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NATO and the INF controversy : nuclear weapons, deterrence, and the Atlantic Alliance Sens, Allen Gregory 1988

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NATO AND THE INF CONTROVERSY: NUCLEAR WEAPONS, DETERRENCE, AND THE ATLANTIC ALLIANCE By ALLEN GREGORY SENS B.A., The U n i v e r s i t y of B r i t i s h Columbia, 1986 A THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF MASTER OF ARTS i n THE FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIES Department of P o l i t i c a l S c i e n c e We a c c e p t t h i s t h e s i s as c o n f o r m i n g t o the r e q u i r e d s t a n d a r d THE UNIVERSITY OF BRITISH COLUMBIA August 1988 (?) A l l e n Gregory Sens, 1988 In p r e s e n t i n g this thesis in part ia l f u l f i l men t o f t h e requ i remen ts fo r an a d v a n c e d d e g r e e at t h e Univers i ty o f Bri t ish C o l u m b i a , I agree that t h e Library shall m a k e it f ree ly avai lable fo r re ference a n d s tudy . I f u r the r agree that permiss ion fo r ex tens ive c o p y i n g o f th is thesis fo r scholar ly p u r p o s e s may b e g r a n t e d by the h e a d o f m y d e p a r t m e n t o r by his o r her representa t ives . It is u n d e r s t o o d tha t c o p y i n g o r pub l i ca t i on o f th is thesis fo r f inanc ia l ga in shall n o t b e a l l o w e d w i t h o u t m y w r i t t e n pe rm iss ion . D e p a r t m e n t o f P o l i t i c a l Science T h e Un ivers i ty o f Brit ish C o l u m b i a 1956 M a i n M a l l Vancouver , Canada V 6 T 1Y3 D a t e 17 August 1988  DE-6(3 /81) i i A b s t r a c t The Intermediate-Range Nuclear Force (INF) c o n t r o v e r s y was one of the most intense i n t r a - A l l i a n c e debates experienced by NATO. The depth of the d i s p u t e , e s p e c i a l l y between the US and the European NATO members, threatened the very u n i t y and cohesion of the A l l i a n c e i t s e l f . The INF c o n t r o v e r s y was the r e s u l t of two f a c t o r s : f i r s t , the establishment of s t r a t e g i c p a r i t y by the S o v i e t Union which brought i n t o q u e s t i o n the c r e d i b i l i t y of the US s e c u r i t y guarantee to Europe; and second, the widening gap i n the p o l i t i c a l and s t r a t e g i c i n t e r e s t s of the US and i t s " European a l l i e s . These f a c t o r s combined to produce the two c e n t r a l - - a n d c o n f l i c t i n g - - f o r c e s at work d u r i n g the INF debate. The Europeans sought s t r a t e g i c reassurance, i n the form of t h e a t r e - n u c l e a r systems, to r e s t o r e the i n t e g r i t y of the seamless web of d e t e r r e n c e . The divergence of p o l i t i c a l and s t r a t e g i c i n t e r e s t s between the US and Europe, however, meant c o n f l i c t over the posture and c h a r a c t e r of any new f o r c e . In the i n t e r e s t s of p r e s e r v i n g the u n i t y of the A l l i a n c e , these problems were " s o l v e d " i n t y p i c a l A l l i a n c e f a s h i o n ; through compromising to a consensus. The December 12 d e c i s i o n was based on erroneous and outdated c onceptions of the s i g n i f i c a n c e of n u c l e a r weapons f o r d e t e r r e n c e i n Europe. What NATO pl a n n e r s , and many western a n a l y s t s , have f a i l e d to re c o g n i z e i s the d i m i n i s h i n g e f f e c t i v e n e s s of US nuclear weapons i n m a i n t a i n i n g e f f e c t i v e deterrence i n Western Europe. Deterrence i n Europe i s not p r i m a r i l y dependent on US nucle a r f o r c e s and the t h r e a t of d e l i b e r a t e nuclear e s c a l a t i o n they imply. Rather, deterrence i n Europe should be understood as a compound product of many r i s k f a c t o r s . Henceforth, t h i n k i n g about NATO's d e t e r r e n t requirements must reco g n i z e the l i m i t e d u t i l i t y of s u c c e s s i v e deployments of US nucl e a r f o r c e s as a d e t e r r e n t . Greater r e l i a n c e must be p l a c e d on the d e t e r r e n t value of other r i s k f a c t o r s which e x i s t i n the European t h e a t r e , most notably the i n c r e a s i n g l y powerful and d i s c r i m i n a t i n g c a p a b i l i t i e s of the French and B r i t i s h n u c l e a r f o r c e s . i v TABLE OF CONTENTS Ab s t r a c t . . . i i Table of Contents i v L i s t of Tables v i Acknowledgement v i i THE EVOLUTION OF NATO's NUCLEAR AFFLICTION 1 The Genesis of NATO's Nuclear A f f l i c t i o n 5 E a r l y NATO Nuclear D o c t r i n e : More i s B e t t e r 7 C h a l l e n g i n g the S e c u r i t y Quarantee 17 Pressures f o r Mo d e r n i z a t i o n : More i s Necessary 28 THE US/EUROPEAN STRATEGIC AND POLITICAL SPLIT........ 36 Extended Deterrence i n Theory 36. The P e r s p e c t i v e s 40 The US/European Threat P e r c e p t i o n S p l i t . . . 52 The US/European S t r a t e g i c S p l i t 59 The Force S t r u c t u r e S p l i t . 66 The Arms C o n t r o l S p l i t 72 Domestic P r o t e s t s : Less i s B e t t e r 77 THE GREAT COMPROMISE: THE MODERNIZATION DECISION..... 81 The Dual Track Concept and A l l i a n c e P o l i t i c s 82 The P o l i t i c a l N e c e s s i t y of Deployment..... 83.. The Weapons and Deployment: C r u i s e and Pershing I I . 86 C r i t i c i s m s of Deployment 91 THE REALITY OF COMPOUND DETERRENCE IN EUROPE......... 104 Reassessing the Conventional Option 105 Reassessing the Nuclear D e t e r r e n t Balance 114 Compound Deterrence:Present R e a l i t y , Future P o l i c y . 134 CASHING IN THE BARGAINING CHIP.. 138 The Terms 1 39 Op p o s i t i o n i n the US 143 Op p o s i t i o n and Senate R a t i f i c a t i o n 147 European O p p o s i t i o n : the R e v i v a l of European Angst. 149 The B a t t l e f i e l d Nuclear Modernization Debate 153 Towards a Coherent Nuclear Force Posture i n Europe. 158 The New Nuclear Force 162 ENDNOTES 170 BIBLIOGRAPHY 194 APPENDIX I: MULTIPLE RISK AND COMPOUND DETERRENCE 205 GLOSSARY 228 v i LIST OF TABLES Table I: Tendencies of Opinion amongst P e r s p e c t i v e Groupings p. 51 Table I I : H y p o t h e t i c a l P r o b a b i l i t i e s of A v o i d i n g E s c a l a t i o n p. 211 Table I I I : H y p o t h e t i c a l Compound Risk C a l c u l a t i o n s in C r i s i s p. 212 V I 1 ACKNOWLEDGEMENT The completion of t h i s t h e s i s would not have been p o s s i b l e without the support and encouragement of many people. I g r e a t l y a p p r e c i a t e the input and a s s i s t a n c e of my s u p e r v i s o r , Douglas A. Ross, and the members of my committee, Paul Marantz and Donald Munton. I n v a l u a b l e emotional support and damage c o n t r o l was p r o v i d e d by my c o l l e a g u e s F r a n c i s Furtado, Ann Rogers, Jim Fergusson, Dave Stewart, Marc D e s j a r d i n s , Danny Savas, Mary G o l d i e , and M a r t i n G r i f f i t h s . F u r t h e r support was generously p r o v i d e d by H e i d i P e l t z e r , Nancy Mina, P e t u l a M u l l e r , and the s t a t i o n a r y c a b i n e t at the I n s t i t u t e of I n t e r n a t i o n a l R e l a t i o n s . S p e c i a l g r a t i t u d e i s extended to Rachel F o u l a d i , whose love and understanding preserved my s a n i t y . L a s t , and foremost, my e v e r l a s t i n g thanks i s extended to my p a r e n t s , whose care and support made t h i s t h e s i s p o s s i b l e . 1 CHAPTER I: THE EVOLUTION OF NATO's NUCLEAR AFFLICTION Since i t s i n c e p t i o n i n 1949, the North A t l a n t i c T r e aty O r g a n i z a t i o n (NATO) has grappled with the p o l i t i c a l and d o c t r i n a l dilemma posed by the presence of n u c l e a r weapons in Europe. During the s o - c a l l e d Golden Age 1 of US nuclear supremacy i n the 1950's, nuc l e a r systems and warheads were deployed i n Europe in ever i n c r e a s i n g numbers, with l i t t l e or no regard f o r m i l i t a r y needs or employment d o c t r i n e s . The p o t e n t i a l problems these weapons c o u l d c r e a t e i n the f u t u r e were d e a l t with i n t y p i c a l A l l i a n c e f a s h i o n ; they were ignored. The development of s t r a t e g i c p a r i t y between the US and the USSR s i g n a l l e d the end of haphazard nu c l e a r deployments to Europe and the beginning of attempts to mold a nuclear p o l i c y consensus w i t h i n the A l l i a n c e . A f t e r notable f a i l u r e s such as the MLF c o n t r o v e r s y (which c o n t r i b u t e d to the withdrawal from the A l l i a n c e of one of the l a r g e r member n a t i o n s , France) and the Neutron bomb f i a s c o , the NATO na t i o n s seemingly reached a consensus on n u c l e a r f o r c e posture and weapons deployments i n 1979. T h i s seeming consensus, however, was a facade; i t was l e s s a consensus than a compromise between p e r s i s t e n t i n t e r - a l l i a n c e disagreements on s e c u r i t y and p o l i t i c a l i s s u e s . At a meeting i n B r u s s e l s on December 12, 1979, r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s of the member n a t i o n s of the North A t l a n t i c T r e a ty O r g a n i z a t i o n announced the i n t e n t i o n of the A l l i a n c e 2 to modernize i t s n u c l e a r a r s e n a l . 572 new long range ground launched systems were to be p l a c e d i n Europe. .Of t h i s t o t a l , 464 of these systems would be Ground Launched C r u i s e M i s s i l e s (GLCMs) deployed i n f i v e European c o u n t r i e s , while a f u r t h e r 108 Pershing II Intermediate-Range B a l l i s t i c M i s s i l e s (IRBMs) 2 would be deployed i n West Germany. At the same time, both to demonstrate the A l l i a n c e ' s commitment to arms c o n t r o l and to emphasize that the deployment d e c i s i o n was not a wanton act of, e s c a l a t i o n , NATO . r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s announced t h e i r w i l l i n g n e s s to engage i n n e g o t i a t i o n s with the USSR to achieve a balance in Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) i n Europe. 3 T h i s announcement of the i n t e n t to deploy new INF systems i n Europe while simultaneously pursuing arms c o n t r o l has come to be known as the Dual Track d e c i s i o n . The p o l i t i c a l debates l e a d i n g up to the December 12 d e c i s i o n encountered the same d i f f i c u l t i e s as past NATO nucle a r p l a n n i n g . These d i f f i c u l t i e s are the r e s u l t of the c o n t r a d i c t o r y s t r a t e g i c and p o l i t i c a l i n t e r e s t s between the A l l i a n c e members who are separated by the A t l a n t i c Ocean. E s s e n t i a l l y a c h a r a c t e r i s t i c NATO compromise between those who d e s i r e d enhanced European s e c u r i t y through strengthened defences and those who viewed arms c o n t r o l as the best method of a c h i e v i n g s t a b i l i t y and s e c u r i t y , the Dual Track d e c i s i o n was meant to i n c r e a s e l e v e l s of A l l i a n c e cohesion, c o o p e r a t i o n , and u n i t y ; i n s t e a d , i t was to have the opposite e f f e c t . C o n f l i c t emerged over what shape the new INF f o r c e 3 should take and whether or not the deployment of new systems c o u l d adequately r e s t o r e the c r e d i b i l i t y of extended deter r e n c e and the o p e r a b i l i t y of f l e x i b l e response. The divergence on these i s s u e s was g r e a t e s t between the US and the European NATO c o u n t r i e s . Clashes of p o l i t i c a l and s t r a t e g i c i n t e r e s t s a c r o s s the A t l a n t i c were to dominate i n t e r - A l l i a n c e debate. T h i s study w i l l focus on two dimensions of the INF debate. I t w i l l demonstrate the extent to which s t r a t e g i c and extended deterrence c o n s i d e r a t i o n s were l o s t i n the p o l i t i c s of c o n t r a d i c t o r y p o l i t i c a l i n t e r e s t s among A l l i a n c e members. These i n t r a - A l l i a n c e d i f f e r e n c e s over NATO d o c t r i n e , f o r c e s t r u c t u r e , and n e g o t i a t i o n posture reduced the f o r m u l a t i o n of NATO nucl e a r p o l i c y to an emphasis on the lowest common p o l i c y denominator which ensured, a consensus on modernization. The December 12 d e c i s i o n was a great compromise between NATO's nuclear requirements and d i f f e r i n g p o l i t i c a l and s t r a t e g i c p e r s p e c t i v e s on the shape that posture should take. T h i s study emphasizes that the s i g n i f i c a n c e of US n u c l e a r weapons i n m a i n t a i n i n g e f f e c t i v e deterrence i n Europe has been g r e a t l y overestimated. A l l i a n c e governments and NATO e l i t e s have h e l d fundamentally erroneous and outdated c o n c e p t i o n s about the u t i l i t y of US n u c l e a r weapons in e n s u r i n g e f f e c t i v e d e t e r r e n c e of S o v i e t a g g r e s s i o n a g a i n s t Western Europe. Over the past f i v e years i n p a r t i c u l a r , the c r e d i b i l i t y of NATO's d e t e r r e n t posture has 4 u n f o r t u n a t e l y and i n c o r r e c t l y come to-be equated with the c r e d i b i l i t y of NATO's Intermediate-Range Theatre Nuclear Forces (INF). T h i s study demonstrates that such views are mistaken. Deterrence i n Europe i s best seen not as a r e s u l t of a u n i t a r y element of r i s k of nuclear e s c a l a t i o n , but ra t h e r must be seen as a compound product of m u l t i p l e r i s k f a c t o r s . Such f a c t o r s i n c l u d e : 1) the p r o b a b i l i t y that NATO's c o n v e n t i o n a l defence w i l l succeed; 2) the p r o b a b i l i t y of d e l i b e r a t e French or B r i t i s h e s c a l a t i o n i n the face of So v i e t a g g r e s s i o n ; and 3) the p r o b a b i l i t y of i n a d v e r t e n t or a c c i d e n t a l e s c a l a t i o n o c c u r r i n g d u r i n g non-nuclear h o s t i l i t i e s . NATO l e a d e r s and m i l i t a r y planners must come to recogn i z e the compounded nature of deterr e n c e i n Europe. Such r e c o g n i t i o n r e q u i r e s a change i n the t r a d i t i o n a l NATO view of US nuclea weapons i n Europe. There has been a p e r s i s t e n t f a i l u r e to recognize that the u t i l i t y of US nucle a r weapons as an e f f e c t i v e d e t e r r e n t f a c t o r i n Europe has d e c l i n e d . T h i s f a c t should have been reco g n i z e d d u r i n g the i n t i a l stages of the INF debate. However, NATO l e a d e r s and p l a n n e r s f a i l e d to c o n s i d e r , or wrongly d i s m i s s e d , the i m p l i c a t i o n s of the changed s t r a t e g i c environment i n Europe. NATO's t r a d i t i o n a l r e l i a n c e on US nuclear weapons has c r e a t e d a decision-making p a r a l y s i s , a c u l t of US nuclear dependency, which has l e d to an i n f l e x i b l e adherence to. e s t a b i s h e d norms of what i s c o n s i d e r e d necessary f o r robust d e t e r r e n c e i n Europe. In order to s u c c e s s f u l l y manage NATO's 5 nucle a r p o l i c y in the f u t u r e , NATO l e a d e r s and planners must move away from the outdated concepts which have guided NATO nuclear p o l i c y s i n c e the i n c e p t i o n of the A l l i a n c e . For a p r e c i s e understanding of the genesis of NATO's nucl e a r a f f l i c t i o n and why adherence to t r a d i t i o n a l modes of t h i n k i n g about US nuclear f o r c e s i n Europe has been so p e r v a s i v e , i t i s necessary to examine the e v o l u t i o n of NATO's nucl e a r dependency. The Genesis of NATO's Nuclear A f f l i c t i o n The damage i n f l i c t e d on the c o u n t r i e s of c e n t r a l and Western Europe during World War II., coupled w i t h ' the s w i f t withdrawal and d e m o b i l i z a t i o n of the • m a j o r i t y of A l l i e d m i l i t a r y f o r c e s l e f t behind a s e c u r i t y quandary f o r the na t i o n s West of the f u r t h e s t l i n e of S o v i e t advance. The d e s t r u c t i o n of the gr e a t e r p a r t of the Western European i n d u s t r i a l base, the l o s s e s i n c u r r e d by t h e i r p o p u l a t i o n s , and the l a b o r i o u s and resource-consuming process of r e c o n s t r u c t i o n made any independent defence e f f o r t a g a i n s t f u r t h e r S o v i e t expansion v i r t u a l l y i m p o s s i b l e . Those Western n a t i o n s s t i l l capable of f i e l d i n g m i l i t a r i l y s i g n i f i c a n t f o r c e s , e s p e c i a l l y the US, were f e e l i n g the economic and domestic p r e s s u r e s of m a i n t a i n i n g such f o r c e s and were h a s t i l y d e m o b i l i z i n g the vast bulk of t h e i r World War II s o l d i e r y . As the m i l i t a r y f o r c e s of the USSR appeared to show few si g n s of a s i m i l a r s c a l e of withdrawal and d e m o b i l i z a t i o n , 6 i t was b e l a t e d l y recognized that some mutual s e c u r i t y arrangements were r e q u i r e d to ensure that Western Europe d i d not come under d i r e c t or i n d i r e c t a t t a c k . Two fundamental c o n d i t i o n s of any Western s e c u r i t y pact were immediately re c o g n i z e d ; f i r s t , that the Western natio n s c o u l d not hope to match the USSR's a l l e g e d c o n v e n t i o n a l f o r c e l e v e l s , and second, the only c a p a b i l i t y i n which the West enjoyed s u p e r i o r i t y was i n nucl e a r weapons. A c c o r d i n g l y , the i n i t i a l concept of the North A t l a n t i c A l l i a n c e c e n t r e d around the f a c t that the Western European n a t i o n s c o u l d not match the c o n v e n t i o n a l s t r e n g t h of the S o v i e t Union, and t h e r e f o r e the s e c u r i t y of Europe was to be guaranteed by US nucl e a r f o r c e s . The u l t i m a t e d e t e r r e n t to S o v i e t a g g r e s s i o n i n Europe was to be the US pledge to use i t s s t r a t e g i c n u c l e a r weapons a g a i n s t the USSR r a t h e r than accept defeat i n Europe. I m p l i c i t i n t h i s guarantee was the US r e c o g n i t i o n that the l o s s of Europe would be d i s a s t r o u s f o r i t s own i n t e r e s t s . T h i s posture was r e i n f o r c e d by the d e s i r e of Europeans to a v o i d another c o n v e n t i o n a l war on t h e i r t e r r i t o r y . D eterrence, based on the US s t r a t e g i c n u c l e a r f o r c e and Forward Based Systems (FBS), was to keep the peace i n Europe. In t h i s c o n t e x t , e a r l y NATO nuclear d o c t r i n e c a l l e d f o r the use of s t r a t e g i c and FBS nuclear weapons i n response to any s i g n i f i c a n t a g g r e s s i o n . From these e a r l y s t r a t e g i c r a t i o n a l e s , t h e r e f o r e , the nuclear p o l i c y of the A l l i a n c e r e s t e d on a fundamental s t r a t e g i c paradox; t h a t "...NATO's 7 nuclear d o c t r i n e r e s t s on an American response even when American s o i l i s not a t t a c k e d . " " The r e a l i t y of European dependence on the US as the u l t i m a t e guarantor of i t s s e c u r i t y d e s p i t e t h i s paradox has had a deep and p e r s i s t e n t consequence; the c r e d i b i l i t y of t h i s guarantee i s a c e n t r a l A l l i a n c e i s s u e and i s under constant s c r u t i n y , e s p e c i a l l y from Europe, where reassurance i s a m i l i t a r y , p o l i t i c a l , and p s y c h o l o g i c a l n e c e s s i t y . The f i r s t reassurance p r o v i d e d by the US was the deployment of T a c t i c a l Nuclear Weapons (TNW) to Europe as a v i s i b l e means of ensuring an e s c a l a t o r y l i n k between Europe and S t r a t e g i c A i r Command (SAC). T h i s s o l i d i f i e d the US commitment to the view that any a t t a c k i n Europe would upset the s t r a t e g i c balance and t h r e a t e n the p o s i t i o n of the US. With the deployment of TNW, t h e r e f o r e , " . . . s t r a t e g i c deployment r a t h e r than a d e c i s i o n taken at the moment of a t t a c k would determine the US response." 5 I t was t h i s p o l i t i c a l commitment, combined with the deployment of nuclear weapons to Europe, that l a i d the foundation f o r a s e c u r i t y r e l a t i o n s h i p that has s t r u g g l e d to f i n d a n u c l e a r d o c t r i n e and a f o r c e s t r u c t u r e that s a t i f i e s both the extended d e t e r r e n c e l o g i c of the s e c u r i t y guarantee and the d i v e r g e n t p o l i t i c a l and s t r a t e g i c i n t e r e s t s among A l l i a n c e members. E a r l y NATO Nuclear D o c t r i n e ; More i s B e t t e r From 1960 on, ever g r e a t e r q u a n t i t i e s of t a c t i c a l 8 n u c l e a r weapons were deployed i n Europe. From 1960 to 1965 the number of n u c l e a r weapons i n Europe rose from 2500 to 5000. T h i s i n c r e a s e i n European based nuclear s t o c k p i l e s was made without a c l e a r m i l i t a r y / d o c t r i n a l r o l e f o r t h e i r employment. NATO nucl e a r p o l i c y seemed to f o l l o w the adage that i f some nuclear weapons were a good t h i n g f o r European s e c u r i t y , then more had to be b e t t e r . Only the m i l i t a r y had any conceptual frameworks for t a c t i c a l n uclear use, and these were bound to c o n v e n t i o n a l b a t t l e f i e l d t a c t i c a l t h i n k i n g . As Henry K i s s i n g e r has observed, TNW's were p l a c e d i n Europe with "...no very p r e c i s e idea of what to do with them." 6 Morton H a l p e r i n , i n h i s p r e s e n t a t i o n to the Senate Committee on F o r e i g n R e l a t i o n s i n 1974, p o i n t e d out that ...the deployment of t a c t i c a l n u c l e a r weapons to Europe duri n g the l a t e 1950's occu r r e d without any e x t e n s i v e d i s c u s s i o n between governments -as to how these weapons might be used. Nor was there any s u b s t a n t i a l d i s c u s s i o n i n v o l v i n g c i v i l i a n o f f i c i a l s i n the American government on the s t r a t e g y f o r d e p l o y i n g n u c l e a r weapons. Rather, these d i s c u s s i o n s were by and l a r g e l e f t to the m i l i t a r y . 7 The m i l i t a r y , however, c o n c e n t r a t e d e x c l u s i v e l y on the b a t t l e f i e l d employment of the weapons, i n t e n d i n g them f o r use a g a i n s t c o n c e n t r a t i o n s of S o v i e t armoured formations and choke p o i n t s . The idea was to "hold at r i s k " such c o n c e n t r a t i o n s and discourage the S o v i e t s from massing t h e i r f o r c e s i n the q u a n t i t i e s r e q u i r e d f o r an armoured breakthrough. The key behind t h i s lack of s t r a t e g i c or d o c t r i n a l p l a n n i n g i s that European TNW deployment was i n s t i g a t e d as a 9 quick f i x for p e r c e i v e d c o n v e n t i o n a l f o r c e d e f i c i e n c i e s . T h i s quick f i x was motivated by the p o l i t i c a l r e l u c t a n c e to spend scarce resources on c o n v e n t i o n a l m i l i t a r y f o r c e s . Nuclear weapons were an a t t r a c t i v e p o l i t i c a l o p t i o n . Uwe N e r l i c h p o i n t s out that s i n c e the e a r l y days of European deployment, TNW have t r a d i t i o n a l l y been viewed as a s u b s t i t u t e f o r c o n v e n t i o n a l f o r c e spending, and as such TNW p l a n n i n g has never r e c e i v e d the d o c t r i n a l and s t r a t e g i c development a s s o c i a t e d with weapons that serve a c l e a r , d e f i n e d m i l i t a r y purpose and s t r a t e g y . 8 T h i s nuclear h e r i t a g e was to l e a d to p e r s i s t e n t A l l i a n c e c o n t r o v e r s y over a l l a s p e c t s of nuclear d o c t r i n e and p l a n n i n g i n the f u t u r e . E a r l y A l l i a n c e s t r a t e g y c a l l i n g f o r an automatic n u c l e a r r e s p o n s e — c o n f i r m e d i n the NATO P o l i t i c a l D i r e c t i v e of 1956—was l e s s a product of a c o n s c i o u s , c a l c u l a t e d ' d e c i s i o n than a c h o i c e between a p o l i t i c a l i m p o s s i b i l i t y and a s t r a t e g i c unknown. A c o n v e n t i o n a l defence was known to be impossible given resource c o n s t r a i n t s ; a nuclear defence, on the other hand, might be p o s s i b l e , or at l e a s t c o u l d not be proven immpossible. The hopelessness of the c o n v e n t i o n a l o p t i o n was brought home to NATO planners a f t e r two f a i l e d attempts to e s t a b l i s h c o n v e n t i o n a l f o r c e requirements f o r the A l l i a n c e . The f i r s t of these attempts was u n v e i l e d i n 1949. Known as DC-28, the plan c a l l e d f o r some 100 d i v i s i o n s and over 9000 combat a i r c r a f t . The second, and more famous, plan was the Lisbon Force Goals of 1952. E s t a b l i s h e d by the "Three Wise Men" (composed of A v e r e l l Harriman, S i r Edwin 10 Plowden, and Jean Monet, i n an E x e c u t i v e Group set up by the Temporary C o u n c i l Committee), the Lisbon f o r c e goals c a l l e d f o r 96 d i v i s i o n s and 4000 combat a i r c r a f t , not i n c l u d i n g the f o r c e s of Greece and Turkey. When i t became obvious that such c o n v e n t i o n a l f o r c e l e v e l s c o u l d never be a t t a i n e d , f e a r s arose w i t h i n NATO that the d i s p a r i t y between p e r c e i v e d defence needs and a v a i l a b l e resources would, cause the break up of the A l l i a n c e . NATO planners (and US planners seeking to augment the combat s t r e n g t h of t h e i r reduced c o n v e n t i o n a l f o r c e s ) began to search f o r the means to reduce c o n v e n t i o n a l f o r c e requirements. Nuclear weapons, both s t r a t e g i c and t a c t i c a l , were s e i z e d upon as the best means of m a i n t a i n i n g a high l e v e l of d e f e n s i v e firepower while reducing c o n v e n t i o n a l f o r c e needs. With the cost of the Lisbon Force Goals seen as p r o h i b i t i v e , the Eisenhower A d m i n i s t r a t i o n i n 1954 adopted the 'New Look' approach--based on massive r e t a l i a t i o n and e a r l y use of b a t t l e f i e l d n u c l e a r weapons--in which every m i l i t a r y c o n f l i c t of s i g n i f i c a n c e would be met with nuclear weapons. 9 T h i s p o l i c y , g e n e r a l by nature, l a c k e d any s p e c i f i c employment d o c t r i n e f o r TNW i n Europe. The d e - f a c t o abandonment of the f o r c e l e v e l s c a l l e d f o r i n the Lis b o n Force Goals was made o f f i c i a l by the US Radford Plan p r o p o s a l . R e l y i n g h e a v i l y on g r e a t e r deployments of TNW under the double veto system, the Radford Plan proposed a c o n v e n t i o n a l f o r c e l e v e l of 30 d i v i s i o n s . 1 0 The NATO Atomic War Plan of 1954-1956, which e s t a b l i s h e d the foundation of a 11 t a c t i c a l n uclear w a r f i g h t i n g d o c t r i n e , attempted to i n t e g r a t e nuclear use with c o n v e n t i o n a l f o r c e posture, i n r e c o g n i t i o n of the enormous impact TNW c o u l d have on the b a t t l e f i e l d . 1 1 Each s u c c e s s i v e NATO f o r c e s t r u c t u r e plan p l a c e d i n c r e a s e d emphasis on nucl e a r weapons, as c o n v e n t i o n a l f o r c e l e v e l s continued to f a l l short of plann i n g g o a l s . The r e l i a n c e of the New Look and NATO nuclear war plans on the e a r l y use of nuclear weapons to defend Europe allowed the gap between f o r c e posture and f o r c e requirements to narrow to a c r e d i b l e margin, thus a v o i d i n g any s e r i o u s c h a l l e n g e s to the u n i t y of the A l l i a n c e . NATO governments accepted the New Look and the t a c t i c a l n u c l e a r war plans but f a i l e d to meet the two c r i t i c a l requirements of the s t r a t e g i e s ; ' readjustment of f o r c e posture f o r nucl e a r combat and a v a i l a b i l i t y of nu c l e a r weapons to NATO f o r c e s at the ou t s e t of any war. Force readjustment was c r i t i c a l to the premise of using n u c l e a r weapons to defend Europe. The great d e s t r u c t i v e n e s s of nucle a r s t r i k e s meant that o l d s t y l e m i l i t a r y formations were h i g h l y v u l n e r a b l e . Without f o r c e r e s t r u c t u r i n g , more, not fewer, c o n v e n t i o n a l f o r c e s would be r e q u i r e d . In a d d i t i o n , e a r l y f i r s t use of nucl e a r weapons depended upon e a r l y a v a i l a b i l i t y . Otherwise the p r a c t i c a l i t y and c r e d i b i l i t y of the s t r a t e g y was h i g h l y q u e s t i o n a b l e . The f a i l u r e of NATO governments to adopt measures to s a t i s f y these requirements l e d to the i n t r o d u c t i o n of the 12 Pause concept, which c a l l e d f o r an i n i t i a l c o n v e n t i o n a l defence to p r o v i d e time f o r n e g o t i a t i o n s and perhaps some second guessing on the pa r t of the aggressor. T h i s l e d to a demand f o r 'dual capable' f o r c e s which c o u l d wage both a c o n v e n t i o n a l and a nuclear war. By 1960, the emphasis on TNW in NATO pl a n n i n g had le a d to the deployment of over 7000 TNW in Europe. By the mid-1960's, however, the c r e d i b i l i t y of massive r e t a l i a t i o n and e a r l y use was soon q u e s t i o n e d i n the face of i n c r e a s i n g S o v i e t s t r a t e g i c c a p a b i l i t i e s . In l a t e 1963, S o v i e t ICBM programs had succeeded i n i r o n i n g out p e r s i s t e n t development problems and by the mid-1960's the USSR' began a r a p i d b u i l d u p of s t r a t e g i c and t h e a t r e nuclear weapons, which threatened both the US and Europe. As a r e s u l t , with the Thor and J u p i t e r m i s s i l e s withdrawn from Europe and the SAC bombers re-based i n the US to reduce t h e i r v u l n e r a b i l i t y , p r e s s u r e was put on the s e c u r i t y l i n k between.the US and Europe w e l l before p a r i t y was t r u l y a c h i e v e d . 1 2 For most of the m i d - t o - l a t e 1960s, with l i t t l e or no c o n v e n t i o n a l or L i m i t e d Nuclear Options (LNOs) i n Europe or at the s t r a t e g i c l e v e l , the US was faced with the prospect of having to respond to agg r e s s i o n i n Europe with massive, p o o r l y c o n t r o l l e d n u c l e a r s t r i k e s . In the face of e v e r - i n c r e a s i n g S o v i e t n u c l e a r c a p a b i l i t i e s , the c r e d i b i l i t y of t h i s form of response was s t e a d i l y weakening. The Kennedy . A d m i n i s t r a t i o n , d e s i r i n g g r e a t e r f l e x i b i l i t y i n i t s s t r a t e g i c o p t i o n s , i n t r o d u c e d the concept of f l e x i b l e response i n t o A l l i a n c e p l a n n i n g . The u n d e r l y i n g 13 premise of the new concept was to provide a c r e d i b l e response a c r o s s the e n t i r e spectrum of p o s s i b i l i t i e s . Responses to aggr e s s i o n were to be made at a l e v e l c o n s i s t e n t with that of the t h r e a t . F l e x i b l e Response was formally, adopted i n 1967, durin g the Nuclear Planning Group's Healy-Schroeder e x e r c i s e . T h i s s i g n a l l e d the abandonment of the p r i n c i p l e s of massive r e t a l i a t i o n and the f i r m adoption of a p o l i c y based on the t a c t i c a l use of nucl e a r weapons. Formal NATO s t r a t e g y , both c o n v e n t i o n a l and n u c l e a r , was set out on January 16, 1968, in a document known as 14/3 and e n t i t l e d " O v e r a l l S t r a t e g i c Concept f o r the Defense of the NATO Area". R e p l a c i n g 14/2, which a r t i c u l a t e d the o l d s t r a t e g y of massive r e t a l i a t i o n , 14/3 based A l l i a n c e d o c t r i n e on the p r i n c i p l e of f l e x i b l e response. I t c a l l e d on NATO to 1) meet i n i t i a l l y any aggresssor short of gen e r a l nuclear a t t a c k with a d i r e c t a t t a c k at the l e v e l - -c o n v e n t i o n a l or n u c l e a r — c h o s e n by the aggressor, 2) conduct a d e l i b e r a t e e s c a l a t i o n i f the aggressor cannot be con t a i n e d and the s i t u a t i o n r e s t o r e d by d i r e c t defense, 3) i n i t i a t e an a p p r o p r i a t e general n u c l e a r response to a major nucl e a r a t t a c k . 1 3 The s t r a t e g y of f l e x i b l e response was not accepted without some a n x i e t y on the pa r t of the Europeans. In t h e i r view, the new d o c t r i n e removed the a u t o m a t i c i t y of nucl e a r response, which would now take p l a c e a f t e r d e l i b e r a t i o n . T h i s r a i s e d f e a r s over whether the US was t r y i n g to disengage from i t s nu c l e a r l i n k a g e to Europe. The M u l t i l a t e r a l Force (MLF) c o n t r o v e r s y , an attempt to r e s o l v e 14 Europe's developing security isolation by creating a collaborative regional nuclear deterrent, only exacerbated European fears. The p o l i t i c a l imbroglio that the MLF controversy created shook European confidence both in the Alliance and in US leadership. It helped confirm DeGaulle's view that the US was not a reliable guarantor of European security, and France withdrew from NATO's integrated military structure in 1966, just prior to the o f f i c i a l adoption of flexible response. As reassurance, both military and p o l i t i c a l , some 400 Poseidon SLBM warheads were assigned to Europe under SACEUR's command. However, because they were US central strategic systems, these warheads were never regarded by Europeans as a credible demonstration of the US commitment to Europe. In fact, they were frequently regarded as an example of US reluctance to firmly commit it s e l f to Europe's security. In the US, the Kennedy administration policy was seen as an attempt to shift TNW policy towards nonuse, to avoid having to make a d i f f i c u l t future choice between backing down in a c r i s i s or risking an a l l out nuclear action. For the most part, this was seen as an advisable course of action for the US to pursue, and this rationale prevailed through to the Nixon Administration. Nixon himself stated in 1972 that: Sole reliance upon early resort to nuclear weapons...would leave us no option between capitulation and risking a l l out mutual destruction. Twenty years ago...when our conventional forces returned to Europe in 15 s t r e n g t h , the US enjoyed a n u c l e a r monopoly and had perhaps l e s s m i l i t a r y need of a massive c o n v e n t i o n a l presence. Today, when we no longer have t h i s u n i l a t e r a l advantage, a NATO co n v e n t i o n a l o p t i o n i s needed l i k e never b e f o r e . 1 " During the Nixon A d m i n i s t r a t i o n , l i t t l e a t t e n t i o n .was p a i d to nuclear f o r c e s t r u c t u r e or d o c t r i n e i n Europe. Emphasis was p l a c e d on US s t r a t e g i c systems and the MIRVing of US ICBMs and SLBMs e f f e c t i v e l y t r i p l e d US warhead t o t a l s from 2000 to 6000. The i m p l i c a t i o n s of t h i s f o r extended deterrence were l i m i t e d , however, as l i t t l e was done to improve the command and c o n t r o l systems necessary to c a r r y out LNOs. The t a r g e t mix was expanded, but the range of o p t i o n s was not. Only when the USSR began to MIRV her ICBMs d i d the US begin to s h i f t to an LNO s t r a t e g y , i n an attempt to graduate deterrence from l i m i t e d use up to a l l out-war. The US r a t i o n a l e f o r a TNW presence i n Europe were summarized in F o r e i g n R e l a t i o n s Committee h e a r i n g s by S e c r e t a r y of Defense James S c h l e s i n g e r : We deploy nuclear weapons t o . Europe f o r three major reasons. F i r s t , m a i n t a i n i n g n u c l e a r c a p a b i l i t i e s i s e s s e n t i a l to d e t e r r e n c e as long as the Warsaw Pact maintains roughly comparable t h e a t r e n u c l e a r c a p a b i l i t i e s . These weapons h e l p to deter use of n u c l e a r weapons by the Warsaw Pact and, along with the c o n v e n t i o n a l and s t r a t e g i c nuclear f o r c e s , p r o v i d e a g e n e r a l d e t e r r e n t a c r o s s the e n t i r e spectrum of p o s s i b l e a g g r e s s i o n . Second, should d e t e r r e n c e f a i l , our t a c t i c a l c a p a b i l i t i e s p r o v i d e a source of nuclear o p t i o n s fo r defense other than the use of s t r a t e g i c f o r c e s . T h i r d , i n keeping with the f l e x i b l e response s t r a t e g y , we do not r u l e out the use of n u c l e a r 16 weapons by the US and i t s a l l i e s i f necessary to c o n t a i n and h a l t major c o n v e n t i o n a l a g g r e s s i o n . 1 5 However, NATO nuclear f o r c e s and p l a n n i n g were l a r g e l y n e g l e c t e d . The Lance warheads were modernized, improvements were made to the Pershing I s , Nuclear Operations Plans (NOPs) were e s t a b l i s h e d to l i m i t c o l l a t e r a l damage in any European exchange, and the P r i o r i t y S t r i k e Plan (PSP) was provided with a g r e a t e r range of lower i n t e n s i t y s t r i k e o p t i o n s . There was, however, no c l e a r s t r a t e g y or framework to guide modernization or deployment, and these programs amounted to l i t t l e more than minor m o d i f i c a t i o n s to NATO's nuclear f o r c e s . In the end, F l e x i b l e Response was accepted by the NATO c o u n t r i e s because of i t s inherent a m b i g u i t y . 1 6 F l e x i b l e Response p e r m i t t e d US planners to i n d e f i n i t e l y suspend any d e c i s i o n on a s t r a t e g i c n u c l e a r s t r i k e , while a l l o w i n g West European l e a d e r s to depend on such a d e c i s i o n as an assurance of the c r e d i b i l i t y of the US n u c l e a r quarantee. Leon V. S i g a l has p o i n t e d out that f l e x i b l e Response i s "... l e s s a s t r a t e g y than an agreement not to d i s a g r e e over s t r a t e g y . " 1 7 The p o l i t i c a l n e c e s s i t y f o r ambiguity i n f o r c e s t r u c t u r e and d o c t r i n a l p l a n n i n g set the context f o r the INF modernization debate of the l a t e 1970's and e a r l y 1980's. The o r i g i n a l s t r a t e g i c r a t i o n a l e behind the deployment of nuclear weapons i n Europe was to c r e a t e a s e c u r i t y b r i d g e a c r o s s the A t l a n t i c . However, l i t t l e or no regard was given to how these weapons c o u l d best be employed to strengthen 17 European s e c u r i t y . T h e i r mere deployment was deemed s u f f i c i e n t , and that g r e a t e r l e v e l s of s e c u r i t y c o u l d be a t t a i n e d by deployment of nuclear weapons i n ever g r e a t e r numbers. The dominant s e c u r i t y issue i n NATO continued to be the maintenance of the s e c u r i t y guarantee, but i n the face of changes i n the m i l i t a r y equation both s t r a t e g i c a l l y and i n Europe, the mere presence of nuclear weapons was not s u f f i c i e n t to guarantee s e c u r i t y . Force s t r u c t u r e and d o c t r i n a l p l a n n i n g were becoming the c r u c i a l determinants of the c r e d i b i l i t y of the nuclear f o r c e i n Europe. The dearth of such p l a n n i n g i n the past--and the miserable f a i l u r e of such p l a n n i n g that had been attempted--was to make the INF process the most troublesome i n A l l i a n c e h i s t o r y . C h a l l e n g i n g the US S e c u r i t y Guarantee The impetus behind the INF modernization d e c i s i o n o r i g i n a t e d from three main p o i n t s of concern over the c r e d i b i l i t y of Western defence p o s t u r e : a) the impact of s t r a t e g i c p a r i t y ; b) So v i e t INF modernization; and c) the obsolescence of NATO's e x i s t i n g INF systems. a) P a r i t y and i t s Impact on S t r a t e g i c R a t i o n a l e s : A l l too f r e q u e n t l y , s t r a t e g i c n uclear p a r i t y i s r e f e r r e d to as i f i t were a m i l i t a r y c o n d i t i o n which appeared without warning i n i n t e r n a t i o n a l p o l i t i c s . In a c t u a l i t y , the a r r i v a l of p a r i t y went through s e v e r a l stages 18 of development, each stage l e a d i n g to p r o g r e s s i v e l y more equi v a l e n c e , both in a m i l i t a r y and p e r c e p t u a l sense. At i t s lowest l e v e l , p a r i t y does not n e c e s s i t a t e e q u a l i t y of c a p a b i l i t y . The a b i l i t y of the o s t e n s i b l y weaker p a r t y to i n f l i c t unacceptable damage on the stronger i s enough to c r e a t e a b a s i c c o n d i t i o n of d e t e r r e n t r e c i p r o c i t y . Often r e f e r r e d to as ' s u f f i c i e n c y ' , t h i s c o n d i t i o n was present and recognized as e a r l y as the l a t e 1950's. 1 8 The r e c o g n i t i o n that p a r i t y has developed through v a r i o u s stages i s c r u c i a l to any argument which stems from i t s -achievement. R i c h a r d B e t t s , i n h i s recent study Nuclear B l a c k m a i l and Nuclear Balance, p r o v i d e s an e x c e l l e n t summation. of the developmental stages of p a r i t y ; If [ p a r i t y ] meant mutual v u l n e r a b i l i t y to unacceptable damage, p a r i t y came i n the mid-1950' s; i f i t meant n e a r l y equal l e v e l s of c i v i l damage, i t a r r i v e d by the e a r l y 1970's; i f e q u a l i t y i n m i s s i l e s or d e l i v e r y v e h i c l e s , by the mid-1970's; i f the measure i s the balance of f o r c e s as a whole or of c o u n t e r f o r c e c a p a c i t y , by the l a t e 1970's. 1 9 The impact of p a r i t y on extended dete r r e n c e d i d not become a major p o l i t i c a l i s s u e u n t i l the SALT process was under way. The i m p l i c i t r e c o g n i t i o n of p a r i t y embodied i n SALT I — e v e n though p a r i t y had r e a l l y been achieved o n l y i n terms of p o p u l a t i o n v u l n e r a b i l i t y and not i n any balance of f o r c e c a p a b i l i t i e s — h e i g h t e n e d a l r e a d y s i g n i f i c a n t a n x i e t i e s in Europe over the s e c u r i t y guarantee. P o l i t i c a l l y r e cognized p a r i t y had a r r i v e d i n the early-1970's. However, there was l i t t l e outward e x p r e s s i o n over i t s i m p l i c a t i o n s 19 f o r extended d e t e r r e n c e i n the e a r l y - t o - m i d 1970's. The reason f o r t h i s seeming lack of concern was that the c o n d i t i o n of p o l i t i c a l l y r e c o g n i z e d p a r i t y developed at a time when superpower r e l a t i o n s were unusually c o r d i a l . The r e l a t i v e a m i a b i l i t y of the p o l i t i c a l s i t u a t i o n softened the p o l i t i c a l s i g n i f i c a n c e of the change in the s t r a t e g i c equation. Consequently, p o l i t i c a l l e a d e r s were not disposed to address the s i t u a t i o n with the urgency that would have been demanded i n a p e r i o d of more h o s t i l e r e l a t i o n s . As B e t t s p o i n t s out, The embrace of vague p a r i t y on both s i d e s of the A t l a n t i c muddled the i m p l i c a t i o n s f o r extended deterrence because detente dampened worries about deterrence a l t o g e t h e r as p o l i t i c s took precedence over s t r a t e g y . 2 0 As the detente process began to decay and then e v e n t u a l l y c o l l a p s e , the i m p l i c a t i o n s of p a r i t y became f u l l y c l e a r a g a i n s t the backdrop of renewed East-West t e n s i o n s . Henry K i s s i n g e r was to remark: ...the change i n the s t r a t e g i c s i t u a t i o n that i s produced by our l i m i t e d v u l n e r a b i l i t y i s more fundamental f o r the U n i t e d S t a t e s than even t o t a l v u l n e r a b i l i t y would be f o r the S o v i e t Union because our s t r a t e g i c d o c t r i n e has r e l i e d e x t r a -o r d i n a r i l y , perhaps e x c l u s i v e l y on our s u p e r i o r s t r a t e g i c power... Even an equivalence i n d e s t r u c t i v e power, even assured d e s t r u c t i o n f o r both s i d e s i s a r e v o l u t i o n i n NATO d o c t r i n e as we have known i t . 2 1 The r e a l i t y of rough s t r a t e g i c p a r i t y under c o n d i t i o n s of heightened i n t e r n a t i o n a l t e n s i o n s posed two fundamental yet c o n t r a d i c t o r y concerns f o r Western s e c u r i t y p o l i c y . On the one hand, the West European e l i t e s (and many e l i t e s i n 20 the US) ques t i o n e d the c r e d i b i l i t y of the US s e c u r i t y guarantee i n c o n d i t i o n s of p a r i t y . How c o u l d the US, du r i n g war or c r i s i s , be expected.to i n i t i a t e a s t r a t e g i c n u c l e a r exchange with the USSR i n response to a So v i e t i n v a s i o n of Western Europe when such an exchange would r e s u l t i n the d e s t r u c t i o n of the US? The Europeans were immediately to seek reassurance that the s e c u r i t y umbrella was s t i l l r a i s e d above t h e i r heads, and wished to strengthen d e t e r r e n c e by ensuring that aggression i n Europe would i n e v i t a b l y e s c a l a t e to a gen e r a l nuclear war. Above a l l , the Europeans sought to a v o i d the nightmare s c e n a r i o ; a l i m i t e d nuclear war fought e x c l u s i v e l y i n Europe. On the other hand the US, p e r c e i v i n g the l e a k s i n the c r e d i b i l i t y of i t s s e c u r i t y umbrella and aware of the choice any P r e s i d e n t would face should a g g r e s s i o n i n Europe occur, sought every means to ensure that a r a p i d , u n c o n t r o l l e d e s c a l a t i o n would not occur. The US d e s i r e d to c o n s t r u c t as many rungs as p o s s i b l e i n the e s c a l a t i o n l a d d e r , i n the hopes of dominating the inte r m e d i a t e stages of any f u t u r e c o n f l i c t . Such an approach would: a) ensure that a g g r e s s i o n would not occur i n the f i r s t p l a c e ; and b) help to ensure that i f war d i d break out, that i t would be terminated short of g e n e r a l n u c l e a r war and on favo u r a b l e terms. The h i s t o r y of recent and contemporary A l l i a n c e n u c l e a r policy-making r e v o l v e s around t h i s fundamental s t r a t e g i c c o n t r a d i c t i o n between the US and i t s European A l l i a n c e p a r t n e r s across the A t l a n t i c , brought about by the development of s t r a t e g i c p a r i t y . 21 Subsequent US nuclear p o l i c y followed two general courses. F i r s t , t h e a t r e n u c l e a r f o r c e s were deployed i n Europe to a c t as l o c a l d e t e r r e n t s , and second, a c a p a c i t y to engage i n L i m i t e d Nuclear Options (LNOs) was sought to prov i d e a s t r a t e g i c nuclear o p t i o n short of a l l - o u t nuclear war. Joseph I. Coffey has observed that ...the US endeavoured to s u b s t i t u t e f o r a concept of d e t e r r e n c e through r e t a l i a t i o n one that r e l i e d p r i m a r i l y on d e n i a l ( i . e . a s u c c e s s f u l c o n v e n t i o n a l defence) and s e c o n d a r i l y on r i s k ( i . e . the t h r e a t of s e l e c t i v e nuclear s t r i k e s which would i n c r e a s e the l i k e l i h o o d of a l l out nucle a r war without a c t u a l l l y s t a r t i n g such a war) . 2 2 The o f f i c i a l announcement of the s h i f t from the p o l i c y of Mutual Assured D e s t r u c t i o n (MAD) to a p o l i c y of (LNOs) came i n 1974 under S e c r e t a r y S c h l e s i n g e r . The US now found i t s e l f caught i n s e v e r a l i n t e r t w i n e d d o c t r i n a l dilemmas. The s t r a t e g i c f o r c e s of the US now had to be capable o f : 1) c a r r y i n g out graduated nu c l e a r d e t e r r e n c e i n the absence of s t r a t e g i c s u p e r i o r i t y to a v o i d a l l out e s c a l a t i o n i n war; 2) ensuring the c r e d i b i l i t y of f i r s t use of s t r a t e g i c nuclear weapons i n response to s i g n i f i c a n t a g g r e s s i o n without c r e a t i n g the impression the US was s t r i v i n g to a t t a i n a c o u n t e r f o r c e c a p a b i l i t y capable of imposing e s c a l a t i o n dominance on the USSR; and 3) p r o v i d i n g reassurance to Europe that the US was committed to the nucl e a r guarantee and capable of c a r r y i n g i t out. In s h o r t , the US was. g r a p p l i n g not only with how best to defend i t s e l f i n a s i t u a t i o n of p a r i t y , but how to defend Europe as w e l l . Both 22 S c h l e s i n g e r ' s 1974. LNO t a r g e t t i n g program and P r e s i d e n t C a r t e r ' s ' c o u n t e r v a i l i n g s t r a t e g y ' were r a t i o n a l i z e d as s t a v i n g o f f any S o v i e t attempts to a t t a i n e s c a l a t i o n dominance and as r e i n f o r c i n g the s t r a t e g i c l i n k to Europe. These p o l i c i e s were attempts to juggle the m i l i t a r y requirements f o r LNOs brought about by p a r i t y and the p o l i t i c a l requirements of r e a s s u r i n g the Europeans. With the i n t r o d u c t i o n of f l e x i b l e response,the European e l i t e s had begun to q u e s t i o n both the depth of the US commitment to the defence of Europe i n gen e r a l and the w i l l i n g n e s s of the US to e s c a l a t e to nucl e a r war on t h e i r behalf i n p a r t i c u l a r . European a n x i e t y i n t e n s i f i e d when i t was announced that the US had adopted a c o u n t e r f o r c e LNO s t r a t e g y . Such a s t r a t e g y brought with i t the prospect of s e l e c t i v e , l o w - i n t e n s i t y s t r i k e s r a t h e r than the gen e r a l nuclear response d e s i r e d by Europeans f o r i t s d e t e r r e n t v a l u e . C a l c u l a t i o n s of s t r a t e g i c v u l n e r a b i l i t y and damage d i s p a r i t y , which are so important a part of US s t r a t e g i c a n a l y s i s , are much l e s s prominent i n European t h i n k i n g . European governments tend to look more to the p s y c h o l o g i c a l and p o l i t i c a l elements of s t a b i l i t y , r a t h e r than the m i l i t a r y elements. E x p r e s s i o n s of European concern over the new US t a r g e t t i n g d o c t r i n e were met with c r i t i c i s m s of the European p o s i t i o n from both Europe and the US. Manfred Woerner p o i n t e d out that " . . . s t r a t e g i c t h i n k i n g i n the F e d e r a l Republic and i n Western Europe more g e n e r a l l y , i s handcuffed to a conception of deterrence that dates back to 23 the era of n u c l e a r monopoly--the conception that the mere  e x i s t e n c e of nuclear weapons i s enough to deter a p o t e n t i a l adversary from m i l i t a r y a d v e n t u r e s . " 2 3 Henry K i s s i n g e r was to remark that "... i t i s absurd i n the 1980's to base the s t r a t e g y of the West on the c r e d i b i l i t y of the t h r e a t of mutual s u i c i d e . " In K i s s i n g e r ' s view: ...our European a l l i e s should not keep ask i n g us to m u l t i p l y s t r a t e g i c assurances that we cannot p o s s i b l y mean or i f we do mean, we should not want to execute because i f we do execute, we r i s k the d e s t r u c t i o n of c i v i l i z a t i o n . 2 " The European conception of 'pure d e t e r r e n c e ' , i t was argued, was no longer a c r e d i b l e b a s i s f o r Western s e c u r i t y . Hans A f e l d t argued: ...the n e c e s s i t y f o r r a t i o n a l p l a n n i n g , even for the s i t u a t i o n where de t e r r e n c e f a i l s , f o l l o w s from the p o s s i b i l i t y of war. The f a c t that d e t e r r e n c e i t s e l f i s not c r e d i b l e i f the options with which one threatens are fundamentally v i o l a t i n g the p a r t i c u l a r i n t e r e s t of the one who i s t h r e a t e n i n g , i s a f u r t h e r cogent argument f o r r a t i o n a l p l a n n i n g f o r emergency. 2 5 The r e a l i z a t i o n that p a r i t y undermined the b a s i s of western s e c u r i t y p o l i c y l e d not only to the r e s t r u c t u r i n g of s t r a t e g i c t a r g e t t i n g p o l i c y i n the US, but a l s o to the r e a l i z a t i o n t h at the US commitment to Europe r e q u i r e d a more v i s i b l e and m i l i t a r i l y capable f o r c e to strengthen l i n k a g e . S i m i l a r sentiments came from Europe, where the same concerns were aggravated by a n x i e t i e s over improvements to S o v i e t t h e a t r e n u c l e a r and t a c t i c a l n u c l e a r c a p a b i l i t i e s . 24 b) S o v i e t Theatre Force Deployments: The second f a c t o r which prompted concern over the c r e d i b i l i t y of Western defence posture was the c o n t i n u i n g b u i l d u p of S o v i e t t h e a t r e - n u c l e a r f o r c e s . In the l a t e 1970's, i n a d d i t i o n to b u i l d i n g up i t s s t r a t e g i c n u c l e a r a r s e n a l , the S o v i e t Union began to upgrade i t s t h e a t r e nuclear f o r c e s i n Europe. The USSR's short-range m i s s i l e f o r c e s - - b u i l t around the aging SCUD, Scaleboard and FROG systems—were being r e p l a c e d or complemented by deployments of the SS-21, SS-22, and SS-23, each a s i g n i f i c a n t improvement i n performance c a p a b i l i t i e s over i t s p r e d e c e s s o r . 2 6 In 1978-79, the USSR had some 1,300 SRBM's i n Europe. The modernization of these SRBM systems, was accompanied by the l a r g e - s c a l e deployment of n u c l e a r - c a p a b l e a r t i l l e r y and new, longer range dual-capable a i r c r a f t (such as the Su-24), and t h e a t e r - s t r a t e g i c a i r c r a f t , e s p e c i a l l y the Tu-22m B a c k f i r e bomber. 