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Covenant in Galatians 3:15-18 : a comparative study in the Pauline and Jewish covenant concepts 1988

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COVENANT IN GALATIANS 3:15-18: A COMPARATIVE STUDY IN THE PAULINE AND JEWISH COVENANT CONCEPTS By GEORGE THOMAS TABERT B.A., The Universi ty of B r i t i s h Columbia, 1985 A THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF MASTER OF ARTS in THE FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIES RELIGIOUS STUDIES We accept th is thesis as conforming to the required standard THE UNIVERSITY OF BRITISH COLUMBIA September 1988 © George Thomas Tabert, 1988 In p resen t ing this thesis in partial f u l f i lmen t o f t h e requ i remen ts fo r an advanced d e g r e e at t he Univers i ty o f British C o l u m b i a , I agree tha t t h e Library shall make it f reely available f o r re ference and s tudy . I fu r ther agree tha t pe rmiss ion f o r extens ive c o p y i n g o f th is thesis f o r scholar ly pu rposes may b e g ran ted by the head o f m y d e p a r t m e n t o r by his o r her representat ives. It is u n d e r s t o o d that c o p y i n g o r p u b l i c a t i o n o f th is thesis f o r f inancial gain shall n o t b e a l l o w e d w i t h o u t m y w r i t t e n pe rm iss ion . D e p a r t m e n t o f R e l i g i o u s Studies T h e Univers i ty o f Brit ish C o l u m b i a Vancouver , Canada Date September 1>, 1988 DE-6 (2/88) i i ABSTRACT The present thesis invest igates Paul's understanding of covenant in Gal 3:15-18 and re lates i t to covenantal thought in Judaism. The B ib l i ca l covenant is commonly thought of as a contract with the resu l t that the law is not seen as a covenant in i t s e l f but only as part of a covenant. This covenantal view of the law is seen as the spec i f ic OT and Jewish view and forms the background against which Paul's treatment of the law is studied. The contractual view of covenant and the resul tant way of re la t ing Paul's treatment of the law to Jewish thought is challenged. The problem of def ining Paul's covenant concept is approached from a study of Gal 3:15. The attempts to in te rpre t th is tex t as a descr ipt ion of some i n s t i t u t i o n of the Greco-Roman world are found de f i c i en t . A fresh attempt is made to understand t h i s tex t as re fe r r ing to the OT covenant. I t is argued that diatheke means "an enactment" or "ordinance." This claim counters the common notion that the speci f ic idea in t h i s term is that of one-sidedness in an arrangement, a nuance absent from the Hebraic term b§ri"t. By understanding the OT covenant as an enactment, Paul works with the d e f i n i t i o n of covenant re f lected in the OT and universal ly held in Judaism. There i s therefore no d ispar i t y between Paul and Judaism in d e f i n i t i o n of covenant, as is often assumed. Since covenant is an enactment, law i t s e l f is a covenant rather than being part of a covenant. This notion l i es behind the singular covenant mot i f seen in the l i t e r a t u r e from Qumran. The sectaries saw only one covenant between God and h is people, of which the var ious covenant formulations of the OT are only renewals. The one covenant i s i den t i f i ed with the law. Other Jewish sources surveyed r e f l e c t the same theology of i i i covenant. Paul also understands the law as a covenant but denies the singular covenant mot i f . In Gal 3:17-18 he t reats the Abrahamic and Mosaic covenant formulations as separate and mutually exclusive covenants. By breaking with the singular covenant mot i f , Paul f inds himself outside the pale of Jewish covenantal thought. Paul's break with the Jewish understanding of law l i es thus in his in te rpre ta t ion of the OT covenant formulat ions. i v TABLE OF CONTENTS PAGE ABSTRACT i i TABLE OF CONTENTS iv ABBREVIATIONS v i i CHAPTER 1. A STUDY IN PAUL'S COVENANT CONCEPT 1 A. A Def in i t iona l and Analyt ical Study of Paul's Covenant Concept 1 B. The Contemporary Context fo r the Present Study 4 i . Schoeps: Paul's "Fundamental Misunderstanding" 4 i i . Sanders: Covenantal Nomism 8 i i i . Gaston: Law Without Covenant 11 C. The Prevai l ing Understanding of Covenant 13 D. Questions Raised fo r a Study of Paul's Covenant Concept 15 2. THE INSTITUTION OF GALATIANS 3:15 19 A. Contract or Testamentary Disposition? 19 B. A Last Wi l l and Gal 3:15 22 i . A Last Wi l l and I r revocab i l i t y 22 i i . The Death of the Testator and Gal 3:15,17 25 C. Adoption In ter Vivos and Gal 3:15 29 D. Mattenat Bar i ? and Gal 3:15 32 E. The Bearing of Kleronomia on the Meaning of Diatheke" 38 F. Diathfke as Contract 41 G. Diatheke and the Old Testament Bert t 44 V 3. GALATIANS 3:15 AND THE OLD TESTAMENT BERIT 46 A. Gal 3:15 Re-examined 46 i . The Structure of Gal 3:15-18 46 i i . The Meaning of Kata Anthropon Lego 48 i i i . What is Said Kata Anthropon in Gal 3:15 51 B. Diatheke as Old Testament B e n t 58 C. Paul's Technical Vocabulary 63 4. THE MEANING OF DIATHEKE 68 A. The Broader Usage of Diatheke Apart from He l len is t i c Judaism and Chr is t ian i t y 69 B. The Broader Usage of Diatheke in the LXX and Apocrypha 74 C. Diatheke" as Ordinance 79 5. BERIT AS ORDINANCE 84 A. The LXX Rendering of B e n t 84 B. BeVtt as Ordinance in Hebrew and Aramaic Sources 86 C. BeVtt as Ordinance in the Old Testament 88 D. Covenant as Ordinance 99 6. BERIT AMONG THE QUMRAN SECTARIES 101 A. Covenant, Torah and Community 101 B. Covenant, Torah and Promise 106 C. The Interrelatedness of Promise and Law in Covenant 107 D. Torah as the One Perpetually Renewed Covenant 110 E. Torah and God's Covenant Faithfulness 113 F. Torah and the Promissory Aspect of Covenant 114 G. BeVtt as Diatheke at Qumran 116 vi 7. THE UNITARY VIEW OF COVENANT IN JUDAISM 117 A. P l u r a l i t y of Covenants in Jewish L i tera ture 117 B. The Singular Covenant Motif in Jubilees 122 C. The Primacy of Torah . 125 8. PAUL'S BREAK WITH THE JEWISH UNDERSTANDING OF COVENANT 128 A. Gal 3:15-18 and the Singular Covenant Motif 128 B. Promise and Law as An t i the t i ca l in Their Effects 131 C. Promise and Law as Mutually Exclusive Categories 138 D. Paul's Fundamental Departure from Judaism 141 9. CONCLUSIONS FOR THE STUDY OF COVENANT IN PAUL 142 A. The Results of the Present Study of Paul's Understanding of Covenant 142 B. Understanding Covenant 144 C. Paul's Point of Departure from Judaism 149 D. The F i n a l i t y of Paul's Break with Judaism 153 E. Final Reflections 155 BIBLIOGRAPHY 162 ABBREVIATIONS ANE Ancient Near East BAGD U. Bauer, w. F. Arndt, F. W. Gingrich and F. W. Danker, Greek- English Lexicon of the New Testament and Other Early Christ ian L i te ra tu re , BDB F. Brown, S. R. Dr iver, and C. A. Briggs, Hebrew and English Lexicon of the Old Testament. BDF F. Blass, A. Debrunner and R. W. Funk, A Greek Grammar of the New Testament. Bib B i b l i c a . EncBib T. K. Cheyne and J . Suther land Black ( e d s . ) , Encyclopaedia B ib l i ca . Exp The Expositor. ExpTim Expository Times. HR History of Rel igions. IDB G. A. But t r ick et a l . , (eds . ) , In te rp re te r ' s Dict ionary of the Bib le. JB Jerusalem Bib le. JBL Journal of B ib l i ca l L i t e ra tu re . JTS Journal of Theological Studies. LSJ Liddel l -Scott -Jones, Greek-English Lexicon. MM J . H. Moulton and G. M i l l i gan , The Vocabulary of the Greek New Testament I l l u s t r a t e d from the Papyri and Other Non-Literary Sources. Moul-T J . H. Moulton and N. Turner, A Grammar of New Testament Greek. MT Masoretic Text. NASB New American Standard Bib le. NIV New Internat ional Version. NovT Novum Testamentum. NT New Testament. v i i i NTS New Testament Studies. OT Old Testament. RSV Revised Standard Version. SR Studies in Religion/Sciences re l ig ieuses. Str-B H. Strack and P. B i l le rbeck, Kommentar zum Neuen Testament aus Talmud in Midrash. TDNT G. K i t t l e and G. Fr iedr ich (eds . ) , Theological Dict ionary of the New Testament. TDOT G. J . Botterweck and H. Ringgren (eds . ) , Theological Dict ionary of the Old Testament. TWOT R. L. Harr is , G. L. Archer and B. K. Waltke (eds. ) , Theological Wordbook of the Old Testament. WTJ Westminster Theological Journal. ZAW Z e i t s c h r i f t fuer die al t testamentl iche Wissenschaft. ZNW Z e i t s c h r i f t fuer die neutestamentliche Wissenschaft. 1 CHAPTER 1 A STUDY IN PAUL'S COVENANT CONCEPT A. A Def in i t iona l and Analyt ical Study of Paul's Covenant Concept The re la t ionsh ip between Pauline and Jewish thought has received new c r i t i c a l a t tent ion in the 20th Century due to the fresh attempt in Western scholarship to study Judaism from i t s own sources and fo r i t s own sake.-'- The p a r t i c u l a r l y sore point in th i s re la t ionsh ip is the Pauline treatment of the law. Torah is at the heart of Judaism. But a c r i t i q u e of nomos or law is at the heart of Paul's gospel. I f Paul does not d i rec t his c r i t i q u e of nomos against the Jewish Torah, he has at least been large ly understood to do so. Thus at least fo r Western scholarship, the Pauline understanding of law is the most pressing issue in re la t ing Paul to Judaism. The way the Paul ine c r i t i q u e of law relates to Judaism has been var iously understood. However, the idea of covenant has been consis tent ly seen as of c r i t i c a l importance in t h i s comparative study. The emphasis on covenant in understanding law has come from the Jewish side of the comparison. In the idea of covenant, scholars have seen the important For a review of the general treatment of Judaism in New Testament scho la rsh ip w i t h i t s tendency to c h a r a c t e r i z e Judaism from i t s own perspective and a ca l l f o r a proper c r i t i c a l study of Judaism, see E.' P. Sanders, Paul and P a l e s t i n i a n Judaism: A Comparison of Patterns of R e l i g i o n , (London: SCM, 1977) 33-59. On Paul and Judaism in Pauline scholarship, see pp. 1-12. Pioneering works in attempting to bring a Judaic in te rpre ta t ion of Judaism to bear on New Testament scholarship are: C. G. Montefiore, Judaism and St. Paul: Two Essays (London: Max Goschen, 1914); G. F. Moore, Judaism in the F i r s t Centuries of the Christ ian Era: The Age of the Tannaim (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Univers i ty , 1927-30) 3 v o l s . ; W. D. Davies, Paul and Rabbinic Judaism (London: SPCK, 1948); and H. J . Schoeps, Paul: The Theology of the Apostle in the Light of Jewish Religious History (Phi ladelphia: Westminster, 1961). 2 category in Judaism t h a t frees Torah from the negative and l e g a l i s t i c elements in the nomos that Paul c r i t i c i z e s . As might be expected, t h i s has raised some c r i t i c a l questions about the Pauline c r i t i q u e of law. Did Paul f a i l to grasp the idea of covenant so central in Judaism? Or did Paul s imply re jec t the Jewish idea of covenant? Or is the nomos of Paul's c r i t i que not the Torah of Judaism? Such questions about Paul and the Jewish covenant concept address the very heart of Pauline thought. Unfortunately, the discussion has largely been carr ied on without a s u f f i c i e n t e f f o r t given to def ining the covenant concept in e i ther Paul or Judaism. The neglect of so basic a task has l e f t the discussion somewhat vulnerable, not only to a lack of precision and c l a r i t y , but also to a f a u l t y analysis of the re la t ionship between Paul and Judaism on t h i s po in t . An attempt to f u l f i l t h i s c r i t i c a l task is made in t h i s thes is . That there is a d ispar i t y between the concept of covenant in Paul's c r i t i que of nomos and in the Jewish view of Torah is c lear . While Judaism embraces Torah not only as a covenant but also in uni ty with the patr iarchal covenant of promise, Paul relegates nomos to a negative ro le and isolates the patr iarchal covenant from i t . The temptation is simply to point to some fundamental d ispar i t y in understanding or subject on the part of Paul. Either he misunderstands the Jewish idea of covenant or he is not speaking of the Torah of Judaism. The matter, however, is not that simple. A d i s t i n c t i o n must be made between the d e f i n i t i o n of covenant worked with and the theology of covenant worked out. The d e f i n i t i o n of covenant concerns the nature of covenant as an i n s t i t u t i o n . The theology of covenant concerns the in te rpre ta t ion of the divine covenant formulations of the OT. The real d ispar i t y between Paul and Judaism l i es in the l a t t e r area. Paul's covenant term is diatheke, by which he understands the OT b e r f t . 3 D e f i n i t i o n a l l y , he understands t h i s category as a binding act , enactment or ordinance. Paul shares th i s d e f i n i t i o n of covenant with a l l Judaism. There is no d ispar i t y between Paul and Judaism on the d e f i n i t i o n of the covenant concept. Paul r a d i c a l l y breaks with Judaism, however, in the area of theology of covenant. Judaism has a uni tary view of covenant. The major covenant f o r m u l a t i o n s of the OT are seen as re-enactments of one covenant. Acco rd ing l y , the promissory and l e g i s l a t i v e aspects of covenant are inseparably uni ted. What Judaism thus holds together, Paul sets apart . Promise and law are seen as mutually exclusive and the Abrahamic and Mosaic covenant formulations as separate enactments. While the di f ference between the Pauline and Jewish view of covenant i s rad ica l , the basic agreement on the nature of the covenantal i n s t i t u t i o n must not be los t to view. This is of c r i t i c a l importance fo r determining p r e c i s e l y where and why Paul departs from the Jewish understanding of covenant. The claim that Paul understands diatheke simply as the OT ber t t must be p r i n c i p a l l y tested against Gal 3:15, which is universal ly understood as re fe r r ing to a legal i n s t i t u t i o n of the Greco-Roman world rather than the OT b e r t t . The paragraph containing t h i s t e x t , Gal 3:15-18, i s also of c r i t i c a l importance fo r re la t ing Paul's understanding of covenant to that of Judaism. I t r e f l e c t s both Paul's basic agreement with Judaism on the nature of the i n s t i t u t i o n of covenant and his radical break from Judaism over the theology of covenant. Therefore, t h i s thesis w i l l t r ea t p r i n c i p a l l y the covenant concept in t h i s passage. 4 B. The Contemporary Context fo r the Present Study The re la t ionship between Paul's c r i t i que of the law and the Jewish understanding of covenant has been worked out var iously by d i f fe ren t scholars. The posit ions of three 20th Century scholars w i l l be summarized to provide a contemporary context for the de f in i t i ona l and analyt ical task of t h i s thes is . i . Schoeps: Paul's "Fundamental Misunderstanding" Schoeps closes his chapter on "Paul's Teaching About the Law" in his work on Paul with a section e n t i t l e d , "Paul's Fundamental Misapprehension." This t i t l e , which r e f e r s to Paul 's no t ion of covenant, r e f l e c t s a fundamental f r u s t r a t i o n that Schoeps f inds in Paul's teaching about the law. Schoeps is able to f i nd Rabbinic presuppositions in the major elements of Paul's teaching about the law. He sees the key to Paul's doctr ine of the cessation of the law in Christ in the Jewish be l ie f that the law would no longer be in e f fec t in the Messianic era. Paul, however, does not leave the matter of the cessation of the law with th i s Jewish idea. He takes other Jewish ideas, such as the ev i l impulse and the u n f u l f i l a b i l i t y of the law, and pushes them to completely non-Jewish conclusions. Under the t i t l e , "Further Jewish Counter-Posit ions," Schoeps shows how the Jewish doc t r ines of repentance and of power over the ev i l impulse Schoeps, Paul, 213. 3 I b i d . , 171. 5 counter Paul's radical conclusions on the negative side of the law. Thus Judaism always concludes w i th an a f f i r m a t i o n of the law and the respons ib i l i t y to obey i t . Paul, however, in his treatment of the law seems to ignore these doctrines and concludes with the displacement of the law. Schoeps depicts Paul's motive in t h i s as fo l lows: [ H i s ] Messianic dogmatism induced him to assemble a l l those features of the law which indicated that i t would be cancelled in the Messianic age. Every c r i t e r i o n suggesting the law was inadequate fo r salvat ion was emphasized y i order to disperse with the old covenant fo r i n t r i n s i c reasons.. . But fo r Schoeps, the real problem with Paul's view of the law does not l i e in h is Messianic dogmatism and ec lect ic use of Jewish ideas. The problem s t i l l remains how Paul could make such an ec lect ic and non-Jewish use of these ideas. Schoeps f i nd the solut ion to th i s problem in the notion of covenant. In covenant Schoeps sees the decisive category in the Jewish understanding of the law which he f inds lacking in Paul. Paul's f a i l u r e to grasp the covenantal view of the law l i es behind his treatment of the law. In answer to the question whether " . . . Paul r i g h t l y understood the law as the saving p r inc ip le of the old covenant," Schoeps says, " I think that we must answer th i s question in the negat ive."^ He then explains, Paul d id not perce ive . . . tha t in the B ib l i ca l view the law is integral to the covenant; in modern terms was the const i tu t ive act by which the Sinai covenant was r a t i f i e d . . . I n the f i r s t place i t was given in order to bind the I s r a e l i t e people to i t s covenant God as His peculiar possession ('m sg lh ) . The maintenance of th is ordinance, the proving of th is cons t i tu t i ve act, is required of every member of the people in order that the covenant might be r e a l l y embodied in I s r a e l i t e l i f e at a l l times and in a l l places. 4 I b i d . , 193-200. 5 I b i d . , 201. 6 I b i d . , 213. 7 I b i d . 6 In contrast to t h i s B ib l i ca l view, . . .when Paul speaks of the Jewish nomos he implies a twofold c u r t a i l m e n t . . . i n the f i r s t place he has reduced the Torah, which means fo r the Jews both law and teaching, to the ethical (and r i t u a l ) law; secondly, he has wrested and isolated the law from the con t ro l l i ng context of God's covenant with I s r a e l . For Schoeps, the Sinai covenant is more than the law. I t "precedes the 9 10 law" and is the "context" of the law . The key to his understanding of covenant or ber t t is " r e c i p r o c i t y . " He aff i rms that " . . . t h e S ina i t i c ber i th is a sacred legal act of rec ip roc i t y , in the contract ion of which both partners stand on one platform and speak on equal terms, recognizing each 11 12 other (Deut. 26:17-18)." The covenant is a foedus aequum. The people of Israel are confoederati and between Israel and God " . . . e x i s t s a genuine r e l a t i o n s h i p of cont rac t—expressed in a Roman legal formula, a mutua 13 obi igat io--which is indissoluble and unredeemable." I t is a "covenantal l eague" . 1 4 The law's funct ion in th is covenantal re lat ionship was to "bind the 15 I s r a e l i t e people to i t s covenant God as His peculiar possession," and maintenance of i t i s required that "the covenant might be r e a l l y embodied in 8 I b i d . , 213. 9 I b i d . , 196. 1 0 I b i d . , 213. U I b i d . , 214. 1 2 I b i d . 1 3 I b i d . , 215. 1 4 I b i d . 1 5 I b i d . , 213. I c I s r a e l i t e l i f e . " Without the re la t iona l context of covenant, law is reduced to a l e g a l i s t i c func t ion . Thus fo r Schoeps the concept of covenant supplies the law with the pos i t ive dimension that is so rad i ca l l y lacking in Paul's treatment of law. He traces the development toward the Pauline view to the dropping out of the contractual idea in He l len is t ic Judaism. He sees t h i s c lear ly in the LXX which t r a n s l a t e s b e r t t w i th diatheke. Concerning th i s t rans la t ion he remarks, "The voluntary pact involving mutual obl igat ions has become an author i ta t ive legal d isposi t ion rather l i ke a testamentary decision fami l i a r to Greek c i v i l law, from which the profane use of the term d e r i v e s . " ^ Fu r the r , Paul " . . . i s e n t i r e l y dependent on LXX usage, and understands diatheke as a one-sided declarat ion of the w i l l of God, an arrangement which 1 o God has made and authorized." Schoeps concludes, Because Paul had lost a l l understanding of the character of the Hebraic ber i th as a partnership involving mutual ob l igat ions, he fa i l ed to grasp the inner meaning of the Mosaic law, namely, that i t is an instrument by which the covenant is rea l ized. Hence the Pauline theology of law and j u s t i f i c a t i o n begins with the fa te fu l misunderstanding in consequence of which he tears asunder covenant and law, and then represents Christ as the end of the law." Thus fo r Schoeps, Paul's ent i re teaching on the law rests on a fundamental misapprehension concerning the covenantal nature of law, which in turn rests on a f a u l t y d e f i n i t i o n of covenant. 1 6 I b i d . , 213. 1 7 I b i d . , 216. 1 8 I b i d . 1 9 1 b i d . , 218. 8 i i Sanders: Covenantal Nomism Sanders agrees with Schoeps that covenant is the essential category by which the Jewish view of the law must be understood and the f a i l u r e to see law in the context of covenant is the cause for a f a u l t y l e g a l i s t i c view of Judaism. In Paul and P a l e s t i n i a n Judaism, he presents an extensive treatment of the ro le of law in Post -b ib l ica l Judaism. In th i s respect, Sanders' treatment is a great advance on Schoeps. Schoeps deals with Paul's "Fundamental Misapprehension" in a l i t t l e less than six pages. He seeks to prove his covenantal view of law in Judaism simply by point ing out canonical and noncanonical Jewish texts which i den t i f y or in t imate ly re la te law and covenant. With Sanders i t is d i f f e r e n t . He does not t rea t the OT. But he extensively t reats three groups of l i t e r a t u r e from which the view of 1st Century Judaism can be derived: Tannaitic l i t e r a t u r e , the Dead Sea Scrol ls and the Apocrypha and Pseudepigrapha. Sanders f inds a uniform pattern of r e l i g i o n throughout t h i s l i t e r a t u r e , with the (possible) exception of 4 Ezra, which he ca l l s "covenantal nomism." Sanders wr i tes , "B r i e f l y put, covenantal nomism is the view that one's place in God's plan is established on the basis of the covenant and that the covenant requires as the proper response of man his obedience to i t s commandments, while providing means of 20 atonement fo r t ransgression." Stating i t more f u l l y , Sanders wr i tes , The 'pa t te rn ' or ' s t ruc tu re ' of covenantal nomism is t h i s : (1) God has chosen Israel and (2) given the law. The law implies both (3) God's promise to maintain the elect ion and (4) the requirement to obey. (5) God rewards obedience and punishes transgression. (6) The law provides fo r means of atonement, and atonement resul ts i n (7 ) maintenance or re -es tab l i shment of the covenantal 20 Sanders, Paul and Palestinian Judaism, 75. 9 re la t ionsh ip . (8) Al l those who are maintained in the covenant by obedience, atonement and God's mercy belong to the group which w i l l be saved. An important in te rpre ta t ion of the f i r s t and last points is that e lect ion and u l t imate ly salvat ion are considered to be by God's mercy rather than human achievement. This las t point is Sanders' thes is . Palestinian Judaism is not a re l i g i on of l e g a l i s t i c works-righteousness or of weighing merits against demerits. Obedience to the law is not pr imar i ly with a view to "sa lva t ion . " Rather than such a forward look, obedience has pr imar i ly a backward look to the c o v e n a n t . The covenant causes d i r e c t l y both s a l v a t i o n and the respons ib i l i t y to obedience. So one is "saved" by v i r tue of the covenant and not by h is "works." One "works" to maintain his posi t ion in the covenant by v i r tue of which posi t ion he is saved. So, the immediate import of obedience is maintenance in the covenant and not sa lvat ion. Thus, in discussing zgkah and tsadaq in Tannaitic l i t e r a t u r e , Sanders wr i tes , The universal ly held view was rather t h i s : those who accept the covenant, which carr ies with i t God's promise of sa lvat ion, accept also the obl igat ion to obey the commandments by God in connection w i th the covenant. One who accepts the covenant and remains wi th in i t is ' r i gh teous ' , and that t i t l e applies to him both as one who obeys God and as one who has a 'sha^e in the world to come', but the former does not earn the l a t t e r . Covenant expresses the whole re la t ionship between God and His people. Sa lva t ion i s a resu l t of th is re la t ionship given graciously to I s r a e l . Obedience to the law is only I s rae l ' s way of maintaining that re la t ionsh ip . Rather than perfect obedience, the essential requirements are to maintain the covenant in obedience and, in the case of f a i l u r e , to avail oneself of the means of atonement. According to Sanders, i t is not Paul but Western B ib l i ca l Scholarship 2 1 I b i d . , 422. 2 2 I b i d . , 204. 10 t h a t has misunderstood Judaism, and to th i s scholarship he wishes to administer a cor rec t ive . He believes that Paul understood covenantal nomism in Judaism and made that the object of his attack. He wr i tes : Paul seems to ignore (and by impl icat ion deny) the grace of God toward Israel as evidenced by the elect ion and the covenant. But th i s is neither because of ignorance of the s igni f icance of the covenant wi th in Jewish thought nor because of the demise of the covenant conception in late Judaism. Paul in fac t e x p l i c i t l y denies that the Jewish covenant can be e f fec t ive for sa lvat ion, thus consciously denying the basis of Judaism. After l i s t i n g examples of t h i s , l i ke the denial of the i n t r i n s i c value of circumcision, the denial that those who keep the covenant through works receive the promises, and the claim that the covenantal promises apply to Christ ians and not to Abraham's descendants, he states: I t i s not f i r s t of a l l against the means of being properly re l ig ious which are appropriate to Judaism that Paul polemicizes ( 'by works of l a w ' ) , but against the p r i o r fundamentals of Judaism: the e l e c t i o n , the covenant and the law; and i t is because these are wrong t h a t the means appropr ia ted to ' r igh teousness according to the law' (Torah observance and repentance) are held to be wrong or are not mentioned. In short , t h i s i s what Paul f i n d s wrong i n Juda ism: i t i s not Ch r i s t i an i t y . Thus, " . . . t h e basis fo r Paul's polemic against the law, and consequently pz: against doing the law, was his exc lus iv is t soter io logy." 27 Sanders sees possible elements of covenantal nomism in Paul but 2 3 I b i d . , 33f. 2 4 I b i d . , 551. 2 5 I b i d . , 551-2. 2 6 I b i d . , 550. 2 7 I b i d . , 513. 11 denies that covenantal nomism is a major thrust in his thought. He sees 29 in Paul p a r t i c i p a t i o n i s t theology rather than covenantal nomism. i i i Gaston: Law Without Covenant Lloyd Gaston has taken a d i f fe ren t approach to the problem of how Paul's treatment of the law relates to the Jewish covenantal view of law or "covenantal nomism." Rather than seeing any fundamental misapprehension in Paul (Schoeps) or seeing Paul as re jec t ing covenantal nomism (Sanders), Gaston sees Paul as c r i t i q u i n g law without covenant, as the Gentiles have i t . So the nomos that Paul c r i t iques is not the Torah of Judaism. Paul leaves th i s Torah i n t a c t . Gaston keeps Schoeps' charge of "Fundamental Misapprehension" in mind in his work on Paul and the law. He makes reference to th i s "fundamental misapprehension" in each of the f i r s t f i v e of the ten essays published in a 3f) book e n t i t l e d , Paul and the Torah. Gaston hypothet ical ly agrees with Schoeps. In his " In t roduct ion" he wr i tes , I f , on the one hand, one were to assume that Paul's statements about the Torah were intended to be d i r e c t e d against the understanding of Judaism, then. . . the conclusion would have to be I b i d . , 513-4. Sanders ( I b i d . , 511f) sees in Davies' (Paul and Rabbinic Judaism) in terpre ta t ion of Paul's theology the pattern of r e l i g i on of covenant nomism. Sanders, however, denies that t h i s is the case. 29 M. D. Hooker ("Paul and 'Covenantal Nomism'," Paul and Paulinism: Essays in Honour of C. K. Bar re t t , eds., M. D. Hooker and S. G. Wilson LLondon: SPCK, 1982J 47-56) argues that Sanders goes too far in set t ing Pauline theology o f f from covenantal nomism. While agreeing with Sanders that Paul's theology is p a r t i c i p a t i o n i s t rather than nomistic,- she argues that the pattern of re l i g ion represented by covenantal nomism is present in Paul's thought as we l l . 30 Lloyd Gaston, Paul and the Torah (Vancouver: Universi ty of B r i t i s h Columbia, 1987) 19,46,61,79,81,82. 12 that in th i s respect at least Paul was simply wrong. This has often been the posi t ion of those who know ear ly Judaism best. For example, in his we l l -wr i t ten study of Pauline theology from a Jewish perspective H. J . Schoeps has to e n t i t l e the conclusion of his chapter on Paul's teaching about the law "Paul's Fundamental Misapprehension." I f Paul does not perceive the re la t ion between covenant and commandment, then he does not understand anything at a l l about Torah., and nothing he says about i t should be taken ser iously. Indeed, even to say "fundamental" misapprehension may be to give Paul too much c r e d i t . Much more l i k e l y is the v i e w . . . t h a t Paul is simply inconsistent and confused. Before coming to such a conclusion, however, i t might be advisable to t r y a d i f f e ren t s ta r t ing p o i n t . . . I shall assume that Paul understood "covenantal nomism" very wel l indeed and t h a t , he is to be interpreted wi th in the context of ear ly Judaism.. . . Gaston comes to Paul with the assumption that Schoeps' and Sanders' understanding of the Jewish view of the law is Paul 's . He d i f f e r s with Schoeps, however, by s ta r t ing " . . . f r o m the premise that Paul knew at least as much about "covenantal nomism" and Jewish "soter io logy" as does E. P. Sanders." 3 2 While Gaston denies from the outset Schoeps' c r i t i c i s m of Paul, he agrees t h a t most of what Paul says about the law is as Schoeps has concluded—without any connection with covenant. Gaston accounts for t h i s 33 by the view, which he sees in ear ly Judaism, that while law was given wi th in the context of covenant to Israel i t was imposed on Gentiles without the context of covenant. So, contrary to the s i tua t ion of I s rae l , Gentiles are not "saved" as a resu l t of being in the covenant but have to work out a l e g a l i s t i c works-righteousness, and they are not in covenant with God but 34 under the administrat ion of angels who punish transgression. 3 1 I b i d . , 4. 3 2 I b i d . , 65. 3 3 I b i d . , 24-28. 3 4 I b i d . , 28. 13 Gaston's view on law and covenant f i t s in with a two-covenant theory 35 which he be l ieves Paul held. According to th is theory God has two covenants: the Sinai covenant with the Jews and a covenant in Christ with the Genti les. Torah is not a covenant for the Gentiles and the covenant in Christ is not fo r Jews. Christ is exclusively fo r Genti les. In f a c t , Gaston denies that Paul sees Jesus as the Messiah fo r the Jews. C. The Prevai l ing Understanding of Covenant Though the three scholars jus t reviewed d i f f e r quite substant ia l ly on how the Pauline c r i t i que of the law relates to Judaism, they share a common set of assumptions about the Jewish or "correct" understanding of covenant and l aw . Covenant i s understood as a r e l a t i o n a l ca tegory , which theo log ica l ly represents the to ta l re la t ionship between God and his people. Law by i t s e l f is understood in a l e g a l i s t i c sense as a mere demand, an i n f l e x i b l e r u l e . Law, however, is freed from i t s l e g a l i s t i c character by being subsumed under covenant. The noncovenantal view of law resul ts in the l e g a l i s t i c character of Paul's (Schoeps) or scholarship's (Sanders) view of the Judaism or of the law fo r Gentiles (Gaston). The " c o r r e c t " view of covenant i s not a d iscovery of recent scholarship. I t is almost universal ly assumed in scholarship, both by the apo log is ts and c r i t i c s of Judaism. Sanders, who seeks to correct a pervasive tendency in NT scholarship, notes: In Chr ist ian scholarship there has generally been the c o n v i c t i o n - a l l but universal ly he ld— tha t there was a degeneration of the b i b l i c a l view in pos t -b ib l i ca l Judaism. The once noble idea of the covenant as offered by God's grace and of obedience as the 3 5 I b i d . , 7 9 . 14 consequence of that gracious g i f t degenerated in to the idea of petty legal ism, according to which one had to earri the mercy of God by minute observance of i r re levant ordinances. Thus, the scholarship that Sanders is t r y ing to correct has the "correct" view of covenant also but is only wrong in not seeing that view in Post- b i b l i c a l Judaism. The prevai l ing understanding of covenant is the resu l t of the triumph of the t r a d i t i o n of t rans la t ion of b e n t introduced by Aquila in the 2nd Century AD. The ear l i es t t r a d i t i o n of t rans la t ion of the Hebrew covenant term is represented by the LXX which t ranslates b e n t with diatheke. This t r a d i t i o n dominates the l i t e r a t u r e of H e l l e n i s t i c Judaism and ear ly Ch r i s t i an i t y . I t passed in to the Occident through the Vetus Latina which, being a t rans la t ion of the LXX, renders diatheke with testamentum. Aqui la, by rendering ber t t with suntheke", introduced a new t r a d i t i o n of t r a n s l a t i o n . As w i l l be seen l a t e r , while diatheke and suntheke could overlap in the i r usage, the two terms represent c lear ly d i s t i n c t concepts. Pi atheke means ordinance or enactment whereas suntheke has the special meaning of agreement or contract . Aquila was followed wi th in Judaism by Symmachus. Aqui la 's rendering of b e n t was introduced into the Occident through Jerome. He affirmed that ber t t did not mean testamentum but rather foedus 37 or pactum. This t r a d i t i o n triumphed over the older one represented by the LXX and Vetus Latina as seen in a l l modern t rans la t ions . I t is represented by the English "covenant," a term stemming from the Lat in convenir, " to agree," the German Bund and the French a l l i ance . Of. Sanders, Paul and Palest inian Judaism, 419. 37 Ernst Kutsch, Neues Testament - Neuer Bund? Eine Fehluebersetzung wird k o r r i g i e r t (Neukirchen-Vluyn: Neukirchener Verlag, 1978) 1. D. Questions Raised for a Study of Paul's Covenant Concept The triumph of Aquila over the LXX has alienated b i b l i c a l scholars somewhat from the NT use of diatheke". Often the NT use of diathgke only gets theological j u s t i f i c a t i o n . I t is admitted that sunthgke is the more accurate term for berTt and then argued that diatheke is theo log ica l ly more appropriate since the pact in mind is rather one sided. For example, Burton a f f i r m s t h a t b e n t "uniformly s ign i f i es 'covenant,' 'compact'" and then suggests that suntheke "the ordinary Greek word for 'compact'...was probably f e l t to be inappropriate to express the thought of the Hebrew berTt, [which was] commonly used not fo r a compact between two part ies of substant ia l ly the same rank, but for a re la t ionsh ip between God and man graciously created o p by God, and only accepted by man". Schoeps re jects any attempt to j u s t i f y the use of diatheke in the LXX 39 and NT. For him, the speci f ic idea in suntheke, which is not brought out in diatheke, alone accurately expresses the idea in b e r i t . Having located in the idea of suntheke the decisive element in Jewish thought that frees the law from the l e g a l i s t i c character of the law Paul c r i t i c i z e s , he traces the f a u l t y view of law that he sees in Paul to the use of diatheke -. Thus Schoeps brings into the foreground the question concerning the d e f i n i t i o n of the b i b l i c a l covenant concept ra ised by the d ivergent t rad i t i ons of 38 Ernest De Witt Burton, A C r i t i c a l and Exegetical Commentary on the Epist le to the Galatians (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1920) 497- 498). Calvin (The Epistles of Paul the Apostle to the Galatians, Ephesians, Phi l ippians and Colossians [Edinburgh: Oliver and Boyd, 1965] 56-57) simply defines diatheke as suntHeke though he concedes that t h i s is not the usual way diatheke was used. This approach at reconci l ing the two t rad i t i ons of t rans la t ion is not common. Schoeps, Paul, 217. 16 t ranslat ions of b e n t . The question concerning the d e f i n i t i o n of the covenant concept also concerns the formulation of the problem of covenant for Pauline studies. Each o f t he t h r e e scholars reviewed above come to Paul w i th the understanding of law and covenant expressed by Sanders' formula, covenantal nomism. For each, the question is how Paul relates to the understanding of covenant in question. This understanding of covenant, however, is based on the par t i cu la r d e f i n i t i o n of the covenant concept represented by Aqui la 's suntheke". I f t h i s d e f i n i t i o n is f a u l t y , then the problem of covenant fo r Pauline studies must be reformulated. In accordance with his concern with d i f f e ren t "patterns of r e l i g i o n , " Sanders does not focus his a t ten t ion , as Schoeps does, on Paul's treatment of the elements of Judaism. He sees in Judaism the pattern of r e l i g i on that he ca l l s covenantal nomism and in Paul a p a r t i c i p a t i o n i s t theology. The two paradigms hardly compare. Thus, while he shares Schoeps' view of covenant, he does not share his c r i t i que of Paul. According to Sanders, Paul re jec ts Judaism because i t is a pattern of re l i g ion that is d i f fe ren t from his own. This means that Judaism is c r i t iqued from without and the question of Paul's treatment of the elements of Judaism is minimized. Accordingly, Sanders writes concerning Paul's treatment of the law: The law is good, even doing the law is good, but salvat ion is only by Chr is t ; therefore the ent i re system represented by the law is worthless fo r sa lvat ion. I t is the change of ' en t i re systems' which makes i t unnecessary for him to speak about repentance or the grace of God shown in the giving of the covenant...Paul was not t r y ing accurately to represent Judaism on i t s own terms, nor need we suppose that he was ignorant on essential po in ts . He simply saw the old dispensation as worthless in comparison with the new. Sanders, Paul and Palestinian Judaism, 550-551. 