UBC Theses and Dissertations

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UBC Theses and Dissertations

Provisions for leadership succession in the P.R.C. Campbell, David Nathan 1988

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PROVISIONS FOR LEADERSHIP SUCCESSION IN THE P.R.C. BY DAVID NATHAN CAMPBELL B.A. (Magna Cum L a u d e ) , B r i g h a m Young U n i v e r s i t y , 1986 A THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF MASTER OF ARTS i n THE FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIES DEPARTMENT OF P O L I T I C A L SCIENCE We a c c e p t t h i s t h e s i s as c o n f o r m i n g t o t h e r e q u i r e d s t a n d a r d THE UNIVERSITY OF B R I T I S H COLUMBIA A u g u s t 1988 © D a v i d N a t h a n C a m p b e l l , 1988 5 S In presenting this thesis in partial fulfilment of the requirements for an advanced degree at the University of British Columbia, I agree that the Library shall make it freely available for reference and study. I further agree that permission for extensive copying of this thesis for scholarly purposes may be granted by the head of my department or by his or her representatives. It is understood that copying or publication of this thesis for financial gain shall not be allowed without my written permission. Department of pn(rltCA( Science The University of British Columbia 1956 Main Mall Vancouver, Canada V6T 1Y3 Date AUMSJ ID AW A b s t r a c t Most a n a l y s t s s t u d y l e a d e r s h i p s u c c e s s i o n i n communist s t a t e s as a " c r i s i s " w h ich ensues a f t e r the d e a t h of a dominant l e a d e r . T h i s s t u d y t a k e s an a l t e r n a t i v e a p p r o a c h . I t i s a s u r v e y of p r o v i s i o n s f o r l e a d e r s h i p s u c c e s s i o n i n the P e o p l e ' s R e p u b l i c , of C h i n a . T h i s i n v o l v e s a c o m p a r i s o n of t h e s t r a t e g i e s and m o t i v a t i o n s of Mao Zedong and Deng X i a o p i n g i n p r o v i d i n g f o r t h e i r own s u c c e s s i o n . Deng X i a o p i n g ' s more e x t e n s i v e p r o v i s i o n s f o r l e a d e r s h i p s u c c e s s i o n d u r i n g the CCP's t r a n s i t i o n towards a more i n s t i t u t i o n a l i z e d o n e - p a r t y b u r e a u c r a t i c r u l e a r e l i k e l y to be more d u r a b l e t han Mao's p r o v i s i o n s i n the e a r l i e r p e r i o d . N e v e r t h e l e s s , g u a r a n t e e s of smooth and r e g u l a r i z e d s u c c e s s i o n , e s p e c i a l l y of p r o t e g e s promoted on the b a s i s of p e r s o n a l t i e s w i t h i n the l e a d e r s h i p c o r e , may be i m p o s s i b l e to o b t a i n . Mao's p r o v i s i o n s were aimed l a r g e l y a t what he saw as a p r o b a b l e , but d e p l o r a b l e , b u r e a u c r a t i c f u t u r e o f the PRC. Deng, on the o t h e r hand, p e r c e i v e s an e l e m e n t of o p p o r t u n i t y i n the s u c c e s s i o n p r o c e s s . He has t r i e d to p r o v i d e l e a d e r s h i p t h a t w i l l , i n h i s e s t i m a t i o n , be b e t t e r a b l e to b r i n g about C h i n a ' s m o d e r n i z a t i o n . In both l e a d e r s ' p r o v i s i o n s f o r s u c c e s s i o n , the e l e v a t i o n to the s t a t u s of " h e i r a p p a r e n t " of i n d i v i d u a l s has been a p o l i t i c a l l i a b i l i t y to t h o s e i n d i v i d u a l s , e s p e c i a l l y when t h e i r p r o m o t i o n i s p e r c e i v e d to be based l a r g e l y on p e r s o n a l t i e s to t h e dominant l e a d e r . T h i s l i a b i l i t y becomes more p r o n o u n c e d i n a p e r i o d of b u r e a u c r a t i c , c o l l e c t i v e l e a d e r s h i p . B e c a u s e of h i s s h i f t i n g p o l i c y p r e f e r e n c e s , h i s s t a t u s as c h a r i s m a t i c l e a d e r , and the a m b i t i o u s n a t u r e of h i s p r o t e g e s , Mao Zedong was u n s u c c e s s f u l i n p r o v i d i n g f o r h i s own s u c c e s s i o n . Deng X i a o p i n g , on the o t h e r hand, has been s u c c e s s f u l i n c u l t i v a t i n g a r e s e r v e of young, w e l l - e d u c a t e d c a d r e s . These p r o v i s i o n s , b e c a u s e t h e y a r e e x t e n s i v e and e x i s t i n a more subdued, c o n s e n s u s - o r i e n t e d p o l i t i c a l e n v i r o n m e n t , may w e l l be Deng's most e n d u r i n g l e g a c y . i i i TABLE OF CONTENTS - Page r-» A b s t r a c t 1 1 Table of Contents iv Acknowledgement v I n t r o d u c t i o n 1 CHAPTER ONE: CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK 5 G e n e r a l C o n s i d e r a t i o n s 5 The Chinese Communist Context 16 CHAPTER TWO: MAO'S PROVISIONS 2 5 L i u Shaoqui 25 L i n Biao 4 1 Wang Hongwen and a Successor G e n e r a t i o n 56 Hua Guofeng 61 O b s e r v a t i o n s on Mao's S t r a t e g y and M o t i v a t i o n . . . . . . 67 CHAPTER THREE: DENG'S PROVISIONS 75 O b s e r v a t i o n s on Deng's S t r a t e g y and M o t i v a t i o n 95 CHAPTER FOUR: COMPARISON AND CONCLUSION 102 B i b l i o g r a p h y 115 iv Acknowledgement Thanks are due to Pete Chamber la in and the e n t i r e UBC P o l i t i c a l Sc ience M . A . c l a s s of 1987-88, a l l of whom had more conf idence i n me than I d i d m y s e l f . T h i s t h e s i s i s d e d i c a t e d to my mother, G e r a l d i n e L o u i s e C a m p b e l l , who has supported me i n my every endeavour. v INTRODUCTION The i s s u e of l e a d e r s h i p s u c c e s s i o n i n communist s t a t e s i s a p a r t i c u l a r l y troublesome t o p i c of s t u d y . To d a t e , no communist country has i n s t i t u t i o n a l i z e d an o r d e r l y process whereby a new s e n i o r l e a d e r (or l e a d e r s ) takes over the r e i n s of power a f t e r the death of a dominant l e a d e r . Moreover , many l e a d e r s , i f they have t r i e d to p r o v i d e for t h e i r own s u c c e s s i o n at a l l , have encountered c o n s i d e r a b l e d i f f i c u l t i e s i n e s t a b l i s h i n g a " s u c c e s s i o n genera t ion" of lower l e v e l o f f i c i a l s to c a r r y out t h e i r p r e f e r r e d p o l i c i e s a f t e r t h e i r own d e a t h . I f i n f o r m a l r u l e s of s u c c e s s i o n evo lve i n what one a n a l y s t c a l l s the " b u r e a u c r a t i c l e a d e r s h i p " p e r i o d (as opposed to an e a r l i e r " h e r o i c l e a d e r s h i p " p e r i o d ) , then the a p p l i c a t i o n of those r u l e s w i l l l i k e l y be hidden from p u b l i c v iew. Indeed, s u c c e s s i o n s t r u g g l e s or d e l i b e r a t i o n s tend to be among the most s e c r e t i v e of p o l i t i c a l p r o c e s s e s . T h i s s ecrecy n o t w i t h s t a n d i n g , o p p o r t u n i t i e s to study the s u c c e s s i o n process i n communist s t a t e s do e x i s t . Many a n a l y s t s have approached the problem by engaging i n a f t e r - t h e - f a c t a n a l y s i s of the " c r i s i s " or debates which ensue upon the death of a dominant l e a d e r . Some w r i t e r s have i d e n t i f i e d stages or phases i n these s u c c e s s i o n s t r u g g l e s . T h i s approach i s u s e f u l , perhaps even e s s e n t i a l , f or our u n d e r s t a n d i n g of the s u c c e s s i o n phenomenon. An a l t e r n a t i v e f o c u s , however, may be e q u a l l y - 1 -v a l u a b l e . In some communist s t a t e s (most n o t a b l y Y u g o s l a v i a and C h i n a ) , aging l e a d e r s have made obvious e f f o r t s to prevent a s u c c e s s i o n " c r i s i s " by p l a c i n g a favored p r o t e g e , supported by a network of sympathet ic lower o f f i c i a l s , i n a p o s i t i o n to succeed them when they d i e . Hence, an a n a l y s i s of p r o v i s i o n s f o r l e a d e r s h i p s u c c e s s i o n seems to be i n o r d e r . An u n d e r s t a n d i n g of events which take p lace before a dominant l e a d e r ' s death w i l l he lp us unders tand what happens a f t e r w a r d s . T h i s " p r o v i s i o n s approach" to s t u d y i n g l e a d e r s h i p s u c c e s s i o n has been a p p l i e d to China by (among o thers ) Myron Rush and by v a r i o u s authors i n Issues and S t u d i e s . These w r i t i n g s are out of d a t e , however, and do not e x t e n s i v e l y examine the e f f o r t s of both Mao Zedong and Deng X i a o p i n g i n t h i s r e g a r d . In the P e o p l e ' s R e p u b l i c of China (PRC) , both Mao and Deng have made very obvious e f f o r t s to p r o v i d e f o r t h e i r own s u c c e s s i o n . In t h i s t h e s i s , I w i l l compare and c o n t r a s t the s t r a t e g i e s and m o t i v a t i o n s of these two l e a d e r s i n t h e i r at tempts to p r o v i d e f o r a smooth t r a n s f e r of power at t h e i r p a s s i n g . T h i s , of c o u r s e , w i l l r e q u i r e a rev iew of much of the h i s t o r y of e l i t e p o l i t i c s i n the Chinese Communist P a r t y (CCP) wi th a focus on each l e a d e r ' s p r o v i s i o n s for s u c c e s s i o n . In t h i s endeavor, I w i l l keep the f o l l o w i n g two broad q u e s t i o n s i n mind: What methods or s t r a t e g i e s have Mao Zedong and Deng X i a o p i n g used i n a t tempt ing to p r o v i d e f o r t h e i r own s u c c e s s i o n s - 2 and to what extent i s i t p o s s i b l e to ensure the success of such p r o v i s i o n s i n a communist s ta te? Some s u b s i d i a r y ques t ions w i l l i n c l u d e the f o l l o w i n g : What f a c t o r s a f f e c t the success or f a i l u r e of such attempts i n China? Is i t i n h e r e n t l y more d i f f i c u l t f o r a founding "hero ic" l e a d e r such as Mao to p r o v i d e f o r h i s own s u c c e s s i o n than i t i s f o r subsequent l eaders? How do the p e c u l i a r i t i e s of Chinese p o l i t i c s ( i . e . g u a n x i , the i m p e r i a l l egacy and f a c t i o n a l t i e s ) a f f e c t the l e a d e r ' s s t r a t e g i e s ? Did e i t h e r l e a d e r e n v i s i o n a more c o l l e c t i v e l e a d e r s h i p a f t e r h i s pass ing? What attempts were made to i n s t i t u t i o n a l i z e the s u c c e s s i o n process? Does d e s i g n a t i o n as an "he ir presumptive" (to use Rush's phrase) d e t r a c t from a proposed s u c c e s s o r ' s chances of a l ong term of o f f i c e ? My g e n e r a l t h e s i s i s that p r o v i s i o n s f o r l e a d e r s h i p s u c c e s s i o n , e s p e c i a l l y from a g e n e r a t i o n a l p o i n t of v iew, w i l l have more e f f e c t under " b u r e a u c r a t i c " , r a t h e r than " h e r o i c " , l e a d e r s h i p . In other words, Deng X i a o p i n g ' s more e x t e n s i v e p r o v i s i o n s for l e a d e r s h i p s u c c e s s i o n d u r i n g the CCP's t r a n s i t i o n towards a more i n s t i t u t i o n a l i z e d o n e - p a r t y r u l e are l i k e l y to be more d u r a b l e than were Mao's p r o v i s i o n s i n the e a r l i e r p e r i o d . N e v e r t h e l e s s , guarantees of a smooth and r e g u l a r i z e d s u c c e s s i o n , e s p e c i a l l y of favored proteges w i t h i n the l e a d e r s h i p c o r e , may be i m p o s s i b l e to o b t a i n . I w i l l a l s o argue that Mao1, s p r o v i s i o n s were l a r g e l y aimed a g a i n s t what he saw as a p r o b a b l e , - 3 -but d e p l o r a b l e , f u t u r e of the PRC. Deng, on the o ther hand, p e r c e i v e s an o p p o r t u n i t y to p r o v i d e l e a d e r s h i p for the f u t u r e . F i n a l l y , I w i l l a l s o suggest that e l e v a t i o n to the s t a t u s of " h e i r apparent" seems to be a p o l i t i c a l l i a b i l i t y to a p r o t e g e , e s p e c i a l l y i f h i s promotion i s p e r c e i v e d to be based l a r g e l y on p e r s o n a l t i e s to the dominant l e a d e r . T h i s l i a b i l i t y becomes more s a l i e n t as the t r a n s i t i o n to a more i n s t i t u t i o n a l i z e d form of r u l e p r o g r e s s e s . In Chapter One, I w i l l o u t l i n e a c o n c e p t u a l framework f o r the study of s u c c e s s i o n i n C h i n a . T h i s w i l l i n c l u d e some g e n e r a l i z a t i o n s about s u c c e s s i o n i n a u t h o r i t a r i a n and communist regimes as w e l l as e x p l a n a t i o n of some s p e c i f i c c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s of Chinese h i s t o r y , s o c i e t y , and p o l i t i c s which have r e l e v a n c e to p r o v i s i o n s for s u c c e s s i o n . Chapters Two and Three w i l l c o n t a i n d e s c r i p t i o n and a n a l y s i s of the p r o v i s i o n s f o r s u c c e s s i o n implemented by, r e s p e c t i v e l y , Mao Zedong and Deng X i a o p i n g . In Chapter Four, a broad comparison of the two l e a d e r s ' s t r a t e g i e s w i l l be made, b r i e f s p e c u l a t i o n about the Chinese f u t u r e w i l l be e n t e r t a i n e d , and some c o n c l u s i o n s w i l l be drawn about l e a d e r s h i p s u c c e s s i o n i n C h i n a . CHAPTER ONE: CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK G e n e r a l C o n s i d e r a t i o n s I t i s o f t en a s s a r t e d that i n a u t h o r i t a r i a n regimes the q u e s t i o n of l e a d e r s h i p s u c c e s s i o n i s a "problem" or that the death of a dominant l e a d e r w i l l produce a " c r i s i s " . A d m i t t e d l y , the near u n i v e r s a l l a c k of p o l i t i c a l l y r e l e v a n t s u c c e s s i o n arrangements i n the w o r l d ' s non-democrat i c systems foments a c e r t a i n amount of a n x i e t y among both d e c i s i o n makers and a n a l y s t s who a n t i c i p a t e the deaths of important l e a d e r s . As Myron Rush notes , s u c c e s s i o n i n communist regimes is^ p r o b l e m a t i c because "there i s no e s t a b l i s h e d center for making d e c i s i o n s whose a u t h o r i t y i s r e c o g n i z e d at a l l t imes [and] no r e l i a b l e means for the t r a n s f e r of power has yet been d e v i s e d . " L i f e - l o n g tenure w i t h i n communist p a r t i e s tends to i n h i b i t g e n e r a t i o n a l t u r n o v e r . Moreover , c o n f u s i o n may e x i s t as to whether supreme power r e s t s i n the p a r t y or the government. And even i f such an a l l o c a t i o n of a u t h o r i t y i s c l e a r , the p r e v a i l i n g mode of govern ing i n communist s t a t e s has been p e r s o n a l r u l e ; t rue o l i g a r c h y occurs on ly sporadical ly ." ' ' S ince p e r s o n a l r u l e r s i n L e n i n i s t s ta t e s have g e n e r a l l y had no c o n s t i t u t i o n a l way of l e g i t i m i z i n g t h e i r own r u l e , t h e i r a u t h o r i t y cannot be t r a n s f e r r e d to a successor by what Rush c a l l s a " r e g u l a t e d .Myron Rush, How Communist S ta te s Change ( I t h a c a : C o r n e l l U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s , 1974), pp . T h e i r R u l e r s 13-18. 2 s u c c e s s i o n . " Thus, d e p a r t i n g l e a d e r s s e a r c h f o r o t h e r methods of l e g i t i m i z a t i o n , and t h e i r d e a t h s i n e v i t a b l y b r i n g u n c e r t a i n t y and e x c i t e m e n t to the p o l i t i c a l s c e n e . That e x c i t e m e n t , i r o n i c a l l y , i s a l s o l i n k e d t o an a l t e r n a t i v e way of v i e w i n g the s u c c e s s i o n p r o c e s s . The same u n c e r t a i n t y w h i c h c a u s e s some to view s u c c e s s i o n as an i n e v i t a b l e c r i s i s i s i n t e r p r e t e d by o t h e r s as an e n v i r o n m e n t of o p p o r t u n i t y . I t has been a r g u e d t h a t p e r i o d s of s u c c e s s i o n i n s o c i a l i s t s t a t e s a r e u n i q u e o p p o r t u n i t i e s f o r p o l i c y i n n o v a t i o n . I t has even been c l a i m e d t h a t i t i s p r e c i s e l y a t the p o i n t of s u e c e s s i o n - a t the a l l e g e d moment of " c r i s i s " - t h a t t h e s y s t e m f i n d s t h e c r i t i c a l o p p o r t u n i t y f o r the f l e x i b i l i t y t h a t e n s u r e s i t s own s u r v i v a l . The s u c c e s s i o n p r o c e s s t h u s p r o v e s to be one of the keys to t h e s t r e n g t h and s t a b i l i t y of communist s t a t e s y s t e m s / Some l e a d e r s have r e c o g n i z e d t h e i m p e n d i n g c r i s i s o r o p p o r t u n i t y a s p e c t s of t h e i r own d e m i s e . T h i s r e c o g n i t i o n w i l l l i k e l y be r e f l e c t e d i n t h e i r a t t e m p t s to p r o v i d e f o r t h e i r own s u c c e s s i o n . U s u a l l y t h e s e p r o v i s i o n s i n v o l v e c h o o s i n g an i n d i v i d u a l ( o r small ^ I b i d . , p . 14. 3 V a l e r i e Bunce, Do New L e a d e r s Make A D i f f e r e n c e :  E x e c u t i v e S u c c e s s i o n and P u b l i c P o l i c y u n d e r C a p i t a l i s m and  S o c i a l i s m ( P r i n c e t o n : P r i n c e t o n U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s , 1 981), pp. 179-221 c i t e d by Joseph W. E s h e r i c k and E l i z a b e t h J . P e r r y , " L e a d e r s h i p S u c c e s s i o n i n The P e o p l e ' s R e p u b l i c of C h i n a : ' C r i s i s ' o r O p p o r t u n i t y ? , " S t u d i e s i n C o m p a r a t i v e Communism 16 (Autumn 1983), p . 1 7 2 ) . ^ E s h e r i c k and P e r r y , p.172. - 6 T* group) to succeed to the top p a r t y p o s i t i o n as w e l l as promoting a host of lower l e v e l o f f i c i a l s as a s u p p o r t i n g c a s t . O s t e n s i b l y , a major aim i n t h i s endeavor i s p o l i c y c o n t i n u i t y . An aging l e a d e r chooses succes sors who are sympathet i c to h i s views and who w i l l cont inue to promote h i s programs or i d e a l s . S ince a p e r s o n a l r u l e r , by d e f i n i t i o n , has a great d e a l of i n f l u e n c e i n major p e r s o n n e l appointments , he i s u s u a l l y i n a f a v o r a b l e , though not unopposed, p o s i t i o n to a i d the promotion 5 of h i s chosen s u c c e s s o r ( s ) . N o t w i t h s t a n d i n g t h i s f a v o r a b l e p o s i t i o n , the a b i l i t y of a l e a d e r to ensure the l o n g e v i t y of h i s s u c c e s s i o n p r o v i s i o n s i s l i m i t e d . R i c h a r d Bet t s and Samuel Hunt ington conc luded from t h e i r survey of l o n g - t e r m a u t h o r i t a r i a n regimes that "no s i g n i f i c a n t [ p o s i t i v e or n e g a t i v e ] r e l a t i o n appears to e x i s t between p r e - d e a t h s u c c e s s i o n arrangements and p o s t - d e a t h 6 i n s t a b i l i t y . Thus , whether ag ing l e a d e r s are i n f l u e n c e d by c u l t u r a l p r e d i s p o s i t i o n s , concerned f o r e s i g h t , or a d e s i r e for a f a v o r a b l e p lace i n h i s t o r y , t h e i r l e a d e r s h i p s u c c e s s i o n p lans o f t e n d i s s o l v e a f t e r t h e i r d e a t h . Attempts to p r o v i d e an 5 R u s h , p . 1 4 . ^Richard K. B e t t s and Samuel P . H u n t i n g t o n , "Dead D i c t a t o r s and R i o t i n g Mobs: Does the Demise of A u t h o r i t a r i a n Rules Lead to P o l i t i c a l I n s t a b i l i t y ? " , I n t e r n a t i o n a l S e c u r i t y 10 (Winter 1985-86) , pp. 127-28 . —• 7 enduring i n s t i t u t i o n a l i z a t i o n of the s u c c e s s i o n process for top l e a d e r s are thwarted by the c o o p t i v e na ture of the C e n t r a l Committee membership.^ Because CC members are s e l e c t e d by the P o l i t b u r o , a d e p a r t i n g l e a d e r can c r e a t e support f o r h i s chosen h e i r by " s t a c k i n g " the CC wi th sympathet ic p o l i t i c i a n s . However, f o r t rue i n s t i t u t i o n a l i z a t i o n to take p l a c e , CC members would have to s e l e c t P o l i t b u r o members, perhaps from among t h e i r own r a n k s . In t h i s way, w ide ly supported l e a d e r s c o u l d r i s e to prominent p o s i t i o n s without n e c e s s a r i l y having a s p e c i f i c h i g h - r a n k i n g mentor behind them. A l s o , i t i s v i r t u a l l y i m p o s s i b l e i d e o l o g i c a l l y to j u s t i f y a p e r s o n a l t r a n s f e r of power i n terms of M a r x i s m - L e n i n i s m . Rule through the p a r t y and democra t i c c e n t r a l i s m , r a t h e r p e r s o n a l r u l e , are the o f f i c i a l l y s a n c t i o n e d modes of g o v e r n i n g . I d e o l o g i c a l p r e s c r i p t i o n s , however, are not the only f a c t o r s which come to bear on attempts by communist l e a d e r s to p r o v i d e f o r t h e i r own s u c c e s s i o n . Two other broad c o n s i d e r a t i o n s must be taken i n t o account when c o n s i d e r i n g s u c c e s s i o n arrangements . F i r s t , communist regimes have e x h i b i t e d an e v o l u t i o n a r y c h a r a c t e r ; the nature of communist l e a d e r s h i p i n r e v o l u t i o n a r y ^See F r e d e r i c k C . Tiewes , L e a d e r s h i p , L e g i t i m a c y and  C o n f l i c t i n China (Armonk, New York: M . E . Sharpe, I n c . , 1 9 8 4 ) , p . 88 . —- 8 — times i s markedly d i f f e r e n t from the l e a d e r s h i p which evo lves a f t e r c o n s o l i d a t i o n of power. Second, l e g i t i m a c y i s not gained s o l e l y through i d e o l o g i c a l or c o n s t i t u t i o n a l means. I w i l l now e l a b o r a t e on these two ideas as they r e l a t e to p r o v i s i o n s for l e a d e r s h i p s u c c e s s i o n . At d i f f e r e n t stages i n the h i s t o r y of r e v o l u t i o n a r y movements, d i f f e r e n t types of l e a d e r s h i p are i n e v i d e n c e . A l f r e d G. Meyer has o u t l i n e d two broad and o v e r l a p p i n g p e r i o d s (or types) of communist l e a d e r s h i p . The f i r s t of these i s what he c a l l s a p e r i o d of "hero ic l e a d e r s h i p " . Dur ing t h i s s tage , l e a d e r s tend to e x h i b i t h e r o i c s t a t u r e - those c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s commonly a s s o c i a t e d wi th "greatness" Of these "hero ic" l e a d e r s , Meyer f u r t h e r i d e n t i f i e s two p o t e n t i a l l y o v e r l a p p i n g s u b - t y p e s . F i r s t , there are c h a r i s m a t i c r e v o l u t i o n a r i e s who "rode out the storms of r e v o l u t i o n and c i v i l war" to e s t a b l i s h a communist p a r t y i n power. L e n i n i s the p r o t o t y p e of Meyer ' s c h a r i s m a t i c r e v o l u t i o n a r y . The second i d e a l type of "hero ic" l e a d e r i s a s t a t e - b u i l d e r , or i n other words, someone l i k e S t a l i n who trans forms an underdeve loped country i n t o a major a c t o r on the world s t a g e d These sub- types may a l s o o v e r l a p ; Mao Zedong was both a r e v o l u t i o n a r y and a s t a t e - b u i l d e r . "See A l f r e d G. Meyer, "Communism and L e a d e r s h i p , " S tud ie s  i n Comparat ive Communism 16 (Spring/Summer 1983), pp. 165-69. 9 I b i d . , p. 165. - 9 -When the " h e r o i c " l e a d e r s h i p p a s s e s from t h e s c e n e , t h e y a r e e v e n t u a l l y r e p l a c e d by men who can b e s t be d e s c r i b e d as " b u r e a u c r a t i c " l e a d e r s . A l t h o u g h t h e s e l e a d e r s may, l i k e t h e i r p r e d e c e s s o r s , be e x p e r t s i n p o l i t i c a l i n f i g h t i n g or p r o m o t e r s of c e r t a i n a s p e c t s of the p e r s o n a l i t y c u l t , t h e y d i f f e r from h e r o i c l e a d e r s i n t h a t t h e y have not r i s e n i n the p a r t y r a n k s t h r o u g h r e v o l u t i o n . They have g a i n e d t h e i r p o s i t i o n s and e x p e r i e n c e t h r o u g h s e r v i c e to the s t a t e . They s t a y i n o f f i c e by g e n e r a t i n g s u p p o r t r a t h e r t han by c r e a t i n g f e a r . These l e a d e r s can be t h o u g h t of as sys t e m managers' r a t h e r t h a n system, b u i l d e r s . A g a i n , t a k i n g the S o v i e t U n i o n as the example, the p o s t - S t a l i n l e a d e r s , t h e i r i n d i v i d u a l d i f f e r e n c e s n o t w i t h s t a n d i n g , can a l l be c l a s s i f i e d as b u r e a u c r a t i c l e a d e r s * t h e y r o s e to power t h r o u g h a b u r e a u c r a t i z e d p a r t y s y s t e m . ^ The p e r i o d of t r a n s i t i o n from c h a r i s m a t i c to b u r e a u c r a t i c , or i n s t i t u t i o n a l i z e d , r u l e may v a r y i n d u r a t i o n and f o r m . T y p i c a l l y , l e a d e r s who a r e of the r e v o l u t i o n a r y or s y s t e m - b u l d i n g g e n e r a t i o n , but who l a c k the " h e r o i c " l e a d e r ' s s t a t u r e , come to the f o r e sometime d u r i n g t h i s t r a n s i t i o n . J u r g e n Domes n o t e s t h a t t h i s p e r i o d may be d e s c r i b e d as a "monocracy," where p u r g e s and the d o m i n a t i o n of one l e a d e r r e m a i n the norm, or as a 1 0 I b i d . , p . l & 7 . - 10 -" t r a n s i t i o n a l c r i s i s s y s t e m , " where c o n f r o n t a t i o n s o c c u r wi t h i n v a r i o u s s u b - s y s t e m s and a r e s i g n a l l e d m o s t l y by t e r m i n o l o g i c a l d i f f e r e n c e s r a t h e r t h a n w i d e s p r e a d p u r g e s . ^ In c o n d u c t i o n w i t h t h e s e b r o a d c l a s s i f i c a t i o n s of communist r u l e , Meyers makes s e v e r a l p o i n t s w h i c h a r e p a r t i c u l a r l y germane to t h i s s t u d y of p r o v i s i o n s f o r s u c c e s s i o n . F i r s t , he n o t e s , h e r o i c l e a d e r s a r e "a h a r d a c t to f o l l o w . " The d e a t h of h e r o i c l e a d e r s g e n e r a l l y marks a t r a n s i t i o n of more t h a n p e r s o n n e l ; i t seems to be the t r a n s f e r of one k i n d of l e a d e r s h i p to a n o t h e r . F u r t h e r , t h e s e t r a n s i t i o n s from r e v o l u t i o n a r y l e a d e r s h i p to s t a t e - b u i l d i n g , or from s t a t e - b u i l d i n g to s y s t e m management, can be c h a r a c t e r i z e d as s t r u g g l e s a g a i n s t power as much as s t r u g g l e s f o r power. T h i s i s to s u g g e s t t h a t ' h e r o i c " l e a d e r s w i l l have d i f f i c u l t y i n p r o v i d i n g f o r t h e i r own s u c c e s s i o n not o n l y b e c a u s e p o t e n t i a l s u c c e s s o r s lack, t h e i r s t a t u r e and c h a r i s m a , but a l s o b e c a u s e s u b o r d i n a t e s may c o n s p i r e to p r e v e n t a s i n g l e g r e a t l e a d e r from r i s i n g a g a i n . A l t h o u g h t h i s s cheming may o n l y t e m p o r a r i l y s u c c e e d i n t h w a r t i n g p e r s o n a l r u l e , i t n e v e r t h e l e s s has the p o t e n t i a l to a b r o g a t e an a g i n g l e a d e r ' s p r o v i s i o n s f o r l e a d e r s h i p s u c c e s s i o n . A p e r i o d of b u r e a u c r a t i c l e a d e r s h i p , a l t e r n a t i v e l y , may p r o v i d e an e n v i r o n m e n t i n w hich compromise i s more p o s s i b l e and J u r g e n Domes, The Government and P o l i t i c s of the PRC: A  Time of T r a n s i t i o n , ( B o u l d e r : Westview P r e s s , 1985), pp. 249-50. 