2 7 However, i t was the deployment of the SS-20--a 5000 km r a n g e 2 8 IRBM with three independently t a r g e t a b l e warheads which was intended to r e p l a c e the o b s o l e t e SS-4 and SS-5 m i s s i l e s - - t h a t caused the most concern, and was to become the focus of Western a n x i e t i e s over improving S o v i e t t h e a t r e - n u c l e a r c a p a b i l i t i e s . D e s p i t e the r e l a t i v e l y small s i g n i f i c a n c e of the SS-20 when viewed i n the context of t h e a t r e n u c l e a r warhead t o t a l s , the m i s s i l e was seen as a s i g n i f i c a n t q u a l i t a t i v e improvement f o r the S o v i e t t h e a t r e nuclear f o r c e . The SS-20's accuracy (a 400m C i r c l e E r r o r 25 Probable). 2 9 and comparatively l o w - y i e l d warhead (150 kt) made i t s u i t a b l e f o r c o u n t e r f o r c e m i s s i o n s , 3 0 rendering NATO TNF h i g h l y v u l n e r a b l e to pre-emption, while i t s m o b i l i t y made i t d i f f i c u l t both to l o c a t e and to de s t r o y . In a d d i t i o n , i t s s o l i d f u e l enabled the SS-20 to be re a d i e d and launched q u i c k l y . I t s r e l o a d c a p a b i l i t y a l s o provided a measure of p r o t r a c t e d w a r f i g h t i n g c a p a b i l i t y . The SS-20 was seen as p r o v i d i n g the So v i e t Union with the c a p a b i l i t y t o s t r i k e p r o m p t l y 3 1 and destr o y with a high degree of confid e n c e NATO's nuc l e a r - c a p a b l e systems and s t o c k p i l e s , i n c l u d i n g those of the land-based French f o r c e , should the S o v i e t s be so i n c l i n e d . . T h i s c a p a b i l i t y f o s t e r e d f e a r s that with these improved TNF the S o v i e t Union c o u l d d e s t r o y the e s c a l a t o r y chain upon which f l e x i b l e response depends. Should i t a t t a i n e s c a l a t i o n dominance i n Europe, the USSR would d i s r u p t the 'seamless web' or 'continuum of det e r r e n c e ' upon which European s e c u r i t y depended. Western a n x i e t y and alarm, e s p e c i a l l y i n Europe, soon s u r f a c e d . Uwe N e r l i c h i d e n t i f i e d these improvements as pa r t of a " . . . t i r e l e s s S o v i e t e f f o r t to d r i v e NATO i n t o a c o n d i t i o n of s e l f - d e t e r r e n c e [and as a r e s u l t ] S o v i e t c o e r c i v e power looms l a r g e over the c o n t i n e n t . " 3 2 The S o v i e t Union, N e r l i c h argues, has "...gained c o n t r o l of the nuclear d e t e r r e n c e game i n E u r o p e . . . " 3 3 F u r t h e r , concerns have been r a i s e d that with these new f o r c e s the S o v i e t Union may have a s e l e c t i v e , damage 26 l i m i t i n g TNF posture a g a i n s t Europe designed to a i d i n a r a p i d m i l i t a r y takeover. With t h e i r new prompt c o u n t e r f o r c e c a p a b i l i t i e s , the S o v i e t s may not be as s e l f - d e t e r r e d as b e f o r e . 3 " A few v o i c e s of disagreement d i d s u r f a c e ; some argued the SS-20 was a no more s i g n i f i c a n t t h r e a t than the numerous S o v i e t IRBM and SRBM systems a l r e a d y i n p l a c e or being deployed. -Karsten D. V o i g t argued that an INF deployment i n response to S o v i e t SS-20 deployments would i n no way determine whether or not Western Europe would become v u l n e r a b l e to So v i e t b l a c k m a i l . 3 5 Others p o i n t e d out that as the m i s s i l e was mobile i t was i n t h i s r e s p e c t more s t a b i l i z i n g than than the o l d e r S o v i e t systems. Gregory T r e v e r t o n has p o i n t e d out that the SS-20 has become a great t h r e a t l a r g e l y because of the a t t e n t i o n i t has r e c e i v e d , u n l i k e the o l d e r , l e s s p u b l i c i s e d SS-4 and SS-5 s y s t e m s . 3 6 However, these v o i c e s were drowned out by the numerous and loud e x p r e s s i o n s of concern over the S o v i e t d r i v e to undermine the b a s i s of European s e c u r i t y . As Joseph Coffey has p o i n t e d out, whether or not t h i s was the So v i e t i n t e n t i o n mattered l i t t l e ; i t was Western p e r c e p t i o n s of the damage done to the m i l i t a r y balance i n Europe that c o u n t e d . 3 7 The SS-20 deployments and the f u r o r they caused i n the West brought home the unpleasant r e a l i z a t i o n that NATO's m i l i t a r y f o r c e s and programs were shaped more by So v i e t f o r c e posture and weapons deployment than by the requirements of NATO m i l i t a r y s t r a t e g y . 27 c) E x i s t i n g INF Obsolescence: The t h i r d major f a c t o r c o n t r i b u t i n g to the d e s i r e f o r modernization of the e x i s t i n g INF c a p a b i l i t y i n Europe was the i n c r e a s i n g obsolescence of A l l i a n c e d e l i v e r y systems, which were v i r t u a l l y a l l a i r - b a s e d . The F-111 had been deployed i n 1967, and the Vulcan i n 1960. F u r t h e r , d u a l -capable TNW systems, such as the F-104 (deployed i n 1958) and F-4 (deployed i n 1961) were a l s o aging and i n any case were not designed f o r the nuc l e a r s t r i k e r o l e . The age of these systems, t h e i r c o n c e n t r a t i o n i n f i x e d bases, t h e i r v u l n e r a b i l i t y to pre-emption, and the improvements to Warsaw Pact a i r defences p l a c e d the a b i l i t y of these systems to c a r r y out t h e i r a l l o t t e d tasks i n grave doubt. The n u c l e a r m i s s i l e systems deployed i n Europe were a l s o dated or l a c k i n g i n c a p a b i l i t y . The 180 Pershing l a m i s s i l e s i n Europe (108 US launchers and 72 West German launchers) with a range of 740 km were f i r s t deployed i n 1964, and were i n need of replacement. The Lance m i s s i l e systems deployed to Europe i n 1972 had a range of only 125 km, which, along with the Pe r s h i n g l a IRBM's and nuclear a r t i l l e r y s h e l l s , meant that they c o u l d only t h r e a t e n t a r g e t s i n Western Europe (and p a r t s of Ea s t e r n Europe i n the case of the Pershing I ) . The c o l l a t e r a l damage from such s t r i k e s , t h e r e f o r e , would f a l l p r i m a r i l y on NATO t e r r i t o r y . T h i s , i t was argued, e f f e c t i v e l y imposed s e l f - d e t e r r e n c e on t h e i r use. (The 400 Poseidon warheads assig n e d to SACEUR were not, i n the view of the Europeans, s u f f i c i e n t l y 28 l i n k e d — i . e . , v i s i b l e and l a n d - b a s e d — t o the defence of Europe). These d e f i c i e n c i e s i n NATO's nuclear f o r c e posture h a r d l y i n s p i r e d c o n f i d e n c e i n A l l i a n c e TNF. The European nucl e a r f o r c e s u f f e r e d from: a) an i n a b i l i t y to p l a c e t a r g e t s i n Eastern Europe and the USSR at r i s k ; b) an ever i n c r e a s i n g v u l n e r a b i l i t y to pre-emptive a t t a c k , both nuclear and c o n v e n t i o n a l ; c) an o v e r - r e l i a n c e on n u c l e a r weapons whose short ranges and high y i e l d s made t h e i r use i n c r e d i b l e ; d) a h i g h l y i n f l e x i b l e command and c o n t r o l system c o n s t r a i n i n g the o p e r a t i o n a l a v a i l a b i l i t y of the weapons; and e) a v i r t u a l l a c k of t r a i n i n g or preparedness among NATO f o r c e s f o r combat in a n u c l e a r e n v i r o n m e n t . 3 8 The c o n d i t i o n of European nuc l e a r f o r c e s i n the mid-1970's was regarded as so poor t h a t James S c h l e s i n g e r once r e f e r r e d to NATO's TNF as "...a p i l e of j u n k . " 3 9 T h i s dismal s t a t e of a f f a i r s aggravated the a n x i e t i e s over the i n a b i l i t y of NATO to s u c c e s s f u l l y implement f l e x i b l e response. Modernization was seen as necessary to r e s t o r e the c a p a b i l i t y and c r e d i b i l i t y of NATO's TNF a r s e n a l . P r e s s u r e s f o r M o d e r n i z a t i o n : More i s Necessary In Europe, the development of s t r a t e g i c p a r i t y , along with the improvements to the S o v i e t TNF, a l l i n the face of the obsolescence of NATO's e x i s t i n g TNF and i t s c o n t i n u i n g i n a b i l i t y to match Warsaw Pact c o n v e n t i o n a l f o r c e l e v e l s , 29 l e d to a c r i s i s of conf i d e n c e i n the US s e c u r i t y guarantee. The fundamental concern was whether Western European c o u n t r i e s c o u l d continue to r e l y on the US f o r t h e i r s e c u r i t y i n the abscence of both a c r e d i b l e s t r a t e g i c nuclear o p t i o n and a capable t h e a t r e nuclear f o r c e . These worries were p u b l i c l y expressed i n the 1977 A l a s t a i r Buchan Memorial L e c t u r e given by the then West German C h a n c e l l o r Helmut Schmidt. Schmidt argued that the development of s t r a t e g i c p a r i t y between the superpowers, as r e a l i s e d by the SALT pr o c e s s , had ' n e u t r a l i z e d ' the s t r a t e g i c n u c l e a r f o r c e s of both s i d e s . T h i s , Schmidt a s s e r t e d , "...magnifies the s i g n i f i c a n c e of the d i s p a r i t i e s between East and West i n nuclear and c o n v e n t i o n a l weapons."" 0 While Schmidt a r t i c u l a t e d the importance of conducting arms c o n t r o l n e g o t i a t i o n s on a l l c a t e g o r i e s of weapons, he emphasized that Europeans had to be " . . . p a r t i c u l a r l y c a r e f u l to ensure that these n e g o t i a t i o n s do not n e g l e c t the components of NATO's deterrence s t r a t e g y . " * 1 And f u r t h e r , should no arms c o n t r o l agreement be forthcoming, ...the A l l i a n c e must...be ready to make a v a i l a b l e the means to support i t s present s t r a t e g y , which i s s t i l l the r i g h t one, and to prevent any developments that would undermine the b a s i s of . t h i s s t r a t e g y . * 2 Schmidt's speech was not the f i r s t a r t i c u l a t i o n of the need f o r improvements to NATO's nuclear a r s e n a l . European and US defence a n a l y s t s had been arguing the case f o r new European-based f o r c e s before the Schmidt*speech.* 3 Senator 30 Sam Nunn r a i s e d the i s s u e i n the US i n 1974, i n a r e p o r t on US f o r c e posture i n Europe, e n t i t l e d " P o l i c y , Troops, and the NATO A l l i a n c e . " As a r e s u l t of t h i s r e p o r t , the then US S e c r e t a r y of Defense James S c h l e s i n g e r proposed a f o r c e modernization program, which was continued by h i s successor, Donald Rumsfeld, from 1975 to 1977. Rumsfeld's e f f o r t s l e d to the i n c l u s i o n of a review of TNF i n NATO's Long Term Defence Programme, and i n 1977 the Nuclear Planning Group (NPG) e s t a b l i s h e d the High L e v e l Group (HLG) to examine NATO's TNF and study modernization p r o p o s a l s . Henry K i s s i n g e r , with c h a r a c t e r i s t i c p l a i n t i v e n e s s , p o i n t e d out t h a t : ...the s t r a t e g i c imbalance that I have p r e d i c t e d for the 80's w i l l a l s o be accompanied by a t h e a t e r imbalance i n the 80's. How i s i t p o s s i b l e to s u r v i v e with these imbalances i n the face of the a l r e a d y demonstrated i n f e r i o r i t y i n c o n v e n t i o n a l f o r c e s ? " " The need f o r US TNF i n Europe, however, was not i n q u e s t i o n : If t here i s no t h e a t e r n u c l e a r establishment on the c o n t i n e n t of Europe, we are w r i t i n g the s c r i p t f o r s e l e c t i v e b l a c k m a i l i n which our a l l i e s w i l l be threatened, and i n which we w i l l be bound i n t o a d e c i s i o n whereby we can respond only with a s t r a t e g y that has no m i l i t a r y purpose..." 5 And Uwe N e r l i c h warned that "NATO continues to adhere to d e l i b e r a t e dependence on e s c a l a t o r y t h r e a t s without s i g n i f i c a n t e f f o r t s to c o n t r o l e s c a l a t i o n . " " 6 Schmidt's speech, however, p r o v i d e d the v i t a l p o l i t i c a l momentum which p u b l i c i z e d the i s s u e and spurred A l l i a n c e governments, and e s p e c i a l l y the US, i n t o examining TNF m o d e r n i z a t i o n . " 7 The 31 aim of the Schmidt request was not to deploy a d i r e c t counter c a p a b i l i t y to the SS-20, but rat h e r to r e p a i r the p e r c e i v e d damage done to the spectrum of de t e r r e n c e . The deployments were, above a l l , needed to r e s t o r e the p e r c e i v e d weakening of the extended nuclear guarantee. As Johan Jorgen H o i s t put i t : The r e c u r r e n t p s y c h o - p o l i t i c a l theme of c o u p l i n g between the American nuc l e a r d e t e r r e n t and a dependent Western Europe had re-emerged. Reassurance was r e q u e s t e d . 4 8 However, the o f f i c i a l European p o s i t i o n was l a r g e l y s p l i t . There was, on the one hand, the p e r c e p t i o n of the SS-20 as a great t h r e a t that warranted a str o n g counter. On the other hand, the p r e v a l e n t d e s i r e was to preserve what was l e f t of detente. The West European p u b l i c consensus l a r g e l y favoured a c o n t i n u a t i o n of detente. A prominent concern i n the US over INF modernization was the q u e s t i o n of US l e a d e r s h i p of the A l l i a n c e . Should a US response to European concerns not be forthcoming ( e s p e c i a l l y a f t e r the MLF and neutron bomb f i a s c o e s ) , i t would p l a c e US l e a d e r s h i p i n doubt, both i n the eyes of the Europeans and the S o v i e t s . The t r o u b l e s i n US/West European r e l a t i o n s brought about by the Neutron Bomb, MLF and SALT II c o n f l i c t s caused the C a r t e r a d m i n i s t r a t i o n to respond i n a more forthcoming f a s h i o n to the European d e s i r e f o r an INF modernization program. The C a r t e r a d m i n i s t r a t i o n had, a f t e r a l l , opposed INF modernization as l a t e as 1977; by January of 1979 the US was f u l l y i n favour of the p r o j e c t . T h i s p r o v i s i o n of p o l i t i c a l reassurance to i t s European 32 a l l i e s p layed as much of a r o l e i n the US response to European d e s i r e s as m i l i t a r y and s t r a t e g i c f a c t o r s . Indeed, to the State Department, INF modernization was worth pursuing because i t c o u l d h e l p persuade the European a l l i e s that the US d i d not inte n d to bargain away European i n t e r e s t s a t . t h e SALT II n e g o t i a t i o n s . Proponents of INF modernization on both s i d e s of the A t l a n t i c f e l t new INF f o r c e s c o u l d strengthen d e t e r r e n c e i n two a s p e c t s . F i r s t , by a c h i e v i n g a c a p a c i t y to impose i n t r a -war d e t e r r e n c e and i n c r e a s e NATO's nuclear o p t i o n s ; and second, by p r o v i d i n g the p o l i t i c a l reassurance c r i t i c a l t o extended dete r r e n c e and the b a s i s of Western s e c u r i t y p o l i c y . In a d d i t i o n , new INF would reduce the r e l i a n c e on short-range systems and improve the c r e d i b i l i t y of NATO's nucle a r f o r c e . Furthermore, modernization was needed to r e c t i f y p o l i t i c a l p e r c e p t i o n s as much as the t e c h n i c a l aspects of det e r r e n c e and defence. A c r i s i s of p o l i t i c a l c o nfidence would emerge i n Europe should the p e r c e p t i o n become widespread that NATO was at an i r r e p a r a b l e m i l i t a r y disadvantage v i s - a - v i s the Warsaw Pact at a l l l e v e l s . In such a s i t u a t i o n , the c r e d i b i l i t y of the p o l i t i c a l w i l l behind the t h r e a t to e s c a l a t e s u f f e r s a c o n s i d e r a b l e blow. Western European s e c u r i t y depends as much on the p o l i t i c a l c o n f i d e n c e a r i s i n g out of a b e l i e f i n i t s s e c u r i t y as from the a c t u a l nature of the m i l i t a r y balance i t s e l f . One of the more f r e q u e n t l y c i t e d p o l i t i c a l arguments 33 contended that should NATO not upgrade i t s INF i n Europe when faced with a growing INF d i s p a r i t y , i t would s i g n a l to the S o v i e t s that NATO lac k e d the r e s o l v e to respond to t h r e a t s to i t s own defence. In t h i s c ontext, modernization was p o r t r a y e d as a case of weapons f o r weapons sake, r a t h e r than to support NATO s t r a t e g y or d o c t r i n e . P u b l i c l y , the most widely c i t e d j u s t i f i c a t i o n f o r INF modernization was the need to counter the S S - 2 0 ; p o l i t i c a l l y , i t was much e a s i e r to p o i n t to expanding S o v i e t c a p a b i l i t i e s than to e x p l a i n NATO d o c t r i n e to the p u b l i c . As Gregory T r e v e r t o n a s s e r t e d , "To the extent that p u b l i c o p i n i o n i n Western Europe supports the NATO [INF] P l a n , i t does so i n the b e l i e f that i t i s necessary to counter the S S - 2 0 . " f l 9 The o f f i c i a l US p o s i t i o n p i c k e d up on t h i s r a t i o n a l e : " F u l l deployment of LRINF m i s s i l e s w i l l incease NATO's nu c l e a r c a p a b i l i t y s i g n i f i c a n t l y and he l p o f f s e t SS-2 0 deployments." 5 0 However, the emphasis p l a c e d on co u n t e r i n g the S S - 2 0 produced c o n f u s i o n both i n the p u b l i c and among A l l i a n c e governments over the exact o b j e c t i v e s of the December 1 2 d e c i s i o n . Was the modernization intended to counter the S S - 2 0 ? Or was i t to r e s t o r e the c r e d i b i l i t y of NATO d o c t r i n e ? These d i f f e r e n t purposes r e q u i r e d d i f f e r e n t INF deployments. West German o f f i c i a l s tended to s t r e s s the 'counter the S S - 2 0 1 r a t i o n a l e , and e a g e r l y attempted to have the S S - 2 0 deployments c i t e d as the main r a t i o n a l e f o r INF modernization. A West German o f f i c i a l once argued, " I t i s 34 important to make i t known to the Russians that they are the source of the problem t h a t we have and we would not need a two-track d e c i s i o n had i t not been f o r t h e i r b u i l d u p . " 5 1 B r i t i s h o f f i c i a l s p o i n t e d to the need f o r modernization to maintain the c r e d i b i l i t y of f l e x i b l e response. I t was e s s e n t i a l to have the c a p a b i l i t y to s t r i k e at t a r g e t s i n the S o v i e t Union from Europe. In the face of the c o n d i t i o n of e x i s t i n g TNF i n Europe, t h i s n e c e s s i t a t e d INF modernization. US o f f i c i a l s s t r e s s e d the need to maintain the c r e d i b i l i t y of f l e x i b l e response, but a l s o suggested the need f o r NATO to possess a wider range of n u c l e a r o p t i o n s , to i n c r e a s e the m i l i t a r y c a p a c i t y and u t i l i t y and thus c r e d i b i l i t y of the European n u c l e a r f o r c e . These d i f f e r e n c e s i l l u s t r a t e the v a r y i n g p e r c e p t i o n s of the heed f o r INF and the v a r y i n g domestic c l i m a t e s which i n f l u e n c e d p u b l i c government statements. Although the p r i n c i p l e of the Dual Track d e c i s i o n was not c h a l l e n g e d , these d i f f e r e n c e s over r a t i o n a l e s and p e r c e p t i o n s l e d to more s i g n i f i c a n t divergences over the number and c a p a b i l i t y of INF f o r c e s i n Europe. A l l i a n c e c o n f l i c t over f o r c e s t r u c t u r e was thus not only a f u n c t i o n of the d i f f e r e n t s t r a t e g i c i n t e r e s t s between Europe and the US, but a l s o was a f u n c t i o n of the d i f f e r e n t r a t i o n a l e s f o r modernization put f o r t h by A l l i a n c e governments. Divergences over f o r c e s t r u c t u r e were to have a great impact on the d i s c u s s i o n s l e a d i n g up to the implementation of the December 12 d e c i s i o n . 35 Most fundamentally, however, the December 12 d e c i s i o n was prompted by the b e l i e f of Western a n a l y s t s and d e c i s i o n -makers that INF was necessary to maintain a strong d e t e r r e n t in Europe. The c o n v e n t i o n a l defence of Europe, i t was b e l i e v e d , was a hopeless undertaking. E x i s t i n g n u c l e a r f o r c e s i n Europe were deemed i n s u f f i c i e n t or . t o t a l l y inadequate. In the absence of what they b e l i e v e d was a v i a b l e a l t e r n a t i v e , Western decision-makers looked once again to the nuclear c r u t c h . 36 CHAPTER I I : THE US/EUROPEAN STRATEGIC AND POLITICAL SPLIT One of modern man's g r e a t e s t achievements l i e s i n the f a c t that h i s s t u d i e s of n u c l e a r war c o n s i s t e n t i r e l y of s p e c u l a t i o n s . A l t o n Frye Extended Deterrence i n Theory Despite the p r o l i f i c l i t e r a t u r e on the s u b j e c t , there i s no f i r m , p r e c i s e d e f i n i t i o n of general n u c l e a r deterrence or extended d e t e r r e n c e . W i l l i a m Kaufmann f e e b l y e x p l a i n e d g e n e r a l d e t e r r e n c e as a "...means of. p r e v e n t i n g c e r t a i n types of c o n t i n g e n c i e s from a r i s i n g . " 5 2 The c o s t s and r i s k s of t a k i n g c e r t a i n a c t i o n s are made c l e a r to an opposite p a r t y , and t h i s knowledge c o n s t r a i n s that p a r t y from undertaking those a c t i o n s i n the f i r s t p l a c e . P r e s e n t i n g the S o v i e t s with the l i k e l i h o o d t h a t they w i l l i n c u r an unacceptable l e v e l of damage i n response to an a t t a c k on Western Europe i s the essence of d e t e r r e n c e . I t i s t h i s ' f o r e c a s t ' nature of d e t e r r e n c e (to use Kaufmann's term) that makes det e r r e n c e 'work'. Extended d e t e r r e n c e i n v o l v e s the threatened use of US nuclear f o r c e s ( i n c l u d i n g s t r a t e g i c n u c l e a r f o r c e s ) i n response to S o v i e t a g g r e s s i o n i n E u r o p e . 5 3 The t h r e a t posed i s that a S o v i e t i n v a s i o n of Europe w i l l r e s u l t i n the r e l e a s e of US t a c t i c a l n uclear weapons, provoking a s i m i l a r S o v i e t response. Nuclear exchanges i n Europe, t h i s t h r e a t i m p l i e s , might then e s c a l a t e to the s t r a t e g i c l e v e l . Extended deter r e n c e thus l a r g e l y depends on invoking the t h r e a t e x p l i c i t i n general 37 nuclear d e t e r r e n c e . In more p r a c t i c a l terms, extended d e t e r r e n c e i s not s o l e l y a f u n c t i o n of the threatened use of US s t r a t e g i c f o r c e s to deter a c o n f l i c t i n Europe. Rather, i t i s a f u n c t i o n of a wide set of s t r a t e g i c and p o l i t i c a l v a r i a b l e s , which d i f f e r a c c o r d i n g to v a r i o u s s c e n a r i o s . Extended deterr e n c e i s thus more a c c u r a t e l y p o r t r a y e d as the d e t e r r e n t e f f e c t a r i s i n g out of v a r i o u s s t r a t e g i c n u c l e a r , t h e a t r e n u c l e a r , and c o n v e n t i o n a l f o r c e p o s t u r e s , f u r t h e r muddied by the u n c e r t a i n t i e s of p o l i t i c a l o b j e c t i v e s , c r i s i s d e c i s i o n making, and peacetime contingency p l a n n i n g . The r e s u l t i s that i t i s v i r t u a l l y i m possible to reduce extended deterrence to a set of c l e a r l y d e f i n e d o p e r a t i o n a l requirements. The one common element i n a l l c a l c u l a t i o n s i s the S o v i e t p e r c e p t i o n 5 " of both Western c r e d i b i l i t y ( i n terms of the w i l l i n g n e s s to c a r r y out the t h r e a t ) and Western c a p a b i l i t y ( i n terms of a f o r c e s t r u c t u r e • c a p a b l e of c a r r y i n g out the t h r e a t ) . The c a p a b i l i t y and w i l l i n g n e s s to e s c a l a t e are the co r n e r s t o n e s of extended d e t e r r e n c e . Without the c a p a b i l i t y , d e c l a r a t i o n s of w i l l l a c k m i l i t a r y c r e d i b i l i t y . Without the w i l l , or the p e r c e p t i o n of that w i l l , c a p a b i l i t i e s l a c k p o l i t i c a l c r e d i b i l i t y . Of course, the r i s k of l a y i n g down an e x p l i c i t t h r e a t - -be i t intended p o l i c y or b l u f f — i s that the a n t a g o n i s t x may decide to c h a l l e n g e the t h r e a t . E s t a b l i s h i n g a hig h degree of c r e d i b i l i t y , t h e r e f o r e , i s necessary to ensure t h a t : 38 * the enemy b e l i e v e s the c a p a b i l i t y to c a r r y out the t h r e a t e x i s t s ; * the c o s t s and r i s k s of c h a l l e n g i n g the th r e a t are c o n s i d e r a b l y g r e a t e r than the p o l i t i c a l or m i l i t a r y value of any advantage that might be gained; * the t h r e a t c o u l d be c a r r i e d out i f the contingency d i d a r i s e . The c r e d i b i l i t y and the w i l l behind the th r e a t is. e s p e c i a l l y c r u c i a l f o r extended d e t e r r e n c e , where the t e r r i t o r y of the threatened and the r e t a l i a t o r are separated by 3000 mi l e s of ocean.. There i s , however, no c l e a r r e l a t i o n s h i p between US and NATO f o r c e s t r u c t u r e and more s t a b l e l e v e l s of extended de t e r r e n c e , because extended deter r e n c e u l t i m a t e l y depends on S o v i e t p e r c e p t i o n s . A l l that can be s a i d i s that US and NATO f o r c e s r e q u i r e the c a p a b i l i t y to respond adequately over a wide range of m i l i t a r y p o s s i b i l i t i e s , i n which the th r e a t to e s c a l a t e i s c r e d i b l e to the USSR. Anthony Cordesman has perhaps provided the most c o n c i s e a r t i c u l a t i o n of the r e l a t i o n s h i p between Western f o r c e s t r u c t u r e and extended d e t e r r e n c e : Where both s t r a t e g i c and th e a t e r f o r c e s are we l l s u i t e d to the defense of Europe, and where US f o r c e s are strong enough to l i m i t any Soviet i n c e n t i v e to e s c a l a t e to even broader l e v e l s of c o n f l i c t , then the l e v e l of deterr e n c e extended i s l i k e l y to be h i g h . 5 5 T h i s i s perhaps as s p e c i f i c as one can get about the f o r c e 39 s t r u c t u r e / d e t e r r e n c e r e l a t i o n s h i p . F u r t h e r , extended deterrence does not apply s o l e l y to the d e t e r r e n c e or p r e v e n t i o n of c o n f i c t ; i t a p p l i e s with equal importance to intra-war d e t e r r e n c e and war t e r m i n a t i o n . While the most important f u n c t i o n of extended de t e r r e n c e i s to prevent l a r g e - s c a l e a g g r e s s i o n from ever breaking out, should such a g g r e s s i o n occur extended de t e r r e n c e s t i l l p l a y s a c r i t i c a l r o l e i n p r e v e n t i n g unfavourable e s c a l a t i o n from t a k i n g p l a c e . Intra-war d e t e r r e n c e does not n e c e s s a r i l y mean the absence of e s c a l a t i o n — e x t e n d e d d e t e r r e n c e , a f t e r a l l , r e l i e s on e x a c t l y that t h r e a t - - b u t r a t h e r the p r e v e n t i o n of unwanted e s c a l a t i o n . The r o l e of intra-war d e t e r r e n c e , then, i s to ensure that the d e t e r r e n t and war t e r m i n a t i o n advantages to be gained by e s c a l a t i o n remain f i r m l y i n Western hands. Commonly, t h i s i s r e f e r r e d to as " e s c a l a t i o n c o n t r o l " . Extended d e t e r r e n c e , because of the important r o l e played by p e r c e p t i o n , i s hard to d e f i n e , d i f f i c u l t to measure, and impossible * to t e s t . I t i s t h i s very ambiguity of extended d e t e r r e n c e which has l e d to the p o l i t i c a l l y charged nature of the debates surounding i t . V a r i o u s views of extended d e t e r r e n c e requirements or c r i t e r i a are o f t e n determined by the p e r s o n a l p o l i t i c a l viewpoint of the i n d i v i d u a l . One's p o l i t i c s i s more l i k e l y than not the key determinant of one's view of extended dete r r e n c e requirements. The i n t e l l e c t u a l o b s c u r i t y of extended deter r e n c e has made i t d i f f i c u l t to c o n s t r u c t an o b j e c t i v e 40 a n a l y s i s of what i s r e q u i r e d to maintain or ensure i t . Questions of s p e c i f i c m i l i t a r y needs cannot be answered, nor can the e f f e c t i v e n e s s of v a r i o u s d o c t r i n e s designed to enhance i t be e v a l u a t e d . Not s u r p r i s i n g l y , the e l u s i v e nature of extended dete r r e n c e has c r e a t e d problems f o r i t s p r a c t i c a l implementation i n t o p o l i t i c a l r e a l i t y . The US has, i n i t s own s t r a t e g i c i n t e r e s t s , one set of requirements and c r i t e r i a f o r extended d e t e r r e n c e . The Europeans, again i n t h e i r own i n t e r e s t , have another d i f f e r e n t s e t . NATO defence p o l i c y i n g e n e r a l — a n d n u c l e a r p o l i c y i n p a r t i c u l a r — i s more o f t e n than not a s t r u g g l e with the inherent a m i g u i t i e s of the u n d e r l y i n g t h e o r e t i c a l r a t i o n a l e s of extended deterrence on the one hand and the p r a c t i c a l r e a l i t i e s of d i f f e r e n t s t r a t e g i c i n t e r e s t s on the o t h e r . The P e r s p e c t i v e s For the purposes of t h i s study, the US debateon INF i s d i v i d e d i n t o four p e r s p e c t i v e groups: the US d e p l o y e r s , the US b a l a n c e r s , the US arms c o n t r o l l e r s , and the US c o n v e n t i o n a l d e t e r r e r s / d e f e n d e r s . 5 6 US Deployers: For the US d e p l o y e r s , deployment of INF i s e s s e n t i a l f o r d e t e r r e n c e . The i n c r e a s i n g m i l i t a r y c a p a b i l i t y of the S o v i e t Union, which i s viewed as an a g g r e s s i v e , h o s t i l e power, r e q u i r e s a s t r o n g counter and heightened m i l i t a r y preparedness on the p a r t of the West. In the face of 41 i n c r e a s i n g S o v i e t advantage i n both c o n v e n t i o n a l and nucl e a r c a p a b i l i t i e s i n Europe, f a i l u r e to deploy INF would leave a conspicuous gap i n the spectrum of deterrence which the So v i e t Union c o u l d e x p l o i t to i t s advantage, e i t h e r m i l i t a r i l y or p o l i t i c a l l y . Deployment would demonstrate that NATO " . . . w i l l not f i g h t a war on [ S o v i e t ] terms, w i l l not permit them t o r e g i o n a l i z e a c o n f l i c t to exclude S o v i e t t e r r i t o r y , and w i l l not permit them to h o l d Europe h o s t a g e . " 5 7 A f a i l u r e to deploy would be tantamount to a f a i l u r e of Western r e s o l v e to respond to t h r e a t s to i t s s e c u r i t y . T h i s would be viewed as a s i g n of Western weakness. Arms c o n t r o l i s anathema to US d e p l o y e r s . James A. Thomson, f o r example, wrote r e c e n t l y that "[Arms c o n t r o l ] has become pa r t of a general p o l i t i c a l t r end weakening the s e c u r i t y consensus i n the West." 5 8 For US de p l o y e r s , i t i s in c r e a s e d m i l i t a r y c a p a b i l i t i e s which ensure s t a b i l i t y and a str o n g d e t e r r e n t ; arms c o n t r o l r e s u l t s only i n u n i l a t e r a l advantage f o r the So v i e t Union. An o f f s h o o t of the US deployer group are those who can l o o s e l y be l a b e l l e d " w a r f i g h t e r s " . W a r f i g h t e r s a l s o view INF deployment as a s e c u r i t y e s s e n t i a l , but d i f f e r i n that e f f e c t i v e d e t e r r e n c e and defence r e q u i r e the adoption of a nuclear w a r f i g h t i n g c a p a b i l i t y i n Europe, which at l e a s t matches and c o u l d p r e f e r a b l y defeat the USSR. S o v i e t s t r a t e g y i s viewed as a w a r f i g h t i n g , warwinning d o c t r i n e , and an e f f e c t i v e counter to i t n e c e s s i t a t e s that the West develop a s i m i l a r 42 philosophy and i n s t a l l the c a p a c i t y to c a r r y i t o u t . 5 9 US de p l o y e r s , then, ho l d that e f f e c t i v e deterrence i n Europe r e q u i r e s a str o n g u n i t e d NATO with a powerful m i l i t a r y c a p a c i t y ( p o s s i b l y d i s p o s e d toward w a r f i g h t i n g ) , of which INF systems are an e s s e n t i a l component. US Ba l a n c e r s : The US ba l a n c e r s , composed l a r g e l y of Reagan a d m i n i s t r a t i o n o f f i c i a l s , emphasize the importance of ma i n t a i n i n g a balance between S o v i e t m i l i t a r y c a p a b i l i t i e s and western m i l i t a r y c a p a b i l i t i e s . To t h i s end, ba l a n c e r s advocate e i t h e r deployment of INF or arms c o n t r o l , though the former o p t i o n i s p r e f e r r e d . Balancers are aware, however, of the p o l i t i c a l imperatives behind arms c o n t r o l and are w i l l i n g , i f u n e n t h u s i a s t i c , about a c h i e v i n g m i l i t a r y balance through n e g o t i a t i o n . Balancers a l s o view f a i l u r e to achieve a balance i n Europe as having d i r e consequences f o r t h e a t e r s t a b i l i t y and p o l i t i c a l c o n f i d e n c e i n the A l l i a n c e . The a g g r e s s i v e nature of the S o v i e t Union, coupled with i t s ever-expanding m i l i t a r y f o r c e s i n E u r o p e 6 0 , presents a bona f i d e t h r e a t to the c o u n t r i e s west of the intra-German border. 6- 1 An absence of o f f s e t t i n g NATO c a p a b i l i t i e s would leave a gap i n the deterre n c e spectrum, and concede e s c a l a t i o n dominance to the So v i e t Union. The d i s p a r i t y i n c a p a b i l i t y between NATO and the WTO, i f not addressed, would a l s o have a d i r e p o l i t i c a l impact: the in c r e a s e d v u l n e r a b i l i t y of western Europe to 43 p o l i t i c a l b l a c k m a i l . Eugene Rostow p r e d i c t e d i n 1983 that the "...wide divergence i n NATO and S o v i e t m i l i t a r y c a p a b i l i t i e s i n Europe...would have a profound p o l i t i c a l e f f e c t throughout the Western w o r l d . " 6 2 For the b a l a n c e r s , the f a c t of deployment i t s e l f i s more important than deployment on the b a s i s of m i l i t a r y c r i t e r i a . The primary purpose of deployment i s to demonstrate r e s o l v e and to n u l l i f y the Soviet s t r a t e g y , as balancers see i t , of s e p a r a t i n g the US from i t s European a l l i e s . However, i f an INF deployment i s judged to be i n s u f f i c i e n t i n q u a n t i t y to c a r r y out t h i s purpose, or i f c e r t a i n m i l i t a r y c a p a b i l i t i e s are l a c k i n g i n any new INF f o r c e , b a l a n c e r s would oppose i t . By and l a r g e , b a l a n c e r s do not accord a l o t of a t t e n t i o n to a l l i e d sentiment about INF. A sub-group of the US b a l a n c e r s , the coupler b a l a n c e r s , p l a c e the US commitment to Europe and the n e c e s s i t y of s e n s i t i v i t y to a l l i e d concerns as the main p o l i c y p r i o r i t i e s . C o n s u l t a t i o n and accommodation of European concerns (with the g r e a t e r l e v e l s of European support such a process engenders) i s of tantamount importance f o r deployment, to strengthen not only the m i l i t a r y aspects of d e t e r r e n c e , but the p o l i t i c a l u n i t y of the A l l i a n c e upon which European s e c u r i t y depends. US Arms C o n t r o l l e r s : The US arms c o n t r o l l e r s , composed l a r g e l y of ex-arms c o n t r o l o f f i c i a l s and academicians, have had to b a t t l e the widespread s k e p t i c i s m of arms c o n t r o l which i s p r e v a l e n t i n 44 e l i t e . US o p i n i o n . The arms c o n t r o l l e r s view INF as unnecessary and p o t e n t i a l l y dangerous. The . . d e s t r u c t i v e p o t e n t i a l of both e x i s t i n g s t r a t e g i c a r s e n a l s and the nuclear systems a l r e a d y i n pl a c e i n Europe i s so great t h a t a d d i t i o n s to these f o r c e s e s s e n t i a l l y have l i t t l e meaning m i l i t a r i l y or f o r d e t e r r e n c e . The i n t r o d u c t i o n of new weapons systems to a l r e a d y b l o a t e d a r s e n a l s can only i n c r e a s e the danger of ina d v e r t e n t war, which f o r the arms c o n t r o l l e r s i s a s e r i o u s t h r e a t . INF, e s p e c i a l l y , are viewed as d e s t a b i l i z i n g , as the Pershing II m i s s i l e s are seen,as f i r s t - s t r i k e prompt c o u n t e r f o r c e weapons. McGeorge Bundy po i n t e d out t h a t : "With a s i n g l e important e x c e p t i o n there i s nothing the new warheads can do that cannot be done as w e l l by other systems that we a l r e a d y have or plan to h a v e . " 6 3 The " s i n g l e important e x c e p t i o n " was the "...new p o s s i b i l i t y of a super sudden f i r s t s t r i k e . " 6 4 C h r i s t o p h e r Paine argued along s i m i l a r l i n e s : The deployment of such weapons as the Pershing II w i l l heighten r a t h e r . than l e s s e n the danger of nucle a r war, by tempting d e c i s i o n makers i n a c r i s i s to pursue i l l u s o r y n u c l e a r 'options' when hone, i n f a c t , e x i s t . 6 5 The S o v i e t Union i s not viewed as i n h e r e n t l y a g g r e s s i v e , but as caught up i n the arms race dynamic, f o r c e d i n t o l a r g e m i l i t a r y expenditure by a combination of US p r o v o c a t i v e n e s s and an h i s t o r i c a l a n x i e t y b o r d e r i n g on para n o i a . The S o v i e t Union, i f o f f e r r e d reasonable terms, i s amenable to arms c o n t r o l and n e g o t i a t e d r e d u c t i o n s i n d e s t a b i l i z i n g systems i n Europe and elsewhere. 45 Arms c o n t r o l l e r s emphasize the need to maintain peace and s e c u r i t y through accommodation and n e g o t i a t i o n , r a t h e r than through r i v a l r y . Stopping the arms race should be the dominant p o l i c y concern. C a l l s f o r the. maintenance of the m i l i t a r y balance i n Europe through deployment of INF are e s s e n t i a l l y an i r r e l e v a n t and dangerous attempt to t i n k e r with the margins of the r e a l i t y of assured d e s t r u c t i o n . The way to i n c r e a s e d s e c u r i t y i n Europe l i e s along the path of fewer and l e s s v u l n e r a b l e weapons and mutual c o n f i d e n c e -b u i l d i n g measures, to reduce the l i k e l i h o o d of war by m i s c a l c u l a t i o n or mistake. US c o n v e n t i o n a l D e t e r r e r s / D e f e n d e r s : T h i s grouping . contends that the INF i s s u e i s e s s e n t i a l l y i r r e l e v a n t . Linkage of Europe to the US s t r a t e g i c n u c l e a r guarantee i s assured by the 300,000 US troops and the US nuclear systems a l r e a d y i n p l a c e i n Europe. As Cyruss Vance argued, There should be no q u e s t i o n about America's commitment to defend Europe with a l l the means necessary... The s u b s t a n t i a l f o r c e s we have deployed to Europe are one concrete evidence of that commitment." 6 6 Expansion of the US n u c l e a r f o r c e i n Europe to balance or o f f s e t improvements i n S o v i e t t h e a t r e n u c l e a r f o r c e s are unnecessary f o r e f f e c t i v e deterrence.. With or without the SS-20, the S o v i e t Union i s capable of d e s t r o y i n g Europe through use of i t s t h e a t r e a r s e n a l . 46 US c o n v e n t i o n a l d e t e r r e r s / d e f e n d e r s i n s t e a d emphasize the expansion of NATO's c a p a b i l i t y to wage and win a c o n v e n t i o n a l war and c i t e the d i f f i c u l t i e s f a c i n g a S o v i e t attack i n Europe and the low l i k e l i h o o d of i t s s u c c e s s . 6 7 Improvements to NATO's c o n v e n t i o n a l c a p a b i l i t y would have the g r e a t e s t impact on d e t e r r i n g a WTO a t t a c k and would circumvent concerns over the c r e d i b i l i t y of NATO's e s c a l a t o r y o p t i o n by r a i s i n g the "nuclear t h r e s h o l d " . The inn o v a t i o n s i n modern c o n v e n t i o n a l weapons technology, encompassing P r e c i s i o n Guided Munitions (PGMs), f r e e f a l l and sub-munitions, and sensor and t a r g e t t i n g improvements, i n s p i r e c o n f i d e n c e f o r US c o n v e n t i o n a l d e t e r r e r s / d e f e n d e r s in the v i a b i l i t y of the c o n v e n t i o n a l defence o p t i o n . 6 8 INF, t h e r e f o r e , i s c r i t i c i s e d because of i t s d e c r e a s i n g relevance to the European t h e a t e r , and because i t does nothing to ensure the most e f f e c t i v e d e t e r r e n t f a c t o r i n Europe, namely, c o n v e n t i o n a l d e f e n c e . 6 9 Strong c o n v e n t i o n a l f o r c e s would reduce NATO r e l i a n c e on nuclear weapons i n Europe and enable the l e v e l of nucl e a r weapons to be s u b s t a n t i a l l y lowered. US c o n v e n t i o n a l d e t e r r e r s / d e f e n d e r s however, have yet to r e c o n c i l e t h e i r p o s i t i o n with e l i t e European sentiments f a v o u r i n g r e t e n t i o n of the f i r s t use t h r e a t and f e a r i n g any p o l i c i e s which make Europe safe f o r c o n v e n t i o n a l war. The European spectrum of o p i n i o n i s d i v i d e d i n t o three p e r s p e c t i v e groupings; the Eur o - c o u p l e r s , the Euro-n e g o t i a t o r s , and the Euro-disarmers. 47 E u r o - c o u p l e r s : The E u r o - c o u p l e r s , found m o s t l y among the c o n s e r v a t i v e elements i n European o p i n i o n but a l s o among some c e n t r i s t s , s u p port both the deployment and n e g o t i a t i o n t r a c k s of the INF d e c i s i o n . E u r o - c o u p l e r s , however, te n d t o emphasize deployment. New INF i n Europe a r e seen as e s s e n t i a l t o uph o l d d e t e r r e n c e and the v i a b i l i t y of NATO s t r a t e g y . For E u r o - c o u p l e r s the c o n v e n t i o n a l defence o p t i o n i s h o p e l e s s l y u n r e a l i s t i c . 7 0 The S o v i e t m i l i t a r y b u i l d u p i s viewed as a c o n s i d e r a b l e t h r e a t t h a t , i f not c o u n t e r e d or o f f s e t by INF, c o u l d l e a d t o a s i t u a t i o n i n which Europe i s d e - c o u p l e d from the US and t h e r e f o r e v u l n e r a b l e t o S o v i e t b l a c k m a i l . I n c r e a s e s i n S o v i e t t h e a t r e n u c l e a r c a p a b i l i t i e s — e s p e c i a l l y the SS-20--in the c o n t e x t of p a r i t y , have p r o f o u n d i m p l i c a t i o n s f o r the s t r e n g t h and c r e d i b i l i t y of extended d e t e r r e n c e . INF i s seen as e s s e n t i a l t o " r e - c o u p l e " the Europe t o the US s t r a t e g i c g u a r a n t e e . E u r o - c o u p l e r s a r e not opposed t o arms c o n t r o l as a means of a c h i e v i n g a s t a b l e b a l a n c e i n Europe. Indeed, f o r many E u r o - c o u p l e r s i t would be the p r e f e r r e d o p t i o n . However, p r a c t i c a l p r o g r e s s towards a n e g o t i a t e d s o l u t i o n i s o n l y p o s s i b l e i f t h e A l l i a n c e d e p l o y s INF t o demonstrate i t s commitment t o European s e c u r i t y . 7 1 N e g o t i a t i o n from a p o s i t i o n of s t r e n g t h i s i m p e r a t i v e f o r e q u i t a b l e arms c o n t r o l . E u r o - c o u p l e r s , t h e n , seek the maintenance of A l l i e d c o h e s i o n , NATO s t r a t e g y , and above a l l the l i n k between the 48 US and Europe. They seek these goals through the deployment of INF, e i t h e r to o f f s e t S o v i e t m i l i t a r y c a p a b i l i t i e s or to prompt a f a i r and e q u i t a b l e arms c o n t r o l agreement which would achieve the same s t r a t e g i c e f f e c t . E u r o - n e g o t i a t o r s : T h i s grouping i s composed l a r g e l y of the c e n t e r - l e f t i n European p o l i t i c s , t y p i f i e d by the SPD government of Helmut Schmidt. The E u r o - n e g o t i a t o r s seek a r e s t o r a t i o n of the European balance and are f i r m supporters of the Dual Track. Caution and prudence d i c t a t e the need to maintain a s t a b l e European m i l i t a r y balance, a balance upset by So v i e t modernization of both i t s c o n v e n t i o n a l and nuclear f o r c e s d i r e c t e d a g a i n s t Europe. Although the USSR i s not viewed as l i k e l y to i n i t i a t e a g g r e s s i o n i n Europe, a s t a b l e European balance between NATO and the Warsaw Pact i s seen as necessary to uphold d e t e r r e n c e , maintain A l l i a n c e u n i t y , and thereby r e s t o r e European s e c u r i t y . Helmut Schmidt, i n the A l a s t a i r Buchan Memorial L e c t u r e , warned a g a i n s t "...the i l l u s i o n that there may be grounds f o r n e g l e c t i n g [the European b a l a n c e ] . " 7 2 For the E u r o - n e g o t i a t o r s , the p r o v i s i o n s of SALT II h e l d f o r Europe the sp e c t r e of de-c o u p l i n g ; the c o d i f i c a t i o n of s t r a t e g i c p a r i t y weakened the c r e d i b i l i t y of de t e r r e n c e through punishment, and S o v i e t c o n v e n t i o n a l and nuclear a t t a c k i n Europe was now " f r e e d " from the c o n s t r a i n t s of the supreme e s c a l a t o r y t h r e a t . F u r t h e r , the r i s e of p a r i t y p l a c e d e s c a l a t i o n o u t s i d e the US 49 s t r a t e g i c i n t e r e s t . R e s t r a i n i n g a war to Europe had now become the most favoured American outcome. The Dual Track d e c i s i o n was t h e r e f o r e a s e c u r i t y n e c e s s i t y , to r e s t o r e the v i a b i l i t y of extended deterrence through deployment i f n e c e s s a r y , 7 3 but p r e f e r a b l y through n e g o t i a t e d r e d u c t i o n s . The E u r o - n e g o t i a t o r s r e j e c t u n i l a t e r a l disarmament as u n r e a l i s t i c and p o t e n t i a l l y d i s a s t r o u s f o r European s e c u r i t y . They are aware of the problems arms c o n t r o l f a c e s , 7 " but view the arms c o n t r o l t r a c k as the best means towards improving the m i l i t a r y balance i n Europe. East-West accommodation, n e g o t i a t i o n , and d e t e n t e — i n s h o r t , p o l i t i c a l over m i l i t a r y means of r e s t o r i n g the m i l i t a r y balance--are the p o l i c y p r e f e r e n c e s and d e s i r e s of the E u r o - n e g o t i a t o r s . Euro-Disarmers: The Euro-disarmers, composed t r a d i t i o n a l l y of l e f t - w i n g o f f i c i a l s and a n a l y s t s , are openly c r i t i c a l of both t r a c k s of the INF d e c i s i o n . NATO s t r a t e g y i s viewed as misguided in i t s emphasis on nuclear weapons. S u c c e s s f u l c o n v e n t i o n a l defence i s seen as a v i a b l e o p t i o n a g a i n s t what i s viewed as the extreme u n l i k e l i h o o d of a S o v i e t a t t a c k . Euro-disarmers p l a c e l i t t l e f a i t h i n c a l c u l a t i o n s of the m i l i t a r y balance. In an era of s t r a t e g i c o v e r k i l l , they argue, such c a l c u l a t i o n s have l i t t l e meaning. For the Euro-disarmers, deployment of INF i s m i l i t a r i l y s u p e r f l u o u s , as the number o f x n u c l e a r weapons deployed i n Europe a l r e a d y f a r exceeds 50 any p r a c t i c a l m i l i t a r y r o l e they c o u l d p o s s i b l y have. As Frank Barnaby p o i n t e d out: " . . . i f t here was a n u c l e a r war i n Europe, s e c u r i t y as we know i t would cease to e x i s t . " 7 5 Euro-disarmers greet the r a t i o n a l e f o r the new INF f o r c e - - t h e need to o f f s e t S o v i e t deployments to ensure a s t a b l e m i l i t a r y balance--with v a r y i n g l e v e l s of s k e p t i c i s m . INF i s viewed as another component in the US d r i v e to e s t a b l i s h w a r f i g h t i n g dominance over the S o v i e t Union. .The Pershing II i s s i n g l e d out i n t h i s respect as i t makes a f i r s t s t r i k e pindown or d e c a p i t a t i o n a t t a c k f e a s i b l e . The GLCMs are a s s a i l e d f o r t h e i r adverse impact on v e r i f i a b l e arms c o n t r o l . In a d d i t i o n , Euro-disarmers c r i t i c i z e INF as a h i g h l y d e s t a b i l i z i n g a d d i t i o n to the m i l i t a r y equation i n Europe. T h e i r v u l n e r a b i l i t y , coupled with the t h r e a t they pose, i n c r e a s e s the l i k e l i h o o d t h at the USSR would be compelled to pre-empt them i n c r i s i s or war. Euro-disarmers are a l s o c r i t i c a l of the arms c o n t r o l t r a c k of the INF d e c i s i o n , as they are c r i t i c a l of western arms c o n t r o l p r o p o s a l s as a whole. They view western i n i t i a t i v e s as l a c k i n g i n enthusiasm and f a i t h , and are seen e s s e n t i a l l y as propaganda e f f o r t s to m o l l i f y p u b l i c s e n t i m e n t s . 7 6 A sub-group of the Euro-disarmers are the u n i l a t e r a l disarmers, found p r i m a r i l y i n the European peace movement. T h i s sub-group has s i m i l i a r sentiments to the Euro-disarmers, but advocates as the u l t i m a t e aim a n u c l e a r - f r e e Europe achieved through disarmament, u n i l a t e r a l l y i f n e c e s s a r y . 7 7 More n u c l e a r weapons are seen as an unnecessary 51 Table I Tendencies of O p i n i o n among P e r s p e c t i v e Groupings US D e p l o y e r s US B a l a n c e r s US Arms C o n t r o l l e r s US Convent i o n a l D e t e r r e r s Euro C o u p l e r s Euro Negot i a t o r s Euro D i s a r m e r s Author R i s k of S o v i e t A g g r e s s i o n High High Low Medium High Low Low Low C o n f i d e n c e i n Non N u c l e a r Defence Low Low Medium High Low Low High Medi urn Need For INF H i g h High Low Low High H i g h Low Low I n t e r e s t i n Arms C o n t r o l Low Medium High Medium Low High High Medium 52 and immoral e v i l . NATO i t s e l f i s viewed as arcane and outdated, a c o n t r i b u t o r to the problem r a t h e r than a promoter of peace. The US/European Threat P e r c e p t i o n S p l i t The p o l i t i c a l and s t r a t e g i c c o n s t r a i n t s of the North A t l a n t i c A l l i a n c e make the p r a c t i c a l implementation of extended d e t e r r e n c e i n t o A l l i a n c e p o l i c y , d o c t r i n e , and fo r c e s t r u c t u r e extremely d i f f i c u l t . The fundamental s t r a t e g i c and p o l i t i c a l i n t e r e s t s of Western Europe and the US d i v e r g e on s e v e r a l important aspects of t h e i r s e c u r i t y r e l a t i o n s h i p . C r i t i c a l areas of divergence i n c l u d e d i f f e r i n g views over the nature of the S o v i e t t h r e a t , the r o l e and c h a r a c t e r of the nucl e a r f o r c e i n Europe, and the s p l i t on arms c o n t r o l . Attempts to formulate the Dual Track d e c i s i o n ran s t r a i g h t , i n t o these key areas of the US-European s t r a t e g i c d i v ergence. As the detente process began to decay d u r i n g the l a t e 1970's, two d i f f e r e n t p e r c e p t i o n s of the S o v i e t t h r e a t emerged a c r o s s the A t l a n t i c . A l l elements of West European o p i n i o n — a n d e s p e c i a l l y the E u r o - n e g o t i a t o r s who dominated Western European decision-making at the t i m e — e q u a t e d enhanced s e c u r i t y and i n t e r n a t i o n a l s t a b i l i t y with the p o l i c i e s of detente. The s p i r i t and dialog u e of detente, they argued, served to moderate S o v i e t behaviour. Indeed, Helmut Schmidt's p o l i t i c a l slogan as C h a n c e l l o r was "defence and detente", taken from the wording of the 1967 Harmel .53 Report. The Harmel formula had e s t a b l i s h e d detente and defence as the two foundations of NATO p o l i c y . However, the balancers who now made up the government of the U n i t e d S t a t e s viewed the era of detente as a p e r i o d of u n i l a t e r a l S o v i e t advantage. In t h e i r view detente, welcomed i n the West i n good f a i t h and with high e x p e c t a t i o n s , had been used by the So v i e t Union to make v i r t u a l l y unopposed i n c u r s i o n s i n t o the T h i r d World and to undergo a massive m i l i t a r y b u i l d u p . The S o v i e t e x p a n s i o n i s t d r i v e had been exposed and proven; the West now had to respond f i r m l y and r e s o l u t e l y to deny any f u r t h e r S o v i e t g a i n s . I n c r e a s i n g l y , t h e r e f o r e , a t t i t u d e s d i v e r g e d ; US e l i t e s became i n c r e a s i n g l y preoccupied with defence and d i s s i l l u s i o n e d with detente, while European e l i t e s sought to maintain detente and showed l i t t l e enthusiasm f o r defence. The i n v a s i o n of Afgh a n i s t a n i n t e n s i f i e d the US-European debate on Western s t r a t e g y v i s - a - v i s the USSR. The US deployers and bal a n c e r s viewed the S o v i e t i n v a s i o n as proof of S o v i e t a g g r e s s i v e n e s s , to which the West had to respond with f i r m p u n i t i v e a c t i o n s and u n i t y of r e s o l v e . The European n e g o t i a t o r s (and many c o u p l e r s ) , d e s p i t e t h e i r condemnation of So v i e t a c t i o n s i n A f g h a n i s t a n , saw l i t t l e p o i n t i n s a c r i f i c i n g East-West detente f o r the sake of what they saw as a p e r i p h e r a l S o v i e t g a i n . When the Reagan A d m i n i s t r a t i o n entered o f f i c e , i t brought with i t a t t i t u d e s and r h e t o r i c r e m i n i s c e n t of the Cold War. I t launched a renewed e f f o r t to c o n t a i n and 54 i s o l a t e the USSR p o l i t i c a l l y , e c onomically, and m i l i t a r i l y , and i t i n s t i t u t e d the beginning of the l a r g e s t peacetime m i l i t a r y b u i l d u p i n US h i s t o r y . The Europeans saw no advantages i n a renewal of East-West c o n f r o n t a t i o n and c a l l e d f o r the maintenance of the detente p r o c e s s . The US deployer and balancer view of the USSR was not shared a c r o s s the A t l a n t i c except by some E u r o - c o u p l e r s . The Reagan A d m i n i s t r a t i o n ' s c o n t i n u a l r h e t o r i c and c o n f r o n t a t i o n a l tone, coupled with the US m i l i t a r y b u i l d u p and attempts to expand NATO's mandate o u t s i d e of Western Europe, aroused more a n x i e t i e s in Europe about US i n t e n t i o n s and l e a d e r s h i p than d i d the So v i e t t h r e a t . The Reagan a d m i n i s t r a t i o n ' s Cold War r h e t o r i c , a n t i -arms c o n t r o l stand, s t r a t e g i c f o r c e modernization and ' l i m i t e d nuclear war' pronouncements began to t e l l on A l l i a n c e u n i t y and c o n f i d e n c e . These US p o l i c i e s were to weaken support f o r the NATO Dual Track d e c i s i o n i n many European p a r l i a m e n t s , notably the West German Bundestag. F r a g i l e c o a l i t i o n governments ( u s u a l l y composed of Euro-n e g o t i a t o r s and Euro-disarmers) were d i v i d e d over deployment. The governments of the Netherlands and Belgium were f o r c e d to a v o i d a concrete commitment to deployment to s a t i s f y t h e i r c o n f l i c t i n g c o a l i t i o n c o n s t i t u e n c i e s . The popular mood i n Europe ranged from d i s c o n t e n t to o u t r i g h t h o s t i l i t y to the December 12 d e c i s i o n . The r e s u l t was h e s i t a n c y and delay on the pa r t of European governments. The u n c e r t a i n t y of E u r o - n e g o t i a t o r s was a l s o a r e a c t i o n 55 to US a c t i o n s . The E u r o - n e g o t i a t o r s saw i n the f a i l u r e to r a t i f y SALT II and the c o n s i s t e n t l y anti-arms c o n t r o l stand of the Reagan A d m i n i s t r a t i o n the d e - f a c t o abandonment of the s p i r i t of the double t r a c k formula. What was viewed as the the s e p a r a t i o n of s e c u r i t y and arms c o n t r o l i n US p o l i c y d i d not s i t w e l l with the middle ground i n the Western European debate. US statements on l i m i t e d nuclear war and p e r s i s t e n t a c c u s a t i o n s t h a t the Europeans were not " p u l l i n g t h e i r weight" a l s o aroused a n x i e t y and r e s e n t m e n t . 