17 Thus Sanders sees Paul taking a rather sweeping approach in c r i t i c i z i n g Judaism. The d i f f e r e n t approaches to explaining Paul's c r i t i que of the law represented by Schoeps and Sanders r a i s e the question whether Paul's c r i t i que of law is based on an understanding of elements wi th in Judaism, such as covenant, or on a perspective wholly d i f fe ren t from and thus without Judaism. Does Paul re jec t law on internal or on external grounds? This quest ion ra ises the need to p i n - p o i n t Paul's point of departure from Judaism. Gaston short-cuts the problem of how the law of Paul's c r i t i q u e re lates to Judaism i t s e l f by making i t a law fo r Gentiles only. Consequently, Paul's c r i t i que does not a f fect the law wi th in Judaism, which, according to Gaston, Paul understands in terms of covenantal nomism. For the present study, Gaston's thesis raises the question whether Paul's thought allows fo r covenantal nomism or fo r the speci f ic Jewish understanding of covenant. The quest ions ra ised are i n t ima te l y related and w i l l be answered through the present de f in i t i ona l and analyt ical study of Paul's covenant concept. The demonstration that Paul works with the d e f i n i t i o n of covenant un i ve rsa l l y held in Judaism leads the study to determine where and how Paul's thought departs from Judaism. This, in t u r n , w i l l enable us to determine i f there is any room in Paul's thought fo r covenantal nomism. A f i n a l word on the use of "covenant" i n the present study is necessary. The use of "covenant" fo r the b i b l i c a l category in question stands s o l i d l y wi th in the t rans la t ion t r a d i t i o n i n i t i a t e d by Aqui la . This thes is , however, argues in favour of the t rans la t ion t r a d i t i o n of the LXX and so concludes that the idea in "covenant," i . e . , agreement, does not accura te ly represent the b i b l i c a l category. However, since the term 18 covenant is so deeply entrenched in b i b l i c a l and theological studies and vocabulary, i t w i l l be reta ined. 19 CHAPTER 2 THE INSTITUTION OF GALATIANS 3:15 A. Contract or Testamentary Disposit ion? Galatians 3:15 of fers a par t i cu la r promise fo r def ining Paul's covenant concept. I t is the only tex t in which Paul does not simply employ diatheke, his covenant term, wi th in a discussion but actua l ly points something out about the i n s t i t u t i o n . Concerning a diatheke, he says that oudeis athetei e ep id ia tasseta i . In f a c t , in Gal 3:15 Paul even steps out of the theological context of the discussion to make his point about the nature of a diatheke as signal led by his formula, kata anthropon lego. Unfortunately, in spi te of the promise that these features of Gal 3:15 hold out fo r def ining diatheke, scholarship has not been able to come to a sat is fac tory explanation of t h i s t e x t . Which i n s t i t u t i o n Paul has in mind s t i l l remains a question that has not been s a t i s f a c t o r i l y answered. There is universal agreement in scholarship concerning the ro le of t h i s text in Paul's argument. In Gal 3:15, i t is agreed, Paul draws an analogy of the div ine diatheke from human experience, which he uses as a premise f o r his argument concerning the re la t ionship between the promise and law in v 17. That Paul i s drawing on human pract ice fo r his argument is taken from his introductory formula, kata anthropon lego, which is interpreted as " I draw an i l l u s t r a t i o n from common human p r a c t i c e . " 1 Also, anthropou diathSke is taken in the sense of a diatheke such as human make. Accordingly, Paul is made i m p l i c i t l y to reason that what is t rue of a human diatheke is also Burton, Galatians, 178. 20 t r u e of a d iv ine d j j t h f k l , or perhaps, that i f i t is t rue of a human diatheke, how much more is i t t rue of a divine one. Agreeing on these points of in te rpre ta t ion of Gal 3:15, scholars are l e f t with the task of determining which legal i n s t i t u t i o n of the Greco-Roman world of the 1st Century Paul has in mind. The discussion has centered around two basic types of i n s t i t u t i o n s : a testamentary d i spos i t i on 3 or a contract . Unt i l the impact of the discovery of the papyri made i t s e l f f e l t in New Testament scholarship at the turn of the century, scholars working with the agreed upon assumptions about the basic meaning of Gal 3:15 could easi ly argue t h a t Paul had a c o n t r a c t in mind. The papyrological evidence, however, made a decisive d i f ference. Ramsay states the impl icat ion of th i s evidence fo r the common in te rp re ta t ion : . . .Paul says that he is speaking "a f te r the manner of men," I I I 15. He therefore is employing the word in the sense in which i t was commonly used as part of the ordinary l i f e of the c i t i e s of the East. What th i s sense was there can be no doubt. The word is often found in the insc r ip t ions , and always in the same sense which i t bears in the c lassical Greek wr i t e rs , Wi l l or Testament. As w i l l be seen l a t e r , Ramsay overstates the case when he says that diatheke always has the sense of testament or w i l l in the c lassical Greek w r i t e r s . He is cor rect , however, as to the usage of the word in the la te r evidence So Mart in Luther, Commentary on Galatians (Grand Rapids: Kregel* 1979) 1 7 8 f . , and John Calvin, The Epistles of Paul the Apostle to the Galatians, e t c . , 56, and most other commentators. 3 By " tes tamentary d i s p o s i t i o n " i s meant any d ispos i t ion made in contemplation of death. This includes more than a las t w i l l as the ensuing discussion shows. , 4 W. M. Ramsay, A H is to r ica l Commentary on St. Paul's Epist le to the Galatians (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1900) 350. 21 offered by the inscr ip t ions and papyr i . Deissmann expresses sentiments s imi lar to Ramsay. He, however, goes fu r ther and extends the conclusion drawn from the papyrological evidence to every occurrence of diatheke. He wr i tes : Now as the new texts help us generally to reconstruct He l len is t ic f a m i l y law and the law of inher i tance, so in par t i cu la r our knowledge of He l len is t i c w i l l s has been wonderfully increased by a number of o r ig ina ls on stone or papyrus. There is ample material to back me in the statement that no one in the Mediterranean world in the f i r s t century A.D. would have thought of f ind ing in the word diatheke the idea of "covenant." St. Paul would not, and in fac t did not. To St. Paul the word meant what i t meant in his Greek Old Testament, "a un i la tera l enactment," in par t i cu la r "a w i l l or testament." Ramsay, who wrote at the t ime the evidence of the papyr i and inscr ip t ions was beginning to make i t s e l f f e l t on New Testament scholarship (1900), could l i s t a whole battery of "excel lent scholars" who interpreted diatheke in Gal 3:15 as covenant or Bund (Calv in, Beza, F l a t t , Higenfeld, Meyer, L i g h t f o o t ) or i n the more general sense of d e t e r m i n a t i o n , Wi 1 lensverfuegung or Bestimmung (Zoeckler, P h i l l i p p i , L ips ius, Hofmann, Schott, Winer) . 7 Betz, however, wr i t i ng much l a t e r , can claim the vast major i ty of scholars in support of rendering diath§ke with testament and o notes only one dissenting voice in the 20th Century, Burton. The triumphant i n te rp re ta t i on , however, is a f f l i c t e d with one c r i t i c a l problem that threatens to unsett le i t . Bammel declares the triumph of the 5 Moulton and Mi l l igan w r i t e , " In papyri and insc r r . the word means testament, w i l l , with absolute unanimi ty . . . " MM 148. ft Adolf Deissmann, Light from the Ancient East (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1911) 341. See also Deissmann, Paul: A Study in Social and Religious History (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1912) 152. ^Ramsay,' H is tor ica l Commentary on Galatians, 349. 8Hans Dieter Betz, Galatians (Phi ladelphia: Fortress, 1979) 155 n. 17. 22 in te rpre ta t ion of Gal 3:15 which sees in i t the i n s t i t u t i o n of a testament as f o l l o w s : "Es hat lange Z e i t gebraucht, bis sich diese Erkenntnis durchsetzte und e igent l ich erst das reiche Vergleichsmaterial, das in den l e t z t e n ach tz ig Jahren zugef lossen i s t . . . h a t d ie Bedeutung Testament s i che rges te l l t . " But he immediately continues: "Umso weniger hat sich K l a r h e i t darueber ergeben, von welchem Rechte her Paulus denkt und g argumentiert." The search fo r a speci f ic testamentary i n s t i t u t i o n that meets the requirements of Paul's argument in Gal 3:15,17 has f a i l e d . B. A Last Wi l l and Gal 3:15 The contention that Gal 3:15 refers to a las t w i l l encounters two d i f f i c u l t i e s : 1) the revocab i l i t y of a w i l l , and 2) the inseparable l ink between a w i l l and the notion of the death of the tes ta to r . i . A Last Wi l l and I r revocab i l i t y I f diatheke in Gal 3:15 refers to a w i l l and i f Paul is drawing an analogy from common human pract ice , then the question concerning which legal i n s t i t u t i o n Paul has in mind must be answered. The given i n s t i t u t i o n must f i r s t of a l l match Pau l 's statement concerning a diatheke that oudeis athetei e ep id ia tasseta i , i . e . , i t must be i r revocable. The testamentary d isposi t ion must be i r revocable. The ea r l i es t attempt at precisely iden t i f y ing the legal i n s t i t u t i o n y E . Bammel, "Gottes DIATHEKE (Gal. I I I . 15-17.) und das juedische Rechtsdenken," NTS 6 (1958/59) 313. 23 behind Gal 3:15 looked to Roman jur isprudence. 1 ^ The problem with the Roman w i l l is that i t was very vulnerable and thus does not meet the requirements of Gal 3 : 1 5 . 1 1 H e l l e n i s t i c j u r i sp rudence i s a natural a l ternate sphere of legal pract ice to look t o . Eger argues at length that Paul has a He l len is t ic w i l l 12 in mind. He re lates the oudeis athetei e epidiatassetai in Gal 3:15 to the penalty clause (Strafk lausel) found in He l len is t ic w i l l s . This clause establishes the punishment for any one who does contrary to the w i l l . I t also appears before the statement he diatheke kur ia which Eger re lates to 1 o Paul's kekuromene diathlke in Gal 3:15. The diathemenos, the one making the w i l l , however, is exempted from the penalty clause. He retains the r i gh t to metadiat i thesthai and akuroun while he l i v e s . 1 4 This means that the oudeis of Gal 3:15 would not include God who makes the d ia th ike . This exemption of God from the r e s t r i c t i o n s on the diatheke would be fa ta l to Paul's argument and thus weakens Eger's 'case. One could respond to Paul that God himself annulled or replaced the promise when he gave the law. Paul's opponents might have argued that the law, i f not a dimension of the eg . , Max Conrat, "Das Erbrecht im Galaterbr ief (3 ,15-4 ,7) , " ZNW 5 (1904) 204-227. Bammel (NTS 6 [1958/59] 313) notes the ea r l i e r studies: W. E. Ba l l , The Contemporary Review, 60 (1881), 286f.; and A. Halmel, Ueber roemisches Recht im Galaterbr ief (L895). ^ F o r a c r i t i que of the Roman w i l l as the i n s t i t u t i o n behind Gal 3:15, see Ramsay, H is tor ica l Commentary on Galatians, 351-352. 12 Otto Eger, "Rechtswoeter und Rechtsb i lder in den paulinischen Br ie fen, " ZNW 18 (1917/18) 84-108. 1 3 I b i d . , 90. 1 4 I b i d . , 92. 24 1 c promise i t s e l f , was added to the promise by God. I f Paul would r e t o r t that t h i s would inval idate (akuroun) the diatheke (v 17), they could respond that God, who is exempt from any r e s t r i c t i o n s on the diatheke, could do t h i s . Schmiedel seeks to evade th i s d i f f i c u l t y by appealing to Gal 3:19 as evidence that Paul did not regard the law as coming from God but from angels. He wr i tes : When i t is said (3:15) that 'no man maketh void or addeth t o ' a man's testament, the tes ta tor himself is not to be regarded as included in the proposi t ion. He himself might perhaps have i t in his power to change i t . Only, t h i s p o s s i b i l i t y does not come in to account in the case under considerat ion. For in the apost le 's view i t is not God but the angels who are regarded as the authors of the Mosaic law, which announces a change of the divine purpose --compared to a testament—given in the promise to Abraham. Of the angels he assumes t h a t t h e i r ac t ion was on t h e i r own respons ib i l i t y , not at the command of God. Schmiedel's appeal to v 19 is both grammatically and theo log ica l ly dubious. When Paul speaks of the establ ishing of the diatheke" by God in v 17, he uses hupo with the passive. When speaking of the ordaining of the law by angels, however, he uses dia with the passive. The passive plus hupo in the expression kekuromenen hupo tou theou (v 17) refers to an or ig ina t ing agency. The passive plus d ia , however, refers to instrumental i ty." '" 7 Burton notes, " d i ' aggelon does not describe the law as proceeding from angels, but only as being given by t he i r i n s t r u m e n t a l i t y . . . . " This much is clear from the use of the d i f f e ren t preposi t ions: the angelic ro le in v 19 is not the ^ T h i s was the Jewish view. See chapter 6, "Ber t t Among the Qumran Sectar ies," pp 101-116 below. 1 6 W. J . Woodhouse and P. W. Schmiedel, "Ga la t ia , " EncBib 2. 1611. 1 7 A . T. Robertson, A Grammar of the Greek New Testament in the Light of H is tor ica l Research (Nashvi l ie: Broadman, 1934) 820. 18 Burton, Galatians, 503. same as the divine ro le in v 17 which would not be the case i f , l i ke God, 19 the angels made a diathgke. Schmiedel's thesis is also in c o n f l i c t with Paul's theology. I f i t is t rue , as Schmiedel states in the quotation given above, that the angels giving the law are the t h i r d int ruding party, then the law is not only d isassoc ia ted from God, but also against the promises of God. Paul, however, denies in Gal 3:21 that the law is kata t(3n epaggelion tou theou. Even i f Schmiedel's in te rpre ta t ion of the ro le of angels in the giving of the law in Gal 3:19 were correct , excluding God from the oudeis of v 15 nevertheless great ly weakens Paul's argument. Paul's argument would s t i l l be vulnerable to the suggestion that God may have revoked or changed the diatheke. For Paul, however, the i r r e v o c a b i l i t y of the diatheke in vv 15,17 has an absolute character that makes the diatheke irrevocable in p r i n c i p l e , even fo r God. i i . The Death of the Testator and Gal 3:15,17 Luther, who saw a las t w i l l in Gal 3:15,17, incorporated the idea of the death of the testa tor in to his exposit ion of the t e x t . Commenting on v 17, he s tates: For when a man maketh his last w i l l , bequeathing his lands and goods to h is h e i r s , and thereupon d i e t h , h is l a s t w i l l i s conf i rmed and r a t i f i e d by the death of the tes ta to r , so that nothing may now be added to i t , or taken from i t , according to a l l law and equi ty. Now, i f a man's w i l l is kept with so great By d iatageis, Paul seems to have the implementation of the law in the world rather than the source of the law in mind. This is suggested by the fac t that the mediator, along with the angels, is the agent of the passive. The mediator's ro le is c lear ly instrumental. J . B. L ight foot (The Epist le of St. Paul to the Galatians [Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 1957] 145) renders diatageis d i ' agge!5n with "administered by the medium of angels." 26 f i d e l i t y , how much more ought the l a s t w i l l of God to be f a i t h f u l l y kept, which He promised and gave unto Abraham and his seed a f ter him? For when Christ d ied, then was i t confirmed in Him, and a f t e r His death the w r i t i n g of His las t w i l l was opened.. . . This was the las t w i l l and testament of God, the great tes ta to r , confirmed by the death of C h r i s t . . . . " Luther's language c lear ly echoes the language of Heb 9:16-17. Yet, he does no t r e f e r t o t h i s t e x t as a source or c o n f i r m a t i o n of h is i n te rp re ta t ion . No doubt, f o r Luther the idea of a w i l l taking e f fec t only upon the death of a tes ta tor was commonplace and so needed no b i b l i c a l support. This idea was also commonplace in the 1st Century. An examination of Gal 3:15,17 shows, however, that the idea of the death of God as tes ta tor is incongruous with the thought of the passage. Burton r i g h t l y observes, " I t i s against the theory that diatheke in 3:17 i s a w i l l that i t is expressly said to have been made by God. For a w i l l becomes e f fec t ive only on the death of the maker of i t . " He then adds that i t is " d i f f i c u l t to suppose that the incongruous element of the death of God should e i ther be involved in the argument of vv. 15-17 or , though implied in the language, be ignored in s i lence when the w i l l is d i r e c t l y cal led G o d ' s . " 2 1 Luther's idea that the death of Christ is the death of the tes ta to r , while probably borrowed from Heb 9:16-17, is e n t i r e l y foreign to Gal 3:15- 17. Throughout the ent i re section in which the theme of inheritance occurs (Gal 3:15-4:7) , Paul does not even mention the death of Chr is t . He only alludes to t h i s once in the reference to Chr is t ' s coming " to redeem those under the law" (4 :5 ) . ^ u Luther , Galatians, 180-181. 21 Burton, Galatians, 502. See also John J . Hughes, "Hebrews IX 15f f . and Galatians I I I 15 f f . : A Study in Covenant Practice and Procedure," NovT 21 (1979) 72. Paul refers to the death of Christ in 3:13. While the death of Christ occurred that "the blessing of Abraham might come to the Genti les" (v 14), which no doubt is the inheritance of v 18, i t does not funct ion to r a t i f y a w i l l . Rather, i t removes the curse of the law so that the blessing might come. Furthermore, in Galatians 3, rather than being the tes ta to r , Christ himself is the seed or the heir (v 16,29). According to Luther's i n te rp re ta t ion , the diathgke would only have been irrevocable and unalterable af ter Chr is t ' s death. Thus, i t s i r r e v o c a b i l i t y could only be urged against Paul's opponents since Christ had already died. But t h i s i s not what Paul does. Rather, he urges the covenant 's i r r e v o c a b i l i t y in view of the law given at S inai , long before Christ d ied. The prokekuromene of v 17 c lear l y suggests that the diathlke went in to i r revocable e f fec t as soon as i t was made, as soon as the promise was spoken. The incongruity between Paul's use of prokuroun and the idea of a w i l l is pointed out by Behm, who also sees a w i l l in Gal 3:15. Commenting on Paul's use of prokuroun, he wr i tes , "The image and thought are here very contradictory, fo r whereas a human w i l l comes in to e f fec t only with the death of the tes ta to r , the w i l l and testament of God. . . is put in to e f fec t as soon as i t i s drawn up, and from th i s point on i t is exclusively and 22 incont rover t ib ly v a l i d . . . . " Luther's attempt to incorporate the idea of the death of the tes ta tor into the meaning of Gal 3:15,17 f a i l s under a scrut iny of the t e x t . I t is not surpr is ing that t h i s aspect of his in te rpre ta t ion of the tex t has not found acceptance in scholar ly i n te rp re ta t i on . TDNT 3. 1100. 28 The incongruity of the notion of death with the idea of a l i v i n g God means that God can only be seen as making a testament by suppressing the 23 notion of the death of the tes ta to r . This not ion, however, is d i f f i c u l t to suppress since the death of the testa tor is essential to the concept of a testament. Not only was the i r r e v o c a b i l i t y of a testament dependent on the death of the tes ta to r , the very notion of a testamentary d isposi t ion was inseparably l inked with death. The pract ice of wi l l -making arose in Ancient Greece out of the concern for a successor for the man who did not have a natural he i r . The primary ro le of the heir was not to take over a man's property but to keep the oikos and i t s c u l t a l i ve . I n i t i a l l y , t h i s need was met simply by adoption. A man who had no sons would adopt a son during his l i f e t i m e . This adopted son would leave the oikos of his father to j o i n and then eventual ly take over the adopter's oikos. The next step in the development of the laws of inheritance was taken by Solon, in the f i r s t hal f of the 6th Century B.C., by "permit t ing a man without sons to adopt a son by w i l l , so that the adoption took e f fec t only 24 af ter his death." MacDowell notes that th i s innovation gave "the wishes of the ind iv idua l , as expressed in a wr i t ten document, precedence over the 25 r igh ts of other members of the fami ly . " Eger (ZNW 18 [1.917/18] 96) makes the strange suggestion that Paul has the testament of one who is about to die in mind. This enables him to a f f i rm that God, the tes ta to r , is exempt from the oudeis and yet maintain that Paul envisions no p o s s i b i l i t y of God changing the diatheke*. But Paul ce r ta in l y did not envision God as a dying tes ta to r . Eger's attempt to both have a w i l l in Gal 3:15 and maintain the diathgke*'s i r r e v o c a b i l i t y f a i l s . 24 Douglas M. MacDowell, The Law in Classical Athens (London: Thames and Hudson, 1978) 100. 2 5 I b i d . 29 In the 6th Century, the idea of the oikos s t i l l dominated laws of inheritance and so also the use of the w i l l . By the time of Paul, however, the w i l l was independent of such concerns fo r succession. Nevertheless, death was always the c r i t i c a l event that both occasioned and brought in to ef fect the w i l l . C. Adoption In ter Vivos and Gal 3:15 Ramsay, seeing the incongruity of the las t w i l l with Gal 3:15, sought t o e x p l a i n t h i s t e x t i n l i g h t of the Greek p r a c t i c e of adopt ion 26 i n te r v ivos. He wri tes concerning Gal 3:15: We are confronted with a legal idea that the duly executed Wil l cannot be revoked by a subsequent act of the tes ta to r . Such i r r e v o c a b i l i t y was a character is t ic feature of Greek law, according to which an heir outside the fami ly must be adopted i n t o the f a m i l y ; and the adoption was the w i l l making...The appointment of an heir was the adoption of a son, and was f i n a l and i r revocable. The tes ta to r , a f ter adopting his he i r , could not subsequently take away from him his share in the inheritance or impose new conditions on his succession." Ramsay is correct on the irrevocable nature of adoption in ancient Greek law. His case that th i s i n s t i t u t i o n applies to Gal 3:15, however, f a l l s apart on h i s to r i ca l grounds. Ramsay assumes that there was one type of Greek w i l l which was fo r adoption and was irrevocable over against the Roman w i l l which was a pr ivate Ramsay, H i s t o r i c a l Commentary on Galatians, 349-356. Deissmann (Paul, 152) argues the same thes is . For a systematic c r i t i c i s m of Ramsay's argument, see P. W. Schmiedel's discussion on " Inher i tance, e tc . " in the a r t i c l e , "Ga la t ia , " EncBib, 2. 1608-1610. For a sympathetic treatment of Ramsay's thes is , see W. M. Calder, "Adoption and Inheritance in Gala t ia , " JTS 31 (1930) 372-374. Calder, while taking up Ramsay's cause, only argues that He l len is t i c legal pract ice is in mind in Gal 3:15. Ramsay, H is tor ica l Commentary on Galatians, 351. 30 28 document and revocab le . This assumption, however, is incorrect and ignores the h i s to r i ca l development evident in the Greek pract ice of w i l l - making. The Greek pract ice of wi l l -making went through the fo l lowing stages of development: adoption in te r v ivos, testamentary adoption, w i l l s adopting sons and making bequests to o t h e r s , and w i l l s e n t i r e l y divorced from 29 adoption. Thus the Greek w i l l became divorced from the idea of adoption. This divorce occurred quite ear ly . Norton notes that by the 3rd Century B.C. the Greek w i l l "came to be e n t i r e l y divorced from the idea of adoption •3(1 that had given i t b i r t h . " J U Eger wr i tes , "Meines Wissens i s t aus der Zei t des Paulus und auch aus e r h e b l i c h f ruehere r Z e i t kein Beleg fue r testamentansche Adoption aus dem hel lensi t ischen Rechtsgebiet bekannt." Not on ly does Ramsay neglect the h i s to r i ca l development in Greek p rac t i ce of wil l -making and thus applies a c lassical pract ice to a 1st Century s i t u a t i o n , he also confuses the two ca tegor ies of adoption in te r vivos and adoption by w i l l . There were th ree methods of adopt ion in the C lass ica l p e r i o d : 32 in te r v ivos, by w i l l and posthumously. As already not iced, the purpose of adoption was to keep a man's oikos and i t s ancestral r i t e s a l i v e . To ensure the continuance of the man's d i s t i n c t oikos and guard against neglect of i t s 2 8 I b i d . , 366. 29 Hughes, NovT, 21 (1979) 84 and F. 0. Norton, A Lexicographical and H is tor ica l Study of DIATHEKE from the Ear l ies t Times to the End of the Classical Period (Chicago: Universi ty of Chicago, 1908) 69. 30 Norton, A Lexicographical and His tor ica l Study of DIATHEKE, 71. 3 1 Eger , ZNW 18 (1917/18) 95. 32 A. R. W. Harr ison, The Law of Athens: The Family and Property (2 v o l s . ; Oxford: Clarendon, 1968) 1. 83. 31 c u l t , the adoptee had to give up his place in his natural fa ther ' s oikos to take over the adopter's oikos. In the case of adoption in ter vivos th i s exchange took place during the adopter's l i f e - t i m e . Since the adoption meant that the adoptee gave up his membership in his natural oikos, qui te obv ious ly the adopter could not revoke the adoption. In f a c t , by i t s nature, adoption in te r vivos was a contract and so was not subject to the 33 a r b i t r a r y w i l l of the adopter . The adopter was res t r i c ted by the adoption. Adoption by w i l l only took e f fec t a f ter the death of the adopter. I t 34 was not a contract . In f a c t , the adoptee did not even necessari ly know of his adoption before the adopter's death. Also, the w i l l f o r adoption could be revoked at any time by the adopter. So, adoption by w i l l en ta i ls the same d i f f i c u l t i e s in explaining Gal 3:15 as what Ramsay ca l l s the Roman w i l l , "a pr ivate and revocable document." Posthumous adoption is hardy relevant to the discussion since i t was adoption without any involvement of the deceased. Norton summarizes the relevant information as fo l lows: We have seen t h a t the adoption from which the Geek w i l l was derived was a legal contract which could not be revoked without the consent of both par t ies to i t . This. . .has given r ise to the idea t h a t i t (a w i l l ) was also a contract , and consequently i r r e v o c a b l e . B u t . . . s i n c e even in i t s rudimentary stage of testamentary adoption the eispoiesis was not completed by the w i l l i t s e l f , i t was not a con t rac t in the eyes of the law, and consequently, while adoption in te r vivos was irrevocable except by the consent of both p a r t i e s , testamentary adoption could be revoked at the pleasure of the tes ta to r . Ramsay made the mistake that Norton points out: he applied the pr inc ip les 3 3 I b i d . , 89. 3 4 I b i d . , 90. 35 Norton, A Lexicographical and His tor ica l Study of DIATHEKE, p. 63. 32 of adoption in ter vivos to adoption by w i l l . But of equal seriousness is the mistake of reading a pract ice from the ear l i es t stage of the development of w i l l making in to a s i tua t ion that comes from the period of i t s la tes t development in which the e a r l i e r pract ice was long obsolete. D. The MattHnat Bar?' and Gal 3:15 Another attempt to explain Gal 3:15 in terms of testamentary pract ice oc was made by Bammel. Af ter giving a br ie f sketch and c r i t i q u e of the var ious attempts to explain Gal 3:15 in l i g h t of Roman and He l len is t i c pract ices, he turns to Jewish legal pract ice fo r the basis of t h i s t e x t . He rightly dismisses the legal instrument (Rechtsinstrument) of deyafTqt. Not only is the term a loan word, but the notion and pract ice of the i n s t i t u t i o n 37 was taken over from the He l len is t i c w i l l . Bammel also notes that the term deyattqi* only appears in post-New Testament wr i t ings and that the extent of i t s usage in ea r l i e r times is uncertain. More s ign i f i can t for him is the fac t that the use of the deyattqf was l imi ted to the mortal ly i l l . 3 8 This aspect of the dey^t fqt is p a r t i c u l a r l y incongruous with the divine diatheke". For the heal thy , another i n s t i t u t i o n was avai lable, the matt^nat b a n 1 . Bammel f i n d s in t h i s i n s t i t u t i o n "d ie e inz ige echte Sachparal le im 39 juedischen Bereich" to Gal 3:15. 3 6Bammel, NTS 6 (1958/59) 313-319. 37 See also Reuven Yaron, Gi f ts in Contemplation of Death in Jewish and Roman Law (Oxford: Universi ty Press, 1960) 19. 38 See also I b i d . , 25. 39 Bammel, NTS 6 (1958/59) 315. Among commentators, Bammel is followed by Franz Mussner, Der Galaterbr ief (Freiburg: Herder KG, 1974) 237. 33 Bammel po in ts out the s p e c i f i c fea tu re of the mattfenat barT * as fo l lows: (1) Der Gegenstand des Rechtsgeschaefts geht sofor t in den Besitz des so Begabten ueber, der Verfuegende behaelt sich nur des Nutzniessungsrecht bis zu seinem Tode vor; (2) die Verfuegung karin-- im Unterschiede zur d y y t y q y - - u n t e r keinen Umstaenden widerrufen oder abgeaendert werden; (3) es handelt sich urn die Verfuegung eines Gesunden, der Gedanke an den Tod b l e i b t , soweit d i e s bei § 0nem solchen Akte ueberhaupt moeglich i s t , im Hintergrund. Such an i n s t i t u t i o n has clear advantages over the He l len is t ic diatheke, and even more so over the Jewish deyatfqf", in explaining Gal 3:15. As already seen, the status of a diatheke depended on the death of the one who made i t . The l ink with death was even stronger in the case of the deyattq"?. Not on ly could i t only be made by the mortal ly i l l , the deyatfqf was cancelled upon the recovery of the man who made i t . 4 1 In contrast to the deyettfqf, the mattSnat barf * was not t ied to the idea of death. The term mattenat barf* means "the g i f t of one who is in 42 (good) hea l th , " and the g i f t could not be made by a sick man at the point of death. Furthermore, the g i f t went in to e f fec t immediately. Ownership passed from donor to donee while the donor s t i l l l i v e d . However, the donor maintained usufruct u n t i l his death. But the r i g h t to usufruct made no di f ference to the g i f t ' s i rrevocable s ta tus. From a j u r i s t i c point of view, the mattenat barf * was a g i f t and so could not be r e c a l l e d . 4 3 From these features of the mattenat bar f * , Bammel's claim to have found an "echte Sachparallele im juedischen Bereich" receives an obvious warrant. 40 Bammel, NTS 6 (1958/59) 315. 41 Yaron, Gi f ts in Contemplation of Death, 48. 42 Ib id 1 n. 1. 43 Ib id 49f. 34 However, as with Ramsay's attempt to explain Gal 3:15 in l i g h t of the Greek pract ice of adoption in ter v ivos, Bammel's case f a l l s apart on h i s t o r i c a l A 44 grounds. The h i s to r i ca l evidence indicates that the i n s t i t u t i o n which Bammel describes did not ex is t in the 1st Century. Bammel c i tes Nahum the Mede, a judge in Jerusalem pr io r to i t s destruct ion in A.D. 70, as the ea r l i es t Rabbinical example of the use of the mattenat b a r ? \ Tos. B. B. 9. 1 says: R. Nathan says: Nahum the Mede was one of the judges of c i v i l law. He said: whoever assigns his goods to the name of his f r i e n d , one does not compel him (the doneeLjto return i t ; but i f he so s t ipu la tes beforehand he is compelled. I t is not cer ta in what kind of d isposi t ion Nahum had in mind. I f , as Bammel suggests, he had a mattenat b a r i ° in mind, then a revocable mattenat bart'was possible by s t i p u l a t i o n . This in te rpre ta t ion of Nahum's s t a t e m e n t , however , e n c o u n t e r s t he d i f f i c u l t y t h a t "a revocable mattenath bar?' was introduced only in the la te Middle Ages" which used the AC. formula, "from today, i f I do not revoke t i l l my death." This h i s to r i ca l consideration means that i f Nahum did indeed have a mattenat b a r t > in mind, he was neither expressing a generally accepted view nor was his opinion w ide ly accepted. Another p o s s i b i l i t y is that he was ta lk ing about the mattenat s'ekhiv mera* or the d e y a t t q t . Yaron observes, "Whatever the correct in te rpre ta t ion may be, we should remember that th i s was the opinion of a single Tanna. There is reason to assume that his view was not fol lowed; i t was the fa te of most of the opinions of Nahum the Mede to be rejected by 44 For a c r i t i que of many deta i ls of Bammel's case, see Hughes, NovT 21 (1979) 72-75. 45 Cited from Yaron, Gi f ts in Contemplation of Death, 53-54. 4 6 I b i d . , 53. 35 his co l l eagues . " 4 7 The mattSnat b a r f was in t roduced i n t o Judaism from Egypt. In Ptolemaic Egypt, two kinds of d isposi t ions in contemplation of death stood side by side: the diatheke and the meta ten te leuten. The former was of Greek o r ig in and had the features of the He l len is t i c w i l l already discussed. The l a t t e r was native to Egypt* 0 and quite d i s t i n c t from the diatheke. Concerning i t Yaron says, "Ownership is immediately t ransferred to the donee and the d isposi t ion is not revocable. I t is characterized by the use of the formula meta ten t e l e u t e n ; th i s implies that usufruct remains with the d o n o r . " 4 9 In the Egyptian pract ice of these two i n s t i t u t i o n s , no d i s t i n c t i o n was made on the basis of the health of the one making the d ispos i t ion . The same s i tua t ion is re f lected in ear ly Tannait ic law which is "p r imar i l y concerned with types of d ispos i t ion , deyctttqt and mattana, rather than with the health 50 of the donor." At a la ter stage, Yaron points out, the Tannaim " b u i l t up the i r own scheme of d isposi t ions in contemplation of death. What they did was to assign a t r u e f u n c t i o n to the main d i f f e r e n c e between the meta ten teleuten g i f t and the diatheke: they la id down that the one in good health should be able to dispose in contemplation of death by way of 4 7 I b i d . , 54. 48 Yaron ( I b i d . , 47) reasons, "While there are great dif ferences between the meta ten teleuten g i f t and the diatheke, nevertheless the i r functions are basica l ly the same: both are disposi t ions in contemplation of death. Especially there is no reason fo r assuming that only one in good health could make a meta ten teleuten g i f t , or only a sick man a diatheke. The existence side by side of the two i n s t i t u t i o n s is to be understood against the h i s t o r i c a l background we have mentioned: one is nat ive, the other imported." 4 9 I b i d . , 46. 5 0 I b i d . , 47. 36 irrevocable g i f t , with or without retent ion of usufruct , while a sick man should dispose by means of a deyathfqf. This development of Jewish law on g i f t s in contemplation of death is c r i t i c a l fo r assessing Bammel's hypothesis. The development took time and did not reach the stage from which Bammel draws his evidence u n t i l the 3rd Century. Yaron states, "Disposit ions in contemplation of death came into Jewish law at a rather la te stage. Their rules were evolved in the course of the Tannait ic period and reached the i r f i n a l form in the time of the CO early Amoraim, in the f i r s t ha l f of the t h i r d century." One might respond in defense of Bammel's general thesis that a d isposi t ion that was not dependent on the death of the donor was already present in Ptolemaic Egypt and so may have been known by Paul. This suggestion brings up a terminological problem. Could Paul have cal led a meta ten t e l e u t e n a di atheke? The Egyptian papyri use diatheke with absolute unanimity fo r last w i l l . The meta tSn teleuten is not cal led diathgke but dosis and suggraphg doseUs. In te res t ing ly , dosis corresponds CO exactly to mattana. While diathek"e and the meta ten teleuten g i f t are c lear l y d i s t i n c t d i s p o s i t i o n s , some ass imi la t ion did take place. In Egypt, the l a t t e r assimilated to the former. The betraying feature of t h i s ass imi la t ion, though, i s t h a t the meta ten t e l e u t e n g i f t became revocable. This ass imi la t ion would s t r i p the g i f t of that feature that Bammel needs to 5 1 I b i d . 5 2 I b i d . , 33. 5 3 I b i d . , 26. 5 4 I b i d . , 47. 37 defend h is c a s e - - i r r e v o c a b i 1 i t y of the d ispos i t i on . In Jewish legal parlance the assimi lat ion went the other way. DeyatTq? was designated in terms of mattana in being cal led mattenat sekhiv rnera', the g i f t of one who is ly ing i l l . 5 5 But, and t h i s is of importance to the present discussion, mattenat bar?* never assimilated to deyat tqt . Since diatheke was the technical term fo r w i l l , Paul could not use i t for a speci f ic type of mattana or dosis without misleading his audience. But more decis ive against Bammel's thesis is the consideration that i f indeed Paul is speaking in terms of common human pract ice , he could not, without some explanation, be re fe r r ing to an Egyptian custom, not to speak of an undeveloped Jewish version of that custom. I f kata anthropon lego* means that Paul is drawing from common human pract ice , the i n s t i t u t i o n in mind must e i ther be of a universal character or be proven to be common in Galat ia . The mattenat barT' qua l i f i es fo r nei ther . Since no testamentary i n s t i t u t i o n can be found t h a t meets the requirements of the i n s t i t u t i o n of Gal 3:15,17, the claim that Paul is t rea t ing covenant as a testamentary d isposi t ion is great ly undermined. I f one s t i l l i ns i s t s on t h i s i n te rp re ta t i on , i t would have to be concluded that Paul is simply taking legal terms from the area of testamentary d isposi t ion and using them w i thou t paying any par t i cu la r a t tent ion to the imagery 56 involved. This, however, amounts to saying that Paul is only using legal 5 5 I b i d . , 20,48. 56 So bas ica l ly Oepke, Der Brief des Paulus an die Galater, (Ber l in : Evangelische VerlagsanstaTTJ 1973) p. 111. He thinks that Paul has H e l l e n i s t i c p r a c t i c e in mind but t h a t "Paulus argumentiert aber nun keineswegs von Besonderheiten des hel lenist ischen Rechts aus (s . u . ) , sondern l e g t mehr oder weniger a l l geme ingue l t i ge Saetze zugrunde." S imi la r ly , Behm (TDNT 2. 129) wri tes concerning Paul's use of diathSke in Gal 3:15, "No regard is paid to the fac t that in the case of God's testament the presuppositions of th i s v a l i d i t y (prokekuromenen) are very d i f fe ren t 38 terminology without arguing from a speci f ic testamentary i n s t i t u t i o n . E. The Bearing of Kleronomia on the Meaning of Di atheke For the claim that Paul has a testamentary d isposi t ion in mind in Gal 3:15, appeal is not only made to the use of diatheke, the Greek term fo r w i l l , but also to the notion of inher i tance, kleronomia, in Galatians 3 and 4 (kleronomia, Gal 3:18, and kleronomos, 3 : 2 9 - 4 : 7 ) . 5 7 In n o n b i b l i c a l Greek, the word group k leronomia, kleronomos and kleronomeo is used almost unanimously in the sense of inheritance and the CO related ideas of heir and to i n h e r i t . In the LXX and NT, however, the usual idea associated with inher i tance, acquiring someone's property upon his death, is wholly absent from most instances in which the terms are used. The Hebrew terms translated by th i s word group have as t he i r pr inc ipa l sense CO the idea of possession. The use of kleros as a synonym fo r kleronomia in the LXX indicates how from that of a human w i l l , i . e . , the death of the tes ta to r . This metaphor of the testament seems to have been worked out by Paul qui te spontaneously in accordance with his penchant fo r legal images." The focus on legal terminology rather than imagery is a step in the r i g h t d i rec t ion as w i l l be shown la te r (pp. 63-67 below). This move, however, involves an abandonment of the central thesis of these scholars: that Paul has a Hel len is t ic w i l l in mind. 57 For th i s argument, see Heinrich Schl ier , Der Brief an die Galater (Goettingen: Vanderhoeck & Ruprecht, 1962) 142. 5 8 LSJ kleronomeo; TDNT 3. 768; MM 346-347. Foerster (TDNT 3. 768) notes four instances in which the terms are used in the sense of what is possessed, acquired or gotten. LSJ only c i tes the LXX f o r t h i s broader sense. 