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Baghdad's quest for strategic surprise : an analysis of the Iraq-Iran War Muir, Michael John 1989

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BAGHDAD'S QUEST FOR STRATEGIC SURPRISE: AN ANALYSIS OF THE IRAQ-IRAN  WAR  By MICHAEL JOHN MUIR B.A.,  Connecticut State University,  A THESIS SUBMITTED  1985  IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF  THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF MASTER OF ARTS in THE FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIES Department o f P o l i t i c a l  We  accept t h i s t h e s i s as  Science  conforming  to the required standard  THE UNIVERSITY OF B R I T I S H COLUMBIA May ®  1989  Michael John Muir,  1989  In presenting degree  this  at the  thesis  in  University of  freely available for reference copying  of  department  this or  publication of  partial  British Columbia, and study.  thesis for scholarly by  his  or  her  of  the  I agree  requirements that the  I further agree  purposes  representatives.  may be It  that  is  Department The University of British Columbia Vancouver, Canada  for  an  advanced  Library shall make it  permission for extensive  granted  this thesis for financial gain shall not be  permission.  DE-6 (2/88)  fulfilment  by the  understood  that  allowed without  head  of my  copying  or  my written  THE  UNIVERSITY OF  BRITISH COLUMBIA  ABSTRACT BAGHDAD'S QUEST FOR AN  ANALYSIS OF by  The  THE  determine the  the  from J a n u a r y o f  gave r i s e  t o what has  r u n n i n g war  was  marked by  strategically goals  and  t h e s i s are  f a c t o r s and  can  to  the  which,  intentions,  longest-  The  dual,  to account  realizing  that  for  the  to its  war  d e c i s i v e campaign—and, a d d i t i o n a l l y , conditions  a systemic theory,  factors that  1980  I r a q t o attempt  v u l n e r a b i l i t y t o a sudden As  combined  b l o o d i e s t and  T h i r d World s t a t e s .  Baath regime o f  in a brief  regional  reciprocal  benevolent  surprise Iran—thereby  to o u t l i n e the Iran's  and  become t h e  aims o f t h i s  d e c i s i o n of the  with the  i n t o a mutually acrimonious path  b e t w e e n two  interconnected  along  t o September o f  pronouncements of c o r d i a l i t y deteriorated  Muir  Iraqi-Iranian relations in 1979  outset  gradually  WAR  I r a q i governing e l i t e ,  course of  although at the  IRAQ-IRAN  Michael John  Iranian Revolution,  d e s i g n s p u r s u e d by  period  STRATEGIC SURPRISE:  contributed  to  invasion.  the  engender a r u l i n g ii  that  theory  dealing with  elite's  impetus  for  the  seeking  s t r a t e g i c s u r p r i s e , as w e l l  contribute  as t h e c o n d i t i o n s  t o the established target nation's  that  exposure t o  such an a c t i o n , b e l o n g s t o t h e g r o u p i n g o f m a c r o - t h e o r i e s that  address t h e f o r c e s which i n f l u e n c e i n t e r n a t i o n a l  relations. theories  Common t o a l l s y s t e m i c i n t e r n a t i o n a l r e l a t i o n s  i s t h e a s s u m p t i o n t h a t t h e c o n d u c t o f one n a t i o n  t o w a r d a n o t h e r i s , more o f t e n t h a n n o t , s h a p e d b y diverse variables.  And, s i n c e t h e c o u r s e o f i n t e r s t a t e  r e l a t i o n s v a r i e s on t h e b a s i s of determinants, least  pleasant,  interaction factors.  i t follows albeit  typically  innumerable  that decisions  list  for war—the  f a r f r o m uncommon, mode o f  among n a t i o n s — a l s o  or methodologically  emanate f r o m numerous  causal  i t i s not  unsound t o p o s i t  that  no s i n g l e , o v e r r i d i n g d e t e r m i n a n t a c t u a t e s  d e c i s i o n t o wage an e f f o r t The  of a nearly  P r o c e e d i n g from such r e a s o n i n g ,  empirically  assorted,  a  to attain strategic surprise.  t e s t i n g o f t h i s h y p o t h e s i s i s a major o b j e c t i v e o f t h i s  present  study. It  i s maintained that the I r a q i decision-maker's  conclusion  t h a t war w i t h I r a n was n e c e s s a r y was s h a p e d b y a  complex o f f a c t o r s . therefore  given  Chief  among t h e s e ,  and one w h i c h i s  a central position i n the thesis, i s that  which emphasizes t h e d e s t a b i l i z i n g e f f e c t s o f t h e I s l a m i c revolutionary argued t h a t status  upheaval  a defensive  quo i n I r a q ,  i n Iran.  More p r e c i s e l y , i t i s  desire t o maintain the p o l i t i c a l  w h i c h was g r o u n d e d on a iii  rigid  secularism, for  played a s i g n i f i c a n t  Baghdad t o  resort  confrontation. beliefs  In l i n e  are  cited:  First,  Muslims,  attributes that  the  political  at  all  costs;  Kurdish aspirations  due t o  the  for  extreme economic  inhabit  (the  demonstrated  heightening  of  that  the  Shi'ite  the  the  pressure  military two  major  which,  b y and  Iraqi polity,  dominance  of  that  Iraqi  populace— be  a reinvigoration  increased  regional  importance of  the  must be  of  autonomy,  region  of  Iraq  forestalled.  Iranian Revolution portended  activism  are  Sunni  Shia Muslims—must  o i l - r i c h north),  and K u r d i s h  It a  nationalism  Iraq. Beyond s t r i c t l y  maintained that  p r e d i c a t e d upon t h e economically  defensive  Baghdad was  enterprising goals.  overall,  argument,  of  second,  ethnic  within  an o v e r t  nature of  m a j o r i t y of which c o n s i s t s  they  of  who c o n s t i t u t e a m i n o r i t y o f  preserved  is  use  in fostering  Iraqi Baathists  of  the  the  with t h i s  e s p o u s e d by t h e  large,  the  to  role  also motivated  By and l a r g e , desire  to  of  establishing  of  by  it  is  several  these ambitions  gain control  important portions  were i n c o n s o n a n c e  imperative  inducements,  of  were  long-coveted,  Iranian t e r r i t o r y ,  with the  and,  grand s t r a t e g i c a l  I r a q i hegemony  over the  perceptions  opportunity  ,  Gulf  region. An a n a l y s i s underpinning the constitutes  of  the  Baathists  1  search  another major aspect of iv  of  for strategic this  surprise  undertaking.  In  short,  it  is  perceived  h e r e i n argued t h a t  economic  and m i l i t a r y w e a k n e s s h a m p e r i n g  I s l a m i c R e p u b l i c , as w e l l friction  that  accuracy of  Baghdad was moved b y  a s by t h e  was spawned by t h e  these perceptions  is  An i n - d e p t h e x a m i n a t i o n revolutionary  Iran,  forces  and t h e  there,  constitutes  conducted  as w e l l  nature of  as  the  h i g h degree of  revolution.  The o v e r a l l  of the  the  economic p o s t u r e  state of  political  its  explaining Iran's  obtain strategic  warning of  Iraq's  international influenced equally from t h e  had been  of  I r a q and I r a n ,  Baghdad's m o t i v a t i o n s  importantly,  v  to  and,  to  initiated.  an o v e r v i e w how t h i s  and o p p o r t u n i t i e s  Teheran's v u l n e r a b i l i t y to  west.  is  inability  aggressive plans,  a r e a l s o made t o p r e s e n t  relations  defense  This discussion  context of  i n r o a d once i t  of  a m b i e n t h o l d i n g sway  i n the  Efforts  political  gauged.  a n o t h e r key t o p i c .  immediately b l u n t the  the  of  the  factor and,  aggression  TABLE OF  CONTENTS  ABSTRACT  Page i i  ACKNOWLEDGEMENT  viii  CHAPTER I .  1  INTRODUCTION  1 3 6  D e f i n i t i o n and Purpose Survey o f P e r t i n e n t L i t e r a t u r e Methodology, Sources, and O r g a n i z a t i o n An E x p l a n a t o r y O v e r v i e w : T h e S u b s t a n c e and D y n a m i c s o f S t r a t e g i c S u r p r i s e The I m p o r t a n c e o f S t u d y i n g S t r a t e g i c S u r p r i s e CHAPTER I I .  9 31  IRAQ'S INCENTIVES: DEFENSIVE, OFFENSIVE, AND  37  IDEOLOGICAL-CULTURAL  D e f e n s i v e Inducements Aggressive Motivations Iraq's Propensity t o Resort t o Force Against Iran Due t o I d e o l o g i c a l a n d E t h n i c - C u l t u r a l D i s p a r i t y .. Conclusion CHAPTER I I I .  57 65  IRAQ'S INCENTIVES: HISTORICAL, E L I T E CONSENSUS AND THE L E V E L OF ACCURACY  OF 72  MOTIVATIONAL PERCEPTIONS P r e d i l e c t i o n A r i s i n g from H i s t o r i c a l Antagonism Degree o f I r a q i E l i t e U n i t y Regarding t h e E f f i c a c y of Attempting a S t r a t e g i c Surprise Degree o f M i s p e r c e p t i o n i n t h e V a l u a t i o n s Comprising t h e I r a q i Regime's I n c e n t i v e S t r u c t u r e Conclusion CHAPTER I V .  37 48  IRAQ'S PERCEPTIONS OF OPPORTUNITY  73 87 92 95  FOR  STRATEGICALLY SURPRISING REVOLUTIONARY  IRAN  P e r c e p t i o n s o f O p p o r t u n i t y Engendered by Q u a n t i t a t i v e and Q u a l i t a t i v e I n d i c e s o f M i l i t a r y Power vi  100  101  O p p o r t u n i t y P r e d i c a t e d upon O b s e r v a t i o n s o f I r a n i a n V u l n e r a b i l i t y Engendered by a R e d u c t i o n o f t h e S i z e o f t h e N a t i o n ' s Armed F o r c e s , E c o n o m i c D i s l o c a t i o n , and I n t e r n a l P o l i t i c a l Fragmentation O p p o r t u n i t y F o s t e r e d by t h e M o n o c r a t i c N a t u r e o f the I r a q i P o l i t i c a l System The L e v e l o f I n a c c u r a c y U n d e r l y i n g t h e Baathists* Estimations of Opportunity: F a i l u r e to Discern P o t e n t i a l , Adverse Consequences I n h e r e n t i n Seeking to Strategically Surprise Revolutionary Iran Determinants Influencing the Timing of the Undertaking of the S u r p r i s e Onslaught Conclusion CHAPTER V .  118  121 132 134  REVOLUTIONARY I R A N ' S EXPOSURE TO STRATEGIC SURPRISE:  MILITARY,  INTELLIGENCE AND  DOMESTIC P O L I T I C A L CAUSAL FACTORS  140  V u l n e r a b i l i t y A r i s i n g from T r a n s i t i o n i n t h e Composition of the M i l i t a r y , Disadvantageous P o s i t i o n i n g o f F o r c e s , and a Breakdown o f S t r a t e g y and D e f e n s i v e P l a n n i n g E x p o s u r e t o A g g r e s s i o n Due t o an I m p a i r e d I n t e l l i g e n c e C a p a b i l i t y and I r a q i S t r a t a g e m V u l n e r a b i l i t y E v o k e d by D o m e s t i c P o l i t i c a l Disagreement Conclusion CHAPTER V I .  105  141 149 153 169  REORIENTATION OF THE FOREIGN POLICY OF IRAN AND IRAQ:  BREAKDOWN OF THE INTERSTATE  STATUS QUO IN THE GULF REGION AND THE EFFECTS OF THIS DEVELOPMENT UPON VULNERABILITY TO AN IRAQI  IRAN'S  STRIKE  The C o n c e p t u a l D e s i g n s U n d e r g i r d i n g t h e I r a n i a n I s l a m i c i s t s ' F o r e i g n P o l i c y : The P r o p a g a t i o n o f T r a d i t i o n a l i s t S h i ' i s m and t h e R o l l i n g B a c k o f Imperial Influence w i t h i n the Muslim World Change i n I r a q i F o r e i g n P o l i c y : From R a d i c a l i s m to Moderation Conclusion CHAPTER V I I .  SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS  SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY  175  176 189 204 2 09 219  vii  ACKNOWLEDGMENTS This t h e s i s r e f l e c t s t h e experience and knowledge o f v a r i o u s p e o p l e , f o r no one c a n r e a l i s t i c a l l y a s p i r e t o w r i t e a work o f t h i s nature u n a s s i s t e d by others. Accordingly, I would l i k e t o a c k n o w l e d g e t h e p e r s o n who i s i n many r e s p e c t s r e s p o n s i b l e f o r t h i s volume: Michael Wallace. Without t h e c r i t i c a l e v a l u a t i o n and a d v i c e , e s p e c i a l l y w i t h r e g a r d t o a proper framework o f a n a l y s i s f o r t h i s t o p i c , p u t f o r t h by t h i s academic, t h i s work would be l e s s organized and l e s s extensive. Donald Munton a l s o c o n t r i b u t e d t o t h e c o m p l e t i o n o f t h i s p r o j e c t b y d e v o t i n g some o f h i s v a l u a b l e t i m e t o p a r t i c i p a t e on t h e e x a m i n i n g c o m m i t t e e . I would also l i k e t o t h a n k P a u l Tennant f o r h i s a s s i s t a n c e i n s u r m o u n t i n g a number of bureaucratic obstacles.  viii  CHAPTER I INTRODUCTION Definition In the Iraqi  e a r l y morning hours o f  army d i v i s i o n s  incursion  into  and Purpose 22 S e p t e m b e r  launched a sudden,  I r a n ; c o i n c i d i n g with the  open w a r f a r e marked t h e  nineteen-month  period of  ground  investment The  culmination of  s p i r a l i n g tension  T e h e r a n , w h i c h h a d commenced  i n February of  the  onset of  Islamic-oriented  in  Iran that  t o p p l e d the m o n a r c h i a l regime  Reza P a h l a v i . directed  at  realize  The I r a q i i r r u p t i o n ,  Iran's  Khuzestan—the constitutes  fundamentalist,  petroleum-rich,  foundation  a recent  a swift  the  example  of  and d e c i s i v e  adversary v i s - a - v i s The  of  study  which General C a r l  the  surprise  i n recent entails  with  revolution  Shah Muhammad of which  southwestern province  Iranian  was of  economy—  an a t t e m p t  phenomenon  Von C l a u s e w i t z  years.  thrust  1979  by a s t a t e over  to  an  surprise.  " p e c u l i a r and i m p o r t a n t c h a p t e r increased  of  military victory  strategic  of  the  a  b e t w e e n Baghdad  and  the  six  coordinated  were numerous s o r t i e s by I r a q i combat a i r c r a f t . outbreak of  1980,  of  strategic  once a l l u d e d t o  as  i n the A r t of W a r , "  Generally defined,  an a b r u p t and f o r c e f u l 1  surprise,  1  a has  strategic  inroad that  is  2 conducted with the the  c a p a b i l i t y of  paramount d e s i g n the  It  surprise differs  considerably  the  i n terms  the  latter,  ends i n h e r e n t  Manchuria 1941,  the  attack  i n 1905;  which occurs  the  strategic  surprise;  for  destroying  In a d d i t i o n ,  a strategic  surprise  on R u s s i a n w a r s h i p s  at  a i r attack Hawaii  on t h e U . S . P a c i f i c  i n 1941;  United Nation's  the  massive  expeditionary  and more r e c e n t l y ,  onslaught  against  Israel  No m e t h o d i c a l strategic  in  past  include  Arthur,  Soviet  This thesis  the  force  of  the  d u r i n g the  against Korean  Iraqi  bid  for  been u n d e r t a k e n by p o l i t i c a l  endeavors  to  partially f i l l  nexus between t h e  foreign policy.  the  bodies  s u r p r i s e and s t r a t e g i c  Pearl  joint Egyptian-Syrian  R e v o l u t i o n and I r a q i works w i t h i n t h e  the  Chinese attack  v o i d by examining Baghdad's d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g more p r e c i s e l y ,  at  Union  1973.  analysis  s u r p r i s e has y e t  scientists.  the  fleet  are  nature.  Port the  the  surprise  i n the  German i n v a s i o n o f  conflict;  and,  strategic  regularly during  potential  enemy.  i n seeking  the  serious  w h i c h was codenamed O p e r a t i o n B a r b a r o s s a ;  Japanese Harbor,  of  note that  r a t h e r than a purely m i l i t a r y ,  instances of  Japanese  diminishing  f r o m common t a c t i c a l  o f m a g n i t u d e and t h e  a political,  Notable  in  important to  warfighting capacity  ultimate of  is  former exceeds the  war,  greatly  besieged s t a t e to muster a  counterattack.^  the  of  of  for  the  aggression  Iranian  This chapter w i l l  l i t e r a t u r e on  deception,  this  strategic  I r a q - I r a n War,  the  cite  3 Iranian Revolution,  and I r a q ' s  pertinent  here.  treatise,  i n c l u d i n g the  the  A review  outbreak of  the  conceptual  In a d d i t i o n ,  surprise w i l l  be p l a c e d  citing  main c a u s a l  the  occurrence. importance  Finally, of  among n a t i o n s be p u t  into  which  used  the  factors  this  t o be a n a l y z e d , nature  of  by a  which i n f l u e n c e of  the  for bilateral  a n d , more i m p o r t a n t l y ,  global  will  strategic  a clearer perspective  surprise  its  overall relations  security,  will  forth.  Survey of  Pertinent  Literature  R e g a r d i n g works on s t r a t e g i c importance  is  surprise,  of  K l a u s s K n o r r and P a t r i c k M o r g a n ' s  S u r p r i s e : I n c e n t i v e s and O p p o r t u n i t i e s ,  contains  an e x c e l l e n t ,  pathologies that  converge  T h i s t r e a t i s e was of  follow  full  of  to  utmost  accounting effect  the  strategic  utility  f o r the  Iraqi invasion  comparable worth f o r g r a s p i n g the strategic  shock  is  f o r Defence  4  focusing  p r i m a r i l y on s t r a t e g i c  cause of  strategic  thesis.  Chief  surprise,  Iran.  study  avenue  nature  of  deception,  were a l s o u s e d  analyses a basic for  following:  root  this  Donald C.  in  to  A tract  Surprise Attack:  A number o f  among t h e s e a r e t h e  and  surprise.  present  fundamental  Richard K. B e t t s ' Planning.  of  which  3  factors  a f f o r d i n g a s t r u c t u r a l and t h e o r e t i c a l  i n analyzing the  Lessons  of  foremost  Strategic  Military  terms  in  are  framework t h r o u g h w h i c h  a brief discussion  strategic  system,  the methodology  I r a q - I r a n War i s  a l s o be u n d e r t a k e n .  of  of  political  of  4  Daniel  and K a t h e r i n e L . H e r b i g ' s S t r a t e g i c  Deception. various  which contains  5  analytical  conditions,  orientations  m a i n l y on t h e  a f a i l u r e to  several  obtain strategic  Stratagem:  Deception  voluminous  examination  Perlmutter•s M i l i t a r y of  use  examples o f  of  the  the  the  limited.  that  the  engender  which e n t a i l s  6  on t h e  the  Surprise,  b r i e f treatments of  in-depth analytical  its  onset,  percentage  origins  analysts,  journals  as b r i e f  of  the  Issues of  of  past  the  quite  come  from a  work c a r r i e d  have been  published. The I r a n - I r a q  Settlement.  analyses based  orientations;  The I r a n - I r a q C o n f l i c t .  Nicola F i r z l i ' s  war f r o m a E u r o p e a n p e r s p e c t i v e ;  in  a number o f  Dessouki's for  on  scholarly  However,  C o n f l i c t and P r o s p e c t s  treatment  w h i c h e n c o m p a s s e s a number o f  Stephen  7  especially  has been  war h a v e  articles.  examinations  forth,  the  w i t h most o f  I n c l u d e d among t h e s e a r e A l i H i l l a l  examines the  a  exigencies  and S t r a t e g i c  has been put  influenced  excellent book-length  War:  which  and J o h n Gooch and Amos  amount o f  A significant  number o f  various  the  deception.  undertakings small  of  the v i c t i m ,  p r o c e s s e s and  due t o  I r a q - I r a n War t h a t  factors  establish  warning; Barton Whaley's  Deception  largely  To d a t e , of  study  and S u r p r i s e i n W a r , ,  associated with deception;  which i s  essays that  f o r the  part of  Military  on  8  differing  and,  9  which  finally,  R . Grummon's The I r a n - I r a q War: I s l a m E m b a t t l e d ,  w h i c h f o c u s e s on t h e  war f r o m an I s l a m i c  standpoint.  1 0  5  Having c i t e d on s t r a t e g i c  the  surprise  works on war c a u s a t i o n  and d e c e p t i o n  war b e t w e e n I r a q a n d I r a n , the of  m a j o r a n a l y s e s on t h e the  revolution  an i n s i g h t  into  constituted  the  first  in-depth elite  source  and t h e  Khomeinists wider of  of  Islamic the  f o r power  opposition  I r a n i a n R e v o l u t i o n upon t h e  Several contemporary this has  thesis  Middle E a s t . works  one  The C o n t e m p o r a r y S t a t e .  1 4  is  useful  as  Iran:  aspects of  an  clerical the  A work  of  ramifications region  Challenge  recently.  further u t i l i t y Iraq,  the  I r a q have been w r i t t e n  e s s a y s on v a r i o u s  with  is and  1 2  treatise  been p a r t i c u l a r l y b e n e f i c i a l :  Iraq:  of  political  concerned,  the  deals  Iran.  regarding the  is  1 1  Persian Gulf  Rouhollah K. Ramazani's Revolutionary  that  that vied with  in postrevolutionary overview  the  dissension  and i s  groups  to  nature  The R e i g n o f  Revolution,  the  in providing  b a c k g r o u n d i n f o r m a t i o n on t h e  various  Response i n the  on  upheaval  mounting  revolution,  s c o p e and an e x c e l l e n t  the  the  Shaul Bakhash's  four years of  and on  now t u r n  utility  and s o c i e t a l  main c a t a l y s t t o  I r a n and t h e  will  tracts  considerable  political  b e t w e e n I r a n and I r a q . Ayatollahs:  discussion  A number o f  were o f  the  specifically,  general,  I r a n i a n R e v o l u t i o n and t h e  I r a q i body p o l i t i c .  Islamic  the  the  in  1 3  of  atmosphere As f a r  this  Iraqi political  In  several  affairs.  Phebe M a r r ' s The Modern H i s t o r y  and F a u d M a t a r ' s Saddam H u s s e i n :  as  description  Timothy N i b l o c k ' s  which comprises  in  Of  of  The M a n , t h e  Cause  f  6 and t h e  Future.  key i n f l u e n c e s latter  The former conveys  1 5  s h a p i n g modern I r a q i  illuminates  political  the  Sources,  v a s t body o f  of  a number o f  Iraq's  which  in his  i n f o r m u l a t i n g a sound,  periods  theories  that  overriding causal explanation  of  champions t h e theoretical narrowly  of  outbreak o f war.  t i m e and i n d i s p a r a t e rest  factors  its  occurrence  approach to  In l i g h t  the  To S i n g e r ,  adherence  to  the  it  geographical  analysis,  or dyadic a n a l y t i c a l of  put  strategic  bearing. surprise,  chapter,  phenomenon.  two  K l a u s s K n o r r and P a t r i c k M o r g a n ,  utility  an  f o r t h by S i n g e r w o u l d seem of  regarding the  Singer  r a t h e r than a  f u r t h e r on i n t h i s  guidelines  on s t r a t e g i c  few  multi-  mandatory f o r a n a l y z i n g a p a r t i c u l a r i n s t a n c e  authorities  due  transpires  Overall,  1 6  a comprehensive,  complexity  w h i c h w i l l be e s t a b l i s h e d  opinion,  o r even a  in general.  conflict  monistic, of  has  cannot p r o v i d e a thorough  u t i l i z a t i o n of  focused,  on a s i n g l e  the  conceptual  u n c e r t a i n a n d s p o r a d i c n a t u r e o f war a s  in different  on  encompass  Joel Singer  standards which,  framework f o r a n a l y z i n g t h e  regions,  the  literature  theories  array of v a r i a n t o r i e n t a t i o n s .  s h o u l d be a d h e r e d t o  the  while  the  and O r g a n i z a t i o n  o f war a r e a p l e t h o r a o f  established  to  of  strongman.  Contained w i t h i n the  a wide  society,  p e r s o n a l governance  Methodology,  causation  a cognizance  surprise,  share  of multi-causal  Singer's  explanations  this leading sentiment for  the  7  o c c u r r e n c e o f war, devising  a viable  and h a v e d e m o n s t r a t e d t h i s  c o n c u r r e n c e by  framework f o r c o n d u c t i n g c a s e a n a l y s e s  strategic  shocks.  paradigm,  a m a c r o s c o p i c and c l e a r e x a m i n a t i o n o f  multitude of  Overall,  factors  elite's  f a i l u r e to  b y e m p l o y i n g K n o r r and M o r g a n ' s  underpinning the  t o mount a s t r a t e g i c  of  surprise,  Iraqi  as w e l l  discern strategic  the  elite's  as the  decision  Iranian  w a r n i n g , c a n be  presented. In terms o f  research data,  p r i m a r y and s e c o n d a r y s o u r c e s . t h e s i s have been newspapers government p u b l i c a t i o n s , and A m e r i c a n .  This  Iran Times, the on West A s i a  both  The p r i m a r y a s s e t s  and a l i m i t e d amount  for  Indian,  s c h o l a r h a s made e x t e n s i v e u s e  (India),  f o r Defense  this  of  including Iranian, Iraqi,  Institute  Science Monitor.  I have u t i l i z e d  o f The  A n a l y s i s ' News  Review  T h e New Y o r k T i m e s , and T h e C h r i s t i a n  A n d , r e g a r d i n g government p a p e r s ,  the  Middle East A s i a Report of the U . S . Foreign Broadcast I n f o r m a t i o n S e r v i c e has proven q u i t e h e l p f u l . fact  that  close,  the  I r a q - I r a n War h a s n o t y e t  and because  investigate access to  origins  official  belligerent years w i l l  the  is  the  of the  international tribunal is  g o v e r n m e n t documents  of  nonexistent,  pass before  and i t  researchers  is  quite  yet  to  to  either l i k e l y t h a t many  establish  have so  a  convene,  are granted access  Attempts to  and I r a n i a n o f f i c i a l s  the  f o r m a l l y come t o  conflict  these valuable sources. key I r a q i  envisioned  Due t o  to  contacts  f a r proven  with  8 unfruitful.  An i n t e r v i e w w i t h A l b o l h a s a n B a n i - S a d r ,  former I r a n i a n head of especially  helpful but,  constraints, study.  government, due t o  By a n d l a r g e ,  I have been a b l e  And,  consequently,  the to  gleaned  diminishing the  with a copious  of  the  is  divided into  Chapter Four e n t a i l s  of  that  I  facts thus  a n d , by d o i n g s o ,  chapters  Iraq's  incentives  an e x a m i n a t i o n o f  entertained  by t h e  Iraqi  on t h e v a r i o u s f a c t o r s attack.  that  f o u r main s e c t i o n s .  for realizing strategic elite.  I  have  ensue  reflects  framework. Chapters  for attacking  the  surprise that  with the  respectively.  an o v e r a l l summation o f  The f i n a l the  of  concentrates to  international allies—of  chapter then  thesis.  of  were  which rendered I r a n v u l n e r a b l e  number and s t r e n g t h  Iran.  perceptions  Chapter Five  Chapter S i x deals  r e l a t i o n s — m a i n l y the  forth  level  I have o b t a i n e d ,  opportunity  I r a n and I r a q ,  I believe  K n o r r and M o r g a n ' s c o n c e p t u a l  Two and T h r e e d e s c r i b e  surprise  r e l y more  a c c u r a c y o f my f i n d i n g s .  structure of  The t h e s i s  limited.  i n d e t e r m i n a t i o n e n g e n d e r e d b y an  The o r g a n i z a t i o n o f t h e the  this  information  to  However,  o r i g i n a l sources level  for  o b t a i n h a s b e e n somewhat  o v e r r e l i a n c e on s e c o n d a r y s o u r c e s , bolstered  feasible  I have been r e l e g a t e d  treatise  from t h e  not  amount o f p r i m a r y  h e a v i l y on s e c o n d a r y r e s o u r c e s . imbued t h e  been  t i m e and f i n a n c i a l  s u c h an u n d e r t a k i n g i s  that  have  would have  the  puts  9  An  E x p l a n a t o r y O v e r v i e w : The Dynamics of S t r a t e g i c  Having put  f o r t h a cursory  Substance Surprise  and  d e f i n i t i o n of  the  phenomenon o f s t r a t e g i c s u r p r i s e , e s t a b l i s h e d t h e purpose of t h i s t h e s i s , b r i e f l y discussed works consulted,  and  organization  f o r p u r p o s e s o f c l a r i t y and  justification  the main  for designating  the  of the  essay, I  Iraqi attack  believe  thorough  as a b i d  i t s incidence,  those  i s i n order.  For  o r g a n i z a t i o n a l purposes, t h i s n a r r a t i v e w i l l proceed accordance with the  framework e s t a b l i s h e d by  for  explicatory  t r e a t m e n t o f t h e n a t u r e o f s t r a t e g i c s u r p r i s e , and influence  of  establishing a  s t r a t e g i c s u r p r i s e , a more b r o a d and  factors that  literary  o u t l i n e d the methodology, types  s o u r c e s e m p l o y e d , and that,  overall  Knorr  in  and  Morgan. An  understanding of the p r i n c i p a l  whether they are  of a defensive  combination of the  two,  motivations,  or aggressive  which comprise the  nature, or  a  impetus f o r a  s t a t e ' s e l i t e t o u n d e r t a k e an e f f o r t t o a t t a i n a s t r a t e g i c surprise,  i s of  foremost i m p o r t a n c e .  former, i t i s not actuated  by  the  that the  1 8  rulers to  existing state  opposing nation  t o n a t i o n a l s e c u r i t y , and, unacceptable.  In terms of  uncommon f o r a n a t i o n ' s  a conclusion  relations with  1 7  constitutes a  accordingly,  In such cases, the  is  the be  of detriment  simply  i n c e n t i v e f o r engaging  i n armed c o n f l i c t s t e m s l a r g e l y f r o m t h e b e l l i c o s e demeanor of the  a d v e r s a r y , and  from a r e s u l t a n t b e l i e f t h a t the  cost  of  r e f r a i n i n g from u n d e r t a k i n g d i r e c t  exceed the Distinct  potential  from d e f e n s i v e  actuations number o f  elite  and a t t a i n i n g demonstrated  aspirations the  that  resorting to  the  the  of  aggressor's  rendered l e s s  concerned, to  action  it  actors, is  confront  the  1 9  inclinations  In short,  The c r u c i a l  foment  strong  feelings  which,  in turn,  of  unity  as  Baath  this  study at  is  a by a  elite.  Such a  reinforce propensity  "historical  interstate  predilection  that  facilitated  can s e r v e t o  termed  is  among  rivalry  animosity within governing  can i n c r e a s e  process  planned aggression  inspirations.  long-standing  that  the  Baghdad's a r r i v a l  c a n s t e m f r o m what J o e l S i n g e r h a s 2 0  necessity  grasp of  Insofar  among t h e  and venturesome  strong  motivations.  r e v o l u t i o n a r y I r a n was  elite  be  and a s h a r e d c o n c l u s i o n  requisite.  coherence  resources;  another major f a c t o r  inducements.  w i l l be a r g u e d t h a t  Existing  memory."  will  a r d u o u s by a h i g h d e g r e e o f  high degree of  protective  It  a sweeping  pertaining to  r a n k i n g governmental such d r a s t i c  natural  consensus r e g a r d i n g the  constitutes  from a  territorial  and a g g r e s s i v e  elite  can a r i s e  r e g i m e was a n i m a t e d b y a  i n a r r i v i n g at  o f making d e c i s i o n s  aggressive  The l a t t e r  o f hegemony.  Iraqi  force  must be e x a m i n e d  are  and g o a l s :  greatly  hostilities.  securing of valuable  defensive  The l e v e l  decision  inducements  a position  combination of  depth of  initiating  for surprise attack.  aggrandizement;  of  cost of  action w i l l  for  can  circles  aggression.  Of g r e a t e r resort to  import, force,  is  political,  ethnic,  government  of  target  i n terms o f  the  the  explaining a willingness  extent of  and c u l t u r a l aggressor  dissimilarity in  values  thought  posit  objective  is  that  the  conditions  p o l i t i c a l decision-makers'  designate  as  governance, atypical  perceives  especially  response  populace-at-large unrest  as  is  to  d i r e c t the  such developments,  revolutions  be a r g u e d t h a t overt  Baathists;  a d h e r e d t o by t h e exacerbate had been strife.  the  the  Iraqi  2 2  attention  the  external  the  hostile  s h o u l d be  noted  can g i v e  s t a n d supreme.  rise  Overall,  in partial  to it  terms,  held  dear  p o s i t i o n t o w a r d Baghdad  fundamentalist  by t h e  source the  that  i n r o a d was,  of  not  industry of  And, i t  factors  its  Iranian disparaging of values  standing level  fostered  to  precisely,  from a b r o a d , a  engage t h e  in a military conflict.  relative and,  2 1  More  o u t w a r d by v i l i f y i n g t h e and t o  of  these preferred  an i n t e r n a l t h r e a t those engendered  a menace,  a reaction to  polities,  a casus b e l l i .  among t h e v a r i o u s c a u s a l  by t h e  the  paramount  c o n c u r r e n c e and  any d i s r u p t i o n o f  constituting  when an e l i t e  will  the  s t r u c t u r a l - f u n c t i o n a l school  the p r e s e r v a t i o n of  accordingly,  that  by  and t h o s e c h a m p i o n e d b y  tranquility within their respective  nation  the  state. Proponents of  of  espoused  to  of  c l e r i c a l regime  served  Iraqi-Iranian tension  lengthy h i s t o r y of  interstate  to that  12 An a d d i t i o n a l c o n s i d e r a t i o n , of  an a t t a c k i n g s t a t e ' s m o t i v a t i o n s ,  precision of  inherent  attempting  in its  a strategic  foment  dissidence  aggressor  appraisals,  By and l a r g e ,  Baghdad o v e r e s t i m a t e d  it  will  the p o t e n t i a l within  of the  the  factors,  perceptions  it  of  It  by a n a t i o n t o  is  necessary  is  to  of  realize  is  estimations  its  to p l a n the  attack  clerics  keeping the  a d v e r s a r y unaware o f salient attack.  leadership  manner. the  of  an rarely  Typically, overall  a means o f  attaining  structure  related  inciting state's disposal  and t h e  manner,  aggressive  deficiencies 2 3  depth  surprise is  in a highly secretive  vulnerable to  that  beyond  An o p p o r t u n i t y  by t h e  the m i l i t a r y c a p a b i l i t y at  target  Iranian  given to  g e n e r a l l y p r e d i c a t e d u p o n two m a i n ,  of the  alternatively,  note t h a t  strategic  and economic d e s i g n s .  an o b s e r v a n c e  on  examine t h e  important to  amount o f t h o u g h t  considerations:  was a c t i n g  Iraq.  w o r t h o f u t i l i z i n g a s u r p r i s e a t t a c k as political  is  or  for the  conducted i n a c a p r i c i o u s o r spontaneous a considerable  it  o p p o r t u n i t y h e l d by t h e  attacking state.  attempt  is  necessity  be p o s t u l a t e d  In f u r t h e r a t t r i b u t i n g c a u s a l i t y , motivational  of  In other words,  c a r e f u l l y weighed  misestimations.  degree  surprise.  the  of  the  analysis  regarding the  determine whether the  basis  is  an  valuations  important to  to  germane t o  elite capacity  thereby  intentions;  that  render  and, the  13 It  is  mounting of  imperative that  a state envisioning  a s u r p r i s e a t t a c k p o s s e s s an a d v a n c e d c a p a b i l i t y  in various military attributes, transportation,  as w e l l  as  have been a l t e r n a t i v e l y by R o b e r t A x e l r o d , shock.  i n c l u d i n g communications and  l e a d e r s h i p and t a c t i c s ,  dubbed a s  "resources  another leading analyst  Quite often,  existing  a nation's  of  of  estimate of  g r o u n d e d on a b e l i e f  that  are superior to  Qualitative  in arriving  executing  a fruitful  experience,  at  to  army d i v i s i o n s ,  the  are of  Of t h e  of  extent of  "On W a r , " C l a u s e w i t z a s s e r t e d  decisive  command o f m i l i t a r y f o r c e s ,  paramount p r e r e q u i s i t e  of  inherent the  l i k e l i h o o d of combat are  are the  crucial. number o f  a r t i l l e r y and t a n k  that  for the  politic  of  and  d i r e c t i o n of and t h e  a  successful  D i e n b i e n p h u was  commander o v e r p l a n n i n g and e x e c u t i o n  the  surprise.  i n G e n e r a l Nguyen G i a p ' s  French g a r r i s o n at  as  renowned  constituted  achievement  d e m o n s t r a b l e c o n n e c t i o n between t h e  out  which F r e d e r i c k  G r e a t and Napoleon Bonaparte e p i t o m i z e d ,  investment  the  In h i s  treatise  is  i n many  command h a s b e e n s i n g l e d  a p a r t i c u l a r l y important property.  of  approximate  former,  most n o t a b l e  along with the  The a d r o i t n e s s  More r e c e n t l y ,  surprise  and m i l i t a r y l e a d e r s h i p  latter,  degree  adversary.  an a p p r a i s a l o f  inroad.  mobility,  With respect  indices  2 4  strategic  military forces,  those of the  and q u a n t i t a t i v e  relevance  support.  its  which  surprise"  the  opportunity for attaining strategic  respects,  the  the  outcome  a supreme of  the  14 effort.  It  2 5  confident  will  be p o s i t e d  that the  sufficient  to  strength  the  capability  strike  the  the  discerning  actual  to  deception, which, of  the  objectives.  for a surprise  c o n t i n g e n t upon t h e  forces  conduct which  attack  a practice basically,  aims  which in  that  l e s s a r d u o u s w i t h i n n a t i o n s r u l e d b y an  the  general  absence of p o l i t i c a l  populace-at-large of  the  and d e c e p t i o n it  are both is  argued t h a t the Iraq's the  the  cabalistic  inroad to  that  2 7  f o r the is  public  cognizance secrecy  realization It  of will  control  p l a n n i n g and p r e p a r a t i o n  in a clandestine  to  the  Although  rigid  of  attributed  most c r u c i a l .  Baath e l i t e ' s  enabled  be c o n d u c t e d  largely  lack of  elite.  important  latter  m i l i t a r y forces  the  The p r e s e r v a t i o n  p a r t i c i p a t i o n by  and a r e s u l t i n g  g o a l s and a c t i o n s o f  surprise,  c a n be  secrecy  a  secrecy  and t h i s  as  at  state  a u t h o r i t a r i a n regime,  is  from  c a n be c o n d u c t e d  sway o f .  small  r e f e r r e d to  state  governance  for  important  The d e g r e e t o  manner o f  a  particular is  was  necessitates  Equally  opposing  2 6  under the  planning  a g g r e s s i v e ends t o  decision-makers. of  was  h a v i n g an a d e q u a t e  s e c r e t i v e manner,  leadership  is  Iraqi military  to  ability  by C l a u s e w i t z ,  preventing  is  of  employment  "stratagem"  planning  is  I r a q i regime  defenses.  p r i o r knowledge o f  and c o h e s i v e u n i t a careful  the  importance  in a highly  restricting  of  overrun Iran's  Of comparable military  t h a t the  manner.  be  over for  D e c e p t i o n has not always been a s c r i b e d importance t h a t the  use  of  agility"  it  presently  deception,  connotes.  the  i n t e n d e d avenue  for  deluding the  diminished the offensive,  forces  onslaught,  enemy,  thereby  overwhelm t h e  of  level  To C l a u s e w i t z ,  which i n c l u d e d such " t r i c k s  as the p o s i t i o n i n g o f  2 8  force  the  possibility  of  a strategical  inferior the  to  those of the  unacceptably high r i s k  that  such a subterfuge  hazardous courses to  i n command o f opponent.  a cognizance  of  relying  on d e c e p t i o n ,  of  ruse.  this  of debacle,  and n i n e t e e n t h - c e n t u r y  result  focused  of  the  upon),  advent  of  the  heightening use,  of  this  Europe  of  inherent  epoch t h a t  the  function,  pretext  proponent  eighteenth  Clausewitz's inescapable  as w e l l  of w a r f a r e .  3 0  as the  of  ended w i t h  Second World War, which e f f e c t e d  of  due  in  c o n c e a l i n g t h e movements  i n f a n t r y and c a v a l r y ,  less  Overall,  stratagem during  of  advocated  o n l y when o t h e r  pitfalls  (the  be  demonstrably  Clausewitz  w h i c h was l a r g e l y an  d i f f i c u l t y of  large contingents  forces  to  Clausewitz  C l a u s e w i t z was n o t a s t r o n g  The l i m i t e d u t i l i t y o f  writings  actual  ploy to  a c t i o n were u n a v a i l i n g . potential  from  Moreover, because  2 9  be r e s o r t e d t o  of the  away  a failure  equated stratagem with gambling, m a i n l y by one  of  potential  for the  In a d d i t i o n ,  use  while  concomitantly  available  r a i s i n g the  target's  presented  the p r a c t i c e  of  i n areas  defenses.  put to  the  a  rapid  frequency  This rather  the  sudden  of  16 development  c a n be l a r g e l y a t t r i b u t e d t o  innovations  i n the  rapidity  onslaught  of  w a r p l a n e and t h e  technological  engines of d e s t r u c t i o n needed t o  tank.  achieve  The numerous  o r c h e s t r a t e d by H i t l e r ,  so v i t a l  surprise:  a  c o o r d i n a t i o n o f German g r o u n d a n d a i r  painfully  s t i r r e d awareness  European  deception  has been t h e  c o m p l e x methods  this  forces,  actuality within  methods  accessory  identified  contrivance of  of deceiving of  i n the  deception,  phenomenon o f  two p r i n c i p a l  novel  adversaries.  and  strategic an  In terms  surprise,  the  target  state;  attention  of the  adversary toward a s i n g l e  the  overriding,  albeit  false,  the  scholar  of  intentional  the  of  of  has  of the  elite  of  increasingly  Barton Whaley, a top  options:  level  usefulness  augmentation  of  various  capitals. C o i n c i d i n g w i t h an i n c r e a s e  actual  the  devastatingly  effective  this  the  blitzkriegs  which e n t a i l e d  of  for  o f u n c e r t a i n t y p r e v a i l i n g among and, a l t e r n a t i v e l y ,  threat.  a drawing and  T h e s e two o p t i o n s  3 1  have  b e e n a l t e r n a t i v e l y dubbed b y D o n a l d D a n i e l and K a t h e r i n e Herbig,  two o t h e r  leading experts  ("ambiguity"-heightening), deceptions. made u s e  3 2  on d e c e p t i o n ,  and " M - t y p e "  A k e y argument o f  this  ("misleading")  thesis  of both aforementioned v a r i a n t s of In u t i l i z i n g the  confusing  former method,  as " A - t y p e "  as  is  t h a t Baghdad  deception. a means  of  a n e m e s i s and c o n c e a l i n g m a j o r o b j e c t i v e s ,  protagonist's  leadership w i l l  often  establish  a wide  a range  17 of  diverse  the  ruse  of  objectives,  a practice referred to  "alternative  goals."  b y Whaley  A reliance  3 3  upon  this  method,  when u n d e r t a k e n i n a c a r e f u l and w e l l - p l a n n e d  manner,  and i n c o n c e r t  (irrelevant the  information),  besieger.  type the  of  investment was t o  A notable  s t r a t a g e m was  Allied  Forces of  propagation of  example  of  on t h e  benefits  an a p p l i c a t i o n o f  continent,  thereby  by  cross-channel  principal  number o f p o s s i b l e  aim o f  locations  increasing  which  for  the  Berlin's  u n c e r t a i n t y and s e r v i n g t o m a i n t a i n t h e  deployment  contingents  f r o m t h e Normandy  coast.  of  German f o r c e s  on t h e  part of  i n the  past  of  to  of  deception  victim state,  where t h e  transmission  opponent  use  the  alternatively,  aggressor  nebulous  rivet  the  upon d i s c e r n i b l e ,  T h i s t r a c k makes h e a v y u s e example  of  this  artifice  Germany's i n t e l l i g e n c e of  that  which succeeded  an o v e r t  to  increase  there  large  has  focus  endeavored  of  equivocation  have been  information, the  instances  to  diminish  and, government  of  the  although baseless,  signals.  of  A celebrated  disinformation.  was t h e  effort  organizations,  " O p e r a t i o n B a r b a r o s s a " (the  Union),  of  3 4  Beyond t h e  the  far-afield  to  this  " P l a n B o d y g u a r d , " w h i c h was u s e d  i n p r e p a r a t i o n f o r the  the  "noise"  can y i e l d s i g n i f i c a n t  northern France, the  increase  assault  with the  as  u n d e r t a k e n by  p r i o r to  invasion of  in falsely  the  the  launching  Soviet  convincing Josef  u l t i m a t u m w o u l d be p u t  3 5  Stalin  f o r w a r d by B e r l i n  prior  to  the  the  actual  undertaking of  Soviet U n i o n .  either  method,  Overall,  3 6  is  of  this  of  equal act  secrecy,  Camouflage referred  to 3 7  variations concealment  which,  is  and,  the  the  to  the  two,  an  attacking  likelihood  to  w i t h i n the  cover:  of  of  securing  noise,  lexicon  more b a s i c  and  and t h e  practice  two  ruses  of m i l i t a r y jargon identified  and e q u i p m e n t ;  establishing  two  and 2 )  concentrations  An e x c l u s i v e r e l i a n c e  3 8  must be complemented  features of  disinformation. are  as  principal the  "positive," of  "dummy"  upon  o n l y minimal g a i n s toward a c h i e v i n g  accordingly,  deception,  1) " n e g a t i v e , " w h i c h i n v o l v e s  troops of  the  a l r e a d y mentioned  secrecy,  B a r t o n Whaley h a s of  main forms o f  define  "camouflage,"  and m a t e r i a l .  would y i e l d  citing  beyond t h e  related  which c o n s i s t s forces  increase  importance  include  "cover."  of  of  shock.  In a d d i t i o n to it  against  through a u t i l i z a t i o n  or a combination  s t a t e can s i g n i f i c a n t l y strategic  any m i l i t a r y a c t i o n s  by o t h e r  cover  deception, acts  of  artifice. C o n f u s i o n on t h e  part of  by p u t t i n g  forth a considerable  reiterate,  entails  which  is  to  place  organizations.  3 9  a strain  enemy c a n be  volume  immaterial data, on t h e  the  of  primary  adversary's  b l o c k enemy c o g n i z a n c e  Disinformation differs  increased  noise which,  Disinformation constitutes  means t h r o u g h w h i c h t o objectives.  the  to  function  of  intelligence an of  additional real  from n o i s e m a i n l y  in  19 terms  of  is  to  put  of  a f r a g m e n t a r y and m i s g u i d i n g n a t u r e ,  consists  pertinence;  simply put,  forth discernible  of wholly  the  purpose  intelligence  inconsequential  of  signals, while  signals.  One means o f  state envisioning is  bent  aggression  of  although  the  latter  various  d i s i n f o r m i n g an a d v e r s a r y  d i p l o m a c y ; by u n d e r t a k i n g a renewal  is  diplomatic efforts,  can convince  its  target  contention  exclusively  the  m a i n s t r e a m p r e s s w i l l be u s e d  transmitting misleading  Finally,  turn,  e x e r t s an o v e r r i d i n g c o n t r o l  intelligence  skew t h e  means.  i n p l a n n i n g and t h e of  deception  strategic  surprise.  justification  of  of  a medium  i n which  over the  4 1  for  especially  true  the  press.  success.  the  by p u t t i n g  who,  I n summing u p ,  these  in  secrecy various  prerequisites without  an  forward  a d r o i t l y employ t h e  Any a t t e m p t  surprise,  aegis of  4 3  crucial  a n a l y z i n g the  strategic  under the  reports.  represent  chance  context of  perceptions  a b i l i t y to  stands l i t t l e  Iraq,  4 2  it  Quite  services with counterspies  adversary's  m i s g u i d i n g o r mendacious  forms  states,  is  that  d i s i n f o r m a t i o n c a n be p r o p a g a t e d b y i n f i l t r a t i n g  opponent's  at  information; this  a u t h o r i t a r i a n and t o t a l i t a r i a n  government  as  a  of  through p a c i f i c  D i s i n f o r m a t i o n c a n a l s o be s p r e a d t h r o u g h m e d i a .  of  through  on r e a c h i n g a s e t t l e m e n t r e g a r d i n g m a t t e r s  interstate  often,  former  4 0  D i s i n f o r m a t i o n c a n be sown v i s - a - v i s methods.  the  for a bid attributes  And, toward e s t a b l i s h i n g  Iraqi  attack  it  important to  is  through  dominant Baath p a r t y ,  the  note  that  h a d come  a  20  to  epitomize  an a u t o c r a t i c s o c i e t y ,  approximated the realization  of  furtive  serve  as w e l l  that of  its  the  of the  target  s t r u c t u r e of  inadequate of  4 4  the  state's  exposure  surprise is  to  as w e l l  of  the  for strategic  This thesis  which  strategic  the accepted  attack  i n a manner  of  armor"  effective  a s weak m i l i t a r y f o r c e s to  convince  the  of  opportunity.  surprise.  one t h a t  argues  rocked Iran,  conditions that  the  p r o d u c e an  Again,  4 5  Unusual  true  can g i v e  conducive to  rise  Baathists'  outlook regarding the  strategically  s u r p r i s i n g I r a n was p a r t i a l l y g r o u n d e d on  development  of that  a weakening o f  its  stemmed f r o m t h e  feasibility  of  military forces, Islamic  to  surprise  opportunistic  observations  and  of the v i c t i m ' s v u l n e r a b i l i t y ,  above mentioned a d v e r s e  attack.  in a  A widely  c i r c u m s t a n c e s w i t h i n an a d v e r s a r y c a n o f t e n  l i k e the  to  an a b s e n c e  p l a n n i n g , can serve  aggressor  revolutions,  inroad  discerned "chinks i n the  t h e r e b y augmenting p e r c e p t i o n s  opportunity  military  shortcomings,  opportunity.  Indications  governance,  defensive  salient  a f u r t h e r component o f  e x p l o i t i n g the  and w a t c h f u l  the  conduct a s t r o n g campaign o f  the  adversary.  regarding i t s  a b i l i t y to plan the  attaining strategic  aims a t  elite  as  constitute  protagonist's way o f  estimations  observations  to heighten  surprise,  conducive to  surprise.  manner and t o  deception,  consequently,  above m e n t i o n e d a t t r i b u t e s  In a d d i t i o n to capability,  and,  a  revolution.  21  Following the perceptions structure  underpinning the  for s u r p r i s i n g the  sequential the  i d e n t i f i c a t i o n and e x a m i n a t i o n o f  step i s  c o u l d stem from t h e  opportunity  target  next  incursion.  outcome h e l d by t h e  aggressor's of  of  a strategic  r e p e l the  consequences. that  inroad,  4 6  is  were  accurate  assumptions.  nature which,  for  example,  resolve  rise  to  of  the  horrific  thesis will  Baghdad b a s e d s e v e r a l  key c a l c u l a t i o n s  on  largely  a t t r i b u t e d to Timing  a c t u a l course that  is  this  realizing executed  must  overall opportunity for  Quite often,  onslaughts  have  been  a c e r t a i n h o u r and o n a s p e c i f i c  date  i n order  c a t c h an a d v e r s a r y o f f g u a r d .  been s e v e r a l  shortcoming.  an a d d i t i o n a l , i m p o r t a n t f a c t o r t h a t  surprise. at  envisioned  t h e war h a s t a k e n c a n be  strategic  be c o n s i d e r e d i n g a u g i n g t h e  be  shallow  and t h a t t h e w i d e d i s c r e p a n c y b e t w e e n and t h e  a  regarding the  factually  can g i v e  task  argument o f t h i s  results  to  this  that  A principal  evidence  to  accuracy of  leadership  can i n c l u d e an e r r o n e o u s a p p r a i s a l o f t h e v i c t i m to  of  to  evaluations  o r on i n a d e q u a t e l y w e i g h e d  Miscalculations  the  ramifications  Central  g r o u n d e d o n an i n - d e p t h a n a l y s i s information  state,  regarding the  d e t e r m i n a t i o n o f whether the likely  attacking state's  t o determine the degree  former's valuations  the  instances  In the past,  there  i n which the p r o t a g o n i s t has  have chosen  s t r i k e when t h e v i c t i m was o b s e r v i n g a n a t i o n a l h o l i d a y  o r a day o f  r e l i g i o u s worship f o r a s i g n i f i c a n t  percentage  of  the  populace.  The Japanese  4 7  attack  on P e a r l  Harbor,  w h i c h was u n d e r t a k e n on a Sunday m o r n i n g , and t h e Egyptian-Syrian inroad  into  Israeli  occupied t e r r i t o r y ,  l a u n c h i n g of which c o i n c i d e d with the Yom K i p p u r r e l i g i o u s the  benefits  debilitating  that  losses that  psychological an a g g r e s s o r . be t o  strike  An example  4 8  p r i o r to  the  possibility  target's  elite  that  timing of  reflected  this  of  its  the  various  armaments, as  state. leaders, this  state,  shifts  strategic  the  Iraqi  attack  factors, the  quantitative  which,  of It  (late  to  of  the  elite  is  by  would  concern part of here  the  argued  September)  aforementioned  decision-making,  attack,  is  reiterate,  include  and c o u n t e r e s p i o n a g e  respect,  they  is  whether  o b t a i n them o r t o  influenced  advantages  at  state-of-the-art agents,  w i t h i n the  The m a j o r d i l e m m a f a c e d b y t h e in this  further  and q u a l i t a t i v e  defensive unpreparedness  n a t u r e as  tactic  of  aggression  in  and  when  initiate  espionage,  a general  this  the  assumption.  