UBC Theses and Dissertations

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UBC Theses and Dissertations

Liberal party activists in British Columbia Sayers, Anthony Michael 1988

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LIBERAL PARTY ACTIVISTS IN BRITISH COLUMBIA by . ANTHONY M. SAYERS B.A.(Hons.), University of Western Australia, 1986 A THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL F U L F I L M E N T OF T H E REQUIREMENTS FOR T H E DEGREE OF MASTER OF ARTS in T H E F A C U L T Y OF GRADUATE STUDIES Political Science We accept this thesis as conforming to the required standard T H E UNIVERSITY OF BRITISH COLUMBIA October 1988 © Anthony M. Sayers, 1988 In p resen t ing this thesis in partial f u l f i lmen t o f t h e r e q u i r e m e n t s fo r an advanced d e g r e e at t he Univers i ty o f British C o l u m b i a , I agree tha t t h e Library shall make it f ree ly available f o r re ference and s tudy . I fu r ther agree tha t pe rmiss ion f o r ex tens ive c o p y i n g o f th is thesis f o r scholar ly pu rposes may b e g r a n t e d by the head o f m y d e p a r t m e n t o r by his o r her representat ives. It is u n d e r s t o o d that c o p y i n g o r pub l i ca t i on o f th is thesis f o r f inancial gain shall n o t b e a l l o w e d w i t h o u t m y w r i t t e n pe rm iss ion . D e p a r t m e n t o f PoUfff-Ms $U &fi}CG-The Univers i ty o f Brit ish C o l u m b i a Vancouver , Canada • a t e / ^ ( O r o f t e ^ 1383 DE-6 (2/88) ABSTRACT The purpose of t h i s t h e s i s i s t o d e s c r i b e and a n a l y z e the n a t u r e and r o l e of L i b e r a l P a r t y a c t i v i s t s i n the p o l i t i c a l l i f e of B r i t i s h Columbia. As a c t i v i s t s a r e a t the c e n t r a l c o r e of p o l i t i c a l p a r t i e s , d e s c r i b i n g t h e s e a c t i v i s t s i s e s s e n t i a l f o r u n d e r s t a n d i n g p a r t i e s and the p o l i t i c a l p r o c e s s i n g e n e r a l . The d e s c r i p t i o n and a n a l y s i s a re based on the r e s u l t s of a survey of the 1987 L i b e r a l l e a d e r s h i p C o n v e n t i o n conducted by s e v e r a l members of the P o l i t i c a l S c i e n c e Department at the U n i v e r s i t y of B r i t i s h Columbia, i n c l u d i n g the a u t h o r . The r e s u l t i n g i n f o r m a t i o n was c o l l a t e d and a n a l y z e d then compared w i t h the a c c e p t e d wisdom c o n c e r n i n g L i b e r a l s u p p o r t e r s i n B r i t i s h Columbia. T h i s t h e s i s r e v e a l s the L i b e r a l P a r t y a c t i v i s t s i n B r i t i s h Columbia t o be q u i t e . t y p i c a l of a c t i v i s t s found i n o t h e r p a r t i e s i n Canada. As a r e s u l t of the p a r t y ' s c e n t r e p o s i t i o n i n the p o l a r i z e d p o l i t i c s of t h i s p r o v i n c e , i t does ten d t o a t t r a c t a c t i v i s t s d i s e n c h a n t e d w i t h t h i s s t y l e of p o l i t i c s . T h i s r e s u l t s i n a heterogeneous c o l l e c t i o n of b e l i e f s amongst a c t i v i s t s . The s u c c e s s of the f e d e r a l L i b e r a l P a r t y and the importance of many f e d e r a l i s s u e s f o r L i b e r a l P a r t y s y m p a t h i z e r s encourages p r o v i n c i a l a c t i v i s t s t o adopt a f e d e r a l o r i e n t e d p e r s p e c t i v e on p o l i t i c s . T h i s i s a t odds w i t h the two major p a r t i e s i n B r i t i s h Columbia. TABLE OF CONTENTS (</' A b s t r a c t i i Table of Con t e n t s i i i L i s t of T a b l e s i v Chapter One INTRODUCTION 1 Chapter Two METHODOLOGICAL AND HISTORICAL CONTEXT 7 Chapter Three THE LIBERAL PARTY IN BRITISH COLUMBIA 26 The L i b e r a l P a r t y i n B r i t i s h Columbia 26 L i b e r a l A c t i v i s t s and P o l a r i z e d P o l i t i c s 36 Chapter Four THE STRUCTURE OF OPINION AMONGST ACTIVISTS IN BRITISH COLUMBIA 53 . Cohesion and D i v i s i o n w i t h i n the P r o v i n c i a l L i b e r a l P a r t y 53 Cohesion and D i v i s i o n w i t h i n the P r o v i n c i a l P a r t i e s 65 Chapter F i v e OPINION CLEAVAGES AMONG LIBERAL ACTIVISTS 75 Chapter S i x CONCLUSION 90 Appendix 93 B i b l i o g r a p h y 97 LIST OF TABLES I. Votes f o r Thee Major P a r t i e s i n P r o v i n c i a l E l e c t i o n s : 1952-1986 12 I I . Comparison of Delegate Opinion on Government R e g u l a t i o n : 41 I I I . Comparison of Delegatee Opinion on Government Spending 44 IV. Delegate Opinion on General P o l i c y Question 48 V. P a r t i s a n A t t i t u d e (%) and Consensus Index 54 VI. A t t i t u d i n a l V a r i a t i o n s Among A c t i v i s t s By Issue Domain 7 0 V I I . R e l i g i o u s A f f i l i a t i o n of the L i b e r a l A c t i v i s t s 77 V I I I . Income D i s t r i b u t i o n of the L i b e r a l A c t i v i s t s 81 IX. L e v e l of Party Close to 85 X. D i s t r i b u t i o n of F e d e r a l and P r o v i n c i a l Delegates 87 1 CHAPTER ONE  INTRODUCTION T h i s t h e s i s f o c u s e s on the n a t u r e and p l a c e of L i b e r a l p a r t y a c t i v i s t s w i t h i n B r i t i s h Columbian p o l i t i c s . In a p r o v i n c e where p o l a r i z e d p o l i t i c s i s the norm, the a c c e p t e d wisdom i s t h a t the L i b e r a l s wander a i m l e s s l y i n the w i l d e r n e s s of the i d e o l o g i c a l 'middle ground'. The h i s t o r i c a l c oncern of the L i b e r a l p a r t y w i t h c u l t u r a l and l i n g u i s t i c i s s u e s i s seen as out of p l a c e i n B r i t i s h Columbia where C a t h o l i c s and Francophones a r e not p o l i t i c a l l y i m p o r t a n t Western p e r c e p t i o n s of a l i e n a t i o n from C e n t r a l Canada, h e i g h t e n e d d u r i n g s u c c e s s i v e L i b e r a l governments l e d by P i e r r e Trudeau, a l s o work a g a i n s t the p a r t y i n B r i t i s h C olumbia. The L i b e r a l s p a r t i c i p a t e i n two d i s t i n c t e l e c t o r a l c o n t e s t s w i t h i n the p r o v i n c e . The t e n s i o n s i n h e r e n t i n Canadian f e d e r a l i s m produce a s e p a r a t i o n of p a r t y systems t h a t c o m p l i c a t e s p a t t e r n s of p a r t y s u p p o r t ( B l a k e , 1972, p.79). The B r i t i s h Columbian e x p e r i e n c e a t t e s t s t o t h i s f a c t . The s e p a r a t i o n of f e d e r a l and p r o v i n c i a l p a r t y systems r e f l e c t s the d i f f e r e n t mix of i d e o l o g i c a l c u r r e n t s amongst a c t i v i s t s and the e l e c t o r a t e a t each l e v e l ( S m i l e y , 1972, p. 122). F e d e r a l p a r t i e s have had t o c o n s t r u c t c o a l i t i o n s a c r o s s e t h n o - l i n g u i s t i c c l e a v a g e s and r e g i o n a l b o u n d a r i e s , o f t e n a t the expense of i d e o l o g i c a l p u r i t y and h i s t o r i c a l 2 c o n s i s t e n c y (Carty e t . a l . , 1987, p.1). At the p r o v i n c i a l l e v e l , p a r t i e s have had to d eal with an i d e o l o g i c a l l y p o l a r i z e d form of p o l i t i c s that r e s u l t s from the p a r t i c u l a r geographic, s o c i o l o g i c a l and s t r u c t u r a l c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s of B r i t i s h Columbia. T h i s s e p a r a t i o n of agendas i s , however, a l s o found i n the other p r o v i n c e s . The responses of B r i t i s h Columbian v o t e r s to f e d e r a l and p r o v i n c i a l p o l i t i c s , once seen as v o l a t i l e and i d i o s y n c r a t i c , are i n f a c t c o n s i s t e n t i n the context of a b i f u r c a t e d p a r t y system (see Blake, 1985). The s w i t c h i n g of p a r t y support between f e d e r a l and p r o v i n c i a l l e v e l s i s indeed a response to the "separate e l e c t o r a l c o n t e x t s which the two p a r t y systems r e p r e s e n t " . But even though p r o v i n c i a l p o l i t i c s i s somewhat unique, "the i s s u e s which d i v i d e the p a r t i e s are not". Moreover, B r i t i s h Columbians are " . . . a v i d p a r t i c i p a n t s i n the world of f e d e r a l p o l i t i c s " (Blake, 1985, pp.174-175). The l e f t - r i g h t d i v i s i o n which separates the New Democratic Party (NDP) and the S o c i a l C r e d i t P arty i n p r o v i n c i a l p o l i t i c s a l s o d i s t i n g u i s h e s NDP support from L i b e r a l s and C o n s e r v a t i v e s taken c o l l e c t i v e l y i n f e d e r a l p o l i t i c s . I t i s the a d d i t i o n of c u l t u r a l and l i n g u i s t i c i s s u e s as w e l l as the d i s a f f e c t i o n from the c e n t r a l government, superimposed on the t r a d i t i o n a l d i v i s i o n between P r o t e s t a n t s and C a t h o l i c s that a l t e r the ambience of f e d e r a l p o l i t i c s (Blake, 1985, pp.174-175). Not only must the p r o v i n c i a l L i b e r a l p a r t y attempt to s t r a d d l e t h i s d i v i d e , but 3 the r e l a t i o n s h i p of the p r o v i n c i a l p a r t y to i t s f e d e r a l c o u n t e r p a r t i s p r o b l e m a t i c . I t appears that the p r o v i n c i a l p a r t y can not expect support from the f e d e r a l p a r t y , a s i t u a t i o n somewhat analogous to the treatment i t was d e a l t by i t s own p r o v i n c i a l e l i t e i n the 1972-1975 p e r i o d . L i b e r a l s i n B r i t i s h Columbia are p l a c e d i n an awkward p o s i t i o n . I d e o l o g i c a l l y i l l s u i t e d to p a r t i c i p a t e i n the p o l a r i z e d p o l i t i c s of the province and unable to e x t r a c t support from t h e i r f e d e r a l c o u n t e r p a r t s they seem d e s t i n e d to p l a y a ' b i t p a r t ' i n p r o v i n c i a l p o l i t i c s . I t i s w i t h i n t h i s context that the L i b e r a l party of B r i t i s h Columbia s t r u g g l e s to e x i s t . Given the dearth of i n f o r m a t i o n regarding the contemporary L i b e r a l p a r t y i n B r i t i s h Columbia, the o b j e c t i v e s of t h i s t h e s i s are q u i t e s t r a i g h t forward. F i r s t , to d e s c r i b e the c e n t r a l core of the p a r t y , d e f i n e d as those a c t i v i s t s who attend p r o v i n c i a l l e a d e r s h i p conventions. Second, to compare these a c t i v i s t s with d e l e g a t e s to NDP and S o c i a l C r e d i t l e a d e r s h i p conventions. In doing t h i s , our aim i s to t e s t the c o n v e n t i o n a l wisdom reg a r d i n g the i d e o l o g i c a l p o s i t i o n of the L i b e r a l p a r t y v i s a v i s the other p r o v i n c i a l p a r t i e s . F u r t h e r , p e r c e p t i o n s of f e d e r a l p o l i t i c s and the most d e s i r a b l e balance of power between f e d e r a l and p r o v i n c i a l governments h e l d by these groups w i l l be compared. L a s t , the i m p l i c a t i o n s of the L i b e r a l ' s minor par t y s t a t u s on the s t r u c t u r e of o p i n i o n w i t h i n the p a r t y w i l l be addressed. We w i l l suggest that the L i b e r a l s r e l y on an e l i t e 4 group of a c t i v i s t s who occupy a v e r s i o n of the 'middle ground' i n B r i t i s h Columbia. Somewhat s u r p r i s i n g l y , they are more l i k e the NDP than they are l i k e S o c i a l C r e d i t d e l e g a t e s . As w e l l they embody some of the te n s i o n s between 'welfare' and 'business' l i b e r a l i s m a s s o c i a t e d with the L i b e r a l p a r t y by C h r i s t i a n and Campbell (1983). W h i l s t the s t r u c t u r e of op i n i o n w i t h i n the p a r t y i s r e l a t i v e l y heterogeneous, there i s a tendency f o r L i b e r a l s to be u n i t e d i n adopting a f e d e r a l or n a t i o n a l p e r s p e c t i v e on some i s s u e s . The L i b e r a l s p l a c e i n the 'middle' of the p o l a r i z e d p o l i t i c s of B r i t i s h Columbia makes i t d i f f i c u l t f o r them to c a p i t a l i z e on any i d e o l o g i c a l d i s t i n c t i v e n e s s they might possess. Moreover, t h e i r minor par t y s t a t u s denies them the u n i f y i n g impetus that comes from the f i g h t f o r government. W h i l s t t h i s allows them to be f l e x i b l e , t h e i r 'cadre' n o n - p o p u l i s t , s t y l e compromises any chance they may have of c a p i t a l i z i n g on t h e i r f l e x i b i l i t y . As w e l l , t h e i r f e d e r a l a l l e g i a n c e tends t o complicate the s t r u c t u r e of o p i n i o n i n the p a r t y . The t e n s i o n between pro-welfare and pro-business elements of the pa r t y must a l s o compete with a strong ' n a t i o n a l i s t i c ' i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of some i s s u e s such as f r e e t r a d e . The adoption of o p i n i o n s synonymous with f e d e r a l p a r t i s a n p o l i t i c s on these n a t i o n a l i s s u e s b r i n g s f u r t h e r complexity to the s t r u c t u r e of o p i n i o n w i t h i n the p a r t y . Only when two or more of these elements are a l i g n e d , do L i b e r a l s approach cohesion on qu e s t i o n s i n v o l v i n g these t e n s i o n s . • 5 L i b e r a l s do appear to represent a p e r s p e c t i v e incommensurate with western a l i e n a t i o n . T h i s , and t h e i r r e l a t i v e 'closeness' to the NDP make sense of Smith's p o i n t that i n the west, L i b e r a l s are o f t e n seen as p r o - C e n t r a l Canada and sympathetic to the NDP (Smith, 1980). T h i s b i a s i s somewhat i r o n i c i n l i g h t of the f a c t that the f e d e r a l L i b e r a l party does l i t t l e to a s s i s t the p r o v i n c i a l p a r t y i n p r o v i n c i a l p o l i t i c s . The advantage of drawing on a c t i v i s t s from the p r o v i n c i a l p a r t y d u r i n g f e d e r a l e l e c t i o n s i n B r i t i s h Columbia, but having a p r o v i n c i a l p a r t y so weak as to not a l i e n a t e S o c i a l C r e d i t v o t e r s and prevent them from v o t i n g L i b e r a l at f e d e r a l e l e c t i o n s , seems to be a t t r a c t i v e to f e d e r a l L i b e r a l s . S t i l l , i f p r o v i n c i a l p o l i t i c s i s not the c e n t r a l focus f o r these a c t i v i s t s (or perhaps as a r e s u l t of j u s t t h i s f a c t o r ) then t h i s may be of r e l a t i v e l y l i t t l e concern. The t h e s i s w i l l be s t r u c t u r e d i n the f o l l o w i n g manner. Chapter Two w i l l p r ovide a b r i e f summary of the Canadian l i t e r a t u r e on l e a d e r s h i p conventions. T h i s w i l l be followed by a b r i e f h i s t o r y of the L i b e r a l p a r t y and a d i s c u s s i o n of some of the main themes of p r o v i n c i a l p o l i t i c s . From t h i s d i s c u s s i o n come the hypotheses to be t e s t e d here. The t h i r d chapter seeks to redress the l a c k of inf o r m a t i o n regarding the B r i t i s h Columbia L i b e r a l p a r t y by d e s c r i b i n g the demographic and a t t i t u d i n a l make up of the del e g a t e s to the l a s t L i b e r a l l e a d e r s h i p convention. T h i s 6 chapter p r o v i d e s us with a ' f e e l ' f o r the p a r t y and i t s a c t i v i s t s i n B r i t i s h Columbia. The second p a r t of t h i s chapter compares L i b e r a l a c t i v i s t s with t h e i r NDP and S o c i a l C r e d i t c o u n t e r p a r t s . The o b j e c t i v e here i s to l o c a t e the L i b e r a l s i d e o l o g i c a l l y i n r e l a t i o n to the other p a r t i e s by comparing the responses of d e l e g a t e s from a l l three p a r t i e s to a s e r i e s of p o l i c y q u e s t i o n s . The a t t i t u d e s of p a r t y a c t i v i s t s towards f e d e r a l p o l i t i c s and p r o v i n c i a l i s s u e s w i l l a l s o be c o n t r a s t e d . (Due to i t s moribund s t a t e , r e f e r e n c e s to ' p r o v i n c i a l p a r t i e s ' do not i n c l u d e P r o g r e s s i v e Conservat i v e s ) . The f o u r t h chapter d e a l s with the s t r u c t u r e of o p i n i o n w i t h i n the p r o v i n c i a l L i b e r a l p a r t y and compares i t to the s t r u c t u r e of o p i n i o n w i t h i n the other p r o v i n c i a l p a r t i e s . The f i f t h chapter i s l a r g e l y an i n v e s t i g a t i o n of whether there are any r e i n f o r c i n g cleavages w i t h i n the p a r t y by using a range of independent v a r i a b l e s . The i n s t i t u t i o n a l i z a t i o n of the f e d e r a l presence in the p r o v i n c i a l p a r t y , by way of the r o l e of f e d e r a l c o n s t i t u e n c y d e l e g a t e s , w i l l be taken up here. The L i b e r a l party i s the only B r i t i s h Columbian par t y that c o n s t i t u t i o n a l l y p r o v i d e s f o r the r e p r e s e n t a t i o n of FEDERAL c o n s t i t u e n c i e s at a p r o v i n c i a l l e a d e r s h i p convention. The s i x t h and f i n a l chapter summarizes the f i n d i n g s of e a r l i e r chapters and attempts to i n d i c a t e some of the i m p l i c a t i o n s of these f i n d i n g s f o r the p a r t y ' s r o l e i n p r o v i n c i a l p o l i t i c s . 7 CHAPTER TWO METHODOLOGICAL AND HISTORICAL CONTEXT THE STUDY OF PARTY ACTIVISTS AND LEADERSHIP CONVENTIONS The study of p o l i t i c a l p a r t y a c t i v i s m i n Canada has been approached from two broad d i r e c t i o n s . The f i r s t , and l e a s t w e l l t r a v e l l e d p a t h , i s d i r e c t e d a t a s s e s s i n g p a r t y a c t i v i s m as one of many forms of p o l i t i c a l p a r t i c i p a t i o n a v a i l a b l e t o the i n d i v i d u a l i n a l i b e r a l democracy, ( f o r examples, see Kornberg et a l . , 1979, 1982, M i s h l e r , 1979) T h i s approach tends t o emphasize both the i n d i v i d u a l ' s c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s ( i n c l u d i n g p s y c h o l o g i c a l and s o c i o l o g i c a l a s p e c t s ) and the n a t u r e of p o l i t i c a l p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n Canada v i s a v i s t h e o r i e s of p o l i t i c a l p a r t i c i p a t i o n and/or p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n o t h e r l i b e r a l d e m o c r a t i c p o l i t i e s . The second and r e l a t e d approach tends t o t r e a t p a r t y a c t i v i s m as a form of p o l i t i c a l p a r t i c i p a t i o n t h a t i s h i g h l y i n s t i t u t i o n a l i z e d i n Canada and c e n t r a l t o the wo r k i n g of the Canadian p o l i t y . The l a t t e r approach i s c o n s i s t e n t w i t h a g e n e r a l emphasis i n Canadian p o l i t i c a l s c i e n c e on i n s t i t u t i o n s and c o n c e p t s r e l a t i n g t o Canadian f e d e r a l i s m and n a t i o n a l i d e n t i t y . The d e s i r e t o u n d e r s t a n d Canadian r e g i o n a l i s m , f e d e r a l i s m and c i t i z e n s h i p has encouraged an emphasis amongst p o l i t i c a l s c i e n t i s t s on what B l a k e and E l k i n s have c a l l e d "system l e v e l " a n a l y s i s . ( E l k i n s and 8 Blake, 1975, pp. 313-325) Party l e a d e r s h i p conventions have become a c e n t r a l p a r t of the i n s t i t u t i o n a l framework of Canadian p o l i t i c s . "Leadership conventions open a window i n t o a p a r t y to r e v e a l i t s inner s t r u c t u r e and dynamics, and makes i t p o s s i b l e to t e s t some of our images of p a r t y o r g a n i z a t i o n . " (Carty, 1988, p. 84) Much of the e a r l y l i t e r a t u r e d e a l s with the r o l e of the leader and the u t i l i t y of l e a d e r s h i p conventions, i n accommodating r e g i o n a l d i v e r s i t y w i t h i n the s t r u c t u r e of Canadian p a r t i e s (notably Courtney, 1973). T h i s i s not s u r p r i s i n g given the p e r e n n i a l concern with r e g i o n a l i s m i n Canada and the primacy of p a r t y l e a d e r s i n Westminster s t y l e p a r l i a m e n t a r y systems such as Canada's. Since the e a r l i e s t days of Confederation the e f f e c t i v e r e p r e s e n t a t i o n and accommodation of r e g i o n a l i n t e r e s t s have preoccupied f e d e r a l p a r t i e s , both in t h e i r e f f o r t s to develop n a t i o n a l p o l i c i e s and t h e i r e f f o r t s to develop a s t a b l e foundation of e l e c t o r a l support. (Courtney and P e r l i n , 1988, p. 124). N a t i o n a l p a r t y l e a d e r s have played a c e n t r a l r o l e in b u i l d i n g t r a n s - r e g i o n a l support, because "Within the s t r u c t u r e s of the p a r t i e s they [the l e a d e r s ] alone speak for the c o l l e c t i v e i n t e r e s t ; thus they have the f i n a l r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r a r t i c u l a t i n g p o s i t i o n s that accommodate the d i v e r s i t y of r e g i o n a l i n t e r e s t s . " ( P e r l i n , 1988, p.6.) Given then that p a r t i e s are "... at the very core of the democratic process i n Canada" ( P e r l i n , 1988, p. 7), and a l s o the " t r a n s c e n d e n t a l r o l e " of p a r t y l e a d e r s i n these i n s t i t u t i o n s i t i s not s u r p r i s i n g that conventions have been 9 d e s c r i b e d as "the most important extra-governmental p o l i t i c a l i n s t i t u t i o n i n Canada." (Courtney, 1986, p. 102) The i n c r e a s i n g l y important r o l e of a c t i v i s t s at such conventions has encouraged the d i r e c t i n v e s t i g a t i o n of t h i s r o l e and the b e l i e f s and c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s of p a r t y a c t i v i s t s . T h i s t h e s i s u t i l i z e s an approach c o n s i s t e n t with a p e r s p e c t i v e that has been used r e c e n t l y to analyze p a r t i s a n a c t i v i t i e s i n Canada, and which focuses on d i v i s i o n and cohesion of o p i n i o n among pa r t y a c t i v i s t s (see Blake, 1988, p.33). The importance of L i b e r a l and Co n s e r v a t i v e l e a d e r s h i p conventions (the two p a r t i e s l i k e l y to provide a Prime Minster) has r e s u l t e d i n an emphasis on these two p a r t i e s at the n a t i o n a l l e v e l . Conventions have been analyzed to determine the nature of Canadian p a r t i e s . Are they "brokerage" p a r t i e s attempting to b u i l d winning c o a l i t i o n s (Clarke et a l . , 1984); i d e o l o g i c a l p a r t i e s r e p r e s e n t i n g the mainstream of l i b e r a l i deology i n Canada but d i s a g r e e i n g about some matters of fundamental p r i n c i p l e ( C h r i s t i a n and Campbell, 1983); or are they best seen i n l i g h t of t h e i r long-term c o m p e t i t i v e r e l a t i o n s h i p — the L i b e r a l s a t t r a c t i n g "power motivated" supporters while the " o p p o s i t i o n m e n t a l i t y " of the C o n s e r v a t i v e s a t t r a c t s s u pporters with negative a t t i t u d e towards government and bureaucracy ( P e r l i n , 1980). P o l i c y a t t i t u d e s and demographic c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s have been the main f o c i of these approaches to p a r t y a c t i v i s m i n Canada. The same approach w i l l be 10 adopted here. Compared with the c u l t u r a l and l i n g u i s t i c concerns of the L i b e r a l s and C o n s e r v a t i v e s , B r i t i s h Columbia p a r t y p o l i t i c s i s most f r e q u e n t l y c o n s i d e r e d to be p o l a r i z e d and i d e o l o g i c a l — a c o n t e s t between d i f f e r e n t economic v i s i o n s of the p r o v i n c e ' s f u t u r e — whereas the manner i n which p a r t i e s s t r u g g l e f o r p o l i t i c a l power elsewhere in Canada i s o f t e n seen as n e g l e c t f u l of p o l i t i c a l i d e a l s . S i e g f r i e d once suggested t h i s was due to the power of the " v i o l e n t o p p o s i t i o n ... E n g l i s h and French, P r o t e s t a n t and C a t h o l i c , " that underpinned Canadian s o c i