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Incentives for activism in a moribund political party : the case of the BC Liberals So, Robyn Ann 1988

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INCENTIVES FOR ACTIVISM IN A MORIBUND POLITICAL PARTY: B.A., M c G i l l U n i v e r s i t y , 1986 A THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF MASTER OF ARTS THE FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIES Department of P o l i t i c a l S c i e n c e We accept t h i s t h e s i s as conforming to the r e q u i r e d standard THE UNIVERSITY OF BRITISH COLUMBIA October 1988 ( c j Robyn Ann So THE CASE OF THE BC LIBERALS By ROBYN ANN SO i n In p resen t ing this thesis in partial f u l f i lmen t o f t he r e q u i r e m e n t s fo r an advanced d e g r e e at the Univers i ty o f Brit ish C o l u m b i a , I agree tha t t h e Library shall make it f ree ly available f o r re ference and s tudy . I fu r ther agree that pe rmiss ion f o r ex tens ive c o p y i n g o f th is thesis f o r scholar ly pu rposes may be g r a n t e d by the head o f m y d e p a r t m e n t o r by his o r her representat ives. It is u n d e r s t o o d that c o p y i n g o r p u b l i c a t i o n o f th is thesis f o r f inancial gain shall n o t b e a l l o w e d w i t h o u t m y w r i t t e n pe rm iss ion . D e p a r t m e n t o f f°OL ! TIC A L- Sci e/VC £• The Univers i ty o f Brit ish C o l u m b i a Vancouve r , Canada Date Oc^ro^&K lbt DE-6 (2/88) A B S T R A C T T h i s t h e s i s e x p l a i n s why i n d i v i d u a l s are a c t i v e i n the B r i t i s h Columbia L i b e r a l Party, c o n s i d e r i n g i t was f i n i s h e d as a v i a b l e f o r c e i n BC p o l i t i c s f o l l o w i n g the 1975 e l e c t i o n . What are t h e i r motivations and i n c e n t i v e s , and the f a c t o r s that govern them, given the party's i n a b i l i t y to reward i t s workers i n terms of winning e l e c t i o n s ? The a n a l y s i s i s conducted using a two-pronged t h e o r e t i c a l approach. This approach p o s i t s f i r s t , that i n c e n t i v e s are dependent on, and independent of, the L i b e r a l Party's ends, i n c l u d i n g i t s p o l i t i c a l p r i n c i p l e s and i t s goal of being e l e c t e d . Second, i t p o s i t s t h e i r i n c e n t i v e s a r i s e from both personal gain and p s y c h o l o g i c a l needs. Using survey data c o l l e c t e d from the BC L i b e r a l Party 1987 l e a d e r s h i p convention, I demonstrate that a c t i v i s t s are i n s p i r e d by a v a r i e t y of motivations that are both dependent on, and independent of, the party's ends. Due to t h e i r d i s t i n c t i d e o l o g i c a l o r i e n t a t i o n and purposive concerns, the a c t i v i s t s would not f i t i n any other p r o v i n c i a l party. A n a l y s i s a l s o r e v e a l s that there are two groups of L i b e r a l a c t i v i s t s — o p t i m i s t s and r e a l i s t s regarding the f u t u r e success of the party. P a r a d o x i c a l l y , the l e a s t o p t i m i s t i c are the most involved i n party a c t i v i t y , and the most hopeful are the l e a s t i n v o l v e d . I demonstrated that closeness to the f e d e r a l L i b e r a l party i n f l u e n c e s the r e a l i s t s ' a c t i v i s m i n the p r o v i n c i a l party. The existing l i t e r a t u r e on incentives for p o l i t i c a l party activism tends to focus on patronage, ideology and party-related concerns, such as policy, issues, leaders and candidates. As such, i t diminishes the importance of psychological motivations. This thesis found the l a t t e r played an equally powerful role in governing motivations for p o l i t i c a l party activism. In this regard, this thesis has contributed to a more comprehensive understanding of party ac tivism. i v TABLE DF CONTENTS page Abstract i i Table of Contents iv L i s t of Tables v Acknowledgements v i Introduction 1 Methodology 6 1 Decline and F a l l 9 2 Theory 27 P o l i t i c a l Party Literature 27 Psychology Literature 35 3 Incentives for Activism 44 Ideological Commitment 46 Loyalty 47 Policy Orientations and Opinion Dimensions 55 4 Optimism and Activism 65 A Winning Party 66 Sources of Optimism 68 Optimism and Activism 75 Conclusion 79 Bibliography 83 Appendix I BB Appendix 11 89 V LIST DF TABLES page 3.1 A t t i t u d e s Toward Government Regulation by Party 61 3.2 A t t i t u d e s Toward Government Spending by Party 62 3.3 A t t i t u d e D i f f e r e n c e s Among A c t i v i s t s by Party 63 v i ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS Many thanks go to Pr o f e s s o r s Ken a n d E l a i n e Carty f o r encouraging me to f i n i s h as e x p e d i t i o u s l y as p o s s i b l e , and I am e s p e c i a l l y g r a t e f u l f o r the kindness they have shown me. I a l s o thank: Kathy Denton, who came up with the idea i n the f i r s t place; Donald Blake, f o r h i s h e l p f u l suggestions; Ramesh, f o r h i s good-natured e d i t o r i a l comments; N e i l Sutherland, who rescued me from the SPSS quagmire with patience beyond the c a l l of duty. I thank my f e l l o w classmates cum S o f t b a l l aficionados f o r g i v i n g me the i n f i e l d p e r s p e c t i v e on l i f e as a graduate student. F i n a l l y , a s p e c i a l thanks goes to my parents f o r t h e i r moral support and encouragement, and most importantly, f o r always b e i n g there. T h i s i s f o r them, with love. 1 INTRODUCTION You have to believe. It's not a matter of kidding yourself. You have to believe you're winning. If you can't do that, you can't win. —Richard Hatfield, after his party's collapse Prospects for a reversal in the electoral fortunes of the BC Liberal Party are bleak. Since the 1952 debacle, when they lost o f f i c e to the Social Credit Party, their popularity has steadily declined: their electoral support collapsed in the 1975 election and then disappeared in 1979. Despite this end, the party has gained f u l l y 43 per cent of i t s current a c t i v i s t s since 1979. On the other hand, 40 per cent of active party members joined over 15 years ago when the party could plausibly be perceived as a viable electoral force. In the face of continuing provincial defeats, what underlies the motivations of the Liberals' continuing enthusiasm, reflected in their lengthy party involvement? As for the former, those who have joined more recently, what motivates them to join a party whose experience of governing i s beyond the memory and experience of most B r i t i s h Columbians? 1 x Suggested by Donald E. Blake, "The Consistency of Inconsistency: Party Identification in Federal-Provincial P o l i t i c s , " Canadian Journal of Political Science, 15 (19B2), 695. 2 There are a v a r i e t y of approaches to the study of p o l i t i c a l party a c t i v i s m . On the one hand, Rapoport et a l . analysed the consequences of v a r i o u s types of i n c e n t i v e s on both the o r g a n i z a t i o n of p o l i t i c a l p a r t i e s and the^ e l e c t o r a l s t r a t e g i e s a c t i v i s t s choose to pursue. 2 Sorauf, on the other hand, examined both the u t i l i t y of i n c e n t i v e s to the p o l i t i c a l party and the e f f e c t s of the changing nature of i n c e n t i v e s on the a b i l i t y of the p o l i t i c a l party to c o n t r o l i t s workers. 3 In c o n t r a s t , P e r l i n was concerned with motives that "govern support r e l a t i o n s h i p s between a party leader and members of i t s party," as a p o s s i b l e explanation of the i n s t a b i l i t y of the Conservative Party l e a d e r s h i p . * Clark and Wilson used an e x p l o r a t o r y approach i n t h e i r paper which e s s e n t i a l l y c l a s s i f i e d the various i n c e n t i v e s they found, and hypothesized about t h e i r r e l a t i o n s h i p s to the ends and means of o r g a n i z a t i o n s . s T h i s t h e s i s , however, w i l l address questions s i m i l a r to those r a i s e d by Payne and Woshinsky (1972), who asked: Why are people i n p o l i t i c s ? . . . A s a t i s f a c t o r y understanding of p o l i t i c a l motivation can provide a powerful a n a l y t i c a l t o o l f o r e x p l a i n i n g why = Ronald B. Rapoport, et a l . , The Life of the Parties (Lexington: The Univ. Press of Kentucky, 1986), esp. parts two and four. 3 Frank J . Sorauf, Political Parties in the American System (Toronto: L i t t l e , Brown & Co., 1964), 60-97. •* George C. P e r l i n , The Tory Syndrome (Montreal: Queen's Univ. Press, 1980). * Peter B. C l a r k , et a l . , "Incentive Systems: A Theory of Org a n i z a t i o n s , " Administrative Science Quarterly, 6 (1961), 129-166. 3 d i f f e r e n t groups of p a r t i c i p a n t s behave as they do; u l t i m a t e l y i t can suggest why they adopt and s u s t a i n d i f f e r e n t p o l i t i c a l i n s t i t u t i o n s . In other words, i t seeks to e x p l a i n the a c t i v i s m of BC L i b e r a l s i n B r i t i s h Columbia (BC). Stated another way, what are the motivations or i n c e n t i v e s f o r a c t i v i s m i n the BC L i b e r a l Party? T h i s question i s p a r t i c u l a r l y i n t e r e s t i n g because the party i s widely perceived to be moribund. Sorauf, among others, maintains that i f the party i s to continue f u n c t i o n i n g as an o r g a n i z a t i o n i t must make 'payments' i n an acceptable ' p o l i t i c a l currency' adequate to motivate and a l l o c a t e the labors of i t s workers. 7 And he continues: For the party to maintain i t s reward system and produce payoffs on i t , i t must win elections...Even those s o c i a l and p s y c h o l o g i c a l rewards depend u l t i m a t e l y on the party's maintaining s t a t u s , voter c l i e n t e l e , and the e x h i l a r a t i o n of v i c t o r y [emphasis added]. s This i m p l i e s that i f a party does not win e l e c t i o n s , i t cannot reward i t s workers which, i n turn, precludes motivations or i n c e n t i v e s f o r a c t i v i s m i n that party. A p e r t i n e n t question to ask, t h e r e f o r e , i s why does anybody work f o r the BC L i b e r a l Party, given i t s i n a b i l i t y to reward i t s workers i n terms of winning e l e c t i o n s ? Why are they not working f o r the S o c i a l C r e d i t Party or the New James L. Payne and O l i v e r H. Woshinsky, "Incentives f o r P o l i t i c a l P a r t i c i p a t i o n , " Mor Id Polities', 24 (1972), p. .518.. 7 Sorauf, op. cit., 81. B Ibid., 89-90. 4 Democratic Party, both of which are much more l i k e l y to win e l e c t i o n s and reward t h e i r workers? One p o s s i b l e explanation i s that winning i s not as important to these a c t i v i s t s as are other motivations. If t h i s i s c o r r e c t , then Sorauf's assumption i s untenable. However, i t would be j u s t i f i a b l e to p o s i t an a l t e r n a t i v e e x p l a n a t i o n : the a c t i v i s t s b e l i e v e , i n s p i t e of the present r e a l i t y , that the party w i l l win i n f u t u r e . T h i s t h e s i s w i l l address both of these expla n a t i o n s , using a two-pronged t h e o r e t i c a l approach. The main argument w i l l be that BC L i b e r a l a c t i v i s t s are i n s p i r e d by a v a r i e t y of motivations that are both dependent on, and independent of, the party's ends. E s s e n t i a l l y , t h e i r i n c e n t i v e s a r i s e from both personal gain and p s y c h o l o g i c a l needs. Personal gain i s s t r a t e g i c , whereas p s y c h o l o g i c a l needs i n v o l v e the maintenance or enhancement of self-esteem, as well as t h e i r b e l i e f s , values and a t t i t u d e s . Chapter One h i g h l i g h t s the h i s t o r y of the BC L i b e r a l Party and emphasizes i t s u n v i a b i l i t y as i l l u s t r a t e d i n e x i s t i n g l i t e r a t u r e on p o l i t i c a l p a r t i e s . A survey of both the l i t e r a t u r e on party a c t i v i s m and on c o g n i t i v e t h e o r i e s of self-knowledge and s e l f - d e c e p t i o n i s the focus of Chapter Two. Explanations posited f o r a c t i v i s m are examined i n the f o l l o w i n g two chapters. Chapter Three w i l l explore i d e o l o g i c a l and e v a l u a t i v e motivations. Chapter Four w i l l analyze f e d e r a l party a c t i v i s m and optimism i n the p r o v i n c i a l party's f u t u r e success as i n c e n t i v e s . From t h i s a n a l y s i s , i t w i l l be concluded that a c t i v i s m i n the BC L i b e r a l Party i s 5 governed by a v a r i e t y of a f f e c t i v e , e v a l u a t i v e and mate r i a l i n c e n t i v e s . Undoubtedly, there are a multitude of explanations f o r a c t i v i s m i n general, and f o r the BC L i b e r a l Party i n p a r t i c u l a r . As Bernstein and Dyer note, "We l i v e i n a complex world. Human behavior and the behavior of human i n s t i t u t i o n s i s almost never explained by the v a r i a t i o n i n a s i n g l e property.'"* Time and other c o n s t r a i n t s preclude the di s c o v e r y of a l l of them. Therefore, any explanation o f f e r e d by t h i s t h e s i s i s i n h e r e n t l y incomplete. However, as Bernstein and Dyer a l s o observed, " I t i s the accumulation of those incomplete explanations that advances our knowledge of human b e h a v i o r . " 1 0 While many assumptions have been made about motivations f o r p o l i t i c a l party a c t i v i s m , e m p i r i c a l research on t h i s aspect of party cadres i s comparatively recent. There i s a p a r t i c u l a r dearth of e m p i r i c a l a n a l y s i s on a c t i v i s t s i n the BC L i b e r a l Party, an important p o l i t i c a l f o r c e i n our province f o r f i f t y years. This t h e s i s attempts to f i l l these gaps. * Robert A. Bernstein and James A. Dyer, An Introduction to Political Science Methods, 2nd ed. (New Jersey: P r e n t i c e -H a l l , 1984), 14. 1 0 Ibid., 15. 6 METHODOLOGY The data analyzed i n t h i s paper i s derived from a survey of delegates who attended the l e a d e r s h i p convention of the p r o v i n c i a l L i b e r a l Party on the 1987 Halloween weekend. The party's c o n s t i t u t i o n p r o h i b i t s voting on p o l i c y i s s u e s at a lea d e r s h i p convention, the delegates being there f o r the s o l e purpose of e l e c t i n g a new leader. Questionnaires were d i s t r i b u t e d by a group of p o l i t i c a l s c i e n t i s t s as the delegates r e g i s t e r e d at the c o n v e n t i o n . 1 The t o t a l number of r e g i s t e r e d delegates at the convention was 224 out of which ninety completed and usable q u e s t i o n n a i r e s were returned by post. Our return r a t e was, t h e r e f o r e , 40 per cent. T h i s t h e s i s w i l l focus on the data generated by the survey of the BC L i b e r a l Party's l e a d e r s h i p convention delegates. However, f o r comparison purposes, the surveys of delegates at the 1986 and 1987 le a d e r s h i p conventions of the 1 The p r i n c i p a l i n v e s t i g a t o r s were R.K. Carty, Robyn A. So, Michael A. Mayer, Tony Sayers. 7 p r o v i n c i a l S o c i a l C r e d i t and New Democratic P a r t i e s r e s p e c t i v e l y w i l l a l s o be u s e d . 2 Comparison of these data i s f a c i l i t a t e d because the q u e s t i o n n a i r e s d i s t r i b u t e d to a l l three p a r t i e s were i d e n t i c a l except f o r some questions r e l a t e d to p o l i c i e s , candidates and lead e r s . It i s recognized that i n general, party a c t i v i s t s are both an e l i t e and a t y p i c a l stratum of the population i n BC. F i r s t , a c t i v i s t s d i s t i n g u i s h themselves from the e l e c t o r a t e by v i r t u e of holding a c t i v e membership i n a p o l i t i c a l party. Second, [while] p r o v i n c i a l party a c t i v i s t s can be expected to r e f l e c t many of the same d i s t i n g u i s h i n g s o c i o -economic c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s as the e l e c t o r a l base of t h e i r p a r t i e s . . . they a l s o , however, tend to be drawn in part from p a r t i c u l a r c l a s s e s of s o c i e t y which possess c e r t a i n p r e r e q u i s i t e p o l i t i c a l and s o c i a l r e s o u r c e s . 3 Thus, we are speaking of a group that has both higher s o c i o -economic s t a t u s and more education than the general popu1ation. It i s a l s o recognized that there i s an inherent response bias i n survey research because delegates who t r o u b l e themselves to complete and return the q u e s t i o n n a i r e s 2 These data were made a v a i l a b l e by Donald Blake of the U n i v e r s i t y of B r i t i s h Columbia. Pr o f e s s o r Blake bears no r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r the use made of them i n t h i s t h e s i s . For d e t a i l s of t h e i r surveys, see Donald E. Blake, R.K. Carty and Lynda E r i c k s o n , " R a t i f i c a t i o n or Repudiation: The S o c i a l C r e d i t Leadership Convention," a paper presented at the annual meeting of the Canadian P o l i t i c a l Science A s s o c i a t i o n , Hamilton, Ontario, 1987. 3 Norman J . Ruff, "A P r o f i l e of B r i t i s h Columbia P r o v i n c i a l Party A c t i v i s t s : P r e l i m i n a r y A n a l y s i s of Three Conventions, November 1973, unpublished d r a f t , U n i v e r s i t y of V i c t o r i a , n.d. 8 d i s t i n g u i s h themselves from the general delegate population by doing so. In a d d i t i o n , a c t i v i s t s who choose to attend a l e a d e r s h i p convention are a d i f f e r e n t group than the l a r g e r a c t i v i s t pool from which they are drawn. One may speculate that the respondents are e i t h e r the most committed of the a c t i v i s t s or simply have stronger o p i n i o n s . Because they a l s o represent those most l i k e l y to i n f l u e n c e p o l i t i c a l d e c i s i o n -makers and the party's platform, i n v e s t i g a t i n g the causes of t h e i r a c t i v i s m w i l l improve our understanding of the nature of a c t i v i s t s and the p a r t i e s they work f o r . 9 Chapter 1 DECLINE AND FALL Antagonism toward the Liberal Party in B r i t i s h Columbia i s as old as the province. Upon re-election as premier in 1878, George Walkam and his government passed a secessionist resolution displaying their i r e against the Liberal government's intransigence regarding railway construction on Vancouver Island. The provincial government did not follow through with the resolution in the wake of Alexander MacKenzie's Liberal government defeat in Ottawa. The Conservatives were returned to o f f i c e and relations between B r i t i s h Columbia and Ottawa improved. Provincial elections were not fought either with disciplined parties or under party labels u n t i l 1903. Rather, the government and i t s opposition were characterized by the composite princ i p l e . That i s to say, they were composed of federal Liberals and Conservatives, whether MPs or a c t i v i s t s , and of non-partisan supporters. Alignments were personal and temporary as they were dictated by personal and business interests irrespective of party label. According to Robin, 10 "The members of parliament returned were local lobbyists who attached themselves to the federal bandwagon and received the patronage necessary to assure their further election." Since the federal bandwagon was, with one exception, Conservative during this period, the majority of MLAs were Conservatives. 1 The present provincial party system had i t s genesis in the growing disenchantment with "Turnerism" 2 and successive scandal-ridden governments. An additional major factor was the i n s t a b i l i t y of governments. Members crossed the floor at w i l l and d i s s a t i s f a c t i o n with this system peaked after the province experienced four different governments in four years. Neither i n s t a b i l i t y nor the sectarianism inherent in this system was conducive to the province's economic development. ...industrial promoters, whether in the mining, railway, fishing or lumber industries, were reluctant to invest for fear of changed conditions. Railway contracts were made and unmade, mining laws passed and altered. Investments could not be planned and undertaken where the legal environment was not predictable... The primary function of government, in the eyes of the company owners and their agents, was to protect private property and provide a stable investment climate... 