and c l i m a t i c  disposal  to  as  target  seasonal  physical  w o u l d l i k e l y be m i n i m a l .  r e g a r d i n g when t o by t h e  as w e l l  onset of winter,  Beyond t a k i n g a d v a n t a g e temporal  attacker,  the  important  stark testaments  In a d d i t i o n ,  which a f f e c t  the  h o m e o s t a s i s o f man, c a n a l s o be e x p l o i t e d  regarding the  the  the  the  c a n be i m p o s e d on t h e  practice.  conditions,  onset of  s t a n d as  can accrue to  by o b s e r v i n g t h i s weather  holiday,  1973  as  well  target  protagonist's  to  employ a s s e t s  delay  their  of  23 u t i l i z a t i o n u n t i l an o p t i m a l l e v e l realized. options the  At f i r s t  4 9  does not  latter  the  choosing  aggressor  the  However,  costs  for  instances  for gain  certainty  two  of  is  immediate  for preserving  the  5 0  Noteworthy examples i n c l u d e the  decision  of  secretly  obtained  with the  i n the  loss of  Israeli  incursion,  of  i n 1973,  the  i n the  s h o c k upon c o u n t e r a t t a c k i n g  Israeli  asset wholly w o r t h w h i l e .  decision  to  attack  b a s e d on t h e  consequently,  that  action before  the  dogfights the  considerable  rendering the  cost  i n l a t e September the  of  of  1980  was  w o u l d be t o  partially  anarchial conditions  Iraq's  c l e r i c a l regime had t h e  to  Baghdad's  I r a n would not p r e v a i l i n d e f i n i t e l y it  actual  With regard  5 1  w i l l be m a i n t a i n e d t h a t  conclusion that  postrevolutionary  in  a i r c r a f t once t h e  preserving this  it  thus  inflict  initiated,  the  although  weeks p r e c e d i n g  i n r o a d had been  hand,  missiles  a number o f w a r p l a n e s  a i r force  at  r e f r a i n from  launching of  which,  e n a b l e d E g y p t and S y r i a t o  case study  above quandary  anti-aircraft  f r o m Moscow p r i o r t o  s u r p r i s e a t t a c k upon I s r a e l resulting  r e s o l v i n g the  b y C a i r o and Damascus t o  employing advanced b a t t e r i e s  the  be  in opting  i n most  potential  j e t t i s o n s the attendant  can  f r o m among t h e  former which,  conclusion that  g a i n a n d must b e a r t h e means.  benefit  appear p r o b l e m a t i c .  r a t h e r than the  stems from t h e greater,  glance,  of  advantage  to  opportunity  within and, take to  consolidate nation's  its  armed  p o l i t i c a l ascendancy  and t o  opportunity structure are: developments,  had they  compelled the  aggressor  germane t o  first,  arisen, to  that  would have  abandon t h e  a d e t e r m i n a t i o n o f whether  envisioning  the  inroad.  systems,  plans  for  or not  troops,  or a s t a b i l i z a t i o n  the  the  only the  state  emergence  new  affairs,  a weapon  can  Iraq,  I  in  Iran,  one w i l l i n g t o m a i n t a i n s t r o n g t i e s w i t h t h e  and t h a t  Baghdad was n o t d i s s u a d e d  observations  that  T e h e r a n was  cancel  a secular  the  obtain  regime West,  incursion,  from a t t a c k i n g  l i k e l y to  dash  With regard  to  would have p r o b a b l y p e r s u a d e d I r a q t o  of  knowledge  such as  or diminish opportunity for r e a l i z i n g s u r p r i s e . argue t h a t  the  indications  a c q u i s i t i o n of  of p o l i t i c a l  of  aggression;  obtain prior  U n a n t i c i p a t e d developments,  routine rotation of  state's  likely  s u r p r i s e a t t a c k d i s c e r n e d any  t h e v i c t i m h a d an o p p o r t u n i t y t o  the  analyzing a  an i d e n t i f i c a t i o n  and s e c o n d ,  of  the  forces.  Two f i n a l o b j e c t i v e s  that  rebuild  by  advanced  warning. Having put the assailing into the  perspective, shortcomings  nation's the  state's  inducement the  to  discussion  will that  defense  the  forces  shape  give r i s e  size  an  structures  now f u r t h e r  sudden a g g r e s s i o n .  opportunities,  besieged nation's  that  and o p p o r t u n i t y  and c o n d i t i o n s  exposure  aggressor's  cardinal factors  to  address the  victim  In s i m i l a r i t y and s t r e n g t h  constitutes  an  of  initial  to the  determinant to will  be e v a l u a t e d  be m a i n t a i n e d t h a t  in explaining vulnerability.  the  overhauling of the  w h i c h was m a i n l y u n d e r t a k e n i n c o n s o n a n c e of  the  Islamic  revolution,  and q u a l i t a t i v e  value  I r a n i a n m i l i t a r y machine.  of  the  In a d d i t i o n to force,  state to  discern external  to  attack.  cognitive  an i m p a i r m e n t o f  Failure to  cognitive,  terms,  threats  the  of basic  can redouble  clearly  established,  s t e m f r o m two p r i n c i p a l ,  actualities: as w e l l  intelligence  the as  With regard to collection,  as  the  former,  operational  dysfunctions of  that  must be c l a s s i f i e d  increase data,  i n the  thereby  strategic  5 3  germane  signals  crucial  information or  And, such a c o n d i t i o n can l e a d to  amount o f  decreasing  warning.  the  regarding ready  and d i s s e m i n a t i o n  either  time needed the  in  has  circumscribed extent of  when t h o s e c h a r g e d w i t h t h i s  as  The  largely  a r e c o n f r o n t e d w i t h an o v e r t a x i n g v o l u m e o f  noise.  exposure  analysts  task  immaterial  of  target  Charles Lindblom  limitations  analysis,  can a r i s e  the its  by p r o f e s s i o n a l  monitoring,  i n the  dimensions  a b i l i t y of  intelligence  5 2  in  deterrent  routine  data.  both  and p o l i t i c a l h i n d r a n c e s .  b a r r i e r s encountered  human i n t e l l e c t  spirit  o b t a i n w a r n i n g c a n stem f r o m  organizational,  inescapable  forces,  effect,  upon t h e  an a t t e n u a t i o n  military  with the  h a d an e n e r v a t i n g  quantitative  armed  It  to  possibility  thoroughly of  an  analyze  obtaining  A f a i l u r e to analysts  recognize  make i n f e r e n c e s  convey t o  actuality,  It  is  equation,  effecting  Indeed,  between t h e  level  professionals their  of  in intelligence  an  dangerous  analyses  that  facing  to  organizational  p u t f o r t h by t h e  Charles Lindblom, maintains that  important problems i n h e r e n t decision-making  is  that  i n the  such a c o g n i t i v e consequences  omission,  f o r the  stems  target  5 6  data,  from  can a l s o  heighten  a leading scholar one o f  process  a  analysis.  of  the  A notable  on  more  governmental  individuals involved in  and e s t i m a t i o n s .  c a n be  protagonist;  f o r m a t i o n o f p o l i c y r o u t i n e l y choose o p t i o n s ideals  basis  an i n u n d a t i o n o f  among p o l i t i c a l e l i t e s  theory,  on t h e  career analysts  p l a n n i n g ; and t e n d e n t i o u s  attack.  accuracy of  linkage  act  r e v e a l i n g i n f o r m a t i o n , which o f t e n  Common b i a s  into  To sum u p ,  5 5  on t h e p a r t o f  noise  the  5 4  intelligence  to which they  prejudgments.  of  is,  situation.  a demonstrable  following conditions:  secretive  personal  when  p e r s o n a l b i a s e s can e n t e r  exists  degree  failures  which can c o n s i s t paucity of  that  equivocation  and t h e  p r o d u c e d by t h e  exposure  information, a  a f u r t h e r skewing o f  there  individual  intelligence  highly  designs of  a h i g h l y i n t r i c a t e and v o l a t i l e  i n such s i t u a t i o n s  analysis.  of  arise  p o l i c y - m a k e r s a n e l e m e n t a r y d e p i c t i o n o f what  in  the  can r e s u l t  can a l s o  regarding the  a d v e r s a r y b a s e d on e q u i v o c a l practice that  threat  the  that  reflect  example  of  which had p r o f o u n d l y grave state,  was S t a l i n ' s  rejection  of  intelligence onslaught,  signals that  a decision  i n d i c a t e d a l o o m i n g German  b a s e d on h i s  H i t l e r was a r a t i o n a l a c t o r a n d , undertake so Union. of the  i r r a t i o n a l an a c t  In a d d i t i o n to  close-knit  as  bias,  mainly p e c u l i a r to  elites  that  championed d o c t r i n e ,  additional  problems  f o r the  security.  It  contributing warning of  w i l l be d e m o n s t r a t e d  Iraqi  intricate,  safeguarding  national  of  of  diminishes  f a i l u r e to  security.  detection  Given the  operations,  limited,  as w e l l  often  complexity  as  and t h e  departments  and  often  dissemination condition  Additionally,  and p r e r o g a t i v e s  state organizations, sharing of  and  security  A n d , more  5 8  of  of  a structural  "compartmentation."  cooperation  task  national  tasks.  over l i m i t e d resources  bureaus,  are very  and i n t r a o r g a n i z a t i o n a l  strictly as  gain  h i e r a r c h i a l composition  highly specific  intraoffice  alluded to  different  national  " g r o u p t h i n k " among  u s u a l l y comprise a myriad of  assigned  competition  of  charged with the  intelligence  information is  often  deviations  incursion.  institutions  than not,  any  advanced  governmental  offices  phenomenon  f a c t o r u n d e r l y i n g the  by t h e  organizations  the  Soviet  a major  Problems r e g a r d i n g t h r e a t  sensitivity  the  z e a l o t s who came t o power i n I r a n was  the  engendered  that  not  can pose  5 7  preservation  of  that  regimes under  discourage  from t h e  clerical  would  an i r r u p t i o n  i n thought  the  conviction  accordingly,  individual elite  "groupthink," which i s sway o f  personal  data.  between further  For  28  example, t h e i n t e n s e coordination and  b e t w e e n U.S.  m i l i t a r y , contributed  debacle. of  r i v a l r y and t h e r e s u l t a n t d e a r t h o f s e c u r i t y agencies, both heavily to the Pearl  civilian  Harbor  The f a c t t h a t t h e c o n v e y a n c e o f a f o r m a l  warning  i m p e n d i n g a t t a c k t o o n - s i t e commanders i n H a w a i i  coincided  with  t h e a c t u a l a r r i v a l o f Japanese torpedo-bomber  a i r c r a f t stands as a sobering  demonstration of the  p o t e n t i a l consequences t h a t can r e s u l t from friction.  Regarding t h e main focus o f t h i s  intrabureau study,  s p e c i f i c a l l y the factors that heightened Iran's a surprise I r a q i attack, f a i l u r e t o recognize  i t w i l l be p o s i t e d  exposure t o  that  Teheran's  and e f f e c t i v e l y r e a c t t o w a r n i n g  s i g n a l s c a n be l a r g e l y a t t r i b u t e d t o t h e p o l i t i c a l between governmental o r g a n i z a t i o n s  strife  founded d u r i n g t h e  m o n a r c h i a l epoch and t o t h o s e e s t a b l i s h e d a f t e r t h e o n s e t o f the  revolution.  obstacles  O v e r a l l , c o g n i t i v e and o r g a n i z a t i o n a l  constituted,  revolutionary  Iran's  i n large part, the causation  of  i n t e l l i g e n c e shortcomings.  A f t e r c i t i n g t h e key inadequacies regarding  the  v i c t i m ' s m i l i t a r y f o r c e s and e s t a b l i s h i n g t h e v a r i o u s factors that contributed services t o obtain objectives  s t r a t e g i c w a r n i n g , t h e n e x t germane  a r e t h e f o l l o w i n g : t o d i s c e r n whether o r not t h e  aggressor benefitted the  target  to the failure of i t s intelligence  from t h e presence o f supporters  s t a t e ; t o i d e n t i f y and examine u n i q u e  v u l n e r a b i l i t i e s ; and, t o determine t h e l e v e l o f t h e  within  29  aggressor's the  target  will  cognizance state.  the  aggregate v u l n e r a b i l i t i e s  With regard to  be a r g u e d t h a t  Republic,  of  on b e h a l f  of  the  conservative  Baghdad r e g a r d i n g I r a n ' s  will of  be h e l d t h a t  because o f  the  standard operating procedures  was that  organizations,  further increased. the  Iran's  Iraqi  elite  "window o f  w i l l be  f u l l y aware o f  is  s t a t e had o p e n l y likely  and,  if  undertaken. officials,  the  b y m i l i t a r y and  Islamic Republic's it  it  breakdown  p o l i c y - m a k e r s and  exposure  demonstrated  postrevolutionary  vulnerability."  A f i n a l v a r i a b l e t o be a n a l y z e d vulnerability  information  In a d d i t i o n ,  adhered to  the  exile  already-mentioned  Finally,  was  Iranian  shortcomings.  it  Islamic  provided useful  n o r m a t i v e b e h a v i o r among e l i t e  governmental  Iraq-Iran case,  agents working w i t h i n the  community r e s i d i n g w i t h i n I r a q , to  the  of  whether  any o f f i c i a l s  expressed  so,  a belief  regarding w i t h i n the  that  aggression  why no p r e c a u t i o n a r y a c t i o n  I posit  that  a number o f  p r i n c i p a l l y President  m a i n t a i n e d on numerous o c c a s i o n s pending but,  due t o  reactionary  clerics,  intense p o l i t i c a l little  secular  Bani-Sadr, that  the  besieged was  was Iranian  openly  Iraqi  attack  feuding with  i m p o r t a n c e was a t t a c h e d  was  the to  his  monitions. Once t h e opportunity that elucidated,  inducement  structure  animated the  and t h e  causal  and t h e  attacking state  factors  perceptions are  underpinning the  target  of  30 state's  exposure  to  r e m a i n i n g component state of third  relations  states,  attack  are  of  equation  the  identified,  between t h e  and how t h i s  to  i n c e n t i v e s and o p p o r t u n i t i e s ,  as w e l l  exposure  it  Islamic  to  shock.  In s h o r t ,  Republic followed  w h i c h was  largely  spreading  an a f f i n i t y  throughout  the  accordingly, isolated  g r o u n d e d on t h e  the  more r a d i c a l ,  significantly nations  of  and S e p t e m b e r  as  de f a c t o  allies  support.  Overall,  it  to  is  establish  of  the  Islamic  of  Islam And,  be as  Arab  p e r i o d between J a n u a r y  a result,  was  emboldened  and a s o u n d b a s e o f h e r e i n argued t h a t  concomitantly,  regional  the  of  Gulf Baghdad,  or  opportunity  a role  but which the on  by a  Iranian  the  afforded  hegemon,  1979  logistical  a significant  R e p u b l i c was b e n t  one  regimes,  with conservative  l o n g been p l a y e d by m o n a r c h i a l I r a n , elite  policy,  who were o n c e v i e w e d  Saddam H u s s e i n ,  I r a q as the  the  internationally  will  a profound a l t e r a t i o n  o f power w h i c h ,  more a c c u r a t e l y ,  it  anti-Western Arab  number o f  balance  that  foreign  I r a n was  score,  Baathists,  and,  Revolution effected  postulated  allies.  West d u r i n g t h e  1980  and  latter's  overriding design  1980,  improved r e l a t i o n s  and t h e  the  r e g i o n and b e y o n d .  R e g a r d i n g I r a q on t h i s  of  as  the  former's  1  by September  the  the  is  victim,  for revolutionary S h i i t e  Persian Gulf  that  the  a confrontational  and l a c k e d s t r o n g  demonstrated  is  last  be w o r k e d o u t  aggressor,  influenced  the  that  had  clerical  terminating.  31 The I m p o r t a n c e o f Indeed, the  Studying Strategic  strategic  d e s c r i p t i o n i n the  surprise,  and t a r g e t  c l e a r l y evidenced  preceding section,  c o m p l e x phenomenon f o r s t u d y . aggressor  as  state,  Surprise  constitutes  Beyond t h e i r  efforts  to  salience  realize  shock can produce f a r - r a n g i n g r a m i f i c a t i o n s nations.  The i l l - f a t e d outcome o f  which has  served to  of  to  threat  the  increase  security  of  the  namely t h e  Japanese  a l l Gulf  German a t t a c k  s t r i k e on P e a r l H a r b o r ,  of  the  events that  over vast  Pearl  areas  of  conflict  i n the  eastern  set  b o m b i n g s o f H i r o s h i m a and N a g a s a k i and t h e  acutely  felt  by L a o s ,  In recent surprise  the  e v i d e n c e d by t h e  Asia,  highly destructive bomber, t h e  II  atomic  advent  of most  importance of  extremely  weapon s y s t e m s ,  Trident  hegemony  and Cambodia.  central  of  series  the  a development  T h i s development  development  of  obtain.  i n motion a  i n American n u c l e a r warfare s t r a t e g y  i n c r e a s i n g l y prominent.  2)  region,  Vietnam,  years,  d i d not  ghastly  -  U n i o n and  expectations  and s o u t h e a s t e r n  American i m p e r i a l i s m i n the  should  smashing o f Japanese  c u l m i n a t i o n o f w h i c h was marked b y t h e  level  past  Soviet  elite  Harbor episode  resulted  adventure,  notable  on t h e  the  third  Arab s t a t e s ,  In s e v e r a l  a v o i d i n g a p r o t r a c t e d and c o s t l y F o r example,  for  strategic  for  Iraqi  a  r a t h e r than diminish the  n o t be c o n s t r u e d as u n u s u a l . instances,  the  by  has  strategic become  has been  clearly  a c c u r a t e and  i n c l u d i n g the  Stealth  submarine-launched b a l l i s t i c  (B-  missile  (SLBM),  which employs  and t h e  Seawolf  nuclear attack  various  confrontational machinations,  of  A-6 attack  Adak,  to  large  Soviet  aircraft,  conduct  at  (MAD),  toward the  to  the  along with  its  r e a l i z a t i o n of  accidental  the  Kremlin which,  n u c l e a r exchange.  precarious posture  of  the  concomitant of mutual  ultimately, Overall,  Soviet  potential  consequences t h i s  development  manifests  the  studying the  strategic  surprise.  importance of  truculent movement  deterrent dangerous the  wariness  a misreading  could trigger  the  Union,  become  assured  has h e i g h t e n e d danger of  the  have  the  an i n h e r e n t l y  U n i o n and r a i s e d t h e  at  posture,  of  use  of  against  significant  of  signals  tenure  concept  offensive  Soviet  p a r t i c u l a r l y the  Petropavlosk,  Moreover, the  first-strike, the  In a d d i t i o n ,  b a s e d on t h e A l e u t i a n i s l a n d  commonplace d u r i n g t h e  away f r o m an a d h e r e n c e  value,  submarine.  installation  Reagan a d m i n i s t r a t i o n .  destruction  a d v a n c e d Mk-500 w a r h e a d ,  r e g u l a r mock b o m b i n g s o r t i e s  naval  increasingly  the  an  increasingly  and a l l t h e carries,  grave,  clearly  phenomenon  of  of  33  CHAPTER I NOTES C o l o n e l J o h n J . Graham, t r a n s , a n d a n n o t . , On War: G e n e r a l C a r l V o n C l a u s e w i t z ( B o s t o n : R o u t l e d g e & Kegan P a u l , I n c . , 1968), p. 200. 1  K l a u s s K n o r r and P a t r i c k M o r g a n , S t r a t e g i c M i l i t a r y S u r p r i s e : I n c e n t i v e s and O p p o r t u n i t i e s (NewB r u n s w i c k , New J e r s e y : T r a n s a c t i o n B o o k s , 1 9 8 3 ) , p . 2. 2  3  Ibid.  R i c h a r d K. B e t t s , S u r p r i s e A t t a c k : Lessons f o r Defence P l a n n i n g (Washington, D . C . : Brookings Institution, 1982) . 4  D o n a l d D a n i e l and K a t h e r i n e L . H e r b i g , M u l t i d i s c i p l i n a r v P e r s p e c t i v e s on M i l i t a r y D e c e p t i o n (Monterey, C a l i f o r n i a : Naval Postgraduate S c h o o l , 1980). 5  B a r t o n W h a l e y , S t r a t a g e m : D e c e p t i o n and S u r p r i s e War ( C a m b r i d g e : C e n t e r f o r I n t e r n a t i o n a l Studies, Massachusetts I n s t i t u t e of Technology, 1969). 6  in  J o h n Gooch and Amos P e r l m u t t e r , M i l i t a r y D e c e p t i o n and S t r a t e g i c S u r p r i s e ( T o t a w a , New J e r s e y : F . C a s s , Inc., 1982) . 7  A l i E . H i l l a l D e s s o u k i , e d . , "The I r a n - I r a q War: An O v e r v i e w , " i n T h e I r a n - I r a q War: I s s u e s o f C o n f l i c t and Prospects f o r Settlement (Princeton: Center of International S t u d i e s , Woodrow W i l s o n S c h o o l o f P u b l i c and I n t e r n a t i o n a l A f f a i r s , P r i n c e t o n U n i v e r s i t y , 1981). 8  N i c o l a F i r z l i , e d . , The I r a n - I r a q C o n f l i c t (Paris: I n s t i t u t e o f N e a r E a s t e r n S t u d i e s and R e s e a r c h , E d i t i o n s du Monde A r a b e , 1 9 8 1 ) . 9  S t e p h e n R . Grummon, The I r a n - I r a g War: I s l a m E m b a t t l e d ( W a s h i n g t o n , D . C . : The C e n t e r f o r S t r a t e g i c and I n t e r n a t i o n a l S t u d i e s , Georgetown U n i v e r s i t y , 1982). 1 0  S h a u l B a k h a s h , The R e i g n o f I s l a m i c R e v o l u t i o n (New Y o r k : 1 1  and t h e  the A y a t o l l a h s : Iran B a s i c Books, 1984).  R o u h o l l a h K. Ramazani, R e v o l u t i o n a r y I r a n : C h a l l e n g e and R e s p o n s e i n t h e M i d d l e E a s t ( B a l t i m o r e : Johns Hopkins U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s , 1988). 1 2  1 3  (London:  T i m o t h y N i b l o c k , e d . , I r a q : The C o n t e m p o r a r y Croom H e l m , L t d . , 1 9 8 2 ) . P h e b e M a r r , The Modern H i s t o r y o f Westview P r e s s , 1985).  1 4  Colorado:  Iraq  State  (Boulder,  F a u d M a t a r , Saddam H u s s e i n : The Man, t h e F u t u r e (London: T h i r d World C e n t r e , 1981). 1 5  and t h e  The  Cause,  J o e l David Singer, "Accounting f o r International War: T h e S t a t e o f t h e D i s c i p l i n e , " J o u r n a l o f P e a c e R e s e a r c h 1 (February 1981):3. 1 6  Knorr  1 7  and M o r g a n , p .  1 8  Ibid.,  p.  197.  1 9  Ibid.,  p.  175.  174.  J o e l D a v i d S i n g e r , " T h r e a t - P e r c e p t i o n and t h e Armament-Tension Dilemma," J o u r n a l o f C o n f l i c t R e s o l u t i o n (March 1 9 5 8 ) : 3 . 2 0  K e i t h L . N e l s o n and S p e n c e r C . O l i n , W a r ? : I d e o l o g y , T h e o r y , and H i s t o r y ( B e r k e l e y : U n i v e r s i t y o f C a l i f o r n i a P r e s s , 1979), p . 54. 2 1  2 2  2 3  Ibid., Knorr  p.  and M o r g a n , p .  Robert Axelrod, World P o l i t i c s 2 (January Knorr Ibid.,  p.  2 7  Nelson  and O l i n ,  2 8  Graham,  3 0  3 1  Ibid.,  p.  207.  p.  3.  p.  196.  201.  Ibid. Whaley,  195.  "The R a t i o n a l 1979):230.  and M o r g a n , p .  2 6  2 9  J r . , Why The  62.  2 4  2 5  1  9.  p.  39.  Timing of  Surprise,"  3 2  Daniel  3 3  Whaley,  3 4  and H e r b i g , p.  Daniel  p.  56.  p.  6.  131.  and H e r b i g ,  B a r t o n W h a l e y , Codeword B a r b a r o s s a (Cambridge: Center for I n t e r n a t i o n a l Studies, Massachusetts I n s t i t u t e Technology, 1973), p. 242. 3 5  p.  3 6  Ibid.  3 7  Daniel  3 8  Whaley,  Stratagem:  p.  4.  D e c e p t i o n and S u r p r i s e  i n War.  16. 3 9  Ibid.,  p.  17.  4 0  Ibid.  4 1  Ibid.,  p.  22.  4 2  Ibid.,  p.  21.  4 3  Ibid.,  p.  23.  Knorr  4 4  and M o r g a n ,  4 5  Ibid.,  p.  195.  4 6  Ibid.,  p.  197.  4 7  p.  and H e r b i g ,  of  Whaley,  Stratagem:  p.  200.  D e c e p t i o n and S u r p r i s e  i n War.  180. 4 8  4 9  Ibid.,  p.  Axelrod,  5 0  Ibid.  5 1  Ibid.  Charles Through,'" Public 5 2  179. p.  232.  L i n d b l o m , "The S c i e n c e o f ' M u d d l i n g A d m i n i s t r a t i o n Review 2 ( S p r i n g 1959):84.  A r i e l L e v i t e , I n t e l l i g e n c e and S t r a t e g i c S u r p r i s e York: Columbia U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s , 1987), p. 13. 5 3  (New  5 4  Betts,  p.  69.  5 5  Ibid.,  5 6  Lindblom,  5 7  Levite,  5  8ibid.,  p.  p. p.  70. p.  79.  10. 17.  CHAPTER I R A Q ' S INCENTIVES: AND  DEFENSIVE,  v  governance of  relationship  largely  the  two  states  nature.  based  on t h e  interstate  friction.  b r e a k down w i t h t h e  Revolution.  This chapter  shift  For  this  purpose,  certain  the  T h i s w i l l be  for seeking  i n i t i a l part of  followed  ambitions.  cultural factors  inclination  aspects of  Baghdad's d e f e n s i v e  enterprising and  to  of motivations  establishes Iran.  of  effects  against  a logical  of  by  the of  status  Iranian the this  Baathists'  a strategic this  surprise.  examination for of  attacking Iraq's  ideological,  Iran are  ethnic,  Baghdad's studied.  Inducements  defensive motivational point  this  and how  partially constituting  for aggression  Identifying  the  pacific  signed  However,  b y an a n a l y s i s the  of  long-standing,  actuations  Finally,  Defensive  represents  the  i n I r a n upon I r a q i - I r a n i a n t i e s  gave r i s e  structure  This mainly  inception  s t u d i e s the  end  b e t w e e n Baghdad and  covenant,  which r e s o l v e d  quo b e g a n t o  revolution  which marked t h e  relations  a strained  i n 1975,  major sources o f  1980,  in Iran,  T e h e r a n were n o t was  OFFENSIVE,  IDEOLOGICAL-CULTURAL  In e a r l y January of monarchial  II  initiation 37  factors  for evaluating  a  38 regime's  impetus  regard to  the  political  unrest  uncertainty Initially,  for undertaking a surprise attack.  Iraq-Iran case, i n the  it  latter  and f e a r among t h e the  Iraqi  was t h e  that  social  evoked  elite  of  With  and  increasing  the  Government r e a c t e d t o  former. the  Iranian  R e v o l u t i o n w i t h g u a r d e d o p t i m i s m ; p r a i s e was e x t e n d e d I r a n i a n masses i n t h e i r d i c t a t o r s h i p of asserted  that  i n domestic 1979,  Iranian affairs.  the  the  nation's  maintained that  attempting to  influence  decide."  Hussein cautioned that Baghdad and t h e contingent  1  course  of  However,  from t h e  a preservation of  Ba,  of  in Iran,  and  "whatever  the  outset,  Saddam  normal t i e s  between  r e v o l u t i o n a r y I r a n i a n r e g i m e w o u l d be  upon t h e  latter's  r e f r a i n i n g from m e d d l i n g i n  that  r e v o l u t i o n would not a d v e r s e l y  T h e hope o f  two s t a t e s s o o n  apparent that  of  political  accept  Iraqi matters.  between t h e  i n February  events  internal the  entanglement  I r a q h a r b o r e d no d e s i g n s  the  was  I r a q i magazine A l i f  acknowledged  the  the  And, i t  from  F o r example,  B a a t h r e g i m e was w i l l i n g t o  Iranian people  topple  Shah Muhammad R e z a P a h l a v i .  d u r i n g an i n t e r v i e w w i t h t h e  strongman,  b i d to  Baghdad w o u l d r e m a i n a l o o f  Saddam H u s s e i n ,  that  successful  to  it  ruling  Baath p a r t y  affect  relations  became  readily  de j u r e g o v e r n m e n t h e a d e d b y t h e  centrist  P r i m e M i n i s t e r M e h d i B a z a r g a n , w h i c h was g e n u i n e l y  desirous  of  cordial  the  f a d e d as  the  relations  with surrounding Muslim n a t i o n s ,  a s o l i d base of p o p u l a r support,  and t h a t  a coterie  of  lacked  zealous  Shi'ite  clerics  Ruhollah Khomeini, were  fast  emerging as t h e  to  sentiment  Iran believed  foster  adherents,  Khomeini,  that  l o o k e d upon as  t h e y were  obligated  Iraq,  i n the  a catalyst  perturbation  due t o  its  Shi'ite  a point of departure for was t h e  Iraqi  city  position  of Najaf,  to  in Iraq.  the  Islamic  the of  made  that  the  an a n a l o g o u s Shortly after  r e v o l u t i o n would  p o l i t i c a l and  political  s t a b i l i t y within Iraq,  affording  of  assistance to  namely S h i ' i t e  irredentists,  as w e l l  fundamentalists dissemination  Shah,  the  undermine  which i n c l u d e d  elements averse  as t h e  social  deposing the  I r a n i a n c h u r c h m e n commenced a c a m p a i g n t o  dominance,  to  enjoyed o n l y a m a r g i n a l base of p o p u l a r  and, consequently,  2  in  Islamic  population of  Furthermore, i t  living in exile  as  power.  w h i c h was b a s e d upon p e r s o n a l o b s e r v a t i o n s  Baath e l i t e  serve  of  values,  who came t o h o l d sway  p r o x i m i t y and s i z a b l e  was  Islamic  a burgeoning of t r a d i t i o n a l  pan-Islamic crusade.  support,  locus  throughout the Muslim w o r l d .  geographical  while  de f a c t o  extremists  1  revolutionary  aegis of Ayatollah  who c h a m p i o n e d r a d i c a l  The S h i i t e  attempt  under the  to  the  the  Baathists'  and e t h n i c of  Kurdish  anti-Baath  propaganda. Compounding B a g h d a d ' s a p p r e h e n s i o n was t h e enthusiasm the  f o r the v i c t o r i o u s  oppressive  revolutionary struggle  Shah, as e x p r e s s e d  S h i a s who e s p o u s e d  outward  by t h e m i n o r i t y o f  fundamental I s l a m i c v a l u e s ,  a  against Iraqi  significant  40 percentage  o f whom were s u p p o r t e r s  Da'wah a l - I s l a m i y a h ] , opposed  to  the  Baathists, strictly  Hakim,  To t h e  societal  encouraged his  role.  traditionalist the  abd-ul-Aziz  by t h e  the  Muslim Warriors  al-Hakim,  and t h e  command o f Muhammad T a q i  spilling-over  of  end,  d u r i n g the  clerics  was  Islamic  al-Husayni,  one  first  few months  in Iran,  put  a development  the  in  the  a  line  following  Iranian holy  that  forestall  the into  demonstrated  Most o f  an  expelled center  of  condemnations  of  served  b e t w e e n I r a q and I r a n .  Iraq's  to  Baghdad s e n t  who h a d o p e n l y  i n Qom on 22 J u n e 1979, of  Sayyed  Islamic  f e r v o r and,  forth bitter  held  this  w h i c h was u n d e r  Qom where  r i s i n g tension  in  additional  Organization for  i n the  Baath governance,  al-  campaign.  [ a l - M u j a h i d i n ] , l e d by  for traditional Shi'ism.  t h e y began t o  two  was d e t e r m i n e d  reactionary  a number o f  interview  a  Call  i n Iraq at  c h u r c h m e n t o o k up r e s i d e n c e  the  the  Islam to  anti-Baath  emerged  [al-  al-Mudarrisi.  a b r u p t end o f m o n a r c h i a l r u l e  affinity  of  by  r e v o l u t i o n a r y tumult  al-Islami],  The B a a t h l e a d e r s h i p  exile  observed  Baath e l i t e ,  groups  [Munazzamat a l - A m a l  with t h i s  Call  organization  The I s l a m i c  organization's  f u r t h e r dismay of  juncture:  relegating  Islamic  d i r e c t i o n o f H u j j a t a l - I s l a m Muhammad B a q i r  intensify  Shi'ite  activist  imperatives  p a r t i c u l a r l y the  who was  Iran to  Action  ideological  apolitical  under the  a Shi'ite  of the  to  further  During  fuel  an  A y a t o l l a h Mohammad  most r e s p e c t e d  clerics,  charged  that  the  repressive  fundamental  Iraq's  some " f i f t y  "there  free  not  clerical  a single  response  B a a t h r e g i m e was growing s i g n s o f  populace.  thousand I r a q i s to  In  the  Shi'ite  p r i s o n and a r e s u b j e c t is  of  f a c t o r u n d e r l y i n g the  among s e g m e n t s o f held that  leaning  to  authorities,  t h e most  the the  unrest  Shirazi  further  are languishing  in  s a v a g e t o r t u r e , " and  paper i n  Iraq."  Baathists' Islamic  the  3  expulsions  Call,  that  of ranking  along with  the  O r g a n i z a t i o n f o r I s l a m i c A c t i o n and t h e M u s l i m W a r r i o r s , initiated  a n u r b a n w a r f a r e c a m p a i g n , w i t h an e m p h a s i s  sabotaging staging The  i m p o r t a n t m i l i t a r y and i n d u s t r i a l s i t e s  armed a t t a c k s  most d a r i n g o f  the various attempt  to  the  Shi'ite damage  Aziz  1980,  obtained  Iraqi  support to  the  B a s r a and an Tariq  he was d e l i v e r i n g an a d d r e s s  4  identified  that  and i n t i m a t e d t h a t  as  recently  Shortly afterward,  disclosed  the  Gholam was a n a g e n t T e h e r a n was  extending  movement. authorities  Iranian c l e r i c s '  put  at  The w o u l d - b e  a n I r a n i a n i m m i g r a n t who h a d  citizenship.  Call  Iraqi the  while  of  unsuccessful  a s s a s s i n a t e Deputy Prime M i n i s t e r  Government o f f i c i a l l y Islamic  officials.  i n c l u d e d an  who was wounded and c a p t u r e d , was  Samir M i r Gholam,  the  groups  M u s t a n s i r i y a h U n i v e r s i t y i n Baghdad.  assassin,  a n d on  u n d e r t a k e n by o p e r a t i v e s  I r a q ' s main n a v a l y a r d a t  to  the  h i g h government  actions  activist  abortive effort on 1 A p r i l  against  on  forward f u r t h e r evidence  complicity in abetting  anti-Baath  of  of  42 subversives  i n l a t e May, when S a l a h A l - A l i ,  attached  Iraq's mission  to  the  to  the  a  diplomat  United Nations,  available  to  extracted  f r o m A b d u l Ameor Hameed a l - M a n s o u r i , a  member o f  the  Islamic  interrogation dissension  G e n e r a l Assembly c o p i e s o f  that  Call,  the  agents of  who h a d r e v e a l e d  Khomeinists'  the  the  organization to  confession captured  during  attempts to  w i t h i n Iraq included the  a s s i s t a n c e a n d weaponry t o  a  made  promote  affording of  Islamic  Call  cross the  financial  and  allowing  Iranian  frontier  unimpeded.5 An a d d i t i o n a l support of  the  source  Islamic  of  anxiety  r e v o l u t i o n openly  Ayatollah Sayyid al-Sadr,  Iraq's  To A y a t o l l a h a l - S a d r ,  Islamic  designation a model o f  of  the  an i d e a l  he e n v i s i o n e d  political foremost  Islamic  cleric,  received  allude  to  the  i n Qom, where the  Ayatollah al-Sadr's resulted  in a direct  conveyed  his  system,  of  i n which he,  w o u l d s e r v e as  intent  (the  by f r e q u e n t l y  establishment  The l a u d a t i o n s  h i m as  Republic  the  a as  6  the  by  cardinal Shi'ite  political  Baathists  system i n I r a q ,  of-government. well  the  professed  churchman.  official  revolutionary Iranian polity)  f u r t h e r dismayed the that  f o r Baghdad was  constituted  and he  maintaining  comparable the  nation's  both h e a d - o f - s t a t e  and h e a d -  o f A y a t o l l a h a l - S a d r were clerical  "Khomeini o f championing of confrontation  Iraq."  leadership 7  Not  began  unexpectedly,  revolutionary  Islam  w i t h Saddam H u s s e i n ,  o f p r e c l u d i n g an i n c i t e m e n t  to  of  who  traditional personal that  S h i ism t o  letter  "I s h a l l  repeated Sadr."  the  1  sent  s p i r i t u a l leader v i s - a - v i s  i n May o f  not allow the  i n w h i c h he  I r a n i a n experiment  admonished  to  be  i n I r a q and A y a t o l l a h a l - S a d r t o become Imam  8  The B a a t h i s t s  opted to  m a c h i n a t i o n s u n d e r t a k e n by t h e heavy hand. statesmen,  allegedly  carried  provided the  involvement  of  the  d i m i n i s h the  i n the  Najaf,  l o o k e d upon as Shi'ite  and t o  assail  fanaticism.  holy centers  and B a s r a .  a potential  the  internal Iranian  fifth  of  the  Saddam H u s s e i n stability scholars  I s l a m i c community c e n t e r s  Shi'ite  Kufa,  to  grounds  Following  on T a r i q A z i z ,  l a r g e numbers o f  scores of  southeastern  Kadhimain,  attempt  of  Iraqi  with defensible  perceived threat  presence the  upon  c l e r i c a l I r a n i a n regime.  abortive assassination  posed by t h e  I s l a m i c groups with a  attacks  elite  activists  1  studying at  radical  destabilizing  out by I r a n i a n - b a c k e d  Iraqi  c r a c k down on S h i i t e  moved t o  counter the  The o u t b r e a k o f v i o l e n t  operatives, to  1979,  a  located  Karbala,  These I r a n i a n s  column t h a t  Saddam H u s s e i n moved t o  could  were foment  counter  this  p e r c e i v e d t h r e a t b y f o r c i b l y d e p o r t i n g some f o r t y  thousand  of  an  these  "undesirables."  T h i s development  evoked  outpouring of b i t t e r  a n t i - B a a t h r e c r i m i n a t i o n s from T e h e r a n  a n d Qom and e f f e c t e d  a considerable heightening  b e t w e e n I r a q and I r a n . international  I n an a t t e m p t  opposition to the  to  of  tension  l i m i t domestic  forced expulsions,  Iraqi  and  diplomats  argued before  the  Islamic R e p u b l i c ' s charges of  a general  anti-Shi'ite  were g r o u n d l e s s ; had o u s t e d  Iranian  the  the  deportations  the  instigation  regime."  the  that  and w i t h t h e  the  large-scale  sought  i n t e r n a l s t a t u s quo,  of  1980  c o l l u d i n g with the  to  the  the  evidence the  of  Iranian  menace  long period of  of  of  of  of  death  an esteemed a  close in  Iraq,  In  1 0  pro-traditionalist  Islamic Republic's m i n i s t e r i a l  Saddam H u s s e i n ' s  popular Islamic  revolution.  1 , 1 1  admonished t h a t  Baathists  constituted  ruthless  A y a t o l l a h Seyyed Shahaboddin M a r ' a s h i N a j a f i ,  a c t s " p e r p e t r a t e d by t h e  top  of  exile  a l - S a d r ' s execution  Iranian ecclesiastic,  to  undermine  Iranian s p i r i t u a l l e a d e r .  who c h a r g e d t h a t  "obliterate  to  The u n t i m e l y d e m i s e  Baghdad's r e p r e s s i o n  conclusive  found c u l p a b l e  Khomeinists i n a p l o t  c h u r c h m e n was d e p l o r e d b y t h e  powerful  of  a number o f  whom K h o m e i n i h a d e s t a b l i s h e d  distressed  leaders,  of  support  expulsions  further offset  being  relationship with during his  addition,  acts  p o r t e n d e d by an o u t b u r s t  after  within Iraq.  co-religionist,  deeply  Government  i n c l u d i n g A y a t o l l a h a l - S a d r , who was p u t t o  late April  stability  the  full  o r t h o d o x S h i ' i s m , b y j a i l i n g and e x e c u t i n g  in  were p a r t  9  Baathists  clergymen,  the  c a m p a i g n b e i n g waged b y Baghdad  further insisted  In a d d i t i o n to Shias,  that  o n l y t h o s e who h a d " c o m m i t t e d b l a t a n t  terrorism at the  they  G e n e r a l Assembly t h a t  bent  to  Moreover, another the  w o u l d draw t h e  "unmanly "wrath o f  45 God a n d a n g e r t h e M u s l i m n a t i o n . " governing e l i t e  the  was c o n s i d e r a b l y a l a r m e d b y t h e  choleric protestations, future  Overall,  1 2  Iraqi  Khomeinists'  w h i c h were c o n s t r u e d a s  a portent  aggression. The I r a n i a n R e v o l u t i o n , b e y o n d b r i n g i n g t o  group o f  Islamicists  who assumed an i n c r e a s i n g l y  l e a n i n g toward Baghdad, f u r t h e r s t r e n g t h e n e d regime's  defensive  resumption of  the  in northern Iraq, significant denizens  motivations  for aggression  a development  as c o n s t i t u t i n g  to  national  viewed  security. realize  Iraq's  inhabited  i n p e t r o l e u m and n a t u r a l g a s  insisting is  vital  that to  the  Kurdish  Baathists  nation's  thousands  h a v e b e e n adamant  economy.  of  i n refugee  1970s,  were a f f o r d e d f r e e  With the  breakdown i n  Iraq.  By J u l y o f  prompted the w h i c h were action to  1979,  Iraqi  largely tighten  Kurdish  and t h i s  security  that  combatants  demands,  Teheran i n i t i a t e  along the  into  development  Government t o make r e p e a t e d ignored,  the mid-  resume i n c u r s i o n s  r e i n f i l t r a t i o n of  an a l a r m i n g l e v e l  Shah's  who h a d b e e n  settlements within Iran since reign to  in  northern t e r r i t o r y  Kurdish insurgents,  living  had i n c r e a s e d t o  from  deposits  o r d e r among I r a n i a n f r o n t i e r g u a r d s f o l l o w i n g t h e downfall,  a  a r e a which they have t r a d i t i o n a l l y  c e n t r a l c o n t r o l over the  the  a  guerrillas  l i m i t e d autonomy  the  accordingly,  by e f f e c t i n g  Kurdish  had l o n g s t r u g g l e d t o  rich  Baath  i n s u r g e n c y by e t h n i c  threat  is  power a  threatening  the  Baghdad; however,  and,  of  immediate  common f r o n t i e r .  46 Beyond a l l o w i n g K u r d i s h g u e r r i l l a s border r a i d s unhindered, extended d i r e c t insurgents.  financial  A number o f  from I r a n i a n a i d : the alternatively command o f  Teheran; Jalal was  the  Iranian c l e r i c a l  and l o g i s t i c a l  the  Peshmerga,  Karaj,  of  its  five  and t h e  1 3  By J u n e o f  I r a n i a n side of  conducting  frequent  armed f o r a y s .  escalating  into  K u r d i s h combatants  on t h e  the  violence  against to  be t r a n s i t  concluded that Shi ite 1  zealots  the  which  estimated  from  responded  by  drive,  which  northwestern  points  for  Kurdish denounced  contributed  tension.  r a n k i n g Baath o f f i c i a l s  Iranian c l e r i c s '  and K u r d i s h  an  i n I r a n and  in interstate  a number o f  1980,  were v e h e m e n t l y  b y b o t h l a y and c l e r i c a l a u t h o r i t i e s  By m i d - 1 9 8 0 ,  (KSP)>  a number o f  The I r a q i a i r a t t a c k s  a further escalation  Party  Kurdish region  i n c l u d e d bombing s o r t i e s Iranian villages believed  commanded by  The B a a t h e l i t e  i n the  to  b o r d e r were  counterinsurgency  to  fighters  operating  the  the  northern I r a q and,  commencing a l a r g e - s c a l e  guerrillas.  (KDP),  and w h i c h h a d a  Kurdish S o c i a l i s t  sanctuaries  to  benefitted  w h i c h was u n d e r  thousand  100,000 f i r e a r m s had been smuggled juncture,  the  a m i l i t a r y compound i n p r o x i m i t y  l e d by R a s o u l M e m e n d e h .  by t h i s  support to  K u r d i s h P a t r i o t i c U n i o n (KPU),  Talabani;  cross-  regime  I r a q i K u r d i s h groups  and M a s s o u d B a r z a n i ,  percentage  at  conduct  Kurdish Democratic Party  known as  Idriss  significant stationed  the  to  disposition  insurgents  within  to  Iraq  had  support  47 indicated that  they harbored designs of  future  T h i s c o n v i c t i o n was r e i n f o r c e d b y a number o f made b y I r a n i a n o f f i c i a l s the  Government.  f o r the  On 27 A p r i l ,  the  in Iraq.  A stalwart  Islamic  time,  news t h a t  a  coup i n I r a q ; hell."  received:  Khomeiniite pundit,  there  Saddam H u s s e i n and h i s  Qotzbadeh's aggressive  1 4  the  ranks of which c o n s i s t e d  Overall, incentive  structure  desire  secure  was h e l d t o Iraq to  Baathists  aggression  sought  I r a n on d e f e n s i v e  to  the  by t h e  followed  armed  forces,  Shias,  to  1 5  elite's  defensive  frontier with Iran,  the  inroad against  grounds by a s s e r t i n g  The  revolutionary  Security  had f a i l e d t o  and t h a t  s e c u r i t y had f a c i l i t a t e d  which  d u r i n g a number o f  the U n i t e d N a t i o n ' s  border with Iraq,  a  the v u l n e r a b i l i t y of  Islamic Republic.  revolutionary<government  monitor i t s frontier  Iraqi  to mitigate  justify  emergency m e e t i n g s o f that  Baathists.  c o n t r o l over the  the  to  f o r r e s o r t i n g t o m i l i t a r y f o r c e was  be n e c e s s a r y  direct  announce  r e g i m e c a n go  predominately of  u n d e r l y i n g the  at  has been a m i l i t a r y  for Iraq's  mount a r e b e l l i o n and d e p o s e t h e  to  i n Damascus  e n u n c i a t i o n was  b y an o p e n c a l l i n g from K h o m e i n i  depose  successful  d e c l a r e d " i t makes me v e r y h a p p y t o I have j u s t  calls  Republic's  F o r e i g n M i n i s t e r Sadegh Q o t z b a d e h , who was this  overt  I r a q i populace to  leadership put f o r t h spurious reports of insurrection  aggression.  this  Council  adequately  lapse  of  an o n s e t o f u n r e s t  s o u t h e a s t and an o u t b r e a k o f b l o o d y f i g h t i n g  in  in northern  the  48 Iraq.  On 24 S e p t e m b e r ,  open w a r f a r e ,  Iraqi  Baghdad's d e c i s i o n  two d a y s a f t e r  delegates to to  put  against  a defensive  forward i n t h i s  d i d have a b a s i s  section  the 1 6  interests  inducements  for a strategic i n the  this  indicates  that  surprise.  a t t a c k a r e seldom o f Aggressive The f i r s t  section  impetus  Republic.  the  However,  defended Teheran's  Iraq,"  had  evidence  Baathists  to  defensive  However,  a solely  of  Iranian  discussion,  as w i l l  motivations  defensive  be for  nature.  Motivations  of t h i s  Baghdad's d e f e n s i v e  the  the  c o n c e r n gave r i s e  succeeding  of  Clearly,  for concern regarding the  and t h a t  surprise  the United Nations  action.  Revolution,  demonstrated  initiation  i n v a d e I r a n by c h a r g i n g t h a t  "indiscriminate actions necessitated  the  chapter  elucidated  f o r a t t a c k i n g the  Baathists'  incentive  Islamic structure  for  g o i n g t o war w i t h I r a n was n o t w h o l l y g r o u n d e d upon defensive motives  considerations;  for aggression,  i n i d e n t i f y i n g the  a c i t i n g of various  Iraqi  elite's  venturesome  objectives,  p a r t i c u l a r l y t h o s e e n t e r t a i n e d b y Saddam  Hussein,  of  is  central  s t r o n g l y emulates  Canal  i n 1956,  constituted  To Saddam H u s s e i n ,  Gamal A b d e l N a s s e r ,  Egyptian leader widely brazen challenge  importance.  the  late  the  charismatic  revered i n the Arab world f o r  of Western c o n t r o l over the onset of  the  an o p p o r t u n i t y t o  vital  a  his  Suez  Iranian Revolution  realize  who  long-standing  49 ambition: Arab  to  attain  guiding role  I r a q was  among t h e  Arab world at  sizable  leadership  product,  dollars,  2,450 d o l l a r s East.  Gulf  among  hegemonic  of  eastern  the  the  following of  Tigris  nation's  highest  i n the  believed  situated of  in  Hormuz,  It  was  his  an the  Greater  connects  and t h e  confluence  of  into  Shatt the  the  Gulf.  the  position  of  Saddam H u s s e i n t h a t  over Khuzestan, p a r t i c u l a r l y the and Kermanshah, t h e facilities  Near  that  which  northern Arabian Sea; formed by t h e  to  the  a n d E u p h r a t e s R i v e r s and w h i c h e m p t i e s  northern Persian  in  thirty-one  Iranian held t e r r i t o r y :  important S t r a i t s  which i s  a  increases  furthered v i s - a - v i s  islands  and t h e  within  gross  K h u z e s t a n ; Abu Musa and t h e  and L e s s e r T u n b s , t h r e e  al-Arab estuary,  as  income h a d i n c r e a s e d  Iraqi chief  c o u l d be  assume a  possessing  significant  the  to  as w e l l  an i m p r e s s i v e  p e r annum, one o f  Persian Gulf  the  and r e a l p e r c a p i t a  southwestern region  strategically  due t o  had r i s e n t o  aspirations  acquisition  Arab n a t i o n s ,  middle c l a s s ,  By a n d l a r g e ,  1 7  position  In a d d i t i o n to  largely  petroleum p r i c e s , billion  in a suitable  large.  and e d u c a t e d  national  the  of  states. By 1979,  the  a position  location  of  o i l - r i c h provinces a number o f  Abadan,  K h o r r a m s h a h r , and B a n d a r - e - S h a h p u r , w o u l d  bolster  Iraq's  posture.  Iraq,  of  developed  for transshipping petroleum products,  economic  control Ilam port  including greatly  in stark contrast  to  50 Iran, that  is it  Gulf,  i n a geographically disadvantageous has  a coastline  and t h i s  brief  of  stretch  P e n i n s u l a and Umm Q a s r , utility  o n l y some f i f t y  due t o  shoreline  which i s  located  as the  Iraqi  relying  elite  a way o f  and T u r k e y .  petroleum,  the  d i m i n i s h i n g the  In t h i s  nation's  contingent  chief  upon t h e  is  up t h e  coastline  on o v e r l a n d p e t r o l e u m c o n d u i t s  Lebanon,  less  as  between t h e  way,  Shatt  necessity  capacity to  of  revenue,  state-of-relations  and l e s s v u l n e r a b l e t o v i c i s s i t u d e s  civil  shutdown o f  I r a q ' s p i p e l i n e through that  regime  war i n L e b a n o n i n 1976  1970s,  i n Damascus r e s u l t e d  petroleum through the the  tense r e l a t i o n s  separatists. enterprising  Overall,  to  with the  conduit.  sabotage by  u n d e r l y i n g the  The  country  1 9  n o r t h e r n p i p e l i n e through Turkey to p o r t s  M e d i t e r r a n e a n was e x p o s e d  in  had n e c e s s i t a t e d  i n a diminution of  Iraqi-Syrian  regimes  was  host countries.  outbreak of  of  export  with the oil  by  w o u l d be  transshipped,  late  al-  Syria,  t e r r i t o r y through which the  during the  little  was v i e w e d  through  the  source  conditions w i t h i n the  Fao  Basra,  governing the  political  of  the  port.  S e c u r i n g an e x p a n d e d G u l f the  along  r e l y i n g p r i m a r i l y on  principal  in  Consequently,  1 8  some one h u n d r e d m i l e s  nation's  miles  shallow depths,  i n terms of p o r t f a c i l i t i e s .  Baghdad h a s b e e n l i m i t e d t o  Arab,  of  position  a  while, rival  the  Baath  flow  of  In a d d i t i o n , on  the  Kurdish  Baathists'  inducement s t r u c t u r e f o r l a y i n g s i e g e t o  Iran,  was t h e  chief  petroleum.  if  securing  I r a q was t o  of  a strong  this  lengthy  objective  that  coastline  i n r o a d would net  capacity  gain a position  a n d Baghdad b e l i e v e d  over Khuzestan's military  of  The r e a l i z a t i o n  be e s s e n t i a l leadership,  design  the  was  of  such a  export  deemed  to  regional  establishing  through a  nation  to  dominion  surprise desired  capability. Initially, means t o the  the  compel t h e  Baathists  Islamic  coveted t e r r i t o r i e s .  attempted  Republic to  to  use  pacific  cede c o n t r o l  W i t h r e g a r d t o Abu Musa and  G r e a t e r a n d L e s s e r T u n b s , Saddam H u s s e i n made w i d e of  the  fact  that  the  Shah h a d i l l e g a l l y  which had been under t h e (UAE),  i n 1971  leader  called  its  pledge to  followed  large,  on T e h e r a n t o  by t h e  relinquishing the  the  deposed  of  on t h e i r  Baathists,  islands  traffic drilling  the  c o n t r o l the  demonstrate  islands  h i g h volume o f  Baghdad b e l i e v e d  that  o v e r A b u Musa a n d t h e  the  design  foreign  the  Iraqi of  policy by  UAE.  By and  over the  commercial  i n the of  islands,  islands  value;  an e x c e l l e n t b a s e  conduct  f o r petroleum deposits  the  sincerity  and economic  represented  capital  And, the  the  mastery  strategic  t h r o u g h Hormuz and t o  to  the  United Arab Emirates  Pahlavi administration  establishing  was p r e d i c a t e d  which to  of  aggressive  r u l e over the  allure  the  control  annexed  t h r o u g h an armed o c c u p a t i o n .  