e t y which "prudent and f a r -s i g h t e d men" f e l t i t t h e i r duty to downplay i n the name of m a i n t a i n i n g " n a t i o n a l e q u i l i b r i u m " . ( S i e g f r i e d , 1949, p. 113) The accommodation of these " f o r c e s " became the c e n t r a l theme of p a r t y competition f e d e r a l l y and i n many p r o v i n c e s , o f t e n masking the s i m i l a r i t i e s between p a r t i e s on other i s s u e s . ( S i e g f r i e d , p. 114.) Party competition and conventions i n B.C. are not concerned with the accommodation of c u l t u r a l d i v e r s i t y . I d e o l o g i c a l p o l i t i c s p l a y a more c e n t r a l r o l e i n both these elements of p r o v i n c i a l p o l i t i c s . THE PROVINCIAL CONTEXT OF PARTISAN COMPETITION At present, i n p r o v i n c i a l e l e c t i o n s i n B r i t i s h Columbia, n e i t h e r of the two main n a t i o n a l p a r t i e s -- the L i b e r a l s and the P r o g r e s s i v e C o n s e r v a t i v e s — a t t r a c t even 11 moderate s u p p o r t , a l t h o u g h b oth are more s u c c e s s f u l i n f e d e r a l e l e c t i o n s w i t h i n the p r o v i n c e . The two p r o t a g o n i s t s i n p r o v i n c i a l e l e c t i o n s are the New D e m o cratic P a r t y (NDP) and the S o c i a l C r e d i t P a r t y , which t o g e t h e r now account f o r about 95 per cent of the v o t e . Y e t , a t the f e d e r a l l e v e l the NDP has h i s t o r i c a l l y o n l y a t t r a c t e d about 20 per cent of the v o t e n a t i o n - w i d e , s u f f e r i n g from v e r y poor support i n the A t l a n t i c p r o v i n c e s and Quebec. The S o c i a l C r e d i t P a r t y i s now a n o n - e n t i t y a t the f e d e r a l - l e v e l . There are t h r e e r e a l p r o t a g o n i s t s -- the L i b e r a l P a r t y , the P r o g r e s s i v e C o n s e r v a t i v e P a r t y , and the NDP -- a t the f e d e r a l e l e c t i o n s i n B r i t i s h Columbia. The C o n s e r v a t i v e s have become the most s u c c e s s f u l p a r t y i n f e d e r a l e l e c t i o n s w i t h i n the p r o v i n c e . In the l a s t e l e c t i o n the p a r t y garnered 47 per cent of the v o t e , compared w i t h 50 per c e n t n a t i o n a l l y . The L i b e r a l P a r t y has s u f f e r e d a l o s s of support t h roughout Canada i n r e c e n t y e a r s , but p a r t i c u l a r l y i n the West. N a t i o n a l l y , i t r e c e i v e d about 28 per c e n t of the v o t e a t the l a s t e l e c t i o n , compared t o o n l y 16 per cent of the v o t e i n B.C. Thus, o n l y the NDP e n j o y s r e l a t i v e s u c c e s s a t b o t h f e d e r a l and p r o v i n c i a l e l e c t i o n s i n B r i t i s h Columbia (Thorburn, 1985, p. 347). The L i b e r a l P a r t y ' s r o l e i n p r o v i n c i a l and f e d e r a l p o l i t i c s r e v e a l s the development of the b i f u r c a t e d p a r t y system which e x i s t s i n B r i t i s h Columbia. E a r l i e r t h i s c e n t u r y , the L i b e r a l s h e l d o f f i c e i n the p r o v i n c e i n t h e i r own r i g h t , w i t h the C o n s e r v a t i v e s as t h e i r main opponent. At f e d e r a l e l e c t i o n s , the p a r t y began a run of v i c t o r i e s i n 1921 which was t o e s t a b l i s h i t as the hegemonic n a t i o n a l p a r t y . TABLE I VOTES FOR THREE MAJOR PARTIES IN PROVINCIAL ELECTIONS: 1952-1986 (%) Year S o c i a l C r e d i t NDP L i b e r a l 1 952 27.2 30.8 23.5 1953 37.8 30.9 23.6 1956 45.8 28.3 21.8 1960 38.8 32.7 20.9 1963 40.8 27.8 20.0 1966 45.6 33.6 20.2 1969 46.8 33.9 19.3 1 972 31.2 39.6 16.4 1975 49.2 39.2 7.2 1979 48.2 46.0 0.5 1 983 49.8 44.9 2.7 1986 49.3 42.6 6.7 Between 1941 and 1952, the L i b e r a l s h e l d B.C. i n c o a l i t i o n w i t h the C o n s e r v a t i v e s . I t i s o f f i c e i n g e n e r a l l y c o n s i d e r e d t h a t the s e p a r a t i o n of the p r o v i n c i a l p a r t y system from i t s f e d e r a l c o u n t e r p a r t had i t s r o o t i n the c o a l i t i o n e x p e r i e n c e , which came t o an end w i t h the r i s e of the S o c i a l C r e d i t P a r t y t o government f o l l o w i n g the 1952 e l e c t i o n . ( C a i r n s and Wong, 1983, p. 104) S u b s e q u e n t l y , the L i b e r a l s ' e l e c t o r a l s u pport d e c l i n e d and i n the r e a l i g n m e n t s of the 1970s was a l l but wiped o u t . L i b e r a l p a r t y s u p p o r t e r s tended t o move t h e i r support t o the NDP p r o v i n c i a l l y i n the p e r i o d t o 1972 and s i n c e then have moved t o support the S o c i a l 13 C r e d i t and NDP i n about equal numbers. (Blake, 1985, p. 22) A s i m i l a r but l e s s d r a s t i c d e c l i n e has attended the p a r t y ' s performance at f e d e r a l e l e c t i o n s w i t h i n the p r o v i n c e , where the 1950s vote share of about 30 per cent has shrunk to about 16 per cent at present. The p r o v i n c i a l C o n s e r v a t i v e s s u f f e r e d a more d r a s t i c d e c l i n e i n support a f t e r 1952, f a l l i n g from about 17 per cent to l e s s than 2 per cent i n the 1980s, a r e s u l t at odds with the p a r t y ' s success at f e d e r a l e l e c t i o n s i n the p r o v i n c e . C o n s e r v a t i v e supporters have s h i f t e d t h e i r p r o v i n c i a l vote to the S o c i a l C r e d i t P a r t y . (Blake, 1985, p. 72) The context i n which the L i b e r a l Party f i n d s i t s e l f i n B r i t i s h Columbia i s very d i f f e r e n t from that i n which i t was f i r s t formed i n C e n t r a l Canada. The i r r e l e v a n c e of c u l t u r a l and l i n g u i s t i c c o n f l i c t s i n t h i s overwhelmingly B r i t i s h , P r o t e s t a n t province (Blake, 1985, p. 13) helped p r o v i d e the b a s i s f o r the development of a unique s t y l e of p o l i t i c s unencumbered by the l e v e l of c u l t u r a l antagonism found elsewhere i n Canada. The l i t e r a t u r e on p r o v i n c i a l p o l i t i c s s t r e s s e s the development of a strong " l e f t p o l e " i n l o c a l p o l i t i c s and takes t h i s pole as a r e f e r e n c e p o i n t from which to view the development of the b i f u r c a t e d p a r t y system i n B r i t i s h Columbia. Whether the c o a l i t i o n of the r i g h t was a response to the s t r e n g t h of the l e f t manifested i n trade unionism, the Co-operative Commonwealth F e d e r a t i o n (CCF) and i t s successor 14 the New Democratic P a r t y (NDP), i s d e b a t a b l e . S t i l l , the " r i g h t ' s " f e a r of a s o c i a l i s t p a r t y t a k i n g c o n t r o l of the r e i n s of power i n B r i t i s h Columbia, and the s u c c e s s of the 1941 t o 1952 c o a l i t i o n of the L i b e r a l s and C o n s e r v a t i v e s , h e l p e d e n t r e n c h the l e f t - r i g h t dichotomy i n p r o v i n c i a l p o l i t i c s t h a t so d i s t i n g u i s h e s i t from f e d e r a l p o l i t i c s . ( C a i r n s and Wong, p. 103 and B l a k e , 1985, p. 17) Without the c o n s t r a i n t s of " v i o l e n t o p p o s i t i o n s " p r o v i n c i a l p o l i t i c s has f o c u s s e d on i s s u e s of economic development. T h i s s e p a r a t i o n of agendas h e l p s e x p l a i n why 40 per c e n t of B r i t i s h Columbian v o t e r s s w i t c h p a r t y a l l e g i a n c e s between the p r o v i n c i a l and f e d e r a l l e v e l s . ( B l a k e , 1985, p. 142) At the p r o v i n c i a l l e v e l , economics ( f r e e e n t e r p r i s e v e r s u s s o c i a l i s m ) c l e a v e s the p r o v i n c i a l community, At the f e d e r a l l e v e l c u l t u r a l and l i n g u i s t i c a t t i t u d e s c r e a t e a d i f f e r e n t agenda which c l e a v e s the p r o v i n c i a l community anew. The L i b e r a l P a r t y and the P r o g r e s s i v e C o n s e r v a t i v e P a r t y l a b e l s were borrowed from E a s t e r n Canada and used i n B r i t i s h Columbia, but "... w i t h o u t the s o c i a l and h i s t o r i c a l baggage which had governed t h e i r development i n the e a s t " ( B l a k e , 1985, p.13). W h i l e the two p a r t i e s competed as e l s e w h e r e up t o 1941, the c o a l i t i o n e x p e r i e n c e proved t o be t h e i r undoing. S e v e r a l elements of the c o a l i t i o n e x p e r i e n c e have been i d e n t i f i e d as c r u c i a l t o the subsequent f a i l u r e of b o th p a r t i e s . The development of the s t r o n g " l e f t p o l e " as a theme i n p r o v i n c i a l p o l i t i c s d i d not s u i t the L i b e r a l and 1 5 C o n s e r v a t i v e s t y l e s of p o l i t i c s . In the 1941 e l e c t i o n (and f o l l o w i n g a r e l a t i v e l y s u c c e s s f u l decade f o r the CCF), the L i b e r a l s s u f f e r e d a s u b s t a n t i a l d e c l i n e i n support while the CCF garnered the highest p r o p o r t i o n of the vote, 33.4 per cent, but not the l a r g e s t number of s e a t s . The circumstances of the war p e r i o d and the need for r e l i a b l e l e g i s l a t i v e a l l i e s i n a m i n o r i t y government l e d to the formation of a c o a l i t i o n between the L i b e r a l s and C o n s e r v a t i v e s . Although not aimed s o l e l y at c o n t a i n i n g the l e f t and "preventing a fragmentation of the f r e e e n t e r p r i s e vote" the u n w i l l i n g n e s s of the CCF to j o i n an a l l - p a r t y c o a l i t i o n and the l a t e r success of the c o a l i t i o n "combined with the i n c e n t i v e s of the p a r l i a m e n t a r y system to transform the n o n - l e f t i n t o the a n t i - l e f t and u l t i m a t e l y r e d e f i n e the b a s i s of p r o v i n c i a l p o l i t i c s " . T h i s c o a l i t i o n formed then "the foundations of the present p r o v i n c i a l p a r t y system and i t s s e p a r a t i o n from the f e d e r a l one" (Blake, 1985, p.17). As noted a l r e a d y , the o v e r - a r c h i n g impact was to i n s t i t u t i o n a l i z e the l e f t - r i g h t dichotomy — a dichotomy both p a r t i e s were arguably u n s u i t e d to d e a l with given t h e i r " s o c i a l and h i s t o r i c a l baggage". D i f f e r e n c e s between the L i b e r a l s and C o n s e r v a t i v e s were based on l i t t l e more than the d i s t i n c t i o n between being i n and out of o f f i c e . (Blake, 1985, p. 15) The c o a l i t i o n experience tended to h i g h l i g h t the r e l a t i v e i d e o l o g i c a l congruence of the two p a r t i e s , i n the eyes of p a r t y members and the e l e c t o r a t e at l a r g e . 16 The t e n s i o n s c r e a t e d by the two p a r t i e s r e t a i n i n g t h e i r separate l e g i s l a t i v e and e x t r a - p a r l i a m e n t a r y i d e n t i t i e s combined with the s t r a i n i n g of i n t r a - p a r t y r e l a t i o n s between the f e d e r a l and p r o v i n c i a l wings of each of the c o a l i t i o n p a r t n e r s " l e a d i n e x o r a b l y to [the] d i s s o l u t i o n " of the c o a l i t i o n i n 1952. ( A l p e r , 1975, Chapter 5) The L i b e r a l Party (the l a r g e r of the two p a r t i e s ) judged i t s e l f w e l l p l a c e d to win government in i t s own r i g h t , p a r t i c u l a r l y as moderates and r a d i c a l s were f i g h t i n g w i t h i n the CCF. The disingenuous adoption of p r e f e r e n t i a l v o t i n g f o r the 1952 e l e c t i o n saw the r i s e of the S o c i a l C r e d i t P a r t y . Drawing on both the f i n a n c i a l and e x p a t r i a t e support of the A l b e r t a S o c i a l C r e d i t Party, S o c i a l C r e d i t gained a s l i m m a j o r i t y . The CCF p l a c e d second by one seat, the L i b e r a l s t h i r d and the C o n s e r v a t i v e s f o u r t h . C a p i t a l i z i n g on the i n s t i t u t i o n a l i z e d l e f t - r i g h t p o l a r i z a t i o n i n the p r o v i n c e , the S o c i a l C r e d i t Party under former Conservative M.L.A. W. A. C. Bennett's l e a d e r s h i p q u i c k l y took on the f r e e e n t e r p r i s e mantle, Not only d i d the S o c i a l C r e d i t Party present a u n i t e d a n t i - l e f t , anti-Ottawa, p r o - B r i t i s h Columbia image, but given that the c o a l i t i o n experience had s e r i o u s l y compromised the l i n k s between the f e d e r a l and p r o v i n c i a l branches of the L i b e r a l s and C o n s e r v a t i v e s , they were in no p o s i t i o n to garner the resources necessary to launch a c h a l l e n g e to the S o c i a l C r e d i t P a r t y ' s p o s i t i o n . 1 7 D u r i n g the c o a l i t i o n p e r i o d , the f e d e r a l p a r t i e s had t o do w i t h o u t the o r g a n i z a t i o n a l support n o r m a l l y o f f e r e d by the p r o v i n c i a l a c t i v i s t s i n f e d e r a l campaigns. The a b i l i t y of W.A.C. Bennett s u b s e q u e n t l y t o p r e s e n t the S o c i a l C r e d i t as the o n l y v i a b l e " f r e e e n t e r p r i s e " a l t e r n a t i v e t o the CCF/NDP awakened f e a r s t h a t moving support from the S o c i a l C r e d i t t o o t h e r " r i g h t " p a r t i e s would ensure a CCF/NDP v i c t o r y . T h i s was p a r t i c u l a r l y damaging f o r the P r o g r e s s i v e C o n s e r v a t i v e P a r t y which had l o s t l a r g e number of s u p p o r t e r s t o the S o c i a l C r e d i t P a r t y and which s u b s e q u e n t l y b e l i e v e d t h a t f e d e r a l C o n s e r v a t i v e s a c t i v e l y s u p p o r t e d the S o c i a l C r e d i t P a r t y . The a t t i t u d e of the f e d e r a l L i b e r a l P a r t y t o i t s p r o v i n c i a l c o u n t e r p a r t has been one of d i s i n t e r e s t . (See A l p e r , 1975) The i n s t i t u t i o n a l i z a t i o n of the l e f t - r i g h t p o l a r i z a t i o n , the c o n f u s i o n between f e d e r a l and p r o v i n c i a l branches p r o v i d e d the b a s i s f o r S o c i a l C r e d i t s ' success and has e x a c e r b a t e d the L i b e r a l s ' and C o n s e r v a t i v e s ' s i t u a t i o n s . For the C o n s e r v a t i v e s and L i b e r a l s t h e r e a f t e r , the l e v e l of support a t the f e d e r a l l e v e l has v a r i e d i n d e p e n d e n t l y of the l e v e l of support a c h i e v e d by t h e i r p r o v i n c i a l c o u n t e r p a r t s . The e l e c t o r a l nexus between th e s e two l e v e l s i s now more c o m p l i c a t e d . Only the NDP e n j o y s s u c c e s s i n both c o m p e t i t i o n s , and i n the 1970s has improved i t s performance i n p r o v i n c i a l e l e c t i o n s , even forming the government between 1972 and 1975. For the C o n s e r v a t i v e s , the p r e c i p i t o u s d e c l i n e f o l l o w i n g the 1952 e l e c t i o n has produced 18 o b s c u r i t y i n t e r s p e r s e d with sporadic r e v i v a l s , notably i n 1972, the year the NDP was e l e c t e d to government. But the r e l a t i v e success of the C o n s e r v a t i v e s , and to a l e s s e r extent, the L i b e r a l s i n the 1972 e l e c t i o n encouraged the view that a s p l i t t i n g of the n o n - l e f t vote r e s u l t e d i n success f o r the l e f t . I t was t h i s a t t i t u d e towards p r o v i n c i a l p a r t y competition which l e d to the ignominious s i t u a t i o n i n which four L i b e r a l and one Cons e r v a t i v e M.L.A.s j o i n e d the o f f i c i a l o p p o s i t i o n , the S o c i a l C r e d i t P arty, i n 1974-75. (See H a r r i s , 1987, K r i s t i a n s o n , 1977) P a r t i c u l a r l y f o r the L i b e r a l s , t h i s proved to be a harbinger f o r a f u r t h e r worsening of t h e i r p r o v i n c i a l f o r t u n e s . From about 23 per cent of the votes in 1952, they s l i p p e d to about 16 per cent i n 1972, and to l e s s than 5 per cent by the 1980s. The steady d e c l i n e of the L i b e r a l s up to the 1970s and t h e i r p r e c i p i t o u s d e c l i n e during the 1970s. The realignment of the 1970s brought to i t s f u l l e s t e xpression the s e p a r a t i o n of the p r o v i n c i a l and f e d e r a l party systems. THEMES IN BRITISH COLUMBIA POLITICS Although the importance of c l a s s v o t i n g i n B r i t i s h Columbia has been q u a l i f i e d by i n v e s t i g a t i o n of the complex r e l a t i o n s h i p between s o c i a l c l a s s and p r o v i n c i a l p a r t i s a n s h i p , i t i s s t i l l the case that " B r i t i s h Columbians have c o n s i s t e n t l y e x h i b i t e d a higher l e v e l of c l a s s v o t i n g i n f e d e r a l e l e c t i o n than voters, i n other r e g i o n s " (Blake, 1985, 19 p.162). . The s e p a r a t i o n of f e d e r a l and p r o v i n c i a l party systems noted e a r l i e r r e l i e s p a r t l y on the economic nature of B r i t i s h Columbia -- b i g companies, b i g unions, and a "boom and bust" economy which c o n s t a n t l y a l t e r e d the balance of power between business and unions, sometimes r a d i c a l l y . The example of s o c i a l i s m i n Saskatchewan, the i n f l u x of r a d i c a l American and B r i t i s h workers, p a r t i c u l a r l y B r i t i s h c o a l -miners with t h e i r "... marked p r o p e n s i t y towards independent p o l i t i c s . . . " (Robin, 1972, pp. 28-35) provided f e r t i l e grounds f o r the p o l a r i z a t i o n of p r o v i n c i a l p o l i t i c s which found expression f o l l o w i n g the c o a l i t i o n e xperience. A n t i - l e f t r h e t o r i c p l a y s an important r o l e i n B r i t i s h Columbian p o l i t i c s . The growth of the s t a t e under W.A.C. Bennett f u r t h e r strengthened the i n s t i t u t i o n a l i n c e n t i v e s f o r c l a s s p o l i t i c s at the p r o v i n c i a l l e v e l . S o c i a l s e r v i c e s , work c o n d i t i o n , labour management and economic development became c e n t r a l to the r o l e of government and the d e f i n i t i o n of p r o v i n c i a l p o l i t i c s . " C r u c i a l developments and d i s t r i b u t i o n questions can be debated i n l e f t - r i g h t terms i n many p r o v i n c e s , e s p e c i a l l y i n the West, without the c o m p l i c a t i o n s introduced by c o n s i d e r a t i o n of i n t e r - r e g i o n a l e q u i t y and complaints that f e d e r a l s o c i a l p o l i c i e s c o n s t i t u t e c u l t u r a l i n t e r f e r e n c e " (Blake, 1985, p.6). I t i s because the s e p a r a t i o n of the two p a r t y systems allows the exp r e s s i o n of these economic i s s u e s as 20 opposed to the l i n g u i s t i c / c u l t u r a l ones of f e d e r a l p o l i t i c s that makes the s e p a r a t i o n so harmful to the L i b e r a l s who have become c l o s e l y a s s o c i a t e d with the l a t t e r . In f a c t , as we w i l l see, p r o v i n c i a l p a r t y a c t i v i s t s b e l i e v e f e d e r a l p o l i t i c s to be more important than p r o v i n c i a l p o l i t i c s . While the L i b e r a l s are d i s t i n g u i s h e d from the NDP on economic issues and a t t i t u d e s at a f e d e r a l l e v e l the same d i s t i n c t i o n i s both l e s s c l e a r at the p r o v i n c i a l l e v e l and does not provide an adequate b a s i s f o r d i s t i n g u i s h i n g them from the S o c i a l C r e d i t Party which has c o a l e s c e d a wide range of n o n - l e f t support. A r e l a t e d p o i n t i s the e f f e c t of "Western a l i e n a t i o n " on the L i b e r a l s ' support in the West. Although the f o r c e of Western a l i e n a t i o n i n B r i t i s h Columbia i s a moot p o i n t , and the degree to which i t r e p r e s e n t s simply " a n t i -Trudeauism" i s a l s o u n c l e a r , the L i b e r a l s have s u f f e r e d g r e a t l y i n the West i n recent years. S i m i l a r to the s i t u a t i o n i n A l b e r t a and Saskatchewan, the e t h n i c composition of B r i t i s h Columbia helped f o s t e r s u s p i c i o n and even h o s t i l i t y towards b i c u l t u r a l v i s i o n s of the n a t i o n a l p o l i t i c a l community synonymous with the L i b e r a l P a r t y . C e r t a i n l y our data suggests that L i b e r a l s i n B r i t i s h Columbia view b i c u l t u r a l i s m and other such p o l i c i e s f a v o u r a b l y , and are thus not " a l i e n a t e d " by t h i s view of the Canadian c u l t u r e . I t has a l s o been argued that the L i b e r a l s have been hurt i n the West by t h e i r i n f o r m a l and sporadic a l l i a n c e with 21 the NDP i n the f e d e r a l parliament (Smith). They have been seen as "enemy sympathizers" by those on the r i g h t . As f o r the NDP, i t has some c l a i m to being a p a r t y of the West, given t h i s i s where i t s beginnings and h i s t o r i c a l s t r e n g t h l i e . B r i t i s h Columbia i s the only p r o v i n c e where the S o c i a l C r e d i t Party i s a s u b s t a n t i a l f o r c e . Both p a r t i e s have t h e i r r o o t s i n the p o p u l i s t p r o v i n c i a l p o l i t i c s of the e a r l y part of t h i s century. Whilst the L i b e r a l s do appear to b e l i e v e f e d e r a l p o l i t i c s and the i s s u e s a s s o c i a t e d with i t are more important than p r o v i n c i a l p o l i t i c s , the r e l a t i o n s h i p between the f e d e r a l and p r o v i n c i a l branches of the p a r t y i s u n c e r t a i n . The c o a l i t i o n experience o f ' 1941 through 1952 c r e a t e d competing a l l e g i a n c e s - - p a r t i e s opposed at one l e v e l were u n i t e d on the other. Moreover, both the f e d e r a l L i b e r a l and C o n s e r v a t i v e p a r t i e s l o s t the use of l o c a l a c t i v i s t s d u r i n g f e d e r a l e l e c t i o n s . The C o n f e d e r a l pressure w i t h i n Canadian p a r t i e s noted by Smiley have been h i g h l i g h t e d w i t h i n the L i b e r a l Party s i n c e that time. (Smiley, 1980, pp. 120-122) The l i m i t e d f e d e r a l - p r o v i n c i a l l i n k a g e was p a r t i c u l a r l y s t r e s s e d i n 1949 when there was a f e d e r a l and p r o v i n c i a l e l e c t i o n the same year. Since that time the f e d e r a l L i b e r a l s i n B.C. have been aware of the advantages of a s t r o n g p r o v i n c i a l base, "but at times the lack of p r o v i n c i a l e f f o r t by f e d e r a l L i b e r a l s seems designed, as with the T o r i e s , not to a l i e n a t e S o c i a l C r e d i t support f o r f e d e r a l L i b e r a l 22 c a n d i d a t e s " (Dyck, 1986, p.555). Not only must the p r o v i n c i a l L i b e r a l P a r t y deal with l e s s than f u l l support in p r o v i n c i a l p o l i t i c s from i t s f e d e r a l c o u n t e r p a r t , i t was a l s o abandoned by that p a r t of i t s l o c a l e l i t e which had a strong i n t e r e s t i n p r o v i n c i a l p o l i t i c s when many of them switched t h e i r support to the S o c i a l C r e d i t party in 1974 and 1975. In f a c t , t h i s abandonment may r e f l e c t the r e c o g n i t i o n by some of the p r o v i n c i a l e l i t e of the competing o b j e c t i v e s of the f e d e r a l L i b e r a l p a r t y , w i t h i n p r o v i n c i a l p o l i t i c s , and as a r e s u l t , the l i k e l i h o o d of p r o v i n c i a l e l e c t o r a l f a i l u r e . Much has been w r i t t e n about the r o l e of e l i t e s i n Canadian p o l i t i c s . (See, f o r example, Olson, 1985) The seeds of the L i b e r a l s ' demise were sown du r i n g the c o a l i t i o n e xperience, a "marriage of convenience" r e s u l t i n g from e l i t e accommodation in response to the e x i g e n c i e s of the p e r i o d and which continued l a t e r as a method of ensuring hegemony f o r the n o n - l e f t e l i t e s i n B r i t i s h Columbia. The s t r a i n s produced w i t h i n the c o a l i t i o n and between f e d e r a l and p r o v i n c i a l branches of the p a r t i e s to some degree represented the t e n s i o n s of competing e l i t e demands. Arguably the i r o n i c outcome of the 1952 e l e c t i o n which r e s u l t e d i n the L i b e r a l s ' r e l e g a t i o n to the "minor league" i n p r o v i n c i a l e l e c t i o n s r e f l e c t s the i n j u d i c i o u s judgments of i t s e l i t e about the workings of e l e c t o r a l laws and the nature of B r i t i s h Columbian p o l i t i c s . 