1 ? Meyer, p. 166 - 11 -even more expec ted . To a l i m i t e d e x t e n t , i n f o r m a l "ru le s" of l e a d e r s h i p s u c c e s s i o n may come to be accepted whi le attempts to i n s t i t u t i o n a l i z e g e n e r a t i o n a l turnover are made. B u r e a u c r a t i c l e a d e r s h i p a r i s e s d u r i n g a process that R i c h a r d Lowenthal terms " p o s t - d e s p o t i c n o r m a l i z a t i o n " . J T h i s phase begins when e f f o r t s to i n s t i t u t i o n a l i z e r e v o l u t i o n become exhausted due to the demands of m o d e r n i z a t i o n . Domestic p o l i c y debates i n t h i s p e r i o d can be c h a r a c t e r i z e d more as c o n f l i c t s between the goa l of economic development and the curse of economic s t a g n a t i o n than as i d e o l o g i g a l c o n f l i c t s . - ^ Thus , the scope of p o l i c y debate narrows and compromise becomes i n c r e a s i n g l y p o s s i b l e . The l i k e l i h o o d of consensus b u i l d i n g around a c e r t a i n s u c c e s s i o n c a n d i d a t e , t h e r e f o r e , i s g r e a t e r i n t h i s b u r e a u c r a t i c p e r i o d . ^ E a r l i e r i t was mentioned that the l e g i t i m a c y of communist l e a d e r s h i p i s not s o l e l y based on i d e o l o g i c a l or c o n s t i t u t i o n a l grounds . A l though l e g a l a u t h o r i t y (of the Weberian type) i s l ^ R i c h a r d Lowentha l , "The P o s t - R e v o l u t i o n a r y Phase i n China and R u s s i a , " S tud ie s i n Comparat ive Communism 16 (Spring/Summer 1983), p. 191. 1 4 I b i d . , p. 200. l ^ x h i s i s not to suggest that o p p o s i t i o n to des ignated s u c c e s s o r s d i s a p p e a r s . P o l i t i c a l i n f i g h t i n g s t i l l p e r s i s t s even though, c o n t r a r y to Meyer ' s a s s e r t a t i o n s , t rends toward c o l l e c t i v e l e a d e r s h i p may a l s o endure . The key po in t i s t h a t , as Rush sugges t s , s t r u g g l e i n the b u r e a u c r a t i c p e r i o d i s waged i n accordance wi th r u l e s which l i m i t i t s d e s t r u c t i v e n e s s . See Rush, p. 329. - 12 -i m p o r t a n t , i t i s not l i k e l y to be the i m p e r a t i v e source of l e g i t i m a t i o n for s u c c e s s i o n arrangements . L e g a l a u t h o r i t y may i n c r e a s e i n importance i n p e r i o d s of b u r e a u c r a t i c r u l e , but even then other l e g i t i m i z i n g f o r c e s come to b e a r . C h a r i s m a t i c and t r a d i t i o n a l a u t h o r i t y p l a y key r o l e s i n the l e g i t i m i z a t i o n of success arrangements . I w i l l now o u t l i n e how Weber e n v i s i o n e d the r e l a t i o n s h i p between char isma and s u c c e s s i o n . A d i s c u s s i o n of t r a d i t i o n a l a u t h o r i t y and l e g i t i m a c y i n the Chinese context w i l l then be o f f e r e d i n the next s e c t i o n . "Hero ic l e a d e r s h i p " i m p l i e s l e a d e r s which Meyer r e f e r r e d to as " c h a r i s m a t i c r e v o l u t i o n a r i e s " . Weber d e s c r i b e d charisma as "a c e r t a i n q u a l i t y of an i n d i v i d u a l p e r s o n a l i t y by v i r t u e of which he i s set apart from other m e n . . . [ a n d ] endowed wi th s p e c i f i c a l l y e x c e p t i o n a l powers or q u a l i t i e s . H e i n c l u d e s war heroes as an example of the most b a s i c type of c h a r i s m a t i c l e a d e r . Thus , the i n c l u s i o n of charisma as a d e f i n i n g c h a r a c t e r i s t i c of e a r l y communist l e a d e r s h i p , e s p e c i a l l y i n those c o u n t r i e s where the communist regime was e s t a b l i s h e d by ind igenous r e v o l u t i o n , i s e s p e c i a l l y a p p r o p r i a t e . C h a r i s m a t i c a u t h o r i t y , however, i s u n s t a b l e and e v e n t u a l l y becomes r a t i o n a l i z e d or t r a d i t i o n a l i z e d , or both.17 A l though t h i s r a t i o n a l i z a t i o n process may beg in l^Max Weber, The Theory of S o c i a l and Economic O r g a n i z a t i o n , t r a n s . A . M . Henderson and T a l c o t t Parsons (New fork: The Free P r e s s , 1947), pp. 358-59. 1 7 1 b i d . , pp. 356-66. - 13 -e a r l i e r , the a c t u a l death of a c h a r i s m a t i c l e a d e r c r e a t e s an a u t h o r i t y vacuum which may speed up the p r o c e s s . Charisma does not d i s s o l v e i n s t a n t l y , however, so the way i n which a subsequent l e a d e r s h i p dea l s wi th the deceased c h a r i s m a t i c l e a d e r becomes a key to t h e i r own l e g i t i m a c y . Weber e n v i s i o n e d s e v e r a l ways i n which the l e g i t i m i z i n g l i n k between d e p a r t i n g c h a r i s m a t i c l e a d e r s 1 p and t h e i r succes sors might be enhanced. F i r s t , a new c h a r i s m a t i c l e a d e r can be sought who embodies the c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s which q u a l i f y him for a p o s i t i o n of a u t h o r i t y . In t h i s s i t u a t i o n , the l e g i t i m a c y of a new r u l e r i s a t tached to c e r t a i n d i s t i n g u i s h i n g c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s ; r u l e s of l e a d e r s h i p s e l e c t i o n based on these t r a i t s become c o d i f i e d . In o ther words, someone who resembles the o r i g i n a l l e a d e r i s chosen as s u c c e s s o r . In a t r a n s i t i o n a l communist system, t h i s method of s e l e c t i o n may r e s u l t i n the s e l e c t i o n of a l e a d e r u n q u a l i f i e d f o r the demands of the t i m e s . An a l t e r n a t i v e method of c h a r i s m a t i c l e a d e r s e l e c t i o n i s by p e r s o n a l d e s i g n a t i o n by the o r i g i n a l l e a d e r . T h i s method would be s u c c e s s f u l only i f the o r i g i n a l f o l l o w e r s r e c o g n i z e t h i s form of d e s i g n a t i o n . A t h i r d way i n which char i sma may be t r a n s f e r r e d i s i f a " c h a r i m a t i c a l l y q u a l i f i e d " a d m i n i s t a t i v e s t a f f s e l e c t s a I b i d . - 14 -s u c c e s s o r . T h i s i s not done through a f r e e vote ; d e l i b e r a t i o n s o f t e n cont inue u n t i l unanimi ty i s a c h i e v e d . Even i n t h i s s i t u a t i o n , l e g i t i m a c y can take on the c h a r a c t e r of an a c q u i r e d r i g h t by a p p l i c a t i o n of c e r t a i n "standards of c o r r e c t n e s s " . In " p r e - b u r e a u c r a t i c " communist reg imes , such s tandards may i n c l u d e r e v o l u t i o n a r y war exper ience or some other unique p r e - v i c t o r y e x p e r i e n c e . A f o u r t h method f o r the t r a n s m i s s i o n of c h a r i s m a t i c a u t h o r i t y i s through h e r e d i t y . Among modern a u t h o r i t a r i a n reg imes , North Korea and N a t i o n a l i s t China have demonstrated t endenc i e s towards t h i s k i n d of power t r a n s f e r . I t i s w e l l to observe that many now-communist c o u n t r i e s have i m p e r i a l pasts i n which h e r e d i t a r y t r a n s f e r of power was the norm. f i n a l l y , c h a r i s m a t i c a u t h o r i t y may be t r a n s f e r r e d through r i t u a l means by passage from one bearer to a n o t h e r . The t r a d i t i o n a l forms of t h i s t r a n s f e r i n v o l v e a n n o i n t i n g , c o n s e c r a t i o n , or the l a y i n g on of hands . These a c t i o n s may be meant to supplement any of the o ther successor s e l e c t i o n t e c h n i q u e s . In modern communist s t a t e s we might expect s u b t l e r , more i m a g i n a t i v e v a r i a t i o n s of t h i s type of t r a n f e r , some of which cou ld be generated i n propaganda o f f i c e s r a t h e r than through a c t u a l e v e n t s . These methods of c h a r i s m a t i c a u t h o r i t y t r a n f e r should be viewed as p a t t e r n s or i d e a l t y p e s . V a r i o u s combinat ions and modern m a n i f e s t a t i o n s are p o s s i b l e . A l though i t may be i m p o s s i b l e , or even i m p r a c t i c a l , to m a i n t a i n the presence of a 15 t rue c h a r i s m a t i c l e a d e r , subsequent g e n e r a t i o n s of l e a d e r s w i l l r e l y on the charisma of h e r o i c l e a d e r s i n ways s i m i l a r to those o u t l i n e d above. As c i rcumstances change d u r i n g the t r a n s i t i o n from h e r o i c to b u r e a u c r a t i c r u l e , however, t h i s "borrowing" of c h a r i s m a t i c a u t h o r i t y becomes an i n c r e a s i n g l y d i f f i c u l t t a s k . Successors face the u n e n v i a b l e job of b a l a n c i n g the f a u l t s and obso le scence of t h e i r predecessor wi th h i s u t i l i t y as a source of l e g i t i m i z a t i o n . I d e a l l y , then , p r o v i s i o n s f o r s u c c e s s i o n w i l l i n c l u d e ways to l e s s e n a chosen s u c c e s s o r ' s dependance on h i s mentor whi le s t i l l a l l o w i n g him to b e n e f i t from t h e i r r e l a t i o n s h i p . C h a r i s m a t i c a u t h o r i t y , as suggested above, may become t r a d i t i o n a l i z e d . M a n i f e s t a t i o n s of t r a d i t i o n a l a u t h o r i t y p a t t e r n s o f t en appear i n "modern" p o l i t i c a l systems. The Chinese Communist p o l i t i c a l system has , due to both t r a d i t i o n a l and sys temic i n f l u e n c e s , developed i t s own p e c u l i a r c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s . These t r a i t s , as they r e l a t e to l e a d e r s h i p s u c c e s s i o n , w i l l be d i s c u s s e d i n the next s e c t i o n . The power bases and a t t r i b u t e s of p o l i t i c a l a c t o r s which are r e l e v a n t to s u c c e s s i o n i n China w i l l a l s o be c o n s i d e r e d . The Chinese Communist Context Whi le some h i s t o r i c a l w r i t e r s may overemphasize the i n f l u e n c e of the i m p e r i a l l egacy on modern-day Chinese p o l i t i c a l a f f a i r s , i t i s safe to say that s t rands of t r a d i t i o n a l b e h a v i o r , - 16 -thought and d i s c o u r s e have been woven i n t o the f a b r i c of post-1949 Chinese s o c i a l i s t s o c i e t y . Many of these t r a d i t i o n a l i n f l u e n c e s r e l a t e d i r e c t l y to l e a d e r s h i p s u c c e s s i o n and the d e s i g n a t i o n of chosen h e i r s . In t h e o r y , the r e l a t i o n s h i p between C o n f u c i a n emperors and t h e i r o f f i c i a l a d v i s o r s was one of mutual o b l i g a t i o n . Court o f f i c i a l s were expected to be l o y a l to the d y n a s t i c throne and o f f e r honest a d v i c e to the emperor whenever they saw f i t . The emperor was expected to r u l e r i g h t e o u s l y and c o n s i d e r the a d v i c e of h i s knowledgeable o f f i c i a l s . A c o u r t o f f i c i a l ' s d i s l o y a l t y to the throne was the u l t i m a t e d i s h o n o r a b l e a c t . An emperor who r e f u s e d to l i s t e n to the r e m o n s t r a t i o n s of o f f i c i a l s deeming him to be i n e r r o r engendered the p o s s i b i l i t y of h i s l o s i n g heaven's mandate, and thus the r i g h t to r u l e . In p r a c t i c e , however, unguarded c r i t i c i s m of an e r r i n g emperor c o u l d put an o f f i c i a l i n b o d i l y danger . A l s o , a l though the t r a n f e r of power was commonly h e r e d i t a r y w i t h i n a d y n a s t y , d u r i n g the Qing p e r i o d the p r a c t i c e of succes sor " d e s i g n a t i n g " evo lved and l e g i t i m a c y was 19 granted to n o n - h e r e d i t a r y h e i r s . The p o t e n t i a l e f f e c t s of these t r a d i t i o n s on the modern s u c c e s s i o n process can be d e s c r i b e d as f o l l o w s . F i r s t , the o v e r t p e r s o n a l d e s i g n a t i o n of a succes sor by an aging l e a d e r may i n i t i a l l y enhance that h e i r p r e s u m p t i v e ' s c l a i m to the top 19 Teiwes , p . 59. ^ 17 -l e a d e r s h i p p o s t when h i s mentor d i e s . However, the r e q u i r e d l o y a l t y of s u b o r d i n a t e s and t r a d i t i o n a l C h i n e s e r e s p e c t f o r the dead would r e q u i r e t h a t an h e i r p r e s u m p t i v e would n e c e s s a r i l y have to r e f r a i n from c r i t i c i z i n g the l e a d e r too h a r s h l y b o t h b e f o r e and a f t e r the l e a d e r ' s d e a t h . F a i l u r e to show such r e s t r a i n t would d i m i n i s h the p r o t e g e ' s l e g i t i m a c y and put him a t r i s k of l o s i n g h i s r e c o g n i t i o n as " h e i r " . F u r t h e r m o r e , i n l i g h t of t h e s e c o n s t r a i n t s , the v e r y d e s i g n a t i o n of a c e r t a i n s u b o r d i n a t e as c h o s e n s u c c e s s o r would g i v e him a h i g h p r o f i l e and make h i s b e h a v i o r s u b j e c t to g r e a t e r s c r u t i n y by h i s peers.20 P u b l i c and p e r s o n a l d e s i g n a t i o n , t h e r e f o r e , may a l s o i n c r e a s e an h e i r a p p a r e n t ' s c h a n c e s of l o s i n g h i s p o s i t i o n . The g e n e r a l l y u n c h a l l e n g e d p o s i t i o n of a dominant l e a d e r i s s t r e n g t h e n e d by the a b s e n c e of a c l e a r s u c c e s s o r . Once an o b v i o u s s u c c e s s i o n c a n d i d a t e i s named, an " a c c e l e r a t i n g s h i f t of l o y a l t i e s i s f e l t " and the i n c u m b e n t ' s p o s i t i o n i s e n d a n g e r e d to some degree.21 E s p e c i a l l y i n the s u c c e s s i o n to a c h a r i s m a t i c l e a d e r , the h e i r p r e s u m p t i v e has a t h i n l i n e to walk between becoming a r o b o t a t the command of the r u l e r and a s s e r t i n g h i s own w i l l i n ways t h a t may awaken h i s p a t r o n ' s f e a r s and s u s p i c i o n s ,22 2 0 x h i s phenomenon of c o u r s e , i s not p e c u l i a r to the C h i n e s e s y s t e m . 2 l E b e r h a r d S a n d s c h n e i d e r , " S u c c e s s i o n i n t h e P e o p l e ' s R e p u b l i c of C h i n a : R u l e by P u r g e , " A s i a n S u r v e y 25 (June 1985), pp. 643, 650. 22R Ush, p. 321. These c o n s t r a i n t s a r e a l s o not u n i q u e i n C h i n a , but a r e p e r h a p s e x a g g e r a t e d by the C o n f u c i a n e t h i c s d e s c r i b e d above. - 18 -Thus , h e i r d e s i g n a t i o n c r e a t e s problems f o r both the h e i r and the incumbent . A l s o , an h e i r presumptive may, due to p e r s o n a l t i e s or p e r c e i v e d c o n s t r a i n t s of c o l l e c t i v e l e a d e r s h i p , f e e l o b l i g a t e d to c o n s i d e r the adv ice of h i s p e e r s . T h i s a d v i c e may c o n f l i c t wi th the precept s of h i s p a t r o n . The way i n which these d i f f e r e n c e s are d e a l t wi th by both the h e i r and the d e p a r t i n g l e a d e r w i l l a f f e c t the l e g i t i m a c y and support of both l e a d e r s . Whi le C o n f u c i a n t r a d i t i o n p r o v i d e s a precedent i n h e i r d e s i g n a t i o n , the o b l i g a t i o n s imposed by that t r a d i t i o n make both the h e i r and the incumbent somewhat v u l n e r a b l e . Put another way, d e p a r t i n g l e a d e r s must choose someone who i s s t r o n g enough to stand on t h e i r own, but l o y a l enough to wait t h e i r t u r n . T h i s i s no easy t a s k . S u c c e s s i o n cand ida te s i n China are e l e v a t e d to prominent p o s i t i o n s based, i n p a r t , on guanxi and f a c t i o n a l t i e s . Indeed, s i n c e i t i s not n e c e s s a r y , at l e a s t i n the s h o r t term ,2% or a succes sor to a t t a i n the top p a r t y p o s i t i o n , promot ion of s u c c e s s o r s can be seen as a s i t u a t i o n i n which formal p o s i t i o n s tend to act as supplements to i n f o r m a l p o w e r A n unders tand ing of f a c t i o n s and guanxi as w e l l as the " r u l e s " which are i m p l i e d 23Deng X i a o p i n g i n i t i a l l y made h i s l a s t e s t comeback through the s t a t e a p p a r a t u s . 24p 0 r a d e t a i l e d d i s c u s s i o n of the d i s t i n c t i o n between i n f o r m a l and formal power i n Chinese p o l i t i c s , see L o w e l l D i t t m e r , "Bases of Power i n Chinese P o l i t i c s : A Theory and A n a l y s i s of the F a l l of the 'Gang of F o u r ' , " World P o l i t i c s 31 (October 1978), pp. 26-60. - 19 -by t h e i r e x i s t e n c e , then , w i l l be h e l p f u l i n the a n a l y s i s of p r o v i s i o n s for l e a d e r s h i p s u c c e s s i o n . L u c i a n Pye d e s c r i b e s f a c t i o n s as " c l u s t e r s of o f f i c i a l s who, for some reason or o t h e r , f e e l c o m f o r t a b l e wi th each o t h e r , who b e l i e v e that they share mutual t r u s t and l o y a l t i e s , and who may . . 25 r e c o g n i z e common f o e s . -• They are an outgrowth of the mutual dependency f e l t between s u p e r i o r s and s u b o r d i n a t e s , and are based on common exper ience or s o c i a l i n t e r a c t i o n . Pye f u t h e r a s s e r t s that c a r e e r s e l f - i n t e r e s t and the sent iments a s s o c i a t e d wiCh p e r s o n a l bonds of a c q u a i n t a n c e s h i p and b e l o n g i n g (guanxi) p r e d i s p o s e o f f i c i a l s to i n d e n t i f y w i th a p a r t i c u l a r l e a d e r . These bonds act as the g lue that ho lds f a c t i o n s together.^^ The guanxi r e l a t i o n s h i p , however, i s not as o n e - s i d e d as the p a t r o n - c l i e n t r e l a t i o n s h i p which i s o f t en a s s o c i a t e d wi th many other s o c i e t i e s i n A s i a . S ince the r e l a t i o n s h i p i s based on some shared e x p e r i e n c e , o r i g i n or a c q u a i n t a n c e , there i s a sense of e q u a l i t y , s u b t l e r e c o g n i t i o n of s u p e r i o r and i n f e r i o r r o l e s n o t w i t h s t a n d i n g , which i s not present i n , f or example, the Japanese case . T h i s i m p l i e s that the p o t e n t i a l f or a s u b o r d i n a t e to v i c t i m i z e h i s s u p e r i o r e x i s t s . The e x i s t e n c e of these r e l a t i o n s h i p s a l s o suggests that whi l e p o l i c y p r e f e r e n c e s , L u c i a n Pye, Dynamics of Chinese P o l i t i c s (Cambridge, M a s s . : Gun and H a i n , 1981), p. 6. 26 i b i d . , p. 7. For a review of the debate about the r e l e v a n c e of f a c t i o n a l a n a l y s i s to Chinese p o l i t i c s , see Tang T s o u , "Prolegomenon to the Study of I n f o r m a l Groups i n CCP P o l i t i c s , " China Q u a r t e r l y 65 (March 1976), pp. 98-114. - 20 -b u r e a u c r a t i c i d e n t i f i c a t i o n , g e n e r a t i o n a l c l e a v a g e s , i d e o l o g i c a l d i s p u t e s , and g e o g r a p h i c a l bases a l l p l a y s i g n i f i c a n t r o l e s i n the f o r m a t i o n of c o n f l i c t i n g e l i t e groups i n CCP p o l i t i c s , p e r s o n a l t i e s (guanxi) and f a c t i o n l i s m w i l l o b v i o u s l y be, both as p a r t y d i s c i p l i n e problems and as a means of support m o b i l i z a t i o n , very prominent f e a t u r e s i n any p l a n for p r o v i s i o n s f o r 27 s u c c e s s i o n . Aging l e a d e r s tend to promote those wi th whom they are the most f a m i l i a r . In o ther words, d e s p i t e the o f f i c i a l p r o s c r i p t i o n of the promotion of o f f i c i a l s on the b a s i s of f a c t i o n a l t i e s , the i n f l u e n c e of these t i e s on o f f i c i a l s ' c a r e e r paths cannot be d e n i e d . T h i s tendency suggests a c e r t a i n t e n s i o n between the "normative r u l e s " imposed by L e n i n i s t i d e o l o g y and the 28 " p r u d e n t i a l r u l e s " which have t h e i r roo t s i n Chinese c u l t u r e . A l t e r n a t i v e l y , t h i s can be seen as a c o n f l i c t beween Weberian l e g a l - r a t i o n a l a u t h o r i t y and t r a d i t i o n a l a u t h o r i t y . F r e d e r i c k Teiwes' u s e f u l c o n c e p t u a l i z a t i o n of these t e n s i o n s can be summarized as f o l l o w s : . Because of the importance of guanxi i n support m o b i l i z a t i o n , the c u l t i v a t i o n of s u p p o r t i n g "successor g e n e r a t i o n s " i s c r u c i a l . See M i c h a e l Yahuda, " P o l i t i c a l G e n e r a t i o n s i n C h i n a , " China Q u a r t e r l y 80 (December 1979), pp. 793-805 and W i l l i a m de B. M i l l s , " G e n e r a t i o n a l Change i n C h i n a , Problems of Communism (November-December 1983), pp. 16-35. Teiwes , pp. 94-99. Normative rules Prudential rules 1. collective leadership « • 1. don't cross the leader i 2. minority r i gh i s * ! >2. maintain broad alliances 3. "deliver the goods" even ' „ •*" " " " " " " " " " violating directives is requ if 3. Leninist d i s c i p l i n e ^ V l u ' a l , n 9 d i r e c t i v e s is required | ——•—•———.^ 4. protect institutional interests 4. ban on factions * " * 5 ' m a i n t a i n « " / a n x / * ' n e , w o r k s •* — d e v e l o p patron-client ties 5. civilian control of military * •—-*• 7. maintain P L A support — — — • lines of tension *Personal relations derived from some common experience or social interaction. Source: T e i w e s , p . 9 6 Each of these c o n t r a d i c t i o n s should be a p o i n t of concern for a dominant l e a d e r t r y i n g to p r o v i d e for h i s own s u c c e s s i o n . For h i s p r o v i s i o n s to have any e f f i c a c y at a l l , the d e p a r t i n g l e a d e r and h i s chosen successor must both walk a f i n e l i n e between the two se ts of r u l e s . D i f f i c u l t ques t ions w i l l i n e v i t a b l y a r i s e . For example, wi th r e f e r e n c e to the f i r s t r u l e i n both columns, how much a u t h o r i t y can a d e p a r t i n g l e a d e r grant h i s in tended successor before h i s own power i s e c l i p s e d , and to what extent can consensus w i t h i n a supposedly c o l l e c t i v e l e a d e r s h i p be - 22 -a c h i e v e d on a d e c i s i o n to promote p o t e n t i a l s u c c e s s o r s to top oq p o s i t i o n s ? There are no easy answers to these q u e s t i o n s . The c h o i c e of a protege who i s capable of e s t a b l i s h i n g h i s own l e g i t i m a c y i s a key task of a d e p a r t i n g l e a d e r w i s h i n g to ensure a smooth s u c c e s s i o n . A l t h o u g h , as suggested e a r l i e r , a s s o c i a t i o n wi th a former l e a d e r may be a source of a u t h o r i t y for a s u c c e s s i o n c a n d i d a t e , i t i s l i k e l y that that a u t h o r i t y alone w i l l be i n s u f f i c i e n t for l o n g - l a s t i n g l e g i t i m a c y . A p o t e n t i a l succes sor must be ab le to defend and l e g i t i m i z e h i s own prominent p o s i t i o n even when h i s mentor i s gone. Eberhard Sandschneider has suggested that the f o l l o w i n g c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s are c r u c i a l (but perhaps not s u f f i c i e n t ) f o r the maintenance of a s t rong successor p o s i t i o n i n C h i n a : 1. und i sputed r e f e r e n c e to Mao Zedong thought as the i d e o l o g i c a l source of l e g i t m i z a t i o n ; 2. l o n g - s t a n d i n g c a r e e r e x p e r i e n c e i n important sub-systems; 3. membership i n the i n n e r l e a d e r s h i p core ; 4. maintenance of a s t r o n g l o c a l power base; 5. ex tens ivee network of formal and i n f o r m a l power a f f l a t i o n s ; 6. a b i l i t y to m o b i l i z e power bases and c o n s t i t u e n c i e s . To these , Sandschneider adds d i f f i c u l t - t o - o b s e r v e p e r s o n a l t r a i t s such as c l o s e t i e s wi th l e a d e r s h i p groups i n the P e o p l e ' s For the h i s t o r i c a l roo t s of t h i s di lemma, see i b i d . , p . 60 . ^ S a n d s c h n e i d e r , p. 699. 23 ~. L i b e r a t i o n Army ( P L A ) , an i n c l i n a t i o n f o r s e l f - p r e s e r v a t i o n , l a c k of a c c u m u l a t i o n of enemies and p u b l i c a p p r o v a l . I t i s c o n c e i v a b l e that movement towards b u r e a u c r a t i c l e a d e r s h i p would r e q u i r e some a l t e r a t i o n s or a d d i t i o n s to t h i s l i s t . For example, t e c h n i c a l u n d e r s t a n d i n g or demonstrated t r o u b l e s h o o t i n g a b i l i t y w i l l grow i n i m p o r t a n c e . ^ A d d i t i o n a l l y , r e f e r e n c e s to Mao cou ld become more d i l u t e d and s e l e c t i v e as the number of former l e a d e r s , and thus the poo l of l e g i t i m i z i n g s o u r c e s , becomes l a r g e r . These q u a l i f i c a t i o n s f o r sys temic e v o l u t i o n n o t w i t h s t a n d i n g , i t i s ev ident that p r o v i s i o n s for l e a d e r s h i p s u c c e s s i o n i n any era must be complex and e x t e n s i v e to meet w i th any degree of s u c c e s s . A d e p a r t i n g l e a d e r must c o n s i d e r the f o l l o w i n g three f o r m i d a b l e requirements i n p r o v i d i n g f o r h i s own s u c c e s s i o n : a succes sor must possess a l a r g e number of l e g i t i m i z i n g c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s ; two l i s t s of c o n f l i c t i n g r u l e s must be ba lanced by both mentor and protege; and the f u t u r e needs of an e v o l v i n g system must be accommodated through g e n e r a t i o n a l s u c c e s s i o n . ^ I w i l l now o u t l i n e how Mao Zedong and Deng X i a o p i n g each pursued t h i s c h a l l e n g e and then compare Deng's p r o s p e c t s f o r success wi th the r e s u l t s of Mao's a t t e m p t s . ^Thomas W. Rob inson , " P o l i t i c a l S u c c e s s i o n i n C h i n a " , World P o l i t i c s 27 (October 1974), p. 15. •^^This i s not to imply that e i t h e r l e a d e r conce ived of t h e i r task i n these terms. I on ly suggest that these f a c t o r s w i l l have a b e a r i n g on the success of t h e i r e f f o r t s . - 24 -CHAPTER TWO: MAO'S PROVISION 1 Mao Zedong was q u i t e aware of h i s own unique s t a t u r e as a c h a r i s m a t i c l e a d e r . T h i s knowledge mot iva ted him p e r s i s t e n t l y to pursue s u c c e s s i o n arrangements f o r over two decades . His concern f o r a smooth s u c c e s s i o n became c l e a r not long a f t e r the e s t a b l i s h m e n t of the P e o p l e ' s R e p u b l i c . However, Mao a l s o r e c o g n i z e d the tendency of communist s o c i e t i e s to become b u r e a u c r a t i z e d and l o s e t h e i r r e v o l u t i o n a r y f e r v o r . T h i s he d e p l o r e d . Hi s l a t e r s u c c e s s i o n arrangements r e f l e c t e d t h i s a t t i t u d e and served p r i m a r i l y to d e s t a b i l i z e p o l i t i c a l l i f e i n C h i n a . A l s o , Mao's ambiva lent f e e l i n g s toward h i s chosen s u c c e s s o r s he lped to erode h i s p r o v i s i o n s for s u c c e s s i o n . The f i r s t v i c t i m of that e r o s i o n was l o n g - t i m e p a r t y s t a l w a r t , L i u S h a o q i . L i u Shaoqi The r e l a t i o n s h i p between L i u and Mao goes back to the e a r l i e s t days of the CCP. L i u , a long wi th about f i f t y o ther youths from h i s n a t i v e Hunan p r o v i n c e , f o l l o w e d Mao and h i s New People S o c i e t y a s s o c i a t e s to B e i j i n g i n September of "''Much of the d i s c u s s i o n i n t h i s chapter i s drawn from Rush, Chapter Two. . 2 5 . 