jettison  over  to from  shipping  exploration  and  northern Arabian  securing  the  I r a q i sway  G r e a t e r and L e s s e r T u n b s w o u l d  be  Sea.  52 further  advanced toward f r u i t i o n i f  littoral  nations,  relatively  which the  reasoning, officials  Baathists  weak and e a s y t o  determination over the the that  Iraqi  one o f  control of  over the  governance At  islands  as  t o be  first,  there  actual  strategically strong, Arafat the  namely t h e  islands.  enthusiasm  role  as  reestablishment  was r e j e c t e d  whose c o n s e r v a t i v e  relations  with the  to  a b i l i t y to  West,  there  Irrespective  the  idea of  soon  a  clerical  leadership  emirs maintained  on  a potential  In a d d i t i o n ,  clerics•  o v e r A b u Musa and t h e  was t h a t  the  to  r e t a i n dominion  G r e a t e r and L e s s e r T u n b s t h r o u g h a  marshalling of pan-Islamic assertion  decision  threat  a number o f  attempted  the  the  strong  p r i n c i p a l l y Sadegh Q o t z b a d e h ,  defend  over  U n i t e d Arab  pro-Khomeini o f f i c i a l s , to  proved  assigning  t e r r i t o r y by t h e  oil.  of  administrator  would c o n s t i t u t e  export  the  i n Qom t o w a r d s u r r e n d e r i n g  by t h e  c o n t r o l over the  that  Baghdad's  However,  a transitional  Emirates,  Iran's  a  might accede t o  important t e r r i t o r y .  a pivotal  grounds t h a t  principal A l -  assume t e m p o r a r y  a prelude to  pro-Palestinian leaning,  islands  this  Iranian  were some i n d i c a t i o n s  regarding the  little  with  by t h e U n i t e d Arab E m i r a t e s .  revolutionary authorities overtures  In l i n e  Government p r o p o s e d t o  F a t a h f a c t i o n headed by Y a s i r A r a f a t ,  as  exercised  islands.  a P a l e s t i n i a n group,  conservative  l o o k e d upon  influence,  disputed  the  r h e t o r i c ; an o f t e n  three  islands  repeated  were " n e i t h e r  Iranian  nor Arab,  but  it  is  f o r Iran a u n i v e r s a l u n i f i c a t i o n of  I s l a m i c w o r l d and t h a t all  Muslims,  Moreover,  and t h a t  the  every part of the  land of  Islamic  land belongs  Islam belongs  Khomeinists f u r t h e r demonstrated  a v e r s i o n toward I r a q ' s e f f o r t s  to wrest  to  carried  an A r a b i c b r o a d c a s t  against  " p l a y i n g w i t h f i r e , " and w h i c h a d v i s e d t h e  that  w o u l d be more p o l i t i c t o  d i m i n i s h i n g the  "injustice  practicing within I r a q . " received  2 1  Musa a n d t h e  admonished  abandon v i s i o n s concentrate  Baathists  of  on  and d i s c r i m i n a t i o n i t  is  S u c h r e b u f f s were n o t  to persuade Teheran to  G r e a t e r and L e s s e r T u n b s ,  nonbelligerent  avenue,  well  insistent  Islamic Republic's refusal to  constituted  conclusive  assertion  that  evidence  r e l i n q u i s h Abu  vis-a-vis  proved u n f r u i t f u l ,  assumed a more a g g r e s s i v e ,  regime's  the  i n Baghdad. When e f f o r t s  the  the  Baathists  approach, charging  p a r t with the  that  t h e hegemonic  a  the  December o f  1979,  the  Iraqi  consideration to  attempting to  However,  surrounding the  secrecy  revolutionary  actions  of  the  r e g i m e was g i v i n g  f o r c i b l y seize the  Shah  planning of  the  the  Iraqi  capital  in a successful  b i d to  By serious  islands. forced  a n n e x a t i o n was c o m p r o m i s e d , p r o m p t i n g Y a s i r A r a f a t to  that  islands  were b e i n g a b a n d o n e d was m e r e l y a r h e t o r i c a l f a c a d e . early  2 0  when T e h e r a n R a d i o  i n w h i c h Baghdad was  aggrandizement and t o  Allah."  c o n t r o l over  f r o m I r a n on 13 J u n e 1979,  territorial  to  their  islands  it  the  to  dissuade  rush Saddam  54  Hussein  from u n d e r t a k i n g t h e  attempted  a final  effort  to  realize  through d i p l o m a t i c channels United Nation's to  call  ones,  this  failed  Iraq  enterprising  in early April  end o f t h e  initiative, to  its  attack.  of  1980,  S e c r e t a r y - G e n e r a l K u r t W a l d h e i m was  f o r an i m m e d i a t e  However,  envisioned  elicit  Iranian  s i m i l a r to  a positive  designs when implored  occupation.  scores of  previous  response from t h e  Islamic  Republic. From t h i s effect  an I r a n i a n w i t h d r a w a l  increasingly closer  to  bellicose.  the  Baathists  hours.  was p u t  R e p u b l i c ' s response to  f o r t h by P r e s i d e n t  preserve  area.  islands  2 2  was  as  a means o f  suzerainty  objectives  Overall, one that  to  when  of  the  a l - A r a b was  the  a c q u i r e Abu Musa and t h e  twenty-four  Iraqi  Iranian  the  resolve  revolutionary  coordinated exercises control  more d i s c e r n i b l e  conducted  the  from  i n Qom a n d T e h e r a n ,  islands,  establishing  actuated  the  be w i t h d r a w n  demonstrating  over the  Iraqi  Baghdad's campaign t o Shatt  moved  A l b o h a s s a n B a n i - S a d r , who  army a n d n a v y w o u l d s o o n c o n d u c t the  on 6 A p r i l ,  which s t i r r e d i n c r e d u l i t y  announced t h a t ,  nations  Iranian forces  to  became  G r e a t e r and L e s s e r T u n b s w i t h i n  The I s l a m i c  arrogation,  all  islands  feuding  open w a r f a r e  demanded t h a t  Baghdad's e f f o r t s  from t h e  The two  brink of  Abu Musa a n d t h e  to  j u n c t u r e onward,  over the  in  three  enterprising  incursion.  achieve  ascendancy  i n a manner a n a l o g o u s  over to  the the  G r e a t e r and L e s s e r T u n b s : a  bid  55 reliance way t o  u p o n b l o o d l e s s methods a t  belligerence.  Hassan,  the  Shatt the  In October of  Baath regime's c h i e f  reinvigorate  the  long-standing  1979,  Hussein  to  The immediate  interstate  the  1975  aim o f  q u a r r e l over  Baghdad was unhappy  been c o n c l u d e d under p r e s s u r e was u n b a l a n c e d position point,  i n that  regarding the  Tariq Aziz  round o f  direct  Shatt  officials  to  patience  becoming  afforded  to  participate  and t h e  of  the  of  Saddam H u s s e i n ,  At  holding of  the  refusal to  this  a new hammer  revolutionary  in a parley regarding of  the  Iranian  r a p i d l y exhaust  forward i n h i s  impositions,  which  Islamic of  contested  Republic  I r a q i mastery waterway.  Baghdad's growing  when I r a q i t r o o p s  three-hundred-square-kilometer along the  estuary.  was  of  September,  and which  by mid-1980,  entire  Evidence of  Shah,  had  who,  "recognition" the  to  i n order to  engage i n d i p l o m a c y s e r v e d  the  favorable  the  However,  intransigent  unconditional  territory  Iran a  the  along  was  central  sector of  of over  impatience  of the  the  2 3  moved t o  enclave  to  with  insisted  by t h e  negotiations  i n c l u d e d an e x t e n s i o n by t h e  early  exerted  covenant.  increasingly  length  which they  delineation  bilateral  declined al-Arab,  it  Baathists  formally requested  a more e q u i t a b l e  regime  the  Algiers Accord,  Muslim  Lebanon, served  s t a t u s quo r e g a r d i n g c o n t r o l o v e r n a v i g a t i o n  jettison  the  o u t s e t g r a d u a l l y gave  envoy  a l - A r a b by m a i n t a i n i n g t h a t  waterway.  out  the  came  in  f o r c i b l y annex  Iranian-held frontier  in  a  56 proximity to  Qasr-e-Shirin,  have been ceded t o agreement.  Iraq  The I r a q i  w h i c h Baghdad c h a r g e d was  i n accordance with the  aggression  Algiers  was met w i t h s t r o n g  f r o m I r a n i a n c l e r i c a l and s e c u l a r  authorities.  Sadegh Qotzbadeh m a i n t a i n e d t h a t  Algiers  c o n t a i n e d no p r o v i s i o n s r e l a t i n g t o  return of of  t e r r i t o r y and t h a t ,  accordingly,  I r a n i a n noncompliance with t r e a t y  baseless. prior  to  On t h e  2 4  the  i n i t i a t i o n of  announced t h a t treaty Iraqi that  f o l l o w i n g day,  I r a q was  all  Arab."  "the  the  territory  after  Iraqi  moving t o  flag.  is  the  charge d ' a f f a i r e s  United Nations,  i n an e f f o r t  provocative actions,  Security Council was  were five  to  the  days  Algiers  totally  e s t u a r y w o u l d now  2 6  occupy the  of  charges  Baghdad d e c l a r e d  disputed  and u n i l a t e r a l l y r e j e c t i n g t h e A l g i e r s  Said Bafi,  the  Baath regime  Shatt al-Arab  In a d d i t i o n ,  2 5  d i s p l a y the  Shortly  which i t  17 S e p t e m b e r ,  commercial v e s s e l s t r a v e r s i n g the  be r e q u i r e d t o  for the  Baghdad's  obligations  invasion,  the  forgoing compliance with the  and m a i n t a i n e d t h a t and t o t a l l y  the  protest  F o r example,  on 16 S e p t e m b e r , covenant  to  Iraqi  establish  a  agreement,  mission at  the  justification  conveyed a l e t t e r  to  the  f r o m F o r e i g n M i n i s t e r S a a d o u n Hammadi,  in  held:  T h e I r a q i Government now f i n d s i t s e l f o b l i g e d t o exercise i t s legitimate r i g h t to self-defense i n s o v e r e i g n t y and t o r e c o v e r i t s t e r r i t o r i e s b y f o r c e , c o n s i d e r i n g t h a t t h e I r a n i a n Government h a s b a r r e d t h e way t o a l l l e g a l l y r e c o g n i z e d ways t o r e s o l v e t h e i s s u e s emanating from i t s obligations. ' 2  57 Overall, at  the  by mid-1980,  the  conclusion that  territories cognizance  governing e l i t e  determination over the  had a r r i v e d  disputed  c o u l d n o t be g a i n e d t h r o u g h p a c i f i c means of  this  p o r t e n d e d by the motivation  Iraqi  actuality,  Islamic  along with the  revolution,  for launching a surprise  and  menace  engendered  a  strong  attack.  Iraq's Propensity to Resort to Force A g a i n s t I r a n Due t o I d e o l o g i c a l and E t h n i c - C u l t u r a l D i s p a r i t y There motivations defensive for  is  for attempting  and o f f e n s i v e  aggression,  factors,  much more t o  In i l l u m i n a t i n g the seek a s t r a t e g i c between t h e espoused target  state  ideological oriented that  is  objectives.  protagonist  predilections  attack.  a governing e l i t e of  the  import. separating  imperatives  the  fundamentalist  in revolutionary Iran,  temporalShi'ite  resort  force.  animosity toward  K h o m e i n i s t s c a n be p a r t i a l l y a t t r i b u t e d t o b e t w e e n A r a b n a t i o n a l i s m and s o c i a l i s m , concepts which c o n s t i t u t e  the  the  foundation of  elite  constituted  determinant u n d e r l y i n g Baghdad's d e c i s i o n The B a a t h i s t s '  the  The w i d e  principal to  to  divergence  and t h o s e c h a m p i o n e d b y  significant  fore  of  and e t h n i c - c u l t u r a l  and c u l t u r a l g u l f  the  than  b y a number o f  an a n a l y s i s  B a a t h r e g i m e and t h e  came t o  surprise  an i m p u l s i o n f o r a s u d d e n  surprise,  of  nation's  Existing  fostered  predisposition  ideological  by the  a strategic  w h i c h c a n be  can strengthen  an a g g r e s s o r  the  a  to  the  variance  two c a r d i n a l Baath  ideology  58 and p a n - I s l a m i c  traditionalism,  t e n e t c h a m p i o n e d by t h e The i n c e p t i o n attendant  toppling of  profound a l t e r a t i o n resulting  i n the  adhered to from t h a t  ideology  paramount  Iranian churchmen.  of  the  the  espoused by t h e  2 8  the  "Peacock Throne" e f f e c t e d  of the  an i d e o l o g i c a l  ideological  I r a n i a n R e v o l u t i o n and  state's political  emergence o f  s t a t e emphasizing  the  atmosphere,  a new r u l i n g e l i t e  orientation deposed  nationalism to  varying  Shah. one  a  which  considerably  Iran shifted  stressing  e s p o u s e d b y K h o m e i n i and o t h e r  Islam;  leading  from a the  clerics,  i n c l u d i n g A y a t o l l a h Muhammad-Javad B a h o n a r , A y a t o l l a h H a s a n Qomi-Tabatabai, Ithna  and A y a t o l l a h S a d e q R u h a n i ,  a s h a r i Shia Islam.  constitutes originated  a notable  r e a l i z e d u n t i l the  a n d who i s  of  due t o  c o r o l l a r y to  the  faqih  responsibility  belief  the  followers  r u l e can  who e x p i r e d  r e t u r n o f Mohammad a l - M a h d i s .  end o f Imamate  Islamic 3 0  orthodox be the  time. is  i n 847 A . D . , An i m p o r t a n t  2 9  the  idea  cleric],  p r e m i e r churchman,  g u i d i n g the  of  which  P r o p h e t Mohammad and  b y supreme  nation's  on  "Imamate"  o f Mohammad a l - M a h d i s ,  the  i n the  [governance  of  Devout  God on e a r t h ) , return at  the  this puritanical sect,  reappearance  i n K h o m e i n i , as t h e  of  no t r u l y l e g i t i m a t e  Imam" ( s u c c e s s o r t o  representative  velayat-e  aspect of  in northern India.  Shi'ism believe that  "Twelfth  The c o n c e p t  was b a s e d  of  which  vests  the  community u n t i l  the  59  In attendance of  clerical rule,  abrogating the realms.  with t h i s  the  Islamic  Shi'ite  of  canon.  I n one o f  religion  as  and p o l i t i c s "  Islam.  legitimacy  to  the  design  of  that  the  ecclesiastical  of the  separation  i n an e f f o r t  a b o l i s h i n g the  Overall,  and t h e  head j u r i s t  is  important to  Khomeinists'  rejection  of  secular  unequivocal;  disdain for lay rule largely  3 2  unwavering b e l i e f  that  of  the  society predicated  it  of  " i r r e l i g i o u s " and  to  God r e p r e s e n t e d  the  of  frequently  i n the  note that  forms o f  on  lend  partition  P r o p h e t Mohammad h a d b e e n b o t h  leader  a  "Islamic  i n t o w o r l d l y and s p i r i t u a l d o m a i n s ,  asserted  Medina.  a t r u l y equitable  at  fundamental  a means o f p r e c l u d i n g  The K h o m e i n i i t e r e g i m e ,  3 1  society  of  i n i m i c a l to  only the  "slogan  nature  and m i n i s t e r i a l  major works,  Government," Khomeini h e l d t h a t the  aimed  zealous supporters,  his  "imperialists" u t i l i z e  sublime  traditionalists  c h u r c h and s t a t e was  establishment  i n the  d i v i s i o n between s e c u l a r  To K h o m e i n i a n d h i s  separation  belief  the city  of  the  government emanated  was  from  only true  the  source  sovereignty. The I r a q i  elite's  position  regarding  the  r e l a t i o n s h i p b e t w e e n c h u r c h and s t a t e was w h o l l y c o n t r a r y that  h e l d by t h e  Khomeinists.  The B a a t h i s t s  clericalism  and h a d l o n g e n d e a v o r e d t o  the  f o r t h of  calling  political  system;  separate  incorporeal authority  accordingly,  the  were a v e r s e  specter  from of  to to  I s l a m and Iraq's  a burgeoning  of  traditionalist  majority  Islamic  i n southeastern  occasionally  sentiment Iraq,  transpired since  among t h e  manifestations the  onset of  l o o k e d upon i n w h o l l y n e g a t i v e t e r m s . apprehension regarding the stemmed  secular  the  first  the  Shah's  time w i t h i n the  Baghdad f e a r e d t h a t  propounded by t h e  would i n c i t e  zeal,  confessional  m i n o r i t y and t h e  nation's  Traditionally, majority of  the  percent—they  Iraqi  maintaining this endeavored  and t h a t  strife  downfall a  to  pan-Islamic a  such a  between t h e  to  the  and p o l i t i c a l a f f a i r s The B a a t h i s t s  unequal r e l a t i o n s h i p attention  upper echelons of  3 4  importance of  r u l i n g Sunni  of  the  by t h e  and h a d  on  long  S h i a masses  away  adherents nation's  upon A r a b  downplaying  In a d d i t i o n ,  the  dominant  Government a n d t h e  and b y i n t e n t i o n a l l y religion.  slight  fifty-five  were b e n t  the  a  periphery of  command b y p l a c i n g a h e a v y e m p h a s i s  nationalism,  development  constitute  i m b a l a n c e b e t w e e n S u n n i and S h i • i t e  w i t h i n the  dissemination  populace—approximately  draw t h e  ideals  Shias.  have been r e l e g a t e d  economic  the  although Shias  Sunni Muslim m i n o r i t y .  military  Iran  Islamic  Khomeinists would e f f e c t  puritanical Shi'ite  from t h e  in  regime had been t o p p l e d by a p o p u l a r r e v o l u t i o n a r y  fundamentalism.  nation's  was  Baathists'  Near E a s t t h a t  movement w i t h a s t r o n g u n d e r c u r r e n t o f  of  Baath r u l e ,  The  3 3  o f which had  p o l i t i c a l upheaval  from a r e c o g n i t i o n t h a t  represented  Shi'ite  i n terms  the of  external  political been a t  aspirations,  the  s i n c e the Iraqi  the  inception  foreign  end o f in  apex o f  of  Baathists' Baath r u l e  p o l i c y has  consolidating  line  a bolstering  with the  o f Arab u n i t y has agenda.  i n 1968,  been p r e d i c a t e d  solidarity  ultimate  the  precisely,  direction  on t h e  of  of  principal  among A r a b n a t i o n s ,  vision  pan-Arab s t a t e with a p o l i t i c a l  More  long  establishing  a  which  is  single,  s y s t e m g r o u n d e d on  socialism. A number o f w i t h i n the  Islamic  l a y and e c c l e s i a s t i c a l Republic served  predisposition  of  denouncing  concept  to  the  the  the  realization  occasion,  the  a pan-Islamic  paradigm to  Arab n a t i o n a l i s m .  as  an o u t s p o k e n  system;  to  Khomeini,  on p r e s e r v i n g  was,  was  believed  that  throughout  the  devoid of  Islamic  of Arab n a t i o n a l i s m  minister,  espoused by  the  Iraqi  governance,  the  basic  Khomeini  political  with  tenets of  legitimacy.  thereby  Overall,  the  engendered  the  alternative  In a d d i t i o n ,  3 6  by  On one  3 5  a viable,  the  obstruction  its  the  Moreover,  obviating  the  Iranian c l e r i c ' s considerable  emphasis  and p a s t o r a l K o r a n and Khomeini  t r a d i t i o n a l i s m would r a p i d l y  Near E a s t ,  Arab n a t i o n a l i s m .  an  d i v i s i o n between t e m p o r a l  anathema t o  therefore,  as  state.  ideology  c r i t i c of  Baathist  a rigid  engage i n w a r f a r e  Iranian foreign  represented  emerged  spheres,  the  revolutionary  leadership  to  further reinforce  of Arab n a t i o n a l i s m  Ibrahim Yazdi,  remarked t h a t clerical  of  Baath e l i t e  to  authorities  spread  appeal  of  impugning  resentment  in  62  Baghdad; Saddam H u s s e i n p u b l i c l y c h a r g e d t h a t t h e of  I r a q i - I r a n i a n r e l a t i o n s had  l a t t e r * s disparaging delivered  on  partially  emanated f r o m  of Arab n a t i o n a l i s m  4 November  straining  during  an  the  address  1980:  We a r e I r a q i s , and we a r e p a r t o f t h e A r a b n a t i o n . . . . . We w i l l n o t a c c e p t anybody c o m i n g e v e r y d a y w i t h a new p a t h t h a t a i m s a t d i v i d i n g I r a q and d i v i d i n g t h e Arab n a t i o n . 3 7  Beyond t h e Baathists'  divergence i n p o l i t i c a l  p r e d i s p o s i t i o n f o r g o i n g t o war  a l s o p a r t l y s h a p e d by claims  of r a c i a l  ethno-cultural  Baathists  that  believed  juncture  rekindled  i t was  and  with Iran  disparity.  that this  other  eastern  indignation,  l a r g e l y dormant, c o u l d  although  easily  Khomeinists.  The  believed  of  cultural variables  Iraqi elite  Baghdad and  T e h e r a n w o u l d be  would serve  t o draw t h e  from the  real  Republic,  ranking cultural and  the  clerical  radical  leadership. began t o  f o r the  By  and  large,  planned  Baghdad s t r i v e d t o  inroad  f o s t e r an  toward  between  I r a q i p o p u l a c e away Islamic  Islamic  frequently  goals end,  allude to  divisions separating  against  the  in that i t  Toward t h i s  i n order  at  be  imbroglio  toward the  Semitic-Aryan ethnic  Persians.  support  a t t e n t i o n of the  and  an i n t e r j e c t i o n  further u t i l i t y  l a r g e l y the  Baath o f f i c i a l s and  i n t o the  source of aversion  w h i c h was  p u r s u e d by  of  that  of  Arabs,  domestic o p p o s i t i o n  and  was  Iranian  u s e d t o w h i p up  ethnic  the  s u p e r i o r i t y have l o n g been a s o u r c e  r e s e n t m e n t among I r a q i s , as w e l l a s the  values,  to heighten the  Islamic  image among I r a q i s o f  the Arabs  domestic Republic, the  heightening the  latest  commenced  animosity  b e t w e e n I r a q and I r a n a s  outbreak of i n the  the m i l l e n n i a l ethnic  seventh century, the  Islam i n t o  Mountains,  w h i c h now encompasse modern I r a n .  p o r t r a y i n g the  region to  emerging public  s t r a i n i n g of  positions  with the  toward the  subscribed to  by t h e  sought t o  Republic's  leaders  b e a r i n g and t o superior to  as  Iranians  the  in that  more i m p o r t a n t h i s t o r i c a l The i m p e t u s  behind the  sentiment l a r g e l y cognizance  that  I r a n as  would have  the  role  to  Shias.  heretical.  diplomatic t i e s with the  elites  of  the  and  that  state,  Islamic  chauvinistic A r a b s were  development  far  of  Islam.  Government's  depict for  the  conflict  s u c h an  toward Baath  image  governance  such a development,  to propagate  F o r example,  the  Iraqi  clash,  To f o r e s t a l l  I s l a m championed by t h e  in  anti-Iranian  afford to  disaffection  endeavored  diminishing  arouse  from t h e  could not  as  former had p l a y e d a  i n the  a secular-clerical  fostered  among I r a q ' s Baath e l i t e  it  of  governing  a racist  I r a q i people  efforts  stemmed  Zagros  b e t w e e n c h u r c h and  adhering to  forces  3 8  and o f  g e n e r a t e an image  convince  the  objectives  respective  the  brand of  east of  extreme d i v e r g e n c e  proper r e l a t i o n s h i p  Baathists  which  Iraqi-Iranian relations  regarding the  with  the  from e t h n i c - c u l t u r a l v a r i a n c e ,  attention  strife,  when m a r a u d i n g A r a b  introduced  In f u r t h e r consonance  constituting  a perception  Khomeinists  as  of  the the  being  i n announcing the  severing  Islamic  Saddam H u s s e i n  Republic,  of  64 charged that that  the  Arabs  K h o m e i n i i t e r e g i m e was  " K o r a n was w r i t t e n  [not  Islam."  the  the  Iranians]  as  various  i n A r a b i c and God d e s t i n e d  the  to p l a y a vanguard r o l e  the  image  of  the  minorities  d u r i n g which they  under the  addition,  of  i n announcing h i s Algiers treaty,  clerical  elite's  to  the  attend  to  penchant,"  K h o m e i n i s t s were m e r e l y u s i n g  an " i n v o c a t i o n  Moreover,  shortly  allusion  to  the  invective,  speech,  the  4 1  of  to  truculent  the  religion  as  4 0  which  was  i n w h i c h an  Persians,  the  rife  anti-Iranian  with  improve the  Persians,  The B a a t h i s t s '  the  "Saddam's Q a d i s s i y a , " an  " i n v a d e r s " and " a g g r e s s o r s , "  such p r o g r e s s .  their  compliance  incursion,  Near E a s t through s c i e n t i f i c  advancement,  of  Arabs."  was m a i n t a i n e d t h a t  Arabs had s t r u g g l e d  as  as  Sassanian  i n which i t  w i t h i n the  acted  launching the  officials  an e m o t i o n a l  i n June  In  637 A . D . m i l i t a r y c o n f r o n t a t i o n  A r a b army r o u t e d t h e delivered  plight  holding that  cover b u r i e d resentment f o r the  by I r a q i  a rally  suspend  a mask t o  designated  of  Saddam H u s s e i n a g a i n a l l u d e d t o  "bigoted  after  leaders  Khomeinists.  decision  clerical  racist  to  i l l u m i n a t e d the  governance  with the  while  in  revolutionary  Baghdad e x t e n d e d i n v i t a t i o n s  Iranian ethnic  1979,  people  and  one p u r s u i n g e n d s p r e d i c a t e d on a  orientation,  of  1 1  3 9  To r e i n f o r c e regime  "non-Islamic,  Iraqi  for  centuries,  quality  of  life  and c u l t u r a l  who h a d  traditionally  consistently  efforts  chief  in this  stymied respect  were l a r g e l y  successful,  f o r by S e p t e m b e r  of  1980,  the  p u b l i c mood i n I r a q was d i s c e r n i b l y a n t i - I r a n i a n . I n sum, that the  affinity Shi'ite  directly  the  Baathists'  for t r a d i t i o n a l i s t  quarters of  attributed to  ascribed to precisely, specific  reaction to  Iraq,  terms,  confessional  impetus;  S u n n i M u s l i m s and t h e  between t h e  majority Shias.  predisposition  perceived domestic  p o r t e n d e d by the  Iranian Revolution.  in  increase  Overall,  for aggression  R e p u b l i c and t h e  which,  4 2  and  there  was  ethnic-  against  the  Islamic  destabilization  Conclusion In r e c a p i t u l a t i n g the main f e a t u r e s incentive one  of  the  inferences driven to  structure  identified  more m a n i f e s t that  attempt  to  terms,  the  Iraqi  Shi'ite  ward o f f  aspirations  the  of  that  the  elite's  analysis,  important Baathists  surprise  were  revolutionary  inducements. motivations  I r a n encompassed  Khomeinists'  Baghdad's  preceding  and e n t e r p r i s i n g  m o u n t i n g an i n c u r s i o n i n t o impulse to  is  strategically  I r a n by b o t h d e f e n s i v e more s p e c i f i c  i n the  and t h e o r e t i c a l l y  c a n be p o s i t e d  in  r u l i n g minority of  c l e a r nexus between Baghdad's i d e o l o g i c a l cultural  be  more  avoiding a significant  disagreement  in  was  can  to maintain i n t e r n a l o r d e r  entailed  rise  which  Iranian Revolution,  a structural-functionalist a desire  indications  I s l a m was on t h e  southeastern the  the  efforts  f o r a more e q u i t a b l e  a  In for  protective to  incite  share of  the  a  66 nation's  political  minority's an  power e q u a t i o n ,  desire to realize  as w e l l  as  Kurdish  regional self-governance;  and,  a d v e n t u r o u s a m b i t i o n , w h i c h l a r g e l y stemmed f r o m Saddam  Hussein's g e o p o l i t i c a l a s p i r a t i o n s , to gain economically  important  sections  In terms of d e f e n s i v e looked  upon t h e  i n s u r g e n c y as existing Shi'ite  than that  the  The  legitimacy  ability  the  autonomy o v e r t h e  who  territory. the  Baath  nation's  a  g o o d s , w h i c h i s made  petroleum  Republic's  sales.  e f f o r t s to bolster  the  aimed a t e s t a b l i s h i n g l i m i t e d  northern  region  a d i r e c t challenge  of the was  country,  construed  including by  the  t o t h e i r governance,  little  d i s i n c l i n a t i o n t o use  f o r c e to preserve the  status  quo  and  have demonstrated political  Iraq.  Beyond c o u n t e r i n g Khomeinists' reactionary, s t a g e an  t o advance I r a q ' s Baathists  the  of  denizens  Baathists  decision to  Kurdish  a heightening  throughout t h e i r tenure, the  in  elite  of Baath r u l e i s l a r g e l y  Kirkuk-Mosul o i l f i e l d s , as  by  to a f f o r d the  Islamic  guerrillas,  Baath e l i t e  of  immediate t h r e a t t o  represented  r e v e n u e g e n e r a t e d by  Accordingly,  vital  and  o f e c o n o m i c s e r v i c e s and  p o s s i b l e by  Kurdish  Iranian  actuations,  f a r more s e r i o u s  activism.  wide a r r a y  of  control  p o t e n t i a l of a major f l a r e - u p of the  a  order  g r o u n d e d on  the  the  believed  the  threats  emanating from  expansionist  i n v a s i o n can  be  be  Baghdad's  attributed to a  g e o p o l i t i c a l posture, could  agenda,  an  end  greatly furthered  the  which by  desire the  depriving  67 Iran  o f Abu  Musa and  the  Khuzestani o i l f i e l d s Shatt  al-Arab.  The  desire to acquire was  the  intense  Greater  and  An foregoing set of  longing  utmost  Gulf.  e x a m i n a t i o n and  importance,  the  to  variance  proceeding political  socialism,  initiate in elite  i t i s not  group's a v e r s i o n spreading Muslim  and  states.  ambitions.  which stems from  the  Baathists'  ethnic-cultural values.  with revolutionary  the  difficult  Iran, In  has  rigidly  Arab s o l i d a r i t y to grasp the  was  short,  i t s i n c e p t i o n as  Baath p a r t y  b a s e d on  toward the  since  Of  Baghdad's  i d e o l o g i c a l imperatives.  traditionalist,  be  p r e d i l e c t i o n f o r warfare  fact that,  ideology  territory  can  which i n f l u e n c e d the  a war  organization,  the  Baghdad's  war  vainglorious  i n terms of e x p l a i n i n g  from the  to a secular  c o n t r o l over  important  outbreak of the  the  political  the  O v e r a l l , a s u b s t a n t i a l degree  Iraqi leader's  i n d u c e m e n t s was  propensity  as  Tunbs,  o f Saddam H u s s e i n t o assume a  additional observation  e n g e n d e r e d by  as w e l l  t r a c t s of economically  of a c c o u n t a b i l i t y f o r the to the  Lesser  paramount impetus b e h i n d  hegemonic r o l e i n the  ascribed  coast,  and  a  adhered  and  basis  of  the  Khomeinists' p r i n c i p a l design  of  pan-Islamic f e r v o r throughout a l l  68  CHAPTER I I  NOTES  •••U.S. F o r e i g n B r o a d c a s t I n f o r m a t i o n S e r v i c e , M i d d l e E a s t A s i a , Baghdad I r a q i News A g e n c y i n A r a b i c , "Saddam H u s s e i n on R e l a t i o n s w i t h t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s , " 15 F e b r u a r y 1979, JN141256. F a u d M a t a r , Saddam H u s s e i n : The M a n , t h e F u t u r e (London: T h i r d World C e n t r e , 1981), p . 2  the  Cause, 143.  and  U . S . Foreign Broadcast Information S e r v i c e , Middle East A s i a , Teheran Information Service i n A r a b i c , " E x i l e d I r a q i A y a t o l l a h Terms I r a q i - S y r i a n U n i t y ' N o m i n a l , " 25 J u n e 1979, LD062116. 3  1  4  Matar,  p.  132.  Permanent Representative of I r a q to the U n i t e d N a t i o n s t o S e c r e t a r y - G e n e r a l o f t h e U n i t e d N a t i o n s , 21 May 1980, U n i t e d N a t i o n s , G e n e r a l A s s e m b l y , 3 5 t h S e s s . , 28 May 1980, A / 3 5 / 2 6 8 , p . 3 . 5  Hanna Batatu, " S h i ' i Organizations i n I r a q : A l Da'wah a l - I s l a m i y a h and a l - M u j a h i d i n , " i n S h i ' i s m and S o c i a l P r o t e s t , e d . J u a n R . I . C o l e and N i k k i R . K e d d i e (New H a v e n : Y a l e U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s , 1 9 8 6 ) , p . 181. 6  7  Ibid.  U . S . Foreign Broadcast Information Service, Middle East A s i a , Teheran E t t e l a ' a t i n P e r s i a n , "Paper A l l e g e s B a a t h i s t s ' P e r s e c u t i o n o f S h i ' i t e L e a d e r , " 23 J u n e 1979, LD270809. 8  U n i t e d N a t i o n s , General Assembly, Report of the S p e c i a l C o m m i t t e e on E n h a n c i n g t h e E f f e c t i v e n e s s o f N o n - U s e o f F o r c e i n I n t e r n a t i o n a l R e l a t i o n s . 25 J u n e 1980, 35th S e s s . , A / 3 5 / 3 0 5 , p . 1. 9  " T h e G u l f A b l a z e , " A n - N a h a r A r a b R e p o r t and Memo 29 S e p t e m b e r 1980, p . 92. 1 0  r  ^ U . S . Foreign Broadcast Information S e r v i c e , Middle E a s t A s i a , Teheran Radio i n A r a b i c , "Teheran C r i t i c i z e s I r a q i R u l e r ' s R e p r e s s i v e M e a s u r e s , " 29 J u n e 1979, LD11456.  69 U . S . Foreign Broadcast Information S e r v i c e , Middle E a s t A s i a , Teheran Domestic S e r v i c e i n P e r s i a n , " A y a t o l l a h N a j a f i Warns I r a q , " 13 J u n e 1979, LD130712. 1 2  1 3  Strategic the G u l f , (Boulder,  A n t h o n y H . C o r d e s m a n , The G u l f and t h e S e a r c h f o r S t a b i l i t y : Saudi A r a b i a , the M i l i t a r y Balance i n and T r e n d s i n t h e A r a b - I s r a e l i M i l i t a r y B a l a n c e C o l o r a d o : Westview P r e s s , 1984), p p . 753-754.  U . S . Foreign Broadcast Information Service, Middle E a s t A s i a , T e h e r a n R a d i o i n A r a b i c , " T e h e r a n R a d i o Denounces B a a t h R e g i m e , " 3 May 1980, LD224513. 1 4  1 5  Matar,  p.  135.  C h a r g e d ' A f f a i r e s o f t h e Permanent M i s s i o n o f I r a q to the United Nations to President of the United Nations, S e c u r i t y C o u n c i l , 24 S e p t e m b e r 1980, U n i t e d N a t i o n s , G e n e r a l A s s e m b l y , S e c u r i t y C o u n c i l , 3 5 t h S e s s . , 24 S e p t e m b e r 1980, S / 1 4 1 9 2 , p . 2. 1 6  A d e e d I . Dawisha, " I r a q i F o r e i g n P o l i c y : M o t i v e s , C o n s t r a i n t s , and P e r f o r m a n c e , " i n S o u r c e s o f D o m e s t i c and F o r e i g n P o l i c y i n I r a g . ed. Z . M i c h a e l Szaz (Washington, D . C . : A m e r i c a n F o r e i g n P o l i c y I n s t i t u t e , 1 9 8 6 ) , p . 34. 1 7  J o h n W. Amos I I , "The I r a q - I r a n War: C o n f l i c t , L i n k a g e , and S p i l l o v e r i n t h e M i d d l e E a s t , " i n G u l f S e c u r i t y i n t o t h e 1 9 8 0 s : P e r c e p t u a l and S t r a t e g i c D i m e n s i o n s ed. R o b e r t D a r i u s , J o h n W. Amos I I , and R a l p h H . Magnus ( P a l o A l t o , C a l i f o r n i a : S t a n f o r d U n i v e r s i t y , Hoover I n s t i t u t i o n P r e s s , 1 9 8 4 ) , p . 52. 1 8  f  1 9  Cordesman,  p.  547.  U n i t e d Nations, General Assembly, Security C o u n c i l , R e p o r t o f t h e S p e c i a l Committee on E n h a n c i n g E f f e c t i v e n e s s o f t h e P r i n c i p l e o f Non-Use o f F o r c e i n I n t e r n a t i o n a l R e l a t i o n s . 21 A u g u s t 1980, 3 5 t h S e s s . , A / 3 5 / 4 0 4 , p . 2. 2 0  the  U . S . Foreign Broadcast Information Service, Middle East A s i a , Teheran I n t e r n a t i o n a l Service i n A r a b i c , " I r a q i I n t e r f e r e n c e S c o r e d , " 13 J u n e 1979, J N 1 3 2 0 1 4 . 2 1  2 2  Matar,  p.  146.  W i l l i a m 0. Staudenmaier, "A S t r a t e g i c A n a l y s i s , " i n T h e I r a n - I r a q War: New Weapons. O l d C o n f l i c t s , e d . S h i r i n T a h i r - K h e l i a n d Shaheen A y u b i (New Y o r k : P r a e g e r P u b l i s h e r s , 1983), p . 29. 2 3  70 2 4  2 5  New  York Times.  18 S e p t e m b e r  1980.  Ibid.  R a m e s h S r e e d h a r , I r a q - I r a n War (New D e l h i : ABC P u b l i s h i n g H o u s e , 1 9 8 5 ) , p . 6. 2 6  U n i t e d Nations, General Assembly, S e c u r i t y C o u n c i l , R e v i e w o f t h e I m p l e m e n t a t i o n o f t h e D e c l a r a t i o n on t h e S t r e n g t h e n i n g o f I n t e r n a t i o n a l S e c u r i t y . 22 S e p t e m b e r 1980, 3 5 t h S e s s . , A / 3 5 / 4 8 3 , p . 4. 2 7  2 8  Staudenmaier,  p.  27.  R o b e r t Ghobad D a r i u s , "The I r a n i a n R e v o l u t i o n o f 1978-1979: P o t e n t i a l I m p l i c a t i o n s f o r Major C o u n t r i e s i n the A r e a , " i n R e v o l u t i o n i n I r a n : A R e a p p r a i s a l , ed. Envour Koury and C h a r l e s MacDonald ( H y a t t s v i l l e , M a r y l a n d : I n s t i t u t e o f M i d d l e E a s t e r n and N o r t h A f r i c a n A f f a i r s , 1982), p . 31. 2 9  S h a m e e m A k h t a r , "Impact o f t h e I s l a m i c Movement I r a n on t h e R e g i o n , " P a k i s t a n H o r i z o n 1-2 (1979):88. 30  R u h o l l a h K h o m e i n i , I s l a m and R e v o l u t i o n , Hamid A l g a r ( B e r k e l e y : M i z a n P r e s s , 1 9 8 1 ) , p . 38. 3 1  in  trans.  S h a r i f M . S h u j a , " I s l a m i c R e v o l u t i o n i n I r a n and I t s I m p a c t on I r a q , " I s l a m i c S t u d i e s : J o u r n a l o f t h e I s l a m i c R e s e a r c h I n s t i t u t e 3 (Autumn 1 9 8 0 ) : 2 1 4 . 3 2  3 3  Amos,  p.  53.  D a n i e l P i p e s , "A B o r d e r A d r i f t : O r i g i n s o f t h e C o n f l i c t , " i n The I r a n - I r a g War: New Weapons, O l d C o n f l i c t s , e d . S h i r i n T a h i r - K h e l i and Shaheen A y u b i (New Y o r k : P r a e g e r P u b l i s h e r s , 1 9 8 3 ) , p . 9. 3 4  3 5  The  Iran Times.  3 6  Shuja,  p.  11 A p r i l  1980.  216.  T a r e q Y. Ismael, "Ideology i n Recent I r a q i F o r e i g n P o l i c y , " i n T h e I r a n - I r a q War: O l d C o n f l i c t s . New Weapons, e d . Thomas N a f f ( W a s h i n g t o n , D . C : N a t i o n a l D e f e n s e U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s , 1 9 8 5 ) , p . 121. 3 7  3 8  Staudenmaier,  p.  28.  71 R o b e r t Ghobad D a r i u s , " K h o m e i n i ' s P o l i c y t o w a r d t h e M i d e a s t , " i n G u l f S e c u r i t y i n t o t h e 1980s: P e r c e p t u a l and S t r a t e g i c D i m e n s i o n s , e d . R o b e r t G . D a r i u s , J o h n W. Amos I I , a n d R a l p h H . Magnus ( P a l o A l t o , C a l i f o r n i a : S t a n f o r d U n i v e r s i t y , Hoover I n s t i t u t i o n P r e s s , 1984), p . 41. 3 9  4 0  4 1  Dawisha, The  p.  36.  Iran Times.  14 November  1980.  K e i t h L . N e l s o n and S p e n c e r C . O l i n , War?: I d e o l o g y . T h e o r y , and H i s t o r y ( B e r k e l e y : U n i v e r s i t y o f C a l i f o r n i a P r e s s , 1979), p . 54. 4 2  J r . , Why The  CHAPTER  III  c  I R A Q ' S INCENTIVES:  HISTORICAL,  E L I T E CONSENSUS,  AND THE L E V E L OF ACCURACY OF MOTIVATIONAL PERCEPTIONS The focused  initial  goaded t h e  a strategic  second s e c t i o n  into  The  third  section  of  ethnic,  component o f t h i s  the  chapter w i l l  degree  reflections  of  origins.  establish  Iran. the  regarding the  factor influenced Iraq's  in general.  Finally,  this  for  outline  further predisposed  force against  among r a n k i n g B a a t h i s t s  i n r o a d and how t h i s  from  impulses  chapter endeavors to  resort to m i l i t a r y  second p a r t o f t h i s  structure  incentives  and c u l t u r a l  the v a r i o u s h i s t o r i c a l antecedents that Baghdad t o  The  structure  c a n be r e i n f o r c e d b y p r e d i s p o s i t i o n a l  initial  to  enterprising motivations.  then demonstrated t h a t  stemming f r o m i d e o l o g i c a l ,  agreement  attempting  examined Baghdad's i n c e n t i v e  alternative perspective  aggression  Baathists  defensive  shock upon r e v o l u t i o n a r y I r a n .  the  The  of the previous chapter mainly  on t h e u n d e r l y i n g i m p o r t a n c e o f t h e  inducements t h a t inflict  section  The  level  of  envisioned  incentive  chapter w i l l  appraise  accuracy u n d e r p i n n i n g Baghdad's i n s p i r a t i o n a l  r e g a r d i n g the  n e c e s s i t y and u t i l i t y  undertaking a surprise attack against  72  Teheran.  of  73 Predilection Arising A long h i s t o r y reinforce surprise stand  the  strained  disposition  onslaught  out  of  from H i s t o r i c a l Antagonism  of  against  among t h e  a state's  various  i n the  Sunni animosity, to  continue  and,  territories  by t h e  Two m a j o r  latter's  as  campaign t o  realize  struggle  and e f f o r t s  of  partial  w h i c h was  gain  influence  factors  to  effect  of  Shi'ite-  I r a q i Kurds independence;  largely  f o r c o n t r o l over the  to  a  antipathy  efforts  an e n c o u r a g e m e n t  to  initiate  sources of h i s t o r i c a l  a v y i n g f o r r e g i o n a l mastery,  manifested  to  former t h r o u g h an e n g e n d e r i n g  as w e l l  their  can serve  elite  an a d v e r s a r y .  b e t w e e n Baghdad and T e h e r a n : t h e instability  relations  disputed  over the  Gulf  Arab  nations. The i n c o n s e q u e n t i a l by I r a q i S h i a s ,  which the  d i m i n i s h even f u r t h e r , predate  the  entire  of p o l i t i c a l  Baath regime  epoch o f  of  I r a q as  the mid-sixteenth  century u n t i l  War,  over  1  unaffected  The d i s p a r a t e  King F a i s a l I,  openly  mastery  political  by independence.  1918, of  local  relationship  I n 1933,  acknowledged  d e g r e e o f power h e l d by t h e  a modern  the  the  from  when  the  Great  political remained  The I r a q i monarch,  the  nation's  state.  which l a s t e d  victors  affairs.  that  T u r k i s h dominion over  O t t o m a n E m p i r e was d i v i d e d up b y t h e Sunni Muslims e x e r c i s e d  wielded  to  antecedents  f o r m e r l y known as M e s o p o t a m i a ,  approximately  power  endeavored  c a n be t r a c e d t o  formal establishment  Throughout the territory,  level  disproportionate  Sunnis,  while  President  Abd a l - S a l a m , who r u l e d f r o m 1963 champion o f  Sunni p o l i t i c a l  Dismay stemming has  to  1966,  supremacy.  from t h e i r  was an u n a b a s h e d  2  relative  powerlessness  c u l m i n a t e d i n a number o f b i d s u n d e r t a k e n b y t h e  masses t o history,  break the albeit  S u n n i m i n o r i t y ' s dominance  a l l have been l a r g e l y  Organized S h i ' i t e  m i l i t a n c y came t o  number o f h i g h c l e r i c s , the  Islamic  percentage  Call, of  the  the  unsuccessful.  the  fore  i n 1960  ranks of which comprised a  f o r m e r members o f  i n 1958.  Call's  generous i n p r o f f e r i n g a s s i s t a n c e to  struggle  greater  to  access to  important to  realize  the  the  by a d e s i r e  hegemon,  of  prompting p o l i t i c a l in  nations  which  movement  exacting It  is  of  securing his  Iraq's  Shias  position  as  but,  regional  c o u l d be f u r t h e r e d b y  i n s t a b i l i t y w i t h i n the  Gulf  states,  Iraq.  The S h a h ' s that  to  Shah was n o t m o t i v a t e d b y a  an e n d w h i c h he b e l i e v e d  particularly  the  p a r a m o u n t end o f  benevolent concern f o r the welfare rather,  Ulama  quick  P a h l a v i regime,  p o l i t i c a l power f r o m B a g h d a d .  note that  significant  c a d r e was  was  its  founded  organization  an i n f o r m a l n e x u s w i t h t h e  in  when a  Association of  an i n i t i a l S h i ' i t e  The I s l a m i c  3  the  establish quite  recent  including Ayatollah al-Sadr,  [ J a m ' i y a t Ulama a l - D i n ] , established  in  Shi'ite  r e a s o n i n g was p r e d i c a t e d upon t h e  w i t h deep p o l i t i c a l ,  divisions  would f i n d  challenge  to  external  it  difficult  influence.  religious,  and  to muster a From 1968  to  premise  ethnic  strong 1975,  the  75 I r a n i a n monarch f o c u s e d Baath governance centers, the  on e x p l o i t i n g  in Iraq's  southeastern  w h i c h was h e i g h t e n e d  area during t h i s  the  period.  by the  Shi'ite  toward  holy  severe drought g r i p p i n g  By 1974,  4  discontent  scores of  the  Shah's  a g e n t s h a d i n f i l t r a t e d s o u t h e r n I r a q and were w o r k i n g d i r e c t l y with the propaganda. holidays,  It  that  extremists Baathists  Islamic  was a t t h i s the  Iraq,  of  forces  the  Islamic  Teheran's involvement  a n t i - I r a n i a n o r i e n t a t i o n which, for  can  the  Baathists'  in turn,  Iraqi  Kurdish unrest  to  In f a c t ,  is  ethnic  hundred y e a r s .  Kurdish separatists the  of  end  Shi'ite  Baath  elite's  strengthened  the  for using m i l i t a r y  the  substantial  not  a recent  state  i n the  The f u n d a m e n t a l  W o r l d War: t h e  in  phenomenon  Near E a s t aspiration following  1920  force  Iranian  Kurdish organizations  was b r i e f l y r e a l i z e d  First  Shi'ite  Kurds have been engaged  f o r an i n d e p e n d e n t  cessation of  the  the  for opposition  predilection  history.  several  swelling  five  aggression.  assistance accorded to  struggle  of  Overall,  solidify  a l s o be p a r t i a l l y a s c r i b e d t o  Iraq.  The  throughout  execution  i n the  Beyond T e h e r a n ' s s u p p o r t groups,  repression  Shi'ite  Shi'ite  transpired.  Call.  i n t h e m i d - 1 9 7 0 s was t o  propensity  during several  which i n c l u d e d the of  anti-Baath  d i r e c t c l a s h e s between  r e s p o n d e d w i t h a wave o f  ranking o f f i c i a l s  activism  first  i n propagating  juncture,  and s t a t e s e c u r i t y  southeastern  result  Call  recent  peculiar  in a for of the  Treaty of  Sevres,  one  of  a multitude of  at V e r s a i l l e s , However,  the  Treaty of  established  Sevres  post-war  an autonomous  a c c o r d was  under the  with sections of control of At this  Syria, point,  the  i n the  5  brethren  i n surrounding states,  i n 1923  by  the  analogous  Soviet  to  Iraq's  the  dismantling  short-lived nation  Turkey,  and I r a q .  concluded  Kurdistan.  superceded  Lausanne, which r e s u l t e d  Kurdistan,  covenants  their  coming  Union,  from t h e  central  Initially, to the  the  Kurdish minority  due t o  However,  insurgents  i n 1943,  significantly  the  a general  coaction Iraqi  of  the  activity  little  began t o  in Iraq  cooperate  Kurds.  (KDP),  Kurds'  p o l i t i c a l organization,  autonomy t o expectations  the  of  the  greater stir  a l a r m among  when t h e  was  Kurds.  soon  faded as  the  I r a q i m o n a r c h y i n 1958,  However, the  Kurdish  founded.  r e v o l u t i o n a r y regime would  Iraq's  the  Mulla  w h i c h g r a d u a l l y emerged a s  deposal that  forces,  was  with  The  served to  Democratic Party  KDP was h o p e f u l  its  c l e r i c who commanded  and was r e d o u b l e d i n 1946  With the  of  c o n c e r n i n Baghdad.  a widely venerated  Kurdish organizations  principal  o r g a n i z a t i o n and  when two p o l i t i c a l g r o u p s ,  s u p p o r t among I r a q i  officials  lack of  K u r d i s h movement  R i z g a r y and Hewa p a r t i e s ,  considerable  of  evoked  strengthened  Mustafa a l - B a r z a n i ,  wrest  government.  r a t h e r low i n t e n s i t y  Kurdish  Iran,  ethnic  o r g a n i z e d armed g r o u p s w h i c h commenced a c a m p a i g n t o autonomy  of  initial,  new g o v e r n m e n t ,  the  grant  sanguine l e d by  G e n e r a l Abd a l - K a r i m Qasiin, the  affording of  I n September o f new r o u n d o f strongholds  indicated that  any s u b s t a n t i v e 1958,  the  concessions  i n northern Iraq, from t h i s  r e g a r d e d as  s p i r i t u a l guide of  insurgency  June o f  1966,  granted the political regime's  intensified  the  the  and, consequently,  which had been b r i e f l y suspended, time that  sizable  the  Shah e n t e r e d  Kurdish  base o f  Mulla be  K u r d s waned  early  1960s,  of  the  and i n  KDP w h i c h  govern  local  the  central  the  agreement  g u e r r i l l a campaign,  was r e s u m e d .  the  sparked a  with the  However,  stipulations  Kurds.  resistance.  freedom t o  and economic a f f a i r s .  to  Kurdish  during the  Kurds s i g n i f i c a n t  proved inconstant  this  of  an a c c o r d was c o n c l u d e d w i t h t h e  adherence to  the  j u n c t u r e o n w a r d , came t o  Baghdad's a v e r s i o n toward n e g o t i a t i n g the  to  shelling  i n c l u d i n g the  a l - B a r z a n i who,  as  was a v e r s e  revolutionary leadership  f i g h t i n g by o r d e r i n g t h e  the  it  It  was  at  f r a y by t r a n s p o r t i n g  amounts o f weaponry and m a t e r i a l , t h e  was p r o v i d e d b y W a s h i n g t o n and T e l A v i v ,  to  bulk of  the  which  Kurdish  combatants. When t h e efforts  to  Following January of  Baathists  p a c i f y the lengthy 1970,  representatives  additional  K u r d i s h p o p u l a c e were u n d e r t a k e n .  negotiations,  w h i c h were commenced  in  P r e s i d e n t a l - B a k r and K u r d i s h c o n c l u d e d a new c o v e n a n t  which s t i p u l a t e d t h a t president,  assumed power i n 1968,  and t h a t  on 11 M a r c h  a Kurd would h o l d the  greater  1970,  office  of  vice-  access to higher posts  in  the  78 government,  the m i l i t a r y ,  and i n s t i t u t i o n s  l e a r n i n g would be extended  to  the  Kurds.  of  But a g a i n ,  6  consensus r e g a r d i n g i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of v a r i o u s the  agreement  proved e l u s i v e  and,  n o r t h was s o o n underway a g a i n .  forces  were e n g a g i n g  government  troops,  increasingly expenditure defense,  by t h i s direct  costly of  while  agricultural  and t h e  a significant effecting  output.  juncture,  Baath regime, percentage  and a r t i l l e r y b a r r a g e s a g a i n s t  clashes  necessitating  of  Iraq's  d r o p i n i n d u s t r i a l and  involvement  insurgents  which i n c l u d e d a i r  Iraqi of  strikes  troops.  Iranian forces  in  the  and t h e  specter  discomfiting of  of  the  such a development,  the  Baathists.  forestalling  the  onset of  bilateral  the  negotiations  for  the  Iran  wide  most  A c c o r d i n g l y , toward the  agreed to  partake  between in  conclusion  a key p r o v i s i o n o f which  though the  Iraqi  end  Houari  which culminated i n the  a termination of Teheran's abetting Overall,  was  b r o k e r e d by P r e s i d e n t  A l g i e r s agreement,  guerrillas.  the  a military conflict  Baath e l i t e  Boumedienne o f A l g e r i a , of  due t o  Shah's m i l i t a r y machine,  to  I r a q and I r a n ,  the  GNP on  i n s u r g e n c y p o r t e n d e d an o u t b r e a k o f war w i t h  superiority  with  was p r o v i n g  Kurdish  of  combat  Kurdish  Shah was g r a n t i n g K u r d i s h  Iranian m i l i t a r y support,  The a c t u a l  of  To f u r t h e r compound B a g h d a d ' s woes,  7  the  large-scale  an a t t e n d a n t  heavy  By 1975,  guerrilla conflict  f o r the  sections  consequently,  i n the  i n frequent,  higher  called  Kurdish  B a a t h r e g i m e was a b l e  to  rapidly  q u e l l the  Iranian aid, Iraq's to  the  insurgency great  expense o f  internal affairs  utilize  force  subversion  as  i n the  militants, regional  with Iran. originate  the of  struggle  demise  Saddam H u s s e i n and o t h e r entertained  designs of  addition to  the  of  in  deepen  Iranian-sponsored  of  the  had  of  annexation  of  The r e c e n t  the  the  more  history  o v e r Abu the  of  Iraqi-  i n the  a powerful m i l i t a r y c a p a b i l i t y ,  paramountcy over the  position  Persian Gulf  to  region.  the  late  conservative  including assistance  i n an a d v a n t a g e o u s  in  Kuwaiti  I r a n i a n m o n a r c h y , T e h e r a n was  Western support,  not  which,  w r a n g l i n g t o o k a more i n t e n s e t u r n a s  Due t o  war  long  K h u z e s t a n and  1970s.  therefore  did  s e c u r i n g ascendancy  1960s a n d e a r l y  establishing  go t o  Rather,  t e r r i t o r i a l aggrandizement  t h e i r Near E a s t e r n dominions  crucial  to  Pahlavi dynasty.  ranking Baathists  included the  the  factor  aspirations  B r i t i s h vacated  of  to  and K u r d i s h  an a d d i t i o n a l  hegemonic  B u b i y a n and W a r b a h .  