23 In r e s p e c t t o the r e a l i g n m e n t of the 1970s, which saw the S o c i a l C r e d i t P a r t y s u c c e s s f u l l y r e b u i l d the " f r e e e n t e r p r i s e a l l i a n c e " f o l l o w i n g the NDP s u c c e s s of 1972, the L i b e r a l and C o n s e r v a t i v e e l i t e s once a g a i n a c t e d i n such a way as t o t h r e a t e n t h e i r own p a r t y ' s s u p p o r t . The i m p e r a t i v e s of a n o n - l e f t , " f r e e e n t e r p r i s e " v i c t o r y a t the next p r o v i n c i a l e l e c t i o n , and a r g u a b l y the enhancement of t h e i r p e r s o n a l s t a t u s were seen as paramount. As a r e s u l t , t h r e e of the f o u r s i t t i n g L i b e r a l M.L.A.s and one of the two C o n s e r v a t i v e M.L.A.s as w e l l as some t o p o f f i c i a l s of both the p a r t i e s s w i t c h e d t h e i r s u p port t o the S o c i a l C r e d i t P a r t y ( H a r r i s , 1987, K r i s t i a n s o n , 1977). Moreover, two of the t h r e e S o c i a l C r e d i t Leaders s i n c e 1952 have been drawn from the o t h e r p a r t i e s : W.A.C. Bennett from the C o n s e r v a t i v e s and B i l l Vander Zalm from the L i b e r a l s . The f e d e r a l e l i t e s of both p a r t i e s d i s p l a y e d an u n w i l l i n g n e s s t o become i n v o l v e d i n the m a c h i n a t i o n s of p r o v i n c i a l p o l i t i c s . T h i s i s c o n s i s t e n t w i t h t h e i r arms l e n g t h approach d e v e l o p e d d u r i n g t h e W.A.C. Bennett e r a . More r e c e n t l y , the L i b e r a l s have p u b l i c l y d i s p l a y e d t h e i r r e c o g n i t i o n of the importance of a h i g h p r o f i l e l e a d e r by t h e i r e f f o r t s t o r e p l a c e Gordon W i l s o n , who was e l e c t e d i n 1987 a t the c o n v e n t i o n a t which our survey was a d m i n i s t e r e d . As of September, 1988, the L i b e r a l s , w i t h W i l s o n ' s apparent s u p p o r t , were wooing businessmen and o t h e r s w i t h h i g h p u b l i c p r o f i l e s f o r a s u c c e s s o r t o W i l s o n . 24 A f i n a l theme r e l e v a n t here i s that B r i t i s h Columbians, more than those i n other p r o v i n c e s , b e l i e v e that i f they t r y , they can have a say about p o l i t i c a l matters of concern to them, They are a l s o more t r u s t i n g of p o l i t i c a l a u t h o r i t i e s and i n s t i t u t i o n s than. other p r o v i n c i a l p o p u l a t i o n s i n Canada. ( E l k i n s , 1985, p. 58. A l s o see E l k i n s and Simeon, 1980) These f a c t o r s should be kept i n mind as "systemic" m o t i v a t i o n s f o r p o l i t i c a l p a r t i c i p a t i o n which may h e l p to e x p l a i n the s u r v i v a l of the L i b e r a l Party i n B r i t i s h Columbia. The remaining chapters of t h i s t h e s i s are concerned with d e s c r i b i n g and a n a l y z i n g contemporary L i b e r a l Party a c t i v i s t s w i t h i n the context of the themes developed above. The lack of i n f o r m a t i o n regarding the L i b e r a l s n e c e s s i t a t e s a p r e l i m i n a r y d e s c r i p t i o n ; t h i s w i l l be done i n the next chapter using demographic i n f o r m a t i o n . In l i g h t of the p a r t y ' s minor p l a c e i n p r o v i n c i a l p o l i t i c s and the l o s s of i t s p r o v i n c i a l e l i t e d u r i n g the 1970s, the aim i s to d i s c o v e r what s o r t of people make up the core of the -party. A f u r t h e r q u e s t i o n a r i s e s out of the s t r u c t u r a l s e p a r a t i o n of the p r o v i n c i a l and f e d e r a l p a r t y systems. Namely, how do L i b e r a l d e l e g a t e s w i t h i n B.C. view f e d e r a l p o l i t i c s and i t s r e l a t i o n s h i p to p r o v i n c i a l p o l i t i c s . Are they f e d e r a l -o r i e n t e d a c t i v i s t s "trapped" i n a p r o v i n c i a l p a r t y . F o l l o w i n g t h i s , the c o n v e n t i o n a l wisdom that p l a c e s the L i b e r a l s i d e o l o g i c a l l y between the NDP and S o c i a l C r e d i t 25 Party i n the p o l a r i z e d p o l i t i c s of B r i t i s h Columbia w i l l be t e s t e d . Are L i b e r a l a c t i v i s t s ' i d e o l o g i c a l p r e f e r e n c e s somewhere "between" those of the NDP and the S o c i a l C r e d i t a c t i v i s t s ? Given our i n t e r e s t i n the L i b e r a l s ' a t t i t u d e s towards f e d e r a l p o l i t i c s , how do these compare with the a t t i t u d e s of other p r o v i n c i a l a c t i v i s t s towards f e d e r a l p o l i t i c s and i t s r e l a t i o n s h i p to p r o v i n c i a l p o l i t i c s . The d i s t i n c t i v e h i s t o r i e s of the three p a r t i e s w i l l be c o n t r a s t e d in making these comparisons. The p r o v i n c i a l p o p u l i s t r o o t s of the NDP and the S o c i a l C r e d i t Party w i l l be c o n t r a s t e d with the r o o t s of the L i b e r a l P a r t y . The penultimate chapter w i l l d e a l with the e f f e c t of these themes on the s t r u c t u r e of o p i n i o n w i t h i n the L i b e r a l and other p r o v i n c i a l p a r t i e s . T h i s chapter w i l l a l s o attempt to d i s c o v e r any r e i n f o r c i n g o p i n i o n cleavages among the L i b e r a l a c t i v i s t s . As with a l l the preceding chapters, t h i s w i l l be l a r g e l y d e s c r i p t i v e . D e s c r i b i n g the L i b e r a l Party w i t h i n the context of B r i t i s h Columbian p o l i t i c s i s then the c e n t r a l o b j e c t i v e of what i s to f o l l o w . The 1987 p r o v i n c i a l l e a d e r s h i p convention p r o v i d e d an op p o r t u n i t y to peer i n t o the p a r t y and gather i n f o r m a t i o n e s s e n t i a l to understanding the p a r t y and f o r t e s t i n g some of the c o n v e n t i o n a l wisdom reg a r d i n g the party i n B.C. 26 CHAPTER THREE  THE LIBERAL PARTY IN BRITISH COLUMBIA THE LIBERAL ACTIVISTS IN BRITISH COLUMBIA The survey of the L i b e r a l Party of B r i t i s h Columbia used here was conducted d u r i n g the l e a d e r s h i p convention i n October, 1987. Gordon Wilson was the only candidate f o r the l e a d e r s h i p and was duly acclaimed leader at the convention. Two hundred and twenty-four q u e s t i o n n a i r e s were d i s t r i b u t e d to the delegates as they completed t h e i r o f f i c i a l r e g i s t r a t i o n . Ninety q u e s t i o n n a i r e s were returned to the U n i v e r s i t y of B r i t i s h Columbia by mail i n p r e p a i d envelopes. T h i s r e p r e s e n t s a r e t u r n r a t e of approximately 40 per cent. The small N of 90 l i m i t s the number of respondents i n some c e l l s i n the subsequent a n a l y s i s to s t a t i s t i c a l l y i n s i g n i f i c a n t l e v e l s . As such, some c o l l a p s i n g of answers to que s t i o n s was necessary to achieve s t a t i s t i c a l l y meaningful numbers. T h i s , and the f a c t that some q u e s t i o n s were not amenable to such manipulations l i m i t e d the u s e f u l n e s s of some of the data. T h i s study complements surveys of the 1987 NDP p r o v i n c i a l l e a d e r s h i p convention and the 1986 S o c i a l C r e d i t convention undertaken by Blake, Carty, and E r i c k s o n . Comparisons with NDP and S o c i a l C r e d i t p r o v i n c i a l delegates 27 draw upon these companion surveys. In very broad terms, p r o v i n c i a l L i b e r a l convention d e l e g a t e s were the w e l l educated, middle to h i g h income earners that are g e n e r a l l y found at other l e a d e r s h i p conventions i n Canada. A l s o c o n s i s t e n t with conventions elsewhere i n Canada, two-thirds were male. Half were born o u t s i d e B r i t i s h Columbia, a higher p r o p o r t i o n than f o r e i t h e r NDP or S o c i a l C r e d i t convention d e l e g a t e s . R e f l e c t i n g the p a r t y ' s h i s t o r i c a l s t r e n g t h i n urban B r i t i s h Columbia, over 70 per cent r e s i d e d i n the lower mainland or V i c t o r i a , thus they attended as r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s of c o n s t i t u e n c y a s s o c i a t i o n from these two areas. A l a r g e percentage, 81.1 per cent, of the delegates had r e s i d e d in B r i t i s h Columbia f o r more than 15 y e a r s . As w e l l , over 82 per cent of them f i r s t j o i n e d the L i b e r a l Party in B r i t i s h Columbia. About 22 per cent of the delegates were Roman C a t h o l i c s , which i s an o v e r - r e p r e s e n t a t i o n of the 13.8 per cent of the general e l e c t o r a t e that i s C a t h o l i c and 50 per cent of the delegates were P r o t e s t a n t s of v a r i o u s denominations. The U n i t e d Church, the l a r g e s t group of P r o t e s t a n t s , accounted f o r 17.6 per cent of the d e l e g a t e s . T h i s i s a s l i g h t u n d e r - r e p r e s e n t a t i o n of the 60 per cent of B r i t i s h Columbians that are P r o t e s t a n t and the 28.6 per cent c l a i m i n g United Church a f f i l i a t i o n . With regard to education l e v e l s , L i b e r a l d e l e g a t e s as group are e x t r a o r d i n a r i l y well-educated compared to any 28 other group of p r o v i n c i a l d e l e g a t e s , with 76.7 per cent c l a i m i n g some u n i v e r s i t y or c o l l e g e education or b e t t e r . Lawyers made up the s i n g l e b iggest occupation group, accounting f o r 15.6 per cent of the d e l e g a t e s . Income l e v e l s were s i m i l a r to those of both NDP and S o c i a l C r e d i t convention d e l e g a t e s , although i n the 75,000 d o l l a r s and over category, the L i b e r a l s and S o c i a l C r e d i t have about the double the p r o p o r t i o n of d e l e g a t e s than'does the NDP. S t i l l , over 60 per cent of the d e l e g a t e s f o r a l l p a r t i e s earn between $20,000 and $74,000. More than any other p a r t y , the L i b e r a l delegates tended to be i n v o l v e d i n p r o f e s s i o n a l a s s o c i a t i o n s , with over 50 per cent c l a i m i n g such involvement. As noted, about over 80 per cent of the L i b e r a l d e l e g a t e s j o i n e d the p a r t y f i r s t i n B r i t i s h Columbia. The l a r g e s t group of d e l e g a t e s (38.9 per cent) j o i n e d the p a r t y before 1972, the l a s t year i n which the L i b e r a l s achieved reasonable p r o v i n c i a l e l e c t o r a l support ( j u s t under 20 per cent) A s i z a b l e p r o p o r t i o n , 34.4 per cent j o i n e d i n the f i v e years between 1980 and 1985, a t r e n d which continued i n t o 1986-1987, a l b e i t at a somewhat reduced r a t e , with 8.9 per cent j o i n i n g i n t h i s p e r i o d . Only 7.8 per cent j o i n e d between 1975 and 1979 and 10 per cent between 1972 and 1975. A vast m a j o r i t y , 91.1 per cent, of the d e l e g a t e s voted f o r the L i b e r a l Party i n the 1984 f e d e r a l e l e c t i o n , while 42.2 per cent worked f o r the p a r t y i n the 1983 p r o v i n c i a l 29 e l e c t i o n , 71.1 per cent worked i n the 1984 f e d e r a l e l e c t i o n and 80 per cent worked f o r the part y i n the 1986 p r o v i n c i a l e l e c t i o n . Just l e s s than h a l f attended the l a s t p r o v i n c i a l l e a d e r s h i p convention and 6.7 per cent have been a c t i v e w i t h i n another p o l i t i c a l party i n B r i t i s h Columbia. The breakdown of the present involvement l e v e l s in the p a r t y produces some remarkable f i g u r e s , i n that the l a r g e s t s i n g l e group of o f f i c e h o l d e r s represented at the Convention c o n s i s t e d of members of f e d e r a l c o n s t i t u e n c y e x e c u t i v e s (43.3 per cent) with p r o v i n c i a l c o n s t i t u e n c y e x e c u t i v e members c o n s t i t u t i n g 35.6 per cent of the d e l e g a t e s . The remainder of the delegates were d i s t r i b u t e d as f o l l o w s : . 14.4 per cent were members of the p r o v i n c i a l e x e c u t i v e , 15.6 per cent were members of women's commission, and 6.7 per cent were members of the youth group. Moreover, the percentage of deleg a t e s who have ever worked on p r o v i n c i a l or f e d e r a l c o n s t i t u e n c y e x e c u t i v e s i s n e a r l y i d e n t i c a l , 61.1 and 62.2 per cent r e s p e c t i v e l y . More than o n e - t h i r d of the d e l e g a t e s , 36.7 per cent, attended the 1984 f e d e r a l l e a d e r s h i p convention of which 42.9 per cent claimed to have supported Turner on the f i r s t b a l l o t , and 48.1 per cent c l a i m t o have supported him on the second b a l l o t . S l i g h t l y fewer, 32.2 per cent attended the 1986 N a t i o n a l Convention i n Ottawa, but only 3.4 per cent of those voted f o r a l e a d e r s h i p review at the convention. About a quarter had r e l a t i v e s a t t e n d i n g the convention 30 similar to the proportion found at the NDP and Social Credit conventions. Liberals' attitude towards the factors which will determine the Liberal Party's success in the next provincial elections are as follows. Exhibiting the familiar emphasis on party leaders in Canada, nearly 100 per cent of the delegates believed the quality of provincial leadership to be important to provincial success. The quality of candidates was seen as important by 94.4 per cent of the delegates, followed by the party platform at 88.9 per cent. The weakness of the Social Credit Party was held to be an important variable by 87.8 per cent, whereas the weakness of the NDP was seen by 83.3 per cent as important. The impact of federal party strength ranked last in factors likely to affect the provincial success, although 72.2 per cent of the delegates saw this as important. As to the goals the party should set in terms of seats in provincial elections, delegates were decidedly modest. 37.8 per cent considered 1 to 3 seats a real i s t i c goal, 40 per cent considered 4-10 seats a real i s t i c goal. Given their recent record, these expectations may be seen by some as optimistic, but making allowance for the expected optimism of party members, they appear rather modest. Delegates were more sanguine about the chances of winning in their federal constituency than they were about winning in their provincial constituency. 38.9 per cent thought their 31 p r o v i n c i a l chances were "medium", whereas 46.7 per cen t thought t h i s about t h e i r f e d e r a l chances. The comparison p r o v i n c i a l t o f e d e r a l i n the "low" and "none" chance c a t e g o r i e s were 41.1 per cen t t o 15.6 per c e n t and 13.3 per ce n t t o 2.2 per c e n t , r e s p e c t i v e l y . Thus, L i b e r a l d e l e g a t e s appear t o have modest e x p e c t a t i o n s but were more f a v o r a b l y d i s p o s e d t o su c c e s s a t the f e d e r a l l e v e l . The optimism w i t h r e g a r d s t o f e d e r a l p o l i t i c s i s t o be e x p e c t e d t o some degree, g i v e n the s t r o n g e r e l e c t o r a l performance of the L i b e r a l s i n f e d e r a l e l e c t i o n i n B.C. where they r e c e i v e about 20 per cen t of the v o t e . Not o n l y were L i b e r a l d e l e g a t e s more o p t i m i s t i c about the p a r t y ' s chances f e d e r a l l y , but they c o n s i d e r e d f e d e r a l p o l i t i c s t o be more im p o r t a n t than p r o v i n c i a l p o l i t i c s . A s o l i d m a j o r i t y , 56.7 per c e n t , of the L i b e r a l s c o n s i d e r f e d e r a l p o l i t i c s t o be the most i m p o r t a n t l e v e l of p o l i t i c s as opposed t o 16.7 per cen t who c l a i m t h i s f o r p r o v i n c i a l p o l i t i c s . There was a l a r g e "no answer" response t o t h i s q u e s t i o n , t h i s answer a c c o u n t i n g f o r 16.7 per cen t of the d e l e g a t e s . Moreover, 28.9 per cen t of the d e l e g a t e s " f e e l c l o s e r " t o the f e d e r a l p a r t y than t o the p r o v i n c i a l p a r t y , w i t h o n l y 17.8 per c e n t c l a i m i n g t h i s c l o s e n e s s i n r e l a t i o n t o the p r o v i n c i a l p a r t y . Only 52.2 per cent f e l t they were e q u a l l y c l o s e t o b o t h l e v e l s of the p a r t y . T h i s i s c o n s i s t e n t w i t h the p r o f i l e of p a r t y involvement noted e a r l i e r i n which f e d e r a l p a r t y involvement was v e r y h i g h , w i t h over 40 per cent of the d e l e g a t e s 32 in v o l v e d i n f e d e r a l r i d i n g e x e c u t i v e s . L i b e r a l s stand out i n respect of t h e i r a t t i t u d e s towards f e d e r a l p o l i t i c s . While there i s no data on t h i s from the S o c i a l C r e d i t convention, the negative a t t i t u d e of that p a r t y towards f e d e r a l governments i s w e l l known. As f o r the NDP, 29.2 per cent of deleg a t e s thought f e d e r a l p o l i t i c s was more important than p r o v i n c i a l and 44.0 per cent reverse t h i s p r e f e r e n c e . T h i s i s a c l e a r i n d i c a t o r that p r o v i n c i a l p o l i t i c s i s not as i n t e r e s t i n g to L i b e r a l a c t i v i s t s i n B r i t i s h Columbia. L i b e r a l d e l e g a t e s c l e a r l y b e l i e v e that the p a r t y i s competing d i r e c t l y with the S o c i a l C r e d i t Party f o r the votes of those on the " r i g h t " of p o l i t i c s i n B r i t i s h Columbia. About h a l f of the L i b e r a l delegates thought that those v o t e r s who supported the f e d e r a l L i b e r a l Party but not the p r o v i n c i a l L i b e r a l Party voted f o r the S o c i a l C r e d i t Party at p r o v i n c i a l e l e c t i o n s . A f u r t h e r 20 percent thought the m a j o r i t y of those s w i t c h i n g t h e i r support voted f o r the S o c i a l C r e d i t Party p r o v i n c i a l l y . In f a c t , the f e d e r a l L i b e r a l s who change t h e i r vote do so i n a r a t i o of about 2 to 1 i n favour of the S o c i a l C r e d i t Party (Blake, 1985, p. 137). The d e l e g a t e s a l s o i d e n t i f i e d the NDP as the d r i v i n g f o r c e behind these d e f e c t i o n s , with 57.8 per cent of them i d e n t i f y i n g "the fear of NDP v i c t o r y " as the reason f o r t h e i r d e f e c t i o n . Roughly one-tenth of the deleg a t e s thought the p e r c e p t i o n that a vote f o r the L i b e r a l s p r o v i n c i a l l y was a 33 wasted vote provided the motivation for the defections. A similar proportion blamed a lack of federal support for the party as a reason for the defections. Given a chance to place the Liberal Party on a "left-right" scale, the Liberal delegates overwhelmingly place i t between the NDP and the Social Credit Party. The range the delegates gave to each party on a scale from one to seven are: NDP, one to four; Liberals, 3.5 to 5.5; and Social Credit 5.0 to 7.0. The overlap is greater on the Liberal/NDP ranges. This is reflected in mean scores for the parties of 2.49, 4.01 and 6.37. The Liberals, despite believing that the Social Credit Party "steals" their vote base, place themselves closer to the NDP ideologically. Alternatively one could describe this outcome as the Liberals picking the mid-point (4) for themselves and identifying the Social Credit Party as the ideological outlier in B.C. po l i t i c s . As to why the Liberal delegates joined the Liberal Party, by themselves the answers are of l i t t l e interest: 15.6 per cent gave "matching beliefs", 10 per cent gave "moderation" and 10 per cent give "free enterprise" nature of the party as their answer. CONCLUSION In summarizing the information presented here we can ascertain a picture of the type of person who is a Liberal activist in British Columbia. The overriding 34 i m p r e s s i o n i s t h a t L i b e r a l a c t i v i s t s i n B.C. a r e drawn from the "middle c l a s s " . In f a c t they a r e a t l e a s t as " e l i t i s t " as S o c i a l C r e d i t a c t i v i s t s i n terms of income l e v e l . They ar e a l s o drawn o v e r w h e l m i n g l y from urban B r i t i s h Columbia where the p a r t y ' s h i s t o r i c a l s t r e n g t h l a y , and a r e , as a group> p a r t i c u l a r l y w e l l - e d u c a t e d . With t h e i r p r o p e n s i t y f o r involv e m e n t i n p r o f e s s i o n a l a s s o c i a t i o n , may L i b e r a l d e l e g a t e s appear t o r e p r e s e n t an urban, p r o f e s s i o n a l e l i t e . Taken t o g e t h e r w i t h t h e i r f e d e r a l p r o c l i v i t i e s and the number of members drawn from f e d e r a l p a r t y p o s i t i o n s , t h i s s u g g e s t s t h a t a s i z a b l e p r o p o r t i o n of d e l e g a t e s t o the p r o v i n c i a l c o n v e n t i o n were r e p r e s e n t a t i v e of a f e d e r a l L i b e r a l e l i t e w i t h i n B.C. Perhaps the l o s s of a t l e a s t p a r t of the p r o v i n c i a l e l i t e d u r i n g the tumultuous 1970s has h e l p e d g i v e r i s e t o t h i s s i t u a t i o n . L i b e r a l a c t i v i s t s a r e more o p t i m i s t i c about the p a r t y ' s chances i n B.C. i n f e d e r a l e l e c t i o n s . T h i s i s not o n l y s e n s i b l e g i v e n the p a r t y ' s f e d e r a l s u c c e s s , i t may a l s o h e l p e x p l a i n why many L i b e r a l s have a f e d e r a l o r i e n t a t i o n . About o n e - h a l f of the d e l e g a t e s were born i n a p r o v i n c e o t h e r than B.C. T h i s may f u r t h e r add t o the "non-p r o v i n c i a l " o u t l o o k of the a c t i v i s t s as a group. There i s a s t r o n g c o n t i n g e n t of members who j o i n e d p r i o r t o 1972, when L i b e r a l f o r t u n e s were b r i g h t e r i n the p r o v i n c e . Y e t , as we s h a l l show l a t e r , the age d i s t r i b u t i o n of the d e l e g a t e s i s o n l y m a r g i n a l l y skewed i n f a v o u r of o l d e r 35 d e l e g a t e s . The i n f l u x of members a f t e r the 1970s i s i n t e r e s t i n g . The strong f e d e r a l t i e s of some d e l e g a t e s and t h e i r support f o r John Turner suggests h i s high p r o f i l e may have helped boost l o c a l membership. I t i s worth n o t i n g that the s t r e n g t h of the " f e d e r a l " L i b e r a l r e p r e s e n t a t i o n at t h i s convention may a l s o have a s t r u c t u r a l component. As we s h a l l see l a t e r , the p r o v i n c i a l p a r t y has i n s t i t u t i o n a l i z e d f e d e r a l delegate r e p r e s e n t a t i o n at p r o v i n c i a l conventions. On the whole, the L i b e r a l a c t i v i s t s appear to accept the commonly h e l d d e s c r i p t i o n of B.C. p o l i t i c s . That i s , that the L i b e r a l Party i s competing with the S o c i a l C r e d i t Party f o r the " r i g h t wing" vote i n p r o v i n c i a l p o l i t i c s . Furthermore, they a t t r i b u t e the " l o s s " of f e d e r a l L i b e r a l v o t e r s to the S o c i a l C r e d i t Party i n p r o v i n c i a l e l e c t i o n s to " f e a r of the NDP". Thus, by i m p l i c a t i o n , they see the S o c i a l C r e d i t ' s success as a response to the " s o c i a l i s t " NDP. The L i b e r a l Party s t i l l h o l d i t s a t t r a c t i o n f o r C a t h o l i c s even i n B.C. Although C a t h o l i c s are l e s s w e l l represented p r o p o r t i o n a t e l y i n comparison to the f e d e r a l L i b e r a l Party, they are c l e a r l y o v e r - r e p r e s e n t e d i n terms of t h e i r p r o p o r t i o n i n the B.C. e l e c t o r a t e . Given the " m i d d l e - c l a s s b i a s " (Blake, 1972, p. 670) a s s o c i a t e d with the L i b e r a l s i n B.C., our f i n d i n g s are not a l t o g e t h e r s u r p r i s i n g . A l s o , we can be c o n f i d e n t i n saying that the L i b e r a l Party i n B r i t i s h Columbia, as represented by 36 i t s a c t i v i s t s , i s a f a i r l y t y p i c a l Canadian p o l i t i c a l p a r t y . It c e r t a i n l y does not appear to have been "captured" by any s p e c i a l i n t e r e s t group (except perhaps l a w y e r s ! ) . The demographic i n f o r m a t i o n shown here r e f l e c t s a c r o s s s e c t i o n of " m i d d l e - c l a s s Canada" s i m i l a r to that found i n other Canadian p a r t i e s . LIBERAL ACTIVISTS AND POLARIZED POLITICS As i t r e c e i v e s l e s s than f i v e per cent of the vote in p r o v i n c i a l e l e c t i o n s at present, the p r o v i n c i a l L i b e r a l Party i s a " b i t p l a y e r " i n p r o v i n c i a l p o l i t i c s . The f a c t that i t does not take p a r t i n the major e l e c t o r a l contest in a p o l a r i z e d party system has l e d to i t being seen as a small c e n t r e - p a r t y , with l i t t l e s i g n i f i c a n c e f o r p r o v i n c i a l p o l i t i c s . The n o t i o n of a p a r t y being banished to the w i l d e r n e s s of the "middle ground" of the p o l i t i c a l spectrum i s somewhat pr o b l e m a t i c . Most p a r t i e s appear to spend much of t h e i r time attempting to "capture" the middle ground to ensure e l e c t o r a l success. The somewhat amorphous nature of the concept has meant that l i t t l e i s known about what t h i s banishment means f o r the exact nature of the L i b e r a l s ' p o s i t i o n v i s - a - v i s the other two p a r t i e s i n B r i t i s h Columbia. Being a minor p l a y e r has tended to l i m i t the a t t r a c t i v e n e s s of the party as an o b j e c t of r e s e a r c h f o r p o l i t i c a l s c i e n t i s t s . 