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Secessionist guerrillas : a study of violent Tamil insurrection in Sri Lanka, 1972-1987 Ravindran, Santhanam 1988

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SECESSIONIST GUERRILLAS: A STUDY OF VIOLENT TAMIL INSURRECTION IN SRI LANKA, 1972-1987 by SANTHANAM RAVINDRAN B.A., University Of Peradeniya, 1981 A THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF MASTER OF ARTS in THE FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIES Department of P o l i t i c a l Science We accept this thesis as conforming to the required standard THE UNIVERSITY OF BRITISH COLUMBIA February 1988 @ Santhanam Ravindran, 1988 In presenting this thesis in partial fulfilment of the requirements for an advanced degree at the University of British Columbia, I agree that the Library shall make it freely available for reference and study. I further agree that permission for extensive copying of this thesis for scholarly purposes may be granted by the head of my department or by his or her representatives. It is understood that copying or publication of this thesis for financial gain shall not be allowed without my written permission. Department of P o l i t i c a l Science The University of British Columbia 1956 Main Mall Vancouver, Canada V6T 1Y3 Date February 29, 1988 DE-6G/81) ABSTRACT In S r i Lanka, the Tamils' demand for a f e d e r a l state has turned within a quarter of a century into a demand for the independent state of Eelam. Forces of secession set i n motion by emerging Sinhala-Buddhist chauvinism and the resultant Tamil nationalism gathered momentum during the 1970s and 1980s which threatened the p o l i t i c a l i n t e g r a t i o n of the i s l a n d . Today Indian intervention has temporarily arrested the process of d i s i n t e g r a t i o n . But post-October 1987 developments i l l u s t r a t e that the s e c e s s i o n i s t war i s f a r from over and secession s t i l l remains a r e a l p o s s i b i l i t y . This thesis focuses on the phenomenon of Tamil armed seee68ienism.» To better understand the forces responsible for the armed se c e s s i o n i s t i n s u r r e c t i o n , t h i s , t h e s i s -'analyzes the " preconditions leading to the v i o l e n t c o n f l i c t between the minority Tamils and the majority Sinhalese i n S r i Lanka. The consistent f a i l u r e of the p o l i t i c a l system to accommodate the basic Tamil demands has contributed to the emergence of Tamil armed secessionism. Further, diverse f a c t o r s have given impetus to the growth of Tamil s e c e s s i o n i s t movements. However, the three main p o l i t i c a l actors i n the s e c e s s i o n i s t struggle — the S r i Lankan government, the Indian c e n t r a l government together with the state government of Tamil Nadu and the L i b e r a t i o n Tigers of Tamil Eelam — have had a major impact on the v i c i s s i t u d e s of the Tamil s e c e s s i o n i s t i n s u r r e c t i o n . - i i -TABLE OF CONTENTS Page ABSTRACT i i TABLE OF CONTENTS i i i LIST OF FIGURES ( v ACKNOWLEDGEMENT v i CHAPTER ONE: A THEORETICAL APPROACH TO A SECESSIONIST CONFLICT . . 1 S r i Lanka: background to the ethnic c o n f l i c t 3 Theoretical Perspective on Secessionist Violence 16 CHAPTER TWO: THE EMERGENCE OF A SECESSIONIST CONFLICT IN SRI LANKA'S MAJORITARIAN DEMOCRACY 51 P o l i t i c i z a t i o n of E t h n i c i t y and Growing Tamil A l i e n a t i o n , 1931-1970 53 I n s t i t u t i o n a l i z a t i o n of E t h n i c i t y and the Rise of a Secessionist Challenge, 1970-1977 57 The 'Carrot and S t i c k ' Ethnic P o l i c y of the UNP: Consolidation of the Secessionist Challenge 1977-1982 . 67 A Catalyst to Secessionist C o n f l i c t - The 1983 Riots 83 CHAPTER THREE: THE DEVELOPMENT OF TAMIL SECESSIONIST GUERRILLA ORGANIZATIONS 99 Pre-1983 Developments 99 Li b e r a t i o n Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) 101 Tamil Eelam L i b e r a t i o n Organization (TELO) 115 Peoples' L i b e r a t i o n of Tamil Eelam (PLOTE), Eelam Revolutionary Organization (EROS) and Eelam People's Revolutionary L i b e r a t i o n Front (EPRLF) 117 Post-1983 Developments 121 Tamil Eelam L i b e r a t i o n Organization (TELO) 122 Peoples' L i b e r a t i o n of Tamil Eelam (PLOTE), Eelam People's Revolutionary L i b e r a t i o n Front (EPRLF) and Eelam Revolutionary Organization (EROS) 128 Li b e r a t i o n Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) . . . . 134 Indo-Sri Lanka Peace Accord - July 1987 140 CHAPTER FOUR: ANALYZING TAMIL SECESSIONISM IN SRI LANKA: SOME TENTATIVE CONCLUSIONS 152 BIBLIOGRAPHY . 202 APPENDIX A: Table 1: University Admissions 1969/70, 1973 and 1974 . 209 Table 2: Advanced Level Marks Required f o r Each Ethnic Groups to Enter University 210 Table 3: Recruitment to the S r i Lankan Administrative Service . 211 - i i i -TABLE OF CONTENTS, cont'd. Page APPENDIX B: INDO-SRI LANKA AGREEMENT TO ESTABLISH PEACE AND NORMALCY IN SRI LANKA 212 ANNEXURE TO THE AGREEMENT 218 - i v -LIST OF FIGURES Page MAP 1: Sri Lanka 4 MAP 2: Sri Lanka — the districts and boundaries of the wet and dry zones 5 MAP 3: Sri Lanka — main Tamil areas 8 MAP 4: Tamil Eelam . 15 MAP 5: Jaffna Peninsula 103 MAP 6: Density of Population of Jaffna District by A.G.A.'s Division - 1981 103 MAP 7: Tamil Eelam as claimed by the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam 104 - v -ACKNOWLEDGEMENT I would l i k e to thank, Prof. John R. Wood f o r his guidance, encouragement, patience and c r i t i c i s m Profs. Diane Mouzy and Tis s a Fernando for t h e i r suggestions and comments The University of B r i t i s h Columbia for i t s f i n a n c i a l assistance Appa and Amma for t h e i r moral support and encouragement Puvana f o r her love, understanding and typing. - v i -1 CHAPTER ONE A THEORETICAL APPROACH TO A SECESSIONIST CONFLICT T h i s i s a p o l i t i c a l - d i p l o m a t i c accord between India and S r i Lanka i n v o l v i n g the f o r e i g n p o l i c y of S r i Lanka. Because powerful c o u n t r i e s have decided to do that we are unable to do anything. Many l i v e s have been s a c r i f i c e d . U n f o r t u n a t e l y we have been f o r c e d to come to t h i s [ s u r r e n d e r ] . 1 With these words, on August 5, 1987, V e l l u p i l l a i Prabakaran, the chairman and m i l i t a r y commander of the L i b e r a t i o n T i g e r s of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) c a l l e d o f f the f i f t e e n -year o l d s e c e s s i o n i s t g u e r r i l l a s t r u g g l e to e s t a b l i s h the separate Tamil s t a t e of Eelam. T h i s surrender brought about an abrupt ( a l b e i t temporary) end to a short but savage war which has a l t e r e d the b a s i c s o c i o - p o l i t i c a l f a b r i c of S r i Lankan s o c i e t y : the war has b r u t a l i z e d the p u b l i c and i n c r e a s i n g l y undermined democracy i n the country. The "end" of the Tamil s e c e s s i o n i s t war represented a rare v o l u n t a r y surrender by armed g u e r r i l l a s , a remarkable submission by the S r i Lankan government to e x t e r n a l pressure to accommodate v i t a l m i n o r i t y demands and an e x t r a o r d i n a r y p o l i t i c a l v i c t o r y f o r a r e g i o n a l power. Both the Pr e s i d e n t of S r i Lanka, J.R. Jayewardene, and Prabakaran grudgingly accepted the I n d i a n - i n s p i r e d peace t r e a t y . For g e o - p o l i t i c a l reasons, the Indian government imposed the J u l y peace t r e a t y which s a t i s f i e d n e i t h e r the S r i Lankan government ( F i n l a n d i z a t i o n of S r i Lanka) nor the 2 g u e r r i l l a s ( f a i l u r e of the s e c e s s i o n i s t war). 2 Indian m i l i t a r y prowess f o r c e d the S r i Lankan government to accommodate the Tamils' major demands 3 and a l s o compelled the s e c e s s i o n i s t g u e r r i l l a s to accept the u n i t a r y c h a r a c t e r of the S r i Lankan p o l i t y . • Today, s i x months a f t e r the Indian peace-keeping f o r c e moved i n t o S r i Lanka under the t r e a t y , the J u l y peace accord i s in complete shambles. Tamil g u e r r i l l a s repudiated the t r e a t y a f t e r two of t h e i r r e g i o n a l commanders committed s u i c i d e while in S r i Lankan army custody in October, 1987. 5 In r e t a l i a t i o n , the g u e r r i l l a s k i l l e d hundreds of S i n h a l e s e c i v i l i a n s in the e a s t . 6 The Indian peace-keeping f o r c e , which had played a p a s s i v e r o l e u n t i l the l a r g e - s c a l e c i v i l i a n k i l l i n g s , c h a l l e n g e d the LTTE on the J a f f n a p e n i n s u l a i n order to salvage the peace t r e a t y . India expected l i t t l e r e s i s t a n c e from the Tamil g u e r r i l l a s and hoped f o r a l i g h t n i n g m i l i t a r y v i c t o r y . But the b a t t l e f o r J a f f n a was b i t t e r and bloody, with high c i v i l i a n c a s u a l t i e s . 7 The Indian army, unaccustomed to urban g u e r r i l l a warfare, committed a t r o c i t i e s a g a i n s t the c i v i l i a n s . 8 Thus the Indian m i l i t a r y o f f e n s i v e has a l i e n a t e d the Tamil p o p u l a t i o n and has a l s o f a i l e d to destroy the LTTE as a g u e r r i l l a f o r c e . The g u e r r i l l a s s u c c e s s f u l l y s l i p p e d out of J a f f n a by mixing with the refugees f l e e i n g the war-torn town. 9 In t h i s way, the core of the LTTE l e a d e r s h i p s u r v i v e d the Indian a s s a u l t . Meanwhile the LTTE has promised to c a r r y out c l a s s i c a l h i t-and-run g u e r r i l l a warfare ag a i n s t the Indian army in the north and e a s t . 1 0 In the south, the government has been unable to c o n t a i n 3 the o c c a s i o n a l S i n h a l a anti-government v i o l e n c e against the p e r c e i v e d b e t r a y a l of Sinhala-Buddhist i n t e r e s t s . For i n s t a n c e , t h i r t y - e i g h t members of the U n i t e d N a t i o n a l Party have been k i l l e d ' s i n c e the accord was signed i n J u l y , 1987. 1 1 Furthermore, the f a i l u r e of the peace-keeping f o r c e s to p r o t e c t the S i n h a l e s e c i v i l i a n s i n the east has angered the S i n h a l e s e m a j o r i t y . There has been a growing demand to r e j e c t the accord and to expel the Indian troops from the i s l a n d . At t h i s time, I n d i a i s o p e r a t i n g i n an extremely unsympathetic environment, while being drawn i n c r e a s i n g l y i n t o the e x p l o s i v e i n t e r n a l a f f a i r s of S r i Lanka. Unless India can r e s t o r e order soon and b r i n g about a p o l i t i c a l settlement, S r i Lanka c o u l d w e l l turn out to be India's Vietnam. The continued v i o l e n c e , however, suggests that the s e c e s s i o n i s t war i s f a r from over. S r i Lanka: background to the e t h n i c c o n f l i c t S r i Lanka i s a small i s l a n d with an area of 25,232 square m i l e s s i t u a t e d at the southern t i p of India (see maps 1 and 2). Palk S t r a i t separates S r i Lanka from India by twenty-two miles at i t s narrowest p o i n t . Since the f i f t h century B.C., p e r i o d i c Indian m i g r a t i o n has formed the m a j o r i t y of the present day S r i Lankan p o p u l a t i o n . 1 2 The f i n a l phase of Indian m i g r a t i o n began around 1825, when the B r i t i s h brought indentured South Indian l a b o u r e r s to work on the p l a n t a t i o n s i n the c e n t r a l h i ghlands. Both the Tamils and the S i n h a l e s e came from the Indian sub-c o n t i n e n t . The a n c e s t r y of the m a j o r i t y of Moors can a l s o be t r a c e d back to South I n d i a . 1 3 Furthermore, India i s the b i r t h p l a c e of both major r e l i g i o n s of S r i Lanka, Buddhism and MAP 1 Kanhcunrura. S r i L a n k a St. Annas paha N j ^ u r t t . v a " V - A ^ V ^ . R j « m a j / / ' *u~an*v«U / ] 8 jdu( l Co torn bo* M o r a t u w v a : iMjdamp* < | m a . (UltWaniV A — l=*BtnTQX2\ Ca^ S— i N a k t u U C j ? o r t u v i < )P3fUnu K a u r j ^ a i n a ' 'Lterlt i * i % t s yiYalj K.nrToi- u rr«r S«oei himtunCflU ""otl Source: S. Ponnambalam, S r i Lanka: The National Question and.the Tamil L i b e r a t i o n Struggle, p. 268. MAP 2 Source: James Jupp, S r i Lanka - Third World Democracy. London: Frank Cass (1978), p. i v . 6 Hinduism. Therefore, h i s t o r i c a l e t h n o - c u l t u r a l - r e l i g i o u s developments on the i s l a n d were l a r g e l y determined by the p r o x i m i t y of I n d i a . S r i Lanka provides a c l a s s i c example of a m u l t i - e t h n i c , m u l t i - r e l i g i o u s s o c i e t y . According to the 1981 census, the S i n h a l e s e c o n s t i t u t e 74% of the t o t a l p o p u l a t i o n of 14.8 m i l l i o n with the Tamils at 18% and the Moors at 7%. The balance i s d i v i d e d among Burgers (0.3%), Malays (0.3%) and others ( 0 . 2 % ) . 1 4 The Sinhalese are the m a j o r i t y , with the Tamils forming the l a r g e s t m i n o r i t y group. Approximately 69% of the p o p u l a t i o n i s Buddhist, 15.5% i s Hindu, and C h r i s t i a n s and Muslims form 7.5% each. C l e a r l y , the S i n h a l a - B u d d h i s t s are the predominant group, but t h e i r predominance i s not extended evenly over the i s l a n d . The S i n h a l e s e are m i n o r i t i e s i n e i g h t of the twenty-four d i s t r i c t s ; seven of these d i s t r i c t s are i n the north and e a s t . 1 5 The Tamils enjoy an a b s o l u t e m a j o r i t y i n J a f f n a , Mannar, Vavunia, M u l l a i t i v u and B a t t i c a l o a and a small numerical advantage i n Trincomalee. The Moors predominate in the seventh d i s t r i c t , Amparai. The other (up-country) Tamil-dominated d i s t r i c t i s s i t u a t e d in the Sinhala-dominated c e n t r a l p r o v i n c e . The m a j o r i t y of S r i Lankan Tamils l i v e i n two r e g i o n s : the a r i d northern province ( J a f f n a , Vavunia, M u l l a i t i v u and Mannar) and the more f e r t i l e east coast of the i s l a n d (Trincomalee and B a t t i c a l o a ) . The Tamils c l a i m the northern and eastern p r o v i n c e s as t h e i r t r a d i t i o n a l homeland. The Tamils comprise 65% of the 2.1 m i l l i o n people i n the north and east together, with a near, predominance of 86% i n the n o r t h . 1 6 Hence the Tamils are the l a r g e s t m i n o r i t y with a 7 "hom e - t e r r i t o r y " i n S r i Lanka (see map 3). However, d e s p i t e t h e i r overwhelming m a j o r i t y on the i s l a n d , the Sin h a l e s e c o n s i d e r themselves a m i n o r i t y e t h n i c group i n the l a r g e r r e g i o n a l c o n t e x t . The S i n h a l e s e , l i v i n g i n the shadow of f i f t y m i l l i o n Indian Tamils i n Tamil Nadu (an Indian s t a t e , a mere twenty-two m i l e s from S r i Lanka), are a m a j o r i t y race with a m i n o r i t y complex. The c e n t u r i e s - o l d S i n h a l e s e f e a r of Tamil i n v a s i o n and expansion has c a r r i e d over i n t o modern S r i Lanka. A speech made by a S i n h a l e s e Member of Parliament (MP) i l l u s t r a t e s the Si n h a l e s e general f e e l i n g of i n s e c u r i t y v i s - a - v i s the Tamils: In t h i s country the problem of the Tamils i s not a m i n o r i t y problem. The Si n h a l e s e are the m i n o r i t y i n Dra v i d a s t a n . We are c a r r y i n g on a s t r u g g l e f o r our n a t i o n a l e x i s t e n c e a g a i n s t the Dravidastan m a j o r i t y . 1 7 T h i s S i n h a l a i n s e c u r i t y has been exacerbated by the emergence of the m i l i t a n t n a t i o n a l i s t Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam (DMK) as the r u l i n g party i n Tamil Nadu and the S r i Lankan Tamils' continued i d e n t i f i c a t i o n with the Tamils across the Palk S t r a i t . The f i r m b e l i e f of the Si n h a l e s e that S r i Lanka i s both Dhammadipa (land of the Buddha's dharma) and Sinhadipa (land of the S i n h a l e s e ) has shaped t h e i r p e r c e p t i o n of the Tamil m i n o r i t y . These r e i n f o r c i n g p e r c e p t i o n s developed i n t o a notion that S r i Lanka belonged to the S i n h a l e s e . Hence the Si n h a l e s e c o n s i d e r e d the Tamils and other m i n o r i t y e t h n i c groups to be non-indigenous i n t r u d e r s i n t o S r i L a n k a . 1 8 Furthermore, the Si n h a l e s e have f o s t e r e d the idea that they are r a c i a l l y s u p e r i o r Aryans (from north-west India) to d i f f e r e n t i a t e 9 themselves from the m i n o r i t y D r a v i d i a n Tamils. These r a c i a l d i f f e r e n c e s have been perpetuated by the myths surrounding the e a r l y h i s t o r y of the i s l a n d . As a r e s u l t of the importation and settlement of South Indian Tamils amidst the Kandyan Sin h a l e s e i n the up-country re g i o n s , B r i t i s h c o l o n i z a t i o n reawakened the dormant S i n h a l a -Buddhist i d e n t i t y . The d e c l i n i n g s t a t u s of Buddhism, together with an i n c r e a s i n g l y d i s p r o p o r t i o n a l number of non-Buddhists in the economic and p o l i t i c a l f i e l d s , provided the dynamics for the Buddhist resurgence. F a l l i n g back on the d i s t o r t e d p e r c e p t i o n of e t h n i c i d e n t i t i e s , the emerging Sinhala-Buddhist n a t i o n a l i s t s p e r c e i v e d a l l others as a l i e n s who threatened t h e i r language, r e l i g i o n and t h e i r way of l i f e . 1 9 Not s u r p r i s i n g l y , the n a t i o n a l i s t movement which emerged under B r i t i s h r u l e took a Sinhala-Buddhist i d e n t i t y . Hence, u n l i k e the s i t u a t i o n i n India where n a t i o n a l i s m bound most of the d i v e r s e e t h n i c groups a g a i n s t the B r i t i s h empire, n a t i o n a l i s m in S r i Lanka r e i n f o r c e d e t h n i c d i f f e r e n c e s . L a t e r , the absence of a common bond among the e t h n i c groups in S r i Lanka weakened i t s a b i l i t y to cope with e x p l o s i v e e t h n i c i s s u e s . The h i s t o r i c a l S i n h a l a p e r c e p t i o n of the m i n o r i t y Tamils s i g n i f i c a n t l y i n f l u e n c e d p o l i t i c a l and economic developments in post-independent S r i Lankan p o l i t y . At the time of independence, e f f e c t i v e p o l i t i c a l power was t r a n s f e r r e d to the S i n h a l a e l i t e s . However, the Tamils enjoyed economic and a d m i n i s t r a t i v e power d i s p r o p o r t i o n a t e to t h e i r number. The S i n h a l e s e , p a r t i c u l a r l y the vernacular-educated middle c l a s s , were determined to redress economic and a d m i n i s t r a t i v e 10 anomalies through t h e i r newly achieved p o l i t i c a l power. C o u n t e r - e l i t e s , i n t h e i r quest f o r power, became messiahs fo r the above c l a s s . E l i t e accommodation, which had been a major determinant of the success of the Westminster-style democracy, broke down under Sinhala-Buddhist p r e s s u r e . E t h n i c i d e n t i t y and t i e s became powerful t o o l s to win p o l i t i c a l power in t h i s m u l t i - e t h n i c s o c i e t y . The major S i n h a l a p a r t i e s were trapped in the e t h n i c m i r e . 2 0 S r i Lanka gained her independence on February 4, 1948. The c o n s e r v a t i v e United N a t i o n a l Party (UNP) dominated the f i r s t e i g h t years of the post-independence p e r i o d . During t h i s p e r i o d the main o p p o s i t i o n to the UNP came from the l e f t i s t s , T r o t s k y i t e s and Communists, who were too deeply s p l i t to c h a l l e n g e the r u l i n g p a r t y . In August, 1948, the main Tamil p a r t y , the Tamil Congress (TC), j o i n e d the UNP government, which followed a s e c u l a r p o l i c y with respect to the e t h n i c m i n o r i t i e s . 2 1 Despite an accommodative p o l i c y towards the Tamils pursued by the UNP l e d by D.S. Senanayaike, the f i r s t Prime M i n i s t e r of S r i Lanka, two major c o n t r o v e r s i e s developed in the T a m i l - S i n h a l a r e l a t i o n s h i p . F i r s t , the UNP government d i s e n f r a n c h i s e d the Tamil p l a n t a t i o n workers through the C i t i z e n s h i p Act of 1948, the Indian and P a k i s t a n Residents ( C i t i z e n s h i p ) Act of 1949, and the Parliamentary E l e c t i o n (Amendment) Act of 1949. 2 2 The government denied c i t i z e n s h i p and f r a n c h i s e r i g h t s to a tenth of the p o p u l a t i o n through these l e g i s l a t i v e enactments. The m i d d l e - c l a s s c o n s e r v a t i v e TC d i d not oppose these l e g i s l a t i o n s . But S.J.V. Chelvanayagam, a prominent lawyer, resigned from the TC to p r o t e s t i t s 11 i n d i f f e r e n c e to p l a n t a t i o n Tamils and formed the F e d e r a l Party (FP). Second, the UNP government i n i t i a t e d l a r g e - s c a l e S i n h a l a c o l o n i z a t i o n i n the s p a r s e l y populated eastern p r o v i n c e , which changed the demographic composition of the t r a d i t i o n a l Tamil homeland. 2 3 For in s t a n c e , the number of Sin h a l e s e i n B a t t i c a l o a and Trincomalee i n c r e a s e d s u b s t a n t i a l l y , from 31,174 and 15,296 r e s p e c t i v e l y i n 1953 to 94,150 and 55,308 i n 1971. 2 f l In other words, the S i n h a l a p o p u l a t i o n i n B a t t i c a l o a r e g i s t e r e d an inc r e a s e of 202% while the percentage of i n c r e a s e i n Trincomalee was 262%. The state-sponsored c o l o n i z a t i o n brought the Tamils and Sin h a l e s e i n t o g r e a t e r contact and subsequently c r e a t e d t e n s i o n s between these e t h n i c groups. In 1951, S.W.R.D. Bandaranaike, a se n i o r UNP member, r e a l i z i n g that he co u l d not secure the UNP l e a d e r s h i p , and sensing a f r u s t r a t i o n i n the pulse of the S i n h a l a r u r a l middle-c l a s s , l e f t the UNP to form the S r i Lanka Freedom Party (SLFP). The p o p u l i s t "middle of the road" SLFP was soon viewed as a moderate a l t e r n a t i v e to the UNP. John Kotelawala's ascendancy to the prime m i n i s t e r s h i p i n 1953 a c c e l e r a t e d the SLFP's b i d for power. Highly Westernized, Kotelawala was i n s e n s i t i v e to the needs of emerging Sinhala-Buddhist n a t i o n a l i s m . He promised to amend the c o n s t i t u t i o n to make both Tamil and S i n h a l a o f f i c i a l l a n g u a g e s . 2 5 Because o p p o s i t i o n i n the S i n h a l a south was tremendous, the SLFP dropped i t s own two-language p o l i c y and advocated S i n h a l a - o n l y to win e l e c t o r a l support i n the south. Bandaranaike promised to make Si n h a l a the o f f i c i a l language i n twenty-four hours of forming the government. The UNP a l s o adopted a S i n h a l a - o n l y p o l i c y to boost i t s d e c l i n i n g 1 2 e l e c t o r a l fortunes i n the south. But i n the process, the UNP l o s t i t s c r e d i b i l i t y among both the Tamils and Sinhalese v o t e r s . The r e s u l t was a c r u s h i n g defeat f o r the UNP i n 1956. 2 6 The 1956 e l e c t i o n was a t u r n i n g p o i n t i n post-independent S r i Lanka's p o l i t i c a l development. As promised, Bandaranaike passed the S i n h a l a - o n l y l e g i s l a t i o n d e s p i t e p r o t e s t s from the Tamil and Marxist p a r t i e s . The FP, f r e s h from i t s e l e c t o r a l success i n the north and east, r e s o r t e d to e x t r a - p a r l i a m e n t a r y methods to f o r c e Bandaranayaike to meet the b a s i c Tamil demands. 2 7 V i o l e n t S i n h a l a r e a c t i o n to the Tamil satyagraha (passive r e s i s t a n c e ) l e d to the f i r s t a n t i - T a m i l r i o t s i n the new settlements at Gal-Oya i n the e a s t e r n province i n 1957. 2 8 The Prime M i n i s t e r reached an agreement with the FP l e a d e r , Chelvanayagam, on l i n g u i s t i c safeguards, d e v o l u t i o n of power and c o l o n i z a t i o n i n 1957 (Bandaranaike-Chelvanayagam P a c t ) . 2 9 , But the strong o p p o s i t i o n from Buddhist monks and the UNP f o r c e d Bandaranaike to abrogate the pact i n A p r i l , 1958. 3 0 The FP was determined to c a r r y out an extended n o n - v i o l e n t s t r u g g l e a g a i n s t the government to e x t r a c t concessions from i t . The-S i n h a l e s e response to the Tamil r e s i s t a n c e i g n i t e d major a n t i -Tamil r i o t s i n May, 1958. 3 1 Bandaranaike was i n d e c i s i v e in h i s attempt to q u e l l the mob v i o l e n c e which, as a r e s u l t , e x t e n s i v e l y damaged the T a m i l - S i n h a l a r e l a t i o n s h i p . The government passed the Tamil Language ( s p e c i a l p r o v i s i o n ) Act in August 1958, but c o u l d not bridge the widening g u l f between the Tamils and S i n h a l e s e . 3 2 The post-1956 p e r i o d witnessed the i n t e n s i f i c a t i o n of e t h n i c h o s t i l i t i e s a cross the country. I r o n i c a l l y , Bandaranaike 13 was shot dead by a Buddhist monk i n September 1959. The UNP formed a m i n o r i t y government i n March 1960. The FP helped the SLFP to b r i n g down the government, when Dudley Senanayake, the leader of the UNP, refused to accept the major Tamil demands contained i n the Bandaranaike-Chelvanayagam Pact of 1957. The FP reached an understanding with the SLFP, now l e d by Sirimavo Bandaranaike, which would meet the Tamil demands on the b a s i s of the Bandaranaike-Chelvanayagam P a c t . 3 3 But Mrs. Bandaranaike formed a m a j o r i t y government i n J u l y 1960 and ignored the demands of the F P . 3 0 Moreover, her government implemented a r i g o r o u s S i n h a l a - o n l y p o l i c y . The f r u s t r a t e d FP once again r e s o r t e d to c i v i l d isobedience in the north and east i n 1961, and attempted to e s t a b l i s h a p a r a l l e l a d m i n i s t r a t i o n i n the Tamil a r e a s . 3 5 The government used i t s m i l i t a r y power to crush the n o n - v i o l e n t p r o t e s t and r e - a s s e r t e d i t s c o n t r o l over the t r a d i t i o n a l Tamil a r e a s . 3 6 The FP f a i l e d to s u s t a i n support f o r c i v i l d isobedience but continued to demand Tamil language r i g h t s and d e c e n t r a l i z a t i o n . The FP played a major r o l e i n the parliamentary defeat of the SLFP government i n December 1964. The UNP formed the government i n March 1965. The FP reached an agreement with Dudley Senanayake to implement the Tamil language and d i s t r i c t c o u n c i l c l a u s e s i n the Bandaranaike-Chelvanayagam Pact. The FP, TC and the main p l a n t a t i o n Tamil o r g a n i z a t i o n , the Ceylon Workers' Congress (CWC), extended t h e i r support f o r the government. The FP senator, M. Tiruchelvam, was appointed to the c a b i n e t . Through the passage of the Tamil R e g u l a t i o n Act i n January, 1966, the government passed the language p r o v i s i o n s i n the Bandaranaike-1 4 Chelvanayagam Pact. However, the SLFP and i t s M a r x i s t c o a l i t i o n p a r t n e r s s t r o n g l y opposed the b i l l as a b e t r a y a l of S i n h a l a i n t e r e s t s . 3 7 Mounting Sinhala-Buddhist pressure from both w i t h i n and without the government compelled Dudley Senanayake to withdraw the d i s t r i c t c o u n c i l b i l l i n 1968. S h o r t l y afterwards, the FP withdrew i t s support for the government. Economic woes and the SLFP's popular a n t i - T a m i l r h e t o r i c r e s u l t e d i n a h u m i l i a t i n g defeat f o r the UNP i n May 1970. The United Front (UF), a c o a l i t i o n comprising the SLFP, the Lanka Sama Samaja Party (LSSP) and the Communist Party (CP), obtained a t h r e e - f o u r t h s parliamentary m a j o r i t y . T h i s huge m a j o r i t y enabled the government to adopt pro-Sinhala-Buddhist p o l i c i e s , such as the Republican C o n s t i t u t i o n of 1972, the s t a n d a r d i z a t i o n of u n i v e r s i t y admission, and the d i s t r i b u t i o n of resources on an e t h n i c b a s i s . The government"also crushed any e x t r a - p a r l i a m e n t a r y r e s i s t a n c e to i t s a u t h o r i t y . A l i e n a t i o n among the Tamils was soon followed by a demand f o r s e c e s s i o n . The FP, TC and CWC formed the Tamil United L i b e r a t i o n Front (TULF) with an independent Tamil S t a t e , Eelam, as i t s o b j e c t i v e in May 1976 (see map 4). A c a l l f o r armed se c e s s i o n a l s o took root i n t h i s p e r i o d of e s c a l a t i n g m i l i t a n c y and f r u s t r a t i o n . The UNP under J.R. Jayewardene, which r e g i s t e r e d a l a n d s l i d e v i c t o r y i n J u l y , 1977, promised a f r e s h s t a r t in e t h n i c r e l a t i o n s . However, the UNP's e t h n i c p o l i c y was inadequate to meet the emerging s e c e s s i o n i s t c h a l l e n g e . Only four decades a f t e r independence, S r i Lanka faced d i s i n t e g r a t i o n . MAP 4 Source: S. Ponnambalam, S r i Lanka: The National Question  and the Tamil L i b e r a t i o n Struggle. London: Zed Books Ltd. (1983), p. i x . 16 Major Questions S e v e r a l major questions are r a i s e d by t h i s b r i e f summary of events: (a) What were the f a c t o r s that c r e a t e d and i n t e n s i f i e d the h o s t i l i t y between the Tamils and Sin h a l e s e ? (b) Why were the Si n h a l e s e u n w i l l i n g to accommodate the demands of the Tamil m i n o r i t y ? (c) What f a c t o r s drove the Tamils to develop g u e r r i l l a movements? (d) How d i d the S r i Lankan government react to the s e c e s s i o n i s t c h a l l e n g e ? How f a r d i d t h e i r s t r a t e g y f o r c o n t a i n i n g s e c e s s i o n succeed? T h e o r e t i c a l p e r s p e c t i v e on s e c e s s i o n i s t v i o l e n c e T h i s t h e s i s focuses on the phenomenon of armed s e c e s s i o n . Why does i t a r i s e and how does i t operate? A t h e o r e t i c a l framework aimed at e x p l a i n i n g armed se c e s s i o n may be d e r i v e d by posing the f o l l o w i n g q u e s t i o n s : (a) Why does a t e r r i t o r i a l l y - b a s e d a l i e n a t e d m i n o r i t y r e s o r t to v i o l e n c e ? (b) What f a c t o r s determine the outcome of s e c e s s i o n i s t , warfare? (c) What s t r a t e g i e s do s e c e s s i o n i s t g u e r r i l l a s adopt i n t h e i r s t r u g g l e against the c e n t r a l government? What i s armed secessionism? F i r s t , a d i s t i n c t i o n must be made between secessionism and separatism. This d i s t i n c t i o n i s necessary f o r two reasons: (1) The demands of a l i e n a t e d m i n o r i t i e s may take e i t h e r a 1 7 s e c e s s i o n i s t or a s e p a r a t i s t form. (2) The demands of such m i n o r i t i e s may v a c i l l a t e between secessionism and separatism over time i n response to the r e a c t i o n s of the c e n t r a l government. Hugh Seton-Watson d e f i n e s separatism as "... a p o l i t i c a l movement i n s p i r e d by an overpowering d e s i r e to remove the community f o r which i t claims to speak from s u b j e c t i o n t o, or a s s o c i a t i o n with, another community or communities." 3 8 In other words, separatism i s the formal withdrawal of s u b - u n i t ( s ) from a country to form an independent sovereign s t a t e . However, f o r Theodore P. Wright, separatism i s "the d e s i r e of some a r t i c u l a t e p o r t i o n of the p o p u l a t i o n ( u s u a l l y a province) of a sovereign s t a t e to loosen or break the p o l i t i c a l and l e g a l bonds which t i e the part to the whole." 3 9 A c c o r d i n g l y , separatism may imply e i t h e r autonomy w i t h i n an e x i s t i n g s t a t e or a complete withdrawal from i t . C l e a r l y , i t i s important to d i s t i n g u i s h between the c a l l f o r autonomy and the demand f o r t o t a l withdrawal, s i n c e the l a t t e r i s our focus of study. Peter Lyon makes t h i s d i s t i n c t i o n between separatism which i s a "movement seeking to r e s i s t f u r t h e r i n c o r p o r a t i o n , s u b o r d i n a t i o n w i t h i n the l a r g e r p o l i t i c a l a u t h o r i t y of which i t i s a l r e a d y a member," 4 0 and s e c e s s i o n which i s a "movement seeking to break away d e c i s i v e l y from the e x i s t i n g p r i n c i p a l p o l i t i c a l a u t h o r i t y . " 4 1 John R. Wood a l s o makes t h i s d i s t i n c t i o n between s e c e s s i o n and separatism. Separatism i n c l u d e s " a l l instances of p o l i t i c a l a l i e n a t i o n which f e a t u r e a d e s i r e f o r the r e d u c t i o n of c o n t r o l by a c e n t r a l a u t h o r i t y i n a s p e c i f i c a r e a . " 4 2 In contrast,' 1 8 secessionism r e f e r s to a "demand f o r formal withdrawal from a c e n t r a l p o l i t i c a l a u t h o r i t y by a member u n i t or u n i t s on the b a s i s of a c l a i m to independent sovereign s t a t u s . " " 3 Whereas separatism may produce demands f o r changes i n decision-making processes w i t h i n the e x i s t i n g p o l i t i c a l system, secessionism suggests a complete l o s s of confidence i n the system. For Morris-Jones, separatism "does not n e c e s s a r i l y e n t a i l a separate e x i s t e n c e ; rather- i t i s a p o l i t i c a l c l a i m f o r a d i s t i n c t i v e ( i n the sense [ o f ] separate) r e c o g n i t i o n i n some form or other by the s t a t e . " " " Thus, secessionism i s one p o s s i b l e m a n i f e s t a t i o n of separatism. While separatism i s a more general concept, secessionism i s more s p e c i f i c . In one of the few comprehensive attempts to e x p l a i n the dynamics of s e c e s s i o n , John R. Wood has provided a conceptual framework f o r se c e s s i o n which i n c l u d e s the f o l l o w i n g : (a) the p r e c o n d i t i o n s of se c e s s i o n -- the f a c t o r s which are necessary f o r the beginnings of s e c e s s i o n i s t a l i e n a t i o n ; (b) the growth and e f f e c t i v e n e s s of the s e c e s s i o n i s t movement; (c) the response of the c e n t r a l government -- p o l i c i e s of c o n s o c i a t i o n a l i s m and c o n t r o l to maintain the i n t e g r i t y of the s t a t e ; (d) the d i r e c t p r e c i p i t a n t s of s e c e s s i o n — the f a c t o r s c o n t r i b u t i n g to the "point of.no r e t u r n " ; ' (e) the r e s o l u t i o n of the s e c e s s i o n i s t c r i s i s by armed c o n f l i c t with refere n c e to both i n t e r n a l and e x t e r n a l f a c t o r s i n f l u e n c i n g outcomes." 5 Why does a c a l l f o r se c e s s i o n a r i s e i n a m u l t i - e t h n i c 19 s o c i e t y ? The p o l i c i e s and programmes of the c e n t r a l government become determining f a c t o r s which may convert a general a l i e n a t i o n among m i n o r i t y groups i n t o a s e c e s s i o n i s t a l i e n a t i o n . A c e n t r a l government may adopt accommodative or c o n t r o l measures i n i t s attempt to c o n t a i n e t h n i c a l i e n a t i o n and c o n f l i c t i n a "deeply d i v i d e d " s o c i e t y . The government's accommodative p o l i c i e s may i n c l u d e c o n s o c i a t i o n or f e d e r a l i s m or both. C o n s o c i a t i o n a l measures may ensure s t a b i l i t y i n e t h n i c a l l y segmented s o c i e t i e s as, f o r example, has occu r r e d i n the N e t h e r l a n d s . " 6 E r i c N o r d l i n g e r suggests s i x " c o n f l i c t -r e g u l a t i n g p r a c t i c e s . " " 7 They are s t a b l e c o a l i t i o n , the p r o p o r t i o n a l i t y p r i n c i p l e , d e p o l i t i c i z a t i o n , the mutual veto, compromises and conc e s s i o n s . According to N o r d l i n g e r , f o r s u c c e s s f u l r e g u l a t i o n of c o n f l i c t i n a d i v i d e d s o c i e t y , one or more of the above s i x c o n f l i c t - r e g u l a t i n g p r a c t i c e s must be adopted by the government. On occasions when formal reforms r e s u l t i n a backlash from the m a j o r i t y community, the p o l i t i c a l l e a d e r s h i p may adopt " n o n - c o n s t i t u t i o n a l c o n f l i c t management p o l i c i e s . " These measures, e i t h e r formal or i n f o r m a l , r e p l a c e the p r i n c i p l e of pure m a j o r i t a r i a n i s m i n an e t h n i c a l l y d i v i d e d s o c i e t y . In a d d i t i o n , f e d e r a l i s m , another major accommodative opt i o n a v a i l a b l e to the c e n t r a l government, i s an important c o n f l i c t r e g u l a t o r y measure when m i n o r i t y e t h n i c groups are l o c a l i z e d i n a "home t e r r i t o r y . " A, government may a l s o e x e r c i s e a l t e r n a t i v e options to accommodative measures i n i t s response to eth n i c c o n f l i c t i n order to maintain, p o l i t i c a l s t a b i l i t y . It can ignore the demands of the m i n o r i t y , grant concessions and l a t e r withdraw 20 them, o f f e r inadequate concessions or i t can impose c o n t r o l measures. The p o l i c y of c o n t r o l may i n c l u d e a mix of c o e r c i v e and non-coercive techniques such as m i l i t a r y r e p r e s s i o n and a s s i m i l a t i o n p o l i c i e s . Ian L u s t i c k d e f i n e s c o n t r o l as e f f e c t i v e group domination by the superordinate segments over the r i v a l group(s) or subordinate s e g m e n t ( s ) . a 8 In a c o n t r o l system, the super-ordinate group, (a) e x t r a c t s what i t needs and d e l i v e r s what i t sees f i t without n e g o t i a t i o n s and without regard f o r the i n t e r e s t of m i n o r i t i e s ; (b) c o n t r o l s the l e g a l and a d m i n i s t r a t i v e instruments of the s t a t e . The bureaucracy i s s t a f f e d by the dominant group which i n t e r p r e t s and implements acc o r d i n g to i t s group i n t e r e s t s ; (c) gains l e g i t i m a c y by e l a b o r a t i n g and a r t i c u l a t i n g a g r o u p - s p e c i f i c ideology ( h i s t o r y , myths, symbols, p o l i t i c a l c u l t u r e of the dominant group); (d) appears as the "puppeteer manipulating s t r i n g e d puppets" (no i l l u s i o n of b a l a n c e ) . " 9 However, L u s t i c k does not c o n s i d e r a mix of c o n t r o l and c o n s o c i a t i o n . M a l a y s i a , f o r example, has a roughly equal mix of c o n t r o l and c o n s o c i a t i o n a l i s m . For M i l t o n Esman, " i n s t i t u t i o n a l i z e d dominance" i s one of the four o p t i o n s to c o n t a i n e t h n i c c o n f l i c t . 5 0 Esman argues that a government committed to permanent dominance of one e t h n i c group w i l l adopt three methods of c o n f l i c t management: (1) P r o s c r i b e or c l o s e l y c o n t r o l the p o l i t i c a l e x pression of c o l l e c t i v e i n t e r e s t s among dominated groups, (2) p r o h i b i t entry by members of dominated groups i n t o the dominant community, and (3) provide monopoly or p r e f e r e n t i a l access f o r members of the dominant group to p o l i t i c a l p a r t i c i p a t i o n , advanced education, economic o p p o r t u n i t i e s , and symbols of s t a t u s as o f f i c i a l language, the f l a g , n a t i o n a l 21 heroes and h o l i d a y s , which r e i n f o r c e the p o l i t i c a l , economic and p s y c h i c c o n t r o l of the dominant g r o u p . 5 1 Esman f u r t h e r w r i t e s that i n s t i t u t i o n a l i z e d dominance as a c o n f l i c t management measure can be "extremely e f f e c t i v e and long l i v e d . " C o n t r o l t h e o r i s t s a s s e r t that accommodation p o l i c y c o u l d "aggravate rather than r e h a b i l i t a t e " the e t h n i c t e n s i o n s i n a m u l t i - e t h n i c s o c i e t y whereas a c o n t r o l system may be a p p r o p r i a t e to maintain e t h n i c s t a b i l i t y . The success of accommodative p o l i c y depends on the extent of m i n o r i t y a l i e n a t i o n and the a b i l i t y and w i l l i n g n e s s of the c e n t r a l a u t h o r i t y to implement the p o l i c y . Often, i f not always, the c e n t r a l government, due to e t h n i c p r e s s u r e , f a i l s to present a strong r e f o r m i s t package to the e t h n i c m i n o r i t y . For i n s t a n c e , the Pakistan government f a i l e d to broaden the base of p o l i t i c a l power to i n c l u d e Bengalis due to pressure from West-Pakistan e l i t e s during 1948-71. S i m i l a r l y , the c o n t r o l system can be c o u n t e r - p r o d u c t i v e s i n c e i t encourages v i o l e n c e and c l o s e s down avenues a v a i l a b l e to e t h n i c m i n o r i t i e s to redress t h e i r g r i e v a n c e s . Thus, the only a l t e r n a t i v e may be v i o l e n c e to break t h i s c o n t r o l system. When c o n s o c i a t i o n a l i s m or c o n t r o l or a combination of these p o l i c i e s f a i l , a demand fo r s e c e s s i o n may a r i s e . Secessionism may i n v o l v e both v i o l e n t and n o n - v i o l e n t measures. E t h n i c p a r t i e s tend to emerge i n m u l t i - e t h n i c s o c i e t i e s to p r o t e c t and promote a p a r t i c u l a r e t h n i c i n t e r e s t . In a context of pure m a j o r i t a r i a n i s m ( i n the absence of c o n f l i c t - r e g u l a t i n g measures) in which the e t h n i c m i n o r i t y i n v a r i a b l y l o s e s , e t h n i c p a r t i e s may become transformed i n t o s e c e s s i o n i s t p a r t i e s where the e t h n i c m i n o r i t y i s t e r r i t o r i a l l y 22 c o n c e n t r a t e d . Such p a r t i e s may be able to form a r e g i o n a l government i f t h e i r home t e r r i t o r y i s part of a f e d e r a t i o n . But i f t h e i r home t e r r i t o r y i s i n a u n i t a r y .state, as i n the S r i Lankan case, t h e i r only hope i s to become part of a r u l i n g c o a l i t i o n or to win s u f f i c i e n t seats to become a f a c t o r i n government decision-making. I f the m a j o r i t y community w i l l not allow them to do t h i s , the m i n o r i t y ' s f r u s t r a t i o n may b u i l d to the p o i n t of s e c e s s i o n i s t a l i e n a t i o n . S e c e s s i o n i s t p a r t i e s ' p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n e l e c t i o n s or i n the formation of a c o a l i t i o n government c o u l d have e i t h e r a p o s i t i v e or a negative impact on the s e c e s s i o n i s t commitment: (a) on the p o s i t i v e s i d e , the a b i l i t y to govern ( i n a f e d e r a l s t a t e ) or to represent the home t e r r i t o r y ( i n a c o a l i t i o n government) g i v e s them c r e d i b i l i t y as a "government i n w a i t i n g . " The party i s p e r c e i v e d as capable and t h i s demonstrated c a p a b i l i t y i n turn a t t r a c t s f u r t h e r p u b l i c support. T h e i r r e g u l a r p a r t i c i p a t i o n in e l e c t i o n s g i v e s them ' l e g i t i m a c y ' i n the eyes of both s e c e s s i o n i s t s and non-s e c e s s i o n i s t s ; (b) on the negative s i d e , the extended r u l e (or re p r e s e n t a t i o n ) of a s e c e s s i o n i s t p a r t y which does not achieve se c e s s i o n may breed d i s i l l u s i o n m e n t and d i s c o n t e n t among i t s s u p p o r t e r s . For ins t a n c e , the TULF's f a i l u r e to obta i n any major concessions from the government i n the post-1977 p e r i o d p a r t l y e x p l a i n s i t s d e c l i n e a f t e r 1983. The party may become subject to i n t e r n a l f i s s u r e s and f a c t i o n s which co u l d demoralize supporters and a l i e n a t e "waverers." F u r t h e r , the c e n t r a l government, through the use of patronage and by encouraging the growth of a n t i - s e c e s s i o n i s t p a r t i e s , may 23 undermine the popular support of the s e c e s s i o n i s t p a r t y . Secession i s r a r e l y p o s s i b l e through n o n - v i o l e n t means. The c e n t r a l a u t h o r i t y w i l l r e s i s t i t and a m i n o r i t y cannot hope to achieve i t s goals through e l e c t o r a l p o l i t i c s . Ruth McVey e x p l a i n s t h i s r e s i s t a n c e s u c c i n c t l y : "The n a t i o n - s t a t e c l i n g s above a l l to t e r r i t o r y ... f o r a l l i t s s t r e s s on the people as i t s b a s i s i t w i l l g ive up p o p u l a t i o n but not l a n d . " 5 2 S e c e s s i o n i s t tendencies are u s u a l l y manifested in p a r t i e s and movements. The s e c e s s i o n i s t p a r t y i s of t e n l e d i n i t i a l l y by moderate, c o n s e r v a t i v e and e s t a b l i s h e d e l i t e s o p e r a t i n g in a democratic framework. T h e i r demand f o r s e c e s s i o n often r e p r e s e n t s an attempt to wrest concessions from and reach compromises with the c e n t r a l government. But the government's a v e r s i o n to accommodating the moderates may prevent i t from adopting e f f e c t i v e p o l i t i c a l reforms. Thus the government's h a l f - h e a r t e d accommodative p o l i c i e s on one hand may undermine the moderate n o n - v i o l e n t segment of the p o p u l a t i o n while, on the other hand, enhancing the support-base of the v i o l e n t segments. In the case of S r i Lanka, the growth of the Tamil armed s e c e s s i o n i s t movements corresponded . with the d e c l i n i n g f o r t u n e s of the TULF. Before long, the moderate " s e c e s s i o n i s t s " become d i s c r e d i t e d and ext r e m i s t s o u t b i d the moderates f o r acceptance as the " l e g i t i m a t e " r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s of the eth n i c group. (A) The f a c t o r s c o n t r i b u t i n g to the f a i l u r e of the p o l i t i c a l  system to respond to m i n o r i t y demands Outbidding: Giovanni S a r t o r i i n h i s work on democratic 24 theory d e s c r i b e s outbidding as " u n f a i r " competition which, " i n the absence of e f f e c t i v e methods of c o n t r o l , " i s based on "what i s a p p e a l i n g even though i t i s not c r e d i b l e . " 5 3 I t i s a support-wooing s t r a t e g y r e s o r t e d to by ambitious p o l i t i c i a n s i n both m a j o r i t y and m i n o r i t y e t h n i c groups. A l v i n Rabushka and Kenneth Shepsle w r i t e that intense competition to a c q u i r e power and c o n t r o l produces e t h n i c p o l i t i c a l entrepreneurs who i n c r e a s i n g l y make use of e t h n i c symbols and i d e n t i t y . 5 4 These entrepreneurs, who are in the "business of winning e l e c t i o n s , " appeal to e t h n i c i n t e r e s t s because they pay high d i v i d e n d s at e l e c t i o n s . The p o l i t i c a l entrepreneurs i n t h e i r quest f o r power reduce a l l i s s u e s to e t h n i c terms. As a r e s u l t of growing e t h n i c s a l i e n c y , a m u l t i -e t h n i c c o a l i t i o n may f i n d i t s e l f under mounting pressure from c o u n t e r - p o l i t i c a l e l i t e s . By t a k i n g an extreme stand on e t h n i c i s s u e s , these p o l i t i c a l entrepreneurs o u t b i d t h e i r moderate c o u n t e r p a r t s . Of course, the e f f e c t i v e n e s s of these entrepreneurs i s s i g n i f i c a n t l y reduced i n the absence of f r u s t r a t i o n . However, once begun, the p o l i t i c s of o u t b i d d i n g tend to destroy p o l i t i c a l moderation. Extremism, a r i s i n g out of the p o l i t i c i z a t i o n of e t h n i c i t y , r e s u l t s i n the d i s m a n t l i n g of brokerage i n s t i t u t i o n s so that m u l t i - e t h n i c c o a l i t i o n s are i n c r e a s i n g l y d i f f i c u l t to form. F u r t h e r , e t h n i c a l l y - o r i e n t e d p a r t i e s emerge with a corresponding d e c l i n e of i n t e r p a r t y c o o p e r a t i o n , communication and e t h n i c i z a t i o n of p u b l i c goods. In a d d i t i o n , e l e c t o r a l manipulation and v i o l e n c e are used to c r e a t e and maintain e t h n i c advantage. In s h o r t , according to Rabushka and Shepsle, " i n f r e q u e n t e t h n i c c o o p e r a t i o n , 25 immoderate e t h n i c p o l i t i c s at the expense of m i n o r i t y groups at the c o n s t i t u t i o n a l as w e l l as the p o l i c y l e v e l and eventual r e p r e s s i o n of m i n o r i t y p o l i t i c a l a c t i v i t y " sum up the p o l i t i c s of e t h n i c p l u r a l i s m i n a would-be democratic p o l i t i c a l system. 5 5 R.S. Milne p o i n t s out that o u t b i d d i n g i s e s p e c i a l l y l i k e l y to occur when, (a) l i t t l e or no r e s t r i c t i o n i s placed on e l e c t o r a l c ompetition; (b) the two major e t h n i c groups are of almost equal s t r e n g t h so that e i t h e r one of them i s p e r c e i v e d as being capable of forming a government. 5 6 Outbidding can come e i t h e r from w i t h i n or without the e t h n i c group. The d i r e c t i o n of outbidding i s s i g n i f i c a n t i n determining i t s f i n a l impact. For M i l n e , the "appearance of o u t b i d d i n g from members of the dominant e t h n i c group on the government p a r t y ' s own e t h n i c f l a n k c o n s t i t u t e s a more deadly t h r e a t than o u t b i d d i n g from the other f l a n k . " 5 7 Thus, a government must respond to the demands of the dominant e t h n i c group f o r e l e c t o r a l support reasons. Conversely, appeasement of the m i n o r i t y becomes d i f f i c u l t f o r the same reason. Outbidding can produce i n t e r n a l d i v i s i o n s among e i t h e r the governing or o p p o s i t i o n p a r t i e s (or c o a l i t i o n of p a r t i e s ) , which may draw t h e i r support from v a r i o u s e t h n i c s e c t i o n s . In a d d i t i o n , i n t e r n a l f a c t i o n a l i s m can change the c h a r a c t e r of the m u l t i - e t h n i c p a r t i e s . However, the government may be able to i n f l u e n c e the o u t b i d d i n g process by awarding concessions to moderate f a c t i o n s , thus enhancing t h e i r c r e d i b i l i t y . Robert Melson and Howard Wolpe argue that where p o l i t i c a l e l i t e s r e l y on t h e i r e t h n i c group f o r e l e c t o r a l s u r v i v a l , the 26 p o l i t i c a l process i s l i k e l y to become "communalized." The i n c r e a s i n g p a r t i c i p a t i o n of n o n - e l i t e s i n the p o l i t i c a l process encourages the e l i t e s to make appeals on the b a s i s of e t h n i c i t y and a l s o to present themselves as communal r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s . Melson and Wolpe note that the "democratic regimes which encourage mass p a r t i c i p a t i o n and c o m p e t i t i v e p o l i t i c a l p a r t i e s appear to be e s p e c i a l l y subject to the communalization of p o l i t i c a l c o m p e t i t i o n . " 5 8 In other words, outbidding i s a r e a l p o s s i b i l i t y i n such "democratic" regimes. Democracy f u n c t i o n s w e l l when winners and l o s e r s a l t e r n a t e i n power and the same groups do not always remain on the winning s i d e . But, under u n r e s t r i c t e d m a j o r i t a r i a n democracy, e t h n i c m i n o r i t i e s , who o f t e n vote as a block, may c o n t i n u a l l y l o s e . In such a s i t u a t i o n where winners always win and l o s e r s always l o s e because of e t h n i c c o n f i g u r a t i o n s , and where compromises and concessions are defeated by the pressures of o u t b i d d i n g , m a j o r i t a r i a n democracy i s i n a p p r o p r i a t e . In such systems, which operate b e n e f i c i a l l y f o r the m a j o r i t y , the b a s i c demands of the m i n o r i t y are e a s i l y ignored. In a d d i t i o n , the i n c r e a s e d s a l i e n c e of e t h n i c i t y i n such a s o c i e t y makes reasonable concessions and compromises d i f f i c u l t to achieve as w e l l as to implement. The m i n o r i t y e t h n i c groups become p o l i t i c a l l y i r r e l e v a n t f o r the c e n t r a l decision-making a u t h o r i t y . F u r t h e r , the p o l i t i c s of o u tbidding p r a c t i s e d by the p o l i t i c a l entrepreneurs leave l i t t l e room f o r p o l i t i c a l manoeuvering by the moderates. The a l i e n a t e d e t h n i c m i n o r i t y o f t e n adopts e x t r a - p a r l i a m e n t a r y s t r a t e g i e s which may take e i t h e r v i o l e n t or n o n - v i o l e n t forms. 