orientation  predisposition  h i s t o r i c a l propensity  primary goal  I r a n i a n hegemonic  the  activists  G r e a t e r and L e s s e r T u n b s ,  al-Arab,  islands  Shah's meddling  b e t w e e n Baghdad and T e h e r a n f o r  The Baath e l i t e ' s  Musa a n d t h e  of  I r a n i a n monarch's e f f o r t s  Shi'ite  Baathists'  with the  withdrawal  averting  supremacy c o n s t i t u t e d  u n d e r l y i n g the  Shatt  of  the  future.  position  the  the  served to  a means  In a d d i t i o n to s h o r e up t h e  following  afforded  in and was  establish As a  result,  80 Baghdad was  forced to  leadership  to  efforts  instigate  to  littoral  limit  strictly  and l a r g e l y  political destabilization  to  ineffectual, in  the  Initially,  over the  establish  sovereignty to  by t h e  to  goad t h e  British,  peacefully.  establish  stationed  in l i n e with regional  which had been d e s i g n a t e d islands  troops  t e r r i t o r y by a s s e r t i n g  administrator  relinquishing  In pursuance of  a legitimate  basis  this  goal,  for his  Arabs d u r i n g the  control  of  islands  the  was  imperative  On 29 November 1971, partially  of  the  Emirates forces while the  the  to  their  c e n t u r y and  for Iran's  Shah's  in  that  security.  objective  8  was  r e a l i z e d when T e h e r a n c o n c l u d e d an a c c o r d  regarding the one  nineteenth  Shah  G r e a t e r and  L e s s e r Tunbs had been under P e r s i a n dominion p r i o r by t h e  the  interest  t h a t Abu Musa and t h e  seizure  islands.  U n i t e d Arab  as t h e  into  by  designs,  I r a n i a n c o n t r o l over the  Teheran attempted  Emirates,  recall British  G r e a t e r and L e s s e r T u n b s was welcomed  o p p o r t u n i s t i c S h a h , who,  moved q u i c k l y t o  the  regional  sheikdoms.  on Abu Musa and t h e  sought  campaign f o r  clandestine,  London's d e c i s i o n  the  its  s t a t u s o f Abu Musa w i t h t h e  p r i n c i p a l i t i e s that  (UAE).  The agreement  Sheik of Sharjah,  comprise the stipulated  U n i t e d Arab  that  Iranian  w o u l d e x e r c i s e c o n t r o l o v e r a p o r t i o n o f Abu M u s a , S h a r j a h w o u l d h o l d sway o v e r t h e  island,  and t h a t  petroleum extracted  all  remaining section  funds generated  from t h e  by t h e  sale  of  i s l a n d and a d j o i n i n g w a t e r s  of  81 w o u l d be e q u a l l y d i v i d e d b e t w e e n I r a n and S h a r j a h . However, the  while  emir of  UAE,  Iran's  L e s s e r Tunbs, to  condemnations  of  insistence,  islands  the  p o i n t e d out t h a t  to  1971,  three  a meeting  order Iranian  on 30 November. forth  bitter  aggressive action. of  A n d , on  the United N a t i o n ' s  i n e a r l y December,  f r o m 1750  the  G r e a t e r and  until  1866,  Security  d u r i n g which i t the  islands  j u r i s d i c t i o n o f Ras a l - K h a i m a and t h a t  had  from  was been  1866  Ras a l - K h a i m a h a d s h a r e d n o m i n a l r u l e r s h i p o v e r  islands  with Sharjah.  observations,  addition,  of  a historical  Iranian diplomats  Council  that  seizure  of  any l e g a l ,  the  islands  c a r r i e d which c a l l e d withdrawal.  However,  United Nation's to  take  as  was no v a l i d i t y  r i g h t to  f a i l e d to  judgments,  Shah d e c i d e d t o and t h i s  r e t a l i a t o r y measures,  the  for  resolutions  the were  Iranian simply ignore  prompted the  thousand I r a n i a n n a t i o n a l s  and  severance  of  diplomatic relations  with Teheran.  convinced Baath o f f i c i a l s  that  the  Iraqi the  some s i x t y  In  Security  which i n c l u d e d  of  to  territory.  basis existed  f o r an u n c o n d i t i o n a l the  the  convince  a result,  expulsion  experience  there  legitimate and,  the  P r o c e e d i n g from t h e s e  Baghdad a r g u e d t h a t  Teheran's claims  elite  Shah t o  immediately put  Shah's  C o u n c i l was c o n v e n e d  under the  regarding the  which prompted t h e  occupy the  r e a c h e d o v e r Abu M u s a ,  another c i t y - s t a t e w i t h i n  overtures  Baath o f f i c i a l s  Iraqi  was e a s i l y  Ras a l - K h a i m a h ,  resisted  forces  agreement  9  This  I r a n was  not  the bitter  82 interested  in equitably  diplomatic  channels,  attendant  belief  diplomacy, issues of  resolving  and t h i s  conclusion  i n Baghdad t h a t  constituted contention  conflicts  force,  t h e most v i a b l e  through  gave r i s e rather  history.  approximately  eighty  I r a n was  struggle  for  regional  percent  Arabic  Constantinople u n t i l control  outset.  over the Iran's  Following the  speaking, 1924,  r e g i o n by t h e  acquisition  of of  League  monarchial  demonstrating  its  interest  was  at  this  foster unrest sentiment.  t e r r i t o r i a l claim to  largely  Khuzestan.  aspiration to  secure control  I r a q i M i n i s t r y of  entitled was  attempted  organized under the  L i b e r a t i o n of  the  Baghdad b e g a n t o  i n Khuzestan by a r o u s i n g A r a b  Arab i r r e d e n t i s t s  attempt  since  in  to  by p r o f f e r i n g a i d Front  for  K h u z e s t a n came  Information published a  Iran's  1 0  nationalist  Further evidence of of  Abadan.  gaining of  to  the  Baghdad's i n 1969  when  tractate  "The H i s t o r y o f A r a b i s t a n [ K h u z e s t a n ] , "  argued t h a t  time  i n a n n e x i n g K h u z e s t a n by h o l d i n g  juncture that  T h i s was  of  Khuzestan  r e v o l u t i o n a r y regime wasted l i t t l e  It  the  point  the  I r a q had a l e g i t i m a t e  is  was u n d e r  at which  elimination  in  which  1958,  that  in  the  The K h u z e s t a n i p o p u l a c e ,  Iraq challenged  from t h e rule  of  assigned  Nations.  of  represents  Baghdad and T e h e r a n h a v e b e e n e n g a g e d  during recent  subjugation  settling  with Teheran.  important feature  supremacy t h a t  the  than  medium f o r  A p u r s u i t of dominion over Khuzestan another  to  i n which  c o n t r o l over  the  it  83  territory,  t h e A r a b s r e s i d i n g t h e r e had been  "tyrannical" However,  objective  Overall, to  the of  Baathists'  that  Khuzestan as  efforts  were w e l l  common f r o n t i e r , al-Arab,  1520  seventeenth, during the  the  ten  eighteenth,  al-Arab.  of  annexing  last  several  separate  of  of t h i s  argued t h a t ,  the  of  a l - A r a b ' s w a t e r emanated T e h e r a n was e n t i t l e d  estuary.  Nonetheless,  favorable  response  this  from t h e  position  of  centuries, century,  fact  the  as  over the  that  well  Teheran  throughout t h i s  consistently  Iranian rivers,  Shatt  sixteenth,  Porte t o g a i n ascendancy  due t o  the  accords regarding  and n i n e t e e n t h  two d e c a d e s  the  hundred y e a r s .  Throughout the  1 2  the  of  segments o f  consisting  Iran's monarchial r u l e r s ,  Shatt  came  prized territory.  delineation  over the  and 1975,  s t r u g g l e d with the  the  Baath e l i t e  Iranian Revolution,  p a r t i c u l a r l y that  first  advance  p r e d i s p o s e d t o mount a r e n e w a l  over the  tension  1 1  powerful P a h l a v i regime remained i n  onset of  w a t e r w a y were c o n c l u d e d .  as  the  h a s b e e n an a d d i t i o n a l , e n d u r i n g s o u r c e  interstate Between  to  l i k e l i h o o d of  to g a i n c o n t r o l over t h i s Friction  Teheran.  c o n t r o l over Khuzestan.  coming t o power,  l o n g as t h e  to  b e t w e e n Baghdad  did l i t t l e  Iraqi  t h e r e was no r e a l  But w i t h the  Baathists  efforts  establishing  shortly after  realize  power.  d i s c r i m i n a t i o n " by  beyond f u r t h e r s t r a i n i n g r e l a t i o n s  and T e h e r a n , the  r u l e and " r a c i a l  subjected  Shatt epoch,  sixty  percent  from a number o f to mastery over f a i l e d to  Ottoman S u l t a n a t e .  elicit  the a  84 I n 1908, discovered greatly Shatt  substantial  petroleum deposits  i n K h u z e s t a n and t h i s  heighten  al-Arab.  the  development  importance of  I n 1913,  exerting  I r a n and t h e  w i t h R u s s i a and G r e a t B r i t a i n ,  served  Ottoman E m p i r e ,  w h i c h were v y i n g t o  i n the  Protocol,  a key p r o v i s i o n o f which e s t a b l i s h e d  a r r i v e at  the  signed  the  Shortly afterward,  Shatt  was  opposed t o  that  al-Arab to the  terms  a formal recognition  of  the  Shatt  l i n k a g e was n o t w e l l newly  continue to  observance  the  compliance with the acceptance  on t h e  1 3  al-Arab.  received  of  the  of  Porte,  Teheran  the  over  to  renegotiate  The i m p o s i n g o f  provisions  of  insisted  w o u l d be  they the  that  the this officials  intended  1913  to  a c c o r d and  had o r i g i n a l l y  I r a n responded by t e r m i n a t i n g  London D e c l a r a t i o n a l t o g e t h e r , the  of  envoys  dominion  i n B a g h d a d , and when  treaty  had been  Teheran's d i s c a r d i n g of  grounds t h a t  commission  demarcation  independence  mandate o v e r t h e waterway  been g r a n t e d t o  British.  Iraqi  founded s t a t e announced t h a t  r e t a i n the  that  of  a  London D e c l a r a t i o n and when  upon B a g h d a d ' s w i l l i n g n e s s  delineation  the  the  establish  The I r a n i a n monarchy  a f f o r d e d l i m i t e d autonomy i n 1920,  contingent  of  of  along  Ottoman a n d B r i t i s h  Constantinople.  the  Constantinople  London D e c l a r a t i o n , which extended  the  I r a q was  concluded the  a new s e t t l e m e n t r e g a r d i n g t h e  waterway.  to  c o n t r o l over  influence  to  region,  were  the  f o r c e d by  claiming the  London D e c l a r a t i o n ,  a c c o r d had been c o n c l u d e d under  85 compulsion,  established  abrogation of  interstate  Rising over the  the  to  the  for  i n the  1920s,  armed c l a s h e s  sporadic,  to  forces  over the  constitute  At t h i s  juncture,  Nations,  thalweg  line.  preserved stipulated  of  1930s,  the  attached  the  challenge  contest  the  relations.  Baghdad's  League  of  s h o u l d be d i v i d e d  principle, that  transpired  Iraqi-Iranian  estuary  law w h i c h h o l d s  d i v i d e d by a waterway,  conclusion  the  aggression;  constabulary  al-Arab before  maintaining that  international  of  u p p e r hand  i m p o r t a n t r i v e r h a d come  R e z a Shah b e g a n t o  accordance with the  thalweg  feature  Shatt  onset of  By t h e  1 4  economically  a salient  supremacy o v e r t h e  channel  and t h e  Basra Port A u t h o r i t y .  control  unilateral  toward I r a q ' s  al-Arab resulted  between I r a n i a n n a v a l  of  c o v e n a n t s b e t w e e n I r a q and I r a n .  Iranian disaffection  Shatt  throughout  an i m p o r t a n t p r e c e d e n t  1 5  a provision  when two n a t i o n s  frontier will  follow  the  in  of are mid-  Teheran r e a l i z e d a minor c o n c e s s i o n with a new t r e a t y  Iraqi control that  the  i n 1937  o v e r most o f  waterway  i n proximity to  which,  the  the  although Shatt  it  al-Arab,  w o u l d be d e m a r c a t e d a l o n g Iranian ports  the  the  o f A b a d a n and  Khorramshahr. The s i g n i n g period of  relative  endured u n t i l the  of  the  1937  pact,  ushered  in a  t r a n q u i l i t y b e t w e e n I r a q and I r a n , late  1960s when R e z a S h a h ' s  Muhammad R e z a P a h l a v i , became 1937  agreement  w h i c h he h e l d t o  be  increasingly  which  successor,  vexed  in contravention  over of  the  86 international addition,  it  statute regarding interstate was c h a r g e d t h a t  I r a q had l o n g been  noncompliance with v a r i o u s p r o v i s i o n s of principally  those that  established  c h a n n e l and t h e  upkeep o f  the  generated  by usage l e v i e s e x a c t e d  More p r e c i s e l y ,  the  maintain the the  alleged  principal of  Iraqi  t h e waterway  the  Iraqi  adherence effected  to  the  1937  a d v a n c e an  thalweg.  border pact.  marked t h e  of  it  the  is  observance  not unreasonable to hold that  A l g i e r s a c c o r d i n September o f  i n f l u e n c e d by a cognizance for  illegally  the  past.  to  seized  entire the to  upon  length  Baathists accede  This event,  second o c c a s i o n  r u l e r had u n i l a t e r a l l y ceased And,  collected  Iran opted to  dormant i l l - w i l l  to  jettison  which  b e t w e e n Baghdad  on w h i c h an I r a n i a n of  a major entente.  Baghdad's s c r a p p i n g  1980  was  likely  of Teheran's c a v a l i e r  penchant  suspending compliance with major ententes  in  T e n s i o n b e t w e e n I r a q and I r a n r a p i d l y mounted i n following years  as t h e  of  immediate,  However,  i n response,  a regeneration of  and T e h e r a n ,  funds  authorities  of the  demarcation of the  along the  S h a h ' s demands a n d ,  the  from commercial s h i p p i n g .  d e m o n s t r a t e d an u n c o m p r o m i s i n g u n w i l l i n g n e s s the  in  The P a h l a v i r e g i m e  infractions to  objective:  treaty,  i n f r a s t r u c t u r e r a t h e r than  Shatt al-Arab.  In  1 6  in  equal d i s t r i b u t i o n of  Shah o p e n l y a c c u s e d  improve I r a q ' s  the  cooperation  i m p r o p e r l y u s i n g an e x c e s s i v e p e r c e n t a g e revenue t o  frontiers.  Shah p l a c e d i n c r e a s i n g r e l i a n c e  the  upon  87 the  use  of  force  as  a means o f  abandon t h e i r e f f o r t s al-Arab. Shah's  direct,  aid to  was t h e b e s t o w i n g  Iraqi  Shi'ite  Kurdish separatists. assistance to to  the  alternative  agreement, Iran,  of  activist  By 1975,  the  Baathists,  regarding  indirect,  cost of  at  the  the  t h e r e was  no  objectives. the  Algiers  preferential  The l o s s o f m a s t e r y  over  coupled with Teheran's abetting  Baath o p p o s i t i o n groups, officials,  and  intolerable  p r o v i s i o n s o f w h i c h were c l e a r l y  the v a l u a b l e estuary,  later  Iranian  Shah's t e r r i t o r i a l  concluded.  the  the  and  a n n u a l OPEC summit i n M a r c h ,  was h a s t i l y  Shatt  of  organizations  who c o n c l u d e d t h a t the  aspect  to  against  t h e s e e l e m e n t s h a d r e a c h e d an  b u t t o bow t o  Accordingly,  Iraqi  a notable  i n a new d i p l o m a t i c c o n f e r e n c e dispute,  Baathists  sway o v e r t h e  c a m p a i g n t o weaken B a g h d a d ' s r e s o l v e  frontier  to  to maintain Iraqi  As mentioned p r e v i o u s l y ,  partaking  level  compelling the  of  i m p a r t e d i n most h i g h - r a n k i n g  p a r t i c u l a r l y Saddam H u s s e i n ,  loathing of  the  Shah w h i c h ,  in turn,  historical,  predispositional basis  an  gave r i s e  intense  to  a  for resorting to  strong an  incursion.  Degree o f I r a q i E l i t e U n i t y Regarding; t h e E f f i c a c y of Attempting a Strategic Surprise A n e x u s c a n be d i s c e r n e d b e t w e e n t h e inducements level  for r e s o r t i n g to  a surprise attack  o f u n a n i m i t y r e g a r d i n g t h e wisdom o f  undertaking prevalent  strength  among t h e  aggressor's  and  of  the  s u c h an key  governmental  88 actors.  A strong  surprise  inroad is  a powerful,  incentive  more l i k e l y t o  ideologically  e x i s t s a minimal l e v e l the  attainment  resorting polity  to  of  structure  arise  united e l i t e ,  Over the  has been under the  last  the  r a n k s o f which beckon from t h e  the  commencement  governance  has  personality to  be  Baath e l i t e ,  located of  a significant  tenure  alluded to  as  Baathists  career took  off  regime  of  j o i n i n g the  of  vice-chairman of the  nation's  in  1976,  secure h i s  point  onward,  position,  of of  of  From n e a r l y Baathists' of  which has  Baath p a r t y at  coming t o  power,  when he was g r a n t e d an President  al-Bakr.  age  come  twenty  his influential  Within a  H u s s e i n had advanced t o  the  r e v o l u t i o n a r y Command C o u n c i l ,  determination  when P r e s i d e n t  From t h i s  Bakr as  of  Government,  facto  Iraqi  "Saddamism."  most i m p o r t a n t g o v e r n m e n t a l  r e a l i z e d de  the  a r o u n d Saddam H u s s e i n ,  upon t h e  i n the  the  percentage  Iraq.  i n 1968,  Saddam H u s s e i n j o i n e d t h e  position  of  b e e n p r e d i c a t e d upon a n i n t e n s e c u l t  frequently  political  hamper  small Sunni v i l l a g e  i n northwestern  their  evolving  and i n 1968,  twenty y e a r s ,  there  near e x c l u s i v e predomination  narrowly based  which i s  need  a  r u l e d by  and i n w h i c h  regarding the  the  Takrit,  in a state  of bureaucratic obstacles to  concurrence  force.  f o r c a r r y i n g out  over  post 1 7  the  body.  Saddam H u s s e i n  Iraq's  political  al-Bakr suffered  a heart  Hussein endeavored  system  attack.  feverishly  and when he s u c c e e d e d t h e  de j u r e h e a d - o f - g o v e r n m e n t  year  ailing  on 16 J u l y 1979,  to al-  he h a d  89 already  amassed an  extraordinary  power v i s - a - v i s t h e government, p a r t y , following: the  Iraq's  and  m i l i t a r y posts,  polity.  including  Baathists and  establishment  effectively political  deterred  ubiquitous Security"  of S t a l i n .  [ A l - M u k h a b a r a t ] , w h i c h was  c a r t e b l a n c h e t o use  dissidence. Iraq's  By  and  p o p u l a c e has  particularly obtaining conclusive  the  large,  r i g h t of  evidence of the 1 8  I r a q i despot  of opposition effective known as  under the  violence  in  f r e e speech; the  and "Public  command and  Baath  of  which  Baath r u l e ,  liberties, necessity  a common t y p e w r i t e r Baathists'  to  suppressing  onset of  been d e n i e d b a s i c c i v i l  a p e r m i t t o own  orientation.  The  ascendancy  totalitarian  of Hussein,  since the  atmosphere  with the  euphemistically  Barazan Ibrahim, a c l o s e confidant afforded  an i d e o l o g i c a l l y  political  r e l y i n g upon an  police force,  of  have c o n s i s t e n t l y  of  open e x p r e s s i o n s  d o m i n a n c e by  of  have  came t o d e m o n s t r a t e a  approximating that  chairman  minister.  I r a q became i n c r e a s i n g l y d i c t a t o r i a l  bearing  the  commander-in-chief  In a d d i t i o n , the  o f Saddam H u s s e i n , who  political  important  Baath p a r t y ;  authoritarian leaning  e n d e a v o r e d t o hamper t h e  in  prime  c o m i n g t o power, t h e  d e m o n s t r a t e d an  pluralistic  of the  Command C o u n c i l ;  armed f o r c e s ; and, Since  of  a c q u i s i t i o n o f a number o f  secretary-general  Revolutionary  concentration  of  constitutes  repressive  was  90 Immediately p r i o r to al-Bakr,  is  of  important to  note,  by a l - B a k r ,  was one o f  in Iraq. and t h i s  the  T h i s move was met w i t h unwelcome  reaction decision  compel t h e w i d e l y  to  Furthermore,  at  respected  this  designs of  establishing  reservations  the  subterfuge  In mid-August, f o l l o w i n g hastily  assembled,  alleged  c o n s p i r a t o r s were  of  Chief  office.  his  The M a c h i a v e l l i a n alleged,  seditious  of h i s  objectives.  found c u l p a b l e o f  sentenced  among t h o s e p u t t o  to  twenty-one anti-government  in addition,  lengthy  death at t h i s  Shi'ite  c o n d u c t e d by  terms  scores  in  j u n c t u r e was  adherent w i t h i n the  Adnan  the  held the  p o s t s o f d e p u t y p r i m e m i n i s t e r and s e c r e t a r y  R e v o l u t i o n a r y Command C o u n c i l .  succeeded  by t h e  an i n v e t e r a t e  hard-line Colonel  proponent of  of  jail.  Hussein,  the  senior  regarding  extraordinary tribunals,  were  quietly  and p a r t y  summary t r i a l s  a n d were p r o m p t l y e x e c u t e d ;  other o f f i c i a l s  to  a t t a c k i n g r e v o l u t i o n a r y I r a n and o f  c o n s p i r a c y t o purge p e r c e i v e d opponents  intrigue  strong  H u s s e i n l a u n c h e d a campaign  I r a q as a r e g i o n a l power.  H u s s e i n opted t o use  who,  constituted  resign his  r a n k i n g government  who h a d e x p r e s s e d  aggressive  president  juncture,  oust the m i n o r i t y of  officials  the  few S h i a s h o l d i n g a  the main impetus u n d e r l y i n g H u s s e i n ' s  to  President  t h e R e v o l u t i o n a r y Command C o u n c i l ,  h i g h government p o s t protest  "retirement" of  Saddam H u s s e i n s a c k e d Mohye A b d e l H u s s e i n ,  secretary-general it  the  regime,  who  of  Adnan H u s s e i n was T a r e q Hamed a l - A b d u l l a h ,  Saddam H u s s e i n ' s  hegemonic  aspirations.  Overall,  Machiavelli, vestiges the  of  factional  By t h e  in  well  as  Baath p a r t y ,  approximately  the  the  agenda.  securing  institution  financial  aspire  of personal  eminence  only ardent to  attain  within  i m p o r t a n t government  resulting  made i t  Government.  By a n d l a r g e ,  wealth,  to  effort  conduct to  the  inflict  of  of  society as  could  political point,  as  Baghdad's  or  almost  power b y  the  from Baath  the  the elite,  authority,  f o r the  This attribute  inducement  was  envisioned  s u r p r i s e upon K h o m e i n i ' s  opposition.  upon  Baathists,  ultimate  u n h i n d e r e d by i n t r a r e g i m e  a  Baathist  this  political  by mid-1980,  of  contingent  for the  And, at  f i n a l preparations  an i m p o r t a n t a s p e c t o f  was  indistinguishable  a strategic  which  become,  Baath l o y a l i s t s  o v e r w h i c h Saddam H u s s e i n e x e r c i s e d able  ranks of  hierarchy,  p o s t s were h e l d b y  almost  the  s t a t e and  a position  Iraq.  i n a monopolization  party that  to  had  of  of  purge.  political  o f unwavering support  Simply put,  realistically  upper echelons  the  some t w e l v e m i l l i o n , central  of  one m i l l i o n members o u t  Advancement w i t h i n t h e  a demonstration  all  the  counsel  remaining  Saddam H u s s e i n a s c e n d e d  population of  Iraq.  d i v i s i o n w i t h i n the  i n mid-1979,  unequivocally,  the  e l i t e w i t h one v i o l e n t  time  had burgeoned t o total  with the  Saddam H u s s e i n e l i m i n a t e d  Baath governing  presidency  i n consonance  Iran, stands  structure.  92 Degree  The is  to  of Misperception i n the V a l u a t i o n s Comprising the I r a q i Regime's Incentive Structure  objective of  gauge t h e  level  the  of  final  accuracy  u n d e r l y i n g Baghdad's m o t i v a t i o n s military  attack.  importance, of,  for  behind the  determined  invade  i n doing so, decision  which,  the  the  to  Islamic  overall  resort  in turn,  outbreak  of  wisdom,  future  posed by t h e  Revolution to  stability  within  Iraq.  foster  of  Islamic  southeastern region  of  the  country.  With regard to  the  perceived  destabilization  represented  Muslim W a r r i o r s ,  the  discern  the  Shi'ite  organizations  at  the  outset,  Islamic lot  of  limited  Baathists  the  revolution Iran's  similar,  extent of and t h e  Islamic  Islamic  affinity  Call  in  the  of  to  the  political  Call  and to  the clearly  between  these Although  that  a m a j o r improvement i n t u r n , might  i n I r a q and o t h e r  of  Khomeinists  had been h o p e f u l  p e a s a n t masses w h i c h ,  to  Iranian  for the  threat  The  assessment  I r a n i a n churchmen.  would e f f e c t  popular upheaval  proffering  e r r e d by f a i l i n g the  be  impetus  fundamentalism  by t h e  dearth  More p r e c i s e l y ,  potential  a burgeoning  or  conflicts.  an i m p r e c i s e  threat  the  in  Baath regime's  immediate  overestimated  can  utility  of  surprise  significant  to warfare  c a n be o f  R e p u b l i c was  chapter  estimations  extent of  Baathists  this  for undertaking a  the  e r r o r underlying the  the  of  S u c h an u n d e r t a k i n g i s  p r e s c r i p t i o n against the principal  section of  the  of  the  effect  surrounding  a  Muslim s t a t e s ,  the  increasingly despotic  demeanor o f  Khomeinists,  along with r a p i d l y escalating  dislocation,  served to  Khomeini  zeal.  traditional Islamic  Irrespective  Islamic  Call  d i m i n i s h the  that  of  lifestyle,  the  economic  organization's  t h e i r espousal it  was t h e  Iranian c l e r i c s '  of  puritanical Shi'ite  and c o n s t i t u t e d faltering  of  the  the  principal  revolution.  ranking o f f i c i a l s  of the  who was one o f t h e  was t h e  concept  observations reinforce  of  the  of  that  cleric.  attempting to  system o f government  untenable,  and t h e  unreserved i n t h e i r denunciations And, there  is  little  between t h e  Islamic  r e g i m e when e s t i m a t i n g traditionalism  in  Beyond t h e a n d among t h e  the  the  of  Call  al  group, the  served  to  implement a w h o l l y  the  evidence  to  Overall,  1 9  c a d r e became  Baghdad g a v e ample c o n s i d e r a t i o n t o relations  on  i n a developing  Islamic C a l l ' s  the  i n c l u d i n g Murtada  Khomeinists' shortcomings  belief  base  nonsensical  f o u n d i n g members o f  theocratic  clergy.  was  the  f a c t o r u n d e r l y i n g the  Call,  r u l e by c h i e f  the  of  Particularly troubling  Islamic  Askari,  a  attempts to  precepts  causal  pro-  position  I s l a m i c R e p u b l i c ' s p o l i t i c a l s y s t e m and economy antiquated,  the  was  increasingly  ruling  to  the  state  Iranian  suggest  that  downturn i n  the  and t h e K h o m e i n i i t e  l i k e l i h o o d of  a surge  of  Shi'ite  Iraq. ranks of  majority of  the m i l i t a n t S h i ' i t e  Iraq's Shias,  a t t a c h i n g a more i m p o r t a n t ,  societal  the  role to  movements,  prospect Islam  of  stirred  little  enthusiasm,  from t h e  generous  government. the  level  Since  establishment  which has  and t h i s  social  coming t o of  employment, majority.  as w e l l  have  stemmed  s p e n d i n g by t h e  central  power,  the  Baathists, social  food,  health  successfully i n the  m o l l i f i e d the aftermath of  the  Saddam H u s s e i n u n d e r t o o k m e a s u r e s  placate  nation's  Shias,  which c o n s i s t e d  c o n s t r u c t i o n o f mosques a n d r e l i g i o u s holding of  numerous c e r e m o n i e s  holy days.  Baghdad's e f f o r t s  of Hussein,  while  was  largely  The s t a r k c o n t r a s t Iranian Shias generally Iraq.  constituted  low l e v e l  Simply put,  of the  s q u a l i d existence of  respect  ramifications  upon t h e  from t h e  the  the Shi * ite  the  popular  and s u p p o r t al-Ghita, this  of  two factor  Baathists. Iraqi  and  a major f a c t o r u n d e r l y i n g  the  lot  of  for traditional Shi'ism within  f o r m e r were n o t latter.  subjected  By and l a r g e ,  r e l a t i o n s h i p between t h e  d o m i n a t e d B a a t h r e g i m e and t h e stemmed  further  and  Again,  2 0  between t h e  appeal  the  to  served to b o l s t e r  in Najaf.  o v e r l o o k e d by t h e  Iranian  i n commemoration o f  earning the  churchmen based  of  mainly of  shrines  S h a i k h A l i a l - S a g h i r and S h a i k h A l i K a s h i f preeminent  housing,  Shi'ite  Revolution,  image  system, and  care,  as p r o v i d i n g a h i g h l e v e l  In a d d i t i o n ,  the  through  p o p u l a c e numerous p r i v i l e g e s  including subsidized  and e d u c a t i o n ,  largely  an e x t e n s i v e and v i a b l e  afforded the  amenities,  of  unreceptivity  Shi'ite  to the  the adverse  Sunni-  majority,  a n t i - B a a t h campaign c o n d u c t e d by  which the  Khomeinists,  were n e g l i g i b l e .  demonstrations  i n support of the  o c c u r r e d t h r o u g h o u t 1979 centers  i n southeastern  zealots to were  foster  Islamic  and 1980 Iraq,  large-scale  largely unsuccessful.  incentive  Beyond s p o r a d i c  2 1  the  revolution,  in various S h i ' i t e efforts  unrest  by t h e  In o v e r a l l terms,  Shias  the  surprise  holy  Iranian  among I r a q ' s  for attempting a s t r a t e g i c  Baathists'  against  revolutionary  Iran that  reaction,  l a r g e l y g r o u n d e d on m i s p e r c e p t i o n and  was  which  stemmed f r o m a v e r s i o n t o  Shi'ite  overreaction.  Conclusion This chapter concludes inducements  a predisposition  In the  initial  for aggression  section  it  Baathists'  elements u n d e r l y i n g the  for Iraqi  Baathists'  incentive  history  b e t w e e n I r a q a n d I r a n were support  of  in their  open  struggle  posited  strained  b e t w e e n an a g g r e s s o r the  and a t a r g e t  onset of war,  state  against  and,  supremacy.  it  to  Two m a j o r  m o n o p o l i z a t i o n o f p o l i t i c a l power;  although a h i s t o r y of  history  friction  Teheran's  P r o c e e d i n g from t h e s e o b s e r v a t i o n s , that,  that  an i m p o r t a n t  interstate  for regional  the  was a r g u e d  structure.  identified:  K u r d s and S h i a s  Baghdad a n d T e h e r a n ' s q u e s t  catalyst  Iraq's  stemming f r o m a l o n g  b i t t e r wrangling with Iran constituted  component o f t h e  the  examination of  for undertaking a surprise attack against  Islamic Republic.  of  the  c a n be  is  generally relations  not  an  such a c o n d i t i o n can  automatic augment  the  former's  the  latter.  incentives  to  attempt  to  strategically  An a d d i t i o n a l , m a j o r p o i n t r a i s e d was t h a t  the  Baath e l i t e  enjoyed  i n Chapter Three  a high level  of  consensus  regarding the  necessity of m i l i t a r i l y confronting  revolutionary  Iran.  c a r r y i n g out of  assent  by t h e  The d i s i n c e n t i v e s  a surprise attack,  nation's  disinclinations reinforcing  the  unanimity of  the  similar  to  Hitler,  Barbarossa,  ruling  immediately p r i o r to  a n d p o l i t i c a l power and was n o t  opposing  sources  Baath e l i t e ' s precise  appraisals  valuations,  overall,  the  inducements strong  it  l i k e l i h o o d to  mount  Overall,  commencing O p e r a t i o n control  over  i n h i b i t e d by  to  the  degree to which  and c a l c u l a t i o n s  is  not unreasonable  combined t o  on  and  to maintain  r e a c h e d b y Baghdad t h a t  and p r e d i s p o s i t i o n s  the  were p r e d i c a t e d  r a t h e r than overestimations  conclusion  incentive  and  authority.  with respect  miscomprehension,  strength  absolute  military  of  mitigate  f o r embarking  s u r p r i s e c a n be i n f e r r e d .  Saddam H u s s e i n e x e r c i s e d  Lastly,  elite  A nexus between t h e  c e n t r a l r e g i m e and t h e  a bid for strategic  the  planned inroad While  c o n c o r d a n c e among t h e  on s u c h an a d v e n t u r e .  served to  extent  influenced  More c l e a r l y ,  Iraqi polity  regarding the  against  the  were s t r o n g l y  p o l i t i c a l ambient.  monocratic nature of  militating  and c o n v e r s e l y ,  i n Baghdad f o r d o i n g s o ,  surprise  the  that, various  constitute  a  s t r u c t u r e t o u n d e r t a k e a m i l i t a r y campaign  was b a s e d on a l a r g e l y notable  error  identified: foster  i n the  the  the  importance to  belief  Iraqi  another.  that of  easily  invocations  was  fundamentalist  f a i l e d to  zeal.  attach  revolutions  t h e r e was no r e a l ,  are  not  to  imminent danger  Khomeini's the  By  sufficient  " e x p o r t e d " f r o m one s t a t e  b y r i s i n g up a n d s w e e p i n g score,  one  I s l a m i c r e v o l u t i o n would  S h i a s would respond t o  power a n d , on t h i s  However,  considerations  Shi'ite  leadership  Realistically,  Iraq's  the  assessment.  t h e v e n e r a b l e maxim t h a t  simple commodities  that  Baathists'  an a u g m e n t a t i o n  and l a r g e ,  factual  frequent  Baathists  Baghdad o v e r r e a c t e d .  from  98  CHAPTER I I I NOTES D a n i e l P i p e s , "A B o r d e r A d r i f t : O r i g i n s o f t h e C o n f l i c t , " i n The I r a n - I r a q War: New Weapons. O l d C o n f l i c t s , e d . S h i r i n T a h i r - K h e l i a n d S h a h e e n A y u b i (New Y o r k : P r a e g e r P u b l i s h e r s , 1983), p . 9. 1  Hanna Batatu, " S h i ' i Organizations i n Iraq: A l Da'wah a l - I s l a m i y a h and a l - M u j a h i d i n , " i n S h i ' i s m a n d S o c i a l P r o t e s t . e d . J u a n R . I . C o l e a n d N i k k i R . K e d d i e (New H a v e n : Y a l e U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s , 1986), p . 189. 2  3  Ibid.,  p.  191.  4  Ibid.,  p.  194.  S a ' a d N . J a w a d , "The K u r d i s h P r o b l e m i n I r a q , " i n The I n t e g r a t i o n o f Modern I r a q , e d . Abbas K e l i d a r ( L o n d o n : Croom H e l m , L t d . , 1 9 7 9 ) , p . 1 7 1 . 5  S h a r i f M. S h u j a , " I s l a m i c R e v o l u t i o n i n I r a n and I t s I m p a c t on I r a q , " I s l a m i c S t u d i e s : J o u r n a l o f t h e I s l a m i c R e s e a r c h I n s t i t u t e 3 (Autumn 1 9 8 0 ) : 2 1 9 . 6  C l a u d i a W r i g h t , "Iraq—New Power i n t h e F o r e i g n A f f a i r s 2 (Winter 1979-1980):261. 7  East,"  8  Shuja,  9  Ibid.  1 0  Pipes,  p.  p.  Middle  222.  18.  ^ R i c h a r d W. B u l l i e t , "Time, P e r c e p t i o n s , and C o n f l i c t R e s o l u t i o n , " i n The I r a n - I r a q War: O l d C o n f l i c t s . New Weapons, e d . Thomas N a f f ( W a s h i n g t o n , D . C : N a t i o n a l Defense U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s , 1985), p . 71. 1 2  Ibid.,  p.  73.  1 3  Pipes,  p.  17.  1 4  Ibid. p.  224.  1 5  1 6  Shuja, Ibid.  99 C l a u d i a W r i g h t , "Behind I r a q ' s Y o r k T i m e s M a g a z i n e . 26 O c t o b e r 1980, p . 1 7  B o l d B i d , " The New 111.  E q b a l Ahmad, "War o f t h e R e n t i e r J o u r n a l of the Revolutionary S o c i a l i s t s of 12 ( S e p t e m b e r 1 9 8 6 ) : 4 9 . 1 8  19 B a t a t u , 2 0  Ibid.,  p. p.  191. 196.  G o d f r e y Jansen, Middle East International 2 1  S t a t e s , " Khamsin: the Middle East  "Dawn E i g h t S h a k e s t h e 269 ( F e b r u a r y 1 9 8 6 ) : 3 .  Gulf,"  CHAPTER I V I R A Q ' S PERCEPTIONS OF OPPORTUNITY FOR STRATEGICALLY SURPRISING REVOLUTIONARY IRAN The  foregoing  structure  as  onslaught  against  complexity strategic chapter  one p r i n c i p a l  of  Islamic  examine  course.  capability,  as w e l l  observations  of  employ d e c e p t i o n , opportunities as w e l l  the  level  of  this  opportunity  a surprise  Baathists'  that  sally  of  basis of  perceptions  quantitative  Second,  the  of  and  and command  by a waning o f  Baghdad's  dislocation  Third,  i n order to  perceived  and p o l i t i c a l  a further analysis  show t h a t  the  the  of  Iraqi  Baath  the polity  regime's  o p p o r t u n i t y was n o t d i m i n i s h e d by f r i c t i o n  100  and  Iranian military  a u t h o r i t a r i a n and u n p l u r a l i s t i c n a t u r e o f be p r e s e n t e d  at  capacity to maintain secrecy  as by economic  are discussed.  the  feasible.  a r e examined.  effected  of  Iraq's military fighting  as t h e  sudden  f o r m o u n t i n g an e f f o r t  on o b s e r v a t i o n s  aspects of  will  its  R e p u b l i c demonstrates  conclusion that  First,  qualitative  strife,  incentive  i n q u i r y w i l l be c o n d u c t e d on t h e  o p p o r t u n i t y based  power,  the  K h o m e i n i ' s I r a n was  following  Baghdad's  The o v e r r i d i n g o b j e c t i v e  Baathists'  This  of  element a c t u a t i n g  decision-making  to  animated the against  the  surprise.  is  analysis  with  101 opposition  political  groups.  i n Baghdad's m o t i v a t i o n a l preceding inherent  chapter, i n the  identified  it  is  which i n f l u e n c e d  the  shortcomings  were o u t l i n e d  appropriate that  the  valuations  And l a s t ,  major  timing of  the  the  in  the  errors  opportunistic  chapter.  the  as  perceptions  Baathists'  in this  Fourth,  inroad are  be  factors  analyzed.  P e r c e p t i o n s o f O p p o r t u n i t y E n g e n d e r e d by Q u a n t i t a t i v e and Q u a l i t a t i v e I n d i c e s o f M i l i t a r y Power In the opportunity  Baathists'  for attaining  calculus their  o b j e c t i v e s through a s u r p r i s e i m p o r t a n c e was m i l i t a r y power, combatants number o f  nature  of  to  avert to  of  aggressive  considerable indicators  number o f  Iraqi  as w e l l  as  authority, that  the  the  affording of  the  Islamic  the  highly  I r a q i m i l i t a r y command,  supreme  of  over  served  which  to  requisite  level  of  advanced warning  Republic's  of  leadership  maintained. In January of  quantitative armies;  the  exerted  impending a t t a c k  c o u l d be  total  and  Furthermore, the  Baghdad's confidence  s e c r e c y needed the  attack,  p r i n c i p a l l y the  degree  defensive  quantitative  combat a i r c r a f t .  Baath e l i t e  reinforce  to  the  and a r m o r e d s u p p o r t v e h i c l e s ,  centralized the  attached  of  the  1978,  there  d i s p a r i t y between t h e former's  was  a  considerable  regular Iraqi  c o m p r i s e d some 1 6 0 , 0 0 0  while  the  latter's  numbered a p p r o x i m a t e l y  there  was  a rough p a r i t y i n terms  of  the  and I r a n i a n  combatants,  285,000. number o f  However, the  102 following Iraq,  compared t o  pieces, and,  types of  armaments: 1,875  nineteen  for Iran;  juncture,  comprised  825.  between t h e Baathists  Shah's  the  200,000,  during the and t h e  number o f while  Iran's  1,532;  of  fifteen -  complement  as w e l l  calibre.  as  outbreak o f war,  active  T-62s,  Baghdad f u r t h e r b o l s t e r e d  organized into  a force  observations  of  quantitative  advantage  confident  that  the  nine French  e i g h t hundred  i n c l u d i n g advanced  Spanish  one h u n d r e d a r t i l l e r y  ranks of the  Iraq's  pieces  r e g u l a r army,  ground f o r c e s  in  this  By and l a r g e ,  narrowing of  the  based  Islamic  i n ground f o r c e s ,  I r a q p o s s e s s e d an a d e q u a t e  armored c a p a b i l i t y t o  the  c o m p r i s i n g some 2 5 0 , 0 0 0 m i l i t i a men  local units. the  in  and t h e  p e r i o d b y m o d e r n i z i n g t h e weaponry and t r a i n i n g o f Army,  the  duty troops  T-72s,  period  2  Beyond e x p a n d i n g t h e  People's  in  nineteen-month  Iraq took d e l i v e r y of  more a r m o r e d f i g h t i n g v e h i c l e s , and F r e n c h m o d e l s ,  superiority  a c q u i r i n g an a d d i t i o n a l  including Soviet  In a d d i t i o n ,  of various  artillery  a fleet  diminish Iran's  downfall  increased  hundred t a n k s , AMX-3 0.  to  ground f o r c e s ,  army t o  while  for  1  I n an e f f o r t conventional  of  Iran possessed  I r a q h a d amassed  h u n d r e d a r m o r e d combat v e h i c l e s ,  Iraqi  i n terms  I r a q h a d a c q u i r e d 930 w h i l e  by t h i s  hundred tanks  launch a successful  on  Republic's  Saddam H u s s e i n i n f a n t r y and inroad.  was  103 In terms acquired  339  interceptor  the  squadrons, wings.  consisted  MIG-23,  began t o  a i r power,  warplanes,  fighter-bomber largely  of  of  TU-22,  by mid-1980,  I r a q had  w h i c h were d i v i d e d i n t o two bomber s q u a d r o n s , Iraq's  3  complement  Soviet-manufactured  and S U - 7 B .  and t w e l v e  of  But b e g i n n i n g  a r t Matra Super-530  missiles.  aircraft,  the  Baathists  some 286  combat h e l i c o p t e r s  powerful  Soviet  Overall,  was p o w e r f u l  as w e l l  the  o p p o r t u n i t y which r e s t e d is  of  c a p a b i l i t y to incursion  a d r o i t l y use these fact  equal  conduct  into  the  fixed-wing fleet  i n addition to  of  the  included French Alouette  as  B r i t i s h Pumas and the  Iraqi  overwhelm I r a n i a n a i r  Baathists' upon b a s i c  importance to  Iran i n secrecy,  deception.  nation's  perceptions  air  defenses  of  categories of discuss  as w e l l  as  military  Iraq's  p l a n n i n g and p r e p a r a t i o n s the  Baghdad's prowess,  important a t t r i b u t e s , that  mainly  strike.  Beyond c i t i n g  it  Iraq  state-of-the-  a sizable  Baghdad was c e r t a i n t h a t enough t o  an u n a n t i c i p a t e d  power,  which,  M I - 8 s and M I - 2 4 s ,  and Super F r e l o n s ,  Gazelles.  in  i n 1977,  In a d d i t i o n to  had assembled  aircraft  including  p u r c h a s e more a d v a n c e d F r e n c h a i r c r a f t , F - l Mirage equipped with  force  combat  models,  D e l t a - 2 0 0 0 s and t h e  Ills  three  for  the  ability  with regard  c a n be m a i n l y a t t r i b u t e d t o  m i l i t a r y command was u n d e r t h e  exclusive  sway o f  cohorts.  Hussein exercised  to  Saddam H u s s e i n and a few ultimate  over  the  nearly  trustworthy  control  to  Iraq's  104 military  forces  through h i s  and t h r o u g h h i s Council, the  the  mastery  of  the  of  beckoned  who d e m o n s t r a t e d  and n a v y .  from t h e  affairs  objective  armed f o r c e s ,  organization other  ineligible s t a t u t e was  able  strictly  revolutionary professional significantly directly  Iran,  the  to  rigid  the  edict  a member o f  of  any  the  this  was  conquest  from by  participants onslaught,  secrecy  opportunity for r e a l i z i n g  and  1968  punishable  Baath e l i t e  In s h o r t ,  number o f  preserve  in  men h a d been  this  f o r the  5  Baathist  and o b s e r v a n c e  i n v o l v e d i n the p l a n n i n g of  Iraq's  leader.  involvement  u n i n h i b i t e d by o b j e c t i o n s  diminishing the  bolstered  Iraqi  and  Baath P a r t y s i n c e  preparations  m i l i t a r y commanders.  were a b l e  Takrit,  enforced with transgressions  necessary  Baathists  surprise.  than the 6  of  p r o m u l g a t e d by  A c c o r d i n g l y , by mid-1980,  t o make t h e  the  In essence,  for military service,  by a  l i k e Saddam  and e n l i s t e d  who h a d b e e n  of  upper  cementing  active  p r o s c r i b e d with a decree  citizen  to  of  by b o t h o f f i c e r s  r e n d e r e d any I r a q i  by d e a t h .  who,  officers  staffed  northern v i l l a g e  R e v o l u t i o n a r y Command C o u n c i l .  political  senior  Moreover, the  4  unqualified loyalty  supremacy o v e r t h e  officially  R e v o l u t i o n a r y Command  ranking officers  In l i n e with the  political  commander-in-chief,  I r a q i m i l i t a r y command was  cohesive clique Hussein,  over the  as  ranks o f which i n c l u d e d the  army, a i r f o r c e ,  echelon  position  the this  strategic  of  105 In a d d i t i o n to maintaining a high l e v e l the  Baath e l i t e  deception,  was  also  in a suitable  mainly through the  disinformation vis-a-vis state control. specifically Organization,  the  of  appointees,  Guidance have  dissemination media,  With regard t o  newspapers,  government  the  1967,  news p u b l i c a t i o n s .  the  direct  control of  all  Baathists as  had f r e e  it  reign to  c a n be use  a medium t h r o u g h w h i c h t o  thus adding to  and P r i n t i n g  the  exclusively C u l t u r e and  Iraq's  Baghdad.  r a d i o and t e l e v i s i o n  from t h e s e o b s e r v a t i o n s ,  rigid  four  I r a q i News A g e n c y  B r o a d c a s t i n g and T e l e v i s i o n E s t a b l i s h m e n t content of  Press  Ministry of  the  practice  information,  p r i n t i n g of  Likewise,  to  under  membership o f w h i c h c o n s i s t s and t h e  secrecy,  of  which i s  printed  since  c o n t r o l l e d the  a l s o under the  position  of  the  (INA)  And, the oversees  broadcasts. induced that nation's  daily  Iraqi the  Proceeding the  media  sources  disinform revolutionary  opportunity  for attaining  is  Iran,  strategic  shock.  - O p p o r t u n i t y P r e d i c a t e d upon O b s e r v a t i o n s o f I r a n i a n V u l n e r a b i l i t y Engendered by a R e d u c t i o n o f t h e S i z e o f t h e N a t i o n ' s Armed F o r c e s , E c o n o m i c D i s l o c a t i o n , and I n t e r n a l P o l i t i c a l Fragmentation Besides qualitative study  of  capabilities  Iraq's  perceived,  identifying at  the  important q u a n t i t a t i v e  the  disposal  opportunity structure  major d e f i c i e n c i e s  Republic vulnerable  to  of  the  Baathists,  must a l s o a d d r e s s  which rendered the  a strategic  and  surprise.  Islamic  A major  the  a  106 consideration  u n d e r l y i n g Baghdad's sense o f  the  sharp trimming of  the  Iranian m i l i t a r y following  Upon c o m i n g t o greatly  design  power,  diminish the  establishment  the  the size  ranks of the  of the  f o u n d e d by t h e  large  to  greatly  attendant  lack of  revolutionary  was  by t h e  to  bent  the  freedom o f  on w e a k e n i n g  of  the  armed f o r c e s  aspirations  of  the  Iranian  In consonance  Iran's of  in  the  to Khomeini,  national  wealth  Moreover,  7  from a  in bloodily  ten  machine cognizance  repressing  the  people.  with the  policy,  the  Madani,  h e l d on 7 M a r c h 1979,  shift  i n Teheran's  revolutionary Minister of  the  of  approximately  military  Shah p a r t i a l l y stemmed  the  an  heightening  Iran."  the  and a  of  F o r example,  squandering of  role  jettisoning  the  Teheran outlayed  a reprehensible  "poisonous  assembled  1978,  of  along with  f o r m i l i t a r y hardware w h i c h ,  Khomeinists'  the  to  this  Indeed,  financial plight  1970s.  military  a fear  acquisition  contributed to  fervor during the  dollars  represented  regard f o r the  for  to  armed f o r c e s  a d v a n c e d armaments,  greatly  f r o m 1972  billion  of  and p o w e r f u l  by t h e  of  revolution.  about  reduce defense expenditures.  technically  peasant masses,  the  set  The i m p e t u s  regime's obsession with the  expensive,  that  the  was g r o u n d e d on two p r i n c i p a l f a c t o r s :  Pahlavi  period  regime  Shah.  was  v a r i o u s branches  onset of  clerical  counterrevolutionary machinations desire  the  opportunity  that  the  Defense, Islamic  m o n a r c h i a l r e g i m e ' s emphasis  on  military  A d m i r a l Ahmad Republic  was  "possessing  107 t h e most a d v a n c e d weapons afterward, national defense  and b i g g e s t b a s e s . "  Shortly  8  Prime M i n i s t e r Bazargan announced t h a t  budget  incorporated a sixty  spending.  percent  A n d , on 9 A u g u s t ,  it  the  new  reduction  was d i s c l o s e d  in that  orders f o r approximately nine b i l l i o n d o l l a r s worth of U . S . m a n u f a c t u r e d armaments and m u n i t i o n s were b e i n g  cancelled.  Accompanying t h i s  some  d e c i s i o n was t h e  expulsion  thousand American m i l i t a r y a d v i s e r s served to  engender  array of  purchased during the  Shah's t e n u r e .  Iran.  military,  the  Khomeinists*  i n the  feasibility the  w r a t h ; i n March o f  the  an i n a d e q u a t e  which  of  the  1979,  number o f  100,000.  level  of  technical  for its  within a short period of  the  Iran's  complement o f  states  of  British  Baathists*  an i n c u r s i o n branches of  the  revolutionary  army t r o o p s w o u l d be  Beyond t r o o p  level  further enfeebled  expertise  a significant  w h i c h numbered 650  army's f l e e t  by  and a s h o r t a g e  percentage  of  i n January of  of  F o r example,  C h i e f t a i n t a n k s was  d i s r e p a i r , while the  the  the  i n t r i c a t e weaponry. time,  systems  developments  individual  a r m y ' s c a p a b i l i t y was  spare p a r t s  helicopters,  These  9  I r a n i a n army b o r e t h e b r u n t o f  r e d u c e d from 285,000 t o  vital  c o m p l i c a t e d weapon  With regard to  regime announced t h a t  reductions,  and t e c h n i c i a n s ,  i n Baghdad and c o n t r i b u t e d t o  growing confidence against  ten  s e v e r e p r o b l e m s i n o p e r a t i n g and  maintaining the vast  were welcomed  of  of  in varying  combat 1978,  had  108 fallen  to  percent.  an o p e r a t i o n a l  of  approximately  of  1980,  Iraq's  200,000-man-strong  f a c i n g a n u m e r i c a l l y i n f e r i o r I r a n i a n army, t h e  which had a c t u a l l y been reduced t o s u p p o r t e d b y a p p r o x i m a t e l y 850 hundred a r t i l l e r y p i e c e s , vehicles. Iraqi  Overall,  1 1  150,000  and 850  in strictly  armored  the  heavily  i n the  Baathists'  Beyond t h e  estimations  army, t h e  factor  estimated the  that  i n the  i n i t i a l months  P a h l a v i regime,  deserted.  The a d v e r s e  over  the the  weighed  opportunity.  operational  I r a n i a n a i r f o r c e was a l s o u n d e r m i n e d .  of  five  terms,  advantage  of  ranks  fighting  quantitative  I s l a m i c R e p u b l i c , and t h i s  army  combatants  functioning tanks,  army h a d come t o w i e l d a n o t a b l e  army o f  of  fifteen  1 0  By S e p t e m b e r was  level  readiness It  has  of  the  been  following  the  deposal  some t w e n t y t h o u s a n d a i r men ramifications  of  this  development  upon I r a n i a n a i r power were f u r t h e r compounded b y a grounding of F-4, to  F-5,  a portion of  and F - 1 4  the  fighter  nation's American-produced  a i r c r a f t , which l a r g e l y  a breakdown i n t h e maintenance  difficulty complex  and g r e a t  Yazdi  consider  serious  attempt  On 3 A u g u s t 1979,  announced t h a t  And,  the  offers  to  sell  purchase  such  a number o f  F o r e i g n M i n i s t e r Ebrahim  I s l a m i c R e p u b l i c was to  due  the  expense i n p r o p e r l y upkeeping  a i r c r a f t l e d Teheran to  these warplanes.  system.  arose  its  fleet  ready of  to  F-14s,  109 w h i c h were deemed t o actual  defense  be w h o l l y s u p e r f l u o u s  were e s t i m a t i n g  Iraqi military intelligence  that  l e s s t h a n two h u n d r e d o f  were r e a d y t o  the  impairment of  the  Shah i n p o s i t i v e  the  engage i n c o m b a t .  terms.  of  Republic's  air capability,  only  invasion,  resistance  A waning o f the  Baathists'  coming t o  decision  of  that  the  the  Baath e l i t e  of  large  naval yard at with the  the  In a d d i t i o n ,  April  of  1980.  