37 The f i r s t task of t h i s chapter i s to examine whether the L i b e r a l s are indeed a centre p a r t y i n p r o v i n c i a l p o l i t i c s . T h i s r e q u i r e s an assessment of the r e l a t i v e p o s i t i o n of the p a r t y v i s - a - v i s the NDP and S o c i a l C r e d i t P a r t y . By i m p l i c a t i o n , the nature of the "middle ground" i n B r i t i s h Columbian p o l i t i c s w i l l a l s o be e x p l o r e d . While t h i r d p a r t i e s and minor p a r t i e s have been an abundant source of f a s c i n a t i o n f o r Canadian academics, the m a j o r i t y of the l i t e r a t u r e has been l a r g e l y c o n f i n e d to d e s c r i p t i o n s of s i n g l e , p r o v i n c i a l based p a r t i e s (White, 1973). T h i s has meant that l i t t l e a t t e n t i o n has been p a i d to the nature of p r o v i n c i a l minor p a r t i e s whose f e d e r a l c o u n t e r p a r t i s a major party (although see A l p e r , 1975). The s t r a i n s w i t h i n p a r t i e s between t h e i r f e d e r a l and p r o v i n c i a l branches has, however, been a common theme of Canadian p a r t y s t u d i e s , ( f o r example see Smiley, 1982, Black, 1972, pp. 88-89) The concept of minor party i s i t s e l f problematic i n Canada due to the v a r i e g a t e d p a t t e r n s of p a r t y competition that occur i n the eleven d i f f e r e n t e l e c t o r a l c o n t e s t s that take p l a c e i n the country. Some p a r t i e s which are minor i n one c o n t e s t are major p l a y e r s i n some other c o n t e s t s . The NDP and S o c i a l C r e d i t Party i n B r i t i s h Columbia both represent p a r t i e s whose p r o v i n c i a l branches are major p l a y e r s but whose f e d e r a l p a r t n e r s are not. The NDP can c l a i m some n a t i o n a l i d e n t i t y given i t s 20 per cent vote at the n a t i o n a l 3 8 e l e c t i o n s . The S o c i a l C r e d i t i s a l l but non-existent n a t i o n a l l y . The L i b e r a l s face the reverse s i t u a t i o n — they are a major party f e d e r a l l y but a minor par t y p r o v i n c i a l l y . Not only i s the L i b e r a l Party d i s t i n c t i n t h i s way, but i t s development separates i t from ' the two major p r o v i n c i a l p a r t i e s . The L i b e r a l Party i s an " i n s i d e r " p a r t y . (La Polambara et a l . , 1969) That i s , du r i n g i t s e a r l y more s u c c e s s f u l p e r i o d i n B r i t i s h Columbia, i t developed, as d i d i t s c o u n t e r p a r t s i n f e d e r a l p o l i t i c s , from c o a l i t i o n b u i l d i n g , w i t h i n the l e g i s l a t u r e . The s t r u c t u r e of the p a r t y became i n s t i t u t i o n a l i z e d i n the time a f t e r p a r l i a m e n t a r y notables b u i l t t h e i r a l l i a n c e . The L i b e r a l Party i s a cadre party in Duverger's terms. (Duverger, 1951, p. 63-64) The NDP and S o c i a l C r e d i t are " o u t s i d e r " p a r t i e s . They emerged from the non-parliamentary mass movements of the 1920s i n Canada. Both p a r t i e s have r o o t s i n the s h o r t - l i v e d P r o g r e s s i v e Party which i n turn developed out of a number of Un i t e d Farmer p a r t i e s i n some p r o v i n c e s . The development of these p a r t i e s r e l i e d upon economic and s o c i a l f a c t o r s s p e c i f i c to those p r o v i n c e s or r e g i o n s i n Canada. ( B l a i s , 1973, p. 432) While p o p u l i s t a g r a r i a n p o l i t i c s was never as stro n g i n B r i t i s h Columbia as on the p r a i r i e s , both these p a r t i e s have p o p u l i s t , p r o v i n c i a l antecedents. While the NDP might be seen as a mass party by Duverger's c r i t e r i a , the S o c i a l C r e d i t appears to s t r a d d l e the mass/cadre d i s t i n c t i o n 39 proposed by Duve'rger. (Duverger, pp. 64-65) The apparent e l i t e nature of the S o c i a l C r e d i t p a r t y i n formal p o l i t i c s i s i n c o n t r a s t to the strong mass membership that has r e s u l t e d from s p e c i f i c attempts by the p a r t y to widen i t s support ( H a r r i s , 1987). Recent s t u d i e s suggest that the S o c i a l C r e d i t Party i s p a r t i c u l a r l y p o p u l i s t , the NDP l e s s so. I t has been argued that the e x i g e n c i e s of a two-party system have encouraged the two p r o v i n c i a l p a r t i e s to mimic each other. The r e s u l t i s a break-down in the cadres/mass pa r t y d i s t i n c t i o n between the two ( E r i c k s o n et a l . , 1988) The f a c t remains, however, that they are to some degree both p r o v i n c i a l and p o p u l i s t p a r t i e s . The i m p l i c a t i o n of t h i s i s that the simple l e f t - r i g h t dichotomy may not t r u l y capture the essence of the d i s t i n c t i o n between these and the L i b e r a l P a r t y . Rather the d i s t i n c t i o n must i n c l u d e an assessment of r e l a t i v e p r o v i n c i a l b i a s and the degree of p o p u l i s t sentiment w i t h i n each p a r t y . Thus, the three f a c t o r s under s c r u t i n y here are whether or not the L i b e r a l s ' are a middle ground p a r t y , to which of the two major p a r t i e s i s i t c l o s e r , and how i t r e l a t e s to the two p a r t i e s with regard to p r o v i n c i a l and p o p u l i s t t e n d e n c i e s . When allowed to express the i s s u e s they thought were most important to B r i t i s h Columbia, d e l e g a t e s from a l l p a r t i e s expressed s i m i l a r concerns. The p r o p o r t i o n of del e g a t e s who noted each of the i s s u e s v a r i e d g r e a t l y from p a r t y to p a r t y . About 28 per cent of the S o c i a l C r e d i t 40 d e l e g a t e s mentioned economy-related i s s u e s , but about 29 per cent mentioned unemployment. Among the NDP d e l e g a t e s , 45 per cent mentioned unemployment as the major i s s u e f a c i n g the p r o v i n c e . Unemployment r a t e d much more l o w l y w i t h the L i b e r a l d e l e g a t e s , w i t h o n l y 11 per cen t m e n t i o n i n g i t whereas 12.3 per cent mentioned economic p l a n n i n g . S t i l l , L i b e r a l s were much l e s s u n i t e d as a p a r t y . Whereas about h a l f the d e l e g a t e s from the o t h e r p a r t i e s f e l l i n t o these two groups l e a v i n g the r e s t spread over a wide range, o n l y a q u a r t e r of L i b e r a l s a re accounted f o r by the s e q u e s t i o n s . Table I I g i v e s the r e s u l t s of some of the q u e s t i o n s asked of a l l t h r e e s e t s of d e l e g a t e s i n r e l a t i o n t o some government r e g u l a t o r y a c t i v i t i e s . I t c o n t a i n s two s e t s of f i g u r e s . One i s the perc e n t a g e of d e l e g a t e s from each of the t h r e e p r o v i n c i a l p a r t i e s who f a v o u r e d i n c r e a s e d r e g u l a t i o n . The second i s a measure of the ' o p i n i o n ' d i s t a n c e between L i b e r a l P a r t y a c t i v i s t s and a c t i v i s t s from each of the o t h e r p r o v i n c i a l p a r t i e s . T h i s i s r e f e r r e d t o as the ' d i f f e r e n c e i n d e x ' (DI) . Ta b l e I I I a l s o uses t h i s a p p r o a c h . 1 These q u e s t i o n s a c t u a l l y p r o v i d e d f i v e p o s s i b l e answers i n t h e i r o r i g i n a l form. These were: s u b s t a n t i a l l y e x t e n d , s l i g h t l y 1The " d i f f e r e n c e i n d e x " (DI) i s c a l c u l a t e d by summing the a b s o l u t e d i f f e r e n c e between p a r t i e s i n the p e r c e n t a g e s i n each e x t e n d / i n c r e a s e and redu c e / d e c r e a s e c a t e g o r i e s ( s t a t u s quo answers a r e not i n c l u d e d ) . T h i s s t a t i s t i c s v a r i e s between 0 and 1 and w i t h a DI of 0 corres p o n d e n c e t o i d e n t i c a l d i s t r i b u t i o n s . A DI of 1 i m p l i e s t h a t d e l e g a t e s from one p a r t y never choose the same response c a t e g o r y as d e l e g a t e s from the o t h e r p a r t y . 41 e x t e n d , kept as now, s l i g h t l y reduce, s u b s t a n t i a l l y reduce as no o p i n i o n . In c o n s t r u c t i n g T a b l e s I I and I I I the s e t h r e e c a t e g o r i e s have been c o l l a p s e d i n t o the f o l l o w i n g t h r e e : e x t e n d , kept as now, and reduce. The no o p i n i o n answers were r e t a i n e d but are i g n o r e d h e r e . T h i s c o l l a p s i n g was n e c e s s i t a t e d by the s m a l l L i b e r a l s i z e and a l s o t o s i m p l i f y c omparison. T a b l e I I COMPARISON OF DELEGATE OPINION ON GOVERNMENT REGULATION FAVOUR INCREASED REGULATION DIFFERENCE INDEX L i b NDP SC Iss u e Q u e s t i o n SC NDP 29 43 40 Gambling .05 .09 29 57 34 A g r i c u l t u r a l P r o d u c t s . 1 1 .29 28 24 22 Shopping Hours .10 .04 76 95 1 1 Human R i g h t s .49 . 1 1 23 26 26 S a l e of A l c o h o l .09 .09 92 97 24 P r o t e c t Environment .48 .04 63 90 22 Land Use .46 .14 Two g e n e r a l o b s e r v a t i o n s can be made about t h i s t a b l e . F i r s t , the L i b e r a l s d i d te n d t o f a l l between the NDP and S o c i a l C r e d i t a c t i v i s t s , and s e c o n d l y , they appeared t o fav o u r the NDP p o s i t i o n i n g e n e r a l . NDP a c t i v i s t s tend t o sup p o r t h i g h e r l e v e l s of government r e g u l a t i o n . S o c i a l C r e d i t d e l e g a t e s tended t o support the s t a t u s quo or r e d u c t i o n i n government r e g u l a t i o n s . O v e r a l l , however, they were q u i t e d i v i d e d w i t h no c e l l on any q u e s t i o n a c c o u n t i n g f o r more than 58 per cen t of the S o c i a l C r e d i t 42 a c t i v i s t s . The NDP presented a d i f f e r e n t p i c t u r e . On environmental p r o t e c t i o n , human r i g h t s and land use about 90 per cent of them favoured extended government r e g u l a t i o n . On the other i s s u e s , the NDP a c t i v i s t s e i t h e r supported the s t a t u s quo or favoured extended r e g u l a t i o n . But even amongst NDP dele g a t e s never more than 57 per cent supported extended r e g u l a t i o n . L i b e r a l s were with the NDP i n supporting environmental p r o t e c t i o n with 96.8 per cent of NDP a c t i v i s t s and 92 per cent of the L i b e r a l a c t i v i s t s t a k i n g t h i s p o s i t i o n . Extension of human r i g h t s r e g u l a t i o n s was supported by 20 per cent .fewer L i b e r a l s as compared to the NDP d e l e g a t e s , with 75.9 per cent of the L i b e r a l s supporting such an e x t e n s i o n . While the m a j o r i t y of the L i b e r a l s were in favour of more r e g u l a t i o n of land use, at 63.4 the NDP o u t - p o l l them on t h i s by 25 per cent. On other r e g u l a t o r y i s s u e s , L i b e r a l s favoured the s t a t u s quo or r e d u c t i o n in r e g u l a t i o n , but were even more d i v i d e d than the S o c i a l C r e d i t d e l e g a t e s with no answer ever g a r n e r i n g more than 44 per cent of the d e l e g a t e s ' support. The " d i f f e r e n c e index" shown i n Table II measures the " o p i n i o n " d i s t a n c e between the L i b e r a l s and the NDP and the L i b e r a l s and the S o c i a l C r e d i t delegates on these i s s u e s . The p a t t e r n of d i f f e r e n c e index scores confirms the above a n a l y s i s . Only with regard t o r e g u l a t i n g the marketing of 43 a g r i c u l t u r a l products do the L i b e r a l s respond more l i k e the S o c i a l C r e d i t respondents. T h i s r e f l e c t s the f a c t that 40.5 per cent of the L i b e r a l s favoured r e d u c t i o n s i n t h i s form of r e g u l a t i o n . T h i s r e s u l t may be expected from such a s t r o n g l y urban p a r t y . The p o s i t i o n of the L i b e r a l s with regard to the s a l e of a l c o h o l i s i n the "middle ", whereas on gambling they are m a r g i n a l l y more l i k e l y to respond l i k e the Socred d e l e g a t e s . C l e a r l y then, while the L i b e r a l s are c o n s i s t e n t l y "between" the two p a r t i e s they tend to favour the NDP p o s i t i o n e s p e c i a l l y with regard to s o c i a l p o l i c y . A f u r t h e r t e s t of the r e l a t i v e p o s i t i o n s of the p a r t i e s on r e g u l a t i o n i s s u e s i s provided by the " A n t i -R e g u l a t i o n " s c a l e . T h i s c o l l e c t s the range of answers given by respondents from each par t y to a set of r e l a t e d q u e s t i o n s (see Appendix I f o r which que s t i o n s make up the s c a l e ) . The o v e r a l l impression of the L i b e r a l s ' c e n t r a l p o s i t i o n on r e g u l a t i o n i s confirmed by a comparison of the means f o r the d i s t r i b u t i o n of party a c t i v i s t s ' responses f o r each p a r t y . The NDP mean i s .92, a f a v o r a b l e a t t i t u d e to in c r e a s e d r e g u l a t i o n . The S o c i a l C r e d i t mean of 2.75 i n d i c a t e s a more negative a t t i t u d e toward governmental r e g u l a t o r y a c t i v i t i e s . A L i b e r a l mean of 1.58 i n d i c a t e s that L i b e r a l d e l e g a t e s are between the NDP an S o c i a l C r e d i t d e l e g a t e s , on average, on que s t i o n s p e r t a i n i n g to governmental r e g u l a t o r y a c t i v i t i e s . T h i s a l s o shows them to be m a r g i n a l l y c l o s e r to the NDP p o s i t i o n . 44 Table I I I p r e s e n t s the d e l e g a t e s responses t o some q u e s t i o n s r e g a r d i n g government s p e n d i n g . The same procedure f o r c o l l a p s i n g c a t e g o r i e s i s f o l l o w e d here as w e l l . T a b l e I I I COMPARISON OF DELEGATE OPINION ON GOVERNMENT SPENDING FAVOUR INCREASED SPENDING (%) DIFFERENCE INDEX L i b NDP SC I s s u e Area SC NDP 92 98 32 Educat i o n .37 .03 21 70 1 5 Government S a l a r i e s .12 .30 72 95 18 Daycare .44 .12 10 28 38 Highways .31 .18 31 29 55 Tourism .15 .07 85 99 84 R e f o r e s t a t i o n .02 .10 47 83 45 Job G r a n t s .03 .38 66 97 1 5 W e l f a r e Rates .40 .16 74 93 32 H e a l t h Care .22 .12 The p a t t e r n of responses w i t h r e s p e c t t o government spending i s a l i t t l e more complex than i n the case of r e g u l a t i o n . A g a i n , the p e r c e n t a g e s show the L i b e r a l s f a l l i n g between the NDP and the S o c i a l C r e d i t r e s p o n d e n t s . Again on s o c i a l p o l i c y the L i b e r a l s and the NDP are q u i t e c l o s e . On e d u c a t i o n a c l e a r m a j o r i t y of L i b e r a l s and New Democrats f a v o u r e d i n c r e a s e d s p e n d i n g , whereas the Socreds f a v o u r e d r e d u c t i o n s . The f i g u r e s f o r e d u c a t i o n show 97.6 per cent of the NDP d e l e g a t e s and 92 per ce n t of the L i b e r a l d e l e g a t e s s u p p o r t e d more sp e n d i n g . For h e a l t h c a r e , 93.2 per cent of the NDP d e l e g a t e s f a v o u r e d i n c r e a s e d s p e n d i n g , 73.6 per cent of the L i b e r a l s f a v o u r e d i n c r e a s e d s p e n d i n g , w h i l e 59.8 per cen t of the S o c i a l C r e d i t a c t i v i s t s f a v o u r e d the " s t a t u s 45 quo". The r e s u l t f o r the day care q u e s t i o n were almost i d e n t i c a l f o r the NDP and L i b e r a l s a c t i v i s t s , but the S o c i a l C r e d i t d e l e g a t e s were more l i k e l y to want r e d u c t i o n s than i n the case of h e a l t h c a r e . The L i b e r a l s are c l o s e r to the S o c i a l C r e d i t d e l e g a t e s with regard to r e f o r e s t a t i o n , although the range of d i f f e r e n c e between the p a r t i e s i s h i g h l y c o n s t r a i n e d . Whereas 84 per cent of the S o c i a l C r e d i t d e l e g a t e s favoured i n c r e a s e d spending on r e - f o r e s t a t i o n , 98.6 per cent and 85.1 per cent of the NDP and L i b e r a l a c t i v i s t s r e s p e c t i v e l y a l s o favoured increased spending. On job grants, the NDP stands out with 82.5 per of i t s dele g a t e s f a v o u r i n g these g r a n t s . L i b e r a l s i n f a c t were most l i k e l y - to want r e d u c t i o n s in job grants -- 28.9 per cent compared with 24.3.per cent of S o c i a l C r e d i t d e l e g a t e s . As to tourism, L i b e r a l and NDP a c t i v i s t s were happy with the present l e v e l of spending with 48.4 per cent and 55.8 per cent, of t h e i r r e s p e c t i v e delegates c l a i m i n g t h i s p o s i t i o n . The S o c i a l C r e d i t came out as f a v o u r i n g governmental spending on "economic development" with 54.8 per cent f a v o u r i n g more spending on tourism. S i m i l a r l y , i n r e l a t i o n to spending on highways, the L i b e r a l s and New Democrats were more l i k e l y to favour r e d u c t i o n s than the Socred a c t i v i s t s . The support f o r s t a t u s quo was strong here f o r a l l p a r t i e s and as such t h i s q u e s t i o n has l i m i t e d comparative value. The " d i s t a n c e " between the NDP and S o c i a l C r e d i t a c t i v i s t s over w e l f a r e r a t e s i s q u i t e l a r g e , yet the 46 L i b e r a l s are not p a r t i c u l a r l y c l o s e t o the NDP p o s i t i o n e i t h e r . Whereas 48.2 per c e n t of the S o c i a l C r e d i t d e l e g a t e s f a v o u r e d the s t a t u s quo, 2.4 per c e n t and 27.6 per cent of the NDP and S o c i a l C r e d i t d e l e g a t e s f a v o u r e d t h i s p o s i t i o n . But 97.3 per c e n t of the NDP a c t i v i s t s and 65.5 per cent of the L i b e r a l a c t i v i s t s f a v o u r e d i n c r e a s e d spending a g a i n s t 15.2 per cent of S o c i a l C r e d i t a c t i v i s t s . Thus, a t t i t u d e s towards government spending p r e s e n t a more complex p i c t u r e . Whereas on s o c i a l s e c u r i t y , L i b e r a l s and NDP are q u i t e c l o s e , L i b e r a l s u p port f o r spending d e c r e a s e s where w e l f a r e , government s a l a r i e s and such q u e s t i o n s are concerned, the NDP a c t i v i s t s s t a y e d s t r o n g l y i n f a v o u r of such s p e n d i n g . There i s however a n o t h e r f a c t o r a t work h e r e , namely, p r o v i n c i a l economic development. On these i s s u e s , L i b e r a l and New Democrat support f o r i n c r e a s e d spending wanes, t o be r e p l a c e d by S o c i a l C r e d i t i n t e r e s t i n i n c r e a s e d s p e n d i n g . A g a i n , these f i n d i n g s are c o n f i r m e d by the DI s c o r e s . Two o p i n i o n s c a l e s a r e r e l e v a n t here (once a g a i n , see Appendix I f o r the q u e s t i o n s used t o c o n s t r u c t the s c a l e s ) . The " A n t i - W e l f a r e " s c a l e taps g e n e r a l a t t i t u d e s t o w e l f a r e and spending and on two s p e c i f i c w e l f a r e programmes. As w i t h the " A n t i - R e g u l a t i o n " s c a l e the L i b e r a l s a r e between the NDP and the S o c i a l C r e d i t a c t i v i s t s . The r e s p e c t i v e means a r e : NDP, .06; L i b e r a l , .31; and S o c i a l C r e d i t , 1.5. A g a i n , the L i b e r a l s are c l o s e r t o the NDP p o s i t i o n . The " A n t i - S o c i a l 47 P o l i c y " s c a l e i s r e l e v a n t here as i t taps spending and r e g u l a t i o n on s o c i a l p o l i c y q u e s t i o n s . The means here, i n the same order given above are .02, .08, and .51. Not only does t h i s show the L i b e r a l p o s i t i o n between that of the other two p a r t i e s , i t a l s o shows how c l o s e to the NDP p o s i t i o n L i b e r a l s are on s o c i a l p o l i c y i s s u e s . The f i g u r e s shown i n Table IV on the f o l l o w i n g page are the r e l a t i v e p o s i t i o n s of the L i b e r a l s v i s a v i s the other two p a r t i e s d e r i v e d from the answers of a l l three party groups to seventeen general p o l i c y q u e s t i o n that were asked of each group. On twelve of these seventeen i s s u e s , L i b e r a l d e l e g a t e s were " c l o s e r " to t h e i r NDP c o u n t e r p a r t s than to the S o c i a l C r e d i t d e l e g a t e s . On f i v e i s s u e s they are' c l o s e r to the S o c i a l C r e d i t p o s i t i o n . The L i b e r a l d e l e g a t e s are 0.3 per cent c l o s e r to the S o c i a l C r e d i t p o s i t i o n than the NDP p o s i t i o n with regards to "not spending taxes on the s i c k " . S i m i l a r l y , t h e i r responses to "a law to balance the B.C. budget" i s 0.8 p o i n t s c l o s e r to the S o c i a l C r e d i t p o s i t i o n . With regards to " s e l f - r e l i a n c e over government help" they favour the S o c i a l C r e d i t o p p o s i t i o n by 4.9 p o i n t s , "help f o r s e n i o r s " p l a c e s them 12.1 p o i n t s c l o s e r to the S o c i a l C r e d i t p o s i t i o n and on " f r e e r trade with the U.S" they are 56 p o i n t s c l o s e r to the S o c i a l C r e d i t p o s i t i o n . I t i s apparent that there i s a strand of f i s c a l conservatism i n the L i b e r a l Party 48 TABLE IV DELEGATE OPINION ON GENERAL POLICY QUESTIONS STATEMENT-1. Don't spend t a x e s on s i c k 2. T r u s t down-to-earth t h i n k i n g * 3. Grass r o o t s s o l v e problems 4. F o r e i g n ownership a t h r e a t t o Canada* 5. Canadian independence at any c o s t 6. Govt n e g o t i a t e I n d i a n l a n d c l a i m s 7. Law t o b a l a n c e BC budget 8. Many w e l f a r e programs unnecessary 9. Govt s h o u l d h e l p women 10. Govt r e g u l a t i o n s s t i f l e i n i t i a t i v e 11. Unemployed c o u l d f i n d j o b s 12. Cut govt red-tape 13. Govt guarantee l i v i n g s t a n d a r d s 14. Govt support s e n i o r s 15. S e l f r e l i a n c e over govt h e l p 16. Unions too p o w e r f u l 17. F r e e r t r a d e w i t h the US POINT DIFFERENCE PARTY LIBERAL  FROM LIBERALS CLOSER TO NDP SOC. CREDIT 2.9 2.6 S/C 3.7 33. 