3 1 Martin Robin, 7"ne Rush for Spoils (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1972), B. = According to R.E. Gosnell, A History of B r i t i s h Columbia, Part 2, B r i t i s h Columbia H i s t o r i c a l Association, Vancouver and V i c t o r i a , 1913, 143; quoted in Robin, Ibid., 67-8, Turnerism meant "favoritism, a lax c i v i l service, extravagance in the expenditure of public money, looseness of administration ... increasing indebtedness, encouragement of speculators and promoters at the expense of public assets, recklessness in railway charters and subventions, lack of definite and comprehensive p o l i c i e s , non-sympathy with labour aspirations and everything else that might be chargeable against the government which had been for a long time in power." 3 Robin, Ibid., 85. 11 Also of growing concern to company owners and MLAs a l i k e was the s o c i a l i s t movement which was i n c r e a s i n g l y perceived to be a threat.-* In 1901, the Executive of the B r i t i s h Columbia L i b e r a l A s s o c i a t i o n "declared that the only way to end e x i s t i n g disturbances and d i f f i c u l t i e s was to adopt Dominion party l i n e s f r a n k l y i n p r o v i n c i a l p o l i t i c s . " 0 Joseph Martin, chosen leader of the L i b e r a l s at t h e i r 1902 convention, adopted t h i s p r i n c i p l e and the Conservatives followed with a s i m i l a r r e s o l u t i o n at t h e i r convention i n the F a l l of that year. Consequently, when E.G. P r i o r ' s composite government f e l l and Richard McBride, leader of the o p p o s i t i o n , was asked to form a cabinet, he composed i t e n t i r e l y of Conservatives. The House then adjourned, was d i s s o l v e d and the ensuing e l e c t i o n was the f i r s t to be fought by d i s c i p l i n e d p a r t i e s under f e d e r a l party l a b e l s . The next t h i r t y years witnessed the development of a two-party system and the b u i l d i n g of party machines. The p a r t i e s during t h i s period, however, were not d i f f e r e n t i a t e d by "* See, among others, E d i t h Dobie, "Party H i s t o r y i n B r i t i s h Columbia," Historical Essays on British Columbia, eds. J . F r i e s e n and H.K. Ralston, The Carleton L i b r a r y , No. 96 (Toronto: Gage P u b l i s h i n g , 1980), 72 and Donald Blake, 7"wo Political Worlds (Vancouver: The Univ. of B r i t i s h Columbia Press, 1985), ch. 2. s Canadian Annual Review, 1903, 214; quoted i n Robin, op. cit. , 82. 12 ideology or p o l i c y p r i n c i p l e s . * ' Indeed, B r i t t o n Cooke observed that Those cl u b s which they are pleased to c a l l Conservative Clubs are as innocent of r e a l Conservative p r i n c i p l e s as a Siwash brave i n l i q u o r . They would not know offhand whether t h e i r p o l i t i c a l ancestors were Round Heads or C a v a l i e r s . They are Tory n e i t h e r by t r a d i t i o n nor p r i n c i p l e — o n l y by p r a c t i c e on p o l l i n g day. Were McBride L i b e r a l , she would be L i b e r a l , were he S o c i a l i s t even, B r i t i s h Columbians would return a S o c i a l i s t M.L.A.7 Campaigns were "a b a t t l e between i n s and outs, with i s s u e s r e l a t i n g almost e n t i r e l y to a d m i n i s t r a t i v e government." 3 There was no other d i f f e r e n c e between the p a r t i e s i n the p u b l i c ' s mind. Neither party could avoid the t a i n t of scandal or accusations of patronage and c o r r u p t i o n . T h i s would have severe consequences f o r both p a r t i e s i n 1952. U n l i k e the p u b l i c , however, T.D. P a t t u l l o , who was e l e c t e d as L i b e r a l Premier i n 1933, p a s s i o n a t e l y b e l i e v e d there was a d i f f e r e n c e between the two p a r t i e s . When the Province f i r s t suggested a c o a l i t i o n government as a more e f f e c t i v e means of d e a l i n g with the c r i s i s brought on by the Depression, he adamantly r e j e c t e d i t . Some reasons were ** Dobie, op. cit., 70 argued that "An examination of party platforms, r e s o l u t i o n s of l o c a l and p r o v i n c i a l A s s o c i a t i o n s , speeches from the throne, debates i n the l e g i s l a t u r e reveal almost complete agreement between L i b e r a l s and Conservatives both i n theory and i n p o l i c i e s . " 7 B r i t t o n Cooke, "The S t a t e c r a f t of Richard McBride," Canadian Collier's, March 8, 1913, 12; quoted i n Robin, op. cit., 131. e Vancouver Province, J u l y 21, 1928; quoted i n Don Alper, "From Rule to Ruin: The Conservative Party of B r i t i s h Columbia 1928-1954," unpublished Ph.D. t h e s i s , U n i v e r s i t y of B r i t i s h Columbia, 1975, 44. 13 s t r a t e g i c . Others, however, were i d e o l o g i c a l . P a t t u l l o had a progressi v e , reform-oriented ideology which he bel i e v e d to be p h i l o s o p h i c a l l y and fundamentally opposed to the Conservative d o c t r i n e . Whereas the Conservatives e x c l u s i v e l y represented Eastern wealth and business i n t e r e s t s , " L i b e r a l s were always on the s i d e of humanity and against the pure d o l l a r s and cents viewpoint.'"* "Truly may i t be s a i d , " P a t t u l l o d e c l a r e d , that the L i b e r a l Party i s a 'no-party' party. It knows of no c l a s s d i s t i n c t i o n s , and i t s p r i n c i p l e s i n v i t e everyone of every walk of l i f e to t h e i r s u p p o r t . . . L i b e r a l i s m . . . s t a n d s f o r the p r o t e c t i o n of the welfare of a l l from the misuse of power f o r any p a r t i c u l a r group or c l a s s and that the welfare of the community as a whole s h a l l predominate. 1 0 In keeping with t h i s ideology, the 1932 L i b e r a l Party Convention endorsed the p r i n c i p l e that the party was "a union of a l l c l a s s e s and a l l creeds who can j o i n together on the common ground of f a i r play, e q u a l i t y and j u s t i c e . " 1 1 P a t t u l l o had l i t t l e sympathy f o r the p l i g h t of the Conservative Party, which had been disowned by both the BC Conservative A s s o c i a t i o n and the leader of the f e d e r a l party, R.B. Bennett. A s s o c i a t i n g with the Conservatives, declared P a t t u l l o , "would have been to d i l u t e 'such b r a i n s and courage as we may have by mixing i t with waste m a t e r i a l . ' " 1 3 T.D. P a t t u l l o , P r i n c e Rupert News, A p r i l 20, 1933; quoted i n Robin, op. cit., 256. 1 0 T.D. P a t t u l l o , V i c t o r i a Times, J u l y 2, 1932; quoted i n Ibid., 250. 1 1 Vancouver Sun, October 4, 1932; quoted i n Ibid., 251. 1 2 Robin, Ibid., 250; quoting T.D. P a t t u l l o to G.H. S a l l a n s , J u l y 25, 1932, Pattullo Papers, P u b l i c Archives of B r i t i s h Columbia. 14 The L i b e r a l platform, "Work and Wages," appealed to an e l e c t o r a t e demanding reform i n the face of s p i r a l l i n g unemployment, wage reductions, decreasing production l e v e l s and l i t t l e unemployment r e l i e f . P a t t u l l o ' s reassurances that h i s party was against e x p r o p r i a t i o n and d i r e c t management of the economy, worked to place the L i b e r a l s between the extremes of r e a c t i o n a r y conservatism and r a d i c a l communism. It undermined the popular appeal of the r e c e n t l y founded CCF and P a t t u l l o ' s t a c t i c , of denouncing the party while trumpeting the v i r t u e s of h i s own, assured v i c t o r y f o r the L i b e r a l Party i n 1933. The L i b e r a l platform bridged the gap between s o c i a l i s m and c a p i t a l i s m although the e l e c t i o n was o s t e n s i b l y a contest between the two i d e o l o g i e s . 1 3 In s p i t e of the v i t r i o l a g a inst s o c i a l i s m , seven CCF candidates were sent to the l e g i s l a t u r e , and the party became the o f f i c i a l o p p o s i t i o n . They gained 32 per cent of the popular vote, s i g n a l i n g the end of a n o n - i d e o l o g i c a l party system and an end to debate on a narrow range of minor i s s u e s . 1 * In the ensuing years up to World War I I , the L i b e r a l government made good on i t s promise to a l l e v i a t e the s u f f e r i n g brought on by the Depression. Subsequent e l e c t i o n s a f f i r m e d the realignment to the l e f t f i r s t seen i n 1933, p r i m a r i l y because the CCF r e - a t t a i n e d o f f i c i a l o p p o s i t i o n s t a t u s and garnered more of the popular vote than d i d e i t h e r of the t r a d i t i o n a l p a r t i e s i n the 1941 e l e c t i o n . The L i b e r a l Party, ?-3 Suggested by A l p e r , op. cit., 88-9. *•+ Ibid., 109. 15 in c o n t r a s t , watched t h e i r share of the popular vote decrease by 10 per cent over the two e l e c t i o n s . T h e i r reform programme, which involved i n t e r f e r e n c e i n the economy and s o c i a l welfare of the province, had a l i e n a t e d the business c l a s s and i n d u s t r i a l promoters, which led to a modest increase in the Tory's share of the popular vote. The P a t t u l l o government responded by moving c l o s e r to the i d e o l o g i c a l c entre. Meanwhile, the Conservative Party i t s e l f was p r a g m a t i c a l l y moving leftward to the c e n t r e . The i d e o l o g i c a l convergence of the two p a r t i e s was p a r t l y a r e f l e c t i o n of the genuine f e a r of s o c i a l i s m among the members and supporters of the t r a d i t i o n a l p a r t i e s , and t h e i r dawning r e c o g n i t i o n that i t s appeal was not a t r a n s i e n t phenomenon. Cooperation appeared to be a means of circumventing the tenacious but i n c r e a s i n g p o p u l a r i t y of the CCF among B r i t i s h Columbians. The f i n a l impetus f o r a c o a l i t i o n government, however, came from the onset of the second World War. It was deemed important to have a s t a b l e government during t h i s period of n a t i o n a l c r i s i s . A c o a l i t i o n was i n i t i a l l y proposed, t h e r e f o r e , to a l l e v i a t e problems as s o c i a t e d with a m i n o r i t y government. Said the Sun, f o r example: The only thing f o r the P a t t u l l o government to do a f t e r yesterday's e l e c t i o n i s to seek c o a l i t i o n immediately with the Conservative Party. B.C. does not want, and must not have a weak mino r i t y government i n wartime. The province cannot a f f o r d a new e l e c t i o n and the defeat of the government would mean p r e c i s e l y t h i s . 1 * i S Vancouver Sun, October 22, 1941; quoted i n Ibid., 194. 16 Although P a t t u l l o remained adamant i n h i s o p p o s i t i o n to the idea, events conspired to defeat him. His colleagues i n the caucus were i n favour of c o a l i t i o n and some L i b e r a l c o n stituency a s s o c i a t i o n s passed r e s o l u t i o n s c a l l i n g f o r a lea d e r s h i p convention. W.J. Knox, P r e s i d e n t of the BC L i b e r a l A s s o c i a t i o n , c a l l e d a general convention of the A s s o c i a t i o n on December 2, and there, a r e s o l u t i o n favouring c o a l i t i o n was passed. P a t t u l l o l e f t the convention i n d i s g u s t and George Pearson got up and nominated John Hart as the party's new leader. Pearson had refused a p o r t f o l i o and resigned i n pro t e s t over P a t t u l l o ' s u n i l a t e r a l approach; P a t t u l l o , sensing a conspiracy of c o a l i t i o n i s t s with Hart as t h e i r leader, had f i r e d Hart i n a desperate, l a s t attempt to r e t a i n c o n t r o l of the party, leading to r e s i g n a t i o n s by MPs and caucus members. A f t e r Pearson's nomination of Hart, someone seconded the motion, "then immediately someone shouted, 'I move nominations c l o s e d , ' and the great convention was past h i s t o r y . " 1 * The L i b e r a l caucus subsequently agreed to support Hart, leavi n g P a t t u l l o no choice but to r e s i g n . Here, i t i s of i n t e r e s t to note that P a t t u l l o had other reasons aside from h i s b e l i e f that they were i d e o l o g i c a l enemies f o r r e j e c t i n g c o a l i t i o n with the Conservatives. He foresaw "that the L i b e r a l Party would c o l lapse through o r g a n i z a t i o n a l d i s r u p t i o n by opposed i n t e r e s t s between the 1 & John N. Sutherland, "T.D. P a t t u l l o as a Party Leader," unpublished M.A. t h e s i s , U n i v e r s i t y of B r i t i s h Columbia, 1969, 135; quoted i n Ibid., 205. 17 f e d e r a l and p r o v i n c i a l wings and that the party's reformed e l e c t o r a l base would be s t o l e n by the CCF." 1" 7 When the c o a l i t i o n was formed the CCF was i n v i t e d to j o i n , an i n v i t a t i o n which Harold Winch, i t s leader, d e c l i n e d arguing that the exi g e n c i e s of parliamentary democracy required an o f f i c i a l o p p o s i t i o n i n the l e g i s l a t u r e . The consequences of t h i s f o r the fortunes of the L i b e r a l Party were twofold. F i r s t , as Blake argues, "the very e x i s t e n c e of the CCF as the o f f i c i a l , and only, o p p o s i t i o n r a i s e d the s a l i e n c e of the d i v i s i o n between f r e e e n t e r p r i s e and s o c i a l i s m . . . " i n BC p o l i t i c s . 1 S I d e o l o g i c a l p o l a r i z a t i o n i s one f a c t o r m i t i g a t i n g against the l i k e l i h o o d of a resurgence of L i b e r a l support i n BC, and t h i s f e a t u r e of BC's p o l i t i c a l c u l t u r e may have had i t s genesis here. Second, Alper a s s e r t s that "In surveying press c l i p p i n g s covering the se s s i o n s of t h i s period [1942-1945], not a s i n g l e instance was found where the c o a l i t i o n p a r t i e s d i v i d e d on a major i s s u e along anything resembling p a r t i s a n l i n e s . " 1 S > T h i s i s known as the convergence e f f e c t and r e s u l t e d i n an erosion of d i f f e r e n c e s between them i n the minds of the e l e c t o r a t e . The weakening of party i d e n t i f i c a t i o n was exacerbated with the t r a d i t i o n a l p a r t i e s together taking one s i d e , and the CCF the other, i n p o l i c y debates. Thus, when voters r e g i s t e r e d t h e i r p r o t e s t i n ± 7 Martin Robin, Pillars of Profit (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1973), 117. i e Blake, Two Political Worlds, op. cit., 17. x * Alper, op. cit., 215. v 18 1952 a g a i n s t government c o r r u p t i o n , f a c t i o n a l i s m and i n t r a n s i g e n c e , the L i b e r a l and Conservative P a r t i e s were penalized together by the e l e c t o r a t e . The c o a l i t i o n ' s performance was e f f e c t i v e ; indeed Winch praised i t as "the best government B.C. ever had." U n t i l the end of the war i n p a r t i c u l a r , s e s s i o n s i n the l e g i s l a t u r e were r e l a t i v e l y harmonious. But i n t r a - c o a 1 i t i o n c o n f l i c t , engendered by l e a d e r s h i p changes and Tory d i s s a t i s f a c t i o n with a l l e g e d L i b e r a l i n t r a n s i g e n c e , led to the disbandment of the c o a l i t i o n i n January, 1952. Both p a r t i e s perceived that the cost of d i s s o l u t i o n was p o t e n t i a l l y high; the CCF had gained t h e i r highest share of the popular vote yet, 37.6 per cent i n the 1945 e l e c t i o n . The L i b e r a l Party, however, be l i e v e d i t would win and that i t s v i c t o r y would be at the expense of the Conservatives. But the e l e c t i o n of 1952 d i d not y i e l d L i b e r a l v i c t o r y . 3 0 The c o a l i t i o n , a n t i c i p a t i n g i t s breakdown, had adopted the t r a n s f e r a b l e vote i n 1951, but the three-party contest required to achieve i t s intended e f f e c t d i d not occur. The t r a d i t i o n a l p a r t i e s expected to a t t r a c t second choice votes from each other, as well as from those who gave t h e i r f i r s t c hoice to the S o c i a l C r e d i t Party. However, although the L i b e r a l s and Conservatives d i d exchange support, a l a r g e = ° The f o l l o w i n g information on the 1952 e l e c t i o n i s found i n g r e a t e r d e t a i l i n A l p e r , Ibid., 334-48. For an a n a l y s i s on the e l e c t o r a t e ' s t r a n s i t i v e o r dering of preference in the 1952 and 1953 e l e c t i o n , see David J . E l k i n s , " P o l i t i c s Makes Strange Bedfellows: The BC Party System i n the 1952 and 1953 E l e c t i o n s , " BC Studies, no. 30 (Summer 1976), 3-26. number of f i r s t choice S o c i a l c r e d i t b a l l o t s gave t h e i r second choice to the CCF, and v i c e versa. On the f i r s t count, the L i b e r a l s got 23.5 per cent of the vote and s i x seats while the Conservatives got 16.8 per cent of the vote and four s e a t s . The CCF e l e c t e d twenty-one members with 30.8 per cent of the vote and S o c i a l C r e d i t e l e c t e d fourteen members with 27.2 per cent of the v o t e . 3 1 The t h i r d count revealed that the t r a n s f e r a b l e b a l l o t had allowed the S o c i a l C r e d i t Party to come out ahead of the CCF. As the numbers i l l u s t r a t e , the o l d p a r t i e s ' support had s i g n i f i c a n t l y d e c l i n e d and would not have been s u f f i c i e n t to win, even i f the f i r s t - p a s t - t h e - p o s t system had been used. The t r a n s f e r a b l e v o t i n g system served only to increase the magnitude of t h e i r d efeat. The r e s u l t s of the 1953 e l e c t i o n sounded the death k n e l l f o r the Conservative Party. They received one per cent of the popular vote, e l e c t i n g one member on the t h i r d count who subsequently crossed the f l o o r to s i t as an Independent. The L i b e r a l ' s share of the vote d e c l i n e d by two per cent and they l o s t two s e a t s . The p o s i t i o n of the S o c i a l C r e d i t Party, i n c o n t r a s t , was strengthened by the e l e c t i o n . T h i s time, CCF and S o c i a l c r e d i t supporters d i d not exchange votes. Rather, CCF second choice support tended to go to the L i b e r a l s . L i b e r a l s and Conservatives tended to give t h e i r second choice to the S o c i a l c r e d i t party. In a d d i t i o n , v o t e r s whose f i r s t c hoice i n 1952 had been Conservative gave t h e i r f i r s t c hoice to the S o c i a l C r e d i t Party i n 1953. David J. E l k i n s suggests = 1 A l p e r , Ibid., 365. 20 that, "As e a r l y as 1953, t h e r e f o r e , one can perhaps d i s c e r n the formation of the 'free e n t e r p r i s e versus s o c i a l i s m ' s t r u c t u r e which has c h a r a c t e r i z e d the B.C. p r o v i n c i a l party system i n recent y e a r s . " 2 = I t can be seen, t h e r e f o r e , that the L i b e r a l s maintained a degree of c r e d i b i l i t y . T h i s was p a r t l y because t h e i r o r g a n i z a t i o n was r e l a t i v e l y stronger than the Conservative P a r t y ' s , which had s u f f e r e d from severe f a c t i o n a l i s m and a complete break with the f e d e r a l party. Moreover, Alper suggests that because the L i b e r a l Party dominated the c o a l i t i o n , and with the exception of one f i v e - y e a r period, governed the province s i n c e 1916, they s t i l l appeared to be a v i a b l e f r e e - e n t e r p r i s e a 1 t e r n a t i v e . 3 5 3 F i n a l l y , one could argue that CCF supporters, i n g i v i n g t h e i r second ch o i c e s to the L i b e r a l Party, saved i t from u t t e r e l e c t o r a l c o l l a p s e . As such, i t i s i r o n i c a l c o n s i d e r i n g that "The c o a l i t i o n which had saved the o l d l i n e p a r t i e s from the C.C.F. had, i n the end, set i n motion the f o r c e s which led to both of t h e i r d e f e a t s . " 3 * The f o r c e s that led to t h e i r defeat were many. As has been di s c u s s e d , the convergence e f f e c t was one of them. An a d d i t i o n a l f o r c e was the i l l - w i l l between the f e d e r a l and p r o v i n c i a l wings of each party, stemming from the c o a l i t i o n experience. The L i b e r a l Party d i d not experience a complete 3 3 E l k i n s , op. cit., 14. 