59 ^ The major terms are nahalah: possession, property or inher i tance; nana!: to get or take as a possession; and yarasT: to take possession of or i n h e r i t . Foerster (TDNT 3. 769,777) gives an analysis of the klerom- word group in the LXX and the Hebrew terms translated by them. 39 fif) the t rans la tors understood kl l ronomia. Kleros means " l o t " and then what is gotten by l o t or "a l lo tment . " The l ink between kleros and kleronomia as inher i tance is obvious. An inheritance is what is a l lo ted to someone. However, the speci f ic idea of property handed down to succeeding generations is not present in k leros. Kleros, the broader term, no doubt, stands behind kleronomia rather than the other way around. So, the t rans la tors of the LXX used kleronomia with i t s broader root idea, l o t . The broader sense of kleronomia and the related terms in the LXX is made abundantly clear by i t s usage of these t e r m s . 6 1 Israel i s said to have possessed the land (kleronomein ten gen, Gen 15:7,8; Lev 20:24; e t c . ) . The verb, klgronomein, is used fo r taking possession of something e i ther j u s t l y or un just ly (1 Kgs 20:15f. ; Hos 9 :6) . The noun is s i m i l a r l y used in the sense of possession. The land is the kleronomia of I s rae l , but also of the Lord (Jer 2 :7 ) . Israel is God's kleronomia (Deut 32:9; e t c . ) . But God is also the kleronomia of Israel (Jer 10:16; 28:19) and the Levites (Num 18:20; Josh 13:14; Ezek 4 4 : 2 8 ) . In a l l of these ins tances , the idea of " inher i tance" is absent. The idea is simply that of k leros, which both Israel and Levi are to God (Deut 9:29; 10:9; Sir 45:22). Another synonym in the LXX fo r kleronomia is meris, a part or por t ion , which term is used in para l le l ism with kleronomia in many of the texts c i ted above (see also Sir 45:22). From th i s i t is clear that kleronomia in the LXX means possession, allotment ( i . e . , kleros) or port ion ( i . e . , mer is) . 6 0See TDNT 3. 759-760. 61 For an analysis of the use of th i s word group in the LXX and NT, see B. F. Westcott, The Epist le to the Hebrews (Grand Rapids: Wm. B. Eerdmans Pub l i sh ing Co., 1980) 167-169 and Gustaf Dalman, The Words of Jesus Considered in the Light of Post-Bib l ica l Jewish Writings and the Aramaic Language (Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1920) 125-127. 40 The kleronomia word group is used in the NT in much the same way as in the LXX. KleYonomia and kleronomos are used in the narrow sense of inheri tance and heir only in f i v e texts (Matt 21:38; Mark 12:7; Luke 12:13; 20:14; Gal 4 :1 ) . Otherwise, the word group is used in the broader sense of receiving or possessing something: the kingdom (Matt 5:5; 25:34; 1 Cor 6:9,10; 15:50; Gal 5:21), eternal l i f e (Matt 19:29; Mark 10:17), salvat ion (Heb 1:14; 1 Pet 1:4), a promise (Heb 6:12), a blessing (Heb 12:17; 1 Pet 3 : 9 ) , the grace of l i f e (1 Pet 3:7) and a name (Heb 1:4). In these instances, the notion of " inher i tance" which is related to the idea of testamentary d isposi t ion of what is passed on by a dying person is c lear l y absent. The notion of inher i tance, however, has the idea of receiving a possession or a port ion in common with th i s broader usage. Since the notions associated with a last w i l l , death, succession and passing on of property, are not central to the meaning of the kleronomia word group in the LXX and NT, there is no warrant fo r appealing to the use of kleronomia in Gal 3:18 in support of understanding diatheke in v 15,17 as a w i l l . A close look at Paul's use of kleronomia and diatheke fur ther suggests that one must not read diatheke in l i g h t of any idea about kleronomia. In Galatians 3, he introduces diatheke only to make the point that the promise is i r revocable. He discusses what was promised, i . e . , the blessing (v 14) or the kleronomia (v 17b-18), only in terms of promise and not in terms of di atheke, as is clear from v 18. In Paul 's mind, kleYonomia and diatheke are not in t imate ly related concepts. Hence, in Rom 4:13-14 Paul can discuss the kleronomia without any re ference to diatheke. Also, in Gal 4 : l f . , where he c lear ly uses the imagery of inher i tance, Paul makes no reference to diatheke. In f a c t , the 41 idea of testamentary d isposi t ion has no place in the imagery of Gal 4 : l f . The heir is already owner of a l l as an in fan t . Nothing is conferred by a testament. The natural t i es of sonship rather than testamentary d isposi t ion provide the mechanism fo r the t ransfer of ownership. F ina l l y , f o r Paul the law, too, is a diatheke and i t too is related to the kleronomia (Gal 3:18; Rom: 13-14). While Paul denies that the kleronomia is through the law, t h i s denial has nothing to do with the absence of the notion of a w i l l in the law. His opponents, who argued that the kleronomia was through the law, ce r ta in ly did not see the law as a w i l l . For Paul, the kleronoirria is not what is w i l led to someone but simply what is possessed. Hence, the kleronomos is kurios panton--owner of a l l . In understanding kleronomia and kleronomos th i s way, Paul is moving wi th in a well established c i r c l e of thought and usage as witnessed by the LXX and the rest of the N T . 6 2 F. Diatheke as Contract The f a i l u r e to f i n d a testamentary d isposi t ion that can meet the requirements of the i n s t i t u t i o n of Gal 3:15 forces the discussion on t h i s text to look elsewhere. Some scholars have found the sui table a l te rnat ive in the c o n t r a c t . This a l t e r n a t i v e p o s i t i o n is taken by Calvin who, commenting on the phrase, "though i t be a man's covenant," wr i tes : This is an argument from the less to the greater. Human contracts are regarded as binding; how much more what God has established? Moreover, where the Lat in version reads testamentum, Paul's Greek word is diatheke. By th i s the Greeks mean more often ' testament ' , On the claim that the primary idea in kleronomia is possession rather than succession or passing on by testamentary d ispos i t ion , see Dalman, Words of Jesus, p. 125-127. 42 though also sometimes any sort of cont rac t . . .here I prefer to take i t simply for the covenant God made. For the simi le from which the apostle argues would not apply so s t r i c t l y to a testament as to a covenant. Therefore le t us proceed on the assumption that the apostle reasons from human agreements to that solemn covenant which God made with Abraham. I f human bargains are so f i rm that they must pot be added t o , how much more must t h i s covenant remain inv ioable. Unfortunately, Calvin does not state why "the s imi le from which the apostle argues would not apply so s t r i c t l y to a testament as to a covenant." Perhaps i t is that he understands the b e n t of the OT as a covenant or contract . Whether the OT b e n t was a contract w i l l be discussed l a t e r . There i s , however, another reason why a contract applies more s t r i c t l y to Paul's s im i le . A contract was less v o l a t i l e than a w i l l . Since a contract is entered by the consent of a l l part ies involved, i t can not be revoked at any person's wish. This fac t has already been seen in the case of adoption in ter v ivos, which was a contract . The contract can only be revoked upon the consent of both part ies involved. Hence, Burton reasons: The diatheke of v 15 must be a contract , not a w i l l , fo r of the d i a t h i k e h e r e spoken o f i t i s sa id oude is a t h e t e i e ep id ia tasseta i , and th is is true of an agreement, which once made can not be modified (except, of course, by mutual agreement of the part ies to i t , an exception too obvious to receive mention), but is not t rue of a wi11. Burton does not explore the impl icat ions of the "too obvious" exception fo r Paul's argument in Gal 3:15-18. Could God and Abraham or the seed agree to revoke the contract? Paul ce r ta in ly would not enter ta in the thought. A contract is not as easi ly revoked as a w i l l since no one party has plenary John Calvin, The Epist les of Paul the Apostle to the Galatians, e t c . , 56-57. The f o l l o w i n g commentators take a s i m i l a r p o s i t i o n : J . B. L i g h t f o o t , Heinrich Meyer, John Eadie and Ernest De Witt Burton. More recent ly John J . Hughes, ("Hebrews IX 15f f . and Galatians I I I 1 5 f f . : A Study in Covenant Practice and Procedure," NovT 21 [1979] 27-96) argued that diatheke in Gal 3:15 means contract . Burton, Galatians, 502. 43 power over i t . But i t is nonetheless revocable. There is nothing in Paul's usage of diatheke to suggest that he sees a di atheke as a contract . The diatheke is e i ther a promise or law, and ne i the r is r e a l l y a contract . One could reply that the diatheke is a somewhat imbalanced contract . But to the extent that contracts became imbalanced they became vulnerable to the w i l l of the powerful par ty, at least in the Greek world. A f i n a l consideration against understanding diatheke* in Gal 3:15 as a c o n t r a c t i s t h a t i f by saying kata anthropon lego Paul is drawing the at tent ion of his audience to common human pract ice, as Burton bel ieves, he would not use diatheke, a word used unanimously fo r testament in the papyr i , when he actual ly has a suntheke in mind. Burton seeks to get around t h i s problem by reasoning: The assumption.. . that the Galatians, being Gent i les, must have understood diatheke in the common Greek sense, ignores the f a c t , of capi ta l importance fo r the in te rpre ta t ion of Gal 3 :15 f f . , that throughout chaps. 3 and 4 Paul is replying to the arguments of his judaising opponents, and is in large part using the i r terms in the sense which t h e i r use of them had made f a m i l i a r to the Galatians. Burton is ra is ing an important point that must be borne in mind. The discussion takes place wi th in a cer ta in context which could determine both the denotation and connotation of words. However, i f kata anthropon lego means, as Burton af f i rms, that Paul is leaving the theological context of the discussion to go into the "secular" world of common human experience, Concerning the t rea t ies or sumbolai of Ancient Greece, Sir Frank Adcock and D. J . Mosley (Diplomacy in Ancient Greece [London: Thames and Hudson, 1975] 186) w r i t e ; "The tes t of whether the part ies to an agreement were bound and obligated equally depended often not so much on the terms stated as on the at t i tudes of the par t ies , t he i r re la t i ve power and the way in which the arrangements worked in p rac t i ce . " Burton, Galatians, 503-504. 44 then any par t i cu la r meaning that the special theological context of the discussion would impart to a term would be also l e f t . The Judaizers may have taught the Galat ians to understand a theo log ica l diatheke* as a contract ; but i t is un l ike ly that they would have taught them to understand the diatheke of the secular world as a suntheke. G. Diatheke and the Old Testament BerTt The in terpre ta t ion that the diatheke of Gal 3:15,17 is a contract is based on the assumption that the OT berTt, which is c lear l y in view in t h i s fi7 passage, is also a contract . In view of t h i s , i t is not surpr is ing that the only examples Hughes gives of a "contract" of which i t can be said that oudeis athetei e epidiatassetai are OT b e r t t o t . In the OT beVtt, Hughes c lear ly f inds an i n s t i t u t i o n that meets the requirements of the i n s t i t u t i o n of Gal 3:15 as well as the requirements of the context of Paul's discussion--the divine covenant. He reasons: I f Paul does not have the legal model of e i ther a Greek, Roman or Egyptian d iatheke in mind, i f he does not argue for e i ther testamentary d isposi t ion in te r vivos or the s imi lar mtnt bry**; j us t what legal model does he employ? The answer, of course, i s that Paul is employing the O.T. legal model of the 'covenant' which i t s e l f was in cer ta in important aspects patterned af ter the i n te rna t iona l t rea t ies prevalent in the ANE in the second and The l ine of reasoning goes somewhat as fo l lows: be r i t is a contract or t rea ty ; the LXX translates i t with diatheke and so fo r the t rans la tors of the LXX diatheke' must have meant contract . That they did not misunderstand the OT be r i t is evident from an analysis of di at hike which shows that t h i s term is used in the same way that be>Tt is used in the MT. Furthermore, since the NT uses diathike in the^same way as the LXX does, the term must have the same meaning there as ber t t does in the OT. So, diatheke in the NT means contract . Since Paul in Gal 3:15 is drawing an i l l u s t r a t i o n from common human experience for what is essent ia l ly a contract , he must be r e f e r r i n g to a contract of the Greco-Roman world. So bas ica l ly J . B. L igh t foo t , Heinrich Meyer and Burton in the i r commentaries on Galatians. Hughes, NovT 21 (1979) 66f. argues s i m i l a r l y . 45 f i r s t mi l lennia B.C. Once such a t reaty had been made no one (not even the great suzerain who imposed the t rea ty on his vassal) a l t e r e d the s t i p u l a t i o n s of the t r e a t y f o r the t r e a t y was considered to be under the sanction of the de i t ies who witnessed i t . These guardian de i t ies were expected to play an avenging ro le both in keeping the t rea ty document sacrosanct f i fand in punishing those who transgressed the terms of the t r e a t y . " Hughes goes on to give examples of the irrevocable nature of OT b e r f t o t . Of special note is the ber t t that Israel under Joshua made with the Gibeonites. Israel the powerful party could not revoke the b e n t . There i s , however, a g lar ing problem with Hughes' attempt to explain Gal 3:15 in l i g h t of the OT ber t t and the t rea t ies of the ANE. Could Paul have such an i n s t i t u t i o n in mind i f by kata anthropon lego he means that he is drawing an i l l u s t r a t i o n from common human pract ice, as Hughes assumes? The only contact Paul and his audience had with the ANE was through the OT. The OT b e r t t , however, was by no means common human pract ice in Paul's day. But neither was the Greek suntheke equivalent to the sacrosanct b e r t t . In the OT b e r t t , we have found an i n s t i t u t i o n that meets the demands of the i n s t i t u t i o n of Gal 3:15. But Paul can only have t h i s i n s t i t u t i o n in mind i f the common in te rpre ta t ion of kata anthropon lego is incor rec t . So the discussion must s h i f t from an examination of possible i n s t i t u t i o n s to a re-examination of the basic sense of Gal 3:15. 68 69 I b i d . , 76-77. I b i d . , 70 n. 150. 46 CHAPTER 3 GALATIANS 3:15 AND THE OLD TESTAMENT BERIT A. Gal 3:15 Re-examined i . The Structure of Gal 3:15-18. The re-examination of Gal 3:15 must begin with a fresh look at the structure of Gal 3:15-18. While there is no par t i cu la r debate concerning the st ructure of th is passage, i t does throw considerable l i g h t on the ro le of Gal 3:15 in Paul's argument and thus is of paramount importance in in te rpre t ing t h i s verse. This passage can be analyzed as fo l lows: Al kata anthropon lego (v 15) Bl homos anthropou kekuromengn diathSken CI a) oudeis b) athetei e epidiatassetai DI tp de Abraam errethe"san hai epaggeliai kai t§ spermati autou (v 16) A2 touto de lego (v 17) B2 diathe"ken prokekuromenen hupo,tou theou C2 a) ho meta...gegonos nomos ouk b) akuroi D2 eis to katargesai ten epaggelian (and v 18) This analysis shows that Gal 3:15-18 consists of two para l le l sect ions, vv 15-16 and 17-18, containing a para l le l series of four proposi t ions. The paral le l ism is made obvious by matching terms and concepts as fo l lows: Al & 2: lego/lego 47 Bl & 2: kekuromenen diatheken/diathlken prokekuromengh CI & 2: a) oudeis/ho...nomos ouk b) athetei e epidiatassetai /akuroi DI & 2: epaggeliai/epaggelian The para l le l ism between vv 15-16 and vv 17-18 suggests that the l a t t e r is d i r e c t l y based on the former. There i s , however, an important s h i f t from the f i r s t to the second sect ion. In vv 15-16 Paul is speaking of the di atheke and promise only. In vv 17-18 he brings nomos back in to the d i s c u s s i o n . The movement of his thought is indicated by touto de lego (v 17). In vv 15-16 he states the facts about the diatheke and the promise, which he applies in vv 17-18 to the issue in question: how the law re lates to what was covenanted and promised. Thus, in vv 15-16 Paul is s ta t ing his premises and in vv 17-18 he is drawing his desired conclusions. In vv 15-16 Paul s ta tes two premises: 1) t h a t a di atheke i s i r revocable, and 2) that the sole seed of promise is Chr is t . Paul does not leave these premises as mere assertions but seeks to substantiate them. To substantiate the f i r s t premise, he speaks kata anthropon. To establ ish the second, he appeals to a grammatical subt lety in the Abrahamic text c i t e d . Thus, one may say, he speaks kata tas graphas. Pau l 's attempt at substant iat ing his two premises in vv 15-16 has proven to be the most problematic point in the exegesis of these verses. His argument in v 16 from the use of the singular spermati in the Abrahamic t e x t has o f ten s t ruck h is i n t e r p r e t e r s as an undue s t ra in ing of the A the te i e e p i d i a t a s s e t a i r e f e r s to two ways a covenant can be inval idated (akuroun)~ So, akuroi in v 17 takes in both expressions in v 15. For more on th i s po int , see pp. 65-66 below. 48 language. I f Paul has a testamentary d isposi t ion in mind in v 15, one must a lso conclude t h a t he is unduly s t r e t c h i n g the s ta tus of such an i n s t i t u t i o n . In f a c t , i f Paul i s describing the testamentary i n s t i t u t i o n in v 15, i t must be concluded that he was wrong and that he misrepresented "man" in speaking kata anthropon. This conclusion can only be avoided i f the universal assumption that Paul i s describing common human pract ice when speaking kata anthropon is abandoned. i i The Meaning of Kata Anthropon Lego I t is universal ly assumed in scholarship that by kata anthropon lego Paul is ind icat ing that he is drawing an i l l u s t r a t i o n from common human experience. A close examination of the expression i t s e l f and what is said kata anthropon, however, suggests another p o s s i b i l i t y . Burton, commenting on the phrase, kata anthrSpon, in Gal 3:15 expresses the common understanding of th is expression as fo l lows: "The regular meaning of the phrase af ter a verb is 'as men do, ' the speci f ic point of resemblance being indicated in the context. Here th i s general meaning natura l ly becomes, ' I speak as men do about t he i r a f f a i r s ' ( c f . 1 Cor. 9 :8 ) , i . e . , ' I draw an i l l u s t r a t i o n from common human p r a c t i c e . ' " Having adduced 1 Cor 9:8 as a p a r a l l e l , he must go on to qua l i f y , "A reference to human author i ty such as is suggested in 1 Cor 9:8 is improbable here, both because there is no suggestion of i t in the context and because the depreciation of the value of the argument which such a reference would imply is uncalled fo r On Gal 3:16, see p. 129 below. 49 and without value fo r the apost le 's purpose." Burton's need to qua l i f y the para l le l he adduces between Gal 3:15 and 1 Cor 9:8 points to a weakness in his in te rpre ta t ion of kata anthropon lego in Gal 3:15. Apart from Gal 3:15, Paul speaks kata anthropon only twice (Rom 3:5; 1 Cor 9 :8 ) , and the idea of " i l l u s t r a t i o n " is wholly absent in the one and only secondarily present in the other instance. The notion of "human au thor i t y , " which Burton sees in 1 Cor 9:8 but denies in Gal 3:15, approaches the s p e c i f i c idea in speaking kata anthropon. The human author i ty is in the way human beings natura l ly th ink , or more p a r t i c u l a r l y in human judgement or reasoning. This is what Paul expresses when he speaks kata anthropon. Burton cor rec t ly points out that the phrase, kata anthropon, has a merely qua l i ta t i ve s ign i f icance, the preposit ion s ign i fy ing "according t o , " "agreeably t o , " "according to the w i l l or thought o f , " or "a f te r the manner o f . " 4 In Gal 1:11 the phrase is used by Paul to s ign i fy what is merely human in e i ther au thor i ty , o r i g i n , content or character in contrast to what is divine or of Chr is t . Accordingly, to speak kata anthropon is to say what is q u a l i t a t i v e l y and cha rac te r i s t i ca l l y human. In other words, i t is to speak about something in the way human beings normally speak about i t . In Rom 3:5 the f u l l expression kata anthropon lego is used to qua l i f y as human the reasoning expressed in the question, " Is God who i n f l i c t s wrath unrighteous?" Paul vehemently re jects the suggestion in the question with a me genoito (v 6 ) . Thus by kata anthropon lego, Paul is ind icat ing that he is merely appropriat ing human reasoning, though he does not agree with i t , 3 Burton, Galatians, 178. 4 I b i d . , 37. 50 fo r the sake of discussion. That concerning which he speaks kata anthropon is the subject in mind in the context: the righteousness of God. Speaking kata anthropon, therefore, means expressing human reasoning on a given subject. Furthermore, in a l l instances where Paul speaks in such a way the subject concerns a divine or re l ig ious t r u t h . In 1 Cor 9:8 the essent ia l ly equivalent expression kata anthropon tauta la lo is used. The ro le of t h i s expression in Paul's discussion, however, is s l i g h t l y d i f f e ren t from i t s use in Rom 3:5. Paul is using what i s said kata anthropon to strengthen his case rather than to express a s u g g e s t i o n t h a t he r e j e c t s . Never the less , i n each case Paul i s appropriating human thought or judgement on the subject under discussion. The tauta in the expression of 1 Cor 9:8 refers to the three statements of v 7. These statements do in fac t const i tu te i l l u s t r a t i o n s or examples from the human realm supporting Paul's posi t ion that the laborer deserves to make a l i v i n g from his labors. That, however, is not Paul's spec i f ic point in speaking kata anthropon. Paul's complete statement in 1 Cor 9:8 is the fo l lowing question: me kata anthropon tauta la lo e kai ho nomos tauta ou legei? Thus, speaking kata anthropon is dist inguished from the voice of the law (ho nomos l e g e i ) . In c i t i n g the law in v 9, Paul also, as is the case in what he says kata anthropon, chooses a case that applies to th is -wor ld ly matters. He c i tes the law's requirement t h a t the ox must be allowed to eat what i t is threshing. Hence, the speci f ic idea in speaking kata anthropon cannot be in the use of th i s -wor ld ly examples. The di f ference between what is said kata anthropon and what the law says is one of source, the law being of God, and 51 author i ty , the law having greater a u t h o r i t y . 5 The expression kata anthropon simply qua l i f i es an idea or statement as being c h a r a c t e r i s t i c a l l y human. Perspect ive rather than the kind of statement made is the determining fac to r . One should not be misled by Pau l 's use of examples in 1 Cor 9:8 in to sh i f t i ng the weight of kata anthropon from the point of view to the use of examples. The examples express human judgment or reasoning on the pr inc ip le in question: that the worker is e n t i t l e d to make a l i v i n g from his l abo rs . 6 In summary, to speak kata anthropon i s s imply to express human reasoning or judgement about the issue in question. i i i What is Said Kata Anthropon in Gal 3:15 I f kata anthropon lego in Gal 3:15 is taken to mean that Paul is signal ing the use of an i l l u s t r a t i o n from the human realm, the exegesis of t h i s tex t is burdened with the search fo r a common i n s t i t u t i o n of the Greco- Roman world that meets the requirements of t h i s t e x t . The f a i l u r e to f i nd such an i n s t i t u t i o n weighs in favour of an in te rpre ta t ion of the expression kata anthropon lego that frees the exegesis of Gal 3:15 from th is burden. The in te rpre ta t ion of kata anthropon lego argued fo r thus fa r accomplishes th i s task. 5 So also A. Robertson and A. Plummer, A C r i t i c a l and Exegetical Commentary on the F i r s t Epist le of St. Paul to the Corinthians, 2nd. ed . , (Edinburgh: T & T Clark, 1978) 183. Paul's use of rhetor ica l questions in 1 Cor 9:8 may also indicate that he is p r i m a r i l y i n t e r e s t e d in the human judgement r e f l e c t e d in the " e x a m p l e s . " By u s i n g these ques t ions , Paul i s h i g h l i g h t i n g the u n i v e r s a l i t y , reasonableness and common sense of the p r inc ip le involved rather than simply s ta t ing an example. 52 I f by speaking kata anthropon Paul i s simply expressing human judgment on the issue in question, then Paul need not have a spec i f ic i n s t i t u t i o n of the Greco-Roman world in mind. The context concerns the Abrahamic promise which is understood both by Paul and his audience as a d ia theke. 7 Hence, the subject of Paul's speaking kata anthropon, the diatheke* of Gal 3:15, i s the type of i n s t i t u t i o n we have in the Abrahamic covenant, i . e . , an OT berTt. In Gal 3:15 Paul is appealing to human judgement to substantiate his po in t t h a t an i n s t i t u t i o n such as the Abrahamic covenant is absolutely i r revocable. In terpret ing the diatheke of Gal 3:15 as an OT covenant makes the best sense of the t e x t . The text has homos, which is an adversative conjunction w i th the sense of " n e v e r t h e l e s s , " " a l l the same" or " y e t . " 8 This conjunction indicates an exception, cont rar ie ty or implied an t i thes is . I t appears three times in the current tex t of the NT. In John 12:42 i t stands in i t s natural posi t ion before the second member of the implied ant i thes is and c lear l y has i t s usual meaning. In the two Pauline examples (1 Cor 14:7 and Gal 3:15), however, homos is not in i t s natural place but rather stands before the f i r s t member of the an t i thes is . Such a t ra jec t i on of homos has para l le ls in Greek l i t e r a t u r e and does not const i tu te a serious problem. 9 Based on the contention that these texts contain a comparison rather than an ant i thes is or exception, i t has been suggested that the text of 1 Cor 9:8 and Gal 3:15 should have homo's (with the c i rcumf lex) , which means " l ikewise" or "equal ly , " instead of the adversative, homos, of the ex is t ing 70n fu r ther grounds fo r understanding diatheke in Gal 3:15 as the OT b e r i t , see pp. 57-53 below. 8BAGD homos. Q Burton, Galatians, 178. 53 t e x t . ^ Indeed, i f Paul is simply s tat ing an example in Gal 3:15, the homos of the current tex t is odd and homo's would be a welcome emendation since i t at least expresses Paul's idea. However, the emendation i t s e l f encounters several d i f f i c u l t i e s . One problem fo r t h i s changed reading of the tex t i s that occurrences of homos are extremely rare in Koine sources."""" This considerat ion, however, only reduces the p robab i l i t y of the correctness of the emended reading. A more serious object ion is tha t , as already seen, the idea of comparison is not the p o i n t of speaking kata anthropon. F ina l l y , a cont rar ie ty or exception can be seen in these tex t s , especial ly in Gal 3:15. The changed reading, homos, makes good sense in 1 Cor 14:7 since t h i s verse can be taken as a comparison to v 6. However, the conjunction may be adversative and indicate a cont rar ie ty or exception wi th in v 7 between to apsucha phonen d i d o n t a . . . and ean d i a s t o l e n t o i s phthoggois me d p . 1 2 Dis t inc t ion of sound is the necessary exception to general l i f e l e s s sounds i f such sounds are to be i n t e l l i g i b l e . In f a c t , the notion of an exception would have to be assumed in the text even in the absence of an adversative conjunct ion. Hence, the homos of the current text has in i t s favour the fac t that i t supplies the log ica l sense of the t e x t . The s i tua t ion in Gal 3:15 i s less ambiguous. What precedes v 15 cannot be taken as pa r t of a comparison. Meyer cor rec t ly notes, "There is therefore a l l the less reason fo r wr i t i ng homos, in l i ke manner, which would 1 0Joachim Jeremias, "OMOS (1 Cor 14,7; Gal 3 ,15) , " ZNW 52 (1961) 128- 128. Jeremias is followed by Rudolf Keydell , "0M(3S," ZNW 54 (1963) 145-146. So also BDF 234 and BAGD homos. This reading is followed by the JB and NIV. n M o u l - T 3. 337; Jeremias, ZNW 52 (1962) 127; Keydell , ZNW 54 (1963) 145; and MM 450. 12 See Burton, Galatians, 178. 54 be unsuitable since that which is to be i l l u s t r a t e d by the comparison only fol lows (at ver. 17) . " In f a c t , i f Paul has a comparison in mind, he never completes i t . One cannot argue from the para l le l ism between v 15 and v 17 shown above that v 17 completes the comparison. As pointed out above, v 17 is an af f i rmat ion derived from v 15, and thus i t cannot be taken as the second member of a comparison begun in v 15. A cont rar ie ty can be seen in what Paul says kata anthropon in Gal 3:15. There i s no meaningful cont rar ie ty between kata anthropon lego and what f o l l o w s homos 1 4 (which suggests that we have a t r a j e c t i o n of homos as mentioned above). But there is a meaningful cont rar ie ty between anthropou and oudeis athetei e ep id ia tasseta i . I t does not take much imagination to see that what is "of man" is natura l ly vulnerable and so oudeis athetei e ep id i a tasse ta i marks an exception to what is expected in an anthropou kekuromenen diatheken. Burton recognizes the implied ant i thes is in Gal 3:15 but wrongly places kekuromen*§n diatheken i n t o the second member of the ant i thes is with oudeis a the te i , e tc . Thus he reads, "though i t be man's, yet a covenant once establ ished no one annuls or adds t o . " 1 5 The paral le l ism in the structure of Gal 3:15-18 shown above, however, indicates otherwise. This ana lys is shows t h a t homos anthropou kekurTjmenen diatheken in v 15 corresponds to diatheken prokekuromenen hupo tou theou in v 17 and the second member of the cont rar ie ty in v 15, oudeis athetei e ep id ia tasseta i , is para l le l to ho meta...gegonos nomos ouk akuroi in v 17. As hupo theou in 13 He in r i ch A. W. Meyer, C r i t i c a l and Exegetical Hand-Book to the Epist le to the Galatians (New York^ Funk & Wagnalls Co., 1892) 120. 14 On t h i s reading of Gal 3:15, see Burton, Galatians, 178. 1 5 I b i d . 55 v 17 belongs to diatheken prokekuromenen so anthropou in v 15 belongs to the f i r s t member of the statement. The para l le l ism between vv 15 and 17 should not obscure the di f ference between anthropou (v 15) and hupo tou theou (v 17). The preposit ion of agent, hupo, relates theou to prokekuromenen. This preposit ion is lacking in v 15. Hence, the gen i t i ve , anthropou, qua l i f i es the noun, diatheken, rather than specifying the agent of the passive p a r t i c i p l e , kekuromenen. So, the idea in v 15 is not a diatheke r a t i f i e d by man but a diatheke from the human realm. Paul emphasizes the humanness of the diatheke in v 15 due to speaking kata anthropon. In v 17, however, Paul emphasizes the divine r a t i f i c a t i o n of the diathekg, probably having the r a t i f i c a t i o n ceremony of Genesis 15 in mind. In view of these observations on the st ructure of the t e x t , what Paul says kata anthropon in Gal 3:15 may be rendered as fo l lows: Though a r a t i f i e d covenant 1 7 i s a human o n e , 1 8 no one annuls or rep laces 1 9 i t . This rendering is a b i t awkward. Paul's statement may be better expressed with the paraphrase, "even a human covenant cannot be annulled or replaced." The in tent of Paul's statement is c lear . The context concerns the Abrahamic covenant, which is a divine one. In Gal 3:15 Paul seeks to e s t a b l i s h the absolute nature of covenant i t s e l f by appealing to human 1 fi On the poss ib le i n f l uence of Genesis 15 on Gal 3 :15-18, see discussion on pp. 58-62 below. 1 7"Covenant" is simply used as a natural ized theological term without suggesting that the basic idea in t h i s English term, agreement, i s the idea in diathSke. The meaning of diathlk*e and beVft and the basic idea in the b i b l i c a l covenant w i l l be discussed in chapters 5 and 6. 18 — This construct ion in English is used to t rans la te the emphatic anthropou. 19 On th i s t rans la t ion of ep id ia tasseta i , see pp. 66-67 below. 56 judgement on the status of such an i n s t i t u t i o n . Thus Paul must speak of a human covenant. So, in e f f ec t , Paul i s reasoning that the i n s t i t u t i o n which we have in the d iv ine, Abrahamic covenant is irrevocable even when i t is human. Thus the absolute nature of the i n s t i t u t i o n is made clear and establ ished. This in te rp re ta t ion of Gal 3:15 has cer ta in advantages. I t agrees with the idea in the expression kata anthropon lego ascertained in the present study. Rather than ind icat ing a comparison or i l l u s t r a t i o n , as would be the case i f the text read homos, th i s expression indicates a specimen of human reasoning or judgement on a concern given in the context. Homos as an adversa t ive con junc t ion indicates such a statement. Furthermore, th i s rendering of Gal 3:15 makes the tex t complete in i t s e l f which the emended reading does not do. As a l ready shown, the proposed i n t e r p r e t a t i o n also explains the anthropou in Gal 3:15. I f Paul were simply s tat ing an example, then af ter kata anthropon lego the anthropou would be redundant. However, in an adversa t ive statement the anthropou i s not on ly meaningful but also necessary. I t bears the weight of the cont rar ie ty suggested by homos, which ro le agrees with i t s emphatic pos i t ion . The question s t i l l remains how Paul could speak kata anthropon about an OT b e r t t . The b e r t t was a common i n s t i t u t i o n of the ANE which was sacrosanct and i r revocable. The diatheke of the Greco-Roman world ce r ta in ly was not such an i n s t i t u t i o n . However, two considerations caution us in drawing conclusions from th i s f a c t . F i r s t , the ber t t was akin to the oath as a sacrosanct i n s t i t u t i o n and t h i s kind of i n s t i t u t i o n would not have been unknown o r , at l e a s t , inconceivable to people in the 1st Century AD. Second, as w i l l be argued shor t l y , diatheke" as a t rans la t ion term is best 57 understood in Galatians 3 in terms of the OT concept behind i t , i . e . , as b j r v t . I f t h i s is the case, then diatheke" spoken of kata anthropon simply refers to any i n s t i t u t i o n l i ke the OT covenant which i s absolutely binding. One example of such an i n s t i t u t i o n is the oath. The 1st Century person could evaluate such an i n s t i t u t i o n and Paul could speak kata anthropon about i t . But even i f the OT covenant could not be l inked with any i n s t i t u t i o n in the Greco-Roman world, human judgement on the OT covenant could s t i l l be inv i ted as long as the i n s t i t u t i o n was understood. A para l le l s i tua t ion may be found in our use of the word covenant. The term "covenant" simply means "an agreement" or "compact." In secular usage, th i s term can be used fo r any agreement or contract and does not imply i r r e v o c a b i l i t y . In i t s B ib l i ca l and theological usage, however, t h i s term acquires par t i cu la r nuances and a special re ferent . I t refers s p e c i f i c a l l y to the B ib l i ca l covenant and takes on the meaning of a solemnly binding act of an absolute and sacrosanct nature. While Western Society does not f o r m a l l y have such an i n s t i t u t i o n , we understand i t and even have approximations of i t with the resu l t that a theologian may s t i l l speak kata anthropon about i t . The crux of the present thesis is simply that w i th in the context of Galatians 3 diatheke is best understood as a t rans la t ion term and thus in terms of the OT berTt. The plausibility of this claim w i l l be explored next. 58 B. Diatheke as Old Testament Ber t t . The most natural meaning of a given term must be determined from the semantic and conceptual sphere of the discussion in which that term appears. The discussion in Galatians 3 i s carr ied on wi th in a theological context and is based heavily on OT tex t s . Hence, the immediate semantic and conceptual background of the discussion is the t r a d i t i o n of t rans la t ion of OT terms and concepts in to Greek represented by the LXX. Recourse must f i r s t be taken to t h i s t r a d i t i o n of t rans la t ion to determine the meaning of key terms in Galatians. The previous discussion on the meaning of kleronomia has shown how a Greek te rm, by being used f o r a p a r t i c u l a r category in the Hebrew s c r i p t u r e s , could w i t h i n the t r a d i t i o n determined by that t rans la t ion acquire i t s own specialized sense and usage, though not unrelated to the sense of the word in i t s secular usage. As a r e s u l t , i t can be misleading to turn to Greek sources outside of that t r a d i t i o n of thought to determine the meaning and usage of terms wi th in that t r a d i t i o n . This precaution is of p a r t i c u l a r importance fo r re l ig ious technical terms which as labels fo r theological categories can be simply defined from the i r theological usage and thus become r e l a t i v e l y isolated from t h e i r secular usage. Di atheke l i ke kleronomi a is c lear ly an example of such a theological term. Being a t rans la t ion- term of ber t t in the LXX, t h i s Greek term would become defined by i t s OT and theological usage. I f diatheke acquired i t s own sense wi th in He l len is t ic Judaism and Chr i s t i an i t y , both of which are governed by the LXX, i t fol lows that the papyrological evidence for the meaning of that term in i t s theological set t ing can be misleading. The diatheke of the LXX rather than of the papyri is nearest at hand in the 59 sphere of ideas in Galatians 3. The conceptual background of Galatians 3 is much narrower than the t r a d i t i o n of thought determined by the LXX. Besides, the immediate t h e o l o g i c a l concerns of the d i s c u s s i o n , Gala t ians 3 concerns the i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of the Abrahamic t r a d i t i o n which contains Paul's major categories: righteousness, f a i t h , blessing, Gent i les, covenant, promise and seed. The Abrahamic t r a d i t i o n is a mine fo r Paul's thought. But Paul's thought in Galatians 3 seems to be dominated p r i n c i p a l l y by one chapter in the Abrahamic cycle—Genesis 15. Not only is Paul's f i r s t OT c i t a t i o n from Genesis 15 (Gal 3 :6) ; his motifs in Gal 3:15-18 are concentrated in th is chapter. Paul ca l l s what is promised to the seed the kleronomia in Gal 3:18. This noun and kleronomos do not appear in the LXX tex t of Abrahamic passages. Only the verb kleronomeo is used. Of i t s seven occurrences in the Abrahamic cycle, f i v e are found in Genesis 15: three times of Abraham's heir (vv 3-4) and twice of Abraham as the one who would receive the promised land (vv 7-8) . The Pauline sense of kleronomia is spec i f i ca l l y that of these two l a t t e r occurrences—possessing what is promised. Outside Genesis 15, kleronomeo is used in Gen 21:10, which tex t Paul quotes in Gal 4:30. This tex t has no d i rec t relevance fo r Paul's argument in Gal 3:18. The verb occurs once more in Gen 22:17 where the seed i s said to possess (kleronomein) the gates of i t s enemies. Clearly Paul's mention of the kleronomia in Gal 3:18 harks back to Genesis 15, where the f i r s t promise of 20 Betz (Galatians, 156) sees Genesis 17 as the primary tex t behind Gal 3:15-18. He aff i rms that Gen 17:1-11 of the LXX has a l l terms coordinated. This tex t contains the most occurrences of diatheke in the Abrahamic cycle. But besides d ia theke , i t on ly contains sperma of Paul's terms in Gal 3 :15-18. S c h l i e r , Der B r i e f an die Galater, 144f., and Mussner, Der Galaterbr ie f , 237f. take the same pos i t i on . 