heightened  Shortly  after  Iran's  complete  flotilla  Gulf  of  of  Oman,  By and l a r g e ,  a of  warships  the  the Islamic  operational  f u r t h e r e n c o u r a g e d by  large-scale  in  Pahlavi  on 1 December 1979,  its  halt  Chah B a h a r ,  A l Waton, m a i n t a i n e d t h a t  Baghdad was  Persian Gulf,  in  encounter  s t a t e d p o l i c y end  o f many I r a n i a n n a v a l v e s s e l s , to  would  r o l e p l a y e d by t h e  R e p u b l i c ' s navy had " l o s t h a l f  breakdown,  Islamic  concluded that  opportunity.  was b e s e t b y s u p p o r t p r o b l e m s ;  1 3  from a  K h o m e i n i i t e regime o r d e r e d the  in line  K u w a i t i newspaper,  by  from I r a n i a n w a r p l a n e s .  hegemonical  administration.  inability  proceeding  I r a n i a n n a v a l power f u r t h e r  the  was  abandoning the  capability."  established  I r a q i ground f o r c e s  perceptions  power,  construction  Iran's  the v a r i o u s problems hampering the  the  light  In short,  analysts  Baghdad v i e w e d  1 2  formidable a i r force  cognizance  executing  nation's  requirements.  In mid-1980,  warplanes  f o r the  due t o  the  mechanical  e x e r c i s e s conducted  in  and n o r t h e r n A r a b i a n Sea  Saddam H u s s e i n p e r c e i v e d  in  the  lackluster  performance  signifying  a lessening of  establishing  of the  the  surprise  the  capability,  structure  difficulty  forcibly  primary designs to  the  regarding the  by o b s e r v a t i o n s  of  i n the  problems t h a t  the  Republic.  had o r i g i n a t e d the  onset of  the  level  stood  at  approximately twenty-five  labor  force  i n January of percent  unemployment  construction  was m a i n l y e f f e c t e d  by t h e  the  sudden h a l t i n g o f  projects  initiated  of  the  on a r e g u l a r  of  rising level  of  became  For  the  Iranian  a crippling in  following  numerous,  by t h e  By O c t o b e r o f  reign  The u p s u r g e  1 4  Shah;  numerous d e f e n s e c o n t r a c t s ;  petroleum production.  economic  which had  burgeoned to 1980.  cancellation.of  protest  o f unemployment,  1978,  which  revolution.  by J a n u a r y o f  developments:  Shah's  percent  Iran's  reinforced  A number o f  the  in  dislocation  during the  example,  forty-five  national  realized  opportunity  s u r p r i s e was  s e v e r e economic  Islamic  more a c u t e f o l l o w i n g  Greater  be  lapse  Iraqi leadership's  for realizing strategic  developed  in  as  attack.  Besides calculations military  forces  I r a q i d o m i n i o n o v e r Abu Musa and t h e  and L e s s e r T u n b s , one o f vis-a-vis  the  Iranian naval  1979,  large-scale the  and a d r o p  in  demonstrations  unemployment were o c c u r r i n g  basis.  The d e s i g n s o f r e s t r u c t u r i n g of  the  the  clerical  economy  spiraling dislocation.  regime  regarding  contributed heavily  to  the the  K h o m e i n i c h a m p i o n e d a number o f  in  Ill populistic  economic  of  as w e l l  wealth,  on t h e line for  ownership  with the Iran's  ideas, as  an e s t a b l i s h m e n t  of p r i v a t e property,  imperative of  indigent  p r i n c i p l e of  [mustaz'afeen]  an e l i m i n a t i o n o f  the  I r a n i a n p e a s a n t s who, monarchial  epoch,  "thirty million  enterprises. lack of  the  d u r i n g the  cleric's  Khomeini,  regime's  principally the  e x i s t e n c e b r o o k e d by  f i n a l years  of  the  elite  objective the  nationalize was t h e  of  clerical key  regime  i n d u s t r i a l and  position  of  i n f r a s t r u c t u r a l development  the  minerals  willingness  to  "Islamic  the  churchmen  and p a n d e m i c the  a l l o w Western  Government," Khomeini  West was d e t e r m i n e d t o and p e t r o l e u m ,  our country i n t o revolutionary  a  former  powers, to  exploit  resources.  In h i s that  as  establishing  t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s and G r e a t B r i t a i n ,  nation's  the  necessitated  p o v e r t y w i t h i n I r a n c o u l d be m a i n l y a s c r i b e d t o royalist  life  1 6  system,  It  in  "downtrodden"  s q u a l i d manner o f  economic  financial the  the  according to  donkeys."  a program t o  that  to  q u a l i t y of  had been a l l u d e d t o by t h e  initiated  limitations  agenda was an a p p l i c a t i o n o f  Toward r e a l i z i n g t h e more e q u i t a b l e  strict  b o t h o f w h i c h were  Central  1 5  defending  which,  of  improving the  masses.  r e v o l u t i o n a r y economic Shi'ite  i n c l u d i n g a major r e d i s t r i b u t i o n  and t h a t  capitalize it  Iran's  was e n d e a v o r i n g t o  a market f o r t h e i r g o o d s . "  authorities,  on  maintained  nationalization  1 7  "turn  To t h e  constituted  the  soundest p r e s c r i p t i o n with which to overdependence first  to  on t h e  West.  The p e t r o l e u m  come u n d e r s t a t e c o n t r o l a n d ,  b a n k s were n a t i o n a l i z e d . determination  to  traditionally  exploitative  nationalization Islamic  remedy I r a n ' s  establish  clause  their  by i n c l u d i n g a  new c o n s t i t u t i o n  on 14 December  all  over  of  R e p u b l i c , w h i c h was r a t i f i e d t h r o u g h a  referendum conducted  the  1979,  evidenced  control  industries  i n the  i n d u s t r y was  i n June of  The K h o m e i n i s t s central  economic  the  national  1979:  With the approval of Parliament c e r t a i n s e c t o r s of i n d u s t r y , commerce, and a g r i c u l t u r e t h a t a r e b e i n g managed a g a i n s t t h e p u b l i c i n t e r e s t may be nationalized. 1 8  Similar to efforts  of  the  the  n e g a t i v e Western r e a c t i o n  p o p u l a r regime  diminish external particularly  the  control  i n Washington,  European c a p i t a l s ,  further  Iran's  complicate  reconstruction  and  Tokyo,  Teheran's efforts  of  to  early  plans  and v a r i o u s  sanctions,  1950s,  elicited  western retaliatory  which served  toward  to  economic  development.  The U n i t e d S t a t e s l e d t h e  purchase  i n the  nationalization  the  resources,  and was met w i t h a number o f  including punitive  economically  natural  p e t r o l e u m and n a t u r a l g a s ,  strong protest  measures,  o f Mohammed M o s s a d e q  over  K h o m e i n i i t e government's  to  punish revolutionary  international Iran.  effort  to  An embargo on  I r a n i a n p e t r o l e u m p r o d u c t s was  imposed  the  by  Washington i n mid-1979  a n d , by mid-1980,  a number o f  i n d u s t r i a l i z e d powers,  i n c l u d i n g Japan,  Great B r i t a i n ,  other and  West Germany, h a d a l s o s u s p e n d e d Islamic  Republic.  Washington,  oil  In a d d i t i o n to  p a r t l y as  a response to  by s t u d e n t s l o y a l  billion  dollars  banks.  A number o f  on 25 J u n e  1980,  the  of  amount  approximately mid-1980,  e v e n t was  seizure  n a t i o n s adopted  Iranian capital  garnished  twelve b i l l i o n d o l l a r s . investment  investment  some  2 0  industrial  similar  that at  In a d d i t i o n ,  by  by a  i n new i n d u s t r i a l v e n t u r e s w h i c h amounted t o  this  punitive  economic  oil  industry,  the  constituted  dropped a virtual  measures a p p l i e d effect  n a t i o n ' s most i m p o r t a n t number o f b a r r e l s  l a r g e s t transshipment  dropped to  and,  growth.  West h a d a p a r t i c u l a r l y d i s r u p t i v e  For example,  eight  measures;  Coinciding with  the  the  of  i n American  abroad stood  1 9  the  a number  i n I r a n had d e c r e a s e d  eighty-eight percent,  The v a r i o u s  Iran's  of  a near complete c e s s a t i o n of Western c r e d i t  by n e a r l y of  oil,  overrunning of  Iranian assets deposited other  Iranian  Khomeini, attached  eighty-seven p e r c e n t .  a result,  halt  the  the  F o r e i g n M i n i s t e r Qotzbadeh d i s c l o s e d  foreign  staggering  as  of  to  from  boycotting  A m e r i c a n Embassy i n T e h e r a n and t h e diplomats  imports  of  facility  oil at  source  contrast  to  Iran's  of  exported  income. from  Kharq I s l a n d  a mere 5 0 0 , 0 0 0 p e r d a y b y May o f a stark  upon  1980,  pre-revolution  by  had  which  days  when  some 2 . 5  m i l l i o n b a r r e l s were l o a d e d t h e r e on a d a i l y  basis.  Overall,  i n the  the  Islamic  p e r i o d f r o m J a n u a r y 1979  Republic's  total  to  May 1980,  d a i l y petroleum production  rate  114 plummeted The  from f i v e m i l l i o n  t o u n d e r one m i l l i o n  r e v o l u t i o n a r y regime attempted t o o f f s e t  r e v e n u e e f f e c t e d by t h e d i m i n u t i o n level  by b r e a k i n g  with  of Petroleum Exporting Countries raising rise  the price of a barrel  2 1  the loss of  i n the d a i l y  the standard  barrels.  exportation  s e t by t h e O r g a n i z a t i o n  (OPEC) a n d u n i l a t e r a l l y  o f crude o i l .  i n t h e c o s t o f an I r a n i a n b a r r e l  T e h e r a n any s u b s t a n t i a l f i n a n c i a l  However, t h e  of o i l f a i l e d  advantages,  to yield  for this  d e c i s i o n prompted a d d i t i o n a l n a t i o n s t o l o o k beyond I r a n f o r alternative  sources  observations  By a n d l a r g e ,  o f t h e mounting economic problems i n t h e  Islamic Republic, industry,  of petroleum.  e s p e c i a l l y those  l e d t h e Baath e l i t e  affecting  the o i l  to believe that loss of  K h u z e s t a n w o u l d g r e a t l y weaken t h e K h o m e i n i i t e this  conclusion served  of opportunity  to bolster the Baathists'  for attaining  their  through a s u r p r i s e attack focused A cognizance the multitude  And,  perceptions  enterprising objectives on s o u t h w e s t e r n  of the p o l i t i c a l  Iran.  d i s s e n s i o n f o s t e r e d by  of ideologically disparate organizations  opposed t o t h e v a l u e s clerical  regime.  espoused by t h e e x t r e m i s t , p r o -  Islamic Republican  Party  (IRP),  w h i c h was h e a d e d b y  A y a t o l l a h Mohammed B e h e s t i , c o n s t i t u t e d a f u r t h e r a s p e c t o f the  Baathists' opportunity  structure.  These o p p o s i t i o n  g r o u p s i n c l u d e d t h e f o l l o w i n g : t h e I r a n Freedom  Front,  w h i c h was l e d b y P r i m e M i n i s t e r B a z a r g a n a n d w h i c h advocated a p o l i t i c a l  s y s t e m f o u n d e d on a b l e n d i n g o f  various positive  features  democratic p r i n c i p l e ; known a s  the  a coalition  fascism;"  to  2 3  the  i n the  the  Khomeini and h i s  by t h e Party  cleric's (KDP),  extolled  the  anti-Soviet  came t o  authorities stemmed regional  the  from t h e autonomy the  revolutionary exacerbate  fore  the  nation  latter's  for Iran's  government  peasantry;  2 4  support  was g r a d u a l l y  b e a r i n g ; the to  the  Kurdish  Persian  groups based  disillusioned  and,  lastly,  the  Arab indigenous, to  dissension clerical  which  secure  Khuzestani Arabs.  Pursuant to  p r e d i c a t e d on t h e  premise t h a t  largely  limited, the  most  in  A c c o r d i n g l y , Baghdad s o u g h t between t h e  to  K h o m e i n i s t s and  this  end,  a  i n Khuzestan.  standpoint,  struggle  Democratic  nationalism  various cleavages p r e v a i l i n g  strife  an  r e v o l u t i o n had extended  from T e h e r a n , c o n s t i t u t e d  Iran.  Front,  and e f f e c t  i n K h u z e s t a n between t h e  ethnic  "toward a  a system of  liberties  the  which,  Baath e l i t e ' s  and t h e  important of  of  m i n i s t e r i a l government;  From t h e  believed  l e d by N u r e - D i n K i a n u r i  w h i c h was a v e r s e  by t h e  that  N a t i o n a l Democratic  colleagues,  number o f A r a b n a t i o n a l i s t  that  factions  l i v i n g conditions  outset of  alternatively  N a t i o n a l F r o n t F o r c e , " w h i c h was  civil  p r o - M o s c o w Tudeh P a r t y , at  National Front,  establishment  would safeguard b a s i c  improvement  d o c t r i n e a n d modern  churchmen were m o v i n g t h e  which supported the  albeit  Islamic  of various secular  new f o r m o f  the  the  "Union f o r the  fundamentalist  that  2 2  of  which  the  was  a K h u z e s t a n t o r n by  internal  116 upheaval would render surprise incite  task of conducting  i n r o a d f a r l e s s arduous, the  anti-Khomeini  of propagandistic the Masses," guerrilla  two  by  extending  principal  benefitted  from I r a q i  Liberation  Front  1979,  i n the  radio broadcasts  and  2 5  sentiment  groups o p e r a t i n g  The  of  the  and  training  Khuzestani  assistance,  irredentist  and  support  an  Iraqi  the  traditionalist on  this  score  clerical l e d to the  d i v i s i o n s w o u l d be secure  The exercised  Iraqi  only  to  Basra.  2 6  Iraqi upon  facilities.  The  in return for proffering a insurgents  Khuzestani  r e g i o n and  regime.  The  in their bid for  p o p u l a c e w o u l d welcome ending  at deposing  the  Baathists' conviction  c o n c l u s i o n t h a t o n l y two  needed t o o v e r r u n  c o n t r o l over  summer  from bases i n n o r t h w e s t e r n  i n c u r s i o n t h a t aimed a t  Teheran's c o n t r o l over the  of  guerrillas  cross-frontier attacks  of a i d to the  self-governance,  of  which  In the  Khuzestani  petroleum processing  level  use  Al-Ahwaz  "Arabistan" Front.  Baath regime b e l i e v e d t h a t considerable  organizations  a t a base w i t h i n p r o x i m i t y  t o c a r r y out  "Voice  t o a number  A r a b f i g h t e r s were a b l e , w i t h  m i l i t a r y b a s e s and  local  support  the  to  there.  S i m i l a r t o I r a q i Kurds o p e r a t i n g Iran,  region through the  entitled  Baghdad b e g a n t o o f f e r t h e  insurgency  B a a t h i s t s attempted  a s s i s t a n c e were t h e the  a successful,  army  Iranian defenses  and  Khuzestan.  elite's belief  that the  churchmen  a tenuous c o n t r o l over r e v o l u t i o n a r y Iran  was  117 further  r e i n f o r c e d by t h e  perceptions  of  a number  of  important  I r a n i a n e x i l e s who h a d t a k e n up r e s i d e n c e  Baghdad.  The a n t i - c l e r i c a l  National  I r a n i a n R e s i s t a n c e Movement.  political briefly  affairs  served  and L i e u t e n a n t as  the  era,  expatriates organized  as  delight  of  prime m i n i s t e r  of  minded d i c t a t o r  to  lead  in its  use  of  clerical  f o r the  dissident 2 9  the  the  date,  and d o e s n o t  into 1979,  support  to  former  narrowknow how  assist  the  as w e l l  as  a  Baghdad a l l o w e d  the  afforded the  large the  U.S.  establish a radio station  forces,  and w h i c h was Islamic  w h i c h was utilized  dubbed to  beam  circulated  a  t h a t some 1 5 0 , 0 0 0 I r a n i a n  a foreign  on  the anti-  Republic.  General Oveissi  was m a i n t a i n e d  stood ready to  Pahlavi  l e d b y B a k h t i a r and O v e i s s i  In a d d i t i o n ,  Iran"  propaganda  it  of  i n an e f f o r t  I n t e l l i g e n c e Agency t o  In June o f i n which  "an o u t  I r a q i m i l i t a r y bases,  amount o f w e a p o n r y .  "Free V o i c e of  served  denounced  a n t i - K h o m e i n i campaign,  counterrevolutionaries  soil  To  2 7  fall,  2 8  the  Iraqi  who h a d  Teheran d u r i n g the  who c a n o n l y d e s t r o y  Iranian resistance  Central  Shah's  I r a n ; on one o c c a s i o n ,  The B a a t h g o v e r n m e n t ,  several  the  Bakhtiar regularly  p r e m i e r c h a r g e d t h a t K h o m e i n i was  construct."  p r i o r to  over m i l i t a r y m a t t e r s .  Baathists,  Khomeini's a b i l i t y  to  The movement's  G e n e r a l Gholam R e z a O v e i s s i ,  control  the  the  were g u i d e d b y S h a h p u r B a k h t i a r , who h a d  m i l i t a r y administrator  assumed  in  i n c u r s i o n t h a t aimed  report troops at  118 ousting of  the  the  Khomeinists  degree of  ranks of  the  Baathists. insisting short, the  counterrevolutionary  M o r e o v e r , by J u l y o f that  the  bid to  vis  received  f o r c i b l y topple  that  the  in turn,  a considerable  both defensive  a surprise  by  openly  near c o l l a p s e .  valuations  support to  contributed to  In  regarding  c l e r i c a l government  to  an be  the  opportunity existed  and o f f e n s i v e  the  the  B a k h t i a r was  I r a n i a n s who w o u l d l e n d d i r e c t  h i g h l y c r e d i b l e which,  attaining  1980,  expatriate's  estimation  sentiment w i t h i n  K h o m e i n i i t e r e g i m e was  Baghdad h e l d t h e  conviction  Oveissi's  3 0  I r a n i a n m i l i t a r y was w e l l  number o f  Iraqi  from p o w e r .  objectives  for vis-a-  attack.  O p p o r t u n i t y F o s t e r e d by t h e M o n o c r a t i c N a t u r e o f t h e I r a q i P o l i t i c a l System Analogous to Baghdad's  incentive  the  absolutist  the  attendant  organizations, complex  a r r i v i n g at framework,  orientation paucity is  of  a bid for strategic  will  demonstrate of  revolutionary  the  opportunity  Overall,  equation.  along  of  with  this  section  surprising  nature  the  decision  Baathists'  for strategically by t h e  influence  i n understanding  which the  of  opposition  underlying Iraq's  I r a n were a f f e c t e d  political  the  Baath governance,  surprise.  degree to  in-depth grasp  of  strong p o l i t i c a l  opportunity structure  perceptions  a citing  comparably e s s e n t i a l  risk  domestic  of  a lucid,  of  the  to  119 Beyond p u r g i n g t h e administration regarding the Hussein,  of  all  after  launched a concerted political  groups  party polity  officials  envisioned  shortly  upper ranks of  and t o  under the  to  objective of  Hussein's  dismantle  the  Progressive  coalition  f o r m e d i n May o f political  Communist P a r t y  (ICP),  party that wielded  1973  the  the  a consequential  long-standing over  Iraq's  Kurdish  efforts  political  H u s s e i n and h i s  to  was  organization,  suspension of Shaab, the  the  into  p l a y against the  a  to  loose  Iraqi  of  An  Baathists  other  and  support.  its  Baathists'  conflicting issues, its  upper hand  l o o k e d upon b y Saddam And, a c c o r d i n g l y ,  i n mid-1979 t o  in April  favored  was  only  with a  p r i n t i n g and d i s t r i b u t i o n  brought the  agenda  and because o f  I r a q i Communist n e w s p a p e r .  Baathists  conspiracy  the  beginning  bent.  Iraqi  due t o  odium.  number o f m e a s u r e s were i n i t i a t e d the  Baathists.  important domestic  break the  associates with  the  one-  mainly the  level  imbroglio,  system,  a  a ruthless  comprising the  w h i c h was  r e g a r d i n g a number o f  principally,  power,  Peoples Front,  organizations, 3 1  Saddam  opposing  of  monocratic  The I r a q i Communist P a r t y , positions  all  mastery  end w i t h  immediate  other  Iran,  came t o  eliminate  unequivocal  National  apprehension  f i r m l y e s t a b l i s h I r a q as  The I r a q i d e s p o t p u r s u e d t h i s  various  against  Khomeinists  effort  Baath  who e x p r e s s e d  onslaught  the  the  thirty-day of  Shortly  stratagem  undermine  of  Tariq  al-  afterward, purported  I C P ; a number o f  the  a  120 movement's to  t o p c a d r e were d e t a i n e d  establish  party "cells"  armed f o r c e s ,  A s a means  ICP,  pretext  design  of  of  terms  officials  of  t o p p l i n g the  f o r t h e wave o f  incarceration to  w i t h i n the m i l i t a r y , the of  Israel,"  the  effort  3 2  to  addition, [Sauut  the  ranks of  of death  the  against  thwarted  Baathists  1980,  a  the  s e n t e n c e s and  "plot" to  stir  charged that  unrest  the  "Zionists  and  supreme nemeses o f A r a b n a t i o n a l i s t s ,  i n February of  of  those ranking party  I C P was c o l l u d i n g w i t h  charged that  London.  the  throughout  the V o i c e of  the  ICP had e s t a b l i s h e d  Communist P a r t y and I s r a e l i  In s h o r t ,  i n an  Iraq.  In  Students  i n concert with the  threat  to  I r a q as w e l l  Baath e l i t e adverse  as t o  the  Arab n a t i o n the  the an  in  ICP as  avowed  in general,  party without  fear  the of  reaction.  R e p e a t e d open a s s e r t i o n s b y t h e Baathists'  with  diplomats posted  "Zionist entity,"  was a b l e t o p e r s e c u t e  public  links  b y p r o p a g a t i n g an image o f  acting  active  nation's  Government.  repression  promote p o l i t i c a l d i s s e n s i o n  British  deter  the  a l - T a l e b ] , a p e r i o d i c a l with a discernible pro-Baath  leaning,  the  attempting  f u r t h e r f a b r i c a t i n g a semblance  i m p l i c a t e d i n the  leadership  of  i n l i n e with  which i n c l u d e d the meting out  lengthy  the  w i t h i n the  w h i c h was h e l d t o be  Communist's u l t i m a t e  legitimate  on c h a r g e s  charges  were w i t h o u t  by t h e  Communists.  leaders  foundation  Saddam H u s s e i n f r o m r e a l i z i n g h i s opposition  ICP's  failed  objective  By t h e  eve  of of  that to ending  the  121 commencement  of  the war,  Baath o r c h e s t r a t e d efforts to  to  adopt  openly  the  leadership  excesses, participate  Overall,  underground, eliminating opposition associates  the  i n the  the  last  and,  of  and  the  Baath  effectively notable  Saddam H u s s e i n and  opportunity  armed c a m p a i g n were n o t  a compromising of  process  Communist movement  succeeded i n  a result,  to  abandon  against  remaining v e s t i g e of  perceptions  1  successful  as  I C P , due  political  opposition  by d r i v i n g t h e  Baathists  the  had been c o m p e l l e d t o  an u n d e r g r o u n d f o r m o f  autocracy.  of  political  his  f o r c a r r y i n g out  a  d i m i n i s h e d by c o n c e r n  s e c r e c y o r r e s i s t a n c e by r i v a l  for  political  groups.  The L e v e l o f I n a c c u r a c y U n d e r l y i n g t h e B a a t h i s t s ' Estimations of Opportunity: F a i l u r e to Discern P o t e n t i a l . Adverse Consequences I n h e r e n t i n Seeking to S t r a t e g i c a l l y S u r p r i s e Revolutionary Iran To t h i s  point,  the  analysis  d i r e c t e d toward the major aspects of opportunity structure; comprehensive  however,  understanding of  incentives,  it  is  perceptions  of  opportunity  aggression Clearly, number o f  necessary to  were b a s e d  the  the  the  c h a p t e r has  judgments  a r r i v i n g at  Islamic  for attaining  degree to  goals  accurate  regarding the  Republic.  a  protagonist's  evaluate the  that  been  Baathists'  observations.  likely,  entailed short-term  w o u l d emerge f r o m Basically,  which  through  Baath regime's opportunity s t r u c t u r e  faulty  on t h e  this  s i m i l a r to  on r e a s o n a b l y  and l o n g - t e r m r a m i f i c a t i o n s attack  of  Baghdad  the  a  122 proceeded the  f r o m numerous  following  factors:  inaccurate the  actual  Republic's m i l i t a r y forces; vulnerability overall  Iraq to  difficulty  c a r r y i n g out nature  of  of  the  prowess o f  Islamic  economic  armed I r a n i a n c o u n t e r a t t a c k s ; complexities  seize control of  political  regarding  the  t h e m i l i t a r y and  and a s s o r t e d  a bid to  calculations  atmosphere  the  inherent  in  K h u z e s t a n ; and  within  the  revolutionary  Iran. First Iraqi  regime  and f o r e m o s t ,  e r r e d b y c o m m i t t i n g an i n a d e q u a t e  ground t r o o p s initially,  to  the  significant  the  opening  degree of  particularly  into  surprise against  and,  army d i v i s i o n ,  r a l l y and i n i t i a t e Baathists.  3 3  the  resolve  of  by a  not  grasped  an o v e r e m p h a s i s  was  placed  strategic  a t t r i b u t e d to  martial  e l a n which v a r i o u s  principally display  the  f a i l u r e to  the  foresee  irregular Iranian  i n r e p e l l i n g an I r a q i i n the  revolution,  s i z e of  import can the  the  be  ferocious,  forces,  R e v o l u t i o n a r y Guards [ P a s d a r a n ] ,  In a d d i t i o n , onset of  the  troops  was  I r a n i a n army. largely  able  single,  Iranian  diminution i n the  of  were  resistance,  b y I r a q i s t r a t e g i s t s upon t h e This foible  a  subsequently,  intense counterattacks  By and l a r g e ,  Albeit  did realize  only l i g h t  the  number o f  Iran.  i n K h u z e s t a n , w h i c h was d e f e n d e d  understrength  by t h e  thrust  invading I r a q i forces  t o make m a j o r a d v a n c e s  to  from a m i l i t a r y p e r s p e c t i v e ,  would  incursion.  tumult that  was  spawned b y  many m i l i t a r y compounds were  the looted  123 o f weapons a n d a m m u n i t i o n , w h i c h were u t i l i z e d t o number o f  local m i l i t i a units defending  mission  of  various  r e v o l u t i o n a r y defense groups  formidable, immediate  largely  designs,  Khuzestan.  the  assigned  revolution.  unanticipated mainly the  The z e a l  of  the  from s e c u r i n g  centers of  the  control  region,  Khorramshahr.  The e s t i m a t e d  i n attempting  cities,  was  deemed t o  result,  o n l y a few months the  resistance,  of  the  consideration  to  a dearth of  adversary.  3 4  to  actual  cost, lay  i n terms  siege to  the  Baathists*  to  Iraqi  metropolitan and of  Iraqi  Khuzestan*s  initiation  d i d not  a precise  I r a q i troops  the  a  the  appraisal  mount  afford  adequate  shortcomings  against  I r a q i army h a d  prowess i n p r i o r  a  Golan Heights  which  foreign  not  military  played only a minor r o l e  A r a b - I s r a e l i wars.  of  strong  t h e most i m p o r t a n t o f  combat e x p e r i e n c e  engagements;  army on t h e  to  qualitative  forces,  of  as  stalled.  a r r i v e at  By and l a r g e ,  1948-1949 a n d 1967  the  prevent  over the major  after  a number o f  a notable  Israeli  to  Baath e l i t e  demonstrated  the  served  I r a n i a n ground f o r c e s  hampering I r a q i i n f a n t r y was  obstacle to  a  i r r e g u l a r Iranian forces  I r a q i o f f e n s i v e was  capability  amounted t o  the  be p r o h i b i t i v e by Baghdad a n d ,  Beyond f a i l i n g t o the  When c o m b i n e d ,  namely Ahwaz, A b a d a n ,  casualties,  conflict,  the p r i n c i p a l  rapid overrunning of  engage i n b l o o d y u r b a n w a r f a r e troops  form a  in  And, i n a c l a s h d u r i n g the  brief  the with  124 conflict  of  O c t o b e r 1973,  t a n k c o r p s was d e s t r o y e d This difficulty rigid  i n q u e l l i n g the  holding of  Soviet  f o r the  engagements,  Iraqi  of  by n o t  of  vulnerability  number o f  the of  September  c o n s t i t u t e s one  c o n s i d e r i n g the  at  its  the  Baathists  However,  for this of  1980,  task. Iraqi  in  regarding  as w e l l  capacity the It  Iraqi is  pilots  and  as  by I r a n i a n on t a k i n g a  thereby  of Teheran to a i r force  were s t i l l recently  launch  note that  acquired French  crucial,  Baghdad was r e l e g a t e d  warplanes  i n i t i a l days to  in  undergoing  were u n a v a i l a b l e  As a r e s u l t ,  air  proved wholly  and t h e s e a d v a n c e d  i n the  the  the  M i r a g e a n d D e l t a 2000 a i r c r a f t ,  war.  past  the  Iraqi  important to  f a m i l i a r i z a t i o n t r a i n i n g with the  f o r use  Iraqi  determining  a l s o misjudged  counterstrikes  reducing the  of  lackluster  rating of  a i r force,  Iraq to  the  invading Khuzestan.  imprecise  the  Iraqi  estimations  A  plausible  effectiveness  I r a n i a n a i r b a s e s by s u r p r i s e ,  counterattacks. inadequate  a t home.  T h e I r a q i m i l i t a r y command c o u n t e d  significantly  extreme  i n f a n t r y and a r m o r e d f o r c e s  I r a n i a n ground f o r c e s ,  warplanes.  b y an  3 5  m i l i t a r y doctrine without  successfully  Parallelling  competence  hours.  Baghdad o v e r l o o k e d an i m p o r t a n t  f a c t o r when a r r i v i n g likelihood  Soviet-supplied  insurgency  limited battle  In s h o r t ,  performance of  followed  Kurdish  r e g u l a r maneuvers  explanation 3 6  to  Iraq's  i n a matter of  r o u t i n g a b r o a d was  adherence  troops.  the bulk of  rely  of  the  exclusively  125 on v a r i o u s m o d e l s o f the  essential  effectively  deep w i t h i n t h e Irrespective  by I r a q i  plants  at  Republic.  the  Iranian targets  against  I s f a h a n and T a b r i z  during the  effected  facilities  air  attacks  effective  limited Iraqi  Iranian a i r fields  The p o o r e x e c u t i o n  regarding selected targets,  pilots  were  air  strikes.  high level  of  I r a n i a n a i r power. expectations,  an  military  as w e l l  the  as  Simply put,  3 9  I r a q ' s exposure Contrary to  e r r e d by n o t to  discerning  counteraggression  Baghdad's  of highly destructive  installations,  of  up-to-date  by  original  Teheran r a p i d l y responded to the  ordering a series military  absence  Iraqi  conducting h i g h - p r e c i s i o n ,  The B a a t h l e a d e r s h i p a l s o the  over a  few I r a n i a n  of the  a i r combat t r a i n i n g .  incapable of  In  3 8  arrive  undetected,  c a p a b i l i t y to gather accurate,  q u a l i t y of Soviet  low-level  were a b l e t o  c a n be l a r g e l y a t t r i b u t e d t o t h e  intelligence  Kharq I s l a n d ,  remained l a r g e l y u n s c a t h e d .  w a r p l a n e s were d e s t r o y e d .  only  only a temporary  and S h i r a z  aircraft  first  the petroleum processing  of p r o d u c t i o n , while the Teheran,  although I r a q i  sorties  Islamic Republic sustained  A i r strikes  number o f w e s t e r n  industrial  3 7  disruption  addition,  and  o f t h e u n d e r t a k i n g o f numerous  conflict,  m i n o r damage.  strike military  Islamic  warplanes against  week o f t h e  which lacked  r a n g e c a p a c i t y and h i g h l y a c c u r a t e weapon  systems needed t o targets  Soviet-produced a i r c r a f t ,  i n r o a d by  sorties.  petroleum processing,  Iraqi  transshipment  126 facilities,  and e c o n o m i c a l l y  bore the brunt  vital  infrastructural  of the Iranian reprisals. and F-5  weeks o f t h e war, I r a n i a n F-4  sites  In t h e opening  fighter-bombers  w r e a k e d h a v o c on t h e f o l l o w i n g t a r g e t s : m i l i t a r y b a s e s i n p r o x i m i t y t o Baghdad a n d B a s r a ; in  the Mosul-Kirkuk area;  the o i l fields  t h e huge o i l r e f i n e r y  t h e Mina, Khor, and a l - B a k r p e t r o l e u m a number o f i m p o r t a n t the  dams a l o n g  Iranian retaliation,  remaining  t h e Zab R i v e r .  I r a q was l e f t w i t h  on t h e v u l n e r a b l e F a o P e n i n s u l a ,  Kuwaiti  frontier.  diminished  which, consequently,  revenue l o s s .  was  adverse  ill-fated  power, a l o n g w i t h  vulnerability attributed  t o the  period of  significantly  effected a substantial  r a m i f i c a t i o n s stemming  from t h e  adventure.  Baghdad's e r r o n e o u s c a l c u l a t i o n s r e g a r d i n g air  was  T h i s d e v e l o p m e n t p r o v e d t o b e o n l y one o f  many u n f o r e s e e n , Baathists'  i n proximity  petroleum  and  Following  and t h i s  By a n d l a r g e , w i t h i n a b r i e f  capacity t o export  4 0  o n l y one  l o a d i n g t e r m i n a l on t h e G u l f c o a s t ,  Iraq's  a t Basra;  loading p l a n t s ;  located  time,  and p i p e l i n e s  the concurrent  to a retributory  extent  air blitz,  Iranian  of Iraq's  c a n be l a r g e l y  t o t h e o v e r e m p h a s i s p l a c e d upon o b s e r v a t i o n s o f  the  r e d u c t i o n , due t o a weakened m a i n t e n a n c e c a p a b i l i t y , o f  the  number o f f l i g h t w o r t h y I r a n i a n w a r p l a n e s ,  an  overlooking o f the marginal  d e f e n s e network. fact  quality  In qualitative  t h a t only approximately  terms,  as w e l l as t o  of the Iraqi a i r irrespective  f i f t y percent  of the  of the Iranian  127 complement  of  condition of this  state-of-the-art operational  amounted t o  Soviet-equipped  air  force.  sorties.  Overall,  4 2  confidence military  i n the  were a b l e  enervation  of  depth study  of  to  the  of  a number o f  actual  major f a c t o r behind the  elite's  a l s o under the  sway o f  n a v a l power a t  the  on t h e error  threat  Gulf.  of  low-level  excessive  the  No i n d e p e n d e n t ,  in-  the  by t h e  revolution  key o m i s s i o n  unanticipation of  of  constituted  massive  o p p o r t u n i t y were  incorrect analysis of  the  i n t e r d i c t i o n of  Islamic  of  the  degree  a c c o r d adequate  and q u a n t i t a t i v e  Iraqi  which comprised only  of  R e p u b l i c and  Iraq's petroleum  Baghdad c o m m i t t e d a m a j o r  qualitative  the  radar  Western  regarding  perceptions  disposal  In short,  i n f a i l i n g to  navy,  and  counterattacks.  The I r a q i  attendant  largely  mediocre,  d e g r e e o f breakdown o f  was u n d e r t a k e n b y B a g h d a d , and t h i s  Iranian a i r  Israeli  Baath l e a d e r s h i p v e s t e d  Islamic Republic's a i r capability effected  the  Iraq's  of t e c h n i c a l l y  Iranian a i r force.  the  1980,  evade I r a q ' s  and I r a n i a n e x i l e s  the  of  (SAM) m i s s i l e s b y c o n d u c t i n g  evaluations  analysts  compared t o  highly-skilled,  s y s t e m and b a t t e r i e s  surface-to-air  i n September  4 1  Iran's  American t r a i n e d p i l o t s  Soviet  readiness  a superior force  In a d d i t i o n ,  detection  combat a i r c r a f t were i n a  consideration  d i s p a r i t y between t h e  outlets  strategic to  the  small  four thousand s a i l o r s  t h i r t y thousand man-strong I r a n i a n navy.  the  and  128 By a n d l a r g e , the  Baath l e a d e r s h i p  flotilla boats,  of  six  was  cognizant  that  naval  the  capability;  nation's  p a t r o l b o a t s and t w e l v e m i s s i l e  against  d i d not  4 3  seaborne  installation  constitute a formidable  onslaughts.  And, while  had been e s t a b l i s h e d  close proximity to  reached through the r u n s between t h e  mechanical defense  a large  a t Umm Q a s r ,  small  attack  w h i c h were r o u t i n e l y b r e a k i n g down due t o  dysfunctions,  in  Iraq lacked a strong  naval  the  base  I r a n i a n t e r r i t o r y and c o u l d o n l y  confined  be  Khawr A b d A l l a h w a t e r w a y ,  I r a q i m a i n l a n d and a number o f  was  which  Kuwaiti  islands. In a d d i t i o n , of  the  Shatt  Iranian Iraqi  the  forces  positioned  importance to  powerful various  capability  vulnerabilities  forces  that,  and f r i g a t e s . shortcomings  were d i s m i s s e d  T h i s anomaly c a n be  realized  accordingly,  fact  the  w o u l d be  the  I r a n was a b l e  Baghdad's mistaken b e l i e f rapidly  on A b a d a n I s l a n d .  Finally,  4 5  the  problems,  destroyers  Baathists.  along with the  was u n t r a i n e d i n f l y i n g  enemy n a v a l v e s s e l s .  maintenance  Fao,  a l - A r a b were w i t h i n s t r i k i n g d i s t a n c e  a i r force  attach  port at  that  negated.  irrespective  and as  did  the  not  of  several  of  its  these  accompanying  inconsequential  largely its  the  against  Paradoxically,  i n a campaign o f importance of  sorties  deploy  of  Moreover,  4 4  Iraqi elite  to  mouth  ascribed  by to  war p l a n s w o u l d short  the  be  d u r a t i o n and,  Islamic  Republic's  naval  129  Beyond s t r i c t l y m i l i t a r y c o n s i d e r a t i o n s , p r e v i o u s l y mentioned,  the  Iraqi  regime's  support  political  that  groups averse On t h e  to  face  the of  a successful  popular support of  ultimately,  widespread discontent,  the  that  elements,  grass-roots  However,  invasion  to  while  groups  within  emergence  of  to  force.  of  not  And, i n  countervailing  a  the  regardless  K h u z e s t a n i A r a b s were  spite  ideological  the  c h u r c h m e n , who w i e l d e d  In short,  extent of  the  among t h e  religio-cultural of  the  Baathists  unifying influence  widespread,  failed of  to  national  K h u z e s t a n i A r a b s and I s l a m i c  I r a n i a n peasant  Baghdad d i d n o t  irruption  Khuzestan,  would s e r v e  secular i n the  premise:  w o u l d p o s e no t h r e a t  a number o f  Shi'ite  support.  identification among t h e  of  this  p o l i t i c a l power w i t h i n r e v o l u t i o n a r y I r a n was  dominated by the  recognize  the  of  Khomeinists  would r e s u l t  embrace a f o r e i g n  existence of  seizure  the  standing p o l i t i c a l order i n Iraq.  of  incorrect  by A r a b i n s u r g e n t s ,  l a y government  inclined to  ideological e x p e c t a t i o n s on  following  a concomitant b o l s t e r i n g  Iran which, centrist,  Iraqi  i n c u r s i o n and t h e  w h i c h w o u l d be a b e t t e d d i m i n i s h the  clerics'  it,  were p r e d i c a t e d on t h e  effecting  anticipation  f r o m K h u z e s t a n ' s A r a b m i n o r i t y and v a r i o u s  imperatives. score  was  opportunity  s t r u c t u r e was a l s o p a r t i a l l y g r o u n d e d upon an of  as  zeal  masses.  thoroughly consider various  and h i s t o r i c a l  factors  ethnic,  i n assuming t h a t  K h u z e s t a n w o u l d be met w i t h s i g n i f i c a n t  an  backing  130 by t h e  region's  indigenous.  minority  readily joined  inroad.  I n many r e s p e c t s ,  as  "Arabistan" appears  composition of of  the  fact  the  that the  To t h e  i n the  to  the  roll  Arab  back the  Baghdad's a l l u s i o n t o  ethnic  is  of  n e a r l y 3.5  Khuzestan,  which c o n s t i t u t e d  In  a mere t h r e e  strong support  the  4 6  of  percent  expectation  for Iraqi  light  approximately  m i l l i o n inhabitants  a whole,  ethnic  considered.  Arabs comprised only  Iraqi  Khuzestan  q u i t e p a r a d o x i c a l when t h e  two-fifths  outpouring of  effort  l o c a l populace  I r a n i a n p o p u l a t i o n as  contrary,  of of  invasion  the an  forces  seems  groundless. Furthermore,  i n assuming t h a t  would r i s e  up i n s u p p o r t o f  leadership  f a i l e d to  minority of  championed by t h e  by t h e  of  limited  espouse the  Arab  predominately of  Shia  ardent Arab  although a percentage  of  homelands  The  4 7  was n o t  of  sought  relished  Iraqi  objectives,  percentage  mainly, the  revenue  after.  And  Khuzestani Arabs are descendants  n o m a d i c t r i b e s m e n who i m m i g r a t e d t o  successive  nationalism  d o m i n i o n was n o t  local  and a g r e a t e r  by p e t r o l e u m s a l e s ,  traditional  Iraqi  the  Accordingly, direct  in realizing their  self-rule  the  Sunni-dominated Baath r e g i m e .  Khuzestani Arabs.  generated  incursion,  "autonomy" u n d e r I r a q i  assistance  I r a n i a n Arabs  n o t e an i m p o r t a n t f a c t :  Khuzestan c o n s i s t e d  M u s l i m s who d i d n o t  specter  the  the  in eastern  I r a n i a n monarchs,  southwestern  Iraq,  I r a n from  a number o f  b e g i n n i n g w i t h Reza Shah,  of  131 brought about the  "Persianization" of  through v a r i o u s measures, P e r s i a n as  the  medium o f  forced r e l o c a t i o n s . several  extremist  followings,  there  instruction  g u e r r i l l a groups, was  Arab m i n o r i t y  including replacing Arabic  As a r e s u l t ,  4 8  the  little  in regional b y 1980,  with  schools  apart  and  from  w h i c h commanded n a r r o w  Arab n a t i o n a l i s t  sentiment  within Khuzestan. Regarding the anti-Khomeini attached  the  c a m p a i g n among t h e  undue  organizations  importance to averse to  traditionalist  considering upheaval.  the  prompted the directed  the  rage  channel  danger  of  the  vigorously  the  Shah t o  flee,  4 9  Overall,  any  not  to  a  the  realize  could readily  Khomeiniite  a  regime's to  Iranian people  proved bent  on  counterrevolutionary  proceeding  from t h e  be  governance,  menace w i t h w h i c h the  that  which had  toward c l e r i c a l  of  upon a  true  F a r from b r i n g i n g out  Baghdad's presumptions,  intrusions.  f a v o r e d by  trauma o f  Iranian populace,  and e n e r g y  challenging  political  revolutionary  who f a i l e d  b y p r o v i d i n g an e x t e r n a l  contrary to  stripe  the  Baghdad  i n l a u n c h i n g an a t t a c k  discontent  attention  for  mere e x i s t e n c e o f  Baathists,  inroad galvanized  the  support  population,  ideological  outward toward I r a q .  Iraqi  position  the  nature of  once p o w e r f u l  sudden b u r g e o n i n g o f the  of  entire  socio-political  escaped the  unmitigated  level  churchmen and f u r t h e r e r r e d b y  The i n h e r e n t  revolution  the  volatile  state experiencing  the  anticipated  extensive  who,  evidence  presented  maintained that for  the  strategically  strategic  in this  Baathists  it  c a n be  perceptions  1  f o r the  This  factor  accurately  of  s h o c k i n g I r a n encompassed  oversights.  explanation  section,  opportunity  a number o f  constitutes  u n a n t i c i p a t e d outcome  of  an i m p o r t a n t  the  surprise  attack.  Determinants I n f l u e n c i n g the Timing of the Undertaking of the S u r p r i s e Onslaught The f a c t o r s  which c o n d i t i o n e d the  Baath  d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g r e g a r d i n g when t o  initiate  c o n s t i t u t e s the  be a n a l y z e d  chapter.  f i n a l variable to  Planning f o r the  incursion into  R e p u b l i c commenced i n A u g u s t o f Hussein forced President hastening  of  the  With regard to seasonal  Bakr t o  timing,  shifts  Baath s t r a t e g i s t s  the  extreme  of  to  its  step d o w n ,  advantage.  concluded that  i n northern Iran,  home h e a t i n g  discomfort  w i t h numerous, revolution, toward the  this  Islamic  shortly after 5 0  exploiting precisely,  the  beginning of  a significant  Khomeinists.  the  In a d d i t i o n ,  of it  long, of  adequate  and t h a t  by such a development,  a heightening 5 1  inroad  percentage  a l r e a d y e x i s t e n t h a r d s h i p s stemming  would hasten  1980.  by commencing t h e  and c o o k i n g f u e l ,  generated  Saddam  and a  More  I r a n i a n p o p u l a c e w o u l d be d e n i e d a c c e s s t o  supplies  in  Baghdad a i m e d a t  and o c c u p y i n g K h u z e s t a n p r i o r t o cold winter  the  attack  preparations transpired in early  actual  weather  1979,  the  regime's  the along from  the  disaffection was d e c i d e d  that  133 the  I r a n i a n g o v e r n i n g e l i t e would not  focused of  the  on t h e  southwestern  onset of  flooding  the  there,  Accordingly,  expect a major  region of  the  c o u n t r y on t h e  annual r a i n y s e a s o n and  which u s u a l l y takes p l a c e  it  a significant  degree of  eve  attendant  i n November.  was assumed t h a t b y e x e c u t i n g  i n e a r l y autumn,  attack  the  onslaught  s u r p r i s e w o u l d be  attained. The I r a q i conquest  of  perceptions  1980,  that  1980  program o f  number o f  London t o of  at  some o r d e r s  for Iran's  large  i n mid-1980,  Iranian troops  a time  that  s u r p r i s e and b e f o r e dissipated. clerical  of  given the  fact  that  the  to  the  In March  Islamic  acquire badly of  Baathists  stationed  of  Republic the parts  British observed  along the  Overall,  tanks. that  common  w o u l d a f f o r d an optimum l e v e l  of  d i d not  anticipated  obtain,  it  the  advantages swelling  of  c a n be s u r m i s e d  K h u z e s t a n and o t h e r  5 2  frontier to  perceived m i l i t a r y  to  needed  Iraq opted  its  to  of p a r t i c u l a r concern  complement  by  nation's  f o r armaments and s p a r e  And, although the  sentiment  the  influenced  conduct a p a r l e y r e g a r d i n g  was b e i n g g r a d u a l l y i n c r e a s e d . strike  was a l s o  revamping the  representatives  Baghdad was T e h e r a n ' s e f f o r t  In a d d i t i o n ,  embark on  c l e r i c a l g o v e r n m e n t was b e g i n n i n g  had p r e v i o u s l y been c a n c e l l e d ;  equipment  to  along revolutionary l i n e s .  a number o f  renegotiation that  the  in its  forces  traveled to  decision  I r a n i n September o f  make headway military  regime's  antithat,  key s t r e t c h e s o f  the  134 I r a n i a n b o r d e r w i t h I r a q were l i g h t l y of  1980,  the  timing of initial  Baathists'  the  defended  in  September  careful planning regarding  onslaught  added t o  surprise visited  the  considerable  upon r e v o l u t i o n a r y  the degree  of  Iran.  Conclusion Chapter Four demonstrated inducements  for aggression,  structure  rested  factors.  It  the  that,  Baath e l i t e ' s  upon a number o f  was a r g u e d t h a t  s i m i l a r to  the  complex,  opportunity  interrelated  Baathists*  sense  opportunity  for realizing strategic  perceptions  o f v a r i o u s m i l i t a r y power a d v a n t a g e s  Iraq,  as w e l l  as  from a b e l i e f  size,  t h e m o r a l e and e f f e c t i v e n e s s  had a l s o d e c l i n e d . was  political Iran. of  In a d d i t i o n ,  f u r t h e r encouraged by t h e unrest  w h i c h came t o  Moreover, i t  Baath governance  effectively  Baathists' argued t h a t initiation  Iran's  fore the  bolster  in  of  decision  the  the  a considerable  level  c o n d u c t e d by t h e  alternatively,  And,  elite.  Baghdad  and  date  was t h e  for  questions the  Finally,  of u t i l i t y - o r i e n t e d  Iraqi  forces  opportunity  o v e r a l l accuracy of  regarding the  in  revolutionary  a t t a c k was n o t a r r i v e d a t  w h i m s i c a l manner b u t ,  armed  by  a u t h o r i t a r i a n nature  opportunistic calculations. the  from  wielded  was h e l d t h a t  employing a s u r p r i s e a t t a c k .  were r a i s e d r e g a r d i n g t h e  stemmed  economic problems the  of  beyond a r e d u c t i o n  of  it  was n o t e d t h a t served to  surprise  that,  the  of  it  was  the  i n a s u d d e n and end r e s u l t  deliberations  of  135 Central observation  of  to  B a g h d a d ' s o p p o r t u n i t y s t r u c t u r e was  a fundamental s h i f t  b e t w e e n I r a q and I r a n . that  the  Iran's  enervation  opportunity to  The I r a q i  and g e n e r a l  conventional  defense  The B a a t h i s t s '  combatants  r a t i o of  tanks,  the  i n terms  one  c a r d i n a l flaws  the  estimations  of  analysis  ample  was  and i n d i v i d u a l  Iran. on t h e  numerical armaments,  u n d e r l y i n g the  Baath  the  armed f o r c e s ,  Baghdad o v e r l o o k e d a number o f  by bands o f  a p p r o x i m a t e edge i n b a s i c ,  i n c l u d i n g the  the  of  the  actual  I r a q i m i l i t a r y machine  i n c u r s i o n and d e f e n d i n g  against  Baghdad was g r e a t l y m i s t a k e n i n c u r s i o n would evoke sentiment the  which,  ruling  elite.  The myopia o f  as  the  and the  counteraggression.  in believing of  ascendancy the  demonstrated  as w e l l  that  an  anti-clerical  would c u l m i n a t e  K h o m e i n i i t e c a b a l and t h e  significant  i n executing  a groundswelling  in turn,  the  experience  Iranian  as  conventional  ferocity  i r r e g u l a r I r a n i a n combatants,  constraining limitations prowess of  unmitigated  stands  elite's  By o v e r e m p h a s i z i n g  importance of  intangibles,  wholly  o f m i l i t a r y power,  of various types of  opportunity.  convinced  long-treasured  aircraft,  overreliance  imbalance, of  accorded  indices  p o s s e s s e d b y I r a q and  However,  balance  breakdown i n o r d e r g r i p p i n g  forces  p r e d i c a t e d upon q u a n t i t a t i v e the  l e a d e r s h i p was  o v e r r u n and annex t h e  Khuzestan r e g i o n .  largely  i n the m i l i t a r y  an  i n the of  Baathists  deposal  a less in this  of  unsavory respect  136 can be p r i n c i p a l l y a s c r i b e d t o mobilization of drive  against  the  the  Iranian populace  degree  and, as  a result,  of  i n mid-1980,  economic d u r e s s , signals  was c a u g h t  that  regardless  the  inroad occurred: the  thoughts  of  In s h o r t ,  ousting  a  demonstrated  the  although the  Iraqi  Khomeinists Iranian  irruption,  the  l i k e l y been j e t t i s o n e d  Iranian e l i t e antithesis  inception of  of  h a d come t o a brief,  a seemingly  war b e t w e e n I r a q and I r a n t h a t the  of  t h e masses i n I r a n  o f f g u a r d by t h e  secular  own v o l i t i o n ,  threaten  of  considerable  a moderate,  total  plethora  Moreover,  u n d e r t a k i n g o f which would have  its  effected  followings.  were b e i n g e n t e r t a i n e d .  if  revolutionary  largely  the  the  o p p o s i t i o n g r o u p s d i d n o t command w i d e  no t a c t i l e  elite  discern that  f o r the  r o y a l i s t regime had been  t h r o u g h l o c a l mosques secular  a f a i l u r e to  came t o  long-term continuation of  the  only  fore  on  fruitful interminable, seriously  Baath governance.  137  CHAPTER I V NOTES -'-Institute of S t r a t e g i c S t u d i e s , M i d d l e E a s t M e d i t e r r a n e a n M i l i t a r y Balance (London: I n s t i t u t e o f S t r a t e g i c S t u d i e s , 1 9 7 8 - 1 9 7 9 ) , p . 36. I n s t i t u t e of S t r a t e g i c Studies, Middle E a s t M e d i t e r r a n e a n M i l i t a r y B a l a n c e (London: I n s t i t u t e o f S t r a t e g i c S t u d i e s , 1 9 8 0 - 1 9 8 1 ) , p . 42. 2  3  4  Analysis 17.  New Y o r k T i m e s ,  13 A p r i l  1980.  E f r a i m K a r s h , The I r a n - I r a q War: A M i l i t a r y (London: I n s t i t u t e o f S t r a t e g i c S t u d i e s , 1987),  p.  L e n o r e G . M a r t i n , The U n s t a b l e G u l f : T h r e a t s f r o m W i t h i n ( L e x i n g t o n , M a s s a c h u s e t t s : D . C . H e a t h & Company, 1984), p . 100. 5  6  Ibid.,  p.  80.  Shameem A k h t a r , "Impact o f t h e I s l a m i c Movement I r a n on t h e R e g i o n , " P a k i s t a n H o r i z o n 1-2 (1979):89. 7  in  U . S . Foreign Broadcast Information S e r v i c e , Middle E a s t A s i a , T e h e r a n Domestic S e r v i c e i n P e r s i a n , "Defense M i n i s t e r D i s c u s s e s A r m y , " 4 O c t o b e r 1979, LD042014. 