3 3 Alper, op. cit., 383. 3* Ibid., 344. 21 separation as d i d the Conservatives. Nevertheless, t h e i r r e l a t i o n s h i p with the f e d e r a l wing d e t e r i o r a t e d and the p r o v i n c i a l party e f f e c t i v e l y l o s t the o r g a n i z a t i o n a l , a d m i n i s t r a t i v e , f i n a n c i a l and moral support of i t s f e d e r a l w i n g . = s A l i e n a t i o n of party supporters and cadre during the c o a l i t i o n era c o n s t i t u t e d another f a c t o r i n t h e i r demise. One must bear i n mind that the c o a l i t i o n was one of e l i t e s . Although the e l i t e s " governed together, each party maintained separate o r g a n i z a t i o n s and as the c o a l i t i o n ' s tenure lengthened to a decade, the p a r t i e s ' cadre became i n c r e a s i n g l y demoralized. T h i r d , P a t t u l l o ' s p r o g r e s s i v e l i b e r a l i s m , followed by the c o a l i t i o n ' s reforms and s o c i a l welfare l e g i s l a t i o n accustomed the e l e c t o r a t e to the b e n e f i t s of s o c i a l i z e d c a p i t a l i s m . F i n a l l y , the r i s e of the s a l i e n c e of i d e o l o g i c a l i s s u e s a f f e c t e d the nature of e l e c t o r a l p o l i t i c s in BC; no longer could they revolve merely around a d m i n i s t r a t i v e questions of c o r r u p t i o n and scandal. The end of the c o a l i t i o n had ushered i n a new party system, one that was p o l a r i z e d between the l e f t and the r i g h t , and more importantly, one that could not accommodate more than one f r e e - e n t e r p r i s e a l t e r n a t i v e . Appendix I shows that the L i b e r a l Party remained a v i a b l e a l t e r n a t i v e f o r twenty years. The r e — e l e c t i o n of a S o c i a l C r e d i t government in 1975, however, c l e a r l y demonstrated that 3 0 For a d e t a i l e d a n a l y s i s of the e f f e c t s of c o a l i t i o n on the f e d e r a l - p r o v i n c i a l r e l a t i o n s h i p , see J u d i t h B. Ward, " F e d e r a l - P r o v i n c i a l R e l a t i o n s i n the L i b e r a l Party," unpublished M.A. t h e s i s , U n i v e r s i t y of B r i t i s h Columbia, 1966. 22 the e l e c t o r a t e no longer perceived the L i b e r a l Party to be a f r e e - e n t e r p r i s e a l t e r n a t i v e . Blake et a l . argue that the BC e l e c t o r a t e underwent a realignment of voter p a r t i s a n s h i p during the 1970s. B a s i c a l l y , due to the expansion of the p u b l i c s e c t o r under S o c i a l C r e d i t r u l e p r i o r to 1975 and the expansion throughout the province of occupational s e c t o r s , the bases of support f o r both the NDP and the S o c i a l C r e d i t Party are now province-wide and comprise 95 per cent of the e l e c t o r a t e . These economic f a c t o r s have had long-term e f f e c t s on the L i b e r a l Party's a b i l i t y to b u i l d and r e t a i n a s t a b l e base of s u p p o r t . 2 * The entrenchment of a p o l a r i z e d p o l i t i c a l system i s another f a c t o r m i t i g a t i n g a g a i n s t b u i l d i n g a base of support f o r the L i b e r a l Party. T h i s i s r e i n f o r c e d by the e x p l o i t a t i o n of the l e f t - r i g h t debate by the c u r r e n t major p o l i t i c a l p a r t i e s i n the province. A concatenation of circumstances that led to changes i n the nature of BC's economy and p o l i t i c a l c u l t u r e could open up the p o s s i b i l i t y f o r a resurgence of L i b e r a l Party p o p u l a r i t y . It i s u n l i k e l y while BC's economy i s based on resource development and primary exports. Edwin Black suggests the nature of BC s o c i e t y precludes t h i s from happening. He argues that the establishmentarianism and t r a d i t i o n a l i s m found i n the comparatively o l d e r s o c i e t i e s of c e n t r a l and eastern Canada never took root along the western coast, and w i l l not i n f u t u r e . 5 8 * Donald E. Blake et a l . , "Sources of Change i n the BC Party System," BC Studies, no. 50 (Summer 1981), 21-6. 23 Black d e s c r i b e s B r i t i s h Columbia as a "continuously e v o l v i n g f r o n t i e r , " with a population dominated by the h i g h l y unionized, the small business person and the recent immigrant. They are a t t r a c t e d to BC because of the nature of i t s economy. He a s s e r t s that t h i s has prevented the two t r a d i t i o n a l p a r t i e s from securing a s t a b l e base of support i n BC.S7 The e f f e c t on the L i b e r a l Party i s twofold. F i r s t , a population which i s co n s t a n t l y i n f l u x has a concomitant absence of a shared past. Newcomers to the province w i l l be u n f a m i l i a r with i t s p o l i t i c a l alignment i n gene r a l , and with the past r o l e played by the o l d p a r t i e s i n p a r t i c u l a r . As Black p o i n t s out: Even i f the t r a d i t i o n a l Canadian p o l i t i c a l p a r t i e s — the L i b e r a l s and C o n s e r v a t i v e s — h a d succeeded i n becoming f i r m l y e s t a b l i s h e d i n p r o v i n c i a l p o l i t i c s , they could not have r e l i e d long on fami l y v o t i n g t r a d i t i o n s to maintain t h e i r place. Such a t r a d i t i o n a l l y - v o t i n g population would soon be upset by new waves of c i t i z e n s without any attachments to the " e s t a b l i s h e d parties. =° Blake's f i n d i n g s support t h i s c o n t e n t i o n . His data revealed that f e d e r a l - o n l y party i d e n t i f i e r s tended to be r e l a t i v e newcomers to the province ( r e s i d e n t s f o r three years or l e s s ) . There was a d i r e c t c o r r e l a t i o n between c o n s i s t e n t p a r t i s a n s h i p and length of residence i n BC of three years or l e s s . S p l i t p a r t i s a n s , i n c o n t r a s t , tended to have res i d e d i n BC f o r more ^ Edwin R. Black, " B r i t i s h Columbia: T h e . P o l i t i c s of E x p l o i t a t i o n " i n Party Politics in Canada, 4th ed., Hugh G. Thorburn, ed. (Scarborough, Ontario: P r e n t i c e - H a l l , 1979), 293. =s Ibid. 24 than three years, suggesting they had gained a f a m i l i a r i t y with the province's p o l i t i c a l alignment. 3^ Second, Black contends that, "An appeal to t r a d i t i o n i s almost r e a c t i o n a r y f o r many i n B r i t i s h Columbia., f o r the past they r e c a l l may be a time of st a g n a t i o n , of hardship, or worse..." 3 0 He continues, "Such people have l i t t l e respect f o r the e s t a b l i s h e d e l i t e s and are i n t o l e r a n t of t h e i r i n s t i t u t i o n s . Neither do they have much cause to respect the e s t a b l i s h e d p a r t i e s [or] t h e i r t r a d i t i o n s . . . " 3 1 The r e s u l t has been the i n s t i t u t i o n a l i z a t i o n of an an t i - e s t a b l i s h m e n t t r a d i t i o n i n BC p o l i t i c s i n which, "both S o c i a l C r e d i t and NDP serve as f o c a l points f o r a n t i - e s t a b l i s h m e n t votes of the majority of B r i t i s h Columbians." The s a l i e n c e of t h i s l e f t - r i g h t d i v i s i o n f o r the p r o v i n c i a l L i b e r a l s i s i l l u s t r a t e d f i r s t , by the f a c t that f e d e r a l L i b e r a l supporters i n BC who adopt a d i f f e r e n t p r o v i n c i a l l o y a l t y are more l i k e l y than c o n s i s t e n t p a r t i s a n s to see a wide gap between the p r o v i n c i a l NDP and the S o c i a l C r e d i t P a r t y . 3 2 Second, p o l a r i z a t i o n has r e s u l t e d i n the e x c l u s i o n of the L i b e r a l Party as an a l t e r n a t i v e choice among vot e r s . Federal L i b e r a l supporters must assess e i t h e r the NDP 3 , 9 Donald E. Blake, "The Consistency of Inconsistency: Party I d e n t i f i c a t i o n i n Federal and P r o v i n c i a l P o l i t i c s , " Canadian Journal of Political Science, 15 (19B2), 698-700. 3 0 Black, op. cit., 293. 3 1 Ibid., 294. 3 = Blake, "The Consistency of Inconsistency," op. cit., 703. 25 or S o c i a l C r e d i t favourably on e l e c t i o n day, or a b s t a i n . 3 3 P o l a r i z a t i o n encourages negative p a r t i s a n s h i p as well which, in the a b s t r a c t , augers well f o r the L i b e r a l Party. But i n a two-party system, s t r a t e g i c c o n s i d e r a t i o n s are paramount to the v o t e r . A vote f o r the L i b e r a l Party, t h e r e f o r e , i s considered to be a l o s t or wasted vote. If the L i b e r a l Party's c e n t r a l p o s i t i o n on the i d e o l o g i c a l continuum i s appealing to the BC e l e c t o r a t e , i t i s undermined by the consequences of the contagion e f f e c t . William Chandler a s s e r t s contagion occurs when the p o l i c y p o s i t i o n s of the o p p o s i t i o n are adopted by the governing party in an e f f o r t to "blunt...the popular appeal which i s the b a s i s of o p p o s i t i o n strength." 3'* I t s consequences are o u t l i n e d by David E l k i n s : The ambiguous p o s i t i o n of the B.C. S o c i a l C r e d i t stems from at l e a s t two sources. F i r s t , S o c i a l C r e d i t r h e t o r i c and p o l i c i e s as well as the personal s t y l e s of W.A.C. Bennett and some of h i s cabin e t m i n i s t e r s were c h a r a c t e r i z e d by a combination of p o p u l i s t and c o n s e r v a t i v e f e a t u r e s . When questioned, an observer of S o c i a l C r e d i t could emphasize one or the other element and thereby place the party on the l e f t , on the r i g h t , or i n the middle. Second, the party formed the government, and governing p a r t i e s t y p i c a l l y moderate t h e i r tendencies compared to when they are i n o p p o s i t i o n . 3 ' Chandler's a n a l y s i s of o v e r a l l expenditure change i n p o t e n t i a l l y r e d i s t r i b u t i v e p o l i c y areas of S o c i a l C r e d i t 3 3 Suggested by Ibid., 693. 3 * W i l l i a m M. Chandler, "Canadian S o c i a l i s m and P o l i c y Impact: Contagion from the L e f t ? , " Canadian Journal of Political Science, 10 (1977), 755. 3 S E l k i n s , op. cit., 4. 26 budgets revealed that they have been s i g n i f i c a n t l y i n f l u e n c e d by the presence of the CCF/NDP i n o p p o s i t i o n . The L i b e r a l Party i s caught between a rock and a hard place because the contagion e f f e c t has acted i n conjunction with the f o r c e s discussed above to cr e a t e a s i t u a t i o n of one-party dominance i n BC. Maurice Pinard d e s c r i b e s the s i t u a t i o n thus: If the party has met repeatedly with resounding defeats i n the past, or i f , as a r e s u l t of i n t e r n a l c r i s e s . . . t h e party i s suddenly i n a s t a t e of d i s a r r a y , i f ( l a r g e l y as a consequence of these) i t s o r g a n i z a t i o n i s i n very poor shape, i f i t s cadres have been destroyed and have to be completely r e c o n s t i t u t e d , i f voters f i n d few of t h e i r r e l a t i v e s , f r i e n d s , or acquaintances, at work, i n t h e i r neighbourhood, or i n other areas of p a r t i c i p a t i o n ready to support that party, then a c o l l e c t i v e d e f i n i t i o n of t h i s party as a hopeless contender i s l i k e l y to develop, and a s i t u a t i o n of one—party dominance p r e v a i l s . 3 * * The c o n s i s t e n t d e c l i n e i n p r o v i n c i a l L i b e r a l support demonstrates that the party has, to date, been unsuccessful i n changing i t s image as an unviable e l e c t o r a l f o r c e . I t s lack of r e c o g n i z a b l e candidates, the comparatively s h o r t tenure of i t s l e a ders, i t s lack of f i n a n c i a l resources, and i t s t h i n o r g a n i z a t i o n a l base r e i n f o r c e and maintain the p o r t r a i t of a party that i s unable to win e l e c t i o n s . Given that the L i b e r a l Party's p o t e n t i a l f o r a t t r a c t i n g voter support i s weak at best, why does i t continue to a t t r a c t a c t i v e party l o y a l i s t s ? Before addressing t h i s question, we turn to an examination of the e x i s t i n g l i t e r a t u r e on i n c e n t i v e s f o r party a c t i v i s m . 3 * Maurice Pinard, "Third P a r t i e s i n Canada Revisted," Canadian Journal of Political Science, 6 (1973), 440-41. 27 Chapter 2 T H E O R Y In the words of Samuel E l d e r s v e l d , "The p o l i t i c a l party u n i t e s an agglomeration of people with a r i c h v a r i e t y of motivations, d r i v e s , and needs." 1 What does the p o l i t i c a l party l i t e r a t u r e say about the motivations, d r i v e s and needs that f o s t e r p o l i t i c a l party a c t i v i s m ? P o l i t i c a l Party L i t e r a t u r e Payne and Woshinksy d e f i n e i n c e n t i v e s as emotional needs that one seeks to s a t i s f y - t h r o u g h p o l i t i c a l p a r t i c i p a t i o n . 2 T h i s i s i n c o n t r a s t to instrumental goals which, given the above d e f i n i t i o n , they a s s e r t are not i n c e n t i v e s to p o l i t i c a l a c t i v i t y . I contend that t h i s c o n c e p t u a l i z a t i o n of motivations i s too narrow. To argue that i n c e n t i v e s f o r p o l i t i c a l a c t i v i s m are f o s t e r e d only by emotional d r i v e s n e i t h e r recognizes the m u l t i p l i c i t y of motivations inherent i n 1 Samuel J . E l d e r s v e l d , Political Parties: A Behavioural Analysis (Chicago: Rand McNally & Co., 1964), 303. 2 James L. Payne and O l i v e r H. Woshinsky, "Incentives f o r P o l i t i c a l P a r t i c i p a t i o n , " World Politics, 24 (1972), 519. 28 a s o c i e t y , nor the important r o l e instrumental goals play i n f o s t e r i n g a f f e c t i v e motivations. As Frank Sorauf suggests, Party members and workers may be a t t r a c t e d to the party f o r any number of reasons, but as they i n v o l v e themselves even more i n the party, they develop t i e s and l o y a l t i e s to i t , to i t s norms and goals, and to i t s l eaders. The o r g a n i z a t i o n i t s e l f achieves a l i f e and a value f o r them; i t ceases to be merely an instrument f o r achieving t h e i r other i n c e n t i v e s , becoming an end i n i t s e l f . . . I d e n t i f i c a t i o n with the party r e i n f o r c e s and perhaps even r e p l a c e s the i n c e n t i v e s that i n i t i a l l y r e c r u i t e d the i n d i v i d u a l . 3 Resolving such t h e o r e t i c a l d i f f e r e n c e s i s beyond the scope of t h i s t h e s i s . S u f f i c e to recognize that party a c t i v i s t s are complex human beings operating i n a complex environment. They are, t h e r e f o r e , motivated by a number and v a r i e t y of i n c e n t i v e s , some which over l a p , others which are d i s t i n c t . Moreover, the primary motive v a r i e s between and among a c t i v i s t s because d i f f e r e n t motives have d i f f e r e n t weights f o r each of them. Furthermore, t h e i r motivations may change over time. F i n a l l y , the party a c t i v i s t may not be cognizant of a l l of them. T y p i c a l l y , i t i s assumed that "party a c t i v i s t s may be motivated by the b e n e f i t s of patronage, sensations of v i c t o r y , or the defeat of an enemy pa r t y . " * S p e c i f i c a l l y , the l i t e r a t u r e on motivations f o r party a c t i v i s m suggests three d i s p o s i t i o n s that s t i m u l a t e people to be a c t i v e party members: 3 Frank J . Sorauf, Political Parties in the American System (Toronto: L i t t l e , Brown & Co., 1964), 86-7. * Donald K. Alper, "From Rule to Ruin: The Conservative Party of B r i t i s h Columbia, 1928-1954," unpublished PhD d i s s e r t a t i o n , U n i v e r s i t y of B r i t i s h Columbia, 1975, 196. 29 a f f e c t i v e , m a t e r i a l and e v a l u a t i v e i n c e n t i v e s . 0 These d i s p o s i t i o n s are two-dimensional. F i r s t , they lead to e i t h e r t a n g i b l e or i n t a n g i b l e rewards. Tangible i n c e n t i v e s y i e l d those rewards to which one may a t t a c h a monetary value, such as p o l i t i c a l c a r e e r s , career advancement, patronage appointments, and p r e f e r r e d treatment by the government. Int a n g i b l e i n c e n t i v e s are motivations which, i f s a t i s f i e d , accrue i n c a l c u l a b l e personal rewards. Second, the f u l f i l l m e n t of these i n c e n t i v e s are e i t h e r dependent on, or occur independent of, the o r g a n i z a t i o n ' s ends. Ideology i s an i n t a n g i b l e i n c e n t i v e thought to act independent of both the party's ends and s p e c i f i c i s s u e and p o l i c y concerns. A f f e c t i v e d i s p o s i t i o n s are another group of i n t a n g i b l e i n c e n t i v e s that r e c r u i t a c t i v i t y independent of the party's ends. They are c a l l e d s o l i d a r y i n c e n t i v e s and i n c l u d e a s p i r a t i o n s to s o c i a l m o b i l i t y and the s t a t u s which may come from i d e n t i f i c a t i o n with a powerful group or p e r s o n a l i t y . F u l f i l l m e n t of a perceived c i v i c duty and d e s i r e s f o r excitement, c o n g e n i a l i t y , f e l l o w s h i p and a sense of belonging a l s o c o n s t i t u t e s o l i d a r y i n c e n t i v e s . E v a l u a t i v e d i s p o s i t i o n s s The l a b e l s vary with the author d i s c u s s i n g i n c e n t i v e s f o r a c t i v i s m . George C. P e r l i n , The Tory Syndrome: Leadership Politics in the Progressive Conservative Party (Montreal: McGi11-Queen's Univ. Press, 1980), 2-4 d e l i n e a t e s three types of motives: a f f e c t i v e , p o l i c y and patronage. In c o n t r a s t , Peter B. Clark and James Q. Wilson, "Incentive Systems: A Theory of Org a n i z a t i o n s , " Administrative Science Quarterly, VI (June 1961), 132-37 have l a b e l l e d them as s o l i d a r y , purposive and m a t e r i a l i n c e n t i v e s . Payne and Woshinsky, op. cit., 520, i d e n t i f y s i x d i s t i n c t i n c e n t i v e s : a d u l a t i o n , s t a t u s , program, mission, o b l i g a t i o n and game. Frank J . Sorauf, op. cit., 82-7 has grouped a v a r i e t y of i n c e n t i v e s under the r u b r i c of t a n g i b l e and i n t a n g i b l e rewards. 30 are i n t a n g i b l e i n c e n t i v e s as w e l l , but tend to be dependent on the party's ends. Also known as purposive i n c e n t i v e s , they comprise candidate concerns, i s s u e o r i e n t a t i o n s , and the concomitant d e s i r e to i n f l u e n c e p u b l i c p o l i c y . L o y a l t y to the party i t s e l f i s d i s t i n g u i s h e d from l o y a l t y to and i d e n t i f i c a t i o n with the party's goals as the d i f f e r e n c e between s o l i d a r y and purposive i n c e n t i v e s . M a t e r i a l d i s p o s i t i o n s are t a n g i b l e i n c e n t i v e s that are dependent on the party' s , p a r t i c u l a r l y the goal of g e t t i n g e l e c t e d . Since the L i b e r a l Party does not win e l e c t i o n s , t h i s t h e s i s a n t i c i p a t e s that a c t i v i s m i s governed by i n t a n g i b l e i n c e n t i v e s that are s a t i s f i e d independent of the party's a b i l i t y to win e l e c t i o n s . Included i n t h i s category i s ideology: Small numbers of ideologues c l i n g even i n the United S t a t e s to minor, non-competitive p a r t i e s that have no prospect of winning e l e c t i o n s . Some within the major p a r t i e s f e e l s i m i l a r l y that they would g l a d l y s a c r i f i c e v i c t o r y to p r i n c i p l e . * This t h e s i s w i l l , t h e r e f o r e , analyze the s a l i e n c e of ideology among the a c t i v i s t s . Not only i s i t expected that t h e i r personal b e l i e f s and values w i l l dominate among t h e i r motivations but a l s o that t h e i r ideology w i l l be perceived as d i f f e r e n t from the i d e o l o g i e s of a c t i v i s t s i n the NDP and S o c i a l C r e d i t Party. It i s p r e d i c t e d that a c t i v i s t s who perceive t h e i r personal b e l i e f s and values are congruent with ** Alan I. Abramowitz, John McGlennon, Ronald B. Rapoport, "Incentives f o r A c t i v i s m , " The Life of the Parties, eds. Ronald Rapoport et a l . (Lexington: The Univ. of Kentucky Press, 1986), 61. 