1 NDP 6.3 15.5 NDP 8.7 69.4 NDP 9.3 47.5 NDP 9.5 71.2 NDP 14.6 13.8 S/C 14.7 48.5 NDP 16.7 60.7 NDP 19.2 46.9 NDP 19.6 33. 1 NDP 22.3 30.9 NDP 24.4 47.2 NDP 32.8 20.7 S/C 39.6 34.7 S/C 43.0 44.6 NDP 68.7 12.7 S/C 2 • I n d i c a t e s s t a t e m e n t s on which L i b e r a l s were the extreme c a s e . In both i n s t a n c e s , a l a r g e number of L i b e r a l s d i s a g r e e d w i t h the g i v e n s t a t e m e n t s . On a l l o t h e r i s s u e s , the L i b e r a l s ' l e v e l of agreement f e l l between the NDP and S o c i a l C r e d i t . The f i g u r e s i n t h i s t a b l e r e p r e s e n t the a b s o l u t e d i f f e r e n c e s between the percentage of d e l e g a t e s from each p a r t y who agreed w i t h the statement. For the f u l l t e x t of the q u e s t i o n , see Appendix I . 49 as w e l l as support f o r " f r e e e n t e r p r i s e " as e x h i b i t e d i n t h e i r responses t o the id e a of f r e e r t r a d e w i t h the U n i t e d S t a t e s . The primacy of s e l f - r e l i a n c e over government h e l p s u g g e s t s t h a t the c o l l e c t i v e / c o m m u n i t a r i a n emphasis of the NDP i s , a t l e a s t i n p a r t , r e j e c t e d by the m a j o r i t y of the L i b e r a l d e l e g a t e s . A s c a l e which at t e m p t s t o t a p the broad a t t i t u d i n a l p r o p e n s i t i e s of d e l e g a t e s w i t h r e g a r d t o the " c o r r e c t " r o l e f o r governments as opposed t o i n d i v i d u a l s e l f - r e l i a n c e i s the " C o l l e c t i v e v e r s u s I n d i v i d u a l R e s p o n s i b i l i t y " s c a l e . On t h i s s c a l e , the l i b e r a l a c t i v i s t s , w h i l e between the two p a r t i e s on a v e r a g e , a re c l o s e r t o the S o c i a l C r e d i t p o s i t i o n . The NDP mean i s .39, the L i b e r a l mean i s 2.65, and the S o c i a l C r e d i t mean i s 3.74. In f a c t , t h r e e of the f i v e i s s u e s t h a t p l a c e d L i b e r a l d e l e g a t e s c l o s e r t o the S o c i a l C r e d i t d e l e g a t e s i n Table IV a r e measured by t h i s s c a l e . Table IV shows answers t o q u e s t i o n s p e r t a i n i n g t o p e r c e p t i o n s of Canadian independence. These r e l a t e l a r g e l y t o Canada's r e l a t i o n s h i p w i t h the U n i t e d S t a t e s . A " C o n t i n e n t a l i s t " s c a l e (see Appendix I) was c o n s t r u c t e d t o c a p t u r e the d i s t r i b u t i o n of answers from each p a r t y . The NDP d e l e g a t e s were the l e a s t " c o n t i n e n t a l i s t " w i t h a mean s c o r e of .24, L i b e r a l s were next w i t h a mean s c o r e of .96, w h i l s t the S o c i a l C r e d i t d e l e g a t e s were " p r o - c o n t i n e n t a l i s t s " w i t h a mean s c o r e of 2.31. The f i n a l s c a l e c o n s t r u c t e d was aimed a t u n c o v e r i n g 50 a t t i t u d e s towards p o p u l i s m . The means f o r the " P o p u l i s m " s c a l e were 1.36, 1.5, and 2.34 f o r the NDP, L i b e r a l and S o c i a l C r e d i t r e s p e c t i v e l y . T h i s shows t h a t L i b e r a l d e l e g a t e s tend t o be n o n - p o p u l i s t a l o n g w i t h the NDP, who a r e even more n o n - p o p u l i s t . S o c i a l C r e d i t d e l e g a t e s a r e s t r o n g l y p o p u l i s t . In f a c t , one of the two q u e s t i o n s on which L i b e r a l d e l e g a t e s were o u t l i e r s i n T a b l e IV d e a l s w i t h a t t i t u d e s towards p o p u l i s m - L i b e r a l d e l e g a t e s were o u t l i e r s i n d i s a g r e e i n g w i t h the p r o - p o p u l i s m s t a t e m e n t . The i n f o r m a t i o n g a t h e r e d here shows t h a t L i b e r a l a c t i v i s t s do r e p r e s e n t a "middle-ground" i n B r i t i s h Columbian p o l i t i c s . Somewhat s u r p r i s i n g l y , g i v e n t h e i r " m i d d l e - c l a s s " b i a s , they tend t o f a v o u r the p o s i t i o n of NDP a c t i v i s t s on most of the i s s u e s l o o k e d a t he r e . On q u e s t i o n s of s o c i a l p o l i c y the L i b e r a l s a r e p a r t i c u l a r l y i n c l i n e d t o approve of a p r o - a c t i v e r o l e f o r government both w i t h r e g a r d s t o spending and r e g u l a t i o n . T h i s a l i g n s them w i t h NDP a c t i v i s t s . On o t h e r q u e s t i o n s concerned w i t h government r e g u l a t o r y a c t i v i t i e s , L i b e r a l s a re more a m b i v a l e n t as a group. They do s t i l l t end t o f o l l o w the NDP p o s i t i o n , however. On government spending q u e s t i o n s o t h e r than those r e l a t i n g t o s o c i a l p o l i c y , L i b e r a l a c t i v i s t s a g a i n are a m b i v a l e n t as a group. On w e l f a r e spending and " j o b g r a n t s " , they tend t o respond more l i k e the S o c i a l C r e d i t a c t i v i s t s . A l l t h i s was born out i n the " d i f f e r e n c e i n d e x " s c o r e s and 51 the d i s t r i b u t i o n by party on the s c a l e s r e l a t i n g to government spending and r e g u l a t i o n . One f u r t h e r theme i s the tendency f o r both NDP and L i b e r a l a c t i v i s t s to be l e s s p o s i t i v e towards p r o v i n c i a l government spending and r e g u l a t i o n a c t i v i t i e s . T h i s tendency was somewhat reversed i n the case of S o c i a l C r e d i t a c t i v i s t s , e s p e c i a l l y when economic development i s s u e s were at hand. The c o n t i n e n t a l i s m s c a l e showed L i b e r a l and NDP a c t i v i s t s opposed to f u r t h e r i n t e g r a t i o n of Canadian and American s o c i e t i e s and economies. The S o c i a l C r e d i t a c t i v i s t s are s upportive of t h i s i n t e g r a t i o n . As f o r populism, the NDP and L i b e r a l a c t i v i s t s s i d e together as non-p o p u l i s t s . Whilst t h i s does not d i s t i n g u i s h the L i b e r a l s from the NDP, i t does d i s t i n g u i s h them from the strong p o p u l i s t tendency amongst S o c i a l C r e d i t a c t i v i s t s . I t was noted i n Chapter Two that L i b e r a l a c t i v i s t s were d i s t i n g u i s h a b l e from NDP a c t i v i s t s by t h e i r b e l i e f i n the importance of f e d e r a l as opposed to p r o v i n c i a l p o l i t i c s . Despite the apparent s i m i l a r i t i e s between the NDP and L i b e r a l d e legates, i t i s not p o s s i b l e to conclude that these two groups are on the same s i d e of p r o v i n c i a l p o l i t i c s . L i b e r a l a c t i v i s t s are too o f t e n c l e a r l y d e f i n e d as h o l d i n g o p i n i o n s that p l a c e them between the two main p a r t i e s . As w e l l , they are o c c a s s i o n a l l y a l i g n e d more with S o c i a l C r e d i t a c t i v i s t s . Perhaps the best example of t h i s d i s t i n c t i o n i s that on the " C o l l e c t i v e versus I n d i v i d u a l R e s p o n s i b i l i t y " 52 s c a l e , L i b e r a l s s i d e with S o c i a l C r e d i t a c t i v i s t s i n opposing the c o l l e c t i v i s t p r o c l i v i t i e s of NDP a c t i v i s t s . In t h i s a n a l y s i s , the v a r i o u s l e v e l s of cohesion amongst a c t i v i s t s from d i f f e r e n t p a r t i e s has been mentioned i n p a s s i n g . W h i l s t the t h e o r i e s r e l a t i n g to the nature of Canadian p a r t i e s l a r g e l y d e a l with them at the n a t i o n a l l e v e l , recent works have t r i e d to use the s t r u c t u r e of o p i n i o n w i t h i n the p a r t i e s to assess the d i f f e r e n c e s between the p a r t i e s . (Blake, 1 9 8 8 , p . 3 3 ) The next chapter attempts t o assess the s t r u c t u r e of o p i n i o n w i t h i n the p a r t i e s i n B r i t i s h Columbia to examine the d i f f e r e n c e s between them. 53 CHAPTER FOUR THE STRUCTURE OF OPINION AMONGST  ACTIVISTS IN BRITISH COLUMBIA COHESION AND DIVISION WITHIN THE PROVINCIAL LIBERAL PARTY The l a c k of i n f o r m a t i o n r e g a r d i n g t he L i b e r a l P a r t y i n B r i t i s h Columbia makes i t d i f f i c u l t t o f o r m u l a t e hypotheses w i t h r e g a r d t o the s t r u c t u r e of o p i n i o n among L i b e r a l d e l e g a t e s . As a r e s u l t of t h i s , what f o l l o w s i n t h i s s e c t i o n i s e s s e n t i a l l y e x p l o r a t o r y and d e s c r i p t i v e . The f i r s t p a r t w i l l d e a l w i t h o u t l i n i n g the i s s u e s which d i v i d e and u n i t e L i b e r a l d e l e g a t e s . G i v e n t h a t the L i b e r a l d e l e g a t e s have been shown t o r e p r e s e n t the "middle-ground" between the NDP and S o c i a l C r e d i t d e l e g a t e s , such a d e s c r i p t i o n w i l l i m p l i c i t l y r e f l e c t the n a t u r e of t h a t "middle-ground". Are the L i b e r a l s c o h e r e n t on any broad s e t of o p i n i o n s or a r e thes e o p i n i o n s r e p r e s e n t a t i v e of an "amorphous" midd l e - g r o u n d . Perhaps the L i b e r a l s r e p r e s e n t t h o s e i n d i v i d u a l s who a r e d i s e n c h a n t e d w i t h the p o l a r i z e d p o l t i c s of B r i t i s h Columbia but n e v e r t h e l e s s w i s h t o p a r t i c i p a t e i n p o l i t c s . In p a s s i n g , whether t h e p a t t e r n of d i v i s i o n and c o h e s i o n i s s i m i l a r t o t h a t found amongst f e d e r a l L i b e r a l d e l e g a t e s w i l l be c o n s i d e r e d . (See B l a k e , 1988, J o h n s t o n , 1988) 54 TABLE V PARTISAN ATTITUDES( ) AND CONSENSUS INDEX Is s u e Area L i b NDP SC Agr. CI Agr. CI Aqr. CI Don't Spend Taxes on S i c k 3.4 46.6 0.5 49.5 6.0 44.0 Canadian I d e n t i t y Over Region 92.2 42.2 Favour Meech Lake 7.8 42.2 S e c r e t S t r i k e B a l l o t s For Unions 92.2 42.2 72.7 22.7 Canadian Independence At Cost 91.9 41.9 82.6 32.6 44.4 5.6 Favour B.C. p o s i t i o n on Meech Lake 8 . 9 4 1 . 1 Favour F r e e Trade Deal 8.9 41.1 Approve of O f f i c i a l B i l i n g u a l i s m 91.1 41.1 P o v e r t y Due t o P r i v a t e Ownership 12.2 37.8 74.5 24.5 F o r e i g n Ownership a Threat 86.7 36.7 95.4 45.4 17.3 32.7 C l e a n Environment D e s p i t e of C o s t s 86.7 36.7 92.8 42.8 N e g o t i a t e Land C l a i m s 85.4 35.4 94.9 44.9 14.2 35.8 Favour B.C. D e c e n t r a l i -z a t i o n 15.6 34.4 Many W e l f a r e Programs Unnecessary 19.5 30.5 4.8 45.2 68.0 18.0 Favour F r e e r Trade 80.2 30.2 11.5 39.5 92.9 42.9 Favour B.C. P r i v a t i -z a t i o n 20.0 30.0 Issue Area L i b NDP SC Agr. CI Agr. CI Agr. CI E l e c t e d Senate 80.0 30.0 R e g u l a t i o n S t i f l e s I n i t i a t i v e 21.4 28.6 2.2 47.8 68.3 18.3 Unemployed Could F i n d Jobs 21.8 28.2 2.2 47.8 54.9 4.9 M a i n t a i n S i z e of Government 22.2 27.8 49.6 0.4 Approve of P u b l i c S e r v i c e B i l i n g u a l i s m 75.6 25.6 Government Help f o r Women 75.3 25.3 92.0 42.0 14.6 35.4 T r u s t Down to E a r t h T h i n k i n g 27.9 22.1 31.6 18.4 61.0 11.0 Guaranteed Standard of L i v i n g 71.8 21.8 96.2 46.2 24.6 25.4 Law to Balance Budget 30.7 19.3 16.1 33.9 44.5 5.5 P u b l i c Sector Workers Have More S e c u r i t y 68.9 18.9 35.1 14.9 M a i n t a i n E x i s t i n g D i v i s i o n of Power 65.6 15.6 Government to Provide Housing 65.6 15.6 B.C. Treated F a i r l y by F e d e r a l Government 40.0 10.0 Rely on S e l f 59.8 9.8 20.2 29.8 94.5 44.5 Cut Government Red Tape 59.3 9.3 37.0 13.0 90.2 40.2 G r a s s r o o t s Could Solve Problems 41.7 8.3 48.0 2.0 57.2 7.2 S o c i a l S e c u r i t y Based on Need 56.7 6.7 29.8 20.2 Free Trade W i l l R e s t r i c t 56 I s s u e Area L i b NDP SC Agr. CI Agr. CI Agr. CI Workers' R i g h t s 46.7 3.3 80.7 30.7 Unions t o o P o w e r f u l 47.1 2.9 4.1 45.9 91.7 41.7 Management Should Not H i r e Workers D u r i n g S t r i k e 47.8 2.2 97.1 47.1 Government Should Support S e n i o r s 48.8. 1.2 81.6 31.6 28.1 21 . 9 Government Should P r o v i d e Jobs 51.1 1.1 89.8 39.8 B i g C o r p o r a t i o n s R e q u i r e B i g Unions 51.1 1.1 85.3 35.3 F i n a l l y , i n t h i s s e c t i o n , the impact of the s t r u c t u r e of o p i n i o n ' o f the f e d e r a l o r i e n t a t i o n found e a r l i e r among the L i b e r a l d e l e g a t e s w i l l be d i s c u s s e d . T h i s w i l l l e a d i n t o the f o l l o w i n g s e c t i o n i n which the s t r u c t u r e of o p i n i o n among d e l e g a t e s from a l l t h r e e p r o v i n c i a l p a r t i e s i s d i s c u s s e d . F o l l o w i n g B l a k e e t a l . , (1988) a f i r s t s t e p i n d e s c r i b i n g the s t r u c t u r e of o p i n i o n w i t h i n a p a r t y i s t o ge n e r a t e a "consensus i n d e x " . T a b l e V p r e s e n t s such an index f o r the t h r e e p r o v i n c i a l p a r t i e s based on d e l e g a t e s ' r e s p o n s e s t o some p o l i c y and o p i n i o n q u e s t i o n . I s s u e s a r e those on which they a r e d i v i d e d . The f i r s t column f o r each p a r t y g i v e s the perc e n t a g e a g r e e i n g w i t h the g i v e n s t a t e m e n t . The second column c o n t a i n s a "consensus i n d e x " (CI) which i s based on the perc e n t a g e of d e l e g a t e s who a r e on the same s i d e 57 3 of the a g r e e / d i s a g r e e d i v i d e w i t h r e s p e c t t o t h a t s t a t e m e n t . The s e t of statements used here were drawn from the q u e s t i o n s p r e s e n t e d t o L i b e r a l d e l e g a t e s and those from o t h e r p a r t i e s at t h e i r l e a d e r s h i p c o n v e n t i o n s . Only some of the q u e s t i o n s were asked of a l l t h r e e d e l e g a t e groups. The assessment of u n i t y among d e l e g a t e s i s somewhat 4 a r b i t r a r y . For the purposes of t h i s paper, a consensus index of 30 or more w i l l be used t o i n d i c a t e s t r o n g c o h e s i o n among d e l e g a t e s i n t h e i r r e sponses t o a g i v e n q u e s t i o n . T h i s i n d i c a t e s t h a t 80 per cent or more of d e l e g a t e s were on the same s i d e of an i s s u e . A consensus index of 10 or l e s s w i l l be used t o i n d i c a t e a l a c k of c o h e s i o n i n d e l e g a t e s ' r e s p o n s e s . An index s c o r e of 10 or l e s s r e f l e c t s a 60/40 per cen t or c l o s e r s p l i t by d e l e g a t e on the i s s u e i n q u e s t i o n . The s h a r p e s t d i v i s i o n s among L i b e r a l d e l e g a t e s o c c u r r e d over what might l o o s e l y be d e s c r i b e d as i d e o l o g i c a l i s s u e s . The b a l a n c e of power between un i o n s and c o r p o r a t i o n s has been a l o n g s t a n d i n g s y s t e m i c i s s u e i n p r o v i n c i a l p o l i t i c s i n B r i t i s h Columbia. In response t o whether b i g c o r p o r a t i o n s r e q u i r e b i g unions t o b a l a n c e t h e i r power, L i b e r a l s were n e a r l y e v e n l y d i v i d e d , w i t h 51.1 per ce n t a g r e e i n g t h a t b i g 3 The "consensus i n d e x " e q u a l s the a b s o l u t e v a l u e of 50 minus the per c e n t a g e a g r e e i n g w i t h a g i v e n s t a t e m e n t . I f everyone agreed (or d i s a g r e e d ) the s c o r e would be 50. A 50/50 s p l i t would y i e l d a s o r e of 0, as would a s i t u a t i o n i n which 50 per ce n t agreed and the remainder were d i v i d e d i n t o " d i s a g r e e " and "no o p i n i o n " 4 . . . T h i s c h o i c e was gu i d e d by P e r l i n ' s d i s c u s s i o n and use of s i m i l a r approach i n the Tory Syndrome, 1980, pp. 153-157. 58 c o r p o r a t i o n s need t o be o f f s e t by b i g u n i o n s . The L i b e r a l s were a l s o d i v i d e d on whether unions i n B r i t i s h Columbia a r e too p o w e r f u l (47.1 per cen t a g r e e i n g ) . S i m i l a r l y , L i b e r a l s were d i v i d e d over the r i g h t of management t o h i r e replacement workers d u r i n g s t r i k e s (CI of 2 2 ) . Gi v e n the l o n g t r a d i t i o n of a n i m o s i t y over the b a l a n c e of power between b u s i n e s s and uni o n s i n B r i t i s h Columbia - a t e n s i o n which has been seen as a d r i v i n g f o r c e b e h i n d the p o l a r i z a t i o n of p r o v i n c i a l p o l i t i c s ( f o r example B l a k e , 1985, R o b i n , 1 9 7 2 ) — the L i b e r a l s ambivalence on t h i s i s s u e d i s t i n g u i s h e s them from both NDP and S o c i a l C r e d i t d e l e g a t e s who a r e u n i t e d on 5 oppo s i n g s i d e s of the i s s u e . Moreover, t h r e e of the n i n e i s s u e s on which the L i b e r a l s were c l e a r l y d i v i d e d r e l a t e t o un i o n s and union power i n some way. L i b e r a l s a r e a l s o d i v i d e d i n t h e i r responses t o w e l f a r e i s s u e s . The government p r o v i s i o n of j o b s f o r the unemployed and government support f o r s e n i o r s both have index s c o r e s of 1.1, i n d i c a t i n g a l a c k of agreement. S o c i a l s e c u r i t y based on need a l s o s p l i t s L i b e r a l s e v e n l y w i t h an index s c o r e of 6.7. T h i s i s c o n s i s t e n t w i t h the L i b e r a l s ' ambiguous p o s i t i o n as a groups on whether i n d i v i d u a l s h o u l d r e l y on themselves or the government when they encounter 5 The NDP and S o c i a l C r e d i t d e l e g a t e s a re on o p p o s i t e s i d e s of i s s u e s d e a l i n g w i t h union power. For example, the NDP d e l e g a t e s were u n i t e d i n not b e l i e v i n g t h a t u n i o n s are too p o w e r f u l i n B.C. (CI 41.7), whereas the S c o i a l C r e d i t d e l e g a t e s were u n i t e d on the o p p o s i t e s i d e . (CI 45.9) 59 d i f f i c u l t i e s i n l i f e ( i n d e x s c o r e 9.8).^ W i t h r e g a r d t o the problem of " r e d t a p e " i n government, l o n g a s h i b b o l e t h of c o n s e r v a t i v e p o l i t i c s , L i b e r a l s a r e a g a i n e v e n l y d i v i d e d , w i t h an index s c o r e of 9.3, i n c o n t r a s t t o S o c i a l C r e d i t u n i t y i n wanting t o c u t r e d t a p e , as shown by an index s c o r e of 40.2. The NDP d e l e g a t e s are a l s o d i v i d e d on t h i s q u e s t i o n . The L i b e r a l s a r e a l s o d i v i d e d over the v a l u e of g r a s s r o o t s a c t i v i s m i n p o l i t i c s ( i n d e x s c o r e 8.3), a s p l i t r e p l i c a t e d i n b oth the NDP and S o c i a l C r e d i t ( i n d e x s c o r e s of 2.0 and 7.2 r e s p e c t i v e l y ) . A c l o s e r a n a l y s i s of the d i s t i n g u i s h i n g f e a t u r e s of o p i n i o n w i t h i n each of the p a r t i e s w i l l f o l l o w l a t e r , f o r the time b e i n g i t i s s u f f i c i e n t t o note t h a t L i b e r a l s are e v e n l y d i v i d e d on " i d e o l o g i c a l " i s s u e s which g e n e r a t e a good d e a l of u n i t y w i t h i n the o t h e r p r o v i n c i a l p a r t i e s . In the c o n t e x t of B r i t i s h Columbia p o l i t i c s , government i n t e r v e n t i o n and the r o l e of u n i o n s , the i s s u e s which s p l i t the L i b e r a l s have l o n g been two of the i s s u e s which have d e f i n e d the n a t u r e of p r o v i n c i a l p o l i t i c s and have s t r o n g l y d i s t i n g u i s h e d the NDP from the S o c i a l C r e d i t P a r t y , w i t h each u n i t e d on the o p p o s i n g s i d e s of the i s s u e s . F i n a l l y , L i b e r a l s are d i v i d e d as t o whether B r i t i s h Columbia i s t r e a t e d f a i r l y by the f e d e r a l government, a f i n d i n g which may i n d i c a t e the t e n s i o n ^The NDP d e l e g a t e s a r e s t r o n g l y u n i t e d on a l l these i s s u e s , f a v o u r i n g government a c t i o n i n each c a s e , S o c i a l C r e d i t d e l e g a t e s g e n e r a l l y o p p o s i n g such a c t i o n . 60 7 between f e d e r a l and p r o v i n c i a l c o n c e r n s i n the p a r t y . L e t us c o n s i d e r those i s s u e s on which the L i b e r a l d e l e g a t e s were u n i t e d i n t h e i r r e s p o n s e s . Statements r e f e r r i n g t o Canadian independence and n a t i o n a l i s m evoked c o n s i s t e n t r e p l i e s from the L i b e r a l s . In f a c t , about h a l f of the i s s u e s i n the " u n i t e d " c a t e g o r y , t h a t i s , h a v i n g an index s c o r e of 30 or above, d e a l w i t h e i t h e r the above-mentioned t y p e s of i s s u e s or m a t t e r s t h a t a r e of a t l e a s t e q u a l i f not g r e a t e r c oncern f o r f e d e r a l p o l i t i c s as opposed t o p r o v i n c i a l p o l i t i c s . Thus, the most " u n i f y i n g " i s s u e f o r L i b e r a l s i s the importance of Canadian i d e n t i t y b e i n g emphasized over r e g i o n a l i d e n t i t y , which has an index s c o r e of 42.2 per c e n t . The Meech Lake has few L i b e r a l s u p p o r t e r s (7.8 per c e n t ) , a response r e p e a t e d i n the L i b e r a l s ' disagreement w i t h the p r o v i n c i a l government's s u p p o r t of the A c c o r d , which g e n e r a t e s an index s c o r e of 41.1. "Canadian independence a t any c o s t " a t t r a c t e d s t r o n g s u pport w i t h a CI of 41.9. The " t h r e a t of f o r e i g n ownership" appears t o have t r i p p e d the same r e f l e x i n L i b e r a l s , w i t h 86.7 per c e n t a g r e e i n g t h a t f o r e i g n ownership i s a t h r e a t t o Canadian independence. On 7 Due t o the a r b i t r a r y n a t u r e of the measures used here t o d e f i n e " e v e n l y s p l i t " , some mention of t h o s e i s s u e s which were j u s t o u t s i d e the low range i s w a r r a n t e d . In f a c t , o n l y f i v e i s s u e s produced index s c o r e between 10 and 20 i n the case of the L i b e r a l s . There was no c l e a r p a t t e r n t o these i s s u e s a l t h o u g h t h r e e maybe v e r y l o o s e l y grouped as d e a l i n g w i t h the r o l e of government i n the economy (numbers 25, 26, and 2 9 ) . One d e a l s w i t h he impact of f r e e t r a d e on the r i g h t s of workers and one d e a l s w i t h the b a l a n c e of f e d e r a l -p r o v i n c i a l powers. 