60 possession is made. Paul's reasoning about diatheke in Gal 3:15 and his use of prokekuroun in v 17 also hark back to Genesis 15. In t h i s chapter we have the only covenant r a t i f i c a t i o n ceremony in the Abrahamic cycle answering to Paul's idea of a covenant r a t i f i e d by God. The purpose of t h i s ceremony, in which God goes through a sel f -curse r i t u a l (vv 9-17), i s made clear by the flow of the chapter. God f i r s t promises Abraham a seed to be his heir (vv 1-5), which promise Abraham believes (v 6 ) . Then God promises Abraham the land (v 7 ) . This time Abraham asks God fo r some assurance of the promise (v 8 ) . Upon t h i s request, God inst ructs Abraham to prepare fo r the r i t u a l and undergoes i t himself (vv 9-17). God alone goes through the r i t u a l . In f a c t , Abraham is asleep while i t is being performed. The meaning of t h i s , most l i k e l y , did not escape Paul's not ice: God alone is bound by th i s covenant. Af ter the narrat ive of the covenant ceremony, the text declares that on that day God made a covenant with Abram and states the divine grant of the land to his seed (vv 18-21). This narrat ive alone warrants the technical d i s t i n c t i o n that Paul makes between promise and covenant in Gal 3:15-18. The promise is the divine grant and the covenant is the formal aspect of that grant that makes i t i r r e v o c a b l e . This t e c h n i c a l i t y i s indicated in Genesis 15. Abraham receives the promise but asks fo r a guarantee, which he receives in the covenant making ceremony. Covenant is a formal dimension added to the promise. Accord ing ly , Paul reasons from the fac t of a covenant being The Hebrew karat b e r t t , used fo r making a covenant in the MT, and the Greek diathesthai diatheken in the LXX are only used in Gen 15:18 in the Abrahamic cyc le f o r the covenant t h a t God made with Abraham. These expressions are also used fo r a covenant Abraham made with Abimelek^in Gen 21:27,32. In Gen 17:7 God establishes his covenant with Abraham (wahaqimotf e t - b e r f t f in MT and steso ten diatheken mou in the LXX). 61 r a t i f i e d to the indest ruc t ib le character of the promise (Gal 3:17). Genesis 15 also answers to prokekuromenen diatheken in Gal 3:17. I t i s the only Abrahamic tex t that gives a t imetable up to the Exodus ( l inked with the giving of the law): 400 years of oppression and deliverance in the four th generation. While Paul's f i g u r e , 430 years, is taken from Exod 12:40, i t c l e a r l y echoes the t i m e t a b l e given in Genesis 15. More i n te res t i ng l y , Gen 15:18 states af ter the t imetable is given that en t~g hemera ekeing diatheto kurios tp Abram diatheken. This answers to Paul's af f i rmat ion that the diatheke was r a t i f i e d before the giving of the law and the i m p l i c i t assumption that i t was r a t i f i e d as soon as i t was given. F i n a l l y , Pau l 's t h i r d major m o t i f i n Gal 3 :15-18, the seed, i s represented in Genesis 15. The f u l l expression in Gal 3:16, kai tQ spermati sou, occurs in Gen 13:15; 17:8; and 24:7. In Gen 15:18 we have tg spermati sou without the k a i . In Gal 3:16 Paul says that the promise was spoken to Abraham and to his seed. We f i n d th i s in Genesis 15. In Gen 15:7 the promise is given to Abraham and in vv 13,18 i t is given to his seed. Furthermore, the statement to de Abraam er re thesan. . .kai to spermati auto in Gal 3:16 echoes the language of these verses in Genesis 15: v 7, eipen de pros auton; v 13, kai errethe .pros Abram; and v 18, legon tg spermati sou. While t h i s evidence is i n c i d e n t a l , i t does t i gh ten the connection between Genesis 15 and Gal 3:15-18. There are two texts in the Abrahamic cycle in which God singles out a seed, answering to Paul's emphasis on one seed. One is Gen 21:10-12 which Paul refers to in Gal 4:30 and Rom 9:7. In these two instances, Paul uses t h i s Genesis passage as a re jec t ion t e x t . According to t h i s t e x t , some of the phys ica l descendants of Abraham are excluded from the seed. This 62 select ion/exclusion moti f in Gen 21:10-12 does not answer as strongly to the singular seed motif in Gal 3:16 as the other Genesis tex t in which God determines a seed by promise--Gen 15:1-5. In t h i s t e x t , Abraham complains that he has no seed and that consequently one of his slaves born in his house would be his he i r . God, however, re jects th i s one as heir and asserts that one born from Abraham, his seed, would be his he i r . In Genesis 15 we 22 have the only promissory seed select ion t e x t . The clear l inks between Gal 3:15-18 and Genesis 15 show that Paul i s not simply moving in the thought world of the LXX but more p a r t i c u l a r l y in that of Genesis 15. As the be r i t in Genesis is in t imate ly l inked with the i idea of a sel f -curse and i r r e v o c a b i l i t y , so the diatheke in Gal 3:15,17 could qui te na tura l ly be thought of in terms of an oath or any sacrosanct i n s t i t u t i o n . I n t e r e s t i n g l y , Pau l 's argument from the i r r e v o c a b i l i t y of the i n s t i t u t i o n l inked with the promise to the absolutely f i rm nature of the promise has a para l le l in Heb 6:13-18. In th i s text the author of Hebrews bases the cer ta in ty of the promise to Abraham on the div ine oath, one o f t h e two pragmata ametatheta (v 18). He also appeals to the f i n a l i t y of the instrument in mind (horkos) among men (Heb 6:16). He, however, has an oath tex t (Gen 22:16-17) in mind and so speaks in terms of oath. Paul has a b e r t t " c u t t i n g " t e x t in mind (Gen 15) and so speaks i n terms of a kekuromene diatheke. The invest igat ion in to- the p o s s i b i l i t y of understanding the diatheke of Gal 3:15 simply as the OT ber t t was stimulated by the f a i l u r e to f i nd an Since the promise in Gen 15:4-5 refers to Isaac, Ishmael is excluded by i t . So t h i s tex t establishes the exclusion of Ishmael, one of Abraham's descendants, expressed in Gen 21:10-12. 63 i n s t i t u t i o n of the Greco-Roman world that meets the requirements of t h i s t e x t . This i nves t i ga t i on may best be concluded by r e f l e c t i n g on t h i s f a i l u r e again. I f i t is insisted that Paul is attempting to draw on the He l len is t i c w i l l , i t must be concluded that Paul did not understand t h i s i n s t i t u t i o n . To account for Paul's misunderstanding, one would have to say that Paul had no immediate experience with or knowledge of the He l len is t i c w i l l . This would have led Paul to erroneously read the nature of the OT be>i t i n t o the H e l l e n i s t i c w i l l . Hence, Gal 3:15 would be seen as s u f f i c i e n t l y desc r ib ing the OT covenant but as f a i l i n g to f i t the H e l l e n i s t i c w i l l . This explanation of Paul's statement concerning the diatheke of Gal 3:15 concedes the main point of the present thes is : that Paul is describing the OT covenant. This ins ight provides the primary basis for the present thes is . C. Paul's Technical Vocabulary When Paul speaks kata anthropon in Gal 3:15, he is not only s ta t ing the human assessment of the type of i n s t i t u t i o n represented by the diatheke of the scr iptures but is also speaking about that diatheke as people normally speak about such i n s t i t u t i o n s . In other words, he is applying common legal terms to the diatheke" in question. The legal nature of kuroun, akuroun, athetein and epidiatassesthai has long been noted by scholars. This legal language is c lear ly a resu l t of speaking kata anthropon. The d iscuss ion in Gal 3:15-18 swings between diatheke and promise Eger, ZNW 18 (1917/18) 88f. 64 (diatheke* in vv 15 & 17a and promise in vv 16 & 17b-18). Of these two, Paul only speaks kata anthropon of diatheke. Accordingly, the legal terminology is used only with reference to diatheke. Thus the promise is spoken (v 16) while the diatheke is kekuromene. The s t r i c t use of the legal language fo r diatheke' is seen in par t i cu la r in the switch of langauge in v 17 as Paul moves from diatheke to promise. In Gal 3:17 Paul is point ing out the impact that the law might have on the Abrahamic grant. He speaks about t h i s grant both in terms of diatheke and epaggelia, but he uses d i f f e ren t terms fo r the impact that the law might have on each. In connection with the diatheke he uses a legal term, akuroun, and in connection with the epaggelia he uses a nonlegal term, katargein. That akuroun is a special term for Paul is evident from the fac t that i t only occurs t h i s one time in Paul's wr i t ings when he steps out of his normal way of th ink ing to speak kata anthropon concerning a given legal i n s t i t u t i o n . Katargein, however, is a nonlegal term that Paul uses quite 24 o f ten. This switch from legal to nonlegal language when switching from di atheke to epaggelia shows that speaking kata anthropon about diatheke" alone caused Paul to use a special vocabulary. This in turn shows that in speaking kata anthropon about diatheke he is speaking of the i n s t i t u t i o n in legal terms. Paul's legal vocabulary in Gal 3:15,17 has been used by scholars to confirm the claim that Paul is speaking of a w i l l . In fac t fo r some, in view of the f a i l u r e to harmonize Gal 3:15,17 with the facts about a w i l l , the legal language in the tex t is the only confirmation that Paul has a TDNT 1. 452f; MM 331; in the papyr i , katargein means to hinder or render inac t i ve . 65 testament in mind. 3 The legal vocabulary used, however, is of a general nature and thus does not point decis ive ly to a w i l l . I t only shows that Paul views whatever diatheke he has in mind as a legal i n s t i t u t i o n . Pau l 's p r i n c i p a l lega l category i s kuroun, which appears in the kekuromene of v 15 and the prokekuromene and akuroun of v 17. This term, which was used of a broad range of legal act ions, means to enforce, confirm, 27 v a l i d a t e or determine. In papyrological testamentary t ex t s , the verb kuroun is not used. The adject ive ku r ia , however, i s used to speak of the 29 30 v a l i d i t y of a w i l l , and akuroun is used fo r revoking a w i l l . But again the legal use of the kuroun word group is not res t r i c ted to w i l l s . Kuroun in Gal 3:15,17 refers to the legal status of an i n s t i t u t i o n . Thus being kekuromene, a diatheke has legal fo rce . I t i s l ega l l y in force or enacted. Akuroun in v 17 refers to the act of s t r ipp ing a diatheke" of i t s legal op fo rce. The analysis of the tex t given previously shows that akuroun in v 17 corresponds to and thus embraces the athetein and epidiatassesthai of v 15. Also, both akuroi in v 17Jand athetei e epidiatassetai in v 15 are in 2 5 So fo r example, Eger, ZNW 18 (1917/18) 96; and Oepke, Galater, 111. pc See Hughes' discussion of these terms, NovT 21 (1979) pp. 67-70 nn. 142-149. 2 7 LSJ kuroo, TDNT 3. 1098, BAGD kuroo. 2 8Hughes, NovT, 21 (1979) 68. 2 9 I b i d . , and Eger, ZNW 18 (1917/18) 90. On the use of kur ia in papyrioTogTca1 testamentary texts and how th i s usage re lates to Gal 3:15,17, see p. 23 above. 3 0 Eger , ZNW 18 (1917/18) 92, and MM 20. 31TDNT 3. 1099-1100. 32 See p. 47 above. 66 opposit ion to kekuromene. Thus, these two expressions represent two ways in which a diatheke can be inval idated or str ipped of i t s legal fo rce . Athetein means " to regard as nought," " to declare i n v a l i d , " " to set aside" or " to a n n u l . " 3 3 In the papyr i , t h i s term is used of a var ie ty of legal t ransact ions. As a way of inva l ida t ing a diatheke, athetein refers to the act of merely cancel l ing i t . Ep id ia tassestha i does not appear outside of Gal 3 : 1 5 . 3 5 The verb diatassein means to appoint, ordain, arrange or order. W. Judeich points out that d iatassesthai , d ia tax is , diatagma and diatage display the special meaning of "determine by testamentary d i spos i t i on . " But again the terms 37 have a much broader usage. Epidiatassesthai in Gal 3:15 is usually taken to mean " to add a cod ic i l op t o . Thus, diatassesthai with the pre f ix epi has the idea of " to ordain o n t o . " Max Conrat takes except ion to t h i s i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of t h i s hapax legomenon. He feels that prosdiatassesthai, which term does appear with the sense of " to add t o , " would be a more appropriate term i f Paul had on meant what he is commonly interpreted as saying. Since epidiatassesthai refers to an act that would overthrow (akuroun) a diatheke, one must agree with Conrat tha t , i f epidiatassesthai means to 33TDNT 8. 158; BAGD atheteo. 34MM 12, and Hughes, NovT 21 (1979) 69 n. 146. 3 5 Eger , ZNW 18 (1917/18) 92. oe W. Judiech, Altertuemer von Hierapol is , p. 110, c i ted by Deissmann, L ight , 87 n. 5. 37MM 155; Hughes, NovT 21 (1979) 69 n. 147. 38 BAGD epidiatassomai. 3 9Max Conrat, ZNW 15 (1904) 214. 67 make an addit ion t o , the addit ion must be of qui te an extraordinary nature to overthrow the d ia theke. 4 ^ Conrat thus suggests that epidiatassesthai means r a t h e r " t o replace." He wr i tes , "Meines Erachtens i s t das Wort ep id i a tassestha i v ie lmehr in dem Sinn e iner erneuten Verfuegung zu vers tehen . " 4"" Thus di atassesthai wi th the pre f ix epi means " to ordain over." I f Conrat i s correct , then Paul is saying that a diatheke can be made inva l id by being e i ther annulled or replaced. While the f i r s t action merely invo lves s t r i p p i n g i t of f o r c e or cancel l ing i t , the second involves replacing i t . Even i f epidiatassesthai simply means " to add t o , " the act entai led would have to be seen as producing a new diatheke which replaces AO the o r ig ina l since t h i s act inval idates i t . Hence, "replace" captures the f o r c e , i f not e x a c t l y the d e f i n i t i o n , of epidiatassesthai and is the preferred rendering of the term since "add to" is too weak an expression. For Paul, covenant is of the genre of legal i n s t i t u t i o n s . Unlike some lega l i n s t i t u t i o n s , such as a testament which can be revoked, however, covenant is absolute and i r revocable. ^ I b i d . , 215. 4 2 H u g h e s (NovT 21 [ 1 9 7 9 ] 70 n. 149) w r i t e s , "The sense of epidiatassetai in v. 15 seems to be that of a di atheke in such a way as to substant ia l ly a l te r i t . I t does not seem to preclude any addit ion to a d ia th lkg since the law, the Mosaic covenant, was added (prostith~"mi--v. 19) to the Abrahamic--though in such a way* as Paul argues, as not to substant ia l l y a l te r the Abrahamic p r inc ip le of inheritance-through-promise." I f t h i s i s the case, to t rans late epidiatassesthai with " to add to" is misleading. 68 CHAPTER 4 THE MEANING OF DIATHEKE The discussion so fa r has focussed on the text of Gal 3:15 and the i n s t i t u t i o n in question. Now the d e f i n i t i o n of the key term, diatheke, must be invest igated. The pr inc ipa l concern for the present study is whether or not diatheke accurately represents b j r v t . This concerns both the meaning of diatheke, which is investigated in the present chapter, and bervt , which is treated in the next chapter. Diatheke is usual ly understood as "d ispos i t ion" or "d isposal , " which emphasizes the one-sidedness of the arrangement in question. Moulton and Mi l l igan express t h i s understanding as fo l lows: " . . . d i a t h l k e is properly disposio, an "arrangement" made by one party with plenary power, which the other party may accept or r e j e c t , but cannot a l t e r . " 1 I f t h i s is the case, diatheke is not r e a l l y a sui table term fo r ber f t since the Hebrew term does not carry t h i s nuance of one-sidedness. Pau l 's use of diatheke in Gal 3:15,17, and p a r t i c u l a r l y his legal terminology associated with diatheke, does not r e f l e c t the supposed nuance of one-sidedness. He characterizes diatheke with the term kuroun. Thus* a diatheke f o r him is p r i n c i p a l l y a binding act or an enactment, which idea i s quite independent of the idea of one-sidedness or disposal. The broader usage of diatheke in both secular Greek and He l len is t ic Jewish l i t e r a t u r e re f l ec ts the same understanding. MM 148. S im i la r l y , Burton (Galatians, 496) describes a diatheke as fo l lows: "An arrangement or agreement between two part ies in which one accepts what the other proposes or s t ipu la tes ; somewhat more one-sided than a suntheke." 69 A. The Broader Usage of Di atheke Apart from He l len is t i c Judaism and Chr i s t i an i t y . Apart from the l i t e r a t u r e of He l len is t i c Judaism and Chr i s t i an i t y , diatheke is predominantly used in the sense of testament or las t w i l l . The few ins tances , however, in which th i s term is used in a broader sense suggest that the basic idea in diatheke is that of a binding act or order. Closely re lated to the idea of a w i l l , the term diatheke* sometimes is used fo r a philosophical testament in the sense of the legacy of a sage. Behm suggests, "This derives from the legal usage; i t is assumed that the last orders, sayings or admonitions of such a man are b inding." Behm's der ivat ion of t h i s usage from the terms used fo r a w i l l i s not necessari ly c o r r e c t , as w i l l be seen shor t l y . However, the meaning he assigns to diatheke in t h i s usage is most ce r ta in ly cor rect . The las t orders of a sage are a diatheke because they are b ind ing . 4 Removed from the idea of a w i l l is the somewhat problematic reference to diathekai in Dinarch 1:9: to sunedrion . . . ho phulat te i tas aporr§tous diathekas en hais ta tes poleos soter ia ke i ta i (the Areopagus . . . who keeps the secret d ia thekai , in which are the salvat ion of the c i t y ) . 5 I f diatheke" means disposal, the diathekai may re fer to "the mystic deposits on which the common weal depended, probably oracles." However, diathekai may simply For references see TDNT 2. 124. 3TDNT 2. 124-125; and Kutsch, Neues Testament - Neuer Bund?, 52. 4 - This is the sense of diatheke in the pseudepigraphic Testaments of the Twelve Patr iarchs. See p. 82 below. 5The Greek tex t i s c i ted from TDNT 2. 125. 6LSJ diatheke. 70 mean, as Behm suggests, sacred decrees or statutes on which the welfare of the state depended.7 According to Sextus Empi r icus , Adversus Mathematicos, v i i , 136, Democr i tus used di atheke f o r " b o d i l y c o n s t i t u t i o n " (ka ta somatos diatheken). According to t h i s usage, diatheke is used as a synonym of d i a t h e s i s ( p l a c i n g in o rde r , arrangement) . This usage of diatheke s i g n i f i c a n t l y departs from the idea of disposal. The bodi ly const i tu t ion is f i x e d . But i t has no connotation of one-sidedness. Ar istophanes in Aves 440 uses diatheke in a way that is commonly understood as t r e a t y , c o n t r a c t or suntheke. The l i n e reads, en me _ q diathontai g' hoide diatheken emoi henper ho pithekos te gunaiki d ie theto. Peisthetai ros, in coming to terms with the b i rds , w i l l not put his arms down unless the birds make a diatheke with him (not to hurt him) l i ke the ape made with his w i fe . I f t h i s diatheke" is a contract , then as scholars have o f ten noted, i t i s rather one-sided. Behm remarks, "This is a t rea ty between two par t ies , but binding only on the one according to the terms f ixed by the o t h e r . S t r i c t l y speaking, diatheke in th i s tex t is not a contract . I t i s only a commitment on the part of one party not to hurt the other. I t is a guarantee or a binding commitment to cer ta in a c t i o n . 1 1 Behm's i n c l u s i o n of " the terms f ixed by the other" in the meaning of 7TDNT 2. 125. 8TDNT 2. 124; and LSJ diatheke. See Kutsch, Neues Testament - Neuer Bund? 53 fo r d i f f i c u l t i e s with t h i s l i n e . 9 Ci ted from TDNT 2. 124. 10TDNT 2. 125. See also Kutsch, Neues Testament - Neuer Bund? 54. 11 For a f u l l discussion of t h i s t e x t , see Kutsch, Neues Testament- Neuer Bund? 53-55. 71 diatheke in t h i s text is unwarranted. This diatheke cannot even be seen as a s t i pu la t i on since only the birds make i t . Di atheke approaches the idea of contract more c lear l y in Isaeus 6:27 which s t a t e s , kai grapsas d ia theken , eph' hois eisegage ton pa ida , 1 9 ka ta t i the ta i meta touton Puthodoro. Burton t ranslates t h i s as fo l lows: "And having wr i t ten out an agreement (diatheke) by which he introduced the boy ( i n t o h is p h r a t r i a ) , he deposited i t , wi th t he i r concurrence, with P y t h o d o r u s . 0 In th i s t e x t , diatheke c lear l y is not a w i l l . But Kutsch does not think i t is a contract as Burton suggests. He not ices, "Die diatheke, die Euktemon niederschrieb, enthaelt die Bedingungen, unter denen er den Knaben in seine Fra t r ie e infuehrte; weder g i l t sie erst fuer den Fal l seines Todes noch t r i t t eine andere Person als ' (Ver t rags-) Partner' auf. Vielmehr steht auch hier diatheke im Sinne der e insei t igen 'Anordnung,' 'Ve r fuegung . ' " 1 4 I t is t rue that there is no contract ing partner. Yet as Kutsch himself admits, the diatheke contained the s t ipu la t ions or condit ions (Bedingungen) upon which he introduced the boy. Thus, though the diatheke' is an "order" or "disposal" and in t h i s sense is c losely l inked to the idea of a w i l l , i t not rad i ca l l y d i s t i n c t from a contract even though the demands are one-sided. The connect ion between di atheke and c o n t r a c t i s made c lea r in Isaeus 4:12, where diatheke, meaning a w i l l , is classed among sumbolaia, 15 agreements or contracts. 12 Cited from Burton, Galatians, 496. 1 3 I b i d . , 496. 14 Kutsch, Neues Testament - Neuer Bund?, 55. 1 5 Bur ton , Galatians, 497. 72 The common denominator in the various usages of di atheke in Greek l i t e r a t u r e is in the idea of something that is binding: an order or binding arrangement. As Behm notes, the las t sayings of a sage are a diatheke because they are binding. As a binding act, a diatheke" can be a guarantee (Aristophanes, Aves 440) or a s t i pu la t i on (Isaeus 6:27) and thus be classed w i th c o n t r a c t s ( Isaeus 4 : 1 2 ) . Even the use of di atheke for bodi ly cons t i tu t ion by Democritus comes under the idea of a binding arrangement. The bodi ly const i tu t ion is f ixed and thus in a sense binding. Since the c e n t r a l idea of d ia theke in i t s various uses is that of an order or arrangement, the d ia theka i in Dinarch 1:9 are most l i k e l y decrees or s ta tutes, as Behm suggests, rather than deposits. The use of diatheke fo r a w i l l does not deviate from the term's general sense of a binding act . Since a w i l l represents- an act of disposal, the idea of disposal does s u f f i c i e n t l y express the idea in a testament. But from th i s i t does not fo l low that the meaning of diatheke as a term fo r a w i l l is that of d isposal . The concept of a binding act equal ly, though from a d i f f e ren t perspective, represents the testamentary act . Which nuance of the testamentary act the Greeks saw in t he i r term fo r testament, diatheke, must be determined from the term's broader usage. The use of diatheke by Democritus noted above is decisive in th i s case. In the idea of bodi ly cons t i t u t i on , the notion of disposal i s wholly absent. That the nontechnical sense of diatheke remained in i t s technical use is suggested by the peculiar use of the plural with reference to a w i l l . The plural diath"5kai was used for both the single provisions of a w i l l without designating the w i l l as a whole, as well as fo r the sum t o t a l of the provisions of a w i l l , so that the p lura l is equivalent to " w i l l " or to the — — 1 fi singular , diatheke. Thus, each provision or ordinance is a diatheke. Another source of confirmation that the Greeks understood a testament as an ordinance, the nontechincal sense of diatheke, comes from the use of the diatasso word group f o r testamentary d isposi t ion noticed above. 1 ' ' This word group has i t s basic sense in the idea of to ordain and then what is ordained. Hence, a testament was seen p r imar i l y as an ordinance rather than as a disposal. In view of t h i s , i t is. questionable whether the use of diatheke fo r the las t sayings of a sage was derived from the legal use of the term, as Behm 18 suggests. The idea of a binding statement or order which is native to the nontechnical use of the term is su f f i c i en t to explain th i s usage. The papyrological evidence suggests that the legal use of diatheke completely monopolized the word by at least the 1st Century A D . 1 9 The fac t that the broader meaning of diatheke was carr ied over in to Judaism, however, checks any hasty conclusions derived from the papyr i . The loan words deyatfqf or d T ' a t t q f 2 0 found in Rabbinic wr i t ings were used both in the pi narrower sense of " l a s t w i l l " and in the broader sense of "ordinance." Since Judaism borrowed the legal i n s t i t u t i o n of a w i l l from the Greco-Roman 1 6 I b i d . , 496. ""7See p. 66 above. See also MM 155. 18 See p. 69 above. ( 19 MM 148. 20 Marcus Jastrow, A Dict ionary of the Targumim, The Talmud Babli and Yerushalmi, and the Midrashic L i te ra ture (New York/Ber l in : Verlag Choreb, 1926) 294. 21TDNJ_ 2. 125; Str-B 3. 545-549; and Yaron, Gi f ts in Contemplation of Death, 19-20. 74 world, i t is not surpr is ing that the technical term fo r w i l l would also be borrowed. What is of special s igni f icance fo r the meaning of diatheke, however, is that the broader meaning of diatheke was also adopted. Af ter c i t i n g a few examples of the use of the term in t h i s more general sense, Behm argues, "Since there is nothing to suggest that the Jews themselves gave a new sense to the term, one can only conclude that they were adopting ?? a common Greek sense." Since the w i l l was taken over in to Judaism l a t e r , i . e . , probably a f ter po the 1st Century, the loan words may also be l a t e . Hence, i t s broader meaning is most l i k e l y ind icat ive of the continuation of the broader usage of diatheke on in to the 1st and 2nd Cen tu r i es . 2 4 In f a c t , i f a testament was pr imar i l y seen as an ordinance, the technical term i t s e l f would have kept the basic, broader sense of the word a l i v e . B. The Broader Usage of Diatheke in the LXX and Apocrypha In a few instances in the LXX and Apocrypha, diatheke and suntheke" approach each other in meaning. The meaning of diatheke ref lected in t h i s la t i tude of usage corroborates what has been seen thus f a r : that diatheke is p r imar i l y a binding act . Two Hebrew terms translated with diatheke in the LXX suggest that t h i s term was used in the sense that approaches the idea of contract . The f i r s t is in Ezekiel 16:29 where diatheke is given fo r the Hebrew taznut (ha r lo t r y , 22TDNT 2. 125; see also Str-B 3. 545. 23 On the adoption of the w i l l by Judaism, see pp. 35f. above. 24 Contra Moulton and M i l l i gan (MM 148) who suggest that the w i l l u l t imate ly monopolized the term, diatheke. 75 f o r n i c a t i o n ) . Harlotry i s a common metaphor in the Old Testament fo r any i l l i c i t or corrupt union and is especial ly used for I s rae l ' s going a f ter other gods. This is har lo t ry because Israel is joined to YHWH as i f by wedlock and ido la t ry thus is an i l l i c i t union. The Hebrew text in question reads, "You also mul t ip l ied your har lo t ry with the land of merchants, Chaldea. . . . " A s imi lar statement i s said of I s rae l ' s re la t i on with Assyria in the previous verse (v . 28) where i t says, "You played the har lot ( t i z n t ) with the sons of Assyr ia . " The LXX renders t i z n t with exeporneusas but uses diatheke fo r the substantive of the same roo t , znh, in v 29. The use of diatheke in v 29 is probably due to the language of commerce in the Hebrew Text. The LXX t ranslates the Hebrew "you mul t ip l ied your har lo t ry with the land of merchants, Chaldea" with "you mul t ip l ied your d ia theka i w i th the land of the Chaldeans." Perhaps the t rans la tors understood har lo t ry in re la t ion to a commercial group as making diathlSkai. At any r a t e , di atheke" i s used here, q u i t e c l e a r l y , in the sense of "covenant" or " t r e a t y " or , perhaps more accurately, in the sense of a pc commercial or p o l i t i c a l arrangement. The second time diatheke is used in t rans la t ion to express the idea of a re la t ionship is in Zech 11:14 of the Alexandrian Text. The Hebrew reads, " t o break the brotherhood (""ahawah) between Judah and I s r a e l . " The Alexandrian Text renders the term * ahawah with diatheke". This statement is an in te rpre ta t ion of the breaking of a s t a f f , which in Hebrew is cal led hahobltm, cords or bands (from habal, to bind or pledge), which can also be p(T Concerning the use of diatheke in Ezekiel 16:29, Cooke (A C r i t i c a l and Exegetical Commentary on the Book of Ezekiel [Edinburgh: T & T Clark, 1951] 171) co r rec t l y remarks, " . . . t h e t rans la t ion is wrong, but the a l lus ion is r i g h t l y understood." 76 used fo r a measured port ion or t e r r i t o r y . The LXX renders t h i s term with schoinisma, from schoinos, a reed, fence or land-measure. The Vat ican and Syr ian vers ions of the LXX continue the idea of t e r r i t o r y i n hahob l fm and scho i n i sma and t r a n s l a t e ~*a h aw ah w i th ten kataschesin, possession. The Alexandrian Text, by rendering ""ahawah with diatheke seems to l e t the idea of cords or bands in hahobltm and the idea of brotherhood d ic ta te the t rans la t i on . I f t h i s is so, diatheke is understood in the sense of a covenant, bond or binding arrangement that t i e s Judah and Israel together. The assoc ia t i on of d i atheke w i t h suntheke i s made e x p l i c i t in Isaiah 28:15. The Hebrew l ines in question read: kT ?amartem karatnu b e n t ?et-mawet we" "im-se'ol c5sTnu* hozeh The LXX uses suntheke" to t rans la te the noun bozeh, which comes from the verb hazah, to see, and as a noun normally means "seer" but in t h i s case probably " v i s i o n . " So the second l i ne in Hebrew reads, "and with se 'o l (the realm of the departed dead, hades in LXX) we have made a v i s i o n , " i .e. by nc necromancy. How the LXX came to t rans late hozeh by suntheke may be explained by the p a r a l l e l i s m invo lved in t h i s poe t i c t e x t . The preceding l ine reads, "Because you have said, 'We have made ( l i t . , cut) a b e n t (diatheke* in LXX) with dea th . ' " Death and se^ol are para l le l concepts, and so beVft and h,ozeh are also taken as para l le l concepts. The para l le l in Hebrew is that the vis ion with se^ol gives secur i ty as does the berTt with death. The LXX, however, makes the para l le l more obvious in rendering hozeh with suntheke whi le, as usual, rendering beVTt 26BDB 302. 77 with diatheke. This t rans la t ion is so a t t rac t i ve fo r i t s c l a r i t y that even 71 7R modern commentators and t rans la t ions fo l low the LXX here. Di atheke and suntheke" also approach each other in meaning in the Wisdom of Solomon and 1 Maccabees. Suntheke is used only twice in Wisdom. In 1:16 suntheke is used of a t reaty which the ungodly (asebeis) made with death ( thanatos). The same verse says t h a t these sought to make death t he i r f r iend (ph i l os ) , re - enforcing the re la t iona l idea of the suntheke. In th i s case, suntheke is used in the usual sense of a t rea ty . The use of t h i s term in Wis 12:21, however, is odd. I t i s the only place in the Apocrypha where i t i s used ( i n the p lu ra l ) in the sense of b e n t . The l ine in question reads, non t o i s p a t r a s i n horkous kai sunthekas edokas agathon huposcheseon (whose fathers you gave oaths and covenants of good promises). The same author uses the plural of diatheke" in an ident ica l manner in chapter 18:22, where he speaks of the horkous pateron kai d ia thekas . 2 9 Moreover, the fac t that the author has sunthekai agathon huposcheseon (covenants of good promises) in 12:21 shows that suntheke is used in the sense of diatheke. Diatheke would be a more exact term fo r promise. The use of horkoi suggests the same. The use of suntheke in Wis 12:21 shows again that diathfSkl" and suntfrSke" were not rad i ca l l y d i s t i n c t concepts. Further, i t shows that i t was not simply the case that diathele could be used in the sense of suntfrske" but 27 For a survey of the in te rpre ta t ion of hozeh - j n t h i s text see Hans Wilderberger, Jesaja 28-39 (Neukirchen-Vluyn: Neukirchener Verlag, 1982) 1064-1065. 2 8 So RSV, NASB, JB and NIV. On Roetzel ("Diatheke in Romans 9,4 , " Bib_ 51 [1970] 381f.) persuasively argues that the diath^kai in 18:22 are promises to the fathers who l ived at the time of the Exodus. This makes the para l le l with the sunthekai of 12:21 more s t r i k i n g since they are sunthekai agathon huposchesefJn. 78 that suntheke could also be used in the sense of diatheke. 1 Maccabees 1:11 and 11:9 gives fu r ther evidence fo r the contention that diatheke and suntheke could approximate each other in meaning. In the former passage where we read diathometha diatheke meta ton ethnon ton kukl? hemon, diatheke is almost ce r ta in l y used in the sense of suntheke". In the l a t t e r passage where we read sunthometha pros heautous diatheken. Normally, and as would be expected, the verb d ia t i thes tha i goes with diatheke. The use of sunt i thesthai for the act of making a diatheke c lear l y shows that diatheke could be a t rea ty or pact. Remarking on the t h r e e passages , 1 Maccabees 1 :11 ; 11:9 and Wisdom 1 2 : 2 1 , Kutsch suggests, "Diese d re i Belege ze igen, dass im 1 . v o r c h r i s t l ichen Jahrhundert sich die Begri f fe diatheke und suntheke" jewei ls am Rande ihres Bedeutungsfeldes uberschneiden konnten; wenn auch nur in ganz se l tenen F a l l e n , konnten beide Worter doch gelegent l ich die Of) Bedentung des anderen annehmen." J U The observation that the two terms cross over i n t o each o t h e r ' s range of meaning on ly at the edges of t he i r de f in i t i ona l f i e l d s is important. The vast major i ty of occurrences of both O l terms shows that they represent qui te d i s t i n c t not ions. However, a small Kutsch, Neues Testament - Neuer Bund?, 71 . 31 In Philo and Josephus, the usage of diatheke narrows down. Philo never uses diatheke in the sense of covenant, t rea ty or contract . For t h i s he uses suntheke. However, he maintains the broader sense of the term. For him diatheke" does not exclusively mean " las t w i l l " (TDNT 2. 128; Burton, Galatians, 498-499). Josephus uses diatheke exclusively in the sense of w i l l . For a t rea ty between nations or agreements between people, he uses suntheke, and fo r making an agreement, sunt i thes tha i . Burton (Galatians, 499) observes, "The absence of diatheke" in the sense of "covenant" is apparently to be explained by his f a i l u r e ever to speak of the covenant of God with his people, though i t is also s ign i f i can t of his fee l ing that diathek~§ was not the sui table word in his day and c i r c l e of thought fo r an agreement between equals that in re fe r r ing to agreements of t h i s character which in the LXX are cal led diathekai he uniformly employs some other form of expression." 79 proport ion of occurrences shows that any f ixed polar izat ion of the terms i s unwarranted. C. Diatheke as Ordinance Suntheke, being derived from sunt i themi, c lear ly emphasizes the two- sidedness of an arrangement. But, from th i s i t does not l o g i c a l l y fo l low t h a t d i atheke i s a one-sided arrangement. Much of the discussion on - - 3? suntheke and diatheke seems to be a f f l i c t e d with t h i s logical f a l l a c y . The fac t that diatheke and suntheke" can approximate each other in meaning The pattern re f lec ted in Philo and Josephus is i n s t r u c t i v e . F i r s t l y , in t h e i r works di atheke" and suntheke are d i s t i n c t notions that do not r e a d i l y approximate each o t h e r . While the d i s t i n c t i o n i s not as consolidated in the LXX and Apocrypha, i t is nonetheless c lear l y evident there also. This prevents any attempt to see the two terms in Jewish l i t e r a t u r e as synonyms. I t also m i l i t a tes against the thesis that the >translators of the LXX understood b e n t as a contract . Had th i s been the case they would no doubt have used sunthlke fo r bervt . Hence^the use of diatheke in the LXX i s j u s t i f i e d on the grounds that the div ine b e n t was rather one-sided though i t is conceded that berTt means contract . The LXX use of diatheke only gets theological j u s t i f i c a t i o n . Annie Jaubert (La Notion d 'a l l iance dans le Juda'i'sme aux Abords de Vere ChrStienne [Par is ! Edit ions du Seui l , 1963] 312) states th i s theological j u s t i f i c a t i o n more f u l l y than ususal as fo l lows: "En f a i t le terme hlbreu beVtt pouvait etre applique au t r a i t e de vassal i te impose par un superieur a un i n f e r i e u r . I I est probable pourtant que c 'est l a densite theologique du mot qui a i n f l u e ' sur sa t r a d u c t i o n . BerTt en hebreu s ' e t a i t comme special ise 'pour exprimer l ' a l l i a n c e de Dieu avec son peuple. Dans la be>?t hebra'fque nous avions dist ingue 1 'a l l iance-contrat et 1 'all iance-promesse, mais dans Tun et l ' au t re cas c ' e t a i t Dieu qui prenait 1 ' i n i t i a t i v e et Israel ne pouvait ni refuser d'adherer au contrat ni e'luder les obl igat ions l iees aux promesses de Yahve.. . Israel e'tait choisi parmi les peuples, mais i l n ' e t a i t pas en son pouvoir de se derober a 1 'e lec t ion. C'est cet aspect souverain de 1 ' i n i t i a t i v e div ine qui semble avoir frappe* les traducteurs des Septante et leur avoir suggere l 'emploi de diatheke. L 'a l l iance d iv ine, c 'e ' ta i t la "d ispos i t ion" de salut^ que Dieu avait e'tablie pour son peuple, dans 1'absolute l i b e r t e de ses decisions. La traduct ion diatheke est par elle-meme une in te rp re ta t i on ; e l l e engage d'emble'e une doctr ine re l ig ieuse de 1 'A l l iance. (Emphasis is added). 