8  R a m e s h S r e e d h a r , " S t a t e o f I r a n i a n Armed F o r c e s , " S t r a t e g i c A n a l y s i s 3 (June 1 9 8 0 ) : 1 0 8 . 9  Ibid.,  p.  10.  -Karsh,  p.  14.  1 0  1 ]  1 2  West A s i a 1980), p.  I n s t i t u t e f o r D e f e n s e A n a l y s i s , News R e v i e w on (New D e l h i : I n s t i t u t e f o r D e f e n s e A n a l y s i s , May 123.  I n s t i t u t e f o r D e f e n s e A n a l y s i s , News R e v i e w West A s i a (New D e l h i : I n s t i t u t e f o r D e f e n s e A n a l y s i s , January 1980), p. 869. 1 3  1 4  1 5  Akhtar, Ibid.  p.  97.  on  138 V a h e P e t r o s s i a n , "Dilemmas o f t h e I r a n i a n R e v o l u t i o n , " The W o r l d T o d a y 1 ( J a n u a r y 1 9 8 0 ) : 2 4 . 1 6  R u h o l l a h K h o m e i n i , I s l a m and R e v o l u t i o n , Hamid A l g a r ~ ( B e r k e l e y : M i z a n P r e s s , 1 9 8 1 ) , p . 3 9 . 1 7  1 8  Christian  1 9  I n s t i t u t e f o r D e f e n s e A n a l y s i s , News R e v i e w (New D e l h i : I n s t i t u t e f o r D e f e n s e A n a l y s i s , 352.  on July  I n s t i t u t e f o r D e f e n s e A n a l y s i s , News R e v i e w (New D e l h i : I n s t i t u t e f o r D e f e n s e A n a l y s i s , 220.  on June  West A s i a 1980), p . 2 0  West A s i a 1980), p. 2 1  Ibid.,  p.  Science Monitor.  16 J u n e  trans.  1979.  217.  R o u h o l l a h K. Ramazani, " I r a n ' s R e v o l u t i o n : P a t t e r n s , P r o b l e m s , and P r o s p e c t s , " I n t e r n a t i o n a l A f f a i r s 3 (Summer 1 9 8 0 ) : 4 4 6 . 2 2  2 3  West A s i a 1979), p .  I n s t i t u t e f o r D e f e n s e A n a l y s i s , News R e v i e w (New D e l h i : I n s t i t u t e f o r D e f e n s e A n a l y s i s , 355.  Shaul and t h e I s l a m i c 1 9 8 4 ) , p . 68. 2 4  2 5  2 6  West A s i a 1979) , p .  B a k h a s h , The R e i g n o f R e v o l u t i o n (New Y o r k :  N e w York Times.  J e f f McConnell, 1980-1981):25.  1980.  The  2 9  I n s t i t u t e f o r D e f e n s e A n a l y s i s , News R e v i e w (New D e l h i : I n s t i t u t e f o r D e f e n s e A n a l y s i s , 439.  3 0  Strategic  Iran Times.  "Iraq-Iran War," Counterspy  2 8  West A s i a 1980) , p .  Ramesh Sreedhar, Analysis 4 (July  15 F e b r u a r y  on August 5  1980.  "Destabilization 1979):141.  in  on August  Iran,"  C l a u d i a W r i g h t , "Iraq—New Power i n t h e F o r e i g n A f f a i r s 2 (Winter 1979-1980):265. 3 1  East,"  the A y a t o l l a h s : Iran B a s i c Books, Inc.,  I n s t i t u t e f o r D e f e n s e A n a l y s i s , News R e v i e w (New D e l h i : I n s t i t u t e f o r D e f e n s e A n a l y s i s , 355.  2 7  (Winter  30 M a r c h  on August  Middle  139 I n s t i t u t e f o r D e f e n s e A n a l y s i s , News R e v i e w on (New D e l h i : I n s t i t u t e f o r D e f e n s e A n a l y s i s , M a r c h 1057.  3 2  West A s i a 1980), p .  J o h n W. Amos I I , "The I r a q - I r a n War: C o n f l i c t , L i n k a g e , and S p i l l o v e r i n t h e M i d d l e E a s t , " i n G u l f S e c u r i t y i n t o t h e 1 9 8 0 s : P e r c e p t u a l and S t r a t e g i c D i m e n s i o n s , ed. R o b e r t D a r i u s , J o h n W. Amos I I , a n d R a l p h H . Magnus ( P a l o A l t o , C a l i f o r n i a : S t a n f o r d U n i v e r s i t y , Hoover I n s t i t u t i o n P r e s s , 1984), p . 60. 3 3  A n t h o n y H . C o r d e s m a n , The G u l f a n d t h e S e a r c h f o r S t a b i l i t y : Saudi A r a b i a , the M i l i t a r y Balance i n and T r e n d s i n t h e A r a b - I s r a e l i M i l i t a r y B a l a n c e C o l o r a d o : Westview P r e s s , 1984), p . 657.  3 4  Strategic the G u l f , (Boulder,  K a r s h » P-  3 5  17.  Cordesman ,  p.  3 7  I b i d . / P-  664.  3 8  I b i d . / P-  546.  3 9  I b i d . / P-  655.  4 0  l b i d . , P- 547.  4 1  I b i d . / P-  4 2  Ibid.  4 3  I b i d . / P-  3 6  688.  655.  656.  4 4  Amos,  4 5  Cordesman ,  p.  4 6  I b i d . / P-  649.  4 7  Christian  Science Monitor,  4 8  4 9  5 0  P- 52.  Cordesman ,  p.  I b i d . , P-  659.  Amos,  688.  1 June  650.  P- 56.  C l a u d i a W r i g h t , "Behind I r a q ' s Y o r k T i m e s M a g a z i n e . 26 O c t o b e r 1980, p . 5 1  5 2  1979.  Sreedhar,  p.  111.  Bold B i d , " 43  CHAPTER V  REVOLUTIONARY IRAN'S EXPOSURE TO STRATEGIC SURPRISE: M I L I T A R Y ,  INTELLIGENCE AND  DOMESTIC P O L I T I C A L CAUSAL FACTORS  The  o v e r r i d i n g emphasis  of  the preceding  c h a p t e r s was p l a c e d u p o n i l l u m i n a t i n g t h e inducements strategic the  and p e r c e p t i o n s  surprise.  case at hand,  depth focus to  that  assorted  now s h i f t  intelligence capability  forces  services  section  third  revolutionary  external  a more i n susceptible chapter  and p r o b l e m s  c a p a b i l i t y of  r a p i d l y r e p e l an i n c u r s i o n . t h e breakdown o f  objectives  section  of  adversaries,  affairs.  140  the  including  a thorough examination  of p o l i t i c a l d i v i s i o n that  developed  factor detracted  de j u r e and de f a c t o  The  Iran's  d e v e l o p m e n t weakened  entails  I r a n and how t h i s  of the  to  of t h i s  developments  and how t h i s  t o gauge t h e  the high l e v e l  attention  to  addresses  And, the  attaining  rendered Iran  c o n t r i b u t e d to the diminution of the  second s e c t i o n  of  The i n i t i a l  i n t o the  Iran's military  Iraq.  analysis w i l l  conditions that  surprise attack.  further delves  opportunity for  elite's  Toward p r o v i d i n g a f u l l e r p i c t u r e o f  the  on t h e  of  Iraqi  three  elites  away  the from  in  141 V u l n e r a b i l i t y A r i s i n g from T r a n s i t i o n i n t h e Composition of the M i l i t a r y . Disadvantageous P o s i t i o n i n g o f F o r c e s , and a Breakdown o f S t r a t e g y and D e f e n s i v e P l a n n i n g As mentioned  i n Chapter Three,  the  Khomeinists  determination to  fundamentally r e s t r u c t u r e the  military  an end w h i c h t h e  forces,  partially  supported,  brutality  d e m o n s t r a t e d by t h e  effort  suppress  to  oppressive  secular  stemmed from t h e  governance,  nation's  government  extreme  armed f o r c e s  popular demonstrations  1  level  i n the against  along with a concern that  of  vain the  Shah's  stalwart  champions o f m o n a r c h i a l r u l e w i t h i n the m i l i t a r y might attempt  to  organize counterrevolutionary e f f o r t s .  forestall  the  number o f  r e f o r m measures  ultimate  objective  a b o l i s h the the  occurrence of  wide s o c i e t a l  common m a s s e s ,  royalist  regime.  transformed  of the  were  initiated.  development,  In g e n e r a l ,  had been  fostered  A l t e r n a t i v e l y , t h e m i l i t a r y was t o  into popular forces  t h a t would adhere t o  safeguarding the welfare  Khomeini e l u c i d a t e d h i s  sentiment  of  the  the m i l i t a r y , with regard to  as  during a meeting with r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s infantry division in April  of  by  of  the  be the Iranian  regarding  function of  army's second  to  d i v i s i o n between t h e m i l i t a r y and  appropriate a whole,  a  the  d o m i n a n t c l e r i c a l e l i t e was  a condition that  paramount purpose o f populace.  s u c h an unwelcome  To  the  society the  1979:  The army b e l o n g s t o u s and we b e l o n g t o t h e a r m y . The army and t h e n a t i o n a r e n o t two d i f f e r e n t t h i n g s . . . . . . . t h e army i s an I s l a m i c a r m y . 1  142 In defense of the p o s i t i o n that I r a n i a n army was a b s o l u t e l y was a c c o r d e d t h e remarked i n e a r l y i n the  satanical  significantly the  cabinet 1979  that  altered to  this  that  the  order.  army was b u i l t and c r e a t e d  correspond to In f a c t ,  2  initially,  disbanding the  possibility  at  be  imperatives  this  serious  of  juncture,  c o n s i d e r a t i o n had  r e g u l a r army a l t o g e t h e r ,  army c o u l d be o f u t i l i t y  toward e s t a b l i s h i n g  the  had been j e t t i s o n e d  A s an a l t e r n a t i v e ,  who  minister,  e r a , " and a c c o r d i n g l y , h a d t o  Chamran r e v e a l e d t h a t ,  that  "this  the  M o s t a f a Chamran,  p o r t f o l i o of defense  revolutionary regime.  been g i v e n t o  essential,  a revamping o f  due t o  the  but belief  in maintaining internal  Qom and T e h e r a n d e c i d e d t o work  an army t h a t  would v i g o r o u s l y defend  the  revolution. In terms o f modified  a p a r a d i g m on w h i c h t o p r e d i c a t e  r e g u l a r army o f  the  Islamic Republic,  r e v o l u t i o n a r y regime adopted t h a t w h i c h had been g u i d e d by a c o r e o f non-commissioned o f f i c e r s . experience, officers  concomitant  requiring support  the  Red R u s s i a n Army,  ideologically  Consonant w i t h the  dedicated  Bolshevik  T e h e r a n aimed a t b r i d g i n g t h e wide g u l f  and e n l i s t e d  privileges  of the  men.  end i n c l u d e d t h e  Manifestations  for  Revolution."  ranking o f f i c e r s  "Iran's 3  of  as w e l l  to demonstrate  independence,"  and t h e  between  this  cancellation of various  e n j o y e d by commissioned o f f i c e r s all  the  special as  unqualified  "Islamic  143 However, satisfied it  K h o m e i n i and h i s  w i t h mere p l e d g e s o f  was t h e i r b e l i e f  that  lieutenants  allegiance  a purging of  the  to  were the  revolution;  senior  officer  c o r p s w o u l d a l s o be n e c e s s a r y  i n order to mitigate  danger o f  The smashing o f  counterrevolution.  S h a h ' s m i l i t a r y command was with the  assassinations of  military  commander o f  Badre'i,  head o f  initiated  Iran's  or sanctioned dissidents,  the  1979 the  4  On 1 O c t o b e r  the  ouster  i n an " I s l a m i c  any o f f i c e r  1979,  of ranking  and  Shortly afterward,  i n c o n c l u d i n g which o f f i c e r s in short,  deposed  on 12 F e b r u a r y  ground f o r c e s .  w o u l d be c o n d u c t e d  elucidated:  the  K h u z e s t a n , and G e n e r a l A b d u l - A l i  revolutionary nature." be u s e d  the  General Bakrot J a f a r i a n ,  D e f e n s e M i n i s t e r Chamran h e l d t h a t officers  not  the  criteria  w o u l d be c a s h i e r e d  who h a d p a r t i c i p a t e d  t o r t u r e and m u r d e r o f  o r who h a d p i l f e r e d s t a t e  to was  in,  political  funds,  was t o  be  punished. In l a t e opposition the  1979,  toward the  m i l i t a r y began t o  on d e m o n s t r a t i n g personnel  engineered  at  seizing  of  the  of  and  visions  surface.  The c l e r i c a l e l i t e  seditious  outbursts  do so a r o s e  vis-a-vis was  by armed  i n e a r l y January of  1980,  officers,  An when a  who a i m e d  T e h e r a n and Qom, was r e v e a l e d .  c o n s p i r a t o r s were f o u n d c u l p a b l e  bent  forces  quashed i n a h a r s h manner.  by a group o f m i d - l e v e l  c o n t r o l of  discontent  Khomeiniite regime's  would be h a s t i l y  opportunity to plot  that  manifestations  5  of high treason  All by  144 r e v o l u t i o n a r y t r i b u n a l s i n h u r r i e d l y conducted and were s u m m a r i l y e x e c u t e d . provided the purges,  Overall,  such  Khomeinists w i t h grounds t o  the magnitude  proceedings  incidents  accelerate  o f w h i c h was e v i d e n c e d  the  on 11  February,  when M a j o r - G e n e r a l Mohammad H a d i Shadmehr, who h a d succeeded  G e n e r a l G h a r a n i as  chief-of-staff,  recently  announced  that  some f o u r t h o u s a n d men h a d b e e n  f o r c i b l y ousted  from  armed f o r c e s  the  and t h a t  sacking of  since  the  onset of  an a d d i t i o n a l 3 , 5 0 0 was  On 19 F e b r u a r y , move,  Khomeini,  informally delegated  commander t o rationale  President  behind t h i s  of  sagging  However,  morale of the  diminution of  the  Khomeini h e l d t h a t  was b a s e d  on t h e  armed f o r c e s this  on an  to  development  stemmed  exacerbated  failed  to  from the  purges.  c o n s i d e r a b l y by t h e  that  the  d e t e c t and t h w a r t t h i s of  that  f a i l u r e of  of  a  military The  latter  abortive  rescue  the  the  effect  it  effort  the was  the  n a v y and a i r  i n t r u s i o n represented  t h e i r basic mission  the  boost  or to  i n Teheran, which t r a n s p i r e d i n A p r i l ;  gross d e r e l i c t i o n  belief  p a r a l y z i n g confusion w i t h i n the  churchmen's c o n t e n t i o n force  the  Islamic  u n d e r t a k e n b y an A m e r i c a n commando team t o hostages  unanticipated  supreme  r e g u l a r m i l i t a r y groups  command s t r u c t u r e t h a t q u a n d a r y was  in a largely  a u t h o r i t y as  the  6  command and c o n t r o l w o u l d h a s t e n  p l a c i n g the  orientation.  envisioned.  Bani-Sadr. decision  a " c e n t r a l i z a t i o n " of process  his  revolution,  the  a  safeguarding  145 I r a n i a n t e r r i t o r y and, p u r g e was  executed.  accordingly,  assuage the  irrespective control  of  instill  uncertainty  armed f o r c e s , clerical  Defense C o u n c i l ,  uprisings  and s u b s e q u e n t p u r g e s effort  known as  the  by l o y a l i s t  troops.  Ahvaz,  pattern  widespread at  it  and,  i n response,  to  the  military  as  a means o f  the  nature. supreme  point, of  direct  and t h e  out  crushed  code-named  that  "Red  i n Hamadan, wake o f  were  scope of  this  arrested. the  140  personal  toward the  jurists  death  regular  of  to  In a d d i t i o n ,  at  the  of  accommodated  sentences  unhappiness  l a n g u i d pace  9  July  any f u r t h e r e p i s o d e s  involvement. his  was  army,  announced  In the  a harder l i n e  high Islamic  Khomeini demonstrated  effectiveness  was  garrisons  forestalling  c l e r i c by meting of  attempted  he e x t e n d e d h i s  adoption of  A number o f  those convicted  of  hundred i n s u r r e c t i o n i s t s  sanction  this  a military  On 2 3 May, a  rebellion,  K h o m e i n i was t a k e n a b a c k by t h e rebellion  Supreme  group w i t h i n the  and T e h e r a n , h a d b e e n p u t down. some f i v e  on t h e  as  continued.  A n d , on 13 J u l y ,  which i n v o l v e d troops  incident  opposition  I r a n i a n Freedom S e e k e r s , "  8  a much more s e r i o u s , Alert,"  the  mounted b y a shadowy  "Army o f  stiff  which functioned  Consequently,  order  a c c o r d i n g him nominal  extremists serving  body.  of  ranks, Bani-Sadr,  encountered  oversight  mutinous  a semblance  w i t h i n the  1  f r o m a number o f National  to  Khomeini s gesture of  over the  high-level  7  A l t h o u g h he d e s i r e d and t o  a further  with the drive  to  this  lack  146 overhaul the  the  r e g u l a r m i l i t a r y when he  national  gendarmerie,  informed the  Z a h i r Nezod,  head  of  that:  I want a s t r o n g i n d e p e n d e n t army f r e e o f any contaminations. P u r g e t h i s army o f any c o n t a m i n a t i o n s and b u i l d a n I s l a m i c a r m y , and t h e n t h e n a t i o n w i l l place i t in its h e a r t . 1 0  Overall,  by September  m i l i t a r y personnel ten  of  1980,  had been  t h o u s a n d came f r o m t h e  some t w e l v e t h o u s a n d  forcibly expelled. army, w h i l e  t h o u s a n d were n a v y and a i r f o r c e significant senior  percentage  officers,  implementation of Islamic  in a virtual  1 1  two Moreover, a  plan of  the  breakdown o f  devising  nation's  of  the  for  the  and  n a t i o n a l defense this  and the  r e g u l a r branches  i n h i b i t e d the  Unquestionably,  added t o  other  servicemen.  a l l three  a viable  Republic.  significantly  of  in turn,  Of t h e s e ,  t h o s e s a c k e d were m i d - l e v e l  resulting  command e s t a b l i s h m e n t s m i l i t a r y which,  of  the  Iranian  condition  exposure  to  strategic  surprise. The c a p a b i l i t y o f  revolutionary Iran to m i l i t a r i l y  respond to  external  manner was  a l s o c o n s i d e r a b l y weakened  institutional  rivalry  r e g u l a r branches forces,  aggression  of  by t h e  and m u t u a l s u s p i c i o n  t h e m i l i t a r y and t h e  p a r t i c u l a r l y that  Revolutionary Guards. o r g a n i z i n g the  i n an e f f e c t i v e  between t h e  Indeed,  the impetus  formal  o f w h i c h was d e c l a r e d b y t h e  1979,  from h i s  personal belief,  the  revolutionary  establishment stemmed  between  army and  the  timely  heated  Khomeini's c h i e f  Revolutionary Guards,  and  Imam on 5 May  s h a r e d by  his  for  147 clerical  colleagues,  military  groupings developed  government,  that  as w e l l  revolutionary  a reduction of  as t h e  committees  by t h e  level  the  One o f the  the  r e g u l a r army.  founding c h a r t e r , from c h a l l e n g e s  possibility  act  as  to  i n consonance  safeguarding  by b o t h d o m e s t i c  Command C o u n c i l w h i c h was  long-standing  the and  staffed  with the  separate Pasdaran.  the  force's  out  Islamic  to  in  its  revolution  foreign Initially,  the  guidance  exclusively  of  a  by a number  confidant  a  of  Khomeini.  forcefully  end,  r e g u l a r army and  upon t h e  and a t  army f o r  from t h e  were e s t a b l i s h e d  inception,  eliminate  a considerable  acquisitioned  b a s e s and m a g a z i n e s  evoked a c r i m o n i o u s ,  from t h e  dependency  Toward t h i s  From i t s  Beyond e s t a b l i s h i n g  Khomeinists endeavored t o  Revolutionary Guards'  m a t e r i a l was  P a s d a r a n by  a  Government, the  and m u n i t i o n s .  the  churchmen h e a d e d by A y a t o l l a h H a s a n L a h u t i ,  command s t r u c t u r e w h o l l y a l o o f the  adequate  a military-  a counterweight  R e v o l u t i o n a r y G u a r d s were p l a c e d u n d e r t h e  ultraistic  the  of  w h i c h was c l e a r l y s p e l l e d of  of  i n p r o v i d i n g an  counterrevolutionary reactionaries.  of  regal  watchdog,  tasks assigned  was t o  T h i s was  mission,  the  1 2  basic  clerical elite  cardinal  against  d'etat.  ranks of  within individual units suffice  i n s p i r e d coup  toppled  placing of  r e g u l a r m i l i t a r y , would not of protection  the  the  armaments  amount army,  for  the  of  and  the  R e v o l u t i o n a r y Guards  times v i o l e n t ,  opposition  from  148 the  I r a n i a n army.  and t h e  o f m i l i t a r y h a r d w a r e amassed b y t h e  diminish cooperation  threats  effectiveness  Khomeinists, in late  adverse  fostered  postrevolutionary  Iran  i n the  precipitant minorities  overhaul of a c i t i n g of  1980  is  Iraqi  attack  intrusions.  chaotic,  armed f o r c e s deployment  conducted  of  troops  for arriving  nation's  exposure  on K h u z e s t a n .  of  Moscow m i g h t a t t e m p t  stationed to  to  to  the  Soviet  T u r k m e n i s t a n and t h e  ethnic  resulted  particularly in  grab p o r t i o n s  significantly  along the  a  A d d i t i o n a l l y , due t o of  i n the  in the  fear  northern  augment t h e  frontier  a  by  within  at  U n r e s t among  combatants,  Kurdish region.  T e h e r a n was p r o m p t e d t o  the  the  served  monitoring  i n a number o f p e r i p h e r a l p r o v i n c e s  northwestern  adjacent  the  vast  Shah  of  foreign  rather the  task  army  upon m o r a l e and  indispensable  an u n u s u a l c o n c e n t r a t i o n  troops  effects  by t h e  thorough understanding of  that  crucial  f r o m a b r o a d and w a r d i n g o f f Beyond t h e  the  t h e v y i n g between t h e  R e v o l u t i o n a r y Guards f o r c o n t r o l over the  stockpile to  By and l a r g e ,  Iran,  number o f area  T r a n s c a u c a s i a n a r e a west  of  Caspian Sea. The d e s i r e  uprisings,  as w e l l  f o r q u e l l i n g the  domestic  as d e t e r r i n g a S o v i e t  necessitated a r o t a t i o n of frontier with Iraq.  troops  ethnic  intrusion,  away f r o m t h e  And, although a s i z a b l e  contingent  R e v o l u t i o n a r y Guards,  along with units  of  were s e n t t o  Iraqi  counter-  confront  forces  and  the  common of  r e g u l a r army,  149 revolutionaries  i n proximity to  of  Karand Gharb,  of  1980,  at  1 3  only three  the  time  of  the  Iraqi  approximately 750-mile-long  the  north,  central  combatants  fear that  1  assistance,  royalist  w o u l d be a b l e  to  agents,  examination demonstrates  explanation aggression how t h i s  f o r the is  not  the  of  the  inaccurate.  one  straddles  that  the  Ahvaz.  1 4  border with the  ranks of  Iranian  sentiment.  the  I r a n i a n m i l i t a r y as  v u l n e r a b i l i t y of  in  Iraqi  counterrevolutionary  Islamic  The n e x t s e c t i o n  v u l n e r a b i l i t y was h e i g h t e n e d  intelligence  with  infiltrate  The f o r e g o i n g  shakeup o f  Sanadej;  the  i n terms  and foment  the  near  an a d d i t i o n a l  i n the v i c i n i t y of  defense u n i t s  positing  at  i n Khuzestan near  I r a q c a n a l s o be p a r t i a l l y e x p l a i n e d Khomeinists  July  September,  i n Kermanshah, which  a r m o r e d d i v i s i o n was s t a t i o n e d  in  Iranian-Iraqi frontier:  segment o f t h e b o r d e r ; a n d ,  The p a u c i t y o f  in  hamlets  were p o s i t i o n e d  i n f a n t r y d i v i s i o n was.based  a r m o r e d d i v i s i o n was d e p l o y e d  Zahab,  irruption  army d i v i s i o n s  the  the  central border  E s l a m a b a d , and S a r - e P o l - e  attenuated  one  the  1 5  thesis an Republic will  to  examine  by s h o r t c o m i n g s  in  gathering.  E x p o s u r e t o A g g r e s s i o n Due t o an I m p a i r e d I n t e l l i g e n c e C a p a b i l i t y and I r a q i Stratagem Iran's v u l n e r a b i l i t y to partially  ascribed to  intelligence following  the  network.  the  surprise attack  enervation  During the  revolution's  onset,  of  the  can a l s o  quality of  its  year-and-a-half period along with the  be  profound  150 revamping of defense  the  forces,  organizations new, the  structure the  and f u n d a m e n t a l  nation's  existing  Da'ere S i y a s i assigned  Ideologik the  the  Gorough Zarb  [Islamic  stamp o u t  which i n c l u d e d the  task  zeal  constabulary w i t h i n the Islam  w h i c h was  realize  attention  the  focus of  the  an  affinity  as  a  Anjumani-idetect  within  against  revolution,  surprise  degree of  agencies,  the  fledgling  internal  and  the  subversion.  a f f o r d e d an  appears  latter  elite's  initial  shock.  belief  the  inadequate actions  factor  revolutionary constituted  in light  threats of  the  monitored.  relatively  by i n v a d i n g I r a q i  to  In  and e x t e r n a l  was n o t v i g o r o u s l y  stands  ability  Pasdaran,  impolitic  i n e x p l a i n i n g the  attained  that  internal  rather  This  Iraqi  along with the both  intelligence  and a n a l y z i n g t h e  for the  Khomeinists'  Moreover, of  and t h e  s u r r o u n d i n g Arab s t a t e s .  ample s e c u r i t y  that  Circle],  which acted  founded t o  the  observing  a significant  intelligence  fact  to  a key e x p l a n a t i o n  hindsight,  the  fostering  dissidence  Iranian intelligence  and d e s i g n s o f as  following:  1 6  Consequently,  out  gathering  Ideological  [Strike Group],  g r o u p s was p l a c e d on c h e c k i n g  of  of  armed f o r c e s ;  Society],  Basically,  level  Iran's  among I r a n i a n m i l i t a r y  counterrevolutionary  military.  intelligence  [Political  chief  for t r a d i t i o n a l Islamic personnel;  of  were d i s b a n d e d and r e p l a c e d w i t h a number o f  revolutionary groupings,  w h i c h was  mission  forces,  high the  degree Iranian  to  151 clerical  elite's  f a i l u r e to  recognize  Baghdad's e n t e r p r i s i n g designs, defensive is  of  motivations  considerable  not p e r c e i v i n g the  as w e l l  f o r a sudden,  import.  the  imperative.  K h o m e i n i s t s , and t h e  l i k e l i h o o d of failure  to  Iraqi  take  indicator of  into  aggression.  In a d d i t i o n to intelligence  the  f u r t h e r heightened  a notable  component o f t h e  Baathists  was t o  averse  to  repeatedly on t h e  of  1979,  neighbor."  to 1 7  aggressive  intense,  fear that  the  a monition of Overall,  the  Islamic  environment the  high  Khomeinists'  r e a d i l y apparent  I s l a m i c R e p u b l i c ' s exposure by I r a q i  deception dismiss  deception.  c a m p a i g n waged b y the  l i k e l i h o o d of  Baghdad was  e n u n c i a t e d by T a r i q A z i z for Iraq  l a u n c h an o f f e n s i v e Furthermore, the  to  Initially, the an  altogether  with a "brother" Islamic  when he c h a r g e d t h a t  impossible  its  first  an  i d e o l o g y propounded  the p o l i t i c a l  grounds t h a t  an armed c o n f l i c t  T h i s p o s i t i o n was  viewed  an i n a d e q u a t e m i l i t a r y and p o l i t i c a l  capability,  onslaught  T e h e r a n e r r e d by  a t t a c k remains p a r a d o x i c a l .  s h o c k was  Iraqi  the  consideration this  a possible  onslaught,  The B a a t h i s t s '  affect  c o u l d have s e r v e d as  strong  Baath regime  subsequent  r e v o l u t i o n would n e g a t i v e l y Iraq,  its  of  I s l a m i c R e p u b l i c as  and h i g h l y d i s c e r n i b l e l o a t h i n g o f  within  as  preemptive  extent to which the  economic and p o l i t i c a l  existence  More p r e c i s e l y ,  d i r e c t m i l i t a r y action against  by t h e  the  state.  i n December  " i t w o u l d be  against  Baath e l i t e  a Muslim sought  d e s i g n s b y p u t t i n g f o r t h numerous  to open  conceal  152 pledges that with Iran. Ministry  I r a q was t r u l y d e s i r o u s For instance,  released  Baghdad d i d n o t aim a t  on 10 S e p t e m b e r ,  an o f f i c i a l  the  feuding  when f r i c t i o n b e t w e e n t h e rise,  disputes,  Baath o f f i c i a l s  asserting  that,  anticipate  Islamic  Republic.  the  dispute  was  to  a causal  over the  to  not  traditionally  the  that  the  factor underlying  of  the  the  Baath  1  the  the  T h i s stratagem Baathists  of  Baghdad  importance of  was  seminal  Khomeiniite  Baghdad s o u g h t t o  focus  regime.  attention  which i t  I r a q i n compliance with  sector of  clerics'  the  of  focusing  the  common f r o n t i e r was t o  r e g a r d away f r o m K h u z e s t a n ,  of which,  to  reiterate,  deposal  of  the  design,  d u r i n g the  attention  the  Baghdad b e l i e v e d  ministerial  elite.  on  detract  forced  the  the  annexation  would e f f e c t  In consonance  with  four-month p e r i o d preceding the  on  claimed  agreement. A corollary objective  central  appears  Qasr-e-Shirin salient,  have been ceded  Algiers  it  c o v e r up t h e  terms,  two  an a c t u a l war w i t h  magnify  forced downfall  I n more s p e c i f i c  did  1 8  frontier clashes,  interstate tension.  the  it  a more c o n v i n c i n g p l o y  outbreak of  deliberately  employed t o  objective:  of  In f a c t ,  1 9  i s s u e as  burgeoning of chiefly  the  that  p a r t i c u l a r l y over t e r r i t o r i a l  adopted  irrespective  d i d not  territorial  Foreign  s e e k war w i t h T e h e r a n , and t h a t  s t a t e s began t o  began t o  relations  statement which h e l d  a g g r a n d i z i n g any I r a n i a n t e r r i t o r y . Later,  elite  of p a c i f i c  the this  main  153 thrust  into  on v a r i o u s  Khuzestan,  Iraqi  I r a n i a n towns a l o n g t h e  i n c l u d i n g D e h l o r a n , Mehran, 31 May 1980, attack of  Iraqi  against  sudden i n c r e a s e  2 0  a p o r t i o n of illegal,  l i m i t e d to  largely  that  its  intelligence  to  at  effort  c a n be  in light  subterfuge  I n summing u p , inferred that  analysis  realize  a  f r o m Baghdad t h a t  last,  of  been  the  fact  that  solidify  b a s e d on t h e  at  furthered the  no  defense  have  been  foregoing  a combination of  warning of  Iranian  primarily  appears t o  and v a r i o u s e f f o r t s  strategic  under  convincing  was u n d e r t a k e n t o  u n d e r t a k e n b y Baghdad s i g n i f i c a n t l y inability  initiated  t e r r i t o r i a l a m b i t i o n s were  successful. it  had,  Baghdad a i m e d a t  i n Khuzestan, t h i s  evidence,  border province  i n the Q a s r - e - S h i r i n  and a d e c l a r a t i o n  Q a s r - e - S h i r i n and,  concerted  coordinated  t e r r i t o r y , which had l o n g been  Overall,  on  p r e c l u d e d an o u t r i g h t m i l i t a r y  forced Iranian control,  officials  forces  tract  Iraqi  "liberated."  timely,  that  region,  In a d d i t i o n ,  Iraq  troops  attacks  frontier  within Iran's  number o f  stage  launched a  And, i n l a t e August,  i n the  the  central  a i r c r a f t and t a n k s  a development  occupation of  began t o  and N a s r a b a d .  various points  Kermanshah.  area,  forces  faulty  deception Teheran's looming  Iraqi  inroad.  V u l n e r a b i l i t y Evoked bv Domestic P o l i t i c a l Disagreement Having discussed intelligence  shortcomings  the  e x t e n t t o w h i c h m i l i t a r y and  added t o  Iran's  vulnerability  to  154 strategic  surprise,  debilitating upon t h e final  the  effects  national  v a r i a b l e to  that  Baghdad's p e r c e p t i o n s analyze  this  factor  the is  of  be e x a m i n e d this  will  the  in this  crucial  divisions  chapter.  At this  fragmentation  i n grasping the  exposure  had  the  Earlier,  i n connection  opportunity.  rising internal  the  Islamic Republic,  condition  of  now t u r n t o  p o l i t i c a l and e t h n i c  security  examined a s p e c t s o f  will  analysis  I  with  juncture, closely, of  I for  Iran  to  aggression. It that, the  is  i n the  of  perceptibly.  their  ideas,  political  was  the  between t h e i n the  At the  2 1  Khomeini  the  insisted freely  forestall  professed  the  the  "willingness"  propounding of  proved i l l u s o r y .  of  churchmen soon  initiated  of  the  to  their  a campaign t o  d o m i n a n c e o v e r I r a n and t o  widened that  various  effect  toward the  any m a j o r  overriding,  countervailing  In c o n t r a s t  elements  used by  r e v o l u t i o n a r y movement p r i o r t o  attained,  departure,  disseminate  leniency  emergence  once t h i s  note  has been a t r a d i t i o n o f  p l u r a l i s m was m e r e l y a d e c e p t i o n  monarchy; b u t ,  brook the  Pahlavi's  revolutionary effort  outset,  However,  regard to  l a y and d i v i n e  "for i n Islam there  Khomeinists to w i t h i n the  following  g r o u p s w o u l d be a l l o w e d t o  tolerance."  of  gulf  had c o o p e r a t e d  political  importance i n t h i s  i n i t i a l months  ideological  that  foremost  the  schisms  overthrowing  immediate  Islamic  end  zealots  ideologies  to  soon  i n i t i a l position, consolidate  a diminution of  the  their the  power  155 of  secular p o l i t i c a l parties.  believed dual,  that  repression of  of  encumbrances o f Western  Iran's natural resources  t h e m a s s e s by t h e  In consonance theocratic  system of  instituted  several  came t o  central  government,  the  scholars  who h a d o r g a n i z e d u n d e r t h e  de  this to  of  grassroots  Shi'ite  a handful of  facto  center  In a d d i t i o n to  guidance of  the  revolutionary propensity the  and, which,  for various extra-legal  making o f  the  arbitrary  private property.  2 2  arrests  jure of  efforts  r e g i o n a l and w h i c h were  The q u a n d a r y  to  the  each  demonstrated machinations,  and t h e  de  in  an  actions  f u r t h e r compounded b y  armed b a n d s t h a t were a t t a c h e d committee  the  Government's  a c c o r d e d u n q u a l i f i e d s u p p o r t by K h o m e i n i .  formation of  Khomeini  obstructive  the  Islamic  emerged a s  by r e v o l u t i o n a r y committees,  e n c o u n t e r e d b y B a z a r g a n was  that  A main  esteemed  i n t e r n a l o r d e r were hampered a t level  a  traditionalists  o f p o l i t i c a l power t o  central clerical institution,  restore  establishing  The R e v o l u t i o n a r y C o u n c i l  Bazargan regime.  violent  c a b a l i s t i c Revolutionary  which c o n s i s t e d  opposing,  and  temporal p a r t i e s .  Council,  1978.  imperial  extraordinary Islamic organizations  r e v o l u t i o n a r y g r o u p i n g was t h e  the  government.  w i t h t h e i r aim o f  openly challenge  January of  Khomeini  o n l y a w h o l l y p a s t o r a l p o l i t y c o u l d remedy  long-suffered  exploitation  By and l a r g e ,  a including  confiscation  of  156 Proponents of the of  Khomeinists' monocratic  i n c r e a s i n g l y vexed  intentions.  of  1979  of  clerical clique's  obstruction of  the  principal  realization  as t h e b a s i s  Shortly  of  democracy,  afterward,  legal,  situation  hundred c h i e f s . " substantial  toward the  impediment t o  encourage of  However,  2 3  the  the the  significant  above  i n the actions  churchmen t o secularists.  headway  to  power t o  regime  as  abdication.  s t e p up t h e i r F o r example,  September,  when K h o m e i n i ,  personnel  at  opponents  of his  nation of while  a  served  on 15  lot  of  one  any  to t o mar t h e  September,  Iran's  he l a c k e d  the  masses.  the  change,  blade."  alluding  2 4  Islamicists'  temporalists  addressing  an a i r base i n I s f a h a n , Islamic  internal  political  efforts  any s u b s t a n t i v e  "a k n i f e w i t h o u t  r i d the  extra-  f o r f a i l i n g t o make any  i n improving the  effect  the  his  a "government w i t h  and c h a r g e s  A further i l l u s t r a t i o n of determination to  cited  the  by the  tense domestic  The P r e m i e r r e s p o n d e d by h o l d i n g t h a t requisite  in  process,  rather than e f f e c t i n g  B a z a r g a n r e g i m e was a s s a i l e d  his  for his  interference  was t a n t a m o u n t  improvement  environment,  to  political  p r o - K h o m e i n i g r o u p i n g s by c h a r g i n g t h a t  political  image  resignation  Prime M i n i s t e r Bazargan demonstrated  personal displeasure  by  manifestations  F o r e i g n M i n i s t e r K a r i m S a n j a b i , who  w h i c h he d e n o u n c e d a s t h e  the  And,  t h e i r mounting f r u s t r a t i o n i n c l u d e d the  April the  l a y r u l e became  came on 19  military  admonished t h a t  r u l e w o u l d be d e s t r o y e d . "  2 5  "all The  157 G o v e r n m e n t was overt  threats  l a r g e l y unable to of  this  Bazargan's tenure  nature.  effectively  And, the  respond  to  c o u p de g r a c e  o c c u r r e d on 4 November,  when t h e  for  U.S.  Embassy was  o c c u p i e d by p r o - c l e r i c a l z e a l o t s .  Bazargan  immediately  indicated that  brook  brazen transgression futile  effort  to  of  he was u n w i l l i n g t o  international  secure the  law;  release of  Prime M i n i s t e r r e s i g n e d  on 6 November,  portended the  the  waning o f  B a z a r g a n was  power o f  s u c c e e d e d as  Republic's  25 J a n u a r y 1980. law a t  the  member o f  the  as  i n the  polity  was  of p o l i t i c a l  an a u t o c r a t i c  However, was  power  not w e l l  the  received  B a n i - S a d r who,  victor  idea  the  elections held  Islamic  t h e o l o g y and late  1950s,  of  a viable  a  tempered  an  Shi'ism,  in a central  as  espoused by  bearing,  vision of  on  ideal  without  authority.  bulwark a g a i n s t  a  2 7  of the  government. of  i n Qom.  s i m i l a r to  in  by  o f power t h r o u g h a n e t w o r k  mosques w o u l d s e r v e as  emergence o f  opposition.  The i d e o l o g y  2 6  authoritarianism; his  To B a n i - S a d r , a d i f f u s i o n local  the  one g u i d e d by an o b s e r v a n c e  concentration  lay  the  which  a n t i - m o n a r c h i a l movement  Bani-Sadr comprised a considerable to  the  Teheran d u r i n g the  National F r o n t .  by an a v e r s i o n  a move  B a n i - S a d r , who h a d s t u d i e d  role  a  the Americans,  i n i t i a l presidential  U n i v e r s i t y of  p l a y e d an a c t i v e  following  head-of-government  A b o l h a s s a n B a n i - S a d r , who emerged Islamic  this  his  decentralization T h i s was  of  authority  readily discerned  predecessor,  began  to  by  158 demonstrate Khomeinists office.  reservations  p o l i t i c a l designs shortly after  1  Bani-Sadr's skepticism,  opposition, friction ongoing  brought about the  between t h e impasse  relations former's  the  announced t h a t Iran to  consent  to  of  the  by t h e  student  of  Bani-Sadr,  captives;  the  the  holding of  students:  Bani-Sadr  c a p t o r s who,  gain the  with the hostages,  would have t o p u b l i c l y  out by t h e  wishes,  c o n t r o l of the  yet-to-be-elected  of  the  in  of  the  who h a d come with  the  acknowledge  P a h l a v i regime b e f o r e  that  a  Khomeini  the United States  Imam d e c i d e d ,  in  the  seeing  contrary  the Americans would remain  students u n t i l  national  on  release  on 10 M a r c h ,  from t h e U n i t e d N a t i o n s ,  involvement  clerics.  2 8  President to  a n d , on 7 A p r i l ,  President's  under the  the  hold interviews  extent of  the  of  the  " d i c t a t o r s who h a v e c r e a t e d  government."  envoys  repression carried the  churchmen;  h o s t a g e s were d a s h e d b y K h o m e i n i ' s i n t e r v e n t i o n  i m b r o g l i o on b e h a l f  the  The  a number o f p o w e r f u l  of the  he d e n o u n c e d a s  Two a t t e m p t s  to  i r e of  of  American  Khomeinists' unhappiness,  government w i t h i n a  the  elites.  the  condemnations  increasingly c r i t i c a l  one o c c a s i o n ,  of  of  a f u r t h e r round  P r e s i d e n t and t h e  h o s t a g e s evoked the  became  onset of  detainment  o p e n and r e p e a t e d  of  assumed  be p a r t i c u l a r l y p r o b l e m a t i c f o r  between t h e  Irrespective  he  the  along with a v o i c i n g  de j u r e and de f a c t o  over the  diplomats proved to  the  r e g a r d i n g t h e wisdom o f  legislature.  the 2 9  convening of Overall,  the  the  159 hostage a f f a i r authority standing  of of  emerged  the  efforts  of  In pursuance that  body p o l i t i c of  this  end,  Bani-Sadr dismiss  However,  President  this  juncture,  political was to  clerical the  conspiring to  on a r i g i d  Islamic  for the  the  Islamic it  Republic." was  And, not  by t h e  put  surprisingly, the  3 0  incumbent  impositions  by  main  fundamentalists,  Government.  On 20 J u n e ,  by H a s a n A y a t ,  Islamic  foundation.  a d m i n i s t r a t i o n who  Republican Party,  unseat the  his  program of  believe that  established  of  c h u r c h m e n demanded  such o v e r b e a r i n g  Islamic  Committee o f  supreme  zeal  depose B a n i - S a d r , designed  Central  Khomeini i n t e n s i f i e d  leadership.  organization  a heightening  his  d i d not  comply w i t h  f o r t h by t h e  the  Republic.  a l l members o f h i s  "insufficient  upon him t o  the  diminish  opposed t o  the  demonstrated the  Islamic  the American detainees,  purge o f f i c i a l s  grounding the  to  to  open c l a s h b e t w e e n T e h e r a n and Qom  w r a n g l i n g o c c u r r e d as  to  challenge  and s e r v e d  Bani-Sadr w i t h i n the  fate  sectarian  a serious  Government,  F o l l o w i n g the over the  as  a  a member o f  Republican Party,  plot the  was  exposed. The d i s c o v e r y inspired the  of  the  Islamic  i n t r i g u e underscored the  moderates  depth of  who f a v o r e d a c l e a r l y d e f i n e d  between w o r l d l y and s p i r i t u a l a f f a i r s radicals.  Republican Party-  A further reduction of  the  rift  between  demarcation  and t h e  Shi'ite  Bani-Sadr's  already  c i r c u m s c r i b e d power o c c u r r e d on 20 J u l y ,  when K h o m e i n i , i n a  160 dictatorial of  the  gesture,  President  control  to  over the  announced t h a t , correct various  served  the  Republic,  sway o v e r  the  to  exacerbate the f o r the  o r economic  Further  eagerness to oriented  chaotic  to  premier,  the  a scorn  atmosphere  Islamic  selection  of  appointment  cadre of  the  of  a  Islamic  by  s t a t e was  the  clearly  the  the  R e p u b l i c and,  transfer  of  exercise his  Secretary  of  Interior  rule  of  law,  B a n i - S a d r was u n a b l e realize  the  announced  the  as  his  to  nominee  muster of  of  by t h e  the  select  the  of  the  head-of-  Imam's  for p r e m i e r .  3 1  champion But,  support  on 11 A u g u s t ,  P a r l i a m e n t had a l t e r n a t i v e l y  extra-  naming U n d e r -  a proven  requisite  of  Bani-Sadr  President,  Salim and,  the  Constitution  legislature,  p o w e r s as  their  prerogatives  Mostafa M i r Salim,  confirmation  that  enumerated  irrespective  power t o  to  the  designation  head-of-government  attempted  of  the  In  maintaining  However,  legal  a  Republican Party  for constitutionalism  accorded to  political  fundamentalist-  prime m i n i s t e r . of  held  Republican  rather than Bani-Sadr, should  Islamic  in  in  affairs.  that Parliament,  one  Parliament.  former Prime M i n i s t e r Bazargan.  secure the  demonstrated  problems,  experience  f r i c t i o n between t h e  for  incapability  c l e r i c a l majority that  P a r t y and B a n i - S a d r a r o s e o v e r t h e replacement  internal  P a r l i a m e n t had l i t t l e  administration  the  Government w o u l d be d e v o l v e d  This action Islamic  due t o  selected  to it  was  161 Mohammad A l i R o j a i , to  assume t h e  a proponent of  office  installation  of  then endeavored to with ministers further  unsuccessful  a clerical  of his  and f o m e n t i n g  remonstrations, unqualified  progressive  to  shortly  after  the  the  Khomeini  a democratic  r i g h t to  sentiment  or deflected By a n d l a r g e ,  from the  of  because of h i s  position  was  countercharges for  impugn  his  example, charged  the  colleagues  a liberal  revolution  Islam."  Islamic  an  and  b u r g e o n i n g o p p o s i t i o n by a s s e r t i n g  the  on  A y a t o l l a h Hashemi-  r e v o l u t i o n we c a n n o t t o l e r a t e  ecclesiastic,  of  that  Prime M i n i s t e r R o j a i  had t h e  o u r c o u n t r y i n s u c h a way t h a t  Khomeini,  prospective  position  supporters;  In a d d i t i o n ,  conveyed the  which  Bani-Sadr's  dictates  Imam's d e v o u t  Cabinet  m i n o r i t y group bent  e v o k e d an o u t p o u r i n g o f  assuming o f f i c e ,  President's  "after  the  r e a l i z a t i o n of  leadership.  Rafsanjani the  the  to  no e l e c t e d o f f i c i a l  clerical  all  w h i c h were g r o u n d e d on t h e  polity,  b y a number o f  3 2  he  On 9 S e p t e m b e r ,  he w o u l d r e j e c t the  the  an e f f o r t  instability.  suspicion."  subservience  antithetical  that  stripe,  members who were " p a r t o f  block  as prime m i n i s t e r ,  from s t a f f i n g  ideological  B a n i - S a d r admonished t h a t  despotism  agenda,  b i d by B a n i - S a d r t o  fanatic  prevent Rojai  increased p o l i t i c a l  cabinet  Khomeiniite  of prime m i n i s t e r .  Following the the  the  is  toward that governing  destroyed  3 3  traditionalists  regarded  as t h e  paramount  nation's  a s b e y o n d r e p r o a c h and l o o k e d upon c r i t i c i s m  162 of  h i m , p a r t i c u l a r l y by l a y m e n ,  Accordingly, and t h e  by t h i s p o i n t ,  Islamic  pronounced, clerical  as  the  tantamount  ongoing  treason.  f r i c t i o n between B a n i - S a d r  R e p u b l i c a n P a r t y h a d become  and t h e  to  quite  b i c k e r i n g between t h e  lay  camps h a d e x h a u s t e d K h o m e i n i ' s p a t i e n c e .  September, terminate  the  political  P a r t y and t o problems  Imam i m p l o r e d t h e infighting  channel  its  de j u r e  with the  efforts  the  reconstruction  Khomeini a l s o d i r e c t e d  toward Premier R o j a i :  some h a r s h  "you h a v e n e i t h e r  put the  another  m o r a l i t y and l a w . "  short, 1980, locked  as the  foregoing  discussion  de j u r e and de  i n a struggle to  political for  the  Islamic  and e c o n o m i c  external  policy  In a d d i t i o n to  the  of  security  was  secular-clerical  attributed  T e h e r a n and Qom's p r e o c c u p a t i o n  among m i n o r i t y e t h n i c country.  Beyond t h e  majority Persians,  encompasses a v e r i t a b l e including Afshars, Basseris,  Fars,  in outlying  mosaic  Arabs,  Kurds,  of  Azeris,  Lors,  were  minimal.  regions of modern  Bakhtiaris,  the  partially  with  unrest the  Iran  ethno-1inguistic  Shahseven,  by m i d -  vigilance  an i n c u r s i o n c a n a l s o be  groups  one In  3 4  division,  of  in  domestic  a result,  vulnerability to  Iran to  as  with  authority  direction  and,  national  fought  demonstrated,  facto centers of shape t h e  threats to  has  and  economy  but  of  rather  major  criticism  order nor e s t a b l i s h e d s e c u r i t y , in violation  to  Republican  toward a d d r e s s i n g  hampering p o s t r e v o l u t i o n a r y  development.  On 13  leadership Islamic  and  groups,  Baluchis,  Turkomans,  Turks,  163 Qashqais, tumult  and Z a b o l i s .  i n K h u z e s t a n , w h i c h was  Khomeinists  activists  economic  affairs,  elites  minorities  Kurdistan.  The p o l i c y  of  the  the  mainstream of  vehemently  Iranian society;  opposed  by t h e  suppressed  minorities. different of  development  emanated  a theocracy  areas  ran counter  into  this  royalists,  to  belief  Iran's  toward  of  the  were  the  longethnic  although the  for  idea  ethnic  toward such  that  on  the  any i n i t i a t i v e s  regime's aversion  to  the  fragmentation  one  of  the  championed by t h e  churchmen:  [unity,  and v i c t o r y ] .  struggle,  of  had been f o c u s e d  K h o m e i n i s t s were a v e r s e t o  from t h e  and  a  establishment of  divisions.  Furthermore,  Khomeinists,  i n other  a r e i n v i g o r a t i o n of  the  of  l a y and c l e r i c a l  w o u l d be hampered b y an a c c e n t u a t i o n  ethno-linguistic  lines  political  The i n c i p i e n c e  3 5  s i m i l a r to  the  The c l e r i c a l  demands  a s p i r a t i o n among a number o f  However,  reasons,  Shah.  the  outlying provinces  affording l i m i t e d self-governance  groups.  of  ergo,  mentioned  by  the  minorities  l i m i t e d autonomy t o  r e v o l u t i o n brought about standing,  local  P a h l a v i regime  peripheral ethnic  granting of  fomented  a l s o arose  in  already  accede t o  between t h e  most n o t a b l y  integrating  the  to  for c o n t r o l over tension  and e t h n i c  from t h e  largely  obstinate refusal  1  regional  Iran,  And a s i d e  a heightening  of  of  Iran along  fundamental  ethnic  slogans  " i t i h a d mubarazeeb v a p i r o o z i " 3 6  In s h o r t ,  emphasis  on  to  the  ethnicity  164 portended  an a t t e n d a n t  S h i ' i s m and,  detracting  accordingly,  of  attention  such a development  away  from  was h e l d t o  anathema.  In f a c t ,  on one o c c a s i o n ,  Khomeini remarked  "as  Islam  concerned,  is  f a r as  Kurds,  Fars,  regard to  clerics  initial  ethnic  B a l u c h i , Arab,  1  minorities  became  L o r , or Turkoman." the  restive.  that  A series  an i n v a s i o n ,  emerged of  c l a s h e s between r e v o l u t i o n a r y Kurdish nationalist  the  Iran's  country,  Kurds,  close of  founded the However,  region.  past:  realized  autonomous  troops  to  faded,  At t h i s point,  the  monarchial regime.  as  Iran's  importance,  disturbances  a citing  culminated  of  the  in direct,  loyal to  were s e t  in  northwestern  sovereignty  throne, central  over  early  region  of  1979.  regional  from I r a n a t  occupation  the  armed  K h o m e i n i and  i n motion  Kurdish Republic of  restore  and,  Kurdistan.  Second World War, S o v i e t  campaign which endured u n t i l the  is  p r i o r to withdrawing  upon r e g a i n i n g t h e  dispatched  With  3 7  numbered a p p r o x i m a t e l y two m i l l i o n i n  i n the the  internal  who i n h a b i t t h e  The K u r d s h a d b r i e f l y affairs  autonomy  forces  guerrillas  of  factions  Of c e n t r a l  in Iranian  events that  that  Bazargan a d m i n i s t r a t i o n  regional  h e r e i n argument t h a t  r e n d e r e d I r a n open t o disquietude  no q u e s t i o n  r e p u l s i o n toward e t h n i c  expectations of  regarding the  1979.  there  de j u r e a u t h o r i t i e s ,  shared the the  is  be  the  forces  Mahabad.  Shah  control  immediately over  the  K u r d s commenced a g u e r r i l l a 1967,  when i t  But, with the  was  Shah's  crushed  ouster  and  by the  165 waning o f  the  Kurds wasted  strength little  of  time  limited  independence.  neither  the  internal security i n resuming e f f o r t s  A n d , when i t  Government n o r t h e  reinitiate  the  to  as  the  the  f o r a formal r e c o g n i t i o n  political cultural tension  self-determination, and l a n g u a g e  between t h e  insurgents that  Muslims.  fundamental  groups,  known a s  Kurdish  the  Kurds  the  local as  as  Beyond  economic respect  and  for  a d d i t i o n a l sources  traditionalists leftist  well  and t h e  orientation  of  Kurdish and  the  I r a n i a n K u r d s were S u n n i  clerics'  the  latter  steadfast  Shi•ism constituted  denunciation of  of  Democratic  Fedayeen.  as w e l l  latter*s  majority of  p r e d i c a t e d on t h e  and t h e i r  Islamic  The i m p o r t a n c e o f  3 8  of  distinctions,  included the the  that  l e d by Abdulrahman Qassemloo,  M a o i s t Komeleh P a r t y and t h e  demands  fact  w h i c h was  apparent  ethnic  collectively  " P e s h m e r g a , " c o m p r i s e d members o f (KDP),  secure  insurgency.  The K u r d i s h r e b e l s ,  Party  became  to  the  K h o m e i n i s t s were i n f a v o r  granting p a r t i a l self-governance elected to  forces,  other  the  factor  insistence foremost  factions  of  was that  sect of the  Islam  religion  as  heretical. Initially,  Qom a t t e m p t e d  u p r i s i n g through use conquer.  