61 a l l t h e s e i s s u e s , the L i b e r a l d e l e g a t e s and the NDP d e l e g a t e s answered s i m i l a r l y . S o c i a l C r e d i t d e l e g a t e s were u n i t e d on the o p p o s i t e s i d e of each i s s u e . L i b e r a l d e l e g a t e s a r e c o h e s i v e i n t h e i r o p p o s i t i o n t o the p r o v i n c i a l government's p r i v a t i z a t i o n and d e c e n t r a l i z a t i o n p l a n s . T h e i r c o n s i s t e n t o p p o s i t i o n t o t h e s e two p l a n s was r e f l e c t e d i n index s c o r e s of 30 and 34.4 r e s p e c t i v e l y . Disagreement w i t h the Free Trade d e a l , which i s s u p p o r t e d by the p r o v i n c i a l government, i s a l s o q u i t e s t r o n g , r e s u l t i n g i n an index s c o r e of 41.1. T h i s i s i n c o n t r a s t t o the L i b e r a l s ' s u pport f o r the i d e a of f r e e r t r a d e w i t h the U n i t e d S t a t e s (perhaps a "John T u r n e r " v e r s i o n t h e r e o f ) . S t r o n g support f o r the concept of p r i v a t e p r o p e r t y and agreement w i t h the demand t h a t unions have s e c r e t s t r i k e b a l l o t s s u g gests the e x i s t e n c e of a " f r e e e n t e r p r i s e " s t r a n d among the L i b e r a l d e l e g a t e s ( i n d e x s c o r e s of 37.8. and 42.2 r e s p e c t i v e l y ) . T h i s i s tempered by the L i b e r a l s ' p o s i t i v e a t t i t u d e towards w e l f a r e programmes, which s u g g e s t s s u p p o r t f o r w e l f a r e as a g e n e r a l p r i n c i p l e ( i n d e x s c o r e 30.5). NDP d e l e g a t e s , on the o t h e r hand, were l e s s u n i t e d on the i m p l i c a t i o n s of p r i v a t e p r o p e r t y , and were v e r y p r o t e c t i v e towards w e l f a r e programmes. S o c i a l C r e d i t d e l e g a t e s were d i v i d e d as t o whether many w e l f a r e programmes a r e unnecessary ( i n d e x s c o r e 18), a somewhat s u r p r i s i n g r e s u l t g i v e n t h e i r p u b l i c image as a n t i - w e l f a r e . L i b e r a l d e l e g a t e s were a l s o 62 u n i t e d i n s u p p o r t i n g government time and money b e i n g spent on s o c i a l p o l i c y m a t t e r s such as e n v i r o n m e n t a l c o n c e r n s ( i n d e x s c o r e 36.7) and I n d i a n l a n d c l a i m s ( i n d e x s c o r e 35.4). They and NDP d e l e g a t e s appear t o agree w i t h r e s p e c t t o s o c i a l p o l i c y i s s u e s . O f f i c i a l b i l i n g u a l i s m r a t e s p o s i t i v e l y w i t h many L i b e r a l d e l e g a t e s , as seen i n the index of 41.1. An o e l e c t e d Senate was s u p p o r t e d by a m a j o r i t y of L i b e r a l s . CONCLUSION The i s s u e s which d i v i d e the L i b e r a l d e l e g a t e s the most can be grouped under two h e a d i n g s . F i r s t l y , t hose which tend t o c h a r a c t e r i z e the c h o i c e s o f f e r e d i n a manner analogous t o a l e f t - r i g h t dichotomy. In p a r t i c u l a r , i s s u e s which j u x t a p o s e the p l a c e of b u s i n e s s and u n i o n s i n s o c i e t y d i v i d e the L i b e r a l d e l e g a t e s . The second group of i s s u e s which c l e a r l y d i v i d e the l i b e r a l d e l e g a t e s a r e those d e a l i n g w i t h t r a d i t i o n a l forms of w e l f a r e and the r o l e of government g e n e r a l l y . Job g r a n t s , o l d age a s s i s t a n c e , and the need t o c u t government r e d - t a p e a l l d i v i d e L i b e r a l d e l e g a t e s . The S o c i a l C r e d i t and NDP d e l e g a t e s are g e n e r a l l y u n i t e d on the o p p o s i t e s i d e w i t h o Seven statements g e n e r a t e d index s c o r e s of between 20 and 30. The two h i g h e s t s c o r e s went t o i s s u e s where L i b e r a l s were more u n i t e d i n opposing n e g a t i v e s t a t e m e n t s about the r o l e of government. The o t h e r index s c o r e s i n t h i s group show a m a j o r i t y of L i b e r a l s concerned w i t h : the c o s t of m a i n t a i n i n g the s i z e of the B.C. government, but approve of p u b l i c s e r v i c e b i l i n g u a l i s m , b e l i e v e government s h o u l d h e l p women, t r u s t down-to-earth t h i n k i n g , and b e l i e v e government s h o u l d guarantee p e o p l e ' s s t a n d a r d of l i v i n g , i n t h a t o r d e r . 6 3 r e g a r d t o the above i s s u e s . On the o t h e r hand, L i b e r a l d e l e g a t e s were u n i t e d i n t h e i r s u p p o r t of pro-Canadian p o s i t i o n on q u e s t i o n s c o n c e r n i n g Canadian independence. "Canadian independence a t any c o s t " , "the t h r e a t of f o r e i g n o w n e r s h i p " , and the importance of a "Canadian i d e n t i t y " were a l l i s s u e s which u n i t e d the L i b e r a l d e l e g a t e s . L i b e r a l s were a l s o u n i t e d i n t h e i r d i s l i k e f o r the Meech Lake A c c o r d and i n o p p o s i t i o n t o many of the p r o v i n c i a l government's programmes. T h i s may r e f l e c t a c o m b i n a t i o n of a n t i - p r o v i n c i a l sentiment as w e l l as disagreement w i t h the p o l i c y p r e f e r e n c e s of the S o c i a l C r e d i t government. The NDP d e l e g a t e s t e n d t o be s i m i l a r l y u n i t e d on "pro-Canadian" i s s u e s and t o a l e s s e r e x t e n t w i t h r e g a r d t o not f a v o u r i n g some examples of p r o v i n c i a l government i n t e r v e n t i o n . D e s p i t e the L i b e r a l s ' d i s u n i t y over some q u e s t i o n s t h a t p r e s e n t d i f f e r i n g views of the power of b u s i n e s s and u n i o n s , they were u n i t e d i n b e i n g f a v o u r a b l y d i s p o s e d towards the v a l u e of p r i v a t e p r o p e r t y and s u s p i c i o u s of un i o n s when the b a l a n c e of power between management and un i o n s i s not a t i s s u e . A l t h o u g h u n i t e d i n t h e i r o p p o s i t i o n t o the F r e e Trade d e a l , they were u n i t e d i n f a v o u r of " f r e e r t r a d e " w i t h the U n i t e d S t a t e s . There does appear t o be a h e a l t h y s t r a n d of " b u s i n e s s l i b e r a l i s m " w i t h i n the p r o v i n c i a l p a r t y . There a l s o appears t o be an element of " w e l f a r e l i b e r a l i s m " i n the p r o v i n c i a l p a r t y . A l t h o u g h the L i b e r a l 64 d e l e g a t e s a re d i v i d e d on s p e c i f i c w e l f a r e i s s u e s , they a r e u n i t e d i n s u p p o r t i n g the g e n e r a l i d e a of w e l f a r e programmes. The d i v i s i o n over s p e c i f i c w e l f a r e programmes stands i n c o n t r a s t t o the L i b e r a l s ' u n i t e d support of s o c i a l p o l i c y i n i t i a t i v e s . What a r e we t o make of t h i s c o l l e c t i o n of i s s u e s ? I t appears t h a t the "middle ground" i n B r i t i s h C o l umbia, as r e p r e s e n t e d by L i b e r a l d e l e g a t e s i s i d e o l o g i c a l l y amorphous. I t does seem t o r e p r e s e n t the p l a c e a t which competing views of p o l i t i c s meet. S t i l l , the L i b e r a l s are i n t h i s p o s i t i o n elsewhere i n Canada, and the p r o v i n c i a l p a r t y does appear t o embody the t e n s i o n between " w e l f a r e " and " b u s i n e s s " l i b e r a l i s m s u g g ested by C h r i s t i a n and Campbell (1983) and d i s c u s s e d by B l a k e and Jo h n s t o n (1988). F u r t h e r m o r e , the continuum between tho s e i s s u e s which d i v i d e and those which u n i t e L i b e r a l a c t i v i s t s i s somewhat u n u s u a l . At one end a r e q u e s t i o n s t h a t l o o k something l i k e l e f t v e r s u s r i g h t q u e s t i o n s - t h e s e evoke d i v i s i o n . At the o t h e r extreme a r e i s s u e s r e l a t i n g t o Canadian " n a t i o n a l i s m . " Are the L i b e r a l s i n B r i t i s h Columbia a r a g - t a g bunch of p o l i t i c a l " j u n k i e s , " a l i e n a t e d by the p o l a r i z a t i o n of p r o v i n c i a l p o l i t i c s and o n l y a t t r a c t e d t o f e d e r a l i s s u e s ? The r e l a t i v e h e t e r o g e n e i t y of o p i n i o n among L i b e r a l d e l e g a t e s compared w i t h t h e i r p r o v i n c i a l c o u n t e r p a r t s might g i v e some c l u e s as t o whether B.C. L i b e r a l s a re a l o o s e c o l l e c t i o n of a c t i v i s t s d i s e n c h a n t e d w i t h p r o v i n c i a l , p o l a r i z e d p o l i t i c s . 65 COHESION AND DIVISION AND WITHIN THE PROVINCIAL PARTIES Having o u t l i n e d the i s s u e s t h a t d i v i d e and u n i t e L i b e r a l d e l e g a t e s , the next t a s k i s t o p l a c e t h i s w i t h i n the c o n t e x t of p a r t i s a n c o m p e t i t i o n i n B r i t i s h C olumbia. How heterogeneous are L i b e r a l d e l e g a t e s i n comparison w i t h t i e r p r o v i n c i a l c o u n t e r p a r t s i n the New Democratic and S o c i a l C r e d i t p a r t i e s ? A g a i n , due t o the s m a l l sample s i z e , q u e s t i o n s which o f f e r e d f i v e responses r a n g i n g from s u b s t a n t i a l l y e x t e n d / i n c r e a s e t o s u b s t a n t i a l l y r e duce/decrease have been c o l l a p s e d i n t o t h r e e c a t e g o r i e s : e x t e n d / i n c r e a s e , keep the same, and r e d u c e / d e c r e a s e , w i t h no o p i n i o n answers r e t a i n e d . The L i b e r a l d e l e g a t e s ' responses on government r e g u l a t i o n showed s t r o n g l y u n i f i e d s u pport f o r e x t e n d i n g e n v i r o n m e n t a l p r o t e c t i o n w i t h 92 per cent i n fa v o u r of more r e g u l a t i o n . T h i s p l a c e s L i b e r a l s w i t h the NDP d e l e g a t e s (96.8 per cent f a v o u r i n g more r e g u l a t i o n ) on the same s i d e of t h i s i s s u e . In c o n t r a s t , o n l y 24 per cent of the S o c i a l C r e d i t d e l e g a t e s f a v o u r extended r e g u l a t i o n i n t h i s a r e a . The r e s u l t w i t h r e g a r d t o extended r e g u l a t i o n on human r i g h t s i s s i m i l a r . S e v e n t y - s i x per cen t of the L i b e r a l s a r e i n f a v o u r of extended r e g u l a t i o n as a r e 95 per cent of the NDP d e l e g a t e s . A g a i n , o n l y 11 per cent of the S o c i a l C r e d i t d e l e g a t e s s u p p o r t e d more r e g u l a t i o n . R e g u l a t i o n on l a n d use e x h i b i t e d the same p a t t e r n . Among the L i b e r a l s 63.4 per cen t 66 favour extending the r e g u l a t i o n s . f o r the NDP, the f i g u r e i s 89.7 per cent i n favour, while only 22 per cent of the S o c i a l . . 9 C r e d i t d e l e g a t e s take t h i s . p o s i t i o n . The remaining f i v e q u e s t i o n d e a l i n g with government r e g u l a t o r y a c t i v i t i e s d i s p l a y e d g r e a t e r d i v i s i o n among the L i b e r a l s . These q u e s t i o n s a l l apply to p r o v i n c i a l government's r e g u l a t o r y a c t i v i t i e s . The d i v i s i o n was c l e a r with regard to the r e g u l a t i o n o f : the s a l e of a l c o h o l , the marketing of a g r i c u l t u r a l products, shopping hours, and gambling laws. These i s s u e s a l s o d i v i d e d the other two p r o v i n c i a l p a r t i e s ' d e l e g a t e s . On the above i s s u e s , with one e x c e p t i o n , the most popular response was extended r e g u l a t i o n . On the whole, the L i b e r a l s are m a r g i n a l l y more sup p o r t i v e of extending r e g u l a t i o n than the S o c i a l C r e d i t d e l e g a t e s . The NDP d e l e g a t e s on the other hand were most l i k e l y to favour i n c r e a s e d r e g u l a t i o n . If we c o n s i d e r the a n t i - r e g u l a t i o n s c a l e developed e a r l i e r (See Appendix One f o r the q u e s t i o n s used to develop t h i s s c a l e ) the NDP d e l e g a t e s are c l e a r l y more cohesive with regard to government r e g u l a t o r y a c t i v i t i e s . T h e i r support of such a c t i v i t i e s produces a mean score on t h i s s c a l e with a standard d e v i a t i o n of 1.00. The L i b e r a l s are somewhat l e s s c o hesive, with a standard d e v i a t i o n of 1.22. The S o c i a l C r e d i t delegates are the l e a s t cohesive of a l l p a r t i e s on q See Blake, 1987C, f o r a p o s s i b l e e x p l a n a t i o n of t h i s d i s t r i b u t i o n . 67 r e g u l a t o r y a c t i v i t i e s , w i t h a s t a n d a r d d e v i a t i o n s on t h i s s c a l e of 1.80. Of a l l the s c a l e s , the a n t i - r e g u l a t i o n s c a l e produces c o n s i s t e n t l y h i g h s t a n d a r d d e v i a t i o n for. t h r e e p a r t i e s . I t would appear t h a t on r e g u l a t i o n , a l l t h r e e p a r t i e s a r e d i v i d e d . I n c r e a s e d e d u c a t i o n spending i s s u p p o r t e d by 92 per cent of the d e l e g a t e s and on r e f o r e s t a t i o n by 85.1 per cent of the d e l e g a t e s . As e v e r , the NDP i s even more u n i f i e d on these i s s u e s . The S o c i a l C r e d i t d e l e g a t e s a re d i v i d e d on e d u c a t i o n spending but s t r o n g l y s u p p o r t i v e of spending on. r e f o r e s t a t i o n (84 per cent i n f a v o u r ) . Other q u e s t i o n s r e g a r d i n g government spending produced g r e a t e r d i v i s i o n s w i t h i n the L i b e r a l s ' r a n k s , but the p a t t e r n i s f a i r l y complex. There i s , f i r s t , a group of q u e s t i o n s r e g a r d i n g government spending on which L i b e r a l s f a v o u r g r e a t e r s p e n d i n g , but not as s t r o n g l y as i n the p r e v i o u s l y mentioned group of two. These a r e h e a l t h c a r e , day c a r e and w e l f a r e r a t e s . W i t h i n t h i s group t h e r e i s c o n s i d e r a b l e v a r i a t i o n . W h i l e 73.6 per cent of the d e l e g a t e s s u p p o r t i n c r e a s e d h e a l t h c a r e s p e n d i n g , 21.8 per cent a r e s a t i s f i e d w i t h the s t a t u s quo. The NDP d e l e g a t e s a re s t r o n g l y u n i t e d i n f a v o u r of i n c r e a s e d spending on h e a l t h c a r e (93.2 per c e n t ) . A m a j o r i t y of the Socred d e l e g a t e s f a v o u r the s t a t u s quo. Day c a r e produces the same p a t t e r n w i t h i n and between p a r t i e s , w i t h 72.1 per cen t of the L i b e r a l s i n f a v o u r of i n c r e a s e d 68 spending and 25.6 per cent c o n t e n t w i t h the e x i s t i n g l e v e l s . W e l f a r e e x p e n d i t u r e p r e f e r e n c e s produced a g r e a t e r d i v i s i o n , w i t h 65.5 per cent i n f a v o u r of i n c r e a s e s and 27.6 per c e n t c o n t e n t w i t h the s t a t u s quo. NDP d e l e g a t e s a r e n e a r l y unanimous i n t h e i r d e s i r e t o see r a t e s i n c r e a s e d (97.3 per c e n t ) , whereas S o c i a l C r e d i t d e l e g a t e s a r e d i v i d e d m a i n l y between the s t a t u s quo and d e c r e a s i n g w e l f a r e r a t e s (40.2 per cent and 36.6 per cent r e s p e c t i v e l y ) . T h i s e x h a u s t s those i s s u e s on which L i b e r a l s were not c l e a r l y d i v i d e d . L i b e r a l s were more d i v i d e d i n r e s p e c t of spending on t o u r i s m : 55.8 per cent of the d e l e g a t e s f a v o u r the s t a t u s quo and 34.1 per cent would l i k e t o see i n c r e a s e i n spending. The NDP d e l e g a t e s g e n e r a l l y d i d not f a v o u r , i n c r e a s e d spending on t o u r i s m whereas the S o c i a l C r e d i t d e l e g a t e s a r e m a r g i n a l l y more i n c l i n e d towards i n c r e a s e d s p e n d i n g . I f a L i b e r a l government was formed i n B r i t i s h Columbia i n the near f u t u r e , government employees c o u l d not expect f a v o u r a b l e c o n s i d e r a t i o n . T h i s i s e v i d e n t i n the data which shows t h a t 65.5 per c e n t of the d e l e g a t e s a c c e p t e d the e x i s t i n g l e v e l of government s a l a r i e s , 21.4 per c e n t wanted an i n c r e a s e , and 13.1 per c e n t a d e c r e a s e . The S o c i a l C r e d i t d e l e g a t e s were f o r the l a r g e p a r t c o n t e n t w i t h the s t a t u s quo (54.3 per c e n t ) but 30.9 per cent f a v o u r e d a r e d u c t i o n i n s a l a r i e s . In c o n t r a s t , 70.3 per c e n t of the NDP d e l e g a t e s f a v o u r e d more spending on government s a l a r i e s . Spending on j o b g r a n t s c l e a r l y s p l i t the L i b e r a l s w i t h 47 per c e n t d e s i r i n g more, 69 24.1 per ce n t c o n t e n t w i t h the s t a t u s quo and 28.9 per cent p r e f e r r i n g r e d u c t i o n . On t h i s q u e s t i o n , L i b e r a l s were d i v i d e d much l i k e the S o c i a l C r e d i t d e l e g a t e s , who s p l i t 45.3 per c e n t , 30.3 per c e n t , and 24.3 per ce n t r e s p e c t i v e l y . The NDP d e l e g a t e s s t a n d out as u n i t e d , w i t h 82.5 per cent i n fav o u r of more spending on job g r a n t s . The L i b e r a l s a r e s a t i s f i e d w i t h the p r e s e n t l e v e l of e x p e n d i t u r e on highways, 10.2 per ce n t i n f a v o u r of an i n c r e a s e , and most n o t a b l y , 40.9 per ce n t f a v o u r i n g a d e c r e a s e . T h i s i s s u e s p l i t t he S o c i a l C r e d i t and NDP d e l e g a t e s as w e l l , even though both p a r t i e s a r e somewhat more s u p p o r t i v e of i n c r e a s e d spending on t h i s i t e m . Two of the s c a l e s a r e a p p r o p r i a t e t o a d i s c u s s i o n of spending q u e s t i o n . The " A n t i - W e l f a r e " s c a l e i n c l u d e s a t t i t u d e s towards spending on w e l f a r e and d a y c a r e . In r e s p e c t of t h i s s c a l e the NDP i s y e t a g a i n the most c o h e s i v e p a r t y w i t h a s t a n d a r d d e v i a t i o n of .23 r e f l e c t i n g d e l e g a t e s ' support of w e l f a r e s p e n d i n g . The L i b e r a l d e l e g a t e s ' response had a s t a n d a r d d e v i a t i o n of .61 and the S o c i a l C r e d i t response a s t a n d a r d d e v i a t i o n of 1.03. The o t h e r s c a l e of r e l e v a n c e here i s the " A n t i -S o c i a l P o l i c y " s c a l e . T h i s s c a l e i s made up of two q u e s t i o n r e g a r d i n g spending (on e d u c a t i o n and h e a l t h ) and one d e a l i n g w i t h the r e g u l a t i o n of human r i g h t s . The p a t t e r n of e a r l i e r s c a l e s i s r e p e a t e d here w i t h the NDP d e l e g a t e s ' responses 70 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 TABLE VI ATTITUDINAL VARIATIONS AMONG ACTIVISTS BY ISSUE DOMAIN Mean S t d Dev Adj S t d Number C o n t i n e n t a l i s m L i b e r a l .96 .62 1.24 90 NDP .24 .51 1.02 373 S o c i a l C r e d i t 2.31 .72 1.44 340 C o n t i n e n t a l i s t S c a l e ranges from 0 (do not f a v o u r ) t o 3 ( f a v o u r ) C o l l e c t i v e v e r s u s I n d i v i d u a l R e s p o n s i b i l i t y L i b e r a l 2.65 1.37 1.37 90 NDP .39 .68 .68 373 S o c i a l C r e d i t 3.74 1.19 1.19 340 R e s p o n s i b i l i t y S c a l e ranges from 0 ( C o l l e c t i v e ) t o 6 ( I n d i v i d u a l ) P o p u l i s m L i b e r a l 1.50 .95 1.90 90 NDP 1.36 1.09 2.18 373 S o c i a l C r e d i t 2.34 .89 1.78 340 P o p u l i s m S c a l e ranges from 0 (not p o p u l i s t ) t o 3 ( p o p u l i s t ) A n t i w e l f a r e L i b e r a l .31 .61 1.22 90 NDP .06 .23 .46 373 S o c i a l C r e d i t 1.50 1.03 2.06 340 A n t i W e l f a r e S c a l e ranges from 0 ( s u p p o r t w e l f a r e ) t o 3 (oppose w e l f a r e ) A n t i R e g u l a t i o n L i b e r a l 1.58 1.22 1.22 90 NDP .92 1.00 1.00 373 S o c i a l C r e d i t 2.75 1.80 1.80 340 A n t i R e g u l a t i o n S c a l e ranges from 0 ( s u p p o r t r e g u l a t i o n ) t o 6 (oppose r e g u l a t i o n ) 71 Mean S t d Dev Adj S t d Number A n t i S o c i a l P o l i c y L i b e r a l .08 .28 .54 90 NDP .02 .15 .30 373 S o c i a l C r e d i t .57 .82 1.64 340 A n t i S o c i a l P o l i c y S c a l e ranges from 0 ( s u p p o r t S o c i a l P o l i c y ) t o 3 (oppose s o c i a l p o l i c y ) Note: Due t o the way i n which c o e f f i c i e n t s of v a r i a t i o n a r e d e r i v e d t h i s measure i s not a v a i l a b l e i n t h i s case t o a s s e s s the r e l a t i v e v a r i a t i o n w i t h i n p a r t i e s on thes e s c a l e s . The use of them a c r o s s p a r t i e s i n t h i s case i s even more p r o b l e m a t i c . T h i s i s because they are a f f e c t e d by the d i s t a n c e of the mean from the e n d p o i n t of the s c a l e . Means a t e i t h e r end tend t o c o m p l i c a t e the measure i n two ways. F i r s t , they a l l o w f o r g r e a t e r s t a n d a r d d e v i a t i o n s , ' o u t l i e r s ' can a f f e c t the measure. Second, because means w i l l v a r y i n v a l u e as p a r t y o p i n i o n moves a l o n g the s c a l e , but s t a n d a r d d e v i a t i o n v a l u e s w i l l n o t , the c o e f f i c i e n t of v a r i a t i o n w i l l a l t e r i r r e s p e c t i v e of whether or not the d i s t r i b u t i o n has. Moreover, as s c a l e s a r e of d i f f e r e n t l e n g t h s t h i s c o m p l i c a t e s comparison f u r t h e r , and i n f a c t , l a r g e s c a l e s e x a g g e r a t e the problem. The a d j u s t e d s t a n d a r d d e v i a t i o n a t t e m p t s t o c o r r e c t the problem of comparison. See Appendix I f o r the wording of q u e s t i o n s a s s o c i a t e d w i t h each s c a l e . 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 g i v i n g a s t a n d a r d d e v i a t i o n of .15, the L i b e r a l s ' response a s t a n d a r d d e v i a t i o n of .28 and the S o c i a l C r e d i t d e l e g a t e s ' response a s t a n d a r d d e v i a t i o n of .82. Three o t h e r s c a l e s a r e a v a i l a b l e w i t h which t o t e s t p a r t y a c t i v i s t s ' c o h e s i o n . The f i r s t of t h e s e i s the " I n d i v i d u a l v e r s u s C o l l e c t i v e R e s p o n s i b i l i t y " s c a l e . T h i s u s e r s q u e s t i o n t h a t c o n t r a s t government a s s i s t a n c e and i n d i v i d u a l s e l f - r e l i a n c e . The NDP d e l e g a t e s a g a i n show the g r e a t e s t c o h e s i o n , w i t h a s t a n d a r d d e v i a t i o n of .68. The S o c i a l C r e d i t d e l e g a t e s a r e l e s s c o h e s i v e i n t h e i r i n d i v i d u a l i s t i c b i a s ; t h e i r d i s t r i b u t i o n of o p i n i o n produces 72 a standard d e v i a t i o n of 1.19. However, the L i b e r a l d e l e g a t e s are the l e a s t cohesive with the standard d e v i a t i o n of t h e i r d i s t r i b u t i o n being 1.37. The " c o n t i n e n t a l i s m " s c a l e taps q u e s t i o n s r e l a t i n g to Canadian independence and American i n f l u e n c e i n Canada. The NDP d i s t r i b u t i o n has a standard d i s t r i b u t i o n of L i b e r a l hypothesis i s .62 and the S o c i a l C r e d i t responses have a standard d e v i a t i o n of .72. The S o c i a l C r e d i t responses r e s u l t i n a standard d e v i a t i o n of .89, the f i g u r e f o r the L i b e r a l s i s .95, and the f i g u r e f o r the NDP i s 1.09. One f u r t h e r measure of i n t e r e s t here i s the "adjusted standard d e v i a t i o n . " 1 ^ These are presented i n Table VI. Comparing these measures suggests that L i b e r a l d e l e g a t e s are most u n i f i e d on s o c i a l p o l i c y q u e s t i o n s . They appear to be as d i v i d e d as the other p a r t i e s with regard to a l l the other s c a l e s except over populism, where they are somewhat more d i v i d e d . Comparing the p a r t i e s , we f i n d that the NDP a c t i v i s t s are most u n i t e d on every s c a l e except the " P o p u l i s t " one. The L i b e r a l s c o n s i s t e n t l y rank as the next most co h e s i v e . The exception here i s with regard to the 1^The a d j u s t e d standard d e v i a t i o n attempts to minimize the d i f f i c u l t y of comparing standard d e v i a t i o n s across s c a l e s of d i f f e r i n g s i z e s . That i s , where the d i s t a n c e between the two extreme cases i s [ a r b i t r a r i l y ] d i f f e r e n t . The s o l u t i o n i s to simply m u l t i p l y the standard d e v i a t i o n s by a f a c t o r d e r i v e d from the r a t i o of the s i z e of the s c a l e s to be compared. In t h i s case, the standard d e v i a t i o n s of s c a l e s 0-3 were m u l t i p l i e d by two. 73 " C o l l e c t i v e versus I n d i v i d u a l R e s p o n s i b i l i t y " s c a l e on which they are the l e a s t c o h e s i v e . S o c i a l C r e d i t d e l e g a t e s are the l e a s t cohesive on a l l the s c a l e s except the two mentioned above - the " P o p u l i s t " and " R e s p o n s i b i l i t y " s c a l e s . On the f i r s t they are the most cohesive; on the second they are between the other two p a r t i e s . CONCLUSION L i b e r a l d e l e g a t e s are l e s s cohesive than the NDP a c t i v i s t s but more cohesive than the S o c i a l C r e d i t d e l e g a t e s . Thus, i t does not appear that the L i b e r a l s ' c e n t r i s t p o s i t i o n r e s u l t s i n a great degree of h e t e r o g e n e i t y . In f a c t , the S o c i a l C r e d i t party appears as a " c a t c h - a l l " p a r t y w h i l s t the NDP e x h i b i t s the cohesiveness of o p i n i o n a s s o c i a t e d with "mass" p o l i t i c s . L i b e r a l a c t i v i s t s are, once again, between the other two p r o v i n c i a l p a r t i e s . The h e t e r o g e n e i t y amongst the L i b e r a l a c t i v i s t s on " l e f t - r i g h t " i s s u e s i s d i s t i n c t i v e . T h i s suggests that i n the context of p o l a r l i z e d p r o v i n c i a l p o l i t i c s , there e x i s t s a group of a c t i v i s t s whose o p i n i o n s f i t between the two major p a r t i e s but vary g r e a t l y s t i l l . As the L i b e r a l Party o f f e r s the only a l t e r n a t i v e , theyh are drawn to i t . S t i l l , the a b i l i t y of the S o c i a l C r e d i t Party to encompass a wide range of opiniopn must c l e a r l y d e t r a c t from the pool of a c t i v i s t s a v a i l a b l e to the L i b e r a l s . The d i f f i c u l t y the L i b e r a l s face i s that the S o c i a l C r e d i t Party i s "broad" but i t s s t y l e of 74 p o l i t i c s makes a t t a c k i n g i t d i f f i c u l t . The avoidance of d i s t i n c t i v e , coherent p o l i c y p r e f e r e n c e s may be e s s e n t i a l to the S o c i a l C r e d i t Party i f i t i s to maintain t h i s broad popular appeal. 