80 exposes t h i s f a l l a c y . I f a diatheke can be a suntheke and vice-versa, then the di f ference between the two must not be in the one-sidedness or two- si dedness of the arrangement. Rather than being the polar opposite of suntheke, diatheke must capture an essential component of suntheke". The essential idea in diatheke" that captures the idea behind suntheke is that of a binding act or enactment. A diatheke commits part ies to a cer ta in ordered, s t ipu lated or promised ac t ion . Thus the idea of an order or a binding arrangement seen as the common denominator in the Greek usage of the term is also the d e f i n i t i o n of diatheke that the t rans la tors of the LXX and the authors of 1 Maccabees and the Wisdom of Solomon worked w i th . Expressing the idea of a binding act, diatheke can have a range of usages. I t can be used fo r decree, d ispos i t ion , order, ordinance, s ta tu te , guarantee, or arrangement. As ordinance or arrangement, a diatheke can f u n c t i o n as a suntheke. The two terms, however, are not synonymous. Suntheke is l imi ted to a mutual arrangement whereas diatheke is not. That the primary idea in diatheke in the LXX is that of ordinance or something that is established is not simply suggested by the fac t that diatheke can approach the meaning of suntheke but also by the Hebrew terms other than be r t t that i t is used f o r . The term translated most f requent ly with diathe'ke, i . e . , other than b e r t t , i s the term 'edut (testimony) which is used in the Old Testament as a para l le l concept of b e r t t . This t rans la t ion of cedQt is used in reference to the ark, i . e . , the ark of the testimony, which is a synonym fo r the ark of the covenant (e .g . Ex. 31:7) . The other instances where diatheke t ranslates a Hebrew term other than b e r t t , thought not numerous, are more t e l l i n g as to how the t rans lators understood the term. In Deut 9:5 diatheke is used fo r dabar (word) which is 81 used in the sense of an oath (the word sworn). The text in question c lea r l y shows that dabar is used fo r the ber t t which God made with the pat r ia rchs . Furthermore, ber t t and oath are very c losely related concepts. I t is d i f f i c u l t to determine whether in the LXX of 2 Chr 25:4 we have a t rans la t ion of the MT. For the Hebrew kakkatub battorah bgseper mosSh (as i t i s wr i t t en in the Law in the book of Moses), the LXX has kata ten diatheken tou nomou Kuriou, kathos gegraptai (according to the diatheke of the law of the Lord, as i t is w r i t t e n ) . Kata ten diatheken may be the equivalent of kakkatub in which case diatheke would be "the w r i t i n g " or "what i s w r i t t e n . " I f i t is not, the in tent ion of the t rans la tors is c lear . The wr i t ings or the book of Moses are the diatheke. S imi la r ly in the Syriac tex t of Daniel 9:13, diatheke is used fo r torah (law of Moses), which is rendered in the Alexandrian and Vatican Text with nomos. The use of diatheke fo r dabar (word=oath), katub (wr i t i ng ) and torah (law) suggests that t h i s term had the general sense of ordinance. The range of ideas expressed by i t includes both oath and law. The common element in oath and law is not a disposal by one party but a binding act. Both oath and law bind part ies to ob l iga t ions. Further, a diatheke can bind e i ther the div ine (oath) or human party ( law) . As such, a diatheke is an ordinance that binds any party related to i t . Ecclesiasticus uses diatheke consistent ly in the sense of ordinance. While diatheke t ranslates ber t t f i v e t imes, i t t ranslates hog (s ta tu te) ten t imes and huqqah ( d i t t o ) once. Diatheke i s associated w i th law, These s t a t i s t i c s are taken from Hatch and Redpath, Concordance of LXX. Roetzel (Bib 51 [1970] 380) gives s l i g h t l y d i f f e ren t s t a t i s t i c s based on I s r a e l L e v i ' s ed i t ion of the text (The Hebrew Text of the Book of Ecclesiasticus [Leiden: E. J . B r i l l , 1951]) as fo l lows: diatheke" is used fo r hdq ten t imes, fo r ber t t three times and fo r *ot once. 82 judgments, commandments and oath (24:23; 28:7; 41:19; 42:2; 44:20; 45 :5) . The term is used f o r the decree or ordinance of death ( 4 : 1 2 , 1 7 ) , 3 4 f o r God's decree in his works (16:22) and fo r the decree or sentence of judgment (38:33; cp. 45:17). In 2 Maccabees 7:36 the martyr dies under (hupo) the diatheke of e v e r l a s t i n g l i f e in c o n t r a s t to the wicked one who dies under God's judgment. This use of diatheke" agrees with the use in Ecclesiast icus. I t is a decree, ordinance or ordainment. The use of di atheke f o r the l a s t sayings of a patr iarch in the pseudepigraphic Testaments of the Twelve P a t r i a r c h s 3 5 does not r e a l l y depart from i t s usage ascertained thus f a r . The primary idea in the diathekai i s not that they are the 1ast words but rather that the words are commanded (T. Reub. 1:1) or decreed (T. Zeb. 1:1 and T. Naph. 1:1). This much is c lear ; diatheke is not used in i t s narrow technical sense evidenced in the papyr i , i . e . , a las t w i l l . Di atheke as ordinance or as that which is established and binding r a t h e r than as a one-sided disposal alone agrees with the i n s t i t u t i o n described in Gal 3:15,17. The notion of one-sidedness carr ies impl icat ions that are incongruous with Paul's descr ipt ion of the divine diatheke in th i s t e x t . Because a las t w i l l i s the exercise of one's own r igh ts over one's own goods, i t was not binding over the one who makes i t ; and i t is t h i s aspect of a w i l l that causes the greatest d i f f i c u l t y fo r understanding diatheke in Gal 3:15 as a w i l l . The argument in Gal 3:15,17 presupposes 34 For the use of di atheke in t h i s way, see W. 0. E. Oesterley, Ecclesiast icus (Cambridge: Universi ty Press, 1912) 99. 3 5 T . Reub. 1 :1 , T. Zeb. 1 :1 , T. Naph. 1 :1 , T. Gad 1 :1 , T. Ash. 1 :1 , T. Jos. 1 :1 . 83 t h a t God h imse l f i s bound by the diatheke. In f a c t , Paul introduces diatheke in to the discussion to draw out the i r r e v o c a b i l i t y of the promise. Therefore, the i n s t i t u t i o n in question is not a mere expression of the author i ta t ive w i l l of the one who makes i t . Rather, i t i s object ive to a l l part ies concerned. Hence, in i t s basic sense, diatheke is simply a binding act or an ordinance. 84 CHAPTER 5 BERIT AS ORDINANCE By render ing b e r i t w i th diatheke, understood as a binding act or ordinance, He l len is t i c Judaism expressed the central idea that Post -b ib l ica l Judaism u n i v e r s a l l y understood in the i n s t i t u t i o n of covenant. Greek, Aramaic and Hebrew sources corroborate th i s meaning of b e r t t . A. The LXX Rendering of Ber i t The t rans la tors of the LXX c lea r l y understood be r i t as ordinance. Of the 286 occurrences of ber t t in the MT, 270 are t ranslated with di at hike, which term meant ordinance fo r the t rans la to rs . That beVft meant ordinance fo r them is also evident from the i r t rans la t ion of beVft with terms other than diatheke. B e r t t i s t r a n s l a t e d w i t h m a r t u r i a, t es t imon ies (Deut. 9:15; 2 Kgs 17:15), which reminds one of the fac t that diatheke was used for the Hebrew c edut ( test imony). • Also ber t t is t ranslated entole (1 Kgs 1 1 : 1 1 ) . In t h i s l a t t e r case b e r t t i s c l e a r l y understood as ordinance. The t rans la t ion of ber t t in Gen 14:13 may suggest that beVtt i s used in the sense of a t r e a t y . A close examination of the t rans la t ion in question, however, reveals that again ber t t i s understood as ordinance or binding act . In t h i s tex t the expression ba 'ale ber t t (possessors of a be r t t ) i s rendered sunomotai (confederates, from sunomnumi: to swear together and thus to j o i n in a league). Here the idea of covenant or t rea ty comes through. However, the idea of league expressed in the pre f i x sun r e a l l y t ranslates "possessors o f " in the expression "possessors of a b e r t t . " The idea of ber t t is 85 expressed by omnumi ( to swear). To possess a ber t t is to come under an oath. Thus a ber t t is a binding commitment or ordinance. Suntheke, a word that expresses the idea of covenant in i t s s t r i c t sense is used four times in the LXX. Only in one doubtful case is i t used fo r b e r t t . Otherwise, i t is used twice to express the idea of t r e a t y 1 and p once as a para l le l to diatheke. Since diatheke could be used fo r a suntheke* and, as w i l l be seen, an OT ber t t could func t iona l l y be a suntheke, i t is amazing that suntheke* is only used in one doub t fu l instance f o r b e r t t i n the Alexandrian Text of 2 Kgs 17:15 (or 4 Kgs 17:15). Since Codex A is taken from Or ig in 's Hexapla, Kutsch speculates that th i s rendering of be r t t here stems from A q u i l a . 3 This conjecture may receive support from the fac t that the other texts of the LXX only give one word (marturia) fo r three terms in the MT (s ta tu tes , covenant and warnings). This t rans la t ion is poor and perhaps a f u l l e r t rans la t ion from Aqui la, which now appears in the f u l l e r t rans la t ion of Codex A, was simply transposed in to t h i s t e x t . Hence, the use of suntheke in th i s tex t cannot be given much weight. In Isaiah 30:1 the LXX renders the Hebrew phrase l insok massekah, l i t . , to pour a l i b a t i o n , with epoiesate...sunthekas, to make a compact. In Greek the p lura l spondai, l i ba t i ons , was a term fo r t rea ty since t rea t ies were concluded with l iba t ions (LSJ sponde). In t h i s case, the LXX gives a correct rendering of the Hebrew idiom. The LXX uses suntheke to give a s imi lar idiomatic t rans la t ion in Daniel 11:6. There the phrase tou poiesai sunthekas, which c l e a r l y r e f e r s to a p o l i t i c a l a l l i a n c e or t r e a t y , t r a n s l a t e s the^ Hebrew phrase l a ' a s o t mesarfm, to make an e q u i t a b l e arrangement (mesarfm, from yasar, to be smooth, s t ra igh t , r i g h t ) . Thus, suntheke* is understood as an agreement or t rea ty in the s t r i c t sense of the word. For t h i s las t instance, see p. 76 above. 'Kutsch, Neues Testament - Neuer Bund?, 50. 86 B. BerTt as Ordinance in Hebrew and Aramaic Sources The unanimity in concept with which the LXX renders berTt r e f l e c t s a unanimity of understanding throughout Judaism. In understanding beVTt as ord inance, there seems to have been no di f ference between the LXX and He l len is t i c Judaism on the one hand and the Hebrew and Aramaic speaking Jewish communities on the other. Kutsch notes that the beVTt of Exod 19:5 was understood by some rabbis as fo l lows: Rabbi E l ieser - - the Sabbath-berit (bryt s b t ) , and Rabbi A k i b a - the berTt of c i r c u m c i s i o n and i d o l a t r y ( b r y t mylh wfbwdh z rh ) . While one could, in view of Gen 17:9-14, ta lk of a "covenant" (Bund) of c ircumcision, one could not leg i t imate ly ta l k of a Sabbath covenant (Bund) and surely not of an ido la t ry covenant. Kutsch concludes that these Rabbis understood by b e n t a commandment—the commandment of the Sabbath, of circumcision or against i d o l a t r y . 4 Strack and Bi l lerbeck quote Rabbinic material which emphasize the berTt-nature of the commandments.5 One quotation reads: "48 Buendnisse ( b r y t w t ) hat es bei jedem einzelnen Gebot gegeben" (= 48 covenants (berTtot) were given with each single commandment). Furthermore, R. Simeon (150 A.D.) aff i rms "dass 576 Bundschliessungen wegen jedes Wortes in der Tora stattgefunden haetten" ( that 576 covenants occur because of every word in the Torah). Thus in the th ink ing of these Rabbis, b e r i t i s i d e n t i f i e d with commandment. S im i la r l y , Roetzel argues that the p lura l berTtot was used as a synonym fo r ordinances, decrees or commandments.6 4 I b i d . , 23-24. 5 Str -B 3. 262. 6 C. Roetzel, Bib_ 51 (1970) 379. 87 The Targums confirm that beVit was understood as ordinance by t h e i r rendering of b e r i t . With a few exceptions, the Targums t rans la te beVtt with g&yam. This term is related to the verb gum which means, in i t s various forms, ar ise , stand, set up, establ ish or appoint. The basic meaning of the noun qeyam is that which is f i r m , established or f i x e d , and the word is used in Daniel 6:7,15 f o r a s tatute established by the k i n g . 7 In the Targums, qeyam also has the same semantic range as beVtt. I t i s used fo r the Hebrew terms !sebufa, oath (Num. 30:3; Dt. 7 :8) , nedar, vow (Gen.28:20, 31:13), and hoq, s ta tute (Ex. 18:16,20; Ps. 9 9 : 7 ) . 8 Ber i t is also t ranslated with the Aramaic term f o r ins t ruc t ion or law ( 'o r aye f a ' ) . Ecclesiasticus c lear l y t reats b e r i t and Ijoq (s ta tute) as synonyms. Not on ly are b e r i t ( f i v e t imes) and hj5£ (ten times) both t ranslated with diatheke, in 45:5 and 15 the two terms are used interchangeably. Whereas Ijoq is used fo r the ever last ing covenant made with Aaron in 45:5, b e r i t i s used fo r the same covenant in v 15. The qeyam of the Targums and hog of Ecclesiasticus as equivalents of ber t t confirm the contention that the covenant was understood pr imar i ly as ordinance or something that was binding. Thus the Hebrew and Aramaic l i t e r a t u r e of Pos t -b ib l i ca l Judaism r e f l e c t the same d e f i n i t i o n of the covenant concept found in the He l len is t i c l i t e r a t u r e . Roetzel ( I b i d . , 380) argues that the plural qeyamaya' means statutes or ordinances in the Targums. He gives the fo l lowing Targumic quotation on Ex. 18,15f . , "Because the people come to me to inquire of God; when they have a dispute, they come to me and I decide between a man and his neighbor, and I make them know the covenants (qeyamaya*) of God and his decis ions." Kutsch, Neues Testament - Neuer Bund?, 26-27. 88 C. BerTt as Ordinance in the Old Testament While Schoeps t races Pau l 's 'fundamental misunderstanding' of the Jewish view of the law to his use of diatheke and thus to Paul's source fo r t h i s term, LXX and He l len is t i c Judaism, he also suspects that Palest inian Judaism f a i l e d to c lea r l y grasp the meaning of berTt in the OT. 9 This turns the discussion to the d e f i n i t i o n of berTt in the OT. A f u l l review of that discussion is beyond the scope of the present study. The case for understanding the b e r i t of the OT as ordinance w i l l , however, be presented. The problem with d e f i n i n g berTt begins with the etymological d i f f i cu l t ies of the word. Among the various etymologies proposed, the one that l inks berTt to the Akkadian b i r i t u , "clasp," " f e t t e r , " "bond," has the most scholarly support. 1 0 The idea of "bond" is associated by scholars with the idea of t rea ty as a bond between par t ies . Weinfeld appeals to the Akkadian and H i t t i t e terms fo r t rea ty , r iksu and i^h iu l respectively, which both mean "bond." He l inks these terms with the Greek terms fo r covenant, sunthgkl, harmonia (11iad 22: 255), sunthesia ( i i . 339), and sunemosume (22: 261) which also express the idea of binding or put t ing together. He also appeals to Arabic ( f aqd) , Lat in (vinculum f i d e i , contractus) and German (Bund) terms which use the concept of a bond fo r a t r e a t y . 1 1 However, even though the idea of "bond" in b i r i t u l inks the term with the idea of contract or the Greek term suntheke, i t does not necessari ly fo l low that the basic Q Schoeps (Paul, 213) wr i tes , " . . . i n consequence of the post -B ib l ica l inadequacy of normative doctr ine even in the schools of Palest ine, there hardly existed clear ideas about the re la t i on of Torah and B e r i t h . . . . " 1QTD0T 2. 255; TDNT 2. 108. n TD0T 2. 255. 89 idea in birTtu is that of contract or agreement. The idea of " f e t t e r " or "bond" may simply imply a b ind ing of o b l i g a t i o n s . The no t ion of " impos i t ion, " " l i a b i l i t y , " or "ob l iga t ion" may be foremost. A related etymology derives be r i t from the Akkadian birTt, which means "between" or "among" and corresponds to the Hebrew preposit ion ben which occurs in connect ion w i th bertt in the phrase bertt...ben...ubhen, "a covenant between X and Y." Weinfeld assesses t h i s der ivat ion as fo l lows: "This equation is based on the assumption that the prep. birTt has been developed in to an adverb and then in to a noun, an assumption that cannot be accepted w i thou t r e s e r v a t i o n s . The main d i f f i c u l t y , however, is the coupling of b e r i t h , "between," with the overlapping prep, ben, which resu l ts in a tauto logy." Another der iva t ion , which sheds a d i f f e ren t l i g h t on b e r t t , derives i t from the Akkadian word burru which means " to establ ish a legal s i tua t ion by testimony with an oath . " Other attempts at der iv ing ber t t have been made , 1 4 but require more explaining and so are more dubious than those mentioned. The derivat ions mentioned point to two p o s s i b i l i t i e s of understanding b e r t t : e i ther as a contract or agreement binding two part ies or simply as establ ishing an obl igat ion on one or more pa r t i es . The two understandings are not mutua l l y e x c l u s i v e . The idea of a contract implies that of " impos i t ion, " "ob l iga t ion" or a " legal s i t u a t i o n . " However, the reverse i s not necessari ly t rue . The question here is whether the idea of agreement 1 2 I b i d . , 254. 13TWp_T 1. 128. 1 4 See discussions by Quell in TDNT 2. 107-109, and by Weinfeld in TDOT 2. 253-255. 90 between part ies or of ob l igat ion is the foremost idea in b e r i t . This must be decided by the use of be r i t and the terms i t is related to or associated w i t h . The d e f i n i t i o n of b e n t must be d i s t i l l e d from the OT i t s e l f . In seeking to define be r i t from i t s OT usage, however, the var ie ty of beVtt types must be taken i n t o c o n s i d e r a t i o n . McCarthy r i g h t l y gives t h i s cautionary note: A cer ta in amount of current invest igat ion of covenant sometimes seems to t rea t covenant as a univocal concept throughout the O.T.; wherever a covenant i s mentioned, i t is assumed to have had cer ta in character is t ics which pertain to one form of covenant. However, i t is simply a fac t that there are many d i f f e ren t forms of covenant and these d i f f e ren t forms imply d i f f e ren t meanings. The f a i l u r e of any given form of be r i t to take in the features of a l l the different b e r t t o t , however, does not exclude an underlying conceptual uni ty in a l l berit types. While d i f f e ren t forms may in themselves imply different meanings, beVTt certainly has a basic meaning that is applicable to a l l the forms of b e r t t . The one idea that binds a l l OT covenants together is not "agreement" or " c o n t r a c t . " 1 0 A contract is only one kind of b e r i t . Rather, the uni fy ing Dennis J . McCarthy, Old Testament Covenant: A Survey of Current • Opinions, (Oxford: Basil Blackwell , 1972) 4. 1 6Mendenhall ("Covenant," I_DB_ 1. 716f.) categorizes the beVitot of the OT a c c o r d i n g t o covenant- type or form as f o l l o w s : 1) Suzera in ty ( I Sam 11 :1 ; Ezek 17:12-14; Hos 12 :1 ; Job 41:4) , 2) Par i ty (Gen 31:44-50; 21:25-32; 26:27-31; Josh 9:3-22; I Sam 18:3; I Kgs 5:12; 15:19), 3) Patron (Noahic, Abrahamic and Davidic covenants), and 4) Promissory . (2 Kgs 11:4- 12,17; 23:3; Jer 34:8; Neh 10:28-29). Only the f i r s t two £ an be cal led a t rea ty . The t rea ty status of the patron and promissory beVit i s not at a l l c lear . The patron b£rr t i s simply a guarantee or promise by the superior. In the ANE, t h i s ber t t - type is the equivalent of the Royal Grant in which a king grants some favour to an i n f e r i o r . These were not t r e a t i e s . The promissory covenant does not even involve a re la t ionsh ip . I t is simply a commitment to cer ta in act ion. For example, in 2 Kgs 23:3 the king and the people make a covenant to keep the law which was rediscovered in the temple. Jer 34:8 t e l l s of a covenant made during the siege to release a l l slaves, 91 idea in a l l OT be r i t o t is that of a binding act, an enactment or ordinance. E. Kutsch has been able to conceptually uni fy the ber t to t of the OT in the idea of Verplichtung or the imposit ion of ob l igat ion. " " 7 He sees three types of b e r i t in the Old Testament. The f i r s t i nvo lves imposing o b l i g a t i o n s on onese l f ( S e l b s t v e r p f l i c h t u n g ) , the second imposing obl igat ions on others (Fremdverpflichtung) and the t h i r d mutually imposed 1 p obl igat ions (gegenseitige Verpf l ich tung) . which was conveniently revoked af ter the siege. Clear ly , we do not have a " t rea ty" in these instances. Ernst Kutsch, Neues Testament - Neuer Bund?, 5-26. Martin Buber (Moses: the Revelation and the Covenant [New York; Harper & Brothers, 1946] 103-104) also argues that "The o r ig ina l meaning of ber i th i s not "contract" or "agreement"; that i s , no condit ions were o r i g i n a l l y s t ipu lated there in , nor did any require to be s t ipu la ted" (p. 103). For Buber t h i s i s even the case in a covenant that is an "a l l iance between two people who stand to some degree on the same l e v e l . " He sees an example of th i s type of covenant in the covenant made by David and Jonathan in 1 Sam 18:3 and 23:18. Buber claims that th i s is a covenant of brotherhood by which two part ies become brothers. The duties that th i s re la t ionship implies need not be stated since they were obvious. Hence, "any detai led agreement is superf luous." The idea in t h i s covenant is not contract but entering a re la t ionsh ip . Buber understands God's covenant with Israel on the analogy of the covenant that David made with the elders of the Northern t r ibes in 2 Sam 5:3. "Here, too , " he argues,"no special agreement is necessary, and indeed there is no room fo r any such th ing . The re la t ion of overlordship and service, in to which the two par tners e n t e r , i s the dec i s i ve f a c t o r . Engagements, concessions, cons t i tu t iona l l im i ta t ions of power may be added, yet the covenant i s founded not on thern^ but on the basic fac t of ru le and serv ice. " He c lass i f i es t h i s kind of b e r i t as the "Royal Covenant." The Book of the Covenant, according to him, "has the character not of an agreement but of a roya l p r o c l a m a t i o n , " and the people's response as simply a pledge of obedience (Ex 2 4 : 7 f f . ) . So covenant is not an agreement but an instrument creating and imposing commitment fo r a re la t ionsh ip . On Buber's re la t iona l emphasis, see the fo l lowing footnote (n . 18). IP ^ The spec i f ic way Kutsch approaches the problem of def in ing berit has been formulated fo r him by the German language. As "covenant" is the common term fo r beVit in English, "Bund" is the common term in German. Both terms represent the same t r a d i t i o n of t rans la t ion but have a s l i g h t l y d i f fe ren t emphasis. The term "covenant" emphasizes the idea of agreement which binds part ies together and thus is synonymous with "contract" or " t r e a t y . " The German term Bund, however, emphasizes the re la t ionship formed by such an agreement. Thus, i t s English equivalents, s t r i c t l y speaking, are a l l iance, 92 Kutsch sees an example of a beVtt that involves obl igat ing oneself (Se lbs t ve rp f 1 i ch tung) in the beVtt t h a t the I s rae l i t es made with the Gibeonites in Joshua 9. He denies that t h i s ber t t is a par i t y t rea ty and observes, "Ein "Bundesschluss"--dass die Gibeoniten etwa "Bundesgenossen" oder gar "Kampfgenossen" der I s rae l i ten wurden--ist heir n icht gemein t . " 1 9 Accordingly, Kutsch d i f f e r s with the usual in te rpre ta t ion on Josh 9:15, which reads, "And Joshua made peace with them and made a ber t t with them, to l e t them l i v e ; and the leaders swore an oath to them." Kutsch does not see the idea of t reaty in the phrase "made peace wi th them." Based on other Old Testament passages l i ke 2 Sam 10:19 (para l le l passage 2 Chr 19:19) and especial ly Deut 20:10-11 and Egyptian T e x t s , 2 0 Kutsch i n t e r p r e t s the phrase as meaning that the Gibeonites were made subservient to the I s r a e l i t e s . This is implied in t he i r request, "We are your se rvan ts ; now t h e n , make a ber t t with us" (v. 11) and in the i r reduction to servanthood when i t was discovered that they were w i th in the t e r r i t o r y Israel was to conquer (v. 16-27). As servants, they were not covenant partners. To Kutsch's observations i t may be added that making peace was not part league, c o a l i t i o n or confederacy. The German equivalent fo r covenant, contract or t rea ty is Vertag. Kutsch is arguing against t rans la t ing beVtt with Bund which he defines as "ein gegenseitiges Verhaltnis von Personen oder Personengruppen, in das diese f r e i w i l l i g e int reten und in dem die gegenseitigen oder gemeinsamen Rechte und Pf l ichten verbindl ich festgelegt sind" (Neues Testament - Neuer Bund?, 1) Thus ber t t would be a mutual re la t ionsh ip of pa r t ies , vo lun ta r i l y entered i n to , in which mutual or agreed upon r igh ts and obl igat ions are bindingly set f o r t h . While Bund puts the emphasis on the r e l a t i o n s h i p entered by agreement and covenant on the agreement forming a re la t ionsh ip , the common idea of agreement between part ies is the issue in question. The basic question is whether be r i t i s fundamentally a re la t iona l or an obl igatory concept. 19 Kutsch, Neues Testament - Neuer Bund?, 11 . 2 0 I b i d . 93 of the b e r i t . In the texts Kutsch refers t o , in which peace is made with someone, no mention of a bertt is made. The beVtt concerns another issue. The text quoted above states i t s content: " to "let them l i v e . " Peace is only the resu l t of such a bertt. The text also states that the b e r f t - making process simply consisted of an oath sworn in regard to the Gibeonites by Israel alone. So, in th i s beVtt two part ies were not entering in to a r e l a t i o n s h i p but one pa r t y was making a guarantee to another. This observation is supported by the Gibeonites' goal, which was to have the i r l i ves saved. That was the i r object ive in securing th i s bertt, as indicated by the content of the covenant and the ob l igat ion Israel took on. Hence, Kutsch r i g h t l y observes, " b e r t t bezeichnet aber e i n d e u t i g n icht das Verhaeltnis—dass damit Unterwerfung und Lebensgewaehrung umfasst waeren—, sondern a l l e i n die Garantie des Lebens, ausgesprochen von Josua zugunsten (1 ahaem!) der Gibeoniten. Das Heisst aber: be r t t bedeutet heir nicht "Bund" sondern die "Zusage," die "Se lbs tverp f l i c tung, " die Verpf l i c tung, die pi Josua fue r s ich und die I s rae l i ten uebernimmt." Thus, i f Kutsch is correct , the phrase wayyikrot lahem ber t t usually rendered, "and they made ( l i t . cut) a covenant with (Je: l i t . to) them," means, "they made a pledge or guarantee to them." In another k ind of b e r t t , instead of Selbstverpf l ic tung, we have Fremdverpf1ichtung or the imposition of ob l igat ion by one, a superior, upon another, an i n f e r i o r . c This kind of be r i t is usually cal led a suzerainty t r e a t y , of which we have a secular example in Ezek 17:12-21. King Nebuchadnezzar, the superior or suzerain, a f te r having taken the king of 2 1 I b i d . , 12. 2 2 I b i d . , 13-18. 94 Judah capt ive, ins ta l led Zedekiah as his vassal. The text s tates, "And he took one of the royal fami ly and made a ber t t with him, put t ing him under oath ( l i t . and caused him to enter in to an oath)" (v . 13). The purpose of the be r i t that Nebuchadnezzar made with Zedekiah, the vassal, is given in verse 14: " tha t the kingdom might be in subject ion, not exal t ing i t s e l f , but keeping his ( i . e . , Nebuchadnezzar's) b e r t t , and that i t might cont inue." In answer to the question how ber t t in th i s tex t i s to be understood, Kutsch observes that Zedekiah, being made king by Nebuchadnezzar, did not enter in to the re la t ionship w i l l i n g l y and that the tex t throughout speaks only of Zedekiah's obl igat ions and not of Nebuchadnezzar's, not even of a promise on his par t . Kutsch concludes from th i s that the word ber t t i t s e l f does not denote a r e l a t i o n s h i p entered upon by agreement between po Nebuchadnezzar and Zedekiah. Kutsch observes fur ther that the word beVtt is l inked with the word ? alah (oath) throughout the tex t (v . 13,16,18,17), which has para l le ls in P4 Ancient Near Eastern "covenant" terminology. Kutsch concludes, "Der 'F luch, ' in den Nebukadnezar den Zedekia hat 'e in t re ten l a s s e n ' . . . i s t nichts anderes a ls der Eid der Vasal len in a l to r ien ta l ischen Suzeraenitaets- vertragen. y Und das para l le le ber t t entspr ich t . . .den Vasallenbestimmungen. b e r t t bezeichnet h ie r a lso wi e jene Termini ( n i c h t 'Bund,' sondern) e i n s e i t i g d ie Bestimmung, d ie Verpf 1 i c h t u n g , die der Grosskoenig dem V a s a l l e n a u f e r l e g t (und deren E inha l tung d ieser durch einen Eid uebernimmt)," 2 5 Thus, instead of a " t rea ty " in which two part ies enter in to 23 Ib id 13-14. 24 Ib id 14-15. 16. 95 a re la t ionsh ip we have simply one party imposing an obl igat ion on the other. "Fuer Ez. 17;13,16,18,19 erg ib t s ich , dass hier berTt nicht 'Bund' bedeuten kann, sondern die 'Verpf l ichtung ' im Sinne der Verpfl ichtung eines anderen, imposition of ob l iga t ion . In 1 Kgs 5:12 and Gen 31:44,52 we have another s i t u a t i o n . Here we do not have one subject of the berTt imposing an obligation upon himself, as in the case of Joshua, or upon another as in the case of Nebuchadnezzar, but we have two subjects, i . e . , both parties making berTt. 1 Kgs 5:12 says of Solomon and Hiram, "and the two of them made a berTt," and in Gen 31:44 Laban says to Jacob " l e t us make a berTt, you and I . " In these two tex t s , we have what might be cal led par i t y t r e a t i e s . The context of both passages shows that both parties have taken on obligations in re la t i on to each other. Commenting on the berTt in 1 Kgs 5, however, Kutsch s ta tes, Die Gegenseitigkeit von "Verpf1ichtung".. .koennte fuer berTt auch an die Bedeutung "Abkommen," "Vertag" denken lassen; und derarticje Belege sind wohl in spaeterer Zei t der Anlass dazu gewesen, bent als "Bund".o.a. zu verstehen. Nur i s t n icht zu uebersehen: Nicht d i e s , dass zwei Partner einander "verbunden" s ind , i s t das entscheidende Moment bei berTt--dass dieses "Bund" bedeuten wuerde--,sondern dies, dass man gegenseitig verpf-Lichet i s t oder gemeinsam dieselbe Verpfl ichtung uebernommen hat . " In t h i s quote Kutsch acknowledges the connection between t h i s type of be r i t ( i . e . , mutual ob l igat ion) and Bund or t reaty (Vertag). However, he r e t u r n s to the idea that the basic idea in ber t t is the taking on of ob l iga t ions, in t h i s case by both par t ies . Especial ly in reference to t h i s las t case, one may wonder whether a der Fremdverp f l i ch tung mein t . H 26 Once aga in , berTt reduces to the 26 Ib id 17. 27 Ib id 21 . 96 radical d i s t i n c t i o n between beVtt and t rea ty can be maintained. I f berTt i s not equal to t rea ty in terms of meaning, berTt often functions as a t r e a t y . Funct ional ly the two categories can be the same, even i f not d e f i n i t i o n a l l y . Perhaps one could even argue that beVTt in a l l cases analyzed f i t s the general category of t rea ty in that they concern the obl igat ions governing the r e l a t i o n s h i p s between two p a r t i e s ( I s r a e l and the G ibeon i tes , Nebuchadnezzar and Zedekiah, and Solomon and Hiram) even i f the obl igat ions are on ly imposed on one p a r t y . However, only the las t case can be considered a proper t rea ty in that i t alone involves mutual i ty and agreement between two p a r t i e s . Kutsch has r i g h t l y pointed out that the common denominator throughout and the essent ia l element in each case is not "agreement" but imposition of ob l iga t ion . B ib l i ca l Hebrew has no separate term fo r the idea of a t rea ty and so uses beVTt fo r t h i s notion since func t iona l l y a t rea ty is a form of beVtt in that i t concerns imposition of ob l iga t ion . However, not every berTt i s a t rea ty . This is especial ly t rue of those instances in which a ber t t is made without reference to a partner or other par ty . Such ber t to t are found in 2 Kgs 23:3, 2 Chr 15:12 and Jer 34:10 where the berTt cons is ts in merely making a binding commitment to a cer ta in act ion. One fu r ther tex t which requires such an understanding of berTt i s Job 31:1 in which Job says, " I have made a berTt with (J_e: l i t . to) my eyes; How then can I gaze at a v i rg in?" Job hardly made a t rea ty with his eyes. Rather, he imposed a r e s t r i c t i o n on them. The basic idea in ber t t i s , on the one hand, that of a binding pledge, guarantee, promise, commitment and, on the other hand, that of command or s t i p u l a t i o n . The basic thrust of be r t t is that of guaranteeing, assuring or securing action e i ther toward (promise) or from (command) another. Thus 97 Quell may be right in detecting the basic motive behind making a ber f t in the Ancient World in the establishment of a legal i n s t i t u t i o n to regulate re lat ionships and behaviour between par t ies where a natural bond l i ke the blood-bond did not ex i s t . Thus a ber t t was designed to provide legal guarantee and secur i ty where t h i s was not provided by some natural t i e . This makes beVft an enactment. The div ine ber f to t in the OT r e f l e c t the same meaning and funct ion as the secular examples already considered. The Noachic, Abrahamic and Davidic covenants are of the kind that Kutsch designates as Selbstverpf l ichtung. Only God is bound by the beVft. Furthermore, the beVft does not "create" a r e l a t i o n s h i p . I t i s on ly a guarantee or r a t i f i e d promise wi th in a re la t ionship that has already been establ ished. So, the ber f t with Noah and the new world is made after Noah is already in the new world (Gen 6:18, note the use of the imperfect, i . e . , future tense, and 9 : 9 f ) . Likewise, the Abrahamic ber f t is made after the promise was given. In fac t i t was made upon a.request for some guarantee (Gen 15:8) . The Davidic be r i t was also made, not to set the house of David up, but to establ ish i t to perpetui ty or to guarantee i t s continuation (2 Sam 7; 23:5; Ps 89) . The narrat ive of the making of the ber f t with Abraham in Genesis 15 i s ins t ruc t i ve fo r t h i s type of bervt. Abraham is to ld to divide the animals to prepare for a beVft-making r i t e , which r i t e is also referred to in Jer 34:18. The meaning of the r i t e seems c lear . The berft-making party passes through the animals as a form of sel f -curse or oath. In te res t ing ly , however, in both Genesis 15 and Jeremiah 34 only the party making the Quell argues fo r th i s thesis at length in TDNT 2. 111-118. cp . , Buber's treatment of covenant in Moses, pp. 103-104, out l ined on p. 91 n. 17 above. 98 promise passes through. In f a c t , in Genesis 15, Abraham, the human par ty , is asleep during the ceremony. This removes any idea of a t rea ty . The ber t t is a r a t i f i e d promise. The other divine bertt is the Mosaic covenant made at Sinai (Exod 1 9 f ) . This beVtt takes the form of the suzerainty t reaty in which God is the suzerain and Israel is the vassal. However, Exod 19:5-6 makes clear that the berTt is that which God demands of I s r a e l . God said that Israel would have a special re la t ionship with himself i f they obey his voice and keep his beVTt. Kutsch correctly observes, " In Paral le le zu 'meine Stimme hoeren (= meiner Stimme gehorchen)' kann 'meine berTt bewahren' nur die Einhaltung von Jahwes 'Verp f l i ch tung, ' 'Gebot' bedeuten."29 As in the Noachic, Abrahamic and Davidic covenants, the re la t ionship with God entai led in the berTt is not created by the berTt. Rather, i t i s only secured. God has already brought Israel to himself (Exod 19:4) . The covenant only provides fo r the securing of that re la t ionship by means of s t ipu la t ing the necessary conduct on the part of I s r a e l . Def in i t ional ly, the divine ber t t is a binding act . Funct ional ly, i t serves to secure certa in action or conduct from ei ther party in the pre- ex is t ing divine-human re la t ionsh ip . Hence, the thrust of a ber t t is to create a legal s i t u a t i o n . Bert t is an enactment. The basic ins ight of th i s discussion is confirmed by Weinfeld. He wr i tes , "The or ig ina l meaning of the Heb. ber i th (as well as of Akk. r iksu 29 • • I b i d . , 23. Kutsch ( I b i d . ) also shows that b e r i t cannot re fer to the r e l a t i o n s h i p (Bund) between God and Israel since according to Ex. 19:5, beVtt is the precondit ion fo r the re la t ionsh ip and not the re la t ionsh ip i t s e l f . He states, "Wenn das Bewahren von Jahwes beVtt die Vorbedingung fuer das (neue) Verhaeltnis zwischen Jahwe und dem Volk Israel i s t , dann kann hier mit der be r i t n icht ebendieses Verhaeltnis selbts gemeint se in . " This point is more pert inent to the spec i f ic concept of Bund than to that of covenant. 99 and H i t t . i s h i u l ) i s not 'agreement or settlement between two p a r t i e s , ' as i s commonly argued. B e r i t h implies f i r s t and foremost the notion of on ' impos i t ion , ' ' l i a b i l i t y , ' or ' o b l i g a t i o n , ' This fundamental notion comes through often in the Old Testament. Weinfeld observes, " . . . b e r i t h i s commanded...(Ps. 111:9; Jgs. 2:20) which cer ta in ly cannot be said about a mutual agreement.. .beri th is synonymous with law and commandment ( c f . , e . g . , Dt. 4:13; 33:9; Isa . 24:5; Ps. 50:16; 103:18), and the covenant of Sinai in Ex. 24 is in i t s essence an imposition of laws and obl igat ions upon the 31 people (vv. 3 -8 ) . " He goes on to notice a para l le l in the use of the Akk. r i k s u and H i t t . i s h i u 1 : " the formulas r i k s u i r k u s in Akkadian and i sh iu l i s j i y a in H i t t i t e occur in connection with a set of commandments imposed by the king on his o f f i c i a l s , his soldiers or c i t i zens , as well as his vassals" (cp. 2 Kgs 11:4) . Furthermore, be r i t is c losely l inked with oa th (Gen 2 1 : 2 2 f . ; 2 6 : 2 9 f . ; Deut 2 9 : 9 f . ; Josh 9 :15-20; 2 Kgs 11 :4 ; Ezek 16:8; 17 :13 f . ) , a l ink which is para l le l led in the Akkadian of the 33 second millennium B.C. and in the Neo-Assyrian Period. D. Covenant as Ordinance The OT beVft, as a binding act or enactment, is the basis fo r the universal understanding of covenant as ordinance in Post -b ib l i ca l Judaism. This idea of ordinance takes in both aspects of covenant: promise and law. 3 0TD0T 2. 255. 3 1 I b i d . , 255. 3 2 I b i d . , 255. 3 3 I b i d . , 256. 100 As promise, covenant i s a guarantee, and as law i t i s an order or commandment. The in tegrat ion of both law and promise in the idea of ordinance is made e x p l i c i t in Jubi lees. Jubilees 30:21 equates covenant and ordinance with command. Jubilees 15, however, equates them with promise. In 15:4 God says to Abraham, "And I w i l l make my covenant between me and you and I w i l l make you increase very much." In 15:6, however, God says, "Behold, my ordinance is with you and you w i l l be the father of many nat ions." In 15:9 the covenant of promise is cal led an "eternal ordinance" and in 15:15 circumcision is said to be a "sign of the eternal ordinance" between God and Abraham. In promise God ordains what w i l l be with regard to the rec ip ients of his covenant, and in command he ordains what they must do or be. In Galatians, law and promise also share a formal uni ty in the idea of ordinance. That Paul understood covenant as ordinance is made clear from his use of epidiatassesthai in Gal 3:15 fo r the act of replacing a covenant. While Paul does not ca l l the law a diatheke in Galatians 3, he does t rea t i t as a covenant. The act of epidiatassesthai in v 15 refers to the potent ia l impact of the law on the promissory covenant in v 17. Also, he says in v 19 that the law was d iatageis , ordained. Thus, the law also has a covenantal character. I t too is a diatheke as stated in Gal 4:24. While law and promise are mutually exclusive fo r Paul, the two are formal ly the same as enactments, as ordinances. 101 CHAPTER 6 BERIT AMONG THE QUMRAN SECTARIES Two aspects of the theology of covenant at Qumran might suggest on the surface that covenant among the sectaries was seen as a contract . F i r s t , the idea of covenant i s c losely l inked with the idea of community so that the two categories at times appear to be synonymous. Second, promise and commandment are seen as inseparable dimensions of covenant so that i t appears that covenant expresses the idea of mutual i ty in a contract . A close examination of the evidence, however, shows that Qumran saw only one covenant which was Torah and thus shared the d e f i n i t i o n of covenant universal ly witnessed in Judaism: ordinance. The d e f i n i t i o n of ber t t at Qumran must be d i s t i l l e d from i t s theology. This f a c t c a l l s f o r a separate chapter to deal with beVft among the sectar ies. Since t h i s treatment w i l l lead the invest igat ion in to the area of the theology of covenant, t h i s chapter also forms a t rans i t i on to the next concern of t h i s thes is : Paul's departure from Judaism. A. Covenant, Torah and Community In the Dead Sea Scro l l s , be r t t is c losely connected with the community. This has led scholars to assume that beVft is used in the sense of compact or re la t ionsh ip . Driver understands ber f t at Qumran " . . . as a pact or agreement between God and the society at Qumran. . . . " 1 Ringgren, wr i t i ng about the idea of community at Qumran, a f f i rms, "This fel lowship is often ""G. R. Dr iver, The Judean Scro l ls : The Problem and a Solution (Oxford: Basil Blackwell , 1965) 518. 