7 8 The INF modernization program came to be widely viewed i n Europe as a US demand on the d e p l o y i n g c o u n t r i e s . Proceeding with deployment was viewed as an a c c e s s i o n to that demand. In the US, however, European h e s i t a n c y was viewed with s u s p i c i o n and annoyance. The INF d e c i s i o n would, i n the view of the US d e p l o y e r s and b a l a n c e r s , i n c r e a s e the r i s k to the US by d e p l o y i n g land-based systems i n Europe which i n c r e a s e d the l i k e l i h o o d of e s c a l a t i o n to the s t r a t e g i c l e v e l . The p e r c e i v e d f a i l u r e of the Europeans to support a program which i n c r e a s e d the l e v e l of r i s k to the US oh t h e i r behalf upset the Reagan A d m i n i s t r a t i o n . Moreover, the o r i g i n a l impetus f o r the modernization d e c i s i o n had been European. Now that the US was prepared to respond to European concerns at c o n s i d e r a b l e p o l i t i c a l c o s t , the Europeans appeared to be backing down. The s c a l e of the mass p r o t e s t s i n Europe, and t h e i r anti-American sentiments, was viewed i n the US as proof of European n i a v e t e and l a c k of r e s o l v e . The view of INF i n US government c i r c l e s had swung d r a m a t i c a l l y : 5 6 In 1979 the argument i n favour of LRTNF was that i t p r o v i d e d a demonstration of an American commitment to the defense of Europe. By 1982 the argument was that unless the Europeans agreed to host the m i s s i l e s , the Americans would not co n s i d e r Europe worth d e f e n d i n g . 7 9 As a r e s u l t , the c a p a c i t y of West European nati o n s ( e s p e c i a l l y the n a t i o n s that were to host INF) to c a r r y out t h e i r o b l i g a t i o n s s u c c e s s f u l l y came to be regarded by the a d m i n i s t r a t i o n as "...symbolic of European r e a d i n e s s to accept i t s share of the r i s k s and r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s of NATO membership." 8 0 The b a l a n c e r s i n the Reagan A d m i n i s t r a t i o n i n c r e a s i n g l y came to i d e n t i f y the INF deployments as a, t e s t of European r e s o l v e , l o y a l t y , and commitment to the A t l a n t i c A l l i a n c e . European r e c a l c i t r a n c e over deployment i s s u e s and c o n t i n u i n g s t r u g g l e s with p a r l i a m e n t a r y p o l i t i c s l e d c o n s e r v a t i v e u n i l a t e r a l i s t elements i n the US to qu e s t i o n the value of the A t l a n t i c A l l i a n c e . Was i t worthwhile defending the Europeans, these a n a l y s t s argued, when they showed so l i t t l e i n t e r e s t i n defending themselves? 8 1 For t h e i r p a r t , the European NATO n a t i o n s took l i t t l e comfort i n the f a c t that the US had i n c r e a s e d i t s share of nu c l e a r r i s k i n the A l l i a n c e . For Europeans, n u c l e a r r i s k was a p o l i t i c a l g i ven, and US p o l i c i e s were seen as i n c r e a s i n g , not a l l i e v i a t i n g , that r i s k . As W i l l i a m G. Hyland observed: The growing c l a s h between what the Europeans came to b e l i e v e was American u n i l a t e r a l i s m and what Americans b e l i e v e d was European p a c i f i s m or n e u t r a l i s m became a v i c i o u s c i r c l e f e e d i n g on i t s e l f . 8 2 57 Tensions across the A t l a n t i c i n t e n s i f i e d as Europeans i n the p o l i t i c a l mainstream i d e n t i f i e d both the US and the USSR as t h r e a t s because of t h e i r g l o b a l r i v a l r y . The US, understandably, resented being i d e n t i f i e d by i t s a l l i e s as no b e t t e r than t h e i r enemy. 8 3 As i f t h i s s t r a i n on the A l l i a n c e was not s u f f i c i e n t , other areas of d i s p u t e a l s o f u e l l e d A l l i a n c e t e n s i o n s . Foremost among these was the r o l e of economic l i n k s i n Western s e c u r i t y s t r a t e g y . The European NATO members were s k e p t i c a l of US attempts to use economic s a n c t i o n s as an instrument of c o n t r o l or to punish S o v i e t behaviour. European r e f u s a l , by and l a r g e , to agree to US san c t i o n s on the USSR a f t e r the i n v a s i o n of Af g h a n i s t a n , or ag a i n s t Poland a f t e r the i m p o s i t i o n of m a r t i a l law, or a g a i n s t I r a n , exposed the US-West European s p l i t on the u t i l i t y of economic c o e r c i o n , to the i n c r e a s i n g f r u s t r a t i o n of the US. Trade c r e d i t s a l s o became a sub j e c t of d i s p u t e . West Germany favoured the ext e n s i o n of c r e d i t a i d to Poland i n the face of that country's bankruptcy, r e s i s t i n g c a l l s from the more c o n s e r v a t i v e elements i n the Reagan A d m i n i s t r a t i o n who c a l l e d f o r a c a n c e l l a t i o n of a i d to Poland and a d e c l a r a t i o n of P o l i s h d e f a u l t . The West Germans saw no advantage to t a k i n g such a p o s i t i o n and r e f u s e d to modify t h e i r c r e d i t p o l i c y v i s - a - v i s Poland. US-West European r e l a t i o n s reached a low p o i n t over the proposed S o v i e t European p i p e l i n e . Western European sentiment, e s p e c i a l l y i n West-Germany and France, s t r o n g l y 58 favoured the d e a l . In the US, concerns were r a i s e d about the subsequent v u l n e r a b i l i t y of Western European governments to economic manipulation and the technology t r a n s f e r s i n v o l v e d i n the c o n s t r u c t i o n of the p i p e l i n e i t s e l f . The economic p o l i c y c l a s h e s between the US and Europe were a r e s u l t of two c o n f l i c t i n g p o l i c y aims. The US sought to enhance the power of i t s economic s a n c t i o n s by b r i n g i n g i t s European A l l i e s on board. The European A l l i a n c e members wished to form t h e i r own economic p o l i c y v i s - a - v i s the S o v i e t Union. US p r e s s u r e s f o r A l l i a n c e u n i t y i n economic and trade p o l i c y only provoked the anger i n Europeans which stemmed from p e r c e i v e d i n t r u s i o n s on n a t i o n a l p o l i c y and s o v e r e i g n t y . There were a l s o US-European c l a s h e s over the r o l e of NATO in "out of a r e a " d i s p u t e s , most notably i n the Middle East over the p e r s i s t e n t A r a b - I s r a e l i d i s p u t e . The US has attempted to expand NATO's mandate to world hotspots which i t regards as important to a l l Western n a t i o n s , thereby i n c r e a s i n g the c r e d i b i l i t y and weight of Western a c t i o n i n any given r e g i o n . The European A l l i a n c e members, however, d i d not view NATO's mandate as extending beyond Europe. US p r e s s u r e s f o r NATO involvement i n o u t - o f - a r e a d i s p u t e s a l s o c o n t r i b u t e d to European c e n t r a l i s t and n e u t r a l i s t sentiments. Mounting US impatience with European r e c a l c i t r a n c e and lack of enthusiasm f o r economic s a n c t i o n s and o u t - o f - a r e a involvement soon l e d to both p u b l i c and o f f i c i a l resentment, although there were c a l l s f o r more 59 c o n s i d e r a t i o n f o r a l l i e s i n US p o l i c y . 8 " The problems encountered by the A l l i a n c e i n fo r m u l a t i n g p o l i c y consensus on e v e r y t h i n g from nuclear p o l i c y to E a s t -West r e l a t i o n s had never been so severe. Andrew J . P i e r r e p o i n t e d out i n 1983 t h a t : "In a rather fundamental manner, the dominant p o l i t i c a l p e r s p e c t i v e s and s o c i e t a l moods have div e r g e d on the two s i d e s of the A t l a n t i c . " 8 5 The Europeans d e s i r e d to c o n s t r a i n the USSR by ma i n t a i n i n g a d i a l o g u e ; the US, concerned over S o v i e t m i l i t a r y b u i l d u p s and expansionism, emphasized strong m i l i t a r y power to r e s t r a i n S o v i e t behaviour. Nor was there much hope f o r a renewal of consensus on the S o v i e t t h r e a t . W i l l i a m G. Hyland p o i n t e d out i n 1984 that "...without a common e v a l u a t i o n of the East-West c o n t e s t . . . the t r e n d towards s e p a r a t i o n between America and Europe i s l i k e l y to c o n t i n u e . " 8 6 The US-European S t r a t e g i c S p l i t D e s p i t e the s i g n i f i c a n c e of i n t r a - A l l i a n c e d i f f e r e n c e s over the S o v i e t t h r e a t , the d i f f e r e n c e s which were to have the g r e a t e s t impact on the INF debate were the c o n t r a d i c t o r y US-European views on what shape the nucl e a r f o r c e i n Europe should take and what d o c t r i n e s should guide t h e i r deployment. There were three fundamental areas of p o l i c y disagreement: a u t o m a t i c i t y of nu c l e a r response, the r o l e of e s c a l a t i o n i n NATO s t r a t e g y , and the f e a s a b i l i t y and d e s i r a b i l i t y of nuclear w a r f i g h t i n g i n NATO strategy." 60 Disagreement over a u t o m a t i c i t y of response and i t s r e l a t i o n s h i p to deterrence i s a r e s u l t of a d i r e c t c l a s h of s t r a t e g i c i n t e r e s t s . The West European c o u p l e r s and n e g o t i a t o r s d e s i r e , i n the words of the West German White Paper of 1983, a "continuum of d e t e r r e n c e , 8 7 with no 'gaps' between f o r c e s at the c o n v e n t i o n a l , t h e a t r e n u c l e a r , and s t r a t e g i c l e v e l s . In t h e i r view, NATO nuclear p o l i c y should t h r e a t e n the e a r l y and widespread use of nucl e a r weapons. Faced with such a prospect, the Soviet Union would be d e t e r r e d from i n i t i a t i n g a c o n f l i c t i n Europe. The US, on the other hand, has sought t o c r e a t e gaps or l e v e l s i n deterr e n c e to c o n t r o l e s c a l a t i o n and av o i d a s t r a t e g i c n u c l e a r exchange. F u r t h e r , i t i s i n the US i n t e r e s t to maintain a c o n v e n t i o n a l f i r e b r e a k f o r as long as p o s s i b l e , so as to av o i d the use of nuclear weapons and the prospect of e s c a l a t i o n t h e i r use e n t a i l s . Should NATO have to r e s o r t to nuclear weapons, the US would p r e f e r they be used both to achieve an advantage i n the war, and to terminate the war at a 'gap' i n deterr e n c e short of s t r a t e g i c n u c l e a r s t r i k e s . A c c o r d i n g l y , the US has attempted to maintain a u t h o r i t y over the c a p a b i l i t i e s r e q u i r e d to 'jump' these gaps. Though the US c o n t r o l s much of NATO's TNW's and some of NATO's t h e a t r e nuclear weapons, US attempts to gain complete c o n t r o l of nuclear decision-making i n Europe have f a l l e n s h o r t . European a t t i t u d e s which favour e a r l y f i r s t use as a d e t e r r e n t i n c o n t r a s t to US d e s i r e s f o r a long c o n v e n t i o n a l 61 f i r e b r e a k stem from Europe's experience of the d e s t r u c t i v e n e s s of c o n v e n t i o n a l war. However, a t t i t u d e s towards c o n v e n t i o n a l war are d i f f e r e n t i n North America, as Paul C. Warnke has p o i n t e d out: . . . f o r a c i t i z e n of the U n i t e d S t a t e s or Canada, the r i s k of c o n v e n t i o n a l a t t a c k produces few nightmares. Deterrence on t h i s s i d e of the A t l a n t i c u s u a l l y i s construed to mean pr e v e n t i o n of n u c l e a r war. 8 8 Not s u r p r i s i n g l y , given the divergence over the d e s i r a b i l i t y of 'gaps' and c o n v e n t i o n a l f i r e b r e a k s i n d e t e r r e n c e , the US and European NATO c o u n t r i e s have developed d i f f e r i n g i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s over the f u n c t i o n of e s c a l a t i o n . The European conception sees e s c a l a t i o n as an unstoppable process l e a d i n g i n e v i t a b l y to a s t r a t e g i c n uclear exchange. For c o u p l e r s and n e g o t i a t o r s , the t h r e a t to e s c a l a t e i n v o l v e s both the c a p a c i t y and the c r e d i b i l i t y to e s c a l a t e to a general nuclear war, and emphasis should be p l a c e d on the t h r e a t that the l e v e l of v i o l e n c e may be u n c o n t r o l l e d . Europeans b e l i e v e that by posing the t h r e a t of quick and v i r t u a l l y automatic e s c a l a t i o n up to the use of US s t r a t e g i c systems, the e f f e c t and c r e d i b i l i t y of d e t e r r e n c e i s i n c r e a s e d . In the words of Manfred Woerner: The S o v i e t Union cannot be i n v i t e d to contemplate a war l i m i t e d e x c l u s i v e l y to Western Europe, or even to German t e r r i t o r y . Moscow must at a l l times be f o r c e d to reckon with the f u l l ladder of e s c a l a t i o n . 8 9 The US, on the other hand, with i t s vested i n t e r e s t i n a v o i d i n g e s c a l a t i o n to the s t r a t e g i c l e v e l , sees e s c a l a t i o n 6 2 as a means of g a i n i n g a m i l i t a r y or p o l i t i c a l advantage, or as an o p p o r t u n i t y to manage a c r i s i s a f t e r a c o n f l i c t has broken out. To achieve t h i s , a c r e d i b l e c a p a c i t y must e x i s t that w i l l enable NATO to gain s t r a t e g i c advantage through e s c a l a t i o n . In t h i s way, i n the US view, deter r e n c e i s enhanced. The fundamental i n t r a - a l l i a n c e d i f f e r e n c e s over deter r e n c e and e s c a l a t i o n have, however, taken a back seat to the i n t e n s e , and more p u b l i c i z e d , c o n f l i c t over the w a r f i g h t i n g r o l e of t h e a t r e nuclear weapons i n Europe. US-d e p l o y e r s (and some ba l a n c e r s ) have pressed f o r a w a r f i g h t i n g c a p a b i l i t y i n the event that h o s t i l i t i e s do break out. The West European's dominant concern, i s l i n k a g e , with t h e a t r e - n u c l e a r c a p a b i l i t i e s l a r g e l y subordinated to the p o l i t i c a l requirements of c o u p l i n g r a t h e r than the m i l i t a r y c r i t e r i a of w a r f i g h t i n g . T h i s was emphasized by the West German White Paper, which s t a t e d that The i n i t i a l use of n u c l e a r weapons i s not intended so much as to b r i n g about a m i l i t a r y d e c i s i o n as to achieve a p o l i t i c a l e f f e c t . The i n t e n t i s to persuade the a t t a c k e r to r e c o n s i d e r h i s i n t e n t i o n , to d e s i s t i n h i s a g g r e s s i o n , and to withdraw. At the same time, i t w i l l be impressed upon him that he r i s k s s t i l l f u r t h e r e s c a l a t i o n i f he continues to a t t a c k . 9 0 Europeans of a l l p e r s p e c t i v e s do not c o n s i d e r n u c l e a r weapons to be w a r f i g h t i n g weapons. They are viewed p r i m a r i l y as p o l i t i c a l instruments of d e t e r r e n c e . Suggestions from US d e p l o y e r s and many Reagan a d m i n i s t r a t i o n o f f i c i a l s that a n u c l e a r w a r f i g h t i n g posture f o r NATO would be a s e n s i b l e o p t i o n arouse European f e a r s and a n x i e t i e s about the US 6 3 commitment to extended d e t e r r e n c e . Tones of resentment can a l s o be d e t e c t e d i n some European remarks: For the f i r s t time i n i t s e x i s t e n c e . . . the US i t s e l f i s in a v u l n e r a b l e p o s i t i o n — b e i n g l i a b l e to n u c l e a r a t t a c k — a n d Washington i s r e l u c t a n t to accept the r i s k s , t r y i n g i n s t e a d to delegate i t to others or at l e a s t keep i t as f a r away as p o s s i b l e from the USA. 9 1 The West European view has always been more concerned with d e t e r r e n c e and the maintenance of deterrence r a t h e r than with the use of n u c l e a r weapons should d e t e r r e n c e f a i l . D e s i r i n g the s t r o n g e s t p o s s i b l e l i n k to the US s t r a t e g i c n u c l e a r guarantee, the Europeans have s t r i v e n to ensure both the c r e d i b i l i t y of that guarantee and assurances that a n u c l e a r war would not be l i m i t e d to Europe. Helmut Schmidt spoke f o r a l l Europeans when he s t a t e d that the use of t a c t i c a l n u c l e a r weapons i n Europe would . . . l e a d to the most e x t e n s i v e d e v a s t a t i o n of Europe and to the most e x t e n s i v e l o s s of l i f e of i t s peoples...Those who think that Europe can be defended by the massed use of such weapons w i l l not defend Europe but destroy i t . 9 2 From the European p e r s p e c t i v e , nuclear weapons should be used e a r l y i n a c o n f l i c t a g a i n s t a wide range of t a r g e t s , to s i g n a l A l l i a n c e r e s o l v e to prosecute the war at any and a l l l e v e l s . The c r e d i b l e t h r e a t to invoke t h i s use i s the c o r n e r s t o n e of the European deter r e n c e p e r s p e c t i v e . S e l e c t i v e Employment Plans (SEPs) and other LNO s t r a t e g i e s worry Europeans of a l l p e r s p e c t i v e s because they imply an attempt to c o n f i n e nuclear war to Europe. Such plans a l s o seem to f o s t e r the view that t h e a t r e - n u c l e a r 64 f o r c e s are a s u b s t i t u t e f o r US s t r a t e g i c f o r c e s . US arguments about the need f o r SEPs are "...bound to prompt quest i o n s about US w i l l i n g n e s s to commit s t r a t e g i c systems i f n e c e s s a r y . " 9 3 The c h a l l e n g e posed by US w a r f i g h t i n g proponents to A l l i a n c e p o l i c y of deterr e n c e and detente i s a l s o a ch a l l e n g e to the e n t i r e European co n c e p t i o n of NATO as a d e t e r r i n g , not w a r f i g h t i n g , o r g a n i z a t i o n . As the nu c l e a r guarantor of NATO, however, the US has f e l t i t must c o n s i d e r what might happen should d e t e r r e n c e f a i l . T h i s has r e s u l t e d i n the c o n s i d e r a t i o n of a v a r i e t y of LNO and w a r f i g h t i n g s t r a t e g i e s , g l o b a l l y and i n Europe, intended to make the use of nuclear weapons more c r e d i b l e than the t h r e a t of a l l - o u t n u c l e a r response. A p o l i c y marriage e x i s t s i n the US p o s i t i o n on the c r e d i b i l i t y of nucle a r use. While US deplo y e r s s t r e s s that adopting a w a r f i g h t i n g s t r a t e g y strengthens d e t e r r e n c e , US balancers welcome the s h i f t towards p o l i c i e s which p r o v i d e d nuclear weapons with a c l e a r m i l i t a r y r o l e f o r both c e n t r a l and extended d e t e r r e n c e m i s s i o n s . From the US deployer p e r s p e c t i v e , the use of nuclear weapons should be delayed as long as i s possible" and then used to s t r i k e at predominantly m i l i t a r y t a r g e t s to achieve a r a p i d r e s o l u t i o n of the war. S e c r e t a r y of Defense S c h l e s i n g e r a r t i c u l a t e d what has been the predominant US view to the Committee on Fo r e i g n R e l a t i o n s i n 1974, "...our nuc l e a r weapons i n Europe are present f o r de t e r r e n c e , and 6 5 d e t e r r e n c e i s made c r e d i b l e by a c r e d i b l e w a r f i g h t i n g c a p a b i l i t y . " 9 " US b a l a n c e r s are i n general agreement. Henry K i s s i n g e r argued that " . . . i t i s imperative that we f i n a l l y t r y to develop some c r e d i b l e m i l i t a r y purposes f o r the t a c t i c a l and theater n u c l e a r f o r c e s that we are b u i l d i n g . " 9 5 The push by the US to adopt s t r a t e g i c and t h e a t r e w a r f i g h t i n g s t r a t e g i e s has f o r c e d the ,US to face the p o l i t i c a l and p u b l i c r e l a t i o n s dilemma brought on by those s t r a t e g i e s . Any p o l i c i e s that make the use of nuclear weapons more c r e d i b l e a l s o makes t h e i r use seem more p o s s i b l e . In f o r m u l a t i n g a consensus on nuclear p o l i c y , the A l l i a n c e must grapple with t h i s c e n t r a l , c o n t r a d i c t o r y s t r a t e g i c r e a l i t y . I t i s i n the s t r a t e g i c i n t e r e s t of the U n i t e d S t a t e s to minimize the r i s k of e s c a l a t i o n to the s t r a t e g i c nuclear l e v e l , which i s the key premise of extended d e t e r r e n c e . I t i s i n the s t r a t e g i c i n t e r e s t of the Western Europeans, to maximize the p r o b a b i l i t y of r a p i d e s c a l a t i o n should war occur so as to strengthen pre-war d e t e r r e n c e . The p o s i t i o n s of both s i d e s are d r i v e n by the purest motives of s e l f - i n t e r e s t . N e i t h e r wants nuclear weapons to explode on t h e i r t e r r i t o r y f i r s t or e x c l u s i v e l y . The Europeans, i f given a c h o i c e , would p r e f e r to see the US and the USSR conduct a nuclear war above t h e i r heads. The US, i f pressed, would r a t h e r see a nuclear war c o n f i n e d to Europe. These dark motives are only o c c a s i o n a l l y expressed i n the i n t e r e s t of m a i n t a i n i n g the visage of p o l i t i c a l 6 6 p o l i t e n e s s and A l l i a n c e harmony. However, the havoc these c o n t r a d i c t o r y i n t e r e s t s pose f o r nuclear p o l i c y consensus i n the A l l i a n c e i s a r e a l i t y NATO has been unable to igno r e . As Richard B e t t s has p o i n t e d out, " . . . p o l i c y on TNF has t r a d i t i o n a l l y remained muddled because of the l a t e n t c o n t r a d i c t i o n between American and A l l i e d i n t e r e s t s . " 9 6 Not s u r p r i s i n g l y , the d i f f i c u l t y i n a c h i e v i n g a nucl e a r p o l i c y consensus made i t a l l the more d i f f i c u l t f o r NATO to decide what shape the new INF f o r c e i n Europe should take. C o n f l i c t over the forc e s t r u c t u r e c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s of the p r o s p e c t i v e INF f o r c e was a r e s u l t of a lack of a d o c t r i n a l consensus. C o n t r a d i c t o r y s t r a t e g i c i n t e r e s t s l e d to c o n t r a d i c t o r y f o r c e s t r u c t u r e d e s i r e s . The Force S t r u c t u r e S p l i t T h i s c o n f l i c t over the A l l i a n c e ' s fundamental s t r a t e g i c posture l e d to disagreement over the c h a r a c t e r and deployment of the new t h e a t r e - n u c l e a r systems. The d i f f e r e n t p e r s p e c t i v e s r e q u i r e d d i s s i m i l a r f o r c e s t r u c t u r e s . In the US conc e p t i o n , a new t h e a t r e - n u c l e a r f o r c e i n Europe r e q u i r e d a l a r g e number of d e l i v e r y v e h i c l e s capable of absorbing a pre-emptive s t r i k e and launchin g s i g n i f i c a n t s t r i k e s on m i l i t a r y t a r g e t s . In the European c o n c e p t i o n , the new f o r c e r e q u i r e d that d e l i v e r y systems be s u r v i v a b l e but not n e c e s s a r i l y numerous, as they are intended to pro v i d e an i n t e r i m s t r i k e demonstrating r e s o l v e and t h r e a t e n i n g e s c a l a t i o n to s t r a t e g i c n u c l e a r war. { 67 P r i o r to the 1979 d e c i s i o n , c o n t r o v e r s y arose over basing schemes f o r the new m i s s i l e f o r c e . A l a r g e number of o f f i c i a l s and a n a l y s t s advocated basing the f o r c e out at sea, on SLBMs or m i s s i l e c a r r i e r s . Such systems, i t was argued, would be v i r t u a l l y i n v u l n e r a b l e to pre-emption, and would possess a high degree of deployment f l e x i b i l i t y . P o l i t i c a l l y , basing the INF f o r c e at sea would a v o i d the p o l i t i c a l f u r o r which land-based deployments would a r o u s e . 9 7 Sea-based systems were, however, excluded from the INF d e c i s i o n due to the European r e f u s a l to accept such a basing scheme. The E u r o - c o u p l e r s and E u r o - n e g o t i a t o r s i n s i s t e d the modernization program should e n t a i l a v i s i b l e p o l i t i c a l commitment by the US to the s e c u r i t y of Europe. T h i s r e q u i r e d v i s i b l e , land-based n u c l e a r systems. Sea-based systems were not v i s i b l e , and t h e r e f o r e were not a s u f f i c i e n t s e c u r i t y l i n k , as they d i d not c o n s t i t u t e a t a n g i b l e US nuclear presence i n Europe. Other o b j e c t i o n s that sunk the sea-based o p t i o n were the c o s t s and probable delay i n developing or r e t r o - f i t t i n g SLCM c a r r i e r s and problems a s s o c i a t e d with command and c o n t r o l , e s p e c i a l l y i n c r i s i s . Other p o l i t i c a l o b j e c t i o n s were a l s o r a i s e d . Risk s h a r i n g , a key West German demand, was not p l a u s i b l e with o f f s h o r e sea-based systems. F u r t h e r , s e v e r a l NATO governments ( e s p e c i a l l y Norway) expressed f e a r s that t h e i r t e r r i t o r i a l waters would become submarine s a n c t u a r i e s and t h e r e f o r e t a r g e t s . F i n a l l y , the sea-basing o p t i o n was too r e m i n i s c e n t of the MLF c o n t r o v e r s y that few NATO o f f i c i a l s 68 were w i l l i n g to t r y a s i m i l a r route a g a i n . In the end, the basing debate was q u i c k l y s e t t l e d by the p o l i t i c a l i mperatives of the Europeans. While the basing scheme debate was s e t t l e d with comparative ease, the c o n t r o v e r s y over the numerical s i z e of the f o r c e i n v o l v e d a somewhat more complex problem. The . US a d m i n i s t r a t i o n d e s i r e d a n u m e r i c a l l y l a r g e f o r c e , one capable of absorbing a f i r s t s t r i k e and r e t a i n i n g the a b i l i t y to launch s i g n i f i c a n t damaging a t t a c k s on important m i l i t a r y i n s t a l l a t i o n s as the war progressed. A c r e d i b l e f o r c e , US o f f i c i a l s argued, had to be l a r g e enough to s u r v i v e a pre-emptive s t r i k e and s t i l l pose a c r e d i b l e t h r e a t to the USSR. The Euro-couplers and n e g o t i a t o r s , on the other hand, only saw the need for a f o r c e capable of s t a r t i n g the e s c a l a t o r y b a l l r o l l i n g . T h i s d i d not r e q u i r e a n u m e r i c a l l y l a r g e f o r c e . The Europeans were i n s t i n c t i v e l y s u s p i c i o u s of US c a l l s f o r a f o r c e of some 600 m i s s i l e s , which many saw as an attempt to p l a c e a l a r g e , h i g h l y capable f o r c e i n Europe which c o u l d prosecute a war without the use of US s t r a t e g i c systems. Once again, c o n t r a d i c t o r y i n t e r e s t s c l a s h e d . A token nuc l e a r deployment to a c t as a t r i p w i r e was the most p o l i t i c a l l y d e s i r a b l e o p t i o n i n Europe, but i t was not a c r e d i b l e d e t e r r e n t . However, a l a r g e r , more c r e d i b l e f o r c e c a r r i e d with i t the prospect of l a r g e - s c a l e n u c l e a r use i n a European war, which r a i s e d f e a r s i n Europe about. US 69 i n t e n t i o n s to c o n f i n e a war to European t e r r i t o r y . The a c t u a l a r r i v a l at the number 572 i n the 1979 d e c i s i o n i s d i s c u s s e d l a t e r . C o n f l i c t a l s o emerged over what warhead y i e l d s the new INF systems should have. In the US view, warhead y i e l d s should be low, to enable the INF f o r c e to c a r r y out d i s c r i m i n a t e s t r i k e s on m i l i t a r y t a r g e t s , with low l e v e l s of c o l l a t e r a l damage. T h i s , US d e p l o y e r s and b a l a n c e r s argued, would enhance the u s a b i l i t y and t h e r e f o r e the c r e d i b i l i t y of the INF f o r c e . From the European p e r s p e c t i v e , however, t h i s i m p l i e d a reduced US commitment, by making nuclear weapons more usable i n Europe. The c o n t r o v e r s y over warhead y i e l d was c o m p a r a t i v e l y q u i e t , l a r g e l y because of the ambivalence of the European p o s i t i o n . Although l o w - y i e l d warheads made the use of n u c l e a r systems in Europe more f e a s i b l e , the lower l e v e l s of c o l l a t e r a l damage the S o v i e t s would i n c u r might make the S o v i e t l e a d e r s h i p more dis p o s e d to t e r m i n a t i n g a c o n f l i c t . A more in t e n s e i n t r a - A l l i a n c e debate r e v o l v e d around the i s s u e of the range of the new f o r c e and i t s t a r g e t t i n g p r i o r i t i e s . Both US and European a n a l y s t s l a r g e l y agreed that the c r e d i b i l i t y of the f o r c e s l a r g e l y r e s t e d on an a b i l i t y to reach S o v i e t t e r r i t o r y . The US d e p l o y e r s , however, sought t h i s c a p a b i l i t y f o r i t s w a r f i g h t i n g advantage, while US b a l a n c e r s sought i t f o r enhanced c r e d i b i l i t y . E x p l i c i t i n the US p o s i t i o n was the a b i l i t y to t a r g e t m i l i t a r y t a r g e t s throughout the European t h e a t r e . The 70 US sought to deploy a long-range f o r c e , intended f o r d i s c r i m i n a t e s t r i k e s a g a i n s t a wide range of m i l i t a r y t a r g e t s . In a d d i t i o n , longer-range systems would be l e s s v u l n e r a b l e to pre-emptive s t r i k e s as they would be based f u r t h e r to the rear of the NATO t h e a t r e . The Euro-couplers and n e g o t i a t o r s , by c o n t r a s t , sought a long-range c a p a b i l i t y f o r e s c a l a t o r y purposes. The European p o s i t i o n , though never e x p l i c i t l y expressed i n p u b l i c , was that long-range systems with a n o n - d i s c r i m i n a t e t a r g e t t i n g posture would best ensure the i n t e g r i t y of the e s c a l a t i o n p r o c e s s . The t h r e a t to i n i t i a t e i n d i s c r i m i n a t e s t r i k e s on S o v i e t t e r r i t o r y would, i n the e s t i m a t i o n of many European a n a l y s t s , perform the st r o n g e s t d e t e r r e n t f u n c t i o n . F i n a l l y , the US sought to c o n s t r u c t an e x t e n s i v e , s u r v i v a b l e command and c o n t r o l network capable of d i r e c t i n g and c o n t r o l l i n g LNO s t r i k e s . Furthermore, c o n t r o l over nuclear weapons had to be t i g h t , to a v o i d unauthorized use, and to maintain s t r i c t c o n t r o l over the instruments of e s c a l a t i o n i n p e r i o d s of c r i s i s or d u r i n g a c o n v e n t i o n a l war. By c o n t r a s t , the Europeans saw the need only f o r as much command and c o n t r o l as was necessary to launch an e s c a l a t o r y s t r i k e . There was a l s o a n x i e t y over the LNO and w a r f i g h t i n g c a p a b i l i t y e x p l i c i t i n e x t e n s i v e command and c o n t r o l s t r u c t u r e s . The Europeans found i t d i f f i c u l t to accept c o n t r o l s over n u c l e a r weapons which were too t i g h t . While the d e s i r a b i l i t y of p r e v e n t i n g unauthorized use was 71 r e c o g n i z e d , the Europeans, e s p e c i a l l y the Eu r o - c o u p l e r s , f e l t that o v e r l y s t r i c t c o n t r o l s over nu c l e a r r e l e a s e damaged the c r e d i b i l i t y of the nuclear t h r e a t and indeed imposed s e l f - d e t e r r e n c e on t h e i r u s e . 9 8 There were a l s o p e r p l e x i n g i n t e r n a l paradoxes unique to both p o s i t i o n s . For the past twenty ye a r s , US a d m i n i s t r a t i o n s have attempted to avoid s i t u a t i o n s which c o u l d l e a d to prompt and automatic e s c a l a t i o n to the s t r a t e g i c l e v e l . INF modernization was to strengthen the US nu c l e a r guarantee, by p r o v i d i n g the US l e a d e r s h i p with the o p t i o n of s t r i k i n g at So v i e t t e r r i t o r y from Western Europe. However, as c r i t i c s argued, t h i s very c a p a b i l i t y may make the US l e a d e r s h i p l e s s d i s p o s e d to r e l e a s e a weapon i n Europe with the knowledge that i t c o u l d (and probably would) r e s u l t i n a r e t a l i a t o r y s t r i k e a g a i n s t the c o n t i n e n t a l US. The USSR has i n f a c t made i t rep e a t e d l y c l e a r that i t w i l l not respond to a nuclear a t t a c k based on the l o c a t i o n from which i t was launched. Rather, i t would respond a c c o r d i n g to the t a r g e t s h i t . Marshal N i k o l a i Ogarkov, f o r example, made i t c l e a r that the C o n t i n e n t a l U n i t e d States (CONUS) would be t a r g e t t e d r e g a r d l e s s of whether the Soviet Union was struck from US-based systems or European-based s y s t e m s . 9 9 In a d d i t i o n , although the d e t e r r e n t value of the new INF f o r c e was to depend on i t s a b i l i t y t o s t r i k e at t a r g e t s i n the USSR, t h i s very c a p a b i l i t y c o u l d induce the USSR to pre-empt them i n a c r i s i s . The a n x i e t y over the p r o s p e c t i v e INF deployment exposed 72 the t i g h t r o p e walk i n v o l v e d i n f o r m u l a t i n g nuclear p o l i c y i n Europe. The r e a l i t y of Europe's nuclear dependency has r e s u l t e d i n a p e r s i s t e n t s e n s i t i v i t y to nucl e a r deployments. On the one hand, INF deployment aroused European f e a r s about the l i k e l i h o o d of nuclear use i n Europe. On the other hand, f a i l u r e to deploy would arouse f e a r s that NATO c o u l d not be depended upon to guarantee European s e c u r i t y . F u r t h e r , i f US nuclear f o r c e s i n Europe f a l l below a c e r t a i n l e v e l , they are c o n s i d e r e d inadequate as m i l i t a r y and p o l i t i c a l deployments. If they r i s e above a c e r t a i n l e v e l , they are co n s i d e r e d e x c e s s i v e as they c o u l d be used to the e x c l u s i o n of US s t r a t e g i c systems. 1 0 0 C o u p l i n g , t h e r e f o r e , i s a matter of balance between extremes that c o u l d l e a d to de c o u p l i n g . These f o r c e s t r u c t u r e c o n f l i c t s were an i n e v i t a b l e r e s u l t of the c l a s h e s i n s t r a t e g i c i n t e r e s t and p e r s p e c t i v e between the US and European NATO members. The Dual Track d e c i s i o n had to accommodate these c o n f l i c t s of i n t e r e s t and fo r c e s t r u c t u r e d i v ergence. However, even as c o n f l i c t i n t e n s i f i e d over the deployment t r a c k , the s p l i t i n p e r s p e c t i v e on arms c o n t r o l emerged' as yet another c o n t e n t i o u s i s s u e between the US and Europe. The Arms C o n t r o l S p l i t While A l l i a n c e cohesion and p o l i c y u n i t y i s dependent on at l e a s t a measure of agreement on o b j e c t i v e s and s o l u t i o n s , no such agreement e x i s t s between Europe and the 73 US on the u t i l i t y of arms c o n t r o l . T h i s l a c k of consensus was e s p e c i a l l y s i g n i f i c a n t d u r i n g the INF c o n t r o v e r s y , as there was pr e s s u r e from E u r o - n e g o t i a t o r s i n power to i n c l u d e the p u r s u i t of arms c o n t r o l i n the modernization d e c i s i o n . -The US and European A l l i a n c e members d i f f e r even over the fundamental r a i s o n d'etre of arms c o n t r o l . The US p l a c e s emphasis on m i l i t a r y s t a b i l i t y and b a l a n c i n g of weapons c a p a b i l i t i e s . For the Europeans, emphasis should be p l a c e d on a c h i e v i n g p o l i t i c a l s t a b i l i t y through n e g o t i a t i o n . To exacerbate t h i s divergence, both extremes i n the East-West arms c o n t r o l c l i m a t e arouse European a n x i e t i e s . Too much superpower c o r d i a l i t y and accommodation worry Europeans who f e a r a US S o v i e t deal at the expense of t h e i r own s e c u r i t y . Tense superpower r e l a t i o n s and C o l d War p o l i t i c s r a i s e a n x i e t i e s over the p r e s e r v a t i o n of s t a b l e East-West r e l a t i o n s . The U n i t e d S t a t e s , on the other hand, i s impatient with what i t p e r c e i v e s as a European preoccupation with arms c o n t r o l at the expense of support f o r Western s e c u r i t y p r o g r a m s . 1 0 1 The INF c o n t r o v e r s y brought the arms c o n t r o l dichotomy to the f o r e f r o n t . Managing t h i s divergence was another A l l i a n c e task. For the European A l l i a n c e members, arms c o n t r o l was a p o l i t i c a l way out of the INF dilemma. A n e g o t i a t e d r e d u c t i o n i n INF would reduce or e l i m i n a t e the S o v i e t INF t h r e a t and would spare NATO the p o l i t i c a l l y d i s r u p t i v e e f f e c t s of any INF modernization. Deployment, or the t h r e a t of deployment, 74 should t h e r e f o r e be implemented i n accordance with i t s p o l i t i c a l purpose as a b a r g a i n i n g c h i p . However, i n the view of the Reagan A d m i n i s t r a t i o n , unless b a r g a i n i n g c h i p s have a c l e a r m i l i t a r y purpose, t h e i r . b a r g a i n i n g power i s l i m i t e d . 1 0 2 And to deploy INF with b a r g a i n i n g c h i p i n t e n t i o n s r e s t r i c t s the a b i l i t y to deploy with a c l e a r m i l i t a r y purpose. Consensus on arms c o n t r o l was another c a s u a l t y of the dichotomy i n s t r a t e g i c i n t e r e s t s between the US and Europe. European a n x i e t i e s over the conduct of US-Soviet arms c o n t r o l n e g o t i a t i o n s were t w o f o l d . F i r s t , t here were qu e s t i o n s as to the commitment of the US to arms c o n t r o l . Second, there was the worrisome p o s s i b i l i t y that the US might bargain away c e r t a i n European i n t e r e s t s i n the process of s e c u r i n g a favourable d e a l f o r i t s e l f . European angst over the US commitment to arms c o n t r o l was understandable i n view of t h e i r p o s i t i o n . The Europeans i n s i s t e d on an arms c o n t r o l component to the modernization d e c i s i o n , yet had no involvement i n the conduct of those n e g o t i a t i o n s . As a r e s u l t , i t was widely f e l t i n Europe that arms c o n t r o l n e g o t i a t i o n s ( s p e c i f i c a l l y the 1980 Geneva n e g o t i a t i o n s ) , c o u l d w e l l be a d i p l o m a t i c ruse by the US to get the INF d e c i s i o n agreed to and implemented by the European A l l i a n c e members. There was no way the Europeans c o u l d know i f the US was n e g o t i a t i n g i n good f a i t h . A n x i e t i e s that the US would regard any arms c o n t r o l t r a c k as a c o n c e s s i o n to get European c o u n t r i e s "on board" p e r s i s t e d 75 throughout the INF proc e s s . When the US suspended arms c o n t r o l t a l k s i n January of 1980 a f t e r the i n v a s i o n of Afg h a n i s t a n , the Europeans found themselves caught i n what was i n many ways a worst-case p o s i t i o n : imminent deployment of the new m i s s i l e s , no arms c o n t r o l n e g o t i a t i o n s on those systems under way, an atmosphere of East-West c o n f r o n t a t i o n , and a l l t h i s without having had any say i n the matter. US n e g o t i a t i n g posture, both p r i o r to the Geneva walkout and a f t e r arms c o n t r o l t a l k s had resumed, a l s o aroused European concern. E u r o - c o u p l e r s and n e g o t i a t o r s r e a c t s t r o n g l y when arms c o n t r o l measures begin to a f f e c t f o r c e s which they see as c r u c i a l to the maintenance of extended d e t e r r e n c e . T h i s was the case with the c r u i s e m i s s i l e . The Europeans viewed the GLCM as a r e l a t i v e l y inexpensive and h i g h l y u s e f u l weapons system f o r NATO's nuclear f o r c e s . 1 0 3 US w i l l i n g n e s s to n e g o t i a t e r e s t r i c t i o n s on c r u i s e m i s s i l e range and i n c l u s i o n of noncircumvention p r o v i s i o n s p r o h i b i t i n g . t e c h n o l o g y t r a n s f e r , while f a i l i n g to ob t a i n r e s t r i c i o n s on the SS-20 and B a c k f i r e bomber, was seen i n Europe as a p u r e l y s e l f - i n t e r e s t e d arms c o n t r o l p o l i c y . The US, i n l o o k i n g . a f t e r i t s own i n t e r e s t s , was f o r s a k i n g those of the A l l i a n c e . As Simon Lunn p o i n t e d out, "There was r e a l concern that i n i t s enthusiasm f o r an arms c o n t r o l agreement the a d m i n i s t r a t i o n would j e t t i s o n European s e c u r i t y i n t e r e s t s . " 1 0 4 E u r o - c o u p l e r s and n e g o t i a t o r s were l a r g e l y dismayed at the SALT II p r o t o c o l which r e s t r i c t e d GLCM/SLCM range to 600 7 6 m i l e s and imposed a deployment ban on c r u i s e systems w i t h i n range of the USSR. European co n f i d e n c e was f u r t h e r shaken when a paper was c i r c u l a t e d to NATO c a p i t a l s by the US attempting to dampen European enthusiasm about the c a p a b i l i t i e s and d e s i r a b i l i t y of the GLCM. The Europeans saw t h i s as an attempt by the US to downplay the GLCM to promote and secure support f o r SALT I I . The US, Europeans p o i n t e d out, had adopted ALCMs as the weapon of c h o i c e f o r SAC bombers. T h i s d i s p l a y of tra n s p a r e n t p o l i t i c a l h y p o c r i s y d i d l i t t l e to b o l s t e r European confidence i n the US. When Ger a l d Ford and James S c h l e s i n g e r , both proponents of c r u i s e m i s s i l e deployment, were r e p l a c e d by Jimmy C a r t e r and H a r o l d Brown, two arms c o n t r o l l e r s , o f f i c i a l US a t t i t u d e s on the c r u i s e m i s s i l e s s h i f t e d a b r u p t l y . The new a d m i n i s t r a t i o n regarded the c r u i s e m i s s i l e as an o b s t a c l e both to arms c o n t r o l and nuclear s t a b i l i t y . With such views now r e s i d i n g i n the White House, c o n f l i c t with Europe over arms c o n t r o l was i n e v i t a b l e . In a d d i t i o n , Europeans feared the emphasis i n SALT II on i n t e r c o n t i n e n t a l - r a n g e systems would l i k e l y l e a d to a b u i l d u p i n European theatre-range systems, with a l l the i m p l i c a t i o n s f o r Europe such a b u i l d u p e n t a i l e d . The Europeans viewed the GLCM as a defence .bargain. I t was r e l a t i v e l y inexpensive and h i g h l y u s e f u l f o r NATO's nucl e a r f o r c e s . The US, however, viewed i t as a b a r g a i n i n g c h i p . The arms c o n t r o l schism at the o f f i c i a l l e v e l was never widely p u b l i c i s e d . The s i z e and p o t e n t i a l impact of domestic 77 peace movements, however, a t t r a c t e d c o n s i d e r a b l y more a t t e n t i o n . Domestic P r o t e s t s : Less i s B e t t e r Although i t i s not the purpose of t h i s study to examine the European a n t i - n u c l e a r movement i n great d e t a i l , the impact of Euro-disarmers on European governments and parl i a m e n t s d u r i n g the INF c o n t r o v e r s y does warrant mention. The European a n t i - n u c l e a r movement experienced a tremendous surge i n both v i s i b i l i t y and p o p u l a r i t y i n the e a r l y 1980's. The primary c a t a l y s t f o r the massive d e m o n s t r a t i o n s 1 0 5 of t h i s p e r i o d was the i n t e n t 'of the A t l a n t i c A l l i a n c e to modernize i t s t h e a t r e - n u c l e a r a r s e n a l . T h i s modernization program was viewed by the a n t i - n u c l e a r movement as an unnecessary expansion of an a l r e a d y o v e r l y -l a r g e NATO nucl e a r a r s e n a l . There was a strong n a t i o n a l nature to the a n t i - n u c l e a r movements; each movement possessed c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s or views p a r t i c u l a r to i t s c o u n t r i e s s o c i a l and c u l t u r a l h e r i t a g e . 1 0 6 The common d e s i r e , or g o a l , as d i s c u s s e d e a r l i e r , was to prevent deployment of the new INF f o r c e and to d e - n u c l e a r i z e Europe at l e a s t p a r t i a l l y , i f not t o t a l l y . The proposed INF f o r c e was viewed as d e s t a b i l i z i n g and an unnecessary p r o v o c a t i o n to the S o v i e t Union. The GLCM was u n i v e r s a l l y accorded e s p e c i a l l y heavy c r i t i c i s m due to the p e r c e i v e d blow i t d e a l t to v e r i f i a b l e arms c o n t r o l . Another common l i n k among the movements was t h e i r o f t e n e x p l i c i t a n t i -78 American overtones. Robert P f a l t z g r a f f was u n d e r s t a t i n g the case whan he suggested that the European peace movement had " . . . a t l e a s t a s l i g h t anti-American o r i e n t a t i o n . " 1 0 7 The US was c l e a r l y the prime t a r g e t of p r o t e s t : the new m i s s i l e s were, a f t e r a l l , American; the vast bulk of n u c l e a r weapons al r e a d y i n Europe were American; and i t was the the Reagan a d m i n i s t r a t i o n which was d i s c u s s i n g l i m i t e d war p o s s i b i l i t i e s i n Europe and r e v i v i n g the c o n f r o n t a t i o n a l p o l i c i e s and inflammatory r h e t o r i c of the Cold War. The p r o t e s t movement charged that Europe was trapped i n a NATO p o l i t i c a l and s e c u r i t y c u l t u r e dominated by the US. European c o u n t r i e s had l o s t any s i g n i f i c a n t imput i n t o European s e c u r i t y arrangements. As the movement grew i n s i z e and began to a t t r a c t p a r t i c i p a n t s and support from the middle of the p o l i t i c a l -i d e o l o g i c a l spectrum, the movement began to have an impact on c e n t e r - l e f t p a r t i e s i n Europe and the cohesion of c e n t r a l i s t c o a l i t i o n s . In Germany, f o r example, p o s i t i o n s on deployment cut ac r o s s p a r t y l i n e s . In a s p e c i a l debate on deployment i n the Bundestag from November 21-22 i n 1983, Schmidt and 38 others a b s t a i n e d on an SPD r e s o l u t i o n to c a n c e l deployment and voted a g a i n s t a CDU r e s o l u t i o n to s u p p o r t i n g deployment. Meanwhile, Herbert Wehner, Egon Bahr and W i l l y Brandt, other SPD members, h a r s h l y c r i t i c i z e d deployment. In H o l l a n d and Belgium, shaky c o a l i t i o n governments d i v i d e d on deployment and under p r e s s u r e from both the a n t i - n u c l e a r movement and popular sentiment 79 opposing deployment p r o c r a s t i n a t e d on making a f i n a l d e c i s i o n . For European governments, the deployment program had become as much a s o c i o - p o l i t i c a l i s s u e as a m i l i t a r y -s t r a t e g i c one. The p r o t e s t movements were ins t r u m e n t a l i n c r e a t i n g the p o l i t i c a l c l i m a t e i n Europe that n e c e s s i t a t e d European government i n s i s t e n c e on an arms c o n t r o l t r a c k . Though h e l d l a r g e l y i n contempt by A l l i a n c e o f f i c i a l s and US and European c o n s e r v a t i v e s , there were a few v o i c e s i n the wil d e r n e s s who argued that the p r o t e s t movement was a p o s i t i v e phenomenon, as i t s t i m u l a t e d p u b l i c i n t e r e s t and debate on s e c u r i t y i s s u e s , and r e q u i r e d p r o t e s t o r s to develop depth and coherence to t h e i r p o s i t i o n s . Indeed, the u l t i m a t e f a i l u r e of the p r o t e s t movement to prevent deployment l a y i n i t s i n a b i l i t y to persuade the bulk of the p o l i t i c a l middle ground i n Europe of the c r e d i b i l i t y of i t s p o s i t i o n as a v i a b l e p o l i t i c a l o p t i o n . As a r e s u l t , i t f a i l e d to widen i t s base of support i n European parliaments f o r e i t h e r o p p o s i t i o n to INF or the u l t i m a t e goal of a n u c l e a r - f r e e Europe. Despite the high v i s i b i l i t y of the Euro-disarmers and the arguments forwarded by more c e n t r i s t p e r s p e c t i v e groupings, NATO decision-making at both the p l a n n i n g and p o l i t i c a l l e v e l s was dominated by US-deployers and Euro-c o u p l e r s . Deployment of INF was seen by US-deployers and Euro-couplers as e s s e n t i a l both f o r the maintenance of e f f e c t i v e deterrence i n Europe and to b o l s t e r the 80 c r e d i b i l i t y of NATO s t r a t e g y . For US-deployers and Euro-c o u p l e r s , the c o n v e n t i o n a l defence of Europe was impossible in the face of overwhelming Warsaw Pact advantage. In t h e i r view, US nuclear weapons were the only v i a b l e o p t i o n a v a i l a b l e to the west to b o l s t e r deterrence i n Europe. 81 CHAPTER I I I : THE GREAT COMPROMISE: THE MODERNIZATION DECISION Throughout the h i s t o r y of A l l i a n c e r e l a t i o n s , fundamentally c o n f l i c t i n g approaches among i t s members have plagued A l l i a n c e p o l i c y . The c h a l l e n g e f o r NATO has been to develop s t r a t e g i e s and f o r c e postures that s a t i s f y , or at l e a s t accommodate, c o n t r a d i c t o r y s t r a t e g i c i n t e r e s t s , d i v e r g e n t views on arms c o n t r o l , and the p o l i t i c a l moods of member n a t i o n p o p u l a t i o n s . The Dual Track d e c i s i o n was such a compromise. C h r i s t o p h Bertram has observed that "Major m i l i t a r y d e c i s i o n s can r a r e l y be t r a c e d to one cause or to one j u s t i f i c a t i o n . " 1 0 8 T h i s was c e r t a i n l y the case with the d e c i s i o n to deploy new INF i n Western Europe. There was a fundamental • m i l i t a r y r a t i o n a l e behind deployment. New INF were needed i n Europe to r e s t o r e the t h e a t r e nuclear balance and the v i a b i l i t y and c o m p a t i b i l i t y of both the s t r a t e g i c d o c t r i n e of the A l l i a n c e and i t s m i l i t a r y p o s t u r e . 1 0 9 The s e c u r i t y l i n k between the US and Europe had to be r e s t o r e d . In an address to the North A t l a n t i c Assembly i n 1981, the A s s i s t a n t S e c r e t a r y of St a t e Lawrence Eagleburger put it: t h i s way: The placement of modernized US nuc l e a r systems i n Europe i s a response to a l l i e d concerns that the Sov i e t Union i s c r e a t i n g the means to devastate or i n t i m i d a t e Europe with t h e a t e r n u c l e a r weapons, while h o l d i n g the US at bay with i t s s t r a t e g i c f o r c e s . TNF modernization w i l l end S o v i e t hopes of r e g i o n a l i s i n g a nuc l e a r c o n f l i c t based on an 82 a b i l i t y to s t r i k e at the European a l l i e s from a Russian s a n c t u a r y . 