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Secessionist guerrillas : a study of violent Tamil insurrection in Sri Lanka, 1972-1987 Ravindran, Santhanam 1988

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SECESSIONIST GUERRILLAS: A STUDY OF VIOLENT TAMIL INSURRECTION IN SRI LANKA, 1972-1987 by SANTHANAM RAVINDRAN B.A., University Of Peradeniya, 1981  A THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF MASTER OF ARTS in THE FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIES Department of P o l i t i c a l Science  We accept t h i s thesis as conforming to the required standard  THE UNIVERSITY OF BRITISH COLUMBIA February 1988  @  Santhanam Ravindran, 1988  In  presenting  this  degree at the  thesis  University  in partial of  freely available for reference copying  of  department publication  this or of  fulfilment of  his  or  and  her  representatives.  Science  The University of British Columbia 1956 Main Mall Vancouver, Canada V6T 1Y3 Date  DE-6G/81)  purposes may  this thesis for financial gain  Political  February 29,  1988  for an  be It  shall not  granted  is be  advanced  Library shall make it  study. I further agree that permission  permission.  Department of  requirements  British Columbia, I agree that the  thesis for scholarly by  the  by  understood  the that  for extensive head  of  my  copying  or  allowed without my  written  ABSTRACT  In  Sri  within of  a quarter  Eelam.  and  1970s and  island.  the  demand  century  Tamil  Indian i n t e r v e n t i o n  s e c e s s i o n i s t war  nationalism the  has  post-October is  demand f o r  state  f a r from  temporarily  state  Sinhala-Buddhist  integration arrested  developments  over and  turned  g a t h e r e d momentum d u r i n g  political  1987  has  the independent  s e t i n motion by emerging  which t h r e a t e n e d  But  for a federal  into a  resultant  1980s  Today  Tamils'  of s e c e s s i o n  of d i s i n t e g r a t i o n . the  the  of a  Forces  chauvinism the  Lanka,  of  the  the  process  illustrate  that  secession s t i l l  remains  a  real  possibility. This To  thesis  focuses  b e t t e r understand  insurrection, the  system emergence given  Sri  three  Sri  Lankan  of  Lanka.  Tamil  main  to  have had  Tamil  major  of T a m i l  actors  impact  f o r the  in  and  armed  Tamils  the  has  the the  diverse  - i i-  to  together  the have  However,  struggle — with  the the  T i g e r s of T a m i l Eelam  on the v i c i s s i t u d e s of the T a m i l  insurrection.  majority  factors  movements.  government  to  political  contributed  secessionist  Liberation  leading  of  secessionist  the  secessionist  and  failure  Further,  Indian c e n t r a l Nadu  T a m i l armed seee68ienism.»  T a m i l demands  armed s e c e s s i o n i s m . the growth  of  " preconditions  consistent  the b a s i c  government, the  a  the  the m i n o r i t y  The  political  s t a t e government of —  responsible  between  accommodate  impetus  the  the f o r c e s  conflict  in to  phenomenon  t h i s , t h e s i s -'analyzes  violent  Sinhalese  on the  secessionist  TABLE  OF  CONTENTS Page  ABSTRACT  i i  TABLE OF CONTENTS  i i i  LIST OF FIGURES  v  (  ACKNOWLEDGEMENT CHAPTER ONE:  vi  A THEORETICAL APPROACH TO A SECESSIONIST CONFLICT  . .  S r i Lanka: background to the e t h n i c c o n f l i c t T h e o r e t i c a l P e r s p e c t i v e on S e c e s s i o n i s t V i o l e n c e  1 3 16  CHAPTER TWO: THE EMERGENCE OF A SECESSIONIST CONFLICT IN SRI LANKA'S MAJORITARIAN DEMOCRACY  51  P o l i t i c i z a t i o n o f E t h n i c i t y and Growing T a m i l A l i e n a t i o n , 1931-1970  53  I n s t i t u t i o n a l i z a t i o n o f E t h n i c i t y and the R i s e o f a S e c e s s i o n i s t C h a l l e n g e , 1970-1977  57  The ' C a r r o t and S t i c k ' E t h n i c P o l i c y o f the UNP: of the S e c e s s i o n i s t C h a l l e n g e 1977-1982 .  67  Consolidation  A C a t a l y s t to S e c e s s i o n i s t C o n f l i c t - The 1983 R i o t s CHAPTER THREE: ORGANIZATIONS  83  THE DEVELOPMENT OF TAMIL SECESSIONIST GUERRILLA 99  Pre-1983 Developments  99  L i b e r a t i o n T i g e r s o f T a m i l Eelam (LTTE)  101  T a m i l Eelam L i b e r a t i o n O r g a n i z a t i o n  115  (TELO)  P e o p l e s ' L i b e r a t i o n o f T a m i l Eelam (PLOTE), Eelam R e v o l u t i o n a r y O r g a n i z a t i o n (EROS) and Eelam P e o p l e ' s R e v o l u t i o n a r y L i b e r a t i o n F r o n t (EPRLF)  117  Post-1983 Developments  121  T a m i l Eelam L i b e r a t i o n O r g a n i z a t i o n  (TELO)  122  P e o p l e s ' L i b e r a t i o n o f T a m i l Eelam (PLOTE), Eelam P e o p l e ' s R e v o l u t i o n a r y L i b e r a t i o n F r o n t (EPRLF) and Eelam R e v o l u t i o n a r y O r g a n i z a t i o n (EROS)  128  L i b e r a t i o n T i g e r s of T a m i l Eelam (LTTE)  134  I n d o - S r i Lanka Peace Accord CHAPTER FOUR:  . . . .  - J u l y 1987  140  ANALYZING TAMIL SECESSIONISM IN SRI LANKA:  SOME  TENTATIVE CONCLUSIONS  152  BIBLIOGRAPHY  202  .  APPENDIX A: Table  1: U n i v e r s i t y Admissions 1969/70, 1973 and 1974  Table 2: Advanced L e v e l Marks Required f o r Each E t h n i c Groups to E n t e r U n i v e r s i t y Table 3: Recruitment to the S r i Lankan A d m i n i s t r a t i v e Service . - iii  -  .  209 210 211  TABLE  OF  CONTENTS, c o n t ' d . Page  APPENDIX B:  INDO-SRI LANKA AGREEMENT TO ESTABLISH PEACE AND NORMALCY IN SRI LANKA  212  ANNEXURE TO THE AGREEMENT  218  - iv -  LIST  OF FIGURES Page  MAP 1: Sri Lanka MAP 2:  Sri Lanka — dry zones  4 the districts and boundaries of the wet and 5  MAP 3: Sri Lanka — main Tamil areas  8  MAP 4: Tamil Eelam .  15  MAP 5: Jaffna Peninsula  103  MAP 6: Density of Population of Jaffna District by A.G.A.'s Division - 1981  103  MAP 7: Tamil Eelam as claimed by the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam  104  - v-  ACKNOWLEDGEMENT  I would l i k e t o thank, P r o f . John R.  Wood  f o r h i s guidance,  encouragement,  patience  and c r i t i c i s m P r o f s . Diane Mouzy and  comments  The  University  and  of  Tissa  British  Fernando  Columbia  f o r t h e i r suggestions  for i t s  financial  assistance Appa and Amma Puvana  for  for her  their  love,  moral  support  understanding  - vi-  and  and  encouragement  typing.  1  CHAPTER  ONE  A THEORETICAL APPROACH TO A SECESSIONIST CONFLICT  This i s a p o l i t i c a l - d i p l o m a t i c accord between India and S r i Lanka involving the f o r e i g n p o l i c y of S r i L a n k a . B e c a u s e p o w e r f u l c o u n t r i e s have d e c i d e d t o do that we are u n a b l e t o do a n y t h i n g . Many l i v e s have been s a c r i f i c e d . U n f o r t u n a t e l y we have been f o r c e d t o come t o t h i s [ s u r r e n d e r ] . 1  With  these  Prabakaran, Liberation year  old  has  the Tigers  Tamil  (albeit  altered  society:  armed  demands  the  war  struggle  in  the  represented  remarkable pressure  Prabakaran  accepted  the  imposed  the  J u l y peace t r e a t y which s a t i s f i e d of  Indian  Sri  by  minority regional  Indian-inspired  geo-political  (Finlandization  surrender  Jayewardene,  For  government  increasingly  vital  treaty.  Lankan  reasons,  o f S r i Lankan  victory for a  of S r i L a n k a , J.R.  which  by t h e S r i Lankan  t o accommodate  the  war  "end" o f t h e T a m i l  submission  power. B o t h t h e P r e s i d e n t grudgingly  and  voluntary  political  the  b r o u g h t a b o u t an  public  rare  the  fifteen-  establish  fabric  c o u n t r y . The a  an e x t r a o r d i n a r y  to  but savage  socio-political  of  o f f the  surrender  the  Vellupillai  commander  (LTTE) c a l l e d  has b r u t a l i z e d  a  1987,  military  guerrilla  basic  to external  and  5,  t e m p o r a r y ) end t o a s h o r t  guerrillas,  government  and  o f T a m i l Eelam  democracy  secessionist  August  s t a t e of Eelam. T h i s  t h e war  undermined  on  chairman  secessionist  separate abrupt  words,  peace  government  neither  Lanka)  and  the S r i  nor  the  2  guerrillas  (failure  prowess f o r c e d Tamils'  the  major  guerrillas  of  the  secessionist  S r i Lankan  demands  to accept  government  and  3  the  war).  also  unitary  to  compelled  character  Indian m i l i t a r y  2  of  accommodate the  the  secessionist  the  Sri  Lankan  polity.• Today, moved in  complete two  of  S r i Lankan army c u s t o d y  east.  6  The  passive  killed  Indian  until  the  LTTE on  peace t r e a t y .  Tamil  battle  guerrilla  warfare,  guerrilla Jaffna  by  In  the  south,  bitter  had  i n order  the  the  played  a  killings, to  resistance  salvage  from  the  high  I n d i a n army, unaccustomed t o  urban  failed  and  bloody,  refugees  of  the the  has to  the  destroy  slipped  out  war-torn  warfare against  the  a of  town.  survived  promised  8  Tamil  LTTE as  leadership  LTTE has  the  the  f l e e i n g the  LTTE  civilians.  alienated  successfully  the  guerrilla  east.  in  with  guerrillas  hit-and-run  n o r t h and  little  offensive  Meanwhile  retaliation,  civilian  peninsula  while  for a lightning m i l i t a r y v i c t o r y .  was  also  core  assault.  classical the  has  mixing with the  which  is  treaty  suicide  In  committed a t r o c i t i e s a g a i n s t  f o r c e . The  t h i s way,  Indian  in  and  5  the  Sinhalese c i v i l i a n s  large-scale  hoped  Indian m i l i t a r y  population  1987.  force  peace a c c o r d  repudiated  force,  Jaffna  The  July  commanders c o m m i t t e d  expected  7  the  guerrillas  in October,  the  for Jaffna  casualties.  Thus t h e  treaty,  the  and  civilian  Indian peace-keeping  h u n d r e d s of  India  guerrillas  the  the  peace-keeping  role  challenged  In  under the  their regional  guerrillas  But  after  shambles. T a m i l  the  the  months  i n t o S r i Lanka  after in  six  to c a r r y Indian  9  the out army  1 0  government has  been  unable  to  contain  3  the  occasional  perceived  members of  ' since  Furthermore, the  majority.  the  to expel is  while  being  affairs  failure  bring out  Indian  drawn  suggests  Lanka  miles  situated  Palk  Strait  at  Lankan around  1825,  continent.  has  and  The  1 2  back t o S o u t h  place  of  both  final  British  the  accord  this  time,  environment, internal  r e s t o r e order  soon  well  over.  an  area  India  of  square  (see maps 1 and  from I n d i a by fifth  25,232  twenty-two  century  B.C.,  phase of  brought  major  from  South  the  Furthermore,  religions  of  Sri  India  miles  day  Indian migration  indentured  Sri  began Indian  highlands.  Indian  is  2).  periodic  of t h e m a j o r i t y of Moors can 1 3  turn  conflict  S i n h a l e s e came  India.  and  v i o l e n c e , however,  the p l a n t a t i o n s i n the c e n t r a l  the  1 1  Sinhalese  explosive  i s f a r from  t i p of  the  1987.  formed the m a j o r i t y of t h e p r e s e n t  ancestry  traced  the  S r i Lanka c o u l d  with  S r i Lanka  been  forces to p r o t e c t  continued  war  island  p o i n t . Since  t o work on  The  I n d i a can  southern  when t h e  Both the T a m i l s  have  i s l a n d . At  the  the  instance,  July,  unsympathetic  into  to the e t h n i c  the  population.  labourers  extremely  secessionist  separates  migration  in  angered  from t h e  settlement,  i s a small  i t s narrowest  Indian  troops  V i e t n a m . The  Lanka: background Sri  For  Party  signed  i n t h e e a s t has  increasingly  India's  t h a t the  National  was  S r i Lanka. Unless  be  interests.  of t h e p e a c e - k e e p i n g  i n an  about a p o l i t i c a l to  Sri  the  violence against  been a g r o w i n g demand t o r e j e c t  operating  of  the U n i t e d accord  T h e r e has  India  at  the  Sinhalese c i v i l i a n s  and  anti-government  b e t r a y a l of S i n h a l a - B u d d h i s t  thirty-eight killed  Sinhala  the  sub-  also  be  birth  L a n k a , Buddhism  and  MAP  1  Kanhcunrura.  S r i  L a n k a  St. Annas  Rj«maj//'  paha N j ^ u r t t . v a " V - A ^ V ^ . *u~an*v«U /]  8jdu(l  Co torn bo*  Cj?ortuvi< i N a k t u U  M o r a t u w v a :  )P3fUnu | m a  —  .  l=*BtnTQX2\  iMjdamp* <  (UltWaniV Ca^  S  A  Kaurj^aina  —  ' 'Lterlt  i*i%ts  yiYalj K.nrToi- u rr«r S « o e i himtunCflU  ""otl Source:  S. Ponnambalam, S r i Lanka: The N a t i o n a l Question and.the Tamil L i b e r a t i o n S t r u g g l e , p. 268.  MAP  Source:  2  James Jupp, S r i Lanka - T h i r d World Democracy. London: Frank Cass (1978), p. i v .  6  Hinduism.  Therefore,  developments  on  p r o x i m i t y of Sri  the  island  society.  Sinhalese constitute with  forming  among  The  1 4  the  population Muslims  of the  the  Sinhalese largest  the  the  The  regions:  the  Mullaitivu island  their  The  1 5  and  The  Tamils  and  east 1 6  by  the  1981  Malays  the  census,  7%.  The  seven of  of  and  Hence t h e T a m i l s  an  balance others  with  Tamils  the 69%  of  Christians  not  the and  are  the  extended  i n the  districts  Batticaloa The  a are  and  small  Tamil-  Sinhala-dominated  central  Tamils  province  (Jaffna,  The  their million  live  Tamils  people  two  Vavunia, of  claim  traditional  largest  in  east coast  the the  homeland.  i n the  n e a r , p r e d o m i n a n c e of the  a  (up-country)  Lankan  2.1  in  Moors p r e d o m i n a t e i n  t h e more f e r t i l e  the  are  absolute majority in  other  Batticaloa).  with  14.8  (0.3%) and  is  these  enjoy  Sri  northern  of  the  Sinhalese are m i n o r i t i e s in e i g h t  A m p a r a i . The  65%  of  Sinhala-Buddhists  Trincomalee.  and  and  predominance  e a s t e r n p r o v i n c e s as  together,  multi-ethnic,  population  Hindu,  Tamils  Mannar) and  comprise  the  majority,  Mullaitivu  majority  (Trincomalee  northern  north.  and  a  t h e Moors a t  is  is situated  arid  of  total  the  15.5%  in  district,  to  (0.3%),  districts;  east.  dominated d i s t r i c t province.  and  i s l a n d . The  advantage  seventh  determined  m i n o r i t y group. Approximately  J a f f n a , Mannar, V a v u n i a , numerical  18%  are  but  twenty-four  n o r t h and  the  each. C l e a r l y ,  group,  over  example  of  Burgers  form 7.5%  evenly  at  i s Buddhist,  predominant  largely  According  74%  the T a m i l s  divided  (0.2%).  were  Lanka p r o v i d e s a c l a s s i c  million  ethno-cultural-religious  India.  multi-religious  is  historical  86%  minority  north i n the with  a  7  "home-territory" However, island, group the  i n S r i Lanka despite  their  overwhelming  the Sinhalese consider i n the larger  shadow o f f i f t y  Indian  state,  a  million  a  Indian Tamils  mere twenty-two m i l e s  race  with  Sinhalese  f e a r of Tamil  modern  themselves  majority  a  minority  on  minority  r e g i o n a l c o n t e x t . The S i n h a l e s e ,  majority  into  ( s e e map 3 ) .  in  ethnic  living in  Tamil  Nadu  from S r i L a n k a ) ,  complex.  The  i n v a s i o n and e x p a n s i o n  the  (an are a  centuries-old  has c a r r i e d  over  S r i L a n k a . A s p e e c h made by a S i n h a l e s e Member o f  Parliament  (MP) i l l u s t r a t e s  insecurity  vis-a-vis  the S i n h a l e s e  general  feeling  of  the Tamils:  In this country the problem of the Tamils i s not a m i n o r i t y p r o b l e m . The S i n h a l e s e a r e t h e m i n o r i t y i n Dravidastan. We a r e c a r r y i n g on a s t r u g g l e f o r o u r national existence against the Dravidastan majority. 17  This  Sinhala  insecurity  has  been  exacerbated  emergence o f t h e m i l i t a n t  nationalist  (DMK) a s t h e r u l i n g  party  i n Tamil  Nadu  and  Tamils'  identification  with  the Tamils  Palk  continued  firm  Dhammadipa  belief  the  Kazhagam  S r i Lankan across the  of t h e S i n h a l e s e t h a t S r i Lanka  Sinhalese)  has  S r i Lanka  considered  shaped  superior  belonged  the  non-indigenous Sinhalese  is  ( l a n d o f t h e Buddha's dharma) and S i n h a d i p a  m i n o r i t y . These r e i n f o r c i n g that  Munnetra  the  Strait. The  the  Dravida  by  Tamils  their  p e r c e p t i o n s developed  t o t h e S i n h a l e s e . Hence and o t h e r  intruders into  have Aryans  fostered (from  perception  the  ( l a n d of  the  Tamil  into a notion the  Sinhalese  m i n o r i t y e t h n i c g r o u p s t o be  S r i Lanka. idea  north-west  of  both  1 8  Furthermore,  that  they  India)  to  are  the  racially  differentiate  9  themselves  from  differences  have been p e r p e t u a t e d  early  h i s t o r y of As  Indian  a  the  the  result  of  Buddhist  British  the  the  i d e n t i t y . The  economic  and  the  Buddhist  resurgence.  of  nationalists  political  ethnic  language,  rule  all  S r i Lanka  the  the  of  South  up-country  dormant  Sinhala-  Buddhism,  together  its  ability  t o cope w i t h  historical  Sri  elites.  administrative Sinhalese,  determined  to  bound  most  empire,  political the  and  absence weakened  the  redress  minority  Tamils  economic d e v e l o p m e n t s  polity.  At  power was  t r a n s f e r r e d to  Tamils  enjoyed to  their  vernacular-educated economic  and  the  the  issues. the  of  nationalism  ethnic  disproportionate  particularly  unlike  explosive  However,  power  Hence,  identity.  of  Not  9  under  i n S r i Lanka  perception  1  emerged  groups  Lankan  independence, e f f e c t i v e  life.  differences. Later,  influenced p o l i t i c a l  post-independent  of  threatened  ethnic  Sinhala  for  distorted  who  which  British  in  Sinhala-Buddhist  aliens way  dynamics  the  emerging  their  the  the  on  nationalism  reinforced ethnic  significantly  back  movement  groups a g a i n s t  a common bond among the  were  settlement in  of  as  and  where  of  Sinhala  and  a Sinhala-Buddhist  s i t u a t i o n in India  The  racial  myths s u r r o u n d i n g  provided  the  others  nationalist  took  ethnic  Falling  religion  the  fields,  identities,  perceived  surprisingly,  in  These  i n c r e a s i n g l y d i s p r o p o r t i o n a l number of n o n - B u d d h i s t s  perception  diverse  importation  declining status  the  the  the  c o l o n i z a t i o n reawakened the  an  British  by  Tamils.  Kandyan S i n h a l e s e  with  their  Dravidian  island.  Tamils amidst  regions,  minority  the  time  in of the  economic  and  number.  The  middle  class,  administrative  10  anomalies  through  Counter-elites, the  above  determinant  their  in their  newly  quest  class.  Elite  of t h e  success  became  powerful  multi-ethnic the e t h n i c Sri  mire.  the  pressure. Ethnic identity  to  win  her  opposition  challenge  to  ruling  the Tamil Congress  which  followed  Tamils  a  pursued  the  by  Citizenship  and  not  oppose  prominent  in  l e d by  D.S.  the  Act  of  1949, 1949.  and 2 2  lawyer,  split  t h e main  UNP  policy  towards  Senanayaike,  the  The  legislations. resigned  from  But the  the first  government  through  the  Pakistan  Residents  Parliamentary  Election  government d e n i e d  middle-class  Tamil  developed  t h e UNP  workers  I n d i a n and the  to  government,  citizenship  t o a t e n t h of t h e p o p u l a t i o n t h r o u g h  e n a c t m e n t s . The these  leftists,  r e s p e c t t o the e t h n i c  First,  1948,  first  this period  major c o n t r o v e r s i e s  relationship.  The  the  the  1948,  accommodative  of  franchise rights  legislative  this  1948.  deeply  the  with  plantation  of  too  joined  Tamil  Act  from  In A u g u s t ,  the  ( C i t i z e n s h i p ) Act (Amendment)  came  policy  an  4,  dominated  were  (TC),  t h e UNP  Tamil-Sinhala  disenfranchised  in  and  were t r a p p e d  period. During  UNP  P r i m e M i n i s t e r of S r i L a n k a , two in  (UNP)  who  secular  Despite  2 1  the  party.  party,  minorities.  power  i n d e p e n d e n c e on F e b r u a r y  Communists,  the  political  major S i n h a l a p a r t i e s  y e a r s of t h e p o s t - i n d e p e n d e n c e  T r o t s k y i t e s and  democracy,  2 0  Lanka g a i n e d  main  for  been a major  of t h e W e s t m i n s t e r - s t y l e  conservative United National Party eight  power.  messiahs  accommodation, which had  tools  s o c i e t y . The  political  f o r power, became  b r o k e down under S i n h a l a - B u d d h i s t ties  achieved  conservative  TC  these did  S.J.V. C h e l v a n a y a g a m , a TC  to  protest  its  11  indifference  t o p l a n t a t i o n T a m i l s a n d formed t h e F e d e r a l  ( F P ) . S e c o n d , t h e UNP government colonization  initiated  i n the s p a r s e l y populated  changed t h e demographic c o m p o s i t i o n homeland. and  For instance,  2 3  Trincomalee  respectively words, t h e increase  of  the  while  in  T a m i l s and S i n h a l e s e  created  tensions  In  1951,  realizing  the  percentage  sensing class, The  he  the  a  in  brought  senior  UNP  member,  t h e UNP l e a d e r s h i p , a n d  (SLFP).  " m i d d l e of t h e r o a d "  alternative  Highly  SLFP was  i n 1953 a c c e l e r a t e d  Westernized,  constitution  languages.  2 5  advocated  to  in  viewed  make  twenty-four  its  to  promised  nationalism. both  to  own  a  ascendancy SLFP's  bid  win make  Tamil  He p r o m i s e d and  Sinhala  i n the Sinhala two-language  electoral Sinhala  hours of forming  UNP a l s o a d o p t e d a S i n h a l a - o n l y  the  as  K o t e l a w a l a was i n s e n s i t i v e t o  Because o p p o s i t i o n  Sinhala-only  Bandaranaike  soon  t o t h e UNP. J o h n K o t e l a w a l a ' s  was t r e m e n d o u s , t h e SLFP d r o p p e d  language  increase  and s u b s e q u e n t l y  of the S i n h a l a  needs o f e m e r g i n g S i n h a l a - B u d d h i s t  south.  of  an  t h e UNP t o form t h e S r i Lanka Freedom P a r t y  t o amend t h e  and  registered  middle-  power.  official  In o t h e r  groups.  secure  i n the pulse  to t h e prime m i n i s t e r s h i p for  not  2fl  rural  populist  moderate  Tamil  in Batticaloa  colonization  contact  Bandaranaike,  could  a frustration left  into greater  between t h e s e e t h n i c  S.W.R.D.  that  traditional  Batticaloa  T r i n c o m a l e e was 262%. The s t a t e - s p o n s o r e d the  which  s u b s t a n t i a l l y , from 31,174 and 15,296  population  202%  Sinhala  province,  1953 t o 94,150 and 55,308 i n 1 9 7 1 .  Sinhala of  eastern  t h e number o f S i n h a l e s e  increased  in  large-scale  Party  support the  south policy i n the  official  t h e g o v e r n m e n t . The  p o l i c y t o boost  i t s declining  1 2  electoral lost  fortunes  its  credibility  v o t e r s . The The Sri  result  1956  Tamil  the and  Marxist  methods  to  (passive new  was  the  The  FP,  east,  Sinhala  strong  opposition  FP  determined the  Sinhalese Tamil attempt  t o c a r r y out  government  to  extensively  i n May, quell  August  1958,  Tamils  and  ethnic  but  the  the  c o u l d not  post-1956  hostilities  31  mob  the Tamil  Sinhalese.  meet  its  the  basic  eastern province with  the  resistance ignited  B a n d a r a n a i k e was which,  Tamil-Sinhala Language bridge  the  of  power  Pact). the  1958.  2 9  ,  UNP The  3 0  struggle  from  i t . The-  major  anti-  indecisive  in h i s  as  a  result,  relationship.  (special  2 8  leader,  monks and  concessions  the  1957.  FP  extended n o n - v i o l e n t  violence  in  in  devolution  in A p r i l ,  Tamil  satyagraha  anti-Tamil riots  extract  the  electoral  to the T a m i l  pact  2 6  extra-parliamentary  Buddhist  the an  Tamil  1958.  damaged  government p a s s e d  The  to  response t o the  riots  first  from  1956.  Bandaranaike  (Bandaranaike-Chelvanayagam  Bandaranaike to abrogate  against  to  UNP  post-independent  from  safeguards,  forced was  in  d e s p i t e p r o t e s t s from  agreement  linguistic  c o l o n i z a t i o n i n 1957 the  an  in  the  Sinhalese  f o r the UNP  r e s o r t e d to  i n the  and  promised,  reaction  at Gal-Oya  on  Tamils  fresh  Bandaranayaike  Prime M i n i s t e r r e a c h e d  Chelvanayagam,  i n the p r o c e s s ,  As  legislation  r e s i s t a n c e ) l e d to the  settlements  But  both  development.  n o r t h and  Violent  27  But  a turning point  parties.  force  south.  a crushing defeat  Sinhala-only  i n the  and  was  election  success  demands.  the among  Lanka's p o l i t i c a l  passed  The  in  p r o v i s i o n ) Act  w i d e n i n g g u l f between  The in the  3 2  period across  witnessed the c o u n t r y .  the  intensification  Ironically,  of  Bandaranaike  13  was  shot  dead  by  a Buddhist  formed a m i n o r i t y government SLFP  i n March  refused to accept  contained  in  FP  an u n d e r s t a n d i n g  reached  which  with  the  t h e SLFP, now  the Bandaranaike-Chelvanayagam P a c t .  the  of  rigorous  Sinhala-only policy. to  attempted  Tamil  areas.  FP.  in  demands  resorted  major  would meet t h e T a m i l  formed a m a j o r i t y government  the  1960. The FP  helped  Tamil  the Bandaranaike-Chelvanayagam Pact  Bandaranaike,  and  1959. The UNP the  t o b r i n g down t h e government, when D u d l e y S e n a n a y a k e , t h e  l e a d e r o f t h e UNP,  of  monk i n September  civil  The  disobedience  to e s t a b l i s h  a  Sirimavo  demands on t h e b a s i s  1960  and  frustrated  ignored  used  FP  once  civil  Tamil  areas.  disobedience  The FP f a i l e d  3 6  but  continued  r i g h t s and d e c e n t r a l i z a t i o n . parliamentary The  formed  the  government  an agreement w i t h D u d l e y  Tamil  language  and  district  Bandaranaike-Chelvanayagam Tamil  (CWC), e x t e n d e d  Pact.  organization, their  support  M. T i r u c h e l v a m ,  the passage of the T a m i l government  demand  passed  in  March  for  TC  Ceylon  was a p p o i n t e d  support f o r language  role  in  implement  clauses  FP,  the  the  the  1965. The FP  to  council  the  the  i n December 1964.  Senanayake  The  over  Tamil  The FP p l a y e d a major  reached  senator,  to sustain  d e f e a t of t h e SLFP government  UNP  plantation  to  in  power t o c r u s h  n o n - v i o l e n t p r o t e s t and r e - a s s e r t e d i t s c o n t r o l  traditional  again  i n 1961,  administration  i t s military  the  implemented a  i n t h e n o r t h and e a s t  parallel  The government  3 5  l e d by  M o r e o v e r , h e r government  3 0  o f 1957. The  But M r s . B a n d a r a n a i k e  3 3  July  demands  in  and  the  Workers'  government.  the the main  Congress The  FP  t o the c a b i n e t . Through  R e g u l a t i o n Act i n January,  the language p r o v i s i o n s i n the  1966,  the  Bandaranaike-  14  C h e l v a n a y a g a m P a c t . However, t h e SLFP and  i t s Marxist  partners  betrayal  s t r o n g l y opposed the  interests. within to  Mounting  3 7  and  without  withdraw  afterwards,  the  the  United  in  withdrew the  council  (LSSP) and  a  parliamentary  three-fourths  enabled  t h e government  such  as  the  standardization  Republican  of  resources  on  any  extra-parliamentary  among t h e T a m i l s The  FP,  TC  May  root The  1976 in  UNP  was  and  (TULF) w i t h an in  an  July,  policies,  the  government"also  United  for  secession.  a  fresh  meet  the  emerging  after  i n d e p e n d e n c e , S r i Lanka  was  Front  i t s objective  registered  However, t h e UNP's e t h n i c p o l i c y  faced  crushed  Liberation  m i l i t a n c y and  relations.  secessionist  the  distribution  f o r armed s e c e s s i o n  promised  obtained  1972,  S t a t e , Eelam, as  Jayewardene, which 1977,  Lanka  huge m a j o r i t y  of  a demand  formed the T a m i l  4). A c a l l  the  The  i t s authority. Alienation  f o l l o w e d by  p e r i o d of e s c a l a t i n g  under J.R. in  resistance to  independent Tamil  ( s e e map  this  victory  CWC  Constitution  1970.  (CP),  This  and  rhetoric  i n May  pro-Sinhala-Buddhist  admission,  Shortly  government.  Party  majority.  e t h n i c b a s i s . The  soon  1968.  t h e SLFP,  t h e Communist  t o adopt  of u n i v e r s i t y  f o r t h e UNP  both  Senanayake  anti-Tamil  comprising  Sama Samaja P a r t y  in  Sinhala  from  Dudley  f o r the  SLFP's p o p u l a r  (UF), a c o a l i t i o n  of  pressure  bill  i t s support  a h u m i l i a t i n g defeat  Front  a  Sinhala-Buddhist  district  t h e FP  as  government c o m p e l l e d  Economic woes and resulted  bill  coalition  also  took  frustration. a  landslide  start  in ethnic  inadequate  c h a l l e n g e . Only disintegration.  four  to  decades  MAP  Source:  4  S. Ponnambalam, S r i Lanka: The N a t i o n a l Question and the T a m i l L i b e r a t i o n S t r u g g l e . London: Zed Books L t d . (1983), p. i x .  16  Major  Questions Several  of  major q u e s t i o n s a r e r a i s e d by t h i s  brief  summary  events: (a) What were  hostility  between  (b)  Why  the f a c t o r s  t h e T a m i l s and  were  created  and i n t e n s i f i e d t h e  Sinhalese?  the S i n h a l e s e  demands o f t h e T a m i l (c) What  that  unwilling  t o accommodate  the  minority?  f a c t o r s drove the  Tamils  to  develop  guerrilla  movements? (d)  How  secessionist containing  Why  the  Sri  challenge?  secession  Theoretical This  did  How  on s e c e s s i o n i s t  and  how  does  framework a i m e d a t e x p l a i n i n g the f o l l o w i n g  (a) resort  to  Why  did  their  react  does  t o the  strategy  for  violence  f o c u s e s on t h e phenomenon of armed  does i t a r i s e  posing  far  government  succeed?  perspective thesis  Lankan  it  armed  operate?  secession  A  may  secession. theoretical  be d e r i v e d  by  questions: a  territorially-based  alienated  minority  violence?  (b) What  f a c t o r s determine  the  outcome  of  secessionist,  warfare? (c) their  struggle What  made  What  (1)  against  i s armed  between  necessary  strategies  do s e c e s s i o n i s t  the c e n t r a l  g u e r r i l l a s adopt i n  government?  secessionism? F i r s t ,  a distinction  s e c e s s i o n i s m and s e p a r a t i s m . T h i s  f o r two  must  be  distinction is  reasons:  The demands of a l i e n a t e d  minorities  may  take e i t h e r  a  17  secessionist (2)  or a s e p a r a t i s t  The  demands o f s u c h  s e c e s s i o n i s m and reactions  movement  separatism  of the c e n t r a l  Hugh  Seton-Watson inspired  community  for  association  country  Theodore  a  i t claims  imply  community  part  to  Lyon  makes  "movement  subordination already  seeking  from  to  member,"  separatism.  alienation by  a central  from  However, f o r of  political  and  some of a legal  Accordingly,  3 9  existing  state  i t i s important the  demand  separatism  further  which  to for  Peter isa  incorporation,  a u t h o r i t y of which i t  s e c e s s i o n which from  the  In o t h e r  i s our focus of study.  political  and  3 8  a province)  whole."  between  the  i s a "movement  existing  principal  4 1  J o h n R. Wood a l s o makes t h i s and  the  i t . Clearly,  t o b r e a k away d e c i s i v e l y  political authority."  (usually  resist  40  remove  desire  f o r autonomy and  w i t h i n the l a r g e r a  state.  autonomy w i t h i n an  distinction  seeking  the  political  of s u b - u n i t ( s )  "the  the  s i n c e the l a t t e r  this  to  or c o m m u n i t i e s . "  is  break  either  a s "... a  sovereign  or  between t h e c a l l  withdrawal,  to  from s u b j e c t i o n t o , o r  withdrawal  separatism  complete withdrawal  total  between  response  desire  t o speak  i s the formal  t i e the  may  distinguish  is  overpowering  state to loosen  which  in  defines separatism  an  Wright,  time  p o r t i o n of the p o p u l a t i o n  separatism or  over  t o form an i n d e p e n d e n t  articulate  bonds  m i n o r i t i e s may v a c i l l a t e  government.  with, another  P.  sovereign  by  which  words, s e p a r a t i s m a  form.  Separatism  distinction  between  secession  i n c l u d e s " a l l i n s t a n c e s of  political  which f e a t u r e a d e s i r e f o r the r e d u c t i o n of c o n t r o l authority in  a  specific  area."  4 2  In  contrast,'  18  secessionism central basis  refers  political of  a  t o a "demand  authority  claim  f o r formal withdrawal  by a member u n i t  to independent  sovereign  s e p a r a t i s m may p r o d u c e demands f o r c h a n g e s processes  within  the  suggests a complete Morris-Jones,  distinctive  (in  form o r o t h e r  by  ratherthe  in  not  is  a  of  framework  for secession  (a)  While  i s more  (b)  which  growth  entail  claim  a  for  a  i n some is  separatism  one is a  specific. to  includes  explain  the  of s e c e s s i o n  the f o l l o w i n g : --  the  f o r the b e g i n n i n g s of s e c e s s i o n i s t  the  For  John R. Wood has p r o v i d e d a c o n c e p t u a l  the preconditions  necessary  system.  secessionism  one o f t h e few c o m p r e h e n s i v e a t t e m p t s secession,  Whereas  3  secessionism  the  political  separatism.  the  decision-making  necessarily  Thus,  secessionism  of  on  [ o f ] separate) recognition  state."""  manifestation  dynamics  are  it  sense  the  more g e n e r a l c o n c e p t , In  "does  status.""  system,  confidence  separatism  separate existence;  possible  of  units  in  existing political  loss  or  from a  and  effectiveness  of  factors  which  alienation;  the s e c e s s i o n i s t  movement; (c)  the response of the c e n t r a l  consociationalism  and c o n t r o l  government  to maintain  -- p o l i c i e s  the i n t e g r i t y  of  of the  state; (d)  the d i r e c t p r e c i p i t a n t s  contributing (e) conflict  the with  influencing Why  t o the "point resolution reference  outcomes."  does  a  of.no of  of s e c e s s i o n  —  return";  i n t e r n a l and  factors  '  the s e c e s s i o n i s t  t o both  the  crisis  by armed  external  factors  5  call  for  secession  arise  in a  multi-ethnic  19  s o c i e t y ? The p o l i c i e s become  determining  alienation  control  A  conflict  both.  in  Netherlands."  may  compromises successful of  leadership  above  policies." the  may  society. option  They  7  localized  A, government accommodative order  to  are  ensure  stability  in  coalition,  the  to  "conflict-  mutual  the veto,  Nordlinger,  i n a d i v i d e d s o c i e t y , one  occasions  when  formal  community,  for or  measure  or  management  informal,  replace  i n an e t h n i c a l l y d i v i d e d  another  major  c e n t r a l government, when  reforms  the p o l i t i c a l  "non-constitutional conflict  the  minority  accommodative i s an  ethnic  important  groups  are  territory." may  measures  maintain,  federalism  six  stable  According  from t h e m a j o r i t y  to  i n a "home  or  suggests  of pure m a j o r i t a r i a n i s m  regulatory  alienation  s i x c o n f l i c t - r e g u l a t i n g p r a c t i c e s must be  adopt  available  secessionist  ethnic  depoliticization,  In a d d i t i o n , f e d e r a l i s m ,  conflict  may  These measures, e i t h e r formal  principle  a  general  s o c i e t y . The g o v e r n m e n t ' s  Nordlinger  concessions.  i n a backlash  contain  divided"  a d o p t e d by t h e government. On result  to  r e g u l a t i o n of c o n f l i c t the  into  a  s o c i e t i e s a s , f o r example, has o c c u r r e d i n  principle,  and  convert  include consociation  Eric  6  government  may adopt accommodative o r  measures  practices.""  proportionality  more  a "deeply  policies  may  groups  i n i t s attempt  segmented  regulating  which  government  Consociational  ethnically the  minority  central  measures  accommodative or  factors  among  alienation.  and  and programmes o f t h e c e n t r a l  also  exercise  a l t e r n a t i v e options  i n i t s response t o  political  demands o f t h e m i n o r i t y ,  grant  ethnic  stability.  It  concessions  and  conflict  can later  to in  ignore the withdraw  20  them,  offer  inadequate  concessions  or  i t can  impose  control  measures. The  p o l i c y of c o n t r o l may  non-coercive assimilation  techniques policies.  group domination group(s)  or  the  it  sees  of  administrative by  according  group);  instruments  what  (b)  of  to  its and  myths,  symbols,  (d) a p p e a r s as  puppets"  (no  illusion  consider  a mix  of  example,  has  a  the of  control  i t needs and  (c)  roughly  system,  and  without the  the  delivers regard  for  legal  and  bureaucracy  is  and  gains  implements  legitimacy  by  c u l t u r e of  dominant  the  manipulating  However, L u s t i c k  consociation.  equal  rival  ideology  "puppeteer 9  the  group-specific  political  and  and  a control  interprets  a  balance)."  repression  s t a t e . The  interests;  articulating  and  c o n t r o l as e f f e c t i v e  controls  the  dominant g r o u p w h i c h group  In  a 8  negotiations  minorities;  coercive  segments o v e r  segment(s). extracts  of  military  superordinate  (a)  a mix  defines  the  elaborating (history,  as  Lustick  f i t without  interest  staffed  the  group,  such  Ian  subordinate  super-ordinate what  by  include  mix  stringed does  not  Malaysia,  for  control  and  of  consociationalism. For  Milton  Esman, " i n s t i t u t i o n a l i z e d  the  four  that  a government  ethnic  options  group w i l l  to  contain  committed adopt  three  to  ethnic  dominance" i s one  conflict.  permanent  methods of  5 0  Esman a r g u e s  dominance  conflict  of  of  one  management:  (1) Proscribe or closely control the political e x p r e s s i o n of c o l l e c t i v e i n t e r e s t s among dominated groups, (2) prohibit e n t r y by members of d o m i n a t e d g r o u p s i n t o the dominant community, and (3) provide monopoly or p r e f e r e n t i a l a c c e s s f o r members of the dominant g r o u p t o p o l i t i c a l p a r t i c i p a t i o n , advanced education, economic opportunities, and symbols of status as official language, the flag, national  21  heroes and economic and  h o l i d a y s , w h i c h r e i n f o r c e the p o l i t i c a l , p s y c h i c c o n t r o l of the dominant g r o u p . 5 1  Esman f u r t h e r w r i t e s  that  conflict  measure  long  lived."  could in  management  a  multi-ethnic  The  central  the  to present For  from  to  a strong  reformist  the  and  redress  violence  their  be  for  secession  or  the  and  may  Ethnic  societies  to p r o t e c t of  involve  parties  the  ethnic  Bengalis  When  of  if  not fails  minority.  to  the  pressure  Similarly,  since  system.  the  to broaden  due  1948-71.  only  extent  pressure,  failed  Thus, t h e  it  the  encourages minorities  a l t e r n a t i v e may  be  consociationalism  these p o l i c i e s  and  both  tend  fail,  violent  to  emerge  and  a demand  non-violent  in  multi-ethnic  promote a p a r t i c u l a r e t h n i c  pure  majoritarianism  conflict-regulating  measures)  invariably  ethnic  loses,  be  arise.  measures.  context  tensions  Often,  to ethnic  counter-productive  control  policy  w i l l i n g n e s s of  policy.  during  a combination  S e c e s s i o n i s m may  secessionist  ability  include  grievances.  and  c o n t r o l s y s t e m may  government  elites  to break t h i s  control  a  ethnic  c l o s e s down a v e n u e s a v a i l a b l e t o e t h n i c  or  In  a  p a c k a g e t o the  Pakistan  power t o  s y s t e m can  violence  the  implement  West-Pakistan  control  accommodation  accommodative p o l i c y depends on  to  political  that  a  stability.  c e n t r a l government, due  instance,  base of  ethnic  as  "extremely e f f e c t i v e  whereas  a l i e n a t i o n and  authority  be  dominance  r e h a b i l i t a t e " the  society  s u c c e s s of  always,  than  to maintain  minority  can  theorists assert  "aggravate rather  appropriate  of  Control  institutionalized  in  which  p a r t i e s may  p a r t i e s where t h e  ethnic  (in the  the ethnic  interest. absence  minority  become t r a n s f o r m e d  minority  is  of  into  territorially  22  c o n c e n t r a t e d . Such p a r t i e s  may  be  able  to  government  i f t h e i r home t e r r i t o r y i s p a r t  if  home  their  Lankan c a s e , coalition  to  win  the  them t o do t h i s ,  point  formation  of  sufficient  s e a t s t o become a f a c t o r i n  positive (a)  or  on t h e p o s i t i v e  state)  or  to  government) waiting."  The  demonstrated support.  side,  them  capability  'legitimacy'  regular  in  secessionists;  the  government  impact  party  Their  may  the a b i l i t y the  home  perceived  in  turn  concessions  partly  explains  of  both  subject  to  demoralize central  internal  s u p p o r t e r s and  government,  encouraging  the  side,  growth  of  the  (in a  federal  "government capable further  gives  them  and  non-  and d i s c o n t e n t  and  rule (or achieve  among i t s obtain  i n the post-1977 party  factions  "waverers." use  to  of  any period  may  become  which  could  Further,  patronage  anti-secessionist  this public  w h i c h does not  failure  in  and  the extended  1983. The  alienate  a  commitment:  in elections  party  fissures  through  have  secessionists  TULF's  after  a  attracts  from t h e government  i t s decline  either  as  participation  the  could  as  disillusionment  supporters. For instance,  or i n the  t e r r i t o r y (in a c o a l i t i o n  is  (b) on t h e n e g a t i v e  major  not  in elections  t o govern  credibility  eyes  breed  ruling  community w i l l  on t h e s e c e s s i o n i s t  r e p r e s e n t a t i o n ) of a s e c e s s i o n i s t secession  a  f r u s t r a t i o n may b u i l d t o  participation  represent  gives  of  alienation.  coalition  a negative  part  I f the majority  the m i n o r i t y ' s  parties'  a  as i n the S r i  become  of s e c e s s i o n i s t  Secessionist  regional  hope i s t o  government d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g . allow  a  o f a f e d e r a t i o n . But  t e r r i t o r y i s i n a u n i t a r y .state,  t h e i r only  or  form  and  parties,  the by may  23  undermine the popular Secession  is  support  rarely  p o s s i b l e through n o n - v i o l e n t  The c e n t r a l a u t h o r i t y w i l l to achieve explains  i t s goals this  of the s e c e s s i o n i s t p a r t y .  resist  through  i t and a m i n o r i t y  electoral  means.  c a n n o t hope  politics.  Ruth  McVey  r e s i s t a n c e s u c c i n c t l y : "The n a t i o n - s t a t e  clings  above a l l t o t e r r i t o r y  ... f o r a l l i t s s t r e s s on t h e p e o p l e  its  give  basis  it  Secessionist movements.  