of  In consonance  accorded support to Ahmad M u f t i z a d a h ,  the  the  the  subterfuge  with this less  t o undermine the of  design,  zealously  leading c l e r i c  divide the  Kurdish and  Khomeinists  nationalistic  i n Sanadaj,  the  Sheik  provincial  capital  f o u n d e r e d due t o among t h e to  of  the  Kurdistan. shallow  traditionalists  opened  f r o m Mahabad,  this  dialogue  influence  abortive  K u r d i s h movement,  a direct the  stratagem  of Muftizadah's  Following the  w i t h i n the  Sheik Ezzedin Hossaini, beckoned  level  Kurdish a c t i v i s t s .  foster divisions  However,  attempt  the  Islamic  w i t h Qassemloo  and  c a r d i n a l K u r d i s h c h u r c h m a n , who  a city  i n proximity to  the  Iraqi  frontier. It local  was H o s s e i n i ' s  sovereignty  to  Iran's  imperative  prerequisite  stability.  Toward t h i s  a feeling  of  In August o f  and K u r d i s h m i n o r i t i e s joint  realization  the  nation's  the  convened  grant  i n the  approval to  Arab,  the  t h o s e who t o o k p a r t i n t h e r e l a t i n g to  Khomeinists.  engender  groups. Turkish, a  of  "autonomous  foreign  parliaments.  1 , 3 9  Mahabad summit c o n c u r r e d  policy  and d e f e n s e  should  purview of Teheran.  Irrespective  r e q u e s t s was  Turkoman,  to  The v a r i o u s  establishment  However,  qualifications,  domestic  ethnic  w o u l d be g o v e r n e d b y " r e g i o n a l  remain under the  an  p a r l e y c a l l e d upon B a z a r g a n and K h o m e i n i  that  matters  of  of  i n Mahabad and c o n c l u d e d  regions"  that  was  Kurds attempted  among t h e of  an e x t e n s i o n  minorities  p r o g r a m f o r p a r t i a l autonomy.  participants to  end,  leaders  that  ethnic  f o r the  solidarity 1979,  position  of  the  no p o s i t i v e  forthcoming To t h e  putting  forth of  response to  from e i t h e r  contrary,  the  the  the  such  clear  minorities'  Government o r  clerical  elite  opted  the to  167 deal  with the  K u r d i s h and o t h e r  Beyond i s s u i n g an o u t r i g h t  numbers o f  a c t i v i s t s with  a number o f p u n i t o r y d e c r e e s ,  proscribing of  disparagingly  ethnic  alluded to  the  as  which  In a d d i t i o n ,  sent to  engage t h e  region,  these  the  "devil's p a r t y , "  strongholds  a division  Peshmerga.  forces  of  the  the  large  4 0  to  r e g u l a r army was  Shortly after  opened m a j o r d r i v e s  i n proximity to  included  KDP, w h i c h K h o m e i n i  R e v o l u t i o n a r y G u a r d s were d i s p a t c h e d  Kurdistan.  force.  arriving in  against  northwestern  the  guerrilla  towns  of  M a r i v a n and P i r a n s h a r . A sharp e s c a l a t i o n occurred  i n the  seized control  fall  of  of  1979;  pressure  undertook  from v a r i o u s  an e f f o r t  Sahabi to to  in Kurdistan  during October,  to  lay  process.  Kurdish  At t h i s  organizations,  arrange  by  rebels  sixty  point,  the  a cease-fire  D e f e n s e M i n i s t e r M o s t a f a Chamran, Sabaghian,  fighting  o f Mahabad, k i l l i n g a p p r o x i m a t e l y  R e v o l u t i o n a r y Guards i n the to  the  bowing  Government sending  I n t e r i o r M i n i s t e r Hashem  and P l a n n i n g and Budget M i n i s t e r E z z a t o l l a h meet w i t h e m i s s a r i e s o f  previous  hostilities,  bids this  at  negotiating  latest  the  KDP.  However,  a termination  round of  dialogue  similar  of  also  proved  fruitless. F o l l o w i n g the the  Kurds a t t r i b u t e d  clerical  zealots,  the  discontinuation to  obstinacy  of  on t h e  the  talks,  part of  KDP i s s u e d an u l t i m a t u m :  R e v o l u t i o n a r y G u a r d s and r e g u l a r army t r o o p s  which  the  all  were t o  be  168 w i t h d r a w n f r o m K u r d i s t a n by 9 December.  T e h e r a n a n d Qom  simply balked at  a result,  fighting  this  a r r o g a t i o n and,  continued to  leadership clerical  had a r r i v e d a t  elite  political  was b e n t  the  as  l o n g as  epitomized  the  By t h i s  regional  the  point,  conclusion that  on e s t a b l i s h i n g  s y s t e m and t h a t  unattainable Hosseini  escalate.  as  outlook, the  the  autonomy w o u l d r e m a i n  K h o m e i n i s t s h e l d power.  popular sentiment  would e m e r g e . "  at  this  time  that  the  was  fast  the  contrary,  consolidating  its  in  "fanatic a  free  optimistic  t h e r e was no i n d i c a t i o n t h a t to  Sheik  prevailing  Notwithstanding t h i s  4 1  c h u r c h m e n was a b a t i n g ;  Khomeiniite e l i t e  Kurdish  dominant  r e l i g i o n w o u l d g r a d u a l l y d i s a p p e a r and t h a t  government  of  the  an a u t h o r i t a r i a n  K u r d i s t a n when he d e c l a r e d on 5 December, men o f  the  the  power  the  mastery  over  Iran. In e a r l y Guards stepped  1980,  up t h e i r  F o l l o w i n g an i n t e n s e , combatants  conflict's  institution  the  the  a "state of  readiness"  smash t h e  insurgency. Peshmerga  n o r t h e r n town o f  heightening  by c h a r g i n g t h a t  "war i n K u r d i s t a n " of  to  and R e v o l u t i o n a r y  b l o o d y c l a s h on 3 F e b r u a r y ,  responded t o  intensity  on f o m e n t i n g  April,  efforts  were d r i v e n o u t o f  Sheik Hosseini  defensive  r e g u l a r army u n i t s  the  of  the  clerics  and b y c a l l i n g  Kamyaran.  were  for  bent  the  g e n e r a l m o b i l i z a t i o n and  among K u r d i s h f o r c e s .  Kurdish representatives  maintained  4 2  During  early  that  i n d i s c r i m i n a t e a r t i l l e r y bombardment b y g o v e r n m e n t  forces  of  169 the  towns o f  some f i f t y three  S a n a d a j and Saqqez  civilians,  A n d , on 24 A p r i l ,  affairs  o r g a n i z a t i o n based  United Nations immediate  the  the  fighting  he was  the  f l a r i n g of  and  i n other peripheral regions  for  the  Iran  to  cessation of h o s t i l i t i e s tension  w i t h i n the  Government w h i c h ,  to  the  extend By  4 3  Banithe  further  however,  Bani-Sadr  Pasdaran and,  effect  a  complete Overall,  northern Kurdish  provinces  constituted  a m a j o r dilemma  intense  i n Qom, s e r v e d t o  undertake e f f e c t i v e  from e x t e r n a l  a  in Kurdistan.  along with the  c l e r i c a l extremists  efforts  on  on 26 A p r i l ,  avoid  l a r g e l y powerless to  lasting  S a d r 's  and,  c o n t r o l over the  and  with the  Red C r o s s t o  with K u r d i s h combatants;  n o t w i e l d any e f f e c t i v e  consequently,  "Kurdish Society,"  i n Teheran, c a l l e d  troops  of  an a d d i t i o n a l  "stricken Kurdish p e o p l e . "  o r d e r e d government  confrontations  deaths  G o v e r n m e n t , w h i c h was h e a d e d b y  h a d grown weary o f  President  did  the  the  International  assistance to  juncture,  Sadr,  and t h e  i n the  wounding o f  hundred.  public  this  with the  resulted  rivalry  hamper  measures  to  Bani-  safeguard  threats.  Conclusion In chapter, Iran's stemmed  it  as  a b i l i t y to  deter  from i n t e r n a l t u m u l t . of  the  raised  c a n be a c c u r a t e l y p o s t u l a t e d  attenuated  weakening well  summing up t h e m a i n p o i n t s  the  readiness  largely  of  that  external  First  in  this  revolutionary aggression  and f o r e m o s t ,  the  Iranian military forces,  inefficient  intelligence  gathering  as  170 capability causal  at the  disposal  factors underlying  surprise attack. military  The  command and  apparatus e s t a b l i s h e d  o f Teheran, s t a n d as p r i n c i p a l the  nearly the  of  forestalling that  Overall,  the  overhauling that,  during  and  served to  jeopardize  downside o f the the  nation's  state,  national  d e f e n s e and an  bids  of  intelligence forces  internal threat  the  to  was  no  central  ends o f  engendered a s e r i o u s ,  Iraq  of  surrounding external  was  authority  effective analysis  to the  was  the  western f r o n t i e r with there  from  security.  churchmen's d e s i g n s  c o l l e c t i o n and  i n turn,  of  mounting of c o u n t e r r e v o l u t i o n a r y  intelligence pertaining  states  threat:  an  invasion. M o r e o v e r , as  volatile  t o keep the affixed  on  extensively  nature of the attention  of e l i t e s ,  domestic a f f a i r s .  predicated  on  r e a l m s and  t h o s e who  c h u r c h and  outlined  both secular  Beyond t h e desired  and  t o r n by  served  clerical,  political  and  system  spiritual  were v i o l e n t l y a v e r s e t o a I r a n was  chapter,  polity  a political  a c l e a r d i v i s i o n of worldly  state,  in this  postrevolutionary  i n f i g h t i n g b e t w e e n t h o s e who  of  which  armed f o r c e s  to oversee the  the  epoch,  r e v o l u t i o n i z i n g the  l a r g e l y u n d e f e n d e d and  Iraqi  royalist  fundamental  while eliminating  which,  the  Khomeinists*  postrevolutionary left  the  of the  the  quarter,  wholesale purges of  Iraqi  l i q u i d a t i o n of the i n t e l l i g e n c e  constituted manifestations objectives  v u l n e r a b i l i t y t o the  separation  a myriad of  other  171 ideological aspirations.  e l e m e n t s b e n t on r e a l i z i n g Chief  The c o n s i d e r a b l e  these c o n f l i c t i n g  sought t o e l i m i n a t e , internal  confusion  revolutionary  among t h e s e g r o u p s were autonomy  ethnic minorities. by  their  dissension  engendered  groups, which t h e r e a c t i o n a r y resulted i n a considerable  which,  i n turn,  diminished  seeking  clerics  degree o f  the l e v e l of  a t t e n t i o n a c c o r d e d t o e x t e r n a l m a t t e r s by t h e r e v o l u t i o n a r y regime.  And, a l t h o u g h B a n i - S a d r was c o n c e r n e d w i t h t h e  possibility  o f an i n c u r s i o n , h i s a t t e m p t s t o s h o r e up  d e f e n s e s were impeded by t h e K h o m e i n i s t s . degree o f p o l i t i c a l explanation  Iran's  Overall, the high  f r a g m e n t a t i o n stands as a major  f o r the nation's  lack of defensive  preparedness.  172  CHAPTER V NOTES ^ . S . Foreign Broadcast Information Service, Middle E a s t A s i a , T e h e r a n D o m e s t i c S e r v i c e i n P e r s i a n , "Khomeyni D i s c u s s e s M i l i t a r y M i s s i o n , " 22 A p r i l 1979, LD221756. U . S . Foreign Broadcast Information S e r v i c e , Middle E a s t A s i a , T e h e r a n Domestic S e r v i c e i n P e r s i a n , "Defense M i n i s t e r D i s c u s s e s A r m y , " 4 O c t o b e r 1979, LD042014. 2  3  Ibid.  U . S . Foreign Broadcast Information Service, Middle E a s t A s i a , T e h e r a n D o m e s t i c S e r v i c e i n P e r s i a n , "New D e f e n s e M i n i s t e r Comments on Army P u r g e , " 30 S e p t e m b e r 1979, LD302020. 4  I n s t i t u t e f o r D e f e n s e A n a l y s i s , News R e v i e w on West A s i a (New D e l h i : I n s t i t u t e f o r D e f e n s e A n a l y s i s , F e b r u a r y 1980), p . 954. 5  I n s t i t u t e f o r D e f e n s e A n a l y s i s , News R e v i e w on West A s i a (New D e l h i : I n s t i t u t e f o r D e f e n s e A n a l y s i s , M a r c h 1980), p . 1041. 6  I n s t i t u t e f o r D e f e n s e A n a l y s i s , News R e v i e w on West A s i a (New D e l h i : I n s t i t u t e f o r D e f e n s e A n a l y s i s , May 1 9 8 0 ) , p. 123. 7  I n s t i t u t e f o r D e f e n s e A n a l y s i s , News R e v i e w on West A s i a (New D e l h i : I n s t i t u t e f o r D e f e n s e A n a l y s i s , J u n e 1 9 8 0 ) , p. 226. 8  S h a u l B a k h a s h , The R e i g n o f t h e A y a t o l l a h s : I r a n a n d t h e I s l a m i c R e v o l u t i o n (New Y o r k : B a s i c B o o k s , Inc., 1984), p . 198. 9  1 0  West A s i a 1980), p.  I n s t i t u t e f o r D e f e n s e A n a l y s i s , News R e v i e w (New D e l h i : I n s t i t u t e f o r D e f e n s e A n a l y s i s , 433.  on August  S h i r e e n H u n t e r , "The I r a n - I r a q War and I r a n ' s D e f e n s e P o l i c y , " i n G u l f S e c u r i t y and t h e I r a n - I r a q War, e d . Thomas N a f f ( W a s h i n g t o n , D . C : N a t i o n a l D e f e n s e U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s , 1985), p . 170. 1 1  173 R o u h o l l a h K. Ramazani, " I r a n ' s F o r e i g n P o l i c y : P e r s p e c t i v e s and P r o j e c t i o n s , " i n R e v o l u t i o n i n I r a n : A R e a p p r a i s a l . e d . E n v o u r K o u r y and C h a r l e s M a c D o n a l d (Hyattsville, M a r y l a n d : I n s t i t u t e o f M i d d l e E a s t e r n and N o r t h A f r i c a n A f f a i r s , 1982), p . 21. 1 2  1 3  West A s i a 1980), p. 1 4  Strategic the G u l f , (Boulder, 1 5  I n s t i t u t e f o r D e f e n s e A n a l y s i s , News R e v i e w (New D e l h i : I n s t i t u t e f o r D e f e n s e A n a l y s i s , 444.  A n t h o n y H . C o r d e s m a n , The G u l f and t h e S e a r c h f o r S t a b i l i t y : Saudi A r a b i a , the M i l i t a r y Balance i n and T r e n d s i n t h e A r a b - I s r a e l i M i l i t a r y B a l a n c e C o l o r a d o : Westview P r e s s , 1984), p . 602. Hunter,  p.  175.  1 6  Ibid.  1 7  Christian  1 8  I n s t i t u t e f o r D e f e n s e A n a l y s i s , News R e v i e w (New D e l h i : I n s t i t u t e f o r D e f e n s e A n a l y s i s , 558.  West A s i a 1980), p.  Science Monitor,  19  R o b e r t Pouliot, "Iraq's Drive P r e s s Review 7 ( J u l y 1980):30. 1 9  2 0  on August  The  Iran Times.  6 June  December  for  1979.  Power,"  on August  World  1980.  S h a m e e m A k h t a r , "Impact o f t h e I s l a m i c Movement I r a n on t h e R e g i o n , " P a k i s t a n H o r i z o n 1-2 (1979):88. 21  2 2  2 3  West A s i a 1979) , p .  Bakhash,  56.  I n s t i t u t e f o r D e f e n s e A n a l y s i s , News R e v i e w (New D e l h i : I n s t i t u t e f o r D e f e n s e A n a l y s i s ,  on June  197.  2 4  Ramazani,  2 5  Bakhash,  2 6  p.  in  Ibid.,  p.  p. p.  450. 81.  92.  I b i d . , p . 94. I n s t i t u t e f o r D e f e n s e A n a l y s i s , News R e v i e w on West A s i a (New D e l h i : I n s t i t u t e f o r D e f e n s e A n a l y s i s , M a r c h 1980) , p . 1036. 2 7  2 8  2 9  Ibid.  174 I n s t i t u t e f o r D e f e n s e A n a l y s i s , News R e v i e w (New D e l h i : I n s t i t u t e f o r D e f e n s e A n a l y s i s , 5.  3 0  West A s i a 1980), p . 3 1  Bakhash,  p.  106.  I n s t i t u t e f o r D e f e n s e A n a l y s i s , News R e v i e w West A s i a (New D e l h i : I n s t i t u t e f o r D e f e n s e A n a l y s i s , O c t o b e r 1980), p . 577. 3 2  3 3  Ibid.  3 4  Ibid.  on April  on  L e n o r e G . M a r t i n , The U n s t a b l e G u l f : T h r e a t s f r o m Within (Lexington, Massachusetts: D . C . H e a t h and Company, 1984), p . 91. 3 5  R o b e r t Ghobad D a r i u s , "The I r a n i a n R e v o l u t i o n o f 1978-1979: P o t e n t i a l I m p l i c a t i o n s f o r Major C o u n t r i e s i n the A r e a , " i n R e v o l u t i o n i n I r a n : A R e a p p r a i s a l , ed. Envour Koury and C h a r l e s MacDonald ( H y a t t s v i l l e , Maryland: I n s t i t u t e o f M i d d l e E a s t e r n and N o r t h A f r i c a n A f f a i r s , 1982), p . 40. 3 6  F r e d H a l l i d a y , "Iranian Foreign P o l i c y Since 1979: I n t e r n a t i o n a l i s m and N a t i o n a l i s m i n t h e I s l a m i c R e v o l u t i o n , " i n S h i ' i s m a n d S o c i a l P r o t e s t , e d . J u a n R . I . C o l e and N i k k i R . K e d d i e (New H a v e n : Y a l e U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s , 1 9 8 6 ) , p . 59. 3 7  Vahe Petrossian, "Dilemmas o f t h e I r a n i a n R e v o l u t i o n , " The W o r l d T o d a y 1 ( J a n u a r y 1 9 8 0 ) : 2 2 . 3 8  3 9  West A s i a 1979) , p .  I n s t i t u t e f o r D e f e n s e A n a l y s i s , News R e v i e w (New D e l h i : I n s t i t u t e f o r D e f e n s e A n a l y s i s , 362.  on August  I n s t i t u t e f o r D e f e n s e A n a l y s i s , News R e v i e w West A s i a (New D e l h i : I n s t i t u t e f o r D e f e n s e A n a l y s i s , S e p t e m b e r 1 9 7 9 ) , p . 462.  on  i n s t i t u t e f o r D e f e n s e A n a l y s i s , News R e v i e w West A s i a (New D e l h i : I n s t i t u t e f o r D e f e n s e A n a l y s i s , J a n u a r y 1 9 8 0 ) , p . 808.  on  4 0  4  4 2  West A s i a 1980) , p . 4 3  West A s i a 1980), p .  I n s t i t u t e f o r D e f e n s e A n a l y s i s , News R e v i e w (New D e l h i : I n s t i t u t e f o r D e f e n s e A n a l y s i s , 8.  on April  I n s t i t u t e f o r D e f e n s e A n a l y s i s , News R e v i e w on (New D e l h i : I n s t i t u t e f o r D e f e n s e A n a l y s i s , May 121.  CHAPTER  REORIENTATION OF  THE  IRAQ: BREAKDOWN OF IN  THE  VI  FOREIGN POLICY OF THE  IRAN  INTERSTATE STATUS  GULF REGION AND  THE  EFFECTS OF  AND QUO  THIS  DEVELOPMENT UPON IRAN'S VULNERABILITY TO  The alteration various  Islamic i n the  Gulf  AN  IRAQI STRIKE  revolution effected a  power r e l a t i o n s h i p b e t w e e n I r a n  Arab s t a t e s .  The  c h a p t e r i s t o examine t h e revolutionary  Iran's  a t t e n d a n t a f f e c t on  nexus between t h e  external  affairs  made t o d e m o n s t r a t e t h a t  status  quo  the  effected a heightening  of  Islamic  hostility the  Republic's  toward the  influence, m a i n end  as w e l l  as  Iraq's  postrevolutionary  The  the  bitter  regional to  initial  section  aspects  be  i n the  to  175  of  Israeli imperial  Near E a s t .  t o e s t a b l i s h the  growing i n t e r n a t i o n a l  of  overt  championing  against  opposition  Soviet,  analysis w i l l Iran's  struggle  is  resolve  monarchies, the  their  b o t h A m e r i c a n and  of t h i s  effort  f o r e i g n p o l i c y , i n c l u d i n g the  P a l e s t i n i a n A r a b s and  oppression,  An  this  its  examination of various  littoral  the  in  shake-up o f the  undertake a b i d at s t r a t e g i c s u r p r i s e .  the  shift  agenda and  Iraqi foreign policy.  c h a p t e r e n t a i l s an  and  p r i n c i p a l o b j e c t i v e of  herein  of t h i s  profound  The  basis  isolation.  for  176 The s e c o n d elite's  section consists of  efforts  toward the standing  to  design: It  following  the  external  the  increasing  attainment  onset of the in Iraq's  sudden change support  revolutionary  for  of  realize  o f hegemony in line  the  Baath  disapprobation  i n order to  w i l l be shown t h a t  moderating s h i f t this  the  K h o m e i n i i t e regime  nations.  that  exploit  a discussion  a  long-  over the  with t h i s  Iranian Revolution, f o r e i g n p o l i c y was  Gulf  end,  the redoubled,  a f f o r d e d Baghdad a s t r o n g b a s e  its  attempt  to  roll  and  of  back Khomeini's  Shi•ism.  The C o n c e p t u a l D e s i g n s U n d e r g i r d i n g t h e I r a n i a n I s l a m i c i s t s ' F o r e i g n P o l i c y : The P r o p a g a t i o n o f T r a d i t i o n a l i s t S h i ' i s m and t h e R o l l i n g Back o f I m p e r i a l I n f l u e n c e w i t h i n the Muslim World Similar to revolution Iranian  set  domestic  policy.  secular  regime  Initially,  r a d i c a l , change  priorities.  Immediately  bolster  1979,  his  movement  relations  the  a champion o f  ordered the  with Israel  and South  a determination  orientation  Shah's  sway  affairs  exodus,  i n an e f f o r t  in to  revolutionary a n t i - i m p e r i a l i s m and of  diplomatic  Africa.  M e h d i B a z a r g a n was to  continue  of  substantive,  external  formal severing  Upon a s s u m i n g p o w e r , demonstrate  in Iran's  following  the  those e x e r c i s i n g  support w i t h i n the  b y a p p e a r i n g as  non-alignment,  i n the  Prime M i n i s t e r B a k h t i a r ,  sagging  equation,  i n Teheran advocated  although not  January of  political  i n motion a major s h i f t  foreign  over the  the  the  quick  to  revamping of  177 foreign policy  initiated  administration. what  Central to  neutrality."  adopting of desire  this  change  of  improving r e l a t i o n s  and b e y o n d ,  1980,  no l o n g e r  was t o  when t h e  that  aim u n d e r l y i n g  Arab s t a t e s  the  tenable.  "policeman of  the  of  as the  with of  the  the  dependent particularly T h i s was  evidenced  on  I r a n would  Persian Gulf  A f u r t h e r development  the  on  behalf  in line  with  came i n A u g u s t when T e h e r a n a n n o u n c e d  from t h e  Development,  an o b s e r v a n c e  Government a n n o u n c e d t h a t  of Western i n t e r e s t s . objective  was  i n consonance  with the  signal  was no l o n g e r  s e r v e as  withdrawal  the  b e t w e e n I r a n and t h e W e s t ,  United States, 3 April  Basically,  1  Bakhtiar  once a l l u d e d t o  t h i s p r i n c i p l e , w h i c h was  relationship  this  ephemeral  F o r e i g n M i n i s t e r Ebrahim Y a z d i  "positive  Gulf  by the  its  Group f o r R e g i o n a l C o o p e r a t i o n and  which a l s o  i n c l u d e d T u r k e y and P a k i s t a n ,  of which maintained a strong m i l i t a r y r e l a t i o n s h i p  both  with  Washington. Overall, isolate  Bazargan's  intention  I r a n f r o m t h e West b u t ,  rather,  power o f W a s h i n g t o n and L o n d o n t o Iran's  foreign  be a l l o w e d Shah's  to  tenure.  a pragmatist, with the for  policy. benefit  Nonetheless, and he was  to  to  completely  diminish  the  direction  of  no l o n g e r w o u l d t h e  West  excesses permitted during  B a z a r g a n was  cognizant  i n d u s t r i a l i z e d powers  not  shape t h e  Simply put, from t h e  was  that  had t o  r e s t r u c t u r i n g and c o n t i n u i n g t h e  first  stable  and  foremost  relations  be m a i n t a i n e d development  the  of  if  plans  Iran's  178 economy were t o  be r e a l i z e d .  which portended  retaliatory  vigorously  opposed by t h e  secularists* there  Government.  also occurred a diminution of p o l i c y which,  control  over the  increasingly  as  the  radical  secularists  Shi'ite  being  establishment  pan-Islamic  revolution  it  to  1980:  was  of  a single  incumbent  a pronouncement  "Iran i s  Brunei,  lofty  the  put  country of  allusion  and o p p r e s s i o n  throughout to  the  K h o m e i n i as  elite  adherence  the  the vision comprising  paramount Khomeinists  spread the of  Islamic  this  f o r t h by K h o m e i n i  in  God and o u r b r o t h e r s 3  Through such  aspired to  "leader  of  The the  April in  an  supplant  with a t r a d i t i o n a l i s t  Muslim realm. the  of  Indicative  society,  clerical  was  on I r a n t o  ideal  lifestyle  moderate  state  design,  l a n d s must come a l o n g w i t h u s . "  exploitation  an  ultimate  Islamic  other  the  their  Of t h e s e ,  2  with the  other Muslim s t a t e s .  s e n t i m e n t was of  unity,  I n s p i r e d by t h i s  that  assumed  direct  w i t h t h o s e c h a m p i o n e d by  precepts.  M u s l i m s , from M a u r i t a n i a t o  believed  t h e i r power t o  ends p u r s u e d by t h e  m o r a l and e t h i c a l  importance.  the  waned,  w h i c h were p r e d i c a t e d upon an  of  all  matters  churchmen t i g h t e n e d  considerably  fostering the  as  leaning.  contrasted  clerical elite,  West were  However,  revolutionary polity,  The f o r e i g n p o l i c y  to  r e s p o n s e s by t h e  l i m i t e d power o v e r d o m e s t i c  foreign  the  A c c o r d i n g l y , any m e a s u r e s  Islamic  frequent oppressed  of  the  179 world"  aptly reflected  4  this  widely held p o s i t i o n  among  s e n i o r churchmen. Inherent was a b e l i e f  i n the  Khomeinists" pan-Islamic  that perceived s o c i a l ,  political,  p r o b l e m s f a c e d b y many M u s l i m s t a t e s ,  such as  license,  d i c t a t o r i a l governance,  poverty,  c o u l d be l a r g e l y a t t r i b u t e d t o  d o m i n a t i o n and t h e ideas  by r u l i n g  discernible to  external  classification categories: al-Islam]  was t h i s  In pursuance of  this  end,  represented  elite  Libya,  multitude of  B a s e d on t h i s sought  deemed t o  to  states that  People's  to  i n t o the  principal  1980  between t h e  the  s e n d an a m b a s s a d o r t o interest  was  of  relations  that  Islam"  [dar  o f war"  former,  with the  latter  the  category. contact,  relations  However,  in establishing  the  A n d on 25 May, R a d i o  Revolutionary Council  Tripoli.  few  namely South  diplomatic  formal  the  I s l a m i c R e p u b l i c and  D e m o c r a t i c R e p u b l i c o f Yemen.  Teheran announced t h a t  a  two c o n t r a r y  while h a r s h l y denouncing fell  sought  r a t h e r d o g m a t i c scheme,  strengthen  was a n n o u n c e d on 23 A p r i l  were b e i n g e s t a b l i s h e d  into  t y p i f i e d a "house  Following a p e r i o d of heightened it  Qom u s e d  a "house  q u a l i f y as t h e  and S y r i a ,  and h i g h l y  Islamicists  divided states  and t h o s e s t a t e s t h a t 5  mainly Western,  weighty the  that  sexual  as u s u r y and  alien,  that  those that  Arab n a t i o n s Yemen,  It  and economic  imperialist  influence  scheme  [dar a l - h a r b ] . clerical  championing of  elites.  eradicate.  as w e l l  objectives  had d e c i d e d  the  clerics'  a strong  alliance  180 with Syria,  w h i c h was p a r t l y b a s e d  proximity to  I r a q and a c o g n i z a n c e  on i t s  geographical  of  heated  the  rivalry  between t h e  B a a t h r e g i m e h e a d e d b y H a f e z a l - A s a d and  ideological  rival  i n Baghdad.  On 22 A p r i l  1980,  M i n i s t e r Qotzbadeh concluded a s t a t e v i s i t the that  endorsement the  of  a joint  warming o f  of  relations  cooperate  i n the  p r i n c i p l e s of  in challenging  constituted regime.  asserted  that  an o b s t a c l e  of u t i l i t y ;  strong the  could  Saddam H u s s e i n . on  11  Iranian-Syrian relations "blood-thirsty  Iraqi  Baathist  1 , 7  While endeavoring to Tripoli,  a n d Damascus, the  the  proffer  support to  engaged  i n a campaign o f  strengthen  t i e s with  only Arab c a p i t a l s  Islamic  Republic, the  The r o y a l i s t  culpable of  this  to  nations  of  transgression.  regime's  orientation  toward the  littoral  s t a t e s was s t r o n g l y  the  Gulf  of  Aden, openly  Khomeinists  d e n u n c i a t i o n aimed a t  M u s l i m s t a t e s j u d g e d t o be d i s r e s p e c t f u l Allah."  6  common g r o u n d  both regimes  a shared nemesis:  to  stating  Islam."  T h i s was made a p p a r e n t b y P r i m e M i n i s t e r R o j a i who, September,  with  the I r a n i a n - S y r i a n  l e s s on i d e o l o g i c a l  t h a n on m u t u a l p e r c e p t i o n s  Damascus  b e t w e e n T e h e r a n a n d Damascus  such r h e t o r i c a l a s s e r t i o n s ,  r a p p r o c h e m e n t was b a s e d  Foreign  I r a n i a n - S y r i a n communique  was b a s e d on a "common b e l i e f Regardless  to  its  various  the  "spirit  were v i e w e d  Furthermore, the governing e l i t e s  t e m p e r e d by a d e e p  of  as  clerical of  the  aversion  181 toward t h e trappings o f i m p e r i a l i s m p r e v a l e n t  i n these  states. More p r e c i s e l y , a t t h e h e a r t o f t h e o p p o s i t i o n toward these  r e g i m e s was t h e c o n c e p t o f a b s o l u t i s t m o n a r c h y ,  w h i c h t h e churchmen h e l d as i n i m i c a l t o t r a d i t i o n a l i s t Islam.  T h e r e j e c t i o n o f s e c u l a r m o n a r c h y stemmed f r o m t h e  c o n v i c t i o n t h a t u l t i m a t e s o v e r e i g n t y o v e r man was t h e exclusive province Kuwait, Saudi Emirates,  of Allah.  Accordingly, t h e monarchies o f  Arabia, Qatar, Bahrain,  a n d Oman, a s w e l l a s t h o s e  the United  Arab  further afield  from t h e  G u l f , such as J o r d a n and Morocco, were denounced a s i l l e g i t i m a t e bands o f " K a f i r s "  [infidels].  w i t h t h e S h i ' i t e concept of " t a k f i r , "  9  8  And, i n keeping  which l e g i t i m i z e s the  u t i l i z a t i o n o f "holy war" [ j i h a d ] a g a i n s t s t a t e s t h a t a r e n o t g o v e r n e d i n a c c o r d a n c e w i t h I s l a m i c d o c t r i n e , Qom upon t h e a l l e g e d l a c k o f l e g i t i m a c y w i e l d e d regimes as a j u s t i f i c a t i o n deposals.  f o radvocating  seized  by t h e r o y a l i s t  their  forced  I n short, with regard t o e s t a b l i s h i n g the root  c a u s e o f t h e a v e r s i o n t o w a r d I r a n among a m a j o r i t y o f t h e r u l i n g e l i t e s o f Near E a s t e r n  s t a t e s , i ti s important  to  n o t e t h a t many r a n k i n g I r a n i a n c h u r c h m e n , t h r o u g h a n e m p h a t i c v o i c i n g o f t h e i r b e l i e f s on t h e n e c e s s i t y o f modifying  the region's  structures, served  social, political,  t o f o s t e r alarm  and economic  i n t h e G u l f and beyond.  F o r e x a m p l e , o n 27 May 1 9 8 0 , A y a t o l l a h S a d e g h K h a l k h a l i r e f e r r e d t o t h e P e r s i a n G u l f as t h e " I s l a m i c  Gulf."  1 0  182 Beyond r e l a t i o n s w i t h t h e G u l f n a t i o n s ,  the  clerical  e l i t e a l s o made a d r a m a t i c b r e a k w i t h t h e p o l i c y f o l l o w e d the monarchial regime regarding one  of the  During the  the A r a b - I s r a e l i dispute,  c e n t r a l s t r a t e g i c issues i n the Shah's t e n u r e ,  b e t w e e n T e h e r a n and colleagues,  who  Near  East.  c l o s e r e l a t i o n s were m a i n t a i n e d  Tel Aviv.  looked  H o w e v e r , K h o m e i n i and  his  upon I s r a e l as a p a r i a h n a t i o n ,  had  long harbored a b i t t e r l o a t h i n g of t h i s r e l a t i o n s h i p  and  w e r e b e n t on b r i n g i n g i t t o a c o m p l e t e t e r m i n a t i o n .  The  Khomeinists the  1  animus toward the  l a t t e r ' s vigorous,  and  I s r a e l i s l a r g e l y stemmed f r o m  frequently v i o l e n t , championing  of Z i o n i s m , the main i d e o l o g i c a l d r i v i n g f o r c e b e h i n d state of I s r a e l , of a "greater  t h e key  design  and  Jordan.  The  under the  Israelis'  c l e a r l y a n t i t h e t i c a l to the Islamic objectives. anti-Semitism, his "Islamic  of which i s the  the  realization  I s r a e l , " o r more p r e c i s e l y , a h a v e n f o r J e w s  e n c o m p a s s i n g t e r r i t o r y now Syria,  by  was  This  c o n t r o l of  Lebanon,  c h a u v i n i s t i c "dream" i s  I r a n i a n churchmen's  sentiment, which  pan-  approximates  made p l a i n by K h o m e i n i i n a s e c t i o n  of  Government":  From t h e v e r y b e g i n n i n g , t h e h i s t o r i c a l movement o f I s l a m h a s h a d t o c o n t e n d w i t h t h e J e w s , f o r i t was t h e y who f i r s t e s t a b l i s h e d a n t i - I s l a m i c p r o p a g a n d a and engaged i n v a r i o u s s t r a t a g e m s this activity c o n t i n u e s down t o t h e present. 1 1  In consonance w i t h the  a n t i - Z i o n i s t b e n t , Qom  began t o  upon T e l A v i v t o r e l i n q u i s h a l l Arab t e r r i t o r y s e i z e d the  1967  war.  1 2  call since  183 A natural  concomitant o f t h e Islamic  Republic's  a n t i - I s r a e l i o r i e n t a t i o n was t h e p r o f f e r i n g o f s u p p o r t t o the  P a l e s t i n i a n s , t h e A r a b p e o p l e who, u n e q u i v o c a l l y ,  have  borne t h e brunt o f t h e s u f f e r i n g engendered by Americanfinanced  Z i o n i s t expansionism i n t h e Levant.  A concern f o r  t h e p l i g h t o f t h e P a l e s t i n i a n s among t h e K h o m e i n i s t s d a t e s back t o w e l l b e f o r e t h e o v e r t h r o w i n g o f t h e Shah; by t h e e a r l y 1970s, t h e l e a d e r s h i p had  established  of the revolutionary  a nexus w i t h v a r i o u s  hard-line  movement  Palestinian  groups, p r i n c i p a l l y t h e Popular Front f o rt h e L i b e r a t i o n o f Palestine  (PFLP), l e d by Dr. George H a b a s h .  d e m o n s t r a t i v e o f t h e churchmen's s t r o n g leaning  was t h e f a c t t h a t Y a s i r A r a f a t ,  Further  1 3  pro-Palestinian t h e chairman o f t h e  mainstream A l - F a t a h grouping o f t h e P a l e s t i n i a n Organization  ( P L O ) , was t h e f i r s t r a n k i n g  t o conduct an o f f i c i a l  Liberation  foreign  dignitary  state v i s i t t o the Islamic  Republic.  I n a d d i t i o n , t h e PLO was a c c o r d e d t h e p r i v i l e g e o f o p e n i n g a diplomatic Teheran.  m i s s i o n i n t h e f o r m e r I s r a e l i Embassy i n  1 4  In l i n e with  Qom's a n t i - Z i o n i s t a n d p r o - P a l e s t i n i a n  p o s t u r e , e f f o r t s were u n d e r t a k e n t o o s t r a c i z e E g y p t , regarded as t h e leading the  bilateral  the  Khomeinists, Cairo's  constituted  A r a b power, f o r i t s c o n c l u s i o n  Camp D a v i d p e a c e a g r e e m e n t w i t h negotiations  a wanton d i s r e g a r d  with  Israel.  of To  T e l Aviv  f o r Muslim u n i t y ,  a fawning g e s t u r e aimed a t c u r r y i n g  long  favor with  as w e l l as  the United  184 States, the  sponsor of the E g y p t i a n - I s r a e l i p a r l e y  produced the T e h e r a n and elite add  accord.  On  30 A p r i l  1979,  a l l other Muslim nations  i n s u l t t o i n j u r y , on  "agent o f world anti-Egyptian  imperialism."  By  1 5  c a m p a i g n a f f o r d e d no  r e v o l u t i o n a r y I r a n , but t o the growing l i s t  and  i s o l a t i o n of the  likewise.  merely served  the  zealous  t o add  f l u c t u a t i o n i n the s u p e r p o w e r s and deprived  the a n a l y s i s w i l l  i n the  Gulf,  Teheran of v a l u a b l e  t h a t c o u l d be  now  how  the  influence s h i f t to  this  aggression  in  Shah's over  the  the  development  sources of e x t e r n a l  u t i l i z e d to deter  and  contrasted  r e l a t i o n s b e t w e e n I r a n and and  to  churchmen b r o u g h t about  considerable  their allies,  clerics'  adversaries.  a development t h a t  t e n u r e when T e h e r a n e x e r t e d  an  another regime  s i g n i f i c a n t l y w i t h the p o s i t i o n of I r a n d u r i n g  regional affairs,  To  foreign policy  Islamic Republic  the Near E a s t i n g e n e r a l ,  large, the  r e a l advantage  Having demonstrated that the  the  t o do  clerical  Anwar S a d a t as  of Teheran's Arab  a d o p t e d by  the  1 October, Deputy Prime M i n i s t e r  Sadegh T a b a t a b a i denounced P r e s i d e n t  priorities  r e l a t i o n s between  C a i r o were f o r m a l l y b r o k e n and  implored  that  support  by i t s  adversaries. As  already  m e n t i o n e d i n t h i s v o l u m e , an  attendant  a s p e c t o f t h e K h o m e i n i s t s ' p a n - I s l a m i c c r u s a d e was intense  an  l o a t h i n g o f i m p e r i a l powers, e s p e c i a l l y t h e  U n i o n and  the United  States  and  their respective  Soviet  Communist  185 and  Capitalist  represented  i d e o l o g i e s w h i c h , i t was h e l d  i n Qom,  a b a r r i e r t o t h e r e a l i z a t i o n o f a new  w i t h i n the Muslim world  i n tune w i t h  order  fundamentalist  Islam.  1 6  Khomeini's d e s c r i p t i o n o f t h e r e l a t i o n s h i p between I r a n and t h e S o v i e t U n i o n and t h e U n i t e d b e t w e e n a "lamb a n d a w o l f , "  1 7  States, as analogous t o t h a t underscored t h e c l e r i c ' s  e n m i t y t o w a r d Moscow a n d W a s h i n g t o n , a n d g a v e r i s e t o t h e popular  slogan  "na s h a r q  na g h a r b "  T h i s a n t i - E a s t e r n and a n t i - W e s t e r n emerged a s a c o r n e r s t o n e  [neither East  nor West].  emotion, which r a p i d l y  of the Islamic Republic's  foreign  p o l i c y , was c l e a r l y a r t i c u l a t e d b y K h o m e i n i o n 28 May 1 9 8 0 , when, d u r i n g Parliament,  an a d d r e s s t o t h e i n a u g u r a l  s e s s i o n o f t h e new  he a s s e r t e d t h a t t h e c o n d u c t i n g  of Iran's  e x t e r n a l a f f a i r s w o u l d t a k e no c o n s i d e r a t i o n o f t h e g l o b a l political Of  d i v i s i o n between East  t h e two superpowers, t h e c l e r i c a l  upon t h e U n i t e d Republic.  and West. elite  looked  S t a t e s as t h e arch nemesis o f t h e I s l a m i c  On o n e o c c a s i o n ,  Khomeini charged t h a t f o r  decades Washington had, i n v i o l a t i o n o f n a t i o n a l sovereignty,  e x e r c i s e d an o v e r r i d i n g mastery o v e r a l l f a c e t s  of Iranians' existence: political,  and m i l i t a r y .  social, cultural,  economic,  The c a s t i n g - o f f o f t h i s  brooked, onerous i n t r u s i o n i n t o I r a n i a n a f f a i r s a c c o r d e d p a r a m o u n t p r i o r i t y b y Qom.  long-  was  A number o f i m p o l i t i c  m a c h i n a t i o n s on t h e p a r t o f t h e U n i t e d  S t a t e s , on t h e e v e o f  the outbreak of t h e r e v o l u t i o n , provided  f u r t h e r grounds f o r  186 t h e churchmen t o a s s a i l Washington. various  N o t a b l e among t h e s e  i n c i d e n t s was t h e a p p o i n t m e n t i n A p r i l  o f 1978, o f  W a l t e r L. C u t l e r a s t h e new h e a d o f t h e A m e r i c a n mission  i n Teheran.  diplomatic  The s e l e c t i o n o f C u t l e r , a  career  f o r e i g n s e r v i c e o f f i c e r who h a d p r e v i o u s l y s e r v e d ambassador  t o Zaire, a nation with a deplorable  r e c o r d and, under t h e aegis o f t h e n o t o r i o u s  as  human r i g h t s  President  Mobutu Sese Seko, a l o n g h i s t o r y o f c o o p e r a t i o n  with  American and South A f r i c a n i n t e l l i g e n c e f o r c e s i n a t t e m p t i n g to r o l l  b a c k r e v o l u t i o n a r y movements i n s o u t h e r n A f r i c a ,  was  c i t e d by t h e K h o m e i n i s t s as a r e f l e c t i o n o f t h e o p p r e s s i v e and v i o l e n t n a t u r e was v i g o r o u s l y  o f American i m p e r i a l i s m and, a c c o r d i n g l y ,  denounced.  F o l l o w i n g t h e Shah's d e p a r t u r e ,  the clerical  made w i d e c a p i t a l o f p a s t A m e r i c a n t r a n s g r e s s i o n s of adding c r e d i b i l i t y t o t h e charge t h a t  regime  a s a means  Washington  c o n s t i t u t e d t h e most s e r i o u s , d i r e c t t h r e a t t o t h e I s l a m i c revolution.  Moreover, t h e K h o m e i n i s t s sought t o ward o f f  any f u r t h e r m e d d l i n g i n I r a n i a n a f f a i r s b y t h e U n i t e d by p u t t i n g f o r t h f r e q u e n t  States  admonitions; f o r instance, a  p a r t i c u l a r l y b e l l i c o s e w a r n i n g came o n 28 A p r i l  1980 when  F o r e i g n M i n i s t e r Qotzbadeh h e l d t h a t I r a n i a n f o r c e s  would  " b l o w up t h e s t r a i t o f Hormuz a n d b u r n t h e e n t i r e G u l f " i n retaliation Washington. already  f o r any c o u n t e r r e v o l u t i o n a r y  a c t i o n s mounted by  The l e v e l o f A m e r i c a n s c o r n t o w a r d I r a n ,  a t a h i g h p i t c h due t o t h e e m b a s s y s t o r m i n g ,  was  187 heightened  even f u r t h e r by t h e s e  which a l s o served internationally  overt threats of violence,  t o render Washington's e f f o r t s t o  isolate the Islamic Republic  l e s s arduous.  As w i t h t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s , Qom was e q u a l l y determined t o maintain The i m p e t u s b e h i n d  this  of i m p e r i a l chauvinism, Khomeinists'  e q u i d i s t a n c e from t h e S o v i e t intention, apart  from t h e a v e r s i o n  was a l s o t e m p e r e d b y t h e  c o g n i z a n c e o f Moscow's r e l i g i o u s r e p r e s s i o n o f  Muslims w i t h i n t h e i r c e n t r a l Asian r e p u b l i c s . precisely, to the clerics, discourage  Union.  More  the efforts of the state t o  open m a n i f e s t a t i o n s o f r e v e r e n c e  f o r Islam i n  t h a t r e g i o n o f t h e Soviet Union c o n s t i t u t e d c o n c l u s i v e evidence of the gross  i n c o m p a t i b i l i t y between  Communism,  w i t h i t s c a r d i n a l emphasis upon s e c u l a r i s m and t h e relegating of religion to a s t r i c t l y private, i n c o n s e q u e n t i a l s o c i e t a l r o l e , and a t r a d i t i o n a l i s t lifestyle. dictum  Such r e a s o n i n g  was i n h e r e n t  Islamic  i n the following  p u t f o r t h b y K h o m e i n i o n 21 M a r c h 1 9 8 0 : "we a r e  f i g h t i n g a g a i n s t i n t e r n a t i o n a l communism j u s t a s we a r e f i g h t i n g t h e Western w o r l d . "  1 8  Observations  figured heavily i n the c l e r i c ' s determination  of t h i s  nature  t o check  Moscow's i n f l u e n c e among M u s l i m s t a t e s . The S o v i e t i n c u r s i o n i n t o A f g h a n i s t a n Khomeiniite Moscow.  regime w i t h a f u r t h e r occasion  provided the  t o condemn  On 29 December 1979, F o r e i g n M i n i s t e r Q o t z b a d e h  conveyed an o f f i c i a l  p r o t e s t t o Moscow i n w h i c h h e h e l d  that  188 Iran's  Islamic  into Afghani of  authorities  affairs  a l l Muslims.  as  regarded the  a serious  A worsening  of  Soviet  affront  the  elite  might r e s o r t the  Soviet  began t o  to  the  presence  Moscow's e f f o r t s states. that  to  a means  of  eliminating  i n Afghanistan,  as w e l l  as  to  gain  influence  discussions regional  among t h e  be t o  forestall  developments Overall,  regime, Soviet  Afghanistan,  the  following  of  prospect  the  design  into  the  to  Soviet  of the  day,  establishment  disenchanting  advent  would  be  Radio  the  of  of  a  which would  Gulf.  These  Russians.  adventure  r e a l i z a t i o n of  in mutual  c o o p e r a t i o n b e t w e e n Moscow and T e h e r a n , l a r g e l y b e c a u s e the  Khomeiniite regime's  e v e n more  imperatives,  was  of  made  remote.  In s h o r t , accurately  ideological  based  asserted the  that  on t h e the  machinations  of  clerics  governments,  i n c l u d i n g the  above d i s c u s s i o n ,  aggressive served to  of  i n Qom w e r e h o l d i n g  principal  penetration  were q u i t e  with the  the  Arab  a prompt w i t h d r a w a l  clerical officials  r e g a r d i n g the p o s s i b l e  hamper  asserted  the Afghan r e s i s t a n c e  A n d , on t h e  Republic  Gulf  on 21 J a n u a r y , Q o t z b a d e h  forces.  defense  Islamic  the  as  force  the  when  of  use  Iranian assistance to  I r a n announced t h a t  1980  relations  that  F o r example,  occupation  interests  intimate  f o r t h c o m i n g u n l e s s Moscow c a r r i e d o u t its  the  acrimonious  b e t w e e n T e h e r a n and Moscow came i n e a r l y clerical  to  intrusion  foreign  alienate  Gulf monarchies,  it  can  be  policy a number o f  conservative  189 regimes i n the superpowers this  Arab realm at  as w e l l  and t h e i r v a r i o u s a l l i e s .  development  By and l a r g e , Libya,  large,  was t h e  isolation  irrespective  of  The end r e s u l t  of  the  1980,  assistance to  safeguard national  to  exploit  foreign  Iran's  support  s u r p r i s e the  security  growing i s o l a t i o n  f o r the  as  of  render  from  address  external  Iraq's  a means o f  planned b i d to  revolutionary  Syria,  T e h e r a n was b e r e f t  w h i c h c o u l d be c a l l e d upon t o  section w i l l  of  Islamic Republic.  strong a l l i e s  The f o l l o w i n g  both  c o r d i a l t i e s with  and S o u t h Yemen, i n l a t e  threats.  as  efforts  augmenting  strategically  state.  Change i n I r a q i F o r e i g n P o l i c y : From R a d i c a l i s m t o M o d e r a t i o n The I s l a m i c slowly  revolution acted  evolving d i r e c t i o n of  designs.  From t h e  mid-1970s,  gradually  shifting  the  from a r a d i c a l  as  a catalyst  Baghdad's e x t e r n a l the  orientation  Baath e l i t e of  Iraqi  and a d e f e n d i n g opposition  of  the  Palestinian  cause,  to Arab s t a t e s with strong  had been  foreign  anti-Zionism,  to  the  t o w a r d a more m o d e r a t e ,  pragmatic p o l i c y conducive  realization  ambitions.  of  regional  f o r e i g n p o l i c y became 1978  policy  to  as w e l l  links  as West, to  The m o d e r a t i o n o f  increasingly discernible  summit o f A r a b h e a d s - o f - g o v e r n m e n t  the  affairs  l e a n i n g p r e d i c a t e d upon a d h e r e n c e  d o c t r i n a i r e A r a b n a t i o n a l i s m and s o c i a l i s m ,  to  the Iraqi  following  in Baghdad.  1 9  the  From  190 this point  onward,  regimes improved  t i e s between I r a q a n d c o n s e r v a t i v e steadily.  Following the toward the  perceptions a secret,  of  of  to  be on t h e  over of  Gulf  to  the  officials,  states  forge  In consonance  K h o m e i n i i t e regime  of  in early  as  clerical  the  stigma  level  of  s u p p o r t among t h e A salient  distrust  and f e a r  i n terms  of  feature of  foreign  pursuing regional  the  that  ends,  albeit  with  Baath campaign of  the Also,  were  c o u l d stem from of  the  Baathists'  r e v o l u t i o n a r y I r a n was the  be  stability.  Baathists  the  spilling-  capitals  rising  A n d , i n t h i s way,  of the  among  design,  Gulf  Arab monarchies  policy,  a  of  clearly,  Shi'ism could  regional  principal instigator  b e t w e e n Baghdad and T e h e r a n .  More  embarked on a  various  regime,  lake  power r e l a t i o n s h i p ,  1979,  i n the  "the  2 0  specter of  1979,  among  apprehension  with t h i s  a menace t o  a v o i d i n g the  a p p e a r i n g as  considerable  fundamentalist  perceptions  by v i l i f y i n g t h e  a volcano."  regarding the  beginning  that  The  to  i n February of  in part,  a new r e g i o n a l  helm.  heighten  hopeful  the  revolutionary,  exploited Iraq at  opportunity:  brink of  movement  further hastened.  t r e n d c a n be a t t r i b u t e d  which s t a t e d ,  Iraqi elite,  royalist  to  this  Baghdad's  somewhat c r y p t i c memo was d i s t r i b u t e d  seems t o the  downfall,  A r a b f o l d was  increased  ranking Baathists oil  Shah's  conservative  intensification  Arab  clerical  would  tension  an optimum obtain.  campaign t o the  charge  sow that,  r e g i m e was b e n t  i n a more a g g r e s s i v e  on  manner,  191 s i m i l a r t o t h o s e a d h e r e d t o by regime.  the domineering  More p r e c i s e l y , t o w a r d t h e g o a l  support f o r the planned attack against i n an e f f o r t t o c o n v i n c e t h e G u l f Republic  differed little  Pahlavi  of f o s t e r i n g  I r a n , Baghdad engaged  states that the  Islamic  from m o n a r c h i a l I r a n i n terms  foreign policy objectives: t e r r i t o r i a l  aggrandizement  r e g i o n a l hegemony, b a s e d on a s t r o n g u n d e r c u r r e n t o f Arab sentiment, continued  to c o n s t i t u t e the  Teheran's e x t e r n a l a f f a i r s  of and  anti-  foundation  of  agenda.  I n l i n e w i t h t h e above d e s i g n ,  the  Baath  elite  maintained t h a t , i r r e s p e c t i v e of r e v o l u t i o n a r y r h e t o r i c regarding  the n e c e s s i t y of e s t a b l i s h i n g greater  among M u s l i m s a s a means o f c o u n t e r i n g the  Islamic Republic  influence,  remained the world's foremost  of petroleum products t o the United continuing  Western  solidarity  States  and,  exporter  that  to support imperial i n t e r e s t s , r e v o l u t i o n a r y  c o n s t i t u t e d the  chief obstacle  pan-Arab s t a t e . on t h i s s c o r e  2 1  t o the  Open c o n d e m n a t i o n s o f t h e  were put  f o r t h by  clerical  Iraqi officials  T a h i r T a w f i q , a s e n i o r member o f t h e B a a t h P a r t y Command, d e n o u n c e d t h e K h o m e i n i s t s as  and  "racist"  t h a t t h e y were a n t i t h e t i c a l t o t h e  attacked  2 2  And,  on one  K h o m e i n i by  regime  with 1979, Regional  f o r e i g n p o l i c y e n d s a d v o c a t e d by  "aggressive"  occasion,  and  Saddam H u s s e i n as  the  maintained  i n t e r e s t s of the  r e f e r r i n g t o him  Iran  attainment of a s i n g l e  i n c r e a s i n g f r e q u e n c y ; f o r example, i n l a t e June o f  nation."  in  "Arab  openly  a " t u r b a n e d Shah"  192 who,  l i k e Muhammad R e z a P a h l a v i , was b e n t o n f u r t h e r i n g  Iranian  influence The  i n the Gulf.  Baathists  s e i z e d upon t h e v i o l e n t u n r e s t i n  Khuzestan i n order t o lend substance t o t h e charge t h a t t h e revolutionary  regime espoused a s t r o n g  a-vis t h i s subterfuge,  Baghdad was a b l e  enterprising territorial  racist  leaning.  t o couch i t s  ambitions i n defensive  p r o t e c t i o n o f Arab t e r r i t o r y  Vis-  from P e r s i a n  terms: t h e  encroachment.  I n d i c a t i v e o f t h e B a a t h e l i t e ' s e f f o r t t o f o s t e r a n image o f I r a q a s a c h a m p i o n o f A r a b i n t e r e s t s was t h e a s s e r t i o n , which i m p l i c i t l y alluded  t o I r a n , made b y T a r i q A z i z i n  December o f 1 9 7 9 : P a l e s t i n e i s n o t t h e o n l y o c c u p i e d A r a b l a n d , and no o c c u p i e r o f Arab l a n d can be a f r i e n d o f t h e A r a b s .  2 3  Beyond d r a w i n g a t t e n t i o n t o t h e K h u z e s t a n as  a f u r t h e r means o f b o l s t e r i n g I r a q ' s  imbroglio,  image a s b e n e f a c t o r  t o t h e G u l f A r a b s t a t e s , Baghdad a l s o made w i d e c a p i t a l o u t of t h e I s l a m i c Republic's  decision against  ceding  control  o v e r A b u Musa a n d t h e G r e a t e r a n d L e s s e r T u n b s t o t h e U n i t e d Arab Emirates, an e f f o r t which e l i c i t e d  an extension  o f open  s u p p o r t f r o m S h e i k S a q r b i n Muhammad a l - Q a s s a m i , t h e e m i r o f Ras  al-Khaimah.  