27 However, m i n o r i t i e s who are " v i c t i m s of democracy" do not always attempt to destroy i t . They may stay away from p o l i t i c s (e.g. P a r s i s i n I n d i a ) ; leave the country (e.g. Burgers in S r i Lanka); d i v e r t t h e i r f r u s t r a t i o n i n t o economic or c u l t u r a l a c t i v i t i e s (e.g. Jews in Europe or Chinese i n Southeast Asia) or work with the m a j o r i t y (e.g. Muslims i n S r i Lanka). Why do some m i n o r i t i e s turn to v i o l e n c e ? I t w i l l be argued here that when a t e r r i t o r i a l l y - b a s e d m i n o r i t y possesses resources, g e o g r a p h i c a l advantage and a w i l l to f i g h t in the context of a h i g h l y s t r a i n e d r e l a t i o n s h i p with the c e n t r a l government, d i s c o n t e n t w i l l be t r a n s l a t e d i n t o v i o l e n c e . V i o l e n c e may take e i t h e r a n a t i o n a l i s t i c ( e t h n i c ) or a r e v o l u t i o n a r y ( c l a s s ) form. The success of i s o l a t e d i n c i d e n t s of v i o l e n c e a g a i n s t the c e n t r a l government induces more v i o l e n c e by the m i n o r i t i e s . The government w i l l react v i o l e n t l y to any " i l l e g a l " c h a l l e n g e to i t s a u t h o r i t y , and these provoked "excesses" of the government w i l l enhance the support base of the r e b e l s . One or more g u e r r i l l a movements with g r a d u a l l y developing sympathy from the people emerge i n the minority-dominated areas. Armed secessionism has been d e f i n e d as: ... a process whereby an e t h n i c group, or a c o a l i t i o n of e t h n i c groups, seeks to secede or gain autonomy from the c o n t r o l , de f a c t o and de j u r e , of a given s t a t e , through an organized and p u r p o s e f u l use of f o r c e , alone or i n combination with other means. Such use of f o r c e c o n s t i t u t e s a c t s of r e v o l u t i o n a r y v i o l e n c e i n that i t expresses a r e j e c t i o n of the p r e v a i l i n g p o l i t i c a l and s o c i a l system and a determination to b r i n g about " p r o g r e s s i v e " changes by overthrowing t h i s s y s t e m . 5 9 From the above d e f i n i t i o n , one may observe that armed se c e s s i o n does not always i n v o l v e an e x c l u s i v e use of f o r c e . I t a l s o i n c l u d e s n o n - m i l i t a r y means, i . e . p o l i t i c a l d e v i c e s . 28 Furthermore, armed s e c e s s i o n i s t s not only r e j e c t the e x i s t i n g p o l i t i c a l system, but a l s o the s o c i a l system in order to widen the support base for s e c e s s i o n i s t v i o l e n c e . 6 0 I n e v i t a b l y , n a t i o n a l i s m i s o f t e n c l o t h e d i n r a d i c a l s o c i a l programmes. (B) The success or f a i l u r e of s e c e s s i o n i s t g u e r r i l l a warfare:  f a c t o r s that i n f l u e n c e the outcome of a s e c e s s i o n i s t war Bard E. O ' N e i l l suggests s i x c a t e g o r i e s of insurgent movements, among which the s e c e s s i o n i s t insurgency i s o n e . 6 1 S e c e s s i o n i s t insurgent movements, a c c o r d i n g to O ' N e i l l , " r e j e c t the e x i s t i n g p o l i t i c a l community of which they are f o r m a l l y a p a r t ; they seek to withdraw from i t and c o n s t i t u t e a new autonomous p o l i t i c a l community." 6 2 He o u t l i n e s s i x c r u c i a l v a r i a b l e s which determine the outcome of the i n s u r r e c t i o n : popular support, o r g a n i z a t i o n , cohesion, e x t e r n a l support, the environment, and the e f f e c t i v e n e s s of the government. 6 3 (a) Popular Support: Mao Tse-Tung w r i t e s , "the r i c h e s t source of power to wage war l i e s i n the masses of the people." Popular support i s important for the success of g u e r r i l l a warfare and may take e i t h e r an a c t i v e or a p a s s i v e form. Sympathizers c o n s t i t u t e the p a s s i v e support. Such p a s s i v e support (or fear) reduces the b e t r a y a l rate which, i n t u r n , prevents the government from g a i n i n g v i t a l i nformation about the g u e r r i l l a s and hinders i t s a b i l i t y to c o n t a i n the g u e r r i l l a movements. The a c t i v e supporters supply the g u e r r i l l a s with food, s h e l t e r , i n t e l l i g e n c e information and h i d i n g p l a c e s from the army and 29 p o l i c e . These i n d i v i d u a l s take r i s k s and face government r e p r i s a l s . To win popular support, the g u e r r i l l a movements adopt one or more of the f o l l o w i n g measures: (a) c h a r i s m a t i c a t t r a c t i o n ; (b) e s o t e r i c appeal; (c) e x o t e r i c appeal; (d) t e r r o r i s m ; (e) provocation of government c o u n t e r - t e r r o r i s m ; ( f ) demonstration of potency. Whereas the c h a r i s m a t i c appeal of the l e a d e r s (e.g. Mao Tse-Tung) can a t t r a c t u n s o p h i s t i c a t e d f o l l o w e r s to the movement, e s o t e r i c appeals are mainly d i r e c t e d at the i n t e l l i g e n t s i a w i t h i n an i d e o l o g i c a l framework which has a "powerful i n t e l l e c t u a l a t t r a c t i o n . " For i n s t a n c e , the Marxist theory of underdeveopment of t e n provides a c o n v i n c i n g e x p l a n a t i o n f o r the socio-economic backwardness of T h i r d World c o u n t r i e s and j u s t i f i e s the need to r e p l a c e the e x i s t i n g ( c a p i t a l i s t ) socio-economic i n f r a s t r u c t u r e . E x o t e r i c appeals are aimed both at the i n t e l l i g e n t s i a and the masses. These appeals are o r i e n t e d towards s p e c i f i c i s s u e s , such as unemployment or land reform i n order to m o b i l i z e support. When the above-stated appeals f a i l to win l a r g e - s c a l e popular support, the g u e r r i l l a s r e s o r t to t e r r o r i s m to d i s p l a y t h e i r c a p a b i l i t y to immobilize the government. In the short run, t e r r o r i s t s t r a t e g y c o u l d be s u c c e s s f u l ; however, in the long run, l a r g e random k i l l i n g c o u l d a l i e n a t e the p u b l i c from the g u e r r i l l a s . Hence t e r r o r i s m can be c o u n t e r - p r o d u c t i v e . A more s u c c e s s f u l s t r a t e g y f o r winning popular support may be to provoke the government through g u e r r i l l a a t t a c k s to react i n d i s c r i m i n a t e l y a g a i n s t an e n t i r e e t h n i c group. Such a government r e a c t i o n would r e s u l t i n that group t u r n i n g towards 30 the g u e r r i l l a s f o r p r o t e c t i o n . F i n a l l y , the g u e r r i l l a s ' s t r a t e g y of demonstrating t h e i r c a p a b i l i t y by both s c o r i n g m i l i t a r y v i c t o r i e s and p r o v i d i n g a d m i n i s t r a t i v e and s o c i a l s e r v i c e s may enable the g u e r r i l l a movement to e s t a b l i s h i t s e l f as a potent f o r c e i n the minority-dominated areas. C r e d i b i l i t y earned i n t h i s way i n turn i n c r e a s e s the support base of the g u e r r i l l a s . (b) O r g a n i z a t i o n : O r g a n i z a t i o n a l a b i l i t y , which i s i n d i s p e n s a b l e f o r the g u e r r i l l a s , o f f s e t s the " m a t e r i a l s u p e r i o r i t y " of the e s t a b l i s h e d m i l i t a r y f o r c e s . The g u e r r i l l a s may a l s o c r e a t e a " p a r a l l e l h i e r a r c h y " i n areas c o n t r o l l e d by them. The c r e a t i o n of c e l l s i n government-controlled areas i s necessary to inc r e a s e the number of a c t i v e members. The g u e r r i l l a movements may a l s o e s t a b l i s h v a r i o u s f u n c t i o n a l o r g a n i z a t i o n s to widen t h e i r support, such as youth groups and women's o r g a n i z a t i o n s . The s u c c e s s f u l establishment of ' p a r a l l e l h i e r a r c h y * , together with m i l i t a r y o r g a n i z a t i o n , demonstrates the competence of the insurgents to run both a d m i n i s t r a t i v e and m i l i t a r y s e r v i c e s . (c) Cohesion: L o c a l l e a d e r s may conduct l o c a l o p e r a t i o n s , but a c e n t r a l command i s necessary to provide a general focus and s t r a t e g y . Mao Tse-Tung notes that "without c e n t r a l i z e d s t r a t e g i c command the p a r t i s a n s can i n f l i c t l i t t l e damage on t h e i r a d v e r s a r i e s . " 6 " They can break down i n t o roaming armed bands, and then f i n d no more support from the p o p u l a t i o n . If there 31 e x i s t f a c t o r s o f f s e t t i n g d i s u n i t y among the r e b e l s , l a c k of u n i t y f o r i d e o l o g i c a l or personal reasons may not always r e s u l t in d e f e a t . For example, the u n w i l l i n g n e s s or i n d e c i s i v e n e s s of the French government to f i g h t a c o l o n i a l war compensated f o r the lack of cohesion among A l g e r i a n r e b e l s . As a r e s u l t , the A l g e r i a n r e v o l u t i o n succeeded. But, i n the absence of such compensating developments or f a c t o r s , d i v i s i o n among g u e r r i l l a s may make them an easy t a r g e t f o r a strong government, (d)  E x t e r n a l Support: Four types of e x t e r n a l support e x i s t : moral, p o l i t i c a l , m a t e r i a l and sanctuary. Moral support i s f o s t e r e d by f o r e i g n acknowledgement that the i n s u r r e c t i o n i s warranted and i n v o l v e s l i t t l e c o st and r i s k to the e x t e r n a l supporter. P o l i t i c a l support a c t i v e l y i n t e r n a t i o n a l i z e s the insurgency movement. The f i r s t two types of support can be very u s e f u l in e x e r t i n g pressure on a weak home government. The l a s t two types of e x t e r n a l support are most c r u c i a l f o r the i n s u r g e n t s . M a t e r i a l support can i n c l u d e weapons, ammunition, medicine, food and m i l i t a r y t r a i n i n g . S a n c t u a r i e s provide safe havens f o r m i l i t a r y t r a i n i n g and l e a d e r s h i p . The g u e r r i l l a s can operate from these s a n c t u a r i e s u n t i l they e s t a b l i s h a safe base i n the home country and m o b i l i z e popular support. Moreover the g u e r r i l l a s must a t t r a c t s i g n i f i c a n t e x t e r n a l a t t e n t i o n v i a t e r r o r i s t a c t i v i t i e s to win support i n the i n t e r n a t i o n a l forum. P u b l i c support, good o r g a n i z a t i o n and m i l i t a r y successes are important to s u s t a i n e x t e r n a l support and r e s p e c t a b i l i t y a f t e r the i n i t i a l i n t e r n a t i o n a l p u b l i c i t y gained through t e r r o r i s m . In the absence, the chances of o b t a i n i n g e x t e r n a l support are 32 s i g n i f i c a n t l y reduced. E x t e r n a l support to ins u r g e n t s may to some extent n e u t r a l i z e the advantages enjoyed by a c e n t r a l government i n i t s war with i n s u r g e n t s . (e) Environment: Environment i n c l u d e s t e r r a i n , c l i m a t e , the road and communication network, e t h n i c i t y , r e l i g i o n and c u l t u r e . Favourable g e o g r a p h i c a l f a c t o r s — mountains and jun g l e s — are c r u c i a l f o r the establishment of g u e r r i l l a bases i n a p r o t r a c t e d war. But a well-developed communication and t r a n s p o r t a t i o n system are u s u a l l y advantageous to the government to t r a n s p o r t i t s troops q u i c k l y and a l s o to e x p l o i t i t s t e c h n o l o g i c a l s u p e r i o r i t y to i t s advantage. However, unpaved roads and a weak communication network can be b e n e f i c i a l to the i n s u r g e n t s . F i n a l l y , i f the g u e r r i l l a s and p u b l i c speak the same language and p r a c t i s e the same r e l i g i o n when the m i l i t a r y belongs to a d i f f e r e n t e t h n i c stock, e t h n i c and r e l i g i o u s cleavages tend to favour the g u e r r i l l a s . ( f ) The r o l e of the government: The government's response i s c r u c i a l i n determining the outcome of g u e r r i l l a warfare. But a government must react d i f f e r e n t l y to the d i v e r s e c h a l l e n g e s . As Walter Sonderland suggests, "to face an o r g a n i z a t i o n a l c h a l l e n g e , the government w i l l have to s t r e s s c i v i c a c t i o n , a d m i n i s t r a t i o n and l o w - l e v e l p o l i c e a c t i v i t y , whereas a t e r r o r i s t t h r e a t w i l l n e c e s s i t a t e i n t e n s i f i e d p o l i c e work. G u e r r i l l a warfare c a l l s f o r a low-l e v e l m i l i t a r y response while m o b i l i t y - c o n v e n t i o n a l warfare 33 w i l l r e q u i r e c o n v e n t i o n a l o p e r a t i o n by the m i l i t a r y . " 6 5 The government must implement counter-insurgency programmes c a r e f u l l y and t a c t f u l l y . For i n s t a n c e , to undertake a search and destroy o p e r a t i o n i n a p a r t i c u l a r g u e r r i l l a area may be c o u n t e r - p r o d u c t i v e . The government may b e t t e r undermine the g u e r r i l l a movement by meeting the socio-economic demands of the people or by e x p l o i t i n g s o c i e t a l cleavages among the v a r i o u s g r o u p s . 6 6 I t must improve i t s a d m i n i s t r a t i v e f a c i l i t i e s i n the "insurgent areas" and deny the insurgents the a b i l i t y to run t h e i r own a d m i n i s t r a t i v e apparatus. The m i l i t a r y , meanwhile, must e s t a b l i s h c o n t a c t with the p u b l i c to undermine popular support f o r the i n s u r g e n t s . Where p o s s i b l e , i t must encourage the g u e r r i l l a s to p a r t i c i p a t e i n d i r e c t c o n f r o n t a t i o n so that the m i l i t a r y through i t s s u p e r i o r f o r c e s and fire-power can defeat them. A c o n v i n c i n g government m i l i t a r y v i c t o r y may t a r n i s h the i n v i n c i b i l i t y image of the g u e r r i l l a s among the people. But i f m i l i t a r y v i c t o r i e s are p o s s i b l e only a f t e r i n f l i c t i n g heavy c a s u a l t i e s among the l o c a l p o p u l a t i o n , " v i c t o r y " may be c o u n t e r - p r o d u c t i v e . In the short run, a government may be able m i l i t a r i l y to crush the s e c e s s i o n i s t movement (e.g. the Basques under General Franco, the L a t v i a n s i n the USSR). However, without p o l i t i c a l accommodation, m i l i t a r y v i c t o r y i s i n the long run u s u a l l y i n s u f f i c i e n t to suppress s e c e s s i o n i s t movements. To sum up, o r g a n i z a t i o n , u n i t y , e x t e r n a l support, a favourable environment and popular support become more c r u c i a l f o r the g u e r r i l l a s to succeed when the government i s capable of c a r r y i n g out a long and exhaustive counter-insurgency 34 programme. On the other hand, the government must respond d i f f e r e n t l y to the v a r i o u s types of i n s u r r e c t i o n s and attempt to win back popular support through p o l i t i c a l and a d m i n i s t r a t i v e a c t i o n s i n the g u e r r i l l a - d o m i n a t e d areas. Without t h i s support, the government's use of f o r c e may turn out to. be c o u n t e r - p r o d u c t i v e . Although O ' N e i l l provides an extensive a n a l y t i c a l framework for insurgency, one must add to i t the importance of l e a d e r s h i p . The masses do not spontaneously " r i s e up" i n the cause of r e v o l u t i o n , insurgency or s e c e s s i o n . As the M a r x i s t s have acknowledged, the masses need o u t s i d e l e a d e r s h i p . However, le a d e r s do not by themselves " c r e a t e " a r e v o l u t i o n , and they cannot " c r e a t e " s e c e s s i o n . 6 7 N e v e r t h e l e s s , by adopting a p p r o p r i a t e s t r a t e g i e s and t a c t i c s , they can i n f l u e n c e the growth of a s e c e s s i o n i s t movement. They must possess the a b i l i t y to m o b i l i z e popular support among v a r i o u s segments of the p o p u l a t i o n . Furthermore, c h a r i s m a t i c appeals may help bind the d i v e r s e groups. The l e a d e r s h i p should not r e l y e x c l u s i v e l y on charisma but b u i l d g r a s s - r o o t o r g a n i z a t i o n s f o r long-term s u r v i v a l . U n l i k e an e s t a b l i s h e d p o l i t i c i a n , a g u e r r i l l a should i n t e r p r e t events c l e a r l y , form s t r a t e g i e s and respond q u i c k l y s i n c e timing i s a l l important. For Thomas Green, a s u c c e s s f u l r e v o l u t i o n a r y leader i s one who i s "more durable than b r i l l i a n t , moving towards the r e v o l u t i o n a r y o b j e c t i v e more by sh o r t steps than by g i a n t s t r i d e s . " 6 8 (C) S t r a t e g y and t a c t i c s of g u e r r i l l a warfare Mao Tse-Tung i d e n t i f i e s three phases i n a p r o t r a c t e d 35 g u e r r i l l a war and argues that g u e r r i l l a s t r a t e g i e s should vary from phase to p h a s e . 6 9 We should note that s e c e s s i o n i s t g u e r r i l l a s have advantages over communist r e v o l u t i o n a r i e s . F i r s t , s e c e s s i o n i s t s are not t r y i n g to take over the whole system but only a part of i t . Second, they are o p e r a t i n g i n t h e i r own t e r r i t o r y . Communist g u e r r i l l a s t r a t e g i e s must be m o d i f i e d to s u i t the s e c e s s i o n i s t c o n f l i c t . For i n s t a n c e , i n a s e c e s s i o n i s t s t r u g g l e the c l a s s f a c t o r i s o f t e n absent. Rather, the m a j o r i t y i s p i t t e d a g a i n s t the m i n o r i t y with b a t t l e l i n e s drawn mainly on an e t h n i c b a s i s . These s t r a t e g i e s can be m o d i f i e d to be e f f e c t i v e l y a p p l i c a b l e to the s e c e s s i o n i s t environment of the g u e r r i l l a war. The establishment of base areas i n the f i r s t phase i s necessary because the g u e r r i l l a war i s o f t e n p r o t r a c t e d and r u t h l e s s (e.g. the Vietnam War). C o n t r o l of these areas i s c r u c i a l , p a r t i c u l a r l y when f i g h t i n g a long war, f o r the g u e r r i l l a s to provide p o l i t i c a l and m i l i t a r y t r a i n i n g to cadres in safe and secluded areas. Since mass support i s e s s e n t i a l f o r the s u r v i v a l of a g u e r r i l l a group, i t i s v i t a l i n t h i s p e r i o d to convince the people i n the c e n t r a l and surrounding areas to support the g u e r r i l l a s ; mass support i s e s s e n t i a l for the s u r v i v a l of a g u e r r i l l a group. N e u t r a l i t y i s not permitted i n g u e r r i l l a warfare; the uncommitted must be e i t h e r "with us or a g a i n s t us." The g u e r r i l l a s must l i v e among the people as f i s h l i v e i n w a t e r 7 0 i f they wish to succeed a g a i n s t the s u p e r i o r m i l i t a r y power of the c e n t r a l government. During t h i s phase, the g u e r r i l l a s c r e a t e l o c a l m i l i t i a whose f u n c t i o n i s to supply i n t e l l i g e n c e i n f o r m a t i o n , c o l l e c t money from the r i c h and 36 e l i m i n a t e informers and c o l l a b o r a t o r s . The g u e r r i l l a s conduct only i n f r e q u e n t g u e r r i l l a o p e r a t i o n s to maintain an image of i n v i n c i b i l i t y . Mao s t r e s s e s the importance of i n t e l l i g e n c e to g u e r r i l l a o p e r a t i o n s in a l l three phases. The establishment of an i n t e l l i g e n c e network enables the g u e r r i l l a to obt a i n v i t a l i n f ormation about the enemy, e s p e c i a l l y regarding h i s strengths and weaknesses. Conversely, popular support f o r the g u e r r i l l a s , both a c t i v e and p a s s i v e , hampers the government's a b i l i t y to c o l l e c t i n f o r m a t i o n about the r e b e l s . During the second phase, the g u e r r i l l a s conduct extended m i l i t a r y and t e r r o r i s t o p e r a t i o n s . Small p o l i c e s t a t i o n s and m i l i t a r y posts are attacked and, wherever p o s s i b l e , weak m i l i t a r y d i v i s i o n s are ambushed. The o b j e c t i v e behind the e s c a l a t e d m i l i t a r y o p e r a t i o n i s to o b t a i n arms, ammunition and other m i l i t a r y s u p p l i e s s i n c e the enemy i s the main source of these s u p p l i e s . The g u e r r i l l a s ' aim to destroy the communication i n f r a s t r u c t u r e in the country. In Mao's words, "the enemy i s put under r e l e n t l e s s and c o n t i n u a l l y mounting p r e s s u r e . " 7 1 Mao d i s c u s s e s why and how g u e r r i l l a m i l i t a r y o p e r a t i o n s are adopted and succeed i n the war against the e s t a b l i s h e d government. Despite t h e i r i n f e r i o r m i l i t a r y p o s i t i o n , the g u e r r i l l a s i n f l i c t c a s u a l t i e s on the enemy by choosing the pl a c e and time of a t t a c k . T h i s element of s u r p r i s e , together with the f a m i l i a r i t y of t e r r a i n , helps the g u e r r i l l a s to score d e c i s i v e m i l i t a r y v i c t o r i e s . S u r p r i s e a t t a c k s c a l l f o r high m o b i l i t y i n g u e r r i l l a o p e r a t i o n s against the enemy. In 37 g u e r r i l l a warfare, the "enemy's rear i s the g u e r r i l l a ' s f r o n t , and the g u e r r i l l a s themselves have no r e a r . " 7 2 The g u e r r i l l a s confuse, attack and demoralize the enemy through simultaneous " d i s t r a c t i o n and c o n c e n t r a t i o n " t a c t i c s . Mao c a l l s i t "sheny tung c h i h s i " - "uproar i n the e a s t , s t r i k e i n the w e s t . " 7 3 If the g u e r r i l l a o p e r a t i o n i s spread over a l a r g e area, d e c e n t r a l i z a t i o n of command i s e s s e n t i a l f o r s u c c e s s f u l warfare. Regional commanders must be aware of l o c a l c o n d i t i o n s and be ready to take advantage of o p p o r t u n i t i e s f o r a t t a c k . The development of the g u e r r i l l a f o r c e i n t o a r e g u l a r army takes plac e in the t h i r d phase. T h i s g u e r r i l l a army i s capable of openly c o n f r o n t i n g the e s t a b l i s h e d army of the enemy. The g u e r r i l l a s a l s o engage in n e g o t i a t i o n s to buy time to strengthen t h e i r m i l i t a r y p o s i t i o n and a l s o c r e a t e b a t t l e weariness and f r u s t r a t i o n i n the enemy. In t h i s way, they achieve a favourable environment f o r the f i n a l v i c t o r y . Che Guevara's a s s e r t a t i o n that g u e r r i l l a s can c r e a t e a r e v o l u t i o n a r y s i t u a t i o n i s a s i g n i f i c a n t v a r i a t i o n on t r a d i t i o n a l t h e o r i e s of r e v o l u t i o n . 7 " However, Guevara admits that three minimum p r e c o n d i t i o n s must e x i s t before g u e r r i l l a s can c r e a t e the c o n d i t i o n s conducive to r e v o l u t i o n : (1) the incumbent e l i t e ' s l a c k i n g l e g i t i m a c y to govern the country (2) e x i s t e n c e of t e n s i o n s that cannot be redressed through r e g u l a r channels (3) a l l l e g a l avenues to change the s i t u a t i o n are p e r c e i v e d as c l o s e d 7 5 The s e c e s s i o n i s t g u e r r i l l a s can c r e a t e a s e c e s s i o n i s t 38 environment i n t h e i r home t e r r i t o r y through g u e r r i l l a o p e r a t i o n s . According to Guevara, g u e r r i l l a s are organized i n t o a foco which i s a w e l l - t r a i n e d and cohesive group. The foco — t y p i c a l l y c o n s i s t i n g of 25-35 men, mostly peasants, and which i s l e d by i n t e l l e c t u a l s or students — c r e a t e the r e v o l u t i o n a r y s i t u a t i o n by c h a l l e n g i n g the l e g i t i m a c y of the government through armed i n s u r r e c t i o n . G u e r r i l l a a t t a c k s i n v i t e - r e p r e s s i o n from the s t a t e which a t t r a c t s i n c r e a s i n g support fo r the g u e r r i l l a s , both from urban and r u r a l areas. Guevara a s s e r t s that at t h i s p o i n t the time i s r i p e f o r a g u e r r i l l a war to be transformed i n t o a people's war. For Guevara, a g u e r r i l l a f i g h t e r i s a l s o a s o c i a l reformer committed to r e p l a c e the e x p l o i t a t i v e s o c i a l system. Furthermore, while Mao views the g u e r r i l l a group as the vanguard of the r e v o l u t i o n and a subordinate to the party, Guevara c o n s i d e r s the foco as the c e n t r e of r e v o l u t i o n . Hence ac c o r d i n g to the l a t t e r , p o l i t i c a l and m i l i t a r y f u n c t i o n s are c a r r i e d out by one group. The foco, w r i t e s Guevara, i s the midwife of r e v o l u t i o n . 7 6 Regis Debray, a d i s c i p l e of Guevara, argues that s i n c e base areas are d i f f i c u l t to e s t a b l i s h i n small country area, the foco f u n c t i o n s as a mobile base. In the absence of base areas, p o l i t i c a l propaganda i s d i f f i c u l t f o r g u e r r i l l a s to generate. Hence, Debray w r i t e s , "the d e s t r u c t i o n of a troop, t r a n s p o r t truck i s more e f f e c t i v e propaganda for the l o c a l p o p u l a t i o n than a hundred s p e e c h e s . " 7 7 Guevara's experience suggests that a g u e r r i l l a warfare i n v o l v i n g medium-s c a l e g u e r r i l l a a t t a c k s , l i m i t e d o r g a n i z a t i o n , popular support 39 and weak government may a l s o succeed. To sum up, the l i k e l i h o o d of s e c e s s i o n i s t a l i e n a t i o n becoming a powerful f o r c e such that g u e r r i l l a movements gain the upper hand i n a c i v i l war with the c e n t r a l government depends on s e v e r a l f a c t o r s and developments. The c e n t r a l ones may be s t a t e d i n the form of p r o p o s i t i o n s which w i l l be t e s t e d i n my i n v e s t i g a t i o n of the Ta m i l - S i n h a l e s e c o n f l i c t i n S r i Lanka. 1. An e t h n i c m i n o r i t y can become a l i e n a t e d from the democratic process i f the m a j o r i t y e t h n i c group i s u n w i l l i n g or unable to accommodate those demands or i n t e r e s t s of the m i n o r i t y p e r c e i v e d as c r u c i a l to the v i a b i l i t y and/or s u r v i v a l of the group. These demands or i n t e r e s t s might i n c l u d e a f a i r share of economic and e d u c a t i o n a l o p p o r t u n i t i e s , l i n g u i s t i c s e c u r i t y and great e r p o l i t i c a l c o n t r o l over i t s own a f f a i r s . 2. The attempt and/or f a i l u r e of the c e n t r a l government to accommodate e t h n i c demands, f o r whatever reasons, encourages the development of a process of outbidding among both m i n o r i t y and m a j o r i t y p o l i t i c i a n s , and ou t b i d d i n g i t s e l f makes the pe a c e f u l r e s o l u t i o n of c o n f l i c t more d i f f i c u l t i f not impossible. 3. Because, the root cause of armed s e c e s s i o n i s p o l i t i c a l , an imp o s i t i o n of c o n t r o l measures (as d e f i n e d e a r l i e r ) without the government making meaningful accommodative steps i s l i k e l y to f a i l i n the long run. In the short term, c o e r c i v e measures may 40 work i f the government has the c a p a b i l i t y to implement such c o n t r o l measures. 4. An a l i e n a t e d e t h n i c m i n o r i t y may r e s o r t to v i o l e n c e i f some or a l l of the f o l l o w i n g c o n d i t i o n s p r e v a i l : (a) the e t h n i c m i n o r i t y i s t e r r i t o r i a l l y - b a s e d ; (b) non-coercive p o l i t i c a l c o n t r o l of the c e n t r a l government over the t r a d i t i o n a l lands of the m i n o r i t i e s weakens; (c) a breakdown of accommodative p r a c t i c e s occurs; (d) a b l e and committed m i n o r i t y armed s e c e s s i o n i s t l e a d e r s are a v a i l a b l e ; (e) arms and a sanctuary such as might be provided by a sympathetic f o r e i g n s t a t e are a c c e s s i b l e ; ( f ) a sense of d e s p a i r about the system e x i s t s among m i n o r i t y l e a d e r s ; (g) a sense of hope and determination f o r a b e t t e r f u t u r e under a d i f f e r e n t system e x i s t s among m i n o r i t y l e a d e r s . Insofar as these c o n d i t i o n s p r e v a i l , the a l i e n a t e d e t h n i c m i n o r i t y i s l i k e l y to r e s o r t to v i o l e n c e . 5. The a b i l i t y of a g u e r r i l l a group to c h a l l e n g e the l e g i t i m a c y of the government depends on many f a c t o r s . The f o l l o w i n g are some of the more important ones: (a) e s t a b l i s h i n g base areas; (b) m o b i l i z i n g p u b l i c support; (c) a c q u i r i n g " s u f f i c i e n t " m i l i t a r y and economic power; (d) m a i n t a i n i n g cohesion and u n i t y ; (e) c r e a t i n g e f f i c i e n t o r g a n i z a t i o n ; ( f ) a t t r a c t i n g and r e c r u i t i n g capable and shrewd l e a d e r s . 6. For the u l t i m a t e success of armed s e c e s s i o n i s t movements, g u e r r i l l a s must be m i l i t a r i l y a c t i v e and manoeuver the government i n t o abandoning c r e d i b l e accommodative p o l i c i e s and 41 i n t o employing an i n c r e a s i n g l e v e l of r e p r e s s i o n a g a i n s t the m i n o r i t y c i v i l i a n p o p u l a t i o n . These successes enable g u e r r i l l a s to win popular support and to decrease the a u t h o r i t y of the c e n t r a l government in the home t e r r i t o r y . 7. The way an i n t e r e s t e d powerful e x t e r n a l neighbour d e f i n e s i t s s t r a t e g i c goals with regard to the s e c e s s i o n i s t war may s i g n i f i c a n t l y i n f l u e n c e the outcome of a s e c e s s i o n i s t c o n f l i c t . In Chapter Two, I w i l l t e s t these p r o p o s i t i o n s by reviewing the h i s t o r y of growing a l i e n a t i o n between Tamils and S i n h a l e s e , f o c u s s i n g e s p e c i a l l y on the p e r i o d between 1970 and 1983. I w i l l t r a c e the development of s e c e s s i o n i s t movements in Chapter Three and analyse the data p r o v i d e d i n Chapters Two and Three w i t h i n the given t h e o r e t i c a l framework i n the f i n a l Chapter. 42 NOTES v' 'New York Times {August 6, 1987). 2The annexure to the I n d i a - S r i Lanka agreement represents a ' v i c t o r y ' f o r Indian g e o - p o l i t i c a l s t r a t e g i e s . See Appendix B. See a l s o New York Times (August 8, 1987) and Globe and M a i l (August 1, 1987). 3New York Times (August 8, 1987). J.R. Jayewardene s a i d immediately a f t e r the s i g n i n g of the J u l y peace-accord, "I am a p r a c t i c a l man ... I t ' s a f a c t that India i s the great power i n t h i s region and that the world's powers have accepted that ... America won't l i f t a f i n g e r to h e l p me without asking I n d i a . " See a l s o Bruce Mathews, "Tough Test Ahead for Peace Move i n S r i Lanka," Globe and M a i l ( J u l y 31, 1987) and (August 6, 1987). "New York Times (August 5, 1987). Prabakaran s a i d at a r a l l y a f t e r the J u l y peace t r e a t y that he was bowing to "s u p e r i o r f o r c e and to g e o - p o l i t i c a l r e a l i t i e s . " I ndia Today (August 15, 1987), p. 53. V. Balakumar, the leader of Eelam Revolutionary O r g a n i z a t i o n (EROS), s t a t e d that "we were informed that India would be going ahead with the agreement ... Nobody asked us f o r our ap p r o v a l . Whether we support or r e j e c t the agreement doesn't matter. India i s going ahead with i t . How can we prevent i t ? " 5Globe and M a i l (October 6, 1987). 6Globe and M a i l (October 8, 1987). The LTTE denied i t s involvement i n the massacre. I t accused India of using the Three Star group (a loose o r g a n i z a t i o n comprising PLOTE, TELO 43 and EPRLF) to c a r r y out the rampage in the east i n order to g i v e her the o p p o r t u n i t y to a t t a c k the LTTE — the main o b s t a c l e to I n d i a ' s ' t o t a l c o n t r o l ' over S r i Lanka. 7 I n d i a Today (November 15, 1987), pp. 8-14. See a l s o Globe  and M a i l (October 14, 20, 22, 26 and November 15, 1987 as w e l l as January 13, 1988). " I b i d . 9The A s s o c i a t e d Press (October 25, 1987) s t a t e d "most of the Tamils [ s e c e s s i o n i s t g u e r r i l l a s ] ... managed to s l i p past the [Indian] s o l d i e r s and escaped i n t o the j u n g l e . " Lieutenant General, Depinder Singh, the Commander of Indian troop i n S r i Lanka, s a i d "the bulk [of g u e r r i l l a s ] l e f t [ J a f f n a ] no q u e s t i o n . " See a l s o Globe and M a i l (November 2, 1987) and India  Today (December 15, 1987), p. 38. 1"Globe and M a i l (November 5, 1987). See a l s o India Today (December 15, 1987), p. 38. 1 1 G l o b e and M a i l (October 31, 1987). 1 2 T h e r e are two schools of thought concerning the r a c i a l composition of the S r i Lankan p o p u l a t i o n . F i r s t , while the m i n o r i t y Tamils are from South India and belong to D r a v i d i a n e t h n i c stock, the m a j o r i t y S i n h a l e s e are Aryans who migrated from North I n d i a . K.M. de S i l v a , A H i s t o r y of S r i Lanka, D e l h i : Oxford U n i v e r s i t y Press (1981), pp. 3-16. Second, although the i n i t i a l m i g r a t i o n came from northern I n d i a , the bulk of the p o p u l a t i o n can be t r a c e d back to South I n d i a . S.J. Tambiah, S r i  Lanka E t h n i c F r a t r i c i d e and the D i s m a n t l i n g of Democracy. Chicago: The U n i v e r s i t y of Chicago Press (1986), p. 5. See a l s o the l e t t e r by Gananath Obeysekere to New York Times quoted in 44 Tambiah, pp. 183-184 and G. Obeysekera, " P o l i t i c a l V i o l e n c e and the Future Democracy i n S r i Lanka" i n Committee For R a t i o n a l Development, p. 72. 1 3Tambiah, p. 4. 1 " S t a t i s t i c a l Pocket Book of S r i Lanka 1984, quoted i n Walter Schwarz, The Tamils of S r i Lanka, The M i n o r i t y Rights Group Report No. 25 (1986), p. 13. 1 5 U r m i l a Phadnis, E t h n i c C o n f l i c t i n S r i Lanka - An Overview. New D e l h i : Gandhi Peace Foundation (1984), p. i v . 1 6Committee For R a t i o n a l Development, S r i Lanka - The  Eth n i c C o n f l i c t . New D e l h i : Navrang (1984), p. 21. 1 7Quoted i n Robert N. Kearney, The P o l i t i c s of Ceylon ( S r i  Lanka). I t h a c a : C o r n e l l U n i v e r s i t y Press (1973), p. 164. 1 8Kumari Jayawardena, "Ethnic Consciousness i n S r i Lanka: C o n t i n u i t y and Change" i n Committee For R a t i o n a l Development, pp. 116-119. See a l s o Michael Roberts, "Ethnic C o n f l i c t i n S r i Lanka and, S i n h a l e s e P e r s p e c t i v e s : B a r r i e r s to Accommodation," Asian S t u d i e s , Volume 12, No. 3 ( J u l y 1978), p. 364. 1 9 R o b e r t s , pp. 364-367. Obeysekere, p. 74. Jayawardena, pp. 119-125, 136-137 and 160-161. 2 0 A S i n h a l a MP's speech i n the 1960s e l u c i d a t e d the dilemma faced by Si n h a l e s e e l i t e s : If we agree to t h e i r [Tamils'] proposals I can straightaway say that we can never go back to the country i n an e l e c t i o n . We w i l l be hounded out i f we say that we have agreed to the requirement of the [Tamil] F e d e r a l P a r t y . I am p e r f e c t l y c e r t a i n that the same f a t e w i l l come to the SLFP ... They w i l l not 45 be able to face the p o l l s . Quoted in Kearney, Communal ism and Language in the  P o l i t i c s of Ceylon. Durham: Duke U n i v e r s i t y Press (1967), p. 117. 2 1 A . J . Wilson, " P o l i t i c s and P o l i t i c a l Development s i n c e 1948" i n K.M. de S i l v a (ed.), S r i Lanka - A Survey. London: C. Hurst and Co. (1977), p. 285. 2 2 I b i d . , p. 294. 2 3 T h e t r a d i t i o n a l Tamil homeland concept i s c o n t r o v e r s i a l . For i n s t a n c e , K.M. de S i l v a argues that the S i n h a l e s e had been a m a j o r i t y i n many i n t e r i o r p a r t s of the eastern province and the Vanni d i s t r i c t . Managing E t h n i c Tensions in M u l t i - E t h n i c  S o c i e t i e s . Lanham: U n i v e r s i t y Press of America (1986),,pp. 212-216 and 260-261. 2"Schwarz, p. 10. 2 5 W i l s o n , p. 296. 2 6 T h e UNP won only e i g h t seats i n 1956. 2 7 T h e b a s i c Tamil demands put forward by the F e d e r a l Party i n the 1950s and 1960s were: (a) r e g i o n a l autonomy for the north and eastern p r o v i n c e s ; (b) p a r i t y of s t a t u s f o r the Tamil language with S i n h a l a ; (c) c i t i z e n s h i p r i g h t s for a l l p l a n t a t i o n Tamils. K.M. de S i l v a , Managing E t h n i c , p. 397. The s i x - p o i n t plan of the FP i n 1972 i n c l u d e d i n a d d i t i o n to the above the f o l l o w i n g demands: (a) a c o n s t i t u t i o n a l guarantee of fundamental r i g h t s and freedom; (b) the concept of a s e c u l a r s t a t e ; (c) the a b o l i t i o n of u n t o u c h a b i l i t y . I b i d . , p. 257. In 1985, both Tamil m i l i t a n t s and moderates put forward the f o l l o w i n g four demands at Thimpu (Bhutan) peace t a l k s : (1) 46 the r e c o g n i t i o n of the Tamils as a d i s t r i c t n a t i o n a l i t y ; (2) the r e c o g n i t i o n of a Tamil homeland i n S r i Lanka; (3) the r i g h t of s e l f - d e t e r m i n a t i o n ; (4) f u l l c i t i z e n s h i p r i g h t s f o r a l l Tamils who regarded S r i Lanka as t h e i r home. Schwarz, p. 12. C o n s i s t e n t l y presented Tamil demands were: (a) a Tamil homeland — d e v o l u t i o n of p o l i t i c a l power; (b) a p o l i c y of b i l i n g u a l i s m — p a r i t y of s t a t u s f o r both Tamil and S i n h a l a ; (c) c i t i z e n s h i p r i g h t s f o r p l a n t a t i o n Tamils. 2 8 A . Sivanandan, " S r i Lanka: Racism and the P o l i t i c s of Underdevelopment," Race and C l a s s , Volume XXVI, No. 1 (Summer 1984), p. 13. 2 9Schwarz, p. 7. 3°Sivanandan, p. 14. 3 1 F o r a good account of the r i o t s see T a r z i e V i t t a c h i , Emergency '58. London: Andre Deutsch (1958). 3 2 W i l s o n , p. 303. 3 3 A . J . Wilson, E l e c t o r a l P o l i t i c s in an Emergent S t a t e . London: Cambridge U n i v e r s i t y Press (1975), pp. 25-26. 3 " I b i d . , p. 26. 3 5James Jupp, S r i Lanka - T h i r d World Democracy. London: Frank Cass (1978), p. 13. 3 6 I b i d . See a l s o Sivanandan, p. 18 and Jupp, p. 13 . 3 7 W i l s o n , E l e c t o r a l P o l i t i c s , pp. 130-132. 3 8Hugh Seton-Watson, " R e f l e c t i o n s on Europe's Experience of Separatism." London: I n s t i t u t e of Commonwealth St u d i e s , U n i v e r s i t y of London, C o l l e c t e d Seminar Papers on The P o l i t i c s  of Separatism, No. 19, p. 1. 3 9Theodore P. Wright J r . , "South Asian S e p a r a t i s t 47 Movements," C o l l e c t e d Seminar Papers, p. 5. 0 0 P e t e r Lyon, "Separatism and Secession i n the Malaysian Realm, 1948-1965," C o l l e c t e d Seminar Papers, p. 69. 4 1I_bid. * 2John R. Wood, "Secession: A Comparative A n a l y t i c a l Framework," Canadian J o u r n a l of P o l i t i c a l Science, Volume XIV, No. 1 (March 1981), p. 110. tt3I_bid. 4,W.H. Mo r r i s Jones, " R e a l i t i e s and Dreams: Ebb and Flow i n the P o l i t i c s of Separatism," E t h n i c Studies Report, Volume IV, No. 1 (January 1986), p. 2. *5Wood, p. 109. 4 6 A r e n d L i j p h a r t , " C o n s o c i a t i o n a l Democracy," World  P o l i t i c s , Volume 21, No. 2 (January 1969), pp. 207-225. * 7 E r i c A. N o r d l i n g e r , C o n f l i c t Regulation i n D i v i d e d  S o c i e t i e s . Cambridge: Centre f o r I n t e r n a t i o n a l A f f a i r s , Harvard U n i v e r s i t y , O c c a s i o n a l Paper, No. 29 (1972), pp. 21-33. 0 8 I a n L u s t i c k , " S t a b i l i t y i n Deeply D i v i d e d S o c i e t i e s : C o n s o c i a t i o n a l i s m versus C o n t r o l , " World P o l i t i c s , Volume 31, No. 3 ( A p r i l 1979), pp. 325-344. " 9 I b i d . , pp. 330-332. 5 0 M i l t o n J . Esman, "The Management of Communal C o n f l i c t , " P u b l i c P o l i c y , Volume 21, No. 1 (Winter 1973), p. 56. The other three options are induced a s s i m i l i a t i o n , s y n c r e t i c i n t e g r a t i o n and balanced p l u r a l i s m . 5 ' I b i d . 5 2 R u t h McVey, "Separatism and the Paradoxes of the Nation-s t a t e i n P e r s p e c t i v e , " Lim Joo-Jock and Vani S., Armed 48 Separatism i n Southeast A s i a . Singapore: Regional S t r a t e g i c Studies Programme, I n s t i t u t e of Southeast Asian S t u d i e s , p. 13. 5 3 G i o v a n n i S a r t o r i , Democratic Theory. New York: F r e d e r i c k A. Praeger (1965), pp. 67-68. 5 f t A l v i n Rabushka and Kenneth A. Shepsle, " P o l i t i c a l E n t r e p r e n e u r s h i p and P a t t e r n s of Democratic I n s t a b i l i t y i n P l u r a l S o c i e t i e s , " Race, Volume 7, No. 4 ( A p r i l 1971), pp. 461-475. See a l s o Rabushka and Shepsle, P o l i t i c s i n P l u r a l  S o c i e t i e s : A Theory of Democratic I n s t a b i l i t y . Columbus: Charles E. M e r r i l l (1972), pp. 82-86. 5 5 A l v i n Rabushka and Kenneth A. Shepsle, P o l i t i c s i n , p. 90. 5 6R.S. Milne, P o l i t i c s i n E t h n i c a l l y B i p o l a r S t a t e s . Vancouver: U n i v e r s i t y of B r i t i s h Columbia Press (1981), pp. 184-185. 5 7 I b i d . , p. 185. • 5 8 R o b e r t Melson and Howard Wolpe, "Modernization and the P o l i t i c s of Communalism: A T h e o r e t i c a l P e r s p e c t i v e , " The  American P o l i t i c a l Science Review, Volume LXIV, No. 3 (September 1970), p. 1122. 59M.R. Sukhumband P a r i b a t r a and Chai-Anan Samudavanija, "Factors behind Armed Separatism: A Framework for A n a l y s i s , " Armed Separatism i n Southeast A s i a , p. 5. 6 0 T h i s i s c o n s i s t e n t with Che Guevara's a s s e r t i o n that a g u e r r i l l a f i g h t e r should be a s o c i a l reformer committed to destroy an unjust s o c i a l system. 6 1 B a r d E. O ' N e i l l , "Insurgency: A Framework for A n a l y s i s , " Bard E. O ' N e i l l , W i l l i a m R. Heaton and Donald J . A l b e r t s 49 (eds.), Insurgency i n the Modern World. Colorado: Westview Press (1980), pp. 1-3. " I b i d . , p. 3. 6 3 I b i d . , pp. 5-26. 6 aMao Tse-Tung quoted i n Bard E. O ' N e i l l et a l , Insurgency i n , p. 13. 6 5 W a l t e r Sonderland, quoted i n Bard E. O ' N e i l l et a l , Insurgency i n , p. 19. 6 6 B y encouraging g r e a t e r p a r t i c i p a t i o n of the Muslim-Malays i n the p o l i t i c a l a d m i n i s t r a t i v e machinery i n the Muslim-dominated p r o v i n c e s in southern T h a i l a n d , the government of T h a i l a n d weakened the Muslim Malay s e c e s s i o n i s t movement i n the l a t e 1970s and 1980s. 6 7Thomas H. Greene, Comparative Re v o l u t i o n a r y Movements - Search f o r Theory and J u s t i c e . New J e r s e y : P r e n t i c e - H a l l (1984), pp. 59-74. 6 8 I b i d . , p. 71. 6 9Samuel B. G r i f f i t h , Mao Tse-Tung on G u e r r i l l a Warfare. New York: Anchor Press (1978), pp. 17-23 ( t r a n s l a t i o n ) . 7 0Edward L. Katzenbach, J r . and Gene Z. Hanrahan. "The R e v o l u t i o n a r y Strategy of Mao Tse-Tung" i n F r a n k l i n Mark Osanka (ed.), Modern G u e r r i l l a Warfare. New York: The Free Press of Glencoe (1962), p. 137. See a l s o G r i f f i t h , p. 27. 7 ' I b i d . , p. 19. 7 2 I b i d . , p. 21. 7 3 I b i d . , p. 22. 7 B J . Moreno, "Che Guevara on G u e r r i l l a Warfare: D o c t r i n e , P r a c t i c e and E v a l u a t i o n " i n Sam C. Sarkesian (ed.), 50 R e v o l u t i o n a r y G u e r r i l l a Warfare. Chicago: Precedent P u b l i s h i n g Inc. (1975), p. 396. 7 5 I b i d . 7 6 I b i d . , p. 415. 7 7Hugh P u r c e l l , R e v o l u t i o n a r y War. Melbourne: Nelson (1981), p. 70. 51 CHAPTER TWO THE EMERGENCE OF A SECESSIONIST CONFLICT IN SRI LANKA'S MAJORITARIAN DEMOCRACY The primary purpose of t h i s chapter i s to e x p l a i n the emergence of the Tamil demand for se c e s s i o n i n S r i Lanka. T h i s h i s t o r i c a l review of the T a m i l - S i n h a l a r e l a t i o n s h i p t r a c e s the i n c r e a s i n g a l i e n a t i o n between these two e t h n i c groups beginning i n 1931 and c u l m i n a t i n g i n the bloody a n t i - T a m i l r i o t s i n 1983. The 1931 Donoughmore C o n s t i t u t i o n exposed the f r a g i l i t y of the T a m i l - S i n h a l a r e l a t i o n s h i p by s i g n i f i c a n t l y s h i f t i n g p o l i t i c a l power to the m a j o r i t y S i n h a l e s e without e s t a b l i s h i n g s u f f i c i e n t checks and b a l a n c e s . 1 The 1947 Soulbury C o n s t i t u t i o n gave more p r o t e c t i o n to the m i n o r i t i e s ; 2 however, the working success of the C o n s t i t u t i o n was l e f t to the m a j o r i t y e l i t e s who succumbed to pressures emanating from emerging Sinhala-Buddhist n a t i o n a l i s t i c f o r c e s . 3 With S.W.R.D. Bandaranaike's r i s e to power on a Sinhala-Buddhist p l a t f o r m i n 1956, accommodation of the main Tamil demands became d i f f i c u l t . " The UF government ' i n s t i t u t i o n a l i z e d ' p o l i t i c a l and economic d i s c r i m i n a t i o n a g a i n s t the T a m i l s . 5 J.R. Jayewardene met some of the long-standing Tamil demands through both c o n s t i t u t i o n a l and non-c o n s t i t u t i o n a l reforms. By 1977, however, Tamil ' a l i e n a t i o n had grown to such an extent that these reforms were too minimal and too b e l a t e d to c o n t a i n the s e c e s s i o n i s t demand. T h i s chapter attempts to i l l u m i n a t e the reasons f o r the f a i l u r e of the 52 S i n h a l e s e l e a d e r s h i p to accommodate v i t a l Tamil demands and hence to check Tamil s e c e s s i o n i s t tendencies. From the beginning of the l a t e nineteenth century u n t i l the e a r l y t w e n t i e t h , e l i t e competition i n S r i Lanka was based on c a s t e and r e l i g i o n r a t her than on e t h n i c i t y . 6 The p o l i t i c a l domination of the Goyigamas ( c u l t i v a t o r - high c a s t e ) i n the Ceylon L e g i s l a t i v e C o u n c i l had been c h a l l e n g e d by the Karava (fisherman) e l i t e s s i n c e the l a t e n ineteenth c e n t u r y . 7 I n t r a -e l i t e c ompetition among the S i n h a l e s e was more pronounced than i n t e r - e l i t e competition between the Tamils and S i n h a l e s e . Furthermore, the Sinhalese e l i t e s were more i n t e r e s t e d i n economic a c t i v i t i e s than i n p o l i t i c a l reforms or p o l i t i c s i n g e n e r a l . 8 In c o n t r a s t , the Tamil e l i t e s e n t h u s i a s t i c a l l y p a r t i c i p a t e d i n p o l i t i c s d u r i n g t h i s p e r i o d . 9 Due to a lack of economic resources i n the north, the Tamils, who c a p i t a l i z e d on the e x c e l l e n t missionary e d u c a t i o n a l o p p o r t u n i t i e s and, to some extent, the B r i t i s h p o l i c y of r e c r u i t i n g m i n o r i t i e s i n t o the p u b l i c s e r v i c e , j o i n e d the c o l o n i a l bureaucracy i n l a r g e numbers. There was l i t t l e c o mpetition between the Tamil and S i n h a l e s e e l i t e s . In the 1920s, the B r i t i s h government's d e c i s i o n to begin sharing p o l i t i c a l power with the l o c a l e l i t e s paved the way f o r p o l i t i c a l reforms. But reforms to the L e g i s l a t i v e C o u n c i l introduced t e n s i o n s i n the T a m i l - S i n h a l a r e l a t i o n s h i p . During the f i r s t e l e c t i o n s to the reformed c o u n c i l , f o r example, t h i r t e e n S i n h a l e s e and three Tamils were e l e c t e d . But, i n the pre-reformed c o u n c i l , S i n h a l e s e and Tamil r e p r e s e n t a t i o n was n e a r l y equal. E l i t e competition i n c r e a s i n g l y became based on e t h n i c f a c t o r s , which slowly communalized 53 p o l i t i c a l development i n S r i Lanka. The p o l i t i c i z a t i o n of e t h n i c i t y gathered momentum in the post-1931 p e r i o d . P o l i t i c i z a t i o n of E t h n i c i t y and Growing Tamil A l i e n a t i o n , 1931- 1970: With the i n t r o d u c t i o n of the Donoughmore C o n s t i t u t i o n i n 1931, the c o o p e r a t i v e c o e x i s t e n c e among the Tamil and Sin h a l e s e e l i t e s which had c h a r a c t e r i z e d S r i Lankan p o l i t i c s i n the e a r l y twentieth century was weakened and u l t i m a t e l y r e p l a c e d by competitive c o e x i s t e n c e . The Donoughmore C o n s t i t u t i o n introduced u n i v e r s a l a d u l t franchisement and t e r r i t o r i a l r e p r e s e n t a t i o n i n S r i Lanka which, due to the demographic composition of the p o p u l a t i o n , i n e v i t a b l y enhanced the p o l i t i c a l s t r e n g t h of the m a j o r i t y S i n h a l e s e . 1 0 For in s t a n c e , t h i r t y - e i g h t out of f i f t y e l e c t e d candidates i n the f i r s t State C o u n c i l e l e c t i o n h e l d in 1931 under the Donoughmore C o n s t i t u t i o n were S i n h a l e s e ; 1 1 the Si n h a l e s e a l s o s u c c e s s f u l l y c r e a t e d an e x c l u s i v e Sinhalese Board of M i n i s t e r s a f t e r the 1936 e l e c t i o n . 1 2 The Tamils, p a r t i c u l a r l y the middle c l a s s which enjoyed d i s p r o p o r t i o n a t e p o l i t i c a l and economic b e n e f i t s under the B r i t i s h , opposed m a j o r i t a r i a n democracy since i t threatened t h e i r r o l e i n the c e n t r a l decision-making machinery. Consequently, the Tamils demanded a " f i f t y - f i f t y " d i v i s i o n of seats i n the l e g i s l a t u r e between the Sinhalese and m i n o r i t i e s and an equal share of c a b i n e t p o s t s . 1 3 The " f i f t y -f i f t y " Tamil campaign can be i n t e r p r e t e d e i t h e r as a r e f l e c t i o n of Tamil a n x i e t y f o r p r o t e c t i o n i n a m a j o r i t a r i a n democracy in which the S i n h a l e s e were already a s s e r t i n g t h e i r dominant 54 p o l i t i c a l p o s i t i o n , or as a r e s u l t of the Tamils' r e f u s a l to accept t h e i r m i n o r i t y s t a t u s and t h e i r s e l f - p e r c e p t i o n as one of the two major e t h n i c groups on the i s l a n d . The Tamils argued that equal r e p r e s e n t a t i o n would c o n t a i n the 'tyranny' of the m a j o r i t y . However, the Tamils' demand f o r balanced r e p r e s e n t a t i o n was r e j e c t e d by the Soulbury Commission in 1944 because such r e p r e s e n t a t i o n would d i s t o r t the working of democracy. The Commission a l s o d i s p l a y e d i t s f a i t h in the moderate c o n s e r v a t i v e S i n h a l a l e a d e r s h i p ' s w i l l i n g n e s s to ensure the p r o t e c t i o n of m i n o r i t i e s i n a m u l t i - e t h n i c s o c i e t y . E l i t e accommodation between the Tamil and S i n h a l e s e middle c l a s s - h i g h c a s t e l e a d e r s h i p would provide r e c o n c i l i a t i o n i n an e t h n i c a l l y competitive environment. 