will  tendencies The  an a t t e m p t  compromises aversion  with  to  effective  the  moderate other  segments. armed  In  wrest  for  political  policies  become  parties  5 2  and by  operating  in  secession  often  from  reach  and  case  the  prevent  a  and  from  may  undermine  of the p o p u l a t i o n  support-base  of  while,  the  on  violent  o f S r i L a n k a , t h e growth o f t h e T a m i l  o f t h e TULF. B e f o r e discredited  it  Thus t h e government's  on one hand  segment  enhancing the  reforms.  may  s e c e s s i o n i s t movements c o r r e s p o n d e d . w i t h  fortunes  land."  led initially  concessions  the moderates  non-violent  hand,  in  i s often  demand  not  t h e c e n t r a l government. But t h e government's  h a l f - h e a r t e d accommodative the  party  Their  t o accommodating  adopting  but  and e s t a b l i s h e d e l i t e s  framework.  represents  population  are usually manifested  secessionist  moderate, c o n s e r v a t i v e democratic  up  as  long,  the  declining  t h e moderate " s e c e s s i o n i s t s "  extremists  outbid  the moderates f o r  a c c e p t a n c e as t h e " l e g i t i m a t e " r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s  of  the  ethnic  group.  (A)  The f a c t o r s c o n t r i b u t i n g t o t h e f a i l u r e  system t o respond t o m i n o r i t y Outbidding:  Giovanni  of the p o l i t i c a l  demands  Sartori  in  h i s work on d e m o c r a t i c  24  theory  describes outbidding  the  a b s e n c e of e f f e c t i v e  is  appealing  even  support-wooing both  majority Alvin  political symbols  to  they  ethnic ethnic  pay  coalition  may  frustration.  with  so to a  electoral  c r e a t e and  maintain  Rabushka  and  reduce  all  ethnic  are  in  that form.  results  political to  saliency, a multipressure stand  outbid  their  in  ethnic  moderate of  the  politics  on  from  these  absence of  of  outbidding out  of  i n the  dismantling  of  multi-ethnic  coalitions  are  Further,  corresponding and  the  issues  extreme  reduced  of  interests  The  effectiveness  ethnically-oriented  decline  ethnicization  manipulation  and  e t h n i c a d v a n t a g e . In  Shepsle,  ethnic  ethnic  moderation. Extremism, a r i s i n g  communication  addition,  to  who  at e l e c t i o n s .  begun, t h e  of e t h n i c i t y ,  difficult  emerge  cooperation, In  political  institutions  increasingly parties  once  use  under m o u n t i n g  the  significantly  politicization  appeal  t a k i n g an  course,  in  intense  produces  make  of g r o w i n g e t h n i c  By  "what  It i s a  5 3  that  entrepreneurs,  f o r power  itself  on  "in  politicians  write  control  entrepreneurs  However,  to destroy  brokerage  quest  elites.  is  and  dividends  find  ambitious  Shepsle  These  5 4  i s based  credible."  increasingly  a result  Of  entrepreneurs  the  who  political  counterparts.  tend  power  high  counter-political these  not  which,  groups.  elections,"  in their  t e r m s . As  issues,  is  Kenneth  acquire  of w i n n i n g  entrepreneurs  it  minority ethnic  entrepreneurs  "business because  though  identity.  competition  methods of c o n t r o l , "  Rabushka and  and  "unfair"  s t r a t e g y r e s o r t e d t o by and  competition  as  "infrequent  of  of i n t e r p a r t y public  v i o l e n c e are short, ethnic  goods. used  according  to to  cooperation,  25  immoderate e t h n i c the  politics  c o n s t i t u t i o n a l as  well  repression  of m i n o r i t y  of  pluralism  ethnic  system.  Milne points  occur  when,  electoral almost as  as  the  being  (a)  in  a  out  that  from w i t h i n  outbidding  For  Milne,  dominant  groups  and up  at  eventual  the  democratic  politics political  major e t h n i c  so  that  without  the  group  on  ethnic  C o n v e r s e l y , appeasement of reason.  among e i t h e r the parties),  sections.  governing  w h i c h may  of  able  concessions  to  the  outbidding the  to  5 6  groups  them  threat  likely  i s placed are  is  group.  The  come  impact.  members  of  own  than o u t b i d d i n g  the  ethnic from  the  to the  demands  group f o r e l e c t o r a l support  reasons.  the  minority  or  can  multi-ethnic the  moderate  becomes  produce  opposition  internal  respond  of  direction  its final  from  on  perceived  O u t b i d d i n g can  government p a r t y ' s  draw t h e i r  influence  of  in determining  Outbidding  In a d d i t i o n ,  character  ethnic  Thus, a government must  5 7  dominant  same  e i t h e r one  the  " a p p e a r a n c e of  ethnic  restriction  forming a government. or  is especially  two  the  is significant  the  outbidding  (b)  flank."  be  sum  no  other  may  activity"  or  c o n s t i t u t e s a more d e a d l y  of  level  would-be  flank  the  policy  little  strength  c a p a b l e of  of  of  e x p e n s e of m i n o r i t y  political  competition;  equal  either  the  5 5  R.S. to  at  difficult  internal divisions  parties  support  (or  coalition  from v a r i o u s  factionalism  can  factions,  process thus  ethnic  change  p a r t i e s . However, the outbidding  for  by  the  government awarding  enhancing  their  credibility. R o b e r t M e l s o n and elites  rely  on  their  Howard Wolpe a r g u e t h a t ethnic  where  political  g r o u p f o r e l e c t o r a l s u r v i v a l , the  26  political  process  increasing  is  likely  p a r t i c i p a t i o n of  encourages the  elites  and  present  also  to  M e l s o n and  Wolpe  encourage appear  t o be  t h e m s e l v e s as  note  that  especially  i n such  Democracy power and  the  the  "democratic"  same But,  well  lose.  In  communal  to  the  often  lose  because and  outbidding,  of  majoritarian  representatives. regimes  increased  the  not  v o t e as  ethnic are  salience  reasonable as  of  are  to  politically  implement. irrelevant  may  is  authority.  Further,  the  political  entrepreneurs  leave  by  often  extra-parliamentary  v i o l e n t or  f o r the  democracy,  in  of  such  a  non-violent  ethnic central  outbidding  little  m o d e r a t e s . The  room  alienated  strategies  forms.  and  losers  and  where  pressures  majority, In  the  continually  the  ignored.  the  politics  real  on  inappropriate.  minority  manoeuvering adopts  the  by  of  In  such  the  basic  addition, society  compromises d i f f i c u l t  for  of  alternate  remain  a block,  easily  The  is a  losers  always  defeated  ethnicity  c o n c e s s i o n s and  parties  communalization  configurations,  democracy  minority  which  political  words, o u t b i d d i n g  systems, which operate b e n e f i c i a l l y of  process  regimes.  do  concessions  The  of e t h n i c i t y  s u c h a s i t u a t i o n where w i n n e r s a l w a y s win  compromises  either  basis  under u n r e s t r i c t e d m a j o r i t a r i a n  m i n o r i t i e s , who  well  the  political  when w i n n e r s and  groups  ethnic  demands  i n the  competitive  In o t h e r  5 8  "communalized."  "democratic  subject  functions  side.  always  non-elites  t o make a p p e a l s on  competition."  possibility  winning  become  mass p a r t i c i p a t i o n and  political  in  to  the  makes  to achieve groups  as  become  decision-making p r a c t i s e d by for ethnic which  the  political minority may  take  27  However,  m i n o r i t i e s who  always attempt (e.g.  Parsis  to destroy  activities or  (e.g.  work w i t h  the  some  minorities  when  a  highly  discontent  central  (e.g.  be  government will  authority, enhance  guerrilla  into  to v i o l e n c e ?  translated  to  with  be  (ethnic)  or  a  do  argued here  that  i n the  resources, context  central  violently  support  base  movements w i t h g r a d u a l l y  t o any  of  the  has  been d e f i n e d  a  take  (class)  against  the The  challenge  the  to  government  r e b e l s . One  developing  may  minorities.  "illegal"  " e x c e s s e s " of  minority-dominated  Armed s e c e s s i o n i s m  the  of  government,  revolutionary  by  Asia)  Why  into violence. Violence  these provoked  p e o p l e emerge i n the  i n Southeast  fight the  in S r i  cultural  possesses  i n d u c e s more v i o l e n c e  the  or  in S r i Lanka).  It w i l l  not  politics  Burgers  i s o l a t e d i n c i d e n t s of v i o l e n c e  react  and  (e.g.  Chinese  minority a will  away from  economic  Muslims  relationship  s u c c e s s of  government  will  turn  a nationalistic  f o r m . The  its  majority  of d e m o c r a c y " do  stay  country  frustration  a d v a n t a g e and  will  the  Jews i n E u r o p e or  strained  either  leave  territorially-based  geographical  "victims  i t . They may  in India);  Lanka); d i v e r t t h e i r  are  sympathy  or from  more the  areas. as:  ... a p r o c e s s whereby an e t h n i c g r o u p , or a c o a l i t i o n of e t h n i c g r o u p s , s e e k s t o s e c e d e or gain autonomy from the control, de f a c t o and de j u r e , o f a g i v e n s t a t e , t h r o u g h an o r g a n i z e d and purposeful use of f o r c e , a l o n e or i n c o m b i n a t i o n w i t h o t h e r means. Such use of force constitutes acts of revolutionary v i o l e n c e in that i t expresses a rejection of the prevailing political and social system and a determination t o b r i n g a b o u t " p r o g r e s s i v e " c h a n g e s by overthrowing t h i s system. 5 9  From t h e  above d e f i n i t i o n ,  one  does not  always  exclusive  includes  involve  non-military  an  may  means,  observe that use i.e.  of  armed force.  political  secession It  also  devices.  28  F u r t h e r m o r e , armed s e c e s s i o n i s t s not political the  s y s t e m , but  support  nationalism  (B)  The  base  for  i s often  s u c c e s s or  factors  that  Bard  also  failure the  O'Neill  the  insurgent  existing  part;  they  autonomous  political  (a)  Popular Mao  war  the  community." the  war  of  is  outlines of  the  the  6 1  "reject  formally  constitute  a  six  a new  crucial  insurrection:  cohesion, external of  one.  to O ' N e i l l ,  and  He  62  insurgent  support,  government.  the  6 3  Support:  in  the  important  f o r the  either  active  an  warfare:  insurgency  outcome  effectiveness  Tse-Tung w r i t e s ,  lies  guerrilla  which they are  it  widen  programmes.  categories  of  from  support, organization,  e n v i r o n m e n t , and  six  to  Inevitably,  6 0  a secessionist  secessionist  withdraw  v a r i a b l e s which determine popular  outcome of  existing  in order  social  secessionist  community  the  violence.  movements, a c c o r d i n g  political  seek t o  of  reject  system  in r a d i c a l  suggests  movements, among which the Secessionist  social  secessionist  clothed  influence  E.  the  only  passive  support.  betrayal  rate  gaining  vital  ability  to  "the  masses  of  s u c c e s s of  which,  in  the  supporters  supply  the  intelligence  information  turn, about  people." Popular warfare  support  (or  prevents the  wage  support  and  the  may  with  places  from  reduces  and  is  take  government  movements.  guerrillas hiding  fear)  guerrillas  guerrilla  and  power t o  form. S y m p a t h i z e r s c o n s t i t u t e  passive  information  contain  the  guerrilla  or a p a s s i v e Such  r i c h e s t s o u r c e of  the the from  hinders i t s The  food, the  active shelter, army  and  29  police.  These  reprisals. adopt  To  one  individuals win  or  attraction; terrorism;  more of  (b)  Whereas Tse-Tung)  esoteric  "powerful  f o r the  (capitalist)  unemployment When t h e  land  the  run,  terrorist  strategy  the  guerrillas.  the  government  framework  to  Hence  against  and  specific  fail  be  f o r winning  These  such  as  large-scale  In  a l i e n a t e the be  the  short  popular  ethnic  in that  in  public  the from  counter-productive.  guerrilla  entire  r e a c t i o n would r e s u l t  appeals  s u c c e s s f u l ; however,  t e r r o r i s m can  an  existing  support.  win  government.  could  through  to  World  r e s o r t to t e r r o r i s m to d i s p l a y  the  could  the  issues,  appeals  a  convincing  masses.  to m o b i l i z e  the  Marxist  Exoteric  the  the  has  the  a  replace  Mao  at  which  instance,  i n order  random k i l l i n g  government  indiscriminately  (f)  to  directed  infrastructure.  immobilize  more s u c c e s s f u l s t r a t e g y provoke  need  guerrillas  to  large  (d)  (e.g.  b a c k w a r d n e s s of T h i r d  towards  reform  capability  run,  appeal;  followers  provides  intelligentsia  their  long  charismatic  leaders  mainly  often  the  above-stated  support,  are  socio-economic  the  the  a t t r a c t i o n . " For  oriented or  exoteric  a p p e a l of  ideological  socio-economic  aimed b o t h a t  popular  an  justifies  are  (c)  (a)  movements  government c o u n t e r - t e r r o r i s m ;  appeals  within  and  appeals  of  underdeveopment  explanation countries  appeal;  government  guerrilla  unsophisticated  intellectual  of  the  face  f o l l o w i n g measures:  charismatic  attract  intelligentsia  and  potency.  the  can  movement,  are  the  esoteric  of  risks  support,  (e) p r o v o c a t i o n  demonstration  theory  popular  take  support  may  attacks group.  group t u r n i n g  be  to  A to  react  Such  a  towards  30  the  guerrillas  strategy  of  military  and  Finally,  their  in  the  capability  providing  guerrillas'  by b o t h  administrative  may e n a b l e t h e g u e r r i l l a  a potent  earned  protection.  demonstrating  victories  services as  for  movement  scoring  and  social  to e s t a b l i s h  itself  force  i n the minority-dominated areas.  Credibility  this  way  base of the  i n turn  increases  the support  guerrillas.  (b)  Organization: Organizational  guerrillas,  ability,  offsets  established military "parallel  hierarchy"  of  in  cells  increase  the  The with  f o r the  superiority"  military  of  the  create  a  i n a r e a s c o n t r o l l e d by them. The c r e a t i o n areas  is  functional  necessary  of ' p a r a l l e l  to  movements  organizations  s u c h as y o u t h g r o u p s and women's  successful establishment  to  widen  organizations.  hierarchy*,  together  o r g a n i z a t i o n , d e m o n s t r a t e s t h e competence of t h e  t o run both a d m i n i s t r a t i v e  and m i l i t a r y  services.  Cohesion:  command  leaders  is  may c o n d u c t  necessary  Mao T s e - T u n g n o t e s t h a t partisans  adversaries." " 6  and  "material  government-controlled  support,  Local  the  indispensable  t h e number o f a c t i v e members. The g u e r r i l l a  insurgents  (c)  is  f o r c e s . The g u e r r i l l a s may a l s o  may a l s o e s t a b l i s h v a r i o u s their  which  then  find  can  local  to provide  a general  but a  focus  inflict  little  more s u p p o r t  damage  i n t o roaming  central  and s t r a t e g y .  "without c e n t r a l i z e d s t r a t e g i c  They c a n b r e a k down no  operations,  command  on  their  armed  bands,  from the p o p u l a t i o n .  If there  31  exist  f a c t o r s o f f s e t t i n g d i s u n i t y among  unity  f o r i d e o l o g i c a l or personal  in  defeat.  the  F r e n c h government  the  lack  Algerian  the  of  a c o l o n i a l war  c o h e s i o n among A l g e r i a n  r e v o l u t i o n succeeded. But,  make  External  them  an  compensated  types of e x t e r n a l  material  and  sanctuary.  acknowledgement cost  support first  r e b e l s . As a r e s u l t , t h e  in  the  absence  support military  risk  types  Moral  to  of  can i n c l u d e  the  support  exist:  support  government, (d)  moral,  political,  i s f o s t e r e d by f o r e i g n  external  can  supporter.  weapons,  and l e a d e r s h i p . until  and  attract  activities  they  mobilize  win  involves Political  sustain  external  absence,  the chances  two  types  medicine,  safe  food  and  havens f o r m i l i t a r y  can operate  safe  of  Material  base  s u p p o r t . Moreover attention  in  from  these  the  home  the g u e r r i l l a s via  terrorist  i n t h e i n t e r n a t i o n a l forum.  Public  and m i l i t a r y s u c c e s s e s a r e i m p o r t a n t  support  international  a  external  support  in exerting  f o r the insurgents.  provide  popular  useful  last  ammunition,  establish  s u p p o r t , good o r g a n i z a t i o n  The  The g u e r r i l l a s  significant  to  be v e r y  government.  t r a i n i n g . Sanctuaries  sanctuaries  the  support  s u p p o r t a r e most c r u c i a l  training  initial  f o r a strong  such  guerrillas  t h e i n s u r r e c t i o n i s w a r r a n t e d and  on a weak home  external  to  among  of  a c t i v e l y i n t e r n a t i o n a l i z e s t h e i n s u r g e n c y movement. The  pressure  must  that  and  two  country  target  for  Support:  Four  little  easy  of  or i n d e c i s i v e n e s s of  compensating developments or f a c t o r s , d i v i s i o n may  lack  r e a s o n s may n o t a l w a y s r e s u l t  F o r example, t h e u n w i l l i n g n e s s to fight  rebels,  and  publicity of  respectability  gained  obtaining  after  the  through t e r r o r i s m . In external  support  are  32  significantly some e x t e n t  External  n e u t r a l i z e the  government  (e)  reduced.  i n i t s war w i t h  advantages  to insurgents  enjoyed  by  may t o  a  central  insurgents.  Environment: Environment  communication  includes  network,  crucial  for  protracted  the  war.  government its  to transport  roads  beneficial public when  a  to  climate,  are  of  i t s troops  superiority a  weak  the  insurgents.  and  guerrilla  tend  are in  communication Finally,  a  and  to  the  exploit  i t s advantage.  to favour  —  bases  advantageous  However,  network  can  be  i f t h e g u e r r i l l a s and  m i l i t a r y belongs to a d i f f e r e n t ethnic  r e l i g i o u s cleavages  culture.  q u i c k l y and a l s o t o to  and  communication  speak t h e same l a n g u a g e and p r a c t i s e t h e the  road  m o u n t a i n s and j u n g l e s  usually  and  the  religion  well-developed  system  technological  unpaved  factors —  establishment  But  transportation  terrain,  ethnicity,  Favourable geographical  and  support  same  religion  stock,  ethnic  the g u e r r i l l a s .  ( f ) The r o l e o f t h e g o v e r n m e n t : The  government's response  outcome  of  differently suggests, will  warfare.  t o the d i v e r s e "to face  activity,  intensified  whereas  response  in  a  challenges.  determining  government must As  Walter  challenge,  action, administration a terrorist  p o l i c e work. G u e r r i l l a  military  But  an o r g a n i z a t i o n a l  have t o s t r e s s c i v i c  police  level  guerrilla  i s crucial  while  threat  warfare  react  Sonderland  t h e government and  will  calls  the  low-level necessitate  for  mobility-conventional  a  low-  warfare  33  will  require conventional  government carefully and  must  implement  and t a c t f u l l y .  destroy  operation  counter-productive. guerrilla people  by  own  areas"  possible,  and  only a f t e r  government  in  accommodation, insufficient  the  military  up,  out  a  undermine  be the  demands of t h e  among t h e v a r i o u s in  the a b i l i t y  may  to  the  t o run  through  if  military  government  victories  heavy c a s u a l t i e s among t h e  able  militarily  However,  victory  is  in  are local  In the s h o r t  to  crush  ( e . g . t h e Basques under G e n e r a l USSR).  in  image o f t h e  be c o u n t e r - p r o d u c t i v e .  be  the  i t s superior  them. A c o n v i n c i n g  But  with  participate  the i n v i n c i b i l i t y  the  Franco,  without  political  the long  run u s u a l l y  s e c e s s i o n i s t movements.  organization,  t o succeed long  may  f o r t h e i n s u r g e n t s . Where  the m i l i t a r y  unity,  e n v i r o n m e n t and p o p u l a r  the g u e r r i l l a s  carrying  may  search  area  establish contact  support  tarnish  inflicting  t o suppress  sum  favourable  may  movement  Latvians  cleavages  the i n s u r g e n t s  can d e f e a t  "victory"  secessionist  To  better  a  apparatus.  among t h e p e o p l e .  population, a  guerrilla  encourage the g u e r r i l l a s  victory  guerrillas  for  deny  undermine p o p u l a r i t must  military  the  societal  c o n f r o n t a t i o n so t h a t  possible  may  The  6 5  programmes  undertake  a particular  meanwhile, must  f o r c e s and f i r e - p o w e r  run,  counter-insurgency  The government  administrative  to  direct  in  military."  improve i t s a d m i n i s t r a t i v e f a c i l i t i e s  The m i l i t a r y , public  the  For instance, to  exploiting  I t must  6 6  "insurgent their  by  movement by m e e t i n g t h e s o c i o - e c o n o m i c  or  groups.  operation  and  external  support  become more  when t h e government exhaustive  support,  a  crucial  i s capable  of  counter-insurgency  34  programme.  On  differently  to the  to  win  the  back  out  this  to. be  various  framework  of  the  support,  the  g o v e r n m e n t ' s use  O'Neill  The  masses do  revolution,  do  not  by  the  not  ability  to mobilize  the  diverse  on  charisma  survival.  of  and areas.  f o r c e may  turn  an  leader  one  moving t o w a r d s the  steps  Strategy  t h a n by  and  giant  tactics  Tse-Tung  leadership.  However,  can  must  is  revolutionary  adopting  the  segments  of  rely  help  bind  exclusively for  long-term  a guerrilla respond  "more  the  possess  a p p e a l s may not  they  influence  Thomas G r e e n ,  a  should quickly  successful  durable  objective  more  than by  6 8  guerrilla  identifies  and  by  organizations  who  the  Marxists  They  should  in  of  the  among v a r i o u s  strides."  of  As  form s t r a t e g i e s and  is  up"  revolution,  established politician,  i s a l l i m p o r t a n t . For  revolutionary brilliant,  support  grass-root  clearly,  importance  "rise  they  movement.  leadership  build  events  timing  a  analytical  Nevertheless,  6 7  tactics,  popular  g r o u p s . The but  i t the  secession.  Furthermore, charismatic  Unlike  interpret  or  "create"  secessionist  population.  to  spontaneously  secession.  a  Mao  attempt  political  extensive  masses need o u t s i d e  themselves  "create"  an  must add  insurgency  of  (C)  and  respond  guerrilla-dominated  provides  growth  short  through  in  s t r a t e g i e s and  since  insurrections  support  appropriate  the  government must  actions  have a c k n o w l e d g e d ,  cannot  types of  f o r i n s u r g e n c y , one  leadership.  leaders  the  counter-productive.  Although  cause  hand,  popular  administrative Without  other  three  warfare phases  in  a  protracted  35  guerrilla from  war  phase  to  guerrillas First,  but  their  own  modified  phase.  have  are  territory.  drawn m a i n l y  not  i t . Second,  an  be of  ruthless  ethnic  the  particularly  guerrillas  War).  when  of a g u e r r i l l a  to  the people  of  guerrilla  warfare;  war  the  The  and  in water  7 0  power  the g u e r r i l l a s  group,  a  of  information,  live  and is  for  the  to  in  this  for  period  surrounding areas essential  for  to the  i s not p e r m i t t e d i n either  "with  against  the  whose f u n c t i o n money  cadres  is essential  government. D u r i n g  collect  is  us  among t h e p e o p l e  to succeed  militia  is  areas  war,  training  i t is vital  Neutrality  must  the c e n t r a l  create local  be  phase  these  long  t h e uncommitted must be  i f they wish  can  secessionist  first  of  military  support  group.  guerrillas  lines  i s o f t e n p r o t r a c t e d and  Control  fighting  mass  a guerrilla  us."  intelligence  the  a  Rather,  strategies to  in  i n the c e n t r a l  the g u e r r i l l a s ;  survival  instance, in  be  war.  guerrilla  the s u r v i v a l  military  For  These  in  s t r a t e g i e s must  s e c l u d e d a r e a s . S i n c e mass s u p p o r t  convince  whole  operating  i s often absent.  applicable  to provide p o l i t i c a l  s a f e and  live  basis.  the g u e r r i l l a  (e.g. the Vietnam  crucial,  against  conflict.  the  a g a i n s t the m i n o r i t y with b a t t l e  effectively  because  revolutionaries.  are  guerrilla  vary  secessionist  to take over they  factor  should  that  communist  trying  the s e c e s s i o n i s t  on  strategies note  e s t a b l i s h m e n t of base a r e a s  necessary  support  over  Communist  is pitted  to  environment  should  s t r u g g l e the c l a s s  majority  modified  guerrilla  We  6 9  advantages  to s u i t  The  that  o n l y a p a r t of  secessionist  in  argues  secessionists  system  the  and  from  as  or fish  superior  this  phase,  i s to  supply  the  rich  and  36  eliminate only  informers  and c o l l a b o r a t o r s . The g u e r r i l l a s  infrequent g u e r r i l l a  operations  to maintain  an  conduct  image  of  invincibility. Mao  stresses  operations  in  intelligence information and  network about  phases.  enables  the  popular  military  the  military  posts  military  communication enemy  pressure."  attacked  and,  f o r the g u e r r i l l a s ,  The  police  The  stations  objective  and weak  behind  i s t h e main aim  to  i n the country.  In  under r e l e n t l e s s  the  source destroy  Mao's  of the  words,  and c o n t i n u a l l y m o u n t i n g  7 1  guerrilla  adopted  t h e war a g a i n s t  government.  and  succeed  Despite inflict  in  their  inferior  casualties  on  military  military the  operations  the e s t a b l i s h e d position,  of  with  the g u e r r i l l a s  the f a m i l i a r i t y  decisive military in  of t e r r a i n ,  victories.  guerrilla  helps  the  enemy by c h o o s i n g t h e  p l a c e and t i m e o f a t t a c k . T h i s e l e m e n t  mobility  extended  possible,  Mao d i s c u s s e s why and how  guerrillas  to  i s t o o b t a i n arms, ammunition and  guerrillas'  infrastructure put  ability  conduct  wherever  s u p p l i e s s i n c e t h e enemy  is  vital  h i s strengths  government's  Small  ambushed.  operation  supplies.  an  the r e b e l s .  operations.  are  military  military  these  are  divisions  escalated  regarding  support  of  to obtain  second phase, t h e g u e r r i l l a s  and t e r r o r i s t  to g u e r r i l l a  establishment  guerrilla  t h e enemy, e s p e c i a l l y  i n f o r m a t i o n about  During  other  The  a c t i v e and p a s s i v e , hampers t h e  collect  are  a l l three  weaknesses. C o n v e r s e l y ,  both  "the  the importance of i n t e l l i g e n c e  surprise,  together to score  Surprise  attacks  call  for  operations  against  the  enemy.  high In  37  guerrilla  w a r f a r e , the  and  guerrillas  the  confuse, attack "distraction  and  and  "enemy's r e a r  t h e m s e l v e s have no demoralize  the  the  guerrilla  decentralization  i n the  of  strike  is  be  ready  The takes of  t o t a k e a d v a n t a g e of  development  place  i n the  also  strengthen  their  weariness  and  achieve a Che  the  in  in  the  environment  Guevara's a s s e r t a t i o n that  traditional  theories  three create (1)  of  is  the  final  elite's  enemy.  The  time  create  In  army  i s capable  buy  to  battle  t h i s way,  they  victory. can  significant  create  variation Guevara  must e x i s t b e f o r e to  attack.  army  to  7  conducive  for  the  r e v o l u t i o n . " However,  conditions  incumbent  conditions  guerrillas  a  minimum p r e c o n d i t i o n s the  local  also  enemy.  f o r the  area,  into a regular  negotiations and  large  successful  guerrilla  position  7 3  for  e s t a b l i s h e d army of  military  situation  force  i t "sheny  west."  a  opportunities  phase. T h i s  engage  favourable  aware of  guerrilla  frustration  revolutionary  that  the  third  openly c o n f r o n t i n g  guerrillas  can  of  simultaneous  i n the  over  front,  guerrillas  calls  essential  w a r f a r e . R e g i o n a l commanders must be and  through  i s spread  command  The  7 2  t a c t i c s . Mao  east,  operation  guerrilla's  rear."  enemy  concentration"  tung c h i h s i " - "uproar If  i s the  a on  admits  guerrillas  revolution:  lacking legitimacy  to govern  the  country (2) regular  existence  tensions  that  avenues  to  cannot  be  redressed  through  channels  (3) perceived The  of  all as  legal closed  change  the  situation  are  7 5  secessionist  guerrillas  can  create  a secessionist  38  environment  in  their  home  territory  through  guerrilla  operations. According which  is  to Guevara, g u e r r i l l a s  a  well-trained  and  c o n s i s t i n g of  25-35 men,  is  intellectuals  or  situation  by  t h r o u g h armed from the  that  at  which  both  this point  transformed For  the  to  replace while  vanguard  the  of  according  to  carried  out  midwife  of  argues that  by  the  of  guerrillas  latter,  one  g r o u p . The  revolution. since  7 6  base  the  areas.  than  population  suggests that  guerrilla  attacks,  for  Guevara  the  asserts  war  to  be  and the  social  reformer  social  system.  guerrilla  group  a subordinate centre  of  and  foco,  to  are  party,  revolution.  Hence  Guevara,  difficult as  to  is  of  a guerrilla  the  establish  in  a m o b i l e b a s e . In  the  propaganda  hundred  are  Guevara,  is difficult "the  speeches."  warfare  7 7  for  the  Guevara's  involving  limited organization,  for  destruction  i s more e f f e c t i v e p r o p a g a n d a a  the  the  writes  functions  as  m i l i t a r y functions  t o g e n e r a t e . Hence, Debray w r i t e s ,  local  scale  the  political  truck  which  government  support  Regis Debray, a d i s c i p l e  foco  areas,  —  invite- repression  exploitative  political  base a r e a s  of a troop, t r a n s p o r t  experience  as  the  country area,  absence  foco  rural  and  the  fighter is also a  views  revolution  Guevara c o n s i d e r s  attacks  foco  war.  the  Mao  of  foco  revolutionary  is ripe for a g u e r r i l l a  Guevara, a g u e r r i l l a  Furthermore,  small  time  The  the  increasing  u r b a n and  into a people's  committed  legitimacy  attracts  from  group.  create  insurrection. Guerrilla  state  guerrillas,  the  into a  mostly peasants,  students —  challenging  organized  cohesive  typically l e d by  are  popular  mediumsupport  39  and  weak government may a l s o To  sum  becoming the  up,  a  powerful  upper hand  depends  the  on  in a  may  be s t a t e d  in  my  likelihood force  civil  several  succeed. of  such t h a t war  with  secessionist guerrilla the  alienation  movements  central  gain  government  f a c t o r s and d e v e l o p m e n t s . The c e n t r a l ones  i n t h e form o f p r o p o s i t i o n s  investigation  of  the  which w i l l  Tamil-Sinhalese  be  tested  conflict  in Sri  Lanka.  1. An e t h n i c process  minority  c a n become a l i e n a t e d  i f the majority  accommodate perceived  those as  ethnic  demands  crucial  from t h e  group i s u n w i l l i n g or unable t o  or  interests  t o the v i a b i l i t y  of  the  and/or include  economic and e d u c a t i o n a l  linguistic  political  2. The a t t e m p t accommodate the and  opportunities,  c o n t r o l over  and/or  ethnic  failure  i t s own  of  demands,  peaceful  politicians,  the  central  f o r whatever  resolution  of  and  share of  s e c u r i t y and  more  government  reasons,  itself  difficult  to  encourages  among b o t h  outbidding  conflict  a fair  affairs.  development of a p r o c e s s of o u t b i d d i n g majority  minority  s u r v i v a l of the  g r o u p . These demands o r i n t e r e s t s m i g h t  greater  democratic  minority makes t h e if  not  impossible.  3.  Because, the root  imposition  c a u s e o f armed s e c e s s i o n  o f c o n t r o l measures  (as d e f i n e d  government making m e a n i n g f u l accommodative fail  i n the long  r u n . In t h e s h o r t  is political,  earlier) steps  without the  is  term, c o e r c i v e  an  likely  to  measures  may  40  work  i f the  control  4. or  An  alienated  minority control  ethnic  territorially-based;  the  weakens;  leaders  might  accessible;  be  (f) a  minority  for a better  (c)  (d) are  future  alienated  ethnic  provided  (g)  Insofar  ability  of  the  government depends on  military  and  (e)  recruiting  6.  For  a guerrilla  more i m p o r t a n t  mobilizing  public economic  creating  such  the  ultimate be  (e)  of  arms  about  minority and  sympathetic  a  the  conditions to  ones:  (a)  (d)  determination  the  violence.  the  The  legitimacy  following  acquiring maintaining  organization;  among  prevail,  establishing  (c)  are  exists  exists  group to c h a l l e n g e many f a c t o r s .  armed  state  system  these  resort  of  sanctuary  foreign  system  to  political  accommodative  different as  ethnic  t r a d i t i o n a l lands  hope and  power;  shrewd  the  i f some  the  non-coercive  s e n s e of  support;  efficient  c a p a b l e and  a  (a)  committed  is likely  The  the  a  a  5.  of  of  and  by  to v i o l e n c e  breakdown  despair  under  minority  (b)  available;  leaders;  leaders.  unity;  implement  prevail:  over  a  able  s e n s e of  minority  (b)  to  resort  conditions  c e n t r a l government  occurs;  secessionist  some  may  is of  as  minority  following  practices  among  capability  the  minorities  such  the  measures.  a l l of  the  government has  base  are  areas;  "sufficient" cohesion  (f) a t t r a c t i n g  and and  leaders.  s u c c e s s of militarily  armed s e c e s s i o n i s t  guerrillas  must  active  government  i n t o abandoning c r e d i b l e  and  movements,  manoeuver  accommodative p o l i c i e s  the and  41  i n t o e m p l o y i n g an  increasing  minority  civilian  population.  to  popular  support  win  central  7.  The  its  government  way  an  significantly  goals  Chapter  Two,  reviewing  the  Sinhalese,  focussing  1983.  I will  h i s t o r y of  trace  C h a p t e r T h r e e and Three  within  Chapter.  to decrease  home  territory.  the I  the  regard  test  against  the  guerrillas  authority  neighbour  of  s e c e s s i o n i s t war  a secessionist these  a n a l y s e the  the  may  conflict.  propositions  of  period  by  1970  and and  s e c e s s i o n i s t movements i n  data provided  theoretical  between  the  defines  g r o w i n g a l i e n a t i o n between T a m i l s  development  given  t o the  outcome of will  the  external  e s p e c i a l l y on  the  repression  and  with  influence  of  These s u c c e s s e s e n a b l e  i n t e r e s t e d powerful  strategic  In  i n the  level  i n C h a p t e r s Two  framework  i n the  and final  42  NOTES ' v  'New York Times 2  a  The annexure  'victory'  {August  3  f o r Indian  New York Times  practical  after  man  region  America  geo-political  (August  "New  lift  after  the  July  that  India  G l o b e and M a i l  (July  Test  5,  peace  (August  Ahead  informed  agreement  that  ahead w i t h  that  that  ...  India."  1987).  he  was  bowing  to  realities."  1987), p . 53. V. Balakumar, t h e  India  would  for  t h e agreement  (EROS),  stated  that  be g o i n g ahead w i t h t h e  our  approval.  Whether  doesn't matter. India  we  i s going  i t . How c a n we p r e v e n t i t ? "  5  G l o b e and M a i l  ( O c t o b e r 6,  6  G l o b e and M a i l  ( O c t o b e r 8, 1987).  involvement  in  Prabakaran s a i d at a  Organization  ... Nobody a s k e d us or r e j e c t  asking  power  f o r Peace Move i n S r i  1987).  treaty  15,  o f Eelam R e v o l u t i o n a r y  were  i s the great  31, 1987) and (August 6,  (August  said  p e a c e - a c c o r d , "I am a  t o h e l p me w i t h o u t  f o r c e and t o g e o - p o l i t i c a l  I n d i a Today  support  See A p p e n d i x  t h e w o r l d ' s powers have a c c e p t e d  a finger  York Times  "superior  "we  represents  1987). J.R. Jayewardene  of the J u l y  ... I t ' s a f a c t and t h a t  won't  8,  the s i g n i n g  L a n k a , " G l o b e and M a i l  leader  strategies.  (August 8, 1987) and  See a l s o B r u c e Mathews, "Tough  rally  Lanka agreement  1, 1987).  immediately  this  1987).  t o the I n d i a - S r i  B. See a l s o New York Times (August  6,  in  Three Star group  the  massacre.  1987).  It  The  LTTE  accused India  (a l o o s e o r g a n i z a t i o n  comprising  denied  its  of u s i n g the PLOTE,  TELO  43  and  EPRLF)  give  her  the  obstacle 7  and as  to  carry  opportunity  to I n d i a ' s  India  Mail  Today  13,  the  'total  14,  rampage  to  attack  i n the the  east  LTTE  in order  —  to  the  main  also  Globe  c o n t r o l ' over S r i Lanka.  (November  (October  January  out  20,  15,  1987), pp.  22,  26  and  8-14.  November  See 15,  1987  as  well  1988).  "Ibid. 9  The Associated  the  Tamils  the  [Indian]  General, Lanka,  s o l d i e r s and  said  Today  See  15,  bulk  15,  Mail  and  Mail  1 2  There  are  two  of  the  ethnic  Tamils are stock,  from N o r t h  India.  Sri  migration  population  can  be  de  jungle."  left  (November 2,  5,  31,  of  1987). See  past  Lieutenant troop  in S r i  [Jaffna] 1987)  no  and  India  also  India  Today  1987).  thought  traced  and  from  are  3-16.  northern  of  U n i v e r s i t y of  the  G a n a n a t h O b e y s e k e r e t o New  to  migrated  S r i Lanka,  India,  of  the  S.J.  the  Dravidian  Delhi:  Second, a l t h o u g h  Dismantling  Chicago Press  racial  while  A r y a n s who  back t o S o u t h I n d i a . and  the  First,  belong  A History  ( 1 9 8 1 ) , pp.  came  concerning  population.  Sinhalese  Silva,  C h i c a g o : The by  slip  of  38.  majority  Fratricide  letter  "most  managed t o  guerrillas]  Lankan  Lanka E t h n i c  the  stated  Indian  from S o u t h I n d i a  K.M.  ...  i n t o the  Mail  (October schools  the  1987)  38.  Oxford U n i v e r s i t y Press initial  25,  Commander of  (November  1987), p.  Globe  minority  [of  1987), p.  1 1  composition  the  a l s o G l o b e and  " G l o b e and  (December  escaped  Singh,  "the  (December 1  (October  [secessionist guerrillas]  Depinder  question."  Press  b u l k of  the the  Tambiah, S r i  Democracy.  (1986), p. York Times  5.  See  quoted  also in  44  Tambiah, the  pp.  Future  Development,  Violence  Democracy  For R a t i o n a l  p.  Tambiah,  1 3  1  183-184 and G. O b e y s e k e r a , " P o l i t i c a l  72. p.  Schwarz,  1 5  Quoted  Lanka). 1 8  Conflict  University  Change"  "Ethnic  Press  1 9  Roberts,  119-125, 2 0  A  dilemma If  136-137 and  agree  country  MP's  to  3 (July  "Ethnic  we  that  in  the  [Tamils'] we  agreed  Party.  same f a t e w i l l  in  Sri  Accommodation," 364.  74.  Jayawardena,  1960s  elucidated  elites:  their  have  to  Lanka:  Development,  Conflict  1978), p. p.  164.  in S r i  For R a t i o n a l  Obeysekere,  i n an e l e c t i o n . We  that  of C e y l o n ( S r i  Consciousness  Roberts,  speech  say  [Tamil] Federal the  21.  160-161.  f a c e d by S i n h a l e s e  straightaway  say  12, No.  pp. 364-367.  Sinhala  we  S r i Lanka - The  ( 1 9 7 3 ) , p.  and, S i n h a l e s e P e r s p e c t i v e s : B a r r i e r s S t u d i e s , Volume  Rights  ( 1 9 8 4 ) , p. i v .  ( 1 9 8 4 ) , p.  i n Committee  See a l s o M i c h a e l  in  i n S r i Lanka - An  Development,  D e l h i : Navrang  Jayawardena,  and  116-119.  Ethnic  i n R o b e r t N. K e a r n e y , The P o l i t i c s  Kumari  Lanka  New  quoted  13.  Rational  Ithaca: Cornell  Continuity  pp.  For  1984,  The M i n o r i t y  D e l h i : G a n d h i Peace F o u n d a t i o n  Conflict.  1 7  ( 1 9 8 6 ) , p.  Phadnis,  Committee  Ethnic  Asian  25  Urmila  O v e r v i e w . New 16  P o c k e t Book of S r i Lanka The T a m i l s o f S r i L a n k a ,  Group R e p o r t No.  pp.  4.  "Statistical  Walter  i n S r i L a n k a " i n Committee  and  I am  proposals  I  can  can n e v e r go back t o t h e will  be hounded  out i f  t o the requirement perfectly  come t o t h e SLFP  we  of t h e  certain  ... They w i l l  that not  the  45  be  able  to  Quoted Politics  face  the  in  of  polls.  Kearney,  Communal ism  and  C e y l o n . Durham: Duke U n i v e r s i t y  Language i n  Press  (1967),  the p.  117. A.J.  2 1  Wilson,  "Politics  1948"  i n K.M.  de  Hurst  and  (1977), p.  For  Co.  2 2  Ibid.,  2 3  The  and 2  in  K.M.  since C.  285.  Tamil  homeland c o n c e p t  Silva  argues that parts  of  the  Managing E t h n i c  Lanham: U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s  the  is controversial. Sinhalese  eastern  Tensions  of  America  in  1956.  had  been  province  and  in Multi-Ethnic (1986),,pp.  212-  260-261.  " S c h w a r z , p.  10.  2 5  Wilson,  p.  296.  2 6  The  UNP  won  only  2 7  The  basic Tamil  the  north  1950s and and  eastern with  plantation  Tamils.  six-point  plan  above t h e  In  seats  demands put  f o r w a r d by  (a)  regional  provinces;  (b) p a r i t y of  Sinhala;  (c)  of  K.M.  Silva,  autonomy status  citizenship  1985,  following  abolition both Tamil  freedom; of  included  f o r the  p.  the Tamil  for 397.  all The  of  (c) t h e  i n 1972  for  rights  Managing E t h n i c ,  Party  f o l l o w i n g demands: (a) a c o n s t i t u t i o n a l g u a r a n t e e and  FP  Federal  the  rights  the  de  the  in a d d i t i o n to  fundamental state;  eight  1960s were:  language  the  de  district.  Societies.  Development  ( e d . ) , S r i Lanka - A S u r v e y . L o n d o n :  i n many i n t e r i o r  Vanni  Political  294.  traditional  a majority  216  p.  instance,  the  Silva  and  (b)  the  concept  of  u n t o u c h a b i l i t y . I b i d . , p.  m i l i t a n t s and  f o u r demands a t Thimpu  moderates  put  a  secular  257. forward  (Bhutan) p e a c e t a l k s :  (1)  46  the  recognition  o f t h e T a m i l s as a  district  the  recognition  of a T a m i l homeland  i n S r i Lanka;  of  self-determination;  T a m i l s who  full  r e g a r d e d S r i Lanka  Consistently homeland  (4)  —  bilingualism  —  citizenship  of  political  p a r i t y of s t a t u s  (c) c i t i z e n s h i p r i g h t s f o r p l a n t a t i o n 2 8  A.  Sivanandan,  Underdevelopment," 1984), p.  3  7.  °Sivanandan,  p.  3 1  Schwarz,  For  Emergency  a  3 3  A.J.  p.  James  p.  of the r i o t s  Sinhala;  the P o l i t i c s No.  1  of  (Summer  Electoral Politics  University  Press  i n an Emergent  ( 1 9 7 5 ) , pp.  State.  25-26.  26.  Jupp,  S r i Lanka  ( 1 9 7 8 ) , p.  - T h i r d W o r l d Democracy.  Wilson,  3 8  Hugh  Electoral Politics,  Seton-Watson,  Separatism."  London:  o f London,  S e p a r a t i s m , No.  18 and J u p p , p.  pp.  "Reflections Institute  Collected  19, p. P.  London:  13.  3 7  Theodore  see T a r z i e V i t t a c h i ,  Andre D e u t s c h ( 1 9 5 8 ) .  I b i d . See a l s o S i v a n a n d a n , p.  3 9  and  Tamils.  Volume XXVI,  3 6  University  Tamil  303.  