75 CHAPTER FIVE OPINION CLEAVAGES AMONG LIBERAL PARTY ACTIVISTS The d i s c o v e r y of s t r o n g d i v i s i o n s i n o p i n i o n among L i b e r a l d e l e g a t e s l e a d s one t o c o n s i d e r whether or not t h e r e a r e d e m o g r a p h i c a l l y d e f i n a b l e sub-groups who respond c o n s i s t e n t l y and d i f f e r e n t l y from each o t h e r w i t h i n the L i b e r a l p a r t y . In s h o r t , a re t h e r e any r e i n f o r c i n g c l e a v a g e s w hich d i v i d e the d e l e g a t e s and h e l p e x p l a i n d i v i s i o n among them. Three broad groups of independent v a r i a b l e s appear s u i t e d t o p u r s u i n g t h i s q u e s t i o n . F i r s t l y , the h i s t o r i c a l importance of C a t h o l i c i s m i n r e l a t i o n t o the L i b e r a l P a r t y s u g g e s t s i t as a c a n d i d a t e . A l t h o u g h B r i t i s h Columbia and the L i b e r a l P a r t y i n the p r o v i n c e l a c k the Fr e n c h i n f l u e n c e found elsewhere i n Canada, 1 C a t h o l i c s a r e p r o p o r t i o n a t e l y o v e r - r e p r e s e n t e d i n comparison t o t h e i r numbers i n the e l e c t o r a t e as a whole. We might expect t h i s group t o respond s y m p a t h e t i c a l l y t o i s s u e s of con c e r n t o F r e n c h Canadians. A second group of independent v a r i a b l e s i s t h a t which d e a l s w i t h the income, e d u c a t i o n l e v e l and age of d e l e g a t e s . Income and e d u c a t i o n have been found elsewhere t o have p l a y e d a r o l e i n sha p i n g the p o l i t i c a l a t t i t u d e of the 1 0 n l y 2.8 per cent of the B r i t i s h Columbian d e l e g a t e s t o the f e d e r a l L i b e r a l c o n v e n t i o n i n 1984 spoke a language o t h e r than E n g l i s h a t home. 76 a c t i v i s t s and might be p a r t i c u l a r l y important i n a province where populism i s so apparent. (See Rapopori, 1986, p. 152) V a r i a t i o n s i n op i n i o n s by age group are e s p e c i a l l y i n t e r e s t i n g i n the case of the L i b e r a l s i n B r i t i s h Columbia, given that p r i o r to 1972 the p a r t y d i d much b e t t e r e l e c t o r a l l y than what i t has experienced s i n c e 1972. The ex i s t e n c e of an " o l d guard" with d i s t i n c t p o l i t i c a l a t t i t u d e s would h e l p e x p l a i n the p a r t y ' s continued e x i s t e n c e i n the pr o v i n c e . S i m i l a r l y , the time p e r i o d i n which the deleg a t e s j o i n e d may i l l u m i n a t e any l o n g i t u d i n a l v a r i a t i o n s i n p o l i c y p r e f e r e n c e s . The l a s t group of ques t i o n s d e a l s with the r e l a t i o n s h i p between the L i b e r a l s i n B r i t i s h Columbia and p o l i c i e s elsewhere i n Canada. As a l r e a d y noted, the L i b e r a l s ' focus on f e d e r a l p o l i t i c s and i s s u e s to a f a r great e r extent than d e l e g a t e s from e i t h e r of the other two p r o v i n c i a l p a r t i e s . Many of them thi n k f e d e r a l p o l i t i c s i s more important than p r o v i n c i a l p o l i t i c s and f e e l c l o s e r to the f e d e r a l party than the p r o v i n c i a l p a r t y . They are a l s o more o p t i m i s t i c about the p a r t y ' s e l e c t o r a l f o r t u n e s i n the f e d e r a l arena. Two f a c t o r s suggest themselves as p o s s i b l e explanatory v a r i a b l e s with regard to t h i s f o c u s . F i r s t l y , about h a l f of the delegates were born o u t s i d e the p r o v i n c e , but w i t h i n Canada. While most of these d e l e g a t e s have been i n B.C. longer than f i f t e e n y ears, they may have brought an e x t r a - p r o v i n c i a l element to the l o c a l p a r t y ' s outlook. 77 S e c o n d l y , the l a r g e s t s i n g l e group of o f f i c i a l s r e p r e s e n t e d a t the c o n v e n t i o n were members of the f e d e r a l r i d i n g e x e c u t i v e . Perhaps t h i s s t r u c t u r a l c h a r a c t e r i s t i c d i s t o r t s the p r o f i l e of o p i n i o n i n the p a r t y i n f a v o u r of f e d e r a l i s s u e s and sympathies. Thus, i n t h i s l a s t s e c t i o n the aim i s to d i s c o v e r whether t h e r e i s a group which has a d i s t i n c t i v e p a t t e r n of o p i n i o n which i s i n t e r - r e l a t e d w i t h a f e d e r a l b i a s or perhaps a view of p o l i t i c s l e s s n a t i v e t o B r i t i s h C olumbia. THE DATA The q u e s t i o n n a i r e asked the d e l e g a t e s t o i n d i c a t e t h e i r r e l i g i o u s a f f i l i a t i o n s . The r e s u l t s of the q u e s t i o n have been c o n s o l i d a t e d i n t o t h r e e c a t e g o r i e s -- none, Roman C a t h o l i c s , and P r o t e s t a n t s — the f i g u r e s f o r which a r e p r e s e n t e d below. TABLE V I I RELIGIOUS AFFILIATION NONE/AGNOSTIC CATHOLIC PROTESTANT NUMBER 23 18 41 PERCENTAGE 28 22 51 These c a t e g o r i e s have been c r o s s - t a b u l a t e d w i t h a range of re s p o n s e s . Government r e g u l a t i o n was examined but i t was TOTAL 82 100 78 apparent t h a t r e l i g i o u s a f f i l i a t i o n y i e l d e d no d i s t i n c t i v e p a t t e r n s of o p i n i o n s . On broad a t t i t u d i n a l q u e s t i o n s , P r o t e s t a n t s were more adverse t o the p r o v i n c i a l government's p r i v a t i z a t i o n p l a n s and somewhat l e s s w o r r i e d about the i m p l i c a t i o n of the Meech Lake A c c o r d . A l l groups d i s l i k e d the Meech Lake A c c o r d because of i t s p e r c e i v e d d e c e n t r a l i z i n g l o g i c . C a t h o l i c s were d i s t i n c t l y l e s s i n t e r e s t e d i n extended r e g u l a t i o n of a l c o h o l s a l e s and m a r g i n a l l y more u n i t e d a g a i n s t the Free Trade D e a l . The p r o v i n c i a l government's d e c e n t r a l i z a t i o n p l a n s a t t r a c t e d the d i s a p p r o b a t i o n of C a t h o l i c s more so than the o t h e r two groups. Those d e l e g a t e s c l a i m i n g no r e l i g i o u s a f f i l i a t i o n were perhaps s l i g h t l y more i n c l i n e d t o f a v o u r more r e g u l a t i o n .and a r e l e s s w o r r i e d about the s i z e of the government i n g e n e r a l than the o t h e r groups, but t h i s e f f e c t i s b l u n t e d when su p p o r t f o r m a i n t a i n i n g the s t a t u s quo and i n c r e a s i n g r e g u l a t i o n s are taken t o g e t h e r . C a t h o l i c s a r e s l i g h t l y more l i k e l y than o t h e r s t o see the g e n e r a l i d e a of government i n t e r v e n t i o n f a v o r a b l y w h i l e P r o t e s t a n t s emphasized the r o l e of s e l f r e l i a n c e of government a s s i s t a n c e . Government spending a l s o produced few c l e a r d i s t i n c t i o n s among thes e groups. C a t h o l i c s and t h o s e w i t h no r e l i g i o u s a f f i l i a t i o n a r e a l i t t l e more i n c l i n e d t o support s o c i a l p o l i c y i s s u e s . C a t h o l i c s support the g e n e r a l i d e a of w e l f a r e programmes but seem l e s s e n t h u s i a s t i c when g i v e n 79 s p e c i f i c examples. P r o t e s t a n t s appeared m a r g i n a l l y more su p p o r t i v e of development-type spending, a tendency o f t e n a s s o c i a t e d with the S o c i a l C r e d i t P a r t y . On other p o l i c y q u e s t i o n , the same lack of c o n s i s t e n t d i s t i n c t i o n s l a r g e l y p e r s i s t e d . C a t h o l i c s were unanimous i n t h e i r fear of " f o r e i g n ownership" and support of "Canadian independence" at any c o s t . But d e s p i t e t h e i r d i s l i k e f o r the Free Trade deal they are the s t r o n g e s t supporters of f r e e r trade with the United S t a t e s . Perhaps some of the " f e d e r a l b i a s " i n the p a r t y a r i s e s from t h i s b i a s among the C a t h o l i c members. C a t h o l i c s g e n e r a l l y show gr e a t e r support f o r the r o l e of the government and are the l e a s t impressed by the value of grass roots and down-to-earth t h i n k i n g . P r o t e s t a n t s favour smaller government somewhat more and are more in support of grass r o o t s p o l i t i c s and down-to-earth t h i n k i n g . As f o r the reasons f o r j o i n i n g the p a r t y , "moderation" i s given by P r o t e s t a n t s i n a r a t i o of 2 to 1 over the other groups. "Congruent b e l i e f s " i s the most popular reason among C a t h o l i c s and those with no r e l i g i o u s a f f i l i a t i o n . While P r o t e s t a n t s do d i f f e r on some i s s u e s we might expect the L i b e r a l s to be u n i f i e d on, there i s l i t t l e c l e a r evidence that they are d r i v e n by the nature of the p r o v i n c i a l s e t t i n g . S t i l l , whereas P r o t e s t a n t s emphasized the P a r t y ' s b e l i e f i n " e q u a l i t y " as i t s next most a t t r a c t i v e f e a t u r e , the other two groups found i t s " f r e e e n t e r p r i s e " 80 nature appealing. (About 20 per cent of these last two groups gave answers which did not receive enough support to generate an answer category) As well as being more unanimous in these concerns over "Canadian independence" and the like, Catholic delegates tended to be more supportive of the existing balance of power between the federal and provincial governments. Moreover, Catholics were the only group in which no delegates felt closer to the provincial party and ' they also felt strongly that federal politics was more important than provincial p o l i t i c s . Protestants were somewhat less concerned with federal politics and its issues. Overall, while' there are some divisions between religious groups, this division is not sufficient to explain the existence of division within the party as a whole. While some of the party's federal bias is a function of a Catholic bias, this distinction does not fully account for the federal orientation. In fact, 55.6 per cent of the Catholic delegates attended the convention as representatives of the federal riding associations, but they constituted only about a quarter of the total number of such delegates. Half of the Protestant delegates were representing federal riding associations. To examine division of opinion by income, the original six income categories were collapsed into three, as shown in Table VIII. 81 TABLE V I I I INCOME DISTRIBUTION No. of D e l e g a t e s P e r c e n t a g e Up t o $ 19,999 12 13.8 $20,000 t o $49,999 42 48.3 $50,000 and above 33 37.9 TOTALS 87 100 Given t h i s , the s m a l l s i z e of the f i r s t c a t e g o r y made comparisons between l e v e l s awkward. Income l e v e l had n e a r l y no impact upon the res p o n d e n t s ' p o l i c y a t t i t u d e s nor f e e l i n g s towards f e d e r a l as opposed t o p r o v i n c i a l p o l i t i c s and i s s u e s . High income e a r n e r s were s l i g h t l y more d i s p o s e d towards f e d e r a l as opposed t o p r o v i n c i a l p o l i c i e s and i s s u e s . As w e l l , h i g h income e a r n e r s were somewhat more d i s p o s e d towards government spending on w e l f a r e but g e n e r a l l y e x h i b i t e d a m a r g i n a l l y g r e a t e r measure of economic c o n s e r v a t i s m . S o c i a l p o l i c y i s s u e s , e d u c a t i o n spending and b i l i n g u a l i s m a r e s l i g h t l y more f a v o u r e d by h i g h income groups. Lower income e a r n e r s were s l i g h t l y more w i l l i n g t o support i n c r e a s e s i n government spending on w e l f a r e . N e v e r t h e l e s s , t h e r e i s no c o n s i s t e n t c l e a v a g e of o p i n i o n between d e l e g a t e s w i t h d i f f e r e n t l e v e l s of income, a l t h o u g h the e x p e c t e d s h i f t s i n c o n c e r n s between w e a l t h y and poor were e v i d e n t . The L i b e r a l s were as a group v e r y w e l l educated. By c o l l a p s i n g r e s p o n d e n t s ' e d u c a t i o n l e v e l s i n t o two groups, those who have a t l e a s t a t t e n d e d u n i v e r s i t y v e r s u s those who 82 have not, we are able to assess whether formal education levels account for divisions within the party. University educated delegates tended to support government regulations on social policy (that is the environment, human rights, etc) more than other delegates and were clearly less supportive of government regulations of the sale of agricultural products. On spending issues, the responses by category were mixed. In general, policy questions this pattern is repeated. In respect of questions relating to federal and provincial governments there was a marginal tendency to favour federal politics and see "Canadian independence" as a thing to be protected among better educated delegates. Age of delegates proved to be equally unenlightening in exposing any distinctive patterns of opinions within the party. The oldest delegates were grouped into three age categories: under 30, 30 to 60, and over 60 years of age. Older.delegates were somewhat more cautious about government regulation and spending, except when t i relates to development issues. Younger delegates show more federally oriented views towards issues concerning the balance of power between federal and provincial governments and are generally more interested in federal p o l i t i c s and the federal party. Younger delegates tend to be supportive of increased government action with regard to social policy and were more positive about the role of government in general. A closely related factor is the length of 83 membership of d e l e g a t e s . A g a i n , the r e s u l t s here show no c l e a r d i s t i n c t i o n s . The s m a l l group who j o i n e d between 1972 and 1S79 were unanimously committed t o an "independent Canada" and viewed the f e d e r a l government and f e d e r a l p o l i t i c a l i s s u e s p o s i t i v e l y . I f d e l e g a t e s who j o i n e d b e f o r e 1972 a re compared w i t h those j o i n i n g a f t e r 1972, l i t t l e s i g n i f i c a n t d i f f e r e n c e i s a p p a r e n t . Some of the v a r i a t i o n s may s i m p l y be an a r t i f a c t of the age v a r i a t i o n i m p l i c i t i n the p r e / p o s t 1972 d i s t i n c t i o n . Thus, d e l e g a t e s from the e a r l i e r p e r i o d were l e s s enamoured w i t h s u g g e s t i o n s t o i n c r e a s e government r e g u l a t i o n and s p e n d i n g . Government i n t e r v e n t i o n w i t h r e g a r d t o economic development r e c e i v e d more s u p p o r t , c o n s i s t e n t w i t h the h i s t o r i c a l importance of government-driven development i n the p r o v i n c e . S o c i a l p o l i c i e s such as government h e l p f o r women were d i s t i n c t l y u n d e r - s u p p o r t e d by t h i s group. The d e l e g a t e s from each of these p e r i o d s d i d not r e a c t p a r t i c u l a r l y c o n s i s t e n t l y nor d i s t i n c t l y from o t h e r members towards q u e s t i o n which p l a c e f e d e r a l and p r o v i n c i a l sympathies a t odds w i t h each o t h e r . Among the d e l e g a t e s born i n Canada 63.2 per c e n t were born o u t s i d e B r i t i s h Columbia. On a l l i s s u e s , except government r e g u l a t i o n of a g r i c u l t u r a l p r o d u c t s , those born o u t s i d e the p r o v i n c e f a v o u r e d the s t a t u s quo by between about 10 and 20 per c e n t , over B.C. born d e l e g a t e s . The same p a t t e r n i s r e p e a t e d a l b e i t not as d i s t i n c t l y when government spending i s at i s s u e . T h i s response would work t o a m e l i o r a t e 84 t e n d e n c i e s amongst o t h e r d e l e g a t e s t o be e i t h e r p r o or a n t i government r e g u l a t i o n and s p e n d i n g . D e l e g a t e s from o t h e r p r o v i n c e s are l e s s l i k e l y t o see government as p r o t e c t i n g as opposed t o s t i f l i n g (70.6 per c e n t compared t o 90.3 per c e n t ) . T h i s d i s t i n c t i o n i s reduced somewhat i n r e s p e c t of o t h e r p o l i c y i s s u e s where d e l e g a t e s o n l y have the chance t o agree or d i s a g r e e w i t h a g i v e n s t a t e m e n t . S t i l l , those born o u t s i d e B.C. o f t e n tended t o be l e s s s y m p a t h e t i c towards government i n t e r v e n t i o n such as on w e l f a r e i s s u e s . W h i l s t b e l i e v i n g u nions were to o p o w e r f u l they saw them as n e c e s s a r y i n o f f s e t t i n g the power of b i g c o r p o r a t i o n s . They are a l s o more i n c l i n e d t o v a l u e g r a s s r o o t s p a r t i c i p a t i o n and "down t o e a r t h " t h i n k i n g i n comparison w i t h d e l e g a t e s born i n B r i t i s h C o lumbia. On i s s u e s a s s o c i a t e d w i t h f e d e r a l p o l i t i c s t hese d e l e g a t e s showed l i t t l e v a r i a t i o n from o t h e r L i b e r a l d e l e g a t e s . On the b a l a n c e of power between f e d e r a l and p r o v i n c i a l governments o n l y d e l e g a t e s born o u t s i d e B r i t i s h Columbia thought more power s h o u l d be v e s t e d , i n the p r o v i n c i a l government, but t h i s was thought by o n l y 4 d e l e g a t e s . In r e l a t i o n t o B r i t i s h Columbia's t r e a t m e n t by the f e d e r a l government, 40.1 p e r c e n t of d e l e g a t e s from o t h e r p r o v i n c e s f e l t B.C. r e c e i v e s f a i r t r e a t m e n t from the f e d e r a l government. Only 28.1 p e r c e n t of B.C. born d e l e g a t e s agreed w i t h t h i s . D e l e g a t e s from " o t h e r p r o v i n c e s " a l s o v a r i e d from 85 l o c a l d e l e g a t e s i n s t r e s s i n g t h e i r a l l e g i a n c e w i t h i n the L i b e r a l p a r t y . TABLE IX LEVEL OF PARTY CLOSER TO Where Born P r o v . F e d e r a l Both T o t a l B r i t i s h Columbia Other P r o v i n c e s 18.8 14.5 15.6 38.2 65.6 47.3 36.8 63.2 Moreover, d e l e g a t e s from o t h e r p r o v i n c e s account f o r 69.7 p e r c e n t of f e d e r a l c o n s t i t u e n c y d e l e g a t e s t o the c o n v e n t i o n . They a r e l e s s o p t i m i s t i c about the p a r t y ' s performance i n p r o v i n c i a l e l e c t i o n s and more o p t i m i s t i c about i t s chances i n t h i s p r o v i n c e i n f e d e r a l e l e c t i o n s . S t r i k i n g l y , 49.1 p e r c e n t of them j o i n e d the p a r t y b e f o r e '1972, which i s 81.8 p e r c e n t of those members who j o i n e d i n t h i s time who are s t i l l i n the p a r t y . T h i s group a c c o u n t s f o r about 30 p e r c e n t of a l l d e l e g a t e s a t the c o n v e n t i o n . i s t hose who a t t e n d e d the c o n v e n t i o n as f e d e r a l p a r t y members. Amongst the t h r e e p r o v i n c i a l p a r t i e s , o n l y the L i b e r a l s have i n s t i t u t i o n a l i z e d the importance of f e d e r a l p o l i t i c a l a c t i v i s t s w i t h i n the p a r t y . T h i s i s not a l t o g e t h e r s u r p r i s i n g g i v e n the p a r t y ' s a s y m m e t r i c a l performances i n the f e d e r a l and p r o v i n c i a l e l e c t i o n s . D e l e g a t e s t o the p r o v i n c i a l l e a d e r s h i p c o n v e n t i o n are s e l e c t e d by the same procedure and c r i t e r i a used t o s e l e c t d e l e g a t e s t o the p a r t y ' s Annual The f i n a l subset of d e l e g a t e s t o be c o n s i d e r e d here 86 G e n e r a l M e e t i n g and o u t l i n e d i n By-law 10, S e c t i o n 6 of the L i b e r a l P a r t y C o n s t i t u t i o n , 1986. F e d e r a l and p r o v i n c i a l o f f i c e h o l d e r s , L i b e r a l members of f e d e r a l and p r o v i n c i a l l e g i s l a t u r e s as w e l l as p r e s e n t c a n d i d a t e s f o r p a r l i a m e n t and c a n d i d a t e s d e f e a t e d a t the l a s t f e d e r a l and p r o v i n c i a l e l e c t i o n s enjoy e x - o f f i c i o s t a t u s . The p r o v i n c i a l women's a s s o c i a t i o n , y o uth a s s o c i a t i o n and I n d i a n a s s o c i a t i o n each have the r i g h t t o e l e c t 25 d e l e g a t e s t o send t o the c o n v e n t i o n . In a d d i t i o n , S u b - s e c t i o n (g) of the above By-law reads i n p a r t There s h a l l be t h i r t y - f i v e (35) d e l e g a t e s from each p r o v i n c i a l r i d i n g a s s o c i a t i o n and twenty (20) d e l e g a t e s from each f e d e r a l r i d i n g a s s o c i a t i o n . ( B r i t i s h Columbia L i b e r a l P a r t y C o n s t i t u t i o n , March 1986.) Thus, f e d e r a l L i b e r a l members a r e t r e a t e d r a t h e r l i k e y o u th and women a s s o c i a t i o n s ' members i n o t h e r Canadian p a r t i e s ; o n l y i n the p r o v i n c i a l B r i t i s h Columbia L i b e r a l P a r t y a r e f e d e r a l members so t r e a t e d . I f a d e l e g a t e i s a member of b o t h a p r o v i n c i a l and f e d e r a l a s s o c i a t i o n ( l e t a l o n e one of the s p e c i a l groups noted e a r l i e r ) , then t h e r e i s a m u l t i p l i e r e f f e c t on the number of a c c e s s p o i n t s a v a i l a b l e t o them v i s -a - v i s l e a d e r s h i p c o n v e n t i o n s . By-law 13 S e c t i o n 5a p a r t ( i i ) s t a t e s i n r e l a t i o n t o d e l e g a t e s e l e c t i o n m e e t i n g s : Each member may v o t e a t not more than one f e d e r a l r i d i n g a s s o c i a t i o n m e e t i n g , not more than one p r o v i n c i a l r i d i n g a s s o c i a t i o n m e e t i n g , and not more than one women's group meeting h e l d f o r the purpose of e l e c t i n g d e l e g a t e s t o the same c o n v e n t i o n . ( C o n s t i t u t i o n March 1986, p.26) The L i b e r a l p a r t y i n B r i t i s h Columbia appears t o be r e s p o n d i n g t o the e x i g e n c i e s of i t s l i m i t e d support base 87 w i t h i n B r i t i s h Columbia. The relevance f o r us i s the impact of f e d e r a l members on the o p i n i o n p r o f i l e of the p a r t y . The d i s t r i b u t i o n of f e d e r a l and p r o v i n c i a l d e l e g a t e s i s shown below. TABLE X DISTRIBUTION OF FEDERAL AND PROVINCIAL DELEGATES Percent Number P r o v i n c i a l Constituency Delegates 45.5 40 F e d e r a l Constituency Delegates 37.5 33 Party O f f i c e 11.4 10 Other 5.7 5 T o t a l 100.0 88* * Two delegates are c l a s s i f i e d as "missing c a s e s " . The c r o s s - t a b u l a t i n g of these c a t e g o r i e s with a wide range of responses produced s p e c t a c u l a r l y unremarkable r e s u l t s . By demographic c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s , f e d e r a l d e l e g a t e s accounted f o r 55.6 percent of the C a t h o l i c s at the convention and 53.8 percent of those e a r n i n g $75,000 or more. They were somewhat more l i k e l y to have been born i n another p r o v i n c e and are more evenly balanced by gender than p r o v i n c i a l d e l e g a t e s . With regard to government r e g u l a t o r y and spending a c t i v i t i e s they responded very much as p r o v i n c i a l d e l e g a t e s . They were m a r g i n a l l y l e s s favourable towards expenditure on matters of p r o v i n c i a l concern such as r e f o r e s t a t i o n , highways and tourism and l e s s s u p p o r t i v e of spending job grants but t h i s i s confused by support f o r welfare on other i s s u e s . Perhaps due to the higher p r o p o r t i o n of women in t h e i r ranks 88 they were more su p p o r t i v e of government a c t i o n to h e l p women. 