2 1918, He j o i n e d the CCP i n 1921 and soon t h e r e a f t e r t r a v e l l e d to the Sov ie t Union to s t u d y . When he r e t u r n e d , he gained g r a s s r o o t s exper ience i n l a b o r union and par ty work i n Hebei and M a n c h u r i a . L i u was e l e c t e d to the C e n t r a l Committee (CC) i n the l a t e 1920s and to the P o l i t b u r o i n 1945. He and Mao worked together i n the Anyuan workers movement and presumably throughout the Long March . L i u served i n the P o l i t i c a l Department of the E i g h t h Army Corps d u r i n g t h i s t ime . Dur ing t h i s p e r i o d , L i u g e n e r a l l y supported Mao Zedong's p o l i c y p r e f e r e n c e s and was no doubt i n s t r u m e n t a l i n Mao's r i s e to supremacy w i t h i n the CCP i n the 1930s and 1940s. L i u ' s a l l e g i a n c e to Mao was v a l u a b l e because of h i s S o v i e t e d u c a t i o n , h i s a b i l i t i e s as a . t h e o r t i c i a n and a s t r a t e g i s t , and h i s 3 exper i ence i n p a r t y work. On s e v e r a l o c c a s i o n s , L i u prepared i n v e s t i g a t i v e r e p o r t s to undermine Mao's opponents w i t h i n the CCP. Mao quoted L i u ' s p o l i t i c a l essays to b o l s t e r h i s own arguments d u r i n g the Zhengfeng movement (the r e c t i f i c a t i o n campaign of 1942-43) . A p p a r e n t l y , L i u ' s For a d e t a i l e d d e s c r i p t i o n of L i u ' s e a r l y y e a r s , see L i T i e n - m i n , L i u S h a o - c h i : Mao's F i r s t H e i r Apparent ( T a i p e i : I n s t i t u t e of I n t e r n a t i o n a l R e l a t i o n s , 197 5 ) . 3 I b i d . , p. 45. r e p u t a t i o n for "pat ient and m e t i c u l o u s work" i n h i s d u t i e s as p o l i t i c a l commissar of the New F o u r t h Army and s e c r e t a r y of the C e n t r a l China Bureau, as w e l l as h i s f i r s t hand exper ience wi th the S o v i e t s , made him an i d e a l a l l i a n c e p a r t n e r for Mao aga ins t the l a t t e r ' s r e t u r n e d - s t u d e n t d e t r a c t o r s . ^ H i n t s that L i u might o b t a i n a p o s i t i o n second only to Mao w i t h i n the CCP sur faced as e a r l y as the Seventh Par ty Congress i n 1945. Th i s was the f i r s t congress that Mao p e r s o n a l l y c o n t r o l l e d . L i u ' s r e p o r t on the p a r t y s t a t u t e at t h i s meeting was viewed as second i n i m p o r t a n c e . ^ L i u became s e n i o r s e c r e t a r y of the C e n t r a l Committee (CC; at t h i s meeting and on s e v e r a l subsequent occas ions f i l l e d i n for Chairman Mao to conduct meetings when the l a t t e r was absent d u r i n g p e r i o d s of extended n e g o t i a t i o n s . In 1950, L i u was named one of s i x v i c e - c h a i r m e n of the C e n t r a l P e o p l e ' s Government and ranked t h i r d a f t e r Zhu De i n the p a r t y h i e r a r c h y . V i c e - C h a i r m a n was somewhat of an honorary p o s i t i o n , but L i u ' s m u l t i p l e other d u t i e s d u r i n g t h i s time ( i n c l u d i n g p r e s i d e n t of the S i n o - S o v i e t F r i e n d s h i p A s s o c i a t i o n and honorary p r e s i d e n t of the A l l - C h i n a Labor F e d e r a t i o n ; made i t c l e a r that l i i s p e r s o n a l s t a t u s was on V b i d . , p. 7 7. "Ru s h , p . 2 5 1. - 27 ^ 6 the r i s e . From 1945 to 1955, L i u ' s d u t i e s as a member of the C e n t r a l Committee S e c r e t a r i a t a l lowed him to become de f a c t o s u p e r v i s o r of r o u t i n e domestic a f f a i r s . C l e a r l y , Mao was a l l o w i n g L i u ' s r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s to grow. S i g n i f i c a n t l y , L i u was i n s t r u m e n t a l i n i n i t i a t i n g the f i r s t meaningfu l purge i n the CCP a f t e r 1949. With Mao on v a c a t i o n , L i u took charge at the Seventh Plenum of the Seventh CC i n February 1954. He d e l i v e r e d the P o l i b u r o ' s r e p o r t which mentioned s p e c i f i c a l l y the p o l i t i c a l s i n s of u p s t a r t s Gao Gang and Rao S h u s h i , and urged a f i g h t for p a r t y u n i t y . Then, i n September 1956, wi th Gao and Rao e x p e l l e d from the p a r t y , L i u was promoted to second spot i n the p a r t y h i e r a r c h y at the E i g h t h P a r t y Congress . He a l s o made the p o l i t i c a l r e p o r t at t h i s meet ing . The c r e a t i o n of an "honorary chairman" p o s i t i o n at t h i s time was presumably i n a n t i c i p a t i o n of Mao's r e t i r e m e n t . As Townsend and Womack p o i n t ou t , the "Gao-Rao c l i q u e was a f a c t i o n aimed at c o n t r o l l i n g s u c c e s s i o n a f t e r M a o . " 7 L i u ' s immediate promotion w i t h i n the p a r t y h i e r a r c h y a f t e r t h i s purge , than , suggests that h_e_ was the P o l i t b u r o ' s c h o i c e to be Mao's s u c c e s s o r . T h i s c o n c l u s i o n i s supported by the f a c t that when Mao r e t r e a t e d to the "second l i n e " of 6 L i , pp. L01-102 ^James R. Townsend and B r a n t l y W o m a c k , P o l i t i c s i n China (3rd ed . ) (Boston: L i t t l e , Brown, and Company, 1986), p. 316 - 28 -l e a d e r s h i p by d e c l i n i n g nominat ion for another term as chairman of the government of the PRC i n 1959, L i u was chosen to succeed h i m . L i u ' s o p p o r t u n i t i e s to operate on t h i s " f i r s t l i n e " of l e a d e r s h i p , e s p e c i a l l y h i s a s s i s t a n c e i n 1958 i n l a u n c h i n g the "three red f l a g s " ( b u i l d i n g s o c i a l i s m , the Great Leap Forward and the p e o p l e ' s communes) program, gave him a chance to c o n s o l i d a t e h i s c o n t r o l of the p a r t y apparatus and g a i n "pervas ive i n f l u e n c e over the processes of o r g a n i z a t i o n and H8 i n s t i t u t i o n b u i l d i n g . • A c c o r d i n g to some a n a l y s t s , Mao's r e t r e a t to a "second l i n e " of l e a d e r s h i p was an i n t e g r a l par t of h i s s u c c e s s i o n s t r a t e g y . By s t epp ing back to d e l i b e r a t e on broader ques t ions of i d e o l o g y and the grand s t r a t e g y of the r e v o l u t i o n , Mao o f f e r e d h i s subord ina te s a chance to become f a m i l i a r w i th the d e t a i l s of the reg ime's a d m i n i s t r a t i o n whi le at the same time i n c r e a s i n g t h e i r own v i s i b i l i t y and p r e s t i g e . Mao h imse l f e x p l a i n e d h i s " r e t r e a t s " of the 1950's t h i s way: In l i g h t of the groblems that o c c u r r e d w i t h i n the Sov ie t Union and c o n s i d e r i n g the s e c u r i t y of our own c o u n t r y , I have dec ided to d i v i d e the Standing Committee of the P o l i t b u r o i n t o two l i n e s 8Lowell D i t t m e r , L i u S h a o - c h ' i and the Chinese C u l t u r a l R e v o l u t i o n : The P o l i t i c s of Mass C r i t i s m ( B e r k l e y : U n i v e r s i t y of C a l i f o r n i a P r e s s , 1974), p. 29. ^Mao abhored the p o s t - S t a l i n s u c c e s s i o n developments i n the USSR and l a t e r branded Khrushchev as a r e v i s i o n i s t and phony communist. 29 . . . b y withdrawing mysel f i n t o the second and by p l a c i n g L i u S h a o - c h ' i and Teng H s i a o - p i n g i n the f i r s t . L i u , as V ice Chairman, c o u l d conduct c e r t a i n important conferences and Teng cou ld a t t end to the d a i l y work (of the C C ) . . . When I r e t r e a t e d i n t o the second l i n e by not c o n d u c t i n g the d a i l y work and l e t t i n g others execute i t , my purpose was to c u l t i v a t e t h e i r p r e s t i g e so that when I t # v e t o s e e God, the country can avo id great chaos . In support of t h i s l i n e of thought , we are reminded that Mao f i r s t p u b l i c l y suggested h i s own r e t i r e m e n t s ta tegy i n 1957, when the Great Leap was g a i n i n g momentum — a p e r i o d of undoubted s t r e n g t h for Maov^ - O b v i o u s l y , Mao's p r e s t i g e and i n f l u e n c e v a s c i l l a t e d wi th the success or f a i l u r e of p o l i t i c a l and economic i n i t i a t i v e s , but i n the p r e - C u l t u r a l R e v o l u t i o n a r y CCP, he was c o n s i s t e n t l y r e c o g n i z e d as the u l t i m a t e a u t h o r i t y by h i s c o l l e a g u e s . Other s c h o l a r s i n t e r p r e t Mao's movement to the "second l i n e " of l e a d e r s h i p d i f f e r e n t l y . The above q u o t a t i o n i s merely Mao's own a f t e r - t h e - f a c t e x p l a n a t i o n of e a r l i e r events . Mao's removal from everyday a f f a i r s , a c c o r d i n g to t h i s l i n e of thought , was not e n t i r e l y h i s own i d e a ; he was f o r c e d onto the "second l i n e " of l e a d e r s h i p . Mao's e a r l y statements about l^Mao Zedong, Address to C e n t r a l Work Conference of October 1966, Y o m i u r i ( i n Japanese) , Tokyo, January 7, p. 3, c i t e d i n Gene T . H s i a o , "The Great P r o l e t a r i a n C u l t u r a l R e v o l u t i o n , " A s i a n Survey 12 (June 1967), p. 392. <Hsee Teiwes , p. 138, note no. 62. -, 30 -r e t i r e m e n t r e f l e c t e d h i s d e s i r e to c o n c e n t r a t e on p a r t y matters (he suggested h i s own r e s i g n a t i o n from the s t a t e c h a i r m a n s h i p ) , not a d e s i r e to c u l t i v a t e L i n ' s p r e s t i g e as the p a r t y ' s chosen h e i r . The CCP e l i t e , on the o ther hand, may have a l lowed L i u to take a l e a d i n g r o l e wi th the enhancement of h i s successor p o s i t i o n , among other t h i n g s , i n mind . T h i s view i s supported by the f a c t t h a t , a l though they had worked together for a long t ime , Mao and L i u d i d not always see eye to eye. L i u S h a o q i , as S t u a r t Schram f o r c e f u l l y argues , d i f f e r e d wi th Mao on some fundamental i d e o l o g i c a l 12 i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s . ' S e v e r a l of these l o n g s t a n d i n g d i f f e r e n c e s of o p i n i o n w i l l , i n s i m p l i f i e d f a s h i o n , be o u t l i n e d h e r e . F i r s t , Mao put great f a i t h i n the peasants as the d r i v i n g f o r c e of the r e v o l u t i o n , whereas L i u , c o n s i s t e n t wi th h i s background i n the l abor movement, tended to emphasize the r o l e of the workers i n the r e v o l u t i o n . Second, Mao and L i u d i f f e r e d i n t h e i r c o n c e p t i o n of the r o l e of the p a r t y o r g a n i z a t i o n ; L i u emphasized the o r g a n i z a t i o n as the source of a u t h o r i t y , whereas Mao had a more p e r s o n a l i z e d idea of l e a d e r s h i p . T h i r d , a l t h o u g h i n the pre-1949 p e r i o d both l e a d e r s seemed to a c q u i e s c e to the Sov ie t U n i o n ' s l e a d e r s h i p of the world communist movement, L i u ' s e d u c a t i o n a l e x p e r i e n c e l ed him to 1 2 g e e s t u a r t Schram, "Mao T s e - t u n g and L i u S h a o - c h ' i , 1939-1969," A s i a n Survey 12 ( A p r i l 1972), pp. 275-93. sympathize wi th the USSR on i d e o l o g y and p o l i c y m a t t e r s , whi l e Mao was not t r u s t e d by S t a l i n and became i n c r e a s i n g l y a l i e n a t e d from Moscow. In l i g h t of these d i f f e r e n c e s , i t seems that L i u was the p a r t y ' s cho ice as successor and that Mao, at l e a s t t e m p o r a r i l y , a c q u i e s c e d to that d e c i s i o n . A l though he l a c k e d Mao's p e r s o n a l p o p u l a r i t y and was only f i v e years Mao's j u n i o r , L u i was, i n some ways, a l o g i c a l c h o i c e f o r h e i r at the t ime . "He was p r e o c c u p i e d with p r a c t i c a l a f f a i r s r a t h e r than great i d e a s . . . a u s e f u l t r a i t i n a l e a d e r who i s to c o n s o l i d a t e a newly 13 e s t a b l i s h e d reg ime. A l s o , L i u seemed to l a c k the d r i v e of e x c e s s i v e p e r s o n a l a m b i t i o n ; t h i s q u a l i t y rendered him i d e a l as 14 an h e i r presumpt ive , i f not as an e v e n t u a l supreme l e a d e r . Rush observes that as the number-two man i n the regime, L i u served w e l l for almost two decades , o r g a n i z i n g the implementat ion of Mao's programs and perhaps d i s c o u r a g i n g more ambi t ious men from c o v e t i n g the succession.-*-^ L i u a l s o possessed another c h a r a c t e r i s t i c which gave the CCP 1 3Ru s h, p. 2 5 6 . l^For a unique e x p l o r a t i o n of the d i f f e r e n c e s of p e r s o n a l i t y between Mao and L i u , see L o w e l l D i t t m e r , "Power and P e r s o n a l i t y : Mao T s e - t u n g , L u i S h a o - c h ' i and the P o l i t i c s of C h a r i s m a t i c S u c c e s s i o n , "Studies i n Comparat ive Communism" 7 (Spring/Summer 19 /4 ; , pp. 21-49. a 5 R u s h , p . 257 . - 3 2 .-l e a d e r s h i p more d i r e c t reasons to r e l y on him. L i u ' s Sov i e t exper i ence and connect ions gave the P o l i t b u r o the b e n e f i t of a member wi th b e t t e r Comintern c r e d e n t i a l s than Mao h i m s e l f had. These are i n d i c a t i o n s , o b v i o u s l y , that the d e c i s i o n to promote L i u was a c o l l e c t i v e one. L i u ' s s t a t u s as a major f i g u r e i n the r e v o l u t i o n , as w e l l as h i s apparent l o n g s t a n d i n g number two p o s i t i o n i n the par ty suggest that he was a very a c c e p t a b l e succes sor i n the eyes of the e l i t e . ^ 6 Another reason that Mao may have a l lowed L i u to r i s e to such a prominent p o s i t i o n w i t h i n the p a r t y a c t u a l l y stems from the d i f f e r i n g p e r s p e c t i v e s of the two l e a d e r s . Mao he ld the i d e a that a s i n g l e p e r s o n a l l e a d e r was e s s e n t i a l to the r e v o l u t i o n . He once commented t h a t : Both the r e v o l u t i o n a r y and the c o u n t e r -r e v o l u t i o n a r y f r o n t s must have someone to act as t h e i r l e a d e r . . . Marx i s dead and Engels and L e n i n too are dead. If we d i d not have S t a l i n , who would g ive the orders?""'' 7 When c o n s i d e r e d i n c o n n e c t i o n wi th h is "two l i n e s " i d e a s , t h i s passage suggests that Mao e n v i s i o n e d h i m s e l f as o p e r a t i n g above and beyond some k i n d of l e s s e r c o l l e c t i v e l e a d e r s h i p composed of the r e s t of the e l i t e . He may have r e c o g n i z e d the need for independent power bases for h i s s u c c e s s o r s , but saw no need to 1 6 S e e Teiwes , pp. 28, 68. "^7Mao Zedong quoted i n Schram, p. 278 - 33 •= c r e a t e p o l i t i c a l r i v a l s Roder i ck MacFarquhar ' s a s s e r t i o n s about the proceedings of the 1956 E i g h t h P a r t y Congress u n i n t e n t i o n a l l y support t h i s v iew. He contends that the most s i g n i f i c a n t promotion at the E i g h t h Par ty Congress was that of Deng X i a o p i n g from the bottom rung i n the pre -Congress P o l i t b u r o to s i x t h s p o t . The s u g g e s t i o n i s that Deng, at that p o i n t i n t ime , was more p e r s o n a l l y l o y a l to Mao than L i u , and thus was to be c o n s i d e r e d a v i a b l e s u c c e s s i o n candidate by M a o . - ^ While Mao's c o n s i d e r a t i o n of Deng as a succes sor i n 1956 i s p l a u s i b l e , the f a c t that both he and L i u were promoted and were both c o n s i d e r e d par t of the " f i r s t l i n e " i n Mao's account of these events c l e a r l y supports the t h e s i s that Mao was somewhat j e a l o u s of h i s power and p r e f e r r e d not to a l l o w any s i n g l e s u b o r d i n a t e to ga in too much power. It a l s o supports the i d e a the L i u was not Mao's own c h o i c e as h e i r . Deng may have been promoted to c o u n t e r b a l a n c e or d i l u t e L i u ' s growing i n f l u e n c e . Why Mao, i n h i s subsequent p e r s o n a l appointment of h e i r s , chose to e l e v a t e j u s t one . cand ida te , however, remains u n e x p l a i n e d . One e x p l a n a t i o n i s that he now knew h i s death was nearer and J^Roder ick MacFarquhar, "Problems of L i b e r a l i z a t i o n and S u c c e s s i o n at the E i g h t h P a r t y C o n g r e s s , " China Q u a r t e r l y 56 (October-December 1973), p. 641. .i^ %ao l a t e r ( i n 1961) s p e c i f i c a l l y r e f e r r e d to L i u as h i s s u c c e s s o r ; see Teiwes , p . 28, note no. 79 . T 34 r. t h e r e f o r e e n v i s i o n e d a successor who a l s o would operate s i n g l e h a n d e d l y above the other members of the e l i t e . MacFarquhar a l s o i m p l i e s that L i u may have o b l i q u e l y c r i t i c i z e d Mao at these meetings by s u g g e s t i n g that Mao's w i l l i n g n e s s to c o n s u l t wi th h i s c o l l e a g u e s was e q u a l l y as 20 important as the c o r r e c t n e s s of h i s i d e a s . Such remarks would be c o n s i s t e n t wi th L i u ' s orthodox L e n i n i s t concept of the p a r t y and h i s more l i t e r a l ideas about c o l l e c t i v e l e a d e r s h i p . A l t h o u g h he r e c o g n i z e d Mao's supreme p o l i t i c a l a u t h o r i t y , he a l s o promoted o m i t t i n g r e f e r e n c e s to Mao Zedong thought from the 1956 c o n s t i t u t i o n . Hi s outspokenness on t h i s matter i n d i c a t e s not open r e b e l l i o n or brazen d i s l o y a l t y to Mao, but r a t h e r a c o n s i s t e n t b e l i e f i n the m e r i t s of c o l l e c t i v e l e a d e r s h i p . I t was these ideas about c o l l e c t i v e l e a d e r s h i p and L i u ' s c l o s e a s s o c i a t i o n wi th the b u r e a u c r a t i c machinery of China which e v e n t u a l l y came i n t o c o n f l i c t wi th Mao's changing goa l s and caused the Chairman to move a g a i n s t the p a r t y ' s chosen h e i r . In 1958, L i u announced the Greap Leap Forward (GLF) program to the second s e s s i o n of the E i g h t h N a t i o n a l Congress of the CCP. It was soon a f t e r t h i s , i n 1959, that L i u was d e s i g n a t e d as s t a t e cha irman . The f a i l u r e of the GLF brought ^^MacFarquhar, p. 624, - 35 -c r i t i c i s m of Mao from P o l i t b u r o member Peng Dehuai and h i s a s s o c i a t e s . L i u supported Mao i n that d i s p u t e , but p layed a s o r t of med ia t ing r o l e by c a l l i n g f o r u n i t y and l e n i e n c y i n d e a l i n g wi th Peng's group. L i u ' s s t a t u r e was i n c r e a s e d i n 1962 by the wide d i s t r i b u t i o n of h i s essay "How to be a Good Communist," which was s e r i a l i z e d i n the Renmin Ribao ( P e o p l e ' s D a i l y ) . At the same t ime , Mao's c r e d i b i l i t y was reduced by the f a i l u r e of the ambi t ious GLF programs. T h e r e f o r e , a l though d u r i n g the p e r i o d 1962-65 Mao was s t i l l i n f l u e n t i a l i n the p o l i c y - m a k i n g p r o c e s s , the implementa t ion of h i s p o l i c i e s became i n c r e a s i n g l y c o l o r e d by the bureaucracy c o n t r o l l e d by L i u Shaoqi and Deng X i a o p i n g . ^ ! - L i u ' s p o s i t i o n i n the f i r s t l i n e of l e a d e r s h i p enabled him to convene c o n f e r e n c e s , s e l e c t speakers and secure passage of the programs he s u p p o r t e d . These programs were r e a c t i o n s to the problems of the G L F . Lioi assumed that Mao had accepted the c a s t i g a t i o n of the GLF 22 programs, but Mao cont inued to espouse some GLF themes. Thus , the p o t e n t i a l f or f r i c t i o n between the two l e a d e r s i n c r e a s e d . Mao's p h y s i c a l absence from B e i j i n g d u r i n g much of the p o s t - G L F retrenchment p e r i o d c o n t r i b u t e d to L i u ' s i n c r e a s i n g 2 lDi t tmer , pp. 50-65 . 2 2 I b i d . , p. 45. v i s i b i l i t y and power, and to Mao's p e r c e p t i o n of the n e c e s s i t y of a Great P r o l e t a r i a n C u l t u r a l R e v o l u t i o n (GPCR). Mao's removal from everyday p o l i t i c s d i d indeed grant i n c r e a s e d v i s i b i l i t y and p u b l i c p r e s t i g e to L i u S h a o q i , as i n t e n d e d . However, as Mao t r i e d p e r i o d i c a l l y to r e a s s e r t h i s a u t h o r i t y , h i s e f f o r t s were c o n s i s t e n t l y f r u s t r a t e d . Because Mao was not immediate ly at hand, h i s o p i n i o n was sought l e s s f r e q u e n t l y by other e l i t e members. Dur ing t h i s p e r i o d , a Japanese r e p o r t e r observed that a "tendency to she lve Mao was s t e a d i l y permeating the CCP."23- xhe word "tendency" i s e s p e c i a l l y d e s c r i p t i v e here s i n c e i t was l a r g e l y the c i r c u m s t a n c e of Mao's absence, r a t h e r than a concer ted c o n s p i r a c y , which l e d to a d i s s o l u t i o n of the CCP's o r i g i n a l s u c c e s s i o n arrangements . Mao responded to t h i s tendency with countermeasures . As e a r l y as 1959 he began to draw upon h i s r e l a t i o n s h i p wi th L i n Biao to b u i l d up the PLA. As we s h a l l see l a t e r i n more d e t a i l , he in tended to use the army's s t r e n g t h to undermine L i u ' s growing power. A l s o , whi le Mao was i n Shanghai , an u n o f f i c i a l "k i t chen cab ine t" s l owly began to c o a l e s c e around him. T h i s group of lower l e v e l o f f i c i a l s known as the C e n t r a l C u l t u r a l R e v o l u t i o n Group (or Shanghai group) i n c l u d e d Mao's See I b i d . , p. 53, note no. 65. T. 37 w i f e , J iang Q i n g , and s e v e r a l o f f i c i a l s i n Shangha i ' s propaganda machine. They a l lowed Mao a secondary mode of p o l i c y implementat ion when L i u ' s bureaucracy was unrespons ive As L i u ' s p r e s t i g e i n B e i j i n g grew, so d i d resentment among Mao's f o l l o w e r s . "Mao's r e t i n u e seems to have n o t i c e d [aj premature leakage of t h e i r p a t r o n s ' a u t h o r i t y and resented i t perhaps even more than Mao d i d h i m s e l f . T h e e x i s t e n c e of a u t h o r i t a t i v e successor weakened t h e i r u n o f f i c i a l , though p o l i t i c a l l y s i g n i f i c a n t , p o s i t i o n s . The Shanghai group' s c o o p e r a t i o n wi th and encouragement of Mao i n the promotion of the GPCR and i t s p r e d e c e s s o r , the 1962-65 S o c i a l i s t E d u c a t i o n Movement (SEM), were s i g n i f i c a n t i n c h a n n e l i n g events i n a d i r e c t i o n that f a c i l i t a t e d L i u ' s removal from o f f i c e . L i u S h a o q i ' s p o s t - G L F readjustment p o l i c i e s i n c l u d e d the c o n t r o l l e d use of f ree markets and p r i v a t e vege tab le p l o t s to s t i m u l a t e p r o d u c t i o n . Mao and h i s a s s o c i a t e s p e r c e i v e d these programs as t h r e a t s to the c o l l e c t i v e economy. C o r r u p t i o n among r u r a l cadres and "economic i n d i v i d u a l i s m " caused alarm w i t h i n l e a d i n g c i r c l e s (both o f f i c i a l and u n o f f i c i a l ) . As a r e s u l t , the SEM was put f o r t h wi th the aim of i d e o l o g i c a l e d u c a t i o n and o r g a n i z a t i o n of p e a s a n t s , as w e l l as the 2 4 I b i d . , pp. 53-54. r e c t i f i c a t i o n of e r r a n t cadre b e h a v i o r . However, Mao's o r i g i n a l i n s t r u c t i o n s f o r the movement were m o d i f i e d by L i u and Deng; c o n f u s i o n was the r e s u l t : Mao advocated open i n v e s t i g a t i o n i n the communes by work teams of top cadres from the c e n t r e ; L i u wanted i n - d e p t h i n v e s t i g a t i o n by c o v e r t i n f i l t r a t i o n among the peasants , both to gather true i n f o r m a t i o n and to f e r r e t out c o r r u p t c a d r e s . . . M a o in tended [the SEMJ to be a mass e d u c a t i o n movement. L i u wanted a p a r t y - c o n t r o l l e d r e c t i f i c a t i o n o p e r a t i o n , w i t h emphasis on c o r r e c t i v e and r e m e d i a l measures , i n accordance wi th e s t a b l i s h e d norms i n the p a r t y o r g a n i z a t i o n . "* The SEM, f o r the most p a r t , drowned i n these c o n t r a d i c t o r y d i r e c t i v e s . Mao was unable to implement h i s programs as f u l l y as d e s i r e d . T h i s impotence i n f l u e n c e d h i s b e l i e f that bourgeo i s t h i n k i n g s t i l l permeated the p a r t y and that the p a r t y i t s e l f had, i n l a r g e measure, become a t h r e a t to the r e v o l u t i o n . In January of 1965, Mao f i r s t r e f e r r e d to these elements i n the p a r t y as "those people i n p o s i t i o n s of a u t h o r i t y w i t h i n the P a r t y who take the c a p i t a l i s t r o a d . " T h i s phrase was l a t e r used s p e c i f i c a l l y to d e s c r i b e L i u S h a o q i . The f a i l u r e of the S i2M c o d i f e d p o i n t s of disagreement James C . F . Wang, Contemporary Chinese P o l i t i c s :  An I n t r o d u c t i o n (2nd ed . ) , (Englewood C l i f f s , New J e r s y : P r e n t i c e - H a l l , 1985), p. 20. "Appendix F: The Twenty-Three A r t i c l e s , " i n R i c h a r d Baum and F r e d e r i c k Te iwes , S s u - c h ' i n g : The S o c i a l i s t  E d u c a t i o n Movement of 1962-66 ( B e r k e l e y : U n i v e r s i t y of C a l i f o r n i a P r e s s , 1968), p . 120 c i t e d i n D i t t m e r , " L i u 3 h a o - c h i . . . " , p . 57. - 39'.-between L i u and Mao, and s o l i d i f i e d i n Mao's mind the n o t i o n tha t he would have to go o u t s i d e the p a r t y bureaucracy to shake i t up. A l though i t was u n c l e a r e x a c t l y when (or i f ) L i u ' s e x p u l s i o n from h i s posts became an i n t e n t i o n a l supplementary goa l of the GPCR (which was launched l a r g e l y i n response to Mao's b u i l t - u p f r u s t r a t i o n s w i th the p a r t y b u r e a u c r a c y ) , i t seems t h a t , d e s p i t e e a r l i e r d i sagreements , i t was on ly i n 27 January of 1965 that Mao dec ided that L i u had to be removed. L o w e l l Di t tmer observes Chat "the [GPCR] brought L i u S h a o - c h ' i ' s attempts to balance r e v o l u t i o n wi th o r d e r , e q u a l i t y w i th economic e f f i c i e n c y , i n t o d i r e c t c o n f r o n t a t i o n wi th the 28 r e v i v e d f o r c e s of r e v o l u t i o n i n C h i n a . " Mao and the Shanghai group , beg inn ing with a t t a c k s aimed at low l e v e l o f f i c i a l s , soon brought down L i u ' s c l o s e a s s o c i a t e s and f i n a l l y L i u h i m s e l f . They thus succeeded i n r e v e r s i n g the p a r t y ' s o r i g i n a l s u c c e s s i o n arrangements . Mao now took the s u c c e s s i o n q u e s t i o n i n t o h i s own hands. In August 1966, at an "enlarged" ( i . e . padded) s e s s i o n of the E l e v e n t h Plenum of the CC, L i u Shaoqi was demoted from second to e i g h t h p l a c e i n the P o l i t b u r o ^See Schram, p. 292. Other s c h o l a r s ( i n c l u d i n g L o w e l l D i t t m e r ) imply that Mao's change of hear t about L i u was even more g r a d u a l . See D i t t m e r , " L i u S h a o - c h i . . . " , chapters 4 and 5 . 28, 'Dittmer, " L i u S h a o - c h i . . . " , p. 67 - 40 -rank ings and L i n Biao was unanimously promoted as Mao's " f i r s t 29 a s s i s t a n t and s u c c e s s o r . " In 1969, a f t e r much p o l i t i c a l s t r u g g l e , s e l f - c r i t i c i s m , and a f t e r having heard a c c u s a t i o n s (some of them v a l i d ) rang ing from r e v i s i o n i s m to mismanagement of work teams, L i u l o s t h i s par ty membership . 