1" The Soulbury C o n s t i t u t i o n guaranteed m i n o r i t y r i g h t s under S e c t i o n 29(2) and allowed weightage in r e p r e s e n t a t i o n f o r the Tamils i n the north and e a s t . 1 5 However, the Commission, i n i t s d e s i r e to t r a n s f e r power to the c o n s e r v a t i v e e l i t e s , ignored the f r a g i l i t y of e l i t e accommodation as a guarantee of e t h n i c s t a b i l i t y i n a p l u r a l democratic country. The f r a g i l i t y of c o m p e t i t i v e c o e x i s t e n c e was exposed by the w i l l i n g n e s s of the S i n h a l e s e c o u n t e r - e l i t e s to e x p l o i t e t h n i c "passions" to c o n s o l i d a t e power and win i n the 1950s. Sinhala-Buddhist n a t i o n a l i s m , r e k i n d l e d by Anagarika Dharmapala, a Buddhist r e v i v a l i s t , which reached i t s climax i n the mid-1950s, provided the major impetus for the d i s i n t e g r a t i o n of e l i t e accommodation. S.W.R.D. Bandaranaike d i d not h e s i t a t e to e x p l o i t t h i s n a t i o n a l i s m to appeal to and m o b i l i z e the vernacular-educated Sinhala-Buddhist m i d d l e - c l a s s . 55 The United N a t i o n a l Party (UNP) a l s o m o dified i t s language and r e l i g i o u s p o l i c y i n i t s attempt to r e t a i n p o l i t i c a l dominance. For example, the UNP dropped i t s e a r l i e r p o l i c y of e s t a b l i s h i n g S i n h a l a and Tamil as o f f i c i a l languages to adopt S i n h a l a as the only o f f i c i a l language i n 1956. The development of a h i g h l y c o m p e t i t i v e two-party system i n which Sinhala-Buddhist n a t i o n a l i s m was c r u c i a l f o r the p o l i t i c a l base of both p a r t i e s r e s u l t e d i n each succumbing to e t h n o - r e l i g i o u s o u t b i d d i n g to win v o t e s . 1 6 By 1965 both the UNP and S r i Lanka Freedom Party (SLFP), together with the main ' p r o g r e s s i v e ' l e f t p a r t i e s , had accepted S i n h a l a as the s o l e o f f i c i a l language of the country. However, the UNP under Dudley Senanayake was w i l l i n g to accommodate the main Tamil demands without compromising gains made by S i n h a l a l i n g u i s t i c n a t i o n a l i s m . Hence the UNP continued to be v u l n e r a b l e to the o u t b i d d i n g process. As Rabushka and Shepsle suggest, p o l i t i c a l entrepreneurs r e s o r t e d to o u t b i d d i n g to win e l e c t i o n s . The communalization of p o l i t i c s helped the F e d e r a l Party ( F P ) , . b u i l t on r i s i n g Tamil n a t i o n a l i s m , to emerge as the 'saviour' of the Tamils i n both the north and the e a s t . 1 7 From i t s i n c e p t i o n , the FP's attempts to appeal to a l l the Tamils in S r i Lanka gave i t an extensive support base in the Tamil areas. The success of FP s i g n a l l e d the beginning of the end of the Tamil Congress (TC), which had been e s t a b l i s h e d by G.G. Ponnambalam in 1944 with a narrow m i d d l e - c l a s s support base in J a f f n a . 1 8 But the TC with i t s moderate n a t i o n a l i s t p o l i c y , f a i l e d to appeal to the growing "ethnic consciousness" of the Tamils. E v e n t u a l l y , the TC became a marginal p a r t y in the Tamil 56 areas. The formation in 1965 of a N a t i o n a l Government, which i n c l u d e d communal p a r t i e s from both ends of the p o l i t i c a l spectrum under the UNP l e a d e r s h i p , brought back a p e r i o d of p e a c e f u l c o e x i s t e n c e which turned out to be a m i r a g e . 1 9 The N a t i o n a l Government l e d by Dudley Senanayake c o u l d not implement p o l i c i e s a c c e p t a b l e to both e t h n i c groups; hence, there were no fundamental changes in the T a m i l - S i n h a l e s e r e l a t i o n s h i p . Senanayake was c o n s t r a i n e d by the United Front (UF), a c o a l i t i o n of p r o g r e s s i v e and p o p u l i s t p a r t i e s with no roots i n the Tamil areas, which d e p i c t e d the government's attempt at a T a m i l - S i n h a l a r e c o n c i l i a t i o n as an a n t i - n a t i o n a l , a n t i - S i n h a l a , and a n t i - B u d d h i s t move. 2 0 In the end, the FP, d e s p i t e i t s c o r d i a l r e l a t i o n s h i p with Senanayake, c o u l d not e x t r a c t any s i g n i f i c a n t concessions from him. The p o l i t i c a l system which had evolved, p a r t i c u l a r l y a f t e r 1956, d i d not allow the major p a r t i e s to p r a c t i c e the p o l i t i c s of moderation on e t h n i c i s s u e s . 2 1 Despite the e t h n i c harmony on the s u r f a c e , the p o l a r i z a t i o n of e t h n i c f o r c e s continued unabated. As outbidding theory suggests, an increase i n n o n - e l i t e p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n p o l i t i c s -- p a r t i c u l a r l y s i n c e 1956 encouraged both Tamil and Sinhalese e l i t e s to make et h n i c appeals to win e l e c t i o n s . Both the SLFP and FP o u t b i d the more moderate UNP and TC on e t h n i c i s s u e s to emerge as strong " e t h n i c r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s " of t h e i r r e s p e c t i v e e t h n i c groups in the mid-1950s. The a r r i v a l of e t h n i c p o l i t i c a l entrepreneurs introduced p o l i t i c s of outbidding which destroyed p o l i t i c a l moderation in S r i Lanka. The p o l i t i c a l entrepreneurs from the 57 S i n h a l e s e m a j o r i t y e t h n i c groups favoured t h e i r own at the expense of the Tamil m i n o r i t y which l e d to growing Tamil a l i e n a t i o n i n the 1950s and 1960s. I n s t i t u t i o n a l i z a t i o n of E t h n i c i t y and the Rise of a  S e c e s s i o n i s t Challenge, 1970-1977: The 1970 . e l e c t ion was a watershed in the p o l i t i c a l h i s t o r y of S r i L a n k a . 2 2 The p o l i t i c a l , economic and s o c i a l f o r c e s generated by t h i s c r u c i a l e l e c t i o n changed the country f o r e v e r . The next decade witnessed the a c c e l e r a t i o n of the end of competitive c o e x i s t e n c e and the emergence of separatism. The UF i n f l i c t e d a c r u s h i n g defeat on the UNP and obtained a t h r e e -f o u r t h s parliamentary m a j o r i t y . Meanwhile, for reasons e x p l a i n e d below, the FP f a i l e d to appeal to Tamil n a t i o n a l i s t sentiments. The p a r t y ' s performance c o u l d be d e s c r i b e d as a m i n i - d i s a s t e r ; three of i t s well-entrenched l e a d e r s , i n c l u d i n g a ' r a d i c a l ' , were d e f e a t e d . 2 3 A l a r g e number of FP candidates returned to Parliament with a reduced m a j o r i t y . The e l e c t i o n a l s o confirmed the d i s i n t e g r a t i o n of the TC, whose leader G.G. Ponnambalam was d e f e a t e d . 2 " The e l e c t i o n s h a t t e r e d the image of the FP as a "king maker" s i n c e i t was c l e a r that the party no longer had the a b i l i t y to i n f l u e n c e the formation of the government. 2 5 The FP's i n a b i l i t y to win meaningful concessions from the c e n t r a l government, together with the s t a l e n e s s of the p a r t y ' s o b j e c t i v e of f e d e r a l i s m , brought d i s i l l u s i o n m e n t among Tamils, p a r t i c u l a r l y the youth -- the post-independent g e n e r a t i o n . The UF formed the government with a t h r e e - f o u r t h s 58 m a j o r i t y . A c o a l i t i o n and a c a b i n e t without a s i n g l e e l e c t e d Tamil MP assumed power, and promised a r a d i c a l r e s t r u c t u r i n g of the p o l i t i c a l - e c o n o m i c i n f r a s t r u c t u r e of the c o u n t r y . 2 6 E t h n i c i z a t i o n of the p o l i t i c a l decision-making process s i g n i f i c a n t l y c u r t a i l e d the a b i l i t y of the p o l i t i c a l system to accommodate the b a s i c m i n o r i t y demands. Thus Tamils, p a r t i c u l a r l y a f t e r 1956, began to view democracy as u n f a i r , and t h e i r f a i t h i n i t was s e r i o u s l y eroded. In 1970, the UF government responded to a S i n h a l a n a t i o n a l i s t demand to c o r r e c t the imbalance i n u n i v e r s i t y admissions by imposing d i f f e r e n t minimum marks f o r d i f f e r e n t e t h n i c g r o u p s . 2 7 The number of S i n h a l e s e i n the ' p r e s t i g e ' f a c u l t i e s of e n g i n e e r i n g and medicine d i d not correspond to t h e i r p o p u l a t i o n r a t i o i n the pre-1974 p e r i o d . 2 8 Thus, a Tamil student was r e q u i r e d to o b t a i n higher marks than a S i n h a l e s e to enter the science-based f a c u l t i e s of the u n i v e r s i t y . 2 9 Admission by merit was modified by the e t h n o - l i n g u i s t i c c r i t e r i o n . By 1972 language-based s t a n d a r d i z a t i o n was introduced as the s o l e c r i t e r i o n f o r the u n i v e r s i t y admission to i n c r e a s e the intake of S i n h a l e s e . Under the new u n i v e r s i t y entrance system, the raw marks from the three language mediums were reduced to a common s c a l e . T h i s , i n t u r n , ensured that "the number q u a l i f y i n g i n each' language would be p r o p o r t i o n a t e to the number s i t t i n g f o r the examination in each l a n g u a g e . " 3 0 Of course, t h i s s t a n d a r d i z a t i o n of the admission system was d i s a s t r o u s f o r the m i n o r i t y Tamils; f o r i n s t a n c e , Tamil admission to the f a c u l t y of e n g i n e e r i n g dropped s h a r p l y from 40.8% i n 1970 to 24.4% i n 1973, and to 16.3% i n 1 974. 3 1 The 59 main o b j e c t i v e of s t a n d a r d i z a t i o n , a c c o r d i n g to C. R. de S i l v a , was to " n e u t r a l i z e the s u p e r i o r performance of Tamil students in s c i e n c e s u b j e c t s . " 3 2 Whereas p r e v i o u s l y Tamil p a r t i e s had h e l d a balance between the dominant S i n h a l e s e p a r t i e s i n the parliament, now a government which drew i t s p o l i t i c a l power e x c l u s i v e l y from o u t s i d e the north and east c o u l d ignore the Tamils without j e o p a r d i z i n g i t s chances of r e - e l e c t i o n . The government used the l e g a l d e v i c e s of parliamentary democracy to d i s c r i m i n a t e openly a g a i n s t the Tamil m i n o r i t y i n order to strengthen i t s p o s i t i o n i n the s o u t h . 3 3 Neither the FP nor the TC had the p o l i t i c a l power to stop t h i s d i s c r i m i n a t i o n . The moderate Tamil l e a d e r s h i p ' s i n a b i l i t y to i n f l u e n c e c e n t r a l decision-makers was again exposed. Thus the f r u s t r a t i o n and disenchantment of the Tamil youth f u r t h e r increased, i n turn p r o v i d i n g i n c e n t i v e s f o r the r a d i c a l i z a t i o n of p o l i t i c s i n the Tamil areas. While the Tamils' f a i t h i n parliamentary democracy was eroding, a segment of the S i n h a l e s e p o p u l a t i o n l e d by Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP) waged an a b o r t i v e 'war' a g a i n s t the government. The f r u s t r a t i o n of educated unemployed r u r a l youth exploded i n t o a M a r x i s t - l e d i n s u r r e c t i o n i n A p r i l , 1971. 3 * T h i s i n s u r r e c t i o n was both rooted i n c l a s s (Marxist ideology) and on e t h n i c (dominated by Sinhalese) bases. Despite e a r l y r e v e r s a l s , the government suppressed the u p r i s i n g r u t h l e s s l y and regained c o n t r o l w i t h i n a couple of months. 3 5 India played a s i g n i f i c a n t r o l e i n c o n t a i n i n g the i n s u r r e c t i o n . 3 6 O r g a n i z a t i o n a l weakness, open c o n f r o n t a t i o n a g a i n s t the r e g u l a r army, c o n f l i c t among the l e a d e r s and a l i m i t e d p o l i t i c a l base were some of the major 60 f a c t o r s which c o n t r i b u t e d to the f a i l u r e of the i n s u r r e c t i o n . The a n t i - I n d i a sentiments of the i n s u r r e c t i o n i s t s d i d not he l p t h e i r cause e i t h e r . 3 7 The u p r i s i n g made the UF government more r e p r e s s i v e and i n t o l e r a n t i n d e a l i n g with o p p o s i t i o n . Moreover, the government's m i l i t a r y success caused i t to overestimate i t s a b i l i t y to meet e x t r a - p arliamentary c h a l l e n g e s . However, the u p r i s i n g exposed the v u l n e r a b i l i t y of the government to armed i n s u r r e c t i o n . No doubt t h i s had a demonstration e f f e c t on Tamil youths i n the north. The UF government decided in 1970 to re p l a c e the Soulbury C o n s t i t u t i o n with a "home-made" Republican C o n s t i t u t i o n . 3 8 The UF government presented the f o l l o w i n g as major flaws i n the Soulbury C o n s t i t u t i o n : .... the e x i s t e n c e . of an entrenched c l a u s e (Clause 29) which safeguarded m i n o r i t i e s a g a i n s t d i s c r i m i n a t o r y l e g i s l a t i o n ; the r i g h t of j u d i c i a l review by the c o u r t s over the c o n s t i t u t i o n a l i t y of l e g i s l a t i o n passed by parliament; c o l o n i a l - o r i e n t e d a d m i n i s t r a t i v e machinery; a bi-cameral l e g i s l a t u r e ; and the i n e q u a l i t y of the a d u l t vote under the e x i s t i n g system of d e l i m i t i n g c o n s t i t u e n c i e s i n the l e g i s l a t u r e with i t s weighted b i a s i n favour of the r u r a l areas and remoter p a r t s of the c o u n t r y . 3 9 A l l but the l a s t were d e a l t with i n the 1972 Republican C o n s t i t u t i o n . For the SLFP, the major c o a l i t i o n p a r t n e r , s e c t i o n 29 of the Soulbury C o n s t i t u t i o n i n h i b i t e d S i n h a l a -Buddhist domination of the i s l a n d ; hence, u n l i k e the Lanka Samasamaja Party (LSSP) and the Communist Party (CP), which were c r i t i c a l of the C o n s t i t u t i o n ' s ' c o l o n i a l ' nature from the beginning, the SLFP e n t h u s i a s t i c a l l y favoured a c o n s t i t u t i o n a l change f o r narrow e t h n o - r e l i g i o u s r e a s o n s . ' 0 Not s u r p r i s i n g l y , the Republican C o n s t i t u t i o n was p e r c e i v e d by the Tamils as a n t i - T a m i l . The Tamil e l i t e s who 61 p a r t i c i p a t e d i n the c o n s t i t u e n t assembly withdrew from i t when they f a i l e d to win any c o n s t i t u t i o n a l concessions from the government. A l l the Tamil p a r t i e s i n S r i Lanka proposed to the c o n s t i t u e n t assembly a n i n e - p o i n t amendment to the d r a f t c o n s t i t u t i o n . " 1 The most important demands were: (1) Tamil should be recognized by the c o n s t i t u t i o n as an o f f i c i a l language along with S i n h a l a ; (2) Buddhism should not be d e c l a r e d the s o l e s t a t e r e l i g i o n and S r i Lanka should be a s e c u l a r s t a t e . P r e d i c t a b l y , these demands were r e j e c t e d . On May 12, 1972, the FP, TC, Ceylon Workers' Congress (CWC) and Tamil youth and student o r g a n i z a t i o n s formed the Tamil United Front (TUF)." 2 The TUF presented a s i x - p o i n t plan to the government i n c o r p o r a t i n g the main Tamil demands: o f f i c i a l s t a t u s f o r Tamil, a s e c u l a r S r i Lanka, c i t i z e n s h i p f o r the Indian Tamils, d e c e n t r a l i z a t i o n of power, guarantee of fundamental r i g h t s , and banning of the c a s t e system." 3 However, the government d i d not respond to the Tamil demands. Thus, the 1972 Republican C o n s t i t u t i o n s t a t e d that the " o f f i c i a l language of S r i Lanka s h a l l be S i n h a l a as provided by the O f f i c i a l Language Act No. 33 of 1956," and i t a l s o s t i p u l a t e d that "The Republic of S r i Lanka s h a l l give to Buddhism the foremost p l a c e and a c c o r d i n g l y i t s h a l l be the duty of the s t a t e to p r o t e c t and f o s t e r Buddhism while a s s u r i n g to a l l r e l i g i o n s the r i g h t s granted by S e c t i o n 18 (1) ( d ) . " " ' At the same time, the m i n o r i t y safeguards provided under S e c t i o n 29(2) of the Soulbury C o n s t i t u t i o n were removed. The Tamil l e a d e r s h i p once again was exposed as impotent by the Sinhala-Buddhist c e n t r a l government. The d r a f t i n g of the new 62 Republican C o n s t i t u t i o n r a i s e d f u r t h e r doubts among Tamils about the u s e f u l n e s s of parliamentary democracy. They were e f f e c t i v e l y cut o f f from the c e n t r a l decision-making process by the m a j o r i t a r i a n democracy p r a c t i s e d by the n a t i o n a l p a r t i e s . In t h i s way, Sinhala-Buddhist chauvinism helped l a y the groundwork f o r the emergence of Tamil armed separatism. The r o l e of the government in the economic f i e l d expanded s i g n i f i c a n t l y i n the post-l970s on account of the UF's s o c i a l i s t i d e o l o g y . " 5 The export-import economy of S r i Lanka had d e t e r i o r a t e d s i n c e the mid-1950s due to i t s n e a r - e x c l u s i v e r e l i a n c e on p l a n t a t i o n a g r i c u l t u r e . The government became the major d i s t r i b u t o r of scarce resources among the competing groups. But the government used e t h n i c c r i t e r i a to a l l o c a t e the s h r i n k i n g economic p i e . The UF government adopted a f f i r m a t i v e d i s c r i m i n a t i o n and r e d i s t r i b u t i o n along r a c i a l l i n e s to meet the economic demands of the m a j o r i t y . For i n s t a n c e , the c a b i n e t r e p l a c e d the independent p u b l i c s e r v i c e s commission as the " c o n t r o l l i n g body" of the p u b l i c s e r v i c e ; hence the s t a t e , as the l a r g e s t employer, determined the e t h n i c balance of the work f o r c e . In the general c l e r i c a l s e r v i c e s , the Tamil p r o p o r t i o n was 40.7% i n 1949, but dropped to 15.3% i n 1966-77 and to 11% i n 1970-77. Tamil r e p r e s e n t a t i o n in the S r i Lankan A d m i n i s t r a t i v e S e r v i c e ( c i v i l s e r v i c e ) , which was 23.4% i n 1963, dropped to 11% during 1970-77." 6 The government's d e l i b e r a t e and s u c c e s s i v e r e s t r i c t i o n s on language (Sinhala only) and education ( s t a n d a r d i z a t i o n ) c o n t r i b u t e d to the low recruitment rate of Tamils i n t o the p u b l i c s e r v i c e . The t o t a l r e j e c t i o n of Tamil demands by the. UF government, 63 together with the d i s c r i m i n a t o r y u n i v e r s i t y admission p o l i c y , l e d to a Tamil p r o t e s t i n 1972. But the government, f r e s h from i t s v i c t o r y over the JVP r e b e l s , r e a c t e d v i o l e n t l y to the Tamil p r o t e s t without i n t r o d u c i n g accommodative measures to a l l e v i a t e Tamil d i s c o n t e n t . In the beginning, the Tamils' p r o t e s t was l i m i t e d to h o i s t i n g black f l a g s while observing days of mourning and conducting h a r t a l s (work stoppage). State r e p r e s s i o n a g a i n s t non-violence l e d to sporadic p o l i t i c a l v i o l e n c e i n the Tamil areas, p a r t i c u l a r l y i n the n o r t h . ' 7 The Tamil Student F e d e r a t i o n (TSF) was i n the f o r e f r o n t of Tamil m i l i t a n c y and v i o l e n c e , which was d i r e c t e d against government p r o p e r t i e s and i n s t i t u t i o n s . In response there was p o l i c e b r u t a l i t y a g a i n s t Tamils, i n c l u d i n g the 'planned k i l l i n g s ' of e i g h t Tamils at . the Fourth I n t e r n a t i o n a l Conference of Tamil Research i n J a f f n a on January 1 0, 1 974. 1 , 8 The government's harsh response under i t s emergency powers d i d c o n t a i n , but c o u l d not e l i m i n a t e , p o l i t i c a l v i o l e n c e i n the no r t h . As a r e s u l t of these c l a s h e s , p o l i t i c a l v i o l e n c e was g r a d u a l l y accepted by Tamils as a v i a b l e and a t t r a c t i v e a l t e r n a t i v e to non-violence. How d i d the moderate Tamil l e a d e r s h i p react to the changing p o l i t i c a l environment i n the Tamil areas? S.J.V. Chelvanayagam, the leader of the FP, resigned h i s seat i n 1972 i n p r o t e s t a g a i n s t the government's f a i l u r e to i n c o r p o r a t e a s i n g l e Tamil demand i n t o the new c o n s t i t u t i o n . * 9 He chall e n g e d the government to hold a b y - e l e c t i o n to t e s t Tamil response to the new c o n s t i t u t i o n . The UF government, as p r e v i o u s l y , responded by postponing the b y - e l e c t i o n f o r over two years. But 64 Chelvanayagam won the b y - e l e c t i o n handsomely in January 1975. 5 0 Due to pressure from the d i s i l l u s i o n e d youth and the need fo r a dynamic p o l i t i c a l agenda f o r i t s p o l i t i c a l s u r v i v a l , the TUF advocated s e p a r a t i o n . Chelvanayagam s t a t e d i n 1975 a f t e r h i s e l e c t i o n v i c t o r y : "I wish to announce to my people and to the country that I c o n s i d e r the v e r d i c t at t h i s e l e c t i o n as a mandate that the Tamil Eelam n a t i o n should e x e r c i s e the s o v e r e i g n t y a l r e a d y vested i n the Tamil people and become f r e e . " 5 1 In May 1976, at Vaddukoddai, the TUF changed i t s name to Tamil United L i b e r a t i o n Front (TULF) and r e s o l v e d that " r e s t o r a t i o n and r e c o n s t i t u t i o n of the Free, Sovereign, S e c u l a r , S o c i a l i s t State of Tamil Eelam ... has become i n e v i t a b l e i n order to safeguard the very e x i s t e n c e of the Tamil n a t i o n i n t h i s c o u n t r y . " 5 2 The p a r t y — under the j o i n t l e a d e r s h i p of Chelvanayagam, Ponnambalam and Thondaman — was e n l i v e n e d by the adoption of the h i g h l y a g g r e s s i v e and p r o v o c a t i v e goal of Tamil Eelam. Along with i t s t r a d i t i o n a l support, the TULF a t t r a c t e d the new youth v o t e s . t o score an impressive e l e c t i o n v i c t o r y i n 1977; the party won a l l fourteen seats i n the north and a four out of f i v e c o n s t i t u e n c i e s with a Tamil m a j o r i t y i n the e a s t . 5 3 The dismal f a i l u r e of non-violence i n the past twenty years had not d e t e r r e d the TULF from adopting t h i s p o l i c y to secure i t s o b j e c t i v e . E x p e c t a t i o n s among the youth had been in c r e a s e d by the TULF's commitment to " l i b e r a t e " the Tamils and to lead them to the promised land of Eelam. However, the TULF was committed to parliamentary democracy and ahimsa (non-65 v i o l e n c e ) to win Eelam. In the meantime, p o l i c e r e p r e s s i o n , p o l i t i c a l and economic d i s c r i m i n a t i o n , the S i n h a l e s e government's uncompromising stand, together with the TULF's r h e t o r i c a l Tamil n a t i o n a l i s m , had dangerously p o l a r i z e d the p o l i t i c a l environment. In such an environment, p o l i t i c a l v i o l e n c e took deep root i n the Tamil areas. Tamil a l i e n a t i o n i n S r i Lanka and the consequent breakdown of communication between north and south brought the S r i Lankan Tamils c l o s e r to Tamils i n India's Tamil Nadu s t a t e . 5 " The Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam (DMK), with i t s strong Tamil n a t i o n a l i s t sentiments, c a l l e d f o r the accommodation of S r i Lankan Tamil i n t e r e s t s and d i d not h e s i t a t e to express i t s sympathy f o r the Tamil cause. The breakup of the DMK i n the e a r l y 1970s, moreover, caused both the DMK and the A l l - I n d i a Anna Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam (AIADMK) to compete with each other i n championing S r i Lankan Tamil i n t e r e s t s . The e t h n i c bond between the S r i Lankan and Indian Tamils transcends narrow p o l i t i c a l d i f f e r e n c e s . But both p a r t i e s were o f t e n motivated by e l e c t o r a l c o n s i d e r a t i o n r a t h e r than genuine sympathy f o r the S r i Lankan Tamils, at l e a s t i n the 1970s. Tamil Nadu provided a safe haven f o r youths running away from S r i Lankan s t a t e r e p r e s s i o n and g r a d u a l l y became the headquarters of the v a r i o u s g u e r r i l l a movements. T h e i r c l o s e c o n t a c t with Tamil Nadu, together with the Indian r o l e i n the s u c c e s s f u l l i b e r a t i o n of Bangladesh, c r e a t e d a p e r c e p t i o n among Tamils i n S r i Lanka that "Mother I n d i a " c o u l d be r e l i e d upon f o r the p r o t e c t i o n and the l i b e r a t i o n of S r i Lankan Tamils. Tamil p o l i t i c a l e l i t e s , youth l e a d e r s and e x p a t r i a t e s c u l t i v a t e d the Indian connection in the 66 1970s. The 'double m i n o r i t y ' e f f e c t c r e a t e d a permanent i n s e c u r i t y among the S i n h a l e s e which helps e x p l a i n t h e i r d i f f i c u l t y i n reaching a compromise with the Tamils. The massive e l e c t i o n v i c t o r y i n 1970 enabled the UF to r u l e the country, i g n o r i n g the fundamental demands of the Tamil m i n o r i t y . The UF ideology, h e a v i l y i n f l u e n c e d by S i n h a l a -Buddhist n a t i o n a l i s m , was i r r e c o n c i l a b l e with the emerging 'defensive' Tamil n a t i o n a l i s m . The UF government p o l i c y can be e x p l a i n e d i n terms of the theory of c o n t r o l . The government d i d not engage i n b a r g a i n i n g or make compromises but t r i e d to. e x e r c i s e c o n t r o l over m i n o r i t y Tamils (subordinate segment). Consequently, the moderate Tamil p a r t y had no r o l e i n the decision-making process. As a r e s u l t , the Tamils' f a i t h i n the i n s t i t u t i o n s of the country eroded. The youth, p a r t i c u l a r l y , were disenchanted with the t r a d i t i o n a l p o l i t i c a l l e a d e r s h i p and i t s p o l i t i c a l s t r a t e g i e s . Because no p o l i t i c a l avenues were a v a i l a b l e to express t h e i r growing f r u s t r a t i o n ' a g a i n s t the system, t h i s post-independent generation of Tamils, which grew up i n an e t h n i c a l l y acrimonious environment, became r a d i c a l i z e d . They soon r e s o r t e d to v i o l e n c e when n e i t h e r the S i n h a l e s e nor the Tamil l e a d e r s h i p was able to . r e s o l v e t h e i r g rievances w i t h i n the e x i s t i n g p o l i t i c a l system. The theory of o u t b i d d i n g p a r t l y e x p l a i n s the f a i l u r e of the UF government in the 1970s to reach an accommodation with the Tamils. The development of a h i g h l y competitive two-party system r e i n f o r c e d the communalization of the p o l i t i c a l process i n S r i Lanka. Hence the p r a c t i c e of o u t b i d d i n g by the two ' n a t i o n a l ' p a r t i e s in a h i g h l y communal environment blocked any 67 accommodative p o l i c i e s towards the m i n o r i t y Tamils. The UF government l e d by the SLFP adopted openly p r o - S i n h a l e s e p o l i c i e s and the UNP d i d not oppose them because o p p o s i t i o n to ' n a t i o n a l i s t ' p o l i c i e s would give the UNP an a n t i - S i n h a l a -Buddhist image, as i n 1956. Thus, the SLFP prevented the UNP from s t a g i n g a p o l i t i c a l comeback on e t h n i c i s s u e s . The i n f l e x i b i l i t y of the Sinhalese l e a d e r s h i p on v i t a l Tamil demands brought enormous pressure on moderate Tamil l e a d e r s who faced i n c r e a s i n g competition from extremist Tamils. The moderate Tamil p a r t i e s , to a v o i d o u t b i d d i n g by the emerging r a d i c a l s , were compelled to adopt a s e c e s s i o n i s t p o l i c y in the 1970s. The 'Carrot and S t i c k ' E t h n i c P o l i c y of the UNP: C o n s o l i d a t i o n  of the S e c e s s i o n i s t Challenge 1977-1982 The SLFP's Sinhala-Buddhist n a t i o n a l i s t support base, along with i t s past c h a u v i n i s t i c stand on language and r e l i g i o u s i s s u e s , c o n t r i b u t e d to the p a r t y ' s f a i l u r e to win the support of the Tamils. The SLFP was considered an " a n t i - T a m i l " p a r t y and i t s record during 1970-1977 confirmed t h i s p e r c e p t i o n among the Tamils. The UNP under Jayewardene, d e s p i t e i t s o p p o r t u n i s t i c n a t i o n a l i s t i c p o l i c i e s i n the post-1956 p e r i o d , was c o n s i d e r e d more responsive to Tamil grievances than the U F . 5 5 The UNP e l e c t i o n manifesto i n 1977, which recognized the demands of the Tamils and promised accommodative p o l i c i e s , r e i n f o r c e d i t s 'sympathetic image.' The 1977 UNP manifesto s t a t e d : The United N a t i o n a l Party accepts the p o s i t i o n that there are numerous problems c o n f r o n t i n g the Tamil-68 speaking people. The lack of a s o l u t i o n to t h e i r problems has made the Tamil-speaking people even support a movement f o r the c r e a t i o n of a separate s t a t e ... The p a r t y , when i t comes to power, w i l l take a l l p o s s i b l e steps to remedy t h e i r grievances i n such f i e l d s as: (1) Education; (2) C o l o n i s a t i o n ; (3) The use of the Tamil Language; (4) Employment in the p u b l i c [ s e c t o r ] and semi-public c o r p o r a t i o n s . We w i l l summon an A l l - P a r t y Conference as s t a t e d e a r l i e r and implement i t s d e c i s i o n . 5 6 For the f i r s t time a ' n a t i o n a l ' party had taken a stand on the management of e t h n i c i s s u e s , f o c u s i n g on the main Tamil g r i e v a n c e s . The e t h n i c p o l i c y s p e l l e d out i n the manifesto a l s o i m p l i e d that the UNP l e a d e r s h i p understood the causes of the nascent Tamil s e c e s s i o n i s t movement. The UNP had always been a b e t t e r organized party than i t s main r i v a l the SLFP, and s i n c e 1973 under \Jayewardene, the p a r t y ' s o r g a n i z a t i o n a l s t r e n g t h had been s i g n i f i c a n t l y s t r e n g t h e n e d . 5 7 Moreover, the UNP appealed to the c o n s e r v a t i v e and i n d i v i d u a l i s t i c Tamils, p a r t i c u l a r l y those with p r o f e s s i o n a l and commercial i n t e r e s t s . Jayewardene was seen as a moderate capable of c o n v i n c i n g the m a j o r i t y Sinhalese of the need to meet b a s i c Tamil demands. Jayewardene was a l s o p e r c e i v e d as a tough and strong leader capable of d e a l i n g e f f e c t i v e l y with v i o l e n c e emanating e i t h e r from the north ( s e c e s s i o n i s t v i o l e n c e ) or the south ( S i n h a l a -B u d d h i s t - l e d communal v i o l e n c e from the r i g h t and Marxist i n s u r r e c t i o n from the l e f t ) . In short, a w e l l - o r g a n i z e d p a r t y under the shrewd and tough l e a d e r s h i p of Jayewardene was f u l l y aware of the s e c e s s i o n i s t pressure and provided hope for Tamils that t h e i r grievances would be redressed. Jayewardene used a mix of c o n t r o l and c o n s o c i a t i o n a l i s m techniques i n h i s attempt to r e g u l a t e e t h n i c c o n f l i c t and, as a r e s u l t , c o u l d appeal to both e t h n i c groups. Furthermore, economic hardships dur i n g the 69 r u l e of the UF government had i n c r e a s e d the s a l i e n c e of economic i s s u e s r e l a t i v e to e t h n i c concerns. Therefore o u t b i d d i n g by p o l i t i c a l entrepreneurs from the dominant e t h n i c group was i n e f f e c t i v e i n 1977. The UNP won a l a n d s l i d e v i c t o r y i n J u l y 1977. 5 8 The 'new look' UNP e x p l o i t e d the widespread disenchantment with the SLFP and i t s former l e f t i s t c o a l i t i o n p a r t n e r s . The UNP won 146 seats out of 168 and secured a massive m a j o r i t y . The SLFP was reduced to e i g h t seats and the l e f t was wiped o f f the e l e c t o r a l map. The TULF, with eighteen s e a t s , became the main o p p o s i t i o n p a r t y . 5 9 A. Amirthalingam, who was e l e c t e d as the S e c r e t a r y -General of the TULF a f t e r the deaths of Chelvanayagam and Ponnambalam, became the leader of the o p p o s i t i o n . 6 0 Apart from the south, the UNP was s u c c e s s f u l i n the Muslim and S i n h a l e s e -dominated c o n s t i t u e n c i e s i n the e a s t . The UNP's only success i n a Tamil c o n s t i t u e n c y was at Kalkudah, where B i l l Devanayagam won with a small m a j o r i t y . Outside the north and east, the m a j o r i t y of the Tamil votes went to the UNP. However, any hope of e a r l y r e c o n c i l i a t i o n through accommodative p o l i c y was s h a t t e r e d by the e r u p t i o n of a n t i -Tamil r i o t s across the country i n August 1977 -- the f i r s t s i n c e 1958. 6 1 The r i o t s l a s t e d over two weeks, r e s u l t i n g in the deaths of over one hundred persons. The r i o t s a l s o c r e a t e d 40,000-50,000 r e f u g e e s . 6 2 I r o n i c a l l y , the p l a n t a t i o n Tamils and Colombo-based Tamils, who. voted overwhelmingly f o r the UNP, were most a f f e c t e d . The government, d e s p i t e the i n t e n s i t y of the v i o l e n c e , refused to r e s t o r e order through emergency r e g u l a t i o n s . 6 3 The r i o t s of August 1977 r e i n f o r c e d the demand 70 f o r Eelam and a l s o strengthened,the c o n v i c t i o n that v i o l e n c e was the only way to achieve Eelam. The moderate TULF, which campaigned on a s e c e s s i o n i s t p l a t f o r m , c o u l d not compromise on Eelam a f t e r the a n t i - T a m i l v i o l e n c e . The r i o t s a l s o r a i s e d doubts about the UNP government's a b i l i t y and w i l l i n g n e s s to c o n t r o l a n t i - T a m i l v i o l e n c e and pro-Sinhala-Buddhist chauvinism. The r i o t s t a r n i s h e d the ' r e c o n c i l e r ' image of the UNP. The e r u p t i o n of e t h n i c v i o l e n c e may be i n t e r p r e t e d e i t h e r as a c o n t r o l measure i n s t i g a t e d by the UNP to i n t i m i d a t e the Tamils or as an o u t b i d d i n g technique by the SLFP to in c r e a s e the s a l i e n c e of e t h n i c i t y . The government appointed a ten-member s e l e c t committee to amend the 1972 c o n s t i t u t i o n on October 3, 1977. The TULF boycotted the process of c o n s t i t u t i o n a l r e v i s i o n . Amirthalingam gave h i s reasons f o r the TULF's r e f u s a l to p a r t i c i p a t e in the S e l e c t Committee as f o l l o w s : The UNP had a c l e a r unequivocal mandate to a s s e r t the sovereignty of the S i n h a l a n a t i o n and a new c o n s t i t u t i o n . The mandate of the m a j o r i t y of the Tamil n a t i o n p o i n t e d to a d i f f e r e n t d u t y . 6 * The moderate TULF boycotted the c o n s t i t u t i o n a l proceedings because the s u c c e s s f u l s e p a r a t i s t e l e c t i o n campaign of J u l y 1977 and the a n t i - T a m i l v i o l e n c e of August 1977 had l i m i t e d the p o l i t i c a l manoeuvreability of the p a r t y . The TULF would have l o s t i t s c r e d i b i l i t y among the Tamil e l e c t o r a t e i f i t had n e g o t i a t e d with the government without f i r s t making a gesture to e s t a b l i s h Eelam. The SLFP withdrew from the committee when i t . r e a l i z e d that the government's i n t e n t i o n was not to amend the 1972 c o n s t i t u t i o n , but to d r a f t a new one. Thus the new c o n s t i t u t i o n 71 was almost e x c l u s i v e l y a UNP-inspired document. The new c o n s t i t u t i o n , introduced on 7th September 1978, was based on the F i f t h French R e p u b l i c . 6 5 T h i s c o n s t i t u t i o n provided s i g n i f i c a n t language and c i t i z e n s h i p r i g h t s f o r the Tamils. In S r i Lanka, concessions — one of s i x c o n f l i c t r e g u l a t i n g p r a c t i c e s in e t h n i c a l l y - d i v i d e d s o c i e t i e s suggested by N o r d l i n g e r — became the most frequent method of accommodating Tamil demands. For i n s t a n c e , A r t i c l e 19 d e c l a r e d Tamil along with S i n h a l a to be a n a t i o n a l language. A r t i c l e 26 a b o l i s h e d the d i s t i n c t i o n between c i t i z e n s by descent and c i t i z e n s by r e g i s t r a t i o n . Moreover, the e x t e n s i v e fundamental r i g h t s i n c o r p o r a t e d i n the new c o n s t i t u t i o n were c o n s i d e r e d adequate safeguards to the m i n o r i t i e s a g a i n s t a r b i t r a r y government a c t i o n ( A r t i c l e s 10-14). The c o n s t i t u t i o n a l s o changed the e l e c t o r a l system from a f i r s t - p a s t - t h e - p o s t system to p r o p o r t i o n a l r e p r e s e n t a t i o n . The new e l e c t o r a l system enhanced the r o l e of Tamils in determining both-the f u t u r e p r e s i d e n t and the government. K.M. de S i l v a a s s e r t e d that "no c o n s t i t u t i o n , not even that of 1947, o f f e r e d the m i n o r i t i e s a more secure p o s i t i o n w i t h i n the S r i Lanka p o l i t y than the present [1978] o n e . " 6 6 But the 1978 c o n s t i t u t i o n a l s o r e a f f i r m e d S i n h a l a as the o f f i c i a l language of S r i Lanka ( A r t i c l e 18) and provided the foremost plac e to Buddhism by r e c o g n i z i n g that the duty of the s t a t e was to p r o t e c t and f o s t e r Buddhism ( A r t i c l e 19). In a d d i t i o n , the fundamental r i g h t s were subjected to a wide range of r e s t r i c t i o n s that c o u l d be imposed by the government ( A r t i c l e 15.7). There was a l s o no p r o v i s i o n f o r d e v o l u t i o n of 72 power i n the c o n s t i t u t i o n . The c o n s t i t u t i o n a l machinery i n c l u d i n g r e s p o n s i b l e parliament, an independent j u d i c i a r y and a responsive bureaucracy was too weak i n S r i Lanka to ensure the s u c c e s s f u l working of the c o n s t i t u t i o n . 6 7 F i n a l l y , the new c o n s t i t u t i o n was not accepted by e i t h e r the SLFP or the TULF, and consequently lacked widespread l e g i t i m a c y . The Tamils d i d not respond p o s i t i v e l y to the c o n s t i t u t i o n a l accommodative p o l i c y of the government because the S r i Lankan government p r e v i o u s l y passed l e g i s l a t i o n aimed at accommodation of Tamil demands, but lacked the p o l i t i c a l w i l l to implement i t . Furthermore, the a n t i - T a m i l v i o l e n c e of 1977 had once again exposed t h e i r v u l n e r a b i l i t y . Not s u r p r i s i n g l y , s e c e s s i o n i s t sentiment was not defused, nor v i o l e n c e c o n t a i n e d i n the n o r t h . The government's accommodative p o l i c i e s were inadequate i n a context . of s e c e s s i o n i s t a l i e n a t i o n . In a d d i t i o n , the i n i t i a l lack of cooperation from moderate Tamil e l i t e s a l s o c o n t r i b u t e d to the l i m i t e d success of the UNP's e t h n i c p o l i c y . Jayewardene appointed B i l l Devanayagam as the M i n i s t e r of J u s t i c e . S. Canagaratnam, the MP f o r the two member P o t t u v i l (eastern p r o v i n c e ) c o n s t i t u e n c y , who won on the TULF t i c k e t but cro s s e d over to the UNP i n December 1977, was made the D i s t r i c t M i n i s t e r of B a t t i c a l o a . A r t i c l e 16 of the 1978 c o n s t i t u t i o n was amended to accommodate the c r o s s i n g over of C. Rajadurai (1st MP B a t t i c a l o a ) , a senior v i c e p r e s i d e n t of the TULF. 6 8 He was rewarded with the ca b i n e t post of Regional Development. Jayewardene a l s o appointed S. Thondaman, the leader of the l a r g e s t p l a n t a t i o n trade union, the Ceylon Workers' Congress, 73 to the cabinet.'Thondaman was the f i r s t p l a n t a t i o n Tamil to h o l d a c a b i n e t post. The UNP c a b i n e t contained the l a r g e s t number of Tamils i n the post-independent p e r i o d . But the government's attempt to a t t r a c t MPs from the north to the c a b i n e t f a i l e d because s e c e s s i o n i s t sentiments were stronger and a l s o because of the i n c r e a s i n g number of p o l i t i c a l murders i n the north. E l i t e c o o p e r a t i o n , an important i n g r e d i e n t i n c o n s o c i a t i o n a l i s m , was c o n s t r a i n e d by o u t b i d d i n g from the e x t r e m i s t s . As a r e s u l t of t h i s o u t b i d d i n g , a c o a l i t i o n government, one of the more a t t a i n a b l e c o n f l i c t - r e g u l a t i n g measures i n S r i Lanka, c o u l d not be formed. Si n h a l e s e and Muslim m i n i s t e r s dominated the key cabin e t p o r t f o l i o s , namely, the employment-generating m i n i s t r i e s or m i n i s t r i e s producing g r e a t e r economic b e n e f i t s . 6 9 Moreover, the government's r e c o n c i l i a t o r y p o l i c y towards the Tamils was accompanied by a c t i v e a n t i - T a m i l statements by s e n i o r c a b i n e t m i n i s t e r s . C y r i l Mathew, a strong S i n h a l a -Buddhist c h a u v i n i s t , and Gamini Dissanayake, a l s o a staunch 'Sinhala n a t i o n a l i s t , ' were appointed to the c a b i n e t . 7 0 These m i n i s t e r s were i n the f o r e f r o n t of a n t i - T a m i l a c t i v i t i e s . The P r e s i d e n t d i d not take steps to c o n t r o l the c h a u v i n i s t i c stand of such m i n i s t e r s because he d i d not want to undermine the extreme Sinhala-Buddhist support base by being h o s t i l e to such an i n t e r e s t . 7 1 As a r e s u l t , a p o l i t i c a l environment conducive to r a t i o n a l n e g o t i a t i o n was never c r e a t e d . Jayewardene pursued an e t h n i c p o l i c y that f a i l e d to i n s p i r e confidence among the Tamil m i n o r i t y . I n e v i t a b l y , Tamil a l i e n a t i o n remained h i g h . Overarching e l i t e c o o p e r a t i o n and s t a b l e n o n - e l i t e support 74 two necessary c o n d i t i o n s f o r the success of c o n s o c i a t i o n a l i s m — were absent in S r i Lanka. In a d d i t i o n to the c o n s t i t u t i o n a l concessions and c a b i n e t appointments, the government a b o l i s h e d the c o n t r o v e r s i a l p o l i c y of s t a n d a r d i z a t i o n i n the u n i v e r s i t y admission p o l i c y . As a d i r e c t r e s u l t , the number of Tamils e n t e r i n g the medical and e n g i n e e r i n g f a c u l t i e s i n c r e a s e d by 250% i n the academic year 1978-79, compared to 1977-78. 7 2 The government accommodated Sinhala-Buddhist i n t e r e s t s by i n c r e a s i n g the t o t a l intake of the u n i v e r s i t y . The government adopted a new admission p o l i c y for 1979-80 which introduced a n a t i o n a l and d i s t r i c t quota system based on raw marks. 7 3 The average share of the Tamils i n e n g i n e e r i n g and medicine was 28% and 22% in the post-1978 p e r i o d . 7 " The new admission system ensured that the S i n h a l e s e r a t i o i n the u n i v e r s i t y was i n p r o p o r t i o n to i t s r a t i o of the p o p u l a t i o n . For i n s t a n c e , the average percentage of the S i n h a l e s e i n t o t a l u n i v e r s i t y admissions was 75% i n 1980-83, and t h e i r percentage i n the p o p u l a t i o n was 74% in 1981. 7 5 However, employment o p p o r t u n i t i e s f o r Tamils i n the s t a t e s e c t o r r e g i s t e r e d a d e c l i n e i n the post-1977 p e r i o d . The 1978 c o n s t i t u t i o n r e i n t r o d u c e d a p u b l i c s e r v i c e commission but the r e s p o n s i b l e cabinet m i n i s t e r r e t a i n e d appointment, t r a n s f e r and d i s m i s s a l powers ( A r t i c l e 5 9 ) . 7 6 Under the UNP s t a t e employment was c o n t r o l l e d by members of parliament through a job bank system. Each MP was given 1,000 job bank forms to be handed over to the c o n s t i t u e n t s chosen by h i m . 7 7 The TULF was excluded from the job bank scheme. Recruitment of Tamils i n the s t a t e s e c t o r was thus extremely low. The number of Tamils r e c r u i t e d 75 to the general c l e r i c a l s e r v i c e s was 11% of t o t a l recruitment i n 1970-77, but dropped to 5.4% i n 1978-81. 7 8 The Tamil share i n the recruitment of school teachers was 6.1% between J u l y 1977 and October 1977, but the share of the Tamil graduate school teachers d u r i n g t h i s p e r i o d was 0%. 7 9 The low recruitment r a t e was evident a l s o i n the, upper l e v e l of government s e r v i c e s . For i n s t a n c e , the recruitment share of Tamils i n the a d m i n i s t r a t i v e s e r v i c e s dropped sharply from 11.1% i n 1970-77 to 5.7% i n 1977-81. 8 0 A l s o , the government's major economic p o l i c i e s d i d not provide t a n g i b l e b e n e f i t s f o r the Tamils. The Mahaweli Development P r o j e c t b e n e f i t e d the S i n h a l e s e s e t t l e r s i n the dry zone. The Free Trade Zone was opened in the south and provided g r e a t e r employment o p p o r t u n i t i e s to s e m i - s k i l l e d and u n s k i l l e d S i n h a l e s e . The north and east - the economic p e r i p h e r i e s — were r e l a t i v e l y untouched by the major economic changes introduced by the UNP. Widespread unemployment e x i s t e d , p a r t i c u l a r l y among the h i g h - s c h o o l (General C e r t i f i c a t e of Education - Advanced Level) q u a l i f i e d y o u t h . 8 1 Youth f r u s t r a t i o n p e r s i s t e d . The p o l i t i c a l v i o l e n c e which began in 1972 continued unabated i n the post-1977 p e r i o d d e s p i t e government proclamations that the b a s i c demands of the Tamils had been s a t i s f i e d . V i o l e n c e was d i r e c t e d a g a i n s t policemen, informants and o p p o s i t i o n p o l i t i c i a n s . Canagaratnam, the TULF MP, who c r o s s e d over to the UNP, s u r v i v e d an a s s a s s i n a t i o n attempt i n January 1978. 8 2 Tamil policemen who i n v e s t i g a t e d Tamil v i o l e n c e were s y s t e m a t i c a l l y murdered. An Inspector of the C r i m i n a l 76 I n v e s t i g a t i o n Department (CID), B a s t i a n p i l l a i , who was a l e a d i n g i n v e s t i g a t o r of Tamil v i o l e n c e , was a s s a s s i n a t e d i n A p r i l 1978. 8 3 Banks, post o f f i c e s and schools were robbed. The v i o l e n c e exposed the p o l i c e as a f o r c e incapable of m a i n t a i n i n g law and order. The " s p e c t a c u l a r successes" of the m i l i t a n t s , and the government f a i l u r e to c o n t a i n them, r e s u l t e d i n two new developments: (1) the p o l i c e adopted b r u t a l methods; (2) the ' r a d i c a l ' communalism emerged in the south. Consequently, by mid-1979, the e r u p t i o n of communal v i o l e n c e was imminent. The government d e c l a r e d an emergency on J u l y 12, 1979 and sent B r i g a d i e r T.I. Weeratunga, Chief of S t a f f of the S r i Lankan Army, to J a f f n a to wipe out t e r r o r i s m before the end of the y e a r . 8 " The r e b e l s went underground. The m i l i t a r y , c l o t h e d with e x t e n s i v e powers under The Prevention of T e r r o r i s m Act, approached the s i t u a t i o n i n J a f f n a i n terms of a S i n h a l a - T a m i l c o n f r o n t a t i o n i n s t e a d of a law-and-order maintenance duty. The S i n h a l a Buddhist-dominated army and p o l i c e , o p e r a t i n g i n an a l i e n environment with language and r e l i g i o u s b a r r i e r s , i n c r e a s e d the h o s t i l i t y between the general p u b l i c and armed f o r c e s . H o s t i l i t y between c i v i l i a n s and the m i l i t a r y deepened on account of the excesses committed by an u n d i s c i p l i n e d army. The emergence of s t a t e t e r r o r i s m c o i n c i d e d with the e r o s i o n of confidence i n the TULF. The n a t u r a l deaths of Chelvanayagam and Ponnambalam in e a r l y 1977 had l e f t a vacuum in the Tamil l e a d e r s h i p . The TULF had been e l e c t o r a l l y s u c c e s s f u l because of the emotional appeal of Tamil Eelam. Amirthalingam became the leader of o p p o s i t i o n a f t e r the J u l y 1977 e l e c t i o n . However, the TULF f a i l e d to take 77 any concrete measures e i t h e r to e s t a b l i s h Eelam or e x t r a c t adequate concessions from the government. The TULF e l e c t i o n manifesto s t a t e d that the e l e c t e d Tamil MPs would form the N a t i o n a l Assembly of Tamil Eelam and d r a f t a c o n s t i t u t i o n f o r the s t a t e of E e l a m . 8 5 But once i n s i d e the n a t i o n a l l e g i s l a t u r e , the TULF, d e s p i t e pressure from the r a d i c a l s w i t h i n the p a r t y , refused to d r a f t an Eelam c o n s t i t u t i o n . The new l e a d e r s h i p of the TULF r e l i e d on a constant d i a l o g u e with Jayewardene to 'solve' Tamil g r i e v a n c e s . The TULF d i d not take a s i n g l e non-v i o l e n t step to pressure the government to grant concessions to the T a m i l s . 8 6 Furthermore, the TULF f a i l e d to take a f i r m stand on v i o l e n c e , but i n c r e a s i n g l y saw the m i l i t a n t s as a source of embarrassment to the p a r t y . The death of Chelvanayagam a l s o removed a c h a r i s m a t i c leader who h e l d together v a r i o u s f a c t i o n s w i t h i n the p a r t y . Amirthalingam c o u l d not e x e r c i s e such c o n t r o l and the p o l i c y c o n t r a d i c t i o n s i n c r e a s e d s t r e s s and s t r a i n i n the p a r t y . The moderate Tamil l e a d e r s h i p as suggested i n the theory was o u t b i d by r a d i c a l s who promised Tamils more than the TULF was able to o f f e r them. The TULF, a party 'pushed' i n t o the r a d i c a l p o l i t i c a l f i e l d i n the mid-1970s, was not prepared to lead the Tamils i n a h i g h l y communalized environment. The pa r t y ' s f i r m commitment to parliamentary democracy and non-violence was becoming i r r e l e v a n t i n the i n c r e a s i n g l y v i o l e n t north. Jayewardene, a shrewd p o l i t i c i a n , r e a l i z e d the dilemma of TULF and e x p l o i t e d i t to d i s c r e d i t the p a r t y . He s u c c e s s f u l l y c r e a t e d a r i f t between the r a d i c a l s and moderates among Tamils, i n the process weakening the once strong TULF c o n s i d e r a b l y . The Pres i d e n t 78 c o r r e c t l y a n t i c i p a t e d that the TULF would be s u s c e p t i b l e to p o l i t i c a l pressure and accept the government's r e c o n c i l i a t i o n p o l i c i e s . The novice Tamil l e a d e r s h i p came to r e l y h e a v i l y on Jayewardene to 'help' them s e t t l e the Tamil i s s u e s . By mid-1979, Jayewardene r e a l i z e d the g r a v i t y of the e t h n i c t e n s i o n that threatened to to tear apart the n a t i o n . He decided to introduce the D i s t r i c t Development C o u n c i l s (DDC) as a means f o r d e c e n t r a l i z i n g a d m i n i s t r a t i o n . The government sought and r e c e i v e d the a s s i s t a n c e of the TULF i n t h i s attempt to defuse e t h n i c t e n s i o n . The government appointed a 1ten-member p r e s i d e n t i a l commission on the 10th of August, 1979. The commission which comprised four S i n h a l e s e , three Tamils and three Muslims was headed by a r e t i r e d C h ief J u s t i c e . 8 7 However only the TULF and the UNP nominated members to the commission. 