1 1 0 These were the fundamental m i l i t a r y - s t r a t e g i c imperatives behind the o r i g i n a l c a l l s f o r INF modernization. However, m i l i t a r y and s t r a t e g i c concerns were r a p i d l y d i m i n i s h e d by the p o l i t i c a l i m p l i c a t i o n s " o f any deployment d e c i s i o n . Deployment became l e s s of a m i l i t a r y program and more of a p o l i t i c a l i m p e r a t i v e . P o l i t i c s came to dominate both the p o l i c y f o r m u l a t i o n and the weapon deployment process to the v i r t u a l e x c l u s i o n of m i l i t a r y or s t r a t e g i c requirements. The Dual Track Concept and A l l i a n c e P o l i t i c s In the Double Track d e c i s i o n of December 12, 1979, the NATO n a t i o n s agreed to the deployment of 572 GLCM and Pershing II s i n g l e warhead m i s s i l e s i n f i v e European c o u n t r i e s . At the same time, the A l l i a n c e agreed to attempts to n e g o t i a t e l i m i t s on the deployment of these same intermediate-range systems, c o n d i t i o n a l upon comparable S o v i e t l i m i t a t i o n s . The very nature of the D u a l - t r a c k was a compromise. I t accommodated two d i v e r g e n t p e r s p e c t i v e s on how best to ensure European s e c u r i t y i n t o a s i n g l e p o l i c y package. The i n t e n t of the double track d e c i s i o n was to demonstrate and strengthen the cohesion of the A l l i a n c e , through the accomodation of the d i f f e r i n g views on s e c u r i t y p o l i c y which e x i s t e d between i t s members. T h i s was a p o l i t i c a l n e c e s s i t y . In the name of A l l i a n c e cohesion and p o l i c y u n i t y , the d e c i s i o n had to s a t i s f y a l l member 83 n a t i o n s . As Hans Gunter Brauch put i t : ...the double t r a c k d e c i s i o n of 12 December 1979 was a p o l i t i c a l compromise to manage NATO's nuc l e a r dilemma a g a i n s t the background of a fundamental d i f f e r e n c e of i n t e r e s t s . 1 1 1 And yet there was even d i s p u t e over the reason behind the need f o r a double-track d e c i s i o n . The US contended that the arms c o n t r o l t r a c k was i n c l u d e d to encourage a l l i e d support f o r the deployment t r a c k ; i t was a con c e s s i o n to b r i n g the European a l l i e s "on board" on INF. The European governments argued that support f o r the INF d e c i s i o n i n t h e i r r e s p e c t i v e parliaments and p u b l i c s c o u l d only be su s t a i n e d i f there was a c r e d i b l e arms c o n t r o l dimension to the NATO d e c i s i o n . Many a n a l y s t s agreed. Leon V. S i g a l , f o r example, a s s e r t e d that "...deployment without a good f a i t h attempt at arms c o n t r o l would not have mustered even the t e p i d p u b l i c and pa r l i a m e n t a r y support i t now h a s . " 1 1 2 The broad West German and European consensus favoured the p o l i c y of detente; deployment, t h e r e f o r e , had to be c o n s i s t e n t with the detente mood in Europe and allow f o r the p o s s i b i l i t y of n e g o t i a t i o n s and r e d u c t i o n s . 1 1 3 The double t r a c k d e c i s i o n was above a l l a f u n c t i o n of the fundamental US-European divergence on s t r a t e g i c and p o l i t i c a l p e r s p e c t i v e s . The P o l i t i c a l N e c e s s i t y of Deployment The INF program r a p i d l y gained i t s own p o l i t i c a l momentum. Deployment f o r deployment's sake became as much an impetus behind the d e c i s i o n as any other r a t i o n a l e . 84 Deployment of the new INF systems came to be regarded as e s s e n t i a l i n order to demonstrate A l l i a n c e w i l l and r e s o l v e . F a i l u r e to deploy would s i g n a l the i n a b i l i t y of the A l l i a n c e to formulate and implement defence programs v i t a l to i t s s e c u r i t y . As Simon Lunn wrote i n 1983: "...the d e c i s i o n i s now more than a q u e s t i o n of deployments and n e g o t i a t i o n s , i t has become a litmus t e s t of the i n t e r n a l s t r e n g t h and cohesion of the A l l i a n c e . " 1 1 " There was an overwhelming d e s i r e "to demonstrate the a b i l i t y and w i l l i n g n e s s of the A l l i a n c e to act e f f e c t i v e l y and c o h e s i v e l y i n the face of S o v i e t f o r c e e x p a n s i o n i s m . . . " 1 1 5 I t was widely f e l t that should NATO not be capable, f o r whatever reason, to deploy ;" ^ ,v.-the new systems, the fu t u r e a b i l i t y of the A l l i a n c e to reach major defence p o l i c y d e c i s i o n s would be put i n grave doubt. "At stake," wrote Uwe N e r l i c h , " . . . i s the A l l i a n c e ' s c a p a c i t y to act m u l t i l a t e r a l l y on v i r t u a l l y any major defence i s s u e . " 1 1 6 Unique p o l i t i c a l p r e s s u r e f o r deployment a l s o r e s t e d on the US. The US had promised the European a l l i e s that s t r a t e g i c reassurance i n the form of deployment would be forthcoming. To back o f f , i t was argued, would be tantamount to an admission of a severe case of p o l i c y wishy washiness. F a i l u r e to deploy would i r r e v o c a b l y damage the a l r e a d y weakened p o s i t i o n of the US as a c r e d i b l e A l l i a n c e l e a d e r , would undermine NATO cohesion and d i r e c t i o n , and would c r e a t e the impression of US i n d e c i s i v e n e s s and weakness. The then S e c r e t a r y of State f o r European A f f a i r s , Lawrence S. 85 Eagleburger, expressed these concerns i n 1981, d u r i n g the height of European r e c a l c i t r a n c e : We would lose our c r e d i b i l i t y with the S o v i e t s , while demonstrating that they have a veto over NATO deployment d e c i s i o n s . We would r a i s e a doubt in the minds of many Americans who would not understand why our a l l i e s are l e s s committed to t h e i r s e c u r i t y than i s the United S t a t e s . And worst of a l l , we would a l l be profoundly u n c e r t a i n of our f u t u r e a b i l i t y to take d i f f i c u l t d e c i s i o n s . 1 1 7 The C a r t e r A d m i n i s t r a t i o n , with i t s c r e d i b i l i t y as an A l l i a n c e l e a d er a l r e a d y r e e l i n g from the Neutron bomb a f f a i r , r ecognized the c r i t i c a l importance of the modernization i s s u e . INF came to be viewed l a r g e l y as a near term p o l i t i c a l o p p o r t u n i t y to r e p a i r damage done by the Neutron bomb f i a s c o . The C a r t e r A d m i n i s t r a t i o n doubted the m i l i t a r y and s t r a t e g i c a d v i s a b i l i t y of de p l o y i n g the new systems and was e s p e c i a l l y concerned with the arms c o n t r o l i m p l i c a t i o n s , but proceeded with deployment p r e p a r a t i o n s out of p o l i t i c a l n e c e s s i t y . Reassuring the European a l l i e s of the competence of US l e a d e r s h i p was high on the A d m i n i s t r a t i o n ' s agenda, along with other p r i o r i t i e s — e s p e c i a l l y S A L T — f o r which European confidence and backing was c r i t i c a l . Zbigniew B r z e z i n s k i expressed these sentiments r a t h e r c a n d i d l y : I was p e r s o n a l l y never persuaded that we needed [the new weapons] f o r m i l i t a r y reasons. I was persuaded r e l u c t a n t l y that we needed [them] to o b t a i n European support f o r SALT. T h i s was l a r g e l y because C h a n c e l l o r Schmidt made such a b i g d e a l out of the so c a l l e d E u r o - s t r a t e g i c imbalance that was being generated by the S o v i e t deployment of the SS-20. To keep him i n l i n e we f e l t that some response i n Europe on the intermediate n u c l e a r 86 level would be necessary. 1 1 8 These pressures were compounded as the Reagan Administration took power. Backing out of the Dual Track decision would be viewed as a confirmation of the new regime's uncompromisingly hawkish image. It would create the appearance of an Administration which was insensitive to a l l i e d concerns, anti-arms control, and unreliable as a guarantor of past US commitments. The administration could not afford to f a i l to follow through on both tracks. As a result of these p o l i t i c a l pressures, the INF debate in the US became highly symbolic, with deployments seen less as a means of addressing a perceived theatre nuclear imbalance in Europe and more as a p o l i t i c a l issue over the image, leadership, and direction of Western security policy. The Weapons and Deployment: GLCM and Pershing II The selection of two substantially different weapons systems for the modernization of NATO's INF came as somewhat of a surprise. The rationalization behind the choices was that deployment of two different types of weapons would strengthen the deterrent value of the new force. Such a mixed force, the then Secretary of Defence Caspar Weinberger argued: ...provides the f l e x i b i l i t y to select the best weapon for a given mission while hedging against the unexpected neutralization of either system, thus greatly complicating enemy planning. 1 1 9 However, while enhanced survivability was a consequence of 87 the s e l e c t i o n of two systems, i t was not a c e n t r a l f a c t o r i n the a c t u a l d e c i s i o n to s e l e c t two systems. That d e c i s i o n was i n f l u e n c e d by f a r more than mere m i l i t a r y i s s u e s . No s i n g l e weapon system c o u l d p o s s i b l e accommodate the v a r i e d p o l i t i c a l requirements of any new INF f o r c e . However, the GLCM and Pershing II together s a t i s f i e d the d i v e r g e n t p o l i t i c a l and for c e s t r u c t u r e d e s i r e s of the Europeans and the US. The GLCM was p a r t i c u l a r l y s u i t e d to the p o l i t i c a l demands of the new INF f o r c e . P o l i t i c a l l y , i t was v i s i b l e . I t was a land-based system whose c a r r i e r s and bases were t a n g i b l e symbols of the US nuclear prescence i n Europe. I t would, i t was thought, have a favo u r a b l e impact on A l l i a n c e cohesion which was i n bad need of reinforcement a f t e r the neutron bomb debate: The GLCM's range p e r m i t t e d deployment " r i s k s h a r i n g " among v a r i o u s European A l l i a n c e members. With the GLCM, f u l l p a r t i c i p a t i o n by many European n a t i o n s was p o s s i b l e , and so the symbolic u n i t y of NATO t e r r i t o r y as embodied i n a r t i c l e F i v e af the North A t l a n i c T r e aty c o u l d be r e i n f o r c e d . Caspar Weinberger remarked that the 2,500 km range of the GLCM ...allows i t to at t a c k t a r g e t s deeper i n enemy t e r r i t o r y and t o be based f u r t h e r rearward, thereby i n c r e a s i n g i t s prelaunch s u r v i v a b i l i t y and o f f e r i n g an o p p o r t u n i t y f o r broader p a r t i c i p a t i o n among the a l l i e s by h o s t i n g US deployments on t h e i r s o i l . 1 2 0 The deployment scheme a l s o r e f l e c t e d a key West German demand f o r grea t e r d i s t r i b u t i o n of p o l i t i c a l r i s k . The range 88 of the Per s h i n g II meant that a l l 108 of the IRBM's would have to be deployed on FRG t e r r i t o r y . At l e a s t one other non-nuclear c o n t i n e n t a l p o w e r — t h e candidates being H o l l a n d , Belgium, and I t a l y — h a d to to share i n the deployment of the GLCM, both to d i f f u s e and undercut domestic p o l i t i c a l b a c klash, and any p o s s i b l e r e t a l i a t i o n from the USSR. The West Germans i n s i s t e d that the new weapons be e x c l u s i v e l y under US c o n t r o l , r a t h e r than under a double-key system. Not only d i d t h i s a v o i d r e q u i r i n g the European c o u n t r i e s to purchase the m i s s i l e s (which may w e l l have t i p p e d the s e n s i t i v e p o l i t i c a l s c a l e s on modernization i n many c o u n t r i e s ) , but i t a l s o ensured the most unambiguous l e v e l of US commitment to Europe. The West Germans a l s o sought g r e a t e r US r i s k - s h a r i n g , a d e s i r e "...provoked by p e r v a s i v e German resentment of recent American f a i l u r e s of A l l i a n c e l e a d e r s h i p . " 1 2 1 In a d d i t i o n , i t a l l a y e d S o v i e t f e a r s t h a t West Germany might be c l o s e r to a c q u i r i n g i t s own nucl e a r weapons. The s i z e and p o t e n t i a l maximum t e r r i t o r i a l d i s p e r s a l of the GLCM deployments meant t h a t a pre-emptive s t r i k e intended to n e u t r a l i z e the European GLCM f o r c e would be of such a s c a l e as to v i r t u a l l y guarantee a response from Great B r i t a i n , France, or US s t r a t e g i c systems, thus enhancing d e t e r r e n c e . In a d d i t i o n , the GLCM were r e a d i l y a v a i l a b l e , c o s t l e s s , and had smal l e r manpower requirements than would a new ge n e r a t i o n of IRBMs. The m i l i t a r y - s t r a t e g i c drawbacks of the GLCM--greater 89 v u l n e r a b i l i t y , slower speed, and d o u b t f u l p e n e t r a t i o n a b i l i t i e s were outweighed by i t s p o l i t i c a l advantages. The GLCM met the p o l i t i c a l requirements of the A l l i a n c e at i t s lowest common denominator. As Uwe N e r l i c h observed, m i l i t a r y p l a n n i n g i n NATO, and e s p e c i a l l y n u c l e a r p l a n n i n g , must be formulated to ensure the maintenance of a " b u r e a u c r a t i c o p e r a t i o n a l consensus" w i t h i n NATO i n s t i t u t i o n s . 1 2 2 The a d d i t i o n of the Pershing II provided f o r the new INF f o r c e what the GLCM c o u l d not: a prompt, time urgent c o u n t e r f o r c e c a p a b i l i t y . 1 2 3 I t s g r e a t e s t a t t r a c t i o n to Europe was i t s c l a s s i f i c a t i o n as an IRBM. I t served the p o l i t i c a l end of c o u n t e r i n g the SS-20 with a weapon of at l e a s t m a r g i n a l l y comparable c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s . I f deployed alone, the GLCM would not have been an adequate measure to r e s t o r e the European nuclear balance or the i n t e g r i t y of extended d e t e r r e n c e . The GLCM was slow, and c o u l d not s t r i k e time urgent m i l i t a r y t a r g e t s nor d e l i v e r the payload weight of the SS-20. The Pershing II p r o v i d e d the INF f o r c e with, a b a l l i s t i c m i s s i l e dimension deemed more comparable to the c a p a b i l i t i e s the SS-20 provided to the S o v i e t Union. That even l o o s e l y matching the S o v i e t IRBM f o r c e f a c i n g Europe was i r r e l e v a n t to NATO s t r a t e g y was ignored; the p o l i t i c a l need to deploy a comparable response overrode a n a l y s i s of what was r e a l l y r e q u i r e d m i l i t a r i l y to support NATO's s e c u r i t y p o l i c y . In a d d i t i o n , the Pershing l i s replacement one-for-one with the 108 Pershing Is i n Europe l e n t c r e d i b i l i t y to the modernization r a t i o n a l e of the d e c i s i o n . 90 The time-urgent c a p a b i l i t i e s of the Pershing I I , meanwhile, s a t i s f i e d the d e s i r e of the US f o r a system capable of prompt s t r i k e s a g a i n s t m i l i t a r y t a r g e t s , to l e n d a m i l i t a r y l e g i t i m a c y to the INF f o r c e not present with only GLCM deployments. The c h o i c e of the GLCM and the Pershing II as the new NATO INF weapons d i d not go unopposed. Strong arguments were presented by the advocates of SLCMs, who p o i n t e d to the h i g h l y f l e x i b l e deployment c a p a b i l i t i e s and e x c e l l e n t s u r v i v a b i l i t y of such m i s s i l e s . However,-the SLCM pro p o s a l was r e j e c t e d . Although d e t r a c t o r s p o i n t e d to the command and c o n t r o l d i f f i c u l t i e s a s s o c i a t e d with sea-based systems, the SLCM was r e j e c t e d l a r g e l y on p o l i t i c a l grounds.- The most prominent of these p o l i t i c a l concerns was r a i s e d by the European A l l i a n c e members. Because SLCMs were not v i s i b l e , they would not c o n s t i t u t e a t a n g i b l e US n u c l e a r presence i n Europe. Land-based systems, i t was b e l i e v e d , had a stronger d e t e r r e n t e f f e c t and as they would be on European t e r r i t o r y they would be i d e n t i f i e d d i r e c t l y with European defence. Such c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s would p r o v i d e an unambiguous c o u p l i n g of the US to Europe. Another f a c t o r which prompted the l a n d - b a s i n g scheme was c o s t and time d e l a y . Land-based systems were cheaper, and the time delay and c o s t of r e t r o - f i t t i n g submarines and s u r f a c e v e s s e l s with SLCMs was viewed as too g r e a t . Moreover, the c o s t of b u i l d i n g any new SLCM c a r r i e r design f o r the f u t u r e was seen as p r o h i b i t i v e . 91 In a d d i t i o n , the Pentagon p r e f e r r e d the land-based o p t i o n because of i t s own program schedule and p r i o r i t i e s : The GLCM and Pershing II programs were nearing completion. The Army may a l s o have put pressure to bear f o r i t s Pershing II s y s t e m . 1 2 " The f i n a l deployment scheme i n v o l v e d 9 s i t e s f o r the 572 INF m i s s i l e s . The FRG was to deploy a l l 108 Pershing I I ' s at Mutlangen, H e i l b r u n n , and Neu-Ulm. In a d d i t i o n , 96 GLCM's would be based at B i t b u r g . Great B r i t a i n would deploy deploy 96 GLCM's at RAF Greenham Common, and 64 at RAF Holesworth. A l l of I t a l y ' s 112 GLCM's would be s t a t i o n e d at Comiso. The Dutch and B e l g i a n deployments, 48 each, f o r a c o n s i d e r a b l e time much i n d o u b t , 1 2 5 were e v e n t u a l l y to be based at Florennes i n Belgium and Woensdrecht, H o l l a n d . The deployment of two systems achieved what deployment of a s i n g l e system c o u l d not; they s a t i s f a c t o r i l y f u l f i l l e d the f o r c e s t r u c t u r e d e s i r e s of both the US and Europe. C r i t i c i s m s of Deployment The f i n a l deployment d e c i s i o n , determined as i t was l a r g e l y by p o l i t i c a l i m p e r a t i v e s , came under heavy c r i t i c i s m on the b a s i s of i t s m i l i t a r y inadequacy and even i r r e l e v a n c e . The f i n a l deployment d e c i s i o n may have made p o l i t i c a l sense, but i t made very l i t t l e m i l i t a r y sense. The de n u n c i a t i o n s of the INF deployments cut acr o s s p o l i t i c a l l i n e s . C r i t i c s were as b i p a r t i s a n as they were vehement i n t h e i r c r i t i q u e s . 92 C r i t i c s who c h a l l e n g e d the INF deployments on m i l i t a r y grounds d i d so from two d i f f e r e n t p e r s p e c t i v e s . One theme of c r i t i c i s m was that the INF deployments were m i l i t a r i l y i n s i g n i f i c a n t , and that a f a r l a r g e r deployment was necessary to s a t i s f y the m i l i t a r y and s t r a t e g i c requirements of a new INF f o r c e . The other l i n e of c r i t i c i s m argued the INF d e c i s i o n was m i l i t a r i l y unnecessary, or at l e a s t f a r too l a r g e . I r o n i c a l l y , the blame which proponents of both these p e r s p e c t i v e s c i t e d f o r t h e i r d i s s a t i s f a c t i o n with the December 12 d e c i s i o n was i d e n t i c a l . P o l i t i c a l f a c t o r s had dominated the debate and i n t e r f e r e d with what should have been the proper course of a c t i o n f o r NATO to take on the new INF systems. Both p e r s p e c t i v e s p r o v i d e d a v a l i d case, and the m i l i t a r y d e f i c i e n c i e s of the deployments was made more evident by the f a c t t h at no matter what the c r i t i c a l approach, the shortcomings of the deployment were r a t h e r s t a r k . The c r i t i c s who a t t a c k e d the INF deployment on the b a s i s of i t s p e r c e i v e d m i l i t a r y inadequacy, u s u a l l y a s s o c i a t e d with the US deplo y e r s and Euro-couplers p e r s p e c t i v e , argued the 572 INF launchers were not a m i l i t a r i l y meaningful or adequate deployment. These c r i t i c s c o n c e n t r a t e d on two shortcomings of the new INF: v u l n e r a b i l i t y to pre-emption and inadequate range and t a r g e t coverage. The s u r v i v a b i l i t y theme was a dominant concern. The f i n a l deployment s t r u c t u r e adopted by NATO was h i g h l y 93 v u l n e r a b l e to pre-emption, e s p e c i a l l y i f t a r g e t t e d i n t h e i r f i x e d bases p r i o r to d i s p e r s a l . And even when d i s p e r s e d , the new INF systems were h i g h l y d i s t i n c t i v e and sub j e c t to a t t a c k by nuclear or c o n v e n t i o n a l Soviet a t t a c k . J e f f r e y Record p o i n t e d out that the e n t i r e GLCM f o r c e , organized as i t was i n t o f l i g h t s of four launchers and 16 m i s s i l e s , posed only 29 t a r g e t p o i n t s . The 464 GLCM's of the new INF f o r c e were, t h e r e f o r e , t h e o r e t i c a l l y d e s t r o y a b l e by 10 S S - 2 0 s . 1 2 6 The p e r c e i v e d v u l n e r a b i l i t y of the INF for c e l e d W i l l i a m Van Cleave and S.T. Cohen to remark that the US was "passing the buck" on the use of nucl e a r weapons i n Europe by p r o v i d i n g the S o v i e t s with an o p p o r t u n i t y to guarantee non-use of INF through p r e - e m p t i o n . 1 2 7 Another c r i t i c i s m l e v e l l e d at the INF f o r c e was i t s la c k of range compared to S o v i e t INF systems, p a r t i c u l a r l y the SS-20. A lack of comparable range, i t was argued, e f f e c t i v e l y p r o v i d e d sanctuary f o r these S o v i e t systems deep i n S o v i e t t e r r i t o r y , while they c o u l d s t i l l t h r e a t e n NATO INF. T h i s c o n d i t i o n of i n v u l n e r a b i l i t y enjoyed by S o v i e t SS-20s based f a r enough to the rear exacerbated concerns over the v u l n e r a b i l i t y of the new INF f o r c e . Not only was the f o r c e v u l n e r a b l e to pre-emption, i t was v u l n e r a b l e to pre-emption from systems i t c o u l d not th r e a t e n . F u r t h e r , while the range of the SS-20 pro v i d e d t a r g e t coverage of most of Europe, i n c l u d i n g c r i t i c a l NATO p o r t s and s t a g i n g areas, NATO INF systems were not capable of d e s t r o y i n g , or even t h r e a t e n i n g , comparable t a r g e t s . The Department of Defense 94 annual r e p o r t of 1981 expressed such concerns: We cannot permit a s i t u a t i o n i n which the SS-20 and B a c k f i r e have the a b i l i t y to d i s r u p t and d e s t r o y the formation and movement of our o p e r a t i o n a l r e s e r v e s , while we cannot t h r e a t e n comparable Soviet f o r c e s . 1 2 8 For these c r i t i c s , any new INF i n Europe had to be capable of absorbing a pre-emptive c o u n t e r f o r c e s t r i k e , p e n e t r a t i n g S o v i e t defences, and s t r i k i n g at a wide and v a r i e d t a r g e t mix deep i n t o S o v i e t t e r r i t o r y . Target coverage was a l s o a concern. D e s p i t e the a b i l i t y of the Pershing II to s t r i k e time-urgent command and c o n t r o l c e n t e r s and hardened m i l i t a r y t a r g e t s , 108 m i s s i l e s would not be s u f f i c i e n t to d e s t r o y a l l such t a r g e t s w i t h i n range. A more meaningful deployment, these c r i t i c s argue, would be an INF f o r c e between two and three times the one announced' on December 12. The c u r r e n t numerical l i m i t was c r i t i c i s e d as u t t e r l y u s e l e s s . The then SACEUR Alexander Haig f o r example, d i s m i s s e d the 572 m i s s i l e s as mere " . . . p o l i t i c a l expediency and t o k e n i s m . " 1 2 9 There were suggestions that s e v e r a l hundred long-range m i s s i l e s were needed to p r o v i d e NATO INF with the s u v i v a b i l i t y and t a r g e t coverage r e q u i r e d to r e s t o r e some semblance of a n u c l e a r balance i n Europe. The then A s s i s t a n t S e c r e t a r y of Defense (Atomic Energy) Donald R. C o t t e r argued f o r the deployment of over 3000 long-range m i s s i l e s i n Europe, which would guarantee the c a p a c i t y of the European n u c l e a r f o r c e to absorb a p r e -emptive s t r i k e . 1 3 0 Support f o r the 572 INF to be deployed was granted only 95 when i t was understood that such a deployment would serve only as a f i r s t step towards a more s a t i s f a c t o r y c a p a b i l i t y . 1 3 1 The o f f i c i a l Defense Department view agreed: "This step [the INF deployment] alone, however, w i l l not p r o v i d e the d i v e r s e set of modern nuclear f o r c e s needed to maintain e f f e c t i v e deterrence i n Europe and w o r l d w i d e . " 1 3 2 The inadequacy of the INF deployments, in the view of the c o n s e r v a t i v e c r i t i c s , i s due not to an i n a b i l i t y to i d e n t i f y the m i l i t a r y requirements of an upgraded European nuclear f o r c e . The f a i l u r e to deploy a m i l i t a r i l y meaningful f o r c e was due to the i n t e r f e r e n c e of p o l i t i c a l i m p e r a t i v e s and the accommodation of widely v a r y i n g p o l i t i c a l d e s i r e s . J e f f r e y Record argued in 1981 that "The p o l i t i c a l c o n t r o v e r s y that continues to engulf the [INF] program has a l l but drowned needed r e c o g n i t i o n of i t s m i l i t a r y i n a d e q u a c y . " 1 3 3 Opposed to t h i s view was the p o s i t i o n that the INF deployments were n e i t h e r a m i l i t a r y nor d o c t r i n a l n e c e s s i t y , and were i n f a c t more p o t e n t i a l l y d e s t a b i l i z i n g than no NATO INF program at a l l . These c r i t i c s c h a l l e n g e d the fundamental r a t i o n a l e behind the modernization d e c i s i o n . The a l l e g e d need to counter-balance the SS-20 and r e s t o r e the nuclear balance in Europe. The SS-20, i t was argued, added l i t t l e to S o v i e t c a p a b i l i t i e s , as Europe had been threatened s i n c e the 1950s by the SS-4 and the SS-5 IRBMs. F u r t h e r , given that there had not been an i n c r e a s e i n the a c t u a l number of S o v i e t launchers or megatonnage (the t o t a l number of S o v i e t IRBM launchers and megatonnage a c t u a l l y d e c l i n e d due to the 96 phase out of the SS-4 and SS-5) deployable a g a i n s t t a r g e t s in Western Europe, INF modernization was t h e r e f o r e was viewed as unnecessary. The imbalance they were supposedly intended to redress d i d not i n f a c t e x i s t . Nor were the new INF systems deemed necessary to r e s t o r e or enhance the NATO's nuclear f o r c e s ; they would c o n s t i t u t e a very small a d d i t i o n to the f o r c e s a l r e a d y a v a i l a b l e , and the extent of c o l l a t e r a l damage i n v o l v e d i n the use of the nuclear weapons a l r e a d y a v a i l a b l e i n Europe made f u r t h e r INF deployment s u p e r f l u o u s . 1 3 * Joseph C o f f e y agreed: The number of weapons a v a i l a b l e i n the t h e a t e r i s so l a r g e , and the damage these f o r c e s would i n f l i c t i s so gr e a t , that even the a d d i t i o n of some 500-600 RV's might not have a c r i t i c a l impact on the m i l i t a r y b a l a n c e . 1 3 5 In response to c o n s e r v a t i v e c r i t i q u e s demanding a l a r g e r INF f o r c e , moderates countered that " . . . e f f e c t i v e d e t e r r e n c e does not n e c e s s a r i l y r e q u i r e p a r i t y or s u p e r i o r i t y at the t h e a t e r n u c l e a r l e v e l . 1 3 6 S e v e r a l other o b j e c t i o n s were r a i s e d q u e s t i o n i n g the r a t i o n a l e s behind the deployment d e c i s i o n . The foremost of these concerned the reassurance imperative. New INF f o r c e s were needed to demonstrate the continued commitment of the US to Europe. The US commitment to Europe was a l r e a d y t a n g i b l y expressed by the 300,000 US troops based on the C e n t r a l F r o n t . F u r t h e r reassurance, e s p e c i a l l y i n the p o l i t i c a l l y charged form of nucl e a r weapons, should not have been necessary. Second, t a r g e t s i n the S o v i e t Union were covered by the SLBMs 97 assigne d to SACEUR. The threatened use of these systems was s u f f i c i e n t to deter and was no l e s s c r e d i b l e than the l a n d -based INF f o r c e . T h i r d , p r e s i d e n t i a l a u t h o r i t y f o r the r e l e a s e of the new weapons i n the e v e n t u a l i t y of war was h i g h l y u n c e r t a i n , c e r t a i n l y more so than with shorter-range systems. Deployment of an INF f o r c e which s u f f e r e d from a lack of c r e d i b i l i t y ran c o n t r a r y to the l o g i c of the deployment r a t i o n a l e s . S u r p r i s i n g l y , many Reagan a d m i n i s t r a t i o n o f f i c i a l s viewed INF along these l i n e s and were s k e p t i c a l of the m i l i t a r y n e c e s s i t y of deployment. Both Fred I k l e and R i c h a r d P e r l e expressed m i s g i v i n g s about the Dual Track d e c i s i o n . I k l e was not convinced of the s u r v i v a b i l i t y of the new weapons and saw t h e i r disadvantages as outweighing any p o t e n t i a l advantages. Richard P e r l e c r i t i c i z e d the December 12 d e c i s i o n ' s m u l t i - b i l l i o n d o l l a r c o s t as "...a h e l l of a p r i c e tag f o r a marginal m i l i t a r y f i x . " 1 3 7 Outside the a d m i n i s t r a t i o n , Paul C. Warnke argued the 572 new m i s s i l e s were l a r g e l y redundant, c o v e r i n g t a r g e t s a l r e a d y covered by US s t r a t e g i c s y s t e m s . 1 3 8 F u r t h e r , p o l i t i c a l c o n t r o v e r s y surrounding the deployment c o u l d prove h i g h l y damaging to A l l i a n c e u n i t y , to the b e n e f i t of the S o v i e t Union. McGeorge Bundy p o i n t e d out t h a t : I f the West European's w i l l i n g n e s s to deploy these e s s e n t i a l l y i r r e l e v a n t weapons becomes a t e s t of A l l i a n c e s o l i d a r i t y , w e ' l l be handing the S o v i e t s a s p l e n d i d bludgeon with which to s p l i t the A l l i a n c e . 1 3 9 98 F i n a l l y , the c r i t i c s who c h a l l e n g e d the need f o r deployment p o i n t e d to the p o t e n t i a l l y d e s t a b i l i z i n g impact of the INF d e c i s i o n . One of the d r i v i n g concerns behind deployment was that without INF, the S o v i e t Union c o u l d s t r i k e Europe and p l a c e the US i n the p o s i t i o n of having to r e t a l i a t e with s t r a t e g i c systems. Moderate c r i t i c s charged t h i s would not change with INF deployment. The GLCM and Pershing II m i s s i l e s c o u l d not s u r v i v e a S o v i e t pre-emptive a t t a c k , and t h i s v u l n e r a b i l i t y to pre-emption meant the GLCM and Pershing II added l i t t l e to the d e t e r r e n t p r o v i d e d by the nuclear systems a l r e a d y i n pl a c e i n Europe. In f a c t , the c a p a b i l i t i e s of the new systems, p a r t i c u l a r l y those of the Pershing I I , might compel the S o v i e t s to pre-empt them i n c r i s i s or war. "Indeed, the p r i n c i p l e consequence' of the [INF] deployment might be to make a S o v i e t pre-emptive a t t a c k more l i k e l y . " 1 " 0 R i c h a r d B e t t s p o i n t e d out that even the GLCM "appears to o f f e r enhanced d e t e r r e n c e when co n s i d e r e d i n i s o l a t i o n from the responses i t may p r o v o k e . " 1 " 1 C l e a r l y , however, the p o l i t i c a l requirements of any new INF systems overrode the s t r a t e g i c ones; the v u l n e r a b i l i t y i s s u e was papered over by loose references, to concealment and d i s p e r s a l p l a n s . 1 " 2 S e v e r a l c r i t i c i s m s of the deployment cut a c r o s s p o l i t i c a l c leavages, although the p o l i c y p r e s c r i p t i o n f o r c o r r e c t i n g the problem d i f f e r e d widely. P a r t i c u l a r l y heavy c r i t i c i s m was l e v e l l e d at the "co u n t e r i n g the SS-20"* r a t i o n a l e . The deployment of an INF f o r c e , i t was argued, 99 need not match the SS-20 c a p a b i l i t y f o r c a p a b i l i t y . The s t r a t e g i e s and d o c t r i n e s of the USSR and NATO were not comparable, and r e q u i r e d d i f f e r e n t systems and f o r c e s t r u c t u r e s . Gregory T r e v e r t o n a s s e r t e d t h a t " I f t h e r e i s a m i l i t a r y r a t i o n a l e f o r d e p l o y i n g c o n t i n e n t a l range c r u i s e m i s s i l e s i n Europe,, i t e x i s t s almost independent of the S o v i e t S S - 2 0 " 1 " 3 And Leon V. S i g a l added, "The r a t i o n a l e t h a t GLCMs and P e r s h i n g l i s were i n t e n d e d t o o f f s e t the S o v i e t SS-20 i s a p o l i t i c a l argument p a r a d i n g i n m i l i t a r y u n i f o r m . " 1 u " However, the p o l i t i c a l demand f o r a c o u n t e r t o the SS-20 l e d the INF deployments t o be c h a r a c t e r i z e d as such, which r e s u l t e d i n c o n f u s i o n over the r e q u i r e m e n t s and r a t i o n a l e s b e h i n d the new INF f o r c e . C r i t i c i s m was a l s o l e v e l l e d a t the l a c k of d o c t r i n a l p l a n n i n g or f o r e t h o u g h t b e h i n d the INF d e c i s i o n . Far from r e s o l v i n g NATOs n u c l e a r p o l i c y conundrums, the INF deployments were add-ons t o a d o c t r i n a l s t r u c t u r e s o r e l y l a c k i n g i n o p e r a t i o n a l p l a n s or c o n c e p t s . Nor w i l l the program a l l e v i a t e the d o c t r i n a l befuddlement over the o p e r a t i o n a l deployment of t h e a t e r n u c l e a r weapons t h a t has p l a g u e d NATO f o r w e l l over two decades. New weapons and t e c h n o l o g i e s a r e , i n e f f e c t , s i m p l y t o be s l a p p e d onto a p o l i t i c o - m i l i t a r y e s t a b l i s h m e n t t h a t has yet t o f i g u r e out how t o use the weapons i t a l r e a d y h a s . . . " 1 " 5 Lawrence Freedman argued t h a t "What has been l a c k i n g i s a d o c t r i n e t h a t l i n k s the NATO a r s e n a l ' s m i l i t a r y f o r c e t o i t s p o l i t i c a l p u r p o s e . " 1 " 6 As a r e s u l t , the INF deployments were dominated by the need t o s a t i s f y the p o l i t i c a l n e c e s s i t i e s 100 a s s o c i a t e d with nuclear weapons i n Europe. Without a c l e a r o p e r a t i o n a l concept f o r nuclear weapons, the m i l i t a r y and s t r a t e g i c i s s u e s of the deployment were pushed a s i d e i n the favour of the more s a l i e n t p o l i t i c a l i m p e r a t i v e s . F i r s t , the numerical s i z e of the new force--572 mi s s i l e s - - w a s a r r i v e d at almost e x c l u s i v e l y through assessments of p o l i t i c a l r a t h e r than m i l i t a r y c r i t e r i a . There was a p o l i t i c a l requirement f o r a s u f f i c i e n t number of launchers to allow a wide d i s p e r s a l to s e v e r a l NATO c o u n t r i e s and to allow some d i s p e r s a l w i t h i n those c o u n t r i e s as w e l l . T h i s s a t i s f i e d the West German demand f o r r i s k s h a r i n g w i t h i n the A l l i a n c e . 1 4 7 Second, the number of m i s s i l e s chosen had to be. viewed by the western p u b l i c as a meaningful response to the S o v i e t SS-20 deployments. At the same time, the deployments c o u l d not be so l a r g e as to match the SS-20's m i s s i l e f o r m i s s i l e . The A l l i a n c e c o u l d not c r e a t e the appearance i t was d e p l o y i n g a f i r s t s t r i k e c o u n t e r f o r c e c a p a b i l i t y a g a i n s t the S o v i e t Union. T h i r d , the f i n a l number a r r i v e d at had to be l a r g e enough to ensure that the f o r c e c o u l d absorb any n e g o t i a t e d arms control- r e d u c t i o n s and s t i l l l eave a s i g n i f i c a n t f o r c e i n p l a c e . A small deployment, i t was argued, would not be an e f f e c t i v e b a r g a i n i n g c h i p f o r the n e g o t i a t i o n s at Geneva. F i n a l l y , p o l i t i c a l and m i l i t a r y o r g a n i z a t i o n a l imperatives had an i n f l u e n c e on the nature of the deployment. The 108 Pershing II m i s s i l e s were to r e p l a c e the 101 108 Pershing I's, to ensure c o n s i s t e n c y with the o f f i c i a l l i n e which maintained the program was a modernization of e x i s t i n g INF c a p a b i l i t i e s . The number of GLCMs--464--was determined by m i l i t a r y o r g a n i z a t i o n . The deployment c o n s i s t e d of 29 f l i g h t s , each f l i g h t composed of four TELs, and each TEL composed of four GLCMs. As Leon V. S i g a l argued: The number of weapons to i n c l u d e i n the deployment was a matter of p o l i t i c a l r a t h e r than m i l i t a r y a r i t h m e t i c ; i t bore no r e l a t i o n s h i p to any r e l e v a n t Warsaw Pact t a r g e t s nor to c o n s i d e r a t i o n s of s u r v i v a b i l i t y , r e l i a b i l i t y , p e n e t r a b i l i t y , and k i l l p r o b a b i l i t y . 1 4 8 The debate over the m i l i t a r y requirements of the new f o r c e was b u r i e d i n the p o l i t i c a l aspects of deployment. The p o l i t i c a l i mperatives of deployment were the key determinants of the s i z e , c a p a b i l i t i e s , deployment and r a t i o n a l e s behind the new INF f o r c e . The c r i t i c a l element of the INF d e c i s i o n was the p o l i t i c a l dimension. A l l i a n c e u n i t y and the c r e d i b i l i t y of western defence, e s s e n t i a l l y p o l i t i c a l imagery items, were at stake, with the p o l i t i c a l symbolism of nuclear weapons the primary p l a y i n g p i e c e s . The p u r e l y m i l i t a r y elements of defence c a p a b i l i t y — d a m a g e expectancy, s u r v i v a b i l i t y , launch p l a n n i n g , t a r g e t t i n g - - w e r e dominated by the need to present the proper p o l i t i c a l image. The US, determined to a v o i d a r e p e t i t i o n of the Neutron bomb c o n t r o v e r s y , sought a f i r m a l l i a n c e consensus f o r INF. As a r e s u l t , there was l i t t l e c o o r d i n a t i o n or debate over 1 02 pu r e l y m i l i t a r y and s t r a t e g i c c r i t e r i a , areas i n which the US and the European NATO c o u n t r i e s had fundamental d i f f e r e n c e s . Managing the s t r a t e g i c dichotomy and p o l i t i c a l schisms between the US and Europe was the c h a l l e n g e of the modernization d e c i s i o n . The f o r c e c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s of any deployment had to be r e c o n c i l a b l e with the d i f f e r i n g s t r a t e g i c and p o l i t i c a l p e r s p e c t i v e s w i t h i n the A l l i a n c e . A p o l i t i c a l consensus, or compromise, or agreement to di s a g r e e , was reached on p o l i t i c a l grounds f o r p o l i t i c a l ends. That the f i n a l d e c i s i o n bore l i t t l e c o n n e c t i o n to m i l i t a r y c r i t e r i a was i n e v i t a b l e , i n view of the p o l i t i c a l schisms and c o n t r a d i c t o r y i n t e r e s t s which had to be papered over i n any d e c i s i o n . T h i s was the nature of the December 12 d e c i s i o n . I t was a compromise to a consensus. Strobe T a l b o t t a l l u d e d to p o l i t i c a l dominance of nucle a r d e c i s i o n s i n n o t i n g that " . . . s i n c e they are not intended f o r use i n m i l i t a r y c o n f l i c t so much as they are intended to serve as symbols and safeguards of p o l i t i c a l arrangements." 1 * 9 In the same v e i n , Gregory T r e v e r t o n wrote that they had come to be regarded as "...tokens of US commitment." From Tr e v e r t o n ' s p e r s p e c t i v e , "NATO had to reach a p o s i t i v e d e c i s i o n on GLCM's and Pershings because i t had made the d e c i s i o n a p o l i t i c a l t e s t of i t s a b i l i t y to take a j o i n t a c t i o n i n the face of S o v i e t h o s t i l i t y . " 1 5 0 And f u r t h e r , " I t i s c l e a r that once the focus of argument moved to p o l i t i c a l t e r r a i n , the r a t i o n a l e f o r the hew systems became c l o u d e d . " 1 5 1 1 0 3 The f a c t that the r a t i o n a l e f o r the INF deployment was obscured by p o l i t i c a l debate may, i n f a c t , have performed a s e r v i c e to the US-deployers and the Euro-couplers who were pushing f o r deployment. The r a t i o n a l e behind the INF deployment was based on q u e s t i o n a b l e s u p p o s i t i o n s and assumptions, and may not have withstood a d e t a i l e d examination had they been at the f o r e f r o n t of the debate. 104 CHAPTER IV: THE REALITY OF COMPOUND DETERRENCE IN EUROPE Past NATO s t r a t e g y and t h i n k i n g about dete r r e n c e i n Europe has been dominated by the US deployer and Euro-coupler p e r s p e c t i v e s , and i s based on the premise that the A t l a n t i c A l l i a n c e cannot hope to defend i t s e l f a g a i n s t c o n v e n t i o n a l a t t a c k by the S o v i e t Union. T h e r e f o r e , US nucle a r f o r c e s deployed i n Europe, and t h e i r l i n k to the US s t r a t e g i c a r s e n a l , have been viewed as the key to e f f e c t i v e , c r e d i b l e deterrence i n Europe. T h i s has been the p r e v e l a n t view amongst a n a l y s t s and A l l i a n c e d e c i s i o n makers and i t t h i s c o nception of deterrence i n Europe which l e d to the deployment of INF. However, t h i s view of deterr e n c e i n Europe has been outdated f o r the l a s t decade. The m i l i t a r y / s t r a t e g i c environment i n Europe i s undergoing fundamental change, which w i l l continue i n t o the f o r s e e a b l e f u t u r e . The INF deployment was the r e s u l t of the f a i l u r e of A l l i a n c e a n a l y s t s and d e c i s i o n makers—dominated by the US deployers and E u r o - c o u p l e r s — t o recognize t h i s change. T h i s chapter w i l l make two arguments. F i r s t , i t w i l l be demonstrated that the l o g i c behind the US de p l o y e r s ' and Eu r o - c o u p l e r s ' p o s i t i o n on INF i s f a l s e . NATO's c o n v e n t i o n a l f o r c e s are not at the hopeless disadvantage that i s assumed by these p e r s p e c t i v e groupings. Secondly, d e t e r r e n c e i n Europe i s no longer a f u n c t i o n of only US nucl e a r f o r c e s , INF, and t h e i r l i n k to the US s t r a t e g i c a r s e n a l . Rather, 105 d e t e r r e n c e i n Europe has become a f u n c t i o n of a number of compound, autonomous d e t e r r e n t elements or r i s k f a c t o r s . D e t e r r e n c e i n Europe can no l o n g e r be thought of as s o l e l y a d y a d i c r e l a t i o n s h i p between the USSR and US n u c l e a r f o r c e s i n Europe. T h i s argument was o r i g i n a l l y f o r warded by R i c h a r d B e t t s , one of the l e a d i n g s t r a t e g i s t s and commentators i n the US d e f e n c e debate. T h i s theme can be found throughout much of B e t t s ' work, and e s p e c i a l l y i n h i s 1985 a r t i c l e "Compound D e t e r r e n c e v s . No F i r s t Use: What's Wrong i s What's R i g h t . " 1 5 2 R e a s s e s s i n g the C o n v e n t i o n a l O p t i o n One key assumption of the c o n v e n t i o n a l wisdom on d e t e r r e n c e i n Europe i s t h a t NATO's c o n v e n t i o n a l f o r c e s a r e h o p e l e s s l y outnumbered and outgunned by t h e i r Warsaw Pa c t c o u n t e r p a r t s . As was made c l e a r i n Chapter I , NATO's c o n v e n t i o n a l f o r c e s a r e b e l i e v e d t o be c a p a b l e a t b e s t of d e f e n d i n g the c e n t r a l f r o n t f o r o n l y a few days. D e t e r r e n c e i n Europe, t h e r e f o r e , depends t o an enormous e x t e n t on a c r e d i b l e n u c l e a r e s c a l a t o r y c a p a b i l i t y . US n u c l e a r weapons i n Europe, and the t h r e a t of e s c a l a t i o n upwards t o the use of US s t r a t e g i c f o r c e s i s the c e n t r a l d e t e r r e n t element of w e s t e r n d e f e n c e p o s t u r e i n Europe. However, i t has become i n c r e a s i n g l y apparent i n r e c e n t y e a r s t h a t NATO's c o n v e n t i o n a l d i s a d v a n t a g e i n Europe i s not as g r e a t as i t has been made out t o be. Indeed, the 106 p r o s p e c t s f o r an extended, s u c c e s s f u l c o n v e n t i o n a l defence of Europe are at l e a s t reasonable, and deterr e n c e by c o n v e n t i o n a l d e n i a l i n Europe i s f a i r l y r o b u s t . 1 5 3 At the very l e a s t , i t has become apparent that the o b s t a c l e s f a c i n g a Soviet a t t a c k i n Europe are c o n s i d e r a b l e and that a f a r gr e a t e r degree of u n c e r t a i n t y faces any such Soviet o f f e n s i v e i n Western Europe. T h i s r e a p p r a i s a l of the c o n v e n t i o n a l o p t i o n i n Europe i s based on four seldom recognized aspects of the m i l i t a r y s i t u a t i o n i n Western Europe: a) the numerical balance of c o n v e n t i o n a l f o r c e s ; b) the g e o g r a p h i c a l nature of Western Europe; c) problems i n So v i e t a t t a c k f o r c e design; and d) Warsaw Pact f o r c e cohesion. The Numerical Balance of Conventional Forces F i r s t , the c o n v e n t i o n a l f o r c e balance between NATO and the Warsaw Pact i s much c l o s e r than i s o f t e n assumed. T y p i c a l Western pessimism on t h i s score i s the product of worst-case c a l c u l a t i o n s i n most western t h r e a t assessments of the European m i l i t a r y b a l a n c e . 1 5 4 NATO weaknesses are overemphasized and Warsaw Pact s t r e n g t h s exaggerated. The r e a l i t y i s q u i t e d i f f e r e n t . As John J . Mearsheimer has argued: The f a c t of the matter i s that the balance of c o n v e n t i o n a l f o r c e s i s nowhere near as unfavourable as i t i s so o f t e n p o r t r a y e d to be. In f a c t , NATO's pro s p e c t s f o r thwarting a So v i e t o f f e n s i v e are a c t u a l l y q u i t e g o o d . 1 5 5 107 An examination of the ground and a i r f o r c e balance between NATO and the Warsaw Pact bears t h i s out. In terms of manpower, w i t h i n the NATO region and the European USSR the Warsaw Pact deploys some 995,000 a c t i v e duty ground tr o o p s . NATO has approximately 796,000 a c t i v e duty ground t r o o p s , 1 5 6 a numerical disadvantage that i s ha r d l y overwhelming. Nor does the Warsaw Pact have a l a r g e numerical s u p e r i o r i t y i n ground f o r c e r e s e r v e s . The Warsaw Pact can deploy some 1,030,000 reserve troops; NATO some 922,000. Again, the Warsaw Pact does not possess anywhere near a d e c i s i v e numerical advantage. In terms of ground f o r c e d i v i s i o n s , the Warsaw Pact has 49, with 200 a f t e r f u l l m o b i l i z a t i o n . NATO deploys some 32 d i v i s i o n s , with 149 a f t e r m o b i l i z a t i o n . 1 5 7 Nor does the Warsaw Pact have an overwhelming advantage i n two other key i n d i c a t o r s : Main B a t t l e Tanks (MBTs) and combat a i r c r a f t . The Warsaw Pact possess some 18,000 MBTs i n the r e g i o n , with m o b i l i z a t i o n r a i s i n g t h i s to a t o t a l of 52,000 MBTs. NATO possesses 12,700 MBTs, with 22,200 a f t e r m o b i l i z a t i o n . Although t h i s may seem to be a l a r g e advantage, many of the reserve S o v i e t tanks are T-62's and T-55's, which are o b s o l e t e . 1 5 8 Much has been made of the Warsaw Pact's m o b i l i z a t i o n c a p a b i l i t i e s and the huge r e s e r v e s the S o v i e t Union can deploy a f t e r m o b i l i z a t i o n . Despite t h i s , NATOs m o b i l i z a t i o n schedule i s capable (assuming a s w i f t p o l i t i c a l d e c i s i o n to m o b i l i z e ) of m a i n t a i n i n g the same approximate pre-108 m o b i l i z a t i o n f o r c e balance. As John Mearsheimer has noted, "The n o t i o n that the S o v i e t s can r e l y on some massive second echelon that NATO cannot match i s a f a l s e o n e . " 1 5 9 In the a i r , the Warsaw Pact has an advantage of 2,644 to 1,277 i n terms of combat a i r c r a f t . A f t e r m o b i l i z a t i o n , the same approximate f o r c e r a t i o remains; ,the Warsaw Pact c o u l d deploy 7,524 a i r c r a f t and NATO 3,292. Here, NATO i s perhaps at i t s worst numerical disadvantage. However, numbers do not t e l l the whole s t o r y . In the a i r , where the Warsaw Pact's numerical s u p e r i o r i t y i s g r e a t e s t , q u a l i t a t i v e d i f f e r e n c e s p l a c e the s i g n i f i c a n c e of t h i s s u p e r i o r i t y i n doubt. NATO p i l o t s are b e t t e r t r a i n e d and more experienced i n performing a v a r i e t y of r o l e s , e s p e c i a l l y those which, f l y NATO's dual capable a i r c r a f t . NATO p i l o t s are t r a i n e d f o r both ground attack.and a i r defence. Warsaw Pact p i l o t s , by c o n t r a s t , are t r a i n e d f o r a s i n g l e r o l e only, and r e c e i v e l e s s f l i g h t time than do NATO p i l o t s . F u r t h e r , NATO ground crews are more thoroughly t r a i n e d and b e t t e r equipped than t h e i r Warsaw Pact c o u n t e r p a r t s , r e s u l t i n g i n f a s t e r turn around times and s o r t i e r a t e s . In s h o r t , an examination of the c o n v e n t i o n a l m i l i t a r y balance i n Europe simply does not y i e l d the enormous Warsaw Pact s u p e r i o r i t y which i s widely b e l i e v e d to e x i s t by US Deployers and E u r o - c o u p l e r s . In a d d i t i o n to a pure numbers count, which can be mi s l e a d i n g , other elements of the c o n v e n t i o n a l balance i n Europe i n v a l i d a t e the theory of overwhelming Warsaw Pact 109 advantage. John Mearsheimer has po i n t e d out the need to con s i d e r not only the balance of f o r c e s , but the f o r c e - t o -space r a t i o as w e l l . In c a l c u l a t i n g f o r c e - t o - s p a c e r a t i o s (the number of f o r c e s needed to hold a s e c t i o n of t e r r i t o r y a g a i n s t a s s a u l t ) Mearsheimer concludes that NATO i s i n a very strong m i l i t a r y p o s i t i o n . 1 6 0 Moreover, i t i s g e n e r a l l y accepted that a three-to-one a t t a c k e r to defender r a t i o i s r e q u i r e d f o r s u c c e s s f u l o f f e n s i v e o p e r a t i o n s . The Warsaw Pact simply does not possess t h i s s u p e r i o r i t y . The Warsaw Pact f a l l s even s h o r t e r of p o s s e s s i n g a r e q u i r e d f o r c e r a t i o f o r o f f e n s i v e success i f S o v i e t estimates of what c o n s t i t u t e s a d e c i s i v e numerical advantage are u s e d . 1 6 1 An important element of the m i l i t a r y balance which i s l e f t out of comparisons of manpower and equipment l e v e l s i s q u a l i t a t i v e d i f f e r e n c e s i n weaponry. Here, NATO has the advantage, e s p e c i a l l y i n e l e c t r o n i c warfare and countermeasures, Anti-Tank Guided Weapons (ATGW), ni g h t f i g h t i n g technology, and t a r g e t a c q u i s i t i o n technology i n tanks, m i s s i l e s , and a i r c r a f t . 1 6 2 F i n a l l y , NATO has a l o n g - t e r n advantage with respect to i t s wartime economic p o t e n t i a l , should an East-West c o n f l i c t remain sub-nuclear over a prolonged p e r i o d . As James Meacham has argued, "... i n a long c o n v e n t i o n a l war there i s no doubt that the p o p u l a t i o n and i n d u s t r i a l c a p a c i t y of the NATO c o u l d overwhelm the Warsaw P a c t . " 1 6 3 110 The G e o g r a p h i c a l - T o p o g r a p h i c a l F a c t o r A second, seldom acknowledged f a c t about the m i l i t a r y s i t u a t i o n i n western Europe i s that the t e r r a i n i n NATO's c e n t r a l f r o n t , where the main S o v i e t o f f e n s i v e e f f o r t would take p l a c e , i s not s u i t e d to mass armoured warfare, and i s p a r t i c u l a r l y advantageous to the defence. In the 500 kilometer-wide C e n t r a l Army Group (CENTAG) area, the t e r r a i n i s very rough, and i s c h a r a c t e r i s e d by numerous r i v e r s and f o r e s t s . T h i s t e r r a i n would f o r c e any So v i e t armoured o f e n s i v e i n t o three channels, or c o r r i d o r s . These are the Thuringer Bulge.(more commonly r e f e r r e d to as the Fulda gap), the Gottingen C o r r i d o r , and the Hof C o r r i d o r . Howeve.^,_<-"even these s o - c a l l e d channels are f a r from o b s t a c l e - f r e e . The Fulda Gap i s t r a v e r s e d by the Fulda r i v e r , and much of the Thuringer f o r e s t encroaches i n t h i s c o r r i d o r . The Gottingen C o r r i d o r i s t r a v e r s e d by the Leine and Weser r i v e r s , and the southern p a r t o f . the Harz mountains. The Hof c o r r i d o r i s covered in uneven t e r r a i n and i n any case leads to S t u t t g a r t , which would not be a major Warsaw Pact o b j e c t i v e . I t i s the Northern Army Group (NORTHAG) area which i s h e l d to be the most s u i t a b l e f o r l a r g e armoured o p e r a t i o n s , e s p e c i a l l y i n view of the a l l e g e d weakness of the I Netherlands Corps and the I B e l g i a n Corps. However, the NORTHAG f r o n t i s only 225 k i l o m e t e r s wide, and almost h a l f of t h i s d i s t a n c e i s covered by the northern p a r t of the Harz mountains and the Luneberger Heath, which i s l a r g e l y 111 impassable to armoured v e h i c l e s . The NORTHAG area i s a l s o t r a v e r s e d by the Elbe r i v e r . In a d d i t i o n , there i s c o n s i d e r a b l e urban sprawl centered around Hannover, Bremen, and Bremerhaven. In f a c t , urban growth throughout the F e d e r a l Republic has made i t i n c r e a s i n g l y d i f f i c u l t f o r an aggressor to a v o i d l a r g e - s c a l e urban f i g h t i n g which g r e a t l y slows o f f e n s i v e o p e r a t i o n s . In s h o r t , the t e r r a i n i n West Germany i s l a r g e l y unfavourable f o r s w i f t armoured op e r a t i o n s and presents a s t r a t e g i c and t a c t i c a l advantage to NATO f o r c e s . Problems i n S o v i e t Attack Force Design T h i r d , i t has been e s t a b l i s h e d t h a t the Warsaw Pact does not possess the numerical advantage v i s - a - v i s NATO that i s t y p i c a l l y p o r t r a y e d by Western m i l i t a r y a u t h o r i t i e s . As a r e s u l t , John Mearsheimer i s p e r s u a s i v e i n suggesting that "success w i l l be a f u n c t i o n of s t r a t e g y , not overwhelming numbers." 