3 ^ The f i r s t h e i r apparent had f a l l e n , but a new one had r i s e n immediate ly to r e p l a c e him. L i n Biao In many r e s p e c t s , a study of L i n B i a o 1 s c a r e e r h i s t o r y i s 31 "akin to s t u d y i n g Chinese Communist h i s t o r y as a whole . L i n , l i k e o t h e r s , but perhaps even to a g r e a t e r ex ten t , e s t a b l i s h e d h i m s e l f p r i m a r i l y i n the m i l i t a r y sphere . In 193L, at the tender age of t w e n t y - f o u r , L i n was appo inted commander of the communist-dominated F i r s t Army C o r p s . In the mid-1930s , L i n p a r t i c i p a t e d i n the Long March at Mao's s i d e . As Thomas Robinson notes , such p a r t i c i p a t i o n became "almost s i n a qua i u , " S e l f - E x a m i n a t i o n " (October 23, 1966), c i t e d i n D i t t m e r , " L i u S h a o - c h i . . . " , p. 95. f u l l d e t a i l s of the pro longed and d i f f i c u l t s t r u g g l e to remove L i u from the p a r t y are omit ted h e r e , but are w e l l e x p l a i n e d i n Chapters four and F ive of D i t t m e r 1 s book and i n o ther s o u r c e s . My concern here i s wi th p r o v i s i o n s f o r s u c c e s s i o n and the f o r c e s which may cause them to d i s i n t e g r a t e . The f a t e of f a l l e n h e i r s i s of l e s s c o n c e r n . "^Thomas W. Rob inson , " L i n Biao as an E l i t e T y p e , " i n Robert A . S c a l p i n o ( e d . ) , E l i t e s i n the P e o p l e ' s  R e p u b l i c of China ( S e a t t l e : U n i v e r s i t y of Washington P r e s s , 1972), p . 150, -.41 -non for p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n the top l e a d e r s h i p a f t e r 1949." Even though, or perhaps because, they worked c l o s e l y t o g e t h e r , L i n and Mao were known to have had d i f f e r e n c e s of o p i n i o n i n t h i s e a r l y p e r i o d . -33- For example, d u r i n g the Yan'an p e r i o d , L i n was r e l i e v e d from f i e l d command d u t i e s because he opposed Mao's i n s i s t e n c e on resuming m i l i t a r y o p e r a t i o n s so s h o r t l y a f t e r the Long March . He then served as p r e s i d e n t of the A n t i - J a p a n e s e M i l i t a r y and P o l i t i c a l U n i v e r s i t y for n e a r l y two y e a r s . L i n was, however, ab le to e s t a b l i s h h i m s e l f as somewhat of a war hero . In the summer of 1937, h i s u n i t was the f i r s t communist f o r c e to defeat a s i z e a b l e group of Japanese i n v a d e r s . L i n i s a l s o c r e d i t e d wi th having c o n t r i b u t e d s i g n i f i c a n t l y to the Red Army's winning s t r a t e g i e s i n the 1945-49 c i v i l war. He a l s o l e n t p o l i t i c a l support to Mao i n the 1942 zhengfeng r e c t i f i c a t i o n movement, e s p e c i a l l y by espous ing the idea of Chinese a d a p t a t i o n of Sov ie t and M a r x i s t p r i n c i p l e s . L i n b r i e f l y served as a r e g i o n a l p a r t y o f f i c i a l a f t e r the 1949 v i c t o r y , but soon veered back i n t o m i l i t a r y s e r v i c e w i th the outbreak of the Korean War. He i s s a i d to 3 2 i b i d . , p. 153. 33xhomas W. Robinson , " L i n Biao" i n W i l l i a m W. Whitson (ed . ) , The M i l i t a r y and P o l i t i c a l Power i n China i n the  19 7 0s (New fork: P r a e g e r , 1972), p. 75 c i t e d i n Rush, p. 266. - 42 -have commanded a c t i v e Chinese "vo lunteer s" i n that c o n f l i c t . L i n s ' e a r l y career i n the CCP and Army, though seemingly t y p i c a l of h i s peers , was i n t e r r u p t e d twice for extended p e r i o d s . In l a t e 1937 or e a r l y 1938, he was i n j u r e d i n b a t t l e and was sent to the USSR to r e c o v e r . While i n R u s s i a , he s t u d i e d and acted as C h i n a ' s Comintern r e p r e s e n t a t i v e before h i s r e t u r n home i n 1942. The cause of L i n ' s second pro longed p e r i o d of i n a c t i v i t y i s l e s s c e r t a i n . He d i d not p a r t i c i p a t e e x t e n s i v e l y i n p u b l i c p o l i t i c a l or m i l i t a r y a f f a i r s d u r i n g the p e r i o d 1933-57. He was s a i d to be s u f f e r i n g from t u b e r c u l o s i s and that i l l n e s s no doubt c o n t r i b u t e d to the l e n g t h of h i s p e r i o d of i n a c t i v i t y . However, the r e p o r t e d immediate cause of h i s i n a c t i v i t y , another war i n j u r y , may have been a f a c e - s a v i n g measure to cover another s t r a t e g i c d isagreement between him and Mao . Al though he was f i f t e e n years younger than Mao, a good age for a s u c c e s s o r , L i n ' s c h r o n i c i l l n e s s c o u l d have d i s q u a l i f i e d him from a successor p o s i t i o n . Overt d isagreements wi th Mao would a l s o tend to d i s q u a l i f y one as a s u c c e s s i o n c a n d i d a t e . However, L i n d i s p l a y e d a unique p a t t e r n of b e h a v i o r i n c o n j u n c t i o n with those d i sagreement s . L i n cont inued to back Mao on major l o y a l t y t e s t s , a t tended important par ty meet ings , and managed to a t t a i n a p o s i t i o n on the P o l i t b u r o d u r i n g h i s p e r i o d of apparent i l l n e s s . Robinson observes that "when L i n -.43 ~ o v e r t l y d i s a g r e e d with Mao, he was immediate ly d i s c i p l i n e d , spent a p e r i o d i n r e l a t i v e d i s g r a c e , and then re-emerged a l l the s t r o n g e r as Mao's s u p p o r t e r . " Mao must have observed t h i s p a t t e r n and accepted the v e r a c i t y of L i n ' s changes of h e a r t , for when L i n r e t u r n e d to g r e a t e r p o l i t i c a l a c t i v i t y i n the l a t e 1950s, he was q u i c k l y awarded prominent p o s i t i o n s . In 1958, L i n was p laced on the S tanding Committee of the P o l i t b u r o . And when Peng Dehuai was ousted from h i s p o s i t i o n as defense m i n i s t e r for h i s o p p o s i t i o n to Mao's GLF economic p o l i c i e s , L i n Biao was chosen to succeed him. L i n ' s v o c a l support for Mao i n c r e a s e d as he pursued p o l i t i c a l reform of the PLA i n the e a r l y 1960s. The s logans "Give Prominence to P o l i t i c s " and " L i v i n g Study and A p p l i c a t i o n of Mao Zedong Thought" were p e r s o n a l l y i n i t i a t e d and implemented by L i n i n t o the d a i l y l i f e of PLA members. As the Army became more p o l i t i c i z e d and more f u l l y under L i n ' s c o n t r o l , the campaign was turned outward. The Army became the model f o r the whole c o u n t r y . M i l i t a r y heroes such as L e i Feng were he ld up for emula t ion; a l l of China was t o l d to "Learn from the PLA". The Army's " p o l i t i c a l work system" Robinson , " L i n Biao as an E l i t e T y p e , " p . 185. - 44 o r g a n i z a t i o n a l s t r u c t u r e was i n t r o d u c e d to s c h o o l s , e n t e r p r i s e s and f a c t o r i e s between 1964 and 1966 under L i n ' s d i r e c t i o n . The L i n - s u p e r v i s e d PLA emulat ion p o r t i o n of the SEM was the most 35 s u c c e s s f u l par t of that campaign. As Mao dec ided that more r a d i c a l methods were needed to r e g a i n c o n t r o l of the p a r t y and to preserve the r e v o l u t i o n , he must have a l s o r e a l i z e d that a l t e r a t i o n of the p r e v i o u s s u c c e s s i o n arrangements was n e c e s s a r y . L a c k i n g f i r m c o n t r o l of c e r t a i n key l e a d e r s i n the p a r t y a p p a r a t u s , Mao i n c r e a s i n g l y r e l i e d on people with whom he had s p e c i a l p e r s o n a l r e l a t i o n s h i p s . Among these , of c o u r s e , was L i n B i a o , h i s defense m i n i s t e r , who had e l e v a t e d Mao Zedong thought to a s p e c i a l p l a c e i n PLA propaganda. Once Mao dec ided that L i u Shaoqi had to go, L i n Biao immediate ly became the new h e i r p r e s u m p t i v e . At the same August 1966 Plenum i n which L i u was f i r s t demoted, L i n was e l e c t e d v i c e - c h a i r m a n of the CC and was d e s i g n a t e d as Chairman Mao's "c lose c o m r a d e - i n - a r m s . " At t h i s meet ing , L i n ' s rank i n the P o l i t b u r o rose from s i x t h to second. Because the jump was so sudden and because L i n had not p r e v i o u s l y he ld any top s t a t e p o s t s , he was l a c k i n g the q u a l i f i c a t i o n s c u s t o m a r i l y he ld by h e i r presumpt ives i n Wang, p. 21. * 45 r-communist s t a t e s . T h i s , coupled wi th the f a c t that the p r e v i o u s h e i r had been so suddenly d i s c r e d i t e d , c r e a t e d a s i t u a t i o n i n which symbol ic r e i n f o r c e m e n t was r e q u i r e d to make L i n ' s new s ta tus c r e d i b l e . T h i s need i s the reason that " L i n ' s b u i l d - u p took on the p r o p o r t i o n s of a minor c u l t , s u b o r d i n a t e t o , and c l o s e l y a s s o c i a t e d with the ex travagant c u l t of Mao, which L i n h imse l f had r a i s e d to new l e v e l s . M a n y photographs and p a i n t i n g s appeared showing L i n a l o n g s i d e the Chairman. L i n Biao was o f t en d e p i c t e d c a r r y i n g a l o f t the " l i t t l e red book". Newpapers f r e q u e n t l y r e p o r t e d t h e i r j o i n t a c t i v i t i e s , and they o f t en r e c e i v e d f o r e i g n d i g n i t a r i e s t o g e t h e r . As the GPCR proceeded, the power and the i n f l u e n c e of the PLA, and thus , L i n ' s p r e s t i g e as defense m i n i s t e r , cont inued to grow. When the Red Guards ' v i o l e n t a t t a c k s on the p a r t y and s t a t e b u r e a u c r a c i e s reached l e v e l s even d i s t a s t e f u l to Mao, the army was c a l l e d upon to i n t e r v e n e . A f t e r a measure of law and order was r e s t o r e d , the PLA's r o l e i n p o l i t i c a l a f f a i r s was i n s t i t u t i o n a l i z e d as i t became one of the three groups i n v o l v e d 3 6 R u s h , p. 266 and Chapter Twelve . 3 7 I b i d . , pp. 266-67. -^The famous book of Mao's q u o t a t i o n s had been p u b l i s h e d on L i n ' s i n i t i a t i v e and i n c l u d e d a foreword w r i t t e n by him. -. 46 r-i i n the p r o v i s i o n a l r e v o l u t i o n a r y committees . L i n thus rode the storm of the GPCR to the peak, of h i s c a r e e r . At the N in th P a r t y Congress i n A p r i l 1969, L i n ' s p o s i t i o n as Mao's successor was o f f i c i a l l y proc la imed i n the new p a r t y c o n s t i t u t i o n . The "Genera l Program" of the document p r o c l a i m e d : Comrade L i n Piao has c o n s i s t e n t l y he ld the great red banner of Mao Zedong thought and has most l o y a l l y and r e s o l u t e l y c a r r i e d out and defended Comrade Mao T s e - t u n g ' s p r o l e t a r i a n r e v o l u t i o n a r y l i n e . Comrade L i n Piao i s Comrade Mao T s e - t u n g ' s c l o s e comrade i n arms and s u c c e s s o r . T h i s c o n s t i t u t i o n a l d e s i g n a t i o n of an h e i r was without precedent i n the 'communist world and was o b v i o u s l y meant to he lp l e g i t i m i z e L i n ' s c l a i m to the s u c c e s s i o n . Mao h i m s e l f , however, has never been p e r s o n a l l y quoted as say ing that L i n was to be h i s s u c c e s s o r , and no o f f i c e i s mentioned to which L i n was supposed to have s u c c e e d e d . ^ These omiss ions may be due to ve teran cadre r e s i s t a n c e to L i n ' s p r o m o t i o n . .Some a n a l y s t s have suggested that Mao had doubts about h i s cho ice of 3 9 S e e the Peking Review, A p r i l 30, 1969, p. 36. on ly s p e c i f i c p a r t y posts mentioned i n the 1969 c o n s t i t u t i o n are those of chairman and v i c e - c h a i r m a n . These were he ld at the time by Mao and L i n , r e s p e c t i v e l y , so one would i n f e r that L i n was to succeed to the cha irmansh ip of the p a r t y . See Rush, p. 268. - 47 L i n even from t h i s e a r l y d a t e . The p e r t i n e n t q u e s t i o n then becomes why d i d Mao choose L i n to be h i s s u c c e s s o r , and who was most r e s p o n s i b l e for the growth of the c u l t which s h e l t e r e d L i n ' s r i d e to the top? Mao Zedong's cho ice of L i n Biao as s u cces s or immediate ly f o l l o w i n g the demotion of L i u Shaoqi may at f i r s t g lance seem r a t h e r odd. The unprecedented d e s i g n a t i o n of a m i l i t a r y man who was without s i g n i f i c a n t p a r t y or s ta t e b u r e a u c r a t i c e x p e r i e n c e to the h e i r ' s p o s i t i o n seems, i n r e t r o s p e c t , l i k e a p a r t i c u l a r l y dangerous move. Was t h i s not an i n v i t a t i o n for a coup d ' e t a t ? However, whi l e s u c c e s s i o n p r o v i s i o n s are presumably aimed at s t a b i l i t y , d i s r u p t i o n came to be somewhat of v i r t u e at the dawn of the GPCR. Myron Rush o f f e r s three p o s s i b l e (and m u t u a l l y compat ib l e ) motives for Mao's d e c i s i o n to e l e v a t e L i n that are c o n s i s t e n t w i th the mood of that p e r i o d F i r s t , i t cou ld have been that Mao thought i t necessary to d e s i g n a t e L i n as successor to ensure h i s l o y a l t y d u r i n g the a n t i c i p a t e d d i s r u p t i o n of the GPCR. Because Mao's i n f l u e n c e i n the L i u - c o n t r o l l e d bureaucracy had waned, support of the ^ S e e , f o r example, Franz M i c h a e l , "China A f t e r the C u l t u r a l R e v o l u t i o n : The Unreso lved S u c c e s s i o n C r i s i s , " O r b i s 18 ( S p r i n g 1973), p .324 . 4 2 R u s h , p. 265. -. 48 -m i l i t a r y s e c t o r would have been i m p e r a t i v e f o r Mao's bo ld i n i t i a t i v e s to succeed . Second, Mao c l e a r l y f e l t that he d i d not have much time l e f t . He had r e c o g n i z e d the need for s u c c e s s i o n arrangements as much as ten years e a r l i e r . I f Mao d i e d d u r i n g the t u r m o i l of the GPCR, the regime cou ld c o n c e i v a b l y be s a f e s t i n the hands of a m i l i t a r y man. A g a i n , we see ev idence of Mao's own r e c o g n i t i o n of h i s important s t a b i l i z i n g i n f l u e n c e as a h e r o i c l e a d e r . He may have surmised that h i s depar ture would cause such a c r i s i s or r e v e r s a l of h i s p o l i c i e s that on ly the f i r m hand of the PLA c o u l d m a i n t a i n c o n t r o l . F i n a l l y , Mao may have thought that L i n ' s l o y a l t y to "Mao Zedong Thought" would a l l o w the best chance for the C h a i r m a n 1 s own idea of cont inuous r e v o l u t i o n to predominate . Of the p e r s o n a l a s s o c i a t e s that were l o y a l to Mao on the eve of the GPCR, on ly L i n had a p o l i t i c a l l y u s e f u l power base of h i s own. He a l s o had a proven r e c o r d i n molding the thoughts of the masses. He was l a r g e l y r e s p o n s i b l e f o r how Mao was p e r c e i v e d among the people at that time and thus c o u l d serve as a v a l u a b l e condui t of Mao's r e v o l u t i o n a r y i n i t i a t i v e s . Was L i n ' s a s s o c i a t i o n wi th the c u l t of Mao a d e l i b e r a t e attempt by Mao to c u l t i v a t e L i n ' s p r e s t i g e or d i d L i n p u r p o s e f u l l y r i d e the c u l t phenomenon to i t s peak, to s o l i d i f y h i s own p o s i t i o n i n case Mao once more changed h i s mind about the s u c c e s s o r s h i p ? I n i t i a l l y , i t seemed that the former was at l e a s t a p a r t i a l e x p l a n a t i o n . As the GPCR began, L i n ' s h u m i l i t y 49. -and l o y a l t y to Mao, as p u b l i c l y expressed at l e a s t , was unwavering: We must not oppose but f i r m l y f o l l o w the Chairman. He g ives o v e r a l l c o n s i d e r a t i o n to problems; he i s f a r s i g h t e d . What i s more, he has h i s i d e a s , many of which we do not u n d e r -s t a n d . We must r e s o l u t e l y c a r r y out Mao's i n s t r u c t i o n s whether we unders tand them or n o t . I have no t a l e n t ; I r e l y on the wisdom of the masses, and do e v e r y t h i n g a c c o r d i n g to the Chairman's d i r e c t i v e s . The C e n t r a l Committee has g i v e n me a task and I know that I am not equa l to i t . I have thought of i t many t imes . But s i n c e the Chairman and the C e n t r a l Committee have made t h e i r d e c i s i o n , I can on ly submit mysel f to i t and t r y my best to do my t a s k . In the meantime, I am prepared to hand i t over to a more s u i t a b l e c o m r a d e . 4 3 T h i s " h u m i l i t y " can be read as a f u r t h e r attempt by L i n to l e g i t i m i z e h i s new r o l e . In Chinese c u l t u r e , a degree of (sometimes f a l s e ) h u m i l i t y i s p r o p e r l y d i s p l a y e d by g i v i n g a l l c r e d i t to one's teacher or mentor . T h i s does not prec lude an inward sense of accomplishment or an a s p i r a t i o n to g a i n a h igher p o s i t i o n . That L i n ' s l a c k of p e r s o n a l a m b i t i o n here expressed was not t o t a l l y h e a r f e l t was p a r t i a l l y r e v e a l e d i n the very same speech c i t e d above. L i n s t a t e d that "I do not i n t e r f e r e w i th him [MaoJ on major problems, nor do I t r o u b l e 4 3 L i n ' s speech at the August 1966 Plenum of the CC, JPRS, p. 17, c i t e d i n I b i d . , p. 270. - 50 -him with s m a l l m a t t e r s . " L i n ' s comments are sugges t ive of the "two l i n e s " approach that was mentioned e a r l i e r wi th r e s p e c t to L i u S h a o q i . A p p a r e n t l y U n d e s i r e d to keep Mao on the second l i n e j u s t as Mao's program to p u l l h i m s e l f f i r m l y back i n t o the f i r s t l i n e was g e t t i n g underway. I f L i n B i a o ' s ambi t ions were somewhat ambiva lent as the GPCR got underway, they became more c l e a r as time wore on. By the time of the N in th P a r t y Congress i n A p r i l 1969, n e a r l y h a l f of the CC members were m i l i t a r y p e r s o n n e l and at l e a s t e i g h t of n i n e t e e n P o l i t b u r o members were l o y a l to L i n . ^ T h i s s i t u a t i o n , exacerbated by the P L A ' s e a r l y dominance of the newly-formed r e v o l u t i o n a r y committees , c l e a r l y made Chairman Mao u n c o m f o r t a b l e . Heated , unmediated c o n f l i c t s between Mao and L i n became i n c r e a s i n g l y common. T e l l i n g l y , these c o n f l i c t s were foreshadowed at the N i n t h P a r t y Congress when L i n ' s p o l i t i c a l r e p o r t was r e p l a c e d wi th one f a v o r e d by Mao. By 1970, Mao had begun to take a c t i o n . The p a r t y s t r u c t u r e was being r e b u i l t , i n p a r t , as a counterweight to the P L A ' s d i s p r o p o r t i o n a t e i n f l u e n c e i n the r e v o l u t i o n a r y committees . In September, at a plenum i n Lushan , the two l e a d e r s ' d i f f e r e n c e s f i r s t became w i d e l y known among the ^ E i g h t members were l a t e r purged i n c o n j u n c t i o n wi th L i n ' s a l l e g e d p l o t a g a i n s t Mao. - 51 -Chinese e l i t e as they c la shed over c e r t a i n p r o v i s i o n s i n the s t a t e c o n s t i t u t i o n . L i n a p p a r e n t l y d e s i r e d the c r e a t i o n of an o f f i c e of S ta te Chairman to usurp Zhou E n l a i ' s p o s i t i o n as premier of the State C o u n c i l . T e c h n i c a l l y , L i n was s t i l l s u b o r d i n a t e to Zhou at that time and t h e r e f o r e d e s i r e d to take over the top spot i n the s ta t e s t r u c t u r e . Mao re fused t h i s p r o p o s a l and r e l i e d on Zhou as a s o r t of " c o u n t e r h e i r - - a powerfu l l e a d e r whose f u n c t i o n i t i s to prevent the h e i r from r e a c h i n g out for h i s i n h e r i t a n c e p r e m a t u r e l y . T h e two l e a d e r s a l s o d i s a g r e e d over the q u e s t i o n of Mao's "genius" . L i n d e s i r e d to r e v i v e the s p i r i t of the GPCR by c a n o n i z i n g the "genius" of Mao i n the s t a t e c o n s t i t u t i o n . Mao r e c o g n i z e d the p o l i t i c a l i m p l i c a t i o n s of t h i s request ( L i n had a s s o c i a t e d h i m s e l f c l o s e l y wi th the c u l t of Mao) and re fused i t . These events at Lushan prompted the Chairman to reasses s h i s v i c e - c h a i r m a n ' s l o y a l t i e s and p o l i c y p r e f e r e n c e s . Mao l a t e r d e s c r i b e d the Lushan Plenum as "a s t r u g g l e between two h e a d q u a r t e r s . " ^ Al though Mao had become d i s c o n t e n t wi th what he p e r c e i v e d " R u s h , p. 273. See "Summary of Chairman Mao's T a l k s to R e s p o n s i b l e L o c a l Cadres During His Tour of I n s p e c t i o n " (Document No. 12 of the CC and of the C C P ) , t r a n s l a t i o n i n M i c h a e l iT.M. Kau , ed . , The L i n P iao A f f a i r : Power, P o l i t i c s and M i l i t a r y Coup (White P l a i n s , New fork: I n t e r n a t i o n a l A r t s and Sc i ences P r e s s , 1975), pp. 55-66. - 52 r to be L i n ' s exce s s ive a m b i t i o n , L i n , l i k e L i u before him, had become f i r m l y entrenched wi th h i s own bases of power. Thus , Mao once aga in had to take an i n i t i a l l y c a u t i o u s , i n d i r e c t approach to undermine h i s h e i r ' s p o s i t i o n . F i r s t , Mao made sweeping personne l changes on the p a r t y ' s M i l i t a r y A f f a i r s Commission which had p r e v i o u s l y been packed wi th L i n s u p p o r t e r s . Mao then i n i t i a t e d a p o l i t i c a l campaign to c r i t i c i z e L i n ' s a l l y , Chen Boda. F i n a l l y , before c o n f r o n t i n g L i n d i r e c t l y , Mao r e o r g a n i z e d the key B e i j i n g M i l i t a r y r e g i o n and made a tour of other m i l i t a r y r e g i o n s to ensure the l o y a l t y of l e a d i n g o f f i c e r s . R e c o g n i z i n g that the Chairman had "become uneasy about u s , " L i n and h i s s u p p o r t e r s began to develop p lans for a m i l i t a r y coup i n case the s t r u g g l e reached a c r i t i c a l s t a g e . 4 7 L i n L i g u o , L i n B i a o ' s son and deputy d i r e c t o r of A i r Force o p e r a t i o n s , was chosen to d i r e c t the coup's o r g a n i z a t i o n and p l a n n i n g . The p lan was code named " P r o j e c t 571"; the numbers are a Chinese homonym for "armed u p r i s i n g " . P lans were a l s o made to a s s a s s i n a t e Mao whi le he was on an i n s p e c t i o n tour i n the Shanghai a r e a . However, r e p o r t s i n d i c a t e that L i n ' s daughter r e v e a l e d the p l o t to Zhou finlai i n • 7See "The S t r u g g l e of Smashing the C o u n t e r -r e v o l u t i o n a r y Coup of the L i n - C h ' e n A n t i - P a r t y C l i q u e , " t r a n s l a t i o n i n Issues and S t u d i e s , 8 (May 1972), p p . 7 8 - 8 3 . r- 53 -time for Mao to avo id the s t r i k e . Having l e a r n e d of the d i s r u p t i o n of t h e i r p l o t , L i n , h i s w i f e , t h e i r son and s e v e r a l o thers boarded an A i r Force j e t and headed for the USSR. A c c o r d i n g to o f f i c i a l PRC s o u r c e s , the plane crashed i n the e a r l y morning hours of 13 September 1971 i n M o n g o l i a , k i l l i n g 48 a l l n ine persons on b o a r d . The s u r v i v i n g c o l l a b o r a t o r s were q u i c k l y d i s m i s s e d from o f f i c e and a r r e s t e d . For the two years f o l l o w i n g h i s death (and d u r i n g the p e r i o d immediate ly b e f o r e ) , L i n Biao was never c r i t i c i z e d p u b l i c l y by name. He was r e f e r r e d to by such t i t l e s as " p o l i t i c a l sw ind ler l i k e L i u S h a o q i , " " t r a i t o r " and "ambit ious c a r e e r i s t " . It was not u n t i l the Tenth P a r t y Congress i n August 1973 that L i n was e x p l i c i t l y i d e n t i f i e d wi th h i s misdeeds . Subsequent ly , a n a t i o n - w i d e campaign to c r i t i c i z e L i n Biao and Confuc ius was l a u n c h e d . L i n was c h a r a c t e r i z e d as a modern-day Confuc ius and a member of the s lave -owning l a n d l o r d bourgeo i s c l a s s . B r o a d l y s p e a k i n g , L i n ' s a l l e g e d cr imes f e l l i n t o two c a t e g o r i e s . F i r s t , he d e v i a t e d from the p o l i c y set by Mao and the p a r t y , and second, he was g u i l t y of p e r s o n a l a m b i t i o n and c o n s p i r a c y f o r p e r s o n a l power. As ^ A l t h o u g h d e t a i l s of these events are s c a r c e , most of the o f f i c i a l v e r s i o n of t h i s s t o r y i s g e n e r a l l y accepted as a c c u r a t e . Whether the coup or a s s a s s i n a t i o n were a c t u a l l y attempted remains open to some q u e s t i o n . ^ K a u , pp. x x v - x x v i . ~ 54 Kau o b s e r v e s The d o c u m e n t a t i o n of the c a s e . . . d o e s not c o n v i n c i n g l y s u p p o r t the argument t h a t t h e at t e m p t e d coup by L i n a g a i n s t Mao was prompted c h i e f l y by a p r o f o u n d d i v e r g e n c e i n p o l i c y o r i e n t a t i o n between the two. The t h r u s t of the cas e a p p e a r s m a i n l y to have been t h e power s t r u g g l e among the key i n d i v i d u a l p o l i t i c a l a c t o r s and co m p e t i n g i n s t i t u t i o n a l f o r c e s l e d by Mao and L i n r e s p e c t i v e l y . However, p o l i c y d i v e r g e n c e s seem to ha v e . . . p r o v i d e d an i d e o l o g i c a l and p o l i c y c o n t e x t f o r power s t r u g g l e . . . ^ 0 A g a i n p r o v i s i o n s f o r l e a d e r s h i p s u c c e s s i o n were u p r o o t e d a t c o n s i d e r a b l e c o s t . The demise of a s u c c e s s o r c h o s e n on a r a t h e r p e r s o n a l b a s i s was more d r a m a t i c t h a n t h a t of a c o n s e n s u s c a n d i d a t e . A g a i n a purge of p a r t y p e r s o n n e l was n e c e s s a r y to o u s t an h e i r p r e s u m p t i v e whose c o n t r o l o v e r a key i n s t i t u t i o n s t o o d i n the way of Mao's s h i f t i n g o b j e c t i v e s A c r u c i a l a l l i a n c e between two p o w e r f u l l e a d e r s d i s s o l v e d when th e p r o t e g e ' s a m b i t i o n o v e r r e a c h e d h i s m e n t o r ' s t o l e r a n c e . T w i c e u n s u c c e s s f u l i n c h o o s i n g a p e r s o n a l s u c c e s s o r , Mao's s t r a t e g y t h e n t u r n e d to m e d i a t i n g between the two g e n e r a l I b i d . , p. x x v i . Note t h a t the "571 P r o j e c t " o u t l i n e d i d i n c l u d e m e n t i o n of some p o l i c y g r i e v a n c e s which L i n had w i t h Mao ( i . e . S o v i e t p o l i c y and Mao's mismanagement of economic p o l i c i e s ) . For a p o l i c y - c e n t e r e d a p p r o a c h , see J u r g e n Domes, "The C h i n e s e L e a d e r s h i p C r i s i s : Doom of an H e i r ? , " 0 r b i s 18 ( F a l l 1973), pp. 863-79. ^ F o r e a r l y , y e t t h o r o u g h , e v a l u a t i o n of L i n ' s f a l l , see P h i l i p Bridgham, "The F a l l of L i n P i a o , " The C h i n a Q u a r t e r l y ( J u l y - S e p t e m b e r 1973), pp. 427-49. Bridgham e m p h a s i z e s p a r a l l e l s between L i u ' s and L i n ' s f a l l s from g r a c e . f a c t i o n a l groupings l e f t w i t h i n the r u l i n g e l i t e . He a l s o began to reemphasize a concept that had been i n t r o d u c e d much e a r l i e r ; there was a d i r e need for a whole g e n e r a t i o n of r e v o l u t i o n a r y s u c c e s s o r s . Wang Hongwen and a Successor G e n e r a t i o n The c r u c i a l r o l e of the r i s i n g g e n e r a t i o n of l e a d e r s h i p was c l e a r l y a concern of the CCP e l i t e from the e a r l y days of the P e o p l e ' s R e p u b l i c . A f t e r the Gao Gang d i s p u t e was s e t t l e d at the E i g h t h P a r t y Congress i n 1956, the p a r t y undertook e x t e n s i v e r e c r u i t m e n t of new members. The consequences of t h i s r e c r u i t m e n t d r i v e w o r r i e d the aging l e a d e r s . By 1961, e i g h t y percent of the seventeen m i l l i o n members of the CCP had j o i n e d the p a r t y a f t e r 1949 and many of these had assumed l e a d i n g posts at l o c a l l e v e l s when r u r a l communes were e s t a b l i s h e d i n 53 1958. The l e a d e r s of the r e v o l u t i o n f eared that these r i s i n g cadres would l a c k the necessary r e v o l u t i o n a r y s p i r i t to s u s t a i n the progression to communism. W i l l i a m F . D o r r i l l observed i n 1965 t h a t : ;Mao and h i s l i e u t e n a n t s , s e n s i t i v e to the l e s sons of h i s t o r y , are m i n d f u l of the e r o d i n g e f f e c t s of time on other r e v o l u t i o n a r y movements. • 152 i . e . b e n e f i c i a r i e s of the GPCR and the more moderate s u p p o r t e r s of Zhou E n l a i . 