o r i c a l l y and l o g i c a l l y unfounded. It i s f i r s t of a l l unlike l y that i n a Party with m i l l i o n s of ind i v i d u a l s i n positions of power and p r i v i l e g e that a l l of them would have such narrowly defined personality t r a i t s and i n t e r e s t s . I f such were the case nothing could be accomplished in the country because the Party i s concerned with most of the day-to-day functioning of society. As well, i t has already been shown that h i s t o r i c a l l y there have been d i v i s i o n s even within the top echelons of the leadership which r e f l e c t , at the minimum, diverging i n t e r e s t s and goals. There can ce r t a i n l y be no doubt that although the views of Kirov, 69 Voznesensky, Khrushchev and Kosygin were not necessarily r a d i c a l i n nature, they were s u f f i c i e n t l y d i f f e r e n t from those of t h e i r colleagues to demonstrate that e l i t e and leadership homogeneity has not been the case i n the Soviet Union. If anything, the reform programs of the l a t t e r two Individuals were i n d i c a t i v e of a concern f o r the i n t e r e s t s of the population, thus challenging Pipes' basic character p o r t r a i t of the e l i t e and the leadership. These arguments are not meant to make l i g h t of the problems within the Party, and es p e c i a l l y of the widespread corruption among Party o f f i c i a l s . I t has been well documented that such corruption e x i s t s and i s a serious problem. The object here i s to dispute Pipes' claims of an almost complete homogeneity of in t e r e s t s among the Soviet e l i t e . Such a view, i f substantiated, would mean that the bat t l e for change in the country has already been i r r e t r i e v a b l y l o s t because of the fundamental b a r r i e r that i s being played by a completely illegimate leadership. Even more suspect than Pipes' description of the e l i t e i s the rel a t i o n s h i p which he sees between i t s interests and the negative r o l e which they play i n the reform process. His basic argument appears to be that because there has yet to be successful "reform from above", the e l i t e must be a c t i v e l y impeding such attempts at change and should therefore receive the l i o n ' s share of the blame f o r t h i s lack of success. Once again, however, such an assumption i s much too general and i s 70 flawed in a number of places. H i s t o r i c a l l y we have seen that although the dominant i n t e r e s t s i n the e l i t e have usually been against change, there have been those in favour of a l t e r i n g the status quo. Indeed, instead of a c t i v e l y r e s i s t i n g change, the reform programs of both Khrushchev and Kosygin were more i n d i c a t i v e of a leadership (or at l e a s t a portion of i t ) a c t i v e l y involved in promoting change. The record of Soviet domestic p o l i t i c s since S t a l i n has even caused one prominent American Sovietologist to argue that a "post-Stalin consensus" has developed both within and between subsequent administrations in which "...there has been r e l a t i v e l y broad agreement among the Soviet p o l i t i c a l e l i t e that "post-Stalinism" requires continuing attention to consumer s a t i s f a c t i o n and welfare."25 At least since S t a l i n , then, i t would appear that Pipes' view of a unanimous leadership which i s a c t i v e l y f i g h t i n g to prevent any kind of changes has been incorrect. Pipes also f a i l s to mention a number of other factors p a r t i a l l y responsible for the f a i l u r e of reform which were not necessarily the f a u l t of the leadership. For instance, although he emphasizes the general population's fear of the aide-effects of domestic change, he does not recognize t h i s emotion within the Soviet e l i t e . This philosophical and a t t i t u d i n a l "gulf" he sees between these groups i s somewhat i l l o g i c a l in that the i n d i v i d u a l s on both sides have s i m i l a r c u l t u r a l and developmental backgrounds. Again, the argument 71 here i s not that personal ambition and power are not motivating factors f o r the e l i t e - Rather, i t i s that some of these s o c i e t a l and c u l t u r a l fears of change do also e x i s t at t h i s l e v e l and therefore cannot help but a f f e c t the speed and ultimate scope of the changes which are attempted. S i m i l a r l y , Pipes' view of the Soviet e l i t e as the fundamental b a r r i e r to change within the country Ignores the barri e r to change which the country's p o l i t i c a l and governmental bureaucracy has played. Already mentioned previously as a cause of a number of the p o l i t i c a l problems in the country,26 i t may play an even more s i g n i f i c a n t role as a barr i e r to any kind of policy change. Bureaucracy, and the "red tape" that i t generates, has been a ba r r i e r to e f f e c t i v e government in a l l Western democracies by the way in which i t slows down or even i n h i b i t s altogether the successful implementation of policy changes aimed at resolving s o c i a l problems. There i s no reason to believe that i t does not play a s i m i l a r r o l e in the Soviet Union. Indeed, the s i z e and extent of the p o l i t i c a l and governmental bureaucracy in the U.S.S.R. i s such that i t i s often beyond the control of the leadership i t s e l f , as was seen by i t s r o l e in helping to sabotage even the minimal reforms of the Brezhnev era.27 i t i s true, of course, that i t i s individu a l s who make up the bureaucracy. At the same time, however, the i n e r t i a which i s oftened generated by a large bureaucracy may i t s e l f be more to blame for policy stagnation 72 than the indivi d u a l s who comprise i t . It would therefore seem that although the leadership has been generally conservative in the past, i t has also been more heterogeneous i n i t s make-up than Pipes would have us believe. This f a c t makes the basic arguments of Colton and Cohen more a t t r a c t i v e . Both, a f t e r a l l , recognized a variety of i n t e r e s t s within the leadership and the e l i t e . What s t i l l must be analyzed, however, are the differences between these two scholars over the nature of the conservative in t e r e s t s within the e l i t e . To repeat the point of contention, i t i s whether the s p e c i f i c conservatism among the e l i t e which w i l l impede change has grown primarily out of the Brezhnev i administration's s t y l e and approach to government, or whether t h i s conservatism i s the extension of a conservative impulse that has h i s t o r i c a l l y pervaded the e l i t e and t r a d i t i o n a l l y dominated the entire country. In terms of assessing these arguments, we are faced with a s i m i l a r dilemma as the one in the previous chapter, in that our basic lack of fa c t u a l information about the inte r n a l p o l i t i c s of the Soviet Union renders a d e f i n i t i v e " r i g h t or wrong" answer impossible at t h i s time. Logic, of course, and even a passing knowledge of Soviet p o l i t i c a l history show that both i n d i v i d u a l s ' arguments have been correct. As a r e s u l t , an extensive l i s t of the h i s t o r i c a l examples of p o l i t i c a l conservatism i n the country i s not needed to substantiate these views. Both arguments do have t h e i r 73 p a r t i c u l a r strengths and weaknesses, however. Colton, for example, by concentrating h i s arguments on the contemporary sources of these conservative i n t e r e s t s among the e l i t e , has provided evidence that i s convincing because i t can be e a s i l y investigated and analyzed. The legacy of the Brezhnev regime i s quite apparent, and i t s e f f e c t s w i l l be p a r t i c u l a r l y relevant as a new leadership attempts to address i t s domestic problems. At the same time, by emphasizing the most recent sources of t h i s conservatism, Colton's arguments lack the kind of h i s t o r i c a l perspective that i s necessary to understand the reasons for t h i s conservatism not only among the e l i t e , but at the lower l e v e l s of Soviet p o l i t i c s and society as well. This l a t t e r point i s one of the most a t t r a c t i v e aspects of Cohen's arguments. His use of a broad, h i s t o r i c a l l e v e l of analysis has allowed him to capture many of the fundamental roots of e l i t e conservatism. S i m i l a r l y , i t i s d i f f i c u l t to c r i t i c i z e h i s arguments because when Soviet reform i s looked at from a h i s t o r i c a l perspective, there do appear to have always been conservative and reformist forces involved, with the former usually dominant. At the same time, Cohen's use of the term conservatism to describe the main b a r r i e r to change could become somewhat problematic. As w i l l be shown in greater d e t a i l i n the next chapter, t h i s term implies a sense of organization and i d e o l o g i c a l / p o l i t i c a l unity that does not always characterize the in t e r e s t s of those among the e l i t e 74 who might oppose change. There are many d i f f e r e n t reasons for r e s i s t i n g change -- i . e . , personal, professional, i n s t i t u t i o n a l , bureaucratic, i d e o l o g i c a l and p o l i t i c a l , 2 8 -- and to attempt to incorporate them a l l within one general d e f i n i t i o n may do more a n a l y t i c a l harm than good. One runs the r i s k of simplifying the d i f f e r e n t motives behind these in t e r e s t s and thus providing a picture of e l i t e i n t e r e s t s that may not be e n t i r e l y accurate .As well, by emphasizing the h i s t o r i c a l c o n t i n u i t i e s within these intere s t s , one might miss altogether the p o s s i b i l i t y that contemporary changes -- within Soviet society, the developing e l i t e , and the world as a whole -- may have affected not only the d i s t r i b u t i o n of i n t e r e s t s among the new e l i t e , but the composition of the i n t e r e s t s themselves. In conclusion, while Cohen's intepretations and arguments do seem to have a good deal of e f f i c a c y , h i s a n a l y t i c a l perspective and the terminology which he employs within i t have the potential to become problematic i n the near future. 75 Endnotes 1. Richard Pipes, "Can the Soviet Union Reform?" Foreign  A f f a i r s , Vol. 64, No. 1, ( F a l l 1984), p. 50 2. Richard Pipes, Survival i s Not Enough (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1984), p. 30 3. Pipes, Survival, p. 45 4. Pipes, Survival, p. 46 5. Pipes, Reform?, p. 50 6. Pipes, Survival, p. 137 7. Pipes, Survival, p. 51 8. Timothy J. Colton, The Dilemma of Reform in the Soviet  Union (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, Inc., 1984), pp. 59-60 9. Colton, p. 63 10. Colton, p. 16 11. Colton, p. 76 12. Colton, p. 75 13. Colton, p.49 14. Colton, p. 76 15. Colton, p. 75 16. Stephen F. Cohen, Rethinking the Soviet Experience (London: Oxford University Press, 1985), p. 147 17. Cohen, P- 147 18. Cohen, P- 133 19. Cohen, P- 147 20. Cohen, p. 146 21. See chapter one, pp. 9-12 and chapter two, pp. 29-32 22. Cohen, p. 132 76 23. Hedrick Smith, The Russians (New York: The New York Times Book Co., 1976), pp. 333-340. The quote i s from p. 333 24. Pipes, Survival. pp. 47-4S. The author i s Michael S. Voalenskl1. 25. George W. Breslauer, " P o l i t i c a l Succession and the Soviet Policy Agenda", Problems of Communism. 29, 3, (May-June, 1980), p. 44 26. See chapter one, pp. 20-21 27. A b r i e f but e f f e c t i v e examination of the reasons f o r the f a i l u r e of these reforms can be found in Stanley Rothman and George Breslauer, Soviet P o l i t i c s and Society (New York: West Publishing Co., 1978), pp. 242-244 28. The array of in t e r e s t s , be they p o l i t i c a l , bureaucratic or s o c i a l , has been the subject of many books and a r t i c l e s . Two examples include the seminal work of H. Gordon S k i l l i n g and Franklyn G r i f f i t h s , eds. Interest Groups i n Soviet P o l i t i c s (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1971), and a chapter in Rothman and Breslauer, pp. 208-225 77 Chapter Four The new Soviet domestic reform program Mikhail Gorbachev has been the General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union for almost three years. During t h i s time, he and his colleagues in the Politburo have both proposed and i n i t i a t e d a wide range of reforms and changes under the general headings of glaanost (openness) and perestroika (restructuring). Although i t i s obviously s t i l l too early to evaluate what the ultimate s i g n i f i c a n c e and success of these reforms w i l l be, i t i s already possible to observe and analyze the various components of the reform process i n the country. The purpose of t h i s chapter w i l l therefore be to examine some of these domestic changes to discover how well they can be incorporated into the reform frameworks which were analyzed in the the previous chapters. A complete analysis of Gorbachev's reform program would, because of i t s widespread e f f e c t s , have to be both exceedingly lengthy and detailed. Because that degree of analysis i s beyond the scope of t h i s t h esis, I w i l l instead concentrate on two f a i r l y s p e c i f i c areas that hopefully w i l l serve as case studies representative of the nature and degree of the changes that are going on i n the country. These two areas are the economic reform program recently put forward by the new Soviet leadership and the re-evaluation of Soviet history, and in p a r t i c u l a r the S t a l i n era, that appears to be going on r i g h t now among the e l i t e . 78 The framework for comparative analysis that, w i l l be used here i s s i m i l a r to the one that was employed i n the f i r s t three chapters. Each case study w i l l analyze the kind of change represented by the reforms and the forces and factors which are apparently supporting and retarding these changes. The e f f i c a c y of a p a r t i c u l a r author's viewpoint w i l l be determined by how c l e a r l y and s u b s t a n t i a l l y i t can explain what i s going on i n the p a r t i c u l a r subject area. Obviously some of the events surrounding the reforms w i l l provide more substantial j u s t i f i c a t i o n or r e f u t a t i o n of the authors' views than others w i l l . Because of t h i s , my conclusions w i l l be divided into those which can be made with a f a i r degree of certainty and those which are more open to interpretation. An attempt w i l l be made to elaborate further upon these l a s t analyses to help determine even more c l e a r l y which authors' views appear to be more applicable now and why t h i s i s so. The Economic Reform Program A. The Degree and Character of the Changes The series of reforms which have been proposed by the new Soviet leadership r e f l e c t an attempt to i n j e c t new energy and v i t a l i t y into a badly sagging economy. Incorporating aspects of decentralization, market reform and economic restructuring, the reforms themselves appear to be aimed d i r e c t l y at some of the country's more serious economic problems with the hope that tangible r e s u l t s w i l l be seen r e l a t i v e l y quickly. Rather than simply l i s t i n g these changes. 