8 8 The m a j o r i t y of the Commissioners recommended weak DDCs as the answer to a system of d e v o l u t i o n . In a d d i t i o n , the m a j o r i t y report provided s k e l e t a l recommendations on d e c e n t r a l i z a t i o n . Neelan Tiruchelvam, the TULF r e p r e s e n t a t i v e , submitted a separate d i s s e n t i n g r e p o r t . 8 9 Furthermore, the commission's report l e f t many quest i o n s on d e v o l u t i o n of power unanswered. Consequently, the government used the d e t a i l s of Tiruchelvam's report to d r a f t the Development C o u n c i l A c t . The Development C o u n c i l Act No. 35 paved the way f o r the establishment of twenty-four DDCs i n the country. The UNP, the TULF and the JVP c o n t e s t e d the DDC e l e c t i o n s on June 4, 1981. A l l the other major p a r t i e s boycotted the e l e c t i o n . The government co n s i d e r e d the J a f f n a DDC e l e c t i o n as a " p r e s t i g e b a t t l e " with the TULF, and was determined to win at 79 l e a s t one seat i n the e l e c t i o n . A. Th i a g a r a j a h , a former TC MP f o r Vaddukoddai and a J a f f n a P o l i t i c a l A u t h o r i t y ( D i s t r i c t M i n i s t e r ) under the UF government, was the l e a d i n g UNP candidate i n the f i r s t e l e c t i o n h e l d under the p r o p o r t i o n a l r e p r e s e n t a t i o n e l e c t o r a l system. However, Th i a g a r a j a h was a s s a s s i n a t e d on 25th May 1981. 9 0 Soon afterwards the k i l l i n g of two policemen on 31st May 1981 l e d to a p o l i c e rampage i n J a f f n a . The J a f f n a p u b l i c l i b r a r y , J a f f n a MP Yogeswaran's house and a Tamil newspaper o f f i c e were burned down. 9 1 The government responded by d e t a i n i n g TULF p o l i t i c i a n s u n d e r house a r r e s t , and the e l e c t i o n was h e l d under emergency r e g u l a t i o n s i n J a f f n a . The TULF captured a l l ten seats d e s p i t e the government's attempt to r i g the e l e c t i o n i n order to win r e p r e s e n t a t i o n i n the J a f f n a D i s t r i c t Development C o u n c i l . 9 2 The TULF captured a l l the Tamil D i s t r i c t Development C o u n c i l s . For f i n a n c i a l and a d m i n i s t r a t i v e reasons, the c o u n c i l s f a i l e d . 9 3 In 1983 a committee was appointed by Jayewardene to study the o p e r a t i o n of the DDC system to make i t more e f f e c t i v e . 9 9 The o b j e c t i v e of the establishment of DDCs was to f i n d a p o l i t i c a l s o l u t i o n to the Tamil i s s u e . But the e l e c t i o n v i o l e n c e and the i n e f f e c t i v e n e s s of the c o u n c i l s destroyed any p o s s i b l e e t h n i c r e c o n c i l i a t i o n based on DDCs. The m i l i t a n t s who campaigned f o r the boycott of the DDCs were v i n d i c a t e d by the dismal f a i l u r e of the DDCs. The Tamils' i n a b i l i t y to o b t a i n v i a b l e p o l i t i c a l i n s t i t u t i o n s f o r the d e v o l u t i o n of a u t h o r i t y d i s c r e d i t e d the TULF. The f a i l u r e of the government's accommodative measures f u r t h e r reduced the support of Tamil n o n - e l i t e s . Thus, the moderate l e a d e r s h i p was undermined and 80 the c r e d i b i l i t y of the c o u n t e r - e l i t e s was enhanced. The government, i n s t e a d of attempting to regain the confidence of the moderate Tamils, engaged i n an 'open' a n t i -Tamil campaign duri n g the summer of 1981. The DDC e l e c t i o n v i o l e n c e was followed by the government MPs'-sponsored vote of no confidence against the TULF leader of the o p p o s i t i o n . 9 5 A n t i - T a m i l and anti-TULF r h e t o r i c was f r e e l y p ermitted i n the Parliament. Wiswa Warnapala c a l l e d i t , "the most g l a r i n g example of 'parliamentary communalism' in S r i L a n k a . " 9 6 The c h i e f government whip's i n s t r u c t i o n that a l l the government members should be present f o r the v o t i n g c l e a r l y i n d i c a t e d the government's r o l e behind t h i s m o t i o n . 9 7 The motion was passed with 121 government MPs v o t i n g f o r i t . The government's a r o u s a l of communal passions i n the Parliament, together with i t s a c t i v e r o l e i n the J a f f n a v i o l e n c e , paved the way f o r the e r u p t i o n of more a n t i - T a m i l r i o t s i n August 1981. The 1981 r i o t s , a c c o r d i n g to the Observer (London), d i r e c t e d a g a i n s t the S r i Lankan Tamils in the east and south of the country, and Indian Tamil tea e s t a t e workers i n the c e n t r a l region were not random. They were s t i m u l a t e d and i n some cases organized by members of the r u l i n g UNP, among them i n t i m a t e s of the P r e s i d e n t . " 9 8 As Milne w r i t e s , outbidding c o u l d appear from the members of the governing p a r t y and threaten the top l e a d e r s h i p . The P r e s i d e n t , a f t e r the r i o t s , expressed h i s sorrow at the a n t i - T a m i l v i o l e n c e and o f f e r e d to step down from the l e a d e r s h i p . 9 9 D i s c i p l i n a r y a c t i o n was taken against UNP M P s . 1 0 0 The UNP and TULF once again engaged i n r e g u l a r meetings with the main o b j e c t i v e of managing e t h n i c t e n s i o n . However, 81 the c r e d i b i l i t y of TULF was damaged. Simultaneously, the m i l i t a n t s strengthened t h e i r h o l d on the Tamils. S i g n i f i c a n t l y , the f i r s t g u e r r i l l a a t t a c k on the army took plac e i n October 1 9 8 1 . 1 0 1 In 1982, Jayewardene amended the c o n s t i t u t i o n again, to advance (to 1982) the p r e s i d e n t i a l e l e c t i o n scheduled f o r 1984. Disenfranchisement of Mrs. Bandaranaike i n 1980 removed the only c r e d i b l e r i v a l to Jayewardene from the e l e c t i o n . The TULF boycotted the e l e c t i o n , but t h i s was an i n d i r e c t boost to Jayewardene. He won c o m f o r t a b l y . 1 0 2 In J u l y 1977, the UNP won a l a n d s l i d e v i c t o r y under the f i r s t - p a s t - t h e - p o s t system. For i n s t a n c e , the UNP won 83.3% of the seats although i t had obtained 50.8% of the vote. However, i t would have been impossible f o r the UNP to repeat i t s success i n the parliamentary general e l e c t i o n scheduled to be h e l d under a p r o p o r t i o n a l r e p r e s e n t a t i o n system in J u l y , 1983. Jayewardene needed a t h r e e - f o u r t h s p a r l i a m e n t a r y m a j o r i t y to amend the c o n s t i t u t i o n and l e g i s l a t e changes b e n e f i c i a l both to himself and the p a r t y . Hence the P r e s i d e n t decided to h o l d a referendum to extend the l i f e of Parliament i n order to r e t a i n the massive m a j o r i t y (140 seats out of 168 i n the P a r l i a m e n t ) . The government won the referendum, but v o t i n g i r r e g u l a r i t i e s were w i d e s p r e a d . 1 0 3 The P r e s i d e n t was assured of a f i v e - s i x t h s m a j o r i t y f o r the next s i x y e a r s . The TULF maintained i t s f a i t h i n the P r e s i d e n t . The party r e f r a i n e d from n o n - v i o l e n t a g i t a t i o n a g a i n s t the government. The p a r t y a l s o attempted to d i s t a n c e i t s e l f from the m i l i t a n t s . Amirthalingam condemned the m i l i t a n t a t t a c k s . In e a r l y 1982, 82 the Secretary-General of the TULF c a t e g o r i c a l l y s t a t e d that the TULF had no connection with any p o l i t i c a l group which advocated v i o l e n c e to win i t s demands. 1 0" The t e n s i o n w i t h i n the p a r t y c r e a t e d by the l e a d e r s h i p ' s s o f t - p e d a l l i n g on the Eelam i s s u e r e s u l t e d i n a s p l i t i n the TULF i n May 1 9 8 2 . 1 0 5 The e l e c t i o n i n l a t e 1982, together with the c o r d i a l r e l a t i o n s h i p between the government and the TULF, ensured that there were no a n t i - T a m i l r i o t s i n 1982. But the m i l i t a n t s continued t h e i r a t t a c k s on the armed s e r v i c e s . S p e c t a c u l a r among the a t t a c k s was the r a i d on Chavakachcheri P o l i c e S t a t i o n on the 27th of October, 1982. 1 0 6 As suggested i n the t h e o r e t i c a l framework, Jayewardene's a b i l i t y to reach compromises with the Tamils i n the post-1977 p e r i o d was c o n s t r a i n e d by S i n h a l e s e and Tamil o u t b i d d e r s . He had r e a l i z e d the importance of d e f u s i n g the Tamil s e c e s s i o n i s t t h r e a t but was a l s o aware that any compromises with the Tamils c o u l d be e x p l o i t e d by the SLFP for i t s p o l i t i c a l s u r v i v a l . In a d d i t i o n , the e x t r e m i s t s among the UNP undermined h i s a u t h o r i t y by opposing concessions to the Tamils. As a r e s u l t , i n the eyes of more and more Tamils, the UNP's concessions were "too l i t t l e too l a t e " to s a t i s f y b a s i c Tamil demands. The UNP p o l i c y destroyed the moderate Tamil l e a d e r s h i p by exposing the i n a b i l i t y of Tamils to e x t r a c t concessions from the government. Outbidding thus became a f e a t u r e of Tamil p o l i t i c s , as extremist s e c e s s i o n i s t s who b e l i e v e d i n v i o l e n c e o u t b i d t h e i r moderate c o u n t e r p a r t s by promising more e f f e c t i v e r e s u l t s . A l l of these developments nurtured the growth of s e c e s s i o n i s t g u e r r i l l a a c t i v i t i e s . 83 A C a t a l y s t to S e c e s s i o n i s t C o n f l i c t - The 1983 R i o t s There were two major developments p r i o r to the J u l y 1983 a n t i - T a m i l r i o t s . F i r s t , s t a t e v i o l e n c e a g a i n s t the Tamils i n c r e a s e d s i g n i f i c a n t l y , p a r t i c u l a r l y i n the Vavunia and Trincomalee d i s t r i c t s . 1 0 7 The government's f a i l u r e to r e s t o r e law and order i m p l i e d i t s acquiescence in a n t i - T a m i l v i o l e n c e . Secondly, the success of the m i l i t a n t s ' c a l l f o r the boycott of l o c a l government e l e c t i o n s , d e s p i t e the TULF's p a r t i c i p a t i o n , c l e a r l y s i g n a l l e d the end of the TULF's hold i n the n o r t h . 1 0 8 By mid-1983 v i o l e n c e and c o u n t e r - v i o l e n c e had produced a dangerously communalized environment. Yet Jayewardene d i d l i t t l e to curb the i n c r e a s i n g v i o l e n c e i n the country. Instead in an i n t e r v i e w i n J u l y 1983, he s t a t e d : I am not worried about the o p i n i o n of the J a f f n a people now ... Now we cannot think of them, not about t h e i r l i v e s or of t h e i r o p i n i o n about u s . 1 0 9 Two weeks l a t e r the worst a n t i - T a m i l r i o t s i n S r i Lankan h i s t o r y broke out. J u l y 1983 c o u l d be c o n s i d e r e d the p o i n t of no r e t u r n i n the T a m i l - S i n h a l e s e r e l a t i o n s h i p . The government 'banned' the TULF by amending the c o n s t i t u t i o n , d e p r i v i n g Tamils of t h e i r p o l i t i c a l r e p r e s e n t a t i o n i n P a r l i a m e n t . 1 1 0 But no a c t i o n was taken a g a i n s t the p e r p e t r a t o r s of v i o l e n c e a g a i n s t the Tamils. The r i o t s had a profound impact on the m i l i t a n t groups. The 'death* of TULF together with the a c t i v e government r o l e i n the r i o t s s h i f t e d Tamil sympathy completely to the m i l i t a n t s . The m i l i t a n t s gained l e g i t i m a c y and r e s p e c t a b i l i t y i n the Tamil d i s t r i c t s . Recruitment to the m i l i t a n t movements s i g n i f i c a n t l y i n c r e a s e d in the post-1983 p e r i o d . F i n a l l y , the r i o t s f o r c e f u l l y imported the "Indian 84 c o n nection" i n t o the Tamil s e c e s s i o n i s t s t r u g g l e . The events of 1977-83 i l l u s t r a t e d once again the f a i l u r e of the p o l i t i c a l system to meet Tamil a s p i r a t i o n s . The c o n s t i t u t i o n a l p r o v i s i o n s on language and d e c e n t r a l i z a t i o n of a d m i n i s t r a t i o n turned out to be inadequate in the context of a v i o l e n t s e c e s s i o n i s t s t r u g g l e . Once more the Sinhala-Buddhist i n t e r e s t s , both w i t h i n and o u t s i d e the government, l i m i t e d the implementation of the government's p o l i c i e s . The TULF's excessive r e l i a n c e on p o l i t i c a l a c t o r s ( i . e . , Jayewardene) and the p o l i t i c a l system ( i . e . , p a r l i a m e n t a r y democracy) to provide s o l u t i o n s destroyed the p a r t y . In sharp c o n t r a s t , the m i l i t a n t movements' success a g a i n s t the s t a t e e s t a b l i s h e d them as a v i a b l e p o l i t i c a l f o r c e . In the end, the S r i Lankan p o l i t i c a l system i t s e l f f o s t e r e d a dynamic Tamil n a t i o n a l i s m based on v i o l e n c e which i n c r e a s i n g l y , and dangerously, threatened the u n i t a r y c h a r a c t e r of the i s l a n d s t a t e . From 1931 onwards p o l i t i c a l power, slowly but s u r e l y , was t r a n s f e r r e d to the S i n h a l e s e . They d i d not l o s e time a s s e r t i n g t h e i r m a j o r i t y s t a t u s i n the m u l t i - e t h n i c s o c i e t y . 1 1 1 Yet the e l i t e s understood the importance of system maintenance and attempted to reach an understanding on "non-negotiable" e t h n i c i s s u e s . The e a r l y e l i t e accommodation and the emergence of the UNP as an umbrella party c r e a t e d a s i t u a t i o n f o r s u c c e s s f u l c o n f l i c t management measures. But e l i t e accommodation d i d not l a s t long enough due to the disenfranchisement of up-country Tamils and the consequent breakup of the TC. Furthermore, the e l i t e - m a s s gap d u r i n g the UNP's r u l e f a i l e d to guarantee a s t a b l e n o n - e l i t e support base f o r a s u c c e s s f u l accommodative 85 p o l i c y . Emerging S i n h a l a Buddhist n a t i o n a l i s m a c c e l e r a t e d the growing S i n h a l e s e a s s e r t i v e n e s s . S i n h a l e s e c o u n t e r - e l i t e s c a p i t a l i z e d on t h i s changing atmosphere by o u t b i d d i n g the ' s e c u l a r ' government p a r t y on l i n g u i s t i c and r e l i g i o u s i s s u e s to win p o l i t i c a l power. But these entrepreneurs, once i n power, found themselves too c o n s t r a i n e d by o u t b i d d i n g from the o p p o s i t i o n to be able to accommodate the Tamil m i n o r i t y . S r i Lanka thus pro v i d e s an example which i l l u s t r a t e s the dilemma faced by the m a j o r i t y e l i t e s i n d e a l i n g with the m i n o r i t i e s . E l e c t o r a l p r e s s u r e s i n a m a j o r i t a r i a n democracy p l a c e d c o n s t r a i n t s on these e l i t e s which l i m i t e d t h e i r a b i l i t y to adopt c o n s o c i a t i o n a l measures. Outbidding among the Tamils r e s u l t e d i n the b i r t h of a ' m i l i t a n t ' n a t i o n a l i s t i c e t h n i c p a r t y . However, m a j o r i t a r i a n democracy l i m i t e d the a b i l i t y of Tamil n a t i o n a l i s t s to o b t a i n concessions from the S r i Lankan government, and r e l i a n c e on extreme n a t i o n a l i s t i c support bases by both Tamil and S i n h a l e s e e l i t e s dangerously communalized the p o l i t i c a l system. Moreover, the management of e t h n i c c o n f l i c t by the UNP under Jayewardene i n v o l v e d a mix of c o n t r o l and c o n s o c i a t i o n . The c o n s o c i a t i o n a l concessions were introduced too l a t e and they o f f e r e d too l i t t l e to c o n t a i n Tamil s e c e s s i o n i s t a l i e n a t i o n , while the c o n t r o l techniques f a i l e d because the c o e r c i v e c a p a c i t y of the s t a t e was i n s u f f i c i e n t . Pressures induced by the p o l i t i c s of e t h n i c i t y thus destroyed the p o l i t i c a l consensus in S r i Lanka. P o l i t i c a l communalization sowed the seeds of the i s l a n d - s t a t e ' s s e l f - d e s t r u c t i o n . In 86 s h o r t , m a j o r i t a r i a n democracy encouraged the growth of o u t b i d d i n g , which i n turn r e l e g a t e d the m i n o r i t y to a p o l i t i c a l wasteland i n which, i t seemed, only v i o l e n t s ecessionism c o u l d blossom. 87 NOTES 1K.M. de S i l v a , A H i s t o r y , pp. 423 and 427. C R . de S i l v a , "The S i n h a l e s e - T a m i l R i f t i n S r i Lanka," i n A. Jeyaratnam Wilson and Dennis Dalton (eds.), The States of South A s i a . London: C. Hurst and Co. (1982), pp. 158-159. 2C.R. de S i l v a , pp. 159-160. 3 I b i d . See a l s o K.M. de S i l v a , A H i s t o r y , pp. 510-524. "See footnote 27 f o r the main Tamil demands. 5The Republican C o n s t i t u t i o n , the u n i v e r s i t y admission system, as we l l as government employment and resource a l l o c a t i o n d u r i n g 1970-77 i l l u s t r a t e the extent of the UF government's d i s c r i m i n a t o r y p o l i c y . See pp. 57-67 i n t h i s t h e s i s f o r d e t a i l s . 6K.M. de S i l v a , A H i s t o r y , p. 389. 7 I b i d . , pp. 361-364. 8 I b i d . , p. 365. 9 I b i d . , p. 366. 1 0C.R. de S i l v a , pp. 158-159. K.M. de S i l v a , A H i s t o r y , pp. 417-429. " I n 1931, the Si n h a l e s e comprised 76% of the e l e c t e d candidates i n the State C o u n c i l though t h e i r share of the po p u l a t i o n was 67%. Furthermore, t h i s dramatic t r a n s f e r of p o l i t i c a l power to the Si n h a l e s e (the r a t i o changed i n favour of the Sin h a l e s e from roughly 1:1 to 4:1) w i t h i n a short span of a decade introduced e t h n i c r i v a l r i e s between Tamil and Sin h a l e s e e l i t e s . 88 1 2C.R. de S i l v a , p. 159. 1 3K.M. de S i l v a , Managing E t h n i c , pp. 103-105. The " f i f t y -f i f t y " demand was a move aimed more at s e c u r i n g g r e a t e r weightage i n the d i s t r i b u t i o n of seats i n the s t a t e c o u n c i l than a genuine demand f o r equal r e p r e s e n t a t i o n (1:1 r a t i o ) . 1 4 A . J . Wilson, " S r i Lanka and i t s f u t u r e — Si n h a l e s e versus Tamils" i n A.J. Wilson & Dennis Dalton, The S t a t e s , p. 296. A l s o see C R . de S i l v a . 1 5 S e c t i o n 29 of the Soulbury C o n s t i t u t i o n s t a t e d , "No such law s h a l l , (a) p r o h i b i t or r e s t r i c t the f r e e e x e r c i s e of any r e l i g i o n ; (b) make persons of any community or r e l i g i o n l i a b l e to d i s a b i l i t i e s or r e s t r i c t i o n s to which persons of other communities or r e l i g i o n s are not made l i a b l e , or (c) confer on persons of any community or r e l i g i o n any p r i v i l e g e or advantage which i s not c o n f e r r e d on persons of other community or r e l i g i o n . " 1 6K.M. de S i l v a , A H i s t o r y , pp. 489-524. Robert N. Kearney, Communalism and Language in the P o l i t i c s of Ceylon. Durham: Duke U n i v e r s i t y Press (1967). Urmila Phadnis, R e l i g i o n  and P o l i t i c s i n S r i Lanka. New D e l h i : Manohar (1976). C a l v i n A. Woodward, Growth of a Party System i n Ceylon. Providence: Brown U n i v e r s i t y Press (1969), pp. 100-170. Robert Kearney, The  P o l i t i c s , pp. 155-180. 1 7 F o r e a r l y F e d e r a l Party p o l i c i e s see, A. Jeyaratnam Wilson, "The Tamil F e d e r a l Party i n Ceylon P o l i t i c s , " J o u r n a l  of Commonwealth P o l i t i c a l S t u d i e s , Volume IV, No. 2 (J u l y 1966), pp. 1 17-137. 1 8A. Jeyaratnam Wilson, P o l i t i c s i n S r i Lanka, 1947-1979. 89 London: The MacMillan Press L t d . (1979), pp. 150-151. 1 9 W i l s o n , E l e c t o r a l P o l i t i c s . 2 0 I b i d . , pp. 130-132. 2'The SLFP with i t s extreme l i n g u i s t i c and r e l i g i o u s p o l i c i e s won the 1956 e l e c t i o n . Since 1956, both major p o l i t i c a l p a r t i e s c o u l d not a f f o r d to ignore l i n g u i s t i c and r e l i g i o u s i s s u e s without a f f e c t i n g t h e i r e l e c t o r a l f o r t u n e s . 2 2 W i l s o n , E l e c t o r a l P o l i t i c s , pp. 161-201. 2 3 A . Amirthalingam, S.M. Rasamanickam-and S. Naganathan (MPs f o r Vaddukoddai, Paddiruppu and N a l l u r r e s p e c t i v e l y ) were def e a t e d . Rasamanickam l o s t to a UNP candidate and the others were defeated by TC candidates who l a t e r j o i n e d the UF government. 2 u A l o n g with G.G. Ponnambalam, h i s deputy leader M. Sivasithamparam and youth league leader T. Sivasithamparam were defeated by FP candidates. 2 5 I n March 1960, the FP played a s i g n i f i c a n t r o l e i n the defeat of the m i n o r i t y UNP government. Again i n 1965 both UNP and SLFP approached the FP to form the government. During the 1970 e l e c t i o n , Chelvanayagam and other FP l e a d e r s s t a t e d that both S i n h a l e s e p a r t i e s would seek the h e l p of FP to . form the government. 2 6Sadhan Mukherjee, C e y l o n - I s l a n d That Changed. New D e l h i : People's P u b l i s h i n g House (1971). A. Jeyaratnam Wilson, E l e c t o r a l P o l i t i c s , pp. 179-201. 2 7C.R. de S i l v a , "Sinhala-Tami1 R e l a t i o n s and Education i n S r i Lanka: The U n i v e r s i t y Admission Issue — The F i r s t Phase 1971-77" in Robert B. Goldmann and A. Jeyaratnam Wilson (eds.), 90 From Independence to Statehood. London: Frances P i n t e r (1984), pp. 125-146. 2 8 S e e Appendix A-Table 1. 2 9 S e e Appendix A-Table 2. 3 0C.R. de S i l v a , "Sinhala-Tami1 R e l a t i o n s p. 129. 3 ' I b i d . 3 2 I b i d . 3 3 T h e UF government a l l o c a t e d economic resources on the ba s i s of e t h n i c i t y , p a r t i c u l a r l y i n the area of u n i v e r s i t y education and employment i n the p u b l i c s e c t o r . The government used i t s massive m a j o r i t y to encourage e t h n i c i z a t i o n of p u b l i c goods. See Coomaraswamy, pp. 180-181 and Sivanandan, pp. 21-22. 3 0A.C. A l l e s , Insurgency - 1971. Colombo: The Colombo Apothecaries Company L t d . (1977); ' P o l i t i c u s , ' "The A p r i l Revolt i n Ceylon," Asian Survey, Volume 12, No. 3 (March 1972), pp. 259-274. 3 5 R a j i v a Wijesinha, Current C r i s i s in S r i Lanka. New D e l h i : Navrang (1986), p. 26, Sivanandan, p. 20. India Today (January 15, 1988), p. 71. 3 6K.M. de S i l v a , A H i s t o r y , p. 543. The Week (August 9-15, 1987), p. 22. India Today (January 15, 1988), p. 72'. 3 7Wijaweera gave f i v e l e c t u r e s to JVP a c t i v i t i s t s . One of these was on Indian expansionism. For Wijaweera, the [Tamil] p l a n t a t i o n worker c o u l d not be t r u s t e d because, " h i s [worker] l o y a l t i e s were elsewhere [India] and who would be a ready v i c t i m to any allurements o f f e r e d by the c o u n t e r - r e v o l u t i o n a r y f o r c e s . " A l l e s , Insurgency - 1971, p. 17. 3 8K.M. de S i l v a , "The C o n s t i t u t i o n and C o n s t i t u t i o n a l 91 Reforms s i n c e 1948," in K.M. de S i l v a (ed.), S r i Lanka - A  Survey. Honolulu: The U n i v e r s i t y Press of Hawaii (1977), pp. 312-329. Wiswa Warnapala, "The New C o n s t i t u t i o n of S r i Lanka," Asian Survey, Volume X I I I , No. 12 (December 1973), pp. 1179-1192. 3 9 C o l v i n R. de S i l v a quoted in K.M. de S i l v a , "The C o n s t i t u t i o n ...," p. 318. 4 0 I b i d . , p. 317. * 1V.P. V a i d i k , E t h n i c C r i s i s i n S r i Lanka - I n d i a ' s Options. New D e l h i : N a t i o n a l (1986), p. 35. ft2S. Thondaman, the leader of the powerful trade union, Ceylon Workers' Congress (CWC) j o i n e d the TUF because the UF government was openly h o s t i l e to up-country Tamils. But he maintained c l o s e r e l a t i o n s h i p with J.R. Jayewardene and opposed the UF i n the south. 9 3 A m i r t h a l i n g a m quoted in V a i d i k , p. 139. ""Quoted in V a i d i k , pp. 35-37. " 5N. Balakrishnan, "The F i v e Year Plan and Development P o l i c y i n S r i Lanka: S o c i o - P o l i t i c a l P e r s p e c t i v e s and the P l a n , " Asian Survey, Volume X I I I , No. 12 (December 1973), pp. 1155-1168. "6S.W.R. de A. Samarasinghe, "Ethnic Representation i n C e n t r a l Government Employment and S i n h a l a - T a m i l R e l a t i o n s i n S r i Lanka: 1948-1981" in Goldmann and Wilson, pp. 173-184. Schwarz, p. 10. Committee f o r R a t i o n a l Development, pp. 1-7. " 7 S a t c h i Ponnambalam, S r i Lanka: The N a t i o n a l Question and  the Tamil L i b e r a t i o n S t r u g g l e . London: Zed Book L t d . (1983), pp. 180-184. 92 4 B V a i d i k , p. 41, Ponnambalam, p. 181. " 9 I b i d . , pp. 38 and 183-184. 5°Chelvanayagam defeated h i s UF candidate, V. Ponnambalam, by over 16,000 votes. 5 1Ponnambalam, p. 184. 5 2 V a i d i k , p. 39. 5 3Ponnambalam, pp. 190-194. V i j a y Samaraweera, " S r i Lanka's 1977 General E l e c t i o n s : The Resurgence of the UNP," Asian Survey, Volume XVII, No.12 (December 1977), pp. 1195-1206. 5 4K.M. de S i l v a , A H i s t o r y , p. 551. 5 5Jayewardene played a s i g n i f i c a n t r o l e i n the a n t i -Bandaranaike-Chelvanayagam Pact of 1957 campaign which l e d both to a b r ogation of the pact and the communal v i o l e n c e in 1958. 5 6K.M. de S i l v a , Managing E t h n i c , p. 289. 5 7James Manor, "The F a i l u r e of P o l i t i c a l I n t e g r a t i o n i n S r i Lanka (Ceylon)," The J o u r n a l of Commonwealth and Comparative P o l i t i c s , Volume XVII (March 1979), p. 36. 5 8 0 n the 1977 General E l e c t i o n , see Samaraweera, pp. 1195-1206. 5 9Ponnambalam, p. 193. 6 0Thondaman, the only remaining leader of the TULF, j o i n e d the government s i n c e he co n s i d e r e d Eelam as not a v i a b l e s o l u t i o n f o r the up-country Tamils who l i v e d among Sin h a l e s e i n the up-country r e g i o n . 6 1 I n f l a m a t o r y speeches by the TULF lea d e r s d u r i n g the e l e c t i o n campaign, d i s t o r t e d r e p o r t i n g i n the S i n h a l a press and the o v e r r e a c t i o n of the Si n h a l e s e to the success of the 93 s e c e s s i o n i s t p a r t y TULF c r e a t e d a h i g h l y charged environment immediately a f t e r the J u l y 1977 e l e c t i o n s . A c l a s h between Tamil students and the p o l i c e at a school c a r n i v a l provided the spark f o r the communal r i o t s . The UNP and the SLFP accused each other of i n c i t i n g v i o l e n c e . V a i d i k , pp. 47-48. 6 2 V a i d i k , p. 47. The Commission which i n q u i r e d i n t o the 1977 v i o l e n c e concluded that over 25,000 people, both Tamil and S i n h a l e s e , l o s t t h e i r houses. 6 3Jayewardene j u s t i f i e d the r e f u s a l to d e c l a r e emergency as f o l l o w s : "We do not wish to d e c l a r e emergency ... I t means the complete e l i m i n a t i o n of the freedom of the people with regard to a r r e s t , d e t e n t i o n and l e g i s l a t i o n by gazette and a v o i d i n g parliament." fi*K.M. de S i l v a , Managing E t h n i c , p. 294. 6 5 A . J . Wilson, The G a u l l i s t System in A s i a : The C o n s t i t u t i o n of S r i Lanka (1978). London: The MacMillan Press L t d . (1980). 6 6K.M. de S i l v a , Managing E t h n i c , p. 294. S 7Wiswa Warnapala, "Parliamentary Government or one Party D i c t a t o r s h i p , " India Q u a r t e r l y , Volume XXXVIII, Numbers 3 & 4 ( J u l y - December 1982), pp. 267-288. Committee for R a t i o n a l Development, pp. 70-94. "Notes and Documents - Human Rights V i o l a t i o n s i n S r i Lanka," Race and C l a s s , Volume XXVI, No. 1 (September 1984) pp. 111-121. These three essays provide e x c e l l e n t i n s i g h t s i n t o the present s t a t e of the j u d i c i a r y and parliament i n S r i Lanka. 6 8 T h i s i s an example of government using i t s f i v e - s i x t h s m a j o r i t y to amend the c o n s t i t u t i o n f o r a p a r t i s a n purpose. The 94 p e r s o n a l c o n f l i c t between Amirthalingam and R a j a t h u r a i , d a t i n g back to e a r l y 1960s, i s one of the major reasons fo r the l a t t e r ' s d e c i s i o n to j o i n the government. 69M.H. Mohamed and A.C.S. Hameed r e c e i v e d the powerful m i n i s t r i e s of t r a n s p o r t and f o r e i g n a f f a i r s i n c o n t r a s t to the 'weak' p o r t f o l i o s r e c e i v e d by the Tamils. 7 0 C y r i l Mathew wrote in 1970, "Let us u n i t e as S i n h a l e s e to repress the t h r e a t s of Tamils." For more info r m a t i o n on Mathew's a n t i - T a m i l stand, read, "The Mathew D o c t r i n e " under "Notes and Documents," pp. 129-139. Gamini Dissanayake d e c l a r e d i n September 1983 that " I t would take fourteen hours for the Indian Army to a r r i v e i n S r i Lanka, but every Tamil i n S r i Lanka would be k i l l e d i n fourteen minutes." N. Sanmugathasan, " S r i Lanka: The Story of the Holocaust," Race and C l a s s , Volume 26, No. 1 (Summer 1984), p. 81. 7 1 T h e Pr e s i d e n t followed a " c a r r o t and s t i c k " p o l i c y with r e s p e c t to the m i n o r i t y Tamils. He took a moderate stand i n an e f f o r t to appeal to the Tamils but 'encouraged' the c h a u v i n i s t i c m i n i s t e r s to take an u l t r a Sinhala-Buddhist stand. The c a r r o t ( c o n s t i t u t i o n a l concessions) and s t i c k ( a n t i - T a m i l r i o t s , a n t i - T a m i l r h e t o r i c to i n s t i l fear among Tamils together with p o l i c e and m i l i t a r y a c t i o n ) p o l i c y was aimed at c o n t a i n i n g and weakening the s e c e s s i o n i s t ( p a r t i c u l a r l y the TULF) support. 7 2K.M. de S i l v a , Managing E t h n i c , p. 307. 7 3C.R. de S i l v a , "Sinhala-Tami1 R e l a t i o n s p. 129. 7"Committee for R a t i o n a l Development, p. 9. 7 5 I b i d . 7 6 W i l s o n , The G a u l l i s t , pp. 185-187. 95 7 7 N e e l a n Tiruchelvam, " E t h n i c i t y and Resource A l l o c a t i o n , " Goldmann and Wilson (ed s . ) , p. 191. 7 8Samarasinghe, p. 178. 7 9 I b i d . 8°Ibid., p. 179. See a l s o Appendix A-Table 3. 8 1 T h e secondary l e v e l educated unemployed youths were i n the f o r e f r o n t of the m i l i t a n t movements. B 2 V a i d i k , p. 53. Canagaratnam s u r v i v e d the a t t a c k but di e d in 1980. 8 3A.S. Balasingham, L i b e r a t i o n T i g e r s and Tamil Eelam  Freedom S t r u g g l e . Madras: L i b e r a t i o n T i g e r s of Tamil Eelam (August 1983), p. 29. 8 , , V a i d i k , p. 54. 8 5Ponnambalam, p. 192. 8 6 "Amir Speaks". Madras: TULF P u b l i c a t i o n (August 1984), p. 4. 8 7K.M. de S i l v a , Managing E t h n i c , p. 314. 8 8 I b i d . , p. 205. See a l s o Neelan Tiruchelvam, "The P o l i t i c s of D e c e n t r a l i z a t i o n and De v o l u t i o n : Competing Conceptions of D i s t r i c t Development C o u n c i l s in S r i Lanka," in Goldman and Wilson (eds.), p. 204. 8 9Coomaraswamy, p. 183. 9 0 V a i d i k , p. 55. 9 1Balasingham, p. 31. 9 2 W i j e s i n h a , p. 43. Sivanandan, p. 33. Notes and Documents in Race and C l a s s , p. 124. 9 3K.M. de S i l v a , Managing E t h n i c , pp. 316-318. See a l s o Amirthalingam's i n t e r v i e w p u b l i s h e d i n Tamil Eelam 96 Documentation B u l l e t i n , Volume 1, No. 2 (October 31, 1983), p. 15, V a i d i k , pp. 82-84. See a l s o V a i d i k ' s i n t e r v i e w with Amirthalingam. I b i d . , pp. 140-141. 9"K.M. de S i l v a , Managing E t h n i c , p. 317. 9 5Wiswa Warnapala, "Parliamentary government or one p a r t y D i c t a t o r s h i p , " pp. 284-286. Without the approval of the P r e s i d e n t , i t was not p o s s i b l e f o r the no-confidence motion a g a i n s t Amirthalingam d i s c u s s e d i n the Parliament. T h i s i s one more example of Jayewardene's s t r a t e g y of mixing accommodation measures with c o n t r o l i n order to c o n t a i n Tamil s e c e s s i o n i s m . 9 6 I b i d . , p. 285. 9 ' N e v i l l e Fernando, UNP MP f o r Panadura, who was e x p e l l e d from the Parliament i n 1981, s t a t e d that the d e c i s i o n to introduce a vote of no confidence on Amirthalingam was made by the c a b i n e t . 9 8Ponnambalam, p. 210. 9 9Jayewardene's r o l e i s c r u c i a l i n i n t e r p r e t i n g the i n c r e a s i n g v i o l e n c e a g a i n s t T a m i l s . In 1981, the P r e s i d e n t , i n s t e a d of c o n t a i n i n g a n t i - T a m i l r h e t o r i c , t o l e r a t e d i t both i n s i d e and o u t s i d e the Parliament. T h i s a t t i t u d e encouraged v i o l e n c e a g a i n s t the Tamils. In a d d i t i o n , the P r e s i d e n t continued to allow C y r i l Mathew to p u b l i s h h i g h l y inflammatory a n t i - T a m i l books and pamphlets, f o r example, D i a b o l i c a l  Conspiracy (1979). One may assume that v i o l e n c e a g a i n s t Tamils was a part of Jayewardene's ' c a r r o t and s t i c k ' p o l i c y . But the extent and i n t e n s i t y of v i o l e n c e o c c a s i o n a l l y (e.g. 1981 and 1983) went beyond h i s o r i g i n a l i n t e n t i o n , consequently damaging the government's r e p u t a t i o n . For i n s t a n c e , before the August 97 1977 communal r i o t s , Jayewardene t o l d both Sivasithamparam (P r e s i d e n t of the TULF) and Amirthalingam t h a t , " i f you [Tamil] want war you can have war. If you want peace you can have peace." Soon afterwards, a n t i - T a m i l r i o t s erupted on the i s l a n d . F r o n t l i n e (March 23 - A p r i l 5, 1985), pp. 58-59. For a view exonerating the Presi d e n t but accusing the UNP f o r i n s t i t u t i o n a l i z i n g p o l i t i c a l v i o l e n c e i n S r i Lanka, see Obeysekere, pp. 158-174. 1 0 0 N e v i l l e Fernando, who moved the vote of no con f i d e n c e , was e x p e l l e d by the UNP, but no a c t i o n was taken a g a i n s t C y r i l Mathew, u n t i l December 1984. 1 0'The f i r s t a t t a ck on the army was c a r r i e d out by PLOTE, l e d by Uma Maheswaran. ' 0 2 T h e Pr e s i d e n t won a l l the d i s t r i c t s but J a f f n a . In J a f f n a , Jayewardene placed a d i s t a n t t h i r d . ' 0 3 P r i y a Samarakone, "The Conduct of the Referendum" in James Manor (ed.), S r i Lanka: In Change and C r i s i s . London: Croom Helm (1984), pp. 84-117. ' 0"Ponnambalam, p. 214. ' 0 5 T h e breakaway group formed the Tamil Eelam L i b e r a t i o n Front i n May 1982. ' 0 6 B a l a s i n g h a m , p. 32. ' 0 7N. Sanmugathasan, p. 64. 1 0 8 T h e voter turnout was very low i n the J a f f n a p eninsula — around 90% boycotted the e l e c t i o n . 1 0 9 D a i l y Telegraph ( J u l y 11, 1983), quoted i n Ponnambalam, p. 224. 1 1 " B r i t i s h Guardian Weekly commented on the amendment 98 t h a t , "Instead of throwing a p r o t e c t i v e Gandhian arm around the m i n o r i t y p o p u l a t i o n the P r e s i d e n t has thus, at a s t r o k e , d i s e n f r a n c h i s e d the great mass of them and turned them i n t o a race of untermenschen or i n s t i t u t i o n a l i z e d second c l a s s semi-c i t i z e n s " (7th August 1983). 1 1'The S i n h a l e s e c l a i m to m a j o r i t y s t a t u s d u r i n g the pre-1956 p e r i o d i s evidenced by the c r e a t i o n of an e x c l u s i v e S i n h a l e s e Board of M i n i s t e r s i n 1936, the disenfranchisement of p l a n t a t i o n Tamils i n 1949 and s t a t e - a i d e d c o l o n i z a t i o n . 99 CHAPTER THREE THE DEVELOPMENT OF TAMIL SECESSIONIST GUERRILLA ORGANIZATIONS Pre-1983 Developments The t r a d i t i o n a l moderate Tamil l e a d e r s h i p ' s i n a b i l i t y to i n f l u e n c e the S r i Lankan decision-making process under parliamentary democracy encouraged the emergence of r a d i c a l m i l i t a n t o r g a n i z a t i o n s i n the north d u r i n g the e a r l y 1970s. The massive e l e c t o r a l v i c t o r y of Sinhala-Buddhist n a t i o n a l i s t s i n 1970 r e i n f o r c e d the sense of impotency of Tamil p o l i t i c a l p a r t i e s and the "tyranny" of m a j o r i t a r i a n r u l e f o r the T a mils. For i n s t a n c e , the i n a b i l i t y of the Tamil l e a d e r s h i p to change the new u n i v e r s i t y admission system or to i n c l u d e b a s i c Tamil demands in the 1972 C o n s t i t u t i o n t a r n i s h e d the image of moderate Tamil p o l i t i c a l p a r t i e s . Furthermore, the t r a d i t i o n a l Tamil p o l i t i c a l e l i t e s ' r e l i a n c e on non-violent e x t r a -parliamentary measures had l i t t l e or no impact on s u c c e s s i v e S r i Lankan governments. The v a r i o u s governments' r e f u s a l to meet the b a s i c Tamil demands for d e v o l u t i o n of power in the 1950s and the 1960s, d e s p i t e l a r g e - s c a l e satyagrahas and h a r t a l s by the F e d e r a l Party (FP), i l l u s t r a t e d the l i m i t a t i o n s of n o n - v i o l e n t a c t i o n . The f a i l u r e of the t r a d i t i o n a l Tamil l e a d e r s h i p , coupled with student f r u s t r a t i o n , produced disenchantment with the c o n v e n t i o n a l p o l i t i c a l system and r e s u l t e d i n the emergence of 100 the Tamil Student F e d e r a t i o n (TSF) i n 1970. 1 T h i s f e d e r a t i o n was i n the f o r e f r o n t of Tamil p r o t e s t , both n o n - v i o l e n t ( f o r example, black f l a g p r o t e s t s ) and v i o l e n t ( i n c l u d i n g bombings, shootings and sabotage of government p r o p e r t i e s ) . Most of the l a t t e r day s e c e s s i o n i s t r e b e l s were i n i t i a t e d through the TSF i n t o v i o l e n t methods of p o l i t i c a l p r o t e s t which swept the c o n s e r v a t i v e J a f f n a p e n i n s u l a . The v i o l e n t p o l i c e r e a c t i o n paved the way f o r a v i c i o u s c i r c l e of v i o l e n c e . Under emergency r e g u l a t i o n s between 1970 and 1977, over two hundred Tamil youths were imprisoned i n the north and h e l d without t r i a l . 2 The United Front (UF) government with i t s t h r e e - f o u r t h s m a j o r i t y i n the Parliament c o u l d ignore the moderate Tamil parliamentary p a r t i e s but was compelled to respond to the v i o l e n t p r o t e s t c a r r i e d out by Tamil youths with the ' b l e s s i n g s ' of the Tamil U n i t e d Front (TUF). A c r u c i a l event which c o n t r i b u t e d immensely to a general acceptance of v i o l e n c e a g a i n s t the s t a t e was the ' k i l l i n g ' of e i g h t Tamils at the Fourth Conference of the I n t e r n a t i o n a l A s s o c i a t i o n f o r Tamil Research h e l d i n J a f f n a on January 8, 1974. The UF government re f u s e d to extend i t s support f o r the academic conference on Tamil language, l i t e r a t u r e and c u l t u r e because i t feared that t h i s conference would boost the growing extreme Tamil n a t i o n a l i s m . In the absence of government sponsorship, the TSF played an important r o l e in the success of the conference. On the l a s t day of the conference, a l a r g e crowd attended the p u b l i c meeting addressed by the v i s i t i n g Tamil s c h o l a r s . But the p o l i c e a t t a c k e d the p u b l i c on the p r e t e x t that the o r g a n i z e r s had v i o l a t e d the permit to h o l d the 101 meeting by moving the meeting o u t s i d e the designated h a l l . The p o l i c e a t t a c k and the subsequent stampede d i r e c t l y l e d to these d e a t h s . 3 The p o l i c e were i d e n t i f i e d as the 'oppressors' of the Tamils and p u b l i c confidence i n law-enforcing agencies was s i g n i f i c a n t l y eroded. F u r t h e r , the p o l i c e f o r c e was l i n k e d to the governing p a r t y , the SLFP and i t s supporters i n the north. The deaths at the Conference s i g n a l l e d the beginning of the end of p o l i c e c o n t r o l on the J a f f n a p e n i n s u l a . Ponnudurai Sivakumaran, a TSF l e a d e r , hunted down the Superintendent of P o l i c e , Chandrasekara, whom he h e l d r e s p o n s i b l e f o r the death of Tamils, with the i n t e n t i o n of k i l l i n g him. But the p o l i c e a r r e s t e d Sivakumaran and he committed s u i c i d e on June 6, 1974." As a martyr to the emerging Tamil m i l i t a n c y , Sivakumaran provided a stimulus f o r Tamil r a d i c a l n a t i o n a l i s m . Fear and hatred of the p o l i c e r e s u l t e d i n a w a l l of s i l e n c e on the p e n i n s u l a , which f r u s t r a t e d p o l i c e attempts to break the underground s e c e s s i o n i s t movements in t h e i r i n f a n c y . The p o l i t i c a l landscape i n the north was transformed with the emergence of v i o l e n c e as an a c c e p t a b l e p o l i t i c a l t o o l with which to c h a l l e n g e the government. L i b e r a t i o n T i g e r s of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) The Tamil New T i g e r s (TNT) were born i n a v o l a t i l e Tamil environment with the o b j e c t i v e of c r e a t i n g Eelam through armed s t r u g g l e . TNT was formed by V e l l u p i l l a i Prabakaran i n 1972. 5 Prabakaran was born on November 26, 1954, i n V a l v e t t i t h u r a i --a c o a s t a l town where f i s h i n g and smuggling were two major t r a d e s . 6 Since independence, the smuggling trade had brought 102 V a l v e t t i t h u r a i under c l o s e p o l i c e s c r u t i n y . Consequently, a n t i -p o l i c e f e e l i n g s were more pronounced i n t h i s town. In a d d i t i o n , the smuggling trade brought V a l v e t t i t h u r a i in c l o s e contact with c o a s t a l towns in Tamil Nadu. Over the years, V a l v e t t i t h u r a i ' s Tamils had d i s c o v e r e d safe sea routes which would allow them to a v o i d d e t e c t i o n by both Indian and S r i Lankan law-enforcing agencies. Furthermore, the J a f f n a p e n i n s u l a was the w e a l t h i e s t among the Tamil areas. T r a d i t i o n a l l y , J a f f n a produced a l a r g e number of Tamil p r o f e s s i o n a l s , both i n the p r i v a t e and p u b l i c s e c t o r , due to e x c e l l e n t e d u c a t i o n a l o p p o r t u n i t i e s i n the north. There was a l s o a l a r g e commercial c l a s s , and as w e l l money flowed i n t o J a f f n a from Tamil e x p a t r i a t e s and migrant workers. By popular r e p u t a t i o n the t h r i f t y J a f f n a Tamils had one of the highest saving r a t e s among the S r i Lankans. Th e r e f o r e , J a f f n a p e n i n s u l a possessed s u f f i c i e n t monetary resources to s u s t a i n the i n i t i a l g u e r r i l l a - c a m p a i g n . Not s u r p r i s i n g l y , Tamil m i l i t a n c y took f i r m root on the J a f f n a p e n i n s u l a , p a r t i c u l a r l y i n V a l v e t t i t h u r a i (see maps 5, 6 and 7). The f i r s t major undertaking of the TNT was the a s s a s s i n a t i o n of A l f r e d Duraiappa, the Mayor and Chief SLFP Organizer of J a f f n a . Prabakaran shot him dead near a Hindu temple in P o n n a l l a i on J u l y 27, 1975. 7 Duraiappa was c o n s i d e r e d a 'betrayer' of Tamils because of h i s suspected r o l e in the p o l i c e a t t a c k during the 1974 Tamil Conference and h i s support fo r a government co n s i d e r e d i n s e n s i t i v e to Tamil a s p i r a t i o n s . That the k i l l i n g d i d not evoke any l a r g e - s c a l e p u b l i c outcry was an e a r l y i n d i c a t i o n of the d i r e c t i o n that Tamil support was ? 03 J a f f n a P e n i n s u l a MAP 5 DENSITY OF POPULATION OF JAFFNA DISTRICT BY A G . A ' S DIVISION - 1981 MAP 6 I V A U G A M A M WEST 2 V A U G A M A M S O U T H W E S T 3. V A L I 4 A M A M N O A T H 4. V A U 6 A M A M SOUTH 3 V A L H A M A M E A S T C W A L L U H 7 . J A F F N A • . T H E N M A R A 0 C H T 9. V A O A M A R A O C H T SOUTH & WEST i o V A O A M A R A O C H Y N O R T H » e » * T Source : J a f f n a - A P r o f i l e , Tami l I n fo rmat ion Research Unic P u b l i c a t i o n , Issue No. 5 & 6 ( J u n e - J u l y 1986), p. 10. 104 Source: Tamil Eela Viduthalai P u l i h a l ("Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam"), Propaganda Unit, p. 1 . 1 05 t a k i n g i n the north. The UF government's attempt to crush the v i o l e n c e by a r r e s t i n g and a l l e g e d l y t o r t u r i n g Tamil youths f u r t h e r a l i e n a t e d the p e o p l e . 8 The government's a c t i o n s c r e a t e d a pool from which the s e c e s s i o n i s t m i l i t a n t s were able to draw t h e i r new r e c r u i t s . To a v o i d government r e p r e s s i o n , the TNT remained an underground movement and changed i t s name to L i b e r a t i o n T i g e r s of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) on May 5, 1976. 9 Formed as an urban g u e r r i l l a o r g a n i z a t i o n , the LTTE developed i n secrecy during the e a r l y stages of the movement. There was minimal contact with the general p u b l i c . At the beginning, the LTTE p a i d l e s s a t t e n t i o n to the p o l i t i c i z a t i o n of the Tamil p u b l i c to prepare them f o r a long s e c e s s i o n i s t s t r u g g l e . The g u e r r i l l a l e a d e r s b e l i e v e d that g u e r r i l l a warfare alone was s u f f i c i e n t to e s t a b l i s h Eelam. But the LTTE was a h i g h l y d i s c i p l i n e d m i l i t a r y o r g a n i z a t i o n from i t s i n c e p t i o n . 1 0 For i n s t a n c e , the chairman of the c e n t r a l committee of the LTTE, Uma Maheswaran, was e x p e l l e d i n 1980 f o r breaking the r u l e s of the o r g a n i z a t i o n . I t s emphasis on d i s c i p l i n e p a i d r i c h d i v i d e n d s in i t s ' m i l i t a r y ' a c t i o n s . The LTTE r e l i e d on bank ro b b e r i e s to s u s t a i n i t s growth. For i n s t a n c e LTTE robbed the People's Bank at Puttur on March 5, 1976 and a l s o r a i d e d the T i n n e v e l y People's Bank on December 5, 1978, g e t t i n g away with over 1.2 m i l l i o n r u p e e s . 1 1 During the e a r l y days of the movement, post o f f i c e s and schools were a l s o robbed to fi n a n c e ' m i l i t a r y ' o p e r a t i o n s . Arms were obtained by ambushing policemen. The weapons were simple but s u f f i c i e n t to c a r r y out i s o l a t e d hit-and-run g u e r r i l l a m i s s i o n s . By the e a r l y 1980s, with the e s c a l a t i o n of s e c e s s i o n i s t warfare, s o p h i s t i c a t e d 106 weapons ( f o r example, the Russian-made AK47) were used by the LTTE. The LTTE concentrated on the d e s t r u c t i o n of the p o l i c e i n t e l l i g e n c e network i n the north. The s e c e s s i o n i s t r e b e l s were aided by the "wall of s i l e n c e " developed d u r i n g the post-1974 p e r i o d . The LTTE executed p o l i c e informants and gunned down i n t e l l i g e n c e personnel from the C r i m i n a l I n v e s t i g a t i o n Department (CID). N. Nadarajah, a gas s t a t i o n manager and a SLFP o r g a n i z e r f o r Kopay, was 'executed' on J u l y 2, 1976, and co n s t a b l e s Karunanidi and Shanmuganathan were shot on February 14, 1977 and May 18, 1977 r e s p e c t i v e l y . 1 2 S i n h a l e s e policemen were c o n s t r a i n e d by language b a r r i e r s when they conducted i n v e s t i g a t i o n s of Tamil s e c e s s i o n i s t g u e r r i l l a s on the p e n i n s u l a . I n e v i t a b l y , the p o l i c e high-command r e l i e d on Tamil o f f i c e r s to c o l l e c t i n t e l l i g e n c e i n f o r m a t i o n . Thus p o l i c e o f f i c e r s k i l l e d i n i t i a l l y by the LTTE were mainly Tamils. The LTTE a l s o concentrated i n e l i m i n a t i n g a p o s s i b l e Tamil threat to i t s development on the p e n i n s u l a . Thus the g u e r r i l l a s i n t h e i r formative stages avoided a l a r g e - s c a l e S i n h a l e s e back-l a s h a g a i n s t the Tamils, which c o u l d have turned the Tamil p u b l i c a g a i n s t them. The most s p e c t a c u l a r success of the LTTE i n demolishing the i n t e l l i g e n c e network came i n the s p r i n g of 1978. CID Inspector B a s t i a n p i l l a i , a h i g h l y e f f i c i e n t but n o t o r i o u s l y tough i n t e l l i g e n c e o f f i c e r , was shot dead by a LTTE leader, 'Lieutenant' Chelvanayagam ( a l i a s Amman, C h e l l a k i l i ) during an attempt to a r r e s t m i l i t a n t s i n the LTTE t r a i n i n g camp at Murunkan on A p r i l 7, 1978. 1 3 L i m i t e d i n t e l l i g e n c e feedback 1 07 about s e c e s s i o n i s t a c t i v i t i e s impeded p o l i c e i n v e s t i g a t i o n and hindered attempts to apprehend the r e b e l s . An aura of i n v i n c i b i l i t y developed around the m i l i t a n t s , which a t t r a c t e d new r e c r u i t s to the movement. A general f e e l i n g that the Tamil m i l i t a n t s c o u l d 'defeat' the government took root i n the north, which i n turn gained the guarded respect and admiration of the p u b l i c — a c r u c i a l f a c t o r i n the success of g u e r r i l l a warfare on the densely populated but f l a t t e r r a i n of the J a f f n a p e n i n s u l a . Mao s t r e s s e s the importance of p u b l i c support f o r the s u r v i v a l of a g u e r r i l l a group. The LTTE came i n t o p u b l i c a t t e n t i o n on A p r i l 25, 1978, when i t claimed r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r the deaths of CID Inspector B a s t i a n p i l l a i , the J a f f n a Mayor A l f r e d Duraiappa and others in a l e t t e r to a Colombo-based independent Tamil d a i l y , V e e r a k e s a r i . 1 " The government, which was f r u s t r a t e d i n i t s attempt to capture the m i l i t a n t s , responded immediately by e n a c t i n g a b i l l on May 22, 1978 p r o s c r i b i n g the L i b e r a t i o n T i g e r s of Tamil Eelam and other s i m i l a r o r g a n i z a t i o n s . 1 5 However, a country-wide search fo r the r e b e l s f a i l e d to produce any s u b s t a n t i a l r e s u l t s . In a d d i t i o n to the poor i n t e l l i g e n c e i n f r a s t r u c t u r e , safe hideouts in Tamil Nadu and secrecy shrouding the growth of the LTTE e x p l a i n the d i f f i c u l t i e s faced by the government s e c u r i t y f o r c e s i n t r a c i n g the core of the g u e r r i l l a membership. The government's response was counter-p r o d u c t i v e s i n c e p o l i c e f r u s t r a t i o n was turned a g a i n s t the g eneral p u b l i c . D e s p i t e the government's attempt to c o n t a i n s e c e s s i o n i s t v i o l e n c e , the LTTE continued to defy s t a t e a u t h o r i t y . The 108 m i l i t a n t s b l a s t e d an Avro Commercial a i r c r a f t belonging to A i r Ceylon at Ratmalana a i r p o r t to p r o t e s t a g a i n s t the promulgation of the Second Republican C o n s t i t u t i o n on September 7, 1978. 1 6 Thus, the government's i n a b i l i t y to curb the m i l i t a n t s was exposed. The m i l i t a n t s chose the time and p l a c e of attack and the p o l i c e (together with the m i l i t a r y ) were inadequate to meet the c h a l l e n g e posed by the LTTE. The LTTE's r e g u l a r successes together with the 1977 a n t i - T a m i l r i o t s p rovided i n c r e a s i n g numbers of r e c r u i t s f o r the movement. 