1 6" The l i k e l i h o o d of S o v i e t success t h e r e f o r e depends l a r g e l y on the a b i l i t y of the USSR t o conduct a s w i f t , armoured breakthrough on the C e n t r a l F r o n t . However, the a b i l i t y of the Warsaw Pact to conduct such a campaign i s i n grave doubt, f o r a v a r i e t y of important yet r a r e l y r e c o g n i z e d reasons. In the f i r s t p l a c e , great a t t e n t i o n has been p a i d i n the West to the ever i n c r e a s i n g 'weight' of S o v i e t d i v i s i o n s . S o v i e t d i v i s i o n s today deploy more tanks, i n f a n t r y f i g h t i n g v e h i c l e s , a r t i l l e r y , a i r - t o - a i r m i s s i l e s , 1 12 and mechanized elements than ever b e f o r e . However, S o v i e t d i v i s i o n s may i n f a c t be too l a r g e and unwieldy to c a r r y out the s w i f t , f l e x i b l e o p e r a t i o n s r e q u i r e d of a breakthrough s t r a t e g y . As Mearsheimer p o i n t s out, "Past a c e r t a i n p o i n t . . . there i s an inverse r e l a t i o n s h i p between the mass and v e l o c i t y of an a t t a c k i n g f o r c e . " 1 6 5 The 'weight' of So v i e t d i v i s i o n s a l s o c r e a t e s l o g i s t i c a l and command problems, a l l of which a d v e r s e l y a f f e c t the speed of a m i l i t a r y f ormation. The l i k e l y speed of a So v i e t advance i n t o West Germany has o f t e n been g r o s s l y o v e r s t a t e d . P e s s i m i s t s have supposed a S o v i e t advance of 100 ki l o m e t e r s a day. More r e a l i s t i c assessments are f a r lower, assuming a 20 to 40 kil o m e t e r d a i l y advance p r i o r to a breakthrough and a 50 to 80 kil o m e t e r r a t e a f t e r breakthrough. Even these l a t t e r estimates may be too g r e a t . 1 6 6 Secondly, a s w i f t armoured breakthrough s t r a t e g y r e q u i r e s a h i g h l y f l e x i b l e command s t r u c t u r e , which allows i n i t i a t i v e at the d i v i s i o n and brigade l e v e l . However, the S o v i e t command s t r u c t u r e i s h i g h l y i n f l e x i b l e , with a r i g i d l y e n f o r c e d h i e r a r c h y of command: The S o v i e t command s t r u c t u r e i s s t r a t i f i e d almost to o s s i f i c a t i o n , with each echelon h i g h l y dependent on a u t h o r i t y from above and l i t t l e allowance p r o v i d e d f o r i n i t i a t i v e at lower l e v e l s . 1 6 7 Although a r i g i d command s t r u c t u r e can be a v i r t u e i f an o f f e n s i v e proceeds as planned, i f b a t t l e f i e l d r e a l i t i e s r e q u i r e a change i n plan t h i s i n f e x i b i l i t y can be a great o p e r a t i o n a l weakness. 1 13 A f o u r t h o b s t a c l e to S o v i e t success i n a s w i f t armoured a s s a u l t i s the Warsaw Pact l o g i s t i c a l i n f r a s t r u c t u r e . Warsaw Pact f o r c e s are n e i t h e r t r a i n e d nor equipped with the support u n i t s r e q u i r e d f o r long-term combat, as are NATO u n i t s . While much has been made of the S o v i e t advantage of i n t e r i o r l i n e s of communication, f a s t reinforcement and resupply of u n i t s i n Europe would be c o n s t r a i n e d by a poor road network and a t r a c k gauge change i n E a s t e r n Europe. Ammunition, spare p a r t s , replacement equipment and other c r i t i c a l s u p p l i e s would have to t r a v e l t h i s r a i l and road network e a r l y i n a c o n f l i c t . When these s u p p l i e s d i d reach r e a r - a r e a l o g i s t i c s c e n t e r s behind the f r o n t , they would reach Warsaw Pact support u n i t s that are not w e l l t r a i n e d or equipped to disseminate s u p p l i e s to the small u n i t l e v e l . 1 6 8 Warsaw Pact Force Cohesion F i n a l l y , c l o s e to h a l f of the Warsaw Pact d i v i s i o n s a v a i l a b l e f o r an o f f e n s i v e a g a i n s t NATO are East European. Except f o r c e r t a i n e l i t e and r e g u l a r u n i t s of the East German and p o s s i b l y Czech armed f o r c e s , the r e l i a b i l i t y and f i g h t i n g c a p a c i t y of E a s t e r n European u n i t s i s q u e s t i o n a b l e . As John E r i c k s o n argues, i t i s h i g h l y i m p l a u s i b l e that "...any non-Soviet n a t i o n a l f o r c e would be a l l o t t e d an independent r o l e on any s c a l e . " 1 6 9 T h i s would reduce the number of So v i e t d i v i s i o n s a v a i l a b l e f o r f r o n t - l i n e o f f e n s i v e o p e r a t i o n s and breakthrough e x p l o i t a t i o n on a l l axes of advance. 1 14 To b r i e f l y conclude, i t should be recognized that NATO's c o n v e n t i o n a l p o s i t i o n i n Europe i s not the hopeless case i t has been made out to be. C r i t i c s such as Henry K i s s i n g e r who have argued that NATO s t r a t e g y i s 'to f i g h t f o r three days and then blow up the world' are doing a great d i s s e r v i c e to the r e a l i t y of the c o n v e n t i o n a l balance i n Europe. The c o n v e n t i o n a l balance which e x i s t s i n Europe does not guarantee NATO success, but i t i s a f a r b e t t e r match f o r a Warsaw Pact o f f e n s i v e than most g i v e i t c r e d i t f o r . The danger of err o n e o u s l y emphasizing NATO's co n v e n t i o n a l weakness i s that the w i l l i n g n e s s to spend resources on a supposedly hopeless m i l i t a r y endeavor w i l l erode. Mearsheimer i s c o r r e c t i n s t r e s s i n g the d e m o r a l i z i n g e f f e c t s of such commentary: "Those A l l i e d l e a d e r s who c o n t i n u a l l y d e n i g r a t e NATO's s u b s t a n t i a l c o n v e n t i o n a l c a p a b i l i t y a r e , i n e f f e c t , undermining popular support f o r continued spending on NATO's c o n v e n t i o n a l f o r c e s . " 1 7 0 In a d d i t i o n , to c o n s t a n t l y emphasize NATO's c o n v e n t i o n a l weakness w i l l weaken morale i n the NATO armies. These armies, however, are i n f a r b e t t e r shape to defend Western Europe than i s widely assumed: "In s h o r t , NATO i s i n r e l a t i v e l y good shape at the c o n v e n t i o n a l l e v e l . The c o n v e n t i o n a l wisdom which c l a i m s otherwise on t h i s matter i s a d i s t o r t i o n of r e a l i t y . " 1 7 1 Reassessing the Nuclear D e t e r r e n t Balance i n Europe Because US deployers and Euro - c o u p l e r s are i n c o r r e c t i n 1 15 assuming the weakness of the c o n v e n t i o n a l f o r c e " d e t e r r e n t " in Europe, the emphasis they place on US nuclear weapons i n Europe as the only v i a b l e NATO d e t e r r e n t i s l a r g e l y m i s placed. However, the c r e d i b i l i t y of the c o n v e n t i o n a l defence of Europe i s not the primary reason why the d e t e r r e n t value of US nuclear weapons i n Europe i s accorded f a r too much importance. Other major d e t e r r e n t elements are in p l a c e i n Europe, making dete r r e n c e i n Europe a f u n c t i o n not of a s i n g l e d e t e r r e n t (such as US nuclear weapons) but a compound of a number of d e t e r r e n t elements. The French nu c l e a r a r s e n a l , the B r i t i s h n u c l e a r a r s e n a l , and the p o s s i b i l i t y of i n a d v e r t e n t or a c c i d e n t a l nuclear r e l e a s e i n Europe, w i l l a l l c o n t r i b u t e to a robust, c r e d i b l e compound d e t e r r e n t posture i n Europe. Each of these f a c t o r s deserves d e l i b e r a t i o n . The French Nuclear Force The French nuclear a r s e n a l i s based on the . concept of p r o p o r t i o n a l d e t e r r e n c e ( d i s s u a s i o n du f a i b l e au f o r t ) . T h i s concept holds that the USSR i s d e t e r r e d from a t t a c k i n g France because the damage the French a r s e n a l can i n f l i c t on S o v i e t s o c i e t y i s g r e a t e r than any p o t e n t i a l gains to be made from an occupied or devastated France. The o f f i c i a l r a t i o n a l e f o r France m a i n t a i n i n g an independent nuclear f o r c e i s that i t permits France to d i s t a n c e i t s e l f from A l l i a n c e commitments that might reduce French p o l i c y f l e x i b i l i t y and autonomy. In a d d i t i o n , an 116 independent nuc l e a r f o r c e enables France to a v o i d a c l o s e a l l i a n c e with the US, which i s v i e w e d — e s p e c i a l l y by G a u l l i s t s - - a s an u n r e l i a b l e s e c u r i t y guarantor. F i n a l l y , the p o s s e s s i o n of an independent n u c l e a r f o r c e p r o v i d e s France with s e c u r i t y i n an unstable i n t e r n a t i o n a l environment. The present i n t e r n a t i o n a l s i t u a t i o n may change or c o l l a p s e , and France b e l i e v e s that i t must t h e r e f o r e p r o v i d e f o r i t s own s e c u r i t y . The r o l e of the French nu c l e a r f o r c e f o r European s e c u r i t y has h i s t o r i c a l l y been ambiguous and u n s p e c i f i e d . The French maintain that ambiguity i s to t h e i r s t r a t e g i c advantage. The d e t e r r e n t e f f e c t of the French f o r c e i s enhanced by p o l i c y ambiguity, which promotes g r e a t e r u n c e r t a i n t y i n the minds of S o v i e t i n v a s i o n p l a n n e r s . However, French a n a l y s t s (DeGaulle included) have in the past maintained that t h e i r n u c l e a r a r s e n a l i s a p u r e l y n a t i o n a l d e t e r r e n t , u s e f u l only f o r p r o t e c t i n g French t e r r i t o r y . 1 7 2 For the French, the e f f e c t i v e n e s s of n u c l e a r f o r c e s depends on the p r i n c i p l e of n a t i o n a l t e r r i t o r i a l s e c u r i t y and independence. " C o n t r o l of n u c l e a r s t r a t e g y , " Andre Beaufre has w r i t t e n , "cannot be c o l l e c t i v e i n p e a c e t i m e . " 1 7 3 The French n u c l e a r f o r c e has, t h e r e f o r e , t r a d i t i o n a l l y been regarded as r e s e r v e d e x c l u s i v e l y f o r the defence of French t e r r i t o r y and borders. However, a major s h i f t i n French n u c l e a r s t r a t e g y i s now under way. There were, i n f a c t , i n d i c a t i o n s that t h i s view was changing as e a r l y as 1975. The then Armed Forces 117 Chief of S t a f f General Guy Mery o u t l i n e d a p o l i c y of 'enlarged s a n c t u a r i z a t i o n ' ( s a n c t u a r i s a t i o n e l a r g e e ) which suggested that the d e t e r r e n t p r o t e c t i o n of the French a r s e n a l might extend to France's a l l i e s i n Western E u r o p e . 1 7 " G i s c a r d d ' E s t a i n g and Jacques C h i r a c a l s o made s i m i l a r statements c h a l l e n g i n g the t r a d i t i o n a l posture of the f o r c e de d i s s u a s i o n . 1 7 5 G i s c a r d d ' E s t a i n g , f o r example, p o i n t e d out t h a t : I t would indeed be i l l u s o r y to hope that France c o u l d maintain more than a reduced s o v e r e i g n t y , i f her neighbors had been occupied by a h o s t i l e power or were simply under i t s c o n t r o l . The s e c u r i t y of Western Europe as a whole i s t h e r e f o r e e s s e n t i a l f o r F r a n c e . 1 7 6 T h i s was the beginning of a new approach to French s e c u r i t y matters, with g r e a t e r a t t e n t i o n accorded to France's a l l i e s and to defence c o o p e r a t i o n with other members of the defence community. None of t h i s , however, was to a f f e c t the autonomy of French m i l i t a r y (and e s p e c i a l l y n u c l e a r ) decision-making or the development of the French n u c l e a r a r s e n a l . That a completely independent French m i l i t a r y p o l i c y was n e i t h e r p r a c t i c a l nor c r e d i b l e was r e c o g i z e d by G i s c a r d d ' E s t a i n g . However, changes i n French defence thought encountered s w i f t o p p o s i t i o n from G a u l l i s t s . The G a u l l i s t s , who wielded c o n s i d e r a b l e p o l i t i c a l power, sought to preserve the t r a d i t i o n a l French tendency toward decision-making autonomy and the avoidance of defence c o o p e r a t i o n with other European n a t i o n s . Recent s h i f t s i n French a t t i t u d e s towards defence p o l i c y are the r e s u l t of the r e v i v a l of concepts f i r s t i n t r o d u c e d i n the G i s c a r d e r a . 118 The change i n French defence p o l i c y , e s p e c i a l l y with regard to nucl e a r p o l i c y , i s now very r e a l . F r a n c o i s M i t t e r a n d has made i t c l e a r that the defence of West Germany and the Benelux c o u n t r i e s i s now c o n s i d e r e d a v i t a l i n t e r e s t of F r a n c e , 1 7 7 and gr e a t e r defence p a r t i c i p a t i o n with other European n a t i o n s and NATO i s growing. T h i s s h i f t away from a b s o l u t e s e c u r i t y independence i s the r e s u l t of a number of f a c t o r s . F i r s t , the French have r e a l i z e d that a p u r e l y n a t i o n a l and i s o l a t i o n i s t m i l i t a r y p o l i c y would allow an aggressor to advance to the French border and a v o i d r e p r i s a l . T h i s , however, would leave France i n an unacceptable p o l i t i c a l and s t r a t e g i c p o s i t i o n . The Defence Committee of Parliament c r i t i c i s e d the G a u l l i s t d o c t r i n e of 's p l e n d i d n u c l e a r i s o l a t i o n ' as a p o l i c y which c o u l d f o r c e France i n t o a h u m i l i a t i n g n e u t r a l i t y or c o u l d l e a d to the F i n l a n d i z a t i o n of F r a n c e . 1 7 8 Thus, the v i t a l i n t e r e s t of France demanded that i t s nuc l e a r d e t e r r e n t p r o t e c t i o n be expanded to i t s neighboring a l l i e s . 1 7 9 Second, t h i s e x t e n s i o n of French n u c l e a r p r o t e c t i o n , coupled with i n c r e a s i n g Euro-French defence c o o p e r a t i o n , has f o r c e d French l e a d e r s to pursue a more m u l t i l a t e r a l defence p o l i c y . As Robbin F. L a i r d put i t : The French are i n c r e a s i n g l y f i n d i n g themselves i n the p o s i t i o n of having to l i n k t h e i r 'independence' more d i r e c t l y and p u b l i c l y with the e f f i c a c y of o v e r a l l Western defence c a p a b i l i t i e s i n order to deter the S o v i e t s . 1 8 0 As the French i n c r e a s i n g l y i d e n t i f y t h e i r s e c u r i t y i n t e r e s t s with t h e i r European 119 neighbors, they i n e v i t a b l y w i l l become i n c r e a s i n g l y i n v o l v e d in c o o p e r a t i v e and j o i n t measures f o r European defence. T h i r d , the s h i f t i n French defence p o l i c y i s based upon a r e c o g n i t i o n of the s t e a d i l y r i s i n g c o s t s of s o p h i s t i c a t e d m i l i t a r y hardware. I t i s f a s t becoming economically i n f e a s i b l e f o r France to continue to pursue a wholly independent m i l i t a r y p o l i c y . Although French l e a d e r s continue to refuse to r e - i n t e g r a t e t h e i r f o r c e s under NATO's m i l i t a r y s t r u c t u r e , c o o p e r a t i o n and contingency p l a n n i n g betwen NATO and France have reached such a high l e v e l that t h i s p o l i t i c a l independence, once a very r e a l o b s t a c l e to NATO-French defence c o o r d i n a t i o n , i s becoming l a r g e l y symbolic. France has developed, f o r example, the 47,000 man Force d'Action Rapide(FAR). The FAR, in the words of Robert S. Rudney, " . . . r e p r e s e n t s a major s h i f t i n French c o n v e n t i o n a l s t r a t e g y . " 1 8 1 P r i o r to the FAR, the French commitment to West Germany was composed of three d i v i s i o n s of some 50,000 men, deployed east of the Rhine. Such a deployment meant that these f o r c e s were not committed to the f r o n t - l i n e defence of West Germany, and at best would c o n s t i t u t e a t h e a t r e r e s e r v e . The FAR, however, i s designed f o r such a f r o n t - l i n e commitment. Defence M i n i s t e r C h a rles Hernu has admitted that i f deployed f o r such a m i s s i o n , the FAR would a u t o m a t i c a l l y come under the command of SACEUR. 1 8 2 Indeed, the c r e a t i o n of the f o r c e was motivated i n part by the p o l i t i c a l o b j e c t i v e of i n c r e a s i n g Franco-German defence c o o p e r a t i o n . 1 8 3 120 Besides the c r e a t i o n of the FAR, other French defence changes r e f l e c t a g r e a t e r NATO emphasis i n French defence p o l i c y . The e n t i r e French army i s being r e - o r i e n t e d to the north and east of the country, c l o s e r to West Germany and the Benelux c o u n t r i e s . The n a t i o n a l p o l i c e (gendarmerie) have been made r e s p o n s i b l e f o r t e r r i t o r i a l defence, f r e e i n g up r e g u l a r army formations f o r f r o n t - l i n e duty o u t s i d e French t e r r i t o r y . 1 8 " France has a l s o engaged i n other defence c o o p e r a t i o n i n i t i a t i v e s . A j o i n t West German-French brigade has been e s t a b l i s h e d t o f a c i l i t a t e g r e a t e r understanding between the m i l i t a r i e s of the two c o u n t r i e s . 1 8 5 In the past s e v e r a l months there have been t e n t a t i v e steps towards B r i t i s h -French c o o p e r a t i o n on the development of nuclear-armed c r u i s e and short-range a t t a c k m i s s i l e s . 1 8 6 T h i s new defence p o l i c y d i r e c t i o n w i l l draw France i n t o ^ c l o s e r defence t i e s with i t s European neighbours. Increased Euro-French c o o p e r a t i o n and the r e - o r i e n t a t i o n of the French army toward a European defence r o l e can only serve to enhance the d e t e r r e n t value of NATO's c o n v e n t i o n a l f o r c e s . However, i t i s the French nuclear f o r c e which has the g r e a t e s t i m p l i c a t i o n s f o r NATO's o v e r a l l d e t e r r e n t posture i n Europe. Despite the steps toward r e - i n t e g r a t i o n i n NATO c o n v e n t i o n a l f o r c e p l a n n i n g o u t l i n e d above, the French n u c l e a r f o r c e remains a b s o l u t e l y autonomous, under e x c l u s i v e French c o n t r o l . The continued autonomy of the French nuclear a r s e n a l , and the s i g n i f i c a n c e of i t s expansion program, 121 p l a c e s France i n the p o s i t i o n of being a c r e d i b l e r e g i o n a l n u c l e a r d e t e r r e r i n Europe. At p r e sent, France deploys a n u c l e a r f o r c e based on a rough ' t r i a d ' arrangement. The French A i r Force deploys 18 Mirage IV bombers equipped with short-range a t t a c k m i s s i l e s . The ground-based m i s s i l e f o r c e c o n s i s t s of 18 S-3 IRBMs based on the A l b i o n P l a t e a u . The S-3 c a r r i e s a one-megaton warhead and has a range of 3500 k i l o m e t e r s . At the t a c t i c a l l e v e l , the French army deploys the mobile Pluton t a c t i c a l n u c l e a r m i s s i l e system, which has a range of 120 k i l o m e t e r s . However, the heart of the French n u c l e a r f o r c e i s i t s SLBM f o r c e — t h e FOST (Force Oceanique S t r a t e g i q u e ) which p r e s e n t l y c o n s i s t s of 5 Redoutable c l a s s and 1 I n f l e x i b l e c l a s s SSBNs. The Redoutable c l a s s SSBNs c a r r y 16 s i n g l e -warhead M-20 m i s s i l e s , while the I n f e x i b l e deploys 16 new M-4 m i s s i l e s , each c a r r y i n g 6 M u l t i p l e Re-entry V e h i c l e s (MRV). France has r e c e n t l y embarked on a f i v e year, $100 b i l l i o n (Cdn) defence modernization program. Some $32 b i l l i o n of t h i s i s to be devoted to upgrading the warheads and d e l i v e r y systems of the French n u c l e a r a r s e n a l . The v i a b i l i t y of the aging Mirage IV bomber f l e e t , and to a l e s s e r extent the n u c l e a r r o l e of the Mirage 2000, w i l l be enhanced by deployment of a new n u c l e a r a t t a c k m i s s i l e , the ASMP (Air-Sol-Moyenne-Portee). The S-3 IRBMs w i l l be r e p l a c e d with a much more s u r v i v a b l e mobile la n d m i s s i l e d e s i g n a t e d the S-4 ( f o r m e r l y the S-X). The Pluton t a c t i c a l 1 22 m i s s i l e system of the French army i s to be r e p l a c e d by the Hades medium-range t a c t i c a l n u c l e a r m i s s i l e system, which may w e l l be armed with an Enhanced Radiation. Warhead (ERW). 1 8 7 The range of the Hades system i s about 350. k i l o m e t e r s . Robert Rudney has p o i n t e d out that t h i s . range, not c o i n c i d e n t a l l y , i s the d i s t a n c e from the Rhine to. the E l b e . 1 8 8 I t should be noted, however, that the o r i g i n a l order of 40 Hades systems has been halved to 20 , 1 8 9 and France i s l i k e l y to come under st r o n g i n t e r n a t i o n a l pressure to abandon the Hades program now t h a t the Soviet-American agreement on INF has been n e g o t i a t e d . 1 9 0 N e v e r t h e l e s s , . t h e s h i f t i n French t a c t i c a l nuclear f o r c e p l a n n i n g i s q u i t e c l e a r . The g r e a t e s t emphasis of the nuclear modernization program i s being p l a c e d on expanding the c a p a b i l i t i e s of the FOST. T h i s program i s l i k e l y to remain wholly immune to any f u t u r e US-Soviet arms agreements. ' Four of. the f i v e Redoutable c l a s s SSBNs are to be r e f i t t e d with the s i x -warhead M-4. As a r e s u l t , the French SSBN f o r c e w i l l expand from 176 warheads to 496 warheads by the mid-1990's.• Furthermore, the M-4 r e p r e s e n t s a dramatic q u a l i t a t i v e improvement to the SSBN f o r c e . The range of the M-20 i s s a i d to be some 3000 m i l e s , whereas the range of the M-4 i s about 4000 m i l e s . 1 9 1 The great i n c r e a s e i n warhead t o t a l s as a r e s u l t of the MRVed M-4 i s s i m i l a r to the e f f e c t MIRVing had on the superpower a r s e n a l s . Indeed, when the SSBN I n f l e x i b l e j o i n e d the French SSBN f l e e t with i t s M-4 m i s s i l e s , the 123 French SSBN-based warhead t o t a l more than doubled. In a d d i t i o n , a seventh submarine i s planned, which w i l l deploy the 10-warhead MIRVed M-5 SLBM, the successor to the M-4. The a d d i t i o n of t h i s seventh submarine, and the much more capable M-5, w i l l expand the c a p a b i l i t i e s of the French nuc l e a r a r s e n a l f a r beyond the l e v e l s a t t a i n e d by the c u r r e n t modernization program. The c r e d i b i l i t y of the French nuclear a r s e n a l as a d e t e r r e n t element i n Europe, e s p e c i a l l y i n the face of these modernization programs, cannot be i n doubt. The S o v i e t Union has l i t t l e c h o i c e but to regard the French nu c l e a r f o r c e as a s i g n i f i c a n t element of r i s k i n any c a l c u l a t i o n s regarding an i n v a s i o n of Western Europe. According to John Prados, J o e l S. Wit, and Michael J . Zagurek J r . , i n 1985, a f u l l -s c a l e s t r i k e by the French s t r a t e g i c f o r c e (comprising the FOST, S-3 and Mirage systems) would have r e s u l t e d i n 23-34 m i l l i o n S o v i e t f a t a l i t i e s , and would have destroyed 16-25% of S o v i e t p r o d u c t i o n c a p a c i t y . By the e a r l y 1990's, a s t r i k e by the modernized and expanded French a r s e n a l w i l l r e s u l t i n 38-55 m i l l i o n S o v i e t c a s u a l t i e s and the d e s t r u c t i o n of 25-40% of S o v i e t p r o d u c t i o n c a p a c i t y . 1 9 2 The c a p a c i t y of the French nuclear f o r c e to t h r e a t e n the S o v i e t Union with the prospect of such c r i p p l i n g and unacceptable damage i s one element of i t s c r e d i b i l i t y as a d e t e r r e n t . A second element of the c r e d i b i l i t y of the French nuc l e a r f o r c e i n v o l v e s the US s t r a t e g i c a r s e n a l . A s t r i k e on the S o v i e t Union by the French nu c l e a r f o r c e would cause 124 m i l i t a r y and s o c i e t a l damage of such scope that the USSR would be p l a c e d i n a d r a m a t i c a l l y i n f e r i o r p o s i t i o n i n s u c c e s s i v e d e a l i n g s with the US. As Robbin F. L a i r d put i t : "The S o v i e t s are d e t e r r e d i n p a r t by r e c o g n i z i n g that the damage i n f l i c t e d by the French might be s i g n i f i c a n t enough to allow the United S t a t e s to dominate the war t e r m i n a t i o n p r o c e s s . " 1 9 3 Another strong p o s s i b i l i t y that must be c o n s i d e r e d i s the r i s k that the use of the French a r s e n a l c o u l d t r i g g e r a superpower s t r a t e g i c . exchange. T h i s r i s k w i l l r i s e as more MIRVed SLBMs which are capable of s u p p r e s s i n g the command and c o n t r o l of S o v i e t nuclear f o r c e s are deployed. Such a t h r e a t f u r t h e r i n c r e a s e s the d e t e r r e n t c r e d i b i l i t y of the French Force. France cannot hope to match the USSR i n terms of o v e r a l l f o r c e c a p a b i l i t y , but the c r e d i b i l i t y of the French f o r c e i s c o n s i d e r a b l y r e i n f o r c e d enhanced by the e x i s t e n c e of the US a r s e n a l , whose use might be provoked by u n i l a t e r a l French a c t i o n . The d e t e r r e n t r e l a t i o n s h i p between France, Great B r i t a i n and the US has been a p t l y c h a r a c t e r i s e d by L a i r d as "the s t r o n g d e t e r r e d by the s t r o n g augmented by the weak." 1 9 4 By f a r the most s i g n i f i c a n t factor, c o n t r i b u t i n g to the c r e d i b i l i t y of the French nu c l e a r f o r c e i s i t s s t a t u s as an autonomous, independent f o r c e c o n t r o l l e d by a European decision-making c e n t e r which i s wholly independent of Washington. Any d e c i s i o n to f i r e French nu c l e a r weapons w i l l be a d e c i s i o n made by French l e a d e r s alone. The S o v i e t 125 Union, t h e r e f o r e , i s faced with the p o s s i b i l i t y t h a t not one, but two decision-making c e n t e r s — W a s h i n g t o n and P a r i s - -might respond to a g g r e s s i o n in Europe with nuclear firepower. The g r e a t e r degree of u n c e r t a i n t y c r e a t e d by the e x i s t e n c e of m u l t i p l e independent c e n t e r s of n u c l e a r decision-making thus enhances the d e t e r r e n t e f f e c t of the western nu c l e a r a r s e n a l s . The concept of the d e t e r r e n t value of m u l t i p l e nuclear decision-making c e n t e r s has a long t r a d i t i o n i n France. Andre Beaufre, w r i t i n g i n 1965, argued that s i n c e i n c r e a s i n g the u n c e r t a i n t y f e l t by the enemy was the primary o b j e c t i v e of d e t e r r e n c e , i t was u s e l e s s to c r e a t e any new f o r c e dependent on US decision-making or US s t r a t e g y . 1 9 5 Instead, Beaufre argued, deterrence c o u l d best be strengthened by having a western d e t e r r e n t f o r c e based on m u l t i p l e autonomous decision-making c e n t e r s . T h i s was c o n s i s t e n t with the t r a d i t i o n a l French view that a c r e d i b l e n u c l e a r d e t e r r e n t can only be n a t i o n a l , not i n t e r n a t i o n a l , i n nature. As Robbin F. L a i r d p o i n t e d out, the f a c t that France i s a European n a t i o n enhances the c r e d i b i l i t y of the f o r c e : "To the S o v i e t s , France, with i t s n a t i o n a l s u r v i v a l at stake i n a European war, would appear more l i k e l y to have the p o l i t i c a l w i l l to use n u c l e a r weapons." 1 9 6 The French nuclear a r s e n a l , at present and f o r the f o r s e e a b l e f u t u r e , w i l l remain c o n s i s t e n t with the p r i n c i p l e s of a n a t i o n a l nuclear d e t e r r e n t , under e x c l u s i v e French c o n t r o l . With France engaging i n g r e a t e r l e v e l s of defence 126 c o o p e r a t i o n and c o n s u l t a t i o n with i t s European neighbors, while at the same time m a i n t a i n i n g and expanding a c r e d i b l e n u c l e a r f o r c e over which i t has e x c l u s i v e , autonomous c o n t r o l , France has emerged as an e f f e c t i v e , c r e d i b l e r e g i o n a l d e t e r r e r i n Europe. As General J . Lacaze argued, the new French defence p o l i c y r e i n f o r c e s d e t e r r e n c e i n Europe because: "The p o s s i b i l i t y of our p a r t i c i p a t i o n [ i n European defence] would s i g n i f y f o r the adversary that h e n c e f o r t h he takes the r i s k of encountering very e a r l y the f o r c e s of a nuclear country which, on the other hand, maintains the independence of i t s [ n u c l e a r ] d e c i s i o n s . " 1 9 7 The B r i t i s h Nuclear Force The B r i t i s h nuclear f o r c e has had a much l e s s independent t r a d i t i o n that that of the French. H e a v i l y dependent on US technology and weapon t r a n s f e r s , the B r i t i s h n uclear f o r c e was not o r i g i n a l l y conceived as a f u l l y autonomous f o r c e . Rather, i t was intended to be p a r t of the B r i t i s h c o n t r i b u t i o n to an a l l i e d defence e f f o r t . During the p e r i o d of 1958 to 1963, the B r i t i s h n u c l e a r f o r c e was part of an i n t e g r a t e d US n u c l e a r s t r i k e plan a g a i n s t the S o v i e t Union. B r i t a i n ' s V bomber f o r c e was under the o p e r a t i o n a l command of SACEUR, as were the P o l a r i s systems when they were a c q u i r e d i n the l a t e 1960's. Des p i t e t h i s higher l e v e l of i n t e g r a t i o n i n t o US and NATO p l a n n i n g , B r i t a i n has always re s e r v e d f i n a l a u t h o r i t y over i t s n u c l e a r a r s e n a l , e s p e c i a l l y c o n t r o l over the sea-based f o r c e . Moreover, 127 B r i t i s h l e a d e r s have made i t c l e a r on s e v e r a l occasions s i n c e Prime M i n i s t e r Macmillan o r i g i n a l l y d e c l a r e d t h i s d o c t r i n e to P r e s i d e n t Kennedy in 1962, that B r i t a i n r e served the r i g h t to use i t s nuclear f o r c e i f 'supreme n a t i o n a l i n t e r e s t s ' were at stake. A c o r d i n g l y , the B r i t i s h n u c l e a r f o r c e possesses two separate t a r g e t s e t s , one f o r n u c l e a r use i n c o n j u n c t i o n with NATO warplans, and a second f o r autonomous, independent use. The B r i t i s h n u c l e a r f o r c e thus has a t h e a t r e r o l e and a s t r a t e g i c r o l e , the l a t t e r f a c i l i t a t e d by the development of the a l l - B r i t i s h C hevaline M u l t i p l e Re-entry V e h i c l e (MRV) warhead system, which i s designed to penetrate the Galosh ABM system deployed around Moscow, thus m a i n t a i n i n g B r i t a i n ' s " d e c a p i t a t i o n " o p t i o n i n the face of S o v i e t investments i n b a l l i s t i c m i s s i l e defence. Under the Thatcher government, emphasis has been p l a c e d on the independence of the B r i t i s h nuclear f o r c e , and i t s e f f e c t i v e n e s s as a s t r a t e g i c d e t e r r e n t . The Thatcher government has a l s o s t r e s s e d the d e t e r r e n t value of m u l t i p l e independent c e n t r e s of n u c l e a r r e l e a s e a u t h o r i t y . The d o c t r i n e of the 'second c e n t r e of d e c i s i o n ' has become a prominent component of contemporary B r i t i s h n u c l e a r p o l i c y . 1 9 8 As the 1981 B r i t i s h White Paper on Defence s t a t e s : The c r u c i a l r o l e which our nuclear f o r c e s p l a y i n enhancing A l l i a n c e s e c u r i t y l i e s i n p r o v i d i n g a nuclear d e t e r r e n t c a p a b i l i t y committed to the A l l i a n c e yet f u l l y under the c o n t r o l of a European member. Even in some f u t u r e s i t u a t i o n , i f S o v i e t l e a d e r s imagined that the U n i t e d S t a t e s might not be prepared to use n u c l e a r weapons, having to take account of the enormous d e s t r u c t i v e power i n 128 European hands would compel them to regard the r i s k s of aggression i n Europe as s t i l l very g r a v e . 1 9 9 To c a r r y out such a deterrence-enhancing m i s s i o n , B r i t a i n r e l i e s almost e x c l u s i v e l y on i t s SSBN-based nuclear f o r c e . C u r r e n t l y , the B r i t i s h SSBN f o r c e c o n s i s t s of 4 R e s o l u t i o n c l a s s SSBNs, each d e p l o y i n g 16 P o l a r i s A3 and A3TK m i s s i l e s . The B r i t i s h - d e s i g n e d Chevaline warhead d i s p e n s i n g system c a r r i e s 3 to 6 non-MIRVed RVs, some of which are decoys to confuse ABM defences. The B r i t i s h SLBM a r s e n a l deploys some 160 warheads in the 40 k i l o t o n or 200 k i l o t o n range. B r i t a i n intends to modernize t h i s f o r c e , through the the a c q u i s i t i o n i n the 1990's of the T r i d e n t II D-5 m i s s i l e . The D-5 w i l l be r e t r o - f i t t e d i n to the R e s o l u t i o n c l a s s submarines, and a l s o r e p r e s e n t s a dramatic q u a l i t a t i v e and q u a n t i t a t i v e improvement to the B r i t i s h SLBM f o r c e . The warhead t o t a l of t h i s f o r c e w i l l grow from 160 to 512 warheads, and the improved accuracy of the D-5 w i l l o f f e r much more f l e x i b l e t a r g e t t i n g o p t i o n s , i n c l u d i n g a t t a c k on the most hardened command and c o n t r o l p o s t s on S o v i e t t e r r i t o r y . The B r i t i s h n uclear f o r c e , though much smaller than i t s French c o u n t e r p a r t , i s n e v e r t h e l e s s s t i l l capable of d e l i v e r i n g a c r i p p l i n g n u c l e a r a s s a u l t on the p o p u l a t i o n and i n d u s t r i a l c a p a c i t y of the S o v i e t Union. In 1985, a nuclear a t t a c k on the USSR by the B r i t i s h n uclear f o r c e would have i n f l i c t e d 6 to 21 m i l l i o n c a s u a l t i e s , and destroyed 5 to 15% 129 of the S o v i e t Union's i n d u s t r i a l c a p a c i t y . With the i n t r o d u c t i o n of the T r i d e n t II i n the mid-1990's, the B r i t i s h f o r c e w i l l be capable of i n f l i c t i n g 24 to 68 m i l l i o n c a s u a l t i e s , and d e s t r o y i n g 50% of the S o v i e t Union's i n d u s t r i a l c a p a c i t y . 2 0 0 Perhaps of g r e a t e r importance, B r i t i s h l e a d e r s w i l l have a h i g h l y c r e d i b l e o p t i o n of p e n e t r a t i n g whatever A n t i - B a l l i s t i c M i s s i l e defences that may be deployed around Moscow over the next twenty y e a r s . As with the French nuclear f o r c e , the MIRVing of the B r i t i s h SLBM for c e w i l l have a tremendous impact on the d e s t r u c t i v e p o t e n t i a l of the B r i t i s h a r s e n a l . The S o v i e t Union i s thus faced with not only the US a r s e n a l and a growing French f o r c e , but with an i n c r e a s i n g l y capable and e q u a l l y independent B r i t i s h f o r c e as w e l l . In a d d i t i o n , the B r i t i s h f o r c e has the same i m p l i c i t r e l a t i o n s h i p with the US nucle a r f o r c e as does the French f o r c e . Not only i s the B r i t i s h f o r c e capable of i n f l i c t i n g severe damage to the USSR on i t s own, the e f f e c t of such a B r i t i s h s t r i k e wouid leave the S o v i e t Union i n a d e t r i m e n t a l s t r a t e g i c and m i l i t a r y p o s i t i o n v i s - a - v i s the US, and might thereby provoke US command a u t h o r i t i e s i n t o an o p p o r t u n i s t i c c o u n t e r f o r c e s t r i k e on the So v i e t m i l i t a r y . The S o v i e t Union i s thus faced with m u l t i p l e independent nuclear decision-making c e n t e r s , any of which are capable of i n f i c t i n g unacceptable damage on the USSR. Fu r t h e r , the c r e d i b i l i t y of the two European decision-making c e n t e r s i s enhanced by the e x i s t e n c e of the US a r s e n a l , and 1 30 e s p e c i a l l y by t h e i r own independent modernization programs. As John Prados, J o e l S. Wit and Michael Zagurek p o i n t out: "...the l e v e l of damage [the European nuc l e a r f o r c e s can* i n f l i c t ] approach, i f they do not exceed, the assured d e s t r u c t i o n c r i t e r i a set f o r US s t r a t e g i c f o r c e s i n the 1 9 60's." 2 0 1 The prospect of j o i n t Anglo-French c o o p e r a t i o n on nuclear defence p r o j e c t s , such as a j o i n t l y designed and produced c r u i s e m i s s i l e , would be a f u r t h e r d i s p l a y of an i n c r e a s i n g l y independent European d e t e r r e n t c a p a b i l i t y , both i n terms of a t t i t u d e s and t e c h n o l o g i c a l autonomy. 2 0 2 The c r e d i b i l i t y and c a p a b i l i t y of these autonomous n a t i o n a l nuclear f o r c e s as independent d e t e r r e n t s would i n c r e a s e a l l the more. Whether the j o i n t procurement pr o p o s a l s mature or not, the key p o i n t , as L a i r d notes, i s "the f a c t that both f o r c e s w i l l be augmented i n the 1980's and 1990's enhances the nuclear p r o t e c t i o n f o r E u r o p e . " 2 0 3 The Risk of Inadvertent or A c c i d e n t a l E s c a l a t i o n The r i s k of i n a d v e r t e n t or a c c i d e n t a l e s c a l a t i o n i s not a f a c t o r that i s g e n e r a l l y emphasized in Western s e c u r i t y w r i t i n g s . However, the r i s k of i n a d v e r t e n t or a c c i d e n t a l e s c a l a t i o n must be t r e a t e d more s o b e r l y by S o v i e t m i l i t a r y p l a n n e r s . M i l i t a r y success f o r the S o v i e t Union i s based l a r g e l y on the l i k e l i h o o d of a v o i d i n g n u c l e a r e s c a l a t i o n , which i s dependent not only on e s c a l a t i o n through d e l i b e r a t e a c t i o n , but on a c c i d e n t a l or u nauthorised f i r i n g of nuclear 131 weapons as w e l l . Inadvertent or a c c i d e n t a l n u c l e a r e s c a l a t i o n would destroy any S o v i e t prospect of v i c t o r y j u s t as s u r e l y as d e l i b e r a t e nuclear e s c a l a t i o n would. S o v i e t u n c e r t a i n t y over the p o s s i b i l i t y of ina d v e r t e n t or a c c i d e n t a l nuclear r e l e a s e i n Europe ought to be c o n s i d e r e d , t h e r e f o r e , as a very r e a l d e t e r r e n t f a c t o r . There are two main elements c o n t r i b u t i n g to u n c e r t a i n t y over the p o s s i b l e unauthorised or a c c i d e n t a l r e l e a s e of European-based nuclear weapons i n war or c r i s i s . These a r e : 1) the t h r e a t of d e c e n t r a l i z e d , p r e d e l e g a t e d a u t h o r i t y to r e l e a s e n u c l e a r weapons i n Europe i n war or c r i s i s , and 2) the ambiguity of the command and r e l e a s e a u t h o r i t y of those weapons. The extent to which the command and c o n t r o l of European n u c l e a r weapons i s d e c e n t r a l i z e d or delegated d u r i n g war or c r i s i s i s a major element of u n c e r t a i n t y i n c a l c u l a t i o n s about the r i s k of in a d v e r t e n t n u c l e a r r e l e a s e . There are thousands of nuclear weapons deployed in Europe, most of which are subsumed under the command s t r u c t u r e f o r c o n v e n t i o n a l ground and a i r f o r c e s . P r e d e l e g a t i o n of launch a u t h o r i t y d u r i n g war or c r i s i s to t a c t i c a l commanders i n the f i e l d would almost c e r t a i n l y i n c r e a s e the l i k e l i h o o d of inad v e r t e n t use. The pressure to delegate r e l e a s e a u t h o r i z a t i o n before n u c l e a r - c a p a b l e f o r c e s are d i s p e r s e d with t h e i r warheads i s very h i g h . In c r i s i s or war, pre -d e l e g a t i o n of launch a u t h o r i t y avoids the great u n r e l i a b i l i t y of wartime communications with f o r c e s d i s p e r s e d i n the f i e l d and ensures that launch a u t h o r i t y 132 w i l l reach the t a c t i c a l l e v e l . The Permissive A c t i o n Link (PAL) codes, which are designed to reduce the chance of i n a d v e r t e n t r e l e a s e are e f f e c t i v e measures which ensure "negative c o n t r o l " by c e n t r a l a u t h o r i t i e s i n peacetime. However, t h e i r u t i l i t y d u r i n g h o s t i l i t i e s i s l e s s c e r t a i n . As Paul Bracken has observed, PALs "...are n e i t h e r designed nor intended as a means of p r o v i d i n g c e n t r a l i z e d p o l i t i c a l c o n t r o l i n b a t t l e . " 2 0 " Even with the PAL system in p l a c e , there remains a great degree of ambiguity over command d e c e n t r a l i z a t i o n and d e l e g a t i o n of n u c l e a r weapons in Europe. T h i s ambiguity can only promote u n c e r t a i n t y i n the minds of S o v i e t planners over the l i k e l i h o o d of i n a d v e r t e n t n u c l e a r r e l e a s e r e g a r d l e s s of command and c o n t r o l measure such as PALs. Ri c h a r d K. B e t t s has observed t h a t : "Ambiguity has some d e t e r r e n t v a l u e . . . [ t h e Kremlin l e a d e r s ] ...would have to reckon e i t h e r that l o w - l e v e l commanders have s e c r e t a u t h o r i t y to launch t h e i r f o r c e s i n the event that n a t i o n a l command i s destroyed or that some i s o l a t e d commanders would do so even without e x p l i c i t a u t h o r i t y . " 2 0 5 The ambiguity over command and r e l e a s e a u t h o r i t y of n u c l e a r weapons i n Europe i s a d i r e c t r e s u l t of the dual-key nature of the a u t h o r i t y to use them. The dual-key arrangements between the US, which c o n t r o l s the warheads, and the host country, which c o n t r o l s the l a u n c h e r s , are not p a r t of a u n i v e r s a l NATO process or program. Instead, they are b i l a t e r a l arrangements, and t h e i r c o n d i t i o n s are l a r g e l y 133 s e c r e t . T h i s presents the S o v i e t Union with the p o s s i b i l i t y that i n a p e r i o d of c r i s i s or war, command d e c e n t r a l i z a t i o n or d e l e g a t i o n of r e l e a s e a u t h o r i t y c o u l d p l a c e n u c l e a r weapons i n the hands of non-American NATO m i l i t a r y commanders. Such a s i t u a t i o n would c r e a t e an environment of even g r e a t e r u n c e r t a i n t y : "The intense u n c e r t a i n t y and lack of c l a r i t y that surrounds command mechanisms of the non-American members of NATO make i t v i r t u a l l y impossible to discount the chances of r e t a l i a t i o n , once NATO has gone on a l e r t . " 2 0 6 The ambiguity of over the command and c o n t r o l of nuclear weapons, and the r e s u l t i n g u n c e r t a i n t y over the l i k e l i h o o d of inadve r t e n t or a c c i d e n t a l nuclear r e l e a s e , c o n t r i b u t e s to deterrence i n Europe. I t i s another element of r i s k which must be c o n s i d e r e d by the So v i e t U n i o n . 2 0 7 As Donald M. Snow has observed, "The i n a b i l i t y to p r e d i c t the consquences [of an a t t a c k ] with any measure of conf i d e n c e becomes the great i n h i b a t o r y f a c t o r that serves to d e t e r . . . " 2 0 8 As Paul Bracken has p o i n t e d out i n somewhat gre a t e r d e t a i l : Complexity of decision-making c o n t r i b u t e s to det e r r e n c e because i t r a i s e s the r i s k that the m i l i t a r y aspects of a c r i s i s would get out of p o l i t i c a l c o n t r o l . Once nuc l e a r weapon d i s p e r s a l has o c c u r r e d , the f o r c e s of d e c e n t r a l i z a t i o n and d e l e g a t i o n and the ambiguity of command a u t h o r i t y make nucl e a r usage so u n p r e d i c t a b l e as to c r e a t e a t h r e a t that no a t t a c k e r can d i s c o u n t . 2 0 9 To b r i e f l y conclude, the r i s k of inadve r t e n t or a c c i d e n t a l nuclear e s c a l a t i o n cannot be dism i s s e d as e i t h e r u n l i k e l y or too i r r a t i o n a l to a s s e s s . For the S o v i e t Union, 134 the r i s k of provoking i n a d v e r t e n t or a c c i d e n t a l nuclear r e l e a s e by NATO f o r c e s i s very r e a l . Given the s i g n i f i c a n c e to S o v i e t r i s k assessment of the l i k e l i h o o d . of any e s c a l a t i o n to the nucl e a r l e v e l , S o v i e t planners are not l i k e l y to d i s m i s s the chances of a c c i d e n t or mistake l i g h t l y . Compound Deterrence; Present R e a l i t y and Future P o l i c y In t h e i r assessments of deterrence i n Europe, the l o g i c of US deplo y e r s and Euro - c o u p l e r s i s based on a c e n t r a l s u p p o s i t i o n . They b e l i e v e that i n a t t a c k i n g Western Europe, the S o v i e t s must evaluate and assess two elements of r i s k . F i r s t , that NATO w i l l not respond by e s c a l a t i n g to the nucle a r l e v e l , and second, that S o v i e t c o n v e n t i o n a l armies can def e a t those of NATO. A n a l y s t s and o f f i c i a l s from these p e r s p e c t i v e groupings emphasize NATO's c o n v e n t i o n a l weakness v i s - a - v i s the Warsaw Pact. As t h i s chapter has p o i n t e d out, t h i s i s not at a l l a gi v e n . For US deplo y e r s and Euro-c o u p l e r s , however, NATO's c o n v e n t i o n a l weakness means that d e t e r r e n c e i n Europe i s dependent on the s t r e n g t h and c r e d i b i l i t y of US nuclear f o r c e s i n Europe and t h e i r l i n k a g e to the US s t r a t e g i c a r s e n a l . In t h i s c o n c e p t i o n , US nuclear f o r c e s i n E u r o p e — a n d e s p e c i a l l y I N F - - c o n s t i t u t e the c e n t r a l r i s k element and thus the b a s i s of str o n g , robust deterrence i n Europe. However, as the pr e v i o u s d i s c u s s i o n has demonstrated, de t e r r e n c e i n Europe i s f u n c t i o n of much more than j u s t the 1 3 5 r i s k of e s c a l a t i o n by US nuclear f o r c e s . S o v i e t warplanners must a l s o c o n s i d e r the r i s k of d e l i b e r a t e nuclear e s c a l a t i o n by France and Great B r i t a i n , as w e l l as the r i s k of nuclear e s c a l a t i o n through a c c i d e n t a l or i n a d v e r t e n t r e l e a s e . T h e r e f o r e , S o v i e t l e a d e r s must make f i v e assessments about f i v e independent, autonomous elements.of r i s k . In such an environment, US n u c l e a r f o r c e s are no longer the only, or even the most important, d e t e r r e n t element in Europe. What must be recognised by western p o l i c y makers i s that d e t e r r e n c e i n Europe i s compound in nature, and as a r e s u l t US n u c l e a r f o r c e s deployed i n Europe are l e s s c e n t r a l to d e t e r r e n c e of war i n Europe than has p r e v i o u s l y been assumed. O f f i c i a l s and a n a l y s t s must become much more cognizant of the i n c r e a s i n g s t r e n g t h and v i a b i l i t y of the French and B r i t i s h n u c l e a r a r s e n a l s , and of the very r e a l r i s k of i n a d v e r t e n t or a c c i d e n t a l n u c l e a r e s c a l a t i o n . I t i s important that they recognize as w e l l that the c o n v e n t i o n a l defence of Western Europe i s not the hopeless task that many c l a i m i t to be. As David P. C a l l e o has observed, "...American s t r a t e g i c t h i n k i n g never has focussed on the p o s i t i v e p o s s i b i l i t i e s and i m p l i c a t i o n s of m u l t i p l e d e t e r r e n c e . " 2 1 0 The removal of INF from Europe i s not the m i l i t a r y or s t r a t e g i c d i s a s t e r that US d e p l o y e r s or .Euro-couplers make i t out to be. The other r i s k elements in Europe are more than capable of a s s u r i n g 'robust' d e t e r r e n c e i n Europe, and the e f f e c t i v e n e s s of the remaining US n u c l e a r f o r c e s 1 3 6 deployed i n Europe i s in f a c t complemented by the French and B r i t i s h a r s e n a l . David C a l l e o has argued t h a t : "A m u l t i p l i c i t y of n a t i o n a l d e t e r r e n t s ... can augment the e f f e c t i v e n e s s of a general extended d e t e r r e n t because two or more r e t a l i a t o r y t r i g g e r s add g r e a t l y to the u n c e r t a i n t y or complexity of the r i s k faced by any would be a g g r e s s o r . " 2 1 1 David C a l l e o goes on to argue that the S o v i e t l e a d e r s h i p , even i f i t d e s i r e s war, i s u n l i k e l y to r i s k a ggression i n Europe unless i t b e l i e v e s that i t i s l i k e l y the USSR w i l l escape s e r i o u s damage. As he p o i n t s out: ...they would be f a r l e s s l i k e l y to reach such a c o n c l u s i o n i f faced by an a r r a y of indigenous and secure European d e t e r r e n t s , supported' by an American guarantee, r a t h e r than only a devalued American promise to s a c r i f i c e i t s e l f f o r Western E u r o p e . 2 1 2 Indeed, the INF agreement may i n f a c t strengthen compound deterr e n c e i n Europe, as i t removes p o t e n t i a l l y d e s t a b i l i z i n g and expensive weapons systems from an otherwise b e t t e r balanced compound deterrence r e l a t i o n s h i p between remaining US nuclear f o r c e s and the independent Anglo-French a r s e n a l s . P a r a d o x i c a l l y , removing the GLCM and Pershing II systems may i n f a c t weaken the o v e r a l l d e t e r r e n t in Europe, as the p o t e n t i a l r i s k of i n a d v e r t e n t nuclear r e l e a s e would d e c l i n e . I t i s i n h e r e n t l y p r e f e r a b l e , however, that the Western nuclear d e t e r r e n t e f f e c t i s achieved by s u r v i v a b l e n u c l e a r systems under f i r m negative c o n t r o l . The s t r o n g e s t p o t e n t i a l argument a g a i n s t g r e a t e r r e l i a n c e on the French and B r i t i s h a r s e n a l s f o r deterrence 1 3 7 i n Europe i s that i t p l a c e s g r e a t e r emphasis on the nuclear f o r c e s of n a t i o n s which might be more di s p o s e d to f i r i n g them i n war or c r i s i s . However, to argue that B r i t a i n or France would be more l i k e l y to i n i t i a t e n uclear h o s t i l i t i e s i r r e s p o n s i b l y or h y s t e r i c a l l y than the superpowers i s dubious at best. The superpowers can c o n c e i v a b l y deceive themselves i n t o b e l i e v i n g they can preserve some l e v e l of n a t i o n a l s u r v i v a l a f t e r a nuclear exchange. Some US and S o v i e t s t r a t e g i s t s may even b e l i e v e that d i s c r i m i n a t i n g s t r i k e s are f e a s i b l e . However, the European n a t i o n s cannot e n t e r t a i n such i l l u s i o n s . France and Great B r i t a i n know that they would be destroyed i n the event of a nuclear war. No European n a t i o n can underestimate the n a t i o n a l i m p l i c a t i o n s of even a ' l i m i t e d ' n u c l e a r war, nor hope to win i t . In s h o r t , the European n a t i o n s should be regarded as safe guardians of nuclear weapons. Deterrence i n Europe should be seen as the f u n c t i o n of a number of independent, autonomous elements of r i s k . A l l of these r i s k f a c t o r s must be c o n s i d e r e d i n any a c c u r a t e e v a l u a t i o n of the s t r e n g t h of d e t e r r e n c e i n Europe. Risk f a c t o r s should not be viewed as d e t e r r e n t a l t e r n a t i v e s . Instead, they should be thought of as d e t e r r e n t complements. Deterrence i n Europe i s , t h e r e f o r e , not a f u n c t i o n of the s t r e n g t h or c r e d i b i l i t y of one, or perhaps two, elements of r i s k . Rather, d e t e r r e n c e i n Europe i s a f u n c t i o n of m u l t i p l e , independent compound r i s k elements. An h e u r i s t i c expansion of t h i s argument i s p r o v i d e d i n Appendix I. 138 CHAPTER V: CASHING IN THE BARGAINING CHIP B a r r i n g a s i g n i f i c a n t downturn i n U S - S o v i e t r e l a t i o n s , the INF t r e a t y s i g n e d on December 8, 1987 w i l l c l o s e the INF c i r c l e . The P e r s h i n g I I and GLCMs, d e p l o y e d a t g r e a t p o l i t i c a l c o s t amidst t u r m o i l and c o n t r o v e r s y , w i l l be withdrawn, a l o n g w i t h comparable S o v i e t systems. The superpowers have e x t o l l e d the v i r t u e s of the new p a c t , the f i r s t i n h i s t o r y which e l i m i n a t e s an e n t i r e c l a s s of n u c l e a r systems. However, the removal of INF from Europe has reopened debate over the same s t r a t e g i c and d o c t r i n a l dilemmas t h a t sparked the INF c o n t r o v e r s y of the e a r l y 1980s. The same c o n t e n t i o u s i s s u e s so t e n u o u s l y " r e s o l v e d " by INF deployment have now r e s u r f a c e d , and NATO i s once a g a i n f a c e d w i t h the p r o s p e c t of t r y i n g t o manage i t s n u c l e a r p o l i c y . T h i s t i m e , however, t h e r e i s a new c o n s t r a i n t ; t h e r e s t r i c t i o n s imposed by the INF t r e a t y . The removal of the P e r s h i n g I I and C r u i s e m i s s i l e s has re-opened the s t r a t e g i c debate over extended d e t e r r e n c e and the s t r e n g t h of the s e c u r i t y l i n k between the US and Europe. A l t h o u g h the SS-20 m i s s i l e s a r e a l s o t o be withd r a w n , i n the view of the m a j o r i t y of western a n a l y s t s and d e c i s i o n makers NATO remains v u l n e r a b l e t o i t s pre-deployment s t r a t e g i c dilemmas. 