31 those of the L i b e r a l Party, and incongruent with those of the other two p r o v i n c i a l p a r t i e s , are more l i k e l y to work f o r the L i b e r a l Party than are those whose i d e o l o g i e s p a r a l l e l the p o l a r i z a t i o n of BC's p o l i t i c a l c u l t u r e . Alan Abramowitz et a l . reported that convention delegates rated purposive i n c e n t i v e s as the most important motivating f a c t o r s f o r t h e i r a c t i v i s m . 7 The authors a l s o found that purposive motivations were p o s i t i v e l y c o r r e l a t e d with party l o y a l t y . e As such, t h i s t h e s i s expects that L i b e r a l a c t i v i s t s w i l l hold d i s t i n c t i v e p o l i c y and i s s u e p o s i t i o n s . It i s posited that t h i s r e i n f o r c e s t h e i r perception that they do not f i t i n with the other p a r t i e s , e i t h e r i d e o l o g i c a l l y or i n terms of i s s u e and p o l i c y domains. Ideology and a t t i t u d e s toward p o l i c i e s germane to BC's p o l i t i c a l c u l t u r e are, t h e r e f o r e , v a r i a b l e s expected to govern a c t i v i s m i n the p r o v i n c i a l L i b e r a l Party. M o t i v a t i o n s f o r a c t i v i s m operate under a number of c o n d i t i o n s . F i r s t , they can be o r i e n t e d toward one l e v e l , or many, of p o l i t i c s . Edwin Black argues that there are three types of a c t i v e members: those whose p o l i t i c a l i n t e r e s t s are p r i m a r i l y o r i e n t e d i n p r o v i n c i a l terms, those whose i n t e r e s t s f i n d primary expression i n c e n t r a l government goals and those whose i n t e r e s t s are m u l t i - f a c e t e d or e l s e concentrated on some aspects of p o l i t i c a l l i f e comprehending both spheres of government—such as 7 Ibid., 63. e Ibid., 64. 32 the attainment of i d e o l o g i c a l o b j e c t i v e s or general governmental power f o r the p a r t y . 9 Second, party work i s both q u a l i t a t i v e l y and q u a n t i t a t i v e l y a f f e c t e d by the motivations underlying i t . For example, Sorauf a s s e r t s that personal i n c e n t i v e s such as l o y a l t y to a candidate or the d e s i r e f o r f e l l o w s h i p produce more t r a n s i t o r y and l e s s i n t e n s i v e work than do purposive or i d e o l o g i c a l i n c e n t i v e s . 1 0 T h i r d , d i f f e r e n t i n c e n t i v e s a t t r a c t d i f f e r e n t kinds of a c t i v i s t s . For example, "Those i n c e n t i v e s which w i l l a t t r a c t s i g n - p o s t i n g or neighborhood canvassing are not l i k e l y to a t t r a c t large c o n t r i b u t o r s . . . " 1 1 Fourth, sustained a c t i v i t y and the continued support of a c t i v i s t s may depend on which motivations are being rewarded by the party, and more importantly, on whether the party i s able to reward i t s a c t i v e members. That i s to say, "the party cannot dangle the i n c e n t i v e without d e l i v e r i n g and paying o f f at l e a s t part of the t i m e . " 1 2 The party must a l s o have the c a p a c i t y to withhold the granting of these i n c e n t i v e s as motivation f o r a c t i v i t y i n and of i t s e l f . Besides the obvious recruitment value of i n c e n t i v e s , a party's v i a b i l i t y i s , i n part, dependent on the f a c i l i t y with which i t can manipulate them. 9 Edwin R. Black, "Federal S t r a i n s w i t h i n a Canadian Party," i n Party Politics in Canada, 4th ed., ed. Hugh S. Thorburn (Ontario: P r e n t i c e - H a l l , 1979), 99. 1 0 Sorauf, op. cit., 87. 1 1 Ibid. 1 2 Ibid., 88. 33 Sorauf contends that p o l i t i c a l p a r t i e s were best able to manipulate a c t i v i s t s ' motivations when patronage and preferment were the predominate i n c e n t i v e s governing a c t i v i s m . In f a c t , he maintains that i t was "almost the i d e a l i n c e n t i v e . " 1 3 Consider i t s advantages. I t s l u r e was so great, e s p e c i a l l y i n times and places of unemployment, that i t produced continuous a c t i v i t y . The machine enjoyed complete c o n t r o l over i t ; the party could d e l i v e r the payment with almost 100 per cent r e g u l a r i t y , and i t could i n many cases f r e e l y revoke i t . . . F o r the party the patronage job not only rewarded a l o c a l worthy. If there were no l e g a l or e t h i c a l r e s t r i c t i o n s , the party often 'maced' the patronage p a y r o l l f o r compulsory party c o n t r i b u t i o n s . . . T h e p u b l i c treasury thus provided the job f o r the worker, f r e e labor f o r the party, and c o n t r i b u t i o n s f o r the party c o f f e r s . Through the c h a r i t y of patronage the party was t h r i c e blessed . Its value, however, d e c l i n e d f o r a v a r i e t y of reasons, among them, i t s d e c l i n i n g r e s p e c t a b i l i t y i n contemporary p o l i t i c a l c u l t u r e , and concomitantly, the r i s e of the merit system i n pub l i c s e r v i c e . Because p a r t i e s c u r r e n t l y r e l y on p o l i c y and i d e o l o g i c a l motivations to r e c r u i t a c t i v i s t s , Sorauf maintains that p a r t i e s no longer have the means to c o n t r o l and manipulate t h e i r a c t i v e supporters to the degree they once d i d . l s i 3 Ibid., 90. Ibid. A=i Ibid. , 91 "To be sure, these i n c e n t i v e s a t t r a c t workers'and a c t i v i s t s who r e l a t e to the p e r s o n a l i t i e s and issue s of the day, who are o r i e n t e d to the changing p o l i t i c a l f u n c t i o n s of the party, and who have the s k i l l s and r e s p e c t a b i l i t y the party needs. But t h e i r t i e s to the party are u n i l a t e r a l ones that they make and break. The party has the c a r r o t , but not the s t i c k , and other p o l i t i c a l 34 The l u r e of m a t e r i a l rewards has been d i s p l a c e d by the emergence of extra-parliamentary o r g a n i z a t i o n s as the means fo r f o s t e r i n g party l o y a l t y and i d e n t i f i c a t i o n . These allow the worker more involvement i n , and c o n t r o l over, the party's decision-making processes, the formulation of e l e c t i o n s t r a t e g i e s , and the making of party p o l i c y . A consequence of t h i s development stems from the suggestion that patronage corresponds to a p a r t i c u l a r l e v e l of p o l i t i c s . P o l i t i c a l p a r t i e s c o n t r o l l e d patronage appointments and preferments at the l o c a l l e v e l and from t h i s , Sorauf i n f e r s that patronage-i n s p i r e d a c t i v i s t s were p a r o c h i a l l o y a l i s t s . That i s to say, t h e i r commitment was to the l o c a l l e v e l of the party. T h i s i m p l i e s that p o l i c y - o r i e n t e d and i d e o l o g i c a l l y - m o t i v a t e d a c t i v i s t s are l e s s p a r o c h i a l , and t h e r e f o r e , d e s i r e to i n f l u e n c e p o l i c y and ideology at the f e d e r a l l e v e l of p o l i t i c s . As discussed p r e v i o u s l y , ideologues are i n c r e a s i n g in number at the same time that m a t e r i a l l y - i n s p i r e d a c t i v i s t s are decreasing i n number among p o l i t i c a l a c t i v i s t s . i 4 > Consequently, i t i s i n f e r r e d that l o c a l p a r t i e s are f i n d i n g i t d i f f i c u l t to f o s t e r l o y a l t y and party i d e n t i f i c a t i o n . If Sorauf and Abramowitz, et a l . are c o r r e c t i n suggesting that patronage has been superseded by i d e o l o g i c a l and p o l i c y — i n s p i r e d motivations, t h i s t h e s i s p o s i t s not only o r g a n i z a t i o n s have c a r r o t s , too." The point i s , patronage rewards t i e d the worker to the party, whereas ideology or a s p e c i f i c p o l i c y concern do not o b l i g e one to remain with a given party. T h i s g i v e s the party l e s s scope f o r manipulation. Alan I. Abramowitz et a l . , op. c i t . , 61. 35 that i d e o l o g i c a l and purposive motivations predominate among L i b e r a l Party a c t i v i s t s , but a l s o that they consider f e d e r a l p o l i t i c s to be more important than p r o v i n c i a l p o l i t i c s . It i s a n t i c i p a t e d that they i d e n t i f y with, and are more l o y a l to the f e d e r a l L i b e r a l Party. Hence, f e d e r a l a c t i v i s m i s expected to be a v a r i a b l e that leads to a c t i v i s m i n the p r o v i n c i a l L i b e r a l Party. Psychology L i t e r a t u r e An explanation f o r a c t i v i s m that does not i n c l u d e the d e s i r e to be a s s o c i a t e d with a winning party i s incomplete. On the face of i t , the b e l i e f that the party w i l l win i n f u t u r e e l e c t i o n s i s i r r a t i o n a l given i t s histor.y of d e f e a t s . However, with i n c r e a s i n g evidence that i n d i v i d u a l s engage i n biased c o g n i t i v e processes, the r a t i o n a l i t y of t h i s supposed i r r a t i o n a l i t y i s apparent. It i s no longer accepted, prima f a c i e , that i n d i v i d u a l s c o n s t r u c t v a l i d r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s of events and i n i t i a t e a given a c t i o n only a f t e r engaging i n r a t i o n a l c a l c u l a t i o n . 1 7 ' The r a t i o n a l choice paradigm t y p i c a l l y assumes that p r i o r to i n i t i a t i n g a course of a c t i o n , the i n d i v i d u a l d e l i n e a t e s and evaluates a l t e r n a t i v e outcomes, and i n t e g r a t e s h i s or her values by a t r a n s i t i v e o rdering of preference. He or she then maximizes h i s or her values by c o s t / b e n e f i t a n a l y s i s . I t i s assumed that the i n d i v i d u a l i s s e n s i t i v e to 1 7 See Graham A l l i s o n , "Conceptual Models and the Cuban M i s s i l e C r i s i s , " The American Political Science Review, 63 (1969), e s p e c i a l l y 693-94. 36 p e r t i n e n t information and, as such, he or she r e v i s e s h i s or her assessment of a l t e r n a t i v e outcomes as new information becomes a v a i l a b l e . There are a number of problems with t h i s paradigm, not the l e a s t of which i s i t s tendency to be t e l e o l o g i c a l . The i n f i n i t e complexity of experiences precludes the p o s s i b i l i t y of engaging i n a causal l e a r n i n g process f o r each a c t i o n or d e c i s i o n taken. To begin, i t i s h i g h l y i m p r a c t i c a l to suspend a c t i o n u n t i l a l l evidence i s gathered, i f indeed one could do so. Adages such as 'he who h e s i t a t e s i s l o s t ' and 'the e a r l y b i r d gets the worm' imply i t i s adaptive to act on best guesses. E a r l y humans who waited u n t i l they f u l l y understood the behaviour of p o t e n t i a l mates before making t h e i r move would have been no more f i t than the modern i n d i v i d u a l who s i t s at home alone, looking at the t e l e p h o n e . 1 3 Moreover, i t i s now understood that, of n e c e s s i t y , i n d i v i d u a l s take pragmatic s h o r t c u t s to f a c i l i t a t e the process of making i n f e r e n c e s and d e c i s i o n s . The reason f o r t h i s i s twofold: f i r s t , i t i s a means of d e a l i n g with the overwhelming amount of information that i s attended to; second, the i n d i v i d u a l natural 1y engages i n these s h o r t c u t s — b e c a u s e i t serves to p o s i t i v e l y enhance one's s e l f - c o n c e p t , which i n turn, c o n t r i b u t e s to a s t a t e of optimal h e a l t h . A c o g n i t i v e model of motivation overcomes the shortcomings of the r a t i o n a l choice model. It p o s t u l a t e s that i e Dennis Krebs et a l . , "On the E v o l u t i o n of S e l f -Knowledge and S e l f - D e c e p t i o n , " i n Sociobiological Perspectives on Human Development, ed. K. MacDonald (New York: Springer— Verlag, 1988), 124. 37 each i n d i v i d u a l perceives a given stimulus (set of information concerning behaviour, i t s consequences, and the circumstances under which i t o c c u r s ) . The stimulus i s then i n t e r p r e t e d by each i n d i v i d u a l ' s b e l i e f system i n order to give i t meaning. The subsequent response to the stimulus i s , t h e r e f o r e , mediated by i n t e r v e n i n g thought processes, r e s u l t i n g i n a causal a t t r i b u t i o n . That i s to say, the stimulus i s placed i n a cause and e f f e c t context. P s y c h o l o g i s t s and s o c i o b i o l o g i s t s apply c o g n i t i v e theory to human a t t r i b u t i o n a l processes i n order to i n c r e a s e t h e i r understanding of the phenomenon of optimism i n the face of v a l i d evidence to the c o n t r a r y . This comparatively new research i n the f i e l d s of s e l f - p e r c e p t i o n and s e l f - d e c e p t i o n provides the foundation f o r e x p l a i n i n g L i b e r a l a c t i v i s m i n terms of the emotional processes underlying t h e i r m otivations. The psychology l i t e r a t u r e suggests that i n f o r m a t i o n -processing mechanisms, some conscious, others subconscious, perceive and process information i n the form of hypotheses, t h e o r i e s and b e l i e f s about the world, o u r s e l v e s and o t h e r s . E m p i r i c a l s t u d i e s demonstrate that i n d i v i d u a l s are capable of using these mechanisms to deceive themselves f o r a given s e l f -s e r v i n g purpose, namely that i t i s more adaptive (healthy) to s e l f - d e c e i v e than to make v a l i d cause and e f f e c t i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s . That i s to say, i f p e r c e i v i n g the t r u t h damages one's s e l f - c o n c e p t , then i t i s maladaptive, hence i r r a t i o n a l , to do so. Conversely, i f d i s t o r t i n g r e a l i t y r e s u l t s i n a healthy a f f e c t i v e s t a t e ( i . e . f e e l i n g secure, 38 hopeful, i n c o n t r o l and that one's l i f e has meaning), then i t i s adaptive, hence r a t i o n a l , to do so. B e l i e f s that both lend purpose to a p a r t i c u l a r a c t i v i t y and f o s t e r a sense of c o n t r o l induce i n d i v i d u a l s to maintain t h e i r e f f o r t s ; i n d i v i d u a l s who persevere are more l i k e l y to succeed than those who give u p . 1 ' T h i s t h e s i s hypothesizes, t h e r e f o r e , that i n order to j u s t i f y t h e i r involvement with a l o s i n g party, a c t i v i s t s engage i n c e r t a i n c o g n i t i v e a t t r i b u t i o n a l biases that f o s t e r a f a l s e sense of hope i n i t s f u t u r e . From f a l s e hope a r i s e s the f a l s e b e l i e f that one i s involved with a winning party. T h i s i n f e r e n c e on the part of a c t i v i s t s i s r a t i o n a l because i t enables them to f e e l that t h e i r a c t i v e membership i s purposeful and meaningful. In c o n t r a s t , i t would be i r r a t i o n a l to work f o r a p o l i t i c a l party, yet f e e l that i t i s f u t i l e and meaningless. The inf o r m a t i o n - p r o c e s s i n g mechanisms are c a l l e d s e l f -s e r v i n g a t t r i b u t i o n a l b i a s e s , or v i t a l l i e s . a o Of those postulated to occur, f i v e are r e l e v a n t to t h i s t h e s i s : exaggeration; the f a l s e consensus e f f e c t ; the s e l f - f u l f i l l i n g prophecy; beneffectance; and the i l l u s i o n of c o n t r o l . 2 1 ^ Suggested in Ibid., 127. < =° See Daniel Goleman, V i t a i Lies, Simple Truths (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1985) and L i o n e l T i g e r , Optimism: The Biology of Hope ( New York: Simon and Schuster, 1979). 3 1 S i m i l a r v a r i a b l e s are described i n decision-making t h e o r i e s . Cf. John Steinbruner, The Cybernetic Theory of Decision (Princeton, NJ: Princeton Univ. Press, 1974), I r v i n g L. Janis,. Groupthink (Boston: Houghton M i f f l i n , 1982) and R. J e r v i s , Perception and Misperception in International Poli tics (Princeton, NJ: Princeton Univ. Press, 1976). 39 Exaggeration i s "the tendency to amplify and exaggerate beneficial outcomes through repeated accounts of an event." 2 2 The false consensus effect refers to the tendency to overrepresent the commonality of one's be l i e f s , attitudes and v a l u e s . 2 3 As such, individuals tend to overestimate the number of people who share their p o l i t i c a l beliefs and values, thus overestimating the appeal of their p o l i t i c a l party. False b e l i e f s , when acted on with conviction, may set up s e l f -f u l f i l l i n g prophecies, thereby validating them. This occurs when individuals, intending their behaviour to result in a desired outcome, expect the desired outcome to occur. They expect e f f o r t to produce success, and when their expectation i s not met, they perceive the outcome to have occurred despite their e f f o r t s . When their expectation i s met, they attribute the positive outcome to a combination of w i l l and e f f o r t . False beliefs are fostered by the i l l u s i o n of control. This refers to the need for individuals to believe they are in control of their l i v e s - 2 4 They tend to attribute success to factors over which they have control, and to attribute f a i l u r e 2 2 R. Trivers, Social Evolution (Menlo Park, Cf.: The Benjamin/Cummings Publishing Co., 19B5), 418; quoted in Krebs et al . , op. cit., 117. 2 3 It may be a ref l e c t i o n of associating primarily with those who support one's opinions and may help to j u s t i f y one's actions to oneself as appropriate and normal. Suggested by Krebs et a l . , Ibid., 121-22. . 2* This i s reflected in superstitious r i t u a l s , for example, the belief that blowing on dice increases the probability of r o l l i n g the desired numbers, or that choosing one's lottery number, as opposed to a computer doing i t , increases the probability of winning the lottery. 40 f a c t o r s over which they have c o n t r o l , and to a t t r i b u t e f a i l u r e to f a c t o r s over which they have no c o n t r o l . The l i k e l i h o o d of a t t r i b u t i n g f a i l u r e to e x t e r n a l f a c t o r s and success to i n t e r n a l f a c t o r s i n c r e a s e s p a r t i c u l a r l y when the s i t u a t i o n being i n t e r p r e t e d i n v o l v e s a high l e v e l of s e l f - e s t e e m . = s Related to the i l l u s i o n of c o n t r o l i s beneffectance, "the tendency to represent o u r s e l v e s as being b e n e f i c i a l and e f f e c t i v e at the same time." 3*" More importantly, i t i n c l u d e s the idea that i n d i v i d u a l s a l s o perceive they are able to avoid undesired outcomes. 2' 7 Benef fee tance i s two dimensional, comprising the locus of c o n t r o l ( i n t e r n a l versus e x t e r n a l d i s p o s i t i o n s ) and the d i r e c t i o n of s t a b i l i t y ( f i x e d versus v a r i a b l e d i s p o s i t i o n s ) . = e I n d i v i d u a l s tend to c r e d i t t h e i r success to i n t e r n a l and v a r i a b l e f a c t o r s , such as e f f o r t or e f f e c t i v e s t r a t e g i e s . 2 ' They tend to blame t h e i r f a i l u r e s on 2 S Cf. e m p i r i c a l s t u d i e s i n , among others, Dale T. M i l l e r , "Ego Involvement and A t t r i b u t i o n s f o r Success and F a i l u r e , " Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 34 (1976), 901-06, and Bernard Weiner and Andy Kukla, "An A t t r i b u t i o n a l A n a l y s i s of Achievement M o t i v a t i o n , " Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 15 (1970), 1-20; c i t e d i n Edward Jones et a l . , Attribution: Perceiving the Causes of Behavior (Morristown, NJ: General Learning Press, 1972), 106-07. 