1 7 By 1979, the LTTE had obtained s u f f i c i e n t f i n a n c i a l resources and armaments to c a r r y out s e l e c t e d g u e r r i l l a o p e r a t i o n s a g a i n s t the s t a t e . The s e c e s s i o n i s t r e b e l s d i s r u p t e d the government i n t e l l i g e n c e network, and t h i s allowed the LTTE to grow without any s e r i o u s r e v e r s a l s . The T i g e r s won the Tamil sympathy through t h e i r s u c c e s s f u l m i l i t a r y o p e r a t i o n s and p r o t e c t i o n of p u b l i c . However, at the p o l i t i c a l l e v e l the TULF continued to enjoy the p u b l i c support. I t was e s s e n t i a l f o r the r e b e l s to develop g r a s s - r o o t s support f o r t h e i r movement. The government f o r c e s were o p e r a t i n g i n an unsympathetic environment which denied them success a g a i n s t the g u e r r i l l a s . More importantly, the government co u l d not stop the d i s i n t e g r a t i o n of law and order on the p e n i n s u l a , a c o n d i t i o n which allowed fo r the c o n s o l i d a t i o n of the e s t a b l i s h e d g u e r r i l l a movements and f o r the mushrooming of new groups. Che Guevara suggests that the g u e r r i l l a s themselves c o u l d c r e a t e the necessary r e v o l u t i o n a r y s i t u a t i o n among the Tamils by c h a l l e n g i n g the l e g i t i m a c y of the government. In the e a r l y stages of the s e c e s s i o n i s t s t r u g g l e , c l o s e 109 l i n k s e x i s t e d between the Tamil United L i b e r a t i o n Front (TULF) and the m i l i t a n t s . Under pressure from the Tamil youths, the TULF fought the 1977 e l e c t i o n on a s e p a r a t i s t p l a t f o r m , and TSF a c t i v e l y p a r t i c i p a t e d i n the e l e c t i o n campaign. The m a j o r i t y of the TULF MPs were lawyers who defended the suspected m i l i t a n t s i n the c o u r t s , f r e e of charge, f o r example i n the Duraiappa murder case and the bombing of the Avro a i r c r a f t case. The p o l i t i c a l aspects of the s e c e s s i o n i s t s t r u g g l e were promoted by the TULF, i n c l u d i n g the p o l i t i c i z a t i o n of the general p u b l i c i n both the north and east, and i n t e r n a t i o n a l i z i n g the Eelam cause. The m i l i t a n t s f o r t h e i r part e l i m i n a t e d the p o l i t i c a l o p p o s i t i o n to the TULF i n the north through t h e i r ' m i l i t a r y ' a c t i o n s . With the death of A l f r e d Duraiappa, an able g r a s s -r o o t s o r g a n i z e r , the SLFP s u f f e r e d the l o s s of a powerful leader on the J a f f n a p e n i n s u l a . Duraiappa was an e f f i c i e n t mayor c r e d i t e d with the r a p i d development of the c i t y of J a f f n a . The deaths of SLFP o r g a n i z e r s and the attempted murders of Kumarasuriyar, a SLFP m i n i s t e r , and T h i a g a r a j a , undermined the growth of the SLFP in the north. M. Canagaratnam was e l e c t e d as a TULF MP f o r P o t t u v i l i n the eastern p r o v i n c e , but c r o s s e d over to the UNP i n December 1977. He was shot by the LTTE on January 27, 1978 i n Colombo, but s u r v i v e d the a t t a c k . 1 8 P o l i t i c a l v i o l e n c e discouraged the growth of Tamil o p p o s i t i o n p a r t i e s and provided a 'monopoly of power' for the TULF in the Tamil areas, p a r t i c u l a r l y i n the north. However, the c l o s e r e l a t i o n s h i p turned sour when the TULF l e a d e r s h i p f a i l e d to l e a d an e x t r a - p a r l i a m e n t a r y p r o t e s t a g a i n s t the government i n 1 10 accordance with i t s e l e c t i o n mandate of 1977. Instead, Tamil l e a d e r s continued to have f a i t h i n Jayewardene. Consequently, by the l a t e 1980s the LTTE c h a l l e n g e d the l e a d e r s h i p of the TULF and i t s p o l i c y of non-violence. The UNP government f a i l e d to c o n t a i n the s e c e s s i o n i s t v i o l e n c e d e s p i t e i t s boast during the 1977 e l e c t i o n that i t would s w i f t l y crush i t . I n s t a b i l i t y i n the north threatened to weaken f u r t h e r the f r a g i l e e t h n i c r e l a t i o n s h i p and h a l t economic development of the i s l a n d . Jayewardene was under pressure to f i n d a quick s o l u t i o n to the burgeoning Tamil g u e r r i l l a s t r u g g l e . Thus the government int r o d u c e d the Prevention of T e r r o r i s m (Temporary P r o v i s i o n ) Act on J u l y 19, 1979 and d e c l a r e d a s t a t e of emergency to a s s i s t the army i n d e f e a t i n g Tamil s e c e s s i o n i s t s . 1 9 The government ordered the new army commander of J a f f n a to e l i m i n a t e "... t e r r o r i s m i n a l l i t s forms from the i s l a n d and more e s p e c i a l l y from the J a f f n a D i s t r i c t before December 31, 1979." 2 0 The m i l i t a n t s s h i f t e d to Tamil Nadu hideouts to a v o i d d e t e c t i o n . As s t a t e d by Bard O ' N e i l l , e x t e r n a l support i s c r u c i a l f o r the development of g u e r r i l l a groups. The LTTE strengthened i t s m i l i t a r y c a p a b i l i t y during t h i s p e r i o d . A new wave of m i l i t a r y r e p r e s s i o n i n the form of murders, t o r t u r e , a r b i t r a r y a r r e s t s and i n d i s c r i m i n a t e r e p r i s a l s a g a i n s t c i v i l i a n s strengthened the s e c e s s i o n i s t movement as i t provided new r e c r u i t s and c r e a t e d an environment for s t a g i n g s u c c e s s f u l g u e r r i l l a warfare i n both the north and e a s t . 2 1 U n l i k e the J a f f n a p e n i n s u l a , the t e r r a i n i n the north (Mannar, Vavunia and M u l l a i t i v u ) and east with i t s dense ju n g l e s , p l a n t a t i o n s and 111 swamps provided i d e a l c o n d i t i o n s f o r the s e c e s s i o n i s t s to e s t a b l i s h g u e r r i l l a camps and h i d e o u t s . The temporary l u l l i n the b a t t l e was used f o r the recruitment and t r a i n i n g of new g u e r r i l l a s . The LTTE a l s o e s t a b l i s h e d an i n t e r n a t i o n a l network durin g t h i s p e r i o d . Contacts were made with " s o c i a l i s t governments, world l i b e r a t i o n movements and i n t e r n a t i o n a l p r o g r e s s i v e o r g a n i z a t i o n s . " 2 2 The l u l l i n the m i l i t a r y a c t i v i t i e s d u r i n g the 1979-80 p e r i o d c o u l d a l s o be a t t r i b u t e d to time needed to make i n t e r n a l adjustments i n the movement a f t e r the e x p u l s i o n i n 1980 of Uma Maheswaran. 2 3 Once again the government's m i l i t a r y measures turned out to be c o u n t e r - p r o d u c t i v e . However, the government's appointment of a ten member P r e s i d e n t i a l Commission i n August 1979 to r e p o r t on a system of d e v o l u t i o n of power, which i n c l u d e d a TULF r e p r e s e n t a t i v e posed a major c h a l l e n g e to the s e c e s s i o n i s t s . 2 4 The e a r l i e r m i l i t a r y success and the general p u b l i c acceptance of the m i l i t a n t s c o u l d be n u l l i f i e d by a TULF-backed package of p o l i t i c a l compromises based on a d e v o l u t i o n of power. I t was necessary f o r the LTTE to expand i t s c o ntact with the p u b l i c . The LTTE t r i e d to break out of i t s p u r e l y m i l i t a r y s h e l l by simultaneously developing i n t o a p o l i t i c a l o r g a n i z a t i o n . I t c a l l e d f o r the boycott of the D i s t r i c t Development C o u n c i l E l e c t i o n s . However, the turnout was high, i n d i c a t i n g the c o n t i n u i n g hold of the TULF in the Tamil a r e a s . 2 5 But the p r e - e l e c t i o n v i o l e n c e and the August 1981 a n t i - T a m i l r i o t s r a i s e d grave doubts about the TULF's r o l e i n Tamil p o l i t i c s . The year 1981 marked the beginning of a r a p i d d e t e r i o r a t i o n of TULF p o p u l a r i t y , p a r t i c u l a r l y on the 1 12 J a f f n a p e n i n s u l a . The T i g e r s were ready to f i l l the ' p o l i t i c a l vacuum' c r e a t e d by the expected demise of the TULF. In 1981, the LTTE f o r the f i r s t time ambushed and k i l l e d army p e r s o n n e l . The a t t a c k was c a r r i e d out i n J a f f n a under the l e a d e r s h i p of 'Lieutenant' Charles Anthony ( a l i a s Seelan) on October 15, 1981. 2 6 T h i s was a j o i n t o p e r a t i o n with the Tamil Eelam L i b e r a t i o n O r g a n i z a t i o n (TELO — introduced on page 115) formed to n e u t r a l i z e the emergence of Peoples' L i b e r a t i o n of Tamil Eelam ( P L O T E — introduced on page 117), a breakaway f a c t i o n of the LTTE under the l e a d e r s h i p of Uma Maheswaran. The LTTE j o i n e d hands with the TELO i n 1980. 2 7 The l e a d e r s of both the LTTE and TELO were from V a l v e t t i t h u r a i and the ' v i l l a g e bond' f a c i l i t a t e d c o operation between t h e i r two movements i n j o i n t o p e r a t i o n s . However, with the a r r e s t of TELO l e a d e r s i n 1981, the r e l a t i o n s h i p came to an end. The a t t a c k on Chavakachcheri P o l i c e S t a t i o n on October 27, 1982 ( a l s o l e d by C h a r l e s Anthony) poi n t e d to a change i n m i l i t a r y s t r a t e g y from ambush to a major attack on the p o l i c e . 2 8 The T i g e r s s u f f e r e d t h e i r f i r s t f a t a l i t y with the death of 'Lieutenant' S. Sathiyanathan ( a l i a s Shankar, Suresh), shot by the m i l i t a r y on November 27, 1982. 2 9 Ten years a f t e r the establishment of the LTTE, and seven years a f t e r a c t i v e m i l i t a r y o p e r a t i o n s , the group met i t s f i r s t setback. By that time, however, the image of LTTE as a w e l l - d i s c i p l i n e d and w e l l - o r g a n i z e d movement was f i r m l y e s t a b l i s h e d . The LTTE became strong enough to attack the army in the e a r l y 1980s. I n e v i t a b l y , the Tamil areas i n c r e a s i n g l y came under the c o n t r o l of the Sinhala-Buddhist-dominated army which 113 c o u l d not e s t a b l i s h a rapport with c i v i l i a n s . By ambushing the s e c u r i t y f o r c e s , m i l i t a n t s succeeded i n provoking r e p r i s a l s a g a i n s t c i v i l i a n s . The " e t h n i c army's" use of e x c e s s i v e v i o l e n c e strengthened Tamil c i v i l i a n s ' a l l e g i a n c e to the s e c e s s i o n i s t g u e r r i l l a s . The LTTE demonstrated i t s a b i l i t y to s u r v i v e both the government r e p r e s s i o n and i n t e r n a l f r i c t i o n s . The government f a i l e d to a r r e s t the d e t e r i o r a t i n g s i t u a t i o n i n the north and allowed i t to reach a c r i s i s by 1983. The f i n a l d i r e c t c o n f r o n t a t i o n between the LTTE and TULF occurred i n 1983. The TULF condemned the armed s t r u g g l e of the LTTE and other m i l i t a n t groups. T h i s exacerbated the a l r e a d y s t r a i n e d r e l a t i o n s h i p between the m i l i t a n t s and moderates, r e s u l t i n g i n the MP f o r Kopay, M. Alalasundaram being shot i n the l e g " f o r a n t i - s o c i a l a c t i v i t i e s " on February 22, 1983. 3 0 The shooting was c o n s i d e r e d a warning to the TULF. The LTTE and TULF used the l o c a l government e l e c t i o n s of May 1983 to t e s t t h e i r p o l i t i c a l s t r e n g t h i n the Tamil d i s t r i c t s , p a r t i c u l a r l y J a f f n a p e n i n s u l a . The former campaigned a g a i n s t the l a t t e r ' s p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n e l e c t i o n s because they had been i n e f f e c t i v e i n e x t r a c t i n g concessions from s u c c e s s i v e governments w i t h i n a parliamentary democratic system. The LTTE through i t s boycott campaign c h a l l e n g e d the long p o l i t i c a l hegemony of the TULF over the the north. But the TULF, u n w i l l i n g to l o s e i t s s t a t u s as the ' e x c l u s i v e ' r e p r e s e n t a t i v e of the Tamils, r e f u s e d to bow to LTTE p r e s s u r e . The LTTE shot dead two UNP candidates f o r the l o c a l e l e c t i o n s on A p r i l 29, 1983. 3 1 These k i l l i n g s r e s u l t e d i n the withdrawal of a l l UNP candidates from the e l e c t i o n . The c a l l 1 1 4 f o r boycott was a huge success on the J a f f n a p e n i n s u l a , and i n d i c a t e d wide support f o r the L T T E . 3 2 However t h i s support may be a l s o due to fear of r e p r i s a l s from the g u e r r i l l a s . The p o l i t i c a l success of. the LTTE e s t a b l i s h e d i t as the foremost g u e r r i l l a movement i n J a f f n a . N e v ertheless, on J u l y 15, 1983, Charles Anthony was k i l l e d by the army i n i t s f i r s t major breakthrough ag a i n s t the L T T E . 3 3 The l o s s of Anthony, who was was not only an able g u e r r i l l a commander but a l s o a c l o s e f r i e n d of Prabakaran r e s u l t e d i n a revenge a s s a u l t on the army on J u l y 23, 1983 at T i n n e v e l y . 3 4 The ambush was l e d by P r a b a k a r a n . 3 5 T h i r t e e n s o l d i e r s were k i l l e d , i n c l u d i n g a Second L i e u t e n a n t . The LTTE l o s t Chelvanayagam. 3 6 The a n t i - T a m i l r i o t s i n Colombo followed t h i s a t t a c k on the m i l i t a r y . John R. Wood in h i s a n a l y s i s of se c e s s i o n p o i n t s to the " p r e c i p i t a n t s or a c c e l e r a t o r s " which l e d to a point of no r e t u r n . In . S r i Lanka's case, the 1983 r i o t s p r ovided t h i s c r i t i c a l t u r n i n g p o i n t . As suggested i n the t h e o r e t i c a l framework, Tamil g u e r r i l l a s concentrated on the establishment of a base area i n the f i r s t phase of the s e c e s s i o n i s t s t r u g g l e . Through v i o l e n t and non - v i o l e n t a c t i o n s , the LTTE developed a p u b l i c support base. The S r i Lankan government's v i o l e n t o v e r - r e a c t i o n to the s e c e s s i o n i s t s t r u g g l e a l s o i n c r e a s e d the Tamils' commitment to the g u e r r i l l a s . E l i m i n a t i o n of informers and c o l l a b o r a t o r s f a c i l i t a t e d the growth of an armed s e c e s s i o n i s t movement in and around the core areas. Through c a r e f u l l y planned and executed g u e r r i l l a a t t a c k s , the LTTE b u i l t an image of the i n v i n c i b i l i t y . Safe hideouts i n Tamil Nadu which allowed the m i l i t a n t s to avoid a r r e s t i l l u s t r a t e d the s i g n i f i c a n c e of 115 e x t e r n a l support to the s e c e s s i o n i s t c o n f l i c t . In the second phase (beginning approximately i n 1981), i n c r e a s i n g a t t a c k s on p o l i c e s t a t i o n s and s e c u r i t y f o r c e s were c a r r i e d out by the r e b e l s to o b t a i n arms and ammunition. Such a t t a c k s a l s o had the e f f e c t of d e m o r a l i z i n g the enemy. The LTTE a c q u i r e d adequate f i n a n c i a l resources, f i r e power and s e l f - c o n f i d e n c e to s u s t a i n i t s o p e r a t i o n s a g a i n s t the government. Tamil Eelam L i b e r a t i o n O r g a n i z a t i o n (TELO) U n l i k e the LTTE, which came i n t o the 'open' with the p u b l i c a t i o n of i t s l e t t e r i n V e e r a k e s a r i , the TELO remained obscure u n t i l 1981. The TELO had achieved prominence during the t r i a l of Thangathurai and S. Yogachandran ( a l i a s Kuttimani) under the Prevention of T e r r o r i s m Act i n 1982. Yogachandran's dramatic announcement of h i s wish to donate h i s eyes so that a f t e r h i s death he c o u l d s t i l l see the b i r t h of Eelam made him a ' f o i k ' hero. In f a c t , the emergence of the TELO co u l d be t r a c e d back to 1972. Thangathurai, who was born i n V a l v e t t i t h u r a i founded TELO i n 1972 but b u i l t the o r g a n i z a t i o n a l s t r u c t u r e f o r the movement in 1973. 3 7 Yogachandran, a " p o l i t i c a l l y c o n s c i o u s " V a l v e t t i t h u r a i smuggler, played a key r o l e in the growth of the movement. He was a very good marksman who provided ' m i l i t a r y e x p e r t i s e ' f o r the g u e r r i l l a group. Thangathurai was the ideologue of the movement. TELO was r e s p o n s i b l e f o r the k i l l i n g of s e v e r a l policemen, i n c l u d i n g Inspector Pathmanathan in 1979. In 1980 and 1981, the TELO c a r r i e d out m i l i t a r y operations together with the LTTE. Among the important operations were the 1 16 r a i d on the Neervely bank (Prabakaran l e d the LTTE in t h i s o p e r a t i o n ) , and the ambush on the army i n J a f f n a . 3 8 However, the t u r n i n g p o i n t f o r the TELO was the capture of both Thangathurai and Yogachandran i n the s p r i n g of 1981. I t was a major success f o r the S r i Lankan army. The TELO d i s i n t e g r a t e d a f t e r the l o s s of i t s l e a d e r s , and i t conducted no f u r t h e r major m i l i t a r y undertakings u n t i l 1984. Yogachandran, along with f e l l o w m i l i t a n t Jaganathan (Jagan), were sentenced to death on August 13 f o r the k i l l i n g of Sivanesan, a p o l i c e o f f i c e r i n J a f f n a i n 1979. 3 9 Thangathurai was c o n v i c t e d in the Neervely bank robbery and r e c e i v e d a l i f e sentence. In order to r e t a i n the support of m i l i t a n t Tamils, the TULF had nominated Yogachandran to the vacant Vaddukkodai Constituency on J a f f n a p e n i n s u l a i n November. 1982. 4 0 However, the death sentence imposed on Yogachandran prevented him from t a k i n g h i s oath as a MP. But Indian E x t e r n a l A f f a i r s M i n i s t e r Narasimha Rao's c a l l f o r l e n i e n c y on behalf of Yogachandran and Jaganathan demonstrated I n d i a ' s concern f o r the s e c e s s i o n i s t m i l i t a n t s . 4 1 In a d d i t i o n , the Tamil Nadu government, backed by a l l the major p o l i t i c a l p a r t i e s , passed a r e s o l u t i o n c a l l i n g f o r the r e d u c t i o n of the death sentence passed on the m i l i t a n t s to a l e s s e r punishment. The ' i n t e r f e r e n c e ' of India i n S r i Lankan i n t e r n a l a f f a i r s suggested the stand I n d i a would take v i s - a - v i s the s e c e s s i o n i s t r e b e l s i n the f u t u r e . At t h i s p o i n t , however, Indian e f f o r t s were f u t i l e . Not only Yogachandran and Jaganathan, but a l s o Thangathurai were b r u t a l l y murdered by S i n h a l e s e p r i s o n e r s at Welikada p r i s o n on J u l y 25, 1983. 4 2 1 17 Peoples' L i b e r a t i o n of Tamil Eelam (PLOTE), Eelam Revolutionary  O r g a n i z a t i o n (EROS) and Eelam People's R e v o l u t i o n a r y L i b e r a t i o n  Front (EPRLF) In 1980, the Peoples' L i b e r a t i o n of Tamil Eelam (PLOTE), a breakaway group of the LTTE, was formed by Uma Maheswaran, an ex-surveyor with trade union experience from T e l l i p a l a i . " 3 The main cause fo r the s p l i t was p e r s o n a l d i f f e r e n c e s with Prabakaran." 0 The p e r s o n a l r i v a l r y between these two l e a d e r s l e d to a gun b a t t l e i n May 1982 at Madras. Both were taken i n t o custody and l a t e r r e l e a s e d on b a i l . The Indian government r e f u s e d to e x t r a d i t e e i t h e r leader to S r i Lanka. PLOTE r e c r u i t s had been t r a i n e d by George Habashi's P a l e s t i n e L i b e r a t i o n F r o n t . " 5 S e v e r a l m i l i t a n t s from PLOTE had k i l l e d A. T h i a g a r a j a h , the l e a d i n g UNP candidate f o r the DDC E l e c t i o n on May 25, 1981." 6 PLOTE attacked the A n a i c o t t a i P o l i c e S t a t i o n i n the summer of 1981 — the f i r s t a t t a ck on a p o l i c e s t a t i o n i n the n o r t h . " 7 I t was followed by the f i r s t a t t a c k on the army at Kurikattuwan i n the f a l l of 1981." B But the l e a d e r s h i p , p a r t i c u l a r l y Uma Maheswaran, g e n e r a l l y advocated mass armed s t r u g g l e i n s t e a d of 'hit-and-run' a t t a c k s on the s e c u r i t y f o r c e s . " 9 The PLOTE from i t s beginning was c l o s e l y i n v o l v e d with the p u b l i c . New farms were e s t a b l i s h e d i n Vavunia, Trincomalee, and B a t t i c a l o a d i s t r i c t s to a c c e l e r a t e economic and s o c i a l development i n the v i l l a g e s . 5 0 The PLOTE c o l l a b o r a t e d with the Refugees R e h a b i l i t a t i o n O r g a n i z a t i o n and Gandhiyam S o c i e t y to r e - s e t t l e up-country Tamils on t r a d i t i o n a l Tamil l a n d . 5 1 But the government c l o s e d down the Gandhiyam S o c i e t y as a t e r r o r i s t 118 network and a r r e s t e d i t s s e c r e t a r y , Dr. S. Rajasundaram i n A p r i l 1983. 5 2 He was k i l l e d i n the Welikada p r i s o n i n J u l y 1983. 5 3 The PLOTE s u c c e s s f u l l y b u i l t a network of students', women's, farmers' and workers' o r g a n i z a t i o n s i n t r a d i t i o n a l Tamil areas. Consequently, the PLOTE developed the l a r g e s t g r a s s - r o o t s o r g a n i z a t i o n by 1983. In a d d i t i o n , PLOTE attempted to d i v e r s i f y out of J a f f n a p e n i n s u l a , making c o n t a c t s with the eastern p r o v i n c e Muslims and up-country Tamils. The PLOTE had the widest p o l i t i c a l base among the m i l i t a n t groups. Mao and other t h e o r i s t s on g u e r r i l l a warfare a s s e r t that p u b l i c support i s necessary f o r the growth of a g u e r r i l l a movement. However, the PLOTE's lack of m i l i t a r y a c t i o n reduced i t s image as a dynamic g u e r r i l l a o r g a n i z a t i o n . The o r i g i n s of the Eelam Rev o l u t i o n a r y O r g a n i z a t i o n (EROS) can be t r a c e d back to the Eelam Research O r g a n i z a t i o n formed by a Marxist economist, Eliathamby Ratnasabapathy, in 1975. 5 4 T h i s o r g a n i z a t i o n comprises the l a r g e s t number of Marxist i n t e l l e c t u a l s among the m i l i t a n t groups o p e r a t i n g i n S r i Lanka. EROS began with the j o i n t l e a d e r s h i p of Rajanayagam i n London and V. Balakumar i n Madras. 5 5 Today i t s Revolutionary C o u n c i l , headed by Secretary-General Balakumar, i s in charge of EROS o p e r a t i o n s . 5 6 The EROS l e a d e r s h i p b e l i e v e s that a 'hit-and-run' g u e r r i l l a p o l i c y can be e f f e c t i v e only at the beginning of warfare. T h i s m i l i t a n t group s t r o n g l y b e l i e v e s i n economic sabotage to d i s l o c a t e the S r i Lankan economy. The EROS i s concentrated i n the east where i t had b u i l t - u p g r a s s - r o o t s bombing f a c t o r i e s , d i s r u p t i n g exports e t c . — o r g a n i z a t i o n s and s u c c e s s f u l l y e s t a b l i s h e d l i n k s with up-country Tamils. 119 The Eelam People's R e v o l u t i o n a r y L i b e r a t i o n Front (EPRLF) i s the youngest of the f i v e major s e c e s s i o n i s t g u e r r i l l a o r g a n i z a t i o n s a c t i v e i n S r i Lanka. The EPRLF emerged out of General Union of Eelam Students (GUES) i n mid-1981. 5 7 The S e c r e t a r y - G e n e r a l of the Front i s K. Pathmanabha. 5 8 The m i l i t a r y wing of the o r g a n i z a t i o n , the People's L i b e r a t i o n Army (PLA), 5 9 c o n s i s t s of g u e r r i l l a f i g h t e r s t r a i n e d i n Lebanon and S y r i a by the PLO. 6 0 The p o l i t i c a l wing c o n s i s t s of v a r i o u s students,' women's and workers' groups. C o n s i s t e n t with Mao's theory, the M a r x i s t g u e r r i l l a groups — the EPRLF, EROS and PLOTE — p a i d g r e a t e r a t t e n t i o n to the p o l i t i c i z a t i o n of the p u b l i c . The EPRLF a l s o concentrated i t s a c t i v i t i e s i n the eastern p r o v i n c e . In the pre-1983 p e r i o d , no major m i l i t a r y o p e r a t i o n s took p l a c e under the EPRLF. C l e a r l y , the LTTE had the most impressive m i l i t a r y r e c o r d . The LTTE boasted of a w e l l - d i s c i p l i n e d and w e l l - o r g a n i z e d g u e r r i l l a group under the strong l e a d e r s h i p of Prabakaran. I t s m i l i t a r y success was a r e s u l t of e f f e c t i v e g u e r r i l l a t r a i n i n g and the t r a i n i n g of f i e l d commanders. Although the LTTE f o l l o w s a M a r x i s t - L e n i n i s t ideology, i t i s f a r from r i g i d i n i t s i d e o l o g i c a l commitment and r e a d i l y adapts to l o c a l c o n d i t i o n s . Due to i t s f l e x i b l e i d e o l o g i c a l stand, the LTTE by mid-1983 had v i r t u a l l y d i s p l a c e d the TULF l e a d e r s h i p . Guevara i n s i s t e d that the g u e r r i l l a s should i d e n t i f y with the p u b l i c of the areas i n which they are o p e r a t i n g . By a v o i d i n g r i g i d i d e o l o g i c a l commitment, the LTTE developed i n t o a strong g u e r r i l l a group. However, i n i t i a l lack of i n t e r e s t i n the p o l i t i c a l aspect of g u e r r i l l a warfare c o n t r i b u t e d to the LTTE's f a i l u r e to develop 120 a strong g r a s s - r o o t s network. A Jaffna-based o r g a n i z a t i o n i n the pre-1983 p e r i o d , the group adopted a g u e r r i l l a s t r a t e g y with a hit-and-run p o l i c y aimed at d e m o r a l i z i n g the army. The TELO's m i l i t a r y v i c t o r i e s were l i m i t e d . The d i s i n t e g r a t i o n of the TELO a f t e r the a r r e s t of i t s l e a d e r s i l l u s t r a t e d the absence of an o r g a n i z a t i o n a l s t r u c t u r e with which to f a c i l i t a t e the smooth t r a n s i t i o n of power. The TELO was the only o r g a n i z a t i o n which lacked a Ma r x i s t ideology and i t s main o b j e c t i v e was simply to e s t a b l i s h Eelam. L i k e LTTE, the TELO was a Jaffna-based movement, but with a narrower p o l i t i c a l base. Since both the LTTE and PLOTE b e l i e v e d in a s o c i a l i s t Eelam, there was no i d e o l o g i c a l schism. However, pe r s o n a l and s t r a t e g i c d i f f e r e n c e s d i s t i n g u i s h e d PLOTE from the LTTE. Uma Maheswaran understood the importance of g r a s s - r o o t s o r g a n i z a t i o n i n the development of a g u e r r i l l a movement and took steps to implement i t . The PLOTE played a s i g n i f i c a n t r o l e in developing p o l i t i c a l consciousness i n an a p o l i t i c a l Tamil p o p u l a t i o n . The EPRLF and the EROS are two r i g i d l y Marxist p a r t i e s , h e a v i l y concentrated i n the e a s t . The groups developed w e l l - o r g a n i z e d p o l i t i c a l s t r u c t u r e s which were not m i l i t a r i l y o r i e n t e d and hence, remained obscure as g u e r r i l l a groups in the post-1983 p e r i o d . In c o n c l u s i o n , the success or f a i l u r e of these g u e r r i l l a o r g a n i z a t i o n s i n the post-1983 p e r i o d was h e a v i l y i n f l u e n c e d by the l e a d e r s h i p , m i l i t a r y and p o l i t i c a l o r g a n i z a t i o n , m i l i t a r y t r a i n i n g and g u e r r i l l a s t r a t e g i e s developed by these v a r i o u s groups i n the pre-1983 years. 121 Post-1983 Developments The J u l y 1983 a n t i - T a m i l r i o t s provided the c a t a l y s t f o r the r a p i d growth of s e c e s s i o n i s t m i l i t a n t movements in S r i Lanka. The g u e r r i l l a system dominated by the LTTE and TELO in the 1970s, bloomed i n t o an overabundance of movements in the post-1983 p e r i o d . By 1983 there were twenty-three m i l i t a n t groups committed to e s t a b l i s h i n g Eelam through armed s t r u g g l e . 6 1 The J u l y r i o t s a l s o enabled India to become deeply i n v o l v e d i n the s e c e s s i o n i s t c o n f l i c t through d i p l o m a t i c measures and, consequently, I n d i a i n d i r e c t l y p a r t i c i p a t e d in the i n t e r n a l a f f a i r s of the i s l a n d . I n d i a , through the P. V. Narasimha Rao and G. Parthasarathy missions of 1983, secured a strong p o l i t i c a l f o o t h o l d on the i s l a n d . 6 2 In t h i s way, the 1983 k i l l i n g s i n t e r n a t i o n a l i z e d the Tamil s e c e s s i o n i s t s t r u g g l e . They a l s o p r e c i p i t a t e d the r a p i d formation of Eelam Tamil A s s o c i a t i o n s i n the West which provided f i n a n c i a l a s s i s t a n c e and engaged in e f f e c t i v e propaganda for the v a r i o u s m i l i t a n t groups. The J u l y events a l s o compelled both M. G. Ramachandran, Chief M i n i s t e r of Tamil Nadu, and M. Karunanidhi, leader of the DMK, to take a f i r m stand on the S r i Lankan Tamil i s s u e ; each competed with the other to present an image of himse l f as 'saviour' of the Tamils. I n e v i t a b l y , the m i l i t a n t movements were drawn i n t o the vortex of Tamil Nadu p o l i t i c s and were s p l i t along Tamil Nadu party l i n e s . Ramachandran emerged as the 'god f a t h e r ' to the LTTE, while Karunanidhi became the patron f o r the TELO. As a r e s u l t of the r i o t s , there was a s i g n i f i c a n t increase i n the numerical s t r e n g t h of the v a r i o u s m i l i t a n t groups. In 122 1982, the m i l i t a n t s numbered around four hundred, i n c l u d i n g twenty hardcore g u e r r i l l a s . 6 3 By 1984, t h i s number had swelled to 5,000, of which only o n e - t h i r d were armed. 6 4 However, by 1985 the f i v e major groups boasted around 10,000 g u e r r i l l a s . 6 5 These f i g u r e s i l l u s t r a t e the importance of the J u l y 1983 r i o t s t o the growth of the v a r i o u s s e c e s s i o n i s t movements. During the f a l l of 1983, v a r i o u s m i l i t a n t groups concentrated on recruitment, t r a i n i n g , o r g a n i z a t i o n and propaganda to b u i l d t h e i r movements. The m i l i t a n t s opened g u e r r i l l a camps i n Tamil Nadu to provide m i l i t a r y t r a i n i n g and i d e o l o g i c a l l e s s o n s to the g u e r r i l l a s . 6 6 Among the major s e c e s s i o n i s t groups, only the LTTE operated t r a i n i n g camps in S r i Lankan f o r e s t s . 6 7 The m i l i t a n t s were t r a i n e d by r e t i r e d Indian Tamil m i l i t a r y o f f i c e r s . 6 8 There were no major g u e r r i l l a o p e r a t i o n s a g a i n s t the m i l i t a r y d u r i n g the r e s t of 1983. India played a key r o l e i n 'convincing' Jayewardene to convene an a l l - p a r t y conference to s e t t l e the e t h n i c problem, and s u c c e s s f u l l y 'reintroduced' the TULF i n t o n e g o t i a t i n g a settlement in January 1984.' The moderate TULF was s t i l l c o n s i d e r e d by India to be the r e p r e s e n t a t i v e of the Tamils, and i t s p a r t i c i p a t i o n a l s o demonstrated In d i a ' s d e s i r e to deal with a moderate Tamil group which would be more amenable to India's i n t e r e s t s . Tamil Eelam L i b e r a t i o n O r g a n i z a t i o n (TELO) S u r p r i s i n g l y , the TELO, which l o s t i t s e n t i r e l e a d e r s h i p i n the Welikada p r i s o n massacre of 1983, emerged as the 123 dominant m i l i t a n t group i n 1984. A f t e r the deaths of Thangathurai and Kuttimani i n 1983, S r i Sabaratnam ( a l i a s T a l l S r i ) from the v i l l a g e of Kalviyangadu took over the l e a d e r s h i p . 6 9 S r i Sabaratnam was sentenced i n a b s e n t i a to l i f e imprisonment f o r h i s p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n the Neervely bank r o b b e r y . 7 0 T h e r e a f t e r , the TELO l e a d e r s h i p was no longer dominated by V a l v e t t i t h u r a i youths. Moreover, the deaths of Thangathurai and Kuttimani removed the ' v i l l a g e bond' that u n i t e d the l e a d e r s h i p of the LTTE and TELO during 1980-81. The r i s e of the TELO can be a t t r i b u t e d to two major f a c t o r s . F i r s t , the TELO, which was the only " n o n - i d e o l o g i c a l " movement among the major s e p a r a t i s t groups, was favoured by the c e n t r a l government of I n d i a . S r i Sabaratnam s t a t e d : Our people want Eelam immediately. They are not concerned with Marxism or any other 'ism.' I t [ i d e o l o g y ] i s only the next step a f t e r Eelam i s a c h i e v e d . 7 1 The Research and A n a l y s i s Wing (RAW), the Indian i n t e l l i g e n c e agency, played an important r o l e i n the growth of the TELO, and consequently, the Indian c e n t r a l government exerted greater i n f l u e n c e over the TELO l e a d e r s h i p . 7 2 Despite being l i m i t e d i n time and q u a n t i t i e s , t r a i n i n g and arms provided by the RAW enhanced the f i g h t i n g c a p a b i l i t y of the TELO. Second, the t r a g i c deaths of the TELO l e a d e r s i n 1983 gave the movement p u b l i c i t y and a t t r a c t e d a l a r g e number of r e c r u i t s . F u r t h e r , i n d i s c r i m i n a t e s e l e c t i o n of r e c r u i t s without proper screening t e s t s a l s o s i g n i f i c a n t l y i n c r e a s e d the numbers j o i n i n g TELO. In Tamil Nadu, the TELO came to be i d e n t i f i e d as a pro-DMK movement and i t s c l o s e r e l a t i o n s h i p with M. Karunanidhi, the DMK leader i s o l a t e d i t from the government of Tamil Nadu under 124 the v i n d i c t i v e l e a d e r s h i p of M.G. Ramachandran. The TELO's f i r s t major attack on the armed f o r c e s took p l a c e i n the f a l l of 1984. Chavakachcheri p o l i c e s t a t i o n , manned by about f i f t y policemen, was a t t a c k e d and destroyed by the TELO g u e r r i l l a s on November 20, 1984. 7 3 Twenty-four policemen were k i l l e d i n the a t t a c k , the l a r g e s t number of m i l i t a r y c a s u a l t i e s i n f l i c t e d on the government. The TELO a s s a u l t u n i t , which used new and modern weapons, a l s o plundered a l a r g e number of weapons i n c l u d i n g M-16S and sub-machine g u n s . 7 4 A S r i Lankan m i l i t a r y commander d e s c r i b e d the a t t a c k as " s o p h i s t i c a t e d and w e l l planned," which i l l u s t r a t e d that the post-1983 g u e r r i l l a s were b e t t e r t r a i n e d and e q u i p p e d . 7 5 T h i s Chavakachcheri a t t a c k a l s o demonstrated that the Tamil g u e r r i l l a s were prepared to progress from a hit-and-run o p e r a t i o n to a l a r g e - s c a l e organized g u e r r i l l a o p e r a t i o n . The TELO's success e s t a b l i s h e d i t as a dominant g u e r r i l l a f o r c e i n the s e c e s s i o n i s t s t r u g g l e , and enhanced i t s l o c a l support, both a c t i v e and p a s s i v e . The TELO c a r r i e d out another s u c c e s s f u l g u e r r i l l a o p e r a t i o n i n the winter of 1985. The TELO blew up a Colombo-bound J a f f n a t r a i n at Murikkandy, a small town south of J a f f n a , on the 19th of January 1985. 7 6 Twenty-seven s o l d i e r s were k i l l e d . 7 7 The m i l i t a n t s a l s o s u c c e s s f u l l y cut o f f the railway l i n k to the J a f f n a p e n i n s u l a . I n d i a ' s increased support e x p l a i n s the increase i n g u e r r i l l a a c t i v i t i e s . As previous t h e o r e t i c a l d i s c u s s i o n i n d i c a t e d , f o r e i g n a s s i s t a n c e and s a n c t u a r i e s can be important f a c t o r s determining the s c a l e and i n t e n s i t y of g u e r r i l l a warfare. Thus, in three months, two 125 s u c c e s s f u l a t t a c k s with high m i l i t a r y c a s u a l t i e s enabled the TELO to c h a l l e n g e the dominance of the LTTE on the J a f f n a p e n i n s u l a . The LTTE played a secondary r o l e to the TELO i n the g u e r r i l l a warfare of e a r l y 1985. Meanwhile, the g u e r r i l l a r a i d s , which were becoming more e f f e c t i v e over time, posed a gre a t e r danger to government c o n t r o l over the p e n i n s u l a . Time rep o r t e d i n A p r i l 1985 that the m i l i t a n t s would " e v e n t u a l l y p r e v a i l i n an a l l - o u t c o n f r o n t a t i o n with the army." 7 8 Every s u c c e s s f u l g u e r r i l l a r a i d encouraged "bolder and bigger" r a i d s on the m i l i t a r y . In the s p r i n g of 1985, the TELO atta c k e d an army camp at K o k a v i l in i t s campaign towards a f u l l - f l e d g e d ' m i l i t a r y ' c o n f r o n t a t i o n in the s e c e s s i o n i s t s t r u g g l e . The TELO under-estimated the m i l i t a r y s t r e n g t h i n the K o k a v i l camp and the ' campaign was a f a i l u r e . 7 9 In r e t r o s p e c t , i t can be seen that t h i s was the beginning of the end of TELO as a s u c c e s s f u l g u e r r i l l a u n i t . A s u c c e s s f u l capture of the camp would have encouraged more a t t a c k s on the v a r i o u s m i l i t a r y camps, the main government a u t h o r i t y in the Tamil areas. But the TELO f a i l e d to repeat i t s success of the past. The TELO was able to b r i n g the i d e o l o g i c a l l y r i g i d EROS and EPRLF under an umbrella o r g a n i z a t i o n i n 1984. These three m i l i t a n t o g a n i z a t i o n s formed the United Front of Eelam L i b e r a t i o n O r g a n i z a t i o n s (UFELO) on A p r i l 16, 1984. 8 0 Coordinated m i l i t a r y o p e r a t i o n s , overseas propaganda and c o l l e c t i o n of funds j o i n t l y administered by a j o i n t committee were the major o b j e c t i v e s of the newly formed UFELO. 8 1 However, both major g u e r r i l l a a t t a c k s were c a r r i e d out e x c l u s i v e l y by 126 the TELO which questioned the e f f e c t i v e n e s s of the UFELO. The UFELO was renamed Eelam N a t i o n a l L i b e r a t i o n Front (ENLF) i n March 1985. 8 2 The LTTE j o i n e d ENLF i n A p r i l 1985. 8 3 These four m i l i t a n t o r g a n i z a t i o n s under the ENLF banner p a r t i c i p a t e d i n the Thimpu (Bhutan) peace t a l k s between J u l y and August 1985. Because the l e a d e r s of the LTTE and TELO c o u l d not bury t h e i r p e r s o n a l d i f f e r e n c e s , the r e l a t i o n s h i p between these two m i l i t a n t groups o p e r a t i n g under a common f r o n t remained h o s t i l e . The PLOTE refused to j o i n the f r o n t . Thus, the attempt to form a j o i n t f r o n t comprising a l l the f i v e major groups d i d not m a t e r i a l i z e . Personal more than i d e o l o g i c a l d i f f e r e n c e s kept the Tamil m i l i t a n t s from e s t a b l i s h i n g a u n i t e d g u e r r i l l a campaign. A c o o r d i n a t e d g u e r r i l l a e f f o r t by the m i l i t a n t s c o u l d have i n f l i c t e d heavy d e f e a t s on the army in the 1984-85 p e r i o d . But the S r i Lankan army was strong enough to r e s i s t the i n d i v i d u a l m i l i t a r y groups which were of v a r y i n g s t r e n g t h both i n terms of t r a i n i n g and f i r e power. The S r i Lankan evidence, however c o l l a b o r a t e s the theory put forward by O ' N e i l l that a lack of cohesion may not always le a d to defeat i f other f a c t o r s counteract t h i s drawback. By mid-1985, the m i l i t a n t s took over the J a f f n a p e n i n s u l a . The army was c o n f i n e d to camps s c a t t e r e d over the d i s t r i c t . The major army camps were s i t u a t e d i n J a f f n a F o r t , Kankesanthurai, Point Pedro, N a v a t k u l i and V a l v e t t i t h u r a i , with headquarters at P a l a l y . Though a l l f i v e major groups were o p e r a t i n g i n the r e g i o n , the TELO and the LTTE were i n the f o r e f r o n t due to a c t i v e and s u c c e s s f u l g u e r r i l l a r a i d s . Each group concentrated on areas where i t enjoyed e x t e n s i v e support of the l o c a l 127 p o p u l a t i o n . The TELO's ' m i l i t a r y ' success and the confinement of the army to barracks brought the o r g a n i z a t i o n out i n t o the open i n J a f f n a . The m i l i t a n t s mixed f r e e l y with the p u b l i c . The fr e e movement of these h e a v i l y armed m i l i t a n t s f a c i l i t a t e d by the i n a b i l i t y of the army to move out of the camps, gave the g u e r r i l l a s ' t o t a l c o n t r o l ' over the p u b l i c . Due to the absence of p o l i t i c a l o r g a n i z a t i o n w i t h i n the movement, the TELO con s i d e r e d i t s e l f a p u r e l y m i l i t a r y u n i t and expected the p u b l i c to t r e a t i t as an army. The TELO's pre-occupation with i t s m i l i t a r y image i s s a i d to have s t r a i n e d the r e l a t i o n s h i p between the p u b l i c and the g u e r r i l l a s . 8 " By 1986, i n t e r n a l d i f f e r e n c e s among the l e a d e r s weakened the TELO. Sabaratnam, who l e f t h i s Indian hideout and c r o s s e d over to S r i Lanka, t r i e d to s e t t l e i n t e r n a l d i f f e r e n c e s w i t h i n the movement but i n s t e a d k i l l e d the d i s s i d e n t TELO group lea d e r , D a s . 8 5 In a d d i t i o n , p u b l i c sympathy f o r the TELO had been de c r e a s i n g since i t s k i l l i n g of two TULF ex-MPs, Alalasundaram and Dharmalingam i n September 1985. 8 6 By A p r i l , the r e l a t i o n s h i p between the TELO and the LTTE had become s t r a i n e d due to t h e i r intense competition to become the major fo r c e in J a f f n a . The LTTE a t t a c k e d the TELO camps in J a f f n a . Over one hundred TELO m i l i t a n t s , i n c l u d i n g S r i Sabaratnam, were k i l l e d . 8 7 The LTTE emerged as the major g u e r r i l l a o r g a n i z a t i o n in the north. A. Selvam was e l e c t e d as the Secretary-General of TELO. 8 8 The lack of p u b l i c outcry over the k i l l i n g s i n J a f f n a , together with I n d i a ' s u n w i l l i n g n e s s to exert pressure on the LTTE to stop the k i l l i n g s , i n d i c a t e d the weak support base of the TELO. Thus, the g u e r r i l l a movement, without an i d e o l o g i c a l 128 commitment and with an o r g a n i z a t i o n a l s t r u c t u r e a r t i f i c i a l l y boosted by a f o r e i g n power, f a i l e d i n the end. The theory of g u e r r i l l a warfare d e s c r i b e s the second phase of warfare as a stage i n which the enemy i s under r e l e n t l e s s and mounting pressure. During the 1984-85 p e r i o d , the TELO had conducted major a t t a c k s on the government f o r c e s , which were on the d e f e n s i v e a g a i n s t the r e b e l a t t a c k s . The m i l i t a n t s destroyed the communication i n f r a s t r u c t u r e i n the J a f f n a area to i s o l a t e i t from the r e s t of the country. However, the TELO's f a i l u r e to score c o n s i s t e n t m i l i t a r y v i c t o r i e s prevented i t from developing i n t o a strong g u e r r i l l a group. The TELO's r a p i d growth c o u l d be a t t r i b u t e d to the support provided by the Indian government. Yet TELO's lack of o r g a n i z a t i o n a l s t r u c t u r e , l e a d e r s h i p , and p u b l i c support — three c r u c i a l elements i n the success of a g u e r r i l l a movement — c o n t r i b u t e d to i t s defeat in 1986. The d e c l i n e of the TELO was f u r t h e r a c c e l e r a t e d by a poor i n t e l l i g e n c e network and the f a i l u r e of g r a s s - r o o t s o r g a n i z a t i o n s to develop. Peoples' L i b e r a t i o n of Tamil Eelam (PLOTE), Eelam People's  R e v o l u t i o n a r y L i b e r a t i o n Front (EPRLF) and Eelam Revolutionary  O r g a n i z a t i o n (EROS) The PLOTE, the EPRLF and the EROS a l l shared a M a r x i s t -L e n i n i s t ideology. From the beginning, these three m i l i t a n t groups concentrated i n both the north and e a s t . The PLOTE and the EPRLF b e l i e v e d i n ' t o t a l r e v o l u t i o n ' ; a s o c i a l i s t south was necessary f o r a s t a b l e Eelam. F u r t h e r , these three groups s u c c e s s f u l l y i n f i l t r a t e d the up-country Tamil base c o n t r o l l e d 1 29 by S. Thondaman. They were able to d e s t a b i l i z e the S r i Lankan government in the south by s h i f t i n g the armed f o r c e s to the south and up-country. Yet only the EROS s u r v i v e d i n 1987 as a c r e d i b l e s e c e s s i o n i s t g u e r r i l l a o r g a n i z a t i o n . Uma Maheswaran's d e c i s i o n to b u i l d a people's army to c h a l l e n g e the S r i Lankan s t a t e i n c o n v e n t i o n a l warfare played a key r o l e i n the d i s i n t e g r a t i o n of the PLOTE. 8 9 In the post-1983 p e r i o d , the PLOTE's s t r e n g t h was estimated around 8,000-10,000. 9 0 The core of the g u e r r i l l a s , i n c l u d i n g Maheswaran, were t r a i n e d by the P a l e s t i n a n L i b e r a t i o n O r g a n i z a t i o n (PLO) i n Lebanon and were w e l l armed. 9 1 However, there were no major g u e r r i l l a o p e r a t i o n s undertaken by the PLOTE i n the post-1983 p e r i o d . The a t t a c k on Nikaweratiya p o l i c e s t a t i o n and the Nikaweratiya bank robbery c a r r i e d out by the PLOTE were exceptions to the general p o l i c y of the l e a d e r s h i p . 9 2 The f a c t that the a t t a c k took place i n an e x c l u s i v e l y S i n h a l a town, e i g h t y k i l o m e t r e s from Colombo, i n d i c a t e d a j o i n t o p e r a t i o n with S i n h a l e s e underground g u e r r i l l a s . Maheswaran was concerned about n o n - m i l i t a r y a c t i v i t i e s i n the post-1983 p e r i o d . The PLOTE operated 'Voice of Tamil Eelam' (VOTE), a r a d i o broadcast r e l a y e d from south I n d i a . 9 3 In February 1984, Maheswaran l e d a d e l e g a t i o n to M a u r i t i u s to win support f o r Eelam from i t s government. 9" Maheswaran's ' s o f t p e d d l i n g ' i n the s e c e s s i o n i s t s t r u g g l e brought him c l o s e r to the c e n t r a l government of I n d i a . Indian o f f i c i a l s c o n s i d e r e d Maheswaran as "balanced, p o l i t i c a l l y mature and c a n n y . " 9 5 A rapport between the PLOTE and the TULF l e a d e r s h i p a l s o e x i s t e d . However, the success of a g u e r r i l l a o r g a n i z a t i o n as Debray 130 argues, i s determined by m i l i t a r y c a p a b i l i t y and p u b l i c support. Although i n i t i a l l y the PLOTE demonstrated m i l i t a r y c a p a b i l i t y , i t s lack of f i e l d o p e r a t i o n s i n the post-1983 years made i t inexperienced i n g u e r r i l l a warfare. In the absence of g u e r r i l l a operations', the PLOTE was regarded as a non-o p e r a t i o n a l f o r c e incapable of p r o t e c t i n g the p u b l i c from the S r i Lankan army. The PLOTE l o s t i t s mass support in the post-1983 p e r i o d and was i s o l a t e d from the r e s t of the major g u e r r i l l a o r g a n i z a t i o n s . As Debray a l s o suggests, a s u c c e s s f u l m i l i t a r y o p e r a t i o n i s the most e f f e c t i v e form of p o l i t i c a l propaganda. The PLOTE remained the only group o u t s i d e the ENLF umbrella. Due to d i f f e r e n c e s over m i l i t a r y s t r a t e g y , i n t e r n a l squabbles set i n . Large numbers of m i l i t a n t s d e s e r t e d the movement because few g u e r r i l l a r a i d s were conducted. Subsequently, the PLOTE s p l i t i n t o v a r i o u s f a c t i o n s . By 1986 the l e a d e r s h i p was d i v o r c e d from the f i g h t i n g cadres. In a d d i t i o n , charges of c o r r u p t i o n were l e v e l l e d a g a i n s t the l e a d e r s h i p . I n e v i t a b l y , the PLOTE d i s i n t e g r a t e d . The dogmatic EPRLF r e c e i v e d a t t e n t i o n when i t s m i l i t a r y wing, the People's L i b e r a t i o n Army (PLA), kidnapped an American couple on May 1 0, 1 984. 9 6 The A l i e n s were accused of being CIA agents. However, the EPRLF's demand that ransom money should be handed over to the government of Tamil Nadu embarrassed the Indian government which had been c a t e g o r i c a l l y denying that i t was a s s i s t i n g the Tamil m i l i t a n t s . Under Indian p r e s s u r e , the A l i e n s were r e l e a s e d without payment of ransom two days l a t e r . I t was an i n a u s p i c i o u s s t a r t f o r EPRLF g u e r r i l l a s . The PLA a t t a c k e d the Karainagar naval base on February 11, 1985 using 131 rocket launchers f o r the f i r s t time i n the s e c e s s i o n i s t s t r u g g l e . 9 7 However, the a t t a c k was u n s u c c e s s f u l . The PLA a l s o f a i l e d to score a d e c i s i v e v i c t o r y i n i t s r a i d on the K i l l i n o c h i p o l i c e s t a t i o n on March 2, 1985. 9 8 The EPRLF was more a c t i v e i n the e a s t , though i t f a i l e d to c a r r y out any s i g n i f i c a n t g u e r r i l l a a t t a c k s . But the EPRLF played a c r i t i c a l r o l e i n the B a t t i c a l o a p r i s o n breakout and the r e l e a s e of p o l i t i c a l p r i s o n e r s i n September 1983." The PLA g u e r r i l l a s c u l t i v a t e d a r e l a t i o n s h i p with p r o g r e s s i v e S i n h a l e s e i n the south. In February 1987, Padmanabha, along with twenty-two p o l i t i c a l a c t i v i s t s ( a l l but two were S i n h a l e s e ) , were i n d i c t e d before the High Court on charges of c o n s p i r a c y to.overthrow the government. 1 0 0 U n l i k e the TELO, the EPRLF was not a strong f o r c e on the J a f f n a p e n i n s u l a . Thus, the LTTE s u c c e s s f u l l y demolished the EPRLF as a v i a b l e g u e r r i l l a f o r c e with minimal c a s u a l t i e s i n December 1986. 1 0 1 However, the EPRLF s u r v i v e d i n the east on account of i t s deep roots i n the B a t t i c a l o a d i s t r i c t . The EPRLF c o u l d not a t t r a c t as l a r g e funds as the LTTE, TELO or PLOTE. I t s f a i l u r e to score d e c i s i v e " m i l i t a r y " v i c t o r i e s a l s o reduced the flow of money i n t o EPRLF c o f f e r s . The m i l i t a n t s were engaged i n rob b e r i e s and kidnappings i n Tamil N a d u . 1 0 2 Consequently, the EPRLF had to operate i n a h o s t i l e environment i n I n d i a . The EPRLF a l s o f a i l e d due to i t s l i m i t e d success i n S r i Lanka. I t s c o n c e n t r a t i o n i n the heterogeneous east prevented i t from a c h i e v i n g c o n t r o l over that area. However, the EPRLF succeeded i n p o l i t i c i z i n g the general p u b l i c through e f f e c t i v e p o l i t i c a l propaganda from 1983. 132 EROS, a c l a s s i c a l M a r x i s t g u e r r i l l a group, used economic sabotage as i t s main t o o l i n the armed campaign a g a i n s t the s t a t e . EROS was a small g u e r r i l a o r g a n i z a t i o n numbering around 1,000-1,500 with r e l a t i v e l y l i m i t e d weaponry. 1 0 3 The group was very a c t i v e i n the B a t t i c a l o a d i s t r i c t . In 1984, EROS c a r r i e d out "bomb campaigns" i n Colombo and suburbs. Bomb a t t a c k s on Hot e l Lanka Oberoi demonstrated the a b i l i t y of EROS to s t r i k e deep i n t o Sinhala-dominated s o u t h . 1 0 * EROS g u e r r i l l a s a l s o made an u n s u c c e s s f u l attempt to destroy o i l r e f i n e r y i n s t a l l a t i o n s at K o l l a n a w a 1 0 5 and i t was a l s o suspected i n the A i r Lanka a i r c r a f t e x p l o s i o n at Katunayake on May 3, 1986 which r e s u l t e d i n the deaths of fourteen p e o p l e . 1 0 6 T h i s was fol l o w e d by the bomb e x p l o s i o n at the C e n t r a l T e l e g r a p h i c O f f i c e i n Colombo. EROS a l s o claimed r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r the bomb e x p l o s i o n on a passenger t r a i n on May 31, 1986 near Colombo. 1 0 7 The m i l i t a n t s a l s o demolished S r i Lanka's second l a r g e s t cement f a c t o r y at Trincomalee on May 21, 19 8 6 . 1 0 8 The government accused EROS in both massacres at Aluthoya and Colombo i n A p r i l 1 9 8 7 . 