1 39 The Terms The p r o v i s i o n s of the INF t r e a t y c a l l f o r the e l i m i n a t i o n w i t h i n three years of a l l ground-launched m i s s i l e s with ranges between 1,000 and 5,500 k i l o m e t e r s . T h i s p r o v i s i o n covers the US Pershing II and the GLCM, as w e l l as the S o v i e t SS-4, SS-5, SS-20, and SSCX-4 m i s s i l e s . In a d d i t i o n , w i t h i n 18 months m i s s i l e s with ranges between 500 and 1000 k i l o m e t e r s w i l l be e l i m i n a t e d . T h i s p r o v i s i o n covers Pershing 1a and the S o v i e t SS-12 and SS-23. The t r e a t y w i l l t h e r e f o r e e l i m i n a t e 859 US m i s s i l e s , with 429 deployed warheads, and 1,836 S o v i e t m i s s i l e s , with 1,667 warheads, many of which are o l d e r , o b s o l e t e systems. Not e x p l i c i t l y mentioned i n the t r e a t y are the West German Pershing 1as. The US warheads earmarked f o r these systems are to be removed, and the West German government has a l r e a d y announced i t s i n t e n t i o n to r e t i r e the aging m i s s i l e s . 2 1 3 The t r e a t y a l s o p r o v i d e s ( i n great d e t a i l ) f o r the p h y s i c a l d e s t r u c t i o n of the weapons systems covered by the agreement, e i t h e r by launch or by l i t e r a l l y c u t t i n g them i n t o p i e c e s . A l s o r e s t r i c t e d i s f l i g h t t e s t i n g of any new m i s s i l e s with ranges between the 500 and 5,500 kilometer l i m i t . E x t e n s i v e v e r i f i c a t i o n measures are i n c l u d e d i n the agreement, most notabl y the o n - s i t e i n s p e c t i o n p r o v i s i o n s , which cover pre-designated s i t e s and s h o r t - n o t i c e i n s p e c t i o n s . I n s p e c t i o n teams are per m i t t e d to v i s i t pre-140 designated s i t e s to v e r i f y weapon numbers, the d e s t r u c t i o n of the m i s s i l e s , and the r a z i n g of s i t e f a c i l i t i e s . One team of i n s p e c t o r s s h a l l r e s i d e i n the o t h e r ' s country f o r 13 years at one manufacturing f a c i l i t y to guarantee that no i l l e g a l m i s s i l e s are being b u i l t . 2 1 " S h o r t - n o t i c e i n s p e c t i o n s are a l s o i n c l u d e d , a l l o w i n g an i n s p e c t i o n team to search one of 20 pre-designated s i t e s . The host country i s o b l i g e d to t r a n s p o r t the team to the chosen s i t e w i t h i n nine hours. These s h o r t - n o t i c e i n s p e c t i o n s are r e s t r i c t e d to f i f t e e n f o r the f i v e years a f t e r the e l i m i n a t i o n d e a d l i n e of three years, and ten i n s p e c t i o n s per year are allowed in the f i v e years f o l l o w i n g . Although i t i s not the purpose here to go i n t o d e t a i l about the impetus behind the INF agreement i n the US and the USSR, some key p o i n t s are worthy of mention. For the USSR, the INF agreement removes NATO's Europe-based d e c a p i t a t i o n -capable n u c l e a r f o r c e s . The Pershing II (with i t s short f l i g h t time and high accuracy) and the c r u i s e m i s s i l e (which c o u l d f l y under radar) were systems of great concern to the USSR. F u r t h e r , although the USSR does give up a d i s p r o p o r t i o n a t e number of both launchers and warheads, the INF d e a l s t i l l l eaves the USSR with a powerful b a t t l e f i e l d n u c l e a r c a p a c i t y , t o t a l l i n g some 2000 warheads, based on SS-21, SS-22, SCUD and FROG launchers, with another 5000 warheads i n s t o c k p i l e . 2 1 5 S e v e r a l e x p l a n a t i o n s have been advanced to account f o r S o v i e t acceptance of the INF d e a l . An INF agreement would be 141 a major p o l i t i c a l success f o r Gorbachev both i n terms of the S o v i e t Union's image in the West, an evident concern of Gorbachev, and f o r h i s p o s i t i o n v i s - a - v i s any c r i t i c s i n the P o l i t b u r o . P r i o r to the INF n e g o t i a t i o n s Gorbachev had s t i l l not achieved a major f o r e i g n p o l i c y success with the United S t a t e s . A f t e r the c o l l a p s e of the Reykyavik summit, a f o r e i g n p o l i c y success was even more im p e r a t i v e . The achievement of an accord with an anti-arms c o n t r o l a d m i n i s t r a t i o n would s u r e l y win i n t e r n a t i o n a l p u b l i c support but more importantly d e f l e c t c r i t i c i s m of h i s reform programs from w i t h i n the S o v i e t l e a d e r s h i p . F u r t h e r , a r e l a x a t i o n of the East-West atmosphere would enable Gorbachev to devote more p o l i t i c a l and economic resources to r e v i t a l i z i n g the S o v i e t economy. In the US, the impetus to reach an "agreement was l a r g e l y p o l i t i c a l . For the Reagan A d m i n i s t r a t i o n , an INF agreement would b r i n g a badly needed p o l i t i c a l boost. The A d m i n i s t r a t i o n ' s p o p u l a r i t y - - r e f l e c t e d l a r g e l y i n the p e r s o n a l p o p u l a r i t y of Reagan h i m s e l f — w a s at i t s lowest p o i n t s i n c e the A d m i n i s t r a t i o n took o f f i c e . The Iran-Contra scandal had s e r i o u s l y damaged both p u b l i c c o n f i d e n c e i n the White House and the A d m i n i s t r a t i o n ' s a b i l i t y to muster support f o r other items on i t s agenda i n Congress. An INF agreement would r e s t o r e both p u b l i c and c o n g r e s s i o n a l c o n f i d e n c e . The p r o s p e c t i v e achievement of an INF accord enjoyed wide p u b l i c support, and Congress was a l s o l a r g e l y amenable to an agreement, with the e x c e p t i o n , i r o n i c a l l y , of 142 o p p o s i t i o n from c o n s e r v a t i v e s e n a t o r s . If the A d m i n i s t r a t i o n was to have any success i n i t s f i n a l year i n o f f i c e , the damage of the Iran-Contra a f f a i r had to be d i m i n i s h e d . An arms c o n t r o l agreement with the So v i e t Union appealed to both c r i t i c s and supporters of the a d m i n i s t r a t i o n i n the p u b l i c , and h e l d b i p a r t i s a n support i n Congress as w e l l . I t would be a badly needed p o l i t i c a l w i n d f a l l f o r the a d m i n i s t r a t i o n . P r e s i d e n t Reagan's much vaunted d e s i r e to go down i n h i s t o r y as a peacemaker may a l s o have had i n f l u e n c e on the US warming to an accord. Even the Pentagon, d e s p i t e i t s d i s a p p r o v a l of the INF d e a l , c o u l d f i n d a b r i g h t spot. An INF d e a l leaves the f o r c e s t r u c t u r e i n Europe i d e a l f o r j u s t i f y i n g a wide range of new weapons development programs, e s p e c i a l l y the W79 and W82 a r t i l l e r y s h e l l s , the Advanced T a c t i c a l M i s s i l e System (ATACMS), the Lance m i s s i l e system modernization, and new A i r - S u r f a c e M i s s i l e (ASM) p r o g r a m s . 2 1 6 Regardless of the pr e s s u r e s f a v o u r i n g an INF d e a l , the accord drew heavy c r i t i c i s m , p a r t i c u l a r l y among d e p l o y e r s and some ba l a n c e r s i n the US, where a l i v e l y Senate r a t i f i c a t i o n debate took p l a c e , and amongst c o u p l e r s i n Europe. These p e r s p e c t i v e groupings have re f u s e d to recog n i z e the new nature of deterr e n c e i n Europe and c l i n g to o l d assumptions and p r a c t i c e s . The accord a l s o reopened key areas of the i n t r a - A l l i a n c e d i s p u t e over n u c l e a r d o c t r i n e s and and f o r c e p o s t u r e . 1 4 3 O p p o s i t i o n i n the US The p r o v i s i o n s of the INF t r e a t y , both before and a f t e r i t was signed, came under heavy f i r e from dep l o y e r s and many c o n s e r v a t i v e balancers i n the US. NATO s t r a t e g y , they argued, would be s e v e r e l y c r i p p l e d by the withdrawal of the c r u i s e and Pershing II m i s s i l e s . F l e x i b l e Response, dependent on the e s c a l a t o r y t h r e a t of t h e a t r e nuclear systems f o r i t s l i n k a g e to the US s t r a t e g i c a r s e n a l , would no longer be c o n s i d e r e d a c r e d i b l e s t r a t e g y . An INF agreement would leave a " . . . l a r g e gap i n the c a p a b i l i t y f o r f l e x i b l e response. " 2 1 7 Donald R. C o t t e r argued that an accord would " . . . r e s u l t i n the l o s s of the 'mid l e v e l e s c a l a t o r y p o t e n t i a l ' of I N F . " 2 1 8 I t was not only the adverse m i l i t a r y i m p l i c a t i o n s of any INF d e a l which prompted c r i t i c i s m . There would be, dep l o y e r s and c o n s e r v a t i v e b a l a n c e r s argued, a negative p o l i t i c a l impact as w e l l : What the Un i t e d S t a t e s and i t s European a l l i e s face i n the wake of the pending INF r e d u c t i o n s w i l l be dangerous i n s t a b i l i t i e s not only i n the s t r a t e g i c - m i l i t a r y context of deterr e n c e and defence i n Europe, but i n the p o l i t i c a l p s y c h o l o g i c a l dimensions as w e l l . 2 1 9 Another key area of c o n s e r v a t i v e o p p o s i t i o n centered around the v e r i f i c a t i o n measures to be i n c l u d e d i n the t r e a t y . James Hackett of the H e r i t a g e Foundation n e a t l y summed up the US deployer and c o n s e r v a t i v e balancer p o s i t i o n : "The a d m i n i s t r a t i o n i s proposing v e r i f i c a t i o n arrangements which do not guarantee that the S o v i e t s won't 1 4 4 c h e a t . " 2 2 0 Senator O r r i n Hatch (Rep-Utah) was more d i p l o m a t i c but no l e s s i n s i s t e n t on the inadequacy of the v e r i f i c a t i o n procedures: "I t h i n k the a d m i n i s t r a t i o n ' s p r o p o s a l s w i l l prompt a hue and c r y f o r stronger v e r i f i c a t i o n m e a s u r e s . " 2 2 1 More s p e c i f i c c r i t i c i s m s of the v e r i f i c a t i o n process centered around the i n s p e c t i o n p r o v i s i o n s . R i c h a r d P e r l e r a i s e d concerns over the lack of measures p e r m i t t i n g s h o r t - n o t i c e i n s p e c t i o n s anywhere in the USSR. 2 2 2 Ambassador Edward Rowny, S p e c i a l A d v i s o r to Ronald Reagan and S e c r e t a r y of S t a t e on arms c o n t r o l , q u e s t i o n e d the a b i l i t y of the US under the t r e a t y to v e r i f y mobile m i s s i l e s . 2 2 3 F i n a l l y , the s i m i l a r i t y of the SS-20 to the f i r s t two stages of the SS-25 r a i s e d o b j e c t i o n s over the a b i l i t y of the USSR to circumvent the p r o v i s i o n s of the t r e a t y . 2 2 " Where the c r i t i c i s m of US deployers and c o n s e r v a t i v e b a l a n c e r s was most i n t e n s e was over the a l l e g e d advantages that the INF accord p r o v i d e d to the S o v i e t Union. Donald R. C o t t e r warned that the INF agreement would "...mark a t r i u m p h - - p o t e n t i a l l y a d e c i s i v e one--of S o v i e t S t r a t e g y i n E u r o p e . " 2 2 5 The INF d e a l would enhance the p e r c e i v e d S o v i e t c o n v e n t i o n a l s u p e r i o r i t y i n Europe by weakening the n u c l e a r l e g of the F l e x i b l e Response s t r a t e g y . In a d d i t i o n , a pact would leave the USSR with b a t t l e f i e l d n u c l e a r preponderance i n Europe. S o v i e t short-range systems c o u l d s t r i k e at t a r g e t s i n Western Europe from Pact t e r r i t o r y or behind advancing Pact f o r c e s , while the T r e a t y e l i m i n a t e s those US 1 4 5 systems capable of s t r i k i n g at S o v i e t t e r r i t o r y i n r e t u r n . For US deployers and c o n s e r v a t i v e b a l a n c e r s , an INF d e a l would "...accentuate the nuc l e a r imbalance i n E u r o p e , " 2 2 6 and i s the f i r s t step toward a d e - n u c l e a r i z e d Europe, a "...longtime S o v i e t o b j e c t i v e . " 2 2 7 A f i n a l concern of c o n s e r v a t i v e s i n the US i s the recent swing of US p o l i c y i n the d i r e c t i o n of arms c o n t r o l . Gorbachev i s seen as s k i l l f u l l y p l a y i n g on the need of the Reagan a d m i n i s t r a t i o n f o r an arms c o n t r o l agreement to salvage p o l i t i c a l c r e d i b i l i t y . In the process, he i s s e c u r i n g a d e a l favourable to the USSR. The INF agreement i s not seen as a complete d i s a s t e r , because, as Eugene Rostow has noted: "The West s t i l l has l o t s of nuc l e a r weapons i n Europe, has l o t s of nuc l e a r o p t i o n s i n i t s s t r a t e g i c f o r c e s , and that b a s t i o n of c r e d i b i l i t y - - A m e r i c a n troops i n the heart of Europ e - - i s s t i l l t h e r e . " 2 2 8 However, others such as James Thomson cau t i o n e d that without Western care and c a u t i o n , an INF d e a l would "...become a d i s a s t e r , weakening or d e s t r o y i n g the Western c o a l i t i o n s , l e a d i n g a number of important i n d u s t r i a l c o u n t r i e s to become n e u t r a l or go nuc l e a r and l e a v i n g America i s o l a t e d i n a c o l d c l i m a t e . " 2 2 9 US deplo y e r s and ba l a n c e r s are worried that the West i s "...on the road to the d e - n u c l e a r i z a t i o n of Europe through p r o g r e s s i v e zero o p t i o n s . " 2 3 0 US deplo y e r s and b a l a n c e r s are i n c r e a s i n g l y worried that arms c o n t r o l has come to dominate s e c u r i t y p o l i c y , r a t h e r than being a component of i t . Arms 146 c o n t r o l , c o n s e r v a t i v e s charge, has f a i l e d to address the t h r e a t — n a m e l y , the c o n v e n t i o n a l f o r c e preponderance of the USSR—which d i c t a t e s the n e c e s s i t y of NATO's nucl e a r requirement. The S o v i e t arms c o n t r o l i n i t i a t i v e s and concessions on INF are p a r t of a c a l c u l a t e d S o v i e t p o l i c y . Eugene Rostow a s s e r t s t h a t "The S o v i e t Union i s c o u n t i n g on the West to r e l a x i n the glow of an INF a g r e e m e n t . " 2 3 1 For US d e p l o y e r s and many b a l a n c e r s , the INF agreement repr e s e n t s the a b s o l u t e l i m i t to which the West should.move on arms c o n t r o l . R i c h a r d P e r l e , f o r example, s t a t e d a f t e r the t r e a t y was signed t h a t : "This i s a t r a i n t h a t has reached the end of the l i n e . T h i s i s the end of the p r o d u c t i v e p o t e n t i a l f o r nuclear arms c o n t r o l i n E u r o p e . " 2 3 2 Supporters of the t r e a t y were impatient with c o n s e r v a t i v e c r i t i c i s m of the accord and t h e i r o p p o s i t i o n to i t i n Senate. US arms c o n t r o l l e r s and more moderate bal a n c e r s have argued that the t r e a t y t r a d e d some 400 US warheads f o r over 1,600 S o v i e t warheads, and with l i t t l e m i l i t a r y l o s s on the p a r t of NATO. The c o u p l e r argument, f o r t r e a t y s u p p o r t e r s , i s an i r r a t i o n a l one. Any damage done to the European d e t e r r e n t through the l o s s of the US INF systems, they argue, i s more than made up f o r by the B r i t i s h and French nuclear d e t e r r e n t s . Others p o i n t out that the n e g o t i a t i o n s have seen numerous S o v i e t c o n c e s s i o n s , among them the acceptance of a worldwide ban, the dropping of demands f o r r e d u c t i o n s i n nuclear capable a i r c r a f t , the dropping of demands f o r the i n c l u s i o n of French and B r i t i s h 147 warheads, and the acceptance of o n - s i t e v e r i f i c a t i o n . 2 3 3 The O p p o s i t i o n and Senate R a t i f i c a t i o n With Senate r a t i f i c a t i o n of the INF t r e a t y v i r t u a l l y assured by both p u b l i c sentiment and Reagan's endorsement, the q u e s t i o n was not the Senate would r a t i f y the t r e a t y , but whether the h a r d l i n e r s would attempt to use the INF debate to secure support f o r other s t r a t e g i c i s s u e s on t h e i r agenda, and whether they would succeed i n a t t a c h i n g s i g n i f i c a n t r e v i s i o n s onto the agreement. The campaign a g a i n s t the INF t r e a t y was l e d by Senator Jesse Helms (Rep-NC) who pressed f o r r e v i s i o n s to the accord to r e p a i r what he termed " s i g n i f i c a n t d e f e c t s and l o o p h o l e s " . 2 3 * Senator Dan Quayle (Rep-Ind) argued that v e r i f y i n g a m i s s i l e ' s range f o r t r e a t y purposes cannot be determined by a n a l y z i n g a f l i g h t t e s t . Quayle a l s o wanted to ensure that the v e r i f i c a t i o n procedures c o n t a i n e d i n the accord were not c o n s i d e r e d a precedent f o r f u t u r e arms c o n t r o l a g r e e m e n t s . 2 3 5 Other c r i t i c s , such as Malcom Wallop (Rep-Wyo), argued that the t e c h n i c a l data s u p p l i e d by the S o v i e t s was incomplete or i n c o n s i s t e n t . US d e p l o y e r s o u t s i d e the r a t i f i c a t i o n process urged the Senate to "...not c o n s i d e r r a t i f y i n g the INF t r e a t y u n t i l s a t i s f a c t o r y agreements are reached on the other ... elements of the nuc l e a r b a l a n c e . 2 3 6 For the US d e p l o y e r s and other h a r d - l i n e c r i t i c s , the INF debate was an o p p o r t u n i t y to promote t h e i r views. C o n s e r v a t i v e senators l i k e Jesse Helms, Dan Quayle 148 and Malcom Wallop, fo r example, made i t c l e a r d u r i n g Senate debate on INF that they would i n s i s t on s e t t i n g s p e c i f i c s e t s of c o n d i t i o n s which must be met before any START agreement was r a t i f i e d . Alan Cranston, the m a j o r i t y Whip, expected these c o n s e r v a t i v e senators—whom he c a l l e d " r a d i c a l r i g h t wing e x t r e m i s t s " 2 3 7 — t o attempt to undermine any f u t u r e START deal by p r o l o n g i n g the INF debate. The INF Treaty enjoys the support of mainstream arms c o n t r o l l e r s i n the Senate, such as Alan Cranston, and of most b a l a n c e r s , such as Ted Stevens of Alaska and R i c h a r d G. Logan of Indiana. US c o n v e n t i o n a l d e t e r r e r s / d e f e n d e r s such as Sam Nunn (Dem-Ga) who have had some m i s g i v i n g s about the accord supported i t i n the i n t e r e s t s of NATO. Outside the Senate, US coupler b a l a n c e r s such as Henry K i s s i n g e r endorsed the Treaty "...not because I see any merit i n i t , but because I t h i n k the damage of not r a t i f y i n g i t would be g r e a t e r . " 2 3 8 The T r e a t y a l s o had the support of o f f i c i a l s of the Reagan A d m i n i s t r a t i o n , e s p e c i a l l y a f t e r h a r d - l i n e deployers in the a d m i n i s t r a t i o n , such as R i c h a r d P e r l e , had l e f t p u b l i c o f f i c e . 2 3 9 The problem f o r c o n s e r v a t i v e o p p o s i t i o n to the t r e a t y was that they were caught in a d i f f i c u l t p o l i t i c a l p o s i t i o n . F i r s t , they were going a g a i n s t p u b l i c o p i n i o n which l a r g e l y favoured the accord, and second, they were a t t a c k i n g P r e s i d e n t Reagan for being too s o f t on matters of s e c u r i t y . US d e p l o y e r s were not the only c r i t i c s of the accord, 149 however. In Europe, the response from Eu r o - c o u p l e r s was e q u a l l y n e g a t i v e . European O p p o s i t i o n and the R e v i v a l of European Angst O p p o s i t i o n from Euro-couplers to the INF accord was s w i f t . E u r o - c o u p l e r s saw the removal of the C r u i s e and Pershing II as the de f a c t o d e - l i n k i n g of Europe from the US s t r a t e g i c nuclear guarantee and the beginning of US retrenchment. Franz Joseph S t r a u s s , former West German Defence M i n i s t e r and P r e s i d e n t of Bavaria a s s e r t e d that the INF agreement "...means the de c o u p l i n g of America from E u r o p e . " 2 " 0 V o l k e r Ruhe, a c o n s e r v a t i v e deputy p a r l i a m e n t a r y l e a d e r , summed up Euro-coupler concerns over the. p o s s i b i l i t y of f u r t h e r US withdrawals when he s t a t e d that " I f there were a withdrawal of [US] troops on top of [the p e r c e i v e d t r e n d toward d e - n u c l e a r i z a t i o n ] , i t would r e a l l y be d i s a s t r o u s and give the wrong s i g n a l s " . 2 " 1 For E u r o - c o u p l e r s , the INF agreement p l a c e d pressure d i r e c t l y on the key weakness of NATO's m i l i t a r y p o s t u r e - - i t s c o n v e n t i o n a l f o r c e s . As Volker Ruhe argued, "No one can conceive of c o n v e n t i o n a l deterrence a l o n e . " 2 " 2 A l f r e d B i e h l e , of the c o n s e r v a t i v e C h r i s t i a n S o c i a l Union, c r i t i c i s e d the d e a l as an accord which i n c r e a s e d Germany's exposure to c o n v e n t i o n a l f o r c e s and short-range nuclear weapons. 2" 3 E u r o - c o u p l e r s , t r a d i t i o n a l supporters of US and NATO p o l i c y and longtime advocates of A l l i a n c e u n i t y ( e s p e c i a l l y between the US and Europe) expressed doubts about the 150 r a t i o n a l i t y of the US p o s i t i o n on the INF t r e a t y . The v o i c e of West German c o n s e r v a t i s m , ( F r a n k f u r t e r Allgemeine Zeitung) , c a l l e d f o r West European o p p o s i t i o n to an INF agreement and c r i t i c i s e d the arms c o n t r o l postures of the superpowers, "...whose p o s i t i o n s are so o f t e n m e r c u r i a l and determined by domestic p o l i t i c a l c o n s i d e r a t i o n s . " 2 4 4 Some Eu r o - c o u p l e r s , however, d i d c r i t i c i z e the d e c o u p l i n g argument. Lord C a r r i n g t o n a s s e r t e d t h a t : The t a n g i b l e m a n i f e s t a t i o n of the American commitment to the defence of Europe i s not i n the t h e a t e r m i s s i l e s , but the presence of 326,000 in p l a c e troops and t h e i r dependents. F l e s h and blood count f o r more than a b s t r a c t d e t e r r e n t c o n c e p t s . 2 4 5 In the same breath, however, he warned Europeans a g a i n s t f e e l i n g s of 'euphoria' over the INF accord. In West Germany, the INF agreement c r e a t e d unique problems f o r the Kohl government. To begin with, the government was s p l i t between two f a c t i o n s ; those f a v o u r i n g the INF d e a l ( l e d by F o r e i g n M i n i s t e r H a n s - D i e t r i c h Genscher) and those opposed (such as former Defence M i n i s t e r Manfred Woerner) who r e j e c t e d the d e a l f o r m i l i t a r y reasons. C h a n c e l l o r Kohl i s t h e r e f o r e caught between the Euro-n e g o t i a t o r s i n h i s government and broad p u b l i c support f o r the t r e a t y and the need to s a t i s f y West German c o u p l e r s that the US s t r a t e g i c guarantee i s s t i l l i n t a c t , and that West Germany w i l l not be exposed to c o n v e n t i o n a l or short-range n u c l e a r war. Such assurances were d i f f i c u l t to g i v e , however, i n the face of the pending withdrawal of a l l US t h e a t r e - r a n g e m i s s i l e s . 151 In an attempt to work out a compromise agreement, Bonn favoured a d e a l p e r m i t t i n g deployment of shorter-range intermediate n u c l e a r f o r c e s (with a range of 500-1000 km). However, while the West German government sought only permission to deploy such systems, the US made i t c l e a r that under such circumstances i t would i n s i s t on d e p l o y i n g such s y s t e m s . 2 " 6 Such a d e a l would reopen the European nuclear debate, a p o t e n t i a l p o l i t i c a l storm Kohl had no d e s i r e to provoke a g a i n . A "zero d e a l " on intermediate-range m i s s i l e s , however, would leave behind only those weapons capable of f i g h t i n g a n u c l e a r war e x c l u s i v e l y i n West German t e r r i t o r y . Bonn was thus faced with the p o l i t i c a l l y awkward s i t u a t i o n of q u e s t i o n i n g the wisdom of the US i n s i g n i n g such a d e a l , while t r y i n g to organize European o p p o s i t i o n to i t . Attempting to do so with p u b l i c o p i n i o n , the US a d m i n i s t r a t i o n , and the m a j o r i t y of European parliaments i n favour of the accord was v i r t u a l l y impossible p o l i t i c a l l y . West Germany's l a s t p o t e n t i a l means of r e t a i n i n g even a token t h e a t r e - c a p a b l e m i s s i l e f o r c e i n Europe was removed when the Kohl government announced on August 26 that West Germany d i d not i n t e n d to modernize i t s aging Pershing Is and that these systems would s h o r t l y be withdrawn. T h i s d e c i s i o n e l i m i n a t e d one of the l a s t o b s t a c l e s i n the path of an INF d e a l which was h a r d l y favourable to West German i n t e r e s t s . D e s p i t e o p p o s i t i o n to withdrawing the Pershing I s , C h a n c e l l o r Kohl managed at l e a s t to gain p o l i t i c a l p r a i s e f o r what was an i n e v i t a b l e d e c i s i o n anyway. The West 1 52 German government was not prepared to f i g h t the domestic p o l i t i c a l b a t t l e over modernization, and i t was not w i l l i n g to r i s k almost c e r t a i n US and S o v i e t anger over d e r a i l i n g a p o t e n t i a l INF accord. In the end, even h a r d - l i n e c r i t i c s such as Manfred Woerner endorsed the agreement. Germany's p o l i t i c a l p o s i t i o n was too s e n s i t i v e to make l a r g e p o l t i c a l waves. -With the INF agreement, the s t r a t e g i c s i t u a t i o n as many Europeans see i t has come f u l l c i r c l e , and the same s t r a t e g i c and p o l i t i c a l a n x i e t i e s of a decade ago are m a n i f e s t i n g themselves once a g a i n . Foremost among these, i s a renewed d e s i r e on the p a r t of many Europeans f o r reassurance of continued US commitment. The fear of abandonment—a consequence of p a r i t y - - w h i c h was t e m p o r a r i l y q u e l l e d by the INF deployment has s u r f a c e d once again. A n x i e t y over the p e r c e i v e d c o n v e n t i o n a l f o r c e d i s p a r i t y between NATO and the Warsaw Pact remains, as does the r e a l i t y of s t r a t e g i c n u c l e a r p a r i t y . The short-range n u c l e a r systems i n Europe, though numerous, are not seen as a c r e d i b l e d e t e r r e n t to Warsaw Pact i n v a s i o n or as adequate s t r a t e g i c " c o u p l e r s " . T h e i r range r e s t r i c t s t h e i r use p r i m a r i l y to West German t e r r i t o r y . As a r e s u l t , they p r o v i d e no t h r e a t to m i l i t a r y t a r g e t s i n the USSR and pr o v i d e no reassurance to West Europeans that d e t e r r e n c e through the t h r e a t of e s c a l a t i o n i s v i a b l e . With such systems, the So v i e t Union i s not h e l d at r i s k from US m i s s i l e s based i n Europe. S c a r c e l y a decade be f o r e , t h i s s t r a t e g i c c o n d i t i o n had prompted the p o l i t i c a l 153 momentum f o r an A l l i e d response to r e s t o r e the s t r a t e g i c foundation of Western s t r a t e g i c p o l i c y . Some a n a l y s t s have argued that the 320,000 US troops i n Europe are a t a n g i b l e e x p r e s s i o n of the US commitment to European s e c u r i t y , and that a n u c l e a r commitment i s n e i t h e r a p o l i t i c a l nor m i l i t a r y n e c e s s i t y . However, the US troop presence i n Europe was not judged a s u f f i c i e n t presence i n debate l e a d i n g up to the deployment of INF. I t i s hard to see how sentiments would be d i f f e r e n t i n post-INF Europe, e s p e c i a l l y i f superpower r e l a t i o n s begin to d e t e r i o r a t e . The B a t t l e f i e l d Nuclear M o d e r n i z a t i o n Debate The importance of b a t t l e f i e l d n uclear weapons became apparent as the INF n e g o t i a t i o n s began and progress was made. Conventional f o r c e improvements to compensate f o r the l o s s of INF were dism i s s e d as i m p r a c t i c a l . T h i s sentiment was t y p i c a l of a n a l y s t s and o f f i c i a l s i n s i d e and o u t s i d e the A l l i a n c e decision-making p r o c e s s . "NATO c o n v e n t i o n a l modernization...cannot be expected to f i l l the gaps i n the A l l i a n c e ' s d e t e r r e n t and defence posture consequent to an INF agreement..." 2" 7 As a r e s u l t , NATO o f f i c i a l s once again reached f o r the t r a d i t i o n a l d e t e r r e n t c r u t c h i n Europe, US nuclear weapons. As e a r l y as 1983, the NATO M i n i s t e r s l a i d the foundation f o r the modernization of NATO's short-range nuclear f o r c e s at a meeting i n Montebello, Canada. The d e c i s i o n was made q u i e t l y , with l i t t l e f a n f a r e , i n what was 1 54 to become the c h a r a c t e r i s t i c approach to the b a t t l e f i e l d n u c l e a r modernization i s s u e . To a v o i d a repeat of the domestic upheaval which plagued the INF d e c i s i o n , debate over the short-range systems has been kept d e l i b e r a t e l y low key. As a p r o s p e c t i v e agreement drew c l o s e r , however, the frequency and i n t e n s i t y of the NATO meetings grew. The HLG met i n A p r i l of 1987 at Alberqerque, New Mexico, to study the i m p l i c a t i o n s of a p o s s i b l e INF accord. The NATO Defence M i n i s t e r s met the next month i n Norway, where a number of p r o p o s a l s f o r a d j u s t i n g NATO's nucl e a r f o r c e s i n the wake of an INF d e a l were t a b l e d . A meeting of the NPG i n November at Monterey, C a l i f o r n i a , d i s c u s s e d these p r o p o s a l s i n g r e a t e r d e t a i l , with an urgency brought about by US o f f i c i a l s encouraging a l l i e d support f o r an INF t r e a t y and b a t t l e f i e l d n u c l e a r modernization. At these meetings, p r o p o s a l s f o r improvements to NATO's post-INF nuclear f o r c e - - o t h e r w i s e r e f e r r e d to as 'compensatory measures'--centered p r i m a r i l y around a i r c r a f t , m i s s i l e s under the 500 kilometer range c e i l i n g , and to a l e s s e r extent, shipborne and a r t i l l e r y systems. Suggested improvements to NATO's a i r - d e l i v e r e d n uclear c a p a b i l i t y mainly i n v o l v e d the enhancement of c a p a b i l i t i e s a l r e a d y i n p l a c e . The deployment of a d d i t i o n a l a i r c r a f t to Europe on a permanent b a s i s — p a r t i c u l a r l y the. FB-111 bomber—was d i s c u s s e d at Monterey. A l s o examined was the p o s s i b i l i t y of d e p l o y i n g a d d i t i o n a l F-15 and F-16 a i r c r a f t , 155 equipped with nuclear capable a i r - t o - s u r f a c e m i s s i l e s (ASMs) with ranges of s e v e r a l hundred k i l o m e t e r s , to enable them to s t r i k e i n t o Eastern Europe from NATO a i r s p a c e . The p o s s i b i l i t y of deploy i n g B-52s to Europe i n time of c r i s i s was d i s c u s s e d i n two v a r i a n t s . One option was to f i t 150 B-52s to c a r r y c o n v e n t i o n a l l y armed ALCMs or ASMs to b o l s t e r NATO's c o n v e n t i o n a l defence o p t i o n . 2 " 8 The second o p t i o n was to deploy nuclear-armed ALCM B-52s to a i r f i e l d s i n B r i t a i n in c r i s i s to b o l s t e r NATO's t h e a t r e - n u c l e a r c a p a b i l i t y . 2 " 9 The modernization or improvement of NATO's b a t t l e f i e l d nuclear m i s s i l e systems a l s o r e c e i v e d a great d e a l of a t t e n t i o n . The only e x i s t i n g b a t t l e f i e l d n uclear m i s s i l e system i n place i n Europe i s the 120 km range Lance. The 36 launchers and s e v e r a l hundred m i s s i l e s deployed i n Europe are o b s o l e t e and t h e i r performance i s q u e s t i o n a b l e , e s p e c i a l l y i n terms of accuracy. The Improved Lance, with a range of 300 k i l o m e t e r s , i s a p o s s i b l e replacement, although before r e t i r i n g as SACEUR General Bernard Rogers was pushing for the l i f t i n g of the ban on nuclear warheads f o r the Army's Advanced T a c t i c a l M i s s i l e System (ATACMS) imposed by Congress. F u l l deployment of the ATACMS, which has a range of some 250 k i l o m e t e r s , would e n t a i l s e v e r a l hundred launchers and n e a r l y 1000 m i s s i l e s , though most of these would probably be equipped with c o n v e n t i o n a l warheads. I t i s l i k e l y the US would seek to improve the range of ATACMS to approach the 500 kilometer range c e i l i n g . General Rogers a l s o p l a c e d emphasis on r e p l a c i n g the US 156 stock of nuclear a r t i l l e r y p r o j e c t i l e s . The e x i s t i n g 155mm nucle a r s h e l l has an u n p r e d i c t a b l e y i e l d and the 8-inch s h e l l i s somewhat unstable once assembled. Pr o d u c t i o n of new 155mm s h e l l s goes ahead i n 1989, although with a producion l i m i t of 925 imposed by Congress. Suggestions were a l s o put forward, f i r s t at Monterey, and l a t e r by General Rogers i n Norway, that SLCMs be deployed on submarines or su r f a c e s h i p s . However, any A l l i a n c e attempt to come to a d e c i s i o n on modernizing NATO's b a t t l e f i e l d n uclear f o r c e s faces a p o t e n t i a l l y b i t t e r p o l i t i c a l o b s t a c l e . At the crux of t h i s o b s t a c l e i s the West German o p p o s i t i o n to any modernization of these systems, which are t r a d i t i o n a l l y viewed as weapons with no purpose other than to be exploded on West German s o i l . As a r e s u l t , the West German government i s opposed to improving short-range nuclear f o r c e s to compensate f o r the l o s s of INF, and i n s t e a d favours immediate n e g o t i a t e d r e d u c t i o n s i n short-range weapons as a follow-on agreement to INF. By c o n t r a s t , the o f f i c i a l US and B r i t i s h p o s i t i o n s are opposed to short-range weapons n e g o t i a t i o n s to a v o i d encouraging p u b l i c support f o r withdrawal of a l l nuclear m i s s i l e s i n Europe. Conventional and chemical n e g o t i a t i o n s are higher on the US and B r i t i s h agendas. V o l k e r Ruhe summed up German a t t i t u d e s when he s t a t e d , a l b e i t somewhat b l u n t l y , "The s h o r t e r the range, the deader the Germans". 2 5 0 In a d d i t i o n , the p o l i t i c a l p o s i t i o n of the West German government i s very d i f f i c u l t . Besides the n a t u r a l West 157 German i n s t i n c t to oppose r e l i a n c e on short-range nuclear weapons, any acceptance of the need f o r b a t t l e f i e l d n u c l e a r modernization would be d i f f i c u l t to s e l l at home. In the words of one West German defence o f f i c i a l : " I t i s very hard to argue that this, i s a good agreement that enhances our s e c u r i t y and then turn around and say we need to take steps to compensate f o r t h a t . " 2 5 1 Another West German o f f i c i a l c oncurred: "We have b i g problems e x p l a i n i n g t h i s i s s u e to the p u b l i c . " 2 5 2 The b a t t l e f i e l d n u c l e a r modernization i s s u e has yet to be r e s o l v e d . In the recent NATO summit i n B r u s s e l s i n March of 1988 (the f i r s t i n s i x years) the i s s u e was c h a r a c t e r i s t i c a l l y papered over. In a ra t h e r ambiguous statement, the B r u s s e l s summit c a l l e d f o r : "...a s t r a t e g y of deterrence based upon an a p p r o p r i a t e mix of adequate and e f f e c t i v e nuclear and c o n v e n t i o n a l f o r c e s which w i l l continue t o be kept up to date where n e c e s s a r y . " 2 5 3 T y p i c a l l y , the B r u s s e l s summit attempted to s a t i s f y everyone, as i t was open to enough i n t e r p r e t a t i o n to enable the p o l i t i c a l l e a d e r s of the A l l i a n c e t o achieve t h e i r p o l i t i c a l g o a l s . P r e s i d e n t Reagan obtained the A l l i a n c e u n i t y he was seeking p r i o r to another superpower summit. C h a n c e l l o r Kohl got a somewhat ambiguous statement on b a t t l e f i e l d nuclear f o r c e modernization and a c a l l f o r short-range nuclear weapons arms c o n t r o l n e g o t i a t i o n s . Prime M i n i s t e r Thatcher, d e s p i t e her f a i l u r e to ensure short-range nuclear f o r c e m o d e r n i z a t i o n , 2 5 * c o u l d i n t e r p r e t the B r u s s e l s 158 d e c l a r a t i o n as saying such. F r a n c o i s M i t t e r a n d gained a high p r o f i l e r e t u r n to NATO p o l i t i c s a f t e r a twenty-two year French absence from such summits. The B r u s s e l s d e c l a r a t i o n , however, s o l v e d l i t t l e . The phrase "up to date" was i n t e r p r e t e d by Thatcher, Lord C a r r i n g t o n and S e c r e t a r y of State S h u l t z as meaning "modernised", while C h a n c e l l o r Kohl made i t c l e a r that he had not committed Germany to b a t t l e f i e l d n uclear m o d e r n i s a t i o n . The B r u s s e l s Summit was a t y p i c a l l y ambiguous A l l i a n c e p o l i t i c a l consensus. D i f f i c u l t i s s u e s were g l o s s e d over i n the i n t e r e s t s of p r o j e c t i n g an image of u n i t y and a v o i d i n g any p o l i t i c a l b o a t - r o c k i n g at a c r i t i c a l stage of superpower r e l a t i o n s . Sooner or l a t e r , the d i f f i c u l t i s s u e of the f u t u r e d i r e c t i o n of NATO nucl e a r f o r c e posture w i l l have to be addressed. Towards a Coherent Nuclear Force Posture i n Europe It i s i r o n i c t h a t i n the wake of the p o l i t i c a l l y traumatic INF episode and i t s dramatic arms c o n t r o l climax, the q u e s t i o n now f a c i n g the A t l a n t i c A l l i a n c e i s how to manage i t s n u c l e a r posture f o r the f u t u r e . Many of the a v a i l a b l e o p t i o n s - - t h e most obvious being the c o n t e n t i o u s i s s u e of of b a t t l e f i e l d n u c l e a r m i s s i l e modernization--t h r e a t e n the renewal of an i n t e r - A l l i a n c e n u c l e a r debate fraught with p o l i t i c a l and p o l i c y d e v i s i v e n e s s . F u r t h e r , each of the proposed compensatory measures have s t r a t e g i c or m i l i t a r y drawbacks of t h e i r own. I t i s c l e a r that only some 159 combination of them w i l l p r ovide an adequate f u t u r e n u c l e a r posture f o r Europe, but only i f western o f f i c i a l s and d e c i s i o n makers recognize that d e t e r r e n c e i n Europe i s no longer s o l e l y a f u n c t i o n of US n u c l e a r weapons in Europe. R e l i a n c e on manned a i r c r a f t f o r NATO's nucl e a r d e t e r r e n t poses s e v e r a l problems, mostly of a m i l i t a r y nature. A i r c r a f t are r e l a t i v e l y slow d e l i v e r y v e h i c l e s , they are not capable of d e l i v e r i n g prompt s t r i k e s a g a i n s t time-urgent t a r g e t s i n E a s t e r n Europe or S o v i e t t e r r i t o r y . They are a l s o h i g h l y v u l n e r a b l e to Warsaw Pact S u r f a c e - t o - A i r (SAM) defences (which have been g r e a t l y improved) and to i n t e r c e p t o r s . T h i s v u l n e r a b i l i t y to being shot down, hot only when p e n e t r a t i n g h o s t i l e a i r s p a c e but but a l s o d u r i n g flyaway, c r e a t e s t a r g e t t i n g problems for NATO planners and reduces c o n f i d e n c e i n m i s s i o n success. The a t t r i t i o n problem i s exacerbated by the f a c t that there are i n s u f f i c i e n t numbers of manned a i r c r a f t a v a i l a b l e f o r the n u c l e a r s t r i k e r o l e . The bulk of these a i r c r a f t w i l l be needed f o r c o n v e n t i o n a l r o l e s i n the a i r war over the c e n t r a l r e g i o n , and any w i t h o l d i n g of such a i r c r a f t f o r n u c l e a r missions w i l l only enhance the Warsaw Pact's numerical s u p e r i o r i t y i n the s k i e s . F u r t h e r , manned a i r c r a f t are t i e d to a i r f i e l d s and, even when d i s p e r s e d , are v u l n e r a b l e to pre-emption or can be destroyed on the ground d u r i n g h o s t i l i t i e s . Even i f s u f f i c i e n t numbers of a i r c r a f t and a i r f i e l d s s u r v i v e , the r e a c t i o n and turnaround times of manned a i r c r a f t can be g r e a t l y reduced by Pact use of runway c r a t e r i n g munitions or 160 chemical i n t e r d i c t i o n , thus f o r c i n g ground crews to wear r e s t r i c t i v e p r o t e c t i v e c l o t h i n g . The f i n a l problem with r e l i a n c e on manned a i r c r a f t i s economic. Such a i r c r a f t are extremely c o s t l y , and r e q u i r e h i g h l y t r a i n e d personnel to s e r v i c e and maintain them. B a t t l e f i e l d n u c l e a r weapons, in a d d i t i o n to t h e i r negative w a r f i g h t i n g i m p l i c a t i o n s f o r West Germany, a l s o have other m i l i t a r y and p o l i t i c a l drawbacks. T h e i r short range (by t r e a t y n e c e s s i t y under 500 k i l o m e t e r s ) means that they are unable to reach t a r g e t s i n the S o v i e t Union. They t h e r e f o r e have no c a p a c i t y to impose e s c a l a t i o n dominance on the USSR, or to h o l d at r i s k S o v i e t second echelon formations or r e a r - a r e a chokepoints deep in E a s t e r n Europe or the USSR. The even s h o r t e r range of most systems i n pl a c e in Europe (under 120 k i l o m e t e r s ) c r e a t e s a c r e d i b i l i t y problem. How disposed can NATO be to c a r r y i n g out nuclear s t r i k e s on Western European t e r r i t o r y ? R e l i a n c e on b a t t l e f i e l d n uclear systems a l s o poses a "use them or l o s e them" problem. They are tempting t a r g e t s f o r pre-emption ( e s p e c i a l l y by c o n v e n t i o n a l means) and are v u l n e r a b l e to r a p i d a t t r i t i o n as. w e l l as to being overrun. Should NATO come to r e l y h e a v i l y on such systems, the S o v i e t s would a s s u r e d l y p l a c e a high p r i o r i t y on t h e i r d e s t r u c t i o n i n the e a r l y stages of any p r e - n u c l e a r c o n f l i c t . F u r t h e r , dependence on b a t t l e f i e l d n u c l e a r systems c r e a t e s a command and c o n t r o l dilemma. Because of insecure communications d u r i n g c o n f l i c t , the c r e d i b i l i t y of the f o r c e would depend 161 on s u b s t a n t i a l l e v e l s of p r e - d e l e g a t i o n of launch a u t h o r i t y to b a t t l e f i r e d commanders. C o n t r o l and c o o r d i n a t i o n of such widely d i s p e r s e d n u c l e a r systems, many of which would be s u p p o r t i n g the c o n v e n t i o n a l b a t t l e at the time, would be extremely i f not impossibly awkward. F i n a l l y , because of the the range r e s t r i c t i o n s of b a t t l e f i e l d systems, most of them would have to be based in West Germany, re n d e r i n g impossible the n u c l e a r r i s k s h a r i n g which has been so important an i s s u e to Bonn. Another o p t i o n — a l s o a p o t e n t i a l p o l i t i c a l h e a d a c h e — i s a r e t u r n to a number of o f f s h o r e basing schemes i n v o l v i n g SLCMs. Any s e r i o u s r e v i v a l of t h i s o p t i o n s u f f e r s from an unfortunate h i s t o r i c a l p r e c e d e n t — t h e MLF c o n t r o v e r s y of the l a t e 1960's. Any p r o s p e c t i v e SLCM f o r c e has the same drawbacks which l e d to the r e j e c t i o n of a SLCM f o r c e e a r l y i n INF debate. There are command and c o n t r o l problems with o f f s h o r e systems, p a r t i c u l a r l y submarines. In a d d i t i o n , as with a i r c r a f t , the bulk of s u r f a c e warships and SSNs are needed f o r c o n v e n t i o n a l r o l e s , p a r t i c u l a r l y to defend the A t l a n t i c convoy r o u t e s . A s s i g n i n g n u c l e a r r o l e s to some of these v e s s e l s e f f e c t i v e l y removes badly needed maritime a s s e t s from i n f l u e n c i n g any c o n v e n t i o n a l outcome. Moreover, the c o s t s of new c a r r i e r s , or even r e t r o - f i t t i n g e x i s t i n g s u r f a c e or subsurface c r a f t , i s p r o h i b i t i v e . The p o l i t i c a l n e g a t i v e s a s s o c i a t e d with o f f s h o r e - b a s e d systems are s u b s t a n t i a l ; problems of v i s i b i l i t y , c r e d i b i l i t y and p o l i t i c a l s h a r i n g i n the f o r c e s t i l l are formidable 162 o b s t a c l e s to t h i s o p t i o n . A more manageable o p t i o n i s a commitment by the US to deploy ALCM armed B-52s to a i r f i e l d s i n Europe—most p l a u s i b l y i n Great B r i t a i n - - d u r i n g times of c r i s i s to augment the European nuclear f o r c e . T h i s p r o p o s a l has the advantage of being p o l i t i c a l l y the l e a s t c o n t e n t i o u s . There would be no permanent deployment of new n u c l e a r f o r c e s , and none of the d o m e s t i c - p o l i t i c a l c o n t r o v e r s y surounding such a deployment. In m i l i t a r y or deterrence terms, however, i t s u f f e r s from a number of disadvantages. Such a system would not provide a prompt s t r i k e c a p a b i l i t y , and although the range of the ALCM permits the B-52 to a v o i d p e n e t r a t i n g Soviet a i r s p a c e , they can s t i l l be pre-empted at t h e i r bases. F u r t h e r , s i n c e such systems would be deployed to Europe i n times of c r i s i s , such an a c t would be an e s c a l a t i o n of any superpower t e n s i o n . T h i s i n turn r a i s e s q u e s t i o n s about whether the US would be s e l f - d e t e r r e d from such an a c t i o n , and whether Europeans would c o n s i d e r US assurances to deploy B-52's to be r e l i a b l e . The B-52 o p t i o n does not p r o v i d e the i n - p l a c e d e t e r r e n t which has i n the past been deemed an e s s e n t i a l to the s t r u c t u r e of the nuclear f o r c e i n Europe. The New Nuclear Force It i s c l e a r that f o r a v a r i e t y of p o l i t i c a l and m i l i t a r y reasons, the A l l i a n c e cannot r e l y e n t i r e l y on any one of the above o p t i o n s . Each one c a r r i e s with i t problems 163 which make the o p t i o n p o l i t i c a l l y i n f e a s i b l e or m i l i t a r i l y i n s u f f i c i e n t . However, i t must be recognized that NATO does not have to r e l y on one of these o p t i o n s . NATO should look to combining v a r i o u s p a r t s of the above options i n t o a f o r c e posture that i s both p o l i t i c a l l y f e a s i b l e and m i l i t a r i l y s i g n i f i c a n t , and which can best perform i t s d e t e r r e n t r o l e a l o n g s i d e the independent nu c l e a r d e t e r r e n t s of Great B r i t a i n and France. The new European nuclear f o r c e should emphasize the d e t e r r e n t value of these n a t i o n a l nuclear f o r c e s and t h e i r autonomous d e c i s i o n making c e n t e r s . F i r s t , however, NATO's c o n v e n t i o n a l f o r c e s must be reco g n i z e d as a formidable d e t e r r e n t i n and of themselves. Strengthening the c o n v e n t i o n a l d e t e r r e n t should be the hig h e s t p r i o r i t y . There i s simply no s u b s t i t u t e f o r the impact a stronger c o n v e n t i o n a l posture can have on dete r r e n c e i n Europe. Conventional deployments would reduce S o v i e t confidence i n a c h i e v i n g m i l i t a r y success i n Europe and would r a i s e western co n f i d e n c e i n deterr e n c e without r e s o r t to continued deployment of nuclear weapons. Deterrence i s i n c r e a s i n g l y i n s e n s i t i v e to deployment of gr e a t e r numbers of nucl e a r weapons, and c o n v e n t i o n a l improvements can make more of a d i f f e r e n c e i n the r i s k e q u a t i o n . U n f o r t u n a t e l y , l a r g e improvements, e s p e c i a l l y numerical improvements, are probably u n r e a l i s t i c . In the past, the NATO na t i o n s have shown a r e l u c t a n c e to meet even minimum agreed upon f l o o r l e v e l s on defence spending. US c a l l s f o r i n c r e a s e s i n NATO spending on c o n v e n t i o n a l 164 armaments have never succeeded in producing dramatic r e s u l t s . When the US c a l l s f o r i n c r e a s e d c o n v e n t i o n a l preparedness, i t u s u a l l y means i n c r e a s e d European c o n v e n t i o n a l preparedness, and i n c r e a s e d a l l o c a t i o n of economic res o u r c e s i n v o l v e d i n expanding c o n v e n t i o n a l a r s e n a l s are seen as p o l i t i c a l l y p r o h i b i t i v e in- most European c a p i t a l s . In a d d i t i o n , two of the n a t i o n s capable of f i e l d i n g m i l i t a r i l y s i g n i f i c a n t c o n v e n t i o n a l . f o r c e s — Great B r i t a i n and F r a n c e — a r e a l l o c a t i n g a great p a r t of t h e i r defence budgets to t h e i r r e s p e c t i v e n a t i o n a l nuclear-programs. Today, the s p i r a l l i n g c o s t of c o n v e n t i o n a l weapons systems, the improved East-West p o l i t i c a l c l i m a t e , and the trends i n p o p u l a t i o n demographics showing a d e c l i n e i n men of m i l i t a r y age a l l stand i n the way of any dramatic improvement to the A l l i a n c e ' s c o n v e n t i o n a l f o r c e posture. On the other hand, i t i s important to remember that NATO's c o n v e n t i o n a l f o r c e s do not have to ensure a s u c c e s s f u l c o n v e n t i o n a l defence of Europe; t h e i r r o l e i s to ensure that the S o v i e t Union cannot have a high degree of c o n f i d e n c e i n any c o n v e n t i o n a l i n v a s i o n . A c r e d i b l e c o n v e n t i o n a l f o r c e posture must be the cornerstone of NATO defence p l a n n i n g i n t o the f o r s e e a b l e f u t u r e . As i n the past, however, the absence of assured c o n v e n t i o n a l defence and the need to deter S o v i e t n u c l e a r f i r s t use d i c t a t e s the demand f o r a c r e d i b l e land-based e s c a l a t o r y c a p a c i t y i n Europe. But again, there are p o l i t i c a l c o n s t r a i n t s on the establishment of such a 1 65 c a p a c i t y , and i t i s u n l i k e l y that any e x t e n s i v e deployment of b a t t l e f i e l d n uclear s y s t e m s — s p e c i f i c a l l y m i s s i l e s such as the ATACMS—can be undertaken. On the other hand, smaller improvements can be made which w i l l have a f a v o u r a b l e impact on the c r e d i b i l i t y of e s c a l a t i o n . Deployment of the Improved Lance, f o r example, should be p o l i t i c a l l y manageable for West Germany, as i t i s a replacement f o r an o b s o l e t e system. T h i s measure, combined with improvements to the a r t i l l e r y -d e l i v e r e d nuclear munitions s t o c k p i l e a l r e a d y under way, ensures that the S o v i e t Union w i l l be faced with b a t t l e f i e l d n u c l e a r systems capable of s t r i k i n g i n t o r e a r - a r e a t a r g e t s i n E a s t e r n Europe and h o l d i n g Warsaw Pact formations at r i s k . In a d d i t i o n to the t h r e a t of d e l i b e r a t e e s c a l a t i o n by these systems, the S o v i e t Union would be faced with the p o s s i b i l i t y of the i n c r e a s e d chance of i n a d v e r t e n t or a c c i d e n t a l e s c a l a t i o n brought about by the command and c o n t r o l problems a s s o c i a t e d with b a t t l e f i e l d nuclear systems. Des p i t e t h e i r admitted drawbacks, manned a i r c r a f t w i l l have to p l a y a key r o l e i n NATO's f u t u r e n u c l e a r f o r c e . Rather than commit a l l of i t s f r o n t l i n e a i r s u p e r i o r i t y a i r c r a f t to nuclear s t r i k e r o l e s , NATO should look to o u t f i t t i n g i t s o l d e r s t r i k e a i r c r a f t , equipped with ASMs, f o r t h i s r o l e . The demand for a theatre-range commitment i s u n l i k e l y to go away. There w i l l continue to be a d e s i r e , however unnecessary, to couple the European nuc l e a r f o r c e to.the US 166 s t r a t e g i c a r s e n a l . T h i s can be adequately s a t i s f i e d by a s s i g n i n g ALCM-armed B-52s f o r deployment to bases i n Europe in c r i s i s . T h i s presents the S o v i e t Union with an e s c a l a t o r y p o t e n t i a l capable of s t r i k i n g at t a r g e t s deep i n t o S o v i e t t e r r i t o r y , which i s not p r o v i d e d by b a t t l e f i e l d systems. The l a s t element of t h i s new European nuc l e a r posture i s an i m p l i c i t European r e l i a n c e on the French and B r i t i s h independent nuclear d e t e r r e n t s . The d e t e r r e n t s i g n i f i c a n c e of both n u c l e a r f o r c e s would have i n c r e a s e d i n any case, i n view of the expansion programs under way. With the e l i m i n a t i o n of US t h e a t r e systems, however, the importance of the B r i t i s h and French a r s e n a l s as a t h e a t r e - c a p a b l e , European-based, and E u r o p e a n - c o n t r o l l e d n u c l e a r f o r c e has been enhanced. In the f u t u r e , France w i l l become much more the producer of European nuclear s e c u r i t y , which the r e s t of Europe w i l l i m p l i c i t l y consume. 