102 cal led a covenant ( b e r t t ) . To "enter in to the covenant" means the same p thing as to become a member of the o r d e r . . . . " However, while entering the covenant at Qumran amounts to the same thing as entering the community, covenant and community represent c lea r l y d i s t i n c t not ions. The Manual of Disc ip l ine connects covenant and community most c lea r l y , which, no doubt, is due to i t s focus on community d i s c i p l i n e . The fo l lowing expressions are used f o r the idea of becoming or being part of the community: to pass or go in to ( ( b r b l ) the covenant (1:16,25), to come in to (bw* be) the covenant (5 :8 ,20) , to bring into (bw' [ i n hi ph. ] b l ) the covenant (1 :7 -8 ; 6:14-15), and to be reckoned in (h£b b£) the covenant (5:11) . The l ink between covenant and community is also expressed in "a covenant of eternal community" (3:11,12) and "a community of an eternal covenant" ( 5 : 5 ) . While these expressions c l e a r l y suggest an int imate l ink between covenant and community, which is essential to the notion of covenant at Qumran as w i l l be seen, covenant and community are not synonymous. Throughout the Manual, the covenant in mind is simply Torah. Helmer Ringgren, The Faith of Qumran: Theology of the Dead Sea Scrol ls (Phi ladelphia: Fortress, 1963) 128. Ringgren, however, does not miss the not ion of ob l igat ion in covenant. In pp. 201-202 he wr i tes , "Becoming a member of the community is cal led "entering the covenant" (1QS i .18, e t c . ) . This presupposes wi l l ingness (forms of the verb NDB) to do God's statutes (1QS i .7 ) and to o f fer "his knowledge, his strength and his wealth to God's congregation" (1QS i . l l f . ) . Hence i t is a question of a real covenant which puts one under obl igat ion and not only a designation f o r the community as such." While in t h i s passage Ringgren captures the sense of covenant, he f a i l s to make t h i s sense i t s primary meaning. In f a c t , as w i l l be shown, covenant i s never used as a designation fo r the community. Covenant always has i t s basic sense of ordinance or enactment at Qumran. I t s close l ink with "community" must be explained from the theology of covenant and not from a f a u l t y d e f i n i t i o n of the term. 3 Yigael Yadin (The Temple S c r o l l : The Hidden Law of the Dead Sea Sect [London: Weidenfeld and Nicol son]) argues that the Temple Scrol l which contains both material in the Pentateuch (the known Torah) and supplementary 103 The covenant entered is God's covenant (1:8; 2:25; 5:8; 5:11,20,21; 10:10). The human being entering that covenant is by no means a contract ing partner with God. Further, entering t h i s covenant means pr imar i l y to commit oneself to f u l f i l l i n g the Mosaic law. This is brought out c lear l y in 5:7b- 10 which reads: Everyone who approaches the council of the community shall enter the covenant of God in the sight of a l l who o f fe r themselves; and he shal l take upon his soul with a binding oath to return to the Law of Moses, according to a l l that he commanded, with a l l his heart and a l l his soul , and to a l l that has been revealed from i t to the sons of Zadok, the pr iests who keep the covenant and who seek out his w i l l , according to the major i ty of the men of t h e i r covenant who o f fe r themselves in community to his t r u t h and to walk according to his w i l l . material was an addit ional Torah at Qumran. He f inds several l ines of evidence fo r t h i s hypothesis. In the Temple S c r o l l , God speaks in the f i r s t person. Yadin observes concerning t h i s , "The clear aim of the author is to dispel any doubt that i t i s God himself who is u t ter ing not only the known injunct ions in the Pentateuch (the Torah), even when they are presented in repor ted speech, but also the supplementary tex t that appears in the s c r o l l . " He goes on, " In, most cases he [God] is addressing someone in the second person, and t h i s is especial ly t rue in the section where the Lord commands the bui ld ing of the Temple. The s ty le there is very s imi lar to that in Exodus, where the Lord speaks to Moses d i r e c t l y and ins t ruc ts him to bui ld the tabernacle. I t may be assumed, therefore, that in the s c r o l l , too, the person addressed is Moses" (p .66) . He also f inds evidence that the Temple S c r o l l was seen as sc r i p tu re in i t s use of the tetragrammaton (p. 68). In b i b l i c a l quotations at Qumran, the tetragrammaton is wr i t ten in the Old Hebrew sc r ip t of the F i r s t Temple period. In b ib l i ca l books, however, the same square sc r ip t as in the rest of the book is used. The same is found in the Temple S c r o l l . Yadin f inds references to t h i s Scrol l in the Book of Hagu, a fundamental book in the community (CD 10:4-6; 13:2-3; 14; 6-7; 1QS 11:2; 15:5; 17:5; The Messianic Rule 1:6-8), in the mentions of a second 'Torah' (Pesher on Ps 37:32 and on Hos 5 :8) , and in the reference to the sealed Book of the Law (CD 5:1-5) which David had not read and which was hidden u n t i l Zadok arose (pp. 225-228). Ben Zion Wacholder, (The Dawn of Qumran: The Sectar ian Torah and the Teacher of Righteousness [ C i n c i n n a t i : Hebrew Union College, 1983]) goes fur ther than Yadin and argues that t h i s t e x t , which he ca l l s "HQ Torah," "arrogates to i t s e l f not merely equal i ty to the t r a d i t i o n a l Pentateuch, but super ior i ty to the Mosaic Law" (p. 33). Thus Torah at Qumran, while seen as the Mosaic law, was, most l i k e l y , not simply the Pentateuch as known today. Translations of 1QS are taken from A. R. C. Leaney, The Rule of Qumran and i t s Meaning (London: SCM, 1966). 104 This passage shows, f i r s t , that to enter in to the covenant of God is to return to the law of Moses.5 The same is suggested in those passages that make keeping the law or the t ru th the purpose of entering the covenant (1:8,16; 5:20; 6:14,15). Secondly, t h i s passage says that the Zadokite p r i e s t s keep the covenant, which refers to the i r ro le as guardians and in terpreters of the law. Thus, to enter the covenant is not only to return the law of Moses but also " to a l l that has been revealed from i t to the sons of Zadok." That the p r i e s t ' s ro le in re la t i on to the covenant concerns his handling of the law is made clear in a fragment containing the blessing of the Priests (lQSb 3:22-25): Words of blessing. The Master shal l bless the sons of Zadok the p r ies ts , whom God has chosen to confirm his covenant forever, and to inquire in to a l l His precepts in the midst of His people, and to i n s t r u c t them as He commanded; who have established [His c o v e n a n t ] on t r u t h and watched over a l l His laws, w i th righteousness and walked according to the way of His choice. The i d e n t i t y between the covenant and the Torah is also suggested by paral lel isms such as in 1QS 5:20 which reads " . . . v a n i t y are a l l that do not acknowledge his covenant and a l l who spurn his word he shal l destroy." God's word i s h is covenant. S imi la r ly 10:10 puts "his statutes" in to paral le l ism with "the covenant of God". 7 But more s i g n i f i c a n t l y , in t h i s text coming in to God's covenant is a da i ly act. The tex t reads: With the coming-in of day and night I w i l l come into the covenant of God and at the going-out of evening and at morning I w i l l rec i te his s ta tu tes. Cf. the oath of the covenant to return to the law of Moses in CD 15:1-16:2. 6 The t rans la t ion is taken from G. Vermes, The Dead Sea Scrol ls in Engl ish (Middlesex: Penguin, 1962) 207. On the p r i e s t ' s r o l e and" in terpreta t ions of law see Leaney, The Rule of Qumran and i t s Meaning, 165. 7 Cf . 1QM 10:10 which describes God's chosen as "a people of men holy through the covenant taught the s ta tu tes . " 105 Thus the idea of entering or coming to the covenant is not p r imar i l y that of entering the community but of coming in to the commitment of Torah. The community dimension of be r i t in the Manual of Disc ip l ine l i es in the f a c t that the law, i t s t rue in te rpre ta t ion and pract ice are given to the community and are to be carr ied out in community. This is brought out c lear ly in 5:20b-22. When a man enters the covenant to act according to a l l these s tatutes, to be united with the community of hol iness, they shal l examine in community his s p i r i t as between a man and his neighbor, according to his in te l l igence and his deeds in the law interpreted according to the sons of Aaron who devote themselves in community to restore his covenant and to heed a l l his statutes which he has commanded men to pract ice , according to the major i ty of Israel who devote themselves to return in community to his covenant. Concerning the backsl iders, 5:5-6 says "unclean, unclean shal l he be a l l the days of his re jec t ion of the precepts of God with his refusal to d i sc ip l i ne himself in the community of his counsel." Thus, the backslider re jects the pract ice of law in community. F ina l l y , the purpose of each one in the group is to " lay a foundation of t r u t h f o r Israel to make a community of an eternal covenant ( 5 : 5 ) . In summary, in the Manual of Disc ip l ine the community's covenant is equivalent to i t s Torah. This covenant i s given to the community and can only be real ized in the community. Also, the community is based on t h i s covenant. To enter that covenant means to enter in to the commitment imposed by the law which in turn means to enter the community of the covenant since that commitment is one of doing Torah in community. 106 B. Covenant, Torah and Promise The Damascus Document re f l ec ts a s imi lar but broader and more complex P view of covenant. The connection between law and covenant is made clear in 20:25, which says concerning the apostates, "But as fo r a l l those of the members of the covenant who have broken out of the boundary of the Law: when the glory of God w i l l appear unto Israel they shal l be cut o f f from the q midst of the camp.. . . " From t h i s quotation i t is clear that the members of the covenant are those who are wi th in the boundaries of the law. In the same vein, 1:20 puts covenant and ordinance (hog) in to para l le l i sm: the f a i t h l e s s "caused others to t ransgress the covenant and to break the ordinance (h5q)." The Damascus Document, however, presents a more complete view of covenant than the Manual of D isc ip l ine , which, no doubt, is also assumed in the l a t t e r . I t speaks of a pre-Mosaic covenant with the patr iarchs (3:4; 20:25), a New Covenant (6:19; 8 :21; 20:12), a covenant of repentance (8:4) and the covenant to return to the law of Moses (15:9) . This array of covenants, however, does not contradict the conclusion drawn from the Manual of Disc ip l ine that the Qumran sectaries only saw one covenant between God and his people. The various covenants only are re-enactments or renewals of one basic covenant which is Torah. The be l ie f that a l l covenants are essent ia l ly the same assumes that P For expressions of entering in to covenant, see CD 1:2; 2:2; 6:12; 8:4; 12:11 and that the covenant is God's, 1:7; 3:11,13; 15:12; 7:5; 8:2; 13:14; 14:2) . g Cf. the expression in 20:13, to have a "share in the house of the Law". The t rans lat ions of CD are taken from Chaim Rabin, The Zadokite Documents (Oxford: Clarendon, 1958). 107 divine promise and law, both of which are l inked with covenant in the OT, are merged into the one covenant that the sectaries had in mind. Hence, the wr i t ings from Qumran do not make a d i s t i n c t i o n between a promissory covenant with Abraham and a l e g i s l a t i v e covenant with Israel through Moses. Promise and commandment are essential to any covenant. These two dimensions of covenant may at f i r s t sight suggest that covenant was understood as a contract at Qumran. Again, however, a careful examination of covenant in the Damascus Document shows t h a t covenant i s simply Torah, with the promissory dimension of covenant being simply the blessing of Torah. C. The Interrelatedness of Promise and Law in Covenant The interrelatedness of promise and law is seen in the section in the Damascus Document on the covenant that God made with the pat r iarchs. Speaking about the "stubbornness" of heart (2:17) through which the watchers of heaven f e l l (2:18-21) and through which the sons of Noah and the i r fami l ies went astray ( 3 : 1 ) , the author says: Abraham did not walk in i t , and he was recorded as a f r i e n d , through keeping the commandments of God and not choosing the desire of his own s p i r i t . And he handed i t down to Isaac and to Jacob; and they kept i t and were wr i t ten down as fr iends of God and His covenanters fo r e te rn i t y (3 :2 -4 ) . This text contains an ambiguity in that i t does not specify the object of msr, i . e . , what Abraham handed down to Isaac and Jacob .^ The idea, however, i s q u i t e c l e a r . The p a r a l l e l between Abraham keeping the commandments of God and being recorded as a f r iend and Isaac and Jacob keeping [ i t ] and being wr i t ten down as f r iends of God makes i t clear that ""°Rabin (The Zadokite Documents, 10 n. 3:1) suggests that "the object of msr is the correct in te rpre ta t ion of the law, as Aboth 1 . 1 . " 108 what Abraham handed down and what Isaac and Jacob kept were the commandments of God. As a r e s u l t of keeping the commandments, Isaac and Jacob became b a ( a l e be>t t le 'o lam, possessors of a covenant forever . The expression ba'ale ber t t 1£'6*1 am contains the promissory element of the covenant. I t means that the covenant that God established with the patr iarchs w i l l be established with t he i r p o s t e r i t y . 1 1 Thus the basic promise of the covenant presupposes the keeping of the commandments. The meaning of the promise of an eternal covenant fo r the pos ter i ty of the p a t r i a r c h s is brought out in the expression "God/he remembered the covenant of the forefathers" (1:4; 6:2; 8:18). In the opening l ines of the Damascus Document ( l : 3 - 5 a ) , which contain t h i s expression, we read: In Ecc les ias t i cus , not only are the covenants, e x p l i c i t l y cal led e te rna l covenants (diathekai aionos), passed on to poster i ty but every divine covenant is passed on perpetual ly with the poster i ty of the one with whom i t was made. In 44:18, God makes diathekai aionos with Noah not to b l o t out a l l f l e s h with a f l ood . The perpetui ty of the diathekai is obvious. In 45:7, Aaron receives a diatheke aionos which confers on him the priesthood. The priesthood thus passes on to his descendants perpetual ly ( ta ekgona autou dia pantos, v 13). Verse 15 states that the anointing by Moses egenethg auto eis diatheken aionos kai tp spermati autou en hemerais ouranou. En hgmerais ouranou defines aionos or 'olam; forever means as long as creation l a s t s . Phinehas was also given a covenant (vv 23-24). Though i t is not cal led an eternal covenant, t h i s covenant gave to him and his descendants the d ign i ty of priesthood forever (eis tous aionas, v 24). Verse 25 says that a covenant was established with David and that the heritage of the king is only from son to son (kleronomia basileos huiou ex huiou monou) and compares i t to the heritage of Aaron which is for his o f f s p r i n g . This verse s ta tes c l e a r l y t h a t a covenant passes on to pos te r i t y . But, again, the covenant is not said to be e te rna l . The obvious assumption is that a div ine covenant with a party passes on to his poster i ty f o r e v e r . The covenant of eternal priesthood is mentioned in lQSb 3:26 (ber t t kehunnat c6lam). For a comprehensive study of f6lam, see Ernst Jenni, "Das Wort folam im Alten Testament," ZAW 64 (1952) 196-248; 65 (1953) 1-35. Concerning^o"!am at Qumran, he says, "Als spaete Texte erweisen sie sich durch die te i lweise haeufige Verwendung der Pluralform und durch die festgepraegte Bedeutung "Ewigkei t , " die al ien goett l ichen und eschatologischen Groessen praediz ier t " (64 [1952] 247). 109 For when they sinned in that they forsook Him, He hid his face from Israel and from His sanctuary and gave them to the sword. But when He remembered the. covenant of the fo re fa thers , He caused a remnant to remain of Israel and gave them not up to be consumed. God remembers his covenant by sparing a port ion of the seed of the f a t h e r s from a n n i h i l a t i o n . Only i f a seed continues forever can the ber f t colam be establ ished. But the beVit 'Slam requires more than the survival of the seed. The granting of a ber f t c6Tam to the fathers means that the covenant would be perpetual ly established with t h e i r seed. Since the covenant is Torah, the promise of perpetui ty means that Torah w i l l be perpetual ly established with the poster i ty of the fa thers . This aspect of the covenant with the fathers is made clear in 6:2-5, which reads: But God remembered the covenant of the fo re fa thers , and He raised from Aaron men of understanding and from Israel men of wisdom, and He caused them to hear and they digged the wel l . . .The well i s the Law. And those that digged i t are they that turned from impiety of I s r a e l . God remembers his covenant by reviv ing the law among the remnant. The preservation of a Torah-keeping community is of c r i t i c a l importance for the preservation of a remnant. The fa te of the major i ty of Israel i s due to t he i r forsaking God's law. Thus God causes "the curses of the covenant to cleave to them, thus del iver ing them to the sword that shal l execute the vengeance of the covenant" (1:17-18). The covenant i t s e l f ensures the ann ih i la t ion of the u n f a i t h f u l . Hence, the remnant can only be spared i f i t keeps the covenant, Torah. 110 D. Torah as the One Perpetually Renewed Covenant The pr inc ipa l reason f o r the Torah revival moti f i s that the covenant is Torah and so covenant renewal is Torah renewal. This is brought out in CD 3:10-16. The succession of commandment keeping from Abraham to Jacob (3:2-4) was broken by the sons of Jacob who went astray and were punished accordingly (3 :4 ) . Their sons in Egypt sinned f l a g r a n t l y against the commandments and were cut o f f in the wilderness (3 :5-10) . But the covenant was renewed with a surviv ing remnant. 3:10-16 reads: Through i t [s tubbornness of hear t ] the f i r s t members of the covenant became culpable, and they were given over to the sword, because they forsook the covenant of God and chose t h e i r own desire and went about a f ter the stubbornness of t he i r hearts by doing each man his desi re. But with them that held fas t to the commandments of God who were l e f t over of them, God established His covenant with Israel even u n t i l e t e r n i t y , by revealing to them hidden things concerning which a l l Israel had gone astray. His sabbaths and His g l o r i o u s appointed t imes , His r igh teous testimonies and His t rue ways and the requirements of His desire, which man shal l do and l i v e t h e r e b y . . . . " The covenant t h a t God established af ter the f i r s t members of the covenant apostatized is the same as the covenant he made with Isaac and Jacob. F i r s t , both times the covenant is made with those that keep the commandments. Second, both times the covenant is established fo r e t e r n i t y . I t has already been pointed out that the expression 1eco1am in connection with the covenant made with the fathers in 3:4 indicates that the covenant would be established with the seed of the fa thers . The renewed covenant which is established fad c6lam is thus also established e te rna l l y with the remnant community throughout i t s successive generations. To understand the renewal of the perpetui ty of covenant, the community aspect of the covenant seen in the Manual of Disc ip l ine must be reca l led . I l l The covenant is given to the community and can only by real ized in that community. A l l I s rae l i tes who are not part of that one community are outside the covenant. To enter the covenant they must enter the remnant community with whom the covenant was renewed. This remnant community is given the covenant forever . That means i t w i l l only be perpetuated in that community and w i t h i t s successive generations. So, the re-established covenant with the community is ident ica l with that established with Isaac and Jacob in that i t too has the promise of perpetu i ty . The covenant established with the remnant i s c lear l y the establishment of Torah among them. Thus "God established His covenant with Israel even u n t i l e t e r n i t y , by revealing to them" the laws "which man shal l do and l i v e thereby." Since t h i s re-establ ished covenant is ident ica l to the one made with the fa thers , i t fol lows that the covenant with the fathers was also Torah. The correspondence between the covenant made with the fathers and with the remnant i s completed by the c lea r i m p l i c a t i o n t h a t p a t r i a r c h s themselves, l i k e the remnant, only had a pre-ex is t ing covenant renewed with them that was handed down to them in the commandments they kept. That covenant is implied in the commandments of 3:2-4 is suggested by the fac t that covenant is not mentioned with reference to Abraham. As in Jubilees, Abraham is not the pr inc ipa l f igure with reference to covenant. 1? Rather, Jacob is emphasized. Also, the idea prominent in Jubi lees, that the covenant began wi th Noah and was renewed with Abraham, Isaac and Jacob, 12 On the prominence of Jacob in Jubi lees, see John C. Enders, B ib l i ca l I n t e r p r e t a t i o n in the Book of Jubi lees, The Catholic B ib l i ca l Quarterly Monograph Series 18 (Washington, DC: The Catholic B ib l i ca l Association of America, 1987) 18-19; Michel Testuz, Les Idees Religieuses du Livre des Jubi1es (Geneve: L i b r a i r i e E. Droz, 1960) 72-73; and Annie Jaubert, La Notion d 'A l l iance , 99-100. 112 is c lear l y assumed in the Damascus Document. A clear succession is presented. CD 3:1 mentions that the sons of Noah went astray. That implies that Noah kept the commandments. Immediately a f ter s tat ing that the sons of Noah were cut o f f , the text presents Abraham as one who kept the commandments ( 3 : 2 ) . He handed the commandments down to Isaac and Jacob and as a resu l t of keeping them they were made possessors of a covenant forever (3 :3 -4 ) . The sons of Jacob strayed and were punished (3 :4 ) . Their sons, however, apostasized and were cut o f f (3 :6-10) , thus meeting the fa te of Noah's sons. While the expression " to be cut o f f " means to be annih i la ted, i t i s e s p e c i a l l y used f o r those who break the covenant. The use of t h i s expression fo r both the sons of Noah and the I s rae l i t es in the wilderness c lear ly suggests that the former, l i ke the l a t t e r , broke the covenant. This in turn suggests that Noah is thought of in terms of covenant. Thus 3:1-10 presents the sequence of Noah and an apostasy among his chi ldren followed by the patr iarchs and an apostasy among the i r ch i ld ren. This pattern suggests that the covenant given to Isaac and Jacob was only a renewal of covenant. The covenant in the commandments was handed down to them by Abraham and then renewed with them by God as a resu l t of t h e i r obedience. Neither in the case of Isaac and Jacob nor of the remnant i s a covenant i n i t i a t e d . Each party stands wi th in a t r a d i t i o n of covenant, handed down in the commandments, and as a resu l t of keeping the commandments has the covenant es tab l i shed w i th them fo rever . That means tha t , unl ike the aposta tes , they and the i r seed w i l l not be cut o f f and w i l l have the covenant renewed. This l a t t e r point means that t he i r seed w i l l also have the law and as a resu l t of keeping i t w i l l have the covenant established 113 with them forever . E. Torah and God's Covenant Faithfulness The int imate l ink between keeping the commandments and covenant renewal even bears on the Document's idea of God's covenant fa i th fu lness as i t s in te rpre ta t ion of Deut 9:5 shows. The text in question is 8:14-18 which reads: And as f o r t h a t which Moses said to I s r a e l : Not f o r thy righteousness, or fo r the uprightness of thy heart, dost thou go in to possess the nat ions, but because He loved thy fathers and because He would keep the oath--thus is the case with those that turned ( f rom imp ie ty ) of I s r a e l , who forsook the way of the people: owing to God's love fo r the fo re fa thers , who bore witness against the people fo r His sake, He loves them that come af ter them, fo r the i rs i s the covenant of the fa thers . At a glance t h i s passage seems to be contradic tory. The quotation from Deut 9:5 emphasizes that God does not act on behalf of the people because of t he i r uprightness (keeping the commandments) but simply out of love fo r the fathers and fa i th fu lness to his bath. The author of the Damascus Document, however, applies the tex t to those who return to the law and are f a i t h f u l . He is led to th i s in te rpre ta t ion by his convict ion that the covenant is Torah and only belongs to those who are f a i t h f u l " fo r the i rs i s the covenant of the fa the rs . " God's fa i th fu lness to his oath is seen in that God renews the covenant with the f a i t h f u l remnant. He renews his covenant with them because he is committed by oath to do so. But since covenant is Torah, the covenant can only be given to those who keep Torah. Any idea that God would f u l f i l the covenant wi th those that do not keep the commandments is excluded. The basis of the d i v i n e commitment to renew the covenant w i th 114 succeeding generations is God's love of the fathers and his oath to them. Both of these are based on the fa thers ' keeping of the commandments. In 3:2-4 God reckons Abraham, Isaac and Jacob his f r iends ('ohabfm, c f . 'Shab in 8:15) because they keep the commandments and Isaac and Jacob are made possessors of the covenant forever (c f . oath in 8:15) fo r the same reason. Hence, as the oath or the promissory aspect of the covenant i s based on the keeping of commandments, so i t is only f u l f i l l e d fo r those who keep the commandments, fo r the covenant as Torah only belongs to such. F. Torah and the Promissory Aspect of Covenant The fact that the promise of having an eternal covenant is only and always given to those tha t keep the covenant ( i . e . , the commandments) suggests that the promissory aspect of covenant is the same as the blessing' attached to the law. This suggestion is confirmed by the other aspect of the covenant promise: deliverance. The party that has the covenant does not only have the promise of p e r p e t u i t y but also of d i v i n e favour and deliverance. God keeps the covenant by sparing the f a i t h f u l from annih i la t ion (1 :4 ) , by keeping them al ive (7:5-6) and by saving "them from a l l the snares of the p i t " (14:2) . War Scrol l 18:7-8 says, "Thou hast many a time opened fo r us the gates of 13 deliverances fo r the sake of thy covenant." This deliverance which is pledged by God in the covenant is nothing more than the blessing fo r keeping the law. The opposite of t h i s salvat ion are the curses and vengeance of the 13 Cited from Yigael Yadin, The Scrol l of the War of the Sons of Light Against the Sons of Darkness (Oxford: Universi ty Press, 1962). 115 covenant v i s i t e d on those that forsake the law (1:18; 8 : 1 ; 15:33). The i d e n t i f i c a t i o n of the promise in the covenant and the blessing in Torah enables us to see the complete i d e n t i t y of covenant with Torah. In the covenant, the promise is given on basis of f u l f i l l i n g the commandments of the covenant. The same arrangement can be expressed in terms of Torah. Torah is a set of commandments wi th promises or blessings attached to i t . The promise in e i t h e r case inc ludes both a divine commitment to the salvat ion of the immediate community and the perpetuation of the covenant with t h e i r succeeding generations, i . e . , the promise of covenant renewal with the seed of the f a i t h f u l . Fur thermore, the i d e n t i f i c a t i o n of Torah and covenant means that promise and commandment can not be separated. At the most, they can only be dist inguished. Divine commandment implies divine promise and vice versa. But t h i s does not mean that Torah is an abstract universal law that anyone can keep and thereby be in the covenant of God. The community dimension of covenant and Torah fo rb id th i s conclusion. God gave the Torah only to Israel and wi th in Israel only to the remnant community. That community alone is in the covenant and alone has the true in te rpre ta t ion and pract ice of the law. For t h i s reason the covenant community is of paramount importance. The only a l lus ion to a universal aspect of the law in the Damascus Document i s in the reference to the straying of the sons of Noah and the i r f a m i l i e s ( 3 : 1 ) . As a l ready seen, the idea of covenant is i m p l i c i t l y connected with Noah. His sons, however, were cut o f f as a resu l t of t he i r straying and the covenant was only renewed with Abraham. He alone kept the commandments and handed them down to his o f f sp r ing . So the en t i re Gentile world is outside the covenant and Torah, and not being of the of fspr ing of 116 Jacob w i t h whom the covenant was renewed they have no access to the covenant. G. Bert t as Diatheke at Qumran The merging of promise and law in covenant gives bfertt a seemingly contractual character. The promise represents the div ine and the law the human commitment. Two fac to rs , however, prevent the conclusion that in the ber t t at Qumran we have a contract or a suntheke rather than a diathgke. F i r s t , i f i t is a question of whether at Qumran we have a one-sided or a mutual arrangement, the features of the beVtt in question decide in favour of the fo rmer . God gives both the promise and the law which as an inseparable un i t const i tu te an ordinance. Second, the essential feature in be>t t t h a t u n i f i e s both promise and law i s not mutual imposition of s t i p u l a t i o n s or sharing of commitments but an ordinance that binds a l l part ies in re la t i on to i t , both human and d iv ine. At Qumran, ber t t is diatheke in the sense of ordinance as implied by i t s complete i den t i t y with Torah. 117 CHAPTER 7 THE UNITARY VIEW OF COVENANT IN JUDAISM The invest igat ion in to the covenant concept at Qumran has disclosed a uni tary view of covenant. By "uni tary view of covenant" i s meant the view t h a t the v a r i o u s , d i v i n e covenant formulations of the OT represent one covenant and that law and promise, the two covenanted elements, form an i n d i s s o l u b l e u n i t y . This means t h a t there is not a m u l t i p l i c i t y of covenants that God made with his people. Rather, there is only a renewal or a re-enactment of one basic covenant. Also, in accordance with the Jewish emphasis on Torah, that one covenant is essent ia l ly Torah. However sectarian the views at Qumran were, the view of covenant seen there is representative of Judaism at large. This fac t makes the community at Qumran thoroughly Jewish. Several strands of evidence of the uni tary view of covenant in Judaism w i l l be b r i e f l y presented. A. P l u r a l i t y of Covenants in Jewish L i te ra ture Calvin Roetzel in an a r t i c l e on the meaning of the p lura l diathekai in Rom 9:4 has made an in teres t ing and important study of the use of the p lura l of the covenant terms, b e r i t o t , geyamaya'' and d i a t h e k a i , i n Jewish l i t e r a t u r e . 1 He notes t h a t "almost unanimously commentators have interpreted the p lura l noun, d iathekai , in Rom 9:4 as a reference to the d i f f e ren t covenants which Yahweh established with the patriarchs—Abraham, Calvin Roetzel, "Diatheke in Romans 9,4" Bib_ 51 (1970) 377-390. 118 Isaac, Jacob, Moses, e tc . " Roetzel, however, takes exception to t h i s i n te rp re ta t i on . Rather than reading Paul against a Christ ian background with i t s tendency " to juxtapose the "new" and "o ld" covenants, or to regard the covenant in Christ as the las t and greatest in a series of covenants," he prefers " to read Paul against his f i r s t - c e n t u r y Jewish background." 3 To do t h i s , he studies the use of the p lura l f o r covenant terms in Hebrew, Aramaic and He l len is t i c l i t e r a t u r e . Roetzel argues persuasively that in pos t -b ib l i ca l Jewish l i t e r a t u r e the p lura l of the covenant terms is consistent ly used in a way other than f o r mul t ip le covenants that God established with the people. He shows that beVrtot " i n both Sofrah and Yebamoth ber t to t is a synonym fo r ordinances, decrees, or commandments." 4 In a d i f f e ren t ve in, beVftot i s used in Berakoth 48b-49a fo r the number of times the word beVft appears in cer ta in t e x t s . 5 In the Targums, the Aramaic covenant term in p lura l i s also used as a synonym fo r commandments or ordinances. Roetzel notes, Q^yama ( s i n g . ) in the Aramaic, denotes God's covenant with Abraham in Gn 15,18, but in Gn 26,5 the p lura l form stands as a synonym fo r statutes or laws. "Abraham" the Targum says, "obeyed my word (mymry), my statutes (pqwdy), my covenants (qeyama), and my laws ( J w r y t y ) " . The appearance of the Aramaic qymy ( p i . ) , f o r the Hebrew hqwty (statutes) bracketed by references to "laws" and 2 I b i d . , 377. 3 I b i d . Roetzel ( I b i d . , 379) wr i tes , " In discussing circumcision Yebamoth notes that i t "stands in a d i f f e ren t category fo r concerning i t th i r teen covenants (beVttot) were made". On the other hand, the Rabbis note in t he i r discussion of A the Decalogue, in Sofrah 37b, that "there were f o r t y -e igh t covenants ( b e r i t o t ) in connection with each commandment". In each of these instances the p l u r a l form denotes ordinances or decrees, not mul t ip le covenants or agreements with the pa t r ia rchs . " Cf. discussion on p. 86 above. 5 I b i d . , 379. 119 " s t a t u t e s " suggests t h a t covenants ( p i . ) in the mind of the wr i ters was synonymous with both. Roetzel f i n d s the same p a t t e r n in the Apocrypha. The p l u r a l , d iathekai , is used in the sense of s ta tu tes, ordinances, decrees, promises or oaths, but i t is never used fo r mul t ip le covenants between God and his people. In S i r 45:17, diathekai means statutes and in 44:18 i t means promises or oaths. Roetzel s tates, " I t is s i g n i f i c a n t , moreover, that with absolute consistency the author refuses to use diathekai to re fer to God's re la t ionship with the d i f f e ren t f igures in I s rae l ' s h i s t o r y . " 7 The p l u r a l , d iathekai , is used only once in the Wisdom of Solomon in 18:22. The tex t says concerning Aaron, He conquered the wrath not by strength of body, and not by force of arms, but by his word he subdued the punisher, appealing to the oaths and covenants (diathekas) given to our fa thers . Roetzel l inks the reference to the " fathers" with 18:6 which concerns the q generation of the exodus. Thus the p lura l is not used fo r the various covenant formulations with the pat r iarchs, Abraham, Isaac and Jacob but f o r promises given to the exodus generation. This much is c lear : "covenants" i s simply a para l le l expression to "oaths." Consequently, the p lura l does not re fer to the various divine covenant formulations of the OT but to cer ta in promises that Aaron could appeal t o , whether made with the exodus generation or n o t . 1 0 Roetzel 's s k i l l in arguing his thesis is seen in his treatment of 6 I b i d . 7 I b i d . , 381. p Quotations of Apocrypha are taken from the RSV (1965/77). 9 I b i d . , 381. 1 0 C f . the use of sunthekai in Wis 12:21 discussed on p. 77 above. 120 2 Mace 8:15 which reads kai ei me di autous, a l i a dia tas pros tous pateras auton diathekas. The RSV renders t h i s t e x t , " i f not fo r t he i r own sake, yet fo r the sake of the covenants made with t he i r f a the rs . " Roetzel, however, argues, The t rans la tor supplies "made" which is absent from the Greek text to gain f luency. The understanding of t h i s passage, however, depends on how one t ranslates pros with the accusat ive--that i s , whether one renders i t "w i th" (as in the RSV) or " t o " . I f the preferred reading " to " is taken and the tex t i s rendered l i t e r a l l y we have, " i f not fo r t he i r own sake, yet fo r the sake of the covenants to t h e i r f a the rs " . In t h i s case, "covenants" apparently means "promises" or possibly "decrees". That being the case, i t seems much more natural to read, ''covenants ( i . e . , promises or decrees) (given) to t he i r f a the rs " . Roetzel f inds a confirmation of his in te rpre ta t ion of 2 Mace 8:15 in the "clear reference to one covenant which God made with the patr iarchs" in 1 : 2 . 1 2 Roetzel's work suffers from one def ic iency. While he has successful ly defined the covenant terms in the p lura l as decree or ordinance, he f a i l s to apply th i s sense to the covenant terms in the s ingular . He persists in understanding the covenant terms in the s ingular , used fo r the one covenant t h a t embraces the var ious covenant formulations of the OT, as meaning 1 O 1 A I K agreement, re la t ionsh ip or union. The d ispar i t y in de f in i t i ons makes the di f ference between the singular and p lura l of the covenant terms more pronounced than i f the terms in both t h e i r singular and p lura l forms have the same meaning. This, however, does not a f fect Roetzel's basic thes is : 1 1 I b i d . , 382. 1 2 I b i d . 1 3 I b i d . , 379. 1 4 I b i d . , 381. 1 5 I b i d . , 383. 121 t h a t the p reva i l i ng use of the p lura l in the sense of commandments or promises in Hebrew, Aramaic and He l len is t i c Jewish l i t e r a t u r e shows that the various covenant formulations between God and his people were not seen as mul t ip le covenants. Roetzel sees the same understanding ref lected in the OT. No case can be argued from the use of the p lura l of the covenant term since the p lura l ber f to t does not appear in the MT. Accordingly, diathekai in the LXX i s never used "to denote mul t ip le covenants which God made with Israel at d i f f e r e n t t i m e s . " He does not t h i n k , however, that th i s is a mere h i s to r i ca l accident. Rather, he fol lows Annie Jauber t 1 6 who argues " that the numerous covenant formulations in the Old Testament are hardly new covenants but copies of the one covenant which God made with I s r a e l . The covenant with Moses, fo r example, is not d i f f e ren t from but a continuation 1 7 of God's covenant with Abraham (Ex 3 ,6 ) . " A study of the theology of covenant in the OT and a thorough assessment of Jauber t ' s and Roetzel 's thesis is outside the scope of the present study. ° As w i l l be seen shor t l y , Paul would disagree with Jaubert and Roetzel. Their thes is , however, is in agreement with Post -b ib l ica l Judaism where, as Roetzel has shown, the consistent use of the p lura l in a sense other than the m u l t i p l i c i t y of covenants that God made in the OT betrays a clear theological convic t ion: the s ingu la r i t y of God's covenant with his 1 fi Annie Jaubert, La Notion d 'a l l i ance , 27f. 1 7 . I b i d . , 378. 