79 I w i l l instead compare the kind of change which they represent with that which was expected by the three scholars in t h i s study as a way of introducing the nature and substance of the reforms themselves. One can begin by saying that the scope of the proposed economic reforms indicates that we are dealing with moderate change here, as opposed to that which i s either minimal or r a d i c a l and systemic.1 At a very general l e v e l , f o r example, i t i s not the entire Soviet economy that w i l l be affected by these changes. The plana c a l l f o r s i x t y percent of Soviet industry to be converted to the s e l f - f i n a n c i n g and self-accounting system by January of 1988.2 while t h i s i s not an i n s i g n i f i c a n t move by any means, i t i s s t i l l not as r a d i c a l a reform as would have been expected i n Pipes' conception of change. More s p e c i f i c a l l y , one of the major components of the reform program i t s e l f -- the recently passed Enterprise Law -- also demonstrates the moderate scope of these changes.3 Many of the changes which t h i s law i n s t i t u t e s do represent s i g n i f i c a n t departures from past Soviet practices. The enterprises which are affected by i t s statutes, for example, w i l l in the near future receive a good deal more autonomy i n setting t h e i r own quotas than has been the case in the past. The employees of these companies are also expected to receive a number of new r i g h t s and incentives. The most s i g n i f i c a n t appears to the d i r e c t voice which they w i l l have i n the decision-making process of each 80 enterprise, a voice which seems destined to be heard because of t h e i r new majority representation on each enterprise's c o n t r o l l i n g "general assembly" (a body which i t s e l f w i l l for the f i r s t time be elected by secret b a l l o t ) - The p o t e n t i a l l y r a d i c a l e f f e c t s of these changes are limited, however, because some of the t r a d i t i o n a l "controls from above" w i l l remain i n place. The top management positions, for example, must s t i l l be approved by the governmental branch ministry i t s e l f . More Importantly, the enterprise Party organization i s s t i l l expected to be involved as a d i r e c t i n g and guiding force from above. As a r e s u l t , while these reforms w i l l s i g n i f i c a n t l y a f f e c t many areas of the Soviet economy, they do not go as far i n "marketizing the economy" as would be expected i f they were r a d i c a l changes. The f a c t that some aspects of the new reform program are expected to be implemented gradually w i l l also serve to l i m i t t h e i r potential e f f e c t s . Changes in the kind of work which i s available and the elimination of food subsidies --two necessary components of the general " s h i f t in emphasis" from the agro-industrial sector to the service sector -- w i l l be c l o s e l y controlled and monitored by the Party over an extended period of time. In the case of the former, f o r example, an extensive worker relocation program i s expected to be i n s t i t u t e d by the Party to deal with such problems as l a y o f f s and/or the i n a b i l i t y of some workers to f i n d new employment amid the economic changes. The deregulation of 81 food prices i s i t s e l f expected to be phased in gradually to allow the general public time to adjust.^ The point here i s not to use the r e l a t i v e speed of implementation of the changes as a c r i t e r i o n for judging whether they are r a d i c a l or not. Instead, i t i s to stress that these reforms are being i n s t i t u t e d gradually because the Party wants to re t a i n complete control over a l l aspects of the changes and es p e c i a l l y over how f a r they go and how strongly t h e i r side-e f f e c t s are f e l t . I t i s therefore the inherent caution of the reforms themselves which i s another indication of t h e i r moderate nature. A somewhat d i f f e r e n t i n d i c a t i o n of the moderate nature of these reforms can be seen from the Soviet leadership's pronouncements concerning why the changes have been formulated and what t h e i r goals are. Gorbachev has at times used the strongest of terms to describe both the severity of the country's economic problems and the kind of change which he f e e l s i s needed to resolve them (the need f o r " r a d i c a l fundamental change" that w i l l bring about a "profound transformation of the economic mechanism and the ent i r e management system").5 A closer look, however, at what he considers to be the l i m i t s of the "ends and means" of these economic reforms i l l u s t r a t e s that the kind of systemic change described in Pipes' reform framework i s not envisioned here. There have apparently been very d e f i n i t e l i m i t s set with respect to both the methodology and content of the 82 economic reform program. Gorbachev, in a speech following the June 1987 plenum of the Central Committee, s p e c i f i c a l l y pointed out: There were some people who suggested things that went beyond the borders of our system, in p a r t i c u l a r , that we should remove the instruments of the planned economy. We did not accept t h i s , nor w i l l we ever accept i t , since i t i s our intention to strengthen socialism, not to replace i t with another system.^ Although one would not expect Gorbachev to admit to the f a i l u r e of the s o c i a l i s t system, i t appears that the changes themselves are not expected to include a complete reconstruction of an "irreparably damaged system". Instead, "r a d i c a l change" i s understood to ref e r to the si g n i f i c a n c e of the changes that w i l l , within the framework of the exi s t i n g system, overcome these problems. These ideas were made clearer in Gorbachev's recent speech commemorating the seventieth anniversary of the Bolshevik revolution when he described the ultimate goals of the economic reform program to be the creation of an economic system which would be "...an optimum combination of c e n t r a l i z a t i o n and self-management."7 As a r e s u l t , the r a d i c a l decentralization which Pipes described in his reform framework has f a i l e d to occur because i t i s does not appear to be one of the goals of the reforms. F i n a l l y , some of the general c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s of the reforms themselves are sim i l a r to the kind of moderate changes which both Colton and Cohen expected. These proposed S3 economic changes, for example, contain a number of aspects which are s i m i l a r to those i n Lenin's N.E.P., and Gorbachev did spend a good deal of time in his recent speech comparing the structure and si g n i f i c a n c e of these new reforms to the ones which were made by Lenin in the early 1920s.& These are the kinds of s t r u c t u r a l changes which Cohen f e l t would characterize any new Soviet economic reform program. At the same time, the changes also appear to represent the kind of "compromise reforms" which Colton had expected to act d i r e c t l y upon some of the country's more serious economic problems. The Enterprise Law, f o r example, appears destined to have i t s greatest e f f e c t s on two or the more serious problem areas of the Soviet economy -- the farm sector and the non-food consumer goods sector.9 S i m i l a r l y , a s i g n i f i c a n t reason f o r a l l of the reforms appears to have been to give employees better work incentives in the hope that t h i s w i l l increase the qua l i t y of production and decrease a number of the labour d i s c i p l i n e problems within the country. Reforms of t h i s character indicate that grandiose reform schemes or more cautious "tinkering" with the system have been eschewed i n favor of more moderate changes that w i l l hopefully have quick, observable e f f e c t s on the problem areas of the economy. As one s o v i e t o l o g i s t has recently concluded: ...the basic objective of crlaanost and perstroika i s not to dismantle the one-Party Soviet state, but to improve i t , to render i t 84 stronger, more e f f e c t i v e and more credible i n the eyes of a population no longer w i l l i n g to t o l e r a t e ...the contradictions between word and deed.10 This short introduction to the new economic reforms would seem to indicate that the kind of change which these reforms r e f l e c t i s quite d i f f e r e n t from that expected by Pipes. It i s simultaneously less r a d i c a l than the kind which he expected to r e s u l t from c r i s i s and more substantial than he thought was possible from a corrupt and i l l e g i t i m a t e leadership. At the same time, the reforms are closer to the kind of moderate, "within-aystem" changes which were expected by both Colton and Cohen. There are other aspects of t h i s economic reform program -- in p a r t i c u l a r the question of whether the reforms themselves w i l l be s i g n i f i c a n t enough to be successful and, i f so, how t h i s w i l l a f f e c t the nature and character of the Soviet Union -- that are s t i l l very much open to interpretation. Because a proper analysis of these questions requires the passage of time, however, any discussion of them now would be pure speculation. As a r e s u l t , i t i s better to l i m i t the analysis here to what has occurred so f a r . With t h i s in mind, i t i s safe to conclude that the i n i t i a l stages of these economic reforms do indicate that they are examples of moderate change. B. Forces and Factors in the Reform Process Just as Interesting as the content and scope of the economic reform program i s what the development and progress 85 of the reforms themselves says about the constituent parts of the domestic reform process. In p a r t i c u l a r , i t i s apparent that a number of the forces and factors which both promote and retard these changes are s i m i l a r to those previously elaborated upon by a l l three scholars. To begin with, there can be l i t t l e doubt that the country's economic problems were one of the leading forces which brought about these changes. We have already seen i n the previous section how much emphasis Gorbachev has placed on these problems i n his speeches. This viewpoint was reinforced i n h i s recent speech when he quite frankly concluded that a "build-up of negative processes i n the economy...had i n e f f e c t created a p r e c r i s i s situation."11 Even more in t e r e s t i n g i s the f a c t that a number of the causes of these problems which were previously emphasized by Cohen, Colton and Pipes -- i n p a r t i c u l a r the overcentralized nature of the S t a l i n i s t economic system -- have come under s p e c i f i c c r i t i c i s m from members of the e l i t e . Gorbachev spoke repeatedly in his speech about what he c a l l e d the problem of a "centralized command structure" i n the Soviet economy,12 and a number of prominent Soviet scholars have recently c a l l e d into question the t h e o r e t i c a l and contemporary relevance of many of the S t a l i n i s t aspects of the economy that p e r s i s t to t h i s day.13 Nikolai Ryzhkov, Politburo member and Chairman of the Council of Ministers, has even gone so f a r as to conclude that so much of the 86 central management of Soviet enterprises i s now fu n c t i o n a l l y obsolete that minimal reforms can no longer resolve the problems here.1 4 These kinds of statements would appear to s i g n i f y that the economic problems themselves have played the important r o l e providing pressure f o r change that a l l three scholars expected. How much pressure the problems provided i s open to interpretation i f only because of the lack of d i r e c t information about the policy-making process i n the country. It would seem, however, based on the fac t that the new leadership undertook these reforms v o l u n t a r i l y and without pressure from f u l l blown domestic c r i s e s , and because the changes themselves are moderate i n scope (both by the standards used in t h i s paper and according to the ends and means envisioned by the leadership), that the economic problems did not play the sin g u l a r l y important r o l e that Pipes expected. There i s nothing to indicate that the new leadership was "forced" to i n s t i t u t e changes in the way which he expected they would be. Some of the b a r r i e r s to change discussed by the three scholars have also arisen to retard the progress of the new economic reform program. I t has quickly become apparent, f o r example, that the general population has not universally embraced either the proposed economic reforms or the economic restructuring that i s going along with them.15 Much of t h i s resistance apparently stems from the fear of change that 8,7 pervades society as a whole. Gorbachev himself Is constantly r e f e r r i n g to t h i s problem in speeches and interviews, i n one case expressing a great deal of f r u s t r a t i o n over the f a c t that so many of the people i n the Soviet Union either cannot or w i l l not understand the necessity and importance of pereatrolka because of t h e i r fear of abandoning the comfort of established and accepted, yet increasingly i n e f f e c t i v e , methods and policies.16 That the leadership appears to understand the depth of t h i s "fear of change" among the people i s shown by the f a c t that most discussions of the economic reforms i n the Soviet press have included assurances to the general population about the gradual manner in which the most s i g n i f i c a n t of the changes w i l l be i n s t i t u t e d . On the issue of the deregulation of food prices, for example, Leonid Abalkin, the Director of the Moscow Ins t i t u t e of Economics, has emphasized that such changes w i l l only be introduced a f t e r a "campaign s p e c i f i c a l l y dealing with public concerns about change."17 These kinds of statements show that a l l three scholars were correct i n emphasizing the negative r o l e that s o c i o - c u l t u r a l factors could play i n the reform process. The conservative r o l e played by Party and governmental bureaucracy -- something emphasized strongly by Colton and to a lesser extent by Cohen as well -- has also received a good deal of attention i n the pronouncements of the leadership and in the press. Most western experts have concluded that t h i s s s factor has been the leading b a r r i e r in the early attempts to restructure the economy not only because the i n d i v i d u a l s who make up the bureaucracy have the most to fear from the economic restructuring, but also because they are often i n the best position -- i . e . , at the point of implementation --to a c t i v e l y i n h i b i t the changes themselves.1® This barr i e r has also been the one most emphasized by Gorbachev i n his speeches, a b a r r i e r f e l t to be so problematic that i t has actually become a f o c a l point f o r a number of the reforms. At his most strident, for example, he has talked about ...tearing up the economic roots of bureaucratization... the moat e v i l , most dangerous enemy of pereatrolka....We need to cut down the apparatus....We should only have the people who are r e a l l y needed....Now, I think, there are one and a half to two times more people than needed.1^ As a r e s u l t , i t seems that the emphasis placed by Cohen and Colton on the importance of bureaucracy was j u s t i f i e d . At the same time, the r o l e that t h i s factor has played c a l l s into question Pipes' premature dismissal of i t . Pipes had argued that the e l i t e purposefully used the term bureaucracy as an excuse f o r i t s p o l i t i c a l i n a c t i v i t y , an excuse which covered up i t s unwillingness to address many of the country's domestic problems. The information presented here would seem to indicate that the bureaucracy instead does play a negative ro l e in impeding change because of i t s si z e and the d i f f i c u l t y with which policy changes are implemented through i t s channels, and not because i t s members are uniformly 