1 0 9 The g u e r r i l l a o p e r a t i o n c a r r i e d out by EROS out s i d e the north and east produced two r e s u l t s . F i r s t , these operations made the s e c e s s i o n i s t c o n f l i c t s p i l l over i n t o the Sin h a l a area. The government's attempt to s h i e l d the Sinhalese p o p u l a t i o n from the c o n f l i c t f a i l e d . Second, S r i Lanka's f r a g i l e economy was damaged by the demise of the t o u r i s t i n d u s t r y and f o r e i g n investment. EROS a l s o s u c c e s s f u l l y i n f i l t r a t e d the up-country Tamils who comprised the m a j o r i t y of the labour f o r c e i n the tea i n d u s t r y — the l a r g e s t S r i Lankan f o r e i g n exchange earner. But Thondaman's f i r m h o l d on the 133 p l a n t a t i o n Tamils slowed down c o n s i d e r a b l y the r a d i c a l i z a t i o n of the youth on the tea p l a n t a t i o n s . The c o n c e n t r a t i o n of EROS in the east kept i t from competing with the LTTE f o r m i l i t a r y dominance on the J a f f n a p e n i n s u l a . Hence, EROS maintained a c o r d i a l r e l a t i o n s h i p with the LTTE and operated with the ' b l e s s i n g s ' of the T i g e r s . In the east and south, EROS s u c c e s s f u l l y brought Tamils together by appealing to both e t h n i c bonds and ideology. A c l e a r s h i f t i n g u e r r i l l a s t r a t e g y from hit-and-run o p e r a t i o n s to open c o n f r o n t a t i o n was evident i n the post-1983 p e r i o d . But none of the m i l i t a n t groups, except f o r the LTTE, c o u l d c o n t i n u a l l y maintain pressure on the government f o r c e s . The s e c e s s i o n i s t g u e r r i l l a s used i n c r e a s i n g l y s o p h i s t i c a t e d and heavy weapons i n t h e i r o p e r a t i o n s , but the government was a l s o purchasing modern weapons to meet the c h a l l e n g e . None of these groups c o u l d develop i n t o a mass-based movement in the north and east. Instead, personal and s t r a t e g i c d i f f e r e n c e s among the r e b e l s continued i n t o the post-1983 y e a r s . Inter-group c o n f l i c t e x p l a i n e d the g u e r r i l l a s ' i n a b i l i t y to run over any m i l i t a r y camps. However, Tamil t e r r o r i s m i n the south drew Si n h a l e s e c i v i l i a n s more and more i n t o the c o n f l i c t . The g u e r r i l l a s t r u g g l e was no longer c o n f i n e d to the Tamil areas. Hence pressure on the government to f i n d a s o l u t i o n r a p i d l y i n c r e a s e d . The l a c k of a p u b l i c support base and the r o l e of the c e n t r a l government e x p l a i n the i n e f f e c t i v e n e s s of these Tamil g u e r r i l l a groups. T h i s evidence i s again c o n s i s t e n t with Mao's and Guevara's t h e o r e t i c a l a n a l y s i s of g u e r r i l l a warfare. 134 L i b e r a t i o n T i g e r s of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) In the post-1983 p e r i o d , the LTTE a l r e a d y possessed the m i l i t a r y i n f r a s t r u c t u r e necessary to b u i l d an e f f i c i e n t g u e r r i l l a o r g a n i z a t i o n , a r e s e r v o i r of w e l l - t r a i n e d f i e l d commanders and experienced f i g h t e r s . Hence the LTTE was not weakened by the deaths of Charles Anthony and Chelvanayagam, who c a r r i e d out the bulk of the major ope r a t i o n s u n t i l mid-1983. Despite i t s a b i l i t y to draw upon thousands of v o l u n t e e r s , the LTTE screened t h e i r background before r e c r u i t i n g them to the movement. T h i s c a r e f u l s e l e c t i o n p a i d d i v i d e n d s , f o r the LTTE (along with EROS) remained the only d i s c i p l i n e d m i l i t a n t group. The new r e c r u i t s underwent s i x months to one year of m i l i t a r y t r a i n i n g 1 1 0 before j o i n i n g one of the r e g i o n a l commands of the LTTE i n J a f f n a , Vavuniya (Vanni), Mannar, Trincomalee and B a t t i c a l o a . 1 1 1 Each r e g i o n a l command c o n s i s t e d of a r e g i o n a l army and a p o l i t i c a l committee. A r e g i o n a l commander was r e s p o n s i b l e f o r the region and those under h i s command. The d e c e n t r a l i z a t i o n of the decision-making process in the o r g a n i z a t i o n allowed f l e x i b i l i t y to the r e g i o n a l commanders with respect to r e g i o n a l m i l i t a r y s t r a t e g y and t a c t i c s . Compared to other g u e r r i l l a groups, only the LTTE's high command was l i n k e d by a r a d i o network with the r e g i o n a l commands; thus, the LTTE l e a d e r s h i p enjoyed b e t t e r communication with t h e i r f i e l d o f f i c e r s and produced e f f e c t i v e r e s u l t s . 1 1 2 A l l the r e g i o n a l commanders were members of the c e n t r a l committee. In a d d i t i o n to the r e g i o n a l commanders, the c e n t r a l committee of the LTTE c o n s i s t e d of s e n i o r m i l i t a r y and n o n - m i l i t a r y p e r s o n n e l . 1 1 3 The p o l i t i c a l committee oper a t i n g i n 1 35 Madras was r e s p o n s i b l e f o r propaganda abroad and the c o l l e c t i o n of funds through a network of over one hundred LTTE overseas branches. A unique f e a t u r e of the LTTE was the combination of both the m i l i t a r y and p o l i t i c a l wings i n t o a s i n g l e s t r u c t u r e . Prabakaran i s both the chairman and m i l i t a r y commander of the LTTE. Since the LTTE was engaged i n r e c r u i t i n g and t r a i n i n g men and women who j o i n e d the g u e r r i l l a movement in l a r g e numbers du r i n g the p o s t - J u l y 1983 p e r i o d , the o r g a n i z a t i o n d i d not c a r r y out any g u e r r i l l a o p e r a t i o n s u n t i l e a r l y 1984. LTTE g u e r r i l l a s k i l l e d two a i r f o r c e o f f i c e r s on March 3, 1984 -- the f i r s t a t t a c k c a r r i e d out i n 1984. 1 1 1 1 The g u e r r i l l a s a l s o demolished Point Pedro p o l i c e s t a t i o n on A p r i l 4, 1 9 8 4 . 1 1 5 In August, the LTTE i n t e n s i f i e d i t s r a i d s on the m i l i t a r y on the J a f f n a peninsula.. There were a t t a c k s on both navy and m i l i t a r y o f f i c e r s . J ayaratna, an A s s i s t a n t Superintendent of the P o l i c e , was k i l l e d i n a landmine a t t a c k at Nediyakadu on August 5, 1 9 8 4 . 1 1 6 The LTTE m i l i t a n t s extended the g u e r r i l l a r a i d s to the Tamil-dominated north o u t s i d e the J a f f n a p e n i n s u l a . Ottisuddan p o l i c e s t a t i o n was att a c k e d on August 5, 1984 by the g u e r r i l l a s , who captured arms and ammunition. 1 1 7 The m i l i t a n t s ambushed armed troops at Vellamkulam in the Mannar d i s t r i c t . The LTTE a l s o made an u n s u c c e s s f u l attack on the Kaluwanchikudy p o l i c e s t a t i o n i n the B a t t i c a l o a d i s t r i c t on September 22, 1 9 8 4 . 1 1 8 On November 19, 1987, the LTTE k i l l e d B r i g a d i e r Ariyapperuma, army commander of the northern range, i n an ambush and claimed r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r b r u t a l c i v i l i a n murders at the S i n h a l e s e f i s h i n g v i l l a g e s of Nayaru and K o k k i l a i i n the 136 M u l l a i t i v u d i s t r i c t s . 1 1 9 These were the f i r s t a t t a c k s on Si n h a l e s e c i v i l i a n s i n the s e c e s s i o n i s t s t r u g g l e . 1 2 0 Throughout 1984, the LTTE r a i d e d p o l i c e s t a t i o n s and ambushed the m i l i t a r y i n i t s g u e r r i l l a warfare. The LTTE's op e r a t i o n s were c o n s i s t e n t with g u e r r i l l a warfare theory propounded by Mao and Guevara. The g u e r r i l l a s succeeded i n dem o r a l i z i n g S r i Lanka's i l l - t r a i n e d , i l l - e q u i p p e d and inexperienced m i l i t a r y i n counter-insurgency warfare. The f r u s t r a t e d m i l i t a r y r e t a l i a t e d a g a i n s t the c i v i l i a n s , which i n turn f u r t h e r a l i e n a t e d the Tamil p o p u l a t i o n . I n e v i t a b l y , the Tamil support base f o r the g u e r r i l l a s widened i n 1984. F u r t h e r , g u e r r i l l a s c o l l e c t e d arms by r a i d i n g p o l i c e s t a t i o n s and ambushing the m i l i t a r y . The m i l i t a n t s ' main source of funds was from e x p a t r i a t e S r i Lankan Tamils s c a t t e r e d a l l over the world and, consequently, the inflow of money was l i m i t e d . Hence, t h i s g u e r r i l l a group's need f o r arms n e c e s s i t a t e d the frequent use of ambushes. The LTTE continued to r e l y on hit-and-run t a c t i c s i n 1985. Fu r t h e r , t h e i r a t t a c k s on Sin h a l e s e c i v i l i a n s continued, though the LTTE d i d not o f f i c i a l l y c l a i m r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r such a t t a c k s . The LTTE attacked the K o k k i l a i army camp on February 13, 1985, but f a i l e d to achieve " t o t a l v i c t o r y . " 1 2 1 On March 13, 1985, the g u e r r i l l a s destroyed the Madawachi p o l i c e s t a t i o n i n the f i r s t g u e r r i l l a r a i d on a S i n h a l a t o w n . 1 2 2 The LTTE a l s o s u c c e s s f u l l y a t t a c k e d p o l i c e s t a t i o n s i n J a f f n a and Mannar and captured l a r g e q u a n t i t i e s of arms and ammunition. These a t t a c k s l e d to the gradual c o l l a p s e of both c i v i l and m i l i t a r y a d m i n i s t r a t i o n on the J a f f n a p e n i n s u l a . However, the Thimpu 137 peace t a l k s and the c e a s e f i r e d e c l a r e d on June 18, 1985 l e d to the d e - e s c a l a t i o n of v i o l e n c e i n the summer. Both m i l i t a n t s and the government used the r e s p i t e to b u i l d up t h e i r m i l i t a r y c a p a b i l i t y . However, the purchase of s i x M a r c h e t t i t r a i n i n g a i r c r a f t which were mo d i f i e d i n t o ground attack planes together with a n t i - i n s u r g e n c y t r a i n i n g i n Pakistan turned the m i l i t a r y advantage in favour of the government. 1 2 3 Although the m i l i t a n t s s u c c e s s f u l l y c o n f i n e d the m i l i t a r y to the P a l a l y , Thondamanaru, Point Pedro, J a f f n a F o r t and N a v a t k u l i camps on the p e n i n s u l a , v i o l e n c e f l a r e d up again i n the north and e a s t . The LTTE c o n t r o l l e d N i l a v e l i and Muttur in Trincomalee d i s t r i c t . 1 2 " The g u e r r i l l a s i n d i s c r i m i n a t e l y k i l l e d 146 people at Anuradhapura — a Buddhist holy c i t y — on May 14, 1 9 8 5 . 1 2 5 The Anuradhapura massacre was widely suspected to have been c a r r i e d out by the LTTE Mannar r e g i o n a l commander, Mara s u l i n P i u s l u s ( a l i a s V i c t o r ) . Tamil m i l i t a n t s a l s o k i l l e d c i v i l i a n s i n Dehiwatta and Mahindapura i n Trincomalee d i s t r i c t . The LTTE was s u c c e s s f u l i n wresting power away from the government on the p e n i n s u l a . Mao's theory emphasizes the importance of e s t a b l i s h i n g base areas where i t would be e a s i e r to conduct m i l i t a r y t r a i n i n g and c a r r y out p o l i t i c a l propaganda. The LTTE a l s o extended i t s c o n t r o l over the north. Although i t s c l a s s i c g u e r r i l l a "hit-and-run" s t r a t e g y produced b e n e f i c i a l r e s u l t s , the .LTTE was not strong enough to defeat the army o u t r i g h t when the l a t t e r was at i t s weakest. The modernization of S r i Lanka's armed f o r c e s , which i n c l u d e d the purchase of a i r c r a f t , made the task more d i f f i c u l t f o r the m i l i t a n t s . However, in 1985, the LTTE thwarted the government's 1 38 p o l i c y , adopted i n 1983, of r e s t r i c t i n g v i o l e n c e to the north and east. The S i n h a l e s e , f e a r i n g continued v i o l e n c e and i n s t a b i l i t y i n the south, exerted pressure on the government to. reach a p o l i t i c a l settlement. For t h i s reason, the Thimpu peace t a l k s were h e l d . The year 1986 c o u l d be a p t l y d e s c r i b e d as the year of the T i g e r s . The LTTE e l i m i n a t e d i t s main c h a l l e n g e r , the TELO, on the peninsula i n May. The government's attempt to regain c o n t r o l through m i l i t a r y o p e r a t i o n s i n May was s u c c e s s f u l l y r e s i s t e d by the L T T E . 1 2 6 The LTTE's v i c t o r y strengthened i t s hold over the p e n i n s u l a . I t a l s o c o n t r o l l e d l a r g e areas of the northern province and some areas i n the eastern p r o v i n c e . On October 12, 1986, the LTTE captured two army personnel i n a d i r e c t c o n f r o n t a t i o n with the m i l i t a r y i n M a n n a r . 1 2 7 However, the LTTE Mannar r e g i o n a l commander Marasulin P i u s l u s was k i l l e d . 1 2 8 The government exchanged p r i s o n e r s with LTTE i n December and followed up t h i s exchange by sending a d e l e g a t i o n to n e g o t i a t e with the LTTE, bypassing I n d i a . 1 2 9 F i n a l l y , the f a c t that R a j i v Gandhi i n v i t e d Prabakaran to Bangalore to p a r t i c i p a t e i n the S r i Lankan peace t a l k s i m p l i e d the emergence of the LTTE as the i n d i s p u t a b l e leader of the T a m i l s . 1 3 0 The LTTE destroyed the EPRLF i n December 1986. Thus i n 1986, the LTTE became the dominant g u e r r i l l a o r g a n i z a t i o n , i n d i s p e n s a b l e in a l l peace t a l k s with the S r i Lankan government. Also 1986 witnessed a f u r t h e r s h i f t i n g u e r r i l l a s t r a t e g y from "hit-and-run" to open c o n f r o n t a t i o n . Yet LTTE was incapable of d e s t r o y i n g the army camps in the J a f f n a d i s t r i c t . The LTTE f a i l e d to b r i n g J a f f n a t o t a l l y under i t s c o n t r o l and a 139 m i l i t a r y stalemate was reached. By d e s t r o y i n g other m i l i t a n t groups, the LTTE compelled both the S r i Lankan and Indian governments to deal with i t f o r any p o l i t i c a l settlement. But the May v i c t o r y of the LTTE exaggerated i t s m i l i t a r y c a p a b i l i t y in c o n v e n t i o n a l warfare a g a i n s t the r e g u l a r army. Emboldened by the success of 1986, the LTTE took over c i v i l a d m i n i s t r a t i o n on the p e n i n s u l a i n January 1987, i n c l u d i n g the r e g i s t r a t i o n of v e h i c l e s and the recruitment of t r a f f i c p o l i c e . 1 3 1 The government responded by imposing a f u e l blockade on January 2, 1987 and, as expected, i t brought economic d i s l o c a t i o n on the p e n i n s u l a . 1 3 2 The r e s o u r c e - s c a r c e J a f f n a d i s t r i c t was not prepared to s u r v i v e a long economic blockade. However, the economic blockade enlarged Tamil support fo r the m i l i t a n t s . A r e f u r b i s h e d S r i Lankan army c a r r i e d out a s u c c e s s f u l m i l i t a r y campaign in February, d r i v i n g the g u e r r i l l a s i n t o the northern j u n g l e s . A i r r a i d s enabled the government to regain i t s m i l i t a r y s u p e r i o r i t y over the g u e r r i l l a s . Lacking a n t i - a i r c r a f t guns and m i s s i l e s , the g u e r r i l l a s faced the danger of l o s i n g t h e i r h o l d on the Tamil areas. The government defeated the m i l i t a n t s — the f i r s t o u t r i g h t win f o r the government — i n Vadamarachchi with heavy c i v i l i a n c a s u a l t i e s i n May 1 987 . 1 3 3 But the Indian government responded with "Operation Poomalai" ("Garland"). They dropped a i r r e l i e f s u p p l i e s over J a f f n a d e s p i t e the S r i Lankan government's p r o t e s t s . 1 3 * C l e a r l y , India was now going to play a c r u c i a l r o l e i n the outcome of the s e c e s s i o n i s t s t r u g g l e . The options a v a i l a b l e f o r S r i Lanka were l i m i t e d . Would there be a peace 'acceptable' to India or a 'Cyprus s o l u t i o n ' to the Tamil 1 40 st r u g g l e ? The theory of g u e r r i l l a warfare suggests the e f f e c t i v e n e s s of a hit-and-run g u e r r i l l a s t r a t e g y against an e s t a b l i s h e d army. Such a s t r a t e g y i s even more e f f e c t i v e i n a s e c e s s i o n i s t s i t u a t i o n where the c o n f l i c t i s more b i t t e r than i n a r e v o l u t i o n a r y s t r u g g l e due to opposing e t h n i c i t y . U n l i k e r e v o l u t i o n a r y g u e r r i l l a s , s e c e s s i o n i s t g u e r r i l l a s must f i g h t an army of d i f f e r e n t e t h n i c i t y . U n l i k e the other m i l i t a n t groups, the LTTE continued to r e l y h e a v i l y on the hit-and-run s t r a t e g y . The LTTE chose the p l a c e and time f o r a t t a c k s a g a i n s t the nu m e r i c a l l y s u p e r i o r army and i n f l i c t e d e x tensive c a s u a l t i e s . In a d d i t i o n , d e c e n t r a l i z a t i o n of the decision-making process i n the r e g i o n a l commands allowed the commanders to take advantage of o p p o r t u n i t i e s f o r a t t a c k s . The t h i r d phase of the g u e r r i l l a war took p l a c e during the s p r i n g of 1986. Long confinement of the army i n the camps cr e a t e d war-weariness and f r u s t r a t i o n in the s e c u r i t y f o r c e s . The r e b e l s were ready to con f r o n t the army openly, but co u l d not d r i v e them out of the camps. A m i l i t a r y stalemate was the outcome. Nevertheless, e x t e r n a l f a c t o r s f i n a l l y determined the outcome of the Tamil s e c e s s i o n i s t s t r u g g l e . I n d i a was only prepared to accept a ne g o t i a t e d settlement. Moreover the war-weariness of the Tamil p u b l i c a l s o i n f l u e n c e d the LTTE's d e c i s i o n to reach a p e a c e f u l s o l u t i o n . Today, ' m i l i t a r y ' v i c t o r y f o r Tamil . s e c e s s i o n i s t g u e r r i l l a s does not seem a b r i g h t p r o s p e c t . Indo-Sri Lanka Peace Accord - J u l y 1987 In J u l y 1987, an I n d i a n - i n s p i r e d peace t r e a t y was 141 'imposed' on. the S r i Lankan government and the Tamil s e c e s s i o n i s t s . 1 3 5 T h i s peace t r e a t y guaranteed the u n i t a r y c h a r a c t e r of the i s l a n d but a l s o paved the way f o r a merger of the north and east p r o v i n c e s , the minimum demand of the s e c e s s i o n i s t g u e r r i l l a s . Under the terms of the t r e a t y , Indian troops moved i n t o S r i Lanka i n August, 1987. The Indian r o l e demonstrates the importance of i t s hegemonic i n t e r e s t i n any s e c e s s i o n i s t s t r u g g l e on the sub-continent. In the eyes of many observers, India became the major b e n e f i c i a r y of the peace t r e a t y . During the long s e c e s s i o n i s t s t r u g g l e , India had faced two main t h r e a t s : f i r s t , e x t e r n a l d e s t a b i l i z a t i o n brought about by the "Pakistan/U.S. f a c t o r " i n S r i Lanka; and second, the b a l k a n i z a t i o n of India brought about by a s u c c e s s f u l s e c e s s i o n i s t war. The peace t r e a t y n e u t r a l i z e d both these e x t e r n a l and i n t e r n a l t h r e a t s . But the continued S i n h a l e s e o p p o s i t i o n i n the south and the prolonged c o n f r o n t a t i o n between the LTTE and the Indian army r a i s e doubts about long-term b e n e f i t s a c c r u i n g to India from the peace a c c o r d . 1 3 6 Indian i n t e r v e n t i o n prevented the S r i Lankan government from n e g o t i a t i n g with the Tamil m i l i t a n t s from a p o s i t i o n of s t r e n g t h . In February, 1987 S r i Lankan government troops r e -captured a l l the major towns in the north and i n May, 1987 the capture of Vadamarachchi on J a f f n a p e n i n s u l a changed the balance of m i l i t a r y power in favour of the government. I t was p o s s i b l e f o r the government, with i t s s o p h i s t i c a t e d weapons and complete a i r coverage, to capture J a f f n a town, though i t would have caused heavy c i v i l i a n c a s u a l t i e s . For the S i n h a l e s e , the a r r i v a l of Indian troops i n S r i Lanka reconfirmed the 1 42 c e n t u r i e s - o l d fear of Indian domination. For the Tamils, the peace t r e a t y a b r u p t l y ended t h e i r f i f t e e n - y e a r - o l d s e c e s s i o n i s t s t r u g g l e . I t i l l u s t r a t e s the ' t o t a l c o n t r o l ' which Ind i a e x e r c i s e d over the s e c e s s i o n i s t s t r u g g l e . I r o n i c a l l y . , the 'Indian f a c t o r , ' which played a c r i t i c a l r o l e i n the growth of the s e c e s s i o n i s t movement, a l s o p layed a s i g n i f i c a n t r o l e i n i t s death. By c a r r y i n g out armed r e s i s t a n c e , the extreme Tamil l e a d e r s h i p was s u c c e s s f u l i n c r e a t i n g a r a d i c a l s e c e s s i o n i s t environment on the J a f f n a p e n i n s u l a . T h i s l e a d e r s h i p was able to harness and convert Tamil s e c e s s i o n i s t a l i e n a t i o n i n t o an e f f e c t i v e g u e r r i l l a movement. The e a r l y phase of the s t r u g g l e i s c o n s i s t e n t with Mao-Guevara's t h e o r e t i c a l a n a l y s i s of g u e r r i l l a warfare: the establishment of base areas, the m o b i l i z a t i o n of p u b l i c support, the conduct of a few s e l e c t , triumphant g u e r r i l l a o p e r a t i o n s and the a c q u i s i t i o n of adequate weapons and f i n a n c e s . C o n s i s t e n t with the theory, the Tamil s e c e s s i o n i s t war inc r e a s e d i n i n t e n s i t y and s c a l e i n the second phase. As O ' N e i l l notes, both i n t e r n a l and e x t e r n a l f a c t o r s d i r e c t l y i n f l u e n c e d the outcome of the s e c e s s i o n i s t war. On the one hand, the c e n t r a l government lacked the m i l i t a r y c a p a b i l i t y to defeat the Tamil g u e r r i l l a s ; but the government a l s o f a i l e d to introduce c r e d i b l e accommodative measures to co n t a i n the s e c e s s i o n i s t c h a l l e n g e . On the other hand, India's r o l e a l s o had a great impact on the outcome due to her s t r a t e g i c i n t e r e s t s i n the South Asian r e g i o n . Thus, the S r i Lankan evidence lends support to t h e o r i e s of g u e r r i l l a war i n var y i n g degrees. 143 NOTES 1Makkalin V i d u t h a l a i a i Venreddupom ("Let us win the People's V i c t o r y " ) . Madras: Pamphlet issued by People's L i b e r a t i o n O r g a n i z a t i o n of Thamil Eelam (January 1985), p. 5. 2E.M. Thornton and R. Niththyananthan, S r i Lanka, I s l a n d  of T e r r o r : An Indictment. Middlesex: Eelam Research O r g a n i z a t i o n (1985), p. 28. 3 F o r d i f f e r e n t i n t e r p r e t a t i o n see K.M. de S i l v a , Managing  E t h n i c , pp. 273-274. "Eela Mulakkam ("Thunder from Eelam"). London and Madras: Eelam People's Information Centre (June 1984), p. 23. 5Balasingam, p. 25. 6 l b i d . , p. 26. 7 D i a r y of Combat (1975-1984). Madras: L i b e r a t i o n T i g e r s of Tamil Eelam (December 1984), p. 15. 8Sivanandan, p. 23. 'Balasingham, p. 25. 1°One may assume that the LTTE based i t s o r g a n i z a t i o n a l s t r u c t u r e (urban g u e r r i l l a o r g a n i z a t i o n a l s t r u c t u r e ) and e a r l y s t r a t e g i e s ( e l i m i n a t i o n of p o l i c e i n t e l l i g e n c e network followed by the d e s t r u c t i o n of p o l i c e a d m i n i s t r a t i v e s e r v i c e and p o l i t i c i z a t i o n of general p u b l i c ) on the PLO. 1 ' D i a r y of Combat, pp.16 and 25. 1 2 I b i d . , p. 18. 1 3 I b i d . , p. 20. 1 " I b i d . , p. 21. 144 1 5K.M. de S i l v a , Managing E t h n i c , p. 328. 1 " D i a r y of Combat, pp. 23-25, and V a i d i k , p. 53. K.M. de S i l v a , I b i d . , p. 328. 1 7 l n d i a Today (March 31, 1984), p. 9 1 . 1 8 D i a r y of Combat, p. 18. 1 9 K.M. de S i l v a , Managing E t h n i c , p. 331. 2 0 V a i d i k , p. 54. 2 1Movement For I n t e r - R a c i a l J u s t i c e and E q u a l i t y , Emergency '79, Kandy: MIRJE (1980), pp. 23-41. " D i a r y of Combat, p. 28. The LTTE maintains c o n t a c t s with the P a l e s t i n e L i b e r a t i o n O r g a n i z a t i o n (PLO), Zimbabwe A f r i c a n People's Union (ZAPU), the Zimbabwe A f r i c a n N a t i o n a l Union (ZANU) and the A f r i c a n N a t i o n a l Congress (ANC). I n i t i a l l y , the main LTTE g u e r r i l l a s were t r a i n e d by the PLO, • but today the g u e r r i l l a group t r a i n s i t s own men. A. Balasingham, the LTTE ideologue, s a i d "The PLO-trained boys have not e x a c t l y proved to be an asset to our armed s t r u g g l e . Our t e r r a i n and c o n d i t i o n s are d i f f e r e n t . " India Today (March 31, 1984), p.90. 2 3 S e e F r o n t l i n e (March 2 3 - A p r i l 5, 1985), p. 62 and the int e r v i e w given by Prabakaran to A n i t a Pratap of Sunday (March 11-17, 1984). 2ltK.M. de S i l v a , Managing E t h n i c , pp. 331-332. 2 5 T h e TULF won a l l ten seats on the J a f f n a D i s t r i c t Development C o u n c i l . The party p o l l e d over 80% of the t o t a l r e g i s t e r e d votes. 2 6 D i a r y of Combat, p. 29. 2 7 I b i d . , p. 28. 2 8 I b i d . , p. 32. 145 2 9 V i d u t h a l a i P u l i h a l ( " L i b e r a t i o n T i g e r s " ) , Volume 1 (March 1984), p. 12. 3 0 A m i r Speaks, p. 6. D i a r y of Combat, p. 34. See a l s o Prabakaran's interv i e w i n Sunday (29 September-5 October, 1985), p. 16. 3 1 V a i d i k , p. 58, Di a r y of Combat, p. 36, K.M. de S i l v a , Managing E t h n i c , p. 337. 3 2Balasingham, p. 33. See a l s o Amirthalingam's i n t e r v i e w with D.B.S. J e y a r a j reproduced i n Amir Speaks, pp. 8-16, p a r t i c u l a r l y p. 15. Over 90% of the vot e r s boycotted the e l e c t i o n i n the J a f f n a p e n i n s u l a though TULF won a l l the seats i n the l o c a l bodies. 3 3 V i d u t h a l a i P u l i h a l ( " L i b e r a t i o n T i g e r s " ) , Volume 2 (May 1984), p. 13. 3 " D i a r y of Combat, p. 40. 3 5 S e e Prabakaran's interv i e w i n Sunday (March 1984). See a l s o India Today (June 30, 1986), p. 73. 3 6 D i a r y of Combat, p. 40. 3 7 F r o n t l i n e , p. 63. 3 " I n d i a Today (June 30, 1986), p. 73. 3 9 F a r Eastern Economic Review (September 24, 1982), p. 49. See a l s o TELO - On A M i s s i o n , Tamil Eelam L i b e r a t i o n O r g a n i z a t i o n (Propaganda U n i t ) , p..4. "°Far Eastern Economic Review (November 19, 1982), p. 22. " 1 F a r Eastern Economic Review (September 24, 1982), p. 49. A combination of both i n t e r n a l (to r e t a i n the Tamil Nadu support base) and e x t e r n a l ( a n t i - I n d i a n f o r e i g n p o l i c y of the UNP government) f a c t o r s i n f l u e n c e d New D e l h i ' s p o l i c y v i s - a - v i s 146 Tamil s e c e s s i o n i s t s . , 2 T h o r n t o n and Niththyananthan, pp. 65-66. During the height of a n t i - T a m i l r i o t s i n J u l y 1983, s i x t y Tamil p o l i t i c a l d e tainees at Welikada high s e c u r i t y p r i s o n were murdered by Si n h a l e s e p r i s o n e r s on J u l y 25 and 27. Because these k i l l i n g s went unpunished, the government was i m p l i c a t e d i n the massacre. Wijesinha, pp. 85-86. a 3 S o l d i e r of Fortune (February 1987), p. 44. See a l s o F r o n t l i n e (March 23 - A p r i l 5, 1985), p. 62. " " S o l d i e r of Fortune, p. 44. ' 5 I b i d . See a l s o Hindu (May 5, 1985), p. 12. " 6 V a i d i k , p. 55. " 7 F r o n t l i n e (March 23 - A p r i l 5, 1985), p. 63. " " I b i d . " 9 I n d i a n Express (May 17, 1985). 5 0 M a k k a l i n V i d u t h a l a i a i Venreddupom, p. 5. 5 1 I _ b i d . , p. 5. 5 2 T h o r n t o n and Niththyananthan, p. 57. 5 3 I b i d . , p. 56. 5 4 F r o n t l i n e , p. 64. " I b i d . 5 6 S o l d i e r of Fortune, p. 44. 5 7 I b i d . See a l s o F r o n t l i n e , p. 64. 5 8 I b i d . See a l s o S o l d i e r of Fortune, p. 44. 5 9 I b i d . See a l s o E e l a Mullakkam, p. 3. 6 0 S o l d i e r of Fortune, p. 44. 6 ' F r o n t l i n e (March 2 3 - A p r i l 5, 1985), p. 62. Some of these m i l i t a n t groups were rooted only i n a p a r t i c u l a r v i l l a g e while 147 some others were s p l i t and e x p e l l e d from the major groups. Others, a f t e r a spurt of g u e r r i l l a a c t i v i t i e s , had gone i n t o o b l i v i o n . Only f i v e groups — the LTTE, PLOTE, TELO, EROS, EPRLF — were w e l l - e s t a b l i s h e d and well-known armed s e c e s s i o n i s t groups. 6 2Narasimha Rao was a f o r e i g n m i n i s t e r under I n d i r a Gandhi. Parthasarathy was the s p e c i a l envoy of I n d i r a Gandhi and former chairman of the powerful p o l i c y planning committee. 6 3 T h e Guardian (August 12, 1982). 6 < I n d i a Today (March 31, 1984), p. 54. " F r o n t l i n e (March 2 3 - A p r i l 5, 1985), p. 64. 6 6 I n d i a Today (March 31, 1984), p. 52. 6 7 0 t h e r m i l i t a n t groups opened t r a i n i n g camps in S r i Lanka only a f t e r the s e c e s s i o n i s t s t r u g g l e took f i r m roots i n the no r t h . 6 8 I n d i a Today (March 31, 1 984), p. 52. 6 9TELO - On A M i s s i o n , p. 1. 7 0 I b i d . , p. 2. 7 ' F a r Eastern Economic Review (12 June, 1986), p. 29. 7 2 T h e Week (May 25-31, 1986), p. 38. India c o n s i d e r e d S r i Lanka under the UNP government as h o s t i l e to her g e o - p o l i t i c a l i n t e r e s t s . The pro-Western f o r e i g n p o l i c y of the UNP was a major concern to the Indian defence and f o r e i g n p o l i c y p l a n n e r s . Though I n d i r a Gandhi r e l i e d more on d i p l o m a t i c pressure (G. Parthasarathy's m i s s i o n ) , m i l i t a r y options were not completely r u l e d out. For i n s t a n c e , m i l i t a n t s were t r a i n e d by r e t i r e d Indian m i l i t a r y o f f i c e r s i n the Ramanathapuram d i s t r i c t . India Today (March 31, 1984), pp. 88-89 and 93-94. 148 Lanka Guardian (January 15, 1987), pp. 3-6. 7 3 T h e Guardian (November 22, 1984). 7"TELO News Pamphlet, TELO London (24 November, 1984). 7 5 F a r E a s t e r n Economic Review (6 December, 1984), p. 50. 7 6TELO Times Pamphlet (March 1985), No. 1. 7 7 F a r Eastern Economic Review (February 7, 1985), p. 14. 7 8 T i m e ( A p r i l 22, 1985), p. 30. 7 9 E l l u c h i ("Rise"). Madras: Pamphlet is s u e d by TELO (April-May, 1985). According to a r e b e l who p a r t i c i p a t e d i n t h i s a t t a c k , the TELO g u e r r i l l a s were outgunned by the army. 8 0 E e l a Mulakkam ("Thunder from Eelam"). London and Madras: Pamphlet is s u e d by Eelam People's Information Centre (May 1984), p. 30. 8 ' I b i d . , pp. 31-32. 8 2 E e l a m News. London: Eelam People's Information Centre (March 1985). 8 3 T h e Hindu ( A p r i l 20, 1985). 8'Author's i n t e r v i e w with a former student of U n i v e r s i t y of J a f f n a , S r i Lanka. 8 5 T h e Week (May 25-31, 1986), p. 37. 8 6 I n a d d i t i o n , the TELO m i l i t a n t s were engaged i n " l o o t i n g shops and temples f o r t h e i r p r i v a t e g a i n s . " They were a l s o accused of kidnapping wealthy i n d i v i d u a l s i n J a f f n a . 8 7 T h e Week (May 25-31, 1986), p.-37. Far Eastern Economic  Review (12 June 1986), pp. 28-29. Ind i a Today (May 31, 1986), p. 67. 8 8 T h e Week (May 25-31, 1986), p. 38. 8 9Uma Maheswaran b e l i e v e d " i n a mass s t r u g g l e with the 1 49 p a r t i c i p a t i o n of the oppressed workers, peasants and students," Indian Express (May 17, 1985). 9 0 S o l d i e r of Fortune (February 1987), p. 44. 9 1 1 n d i a Today (March 31, 1984), p. 54. 9 2 F a r E a s t e r n Economic Review (30 May, 1985). 9 3 I n d i a Today (March 31, 1984), p. 56. 9"PLOTE b u l l e t i n . Madras: Volume 1 (February 1984), No. I I , p. 7. "Sunday (September 1-7, 1985). 9 6 T h e Recent Operation of the P.L.A., open l e t t e r of EPRLF (May 1984). India Today (June 15, 1984), p. 71. 9 7 T i m e s of I n d i a (February 1-2 and February 13, 1985). 9"The Hindu (March 2, 1985). Bruce Mathews, " R a d i c a l C o n f l i c t and the R a t i o n a l i z a t i o n of V i o l e n c e i n S r i Lanka," P a c i f i c A f f a i r s , Volume 59, No. 1 (Spring 1986), p. 40. " T h e PLOTE a l s o claimed c r e d i t f o r the p r i s o n breakout o p e r a t i o n . 1 0 0 L a n k a Guardian, Volume 9, No. 19 (February 1, 1987), Colombo, p. 7. 1 0 ' F i n a n c i a l Express (December 23, 1986). 1 0 2 B o t h the PLOTE and TELO too were engaged i n a n t i - s o c i a l a c t i v i t i e s i n Tamil Nadu. 1 0 3 S o l d i e r of Fortune, p. 87. 1 °"Frontline (March 2 3 - A p r i l 5, 1985), p. 64. 1 0 5 I b i d . 1 0 6 1 0 7 1 0 8 Far Eastern Economic Review (15 May, 1986), p. 18. Far Eastern Economic Review (12 June, 1986), p. 27. Far Eastern Economic Review (June 5, 1986). 150 1 0 9 I n d i a Today (May 15, 1987), p. 54. 1 1°Frontline (January 10-23, 1987), p. 21. 1 1'The f i v e r e g i o n a l commanders were (January 1987) R i t t u ( J a f f n a ) , Radha (Mannar), Mathya S r i (Vavunia), Santhosam (Trincomalee), Kumaran ( B a t t i c a l o a ) . Radha was k i l l e d i n May 1987. Kumaran committed s u i c i d e i n October 1987 and Santhosam was k i l l e d i n November 1987. Mathya S r i i s second in command to Prabakaran. '' 2The Economist (August 3-9, 1985), p. 36. ' ' 3 F r o n t l i n e (January 10-23, 1987), p. 21. 1 1 " D i a r y of Combat, p. 44. ' ' 5 I b i d . , p. 47. 1 1 6 I b i d . , p. 53. ' ' ' I b i d . ' ' " I b i d . ' 1 9 T i m e s of India (November 21, 1984). ' 2 0 I n d i a Today (December 31, 1984), p. 27. ' 2'Mathews, p. 40. Press Release, L i b e r a t i o n T i g e r s of Tamil Eelam (21 February 1985). ' 2 2 T i m e s of India (March 14, 1985). Press r e l e a s e of LTTE (16 March, 1985). 1 2 3 I n d i a Today (August 31, 1985), p. 38. ' 2 f t I n d i a Today (October 15, 1985), p. 53. ' " I n d i a Today (June 15, 1984), p. 58. 1 2 6 T h e PLOTE and EPRLF j o i n e d hands with the LTTE i n r e p u l s i n g the government a t t a c k . The government a f t e r i n i t i a l gains r e t r e a t e d to the camps. See India Today (June 15, 1986), pp. 58-59 and F r o n t l i n e (November 15-28, 1986), p. 123. 151 1 2 7 T i m e s of India (October 14, 1986). 1 2 8 I b i d . . 1 2 9 F r o n t l i n e (January 10-23, 1987), p. 19. 1 3 0 I b i d . , p. 20. l 3 1 I n d i a Today (February 15, 1987), pp. 26-27. } 3 2 I b i d . , p. 24. 1 3 3 T h e Week (J u l y 5-11, 1987), pp. 18-20. 1 3"The Week (June 14-20, 1987), pp. 22-24. 1 3 5 S e e Appendix B. 1 3 6 I n the long-run, I n d i a ' s a b i l i t y to a s s e r t i t s r e g i o n a l power s t a t u s i n S r i Lanka depends on (a) Jayewardene's pur s u a s i v e power to implement the.accord; (b) p u b l i c support for the Indian army i n the north and ea s t . At present the prospects are bleak. For a more o p t i m i s t i c view of India's prospects i n the s t r u g g l e , see India Today (December 15, 1987), pp. 39-42. 152 CHAPTER FOUR ANALYZING TAMIL SECESSIONISM IN SRI LANKA: SOME TENTATIVE CONCLUSIONS At the outset, t h i s t h e s i s s t a t e d seven p r o p o s i t i o n s with regard to the development of s e c e s s i o n i s t g u e r r i l l a movements. The primary purpose of these p r o p o s i t i o n s i s to provide a conceptual framework f o r armed s e c e s s i o n i s t movements and to organize the data s y s t e m a t i c a l l y and to guide the a n a l y s i s of the S r i Lankan s e c e s s i o n i s t i n s u r r e c t i o n . 1. An e t h n i c m i n o r i t y can become a l i e n a t e d from the democratic process i f the m a j o r i t y e t h n i c group i s u n w i l l i n g or unable to accommodate those demands or i n t e r e s t s of the m i n o r i t y p e r c e i v e d as c r u c i a l to the v i a b i l i t y and/or s u r v i v a l of the group. These demands or i n t e r e s t s might i n c l u d e a f a i r share of economic and e d u c a t i o n a l o p p o r t u n i t i e s , l i n g u i s t i c s e c u r i t y and g r e a t e r p o l i t i c a l c o n t r o l over i t s own a f f a i r s . A l i e n a t i o n does not a r i s e i n s t a n t l y but f o l l o w s a p e r i o d of g e s t a t i o n which may vary in d u r a t i o n from country to country. The i n t e n s i t y and s c a l e of a l i e n a t i o n are i n f l u e n c e d by many f a c t o r s . John R. Wood argues that g e o g r a p h i c a l , s o c i a l , p o l i t i c a l , economic and p s y c h o l o g i c a l p r e c o n d i t i o n s are necessary (though not s u f f i c i e n t ) f o r the emergence of s e c e s s i o n i s t a l i e n a t i o n . M i n o r i t y a l i e n a t i o n may be t r a c e d back to u n f u l f i l l e d p o l i t i c a l , economic and s o c i a l demands or i n t e r e s t s of the m i n o r i t y . 153 Despite the m u l t i - e t h n i c nature of the S r i Lankan p o l i t y , p o l i t i c a l e l i t e s from the m a j o r i t y e t h n i c groups have p r a c t i s e d m a j o r i t a r i a n democracy i n i t s 'pure' form, p a r t i c u l a r l y s i n c e 1956. Post-1956 events strengthened m a j o r i t a r i a n p o l i t i c a l i n s t i t u t i o n s and a l s o encouraged e l i t e s to implement p o p u l i s t i c measures. However, i n i t i a l l y , optimism p r e v a i l e d when westernized c o n s e r v a t i v e p o l i t i c a l e l i t e s from both communities maintained s t a b i l i t y i n e t h n i c r e l a t i o n s through e l i t e accommodation. Moreover, the U n i t e d N a t i o n a l Party (UNP) was e s t a b l i s h e d as an "umbrella" party comprising a l l the major l i n g u i s t i c , r e l i g i o u s and c u l t u r a l i n t e r e s t s . Despite the f a i l u r e of the f i f t y - f i f t y campaign, the Tamil Congress (TC) j o i n e d the f i r s t government of D.S. Senanayake. T h i s m u l t i -e t h n i c c o a l i t i o n enhanced the government's a b i l i t y to respond by accommodating demands a r i s i n g from d i f f e r e n t groups i n S r i Lanka. But a f t e r the c o l l a p s e of m u l t i - e t h n i c c o a l i t i o n i n the mid-1950s, the Tamils and Sinhalese e l i t e s c o u l d not agree on accommodative measures acceptable to both e t h n i c groups. Consequently, Tamil a l i e n a t i o n emerged from m a j o r i t a r i a n democracy. Under t h i s system, Tamils i n c r e a s i n g l y became p o l i t i c a l l y i r r e l e v a n t . The SLFP formed governments without a s i n g l e e l e c t e d Tamil r e p r e s e n t a t i v e si n c e 1956 (1956-1965 and 1970-1977). Furthermore, no Tamils were represented i n the cabi n e t between 1956-1964 — the main decision-making body i n the country. Hence, there was l i t t l e or no pressure on the government, which drew very l i m i t e d support from the Tamils, to accommodate t h e i r main economic, p o l i t i c a l and c u l t u r a l 154 demands. Instead the government adopted c o e r c i v e and non-c o e r c i v e c o n t r o l s to maintain s t a b i l i t y without responding to Tamil g r i e v a n c e s . On the one hand, the Tamil's e x t r a -p a r l i a m e n t a r y p r o t e s t was suppressed by the p o l i c e and l a t e r by the m i l i t a r y . On the other hand, the government worked towards a s s i m i l a t i n g the Tamils through a S i n h a l a - o n l y p o l i c y . The government's a c t i o n was c o n s i s t e n t with L u s t i c k ' s t h e o r e t i c a l approach to p o l i t i c a l s t a b i l i t y i n e t h n i c a l l y - d i v i d e d s o c i e t i e s . The SLFP contained c o n f l i c t without t o t a l l y r e l y i n g on c o e r c i o n i n the e a r l y stages. But the government r e l i e d more on c o e r c i o n a f t e r 1971. It must be po i n t e d out that e l i t e s from the m a j o r i t y community d i d attempt to b r i n g e t h n i c s t a b i l i t y through c o n s o c i a t i o n a l measures. For i n s t a n c e , a c c o r d i n g to Walter Schwarz, the 1957 Bandaranaike-Chelvanayagam Pact embodies "one of the few statesmanlike compromises between two extreme p o s i t i o n s even to be attempted i n S r i Lanka." 1 A l s o Dudley Senanayake attempted to r e c o n c i l e the widening gap between the two communities between 1965-1970. However, both f a i l e d to implement the proposed accommodative p o l i c i e s under pressure from the S i n h a l e s e . Although the 1958 r i o t s provided an e a r l y warning of the danger r e s u l t i n g from f r a g i l e e t h n i c r e l a t i o n s , the p o l i t i c a l e l i t e s f a i l e d to comprehend the g r a v i t y of the problem. In M a l a y s i a , however, the p o l i t i c a l e l i t e s were ready to share p o l i t i c a l power with non-Malays, c a r r y i n g out b a r g a i n i n g and reaching compromises to maintain the p o l i t i c a l system. 2 The e t h n i c v i o l e n c e i n 1969 r e i n f o r c e d the importance of c o n s o c i a t i o n a l arrangements; however, i n S r i Lanka none of 1 55 the c o n f l i c t - r e g u l a t i n g p r a c t i c e s suggested by N o r d l i n g e r were i n s t i t u t e d and Tamil a l i e n a t i o n remained high. The p o l i t i c a l system r e i n f o r c e d Tamil a l i e n a t i o n . The Tamils were reduced to a 'permanent' m i n o r i t y with no o p p o r t u n i t y to enjoy p o l i t i c a l power or c o n t r o l . I n e v i t a b l y , Tamils were i n c r e a s i n g l y d i s r e g a r d e d in the parliamentary democracy. In the mid-1960s, the DMK, a s e c e s s i o n i s t Tamil pa r t y i n Tamil Nadu, was drawn i n t o mainstream Indian p o l i t i c s p a r t l y through i t s p o t e n t i a l to win power at the s t a t e l e v e l ; but, i n S r i Lanka, Tamil p a r t i e s were denied the a b i l i t y to gain power i n a u n i t a r y s t a t e . Thus,the e l i t e s remained marginal. T h i s process was expedited by the ascendency of the UF government in 1970. S i m i l a r l y , i n Pakistan p o l i t i c a l power was almost e x c l u s i v e l y concentrated i n the hands of non-Bengalis e l i t e s p r i o r to the eastern wing's seces s i o n i n 1971. Any attempt to strengthen the p o l i t i c a l power of B e n g a l i s was r e s i s t e d by these e l i t e s , e v e n t u a l l y l e a d i n g to the d e c l i n e of the c e n t r a l government's l e g i t i m a c y i n the e a s t . The S r i Lankan government adopted " a f f i r m a t i v e a c t i o n " to c o r r e c t economic imbalances, i n t r o d u c i n g two measures which l i m i t e d the economic o p p o r t u n i t i e s of Tamils. The S i n h a l a - o n l y p o l i c y and the s t a n d a r d i z a t i o n of u n i v e r s i t y admission on a language b a s i s c o n t r i b u t e d to the d e c l i n e of the Tamils' economic predominance. The S i n h a l a Buddhist-dominated government, which was the major economic agent, a l l o c a t e d scarce resources on e t h n i c l i n e s . Tamils were denied economic o p p o r t u n i t i e s , p a r t i c u l a r l y i n the e d u c a t i o n a l and employment f i e l d s . The Tamils enjoyed g r e a t e r access to government jobs 156 and p r o f e s s i o n a l occupations to an extent d i s p r o p o r t i o n a t e to t h e i r numbers under the B r i t i s h r u l e and thus the s u c c e s s i v e government measures produced a sense of ' r e l a t i v e d e p r i v a t i o n ' i n the post-1956 p e r i o d . Economic f r u s t r a t i o n and d i s c o n t e n t f u e l l e d Tamil a l i e n a t i o n . For Gananath Obeysekere, "the core of the Sinhalese i d e n t i t y was Buddhist: the d e s t i n y of the e t h n i c group and that of the r e l i g i o n were i n s e p a r a b l e . " 3 P a r t i c u l a r l y s i n c e 1956, the government has attempted to a s s i m i l a t e the m i n o r i t i e s to the Sinhala-Buddhist c u l t u r e . The S i n h a l a - o n l y Act marks a major step i n t h i s d i r e c t i o n . However, the Tamils r e s i s t e d the government's e f f o r t . The Tamils' response was to forge a powerful group i d e n t i t y based on language and c u l t u r e . S. Arasaratnam w r i t e s that the "Tamil c u l t u r a l r e v i v a l (of the 1960*s) c o n t r i b u t e d more than anything e l s e to f o r g i n g u n i t on the b a s i s of a l a n g u a g e - c u l t u r a l u n i t . " " But the government f a i l e d i n the past to implement measures to guarantee the l i n g u i s t i c / c u l t u r a l s e c u r i t y of the m i n o r i t y . However, the S i n h a l e s e are a "threatened m a j o r i t y " due to the p r o x i m i t y of Tamil Nadu with i t s 55 m i l l i o n Tamils. The government introduced steps which p r o t e c t e d the S i n h a l a language and the Buddhist r e l i g i o n . By 1970, the S i n h a l a demands r a i s e d i n the 1950s and 1960s were met by s u c c e s s i v e governments' d e c l a r a t i o n s of S i n h a l a as the o f f i c i a l language and by p r o v i d i n g g r e a t e r s t a t e a s s i s t a n c e to Buddhism. Yet d e s p i t e the l i n g u i s t i c and r e l i g i o u s s e c u r i t y , the 'double m i n o r i t y ' e f f e c t r e i n f o r c e d the communalization of p o l i t i c s . As Wood argues, e t h n i c i t y u s u a l l y but not i n v a r i a b l y becomes the 157 r a l l y i n g p o i n t f o r e t h n i c groups. However, the growth of the Tamil a l i e n a t i o n was i n f l u e n c e d by a c o n d i t i o n d i s t i n c t i v e to S r i Lanka. The m i n o r i t y s t a t u s of the S i n h a l e s e in a r e g i o n a l context c o l o u r e d the working of the S r i Lankan p o l i t i c a l system and i n h i b i t e d the accommodation of m i n o r i t y demands. The m i n o r i t y complex of the m a j o r i t y S i n h a l e s e community r e f l e c t e d a permanent f e e l i n g of i n s e c u r i t y among them. Hence the S i n h a l e s e continued to demand grea t e r safeguards f o r themselves d e s p i t e the f a c t that t h e i r long-standing language, r e l i g i o n , employment and education demands were met by s u c c e s s i v e S r i Lankan governments. I n c r e a s i n g l y , i n a zero-sum game, S i n h a l a demands were met at the expense of the m i n o r i t y T a m i l s . 5 The S i n h a l a p o l i t i c a l e l i t e s ' p e r c e p t i o n of the Tamils was d i s t o r t e d by the p r o x i m i t y of a l a r g e Tamil p o p u l a t i o n i n Tamil Nadu. Thus the Sinhalese c o n s i d e r e d themselves to be 'oppressed m i n o r i t y , ' which i n turn produced a s i g n i f i c a n t impact on the i s l a n d ' s i n t e r n a l p o l i t i c a l development i n the post-1948 p e r i o d . The i n s e c u r i t y of the S i n h a l e s e made compromise with Tamils an arduous task. Because democracy commonly f u n c t i o n s through numbers, the p o l i t i c s of the m a j o r i t y n e c e s s a r i l y dominate the country. However, to guarantee that democracy i s f a i r to a l l e t h n i c members, measures must be adopted to p r o t e c t i n d i v i d u a l s who do not come from the m a j o r i t y e t h n i c group. Since p o l i t i c a l power i s always in the hands of m a j o r i t y i n the absence of any t i n k e r i n g with the m a j o r i t a r i a n democratic system, there i s no i n c e n t i v e to accommodate m i n o r i t y i n t e r e s t s or demands. Consequently, the m i n o r i t i e s tend to become a l i e n a t e d from the 158 system and the p o l i t i c a l system may become v u l n e r a b l e to non-democratic c h a l l e n g e s from the 'permanent' o p p o s i t i o n . N o r d l i n g e r makes two p o i n t s about m a j o r i t a r i a n i s m as a c o n f l i c t - r e g u l a t i n g p r a c t i c e . 6 F i r s t , N o r d l i n g e r suggests that m a j o r i t a r i a n i s m should be o v e r r i d e n by a n t i - m a j o r i t a r i a n p r a c t i c e s and one or more of the s i x p r a c t i c e s should be implemented. Second, e x c l u s i v e r e l i a n c e upon m a j o r i t a r i a n i s m may le a d to exacerbation of c o n f l i c t . The S r i Lankan government's e x c l u s i v e r e l i a n c e on m a j o r i t a r i a n i s m discouraged the implementation of c o n f l i c t - r e g u l a t i n g measures and i n t e n s i f i e d e t h n i c h o s t i l i t i e s . 