18 The expression "the covenant with the fathers" ce r ta in l y does not include the divine covenant with Phinehas or David. I t c lear l y embraces the various covenant formulations made with Abraham, Isaac and Jacob. Whether i t ever uni ts the covenant with the patr iarchs and that made with Israel at Sinai remains to be proven. 122 people. The view of covenant found at Qumran in the previous chapter c lea r l y supports Roetzel's thes is . B. The Singular Covenant Motif in Jubilees Perhaps the clearest expression of the convict ion that God only has one covenant with his people comes from Jubi lees. Unlike the Damascus Document, which f i r s t mentions covenant with reference to the pat r iarchs, Jubilees begins i t s treatment of God's covenant with Noah. But more important, i t makes the Noachic covenant the prototype of a l l covenants. The Noachic covenant includes both promise and commandment. God made a covenant with Noah "so that there might not be floodwaters which would dest roy the e a r t h " (Jub 6 : 4 ) . 1 9 The covenant, however, does not only consist of a promise, but also of the covenant commandment not to eat blood (6 :7 ) . Noah establishes t h i s p roh ib i t ion as a perpetual covenant in verse 10 which reads: "And Noah and his sons swore that they would not eat any blood which was in any f l e s h . And he made a covenant before the LORD God fo reve r in a l l of the generations of the earth in that month." This covenant was renewed by Moses on the mountain with the chi ldren of Israel in the same month (v 11). The i d e n t i t y of the Noachic covenant with the covenant established with Israel i s c lear l y brought out in 6:17-19, which deals with the feast of 0. S. Wintermute's t rans la t ion of Jubilees in The Old Testament Pseudepigrapha, ed . , James H. Charlesworth (2 v o l s . ; New York: Doubleday & Company, 1985) 2. 52-142, i s used. 123 Shebuot (oaths) . The text reads: Therefore, i t is ordained and wr i t ten in the heavenly tab le ts that they should observe the feast of Shebuot in t h i s month, once per year, in order to renew the covenant in a l l ( respects) , year by year. And a l l of t h i s feast was celebrated in heaven from the day of creat ion u n t i l the days of Noah, twenty-six jub i lees and f i v e weeks of years. And Noah and his chi ldren kept i t fo r seven jubi lees and one week of years u n t i l the day of the death of Noah. And from the day of the death of Noah, his sons corrupted i t u n t i l the days of Abraham, and they ate blood. But Abraham alone kept i t . And Isaac and Jacob and his sons kept i t u n t i l your days, but i n your days the chi ldren of Israel forgot i t u n t i l you renewed i t fo r them on t h i s mountain. The feast of Shebuot i s i den t i f i ed with the covenant. Not only i s i t a covenant renewal feas t , i t s h is tory is the h is tory of the covenant. The f i r s t to celebrate i t on earth was Noah who f i r s t received the covenant. The feast was corrupted by a l l the descendants of Noah u n t i l Abraham who 21 alone kept i t . This c lear ly para l le ls the fac t that the covenant was only renewed with Abraham. This feast was kept, and so the covenant renewed, by Wintermute ( I b i d . , 67 n. f . ) exp la ins concerning "Shebuot" in Jubilees that while the Ethiopic word means "weeks," the Hebrew word behind i t undoubtedly had a double meaning of weeks and oaths. " In an unpointed Heb. t e x t the consonants s'b'wt could be translated e i ther "weeks" or "oaths." The MT vocalizes the absolute form of the word for "weeks" as iaabu^ot and the word fo r "oaths" as Sebu'ot, but "weeks" also appears as lagbu'ot in the construct . " He goes on to observe, "The feast referred to by the Eth. word i s , of course, bet ter known by the name of Pentecost or weeks, but both of these names are supposedly derived from the number of days (or weeks) which separate that feast from the o f fe r ing of Omer (Lev 2 3 : 9 - 1 7 ) . Since the book of Jub, which is p a r t i c u l a r l y sensi t ive to chronology, does not i d e n t i f y t h i s feast in re la t ion to the passing of seven weeks, S. Z e i t l i n (The Book of Jubilees: I t s Character and Signif icance [Phi ladelphia, 1939]) made the fo l lowing observation: " I venture to say that even the name Shabuot in the Book of Jubilees has not the connotation of 'weeks,' but means 'oa ths ' " ( p . 6 ) . " This conjecture is in l i ne with the purpose of the feas t . As a feast of oaths i t is a covenant renewal feast . 21 Jub 14:20 also connects the Abrahamic covenant with the Noachic. Chapter 14 r e t e l l s the story of Genesis 15. Verse 20, which concludes the narrat ive on the covenant making ceremony says, "And on that day we made a covenant with Abram j u s t as we had made a covenant in that month with Noah. And Abram renewed the feast and the ordinance fo r himself fo rever . " 124 oo Isaac and Jacob and his sons. Hence, the covenant is only for I s r a e l . The I s rae l i t es in Moses' day forgot the feast and so i t , with the covenant, was renewed on the mountain. From the feast renewal theme in th is tex t i t is clear that the various covenant formulations from Noah to Moses are not mul t ip le covenants but renewals of one covenant . 2 3 The u n i t y of a l l covenants in Jubi lees is also seen in the way important covenant events are synchronized as J . C. Enders points out: In Jubilees a l l of the indiv idual covenants collapse in to a single covenantal re la t ionsh ip , which began with Noah's covenant with God in Jub. 6 :1-21. In order to re-establ ish t h i s covenant as the p ro to type f o r a l l o t h e r s , the author concentrated a l l major covenant celebrations on the same day of the year. Thus, on 111/15 the Jewish community of t h i s author should celebrate the f o l l o w i n g events : the covenant w i th Abraham (14:1-20); the changing of Abram's and Sarai 's names and the i n s t i t u t i o n of circumcision (15:1-34); the b i r t h of Isaac (16:13) and his weaning (17:1) ; Abraham's farewell address and death (Jubilees 22); the covenant between Jacob and Laban (29:7-8) ; and Jacob's celebrat ion of the Well of the Oaths (44:1 ,4) . Af ter a period of desuetude, Moses renewed the celebrat ion of Shabuot on t h i s date at Mt. Sinai ( 6 : 1 9 ) . 2 4 Though Jub i lees i s a s e c t a r i a n work, the singular covenant moti f c lear ly expressed in i t i s common throughout Judaism. While not as c lea r l y expressed in the l i t e r a t u r e from Qumran, t h i s moti f is ce r ta in ly present p c there as w e l l . Also, the fac t that the p lura l of the covenant term was consistent ly used throughout Judaism in a sense other than that of mul t ip le 22 On the renewal of covenant with Jacob, see Jub 22:15,30. 23 On the renewal of covenant from Noah to Moses, see Michel Testuz, Les Idees Religieuses du Livre des Jubilees, 62-69. 24 Enders, B ib l i ca l In terpre ta t ion in the Book of Jubi lees, 227. 25 On the re la t ionship between Jubilees and the l i t e r a t u r e from Qumran, see VanderKam, Textual and His tor ica l Studies in the Book of Jubilees (Missoula: Scholars, 1977) 255-285 and Michel Testuz, Les Ide"es Religieuses du L i v re des Jubi les, 179-195. The Damascus Document in 16:3 mentions Jubi lees, and fragments of Jubilees were found at Qumran. 125 covenants that God made with his people witnesses to the un iversa l i t y of t h i s mot i f in Post -b ib l i ca l Judaism. C. The Primacy of Torah Enders percept ively notes concerning the collapse of a l l indiv idual covenants i n t o one covenant in J u b i l e e s , "The s i g n i f i c a n c e of t h i s theologoumenon is c r i t i c a l f o r the book of Jubi lees; even the people of Noah's generation were f u l l y observant 'Mosaists, ' since they shared in the fu l lness of the covenant re la t ionship between God and I s r a e l . There never was a t ime, therefore, when I s r a e l ' s ancestors did not observe the customs and laws revealed at S i n a i . " 2 6 The convict ion that the patr iarchs kept the law was also seen in the Damascus Document. The patr iarchs kept the commandments and as a resu l t had the covenant established as a beVit f6lam with them. In the same ve in , Jub 24:11 has God saying to Isaac that he would give to his seed the covenanted blessings "because your father obeyed me and observed my r e s t r i c t i o n s and my commandments and my laws and my ordinances and my covenant." The convict ion that the patr iarchs were f u l l y observant Mosaists was not merely a sectarian t r a i t . Betz notes that "according to the normative Jewish t r a d i t i o n , Abraham kept the Torah, even though i t was given only much l a t e r . How he could do so is explained in various ways: he knew the Torah "out of h imsel f , " or from secret w r i t i n g , or through a special revelat ion from God." Betz gives as an example R. Shimeon, Gen. Rab. 61 (38b) who said concerning Abraham, "A father did not teach him, and a teacher he did not Enders, B ib l i ca l In terpre ta t ion in the Book of Jubi lees, 227. 126 have. Wherefrom did he learn the Torah?" Betz adds, "Shimeon explains by reference to Ps 16:7: God used the kidneys to teach Abraham the T o r a h . " 2 7 In a d i f f e r e n t ve in , Jub 21:10 has Abraham saying a f ter giv ing inst ruct ions on s a c r i f i c i a l meat, "Because thus I have found wr i t ten in the books of my forefathers and in the words of Enoch and in the words of Noah." 2 Baruch 57:2 says concerning the time of the pat r iarchs, "For at that time the unwritten law was in force among them, and the works of the commandments pp were accomplished at that t ime." Despite the d i ve rs i t y of explanations as to how Abraham knew the law, these quotation r e f l e c t a clear consensus that Abraham kept the law. The reason fo r t h i s tendency to read the Mosaic law in to the l i ves of the p a t r i a r c h s l i es in the i d e n t i t y of Torah and covenant seen in the previous chapter on covenant at Qumran. This i d e n t i t y is rooted in the singular covenant mot i f exemplified in Jubi lees. I f the giving of the law at Sinai was merely a renewal of the covenant with the pat r iarchs, then that covenant must be Torah. The singular covenant mot i f , in t u r n , is rooted in the uni tary view of covenant that promise and commandment or law const i tu te an indissoluble un i t y . In the uni ty between promise and law seen thus f a r , law is predominant. The promissory aspect of the covenant is only established with those who keep the commandments. As we have seen, promise i s , in f a c t , a dimension of law. The primacy of law is given clear expression in 2 Mace 2:17f. which reads: "God has saved his whole people and gave us a l l the inher i tance, the kingship, the priesthood, and the consecration, as he had promised by the 2 7 B e t z , Galatians, 158. 28 The t r a n s l a t i o n is that of A. F. J . K l i j n in The Old Testament Pseudepigrapha, ed . , J . H. Charlesworth, 615-652. 127 law (katos epSggeilato dia tou nomou)." Thus, through the law the promises are given to I s r a e l . This convict ion concerning the primacy of Torah is c lear l y behind the persistent tendency to read the law of Sinai into the l i v e s of the pat r iarchs. Covenant and divine promise without Torah is inconceivable in Judaism. The s i n g u l a r covenant mot i f , the uni tary view of the OT covenant formulations and the primacy of Torah are not simply theories of covenant worked out in Judaism but const i tu te a basic o r ien ta t i on , a. hermenutical framework or a presuppositional basis fo r the Jewish approach to the OT d i v i n e covenant f o r m u l a t i o n s . This f a c t alone accounts f o r the pervasiveness of the convict ion that there is no covenant without Torah. What na tura l l y f i t s together in Judaism, promise and law, is sundered in to mutually exclusive e n t i t i e s in Paul. Not only does Paul conceive of promise without law and i n s i s t on the primacy of the former; f o r him promise and law can not be un i ted i n t o a single covenant. Here l i es Paul's fundamental break with Judaism, i . e . , in the area of covenant concept. 128 CHAPTER 8 PAUL'S BREAK WITH THE JEWISH UNDERSTANDING OF COVENANT While Paul works with the d e f i n i t i o n of covenant or the understanding of the nature of the covenantal i n s t i t u t i o n held universal ly in Judaism, he rad i ca l l y breaks with Judaism on the question of the theology of covenant. As universal as the idea that a covenant is a binding act was in Judaism, so universal also was the convict ion that the covenant formulations of the OT and the l e g i s l a t i v e and promissory covenantal elements form an indissoluble un i ty . In part ing with th i s convic t ion, Paul makes a radical break with Judaism and f inds himself outside of i t s pale. As a r e s u l t , any agreement between Paul and Judaism is at best pa r t i a l and fragmentary. A. Gal 3:15-18 and the Singular Covenant Motif The examination of the nature of the diatheke in Gal 3:15,17 has shown the fundamental de f i n i t i ona l uni ty between Paul and Judaism. An examination of the whole paragraph, Gal 3:15-18, however, demonstrates with equal force the r a d i c a l break Paul makes w i th the Jewish i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of the patr iarchal and S ina i t i c covenant formulat ions. Paul in terpre ts the temporal distance between the Abrahamic and Mosaic enactments in a way that Judaism does not. The fac t that the law came af ter the covenant established with Abraham (Gal 3:17) means fo r Paul that the law is a d i f f e ren t enactment and thus has no bearing on the previously r a t i f i e d promise. In Judaism th i s fac t would only mean that the law was a re - enactment of the Abrahamic covenant with his seed at S ina i . The covenant renewal m o t i f , so strong in Jewish thought, is not 129 necessari ly absent from Paul's thought. In Gal 3:16, he says that the promises, which const i tu te the covenant, were given to Abraham and to his seed which is Chr is t , who is separated from Abraham by two mi l lenn ia . Thus while Paul does not use the language of covenant renewal, he works with the idea t h a t the covenant i s passed on to or es tab l i shed w i t h f u t u r e p o s t e r i t y . 1 The fac t that Paul does not speak of a new covenant in Christ in Galatians 3 but wholly subsumes Christ under Abraham may also suggest the covenant renewal mot i f . I t is possible that Paul does not see the law as a re-enactment of the Abrahamic covenant because he comes to the question of the covenant with the p resuppos i t i on t h a t Chr is t is the one and only seed. For Paul, the Abrahamic covenant enta i ls the j u s t i f i c a t i o n of the Gentiles through f a i t h (Gal 3:8) and the blessing of Abraham comes to the Gentiles in Christ The idea in Gal 3:16 that the covenant is re-establ ished with a singular seed may be present in the Damascus Document. As seen above, pp. 107f., the covenant i s renewed only with the f a i t h f u l pos ter i ty or remnant. This remnant i s a s o l i d a r i t y and as a single community alone has the covenant. So, fo r any I s r a e l i t e to be in the renewed covenant, he must j o i n th is community. No other covenant community could spring up. This idea, held at Qumran, only corresponds to Paul's emphasis on the s ingu la r i t y of the seed, i f by the one seed Paul means a co l lec t i ve rather than an indiv idual i d e n t i t y . According to t h i s in te rpre ta t ion of the one seed, Christ in the phrase hos est in Christos is understood as a representative and co l lec t i ve personal i ty . Christ as a co l lec t i ve i d e n t i t y is connected with the theme of uni ty and the seed of Abraham in Gal 3:28-29. The view that Paul has a co l lec t i ve uni ty in mind in Gal 3:16 i s argued by L igh t foo t , Galatians, 142-143. For a discussion on d i f f i c u l t i e s in in terpre t ing t h i s t e x t , see Burton's a r t i c l e "Spermati and Spermasin," Galatians, 505-510. 2 Paul's chr is to log ica l in te rpre ta t ion of the OT, no doubt, governs his in te rpre ta t ion of the singular spermati in Gal 3:16. Burton (Galatians, 182) apt ly wr i tes , " I t is not probable, indeed, that the apostle derived the meaning of the promise from the use of the singular spermati. He is well aware of the co l lec t i ve sense of the word sperma in the Gen. passage (see v. 29 and Rom. 4: 13-18). He doubtless arr ived at his thought, not by exegesis of sc r ip tu re , but from an in te rpre ta t ion of h is to ry , and then ava i led himself of the singular noun to express his thought b r i e f l y . " Sanders (Paul and Palest inian Judaism, 550f.) even thinks that Paul's en t i re in te rpre ta t ion of the law is c h r i s t o l o g i c a l l y determined. 130 (v 1 4 ) . So, Paul on ly sees the f u l f i l l m e n t of the promise in what t ranspires in Chr is t . Thus Christ rather than the law represents the re - enactment of the covenant. While Paul's chr is to log ica l reading of the OT no doubt influenced his i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of covenant, he presents a more r a d i c a l reason f o r disassociat ing the Abrahamic and Mosaic covenants. In Gal 3:17 Paul states that the law does not inval idate the covenant previously r a t i f i e d by God. In so fa r as th i s statement is based on the nature of a covenant as stated in v 15, Judaism is in agreement with i t . The s i n g u l a r covenant mot i f in Judaism is based on the notion that a covenant i s i rrevocable or that oudeis athetei e epidiatassetai (Gal 3:15) . Because a covenant cannot be annulled or replaced, the divine covenant is a b e r i t c 6 lam, and, as was seen in the Damascus Document, God's covenant f a i t h f u l n e s s necess i ta tes t h a t the covenant be p e r p e t u a l l y renewed. Accordingly, the giving of the law at Sinai was seen simply as a renewal, and by no means an inva l i da t ion , of the covenant with Abraham. When Paul, however, on the basis of v 15 aff i rms that the law does not inval idate the covenant, he is not s tat ing a fac t agreeable to Judaism. Rather, he is making an inference t o t a l l y disagreeable to Judaism: that the law, i f not separated from i t , would inva l idate the Abrahamic covenant. The law would do t h i s by n u l l i f y i n g the promise ( e i s to katargesai ten epaggelian). Paul explains t h i s phrase in v 18 as signal led by gar. The concern in Gal 3:18 is he kleronomia which, as has already been shown, means "possession." The kleronomia is what i s promised and thus is the blessing See pp. 38f. above. 131 of Abraham.4 In re la t i on to the kleronomia^ Paul sees the promise and the law as mutually exclusive so that ei ek nomou he kleronomia, ouketi ex epaggelias. Thus, the uni ty of promise and law essential for the singular covenant moti f i s shattered. B. Promise and Law as An t i the t i ca l in Their Effects A s imi lar ant i thes is between promise and law to that suggested in Gal 3:18 is found in Rom 4:13-15. The promise to Abraham and his seed to be to kleronomon kosmou is not dia nomou (v 13). The reason is that ei gar hoi ek nomou kleronomoi, kekenotai he p i s t i s kai katergetai he epaggelia (v 14). This explanation c lea r l y echoes Gal 3:17 which states that the law would inval idate the covenant by n u l l i f y i n g (katargeo) the promise. In Rom 4:15 Paul states how the law would n u l l i f y the promise: ho gar nomos orgen katergazetai ; hou de ouk est in nomos oude parabasis. The law Burton (Galatians, 185)j_ commenting on v 18, wr i tes , "The previous r e f e r e n c e t o t he d i a theke and the epaggel i a make i t c lear t h a t he k le ronomia- -no te the r e s t r i c t i v e a r t i c l e — r e f e r s to the possession promised in the covenant (Gen. 13:15; 15:7; 17:8; c f . Rom. 4:13,14), which was with Abraham and his seed. This promised possession, while consist ing mater ia l ly in the promised land, ,was the expression of God's favour and blessing ( c f . , e . g . , 2 Chron. 6:27; Ps. Sol. 7:2; 9:2; 14:3, hot i he meris kai he k leronomia tou theou est in I s r a e l , 17:26), and the term eas i ly becomes in the Christ ian vocabulary a designation of the blessing of God which they shal l obtain who through f a i t h become acceptable to God (see Acts 20:32; 1 Cor. 6:9,10; 15:50; Gal. 5 :21; Eph. 5:5; Col. 3:24), of which blessing the S p i r i t , as the i n i t i a l g i f t of the new l i f e (v . 2) is the earnest (2 Cor. 1:22; 5:5; Eph. 1:13, 14; 4:30) , and so the f u l f i l l m e n t of the promise. Such a sp i r i t ua l i sed conception in general doubtless underlies the apost le 's use of i t here. Cf. Rom. 4:14 and the suggestion of v. 14 above, t h a t he thought of the promise to Abraham as a promise of the S p i r i t . " Burton adds, however, "But fo r the purposes of his argument at th is po in t , the content of the kleronomia is not emphasised." 132 threatens to n u l l i f y the promise by working wrath ( o r g e ) . 5 In contrast to the e f fec t of the law is the law-free state which is without transgression (parabasis). Hence, the law's funct ion in working wrath is i den t i f i ed with i t s ro le in producing transgression. Transgression (parabasis) is l inked with law fo r Paul. Besides Rom 4:15, parabasis is used in Romans in 2:23 and 5:14. In the former passage, the Jew who boasts in the law is involved in the transgression of the law (he parabasis tou nomou). Though the connection between parabasis and law is not as d i rec t in the Rom 5:14, i t is nonetheless there. Only between Adam and Moses did people not sin epi to homoiomati tes parabaseos Adam. That means that a f ter Moses, i . e . , the giv ing of the law, people sinned in the likeness of Adam's transgression. So, Adam's sin was sin under law and thus transgression. This in te rpre ta t ion of Rom 4:14-15 is the most na tura l . The gar of v 15 introduces an explanation of v 14, i . e . , why, i f those of the law were h e i r s , f a i t h would be made void and the promise n u l l i f i e d . This in te rpre ta t ion is taken by the fo l lowing commentators in the i r commentaries on Romans: Meyer, Schmidt, Schl ier , Kaesemann, Cranf ield and Murray. The text has also been interpreted d i f f e r e n t l y . C. K. Barret t (A Commentary on the E p i s t l e to the Romans [New York: Harper & Brothers^ 1975] 94-95) represents the major a l te rnat ive i n te rp re ta t i on . He argues that in v 14 Paul i s appealing to the proper meanings of p i s t i s and epaggelia to j u s t i f y what he said in the previous verse. A promise is not a legal contract of payment but is w i th in the sphere of g i f t or grace. Becoming heir by keeping the law, however, is contractual . Thus Barret t understands Paul as saying, " I f then i t should be true that the way to be an heir ( i n the terms of the promise) i s to keep the law, we can only conclude that the terms " f a i t h " and "promise" have los t t he i r meanings" (p. 95). Barret t reads v 4 in to t h i s t e x t . With t h i s in te rpre ta t ion of v 14, Barret t must make v 15 a second argument, added parenthe t ica l l y , that in ter rupts the connection between vv 14 and 16. Luther, Hodge, Sanday and Headlam, and Nygren in te rpre t the tex t s i m i l a r l y in t he i r commentaries. The primary d i f f i c u l t y wi th th i s in te rpre ta t ion is i t s awkwardness. According to i t , the gar of v 15 does not re fer to what immediately precedes but to v 13. Thus the flow of the passage is in ter rupted. This in te rpre ta t ion also brings to the text the idea t h a t law on the one hand and f a i t h and promise on the other are d e f i n i t i o n a l l y contrary. There is no. warrant to read v 4 in to the text as Barret t does. And since Paul points out what is the problem with the law in v 15, there is no need to introduce the notion of de f i n i t i ona l c o n f l i c t . 133 The di f ference that the law makes for sin is stated in Rom 5:13 as fo l lows: achri gar nomou hamartia en en kosmo, harmatia de ouk e l l o g e i t a i me ontos nomou. Romans 4:15 states that where there is no law there is no transgression. Romans 5:13 makes the para l le l statement that where there is no law sin is not reckoned. Transgression is sin that is reckoned, and the law produces transgression by point ing out s i n . Thus the law gives sin the character of v i o la t i on and so introduces wrath. As producing wrath and t ransgress ion, the law is an t i the t i ca l to promise as to i t s e f fec t in Rom 4:14-15. This theme of the law's i l l e f fec t is also present in Galatians 3. The only e x p l i c i t connection between Galatians 3 and Rom 4:15 is the statement concerning the law in v 19: ton parabaseon charin prosetethe. The t e x t does not make clear whether charin means "because o f , " i . e . , because of ex is t ing transgressions, or " fo r the sake o f , " i . e . , to produce transgressions. However, the int imate l ink between law and transgression in Romans and the ro le of law in producing transgressions in Rom 4:15 strongly suggests the l a t t e r . Galatians 3:10 is another para l le l to Rom 4:15. In th i s t e x t , Paul uses Deut 27:26 to show that a l l those who are of the works of the law are under a curse. The c i t a t i o n pronounces a curse on those who do not continue in the things wr i t ten in the law to do them. Most scholars fo l low Calvin who suggests that t h i s tex t substantiates the af f i rmat ion that those of the works of the law are cursed fo r Paul because no one actual ly keeps the The only other occurrence of parabasis in the Pauline corpus, besides those already mentioned, i s in 1 Tim 2:14. Eve's transgression was c lear l y the v i o l a t i o n of a commandment and so i s l i nked wi th law as Adam's transgression is in Rom 5:14. 134 ent i re law without breaking i t . This i n te rp re ta t ion , however, encounters two problems. F i r s t , i t must import i n t o the argument an e n t i r e proposi t ion: that no one keeps the whole law p e r f e c t l y . 8 Second, while Paul would agree that no one keeps the law without ever breaking i t (Rom 3:23), Paul never uses the u n f u l f i l a b i l i t y of the law as a grounds fo r re jec t ing the law as a means fo r j u s t i f i c a t i o n . The law is not simply a f a i l i n g attempt to secure the blessing. In f a c t , i t was never given as a means fo r securing the inheritance (Gal 3:18) or imparting l i f e (Gal 3 : 2 1 ) . 9 Calvin, Galatians e t c . , 53. o Scholars have sought to establ ish th i s missing premise on the basis of the presence of pas (everyone) and pasi ( a l l ) in the t e x t , which do not appear in the MT. However, since Paul is quoting the LXX here, the presence of these words may simply be inc iden ta l . J . B. L ight foot (Galatians, 138) notes that the " a l l " (pas) is found in the Peshito and the "every" (pasi) in the Samaritan Pentateuch. Jerome states that he saw the kol in the Samaritan tex t and accused the Jews of w i l f u l l y delet ing i t les t they too should be under a curse. Eadie (A Commentary on the Greek Text of the E p i s t l e of Paul to the Galat ians LGrand Rapids: Baker, 1979J 242) percept ively remarks that " . . . t h e motive he ascribes to them is somewhat p u e r i l e . . . f o r the omission does not change the sense, and the verse is a summary conc lus ion of a l l the Ebal curses recorded in the previous paragraph." The "every" i s not necessary in the Hebrew tex t since the ~a5er indicates that each and every v io la to r is cursed. For that matter, nei ther is pas necessary in the Greek. The pas is simply a matter of emphasis and not a change of meaning. The " a l l " (pasi) may seem to be more s ign i f i can t in that without i t the curse pronouncement may not have such an absolute tone. But again, i t is a matter of connotation and emphasis rather than of meaning since 'e t -d ibre hattorah-hazzo*t refers to a l l of the words of the law in question. Quite an array of in terpreta t ions have been given of Gal 3:10. Martin Noth in an essay e n t i t l e d , "For a l l who re l y on the works of the law are under a curse," in The Laws in the Pentateuch and Other Studies (Edinburgh: Ol iver and Boyd, 1966), argues that since the blessing was not given by the law but through the oath to the pat r iarchs, the law only added a curse. As such, the law only brings a curse in to the existence of a l l under i t , which he takes to be the force of Gal 3:10. E. Edwards (Chr is t , a Curse, and the Cross: An I n t e r p r e t a t i v e Study of Galatians 3:13 [Michigan: Universi ty Microf i lms, 1972] 209f.) picks up Noth's suggestion and develops i t f u r t h e r . She argues that hupo kataran refers to a condit ional curse that the law puts people under. Since Christ became an actual curse v icar ious ly (Gal 3:17), the curse must be actua l . Luther in his commentary on Galatians, followed 135 For Paul the law act ive ly produces i t s negative e f fec t as seen in Rom 4:14-15. This is also the case in Gal 3:10. The curse does not simply come af ter breaking the law. Rather, as being blessed or j u s t i f i e d is d e f i n i t i v e of those who are of f a i t h (v 9 ) , so being under a curse is d e f i n i t i v e of those who are of the works of the law (v 10). The curse pronouncement is connected with the preceding verse in two ways. F i r s t l y , the pa r t i c l e gar points to a logical connection with what precedes i t . Secondly, v 10a is para l le l in st ructure to v 9. Verse 9 reads, hoste hoi ek pisteos eulogountai sun tq pistQ Abraam; and v 10 reads, hosoi gar ex ergon nomou hupo kataran e i s i n . Each clause begins with an i d e n t i f i c a t i o n of those who are in a par t i cu la r class: hoi ek pisteos and hosoi ex ergon nomou. These two classes are an t i t he t i ca l pairs in Paul's thought ( c f . Gal 2:16; 3 :2 ) . Paul predicates to those of each class a phrase that depicts t he i r s i t u a t i o n . The f i r s t are eulogountai sun to p is tp Abraam and the second are hupo kataran. Again Paul uses an an t i t he t i ca l pa i r : blessing and curse. This para l le l ism indicates that v 9 brought v 10a to Paul's mind. He was t h i n k i n g i n terms of oppos i tes . Then to support t h i s curse pronouncement Paul quotes Deut 27:26 in accordance with his method of by R. Bring (Christus und das Gesetz [Leiden: E. J . B r i l l , 1969] 115-125) and D. P. Fu l ler ("Paul and 'The Works of the Law'," WTJ 38 [1975/76] 32- 33), argues that the works of the law are l e g a l i s t i c works while the "doing" required by the law are fa i th-works. Hence, those of the works of the law do not f u l f i l l the law and so are cursed. This in te rp re ta t ion s t ra ins the language of Deut 27:26. H. Schlier (Der Br ief an die Galater, 132) suggests that the emphasis in Paul's c i t a t i o n rests on poiSsai. Thus the curse is not p r imar i l y given because the law is not quan t i ta t i ve ly f u l f i l l e d but because something must be done. Doing i t s e l f i s cursed. Schlier must turn to Romans 7 to support his thes is . The fac t that the idea must be imported in to the tex t is s u f f i c i e n t to dismiss t h i s i n te rp re ta t i on . Lloyd Gaston (Paul and Torah, 75) argues that the curse is only on Gentiles since they have law without covenant. A response to Gaston's theory w i l l emerge out of the ensuing discussion and w i l l be given in the concluding chapter. 136 arguing from proo f - tex ts . In Gen 18:18 Paul f inds a blessing pronouncement: " A l l na t ions s h a l l be blessed in y o u . " In Deut 27:26 he f i n d s a corresponding curse pronouncement: "Cursed is everyone. . . . " These two scr ip ture statements y i e l d fo r Paul the basis fo r his own statements in vv 9 and 10a. The po la r correspondence of these two texts suggests that Paul's in teres t in Deut 27:26 was not in some accidental feature of the curse such as a curse fo l lowing the event of transgression. Rather, his in terest , in the text i s in the connection i t makes between law and curse. Sanders points out " . . . t h a t Deut 27:26 i s the only passage in the LXX in which nomos is connected with ' c u r s e ' . " He goes on to say, "There are passages which say that one who does not keep the commandments (en to la i : see e .g . Deut 28:15) w i l l be cursed, but that does not su i t Paul's argument. He wants a passage which says that the nomos brings a curse, and he c i tes the only one which does. " 1 ^ The opposites with which Paul is working w i th , p i s t i s /e rga nomou and eulogia/kataran, r e f l e c t a polar logic that explains the gar in v 10a. The curse pronouncement is a negative proof of the conclusion drawn in v 9. The claim that i t is those of f a i t h who are blessed with Abraham, and only those, i s supported by the fac t that those who are of the works of the law, the a l te rna t i ve , are under a curse. Paul's polar logic also indicates that the curse is inherent in being of the works of the law. I t i s an essential rather than accidental feature . The reason why the law curses a l l who are of the works of the law must be sought in the context of Gal 3:10 rather than in a missing premise. The 1 0 E . P. Sanders, Paul, the Law, and the Jewish People (Phi ladelphia: Fortress, 1983) 21. 137 curse is in d i rec t contrast to the blessing (v 9) which is j u s t i f i c a t i o n (v 8 ) . The j u s t i f i c a t i o n in question is not the v indicat ion of a sinless person ( c f . the j u s t i f i c a t i o n of God in Rom 3 :4) . Rather, i t is the soter io log ica l j u s t i f i c a t i o n of the sinner. Those ex ergon nomou in Gal 3:10 are those who seek t h i s j u s t i f i c a t i o n from the law. In th i s context, they are Genti les. When a sinner comes to the law, instead of j u s t i f y i n g him, the law automatically curses him because of i t s b u i l t - i n c u r s e . 1 1 Hence the absurdity of seeking j u s t i f i c a t i o n from the law. The idea that explains the verse is the subject of d i s c u s s i o n — j u s t i f i c a t i o n . The argument in Gal 3:10 is para l le l to the one in Rom 4:14-15. The curse of the law and the wrath i t produces are invoked to show that i t s e f f e c t is the exact opposite of what was promised. Thus in these two passages, Paul argues against the law as a means of i n h e r i t i n g the kleronomia or Abrahamic blessing by appealing to i t s opposite e f f e c t . Paul's choice of "wrath" in Rom 4:15 and of "curse" in Gal 3:10 are c l e a r l y determined by the respective contexts. In Rom 4:15, Paul uses "wra th" because t h a t term i s themat ic in the f i r s t f i v e chapters of 1 ? Romans. As already seen, the choice of "curse" in Gal 3:10 is determined by his polar logic and p roo f - tex t ing . Thus any semantic bar r ier to seeing Rom 4:15 and Gal 3:10 as para l le l passages is removed. Thus f o r Paul the law is adverse to the promise since i t i nev i tab ly , by i t s very nature, produces wrath and transgression or brings people under a curse . Consequently, i f the law is related to the promised possession ( k l e r o n o m i a ) , i t n u l l i f i e s the promise of t h a t possession since i t 11 Cf. Gal 2:15,17 where Gentiles are categor ica l ly judged sinners and are on a par wi th the Jewish apostate. 12 Orge appears in Rom 1:18; 2:5,8; 3:5; 4:15; 5:9. 138 inev i tab ly brings the opposite of that possession. So i f the law were added as a means ( c o n d i t i o n ) to o b t a i n i n g the possession of the covenanted promise, i t would indeed inval idate (akuroi) the covenant so as to n u l l i f y (eis to katargesai) the promise (Gal 3:17). C. Promise and Law as Mutually Exclusive Categories The ant i thes is between j u s t i f i c a t i o n and wrath or blessing and curse is not the on ly a n t i t h e s i s between promise and law. There is also the ant i thesis between grace and earning or bel ieving and doing. This contrast is c lear l y stated in Rom 4:4: t9 de ergazomemj" ho misthos ou log izeta i kata charin a l i a kata opheilema. What one works for is considered his due, but what one does not work f o r , i . e . , he simply believes (v 5: tp de me ergazomeno pisteuont i de), i s considered a g i f t or grace (char i s ) . The ant i thes is between grace and earning or f a i t h and doing is present in Galatians 3, at least in v 12. The text says, ho de nomos ouk est in ek p isteos, a l l ' ho poiesas auta zesetai en autois. L i f e , jwhich is treated as that which was promised and as an equivalent of righteousness in v 21 , must, under the law, be achieved by doing according to the law and thus must be earned. As such, the law is not of f a i t h . Commentators, t a k i n g t h e i r clue from Paul's use of charizo, have g e n e r a l l y seen the same m o t i f in Gal 3:18. Af ter having stated his argument, ei gar ek nomou he kleronomia, ouketi ex epaggelia, Paul a f f i rms, t~) de Abraam d i ' epaggelias kecharistai ho theos. Commenting on th i s l a t t e r statement, Calvin wr i tes , "And he immediately adds that God gave i t to Abraham, not by requir ing some sort of reciprocal compensation, but by f ree promise. For i f you take i t as condi t iona l , the 139 1 o word gave would be u t t e r l y inappl icab le . " In a s imi lar vein, Burton wr i tes , "kecharistai emphasises the gracious, uncommercial, character of the grant, and the perfect tense marks the grant as one s t i l l in force, thus reca l l i ng the argument of vv. 1 5 - 1 7 . H e n c e , charizo, to f r ee l y give, i s understood as expressing the nature of promise to which law is a n t i t h e t i c a l . A possession received ek nomou is not given f ree ly as is the case when i t i s received ex epaggelias. I f t h i s in te rpre ta t ion of Gal 3:18 is correct , then t h i s text is not exactly para l le l to Rom 4:14-15. In the l a t t e r , the law n u l l i f i e s the promise by i t s adverse e f f e c t . In the former, the law n u l l i f i e s the promise by i t s contrary nature: requirement instead of g i f t . The fac t that Gal 3:19 contains the notion i n . Rom 4:15, that the law produces transgressions, does not mean that the ant i thes is in Gal 3:18 i s the same as in Rom 4:14-15 since Gal 3:15-19 is a complete un i t in i t s e l f so t h a t a new t h o u g h t cou ld e a s i l y be in t roduced in v 19. More s i g n i f i c a n t l y , however, the s t r u c t u r e of the argument in Gal 3:18 i s d i f fe ren t from that in Rom 4:14. Romans 4:14 says that i f those of the law Calvin, Galatians, e t c . , 60. 14 Burton, Galatians, 186. Luther, L igh t foo t , Oepke, Ebeling, Mussner and Betz fo l low the same l ine of i n te rp re ta t i on . F. F. Bruce (The Epist le of Paul to the Galat ians [ E x e t e r : Pa te rnos te r , 1982] 174) gives the fo l lowing unusual explanation of 3:18: " I f the inheritance of Abraham's descendants were based on law--more s p e c i f i c a l l y , the Mosaic law--then i t would belong to the people of the law (c f . v 10, hosoi . . .ex ergon nomou e i s i n ) , i . e . the Jewish nat ion. But i f i t is based on the promise made to Abraham, generations before the giv ing of the law, then the law cannot a f fect i t . I t belongs to the people of f a i t h ( c f . v 7, hoi ek pisteos) who, whether of Jewish or Gentile b i r t h , are the true chi ldren of Abraham." Nowhere in Galatians is i t a question of whether the kleYonomia is fo r Jews only or fo r a l l the chi ldren of Abraham by f a i t h . Also, the expression hosoi . . .ex ergon nomou e is in ce r ta in l y does not re fer to the Jewish nat ion. Rather, i t simply refers to those who seek j u s t i f i c a t i o n from the law. See analysis of Gal 3:15-18 on p. 46 above. 