89 against any kind of po s i t i v e change. While these forces and facto r s are quite obviously present, what i s s t i l l very much open to interpretation i s the r o l e which e l i t e i n t e r e s t s have played i n the development and progress of these reforms, and esp e c i a l l y how the di f f e r e n t i n t e r e s t s within the country have been involved in t h i s process. There i s ambiguity here because although Pipes' views of these i n t e r e s t s can be almost completely refuted, much of what has occurred so f a r within t h i s area can be incorporated into both Cohen's and Colton's reform frameworks. There do appear to ex i s t , for example, the kind of s i g n i f i c a n t constituencies within Soviet society which Cohen expected. At the same time, the new leadership, as a whole, seems to be providing the main impetus f o r economic change. This, in turn, was expected by Colton. In an attempt to d i s t i n g u i s h which parts of these scholars' interpretations best describe the progress of the economic reform program, a closer examination of the e l i t e i n t e r e s t s , and the r o l e they have played, i s necessary. At the l e v e l of the leadership there has been considerable public enthusiasm for most aspects of the new economic reforms. Strong support has come not only from Gorbachev and Ryzkhov, but also from Nikolai Slyunkov, the leading economic s p e c i a l i s t on the Politburo,20 a n c j even from Yegor Ligachev, the in d i v i d u a l in charge of ideology within the leadership. The l a t t e r , seen by many in the west 90 to represent a conservative a l t e r n a t i v e to Gorbachev i n the Politburo, strongly emphasized the fundamental s i g n i f i c a n c e of pereatroika in general, and economic reform in pa r t i c u l a r , when he stated that these are "not minor, p a r t i c u l a r improvements, but a r a d i c a l change in the way of acting, a r a d i c a l change i n a l l spheres of activity."21 This kind of support i s not i n and of i t s e l f that surprising due to the degree of emphasis which every Soviet leadership places on p o l i t i c a l uniformity, and i t should not be taken to mean that there has been complete, unqualified support f o r these reforms at t h i s l e v e l . There has been a kind of opposition from within the leadership, but rather than being directed at the reforms themselves i t has been focussed upon some of the supporting aspects and side e f f e c t of the reform program. Vikt or Chebrlkov (the head of the KGB and a member of the Politburo) has, for example, been more hesitant than some of his colleagues i n c r i t i c i z i n g the S t a l i n i s t elements of the economy and has instead stressed the problems which could a r i s e from the increased l e v e l s of c r i t i c i s m that have come to be associated with the new economic reforms.22 Llgachev has made sim i l a r arguments and has been p a r t i c u l a r l y concerned about the amount of s e l f - c r i t i c i s m and negative reporting that has begun to appear i n the Soviet press.23 As a r e s u l t , although some resistance among the leadership i s evident, the source of th disagreements does not seem to involve the more fundamental 91 aspects of the reforms themselves. I t Is, of course, somewhat problematic to r e l y on the Soviet press and the leadership's pronouncements for accurate information about the extent of the differences within the Politburo. These are the only real sources which we have for such information, however, so i t must be used, a l b e i t with a good deal of caution. What one can say, however, i s that the differences which are observable appear to be over the qlasnost portion of the reforms, rather than over the more substantive pereatroika component. There i s , indeed, almost complete public unanimity on the subject of the l a t t e r and p a r t i c u l a r l y on the degree of change which i s necessary, the kind of restructuring that i s needed, and how s i g n i f i c a n t both are in the Soviet context. I t does seem that the concerns over the l e v e l s of c r i t i c i s m and the l i m i t s of debate are separate from any problems with the more fundamental aspects of these economic reforms. As a r e s u l t , while qlasnost and pereatroika. as concepts, are clo s e l y i n t e r r e l a t e d , i t appears that i t i s necessary to separate them during t h i s analysis so as to avoid conveying the wrong impression of what exactly the sources of the differences between the leaders are. With these kinds of differences in mind, i t would seem that Richard Pipes' conception of the leadership's i n t e r e s t s , and the role he expected them to play, has been almost completely refuted. He had characterized these i n d i v i d u a l s as 92 being t o t a l l y corrupt and unified in t h e i r resistance to any kind of changes which might i n f r i n g e upon t h e i r power and p r i v i l e g e s . In contrast to his interpretation, there does appear to be a s i g n i f i c a n t segment within the new leadership which i s in favour of economic change, and what resistance has been observable i s not of the character or scope which Pipes had theorized. Indeed, his entire " c r i s i s / r e f o r m " thesis, including the r o l e that the leadership i s seen to play in i t , has to be ca l l e d into question because of the moderate nature of the changes and the active r o l e that the leadership, as a whole, has taken in promoting them. Cohen's conception of the nature and organization of these interests also appears to run into some problems i f i t i s used to describe the contemporary s i t u a t i o n , but they are problems with the terminology which he would use to describe the i n t e r e s t s . It does not seem, at least from what can be seen, that the differences between the new leaders on the topic of economic reform are s i g n i f i c a n t enough to indicate the kind of conservative/reformist d i v i s i o n s within the Politburo that Cohen's framework includes. As was shown, the differences appear to be limited to some of the supporting aspects of the new economic reforms. As well, when these c r i t i c i s m s have arisen they are often made alongside strong support f o r the basic premises of the economic reforms, the type of agreement on the fundamental nature of the changes that one would not expect from one of Cohen's 93 "conservatives". The differences over the qlasnost portions of the reforms are undoubtedly important i n t h e i r own r i g h t (as w i l l be seen more c l e a r l y i n the next case study). At the same time, i t also appears that Cohen's use of the terms conservatism and reformism may not be the best way to describe the reasons f o r these differences. To describe some of the in t e r e s t s within the leadership as generally "conservative" i n nature would also be a problem because they may be p a r t i a l l y a t t r i b u t a b l e to i n s t i t u t i o n a l positions and r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s within the Politburo. Ligachev and Chebrikov, the two persons who are generally considered to represent the opposition to any changes, are also the Individuals in charge of Ideology and state security, respectively. As a r e s u l t , an Increase i n the general l e v e l s of c r i t i c i s m and/or openness could represent more of a threat to t h e i r p a r t i c u l a r i n t e r e s t s than the actual economic reforms would. These in d i v i d u a l s do seem to be naturally more cautious and conservative than someone l i k e Gorbachev i s , but th e i r i n s t i t u t i o n a l r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s may have had some e f f e c t on t h e i r statements. Although Cohen has made h i s d e f i n i t i o n of a conservative broad enough to take into consideration these kinds of i n s t i t u t i o n a l influences, to use i t here might be misleading because of i t s very breadth. Ignored would be the d i f f e r e n t reasons and motivations behind these apparently conservative i n t e r e s t s . As a r e s u l t , the use of the term conservative to describe some of the in t e r e s t s within the 94 present leadership would not provide a completely accurate picture of the nature of the i n t e r e s t s themselves. The l a s t factor which shows that Cohen's d e f i n i t i o n s nay not be the best f o r characterizing the i n t e r e s t s within the leadership i s the amount of change that the economic reforms themselves actually represent. Although leas than r a d i c a l in both t h e i r content and apparent goals, these reforms s t i l l demonstrate important departures from past Soviet practices. Indeed, these changes are s i g n i f i c a n t enough that i t i s doubtful a Politburo fundamentally divided between reformist and conservative i n t e r e s t s would have allowed, even through some kind of a " c o a l i t i o n of i n t e r e s t s " , such reforms to see the l i g h t of day. Instead, the scope of these changes i s more Indicative of a new leadership which i s b a s i c a l l y u n i f i e d in i t s support f o r economic change. This support does not seem to be coming only form a "reformist impulse" within the Politburo. Thus, these arguments reinforce the conclusion that although Cohen has obviously been correct in proposing the existence of d i f f e r e n t i n t e r e s t s within the leadership, h i s d e f i n i t i o n s of conservatism and reformism do not necessarily represent the beat way to describe either them or the r o l e that they are playing. Cohen's rebuttal to these arguments would probably state that what one i s simply seeing here i s the reformists in power, with the conservatives waiting i n the wings to take 95 over at some l a t e r date ( i . e . , the way i n which Brezhnev followed Khrushchev). There are problems with t h i s argument, however. To begin with, the Brezhnev regime appeared to be reacting to one man -- i . e . , Khrushchev -- and h i s i n d i v i d u a l p o l i c i e s , p o l i c i e s which in the l a t e r years of his rul e were almost u n i l a t e r a l l y developed and implemented without the input of h i s colleagues i n the Praesidium. Gorbachev and his supporters not only do not seem to have Khrushchev's degree of power and control, but the new economic p o l i c i e s have found support from so much of the leadership that i t i s hard to f i n d the kind of fundamental resistance that occurred during Khrushchev's l a t e r years and which formed the basis fo r the Brezhnev regime. S i m i l a r l y , the kind of support which pereatroika has received does not seem to be only " l i p -service' from a cowed conservative constituency within the leadership, but instead seems to be i n d i c a t i v e of emphatic b e l i e f and in t e r e s t in the need for economic reform. F i n a l l y , as was mentioned i n the previous paragraph, the economic reforms themselves represent such departures from past Soviet practice that i t i s doubtful they could have arisen from a conservative/reformist c o a l i t i o n within the leadership. Finally,, i t appears that Colton's conception of both the i n t e r e s t s within the leadership and the ro l e that the leaders themselves would play i n promoting change has been strongly substantiated by the events of t h i s case study. Without repeating the evidence which has been presented here, 96 i t i s quite clear that we are seeing a more dynamic, "problem-solving oriented" new generation of leadership, one which has provided the main impetus for change. I t also appears to be un i f i e d over one fa c t o r : the need f o r s i g n i f i c a n t , yet within-system economic changes that w i l l d i r e c t l y address some of the problems within the country. The differences among the leaders also r e f l e c t the kind Colton expected i n that they are over the methodology and means of implementation of the reforms. As such, they are hindering somewhat the progress of the changes without i n t e r f e r i n g with the basic idea of the need for change. In conclusion, then, Colton's conception of the nature and character of the new leadership appears to have been almost completely substantiated by the events of t h i s case study. The one event which challenges these conclusions i s the Boris Y e l t s i n " a f f a i r " . The former Moscow Party boss, who was both an alternate member of the Politburo and one of the leading proponents of economic reform and perestroika. was unceremoniously ousted from his high l e v e l positions in November of 1987 amid mysterious circumstances. The reasons for h is removal apparently revolve around a scathing speech he gave at a meeting of the Central Committee, a speech i n which he i s rumored to have sharply c r i t i z e d not only the pace of the restructuring process i n general, but also the roles that a number of s p e c i f i c i n d i v i d u a l s , including Ligachev, Chebrikov and even Gorbachev have played i n t h i s 97 slow down.21 These events were seen by many to be a d i r e c t blow to the cause of reform and a victory f o r endemic conservative i n t e r e s t s i n the leadership and the e l i t e . This, however, may not necessarily be the case. Both Colton and Cohen, i n t h e i r separate writings, have employed a d e f i n i t i o n of a " r a d i c a l reformer" which may help to explain why Y e l t s i n received the treatment he did. Radical change, defined in one case as "all-encompassing change containing as an es s e n t i a l component the restructuring of the country's p o l i t i c a l i n s t i t u t i o n s and central l e g i t i m i z i n g b e l i e f s and myths",25 may be the kind of change which Y e l t s i n was advocating based on the extremely emotional and r h e t o r i c a l nature of h i s actions both at that meeting and up u n t i l that time. Although b a s i c a l l y supportive of the reforms themselves, he had been much more outspoken i n his c r i t i c i s m of the problems which the country faces, the slow pace of the implementation of these changes, and e s p e c i a l l y of the opposition to these changes regardless of where i t manifested i t s e l f . As a r e s u l t , while Y e l t s i n ' s actions were probably a greater source of concern for those i n d i v i d u a l s in the Politburo who have been more cautious i n t h e i r support f o r economic reform, there i s also an argument to be made that Gorbachev and h i s colleagues had l i t t l e choice but to expel Y e l t s i n because his words and deeds ran counter to the kind of moderate change which the reforms were themselves aimed at. If t h i s i s the case then the Y e l t s i n a f f a i r , though 98 undoubtedly a disappointment for those in the West and in the leadership who were hoping f o r quick changes, may be more important for the way which i t re-defines the moderate goals of the new Soviet economic reform program. Understood in t h i s way, i t does not have, to be seen as i n d i c a t i v e of a conservative impulse within the leadership that i s succeeding in i t s struggle to sabotage these reforms. Below the l e v e l of the leadership there has also been noticeable i n t e r e s t in the new economic reform program. The i n t e l l i g e n t s i a has been the the group which has voiced the greatest support f o r these changes, as both Soviet and western research has shown.26 The sen s i t i v e nature of t h i s topic has no doubt limited c r i t i c i s m from members of t h i s group, but t h i s research does show that a s i g n i f i c a n t portion of the i n t e l l i g e n t s i a i s i n favour of reform. There has also been considerable resistance to these economic changes below the l e v e l of the leadership, however. As was mentioned at the beginning of t h i s section, the two strongest sources of opposition to these reforms appear to have come from the Party and governmental bureaucracy and the "rank and f i l e " . Gorbachev has elaborated s p e c i f i c a l l y upon both the organization of t h i s resistance and on how i t has arisen. On the l a t t e r subject, f o r example, he appeared to be borrowing from Colton's arguments when he stated: Restructuring means not only shaking o f f the stagnation and conservatism of the preceding period and correcting the mistakes committed. 