Cambridge  Frank Cass  of  account  Wilson,  "Ibid.,  3 5  a  (b) a p o l i c y of  Tamil  L a n k a : R a c i s m and  and C l a s s ,  (a)  12.  14.  '58. London:  Wilson,  3  of  good  3 2  London:  power;  p.  13. p.  2 9  "Sri  Race  rights for a l l  were:  f o r both  (2)  (3) t h e r i g h t  as t h e i r home. Schwarz,  p r e s e n t e d T a m i l demands  devolution  nationality;  13.  130-132. on  Europe's  Experience  of  Commonwealth  Studies,  Seminar  P a p e r s on The  Politics  1.  Wright  Jr.,  "South  Asian  Separatist  47  Movements,"  Collected  Peter  0 0  Realm,  Lyon,  "Separatism  1948-1965," C o l l e c t e d  4  1  R.  2  Wood,  Framework," C a n a d i a n 1 (March tt3  and S e c e s s i o n  Seminar P a p e r s ,  in  the  Malaysian  p . 69.  "Secession:  A  Comparative  J o u r n a l of P o l i t i c a l  Analytical  S c i e n c e , Volume  XIV,  1981), p . 110.  I_bid.  4,  in  p . 5.  I_bid.  * John  No.  Seminar P a p e r s ,  W.H.  Morris  the P o l i t i c s  Jones,  "Realities  of Separatism,"  IV, No. 1 ( J a n u a r y  and Dreams: Ebb and Flow  E t h n i c Studies Report,  Volume  1986), p . 2.  * Wood, p . 109. 5  4 6  Arend  Politics,  Lijphart,  Volume 21, No. 2 ( J a n u a r y  * Eric  A.  7  Societies.  Ian  Lustick,  3 (April 9  Public  1969), pp. 207-225.  Conflict  in  Deeply  Milton  5  pp. 21-33. Divided  Societies: Volume  31,  J . Esman,  "The Management  o f Communal  Conflict,"  1973), p . 56. The o t h e r syncretic  integration  pluralism.  'Ibid.  5 2  state  Harvard  pp. 330-332.  P o l i c y , Volume 21, No. 1 ( W i n t e r  balanced  in Divided  Affairs,  versus C o n t r o l , " World P o l i t i c s ,  three options are induced a s s i m i l i a t i o n , and  Regulation  No. 29 ( 1 9 7 2 ) ,  "Stability  World  1979), pp. 325-344.  " Ibid., 5 0  Democracy,"  for International  O c c a s i o n a l Paper,  Consociationalism No.  Nordlinger,  Cambridge: Centre  University, 0 8  "Consociational  R u t h McVey, in  "Separatism  Perspective,"  Lim  and t h e P a r a d o x e s o f t h e N a t i o n Joo-Jock  and  Vani  S.,  Armed  48  Separatism  i n Southeast  Asia.  S t u d i e s Programme, I n s t i t u t e Giovanni  5 3  A.  Praeger 5 f t  Sartori,  ( 1 9 6 5 ) , pp.  Alvin  Plural  Societies,"  475.  See  Societies:  C h a r l e s E. M e r r i l l 5 5  Alvin  Democratic  and  T h e o r y . New  Kenneth  Patterns  Rabushka  A Theory  Strategic  of S o u t h e a s t A s i a n S t u d i e s ,  of  A.  York:  and  Rabushka  and  4  p.  13.  Frederick  "Political  Instability  (April  Shepsle,  of D e m o c r a t i c ( 1 9 7 2 ) , pp.  Shepsle,  Democratic  Race, Volume 7, No.  also  Regional  67-68.  Rabushka  E n t r e p r e n e u r s h i p and  Singapore:  1971),  Politics  Instability.  pp.  in 461-  in Plural Columbus:  82-86.  K e n n e t h A.  Shepsle, P o l i t i c s  i n , p.  90. 5 6  R.S.  Vancouver:  Milne,  Politics  University  of  in Ethnically  British  Columbia  Bipolar  Press  States.  (1981),  pp.  184-185. 5 7  Ibid.,  p.  5 8  Robert  Melson  Politics American  of  1970),  M.R.  and  Howard Wolpe,  Communalism:  Political  (September 59  185. •  A  Theoretical  S c i e n c e Review, p.  Paribatra  " F a c t o r s b e h i n d Armed S e p a r a t i s m : A  6 0  This  guerrilla  Bard  consistent s h o u l d be  unjust s o c i a l  Bard  E.  in Southeast A s i a ,  fighter  d e s t r o y an 6 1  is  E. O ' N e i l l ,  O'Neill,  and  the  Perspective,"  The  Volume  LXIV,  No.  3  1122.  Sukhumband  Armed S e p a r a t i s m  "Modernization  w i t h Che a  and  Chai-Anan  Framework p.  for  Analysis,"  5.  Guevara's  social  Samudavanija,  assertion  reformer  that  committed  a to  system. " I n s u r g e n c y : A Framework f o r A n a l y s i s , "  William  R.  Heaton  and  Donald  J. Alberts  49  (eds.), Press  I n s u r g e n c y i n t h e Modern W o r l d .  ( 1 9 8 0 ) , pp. " I b i d . , p.  in,  6 a  M a o Tse-Tung  pp.  5-26. quoted  i n Bard E. O ' N e i l l  6 6  Walter  By  Malays  Sonderland,  i n , p.  greater  i n the p o l i t i c a l  Thailand  provinces  in  southern  Ibid.,  p.  6 9  Samuel  B.  Y o r k : Anchor Edward  Revolutionary  Thailand,  Comparative New  Muslim-  movement  Jersey:  i n the  Movements -  Prentice-Hall  71. Griffith,  Mao  Tse-Tung  P r e s s ( 1 9 7 8 ) , pp.  L.  Katzenbach,  S t r a t e g y o f Mao  17-23  Jr.  ( 1 9 6 2 ) , p.  137.  'Ibid.,  p.  19.  7 2  Ibid.,  p.  21.  7 3  Ibid.,  p.  22.  Moreno, and  "Che  Evaluation"  in  in Franklin  Y o r k : The p.  on G u e r r i l l a Sam  Warfare.  and Gene Z. H a n r a h a n .  Tse-Tung"  Guevara  on G u e r r i l l a (translation).  See a l s o G r i f f i t h ,  Practice  Muslim-  i n the  Revolutionary  Glencoe  J.  the  t h e government of  secessionist  W a r f a r e . New  B  of  machinery  ( e d . ) , Modern G u e r r i l l a  7  et a l ,  59-74.  6 8  7 0  E. O ' N e i l l  1980s.  f o r T h e o r y and J u s t i c e .  ( 1 9 8 4 ) , pp.  Bard  administrative  T h o m a s H. G r e e n e ,  Search  in  participation  weakened t h e M u s l i m M a l a y  1970s and 67  quoted  19.  encouraging  dominated  7  et a l , Insurgency  13.  Insurgency  New  3.  Ibid.,  6 5  late  Westview  1-3.  6 3  p.  Colorado:  C.  "The  Mark Osanka  Free  Press  of  27.  Warfare: Sarkesian  Doctrine, (ed.),  50  Revolutionary Inc.  Guerrilla  ( 1 9 7 5 ) , p. 7 5  Ibid.  7 6  Ibid.,  7 7  Hugh  ( 1 9 8 1 ) , p.  p.  Chicago: Precedent  Publishing  396.  415.  Purcell, 70.  Warfare.  Revolutionary  War.  Melbourne:  Nelson  51  CHAPTER  THE  EMERGENCE OF  TWO  A SECESSIONIST CONFLICT IN  SRI  LANKA'S  MAJORITARIAN DEMOCRACY The  primary  purpose  of  this  chapter  i s t o e x p l a i n the  emergence of t h e T a m i l demand f o r s e c e s s i o n i n S r i L a n k a . historical  review  increasing in  1931 The  the  of t h e T a m i l - S i n h a l a r e l a t i o n s h i p t r a c e s t h e  alienation  and  between t h e s e  two  c u l m i n a t i n g i n the bloody  1931  This  relationship  beginning  anti-Tamil riots  Donoughmore C o n s t i t u t i o n  Tamil-Sinhala  e t h n i c groups  exposed  by  the  in  1983.  fragility  significantly  of  shifting  political  power t o t h e m a j o r i t y S i n h a l e s e w i t h o u t  establishing  sufficient  checks  Constitution  and  balances.  The  1  1947  gave more p r o t e c t i o n t o t h e m i n o r i t i e s ; success  of t h e C o n s t i t u t i o n  was  left  succumbed t o p r e s s u r e s e m a n a t i n g nationalistic power on the  main  forces.  a Sinhala-Buddhist Tamil  demands  'institutionalized' against  With  3  the  standing Tamil  Tamils.  grown t o s u c h  J.R.  reforms. an  extent  By  to  illuminate  emerging  S.W.R.D.  and  both  rise  accommodation The  UF  some of the  long-  and  non-  were t o o m i n i m a l  demand. for  of  discrimination  however, T a m i l ' a l i e n a t i o n  reasons  to  government  constitutional  reforms  who  Sinhala-Buddhist  economic  secessionist the  working  Bandaranaike's  J a y e w a r d e n e met  that these  too b e l a t e d to c o n t a i n the attempts  from  1977,  the  t o the m a j o r i t y e l i t e s  became d i f f i c u l t . "  demands t h r o u g h  constitutional  however,  p l a t f o r m i n 1956,  political 5  2  Soulbury  the  This failure  had and  chapter of  the  52  Sinhalese  l e a d e r s h i p t o accommodate  hence t o c h e c k T a m i l From  the  the  early  on  c a s t e and  religion  of  elites  competition  inter-elite  participated economic the  late  than  contrast,  service,  numbers.  There  Sinhalese decision paved  British  elites. to begin  the  way  Legislative  council, elected.  the  representation became b a s e d  on  the  in  the  1920s,  the  the  or  Intra-  7  interested  in  politics  in  Due  9  who  to a lack  of  capitalized  on  British the  But in  in  council,  to  the  large and  government's local  elites  reforms  the  elections  to  the  Tamil-Sinhala the  reformed  three Tamils  were  S i n h a l e s e and  Tamil  competition  which  t o some  minorities into  S i n h a l e s e and  factors,  than  enthusiastically  power w i t h  nearly equal. E l i t e  Karava  between t h e T a m i l  reforms.  first  the  Sinhalese.  bureaucracy  introduced tensions  ethnic  and  elites  recruiting  i n the p r e - r e f o r m e d was  by  more  reforms  competition  f o r example, t h i r t e e n But,  were  colonial  political  During  political  more p r o n o u n c e d  the T a m i l s ,  sharing p o l i t i c a l  Council  relationship.  of  little  for  based  e d u c a t i o n a l o p p o r t u n i t i e s and,  policy  In  The  6  century.  this period.  north,  and  until  was  caste)  Tamils  Tamil  during  joined was  the  elites  the  i n the  e x c e l l e n t missionary  public  - high  nineteenth  in p o l i t i c a l  in p o l i t i c s  the  ethnicity.  been c h a l l e n g e d  between  Sinhalese  resources  extent,  on  century  i n S r i Lanka  (cultivator  s i n c e the  demands  nineteenth  among t h e S i n h a l e s e was  the  In  late  competition  had  economic a c t i v i t i e s 8  the  Council  Tamil  tendencies.  r a t h e r than  competition  Furthermore,  general.  of  t h e Goyigamas  Legislative  (fisherman) elite  beginning  twentieth, e l i t e  domination Ceylon  secessionist  vital  slowly  increasingly communalized  53  political  development  ethnicity  gathered  Politicization  in  Sri  Lanka.  The  p o l i t i c i z a t i o n of  momentum i n t h e post-1931  of E t h n i c i t y  and G r o w i n g  period.  Tamil  A l i e n a t i o n , 1931-  1970: W i t h t h e i n t r o d u c t i o n o f t h e Donoughmore 1931,  the c o o p e r a t i v e  elites  coexistence  century  competitive  weakened  universal  representation composition political  was  coexistence.  introduced  Lanka  the  which,  population,  o u t of f i f t y  election  held  in  were S i n h a l e s e ;  created  exclusive  election. enjoyed  under  1 2  The  their  seats  in  opposed  of  Tamil  Tamil  which the  Sinhalese.  the  campaign  anxiety  territorial  the  demographic  enhanced For  instance,  i n the f i r s t the also  the  State  Donoughmore successfully  Board of M i n i s t e r s a f t e r the  particularly  the  middle  and economic democracy  decision-making  between  of c a b i n e t  the  posts.  c a n be i n t e r p r e t e d e i t h e r  class  benefits since  division  Sinhalese 1 3  The  as a  it  machinery.  demanded a " f i f t y - f i f t y "  legislature share  and  1 0  under  the Sinhalese  i n the c e n t r a l  m i n o r i t i e s a n d an e q u a l fifty"  to  majoritarian  the Tamils  r e p l a c e d by Constitution  inevitably  1931  Sinhalese Tamils,  role  Consequently, of  due  disproportionate p o l i t i c a l  the B r i t i s h ,  threatened  1 1  i n the e a r l y  ultimately  elected candidates  Constitution an  politics  franchisement  in  and S i n h a l e s e  Donoughmore  s t r e n g t h of the m a j o r i t y  Council  which  and  The  adult  in S r i of  thirty-eight  1936  among t h e T a m i l  w h i c h had c h a r a c t e r i z e d S r i Lankan  twentieth  Constitution  and  "fifty-  reflection  f o r p r o t e c t i o n i n a m a j o r i t a r i a n democracy i n  Sinhalese  were  already  asserting  their  dominant  54  political  position,  accept  their  of  two  the  that  minority  However,  representation such  democracy.  ensure Elite  was  the  Commission  power  caste  elite  the  in  the  fragility  w i l l i n g n e s s of "passions"  Sinhala-Buddhist Dharmapala, the  did  mobilize  for in  in  faith  1944  in  of the to  society.  Sinhalese  middle  reconciliation Soulbury  the  balanced  willingness  in  an  Constitution  29(2)  Tamils  its  elites,  and  i n the  desire  allowed north  to  and  transfer  ignored  the  fragility  ethnic  stability  of  in  a  exposed  by  country. of  competitive  the to  Sinhalese consolidate  elite  the  coexistence  was  counter-elites power and  win  rekindled  revivalist,  exploit  i n the  by  which reached major  to  1950s.  Anagarika i t s climax  impetus  for  in the  accommodation. S.W.R.D. B a n d a r a n a i k e  h e s i t a t e to e x p l o i t t h i s the  the  a g u a r a n t e e of  provided of  of  working  its  and  Section  nationalism,  mid-1950s,  not  under  Commission,  a Buddhist  disintegration  Tamil  one  argued  'tyranny'  the  leadership's  1  conservative  democratic  ethnic  Tamils  for  distort  e n v i r o n m e n t . " The  representation  However, the  The  the  displayed  the  rights  accommodation as  plural  The  as  S o u l b u r y Commission  l e a d e r s h i p would p r o v i d e  competitive  to  Sinhala  between  guaranteed minority  1 5  island.  demand  would also  r e f u s a l to  p r o t e c t i o n of m i n o r i t i e s i n a m u l t i - e t h n i c  class-high  east.  the  Tamils'  self-perception  Tamils'  r e j e c t e d by  accommodation  weightage  the  the  would c o n t a i n  the  conservative  of  their  g r o u p s on  representation  The  ethnically  a result  representation  majority.  moderate  as  s t a t u s and  major e t h n i c  equal  because  or  vernacular-educated  nationalism  to appeal  Sinhala-Buddhist  to  and  middle-class.  55  The  United National Party  religious  policy  F o r example, Sinhala only  and  also modified  i n i t s attempt  t h e UNP Tamil  official  (UNP)  dropped  political  its earlier  policy  languages  t o adopt  1956.  development  as o f f i c i a l  language  to r e t a i n  in  The  competitive  two-party  system  nationalism  was  f o r the p o l i t i c a l  resulted win  By  1 6  together  1965 with  both  S i n h a l a as the  However,  the  accommodate  t o be  UNP the  t h e UNP  sole  under  Sinhala linguistic  and  official  Shepsle  suggest,  t o win  political  communalization  (FP),.built 'saviour'  on  rising  parties  outbidding  S r i Lanka Freedom  l a n g u a g e of was  Party  the  As  had  country.  willing  compromising  process.  to  parties,  n a t i o n a l i s m . Hence t h e UNP  entrepreneurs  the  of a h i g h l y  base of b o t h  demands w i t h o u t  of t h e T a m i l s  inception,  t h e FP's  Sri  Lanka gave  i t an  The  success  of FP  Congress  Ponnambalam Jaffna.  1 8  to  gains  continued  Rabushka  and  r e s o r t e d to outbidding  to appeal  attempts  the  the  the  which  to  to appeal  been  emerge  the e a s t .  with  t o the g r o w i n g  T a m i l s . E v e n t u a l l y , the TC  the From  1 7  of  i n the T a m i l the  end  established  w i t h a narrow m i d d l e - c l a s s s u p p o r t TC  as  t o a l l the T a m i l s  base  beginning had  the F e d e r a l P a r t y  n o r t h and  extensive support  (TC),  helped  nationalism,  i n both  signalled  i n 1944 But  of p o l i t i c s  Tamil  its  failed  establishing  elections.  The  Tamil  dominance.  Sinhala-Buddhist  Senanayake  v u l n e r a b l e t o the o u t b i d d i n g  and  S i n h a l a as  'progressive' l e f t  Dudley  main T a m i l  which  of  ethno-religious  t h e main  accepted  made by  in  i n e a c h succumbing t o  votes.  (SLFP),  crucial  i t s language  i t s moderate n a t i o n a l i s t "ethnic consciousness"  became a m a r g i n a l  party  in  areas. of  the  by  G.G.  base  in  policy, of  i n the  the Tamil  56  areas. The  formation  included  under  peaceful  policies  were  no  relationship. a  i n the  attempt  a National both  which turned led  by  fundamental  out  be  in  and  which  and  despite  cordial  relationship  with  significant  concessions  from  extract  any  system  which  allow  had  evolved,  ethnic  the  p o l a r i z a t i o n of As  issues.  outbidding  participation  ethnic theory  in  appeals  t o win  m o d e r a t e UNP "ethnic  and  and  --  on  arrival  politics  of  an  of of  i n S r i L a n k a . The  the  The  after  politics  to  no  FP,  of  not  political  1956,  harmony on  did  not  moderation the  surface,  unabated. in  non-elite  since to  FP  1956  make  outbid  emerge  respective  political  Front  government's  end,  him.  elites  issues  outbidding  hence,  Senanayake, c o u l d  SLFP and  ethnic  not  an a n t i - n a t i o n a l ,  particularly  their  could  United  increase  Sinhalese  ethnic  The  Tamil-Sinhalese  the  forces continued  e l e c t i o n s . B o t h the  m i d - 1 9 5 0 s . The  moderation  ethnic  suggests,  representatives"  introduced  the  politics  TC  In  of  1 9  groups;  the  as  particularly  Despite  2 1  encouraged both Tamil  the  2 0  the major p a r t i e s t o p r a c t i c e t h e  on  mirage.  the  depicted  move.  political  p o p u l i s t p a r t i e s with  anti-Sinhala, its  a  by  which  back a p e r i o d  the  reconciliation  anti-Buddhist  the  ethnic  constrained  areas,  of  Senanayake  both  of p r o g r e s s i v e  at a T a m i l - S i n h a l a  to  Dudley  to  Government,  brought  changes  Senanayake was  Tamil  ends  leadership,  acceptable  coalition  of  from  UNP  Government  implement  roots  the  coexistence  National  (UF),  1965  communal p a r t i e s  spectrum  there  in  political  more  strong  groups  in  entrepreneurs  which d e s t r o y e d entrepreneurs  the  as  ethnic  ethnic  political from  the  57  Sinhalese  majority  e x p e n s e of  the  alienation  i n the  ethnic  Tamil  The of  Sri  generated The  next  Challenge,  Lanka. by  this  decade  inflicted  The  'radical',  returned  the  The  UF  the  majority. FP  of  failed  UNP  and  A  2 3  with  and  to appeal  of  of  forever.  the  obtained  end  be  The  a  of UF  three-  for  to Tamil  reasons  nationalist  described  as  a  leaders, including FP  candidates  m a j o r i t y . The  t h e TC,  forces  separatism.  l a r g e number of a reduced  history  social  country  Meanwhile,  i t s well-entrenched  image  of  clear  the  party  no  t o win  that  the  formation  of  the  meaningful concessions  election  whose l e a d e r  G.G.  the  FP  as a  longer  "king  had  government.  the 2 5  The  from  the  central  of  the  party's  f e d e r a l i s m , b r o u g h t d i s i l l u s i o n m e n t among  Tamils,  together  particularly  on  the  influence  of  a  political  changed the  shattered  ability  objective  Tamil  2  i t was  government,  economic  emergence of  disintegration  maker" s i n c e  inability  the  defeated. "  election  to  at  growing  of  acceleration  the  defeat  Parliament  Ponnambalam was  FP's  and  were d e f e a t e d .  to  Rise  i n the  p a r t y ' s performance c o u l d three  a l s o confirmed  The  the  crushing  mini-disaster; a  witnessed  the  the  a watershed  election  below,  sentiments.  and  crucial  parliamentary  explained  to  own  1960s.  political,  coexistence a  led  their  1970-1977:  The  2 2  favoured  which  of E t h n i c i t y  1970 . e l e c t i o n was  competitive  fourths  minority  1950s and  Institutionalization Secessionist  groups  the  with  y o u t h -formed  the  the  the  staleness  post-independent government  with  generation. a  three-fourths  58  majority. A coalition  and  Tamil  MP  the  political-economic  assumed power, and  Ethnicization  of  significantly  curtailed basic  particularly  after  1956,  In  i n i t was  1970,  demand  admissions  by  ethnic  faculties their  was  enter  the  Admission  to  were "the to Of  as  in  for t o the 1970  process system  Thus  to  Tamils,  unfair,  and  to  a  imbalance  in  university  minimum marks f o r in  the  modified  of  by  Sinhalese.  Thus, a  faculty  university  three  the  new  and  university mediums  to  language." system  instance,  dropped 16.3%  that  proportionate  i n each  for  2 9  admission  language  admission  Tamils;  to  was  in turn, ensured  examination  i n 1973,  Tamil  ethno-linguistic  Under the  the  of e n g i n e e r i n g  24.4%  to  university.  i n each' l a n g u a g e would be  minority  'prestige'  standardization  common s c a l e . T h i s ,  f o r the  different  correspond  the  the  f o r the  marks from  2 8  Sinhala  marks t h a n a S i n h a l e s e  faculties  s t a n d a r d i z a t i o n of  to  2 6  responded  language-based  raw  a  the  country.  political  m e d i c i n e d i d not  i n t a k e of  number s i t t i n g  admission  and  the  this  the  Sinhalese  sole c r i t e r i o n  to  the  i n the p r e - 1 9 7 4 p e r i o d .  was  number q u a l i f y i n g  disastrous  of  the  the  of  demands.  the  different  1972  system,  course,  correct  number  merit  reduced  the  40.8%  to  ratio  By  increase  entrance  of  government  science-based  criterion. introduced  ability  required to obtain higher  by  r e s t r u c t u r i n g of  began t o view democracy a s  engineering  population  elected  decision-making  minority  UF  The  2 7  of  student  the  imposing  groups.  single  s e r i o u s l y eroded.  the  nationalist  a  promised a r a d i c a l  political  the  faith  without  infrastructure  the  accommodate  their  a cabinet  was Tamil  sharply i n 1 974.  3 0  from 3 1  The  59  main o b j e c t i v e of was in  to  standardization, according  " n e u t r a l i z e the  science  subjects."  Whereas between t h e  superior  the  north  jeopardizing the  legal  its and  devices the the  in  political  power t o s t o p inability  Tamil  youth  eroding, Vimukthi  the  exploded  the  without  FP  used  discriminate  strengthen  nor  the  TC  its  had  moderate  the Tamil  i n the  disenchantment providing  Tamil  waged  for  areas. democracy  population  led  abortive  'war'  an  the  incentives  in parliamentary  Sinhalese  of  was  by  was  Janatha  against  the  of e d u c a t e d unemployed  rural  into a Marxist-led  insurrection in A p r i l ,  1971. * T h i s  was  both  ( d o m i n a t e d by  within  rooted  open c o n f r o n t a t i o n and  a  in class  Sinhalese) the  the  limited  3 5  the  political  India 3 6  regular  youth 3  ideology)  and  on  early reversals,  u p r i s i n g r u t h l e s s l y and  insurrection.  against  (Marxist  bases. Despite  a c o u p l e of m o n t h s .  in containing  leaders  and  in turn  faith  (JVP)  government s u p p r e s s e d  control role  the  from  government  to  a  frustration  insurrection ethnic  frustration  Tamils'  g o v e r n m e n t . The  the  now  influence c e n t r a l decision-makers  of p o l i t i c s  Peramuna  Tamils  t h i s d i s c r i m i n a t i o n . The  increased,  a segment of  the  democracy t o  Neither  balance  parliament,  The  in order  a  exclusively  ignore  re-election.  3 3  to  e x p o s e d . Thus the  radicalization  Silva, students  held  power  could  minority  south.  again  While  east  Tamil  further  de  Tamil  had  p a r t i e s i n the  of p a r l i a m e n t a r y  position  leadership's  parties  political  i t s c h a n c e s of  openly against  the  Tamil  Sinhalese  government w h i c h drew outside  p e r f o r m a n c e of  R.  3 2  previously dominant  t o C.  played  a  regained  significant  Organizational  weakness,  army, c o n f l i c t  among  base were  some  of  the  the  major  60  factors The  which  anti-India  their  cause  c o n t r i b u t e d to the f a i l u r e sentiments  either.  of the i n s u r r e c t i o n i s t s d i d not  The u p r i s i n g  3 7  of the i n s u r r e c t i o n . help  made t h e UF government more  r e p r e s s i v e and i n t o l e r a n t  i n d e a l i n g with o p p o s i t i o n . Moreover,  the government's m i l i t a r y  success caused  ability  t o meet e x t r a - p a r l i a m e n t a r y c h a l l e n g e s .  uprising  exposed  insurrection. youths  the v u l n e r a b i l i t y  No doubt  this  However,  o f t h e government  had a d e m o n s t r a t i o n  the  t o armed  effect  on T a m i l  i n 1970 t o r e p l a c e t h e  Soulbury  i n the north.  The  UF government d e c i d e d  Constitution UF  i t to overestimate i t s  w i t h a "home-made" R e p u b l i c a n  government p r e s e n t e d  Soulbury  the following  as  Constitution.  major  flaws  3 8  The  i n the  Constitution:  .... t h e e x i s t e n c e . o f an e n t r e n c h e d c l a u s e ( C l a u s e 29) which safeguarded minorities against discriminatory legislation; the right of j u d i c i a l r e v i e w by t h e c o u r t s o v e r the c o n s t i t u t i o n a l i t y of legislation passed by p a r l i a m e n t ; c o l o n i a l - o r i e n t e d a d m i n i s t r a t i v e machinery; a bi-cameral legislature; and the i n e q u a l i t y of the a d u l t vote under t h e e x i s t i n g system of d e l i m i t i n g c o n s t i t u e n c i e s i n t h e legislature with i t s weighted b i a s i n favour of the r u r a l a r e a s and r e m o t e r p a r t s o f t h e c o u n t r y . 3 9  All  but the  last  were  dealt  with  in  SLFP,  the  major  coalition  partner,  Constitution  inhibited  Sinhala-  hence, u n l i k e  t h e Lanka  Constitution.  For  the  section  the  Soulbury  29 o f  Buddhist  domination  Samasamaja P a r t y were  critical  beginning, change  of  the  island;  (LSSP) and t h e  the  Communist  perceived  Party  of the C o n s t i t u t i o n ' s ' c o l o n i a l '  t h e SLFP e n t h u s i a s t i c a l l y  favoured a  f o r narrow e t h n o - r e l i g i o u s r e a s o n s . '  Not  1972  surprisingly,  the  Republican  by t h e T a m i l s a s a n t i - T a m i l .  The  Republican  (CP), which  nature  from t h e  constitutional  0  Constitution Tamil  elites  was who  61  participated they  failed  i n the c o n s t i t u e n t assembly t o win  any  constitutional  government.  A l l the T a m i l  constituent  assembly  constitution." should  be  language  secular  Tamil to  May  the  12,  Tamil  1972,  youth  fundamental  rights,  "official  stipulated  to At  Section Tamil  The  2  should  Lanka  Ceylon  not  should  Workers'  organizations  TUF  presented the  main  decentralization and  b a n n i n g of  1972  did  that the  the  "The  Act  be  be  foremost  place  s t a t e t o p r o t e c t and  same 29(2)  the  time, of  leadership  Sinhala-Buddhist  rights the  formed  the  a six-point  plan  Tamil  demands:  once central  to  the  S i n h a l a as p r o v i d e d  of  1956," Lanka  and  and  accordingly i t shall  by  Buddhism w h i l e Section  18  safeguards  Constitution was  shall  e x p o s e d as  government. The  give be  (1)  impotent of  to the  (d).""' under  removed.  drafting  by  assuring  provided  were  the  i t also  Sri  foster  of  Tamil  C o n s t i t u t i o n stated that be  for  3  of  minority  again  system."  respond  33  granted  the S o u l b u r y  a  Congress  power, g u a r a n t e e  the c a s t e  shall  No.  Republic  of  not  Republican  Language  a l l religions the  TC,  student  l a n g u a g e of S r i Lanka  Official  of  and  official  demands were r e j e c t e d .  FP,  government  demands. T h u s , the  duty  Sri  incorporating  Tamils,  However, t h e  Buddhism  and  Tamil  s t a t u s f o r T a m i l , a s e c u l a r S r i Lanka, c i t i z e n s h i p  Indian  the  the  (TUF)."  government  official  Buddhism  the  draft  (1)  an  the  to  the  were: as  (2)  P r e d i c t a b l y , these  United Front  the  Sinhala;  i t when  from  to  demands  constitution  sole state r e l i g i o n  state.  and  with  the  concessions  amendment  important  by  from  i n S r i Lanka p r o p o s e d  nine-point  most  recognized  the  On (CWC)  The  1  along  declared  a  parties  withdrew  by  the  The the new  62  Republican about  the  Constitution usefulness  effectively the In  cut  majoritarian this  way,  groundwork The  r o l e of  the  in  deteriorated on  g r o u p s . But shrinking  since  the  of  and  the  largest  force.  In  40.7%  in  recruitment The  of  public  criteria  racial  services  1949,  and  but  dropped  Tamil  to  (civil  11%  of  15.3%  (standardization)  Tamils  r e j e c t i o n of  i n t o the  the  on  of  Tamil  the  was  The  the as work  proportion to  Sri  11%  Lankan  23.4%  in  government's  language  contributed  public  cabinet  state,  the  6  meet  c o m m i s s i o n as  which  1970-77."  restrictions  to  1966-77 and  in  the  affirmative  lines  the  the  competing  to a l l o c a t e  balance  in  service),  during  successive  rate  to  representation  Service  education  total  clerical  UF's  became  hence the  ethnic  expanded  S r i Lanka  the  instance,  service;  the  near-exclusive  among  services,  general  its  government  For  parties.  the  economy of  to  the  dropped  and  the  majority.  by  separatism.  government a d o p t e d  public  were  lay  account  resources  UF  helped  field  the  Administrative  only)  on  r e d i s t r i b u t i o n along the  national  economic  employer, determined  in  deliberate  i n the  used e t h n i c  p i e . The  body" of  the  a g r i c u l t u r e . The  independent  1970-77.  1963,  by  mid-1950s due  government  They  decision-making process  export-import  scarce  economic demands of  "controlling  was  the  plantation  discrimination  the  The  among T a m i l s  democracy.  T a m i l armed  post-l970s  5  doubts  chauvinism  government  the  economic  replaced  central  emergence of  major d i s t r i b u t o r  the  from the  ideology."  reliance  parliamentary  democracy p r a c t i s e d  f o r the  socialist  of  further  Sinhala-Buddhist  significantly  had  off  raised  (Sinhala to  the  low  service.  T a m i l demands by  the. UF  government,  63  together led its  w i t h the d i s c r i m i n a t o r y  to a Tamil protest v i c t o r y over  protest  without  to  introducing  mourning  and  repression violence Tamil  properties brutality eight  harsh  i n J a f f n a on  could result  of  accepted  these  In  to  its  i n the  State  north.'  The  7  i n t h e f o r e f r o n t of T a m i l against  1 974.  emergency violence  political  by T a m i l s a s a v i a b l e and  of  political  government  there  was  The  1,8  police  killings'  I n t e r n a t i o n a l Conference  political  clashes,  days  sporadic  response  1 0,  was  stoppage).  i n c l u d i n g the 'planned  January  under  not e l i m i n a t e ,  led  (TSF) was  a t . the Fourth  response  (work  w h i c h was d i r e c t e d  Tamils,  from  protest  observing  particularly  institutions.  against  Tamils  Research  Federation  and  fresh  t o the Tamil  Tamils'  while  hartals  non-violence  and v i o l e n c e ,  the  flags  i n the Tamil areas,  militancy  violently  policy,  accommodative measures t o a l l e v i a t e  black  conducting  against  Student  reacted  In t h e b e g i n n i n g ,  hoisting  admission  i n 1972. But t h e government,  t h e JVP r e b e l s ,  Tamil discontent. limited  university  of  of T a m i l  government's  powers d i d c o n t a i n , in  the  north.  violence  attractive  was  but  As  a  gradually  alternative  to  non-violence. How  did  the  changing p o l i t i c a l Chelvanayagam, in  protest  single the the  moderate  environment  the leader  against  Tamil  new  react  the  areas?  Tamil  o f t h e FP, r e s i g n e d  the government's f a i l u r e  T a m i l demand i n t o t h e new  government  in  leadership  to hold  constitution.  r e s p o n d e d by p o s t p o n i n g  The  UF  h i s seat  to 9  to t e s t Tamil  government,  the b y - e l e c t i o n  as  He  the  S.J.V. in  incorporate  constitution.*  a by-election  to  1972 a  challenged  response  to  previously,  f o r o v e r two y e a r s .  But  64  C h e l v a n a y a g a m won Due  to pressure  the b y - e l e c t i o n handsomely  from  dynamic p o l i t i c a l advocated  the d i s i l l u s i o n e d  agenda  separation.  election  victory:  "I w i s h  country  that  I  consider  mandate  that  the  sovereignty free."  Eelam  vested  nation  in  May  Tamil  1976,  United  "restoration  the  people  the  TUF  after  his  and  to  election  should  exercise  people  5 0  for a  at t h i s  Tamil  a t V a d d u k o d d a i , t h e TUF Liberation  and  Socialist  inevitable  i n order  nation  Front  reconstitution  Secular,  State  of  in this  (TULF) of  the  country."  5 2  and  the  Tamil  to safeguard  changed  and  Eelam very  The  enlivened  by  provocative  g o a l of T a m i l  support,  the  impressive  the  adoption  TULF  election  the as  a  the  become  victory  party —  The  dismal  i n the  east.  failure  years  had  not  secure  i t s objective.  with  t h e new  youth  a f o u r out  of  become of  under t h e  the joint  —  was  aggressive its  and  traditional  votes.to score  t h e p a r t y won five  that  an  a l l fourteen  c o n s t i t u e n c i e s with  a  5 3  non-violence  d e t e r r e d t h e TULF  from  E x p e c t a t i o n s among  increased  by  t h e TULF's commitment  to  lead  them t o the p r o m i s e d  was  committed  to  of  has  Thondaman  Along  to  Sovereign,  existence  highly  i n 1977;  name  resolved  ...  the  Eelam.  attracted  i n t h e n o r t h and  Tamil majority  of  its  Free,  l e a d e r s h i p of C h e l v a n a y a g a m , Ponnambalam and  seats  t h e need  s t a t e d i n 1975  verdict  1975.  5 1  In  Tamil  the  and  survival,  t o announce t o my  Tamil  already  youth  for i t s p o l i t i c a l Chelvanayagam  in January  in  the  adopting the  past  this policy  youth  to " l i b e r a t e "  twenty  had  the T a m i l s  l a n d of Eelam. However, the  parliamentary  democracy  and  ahimsa  to  been and TULF (non-  65  violence)  to  political  win  and  government's rhetorical  violence  of  took  alienation  closer  Dravida  Lankan sympathy early  other  an  and  cause.  moreover,  Munnetra Kazhagam  championing  south  Sri  did  not  electoral  c o n s i d e r a t i o n r a t h e r than  safe  both p a r t i e s  Lankan T a m i l s , a t l e a s t haven  repression  for and  youths  movements.  together  with  "Mother  running  the  DMK  and  the  the  Their Indian  close role  relied  in  from  contact  All-India each ethnic  transcends  narrow  sympathy  for  of S r i Lankan T a m i l s . T a m i l  l e a d e r s and  expatriates cultivated  the  by the  Nadu p r o v i d e d a S r i Lankan  with  of t h e  state  various  Tamil  Nadu,  successful liberation  of  i n S r i Lanka t h a t  upon f o r t h e p r o t e c t i o n and  liberation  the  were o f t e n m o t i v a t e d  c r e a t e d a p e r c e p t i o n among T a m i l s  I n d i a " c o u l d be  Sri  The  1970s. T a m i l  i n the  of  with  interests.  genuine  away  Tamil  to express i t s  g r a d u a l l y became t h e h e a d q u a r t e r s  guerrilla  Bangladesh,  i n the  strong  compete  Indian Tamils  differences.  Sri  hesitate  t h e DMK  The  5  accommodation  (AIADMK) t o  political  state. "  its  b r e a k u p of both  breakdown  t h e S r i Lankan  Nadu  with  Lankan T a m i l  bond between t h e S r i Lankan and But  brought  Tamil  the  caused  the  political  the consequent  for  The  TULF's  polarized  environment,  (DMK),  called  the  areas.  India's  Kazhagam  f o r the Tamil  in  in  interests  1970s,  such  Sinhalese  with  dangerously  i n S r i Lanka and  sentiments,  Anna D r a v i d a  In  the  together  i n the Tamil  to Tamils  Tamil  had  between n o r t h and  Munnetra  nationalist  stand,  nationalism,  deep r o o t  communication  Tamils  discrimination,  uncompromising  environment.  Tamil  In t h e meantime, p o l i c e r e p r e s s i o n ,  economic  Tamil  political  Eelam.  political  elites,  Indian connection  the youth  i n the  66  1970s.  The  'double  insecurity  among  difficulty The rule  The  UF  ideology,  Tamil  was  control  Consequently,  institutions  of  available  with  in  They  soon  Sinhalese  the Tamil  theory  of  government  Tamils.  Sri  with  The  Lanka.  'national'  parties  emerging  but  no  can  tried  be  to.  segment).  role  the T a m i l s '  The  Tamil  government d i d  in  faith  the  i n the  youth,  particularly,  political  l e a d e r s h i p and  no p o l i t i c a l  growing  frustration  generation  avenues were 'against  the  of T a m i l s , w h i c h grew environment,  became  r e s o r t e d t o v i o l e n c e when n e i t h e r t h e l e a d e r s h i p was  able  political  the  to . resolve  e x p l a i n s the  failure  accommodation  of a h i g h l y c o m p e t i t i v e  practice  their  system.  1970s t o r e a c h an  the communalization Hence  had  acrimonious  development  reinforced  The  to  by S i n h a l a -  (subordinate  party  outbidding partly  i n the  UF  the  the  Because  g r i e v a n c e s w i t h i n the e x i s t i n g The  the  government p o l i c y  traditional  ethnically  their  Tamils.  compromises  eroded.  their  radicalized.  in  UF  a result,  post-independent  an  nor  make  strategies.  to express this  the  explain  influenced  minority Tamils  the c o u n t r y  permanent  enabled  irreconcilable  p r o c e s s . As  political  system  i n 1970  heavily  or  over  were d i s e n c h a n t e d  the  helps  a  f u n d a m e n t a l demands of  t h e moderate T a m i l  decision-making  t h e UF  which  n a t i o n a l i s m . The  engage i n b a r g a i n i n g  system,  created  i n terms of t h e t h e o r y of c o n t r o l .  exercise  up  victory  i g n o r i n g the  nationalism,  'defensive'  its  Sinhalese  massive e l e c t i o n  explained  effect  i n r e a c h i n g a compromise w i t h t h e  minority.  not  the  the c o u n t r y ,  Buddhist  minority'  of t h e p o l i t i c a l of o u t b i d d i n g by  i n a h i g h l y communal e n v i r o n m e n t  of  with  two-party process the  two  blocked  any  67  accommodative p o l i c i e s government  led  policies  t h e UNP  and  'nationalist' Buddhist from  image, as a  inflexibility  d i d not  adopted  would  the  give  the  comeback  UNP  The  pro-Sinhalese  prevented  on  on  competition to avoid  ethnic on  UNP  issues.  The  vital  extremist  outbidding  to  the  moderate T a m i l  from  UF  an a n t i - S i n h a l a -  leadership  enormous p r e s s u r e  were c o m p e l l e d  Tamils.  openly  Thus, t h e SLFP  Sinhalese  parties,  minority  oppose them b e c a u s e o p p o s i t i o n  political  increasing  moderate T a m i l  the  SLFP  i n 1956.  of  demands b r o u g h t  radicals,  the  policies  staging  faced  by  towards  Tamil  leaders Tamils.  by  the  t o adopt a s e c e s s i o n i s t  who The  emerging  policy  in  the  1970s.  The of  ' C a r r o t and the  along  SLFP's with  religious support  of  the  The  demands  SLFP was  i t s record during Tamils.  UNP of  reinforced  The  stand  more  election the  policies  manifesto  Tamils  and  i t s 'sympathetic  failure  t o win  this  despite i t s  post-1956  to Tamil  grievances  period, than  which r e c o g n i z e d  p r o m i s e d accommodative The  1977  the  perception  i n the  image.'  and  "anti-Tamil"  Jayewardene,  i n 1977,  base,  language  c o n s i d e r e d an  under  responsive  support  on  1970-1977 c o n f i r m e d  UNP  nationalistic  considered 5 5  nationalist  chauvinistic  t h e T a m i l s . The  opportunistic  UF.  past  Consolidation  1977-1982  Sinhala-Buddhist  its  of t h e UNP:  i s s u e s , c o n t r i b u t e d to the p a r t y ' s  and  among  was  Ethnic Policy  Secessionist Challenge  The  party  Stick'  UNP  the the  policies, manifesto  stated: The United N a t i o n a l P a r t y a c c e p t s the p o s i t i o n t h a t t h e r e a r e numerous p r o b l e m s confronting the Tamil-  68  speaking people. The lack of a s o l u t i o n to t h e i r p r o b l e m s has made the Tamil-speaking people even support a movement for the c r e a t i o n of a s e p a r a t e s t a t e ... The p a r t y , when i t comes to power, will t a k e a l l p o s s i b l e s t e p s t o remedy t h e i r g r i e v a n c e s i n such f i e l d s a s : (1) E d u c a t i o n ; (2) C o l o n i s a t i o n ; (3) The use of t h e T a m i l Language; (4) Employment i n the p u b l i c [ s e c t o r ] and s e m i - p u b l i c c o r p o r a t i o n s . We will summon an A l l - P a r t y C o n f e r e n c e as s t a t e d e a r l i e r and implement i t s d e c i s i o n . 5 6  For the  the  first  management of  grievances.  The  ethnic  ethnic  implied  that  nascent  Tamil  better  organized  1973  the  UNP  'national' party issues,  p o l i c y s p e l l e d out leadership  party  than  under \Jayewardene, t h e  the  and  J a y e w a r d e n e was majority  Jayewardene  was  also  c a p a b l e of  dealing  from  north  the  Buddhist-led insurrection under t h e aware of that  from  their  mix  of  to  regulate  the  perceived  left).  tough  grievances  also  c a u s e s of  the  a l w a y s been SLFP, and  Moreover, the  as  UNP  a  since  strength  Tamils,  had  appealed  particularly  from In  would be  and,  or  the  short,  leadership  conflict  of  demands.  strong  emanating the  south  right  leader either  (Sinhala-  and  Marxist  a well-organized  party  of J a y e w a r d e n e was  and  provided  redressed.  as  convincing  Tamil  a t o u g h and  with violence  consociationalism  ethnic  had  need t o meet b a s i c  s e c e s s i o n i s t pressure  c o n t r o l and  both e t h n i c  5 7  the  the  Tamil  manifesto  a moderate c a p a b l e  violence  the  UNP  main  organizational  (secessionist violence)  communal  the  on  commercial i n t e r e s t s .  effectively  shrewd and the  of  on  i n the  individualistic  seen as  Sinhalese  taken a stand  i t s main r i v a l  strengthened.  conservative  had  understood  party's  t h o s e w i t h p r o f e s s i o n a l and  the  focusing  s e c e s s i o n i s t movement. The  been s i g n i f i c a n t l y to  time a  hope f o r  fully Tamils  J a y e w a r d e n e used  techniques a result,  in his could  a  attempt appeal  g r o u p s . F u r t h e r m o r e , economic h a r d s h i p s d u r i n g  to the  69  rule  of  the  economic  g r o u p was The  and  UNP  of  General  to  and  in  ethnic  seats  from the  in July  coalition  and  Therefore  dominant  1977.  partners.  the  left  was  seats,  who  was  with  The  wiped o f f the  became the main  elected  as  leader  of  the  s u c c e s s f u l i n t h e M u s l i m and  dominated c o n s t i t u e n c i e s i n the a Tamil won  constituency  with  majority  a of  small the  However, accommodative Tamil  riots  since  1958.  deaths  of  was  Tamil any  hope  policy  across The  61  votes  over  was  the  the  most  who. v o t e d  affected.  violence,  regulations.  6 3  The  refused The  Outside  to  riots  was  electoral  the  in  Bill north  the  August  in  Devanayagam and  east,  the  through  --  of  the  riots  first  also  in  order  for the  the  and UNP,  intensity  through  the  created  p l a n t a t i o n Tamils  government, d e s p i t e  1977  anti-  the  weeks, r e s u l t i n g  overwhelmingly  of A u g u s t  success  eruption  1977  p e r s o n s . The  restore  from  UNP.  by  two  and  Sinhalese-  reconciliation  Ironically,  6 2  SLFP  Apart  6 0  UNP's o n l y  where  shattered  hundred  40,000-50,000 r e f u g e e s .  were  e a s t . The  l a s t e d over  one  opposition.  early  country  riots  Colombo-based T a m i l s ,  the  went t o the  of  146  d e a t h s of C h e l v a n a y a g a m  at Kalkudah,  majority.  