53 John Wi l son Lewi s , " R e v o l u t i o n a r y S t r u g g l e and the Second G e n e r a t i o n i n Communist C h i n a , " The China Q u a r t e r l y ( J a n u a r y - M a r c h 1965), p. 139. 56 -In p a r t i c u l a r , they are g e n u i n e l y d i s t u r b e d at what they c o n s i d e r the c o r r u p t i o n and d e g e n e r a t i o n of S o v i e t s o c i e t y , which they b e l i e v e t h r e a t e n s to r e s t o r e c a p i t a l i s m i n the U S S R . . . F o r a long t ime , top P a r t y l e a d e r s had f eared that the younger g e n e r a t i o n , untes ted i n war and u n s t e e l e d by the h a r d s h i p s of the Long March of the Yenan caves , would f a i l to a p p r e c i a t e f u l l y the accomplishments of the r e v o l u t i o n - or even be l u r e d from the c o r r e c t but arduous path of s t r u g g l e by the c o r r u p t i n g i n f l u e n c e s of c a p i t a l i s m and " r e v i s i o n i s m " The p e r c e i v e d need to c u l t i v a t e a g e n e r a t i o n of r e v o l u t i o n a r y s u c c e s s o r s who had been p o l i t i c i z e d and p u r i f i e d through s t r u g g l e was c l e a r l y part of Mao Zedong's m o t i v a t i o n i n l a u n c h i n g the SEM and s u b s e q u e n t l y , the GPCR. Perhaps spurred to a c t i o n by the December 1963 speech i n which U . S . A s s i s t a n t S e c r e t a r y of State Roger Hi lsman assured h i s countrymen that a "more s o p h i s t i c a t e d second eche lon of l e a d e r s h i p " was r i s i n g i n China and that e v o l u t i o n a r y change c o u l d " e v e n t u a l l y p r o f o u n d l y erode the present s imple view wi th which the l e a d e r s h i p regards the w o r l d , " the B e i j i n g regime began to i n t e n s i f y i t s e f f o r t s to d e a l wi th g e n e r a t i o n t r a n s f e r s . ^ In 1964, f i v e P o l i t b u r o members at tended the N i n t h N a t i o n a l Congress of the Communist Youth League ( C Y L ) ; they c a l l e d f o r new measures to win over -^-William F . D o r r i l l , "Leadersh ip and S u c c e s s i o n i n .Communist C h i n a , " Current H i s t o r y 49 (September 1965), pp. 131 133 . 55u . S . Department of S ta te B u l l e t i n , V o l . L . , No. 1280, January 6, 1964, pp. 13-14 c i t e d i n i b i d . , p . 133. -,57 -youth and warned of the t h r e a t of r e v i s i o n i s m . In August of the same y e a r , a Renmin Ribao f r o n t page e d i t o r i a l d e c l a r e d that s u c c e s s o r s must be chosen on the bas i s of p o l i t i c a l a t t i t u d e s and c l a s s o r i g i n s , and then tempered through c l a s s s t r u g g l e s and r e c t i f i c a t i o n campaigns . F i v e c r i t e r i a were e s t a b l i s h e d to determine the wor th ines s of s u c c e s s o r s : they must be genuine M a r x i s t - L e n i n i s t s ; t rue r e v o l u t i o n a r i e s ; humble, prudent and capable of s e l f - c r i t i c i s m ; p r o l e t a r i a n workers who can r a l l y and work wi th the m a j o r i t y ; and they must be p r a c t i t i o n e r s of the p a r t y ' s system of democrat i c c e n t r a l i s m . In 1965, the p a r t y launched a number of a t t a c k s a g a i n s t p o l i t i c a l l y dev iant i n t e l l e c t u a l s . The purpose of these a t t a c k s was presumably to c r e a t e an environment of c l a s s s t r u g g l e and to prevent the r i s i n g g e n e r a t i o n from being l ed a s t r a y . The scope of these a t t a c k s g r a d u a l l y widened and, by 1966, many of the younger g e n e r a t i o n were indeed i n v o l v e d i n v i o l e n t s t r u g g l e . Concern over d w i n d l i n g r e v o l u t i o n a r y f e r v o r had c o n t r i b u t e d to one of the most d i s r u p t i v e s o c i a l upheavals of modern t i m e s . A l though u l t i m a t e l y the e f f o r t to i n s t i l l Mao's r e v o l u t i o n a r y i d e a l s i n the h e a r t s of C h i n a ' s youth was c o u n t e r - p r o d u c t i v e , the GPCR d i d a l l o w f o r the r i s e of many zealous young cadres w i t h i n the p a r t y r a n k s . The most we l l -known of the cadres who were r a p i d l y promoted d u r i n g the GPCR a r e , of c o u r s e , the four f a v o r i t e s of Mao who l a t e r became - 58 -known p e j o r a t i v e l y as the "gang of f o u r " . Zhang Chunqiao , J i a n g Q i n g , Yao Wenyuan and Wang Hongwen may never have been s e r i o u s l y c o n s i d e r e d as p e r s o n a l s u c c e s s o r s by Mao. However, they d i d p lay a key r o l e i n f a c t i o n a l p o l i t i c s i n the p e r i o d 1966-76 and r e p r e s e n t e d one of the groups which Mao t r i e d to accommodate d u r i n g h i s f i n a l decade. Of the f o u r , Wang was the youngest and thus became a symbol and key proponent of Mao's d r i v e for r e v o l u n t i o n a r y s u c c e s s o r s . Wang Hongwen was born to a poor peasant f a m i l y i n K i r i n i n 1937 and j o i n e d the PLA as a y o u t h . A f t e r d i s c h a r g e , he served as a j u n i o r cadre i n the Shanghai No. 17 C o t t o n T e x t i l e F a c t o r y S e c u r i t y Department . It was there that he a s s i s t e d Zhang Chunqiao i n m o b i l i z i n g worker support f o r Zhang's s e i z u r e of power i n Shanghai i n e a r l y 1967. T h i s l o y a l t y to Zhang, and thus to Mao, served Wang w e l l . H i s enthusiasm alone seemingly brought him i n t o the p r e s i d i u m of the N i n t h N a t i o n a l Par ty Congress and gave him membership on the N i n t h C C i n 1969. Deng X i a o p i n g once r e f e r r e d to such young upwardly mobi le cadres as " h e l i c o p t e r s " because of t h e i r sudden upward movement i n the p a r t y a p p a r a t u s . Indeed, by the Tenth N a t i o n a l Congress i n 1973, Wang was on the P o l i t b u r o ranked t h i r d behind on ly Zhou E n l a i and Mao h i m s e l f . Dur ing the GPCR, the r e v o l u t i o n a r y committees comprised of PLA, Red Guards and P a r t y r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s were l a b e l l e d as a t h r e e - i n - o n e l e a d e r s h i p system. A f t e r the f a l l of L i n B i a o , - 59 -t h i s t h r e e - i n - o n e formula came to r e p r e s e n t a new mode of r u l e ; Mao's newly a f f i r m e d c e n t r a l i z e d l e a d e r s h i p was to be supported by a combinat ion of the young, the o l d and the m i d d l e - a g e d . A l l f i v e of the v i c e - c h a i r m e n chosen at the Tenth N a t i o n a l P a r t y Congress ( i n rank o r d e r : Zhou E n l a i , Wang Hongwen, Kang Sheng, Ye J i a n y i n g and L i Desheng) , a c c o r d i n g to Mao, 56 r e p r e s e n t e d succes sors or a p p r e n t i c e s . O s t e n s i b l y , the three age-groups were r e p r e s e n t e d w i t h i n t h i s smal l e l i t e . The o l d e r cadres would be expected to t r a i n the young, whi l e young cadres (on ly Wang i n t h i s s m a l l group) "warmly pledged to l e a r n most ly from the s t rong p o i n t s of the ve teran cadres .""* 7 At t h i s c o n g r e s s , Wang was the most outspoken advocate of the renewed c a l l f or the c u l t i v a t i o n of " m i l l i o n s " of r e v o l u t i o n a r y s u c c e s s o r s needed to p a r t i c i p a t e i n f u t u r e c u l t u r a l r e v o l u t i o n s . He had, by v i r t u e of h i s age ( t h i r t y - f i v e ) , en thus iasm, and e x p e r i e n c e , become the symbol ic p r o t o t y p e of the young l e a d e r s the par ty was being t o l d to r e c r u i t . The make-up of the CCP e l i t e bodies of the Tenth N a t i o n a l Congress r e p r e s e n t e d a ba lance between the s u p p o r t e r s of Zhou E n l a i , whose he lp Mao needed i n r e b u i l d i n g the c e n t r a l p a r t y a p p a r a t u s , and the s u p p o r t e r s of the Shanghai group (gang Issues and S tud ie s 10 (January 19 7 4 ) , p. 37 5 7 I b i d . - 60 .„ of f o u r ) who, to Mao, r e p r e s e n t e d a f u t u r e source of c u l t u r a l 58 r e v o l u t i o n s and a c o n s t r a i n t on b u r e a u c r a t i c s e l f - s a t i s f a c t i o n . The two groups were b i t t e r l y opposed d u r i n g the GPCR, found compromise i m p o s s i b l e , and c o n t i n u e d to compete f o r Mao's ear and i n f l u e n c e . At the t ime , many China-watchers saw t h i s ' d i a l e c t i c a l b a l a n c i n g act as ev idence that Mao had, a f t e r two d i s a s t r o u s f a i l u r e s , g i v e n up on the i d e a of l e a v i n g behind a p e r s o n a l s u c c e s s o r . That Mao a p p a r e n t l y would, at the e l e v e n t h hour , anno int a t h i r d p e r s o n a l succes sor to c a r r y on h i s b a l a n c i n g act i s i n d i c a t i v e of h i s deep concern for the f u t u r e of the r e v o l u t i o n and h i s d e s i r e to m o l l i f y the shock that 59 would l i k e l y ( i n h i s e s t i m a t i o n ) f o l l o w h i s d e a t h . That Hua Guofeng would t u r n out to be the l e a s t powerfu l of Mao's three c h o i c e s serves to underscore the depth of the d i f f i c u l t i e s encountered by a h e r o i c or n a t i o n - b u i l d i n g c h a r i s m a t i c l e a d e r i n p r o v i d i n g for h i s own s u c c e s s i o n . Hua Guofeng The p e r i o d from the f a l l of L i n Biao i n 1971 to Mao's 5*The v i s u a l and symbol ic d imensions of t h i s b a l a n c i n g act are c o n c i s e l y conveyed i n Rush, p. 277. 5 %h at Mao indeed d e s i r e d that Hua succeed him i s s t i l l a debatab le p o i n t , a l though most ev idence suggests that t h i s was h i s i n t e n t i o n . 61 death i n 1976 has o f t en been c h a r a c t e r i z e d as one of s t r u g g l e between two groups j o s t l i n g for a succes sor p o s i t i o n i n e x p e c t a t i o n of Mao's d e p a r t u r e . In many ways, the p o l i t i c a l debate of t h i s p e r i o d was a c o n t i n u a t i o n of the "pragmatism v . r e v o l u t i o n a r y p u r i t y " themes of the GPCR and a d i s c u s s i o n about which of the three age groups mentioned above would predominate a f t e r Mao's d e a t h . S ince L i n B i a o ' s cr imes had t a r n i s h e d the r e p u t a t i o n of the GPCR, h i s depar ture f a c i l i t a t e d the r e t u r n to power of many v e t e r a n cadres who had been purged e a r l i e r . Most prominent among these was Deng X i a o p i n g . Promoted by Zhou E n l a i , and at l e a s t acqu ie sced to by Mao, Deng's r e h a b i l i t a t i o n i n 1973 was r e q u i r e d to b o l s t e r the a n t i - L i n f o r c e s , p r o v i d e p a r t y a d m i n i s t r a t i o n t a l e n t and m i l i t a r y s u p p o r t , and to p r o v i d e 60 a s s i s t a n c e for the a i l i n g Premier (Zhou) . Indeed, d u r i n g Zhou's extended h o s p i t a l i z a t i o n (1974-76) , Deng X i a o p i n g i n c r e a s i n g l y took over the d a y - t o - d a y a d m i n i s t r a t i o n of the p a r t y . The "Campaign to C r i t i c i z e L i n Biao and C o n f u c i u s " , d i r e c t e d by the Shanghai group through the p r e s s , was aimed at cadres f a v o r i n g " r i g h t i s t r e s t o r a t i o n " , namely Zhou E n l a i and Deng X i a o p i n g . The r e h a b i l i t a t e d v e t e r a n cadres cont inued to g a i n power, however, and the campaign pe tered out i n the summer 6 0 p a r r i s H . Chang, Mao's L a s t S t a n d , " Problems of  Communism 25 ( J u l y - A u g u s t 1976), pp. 1-17. - 62 of 1974. The d e c i s i o n s r e g a r d i n g r e i n v i g o r a t i o n of the economy reached at the January 1975 meetings of the CC and the N a t i o n a l P e o p l e ' s Congress d i d not p lease Mao. He boycot ted the 61 meetings to demonstrate h i s d i s p l e a s u r e . Presumably , he was w a i t i n g to act a g a i n s t the v e t e r a n cadres who had upset the ba lance he was t r y i n g to m a i n t a i n . The death of Zhou E n l a i on 8 January 1976 p r o v i d e d an o p p o r t u n i t y to r e s t o r e that b a l a n c e . P a r r i s Chang notes that Zhou's death seems to have p r e c i p i t a t e d events by removing whatever c o n s t r a i n t s h i s presence had imposed on Mao and the r a d i c a l l e a d e r s and e n a b l i n g them to po^i t the spearhead of s t r u g g l e d i r e c t l y a t [Deng]. I f Deng were apo in ted premier at t h i s j u n c t u r e , he cou ld have c o n c e i v a b l y l a i d c l a i m to the s u c c e s s i o n to Mao; the balance 6 ^ Mao was t r y i n g to preserve would have been permanently e r a s e d . T h e r e f o r e , Mao acted q u i c k l y i n o p p o s i t i o n to a P o l i t b u r o m a j o r i t y and appointed Hua Guofeng as a c t i n g p r e m i e r . T h i s can be seen as a d e f e n s i v e move, perhaps on ly meant as a s top-gap measure. A f t e r d e l i v e r i n g the eulogy at Zhou's f u n e r a l , Deng X i a o p i n g d i s a p p e a r e d from p u b l i c l i f e . In A p r i l , (following the I D X d . , p . 6. 6 2 I b i d . , p . 11. k^In the long r u n , t h i s i s , i n e f f e c t , what happened, a l though Deng never a c t u a l l y became p r e m i e r . - 63 -Tienanmen i n c i d e n t i n which thousands of Zhou's mourners demonstarted i n favor of p o l i c i e s espoused by Zhou and Deng, Deng was d i s m i s s e d from a l l posts f o r the second time i n h i s l i f e . Hua was s i m u l t a n e o u s l y named premier of the S ta te C o u n c i l and r a n k i n g v i c e - c h a i r m a n of the p a r t y . In terms of age (56 i n 1976), Hua Guofeng perhaps a p t l y re-presented Mao's d e s i r e for y o u t h f u l r e v o l u t i o n a r y s u c c e s s o r s . He had been s u p p o r t i v e of the cha irman' s i n i t i a t i v e s at v a r i o u s t imes i n h i s c a r e e r . He had s i d e d wi th Mao on c o l l e c t i v i z a t i o n , the SEM, and d u r i n g the L i n Biao a f f a i r . In f a c t , the two may have developed a p e r s o n a l r e l a t i o n s h i p through p e r i o d i c contac t d u r i n g c e r t a i n s p e c i a l p r o j e c t s ' . ^ Whi le working on these p r o j e c t s , Hua demonstrated v a l u a b l e problem s o l v i n g a b i l i t i e s . At the time of h i s appointment as p r e m i e r , i t seemed that Hua would l i k e l y be ab le to draw support from two groups w i t h i n the e l i t e . As a b e n e f i c i a r y of the GPCR, he was committed to cont inuous r e v o l u t i o n and was a p o t e n t i a l pa tron of the p a r t y members who rose d u r i n g that e r a . On the o ther hand, as a competent r e g i o n a l o f f i c i a l who had a l s o served as m i n i s t e r of p u b l i c s e c u r i t y and had a l s o p u b l i c l y supported Zhou's m o d e r n i z a t i o n d r i v e , Hua l i k e l y found 6%ichel Oksenberg and Sa i - cheung Yeung, "Hua Guo- feng ' s P r e - C u l t u r a l R e v o l u t i o n Hunan Y e a r s , 1949-66: The Making of a P o l i t i c a l G e n e r a l i s t , " The China Q u a r t e r l y 69 (March 1977), p. 53 . - 64 support among ve terans l i k e Ye J i a n y i n g and L i X i a n n i a n . These l e a d e r s p r e f e r r e d a p o l i c y d i r e c t i o n somewhere between that espoused by the Shanghai group and the m o d e r n i z a t i o n s t r a t e g y of Zhou and Deng. To them, Hua seemed l i k e an a c c e p t a b l e , and perhaps p l i a b l e , compromise c h o i c e . But even at the time of Hua's appointment , there were i n d i c a t i o n s that he might l a c k the necessary q u a l i f i c a t i o n s to m a i n t a i n any s o r t of balance between the young l e f t and v e t e r a n c a d r e s . His i n f l u e n c e wi th the Shanghai group would be l i m i t e d because of h i s v i g i l a n t s u p p r e s s i o n of Red Guard a c t i v i t i e s i n Hunan and because he supported the r e h a b i l i t a t i o n of those who had l o s t p o s i t i o n d u r i n g the GPCR. Hua's a b i l i t y to i n f l u e n c e v e t e r a n cadres was l i k e w i s e l i m i t e d . He was too young to boast a noteworthy r e v o l u t i o n a r y career before 1949, he l a c k e d p a r t y s e n i o r i t y , and he was r e l a t i v e l y unknown n a t i o n a l l y at the time of h i s appointment . And because the chairman was a l r e a d y near d e a t h , there was l i t t l e o p p o r t u n i t y f o r him to c u l t i v a t e Hua 1 s p r e s t i g e or for Hua to c o n s o l i d a t e h i s p o s i t i o n . When Mao d i ed f i v e months a f t e r Hua's unexpected appointment as premier , l e f t i s t attempts to coopt Hua f a i l e d . Hua formed a c o a l i t i o n wi th the v e t e r a n cadres to a r r e s t , v i l i f y and i m p r i s o n the "Gang of F o u r " . Hua took a dangerous c o u r s e , however, i n d i s a s s o c i a t i n g h i m s e l f from the group most c l o s e l y a s s o c i a t e d with Mao i n h i s d e c l i n i n g y e a r s . Hua, l i k e the Shanghai group, had a ves ted i n t e r e s t i n the p r e s e r v a t i o n 65 .-j of the Maois t h e r i t a g e because the Chairman and h i s d o c t r i n e s were such a predominant source of l e g i t i m a c y f o r him. In October 1976, Hua 1 s a ides began c i r c u l a t i n g the s t o r y t h a t , i n A p r i l of that y e a r , Mao had t o l d Hua, "With you i n charge , I am at ease!" Not long a f t e r t h i s , p a i n t i n g s d e p i c t i n g the scene of t h i s u t t e r a n c e appeared throughout the c o u n t r y . Hua u t i l i z e d propaganda techniques r e m i n i s c e n t of the " c u l t of L i n " . He even changed h i s h a i r s t y l e to look more l i k e Mao. These exaggerated attempts to l e g i t i m i z e h i m s e l f through a s s o c i a t o n wi th Mao underscored the a c t u a l weakness of h i s own p o s i t i o n and the s k e p t i c i s m wi th which some v e t e r n cadres must have viewed the v a l i d i t y of Mao's l e g i t i m i z i n g b l e s s i n g . A l though Hua t r i e d to emphasize Mao's a g r i c u l t u r a l and r u r a l p o l i c i e s (areas i n which he p e r s o n a l l y c o u l d c l a i m at l e a s t min imal e x p e r t i s e ) i n an e f f o r t to preserve the Maois t l e g a c y , he was f i g h t i n g a l o s i n g b a t t l e . Deng X i a o p i n g engineered an unprecedented second p o l i t i c a l comeback by i n i t i a l l y p l e d g i n g support f o r Hua and then t u r n i n g to c r i t i c i z e the "whatever f a c t i o n " ( those , l i k e Hua, who u n s w e r v i n g l y supported whatever Mao s a i d ) . Deng X i a o p i n g ' s comeback was long and d i f f i c u l t , however, as L i and Ye cont inued to support Hua and the p r e s e r v a t i o n of the Maois t l e g a c y . Hua defended h i s successor p o s i t i o n q u i t e w e l l f or over two y e a r s , but by December 1978 i t became c l e a r that Deng and h i s GPCR r e h a b i l i t a t e d c o l l e a g u e s were g a i n i n g the upper hand. The support network of v e t e r a n - 66 ^ cadres l i k e Deng proved to be more e x t e n s i v e and r e l i a b l e than that of the n e w l y - a r r i v e d " h e l i c o p t e r s " . By 1980, Deng had f o s t e r e d a d e v a l u a t i o n of Mao's r o l e i n modern Chinese h i s t o r y and had s e v e r e l y c o n s t r a i n e d Hua's power. At the T w e l f t h P a r t y Congress i n 1982, Hua l o s t h i s p o s i t i o n on the P o l i t b u r o . A l t h o u g h s t i l l a member of the CC, he soon d i s a p p e a r e d from . 65 p u b l i c v iew. O b s e r v a t i o n s on Mao's S t r a t e g y and M o t i v a t i o n s Three very broad o b s e r v a t i o n s about Mao Zedong's arrangements f o r h i s own s u c c e s s i o n can be made from the o u t s e t . F i r s t , Mao seems to have been very aware of both h i s own r o l e and l i m i t a t i o n s as a c h a r i s m a t i c , h e r o i c l e a d e r . He was a l s o very cogn izant of the t rend towards b u r e a u c r a c t i c l e a d e r s h i p i n o ther communist regimes (a tendancy he a b h o r e d ) . Second, h i s f e a r of t h i s l a t t e r t rend i n f l u e n c e d h i s s u c c e s s i o n arrangements i n such a way that those p l a n s , a c c o r d i n g to the c r i t e r i a o u t l i n e d e a r l i e r i n t h i s t h e s i s , became i n c r e a s i n g l y i n e f f e c t u a l as h i s death approached . F i n a l l y , Mao's o p i n i o n v a c i l l a t e d with re spec t to the proper r o l e of the p a r t y i n "-'For a c o n c i s e treatment of t h i s p e r i o d , see Jurgen Domes, The Government and P o l i t i c s of the PRC: A Time of  T r a n s i t i o n ( B o u l d e r : Westview, 1985), Chapter N i n e . In some ways, Hua's demise i s coterminous wi th Deng's e f f o r t s to p r o v i d e f o r h i s own s u c c e s s i o n ; these events w i l l be c o n s i d e r e d i n Chapter T h r e e . -r 67 -s u c c e s s o r d e s i g n a t i o n . L u i was the p a r t y ' s c h o i c e and L i n was M a o ' s , whi le Hua can be seen as a c o m b i n a t i o n of the two; Hua Guofeng was p e r s o n a l l y s e l e c t e d by Mao a f t e r he had r i s e n through a " c u l t u r a l l y r e v o l u t i o n z e d " p a r t y system. With r e s p e c t to S a n d s c h n e i d e r ' s s i x c r i t e r i a f o r m a i n t a i n i n g a s t rong successor p o s i t i o n , the s e l e c t i o n of L i u as h e i r apparent seems r e a s o n a b l y a s t u t e . L i u had a long c a r e e r h i s t o r y i n the p a r t y o r g a n i z a t i o n s and was a l o n g - t i m e member of the inner l e a d e r s h i p c o r e . He had undoubtedly b u i l t up a c o n s i d e r a b l e network of important power a f f i l i a t i o n s , e s p e c i a l l y w i t h i n the bureaucracy a f t e r Mao's r e t r e a t to the second l i n e of l e a d e r s h i p . His a b i l i t y to m o b i l i z e these c o n s t i t u e n c i e s was demonstrated both by Mao's f r u s t r a t i o n at the unrespons iveness of cadres when the two l e a d e r s ' d i r e c t i v e s d i f f e r e d and by the v i c i o u s n e s s and p e r v a s i v e n e s s of the purges e v e n t u a l l y r e q u i r e d to root out L i u and h i s s u p p o r t e r s . In r e t r o s p e c t , L i u ' s s t r e n g t h as a s u c c e s s i o n cand ida te was hampered on two f r o n t s . F i r s t , h i s power base was not s u f f i c i e n t l y b r o a d . With support anchored p r i m a r i l y i n the p a r t y o r g a n i z a t i o n s , L i u was v u l n e r a b l e to the a t t a c k of men w i t h broad m i l i t a r y s u p p o r t . Second, as R o d e r i c k MacFarquhar ' s a n a l y s i s of the E i g h t h Par ty Congress makes c l e a r , L i u ' s o r g a n -i z a t i o n a l bent had caused him to have some m i s g i v i n g s about the - 68 r o l e of Mao Zedong thought as an i d e o l o g i c a l s o u r c e . These two weaknesses were magni f i ed by the t h r u s t of the GPCR. Mao's i n i t i a l acceptance of L i u as h i s succes sor must have a l s o been based at l e a s t p a r t l y on t h e i r l o n g - s t a n d i n g c o o p e r a t i v e working r e l a t i o n s h i p . D e s p i t e d i f f e r e n c e s of o p i n i o n , L i u and Mao had no doubt c u l t i v a t e d a deep re serve of mutual o b l i g a t i o n and re spec t over the y e a r s . L i u ' s help was c r i t i c a l i n Mao's v i c t o r y over i n t r a - p a r t y c h a l l e n g e r s . More c r u c i a l at the time than Mao's p e r s o n a l acceptance of L i u , however, were L i u ' s a c c e p t a b i l i t y to the r e s t of the- CCP e l i t e i n the context of p a r t y t r a d i t i o n s and h i s apparent r a n k i n g as 67. ' number two i n the p a r t y from an e a r l y d a t e . Whether or not Mao i n i t i a t e d h i s own r e t r e a t to the "second l i n e " of l e a d e r s h i p , the "two l i n e s " approach to the s u c c e s s i o n dilemma p r o p e r l y takes i n t o account the need to a l l o w proteges to b u i l d up t h e i r own power bases . The demise of both Hua Guofeng and the "Gang of Four" demonstrates that when the l e g i t i m a c y of one's l e a d e r s h i p r e s t s l a r g e l y on a f f i l i a t i o n wi th a deceased c h a r i s m a t i c l e a d e r , then the s t a y i n g power of that l e a d e r s h i p i s extremely l i m i t e d . Mao's "re t i rement" had i t s d e s i r e d e f f e c t : L i u Shaoqi was ab le to 66MacFarquhar, pp. 619-23 ^ T e i w e s , p, 68. - 69 deve lop a powerful c o n s t i t u e n c y of h i s own i n the par ty a p p a r a t u s , We can specu la te that i n an era of b u r e a u c r a t i c l e a d e r s h i p when a more " c o l l e c t i v e " s t y l e of l e a d e r s h i p i s i n e v i d e n c e , L i u ' s p o s i t i o n as a successor may have been more s e c u r e . However, because the h e r o i c l e a d e r was s t i l l present and had become b i t t e r l y opposed to the very type of l e a d e r s h i p which might have a l lowed h i s s u c c e s s i o n arrangements to succeed , he saw f i t to des t roy those arrangements , whatever the c o s t . The c o s t , as i t turned out , was the GPCR. It was suggested e a r l i e r that t ens ions between normat ive and p r u d e n t i a l r u l e s can cause problems for both h e r o i c l e a d e r s and t h e i r h e i r s . With one e x c e p t i o n , L u i seems to have adhered to both sets of r u l e s q u i t e w e l l . However, he cros sed the l e a d e r by b e l i e v i n g i n c o l l e c t i v e l e a d e r s h i p and s u p p o r t i n g a L e n i n i s t system of i n n e r - p a r t y d i s c i p l i n e . Whi le a c h a r i s m a t i c l e a d e r s t i l l p r e s i d e s , the "don't cros s the l eader" r u l e appears to take precedence when c o n t r a d i c i t i o n s among r u l e s a r i s e . L i n Biao f i t s S a n d s c h n e i d e r ' s model successor c r i t e r i a l e s s w e l l than L i u . L i n ' s power c o n s t i t u e n c y was conf ined l a r g e l y to the PLA and h i s a b i l i t y to m o b i l i z e that s e c t o r of s o c i e t y was very l i m i t e d , as the f a i l e d coup attempt demonstrated . More s i g n i f i c a n t l y , at the time of h i s - 70 ^  d e s i g n a t i o n as h e i r , L i n had almost no e x p e r i e n c e i n the par ty 68 or government sub-sys tems . Sandschne ider suggests that u n d i s p u t e d r e f e r e n c e to Mao Zedong thought i s a c r u c i a l was d e s c r i b e d as the "best p u p i l " of Chairman Mao and an o u t s t a n d i n g Mao Zedong thought t h e o r i s t . Because he lacked exper i ence o u t s i d e the m i l i t a r y and was not p a r t i c u l a r l y c l o s e to Mao before the 19 50 ' s , L i n r e q u i r e d 69 a d d i t i o n a l support to enhance h i s l e g i t i m a c y . Mao was not prone to cont inue wi th a "two l i n e " approach s i n c e that se t -up had so r e c e n t l y b a c k f i r e d . I n s t e a d , L i n B i a o ' s power was enhanced i n two other ways, both of which progres sed beyond what Mao had i n t e n d e d . F i r s t , L i n ' s power grew as the Army's i n f l u e n c e i n c r e a s e d d u r i n g the GPCR; i n s t e a d of b o l s t e r i n g h i s support i n the most c r u c i a l subsystem ( t r a d i t i o n a l l y the p a r t y ) , L i n f o s t e r e d an i n c r e a s e i n the s t r e n g t h of the c o n s t i t u e n c y i n which he a l r e a d y had some support (the P L A ) . Second, i n ways r e m i n i s c e n t of Weber's d e s c r i p t i o n s of the t r a n s f e r of c h a r i s m a t i c a u t h o r i t y , L i n became i n t i m a t e l y a s s o c i a t e d wi th the c u l t of Mao. Weber had c la imed that "charisma may be t r a n s m i t t e d by r i t u a l means from one bearer to L i u , on the other hand, d i d have some PLA e x p e r i e n c e . Rush, p. 26 6. 