2* > T r i v e r s , op. cit., 418; quoted i n Krebs et a l . , op. cit., 117. 2 - 7 A.G. Greenwald and A.R. P r a t k a n i s , "The S e l f , " i n Handbook of Social Cognition, eds. R.S. Wyer, J r . and T.K. S r u l l , v o l . 3 ( H i l l s d a l e , NJ: Erlbaum, 1984), 139. 2 e Bernard Weiner et a l . , " P e r c e i v i n g the Causes of Success and F a i l u r e , " i n Jones et a l . , op. cit., 96. 2 9 C r a i g A. Anderson and Dennis L. Jennings, "When experiences of f a i l u r e promote expectations of success: The impact of a t t r i b u t i n g f a i l u r e to i n e f f e c t i v e s t r a t e g i e s , " 41 e x t e r n a l and f i x e d f a c t o r s , such as task d i f f i c u l t y , lack of a b i l i t y or bad l u c k . 3 0 I n d i v i d u a l s who a t t r i b u t e a d i s a p p o i n t i n g outcome to v a r i a b l e , i n t e r n a l f a c t o r s d i s p l a y " a t y p i c a l a s p i r a t i o n s h i f t s ( i n c r e a s i n g a s p i r a t i o n a f t e r f a i l u r e . . . ) . " 3 1 - In other words, a f t e r f a i l u r e , they remain o p t i m i s t i c that task achievement w i l l be s u c c e s s f u l . On the other hand, those who blame f a i l u r e on f i x e d or e x t e r n a l f a c t o r s d i s p l a y t y p i c a l a s p i r a t i o n s h i f t s . That i s to say, they expect f u t u r e outcomes c o n s i s t e n t with past o n e s . 3 2 Journal of Personality, 48, (1980), 403 argue that "when people are s e t to a t t r i b u t e task outcome to s t r a t e g i e s , they are l i k e l y to monitor how e f f e c t i v e l y t h e i r s t r a t e g i e s meet the demands of the task at hand. For these s u b j e c t s , i n i t i a l f a i l u r e i n d i c a t e s that t h e i r s t r a t e g i e s were i n e f f e c t i v e , and that i n order to success they must modify those s t r a t e g i e s . . . I n c o n t r a s t , s u b j e c t s s e t to a t t r i b u t e task outcome to t h e i r a b i l i t i e s [an u n c o n t r o l l a b l e d i s p o s i t i o n ] do not monitor the demands of the task at hand. They f a i l to attend to s t r a t e g i c f e a t u r e s of t h e i r attempts, f a i l to learn from t h e i r experiences, and conclude that they cannot improve t h e i r performance." The authors a s s e r t that s u b j e c t s ' e x p ectations about the e f f e c t s of c o n t i n u a l monitoring and m o d i f i c a t i o n of t h e i r s t r a t e g i e s enhanced t h e i r optimism. The adage, ' p r a c t i c e makes p e r f e c t ' best d e s c r i b e s t h e i r f i n d i n g that s u b j e c t s who a t t r i b u t e d f a i l u r e to i n e f f e c t i v e s t r a t e g i e s maintained t h e i r optimism, even a f t e r many f a i l e d attempts at the task. 3 0 Luck i s a s p e c i a l case. In r e a l i t y i t i s an e x t e r n a l f a c t o r beyond our c o n t r o l , but p s y c h o l o g i s t s have found evidence that i n d i v i d u a l s attempt to a s s e r t c o n t r o l over luck by misconstruing i t to be dependent on other f a c t o r s , such as c o n s i s t e n c y and e f f o r t . An example i s the well-documented case of "gambler's f a l l a c y : " i n games of chance, i n d i v i d u a l s tend to a n t i c i p a t e an increased p r o b a b i l i t y of success a f t e r a l o s s , and e s p e c i a l l y a f t e r c o n s i s t e n t l o s s e s . Conversely, i n d i v i d u a l s a n t i c i p a t e an increased p r o b a b i l i t y of l o s i n g a f t e r they have won a game of chance. 3 1 Weiner et a l . , op. cit., 97. 3 2 Ibid., 108. 42 Together, these s e l f - s e r v i n g a t t r i b u t i o n a l biases f o s t e r a sense of s e c u r i t y that events are p r e d i c t a b l e and that the i n d i v i d u a l i s able to a n t i c i p a t e outcomes. This sense of s e c u r i t y enables the i n d i v i d u a l to f e e l i n c o n t r o l , and that h i s or her a c t i v i t y has meaning and purpose, From t h i s a r i s e s optimism or hope. Optimism governs the motivation to p e r s i s t at an a c t i v i t y , whether previous outcomes have been disappointments or successes. In terms of t h i s t h e s i s ' focus, i f a c t i v i s t p o s t d i c t i o n blames the f a i l u r e to win an e l e c t i o n on i n t e r n a l party f a c t o r s over which the a c t i v i s t s have c o n t r o l , they w i l l p r e d i c t f u t u r e success. As such, they w i l l be o p t i m i s t i c a c t i v i s t s . Conversely, a c t i v i s t s who blame the party's f a i l u r e on f i x e d , e x t e r n a l v a r i a b l e s that are beyond t h e i r c o n t r o l w i l l p r e d i c t f a i l u r e f o r the party i f i t cont e s t s an e l e c t i o n i n the f u t u r e . As such, they w i l l be u n o p t i m i s t i c a c t i v i s t s . Although the L i b e r a l Party i s not a s e r i o u s e l e c t o r a l f o r c e , t h i s t h e s i s p o s i t s that because of a t t r i b u t i o n a l b i a s e s , L i b e r a l a c t i v i s t s are hopeful about the party's f u t u r e . It a n t i c i p a t e s , t h e r e f o r e , that L i b e r a l a c t i v i s m i s i n s p i r e d by t a n g i b l e and i n t a n g i b l e i n c e n t i v e s that are dependent on the party's goal of winning e l e c t i o n s . T h e i r optimism and p e r s i s t e n c e i n the face of c o n s i s t e n t f a i l u r e not only to win e l e c t i o n s , but to e l e c t any candidates makes sense when one understands that i t i s governed by f a l s e b e l i e f s . 43 These hypotheses w i l l be examined i n Chapter Four. We now turn to an a n a l y s i s of i d e o l o g i c a l and purposive motivations f o r L i b e r a l a c t i v i s m i n BC. 44 Chapter 3 INCENTIVES FOR ACTIVISM The e x i s t i n g party l i t e r a t u r e suggests purposive i n c e n t i v e s , i n c l u d i n g i s s u e o r i e n t a t i o n s and p o l i c y concerns, are among the most important motivations of party a c t i v i s m . Besides i d e n t i f i c a t i o n with the party's ends, personal ideology and l o y a l t y to the party i t s e l f are powerful motivating f o r c e s determining a c t i v i s m i n a p a r t i c u l a r party. This chapter w i l l examine the data f o r evidence of each of these motivations and p r e d i c t s that these v a r i a b l e s w i l l be found to govern a c t i v i s m i n the p r o v i n c i a l L i b e r a l Party. A caveat must here be noted. As the delegates were not d i r e c t l y queried on t h e i r motivations f o r a c t i v i s m i n the L i b e r a l Party, the questions i n our survey do not permit us to t e s t f o r the presence and r e l a t i v e importance of a l l the motivations discussed i n Chapter Two. Even among the motivations mentioned i n the survey, not a l l of them were addressed by the respondents. For example, only one a l l u d e d to f e l l o w s h i p and c o n g e n i a l i t y as reasons f o r being a L i b e r a l . This i s not to argue that s o l i d a r y motivations d i d not govern 45 BC L i b e r a l Party a c t i v i s m , merely that they were l e s s important than those mentioned more o f t e n . T h i s contention i s supported by Abramowitz, who reported that "personal b e n e f i t s received from p a r t i c i p a t i o n . . . were rated much lower i n importance [than purposive i n c e n t i v e s ] by delegates i n both p a r t i e s . . . [ R e p u b l i c a n s and Democrats]" 1 In c o n t r a s t , the party's i d e o l o g i c a l p o s i t i o n and i t s congruence with the respondents' b e l i e f s were mentioned by almost three-quarters of the respondents i n our survey. 1 Alan Abramowitz et a l . , "Incentives f o r A c t i v i s m , " i n The Life of the Parties, eds. Ronald B. Rapoport et a l . (Lexington: The Univ. Press of Kentucky, 1986), 64. 46 I d e o l o g i c a l Commitment L i b e r a l a c t i v i s t s perceived that they were i d e o l o g i c a l l y d i s s i m i l a r from New Democrats and S o c r e d s . 2 Whereas 95 per cent of L i b e r a l s defined a range l e f t of centre as the p o s i t i o n occupied by the NDP, only 12 per cent of L i b e r a l s perceived t h e i r own party to be within that range. 3 The S o c i a l C r e d i t Party was put within a range r i g h t of centre by a l l the respondents, while l e s s than 2 per cent of them po s i t i o n e d the L i b e r a l Party w i t h i n i t . On the other hand, 87 per cent of the L i b e r a l s placed t h e i r party e i t h e r at the centre of the i d e o l o g i c a l s c a l e or one point to the r i g h t , a range on the s c a l e i n t o which no L i b e r a l s p o s i t i o n e d the S o c i a l C r e d i t Party. I t i s evident that these a c t i v i s t s perceived t h e i r party to be d i f f e r e n t from the others. They a l s o believed t h e i r party to be one of moderate ideology. To the question, "Why are you a L i b e r a l ? , " 50 per cent of them responded that i t was a moderate party. Including both those respondents who were a t t r a c t e d to the = To the query, "Why are you a L i b e r a l ? " respondents underlined t h e i r b e l i e f that the L i b e r a l Party i s non-i d e o l o g i c a l and that t h i s i s congruent with t h e i r personal b e l i e f s and values. A d j e c t i v e s commonly given to d e s c r i b e the party were "moderation," " a d a p t a b i l i t y , " and " f l e x i b i l i t y . " An example of a t y p i c a l response was "I l i k e what the L i b e r a l Party stands for a balance between 'business government' and 'big government.' 3 We provided the respondents with a 7-point s c a l e on which 1 was demarcated as ' L e f t ' and 7 as 'Right'. The exact question was, "In terms of t h e i r ideology, please i n d i c a t e where you would l o c a t e the p r o v i n c i a l p a r t i e s on t h i s s c a l e . " Respondents located the three p a r t i e s as f o l l o w s : NDP 1-4 range; L i b e r a l Party 3-5.5 range; S o c i a l C r e d i t 5.0-7.0 range. 47 n o n i d e o l o g i c a l nature of the party,"* and those who added that the party's stand was congruent with t h e i r b e l i e f s accounted fo r almost three-quarters of the respondents. In c o n t r a s t , New Democratic and S o c i a l C r e d i t party a c t i v i s t s were l e s s e n t h u s i a s t i c than t h e i r L i b e r a l counterparts about moderation i n t h e i r r e s p e c t i v e p a r t i e s . Less than h a l f of the NDP a c t i v i s t s (447.) agreed that t h e i r party had to be c a r e f u l not to move too f a r to the l e f t , and j u s t over h a l f of the Socred a c t i v i s t s (53X) agreed that t h e i r party must be c a r e f u l not to move too f a r to the l e f t . C l e a r l y , one may aver that the L i b e r a l Party i s the most appropri a t e v e h i c l e f o r those whose o r i e n t a t i o n i s moderate and i d e o l o g i c a l l y n e u t r a l . Loyalty T h i s c o n c l u s i o n i s enhanced when one examines the reasons motivating L i b e r a l a c t i v i s t s to d efect to other p a r t i e s during the 1970s. As such, i t demonstrates the s t r e n g t h of c u r r e n t party a c t i v i s t s ' l o y a l t y to the party, r e g a r d l e s s of i t s e l e c t o r a l h i s t o r y . Those a c t i v i s t s who were not motivated by a commitment to L i b e r a l values j o i n e d other p r o v i n c i a l p a r t i e s during the 1960s and 1970s. The argument i s twofold. F i r s t , L i b e r a l a c t i v i s t s who switched party i d e n t i f i c a t i o n belonged to the L i b e r a l Party because i t was a f r e e - e n t e r p r i s e a l t e r n a t i v e . As such, they were more l i k e l y than c u r r e n t p o l i c y - o r i e n t e d L i b e r a l s to see •* See footnote 2. 48 BC p o l i t i c s i n terms of the i n d i v i d u a l i s t / c o l l e c t i v i s t d i v i s i o n . That i s to say, t h e i r L i b e r a l p a r t i s a n s h i p was negative, rather than p o s i t i v e . D i s l i k e of s o c i a l i s m motivated them to seek a c t i v e membership with the L i b e r a l Party. Second, t h e i r a c t i v i s m was governed by the d e s i r e to be a s s o c i a t e d with a winning party and i t s a s s o c i a t e d p e r q u i s i t e s . This i n c e n t i v e was f u l f i l l e d only by j o i n i n g a p r o v i n c i a l party that was a c t u a l l y winning e l e c t i o n s . As we s h a l l see i n the next chapter, t h i s d e s i r e governed the a c t i v i s m of cur r e n t party workers as w e l l . However, they sought s a t i s f a c t i o n of t h i s i n c e n t i v e through a d i f f e r e n t route, one that allowed them to remain l o y a l to the L i b e r a l Party. The philosophy of P a t r i c k McGeer, former L i b e r a l MLA and leader of the party, i s i l l u s t r a t i v e of the contention that f r e e - e n t e r p r i s e values and the defeat of the NDP were more s a l i e n t to previous a c t i v i s t s than was l o y a l t y to the L i b e r a l Party.= The p o l i t i c a l equation i n B r i t i s h Columbia i s basic - and crude. The economy i s resource o r i e n t e d , dependent on a f r e e flow of f o r e i g n c a p i t a l i n t o the province. Expressed i n p o l i t i c a l terms, that means a f r e e — e n t e r p r i s e government. The spectre at the f e a s t i s s o c i a l i s m . . . s P a t r i c k L. McGeer, Politics in Paradise (Toronto: Peter Martin A s s o c i a t e s L t d . , 1972), 220 a s s e r t s i n h i s autobiography that the L i b e r a l Party l o s t the contest of the f r e e - e n t e r p r i s e p a r t i e s i n 1969 because the e l e c t o r a t e equated the L i b e r a l Party with the NDP. 49 He continues: If (and i t ' s the ' i f ' that haunts the minds of the majority of B r i t i s h Columbians) the f r e e -e n t e r p r i s e vote were ever to d i v i d e . . . I t happened twice i n Saskatchewan... 11 happened once i n Manitoba... Could i t happen i n B r i t i s h Columbia? [ e l l i p s e s his]** His d e c i s i o n to leave the L i b e r a l Party f o r the S o c i a l C r e d i t Party was predicated i n part on s t r a t e g i c reasoning. The S o c i a l C r e d i t Party o f f e r e d the best chance of preventing the return of an NDP government. The 1975 e l e c t i o n c l e a r l y e s t a b l i s h e d the f a c t that the L i b e r a l Party was not enough of an e l e c t o r a l f o r c e to keep the s o c i a l i s t wolves at bay. P o l a r i z a t i o n of the e l e c t o r a t e had ensured that a S o c i a l C r e d i t defeat would be "at the hands of the NDP.""7 Yet, subsequent e l e c t i o n r e s u l t s c l e a r l y demonstrated the L i b e r a l Party was no longer regarded as a v i a b l e f r e e - e n t e r p r i s e a l t e r n a t i v e by the e l e c t o r a t e . F i r s t , i t was apparent simply because the S o c i a l C r e d i t Party won the e l e c t i o n , and because the NDP formed the o f f i c i a l o p p o s i t i o n . The L i b e r a l Party's share of the popular vote not only d e c l i n e d from the previous e l e c t i o n , but a l s o reached 7 per cent, t h e i r lowest i n the party's h i s t o r y up to that time. Another i n d i c a t i o n was the l o s s of t h e i r stronghold over what was p r e v i o u s l y considered a safe seat. David Anderson, *• Ibid. , 220-21. 7 Suggested by Alan C a i r n s , " S o c i a l i s m , Federalism and the BC Party Systems, 1933-1980," presented to the annual meeting of the Learned S o c i e t i e s , Vancouver, 1983, 32-33; c i t e d by Donald E. Blake, Two Political Worlds (Vancouver: The Univ. of B r i t i s h Columbia Press, 1985), 21. 50 t h e n - L i b e r a l leader, hoped that the b y - e l e c t i o n i n February, 1974 would engender confidence i n the L i b e r a l Party as a v i a b l e a l t e r n a t i v e . His hope, however, was dashed f o r Gordon Gibson won the e l e c t i o n by a narrow margin of 57 votes. Anderson's hope had been premised on the observation that the L i b e r a l Party c o n s i s t e n t l y p o l l e d 20 per cent more of the popular vote than the other p a r t i e s i n the North Vancouver— Capilano r i d i n g . B In the 1974 b y - e l e c t i o n , however, i t p o l l e d 29.3 per cent compared to the S o c i a l C r e d i t Party's 28.9 per cent. They l o s t the r i d i n g i n 1975, p o l l i n g 37.4 percent to S o c i a l C r e d i t ' s 44.8 percent. Such a showing d i d not auger well f o r a party whose e l i t e members were r e s t l e s s l y c a s t i n g about f o r reasons to leave. Even the v i c t o r y of David Anderson i n 1972 d i d not depend on the inherent appeal of h i s party. Rather, i t was due to a concatenation of f a c t o r s : a dual r i d i n g and the c o n j o i n t opportunity to detach from one's party without r e q u i r i n g a t o t a l commitment to another; personal appeal of the candidate; the unpopularity of one of the S o c i a l C r e d i t candidates; and the NDP's s t r a t e g y of a i d i n g Anderson's v i c t o r y i n order to defeat a S o c i a l C r e d i t candidate.*" e In 1969, Brousson, the L i b e r a l candidate, p o l l e d 46V. compared to 34.7V. and 19.3V. f o r the S o c i a l C r e d i t and New Democratic P a r t i e s r e s p e c t i v e l y . In 1972, the Socreds and New Democrats share was 20.7'/. and 22.2V. r e s p e c t i v e l y , whereas Brousson took 35.9V. of the r i d i n g ' s popular vote. The f i g u r e s are reported i n T. P a t r i c k Boyle, Elections British Columbia (Vancouver, Lions Gate Press L t d . , 1982), 113, 170-71. 9 Norman J . Ruff, "Party Detachment and Voting Patterns in a P r o v i n c i a l Two-Member Constituency: V i c t o r i a , 1972," BC Studies, no. 23 ( F a l l 1974), 23 argues that i f the dual-member 51 A f t e r the NDP v i c t o r y i n 1972, most prominent p r o v i n c i a l L i b e r a l s , i n c l u d i n g s i t t i n g MLAs P a t r i c k McGeer, Alan Williams and Garde Gardom, defected to the S o c i a l C r e d i t Party. T h i s t h e s i s argues that besides incongruent personal i d e o l o g i e s governing t h e i r lack of commitment to the L i b e r a l Party, s e l f -i n t e r e s t a l s o i n f l u e n c e d t h e i r d e c i s i o n to leave the L i b e r a l Party. The p e r q u i s i t e s of being with a winning party were a stronger i n c e n t i v e than l o y a l t y , an a f f e c t i v e motivation governing a c t i v i s m of c u r r e n t L i b e r a l s . The events surrounding the u n i t y movement and exodus of L i b e r a l e l i t e s and r a n k - a n d - f i l e a c t i v i s t s from the party f o l l o w i n g the NDP v i c t o r y i n 1972 i l l u s t r a t e t h i s argument. 1 0 Premised on the b e l i e f that the NDP won because of a s p l i t i n the f r e e — e n t e r p r i s e vote, the M a j o r i t y Movement f o r Freedom and P r i v a t e E n t e r p r i s e was organized. I t s i n t e n t was "to r e s t o r e f r e e - e n t e r p r i s e government i n B r i t i s h Columbia" by " u n i f y i n g the three f r e e - e n t e r p r i s e p a r t i e s or f a i l i n g that, the f r e e - e n t e r p r i s e v o t e . " 1 1 r i d i n g had been d i v i d e d i n t o two single-member c o n s t i t u e n c i e s , Anderson's p o p u l a r i t y would not have been enough to enable him to win i n e i t h e r of them, given that the t o t a l vote obtained by the two Socred candidates exceeded that of the two L i b e r a l s in both h y p o t h e t i c a l c o n s t i t u e n c i e s . 1 0 For a d e t a i l e d account of t h i s p e r i o d , see G.L. K r i s t i a n s o n , "The Non-Partisan Approach to BC P o l i t i c s : The Search f o r a Unity Party," BC Studies, no.33 (Spring 1977), 13-29. Information f o r t h i s s e c t i o n of the t h e s i s was a l s o found i n Christopher H a r r i s , British Columbia 1972-1975: The Genesis of a Two-Party System, Unpublished M.A. t h e s i s , U n i v e r s i t y of B r i t i s h Columbia, 1987, e s p e c i a l l y ch. 4. 1 1 Quoted i n K r i s t i a n s o n , Ibid., 15. 