99 but also overcoming h i s t o r i c a l l y limited and obsolete features of s o c i a l organization and working methods.27 At the same time, Gorbachev has also talked s p e c i f i c a l l y and at some length about "conservative forces" within the country, forces which appear to have s i m i l a r c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s to the ones theorized by Cohen. He has emphasized: . . . i t would be wrong not to see a c e r t a i n strengthening of resistance from conservative forces who regard restructuring as merely a threat to t h e i r own s e l f i s h i n t e r e s t s and aims. This i s occurring not only i n various l e v e l s of administration but i n labour c o l l e c t i v e s as well. Nor can one be in any doubt that the forces of conservatism... w i l l not f a i l to e xploit any d i f f i c u l t i e s in order to attempt to disrupt restructuring and arouse d i s s a t i s f a c t i o n among the wrong people.28 Where the differences within the leadership appeared to be over some of the glaanost aspects of the new economic reforms, the support and resistance at the lower l e v e l s of Soviet p o l i t i c s and society instead seem to be directed s p e c i f i c a l l y at the e f f e c t s of the restructuring i . e . , over perestroika. As well, the motivations behind these Interests appear to be quite varied. Those i n favor of these changes -- selected members of the i n t e l l i g e n t s i a have voiced t h e i r support f o r what appears to be predominantly personal and professional reasons, reasons which are quite consistent with a number of t h e i r personality c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s . The f a c t that creative, in-depth, I n t e l l e c t u a l pursuit and academic debate are the t o o l s of academla would predispose many scholars to any changes that 100 might allow them to increase the acope of t h e i r atudiea. Because a scholar's personal and professional l i v e l i h o o d and reputation are often t i e d to his or her l i n e of academic inquiry, s t r u c t u r a l reforms which might provide increased research and/or publication opportunities would naturally be supported by a number of them. In conclusion, i t does seem that s i g n i f i c a n t i n t e r e s t s in favor of economic reform do exi s t within t h i s group, that these i n d i v i d u a l s are p a r t i c u l a r l y interested in the helpful s i d e - e f f e c t s of the economic restructuring, and that the reasons f o r t h i s support are heterogeneous in nature. This characterization of the support and the reasons for i t i s reinforced by Gorbachev's actions towards the i n t e l l i g e n t s i a . I t appears that he has both recognized and attempted to take advantage of these kinds of i n t e r e s t s within t h i s group. Robert Tucker, the emminent American s o v i e t o l o g i s t , has even proposed that Gorbachev has purposely recruited members of t h i s group to gain support f o r h i s reforms.29 In support of such an argument i s the f a c t that Gorbachev has on many occasions held closed meetings or b r i e f i n g s with p a r t i c u l a r groups of scholars to discuss i n greater d e t a i l the leadership's economic reforms.30 A S A r e s u l t , some of t h i s support f o r economic reform amongst the i n t e l l i g e n t s i a may be more evident because i t has been encouraged and perhaps even s o l i c i t e d by the new leadership. I t has also been quite apparent that the opposition to 101 the economic changes among the bureaucracy and the working class has been directed towards the perestroika component of the changes, as i t i s t h i s restructuring which has the potential f o r detrimental e f f e c t s on these i n d i v i d u a l s . The members of the bureaucracy are r e s i s t i n g because s t r u c t u r a l changes which are implemented on the basis of competency and s k i l l l e v e l would seriously threaten t h e i r security, power and p r i v i l e g e s . At the same time, workers who are suddenly faced with the prospect of unemployment w i l l also have l i t t l e enthusiasm f o r such reforms. A recently published survey of one hundred commuters on a Moscow subway showed that only f i f t e e n percent of them were act u a l l y i n favor of the economic restructuring and almost two-thirds of them said they were maintaining a very "watchful eye" over the changes themselves.31 Although t h i s information did come from a Soviet source, the f a c t that such negative figures would be printed i n the Soviet press indicates that they might be s i g n i f i c a n t . One can thus see that although there does exist a s i z a b l e conservative constituency within the lower l e v e l s of Soviet society and p o l i t i c s , i t s actions appear to be directed towards the perestroika component of the reforms and these actions do not appear to necessarily be i d e o l o g i c a l l y motivated. With these kinds of motivations and in t e r e s t s i n mind, i t would appear that Pipes* views are once again not very applicable. While i n d i v i d u a l members of the bureaucracy may 102 have some of the personality t r a i t s which he expected, these c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s are not uniformly represented throughout the e l i t e , nor i s t h i s resistance to change always motivated only by such emotions as greed and power. S i m i l a r l y , there appears to e x i s t more support for these changes at these lower l e v e l s of Soviet p o l i t i c s and society than Pipes envisioned. Altogether, the r o l e that these various int e r e s t s seem to play i n the reform process i s at odds with many of the basic tenets of his " c r i s i s / r e f o r m " thesis. Cohen's views of these i n t e r e s t s , on the other hand, have received much more substantial j u s t i f i c a t i o n from recent events. There can be l i t t l e doubt that h i s reformist and conservative constituencies do e x i s t within the country and that they have the breadth and depth which he expected. These inte r e s t s have also had an important e f f e c t on the progress of the economic reforms themselves, both at the point of t h e i r implementation and through the debate which has been generated within the Soviet press. As a r e s u l t , reformist and conservative Interests have played the kind of role in the reform process which Cohen had theorized they would. At the same time, his use of the terms reformism and conservativism to enscapsulate the i n t e r e s t s might once again be somewhat innapropriate. There appear to be so many d i f f e r e n t reasons for both supporting and opposing these changes that to apply such general terms to them may simplify the true nature of the i n t e r e s t s at the lower l e v e l s of Soviet p o l i t i c s and 103 society. S i m i l a r l y , to imply the existence of two q u a s i - d i s t i n c t groups here gives the impression that these int e r e s t s are somehow organized around the i d e o l o g i c a l and/ or p o l i t i c a l banners of "reformism and conservatism". This does not appear to be the case based on the information provided i n t h i s study. The problem, therefore, i s not with Cohen's basic assumptions and interpretations but with his terminology and the way he would have to employ i t to describe the nature and organization of the interests within the Soviet Union. F i n a l l y , Colton's views on the organization and r o l e of these in t e r e s t s have also been shown to be at least somewhat correct. His use of a d i f f e r e n t " l e v e l of analysis" meant that he spent l i t t l e time investigating the interests below the leadership, but what he did have to say has been shown to be correct. As expected, the leadership has provided the impetus f o r the changes even at t h i s l e v e l , as the apparent recruitment of some segments of the i n t e l l i g e n t s i a has shown. As f o r the resistance at t h i s l e v e l , he was also r i g h t that the adherence to old ways, p o l i c i e s and b e l i e f s would be a s p e c i f i c source of opposition to change and an impediment to the progress of any reforms. The f a c t that Colton f a i l e d to deal i n greater d e t a i l with the i n t e r e s t s at these lower l e v e l s i s unfortunate in that i t has caused his arguments to develop a somewhat "one-sided" nature, one i n which a l l of the emphasis has been placed on the leadership. By doing so 104 he has missed the obviously important e f f e c t s which these inte r e s t s have had on the progress of the new economic reform program. I I . The r e l n t e r p r e t a t i o n of S t a l i n ' s r o l e i n Soviet  history The second aspect of Soviet domestic reform which w i l l be used as a case study i s the reevaluation of Soviet history, and i n p a r t i c u l a r the S t a l i n era, that i s now going on within the Soviet press and leadership. This topic i s p o t e n t i a l l y even more i n t e r e s t i n g than the previous one because i t demonstrates in greater d e t a i l the range of Interests that e x i s t s within the Soviet e l i t e and leadership, and how they might be involved in the domestic reform process. A s i m i l a r format to the one used i n the previous study w i l l be used here with the exception that the text of Gorbachev's recent commemorative speech w i l l be r e l i e d upon much more as an indicator of the current state of the discussions on the S t a l i n question, mainly because of the degree of expectation which preceded i t . The Degree and Character of the Changes The current attempt at a relnterpretation of S t a l i n ' s ri r o l e i n Soviet history i s the the most s i g n i f i c a n t of i t s kind since Khrushchev's o r i g i n a l d e - S t a l i n i z a t i o n . The e f f e c t s of these changes can be seen i n the leadership's pronouncements, the substance of the debate amongst the i n t e l l i g e n t s i a , the c r i t i c a l evaluation i n the press and 105 e s p e c i a l l y in the " c u l t u r a l thaw" that i s being f e l t at a l l l e v e l s of the a r t i s t i c community- Before assessing the type of change r e f l e c t e d by the current r e v i s i o n i s t trend in Soviet history, the d e f i n i t i o n s of change that have been employed i n t h i s paper must be adapted somewhat to t h i s topic. This i s necessary because only Cohen wrote s p e c i f i c a l l y about the p o s s i b i l i t y of a reevaluation of the S t a l i n question as a part of a new domestic reform program. The adaptation i t s e l f can be made without fear of misrepresenting the authors' views because Stalinism i s such an i n t e g r a l component of many of the p o l i t i c a l and economic problems of the Soviet Union that any re l n t e r p r e t a t i o n of i t r e a l l y represents attempts at reforms in these areas. Since many of these problems and reforms were the ones discussed by the three authors, t h e i r " d e f i n i t i o n s of change" can also apply almost d i r e c t l y to t h i s t o p i c . Radical change -- the kind which Pipes f e l t was both needed and to be expected because of his "cr i s i s / r e f o r m t h e s i s " -- i n t h i s context would involve a complete, factual reln t e r p r e t a t i o n of Soviet history, including a discussion of a l l of the excesses of Stalinism and the t o t a l r e h a b i l i t a t i o n of h i s p o l i t i c a l victims. Minimal change -- the only kind of change which Pipes believed the leadership might agree to without the pressure of domestic c r i s e s -- i n t h i s case would be represented by only s u p e r f i c i a l departures from the conservative "Brezhnev l i n e " on S t a l i n and h i s r o l e i n Soviet 106 history (perhaps in the form of v e i l e d , very general c r i t i c i s m s of such topics of the " c u l t of personality" or the abuse of personal power), but with no s p e c i f i c c r i t i c i s m or questioning of Stalinism and i t s main concepts. F i n a l l y , moderate change -- the kind expected to occur by both Colton and Cohen i n a l l areas of Soviet domestic p o l i t i c s -- would f a l l somewhere in the middle of these two d e f i n i t i o n s in that i t would simultaneously incorporate s i g n i f i c a n t reassessments of Stalinism alongside the maintenance of certain t r a d i t i o n a l "truths" of Soviet history. With these d e f i n i t i o n s i n mind, an analysis of the current h i s t o r i c a l debate in both the Soviet press and in the speeches and pronouncements of the leadership would seem to indicate that i t i s moderate change that i s occurring. This conclusion i s baaed on the f a c t that although the l i m i t s on c r i t i c i s m and discussion have been broadened considerably in the past year, there are s t i l l many s p e c i f i c topics that have yet to be either revised or even mentioned for the o v e r a l l changes to be c a l l e d r a d i c a l i n nature. Such a conclusion i s not meant to downplay either the importance or the potential s i g n i f i c a n c e of the r e v i s i o n s that have occurred. Instead, i t i s a factual assessment of how much haa changed ao f a r i n the discussion of S t a l i n ' s r o l e i n Soviet history, an asseaament which makes possible the comparison of t h i s kind of change with that which was expected by the three scholars.. The moderate character of the h i s t o r i c a l r e v i s i o n s can 107 be seen in two general areas. On the general topic of S t a l i n ' s p o l i t i c a l and economic p o l i c i e s , f o r example, a number of d i r e c t c r i t i c i s m s have surfaced in the Soviet press which demonstrate that the changes on t h i s subject have c e r t a i n l y been more than minimal i n scope. Recent a r t i c l e s have car r i e d remarkably scathing c r i t i c i s m of not only the excesses of S t a l i n ' s personality but of his p o l i c i e s as well. Such notable Soviet scholars as A n a t o l i i Butenko, Nikolai Shmelev and Viktor Tikhonov have even gone so f a r as to question the t h e o r e t i c a l r e l a t i o n s h i p of Stalinism to Marxism/Leninism and Soviet socialism.32 S i m i l a r l y , one e f f e c t of the new " c u l t u r a l qlasnost" has been the publication of a number of s p e c i f i c a l l y a n t i - S t a l i n i s t books and plays, the most prominent having been Children of  Arbat by Anatoli Rybakov and The Brest Peace by Mikhail Shatrov.33 This kind of d i r e c t , public c r i t i c i s m of S t a l i n has not been seen since Khrushchev's de - S t a l i n i z a t i o n program and the c u l t u r a l thaw which went along with i t . Gorbachev himself has provided some of the harshest o f f i c i a l c r i t i c i s m of S t a l i n and his p o l i c i e s since Khrushchev's speeches to the Twentieth and Twenty-Second Party Congresses. In his much anticipated speech commemorating the seventieth anniversary of the Bolshevik revolution, he spoke s p e c i f i c a l l y about the methodological problems of Stalinism, questioning the "mechanical 108 maintainance of old p o l i c i e s under fundamentally new conditions" as well as the development of a "system of administration by command" and an "increase in the l e v e l s of bureaucracy", a l l of which were seen to be foreign to Leninist principles. 