won  Secretary-  Ponnambalam, became t h e was  SLFP  opposition  the  the  t h e UNP  'new  the  UNP  after  south,  ethnic  The  5 8  The  a massive m a j o r i t y .  eighteen  TULF  s a l i e n c e of  concerns.  widespread disenchantment  Amirthalingam, the  the  1977.  secured  TULF, w i t h  of  increased  entrepreneurs  leftist  168  A.  5 9  had  a landslide victory  to eight  The  party.  won  former  out  map.  political  e x p l o i t e d the  its  reduced  by  relative  ineffective  UNP  seats  government  issues  outbidding  look'  UF  of  emergency  r e i n f o r c e d the  demand  70  for  Eelam and a l s o  was  the  only  strengthened,the  way  after  the  anti-Tamil  as  The e r u p t i o n  a control  Tamils the  or  as  salience  violence  the  boycotted  tarnished  violence  instigated  not compromise  The r i o t s and  and  also  on  raised  willingness  to  pro-Sinhala-Buddhist  the ' r e c o n c i l e r '  violence  an o u t b i d d i n g  may  image  of  be i n t e r p r e t e d  by t h e UNP  to  either  intimidate  t e c h n i q u e by t h e SLFP t o  the  the  increase  of e t h n i c i t y .  The government amend  violence.  of e t h n i c  measure  could  government's a b i l i t y  c h a u v i n i s m . The r i o t s UNP.  platform,  anti-Tamil  d o u b t s a b o u t t h e UNP control  that  t o a c h i e v e E e l a m . The moderate TULF, w h i c h  campaigned on a s e c e s s i o n i s t Eelam  conviction  1972  a p p o i n t e d a ten-member s e l e c t  constitution  on  October  t h e p r o c e s s of c o n s t i t u t i o n a l  gave h i s r e a s o n s  f o r t h e TULF's  Select  as  1977. The  revision.  to TULF  Amirthalingam  to participate  in  The UNP had a c l e a r u n e q u i v o c a l mandate t o a s s e r t sovereignty of the Sinhala nation and a c o n s t i t u t i o n . The mandate of the m a j o r i t y of Tamil nation pointed to a d i f f e r e n t duty. *  the new the  Committee  refusal  3,  committee  the  follows:  6  The  moderate  TULF  boycotted  because the s u c c e s s f u l 1977 and t h e a n t i - T a m i l political lost  negotiated to  the  separatist violence  manoeuvreability  itscredibility with  establish  the  of  among  the  t h e government  constitutional election  of August the p a r t y . Tamil without  proceedings  campaign  of  July  1977 had l i m i t e d t h e The TULF would  electorate first  if  it  have had  making a g e s t u r e  Eelam.  The SLFP withdrew from t h e c o m m i t t e e when i t . r e a l i z e d  that  government's  1972  constitution,  intention  but t o d r a f t  was  a new  not  to  amend  one. Thus t h e new  the  constitution  71  was  almost  exclusively  constitution,  introduced  the  French  Fifth  significant Sri  on  in  Nordlinger  —  —  became the  instance,  with  Sinhala  be  to  distinction  registration.  safeguards action  the  not  position one."  minorities The  from  19  of  1947, the  de  26  new  Silva  arbitrary  asserted  o f f e r e d the  also  rights  government  changed  the  system  to  enhanced  future president  that  by  adequate  system  and  "no c o n s t i t u t i o n ,  minorities  S r i Lanka p o l i t y  abolished  considered  both-the  along  fundamental  electoral  by  citizens  first-past-the-post The  In  regulating  Tamil  and  constitution  in determining K.M.  descent  provided  accommodating  declared  against  a  on  suggested  method of  c o n s t i t u t i o n were  representation.  within  the  official foremost  1978  language place  was  addition, of  frequent  the  based  a  than the  more  secure  present  [1978]  6 6  But  state  new  system  that  conflict  societies  Article  new  Tamils.  a n a t i o n a l language. A r t i c l e  10-14).  government. even  six  extensive  r o l e of T a m i l s  the  of  Moreover,  the  was  The  constitution  by  (Articles  proportional  1978,  between c i t i z e n s  i n the to  electoral  This  6 5  one  most  demands. F o r  incorporated  September  ethnically-divided  Tamil  the  7th  document.  c i t i z e n s h i p r i g h t s f o r the  concessions  practices  UNP-inspired  Republic.  l a n g u a g e and  Lanka,  a  S r i Lanka  protect  and  fundamental  restrictions  (Article  of  t o Buddhism by  to the  constitution also reaffirmed  15.7).  that  (Article  recognizing foster  Sinhala  T h e r e was  be  and  provided  the  that  the  d u t y of  the  Buddhism  a l s o no  imposed  the  18)  (Article  r i g h t s were s u b j e c t e d  could  as  by  provision  19).  t o a wide the  In  range  government  for devolution  of  72  power  in  the  including a  responsible  responsive  the  the  or  legitimacy.  constitutional  p a r l i a m e n t , an i n d e p e n d e n t  working of the c o n s t i t u t i o n .  Finally, SLFP  The  b u r e a u c r a c y was t o o weak i n S r i  successful  the  constitution.  the The  new c o n s t i t u t i o n TULF,  Tamils  at  will  to  1977  had  once  surprisingly, violence  not  positively  respond  policies  were  alienation.  moderate T a m i l of  addition,  elites  t h e UNP's e t h n i c Jayewardene  also  in  a  was  context  contributed  t o the  appointed B i l l  Minister  of B a t t i c a l o a .  amended  to  largest  a senior the  defused,  nor  accommodative secessionist  of c o o p e r a t i o n limited  from  success  two  member  vice  cabinet  trade  S.  over  president post  of  was  o f C. R a j a d u r a i ( 1 s t  of the T U L F .  Thondaman,  union,  of  Pottuvil  A r t i c l e 16 o f t h e 1978 c o n s t i t u t i o n  appointed  plantation  Not  1977, was made t h e D i s t r i c t  accommodate t h e c r o s s i n g  Jayewardene a l s o  of  who won on t h e TULF t i c k e t b u t  t o t h e UNP i n December  with  violence  Devanayagam a s t h e M i n i s t e r  province) constituency,  rewarded  political  policy.  (eastern  MP B a t t i c a l o a ) ,  . of  lack  S. Canagaratnam, t h e MP f o r t h e  over  not  the i n i t i a l  Justice.  crossed  because  vulnerability.  i n t h e n o r t h . The government's  inadequate  In  the  the anti-Tamil  sentiment  to the  l e g i s l a t i o n aimed  lacked  their  widespread  government  passed  but  exposed  secessionist  contained  by e i t h e r  did  of the  ensure  6 7  lacked  i t . Furthermore,  again  to  consequently  o f T a m i l demands,  implement  Lanka  was n o t a c c e p t e d  S r i Lankan government p r e v i o u s l y accommodation  j u d i c i a r y and  and  c o n s t i t u t i o n a l accommodative p o l i c y the  machinery  6 8  He  was  Regional  Development.  the  of  leader  t h e C e y l o n Workers'  the  Congress,  73  t o t h e c a b i n e t . ' T h o n d a m a n was t h e hold  a  number  cabinet of  Tamils  government's cabinet and in  post. in  the  attempt  failed  The  cabinet  attract  MPs  because s e c e s s i o n i s t  contained  the north.  Elite  cooperation,  extremists.  As  result  government,  one  measures Muslim  a of  constrained of  the  i n S r i Lanka,  this  more  could  m i n i s t e r s dominated  by  economic  Moreover,  benefits. the  cabinet  Buddhist  not  be  formed.  d i d not t a k e  such m i n i s t e r s  extreme  interest.  to  rational  an  ethnic  Tamil  7 1  negotiation  minority.  Overarching  elite  the  coalition  or  Sinhalese  ministries  by a c t i v e a n t i - T a m i l Cyril  Mathew,  and  namely, producing  steps  also  a  staunch  t o the c a b i n e t .  7 0  These  t o c o n t r o l the c h a u v i n i s t i c  stand  not  want  to  base by b e i n g  to i n s p i r e Tamil  undermine hostile  environment  was n e v e r c r e a t e d .  cooperation  Sinhala-  The  a political  Inevitably,  strong  by  activities.  support  failed  statements  a  Dissanayake,  were a p p o i n t e d  As a r e s u l t ,  p o l i c y that  a  in  6 9  b e c a u s e he d i d  Sinhala-Buddhist  an  from  portfolios,  m i n i s t e r s were i n t h e f o r e f r o n t o f a n t i - T a m i l  of  ingredient  outbidding  t h e key c a b i n e t  ministers.  nationalist,'  President  murders  attainableconflict-regulating  c h a u v i n i s t , and G a m i n i  'Sinhala  to the  government's r e c o n c i l i a t o r y p o l i c y towards  T a m i l s was a c c o m p a n i e d  senior  the  stronger  of p o l i t i c a l  outbidding,  employment-generating m i n i s t r i e s  greater  But  were  important  to  the l a r g e s t  the north  sentiments  an  Tamil  period.  from  a l s o b e c a u s e o f t h e i n c r e a s i n g number  was  the  plantation  post-independent  to  consociationalism,  the  UNP  first  to such  conducive  Jayewardene  confidence  pursued  among  a l i e n a t i o n remained  and s t a b l e n o n - e l i t e  the  the high.  support  74  two —  necessary  conditions  were a b s e n t  appointments, the  result,  engineering  the  in  faculties  Sinhala-Buddhist  1979-80  the  the  increased 1977-78.  by  by  250%  The  72  introduced  and  i n the  academic  year  government  engineering  m e d i c i n e was  28%  new  system ensured  period. "  The  7  ratio  i n the  admission  u n i v e r s i t y was  population.  For  in total  and  percentage  However, sector  responsible dismissal was  cabinet  Each  to the  from t h e sector  MP  the  population  i n the  to  constituents  post-1978  the  Sinhalese  i t s ratio  of  the  percentage  of  the  75%  74%  in  in  1980-83,  1981.  for Tamils  i n the  state  The  1978  r e t a i n e d appointment, t r a n s f e r  and  7 6  Under the  1,000  c h o s e n by  thus extremely  7 5  the  parliament  given  in  but  59).  members of was  the  that  quota  Tamils  a p u b l i c s e r v i c e commission  minister  (Article  was  the  of  policy  district  post-1977 p e r i o d .  low.  UNP  state  through  employment  a  job  j o b bank forms t o be him.  j o b bank scheme. R e c r u i t m e n t was  in  average  opportunities  reintroduced  c o n t r o l l e d by  system. over  i n the  employment  powers  22%  u n i v e r s i t y a d m i s s i o n s was  registered a decline  constitution  and  intake  admission  a v e r a g e s h a r e of  in proportion  instance,  Sinhalese their  The  accommodated  total  n a t i o n a l and  raw  7 3  a  medical  s y s t e m b a s e d on and  marks.  p o l i c y . As  the  i n c r e a s i n g the  a  cabinet  controversial policy  government a d o p t e d a new  which  and  u n i v e r s i t y admission  interests  u n i v e r s i t y . The  for  consociationalism  number of T a m i l s e n t e r i n g  1978-79, compared t o  the  of  c o n s t i t u t i o n a l concessions  government a b o l i s h e d  standardization  direct  success  in S r i Lanka.  In a d d i t i o n t o the  of  f o r the  The  7 7  The  TULF was  of T a m i l s  in  bank handed  excluded  the  state  number of T a m i l s r e c r u i t e d  75  t o the in in  general  1970-77, the  1977  clerical but  dropped to  recruitment and  school  The level  low  of  s h a r e of from  of  October  teachers  services  during  this  government  11.1%  in  in  the  period  r a t e was services.  i n the  11%  to  was  for  benefited  the  Trade  Zone  the  Tamils.  Sinhalese was  evident For  5.7%  opened  in  opportunities  Sinhalese.  The  north  relatively  introduced  by  particularly  among  the  persisted.  political in  satisfied. and  violence  the that  post-1977 the  Violence  opposition  crossed  over  January  1978.  basic  was  to the 8 2  UNP,  Development  Project  provided  major  greater unskilled —  changes  unemployment  existed,  (General  began  demands of  An  and  Free  economic  period  T a m i l p o l i c e m e n who  The  economic p e r i p h e r i e s  Certificate youth.  in  1972  despite the  had  MP,  who  attempt  in  i n v e s t i g a t e d Tamil of  the  been  informants  TULF  assassination  Inspector  Youth  8 1  continued  Tamils  the  of  government  policemen,  Canagaratnam,  were s y s t e m a t i c a l l y m u r d e r e d .  tangible  and  an  the  provide  qualified  survived  Also,  south  directed against  politicians.  80  sharply  zone.  the  which  upper  recruitment  dry  - the  Level)  the,  the  high-school  Advanced  1977-81.  d i d not  Widespread  UNP.  graduate  s e r v i c e s dropped  semi-skilled  east  Tamil  the  the  frustration  proclamations  and  July  instance,  by  -  unabated  to  between  79  Mahaweli  the  share  in  in  in  the  Tamil  also  untouched  Education  The  The  settlers  employment  were  0%.  recruitment  The  78  6.1%  s h a r e of  g o v e r n m e n t ' s major economic p o l i c i e s benefits  total  was  administrative  1970-77  of  1978-81.  teachers  but  recruitment  Tamils  5.4%  school  1977,  was  violence Criminal  76  Investigation leading April  Department  i n v e s t i g a t o r of T a m i l 1978.  violence  8 3  Banks, p o s t  e x p o s e d the  law  and  order.  and  the  government  developments: 'radical'  The  offices  p o l i c e as  failure  (1)  the  violence  was  12,  and  schools  force  i n the  T.I.  before  the  end  of  Act,  maintenance police,  public  military  duty.  The in  of  natural had  on  army. The  erosion  1977  been e l e c t o r a l l y  of  Tamil the  the  militants,  an  account  of  hostility between the  emergence o f  terrorism The of  i n t e r m s of  a  law-and-order army  and  language  between the  and  general and  e x c e s s e s committed terrorism  the by  an  coincided  TULF.  Tamil  the  Eelam. A m i r t h a l i n g a m  became t h e  leader  e l e c t i o n . However, the  Ponnambalam  leadership.  b e c a u s e of  1977  of  Prevention  a  C h e l v a n a y a g a m and i n the  on  Chief  civilians  state  i n the  of  the  went u n d e r g r o u n d .  environment with  of  (2)  emergency  Buddhist-dominated  the  new  communal  t o wipe out  instead  alien  a vacuum  an  successful  July  i n two  of  powers under The  Sinhala  deaths  left  maintaining  s i t u a t i o n in Jaffna  confidence  had  after  rebels  armed f o r c e s . H o s t i l i t y deepened  The  The  confrontation  undisciplined  early  the  b a r r i e r s , increased  and  w i t h the  8  with extensive  operating  religious  year. "  approached  Sinhala-Tamil  of  Weeratunga,  S r i Lankan Army, t o J a f f n a  Terrorism  of  government d e c l a r e d  the  clothed  The  eruption  of  military,  were r o b b e d .  south.  the  Brigadier  a in  them, r e s u l t e d  Staff  the  was  assassinated  incapable  successes"  mid-1979,  sent  was  who  p o l i c e a d o p t e d b r u t a l methods;  imminent. The  1979  a  and  to c o n t a i n  communalism emerged by  Bastianpillai,  violence,  "spectacular  Consequently,  July  (CID),  The  emotional of  in  TULF appeal  opposition  TULF f a i l e d  to  take  77  any  concrete  measures  adequate c o n c e s s i o n s manifesto National the  stated  the  the  A s s e m b l y of T a m i l  TULF,  refused  from t h e  that  s t a t e of E e l a m .  the  either  TULF  on  a  'solve'  Tamil  violent  step to pressure  on  8 6  removed within and  constant  t o t h e p a r t y . The  the p a r t y . Amirthalingam  theory TULF  policy  was  was  to  to o f f e r a  h i g h l y communalized parliamentary  the  discredit  the r a d i c a l s t h e once  and  increasingly  it  weakening  a firm  to  stand  as a s o u r c e  various  promised Tamils  of  also  factions control  strain in  suggested  into  in  the  more than  the  the r a d i c a l  non-violence violent  t h e dilemma  party.  He  TULF  in  firm  commitment  was  becoming  n o r t h . Jayewardene, a  o f TULF  successfully  and m o d e r a t e s among T a m i l s , strong  political  to l e a d the T a m i l s  e n v i r o n m e n t . The p a r t y ' s  realized  between  concessions  c o u l d not e x e r c i s e s u c h  not p r e p a r e d  democracy  the  non-  Chelvanayagam  held together  'pushed'  was  shrewd p o l i t i c i a n , to  single  to  them.  party  i n t h e mid-1970s,  in  a  the m i l i t a n t s  l e a d e r s h i p as  of  w i t h Jayewardene  to take  of  for  legislature,  c o n t r a d i c t i o n s i n c r e a s e d s t r e s s and  TULF,  irrelevant  form t h e  leadership  to grant  failed  death  o u t b i d by r a d i c a l s who  able  The field  saw  would  w i t h i n the p a r t y ,  The new  dialogue  t h e TULF  election  the n a t i o n a l  t h e government  Furthermore,  TULF  constitution  g r i e v a n c e s . The TULF d i d not t a k e  a c h a r i s m a t i c l e a d e r who  the  a  from t h e r a d i c a l s  t h e p a r t y . The moderate T a m i l  a  inside  v i o l e n c e , but i n c r e a s i n g l y  embarrassment  T a m i l MPs  an Eelam c o n s t i t u t i o n .  relied  the T a m i l s .  elected  E e l a m or e x t r a c t  The  E e l a m and d r a f t  despite pressure  to d r a f t  establish  government.  But once  8 5  to  considerably.  and  exploited  created a i n the The  rift  process  President  78  correctly  anticipated  political  pressure  policies.  The  novice  Jayewardene t o By  'help'  mid-1979,  ethnic  tension  decided  to  a  means  sought  and  M u s l i m s was the  the  government's  reconciliation  Tamil  The  8 8  the  majority  them s e t t l e  and  report  of  of  The  dissenting  Consequently,  left  Tiruchelvam's  report  Development  Council  establishment  of the  skeletal  the  Act  No.  on  TULF and  The  UNP,  June  4,  1981.  The  government c o n s i d e r e d  All  "prestige b a t t l e " with  the the  the  In  JVP other  and  However  8 7  to  the  addition,  8 9  Furthermore,  the  way  of  power  details  of  Act.  The  for  the  the  DDC  elections  major p a r t i e s b o y c o t t e d  TULF, and  the  country.  contested  the  on  representative,  devolution  paved  t w e n t y - f o u r DDCs i n t h e  Tamils  recommended  Development C o u n c i l 35  The  members  government u s e d t h e  t o d r a f t the  1979.  recommendations  report.  many q u e s t i o n s  attempt  1  three  TULF  as  a ten-member  Commissioners  the  (DDC)  He  government  Justice.  nominated  the  on  the  nation.  August,  Chief  Neelan Tiruchelvam,  separate  of  TULF i n t h i s  Sinhalese,  UNP  provided  unanswered.  a  the  10th  four  the  report  election.  of  a retired  majority  the  government a p p o i n t e d the  headed by  gravity  Development C o u n c i l s  assistance  on  the  administration.  The  heavily  to  issues.  to to tear apart  the D i s t r i c t  the  Tamil  realized  threatened  commission's  on  the  answer t o a s y s t e m of d e v o l u t i o n .  decentralization. a  l e a d e r s h i p came t o r e l y  comprised  TULF  submitted  accept  commission  weak DDCs as the  susceptible  tension.  which  commission.  TULF would be  decentralizing  ethnic  commission  only  that  received  presidential  the  Jayewardene  introduce for  to defuse  three  and  that  J a f f n a DDC was  election  determined  t o win  the as at  79  least  one s e a t  i n t h e e l e c t i o n . A. T h i a g a r a j a h ,  f o r V a d d u k o d d a i and Minister)  under  candidate  assassinated  the  UF  a Tamil  office  r e s p o n d e d by d e t a i n i n g the  election  The TULF  was  attempt  to  all  the Tamil D i s t r i c t  failed. study  the  effective. find  a political  police  despite  of  The  9 2  viable  accommodative  government  in Jaffna.  government's  TULF  reasons,  appointed  DDC  system  by to  of the e s t a b l i s h m e n t  s o l u t i o n t o the Tamil  the boycott  the c o u n c i l s  Jayewardene make  it  the  TULF.  measures  The  destroyed  further  n o n - e l i t e s . T h u s , t h e moderate  inability  f o r the d e v o l u t i o n  failure  to  i s s u e . But t h e e l e c t i o n  Tamils'  institutions  to more  o f DDCs was  of t h e DDCs were v i n d i c a t e d  o f t h e DDCs. The  in  captured  any  r e c o n c i l i a t i o n b a s e d on DDCs. The m i l i t a n t s  political  discredited  house  Councils.  ethnic for  of in  t o win r e p r e s e n t a t i o n  Council.  the  the  possible  failure  The  91  and t h e i n e f f e c t i v e n e s s o f t h e c o u n c i l s  dismal  rampage  Yogeswaran's  violence  campaigned  was  the k i l l i n g  regulations  administrative  The o b j e c t i v e  9 9  a  UNP  Thiagarajah  burned down.  Development  and  operation  proportional  J a f f n a MP  seats  In 1983 a c o m m i t t e e was  9 3  the  under emergency  Development  financial  under  to  r i g the e l e c t i o n i n order  Jaffna District  For  were  a l l ten  the  leading  TULF p o l i t i c i a n s u n d e r house a r r e s t , and  held  captured  library,  (District  the  However,  led  MP  was  Soon a f t e r w a r d s  9 0  1981  public  newspaper  held  system.  1981.  on 3 1 s t May  Authority  government,  electoral  The J a f f n a  Political  election  on 2 5 t h May  two p o l i c e m e n  and  Jaffna  i n the f i r s t  representation  Jaffna.  a  a f o r m e r TC  of  reduced  leadership  the  to of  by t h e obtain  authority  government's  the support was  who  of T a m i l  undermined  and  80  the  credibility The  government,  confidence Tamil  was  during  followed  confidence  Anti-Tamil  chief  Wiswa  government  government's  MPs  of communal p a s s i o n s active  role  eruption  in  the  Jaffna  riots,  according  against  t h e S r i Lankan T a m i l s  country, region  and  the  members  of  the  MPs.  President,  with  leadership. 1 0 0  in the  The UNP  t h e main  9 9  writes,  party the  passed arousal its  f o r the  The  1981  directed south  of  the  workers i n the c e n t r a l and  i n some  among them  outbidding  after  and  could  intimates  of  a p p e a r from  threaten  riots,  cases  the top  expressed  his  v i o l e n c e and o f f e r e d t o s t e p down from  Disciplinary  and TULF  UNP,  the  with  1981.  and  The  9 6  indicated  paved t h e way  east  the  government  (London),  tea estate  governing  sorrow a t the a n t i - T a m i l  Lanka."  together  August  9 5  glaring  The m o t i o n was  9 7  violence,  Observer  Tamil  As M i l n e  9 8  l e a d e r s h i p . The  the  Sri  of  in  most  that a l l the  Parliament,  by members o f t h e r u l i n g  President."  the  permitted  were n o t random. They were s t i m u l a t e d  organized the  Indian  in  in  anti-  election  f o r i t . The g o v e r n m e n t ' s  riots  the  opposition.  i t , "the  this motion.  of more a n t i - T a m i l to  freely  called  voting  'open'  of t h e  f o r the v o t i n g c l e a r l y  in  the  leader  instruction  behind  government  i n an  regain  MPs'-sponsored vote  communalism'  be p r e s e n t  to  of 1981. The DDC  r h e t o r i c was  whip's  role  engaged  TULF  Warnapala  enhanced.  attempting  summer  the  of ' p a r l i a m e n t a r y  121  of  by t h e government  against  members s h o u l d  with  the  and a n t i - T U L F  Parliament. example  instead  o f t h e moderate T a m i l s ,  campaign  violence no  of t h e c o u n t e r - e l i t e s was  action  was  once a g a i n  engaged  o b j e c t i v e o f managing  ethnic  taken a g a i n s t  UNP  in regular  meetings  tension.  However,  81  the  credibility  of  TULF  militants  strengthened  the  g u e r r i l l a attack  first  1981.  advance  1982,  ( t o 1982)  credible  boycotted  the  the  landslide  on  the  the  Simultaneously, Tamils.  army t o o k  the  Significantly,  place  in  obtained  50.8%  impossible  UNP  parliamentary proportional a  majority  the  the  October  and  the  widespread.  The refrained party  the  also  Amirthalingam  it  1983.  President  of  i n order 168  next  President six  was  in  the  under a  t o amend to  to r e t a i n  voting  had  Jayewardene  to h o l d a  the  For  the  himself  referendum the  massive  Parliament).  The  irregularities  were  assured  of  a  five-sixths  years. i t s faith  non-violent attempted  in  a  have been  held  majority  decided  to  won  it  success  in July,  system  TULF  system.  would  t o be  the  boost  t h e UNP  to  1984.  The  although  its  parliamentary  out  TULF m a i n t a i n e d from  1977,  scheduled  r e f e r e n d u m , but  The  f o r the  indirect  However,  of P a r l i a m e n t  seats  1 0 3  election.  seats  repeat  for  removed  l e g i s l a t e changes b e n e f i c i a l both  life  (140  an  the  election  three-fourths  1980  In J u l y  1 0 2  of  to  in  from t h e was  again,  scheduled  first-past-the-post  vote.  UNP  general  government won  majority  the  83.3%  p a r t y . Hence t h e  extend  this  representation  constitution the  but  under  of  for  election  t o Jayewardene  won  constitution  Bandaranaike  comfortably.  victory the  needed  won  amended t h e  presidential  election,  instance,  The  on  of Mrs.  rival  J a y e w a r d e n e . He  to  their hold  Jayewardene  Disenfranchisement  and  damaged.  1 0 1  In  only  was  i n the  agitation  to d i s t a n c e  condemned the  militant  President.  against  itself  the  In  party  government.  from t h e  attacks.  The  militants.  early  1982,  82  t h e S e c r e t a r y - G e n e r a l of t h e TULF c a t e g o r i c a l l y TULF had  no  violence created  to by  resulted late  connection win  the  political  i t s d e m a n d s . " The  group which  leadership's soft-pedalling i n t h e TULF  together  with  i n May  on  1982.  the c o r d i a l  the  t h e TULF, e n s u r e d  t h a t t h e r e were no  riots  But  continued  armed  services.  Chavakachcheri As  period had  to was  i n the  the  was  could  be  exploited  opposing  late"  destroyed inability Outbidding extremist  framework, the T a m i l s  S i n h a l e s e and  a l s o aware t h a t any by  to  satisfy the  moderate  of T a m i l s thus  Tamil  Tamil  secessionists  a  leadership  who  feature  the  Tamils  survival.  In  of  i n the  by  UNP  exposing  from t h e Tamil  politics,  nurtured  the  of  the  government.  believed in violence outbid  growth  eyes  policy  of  activities.  He  The  more e f f e c t i v e  guerrilla  post-1977  little  promising  developments  1 0 6  were " t o o  moderate c o u n t e r p a r t s by these  1982.  on  secessionist  a result,  demands.  to e x t r a c t concessions  became  raid  undermined h i s a u t h o r i t y  t h e UNP's c o n c e s s i o n s  basic  the  outbidders.  compromises w i t h  t o t h e T a m i l s . As  more T a m i l s ,  the  i n the  Tamil  the  Jayewardene's  t h e SLFP f o r i t s p o l i t i c a l  concessions  in  anti-Tamil  2 7 t h of O c t o b e r ,  t h e e x t r e m i s t s among t h e UNP  of more and too  the  election  a t t a c k s on  i m p o r t a n c e of d e f u s i n g t h e T a m i l  but  by  on  theoretical  c o n s t r a i n e d by  threat  addition,  Station  r e a c h compromises w i t h  realized  their  S p e c t a c u l a r among t h e a t t a c k s was  Police  suggested  ability  the m i l i t a n t s  issue  r e l a t i o n s h i p between  government and i n 1982.  party  Eelam  The  1 0 5  the  advocated  t e n s i o n w i t h i n the  10  in a s p l i t  1982,  w i t h any  stated that  results.  as their All  secessionist  83  A Catalyst  to S e c e s s i o n i s t C o n f l i c t  T h e r e were two anti-Tamil  riots.  increased  law  and  Secondly, local  dangerously  in  an  First,  against  the  state  violence  particularly The  1 0 7  success  of  end  of  interview  the  and  communalized  t o c u r b the  the  TULF's h o l d  environment.  he  history no  weeks  broke out.  return  i n the  'banned' the Tamils no  later  of  action  July  was  by  taken  against  the  militant  g r o u p s . The  government to  the  The  militants.  The the  Finally,  the  riots  1 0 8  a did  Instead  1 0 9  riots  i n S r i Lankan the  point  Tamil  increased  1 1 0  sympathy  the  on  completely  Recruitment the  imported  the  active  legitimacy  in  But  violence  impact  with  gained  forcefully  depriving  of  a profound  of  government  in P a r l i a m e n t .  districts.  period.  country.  constitution,  had  militants  movements s i g n i f i c a n t l y  of  north. produced  perpetrators  shifted  militant  the  considered  the  the  Tamil  boycott  of the Jaffna them, not a b o u t us.  of TULF t o g e t h e r  riots  violence.  r e l a t i o n s h i p . The  riots  'death*  r o l e i n the  in  be  representation  against  Tamils.  respectability  could  amending  political  restore  Jayewardene  i n the  worst a n t i - T a m i l  1983  and  stated:  Tamil-Sinhalese  TULF  their  the  Tamils  participation,  had  Yet  I am not w o r r i e d a b o u t the opinion p e o p l e now ... Now we c a n n o t t h i n k of t h e i r l i v e s or of t h e i r o p i n i o n about Two  in  counter-violence  1983,  to  f o r the  TULF's  1983  Vavunia  in anti-Tamil  increasing violence  in July  the  the m i l i t a n t s ' c a l l  elections, despite  violence  in  government's f a i l u r e  i t s acquiescence  s i g n a l l e d the  mid-1983  little  July  implied  government  clearly By  the  Riots  t o the  districts.  order  1983  major d e v e l o p m e n t s p r i o r  significantly,  Trincomalee  - The  and to  the  post-1983 the  "Indian  84  connection" The of  i n t o the  e v e n t s of  the  turned  secessionist  interests,  excessive  of  political  solutions movements'  system  violence unitary  From  1931  transferred  to  the  majority  elites  understood  issues. UNP  as  conflict last  to  The an  party.  against In  the  r e a c h an  early  umbrella  long  elite-mass  enough the  island  non-elite  (i.e.,  to  The  of  the  TULF's  democracy) to  Sri  a  the  and  provide militant  them as  Lankan  a  political based  on  threatened  the  but  was  state. power, s l o w l y  They d i d  not  lose  multi-ethnic of  created  the  of  Jayewardene)  established  on  time  the  UNP's  support  base  for  the  the  TC.  of  the and  ethnic  emergence of  accommodation  rule a  Yet  1 1 1  "non-negotiable"  disenfranchisement  during  asserting  maintenance  a s i t u a t i o n for  elite  b r e a k u p of  surely,  society.  system  accommodation and  due  context  policies.  the  understanding  party  The  Sinhala-Buddhist  dangerously,  importance  consequent  gap  the  state  end,  and  i n the  elite  i n the  dynamic T a m i l n a t i o n a l i s m  Sinhalese.  status  aspirations.  sharp contrast,  the  the a  the  In  failure  government, l i m i t e d  actors  management m e a s u r e s . But  T a m i l s and  stable  Once more  onwards p o l i t i c a l  their  attempted  the  of  inadequate  the  the  decentralization  parliamentary  increasingly,  character  be  political  fostered  which  Tamil  government's  force.  itself  once a g a i n  meet  outside  (i.e.,  success  viable p o l i t i c a l system  on  destroyed  to  and  struggle.  l a n g u a g e and  struggle.  the  reliance  to  on  out  both w i t h i n  implementation  the  system  provisions  administration  secessionist  1977-83 i l l u s t r a t e d  political  constitutional  violent  Tamil  the  successful did  not  up-country  Furthermore,  the  failed  to guarantee a  successful  accommodative  85  policy. Emerging growing  Sinhalese  capitalized 'secular' t o win  Sinhala  on  t o be  thus  faced  by  Electoral  party.  political  the  under J a y e w a r d e n e  minority.  Sri  the  dilemma  minorities.  their  Outbidding  placed  ability  among  the  l i m i t e d the from  the  extreme n a t i o n a l i s t i c  to  Tamils  nationalistic  concessions  elites  the  democracy  limited  democracy  management  involved  consociational offered  alienation,  too  little  while  the of  induced  by  politics  political the  consensus seeds  the  in of  to  control  capacity the  a mix  concessions  coercive  sowed  the  ethnic  ability Sri  of  Lankan  support  bases  d a n g e r o u s l y communalized  the  system.  Moreover,  they  Sinhalese  issues  from  illustrates with  the  once i n power,  Tamil  'militant'  majoritarian  b o t h T a m i l and  The  which  a  r e l i a n c e on  religious  majoritarian  measures. of  outbidding  outbidding  in dealing a  n a t i o n a l i s t s to obtain  government, and by  in  birth  by  and  by  example w h i c h  these e l i t e s  However,  linguistic  the  counter-elites  these entrepreneurs,  elites  pressures  i n the  atmosphere  constrained  an  accelerated  Sinhalese  t o accommodate t h e  consociational  resulted  Tamil  able  majority  c o n s t r a i n t s on adopt  too  provides  the  on  power. But  themselves  Lanka  changing  government p a r t y  opposition  nationalism  assertiveness.  this  political  found  Buddhist  Sri the  state of  of  ethnic  of  control  were  conflict and  Tamil  techniques was  Lanka.  too  failed  thus  Political  UNP  late  and  secessionist  insufficient.  ethnicity  the  consociation.  introduced  contain  by  because  the  Pressures  destroyed  the  communalization  i s l a n d - s t a t e ' s s e l f - d e s t r u c t i o n . In  86  short,  majoritarian  outbidding, wasteland blossom.  which  democracy  in turn  i n which,  encouraged  relegated  i t seemed, o n l y  the  the m i n o r i t y violent  growth to a  of  political  secessionism  could  87  NOTES  1  "The  K.M.  de S i l v a ,  Sinhalese-Tamil  Wilson  and  Dennis  L o n d o n : C. H u r s t 2  Ibid.  "See  as  allocation  K.M.  Jeyaratnam  of South A s i a .  A H i s t o r y , pp. 510-524.  27 f o r t h e main T a m i l Constitution, as  government  1970-77  demands.  the  university  employment  illustrate  discriminatory  de S i l v a ,  policy.  admission  and  the  extent  See  pp.  resource  of  57-67  the  UF  in this  A H i s t o r y , p. 389.  7  Ibid.,  pp. 361-364.  8  Ibid.,  p . 365.  9  Ibid.,  p . 366.  C . R . de S i l v a ,  pp. 158-159. K.M.  de  Silva,  A History,  417-429. "In  1931,  candidates  political the  was  67%.  Sinhalese Council  Sinhalese  from  roughly  introduced  ethnic  elites.  comprised though  Furthermore,  power t o t h e S i n h a l e s e  of a d e c a d e Sinhalese  the  i n the State  population  of  The S t a t e s  A.  for details.  10  pp.  (eds.),  in  pp. 159-160.  well  during  government's thesis  S r i Lanka,"  See a l s o K.M. de S i l v a ,  footnote  system,  in  de S i l v a ,  and Co. ( 1 9 8 2 ) , p p . 158-159.  The Republican  5  6  Rift Dalton  C.R. de S i l v a ,  3  A H i s t o r y , pp. 423 and 427. C R .  this  76% o f t h e e l e c t e d  their  share  dramatic  ( t h e r a t i o changed  of  t r a n s f e r of in  favour  1:1 t o 4:1) w i t h i n a s h o r t rivalries  between  the  Tamil  span and  88  12  C . R . de S i l v a ,  p . 159.  13  K.M. de S i l v a ,  Managing E t h n i c , pp. 103-105. The " f i f t y -  fifty"  demand  weightage than  a  move  aimed  i n the d i s t r i b u t i o n  a genuine 1 4  was  A.J.  versus Tamils"  of s e a t s  demand f o r e q u a l  Wilson,  more in  securing greater  the  state  council  r e p r e s e n t a t i o n (1:1 r a t i o ) .  " S r i Lanka  i n A.J. Wilson  at  and  & Dennis  i t s future — Dalton,  Sinhalese  The S t a t e s ,  p.  296. A l s o s e e C R . de S i l v a . 1 5  law  Section  shall,  religion; to  29 o f t h e S o u l b u r y  (a) p r o h i b i t  (b) make p e r s o n s  disabilities  or  Constitution  or r e s t r i c t  to  or r e l i g i o n  which  communities or r e l i g i o n s  a r e n o t made l i a b l e ,  persons  or r e l i g i o n  o f any community  which  i s not  conferred  on  persons or (c)  any p r i v i l e g e  persons  "No s u c h  t h e f r e e e x e r c i s e o f any  o f any community  restrictions  stated,  of  liable of other  confer  on  o r advantage  other  community o r  religion." 16  K.M.  de  Kearney,  Silva,  Communalism  Durham: Duke U n i v e r s i t y and  Politics  A History,  Politics, 1 7  Press  (1967).  of  Urmila  i n S r i L a n k a . New D e l h i : Manohar  Press  Robert  (1969),  pp.  N.  of Ceylon.  Phadnis,  Religion  (1976).  C a l v i n A.  i n Ceylon. Providence:  100-170.  Robert  policies  s e e , A.  Brown  K e a r n e y , The  p p . 155-180.  For  Wilson,  489-524.  and Language i n t h e P o l i t i c s  Woodward, Growth o f a P a r t y System University  pp.  early  "The  Commonwealth  Federal  Party  Tamil Federal Party P o l i t i c a l Studies,  i n Ceylon Volume  Jeyaratnam  P o l i t i c s , " Journal IV,  No.  2  (July  1966), p p . 1 17-137. 1 8  A.  Jeyaratnam  Wilson,  Politics  i n S r i Lanka,  1947-1979.  89  L o n d o n : The  MacMillan  1 9  Wilson,  2 0  Ibid.,  2  Electoral pp.  ' T h e SLFP  policies  Press Ltd.  won  (1979),  130-132. with  the  its 1956  extreme  religious  i s s u e s without  (MPs  2 3  A.  Electoral  pp.  defeated  by  TC  lost  and  1956,  ignore  Politics,  and  major  linguistic  electoral  and  fortunes.  161-201.  Nallur  t o a UNP  candidates  religious both  Rasamanickam-and S.  f o r Vaddukoddai, Paddiruppu  were  to their  S.M.  Rasamanickam  Since  affecting  Amirthalingam,  defeated.  linguistic  election.  p a r t i e s c o u l d not a f f o r d  Wilson,  150-151.  Politics.  political  2 2  pp.  respectively)  c a n d i d a t e and  who  Naganathan  later  the  joined  were others  the  UF  leader  M.  government. Along  2 u  with  Sivasithamparam defeated 2 5  In  defeat and  March  of  Ponnambalam,  youth  league  1960,  l e a d e r T.  deputy  Sivasithamparam  t h e FP p l a y e d a s i g n i f i c a n t  t h e m i n o r i t y UNP  election,  his  were  candidates.  SLFP a p p r o a c h e d  1970 both  by FP  and  G.G.  t h e FP  government. Again  t o form  C h e l v a n a y a g a m and  role  i n 1965  the government. o t h e r FP  in  the  both  UNP  During  the  leaders stated  that  S i n h a l e s e p a r t i e s would seek t h e h e l p of FP  t o . form  the  government. 2 6  S a d h a n Mukherjee, C e y l o n - I s l a n d That  People's Electoral 2 7  Sri  Publishing Politics,  C . R . de  L a n k a : The  House  pp.  Silva,  A.  Jeyaratnam  Delhi: Wilson,  179-201.  "Sinhala-Tami1  University  1971-77" i n R o b e r t  (1971).  Changed. New  Admission  B. Goldmann and  R e l a t i o n s and Issue  A.  —  The  Jeyaratnam  Education in First  Wilson  Phase (eds.),  90  From Independence pp.  London:  Frances Pinter  (1984),  125-146. 2 8  S e e Appendix  A - T a b l e 1.  2 9  See  A - T a b l e 2.  30  C . R . de S i l v a ,  3  Appendix  "Sinhala-Tami1 Relations  p . 129.  'Ibid.  3 2  Ibid.  3 3  The  basis  UF government  of  ethnicity,  education used  allocated  3 0  and employment  in  i n the p u b l i c  resources  the area  sector.  t o encourage  on t h e  of u n i v e r s i t y  The  government  ethnicization  of p u b l i c  See Coomaraswamy, pp. 180-181 and S i v a n a n d a n , p p . 21-22. A.C.  Alles,  Apothecaries Revolt  economic  particularly  i t s massive m a j o r i t y  goods.  pp.  to Statehood.  I n s u r g e n c y - 1971. Colombo:  Company  L t d . (1977);  i n Ceylon," Asian  The  'Politicus,'  S u r v e y , Volume  Colombo  "The  12, No. 3 (March  April 1972),  259-274. 3 5  Rajiva  Delhi:  Navrang  (January 36  Wijesinha, (1986),  these  K.M. de S i l v a ,  Wijaweera was  on  gave  worker  loyalties  were  New  p . 26, S i v a n a n d a n , p . 20. I n d i a  Today  five  could  K.M.  de  p . 543. The Week  ( J a n u a r y 15, 1988), p . lectures  (August 9-15, 72'.  t o JVP a c t i v i t i s t s .  expansionism. F o r Wijaweera, n o t be t r u s t e d  elsewhere  [India]  t o any a l l u r e m e n t s o f f e r e d  forces." Alles, 38  i n S r i Lanka.  A History,  Indian  plantation  victim  Crisis  15, 1988), p . 71.  1987), p . 22. I n d i a Today 3 7  Current  because,  and  by t h e  who  One o f  the [Tamil]  " h i s [worker] would  be a r e a d y  counter-revolutionary  I n s u r g e n c y - 1971, p . 17. Silva,  "The  Constitution  and C o n s t i t u t i o n a l  91  Reforms s i n c e Survey.  1948," i n  Honolulu:  K.M.  The  Survey,  Volume  Silva  (ed.),  U n i v e r s i t y Press  312-329. Wiswa W a r n a p a l a , Asian  de  "The  New  XIII,  S r i Lanka - A  of H a w a i i  C o n s t i t u t i o n of  No.  12  (1977), Sri  pp.  Lanka,"  (December  1973), pp.  in  de  1179-  1192. Colvin  3 9  R.  Constitution  ...,"  Ibid.,  4 0  p.  * V.P.  ft2  New  S.  Ceylon  9 3  i n the  " N. in  Plan,"  "The  i n S r i Lanka  of  (CWC)  the  powerful TUF  up-country  r e l a t i o n s h i p with  J.R.  India's  35.  j o i n e d the  to  -  trade  union,  because the  Tamils.  J a y e w a r d e n e and  But  UF he  opposed  south. quoted  in Vaidik,  Sri  Asian  Crisis  ( 1 9 8 6 ) , p.  leader  pp.  Balakrishnan,  5  Policy  Ethnic  Congress  Amirthalingam  ""Quoted  Silva,  317.  openly h o s t i l e  maintained close  K.M.  318.  Thondaman, t h e Workers'  UF  p.  quoted  Delhi: National  government was  the  Silva  Vaidik,  1  Options.  de  Lanka: Survey,  in Vaidik,  p.  139.  35-37.  "The  Five  Year P l a n  Socio-Political Volume X I I I ,  No.  and  Development  Perspectives 12  (December  and  the  1973),  pp.  1155-1168. " S.W.R. de 6  A.  Central  Government  Sri  Lanka:  1948-1981"  Schwarz, p.  10.  " Satchi 7  the  Tamil  pp.  180-184.  Samarasinghe, Employment in  Committee  and  Goldmann  "Ethnic  Sinhala-Tamil and  for Rational  Wilson,  London:  Relations pp.  D e v e l o p m e n t , pp.  Ponnambalam, S r i L a n k a : The  Liberation Struggle.  Representation  National Zed  in  173-184. 1-7.  Question  Book L t d .  in  and  (1983),  92  Vaidik,  4 B  " Ibid., 9  5  by  p p . 38 and 183-184.  °Chelvanayagam defeated  over  16,000  h i s UF c a n d i d a t e ,  V. Ponnambalam,  votes.  P o n n a m b a l a m , p . 184.  51  Vaidik,  5 2  p . 39.  Ponnambalam,  53  Lanka's Asian  p . 41, Ponnambalam, p . 181.  1977  pp.  General  190-194.  Vijay  Elections:  S u r v e y , Volume X V I I ,  No.12  Samaraweera,  "Sri  The R e s u r g e n c e o f t h e UNP," (December  1977),  pp. 1195-  1206. 54  K . M . de S i l v a ,  5 5  Jayewardene  A H i s t o r y , p.  played  a  significant  Bandaranaike-Chelvanayagam Pact to abrogation  of the pact  K . M . de S i l v a ,  5 7  J a m e s Manor, "The F a i l u r e Lanka  5 8  0n  in  the a n t i -  o f 1957 campaign w h i c h l e d  Managing E t h n i c , p .  (Ceylon),"  Comparative P o l i t i c s ,  role  and t h e communal v i o l e n c e i n  56  Sri  551.  of  1958.  289.  Political  Integration  in  T h e J o u r n a l o f Commonwealth and  Volume XVII  t h e 1977 G e n e r a l  both  (March  Election,  1979), p . 36.  s e e Samaraweera, p p .  1195-  1206.  the  59  P o n n a m b a l a m , p . 193.  60  Thondaman, the only  government  solution the  considered Tamils  l e a d e r o f t h e TULF, j o i n e d Eelam  who l i v e d  as  not  a  viable  among S i n h a l e s e i n  region.  Inflamatory  election  he  f o r the up-country  up-country 6 1  since  remaining  speeches  campaign, d i s t o r t e d  the o v e r r e a c t i o n  of  the  by  t h e TULF  leaders during the  r e p o r t i n g i n t h e S i n h a l a p r e s s and  Sinhalese  to  the  success  of the  93  secessionist immediately  party a f t e r the  Tamil  s t u d e n t s and  spark  f o r the  other  of  1977  inciting  violence  Sinhalese,  follows:  the  complete  regard  to  avoiding  between  The  UNP  and  pp.  