2. The attempt and/or f a i l u r e of the c e n t r a l government to accommodate e t h n i c demands, f o r whatever reasons, encourages the development of a process of out b i d d i n g among both m i n o r i t y and ma j o r i t y p o l i t i c i a n s , and ou t b i d d i n g i t s e l f makes the pe a c e f u l r e s o l u t i o n of c o n f l i c t more d i f f i c u l t , i f not impossible. Rabushka and Shepsle suggest that a m u l t i - e t h n i c c o a l i t i o n i s i n h e r e n t l y u n s t a b l e . P o l i t i c a l entrepreneurs who are out s i d e the c o a l i t i o n may f i n d i t to t h e i r advantage to increase the s a l i e n c e of e t h n i c i s s u e s and to o u t b i d the moderate p o l i t i c a l e l i t e s of the c o a l i t i o n . I n e v i t a b l y , m u l t i - e t h n i c c o a l i t i o n s c o l l a p s e i n the face of growing e t h n i c i z a t i o n of p o l i t i c s . In S r i Lanka, the UNP-TC c o a l i t i o n came under i n c r e a s i n g a t t a c k from the eth n i c entrepreneurs. By 1949, outbidding became an important support-wooing s t r a t e g y of the Tamil c o u n t e r - e l i t e s . By opposing the disenfranchisement of up-country Tamils, the F e d e r a l Party (FP) presented i t s e l f as a party which stood for the i n t e r e s t s of a l l Tamils and, by 159 adopting a more m i l i t a n t Tamil n a t i o n a l i s m , the party a t t r a c t e d the m a j o r i t y of the vernacular-educated Tamils i n the north and e a s t . The FP s u c c e s s f u l l y o u t b i d the more moderate TC by the mid-1950s and became the dominant f o r c e among the Tamil e l e c t o r a t e . S i m i l a r l y , the departure of the S.W.R.D. Bandaranaike from the UNP and the subsequent formation of the SLFP in a p e r i o d of n a t i o n a l i s t i c upsurge s i g n a l l e d the a r r i v a l of e t h n i c entrepreneurs among the S i n h a l a e l e c t o r a t e . For these counter-e l i t e s , e t h n i c appeals as observed by Rabushka and Shepsle were s i g n i f i c a n t instruments with which to win p o l i t i c a l power q u i c k l y . The UNP's commitment to a s e c u l a r S r i Lanka was v u l n e r a b l e to attack by the SLFP whose power base was almost e x c l u s i v e l y S i n h a l a - B u d d h i s t . Bandaranaike s k i l l f u l l y outmanoeuvered the UNP by advocating a S i n h a l a - o n l y p o l i c y . The moderate UNP, which stood f o r two o f f i c i a l languages, was compelled to change to a S i n h a l a - o n l y p o l i c y to s u r v i v e p o l i t i c a l l y among the Sinhala-dominated e l e c t o r a t e . What R.S. Milne has suggested as a g e n e r a l i z a t i o n a p p l i e s to S r i Lanka: the i n t r a - S i n h a l a o u t b i d d i n g turned out to be a "more deadly t h r e a t " to e t h n i c harmony than outbidding among the Tamils, at l e a s t u n t i l the 1980s. Since 1956, both major p o l i t i c a l p a r t i e s , which d e r i v e d t h e i r support mainly from the dominant e t h n i c group, the S i n h a l e s e , have s u c c e s s f u l l y e x p l o i t e d e t h n i c passions to win e l e c t i o n s . Outbidding s t r a t e g i e s adopted by the UNP and SLFP in turn helped the growth of the n a t i o n a l i s t FP at the expense of the TC i n the Tamil areas. I t was not p o s s i b l e to p r a c t i s e consensus p o l i t i c s 160 i n an p r o g r e s s i v e l y e t h n i c a l l y - p o l a r i z e d p o l i t i c a l system. Not s u r p r i s i n g l y , s u c c e s s i v e governments f a i l e d to manage e t h n i c c o n f l i c t . The p o s s i b i l i t y of being o u t b i d by each other at the e l e c t i o n s discouraged the n a t i o n a l p a r t i e s from g r a n t i n g concessions to or reaching compromises with the m i n o r i t y T a m i l s . According to N o r d l i n g e r , compromises and concessions are two of the s i x c o n f l i c t - r e g u l a t i n g p r a c t i c e s e s s e n t i a l f o r s u c c e s s f u l r e g u l a t i o n of c o n f l i c t i n a d i v i d e d s o c i e t y . Moreover o u t b i d d i n g discouraged the formation of m u l t i - e t h n i c c o a l i t i o n . As Rabushka and Shepsle observe, the disappearance of brokerage i n s t i t u t i o n s i s the f i r s t s i g n i f i c a n t outcome of out b i d d i n g p o l i t i c s . Instead, both the UNP and SLFP competed to promote Sinhala-Buddhist i n t e r e s t s . For fear of being accused of b e t r a y i n g these i n t e r e s t s , n e i t h e r the UNP nor the SLFP would reach an agreement with the FP. Bandaranaike's i n a b i l i t y to implement the Bandaranaike-Chelvanayagam Pact or Dudley Senanayake's f a i l u r e to implement d i s t r i c t c o u n c i l can be a t t r i b u t e d to t h e i r f ear of S i n h a l a o u t b i d d e r s . The 1970 e l e c t i o n rout of the UNP could a l s o be t r a c e d p a r t l y to the UNP's c o a l i t i o n with the Tamil p a r t i e s , f o r i t f a c i l i t a t e d the UF's a c c u s a t i o n that the UNP was s e l l i n g out to the Tamils. The SLFP-led UF government adopted an extreme Sinhala-Buddhist p o l i c y so biased that the UNP c o u l d not out b i d i t s p o l i c i e s . Nor c o u l d the UNP oppose such p o l i c i e s without damaging i t s e l e c t o r a l chances at the next e l e c t i o n . In e f f e c t , m a j o r i t a r i a n democracy encouraged both the UNP and the SLFP to turn i n t o e t h n i c p a r t i e s to appease the 161 S i n h a l e s e . As p r e d i c t e d by Rabushka and Shepsle, the p a r t i e s became e t h n i c a l l y - o r i e n t e d i n s t e a d of remaining broad-based brokerage i n s t i t u t i o n s . The Tamils' disenchantment with the p o l i t i c a l system a l s o l e d them to demand for a f e d e r a l s t a t e . Although No r d l i n g e r argues that f e d e r a t i o n may increase e t h n i c c o n f l i c t and c o n t r i b u t e to the f a i l u r e of c o n f l i c t r e g u l a t i o n , a u n i t a r y s t a t e having c e n t r a l i z e d p o l i t i c a l power and c o n t r o l l e f t the Tamils' f e e l i n g p o l i t i c a l l y impotent even where they were n u m e r i c a l l y dominant. However, the S i n h a l e s e , u t i l i z i n g t h e i r overwhelming m a j o r i t y , e a s i l y r e s i s t e d the d e c e n t r a l i z a t i o n of p o l i t i c a l power. On the whole, due to the i n a b i l i t y of the p o l i t i c a l p a r t i e s to address emerging Tamil a l i e n a t i o n without s u f f e r i n g e l e c t o r a l r e v e r s a l s , i t was not d i f f u s e d . P o l i t i c a l i n a c t i o n by the S i n h a l e s e l e a d e r s h i p made the moderate Tamil l e a d e r s h i p more v u l n e r a b l e to outbidding from extremist Tamil youths. Just as the Tamil moderate e l i t e s were withdrawing from mainstream p o l i t i c s , v i o l e n t s e c e s s i o n i s t g u e r r i l l a s began t h e i r attempt to take over the Tamil areas. As suggested i n the theory, a government's accommodative measures may i n c l u d e c o n s o c i a t i o n or f e d e r a l i s m or both; yet i n S r i Lanka the r e s t r a i n t s placed on the S i n h a l e s e e l i t e s by p o l i t i c s of "over-promising and o u t b i d d i n g " l i m i t e d t h e i r a b i l i t y to implement s u c c e s s f u l e t h n i c conflict-management p o l i c i e s . As p r e v i o u s l y mentioned, none of the p r a c t i c e s suggested by N o r d l i n g e r was adopted by the government. In 1977, Jayewardene' took bold steps to c o n t a i n Tamil a l i e n a t i o n by adopting an accommodative p o l i c y towards the 162 Tamils. He was aided by the inc r e a s e d s a l i e n c e of economic (non-ethnic) i s s u e s which dominated the 1977 e l e c t i o n s i n the south. Jayewardene a l s o followed a p o l i c y of r e s t r a i n t on e t h n i c a l l y s e n s i t i v e i s s u e s . Yet r e c o n c i l i a t i o n between Tamils and Sinhalese d i d not take p l a c e . Instead, e t h n i c p o l a r i z a t i o n reached dangerous l e v e l s i n S r i Lankan s o c i e t y . The c o n s t i t u t i o n a l and n o n - c o n s t i t u t i o n a l concessions c o u l d have s a t i s f i e d the Tamils i n the 1950s and 1960s, but were inadequate i n the l a t e 1970s. Moreover, none of h i s accommodative p o l i c i e s was p r o p e r l y implemented. Jayewardene was c o n s t r a i n e d by outbidders both from w i t h i n and without the UNP. As Milne suggests, o u t b i d d i n g may cause r e p e r c u s s i o n s i n the government p a r t y . C e r t a i n l y , outbidding by extr e m i s t Sinhalese f a c t i o n s w i t h i n the UNP has a l s o l i m i t e d Jayewardene's a b i l i t y to introduce c o n f l i c t - r e g u l a t i n g measures. U l t r a - n a t i o n a l i s t elements w i t h i n the UNP co u l d have c h a l l e n g e d Jayewardene's l e a d e r s h i p . Extensive concessions to the Tamils, p a r t i c u l a r l y c r e d i b l e d e c e n t r a l i z a t i o n schemes, c o u l d have p o l i t i c a l l y damaged the part y i n the south. Although weakened by Jayewardene's p o l i t i c a l s t r a t e g i e s , the SLFP c o u l d have e x p l o i t e d the UNP's agreement with the Tamils to r e -e s t a b l i s h i t s e l f i n the south on a communal p l a t f o r m . Once again, the f a i l u r e of the UNP's accommodative measures r e i n f o r c e s the t h e o r e t i c a l o b s e r v a t i o n that p o l i t i c a l moderation i s not p o s s i b l e when s a l i e n c e of e t h n i c issue i n c r e a s e s and exposes moderate e l i t e s to o u t b i d d i n g . Meanwhile, in the Tamil areas the moderate s e c e s s i o n i s t p a r t y , the TULF, was soon viewed as impotent. The non- v i o l e n t 163 s t r a t e g i e s of the TULF w i t h i n the parliamentary democracy were not producing r e s u l t s . The a l t e r n a t e s t r a t e g i e s of v i o l e n c e s t e a d i l y gained acceptance. On the one hand, i n the post-1977 p e r i o d Jayewardene granted only l i m i t e d concessions to the Tamils to ward o f f c h a l l e n g e s from the SLFP. On the other hand, Jayewardene's f a i l u r e to adopt reasonable accommodative p o l i c i e s allowed Tamil e x t r e m i s t s to o u t b i d moderate Tamil l e a d e r s h i p . Consequently, by 1983 no room for a p o l i t i c s of moderation remained and the J u l y 1983 catastrophe r e s u l t e d . The development of o u t b i d d i n g as a s u c c e s s f u l p o l i t i c a l s t r a t e g y was helped by v a r i o u s f a c t o r s i n S r i Lanka. The r e g i o n a l c o n c e n t r a t i o n of e t h n i c groups r e s u l t e d i n "homogenous" e t h n i c e l e c t o r a t e s . The Tamils' a b i l i t y to i n f l u e n c e the outcome of e l e c t i o n s i n the e l e c t o r a t e s o u t s i d e the north and east was extremely l i m i t e d . T h i s together with the f i r s t - p a s t - t h e - p o s t e l e c t o r a l system encouraged the n a t i o n a l p a r t i e s to ' d i s r e g a r d ' the Tamil-dominant e l e c t o r a t e s in the north and east. These p a r t i e s c o u l d indulge i n "Tamil bashing" and s t i l l form the government by winning c o n v i n c i n g l y in the south. The emergence of a competitive two-party system with each pa r t y a l t e r n a t i n g i n power s i n c e 1956 made both p a r t i e s h i g h l y conscious of the s a l i e n c e of e t h n i c i t y . A more c o n c i l i a t o r y p o l i c y towards the Tamils by e i t h e r one of the p a r t i e s c o u l d i n v i t e o u t b i d d i n g from the other. The economy was the f i n a l f a c t o r determining the extent of o u t b i d d i n g as an i n f l u e n c e on p o l i t i c a l s t r a t e g y . The export-import economy was subject to world market f l u c t u a t i o n s . The l a g g i n g economy co u l d not meet the i n c r e a s i n g economic demands 164 of the masses. Consequently, the government adopted a f f i r m a t i v e d i s c r i m i n a t i o n and r e d i s t r i b u t i o n along r a c i a l l i n e s to respond to the economic demands of the m a j o r i t y . S i n h a l a as the o f f i c i a l language and the u n i v e r s i t y s t a n d a r d i z a t i o n system were p r i m a r i l y aimed at improving the economic p o s i t i o n of the S i n h a l e s e . Slow economic growth and the intense competition f o r economic resources among Tamils and Sinhalese allowed the p o l i t i c a l e l i t e s to use outbidding to win votes among t h e i r r e s p e c t i v e communities. In a communalized p o l i t i c a l process, o u t b i d d i n g f l o u r i s h e d as a s t r a t e g i c imperative. The concept of outbidding i s our best t o o l f o r e x p l a i n i n g the emergence of a l i e n a t i o n and the d i f f i c u l t i e s in r e s o l v i n g e t h n i c c o n f l i c t p e a c e f u l l y . A l i e n a t i o n s e t s i n when government p o l i c i e s exclude m i n o r i t i e s from p o l i t i c a l and a d m i n i s t r a t i v e i n s t i t u t i o n s of the s t a t e . Furthermore, l i n g u i s t i c and r e l i g i o u s d i s c r i m i n a t i o n r e s u l t i n g from outbidding may r e i n f o r c e a l i e n a t i o n . Outbidding i n s i d e the m i n o r i t y group enhances t h e i r e x p e c t a t i o n s and, when such hopes go u n f u l f i l l e d , they may l e a d to a demand f o r s e c e s s i o n . C l e a r l y , the f a i l u r e of the m a j o r i t a r i a n democratic p o l i t i c a l system to produce f a i r r e s u l t s f o r the m i n o r i t y c r e a t e d a l i e n a t i o n among the Tamils. Under t h i s system the m a j o r i t y e t h n i c group, the S i n h a l e s e , always triumphed. The p o l i t i c s of o u tbidding e f f e c t i v e l y prevented Tamils from sh a r i n g p o l i t i c a l power with the S i n h a l e s e and l i m i t e d the S r i Lankan government's a b i l i t y to accommodate the e t h n i c demands of the m i n o r i t y . The government's f a i l u r e can a l s o be r e l a t e d to o u t b i d d i n g s t r a t e g i e s adopted by e t h n i c entrepreneurs. 165 N o r d l i n g e r d i s c u s s e s s i x c o n f l i c t - r e g u l a t i n g p r a c t i c e s to manage eth n i c c o n f l i c t , among which are d e p o l i t i c i z a t i o n , concessions and c o a l i t i o n . Since both ' n a t i o n a l ' p a r t i e s gained from these outbidding s t r a t e g i e s , there were no attempts to d e p o l i t i c i z e non-negotiable i s s u e s , such as the l i n g u i s t i c and r e l i g i o u s ones. Furthermore, every attempt to grant concessions to the m i n o r i t y encouraged ou t b i d d i n g from c o u n t e r - e l i t e s . As suggested by Rabushka and Shepsle, m u l t i - e t h n i c c o a l i t i o n s were d i f f i c u l t to form due to the growth of e t h n i c extremism. In S r i Lanka, where the p o l i t i c a l e l i t e s r e l i e d on t h e i r e t h n i c group f o r s u r v i v a l , the p o l i t i c a l process, as Melson and Wolpe a s s e r t , became communalized. Communalization of the p o l i t i c a l process i n turn encouraged o u t b i d d i n g . T h e r e f o r e , not the government's i n a b i l i t y or f a i l u r e to accommodate et h n i c demands but o u t b i d d i n g i t s e l f prevented the adoption of c o n s o c i a t i o n a l measures to c o n t a i n e t h n i c c o n f l i c t i n S r i Lanka. Thus, n e i t h e r m a j o r i t y nor m i n o r i t y governments implemented l e g i s l a t i o n to r e s o l v e the growing Tamil a l i e n a t i o n and bridge the widening gap between these groups. I n e v i t a b l y , the p o l i t i c a l system was c h a l l e n g e d by the Tamil s e c e s s i o n i s t s . 3. Because the root cause of armed s e c e s s i o n i s p o l i t i c a l , an i m p o s i t i o n of c o n t r o l measures (as d e f i n e d e a r l i e r ) without the government making meaningful accommodative steps i n l i k e l y to f a i l i n the long run. In the short term, c o e r c i v e measures may work i f the government has the c a p a b i l i t y to implement such c o n t r o l measures. Wood writ e s that the " c e n t r a l government's response w i l l have an important, p o s s i b l y c o n c l u s i v e e f f e c t on the outcome of a s e c e s s i o n i s t attempt." 7 A government f a c i n g a s e c e s s i o n i s t 166 t h r e a t may adopt three p o s s i b l e measures: (1) combination of accommodative and c o n t r o l measures; (2) p u r e l y c o n t r o l measures; (3) p o l i t i c a l l y accommodative measures. C o n t r o l measures may in c l u d e a mix of c o e r c i v e and non-coercive techniques. S r i Lanka r e l i e d on a p o l i c y of c o n t r o l , p a r t l y because p o l i t i c a l accommodation was c o n s t r a i n e d as e x p l a i n e d p r e v i o u s l y , by Sinhala-Buddhist o u t b i d d e r s . The UF government followed a p o l i c y of c o n t r o l i n i t s d e a l i n g s with the m i n o r i t y Tamils. The 1970-77 p e r i o d was c h a r a c t e r i z e d by an absence of n e g o t i a t i o n s between Tamils and S i n h a l e s e . In the beginning, the UF government refused to ne g o t i a t e with the FP and l a t e r with the TUF. According to L u s t i c k , the c o n t r o l system d i d not allow f o r e l i t e agreement, compromises and b a r g a i n i n g . The p o l i t i c a l e l i t e s from the m a j o r i t y e t h n i c group determined the resource a l l o c a t i o n e x c l u s i v e l y a c cording to t h e i r i n t e r e s t s . For i n s t a n c e , the u n i v e r s i t y admission system and recruitment to the p u b l i c s e c t o r were based on e t h n i c c r i t e r i a . I n c r e a s i n g ' S i n h a l i z a t i o n ' o f the bureaucracy a s s i s t e d the government i n implementing measures c o n s i s t e n t with i t s group i n t e r e s t s . F u r t h e r , through the propagation of Sinhala-Buddhist 'ideology,' the government j u s t i f i e d and l e g i t i m i z e d the m a j o r i t y e t h n i c groups' c o n t r o l over the m i n o r i t y . However, co n t r a r y to L u s t i c k ' s e x p e c t a t i o n s of ensuring s t a b i l i t y , the UF government's c o n t r o l measures i n a m u l t i -e t h n i c s o c i e t y c o n t r i b u t e d to i n s t a b i l i t y in S r i Lanka. For i n s t a n c e , the armed s e c e s s i o n i s t movements among Tamils emerged during t h i s p e r i o d . C o n t r o l i s most l i k e l y achieved by c o e r c i v e 167 means; but the government lacked the c o e r c i v e c a p a b i l i t y to c o n t a i n Tamil v i o l e n c e . S r i Lanka apparently lacked the i n s t i t u t i o n a l framework to s u c c e s s f u l l y implement these c o n t r o l p o l i c i e s . The m i l i t a r y was i l l - e q u i p p e d and i l l - t r a i n e d to c o n t r o l the g u e r r i l l a movements in i t s i n f a n c y . I f the c o e r c i v e c a p a c i t i e s of the s t a t e are not s u f f i c i e n t , continued use of c o n t r o l methods may l e a d to armed r e s i s t a n c e . The UNP recognized the need f o r accommodation to maintain s t a b i l i t y . The government adopted not only c o n t r o l measures but a l s o c o n s o c i a t i o n , which L u s t i c does not c o n s i d e r i n h i s t h e o r e t i c a l a n a l y s i s . But both these measures turned out c o u n t e r - p r o d u c t i v e . C o n s o c i a t i o n a l measures were inadequate while c o n t r o l measures were i n e f f i c i e n t l y a dministered. The frequent a n t i - T a m i l r i o t s i n the post-1977 p e r i o d gave s e c e s s i o n i s t g u e r r i l l a s a much needed boost. Such r i o t s i n c r e a s e d the numbers j o i n i n g the v a r i o u s movements. These r i o t s a l s o widened the support-base beyond the t r a d i t i o n a l Tamil l a n d . I n s u f f i c i e n t c o n s o c i a t i o n a l steps d i s c r e d i t e d the moderate Tamil p a r t y and a c c e l e r a t e d the d i s i n t e g r a t i o n of t r a d i t i o n a l Tamil l e a d e r s h i p . S r i Lanka r e l i e d on a m i l i t a r y s o l u t i o n i n i t s attempt to cr u s h the s e c e s s i o n i s t c h a l l e n g e . The reasons f o r the f a i l u r e of accommodative steps have alr e a d y been e x p l a i n e d . Why d i d the m i l i t a r y steps f a i l ? The government f o r c e s lacked the m i l i t a r y c a p a b i l i t y to defeat the s e c e s s i o n i s t s . Furthermore, the p o s s i b i l i t y of heavy c i v i l i a n c a s u a l t i e s was high during counter-insurgency maneuvers i n t h i c k l y populated areas such as the J a f f n a p e n i n s u l a . While suppressing g u e r r i l l a o p e r a t i o n s , 168 the government v i c t o r i e s were more o f t e n than not counter-p r o d u c t i v e due to the army's i n d i s c r i m i n a t e k i l l i n g s . As Mao argues, a g u e r r i l l a war i s o f t e n a p r o t r a c t e d war; hence, p u b l i c sympathy and support are necessary to s u s t a i n i t . As long as the army vents i t s f r u s t r a t i o n on c i v i l i a n s , m i n o r i t y a l i e n a t i o n remains high and p u b l i c support f o r g u e r r i l l a s may not change. For ins t a n c e , S r i Lanka's only major v i c t o r y at Vadamarachchi i n v o l v e d high c i v i l i a n deaths. Despite i t s m i l i t a r y v i c t o r y the government c o u l d not e s t a b l i s h i t s l e g i t i m a c y i n these areas. Moreover, i n S r i Lanka, the government's a b i l i t y to use c o n t r o l measures was undermined by I n d i a . I n d i a , motivated by s t r a t e g i c concerns and domestic p o l i t i c a l n e c e s s i t y , exerted pressure on the S r i Lankan government. Thus, the S r i Lankan s e c e s s i o n i s t c h a l l e n g e and the government's response must be viewed w i t h i n the r e g i o n a l context i n which the s c a l e of S r i Lanka's m i l i t a r y o p e r a t i o n s a g a i n s t the g u e r r i l l a s was s e v e r e l y r e s t r i c t e d by I n d i a . A strong r e f o r m i s t package, i n c l u d i n g l i n g u i s t i c s e c u r i t y and more e q u i t a b l e economic o p p o r t u n i t i e s f o r Tamils in a d e c e n t r a l i z e d p o l i t i c a l system, c o u l d have undermined the g u e r r i l l a support-base. The government's i n a b i l i t y to wipe out the LTTE, d e s p i t e the l a t t e r ' s m i l i t a r y weakness i n the east, i n d i c a t e s the importance of p o l i t i c a l settlement i n an et h n i c c o n f l i c t . As i t was, the government's m i l i t a r y a c t i o n allowed the g u e r r i l l a s to r e t a i n p u b l i c support. A p o l i t i c a l and m i l i t a r y stalemate threatened the democratic foundation of S r i Lanka's p o l i t y . The m i l i t a r i z a t i o n of the country might change 169 the p o l i t i c a l ethos, which could destroy the p o l i t i c a l system that a government i s f i g h t i n g to p r e s e r v e . A long war might a l s o d e s t r o y the economic b a s i s of the country. For a developing country, a p r o t r a c t e d war may in f a c t be d i s a s t r o u s . P o l i t i c a l accommodation i s more l i k e l y to succeed i n c o n t r o l l i n g both a l i e n a t i o n and s e c e s s i o n . 8 Although in the short run s e c e s s i o n i s t v i o l e n c e may be defeated, long-term v i c t o r i e s are not always guaranteed. The examples of I s r a e l and South A f r i c a i l l u s t r a t e how c o n t r o l measures may succeed only t e m p o r a r i l y . Further, South A f r i c a and I s r a e l have developed e x t e n s i v e system-maintenance i n s t i t u t i o n s . But recent events in the Gaza S t r i p and South A f r i c a i n d i c a t e the f a i l u r e of c o n t r o l measures to ensure l a s t i n g s t a b i l i t y . S r i Lanka not only l a c k s the i n s t i t u t i o n s to implement c o n t r o l measures f u l l y but a l s o , s i n c e i t i s w i t h i n the Indian r e g i o n a l sphere of i n f l u e n c e has found that i t must prud e n t l y r e s t r i c t i t s domestic p o l i c i e s so as not to offend I n d i a . In short, a p u r e l y m i l i t a r y v i c t o r y does not always suppress the m i n o r i t y ; the root causes of a l i e n a t i o n must be remedied. If not, s e c e s s i o n i s t sentiments may become v i o l e n t from time to time and threaten the p o l i t i c a l e x i s t e n c e of a country. 4. An a l i e n a t e d e t h n i c m i n o r i t y may r e s o r t to v i o l e n c e i f some or a l l of the f o l l o w i n g c o n d i t i o n s p r e v a i l : (a) the e t h n i c m i n o r i t y i s t e r r i t o r i a l l y -based; (b) non-coercive p o l i t i c a l c o n t r o l of the c e n t r a l government over the t r a d i t i o n a l lands of the m i n o r i t i e s weakens; (c) a breakdown of accommodative p r a c t i c e s occurs; (d) able and committed m i n o r i t y armed s e c e s s i o n i s t leaders are a v a i l a b l e ; (e) arms 170 and a sanctuary such as might be provided by a sympathetic f o r e i g n s t a t e are a c c e s s i b l e ; ( f ) a sense of d e s p a i r about the system e x i s t s among m i n o r i t y l e a d e r s ; (g) a sense of hope and determination f o r a be t t e r f u t u r e under a d i f f e r e n t system e x i s t s among mi n o r i t y l e a d e r s . Insofar as these c o n d i t i o n s p r e v a i l , the a l i e n a t e d e t h n i c m i n o r i t y i s . l i k e l y to r e s o r t to v i o l e n c e . The g e o g r a p h i c a l p r e c o n d i t i o n of secession,, w r i t e s Wood, in c l u d e s "the e x i s t e n c e of separable t e r r i t o r y which c o n t a i n s the bulk of the p o t e n t i a l l y s e c e s s i o n i s t p o p u l a t i o n . " 9 According to the c l a s s i f i c a t i o n scheme of Rabushka and Shepsle, S r i Lanka, where the Si n h a l e s e are an overwhelming m a j o r i t y , can be c l a s s i f i e d as a "dominant m a j o r i t y p o l i t y . " However, the mi n o r i t y Tamils outnumber the Si n h a l e s e i n the north and east by a rough p r o p o r t i o n of 5:1. 1 0 C l e a r l y , e t h n i c i t y i s t e r r i t o r i a l l y based i n S r i Lanka. Tamil d i s c o n t e n t a r i s i n g out of l i m i t e d p o l i t i c a l p a r t i c i p a t i o n and economic o p p o r t u n i t i e s together with a f e e l i n g of threatened e t h n i c i d e n t i t y a l i e n a t e d the m i n o r i t y from the system of m a j o r i t a r i a n democracy. Whereas a d i s p e r s e d m i n o r i t y e t h n i c group o f t e n adapts to the a l i e n a t e d environment by s u r v i v i n g as a 'passive m i n o r i t y , ' an e t h n i c m i n o r i t y with a "home" may ch a l l e n g e the c e n t r a l a u t h o r i t y . T h i s c h a l l e n g e may take a v i o l e n t or a no n - v i o l e n t form. But i t i s l i k e l y that the i n i t i a l c h a l l e n g e comes from an e t h n i c party with r o o t s i n the home t e r r i t o r y . Wood suggests that s e c e s s i o n i s not a r e a l i s t i c o ption f o r an a l i e n a t e d m i n o r i t y which l a c k s a home t e r r i t o r y . For example, the Chinese m i n o r i t y i n Malaysia (Malay dominated) i s i n t e r m i n g l e d and not t e r r i t o r i a l l y based. Not s u r p r i s i n g l y , i n S r i Lanka, a c a l l f o r sec e s s i o n was r a i s e d i n the e a r l y 1970s by the Tamils. T h i s c a l l was a r t i c u l a t e d by 171 the e s t a b l i s h e d Tamil p a r t y , the TULF. The S r i Lankan case demonstrates that a m i n o r i t y response i s c o n d i t i o n e d by a c o n c e n t r a t i o n of the m i n o r i t y p o p u l a t i o n i n one area. In an e t h n i c a l l y p l u r a l s o c i e t y , a l i e n a t i o n of a m i n o r i t y a r i s e s f o r reasons al r e a d y d i s c u s s e d . A l i e n a t i o n may or may not be transformed i n t o a s e c e s s i o n i s t demand. A c e n t r a l government's a b i l i t y to c o n t a i n s e c e s s i o n depends upon i t s c a p a c i t y to r e t a i n i t s l e g i t i m a c y among the m i n o r i t i e s . Wood argues that a d e c l i n e i n l e g i t i m a c y i s a necessary c o n d i t i o n f o r the emergence of secessionism. In a democratic p o l i t i c a l system, e l e c t i o n s may be a good i n d i c a t i o n f o r t e s t i n g the government's non-coercive p o l i t i c a l c o n t r o l ( l e g i t i m a t e a u t h o r i t y ) over the homeland of the m i n o r i t i e s . D e c l i n e or absence of l e g i t i m a c y c o u l d undermine the process of p o l i t i c a l i n t e g r a t i o n . Myron Weiner i d e n t i f i e s f i v e types of p o l i t i c a l i n t e g r a t i o n : (1) n a t i o n a l i n t e g r a t i o n ; (2) t e r r i t o r i a l i n t e g r a t i o n ; (3) e l i t e - m a s s i n t e g r a t i o n ; (4) value i n t e g r a t i o n ; (5) i n t e g r a t i v e b e h a v i o u r . 1 1 From independence onward, the c e n t r a l government co u l d not e x e r c i s e p o l i t i c a l c o n t r o l over the north. In the past f o r t y years, both major ' n a t i o n a l ' p a r t i e s fared d i s a s t r o u s l y i n e l e c t i o n s in the northern p r o v i n c e . The northern Tamil c o n s t i t u e n c y was almost e x c l u s i v e l y represented by the Tamil e t h n i c p a r t i e s . In sh o r t , the p o l i t i c a l p e n e t r a t i o n of the north by the n a t i o n a l p a r t i e s were d i f f e r e n t from those i n the r e s t of the i s l a n d . J a f f n a was a ' p o l i t i c a l enclave' only l o o s e l y connected with the r e s t of the country. N a t i o n a l or t e r r i t o r i a l i n t e g r a t i o n , which glues a s o c i e t y or a p o l i t i c a l 172 system together d i d not take plac e in the country. On the co n t r a r y , e t h n i c l o y a l t i e s p r e v a i l e d over l o y a l t i e s to the (new) c e n t r e and produced f o r c e s of d i s i n t e g r a t i o n . In t h i s enclave, the government and, l a t e r , the s e c u r i t y f o r c e s c o u l d not win the people's c o n f i d e n c e . The o p p o s i t i o n m e n t a l i t y of the northern Tamils made them p e r c e i v e the government and i t s i n s t i t u t i o n s as h o s t i l e to t h e i r i n t e r e s t s . Weiner claims that the c r u c i a l f a c t o r i n el i t e - m a s s i n t e g r a t i o n i s not the d i f f e r e n c e s i n "values and a s p i r a t i o n s " between the government and the governed but whether the governed accept the r u l e r ' s a u t h o r i t y . In the north, i t was i n c r e a s i n g l y evident that the government was not considered the ' l e g i t i m a t e a u t h o r i t y . ' According to Che Guevara, a government l a c k i n g l e g i t i m a c y i s one of the p r e c o n d i t i o n s f o r a r e v o l u t i o n a r y s i t u a t i o n which can be c r e a t e d through g u e r r i l l a warfare. V i o l e n c e may not produce e f f e c t i v e r e s u l t s against a l e g i t i m a t e government. Because J a f f n a Tamils p e r c e i v e d themselves as a 'separate e n t i t y ' w i t h i n the boundaries of the p e n i n s u l a , t h e i r p e r c e p t i o n of the J a f f n a p e n i n s u l a as a "s t a t e w i t h i n a s t a t e " allowed secessionism to take root on the p e n i n s u l a . The response of c e n t r a l government i s c r i t i c a l i n the emergence of s e c e s s i o n i s t v i o l e n c e . Wood, f o r ins t a n c e , argues that the c e n t r a l government of an e t h n i c a l l y p l u r a l s o c i e t y has "two b a s i c o p t i o n s " i n d e a l i n g with s e c e s s i o n i s t c h a l l e n g e : (1) c o n t r o l measures, i n c l u d i n g both c o e r c i v e and non-coercive; (2) accommodative p r a c t i c e s , t a k i n g i n t o account the et h n i c d i v i s i o n s of the s o c i e t y . As already shown, t h i s c o n t r o l system was c o u n t e r - p r o d u c t i v e , most l i k e l y because i t was not 173 accompanied by c r e d i b l e p o l i t i c a l programmes such as c o n s o c i a t i o n a l i s m or d e c e n t r a l i z a t i o n . During the 1950s and 1960s, the s u c c e s s i v e S r i Lankan governments f a i l e d to a l l e v i a t e Tamil a l i e n a t i o n . Reforms int r o d u c e d by governments were cosmetic and t h e r e f o r e d i d not meet the Tamils' fundamental demands. Moderate Tamil e l i t e s were cut o f f from the c e n t r a l decision-making i n s t i t u t i o n s . A l l the necessary channels needed to i n f l u e n c e the government remained c l o s e d to the Tamils. I n e v i t a b l y , the relevance of p a r l i a m e n t a r y ( m a j o r i t a r i a n ) democracy was questioned by a growing number of Tamils, p a r t i c u l a r l y the northern youths. The r e s t r a i n t s p l a c e d on the S i n h a l e s e e l i t e s by outbidders from t h e i r own f l a n k l i m i t e d t h e i r a b i l i t y to implement s u c c e s s f u l e t h n i c c o n f l i c t management p o l i c i e s . S i g n i f i c a n t l y , the passage of the 1972 C o n s t i t u t i o n , which s i g n a l l e d the c o n s o l i d a t i o n of m a j o r i t a r i a n r u l e , c o i n c i d e d with the emergence of the L i b e r a t i o n T i g e r s of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) and the Tamil Eelam L i b e r a t i o n O r g a n i z a t i o n (TELO). Che Guevara notes that i n the absence of a p o l i t i c a l and l e g a l mechanism needed f o r a l l e v i a t i n g g r ievances, r e v o l u t i o n a r y s i t u a t i o n may be c r e a t e d . In S r i Lanka, m a j o r i t a r i a n democracy prevented Tamils from p a r t i c i p a t i n g i n p o l i t i c a l decision-making i n a meaningful way. The S r i Lankan governments, p a r t i c u l a r l y the UF, d i s r e g a r d e d a l l the l e g a l and e x t r a - l e g a l methods adopted by the e s t a b l i s h e d Tamil p a r t i e s . Because no accommodative steps were taken to prevent the d r i f t i n g of Tamils from mainstream p o l i t i c s , the p r o p e n s i t y f o r Tamils to r e s o r t to v i o l e n c e i n c r e a s e d . As Rabushka and Shepsle 174 c o r r e c t l y p o i n t out, the only hope for the m i n o r i t y community in a dominant m a j o r i t y p o l i t y e x e r c i s i n g p o l i t i c a l power may be through non-democratic means. Although leaders do not by themselves " c r e a t e " s e c e s s i o n , they are i n d i s p e n s a b l e i n the development of a s u c c e s s f u l s e c e s s i o n i s t movement. Long term r e s u l t s of s e c e s s i o n may be beyond a l e a d e r ' s i n f l u e n c e ; but a s k i l l f u l l e a d e r , by adopting c o r r e c t t a c t i c s and i n t e r p r e t i n g events, c l e a r l y may l e a d the movement towards i t s f i n a l g o a l . The t r a d i t i o n a l Tamil l e a d e r s h i p r e l i e d on non-violence to e s t a b l i s h Eelam. The TULF b e l i e v e d s t r o n g l y in parliamentary democracy. However, the c o n t r a d i c t i o n s a r i s i n g out of the parliamentary r e s p o n s i b i l i t y and the goal of secession c u r t a i l e d the e f f e c t i v e n e s s of the p a r t y and i t s l e a d e r s h i p . The TULF l e a d e r s h i p a l s o f a i l e d to take any concrete n o n - v i o l e n t steps, e.g. h a r t a l s and satyagrahas. The r a d i c a l Tamil l e a d e r s , u n l i k e e s t a b l i s h e d l e a d e r s , were drawn from the non-propertied lower middle c l a s s and provided a committed l e a d e r s h i p f o r the s e c e s s i o n i s t movements. The l e a d e r s adopted c l a s s i c a l g u e r r i l l a warfare and avoided d i r e c t c o n f r o n t a t i o n s with the s u p e r i o r armed f o r c e s . Ruthless e f f i c i e n c y of the LTTE g r a d u a l l y r a d i c a l i z e d the c o n s e r v a t i v e p e n i n s u l a . I n i t i a l l y , the l e a d e r s and the m a j o r i t y of g u e r r i l l a s were from V a l v e t t i t h u r a i , where smuggling was the major i n d u s t r y . The Tamils i n V a l v e t t i t h u r a i , by the d i s t i n c t i v e nature of t h e i r i l l e g a l trade, developed i n t o a c l o s e l y - k n i t o r g a n i z a t i o n . Furthermore, the success of the smuggling trade demanded l o y a l t y to t h e i r l e a d e r s , knowledge of 175 the t e r r a i n , e f f i c i e n t and d i s c i p l i n e d o r g a n i z a t i o n . V a l v e t t i t h u r a i youths were able to t r a n s f e r t h e i r o r g a n i z a t i o n a l s t r u c t u r e , c l a n u n i t y and f i e r c e l o y a l t y to the emerging g u e r r i l l a movement. A f t e r long years of c o n f r o n t i n g p o l i c e over smuggling charges and a n t i - s t a t e a c t i v i t i e s , the Tamils i n V a l v e t t i t h u r a i were p s y c h o l o g i c a l l y prepared to engage in g u e r r i l l a warfare. Thus Prabakaran had under h i s command m a t e r i a l and human resources as w e l l as the p s y c h o l o g i c a l resources ( i . e . experience i n a n t i - s t a t e a c t i v i t i e s and organized group a c t i o n ) to begin a s e c e s s i o n g u e r r i l l a war i n the north. The Tamils, who possessed the o r g a n i z a t i o n a l framework, needed the support of p u b l i c to convert themselves i n t o s e c e s s i o n i s t g u e r r i l l a s . Guevara argues that a band of robbers has a l l the c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s of a g u e r r i l l a army; but robbers lack p u b l i c support and thus do not s u r v i v e f o r long. O ' N e i l l proposes four types of e x t e r n a l support. E a r l y moral and p o l i t i c a l support f o r Tamil s e c e s s i o n i s t g u e r r i l l a s d i d not come from the c e n t r a l government of I n d i a but from the s t a t e government of Tamil Nadu. To win Tamil Nadu support, and a l s o f o r r e g i o n a l s t r a t e g i c reasons, the Indian government l a t e r backed Tamil s e c e s s i o n i s t s . The e t h n i c bond between the f i f t y m i l l i o n Tamils i n Tamil Nadu and the 2.5 m i l l i o n S r i Lankan Tamils c r e a t e d sympathy i n the beginning and, l a t e r , o u t r i g h t support i n Tamil Nadu, for the s e c e s s i o n i s t g u e r r i l l a s . The DMK's ascendance to power in 1967 encouraged m i l i t a n t Tamil n a t i o n a l i s m i n the s t a t e . The more r a d i c a l Tamil n a t i o n a l i s t M. Karunanidhi, who succeeded C.N. Annadurai in 176 1969, d i d not h e s i t a t e to drum up support for S r i Lankan Tamils to c o n s o l i d a t e h i s p o l i t i c a l h o l d . The a n t i - I n d i a and anti-DMK sentiments of the S i n h a l e s e r e i n f o r c e d Indian Tamil support f o r the S r i Lankan T a m i l s . More importantly, Tamil Nadu provided l o g i s t i c a l support as w e l l as sanctuary f o r s e c e s s i o n i s t g u e r r i l l a s . S h u t t l i n g between Ind i a and S r i Lanka, the m i l i t a n t s s u c c e s s f u l l y e s t a b l i s h e d g u e r r i l l a groups. The p r o x i m i t y of Tamil Nadu played a s i g n i f i c a n t r o l e i n the emergence of the s e c e s s i o n i s t g u e r r i l l a movements i n the n orth. Although not a l l a l i e n a t e d e t h n i c m i n o r i t i e s r e s o r t to v i o l e n c e to achieve t h e i r demands, some do. A l i e n a t i o n i s a necessary but not a s u f f i c i e n t c o n d i t i o n f o r the r i s e of armed s e c e s s i o n . The m i n o r i t y e t h n i c group must possess the a b i l i t y to t r a n s l a t e a l i e n a t i o n i n t o a s e c e s s i o n i s t c o n f l i c t . I t s a b i l i t y to do so i s determined by c o n d i t i o n s s t a t e d i n the beginning. A c r u c i a l q u e s t i o n r a i s e d here i s , to what extent does each of these c o n d i t i o n s i n f l u e n c e s the d e c i s i o n of the a l i e n a t e d m i n o r i t y to r e s o r t to v i o l e n c e ? The importance of any one of these c o n d i t i o n s v a r i e s from place to p l a c e and a l s o changes over time. Therefore, i t i s not p o s s i b l e to p o i n t out which one of these i s more important than o t h e r s . One may p r e d i c t that i f none of these c o n d i t i o n s e x i s t s , i t i s u n l i k e l y that s e c e s s i o n i s t v i o l e n c e may erupt. 5. The a b i l i t y of a g u e r r i l l a group to c h a l l e n g e the l e g i t i m a c y of the government depends on many f a c t o r s . The f o l l o w i n g are some of the more important ones: (a) e s t a b l i s h i n g base areas; (b) m o b i l i z i n g p u b l i c support; (c) a c q u i r i n g " s u f f i c i e n t " m i l i t a r y and economic power; (d) maintaining cohesion and u n i t y ; (e) c r e a t i n g e f f i c i e n t o r g a n i z a t i o n ; (f) a t t r a c t i n g and r e c r u i t i n g capable and shrewd l e a d e r s . 177 A base i s important for the development of g u e r r i l l a warfare. G u e r r i l l a s , a c c ording to Mao Tse-Tung, should engage in both m i l i t a r y and p o l i t i c a l a c t i v i t i e s w i t h i n a base area. Winning p u b l i c support and d e f e a t i n g the enemy allow g u e r r i l l a s to e s t a b l i s h bases i n the f i r s t phase of the war. Mostly base areas are e s t a b l i s h e d i n a favourable g e o g r a p h i c a l t e r r a i n (e.g. mountain a r e a s ) . In the absence of an advantageous t e r r a i n , g u e r r i l l a s may e s t a b l i s h bases in areas where they can m o b i l i z e l a r g e p u b l i c support. Notably, Mao recognizes the importance of p u b l i c support. P o l i t i c a l m o b i l i z a t i o n i s the c a r d i n a l c o n d i t i o n f o r winning a g u e r r i l l a war. In 1977, the moderate Tamil s e c e s s i o n i s t p a r t y , the TULF, won an impressive v i c t o r y i n the north, p a r t i c u l a r l y on the J a f f n a p e n i n s u l a , with l i t t l e o p p o s i t i o n from the n a t i o n a l p a r t i e s . In the heterogenous eastern p r o v i n c e , the TULF however c o u l d not repeat i t s overwhelming northern v i c t o r i e s . C l e a r l y , the J a f f n a p e n i n s u l a was the optimal s i t e on which the s e c e s s i o n i s t g u e r r i l l a s might e s t a b l i s h t h e i r base areas. C o n t r o l l i n g bases becomes c r u c i a l when g u e r r i l l a s engage i n a long war. For the Tamil s e c e s s i o n i s t g u e r r i l l a s , c o n t r o l of the J a f f n a p e n i n s u l a was necessary to c a r r y out an extended war s i n c e n e i t h e r the c e n t r a l government nor the g u e r r i l l a s possessed the c o e r c i v e ( m i l i t a r y ) c a p a b i l i t y to i n f l i c t o u t r i g h t defeat on the other. Furthermore, a homogenous p o p u l a t i o n made i t e a s i e r to m o b i l i z e p u b l i c support where the Tamil g u e r r i l l a s l i v e d among the p u b l i c . Mao a s s e r t s that the g u e r r i l l a s must l i v e among the people as f i s h l i v e i n water. 178 For these Tamil g u e r r i l l a s , p u b l i c support was i n d i s p e n s a b l e f o r t h e i r s u r v i v a l as urban g u e r r i l l a s on the f l a t t e r r a i n of the J a f f n a p e n i n s u l a . P u b l i c support for the g u e r r i l l a s prevented the government from o b t a i n i n g i n c r i m i n a t i n g i n f o r m a t i o n about them. In the absence of such support, g u e r r i l l a s i n such a h i g h l y populated area c o u l d e a s i l y be betrayed. A l s o , the p u b l i c p r o v i d e s i n t e l l i g e n c e f o r g u e r r i l l a s on government troop movements and supply routes. E s t a b l i s h i n g i n t e l l i g e n c e network i s one of the primary developments i n the f i r s t phase of the war. The LTTE was the only s e c e s s i o n i s t g u e r r i l l a group which s y s t e m a t i c a l l y attempted to e s t a b l i s h base areas on the p e n i n s u l a . In the f i r s t phase, the LTTE e l i m i n a t e d p o l i t i c a l o p p o s i t i o n to secess i o n by murdering prominent government l e a d e r s , informers and c o l l a b o r a t o r s — a development c o n s i s t e n t with Mao's a n a l y s i s of g u e r r i l l a s t r a t e g y . The LTTE a l s o 'convinced' the people l i v i n g i n and around the pen i n s u l a to support the o b j e c t i v e of the g u e r r i l l a s through e t h n i c t i e s and murders. A f t e r a l l , Mao observes, n e u t r a l i t y i s not permitted i n g u e r r i l l a warfare. The LTTE c r e a t e d a r a d i c a l i z e d environment by c a r r y i n g out c o n s i s t e n t l y s u c c e s s f u l o perations a g a i n s t the s t a t e . Soon the p u b l i c came to conside r the g u e r r i l l a s as "our boys" f i g h t i n g f o r "us." Thus, as Che Guevara argues, c o n d i t i o n s necessary f o r the development of r e v o l u t i o n can be cr e a t e d by g u e r r i l l a s . The success of the LTTE i n e s t a b l i s h i n g base areas and m o b i l i z i n g p u b l i c support on the p e n i n s u l a was demonstrated by the government's f a i l u r e to destroy the g u e r r i l l a movement. Only a f t e r eleven years d i d 179 the army k i l l the f i r s t LTTE g u e r r i l l a who was betrayed i n J a f f n a . 1 2 None of the other major g u e r r i l l a groups was as s u c c e s s f u l as the LTTE e i t h e r i n e s t a b l i s h i n g base areas or i n m o b i l i z i n g p u b l i c support. In 1984, the re-emergence of the TELO with the backing of the Indian government l e d to a r a p i d m o b i l i z a t i o n of p u b l i c support. Through i t s m i l i t a r y v i c t o r i e s , the TELO e s t a b l i s h e d bases on the p e n i n s u l a . T h i s group, which became the dominant f o r c e i n the north w i t h i n a short span of time, lac k e d i d e o l o g i c a l commitment and a strong o r g a n i z a t i o n a l s t r u c t u r e , hence becoming d i r e c t i o n l e s s i n a p e r i o d of d e c l i n i n g m i l i t a r y s t r e n g t h . In d e s p e r a t i o n , to r e i n f o r c e i t s image as a strong g u e r r i l l a group, the TELO i n t i m i d a t e d c i v i l i a n s i n t o a c c e p t i n g i t s l e a d e r s h i p , thus l o s i n g i t s v o l u n t a r y support base. Consequently, in 1986, the LTTE decimated the TELO with l i t t l e p u b l i c p r o t e s t . As Mao and other g u e r r i l l a s t r a t e g i s t s a s s e r t , mass support i s e s s e n t i a l f o r the s u r v i v a l of a g u e r r i l l a group. The PLOTE, however, understood the importance of e s t a b l i s h i n g base areas in major Tamil c e n t e r s . Being the f i r s t g u e r r i l l a group to move out of the p e n i n s u l a i n i t s search f o r d i v e r s e p u b l i c support, the PLOTE f a i t h f u l l y adopted the communist s t r a t e g y of b u i l d i n g g r a s s - r o o t s o r g a n i z a t i o n s i n backward Tamil areas. For i n s t a n c e , the PLOTE was w e l l entrenched in the Vavunia d i s t r i c t . But the PLOTE l o s t i t s mass support base due to i t s l i m i t e d m i l i t a r y engagement a f t e r 1983. According to Mao, "... the main form of s t r u g g l e i s war, the main form of o r g a n i z a t i o n i s the army ... Without armed 180 s t r u g g l e there would be no place f o r the people ... and there w i l l be no v i c t o r y i n r e v o l u t i o n . " 1 3 The EPRLF, a r i g i d Marxist group, b e l i e v e d i n c r e a t i n g an ' i n s t a n t r e v o l u t i o n ' — the c r e a t i o n of the c l a s s l e s s s o c i e t y — by e l i m i n a t i n g the r i c h . N a t u r a l l y , t h i s group r e c e i v e d l i t t l e support from c o n s e r v a t i v e Tamils. The M a r x i s t - o r i e n t e d EROS tended to r e l y on e s o t e r i c appeals to a t t r a c t f o l l o w e r s and, as a r e s u l t , remained a group with a small but h i g h l y d e d i c a t e d support base. Both the EPRLF and EROS concentrated on the e t h n i c a l l y - m i x e d east and up-country, hence f a i l i n g to e s t a b l i s h base areas from which to d i r e c t g u e r r i l l a warfare. Meanwhile the LTTE, which was s u c c e s s f u l i n m o b i l i z i n g p u b l i c support and e s t a b l i s h i n g bases, emerged as the strongest o r g a n i z a t i o n by the mid-1980s. For Mao, the g u e r r i l l a s ' enemy i s the primary source of arms and ammunition. In t h e i r search for f i r e power and f i n a n c i a l resources, the EPRLF and EROS were hampered by t h e i r small s i z e . While the EPRLF c a r r i e d out very few s u c c e s s f u l a t t a c k s on the army, the EROS r e s o r t e d to economic sabotage in t h e i r g u e r r i l l a war ag a i n s t the government. Consequently, both groups secured few arms and ammunition from the enemy. However, the EROS' cooperation with the LTTE improved i t s f i n a n c i a l base. With the strong support of U.S.-based e x p a t r i a t e s , g u e r r i l l a s from the PLOTE were well-armed and fin a n c e d , but the PLOTE d i s i n t e g r a t e d due to i t s f a i l u r e to engage i n g u e r r i l l a warfare and i t s i n t e r n a l d i v i s i o n s . Both the LTTE and TELO i n t e r n a l l y financed t h e i r i n i t i a l g u e r r i l l a o perations by robbing banks and other s t a t e 181 i n s t i t u t i o n s . Both groups a l s o c o l l e c t e d arms and s u p p l i e s by a t t a c k i n g p o l i c e s t a t i o n s and m i l i t a r y p o s t s . But the LTTE was more s u c c e s s f u l i n o b t a i n i n g m i l i t a r y resources from the enemy due to i t s c o n s i s t e n t g u e r r i l l a ambushes and a t t a c k s . Furthermore, the LTTE's success i n e s t a b l i s h i n g base areas a l s o enhanced i t s a b i l i t y to manufacture m i l i t a r y hardware and to c o l l e c t f i n a n c i a l r e s o u r c e s . The LTTE b u i l t armories on the p e n i n s u l a and a l s o c o l l e c t e d taxes. O ' N e i l l has argued that a w e l l - o r g a n i z e d , popular g u e r r i l l a group a t t r a c t s s u b s t a n t i a l e x t e r n a l support which guarantees m a t e r i a l and f i n a n c i a l a s s i s t a n c e . Tamil Nadu government's support guaranteed a l a r g e flow of money for the LTTE. Again, i t was the LTTE which c o u l d optimize the use of economic and m i l i t a r y r e s o u r c e s . Although u n i t y among g u e r r i l l a s i s important, d i v i s i o n s among them may remain, deep. T y p i c a l l y , such d i v i s i o n s a r i s e from personal and i d e o l o g i c a l d i f f e r e n c e s . D i s s e n s i o n may take p l a c e w i t h i n a group or between groups but, as O ' N e i l l suggests, lac k of cohesion need not always l e a d to d e f e a t . I n t e r n a l and e x t e r n a l d i v i s i o n s w i t h i n the group and among the groups weakened the Tamil s e c e s s i o n i s t movement. The g u e r r i l l a s used t h e i r scarce resources to a n n i h i l a t e each other when j o i n t m i l i t a r y o p e r a t i o n s c o u l d have undermined the l i m i t e d m i l i t a r y c a p a b i l i t y of the enemy. The d i v i s i v e nature of the g u e r r i l l a groups gave the government not only s u f f i c i e n t time to b u i l d up i t s m i l i t a r y s t r e n g t h but, more importantly, to i n s t i l l d i s c i p l i n e i n t o i t s ragged armed f o r c e s . T h i s modernization programme was d i s a s t r o u s f o r the g u e r r i l l a s i n the long run. In f a c t , the army's success i n 1987 can i n part be t r a c e d back to 182 changes introduced during the post-1983 p e r i o d . However, d i s u n i t y among the g u e r r i l l a s d i d not end i n defeat while the government's m i l i t a r y weakness represented a comparable drawback. Indian pressure on the S r i Lankan government a l s o hampered i t s m i l i t a r y o p e r a t i o n s a g a i n s t the s e c e s s i o n i s t g u e r r i l l a s , which allowed them to s u r v i v e d e s p i t e d i s u n i t y . The LTTE, the only major g u e r r i l l a group f r e e from i n t e r n a l d i v i s i o n i n the post-1983 p e r i o d , was a l s o aggressive i n i t s attempts to e s t a b l i s h dominance over other g u e r r i l l a groups. I n t e r n a l s t r u g g l e i n the TELO made the o r g a n i z a t i o n v u l n e r a b l e to the LTTE's a t t a c k . S i m i l a r l y , s t r a t e g i c d i f f e r e n c e s over the conduct of the g u e r r i l l a war between the l e a d e r s h i p i n India and the f i e l d commanders in S r i Lanka destroyed the PLOTE. The EPRLF and EROS were r e l a t i v e l y f r e e from i n t e r n a l squabbles but too small to r e s i s t the LTTE. Hence, the EPRLF c a p i t u l a t e d to the LTTE in the north and east, and the EROS agreed to accept the dominance of the LTTE. By 1987, the LTTE became the strongest g u e r r i l l a group in the Tamil areas. The PLOTE, EPRLF and TELO were reduced to p e r i p h e r a l groups in the s e c e s s i o n i s t s t r u g g l e . But the LTTE's triumph i n c u r r e d a high c o s t . Today the main t h r e a t to the LTTE stems from the Three Star — a c o a l i t i o n of the PLOTE, TELO and EPRLF — which cooperates with the Indian army in i t s attempt to destroy the L T T E . 