140 are he i rs , f a i t h is made void and the promise n u l l i f i e d . This is so because what f a i t h believes and the promise holds out w i l l not happen since the law br ings the o p p o s i t e . Gala t ians 3:18, however, contains a d i f f e ren t argument. I t says that i f the inheritance is of the law, i t cannot be of promise. In other words, i t must be one or the other. I t cannot be both. Such an argument hypothetical l y contemplates the p o s s i b i l i t y of obtaining the inheritance by law and only argues that i f i t were by law, i t cannot be by promise. Hence, Paul resolves the e i the r /o r s i tua t ion by s tat ing that God gave i t ( i . e . , the kleronomia) to Abraham by promise. So the fac t that the kleronomia was given by promise rather than that the law's e f fec t is opposite to what is promised is what decides in favour of the promise and against the law. Law and promise thus represent mutually exclusive paradigms of salvat ion in Gal 3:18. That Paul has paradigms of salvat ion in mind in Gal 3:18 is also suggested by the absence of the a r t i c l e s . When Paul has the spec i f ic promise(s) in mind, he uses the a r t i c l e (vv 16, 17). Clear ly, in v 18b, tp de Abraam d i ' epaggelias kecharistai ho theos, the absence of the a r t i c l e puts the emphasis on the nature of promise as opposed to what is promised. The same is t rue of v 18a, ei gar ek nomou...ouketi ex epaggelias. Rom 4:14, which does not argue from the nature of a promise, only mentions the promise with the a r t i c l e . Paul sees a two-fo ld ant i thes is between the law and the promise. The law n u l l i f i e s the promise by i t s opposite e f fec t (Rom 4:14-15, c f . Gal 3:9-10). But i t also n u l l i f i e s (katargeo) the promise by contradict ing the very nature of promise (Gal 3:17-18). This l a t t e r s i tua t ion makes the ant i thes is between law and promise absolute. Not only by the law's e f f e c t , but by i t s contrary nature is the law incompatible with the promise. 141 The two antitheses are in t imate ly re la ted . As we have seen, the law produces transgression and wrath by point ing out s i n . I t does th is by demanding righteousness. Also, i t curses those who do not continue in what is wr i t ten in the law to do. So again, the law's adverse e f fec t is based on i t s requirement to do and continue. The fundamental problem with the law is in the paradigm of salvat ion i t represents. D. Paul's Fundamental Departure from Judaism In Judaism covenant was Torah and promise was inseparable from law. Paul's idea of a promise wholly f ree from law is outside of the pale of Jewish thought and his argument that promise and law are mutually exclusive an a f f ront to i t . This departure from Judaism is so fundamental that there can be no real uni ty between Paul and Judaism. Any conceptual uni ty between them must inev i tab ly be pa r t i a l and fragmented since in Paul the heart of Jewish thought is re jected. 142 CHAPTER 9 CONCLUSIONS FOR THE STUDY OF COVENANT IN PAUL A. The Results of the Present Study of Paul's Understanding of Covenant The present invest igat ion has disclosed both a fundamental uni ty and d isuni ty in the covenant concepts of Paul and Judaism. The uni ty l i es in the i r d e f i n i t i o n of covenant. The d isuni ty l i es in t h e i r in terpreta t ions of the patr iarchal and S ina i t i c covenant formulat ions. Both Paul's agreement and break with the Jewish understanding of covenant receive clear expression in Gal 3:15-18. In Gal 3:15,17 Paul sees covenant p r i m a r i l y as an i r r e v o c a b l e enactment. While he has the OT covenant s p e c i f i c a l l y in mind, he uses Hel len is t ic legal terminology fo r i t due to speaking kata anthropon. This does not mean t h a t he sees covenant in l i g h t of any par t i cu la r legal i n s t i t u t i o n of the Greco-Roman world. The legal terminology he uses fo r covenant i s of a general nature and does not warrant any s p e c i f i c conclusions concerning the i n s t i t u t i o n he has in mind. In speaking kata anthropon, he is simply contemplating the i n s t i t u t i o n of the OT covenant from a j u r i s t i c perspective to establ ish the absolute nature of such an enactment. However, the idea of the OT covenant as a sacrosanct and irrevocable i n s t i t u t i o n was not necessarily foreign to people of the 1st Century AD. Thus Paul could easi ly invoke human judgement to establ ish the absolute nature of covenant since a l l who understood the i n s t i t u t i o n would acknowledge t h i s . Paul's covenant term is diatheke. In understanding di atheke simply as an enactment, Paul i s using the term in i t s basic sense. While diatheke is 143 a t e c h n i c a l term f o r l a s t w i l l , which i n s t i t u t i o n has the nuance of d isposi t ion or one-sided arrangement, the idea of one-sidedness is not the primary sense of the term. The few times diatheke appears in secular Greek usage with a sense other than " l as t w i l l " c lea r l y show that the primary idea in t h i s term is that of binding or f i x i n g . The broader usage of diatheke in the LXX and Apocrypha corroborates th i s conclusion. The use of diatheke" fo r a las t w i l l does not argue against th i s contention since a las t w i l l can be understood simply as a binding act . A su rvey of Greek, Aramaic and Hebrew sources of the Jewish understanding of covenant shows that i t is understood precisely in the sense of d iatheke es tab l i shed in t h i s s tudy: a binding act , enactment or o rd inance. Hence, contrary to the major i ty opinion, there is complete unanimity in the understanding of the nature of the covenantal i n s t i t u t i o n wi th in the various groups in Judaism and between Paul and Judaism. Judaism also holds f i r m l y to the i r revocab le nature of covenant explicated by Paul in Gal 3:15,17. Paul and Judaism, however, use th i s idea fo r rad i ca l l y d i f f e ren t ends. In Judaism the absolute nature of covenant i s taken to mean that the various covenant formulations between God and his people are not d i f f e r e n t covenants but s imply renewals of one basic covenant. Pau l , however, uses t h i s idea to iso la te and insulate the Abrahamic enactment from the S ina i t i c law. Though chr is to log ica l in terests are, no doubt, behind t h i s move on the part of Paul, in Gal 3:18 he bases the separation of the two covenant formulations on the mutual exclusiveness of t h e i r respective characters, promise and law. Thus Paul breaks up the u n i t y at the hear t of Judaism and makes the singular covenant motif impossible. In t h i s move l i es Paul's break with Judaism. The bearing of the present study on the contemporary discussion of the 144 Pauline and Jewish views of covenant represented by the work of the three scholars out l ined in chapter one w i l l now be discussed. B. Understanding Covenant The three posi t ions out l ined in chapter one share a common s ta r t ing point in the Jewish or "correct" view of covenant. This view of covenant rece ives i t s c l e a r e s t , and perhaps a l ready c l a s s i c a l , formulation in Sanders' "covenantal nomism." This formula sees covenant as the framework in which law operates ( i . e . , nomism is covenantal). Thus the law is not a covenant in i t s e l f but is only part of a covenant that embraces i t . This al ignment of covenant and law assumes t h a t covenant is a re la t iona l category, a contract , rather than simply an ordinance or binding act . In i t s e l f , law is not a contract . At the most, law can only be part of a contract . I t can only be a s t i pu la t i on of a contract . This understanding of covenant is challenged by the present study. The c o n t r a c t u a l understanding of covenant l i e s behind Schoeps' c r i t i c i s m of Paul. Schoeps' complains that Paul "wrested and isolated the law from the con t ro l l i ng context of God's covenant with I s r a e l . " 1 Paul could only wrest the law from the context of covenant i f covenant i s a c o n t r a c t . However, i f covenant is simply an enactment, then Schoeps' c r i t i c i s m d i s s i p a t e s . Rather than d i v o r c i n g covenant and law, Paul collapses the two so that law cannot be seen as "w i th in " the context of covenant. Sanders does not fo l low Schoeps1 c r i t i c i s m of Paul. According to Schoeps, Paul, 213. 145 Sanders , P a u l ' s break w i th Judaism i s not based on a p a r t i c u l a r understanding of covenant. Consequently, while the present study argues against Sanders' d e f i n i t i o n of covenant, i t leaves Sanders' in te rpre ta t ion of Paul's re la t ionsh ip to Judaism i n t a c t . In f a c t , Sanders' contention that Paul cor rec t l y understood Judaism and consciously rejected i t i s sustained by the present thes is . However, the present study ca l l s in to question Sanders' f o rmu la , "covenantal nomism," for the Jewish understanding of covenant which he sees Paul r e j e c t i n g . In l i g h t of the present study "covenantal nomism" is tau to log ica l . Since covenant is a binding act or an enactment and thus law is a covenant in i t s e l f , the a d j e c t i v e "covenanta l " does not mean ing fu l l y qua l i f y "nomism." The idea of an enactment or covenant is i m p l i c i t in the idea of law and nomism. In the singular covenant motif in Judaism, the tauto logical nature of "covenantal nomism" extends in to the theological l e v e l . Not only i s the law by d e f i n i t i o n a covenant, but also the one covenant that is repeatedly renewed is the law. Hence, in Judaism we have a complete i d e n t i t y between covenant and law. In Pauline thought, covenant and law are more c lea r l y dist inguished than in Judaism due to Paul's re jec t ion of the singular covenant moti f and thus the i d e n t i f i c a t i o n of covenant and law. He sees the Abrahamic covenant as being without law. However, even working with Paul's system of thought, "covenantal nomism" is a questionable formulat ion. For Paul, the only covenant that the law is related to is the S ina i t i c one which simply i_s the law. The tauto log ica l nature of "covenantal nomism" raises the question as to the background and ult imate source of th i s formulat ion. Unfortunately, 146 in his otherwise excel lent work on Paul and Palest inian Judaism, Sanders does not carry on an invest igat ion in to the d e f i n i t i o n of "covenant." He simply assumes that the universal ly accepted d e f i n i t i o n of covenant w i th in his t r a d i t i o n of scholarship is that held by 1st Century Judaism. Hence, a review of "covenantal nomism" is a review of the prevai l ing understanding of covenant and law. The formula "covenantal nomism" has a point of contact with Paul in i t s understanding of nomos. Since Paul divorces law from promise, law has a negative and l e g a l i s t i c sense. This bare and legal sense of law is entai led in "nomism." The adject ive "covenantal," however, i s not taken from Paul. Neither, as already not iced, is i t taken from the prevai l ing understanding of covenant in 1st Century Judaism. However, i t can be traced to a Jewish roo t . The understanding of covenant as a contract assumed in covenantal nomism has i t s roots in Aqui la 's use of suntheke fo r be r t t in the 2nd Century. Though Aquila was a Jew, one can only say with reservations that the adject ive "covenantal" i s derived from Judaism since the speci f ic idea in suntheke does not represent the central notion in the Jewish covenant concept. One can only speculate as to why Aquila used suntheke fo r beVft. The reason given by Schoeps that Aquila and Symmachus were more strongly rooted in the Rabbinic t r a d i t i o n than the t rans la tors of the LXX carr ies l i t t l e weight. He gives no proof fo r his assert ion. Perhaps i t is simply based on his assumption that suntheke is the more exact t rans la t ion of b e r f t . Moreover, the present study has shown a unanimous consensus throughout 2 I b i d , 217. i 147 Judaism, w i th the exception of Aquila and Symmachus, that covenant was understood as a diatheke. Whether Aqui la 's change in terminology from diatheke in the LXX to suntheke has anything to do with the Jewish re jec t ion of the LXX as a Chr ist ian Bible is uncertain. I f a Chr ist ian in te rpre ta t ion of "covenant" was urged against Judaism, the change in terms may be understandable. There may also be some basis fo r rendering ber t t with suntheke in the Jewish theology of covenant. In the singular covenant m o t i f , promise and law, which represent d iv ine and human commitments respect ive ly , were united in to an indissoluble u n i t . Perhaps Aquila sought to h igh l igh t t h i s aspect of the Jewish understanding of covenant. The a d j e c t i v e , " c o v e n a n t a l , " in "covenantal nomism" may thus be considered to be derived from Judaism i f i t is taken only to represent the inc lusive understanding of covenant in Judaism, which embraces promise and law. But the idea of law as bare regulat ion is not Jewish. The Damascus Document shows how the promise in the covenant is the blessing attached to Torah. The idea of law without promise is Pauline. Hence, the formula, "covenantal nomism," is at best a theological hybr id. I t draws on the i n c l u s i v e understanding of the d iv ine covenant in Judaism and on the exclusive idea of law in Paul. The formula, however, belongs to neither Judaism nor to Paul. I t is a cross between two systems of thought and thus f a i l s to represent e i ther system of thought proper ly. Despite any theological j u s t i f i c a t i o n Aquila may have fo r t rans la t ing b e r t t with suntheke, the t rans la t ion is both wrong and misleading. By making b e r t t a c o n t r a c t instead of an ordinance, th i s t rans la t ion has obscured the i d e n t i t y of law and covenant. This, in t u r n , has obscured the singular covenant mot i f which was suggested as a possible basis fo r Aqui la 's use of suntheke. This moti f requires the notion that Torah i t s e l f is a 148 - covenant. The i d e n t i t y between Torah and covenant leads to .the spec i f ic Jewish notion that Torah is the one renewed covenant which the idea of covenant as contract obscures. The idea t h a t covenant i s a c o n t r a c t has also led to a f a u l t y formulation of the problem of covenant fo r Pauline studies inasmuch as i t has raised the question how Paul re lates to the covenantal view of law. S t r i c t l y speaking, Paul did not have a covenantal view of law since fo r him the law i t s e l f i s a covenant. But t h i s f a c t does not warrant any conclusions about Paul's re la t ionship to Judaism since, formal ly , Judaism held the same p o s i t i o n . Hence, the c laims t h a t Paul misunderstood (Schoeps), rejected (Sanders) or accepted (Gaston) the covenantal view of the law are a l l erroneous. Using Pauline categories, one might suggest "promissory nomism" fo r the Jewish view of law against which the Pauline treatment of law must be understood. In Judaism, rather than law being seen in the con t ro l l i ng context of covenant, i t is seen as inseparably united with promise. The formula, promissory nomism, has the advantage over covenantal nomism in not being tau to log i ca l . But i t has the disadvantage of formulating the Jewish posi t ion from the perspective of the Pauline dichotomy between promise and law. Also, t h i s formulation omits the category of covenant, the basic term fo r the div ine enactments in question. The real c o n f l i c t between the Pauline and Jewish views of the law is over the in te rp re ta t ion of the covenant formulations of the OT. Promise and law are the concern of these formulat ions. The Jewish posi t ion is best summarized in the s i n g u l a r covenant m o t i f . This m o t i f un i tes the p a t r i a r c h a l and S ina i t i c covenant formulations in to one basic covenant. Thus, i t also unites promise and law, the two covenanted elements, in to an 149 indissoluble un i ty . I t is th i s uni tary view of the OT covenant formulations t h a t i s lack ing in Paul's understanding of the law. Thus, the debate between Paul and Judaism concerns whether or not the S ina i t i c covenant formulation is a re-enactment of the patr iarchal covenant. Formulating the problem of covenant f o r Pauline studies in terms of the singular covenant moti f has several advantages. F i r s t , i t represents the Jewish o r i e n t a t i o n toward the divine covenant formulations of the OT. Second, i t en ta i ls the issues of law and promise and t h e i r re la t ionship with each other, which are at stake in Paul's c r i t i que of the law. Th i rd , i t represents the fundamental break between Paul and Judaism in t h e i r respective in terpre ta t ions of the OT covenant formulat ions. C. Paul's Point of Departure from Judaism While Schoeps and Sanders agree that Paul rad i ca l l y departs from the Jewish understanding of the law, they disagree on the grounds of Paul's break w i t h Judaism. Schoeps sets out to understand Paul against the background of r a b b i n i c p r e s u p p o s i t i o n s . He f i nds the key to Paul's treatment of the law p a r t i c u l a r l y in "the fac t that fo r a Jew the problem of the abo l i t i on of the law could only be solved by the law i t s e l f , i . e . , by drawing out from scr ip ture the " t rue meaning of the law"." In keeping with th i s hermeneutical presupposit ion, Schoeps sees Paul breaking with Judaism on in te rna l grounds, on Paul's understanding of elements wi th in Judaism i t s e l f . Schoeps' d iscovery of Paul 's rad i ca l l y non-Jewish use of rabbinic 3 I b i d , 170. 150 presuppositions and the law leads him to look at Paul in the l i g h t of the basis of Judaism, the idea of covenant. Here Schoeps f inds Paul's fundamental misunderstanding that l i es behind his pecul iar use of the law against i t s e l f . Sanders approaches Paul from a d i f f e ren t perspective. Rather than seeking to in te rpre t Paul in l i g h t of Jewish presupposit ions, he approaches Paul with the in terest of comparing "patterns of r e l i g i o n . " Accordingly, Sanders looks to the Pauline pattern of r e l i g i o n to f i nd the basis f o r Paul's treatment of the law. Consequently, Sanders f inds Paul breaking with Judaism on grounds wholly external to Judaism, i . e . , chr is to logy and his own Chr ist ian soter io logy. Sanders' approach to Paul i s in keeping with his basic concern in Paul and Palest inian Judaism. The target of his apologia fo r Judaism is Western scholarship which has pers is ten t ly interpreted Judaism from i t s own rather than Jewish presuppositions and sources. Sanders is very sensi t ive to the d is to r t ions that resu l t from such an approach. He cor rec t l y emphasizes that proof - tex t ing fo r one's character izat ion of the re l i g i on in question only masks the biased character izat ion. As a correct ive to such a d i s to r t i ng approach, he proposes a comparative study of the patterns of r e l i g i o n . This means determining the pattern of each r e l i g i o n , in te rpre t ing the texts and elements of each re l i g i on in l i g h t of i t s own pattern instead of notions drawn from outs ide t h a t r e l i g i o n , and then comparing the pa t te rns . 4 Sanders' approach thus ca l l s fo r a moratorium on the approach represented by Schoeps. I t also leads to emphasizing the grounds wi th in Paul's pattern of r e l i g i o n ( foreign to Judaism) that led to his break with Judaism. 4 For an evaluation of the success of Sanders' undertaking, see Jacob Neussner, "Comparing Judaisms," HR 18. 2 (Nov, 1978) 177-191. 151 Sanders' approach to comparing Paul and Judaism minimizes the impact of the erroneous notion that law is r i g h t l y understood as a part of covenant on his in te rpre ta t ion of Paul. Schoeps' approach maximizes i t . The important question raised by the two approaches, however, is whether Paul's break with Judaism rests on grounds in ternal or external to Judaism. The present study has shown that on the meaning of covenant, Paul is in agreement with Judaism. He is working with the d e f i n i t i o n of covenant u n i v e r s a l l y accepted in the Judaism of h is t i m e . The "fundamental misunderstanding" is with Schoeps rather than with Paul. Yet, Schoeps was not altogether wrong in point ing to the covenant concept as the c r i t i c a l issue. He simply went astray in t rac ing the d ispar i t y between Paul and Judaism to d i f f e r i n g de f in i t i ons of covenant. By separating the patr iarchal and S ina i t i c covenant formulations and by making promise and law mutually exclusive concepts, Paul rad i ca l l y breaks w i th the Jewish understanding of covenant. But in th i s case also, as Schoeps notes in other instances, Paul uses basic Jewish notions to argue fo r non-Jewish conclusions. Paul shares w i t h Judaism the not ions that covenant is the basic soter io log ica l category, that covenant i s a binding and irrevocable act and that i t is renewed with the seed. But from these notions he draws the t o t a l l y non-Jewish conclusion that the Abrahamic enactment is both isolated and insulated from the law. The cause f o r t h i s t u rn against Judaism in Paul's thought is of c r i t i c a l concern fo r Pauline studies. Sanders traces Paul's radical break with Judaism to his chr is to log ica l presupposit ions. Thus, Paul is seen as re jec t ing Judaism simply because i t is not C h r i s t i a n i t y . The clash between Paul and Judaism, concentrated on the question of law, i s simply a clash 152 between two patterns of r e l i g i o n . The chr is to log ica l basis fo r Paul's c r i t i que of the law can hardly be denied. Paul received a revelat ion of Christ (Gal 1:16) in view of which he saw a l l he had achieved in Judaism, especial ly v ia the law, as loss and dross (Phil 3:4-11). These biographical facts establ ish the p r i o r i t y of chr isto logy in his thought. But from t h i s , i t does not fo l low that Paul s imply r e j e c t e d Judaism and i t s view of the law because i t was of a d i f f e ren t "pattern of r e l i g i o n " than what he found in Chr is t . Paul does c r i t i c i z e the law from the law. Paul's re jec t ion of the Jewish view of covenant by re - in te rp re t ing the covenantal formulations of the Pentateuch is c lear l y established in his dichotomizing of promise and law in Gal 3:18. Paul is drawing from the very nature of the enactments to ar r ive at his non-Jewish conclusions about the law. Through t h i s hermeneutical move, Paul shatters the uni ty at the basis of Judaism. As a resu l t of Paul's separating promise and law, any agreement between Paul and Judaism is at best pa r t i a l and fragmentary. Paul can, and large ly does, use Jewish not ions. But having rejected the uni tary view of covenant, he cannot ar r ive at a Jewish synthesis. By shatter ing the uni ty between law and promise, Paul has destroyed the Jewish in tegrat ing po in t . I f Paul begins with a chr is to log ica l and external basis in his c r i t i q u e of the law, he ends with a hermeneutical and internal basis fo r re jec t ing the law. A l l t h i s has nothing to do with the basic understanding of covenant as an i n s t i t u t i o n , as Schoeps supposes. I t simply has to do with the in te rpre ta t ion of the covenant formulations of the Torah. Here l i e s Paul's point of departure from Judaism. 153 D. The F i n a l i t y of Paul's Break with Judaism The d iscuss ion thus fa r has assumed with Schoeps and Sanders that Pau l ' s t reatment of the law represents a break w i th Judaism. This assumption is challenged by Gaston who argues that the nomos of Paul's c r i t i q u e is not the Torah of Judaism. Hence, Paul's treatment of the law would leave Judaism i n t a c t . Gaston's thesis represents a major a l te rnat ive to the t r a d i t i o n a l and commonly accepted in te rpre ta t ion of Paul. The bearing of the present study on t h i s thesis w i l l b r i e f l y be considered. Gaston comes to the problem of Paul and Judaism with the assumption that the view of covenant put f o r t h by Schoeps and Sanders is cor rect . The previously given c r i t i que of t h i s in te rpre ta t ion of covenant thus s t r i kes at the basis of his thes is . Like Schoeps, Gaston basis his in te rpre ta t ion of Paul d i r e c t l y on the idea of a covenantal view of the law. Schoeps f inds in the absence of t h i s notion in Paul's c r i t i q u e of the law the real problem underlying his treatment of the law. Gaston agrees with Schoeps that the idea of "covenant" is absent from the law of Paul's c r i t i q u e . He, however, in terprets t h i s absence as meaning that Paul i s not c r i t i c i z i n g Torah in Judaism, i . e . , law in the context of covenant, but law as the Gentiles have i t , i . e . , law without covenant. Gaston also aff i rms that Paul accepts covenantal nomism fo r Jews. The f indings of the present study seriously challenge Gaston's thes is . Since covenant is simply an enactment, the law i t s e l f i s a covenant and both the ideas of law without covenant and law in the context of covenant are f a l l a c i o u s . Furthermore, in Jewish thought law is not simply covenant by d e f i n i t i o n bu t t h e r e i s no covenant w i thou t law. This complete i d e n t i f i c a t i o n of covenant and law in Judaism means that a c r i t i que of law 154 is a c r i t i q u e of covenant. As a r e s u l t of working w i th the idea of covenantal nomism which represents neither Pauline nor Jewish thought, Gaston's thesis i s erroneous. His pos i t i on , however, can be reformulated in terms of the singular covenant mot i f . I t might be argued that fo r Jews Paul understood the Mosaic law as the renewal of the patr iarchal covenant, and, fo r Genti les, law as separate from promise. As a r e s u l t , Torah would form a uni t with promise as fa r as the Jews are concerned. Such a thesis encounters d i f f i c u l t i e s in both Paul and Judaism. From a Pauline perspective, i t encounters the problem that promise and law are mutually exclusive. From a Jewish perspective, i t encounters the d i f f i c u l t y that there is no law-free promise. So fa r only the conceptual side of Gaston's work has been t rea ted. Gaston also argues from spec i f ic t ex t s . A review of the exegetical aspect of his thesis i s beyond the scope of the present study. Some considerations on the exegetical basis of his work, however, may be pointed out here. Gaston does not have any Jewish or Pauline texts that e x p l i c i t l y teach his thes is . His thesis must be in ferred from the tex t s . But here l i e s the pr inc ipa l d i f f i c u l t y with the textual basis fo r his theory. Inference can easi ly amount to nothing more than reading an idea in to the t e x t . Since Gaston reads the Pauline and Jewish texts in l i g h t of covenantal nomism, an idea foreign to both Pauline and Jewish thought, one must be suspicious of his exegesis from the outset. Nevertheless, a thorough treatment of his work requires a painstaking review of his in te rpre ta t ion of the texts he uses to see i f the texts can possibly be understood to represent his theory. The present study only affords a l imi ted c r i t i que of Gaston's thes is . This much is c lear , however: i f the present thesis is cor rec t , Gaston's thesis i s untenable. The dichotomy which Paul sets up between promise and 155 law shatters the uni fy ing idea in Jewish thought found in the singular covenant mot i f . As a r e s u l t , Paul's break wi th Judaism is f i n a l . By part ing with the singular covenant mot i f , Paul f inds himself outside of the pale of Jewish thought. E. Final Reflections I w i l l c l o s e the . present study w i t h some r e f l e c t i o n s oq i t s de f i n i t i ona l task and with a suggestion concerning the fu r ther questions fo r Pauline studies i t ra ises. I embarked on the research fo r t h i s thesis sensing a need fo r a f resh invest igat ion in to the meaning of covenant fo r Pauline studies. Having completed the thes is , I am convinced of the need fo r such a study. In r e t r o s p e c t , I c l e a r l y see that Pauline scholarship on the question of covenant has been great ly impaired and even handicapped by the lack of d e f i n i t i o n a l ground work. Some of the causes f o r t h i s , which also c o n s t i t u t e the p r i n c i p a l b a r r i e r s t h a t stand in the way of f r e s h de f in i t i ona l work, w i l l be considered. There i s an almost complete scholar ly consensus that the B ib l i ca l covenant is properly a suntheke rather than a d ia th ike . This consensus is re f lec ted in the absence of a serious attempt to define covenant in the work of the three scholars reviewed in chapter one. Sanders makes no attempt at def in ing covenant in Jewish and Pauline thought. He simply speaks about covenant. Gaston assumes the work of Sanders and l ikewise f a i l s to define covenant. Schoeps makes a b r ie f and sketchy attempt at def ining covenant. 5 Schoeps, Paul, pp. 214-215. 156 He c i tes a few OT references which show that law and covenant are c losely re la ted . These texts ac tua l ly confirm the resul ts of the present study that the law is a covenant. This idea, however, is missed by Schoeps who holds that covenant is a contract and that law is only a part of covenant. Furthermore, in arguing that beVft is properly suntheke, Schoeps does not have to enter i n t o a d iscuss ion w i t h a c o u n t e r - p o s i t i o n . Schoeps' contention is simply universal ly assumed. A few dissenting voices have been ra ised, but they have not received serious a t ten t ion . The lack of d e f i n i t i o n a l work on covenant is due to the complete t r iumph of the t r a d i t i o n of t r ans la t i on and understanding of covenant introduced by Aqui la . This t r a d i t i o n has formed the t rans la t ion terms, the theological vocabulary and the conceptual framework of Western scholarship. I t has been so pervasive that i t represents an almost universal consensus that receives no serious challenge. Overcoming the l i n g u i s t i c and conceptual consensus has proven to be the most d i f f i c u l t task of the present study. This has meant at times part ing e n t i r e l y w i th cu r ren t scholarship to s t r i ke out on my own. This was p a r t i c u l a r l y the case in determining the meaning of be>ft in the DSS. A l l the t rans la t ions and works on the DSS simply assume the beVft i s a contract . Hence, there was very l i t t l e , i f any, scholar ly d i rec t ion and support that I could obtain fo r my thes is . However, the attempt at f resh ly redef in ing ber f t in the DSS proved f r u i t f u l . I began to study the texts of Qumran in an experimental fashion to see i f beVft could be understood as an enactment or ordinance. I soon real ized that i t was necessary to study the theology of covenant in the texts rather eg . , Kutsch, Neues Testament - Neuer Bund? 157 than jus t isolated texts containing the term beVTt. This study confirmed the hypothesis with which I set out to study the DSS and resulted in a new understanding of the idea of covenant at Qumran. The same understanding of covenant was discovered in Jubilees and was corroborated by the other Jewish evidence surveyed in the process of wr i t i ng t h i s thes is . The fresh insights on the idea of covenant in Judaism led to a new understanding of Paul's re la t ionship with Judaism. However, the fresh insights also led me to part wi th the prevai l ing scholar ly in te rp re ta t ion of both Paul and Judaism. As a r e s u l t , I have struck out on a new and untr ied path. The de f i n i t i ona l task of th i s study also had to deal with d is to r t ions in the understanding of diatheke. The discussion on the t rans la t ion of b e r i t in the LXX and NT has largely assumed that the spec i f ic idea in diatheke is that of the one-sidedness of an arrangement. This assumption has contr ibuted to the convict ion that diatheke is not the appropriate term fo r be r i t since the nuance of one-sidedness is c lear ly absent from beVft. The emphasis on the notion of one-sidedness in diatheke may in part be due to Aqui la 's a l te rnat ive rendering of berTt. In much scholar ly work, suntheke is simply not treated as an a l te rnat ive rendering but as the polar opposite to diatheke. The emphasis on two-sidedness in suntheke seems to have determined the understanding of diatheke in b ib l i ca l studies. Even Kutsch's work, which contributed s i g n i f i c a n t l y toward the present thes is , i s a f f l i c t e d w i th the assumption t h a t diatheke is the polar opposite of suntheke". The use of diatheke for a las t w i l l also contributed to the sense of d i s p a r i t y between t h i s term and beVtt. We understand the testamentary i n s t i t u t i o n in terms of the t e s t a t o r ' s act of disposal. Hence, the one- 158 sidedness of the arrangement is emphasized. But the idea of one-sidedness expresses only one aspect of the i n s t i t u t i o n in question. Another is the notion of a binding act i r respect ive of "one-sidedness." A study of the usage of diatheke shows that t h i s l a t t e r idea is the spec i f ic nuance of di atheke by which the testamentary act was understood. Scholarship, however, la rge ly f a i l e d to see t h i s due to reading in to the Greek term fo r a las t w i l l our spec i f ic understanding of that instrument. The d i s t o r t i o n s of the meanings of b e n t and diatheke point to a ser ious problem t h a t can a f f l i c t scho la rsh ip in any area . Certain assumptions in a given area can so dominate scholarship that i t can no longer see beyond them. A universal consensus leaves the assumptions unchallenged and even unnoticed. Moreover, a l l the terms in questions can be subconsciously defined in terms of the assumptions which resu l ts in the assumptions being b u i l t in to our vocabulary, the very bui ld ing blocks of our thought. These dangers cont inual ly ca l l us back to the most basic, the d e f i n i t i o n a l , task which must be carr ied on with a healthy skepticism and s e l f - c r i t i c a l a t t i t u d e . C r i t i c a l d e f i n i t i o n a l work does not only require breaking through preconceived not ions about the meaning of terms but a lso demands a s e n s i t i v i t y t o the f a c t o r s determin ing the development of te rms. Unfortunately, scholarship has not always been sensi t ive to these fac to rs . The impact that the adoption of diatheke in to a par t i cu la r t r a d i t i o n of t r a n s l a t i o n and t h e o l o g i c a l discussion has on the meaning and fu r ther development of that term has been almost e n t i r e l y overlooked in scholarship. This considerat ion, however, great ly qua l i f i es the evidence from outside the given t r a d i t i o n of t rans la t ion and thought fo r the meaning of important t rans la t ion and theological terms. For the present study, t h i s concerns the 159 weight given to papyrological evidence fo r the meaning of diatheke in the NT. But despite th i s cautionary note, the present study has shown that the B ib l i ca l use of terms such as kleronomia and diatheke is not incompatible w i t h the secular usage of these terms. In f a c t , the B ib l i ca l usage preserves the broader and non-technical sense of the terms that are obscured in the terms' secular usage as known through extant sources. In view of the factors that inf luence our own understanding and the h i s to r i ca l development of terms, the de f in i t i ona l task is a d i f f i c u l t one. However, i t is also important and f r u i t f u l . The present study has shown how an a l t e r e d understanding of covenant can r a d i c a l l y rest ructure one's in te rpre ta t ion of Judaism and Paul and how the l a t t e r re lates to the former. Furthermore, f a u l t y de f in i t i ons invar iab ly contr ibute to a scholar ly muddle and can set what may be otherwise good scholarship on a f a u l t y basis and thus impair a scholar 's ent i re work. The changed understanding of covenant proposed in the present study introduces new questions. The troublesome issue about a covenantal and non- covenantal view of the law vanishes. The p r i n c i p a l question fo r a comparative study of the Pauline and Jewish understandings of covenant now concerns the d i f f e r e n t in terpreta t ions of the OT covenant formulat ions. The changed understanding also leads to f resh h i s to r i ca l problems. I t raises the question as to the development of Paul's rad i ca l l y non-Jewish posi t ion on the OT covenant formulat ions. One source fo r answers w i l l , no doubt, be his own chr is to logy and soter io logy. But non-Pauline sources must also be explored fo r possible para l le ls and antecedents to his pos i t i on . I w i l l close th i s study with a suggestion about the immediate precursor to Paul's i radical break with the uni tary view of covenant in Judaism. To my knowledge, no other NT wr i t i ng separates promise and law as Paul 160 does. This separation seems to be genuinely Pauline. The break with the singular covenant mot i f , however, i s re f lec ted in the teaching about the new covenant in Hebrews. The author of Hebrews argues that the new covenant i s a bet ter covenant ( 8 : 6 ) , that i t replaces (instead of renews) the old one (8 :7 ,13) , and that i t is based on a better sac r i f i ce as a resu l t of which i t outs t r ips the former (9 :23) . In Hebrews, the new covenant that is based on a superior s a c r i f i c e , the death of Chr is t , is q u a l i t a t i v e l y d i f f e ren t from the old one. Hebrews also argues that a change of priesthood enta i ls a change of law (7:12) . This idea of a new covenant replacing the old is non- Jewish. The Damascus Document speaks of a new covenant. But th i s covenant is only a renewal of the one and only covenant the sectaries envisioned. In th i s regard, Hebrews breaks with the Jewish understanding of covenant. The idea of a new covenant based on the blood of Christ is present in the euchar is t ic formula, which Paul received from the Lord (1 Cor 11:23-25). The author of Hebrews only draws out the conclusion that the change in priesthood and sac r i f i ce entai led in the idea of a new covenant in Chr is t ' s blood involves a change rather than a renewal of covenant. The be l ie f in the death of Jesus Christ as the basis of a new covenant and sa lvat ion, which c lear l y antedates Paul, inev i tab ly led to the idea that the Mosaic covenant was replaced. In pre-Pauline Chr i s t i an i t y , however, a dichotomy between promise and law was not made. But Paul's separating of the two may represent a natural development. From the convict ion that Christ and not the law was the f u l f i l l m e n t of the promise, a two-fold development would lead to Paul's pos i t i on . F i r s t , Christ would be l inked d i r e c t l y with the promise and the law be subordinated in the soter iology of the church. Second, the ant i thes is involved in the idea that the new covenant in Christ replaced the o ld Mosaic covenant could e a s i l y be t ransferred to the 161 re la t ionsh ip between the Mosaic law and the promise that Christ f u l f i l l e d . Thus while Paul's radical separation of promise and law has no antecedents, the separation nevertheless has roots in ear ly Christ ian chr isto logy and soter io logy. The pre-Pauline church's be l ie f in a new covenant in the blood of Jesus Christ forms a logical t r a n s i t i o n from the Jewish to the Pauline in terpre ta t ions of the OT covenant formulat ions. 162 BIBLIOGRAPHY Adcock, Sir Frank, and D. J . 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L i d d e l l , Henry George, Robert Scott and Sir Henry Stuart Jones, A Greek- English Lexicon (Oxford: Clarendon, 1968). Moulton, James Hope, and George M i l l i gan , The Vocabulary of the Greek New Testament I l l u s t r a t e d from the Papyri and Other Non-Literary Sources (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1930).

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