SLFP a c c u s e d  each  47-48.  Commission w h i c h over  the  inquired  25,000 p e o p l e ,  into  the  both Tamil  and  houses.  justified not  the  r e f u s a l to  wish to d e c l a r e  e l i m i n a t i o n of arrest,  clash  the  that  do  A  riots.  concluded  "We  elections.  environment  c a r n i v a l provided  The  their  charged  p o l i c e at a school  47.  the  emergency  freedom  detention  and  declare  of  ...  the  legislation  emergency I t means  people by  with  gazette  and  in Asia:  The  parliament."  *K.M. de  Silva,  fi  6 5  1977  a highly  violence. Vaidik,  p.  lost  as  A.J.  Managing E t h n i c ,  Wilson,  Constitution Ltd.  the  Jayewardene  6 3  created  July  communal  Vaidik,  6 2  TULF  of  The  S r i Lanka  (1978).  p.  294.  Gaullist  System  London:  The  MacMillan  Press  (1980). 66  K . M . de  Silva,  S 7  Wiswa Warnapala,  Dictatorship," (July  Violations  70-94.  pp.  267-288. "Notes  111-121.  i n s i g h t s i n t o the  294.  Government or  one  Party  and  Committee  present  Rational  Documents - Human  C l a s s , Volume These  for  three  s t a t e of  the  XXVI, essays  4  Rights No.  1  provide  judiciary  and  i n S r i Lanka.  This  majority  pp.  1984)  parliament 6 8  1982), pp.  p.  Volume X X X V I I I , Numbers 3 &  i n S r i L a n k a , " Race and  (September excellent  "Parliamentary  India Quarterly,  - December  Development,  Managing E t h n i c ,  is  an  example of  t o amend the  government u s i n g  its five-sixths  c o n s t i t u t i o n for a p a r t i s a n purpose.  The  94  personal back  conflict  to e a r l y  latter's 69  1960s,  d e c i s i o n to  M.H.  Cyril  repress  Mathew's  in  1983  26,  Army  to  7 1  1 (Summer The  respect effort  t o the to  appeal  carrot  riots, with and  i n 1970, Tamils."  ministers  p o l i c e and  read,  in  us  For  more  "The  the  minutes."  followed  a  Tamils.  " c a r r o t and He  the  t o t a k e an  Tamils ultra  instil  action)  but  the  in S r i  Volume  Sinhala-Buddhist and  stick  p o l i c y was  p.  aimed a t  185-187.  in  the  the  together  containing  TULF)  p. 9.  an  stand.  support.  307.  D e v e l o p m e n t , p.  pp.  with  (anti-Tamil  f e a r among T a m i l s  "Sinhala-Tami1 R e l a t i o n s  for Rational  policy  'encouraged'  Silva,  Gaullist,  for  took a m o d e r a t e s t a n d  secessionist (particularly  The  declared  Class,  stick"  C . R . de  Wilson,  under  81.  73  7 6  on  Sanmugathasan,  Race and  Managing E t h n i c ,  Ibid.  the  Sinhalese  hours  N.  Silva,  7 5  as  every Tamil  K . M . de  "Committee  to  information  fourteen  72  7  the  powerful  Mathew D o c t r i n e "  Holocaust,"  r h e t o r i c to  weakening t h e  unite  S r i L a n k a , but  in fourteen  military  the  in contrast  "Let  ( c o n s t i t u t i o n a l concessions)  anti-Tamil  for  129-139. G a m i n i D i s s a n a y a k e  to  dating  Tamils.  " I t would t a k e  minority  reasons  Hameed r e c e i v e d  the  stand,  of  Rajathurai,  major  foreign affairs  1984), p.  President  chauvinistic The  Story  and  government.  by  of  arrive  killed  L a n k a : The No.  and  wrote  that  the  A.C.S.  Documents," pp.  L a n k a would be "Sri  and  threats  of  the  received  anti-Tamil  September  Indian  join  Mathew  the  "Notes and  one  transport  'weak' p o r t f o l i o s  to  is  Mohamed  m i n i s t r i e s of  7 0  between A m i r t h a l i n g a m  129.  95  Neelan  7 7  T i r u c h e l v a m , " E t h n i c i t y and Resource A l l o c a t i o n , "  Goldmann a n d W i l s o n ( e d s . ) , 7 8  Samarasinghe,  °Ibid., The  8 1  the  p . 178.  Ibid.  7 9  8  p . 191.  p . 179. See a l s o A p p e n d i x A - T a b l e 3.  secondary  level  e d u c a t e d unemployed  y o u t h s were i n  f o r e f r o n t o f t h e m i l i t a n t movements. Vaidik,  B 2  p . 53. Canagaratnam  survived  the attack  but died  i n 1980. A.S.  8 3  Balasingham,  Freedom  Struggle.  (August  1983), p . 29.  8 , ,  85  Vaidik,  Liberation Tigers  Madras:  Liberation  Tigers  and T a m i l  Eelam  of  Eelam  Tamil  p . 54.  P o n n a m b a l a m , p . 192. "Amir  8 6  Speaks". Madras:  TULF P u b l i c a t i o n  (August  1984),  p. 4. 87  K . M . de S i l v a ,  8 8  Ibid.,  Politics  p.  of  Conceptions  Managing  205.  See  in  of D i s t r i c t  p . 314.  Neelan  and  Development  T i r u c h e l v a m , "The  Devolution:  Councils  Competing  i n S r i Lanka," i n  p . 204.  Coomaraswamy, p . 183.  9 0  Vaidik,  9 1  B a l a s i n g h a m , p . 31.  9 2  Wijesinha,  p . 55.  Race a n d C l a s s , 93  also  Decentralization  Goldman a n d W i l s o n ( e d s . ) , 89  Ethnic,  p . 43. S i v a n a n d a n , p . 33. N o t e s a n d Documents p . 124.  K . M . de S i l v a ,  Amirthalingam's  Managing  interview  Ethnic,  pp.  published  316-318. in  See Tamil  also Eelam  96  Documentation  Bulletin,  15,  pp.  Vaidik,  Amirthalingam. 9  Silva,  President, against  pp.  i t was  measures with  9  the  not  1983),  interview  p. with  140-141.  "Parliamentary  possible  for  discussed  317.  government  Without  the  the  i n the  or one  party  approval  of  no-confidence Parliament.  of m i x i n g  to c o n t a i n  F e r n a n d o , UNP in  a v o t e of  no  MP  1981,  the  motion  This  is  one  accommodation  Tamil  secessionism.  f o r P a n a d u r a , who stated  confidence  on  that  was  the  expelled  decision  Amirthalingam  was  to  made  by  cabinet. 98  P o n n a m b a l a m , p.  9 9  Jayewardene's  210. role  violence  is  against  crucial Tamils.  instead  of c o n t a i n i n g  anti-Tamil  inside  and  the  violence  outside  against  continued  to allow  the  books  Conspiracy  ( 1 9 7 9 ) . One  a part  extent 1983)  and  and  In  In  interpreting 1981,  the  pamphlets, may  addition,  the  for  example, violence  ' c a r r o t and  stick'  went beyond h i s o r i g i n a l  it  President inflammatory Diabolical  against  occasionally  instance,  Tamils  p o l i c y . But (e.g.  i n t e n t i o n , consequently  g o v e r n m e n t ' s r e p u t a t i o n . For  both  T h i s a t t i t u d e encouraged  assume t h a t  of v i o l e n c e  the  President,  tolerated  Mathew t o p u b l i s h h i g h l y  of J a y e w a r d e n e ' s intensity  in  rhetoric,  Parliament.  Tamils.  Cyril  anti-Tamil  the  31,  285.  Parliament  increasing  was  (October  Vaidik's  Jayewardene's s t r a t e g y  p.  'Neville  introduce  also  c o n t r o l i n order  Ibid.,  from the  See  2  284-286.  Amirthalingam  more example of  1, No.  Managing E t h n i c , p.  Wiswa Warnapala,  Dictatorship,"  9 6  82-84.  I b i d . , pp.  "K.M. de  9 5  Volume  before  the  1981  the and  damaging August  97  1977  communal  (President want  riots,  told  both  o f t h e TULF) and A m i r t h a l i n g a m  that,  war you c a n have war.  peace."  Soon  island. view  Frontline  O b e y s e k e r e , pp.  the  'The  1 0  led  by Uma '  0 2  Jaffna, '  political  James  December first  The  Croom Helm  The  ' N.  the  Sri  UNP  a  for  Lanka,  see  was  confidence,  taken a g a i n s t  Cyril  was  carried  o u t by  PLOTE,  all  the  districts  a distant "The  but  Jaffna.  In  third.  C o n d u c t of t h e Referendum" i n London:  84-117.  g r o u p formed t h e T a m i l E e l a m L i b e r a t i o n  1982. p. 32.  Sanmugathasan, p. 64.  0 7  1 0 9  on  p. 214.  breakaway  i n May  The  around  in  the  S r i L a n k a : In Change and C r i s i s .  ( 1 9 8 4 ) , pp.  0 6  p.  won  (ed.),  ' Balasingham,  —  accusing  moved t h e v o t e of no  on t h e army  Samarakone,  0  1 0 8  erupted  have  1985), pp. 58-59. F o r  but  b u t no a c t i o n  attack  ' "Ponnambalam,  Front  can  1984.  President  Priya  0 5  you  [Tamil]  Maheswaran.  Manor  '  riots  5,  " i f you  peace  violence  F e r n a n d o , who  Jayewardene p l a c e d  0 3  anti-Tamil  President  by t h e UNP,  Mathew, u n t i l  want  Sivasithamparam  158-174.  Neville  expelled  you  (March 23 - A p r i l  exonerating  1 0 0  If  afterwards,  institutionalizing  was  Jayewardene  voter  turnout  90% b o y c o t t e d  Daily  Telegraph  was  very  low i n t h e J a f f n a  peninsula  the e l e c t i o n . (July  11, 1983), q u o t e d  in  Ponnambalam,  224. 1 1  "British  G u a r d i a n Weekly  commented  on  the  amendment  98  that,  "Instead  minority  of  population  disenfranchised race  of  1956  the  the  (7th August  'The  period  Sinhalese plantation  Sinhalese is  President  great  u n t e r m e n s c h e n or  citizens" 1 1  t h r o w i n g a p r o t e c t i v e G a n d h i a n arm  mass of  thus,  them and  institutionalized  at  a  turned  second  the  stroke,  them  into a  class  semi-  1983). claim  evidenced  by  B o a r d of M i n i s t e r s Tamils  has  around  i n 1949  and  to m a j o r i t y the  status during  creation  i n 1936,  the  of  an  the  pre-  exclusive  disenfranchisement  state-aided colonization.  of  99  CHAPTER THREE  THE  DEVELOPMENT OF  TAMIL SECESSIONIST GUERRILLA ORGANIZATIONS  Pre-1983 D e v e l o p m e n t s The  traditional  influence  the  parliamentary  moderate T a m i l  Sri  Lankan  o r g a n i z a t i o n s i n the  massive  electoral  r e i n f o r c e d the  parties For  and  the  the  new  demands  in  moderate Tamil  the  Tamil  parliamentary  1972  the  1950s  basic  Tamil  the  1960s,  and  hartals  by  the F e d e r a l  non-violent The  with  conventional  the  of  the  Tamil  system or  had  Tamil  f o r the  little  or no  various  change  extra-  successive refusal  demands f o r d e v o l u t i o n of power despite Party  large-scale  (FP),  illustrated  in  satyagrahas the  of  traditional  on  governments'  Tamil  image  non-violent impact  in  Tamils.  to  the the  The  political  include basic  Furthermore, on  radical  nationalists  leadership to  under  e a r l y 1970s.  tarnished  reliance  of  to  to the and  limitations  action.  failure  student  impotency  parties.  elites'  measures  during  Constitution  Lankan g o v e r n m e n t s . The  meet  of  of  process  emergence  of m a j o r i t a r i a n r u l e  admission  political  political  north  of  inability  university  the  of S i n h a l a - B u d d h i s t  sense  "tyranny"  i n s t a n c e , the  Sri  victory  inability  decision-making  democracy e n c o u r a g e d  militant  1970  leadership's  of  the  traditional  frustration, political  Tamil  produced  s y s t e m and  leadership,  disenchantment  r e s u l t e d i n the  coupled with  the  emergence  of  100  the  Tamil  Student  was  i n the  forefront  example,  black  s h o o t i n g s and latter  day  Federation  (TSF)  of T a m i l p r o t e s t ,  flag  p r o t e s t s ) and  sabotage  into violent  methods  political  conservative  Jaffna  paved  for a vicious  youths The  were  majority  protest  eight  for  1974.  government  because extreme  Tamil  conference  Tamil  sponsorship,  t h e c o n f e r e n c e . On crowd Tamil  attended  that  youths  language,  In  p l a y e d an last public the  meeting  police  t h e o r g a n i z e r s had  the  the  the  role  violated  the  with  the  on  January for  and  of  of  by  the  growing  government success  the  public  the permit  8,  culture  the  conference,  the  general  International  i n the  addressed  attacked  to  i t s support  absence  2  Tamil  'killing'  would b o o s t  the  of  Tamil trial.  a  literature  important  day  to  held in Jaffna  t h i s conference  the  the  s c h o l a r s . But  pretext  Tamil  nationalism.  t h e TSF  of  r e f u s e d to extend  on  i t feared that  Conference  Research  emergency  respond  v i o l e n c e a g a i n s t t h e s t a t e was  the  three-fourths  w h i c h c o n t r i b u t e d immensely  Association  academic  to  (TUF).  Fourth  TSF  i g n o r e the moderate  of the T a m i l U n i t e d F r o n t event  the  hundred  its  compelled out  the  reaction  h e l d without  with  could  was  police  two  Tamil  of  UF  government  carried  T a m i l s at the  The  over  of  swept  of v i o l e n c e . Under  i n t h e n o r t h and  but  which  (for  bombings,  through  violent  by  A crucial acceptance  (including  protest  1977,  Parliament  parties  federation  non-violent  initiated  The  circle  and  (UF)  the  parliamentary  'blessings'  peninsula.  1970  Front  in  violent  of  imprisoned  United  This  1  of government p r o p e r t i e s ) . Most r e b e l s were  r e g u l a t i o n s between  both  violent  secessionist  t h e way  i n 1970.  a  of  large  visiting on  to hold  the the  101  meeting  by moving the m e e t i n g o u t s i d e t h e d e s i g n a t e d h a l l .  police  a t t a c k and  deaths.  3  The  Tamils  police  and  The  of p o l i c e  Ponnudurai  the J a f f n a  of  But  Tamils,  arrested  provided  silence  attempts  to  their  break  infancy.  transformed political  The  environment struggle. Prabakaran  New  with  TNT  was  was  a  underground s e c e s s i o n i s t  political  which  landscape  emergence  Eelam  trades.  Since  independence,  he  and  of he  emerging Tamil  resulted  frustrated  in  held  in  police  movements i n  the  north  was  acceptable  government.  (LTTE) were born  on November fishing  the  for  of v i o l e n c e as an  formed by V e l l u p i l l a i  town where  north.  down  to the  stimulus  in a  t h e o b j e c t i v e of c r e a t i n g  a coastal 6  a martyr  h a t r e d of t h e p o l i c e  T i g e r s (TNT)  born  to  intention  the  T i g e r s of T a m i l  was  end  Sivakumaran  w i t h which t o c h a l l e n g e the  Tamil  the  peninsula,  the  the  of t h e  whom  the  The  with  tool  Liberation  on  i n the  hunted  with  T a m i l m i l i t a n c y , Sivakumaran and  of  linked  the b e g i n n i n g  leader,  1974." As  a w a l l of  f o r c e was  i t s supporters  TSF  police  n a t i o n a l i s m . Fear  these  law-enforcing agencies  on June 6,  radical  suicide  the  'oppressors'  Chandrasekara,  of  l e d to  peninsula.  Police,  f o r the death  him.  committed  on  the  signalled  Sivakumaran, a  Superintendent  killing  in  p a r t y , t h e SLFP and  control  as  F u r t h e r , the p o l i c e  at the Conference  responsible  stampede d i r e c t l y  confidence  eroded.  governing deaths  subsequent  were i d e n t i f i e d  public  significantly the  the  The  26,  and the  volatile  Eelam t h r o u g h  Prabakaran  1954,  in  Tamil armed 1972.  in V a l v e t t i t h u r a i  smuggling smuggling  were  two  t r a d e had  5  --  major brought  102  Valvettithurai police the  under c l o s e  with  trade brought  coastal  towns  Valvettithurai's would  allow  Lankan  T a m i l s had  them  to  was  professionals,  both  thrifty  among the  sufficient  guerrilla-campaign.  (see  on  the  maps 5, The  first  assassination Organizer temple a  attack  for  a  That  the an  and  in  and  resources  to  Sri  Tamil  areas.  of  Tamil  sector,  due  to  There  was  money f l o w e d  into  workers.  T a m i l s had  and  Jaffna  north.  well  which  the  number  the as  years,  routes  the  public  migrant  one  of  By  popular  the  highest  sustain  peninsula  the  initial took  firm  p a r t i c u l a r l y in V a l v e t t i t h u r a i  undertaking  Prabakaran July  Tamils the  did  not  of  Duraiappa,  27,  1974  him  1975.  the  7  TNT  was  Mayor and dead  his  Chief  near  D u r a i a p p a was suspected  the  a  SLFP Hindu  considered role  in  the  T a m i l C o n f e r e n c e and  his  i n s e n s i t i v e to Tamil  aspirations.  evoke any  i n d i c a t i o n of  the the  shot  b e c a u s e of  government c o n s i d e r e d  early  the  both Indian  large  private  peninsula,  on  during  killing  by  among a  Jaffna  Alfred  Jaffna.  of  sea  contact  7).  in Ponnallai  'betrayer'  police  was  of  Over  s u r p r i s i n g l y , Tamil militancy  major of  close  Furthermore,  c l a s s , and  monetary  Jaffna  in  anti-  addition,  S r i Lankans. T h e r e f o r e , J a f f n a  Not  6 and  detection  opportunities  commercial  the  rates  possessed  root  the  from T a m i l e x p a t r i a t e s  reputation saving  safe  produced in  educational large  discovered  wealthiest  Jaffna  a  Nadu.  agencies.  Traditionally,  excellent  i n t h i s town. In  Tamil  avoid  the  Consequently,  Valvettithurai  in  law-enforcing  peninsula  Jaffna  scrutiny.  f e e l i n g s were more p r o n o u n c e d  smuggling  also  police  large-scale  d i r e c t i o n that  public  Tamil  support  outcry  support  was  ? 03  Jaffna  Peninsula  DENSITY  OF  IVAUGAMAM  MAP  POPULATION  OF JAFFNA DISTRICT  BY A G . A ' S  DIVISION -  1981  MAP  WEST  2VAUGAMAM  SOUTH  3. V A L I 4 A M A M  N OATH  4. V A U 6 A M A M  SOUTH  3 VALHAMAM  EAST  WEST  CWALLUH 7. J A F F N A • . THENMAR A 0 CHT  Source:  9. V A O A M A R A O C H T  SOUTH  &  WEST  i o VAOAMARAOCHY  NORTH  »  e»*  T  J a f f n a - A P r o f i l e , T a m i l I n f o r m a t i o n R e s e a r c h Unic P u b l i c a t i o n , I s s u e No. 5 & 6 ( J u n e - J u l y 1986), p. 10.  5  6  104  Source:  Tamil E e l a V i d u t h a l a i P u l i h a l ( " L i b e r a t i o n of Tamil Eelam"), Propaganda U n i t , p. 1 .  Tigers  1 05  taking  in  violence  the  by  n o r t h . The  arresting  and  further  alienated  a  from w h i c h the  pool  their  new  an  Liberation  Tigers  developed  as in  T h e r e was  avoid  an  struggle.  The  created  with  and  early  them  for  believed  was  highly  d i s c i p l i n e d military organization  instance,  L T T E , Uma rules  of  the  the  dividends  organization.  in  its  to  People's  Bank  Tinnevely  P e o p l e ' s Bank on  over  1.2  sustain  million  movement, p o s t 'military'  operations.  p o l i c e m e n . The  expelled  on  hit-and-run  w i t h the  escalation  December 1 1  that  from  9  LTTE  movement. At  the  politicization secessionist  the  warfare  LTTE was  a  inception.  1 0  committee of  the  breaking  the  d i s c i p l i n e paid  rich  The  LTTE r e l i e d  1976 1978, the  LTTE  and  also  getting early  obtained  but  sufficient  m i s s i o n s . By  the  warfare,  on  bank  robbed  the  raided away  days  robbed  were  secessionist  name t o  the  the  for  s c h o o l s were a l s o  guerrilla  TNT  1976.  its  instance  5,  the  guerrilla  1980  During  Arms  of  long  in  March 5,  weapons were s i m p l e  isolated  a  I t s e m p h a s i s on  rupees.  o f f i c e s and  the  central  i t s growth. For Puttur  to  the  'military' actions.  robberies  at  of  draw  public.  e s t a b l i s h E e l a m . But  chairman  Maheswaran, was  5,  general  less attention  to  May  to  its  s t a g e s of  alone  For  changed  organization,  the  leaders  sufficient  repression,  (LTTE) on  the  to prepare  guerrilla  m i l i t a n t s were a b l e  guerrilla  during  LTTE p a i d  Tamil public  government's a c t i o n s  movement  urban  the  youths  government  T a m i l Eelam  secrecy  the  The  8  torturing  to c r u s h Tamil  secessionist  minimal contact  beginning, the  of  government's attempt  allegedly  people.  underground  Formed  of  the  r e c r u i t s . To  remained  UF  to  by  the with  of  the  finance ambushing  to c a r r y early  out  1980s,  sophisticated  106  weapons  ( f o r example, t h e Russian-made AK47) were u s e d  by t h e  LTTE c o n c e n t r a t e d  police  LTTE. The  intelligence aided  by  network  the " w a l l of s i l e n c e " developed  intelligence Department  the  ( C I D ) . N. N a d a r a j a h ,  a gas  f o r Kopay, was  and May  were c o n s t r a i n e d  peninsula. officers officers LTTE to  also  Tamil  collect  l a s h a g a i n s t the Tamils, public  against  The the  spectacular  intelligence  tough  network  'Lieutenant'  Murunkan  Sinhalese  policemen  they  conducted  guerrillas relied  information.  could  success in  a  highly  officer,  Chelvanayagam  to arrest on  February  on  the  have  the  on  Tamil  Thus  police  Tamils.  a p o s s i b l e Tamil  a large-scale  came  Bastianpillai,  intelligence  attempt  which  a  2, 1976, and  by t h e LTTE were m a i n l y  avoided  and  The  threat  guerrillas Sinhalese  turned  in  back-  the  Tamil  them.  most  Inspector  Investigation manager  when  Thus  down  on  high-command  on t h e p e n i n s u l a . stages  1 2  secessionist  in eliminating  r e b e l s were  on J u l y  barriers  intelligence  concentrated  formative  station  'executed'  the p o l i c e  initially  i t s development  their  language  of  killed  the  gunned  Criminal  18, 1977 r e s p e c t i v e l y .  Inevitably, to  and  and Shanmuganathan were s h o t  by  investigations  of  d u r i n g the post-1974  informants  from  constables Karunanidi 1977  police  personnel  organizer  14,  destruction  i n t h e n o r t h . The s e c e s s i o n i s t  p e r i o d . The LTTE e x e c u t e d  SLFP  on t h e  April  militants 7,  was s h o t  o f t h e LTTE the  spring  of  efficient dead  by  i n demolishing 1978.  but n o t o r i o u s l y a  LTTE  ( a l i a s Amman, C h e l l a k i l i ) in  1978.  1 3  the  LTTE  CID  training  Limited intelligence  leader, d u r i n g an camp  at  feedback  1 07  about  secessionist  hindered  attempts  invincibility new  to  which  could  in turn —  on  densely  when  letter  to  attempt  to  enacting  a bill  Jaffna a  The  1  of  on  Tamil  May  substantial  the  the  safe  growth of  government  membership.  productive  since  police  of  north, the  warfare  the  public  on  Jaffna  support  April  d e a t h s of  was  for  25,  CID  addition  hideouts  in  The  in  its  immediately  by  Liberation  failed  to  1 5  produce  poor  intelligence  Tamil  Nadu  and  the  in tracing  was  secrecy  difficulties the  core  g o v e r n m e n t ' s r e s p o n s e was  frustration  daily,  the  LTTE e x p l a i n forces  in  organizations.  rebels  to  others  the  similar  f o r the  Inspector  frustrated  proscribing  1978,  Tamil  responded  other  search  the  Tamil  of  guerrilla  independent  which  1978  and  security  guerrilla  general  22,  r e s u l t s . In  infrastructure, shrouding  attention  militants,  Eelam  the  i n the  Mayor A l f r e d D u r a i a p p a and  the  attracted  admiration  terrain  of  group.  government,  capture  and  i m p o r t a n c e of  Colombo-based  However, a c o u n t r y - w i d e  by  the  root  and  aura  which  s u c c e s s of  flat  An  f e e l i n g that took  r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r the  the  Veerakesari. "  any  i n the  L T T E came i n t o p u b l i c  Bastianpillai,  rebels.  respect  but  investigation  militants,  government  guarded  a guerrilla  i t claimed  Tigers  the  stresses  s u r v i v a l of The  the  populated  Mao  the  movement. A g e n e r a l  a c r u c i a l factor  peninsula. the  apprehend  'defeat'  gained  public the  impeded p o l i c e  d e v e l o p e d a r o u n d the  r e c r u i t s t o the  militants  a  activities  turned  of  faced the  counter-  against  the  public.  Despite violence,  the  the LTTE  government's attempt continued  to  defy  to c o n t a i n state  secessionist  authority.  The  108  militants  blasted  an  Avro Commercial a i r c r a f t  C e y l o n a t Ratmalana a i r p o r t t o p r o t e s t of  the  Thus,  Second R e p u b l i c a n C o n s t i t u t i o n the  government's  e x p o s e d . The the  police  the  m i l i t a n t s chose the (together  challenge  together  with  numbers of By  the  the  and  operations  against  t o grow w i t h o u t  the  continued  of  any  the  forces  guerrilla  the  of  allowed  Guevara  law for  suggests  challenging the  the  that  the  I t was  guerrillas  revolutionary  situation  s t a g e s of  the  and  the  TULF the The  unsympathetic  the  guerrillas.  not  the new  a  stop  the  the  condition established  groups.  themselves c o u l d among  Tamil  movement.  peninsula,  mushrooming of  LTTE  e s s e n t i a l for  an  of  the  level  could  consolidation  the  won  the  operations  in  the  early  Tigers  political  the  disrupted  t h i s allowed  operating  of  increasing  guerrilla  for their  f o r the  successes  selected  support  on  t o meet  financial  military  support.  order  legitimacy  and  sufficient  out  government  the  attack  of  17  them s u c c e s s a g a i n s t  and  1 6  was  secessionist rebels  successful  the  1978.  militants  provided  r e v e r s a l s . The  were  7,  LTTE's r e g u l a r  riots  carry  public  movements and  necessary  In  to  to develop grass-roots  disintegration  place  obtained  p u b l i c . However, a t  importantly,  which  L T T E . The  s t a t e . The  environment which d e n i e d More  c u r b the  to A i r  promulgation  September  t i m e and  movement.  serious  the  m i l i t a r y ) were i n a d e q u a t e  had  their  to enjoy  government  on  i n t e l l i g e n c e n e t w o r k , and  through  protection  LTTE  against  to  anti-Tamil  armaments  government  rebels  1977  the  r e c r u i t s f o r the  1979,  sympathy  w i t h the  p o s e d by  resources  the  inability  belonging  Che  create  Tamils  by  government. secessionist struggle,  close  109  links and  e x i s t e d between t h e the  militants.  TULF f o u g h t actively  the  in  the  1977  election  murder c a s e political  i n the  were l a w y e r s  courts, and  free  who  of  the  north  and  L i b e r a t i o n Front  from t h e T a m i l  (TULF)  youths,  a separatist platform,  election  campaign. The  defended  the bombing of  aspects  the  on  of charge,  t h e TULF, i n c l u d i n g t h e both  United  Under p r e s s u r e  participated  t h e TULF MPs  Tamil  the  the  majority  suspected  f o r example Avro  and  i n the  aircraft  east,  and  of t h e  TSF of  militants Duraiappa case.  The  s e c e s s i o n i s t s t r u g g l e were promoted politicization  the  general  by  public in  i n t e r n a t i o n a l i z i n g the  Eelam  cause. The  militants  opposition  to  the  a c t i o n s . With the roots  organizer,  leader  on  mayor  credited  Jaffna.  for  TULF  part  i n the  the  SLFP  the  the  political  through t h e i r  'military'  Duraiappa,  suffered  peninsula.  with  eliminated  north  d e a t h of A l f r e d  the J a f f n a  The  their  the  of K u m a r a s u r i y a r , a SLFP m i n i s t e r , and the  growth  elected  over  Tamil  SLFP  in  and  relationship  the  for P o t t u v i l  i n the  1978  i n Colombo, but  provided  a  efficient the  in  sour  extra-parliamentary  the when  north. the  city  murders  Canagaratnam  He  province, was  Tamil  However,  shot  the  was but  by  the  attack.  1 8  opposition  the  in  the  close  TULF l e a d e r s h i p f a i l e d  protest against  of  undermined  s u r v i v e d the  g r o w t h of  powerful  attempted  eastern  1977.  grass-  'monopoly of power' f o r t h e TULF  particularly turned  the  of  n o r t h . M.  i n December  27,  the  an  Thiagaraja,  the UNP  violence discouraged  areas,  l e a d an  to  January  Political parties  the  a s a TULF MP  crossed L T T E on  of  was  development  d e a t h s of SLFP o r g a n i z e r s and  able  l o s s of a  Duraiappa  rapid  an  government  to in  1 10  accordance leaders by  with  its  continued  the  late  TULF and  e l e c t i o n mandate of  t o have f a i t h  1980s  the  i t s p o l i c y of  The  UNP  violence  weaken  further  to  the  guerrilla  and  of a  of  quick  defeating  Thus  Tamil  forms  from  District  before  The  crucial  the  As  island  stated  f o r the  strengthened  1 9  The  and 31,  by  Tamil  r e c r u i t s and  guerrilla Jaffna  created  warfare  peninsula,  M u l l a i t i v u ) and  in the  east  Tamil  introduced  the  Act  hideouts  O'Neill,  external  guerrilla  form  environment  both terrain  the  north  i n the  i t s dense  on  the  July  19,  army  in  the  new  in a l l i t s Jaffna  of  support The  murders,  LTTE A  new  it  against provided  successful Unlike  the  (Mannar, V a v u n i a  and  jungles,  east.  is  torture,  reprisals  and  avoid  this period.  for staging  north  to  groups.  s e c e s s i o n i s t movement as  an  with  burgeoning  Nadu  indiscriminate  the  under  2 0  arbitrary  strengthened  was  terrorism  i t s m i l i t a r y c a p a b i l i t y during  and  halt  e s p e c i a l l y from the  1979."  of  "...  to  and  government o r d e r e d  more  Bard  threatened  to a s s i s t  i n the  new  north  t o the  wave of m i l i t a r y r e p r e s s i o n  civilians  the  secessionist  Jayewardene  emergency  development  arrests  of  e l e c t i o n that i t  government  to e l i m i n a t e  December  the  (Temporary P r o v i s i o n )  m i l i t a n t s s h i f t e d to  detection.  Consequently,  relationship  island.  secessionists.  the  Tamil  leadership  1977  i n the  solution  a s t a t e of  army commander of J a f f n a  the  ethnic  the  Terrorism  declared  the  contain  during  fragile  struggle.  Prevention 1979  find  boast  to  i t . Instability  economic d e v e l o p m e n t pressure  Jayewardene.  LTTE c h a l l e n g e d  failed  its  would s w i f t l y c r u s h  Instead,  non-violence.  government  despite  in  1977.  2 1  plantations  and  111  swamps  provided  establish the  guerrilla  battle  was  guerrillas. during  ideal  The  this  conditions  camps and  used  hideouts.  f o r the  during  t o be of  liberation  ten  make i n t e r n a l i n 1980  the  TULF  representative  public  system of  of  its  with  contact  military  political District was  1981 in  the of  power. the  shell  2 5  But  the  riots  politics.  of  LTTE t r i e d  continuing  pre-election  be  d e t e r i o r a t i o n of TULF  year  1981  to  included  a  to  based  the  general by  on  a a  expand  t o b r e a k out  of i t s  developing the  boycott  However, hold  of  violence  the  the and  marked the  popularity,  1979  LTTE t o  r a i s e d grave doubts about The  out  appointment  nullified  f o r the  simultaneously  the  turned  the  compromises  Elections.  movement  23  and  could  for  attributed  challenge  necessary  called  network  i n August  success  new  military  i n the  which  major  political  It  be  measures  power,  militants  by  also  Commission  of  "socialist  the  government's  military  p u b l i c . The  in  Maheswaran.  in  international  adjustments  a  I t was  indicating  anti-Tamil  rapid  of  Development C o u n c i l  areas.  Tamil  earlier  organization.  high,  Tamil  posed  and  could  However, t h e  devolution  package  devolution  purely  The  acceptance  TULF-backed  of Uma  Presidential  on  2 4  training  with  lull  government's m i l i t a r y  report  secessionists.  The  2 2  to  member a  movements  1979-80 p e r i o d  counter-productive.  a  were  the  expulsion  Once a g a i n  and  lull  made  needed  the  recruitment  Contacts  organizations."  after  temporary  period.  progressive  time  The  s e c e s s i o n i s t s to  international  world  to  the  LTTE a l s o e s t a b l i s h e d an  governments,  activities  for  the  into of  a the  turnout  TULF  in  the  the  August  TULF's r o l e  beginning  particularly  on  of  a  the  1 12  Jaffna  p e n i n s u l a . The  vacuum' c r e a t e d by In army  1981,  the  personnel.  T i g e r s were r e a d y  the  expected  'Lieutenant'  October  1981.  T h i s was  2 6  Tamil  to Eelam  faction LTTE  neutralize  of  (PLOTE— the  bond'  TELO were from  the  Charles  came  P o l i c e S t a t i o n on  Anthony) p o i n t e d  on  their  with  Sathiyanathan  fatality (alias  November  27,  L T T E , and  seven y e a r s  group of  met  1982.  arrest  to  an  October  t o a change  ambush t o a major a t t a c k first  the p o l i c e .  its first  Ten  the  years  after  LTTE as a w e l l - d i s c i p l i n e d  By and  27,  The  after  shot the  by  page  115)  breakaway  two  time,  The both  'village  movements i n leaders  in  attack  on  The  (also  led  strategy  by from  suffered  'Lieutenant'  S.  the m i l i t a r y  on  establishment  military  that  a  Tigers  of  Tamil  the  1982  on  L i b e r a t i o n of  of TELO  death  active  setback.  and  end.  2 8  on  the  the  l e a d e r s of  in military  Shankar, S u r e s h ) , 2 9  with  Maheswaran.  The  2 7  between t h e i r the  killed  Seelan)  117),  Valvettithurai  cooperation  relationship  Chavakachcheri  page  l e a d e r s h i p of Uma  o p e r a t i o n s . However, w i t h  1981,  (alias  emergence of P e o p l e s '  t h e TELO i n 1 9 8 0 .  and  i n J a f f n a under  introduced  on  'political  TULF.  operation  (TELO —  LTTE under t h e  facilitated  out  Anthony  joint  introduced  j o i n e d hands w i t h  t h e LTTE and  joint  the  a  the  the  t i m e ambushed  carried  Charles  Eelam L i b e r a t i o n O r g a n i z a t i o n formed  first  a t t a c k was  l e a d e r s h i p of 15,  demise of  LTTE f o r t h e The  to f i l l  of  operations, however, t h e  well-organized  the the  image  movement  was  firmly established. The early under  LTTE  became  s t r o n g enough t o a t t a c k  1980s. I n e v i t a b l y , the  c o n t r o l of  the  the  Tamil  areas  the  army  in  increasingly  Sinhala-Buddhist-dominated  army  the came  which  113  could  not  establish  security  forces,  against  The  survive  the  The  government  the  n o r t h and The  occurred  strained  The  other  in  leg "for anti-social  The  shooting  was  TULF  used  their  political  Jaffna  local  participation extracting  as  the  the  the  the  north.  But  armed s t r u g g l e of  the  t o the  had  long p o l i t i c a l  the  and  moderates, in  1983. LTTE  1983  to  3 0  and test  particularly the  latter's  ineffective  governments LTTE t h r o u g h hegemony  shot  22,  TULF. The  been  already  being  districts,  s y s t e m . The  in  TULF  February  successive  of  within  in a  i t s boycott the  TULF  t h e TULF, u n w i l l i n g t o l o s e i t s s t a t u s  ' e x c l u s i v e ' r e p r e s e n t a t i v e of  to LTTE  frictions.  LTTE and  former campaigned a g a i n s t  democratic  campaign c h a l l e n g e d over  on  a warning  from  to  1983.  Alalasundaram  i n e l e c t i o n s because they  concessions  parliamentary  by  militants  i n the T a m i l  The  the  ability  internal  government e l e c t i o n s of May  strength  peninsula.  the  activities"  considered  the  its  to  deteriorating situation  a crisis  f o r Kopay, M.  the  excessive  groups. T h i s exacerbated  between  t h e MP  of  c o n f r o n t a t i o n between t h e  militant  the  reprisals  allegiance  r e p r e s s i o n and the  ambushing  use  LTTE d e m o n s t r a t e d  TULF condemned t h e  relationship  resulting  army's"  i t to reach  direct  By  in provoking  civilians'  to a r r e s t  allowed  i n 1983.  and  The  government  failed  final  succeeded  Tamil  guerrillas.  both  civilians.  "ethnic  strengthened  secessionist  with  militants  civilians.  violence  LTTE  a rapport  the T a m i l s ,  refused  to  bow  pressure.  The elections  LTTE s h o t on  dead  April  w i t h d r a w a l of a l l UNP  29,  two 1983.  UNP 3 1  candidates  candidates  These k i l l i n g s from t h e  for  the  local  resulted in  election.  The  the call  11 4  for  boycott  indicated be a l s o  was  wide  due  a  support  to fear  political  success  guerrilla  movement  Charles  huge s u c c e s s on t h e J a f f n a  Anthony  of  not  friend on  only  reprisals  an  killed  23,  Prabakaran.  the L T T E . able  1983  at  Thirteen  3 5  in  Colombo f o l l o w e d his  analysis  accelerators" case,  the and  first  the  facilitated  guerrilla  of no r e t u r n .  of  to  Safe avoid  the  LTTE  hideouts arrest  riots  R.  Wood  violent  point.  framework,  Tamil  of a base a r e a i n Through  violent support  over-reaction  to  t h e T a m i l s ' commitment  informers  and  secessionist  built  an  the  the to  collaborators movement  image  i n and  executed of  i n T a m i l Nadu w h i c h a l l o w e d  illustrated  or  In . S r i L a n k a ' s  turning  struggle.  increased  Elimination  attacks,  a Second  to the " p r e c i p i t a n t s  c o r e a r e a s . T h r o u g h c a r e f u l l y p l a n n e d and  invincibility. militants  also  army l e d by  t h e LTTE d e v e l o p e d a p u b l i c  government's  was close  The a n t i - T a m i l  3 6  theoretical  t h e g r o w t h of an armed  the  who  was  including  on t h e e s t a b l i s h m e n t  actions,  struggle  guerrillas.  around  points  phase of t h e s e c e s s i o n i s t  major  on t h e  ambush  this critical  the  1983,  in i t s first  on t h e m i l i t a r y . John  secession  concentrated  secessionist  The  3 4  Chelvanayagam.  provided  15,  l o s s of A n t h o n y ,  The  foremost  commander b u t a l s o a  Tinnevely.  in  b a s e . The S r i Lankan  on J u l y  army  may  guerrillas. i t as the  s o l d i e r s were k i l l e d ,  of  riots  non-violent  the  i n a revenge a s s a u l t  t h i s attack  suggested  guerrillas  The  3 3  which l e d t o a p o i n t  t h e 1983 As  the  guerrilla  L i e u t e n a n t . The LTTE l o s t in  by  of P r a b a k a r a n r e s u l t e d  July  from  in Jaffna. Nevertheless, was  and  However t h i s s u p p o r t  3 2  of. the LTTE e s t a b l i s h e d  breakthrough against was  f o r the L T T E .  peninsula,  significance  the the of  115  external phase  support  (beginning  police  to  the  approximately  stations  and  t o o b t a i n arms and  effect  of d e m o r a l i z i n g  its  resources,  operations  Tamil  publication  of  obscure u n t i l  the  dramatic after  in  fire  came  s e l f - c o n f i d e n c e to s u s t a i n  and  (TELO) into  S.  achieved  of T e r r o r i s m A c t  still  see  the  fact,  the  emergence of  but  1973.  built  who  the  was  the  the  with  TELO  the  remained  prominence d u r i n g (alias  i n 1982.  birth  the  Kuttimani)  Yogachandran's eyes  so  that  of Eelam made  born  TELO c o u l d be  him  smuggler, p l a y e d  a key  movement.  was  He  expertise' ideologue  for  a very  the  "politically  1980  and  together  with  1981,  guerrilla  group.  the  conscious" growth of  provided  was  Pathmanathan  out  important  military  the  'military  r e s p o n s i b l e f o r the  TELO c a r r i e d  L T T E . Among t h e  movement  Thangathurai  i n c l u d i n g Inspector the  i n the  good marksman who  of t h e movement. TELO was  s e v e r a l policemen,  role  to  f o u n d e d TELO  o r g a n i z a t i o n a l s t r u c t u r e f o r the  Valvettithurai  3 7  t r a c e d back  in V a l v e t t i t h u r a i  a  In  'open'  Yogachandran  Yogachandran,  of  the  in Veerakesari,  TELO had  could  adequate  hero.  Thangathurai,  1972  acquired  government.  letter  The  LTTE  power and  the  Prevention  h i s d e a t h he  In  in  the  announcement of h i s w i s h t o d o n a t e h i s  'foik'  1972.  1981.  of T h a n g a t h u r a i  under  a  a m m u n i t i o n . Such a t t a c k s a l s o had enemy. The  out  on the  LTTE, which its  second  increasing attacks  f o r c e s were c a r r i e d  Eelam L i b e r a t i o n O r g a n i z a t i o n the  In t h e  by  the  against  Unlike  trial  i n 1981),  security  rebels  financial  secessionist conflict.  the  killing in  1979.  operations  operations  were  the  1 16  raid  on  the N e e r v e l y bank  operation),  and  the t u r n i n g  point  Thangathurai  and  major  the  (Prabakaran  ambush on  for  the  the  loss  major m i l i t a r y fellow  death  on August  officer  of  its  militant 13  in Jaffna  for  the  in 1979.  In TULF  order to r e t a i n  had  nominated  Constituency death  taking  Jaganathan  imposed on  the  But  4 1  major  Lankan  vis-a-vis  on  the s e c e s s i o n i s t  parties,  the  a  passed  Tamils,  vacant  the  Vaddukkodai  1982.  However,  4 0  him  Affairs  f o r the  from  Minister and  secessionist  rebels  Thangathurai  S i n h a l e s e p r i s o n e r s at Welikada  of  on  the  Not  prison  f u t u r e . At  by  calling  militants  India  the stand I n d i a  i n the  Jaganathan,  a resolution  passed  'interference' suggested  to  police  b e h a l f of Yogachandran  sentence  were f u t i l e .  also  along  sentence.  concern  however, I n d i a n e f f o r t s but  further  t h e T a m i l Nadu government, b a c k e d  political  affairs  no  c o n v i c t e d i n the  militant  to  India's  p u n i s h m e n t . The  internal  of  was  a  disintegrated  Sivanesan,  Indian External  the r e d u c t i o n of the death a lesser  I t was  Yogachandran p r e v e n t e d  for leniency  In a d d i t i o n ,  of  1981.  both  were s e n t e n c e d  p e n i n s u l a i n November.  demonstrated  militants.  to  the support  h i s o a t h as a MP.  N a r a s i m h a Rao's c a l l  of  a life  Yogachandran  on J a f f n a sentence  received  of  Yogachandran,  Thangathurai  3 9  this  However,  3 8  i t conducted  (Jagan),  killing  in  capture  TELO  1984.  Jaganathan  N e e r v e l y bank r o b b e r y and  for  i n the s p r i n g  until  LTTE  in J a f f n a . the  l e a d e r s , and  undertakings  with  all  was  the  s u c c e s s f o r t h e S r i Lankan army. The  after  the  t h e army  TELO  Yogachandran  led  in  Sri  would  take  this  point,  o n l y Yogachandran  were b r u t a l l y on J u l y  25,  murdered 1983.  4 2  and by  1 17  Peoples'  L i b e r a t i o n of Tamil  Organization Front  (EROS) and  Eelam  Eelam People's  1980,  the  Peoples'  ex-surveyor  with  trade  main  for  the  cause  Prabakaran." t o a gun  custody  and  The  0  split  i n May  PLOTE Palestine killed Election Police police  Thiagarajah,  on May  25,  station on  i n the i n the  the  advocated  PLOTE  summer of  PLOTE from  leaders into  government  George  1981  —  the  first  Uma  fall  a t t a c k on the 1981."  Maheswaran,  'hit-and-run'  attacks  was  closely  i n v o l v e d with  Batticaloa  districts  to  accelerate  i n the v i l l a g e s .  5 0  The  Refugees R e h a b i l i t a t i o n O r g a n i z a t i o n  the  But  9  i t s beginning  up-country  B  generally  farms were e s t a b l i s h e d i n V a v u n i a , T r i n c o m a l e e ,  re-settle  a  first  p u b l i c . New  development  DDC  Anaicottai  by of  had  f o r the  the  followed i n the  Habashi's  from PLOTE  candidate  attacked  I t was  7  particularly  forces."  Indian  by  mass armed s t r u g g l e i n s t e a d of  security  The  trained  l e a d i n g UNP  6  north."  The  Several militants  the  with  t o S r i Lanka.  army a t K u r i k a t t u w a n  leadership,  the  been 5  two  an The  3  differences  between t h e s e  bail.  leader  1981."  Maheswaran,  a t M a d r a s . B o t h were t a k e n  on  Liberation Front."  Station  attack  had  (PLOTE), a  from T e l l i p a l a i . "  personal  rivalry  released  recruits  A.  was  1982  Eelam  f o r m e d by Uma  experience  personal  battle later  union  refused to e x t r a d i t e either  on  Revolutionary Liberation  L i b e r a t i o n of T a m i l  breakaway g r o u p of t h e L T T E , was  the  Revolutionary  (EPRLF) In  led  (PLOTE), E e l a m  Tamils  on  economic  and  Gandhiyam  traditional  Tamil  Society land.  government c l o s e d down t h e Gandhiyam S o c i e t y as a  and  social  PLOTE c o l l a b o r a t e d w i t h and  the  5 1  the to But  terrorist  118  network and a r r e s t e d i t s April  1983.  