2 5 5 The expansion of the French and B r i t i s h n u c l e a r f o r c e w i l l c r e a t e that much gre a t e r an element of r i s k f o r S o v i e t p l a n n e r s , f u r t h e r s t r e n g t h e n i n g the o v e r a l l Western d e t e r r e n t . With US land-based theatre-range n u c l e a r systems withdrawn, and the s t r a t e g i c l i n k t h e r e f o r e - - a t l e a s t i n the p s y c h o l o g i c a l sense—weakened, the European A l l i a n c e members may i n any case look i n c r e a s i n g l y to t h e i r own s e c u r i t y . There has been s p e c u l a t i o n over i n c r e a s e d i n t e r -European p a r t i c i p a t i o n on defence i s s u e s , most notably on nuclear c o o p e r a t i o n . With the withdrawal of INF, and i n the face of the s p e c t r e of a US nuclear p u l l o u t from Europe, the 167 European NATO c o u n t r i e s have b e l a t e d l y r e c o g n i z e d the a d v i s a b i l i t y of i n c r e a s e d n u c l e a r p a r t i c i p t i o n and even development and procurement of nu c l e a r weapons. The l a t e Hedley B u l l argued that Europe "... should look to nuclear f o r c e s that are c o n t r o l l e d by European governments and serve the i n t e r e s t s of European p e o p l e s . " 2 5 6 Franz Joseph S t r a u s s , f o r example, argued that i t i s time to ". . . c r e a t e a common European nu c l e a r p o t e n t i a l . " He went on to s t a t e that "The B r i t i s h - F r e n c h d i s c u s s i o n on t h i s t o p i c would p r o v i d e a s t a r t . " 2 5 7 Raymonde Barre, a c o n s e r v a t i v e candidate f o r the French Presidency, c a l l e d f o r a new " F r a n c o - B r i t i s h Entente C o r d i a l " that would i n c l u d e c o n s u l t a t i o n on nucl e a r p l a n n i n g and j o i n t procurement a g r e e m e n t s . 2 5 8 General Georges F r i c o u d Chagraud went a step f u r t h e r , a d m i t t i n g that France and Great B r i t a i n had been " f l i r t i n g w ith the i d e a " of expanded nuc l e a r c o o p e r a t i o n . 2 5 9 The renewed i n t e r e s t i n the Western European Union (WEU) i s another example of i n c r e a s e d European defence p a r t i c i p a t i o n . The i m p l i c a t i o n of such i n t e r e s t , whether i n t e n t i o n a l or not, i s a reduced dependence on the US f o r s e c u r i t y guidance and l e a d e r s h i p . Such developments should not be viewed as a weakening of dete r r e n c e i n Europe. As i t has been demonstrated throughout t h i s t h e s i s , d e t e r r e n c e i n Europe i s a f u n c t i o n of s e v e r a l r i s k elements. The s t r e n g t h of NATO's d e t e r r e n t posture i s not s o l e l y a f u n c t i o n of US nu c l e a r weapons deployed i n Europe. Because of the s i g n i f i c a n c e of the expanding French and B r i t i s h 168 nuclear a r s e n a l s , the r i s k to the USSR of a c c i d e n t a l or i n a d v e r t e n t n u c l e a r e s c a l a t i o n , and a c o n v e n t i o n a l defence option which i s more c r e d i b l e than has been b e l i e v e d , d eterrence in Europe i s at present very robust, p o s s i b l y more so than ever b e f o r e . With compound deter r e n c e a r e a l i t y , i t w i l l remain so r e g a r d l e s s of any eventual de-emphasis on US nuclear weapons. The INF a f f a i r d i d i l l u s t r a t e the advantages, at l e a s t in the short and medium term, of NATO's t r a d i t i o n a l p o l i c y of compromise on key defence p o l i c y i s s u e s . The papering over of d i s p u t e s , and the p u r s u i t of a p o l i c y of c o n s t r u c t i v e ambiguity, h e l p to preserve the image of an u n i t e d A l l i a n c e . However, the INF a f f a i r has a l s o i l l u s t r a t e d the disadvantages of f o r m u l a t i n g p o l i c y i n t h i s manner. Confusion and d i s t r u s t are c r e a t e d amongst A l l i a n c e members, and key areas of p o l i t i c a l and s t r a t e g i c divergence are never r e s o l v e d . The r e s u l t i s p o l i c y p a r a l y s i s . NATO has been unable to turn away from o l d concepts and methods and has f a i l e d to recognize the new s t r a t e g i c environment i n Europe, l e t alone i t s p o l i c y i m p l i c a t i o n s . T h i s i s not to argue that NATO w i l l c o l l a p s e i f i t c ontinues to operate by o l d concepts and methods. Presumably, the A t l a n t i c A l l i a n c e c o u l d c ontinue to muddle through. I t s e f f e c t i v e n e s s , however, would d e t e r i o r a t e i n t o i r r e l e v a n c e , as i t s p o l i c i e s and f o r c e postures became i n c r e a s i n g l y i n c o n s i s t e n t with s t r a t e g i c r e a l i t y . To maintain i t s e l f as a r e l e v a n t and e f f e c t i v e a l l i a n c e , NATO 169 must demonstrate the f l e x i b i l i t y to adapt to the new s t r a t e g i c environment i n Europe. Adopting the p r i n c i p l e of compound deterrence might not e l i m i n a t e i n t r a - a l l i a n c e c o n f l i c t , but i t w i l l ensure the robustness of d e t e r r e n c e in Europe i n t o the f o r s e e a b l e f u t u r e . 170 Endnotes t o Chapter I 'Some a n a l y s t s , such as R i c h a r d B e t t s , have q u e s t i o n e d the e x i s t e n c e of a Golden Age of US n u c l e a r s u p e r i o r i t y . See R i c h a r d K. B e t t s , N u c l e a r B l a c k m a i l and N u c l e a r B a l a n c e (Washington, D.C.: The B r o o k i n g I n s t i t u t i o n , 1987), pp. 144-171 . 2 V a r i o u s c l a s s i f i c a t i o n s have been forwarded f o r the P e r s h i n g I I , f o r example Short-Range B a l l i s t i c M i s s i l e (SRBM) and Medium-Range B a l l i s t i c M i s s i l e (MRBM). For the purpose of t h i s paper, the P e r s h i n g I I w i l l . b e r e f e r r e d t o as an Intermediate-Range B a l l i s t i c M i s s i l e (IRBM). 3 C l a s s i f i c a t i o n s of the P e r s h i n g I I and Ground Launched C r u i s e M i s s i l e (GLCM) deployments v a r y w i d e l y throughout the l i t e r a t u r e on the INF. They have been r e f e r r e d t o as Long-Range I n t e r m e d i a t e N u c l e a r F o r c e s (LRINF) i n NATO and Pentagon t e r m i n o l o g y , and f r e q u e n t l y as Long-Range T h e a t e r N u c l e a r F o r c e s (LRTNF) i n Academic l i t e r a t u r e . T h i s d i s t i n g u i s h e s the P e r s h i n g I I . and GLCMs from the r e s t . o f NATO's T h e a t r e N u c l e a r F o r c e s (TNF). For t h i s s t u d y , the most common term INF w i l l r e f e r t o the P e r s h i n g I I and GLCM, w h i l e NATO n u c l e a r f o r c e s i n g e n e r a l w i l l be r e f e r r e d t o as TNF. T a c t i c a l N u c l e a r W e a p o n s - - r e f e r r i n g t o b a t t l e f i e l d n u c l e a r w e a p o n s — w i l l be r e f e r r e d t o as TNW. "Gregory A. T r e v e r t o n , " N u c l e a r Weapons and the 'Gray A r e a ' , " F o r e i g n A f f a i r s , 57 (Summer 1979), p. 1083. 5 0 . S u k o v i c , " T a c t i c a l N u c l e a r Weapons i n Europe," i n T a c t i c a l N u c l e a r Weapons: European P e r s p e c t i v e s (Stockholm I n t e r n a t i o n a l Peace Re s e a r c h I n s t i t u t e . London: T a y l o r and F r a n c i s L t d . , 1978), p. 141. 6 H e n r y A. K i s s i n g e r , "The F u t u r e of NATO," i n Kenneth A. Myers, ed., NATO: The Next T h i r t y Years ( B o u l d e r , C o l o r a d o : Westview P r e s s , 1980), p. 8. 7 M o r t o n H a l p e r i n , i n US, Congress, Senate Committee on F o r e i g n R e l a t i o n s , H e a r i n g s on N u c l e a r Weapons and F o r e i g n  P o l i c y , 9 3 r d . Congress, 2nd S e s s i o n , 1974, pp. 17-18. See a l s o A l a i n Enthoven, i n H e a r i n g s on N u c l e a r Weapons i n  F o r e i g n P o l i c y , 1974, pp. 84-85. Enthoven obse r v e d t h a t the placement of t a c t i c a l n u c l e a r weapons i n Europe "...was done w i t h o u t any co h e r e n t p l a n or d o c t r i n e f o r the conduct of a t h e a t e r n u c l e a r war. I t was s i m p l y a race t o e q u i p e v e r y b o d y — e v e n the i n f a n t r y - - w i t h n u c l e a r weapons." . BUwe N e r l i c h , "Theater N u c l e a r F o r c e s i n Europe: I s NATO Running Out of O p t i o n s ? " i n Myers, ed., NATO: The Next  T h i r t y Y e a r s , pp. 63-75. 171 9 T h i s was s u b s e q u e n t l y m o d i f i e d when John F o s t e r D u l l e s p r o v i d e d a s s u r a n c e s t h a t t h i s d i d not mean aut o m a t i c e s c a l a t i o n t o n u c l e a r war. 1°A s i m i l a r p l a n , the Ridgeway P l a n of 1952-53 never got beyond the p l a n n i n g s t a g e a t SHAPE. 1 1 F o r an e x c e l l e n t account of e a r l y NATO n u c l e a r s t r a t e g y see Gen. Robert C. R i c h a r d s o n I I I ( R e t . ) , "NATO N u c l e a r S t r a t e g y : A Look Back," S t r a t e g i c Review, 9 ( S p r i n g 1981 ) , pp. 33-44. 1 2 C h r i s t o p h Bertram goes, so f a r as t o a s s e r t t h a t w i t h the age of the ICBM, the "...age of g e o g r a p h i c d e t e r r e n c e i d e n t i t y between the US and i t s European a l l i e s had come t o an end." C h r i s t o p h B e r t r a m , "The I m p l i c a t i o n s of Theater N u c l e a r Weapons i n Europe," F o r e i g n A f f a i r s , 60 (Winter 1981/82), pp. 302. 1 3 J a c q u e l y n K. D a v i s and Robert L. P f a l t z g r a f f , J r . , The A t l a n t i c A l l i a n c e and US G l o b a l S t r a t e g y S p e c i a l R e p o r t , (Washington, D.C.: I n s t i t u t e f o r F o r e i g n P o l i c y A n a l y s i s I n c . , 1983), p. 3. 1 " R i c h a r d N i x o n , US F o r e i g n P o l i c y f o r the 1970's: The  Emerging S t r u c t u r e of Peace, A Report t o the Congress by  R i c h a r d Nixon (Washington D.C: US Government P r i n t i n g O f f i c e , 1972), p. 43. 1 5 S e c r e t a r y of Defence S c h l e s i n g e r , i n H e a r i n g s on  N u c l e a r Weapons and F o r e i g n P o l i c y , Senate Committee on F o r e i g n R e l a t i o n s , 93rd C ongress, 2nd S e s s i o n , ( M a r c h / A p r i l 1974), p. 209. 1 6 S e e Joseph I . C o f f e y ' s e x c e l l e n t study D e t e r r e n c e and  Arms C o n t r o l : American and West German P e r s p e c t i v e s on INF, Monograph S e r i e s i n World A f f a i r s , (Denver, C o l . : U n i v e r s i t y of Denver, 1985), p.9. 1 7 L e o n V. S i g a l , N u c l e a r F o r c e s i n Europe (Washington, D.C: The B r o o k i n g s I n s t i t u t i o n , 1984), p. 14. 1 8 B e t t s a s s e r t s t h a t the US, f e a r i n g the l o s s of e s c a l a t i o n dominance and n eeding t o m a i n t a i n the c r e d i b i l i t y of extended d e t e r r e n c e s t r o v e t o m a i n t a i n a l e v e l of " e s c a l a t i o n e q u i t y " . B e t t s , N u c l e a r B l a c k m a i l and N u c l e a r  B a l a n c e , p. 197. 1 9 B e t t s , N u c l e a r B l a c k m a i l and N u c l e a r B a l a n c e , p. 197. 2 0 B e t t s , N u c l e a r B l a c k m a i l and N u c l e a r B a l a n c e , p. 197. 2 1 H e n r y K i s s i n g e r , "The F u t u r e of NATO," p. 7. 172 2 2 C o f f e y , Deterrence and Arms C o n t r o l , p. 9. 2 3 M a n f r e d Woerner, "NATO Defenses and T a c t i c a l Nuclear Weapons," S t r a t e g i c Review, 5 ( F a l l 1977), p. 12. 2 u K i s s i n g e r , "The Future of NATO," p. 8. 2 5 H . A f h e l d t , " T a c t i c a l Nuclear Weapons and European S e c u r i t y , " i n T a c t i c a l Nuclear Weapons: European P e r s p e c t i v e s , p. 266. 2 6 T h e SS-21, with a range of 120 km i s to r e p l a c e FROG; the SS-22, with a range of 900 km i s to re p l a c e the SS-12 Scaleboard, and the SS-23, with a range of 500 km i s to rep l a c e the SCUD at Army and Front l e v e l s . The SS-21 was f i r s t deployed i n 1978; the SS-22 and SS-23 i n 1979. 2 7 I n 1978-79, 50 Tu-22M and some 190 Su-24 (then known as the Su-19) were i n s e r v i c e . 2 8 S e e The M i l i t a r y Balance, (London: The I n t e r n a t i o n a l I n s t i t u t e f o r S t r a t e g i c S t u d i e s , 1986), p. 204. 2 9 S e e The M i l i t a r y Balance, p. 204. C i r c u l a r E r r o r Probable (CEPl i s the r a d i u s of a c i r c l e around a t a r g e t i n which there i s a 50% chance the warhead w i l l l a n d . The r e a l s i g n i f i c a n c e of t h i s f i g u r e i s t h e r e f o r e rather dubious. 3 0 T h e v i a b i l i t y of a d i s c r i m i n a t e c o u n t e r f o r c e s t r i k e or a l i m i t e d c o u n t e r f o r c e exchange i n Europe i s h i g h l y q u e s t i o n a b l e . See W i l l i a m A r k i n et a l . , "The Consequences of a ' L i m i t e d 1 Nuclear War i n East and West Germany," i n Ambio, 11 (1982), pp. 163-174 and Gary L. Guertner, "Nuclear War i n Suburbia," O r b i s , 26 (Sp r i n g 1982), pp. 49-71. 3 1 W e s t e r n Europe would have some 5 minutes advance warning of an imminent s t r i k e . 3 2Uwe N e r l i c h , "Theater Nuclear Forces i n Europe," p. 83. 3 3Uwe N e r l i c h , "Theater Nuclear Forces i n Europe," p. 85. 3*See Joseph R. Douglass, J r . , " S o v i e t Nuclear Str a t e g y i n Europe: A S e l e c t i v e T a r g e t t i n g D o c t r i n e ? " S t r a t e g i c  Review, 5 ( F a l l 1977), pp. 19-32. 3 5 S e e Karsten D. Vo i g h t , "Nuclear Weapons i n Europe: A German Democrat's P e r s p e c t i v e , " In Andrew J . P i e r r e , ed., Nuclear Weapons i n Europe, Europe America S e r i e s , No. 1. (New York: C o u n c i l on Fo r e i g n R e l a t i o n s , Inc., 1984), pp. 98-118. 173 3 6 G r e g o r y T r e v e r t o n , "Nuclear Weapons and the Grey Area," F o r e i g n A f f a i r s , pp. 1075-1089. 3 7 C o f f e y , Deterrence and Arms C o n t r o l , p. 14 3 8 F o r a d e t a i l e d examination of these problems, see W i l l i a m R. Van Cleave and S.T. Cohen, T a c t i c a l Nuclear  Weapons: An Examination of the Issues. (New York: Crane & Russak, 1978). 3 9 Q u o t e d i n Joseph J o f f e , " A l l i e s , Angst, and Arms C o n t r o l : New Troubles f o r an Old P a r t n e r s h i p , " i n Marsha McGraw O l i v e and J e f f r e y D. Porro, eds., Nuclear Weapons i n  Europe: Modernization and L i m i t a t i o n (Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books, 1983), p. 33. "°Helmut Schmidt, "The 1977 A l a s t a i r Buchan Memorial L e c t u r e , " S u r v i v a l , 21 (Jan/Feb 1979), p. 4. 4 1 Schmidt, "The A l a s t a i r Buchan Memorial L e c t u r e , " p. 4. * 2Schmidt, "The A l a s t a i r Buchan Memorial L e c t u r e , " p. 4. " 3See Fred Kaplan, Warring Over New M i s s i l e s f o r NATO," New York Times Magazine, Dec. 9, 1979. " " K i s s i n g e r , "The Future of NATO," p. 9. " 5 K i s s i n g e r , "The Future of NATO," p. 9. "6Uwe N e r l i c h , "Theater Nuclear Forces i n Europe," p. 81 . " 7 F o r an e x c e l l e n t account of the other f a c t o r s that l e d to the Schmidt speech see David N. Schwartz, NATO's  Nuclear Dilemmas (Washington D.C: The Brookings I n s t i t u t i o n , 1983). " 8Johan Jorgen H o i s t , "The Double Track D e c i s i o n R e v i s i t e d " , i n Hans Henrik Holm and N i k o l a j Petersen, eds., The European M i s s i l e s C r i s i s : Nuclear weapons and S e c u r i t y  P o l i c y , (London: F r a n c i s P i n t e r P u b l i s h e r s , 1983), p. 45. "'Gregory T r e v e r t o n , "NATO A l l i a n c e P o l i t i c s , " i n R i c h a r d K. B e t t s , ed., C r u i s e M i s s i l e s : Technology,  S t r a t e g y , P o l i t i c s (Washington, D.C: The Brookings I n s t i t u t i o n , 1981), p. 438. 5 0 US M i l i t a r y Force Posture FY 1986. (Washington, D.C: O r g a n i z a t i o n of the JCS, U n i t e d S t a t e s P r i n t i n g O f f i c e , 1986), p. 34. 174 5'Quoted i n John Cartwright and J u l i a n C r i t c h l e y , C r u i s e , Pershing and SS-20 (London: Brassey's Defense P u b l i s h e r s L t d . , 1985), p. 14. 175 Endnotes to Chapter II 5 2 W i l l i a m W. Kaufmann, "The Requirements of Deterrence," i n W i l l i a m W. Kaufmann, ed., M i l i t a r y P o l i c y  and N a t i o n a l S e c u r i t y (London, Kennikat Press") 1972), p. 17. 5 3 T h i s can, of course, apply to other p o s s i b l e t h e a t r e s of war, but i n the context of t h i s paper r e f e r s s oley to NATO Europe. 5"Guido Vigeveno has p o i n t e d out that "Any s i g n i f i c a n t e r o s i o n of deterrence i s d i f f i c u l t to q u a n t i f y , because i t u l t i m a t e l y depends on assumptions about S o v i e t p e r c e p t i o n s . " Guido Vigeveno, The Bomb and European S e c u r i t y (London: C. Hurst and Company, 1 983), p. 57~. 5 5Anthony H. Cordesman, "Deterrence i n t h e ' 1980's: American S t r a t e g i c Forces and Extended Deterrence", Adelphi  Papers, No. 175 (Summer 1982), p. 3. 5 6 T h e s e p e r s p e c t i v e groupings are l o o s e l y adapted from those o u t l i n e d i n Joeph C o f f e y ' s e x c e l l e n t study, Deterrence  and Arms C o n t r o l . 5 7 R i c h a r d Burt, A l l i a n c e S t r a t e g y and the INF N e g o t i a t i o n s , Current P o l i c y NoT 379., (Washington D.C.; US Department of S t a t e , 1982), p. 2. 5 8James A. Thomson, "The Arms C o n t r o l Challenge to the A l l i a n c e " , RAND [P-7382] (September 1987), p. 2. 5 9 S e e Robert Kennedy, " S o v i e t Theater-Nuclear F o r c e s : I m p l i c a t i o n s f o r NATO Defence," ORBIS, 25 (Summer 1981), pp. 331-351; C o l i n Gray and K e i t h Payne, " V i c t o r y i s P o s s i b l e , " F o r e i g n P o l i c y , 36 (Summer 1980), pp. 14-27; and W i l l i a m Van Cleave and S.T. Cohen, T a c t i c a l Nuclear Weapons: An  Examination of the Issues (New York: Crane and Russak, 1978). 6 0 S e e Caspar Weinberger, Report to the Congress on the FY 1983 Budget, FY 1984 A u t h o r i z a t i o n Request and FY 1982-87  Defence Programs(Washington, D.C.; US Government P r i n t i n g O f f i c e , 1982), pp. 1-4. 6 1 F r a n k C a r l u c c i argued i n 1981 that "The S o v i e t b u i l d u p i n Europe c l e a r l y exceeds any n a t i o n a l requirements f o r defence. I t bears a l l the marks of an o f f e n s i v e m i l i t a r y c a p a b i l i t y . . . " "Address by US Deputy S e c r e t a r y of Defence Frank C a r l u c c i , 21 February 1981," S u r v i v a l , 23 (May/June 1981), p. 132. 6 2Eugene Rostow, "Dangerous Dreams of Peace," The  Chicago Tribune 20 March, 1983. p. 7. 176 6 3McGeorge Bundy, "America i n the 1980's: Reframing Our R e l a t i o n s Among Our F r i e n d s and Among Our A l l i e s , " S u r v i v a l , 24 ( J a n u a r y / F e b r u a r y 1982), p. 26. See a l s o McGeorge Bundy, "The F u t u r e of S t r a t e g i c D e t e r r e n c e , " S u r v i v a l , 21 (November/December 1979), pp. 268-272. 6"McGeorge Bundy, "America i n the 1980's," p. 133. 6 5 C h r i s t o p h e r P a i n e , " P e r s h i n g I I : The Army's S t r a t e g i c Weapon," B u l l e t i n of the Atomic S c i e n t i s t s , 36 (October 1980) p. 30. See a l s o R i c h a r d U l l m a n , "The E u r o m i s s i l e M i r e , " F o r e i g n P o l i c y , 50 ( S p r i n g 1983), pp 39-52-. 6 6 C y r u s Vance, quoted i n K l a a s De V r i e s , "Responding t o the SS-20: An A l t e r n a t i v e Approach," S u r v i v a l , 7 (Summer 1982), pp.. 3-40. 6 7 S e e G e n e r a l B e r n a r d Rogers, "The A t l a n t i c A l l i a n c e : P r e s c r i p t i o n s f o r a D i f f i c u l t Decade," F o r e i g n A f f a i r s , 60 (Summer 1982), pp. 1145-1146; The European . S e c u r i t y Study, " S t r e n g t h e n i n g C o n v e n t i o n a l - D e t e r r e n c e i n Europe," ( B o u l d e r , C o l . : Westview P r e s s , 1985); and The Boston Study Group, The  P r i c e of Defence (New York: New York Times, 1979). 6 8 S e e Senator Sam Nunn, "NATO: Can the A l l i a n c e be Saved?" E x c e r p t e d i n S u r v i v a l , 24 (September/October 1982), pp. .234-236; and Sam Nunn, "NATO S a v i n g the A t l a n t i c A l l i a n c e , " Washington Q u a r t e r l y , (Summer 1982), pp. 1929. 6 9 S e e Manfred Woerner, "NATO Defences and T a c t i c a l N u c l e a r Weapons," S t r a t e g i c Review, 5 ( F a l l 1977), pp. 16-19. 7 0 S e e , f o r example, K u r t B i e d e n k o p f , "Defence and Consensus: The Domestic A s p e c t s of Western S e c u r i t y , " P a r t 1. A d e l p h i P a p e r s , 182 (1983), pp. 6-13. 7 1 H e l m u t Schmidt, "The 1977 A l a s t a i r Buchan Memorial L e c t u r e , " S u r v i v a l , 21 ( J a n u a r y / F e b r u a r y 1979), p. 3. 7 2 S c h m i d t , "The A l a s t a i r Buchan Memorial L e c t u r e , " p. 4. 7 3 E v e n the most pro-arms c o n t r o l of the Euro-n e g o t i a t o r s , such as Egon Bahr and W i l l y B r a n d t , were p r e p a r e d t o support INF i f no p r o g r e s s on arms c o n t r o l was made. See John V i n p c u r , "Setback t o N o r t h Europe's M i s s i l e Foes," The New York Times, (24 March 1981), p.1 7"See Lawrence Freedman, "The Dilemma of T h e a t r e ' N u c l e a r Arms C o n t r o l , " S u r v i v a l , 23 ( J a n u a r y / F e b r u a r y 1981), pp. 2-11. 177 7 5 F r a n k Barnaby, "The I r r a t i o n a l i t y of C u r r e n t N u c l e a r D o c t r i n e s , " i n T a c t i c a l N u c l e a r Weapons: European P e r s p e c t i v e s , pp. 213-222. See a l s o K l a a s D e V r i e s , "Responding t o the SS-20," p. 253, and Mary K a l d o r , " I s There a S o v i e t M i l i t a r y T h r e a t ? " i n M i c h a e l C l a r k e and M a r j o r i e Mowlam, eds., Debate oh Disarmament (London:Routledge and Keegan P a u l L t d . , 1983). 7 6 A n o f f i c i a l of B r i t a i n ' s Campaign f o r N u c l e a r Disarmament i s quoted as s a y i n g of P r e s i d e n t Reagan's " i n t e r i m agreement"; "The o f f e r was made i n the hope i t would be r e j e c t e d . " See " O u t f l a n k e d by T h a t c h e r , M i s s i l e Foes Look P a s t the Law," W a l l S t r e e t J o u r n a l , ( A p r i l 6, 1983), p. 1. See a l s o E.P. Thompson, "Zero O p t i o n : A N u c l e a r F r e e Europe," i n Beyond the C o l d War: A New Approach t o the  Arms Race and N u c l e a r A n n i h i l a t i o n (New York: B e r l i n P r e s s , 1982), e s p e c i a l l y p. 93. 7 7 See Mary K a l d o r , " I s There a S o v i e t M i l i t a r y T h r e a t ? " 7 8 S e e Morton H. H a l p e r i n , "NATO and the TNF C o n t r o v e r s y : T h r e a t s t o the A l l i a n c e , " O r b i s , 26 ( S p r i n g 1982), pp. 105-117. 7 9 L a w r e n c e Freedman, " L i m i t e d War, U n l i m i t e d P r o t e s t , " O r b i s , 26 ( S p r i n g 1982), pp. 89-105. 8 0 L a w r e n c e Freedman, "US N u c l e a r Weapons i n Europe: Symbols, S t r a t e g y , and F o r c e S t r u c t u r e , " In Andrew J . P i e r r e , ed., N u c l e a r Weapons i n Europe p. 59. 8 ' F o r example, I r v i n g K r i s t o l and Norman Podhor e t z a d v o c a t e d w i t h d r a w a l from Europe u n l e s s t h e r e was a c o n s i d e r a b l e h a r d e n i n g of European a t t i t u d e s t o the USSR. M e e t i n g of the Committee f o r a Free World i n Washington, D.C., J a n u a r y 22, 1982; J e f f r e y Record a d v o c a t e d w i t h d r a w a l and r e a l i g n m e n t w i t h F r a n c e . J e f f r e y Record, "Should America Pay f o r Europe's S e c u r i t y ? " The Washington Q u a r t e r l y , (Winter 1982); In 1982, Senator Ted Stevens ( R - A l a s k a ) and Senator Howard Baker, the R e p u b l i c a n M a j o r i t y L e a d e r , a d v o c a t e d a review of the US commitment t o Europe. B e r n a r d Gwertzman "Some Congressmen Suggest B r i n g i n g the Boys Back Home," The New York Times, 14 March 1982. US c o n s e r v a t i v e s were by and l a r g e o v e r r e a c t i n g ; the presence of US m i s s i l e s i n Europe i s much l e s s welcome than t h e presence of US t r o o p s . Many i n the Reagan A d m i n i s t r a t i o n m i stook European a t t i t u d e s on n u c l e a r weapons f o r a t t i t u d e s on the US presence as a whole. 8 2 W i l l i a m G. H y l a n d , "The S t r u g g l e f o r Europe: An American View," i n Andrew J . P i e r r e , ed., N u c l e a r Weapons i n  Europe, p. 22. 8 3 As G e n e r a l Rogers put i t , "We must...disabuse those 178 who b e l i e v e that the two superpowers should be p l a c e d on the same moral plane. That i s wrong." General Bernard Rogers, "NATO: The Next Decade," i n C h r i s t o p h e r Coker, ed., The  Future of the A t l a n t i c A l l i a n c e (Southampton: Royal United S e r v i c e s I n s t i t u t e , 1984). 8"McGeorge Bundy, f o r example, s t r e s s e d i n 1982 that the US, when making f o r e i g n p o l i c y , should " . . . t h i n k more about the i n t e r e s t s and concerns of our f r i e n d s and a l l i e s , and l e s s about the S o v i e t menace, than seems to be the h a b i t of the present a d m i n i s t r a t i o n i n Washington". McGeorge Bundy, "America i n the 1980's; Reforming our R e l a t i o n s with our F r i e n d s and Among Our A l l i e s , " S u r v i v a l , 24 (Jan/Feb 1982), p. 24. 8 5Andrew J . P i e r r e , "Long-Range-Theater Nuclear Forces i n Europe: The Primacy of P o l i t i c s , " In Marsha McGraw O l i v e and J e f f r e y D. Porro, eds.,. Nuclear Weapons i n Europe , p. 41 . • 8 6 W i l l i a m G. Hyland, "The S t r u g g l e f o r Europe," p. 29. 8 7 F e d e r a l M i n i s t e r of Defense, White Paper 1983: The  S e c u r i t y of the F e d e r a l Republic of Germany (Bonn: 1983), p7 1 46. 8 8 P a u l C. Warnke, "The I l l u s i o n of NATO's Nuclear Defense," i n Andrew J . P i e r r e , ed., Nuclear Weapons in  Europe, p. 79. 8 9 M a n f r e d Woerner as quoted i n Alex A. Vardamis, "German-American M i l i t a r y F i s s u r e s , " F o r e i g n P o l i c y , 34 (S p r i n g 1979), p. 98. 9 0 Q u o t e d i n Alex A. Vardamis, "German-American M i l i t a r y F i s s u r e s , " F o r e i g n P o l i c y , 34 ( S p r i n g 1979), p. 92. 9 1 L u t h a r Ruehl i n Die Z e i t , as quoted i n Vardamis, "German-Americam M i l i t a r y F i s s u r e s , " p. 93. 9 2Helmut Schmidt, Defense or R e t a l i a t i o n : A German View (New York: F r e d e r i c k A. Praeger, 1962), pp. 100-101 . 9 3 L e o n V. S i g a l , Nuclear Forces i n Europe: Enduring  Dilemmas, Present Prospects (Washington, D.C: The Brookings I n s t i t u t i o n , 1984), p. 40. 9 " S e c r e t a r y of Defense S c h l e s i n g e r , Senate Committee on F o r e i g n R e l a t i o n s , 93rd Congress, 2nd S e s s i o n , Hearings  on Nuclear Weapons and Fo r e i g n P o l i c y , (March-April 1974),  p. 209. 9 5 H e n r y A. K i s s i n g e r , "The Future of NATO," p. 9. 179 9 6 R i c h a r d K. B e t t s , "Innovation, Assessment, and D e c i s i o n , " i n Richard K. B e t t s , ed. C r u i s e M i s s i l e s :  Technology, S t r a t e g y , P o l i t i c s , p. 20. 9 7 P o p u l a r d i s c o n t e n t with l a n d - b a s i n g — a n d the a t t r a c t i v e n e s s of the sea-basing option--was epitomized by a j i n g l e popular during the MLF c o n t r o v e r y : "Put the m i s s i l e s out to s e a / Where the r e a l e s t a t e i s f r e e / And they're f a r away from me ..." 9 8NATO's nuclear r e l e a s e procedures, o f t e n r e f e r r e d to as impossibly cumbersome, do however c o n t a i n an important caveat r e l a t i n g to use. Expressed i n the Athens G u i d l i n e s i s the phrase "time and circumstances p e r m i t t i n g " t h e o r e t i c a l l y at l e a s t a l l o w i n g circumvention of the c o n s u l t a t i v e process i n v o l v e d i n n u c l e a r r e l e a s e . 9 9 New York Times, 17 March 1983, p. 21. 1 0 0 F o r t h i s reason, the Europeans have a s t r o n g d i s l i k e f o r the term " E u r o s t r a t e g i c " , o f t e n used i n r e f e r e n c e to weapons systems or the European nuclear balance. The term i m p l i e s a separate s t r a t e g i c equation r e s t r i c t e d to Europe, a conception the Europeans l a r g e l y r e f u s e to r e c o g n i z e . 1 0 1 F u r t h e r , the US was d i s t r a c t e d with the p o t e n t i a l impact an arms accord would have on i t s r e l a t i o n s h i p with other a l l i e s . Japan, f o r example, d e s p i t e i t s f i r m support of the Zero Option, p e r s i s t e n t l y sought US assurance that an INF deal i n Europe would not be n e g o t i a t e d at the expense of Japanese s e c u r i t y . 1 0 2 G r e g o r y T r e v e r t o n a r t i c u l a t e d t h i s view i n another way when he p o i n t e d out that using m i l i t a r y means to achieve p o l i t i c a l ends w i l l f a i l i f the m i l i t a r y means themselves are i n c r e d i b l e . See Gregory T r e v e r t o n , "Managing NATO's Nuclear Dilemma," I n t e r n a t i o n a l S e c u r i t y , 7 (Spring 1983), pp. 93-116. 1 0 3 S e e John Cart w r i g h t MP, and J u l i a n C r i t c h l e y MP, C r u i s e , Pershing and the SS-20: The Search f o r a Nuclear  Weapons Consensus i n Europe (North A t l a n t i c Assembly Report. Brassey's Defence P u b l i s h e r s , 1985.) 1 0 < ,Simon Lunn, "INF and P o l i t i c a l Cohesion i n NATO," In Hans Henrik Holm and N i k o l a j Petersen, eds., The European  M i s s i l e s C r i s i s , p. 211. 1 0 5 0 n October 22 1988, the l a r g e s t demonstration i n FRG h i s t o r y i n v o l v e d over 500,000 people. See James M. Markham, "Vast Crowds Hold R a l l i e s i n Europe Again s t US Arms," New  York Times, October 23, 1983. 1 0 6 W i l l i a m E. G r i f f i t h observed, f o r example, that the 180 German peace movement was a r e v i v a l of German Kulturpessimismus, or c u l t u r a l pessimism, r e j e c t i n g " . . . m a t e r i a l i s m , consumerism, economic growth, bureaucracy, l i b e r a l i s m , bourgieos l i f e s t y l e , and c o n v e n t i o n a l m o r a l i t y . " See W i l l i a m E. G r i f f i t h , "Bonn and Washington: From D e t e r i o r a t i o n to C r i s i s ? " O r b i s , V o l . 26 No. 1 (Spring 1982), p. 118. 1 0 7 R o b e r t L. P f a l t z g r a f f J r . , "West European A n t i -n u c l e a r i s m and the A l l i a n c e : A R e t r o s p e c t i v e Assessment," In James E. Dougherty and Robert P f a l t z g r a f f J r . , S h a t t e r i n g  Europe's Defense Consensus (New York: Pergammon Brassey's, 1985), p. 207. 181 Endnotes to Chapter III 1 0 8 C h r i s t o p h Bertram "The I m p l i c a t i o n s of Theater Nuclear Weapons i n Europe," F o r e i g n A f f a i r s 62, (Winter 1981/1982) p. 306 1 0 9 E u r o p e a n c r i t i c s of the deployment charged that INF was part of a l a r g e r US s t r a t e g i c purpose. Karsten D. V o i g t argued that the primary m i l i t a r y s t r a t e g i c r a t i o n a l e behind the INF d e c i s i o n was to ensure that NATO possessed the c a p a c i t y to engage in c o n t r o l l e d nuclear e s c a l a t i o n . In t h i s view, the deployment g i v e s NATO the c a p a c i t y to c a r r y out s e l e c t i v e f i r s t - s t r i k e c o u n t e r f o r c e a t t a c k s i n t o Warsaw Pact and S o v i e t t e r r i t o r y , a c a p a b i l i t y not i n the i n t e r e s t s of the European members. See Karsten D. V o i g t . "Nuclear Weapons in Europe: A German Democrat's P e r s p e c t i v e , " In Andrew J . P i e r r e , ed. Nuclear Weapons i n Europe, pp. 98-118. 1 1 0 A s s i s t a n t S e c r e t a r y of S t a t e Lawrence Ea g l e b e r g e r . Address before the North A t l a n t i c Assembly. 15 Oct. 1981. 1 1 1 H a n s Gunter Brauch, "INF and the Current NATO D i s c u s s i o n on A l l i a n c e S t r a t e g y : A German P e r s p e c t i v e , " In Hans Henrik Holm and N i k o l a j Petersen, eds., The European  M i s s i l e s C r i s i s : Nuclear Weapons and S e c u r i t y P o l i c y (London: F r a n c i s P i n t e r , 1983), p. 161. 1 1 2 L e o n V. S i g a l , Nuclear Forces i n Europe: Enduring  Dilemmas, Present Prospects, p. 2. 1 1 3 E u r o p e a n i n s i s t e n c e on the arms c o n t r o l t r a c k of the December 12 d e c i s i o n l e d to the establishment of the S p e c i a l Group (SG) to study the arms c o n t r o l dimension of the INF d e c i s i o n . 1 1"Simon Lunn, "INF and P o l i t i c a l Cohesion i n NATO," In Hans Henrik Holm and N i k o l a j Petersen, eds., The European  M i s s i l e s C r i s i s , p. 208. 1 1 5 L i b r a r y of Congress, The Modernization of NATO's  Long Range Theater Nuclear Forces, Report Prepared f o r the Subcommittee on Europe and the Middle East of the Committee on F o r e i g n A f f a i r s by the F o r e i g n A f f a i r s and N a t i o n a l Defense D i v i s i o n of the C o n g r e s s i o n a l Research S e r v i c e , L i b r a r y of Congress, December 31, 1980(Washington, D.C.: US Government P r i n t i n g O f f i c e , 1981), p. 32. 1 1 6Uwe N e r l i c h , "Theater Nuclear Forces i n Europe: Is NATO Running Out of Options?" i n Myers, ed., NATO: The Next  T h i r t y Years, p. 64. 1 1 7 Q u o t e d in John Vinocur, "US i s A f r a i d A l l i e s W i l l Back Out of M i s s i l e P l a n , " New York Times. Aug 29, 1981. p. 182 2. 1 1 8 Q u o t e d i n Strobe T a l b o t , Deadly Gambits (New York: A l f r e d A. Knopf, 1984), p. 33 1 1 9 C a s p a r Weinberger, S e c r e t a r y of Defense Annual Report to the Congress, F i s c a l Year 1986. (Washington, D.C: US Government P r i n t i n g O f f i c e , 1985), p. 200. , 2 0 C a s p a r Weinberger, S e c r e t a r y of Defense Annual Report to the Congress, F i s c a l Year 1985. p. 200. 1 2 1 G r e g o r y T r e v e r t o n , "NATO A l l i a n c e P o l i t i c s , " In R i c h a r d K. B e t t s , ed., C r u i s e M i s s i l e s : Technology,  St r a t e g y , P o l i t i c s , p. 43. 1 2 2Uwe N e r l i c h , "Theater Nuclear Forces i n Europe," p. 65. 1 2 3 T h e 1,800 km range Pershing I I , a c c o r d i n g to the JCS, "...provides an a d d i t i o n a l c a p a b i l i t y because i t can s t r i k e time urgent targets'." US M i l i t a r y Force Posture,  F i s c a l Year 1986, p. 34. 1 2 a S e e "Pershing. . I I : The Army's S t r a t e g i c Weapon". B u l l e t i n of the Atomic S c i e n t i s t s , 36 (October 1980), pp. 25-32. 1 2 S B o t h Parliamentary votes i n Belgium and H o l l a n d , conducted on 9 November 1983 and June 14 1984, r e s p e c t i v e l y , were c o n d i t i o n a l upon the progress of the INF n e g o t i a t i o n s . See John Cart w r i g h t and J u l i a n C r i t c h l e y , C r u i s e , Pershing  and SS-20: The Search f o r Consensus. 1 2 6 J e f f r e y Record, NATO's Nuclear Force Modernization  Program, p. 65. J e f f r e y Record a l s o brushed a s i d e the c o n c e a l a b i l i t y argument; each f l i g h t , he argued, was composed of 41 v e h i c l e s , an e a s i l y r e c o g n i z a b l e convoy. 1 2 7 S e e W i l l i a m R. Van Cleave and S.T. Cohen, T a c t i c a l  Nuclear Weapons, p. 22. 1 2 8 Department of Defense Annual Report, F i s c a l Year  1 981 . (Washington, D.C: Department of Def ense, 1 979) , p. 7. 1 2 9 L i b r a r y of Congress, "the Modernization of NATO's Long Range Theater Nuclear F o r c e s , " p. 34. 1 3 0 Q u o t e d i n J e f f r e y Record, NATO's Nuclear Force  Modernization Program, p. 70. 1 3 1 S e e , f o r example, J e f f r e y Record, NATO's Nuclear  Force M odernization Program, p. 5. 183 1 3 2 A n n u a l Report t o Congress, F i s c a l Year 1986. S e c r e t a r y of Defense Caspar Weinberger. (Washington, D.C.: US Government P r i n t i n g O f f i c e , 1985), p. 220. 1 3 3 J e f f r e y Record, NATO's N u c l e a r F o r c e M o d e r n i z a t i o n  Program, p. 63. 1 3 a F o r an e x c e l l e n t example of t h i s v i e w , see W i l l i a m A r k i n e t a l . , "The Consequences of a L i m i t e d N u c l e a r War i n Ea s t and West Germany," Ambio, 11 (1982), pp. 163-174, and Frank Barnaby, "The I r r a t i o n a l i t y of C u r r e n t N u c l e a r D o c t r i n e s , " i n T a c t i c a l N u c l e a r Weapons: European P e r s p e c t i v e s , pp. 213-214. On the o t h e r hand, P a u l Bracken p o i n t e d out t h a t the S o v i e t s may e x p l o i t the t h r e a t of c o l l a t e r a l damage; see " C o l l a t e r a l Damage and Theater W a r f a r e , " S u r v i v a l , 22 (Sept/Oct 1980), pp. 203-208. 1 3 5 J o s e p h I . C o f f e y , D e t e r r e n c e and Arms C o n t r o l , p. 88. 1 3 6 P a u l Buteux, S t r a t e g y , D o c t r i n e , and the P o l i t i c s of  A l l i a n c e : T h e a t e r N u c l e a r F o r c e M o d e r n i z a t i o n i n NATO ( B o u l d e r , C o l o r a d o : Westview P r e s s , 1983), p. 115. 1 3 7 S t r o b e T a l b o t t , Deadly Gambits (New York: A l f r e d A. Knopf, 1984), p. 44. 1 3 8 P a u l C. Warnke, "Theater N u c l e a r F o r c e s and NATO S e c u r i t y , " O r b i s , 25 ( F a l l 1981), p. 503. 1 3 9 Q u o t e d i n S t r o b e T a l b o t t , Deadly Gambits, p. 43. 1 4 0 P a u l C. Warnke, "Theater N u c l e a r F o r c e s and NATO S e c u r i t y , " p. 503. 1 " 1 B e t t s , p. 554. 1 " 2 F o r examples of t h e c r i t i q u e s l e v e l l e d a t NATO's concealment and d i s p e r s a l p l a n s see J e f f r e y R e c o r d , NATO's  N u c l e a r M o d e r n i z a t i o n Program, pp. 64-66. 1 f l 3 G r e g o r y T r e v e r t o n , "NATO A l l i a n c e P o l i t i c s , " I n R i c h a r d K. B e t t s , ed., C r u i s e M i s s i l e s : Technology,  S t r a t e g y , P o l i t i c s , p. 438. 1 ( , l ,Leon V. S i g a l , N u c l e a r F o r c e s i n Europe: E n d u r i n g  Dilemmas, P r e s e n t P r o s p e c t s , p. 45. 1 4 5 J e f f r e y Record, NATO's N u c l e a r F o r c e M o d e r n i z a t i o n  Program, p. 67. 1 f l 6 L a w r e n c e Freedman, "US N u c l e a r Warheads i n Europe: Symbols, S t r a t e g y , and F o r c e S t r u c t u r e , " I n Andrew J . P i e r r e , ed., N u c l e a r Weapons i n Europe, p. 58. 184 1 f l 7 F u r t h e r , due to munitions and maintenance c o s t s , any s i n g l e n a t i o n a l deployment of below 48 GLCM's was not co s t e f f e c t i v e . 1 * 8 L e o n V. S i g a l , Nuclear Forces i n Europe, p. 52. 1 4 9 S t r o b e T a l b o t t , Deadly Gambits, p. 23. 1 5 0 G r e g o r y T r e v e r t o n , "NATO A l l i a n c e P o l i t i c s , " p. 431. 1 5 ""Gregory T r e v e r t o n , "NATO A l l i a n c e P o l i t i c s , " p. 431. 185 Endnotes to Chapter IV 1 5 2 T h e b a s i s of the compound deter r e n c e argument used i n t h i s chapter i s drawn from R i c h a r d K. B e t t s ' a r t i c l e "Compound Deterrence v s. No F i r s t Use: What's Wrong i s What's Rig h t , " O r b i s , 2 (Winter 1985), pp. 697-718). The arguments forwarded i n t h i s chapter are i l l u s t r a t e d and e x p l a i n e d h e u r i s t i c a l l y i n Appendix 1, through the use of an a n a l y t i c a l t o o l adapted from the B e t t s a r t i c l e . R i c hard B e t t s ' s i s one of the premier commentators on s t r a t e g y and defence a f f a i r s i n the US. His p u b l i s h e d work i n c l u d e s Conventional St r a t e g y , unconventional c r i t i c i s m and  c o n v e n t i o n a l wisdom (Jerusalem: Magnes Press, 1984); C r u i s e  M i s s i l e s and US P o l i c y (Washington, D.C.; The Brookings I n s t i t u t i o n , 1982); C r u i s e M i s s i l e s : Technology, S t r a t e g y ,  P o l i t i c s (Washington, D.C.: The Brooking I n s t i t u i o n , 1981 ); The Irony of Vietnam: The System Worked. With L e s l i e H. Gelb. (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings I n s t i t u t i o n , 1979); Nuclear Blackmail and Nuclear Balance (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings I n s t i t u t i o n , 1987); S u r p r i s e A t t a c k : Lessons f o r  Defence Planning (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings I n s t i t u t i o n , 1982). 1 5 3 ' S u c c e s s f u l ' here i s taken to mean the h a l t i n g of a Warsaw Pact o f f e n s i v e i n West Germany and the i m p o s i t i o n of a s t r a t e g i c stalemate, with advantage s h i f t i n g to the West as the Western European, US, and Japanese economies m o b i l i z e to a f u l l war f o o t i n g . 1 5 " R i c h a r d K. B e t t s , S u r p r i s e A t t a c k : Lessons f o r  Defense Planning (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings I n s t i t u t i o n , 1982), p. 200. 1 5 5 J o h n J . Mearsheimer, "Why the S o v i e t s Can't Win Q u i c k l y i n C e n t r a l Europe," I n t e r n a t i o n a l S e c u r i t y , 7 (Summer 1982), p. 3. 1 5 6 T h e f i g u r e s used here are drawn from the 1987-1988  M i l i t a r y Balance (London: The I n t e r n a t i o n a l I n s t i t u t e f o r S t r a t e g i c S t u d i e s , 1987). These f i g u r e s do not i n c l u d e p o l i c e or p a r a m i l i t a r y f o r c e s . They do i n c l u d e French and Spanish ground f o r c e s . 1 5 7 F i g u r e s i n c l u d e Warsaw Pact category II d i v i s i o n s . NATO f i g u r e s do not i n c l u d e US and Canadian f o r c e s i n North America earmarked f o r Europe. 1 5 8 I t i s a l s o important to note that NATO has an advantage i n terms of Anti-Tank Guided Weapons (ATGW) of 6,500 to 4,500. 1 5 9 J o h n Mearsheimer, "Why the S o v i e t s Can't Win Q u i c k l y in C e n t r a l Europe," p. 9. 186 1 6 0 S e e John Mearsheimer, "Why the S o v i e t s Can't Win Q u i c k l y i n C e n t r a l Europe," p. 26. 1 6 1 S o v i e t Estimates of d e c i s i v e numerical s u p e r i o r i t y c a l l f o r a 3-5:1 s u p e r i o r i t y in i n f a n t r y , 6-8:1 i n a r t i l l e r y , 3-4:1 i n MBTs and S e l f - P r o p e l l e d A r t i l l e r y , and 5-10:1 i n a i r c r a f t . A.A. Sidorenko, The O f f e n s i v e : A So v i e t  View (Moscow, 1970), t r a n s , by U.S. A i r Force (Washington, D .C: US Government P r i n t i n g O f f i c e , 1976), p. 82. 1 6 2 J a m e s Meacham, "The Sentry at the Gate: A Survey of NATO's C e n t r a l F r o n t , " The Economist, 30 Aug. 1986, p. 8-9. 1 6 3 S e e James Meacham, "The Sentry at the Gate," p. 10. 1 6 " J o h n Mearsheimer, "Why the S o v i e t s Can't Win Q u i c k l y i n C e n t r a l Europe," p. 9. 1 6 5 J o h n Mearsheimer, "Why the S o v i e t s Can't Win Q u i c k l y i n C e n t r a l Europe," p. 30. 1 6 6 T h e s e f i g u r e s are drawn from R i c h a r d K. B e t t s , S u r p r i s e A t t a c k , p. 210. 1 6 7 B e n j a m i n S. Lambeth, " U n c e r t a i n t i e s f o r the S o v i e t War Planner," I n t e r n a t i o n a l S e c u r i t y , 7 (Winter 1982/83), p. 158. 1 6 8 S e e James Meacham, "The Sentry at the Gate," pp. 2-17. 1 6 9 J o h n E r i c k s o n , " S o v i e t M i l i t a r y C a p a b i l i t i e s i n Europe," J o u r n a l of the Royal U n i t e d S e r v i c e s I n s t i t u t e , 120 (March 1975) , p i 66~. See a l s o Dale H e r s p r i n g and Ivan Volges, " P o l i t i c a l R e l i a b i l i t y i n the E a s t e r n European Warsaw Pact Armies," Armed Forces and S o c i e t y , 6 (Winter 1980), pp. 270-296. 1 7°Mearsheimer, "Why the S o v i e t s Can't Win Q u i c k l y i n C e n t r a l Europe," p. 38. 1 7'Mearsheimer, "Why the S o v i e t s Can't Win Q u i c k l y i n C e n t r a l Europe," p. 36. 1 7 2 S e e David S. Yost, "The French Defence Debate," S u r v i v a l , 23 (Jan/Feb 1981), pp. 18-27. 1 7 3 A n d r e Beaufre, "The Sharing of Nuclear R e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s : A Problem i n Need of a S o l u t i o n . " I n t e r n a t i o n a l A f f a i r s , 41 ( J u l y 1965), p. 417. 1 7 " S e e Yost, "The French Defence Debate," p. 18. 187 1 7 5 S e e Excerpts i n S u r v i v a l , (Sept/Oct 1975), pp. 241-243 and (Sept/Oct 1976), pp. 226-228. 1 7 6 Q u o t e d in Yost, "The French Defence Debate," p. 20. 1 7 7 S e e General L. Lacaze, " P o l i t i q u e de Defense et S t r a t e g i e M i l i t a i r e de l a France," Defense N a t i o n a l e , (June 1983), p. 16. 1 7 8 P a u l Lewis, "France Approves Arms Plan Linked to European A l l i e s , " New York Times, 11 A p r i l 1987. 1 7 9 S e e Lacaze, " P o l i t i q u e de Defense S t r a t e g i e M i l i t a i r e de l a France," pp. 11-31. 1 8 0 R o b b i n F. L a i r d , O r b i s , 28 (Summer 1984), p. 1 8 1 R o b e r t S. Rudney, E v o l v i n g French A t t i t u d e s 1984), p. 90. 1 8 2 S e e O l i v e r Warmser, L'Express, 9-15 Dec. 1983. "The French S t r a t e g i c Dilemma," 311. "Mitterand's New A t l a n t i c i s m : Toward NATO." O r b i , 28 (Spring " Q u e l l P o l i t i q u e de Defense?" 1 8 3 S e e Rowland Evans and Robert Novak, "M i t t e r a n d Looks to Germany," Washington Post, 16 Dec. 1983. F u r t h e r French i n c e n t i v e to strengthen i t s defence t i e s to the F e d e r a l Republic may come from an a n x i e t y over the f u t u r e d i r e c t i o n of West German defence p o l i c y should the US withdrawal from Europe. The p o s s i b i l i t y of the F e d e r a l Republic a c q u i r i n g i t s own n u c l e a r f o r c e under such circumstances, however u n l i k e l y , i s a daunting prospect to the French. I f i n c r e a s i n g c o o p e r a t i o n with West Germany and expanding the scope of i t s nuclear p r o t e c t i o n w i l l h e lp prevent such a s i t u a t i o n , the French would w i l l i n g l y pay the p r i c e of g r e a t e r c o o p e r a t i o n i n European defence a f f a i r s . 1 8 " S e e Rudney, "Mitterand's New A t l a n t i c i s m , " p. 90. 1 8 5 S e e "France and NATO," The Ottawa C i t i z e n , 16 J u l y 1987. 1 8 6 S e e Paul Lewis, "France Approves Arms Plan Linked to European A l l i e s , " New York Times, 11 A p r i l 1987. 1 8 7 " F r a n c e plans i n c r e a s e i n i t ' s nuclear a r s e n a l , " The  Globe and M a i l , 27 November 1987. 1 8 8 S e e Lewis, "France Approves Arms Plan Linked to European A l l i e s . " 9Rudney, "Mitterand's New A t l a n t i c i s m , " p. 88. 188 1 9 0 S e e Jonathan S t e e l e , " P a r i s Moves to E a r l y Use of N-Weapons," New York Times, 26 March 1987. 1 9 1 See Lewis, "France Approves Arms Plan Linked to European A l l i e s . " 1 9 2 J o h n Prados, J o e l S. Wit and Michael J . Zagurek J r . , "The S t r a t e g i c Nuclear Forces of B r i t a i n and France," S c i e n t i f i c American, 255 (August 1986), p36. 1 9 3 L a i r d , "The F r e n c h . S t r a t e g i c Dilemma," p. 309. 1 9 U L a i r d , "The French S t r a t e g i c Dilemma," p. 308. Robbin F. L a i r d even went a step f u r t h e r i n suggesting that " P r o p o r t i o n a l deterrence would f a i l as a s t r i c t l y dyadic S o v i e t - F r e n c h exchange." p.311. 1 9 5 B e a u f r e , "The Sharing of Nuclear R e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s , " pp. 411-419. 1 9 6 L a i r d , "The French S t r a t e g i c Dilemma," p. 308. 1 9 7 Q u o t e d i n Rudney, "Mitterand's New A t l a n t i c i s m , " p. 91 . 1 9 8 S e e E r i c J . Grove, " A l l i e d Nuclear Forces complicate N e g o t i a t i o n s , " B u l l e t i n of the Atomic S c i e n t i s t s , (June / J u l y 1986). p. 19. 1 " Q u o t e d i n Grove, " A l l i e d Nuclear Forces complicate N e g o t i a t i o n s , " p. 19. 2 0 0 S e e John Prados, et a l . , "The S t r a t e g i c Nuclear Forces of B r i t a i n and France," p. 36. 2 0 1 John Prados, et a l . , "The S t r a t e g i c Nuclear Forces of B r i t a i n and France," p. 37. 2 0 2 See Lewis, "France Approves Arms Plan Linked to European A l l i e s , " and comments by Robbin F. L a i r d , "The French S t r a t e g i c Dilemma," p. 320. 2 0 3 L a i r d , "The French S t r a t e g i c Dilemma." p. 326. 2 0 < 4 P a u l Bracken, The Command and C o n t r o l of Nuclear  Forces (New Haven: Yale U n i v e r s i t y p r e s s , 1983), p. 169. 2 0 5 R i c h a r d K. B e t t s , S u r p r i s e Attack, p. 252. See a l s o R i c h a r d B e t t s , "Compound Deterrence vs. No F i r s t Use: What's Wrong i s What's Ri g h t . " O r b i , 2 (Winter 1 9 8 5 ) , p . 703. 2 0 6 P a u l Bracken, The Command and C o n t r o l of Nuclear  Weapons, p. 171. 189 2 0 7 T h i s aspect of deterr e n c e i n Europe i s not new. Thomas S c h e l l i n g and Herman Kahn noted i n the 1960's that there was a d e t e r r e n t element i n the ambiguity of NATO p o l i c y . Thomas C. S c h e l l i n g , The St r a t e g y of C o n f l i c t (London: Oxford U n i v e r s i t y Press, 1960) and Herman Kahn, On E s c a l a t i o n (Baltimore: Penguin Books, 1965). 2 0 8 D o r i a l d M. Snow. The Nuclear F u t u r e : Toward a  Str a t e g y of U n c e r t a i n t y (Alabama: U n i v e r s i t y of Alabama Press, 1983), p. 159. 2 0 9 P a u l Bracken, The Command and C o n t r o l of Nuclear  F o r c e s , p. 174. Some a n a l y s t s have suggested that the West should adopt a nuclear s t r a t e g y based on u n c e r t a i n t y . Donald M. Snow, f o r example, has argued t h a t : "A more prudent and s e n s i b l e approach to s e r v i n g the d e t e r r e n t purpose i s to accept and make the best of the very r e a l u n c e r t a i n t i e s i n v o l v e d i n p r e d i c t i n g the outcome of employing nu c l e a r weapons as t h e . c e n t r a l r e a l i t y f o r s t r a t e g y . " Snow, The  Nuclear Future, p. 158. 2 1 0 D a v i d P. C a l l e o , "NATO's Middle Course," F o r i e g n  P o l i c y , 69 (Winter 1987-88), pp. 135-147. 2 1 ' C a l l e o , "NATO's Middle Course", p. 146. 2 1 2 C a l l e o , "NATO's Middle Course", p. 147. 190 Endnotes t o Chapter V 2 1 3 S e e E l i z a b e t h Pond, "Kohl A - O f f e r makes s p l a s h , but not a wave," C h r i s t i a n S c i e n c e M o n i t o r , 31 (Aug-Sept 6 1987). 2 1 " T h e S o v i e t p l a n t i s i n V o t k i n s k , near the U r a l s , and the US p l a n t i s i n Magna, Utah. The S o v i e t p l a n t produces the SS-25, and the US p l a n t components of the T r i d e n t I I . 2 1 5 D a v i d Evans, "Much Remains the Same Under Superpower T r e a t y , " C a l g a r y H e r a l d , (September 20, 1987) 2 1 6 S e e D a v i d Evans, "Much Remains the Same Under Superpower T r e a t y . " 2 1 7 J o h n Deutch, Br e n t S c o w c r o f t , R. James Woolsey, "The Danger of the Zero O p t i o n , " New York Times, ( A p r i l 12, 1987). 2 1 B D o n a l d R. C o t t e r , "The Emerging INF Agreement: A Case of S t r a t e g i c R e g r e s s i o n , " S t r a t e g i c Review, 15 (Summer 1987), p. 18 2 1 9 D o n a l d R. C o t t e r , "The Emerging INF Agreement," p. 13. 2 2 0 " C l o s i n g the Gap", Time, 7 September 1987, p. 15. 2 2 1 " C l o s i n g the Gap", Time, p. 15. 2 2 2 S e e " P e r l e i s C r i t i c a l of P r o v i s i o n s t o V e r i f y the M i s s i l e T r e a t y , " New York Times, 2 December 1987, p. 5. 2 2 3 S e e Gary T h a t c h e r , "Reagan A i d e c a l l s S o v i e t O f f e r ' o n l y an i n t e r i m s t e p ' , " C h r i s t i a n S c i e n c e M o n i t o r , May 4-10, 1987, p. 4. 2 2""Arms t a l k s Snagged by M i s s i l e s ' L i k e n e s s , " Globe  and M a i l , 13 Nov 1987. p. 8. T h i s c o u l d be done, c r i t i c s c h a r g e d , i n one of two ways. F i r s t , the p r o d u c t i o n of SS-25s c o u l d be a l t e r e d t o b u i l d an i l l i c i t s t o c k of SS-20s. Second, the t h i r d s t age of the SS-25s c o u l d s i m p l y be removed t o a c h i e v e the same e f f e c t . In a d d i t i o n , the SS-25s themselves c o u l d t h r e a t e n Europe, e s p e c i a l l y t h r o u g h d e p r e s s e d t r a j e c t o r y l a u n c h t o reduce warning t i m e , or from a l o f t e d t r a j e c t o r y t o render a Euro-ABM system i n e f f e c t i v e . 2 2 5 D o n a l d R. C o t t e r , "The Emerging INF Agreement," p. 12. 2 2 6 J o h n Deutch, e t a l . "The Danger of the Zero O p t i o n . " 191 2 2 7 S e e John Deutch et a l . , "The Danger of the Zero Option." 2 2 8 E u g e n e Rostow, "Beware the INF R i s k s , " New York  Times, 30 Aug 1987. 2 2 9 J a m e s A. Thomson, "The Arms C o n t r o l Challenge to the A l l i a n c e , " RAND. [P-7382] September 1987, p. 6. 2 3 0 J a m e s A. Thomson, "The Arms C o n t r o l Challenge to the A l l i a n c e " , p. 6. 2 3 1 E u g e n e Rostow, "Beware the INF R i s k s , " 2 3 2 Q u o t e d i n D a n i e l C h a r l e s , "NATO Looks f o r Arms C o n t r o l Loopholes", B u l l e t i n of the Atomic S c i e n t i s t s , 47 (September 1987), p. 11. 2 3 3 S e e E l i z a b e t h Pond, "Arms C o n t r o l T a l l y : Who's Making the Most Concessions", C h r i s t i a n Science Monitor. 6 September 1987. 2 3 " " S e n a t e Now Turns S c r u t i n y to INF-and Beyond," C o n g r e s s i o n a l Q u a r t e r l y , 46, 23 January . 1988, p. 149. 2 3 5 S e e "Senate Now Turns S c r u t i n y to INF," p. 149. 2 3 6 E u r g e n e Rostow, "Beware the INF R i s k s " . 2 3 7 " S e n a t e Now Turns S c r u t i n y to INF", p. 149. 2 3 8 H e n r y K i s s i n g e r , Speech to the Her i t a g e Foundation, quoted i n "Senate Now Turns S c r u t i n y to INF," p. 151. 2 3 9 I n f a c t , recent a d m i n i s t r a t i o n appointments of o f f i c i a l s f a v o u r a b l e to arms c o n t r o l i n t o key p o s i t i o n s (such as the appointment of Paul N i t z e to the D i r e c t o r s h i p of the ACDA) have i n c r e a s e d the a d m i n i s t r a t i o n s p o s i t i o n i n the Senate r a t i f i c a t i o n b a t t l e . O p p o s i t i o n by c o n s e r v a t i v e s to such appointments has been a c t i v e , and has prompted a n x i e t y amongst US c o n s e r v a t i v e s over the f u t u r e i n t e n t i o n s of the a d m i n i s t r a t i o n . See "Conservatime Storm Brews over Reagan's arms p o l i c i e s , " C h r i s t i a n Science Monitor, 14-20 September 1987. 