52 The leaders of the f r e e — e n t e r p r i s e p a r t i e s , Scott Wallace excepted, were u n i n t e r e s t e d . 1 3 However, prominent s i t t i n g L i b e r a l MLAs and a s u b s t a n t i a l number of a c t i v i s t s a g i t a t e d f o r a non-partisan party. It became a d i v i s i v e i s s u e f o r the L i b e r a l P a r ty: the f a i t h f u l were demoralized when t h e i r s i t t i n g MLAs attended meetings of the M a j o r i t y Movement and disdained to help Gordon Gibson campaign f o r the nomination as L i b e r a l candidate i n the North Vancouver—Capilano b y - e l e c t i o n . While McGeer, Williams and Gardom proclaimed t h e i r party l o y a l t y a f t e r the u n i t y movement died, they continued informal d i s c u s s i o n with members of the o p p o s i t i o n caucuses regarding the formation of a t h i r d p a r t y . 1 3 No such option was p o s s i b l e without the cooperation of the S o c i a l C r e d i t Party. By A p r i l , 1975, Socreds were con f i d e n t enough of success to plan c o n t e s t i n g the next e l e c t i o n alone. "The three L i b e r a l s found themselves i n an untenable p o s i t i o n . " 1 " * Williams s a i d that he would q u i t the party unless i t united with the other p a r t i e s . 1 3 Anderson 1 3 David Anderson, then leader of the L i b e r a l Party, argued that t h i s was a d e l i b e r a t e attempt to manipulate the e l e c t o r a t e , and as such was undemocratic. See G.L. K r i s t i a n s o n , Ibid., 17. K r i s t i a n s o n suggests that Anderson was d i s i n t e r e s t e d because he had reason to b e l i e v e that h i s party could win the b y - e l e c t i o n i n 1974 and demonstrate that the L i b e r a l Party was a v i a b l e f r e e - e n t e r p r i s e a l t e r n a t i v e . 1 3 For example, Williams s a i d , " c o a l i t i o n or everyone j o i n i n g one of the three p a r t i e s — a r e not acceptable [ a l t e r n a t i v e s ] , " and that he favoured the t h i r d o p t i o n , forming a new party. Alan Williams, Vancouver Province, 8/3/74; quoted i n K r i s t i a n s o n , Ibid., 24. 1 4 Ibid., 27 1 5 H a r r i s , op. cit., 46. 53 c a l l e d Williams "dishonourable," and w i t h i n days Williams and McGeer resigned to s i t as independents. They were j o i n e d l e s s than two weeks l a t e r by Gardom, who expressed the hope that the three p a r t i e s could s t i l l reach an agreement that would preclude a f r a c t u r i n g of the f r e e - e n t e r p r i s e v o t e 1 * . Even prominent f e d e r a l L i b e r a l s were unsupportive of Anderson's stand. For example, the Hon. J.V. Clyne appealed to Anderson f o r "...the n o n - s o c i a l i s t p a r t i e s to u n i t e on a temporary b a s i s . . . t o achieve u n i t y of purpose i n rescuing BC from becoming a s o c i a l i s t i c s t a t e . . . 1 1 1 7 In June, 1975, Don Wray, BC L i b e r a l Executive V i c e P r e s i d e n t , resigned, s t a t i n g that he no longer supported the p r o v i n c i a l L i b e r a l s and that he concurred with the p o s i t i o n s taken by McGeer, Williams and Gardom. His d e f e c t i o n to the S o c i a l C r e d i t Party occurred the f o l l o w i n g month. The L i b e r a l ranks were f u r t h e r decimated at the end of August by the conversion to S o c i a l C r e d i t of s i x Vancouver Island L i b e r a l notables. Then Jack Davis, a former cabinet m i n i s t e r , j o i n e d the S o c i a l C r e d i t Party on September 1st. Barely a month l a t e r , McGeer, Williams and Gardom announced that they now judged S o c i a l C r e d i t to be the u n i t y p a r t y . i e Anderson's e f f o r t s to hold the party together had f a i l e d , and Gordon Gibson became the new leader of the demoralized ranks. x* Ibid., 48. 1 7 J.V. Clyne to David Anderson, 17/5/74; quoted i n K r i s t i a n s o n , op. cit., 25. i e See K r i s t i a n s o n , Ibid., 28. 54 Despite McGeer's presumably honourable j u s t i f i c a t i o n f o r j o i n i n g the S o c i a l C r e d i t Party, namely that: "[the s i t u a t i o n ] r e q u i r e s that people put the o v e r — a l l good of the province ahead of party po 1 itr'.cs, " 1 C ? p o l i t i c a l opportunism a l s o played a r o l e . To L i b e r a l MLAs McSeer, Williams and Gardom, t h e i r p o l i t i c a l f u t u r e s must have appeared u n c e r t a i n . As McGeer t o l d the Sun, "I don't want to spend another Parliament i n o p p o s i t i o n . " s o The 1972 v i c t o r y of the NDP was the l a s t straw. They were profoundly depressed about the L i b e r a l Party's and t h e i r own p o l i t i c a l chances...Al1 were in the midst of s u c c e s s f u l c a r e e r s and not eager to spend more time i n V i c t o r i a except as c a b i n e t m i n i s t e r s . = 1 As incumbent Socred MLAs c o n t e s t i n g the 1975 e l e c t i o n , not only was the chance of s e r v i n g i n the governing party s i g n i f i c a n t l y improved, but with t h e i r experience, they were a l s o prime candidates f o r m i n i s t e r i a l p o s i t i o n s . The gamble paid o f f f o r McGeer and Gardom, both of whom were given cabinet p o s i t i o n s i n the Bennett government. It i s apparent " t h e i r expressions of d e s i r e to defeat the NDP pointed them i n the same d i r e c t i o n as t h e i r s e l f - i n t e r e s t i n p o l i t i c a l s u r v i v a l . " = = These a c t i v i s t s were more concerned with being part of a winning party f o r s t r a t e g i c and personal reasons. The l e f t — r i g h t p o l i t i c a l d i v i s i o n was more s a l i e n t , i < p Pat McGeer to David Anderson, 9/5/75; quoted i n Ibid. 2 0 Pat McGeer, Vancouver Sun, 10/5/75; quoted i n Ibid., 28. 3 1 K r i s t i a n s o n , Ibid., 21. 3 : 2 H a r r i s , op. cit., 53. 55 i n c o n t r a s t to the importance of i d e o l o g i c a l n e u t r a l i t y to current a c t i v i s t s . If t h i s was not of primary concern, they would have j o i n e d the exodus i n the 1970s. L o y a l t y to the party i t s e l f , as well as to i t s ends, t h e r e f o r e , governed motivations of our long-term a c t i v i s t s . P o l i c y O r i e n t a t i o n and Opinion Dimensions Er i c k s o n et a l . noted that "The B r i t i s h Columbia party system i s one of c l a s s i c two-party p o l a r i z e d competition with a c a t c h - a l l party of the r i g h t ( S o c i a l C r e d i t ) f a c i n g a mass party of the l e f t (the New Democratic P a r t y ) . " 2 3 T h e i r a n a l y s i s revealed that while there i s l i m i t e d convergence of opinion on some p o l i c y domains between the a c t i v i s t s of these two p a r t i e s , on most i s s u e s "a b i - p o l a r d i s t r i b u t i o n of opinion between NDP and S o c i a l C r e d i t a c t i v i s t s i s t y p i c a l . . . " 2 * We know that L i b e r a l a c t i v i s t s have defined t h e i r party as i d e o l o g i c a l l y d i s t i n c t from the S o c i a l C r e d i t and New Democratic P a r t i e s . Consequently, t h i s t h e s i s expects t h e i r opinions on p o l i c i e s w i l l not converge on e i t h e r polar end of the d i s t r i b u t i o n of opinion between NDP and S o c i a l C r e d i t a c t i v i s t s . They w i l l have d i s s i m i l a r views from New Democrats and Socreds on various p o l i c y o r i e n t a t i o n s and is s u e cleavages 2 3 Lynda E r i c k s o n , R.K. Carty and Donald E. Blake, "Ideology and P a r t i s a n s h i p i n B r i t i s h Columbia: A c t i v i s t s i n a B i - P o l a r P o l i t i c a l System," a paper presented to the 14th World Congress of the I n t e r n a t i o n a l P o l i t i c a l Science A s s o c i a t i o n , Washington, DC, August, 1988, 2. 2* Ibid., 14. 56 that c h a r a c t e r i z e BC p o l i t i c s . Knowing that L i b e r a l a c t i v i s t s have placed t h e i r party i n the centre of the l e f t - r i g h t s c a l e , with the NDP and Socreds f i r m l y to e i t h e r s i d e , t h i s t h e s i s a l s o expects that t h e i r p o l i c y a t t i t u d e s and opinions w i l l f a l l between those of the NDP and Socreds. Blake et a l . ' s examination of Socred a c t i v i s t s revealed that although t h e i r ranks were swelled with d i s a f f e c t e d L i b e r a l s during the realignment of the 1970s, the a t t r i t i o n of the L i b e r a l ranks occurred l a r g e l y at the e l i t e l e v e l . I t was suggested that the NDP may have b e n e f i t t e d more than the Socreds at the cadre l e v e l , = s given t h e i r f i n d i n g that 67 per cent of p r o v i n c i a l L i b e r a l s who have worked f o r another party, have done so f o r the NDP. Presuming that t h i s i n d i c a t e d some degree of a f f i n i t y between L i b e r a l s and New Democrats, we expect to f i n d not only that they occupy c e n t r a l p o s i t i o n s r e l a t i v e to the other p a r t i e s , but a l s o that they w i l l be weighted i n a d i r e c t i o n approaching the p o s i t i o n s of NDP a c t i v i s t s . As a n t i c i p a t e d , the opinions of L i b e r a l a c t i v i s t s converged on the middle ground. On the a n t i r e g u l a t i o n dimension, L i b e r a l s were c l o s e s t to the mean f o r the e n t i r e p opulation, occupying a p o s i t i o n between those of the NDP and S o c i a l Credit. = :' i , An examination of the frequency = s Donald E. Blake, R.K. Carty and Lynda E r i c k s o n , "Ideology and P a r t i s a n s h i p : A Comparison of Federal and P r o v i n c i a l A c t i v i s t s , " a paper presented at the annual meeting of the Canadian P o l i t i c a l Science A s s o c i a t i o n , Hamilton, Ontario, 1987, 8. = , s See Table 3.3 f o r mean scores of a c t i v i s t s ' a t t i t u d e s . 57 d i s t r i b u t i o n s revealed that L i b e r a l a c t i v i s t s tended to be c l o s e r i n t h e i r views to NDP a c t i v i s t s than S o c r e d s . 2 7 L i k e the NDP a c t i v i s t s , L i b e r a l s wanted to see r e g u l a t i o n i n v o l v i n g environmental p r o t e c t i o n and human r i g h t s extended, but were more l i k e l y than the NDP to support the s t a t u s quo regarding land use. In c o n t r a s t , Socreds tended to support the s t a t u s quo or a reduction i n r e g u l a t i o n on these three i s s u e s . On r e g u l a t i o n of the s a l e of a l c o h o l , gambling and shopping hours, the three p a r t i e s ' a c t i v i s t s tended to support the s t a t u s quo, although the s u b s t a n t i a l m i n o r i t y of L i b e r a l s who p r e f e r r e d l e s s r e g u l a t i o n resembled Socreds r a t h e r than New Democrats. Co n s i s t e n t with the i d e o l o g i c a l gap between the NDP and Socreds, Socreds supported the s t a t u s quo or favoured decreased government spending i n the areas of education, welfare r a t e s , health care and d a y c a r e . = e The i n v e r s e was true f o r NDP a c t i v i s t s , who tended to support i n c r e a s e s i n current l e v e l s of spending. L i b e r a l a c t i v i s t s ' a t t i t u d e s were s i m i l a r to those of the NDP, but were not of the same magnitude. Most p r e f e r r e d increased spending on education and daycare. They a l s o wanted to see increased spending on welfare r a t e s , health care, job grants, and government s a l a r i e s . But they were more l i k e l y than New Democrats to support c u r r e n t l e v e l s of spending i n these areas. L i b e r a l s = - 7 , See Table 3.1 f o r a comparison by party of a t t i t u d e s twoard government r e g u l a t i o n . 3 e See Table 3.2 f o r a comparison by party of a t t i t u d e s toward government spending. 58 tended to agree with Socreds that government spending on highways, tourism, job grants and r e f o r e s t a t i o n should be increased. C o n t i n e n t a l ism i s a contentious p o l i t i c a l i s s u e i n BC. Support f o r f r e e r trade with the US, and disagreement that s u b s t a n t i a l f o r e i g n ownership threatens the independence of Canada's economy c h a r a c t e r i z e d S o c i a l C r e d i t a c t i v i s t s . They were d i v i d e d over whether Canada should maintain i t s independence even i f i t means a lower standard of l i v i n g . In c o n t r a s t , the NDP were a n t i - c o n t i n e n t a l i s t on each item of the c o n t i n e n t a l i s t s c a l e . The L i b e r a l s showed much l e s s consensus on these items than d i d the other two p a r t i e s . On the one hand, they tended to support f r e e r trade with the US. On the other hand, l i k e the NDP, they agreed that f o r e i g n ownership threatens our independence and that Canada should maintain i t s independence even i f i t means a lower standard of l i v i n g . A breakdown by party of a t t i t u d e s toward each opinion dimension revealed L i b e r a l opinion c o n s i s t e n t l y f e l l i n between the b i p o l a r d i s t r i b u t i o n of opinion of NDP and Socred a c t i v i s t s . T h e i n d i v i d u a l i s t / c o l l e c t i v i s t dimension p a r a l l e l s the r i g h t / l e f t p o l i t i c a l cleavage i n BC p o l i t i c s . The L i b e r a l s were c l o s e s t to the mean and weighted toward the i n d i v i d u a l i s t end of the s c a l e . In c o n t r a s t , the mean scores f o r the S o c i a l C r e d i t and New Democratic P a r t i e s were f a r to the r i g h t and l e f t r e s p e c t i v e l y of the mean score f o r the S 9 See Table 3.3 f o r a breakdown by party of a t t i t u d e s toward i s s u e s s a l i e n t to BC p o l i t i c s . 59 population. Regarding a t t i t u d e s toward continenta1 ism, the L i b e r a l s f e l l i n between the NDP and Socreds. The L i b e r a l s a l s o occupied the centre p o s i t i o n on the p o p u l i s t s c a l e . As expected, Socreds were more p o p u l i s t than a c t i v i s t s i n the other two p a r t i e s , although the NDP e x h i b i t e d some elements of populism as w e l l . These f i n d i n g s support those of Blake et a l . , who reported that former p r o v i n c i a l L i b e r a l a c t i v i s t s , now working f o r the S o c i a l C r e d i t Party, d i s p l a y e d d i s t i n c t i v e p o l i c y p o s i t i o n s w i t h i n i t . L i k e c u r r e n t p r o v i n c i a l L i b e r a l a c t i v i s t s , they tended to be l e s s p o p u l i s t , more c o l l e c t i v i s t -o r i e n t e d , and l e s s a n t i - r e g u l a t i o n than Socreds who had not formerly worked f o r another p a r t y . 3 0 Former L i b e r a l a c t i v i s t s p r e s e n t l y within Socred ranks were a l s o more l i k e l y than t h e i r Socred c o l l e a g u e s (65 per cent versus 55 per cent) to agree that the S o c i a l C r e d i t Party should not move i t s p o s i t i o n too f a r to the r i g h t . As such, t h e i r o r i e n t a t i o n to moderation was s i m i l a r to that found i n t h i s study. The f i n d i n g s reported here reveal that from a L i b e r a l ' s p e r s p e c t i v e , S o c i a l C r e d i t and New Democratic p o l i c y o r i e n t a t i o n s were extreme. As such, i t i s apparent that t h e i r b e l i e f s and a t t i t u d e s were incongruent with those of L i b e r a l a c t i v i s t s . L i b e r a l s would not f e e l comfortable with the l e g i s l a t i v e ends and p o l i c y platforms of e i t h e r party, even though the p a r t i e s win e l e c t i o n s . 3 0 Ibid., 4. 60 It was posited i n the e x i s t i n g l i t e r a t u r e that ideology and purposive i n c e n t i v e s , i n c l u d i n g i s s u e o r i e n t a t i o n s and p o l i c y concerns, would be among the most important motivations of party a c t i v i s m . Other i n c e n t i v e s would be the excitement of v i c t o r y or the defeat of an enemy party. It was a l s o assumed that l o y a l t y to the party i t s e l f would be a powerful for c e motivating i n d i v i d u a l s to remain with a p a r t i c u l a r party. The data showed that a l l these v a r i a b l e s f o s t e r e d party a c t i v i s m . The most important f i n d i n g that emerged from the a n a l y s i s was that the choice of p o l i t i c a l party with which to be involved v a r i e d because of the d i f f e r e n c e s i n i n c e n t i v e s motivating i n d i v i d u a l s to be a c t i v i s t s . S p e c i f i c a l l y , L i b e r a l s were a d i s t i n c t group wit h i n BC's party a c t i v i s t p o pulation, i n terms of t h e i r moderate ideology, lack of p o p u l i s t b e l i e f s , and a t t i t u d e s toward p r o v i n c i a l l y s a l i e n t i s s u e s such as c o n t i n e n t a l ism, government r e g u l a t i o n , and government spending on s o c i a l welfare programmes. This determined that they would not f i t i n any other p r o v i n c i a l party. They were committed to the L i b e r a l Party because i t s values were perceived to be congruent with t h e i r personal values. In c o n t r a s t , former L i b e r a l a c t i v i s t s who l e f t the party a f t e r the NDP v i c t o r y i n 1972 saw the i n d i v i d u a l i s t / c o l l e c t i v i s t gap between the other two p a r t i e s as more important. They j o i n e d the L i b e r a l Party because i t was a f r e e - e n t e r p r i s e a l t e r n a t i v e , not because of i t s moderate views. When i t became apparent that the party was no longer 61 v i a b l e , they were motivated to j o i n a party that t h r i v e d on the p o l a r i z a t i o n of the province and was s u f f i c i e n t l y strong to defeat the enemy. A c t i v i s t s who d i d not f o l l o w s u i t thereby demonstrated the magnitude of t h e i r l o y a l t y to the L i b e r a l Party. 62 Table 3.1 ATTITUDES TOWARD GOVERNMENT REGULATION BY PARTY* P o l i c y Area Party D i r e c t i o n of Change" N Environmental P r o t e c t i o n Land Use Human Rights P r o t e c t i o n NDP L i b e r a l Socred NDP L i b e r a l Socred NDP L i b e r a l Socred 82, 56, 7. 59, 31. 4. 71.4 37.9 2.1 14.3 35.6 16. 5 30.7 31.7 17.6 23.8 37.9 8.7 3.0 4.6 44.9 7, 31, 23.2 4.1 20.7 52.8 .3 2.3 21.0 3.0 3.7 31.8 . 5 1.1 20.6 1.1 10. 5 .3 1.2 22.9 .3 2.3 15.8 370 87 334 368 82 336 370 87 335 Sale of Alcohol Marketing of A g r i c u l t u r a l Produc t s Shopping Hours Gambling NDP L i b e r a l Socred NDP L i b e r a l Socred NDP L i b e r a l Socred NDP L i b e r a l Socred 10.7 7.9 8.4 28.7 7.1 21.1 8.5 12.6 9.2 29.6 11.2 17.8 15.3 14.6 17.4 28.1 21.4 12.4 15.6 14.9 12.4 13.6 18.0 22.0 56.3 44.9 27. 5 32.0 31.0 8.8 47. 5 39.1 30.5 24.7 34.8 24.3 11.7 16.9 18.0 9. 28. 22. IB. 12. 12. 10.3 13.5 16.0 6.0 15.7 28.7 2.0 11.9 35.6 9.4 20.7 35.8 21.7 22. 5 19.9 366 89 334 356 84 331 366 87 338 368 89 337 * t a b l e e n t r i e s are v a l i d percentage d i s t r i b u t i o n s ** l = s u b s t a n t i a l l y extended 2 = s l i g h t l y extended 3=kept as now 4 = s l i g h t l y reduced 5 = s u b s t a n t i a l l y reduced N=valid cases 63 Table 3.2 ATTITUDES TOWARD GOVERNMENT SPENDING BY PARTY* P o l i c y Area Party D i r e c t i o n of Change** 2 3 4 5 N Education Welfare Rates NDP L i b e r a l Socred NDP L i b e r a l Socred 77.7 58.0 4.2 68.0 19. 5 .9 19.8 34.1 27.4 29.3 46.0 14.3 2.1 8.0 54.5 2.4 27.6 48.2 .3 7.8 5.7 21.1 6.0 .3 1.1 15.5 373 B8 332 369 87 336 Health Care R e f o r e s t a t i o n Job Creation Grants Highways NDP L i b e r a l Socred NDP L i b e r a l Socred NDP L i bera1 Socred NDP L i b e r a l Socred 57.7 20.7 3.3 86.2 50.6 44.0 58.5 14.5 19.8 7.0 1.1 11.0 35.5 52.9 29.0 12.4 34. 5 40.1 24.0 32. 5 25. 5 21.1 9.1 27.1 6.2 21.8 59.8 1.4 9.2 13.9 11 24 30 49 48 55 ,5 . 1 ,3 ,2 ,9 ,4 . 5 5.7 3.4 .9 3.0 16.9 8.7 16.2 29.5 6.0 2.1 2.3 1.2 3.0 12.0 15.6 6.5 11.4 .6 369 87 331 370 87 332 366 83 333 370 88 336 Tourism NDP L i b e r a l Socred 6.3 9.3 24.7 22.3 22.1 30.1 48.4 55.8 39.9 14.7 11.6 2.7 8.4 1.2 2.7 368 86 336 P u b l i c S e r v i c e S a l a r i e s Daycare NDP L i b e r a l Socred NDP L i b e r a l Socred 14.3 1.2 66.7 27.9 3.6 56, 21, 13, 28. 42. 14. 29. 65. 54. 5. 24. 