1 4 The success of s e c e s s i o n i s t movements v a r i e s c o n s i d e r a b l y . In the case of the LTTE, i t s success may p a r t l y be a t t r i b u t e d to the development of i t s l e a d e r s h i p and o r g a n i z a t i o n . Prabakaran's charisma h e l d the LTTE together and he provided a 183 dynamic l e a d e r s h i p f o r the group. By j u d i c i o u s l y mixing r u t h l e s s n e s s and compassion i n h i s d e a l i n g s with h i s subordinates, Prabakaran b u i l t a f i e r c e l y l o y a l g u e r r i l l a u n i t . He won the confidence of h i s r e g i o n a l commanders by a l l o w i n g them more freedom i n m i l i t a r y decision-making as w e l l as by rewarding them for m i l i t a r y success i n t h e i r commands. A l s o he surrounded himself with good p o l i t i c a l a d v i s o r s , thus a v o i d i n g being o u t b i d by h i s opponents in the p o l i t i c a l sphere. For i n s t a n c e , Prabakaran's d e c i s i o n to a l i g n ' e x c l u s i v e l y ' with M.G. Ramachandran gave the LTTE p o l i t i c a l leverage over the other groups. By adopting a f l e x i b l e ideology — a mixture of n a t i o n a l i s m and s o c i a l i s m -- Prabakaran d i d not introduce r a d i c a l changes in an e s s e n t i a l l y c o n s e r v a t i v e p e n i n s u l a . He c o u l d form a c r o s s - c u t t i n g a l l i a n c e between r a d i c a l s and c o n s e r v a t i v e s . As Wood w r i t e s , a f t e r m o b i l i z i n g and r e t a i n i n g p u b l i c support, s e c e s s i o n i s t l e a d e r s r e s o r t to o u t b i d d i n g . By r e f u s i n g to compromise on the establishment of Eelam, Prabakaran o u t b i d more f l e x i b l e g u e r r i l l a movements. Therefore the LTTE was p e r c e i v e d by the p u b l i c as the only major group committed to the cause of a separate s t a t e . The group's support base s o l i d i f i e d i n the Tamil areas. His r i g i d stand a l s o ensured that there was no c h a l l e n g e to h i s l e a d e r s h i p from h a r d l i n e r s w i t h i n h i s group. , On the c o n t r a r y , the TELO a f t e r the death of Thangathurai d i d not possess an e f f e c t i v e and strong l e a d e r s h i p . The unimaginative l e a d e r s h i p of Uma Maheswaran r e s u l t e d i n the PLOTE's d i s i n t e g r a t i o n . For a long time, he could not hold 184 together the r e s t l e s s and i d l e g u e r r i l l a s i n the Tamil Nadu camp. The EROS's l e a d e r s h i p ' s d e c i s i o n to cooperate with the LTTE showed greater f l e x i b i l i t y and p o l i t i c a l maturity than the l e a d e r s h i p of other g u e r r i l l a groups. As a r e s u l t , the EROS was the only g u e r r i l l a group to avoid the i n t e r - g r o u p f r a t r i c i d e . " S e c e s s i o n i s t s , " w r i t e s Wood, "without o r g a n i z a t i o n foment l i t t l e more than upheavals that have no l a s t i n g e f f e c t . " 1 5 L i m i t e d a v a i l a b l e data on the o r g a n i z a t i o n a l s t r u c t u r e of Tamil s e c e s s i o n i s t groups prevent us from a s s e s s i n g i t s importance to the development of s e c e s s i o n i s t g u e r r i l l a movements. However, among the g u e r r i l l a s the LTTE developed i n t o a w e l l - s t r u c t u r e d o r g a n i z a t i o n , both at the p o l i t i c a l and m i l i t a r y l e v e l s . I t s c l o s e i n t e r n a l network connecting i t s c e n t r a l command in India ( p r i o r to 1987) with the r e g i o n a l commanders in S r i Lanka and i t s h i g h l y c e n t r a l i z e d c o n t r o l of policy-making together with i t s d e c e n t r a l i z e d p o l i t i c a l and m i l i t a r y executions converted i t i n t o a powerful o r g a n i z a t i o n . I t s p o l i t i c a l o r g a n i z a t i o n was a l s o e f f e c t i v e enough to generate propaganda which overshadowed the government propaganda machinery. R e l a t i v e l y few . other groups (with the exception of EROS) remained o r g a n i z a t i o n a l ' l i g h t w e i g h t s ' i n the s e c e s s i o n i s t s t r u g g l e . The success of s e c e s s i o n i s t g u e r r i l l a warfare may be determined by a combination of f a c t o r s . But some f a c t o r s may be more important than others i n determining a g u e r r i l l a group's a b i l i t y to c h a l l e n g e the c e n t r a l government. A g u e r r i l l a o r g a n i z a t i o n ' s a b i l i t y to e s t a b l i s h base areas may determine i t s a b i l i t y to c h a l l e n g e the c e n t r a l government. The experience of the LTTE i n d i c a t e s the success of e s t a b l i s h i n g such bases, 185 thus r e i n f o r c i n g the t h e o r e t i c a l e x p e c t a t i o n s of Mao. But the Indian army's success i n t a k i n g c o n t r o l of the J a f f n a p e n i n s u l a i l l u s t r a t e s the weaknesses i n e s t a b l i s h i n g base areas which lack g e o g r a p h i c a l advantage. Mao d i s c u s s e s the advantage i n making a mountain region the base areas i n a g u e r r i l l a warfare; understandably, a s u p e r i o r m i l i t a r y f o r c e may destroy a base area i n a disadvantageous t e r r a i n such as the J a f f n a p e n i n s u l a . U n l i k e the Indian f o r c e s , the S r i Lankan army lacked m i l i t a r y c a p a b i l i t y to e x e r c i s e c o n t r o l over the north. But the Indian army has been bogged down i n the east — p a r t l y due to i t s advantageous t e r r a i n , f o r example i t s j u n g l e s . 1 6 For g u e r r i l l a s , p u b l i c support i s e s s e n t i a l i f they are to conduct t h e i r g u e r r i l l a o p e r a t i o n s s u c c e s s f u l l y . With p u b l i c c o o p e r a t i o n , a g u e r r i l l a may be d i s g u i s e d as a c i v i l i a n . A l s o , p u b l i c support ensures that the g u e r r i l l a may mix with the people without being b e t r a y e d . 1 7 C l e a r l y , as suggested by Mao, Guevara and O ' N e i l l , b u i l d i n g mass-support i s imperative f o r the development of a v i a b l e g u e r r i l l a f o r c e . In S r i Lanka, the success of the LTTE may be d i r e c t l y r e l a t e d to i t s p u b l i c support. Mao a s s e r t s , "with the common people of the whole country m o b i l i z e d , we s h a l l c r e a t e a vast sea of humanity and drown the enemy i n i t . " 1 8 But, as the example of Kurdish insurgents i n Iraq suggests, a s e c e s s i o n i s t s t r u g g l e may be defeated by a government d e s p i t e p u b l i c support. The government may a l s o undermine p u b l i c support of insurgents by accommodating the e t h n i c group's demands. By i n t r o d u c i n g economic and s o c i a l reforms, Ramon Magasaysay defeated the communist insurgents i n P h i l i p i n e s . 186 The g u e r r i l l a group which enjoyed capable l e a d e r s h i p and o r g a n i z a t i o n emerged as the powerful f o r c e . Today i f the LTTE i s able to r e s i s t the Indian army — the f o u r t h l a r g e s t army i n the world — i t may be due to i t s committed l e a d e r s h i p and o r g a n i z a t i o n a l a b i l i t y . The TELO's d e s t r u c t i o n and the PLOTE's d i s i n t e g r a t i o n i l l u s t r a t e the l i m i t a t i o n s of economic and m i l i t a r y resources i n the absence of an able l e a d e r s h i p , good o r g a n i z a t i o n and a mass support base in a g u e r r i l l a warfare. F i n a l l y , d e s p i t e d i s u n i t y , g u e r r i l l a s e c e s s i o n i s t movements have s u r v i v e d over a decade. D i v i s i v e n e s s may not destroy g u e r r i l l a movements i f compensation developments emerge in the s e c e s s i o n i s t s t r u g g l e . S r i Lanka's i n f e r i o r armed f o r c e s c o u l d not e x p l o i t the i n t e r - g r o u p and i n t r a - g r o u p d i v i s i o n s among the g u e r r i l l a s to e l i m i n a t e them o u t r i g h t . F i n a l l y , i f u n i t y can be achieved only by a n n i h i l a t i n g the r i v a l groups, p u b l i c support and c o n t r o l over resources may begin to d i m i n i s h . The S r i Lanka experience t h e r e f o r e demonstrates that the establishment of base areas, the m o b i l i z a t i o n of p u b l i c support as w e l l as b u i l d i n g strong o r g a n i z a t i o n s and l e a d e r s h i p may be more important than a c q u i r i n g s u f f i c i e n t m i l i t a r y and economic power or even than s u r v i v i n g as a u n i f i e d f o r c e . Importantly, the a b i l i t y of the g u e r r i l l a s i s s i g n i f i c a n t l y i n f l u e n c e d by the response of the c e n t r a l government i t s e l f — f o r example, by the extent of i t s m i l i t a r y c a p a b i l i t y and implementation of economic, s o c i a l and p o l i t i c a l reforms. 6. For the u l t i m a t e success of armed s e c e s s i o n i s t movements, g u e r r i l l a s must be m i l i t a r i l y a c t i v e and manoeuver the government i n t o abandoning c r e d i b l e accommodative p o l i c i e s and i n t o employing an 187 i n c r e a s i n g l e v e l of r e p r e s s i o n a g a i n s t the m i n o r i t y c i v i l i a n p o p u l a t i o n . These successes enable enable g u e r r i l l a s to win popular support and to decrease the a u t h o r i t y of the c e n t r a l government i n the home t e r r i t o r y . G u e r r i l l a warfare i s the s t r a t e g y of the weak. G e n e r a l l y , g u e r r i l l a s c onfront c e n t r a l governments which, a c c o r d i n g to Wood, "command ... system maintenance i n s t i t u t i o n s ... c o n t r o l or have gre a t e r i n f l u e n c e over the budget, f i n a n c i a l i n s t i t u t i o n s and other l e v e r s of the economy ... have b e t t e r access to e x t e r n a l s u p p o r t . " 1 9 The s e c e s s i o n i s t i n s u r g e n t s ' task i s d i f f i c u l t indeed. In t h i s context, a main s t r a t e g y of s e c e s s i o n i s t g u e r r i l l a s to for c e the government to react v i o l e n t l y i n response to t h e i r i s o l a t e d but deadly t e r r o r i s t a t t a c k s or g u e r r i l l a o p e r a t i o n s . The c e n t r a l government succumbs to t h i s s t r a t e g y when, in i t s f r u s t r a t e d attempts to separate g u e r r i l l a s from c i v i l i a n s , i t r e t a l i a t e s a g a i n s t the p u b l i c . G u e r r i l l a s simultaneously achieve two o b j e c t i v e s : F i r s t , the r e b e l s win the p u b l i c support and, second, they r a d i c a l i z e a s t a b l e p o l i t i c a l environment. Both O ' N e i l l and Wood recognize the importance of the c e n t r a l government's response i n the outcome of the s e c e s s i o n i s t s t r u g g l e . The Tamil s e c e s s i o n i s t insurgents i d e n t i f i e d with the p u b l i c on account of t h e i r e t h n i c t i e s . As O ' N e i l l notes, the m i n o r i t y f a c t i o n tends to sympathize with t h e i r own e t h n i c g u e r r i l l a s d u r i n g an i n s u r r e c t i o n . On one hand, e t h n i c l o y a l t y was one way i n which the Tamils s e c e s s i o n i s t e s t a b l i s h e d t h e i r support base. But, on the other hand, these g u e r r i l l a s faced an arduous task i n s e l l i n g an "ideology of v i o l e n c e " to the co n s e r v a t i v e and i n d i v i d u a l i s t i c T a m i l s . P o l i t i c a l propaganda 188 may be one of the e f f e c t i v e mediums a v a i l a b l e to g u e r r i l l a s to m o b i l i z e p u b l i c support f o r armed c o n f l i c t . Increased popular support reduced chances f o r g u e r r i l l a s ' b e t r a y a l in the t r a d i t i o n a l homeland. When a c t i v e support f o r g u e r r i l l a s expands, e f f e c t i v e n e s s (both p o l i t i c a l and m i l i t a r y ) of these groups improves c o n s i d e r a b l y . The g u e r r i l l a movement, a c c o r d i n g to Regis Debray, i s "born and develops i n sec r e c y . " When s e c e s s i o n i s t movements are shrouded i n secrecy, one of the p r i n c i p a l ways of c r e a t i n g a p o s i t i v e impact on the p u b l i c i s through the conduct of g u e r r i l l a (and t e r r o r i s t ) o p e r a t i o n s . Debray c o r r e c t l y notes, "the most s u c c e s s f u l form of p o l i t i c a l propaganda i s s u c c e s s f u l m i l i t a r y o p e r a t i o n . " 2 0 The LTTE was the only g u e r r i l l a group which c o n s i s t e n t l y engaged i n m i l i t a r y o p e r a t i o n s . Undoubtedly, the LTTE's emergence as the strongest g u e r r i l l a group i s d i r e c t l y r e l a t e d to i t s m i l i t a r y v i c t o r i e s . I t s e f f e c t i v e m i l i t a r y o r g a n i z a t i o n a l s t r u c t u r e and t r a i n i n g programmes helped i t to develop i n t o an e f f i c i e n t group. The LTTE b u i l t an image of i n v i n c i b i l i t y around i t s e l f by c a r r y i n g out s u c c e s s f u l g u e r r i l l a o p e r a t i o n s for an extended p e r i o d . Beginning with the k i l l i n g of A l f r e d Duraiappa i n 1975, the LTTE was engaged i n p r o g r e s s i v e l y bolder g u e r r i l l a o p erations a g a i n s t the government. The p u b l i c was 'convinced' that the m i l i t a r y c o u l d be defeated. I n v a r i a b l y , the Tamil p u b l i c i d e n t i f i e d with the winners, hence the support base f o r the LTTE widened. The success of the LTTE demonstrated: (a) the government c o u l d e f f e c t i v e l y be chall e n g e d and demoralized. A demoralized government l o s e s the w i l l to f i g h t a long war; (b) armed 189 s e c e s s i o n turned out to be a v i a b l e s t r a t e g y f o r e x t r a c t i n g concessions from the government. The S r i Lankan government accommodated more Tamils demands in the post-1983 p e r i o d than ever before; (c) the LTTE g u e r r i l l a ( i n the post-1985 period) c o u l d p r o t e c t the c i v i l i a n s from the army. The group possessed the c a p a b i l i t y to e x e r c i s e power, which was e a r l i e r monopolized by the c e n t r a l a u t h o r i t y . The LTTE's m i l i t a r y successes were not matched by any other g u e r r i l l a groups. The PLOTE had not c a r r i e d out any s i g n i f i c a n t m i l i t a r y operations, i n the post-1983 p e r i o d and was no longer c o n s i d e r e d a potent g u e r r i l l a o r g a n i z a t i o n . The EROS b e l i e v e d i n economic sabotage a g a i n s t the government; hence i t s m i l i t a r y e x p l o i t s were l i m i t e d . The EPRLF f a i l e d to d i r e c t any major s u c c e s s f u l operations a g a i n s t the government. The TELO was the only group other than the LTTE to conduct e f f e c t i v e g u e r r i l l a o p e r a t i o n s . But the TELO c o u l d not match the m i l i t a r y prowess of the LTTE due to i t s weak l e a d e r s h i p and poor m i l i t a r y t r a i n i n g . Tamil g u e r r i l l a s succeeded in f o r c i n g the government to react v i o l e n t l y to i s o l a t e d i n c i d e n t s of t e r r o r i s m or g u e r r i l l a a t t a c k s . For i n s t a n c e , the p o l i c e rampage in the s p r i n g of 1981 and the army's r e t a l i a t i o n i n the summer of 1983 f o l l o w i n g g u e r r i l l a a t t a c k s on them a l i e n a t e d p u b l i c support. The government's o v e r r e a c t i o n a l s o disenchanted the moderate f a c t i o n of the Tamils, thus l o s i n g i t s remaining leverage over the m i n o r i t y . I n d i s c r i m i n a t e r e p r i s a l s a g a i n s t the p u b l i c were p a r t l y e x p l a i n e d by the army's f r u s t r a t i o n and i t s i n a b i l i t y to d i s t i n g u i s h g u e r r i l l a s from the p u b l i c . Again, such r e p r i s a l s 190 were cou n t e r - p r o d u c t i v e s i n c e they widened the p u b l i c support f o r g u e r r i l l a s . Hence the government helped to turn a small i n s u r r e c t i o n i n t o a mass s e c e s s i o n i s t movement. In s h o r t , the government's l e g i t i m a c y d e c l i n e d c o n s i d e r a b l y , and i t s r i g h t to govern was i n c r e a s i n g l y c h a l l e n g e d . Furthermore, Tamil g u e r r i l l a s succeeded in d e s t r o y i n g p o l i t i c a l i n s t i t u t i o n s and ethos i n the north and e a s t . The e l i m i n a t i o n of some of these i n s t i t u t i o n s (e.g. p o l i t i c a l p a r t i e s ) , which may have had i n t e g r a t i v e c a p a c i t y , prevented the government from b r i n g i n g the Tamils i n t o mainstream p o l i t i c s . The s p i l l over e f f e c t of Tamil secessionism i n the south generated Sinhalese o p p o s i t i o n to the government for i t s f a i l u r e to defeat the g u e r r i l l a s . As a r e s u l t , the government became more r e p r e s s i v e i n i t s d e a l i n g s with the o p p o s i t i o n . The government t h e r e f o r e c o u l d not e s t a b l i s h a consensus among Sin h a l e s e e l i t e s to solve the e t h n i c c o n f l i c t . To a v o i d being o u t b i d by the Sinhala-Buddhist e x t r e m i s t s , the government r e l i e d more on a m i l i t a r y s o l u t i o n to an e s s e n t i a l l y p o l i t i c a l problem. Tamil g u e r r i l l a s c r e a t e d a v i o l e n t , p o l i t i c a l c o n d i t i o n w.hich encouraged e t h n i c chauvinism i n both groups. Guevara c o r r e c t l y a n t i c i p a t e s that the government's o v e r r e a c t i o n to g u e r r i l l a a t t a c k s c o u l d draw the uncommitted to the r e b e l ' s s i d e . I t s r e t a l i a t i o n on p u b l i c c o u l d a l s o convert a pool of p a s s i v e sympathizers i n t o a c t i v e supporters. The government's response, as suggested i n the theory, has a c o n s i d e r a b l e i n f l u e n c e on the outcome of the s e c e s s i o n i s t s t r u g g l e . Both Wood and O ' N e i l l agree that a c e n t r a l government may undermine the support base of the g u e r r i l l a s through a 191 mixture of accommodation and m i l i t a r y measures. An e f f e c t i v e g u e r r i l l a response may be to thwart any government attempt to reach a negot i a t e d settlement. A government's excessive r e l i a n c e on a m i l i t a r y s o l u t i o n may le a d to the replacement of p o l i t i c a l i n s t i t u t i o n s by m i l i t a r y machinery. The subsequent c r e a t i o n of a m i l i t a r y environment and the simultaneous c l o s i n g down of the e s t a b l i s h e d channels f o r r e d r e s s i n g g r i e v a n c e s , as Guevara argues, s t i m u l a t e s the growth of g u e r r i l l a movements. I n i t i a l l y , the primary goal of the g u e r r i l l a s i s two-fold: (1) c h a l l e n g e and reduce the l e g i t i m a c y of the c e n t r a l government; (2) win and c o n s o l i d a t e popular support. However, the a b i l i t y of the groups to be m i l i t a r i l y a c t i v e and to compel the government to react v i o l e n t l y depends on a combination of f a c t o r s , some of which have a l r e a d y been d i s c u s s e d l e a d e r s h i p , o r g a n i z a t i o n e t c . S r i Lankan evidence suggests that the g u e r r i l l a s were f a i r l y s u c c e s s f u l in a c h i e v i n g t h i s twin o b j e c t i v e s through v i o l e n c e . 7. The way an i n t e r e s t e d powerful e x t e r n a l neighbour d e f i n e s i t s s t r a t e g i c goals with regard to the s e c e s s i o n i s t war may s i g n i f i c a n t l y i n f l u e n c e the outcome of a s e c e s s i o n i s t c o n f l i c t . Outside involvement i n a s e c e s s i o n i s t c o n f l i c t may depend on v a r i o u s f a c t o r s . Wood suggests two f a c t o r s which i n f l u e n c e the e x t e r n a l involvement: f i r s t , the degree of p e n e t r a b i l i t y of the p o l i t i c a l system, and second, r e g i o n a l and/or g l o b a l i n t e r n a t i o n a l systemic f a c t o r s . He p o i n t s out that e x t e r n a l governments i n t h e i r d e s i r e to maintain the s t a t u s quo tend to support the c e n t r a l government i n a s e c e s s i o n i s t war. But there 192 are a few instances where the f o r e i g n government f o r s t r a t e g i c , i d e o l o g i c a l or economic reasons may back the s e c e s s i o n i s t r e b e l s . Indian i n t e r v e n t i o n i n the B e n g a l i s ' s e c e s s i o n i s t war (motivated mainly by her s t r a t e g i c i n t e r e s t s ) played a major r o l e i n the dismemberment of Pa k i s t a n and the c r e a t i o n of Bangladesh i n 1971. India's triumph over Pakistan a l s o confirmed her r e g i o n a l power s t a t u s i n South A s i a . A f t e r 1971, I n d i r a Gandhi's a g g r e s s i v e f o r e i g n p o l i c y i n i t i a t i v e s c r e a t e d a pe r c e p t i o n that a m i l i t a r y o p t i o n may be used by India i f her g e o p o l i t i c a l i n t e r e s t s were threatened. Tamil s e c e s s i o n i s t movements emerged i n the post-Bangladesh p e r i o d when India was beginning to a s s e r t her l e a d e r s h i p , both p o l i t i c a l l y and m i l i t a r i l y i n the r e g i o n . The Tamil s e c e s s i o n i s t g u e r r i l l a s took the "Indian f a c t o r " i n t o c o n s i d e r a t i o n since.both r a d i c a l and moderate s e c e s s i o n i s t a c t i v e l y e s t a b l i s h e d c l o s e l i n k s with Tamil Nadu p o l i t i c i a n s . But I n d i r a Gandhi's pe r s o n a l f r i e n d s h i p with Sirimavo Bandaranaike and the l a t t e r ' s strong non-alignment stand ( i n p r a c t i c e anti-west) i n f l u e n c e d India's non-i n t e r v e n t i o n i s t approach to S r i Lanka i n the 1970s. In 1977, right- w i n g , pro-western governments took power i n India and S r i Lanka. The new Indian prime m i n i s t e r M o r a r j i Desai adopted a strong n o n - i n t e r v e n t i o n i s t f o r e i g n p o l i c y v i s -a - v i s S r i Lanka and was openly h o s t i l e to the Tamil s e c e s s i o n i s t r e b e l s . But when Gandhi returned to power in 1980, Jayewardene's pro-western f o r e i g n p o l i c y , which was d i a m e t r i c a l l y opposite to her's, s t r a i n e d the Indo-Sri Lankan r e l a t i o n s h i p . Gandhi i n c r e a s i n g l y p a i d a t t e n t i o n to the 193 changing p o l i t i c a l developments i n her southern n e i g h b o u r . 2 1 The establishment of a southern command r e i n f o r c e d India's concern with new developments i n S r i Lanka. I n d i a began to p e r c e i v e S r i Lanka as a t h r e a t to her g e o p o l i t i c a l i n t e r e s t s . A r e g i o n a l power, suggests Wood, may intervene i n a s e c e s s i o n i s t war to ensure an outcome b e n e f i c i a l to i t s long-term s e c u r i t y . I n d i a ' s r e f u s a l to e x t r a d i t e Prabakaran and Uma Maheswaran in 1982 was one of the e a r l i e s t s i g n a l s of India's stand with regard to the s e c e s s i o n i s t c o n f l i c t . The second major f a c t o r e x p l a i n i n g Gandhi's concern about S r i Lankan p o l i t i c s was l i n k e d to domestic p o l i t i c a l n e c e s s i t y . Despite the 'death' of secessionism i n South I n d i a , e t h n i c consciousness remained high and c o u l d be r e a d i l y transformed i n t o a n t i - D e l h i and a n t i - H i n d u sentiments i n Tamil Nadu. Successive Indian prime m i n i s t e r s d a t i n g back to Nehru have been aware of Tamil n a t i o n a l i s m and, consequently, have been more accommodating on l i n g u i s t i c i s s u e s . The c e n t r a l government a n t i c i p a t e d that continued e t h n i c v i o l e n c e i n S r i Lanka c o u l d produce r e p e r c u s s i o n s i n Tamil Nadu. F i r s t , i t c o u l d produce i n s t a b i l i t y i n the s t a t e , and second i t c o u l d lead to the a c c u s a t i o n of the c e n t r a l government's i n s e n s i t i v i t y to the Tamils, p o s s i b l y encouraging the reemergence of s e c e s s i o n i s t f o r c e s . With the d e c l i n i n g e l e c t o r a l fortunes i n the north, Gandhi came to r e l y more on the south to win e l e c t i o n s . In t h i s context, she was not prepared to a l i e n a t e the Tamil support. I n e v i t a b l y , the Indian prime m i n i s t e r was openly c r i t i c a l of the S r i Lankan government attempts to c o n t r o l i t s Tamil p o p u l a t i o n . A f t e r a l l , as Howard Wriggins argues, a r u l e r ' s 194 f i r s t imperative i s to r e t a i n power. 2 2 Tamil Nadu's moral and p o l i t i c a l support i n the beginning extended to l o g i s t i c a l and m a t e r i a l a s s i s t a n c e i n the e a r l y 1980s. Undoubtedly, the moral and l o g i s t i c a l support was c r u c i a l f o r the growth of s e c e s s i o n i s t a c t i v i t y . In the absence of Indian s a n c t u a r i e s , the g u e r r i l l a s c o u l d not have s u r v i v e d as e f f e c t i v e groups in the long run. L a l i t h Athulathmudali, a former m i n i s t e r of n a t i o n a l s e c u r i t y observed: Now the t e r r o r i s t a c t i v i t i e s would have been curbed and would have ended a long time ago i f not f o r the f a c t that they had obtained f o r themselves bases and areas of operation i n which our w r i t does not l i e , because i t i s o u t s i d e our country. I do not think anybody doubts the f a c t that i f there were no t e r r o r i s t bases i n Tamil Nadu, the t e r r o r i s t s would not be i n a p o s i t i o n to do anything at a l l . I t i s t h i s base that has given them succour, the support and the a b i l i t y to continue with t h e i r hit-and-run methods. 2 3 Tamil Nadu opposed s t r o n g l y the e x t r a d i t i o n of Prabakaran and Maheswaran to S r i Lanka. E x t r a d i t i o n c o u l d have been a d i s a s t e r f o r the Tamil g u e r r i l l a movements. The TELO was a l r e a d y i n a c t i v e a f t e r the capture of Thangathurai and Kuttimani i n 1981. The a r r e s t s of these two l e a d e r s c o u l d have c r i p p l e d the s e c e s s i o n i s t g u e r r i l l a s . M.G. Ramachandran, who was the l i n k between the Indian government and the LTTE, f o r c e d h i s government to exert pressure on the S r i Lankan government. In h i s "god-father" r o l e to the LTTE, he provided l a r g e f i n a n c i a l a s s i s t a n c e . 2 4 F i n a l l y , Tamil propaganda machinery o p e r a t i n g from Tamil Nadu was h i g h l y organized and very e f f e c t i v e i n c r e a t i n g a sympathetic i n t e r n a t i o n a l image for Tamils. The importance of the Tamil Nadu connection to the development of s e c e s s i o n i s t g u e r r i l l a s 195 i s c l e a r . A complex set of s t r a t e g i c i n t e r e s t s and domestic p o l i t i c a l n e c e s s i t y determined the Indian government's response to the S r i Lankan e t h n i c c r i s i s . The J u l y 1983 r i o t s provided India with an o p p o r t u n i t y to exert d i p l o m a t i c pressure on S r i Lanka. But I n d i a f a i l e d to compell the S r i Lankan government to accommodate main Tamil demands. To crush the Tamil s e c e s s i o n i s t s , Jayewardene continued to r e l y more on m i l i t a r y measures than accommodative steps f o r the f o l l o w i n g reasons: (a) the P r e s i d e n t ' s peace i n i t i a t i v e s under Indian pressure were c o n s t r a i n e d by the S i n h a l e s e o u t b i d d e r s . The SLFP — the main o p p o s i t i o n p a r t y having a l a r g e Sinhala-Buddhist support base — boycotted the a l l - p a r t y conference; (b) the government's assumption that the s e c e s s i o n i s t nature of the Tamil insurgency would prevent I n d i a from t a k i n g any strong measures and imposing a s o l u t i o n on S r i Lanka. India's r e j e c t i o n of the Sikhs' s e c e s s i o n i s t demand would l i m i t the Indian manoeuverability on Tamil secessionism. Jayewardene was to some extent c o r r e c t i n h i s a n a l y s i s of India's dilemma. The S r i Lankan government, p a r t i c u l a r l y a f t e r the death of I n d i r a Gandhi, used the peace t a l k s to ward o f f pressure from D e l h i , while attempting to f i n d a m i l i t a r y s o l u t i o n to the Tamil s e c e s s i o n i s t c h a l l e n g e . But India was not prepared to l e t the S r i Lankan government f o r c e s defeat the Tamil s e c e s s i o n i s t s and continued to apply d i p l o m a t i c pressure, which d e t e r r e d S r i Lanka from undertaking the ' f i n a l a s s a u l t ' on the g u e r r i l l a s . F i n a l l y , the i n c r e a s i n g Pakistan and I s r a e l i involvement 196 i n the s e c e s s i o n i s t war, and Tamil Nadu's d i s c o n t e n t with D e l h i ' s ' s o f t ' stand on S r i Lanka, brought on India's i n t e r v e n t i o n on "humanitarian grounds." There was l i t t l e i n t e r n a t i o n a l p r o t e s t a g a i n s t India's a c t i o n . T h i s i m p l i e d t a c i t approval of Indian dominance i n t h i s region and that any s o l u t i o n to the eth n i c war must be acceptable to her. By the summer of 1987, India was able to exert pressure on both the S r i Lankan government and the Tamil g u e r r i l l a s to accept a peace - t r e a t y . India has now played a very s i g n i f i c a n t r o l e i n two s e c e s s i o n i s t c o n f l i c t s on the sub-continent. She helped Bangladesh to secede from P a k i s t a n . In the S r i Lankan case, however, India intervened to ensure that v i c t o r y was achieved by n e i t h e r the government nor the g u e r r i l l a s . Wood has argued that i f a s e c e s s i o n i s t war takes plac e i n a country which i s w i t h i n a sphere of i n f l u e n c e of a r e g i o n a l power, involvement of the l a t t e r i n the war i s a l i k e l y p r ospect. A c c o r d i n g l y , I n d i a as the r e g i o n a l power intervened f o r s t r a t e g i c (prevent d e s t a b i l i z a t i o n of the region) and domestic ( e l e c t o r a l n e c e s s i t y of Congress and et h n i c t i e s between Indian Tamils and Tamils in S r i Lanka) reasons. However, the post-1987 events i n d i c a t e that the Indian e x p e c t a t i o n of a short war with the Tamil r e b e l s and a quick r e t u r n to normalcy d i d not m a t e r i a l i z e . . Instead I n d i a has become i n v o l v e d i n her longest war i n the post-independent p e r i o d . As t h e o r e t i c a l l y noted, i f s e c e s s i o n i s t p r e c o n d i t i o n s p r e v a i l and the s e c e s s i o n i s t g u e r r i l l a s enjoy p u b l i c support, e x t e r n a l support to the government may not make a d i f f e r e n c e i n the s t r u g g l e . The Indian m i l i t a r y and d i p l o m a t i c stakes i n S r i 197 Lanka are h i g h . India Today r e p o r t e d : For Indian diplomacy, S r i Lanka represents perhaps the b i g g e s t c h a l l e n g e s i n c e 1971. Success w i l l ensure that i t s r e g i o n a l s t a t u s i s commensurate with i t s s i z e and g e o p o l i t i c a l l egacy. F a i l u r e w i l l c i r c u m s c r i b e India's d i p l o m a t i c and m i l i t a r y r o l e f o r decades to come. 2 5 Due to the present h i g h l y f l u i d s t a t e of the Tamil s e c e s s i o n i s t war, no f i r m p r e d i c t i o n can be made on the outcome. Yet some gene r a l , although s p e c u l a t i v e o b s e r v a t i o n s can be made. 1. The c e n t r a l government of India depends h e a v i l y on the Tamil Nadu support f o r the success of the J u l y 1987 peace accord. There was muted Indian Tamil o p p o s i t i o n to In d i a ' s a t t a c k on the LTTE. M.G. Ramachandran, checked.the Tamil p r o t e s t by not being openly h o s t i l e to the c e n t r a l government. But with Ramachandran's death, the Indian government c o u l d no longer r e l y on the s t a t e government's continued support f o r the accord and the Indian army's o f f e n s i v e a g a i n s t the LTTE. The p o l i t i c a l entrepreneurs — p a r t i c u l a r l y the DMK leader, M. Karunanidhi — c o u l d c a p i t a l i z e on the Indian government's " a n t i - T a m i l " r o l e i n S r i Lanka to regain p o l i t i c a l power i n the s t a t e . The e l e c t i o n s w i l l p o s s i b l y determine the f a t e of the peace accord. If an anti-peace accord, a n t i - I n d i a n peace keeping f o r c e (IPKE) p a r t y assumes power i n Tamil Nadu, the accord c o u l d c o l l a p s e . M.G. Ramachandran had a l s o acted as the l i n k between the c e n t r a l government and the LTTE. Thus the government has l o s t any i n f l u e n c e i t had over the LTTE. Thus a permanent settlement seems u n l i k e l y i n the near f u t u r e . 198 2. J.R. Jayewardene i s the key to the peace accord's success in S r i Lanka. But o p p o s i t i o n to the accord i s f i e r c e . The JVP i s the main b e n e f i c i a r y of the a n t i - a c c o r d sentiments. T h i s M a r x i s t o r g a n i z a t i o n has remodelled i t s e l f on a S i n h a l a -Buddhist c h a u v i n i s t i c ideology. The JVP has succeeded in i n t i m i d a t i n g the S i n h a l e s e l e a d e r s to withdraw t h e i r support for the a c c o r d . Since the r e s i g n a t i o n of Ronnie de Mel — one of the few supporters of the accord -- no S i n h a l e s e p o l i t i c i a n has been w i l l i n g to honour the accord. I t i s very l i k e l y that any S i n h a l e s e leader succeeding Jayewardene w i l l ask India to withdraw from the i s l a n d . 3. How w i l l India respond? The Indian move may be determined by the c o s t s and b e n e f i t s of heir s t r a t e g i c i n t e r e s t s . The c o s t s i n c l u d e the damage to her i n t e r n a t i o n a l p r e s t i g e , a l i e n a t i n g the Tamils i n South India and the high p r i c e of supporting the army. The b e n e f i t s i n c l u d e keeping a n t i - I n d i a n f o r c e s away from the southern f l a n k , demonstrating her a b i l i t y to meet s t r a t e g i c i n t e r e s t s through m i l i t a r y f o r c e , and guaranteeing access to the Trincomalee harbour. India may not be w i l l i n g to r e t u r n to the status-quo i n the Indo-Sri Lankan r e l a t i o n s h i p . She may want to keep the f o r c e s h o s t i l e to her i n t e r e s t s permanently away from the i s l a n d i n order to c o n s o l i d a t e her h o l d . Although i n the f u t u r e India may be able to e s t a b l i s h a rapport with the LTTE. through 'ethnic s o l i d a r i t y , ' she may f i n d i t d i f f i c u l t to e l i m i n a t e c e n t u r i e s - o l d a n t i - I n d i a n sentiments among the S i n h a l e s e . As a r e g i o n a l power, she may not achieve her main o b j e c t i v e — s t r a t e g i c and g e o p o l i t i c a l concerns — without the 199 p u b l i c support. Thus, i n the long run, her a c t i o n s are l i k e l y to be p a r t i a l to the Tamils due to s t r a t e g i c (Colombo i s pro-west and a n t i - I n d i a ) , domestic (Tamil Nadu support base) and e t h n i c ( r e l i g i o u s - l i n g u i s t i c l i n k s ) f a c t o r s . 200 NOTES 1Schwarz, p. 7. 2Diane K. Mauzy, C o n s o c i a t i o n a l i s m and C o a l i t i o n P o l i t i c s  i n M a l a y s i a , Ph.D. T h e s i s , The U n i v e r s i t y of B r i t i s h Columbia (1978), p. 375. 3Obeysekere, p. 72. "Coomaraswamy, p. 178. 5Samarasinghe, pp. 176-179. 6 N o r d l i n g e r , p. 36. 'Wood, p. 125. 8A s e n i o r S r i Lankan army o f f i c e r noted, "we r e a l l y have no i n s t a n c e s i n m i l i t a r y h i s t o r y to take heart from ... nowhere in the world has a p o p u l a r i t y - b a c k e d insurgency been destroyed by government troops b a r r i n g Malaya. But that was a d i f f e r e n t case. The B r i t i s h were f i g h t i n g i n someone e l s e ' s land and co u l d get away with measures that w i l l g ive Amnesty I n t e r n a t i o n a l many heart a t t a c k s . We have n e i t h e r the p o l i t i c a l nor m i l i t a r y a b i l i t y to do that and thus the only way out i s a s o l u t i o n a c r o s s the t a b l e . " India Today (October 15, .1985), p. 55. 9Wood, p. 12. 1"Committee For R a t i o n a l Development, p. 21. 1 1 James Manor, "The Dynamics of P o l i t i c a l I n t e g r a t i o n and D i s i n t e g r a t i o n " i n Wilson and Dalton (eds.), The S t a t e s , p. 89. 1 2 ' L i e u t e n a n t ' Lucas Charles Anthony (Seelan) was the f i r s t LTTE g u e r r i l l a betrayed and k i l l e d i n J a f f n a . 201 1 3Mao Tse-Tung quoted i n Katzenbach, J r . and Hanrahan, p. 131. 1"Globe and M a i l (November 10, 1987). 1 5Wood, p. 124. 1 6 T h e LTTE i s i n v i r t u a l c o n t r o l i n B a t t i c a l o a a c c o r d i n g to Bryan Johnson, a Globe and M a i l correspondent, Globe and  M a i l (January 13, 1987). 1 7 I b i d . 1"Katzenbach and Hanrahan, p. 137. 1 9Wood, p. 18. 2 0 S c o t t G. 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" P o l i t i c s and P o l i t i c a l Development s i n c e 1948," in K.M. de S i l v a (ed.), S r i Lanka - A Survey, pp. 281 -311. Wilson, A. Jeyaratnam. and Dalton, Dennis. The Sta t e s of  South A s i a . London: C. Hurst and Co. (1982). Wood, John R. "Secession: A Comparative A n a l y t i c a l Framework," Canadian J o u r n a l of P o l i t i c a l Science, Volume 14, No. 1 (March 1981), pp. 107-134. Woodward, C a l v i n A. The Growth of a Party System i n Ceylon . Providence: Brown U n i v e r s i t y Press (1969). Wriggins, W. Howard. The R u l e r ' s Imperative. New York: Columbia U n i v e r s i t y Press (1969). Wright ( J r . ) , Theodore P. "South Asian S e p a r a t i s t Movements," i n C o l l e c t e d Seminar Papers on the P o l i t i c s of 207 Separatism (No.19), pp. 5-18. Newspapers and Magazines Far Eastern Economic Review (Hongkong). F r o n t l i n e (Madras). Globe and M a i l (Toronto). Hindu (Madras). Indian Express (Madras). India Today (New D e l h i ) . Lanka Guardian (Colombo). New York Times (New York). S o l d i e r of Fortune. The Economist (London). The Guardian (London and Manchester). The Week (Cochin). Time (Toronto). Times of India (Bombay). Pamphlets Amir Speaks, Madras: TULF P u b l i c a t i o n (August 1984). Dia r y of Combat (1975-1984), Madras: L i b e r a t i o n T i g e r s of Tamil Eelam (December 1984). E e l a Mulakkam ("Thunder from Eelam"), London and Madras: Eelam People's Information Centre (June 1984). Eelam News, London: Eelam People's Information Centre (March 1985). E l l u c h i ("Rise"), Madras: Tamil Eelam L i b e r a t i o n O r g a n i z a t i o n (April-May 1985). Makkalin V i d u t h a l a i a i Venreddupom ("Let us win the people's v i c t o r y " ) , Madras: People's L i b e r a t i o n O r g a n i z a t i o n of Thamil Eelam (January 1985). PLOT b u l l e t i n , Madras: February 1984. Tamil Eeelam Documentation B u l l e t i n , Ottawa: The Tamil Eeelam I n t e r n a t i o n a l Research and Documentation Centre, Volume 208 1, No. 2 (October 1983). TELO - On a M i s s i o n , Madras: Tamil Eelam L i b e r a t i o n O r g a n i z a t i o n . V i d u t h a l a i P u l i h a l ( " L i b e r a t i o n T i g e r s of Tamil Eelam"), Madras: March and May 1984. 209 APPENDIX A  Table 1 Unive r s i t y Admissions 1969/70, 1973 and 1974 1969-70 Sinhalese Tamil Course of Study No. % No. Phy. Sc., Bio-Sc. & 235 69.7 93 27.6 Architecture Engineering 77 51.7 72 48.3 Medicine 112 48.9 112 48.9 Dental Surgery 11 52.4 8 38.1 Agriculture 17 44.7 18 47.4 Vet. Science 5 27.7 12 66.7 TOTAL Science 457 57.7 315 39.8 1973 Phy. Sc., Bio-Sc. & 356 73.1 115 23.6 Architecture Engineering 201 73.1 67 24.4 Medicine 150 58.8 94 36.9 Dental Surgery 25 51.0 23 46.9 Agriculture 41 46.6 45 51.1 Vet. Science 20 87.0 3 13.0 TOTAL Science 793 67.4 347 29.5 1974 Phy. Sc., Bio-Sc. & 511 75.5 146 21.6 Architecture Engineering 223 78.8 46 16.3 Medicine 184 70.0 68 25.9 Dental Surgery 34 69.4 14 28.6 Agriculture 83 83.8 11 11.1 Vet. Science 23 71.9 9 28.1 TOTAL Science 1058 75.4 294 20.9 (Source: CR. de S i l v a , "Sinhala-Tamil Relations and Education i n S r i Lanka: The University Admission Issue - The f i r s t phase 1971- -77," Robert B. Goldmann and A. Jeyaratnam Wilson, From Independenci e to Statehood, pp . 138-139). 210 APPENDIX A Table 2 Advanced Level Marks Required for Each Ethnic Groups to Enter u n i v e r s i t y : 1974 Sinhalese Students Tamil Students Medicine Physics Bio-Science Engineering Veterinary Science Architecture 229 183 175 227 181 180 250 204 184 250 206 194 (Source: Walter Schwarz, The Tamils of S r i Lanka, The Minority Rights Groups Report No. 25 (1986), p. 10). 211 APPENDIX A Table 3 Recruitment to the S r i Lankan Administrative Service Sinhalese Tamil 1970-77 1978-81 1970-77 1977-81 No. % No. % No. % No. % Open Competitive Examination 433 91.5 159 100.0 34 7.2 0 0.0 Limited Competitive 2 0 g ^ 3 g ^ 1 5 > ? 3 ? a Examination Merit Appointment 148 82.2 48 77.4 27 15.0 12 19.4 TOTAL 789 87.4 246 93.5 100 11.1 15 5.7 (Source: M i n i s t r y of Public Administration. Quoted i n S.W.R. de A. Samarasinghe, "Central Government Employment i n S r i Lanka" i n Goldmann and Wilson, From Independence to Statehood, p. 179). 212 APPENDIX B INDO-SRI LANKA AGREEMENT TO ESTABLISH  PEACE AND NORMALCY IN SRI LANKA The Prime Minister of the Republic of India, His Excellency, Mr. Rajiv Gandhi and the President of the Democratic S o c i a l i s t Republic of S r i Lanka, His Excellency Mr. J . R. Jayawardena, having met at Colombo on July 29, 1987. Attaching utmost importance to nurturing, i n t e n s i f y i n g and strength-ening the t r a d i t i o n a l friendship of India and S r i Lanka, and acknowledging the imperative need of reso l v i n g the ethnic problem of S r i Lanka, and the consequent violence and for the safety, well-being and prosperity of people belonging to a l l communities i n S r i Lanka. Have th i s day entered into the following agreement to f u l f i l t h i s objective. In t h i s context: 1.1 Desiring to preserve the unity, sovereignty and t e r r i t o r i a l i n t e g r i t y of S r i Lanka: 1.2 Acknowledging that S r i Lanka i s a multi-ethnic and a m u l t i - l i n g u a l p l u r a l society c o n s i s t i n g , i n t e r a l i a , of Sinhalese, Tamils, Muslims (Moors) and Burghers: 1.3 Recognising that each ethnic group has a d i s t i n c t c u l t u r a l and l i n g u i s t i c i d e n t i t y which has to be c a r e f u l l y nurtured: 1.4 Also recognising that the northern and the eastern provinces have been areas of h i s t o r i c a l h a b i t a t i o n of S r i Lankan Tamil speaking peoples, who have at a l l times hitherto l i v e d together i n t h i s t e r r i t o r y with other ethnic groups: . 213 1.5 Conscious of the necessity of strengthening the forces contributing to the unity, sovereignty and t e r r i t o r i a l i n t e g r i t y of S r i Lanka, and preserving i t s character as a multi-ethnic, m u l t i - l i n g u a l and m u l t i - r e l i g i o u s p l u r a l society, i n which a l l c i t i z e n s can l i v e i n equality, safety and harmony, and prosper and f u l f i l t h e i r a s p i r a t i o n s : 2. RESOLVE THAT: 2.1 Since the government of S r i Lanka proposes to permit adjoining provinces to j o i n to form one administrative unit and also by a referendum to separate as may be permitted to the northern and eastern provinces as outlined below: 2.2 During the period, which s h a l l be considered an interim period ( i . e . from the date of the el e c t i o n s to the p r o v i n c i a l c o u n c i l as s p e c i f i e d i n para 2.8 to the date of the referendum as s p e c i f i e d i n para 2.3, the northern and eastern provinces as now constituted, w i l l form one administrative u n i t , having one elected p r o v i n c i a l c o u n c i l . Such a unit w i l l have one governor, one chief minister and one board of ministers. 2.3 There w i l l be a referendum on or before 31st December, 1988 to enable the people of the eastern province to decide whether: (a) the eastern province should remain linked with the northern province as one administrative unit and continue to be governed together with the northern province as s p e c i f i e d i n para 2.2, or (b) the eastern province should constitute a separate administrative unit having i t s own d i s t r i c t p r o v i n c i a l council with a separate governor chief minister and board of ministers. 214 The President may, at his d i s c r e t i o n decide to postpone such a referendum. 2.4 A l l persons who have been displaced due to ethnic violence, or other reasons, w i l l have the r i g h t to vote i n such a referendum. Necessary conditions to enable them to return to areas from where they were displaced w i l l be created. 2.5 The referendum, when held, w i l l be monitored by a committee headed by the chief j u s t i c e a member appointed by the President, nominated by the government of S r i Lanka and a member appointed by the President, nominated by the representatives of the Tamil speaking people of the eastern province. 2.6 A simple majority w i l l be s u f f i c i e n t to determine the r e s u l t of the referendum. 2.7 Meetings and other forms of propaganda, permissible within the laws of the country w i l l be allowed before the referendum. 2.8 Elections to p r o v i n c i a l councils w i l l be held within the next three months, i n any event before 31st December 1987. Indian observers w i l l be i n v i t e d for elections to the p r o v i n c i a l council of the north and. east. 2.9 The emergency w i l l be l i f t e d i n the eastern and northern provinces by August 15, 1987. Accessation of h o s t i l i t i e s w i l l come into e f f e c t a l l over the i s l a n d within 48 hours of the signing of t h i s agreement. A l l arms presently held by m i l i t a n t groups w i l l be surrendered i n accordance with an agreed procedure to a u t h o r i t i e s to be designated by the government of S r i Lanka. 215 Consequent to the cessation of h o s t i l i t i e s and the surrender of arms by m i l i t a n t groups, the army and other security personnel w i l l be confined to barracks i n camps as on 25 May 1987. The process of surrendering of arms and the confining of security personnel moving back to barracks s h a l l be completed within 72 hours of the cessation of h o s t i l i t i e s coming into e f f e c t . 2.10 The government of S r i Lanka w i l l u t i l i z e for the purpose of law enforcement and maintenance of s e c u r i t y i n the northern and eastern provinces the same organizations and mechanisms of government as are used i n the rest of the country. 2.11 S r i Lanka w i l l grant a general amnesty to p o l i t i c a l and other prisoners now held i n custody under the Prevention of Terrorism Act and other emergency laws, and to combatants, as well as to those persons accused, charged and/or convicted under these laws. The government of S r i Lanka w i l l make s p e c i a l e f f o r t s to r e h a b i l i t a t e m i l i t a n t youth with a view to bringing them back into the mainstream of n a t i o n a l l i f e . India w i l l co-operate i n the process. 2.12 The government of S r i Lanka w i l l accept and abide by the above provisions and expect a l l others to do likewise. 2.13 If the framework for the resolutions i s accepted, the government of S r i Lanka w i l l implement the relevant proposals forthwith. 2.14 The government of India w i l l underwrite and guarantee the re s o l u t i o n s , and co-operate i n the implementation of these proposals. 2.15 These proposals are c o n d i t i o n a l to an acceptance of the proposals negotiated from 4.5.1986 to 19.12.1986. Residual matters not f i n a l i s e d during the above negotiations s h a l l be resolved between India and 216 2.15 S r i Lanka within a period of s i x weeks of signing t h i s agreement. These proposals are also c o n d i t i o n a l to the government of India co-operating d i r e c t l y with the government of S r i Lanka i n t h e i r implementation. 2.16 These proposals are also c o n d i t i o n a l to the government of India taking the following actions i f any m i l i t a n t groups operating i n S r i Lanka do not accept t h i s framework of proposals for a settlement namely, (a) India w i l l take a l l necessary steps to ensure that Indian t e r r i t o r y i s not used for a c t i v i t i e s p r e j u d i c i a l to the unity, i n t e g r i t y and s e c u r i t y of S r i Lanka. (b) The Indian navy/coast guard w i l l co-operate with the S r i Lanka navy i n preventing Tamil m i l i t a n t a c t i v i t i e s from a f f e c t i n g S r i Lanka. (c) In the event that the government of S r i Lanka requests the government of India to a f f o r d m i l i t a r y assistance to implement these proposals the government of India w i l l co-operate by giving to the government of S r i Lanka such m i l i t a r y assistance as and when requested. (d) The government of India w i l l expedite r e p a t r i a t i o n from S r i Lanka of Indian c i t i z e n s to India who are resident there, concurrently with the r e p a t r i a t i o n of S r i Lankan refugees from Tamil Nadu. (e) The governments of India and S r i Lanka w i l l co-operate i n ensuring the physical security and safety of a l l communities inhabiting the northern and eastern provinces. 2.17 The government of S r i Lanka s h a l l ensure free, f u l l and f a i r p a r t i c i -pation of voters from a l l communities i n the northern and eastern 217 2.17 provinces i n e l e c t o r a l processes envisaged i n t h i s agreement. The government of India w i l l extend f u l l co-operation to the government of S r i Lanka i n t h i s regard. 2.18 The o f f i c i a l language of S r i Lanka s h a l l be Sinhala. Tamil and English w i l l also be o f f i c i a l languages. 218 ANNEXURE TO THE AGREEMENT 1. His Excellency the Prime Minister of India and His Excellency the President of S r i Lanka agree that the referendum mentioned i n paragraph 2 and i t s sub-paragraphs of the Agreement w i l l be observed by a Representative of the e l e c t i o n commission of India to be i n v i t e d by His Excellency the President of S r i Lanka. 2. S i m i l a r l y both Heads of Government agree that the elec t i o n s to the p r o v i n c i a l c o u n c i l mentioned i n paragraph 2.8 of the Agreement w i l l be observed by a Representative of the Government of India to be i n v i t e d by the President of S r i Lanka. 3. His Excellency the President of S r i Lanka agrees that the home guards would be disbanded and a l l para m i l i t a r y personnel w i l l be with-drawn from the eastern and northern provinces with a view to creating conditions conducive to f a i r e lections to the co u n c i l . The President i n his d i s c r e t i o n s h a l l absorb such para m i l i t a r y forces which came into being due to ethnic violence into the regular security forces of S r i Lanka. 4. The Prime Minister of India and the President of S r i Lanka agree that the Tamil m i l i t a n t s s h a l l surrender t h e i r arms to a u t h o r i t i e s agreed upon to be designated by the President of S r i Lanka. The surrender s h a l l take place i n the presence of one senior Representative each of the S r i Lanka Red Cross and the Indian Red Cross. 5. The Prime Minister of India and the President of S r i Lanka agree that a j o i n t Indo-Sri Lankan observer group con s i s t i n g of q u a l i f i e d representatives of the Government of India and the Government of S r i Lanka would monitor the cessation of h o s t i l i t i e s from 31 July 1987. 219 6. The Prime Minister of India and the President of S r i Lanka also agree that i n terms of paragraph 2.14 and paragraph 2.16(C) of the Agreement an Indian peace keeping contingent may be i n v i t e d by the President of S r i Lanka to guarantee and enforce the cessation of h o s t i -l i t i e s i f so required. Prime Minister of India New Delhi July 29, 1987 Excellency: Conscious of the friendship between our two countries s t r e t c h i n g over two m i l l e n i a and more and recognizing the importance of nurturing t h i s t r a d i t i o n a l friendship i t i s imperative that both S r i Lanka and India r e a f f i r m the decision not to allow our respective t e r r i t o r i e s to be used for a c t i v i t i e s p r e j u d i c i a l to each other's u n i t y - t e r r i t o r i a l i n t e g r i t y and s e c u r i t y . In t h i s s p i r i t you had during the course of our discussions, agreed to meet some of India's concerns as follows: (1) Your Excellency and myself w i l l reach an early understanding about the relevance and employment of foreign m i l i t a r y and i n t e l l i g e n c e personnel with a view to ensuring that such presences w i l l not prejudice Indo-Sri Lankan r e l a t i o n s . (2) Trincomalee or any other ports i n S r i Lanka w i l l not be made avai l a b l e for m i l i t a r y use by any country i n a manner p r e j u d i c i a l to India's i n t e r e s t s . (3) The work of r e s t o r i n g and operating the Trincomalee o i l tank farm w i l l be undertaken as a j o i n t venture between India and S r i Lanka. (4) S r i Lanka's agreement with foreign broadcasting organizations w i l l be reviewed to ensure that any f a c i l i t i e s set up by them i n S r i Lanka are used s o l e l y as public broadcasting f a c i l i t i e s and not for any m i l i t a r y or i n t e l l i g e n c e purposes. 220 In the same s p i r i t India w i l l , (1) Deport a l l S r i Lankan c i t i z e n s who are found to be engaging i n t e r r o r i s t a c t i v i t i e s or advocating separatism or secessionism. (2) Provide t r a i n i n g f a c i l i t i e s and m i l i t a r y supplies f or S r i Lankan sec u r i t y forces. India and S r i Lanka have agreed to set up a j o i n t consulatative mechanism to continuously review matter of common concern i n the l i g h t of the objectives stated i n paragraph 1 and s p e c i f i c a l l y to monitor the implementation of other matters contained i n t h i s l e t t e r . Kindly confirm Excellency that the above c o r r e c t l y sets out the Agreement reached between us. Yours s i n c e r e l y , Rajiv Gandhi 

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