81.3 percent favoured such a c t i o n compared with 65.0 percent of p r o v i n c i a l d e l e g a t e s . F e d e r a l L i b e r a l s d i f f e r i n t h e i r responses to ques t i o n s d e a l i n g with the balance of power between f e d e r a l and p r o v i n c i a l governments and the r e l a t i v e importance of f e d e r a l and p r o v i n c i a l p o l i t i c s , but not overwhelmingly. 84.2 percent of them co n s i d e r e d f e d e r a l p o l i t i c s more important than p r o v i n c i a l p o l i t i c s compared with 69.7 percent of p r o v i n c i a l delegates who thi n k t h i s . S i m i l a r l y , 42.4 percent f e l t c l o s e r to the f e d e r a l p a r t y while only 3.0 percent f e l t c l o s e r to the p r o v i n c i a l p a r t y . The f i g u r e s f o r p r o v i n c i a l L i b e r a l s are 17.9 percent and 33.3 percent. They are a l s o c l e a r l y more concerned that the NDP must f a i l i n B r i t i s h Columbia i f the L i b e r a l p a r t y i s to do w e l l . W h i lst d i f f e r e n t a t t i t u d e s towards f e d e r a l and p r o v i n c i a l p o l i t i c s can be seen as a s t r a i g h t f o r w a r d e x p r e s s i o n of d e l e g a t e s ' f u n c t i o n a l p o s i t i o n s (or v i c e versa) the f a c t i s that these d i f f e r e n c e s are not r e l a t e d to d i s t i n c t p a t t e r n s of b e l i e f i n the p a r t y . On r e g u l a t o r y , spending and general p o l i c y q u e s t i o n s there was no c o n s i s t e n t d i v i s i o n i n responses, as was the case on those i s s u e s which can be construed as " f e d e r a l " . 89 CONCLUSION The overwhelming i m p r e s s i o n g i v e n by our attempt t o l o c a t e r e i n f o r c i n g c l e a v a g e s w i t h i n the L i b e r a l p a r t y t o h e l p e x p l a i n the d i v i s i o n s over p o l i c y q u e s t i o n s n o t e d e a r l i e r i s t h a t t h e s e f a c t o r s do not account s y s t e m a t i c a l l y f o r the d i v i s i o n s t h a t were found. W h i l s t each v a r i a b l e i s a s s o c i a t e d w i t h some d i f f e r e n t mix of p o l i c y emphases, none of them seem t o d e s c r i b e a sub-group w i t h s t r o n g p a r t y p r e f e r e n c e s d i s t i n c t from the p a r t y as a whole or o t h e r f a c t i o n s of the p a r t y and c o n s i s t e n t w i t h the p o l i c y d i v i s i o n s d i s c o v e r e d e a r l i e r . Thus, w h i l s t i t i s t r u e t h a t C a t h o l i c s show a penchant f o r f e d e r a l p o l i t i c s and i s s u e s of " n a t i o n a l i m p o r t a n c e " o t h e r v a r i a b l e s (such as age) a l s o d e f i n e d groups w i t h such t e n d e n c i e s . W h i l s t age a l s o s e p a r a t e d some d e l e g a t e s out i n r e l a t i o n t o government i n t e r v e n t i o n , income d i d as w e l l . There i s no c l e a r p a t t e r n of r e i n f o r c i n g c l e a v a g e s amongst L i b e r a l a c t i v i s t s t h a t d e f i n e c l e a r sub-groups i n r e s p e c t of the v a r i a b l e s used h e r e . 90 Chapter S i x  CONCLUSION T h i s t h e s i s has begun the task of d e s c r i b i n g and a n a l y z i n g the p l a c e of the L i b e r a l Party and i t s a c t i v i s t s i n B r i t i s h Columbian p o l i t i c s . Given the e x p l o r a t o r y nature of the t h e s i s . and the n e c e s s i t y of s y s t e m a t i c a l l y p r e s e n t i n g o r i g i n a l data, the c o n c l u s i o n s that can be drawn at t h i s stage are s t r a i g h t f o r w a r d . N e v e r t h e l e s s , the o p p o r t u n i t y to "peer" i n s i d e the p a r t y i s i n v a l u a b l e and adds unique i n f o r m a t i o n to the body of knowledge r e g a r d i n g p o l i t i c s i n Canada. I t w i l l allow f u r t h e r i n v e s t i g a t i o n of p r o v i n c i a l p o l i t i c s , the r e l a t i o n s h i p to f e d e r a l p o l i t i c s and the nature of the L i b e r a l Party at the p r o v i n c i a l l e v e l . Moreover, t h i s i n f o r m a t i o n o f f e r s an o p p o r t u n i t y to t e s t the " c o n v e n t i o n a l wisdom" concerning the L i b e r a l s i n B.C. and p r o v i d e s e m p i r i c a l evidence f o r many of the widely h e l d assumptions, i m p l i c i t and e x p l i c i t , concerning the p a r t y i n B r i t i s h Columbia. L i b e r a l a c t i v i s t s conform to the g e n e r a l p a t t e r n of p a r t y a c t i v i s t s found throughout Canada in being "middle-c l a s s " . But i n c o n t r a s t to a c t i v i s t s from other p r o v i n c i a l p a r t i e s they are more l i k e l y to be C a t h o l i c and are drawn overwhelmingly from the lower mainland. Although s i m i l a r l y u r ban-oriented, the NDP draws a c t i v i s t s from a wider area. As w e l l , L i b e r a l a c t i v i s t s were t y p i c a l l y more l i k e l y to be 91 p r o f e s s i o n a l s and to have r e c e i v e d more education than other a c t i v i s t s i n B.C. As to whether the p r o v i n c i a l L i b e r a l s are a "branch-party" of the f e d e r a l L i b e r a l Party, there i s some evidence to suggest that t h i s i s i n p a r t t r u e . Only the B.C. L i b e r a l s have i n s t i t u t i o n a l i z e d the r e p r e s e n t a t i o n of f e d e r a l members at l e a d e r s h i p conventions p r o v i n c i a l l y . On the whole, L i b e r a l a c t i v i s t s were a l s o i n c l i n e d to view f e d e r a l p o l i t i c s as more important and to f e e l that they were " c l o s e r " to the f e d e r a l p a r t y . In l i g h t of t h i s i t i s c e r t a i n l y p o s s i b l e that L i b e r a l a c t i v i s t s i n B.C. are motivated to j o i n and remain L i b e r a l s i n part because of the s o c i a l and m a t e r i a l rewards that the federal- L i b e r a l Party might provide at some stage. Jacek e t . a l . have commented upon t h i s upon t h i s f a c t o r i n respect of L i b e r a l recruitment elsewhere i n Canada (Jacek e t . a l . 1972, p.199-201). C o n s i s t e n t with t h i s f e d e r a l o r i e n t a t i o n , L i b e r a l a c t i v i s t s i n B.C. are more o p t i m i s t i c about the f e d e r a l p a r t y ' s chances i n B.C. than the p r o v i n c i a l p a r t y ' s . They a l s o appear to adopt " f e d e r a l " p o s i t i o n s on many i s s u e s . I d e o l o g i c a l l y the L i b e r a l a c t i v i s t s proved to be c l o s e r to the NDP than the S o c i a l C r e d i t P a r t y . There i s , however, a degree of f i s c a l c o nservatism and support f o r " f r e e e n t e r p r i s e " which d i s t i n g u i s h e s the L i b e r a l s from the NDP a c t i v i s t s and confirms other c o n v e n t i o n a l wisdom that L i b e r a l s are "between" the NDP and the S o c i a l C r e d i t P a r t y . 92 I t i s with regard to o p i n i o n s on s o c i a l p o l i c y that the L i b e r a l and NDP a c t i v i s t s are most s i m i l a r . From t h e i r p o s i t i o n i n B r i t i s h Columbia p o l i t i c s , the i s s u e s that d i v i d e and u n i t e the p a r t y allows us to assess both the i n t e r n a l nature of the L i b e r a l Party and what the middle-ground i n the p r o v i n c e c o n s i s t s o f . On q u e s t i o n s of union versus business power, as w e l l as the welfare i s s u e s on which the L i b e r a l s were d i v i d e d . T h i s i s i n c o n t r a s t to the r e l a t i v e l y cohesive but opposed p o s i t i o n s of the NDP and S o c i a l C r e d i t a c t i v i s t s . Questions that invoked " l e f t - r i g h t " dichotomies and s p e c i f i c examples of Canadian independence and n a t i o n a l i s m were s t r o n g l y supportive and u n i t e d . A l s o , p r o v i n c i a l government p o l i c i e s , p a r t i c u l a r l y with regard to p r i v a t i z a t i o n and d e c e n t r a l i z a t i o n a t t r a c t e d cohesive o p p o s i t i o n . Notwithstanding the f e d e r a l - p r o v i n c i a l s t r a i n s i n the p a r t y as w e l l as the e x i g e n c i e s of the p a r t y ' s middle-ground, minor par t y s t a t u s , the L i b e r a l s proved to be more cohesive than the Socreds. S o c i a l C r e d i t appears as a c a t c h -a l l p a r t y which i s i n t e r n a l l y heterogeneous. The NDP i s the p a r t y that i s the most i n t e r n a l l y cohesive of the three p a r t i e s . T h i s suggests that the p o p u l i s t s and or p r o v i n c i a l nature of the NDP and S o c i a l C r e d i t Party d i s t i n g u i s h them from the L i b e r a l s , but d i f f e r e n t l y i n each case. Although they mimic each other to a degree, they both r e t a i n some of the elements of e a r l i e r days. F i n a l l y , d i v i s i o n s i n o p i n i o n w i t h i n the L i b e r a l P arty as expressed i n that amongst a c t i v i s t s do not appear to be r e l a t e d to the d i s t i n c t but c o n s i s t e n t o p i n i o n s of i d e n t i f i a b l e sub-groups w i t h i n the p a r t y . R e l i g i o n , e d u c a t i o n , income, age, p l a c e of b i r t h and de l e g a t e - t y p e were not r e l a t e d to o p i n i o n d i f f e r e n c e s i n any systematic way. The L i b e r a l s ' middle-road p r o - f e d e r a l i s t p r o f i l e i s not an a r t i f a c t of C a t h o l i c i s m , o u t - o f - p r o v i n c e b i r t h , or the r e p r e s e n t a t i o n of f e d e r a l r i d i n g s at the p r o v i n c i a l c o n v e n t i o n . The o p i n i o n s i d e n t i f i e d are broadly p a r t i s a n r a t h e r than a c o l l e c t i o n of d i s t i n c t o p i n i o n sub-sets. I t appears then, t h a t ' the L i b e r a l a c t i v i s t s i n B r i t i s h Columbia are much l i k e what we would have expected to f i n d . T h e i r c l o s e n e s s to the NDP i s somewhat s u r p r i s i n g given t h e i r own and o t h e r s ' p e r c e p t i o n that they are competing f o r the S o c i a l C r e d i t vote i n the p r o v i n c e . T h e i r m i d d l e - c l a s s p r o - f e d e r a l c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s h i g h l i g h t the d i f f i c u l t y of a p a r t y of the middle with a s t r o n g f e d e r a l c o u n t e r p a r t succeeding i n a p r o v i n c e where p o l a r i z e d p o l i t i c s i s the norm; a norm which separates the p r o v i n c i a l p a r t y system from the f e d e r a l p a r t y system to which the L i b e r a l P arty i s much b e t t e r s u i t e d . The L i b e r a l Party i s n e i t h e r w e l l - s u i t e d nor s t r a t e g i c a l l y w e l l - p l a c e d to d e a l with t h i s type of p o l i t i c a l environment. 93 APPENDIX I Surv e y q u e s t i o n from w h i c h S c a l e s were c o m p i l e d : ( U n l e s s o t h e r w i s e n o t e d t h e p o s s i b l e r e s p o n s e s were coded as agree o r d i s a g r e e w i t h a s c o r e o f 1 o r 0 depending on t h e wo r d i n g o f t h e q u e s t i o n . F o r q u e s t i o n s p r e c e d e d by an a s t e r i s k (*) d e l e g a t e s were asked t o s e l e c t one o f two st a t e m e n t s . ) C o n t i n e n t a l i s t S c a l e : O = a n t i - c o n t i n e n t a l i s t 3=pro-c o n t i n e n t a l i s t 1/ Canada s h o u l d have f r e e r t r a d e w i t h t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s . 2 / We must ensure an independent Canada even i f t h a t was t o mean a l o w e r s t a n d a r d o f l i v i n g f o r Canadians. 3/ C a n a d a 1 s i n d e p e n d e n c e i s t h r e a t e n e d by t h e l a r g e p e r c e n t a g e o f f o r e i g n ownership i n key s e c t o r s o f t h e economy. I n d i v i d u a l R e s p o n s i b i l i t y S c a l e : O = c o l l e c t i v e r e s p o n s i b i l i t y 6 = i n d i v i d u a l r e s p o n s i b i l i t y 1/ The government ought t o make s u r e t h a t everyone has a decent s t a n d a r d o f l i v i n g . 94 2/ L e t ' s f a c e i t , most unemployed p e o p l e c o u l d f i n d a j o b i f t h e y r e a l l y wanted t o . 3/ Why s h o u l d t h e government spend my t a x money on s i c k p e o p l e : my f a m i l y always p u t something a s i d e f o r a r a i n y day. 4/ A f t e r a p e r s o n has worked u n t i l 65, i t i s p r o p e r f o r t h e community t o s u p p o r t him o r h e r . *5/ R e g u l a t i o n s t i f l e s p e r s o n a l i n i t i A T I v e . OR W i t h o u t government r e g u l a t i o n s , some p e o p l e would j u s t t a k e advantage o f t h e r e s t o f us. *6/ I f I do my b e s t , i t i s o n l y r i g h t t h a t t h e government s h o u l d h e l p me out when I g e t some bad b r e a k s . OR Each i n d i v i d u a l s h o u l d a c c e p t t h e consequences o f t h e i r own a c t i o n s . P o p u l i s t S c a l e : O=non-populist 3 = p o p u l i s t 1/ I n t h e l o n g r u n , I ' l l p u t my t r u s t i n t h e s i m p l e , down t o e a r t h t h i n k i n g o f o r d i n a r y p e o p l e r a t h e r t h a n t h e t h e o r i e s o f e x p e r t s and i n t e l l e c t u a l s . 2/ We c o u l d p r o b a b l y s o l v e most o f o u r b i g p o l i t i c a l problems i f government c o u l d a c t u a l l y be b r o u g h t back t o t h e p e o p l e a t t h e g r a s s r o o t s . 3/ What we need i s a government t h a t g e t s t h e j o b done w i t h o u t a l l t h e r e d t a p e . 95 A n t i - W e l f a r e S c a l e : O=support w e l f a r e 3 = a n t i - w e l f a r e 1/ A l o t o f w e l f a r e and s o c i a l s e c u r i t y programs we have now a r e u n n e c e s s a r y . 2/ S h o u l d government s p e n d i n g be i n c r e a s e d ( 0 ) , be d e c r e a s e d o r r e m a i n t h e same (1) i n t h e f o l l o w i n g a r e a s : a/ W e l f a r e r a t e s b/ d a y c a r e F o r t h e r e m a i n i n g two s c a l e s , d e l e g a t e s were asked whether t h e y wanted more government r e g u l a t i o n o r s p e n d i n g i n a v a r i e t y o f a r e a s . P o s i t i v e r e s p o n s e s were s c o r e d as 1 o t h e r r e s p o n s e s were s c o r e d as 0. A n t i - R e g u l a t i o n S c a l e : 0 = s u p p o r t e x t e n d e d r e g u l a t i o n 3=opposed t o more government r e g u l a t i o n 1/ E n v i r o n m e n t a l p r o t e c t i o n 2/ Land use 3/ Human r i g h t s p r o t e c t i o n 4/ S a l e o f a l c o h o l 5 / M a r k e t i n g o f a g r i c u l t u r a l p r o d u c t s 6/ R e t a i l s h o p p i n g h o u r s 7 / Gambling 96 A n t i - S o c i a l P o l i c y S c a l e : O=favour i n c r e a s e d spending on s o c i a l p o l i c y 3=opposed t o more spending on s o c i a l p o l i c y 1/ E d u c a t i o n 2/ H e a l t h c a r e 3/ Human r i g h t s p r o t e c t i o n 97 BIBLIOGRAPHY A l p e r , Donald, "The E f f e c t s of C o a l i t i o n Government on P a r t y S t r u c t u r e : The Case o f the C o n s e r v a t i v e P a r t y i n B.C.," B.C. S t u d i e s . No. 33 (Spring 1977), 40-49. 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Vancouver: U n i v e r s i t y of B r i t i s h Columbia P r e s s , 1986. _ _ _ _ _ _ "The Measurement of Regionalism i n Canadian V o t i n g P a t t e r n s , " Canadian J o u r n a l of P o l i t i c a l S c i e n c e , Volume 1 (March 1972), 54-81. , Two P o l i t i c a l Worlds. Vancouver: U n i v e r s i t y of B r i t i s h Columbia Press, 1985. B l a k e , D o n a l d E., R.K. C a r t y and Lynda E r i c k s o n , "Federalism/Conservatism and the S o c i a l C r e d i t P a r t y i n B.C.". Unpublished paper. U n i v e r s i t y o f B r i t i s h Columbia, 1987. , Ideology and P a r t i s s h i p : A Comparison o f F e d e r a l and P r o v i n c i a l A c t i v i s t s . A paper prepared f o r t h e Canadian P o l i t i c a l S c i e nce A s s o c i a t i o n , McMaster U n i v e r s i t y , June 6-10, 1987. _, " R a t i f i c a t i o n o r R e p u d i a t i o n : The S o c i a l C r d i t L e a dership Convention". A paper prepared f o r the C a n a d i a n P o l i t i c a l S c i e n c e A s s o c i a t i o n , McMaster U n i v e r s i t y , June 6-10, 1987>£* ' C a i r n s , A l a n C., "The E l e c t o r a l System and the P a r t y System i n Canada, 1921-1965," i n P o l i t i c s i n Canada. E d i t e d by Paul Fox. Toronto: McGraw H i l l Ryerson, 1982. and D a n i e l Wong, " S o c i a l i s m , F e d e r a l i s m and the B.C. 98 P a r t y Systems 1933-1983," i n P a r t y P o l i t i c s i n Canada. E d i t e d by Hugh Thorburn. Scarborough: P r e n t i c e - H a l l , 1985. Carty, R.K., "Three Canadian P a r t y Systems: An I n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f the Development o f N t i o n a l P a r t i e s , " i n P a r t y  Democracy i n Canada. E d i t e d by George P e r l i n . Scarborough: P r e n t i c e - H a l l , 1988. C h r i s t i a n , W i l l i a m and C o l i n Campbell. P o l i t i c a l P a r t i e s and  I d e o l o g i e s i n Canada. Toronto: McGraw-Hill Ryerson, 1983. C l a r k e , H a r o l d D., Jane Jenson, Lawrence LeDuc and Jon H. Pammett. Absent Mandate: The P o l i t i c s o f D i s c o n t e n t i n  Canada. Toronto: Gage, 1984. , P o l i t i c a l Choice i n Canada. Toronto: McGraw-Hill Ryerson, 1980. C o u r t e n a y , John C. " L e a d e r s h i p Conventions and the Development of the N a t i o n a l P o l i t i c a l Community i n Canada," i n N a t i o n a l P o l i t i c s and Community i n Canada. E d i t e d by R. K. Carty and W.P. Wood. Vancouver: U n i v e r s i t y of B r i t i s h Columbia Press, 1986. , The S e l e c t i o n of N a t i o n a l P a r t y Leaders i n Canada. Toronto: Macmillan of Canada, 1973. and George P e r l i n . "The Role of Conventions i n the R e p r e s e n t a t i o n and Accomodation o f R e g i o n a l Cleavages," i n P a r t y Democracy i n Canada. Dyck, Rand. P r o v i n c i a l P o l i t i c s i n Canada. Scarborough: P r e n t i c e - H a l l , 1986. Duverger, Maurice. 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" B r i t i s h Columbia," i n The P r o v i n c i a l  P o l i t i c a l Systems. E d i t e d by D.J. Bellamy, J.H. Pammett and D.C. Rowat. Toronto: Methuen, 1976. G i b b i n s , Roger. Regionalism: T e r r i t o r i a l P o l i t i c s i n Canada  and the U.S. Toronto: Butterworth, 1982. Jacek, Henry, John McDonough, Ronald Shimjer and P a t r i c k Smith. "The Congruence o f F e d e r a l - P r o v i n c i a l Campaign A c t i v i t y i n P a r t y O r g a n i z a t i o n s : The I n f l u e n c e of Recruitment P a t t e r n s i n Three Hamilton R i d i n g s , " The  Canadian J o u r n a l of P o l i t i c a l S c i e n c e . Volume 1 (June 1982), 190-233. . " S o c i a l A r t i c u l a t i o n and Aggregation i n P o l i t i c a l P a r t y O r g a n i z a t i o n s i n a Large Canadian C i t y , " The  Canadian J o u r n a l of P o l i t i c a l S c i e n c e . Volume V I I I (June 1975), 274-298. Jackson, Robert J . e t a l . P o l i t i c s i n Canada. Scarborough: P r e n t i c e - H a l l , 1986. Jenson, Jane. "Party L o y a l t y i n Canada: The Q u e s t i o n of P a r t y I d e n t i f i c a t i o n , " The Canadian J o u r n a l o f P o l i t i c a l  S c i e n c e . Volume V I I I (December 1975), 543-553. J o h n s t o n , R i c h a r d . "The F i n a l C h o i c e : I t s S o c i a l , O r g a n i z a t i o n a l , and I d e o l o g i c a l B a s e s " i n P a r t y  Democracy i n Canada. E d i t e d by George P e r l i n . Scarborough: P r e n t i c e - H a l l , 1988. "The I d e o l o g i c a l S t r u c t u r e o f Opinion on P o l i c y , " i n P a r t y Democracy i n Canada. E d i t e d by George P e r l i n . Scarborough: P r e n t i c e - H a l l , 1988. K o i n i g , D a n i e l J . and T r e v o r B. Proverbs. " C l a s s Regime and I n s t i t u t i o n a l Sources o f P a r t y Support w i t h i n B r i t i s h Columbia,: B.C. S t u d i e s . No. 29 ( S p r i n g 1976), 19-26. Kornberg, A l l a n , J o e l Smith and A r n o l d C l a r k e . " A t t r i b u t e s o f A s c r i b e d I n f l u e n c e i n L o c a l P a r t y O r g a n i z a t i o n s i n Canada and the U n i t e d S t a t e s , " The Canadian J o u r n a l of  P o l i t i c a l S cience, Volume 1 (June 1972), 206-233. Kornberg, A l l a n , J o e l Smith and H a r o l d D. C l a r k e . C i t i z e n  P o l i t i c s i n Canada. Durham: C a r o l i n a Academic Pr e s s , 1979. 100 K r i s t i a n s o n , G.L. "The Non-partisan Approach t o B.C. P o l i t i c s : The Search f o r a U n i t y P a r t y — 1972-1975," B.C. S t u d i e s . No. 33 (Spring 1977), 13-29. La Palombara, Joseph and Myron Wiener. "The O r i g i n and Development o f P o l i t i c a l P a r t i e s i n ," i n P o l i t i c a l P a r t i e s and P o l i t i c a l Development. E d i t e d by Joseph LaPalombara and Myron Weiner. P r i n c e t o n : P r i n c e t o n U n i v e r s i t y Press, 1969. MacLeod, John T. 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" P s y c h o l o g i c a l Needs, P e r s o n a l C o n t r o l and P o l i t i c a l P a r t i c i p a t i o n , " Canadian J o u r n a l o f  P o l i t i c a l S c i e n c e f Volume V I I I (March 1975), 107-116. R e s n i c k , P h i l i p , " S o c i a l Democracy i n Power: The Case o f B r i t i s h Columbai," B.C. S t u d i e s . No. 34 (Summer 1977), 3-20. R o b i n , M a r t i n . " B r i t i s h C olumbia," i n C a n a d i a n P r o v i n c i a l  P o l i t i c s E d i t e d by M r t i n R o b i n . S c a r b o r o u g h : P r e n t i c e -H a l l , 1972. R u f f , Norman J . " B r i t i s h Columbai and Canadian F e d e r a l i s m , " i n The R e i n s o f Power. E d i t e d by ??? Terence M o r l e y e t a l . Vancouver: Douglas and M c l n t y r e , 1983. , "A P r o f i l e o f B r i t i s h Columbia P a r t y A c t i v i s t s : P r e l i m i n a r y A n a l y s i s o f Three C o n v e n t i o n s . " U n p u b l i s h e d p a p e r , U n i v e r s i t y o f V i c t o r i a , 1974. S e i g f r i e d , Andre. The Race Q u e s t i o n i n Canada. E d i t e d by F.H. U n d e r h i l l . T o r o n t o : M c C l e l l a n d and S t e w a r t L t d . , 1966. Tennant, P a u l . "The NDP Government o f B r i t i s h C o lumbia: Unaided P o l i t i c i a n s i n an Unaided C a b i n e t , " Canadian  P u b l i c P o l i c y . 111:4 (Autumn 1977), 489-502. Welch, Susan. "Dimensions o f P o l i t i c a l P a r t i c i p a t i o n , " Canadian J o u r n a l o f P o l i t i c a l S c i e n c e . Volume V I I I (December 1975). White, Graham. "One P a r t y Dominance and T h i r d s P a r t i e s : The P i n a r d Theory R e c o n s i d e r e d . " Canadian J o u r n a l o f  P o l i t i c a l S c i e n c e . Volume 1 (September 1973), 399-421. Winn, Conrad and John McMenery. P o l i t i c a l P a r t i e s i n Canada. M c G r a w - H i l l R y e r s o n , 1976. 

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