3 4 Gorbachev also l e f t no question as to either how s i g n i f i c a n t he believed the negative e f f e c t s of these p o l i c i e s had been or how d i r e c t l y responsible S t a l i n was for them. He stated: ...serious damage was done to the cause of socialism and the authority of the party...the gross p o l i t i c a l errors and a r b i t r a r i n e s s permitted to occur by him and those around him...had serious consequences for the l i f e of our society. Sometimes i t i s said that S t a l i n did not know about the instances of lawlessness. Documents now i n our possession say that t h i s i s not so. The g u i l t of S t a l i n and those closest to him before the party and the people f o r the mass repressions and lawlessness that were permitted are immense and unpardonable. This i s a lesson f o r generations.35 While these c r i t i c i s m s of S t a l i n ' s personality and methods were s i g n i f i c a n t in t h e i r own r i g h t , they cannot be considered r a d i c a l i n nature because Gorbachev f a i l e d to follow them up with s i m i l a r c r i t i c i s m s of the main concepts and tenets of Stalinism. Indicative of the l i m i t s of t h i s reassessment were the discussions of S t a l i n ' s most contentious p o l i c y innovation -- forced c o l l e c t i v i z a t i o n . Although he did f o r the f i r s t time c r i t i c i z e S t a l i n ' s handling of the peasant population during the c o l l e c t i v i z a t i o n process, Gorbachev s t i l l provided almost complete j u s t i f i c a t i o n f o r the concept i t s e l f when he 109 concluded that " . . . i f we are to assess the importance of c o l l e c t i v i z a t i o n , o v e r a l l , i n the strengthening of the positions of socialism in the countryside, then i n the f i n a l analysis i t was a turning point of fundamental importance."36 Perhaps most s i g n i f i c a n t , however, was the continued lack of a discussion of the economic and p o l i t i c a l causes of Stalinism, or of the e f f i c a c y of the S t a l i n i s t mode of s o c i a l i s t development. Gorbachev actually provided a strong vindicaton of the path chosen by S t a l i n , and of S t a l i n ' s integral r o l e in Soviet history, when he stated: Could a course have been chosen i n the circumstances other than that path followed by the party? I f we wish to remain on a standpoint of h i s t o r i c method and truth of l i f e , there can only be one answer. No, i t could not.37 The other major example of how these h i s t o r i c a l revisions have been s i g n i f i c a n t but at the same time f a l l e n short of r a d i c a l change i s the way i n which the s p e c i f i c issue of S t a l i n ' s p o l i t i c a l and s o c i a l "purges" has been addressed. Prio r to Gorbachev's speech there had been a number of unprecedented openings i n t h i s area which indicated that t r u l y r a d i c a l changes might be forthcoming. The press, fo r example, had f o r the f i r s t time published actual s t a t i s t i c s regarding the magnitude of these repressions and the s p e c i f i c e f f e c t s which they had had on not only Party members,3S but on the m i l i t a r y and the general population 110 as well.39 S i m i l a r l y , a number of prominent Soviet academics and scholars had recently come out in the press with strong defences of S t a l i n ' s victims. Yuri Polyakov, a Soviet h i s t o r i a n , had even gone so f a r as to state that the majority of Joseph S t a l i n ' s purge victims were innocent of the a n t i - S t a l i n i s t crimes f o r which they were executed. 4 0 Along the same l i n e s , some of the important "non-persons" in Soviet history had also been p a r t i a l l y r e h a b i l i t a t e d i n the press, as had the i n d i v i d u a l s who wrote either about them or about the excesses of Stalinism. Most s i g n i f i c a n t among these "non-persons" was Nikolai Bukharin, a close associate of Lenin and the major theoretician behind hi s N.E.P., who had i n the months pr i o r to the speech received increasingly favorable treatment in both the press and in a number of l i t e r a r y works. 4! i t was t h i s kind of progress on the r e h a b i l i t a t i o n issue which was one of the main reasons f o r the tremendous degree of expectation that preceded Gorbachev's anniversary speech. Once again, however, Gorbachev's speech did not f u l f i l l the hopes of many in the West and the Soviet Union. He did emphatically reassert the "Khrushchev l i n e " on the purges, stating that "many thousands of the party and non-party members were subjected to mass repressions". 42 At the same time, too many topics and i n d i v i d u a l s retained t h e i r b a s i c a l l y t r a d i t i o n a l interpretations. S t i l l not dealt with, for example, were the famous "show t r i a l s " of the early 1930s in which many of the o r i g i n a l Bolsheviks were unjustly t r i e d and executed by S t a l i n as he manouevered for power. Neither was the assassination of former Leningrad Party boss Sergei Kirov, or S t a l i n ' s r o l e i n i t , discussed i n Gorbachev's speech. Most s i g n i f i c a n t , however, i s the f a c t that the h i s t o r i c a l interpretation of such in d i v i d u a l s as Grigory Zinoviev, Lev Kamenev and Leon Trotsky was almost s t r i c t l y maintained, thus decreasing the si g n i f i c a n c e of the progress which had been made on these i n d i v i d u a l s i n both the press and the a r t i s t i c community.43 Even Bukharln, who many Soviet and Western sources expected to receive almost f u l l r e h a b i l i t a t i o n because of his association with Lenin's N.E.P., was seen in only a moderately sympathetic l i g h t by Gorbachev. Praised f o r h i s r o l e i n helping to defeat the "Trotskyites", he was then c r i t i c i z e d because he and his supporters: ...underestimated the sig n i f i c a n c e of the time factor in the construction of socialism in the t h i r t i e s . . . [they maintained al position dominated by dogmatic thinking, by a lack of d i a l e c t i c approach in the the i r appraisal of the s p e c i f i c situation. 4** As a r e s u l t , while Gorbachev's assessment of the purges and th e i r e f f e c t s was a welcome return to the kinds of c r i t i c i s m s used by Khrushchev, i t did not go f a r enough to be i n d i c a t i v e of r a d i c a l change on the general issue of S t a l i n ' s r o l e in Soviet history. In conclusion, the kind of change which i s r e f l e c t e d in t h i s r e l n t e r p r e t a t i o n of the S t a l i n era -- s i g n i f i c a n t l e v e l s of c r i t i c i s m , some extension of the parameters of c r i t i c i s m and discussion, but a d e f i n i t e maintenance of the t r a d i t i o n a l Soviet l i n e on many topics -- i s both consistent with the d e f i n i t i o n of moderate change proffered i n the introduction and c h a r a c t e r i s t i c of the kind of change expected by both Cohen and Colton. While these kinds of changes c e r t a i n l y j u s t i f y the views of these scholars. Pipes' views do not receive the same vindication. The reassertion (and i n some cases extension) of the Khrushchev l i n e on S t a l i n and his p o l i c i e s i s i n d i c a t i v e of changes that are assuredly greater than the minimal ones he expected were v o l u n t a r i l y possible from the leadership. At the same time, these reforms are also not as r a d i c a l in nature as the ones Pipes have expected to re s u l t from domestic p o l i t i c a l c r i s i s . Forces and Factors in the Reform Process A number of the forces and factors which appear to be involved in t h i s renewed c r i t i q u e of Stalinism are si m i l a r to those expressed by the three scholars. There i s , f o r instance, l i t t l e doubt that the t r a d i t i o n a l interpretation of Soviet history has come to be seen as an increasingly important p o l i t i c a l problem by some members of the leadership and e l i t e , a problem that had been providing at le a s t some pressure for change. L o g i c a l l y , of course, one would have expected some h i s t o r i c a l r e v i s i o n because so much of what i s 113 being reformed in the country (and e s p e c i a l l y in the economic realm) i s t i e d so intimately to Stalinism. The Soviet leadership has t r a d i t i o n a l l y not undertaken domestic changes without j u s t i f y i n g them in some way, and because of the intimate r e l a t i o n s h i p between Stalinism and the structure of the Soviet system, part of t h i s " j u s t i f i c a t i o n " would necessarily have to involve some reassessment of both S t a l i n and the r o l e which he played i n the development of Soviet society. The evidence that the t r a d i t i o n a l i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of Stalinism has actually become a p o l i t i c a l problem can be seen from the views expressed by such scholars as Y u r i i Afanaaiev. A Soviet h i s t o r i a n , he has been quoted in a number of the leading Soviet publications about the need fo r a more fac t u a l and r e a l i s t i c interpretation of the past, one which would restore c r e d i b i l i t y to the state of Soviet historiography.45 Afanaaiev may have been taking h i s cue from Gorbachev himself, whose views on t h i s topic have evolved to the point where he appears to see i t as a serious problem. Gorbachev reinforced t h i s viewpoint in h i s recent speech when he said: ...even now we s t i l l encounter attempts to ignore s e n s i t i v e questions of our history, to hush them up, to pretend that nothing s p e c i a l happened. We cannot agree with t h i s . It would be a neglect of h i s t o r i c a l truth, disrespect f o r the memory of those who found themselves innocent victims of lawlessness and arbitariness.46 114 As a problem i t s e l f , the t r a d i t i o n a l interpretation of Soviet history has therefore provided at least some pressure f o r change. This i s consistent with the kind of r o l e which a l l three scholars expected the country's domestic p o l i t i c a l problems to play. Because the changing h i s t o r i c a l i n terpretation of Stalinism has had s p e c i f i c e f f e c t s on a rather narrow segment of the Soviet population, the major forces both promoting and opposing these changes have come from within the leadership and the i n t e l l e c t u a l / a r t i s t i c community. What i s less clear, however, i s how s i g n i f i c a n t these differences are and what the depth and extent of the respective i n t e r e s t s involved says about t h e i r organization within the reform process. Adding to the ambiguity i s the somewhat confusing developmental process that t h i s h i s t o r i c a l reevaluation has gone through. Gorbachev's personal views are a good example of this.47 Upon assuming the r o l e of General Secretary he was quite reluctant to p u b l i c l y c r i t i c i z e either S t a l i n or his p o l i c i e s . As he began to consolidate h i s power and authority, however, his speeches and pronouncements slowly began to include increasingly negative references to Stalinism. There were even some grounds fo r expecting an extensive c r i t i q u e of the man and h i s methods in the seventieth anniversary speech. The speech i t s e l f , however, can only be described as disappointing by these standards. S i m i l a r l y , although the impetus for greater c r i t i c i s m of Stalinism has c e r t a i n l y been provided by the leadership, the strongest pressures both f o r and against these changes appear to exis t below the le v e l of the leadership i . e . within the i n t e l l i g e n t s i a , among whom the l i m i t s f o r discussion of S t a l i n ' s r o l e in Soviet history appear to actually be wider than they are i n the " o f f i c i a l i n t e r p r e t a t i o n " . In order to try to explain these ambiguities and to determine which author's conception of the in t e r e s t s involved i n the reform process i s better suited to t h i s case study, i t i s once again necessary to look i n greater d e t a i l at both the nature of the debates themselves and the apparent reasons for the depth of these i n t e r e s t s at the d i f f e r e n t l e v e l s of Soviet p o l i t i c s . At the l e v e l of the leadership, there has been both strong support f o r and cautious c r i t i c i s m of t h i s r e-interpretation of S t a l i n ' s r o l e in Soviet history. Most of the former, as can be seen from the examples i n the previous section, has come from Gorbachev himself. This in i t s e l f i s not that surprising considering h i s i n s t i t u t i o n a l p o s i t i o n , in that the General Secretary i s usually the leading proponent of any reforms. The opposition to these changes, on the other hand, has been i n the form of c r i t i c i s m from such indivi d u a l s as Ligachev and Chebrikov, c r i t i c i s m which appears to be much stronger and more s i g n i f i c a n t than that voiced on the subject of the new economic reform program. Ligachev, for example, has been quite emphatic about the harmful r e s u l t s which can ar i s e from uncontrolled l e v e l s of h i s t o r i c a l c r i t i c i s m and has expressed a p a r t i c u l a r concern that Soviet history not be depicted as a "chain of errors".48 Chebrikov has been more e x p l i c i t i n h i s opposition to these revisions, in one instance even presenting a staunch defence of the t r a d i t i o n a l interpretation of Soviet history and refusing to place a l l of the blame on S t a l i n for many of the past problems.49 These c r i t i c i s m s are similar i n s t y l e to those on the subject of economic reform -- i . e . , they deal with the dangers of public s e l f - c r i t i c i s m -- but they have also been more frequent and s p e c i f i c in t h i s area. The nature of these disagreements between the leaders i s more d i f f i c u l t to discern, however. The main tenets of qlaanost -- i . e . , s e l f - c r i t i c i s m and increased debate --have c e r t a i n l y been one source of concern. At the same time, one has also been able to see a mixture of both support f o r and c r i t i c i s m of the more fundamental h i s t o r i c a l restructuring that appears to be going on.5° As a r e s u l t , i t does not appear possible to la b e l the c r i t i c i s m as representative of differences over either the glasnost or the perestroika components of the h i s t o r i c a l r e v i s i o n s . This would seem to indicate that the differences within the leadership on t h i s subject are more fundamental than they were on the topic of economic reform. The existence of these kinds of i n t e r e s t s within the leadership, when compared to those expected by the three 117 scholars, generates some inter e s t i n g conclusions. In the case of Richard Pipes' arguments, i t would seem that although there do appear to be conservative i n t e r e s t s within the Politburo which are opposed to a broad h i s t o r i c a l r e v i s i o n , they are neither as homogeneous nor as s i n i s t e r as those which e x i s t i n h i s i n t e r p r e t a t i o n . Indeed, the f a c t that there do appear to be s i g n i f i c a n t forces within the new leadership which are i n favour of these p o l i t i c a l changes c a l l s into question not only Pipes' basic assumptions and