1983.  5 3  was  killed  Dr.  farmers'  areas.  and  workers'  Consequently,  S.  Rajasundaram  i n the Welikada p r i s o n  The PLOTE s u c c e s s f u l l y b u i l t  women's, Tamil  He  5 2  secretary,  the  a  network  of  organizations PLOTE  in  in July  students',  in traditional  developed  the  largest  grass-roots  o r g a n i z a t i o n by 1983. In a d d i t i o n , PLOTE  attempted  to d i v e r s i f y  out of J a f f n a p e n i n s u l a ,  with  eastern the  province  widest  other  Muslims and u p - c o u n t r y T a m i l s .  political  base among t h e m i l i t a n t  t h e o r i s t s on g u e r r i l l a  is  necessary  the  PLOTE's l a c k o f m i l i t a r y  can  comprises  Organization  the  the j o i n t  V. Balakumar  guerrilla warfare. sabotage  5 6  in Madras.  concentrated bombing  can  This militant to  dislocate i n the east  factories,  successfully  largest  number  groups o p e r a t i n g  5 5  Today  be  Balakumar,  is  effective  group the  only  strongly S r i Lankan  in  of  d i s r u p t i n g exports  5 4  This  Marxist  i n S r i Lanka. in  charge  London  Council, of  EROS  'hit-and-run'  a t the b e g i n n i n g of  believes  in  economic  economy. The EROS i s  where i t h a d b u i l t - u p  e s t a b l i s h e d l i n k s with  formed by  i t s Revolutionary  The EROS l e a d e r s h i p b e l i e v e s t h a t a  policy  a  (EROS)  in 1975.  l e a d e r s h i p o f Rajanayagam  headed by S e c r e t a r y - G e n e r a l operations.  Ratnasabapathy,  among t h e m i l i t a n t  EROS began w i t h  as  organization.  economist, Eliathamby  intellectuals  support  i t s image  be t r a c e d back t o t h e E e l a m R e s e a r c h O r g a n i z a t i o n  organization  and  movement. However,  reduced  o r i g i n s of the Eelam R e v o l u t i o n a r y  a Marxist  and  Mao  warfare a s s e r t that p u b l i c  action  the  The PLOTE h a d  groups.  f o r t h e growth o f a g u e r r i l l a  dynamic g u e r r i l l a The  making c o n t a c t s  etc. —  up-country  grass-roots o r g a n i z a t i o n s and Tamils.  119  The is  the  Eelam P e o p l e ' s youngest  organizations General  of  (PLA),  wing o f  Syria  by  the  students,'  L a n k a . The  Front  is  guerrilla  PLO.  The  6 0  women's and  PLOTE —  p a i d g r e a t e r a t t e n t i o n to the  public.  The  province.  operations  also  LTTE  under t h e  of  g r o u p under t h e  military  success  the  training  was of  Due  to  virtually the  field  which  are  operating.  commitment,  the  LTTE d e v e l o p e d  However, i n i t i a l guerrilla  l a c k of  warfare  with  Mao's  major  and  of  activities  impressive  the  in  the  military  military  and  record.  well-organized  guerrilla  is  far  the  from  stand,  with  By  interest  Its  training  LTTE  rigid  follows in  its  adapts to l o c a l c o n d i t i o n s . t h e LTTE by  TULF l e a d e r s h i p . G u e v a r a  they  various  EPRLF, EROS  no  of e f f e c t i v e  readily  identify  and  l e a d e r s h i p of P r a b a k a r a n .  it  ideological  should  its  commanders. A l t h o u g h  and  d i s p l a c e d the  guerrillas  L i b e r a t i o n Army  EPRLF.  strong  a result  commitment  its flexible  The  politicization  well-disciplined  a Marxist-Leninist ideology, ideological  58  the  period,  t h e most  a  guerrilla  and  Pathmanabha.  wing c o n s i s t s of  concentrated  t h e LTTE had  boasted  The  t r a i n e d i n Lebanon  groups —  In t h e pre-1983  took p l a c e  Clearly, The  guerrilla  of  5 7  workers' groups. C o n s i s t e n t  Marxist  guerrilla  mid-1981.  People's  political  the  EPRLF  in  K.  fighters  (EPRLF)  EPRLF emerged out  (GUES)  theory,  eastern  secessionist  o r g a n i z a t i o n , the  c o n s i s t s of  5 9  Sri  the  L i b e r a t i o n Front  major  Students  of the  five  in  Eelam  Secretary-General military  the  active  Union of  Revolutionary  the  insisted  p u b l i c of  avoiding  mid-1983  c o n t r i b u t e d t o the  that  the a r e a s  rigid  political  LTTE's f a i l u r e  in  ideological  into a strong g u e r r i l l a i n the  had  group.  aspect to  of  develop  120  a  strong  grass-roots  network. A  the  pre-1983  period,  with  a hit-and-run  policy  The  military  TELO's  disintegration illustrated which was  facilitate  main  a  strategic  was  steps  no  LTTE  strategy  t h e army.  were  limited.  The  t h e a r r e s t of i t s l e a d e r s  organizational transition  structure  with  o f power. The  but  TELO  ideology  t o e s t a b l i s h Eelam. L i k e  movement,  the  with  the  and LTTE,  a  narrower  in a  socialist  EPRLF  political  and hence, period.  guerrilla  organization,  of  in  movement  a significant  an  apolitical  EROS a r e two  i n t h e e a s t . The  s t r u c t u r e s w h i c h were  Uma  grass-roots  of a g u e r r i l l a  the  and  rigidly groups not  and role  Tamil Marxist  developed militarily  r e m a i n e d o b s c u r e as g u e r r i l l a  groups  In  success  or f a i l u r e  of  post-1983  period  was  by  military  d e v e l o p e d by t h e s e  importance  consciousness and  personal  PLOTE from t h e L T T E .  i t . The PLOTE p l a y e d  conclusion,  organizations  influenced  s c h i s m . However,  development  heavily concentrated  well-organized  PLOTE b e l i e v e d  distinguished  political The  and  ideological  t o implement  population.  heavily  the  in  in developing  these  an  simply  understood  organization  post-1983  was  differences  Maheswaran  oriented  after  Jaffna-based  both  there  parties,  TELO  in  base.  Since  took  victories  t h e smooth  objective  political  aimed a t d e m o r a l i z i n g  o r g a n i z a t i o n which l a c k e d a M a r x i s t  TELO was  Eelam,  the  organization  group adopted a g u e r r i l l a  the absence of  the only  its the  to  of  the  Jaffna-based  in  the the  the l e a d e r s h i p , m i l i t a r y training  various  groups  and  guerrilla  i n t h e pre-1983  and  i n the  political strategies  years.  121  Post-1983  Developments  The the  July  rapid  Lanka. the  1983  g r o w t h of  The  post-1983  The  6 1  involved  in  measures  and,  internal  Narasimha  the  there  riots  and  killings  of t h e  G.  the  internationalized  s t r u g g l e . They a l s o p r e c i p i t a t e d Tamil  Associations  a s s i s t a n c e and militant  in  engaged  groups.  the  the  West  in effective  The  July  the  In  of t h e DMK,  issue;  e a c h competed w i t h  himself  as  to take a  'saviour'  movements were drawn were s p l i t as  the  patron As in  the  along  'god f o r the  firm  the other  into  the v o r t e x  Inevitably,  of T a m i l  father'  t o t h e LTTE, w h i l e  the  Eelam  financial various  b o t h M.  G.  Karunanidhi,  t h e S r i Lankan  present  T a m i l Nadu p a r t y l i n e s .  of  f o r the  M.  a  secessionist  a l s o compelled  of t h e T a m i l s .  V.  way,  provided  to  P.  this  which  s t a n d on  in  secured  formation  propaganda  deeply  1983,  Tamil  Ramachandran, C h i e f M i n i s t e r of T a m i l Nadu, and leader  armed  the  rapid  events  militant  participated  m i s s i o n s of 6 2  the  diplomatic  I n d i a , through  island.  Sri  in  through  India i n d i r e c t l y  Parthasarathy  f o o t h o l d on  movements  through  for  TELO i n  I n d i a t o become  conflict  island.  in  t h e LTTE and  Eelam  a l s o enabled  consequently,  Rao  movements  were t w e n t y - t h r e e  establishing  secessionist  affairs  militant  o v e r a b u n d a n c e of  1983  to July  strong p o l i t i c a l 1983  By  committed  p r o v i d e d the c a t a l y s t  s y s t e m d o m i n a t e d by  i n t o an  period.  struggle.  the  secessionist  guerrilla  1970s, bloomed  groups  anti-Tamil riots  an  Tamil  image  the  militant  Nadu p o l i t i c s  Ramachandran Karunanidhi  of  and  emerged  became  the  TELO.  a result numerical  of t h e  riots,  s t r e n g t h of  t h e r e was  the v a r i o u s  a significant militant  increase  groups.  In  122  1982,  the  militants  numbered  twenty h a r d c o r e  guerrillas.  to  which  5,000,  1985  of  the f i v e  These  major  groups boasted  figures illustrate  of  1983,  recruitment,  Nadu  to  LTTE o p e r a t e d militants  6 6  were  officers.  the m i l i t a r y  Among t h e major  trained  during played  a  successfully  settlement considered its a  in  However, by  guerrillas. 1983  guerrilla and  Sri  retired  of  Tamil  lessons to  Lankan  forests.  Indian  Tamil  Tamil  the The  6 7  military  operations  against  1983. in 'convincing' to s e t t l e  'reintroduced' 1984.'  on  to b u i l d  camps i n  ideological  guerrilla  role  conference  the  concentrated propaganda  6 5  riots  The  the  the  TULF  Jayewardene  ethnic  to  problem,  into negotiating a  moderate  TULF  was  still  by I n d i a t o be t h e r e p r e s e n t a t i v e o f t h e T a m i l s ,  participation moderate  key  January  6 4  swelled  s e c e s s i o n i s t groups, only  in  by  the r e s t  convene an a l l - p a r t y and  training  camps  and  opened  T h e r e were no major  6 8  India  military  training  10,000  groups  organization  movements. The m i l i t a n t s  guerrillas.  number had  s e c e s s i o n i s t movements. D u r i n g  their  the  around  militant  training,  this  the importance of the J u l y  various  provide  1984,  o n e - t h i r d were a r m e d .  t o t h e growth o f t h e v a r i o u s fall  By  6 3  only  around four hundred, i n c l u d i n g  a l s o demonstrated India's d e s i r e to deal g r o u p w h i c h would be more amenable  to  and with  India's  interests.  Tamil  Eelam L i b e r a t i o n O r g a n i z a t i o n Surprisingly,  in  the  Welikada  (TELO)  t h e TELO, w h i c h l o s t prison  massacre  of  its  entire  1983,  leadership  emerged  as the  123  dominant  militant  Thangathurai Sri)  and  from  the  leadership.  Kuttimani village  for  his  Thangathurai the  The  and  the  TELO  in  First,  Our p e o p l e concerned [ideology] achieved.  over  the  i n a b s e n t i a to the  life  Neervely  bank  Moreover,  the  deaths  the  'village  TELO d u r i n g attributed  t h e TELO, w h i c h was  government of  Tall  no  be  separatist  (alias  was  removed  can  of  leadership  youths.  TELO  deaths  took  sentenced  participation  movement among t h e major central  Kalviyangadu  Kuttimani  of t h e  the  S r i Sabaratnam  l e a d e r s h i p of t h e LTTE and  rise  factors.  After  i n 1983,  d o m i n a t e d by V a l v e t t i t h u r a i  united  1984.  of  Thereafter,  7 0  in  S r i S a b a r a t n a m was  6 9  imprisonment robbery.  group  longer of  bond' t h a t  1980-81. to  two  major  the o n l y " n o n - i d e o l o g i c a l " groups,  was  favoured  by  the  I n d i a . S r i Sabaratnam s t a t e d :  want Eelam immediately. They are with Marxism or any other 'ism.' i s only the next step after Eelam  not It is  7 1  The  Research  and  a g e n c y , p l a y e d an consequently, influence time  and  the  indiscriminate tests also  movement and DMK  leader  attracted selection  significantly  Nadu,  government  and  the  TELO  Despite  7 2  arms  capability  the  1983  being  of r e c r u i t s  without  in  the  RAW  by  the  proper  i n c r e a s e d the  numbers j o i n i n g  came  identified  to  be  i t from  M.  greater  TELO. Second, gave  and  limited  a l a r g e number of r e c r u i t s .  i t s c l o s e r e l a t i o n s h i p with isolated  intelligence  exerted  provided  of  of t h e TELO l e a d e r s i n  and  Indian  i n t h e growth of t h e TELO,  central  training  fighting  deaths  role  (RAW), t h e  t h e TELO l e a d e r s h i p .  quantities,  publicity  Tamil  important  the Indian  over  enhanced tragic  A n a l y s i s Wing  the  movement Further, screening TELO. In  as a pro-DMK  Karunanidhi,  the  t h e government of T a m i l Nadu under  124  the  v i n d i c t i v e leadership The  place  TELO's f i r s t  in  the  manned by the  about  TELO  of M.G.  major a t t a c k of  fifty  p o l i c e m e n , was  guerrillas  1984.  on  inflicted  u n i t , w h i c h u s e d new  l a r g e number  guns.  of  on  and  well  post-1983 g u e r r i l l a s Chavakachcheri guerrillas  destroyed  to  also  prepared  government.  The  M-16S  and  a large-scale organized  the  and  secessionist struggle,  a c t i v e and  TELO  carried  out  i n the  w i n t e r of  1985.  bound J a f f n a the  train  19th 7 7  that  as the  This  7 5  the  a  Tamil  hit-and-run operation.  guerrilla  i t s local  the  sanctuaries  January  Jaffna  increase  of  be  The  1985.  force  support,  in  guerrilla  up  The in both  s u c c e s s f u l l y cut India's  Jaffna,  the  railway  increased  support  foreign  Thus,  Colombo-  s o l d i e r s were  off  factors determining  warfare.  a  activities.  indicated,  guerrilla  town s o u t h of  Twenty-seven  guerrilla  important  successful  TELO blew  7 6  peninsula.  discussion can  another  at Murikkandy, a small  militants also  the  theoretical  intensity  of  The  to  explains  attack  passive.  The operation  a dominant  enhanced  the  that  guerrilla  TELO  sub-machine  equipped.  from  of  plundered  illustrated  t r a i n e d and  progress  i t as  Twenty-four  7 3  number  demonstrated  to  by  largest  planned," which  TELO's s u c c e s s e s t a b l i s h e d  link  and  modern weapons, a l s o  including  were b e t t e r  attack  were  operation  killed.  the  took  police station,  1984.  the  forces  A S r i Lankan m i l i t a r y commander d e s c r i b e d  7 4  "sophisticated  on  20,  attack,  and  weapons  armed  attacked  November  military  casualties  the  Chavakachcheri  i n the  a  on  fall  p o l i c e m e n were k i l l e d  assault  Ramachandran.  As  previous  assistance the  in three  and  scale  and  months,  two  125  s u c c e s s f u l attacks with TELO  to  challenge  high m i l i t a r y  the  dominance  p e n i n s u l a . The LTTE p l a y e d guerrilla  warfare  Meanwhile, effective control the  over over  the  militants  confrontation encouraged spring its the  time,  of 1985,  In  7 9  beginning  greater  "eventually  and  w h i c h were becoming danger  reported  to  in  1985  an  retrospect,  it  i n the Tamil  the  successful guerrilla  an army camp 'military' TELO  can  camp  military areas.  that  all-out  r a i d s on t h e m i l i t a r y .  The  more  government  in April  prevail  Every  bigger"  of  the  at  camps,  In t h e  Kokavil  in  confrontation in  under-estimated  be seen t h a t  would  raid  the was  t h i s was  a the  unit.  A  have e n c o u r a g e d more the  main  But t h e TELO f a i l e d  government  to repeat i t s  of the p a s t .  The  TELO  was  able  to b r i n g the i d e o l o g i c a l l y  and EPRLF under an u m b r e l l a militant Liberation  oganizations  collection  military  major  the  (UFELO)  United on  operations,  of funds j o i n t l y  were t h e major  o r g a n i z a t i o n i n 1984.  formed  Organizations  Coordinated  both  7 8  struggle.  a t t a c k s on t h e v a r i o u s  success  t o t h e TELO i n  i n t h e K o k a v i l camp and t h e ' campaign  capture  the  t h e L T T E on t h e J a f f n a  of t h e end of TELO as a s u c c e s s f u l g u e r r i l l a  successful  authority  a  towards a f u l l - f l e d g e d  strength  failure.  posed  t h e TELO a t t a c k e d  secessionist  military  raids,  the army."  "bolder  campaign  guerrilla  would  enabled  1985.  p e n i n s u l a . Time  with  of  a secondary r o l e  of e a r l y the  casualties  o b j e c t i v e s o f t h e newly  guerrilla  overseas by a  These  Front  April  administered  Eelam 1984.  propaganda joint  EROS three  of  16,  formed U F E L O .  a t t a c k s were c a r r i e d  rigid  8 0  and  committee 8 1  However,  out e x c l u s i v e l y by  126  the  TELO w h i c h q u e s t i o n e d  UFELO  was  March  1985.  militant the  Eelam  Thimpu  under  leaders  groups  hostile.  in A p r i l  The  the  1985.  PLOTE r e f u s e d  form a j o i n t f r o n t  under  July  and  materialize.  Personal  kept  the Tamil m i l i t a n t s  (ENLF) i n  These  four  August  a  between  common  1985.  not bury t h e i r these  front  t o j o i n t h e f r o n t . Thus,  comprising  not  8 3  The  t h e ENLF banner p a r t i c i p a t e d i n  relationship  operating  UFELO.  Front  o f t h e L T T E and TELO c o u l d  differences,  militant  ENLF  of t h e  Liberation  ( B h u t a n ) p e a c e t a l k s between  the  personal  National  The LTTE j o i n e d  8 2  organizations  Because  to  renamed  the e f f e c t i v e n e s s  two  remained  the attempt  a l l t h e f i v e major g r o u p s  more  than  ideological  from e s t a b l i s h i n g  a  did  differences  united  guerrilla  c a m p a i g n . A c o o r d i n a t e d g u e r r i l l a e f f o r t by t h e m i l i t a n t s have  inflicted  heavy d e f e a t s on t h e army  But  the  Lankan  Sri  individual both  was  Sri  to  defeat  mid-1985, army  was  fire  that  i f other  the m i l i t a n t s confined  to  a lack factors  took over  Point  Pedro, N a v a t k u l i  Palaly.  enough  Though  a l l  the  strength  collaborates  the  the theory not  always  t h i s drawback.  Jaffna over  peninsula.  The  the d i s t r i c t .  Fort,  By  The  Kankesanthurai,  and V a l v e t t i t h u r a i , w i t h h e a d q u a r t e r s a t five  major  t h e TELO and t h e LTTE were  active  and s u c c e s s f u l it  varying  counteract  in Jaffna  region,  on a r e a s where  period.  to r e s i s t  of c o h e s i o n may  camps s c a t t e r e d  major army camps were s i t u a t e d  1984-85  power.  Lankan e v i d e n c e , however  f o r w a r d by O ' N e i l l  lead  strong  m i l i t a r y g r o u p s w h i c h were of  i n t e r m s o f t r a i n i n g and The  put  army  i n the  could  g r o u p s were o p e r a t i n g in  the  forefront  i n the due  to  g u e r r i l l a r a i d s . Each group c o n c e n t r a t e d  enjoyed  extensive  support  of  the  local  127  population. of  The  TELO's  ' m i l i t a r y ' s u c c e s s and t h e c o n f i n e m e n t  t h e army t o b a r r a c k s b r o u g h t t h e o r g a n i z a t i o n  open  in Jaffna.  free  movement  the  inability  guerrillas of  of these h e a v i l y  'total control'  considered  its  organization  itself  to t r e a t  military  between  a  image  1986,  t o S r i Lanka, t r i e d  the  movement  left  relationship  strained force  due  in  in  8 7  8 8  since  together with LTTE the  to  lack  the  the with  relationship  leaders  h i s Indian hideout  public its  between  the  dissident  sympathy  killing  for  of  weakened  the  TELO  The LTTE a t t a c k e d  1985.  and  TULF 8 6  outcry  India's unwillingness  stop the k i l l i n g s ,  By  had  ex-MPs, April,  t h e LTTE had become t o become  the  major  S r i Sabaratnam,  as t h e m a j o r g u e r r i l l a  of p u b l i c  TELO  t h e TELO camps i n J a f f n a .  including  elected  TELO g r o u p  the  two  i n September  intense competition  The L T T E emerged  The  pre-occupation  among t h e  killed  t h e n o r t h . A. Selvam was  TELO.  and e x p e c t e d  within  Over one h u n d r e d TELO m i l i t a n t s , killed.  TELO  to s e t t l e i n t e r n a l differences  instead  to their  Jaffna.  the  crossed  A l a l a s u n d a r a m and Dharmalingam the  to the absence  movement, unit  the  and  In a d d i t i o n ,  decreasing  gave  by  8  over  been  Due  The  and t h e g u e r r i l l a s . "  Sabaratnam, who  but  the  facilitated  camps,  t o have s t r a i n e d  internal differences  8 5  the  military  i s said  TELO.  Das.  militants  the p u b l i c .  within  purely  the  leader,  armed  i t a s an army. The TELO's  the p u b l i c  By  over  into  f r e e l y with the p u b l i c .  o f t h e army t o move o u t o f t h e  political  public  The m i l i t a n t s mixed  out  were  organization  as the S e c r e t a r y - G e n e r a l of over  the k i l l i n g s  to exert  indicated  in Jaffna,  pressure  t h e weak s u p p o r t  TELO. T h u s , t h e g u e r r i l l a movement, w i t h o u t an  on  the  base o f  ideological  128  commitment boosted  by  The of  a  with  an  organizational structure  f o r e i g n power, f a i l e d  theory  warfare  and  and  of g u e r r i l l a  as a s t a g e  During  c o n d u c t e d major a t t a c k s on defensive  against  destroyed  the  to  i t from t h e  isolate  failure  could  be  success  The  the TELO was  However, t h e  victories  support  area  TELO's  prevented  g r o u p . The  on  militants  it  TELO's r a p i d  provided  elements  by  the  failure  in  the  i t s defeat  f u r t h e r a c c e l e r a t e d by  Eelam  L i b e r a t i o n Front  of  a  in  poor  grass-roots  (PLOTE), Eelam  (EPRLF) and  Eelam  People's Revolutionary  (EROS) the  concentrated  EPRLF and  for a  i n both  stable  infiltrated  t h e EROS a l l s h a r e d  beginning,  EPRLF b e l i e v e d i n ' t o t a l  successfully  had  develop.  i d e o l o g y . From t h e  necessary  TELO  i n the J a f f n a  c o n t r i b u t e d to  L i b e r a t i o n of T a m i l  to  phase  relentless  The  three c r u c i a l  movement —  network  PLOTE,  Leninist  —  the  Organization  country.  the  and  Revolutionary  The  to  under  attacks.  military  p u b l i c support  d e c l i n e of  organizations  Peoples'  the  second  TELO's l a c k of o r g a n i z a t i o n a l s t r u c t u r e ,  of a g u e r r i l l a  intelligence  the  of  the  f o r c e s , w h i c h were  infrastructure  attributed  government. Yet  is  government  into a strong g u e r r i l l a  l e a d e r s h i p , and  groups  rest  describes  1984-85 p e r i o d , t h e  rebel  to score c o n s i s t e n t  growth  1986.  the  end.  enemy  the  the  communication  from d e v e l o p i n g  Indian  warfare  i n which the  mounting p r e s s u r e .  the  i n the  artificially  the  these  Marxist-  three  militant  e a s t . The  PLOTE  and  revolution'; a socialist  south  was  Eelam. the  n o r t h and  a  Further,  these  up-country Tamil  three base  groups  controlled  1 29  by  S.  Thondaman. They were a b l e  government south  and  credible  the  Maheswaran's  role  the  only  the  PLOTE's  The  90  Lebanon and guerrilla  the  of  attack  to the  that  attack  Sinhalese  robbery  took  February support  1984,  was  peddling'  in  from  as  the  army  to  played  a  post-1983  of  were  (PLO) no  PLOTE i n t h e  out the  8,000-  i n c l u d i n g Maheswaran,  police  i n an  the  major  and  the  PLOTE  leadership.  in  post-1983  station  by  were  The  fact  exclusively Sinhala  town,  indicated  relayed  a  9 2  joint  operation  'Voice  from  of T a m i l  south  government. " 9  a  Indian  politically  PLOTE and of  India.  Maheswaran's him  officials mature and  in  Eelam' In  9 3  l e d a d e l e g a t i o n to M a u r i t i u s to  India.  "balanced,  success  a  around  s e c e s s i o n i s t s t r u g g l e brought  Maheswaran  between t h e  as  guerrillas.  its  government of  However, t h e  In t h e  89  there  PLOTE o p e r a t e d  Maheswaran  the  the  c o n c e r n e d about n o n - m i l i t a r y a c t i v i t i e s  the c e n t r a l  rapport  However,  9 1  place  broadcast  f o r Eelam  warfare  estimated  guerrillas,  from Colombo,  radio  i n 1987  a people's  PLOTE.  was  policy  t h e p o s t - 1 9 8 3 p e r i o d . The (VOTE), a  the  carried  underground  Maheswaran  of  Nikaweratiya  general  kilometres  build  u n d e r t a k e n by  on  bank  exceptions the  the  Lankan  forces to  Palestinan Liberation Organization  operations  Nikaweratiya  to  state in conventional  were w e l l a r m e d .  p e r i o d . The  t h e armed  Sri  organization.  strength  core  the  t h e EROS s u r v i v e d  decision  S r i Lankan  were t r a i n e d by  with  shifting  i n the d i s i n t e g r a t i o n  period, 10,000.  by  secessionist guerrilla  challenge  eighty  south  u p - c o u n t r y . Yet  Uma  key  in  to d e s t a b i l i z e  win  'soft  c l o s e r to considered  canny."  9 5  A  t h e TULF l e a d e r s h i p a l s o e x i s t e d .  guerrilla  organization  as  Debray  130  argues,  is  determined  support. Although capability, made  it  i t s l a c k of  Sri  force  period  and  PLOTE  in g u e r r i l l a the  PLOTE of  PLOTE l o s t  was  organizations.  As  military  operation  the  is  i n the  warfare. was  In  the  regarded  from  the  the  Debray a l s o  military  as  a  public in  rest  of  to d i f f e r e n c e s over m i l i t a r y s t r a t e g y ,  movement  because  Subsequently, the  Large  the  leadership  addition,  The  few  was  dogmatic  wing, t h e  EPRLF  1 0,  1 984.  a g e n t s . However, t h e handed Indian was  It  over  to  were r e l e a s e d  was  attacked  the  internal  deserted  were  the  conducted.  factions. fighting  levelled  ENLF  By  1986  cadres. against  the  ( P L A ) , k i d n a p p e d an  A l i e n s were a c c u s e d of  American  being  CIA  ransom money s h o u l d  government of T a m i l Nadu e m b a r r a s s e d been c a t e g o r i c a l l y d e n y i n g  T a m i l m i l i t a n t s . Under I n d i a n without  an  inauspicious  the  Karainagar  In  a t t e n t i o n when i t s m i l i t a r y  EPRLF's demand t h a t  the  the  were  received  The  9 6  the  major  PLOTE d i s i n t e g r a t e d .  government which had  assisting  Aliens  the  P e o p l e ' s L i b e r a t i o n Army  c o u p l e on May  militants raids  from  corruption  Inevitably,  group o u t s i d e  into various  divorced  of  of  guerrilla  PLOTE s p l i t  charges  leadership.  numbers  post-  political  umbrella.  in.  the  successful  PLOTE r e m a i n e d  squabbles set  from  the  p r o p a g a n d a . The Due  of non-  the  suggests, a  only  years  absence  e f f e c t i v e form of  the  public  post-1983  i t s mass s u p p o r t  most  and  demonstrated  protecting  isolated  guerrilla  capability  operations  incapable  Lankan army. The  1983  the  field  operations',  operational  military  initially  inexperienced  guerrilla  by  payment o f  start  naval  ransom two  February  11,  the  that  it  pressure,  the  days  f o r EPRLF g u e r r i l l a s .  base on  be  1985  later. The  PLA using  131  rocket  launchers  struggle. failed  However,  9 7  to  score  Killinochi more  significant in  political  guerrilla  cultivated south.  the  a  political before  victory  though  prison  i n September  the  a  viable guerrilla  1986.  1  engaged  of in  prevented the  However,  money  on  the  EPRLF  was  t o c a r r y o u t any a  critical  The  progressive along  PLA  guerrillas  Sinhalese with  i n the  twenty-two indicted  to.overthrow the  successfully  force with  into  EPRLF  the  minimal c a s u a l t i e s i n in  the  and  kidnappings  The  east  on  The EPRLF  in  in  Tamil  in a hostile  the  in p o l i t i c i z i n g from  reduced  that  were  Nadu.  1 0 2  environment success  heterogeneous  the general 1983.  also  militants  due t o i t s l i m i t e d  concentration  propaganda  victories  coffers.  i t from a c h i e v i n g c o n t r o l o v e r  political  demolished  i n the B a t t i c a l o a d i s t r i c t .  t h e EPRLF had t o o p e r a t e  Its  f o r c e on t h e  a s l a r g e f u n d s a s t h e L T T E , TELO o r PLOTE.  robberies  EPRLF s u c c e e d e d  effective  also  and t h e r e l e a s e o f  t h e EPRLF s u r v i v e d  I n d i a . The EPRLF a l s o f a i l e d Lanka.  1983."  to score d e c i s i v e " m i l i t a r y "  Consequently,  Sri  1  attract  flow  in  0  of i t s deep r o o t s  the  i t failed  TELO, t h e EPRLF was n o t a s t r o n g  as  failure  The  9 8  on c h a r g e s of c o n s p i r a c y  EPRLF  Its  i t s raid  1985.  Padmanabha,  p e n i n s u l a . Thus, the LTTE  not  in  breakout  with  Jaffna  could  secessionist  1 0 0  Unlike  account  the  ( a l l b u t two were S i n h a l e s e ) , were  the High Court  December  in  a t t a c k s . But t h e EPRLF p l a y e d  1987,  activists  government.  east,  relationship  In F e b r u a r y  time  on March 2,  Batticaloa  prisoners  first  decisive  station  in  the  the  t h e a t t a c k was u n s u c c e s s f u l . The PLA  a  police  active  role  for  area. public  in east  However, through  132  EROS, a c l a s s i c a l sabotage state.  as  Marxist  i t s main  tool  EROS was a s m a l l  1,000-1,500  with  guerrilla  limited  weaponry.  a c t i v e i n the B a t t i c a l o a d i s t r i c t .  out  "bomb  Hotel  Lanka O b e r o i  unsuccessful  at K o l l a n a w a  demonstrated  aircraft in  attempt  explosion  explosion  at  EROS a l s o c l a i m e d passenger  train  a l s o demolished Trincomalee  north  to destroy  population fragile industry  from  economy  largest  carried  Air  Lanka  conflict  was  damaged  foreign  by  investment.  force  over to  the  a  at  into  demise also  who c o m p r i s e d  the  operations  the the  Second,  1 0 9  outside  these  shield  EROS  i n the t e a i n d u s t r y — But  on  factory  1987.  EROS  First,  failed.  the  exchange e a r n e r .  the  The m i l i t a n t s  1 0 7  cement  o u t by  spill  attempt  the  by  explosion  in April  p r o d u c e d two r e s u l t s .  the up-country Tamils  foreign  the  The government a c c u s e d EROS i n  1 0 8  infiltrated labour  installations  O f f i c e i n Colombo.  f o r t h e bomb  and Colombo  operation  government's  and  in  strike  a l s o made  T h i s was f o l l o w e d  1 0 6  S r i Lanka's second  on May 21, 1 9 8 6 .  The  suspected  people.  made t h e s e c e s s i o n i s t c o n f l i c t area.  o i l refinery  on May 31, 1986 n e a r C o l o m b o .  east  carried  to  EROS g u e r r i l l a s  1 0  responsibility  guerrilla  and  south. *  o f EROS  the Central Telegraphic  both massacres a t Aluthoya The  EROS  a t K a t u n a y a k e on May 3, 1986 w h i c h r e s u l t e d  the deaths of f o u r t e e n  bomb  The g r o u p was  1 0 3  I n 1984,  the a b i l i t y  a n d i t was a l s o  1 0 5  around  i n Colombo and s u b u r b s . Bomb a t t a c k s on  deep i n t o S i n h a l a - d o m i n a t e d an  economic  o r g a n i z a t i o n numbering  very  campaigns"  used  i n t h e armed campaign a g a i n s t t h e  guerrila  relatively  group,  Sinhala Sinhalese  S r i Lanka's of the t o u r i s t successfully  t h e m a j o r i t y of  t h e l a r g e s t S r i Lankan  Thondaman's  firm  hold  on  the  133  plantation of in  Tamils  the youth the  on  east  dominance on cordial  the  kept  i t from  relationship of  successfully  peninsula. the  Tigers.  brought  A clear  competing  with  the  bonds and  down c o n s i d e r a b l y t h e  t e a p l a n t a t i o n s . The  the J a f f n a  'blessings'  ethnic  slowed  shift  in  guerrilla  p e r i o d . But  none of t h e m i l i t a n t  continually  maintain  guerrillas  heavy weapons i n t h e i r purchasing  used  the  the government  increasingly  LTTE, forces.  sophisticated  i n t o a m a s s - b a s e d movement  into  guerrillas'  inability  more  more  s t r u g g l e was  no  on  and longer the  i n c r e a s e d . The  in  into  the  and  groups.  to  the find  support  explain  the  This evidence  Guevara's t h e o r e t i c a l  south  Tamil a  any  drew  conflict.  to  government  government  the  north  d i f f e r e n c e s among  t o run o v e r  the  confined  l a c k of a p u b l i c  guerrilla  strategic  in  the post-1983 y e a r s . I n t e r - g r o u p  civilians  Mao's and  for  post-1983  these  terrorism  Tamil  both  modern weapons t o meet t h e c h a l l e n g e . None of  the  central  to  hit-and-run  i n the  except  on  o p e r a t i o n s , but  camps. However, T a m i l  the  EROS  also  rebels continued  pressure  from  evident  groups,  pressure  e a s t . I n s t e a d , p e r s o n a l and  explained  the  t h e government was  groups c o u l d develop and  south,  appealing  strategy  open c o n f r o n t a t i o n was  secessionist  by  and  with  a  ideology.  to  The  maintained  operated  east  together  operations  could  EROS  and  the  EROS  t h e LTTE f o r m i l i t a r y  Hence,  In  Tamils  c o n c e n t r a t i o n of  with  LTTE  radicalization  The  base and  conflict military Sinhalese guerrilla  areas.  solution the  the  Hence rapidly  role  of  i n e f f e c t i v e n e s s of  these  i s again consistent  with  analysis  of g u e r r i l l a  warfare.  134  Liberation In  T i g e r s of Tamil  the  military  post-1983  a  commanders and e x p e r i e n c e d  who  by  the  the the LTTE  LTTE  screened  movement. T h i s with  g r o u p . The new military  commander  LTTE  Anthony and  major  efficient  well-trained the  field  was  not  Chelvanayagam,  operations  background before  the  until  mid-  volunteers,  recruiting  them t o  dividends,  EROS) r e m a i n e d t h e o n l y  disciplined militant  underwent before  1 1 0  LTTE  army  was  an  t o draw upon t h o u s a n d s o f  in  s i x months  joining  Jaffna,  and B a t t i c a l o a .  of a r e g i o n a l  of  possessed  careful selection paid  training  Trincomalee  reservoir  of the  their  recruits  commands of t h e  build  f i g h t e r s . Hence  itsability  (along  to  deaths of C h a r l e s  c a r r i e d out the bulk  1983. D e s p i t e  t h e LTTE a l r e a d y  necessary  organization,  weakened  (LTTE)  period,  infrastructure  guerrilla  Eelam  and  a  responsible  1 1 1  one  Vavuniya  for  to  one  year  of  the  regional  (Vanni),  E a c h r e g i o n a l command  political  committee.  f o r the region  the  of  Mannar, consisted  A  regional  and t h o s e under h i s  command. The d e c e n t r a l i z a t i o n o f t h e d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g p r o c e s s the with  organization respect  Compared  to  allowed  to  flexibility  regional  other linked  by  commands;  thus,  the  communication with  their  results.  1 1 2  All  central  committee.  central  committee  non-military  military  guerrilla  command was  the  a  t o the r e g i o n a l  groups,  radio LTTE  field  regional  strategy only  network leadership  officers  commanders  and the  with  tactics. LTTE's  the  enjoyed  and p r o d u c e d  in  high  regional better effective  commanders were members o f t h e  In a d d i t i o n t o t h e r e g i o n a l commanders,  the  of t h e LTTE c o n s i s t e d  and  personnel.  1 1 3  The p o l i t i c a l  of s e n i o r m i l i t a r y committee  operating  in  1 35  Madras of  was  responsible  f o r p r o p a g a n d a a b r o a d and t h e  f u n d s t h r o u g h a network  branches.  A  hundred  u n i q u e f e a t u r e o f t h e L T T E was  both the m i l i t a r y Prabakaran  of o v e r one  is  and p o l i t i c a l  wings  collection  LTTE  overseas  the c o m b i n a t i o n of  into a single  b o t h t h e c h a i r m a n and m i l i t a r y  structure.  commander o f t h e  LTTE. Since and  t h e LTTE was  women  who  joined  during  the p o s t - J u l y  carry  out  any  guerrillas first  demolished  Point  August, the LTTE Jaffna  out  in  Pedro p o l i c e intensified  1984.  in large  organization until  officers  early  on March The  1 1 1 1  station  1 1 6  i n a landmine a t t a c k  The LTTE m i l i t a n t s  3,  on A p r i l  police  was  station  guerrillas,  who  ambushed armed  attacked  did 1984.  the J a f f n a  troops at Vellamkulam in  station 1 1 8  On  Ariyapperuma,  in  the  November army  ambush and c l a i m e d the S i n h a l e s e  19,  attack  district  1987,  LTTE  of  responsibility villages  the the  In the  Police, 5,  t o the  Ottisuddan  The  Mannar  by  the  militants district.  on t h e K a l u w a n c h i k u d y  Batticaloa  commander  fishing  the  1 1 7  1 1 5  military  raids  1984  c a p t u r e d arms and a m m u n i t i o n .  The LTTE a l s o made an u n s u c c e s s f u l police  5,  also  August  peninsula.  August  LTTE  on  of the on  not  -- t h e  1984.  on t h e m i l i t a r y  Nediyakadu  on  numbers  1984  4,  Superintendent at  men  guerrillas  extended the g u e r r i l l a  north outside  at  the  i t s raids  Tamil-dominated  1984.  movement  operations  J a y a r a t n a , an A s s i s t a n t  killed  1984.  period,  and t r a i n i n g  p e n i n s u l a . . T h e r e were a t t a c k s on b o t h navy and  officers. was  1983  two a i r f o r c e  carried  in recruiting  the g u e r r i l l a  guerrilla  killed  attack  engaged  on September killed  northern  for brutal  22,  Brigadier  r a n g e , i n an  civilian  of N a y a r u and K o k k i l a i  murders i n the  136  Mullaitivu Sinhalese  districts. civilians  Throughout ambushed  the  propounded  by  demoralizing  the  military  were  LTTE  in  and  Sri  military  further  Tamil  support  guerrillas ambushing from  collected  of  the inflow  g r o u p ' s need  in  their  LTTE  attacks.  13,  warfare. which  The in  I n e v i t a b l y , the  police  stations  and  s o u r c e o f f u n d s was a l l over  the world  o f money was l i m i t e d . Hence, the  frequent  this use  ambushes.  Further,  13,  raiding  and  i n 1984. F u r t h e r ,  f o r arms n e c e s s i t a t e d  The LTTE c o n t i n u e d  the  widened  S r i Lankan T a m i l s s c a t t e r e d  and, c o n s e q u e n t l y , guerrilla  by  succeeded i n  the c i v i l i a n s ,  the Tamil population.  arms  and  theory  ill-equipped  t h e m i l i t a r y . The m i l i t a n t s ' main  expatriate  warfare  counter-insurgency  base f o r the g u e r r i l l a s  on  1 2 0  stations  The g u e r r i l l a s  against  attacks  w a r f a r e . The L T T E ' s  ill-trained,  in  alienated  police  guerrilla  Guevara.  Lanka's  first  struggle.  raided  with  frustrated military retaliated turn  the  i t s guerrilla  consistent Mao  inexperienced  were  i n the s e c e s s i o n i s t  1984,  operations  These  1 1 9  attacks  did  not  to rely  on S i n h a l e s e  officially  The L T T E a t t a c k e d  1985,  but  failed  successfully  guerrilla attacked  civilians  claim  tactics  destroyed  raid  "total  on  victory."  1 2 1  on a S i n h a l a  town.  On March  The LTTE  also  p o l i c e s t a t i o n s i n J a f f n a and Mannar  and  1 2 2  These  led  the  and  administration  February  t h e Madawachi p o l i c e s t a t i o n  l a r g e q u a n t i t i e s o f arms and ammunition. gradual  though  r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r such  captured to  i n 1985.  continued,  t h e K o k k i l a i army camp  to achieve  1985, t h e g u e r r i l l a s the f i r s t  on h i t - a n d - r u n  collapse  on t h e J a f f n a  of  both  peninsula.  civil However,  attacks military  the  Thimpu  137  peace  t a l k s and  the c e a s e f i r e d e c l a r e d  on June  18,  1985  l e d to  t h e d e - e s c a l a t i o n of v i o l e n c e i n t h e  summer. B o t h m i l i t a n t s  the  build  government used t h e  capability. aircraft with  However,  respite the  purchase  w h i c h were m o d i f i e d  anti-insurgency  advantage  in  militants  of  the  successfully confined Point  the p e n i n s u l a ,  violence flared  LTTE  district.  1 2  "  The  guerrillas  The  A n u r a d h a p u r a m a s s a c r e was  Piuslus  out  by  a Buddhist  widely  —  i n D e h i w a t t a and  Tamil  Mahindapura  in Trincomalee  was  successful in wresting  government  on  the  peninsula.  importance  of e s t a b l i s h i n g base a r e a s  conduct  propaganda. Although  military The  training  results,  guerrilla the  t h e army o u t r i g h t when t h e modernization  14,  to  of  latter  S r i L a n k a ' s armed  p u r c h a s e of a i r c r a f t ,  made t h e  m i l i t a n t s . However, i n 1985,  the  task  people 1985.  have  civilians  power away from emphasizes  out  strategy  the  its  f o r c e s , which more  easier  north.  defeat  weakest. included  difficult  LTTE t h w a r t e d t h e  the  produced  s t r o n g enough t o at  the  political  i t s c o n t r o l over  was  been  district.  carry  not  1 2 5  Marasulin  where i t would be  "hit-and-run"  .LTTE was  east.  146  killed  theory  and  LTTE a l s o e x t e n d e d  its classic  beneficial  Mao's  on  Trincomalee  on May  also  LTTE  to  in  suspected  militants  camps  n o r t h and  Muttur  city  the  Palaly,  Navatkuli  t h e LTTE Mannar r e g i o n a l commander,  (alias Victor).  The  holy  military  the  indiscriminately killed  Anuradhapura —  together  Although  to  i n the  and  training  the  1 2 3  military  up a g a i n  Nilaveli  at  carried  government. the  military  planes  turned  P e d r o , J a f f n a F o r t and  controlled  their  six Marchetti  in Pakistan  Thondamanaru,  The  of  up  i n t o ground a t t a c k  training  favour  to  and  for  The the the  government's  1 38  policy, and  adopted  east.  The  instability reach  i n 1983, Sinhalese,  i n the south,  a political  t a l k s were The  of r e s t r i c t i n g  exerted  settlement.  year  1986 c o u l d  peninsula  control  continued  pressure  For t h i s  t o the  north  violence  and  on t h e government to.  reason,  t h e Thimpu  peace  held. be a p t l y d e s c r i b e d  T i g e r s . The LTTE e l i m i n a t e d the  fearing  violence  in  May.  The  through m i l i t a r y  government's  operations  in  May  the  TELO,  attempt was  successfully  hold  the p e n i n s u l a .  I t a l s o c o n t r o l l e d l a r g e a r e a s of  province  some a r e a s  October  12,  direct  confrontation  the  LTTE  killed.  1986,  The  December and to fact  that R a j i v  the  LTTE  in Mannar.  exchanged  prisoners  with  with  exchange  by s e n d i n g a  the LTTE, b y p a s s i n g  Gandhi  invited  India.  Prabakaran  1 2 9  to  as the i n d i s p u t a b l e l e a d e r t h e EPRLF  1986  guerrilla  organization,  t h e S r i Lankan  to  open  to bring J a f f n a t o t a l l y  Finally,  the  Bangalore  to  the  in  emergence 1 3 0  1986,  The the  indispensable  in guerrilla  confrontation.  t h e army camps  delegation  government.  witnessed a further s h i f t  of d e s t r o y i n g  The LTTE f a i l e d  1986. Thus  was  LTTE i n  of t h e T a m i l s .  i n December  a  However,  1 2 7  government up t h i s  On  in  Piuslus  "hit-and-run"  incapable  the m i l i t a r y  personnel  Marasulin  i n a l l peace t a l k s w i t h  from  army  the  province.  commander  became t h e dominant  Also  two  i n t h e S r i Lankan p e a c e t a l k s i m p l i e d  LTTE d e s t r o y e d LTTE  with  i n the e a s t e r n  regional  followed  negotiate  participate of  t h e LTTE c a p t u r e d  Mannar  1 2 8  The L T T E ' s v i c t o r y s t r e n g t h e n e d i t s  1 26  and  on  to regain  by  northern  LTTE.  challenger,  resisted over  the  i t s main  as the year of the  Yet  i n the J a f f n a under  strategy LTTE  was  district.  