71 -a n o t h e r . " Many of the " s o c i a l i s t r e a l i s t " p a i n t i n g s of the two l e a d e r s were, through s u b t l e nuance, s u g g e s t i v e of t h i s k i n d of a u t h o r i t y t r a n s f e r . A l s o , Mao's o n l y , a l b e i t f e e b l e , attempt to " i n s t i t u t i o n a l i z e " the s u c c e s s i o n was h i s d e s i g n a t i o n of L i n as h i s successor i n the 1969 p a r t y c o n s t i t u t i o n . ^ It may seem i r o n i c that an o r g a n i z e d attempt to usurp Mao came when Mao had worked h i m s e l f back on to the f i r s t l i n e of l e a d e r s h i p . From one p e r s p e c t i v e , however, both L i n and L i u d e a l t wi th Mao from a p o s i t i o n of r e l a t i v e s t r e n g t h ; they both were, f o r l a c k of a b e t t e r word, a l l i a n c e p a r t n e r s wi th the Chairman. They were both needed and thus i n a p o s i t i o n to improve t h e i r own l o t . As S i n o - S o v i e t r e l a t i o n s d e t e r i o r a t e d , Mao i n c r e a s i n g l y r e l i e d on L i u to enhance the reg ime' s s t a t u s v i s - a - v i s the S o v i e t s . And perhaps to a g r e a t e r e x t e n t , L i n was r e q u i r e d to secure m i l i t a r y support and i n t e r v e n t i o n for Mao d u r i n g the GPCR. In t h i s c o n t e x t , i t i s not s u r p r i s i n g tha t a m i l i t a r y man turned out to be a u s u r p e r . By p l a n n i n g a • v u Weber , p. 266 . 71 The neares t t h i n g Mao d i d to i n s t i t u t i o n a l i z e a s u c c e s s i o n process was to e n s h r i n e a c a l l f o r the r e c r u i t m e n t of r e v o l u n t i o n a r y succes sors i n a 1973 r e v i s i o n of the c o n s t i t u t i o n r e p o r t . coup d ' e t a t , L i n was the u l t i m a t e v i o l a t o r of the "don't cross the l eader" r u l e . The second attempt to p r o v i d e a successor had b a c k f i r e d more r e s o u n d i n g l y than the f i r s t . Twice d i s s a t i s f i e d wi th h i s s u c c e s s i o n c a n d i d a t e s , Mao r e s i g n e d h i m s e l f to c a l l i n g f o r the c u l t i v a t i o n of a r e v o l u t i o n a r y successor g e n e r a t i o n . A l though t h i s c a l l had been par t of the GPCR and had no doubt supplemented L i n B i a o ' s b u i l d - u p of power, i t s reemphasis i n the p e r i o d a f t e r L i n ' s f a l l i s a l so s i g n i f i c a n t . Mao's emphasis on a successor g e n e r a t i o n d u r i n g t h i s p e r i o d was l e s s a s t r a t e g y to support a p e r s o n a l successor than i t was an e f f o r t to counter the r e q u i r e d , yet l o a t h e d , b u r e a u c r a t i c know-how of the s u r v i v i n g v e t e r a n c a d r e s . In o ther words, Mao's a c t i o n s i n succes sor g e n e r a t i o n r e c r u i t m e n t were not meant to prepare the country f o r the f u t u r e as much as they were in tended to prepare the c o u n t r y a g a i n s t i t s l i k e l y f u t u r e . With t h i s i n mind, the appointment of Hua Guofeng to succeed Zhou S n l a i as premier can be seen as a compromise c h o i c e . While e l e v a t i o n of one of the Shanghai group to the post would have been t o t a l l y unacceptab le to the s t i l l - p o w e r f u l group of v e t e r a n c a d r e s , the appointment of Deng Xiaop ing to that post would have, i n e f f e c t , meant the abandonment of Mao's v i s i o n of the f u t u r e . For Mao, the cho ice of Hua as v i c e - p r e m i e r was the l e a s t of s e v e r a l e v i l s . With re spec t to S a n d s c h n e i d e r ' s c r i t e r i a , Hua Guofeng e x h i b i t s both s t r e n g t h s and weaknesses as a s u c c e s s i o n - 73 -c a n d i d a t e . He e n t h u s i a s t i c a l l y advocated the use of Mao Zedong thought as an i d e o l o g i c a l s o u r c e , had long e x p e r i e n c e i n p r o v i n c i a l p a r t y o r g a n i z a t i o n s , and was supported by some key v e t e r a n l e a d e r s . However, Hua 1 s very recent entrance i n t o the l e a d e r s h i p core may have a d v e r s e l y a f f e c t e d h i s a b i l i t y to m o b i l i z e the power bases he d i d have; i n the end Deng X i a o p i n g proved to be much more adept at m o b i l i z i n g s u p p o r t . When Hua f i r s t appeared on the n a t i o n a l p o l i t i c a l s t a g e , he was seen by 72 some as a "care taker f o r the b u r e a u c r a c y . " Even i f Mao in tended that Hua f i l l t h i s r o l e , i t was not to be. Members of the r e v o l u t i o n a r y g e n e r a t i o n were not q u i t e ready to l eave the scene . Chairman Mao's s u c c e s s i o n arrangements were, i r o n i c a l l y , more f e e b l e when he d ied than they had been two decades e a r l i e r . The pas s ing of the PRC's most h e r o i c l e a d e r so soon a f t e r h i s l a s t attempt to p r o v i d e for h i s own s u c c e s s i o n ushered i n a c h a i n of events which , c o n t r a r y to Mao's wishes , e v e n t u a l l y brought a twice -purged veteran c a d r e , Deng X i a o p i n g , to the paramount p o s i t i o n i n the PRC l e a d e r s h i p . A l r e a d y an aged man, and with the c h a r i s m a t i c l e a d e r now gone, Deng b u s i l y set h i m s e l f at the task of p r o v i d i n g f o r h i s own s u c c e s s i o n i n a p e r i o d of t r a n s i t i o n . • ' M a u r i c e M e i s n e r , Mao ' s C h i n a : A H i s t o r y of the  P e o p l e ' s R e p u b l i c (New York: The Free P r e s s , L 9 7 7 ) , p . 379. CHAPTER THREE DENG'S PROVISIONS The a r r e s t of the "Gang of Four" i n October 1976 and the f o r m a l c o n f i r m a t i o n of Hua Guofeng as p a r t y chairman i n Ju ly of next year d i d not end the s t r u g g l e for the s u c c e s s i o n to Mao which was, by then , a l r e a d y two decades o l d . Not long a f t e r Hua o f f i c i a l l y became p a r t y chairman and before he cou ld c o n s o l i d a t e h i s g r i p on power, v e t e r a n cadre Deng X i a o p i n g , wi th the he lp of some a l l i e s on the P o l i t b u r o , set out to undermine Hua's power and to stage an u n p a r a l l e l e d t h i r d r i s e to prominence i n the CCP l e a d e r s h i p . A l though Hua cont inued to a s s o c i a t e h i m s e l f wi th Mao's theory of c o n t i n u i n g r e v o l u t i o n and had c a l l e d for what amounted to a new "great l e a p " , he a l s o sought a more s t a b l e p o l i t i c a l environment and was l o o k i n g f o r ways to i n v i g o r a t e an economy devas ta ted by ten years of u p h e a v a l . Deng was prepared to go much f u r t h e r : (He| sought a complete r e p u d i a t i o n of the (GPCR], even i f that r e q u i r e d a c o r r e s p o n d i n g d e v a l u a t i o n of Mao's r o l e i n contemporary Chinese h i s t o r y and a t o t a l r e n u n c i a t i o n of the t h e o r e t i c a l c o n c e p t i o n s that l a y behind the C u l t u r a l R e v o l u t i o n . Deng a l s o wished - and a p p a r e n t l y Hua r e s i s t e d - a throughgoing r e h a b i l i t a t i o n of a l l the v e t e r a n o f f i c i a l s who had l o s t power d u r i n g the C u l t u r a l R e v o l u t i o n . . . Deng made i t c l e a r that he favored a fundamental reform and r e s t r u c t u r i n g of v i r t u a l l y every p o l i t i c a l and economic -r. 75 ^ i n s t i t u t i o n i n the c o u n t r y . With these d i f f e r e n c e s as a backdrop , Deng's e f f o r t s to o s i d e l i n e Hua were both p r o t r a c t e d and r e l e n t l e s s . ' T h i s support s the t h e s i s that Hua had c o n s i d e r a b l e support and was not whol ly inadequate as a successor to Mao. I n i t i a l l y r e c o g n i z i n g Hua's supremacy i n the p a r t y to secure h i s own r e i n s t a t e m e n t , Deng l a t e r moved to b r i n g key a s s o c i a t e s onto the P o l i t b u r o wi th him. He a l s o used i n f l u e n c e i n the government apparatus to "get around" Hua, In 1980, he was able to m o b i l i z e support a g a i n s t , and i n i t i a t e the removal o f , s e v e r a l of Hua's most ardent s u p p o r t e r s and economic p l a n n e r s . Hua's m u l t i p l e o f f i c i a l posts were l o s t one by one. In 1980, he l o s t the p r e m i e r s h i p to Zhao Z i y a n g , a former S ichuan party l e a d e r . In 1981, Hua l o s t the p a r t y cha irmansh ip to l o n g - t i m e Deng a s s o c i a t e , Hu Yaobang. By 1982, he was gone from the P o l i t b u r o a l t o g e t h e r . Even though the Deng-Hua c o n f l i c t was b i t t e r and has been p o r t r a y e d as an example of the q u i n t e s s e n t i a l "ru le by purge" f a c t i o n a l s t r u g g l e i n C h i n a , s e v e r a l p o i n t s d i s t i n g u i s h those events from p r e v i o u s s u c c e s s i o n s t r u g g l e s , 3 For the f i r s t time - l l larry H a r d i n g , " P o l i t i c a l S t a b i l i t y and S u c c e s s i o n , " i n (J. S . Congress , J o i n t Economic Committee, The Chinese Economy i n the 1980's (Washington: Government P r i n t i n g O f f i c e , L987) p 53 , 2 f b i d . S a n d s c h n e i d e r , pp. 651-57. 76 -the l o s e r of a c o n f l i c t over s u c c e s s i o n i n China was not p h s y i c a l l y e l i m i n a t e d or immediate ly purged from the p a r t y . 4 With Mao gone, the d i s s o l u t i o n of s u c c e s s i o n arrangements d i d not e s c a l a t e i n t o systemic c r i s i s . Nor was p h y s i c a l mis trea tment an i n t e g r a l part of the ensuing p e r s o n n e l replacements as i t had been d u r i n g the GPCR. From these and subsequent developments we can s p e c u l a t e that C h i n a , at t h i s p o i n t , had a l r e a d y entered a p e r i o d of t r a n s i t i o n a l r u l e as d e s c r i b e d by Domes.^ T h i s p e r i o d may be d e s c r i b e d as one i n which c o n f l i c t s between c o n c u r r i n g groups s t i l l p r e v a i l , where terms of incumbency and t r a n s i t i o n of power from incumbent to successor are not yet comple te ly r e g u l a r i z e d , but where s u c c e s s i o n c o n f l i c t s do not r e s u l t i n a thorough shake-up and ensuing c r i s i s f o r the whole p o l i t i c a l system.6 As Deng X i a o p i n g ' s s u c c e s s i o n s t r a t e g y u n f o l d e d , i t became c l e a r that he was ready to support such a t r a n s i t i o n . Other d imensions of h i s p lans for reform a l s o soon became e v i d e n t . F i r s t , Zhao Ziyang and Hu ifaobang were the a l l i e s who seemed f a v o r e d to succeed Deng. Second, i t became c l e a r that f u t u r e s u c c e s s o r s ' r e l i a n c e on Mao Zedong as a l e g i t i m i z i n g f o r c e would be reduced; Deng undertook a c a u t i o u s r e e v a l u a t i o n of Mao Zedong thought . F i n a l l y , Deng's s u c c e s s i o n s t r a t e g y , both p e r s o n a l and g e n e r a t i o n a l , was i n t i m a t e l y t i e d to h i s o v e r a l l 4 H u a r e t a i n e d h i s CC membership at the Twel f th P a r t y Congres s. 5 Domes, pp. 249-50. ^Sandschne ider , pp. 657-58. • ^ 77 - . reform program and was to i n c l u d e massive p e r s o n n e l turnover as w e l l as attempts to i n s t i t u t i o n a l i z e the p e r s o n n e l replacement p r o c e s s . I w i l l now e l a b o r a t e on these three p o i n t s by b r i e f l y o u t l i n i n g both the p o l i t i c a l backgrounds of Deng's chosen s u c c e s s o r s and the CCP's attempts to d e a l w i th the Mao i s t l e g a c y . I w i l l then d e s c r i b e the u n f o l d i n g of Deng's s u c c e s s i o n plans through p e r s o n n e l changes at s u c c e s s i v e p a r t y mee t ings . Hu Yaobang was born i n Mao's n a t i v e Hunan p r o v i n c e i n 19 15. He p a r t i c i p a t e d i n g u e r r i l l a a c t i v i t i e s as young as age t h i r t e e n and worked as a youth o r g a n i z e r i n g u e r r i l l a bases from 1929 to 1934.^ He p a r t i c i p a t e d i n the Long March , a c l a i m that most younger l e a d e r s i n the post-Mao era cannot make. He was acqua in ted wi th Deng X i a o p i n g e a r l y i n h i s l i f e ; the two developed a f i r m a s s o c i a t i o n d u r i n g t h e i r work together i n the 1930s and 1940s, i n what e v e n t u a l l y became the Second F i e l d Army. They a l s o worked toge ther i n Southwest China i n the immediate post-1949 p e r i o d . When Deng moved to B e i j i n g to work at the p a r t y center i n 1952, Hu j o i n e d him as the g e n e r a l s e c r e t a r y of the Communist Youth League ( C Y L ) . In t h i s p o s i t i o n , which he he ld u n t i l h i s purge i n 1966, Hu, l i k e Deng, was able to c o n s t r u c t a network of p e r s o n a l a s s o c i a t i o n s i n a l l the major o r g a n i z a t i o n s i n C h i n a . T h i s long p e r i o d of s e r v i c e gave Hu an i n t i m a t e knowledge of p e r s o n n e l and p a r t y a f f a i r s , Wang, p. 3 4. r- 78 -but e s s e n t i a l l y d e p r i v e d him of s u b s t a n t i v e exper i ence i n the s o c i a l , economic or f o r e i g n r e l a t i o n s s e c t o r s . Hu was r e h a b i l i t a t e d wi th Deng i n the e a r l y 1970s and served i n the Academy of Sc iences u n t i l both l e a d e r s were purged aga in i n 1976. When Deng was ab le to r e t u r n to power aga in i n 19 7 7, he saw to i t that Hu was appo inted d i r e c t o r of the p a r t y ' s o r g a n i z a t i o n department . In t h i s p o s i t i o n , Hu was r e s p o n s i b l e for cadre ass ignments and remova l s , and was thus ab le to support Deng's c o n s o l i d a t i o n of power through personne l appo intments . In 19 7 8, Hu became d i r e c t o r of the p a r t y propaganda department and he lped Deng i n i t i a t e the "seeking t r u t h from f a c t s " o f f e n s i v e a g a i n s t Hua's "what e v e r i s t s " . In September of L982, he o f f i c i a l l y became the p a r t y ' s g e n e r a l s e c r e t a r y , a l though he had a c t u a l l y taken over from Hua as g p a r t y head e a r l i e r i n 1981. O v e r a l l , Hu developed a r e p u t a t i o n as a l o y a l Deng protege and pragmat ic p a r t y boss w i t h a s t r o n g , even i n a p p r o p r i a t e l y " h y p e r k i n e t i c " p e r s o n a l i t y . Zhao Z i y a n g ' s c a r e e r , by compar i son , r e v e a l s a s i m i l a r pragmat ic s t r e a k , but a more l i m i t e d p e r s o n a l a s s o c i a t i o n wi th Deng X i a o p i n g . Zhao was born i n Henan i n 1919. He j o i n e d the Hua's p o s t , Chairman of the CCP, was a b o l i s h e d i n 1982 H a r d i n g , p. 57. <- 79. -CYL i n 1932 and the CCP i n 1938 . J 0 In the e a r l y 1940s, Zhao served as an a d m i n i s t r a t o r i n a s m a l l d i s t r i c t i n the Hebei-Shandong .border r e g i o n . From 1949 to 1966, he served as a member of the South China Sub-Bureau of the Communist Par ty and then as a member of the Guangdong P r o v i n c i a l P a r t y Committee. Zhao was purged d u r i n g the GPCR as a " c a p i t a l i s t roader" but was r e h a b i l i t a t e d r e l a t i v e l y e a r l y , i n 1971. At that time he was sent to Mongo l ia as a p a r t y s e c r e t a r y , but he soon r e t u r n e d to Guangdong where he became that p r o v i n c e ' s f i r s t s e c r e t a r y i n 1974. In 1975, he was moved to S ichuan to head the p a r t y committee t h e r e . I t was i n S ichuan that Zhao experimented with reforms i n both i n d u s t r y and a g r i c u l t u r e . Hi s r e forms , i n c l u d i n g the "household r e s p o n s i b 1 i t y " c o n t r a c t i n g system i n a g r i c u l t u r e , became q u i t e s u c c e s s f u l l a t e r i n the decade and were e v e n t u a l l y adopted on a n a t i o n - w i d e b a s i s . I n t e r e s t i n g l y , Zhao was not purged i n 1976 and became c l o s e l y a s s o c i a t e d wi th Deng on ly when h i s successes i n S ichuan became r e c o g n i z e d . He f i r s t moved to B e i j i n g i n 1980 when he became v i c e - p r e m i e r and then r e p l a c e d Hua as premier s e v e r a l months l a t e r . Because of h i s l a r g e l y p r o v i n c i a l or r e g i o n a l p a r t y e x p e r i e n c e s , Zhao a r r i v e d i n the c a p i t a l wi thout a broad -^Wolfgang B a r t k e , ed . ,Who' s Who i n the P e o p l e ' s R e p u b l i c  of China(2nd ed.)(New STork: K . G . Saur , 1982), p. 682 . network of p e r s o n a l c o n t a c t s i n B e i j i n g . However, Zhao's long s e r v i c e as a powerful r e g i o n a l f i g u r e may have p r o v i d e d him wi th the o p p o r t u n i t y to devleop t i e s wi th o ther r e g i o n a l l e a d e r s . And h i s absence from the c a p i t a l a l lowed him to be cas t as a mediator between competing f a c t i o n a l i n t e r e s t s extant among l o n g - t i m e r e s i d e n t s of B e i j i n g . He i s thus the k i n d of l e a d e r with whom most of the e l i t e would now f e e l c o m f o r t a b l e . A l s o , he has c o n s i d e r a b l e exper i ence as an a d m i n i s t r a t o r i n two l a r g e p r o v i n c e s and i s very committed to economic r e f o r m . Zhao has a r e p u t a t i o n as a man who f a i t h f u l l y implements c o l l e c t i v e d e c i s i o n s . He soon became known i n B e i j i n g for h i s "persona l q u a l i t i e s , a d m i n i s t r a t i v e s k i l l s , and c o l l e g i a l style.""'"'' T h i s . r i s e to power of two acknowledged reform-minded i n t e n d e d succes sors was accompanied by p a r t y e f f o r t s to r e e v a l u a t e Mao Zedong and h i s w r i t i n g s . While t r y i n g to g r a p p l e w i th both the l egacy of the GPCR and the huge p o s i t i v e c o n t r i b u t i o n s of .Mao i n e s t a b l i s h i n g the P e o p l e ' s R e p u b l i c , the "CCP needed to e x t r a c t those p h i l o s o p h i c a l components of Mao's r e v o l u t i o n a r y exper ience that served the p o l i c y goa ls of the succes sor r e g i m e . W h i l e t h i s e x t r a c t i o n process i s -^•Harding, p . 57 Jean C . Robinson , "Mao A f t e r Death: Charisma and P o l i t i c a l L e g i t i m a c y , " A s i a n Survey 28 (March 1988), p. 356. T h i s e n t i r e a r t i c l e takes a f r e s h look at the p h i l o s o p h i c a l s e a r c h for a p lace f o r Mao's thought i n Post-Mao C h i n a ' s o f f i c i a l i d e o l o g y . 81 ongo ing , the CCP i n 1981 i n i t i a l l y conc luded that Mao was a great M a r x i s t and r e v o l u t i o n a r y , but had committed a great mis take i n l a u n c h i n g the GPCR. More s p e c i f i c a l l y , and more germane to the t o p i c at hand, Mao was found to be at l e a s t p a r t i a l l y at f a u l t f or a l l o w i n g a p e r s o n a l i t y c u l t to develop around him and for f a i l i n g to p r a c t i c e democrat i c c e n t r a l i s m and c o l l e c t i v e l e a d e r s h i p . These c r i t i c i s m s of Mao can , i r o n i c a l l y , now be used to l e g i t i m i z e new p a r t y l e a d e r s . Post-Mao p a r t y l e a d e r s agree that a r e t u r n to p a r t y norms of e a r l i e r days ( i . e . c o l l e c t i v e l e a d e r s h i p ) are e s s e n t i a l to the 1 o m o d e r n i z a t i o n program. J At i t s T w e l f t h N a t i o n a l Congress , the CCP o f f i c i a l l y separated Mao, the great r e v o l u t i o n a r y who was capable of e r r o r , from the body of thought which bears h i s name. Mao Zedong thought was s a i d to be the "body of t h e o r e t i c a l p r i n c i p l e s concern ing the r e v o l u t i o n and c o n s t r u c t i o n i n China and a summary of exper ience t h e r e i n , both of which have proved 1 3 H a r r y H a r d i n g , " P o l i t i c a l Development i n Post-Mao C h i n a , " i n A . Doak B a r r e t t and Ralph N. C l o u g h , e d s . , M o d e r n i z i n g China ( B o u l d e r : Westview P r e s s , 1986), pp. 26-27. A l s o , note that t h i s k ind of agreement does not prevent u n a c c e p t a b l e b e h a v i o r . Patronage and even nepot ism were s t i l l o b s e r v a b l e i n many personne l appointments at the T h i r t e e n t h P a r t y Congres s . Changes i n p o l i t i c a l c u l t u r e are slow i n coming. r- 82 -c o r r e c t by p r a c t i c e . " ^ Thus , not on ly was Mao not the so l e c o n t r i b u t o r to t h i s body of thought , but on ly those p a r t s of h i s thought that "worked" cou ld be a c c e p t e d . T h i s suggests that pragmatism and an a b i l i t y to " d e l i v e r the goods." w i l l be impor tant c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s f or Deng's s u c c e s s o r s . Reference to Mao's thought i s s t i l l a c c e p t a b l e ; indeed i t i s s t i l l one of 15 the four c a r d i n a l p r i n c i p l e s of the CCP. However, the r e d e f i n i t i o n noted above i n d i c a t e s that f u t u r e l e a d e r s w i l l need only to make d i m i n i s h e d and d i l u t e d r e f e r e n c e s to Mao i n t h e i r e f f o r t s to l e g i t i m i z e t h e i r r u l e . Deng X i a o p i n g ' s s u c c e s s i o n s t r a t e g y , of c o u r s e , does not c o n s i s t s o l e l y of the promotion of a tandem of r e l a t i v e l y young l e a d e r s to par ty and government p o s t s . Nor was the r e d e f i n i t o n of Mao Zedong thought in tended merely to l end l e g i t i m a c y to the work s t y l e of the new l e a d e r s h i p . Deng a p p a r e n t l y d e s i r e s a s i g n i f i c a n t reform of the p o l i t i c a l system that would i n s t i t u t i o n a l i z e personne l t u r n o v e r and a l low f o r g r a c e f u l r e t i r e m e n t of an e n t i r e g e n e r a t i o n of ag ing p a r t y l e a d e r s . Top o f f i c i a l s have r e c o g n i z e d both t h e i r own tendency to ho ld Hu Yaobang, "Create a New S i t u a t i o n i n A l l F i e l d s of S o c i a l i s t M o d e r n i z a t i o n : Report to the 12th N a t i o n a l Conference of the C P C , " c i t e d i n i b i d . , p . 359, note i l . ~*"^ The four c a r d i n a l p r i n c i p l e s a r e : 1) Keep to the S o c i a l i s t Road; 2) Uphold the P e o p l e ' s Democrat ic D i c t a t o r s h i p ; 3) L e a d e r s h i p by the Communist P a r t y ; and 4) Marx i sm-Lenin i sm-Mao Zedong Thought . - 83 -on to power too long and the need for promot ion of younger , b e t t e r - e d u c a t e d c a d r e s . As e a r l y as 1980, the CCP r e v e a l e d an i d e a l of s u c c e s s i o n that d i f f e r e d markedly from Mao's more p e r s o n a l approach: What we r e f e r to as "success ion" i s the h e a l t h y and s t a b l e e v o l u t i o n a r y process of the g r a d u a l f o r m a t i o n of a new l e a d e r s h i p c o l l e c t i v e . I t i s not an i s o l a t e d or sudden process i n which some p a r t i c u l a r i n d i v i d u a l r e p l a c e s another i d i v i d u a l . I n i t i a l l y , Deng balanced t h i s i d e a l with a need to c o n s o l i d a t e h i s own l e a d e r s h i p . The r e s u l t s of p e r s o n n e l replacements at the T w e l f t h Par ty Congress i n 1982, t h e r e f o r e , were mixed . At the h i g h e s t l e v e l s of l e a d e r s h i p , Deng r e h a b i l i t a t e d many GPCR v i c t i m s of h i s own g e n e r a t i o n . N e v e r t h e l e s s , on average , the age of the CC membership was s l i g h t l y lower than the E l e v e n t h Congress and cadres were s i g n i f i c a n t l y b e t t e r educa ted . M i l i t a r y dominat ion of l e a d e r s h i p c i r c l e s was a l s o reduced . These changes can be seen l a r g e l y as attempts to e r a d i c a t e the i n f l u e n c e of the b e n e f i c i a r i e s of the GPCR. However, groundwork f o r l a t e r e x t e n s i v e g e n e r a t i o n a l t u r n o v e r was a l s o l a i d at the T w e l f t h C o n g r e s s . A C e n t r a l A d v i s o r y Commission (CAC) was e s t a b l i s h e d . T h i s new body was des igned as a p lace where aging p a r t y l e a d e r s c o u l d take on an i t o r i a l , "An Important S t r a t e g i c T a s k , " P e o p l e ' s  D a i l y , 10 March 1980, p. 1, c i t e d i n Chang Chen-pang, "How Teng H s i a o - p ' i n g P lans to Resolve the Problem of S u c c e s s i o n , " Issues and S t u d i e s 21 (December 1985), p. 14. - 84 -a d v i s o r y r o l e on the "second l i n e " of l e a d e r s h i p , whi le younger cadres beg in to take r e s p o n s i b i l i t y for the day to day running of the par ty and the government. The i n i t i a l r e s u l t s of t h i s new p r o v i s i o n were q u i t e d i s a p p o i n t i n g . Only about f i f t y former CC members were named to the CAC and only four of those were former P o l i t b u r o members. E v i d e n t l y , some l e a d e r s had changed t h e i r minds about r e t i r e m e n t . They urged an "enter f i r s t , depart l a t e r " p o l i c y wherein aging l e a d e r s r e t a i n e d t h e i r posts whi le t r a i n i n g t h e i r s u c c e s s o r s . 