conclusions about the leadership and t h e i r i n t e r e s t s , but also his view of the reform process as well. Cohen's arguments* on the other hand, received much stronger vindication from the events surrounding these changes. The very subject area which has caused these differences among the leadership -- i . e . , Soviet history --i s a topic which Cohen believed was closest to the hearts of conservatives and one which they would emphatically defend. Si m i l a r l y , the differences themselves over t h i s subject do seem to be more fundamental than they were in the previous case study i n that some of them have been over the basic reasons f o r the h i s t o r i c a l r e v i s i o n i t s e l f . Because of these two points, i t would appear that the kind of i n t e r e s t s which Cohen theorized about may have arisen within the new leadership. At the same time, however, there i s some evidence which indicates that the d i v i s i o n s within the leadership may not be 118 completely d i s t i n c t and that Cohen's terminology may not be e n t i r e l y useful f o r describing them. The members of the leadership, for example, have not been as f a r apart in t h e i r pronouncements as i t would appear. A l l of the i n d i v i d u a l s who have either supported or opposed these h i s t o r i c a l revisions have attempted to make the d i s t i n c t i o n between c r i t i c i z i n g S t a l i n and his methods on the one hand and lauding the generally triumphant nature of Soviet history on the other. For example, even in some of his harshest c r i t i c i s m s of the S t a l i n i s t repressions, Gorbachev has said that although "...those who were in power at the time were responsible... comrades, that does not d i s t r a c t from what we have today."51 These types of d i s t i n c t i o n s were also c h a r a c t e r i s t i c of his c r i t i c i s m s of S t a l i n in the recent commemorative speech. At the same time, they are s i m i l a r i n structure to those which have been put forward by some of his purportedly more conservative colleagues. The difference has been that where Gorbachev has placed a good deal of emphasis on S t a l i n ' s mistakes, i n d i v i d u a l s such as Ligachev have tended to emphasize the l a t t e r part of the d i s t i n c t i o n i . e . , the triumphs of Soviet history. I f some of these differences have been over the semantics of the pronouncements themselves, then Cohen's d e f i n i t i o n s may not apply as well here. S i m i l a r l y , some of the i n s t i t u t i o n a l concerns which were discussed in the previous case study might be even more 119 applicable here. Ligachev, aa the member of the leadership in charge of setting the id e o l o g i c a l parameters f o r the new reform programs, would have s p e c i f i c i n s t i t u t i o n a l concerns and fears about the scope of h i s t o r i c a l c r i t i c i s m because of the extremely de l i c a t e i n t e r r e l a t i o n s h i p that e x i s t s between Stalinism, the structure of the Soviet p o l i t i c a l system, and Marxist-Leninist ideology. Chebrikov's lack of enthusiasm about the increased l e v e l s of S t a l i n i s t c r i t i c i s m i s even easier to understand because of his position as head of the KGB. Any kind of "openness' within society has the potential to increase the security problems f o r the secret p o l i c e , and a more fac t u a l interpretation of Soviet history might even threaten the legitimacy and position of the i n s t i t u t i o n i t s e l f . As was the case i n the previous study, then, even though Cohen's d e f i n i t i o n of conservatism does take into consideration these kinds of reasons, the d e f i n i t i o n i t s e l f may become somewhat too general because of t h i s . F i n a l l y , the changes that have already occurred i n the o f f i c i a l interpretation of Stalinism do say something about the nature of the int e r e s t s within the leadership. Gorbachev's recent speech was c e r t a i n l y s i g n i f i c a n t in i t s reaasertion of the Khrushchev l i n e on Stalinism, and although the preparation of the speech was apparently the source of a lengthy and heated debate, i t s f i n a l form was subject to the approval of the entir e leadership before i t was given.52 When one combines t h i s factor with the f a c t that even 120 i n d i v i d u a l s l i k e Ligachev have c r i t i c i z e d many of S t a l i n ' s p o l i c i e s and emphasized the need f o r some h i s t o r i c a l revisionism, the o v e r a l l changes in t h i s area do seem to have been p a r t i c u l a r l y important. As was the case in the previous study, one wonders i f these kinds of o f f i c i a l changes could come about from a Politburo which was fundamentally divided into Cohen's conservatives and reformists, regardless of the kind of c o a l i t i o n that might be formed. The kind of change which has occurred i s therefore another indicat i o n that Cohen's d e f i n i t i o n s may not e n t i r e l y apply to the d i s t r i b u t i o n of interests within the leadership on t h i s subject. Cohen could argue, of course, that although the current Politburo may not c l e a r l y r e f l e c t conservative/reformist d i v i s i o n s , these d i v i s i o n s c e r t a i n l y s t i l l e x i s t within the general Soviet e l i t e and that t h i s i s where the b a t t l e over these p o l i t i c a l changes i s going on. This l i n e of argument i s somewhat problematic, however. To begin with, there i s no way to gain an accurate p o r t r a i t of the entire e l i t e , not only because i t i s such a large, amorphous group but also because the only i n d i v i d u a l s whose views we can discern are those who are very close to the reigns of power. As such Cohen's argument would remain t h e o r e t i c a l at beat. Perhaps more importantly, however, on would wonder how such a reformist Politburo could have been formed i f the conservative i n t e r e s t s within the general e l i t e are as strong and as 121 extensive as Cohen's arguments seem to i n f e r . It would seem l o g i c a l that the power and i n t e r e s t s within the leadership would more clos e l y r e f l e c t the d i s t r i b u t i o n of i n t e r e s t s within the general e l i t e . This e s p e c i a l l y true now because of the generational turnover that i s occurring throughout the entire e l i t e , a process during which one would expect an even f i e r c e r struggle between any i d e o l o g i c a l d i v i s i o n s that might exis t within the new generation. As a r e s u l t , differences have been observable even over the S t a l i n question do not appear to represent the kind of d i v i s i o n s contained within Cohen's reform framework. F i n a l l y , Colton's view of the leadership, i t s i n t e r e s t s and the role that they would both play in the reform process has also received a good deal of j u s t i f i c a t i o n from these events. Impetus for these changes has actually come from within the leadership i t s e l f . At the same time, the differences which appear to divide the new leaders are not unlike those which Colton had expected to occur over the attempted resolution of any p o l i t i c a l problem. What agreement i s apparent on t h i s issue of h i s t o r i c a l r e v i s i o n has been over the kinds of changes that are needed to supplement the new economic reforms. This i s consistent with Colton's view of the main purpose of the new leadership. At the same time, the differences have revolved around how much of the p o l i t i c a l past should be revised, a topic of discussion within the leadership which Colton s p e c i f i c a l l y expected to 122 cause a great, deal of dissension and one which would l i m i t the progress of any p o l i t i c a l reforms. As a r e s u l t , while the differences within the Politburo may not appear to be consistent with his view of a generally uniform new leadership, i t must be remembered that i t was the need for di r e c t economic changes which was expected to be the unifying factor among t h i s group, and not the need to change s i g n i f i c a n t aspects of the p o l i t i c a l structure of the system. This kind of interpretation of the i n t e r e s t s within the leadership -- i . e . , as divided but perhaps not as fundamentally as Cohen's d e f i n i t i o n s would imply -- could help to explain the apparently disappointing nature of Gorbachev's recent speech. Looked at from t h i s perspective, the actual c r i t i c i s m s which Gorbachev did make would be consistent with the kinds which he had been making a l l along i . e . , attempts to distinguish between Stalinism and Soviet history. What i s perhaps more important, however, i s that the degree of c r i t i c i s m on the S t a l i n question which he did offe r i . e . , moderate changes in interpretation, i s consistent with the kind of changes being attempted i n other areas of the domestic reform program. One has to wonder why a more r a d i c a l reassessment of Soviet history would have been i n the inte r e s t s of a reform program that i s c l e a r l y moderate in i t s goals. There i s even an argument to be made that these h i s t o r i c a l and p o l i t i c a l changes are being made primarily to supplement the main goal of the leadership i . e . , the economic 123 reform program. If t h i s i s true, then i t i s not hard to understand the differences between the leaders over some of these p o l i t i c a l changes, as they would be subjects upon which there was the least amount of agreement. In terms of the speech i t s e l f , i t must be remembered that a r a d i c a l reevaluation of S t a l i n and h i s ro l e i n Soviet history was expected not so much because of what was contained i n the leadership's p r i o r pronouncements, but rather because of the words and writings of some of the more prominent benefactors of the country's new c u l t u r a l qlasnost. As we w i l l see in the next section, these indiv i d u a l s may not necessarily have the kind of "d i r e c t p i p e l i n e " to the leadership which some in the West might believe. In conclusion, t h i s kind of an explanation of the substance of Gorbachev's speech would appear to be just as plausible as one which posits the existence of r e l a t i v e l y d i s t i n c t "conservative forces" at work within the Politburo, forces which l e f t Gorbachev l i t t l e choice but to tone down his speech. As was mentioned e a r l i e r , the amount of i n t e r e s t i n t h i s h i s t o r i c a l revisionism at the l e v e l of the i n t e l l i g e n t s i a appears to have been greater and gone deeper than has been the case within the leadership. The i n i t i a l section demonstrated just how much emphatic, public support has arisen out of t h i s group for the changes. At the same time, however, the increased l e v e l of S t a l i n i s t revisionism 124 in both the press and l i t e r a t u r e has evoked a number of equally c r i t i c a l responses from in d i v i d u a l s who are i n support of the more t r a d i t i o n a l interpretation of Soviet history. For example, afte r a recent l e t t e r by the r e v i s i o n i s t h i s t o r i a n Afanasiev was printed in Moscow  News, the paper was inundated with c r i t i c i s m s from such luminaries as Fedor Vaganov, the head of the U.S.S.R.'s main archival agency, as well as from the heads of three university history departments.53 ^11 emphatically defended the present state of Soviet historiography. As well, a leading opponent of r e v i s i o n i s t l i t e r a t u r e -- the writer Petr Proakurin -- has just recently become the chairman of the RSFR branch of the Soviet Cultural Foundation, thus apparently furthering the cause of the more t r a d i t i o n a l scholars and writers.54 One can therefore see that the amount of open disagreement among t h i s group i s much stronger than i t was within the leadership. Where the source of the differences at t h i s l e v e l in the previous study had primarily been the v i s i b l e e f f e c t s of the perestroika component of the new reforms, the disagreement here appears to be over the si d e - e f f e c t s of both the glasnost and the perestroika aspects of the new h i s t o r i c a l revisionism. The former has been the main reason for the " c u l t u r a l thaw" within the country, the e f f e c t s of which have been both p o s i t i v e and negative throughout the i n t e l l e c t u a l and a r t i s t i c community. At the same time, the 125 restructuring has begun to change what kind of h i s t o r i c a l views receive attention not only i n the press but, more importantly, in l i t e r a t u r e and the a r t s . As a r e s u l t , some of the i n s t i t u t i o n a l and professional reasons f o r supporting reform which were discussed in a p o s i t i v e sense in the previous study are a l l the more apparent and applicable here in the negative sense. The f a c t i s that the most v o l a t i l e disagreements have been between the members of the professions which have had the highest stakes in these h i s t o r i c a l debates. Many hi s t o r i a n s and writers, because of the decrease in censorship and the r e h a b i l i t a t i o n of previously banned indivi d u a l s and authors, w i l l e f f e c t i v e l y f i n d t h e i r livelyhoods at stake. This point was recently made quite clear by F e l i k s Kuznetsov of the Moscow Writer's Organization who, in response to a question about academic and j o u r n a l i s t i c resistance to perestroika. r e p l i e d : Whatever resistance there i s to perestroika i s rather of a psychological than a p o l i t i c a l nature. One of the reasons for t h i s i s that perestroika leads to the s t r i p p i n g of the t i t l e s and positions of many writers and public figures. They may be deprived of t h e i r previous posts and jobs, they may be deprived of t h e i r fame and t h e i r material wealth, which often was acquired not through t h e i r accomplishments in l i t e r a t u r e and arts but simply by vir t u e of the post they occupied.