46. .3 8.3 17.2 1.1 13.4 4 13 1 22 ,3 ,8 ,6 ,3 , 1 ,9 364 84 337 372 86 336 * t a b l e e n t r i e s are v a l i d percentage d i s t r i b u t i o n s ** l=substantia11y extended 2 = s l i g h t l y extended 3=kept as now 4 = s l i g h t l y reduced 5 = s u b s t a n t i a l l y reduced N=total sample excluding missing responses ATTITUDE Table 3.3 DIFFERENCES AMONG ACTIVISTS BY PARTY* E n t i r e A t t i t u d e S cale NDP L i b SC Sample S i g . Level I n d i v i d u a l vs. .39 2.65 3.74 1.94 .000 C o l l e c t i v e R e s p o n s i b i l i t y Populism 1.36 1.50 2.34 1.84 .000 A n t i - .92 1.58 2.75 1.79 .000 Regulation Continental ism .24 .96 2.31 1.16 .000 * Table e n t r i e s are mean scores. Scales were scored in d i r e c t i o n i n d i c a t e d by name of s c a l e . 65 Chapter 4 OPTIMISM AND ACTIVISM This chapter w i l l use a c o g n i t i v e theory of motivation to analyze the r e l a t i o n s h i p between a c t i v i s t s ' d e s i r e to be a s s o c i a t e d with a winning party and membership i n the moribund L i b e r a l Party. The b e l i e f that i t i s a strong f o r c e i n BC p o l i t i c s i s , of course, f a l s e , c o n s i d e r i n g past e l e c t o r a l performances of the party. A c o g n i t i v e model accounts f o r the importance of f a l s e b e l i e f s i n the healthy i n d i v i d u a l and o f f e r s a comprehensive explanation of how they a r i s e . It p o s i t s that i n d i v i d u a l s engage i n c o g n i t i v e a t t r i b u t i o n a l biases i n order to j u s t i f y t h e i r a c t i o n s as meaningful, approp r i a t e and e f f e c t i v e . Thereby, i n d i v i d u a l s f e e l they have c o n t r o l over the course of f u t u r e events. T h i s , i n turn, f o s t e r s hope; hope leads i n d i v i d u a l s to persevere. Hope, perseverance, s e c u r i t y , and c o n t r o l are p o s i t i v e a f f e c t i v e d i s p o s i t i o n s , r e i n f o r c i n g or enhancing self-esteem. As such, c o g n i t i v e processes that lead to our d i s p o s i t i o n s occur n a t u r a l l y , and most o f t e n , below the l e v e l of conscious awareness. 66 Concepts of the c o g n i t i v e model i n c l u d e the tendency to exaggerate and to f e e l beneffectance, which i s the b e l i e f one i s able to achieve intended outcomes and to avoid unintended outcomes. The i l l u s i o n of c o n t r o l , the f a l s e consensus e f f e c t , or s e l f - f u l f i l l i n g prophecies are a l s o i n v o l v e d . This t h e s i s p r e d i c t s that a t t r i b u t i o n a l biases would f o s t e r optimism i n the party's f u t u r e , d e s p i t e evidence to the co n t r a r y . E s s e n t i a l l y , r e a l i t y would be d i s t o r t e d i n order to j u s t i f y involvement i n a party without a chance at success, such that the party would be seen as a s u c c e s s f u l p o l i t i c a l f o r c e . In turn, optimism would guide t h e i r motivations to be a c t i v e party members, and more importantly, t h e i r p e r s i s t e n c e in the face of repeated e l e c t o r a l d e f e a t s . A Winning Party The data revealed a party whose members b e l i e v e d i t can win—some pr e d i c t e d that they could p o s s i b l y form the government with up to 55 per cent of the popular vote i n the next e l e c t i o n . 1 T h i s i s i n c o n t r a s t to Sorauf's a s s e r t i o n that winning i s of l e s s importance to a c t i v i s t s i n s p i r e d by ideology and i d e n t i f i c a t i o n with the party's ends. Although t a r g e t s of 30 per cent or more of the popular vote were given by only a mi n o r i t y of respondents (10.57.), an eq u a l l y small proportion p r e d i c t e d more r e a l i s t i c f i g u r e s of 10 per cent of the popular vote and l e s s . This t h e s i s assumes 1 The exact question was, "What do you think are r e a l i s t i c goals f o r the L i b e r a l Party i n the next p r o v i n c i a l e l e c t i o n ? a. "/. of the vote b. 0 seats; 1-3 seats; 4-10 seats; seats; o p p o s i t i o n s t a t u s ; form the government 67 that 10 per cent or l e s s of the popular vote are r e a l i s t i c goals f o r a party which has p o l l e d l e s s than 8 per cent over the l a s t 4 e l e c t i o n s . 3 Indeed, one could argue that p r e d i c t i o n s of 6 per cent or l e s s of the vote are the most r e a l i s t i c goals c o n s i d e r i n g that the party received only 6.74 per cent i n the l a s t e l e c t i o n , 2.69 per cent previous to that, and l e s s than 1 per cent i n 1979. Yet, only 2.6 per cent of the respondents gave 6 per cent or l e s s of the vote as r e a l i s t i c goals f o r the party i n the next e l e c t i o n . In c o n t r a s t , 83 per cent of the a c t i v i s t s thought that 12 per cent or more of the popular vote were not u n r e a l i s t i c g o a l s . The median r e a l i s t i c goal targeted by the respondents was 19 per cent. It must here be noted that although the L i b e r a l Party c o n s i s t e n t l y hovered around t h i s f i g u r e i n the e l e c t i o n s from 1952 to 1966, i t has not been able to p u l l up i t s share to even h a l f that s i n c e 1972. Nevertheless, what i s important i s that BC L i b e r a l a c t i v i s t s b e lieved the party has the a b i l i t y to win: the expectation of 43 per cent was that the party w i l l e l e c t between 4 and 10 MLAs, while s l i g h t l y l e s s (40"/.) thought a r e a l i s t i c goal was between 1 and 3 s e a t s . The remainder were evenly d i v i d e d between those who b e l i e v e d the party w i l l a t t a i n o p p o s i t i o n s t a t u s or form the government and those who believed that the party w i l l repeat t h e i r previous performances. 3 See Appendix I f o r the L i b e r a l P arty's e l e c t i o n r e s u l t s , 1903-19B6. 68 C l e a r l y , the majority of L i b e r a l a c t i v i s t s perceived they were a s s o c i a t e d with a winning party d e s p i t e i t s h i s t o r y of e l e c t i o n d e f e a t s . To determine whether t h i s f a l s e b e l i e f was an i n c e n t i v e governing L i b e r a l a c t i v i s m , the remainder of t h i s chapter w i l l examine the data f o r evidence of underlying c o g n i t i v e b i a s e s . Sources of Optimism Perusal of the party l i t e r a t u r e revealed BC L i b e r a l s engaged i n c o g n i t i v e a t t r i b u t i o n a l b i a s e s . Not only d i d they present themselves as being simultaneously b e n e f i c i a l and e f f e c t i v e , but they a l s o exaggerated what the outcome of the l a s t e l e c t i o n portended f o r the party. The l a s t e l e c t i o n saw the L i b e r a l ' s share of the popular vote r i s e from 2.69 per cent to 6.74 per cent. In the l i t e r a t u r e produced by e l i t e L i b e r a l a c t i v i s t s f o r the party cadre, t h i s outcome was i n t e r p r e t e d as auguring well f o r the party. The f o l l o w i n g quotes, which contained repeated r e f e r e n c e s to the outcome, confirmed Clark and Wilson's p r e d i c t i o n that, "Considerable a t t e n t i o n w i l l a l s o be devoted to producing among members a sense of accomplishment - often spurious - which i s e s s e n t i a l in maintaining the f o r c e of the i n c e n t i v e s . " 3 ...the doubling of our vote i n the p r o v i n c i a l e l e c t i o n proves to me that we can and w i l l e l e c t L i b e r a l s to the L e g i s l a t u r e . - * 3 Peter B. Clark and James Q. Wilson, "Incentive Systems: A Theory of Org a n i z a t i o n s , " Administrative Science Quarterly, 6 (1961) 148. •* Dove Hendren, P r e s i d e n t , Executive Reports to the 1987 Convention, May 8, 9, 10, Richmond, BC. 69 We d i d n ' t achieve the r e s u l t s we had hoped f o r during the l a s t e l e c t i o n by winning a seat, but we did manage to r a i s e the p r o f i l e of l i b e r a l i s m i n B.C. That was evidenced by our percentage of the popular vote. The breakthrough we hope f o r w i l l have to await another e l e c t i o n and a new leader, but I know i t w i l l come. Dne day there w i l l be a L i b e r a l government i n Vancouver.* A r t [Lee]'s t i r e l e s s e f f o r t s during the l a s t campaign r e s u l t e d i n the doubling of our popular vote and have provided the foundation upon which we can a l l b u i l d . * I t i s e x c i t i n g to contemplate the r i s e i n p o p u l a r i t y of our party i n B r i t i s h Columbia over the l a s t two and one h a l f years and i t s i m p l i c a t i o n s f o r our f u t u r e . The recent p r o v i n c i a l e l e c t i o n showed us that people i n t h i s province are w i l l i n g to take a second look at the L i b e r a l a l t e r n a t i v e . 7 ...we were able to double our percentage of the popular vote i n the 1986 campaign. More people began to recognize the need f o r a moderate party of the c e n t r e . 6 C o g n i t i v e dissonance was avoided by not acknowledging the actual f i g u r e s . T h i s enhanced t h e i r a b i l i t y to a s s e r t with c o n v i c t i o n that L i b e r a l p o p u l a r i t y was on the r i s e i n BC. These statements r e f l e c t e d a number of other c o g n i t i v e biases. Beneffectance, f o r example, was i l l u s t r a t e d i n A r t Lee's b e l i e f that, "we d i d manage to r a i s e the p r o f i l e of l i b e r a l i s m i n B.C." The f a l s e consensus e f f e c t was apparent in the a s s e r t i o n that a doubling of the vote r e f l e c t e d the L i b e r a l P arty's r i s i n g appeal among the e l e c t o r a t e . s Art Lee, Liberal Insight: Leadership Convention 1987, pamphlet, 4. * John Turner, l e t t e r to delegates, October, 1987. 7 John Turner, l e t t e r to p o l i c y convention, May, 1987. e John Turner, Liberal Insight, op. cit., 2. 70 According to the l i t e r a t u r e , e f f o r t i s expected by i n d i v i d u a l s to be a v a r i a b l e d i s p o s i t i o n within t h e i r c o n t r o l . S p e c i f i c a l l y , they are primed c o g n i t i v e l y to expect e f f o r t to produce success. The f o l l o w i n g statements by e l i t e L i b e r a l a c t i v i s t s , A r t Lee and John Turner r e s p e c t i v e l y , i l l u s t r a t e t h i s t h e s i s ' argument that optimism i n the party's f u t u r e success arose from such a t t r i b u t i o n a l b i a s e s . During the past two years, L i b e r a l s have a l l worked very hard to r e - e s t a b l i s h our Party as a p o l i t i c a l f o r c e i n B r i t i s h Columbia. Although we were not s u c c e s s f u l i n winning a seat i n the recent general e l e c t i o n , the Party d i d double i t s popular vote. L i b e r a l s can be very proud of t h i s achievement, and because of our r e s u l t at the p o l l s , we a l s o can be very o p t i m i s t i c about our fut u r e r o l e i n B r i t i s h Columbia. 9 I am convinced that we have what i t takes to make great inroads i n t h i s province i n the coming months. If we strengthen our r e s o l v e , d i s c i p l i n e our e f f o r t s and u n i t e i n a common purpose, we w i l l move q u i c k l y and s u r e l y towards a b r i g h t e r f u t u r e . 1 0 They a t t r i b u t e d the party's improved standing at the p o l l s to the amount of e f f o r t expended by L i b e r a l a c t i v i s t s . Given t h i s i n f e r e n c e , they p r e d i c t e d that more e f f o r t would r e s u l t i n an even be t t e r showing i n the next e l e c t i o n . The i l l u s i o n of c o n t r o l f o s t e r e d confidence that they could p r e d i c t outcomes. I t a l s o gave them the s e c u r i t y to b e l i e v e that a c t i v i s m i n the L i b e r a l Party was not meaningless and f u t i l e . Hard work had paid o f f i n a doubling of t h e i r share of the popular vote. They were, t h e r e f o r e , o p t i m i s t i c that the 9 Art Lee, l e t t e r to p o l i c y convention, May, 1987. 1 0 John Turner, l e t t e r to le a d e r s h i p convention delegates, October, 1987. 71 outcome s i g n i f i e d a b r i g h t e r f u t u r e f o r the L i b e r a l Party. As such, they have set up the p o s s i b i l i t y f o r a s e l f - f u l l i n g prophecy. If the party wins a seat i n the next e l e c t i o n , they would c r e d i t t h e i r success to increased e f f o r t . However, i f the party again f a i l e d to win a seat, they would b e l i e v e t h i s occurred despite t h e i r e f f o r t s . This would enable them to continue being o p t i m i s t i c that t h e i r work f o r the party was not a waste of t h e i r time and energy. Evidence of c o g n i t i v e biases i n the data support t h i s t h e s i s ' argument as w e l l . A new v a r i a b l e was created by d i v i d i n g the a c t i v i s t s i n t o two groups, those we considered to be o p t i m i s t s and those we considered to be r e a l i s t s about the party's f u t u r e e l e c t o r a l chances. An o p t i m i s t was defined as an i n d i v i d u a l who rated the party's chance of winning a seat i n h i s or her constituency as medium or high. A r e a l i s t was an i n d i v i d u a l who rated the chance as low or nonexistent. Optimists c o n s t i t u t e d 45 per cent of our sample; the remainder was composed of r e a l i s t s . The v a r i a b l e was c r o s s t a b u l a t e d with a s e r i e s of questions probing the f a c t o r s to which the a c t i v i s t s a t t r i b u t e d the party's outcome i n the previous e l e c t i o n . i i According to the l i t e r a t u r e , d i s p a r i t i e s i n i n t e r n a l versus e x t e r n a l , and f i x e d versus v a r i a b l e , a t t r i b u t i o n s of A 1 The exact question was, "How important do you think the f o l l o w i n g f a c t o r s w i l l be i n determining the L i b e r a l Party's success i n the next PROVINCIAL e l e c t i o n (very important, somewhat important, not very important, not at a l l important)?: the p r o v i n c i a l leader; the party's l o c a l candidates; weakness of the S o c i a l C r e d i t ; weakness of the NDP; s t r e n g t h of the f e d e r a l L i b e r a l s ; the p r o v i n c i a l platform 72 c a u s a l i t y when p o s t d i c t i n g an event are r e s p o n s i b l e f o r v a r i a t i o n s i n expectancy of f u t u r e success and f a i l u r e . S p e c i f i c a l l y , i f blame f o r a f a i l e d outcome i s placed on f i x e d , e x t e r n a l c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s , there would be l e s s l i k e l i h o o d of p r e d i c t i n g a f u t u r e outcome i n c o n s i s t e n t with the past. If f a i l u r e i s a t t r i b u t e d to v a r i a b l e , i n t e r n a l f a c t o r s , there would be more l i k e l i h o o d of d i s p l a y i n g an a t y p i c a l a s p i r a t i o n s h i f t . That i s to say, the i n d i v i d u a l would p r e d i c t success w i l l occur with repeated attempts at the task. The data revealed that, as p r e d i c t e d , o p t i m i s t s were more l i k e l y than r e a l i s t s to a t t r i b u t e past e l e c t i o n f a i l u r e s to v a r i a b l e , i n t e r n a l f a c t o r s . They were more l i k e l y to r a t e the party leader and platform, as opposed to a weak S o c i a l C r e d i t or NDP, as i m p o r t a n t . 1 2 The party leader and platform, being matters i n t e r n a l to the party, were f a c t o r s they c o n t r o l l e d . As such, they regarded the choices of leader and platform as s t r a t e g i e s . B e l i e v i n g they would be of primary importance i n determining the outcome of the next e l e c t i o n demonstrated that o p t i m i s t s monitored the e f f e c t i v e n e s s of t h e i r choice of leader and platform i n the l a s t e l e c t i o n , and concluded that they were i n e f f e c t i v e i n meeting the goal of e l e c t i n g the party. Future f a i l u r e could be avoided by manipulating these i = There was no d i f f e r e n c e between v a r i a t i o n i n the l e v e l of optimism and the importance with which the party's candidates were regarded. According to the l i t e r a t u r e , o p t i m i s t s should have seen t h i s as an important f a c t o r . 73 s t r a t e g i e s . C l e a r l y , a t t r i b u t i o n a l biases i n s p i r e d the optimism d i s p l a y e d by t h i s sub-set of our sample. R e a l i s t s , on the other hand, were more l i k e l y to r a t e a weak S o c i a l C r e d i t or NDP as the most important portents of the next e l e c t i o n outcome. The s t r e n g t h of the other p r o v i n c i a l p a r t i e s , although v a r i a b l e , are e x t e r n a l f a c t o r s . As such, they are s t r a t e g i c f e a t u r e s of BC p o l i t i c s beyond L i b e r a l a c t i v i s t s ' c o n t r o l . R e a l i s t s would not attend to the e f f e c t i v e n e s s of i n t e r n a l s t r a t e g i e s as they disagreed the outcome would be dependent on them. In t h i s regard, they e x h i b i t e d a lack of optimism i n the party's f u t u r e because they were not operating under an i l l u s i o n of c o n t r o l s i m i l a r to that of the o p t i m i s t s . In turn, they were more l i k e l y than the o p t i m i s t s to d i s p l a y some f e e l i n g s of f u t i l i t y . 1 3 T h i s i s not to argue that r e a l i s t s were not engaging i n a t t r i b u t i o n a l b i a s e s . The data a l s o revealed that r e a l i s t s were more l i k e l y to agree that the st r e n g t h of the f e d e r a l L i b e r a l Party was an important s t r a t e g i c f a c t o r i n f l u e n c i n g the chance of f u t u r e success f o r the p r o v i n c i a l L i b e r a l Party. Their i n t e r n a l locus of c o n t r o l was, t h e r e f o r e , d i f f e r e n t from that of o p t i m i s t s ; r e a l i s t s perceived that the f e d e r a l party was a matter within t h e i r c o n t r o l . 1 3 When asked why they* thought f e d e r a l L i b e r a l supporters deserted the party i n p r o v i n c i a l e l e c t i o n s , o p t i m i s t s were more l i k e l y to a t t r i b u t e the cause to a v a r i e t y of p a r t y -r e l a t e d matters such as the platform, poor o r g a n i z a t i o n , the leader, or the candidates. R e a l i s t s were more l i k e l y to say i t was because votes were wasted on the L i b e r a l Party. 74 It f o l l o w s that r e a l i s t i c p r o v i n c i a l a c t i v i s t s would be more o r i e n t e d than o p t i m i s t i c p r o v i n c i a l a c t i v i s t s toward the f e d e r a l party. The data confirmed the e x p e c t a t i o n : a l l other p r o p e r t i e s being held constant, 1"* r e a l i s t s were more l i k e l y than o p t i m i s t s to f e e l c l o s e r to the f e d e r a l party (43*/. versus 137.). They were a l s o l e s s l i k e l y than o p t i m i s t s to f e e l e q u a l l y c l o s e to both p a r t i e s (437. versus 677.). 1 0 P r o v i n c i a l r e a l i s t s were a l s o more l i k e l y to have served i n the higher echelons of the party o r g a n i z a t i o n . They predominated among those i n d i v i d u a l s who reported ever s e r v i n g on a f e d e r a l r i d i n g e x ecutive. And they were more l i k e l y to have ever been a f e d e r a l candidate or to have worked on a f e d e r a l e l e c t i o n campaign, i n c l u d i n g the l a s t one. *••* V a r i a t i o n s i n the l e v e l of optimism were not s i g n i f i c a n t l y a s s o c i a t e d with most demographic and s o c i o -economic c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s . Income was the only SES v a r i a b l e s i g n i f i c a n t l y a s s o c i a t e d with l e v e l of optimism ( s i g . level=.03). While o p t i m i s t s tended to have an income between 420,000 and $50,000, r e a l i s t s tended to make e i t h e r l e s s than $20,000 or more than $50,000. There was a l s o no r e l a t i o n s h i p between l e v e l of optimism and a number of contextual f a c t o r s : length of L i b e r a l Party involvement; length and region of residence i n BC; whether the constituency represented by the delegate received a high, medium or low degree of support from voters i n the 19B6 e l e c t i o n . 1 = 1 The r e l a t i o n s h i p was s t a t i s t i c a l l y s i g n i f i c a n t at the .01 l e v e l . 