i t s c o n t r o l and a  139  military groups,  stalemate  reached.  t h e LTTE c o m p e l l e d  governments t h e May in  was  to  deal with  victory  Emboldened by  the  traffic  police.  blockade  on J a n u a r y  Jaffna  Sri  i t f o r any  s u c c e s s of on  the r e g i s t r a t i o n  economic  the  a g a i n s t the  administration  including  destroying other  The  1 3 1  2,  dislocation  district  was  on  the  of v e h i c l e s and  1987  as  the m i l i t a n t s .  the p e n i n s u l a . to  military  guerrillas  into  government  to  guerrillas. guerrillas areas. outright  the  its  responded  with  peace  defeated  i n May  "Operation supplies  government's p r o t e s t s .  options  military  role  imposing  The  a  1 3  *  1 3 3  Poomalai"  over  fuel  brought  a  long  economic  enlarged Tamil  support out  driving  guns  and  their  h o l d on  militants  —  the  Indian  ("Garland").  Jaffna  Clearly,  But  despite  I n d i a was  now  the Tamil  the  first heavy  government  They  the  the the  missiles, the  dropped  Sri  going  Lankan to  play  struggle.  The  f o r S r i Lanka were l i m i t e d . Would t h e r e be  ' a c c e p t a b l e ' t o I n d i a or a  'Cyprus s o l u t i o n '  a  the  over  i n Vadamarachchi with  1 987 .  of  resource-scarce  i n t h e outcome of t h e s e c e s s i o n i s t  available  it  superiority  the  f o r t h e government —  casualties  a crucial  by  jungles. A i r r a i d s enabled  anti-aircraft  government  relief  1987,  recruitment  February,  f a c e d t h e d a n g e r of l o s i n g  win  1 3 2  over  January  the  survive  in  northern  regain  civilian  air  campaign  Lacking  The  took  A r e f u r b i s h e d S r i Lankan army c a r r i e d  successful  But  capability  LTTE  expected,  b l o c k a d e . However, t h e economic b l o c k a d e for  settlement.  in  responded  and,  not p r e p a r e d  Indian  r e g u l a r army.  peninsula  government  militant  and  i t s military  1986,  the  Lankan  political  of t h e L T T E e x a g g e r a t e d  c o n v e n t i o n a l warfare  civil  both  By  t o the  a  Tamil  1 40  struggle? The of  theory  of g u e r r i l l a  a hit-and-run  army.  guerrilla  Such a s t r a t e g y  situation  where  revolutionary revolutionary  warfare strategy  the  conflict  struggle  due  guerrillas,  The  LTTE c o n t i n u e d LTTE  chose  numerically  an  established  is to  the  more  bitter  opposing  than  ethnicity.  s e c e s s i o n i s t g u e r r i l l a s must  to rely  superior  against  i s even more e f f e c t i v e i n a s e c e s s i o n i s t  army o f d i f f e r e n t e t h n i c i t y . U n l i k e the  suggests the e f f e c t i v e n e s s  heavily  place  and  the other  militant  on t h e h i t - a n d - r u n time  for attacks  army and i n f l i c t e d  extensive  in  a  Unlike fight  an  groups, strategy.  against  the  casualties.  In a d d i t i o n , d e c e n t r a l i z a t i o n o f t h e d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g p r o c e s s i n the of war  r e g i o n a l commands a l l o w e d opportunities took  place  for attacks. during  t h e commanders The t h i r d  the s p r i n g  the  army  the  s e c u r i t y f o r c e s . The r e b e l s  openly,  i n t h e camps c r e a t e d  but  stalemate finally  could  was  the  determined  struggle.  India  not d r i v e  was  phase o f t h e  guerrilla  o f 1986. Long c o n f i n e m e n t o f  were r e a d y  to confront  t h e army  Nevertheless, of  prepared  the to  external Tamil  accept  factors  secessionist a  negotiated  settlement.  M o r e o v e r t h e w a r - w e a r i n e s s of t h e T a m i l p u b l i c  influenced  the  Today,  LTTE's  does n o t seem a b r i g h t  Indo-Sri In  decision  'military' victory  1987,  for  to reach a peaceful  Tamil . s e c e s s i o n i s t  also  solution. guerrillas  prospect.  Lanka Peace A c c o r d July  in  them o u t o f t h e camps. A m i l i t a r y  outcome  only  advantage  w a r - w e a r i n e s s and f r u s t r a t i o n  outcome. the  t o take  an  - July  1987  Indian-inspired  peace  treaty  was  141  'imposed'  on.  the  secessionists. character the  of  north  troops  east  but  into  demonstrates the secessionist  S r i Lanka  the  became  the  and  t h e way  f o r a merger  t e r m s of t h e  treaty,  1987.  i t s hegemonic  sub-continent. major  The  In t h e  by  the  factor"  secessionist external  and  of  India  war.  The  internal  opposition  i n the  the  and  LTTE  treaty  threats.  south  the  peace  and  Indian  about  But  the  raise  from  i n t e r v e n t i o n prevented  negotiating  with  strength.  In F e b r u a r y ,  captured  a l l t h e major  the  of  Vadamarachchi  on  balance  of  military  in favour  possible  f o r t h e government, w i t h  power  complete a i r coverage, have  caused  arrival  of  heavy c i v i l i a n Indian  troops  both  the  these  Sinhalese  of t h e  long-term  1 3 6  government  from a p o s i t i o n troops  i n May,  peninsula  of re-  1987  changed  the the  government. I t  was  i t s s o p h i s t i c a t e d weapons  and  J a f f n a town, t h o u g h i t  casualties. in  about  successful  Lankan  government  Jaffna  to capture  a  accord.  towns i n t h e n o r t h and  capture  faced  c o n f r o n t a t i o n between  Sri  S r i Lankan  peace  second,  continued  the Tamil m i l i t a n t s 1987  brought  doubts about  b e n e f i t s a c c r u i n g t o I n d i a from t h e p e a c e Indian  the  neutralized  the p r o l o n g e d army  by  any  e y e s of many  i n S r i L a n k a ; and  brought  role  in  s t r u g g l e , I n d i a had  external destabilization  the  Indian  Indian  b e n e f i c i a r y of  main t h r e a t s : f i r s t ,  of  of  interest  two  balkanization  the u n i t a r y  demand  long s e c e s s i o n i s t  "Pakistan/U.S.  Tamil  minimum  i n August,  the  the  guaranteed  the  Under t h e  s t r u g g l e on  t r e a t y . During  a l s o paved  i m p o r t a n c e of  India  treaty  provinces,  guerrillas.  moved  government  peace  island  and  observers,  Lankan  This  1 3 5  the  secessionist  Sri  Sri  For  Lanka  the  would  Sinhalese,  reconfirmed  the the  1 42  centuries-old For  fear  the  of Indian  Tamils,  domination.  the  peace  treaty  abruptly  fifteen-year-old  secessionist  struggle.  It  'total  which  exercised  over  control'  struggle.  Ironically.,  critical  role  India the  carrying  out  was  environment  on t h e J a f f n a  harness  effective is  successful  and  consistent  guerrilla  with  triumphant  of  As  directly one  to  had  support,  O'Neill  Consistent  introduce  a  a  also  phase of  of  Tamil  secessionist was  alienation the  able  i n t o an struggle  analysis  base  the conduct  both  areas,  of the  o f a few s e l e c t ,  the  theory,  the  t h e outcome of t h e s e c e s s i o n i s t lacked  Tamil  i n the second  i n t e r n a l and e x t e r n a l  factors  war. On t h e  the m i l i t a r y c a p a b i l i t y  g u e r r i l l a s ; b u t t h e government a l s o  challenge. impact  accommodative  on  the  outcome  i n the South  Asian  evidence  lends  to theories  support  region.  failed  measures t o c o n t a i n  On t h e o t h e r hand,  interests  degrees.  extreme  leadership  i n i n t e n s i t y and s c a l e  notes,  credible  great  movement,  theoretical  with  hand, t h e c e n t r a l government the Tamil  played  o p e r a t i o n s and t h e a c q u i s i t i o n o f a d e q u a t e  war i n c r e a s e d  secessionist  which  the  secessionist  establishment  public  influenced  to defeat  the s e c e s s i o n i s t  a radical  This  Mao-Guevara's  weapons and f i n a n c e s .  phase.  Tamil  the  guerrilla  secessionist  in creating  movement. The e a r l y  warfare:  mobilization  resistance,  peninsula.  convert  guerrilla  the  i n i t s death.  armed  leadership  to  factor,'  their  illustrates  i n the growth of the s e c e s s i o n i s t  played a s i g n i f i c a n t role By  'Indian  ended  India's  due Thus,  to  also  her s t r a t e g i c  the  of g u e r r i l l a  role  the  Sri  Lankan  war i n v a r y i n g  143  NOTES Makkalin  1  V i d u t h a l a i a i Venreddupom  People's  Victory").  Madras:  Liberation  Organization  of Thamil  Thornton  R.  2  E.M.  of T e r r o r :  An  Organization 3  For  Ethnic,  and  p.  Pamphlet Eelam  (January  win by  the  People's  1985),  p.  S r i Lanka,  Middlesex:  Eelam  5.  Island  Research  28.  d i f f e r e n t i n t e r p r e t a t i o n see K.M.  pp.  us  issued  Niththyananthan,  Indictment. (1985),  ("Let  de  Silva,  Managing  273-274.  " E e l a Mulakkam Eelam P e o p l e ' s  ("Thunder  from  Information Centre  (June  London and  1984),  p.  Madras:  23.  5  Balasingam,  6  lbid.,  7  Diary  o f Combat  (1975-1984). Madras: L i b e r a t i o n T i g e r s  T a m i l Eelam  (December  1984),  8  p.  p.  Eelam").  26.  Sivanandan,  'Balasingham, 1  ° O n e may  25.  p. p.  p.  15.  23. 25.  assume t h a t  t h e LTTE  based  organizational  (urban g u e r r i l l a  strategies  ( e l i m i n a t i o n o f p o l i c e i n t e l l i g e n c e network  the  destruction  politicization 1  'Diary  of general  Ibid.,  p.  18.  1 3  Ibid.,  p.  20.  "Ibid.,  p.  21.  structure)  police  administrative  public)  on  of Combat, pp.16  1 2  1  of  organizational  its  structure  by  of  and  25.  the  PLO.  and  early  followed  service  and  144  K.M. de S i l v a ,  15  1  "Diary  Silva,  o f Combat,  lndia  Today  1 8  Diary  o f Combat, p . 18.  21  p . 328.  23-25, a n d V a i d i k ,  1 7  For  Ethnic,  Inter-Racial  '79, Kandy: MIRJE  "Diary  p.  People's Union  Justice  Liberation Organization (ZAPU),  LTTE g u e r r i l l a s  the  Zimbabwe  African  Congress  were t r a i n e d by t h e  group  ideologue,  s a i d "The P L O - t r a i n e d boys have  conditions 2 3  See  interview 11-17,  trains  asset  to  given  National  (ANC).  Union  I n i t i a l l y , the  PLO, • b u t  today  the  i t s own men. A. B a l a s i n g h a m , t h e LTTE  our  armed  are d i f f e r e n t . " India Frontline  with  not  struggle. Today  (March 2 3 - A p r i l  exactly  Our  proved  terrain  and  (March 31, 1984), p . 9 0 .  5, 1985), p .  by P r a b a k a r a n t o A n i t a  62  and the  P r a t a p o f Sunday  (March  1984). K.M. de S i l v a , Managing  Ethnic,  The  seats  2lt  2 5  Equality,  (PLO), Zimbabwe A f r i c a n  guerrilla  an  and  ( 1 9 8 0 ) , p p . 23-41.  and t h e A f r i c a n N a t i o n a l  be  331.  o f Combat, p . 28. The L T T E m a i n t a i n s c o n t a c t s  Palestine  (ZANU)  Managing  p . 54.  Movement  Emergency  to  p . 53. K.M. de  (March 31, 1984), p . 9 1 .  K.M. de S i l v a , Vaidik,  2 0  main  pp.  Ethnic,  I b i d . , p . 328.  1 9  the  Managing  TULF won  Development registered  Council.  a l l ten The  party  votes.  2 6  Diary  o f Combat, p . 29.  2 7  Ibid.,  p . 28.  2 8  Ibid.,  p . 32.  p p . 331-332. on  the Jaffna  District  p o l l e d o v e r 80% o f t h e t o t a l  145  Viduthalai  2 9  (March  1984), p. Amir  3 0  Managing 3 2  with  election  p.  p.  58,  See  o f Combat, (29  Diary  34. See  September-5  also  October,  of Combat, p. 36, K.M.  reproduced Over  90%  Pulihal  Prabakaran's  Silva,  Amirthalingam's in  of  Amir  the  Speaks,  voters  interview pp.  8-16, the  a l l the  seats  ( " L i b e r a t i o n T i g e r s " ) , Volume 2  (May  t h o u g h TULF  won  Frontline,  "India  interview  p.  Today  73.  63.  (June 30, Economic  1986), p. Review  (Propaganda U n i t ) ,  73.  (September Tamil  Review  (November  " Far  Economic  Review  (September  of  both  b a s e ) and e x t e r n a l  government)  1982), p.  49.  Liberation  p..4.  Economic  combination  24,  Eelam  "°Far E a s t e r n Eastern  (March 1984). See  40.  TELO - On A M i s s i o n ,  Organization  i n Sunday  1986), p.  o f Combat, p.  Eastern  also  40.  (June 30,  3 7  Far  de  boycotted  o f Combat, p.  Diary  support  p.  bodies.  3 6  1  1  13.  "Diary  3 9  Volume  337.  15.  I n d i a Today  3  UNP  Sunday  Viduthalai  3 5  A  in  i n the J a f f n a p e n i n s u l a  1984), p.  See  interview  Jeyaraj  the l o c a l  also  Diary  E t h n i c , p.  D.B.S.  3  6.  B a l a s i n g h a m , p. 33. See a l s o  3 3  Tigers"),  16.  particularly  in  p.  Vaidik,  3 1  ("Liberation  12.  Speaks,  Prabakaran's 1985), p.  Pulihal  internal  (to  19, 24,  retain  1982), p. 1982), p. the Tamil  (anti-Indian foreign policy  f a c t o r s i n f l u e n c e d New  Delhi's policy  of  22. 49. Nadu the  vis-a-vis  146  Tamil  secessionists. , 2  Thornton  height  and  Niththyananthan,  of a n t i - T a m i l  detainees  at  Welikada  Sinhalese prisoners went u n p u n i s h e d , W i j e s i n h a , pp. a 3  on J u l y  security  25 and  of Fortune  ""Soldier  27.  s i x t y Tamil prison  During  the  political  were murdered  Because  implicated  (February  23 - A p r i l  5,  of F o r t u n e , p.  See  5  high  1983,  t h e government was  (March  ' Ibid.  in July  65-66.  by  these  killings  i n the  massacre.  85-86.  Soldier  Frontline  riots  pp.  " Vaidik,  also  p.  6  " Frontline  Hindu  1985),  p.  p.  44.  See  also  62.  44.  (May  5,  1985),  p.  12.  55. (March  7  1987),  23  - April  5,  1985),  p.  Venreddupom, p.  5.  63.  ""Ibid. " Indian  Express  9  5 0  Makkalin  5 1  I _ b i d . , p.  5 2  Thornton  (May  17,  Viduthalaiai  1985).  5. and N i t h t h y a n a n t h a n ,  5 3  Ibid.,  p.  5 4  Frontline,  p.  57.  56. p.  64.  "Ibid. 5 6  Soldier  5 7  Ibid.  See  also  5 8  Ibid.  See  also  5 9  Ibid.  See  also  6 0  Soldier  6  o f F o r t u n e , p.  militant  groups  Frontline, Soldier Eela  of F o r t u n e ,  'Frontline  44.  (March  p.  64.  of F o r t u n e , p.  M u l l a k k a m , p. p.  44.  3.  44.  23-April  5,  1985),  p.  62.  Some of  were r o o t e d o n l y i n a p a r t i c u l a r v i l l a g e  these while  147  some  others  were  split  Others, a f t e r a spurt oblivion. EPRLF  Only  —  five  were  secessionist  of g u e r r i l l a groups  from t h e major  activities,  —  had  gone  into  t h e L T T E , PLOTE, TELO, EROS, and  well-known  Rao  was was  a  foreign  minister  armed  t h e s p e c i a l envoy  of  under  Indira  Indira  Gandhi  f o r m e r c h a i r m a n of t h e p o w e r f u l p o l i c y p l a n n i n g 6 3  T h e Guardian  6 <  India  Today  "Frontline  (August 12, (March 31,  1984), p.  (March 2 3 - A p r i l (March 31,  committee.  1982).  5,  6 6  India  Today  6 7  0ther  m i l i t a n t g r o u p s opened  after  the  6 8  India  Today  6 9  T E L O - On  A Mission,  7 0  Ibid.,  2.  only  groups.  groups.  Gandhi. Parthasarathy and  expelled  well-established  Narasimha  6 2  and  1985), p.  1984), p.  secessionist  54. 64.  52.  t r a i n i n g camps  struggle  took  i n S r i Lanka  firm roots  i n the  north.  7  'Far  7 2  Lanka  p.  Eastern  (March 31,  Economic  T h e Week (May under  interests. major  t h e UNP  planners.  Though (G.  the Indira  completely  by  retired  Review  India  (12 J u n e ,  Today  1986), p.  1986), p. 38. I n d i a  foreign policy Indian  considered  officers  the  and  relied  mission),  (March 31,  of  defence  Gandhi  military  29. Sri  as h o s t i l e t o h e r g e o - p o l i t i c a l  r u l e d out. For instance,  Indian  52.  1.  Parthasarathy's  not  district.  to  p.  government  The p r o - W e s t e r n  concern  pressure  25-31,  1 984), p.  more  UNP  foreign on  was  policy  diplomatic  m i l i t a r y options  m i l i t a n t s were in  1984), pp.  a  were  trained  t h e Ramanathapuram 88-89  and  93-94.  148  Lanka G u a r d i a n ( J a n u a r y 15, 1987), pp. 3-6. 7 3  7  The  Guardian  " T E L O News Pamphlet,  7 5  Far  7 6  T E L O Times  7 7  Far  7 8  Time  7 9  Elluchi  Eastern  1984).  1984), p . 50.  1985), No. 1.  Review  (February  7, 1985), p . 14.  22, 1985), p . 30.  ("Rise").  Madras: to a  t h e TELO g u e r r i l l a s Mulakkam  issued  (24 November,  (6 December,  (March  1985). A c c o r d i n g  Eela  Pamphlet  Review  Economic  (April  attack, 8 0  Pamphlet  22, 1984).  TELO London  E a s t e r n Economic  (April-May, this  (November  ("Thunder  by  Eelam  Pamphlet rebel  issued  who  TELO  participated  were o u t g u n n e d  in  by t h e army.  from E e l a m " ) . London  People's  by  Information  and M a d r a s : C e n t r e (May  1984), p . 30. 8  'Ibid.,  pp. 31-32.  Eelam  News. London:  8 2  (March 8 3  8  Eelam  People's  The  of J a f f n a ,  Hindu  (April  20, 1985).  interview  w i t h a former student  of U n i v e r s i t y  S r i Lanka.  8 5  T h e Week  8 6  In  (May 25-31,  addition,  1986), p . 37.  t h e TELO m i l i t a n t s  shops a n d t e m p l e s f o r t h e i r  private  were engaged gains."  accused of kidnapping wealthy i n d i v i d u a l s  Review  Centre  1985).  'Author's  8 7  Information  T h e Week (12 June  (May 25-31,  1986), p.-37.  1986), p p . 28-29. I n d i a  They  in "looting were  also  in Jaffna. Far Eastern  Today  (May  Economic  31,  1986),  p. 67. 8 8  89  T h e Week Uma  (May 25-31,  Maheswaran  1986), p . 38.  believed  " i n a mass s t r u g g l e  with the  1 49  participation  o f t h e o p p r e s s e d w o r k e r s , p e a s a n t s and  I n d i a n E x p r e s s (May 9 0  Soldier  9 1  1ndia  9 2  Far  9 3  India  9  II,  Today  (March 31,  Eastern  Economic  Today  1984), p .  Review  (March 31,  Volume  44.  54.  (30 May,  1984), p.  "PLOTE b u l l e t i n . Madras:  p.  1985).  56.  1  (February  1984),  No.  7.  9 6  The  I n d i a Today  Times  9 7  (September  of I n d i a  "The Hindu  Conflict Pacific  1-7,  1985).  R e c e n t O p e r a t i o n o f t h e P.L.A., open  1984).  9  1985).  o f F o r t u n e ( F e b r u a r y 1987), p.  "Sunday  (May  17,  students,"  and  15,  2,  Volume 59, No. also  Bruce  of  claimed c r e d i t  1985).  Mathews,  Violence  1 (Spring  o f EPRLF  71.  and F e b r u a r y 13,  1985).  the R a t i o n a l i z a t i o n  PLOTE  1984), p.  ( F e b r u a r y 1-2  (March  Affairs,  "The  (June  letter  in  "Radical  Sri  1986), p.  Lanka,"  40.  f o r the p r i s o n  breakout  operation. 1 0 0  Lanka  Colombo, p. 1 0  Both  activities 1 0 3  (February  E x p r e s s (December  23,  1,  1987),  1986).  t h e PLOTE and TELO t o o were engaged  in anti-social  i n T a m i l Nadu.  Soldier  o f F o r t u n e , p.  °"Frontline  1 0 5  19  7.  'Financial  1 0 2  1  G u a r d i a n , Volume 9, No.  87.  (March 2 3 - A p r i l  5,  1985), p.  64.  Ibid.  10 6  Far Eastern  Economic  Review  (15  10 7  Far  Eastern  Economic  Review  (12 J u n e ,  10 8  Far Eastern  Economic  Review  (June  May, 1986), 1986),  5, 1986).  p. 18. p. 27.  150  1 0 9  India  Today  15,  1987), p.  54.  1 1  °Frontline  ( J a n u a r y 10-23,  1 1  'The  r e g i o n a l commanders were  (Jaffna),  five Radha  (Trincomalee), 1987. was  (May  (Mannar), Kumaran  i n November  Mathya  Sri  (Batticaloa).  Kumaran c o m m i t t e d  killed  1987), p .  ( J a n u a r y 1987) (Vavunia),  Radha was  s u i c i d e i n October 1987. Mathya  21.  1987  Santhosam  killed and  S r i i s second  Rittu  i n May  Santhosam  i n command t o  Prabakaran. '' The Economist 2  '' Frontline "Diary  o f Combat, p.  '' Ibid., 5  p.  47.  Ibid.,  p.  53.  1 1 6  1985), p.  ( J a n u a r y 10-23,  3  1 1  (August 3-9,  1987), p.  36. 21.  44.  '''Ibid. ''"Ibid. ' Times  of I n d i a  '  Today  1 9  2 0  India  ' 'Mathews, T a m i l Eelam 2 2  (March  14,  Today  ( O c t o b e r 15,  '"India  Today  (June 15,  The  repulsing  27. Liberation Tigers  of  1985). P r e s s r e l e a s e  of  LTTE  1985).  India  1 2 6  1984), p .  1985).  (August 31,  2 f t  1984).  Press Release,  Today  '  pp.  of I n d i a  31,  India  1 2 3  gains  40.  (21 F e b r u a r y  ' Times (16 M a r c h ,  (December  p.  2  (November 21,  PLOTE  and  t h e government  retreated  1985), p . 1985), p.  53.  1984), p.  58.  joined  hands  EPRLF attack.  The government  t o t h e camps. See  58-59 and F r o n t l i n e  38.  (November  India 15-28,  Today  w i t h t h e LTTE i n after  initial  (June 15,  1986),  1986), p.  123.  151  .  1 2 7  Times  1 2 8  Ibid.  1 2 9  Frontline  1 3 0  Ibid.,  l 3 1  India  } 3 2  Ibid.,  1 3 3  The  1 3  1 3 6  Today  Week  (July  status  (June 14-20,  in  power  the Indian are  15, 1987), pp. 26-27.  5-11, 1987), pp. 18-20.  the long-run,  39-42.  1987), p. 19.  p. 24.  In  prospects  14, 1986).  10-23,  (February  A p p e n d i x B.  prospects  pp.  (January  See  pursuasive for  (October  p . 20.  " T h e Week  1 3 5  power  of India  army  1987), pp. 22-24.  India's a b i l i t y  S r i Lanka to  implement  i n the  bleak.  depends  For  on  (a)  the.accord;  north a  to assert i t s regional  and  (b) p u b l i c  east.  more o p t i m i s t i c  i n t h e s t r u g g l e , s e e I n d i a Today  Jayewardene's  At  support  present  the  view of I n d i a ' s  (December  15, 1987),  152  CHAPTER FOUR  ANALYZING TAMIL SECESSIONISM IN  SRI  LANKA: SOME TENTATIVE  CONCLUSIONS  At regard The  the  outset,  to the  primary  the  data  S r i Lankan  for  seven p r o p o s i t i o n s  secessionist guerrilla  these  framework the  thesis stated  d e v e l o p m e n t of  p u r p o s e of  conceptual organize  this  propositions  to  movements. provide  a  armed s e c e s s i o n i s t movements and  to  s y s t e m a t i c a l l y and  is  with  t o g u i d e the  analysis  of  secessionist insurrection.  1. An e t h n i c m i n o r i t y can become a l i e n a t e d from the d e m o c r a t i c p r o c e s s i f the m a j o r i t y ethnic group is unwilling or u n a b l e t o accommodate t h o s e demands o r i n t e r e s t s of the m i n o r i t y p e r c e i v e d as c r u c i a l t o the v i a b i l i t y and/or s u r v i v a l of t h e g r o u p . T h e s e demands o r i n t e r e s t s might i n c l u d e a f a i r s h a r e of economic and educational opportunities, linguistic security and g r e a t e r p o l i t i c a l c o n t r o l o v e r i t s own affairs. Alienation of  gestation  c o u n t r y . The by  which  necessary  (though  of  not  the  in  duration  Wood a r g u e s t h a t and  minority.  from  for  and  period  country  the  social,  emergence be  social  to  influenced  preconditions  a l i e n a t i o n may  economic  are  a  geographical,  psychological  sufficient)  political,  follows  s c a l e of a l i e n a t i o n  alienation. Minority  unfulfilled  interests  vary  i n t e n s i t y and  economic  secessionist  a r i s e i n s t a n t l y but  may  many f a c t o r s . J o h n R.  political,  to  does not  traced demands  are of back or  153  Despite political  the m u l t i - e t h n i c  elites  majoritarian 1956.  from t h e m a j o r i t y  democracy  Post-1956  institutions measures.  n a t u r e of t h e S r i Lankan ethnic  i n i t s 'pure'  events  strengthened  and a l s o e n c o u r a g e d e l i t e s t o implement  populistic  accommodation.  initially,  in  optimism  the  religious  and  joined  the  first  coalition  o f D.S.  demands a r i s i n g  T a m i l s and S i n h a l e s e measures  Tamil  Tamil  emerged  (TC) multi-  respond  coalition  both  the  groups i n S r i  e l i t e s could to  alienation  to  was  major  Congress  Senanayake. T h i s  of m u l t i - e t h n i c  acceptable  (UNP)  Despite  from d i f f e r e n t  mid-1950s,  elite  a l l the  enhanced the government's a b i l i t y  the c o l l a p s e  Consequently,  Party  interests.  campaign, t h e  L a n k a . But a f t e r  accommodative  through  comprising  cultural  when  from b o t h c o m m u n i t i e s  United National  government  accommodating  the  prevailed  relations  a s an " u m b r e l l a " p a r t y  of the f i f t y - f i f t y  by  ethnic  Moreover,  failure  ethnic  since  political  stability  linguistic,  practised  form, p a r t i c u l a r l y  westernized conservative p o l i t i c a l e l i t e s  established  g r o u p s have  majoritarian  However,  maintained  polity,  in  the  not a g r e e on  ethnic  groups.  from  majoritarian  became  politically  democracy. Under  this  irrelevant. e l e c t e d Tamil  system, T a m i l s  The  SLFP  increasingly  formed  representative  governments  since  1956  without  (1956-1965  1977).  Furthermore,  no T a m i l s were r e p r e s e n t e d  between  1956-1964 —  the  country.  Hence,  there  main was  government, w h i c h drew v e r y accommodate  their  main  decision-making  little limited  economic,  or  no  support  a  single  and  1970-  i n the c a b i n e t body  in  the  pressure  on  the  from t h e T a m i l s , t o  political  and  cultural  154  demands.  Instead  coercive controls Tamil  the  to maintain  grievances.  parliamentary  protest  t h e m i l i t a r y . On assimilating  government  the  was  suppressed  Tamils  government's a c t i o n  stability  On  the other  the  adopted  was  one  consistent  with  societies.  The SLFP c o n t a i n e d c o n f l i c t  on c o e r c i o n  after  It  must  community  consociational  of  the  few  positions  pointed  out  to  measures.  For  implement from  the  ethnic  be  compromises  attempted  between  relying  relied  stability according  two  from f r a g i l e  A l s o Dudley  gap between  policies riots  1  both under  elites  to  with  2  and r e a c h i n g The e t h n i c  of c o n s o c i a t i o n a l  compromises  violence  non-Malays, to maintain  i n 1969  reinforced  a r r a n g e m e n t s ; however,  early  relations,  the p o l i t i c a l  power  to  pressure  p r o v i d e d an ethnic  the  failed  p r o b l e m . I n M a l a y s i a , however, political  "one  extreme  the g r a v i t y  system.  elites  embodies  between  However,  S i n h a l e s e . A l t h o u g h t h e 1958  to Walter  t o comprehend  bargaining  more  through  failed  share  The  from the m a j o r i t y  the widening  t h e p r o p o s e d accommodative  political  policy.  theoretical  i n S r i Lanka."  1965-1970.  w a r n i n g o f t h e danger r e s u l t i n g the  towards  totally  Bandaranaike-Chelvanayagam Pact  to  communities  elites  instance,  Senanayake a t t e m p t e d t o r e c o n c i l e two  by  ethnically-divided  without  that  bring  statesmanlike  even  extra-  worked  s t a g e s . But t h e government  attempt  Schwarz, t h e 1957  in  to  and l a t e r  Lustick's  stability  non-  1971.  be  did  Tamil's  Sinhala-only  to  i n the e a r l y  the  hand, t h e government a  and  responding  by t h e p o l i c e  approach  on c o e r c i o n  without  hand,  through  political  coercive  of t h e  were  ready  carrying the  out  political  the importance  i n S r i Lanka  none  of  1 55  the  conflict-regulating  instituted The  and  Tamil a l i e n a t i o n  political  Tamils  were  opportunity Tamils  system  reduced  to enjoy  were  practices  a  increasingly  partly  through  but,  in  Sri  gain  power  marginal. UF was  resisted  by  the c e n t r a l The correct  policy  DMK,  a  the  state.  Thus,the  a  unitary  process  was  Similarly,  exclusively prior  parliamentary  power a t t h e  expedited  by  and  state  these e l i t e s ,  the a b i l i t y  in  the p o l i t i c a l  government,  political  the  hands  The  non-  the  enjoyed  1971.  east.  "affirmative action"  introducing  to  The  particularly  Tamils  of  of  two  university the  decline  Sinhala major  r e s o u r c e s on e t h n i c l i n e s .  opportunities,  power  e v e n t u a l l y l e a d i n g t o the d e c l i n e  contributed  was  the  was  s t a n d a r d i z a t i o n of  which  remained  power of B e n g a l i s  imbalances,  predominance.  to  t h e a s c e n d e n c y of  government's l e g i t i m a c y i n t h e  basis  level;  t o the e a s t e r n wing's s e c e s s i o n i n  to strengthen  the  Tamil  politics  elites  in Pakistan  concentrated  no  Inevitably,  Indian  were d e n i e d  The  with  secessionist  i n t o mainstream  S r i Lankan government a d o p t e d  economic  fields.  in  measures  t h e economic o p p o r t u n i t i e s of T a m i l s . The  language  scarce  control.  parties  economic  limited  the  drawn  Tamil  i n 1970.  attempt  or  minority  Lanka,  Bengalis e l i t e s Any  power  alienation.  t o win  This  almost  Tamil  i t s potential  in  government  high.  disregarded  d e m o c r a c y . In t h e mid-1960s,  by N o r d l i n g e r were  'permanent'  political  i n T a m i l Nadu, was  remained  reinforced  to  party  suggested  Sinhala-only  admission of  the  on  a  Tamils'  were  agent,  allocated  denied  economic  i n t h e e d u c a t i o n a l and  greater access  which  Buddhist-dominated  economic  Tamils  to  to  employment  government  jobs  156  and  professional  their  numbers under t h e  government in  the  the  was  Obeysekere,  B u d d h i s t : the  religion  were  government  has  step  powerful  group  The  that  contributed  in  the  However, the proximity  government language  to  successive deprivation'  and  discontent  based  of  Tamil  and  the  on  minority'  the  greater  state and  r e i n f o r c e d the  since  1956,  the a  Act  marks  to  to a  forge  a  culture.  S.  revival  But  (of  forging unit the  the on  government the  minority.  "threatened i t s 55  Sinhala  majority"  million  protected By  1960s were as  religious  1970,  the  to  Tamils.  The  Sinhala  the  by  to  Sinhala  successive  official  language  Buddhism.  s e c u r i t y , the  communalization not  due  the  met  assistance  Wood a r g u e s , e t h n i c i t y u s u a l l y but  minorities  and  e l s e to  religion.  of  that  measures t o g u a r a n t e e  which  1950s and  linguistic  effect  cultural  Nadu w i t h  steps  declarations  providing  are  g r o u p and  was  language  unit.""  Sinhalese  T a m i l s r e s i s t e d the  response  implement  Buddhist  ethnic  Sinhala-only  "Tamil  Sinhalese  introduced  governments'  despite  to  the  Particularly  3  Tamils'  the  of  However, the  s e c u r i t y of  demands r a i s e d i n the  by  'relative  the  more t h a n a n y t h i n g  past  linguistic/cultural  and  the  t o a s s i m i l a t e the  b a s i s of a l a n g u a g e - c u l t u r a l  failed  the  thus  core  of  The  direction.  identity  Arasaratnam writes 1960*s)  destiny  culture.  in this  "the  attempted  government's e f f o r t .  the  disproportionate  frustration  inseparable."  Sinhala-Buddhist  major  r u l e and  measures p r o d u c e d a s e n s e of  Gananath  identity  the  British  extent  Tamil a l i e n a t i o n .  For  the  t o an  p o s t - 1 9 5 6 p e r i o d . Economic  fuelled  of  occupations  'double  of p o l i t i c s .  invariably  Yet  becomes  As the  157  rallying  point  for ethnic  However, t h e by the  groups.  growth o f  a condition distinctive Sinhalese  Sri  the  s y s t e m and  minority  demands.  The  Sinhalese  community  reflected  them.  safeguards standing were met  Hence  language, by  religion,  continued fact  employment  the  Tamils  was in  significant  5  The  Sinhala p o l i t i c a l  distorted Tamil  t h e m s e l v e s t o be  development  by  Nadu.  'oppressed  impact  of  However,  majority  of  insecurity  that  greater  their  education  on  the  to  majority  guarantee  come from t h e m a j o r i t y  is  always  tinkering  with  incentive  to  Consequently,  the  period.  that  not  the  proximity  longdemands  Tamils  an  of  of a  large  Tamil  considered  i n turn produced a political  insecurity  arduous  dominate is fair  to p r o t e c t  of  the  task.  majority  minority  the m i n o r i t i e s tend  the  to a l l ethnic who  political  i n the  or  do  power  a b s e n c e of  system, t h e r e  interests  the  country.  individuals  group. Since  the m a j o r i t a r i a n democratic accommodate  perception  internal  The  democracy  ethnic of  the  f u n c t i o n s t h r o u g h numbers,  adopted  hands  expense of  Sinhalese  necessarily  members, measures must be  in  elites'  island's  democracy commonly the  a t the  m i n o r i t y , ' which  i n the post-1948  Because  the  Thus  S i n h a l e s e made compromise w i t h  politics  of  the  t o demand  and  the  s u c c e s s i v e S r i Lankan g o v e r n m e n t s . I n c r e a s i n g l y , i n  Tamils.  population  s t a t u s of  w o r k i n g of  feeling  a z e r o - s u m game, S i n h a l a demands were met minority  the  of  a permanent  f o r themselves d e s p i t e the  influenced  t h e accommodation  complex  Sinhalese  was  minority  coloured  inhibited  minority  the  alienation  t o S r i L a n k a . The  in a regional context  Lankan p o l i t i c a l  among  Tamil  is  any no  demands.  t o become a l i e n a t e d from  the  158  system  and  the p o l i t i c a l  democratic  challenges  Nordlinger  makes  majoritarianism  may  lead  government's the  about  the  Nordlinger  opposition.  by  six  that  should  be  majoritarianism  The  Sri  r e l i a n c e on m a j o r i t a r i a n i s m  of  a  anti-majoritarian  practices  conflict.  as  suggests  r e l i a n c e upon  of  t o non-  majoritarianism  overriden  exclusive  exclusive  'permanent'  First,  of  exacerbation  ethnic  6  be  more  implementation  intensified  points  should  Second,  to  the  practice.  p r a c t i c e s and one o r implemented.  from  two  conflict-regulating  s y s t e m may become v u l n e r a b l e  conflict-regulating  Lankan  discouraged  measures  and  hostilities.  2. The attempt and/or failure of the c e n t r a l government t o accommodate ethnic demands, for whatever reasons, encourages t h e d e v e l o p m e n t of a process of o u t b i d d i n g among both minority and m a j o r i t y p o l i t i c i a n s , and o u t b i d d i n g i t s e l f makes t h e peaceful resolution o f c o n f l i c t more d i f f i c u l t , i f not impossible. Rabushka and S h e p s l e is the  inherently unstable. coalition  salience elites  may  of e t h n i c  Political  In  a multi-ethnic  entrepreneurs advantage  i s s u e s and t o o u t b i d Inevitably,  coalition  who a r e o u t s i d e to  increase  t h e moderate  multi-ethnic  the  political coalitions  i n the face of growing e t h n i c i z a t i o n of p o l i t i c s . S r i L a n k a , t h e UNP-TC  attack  from  became  an  the  ethnic  important  counter-elites. country  that  i t to t h e i r  of the c o a l i t i o n .  collapse  party  find  suggest  Tamils,  which stood  By  coalition  entrepreneurs.  support-wooing opposing  the  Federal  f o r the  the  came under  increasing  By  outbidding  1949,  strategy  of  the  disenfranchisement  Party  interests  (FP) p r e s e n t e d of  of  itself  a l l Tamils  Tamil upas a  and,  by  159  adopting  a more m i l i t a n t  Tamil  n a t i o n a l i s m , the p a r t y  t h e m a j o r i t y of t h e v e r n a c u l a r - e d u c a t e d east.  The  FP  mid-1950s  and  Tamils  attracted  i n the n o r t h  successfully  o u t b i d t h e more moderate TC  became  dominant  the  force  among  and  by  the  the  Tamil  electorate. Similarly, t h e UNP  and  the d e p a r t u r e  the  subsequent  nationalistic  upsurge  entrepreneurs elites,  formation  of t h e  signalled  as o b s e r v e d  the  significant  instruments  q u i c k l y . The  UNP's to  exclusively  with  commitment  attack  by  by  arrival  which  to  to  secular  moderate  UNP,  which  stood  for  compelled  to  change  to  Sinhala-only  to S r i Lanka: the "more  deadly  dominant  least  ethnic  Tamil  of areas.  until  the  suggested  the  the  passions by  t h e UNP  nationalist  I t was  Sri  two  official  not  Lanka  was  almost  languages,  policy  to  The was  survive  electorate.  as a g e n e r a l i z a t i o n a p p l i e s  1980s. S i n c e  win SLFP  out  1956,  elections.  a  turn  major  from  the  successfully Outbidding helped  FP a t t h e expense of t h e TC  p o s s i b l e to p r a c t i s e  be  both  mainly  have  in  to  o u t b i d d i n g among  support  Sinhalese,  and  power  skillfully  outbidding turned  to  were  a Sinhala-only policy.  which d e r i v e d t h e i r  ethnic  Shepsle  political  t o e t h n i c harmony than  group,  s t r a t e g i e s adopted growth  a  intra-Sinhala  parties,  exploited  has  threat"  the T a m i l s , at political  advocating  among t h e S i n h a l a - d o m i n a t e d Milne  ethnic counter-  Bandaranaike  by  R.S.  these  win  outmanoeuvered t h e UNP  What  of  t h e SLFP whose power base was  Sinhala-Buddhist.  politically  For  Rabushka and  a  from  SLFP i n a p e r i o d of  among t h e S i n h a l a e l e c t o r a t e .  ethnic appeals  vulnerable  of t h e S.W.R.D. B a n d a r a n a i k e  consensus  the  i n the  politics  160  i n an p r o g r e s s i v e l y e t h n i c a l l y - p o l a r i z e d surprisingly,  successive  governments  political failed  system.  Not  t o manage e t h n i c  conflict. The  possibility  elections  discouraged  concessions Tamils. are  of b e i n g  to  or  outbid  the  national  reaching  According  to  compromises  of  of brokerage outbidding promote  would to  institutions  the  Senanayake's attributed election  to  to  their  fear  rout  of  policy  could  the  of  UNP  society.  multi-ethnic  the disappearance  For fear  neither  outcome  the  UNP  of b e i n g nor  district  Sinhala  Pact  or  council  outbidders.  parties,  an  extreme  The  outbid  t o the the  i t s policies.  without  damaging i t s  election.  the  to  into  1970  Sinhala-Buddhist  m a j o r i t a r i a n democracy e n c o u r a g e d b o t h turn  c a n be  o u t t o t h e T a m i l s . The  In e f f e c t , SLFP  Dudley  for i t facilitated  oppose s u c h p o l i c i e s  chances a t the next  SLFP  inability  UNP c o u l d a l s o be t r a c e d p a r t l y  adopted  of  accused  the  the FP. Bandaranaike's  implement  the Tamil  government  the  of  for  t h e UNP and SLFP competed t o  so b i a s e d t h a t t h e UNP c o u l d n o t  electoral  and  UF  minority  divided  Bandaranaike-Chelvanayagam  with  the  granting  the  significant  a c c u s a t i o n t h a t t h e UNP was s e l l i n g  SLFP-led  Nor  interests,  a  observe,  interests.  failure  UNP's c o a l i t i o n UF's  Instead, both  r e a c h an agreement w i t h  implement  in  i s the f i r s t  Sinhala-Buddhist  b e t r a y i n g these  from  with  the formation  Rabushka and S h e p s l e  politics.  at  practices essential  conflict  Moreover o u t b i d d i n g d i s c o u r a g e d As  other  N o r d l i n g e r , compromises and c o n c e s s i o n s  regulation  coalition.  each  parties  two o f t h e s i x c o n f l i c t - r e g u l a t i n g  successful  of  by  ethnic  parties  the  UNP  t o appease the  161  Sinhalese. became  As  predicted  by  Rabushka and  ethnically-oriented  brokerage  institutions.  political  system  The  also  Although Nordlinger  Shepsle,  instead  of  remaining  Tamils'  disenchantment  argues that  a  state having c e n t r a l i z e d p o l i t i c a l  the  contribute  f e d e r a t i o n may  and  left  Tamils'  were n u m e r i c a l l y their  to the  failure  feeling politically  d o m i n a n t . However,  overwhelming  decentralization  of  inability  of  the  alienation  without  parties  broad-based with  l e d them t o demand f o r a f e d e r a l  conflict unitary  the  majority,  regulation, control  even where  Sinhalese,  easily the  ethnic  power and  impotent  the  state.  increase  of c o n f l i c t  the  they  utilizing  resisted whole, due  the  political  power. On  political  p a r t i e s to address emerging  suffering electoral reversals,  it  to  the Tamil  was  not  diffused. Political moderate T a m i l extremist  inaction leadership  from  guerrillas  began  suggested  i n the  include  Lanka the of  their  implement previously Nordlinger  consociation  mentioned,  politics,  on  adopting  the  the  none the  an  or  Sinhalese  of  the  from were  Tamil areas.  limited their  by  As  measures  yet  elites  practices  the  secessionist  both;  conflict-management  Jayewardene' took by  outbidding  violent  to take over  outbidding"  a d o p t e d by  to  T a m i l moderate e l i t e s  federalism  successful ethnic  1977,  alienation  or  and  the  l e a d e r s h i p made  a g o v e r n m e n t ' s accommodative  r e s t r a i n t s placed  was  as  attempt  theory,  Sinhalese  more v u l n e r a b l e  mainstream  "over-promising  In  the  Tamil youths. Just  withdrawing  may  by  in  Sri  politics  ability  to  policies.  As  suggested  by  government. bold  steps  accommodative  to  contain  Tamil  p o l i c y towards  the  162  Tamils.  He was a i d e d  (non-ethnic) south.  issues  the  inadequate  in  accommodative  Tamils the  Jayewardene  in  late  ability  to  Jayewardene's  again,  the  reinforces moderation  in  failure the  is  party,  suggests,  t h e TULF,  in  south  possible  the  The  could  have  but  were  none  of  his  both  from w i t h i n  outbidding  may c a u s e  p a r t y . C e r t a i n l y , o u t b i d d i n g by t h e UNP  has  also  limited  conflict-regulating  i n the south.  strategies, with  the  observation when  Tamil  Although  t h e SLFP Tamils  accommodative  salience  elites areas  that of  to  schemes,  could  to r e -  on a communal p l a t f o r m .  UNP's  have  concessions  decentralization  agreement  i n c r e a s e s and e x p o s e s moderate Meanwhile,  society.  1960s,  by o u t b i d d e r s  credible  theoretical  not  polarization  Lankan  introduce  the  on  Tamils  e l e m e n t s w i t h i n t h e UNP c o u l d  the of  ethnic  and  damaged t h e p a r t y  have e x p l o i t e d t h e UNP's  restraint between  leadership. Extensive  particularly  itself  economic  implemented.  by J a y e w a r d e n e ' s p o l i t i c a l  establish  of  Moreover,  factions within  c o u l d have p o l i t i c a l l y weakened  of  concessions  1950s  was p r o p e r l y  measures. U l t r a - n a t i o n a l i s t  Tamils,  Sri  1970s.  i n t h e government  Jayewardene's  the  the  UNP. As M i l n e  Sinhalese  challenged  in  was c o n s t r a i n e d  the  repercussions  policy  place. Instead,  levels  policies  without  a  and n o n - c o n s t i t u t i o n a l  satisfied  salience  i s s u e s . Yet r e c o n c i l i a t i o n  dangerous  extremist  followed  d i d not take  constitutional  increased  w h i c h d o m i n a t e d t h e 1977 e l e c t i o n s i n t h e  sensitive  Sinhalese  reached  and  the  Jayewardene a l s o  ethnically and  by  Once  measures political  ethnic  issue  to outbidding. the moderate s e c e s s i o n i s t  was soon v i e w e d a s i m p o t e n t .  The  non-violent  163  strategies not  of  producing  steadily  the TULF w i t h i n t h e p a r l i a m e n t a r y democracy results.  gained  The  alternate  acceptance.  p e r i o d Jayewardene g r a n t e d Tamils  policies  failure  allowed  leadership. moderation The  to  Tamil  r e m a i n e d and  helped  by  concentration  "homogenous" influence  ethnic  north  the  first-past-the-post  national  and  parties  t h e n o r t h and  bashing"  and  each  e a s t was  to  party  highly conscious  invite  could  economy was  outbidding  a s an  a  hand,  moderate  in  Tamil  The  political  S r i Lanka.  