2"°Quoted i n D a n i e l C h a r l e s "NATO looks f o r arms c o n t r o l l o o p h o l e s , " B u l l e t i n of the Atomic S c i e n t i s t s , 47 September 1987, p. 12. 2 " 1 E l i z a b e t h Pond, "Europe Questions America's Promise," C h r i s t i a n Science Monitor, 10-16 August 1987, p. 1 3. 2 4 2 Q u o t e d i n E l i z a b e t h Pond, "Europe Questions 192 America's Promise," p. 13. 2 4 3 S e e "US Ready to Remove Warheads," New York Times, 3 September 87. 2 *"Quoted i n E l i z a b e t h Pond, "Europe Questions America's Promise," p. 11. 2" 5"NATO Chief Warns of 'Euphoria'," New York Times, 18 September 1987. 2 < l 6 S e e E l i z a b e t h Pond, "Kohl Caught i n a Bind Between Zero Options," C h r i s t i a n Science Monitor, 4-10 May 1987. 2 ' 7 D o n a l d R. C o t t e r , "The Emerging INF Agreement: A Case of S t r a t e g i c Regression," p. 19. 2 f l 8 S e e R i c h a r d H a l l o r a n , "Plan to equip B-52's i s proposed," New York Times, 18 September 1987. 2 " 9 S e e D a n i e l C h a r l e s , "NATO looks f o r arms c o n t r o l l o o p h o l e s " . 2 5 0 Q u o t e d i n D a n i e l C h a r l e s , "NATO looks f o r arms c o n t r o l l o o p h o l e s , " p. 1 1. 2 5 1 Q u o t e d i n Michael Gordon, " M i s s i l e Pact Prompts T a l k s on West's Nuclear Defence," p. 7. 2 5 2 Q u o t e d i n D a n i e l C h a r l e s , "NATO looks f o r arms c o n t r o l l o o p h o l e s , " p. 7. 2 5 3 Q u o t e d i n Jonathan Braude, " B r u s s e l s Summit: NATO Agrees Short Range compromise," Jane's Defence Weekly, 9 (12 March 1988), p. 446. 2 5""You do not deter with o b s o l e t e weapons," Thatcher warned at the B r u s s e l s Summit. Quoted i n Jonathen Braude, "NATO Re a f f i r m s commitment to f l e x i b l e respons s t r a t e g y , " Jane's Defence Weekly, 9 (12 March 1988), p. 446. 2 5 5 T h e r e are p o t e n t i a l problems with the p r a c t i c a l management of such a s e c u r i t y s t r u c t u r e . The non-nuclear NATO c o u n t r i e s would have l i t t l e or no input i n t o n u c l e a r p o l i c y i s s u e s i n such a s i t u a t i o n . The n a t i o n a l n u c l e a r f o r c e s of both France and Great B r i t a i n are guided almost e x c l u s i v e l y by n a t i o n a l and s t r a t e g i c s e l f - i n t e r e s t , and might demonstrate l i t t l e or no i n t e r e s t i n s u b o r d i n a t i n g or implementing the f o r c e s t r u c t u r e d e s i r e s of the non-nuclear NATO c o u n t r i e s i n t o t h e i r r e s p e c t i v e nuclear f o r c e s . R e l i a n c e of the European NATO members on r e g i o n a l n u c l e a r d e t e r r e n t s c o u l d i s o l a t e the bulk of NATO n a t i o n s from any input i n t o n u c l e a r p o l i c y q u e s t i o n s . Resentment might be the r e s u l t . The non-nuclear c o u n t r i e s , f r u s t r a t e d by t h e i r l a c k 193 of i n f l u e n c e on nuclear i s s u e s , and the annoyance of B r i t a i n and France over repeated "suggestions" (read "meddling") of non-nuclear European c o u n t r i e s on how to run t h e i r n a t i o n a l n u c l e a r f o r c e s , c o u l d r e s u l t i n the development of severe p o l i t i c a l r i f t s i n the NATO. 2 5 6 H e d l e y B u l l , " S e c u r i t y by N e g o t i a t i o n " , i n Ch r i s t o p h e r Coker, The Future of the A t l a n t i c A l l i a n c e , p. 158 . 2 5 7 Q u o t e d i n D a n i e l C h a r l e s , "NATO looks f o r arms c o n t r o l l o o p h o l e s , " p. 12. 2 5 8 S e e James M. 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" F o r e i g n P o l i c y . 34 ( S p r i n g 1979), pp. 87-107. Warnke, P a u l C. "Theater N u c l e a r F o r c e s and NATO S e c u r i t y . " O r b i s . 25 ( F a l l 1984), pp. 501-505. "West German White Paper on Defence." S u r v i v a l . 21 (Nov/Dec 1979), pp. 273-277. Worner, Manfred. "NATO Defenses and T a c t i c a l N u c l e a r Weapons." S t r a t e g i c Review. 5 ( f a l l 1977), pp. 11-19. 203 Y o s t , D a v i d S. "The Fre n c h Defence Debate." S u r v i v a l . 23 (Jan/Feb 1981), pp. 18-27. Newspaper A r t i c l e s "Arms T a l k s Snagged by M i s s i l e s L i k e n e s s . " The Globe and  Mai 1 , 13 November 1987. " C l o s i n g the Gap." Time Magazine, 7 September 1987. " C o n s e r v a t i v e Storm Brews Over Reagan's Arms P o l i c i e s . " C h r i s t i a n S c i e n c e M o n i t o r , 14-20 September 1987. Deutch, John, e t a l . "The Danger of the Zero O p t i o n . " The  New York Times, 12 A p r i l 1987. Evans, D a v i d . "Much Remains the Same Under Superpower T r e a t y . " C a l g a r y H e r a l d . 20 September 1987. Evans, Rowland, and Robert Novak. " M i t t e r a n d Looks t o Germany." Washington P o s t , 16 December 1983. "France and NATO." The Ottawa C i t i z e n , 16 J u l y 1987. "France P l a n s I n c r e a s e i n i t s N u c l e a r A r s e n a l . " The Globe  and M a i l , 27 November 1987. "Gordon, M i c h a e l . " M i s s i l e P a ct Prompts T a l k s on West's N u c l e a r Defence." The New York Times, 4 November •, 1987. Gwertzman, B e r n a r d . "Some Congressmen Suggest B r i n g i n g the Boys Back Home." The New York Times. 14 March 1982. H a l l o r a n , R i c h a r d . " P l a n t o E q u i p B-52's i s Proposed." The  New York Times, 18 September 1987. K a p l a n , F r e d . "Warning Over New M i s s i l e s f o r NATO." The New  York Times Magazine, 9 December 1979. L e w i s , P a u l . "France Approves Arms P l a n L i n k e d t o European A l l i e s . " The New York Times, 11 A p r i l 1987. Markham, James M. "Vast Crowds H o l d R a l l i e s i n Europe A g a i n s t US Arms." The New York Times, 23 October 1983. Markham, James M. " M i s s i l e D iplomacy: Europe P r e p a r e s . " The  New York Times, 2 A p r i l 1987. "NATO C h i e f Warns of E u p h o r i a . " The New York Times, 18 204 September 1987. " O u t f l a n k e d by T h a t c h e r , M i s s i l e Foes Look Past the Law." W a l l S t r e e t J o u r n a l . 6 A p r i l 1983. " P e r l e i s C r i t i c a l of P r o v i s i o n s t o V e r i f y the M i s s i l e T r e a t y . " The New York Times, 2 December 1987. Pond, E l i z a b e t h . "Kohl A - O f f e r makes s p l a s h , but not a wave." C h r i s t i a n S c i e n c e M o n i t o r , 31-6 August/September 1987. Pond, E l i z a b e t h . "Kohl Caught i n a B i n d Between Zero O p t i o n s . " C h r i s t i a n S c i e n c e M o n i t o r , 4-10 May 1 987. Pond, E l i z a b e t h . "Europe Q u e s t i o n s America's Promise." C h r i s t i a n S c i e n c e M o n i t o r , 10-16 August 1987. Pond, E l i z a b e t h . "Arms C o n t r o l T a l l y : Who's Making the Most C o n c e s s i o n s . " C h r i s t i a n S c i e n c e M o n i t o r , 6September 1987. Q u e s t e r , George. " S o v i e t M i l i t a r y Debate." New York Times, 17 September 1987. Rostow, Eugene. "Dangerous Dreams of Peace." The Chicago  T r i b u n e , 29 March 1983. Rostow, Eugene. "Beware the INF R i s k s . " The New York Times, 30 August 1987. S t e e l e , J o n a t h a n . " P a r i s Moves t o E a r l y Use of N-Weapons." The New York Times, 26 March 1987. T h a t c h e r , Gary. "Reagan A i d e c a l l s S o v i e t O f f e r 9 o n l y an i n t e r i m s t e p ' . " C h r i s t i a n S c i e n c e M o n i t o r , 4-10 May 1987. Thompson, E.P. "A L e t t e r t o A m e r i c a . " The N a t i o n , 24 January 1981. "US Ready t o Remove Warheads." The New York Times, 3 September 1987. V i n o c u r , John. "US i s A f r a i d A l l i e s W i l l Back Out of M i s s i l e P l a n . " The New York Times, 29 August 1981. V i n o c u r , John. "Set Back t o N o r t h Europe's M i s s i l e Foes." The New York Times, 24 March 1981. Warmser, O l i v e r . " Q u e l l P o l i t i q u e de Defense?" L ' E x p r e s s , 9-15 December 1983. 205 APPENDIX 1 MULTIPLE RISK AND COMPOUND DETERRENCE As s e s s i n g . the impact of INF on deterrence i s unavoidably a s u b j e c t i v e e n t e r p r i s e . As p o i n t e d out e a r l i e r , d e t e r r e n c e , besides being hard to d e f i n e , i s d i f f i c u l t to measure and impossible to t e s t . Attempts to draw c o n c l u s i o n s about the r e l a t i v e i n f l u e n c e of c e r t a i n f a c t o r s on d e t e r r e n c e are muddled by the v a r y i n g assumptions and d i v e r g e n t frames of r e f e r e n c e used by commentators or groups of commentators. The i d e o l o g y of the i n d i v i d u a l or group i s a prominent component of any d e t e r r e n c e p e r s p e c t i v e . F u r t h e r , deterrence u l t i m a t e l y depends on S o v i e t p e r c e p t i o n s . The d i f f i c u l t y here, of course, l i e s i n making i n f e r e n c e s or p r o j e c t i o n s of S o v i e t r i s k assessment and judging the impact c e r t a i n f a c t o r s have on that assessment. T h i s e n t e r p r i s e i n v o l v e s c o n s i d e r a b l e guesswork and i n the absence of a means of v e r i f y i n g these judgements (the S o v i e t s themselves, in f a c t , may not be sure) they remain guesses about S o v i e t p e r c e p t i o n s . A c c o r d i n g l y , when attempting to assess the impact of INF on d e t e r r e n c e , i t i s impossible to make a q u a n t i t a t i v e judgement. Furthermore, de t e r r e n c e assessment i s h i g h l y dependent upon i d e o l o g i c a l p e r s p e c t i v e and what R i c h a r d B e t t s has r e f e r r e d to as the "muddle of r i s k " . 1 I t i s p o s s i b l e , however, to e x t r a p o l a t e t e n d e n c i e s . The r e l a t i v e d i r e c t i o n of the impact a given f a c t o r would have on d e t e r r e n c e can be assessed. Such a model would have 2 0 6 s e v e r a l a n a l y t i c a l uses. F i r s t , such a model would serve as an instrument of c l a r i f i c a t i o n , to organize the p e r s p e c t i v e s of c e r t a i n groupings of o p i n i o n and the r e l a t i v e weights they a t t a c h to v a r i o u s elements of the deterrence equation. Second, through adjustment of one or more of these elements i t c o u l d be seen how s h i f t s i n these elements a f f e c t the deterr e n c e equation as a- whole. T h i r d , by i n t r o d u c i n g a whole new element i n t o the equation, coupled with the views the groupings h o l d of the new element, the r e l a t i v e impact of a new f a c t o r - - s u c h as INF--on the deterrence equation can be shown r e l a t i v e to a l l deterrence p e r s p e c t i v e s . The b a s i s of the a n a l y t i c a l t o o l used i n t h i s appendix i s adapted from one put forward by Ri c h a r d B e t t s i n h i s a r t i c l e "Compound Deterrence vs. No F i r s t Use: What's Wrong i s What's R i g h t . " The framework pres e n t s d e t e r r e n c e as the f u n c t i o n not of s i n g l e r i s k f a c t o r s c o n s i d e r e d i n i s o l a t i o n , but of compounded r i s k f a c t o r s c o n s i d e r e d i n t e r d e p e n d e n t l y . Each f a c t o r has an i n f l u e n c e on a comprehensive assessment of the r i s k s i n v o l v e d i n c h a l l e n g i n g d e t e r r e n c e . However, s i n c e r i s k f a c t o r s are cumulative, i t i s the t o t a l "package" th a t makes up the deterrence e q u a t i o n . O s t e n s i b l y , deterrence i n Europe i s maintained by the d u a l i t y of c a p a b i l i t y e x p l i c i t i n F l e x i b l e Response. Contained i n the c o n v e n t i o n a l f o r c e s i n p l a c e i n Europe i s the element of d e n i a l through defence, while nuclear d e t e r r e n c e poses the t h r e a t of punishment. T h e r e f o r e , two separate p r o b a b i l i t i e s face any S o v i e t c a l c u l a t i o n of r i s k 207 i n v o l v e d i n an a t t a c k : f i r s t , the l i k e l i h o o d that NATO's co n v e n t i o n a l f o r c e s w i l l f a i l to defend Europe a g a i n s t Warsaw Pact f o r c e s , and second, the l i k e l i h o o d that NATO would not d e l i b e r a t e l y e s c a l a t e to the nuclear l e v e l . Should NATO choose to e s c a l a t e , v i c t o r y i n a meaningful sense e s s e n t i a l l y vanishes. These two p r o b a b i l i t i e s must be con s i d e r e d j o i n t l y . To ignore one or the other on the S o v i e t ' s part would r e s u l t i n an i n a c c u r a t e assessment of the r i s k i n v o l v e d i n an a t t a c k . However, as Chapter IV p o i n t s out, these are not the only f a c t o r s i n v o l v e d i n a Soviet assessment of the r i s k s faced i n a t a c k i n g Europe. The l i k e l i h o o d of e s c a l a t i o n i s not a s i n g l e u n i t a r y p r o b a b i l i t y . Rather, the p r o b a b i l i t y of a v o i d i n g e s c a l a t i o n i s a f u n c t i o n of four d i f f e r e n t p o s s i b i l i t i e s : the p o s s i b i l i t y of e s c a l a t i o n by the US; the p o s s i b i l i t y of e s c a l a t i o n by France; the p o s s i b i l i t y of e s c a l a t i o n by Great B r i t a i n ; and d e s p i t e the f a c t that i s i s f r e q u e n t l y f o r g o t t e n or ignored i n western s e c u r i t y w r i t i n g s , the l i k e l i h o o d of a c c i d e n t a l or inadver t e n t e s c a l a t i o n . Any assessment of the l i k e l i h o o d that e s c a l a t i o n can be avoided i s t h e r e f o r e not dependent on an examination of one p r o b a b i l i t y , but of fou r , each with i t s own d e c i s i o n dynamic. The p r o b a b i l i t y of NATO's c o n v e n t i o n a l f o r c e s s u c c e s s f u l l y r e p e l l i n g an at t a c k adds a f i f t h independent d e t e r r e n t f a c t o r . F i n a l l y , the p r o p e n s i t y of the S o v i e t l e a d e r s h i p to seek i t s goals through armed c o n f r o n t a t i o n i n Europe must be i n c l u d e d as w e l l . I n t e n t , as Be t t s 208 emphasizes, i s not a constant, or at l e a s t should not be, i n e v a l u a t i n g d e t e r r e n c e . 2 The S o v i e t s w i l l not n e c e s s a r i l y a t t a c k the moment they f e e l they w i l l be s u c c e s s f u l . The d e s i r e to achieve t h e i r g o als i n t h i s manner, balanced with f l u c t u a t i n g p o t e n t i a l r i s k s and c o s t s , i s not a constant p r o b a b i l i t y . From these f i v e separate p r o b a b i l i t i e s which S o v i e t r i s k assessment must c o n s i d e r , the cumulative p r o b a b i l i t y that deterrence w i l l f a i l can be t a b u l a t e d . The p e r s e c t i v e groupings o u t l i n e d i n Chapter II r e p l a c e the a n a l y t i c a l l y more l i m i t e d g r o u p i n g s — a t l e a s t f o r t h i s s t u d y — u s e d i n the o r i g i n a l . Added to the separate r i s k f a c t o r s where r e l e v a n t i s the allowance f o r t h e i r ' r e l a t i v e impact i n the d e t e r r e n c e equation with INF i n p l a c e and without INF i n p l a c e . T h i s enables i l l u s t r a t i o n of the p r o s p e c t i v e impact INF has on the v a r i o u s r i s k f a c t o r s a c c o r d i n g to the p e r s p e c t i v e of each grouping. I t a l s o a l l o w s f o r an assessment of INF's r e l a t i v e impact on d e t e r r e n c e as a whole. • The numbers in both t a b l e s , as i n the o r i g i n a l B e tts c o n c e p t i o n , are the author's own, and are acknowledged as s u b j e c t i v e e s t i m a t e s . They are not intended to be r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s of r e a l e m p i r i c a l p r o b a b i l i t i e s . They are intended to be r e p r e s e n t a t i v e of the r e l a t i v e p o s i t i o n s h e l d by the groupings and the d i r e c t i o n of s h i f t s i n these p o s i t i o n s . S i m i l a r l y , they are not intended to represent e m p i r i c a l p r o b a b i l i t i e s of S o v i e t r i s k assessment or western de t e r r e n c e c o n f i d e n c e , but are designed to show p o s i t i o n s 209 and d i r e c t i o n a l s h i f t s i n So v i e t and western c a l c u l a t i o n s . No assumption i s being made that S o v i e t l e a d e r s think i n pu r e l y i n terms of such, p r o b a b i l i t i e s . However, the presumption i s that i n pl a n n i n g an i n v a s i o n , or while under the p r e s s u r e of c r i s i s , they would be fo r c e d to evaluate r i s k i n a s i m i l a r manner. The Groupings and T h e i r P o s i t i o n s E x p l a n a t i o n s of the p e r s p e c t i v e groupings, views on INF are e x p l a i n e d i n d e t a i l i n chapter I I , but a b r i e f r e i t e r a t i o n of t h e i r p o s i t i o n s r e l a t i v e to t a b l e s II and III i s o f f e r e d here to c l a r i f y the o p i n i o n s h e l d by each grouping. For the US de p l o y e r s , as i l l u s t r a t e d i n Table I I , the c r e d i b i l i t y of the t h r e a t of e s c a l a t i o n depends upon deployment of INF. Without INF, the l i k e l i h o o d t h at the US w i l l not e s c a l a t e i s very high. With INF, the e s c a l a t o r y p o t e n t i a l of NATO i s r e s t o r e d and confidence i n e s c a l a t i o n r i s e s . The US deploy e r s p l a c e l i t t l e f a i t h i n the p o s s i b i l i t y of d e l i b e r a t e e s c a l a t i o n by the European n u c l e a r powers and have l i t t l e f a i t h i n the d e t e r r e n t value of the th r e a t of inadver t e n t e s c a l a t i o n . From the US dep l o y e r s ' p e r s p e c t i v e , t h e r e f o r e , the So v i e t view of the cumulative chances of a v o i d i n g e s c a l a t i o n are q u i t e favourable without the new INF fo r c e i n Europe. With INF, however, S o v i e t assessments of the l i k e l i h o o d of a v o i d i n g e s c a l a t i o n drop d r a m a t i c a l l y . Table II re p r e s e n t s 210 the key i n d i c a t o r s — i n c l u d i n g estimates of the l i k e l i h o o d of a v o i d i n g e s c a l a t i o n — t h a t i n s p i r e c onfidence, or a lack of co n f i d e n c e , i n the s t r e n g t h of d e t e r r e n c e . For US deployers, the a b i l i t y of NATO's c o n v e n t i o n a l d e f e n c e s — e v e n with l i m i t e d use of TNWs—to withstand the p e r c e i v e d S o v i e t c o n v e n t i o n a l f o r c e preponderance i s very much i n doubt. T h e r e f o r e , the l i k e l i h o o d that NATO defence w i l l f a i l i s v i r t u a l l y a g i v e n . The S o v i e t d e s i r e to a t t a c k i s based on S o v i e t c a l c u l a t i o n s of the p l a u s i b i l i t y of a t t a i n i n g v i c t o r y at ac c e p t a b l e c o s t . Without INF, US deplo y e r s argue, the m i l i t a r y chances f o r the S o v i e t s i n Europe look a t t r a c t i v e . There i s a reasonable chance of a v o i d i n g e s c a l a t i o n and high c o n f i d e n c e i n the chances of c o n v e n t i o n a l v i c t o r y . With INF deployed, however, the S o v i e t p r o p e n s i t y to at t a c k i s g r e a t l y reduced. For US d e p l o y e r s , then, the o v e r a l l p r o b a b i l i t y that deterrence w i l l f a i l w i l l drop d r a m a t i c a l l y i f INF i s deployed. I f INF i s not deployed, and the i n t e g r i t y of extended dete r r e n c e i s not r e s t o r e d , the l i k e l i h o o d of deterr e n c e f a i l i n g i s q u i t e h i g h . The US ba l a n c e r s have s i m i l a r a t t i t u d e s to the de p l o y e r s and d i f f e r only i n the r e l a t i v e emphasis they p l a c e on c e r t a i n h y p o t h e t i c a l r i s k assessments. Without INF, f o r example, the l i k e l i h o o d that there would be no d e l i b e r a t e US e s c a l a t i o n i s hig h , 21 1 T able I I H y p o t h e t i c a l P r o b a b i l i t i e s of P e r c e i v e d R i s k of E s c a l a t i o n By P e r s p e c t i v e Groupings No D e l i b e r a t e NATO No Cu m u l a t i v e E s c a l a t i o n I n a d v e r t e n t / Prob. of S c h o o l s of Acc i d e n t a l A v o i d i n g Thought on By By. By E s c a l a t i o n " 2 " E s c a l a t i o n 3 European US GB Fr Secur i t y No No No I s s u e s INF INF INF INF INF INF a a' b c d d' abed a ' bed US D e p l o y e r s .9 . 1 .9 .9 .9 . .9 .66 .07 US B a l a n c e r s .8 .2 .7 .7 .9 .9 .35 .09 US Arms C o n t r o l l e r s .5 .5 .4 .4 .7 .3 .06 .02 US C o n v e n t i o n a l D e t e r r e r s .9 .9 .9 .9 .6 .9 .44 . 66 Euro C o u p l e r s .9 . 1 .7 j .7 .5 .5 .22 .02 Euro Negot i a t o r s . 7 .3 .7 .7 . 5 .5 . 17' .07 Euro Di sarmers .4 . 1 .3 . 3 .4 .2 .01 .002 A u t h o r ' s Assessment .7 .7 .5 .8 .7 .7 .20 .20 1 These f o u r columns d i s p l a y the v a r y i n g s u b j e c t i v e p e r c e p t i o n s t h a t occur i n the debate c o n c e r n i n g the p r o b a b i l i t y of d e l i b e r a t e m i l i t a r y ' e s c a l a t i o n a c r o s s the n u c l e a r t h r e s h o l d by the t h r e e nuclear-armed governments of NATO. 2 These two columns d i s p l a y the p e r c e i v e d . r i s k of i n a d v e r t e n t e s c a l a t i o n t h r o u g h an a r b i t r a r i l y a s s i g n e d p r o b a b i l i t y of a v o i d i n g u n a u t h o r i z e d or t e c h n i c a l - a c c i d e n t a l d e t o n a t i o n of n u c l e a r weapons by NATO f o r c e s . 3 These two columns d i s p l a y the net p e r c e i v e d p r o b a b i l i t y of s u c c e s s f u l l y a v o i d i n g e s c a l a t i o n a c r o s s the n u c l e a r t h r e s h o l d by the v a r i o u s p e r s p e c t i v e g r o u p i n g s — w i t h and w i t h o u t INF systems. 212 Table I I I V a r y i n g P e r c e i v e d R i s k s of F a i l u r e t o Deter S o v i e t A t t a c k on Western Europe NATO's Non Perce i v e d I ndex of Cumulat i v e N u c l e a r L i k e l i h o o d Perce i ved Compound S c h o o l s of Defence E s c a l a t i o n •Soviet Prob . t h a t Thought on W i l l F a i l W i l l Not Des i re to D e t e r r e n c e European Occur" A t t a c k 5 W i l l F a i l Secur i t y I s s u e s No No No INF INF INF INF INF INF' a b c cj_ _ a be ab'c' US D e p l o y e r s si .66 .07 . si s i .48 .01 US B a l a n c e r s ^9 .35. . 09 . s i s i .22 .05 US Arms C o n t r o l l e r s JL_5_ . 06 .02 s i . 003 .001 US C o n v e n t i o n a l D e t e r r e r s . 44 . 66 . s i s i .02 .03 Euro C o u p l e r s si .22 ' .02 . s i s i . 1 2 .005 Euro Negot i a t o r s . 1 7 .07 . s i _:_2 .04 . 0.1 Euro Di sarmers s i .01 .002 . 1 .001 .001 A u t h o r ' s Assessment .20 .20 L S i L .01 .01 " These columns a r e d e r i v e d d i r e c t l y from columns from the compound P r o b a b i l i t y columns i n T a b l e I I . 5 These f i g u r e s a r e f o r i l l u s t r a t i v e p u r p o s e s , a l t h o u g h they do r e f l e c t the a u t h o r ' s assessment of the v a r i o u s p e r s p e c t i v e g r o u p i n g ' s e s t i m a t i o n of i n n a t e S o v i e t a g g r e s s i v e n e s s . 213 though not so hig h as the d e p l o y e r s . US ba l a n c e r s p l a c e some f a i t h i n So v i e t h e s i t a n c y over the t h r e a t of b a t t l e f i e l d n u c l e a r use and over nu c l e a r capable a i r c r a f t . Deployment of INF would, however, s i g n i f i c a n t l y r e s t o r e the c r e d i b i l i t y of NATO's e s c a l a t o r y t h r e a t . For the US b a l a n c e r s , S o v i e t concern about the l i k e l i h o o d of d e l i b e r a t e e s c a l a t i o n by the independent European d e t e r r e n t s i s s i g n i f i c a n t . S o v i e t r i s k assessment cannot d i s c o u n t these independent d e t e r r e n t s e n t i r e l y . The r i s k of ina d v e r t e n t or a c c i d e n t a l e s c a l a t i o n , i n the ba l a n c e r s ' view, i s s u f f i c i e n t l y small f o r the S o v i e t s to di s c o u n t as a n e g l i g i b l e t h r e a t . Without INF, then, US bal a n c e r s see S o v i e t c a l c u l a t i o n s of the l i k e l i h o o d of a v o i d i n g e s c a l a t i o n as f a i r , i f not so high as the d e p l o y e r s . If INF i s deployed, however, US ba l a n c e r s agree that S o v i e t assessments of the p l a u s i b l i t y of a v o i d i n g e s c a l a t i o n drop to v i r t u a l l y n i l . US b a l a n c e r s , l i k e US d e p l o y e r s , have l i t t l e c o nfidence i n the a b i l i t y of NATO to conduct a c t i v e defence, e i t h e r c o n v e n t i o n a l l y or with l i m i t e d TNW use. The impact of INF on the S o v i e t d e s i r e to a t t a c k , however, i s not as great f o r the ba l a n c e r s as f o r the d e p l o y e r s . While S o v i e t c a l c u l a t i o n s of a t t a i n i n g v i c t o r y at ac c e p t a b l e cost are more favo u r a b l e without INF, INF alone cannot be expected to d r a s t i c a l l y reduce S o v i e t i n c e n t i v e to a t t a c k . Comprehensive improvements to western f o r c e posture in a l l areas i s needed to e f f e c t i v e l y dissuade S o v i e t 2 1 4 adventurism. O v e r a l l , the US ba l a n c e r s view INF as a p o s i t i v e f o r c e fo r d e t e r r e n c e . The l i k e l i h o o d that d e t e r r e n c e w i l l f a i l without INF i s not viewed as n e a r l y so great as the dep l o y e r s , but i t i s s i g n i f i c a n t enough to warrant a t t e n t i o n , p r e f e r a b l y through deployment, and i f necessary through arms c o n t r o l . For US b a l a n c e r s , deployment of INF r e s t o r e s the c r e d i b i l i t y of dete r r e n c e , and g r e a t l y reduces the l i k e l i h o o d that i t w i l l f a i l . US arms c o n t r o l l e r s are g e n e r a l l y s k e p t i c a l of the impact INF would have on S o v i e t t h r e a t assessment and on de t e r r e n c e . Deterrence i s seen as much more a f u n c t i o n of r i s k p r o b a b i l i t i e s other than those presented by INF. There i s ambivalence on the pa r t of US arms c o n t r o l l e r s over the l i k e l i h o o d of d e l i b e r a t e NATO e s c a l a t i o n . D e l i b e r a t e e s c a l a t i o n by NATO i s not seen as e s p e c i a l l y probable, and deployment of INF, i t i s argued, makes l i t t l e d i f f e r e n c e to NATO's p r o p e n s i t y to e s c a l a t e . For the US arms c o n t r o l l e r s , the S o v i e t Union would have to c o n s i d e r the r i s k of d e l i b e r a t e e s c a l a t i o n by France or Great B r i t a i n to be h i g h l y probable. Where INF i s l i a b l e to have an impact, i n the arms c o n t r o l l e r s ' view, i s on S o v i e t assessments of the l i k e l i h o o d of a c c i d e n t a l e s c a l a t i o n . Without INF i n p l a c e i n a d v e r t e n t or a c c i d e n t a l n u c l e a r use was a f u n c t i o n of e x i s t i n g weapons and c o n t r o l procedures. With INF deployed, the t h r e a t of key e s c a l a t o r y n u c l e a r systems being overrun 215 meant an i n c r e a s e d l i k e l i h o o d of unauthorized or a c c i d e n t a l launch. For the US arms c o n t r o l l e r s , then, S o v i e t c a l c u l a t i o n s of the l i k e l i h o o d of a v o i d i n g n u c l e a r e s c a l a t i o n d u r i n g an i n v a s i o n of Western Europe are not encouraging. The p r o b a b i l i t y of a v o i d i n g e s c a l a t i o n i s very low, with INF lowering the l i k e l i h o o d m a r g i n a l l y not because of i t s e s c a l a t o r y p o t e n t i a l but because of i t s impact on the chances of inadve r t e n t use. US arms c o n t r o l l e r s are ambivalent about the a b i l i t y of NATO to defend i t s e l f m i l i t a r i l y . G e n e r a l l y , however, they pla c e much more confi d e n c e i n the defence o p t i o n than do deplo y e r s or - b a l a n c e r s . In the end, f o r arms c o n t r o l l e r s , many of these c a l c u l a t i o n s are i r r e l e v a n t . The USSR has l i t t l e or no d e s i r e to a t t a c k Europe, whatever the s h i f t s i n the m i l i t a r y balance might do to i t s chances of v i c t o r y . A c c o r d i n g l y , f o r arms c o n t r o l l e r s the o v e r a l l l i k e l i h o o d of deterrence f a i l i n g i s extremely low, with INF having only an i n f i n i t e s i m a l i n f l u e n c e on the r i s k assessment equation. INF, f o r a l l i t s vaunted m i l i t a r y and p o l i t i c a l p o t e n t i a l , i s e s s e n t i a l l y i r r e l e v a n t to the c r e d i b i l i t y of Western d e t e r r e n c e . For arms c o n t r o l l e r s , of course, the importance of the new INF f o r c e l i e s i n the realm of i t s arms c o n t r o l i m p l i c a t i o n s , not i t s m i l i t a r y importance. The US c o n v e n t i o n a l d e t e r r e r s are h i g h l y s k e p t i c a l of the c r e d i b i l i t y of the e s c a l a t o r y t h r e a t , whether the th r e a t 216 i s that of the US or Great B r i t a i n of France. The S o v i e t Union can, with high c o n f i d e n c e , expect the US and European nucl e a r powers to be s e l f - d e t e r r e d . T h i s does not change with the deployment of INF. No US p r e s i d e n t , the US c o n v e n t i o n a l d e t e r r e r s argue, would order a nuclear s t r i k e on the S o v i e t Union from Europe, knowing what the response to such an a t t a c k would almost c e r t a i n l y be. For US c o n v e n t i o n a l d e t e r r e r s , t h e r e f o r e , the cumulative chance of a v o i d i n g e s c a l a t i o n i s q u i t e h i g h , r e g a r d l e s s of whether or not INF i s deployed. Deployment of n u c l e a r f o r c e s to Europe avoids a d d r e s s i n g the crux of the European s e c u r i t y problem. The key to d e t e r r e n c e i n Europe, the c o n v e n t i o n a l d e t e r r e r s argue, i s improved c o n v e n t i o n a l preparedness. To t h i s end, as George Quester argued, there i s a r e a l need to " . . . r e c o n f i g u r e c o n v e n t i o n a l f o r c e s i n Europe." 3 Confidence i n c o n v e n t i o n a l defence would be most enhanced through the deployment of new c o n v e n t i o n a l t e c h n o l o g i e s married to new o p e r a t i o n a l concepts. Only i n c r e a s e d l e v e l s of c o n v e n t i o n a l preparedness, not deployment of new n u c l e a r systems, can t r u l y enhance det e r r e n c e i n Europe. US c o n v e n t i o n a l d e t e r r e r s a l s o e v a l u a t e the S o v i e t d e s i r e to a t t a c k Europe as low. A moderate i n c r e a s e i n NATO's c o n v e n t i o n a l c a p a b i l i t y would t h e r e f o r e be s u f f i c i e n t to b u t t r e s s a d e t e r r e n t based on a c r e d i b l e defence c a p a c i t y , not on t r a n s p a r e n t nuclear promises. For the 217 c o n v e n t i o n a l d e t e r r e r s , the l i k e l i h o o d that d e t e r r e n c e would f a i l i n such c o n d i t i o n s i s extremely s m a l l . For Euro-c o u p l e r s , INF i s a b s o l u t e l y e s s e n t i a l to maintain the c r e d i b i l i t y and v i a b i l i t y of the nuclear guarantee and to ensure the continued l i n k a g e of Europe to US s t r a t e g i c n u c l e a r f o r c e s . Without INF, the t h r e a t of e s c a l a t i o n upon which western s e c u r i t y depends w i l l not appear at a l l c r e d i b l e . With INF, the e s c a l a t o r y chain or "seamless web" of deterrence w i l l be r e s t o r e d and S o v i e t estimates of the p r o b a b i l i t y of US e s c a l a t i o n w i l l be r e s t o r e d to a healthy l e v e l . E u r o -couplers emphasize the e s c a l a t o r y l i n k of Europe to the US, and p l a c e l e s s emphasis on the c r e d i b i l i t y of e s c a l a t i o n by the European nuc l e a r powers. They g e n e r a l l y concede, however, that although the l i k e l i h o o d of d e l i b e r a t e B r i t i s h and French e s c a l a t i o n i s low, the S o v i e t s do, at l e a s t , have to c o n s i d e r the p o s s i b i l i t y . In the words of A i r M a r s h a l l S i r Peter T e r r y (DepSACEUR): " . . . i t would be a brave Russian who r i s k e d a P o l a r i s or T r i d e n t response to any attempt to subjugate us by f o r c e . " " S i m i l a r l y , the p l a u s i b i l i t y of a c c i d e n t a l or i n a d v e r t e n t nuclear use i s a f u r t h e r r i s k the S o v i e t s must take s e r i o u s l y . The abundance of n u c l e a r weapons i n Europe, and the "use or l o s e " nature of many of them, pose a unique, n o n - r a t i o n a l e s c a l a t i o n t h r e a t that i s more e f f e c t i v e i n some ways than t h r e a t s of d e l i b e r a t e e s c a l a t i o n . L a r g e l y because of these other e s c a l a t o r y r i s k s , Euro-218 c o u p l e r s view o v e r a l l S o v i e t , confidence- i n a v o i d i n g e s c a l a t i o n as lower than US deplo y e r s or b a l a n c e r s . However, without deployment of INF, the S o v i e t s may see some chance of a v o i d i n g e s c a l a t i o n . With INF deployed> Euro-couplers argue, S o v i e t confidence i n a v o i d i n g e s c a l a t i o n i s minimal. For E u r o - c o u p l e r s , the f e a s i b i l i t y of a c o n v e n t i o n a l defence of Europe i s marginal. The c o n v e n t i o n a l s u p e r i o r i t y enjoyed by the USSR i s seen as too great to be r e a l i s t i c a l l y matched by the NATO n a t i o n s . A c c o r d i n g l y , Euro-couplers pl a c e l i t t l e f a i t h i n NATO's c o n v e n t i o n a l defence, emphasizing i n s t e a d the nucl e a r d e t e r r e n c e dimension. As a r e s u l t , without INF deployed the S o v i e t d e s i r e to a t t a c k and confi d e n c e i n v i c t o r y i s q u i t e high; with INF.deployed, S o v i e t d e s i r e s to gain advantage by a p p l y i n g f o r c e i n Europe drop s i g n i f i c a n t l y . For the Eu r o - c o u p l e r s , f a i l u r e to deploy INF would leave a chance that d e t e r r e n c e might f a i l ; deployment of INF would ensure the continued s t r e n g t h of the western d e t e r r e n t . The E u r o - n e g o t i a t o r s a l s o b e l i e v e INF i s necessary to r e s t o r e the i n t e g r i t y of the e s c a l a t i o n p r o c e s s . They p l a c e more f a i t h i n the e x i s t i n g e s c a l a t o r y t h r e a t than do the Euro- c o u p l e r s and are not as c o n f i d e n t that INF w i l l e n t i r e l y r e s t o r e the c r e d i b i l i t y of extended d e t e r r e n c e . J P a r i t y has p l a c e d d e l i b e r a t e e s c a l a t i o n i n some permanent doubt. INF deployment would, however, i n f l u e n c e S o v i e t r i s k assessment i n a p o s i t i v e manner. E u r o - n e g o t i a t o r s , along with the Eur o - c o u p l e r s , 219 emphasize the importance of the s e c u r i t y l i n k to the US s t r a t e g i c nuclear f o r c e and minimize the impact the t h r e a t of e s c a l a t i o n from the B r i t i s h and French nu c l e a r f o r c e s would have on S o v i e t r i s k c a l c u l a t i o n s . E u r o - n e g o t i a t o r s a l s o view the l i k e l i h o o d of i n a d v e r t e n t e s c a l a t i o n as a very r e a l i n f l u e n c e on S o v i e t assessments of the chances of a v o i d i n g e s c a l a t i o n . For the E u r o - n e g o t i a t o r s , INF w i l l have a p o s i t i v e impact on S o v i e t r i s k assessment. Although S o v i e t confidence i n a v o i d i n g e s c a l a t i o n i s q u i t e low without INF i n p l a c e , with INF deployed t h i s c onfidence w i l l be reduced to almost n i l . E u r o - n e g o t i a t o r s a l s o p l a c e l i t t l e f a i t h i n the v i a b i l i t y of c o n v e n t i o n a l defence. However, E u r o - n e g o t i a t o r s do not accept arguments warning of the imminence of a S o v i e t a t t a c k on Europe. They see the S o v i e t d e s i r e to use f o r c e i n Europe as being extremely low, and i t would only be m a r g i n a l l y reduced f u r t h e r by deployment of INF. E u r o - n e g o t i a t o r s are c o n f i d e n t i n the s t r e n g t h of d e t e r r e n c e . Although INF i s d e s i r a b l e to r e s t o r e the c r e d i b i l i t y of the s e c u r i t y guarantee, the o v e r a l l l i k e l i h o o d of deterrence f a i l i n g i s extremely low, l a r g e l y due to the i n f l u e n c e of other f a c t o r s i n the r i s k equation. In t h i s broad sense, INF w i l l only m a r g i n a l l y enhance the western d e t e r r e n t . Using arms c o n t r o l to achieve western d e s i r e s i s the p r e f e r a b l e o p t i o n . The Euro-disarmers, f o r whom the imperative i s disarmament, do not p l a c e much emphasis on c a l c u l a t i o n s of 220 the m i l i t a r y balance. For them, the g r e a t e s t r i s k are nuclear weapons themselves and the t h r e a t of a c c i d e n t a l war. T h e i r p o s i t i o n holds that e s c a l a t i o n i s l i k e l y and i s more so with INF deployed. D e l i b e r a t e e s c a l a t i o n by the European nuclear powers i s a l s o l i k e l y . The dominant concern of the Euro-disarmers i s that the r i s k of inadve r t e n t or a c c i d e n t a l nuclear r e l e a s e i s high, and that r i s k i s compounded with INF in p l a c e . The S o v i e t s must r e a l i z e , t h e r e f o r e , that the chances of a v o i d i n g e s c a l a t i o n with or without INF, are very s m a l l . The Euro-disarmers, i n advocating a n u c l e a r - f r e e (or at l e a s t nuclear-reduced) Europe, p l a c e a great d e a l of confidence i n the v i a b i l i t y of c o n v e n t i o n a l defence, but t h i s c o n f i d e n c e i s l a r g e l y a f u n c t i o n of the extent of the t h r e a t . The Euro-disarmers argue that the t h r e a t of a t t a c k from the S o v i e t Union i s v i r t u a l l y n o n - e x i s t e n t . E.P. Thompson, f o r example, wrote: "The b a s i c posture of the Sov i e t Union seems to me...to be those of s e i g e and ag g r e s s i v e d e f e n c e . " 5 Real disarmament i n i t i a t i v e s , e i t h e r b i l a t e r a l or f o r some, u n i l a t e r a l , w i l l remove the S o v i e t m i l i t a r y c a p a c i t y deployed i n Europe. As a r e s u l t , Euro-disarmers argue that the chance of deterrence f a i l i n g i s minimal. The absence of a g g r e s s i v e i n t e n t on the part of the Sov i e t Union, coupled with s t r a t e g i c p a r i t y ( p r e f e r a b l y reduced to minimum deterr e n c e l e v e l s or at l e a s t halved) ensures the peace. 221 Turning the T a b l e s : INF and Deterrence S e v e r a l c o n c l u s i o n s can be drawn from the n o t i o n a l outcomes i l l u s t r a t e d i n Tables I and I I . F i r s t , and most notab l e , i s how deterrence as a whole i s a f u n c t i o n of a number of separate, autonomous r i s k c a l c u l a t i o n s , a l l of which must be c o n s i d e r e d i n a s s e s s i n g both the l i k e l i h o o d of s u c c e s s f u l a t t a c k ( f o r the S o v i e t s ) the s t r e n g t h of d e t e r r e n c e ( f o r the West). Because of t h i s compounded nature of r i s k , the impact of a s h i f t i n one r i s k f a c t o r i s l e s s i n terms of the e n t i r e r i s k equation than i t i s i f c o n s i d e r e d a l o n e . While marginal changes to a s i n g l e r i s k f a c t o r have a minimal impact on the whole, even l a r g e s h i f t s i n a s i n g l e r i s k f a c t o r are " d i l u t e d " by other r i s k f a c t o r s i n ..the • f i n a l assessment of r i s k . For example, f o r the US d e p l o y e r s I N F has a very s i g n i f i c a n t impact on the l i k l i h o o d of d e l i b e r a t e e s c a l a t i o n by the US. The d i f f e r e n t i a l between the two n o t i o n a l c a s e s - - w i t h INF and without — i s .8. However, when the other r i s k f a c t o r s are i n c l u d e d , the cumulative p r o b a b i l i t y of a v o i d i n g e s c a l a t i o n narrows to .59, while the impact of INF on deterrence as a whole drops to a d i f f e r e n t i a l of .47 (assuming here f o r i l l u s t r a t i v e purposes t h a t the S o v i e t d e s i r e to a t t a c k i s c o n s t a n t ) . For most other p e r s p e c t i v e groupings, where INF i s judged to have a l e s s dramatic impact on one r i s k f a c t o r , the r e l a t i v e impact of INF on the e n t i r e r i s k equation i s much l e s s . What t h i s i m p l i e s i s that changes to Western defence posture must be c o n s i d e r e d i n terms of t h e i r impact as part 222 a l a r g e r whole, not i n terms of t h e i r impact on a given r i s k f a c t o r . E x t o l l i n g the v i r t u e s of how a given program or p o l i c y can favourably i n f l u e n c e one aspect of the r i s k equation i s m i s l e a d i n g i n terms of i t s impact on d e t e r r e n c e as a whole. Second, i t i s evident that the impact of INF on d e t e r r e n c e as a whole i s , f o r most groupings, e i t h e r small or v i r t u a l l y i n f i n i t e s i m a l . Where INF i s assumed to have the most s i g n i f i c a n t impact i s with the US d e p l o y e r s . However, the s i g n i f i c a n c e US d e p l o y e r s a t t a c h to INF i s l a r g e l y due to t h e i r l a c k of f a i t h i n the c r e d i b i l i t y of other d e t e r r e n t f a c t o r s and i n t h e i r view of the l i k e l i h o o d of a S o v i e t a t t a c k . As an i l l u s t r a t i o n , i f t h e i r f a i t h i n c o n v e n t i o n a l defence was improved, f o r example to .5, then the cumulative p r o b a b i l i t y of deterrence f a i l i n g with and without INF would drop to .007 and .26 r e s p e c t i v e l y , a decrease i n d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n of .47 to l e s s than .26. S i m i l a r l y , i f t h e i r view of the S o v i e t p r o p e n s i t y to a t t a c k without INF i n p l a c e was moderated, for example to .4, the cumulative p r o b a b i l i t y of d e t e r r e n c e f a i l i n g without INF would drop to .24, and the d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n with INF and without f a l l s to a much l e s s dramatic .23. US d e p l o y e r s and Euro-couplers overemphasize the impact a n u c l e a r weapons system can have i n the d e t e r r e n c e e q u a t i o n . As Betts p o i n t s out, i n an era of c o u n t e r v a l u e redundancy and rough e q u a l i t y , nuclear c r e d i b i l i t y i s l a r g e l y i n e l a s t i c . 6 Increases to n u c l e a r c a p a b i l i t i e s do not 223 have the impact they might otherwise have had. Nuclear improvements are no longer an easy, economical means of i n c r e a s i n g d e t e r r e n c e . The s e c u r i t y r e t u r n s on such deployments have become l e s s and l e s s s i g n i f i c a n t . The US deployers make the mistake of overemphasizing the importance of a s i n g l e r i s k f a c t o r to the v i r t u a l e x c l u s i o n of the i n f l u e n c e the others might have on S o v i e t r i s k assessment. T h i r d , the t a b l e s demonstrate the importance of the autonomous B r i t i s h and French nu c l e a r c a p a b i l i t i e s . The i n f l u e n c e of these independent nu c l e a r d e t e r r e n t s i s o f t e n de-emphasized in the West due to t h e i r r e l a t i v e i n s i g n i f i c a n c e next to the US a r s e n a l . However, they are s i g n i f i c a n t to S o v i e t planners i n t h e i r p o t e n t i a l to wreak d e s t r u c t i o n on the USSR. The autonomy of the European nuclear f o r c e s means the S o v i e t s are f o r c e d to c o n s i d e r three d i f f e r e n t r e a c t i o n s to any a t t a c k from three d i f f e r e n t d e c i s i o n making c e n t e r s : Washington, London, and P a r i s . T h i s cannot be ignored i n S o v i e t c a l c u l a t i o n s of r i s k . The complexity of the s i t u a t i o n i s made worse by the p o s s i b i l i t y t h a t the use of one of these independent nuclear f o r c e s c o u l d draw the US i n t o a n u c l e a r c o n f l i c t . The US, r e g a r d l e s s of i t s wishes or the s u i t a b i l i t y of the s i t u a t i o n , might f e e l compelled to s t r i k e the USSR r a t h e r than attempt to r i d e out a s p o r a d i c and i n d i s c r i m i n a t e S o v i e t response. Fourth, the importance of the r i s k of i n a d v e r t e n t or a c c i d e n t a l e s c a l a t i o n i s c l e a r l y e v i d e n t . Again, t h i s i s a 224 r i s k f a c t o r not g e n e r a l l y emphasized as such i n western s e c u r i t y w r i t i n g s . U s u a l l y , i t i s r e f e r r e d to i n arms c o n t r o l or Confidence B u i l d i n g Measures (CBM) enhancing l i t e r a t u r e . However, the r i s k of in a d v e r t e n t or a c c i d e n t a l e s c a l a t i o n must be very cogent to S o v i e t p l a n n e r s . M i l i t a r y success f o r the S o v i e t ' Union i s based l a r g e l y on c a l c u l a t i o n s of the l i k e l i h o o d of a v o i d i n g e s c a l a t i o n , which i s dependent not only on the t h r e a t of nuclear e s c a l a t i o n through d e l i b e r a t e p o l i c y , but on a c c i d e n t a l r e l e a s e as w e l l . Inadvertent or a c c i d e n t a l e s c a l a t i o n would destroy S o v i e t chances of v i c t o r y j u s t as d e l i b e r a t e e s c a l a t i o n ' would. F i f t h , e v a l u a t i o n of the S o v i e t d e s i r e or i n t e n t to at t a c k are as important a part of the deterr e n c e equation as estimates of how the S o v i e t s e v a l u a t e the r i s k s of a t t a c k . "Formal deterrence t h e o r i e s u s u a l l y ignore the e s t i m a t i o n of ) i n t e n t , p o s i t i n g i t as a c o n s t a n t — t h e enemy w i l l a t t a c k i f he t h i n k s he can get away with i t . " 7 However, the d e s i r e to achieve o b j e c t i v e s through war cannot be p o s i t e d as a co n s t a n t . I t i s s u b j e c t to s h i f t i n g l e a d e r s h i p a t t i t u d e s , p o l i t i c a l , events and i n f l u e n c e s , and e v o l v i n g m i l i t a r y c a l c u l a t i o n s about the p o t e n t i a l r i s k s and c o s t s of a g g r e s s i o n . The d e s i r e of the S o v i e t Union to achieve i t s o b j e c t i v e s through war i s an.important i n f l u e n c e on the r i s k e q u a t i o n . I f the USSR d e s i r e s war, a c e r t a i n p r o b a b i l i t y of the l i k e l i h o o d of v i c t o r y may be s u f f i c i e n t f o r i t to a t t a c k . I f the USSR does not d e s i r e war, s u b s t a n t i a l l y more 225 favo u r a b l e estimates of the p r o b a b i l i t y of success are not l i k e l y to change the S o v i e t p r o p e n s i t y to a t t a c k . Those who favour deployment of INF view the S o v i e t d e s i r e to use f o r c e i n Europe as h i g h . Deployment of INF has v a r i o u s i n f l u e n c e s on the S o v i e t d e s i r e to a t t a c k , but i t i s l a r g e l y construed to weaken S o v i e t c o n f i d e n c e i n an a t t a c k . It only does so, however, because estimates of S o v i e t a g g r e s s i v e n e s s by these p e r s p e c t i v e s are hi g h , an e v a l u a t i o n d o u b t f u l i n the face of S o v i e t preoccupation with i t s i n t e r n a l economic and p o l i t i c a l agenda. A more moderate t h r e a t assessment which judges S o v i e t d e s i r e to engage i n c o n f l i c t as somewhat l e s s changes the r e l a t i v e impact of INF on d e t e r r e n c e . If US d e p l o y e r s , f o r example, had a l e s s negative view of S o v i e t i n t e n t i o n s ( i . e . .5), t h i s would lower the cumulative l i k e l i h o o d of deterr e n c e f a i l i n g to .3, a d i f f e r e n t i a l of .18. F i n a l l y , i t i s evident that given the s i z e of nu c l e a r a r s e n a l s and the impact of other r i s k f a c t o r s on compound deter r e n c e , a d d i t i o n s to n u c l e a r c a p a b i l i t i e s have l e s s and l e s s r e l a t i v e impact. Such i s the case with INF. However, a d d i t i o n s to c o n v e n t i o n a l f o r c e s can have a much gr e a t e r impact on r i s k c a l c u l a t i o n s . Improvements to NATO's c o n v e n t i o n a l f o r c e posture can s i g n i f i c a n t l y improve the chances f o r a s u c c e s s f u l c o n v e n t i o n a l defence. Even f o r those who p l a c e l i t t l e f a i t h i n the c r e d i b i l i t y of the other r i s k . f a c t o r s , improvements to NATO's c o n v e n t i o n a l f o r c e posture would go a long way towards improving d e t e r r e n c e . 226 For example, i f US deplo y e r s had moderate confidence i n the chances of a s u c c e s s f u l c o n v e n t i o n a l defence ( i . e . .4) the cumulative p r o b a b i l i t y of deterr e n c e f a i l i n g with and without INF drops to .006 and .21 r e s p e c t i v e l y . T h i s d i f f e r e n t i a l would a c t u a l l y be somewhat l e s s , as reduced chances of c o n v e n t i o n a l success would reduce S o v i e t i n c e n t i v e s to a t t a c k . The p o t e n t i a l impact of c o n v e n t i o n a l improvements becomes even more noteworthy i f other r i s k f a c t o r s are accorded the s i g n i f i c a n c e they deserve. T h i s i s not to argue that improvements to c o n v e n t i o n a l f o r c e s i n Europe would guarantee a s u c c e s s f u l defence. The p o i n t i s that when the compound nature of de t e r r e n c e i n Europe i s recognized, improvements to c o n v e n t i o n a l defence are the best means of i n c r e a s i n g the s t r e n g t h of d e t e r r e n c e . Such improvements would r a i s e NATO confidence i n defence and lower S o v i e t c o n f i d e n c e i n an a t t a c k . In a d d i t i o n , t h i s does not mean to suggest a l a r g e c o n v e n t i o n a l m i l i t a r y m i l i t a r y b u i l d u p f o r NATO (a p o l i t i c a l and economic i m p l a u s i b i l i t y i n any c a s e ) , and n e i t h e r does i t d i s p l a y i n s e n s i t i v i t y to European concerns about making Europe safe f o r c o n v e n t i o n a l war. The aim should be to improve NATO's c o n v e n t i o n a l f o r c e posture w i t h i n the context of i t s i n f l u e n c e on the compound deterr e n c e equation and with r e l a t i o n to the other r i s k f a c t o r s . The temptation i s to adopt the r a t i o n a l e of many of the INF deployment e n t h u s i a s t s and argue that massive c o n v e n t i o n a l improvements are the only way to strengthen d e t e r r e n c e and that the c r e d i b i l i t y of the other r i s k 227 f a c t o r s i s n e g l i g i b l e . P l a i n l y , t h i s i s not the case. The-US nuclear c a p a c i t y i n Europe must be maintained to provide the element of the r i s k of e s c a l a t i o n to a s t r a t e g i c exchange. S i m i l a r l y , the c r e d i b i l i t y and impact the other r i s k f a c t o r s have on S o v i e t r i s k assessment must be accounted f o r i n NATO estimates of how much e f f o r t should be .placed on c o n v e n t i o n a l preparedness. 228 Endnotes to Appendix I 1 R i c h a r d K. B e t t s , "Compound Deterrence vs. N o - F i r s t -Use: What's Wrong i s What's R i g h t , " ORBIS, 2 (Winter 1985), p.706. 2 R i c h a r d K. B e t t s , "Compound Deterrence vs. N o - F i r s t -Use," p. 710. 3 R i c h a r d K. B e t t s , "Compound Deterrence v s . N o - F i r s t -Use," p. 708. "George Quester, " S o v i e t M i l i t a r y Debate," New York  Times, .(-1-7 Sept. 1987). 5 A i r M a r s h a l l S i r Peter T e r r y , "The Way Ahead: B r i t a i n ' s Roles," In C h r i s t o p h e r Coker, The Future of the  A t l a n t i c A l l i a n c e (Southampton: Royal U n i t e d S e r v i c e s I n s t i t u t e , 1984.) p. 149. 6E.P. Thompson, "A L e t t e r to America," The Nation, (Jan. 24 1981) p. 17. 7 R i c h a r d K. B e t t s , Compound Deterrence vs. N o - F i r s t -Use," p. 710 8 R i c h a r d K. B e t t s , "Compound Deterrence vs. N o - F i r s t -Use," p. 710 229 G l o s s a r y ACDA....Arms C o n t r o l and Disarmament Agency ADM Atomic D e m o l i t i o n M u n i t i o n ALCM....Air-launched C r u i s e M i s s i l e ASM A i r - S u r f a c e M i s s i l e ASW A n t i - S u b m a r i n e W a r f a r e B A O R . . . . B r i t i s h Army of the Rhine CENTAG..Central Army Group ERW Enhanced R a d i a t i o n Warhead FBS Forward Based Systems GLCM....Ground-Launched C r u i s e M i s s i l e I C B M . . . . I n t e r c o n t i n e n t a l B a l l i s t i c M i s s i l e INF Intermediate-Range N u c l e a r F o r c e s IRBM....Intermediate-Range B a l l i s t i c M i s s i l e MAD M u t u a l Assured D e s t r u c t i o n MBFR....Mutual Balanced F o r c e R e d u c t i o n s MBT Main B a t t l e Tank M I R V . . . . M u l t i p l e I n d e p e n d e n t l y T a r g e t t e d R e - e n t r y V e h i c l e MLF M u l t i l a t e r a l F o r c e 230 MRBM....Medium Range B a l l i s t i c M i s s i l e NATO....North A t l a n t i c T r e a t y O r g a n i z a t i o n NORTHAG.Northern Army Group PAL P e r m i s s i v e A c t i o n L i n k s PGM P r e c i s i o n Guided M u n i t i o n PSP P r i o r i t y S t r i k e P l a n QRA Quick R e a c t i o n A l e r t SAC S t r a t e g i c A i r Command SACEUR..Supreme A l l i e d Commander Europe SALT.... S t r a t e g i c Arms L i m i t a t i o n s T a l k s SAM S u r f a c e - A i r M i s s i l e SHAPE... Supreme H e a d q u a r t e r s A l l i e d Powers Europe S I O P . . . . S i n g l e I n t e g r a t e d O p e r a t i o n P l a n SLBM.... Sea-Launched B a l l i s t i c M i s s i l e SLCM.... Sea-Launched C r u i s e M i s s i l e SRBM....Short-Range B a l l i s t i c M i s s i l e SSBN....Subsurface S h i p B a l l i s t i c N u c l e a r SSM S u r f a c e - S u r f a c e M i s s i l e TAC Tact i c a TNF Theater TNW T a c t i c a 1 A i r Command N u c l e a r F o r c e 1 N u c l e a r Weapon USAF....United States A i r Force WP Warsaw Pact 

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