^ 5 In conclusion, there once again do appear to be d i f f e r e n t constituencies within t h i s segment of Soviet society which are a c t i v e l y in favor of and in opposition to these h i s t o r i c a l r e v i s i o n s . S i m i l a r l y , the reasons for these 126 int e r e s t s are often personal and professional, and not necessarily related to i d e o l o g i c a l or p o l i t i c a l b e l i e f s . Because these in t e r e s t s appear to be of a s i m i l a r nature to those which were analyzed in the previous case study, Richard Pipes' views are once again not that applicable here. There appears to be more support for reform at t h i s l e v e l than he expected. S i m i l a r l y , the resistance, though often strong and deep, has been for a variety of reasons, only some of which are d i r e c t l y related to such motivations as greed and the maintenance of power. F i n a l l y , because these interests have had such a s i g n i f i c a n t e f f e c t on the progress of these reforms, most of the tenets of Pipes' " c r i s i s / r e f o r m " thesis do not appear to apply here. Cohen's views, on the other hand, have received even stronger j u s t i f i c a t i o n from these events than they did in the previous case study. The i n t e r e s t s here have run very deep on both sides of the h i s t o r i c a l debate and they have had the kinds of e f f e c t s on the reform process which he expected they would have. As well, the strength of these interests does make i t appear that i t i s these forces which have provided the main impetus for the changes, esp e c i a l l y because the debate has been strongest at t h i s l e v e l . However, because the reasons for both supporting and r e s i s t i n g t h i s h i s t o r i c a l r e v i s i o n are quite varied, Cohen's use of the terms reformism and conservatism to define them may simplify the true nature of the in t e r e s t s themselves. Although h i s terms are broad 127 enought to take a l l of these d i f f e r e n t motivations into consideration, the labels "reformism and conservatism" i n f e r ideas of organization and i d e o l o g i c a l / p o l i t i c a l unity which once again do not seem to ex i s t within the in t e r e s t s here- As has been the case throughout the thesis, the problems with Cohen's reform framework are related to h i s terminology and not to his basic obsrvations and interpretations. F i n a l l y , Colton's views can receive only p a r t i a l j u s t i f i c a t i o n here because he did not deal extensively with the d i f f e r e n t i n t e r e s t s at the lower l e v e l s of Soviet society. Even more so than was the case in the previous study, h i s arguments i n t h i s context have appeared somewhat skewed in the di r e c t i o n of the ro l e that the new leadership has played. This i s unfortunate because even though some impetus f o r the changes on the S t a l i n question has once again come from above, the strength of the inte r e s t s on t h i s issue appears to be greater within the i n t e l l i g e n t s i a than i t i s within the leadership. As a r e s u l t , these i n t e r e s t s have had a s i g n i f i c a n t e f f e c t on the progress of these changes through the debate which they have generated i n the Soviet press. This kind of a characterization of the inte r e s t s within the i n t e l l i g e n t s i a helps to explain the other major ambiguity of these reforms, i . e . , the reason f o r the strength of the debate among t h i s group. What has made i t appear even stronger, however, i s the way in which t h i s debate has been presented i n the Soviet press. A new s t y l e of Soviet 128 journalism has developed within the press, one which has apparently taken to heart some of the leaders' b e l i e f s i n debate, s e l f - c r i t i c i s m and a more r e a l i s t i c and factual presentation of the news. The increased i n t e l l e c t u a l debate in the country has been the prime benefactor of these changes in the Soviet press i n that i t has been conducted more comprehensively than ever before. Two problems have arisen because of t h i s new s t y l e of journalism, however, both of which may make these debates appear more s i g n i f i c a n t than they r e a l l y are. The f i r s t has to do with the fa c t that because t r a d i t i o n a l Soviet journalism contained very l i t t l e of t h i s type of debate and c r i t i c i s m , the importance of the increased l e v e l s of both of these factors can be exaggerated. Not only does i t sometimes look l i k e the press i s divided along ideo l o g i c a l and p o l i t i c a l l i n e s , the strength of the debate there has caused some in the West to see a d i r e c t r e l a t i o n s h i p between them and the kind of differences which exi s t between the leaders themselves. This kind of thinking was in evidence p r i o r to Gorbachev's recent speech, during which time many western publications based t h e i r speculations about the content of the speech upon the views and expectations of Soviet scholars and academics who were purportedly "close" to Gorbachev, and who had been prominently involved i n the academic debate in the press.52 Although we do not know for sure the exact r e l a t i o n s h i p between what i s printed i n 129 the press and the d i v i s i o n o£ inte r e s t s within the leadership, i t would seem that much of the increased debate and c r i t i c i s m within the press i s much more a r e f l e c t i o n of the new s t y l e of journalism than i t i s of deep d i v i s i o n s within the new leadership. The second problem with t h i s new s t y l e of Soviet journalism has been that i t has often been taken too f a r . Many publications have taken the new emphasis on s e l f - c r i t i c i s m to extremes by only publishing the c r i t i c a l side of these i n t e l l e c t u a l and scholarly debates and therefore giving the press a decidedly negative outlook. Not only has t h i s once again tended to exaggerate the sign i f i c a n c e of t h i s increased degree of c r i t i c i s m , i t has also been one of the greatest sources of concern f o r indi v i d u a l s l i k e Ligachev. Indeed, almost a l l of his c r i t i c i s m of h i s t o r i c a l revisionism has come i n the context of discussions about the changes in the press and l i t e r a t u r e . As a r e s u l t , the increasingly negative press and some of the leadership's responses to i t have made i t appear as i f r e l a t i v e l y d i s t i n c t conservative and reformist forces, as defined by Cohen, are doing battle through the press. Although the d i f f e r e n t leadership i n t e r e s t s do undoubtedly f i l t e r down into the press, i t would seem that the strength of the i n t e l l e c t u a l debate i s instead better explained by a new s t y l e of Soviet journalism and by the nature of the subject of the debate i t s e l f , a topic which has apparantly 130 struck a number of se n s i t i v e chords among the i n t e l l i g e n t s i a . 131 Endnotes 1. The d e f i n i t i o n s of change used by the three authors, and described in d e t a i l in the f i r s t chapter, w i l l serve as the bases f o r a comparision of the kind of change that has occurred here. 2. The Christian) Science Monitor. World E d i t i o n , (December 7-13, 1987), p. 18 3. The information on the s p e c i f i c aspects of the Enterprise Law was taken from an excellent summary by P h i l i p Hanson in "The Enterprise Law and the Reform Process", Radio  Liberty Research B u l l e t i n . Supplement 269/87 (July 14, 1987), pp. 1-9 4. These references were made by Leonid Abalkin, the Director of the Moscow Ins t i t u t e of Economics, as reported in "The U.S.S.R. This Week", Radio Liberty Research  B u l l e t i n . Supplement 268/87 (July 10, 1987), p. 13 5. Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS): Soviet  Union. 212, (3 November 1987), pp. 49-50 6. Cited i n Elizabeth Teague, "Gorbachev Answers His C r i t i c s " , Radio Liberty Research B u l l e t i n . Supplement 280/87 (July 15, 1987), p. 5 7- FBIS. (3 November 1987), p. 50 8. Ibid., pp. 40-41 9. Hanson, p. 6 10. Teague, p. 6 11. FBIS. (3 November 1987), p. 48 12. Ibid., p. 48 13. Vera Tolz, "Debates Over S t a l i n ' s Legacy on the Eve of the Seventieth Anniversary of the October Revolution" Radio Liberty Research B u l l e t i n . Supplement 407/87 (Oct. 15, 1987), pp. 3-4 14. Cited i n "The U.S.S.R. This Week", Radio Liberty Research B u l l e t i n . Supplement 253/87 (July 3, 1987), p. 10 15. The Chri s t i a n Science Monitor. World E d i t i o n , (December 7-13, 1987), pp. 18-19 132 16. Cited in Robert C. Tucker, "Gorbachev and the Fight for Soviet Reform", World Policy Journal. Vol. 4, No. 2, (Spring 1987), pp. 181-2 17. "The U.S.S.R. Thia Week", Radio Liberty Research  B u l l e t i n . Supplement 268/87 (July 10, 1987), p. 13 18. Examples of these kinds of conclusions can be found i n Tucker, pp. 183-4; Michael Kaser, "One economy, two systems: p a r a l l e l s between Soviet and Chinese reform", International A f f a i r s . Vol. 63, No. 4, (Summer 1987), p. 402, and i n The Chr i s t i a n Science Monitor. World Edi t i o n , (December 7-13, 1987), pp. 18-19 19. Cited i n Elizabeth Teague, "Gorbachev Bounces Back", Radio Liberty Research B u l l e t i n . Supplement 406/87 (Oct. 14, 1987), pp. 5-6 20. Cited in P h i l i p Hanson and Elizabeth Teague, "Text of Gorbachev's and Slyunkov's speeches to the Party Conference on the Soviet Economy", Radio Liberty  Research B u l l e t i n . Supplement 223/87 (June 12, 1987), p. 8 21. Tucker, p. 181 22. Chebrikov expressed these views i n a Sept. 11 speech to security and police o f f i c e r s and Party o f f i c i a l s , as reported i n The Christian Science Monitor. World Edi t i o n , (Sept. 21-27, 1987), p. 13 23. Tolz, p. 7 24. For information of the Y e l t s i n a f f a i r see The  Chri s t i a n Science Monitor. World Ed i t i o n , (December 14-20, 1987), p. 5 25. The quotation i s from Timothy J. Colton, The Dilemma  of Reform i n the Soviet Union (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, Inc., 1984), p. x. For a s i m i l a r d e f i n i t i o n of r a d i c a l change see Stephen F. Cohen, Rethinking the Soviet Experience (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1985), p. 131 26. Soviet sources, unreliable as they may be, have reported that up to ninety-four percent of the i n t e l l i g e n t s i a who were questioned voiced support for these changes. See The Christian Science Monitor. World E d i t i o n , (December 7-13, 1987), p. 18. For more r e l i a b l e analysis see Tucker, pp. 183-189 133 27. FBIS. <3 November 1987), p. 49 28. Ibid., p. 53 29. Tucker, p. 185 30. Hanson and Teague, p. 1 31. The Vancouver Sun. (January 4, 1988), p. A12 32. Tolz, "Debates", p. 4 33. For information on Rybakov and Shatrov see The  Christian Science Monitor. World Edi t i o n , (May 4-10, 1987), p. 10 and (April 13-19, 1987), p.21, respectively. 34. FBIS. (3 November 1987), p. 45 35. Ibid. 36. Ibid., p. 44 37. Ibid. 38. The Chri s t i a n Science Monitor. World E d i t i o n , (June 22-28, 1987), p. 7 39. "The U.S.S.R. This Week", Radio Liberty Research  B u l l e t i n . Supplement 253/87 (July 3, 1987), p. 10 40. "The U.S.S.R. This Week", Radio Liberty Research  B u l l e t i n . Supplement 400/87 (Oct. 9, 1987), p. 12 41. Bukharin has recently been seen i n a more po s i t i v e l i g h t in Mikhail Shatrov's play "The Brest Peace", described in The Chri s t i a n Science Monitor. World E d i t i o n , (April 13-19, 1987), p. 21, and also by historians l i k e Y u r i i Afanasiev i n the Soviet press as reported i n "The U.S.S.R. This Week", Radio Liberty Research B u l l e t i n . Supplement 366/87 (July 17, 1987), p. 14 42. FBIS. (3 November 1987), p.45 43. Ibid., p. 43 44. Ibid. 45. Cited i n Vera Tolz, "The Current Discussion of Stalinism and the Style of Debates Among Soviet Historians", in Radio Liberty Research B u l l e t i n . Supplement 282/87 (July 20, 1987), p. 1 134 46. FBIS. <3 November 1987), p. 45 47. Tolz, "Debates Over S t a l i n " , p. 2 48. Tolz, "Debates Over S t a l i n " , p. 2 49. The Chr i s t i a n Science Monitor. World Edi t i o n , (September 21-27, 1987), p. 13 50. Tolz, "Debates Over S t a l i n " , p. 2 51. Teague, "Gorbachev Answers His C r i t i c s " , p. 5 52. Elizabeth Teague, "Gorbachev Opens Seventieth Anniversary Celebrations", Radio Liberty Research  B u l l e t i n . Supplement 432/87 (November 2, 1987), p. 2 53. Tolz, "Current Discussion", p. 2 54. "The U.S.S.R. This Week ".Radio Liberty Research  B u l l e t i n Supplement 255/87 (June 8, 1987), p. 11 55. Cited i n Roland Eggleston, "Writer's Union O f f i c i a l s Discuss Soviet Authors", in Radio Liberty Research  B u l l e t i n . Supplement 247/87 (June 30, 1987), pp. 4-5 56. The Christian Science Monitor. World Edition, (November 9-15, 1987), p. 28 135 Conclusion This thesis has attempted to provide a good deal of information on both the r e l a t i v e e f f i c a c y of the three scholars' views of the reform process i n the Soviet Union and on some of the c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s of the new Soviet domestic reform program. Rather than use t h i s section f o r a lengthy summary of these analyses, I w i l l instead off e r a conclusion which w i l l examine how well the purposes of t h i s paper have been f u l f i l l e d . In the process, the r e l a t i v e strengths and weaknesses of each scholar's arguments w i l l be presented along with some related conclusions about the nature and character of the current domestic reforms. The main purpose of t h i s paper was to compare, contrast and c r i t i q u e the views of the three scholars i n an e f f o r t to determine which arguments were the most credible. This has been done and some conclusions can be offered on the r e s u l t s . To begin with, Richard Pipes' arguments -- from a l o g i c a l , h i s t o r i c a l and contemporary perspective -- can only be described as inconsistent, unsubstantiated and generally incorrect. The strength of h i s analysis was limited to h i s recognition of some of the more obvious problems within the country, t h e i r basic s t r u c t u r a l causes and a few of the endemic forces which act as b a r r i e r s to impede the progress of change. The flaws i n his interpretations are f a r greater in number, however, and they a l l can be traced back to two related problems: an often e x p l i c i t d i s b e l i e f i n socialism as 136 a functional p o l i t i c a l and economic model combined with a very narrow, one-dimensional view of Soviet e l i t e i n t e r e s t s . Pipes' perception of these indiv i d u a l s as completely corrupt and uniformly opposed to any kind of " p o s i t i v e " reform within the country has caused him to develop f a u l t y interpretations from otherwise correct observations of many aspects of the Soviet s i t u a t i o n . His conception of the nature of the Soviet Union's domestic problems, the kind of change needed to overcome them and the reform process i t s e l f have a l l been colored, and thus made leas credible, by h i s unsubstantiated views of both the e l i t e and the system. Although some of his more basic observations may have been correct, Pipes' o v e r a l l arguments on the topic of Soviet reform have not only been refuted, they have been shown to be of l i t t l e use as too l s for analysis. Cohen's and Colton's arguments fared much better than Pipes' did in that the majority of the interpretations and conclusions within them were shown to be correct. There were two major strengths in Cohen's reform framework. The f i r s t was with respect to h i s interpretation of the severity of the country's problems and the kind of change which was needed to overcome them. His description of both topics i n moderate terms was not only substantiated by a r e a l i s t i c appraisal of the s t a t i s t i c s and f a c t s available on the domestic s i t u a t i o n , i t has also been reinforced by the scope and apparent goals of the new domestic reforms themselves. More s p e c i f i c a l l y , 137 his expectation that future Soviet reform programs would include a n t i - S t a l i n i s t and N.E.P•-related components has been correct, demonstrating that he also had some insight into the p a r t i c u l a r character of future reforms. Cohen's strongest argument was the one r e l a t i n g to the existence of s i g n i f i c a n t constituencies within the country which were both for and against any kind of changes. Past examples of Soviet reform showed that t h i s had been the case and both case studies analyzed here demonstrated that these inte r e s t s are obviously quite widespread, at times even showing up in the leadership. Cohen was not only correct about the existence of the constituencies themselves, but also about the s i g n i f i c a n t r o l e s that these in t e r e s t s would have i n the reform process, r o l e s which were demonstrated quite c l e a r l y in the case study on h i s t o r i c a l revisionism. The flaw i n Cohen's framework, however, was the terminology which he used in his attempts to define these same i n t e r e s t s . The terms "conservatism" and "reformism" were shown to