1 ^ The L982 s t a t e c o n s t i t u t i o n made p r o v i s i o n s to l i m i t the tenure of top s t a t e o f f i c i a l s to two c o n s e c u t i v e terms of f i v e years each . However, i t w i l l be some time be fore the e f f e c t i v e n e s s of such p r o v i s i o n s i n s e c u r i n g p e r s o n n e l t u r n o v e r w i l l be known. Notwi ths tand ing the l i m i t e d immediate success of new i n s t i t u t i o n a l i z a t i o n measures i n i982 , the l e a d e r s h i p cont inued to c a l l f or r e i n v i g o r a t i o n of p a r t y ranks i n the f o l l o w i n g y e a r . Ins tead of Mao's " t h r e e - i n - o n e " c o n c e p t i o n of m u l t i - g e n e r a t i o n l e a d e r s h i p , Hu and o thers were now t a l k i n g about a more dynamic and f o r w a r d - l o o k i n g "three echelons" p r o p o s a l . At the f i r s t s e s s i o n of the S i x t h N a t i o n a l P e o p l e ' s Congress (NPC) i n June 1983, Hu brought forward t h i s p l a n : The v e t e r a n cadres i n our P a r t y who enjoy h i g h p r e s t i g e and command u n i v e r s a l r e s p e c t are the f i r s t e c h e l o n . They w i l l dev i se s t r a t e g i e s which w i l l form the b a s i s of the g u i d i n g p r i n c i p l e s of great p o l i t i c a l a f f a i r s . Because of the advanced age of the o l d cadres i n the f i r s t e c h e l o n , and to R i c h a r d D. N e t h e r c u t , "Leadersh ip i n C h i n a : R i v a l r y , Reform, Renewal ," Problems of Communism 32 ( M a r c h - A p r i l 1983), p. 39. -85 r enable them to c o n c e n t r a t e t h e i r energy on major a f f a i r s , our Par ty has c r e a t e d a second e c h e l o n , which c o n s i s t s of the comrades now working i n the CCPCC S e c r e t a r i a t and the State C o u n c i l . Many of the second e c h e l o n , however, are a l s o not so young. T h e r e f o r e , we have dec ided to e s t a b l i s h a t h i r d e c h e l o n , composed of those comrades who have both a b i l i t y and p o l i t i c a l i n t e g r i t y and are i n the prime of l i f e , who w i l l be promoted to l e a d e r s h i p p o s i t i o n s at v a r i o u s l e v e l s . Because of the r e l u c t a n c e of o l d e r cadres to g ive up t h e i r p o s t s , Deng and Hu began promoting the "three echelons" idea as a supplement to the CAC a p p r o a c h . I f p r e s s u r e at the top for o l d cadres to r e t i r e , had l i m i t e d e f f e c t i v e n e s s , perhaps upward p r e s s u r e through the c u l t i v a t i o n of a "reserve" of competent 19 young cadres might speed the process a l o n g . The c u l t i v a t i o n of a t h i r d eche lon was a l s o mot iva ted by a d e s i r e to c r e a t e a base of support for reforms which were be ing r e s i s t e d by aged l e a d e r s l i k e L i X i a n n i a n and Ye J i a n y i n g . A d d i t i o n a l l y , Hu and Zhao were both i n t h e i r m i d - s i x t i e s i n 1983, D e s p i t e h i s own l o n g e v i t y , Deng a p p a r e n t l y deems i t necessary to p r o v i d e for the s u c c e s s i o n to h i s own no t - so -young s u c c e s s o r s . The f i r s t wave of personne l changes i n both the p a r t y and the government progressed down the h i e r a r c h y . As par t of the d r i v e to e l i m i n a t e o p p o s i t i o n to r e f o r m , p r o v i n c i a l and p r e f e c t u a l organs were "s treaml ined" i n 1983, whi le county reforms came i n the f o l l o w i n g y e a r . As a r e s u l t , the average Remain R i b a o , 2 June 1983, p. 1, c i t e d i n C h ' i M a o - c h i , "Red C h i n a ' s L e a d e r s h i p S u c c e s s i o n Problem: An A n a l y s i s of the 'Three E c h e l o n s ' P l a n , " Issues and S t u d i e s 21 (January 1985), p. 40. S p e c i f i c age c a t e g o r i e s for the three groups are o u t l i n e d h e r e . 1 9 I b i d . , pp . 41-42. - 86 -age of l e a d i n g o f f i c i a l s i n the p r o v i n c e s d e c l i n e d from s i x t y - t w o to f i f t y - f i v e and the percentage of c o l l e g e - e d u c a t e d o f f i c i a l s rose to f o r t y - f i v e percent from twenty p e r c e n t . Between 1982 and 1984, twenty thousand l e a d i n g cadres r e c e i v e d new appointments and a "reserve force" of about 1.00,000 younger and middle -aged cadres had been des ignated f o r f u t u r e appo intments . S t i l l , Qiao S h i , the head of the CC's O r g a n i z a t i o n Department mainta ined that the e d u c a t i o n l e v e l s 20 were s t i l l too low and the age averages too h i g h . O v e r a l l age and e d u c a t i o n a l i n d i c a t o r s for the g e n e r a l p a r t y membership remained r a t h e r d i s a p p o i n t i n g . As the d r i v e to e f f e c t p e r s o n n e l t u r n o v e r c o n t i n u e d , the emphasis turned to the r e c r u i t m e n t of younger r e p l a c e m e n t s . v The u l t i m a t e condemnation of " l e f t i s t t endenc ies" i n the campaign a g a i n s t " s p i r i t u a l p o l l u t i o n " of 1983-4 s trengthened Deng's hand to cont inue h i s e f f o r t s to r i d the p a r t y of b e n e f i c i a r i e s of the GPCR.. Speaking p o s i t i v e l y , however, Deng l a t e r made c l e a r that the c o r n e r s t o n e s of r e c r u i t m e n t were to "be youth and e d u c a t i o n A nat ionwide s earch for t a l e n t e d p a r t y 21 members was implemented. In January of 1985, p lans to i n t e n s i f y the c u l t i v a t i o n of the t h i r d eche lon were r e v e a l e d . The f i r s t par t of the p lan c a l l e d f o r the grooming of a " s t r a t e g i c re serve" of one 20 Thomas P. B e r n s t e i n , "China i n 1984: The fear of Hong K o n g , " A s i a n Survey 25 (January 1985), p. 41. 2 l B e i j i n g Review, 4 March 1985, p. 15, c i t e d by R i c h a r d Baum, "China i n 1985: The Greening of the R e v o l u t i o n , " A s i a n  Survey 26 (January 1986), p. 32. - 87 thousand of the n a t i o n ' s most p r o m i s i n g young and middle -aged cadres s e r v i n g i n the n a t i o n a l and p r o v i n c i a l m i n i s t r i e s and departments . Another p o r t i o n of the p l a n c a l l e d f o r the development of a l a r g e r re serve groomed f o r s e r v i c e i n lower l e v e l s of government. A l though toge ther those cadres would compose only a s m a l l percentage of the n a t i o n a l f o r c e , t h e i r l e a d e r s h i p , accompanied by the g r a d u a l r e t i r e m e n t and deaths of aged c a d r e s , c o u l d pave the way f o r recu i tment of more young and t a l e n t e d p e o p l e . L a t e r i n the y e a r , a f t e r s i d e l i n i n g one of h i s most v o c a l c r i t i c s (former propaganda c h i e f Deng L i q u n ) , Deng began a s e r i e s of personne l appointments that were u l t i m a t e l y s u c c e s s f u l on two f r o n t s ; some e l d e r l y ve t erans r e t i r e d and members of the t h i r d eche lon a c t u a l l y made t h e i r way onto the P o l i t b u r o . At a s p e c i a l p a r t y conference i n l a t e September, f i f t y - f o u r f u l l members and ten a l t e r n a t e members of the CC announced t h e i r r e s i g n a t i o n s . These i n c l u d e d t w e n t y - e i g h t cadres over the age of s eventy . A d d i t i o n a l l y , ten members of the twenty - four member P o l i t b u r o r e s i g n e d , i n c l u d i n g Standing Committee member Ye J i a n y i n g . The names of s i x former P o l i t b u r o members were added to the CAC r o s t e r . Bes ides Deng h i m s e l f , s i x cadres i n t h e i r s e v e n t i e s then remained on the P o l i tbur o . At the f i f t h plenum of the T w e l f t h CC, s i x new P o l i t b u r o members were named. Three of these men were i n t h e i r f i f t i e s , a very young age f o r men i n C h i n a ' s h ighes t r u l i n g body. Of those t h r e e , L i Peng and Hu Q i l i were viewed as p o t e n t i a l - 88 * s u c c e s s o r s to Zhao Ziyang and Hu Zaobang r e s p e c t i v e l y . S i g n i f i c a n t l y , r e c e n t l y f i r e d Deng L i q u n r e t a i n e d h i s seat on the C e n t r a l S e c r e t a r i a t of the CC. The r e t e n t i o n of Den L i q u n r e p r e s e n t e d a compromise between Deng X i a o p i n g and the 22 remain ing more c o n s e r v a t i v e P o l i t b u r o members. It i s a l s o s u g g e s t i v e of the new tone of compromise emerging i n post-Mao C h i n a . As suggested e a r l i e r , "purges" i n the Mao i s t era were u s u a l l y more thorough and c o n c l u s i v e . Deng X i a o p i n g ' s e f f o r t s i n 1985 to s t r e a m l i n e and reform the r a t h e r r e l u c t a n t m i l i t a r y e s t a b l i s h m e n t a l s o bore f r u i t . The i n f l u e n c e of aged m i l i t a r y men i n the P o l i t b u r o was r e d u c e d . The number of t r o o p s , as w e l l as the number of o f f i c e r s , were cut by o n e - q u a r t e r . R e j u v e n a t i o n of the m i l i t a r y ranks would presumably he lp b u i l d support there f o r Zhao and Hu. It i s b e l i e v e d that i n i t i a l l y they both r e l i e d h e a v i l y on Deng's p e r s o n a l c r e d i b i l i t y wi th the PLA. The most s i g n i f i c a n t event of 1986 wi th regards to l e a d e r s h i p s u c c e s s i o n turned out to be the s tudent demonstra t ions that began i n December and c a r r i e d on i n t o January of 1987. The massive s tudent p r o t e s t s a g a i n s t C h i n a ' s l a c k of democracy were viewed by s e n i o r par ty l e a d e r s as ev idence of "bourgeois l i b e r a l i z a t i o n " . C e n t r a l documents r e l e a s e d to Western news agencies suggested that Deng h i m s e l f Baum, pp. 33-35. - 89 -(though perhaps under pres sure from e l d e r l y c o n s e r v a t i v e s ) had c a l l e d for a P o l a n d - l i k e crackdown on demonstrators and d i s s i d e n t i n t e l l e c t u a l s . The documents a l s o c o n t a i n e d a speech by CAC member Bo Yibo i n which he c i t e d the s i x major mistakes which t h e n - g e n e r a l s e c r e t a r y , and h e i r a p p a r e n t , Hu Yaobang, had committed and which had encouraged the d e m o n s t r a t i o n s . The p o i n t was a l so made that Hu had b e h a v i o r went beyond a c c e p t a b l e reason behind h i s sudden f o r c e d been r e p e a t e d l y warned that h i s l i m i t s . His mis takes were the r e s i g n a t i o n on 16 January 1987. Hu ' s e r r o r s were s a i d to be both i d e o l o g i c a l ( encourag ing "bourgeois l i b e r a l i z a t i o n " ) and economic ( i . e . promoting h igh g r o w t h - r a t e s and economic i m b a l a n c e ) . S tan ley Rosen noted that the P o l i t b u r o meeting that dec ided on Hu's d i s m i s s a l was at tended by 17 members of the C e n t r a l A d v i s o r y Commission and other l e a d i n g o f f i c i a l s , a l l of whom, i n apparent v i o l a t i o n of the P a r t y c o n s t i t u t i o n , were a l lowed to v o t e . The r e v e r s i o n to ad hoc r e l i a n c e on s e n i o r cadres (Bo Yibo and Wang Zhen had p layed major r o l e s at the meeting) over l e g a l p r o c e d u r e s , combined w i t h the sweeping i n d i c t m e n t of p a r t y p o l i c y on i d e o l o g y and economics , r a i s e s e r i o u s q u e s t i o n s that went w e l l beyond Hu's d i s m i s s a l . 2 3 Indeed , the a b i l i t y of " r e t i r e d " o f f i c i a l s to demote Deng's chosen succes sor r e v e a l e d that Deng's d e s i r e s f o r i n s t i t u t i o n a l i z a t i o n were not yet be ing r e a l i z e d . Old l e a d e r s S tan ley Rosen, "China i n 1987: The Year of the T h i r t e e n t h P a r t y Congress ," A s i a n Survey 28 (January 1988), p. 37 . 90 -were s t i l l a c t i n g by o l d " r u l e s " . Reasons for Hu's ouster more fundamental than the student demonstrat ions and Hu 1 s enthusiasm f o r reform can be seen. Hu d i d not have the support of the e l i t e . The m i l i t a r y opposed Hu's appointment as g e n e r a l s e c r e t a r y i n 1981; they would have p r e f e r r e d Deng to have taken that job h i m s e l f . In r e t r o s p e c t , Hu's r i s e to the top spot i n the p a r t y can be seen as a c o n c e s s i o n to h i s l o n g - t i m e a s s o c i a t e Deng X i a o p i n g by others 2*4 i n the e l i t e . I n i t i a l l y , c o n s e r v a t i v e s pre t e r r e d not to "cross the l eader" so that s t a b i l i t y c o u l d be m a i n t a i n e d . The a t t i t u d e s of some l e a d e r s towards Hu, however, caused him problems l a t e r . F r e d e r i c k Teiwes commented that r a t h e r than having independent p r e s t i g e as someone capable of d e l i v e r i n g the goods on h i s own i n i t i a t i v e a s , f o r example, v a l u a b l e s e r v i c e to Deng as a t r o u b l e -s h o o t e r , Hu has o f t en borne mjach of the resentment en-gendered by Deng's p o l i c i e s . Zhao Z i y a n g , a l t e r n a t i v e l y , who r e p l a c e d Hu immediate ly as a c t i n g g e n e r a l s e c r e t a r y , has r i s e n to h i s p o s i t i o n more on h i s own m e r i t s and more as a consensus cho ice of the whole l e a d e r s h i p . That Zhao would s tay when Hu was ousted may i n d i c a t e that a c o n s e n s u s - b u i l d i n g s t y l e and p r o b l e m - s o l v i n g a b i l i t i e s are now weighted more n e a v i l y as c r i t e r i a for ^^Far E a s t e r n Economic Review^ 29 January 1987, p. 12-25 I b i d , - 91 -promotion w i t h i n the Chinese e l i t e . Hu 1 s c l o s e t i e s to s t i l l - p a r a m o u n t l e a d e r Deng X i a o p i n g have become a l i a b i l i t y to him whi le Deng i s yet a l i v e . C l e a r l y , the k i n d of p e r s o n a l r u l e e x h i b i t e d by Mao Zedong i s no longer v i a b l e and the bowing of the dominant l e a d e r to the w i l l of a c o l l e c t i v e of s e n i o r l e a d e r s has become more common.^ In l i g h t of the events of e a r l y 1987, personne l turnover at the T h i r t e e n t h P a r t y Congress l a t e r that year was s u r p r i s i n g l y e x t e n s i v e . R e a c t i o n to what some ve terans viewed as the i l l - e f f e c t s of overzea lous reform d i d f o r c e some compromise, but , i n g e n e r a l , Deng's g e n e r a t i o n a l s u c c e s s i o n arrangements proceeded as p l a n n e d . N e a r l y a l l of the s u r v i v i n g r e v o l u t i o n a r y l e a d e r s h i p , i n c l u d i n g Deng h i m s e l f , r e t i r e d or 27 were moved to l e s s important p o s t s . The o l d e r g e n e r a t i o n was gone from the " f i r s t l i n e " of day to day l e a d e r s h i p . T h i s r e p r e s e n t s the c u l m i n a t i o n of a process i n i t i a t e d i n the e a r l y 1980s i n which Deng a l lowed h i s tandem of s u c c e s s i o n h o p e f u l s , r a t h e r than h i m s e l f , take over the head of p a r t y and government p o s i t i o n s which had t r a d i t i o n a l l y been r e s e r v e d f o r the paramount l e a d e r . I t i s important to note that Hu's d e p a r t u r e was more or l e s s a c o l l e c t i v e d e c i s i o n whi l e L i u and L i n were ousted l a r g e l y at Mao's behest . Rosen, p. 42. - 92 At the T h i r t e e n t h Congress , Zhao Z iyang was conf irmed as g e n e r a l s e c r e t a r y of the p a r t y and was j o i n e d on the S tanding Committee of the P o l i t b u r o by a r a t h e r " y o u t h f u l " new group . The Standing Committee of Zhao, L i Peng, Qiao S h i , Yao Z i l i n , and Hu Q i l i r e p r e s e n t s a ba lance between c a u t i o u s and b o l d e r r e f o r m e r s . More s i g n i f i c a n t , however, i s the a r r i v a l of three " t h i r d echelon" l e a d e r s , L i , Q i a o , and Hu, to t h i s e x c l u s i v e body of Chinese l e a d e r s h i p . The c o m p o s i t i o n of the P o l i t b u r o as a whole i s a l s o q u i t e s t r i k i n g . Hu faobang was i n c l u d e d as a P o l i t b u r o member, c o n f i r m i n g my e a r l i e r a s s e r t i o n that demotions have become l e s s dramat i c i n the post-Mao e r a . Nine e l d e r l y v e t e r a n P o l i t b u r o members (average age: s e v e n t y - e i g h t ) r e s i g n e d . ° These i n c l u d e d no tab l e s l i k e Peng Zhen and Hu. Qiaomu, as w e l l as v e t e r a n economist Chen Yun, who r e p l a c e d Deng as head of the CAC. Bo Yibo and Song Renqiong a l s o j o i n e d the CAC as v i c e - c h a i r m e n . As Hu's demotion demonstrated , a v e t e r a n ' s l o s s of p o s i t i o n does not t o t a l l y e l i m i n a t e h i s i n f l u e n c e . Members of the CAC w i l l cont inue to a f f e c t p o l i c y and personne l appointments u n t i l they d i e or u n t i l the body d i s s o l v e s , as p l a n n e d , i n ten or f i f t e e n y e a r s . z o T h i s p a t t e r n of r e s i g n a t i o n , as opposed to purges or d i s m i s s a l s , has become i n c r e a s i n g l y common i n the post-Mao y e a r s . - 93 -At a broader l e v e l , the new CC r e f l e c t e d a c o n s i d e r a b l e q u a l i t a t i v e change i n p e r s o n n e l . The new l e a d e r s are d e s c r i b e d as "managers and t echnocra t s" who are younger , b e t t e r educated , and who have e x h i b i t e d markedly d i f f e r e n t c a r e e r paths than 29 t h e i r p r e d e c e s s o r s . Some rose through the p a r t y apparatus by h o l d i n g v a r i o u s s e c r e t a r i a l or committee posts whi le o thers came up through the government m i n i s t r i e s . M i c h e l Oksenberg observes that the new CC has " b u r e a u c r a t i c r e a c h " . In o ther words, when t h i s body meets, "the g a t h e r i n g b r i n g s toge ther o f f i c i a l s from the commanding h e i g h t s of the government and the p a r t y , both i n B e i j i n g and i n the p r o v i n c e s . " The present CC b r o a d l y r e p r e s e n t s the v a r i o u s s e c t o r s of the Chinese p o l i t i c a l 30 system i n a way u n p a r a l l e l e d s i n c e the E i g h t h CC. C h i n a ' s top s t a t e organs were a l s o r e o r g a n i z e d i n the S p r i n g of 1988. L i Peng became premier and Yang Shangkun was named p r e s i d e n t . Peng Zhen r e t i r e d from the cha irmansh ip of the Standing Committee of the N a t i o n a l P e o p l e ' s Congress (and from or an e x c e l l e n t summary of the c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s and i d e o l o g i c a l out look of the T h i r t e e n t h CC, see L i Cheng and Lynn Whi te , "The T h i r t e e n t h C e n t r a l Committee of the Chinese Communist P a r t y : From M o b i l i z e r s to Managers ," A s i a n Survey 28 ( A p r i l 1988), pp. 371-399. For an e a r l i e r look at s i m i l a r changes , see W i l l i a m de B. M i l l s , " G e n e r a t i o n a l Change i n C h i n a , " Problems of Communism 32 (November-December 1983), pp. 16-35. - ^ M i c h e l Oksenberg, " C h i n a ' s 13th P a r t y C o n g r e s s , " Problems of Communism 36 (November-December 1987), p. 6. - 94 -a l l h i s other par ty and s t a t e pos t s ) as the NPC Standing Committee f e l l i n t o the hands of s taunch Deng-Zhao a l l i e s . 3 ! O b s e r v a t i o n s on Deng's S t r a t e g y and M o t i v a t i o n s Deng's e f f o r t s to p r o v i d e for h i s own s u c c e s s i o n , m o d i f i e d p e r i o d i c a l l y not by s h i f t s i n h i s own p o l i c y p r e f e r e n c e s or u s u r p a t i o n , but by compromise wi th top c o n s e r v a t i v e l e a d e r s , have been d e s c r i b e d as a four par t s t r a t e g y . Harry Harding observes that Deng has t r i e d (1) to i d e n t i f y a c o l l e c t i v e l e a d e r s h i p that he hopes w i l l succeed him, and to p lace h i s s u c c e s s o r s i n o f f i c e before h i s d e a t h , (2) to r e s h u f f l e the P a r t y , s t a t e , and m i l i t a r y o r g a n i z a t i o n s , so as to p r o v i d e h i s s u c c e s s o r s wi th a more s o l i d base of p o l i t i c a l s u p p o r t , (3) to c r e a t e a set of p o l i t i c a l d o c t r i n e s that w i l l e x p l a i n and j u s t i f y h i s program of r e f o r m , and to launch a r e c t i f i c a t i o n campaign to educate a l l P a r t y members i n these i d e o l o g i c a l p r i n c i p l e s , and (4) to r e s u r r e c t a set of p o l i t i c a l norms t h a t , by i n s t i t u t i o n a l i z i n g the Chinese p o l i t i c a l p r o c e s s , w i l l he lp p r o t e c t h i s s u c c e s s o r s a g a i n s t s e r i o u s c h a l l e n g e . 3 2 Deng has met wi th c o n s i d e r a b l e success i n meeting the f i r s t two of these o b j e c t i v e s , but the l a t t e r two a r e , and w i l l l i k e l y cont inue to be, more p r o b l e m a t i c . The removal of n e a r l y a l l of the "Long March" g e n e r a t i o n from the P o l i t b u r o coupled wi th the e l e v a t i o n of consensus-minded Zhao to the " f i r s t among equals" g e n e r a l s e c r e t a r y p o s i t i o n i n d i c a t e s accomplishment of 3 l S e e Far E a s t e r n Economic Review, 21 A p r i l 1988, pp. 12-13. 3 2 H a r d i n g , p. 55. - 95 F. the f i r s t p o r t i o n of Deng's s t r a t e g y . A l though Hu faobang's demotion d i s r u p t e d Deng's s u c c e s s i o n p lans t e m p o r a r i l y , the r e s u l t i n g compromise gave way to a top l e a d e r s h i p corps that enjoys broader support w i t h i n the r u l i n g e l i t e . In h i s r e o r g a n i z a t i o n and personne l replacements i n the p a r t y , s t a t e and m i l i t a r y o r g a n i z a t i o n s , Deng has f o s t e r e d a r e f o r m i s t outlook, among c a d r e s . The a b i l i t y of " t h i r d echelon" l e a d e r s to c o n t r o l these s e c t o r s ( e s p e c i a l l y the m i l i t a r y ) i n Deng's absence i s u n c e r t a i n . To t h e i r c r e d i t , though, the new P o l i t b u r o seems committed to the i d e a l s of c o l l e c t i v e l e a d e r s h i p . T h i s should serve them w e l l as t h e i r mentors pass away and m o d e r n i z a t i o n remains the c e n t r a l focus of the reg ime . The search for i d e o l o g i c a l j u s t i f i c a t i o n of c u r r e n t and f u t u r e r e f o r m s , as w e l l as c a l l s for i n s t i t u t i o n a l i z a t i o n of p e r s o n n e l replacement p r o c e d u r e s , have met wi th only very l i m i t e d s u c c e s s . The s o l u t i o n s to these problems may be i n c o m p a t i b l e w i th M a r x i s m - L e n i n i s m . The p a r t i a l " d e - M a o i f i c a t i o n " of CCP i d e o l o g y , though d i f f i c u l t and p o t e n t i a l l y t h r e a t e n i n g to the reg ime' s l e g i t i m a c y , was p o s s i b l e because of g e n e r a l abhorence of the t u r n m o i l of the GPCR and because j u s t i f i c a t i o n cou ld be found i n L e n i n i s t c o l l e c t i v e l e a d e r s h i p i d e a l s . L i k e w i s e , the d e c l a r a t i o n of the T h i r t e e n t h P a r t y Congress that China i s s t i l l i n the very e a r l y s tages of s o c i a l i s m , and that t h e r e f o r e some " c a p i t a l i s t " p r a c t i c e s ' can be t o l e r a t e d , i s couched, a l b e i t q u i t e ^ 96 -c r e a t i v e l y , i n M a r x i s t d o c t r i n e . However, i f economic reforms c o n t i n u e to exacerbate r e g i o n a l and u r b a n - r u r a l p r o s p e r i t y i m b a l a n c e s , new i d e o l o g i c a l m o d i f i c a t i o n s w i l l be needed. T e c h n o l o g i c a l changes and m o d e r n i z a t i o n w i l l r e q u i r e f u r t h e r e l a b o r a t i o n (assuming abandonment i s out of the q u e s t i o n ) of Marx i sm. Al though Zhao has proven to be q u i t e adept as a t h e o r i s t , i t i s u n c e r t a i n whether the t e c h n i c a l l y t r a i n e d g e n e r a t i o n which w i l l succeed him w i l l be capable of h a n d l i n g these l e s s concre te problems of m o d e r n i z a t i o n . I n s t i t u t i o n a l i z a t i o n of the s u c c e s s i o n process has a l s o been d i f f i c u l t f or Deng. Tenure r e s t r i c t i o n s and the c r e a t i o n of the CAC, whi le i n n o v a t i v e , have, as y e t , had only mixed r e s u l t s . The e s s e n t i a l l y c o o p t i v e nature of the CC prevents implementa t ion of any formal s u c c e s s i o n arrangements f o r the top l e v e l s of l e a d e r s h i p . Top l e a d e r s cont inue to s e l e c t the lower o f f i c i a l s who are supposed to e l e c t them. A r e t u r n to the norms of c o l l e c t i v e l e a d e r s h i p and compromise p o l i t i c s , however, w i l l make the s u c c e s s i o n to Deng more p e a c e f u l than past ones . Because of a growing w i l l i n g n e s s to compromise, a g r e a t e r number of Deng promotees w i l l remain i n p lace a f t e r h i s d e a t h . Deng's emphasis on these normat ive r u l e s cou ld be deemed h y p o c r i t i c a l i n l i g h t of the methods he used to ga in h i s own power and promote Hu Yaobang. Deng's p e r s o n a l a u t h o r i t y had t e m p o r a r i l y convinced o thers to not "cross the l e a d e r " . To a - 97 -l i m i t e d e x t e n t , Deng was making the same k i n d of p e r s o n a l c h o i c e of successor for which he had so b i t t e r l y c r i t i c i z e d Mao. Because of t h i s , the demotion of Hu xaobang before Deng's death i s a p o s i t i v e development for the s t a b i l i t y of Deng's o v e r a l l s u c c e s s i o n s t r a t e g y . Zhao Z i y a n g ' s c o l l e g i a l s t y l e and demonstrated a b i l i t y to " d e l i v e r the goods" g ive him c o n s i d e r a b l e s t r e n g t h from both a normative and p r u d e n t i a l s t a n d p o i n t . A d d i t i o n a l l y , because new f a c t i o n a l t i e s take time to d e v e l o p , Zhao's r e l a t i v e l y recent a r r i v a l i n B e i j i n g w i l l be an asse t to h im. Even though he has support throughout the c o u n t r y , he i s l e s s l i k e l y than Hu to be condemned for 33 f a c t i o n a l i s m . Hu Yaobang, n e v e r t h e l e s s , possesses many of the a t t r i b u t e s c l a i m e d by Sandschneider to be c r u c i a l for de fending a s u c c e s s o r p o s i t i o n . Hi s l o n g s t a n d i n g s e r v i c e i n the CYL i n B e i j i n g a l lowed him to develop a network of r e l a t i o n s h i p s w i th young p a r t y l e a d e r s throughout the c o u n t r y . He has a l s o occup ied s e v e r a l posts i n Southwest C h i n a , perhaps g i v i n g him some c o n t a c t s i n that r e g i o n . While Hu's demotion i s perhaps ev idence that he was u n a b l e , wi thout Deng's s u p p o r t , to m o b i l i z e these power bases enough to prevent h i s own demise, The author r e c o g n i z e s that c o n s e r v a t i v e ' s w o r r i e s about the pace and scope of re form are a l s o a l a r g e par t of the reason f o r Hu's remova l . - 98 -many of h i s o l d CYL a s s o c i a t e s ( i n c l u d i n g Hu Q i l i ) r e t a i n e d t h e i r p o s i t i o n s a f t e r h i s f a l l and remain a p o t e n t i a l source of a p o l i t i c a l comeback. Zhao Z i y a n g , at f i r s t g l a n c e , does l e s s w e l l as a s u c c e s s i o n cand ida te by S a n d s c h n e i d e r ' s c r i t e r i a . Zhao has good degree of l o c a l support i n Guangdong and S ichuan based on h i s long years of s e r v i c e i n those p r o v i n c e s . In f a c t , the very r e g i o n a l nature of Zhao's c a r e e r be fore 1980 means that h i s a b i l i t y to m o b i l i z e support i n B e i j i n g may be l i m i t e d . Hi s network of connec t ions at the c e n t e r , though growing , would have been q u i t e meager when he a r r i v e d at the c a p i t a l . H i s membership i