75 Optimism and A c t i v i s m A new v a r i a b l e was created measuring the degree and type of p a r t i c i p a t i o n reported by the respondents. It was pr e d i c t e d that o p t i m i s t s would be the most a c t i v e members i n the party, yet a breakdown of the amount of a c t i v i t y by l e v e l of optimism revealed the i n v e r s e r e l a t i o n s h i p . As the l e v e l of optimism increased, the degree of p a r t i c i p a t i o n decreased. Moreover, the data revealed that r e a l i s t s predominated i n the higher echelons of the p r o v i n c i a l party o r g a n i z a t i o n . They were more l i k e l y to have ever served on the p r o v i n c i a l executive or a p r o v i n c i a l c o n s t i t u e n c y executive. And they were more l i k e l y to have been a p r o v i n c i a l candidate, or to have worked f o r a candidate, or to have worked f o r the party i n the l a s t p r o v i n c i a l e l e c t i o n . No s t a t i s t i c a l r e l a t i o n s h i p was found between the l e v e l of optimism and v a r i a t i o n i n a c t i v i t y f o r the p r o v i n c i a l party. However, the r e l a t i o n s h i p between l e v e l of optimism and v a r i a t i o n i n a c t i v i t y f o r the f e d e r a l party was s i g n i f i c a n t at the .05 l e v e l . Federal a c t i v i s m was i n v e r s e l y r e l a t e d to the l e v e l of optimism i n p r o v i n c i a l p o l i t i c s . As the l e v e l of a c t i v i t y f o r the f e d e r a l party i n c r e a s e d , the l e v e l of optimism in the p r o v i n c i a l party's f u t u r e decreased. A breakdown of p r o v i n c i a l a c t i v i t y by c a p a c i t y at the l e a d e r s h i p convention revealed that r e a l i s t s were more l i k e l y to be f e d e r a l c o n s t i t u e n c y r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s while o p t i m i s t s were more l i k e l y to be p r o v i n c i a l c o n s t i t u e n c y 76 representatives. 1* Therefore, activism in the federal party, rather than optimism in the provincial party, governed activism in the BC Liberal Party. We have seen that almost half the a c t i v i s t s believed tney belonged to a party that could win. Their optimism stemmed from a number of attributional biases, especially the i l l u s i o n of control over internal party features such as the leader and platform. Yet, their optimism did not determine involvement in the Liberal Party. Rather, federal activism was found to be the determinant of provincial participation. The negative relationship between variations in the level of optimism and a c t i v i t y reinforces this thesis' argument that persistence in activism for the Liberal Party was governed by attributional biases. The following hypothetical example w i l l i l l u s t r a t e this contention. Optimists, because of their lower participation rates, were subject to the false consensus e f f e c t . Party a c t i v i s t s , by d e f i n i t i o n , maintained contact with the electorate. It fallows that workers with higher participation rates would have had more contact with the voters. As such, the opportunity was there for the r e a l i s t s to make vali d assessments of the party's popularity among the voters. However, the optimists, given their lower participation rates, did not have a similar opportunity. They associated less with those who would not necessarily support their p o l i t i c a l This was s i g n i f i c a n t at the .04 le v e l . 77 values. Consequently, t h e i r sense of the r e p r e s e n t a t i v e n e s s of t h e i r p o l i t i c a l values could e a s i l y be biased i n the d i r e c t i o n of overestimating the extent to which t h e i r a t t i t u d e s toward the L i b e r a l Party were shared among v o t e r s . In turn, o p t i m i s t i c estimates of the party's p o p u l a r i t y meant there was l i t t l e reason to be a c t i v e l y r a i s i n g the p r o f i l e of the party. On the other hand, r e a l i s t s , by v i r t u e of t h e i r higher p a r t i c i p a t i o n r a t e s , set up a s e l f - f u l f i l l i n g prophecy. B e l i e f c r e a t e s r e a l i t y , and i n t h i s case, the b e l i e f that hard work pays o f f governed the i n c e n t i v e to work f o r the p r o v i n c i a l L i b e r a l Party. A c t i v i s m i n the f e d e r a l party enhanced t h e i r c o n v i c t i o n that more e f f o r t r e s u l t s i n the intended outcome. That the f e d e r a l party e l e c t e d candidates was v a l i d a t i o n i n i t s e l f of t h i s b e l i e f . Involvement with the f e d e r a l party provided a v i c a r i o u s t h r i l l of v i c t o r y , a s u c c e s s f u l outcome they a t t r i b u t e d to hard work. Ac t i v i s m i n the f e d e r a l party a l s o f u l f i l l e d the d e s i r e of the r e a l i s t s to be a s s o c i a t e d with a winning party and i t s p e r q u i s i t e s while remaining l o y a l to the L i b e r a l Party. I t can be reasonably argued that r e a l i s t s were, f i r s t and foremost, f e d e r a l a c t i v i s t s . P r o v i n c i a l a c t i v i s m was a means of demonstrating t h e i r commitment to the L i b e r a l Party. The purpose of doing so was twofold. F i r s t , l o y a l t y and party i d e n t i f i c a t i o n i n s p i r e d a c t i v i t y that would p o t e n t i a l l y r a i s e the p r o f i l e of the L i b e r a l Party i n BC. In turn, t h i s might help the f e d e r a l party's fortunes i n the province. Second, 78 demonstrable l o y a l t y and commitment i s u s u a l l y rewarded by the party. P o l i t i c a l opportunism, t h e r e f o r e , i n s p i r e d p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n the p r o v i n c i a l party o r g a n i z a t i o n . But the s a t i s f a c t i o n of t a n g i b l e , m a t e r i a l b e n e f i t s required they a l s o be a c t i v i s t s i n the f e d e r a l p a r t y . i 7 i - 7 The p l a u s i b i l i t y of the argument that the p r o v i n c i a l party was unable to give i t s workers c e r t a i n p e r q u i s i t e s i s apparent c o n s i d e r i n g the BC L i b e r a l Party's poor f i n a n c i a l s t a t u s and t h i n o r g a n i z a t i o n a l base. Presumption of t h e i r poor f i n a n c i a l s t a t u s was based on information contained i n the Executive Reports to the 1987 ( P o l i c y ) Convention of the BC L i b e r a l Party, Richmond, BC, May 8-10, 1987. For example, Dove Hendren, President's Report, 1 commented on a new f u n d r a i s i n g method: "...the t r a d i t i o n a l f i n a n c i a l woes of our party can indeed become part of h i s t o r y i f we a l l work together to make the new system work." She continues: "...we have a l s o lacked the resources to b u i l d our o r g a n i z a t i o n a l base and to implement communications programs, and s p e c i a l p r o j e c t s . Our f u t u r e e f f o r t s must be d i r e c t e d to making the new f u n d r a i s i n g program work to ensure that we have the necessary funds f o r the party to be a v i a b l e f o r c e i n the p o l i t i c a l l i f e of B r i t i s h Columbia (2)." The Vice-President's Report s a i d the party had to undertake a program of f i n a n c i a l r e s t r a i n t . This meant lack of funds f o r "the program component (Communication, Org a n i z a t i o n , Membership, P o l i c y (1) . " 79 C O N C L U S I O N The purpose of t h i s t h e s i s was to e x p l a i n why i n d i v i d u a l s are a c t i v e i n the BC L i b e r a l Party, c o n s i d e r i n g i t was f i n i s h e d as a v i a b l e f o r c e i n BC p o l i t i c s f o l l o w i n g the 1975 e l e c t i o n . Related goals were f i r s t , to c l a s s i f y t h e i r i n c e n t i v e s and second, to account f o r the f a c t o r s that governed them. This t h e s i s used a two-pronged t h e o r e t i c a l approach to formulate p r e d i c t i o n s about i n c e n t i v e s governing a c t i v i s m i n the BC L i b e r a l Party. It pr e d i c t e d that both i n c e n t i v e s dependent on, and independent of, the L i b e r a l Party being e l e c t e d would r e s u l t i n L i b e r a l Party a c t i v i s m . Data derived from a survey of L i b e r a l a c t i v i s t s was then analyzed f o r the presence of i n c e n t i v e s suggested i n the e x i s t i n g l i t e r a t u r e on motivations. Evidence f o r both types of i n c e n t i v e s was found. This t h e s i s used c o g n i t i v e m o t i v a t i o n a l theory to e x p l a i n party a c t i v i s m i n a f a i l e d party. Two types of a c t i v i s t s were c l a s s i f i e d : o p t i m i s t s and r e a l i s t s . The data revealed that the most o p t i m i s t i c a c t i v i s t s had the lowest l e v e l of involvement i n the party. In c o n t r a s t , the r e a l i s t i c a c t i v i s t s had the highest l e v e l of involvement i n the party. They were a l s o more l i k e l y to work f o r the f e d e r a l party as wel 1 . T h i s t h e s i s argued that v a r i a t i o n i n the types of a t t r i b u t i o n a l biases engaged i n determined the l e v e l of optimism and a c t i v i s m . It was concluded that o p t i m i s t s f a l s e l y b e lieved the party's values were widely shared by the v o t e r s . Therefore, s i n c e the party was already popular, o p t i m i s t s saw l i t t l e reason f o r higher p a r t i c i p a t i o n r a t e s . R e a l i s t s , on the other hand, b e l i e v e d that e f f o r t was the dependent v a r i a b l e i n the party's outcome i n the next e l e c t i o n , and as such, they were more a c t i v e l y involved i n the party. T h i s t h e s i s reported that personal i d e o l o g i e s and e v a l u a t i v e d i s p o s i t i o n s of L i b e r a l a c t i v i s t s were s t r i k i n g l y d i f f e r e n t from those of S o c i a l C r e d i t or NDP a c t i v i s t s . S p e c i f i c a l l y , L i b e r a l s placed S o c i a l C r e d i t and the NDP on opposite s i d e s of the l e f t - r i g h t continuum that c h a r a c t e r i z e s BC p o l i t i c s . They c l a s s i f i e d t h e i r party as n e i t h e r i n d i v i d u a l i s t nor c o l l e c t i v i s t . In e f f e c t , they perceived t h e i r party to be i d e o l o g i c a l l y balanced and to have moderate views on p o l i c y domains s a l i e n t to BC's p o l i t i c a l c u l t u r e . T h i s was then contrasted to the p o l i t i c a l b e l i e f s of former L i b e r a l a c t i v i s t s who j o i n e d the S o c i a l C r e d i t Party a f t e r the 1972 e l e c t i o n . T h i s t h e s i s contended that L i b e r a l d e f e c t o r s were members of the L i b e r a l Party because i t was a 81 f r e e - e n t e r p r i s e a l t e r n a t i v e , not because i t was moderate or i d e o l o g i c a l l y balanced. They were more l i k e l y to see the i n d i v i d u a l i s t / c o l l e c t i v i s t d i v i s i o n as a s a l i e n t aspect of t h e i r personal views. As such, they were not committed to the ends of the L i b e r a l Party. Consequently, when i t was apparent that the party was not s u f f i c i e n t l y v i a b l e to defeat s o c i a l i s m i n the province, they j o i n e d the S o c i a l C r e d i t Party, a more appropri a t e v e h i c l e f o r t h e i r b e l i e f s . It was concluded that c u r r e n t L i b e r a l a c t i v i s t s would not f e e l comfortable i n any other p r o v i n c i a l party. Therefore, i d e n t i f i c a t i o n with the ends of the L i b e r a l Party, i n c l u d i n g i t s i d e o l o g i c a l p o s i t i o n , was a strong motivation determining a c t i v i s m i n the L i b e r a l Party, d e s p i t e i t s h i s t o r y of d e f e a t s . T h i s t h e s i s asserted that former L i b e r a l a c t i v i s t s were a l s o motivated to leave the party because of t h e i r d e s i r e to be a s s o c i a t e d with a party that could reward i t s workers. P e r q u i s i t e s depending on the party winning e l e c t i o n s i n c l u d e patronage, ma t e r i a l b e n e f i t s , s t a t u s , career advancement and sensations a s s o c i a t e d with the t h r i l l of v i c t o r y . I t was argued that c u r r e n t L i b e r a l a c t i v i s m was a l s o governed by p o l i t i c a l opportunism. However, they chose a route s a t i s f y i n g t h i s i n c e n t i v e which allowed them to remain l o y a l to the L i b e r a l Party: they became a c t i v i s t s f o r the f e d e r a l L i b e r a l Party as w e l l . L i b e r a l a c t i v i s t s tended to f e e l that f e d e r a l p o l i t i c s was more important than p r o v i n c i a l p o l i t i c s and tended to f e e l c l o s e r to the f e d e r a l party. This was e s p e c i a l l y true of the r e a l i s t s . T h i s f i n d i n g suggested that 82 p r o v i n c i a l a c t i v i s t s r e l i e d on the f e d e r a l party f o r t h e i r rewards, t h e r e f o r e , o b v i a t i n g the need f o r the p r o v i n c i a l party to win e l e c t i o n s i n order to a t t r a c t and r e t a i n i t s a c t i v e supporters. A caveat to t h i s c o n c l u s i o n must here be noted. The survey was not designed to probe f o r motivations. As such, the methods used by t h i s t h e s i s were i n d i r e c t measures of motivations and i n c e n t i v e s . As i t was a p r e l i m i n a r y study, I have not weighed the r e l a t i v e c o n t r i b u t i o n s of these f a c t o r s . So whether these c o n c l u s i o n s are a l t e r n a t i v e e x p l a n a t i o n s , or simply strands w i t h i n the same ex p l a n a t i o n , i s not yet determined. A l l these f a c t o r s , i n v a r i o u s ways, c o n t r i b u t e d to determining a c t i v i s m i n the BC L i b e r a l Party. E x i s t i n g l i t e r a t u r e c l a s s i f i e s i n c e n t i v e s f o r party a c t i v i s m based on evidence from s u c c e s s f u l p o l i t i c a l p a r t i e s . As such, i t focuses on ideology, purposive concerns and p o l i t i c a l opportunism. While t h i s t h e s i s found those to be important i n c e n t i v e s f o r a c t i v i s m , patterns of c o g n i t i v e i n f e r e n c e s played an e q u a l l y powerful r o l e i n governing involvement i n a p o l i t i c a l party. Focussing on a weak, unsuccessful p o l i t i c a l party provided an opportunity to observe t h i s . 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In Canadian Provincial Politics: The Party Systems of the Ten Provinces. 2nd ed. Ed. Martin Robin. Scarborough, Ontario: P r e n t i c e - H a l l , 1978, 28-60. . Pillars of Profit: The Company Province, 1934-1972. Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1973. . The Rush for Spoils: The Company Province 1871-1933. Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1972. Roy, P a t r i c i a . "Progress, P r o s p e r i t y and P o l i t i c s : The Railway P o l i c i e s of Richard McBride." BC Studies, no. 47 (Autumn 1980), 3-28. Ruff, Norman J . "A P r o f i l e of B r i t i s h Columbia P r o v i n c i a l Party A c t i v i s t s : P r e l i m i n a r y A n a l y s i s of Three Conventions, November 1973." Unpublished d r a f t , U n i v e r s i t y of V i c t o r i a , n.d. . "Party Detachment and Voting Patterns i n a P r o v i n c i a l Two-Member Constituency: V i c t o r i a , 1972." BC Studies, no. 23 ( F a l l 1974), 3-24. Smiley, Donald V. Canada in Question: Federal ism in the Seventies. 2nd ed. Toronto: McGraw-Hill Ryerson, 1976, 83-113. Sorauf, Frank J . Political Parties in the American System. Boston: L i t t l e , Brown & Co., 1964, 60-97. T i g e r , L i o n e l . Optimism: The Biology of Hope. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1979. White, Graham. "One-Party Dominance and T h i r d P a r t i e s : The Pinard Theory Reconsidered." Canadian Journal of Political Science, 3 (1973), 399-421. Unpublished M a t e r i a l s A l p e r , Donald K. "From Rule to Ruin: The Conservative Party of B r i t i s h Columbia, 1928-1954." Unpublished PhD d i s s e r t a t i o n . U n i v e r s i t y of B r i t i s h Columbia, 1975. H a r r i s , C h r i s t o p h e r . " B r i t i s h Columbia 1972-1975: The Genesis of a Two-Party System." Unpublished M.A. t h e s i s , U n i v e r s i t y of B r i t i s h Columbia, 1987. Ward, J u d i t h B. " F e d e r a l - P r o v i n c i a l R e l a t i o n s i n the L i b e r a l Party." Unpublished M.A. t h e s i s , U n i v e r s i t y of B r i t i s h Columbia, 1966. 88 APPENDIX I BC LIBERAL PARTY ELECTION RESULTS, 1903-1986 E l e c t i o n Year Candidates E l e c t e d 7. Vote 1903 17 38.5 1907 12 37.1 1909 2 36.3 1912 0 25.2 1916 37 50.3 1920 26 39.0 1924 23 31.3 1928 12 40.0 1933 34 41 .7 1937 31 37.3 1941 21 32.9 1945= 36 55.8 1949= 39 61.4 1952 1 6 25.3 1953 i- 3 4 23.4 1956 2 21.8 I960* 4 20.9 1963 5 20.0 1966 6 20.2 1969 5 19.0 1972 5 16.4 1975 1 7.2 1979 0 0.7 1983 0 2.7 1986 0 6.7 Source: Statements of Votes, 1903 to 19B6. Province of B r i t i s h Columbia, Chief E l e c t o r a l O f f i c e . 1 f i n a l r e s u l t s of s i n g l e t r a n s f e r a b l e b a l l o t ( f i r s t and second counts were 23.467. and 23.597. r e s p e c t i v e l y f o r the L i b e r a l Party) = L i b e r a l Party e l e c t e d as part of c o a l i t i o n 3 L i b e r a l candidate e l e c t e d i n b y - e l e c t i o n ( V i c t o r i a ) November 24, 1953 g i v i n g the L i b e r a l Party a t o t a l of 5 seats * L i b e r a l candidate e l e c t e d i n b y - e l e c t i o n (Vancouver—Point Grey) December 17, 1962 g i v i n g the L i b e r a l Party a t o t a l of 5 seats B9 APPENDIX II A t t i t u d e S c a l e s 1 C o l l e c t i v e versus I n d i v i d u a l R e s p o n s i b i l i t y ( s c a l e scored i n i n d i v i d u a l r e s p o n s i b i l i t y d i r e c t i o n ) 1. A f t e r a person has worked u n t i l he i s 65, i t i s proper f o r the community to support him. (Disagree) 2. The government ought to make sure that everyone has a decent standard of l i v i n g . (Disagree) 3. Let's face i t , most unemployed people could f i n d a job i f they r e a l l y wanted to. (Agree) 4. Why should the government spend my tax d o l l a r s on s i c k people; my family always put aside something f o r a ra i n y day. (Agree) 5. Government r e g u l a t i o n s t i f l e s personal i n i t i a t i v e . OR Without government r e g u l a t i o n s , some people w i l l j u s t take advantage of the r e s t of us. (Choose f i r s t statement) 6. If I do my best, i t i s only r i g h t that the government should help me out when I get some bad breaks. OR Each i n d i v i d u a l should accept the consequences of t h e i r own a c t i o n s . (Choose second statement) Continentalism ( s c a l e scored i n c o n t i n e n t a l i s t d i r e c t i o n ) 1. Canada should have f r e e r trade with the United S t a t e s . (Agree) 2. Canada's independence i s threatened by the larg e percentage of f o r e i g n ownership i n key s e c t o r s of our economy. (Disagree) 3. We must ensure an independent Canada even i f that were to mean a lower standard of l i v i n g f o r Canadians. (Disagree) 1 I am g r a t e f u l to P r o f e s s o r Donald Blake of the U n i v e r s i t y of B r i t i s h Columbia f o r the use of these s c a l e s . 90 Populism ( s c a l e scored i n p o p u l i s t d i r e c t i o n ) 1. In the long run, I ' l l put my t r u s t i n the simple, down-to-earth t h i n k i n g of ordinary people rather than the t h e o r i e s of experts and i n t e l l e c t u a l s . (Agree) 2. We would probably s o l v e most of our big n a t i o n a l problems i f government could a c t u a l l y be brought back to the people at the grass r o o t s . (Agree) 3. What we need i s government that gets the job done without a l l t h i s red tape. (Agree) A n t i r e g u l a t i o n This s c a l e was created by summing the number of areas i n which a respondent favoured s l i g h t or s u b s t a n t i a l r e d u c t i o n s i n government r e g u l a t i o n . The p o l i c y areas were: environmental p r o t e c t i o n marketing of a g r i c u l t u r a l products land use s a l e of a l c o h o l shopping hours gambling 

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