be somewhat problematic for two related reasons. Used to describe the existence of two fundamental, ide o l o g i c a l d i v i s i o n s at a l l l e v e l s of Soviet p o l i t i c s and society, they were found to be too general to give the f u l l s i g n i f i c a n c e and importance of the range of reasons for supporting or r e s i s t i n g change. This problem was seen when trying to define the spectrum of i n t e r e s t s within the i n t e l l i g e n t s i a and also when attempting to characterize the 138 general nature of the problems within Soviet p o l i t i c s . While Cohen's d e f i n i t i o n s do propose to incorporate within them a l l of the reasons for supporting or r e s i s t i n g change, the spectrum of these reasons -- ranging from personal to professional and i n s t i t u t i o n a l as well as ide o l o g i c a l and p o l i t i c a l -- i s so broad that one has to wonder whether generalizing them under two headings i s the best way to present them. In other words, by using the terms reformism and conservatism, regardless of the q u a l i f i c a t i o n s attached to the d e f i n i t i o n s , one runs the r i s k of simplifying the true nature and range of the inte r e s t s themselves. Cohen's d e f i n i t i o n s of reformism and conservatism also presented some problems when they were used to explain the apparent d i s t r i b u t i o n of i n t e r e s t s within the present i leadership. There appears to be more of a general consensus within the Politburo than Cohen might have expected, e s p e c i a l l y over the kind of economic changes that are needed. The s i g n i f i c a n c e of the reforms that have already occurred reinforces t h i s interpretation in that they r e f l e c t a greater degree of change than one would expect from a leadership that was either divided on the basis of Cohen's d e f i n i t i o n s , or which had reached the kind of "reformist/conservative c o a l i t i o n " envisioned by him. S i m i l a r l y , the kinds of differences which have arisen among the leaders, though related to some of those which would e x i s t in Cohen's framework, do not appear to be s i g n i f i c a n t enough to j u s t i f y 139 defining them as representative of the existence of a d i s t i n c t conservative constituency. While such i n d i v i d u a l s as Ligachev have voiced concerns over the l e v e l of h i s t o r i c a l c r i t i c i s m and even about the pace of some of the changes themselves, these kinds of arguments have not stopped these same ind i v i d u a l s from simultaneously agreeing on the fundamental importance of perestroika in general and on some of the s p e c i f i c economic and S t a l i n i s t reforms i n pa r t i c u l a r . As a r e s u l t , while there do appear to be Individuals within the leadership who are more cautious and conservative than Gorbachev, they do not appear to have a l l of the c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s that one would expect from a "conservative". It i s therefore the terminology that i s the problem here and not the basic argument about d i f f e r e n t i n t e r e s t s within the leadership. In conclusion, although Cohen's arguments have c e r t a i n l y received a good deal of j u s t i f i c a t i o n from both past and present events, the d e f i n i t i o n a l problems inherent i n h i s reform framework do detract somewhat from his overall approach. Colton, on the other hand, was much more s p e c i f i c i n his arguments and because of t h i s avoided some of the d e f i n i t i o n a l problems that characterized Cohen's views. The strength of his arguments resided in three basic areas. Like Cohen he, too, was correct i n both h i s interpretation of the si t u a t i o n within the country and the kind of change which might be involved i n overcoming some of the problems there. 140 As well, where Cohen had been correct in a n t i c i p a t i n g some of the s p e c i f i c features of the reforms, Colton has also been ri g h t about what the general character of the reforms would look l i k e - The changes themselves do appear to r e f l e c t "compromises" aimed d i r e c t l y at some of the country's more serious problems. At the same time they are also apparently limited in t h e i r scope by such things as the use of a number of old solutions, the "untouchable nature" of some aspects of Soviet p o l i t i c s and by an excess of caution on the part of the leadership- In a d i f f e r e n t way from Cohen, then, Colton was also correct in his expectations of what the nature and character of the changes would be. The strongest part of Colton's arguments has obviously been the amount of emphasis which he placed on the e f f e c t s that a new generation of leadership would have on the reform process i n general and on the progress of the changes i n p a r t i c u l a r . The new Soviet leadership under Gorbachev has provided t h i s Impetus fo r change and i t s approach has been a "problem-solving" one. Although Gorbachev has been i t s main spokesman, pronouncements from a number of d i f f e r e n t i n d i v i d u a l s suggest that some of the generational c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s which Colton expected to be present i n t h i s group do indeed ex i s t , with the most obvious one being a desire to "get the country going again". The f i n a l area of strength in Colton's reform framework was his conception of the conservative resistance within the country and the r o l e that i t has played as a source of the problems and a ba r r i e r to change. By concentrating on some of the s p e c i f i c sources of conservatism and how they have acted to impede the progress of change -- sources such as the approach of the Brezhnev administration and in p a r t i c u l a r the increasingly obsolete nature of i t s methods and polices -- he has avoided using the general term "conservatism" to describe the reasons f o r these problems. By doing so, the analysis of his arguments was made simpler because these are the kinds of factors which can be discovered and examined. As such, although Colton chose not to expand upon a l l of the reasons for the existence of these conservative i n t e r e s t s , the ones he did discuss could be analyzed, and in the process he avoided some of the d e f i n i t i o n a l problems which Cohen ran into in trying to incorporate a l l of these in t e r e s t s under one general heading. The only r e a l flaw i n Colton's arguments was h i s f a i l u r e to deal in greater d e t a i l with the extensive interests which exi s t at the lower l e v e l s of Soviet society and p o l i t i c s and which have been shown to play a s i g n i f i c a n t r o l e i n the reform process. By f a i l i n g to do so his arguments were somewhat one-sided in that they placed almost a l l of the emphasis on the r o l e which would be played by the new leadership in t h i s process. Even though t h i s group has been the most important force providing impetus f o r change, the d i f f e r e n t interests supporting and opposing the various 142 changes have s i g n i f i c a n t l y affected the progress of the reforms themselves. Admittedly part of t h i s ommission on Colton's part can be attributed to his use of a d i f f e r e n t " l e v e l of analysis", one which did not s p e c i f i c a l l y concentrate on these factors. Even so, his decision not to emphasise the r o l e played by these d i f f e r e n t i n t e r e s t s did detract somewhat from the o v e r a l l a p p l i c a b i l i t y of his arguments. The secondary purpose of t h i s paper was to gain a better understanding of the current Soviet domestic reform program. This, too, has hopefully been accomplished by using the scholars' d i f f e r e n t reform frameworks as tools to investigate the nature of the current changes. Rather than completely restate the emerging c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s of these new reforms, i t i s more useful to present the most important aspects of these changes, some of which were not necessarily expected by the three authors. To begin with, a dynamic leader has arisen at the helm of t h i s reform program in the person of Mikhail Gorbachev, a man who has provided the greatest public support f o r the changes. Based on his i n s t i t u t i o n a l position t h i s i s not that surprising, but i t i s a sharp contrast to the kind of leadership that was c h a r a c t e r i s t i c of the l a t e r Brezhnev years. The new leadership does seem to be unified over one main idea: the need f o r s i g n i f i c a n t , yet within-system economic reforms which w i l l d i r e c t l y address some of the country's more 143 serious problems. The differences within the leadership appear to be, f o r the most part, over the glasnost portion of the reforms, with the perestroika component receiving substantial support from a l l members. Although these differences over glasnost do seem to have created some d i v i s i o n s within the Politburo, they are not clear enough (even on the subject of the S t a l i n question) to indicate any i d e o l o g i c a l l y d i s t i n c t groups or factions within the leadership. The S t a l i n issue has apparently caused such a disturbance because of the extremely s e n s i t i v e nature of i t s subject matter and because of the p a r t i c u l a r e f f e c t s i t has had on some segments of Soviet p o l i t i c a l l i f e . Below the le v e l of the leadership, the changes have met with lukewarm enthusiasm, to say the least, with the main source of the problems being the s p e c i f i c e f f e c t s that the economic restructuring are expected to have on many groups within the country. More s p e c i f i c a l l y , the i n t e l l i g e n t s i a , as a group, have also played a f a r greater r o l e i n the reform process than was expected. T r a d i t i o n a l l y either ignored or forced into submission by the Party, some members of t h i s group have instead been a c t i v e l y recruited by members of the leadership to gain support for these changes and other more conservative scholars and academics have also provided the most public opposition to these changes to date. F i n a l l y , the Soviet press has i t s e l f f e l t the e f f e c t s of glasnost, with the r e s u l t s being a medium that f o r the f i r s t time has 144 brought at least some c r e d i b i l i t y to Soviet journalism. One r e s u l t of these new changes has been a new emphasis on s e l f - c r i t i c i s m and debate within the press, both of which have apparently been the sources of tension within the leadership. These c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s , then, while not always expected by the three scholars, are int e r e s t i n g in t h e i r own rig h t and have helped to account for some of the ambiguities of the reform process. To conclude, I hope that t h i s paper has been successful in f u l f i l l i n g i t s purposes. In the process I hope that something has been learned not only about Soviet reform, but esp e c i a l l y about how to analyze and interpret i t . What the future holds f o r the present reform program i s , of course, unknown, but i t s progress w i l l no doubt continue to be related to and affected by some of the concepts and arguments elaborated upon in t h i s paper. Because of t h i s i t should continue to be analyzed from these perspectives. 145 BibIiaqraphy Barghoorn, Frederick. "Problems of Policy and P o l i t i c a l Behavior." S l a v i c Review. 38, No. 2, (June 1979), pp. 211-15 Bi a l e r , Seweryn. S t a l i n ' s Succeaaora Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1980. Breslauer, George W. "Reformism and Conservatism." S l a v i c  Review. 38, No. 2, (June 1979), pp. 216-219 " P o l i t i c a l Succession and the Soviet Policy Agenda." Problems of Communism. 29, 3, (May-June 1980), pp. 34-52 The Christian Science Monitor. (World E d i t i o n ) , various issues Cohen, Stephen F. "The Friends and Foes of Change: Reformism and Conservatism in the Soviet Union." S l a v i c Review 38, No. 2, (June 1979), pp. 187-202 "Reply." S l a v i c Review. 38, No. 2, (June 1979), pp. 187-202 Rethinking the Soviet Experience London: Oxford University Press, 1985. Sovletlcus London: W. W. Norton and Company, 1985. Colton, Timothy J. The Dilemma of Reform in the Soviet Union New York: Council on Foreign Relations, Inc., 1984. Conquest, Robert. "A New Russia? A New World?" Foreign  A f f a i r s . Vol. 53, No. 3, (April 1975), pp. 482-97 Eggleston, Roland. "Writer's Union O f f i c i a l s Discuss Soviet Authors." Radio Liberty Research B u l l e t i n . Supplement 247/87, (June 30, 1987), pp. 1-5 Encounter, various issues Foreign A f f a i r s , various issues Foreign Broadcast Information Service: Soviet Union 146 Hanson, P h i l i p . "The Enterprise Law and the Reform Process." Radio Liberty Research B u l l e t i n , Supplement 269/87 (July 14, 1987), pp. 1-9 and Teague, Elizabeth. "Text of Gorbachev's and Slyunkov's speeches to the Party Conference on the Soviet Economy." Radio Liberty Research B u l l e t i n . Supplement 223/87 (June 12, 1987), pp. 1-12 Hough, Jerry F. Soviet Leadership i n Transition Washington: Brookings I n s t i t u t i o n , 1980. Huntington, Samuel P. "Generations, Cycles and Their Role in American Development" In P o l i t i c a l Generations and  P o l i t i c a l Development Ed. by Richard J. Samuels. Lexington, Mass.: D.C. Heath, 1977. International A f f a i r s , various issues. Kaser, Michael. "One economy, two systems: p a r a l l e l s between Soviet and Chinese reform." International A f f a i r s , Vol. 63, No. 4, (Summer 1987), pp. 395-412 The New York Times Odum, William E. "Whither the Soviet Union?" The Washington Quarterly. Vol. 4, No. 2, (Spring 1982), pp. 30-49 Pipes, Richard. "Mr. X Revises." Encounter, Vol. L, No. 4, (April 1978), pp. 18-21 "Can the Soviet Union Reform?" Foreign A f f a i r s . Vol. 63, No. 1, ( F a l l 1984), pp. 47-61 Survival i s Not Enough New York: Simon and Schuster, 1984. Problems of Communism, various issues. Radio Liberty Research B u l l e t i n , various supplements. Rigby, T. H. "Forward From "Who Gets What, When, How?" Sl a v i c Review. 38, No. 2, (June 1979), pp. 203-7 Rothman, Stanley and Breslauer, George W. Soviet P o l i t i c s  and Society New York: West Publishing Co., 1978. S k i l l i n g , H. Gordon and G r i f f i t h s , Franklyn, eds. Interest Groups in Soviet P o l i t i c s Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1971. 147 Sl a v i c Review, various issues. Smith, Hedrick. The Russians New York: The New York Times Book Co., 1976. Teague, Elizabeth. "Gorbachev Answers His C r i t i c s . " Radio  Liberty Research B u l l e t i n . Supplement 280/87 (July 15, 1987), pp. 1-8 "Gorbachev Bounces Back." Radio Liberty Research B u l l e t i n . Supplement 406/87 (October 14, 1987), pp. 1-7 "Gorbachev Opens Seventieth Anniversary Celebrations." Radio Liberty Research B u l l e t i n . Supplement 432/87 (November 2, 1987), pp. 1-3 Tolz, Vera. "The Current Discussion of Stalinism and the Style of Debates Among Soviet Historians." Radio  Liberty Research B u l l e t i n . Supplement 282/87 (July 20, 1987), pp. 1-6 "Debates Over S t a l i n ' s Legacy on the Eve of the Seventieth Anniversary of the October Revolution." Radio Liberty Research B u l l e t i n . Supplement 407/87 (October 15, 1987), pp. 1-11 Tucker, Robert C. "Gorbachev and the Fight for Soviet Reform." World Policy Journal. Vol. 4, No. 2, (Spring 1987), pp. 179-206 World Policy Journal, various issues. The Washington Quarterly, various issues. The Vancouver Sun, various issues. 

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