n the l e a d e r s h i p core i s a r e l a t i v e l y recent o c c u r r e n c e . However, d u r i n g h i s long tenure as a powerfu l r e g i o n a l f i g u r e , Zhao may have developed a s t rong network of i n f o r m a l power a f f i l i a t i o n s among o ther r e g i o n a l l e a d e r s . Hi s new p o s i t i o n i n the center would enhance h i s a b i l i t y to m o b i l i z e these power bases and draw support from these c o n n e c t i o n s . Another reason that Zhao has been ab le to ho ld onto the succes sor p o s i t i o n thus f a r i s that the c r i t e r i a for the maintenance of a successor p o s i t i o n i n China are ch an g in g . F i r s t of a l l , the r e d e f i n i t i o n of Mao Zedong thought d e s c r i b e d e a r l i e r i n d i c a t e d that pragmatism, not dogmatism, has come to shade p r e v a i l i n g i d e o l o g i e s . In o ther words, the a b i l i t y to "make th ings work" or " d e l i v e r the goods" f o r China i s becoming ~ 99 ^ more important than any r e f e r e n c e to Mao (though the l a t t e r cannot be i g n o r e d ) . In t h i s a r e a , Zhao's r e c o r d i s most commendable. A d d i t i o n a l l y , the d e c l i n i n g of the r o l e of the PLA i n Chinese s o c i e t y (by Deng's des ign) has c r e a t e d a s i t u a t i o n i n which Long March and Yan'an exper ience are no l o n g e r c r u c i a l l e g i t i m i z i n g requirements for top l e a d e r s . A l t h o u g h n e i t h e r Zhao nor Hu c o u l d c l a i m e x c e p t i o n a l l y s t r o n g support i n the m i l i t a r y , the r e d u c t i o n of m i l i t a r y i n f l u e n c e c i v i l i a n a f f a i r s has m i l d l y r e i n f o r c e d the l e g i t i m a c y of l e a d e r s l i k e Zhao who have e s s e n t i a l l y n o n - m i l i t a r y backgrounds . There i s one other f a c t o r which may have c o n t r i b u t e d to Zhao's apparent a c c e p t a b i l i t y as a succes sor c a n d i d a t e . Sandschne ider and Rush both suggest that a r e c o r d of "not hav ing made too many enemies" i s important i n s u s t a i n i n g a c l a i m to a successor p o s i t i o n . It i s l i k e l y that Hu's p e r c e i v e d overzea lousness i n promoting re form c r e a t e d resentment among s e n i o r c o n s e r v a t i v e c a d r e s . Indeed, the a v a i l a b l e ev idence i n d i c a t e s that t h i s i s e x a c t l y the reason f o r Hu's f a l l . Zhao, by c o n t r a s t , i s more prone to accomodat c o n s e r v a t i v e ideas to m a i n t a i n s u p p o r t . But because he i s a committed r e f o r m e r , Zhao i s a l s o a c c e p t a b l e to more l i b e r a l elements w i t h i n the p a r t y . Thus , Zhao's widespread a c c e p t a b i l i t y prompted a group of former r e v o l u t i o n a r i e s to support him as a successor i n p r e f e r e n c e to Deng's p e r s o n a l -.100. -c h o i c e . T h i s shows that Deng's i n f l u e n c e as paramount l eader i s l i m i t e d and that promotions to top p o s i t i o n s based l a r g e l y on p e r s o n a l t i e s are no longer a c c e p t a b l e . A l l of t h i s , viewed i n l i g h t of the f a c t that the Chinese p o l i c y spectrum has narrowed remarkably i n the l a s t dozen y e a r s , means that the r e l i a b i l i t y of Deng's s u c c e s s i o n arrangements has cont inued to improve wi th t ime . O s t e n s i b l e "setbacks" may have even s trengthened these s t i l l incomple te p r o v i s i o n s . A l though thorough i n s t i t u t i o n a l i z a t i o n of these arrangements i s l a c k i n g , a group of l e a d e r s who a r e , i n most r e s p e c t s at l e a s t , more prepared f o r C h i n a ' s b u r e a u c r a t i c and t e c h n o c r a t i c f u t u r e have come to the f o r e . At a minimum, Deng's ambi t ious s u c c e s s i o n arrangements w i l l have c o n t r i b u t e d markedly to C h i n a ' s d i f f i c u l t m o d e r n i z a t i o n d r i v e . Only long a f t e r Deng's dea th , however, w i l l a d e c i s i v e v e r d i c t on the e f f e c t i v e n e s s of those arrangements be p o s s i b l e . -101 -CHAPTER FOUR: COMPARISONS AND CONCLUSION Three very g e n e r a l o b s e r v a t i o n s can be made about the s i m i l a r i t i e s of the s u c c e s s i o n arrangements undertaken by Deng X i a o p i n g and Mao Zedong. F i r s t , both l e a d e r s ' attempts to p r o v i d e f o r t h e i r own s u c c e s s i o n have been among the most b l a t a n t of such attempts i n the communist w o r l d . Rush notes that most l e a d e r s t r y to hide these e f f o r t s because "they i n d i c a t e the temporal l i m i t s of [the l e a d e r s ' ] own r u l e . Mao's d e s i g n a t i o n of L i n Biao as h i s succes sor i n the p a r t y c o n s t i t u t i o n was, at the t ime , an act of u n p a r a l l e l e d over tness i n the h i s t o r y of communist p a r t i e s . Deng X i a o p i n g , whi le of n e c e s s i t y somewhat l e s s b o l d , has n e v e r t h e l e s s spoken openly of s u c c e s s i o n arrangements and h i s impending d e a t h . Given the t r a d i t i o n a l Chinese idea that wisdom and age are p o s i t i v e l y c o r r e l a t e d and the f a c t that many CCP v e t e r a n s have seemingly found i t d i f f i c u l t to e n v i s i o n t h e i r own p a s s i n g , the emphasis which both l e a d e r s openly p laced on youth (a l though with somewhat d i f f e r e n t m o t i v a t i o n s ) i s q u i t e s t r i k i n g . Second, both l e a d e r s wi tnessed developments which i n c l u d e d 1-Rush, pp. 314-15. Kim II Sung of North K o r e a , who has been extremely brazen i n h i s p r o v i s i o n s for s u c c e s s i o n , i s a more recent e x c e p t i o n to t h i s r u l e . - .102 t h e i r own "re t i rement" to a second l i n e of l e a d e r s h i p . In a formal sense , Deng has i n t e n t i o n a l l y proceeded with t h i s s t r a t e g y much f u r t h e r than d i d Mao and has expanded the concept to a more dynamic "three echelons" p l a n . Because formal p o s i t i o n i s o f t en merely a secondary source of p o l i t i c a l power i n C h i n a , the "two l i n e s " concept i s of l i m i t e d u s e f u l n e s s i n p r o v i d i n g f o r smooth s u c c e s s i o n . N e v e r t h e l e s s , the v o l u n t a r y r e l i n q u i s h i n g of any power by l e a d e r s i n a communist s t a t e i s a noteworthy o c c u r r e n c e . The w i l l i n g n e s s of both Chinese l e a d e r s to g ive up even a s m a l l measure of t h e i r own power i n d i c a t e s the urgency wi th which they viewed the s u c c e s s i o n q u e s t i o n . The recent r e t i r e m e n t of Janos Kadar i n Hungary, moreover, i n d i c a t e s that the o p p o r t u n i t y f o r top communist l e a d e r s to step down ' w i t h d i g n i t y r e a l l y does e x i s t . F i n a l l y , both l e a d e r s g e n e r a l l y drew from among t h e i r p e r s o n a l , l o n g - t i m e a s s o c i a t e s i n choos ing s u c c e s s o r s . Guanxi t i e s a p p a r e n t l y p l a y a key r o l e i n the promot ion of p r o t e g e s . T h i s has come to be more of a l i a b i l i t y than an asset to h e i r p r e s u m p t i v e s . Both Mao and Deng seem to have, at v a r i o u s t imes , f l o u t e d the Chinese t r a d i t i o n which suggests that the promot ion of the next g e n e r a t i o n of l e a d e r s i n a way The C h r i s t i a n Sc ience M o n i t o r , ( I n t e r n a t i o n a l E d i t i o n ) 30 May 1988, p. 5. - 103 -that i n c r e a s e s one's own power i s i n a p p r o p r i a t e . The promotions of Hu Yaobang and L i n Biao seem to have been very p e r s o n a l c h o i c e s i n i t i a l l y aimed at i n c r e a s i n g the dominant l e a d e r s ' power. L i u Shaoqui and Zhao Ziyang were both more consensus cho i ce s than the other cand ida te s d i s c u s s e d , wi th Zhao d i s p l a y i n g the weaker p e r s o n a l t i e s to h i s mentor. Hua Guofeng was p e r s o n a l l y chosen by Mao, but he had r i s e n through the p a r t y r a n k s , and was supported by at l e a s t some of the v e t e r a n s then a c t i v e on the P o l i t b u r o . The s u c c e s s i o n s t r a t e g i e s of Deng X i a o p i n g and Mao Zedong a l s o e x h i b i t s e v e r a l s i g n i f i c a n t d i f f e r e n c e s . Mao and Deng d i f f e r e d on t h e i r p e r c e p t i o n of the o p p o r t u n i t y element i n h e r e n t i n the s u c c e s s i o n p r o c e s s . Mao Zedong c l e a r l y s t a t e d that the purpose of h i s s u c c e s s i o n arrangements was to a v o i d the death of the r e v o l u t i o n . T h i s d e s i r e for a c o n t i n u a t i o n of c e r t a i n va lues would l o g i c a l l y be par t of the m o t i v a t i o n of any l e a d e r a t t empt ing to p r o v i d e f o r h i s own s u c c e s s i o n (Deng i n c l u d e d ) . Mao saw the GPCR as an o p p o r t u n i t y f o r the regime to r e v i v e i t s e l f . He wanted young r e v o l u t i o n a r i e s — men not u n l i k e h i m s e l f - - to c a r r y on a f t e r h i s d e a t h . Deng X i a o p i n g , on the o ther hand, has r e c o g n i z e d a d i f f e r e n t o p p o r t u n i t y i n the s u c c e s s i o n . He knows that he r e p r e s e n t s the l a s t of the t r u e r e v o l u t i o n a r y g e n e r a t i o n and that C h i n a ' s l o n g - t e r m f u t u r e w i l l depend l a r g e l y on the success of i t s m o d e r n i z a t i o n d r i v e . A c c o r d i n g l y , Deng has i s sued an o f f i c i a l c a l l f o r l e a d e r s who - 104 -are "younger i n average age, b e t t e r educa ted , and more p r o f e s s i o n a l l y competent" / E v i d e n t l y he r e c o g n i z e s that the pas s ing of h i s own g e n e r a t i o n w i l l p r o v i d e China wi th an o p p o r t u n i t y to prepare i t s e l f b e t t e r for the t w e n t y - f i r s t c e n t u r y . To f a c i l i t a t e the t r a n s i t i o n , a host of t e c h n o c r a t i c l e a d e r s wi th s p e c i a l i z e d t r a i n i n g have been e l e v a t e d to prominent p o s t s . Deng has seen f i t to promote men who have backgrounds very d i f f e r e n t from h i s own. Sa id another way, Mao's s u c c e s s i o n arrangements were g e n e r a l l y aimed at va lue c o n t i n u i t y and the p r e s e r v a t i o n of r e v o l u t i o n . He wanted to prepare China to r e j e c t e v o l u t i o n a r y t endenc ie s that were emerging . Deng, on the o ther hand, i s more a c u t e l y aware of C h i n a ' s f u t u r e needs and i s doing h i s best to make accomodations f o r them, i d e o l o g i c a l o b s t a c l e s n o t w i t h s t a n d i n g . -•Pye, Chapter Four . • C o n s t i t u t i o n of the Communist P a r t y of C h i n a , see B e i j i n g Review, No. 38, 1982, p . 18. ^ O b v i o u s l y , the two l e a d e r s had very d i f f e r e n t views of the short and medium term Chinese f u t u r e . T h i s i n t e r e s t i n g i s s u e w i l l not be pursued h e r e , but i s worth i n v e s t i g a t i o n . - 105 -While n e i t h e r l eader viewed s u c c e s s i o n as an i n e v i t a b l e c r i s i s , both o b v i o u s l y c o n s i d e r e d the matter to be very i m p o r t a n t . Both were v i g o r o u s i n t h e i r p u r s u i t of s u c c e s s i o n p r o v i s i o n s , Another major d i f f e r e n c e between the s u c c e s s i o n plans of Deng and Mao i s the p o l i t i c a l environment i n which the a c t u a l s u c c e s s i o n d i d , or w i l l , take p l a c e . Rush suggests t h a t , d e s p i t e p e r i o d s of o l i g a r c h y immediate ly a f t e r the pas s ing of a dominant l e a d e r , the dominant tendency i n communist s t a t e s i s towards " l i m i t e d p e r s o n a l r u l e , " A g a i n , the promotions of Hu and L i n are examples of t h i s mode of l e a d e r s h i p . Dur ing Mao's t e n u r e , and e s p e c i a l l y d u r i n g the GPCR, the p o l i t i c a l environment i n the PRC was one i n which l e g a l norms were meaningless and f a c t i o n a l d i s p u t e s were predominant . Because of t h i s , the " o l i g a r c h y " which formed a f t e r Mao's death d i d not l a s t l o n g . ^ If Deng c r e a t e s an atmosphere wherein r u l e by law and consensus p o l i t i c s g a i n g r e a t e r a c c e p t a n c e , as i t appears he has begun to do, then we can expect the o l i g a r c h y which c a r r i e s on a f t e r h i s death to enjoy reasonab le l o n g e v i t y . ^ A 6 R u s h , p. 134. ^Deng, Hua, and others cooperated to e l i m i n a t e the Shanghai group and t h e i r f o l l o w e r s . 8 T h i s p r o c e s s , of c o u r s e , i n v o l v e s a l t e r i n g p o l i t i c a l c u l t u r e to some extent ; at bes t , t h i s w i l l be a long and arduous p r o c e s s . - 1 0 6 s i n g l e person may take a l e a d i n g r o l e , but he w i l l be c o n s t r a i n e d by h i s c o l l e a g u e s to a g r e a t e r deagree than were h i s p r e d e c e s s o r s . T h i s t rend i s a l r e a d y i n e v i d e n c e . It i s noteworthy that Hu Yaobang i o s t h i s p o s i t i o n due to the e f f o r t s of a group of l e a d e r s , whereas L i u and L i n appeared to be ousted ( a f t e r much s t r u g g l e ) at Mao's p e r s o n a l behest . Another s i g n i f i c a n t d i f f e r e n c e between the s u c c e s s i o n arrangements pursued by the two l e a d e r s i s the degree to which the " c u l t of p e r s o n a l i t y " or Weberian " r i t u a l means" were used to t r y to t r a n s f e r l e g i t i m a c y from mentor to h e i r . L i n Biao and Hua Guofeng r e l i e d h e a v i l y on symbol ic l i n k s to Mao and h i s wisdom. Dur ing the era of Deng X i a o p i n g , the c u l t phenomenon has been wide ly condemned and has been l e s s e v i d e n t i n Deng's s t r a t e g y . C u r i o u s l y , Mao's and Deng's s t r a t e g i e s seem to have evo lved i n oppos i t e d i r e c t i o n s . I n i t a l l y , Mao a l lowed the "system" to choose L i u Shaoqi as h i s most l i k e l y s u c c e s s o r . L i u was a consensus cand idate that Mao a c c e p t e d . L a t e r , f o r reasons a l r e a d y noted , Mao p e r s o n a l l y chose L i n Biao a g a i n s t the wishes of a l a r g e number of cadres w i t h i n the l e a d e r s h i p c o r e . Deng, on the other hand, i n i t i a l l y chose to e l e v a t e Hu Yaobang, a r a t h e r c o n t r o v e r s i a l c a n d i d a t e and c l o s e a s s o c i a t e . Only when those plans were f r u s t r a t e d d i d the consensus cho ice for s u c c e s s o r , Zhao Z i y a n g , emerge i n the preeminent par ty p o s i t i o n . In t h i s r e g a r d , Deng's f o r e s i g h t was h e l p f u l . He - 107 -a c t u a l l y promoted a tandem of s u c c e s s i o n h o p e f u l s and, perhaps wi th some r e l u c t a n c e , a l lowed the p a r t y to choose between them. T h i s e v e n t u a l l y c o n t r i b u t e d to the s t a b i l i t y of h i s s u c c e s s i o n arrangements . Mao, i n c o n t r a s t , c o n s i s t e n t l y chose a s i n g l e h e i r . His f i n a l c h o i c e , Hua Guofeng, can be s a i d to r e p r e s e n t a s l i g h t r e v e r s a l i n the e v o l u t i o n of the s t r a t e g y noted above. Hua was both a p e r s o n a l cho ice and a product of the p a r t y ( a l t h o u g h not a consensus c h o i c e ) . He was a l s o the f i r s t s u c c e s s i o n cand idate who was not a t rue member of the r e v o l u t i o n a r y g e n e r a t i o n . Under the s p e c i a l c i r c u m s t a n c e s of Hua's s u r p r i s i n g appointment and Mao's subsequent d e a t h , the CCP e l i t e was not yet ready to accept such a t r a n s i t i o n . Deng's l o n g e v i t y , c o n v e r s e l y , has granted h i s p r o v i s i o n s a needed p e r i o d of s t a b i l i z a t i o n . Under these c o n d i t i o n s , the g e n e r a t i o n a l t r a n s f e r i s more e a s i l y made. F i n a l l y , Deng's p r o v i s i o n s f o r s u c c e s s i o n are s imply more e x t e n s i v e than Mao's were. Even Taiwan a n a l y s t s agree that Deng X i a o p i n g ' s approach i s "far more s o p h i s t i c a t e d than [ that ] 9 of Mao Tse - tung . T h i s has been p o s s i b l y main ly due to the p o l i t i c a l environment which Deng has been ab le to work i n as w e l l as h i s c o n s i d e r a b l e p o l i t i c a l s k i l l s . As mentioned above, Deng's p lans f o r the top l e a d e r s h i p embody not only a "two l i n e " s t r a t e g y , but a l s o the c u l t i v a t i o n of a " t h i r d echelon" 'Chang Cheng-pang, p. 26. - 108 -7, of cadres as a l e a d e r s h i p r e s e r v e . P e r s o n n e l replacements uuder Deng have been e x t e n s i v e , but have taken on l e s s of a t r a d i t i o n a l "purge" n a t u r e . ^ The percentage of new members i n the c u r r e n t CC i s the g r e a t e s t s i n c e the N i n t h Congress i n i y 6 9 . H S i m i l a r l y , the s i x t y - s i x percent "new membership r a t i o " on the P o l i t b u r o at the T h i r t e e n t h Party Congress i s the g r e a t e s t i n PRC h i s t o r y . These new l e a d e r s are g e n e r a l l y s u p p o r t i v e of reform and the new, more y o u t h f u l P o l i t b u r o S tand ing Committee. Hu Yaobang's demotion n o t w i t h s t a n d i n g , there i s mounting ev idence that China i s approaching a p e r i o d of i n s t i t u t i o n a l i z a t i o n and b u r e a u c r a t i c l e a d e r s h i p . In 1983, Jurgen Domes c h a r a c t e r i z e d C h i n a ' s stage of development as a " t r a n s i t i o n a l c r i s i s system" i n which " c o n f l i c t s are most ly s i g n a l l e d by t e r m i n o l o g i c a l d i v e r g e n c i e s , r emova l s , e x p u l s i o n s 12 and o c c a s i o n a l l y an open r i f t w i t h i n the P a r t y " . He a s s e r t s that China entered t h i s stage of t r a n s i t i o n a l r u l e i n about 1958. Domes put forward f i v e i n d i c a t o r s to determine i f t h i s t r a n s i t i o n a l stage i s n e a r i n g the i n s t i t u t i o n a l i z e d s tage: Persuaded r e s i g n a t i o n , r a t h e r than c o e r c i v e r e c t i f i c a t i o n and r e - e v a l u a t i o n , have become the dominant mode of cadre r emova1 . •11 L i and Whi te , p. 375 . 12 Domes, p. 250. 109 tS. 1. The l e a d e r s of the p a r t y and s t a t e a d m i n i s t r a t i v e machine serve t h e i r s t a t u t o r y terms of o f f i c e and the l e a d i n g organs meet at s t a t u t o r y i n t e r v a l s . 2. P a r t y d e c i s i o n s r e g a r d i n g c o n s t i t u t i o n a l powers of the s ta t e a d m i n i s t r a t i v e machine are r e g u l a r l y r a t i f i e d by ensuing d e c i s i o n s of the l e a d i n g s t a t e o r g a n s . 3. Promotion w i t h i n the l e a d i n g organs of the par ty i s preceded by promotions i n the subsystems of the s t a t e a d m i n i s t r a t i v e machine, the armed f o r c e s or the mass o r g a n i z a t i o n s ; e . g . a person becomes f i r s t a m i n i s t e r and then , at the next p o s s i b l e date and because of t h i s promot ion , a f u l l member of the CC. 4. The subsystems develop t h e i r own channels of e l i t e r e c r u i t m e n t and c a r e e r p a t t e r n s , a l b e i t under c o n t r o l of the p a r t y c e n t e r . 5. A g e n e r a t i o n that j o i n e d the p a r t y a f t e r the e s tab l i shment of Communist r u l e - the p o s t - r e v o l u -t i o n a r y g e n e r a t i o n - has taken over the m a j o r i t y of p o s i t i o n s i n the d e c i s i o n combine, as w e l l as w i t h i n the r u l i n g e l i t e i n general.1^ At p r e s e n t , there i s evidence that the f i r s t , second, f o u r t h and f i f t h of these c r i t e r i a a r e , though not i m p e r f e c t l y , b e g i n n i n g to be f i l l e d i n C h i n a . Indeed, "the P R C . . . m a y have begun i t s movement toward the stage of i n s t i t u t i o n a l i z e d r u l e . . . a n d the tendencies toward [ t h i s ] appear to be i n c r e a s i n g " .^-^ As the t r a n s i t i o n c o n t i n u e s , an a b i l i t y to " d e l i v e r the goods" for C h i n a , e d u c a t i o n , the t e c h n o l o g y , and adherence to the and compromise p o l i t i c s w i l l a l l c r i t e r i a for the l e g i t i m i z a t i o n 1 3 I b i d . , p. 252. l 4 I b i d . , p . 253. a b i l i t y to unders tand modern norms of c o l l e c t i v e l e a d e r s h i p become i n c r e a s i n g l y important of a s t r o n g succes sor p o s i t i o n . - . 110 -B i t t e r and v i o l e n t f a c t i o n a l c o n f r o n t a t i o n w i l l fade and p u r e l y p e r s o n a l ( f a c t i o n - b a s e d ) h e i r d e s i g n a t i o n w i l l be even more unacceptab le i n the f u t u r e than i t has been i n the p a s t . When the d e s i g n a t i o n of an h e i r i s p e r c e i v e d as be ing l a r g e l y the r e s u l t of p e r s o n a l t i e s , the p o s i t i o n of h e i r i s most v u l n e r a b l e to the o b j e c t i o n s of the "non-paramount" e l i t e . T h i s i s not meant to i m p l y , however, that guanxi t i e s w i l l d i s s o l v e i n a p e r i o d of b u r e a u c r a t i c l e a d e r s h i p . P e r s o n a l c o n n e c t i o n s w i l l cont inue to have s i g n i f i c a n t i n f l u e n c e on p e r s o n n e l appointments . Indeed, i t i s perhaps because of h i s e x t e n s i v e p e r s o n a l t i e s that Deng has been ab le to make, such thorough p e r s o n n e l rep lacements . F u r t h e r m o r e , i t i s probable that the c o n t i n u a t i o n of f a c t i o n a l t i e s i s one of the major impediments to the e x i s t e n c e of Domes' T h i r d i n d i c a t o r of b u r e a u c r a t i c reg imes . By Domes' c r i t e r i a , complete i n s t i t u t i o n a l i z a t i o n may not e x i s t i n China for q u i t e some t ime , i f e v e r . N e v e r t h e l e s s , g e n e r a l p r i n c i p l e s of c o l l e c t i v e l e a d e r s h i p are s t rong enough at top l e v e l s to ensure that consensus w i l l be sought i n the s e l e c t i o n of paramount l e a d e r s . In a stage of i n s t i t u t i o n a l i z e d r u l e , a change of l e a d e r s h i p can be brought about i n o n l y one of two ways: " e i t h e r by a s u c c e s s i o n of g e n e r a t i o n s of a d m i n i s t e r i n g r a t h e r I l l T than p o l i t i c a l l y l e a d i n g b u r e a u c r a t s or by a new r e v o l u t i o n " Because China appears to be heading towards i n s t i t u t i o n a l i z e d r u l e , and because Chinese o p i n i o n about past s o c i a l upheavals makes a new r e v o l u t i o n u n l i k e l y , Deng's e x t e n s i v e arrangements for g e n e r a t i o n a l s u c c e s s i o n stand a good chance of s t a y i n g i n t a c t a f t e r h i s d e a t h . The type of l e a d e r s now r i s i n g through p a r t y ranks are wide ly p e r c e i v e d as e s s e n t i a l to C h i n a ' s m o d e r n i z a t i o n d r i v e . T h i s , of c o u r s e , does not mean that Zhao Ziyang w i l l n e c e s s a r i l y be able to i n h e r i t the "paramount" p o s i t i o n i n the CCP l e a d e r s h i p when Deng d i e s . In f a c t , the f l e d g l i n g norms of r u l e by law and compromise p o l i t i c s i n C h i n a , a long with Zhao's own l e a d e r s h i p s t y l e , may prevent that from happen ing . A l s o , the l i m i t s of i n s t i t u t i o n a l i z a t i o n i n communist regimes seem to impinge most h e a v i l y on the top l e v e l s of l e a d e r s h i p . In other words, i t i s r e l a t i v e l y s imple to c r e a t e r u l e s which modify the manner in which lower l e v e l cadres are r e c r u i t e d . A l though enforcement of those r u l e s may be p r o b l e m a t i c , they w i l l g e n e r a l l y have some e f f e c t i f top l e a d e r s are adamant about adherence to them. On the other hand, true i n s t i t u t i o n a l i z a t i o n of the s u c c e s s i o n process f o r top l e a d e r s r e q u i r e s more fundamental changes . Presumably , the CC or some l - ' l b i d . , p. 251. By t h i s Domes means not cont inuous r e v o l u t i o n i n the Maois t sense , but r a t h e r the replacement of t he reg ime. - 112 ~ l a r g e r body would have to o b t a i n e f f e c t i v e power to s e l e c t the P o l i t b u r o and perhaps even determine i n d i v i d u a l s ' rank ings w i t h i n i t . T h i s would mean r e v e r s a l of the present d_e f a c t o flow of power from the P o l i t b u r o to the CC. The c u r r e n t " d e m o c r a t i z a t i o n " experiments be ing pursued i n China are u n l i k e l y to be t e s t ed at t h i s h igh l e v e l . Deng has p r e s i d e d over a p e r i o d i n CCP p o l i t i c s i n which •the t r a n s i t i o n towards i n s t i t u t i o n a l i z e d p o l i t i c s and b u r e a u c r a t i c r u l e has begun to a c c e l e r a t e because of the death off the c h a r i s m a t i c , "hero ic" l e a d e r . As E s h e r i c k and Perry n o t e , Deng and h i s c o l l e a g u e s have a c t u a l l y been encouraging 16 bureaucracy i n the Weberian sense . Recent p e r s o n n e l appointments r e f l e c t t h i s i n t e n t i o n . In the end, one of Deng's most endur ing l e g a c i e s may be h i s c u l t i v a t i o n of the g e n e r a t i o n which w i l l p r e s i d e over the f i n a l t r a n s f e r to b u r e a u c r a t i c l e a d e r s h i p . And the f a c t that Deng was unable to act alone i n those e f f o r t s w i l l have c o n t r i b u t e d to the l o n g - t e r m success of h i s s u c c e s s i o n p r o v i s i o n s . T h i s study conf irms Rush's a s s e r t i o n s about the d i f f i c u l t i e s i n v o l v e d i n p r o v i d i n g for s u c c e s s i o n . N e i t h e r dominant Chinese l e a d e r has been able to d e v i s e a r e l i a b l e 1 f\ E s h e r i c k and P e r r y , p. 176. A l s o , a l though China seems to be approach ing a b u r e a u c r a t i c p e r i o d , i t s development may vary g r e a t l y from that of the USSR. See Constance S q u i r e s Meany, "Is the Sov ie t Present the Chinese F u t u r e ? " , World  P o l i t i c s 39 (January 1987;, pp. 203-230. -113 -means for the t r a n s f e r of h i s own power. S i m i l a r l y , a c o n s i d e r a t i o n of the e f f e c t i v e n e s s of Mao's arrangements lends some support to B e t t s ' and H u n t i n g t o n ' s c o n c l u s i o n t h a t , i n g e n e r a l , there i s l i t t l e c o r r e l a t i o n between s u c c e s s i o n p r o v i s i o n s and p o l i t i c a l i n s t a b i l i t y a f t e r an a u t h o r i t a r i a n . l e a d e r ' s d e a t h . Bet t s and Hunt ing ton a l s o observe , however, that s u c c e s s i o n p r e p a r a t i o n s may have some p o s i t i v e e f f e c t s i n p a r t i c u l a r case s . ^ If the above s p e c u l a t i o n about the s u c c e s s i o n to Deng X i a o p i n g proves c o r r e c t , i t would c e r t a i n l y q u a l i f y as one of those case s . Deng's p e r s o n n e l replacements w i l l smooth the p o t e n t i a l l y d i s r u p t i v e t r a n s i t i o n between r e v o l u t i o n a r y and b u r e a u c r a t i c g e n e r a t i o n s . 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