2 4  By a n d l a r g e , I r a n ' s  uncompromising  p o s i t i o n toward t h e a s p i r a t i o n s of t h e Khuzestani which engendered a c o n s i d e r a b l e as was  i t s intransigence widely  allowed  perceived  activists,  amount o f v i o l e n c e ,  as w e l l  t o w a r d r e l i n q u i s h i n g c o n t r o l o v e r what i n Gulf  Baghdad t h e l u x u r y  c a p i t a l s as Arab  territory,  o f b r a n d i n g Teheran as an  193 aggressor  while  subsequently  advancing I r a q ' s  own h e g e m o n i s t i c  I r a q c a r r i e d out defender  of  the  determination. Baath regime capitals  of  Gulf  its  the  the  Baathists  any m a c h i n a t i o n s to  incite  the  Gulf  Shah was  of  defense to  counter  Islamic  efforts  conservative  elites  to  to  1  the  curry  regime under the  were e t h n i c by t h e  by  were  of  brook  designed  Arab s t a t e s  ethnic  fact  that,  littoral  of  outbreak  of  number o f  sway o f  Shias,  2 7  Kuwaiti monarchy's  similar  states  a basis  for  the  which,  traditionalist  by a  For  example,  royalist  Sunni Muslims,  a high percentage  T h i s v u l n e r a b i l i t y was sensitivity  to  rendered  fabrics.  w h i c h was g o v e r n e d  the  particularly  I r a n , were  and r e l i g i o u s  exclusive  Persians.  favor within  revolution,  proximity to  Kuwaiti populace,  a significant  Islamic  a destabilizing  S h i i s m by t h e i r  Baghdad  posed  Arab regimes d i d have  governing the  beyond g e o g r a p h i c a l vulnerable  various  2 6  concern regarding the monarchial  the  I r a q would not  conservative  A r a b r e a l m were made e a s i e r by t h e various  and  i n September  Republic that  w i t h i n the  The B a a t h i s t s *  Iraq,  zeal  the  any t h r e a t  b e g a n t o warn t h a t  of the  for  as  overthrown,  Moreover, beginning  2 5  dissidence region.  increasing  role  states with assurances that  would p r o v i d e a s s i s t a n c e to  1979,  the  minister  littoral  Iran.  self-appointed  Arab realm with  its  support  plans.  new,  Shortly after  sent  revolutionary  b u i l d i n g a base of  toward the  comprised of  whom  manifested clerical  194 regime's determination  to foster similar revolutionary  upheavals throughout the region.  To t h e d e l i g h t o f  Baghdad,  t h e K u w a i t i r e g i m e became i n c r e a s i n g l y o p e n i n d e n o u n c i n g the aggressive clerics,  pronouncements put  on one  Khomeinists'  " i m p e r i a l m e n t a l i t y " d i d not  Iran's t e r r i t o r i a l  with Saudi  A r a b i a , one  Saudi  in directly  Khuzestan.  Kuwait  challenging  2 8  o f t h e more p o w e r f u l  I z z a t Ibrahim  elite's  ties  Arab s t a t e s .  a l - D o u r i , the  l e d a d e l e g a t i o n to Riyadh,  c o n c l u s i o n o f an The  claim to  soon abate,  B a a t h i s t s took s p e c i a l pains t o normalize  F e b r u a r y o f 1979, minister,  Iranian  occasion admonishing t h a t i f the  would j o i n w i t h other Gulf nations  The  f o r t h by v a r i o u s  Iraqi  In  interior  which r e s u l t e d i n  the  I r a q i - S a u d i f r o n t i e r s e c u r i t y agreement. impetus f o r c o n c l u d i n g  a joint  defense  p a c t w i t h I r a q l a r g e l y emanated from i n c r e a s i n g l y discernible manifestations Shias.  of unrest  By O c t o b e r o f 1979,  various Saudi disturbances.  among t h e  t r o o p s had  been p o s i t i o n e d i n  holy centers to deter the outbreak H o w e v e r , i n November, I s l a m i c  f o r c i b l y occupied  served  of  militants  t h e G r a n d Mosque o f M e c c a f o r a two-week  p e r i o d , w h i c h ended w i t h a b l o o d y s t o r m i n g . episode  nation's  This v i o l e n t  to increase Riyadh's aversion toward  Iranian c l e r i c a l  elite,  w h i c h was  encouraged the occupation  the  b e l i e v e d t o have  o f t h e mosque.  Baghdad's e f f o r t s t o b u i l d a base o f s u p p o r t c o n s e r v a t i v e A r a b r e g i m e s was  not  l i m i t e d to the  Gulf  among  195 monarchies.  I r a q i diplomatic relations with Jordan,  M o r o c c o , a n d T u n i s i a warmed c o n s i d e r a b l y i n t h e p e r i o d between t h e onset o f t h e r e v o l u t i o n and t h e i n i t i a t i o n o f the invasion.  By m i d - 1 9 7 9 , t h e B a a t h r e g i m e was l a v i s h i n g  p r a i s e on K i n g H u s s e i n , and t h i s c o n s t i t u t e d a s t a r k c o n t r a s t f r o m t h e y e a r b e f o r e when B a g h d a d  routinely  denounced t h e J o r d a n i a n monarch a s an " i m p e r i a l i s t The  tool."  2 9  r a p p r o c h e m e n t b e t w e e n I r a q a n d M o r o c c o was h a s t e n e d b y  Baghdad's d e c i s i o n t o s u p p o r t Rabat's Western Sahara  c o n t r o l over t h e  and i t s e f f o r t s t o q u e l l t h e i n s u r g e n c y b e i n g  c o n d u c t e d b y t h e S a h r a w i P e o p l e ' s L i b e r a t i o n Army t h e armed w i n g o f t h e P o l i s a r i o  (SPLA),  [Popular Front f o r the  L i b e r a t i o n o f S a q u i a al-Hamra and R i o de O r o ] .  And, w i t h  r e g a r d t o T u n i s i a , t h e B a a t h i s t s sought t o p l a c a t e P r e s i d e n t Habib  Bourquiba by openly denouncing  the decision of Colonel  Muammar Q a d d a f i t o r e i n f o r c e t r o o p l e v e l s a l o n g t h e L i b y a n Tunisian frontier.  O v e r a l l , beyond t h e  above-mentioned  conciliatory gestures, the principal causal factor u n d e r l y i n g t h e w i l l i n g n e s s o f Jordan, Morocco, and T u n i s i a t o s e e k s t r o n g e r t i e s w i t h I r a q was t h e common a f f i n i t y f o r s e c u l a r governance fanaticism. animated  and an a t t e n d a n t a v e r s i o n toward  I t was c o g n i z a n c e o f t h i s a c t u a l i t y  the shift  i n I r a q i p o l i c y toward these  Islamic  that states.  Beyond e s t a b l i s h i n g a b r o a d base o f s u p p o r t f o r t h e pending c l a s h w i t h t h e I s l a m i c R e p u b l i c w i t h i n t h e Arab realm, t h e B a a t h i s t s developed sources o f support  further  196 afield  f r o m t h e N e a r E a s t by m o d i f y i n g  Iraqi foreign policy  w i t h regard t o superpower i d e n t i f i c a t i o n .  Following  the  o n s e t o f t h e I s l a m i c r e v o l u t i o n , Baghdad i n t e n s i f i e d t o move away f r o m t h e S o v i e t o r b i t , a p r o c e s s s e t i n m o t i o n i n t h e m i d - 1 9 7 0 s , and w i t h t h e West.  This s h i f t  external affairs  that without  f r o m L o n d o n and  untenable.  and  Western the  a bid for  More p r e c i s e l y , t h e  a w a r e t h a t t h e B r i t i s h and  the Americans,  t h e i r h i s t o r y of entanglement i n Gulf a f f a i r s ,  ties  Iraq's  Washington,  u l t i m a t e a r b i t e r s o f t h e G u l f power e q u a t i o n , r e g i o n a l hegemony was  been  t o e s t a b l i s h warmer  stemmed f r o m a p r a g m a t i c b a s i s ; b y  sanction, particularly  e l i t e was  t h a t had  i n a major dimension of  l a r g e , t h e B a a t h i s t s were c o g n i z a n t  efforts  Baath  given  would  not  a l l o w a S o v i e t d e p e n d e n c y t o assume a p o s i t i o n o f leadership i n the region.  This r e a l i z a t i o n spurred  the  B a a t h e l i t e ' s e f f o r t s t o d i s t a n c e I r a q f r o m Moscow and i t s Eastern bloc The  allies. l o o s e n i n g of the I r a q i nexus w i t h t h e  Soviet  U n i o n and  v a r i o u s e a s t e r n European n a t i o n s , a t the c o r e  of  w h i c h was  the  with  Moscow, was  1972  Treaty  o f F r i e n d s h i p and  Cooperation  a c c e l e r a t e d w i t h t h e Shah's d o w n f a l l .  t h e B a a t h r e g i m e was  However,  c a r e f u l t o avoid the appearance  of  r u s h i n g t o e m b r a c e t h e West i n an o p p o r t u n i s t i c b i d f o r r e g i o n a l p o w e r , f o r s u c h an  image w o u l d h a v e l i k e l y  s u s p i c i o n among t h e m o n a r c h i a l states.  e l i t e s of the  stirred  littoral  A c c o r d i n g l y , t h e c o o l i n g o f r e l a t i o n s w i t h Moscow  197 was  conducted i n a r a t h e r gradual,  s u b t l e manner.  O c c a s i o n a l , p r o - S o v i e t pronouncements c o n t i n u e d f o r t h by  Baghdad.  B a a t h i s t s was  By and  t o be  large, the o b j e c t i v e of  not t o completely  put  the  a l i e n a t e the Soviets  but,  r a t h e r , t o s i g n a l t h a t I r a q ' s d r i v e f o r r e g i o n a l dominance, w h i c h was  contingent  on a r e a l i z a t i o n o f W e s t e r n  support,  w o u l d n o t be h a m p e r e d by a t o o c l o s e i d e n t i f i c a t i o n w i t h  the  East. However, t h e slow, d i s r u p t e d by provided process Official  q u i e t d r i f t away f r o m Moscow  the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan,  I r a q from t h e Communist  c o n v e y e d by  B a g h d a d : on  s p e e c h commemorating t h e establishment  Afghanistan  f i f t y - n i n t h anniversary  o f t h e I r a q i army, Saddam H u s s e i n  during  of  a  the  denounced  i n the tumult  in  as a "dangerous development" t h a t c o n s t i t u t e d a  f u r t h e r blow t o r e g i o n a l s t a b i l i t y . protests, the  Baath e l i t e decided,  3 0  Beyond t h e  f i f t y percent,  lodging  of  as a f u r t h e r p u n i t o r y  measure, t o reduce t h e l e v e l o f o i l e x p o r t e d  day.  was  6 J a n u a r y 1980,  Moscow's d e c i s i o n t o i n t e r v e n e d i r e c t l y  the  realm.  condemnation of the S o v i e t aggression  immediately  U n i o n by  which  the Baathists with a pretext to accelerate of decoupling  was  to the  Soviet  f r o m 340,000 t o 170,000 b a r r e l s p e r  3 1  Overall,  although  Iraqi-Soviet relations  weakened c o n s i d e r a b l y , as e v i d e n c e d  by t h e B a a t h  c o n s i d e r a t i o n o f j e t t i s o n i n g t h e f r i e n d s h i p and  were elite's cooperation  198 pact  i n F e b r u a r y o f 1 9 8 0 , a n o p e n l i n e o f c o m m u n i c a t i o n was  maintained  b e t w e e n B a g h d a d a n d Moscow, e s p e c i a l l y r e g a r d i n g  Iraq's aggressive  designs  toward I r a n .  T h i s c a n be  attributed to the Baathists' recognition that, albeit the West, p a r t i c u l a r l y t h e U n i t e d  States, exerted  influence over the Gulf than the East,  greater  the Soviet Union, i n  keeping with centuries of Russian  m e d d l i n g i n I r a n , was  keenly  affairs,  interested i n the region's  flow of petroleum.  Accordingly,  particularly the  Baghdad c o n c l u d e d  that  Moscow's a c q u i e s c e n c e f o r a n y f o r a y i n t o I r a n h a d t o b e secured.  S i m p l y p u t , I r a q c o u l d n o t a f f o r d t o u n d e r t a k e any  a c t i o n s t h a t c o u l d evoke a d i r e c t S o v i e t  challenge.  Toward r e a l i z i n g a s s u r a n c e s from t h e R u s s i a n s s u c h a r e s p o n s e w o u l d n o t be f o r t h c o m i n g ,  that  Tariq Aziz  t r a v e l e d t o Moscow i n l a t e S e p t e m b e r o f 1 9 8 0 , o s t e n s i b l y t o g i v e t h e Brezhnev regime a f i n a l b r i e f i n g r e g a r d i n g t h e planned I r a q i  incursion.  And, i t c a n be adduced from t h e  3 2  f a c t t h a t t h e i n v a s i o n was e x e c u t e d s h o r t l y t h e r e a f t e r , no serious Soviet objections to the Baathists' goals raised at this juncture. regarding  an I r a q i  Iranian c l e r i c a l  were  Moscow's l a c k o f r e s e r v a t i o n s  i r r u p t i o n t h a t aimed a t d e p o s i n g t h e  r e g i m e , w h i c h c a n be l a r g e l y a t t r i b u t e d t o  a concern t h a t I s l a m i c fundamentalism might spread t o t h e predominately Muslim-populated Soviet r e p u b l i c s of Turkmenistan and A z e r b a i j a n ,  served  t o b o l s t e r both the  199  Baathists'  i n c e n t i v e s and p e r c e p t i o n s  aggression  against the Islamic  As a l r e a d y mentioned, S o v i e t U n i o n was West.  of opportunity f o r  Republic. t h e I r a q i s h i f t away f r o m t h e  a c o n c o m i t a n t o f t h e movement t o w a r d  the  By a n d l a r g e , t h e B a a t h i s t s l o o k e d u p o n I r a q ' s  petroleum reserves  a s a v i a b l e medium w h i c h c o u l d  vast  be  u t i l i z e d t o e n t i c e t h e West i n t o a f f o r d i n g s u p p o r t t o Baghdad's b i d t o f i l l  t h e r e g i o n a l power v o i d engendered  the r e v o l u t i o n i n Iran.  A c c o r d i n g l y , when t h e f l o w  of  I r a n i a n c r u d e was  i n t e r r u p t e d , l a r g e l y as a r e s u l t  sanctions  by Western powers i n r e s p o n s e t o t h e  imposed  hostage impasse, the Baath l e a d e r s h i p wasted o f f e r i n g t o increase o i lexports  of  little  time i n  t o v a r i o u s European  and J a p a n , w h i c h had p r e v i o u s l y r e c e i v e d a  by  states  significant  percentage of t h e i r petroleum s u p p l i e s from Teheran. volume o f t r a d e between I r a q and t h e s e s t a t e s a l s o  The  increased  considerably. Of s i g n i f i c a n t Iraq's confidence supremacy,  import,  t o a c t i v e l y pursue i t s b i d f o r G u l f  the strengthening  b e t w e e n B a g h d a d and P a r i s .  of economic  In p a r t i c u l a r ,  establishment  The  states  cooperation  t h e F r e n c h became  involved i n Iraq's e f f o r t s t o construct a  power s t a t i o n .  heighten  solidifying  a n d t o assume a l e a d e r s h i p r o l e among A r a b  i n g e n e r a l , was  actively  i n terms o f  Baath regime b e l i e v e d t h a t  nuclear  the  o f a v i a b l e n u c l e a r power s y s t e m w o u l d g r e a t l y  respect of I r a q throughout the Arab  world.  200 M o r e o v e r , t h e v a s t F r e n c h armaments i n d u s t r y o f f e r e d  the  B a a t h i s t s a s o u r c e f o r a c q u i r i n g s t a t e - o f - t h e - a r t weapon systems f o r s t r e n g t h e n i n g  Iraq's m i l i t a r y  capability.  London a l s o demonstrated a w i l l i n g n e s s t o the p o s s i b i l i t y of improving t i e s with the I n J u l y o f 1979,  the B r i t i s h dispatched  M i n i s t e r of Foreign ranking  Affairs,  Iraqi officials  S a a d o u n Hammadi, t h e an  And,  f  concluded with various  i n c l u d i n g West Germany and  Carrington, with  1980,  Minister, declared  the o f f i c i a l  forum of  c u l t u r a l pacts  Belgium.  i n economic c o o p e r a t i o n  Bonn and  Brussels,  that  i t had  Lastly, the  and  the  these perception  external  c o n f l i c t with  Iran.  i n terms of e x p l a i n i n g the w i l l i n g n e s s  I r a q i s t o engage t h e  accelerated,  w i t h western Europe  to the Baath e l i t e ' s  executing  ready the  e s t a b l i s h e d an a d e q u a t e l e v e l o f  support f o r properly  as  In short,  access to the markets of  powerful states, contributed  were  other western European s t a t e s ,  t o meet t h e i r r e q u i r e m e n t s f o r p e t r o l e u m .  Japan, i n c l u d i n g greater  during  the  w e l l as Tokyo, were a l s o a s s u r e d t h a t Baghdad s t o o d  increase  the  increasing  i n February of  B a a t h i s t s , t h a t e c o n o m i c , t e c h n i c a l and being  Lord  means o f  I r a q i Foreign  i n t e r v i e w with Al-Thawra  Baath government.  t o Baghdad t o p a r l e y  regarding  B r i t i s h - I r a q i cooperation.  explore  Islamic r e p u b l i c , a c i t i n g of  of the  a l b e i t q u i e t , rapprochement between Baghdad  Washington, i s of c e n t r a l importance. r e l a t i o n s between the U n i t e d  States  and  Formal  diplomatic  I r a q were severed  and  201 f o l l o w i n g t h e 1967 A r a b - I s r a e l i c o n f l i c t , w h i c h stemmed f r o m W a s h i n g t o n ' s Aviv's Zionist visions.  a  development  carte blanche support of T e l  However, n o t u n e x p e c t e d l y , t h e  impasse on t h e d i p l o m a t i c f r o n t d i d n o t p r e v e n t t h e c o n t i n u a t i o n o f t r a d e r e l a t i o n s between t h e two s t a t e s , t h e volume o f which i n c r e a s e d s t e a d i l y from t h e m i d - t o l a t e 1970s.  The i n c r e a s e i n c o o p e r a t i o n i n t h e e c o n o m i c  was a c c o m p a n i e d  by a g r a d u a l s o f t e n i n g o f  sphere  Washington's  p e r c e p t i o n o f Saddam H u s s e i n a s a n a u t o c r a t who t o o k h i s c u e from Moscow.  3 3  Interestingly,  i t was n o t u n t i l  of t h e P a h l a v i dynasty t h a t Washington  t h e demise  began t o c o u r t t h e  Baath regime i n e a r n e s t . I n e a r l y 1 9 7 9 , a number o f I r a q i  officials,  i n c l u d i n g F o r e i g n M i n i s t e r Hammadi, b e g a n t o i n t i m a t e a l t h o u g h no s i g n i f i c a n t s h i f t i n B a g h d a d ' s toward t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s had t r a n s p i r e d , t h a t d i p l o m a t i c r e l a t i o n s would The  that  orientation  i t was n o t b e l i e v e d  "remain f o r e v e r  broken."  3 4  B a a t h i s t s v a g u e l y q u a l i f i e d t h e meaning o f such  p r o n o u n c e m e n t s b y o p e n l y c a u t i o n i n g t h a t no i m p r o v e m e n t i n I r a q i - A m e r i c a n t i e s would o b t a i n u n l e s s  Washington  c o n s i d e r a b l y a l t e r e d i t s p o l i c y toward t h e Near E a s t . However, i n a c t u a l t e r m s , t h e i m p o s i t i o n o f s u c h  linkage  amounted t o a mere r h e t o r i c a l f a c a d e t h r o u g h w h i c h t o a v o i d a l a r m i n g p o t e n t i a l Arab a l l i e s ,  particularly the l i t t o r a l  s t a t e s , w h i c h were c o n v i n c e d t h a t Washington, l o s s o f i t s foremost a l l y  s t u n g by t h e  i n t h e r e g i o n , was b e n t o n  202 r e a s s e r t i n g i t s l e v e r a g e over t h e G u l f and, t h i s end,  t h a t i n quest  of  the U n i t e d S t a t e s would l i k e l y serve t o f u r t h e r  d e s t a b i l i z e peace i n the r e g i o n .  The  need t o a l l a y  concerns c o n s t i t u t e d the impetus behind  I r a q ' s open c a l l  major changes i n American p o l i c y toward the Arab O v e r a l l , at the center of the m e l i o r a t i o n of r e l a t i o n s was  the  former's  development.  T h i s was  when, i n F e b r u a r y ,  Iraqi-American  inherent i n such  c l e a r l y evidenced  by  i n terms  a  Saddam  Hussein  he p u b l i c l y a s s e r t e d t h a t B a g h d a d w o u l d  be w i l l i n g t o r e e s t a b l i s h d i p l o m a t i c r e l a t i o n s  with  Washington o n l y i f t h i s would e f f e c t a f u r t h e r i n g of A r a b i s m and The  unspecified "Iraqi national interests." conducting  behind-the-scenes o f f i c i a l s was  for  world.  perceptions of u t i l i t y ,  of r e a l i z i n g r e g i o n a l designs,  such  of i n c r e a s i n g l y frequent,  c o n t a c t s between A m e r i c a n and  pan3 5  largely Iraqi  f a c i l i t a t e d by d i p l o m a t i c m i s s i o n s  of  third  n a t i o n s , p a r t i c u l a r l y t h e B e l g i a n Embassy i n B a g h d a d a n d  the  I n d i a n Embassy i n W a s h i n g t o n .  the  On  10 A p r i l ,  Edward Peck,  s e n i o r o f f i c e r attached to the American i n t e r e s t s s e c t i o n at t h e B e l g i a n m i s s i o n , was official  e x t e n d e d an i n v i t a t i o n t o a t t e n d  government f u n c t i o n ; t h i s event marked t h e  d i p l o m a t i c c o n t a c t between t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s and number o f y e a r s .  3 6  A further i n d i c a t i o n that the  highest  Iraq in a United  S t a t e s was  i n t e r e s t e d i n e m p l o y i n g I r a q a s a means o f  attempting  to r o l l  February  o f 1980  an  b a c k t h e I s l a m i c r e v o l u t i o n came i n e a r l y  when, a c c o r d i n g t o The  Wall Street Journal,  203 Z b i g e n e w B r z e z i n s k i , an a s s i s t a n t f o r n a t i o n a l s e c u r i t y a f f a i r s u n d e r P r e s i d e n t Jimmy C a r t e r , u n d e r t o o k  a  c l a n d e s t i n e " 2 8 - h o u r v i s i t " t o B a g h d a d , w h e r e he discussions with Iraqi o f f i c i a l s , and  held  i n c l u d i n g Saddam  Michel A f l a q , a l e a d i n g Baath ideologue,  Hussein  regarding  d e t a i l s of a " s e c u r i t y a l l i a n c e " between Washington Baghdad.  3 7  Such s e c r e t i v e c o n t a c t s were c o n s o n a n t w i t h pronouncements put beginning  f o r t h by t h e U.S.  i n approximately  the United  with Iraq.  official  S t a t e Department which,  mid-1980, began t o a s s e r t t h a t  c o n d i t i o n s w i t h i n t h e G u l f r e g i o n had for  and  made i t  "important"  States to r e e s t a b l i s h formal diplomatic  And,  ties  i n terms of i n c e n t i v e s f o r s e c u r i n g  Baghdad's s u p p o r t  f o r the American l i n e toward the Gulf  and  t h e I s l a m i c r e v o l u t i o n , the S t a t e Department a u t h o r i z e d  the  s a l e of powerful  gas  t u r b i n e e n g i n e s m a n u f a c t u r e d by  E l e c t r i c , w h i c h w e r e t o be  installed  construction i n Italy,  a number o f B o e i n g 727  transport aircraft. to  and  By and  i n naval vessels  l a r g e , W a s h i n g t o n was  s i g n a l t o the Baath regime t h a t c o n s i d e r a b l e  General under  and  747  determined  benefits  w o u l d accompany I r a q ' s w i l l i n g n e s s t o p a r t i c i p a t e i n t h e e f f o r t t o c o n t a i n t h e I r a n i a n R e v o l u t i o n and forestall  any  thereby  d i s r u p t i o n s o f t h e e c o n o m i c s t a t u s quo  G u l f , w h i c h had profit.  to  allowed  t h e West t o r e a p  This c r u c i a l source  of support  in  the  r e i n f o r c e d both  the  considerable  204  Baathists* their  incentive  resolve  to  and o p p o r t u n i t y s t r u c t u r e s  undertake a b i d at  strategic  and  cemented  surprise.  Conclusion Two m a j o r i n f e r e n c e s discussion.  First  c a n b e drawn f r o m t h e  and f o r e m o s t ,  Islamic Republic's foreign policy  foregoing  the maverick nature of ideals,  which i n c l u d e d a  profound d i s d a i n for the various s e c u l a r monarchies the Arab world, for  strong support f o r the  an i n d e p e n d e n t  state,  o p p o s i t i o n toward Zionism,  within  Palestinians'  and a c o n c o m i t a n t , served to  greatly  drive  intense diminish  number o f N e a r E a s t e r n s t a t e s t h a t w o u l d p r o f f e r a i d revolutionary  I r a n i n the  event t h a t  its  was d i r e c t l y j e o p a r d i z e d by an e x t e r n a l the  breakdown o f  attendant  the  made t h e  rescue  of  the  Secondly,  national foe.  Teheran-Washington a x i s ,  overt h o s t i l i t y  Khomeinists, to  the  either  advantages  as w e l l  a c c r u i n g from t h e and—most  of  all—they  Iraqi  opportunities  the  r e g i m e and t h e  Gulf  access to  of  the  the  development  long-standing  Shah.  immense  Thus,  the  Baathists  f i n a n c i a l resources  w h i c h added t o  isolation important  rapidly were of  and  inroad.  enmity between t h e  monarchies d i s s i p a t e d  the  incentives  f o r c o n d u c t i n g a s h o r t and d e c i s i v e  C l o s e t o home,  downfall  existing  the  remote.  r e v o l u t i o n a r y I r a n were c o n s i d e r a b l e bolster  as  superpower coming  of  served to  to  Furthermore,  I s l a m i c R e p u b l i c e v e n more  the  the  security  t o w a r d Moscow d i s p l a y e d b y  l i k e l i h o o d of  the  Baath  after  the  granted  these states,  Baghdad's c o n f i d e n c e  that  it  a  205  would p r e v a i l  o v e r T e h e r a n and Qom.  q u i e t , moderate West d i v i s i o n ,  And, v i s - a - v i s  s h i f t i n t h e i r stance  the  regarding the East-  t h e B a a t h i s t s w e r e a b l e t o e n l i s t t h e much  more v a l u a b l e s u p p o r t  of the l a t t e r , while a v e r t i n g a  complete a l i e n a t i o n of the former. worked t o t h e b e n e f i t o f I r a q .  A l l in a l l , this  change  206  CHAPTER V I NOTES i n s t i t u t e f o r D e f e n s e A n a l y s i s , News R e v i e w o n West A s i a (New D e l h i : I n s t i t u t e f o r D e f e n s e A n a l y s i s , J u n e 1 9 7 9 ) , p. 2 0 3 . R o b e r t Ghobad D a r i u s , " K h o m e i n i ' s P o l i c y t o w a r d t h e M i d e a s t , " i n G u l f S e c u r i t y i n t o t h e 1980s: P e r c e p t u a l and S t r a t e g i c D i m e n s i o n s , e d . R o b e r t G. D a r i u s , J o h n W. Amos I I , a n d R a l p h H. Magnus ( P a l o A l t o , C a l i f o r n i a : S t a n f o r d U n i v e r s i t y , Hoover I n s t i t u t i o n P r e s s , 1 9 8 4 ) , p. 36. 2  3  N e w Y o r k T i m e s . 23 A p r i l 1 9 8 0 .  F r e d H a l l i d a y , " I r a n i a n F o r e i g n P o l i c y S i n c e 1979: I n t e r n a t i o n a l i s m and N a t i o n a l i s m i n t h e I s l a m i c Revolution," i n S h i ' i s m and S o c i a l P r o t e s t , ed. Juan R . I . C o l e and N i k k i R. K e d d i e (New H a v e n : Y a l e U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s , 1 9 8 6 ) , p . 102. 4  R o g e r M. S a v o r y , " K h u m a y n i ' s I s l a m i c Revolutionary Movement," i n I r a n - I r a q a n d t h e G u l f War, e d . R o b e r t S p e n c e r (Toronto: Centre f o r I n t e r n a t i o n a l Studies, U n i v e r s i t y o f T o r o n t o , 1 9 8 2 ) , p. 33. 5  I n s t i t u t e f o r D e f e n s e A n a l y s i s , News R e v i e w o n West A s i a (New D e l h i : I n s t i t u t e f o r D e f e n s e A n a l y s i s , May 1 9 8 0 ) , p. 1 2 8 . 6  I n s t i t u t e f o r D e f e n s e A n a l y s i s , News R e v i e w o n West A s i a (New D e l h i : I n s t i t u t e f o r D e f e n s e A n a l y s i s , O c t o b e r 1 9 8 0 ) , p. 584. 7  8  S a v o r y , p . 34.  9  Ibid.,  p. 49.  I n s t i t u t e f o r D e f e n s e A n a l y s i s , News R e v i e w o n West A s i a (New D e l h i : I n s t i t u t e f o r D e f e n s e A n a l y s i s , J u n e 1 9 7 9 ) , p. 204. 1 0  R u h o l l a h Khomeini, I s l a m and R e v o l u t i o n , Hamid A l g a r ( B e r k e l e y : M i z a n P r e s s , 1 9 8 1 ) , p. 27. 1 1  trans.  S h a r i f M. S h u j a , " I s l a m i c R e v o l u t i o n i n I r a n a n d I t s Impact on I r a q , " I s l a m i c S t u d i e s : J o u r n a l o f t h e I s l a m i c R e s e a r c h I n s t i t u t e 3 (Autumn 1 9 8 0 ) : 2 1 3 . 1 2  207 S h a m e e m A k h t a r , " I m p a c t o f t h e I s l a m i c Movement i n I r a n o n t h e R e g i o n , " P a k i s t a n H o r i z o n 1-2 ( 1 9 7 9 ) : 9 5 . 13  14 S a v o r y ,  p. 42.  I n s t i t u t e f o r D e f e n s e A n a l y s i s , News R e v i e w o n West A s i a (New D e l h i : I n s t i t u t e f o r D e f e n s e A n a l y s i s , November 1 9 7 9 ) , p . 674. 1 5  R o u h o l l a h K. R a m a z a n i , R e v o l u t i o n a r y I r a n : C h a l l e n g e and Response i n t h e M i d d l e E a s t ( B a l t i m o r e , M a r y l a n d : The J o h n s H o p k i n s U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s , 1988), p. 23. 1 6  I n s t i t u t e f o r D e f e n s e A n a l y s i s , News R e v i e w o n West A s i a (New D e l h i : I n s t i t u t e f o r D e f e n s e A n a l y s i s , November 1 9 7 9 ) , p . 674. 1 7  I n s t i t u t e f o r D e f e n s e A n a l y s i s , News R e v i e w o n W e s t A s i a (New D e l h i : I n s t i t u t e f o r D e f e n s e A n a l y s i s , A p r i l 1980), p. 15. 1 8  J o h n W. Amos I I , "The I r a q - I r a n War: C o n f l i c t , Linkage, and S p i l l o v e r i n t h e M i d d l e E a s t , " i n G u l f S e c u r i t y i n t o t h e 1980s: P e r c e p t u a l and S t r a t e g i c Dimensions, ed. R o b e r t D a r i u s , J o h n W. Amos I I , a n d R a l p h H. Magnus ( P a l o A l t o , C a l i f o r n i a : S t a n f o r d U n i v e r s i t y , Hoover I n s t i t u t i o n P r e s s , 1984), p. 59. 1 9  2 0  C h r i s t i a n S c i e n c e M o n i t o r , 21 J u n e 1 9 7 9 .  U.S. Foreign Broadcast Information S e r v i c e , Middle E a s t A s i a , B a g h d a d I r a q i News A g e n c y i n A r a b i c , " A t h T h a w r a h T h r e a t e n s A r a b E a s t e r n F l a n k , " 20 J u n e 1 9 7 9 , J N 2 0 0 9 5 0 . 2 1  U.S. Foreign Broadcast Information S e r v i c e , Middle E a s t A s i a , B a g h d a d I r a q i News A g e n c y i n A r a b i c , " P o p u l a r R a l l y i n B a g h d a d D e n o u n c e s I r a n i a n R e g i m e , " 30 J u n e 1 9 7 9 , JN301800. 2 2  2 3  C h r i s t i a n Science Monitor.  19 December 1 9 7 9 .  F a u d M a t a r , Saddam H u s s e i n : T h e Man, t h e C a u s e , t h e F u t u r e (London: T h i r d World C e n t r e , 1 9 8 1 ) , p. 140. 2 4  and  A d e e d I . D a w i s h a , " I r a q : The W e s t ' s O p p o r t u n i t y , " F o r e i g n P o l i c y 41 ( W i n t e r 1 9 8 0 - 1 9 8 1 ) : 1 4 6 . 2 5  U.S. Foreign Broadcast Information S e r v i c e , Middle E a s t A s i a , B a g h d a d I r a q i News A g e n c y i n A r a b i c , " A t h T h a w r a h Warns I r a n A g a i n s t I n t e r v e n t i o n i n G u l f , " 29 S e p t e m b e r 1 9 7 9 , JN543930. 2 6  208 2 7  N e w Y o r k T i m e s . 12 J u n e 1 9 8 0 .  A.H.H.H. A b i d i , "The I r a n i a n R e v o l u t i o n i n t h e Perceptions o f t h e Gulf S t a t e s , " i n Contemporary G u l f , ed. S u r e n d r a B h u t a n i (New D e l h i : The A c a d e m i c P r e s s , 1 9 8 0 ) , p . 27. 28  2 9  C h r i s t i a n S c i e n c e M o n i t o r . 11 A p r i l 1 9 7 9 .  I n s t i t u t e f o r D e f e n s e A n a l y s i s , News R e v i e w o n W e s t A s i a (New D e l h i : I n s t i t u t e f o r D e f e n s e A n a l y s i s , F e b r u a r y 1 9 8 0 ) , p. 973. 3 0  R o b e r t P o u l i o t , "Iraq's P r e s s Review 7 ( J u l y 1980):28. 3 1  Drive  f o r Power," W o r l d  I n s t i t u t e f o r D e f e n s e A n a l y s i s , News R e v i e w o n West A s i a (New D e l h i : I n s t i t u t e f o r D e f e n s e A n a l y s i s , O c t o b e r 1 9 8 0 ) , p. 595. 3 2  C l a u d i a W r i g h t , " I r a q — N e w Power i n t h e M i d d l e F o r e i g n A f f a i r s 2 (Winter 1979-1980):260. 3 3  East,"  U.S. Foreign Broadcast Information Service, M i d d l e E a s t A s i a , A n - N a h a r A l - A r a b i Wa A d - D u w a l i i n A r a b i c , " F o r e i g n M i n i s t e r D i s c u s s e s I r a n , R e l a t i o n s w i t h U.S.S.R.," 22 J a n u a r y 1 9 7 9 , LD231401. 3 4  U.S. Foreign Broadcast Information Service, Middle E a s t A s i a , B a g h d a d I r a q i News A g e n c y i n A r a b i c , "Saddam H u s s e i n o n R e l a t i o n s w i t h I r a n , U n i t e d S t a t e s , " 14 F e b r u a r y 1979, J N 1 4 1 2 5 6 . 3 5  I n s t i t u t e f o r D e f e n s e A n a l y s i s , News R e v i e w o n West A s i a (New D e l h i : I n s t i t u t e f o r D e f e n s e A n a l y s i s , May 1979), p. 129. 3 6  I n s t i t u t e f o r D e f e n s e A n a l y s i s , News R e v i e w o n West A s i a (New D e l h i : I n s t i t u t e f o r D e f e n s e A n a l y s i s , F e b r u a r y 1980), p. 1058. 3 7  CHAPTER V I I SUMMARY AND  CONCLUSIONS  My d e s i r e t o e x a m i n e t h e I r a q i b i d a t s t r a t e g i c s u r p r i s e was i n d u c e d b y s e v e r a l f a c t o r s . t h i s p a r t i c u l a r subject  The r e c e n c y o f  i s f i r s t a n d f o r e m o s t among  W h i l e many r e n o w n e d a n a l y s t s o f t h e c o n d i t i o n s  these.  that  engender i n t e r s t a t e war acknowledge t h e i m p o r t a n c e o f s t r a t e g i c s u r p r i s e , no d e t a i l e d w o r k , t o my k n o w l e d g e , o n the motivations  and d e s i g n s u n d e r g i r d i n g  Baghdad's q u e s t f o r  strategic s u r p r i s e — o r postrevolutionary  Iran's  v u l n e r a b i l i t y t o a sudden s t r i k e — h a d been u n d e r t a k e n p r i o r to the i n i t i a t i o n of this project.  Second i s K n o r r and  Morgan's model f o r case s t u d i e s , w h i c h p r o v i d e d t h e conceptual  t o o l f o r p u l l i n g together  the multivariate  threads o f a p p l i c a b l e , empirical data i n t o a comprehensible, analytical pattern.  This chapter e n t a i l s a consideration of  some o f t h e more common a s p e c t s o f s t r a t e g i c s u r p r i s e elucidated i n this tract.  Rather than put f o r t h a  summary o f t h e I r a q - I r a n c a s e , I w i l l parallels with earlier,  attempt, by drawing  noted instances  of strategic  s u r p r i s e , t o shed f u r t h e r l i g h t on g e n e r a l associated  with  strategic surprise.  209  cursory  phenomena  210  A grand t h e o r e t i c a l conclusion  of this thesis i s  t h a t t h e o u t b r e a k o f t h e r e c e n t l y ended I r a n - I r a q war c a n be a t t r i b u t e d t o a mutually  reinforcing misestimation  shortcoming: the expectation territorial  and p o l i t i c a l  i n Baghdad t h a t  and  principal  d e s i g n s c o u l d be r e a l i z e d t h r o u g h  a s u r p r i s e a t t a c k upon K h u z e s t a n — t h e r e b y a v o i d i n g protracted, political  a  c o s t l y w a r — a n d the f a i l u r e o f key I r a n i a n  a c t o r s , b o t h i n T e h e r a n a n d Qom,  warning of t h e planned I r a q i inroad.  t o gain strategic  The f o r m e r  m i s c a l c u l a t i o n heightened the w i l l i n g n e s s of the I r a q i  elite  to r e s o r t t o a use o f m i l i t a r y force t o r e s o l v e t h e political latter  and t e r r i t o r i a l  friction  with  Iran, while the  f a i l u r e prevented Iranian p o l i t i c a l  s e c u l a r and c l e r i c a l ,  from u n d e r t a k i n g  elites,  both  effective  c o u n t e r m e a s u r e s t o ward o f f an I r a q i a t t a c k upon t h e important southwestern A considerable  provinces. p o r t i o n o f t h i s volume e n t a i l e d a  t r e a t m e n t o f t h e s e two i n t e r a c t i n g f a u l t s ; t h i s facilitated  an e x p l a n a t i o n  analysis  of the h o s t i l e interactions  between t h e I r a q i and I r a n i a n regimes w h i c h c u l m i n a t e d the  initiation  conclusive  o f t h e I r a n - I r a q war.  in  However, a h i g h l y  examination o f t h e I r a q i campaign t o  strategically surprise revolutionary Iran w i l l  only  be  p o s s i b l e i f a n d when p e r t i n e n t d o c u m e n t s o f e a c h b e l l i g e r e n t (e.g.,  personal  evaluations,  memoirs o f key o f f i c i a l s , i n t e l l i g e n c e  and d i p l o m a t i c cables)  become a v a i l a b l e f o r  scholarly scrutiny.  Given the paucity  evidence, along with  a heavy r e l i a n c e upon t r a n s c r i p t s o f  speeches and newspaper a r t i c l e s ,  of  the analysis  w i t h i n t h i s t h e s i s c a n o n l y be a c c u r a t e l y somewhat s p e c u l a t i v e .  But w h i l e  conclusive  contained  described  t h e hypotheses propounded  i n t h i s t h e s i s have n o t been documented t o a degree, I have demonstrated a c o n s i s t e n c y findings this  conclusive  between t h e  I h a v e p u t f o r t h and t h e e v i d e n c e c o n t a i n e d  within  work. A p r i n c i p a l f i n d i n g of t h i s study i s that  surprise constitutes  by a m y r i a d o f f a c t o r s . several  celebrated  involved  strategic  a c o m p l e x phenomenon f o r s t u d y .  Indeed, t h e occurrence of s t r a t e g i c s u r p r i s e  past,  as  The I r a q - I r a n  instances  a complex  i s influenced  case, s i m i l a r t o  of strategic surprise  i n the  causation.  I n t h i s s t u d y , a number o f s i g n i f i c a n t o b s e r v a t i o n s r e l a t e t o t h e complex a r r a y  of d i s t i n c t but i n t e r a c t i n g  levels of c a u s a l i t y that t y p i c a l l y actuate a governing elite's  search f o r s t r a t e g i c surprise.  I n t h i s volume, t h e  examination of these f a c t o r s , which include historical,  political,  geostrategical  those of a  i d e o l o g i c a l , economic, and  n a t u r e , has been l a r g e l y c o n d u c t e d v i s - a - v i s  exposition. In terms of the basis  f o r an a t t a c k i n g  state's  motivations f o r attempting a s t r a t e g i c surprise, the r u l i n g e l i t e ' s visions of national  s e c u r i t y , o r t h e more n e b u l o u s  212 term of  " n a t i o n a l i n t e r e s t s , " are  I r r e s p e c t i v e of the I r a n and  the  considerations Baathists  concern of the  attendant specter  traditional Islamic  be  several  surprise.  example, the  For  access t o the  The  United  due  of  strategic  States  believed  s t a t i o n of major g l o b a l  and,  to a lesser  power,  was extent,  t o t h e i r armed p r e s e n c e i n t h e  region,  t o J a p a n ' s b i d f o r hegemony. which c o n s t i t u t e d  It the  s u r p r i s e a t t a c k s upon A m e r i c a n f o r c e s  upon B r i t i s h  borne out  the  i m p e r i a l Japanese e l i t e  removal of these obstacles  impetus f o r the  in  Iraqi  earlier efforts to obtain  s t o o d as m a j o r o b s t a c l e s  H a w a i i and  between the  n a t u r a l resources of southeast A s i a  Great B r i t a i n ,  was  of a " s p i l l i n g over"  discerned  f o r Japan t o r i s e t o the  the  revolution  Iran.  e x p e r i e n c e and  was  Islamic  w e r e f a r more i m p o r t a n t i n p r o m p t i n g  to s t r i k e at  imperative.  crucial.  z e a l , i t appears t h a t g e o p o l i t i c a l  C o r r e l a t i o n s can  that  often  f o r c e s on t h e M a l a y P e n i n s u l a .  i n t h i s study that, s i m i l a r to the  a n i m a t e d Tokyo's m i l i t a r i s t i c agenda i n t h e  early  1940s, of  c h i e f among t h e s e w e r e a g g r a n d i z e m e n t  e c o n o m i c a l l y i m p o r t a n t segments of I r a n i a n t e r r i t o r y . geopolitical  i m p u l s e was  g r o u n d e d on t h e  c a r d i n a l s t r a t e g i c design: hegemony o v e r t h e desire to play  It  goals which  B a g h d a d ' s i n c e n t i v e s t r u c t u r e r e s t e d u p o n a number offensive designs:  in  Gulf,  a leading  the  an end  Baath  establishment of p a r a l l e l e d by  r o l e , i n the  This  elite's Iraqi  Baghdad's  Egyptian  of  tradition,  213  among A r a b n a t i o n s .  O v e r a l l , a q u e s t f o r hegemony  c o n s t i t u t e d t h e paramount d e t e r m i n a n t u n d e r l y i n g regime's i n c e n t i v e s ; and on t h i s s c o r e ,  t h e Baath  the Iraqi  to s t r a t e g i c a l l y s u r p r i s e Iran shared s i m i l a r i t i e s  campaign with  Germany's e f f o r t t o s t r a t e g i c a l l y s u r p r i s e t h e S o v i e t  Union.  A l t h o u g h t h i s o b s e r v e d s i m i l a r i t y does n o t c o n s t i t u t e g r o u n d s t o i n f e r a u n i v e r s a l l y v a l i d maxim o n t h e phenomenon of s t r a t e g i c s u r p r i s e , i t i s not unreasonable t o maintain t h a t h e g e m o n i c a s p i r a t i o n s a r e n o t a n uncommon for  s t r a t e g i c a l l y s u r p r i s i n g an  adversary.  An a d d i t i o n a l m a j o r c o n c l u s i o n the  o f t h i s essay i s that  o v e r r i d i n g f i x a t i o n on a t t a i n i n g t h e i r  t e r r i t o r i a l goals  motivation  aggressive  b l i n d e d t h e B a a t h i s t s t o t h e danger  such an u n d e r t a k i n g  c o u l d go p r o f o u n d l y  awry.  In short,  Baghdad f a i l e d t o d e t e r m i n e t h a t t h e I r a n i a n c l e r i c a l would r e s o r t t o a t o t a l war t o defend I r a n i a n Moreover, Iraq's cautionary  leadership erred  that  regime  territory.  i n n o t t a k i n g a more  approach t o t h e I r a n i a n Revolution.  e x a m i n a t i o n was n o t n e c e s s a r y i n o r d e r  An  in-depth  t o grasp the f a c t  t h a t t h e r e v o l u t i o n had widespread support a t t h e g r a s s r o o t s l e v e l and t h a t t h e K h o m e i n i s t s c o u l d energy o f t h e masses t o c o n f r o n t Baghdad s h o u l d  readily mobilize the  an i n t r u s i o n .  have thought o f Khomeini's f i e r y  G i v e n t h e Imam's a v o w a l o f s p r e a d i n g Baath regime should Islamic Republic  In addition, resolve.  the revolution, the  have r e a l i z e d t h a t an i n c u r s i o n i n t o t h e  would c o n s t i t u t e a c h a l l e n g e  which Khomeini  214 w o u l d r e s p o n d t o w i t h optimum z e a l a n d d e t e r m i n a t i o n . Saddam H u s s e i n ' s s h o r t c o m i n g o n t h i s s c o r e somewhat  reflects  H i t l e r ' s f a i l u r e t o recognize the resolve of the d i c t a t o r i a l S t a l i n t o defend Soviet  territory.  A c o n s i d e r a b l e p o r t i o n o f t h i s t h e s i s was d e v o t e d t o examining the f a i l u r e of the t a r g e t s t a t e t o g a i n s t r a t e g i c w a r n i n g o f t h e a g g r e s s o r ' s d e s i g n s and t o u n d e r t a k e d e f e n s i v e counter-measures.  In explaining failures to  r e a l i z e s t r a t e g i c w a r n i n g , a number o f k e y r e a s o n s h a v e b e e n cited.  F i r s t and f o r e m o s t a r e t h e q u a n t i t a t i v e  and  q u a l i t a t i v e nature of warning s i g n a l s a v a i l a b l e t o the target state.  A c c u r a t e t h r e a t p e r c e p t i o n and t h e a t t e n d a n t  r e a l i z a t i o n o f s t r a t e g i c w a r n i n g i s no s m a l l f e a t .  I have  attempted t o e s t a b l i s h that Iran's disadvantageous  position  o n t h i s s c o r e stemmed p a r t l y f r o m t h e a u t h o r i t a r i a n  nature  of i t sI r a q i adversary.  which  S i m i l a r t o s e v e r a l regimes  have s u c c e s s f u l l y o r c h e s t r a t e d s t r a t e g i c s u r p r i s e s i n t h e p a s t , most n o t a b l y i m p e r i a l Japan and N a t i o n a l  Socialist  Germany, t h e B a a t h i s t s w e r e a b l e t o o p e r a t e i n a n environment  n e a r l y w h o l l y a l o o f from t h e n o r m a t i v e  c o n s t r a i n t s o f p u b l i c s c r u t i n y t h a t h o l d sway i n d e m o c r a t i c political  systems.  More p r e c i s e l y , t h e c a p a b i l i t y o f t h e  I r a n i a n i n t e l l i g e n c e community t o e f f e c t i v e l y m o n i t o r p l a n s , a l r e a d y m a r r e d by t h e r e v o l u t i o n a r y u p h e a v a l ,  Iraqi was  even f u r t h e r c o m p l i c a t e d by t h e h i g h l y c r y p t i c b e h a v i o r o f the a u t o c r a t i c Baath c a b a l .  The i m p o r t a n t g e n e r a l l e s s o n t o  215 be drawn from t h i s i s n o t t h a t  s t a t e s governed by  a u t h o r i t a r i a n regimes w i l l always succeed i n s t r a t e g i c a l l y s u r p r i s i n g an a d v e r s a r y , b u t , r a t h e r , will  f i n d the task  of obtaining  that  a target  s t r a t e g i c w a r n i n g more  a r d u o u s when f a c i n g a n a u t o c r a t i c , a s o p p o s e d d e m o c r a t i c , opponent. problems  state  to a  T h i s was o n e o f t h e d i f f i c u l t  e n c o u n t e r e d by S t a l i n i n g a u g i n g H i t l e r ' s d e s i g n s . H o w e v e r , i t w o u l d be i n a c c u r a t e  t o conclude that  no  p o t e n t i a l w a r n i n g s i g n a l s were a v a i l a b l e t o t h e I r a n i a n elite.  I r r e s p e c t i v e o f t h e s e c r e t i v e demeanor o f t h e  Baathists, could  t h e r e were innumerable I r a q i m a c h i n a t i o n s  have b e l i e d a h o s t i l e i n t e n t t o c a r e f u l  observers.  F o r example,  c o m p r o m i s e on t e r r i t o r i a l  alerted Iranian  Iranian  Baghdad's f r e q u e n t and open  pronouncements o f d i s s a t i s f a c t i o n w i t h diplomatic  that  officials  e f f o r t s t o reach a  disputes  s h o u l d have  to the p o s s i b i l i t y that  attempt t o use force t o e f f e c t a r e s o l u t i o n . respond t o such outward m a n i f e s t a t i o n s e f f e c t i v e d e f e n s i v e countermeasures warning i n d i c a t o r s of l i k e l y  Iraq  The f a i l u r e t o  by u n d e r t a k i n g  i s not unprecedented:  enemy a g g r e s s i o n w e r e  a v a i l a b l e t o A m e r i c a n and S o v i e t  would  leaders  also  on t h e e v e o f t h e  P e a r l H a r b o r d i s a s t e r and t h e l a u n c h i n g o f O p e r a t i o n Barbarossa.  By a n d l a r g e ,  i ti s safe  t o conclude  that,  given the lack of defensive preparation  underway i n  K h u z e s t a n i n September o f 1980, I r a n i a n  d e c i s i o n - m a k e r s had  f a i l e d t o determine t h e d a t e , hour, and l o c a t i o n o f t h e  216 planned I r a q i attack.  Again,  s h o r t c o m i n g s on t h i s s c o r e of other  the I r a n i a n  somewhat r e f l e c t e d t h e  regimes i n the past.  a general  elite's  For example, i r r e s p e c t i v e of  cognizance w i t h i n the American  intelligence  c o m m u n i t y t h a t t h e J a p a n e s e w o u l d mount a n December o f 1941,  no  attack  O v e r a l l , such h i s t o r i c a l  demonstrate commonalities regarding s t r a t e g i c warning. experiences, effective,  in  s i n g l e analyst expressed a b e l i e f  an a t t a c k d i r e c t e d a t P e a r l H a r b o r w o u l d be Sunday m o r n i n g .  misfortune  Proceeding  elite  from t h e s e  that  l a u n c h e d on  a  analogies failures to  obtain  shared  the paramountcy o f the c o r r e l a t i o n between  timely intelligence gathering  and  analysis  and  t h e w a r d i n g o f f o f s u r p r i s e a t t a c k s becomes r e a d i l y apparent. With f u r t h e r regard study  to i n t e l l i g e n c e problems,  established that internal p o l i t i c a l  this  d i v i s i o n s can  also  s i g n i f i c a n t l y contribute to failures to obtain s t r a t e g i c warning of a planned attack. among p o l i t i c a l  Simply put,  a greater opportunity  g r a n t i n g an  t h i s premise r e s t s upon t h e  The  basic conquered  house.  T h r o u g h an political  adversary  to realize strategic surprise.  c o n c l u s i o n t h a t a d i v i d e d h o u s e i s more e a s i l y than a united  struggles  e l i t e s diminish the l e v e l of a t t e n t i o n  accorded to p o t e n t i a l t h r e a t s , thereby  logic underlying  power  in-depth  examination of the  d i v i s i o n s that obtained  numerous  i n revolutionary Iran,  the  217  c o n t r i b u t i o n of t h i s c o n d i t i o n t o the f a i l u r e of Teheran t o foresee the looming  Iraqi  i n c u r s i o n was  established.  The  most d i s c e r n i b l e i m p r e s s i o n drawn from t h i s e x a m i n a t i o n  is  t h a t t h e v y i n g f o r s u p r e m a c y b e t w e e n t h e de  jure,  e l i t e and  considerable  the c l e r i c a l  facto power—resulted cooperation clerics,  e l i t e — w h i c h wielded i n an a t t e n d a n t  breakdown  i n the i n t e l l i g e n c e process.  l a r g e l y due  secularists,  t o t h e i r d i s d a i n and  attached  little  e s t i m a t e s t h a t were put  The  t h i s s c o r e , t h e most i m p o r t a n t  intelligence  Bani-Sadr  regimes.  f o r the e f f e c t i v e carrying-out of the  important  t a s k o f g a t h e r i n g and  this  is all-  analyzing intelligence  data  obj e c t i v e s .  L a s t l y , proceeding trends  On  l e s s o n t o be d r a w n f r o m  necessary  1  the  intelligence  example i s t h a t a h i g h l e v e l o f e l i t e c o o p e r a t i o n  on an a d v e r s a r y s  powerful  m i s t r u s t of  f o r t h by t h e i m p a i r e d  de  of  more  importance t o the  g r o u p s d i r e c t e d b y t h e B a z a r g a n and  secular  f r o m an o b s e r v a n c e o f t h e  i n superpower m i l i t a r y a c q u i s i t i o n ,  recent  especially  of the United States, i t i s p o s s i b l e t o put  forth a  that few  p o i n t s regarding the f u t u r e importance of s t r a t e g i c s u r p r i s e to global security.  I n s h o r t , as t h e r a p i d i t y and  of the American nuclear arsenal continues i n c r e a s i n g l y approximating there w i l l  o c c u r an  lethality  t o mount,  a real counterforce  thereby  capability,  i n c r e a s e i n p r e s s u r e upon t h e K r e m l i n  p l a c e even g r e a t e r emphasis upon p l a n n i n g  f o r a massive,  preemptive nuclear s t r i k e against the United  States.  to  218 Indeed, p r e e m p t i o n has l o n g been a c a r d i n a l t e n e t o f strategic nuclear doctrine. how  I t i s not d i f f i c u l t t o  t h e c u r r e n t American emphasis  Soviet imagine  upon a t t a i n i n g an  ability  t o d e c a p i t a t e t h e S o v i e t command a n d c o n t r o l s t r u c t u r e w i t h a surprise onslaught u t i l i z i n g a potent, launched c r u i s e m i s s i l e s ,  submarine-launched  m i s s i l e s , and l o w - l e v e l , s u p e r s o n i c t o undermine  d e a d l y mix o f s e a ballistic  bomber s o r t i e s ,  serves  the deterrent value of the c e n t r a l concept of  mutual assured  d e s t r u c t i o n (MAD).  The m a j o r ,  concomitant  r a m i f i c a t i o n s t e m m i n g f r o m a movement away f r o m MAD ever- heightening  i s an  d e s t a b i l i z a t i o n i n the s t r a t e g i c balance  between t h e superpower  rivals.  The g r o w i n g S o v i e t  exposure  t o an A m e r i c a n s t r a t e g i c s u r p r i s e r a i s e s t h e s p e c t e r o f a c c i d e n t a l n u c l e a r war.  an  I n t e r m s o f p r e s c r i p t i o n , arms  c o n t r o l n e g o t i a t i o n s s h o u l d aim a t i n s t i t u t i n g c o n f i d e n c e - b u i l d i n g m e a s u r e s (CBMs).  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" I n R e v o l u t i o n i n I r a n : A R e a p p r a i s a l , p p . 3045. E d i t e d b y E n v o u r K o u r y a n d C h a r l e s M a c D o n a l d . H y a t t s v i l l e , Maryland: I n s t i t u t e o f Middle E a s t e r n and N o r t h A f r i c a n A f f a i r s , 1982. . "Khomeini's P o l i c y toward t h e Mideast." I n G u l f S e c u r i t y i n t o t h e 1980s: P e r c e p t u a l a n d S t r a t e g i c D i m e n s i o n s , pp. 31-46. E d i t e d b y R o b e r t G. D a r i u s , J o h n W. Amos I I , and R a l p h H. Magnus. P a l o A l t o , C a l i f o r n i a : S t a n f o r d U n i v e r s i t y , Hoover I n s t i t u t i o n P r e s s , 1984.  Dawisha, Adeed I . " I r a q i F o r e i g n P o l i c y : M o t i v e s , C o n s t r a i n t s , and P e r f o r m a n c e . " I n S o u r c e s o f D o m e s t i c a n d F o r e i g n P o l i c y i n I r a q , p p . 30-42. E d i t e d b y Z. M i c h a e l S z a z . W a s h i n g t o n , D . 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