The  resulted  in  Tamils'  i n the  ability  electorates  limited.  electoral  system  of  resulted.  groups  extremely  could  t h e government by  in  of t h e  towards  power  to  outside  This together  with  encouraged  indulge  the  final  in  the  the  two-party  s i n c e 1956  Tamils the  factor  import  economy  subject to world  lagging  economy c o u l d not meet the  by  either  system  made  one  A  both more  of  the  other.  determining  political  "Tamil  winning c o n v i n c i n g l y  s a l i e n c e of e t h n i c i t y .  o u t b i d d i n g from  i n f l u e n c e on was  the  accommodative  successful  ethnic  alternating  parties  the o t h e r  catastrophe  emergence of a c o m p e t i t i v e  policy  to  ' d i s r e g a r d ' the Tamil-dominant e l e c t o r a t e s  form  conciliatory  post-1977  room f o r a p o l i t i c s  factors  e a s t . These p a r t i e s  still  t h e s o u t h . The  The  1983  t h e outcome of e l e c t i o n s  i n the  concessions  outbid no  electorates.  the  parties  to  various of  violence  reasonable  1983  the J u l y  of  t h e SLFP. On  adopt  by  hand,  limited  extremists  Consequently,  was  regional  with  only  d e v e l o p m e n t of o u t b i d d i n g as  strategy  in  t h e one  t o ward o f f c h a l l e n g e s from  Jayewardene's  in  On  strategies  were  strategy. market  increasing  the e x t e n t The  export-  fluctuations. economic  of  The  demands  164  of  t h e masses. C o n s e q u e n t l y ,  discrimination to  the  government a d o p t e d a f f i r m a t i v e  redistribution  economic  official were  and  the  demands  l a n g u a g e and  of  the  p r i m a r i l y aimed a t  along  the  university  improving  resources  among  the  respective  communities.  outbidding  f l o u r i s h e d as a s t r a t e g i c  the  concept  use In a  conflict  policies  of  the  state.  discrimination  reinforce  alienation. their  unfulfilled,  political  may  failure  of  system t o  produce  fair  majority  e t h n i c group, the  the  allowed  votes  among  political  best  tool  their  process,  for explaining in  t h e m i n o r i t y . The  and  resolving  inside  the  ability  minority  group  such  for  Under  the  prevented and  can  minority system  triumphed. Tamils  limited  t o accommodate t h e  by  go  democratic  this  always  Sinhalese  adopted  hopes  secession.  results  government's f a i l u r e  strategies  may  majoritarian  Tamils.  and  outbidding the  when  effectively the  administrative linguistic  from  Sinhalese,  power w i t h  government's  outbidding  among  outbidding  sharing p o l i t i c a l  to  the  l e a d t o a demand f o r  alienation  Lankan  Sinhalese  difficulties  and,  the  of  for  Furthermore,  Outbidding  created  politics  intense competition  t o win  resulting  expectations  they  Clearly,  system the  m i n o r i t i e s from p o l i t i c a l  religious  enhances  the  imperative.  i s our the  as  p e a c e f u l l y . A l i e n a t i o n s e t s i n when government  exclude  institutions  and  Sinhala  of  communalized  of o u t b i d d i n g  emergence of a l i e n a t i o n  ethnic  of  outbidding  respond  economic p o s i t i o n  and  elites  to  standardization  the  political  The  to  Tamils  lines  majority.  S i n h a l e s e . Slow economic g r o w t h and economic  racial  The from Sri  e t h n i c demands  also  ethnic  the  the  be  related  entrepreneurs.  165  Nordlinger manage  discusses  ethnic  concessions  and  six  conflict,  among  coalition.  Since  from t h e s e o u t b i d d i n g depoliticize religious to the  which both  encouraged o u t b i d d i n g  suggested were  by  Rabushka  difficult  to  ethnic  M e l s o n and the  group  for  Wolpe a s s e r t , became political  Therefore,  not  accommodate  process  the  ethnic  t o the  political the  turn  government's  outbidding  L a n k a . Thus, n e i t h e r  and  bridge  the  the  political  widening  to  resolve  gap  system was  the  nor  g r o w t h of  by  ethnic  relied  on  process,  as  Communalization outbidding.  or  failure prevented  ethnic  minority  to the  conflict  governments  growing Tamil a l i e n a t i o n  between t h e s e  challenged  multi-ethnic  itself  in  legislation  concessions  encouraged  of c o n s o c i a t i o n a l measures t o c o n t a i n  implemented  and  political  inability  majority  linguistic  elites  adoption Sri  to  to grant  communalized.  in  demands but  the  attempts  Shepsle,  form due  survival,  no  gained  from c o u n t e r - e l i t e s .  and  e x t r e m i s m . In S r i L a n k a , where the  of  were  i s s u e s , s u c h as  to  depoliticization,  'national' parties  ones. Furthermore, every attempt  coalitions  their  are  s t r a t e g i e s , there  non-negotiable  minority  As  conflict-regulating practices  the  groups. Tamil  Inevitably,  secessionists.  3. Because the root cause of armed s e c e s s i o n i s p o l i t i c a l , an imposition of control measures (as defined earlier) without the government making m e a n i n g f u l accommodative s t e p s i n l i k e l y t o fail in the long run. In the s h o r t t e r m , c o e r c i v e measures may work i f the government has the capability to implement s u c h c o n t r o l m e a s u r e s . Wood have an a  writes  that  the  " c e n t r a l government's response  important, p o s s i b l y c o n c l u s i v e  secessionist attempt."  7  A government  effect facing  on  the a  will  outcome of  secessionist  166  threat  may  adopt  accommodative measures;  and  (3)  measures  may  techniques.  dealings  UF with  the  with  of  relied  majority  was  the  FP  and  bargaining.  ethnic  university sector  group  admission were  a  the  The  UF  later  the  and  on  as  explained  of c o n t r o l i n i t s  1970-77  period  government  with  government  UF  justified  to Lustick's  government's  society contributed t h e armed  of  from t h e allocation  For i n s t a n c e , the to  the its  the  government group  in  interests.  Sinhala-Buddhist  and  legitimized  the  the m i n o r i t y . expectations  c o n t r o l measures  to i n s t a b i l i t y  i s most  public  Increasing  in  Sri  of  likely  achieved  ensuring  in a multiLanka.  s e c e s s i o n i s t movements among T a m i l s  this period. Control  to  agreement,  criteria.  with  groups' c o n t r o l over  to  elites  recruitment  propagation  refused  resource  interests.  ethnic  and  for e l i t e  the  was  Tamils  t h e TUF. A c c o r d i n g  political  consistent  the  However, c o n t r a r y the  The  their  system  measures  ethnic  stability,  non-coercive  of c o n t r o l , p a r t l y  policy  the bureaucracy a s s i s t e d  through  'ideology,'  to  based  'Sinhalization'of  Further,  Control  outbidders.  determined  according  implementing  measures.  constrained  Tamils.  beginning,  and  exclusively  control  and  on a p o l i c y  followed  minority  purely  coercive  t h e c o n t r o l s y s t e m d i d not a l l o w  compromises  instance,  (2)  by an a b s e n c e of n e g o t i a t i o n s between  negotiate  during  mix  government  (1) c o m b i n a t i o n o f  accommodative  accommodation  In t h e  ethnic  a  Lanka  Sinhalese.  majority  measures;  by S i n h a l a - B u d d h i s t  characterized  Lustick,  control  include  because p o l i t i c a l  The  p o s s i b l e measures:  politically  Sri  previously,  three  by  For  emerged coercive  167  means;  but  contain  the  Tamil  institutional policies. control  government violence.  framework  The  capacities control  UNP  stability.  may  frequent  increased  traditional  crush  widened  Tamil  to  use  of  to  maintain  consider  measures  measures  the  much the  inadequate The  period  gave  Such  riots  movements.  These  beyond t h e  c o n s o c i a t i o n a l steps accelerated  out  administered.  boost.  various  his  turned  were  post-1977 needed  in  traditional  discredited  the  the d i s i n t e g r a t i o n of  leadership. on a m i l i t a r y  steps  fail?  defeat  possibility  of  heavy  counter-insurgency  have a l r e a d y  The government  to  Jaffna  these  solution  s e c e s s i o n i s t c h a l l e n g e . The  steps  ill-trained  continued  not  support-base  and  capability  the  in a  the  party  of accommodative military  and  inefficiently  joining  Lanka r e l i e d  the  were  guerrillas  Tamil  does  both  riots  land. Insufficient  moderate  Lustic  But  measures  t h e numbers  also  the  a d o p t e d n o t o n l y c o n t r o l measures but  Consociational  anti-Tamil  secessionist  Sri  ill-equipped  t h e need f o r accommodation  which  analysis.  control  lacked  movements i n i t s i n f a n c y . I f t h e c o e r c i v e  recognized  counter-productive.  Tamil  was  The government  theoretical  riots  apparently  l e a d t o armed r e s i s t a n c e .  also consociation,  while  Lanka  o f t h e s t a t e a r e not s u f f i c i e n t ,  methods  The  Sri  to  t o s u c c e s s f u l l y implement t h e s e c o n t r o l  military  the g u e r r i l l a  lacked the c o e r c i v e c a p a b i l i t y  the  maneuvers  p e n i n s u l a . While  reasons  f o r the  been e x p l a i n e d . Why forces lacked  secessionists.  civilian  i n i t s attempt  casualties  in thickly  the  to  failure d i d the military  Furthermore,  the  was  high  during  populated  areas  such as  suppressing  guerrilla  operations,  168  the  government  productive  victories  due  to  long  sympathy  not  war  and  remains  is  military  high  involved  victory  legitimacy  Moreover,  in  c o n t r o l measures strategic pressure  the  i n these  was  concerns  high  decentralized  indicates conflict. the  could  minority  not  may  victory  at  Despite  its  establish  its  areas. Sri  L a n k a , t h e government's  undermined and  by I n d i a .  government.  and  ability  India,  domestic p o l i t i c a l  the  t h e government's  by  exerted  Sri  Lankan  r e s p o n s e must  i n which t h e  against  t o use  motivated  necessity,  Thus,  scale  the g u e r r i l l a s  of  be  Sri  was  severely  r e f o r m i s t package,  including linguistic  security  economic  political  opportunities  system,  could  despite  the l a t t e r ' s m i l i t a r y  the importance of p o l i t i c a l As  i t was, to  public  stalemate threatened  Lanka's p o l i t y .  in  inability  t o wipe  weakness  i n the  military  support.  the democratic  The m i l i t a r i z a t i o n  Tamils  undermined  settlement  t h e government's  retain  for  have  s u p p o r t - b a s e . The government's  guerrillas  military  i t . As  India.  strong  LTTE,  to s u s t a i n  deaths.  Mao  hence,  civilians,  only  civilian  government  operations  and more e q u i t a b l e  the  war;  major  the r e g i o n a l context  guerrilla  on  As  S r i Lanka's  viewed w i t h i n  A  counter-  for guerrillas  challenge  by  not  protracted  are necessary  secessionist  restricted  than  and p u b l i c s u p p o r t  on t h e S r i Lankan  Lanka's m i l i t a r y  a  i t s frustration  change. For i n s t a n c e ,  Vadamarachchi  often  indiscriminate k i l l i n g s .  often  support  a s t h e army v e n t s  alienation  more  t h e army's  argues, a g u e r r i l l a public  were  A  in  the out east,  an  ethnic  action  allowed  political  foundation  of t h e c o u n t r y  a  might  and  of S r i change  169  the  political  that  a government  also  ethos,  destroy  which c o u l d  is fighting  the  country,  Political  accommodation  controlling  basis  in  the  short  not  examples  of  Africa  m e a s u r e s may and  South  succeed only  Israel  have  institutions.  But  recent  Africa  indicate  the  lasting  stability.  of  S r i Lanka not  implement c o n t r o l measures f u l l y the  Indian  prudently  r e g i o n a l s p h e r e of  restrict  For  succeed  illustrate  in  but  Gaza  The  control  South  Strip  Africa  and  South  measures t o  ensure  l a c k s the  institutions  also, since  i n f l u e n c e has  i t s domestic p o l i c i e s  how  be  system-maintenance  control  only  a  disastrous.  guaranteed.  Further,  i n the  failure  might  8  extensive  events  be  to  always  temporarily.  developed  war  country.  in fact  system  s e c e s s i o n i s t v i o l e n c e may  long-term v i c t o r i e s are and  long  likely  defeated,  Israel  A  secession. run  political  the  may  more  b o t h a l i e n a t i o n and  Although  of  a p r o t r a c t e d war is  the  to p r e s e r v e .  economic  developing  destroy  is  within  found t h a t  i t must  so as  it  to  not  to  offend  does  not  always  India. In  short,  s u p p r e s s the remedied.  If  a  purely  minority; not,  from t i m e t o time and  the  military  victory  r o o t c a u s e s of  alienation  s e c e s s i o n i s t s e n t i m e n t s may threaten  the  political  must  become  be  violent  existence  country.  4. An alienated ethnic minority may resort to v i o l e n c e i f some o r a l l of t h e following conditions prevail: (a) the ethnic minority i s t e r r i t o r i a l l y b a s e d ; (b) non-coercive political control of the central government o v e r the t r a d i t i o n a l l a n d s of the m i n o r i t i e s weakens; (c) a breakdown of accommodative practices occurs; (d) able and c o m m i t t e d m i n o r i t y armed s e c e s s i o n i s t l e a d e r s a r e available; (e) arms  of  a  170  and a sanctuary such a s might be p r o v i d e d by a sympathetic f o r e i g n s t a t e a r e a c c e s s i b l e ; ( f ) a sense of d e s p a i r a b o u t t h e s y s t e m e x i s t s among minority leaders; (g) a s e n s e o f hope a n d d e t e r m i n a t i o n f o r a b e t t e r f u t u r e under a d i f f e r e n t s y s t e m e x i s t s among minority leaders. Insofar as these conditions p r e v a i l , the a l i e n a t e d ethnic minority i s . l i k e l y to resort to violence.  The includes the  geographical  precondition  o f s e c e s s i o n , , w r i t e s Wood,  "the existence  of separable  territory  bulk  According  of  the  potentially  t o the c l a s s i f i c a t i o n  Sri  L a n k a , where t h e S i n h a l e s e  can  be c l a s s i f i e d  minority by  a  Tamils  rough  of  limited  together  a dispersed  participation  a feeling  minority by  with  ethnic  surviving  a "home" may  the i n i t i a l  is  Clearly,  1 0  and  of threatened  is  that  roots  5:1.  i n S r i Lanka. Tamil  may t a k e  with  overwhelming  majority,  i n the north  This challenge likely  an  However, t h e  ethnicity  discontent economic  ethnic  and e a s t is  a r i s i n g out  opportunities  identity  alienated  from t h e s y s t e m of m a j o r i t a r i a n d e m o c r a c y . Whereas  environment minority  are  the Sinhalese  of  9  scheme o f Rabushka and S h e p s l e ,  outnumber  political  the m i n o r i t y  population."  polity."  based  with  secessionist  contains  a s a "dominant m a j o r i t y  proportion  territorially  which  group o f t e n adapts t o the a l i e n a t e d as  a 'passive  challenge  a violent  minority,'  the  central  or a n o n - v i o l e n t  challenge  authority. f o r m . But  comes from an e t h n i c  i n t h e home t e r r i t o r y . Wood s u g g e s t s t h a t  not a r e a l i s t i c  a home t e r r i t o r y .  option  f o r an a l i e n a t e d m i n o r i t y  F o r example, t h e C h i n e s e m i n o r i t y  (Malay d o m i n a t e d ) i s i n t e r m i n g l e d Not  surprisingly,  in  the e a r l y  f o r secession  This c a l l  i t  party  secession  which  lacks  i n Malaysia  and n o t t e r r i t o r i a l l y  i n S r i Lanka, a c a l l  1970s by t h e T a m i l s .  an e t h n i c  based.  was r a i s e d  was a r t i c u l a t e d by  171  the  established  Tamil party,  demonstrates  that  concentration  of t h e m i n o r i t y  In arises be  a  the  f o r reasons already into  government's a b i l i t y capacity  to  argues that the  retain  emergence  government's authority) absence  integration:  (1)  integration; (5)  From exercise  both  major  in  the was  control  of the i s l a n d . connected  territorial  central  Wood  is  a  necessary  condition  In a d e m o c r a t i c  indication  the  for  political  testing  control  five  the  (legitimate  minorities.  types  Decline  of  or  political political  (2)  territorial  (4) v a l u e  integration;  the c e n t r a l the n o r t h . parties  the  Jaffna  integration,  A  not  among t h e m i n o r i t i e s .  province.  parties  with  o r may  its  exclusively  In s h o r t ,  may  minority  1 1  over  almost  by t h e n a t i o n a l  of a  upon  integration;  northern  north  area.  depends  integration;  'national'  parties.  by a  undermine t h e p r o c e s s of  national  ethnic  conditioned  demand.  secession  identifies  behaviour.  political  constituency  loosely  of  could  Weiner  case  i n one  political  i n d e p e n d e n c e onward,  elections  rest  good  (3) e l i t e - m a s s  integrative  years,  be a  t h e homeland  Myron  Lankan  alienation  of s e c e s s i o n i s m .  of l e g i t i m a c y  integration.  contain  non-coercive  over  is  secessionist  in legitimacy  may  Sri  discussed. Alienation  i t s legitimacy  a decline  system, e l e c t i o n s  response  society,  a  to  The  population  an e t h n i c a l l y p l u r a l  transformed  for  minority  TULF.  the  government In fared  The  rest  forty  northern  Tamil  of  from those  'political  enclave'  or  a  the  i n the  of t h e c o u n t r y . N a t i o n a l  which g l u e s a s o c i e t y  in  by t h e T a m i l  penetration  were d i f f e r e n t a  past  not  disastrously  represented  political  was  the  could  only or  political  172  system  together  contrary, (new)  ethnic  centre In  forces  d i d not  and produced  this could  mentality  loyalties  enclave,  take  prevailed  the  Weiner c l a i m s  that  over  northern  confidence.  Tamils  the c r u c i a l  not t h e d i f f e r e n c e s  made  that  authority. the  factor  i n "values  In t h e n o r t h ,  government  authority.'  According  legitimacy  is  situation Violence  which  of  can  be  perceive  Because  integration  the governed accept the  i t was  increasingly  considered a  preconditions  created  Jaffna  'separate e n t i t y ' within perception  through  The  Tamils  the  response  t o take of  evident  'legitimate  government fora  lacking  revolutionary  guerrilla  perceived  warfare.  a legitimate  themselves as a  the boundaries of the p e n i n s u l a ,  of t h e J a f f n a p e n i n s u l a  secessionism  root  central  as a " s t a t e w i t h i n  a  government  iscritical  that  t h e c e n t r a l government o f an e t h n i c a l l y p l u r a l  "two  basic  control  measures,  accommodative divisions was  in dealing  with  taking  o f t h e s o c i e t y . As a l r e a d y  counter-productive,  most  state"  i n the argues  s o c i e t y has  secessionist challenge:  i n c l u d i n g both c o e r c i v e  practices,  their  on t h e p e n i n s u l a .  emergence o f s e c e s s i o n i s t v i o l e n c e . Wood, f o r i n s t a n c e ,  options"  the  interests.  i n elite-mass  Guevara,  the  them  opposition  and a s p i r a t i o n s " between t h e  not  Che  The  may n o t p r o d u c e e f f e c t i v e r e s u l t s a g a i n s t  government.  allowed  was  to  one  to the  the s e c u r i t y  as h o s t i l e t o t h e i r  government and t h e g o v e r n e d b u t whether ruler's  loyalties  t h e government a n d , l a t e r ,  n o t win t h e p e o p l e ' s  of  i n t h e c o u n t r y . On t h e  f o r c e s of d i s i n t e g r a t i o n .  government and i t s i n s t i t u t i o n s  is  place  into  and n o n - c o e r c i v e ; (2) account  shown, t h i s  likely  (1)  because  the  ethnic  control  system  i t  was  not  173  accompanied  by  credible  consociationalism During  the  governments  or  programmes  1960s,  to  the  alleviate  successive  Tamil  i n t r o d u c e d by g o v e r n m e n t s were c o s m e t i c meet  the  Tamils'  were c u t o f f from the necessary remained  parliamentary growing  own  ethnic of  channels to  flank  1972  Liberation  Che legal  rule,  of  Guevara notes mechanism  majoritarian political  that  situation democracy  governments, p a r t i c u l a r l y  B e c a u s e no drifting  to r e s o r t  the  Eelam  elites  government  questioned  by  the n o r t h e r n youths.  to  by o u t b i d d e r s  implement  The from  the  passage  the c o n s o l i d a t i o n  the  emergence  (LTTE) and  a  successful  Significantly,  with  not  the r e l e v a n c e of  of  of  the  the T a m i l  Eelam  i n t h e a b s e n c e of a  may  for be  Tamils  i n a meaningful t h e UF, by  steps  political  alleviating created.  prevented  adopted  accommodative  of T a m i l s  was  which s i g n a l l e d  needed  methods  did  (TELO).  decision-making  extra-legal  ability  Tamil  Reforms  institutions. A l l  influence  democracy  coincided  Organization  revolutionary  Tamils  to  management p o l i c i e s .  Tigers  Liberation  their  Constitution,  majoritarian  therefore  the S i n h a l e s e e l i t e s  limited  conflict  the  on  and  Tamils. Inevitably,  (majoritarian)  placed  as  Lankan  alienation.  decision-making  needed  the  Sri  demands. M o d e r a t e T a m i l  number of T a m i l s , p a r t i c u l a r l y  restraints their  fundamental the c e n t r a l  closed  such  decentralization.  1950s and  failed  political  In  grievances, Sri  Lanka,  from p a r t i c i p a t i n g way.  The  Sri  the e s t a b l i s h e d Tamil taken  from m a i n s t r e a m p o l i t i c s ,  to  in  Lankan  d i s r e g a r d e d a l l the l e g a l  were  and  and  parties.  prevent  the  the p r o p e n s i t y f o r  t o v i o l e n c e i n c r e a s e d . As Rabushka and  Shepsle  174  correctly  point  out,  the  only  i n a dominant m a j o r i t y  polity  through non-democratic  means.  Although they  are  l e a d e r s do  not  indispensable  in  secessionist  hope f o r t h e m i n o r i t y  exercising p o l i t i c a l  by  themselves  the  beyond a l e a d e r ' s  i n f l u e n c e ; but  correct  and  tactics  movement  towards  leadership believed  relied  on  strongly  final  in  and  secession  party  and  take  of its  any  goal.  out  of  the  concrete  secession leader,  by may  may  democracy.  the  be  adopting lead  traditional  parliamentary  curtailed  l e a d e r s h i p . The  of a s u c c e s s f u l  clearly  The  the  Tamil TULF  However,  effectiveness  steps,  the  responsibility of  TULF l e a d e r s h i p a l s o f a i l e d  non-violent  be  secession,  t o e s t a b l i s h E e l a m . The  parliamentary  arising  goal  a skillful  non-violence  contradictions the  of  i n t e r p r e t i n g events,  its  power may  "create"  development  movement. Long term r e s u l t s  community  e.g.  hartals  the to and  satyagrahas. The  radical  were drawn from provided The  the  unlike established leaders, lower  l e a d e r s h i p f o r the  adopted  classical  confrontations  with  the  peninsula.  Initially,  the  guerrillas  were  Valvettithurai,  industry.  LTTE g r a d u a l l y  The  nature  closely-knit  organization.  smuggling  trade  of  w a r f a r e and  radicalized  leaders  Tamils  distinctive  class  s u p e r i o r armed f o r c e s .  of  from  middle  their  in  and  the  avoided Ruthless  conservative majority  where s m u g g l i n g was  trade,  Furthermore,  demanded l o y a l t y  the  Valvettithurai,  illegal  and  s e c e s s i o n i s t movements.  guerrilla  efficiency  major  the  leaders,  non-propertied  a committed  leaders  direct  Tamil  to t h e i r  the  by  developed success  leaders,  of the the  into a of  knowledge  the of  175  the  terrain,  efficient  Valvettithurai  youths  organizational  After charges were  Thus P r a b a k a r a n  had  resources  well  prepared under as  in anti-state  possessed  of p u b l i c  to convert  Guevara  argues  support  and  his the  O'Neill moral did  and  a  not  four  support  militant  The  Tamil  nationalist  M.  in Valvettithurai warfare.  and  human  resources  (i.e.  north.  The  Tamils,  robbers  support  guerrillas. has  robbers  all  lack  the  public  of e x t e r n a l s u p p o r t .  in  secessionist  win  Tamil  e t h n i c bond  the  Tamil  the  t o power  for  the  in  n a t i o n a l i s m i n t h e s t a t e . The who  2.5  beginning  Nadu,  DMK's a s c e n d a n c e  Karunanidhi,  guerrillas  the I n d i a n  Nadu and  in  Early  from  T a m i l Nadu s u p p o r t ,  reasons,  s e c e s s i o n i s t s . The  in  smuggling  government of I n d i a but  strategic  L a n k a n T a m i l s c r e a t e d sympathy  guerrillas.  of  for Tamil  the c e n t r a l  Tamils  over  secessionist  types  backed  support  the  survive for long.  later  outright  to  o r g a n i z e d group a c t i o n )  army; but  for  million  loyalty  material  i n the  band  also  fifty  and  into  government of T a m i l Nadu. To  Tamil  their  framework, needed t h e  state  regional  police  command  war  themselves  proposes  not come from  fierce  psychological  of a g u e r r i l l a  political  transfer  the Tamils  activities  that  t h u s do  organization.  t o engage i n g u e r r i l l a  the o r g a n i z a t i o n a l  characteristics  and  confronting  to begin a secession g u e r r i l l a who  to  unity  activities,  psychologically  experience  able  clan  of  anti-state  as  disciplined  movement.  long years  and  were  structure,  emerging g u e r r i l l a  and  succeeded  1967  and  government  between  the  million Sri and,  later,  secessionist encouraged  more r a d i c a l C.N.  the  Tamil  Annadurai  in  176  1969,  did  not  hesitate  to c o n s o l i d a t e  his p o l i t i c a l  s e n t i m e n t s of the  Sri  the  Sinhalese  Lankan  logistical  t o drum up  as  militants  successfully  proximity  of  Tamil the  to  achieve  necessary  but  not  The  translate  ability  each  so  is  alienated one  of  over  w h i c h one  that  of  that  into  these  is  i f none of  secessionist  more  by  is,  influences  to v i o l e n c e ? from p l a c e i t i s not  important  may  in  resort  rise  of  the  The to  armed ability  stated  in  what  Its the  extent  decision  of  the  i m p o r t a n c e of  any  place  possible  than  to is a  conflict.  to  the  north.  Alienation  conditions  these c o n d i t i o n s  violence  role  minorities  r a i s e d here  the The  movements i n t h e  secessionist  determined  time. Therefore,  Lanka,  g r o u p must p o s s e s s t h e a  varies  provided  groups.  f o r the  for  secessionist  significant  condition  ethnic  resort  a  support  Sri  demands, some do.  question  these c o n d i t i o n s  changes  predict  to  and  ethnic  these c o n d i t i o n s  minority  for  Tamils  anti-DMK  T a m i l Nadu  guerrilla  guerrilla  their  minority  do  of  played  a sufficient  beginning. A c r u c i a l does  Nadu  and  Indian Tamil  India  established  alienation  to  anti-India  sanctuary  between  a l l alienated  violence  to  as  secessionist  A l t h o u g h not  secession.  The  reinforced  well  Shuttling  emergence of  hold.  f o r S r i Lankan  T a m i l s . More i m p o r t a n t l y ,  support  guerrillas.  support  to point  others.  exists,  and  One  also out may  i t is unlikely  erupt.  5. The a b i l i t y o f a g u e r r i l l a g r o u p t o c h a l l e n g e the l e g i t i m a c y of t h e government depends on many f a c t o r s . The f o l l o w i n g a r e some of the more important ones: (a) establishing base a r e a s ; (b) m o b i l i z i n g p u b l i c support; (c) acquiring "sufficient" military and economic power; (d) m a i n t a i n i n g c o h e s i o n and u n i t y ; (e) c r e a t i n g e f f i c i e n t o r g a n i z a t i o n ; (f) attracting and r e c r u i t i n g c a p a b l e and shrewd l e a d e r s .  177  A  base  warfare. in  is  important  Guerrillas,  both  military  according  and  establish  areas  are  bases  terrain,  and  i n the  established  ( e . g . mountain  areas).  g u e r r i l l a s may  mobilize  large  the  t o Mao  political  Winning p u b l i c support to  for  Tse-Tung,  activities  first  p h a s e of  in  a  In  the  absence bases  support.  of  Notably,  a guerrilla  c o n d i t i o n f o r winning  won  an  impressive  Jaffna  the  repeat  Jaffna  Controlling  north,  little  opposition  guerrillas bases  the  might  advantageous where t h e y  can  recognizes  the  is  p a r t y , the  particularly  the  the  from t h e n a t i o n a l t h e TULF however  site  establish  TULF,  on  victories.  optimal  becomes c r u c i a l  terrain  on  their  Clearly, which  base  when g u e r r i l l a s  the  areas.  engage  in a  war. For  Jaffna  the T a m i l  secessionist  peninsula neither  possessed outright population Tamil  secessionist  i n the  was  base  war.  i t s overwhelming n o r t h e r n  peninsula  secessionist  since  with  guerrillas  mobilization  In t h e h e t e r o g e n o u s e a s t e r n p r o v i n c e ,  not  long  victory  peninsula,  parties. could  t h e moderate T a m i l  Mao  area.  Mostly  an  in areas  cardinal  engage  w i t h i n a base  favourable geographical  Political  1977,  guerrilla  should  the war.  i m p o r t a n c e of p u b l i c s u p p o r t .  In  of  d e f e a t i n g t h e enemy a l l o w  establish  public  development  the defeat  the  necessary  central  coercive on  the  t o c a r r y out  government (military)  other.  control  nor  an the  capability  Furthermore,  must  lived live  among the p u b l i c . Mao among t h e p e o p l e  as  the war  guerrillas to  a  asserts fish  of  extended  made i t e a s i e r t o m o b i l i z e p u b l i c s u p p o r t  guerrillas  guerrillas  was  guerrillas,  live  inflict  homogenous where  the  that  the  i n water.  178  For  these Tamil g u e r r i l l a s , p u b l i c  for  their  the  Jaffna  peninsula. the  information  in  government  intelligence  leaders,  highly  network  the  obtaining absence  t e r r a i n of guerrillas  incriminating such  support,  populated area could  e a s i l y be  provides  of  intelligence forguerrillas routes.  Establishing  i s one o f t h e p r i m a r y d e v e l o p m e n t s  and  After  environment  by c a r r y i n g  the  guerrillas  state.  as "our  argues,  revolution  i n the  destroy  areas  eliminated  —  a  of g u e r r i l l a  Mao  observes,  out c o n s i s t e n t l y  boys"  the  public  fighting  conditions  development The LTTE  the  peninsula  for  necessary  by g u e r r i l l a s .  to  "us."  was d e m o n s t r a t e d  by t h e  ties  i s not  a radicalized  successful came  the  government  neutrality  operations consider  Thus,  as  the Che  f o r the development of The  success  base a r e a s and m o b i l i z i n g  the g u e r r i l l a  on  strategy.  i n and a r o u n d  which  political  prominent  w a r f a r e . The LTTE c r e a t e d  c a n be c r e a t e d  the peninsula  group  of the g u e r r i l l a s through e t h n i c  Soon  establishing  LTTE  murdering  living  all,  in guerrilla  base  collaborators  the people  the o b j e c t i v e  murders.  in  phase, the by  guerrilla  establish  w i t h Mao's a n a l y s i s  support  Guevara  to  secession  'convinced'  against  secessionist  attempted  informers  permitted  to  a  for  t r o o p movements and s u p p l y  to  consistent  on  the  In t h e f i r s t  opposition  LTTE  In  LTTE was t h e o n l y  peninsula.  and  them.  the p u b l i c  systematically  to  indispensable  p h a s e o f t h e war. The  also  support from  such  betrayed. Also,  Public  government  about  guerrillas  first  was  s u r v i v a l a s urban g u e r r i l l a s on t h e f l a t  prevented  on  support  of  public  government's  movement. O n l y a f t e r e l e v e n  the  support failure  years d i d  179  the  army k i l l  Jaffna.  the  public  the  s u p p o r t . In of  public  support.  the  established  LTTE  guerrilla  who  lacked  the  betrayed  force  hence  the  its  in  a  civilians voluntary  military  i n the  north  commitment becoming  strong  into  within  a short  span of  a  strong  group,  establishing guerrilla diverse communist backward  Tamil  entrenched  base due  period  of  reinforce  its  intimidated  leadership,  thus  losing  in  understood  of  of  the  the  1986, Mao  its  the  LTTE  and  other  i s e s s e n t i a l for  the  PLOTE  building For  peninsula  the  importance Being  faithfully  instance, But  the the  of  the  first  in i t s search  grass-roots  Vavunia d i s t r i c t . to  to  i n major T a m i l c e n t e r s .  areas.  i n the  time,  group.  support,  strategy  a  l i t t l e p u b l i c p r o t e s t . As  g r o u p t o move out public  became  TELO  Consequently,  however,  base a r e a s  TELO  the  s t r a t e g i s t s a s s e r t , mass s u p p o r t  PLOTE,  of  organizational  in  In d e s p e r a t i o n ,  guerrilla  The  the  the  which  the  of a g u e r r i l l a  TELO w i t h  group,  decimated  survival  TELO w i t h  in mobilizing  victories,  directionless  its  base.  the  successful  This  and  guerrilla  accepting  support  as  l e d to a r a p i d m o b i l i z a t i o n  peninsula.  m i l i t a r y strength.  as  g r o u p s was  r e - e m e r g e n c e of  government  Through  ideological  declining  major g u e r r i l l a  1984,  b a s e s on  structure,  support  was  i n e s t a b l i s h i n g base a r e a s o r  Indian  dominant  image  other  LTTE e i t h e r  backing  the  first  1 2  None of as  the  adopted  the  organizations PLOTE  was  PLOTE l o s t  to  Mao,  "...  the  main form  of  organization  main form of is  the  army  struggle ...  in  well  i t s mass  i t s l i m i t e d m i l i t a r y engagement a f t e r  According  for  1983.  i s war,  Without  the  armed  180  struggle will  there  be no v i c t o r y i n r e v o l u t i o n . " The  EPRLF, a r i g i d  'instant —  would be no p l a c e  revolution'  —  by e l i m i n a t i n g t h e  little  support  EROS t e n d e d and,  as  dedicated the  Naturally, Tamils.  and  organization For arms  east  areas  and  financial small  their  establishing  ammunition. resources, While  guerrilla  With  guerrillas  Marxist-oriented followers  a group with a small  but h i g h l y  up-country,  bases,  In  hence  in  emerged  enemy i s t h e  their  failing  mobilizing as  on to  warfare.  the  public  strongest  search  the  for  source  fire  EPRLF c a r r i e d o u t v e r y  with  strong  the  LTTE  support  of  their  few s u c c e s s f u l  t o economic  sabotage  in both  from t h e enemy. However, improved U.S.-based  i t s financial expatriates,  from t h e PLOTE were w e l l - a r m e d and f i n a n c e d ,  PLOTE d i s i n t e g r a t e d due t o i t s f a i l u r e  of  power and  the government. C o n s e q u e n t l y ,  few arms and ammunition  the  primary  t h e EPRLF and EROS were hampered by  war a g a i n s t  EROS' c o o p e r a t i o n  base.  received  attract  on t h e army, t h e EROS r e s o r t e d  groups secured the  an  by t h e mid-1980s.  size.  attacks  group  from w h i c h t o d i r e c t g u e r r i l l a  Mao, t h e g u e r r i l l a s '  and  The  to  M e a n w h i l e t h e LTTE, which was s u c c e s s f u l support  this  b a s e . B o t h t h e EPRLF and EROS c o n c e n t r a t e d  ethnically-mixed base  remained  in creating  of the c l a s s l e s s s o c i e t y  on e s o t e r i c a p p e a l s  result,  support  establish  the c r e a t i o n  rich.  ... and t h e r e  1 3  group, b e l i e v e d  from c o n s e r v a t i v e  to rely  a  Marxist  f o r the people  t o engage  in  but t h e guerrilla  w a r f a r e and i t s i n t e r n a l d i v i s i o n s . Both guerrilla  the  LTTE and TELO i n t e r n a l l y  operations  by  robbing  banks  financed and  their  initial  other  state  181  institutions. attacking more due  Both  p o l i c e s t a t i o n s and  successful to  its  enhanced  consistent  its  ability  and  external  flow  optimize  the  use  them  from p e r s o n a l place  suggests,  lack  Internal  and  a  external  of  military  discipline  programme was fact,  the  or  Tamil  also  attracts  material  i t was  is  between need  and  a  financial large  LTTE which  could  resources. important,  divisions  not  as  O'Neill  always  lead  to  defeat.  but, ragged  divisive only more  take  but,  the  g r o u p and  have u n d e r m i n e d the  not  may  groups  to a n n i h i l a t e each other  enemy. The  strength  the  substantial  guaranteed a the  military  on  to  argued that  s e c e s s i o n i s t movement. The  could  its  enemy  attacks.  armories  O ' N e i l l has  d i v i s i o n s within  government  into  was  deep. T y p i c a l l y , s u c h d i v i s i o n s a r i s e  resources  the  g r o u p s gave t h e its  economic and  of c o h e s i o n  operations  capability  built  group  LTTE. Again,  group  scarce  and  i d e o l o g i c a l differences. Dissension  g r o u p s weakened the  military  LTTE  guarantees  remain,  and  within  used t h e i r  The  u n i t y among g u e r r i l l a s may  by  LTTE  i n e s t a b l i s h i n g base a r e a s  guerrilla  which  of  the  from t h e  ambushes  T a m i l Nadu g o v e r n m e n t ' s s u p p o r t  Although among  popular  of money f o r the  supplies  t o m a n u f a c t u r e m i l i t a r y h a r d w a r e and  resources.  support  assistance.  guerrilla  also c o l l e c t e d taxes.  well-organized,  But  m i l i t a r y resources  LTTE's s u c c e s s  financial  peninsula  m i l i t a r y posts.  in obtaining  Furthermore, the  collect  g r o u p s a l s o c o l l e c t e d arms and  sufficient  armed f o r c e s . T h i s  f o r the  guerrillas  army's s u c c e s s  i n 1987  can  in part  when  i n the be  the  joint  military guerrilla  time to b u i l d  importantly,  the  guerrillas  limited  n a t u r e of  disastrous  among  to  up  instill  modernization long  traced  run. back  In to  182  changes  introduced  disunity  among the  government's  its  guerrillas, The internal in  military  division  i t s attempts  groups.  over  i n I n d i a and  destroyed  the  internal  Hence, the and  the  1987, Tamil  —  The  to  the  i n the  success  c a s e of  the  of  the  government  also  secessionist  group  attack. the  field  EPRLF  other  guerrilla  organization  Similarly, war  commanders  small  to  between  in  the  guerrilla TELO  group  were  Indian  the  east,  LTTE. in  the  to  LTTE's  t o the  LTTE  PLOTE, TELO  army  By the  reduced  main t h r e a t of  free LTTE.  and  the  the  Lanka  the  north  dominance of  and  the  Sri  resist  LTTE i n t h e  a coalition with  strategic  EROS were r e l a t i v e l y  c o s t . Today the —  from  aggressive  guerrilla  EPRLF and too  over  free  also  s e c e s s i o n i s t s t r u g g l e . But  Three S t a r  LTTE.  the  comparable  TELO made t h e  strongest  which cooperates the  However, while  a  the  guerrilla  the  to accept  PLOTE,  incurred a high  to destroy  In  The  groups  stems from t h e EPRLF  against  EPRLF c a p i t u l a t e d t o t h e  areas.  triumph  The  LTTE became t h e  peripheral  in  the  s q u a b b l e s but  agreed  Lankan  dominance  c o n d u c t of  PLOTE.  EROS  the  Sri  p o s t - 1 9 8 3 p e r i o d , was  LTTE's the  in defeat  represented  major  struggle  the  end  period.  them t o s u r v i v e d e s p i t e d i s u n i t y .  only  leadership  from  the  to e s t a b l i s h  to  differences  d i d not  operations  i n the  Internal  vulnerable  on  which a l l o w e d the  post-1983  weakness  pressure  LTTE,  the  guerrillas  military  drawback. I n d i a n hampered  during  and  i n i t s attempt  1 4  s e c e s s i o n i s t movements v a r i e s LTTE,  development  i t s success of  Prabakaran's charisma h e l d  its the  may  partly  leadership  LTTE t o g e t h e r  and and  considerably. be  attributed  organization. he  provided  a  183  dynamic  leadership  for  the  ruthlessness  and  subordinates,  Prabakaran b u i l t  He  confidence  won  the  compassion  them more f r e e d o m rewarding  group. in  his  in military  success  being  his  opponents  Prabakaran's d e c i s i o n  Ramachandran  other  g r o u p s . By  nationalism radical could  changes form  gave  adopting  and  a  the  his  guerrilla  unit.  a  advisors,  i n the to  flexible --  cross-cutting  thus  by  —  sphere.  a  did  conservative  For with  over  the  mixture  of  not  introduce  peninsula.  between  he  avoiding  leverage  ideology  alliance  as  'exclusively'  Prabakaran  essentially  well  political  align  allowing  commands. A l s o  LTTE p o l i t i c a l  socialism i n an  mixing  with  as  in their  good p o l i t i c a l  M.G.  loyal  decision-making  with  instance,  dealings  a fiercely  surrounded himself by  judiciously  of h i s r e g i o n a l commanders by  them f o r m i l i t a r y  outbid  By  He  radicals  and  conservatives. As Wood w r i t e s , support, to  after  secessionist leaders  compromise on  the  guerrilla  perceived  by  the  the c a u s e  of  a  solidified there  within , did  his  On not  in was  separate the  no  Tamil  challenge  retaining  the  state. areas.  By  public refusing  of Eelam, P r a b a k a r a n  movements.  p u b l i c as  and  resort to outbidding.  establishment  more f l e x i b l e  that  mobilizing  Therefore  the  outbid  LTTE  was  o n l y major g r o u p c o m m i t t e d The His  group's rigid  support  stand  to h i s l e a d e r s h i p  also  from  to  base  ensured  hardliners  group.  the  contrary,  possess  unimaginative  an  the  TELO a f t e r  effective  leadership  PLOTE's d i s i n t e g r a t i o n . F o r  of  Uma  a long  and  the  d e a t h of  strong  Maheswaran time,  he  Thangathurai  leadership. resulted in could  not  The the hold  184  together  the  restless  and  idle  camp. The  EROS's l e a d e r s h i p ' s  decision  LTTE showed g r e a t e r  flexibility  leadership  guerrilla  the  only  of other  guerrilla  than  little  more  Limited  a v a i l a b l e d a t a on  secessionist the  among  the  of  both at  us  it  have no  lasting  political  military  r e g i o n a l commanders  into a powerful o r g a n i z a t i o n .  the  'lightweights' The  to  ability  of  the  of  guerrilla  f a c t o r s . But  in determining a  the  central  the  LTTE i n d i c a t e s t h e  converted was  few  . other  organizational  warfare  may  be  some f a c t o r s may  be  guerrilla  government.  t o e s t a b l i s h base  to challenge  with  overshadowed  Relatively remained  and  struggle.  secessionist  than o t h e r s  ability  EROS)  secessionist  challenge  organization's its  of  of  a combination  more i m p o r t a n t ability  i n the  success  d e t e r m i n e d by  exception  India  organization  government (with  in  Lanka  executions  the  groups  to  Its  together  e f f e c t i v e enough t o g e n e r a t e p r o p a g a n d a which machinery.  Tamil  levels.  in S r i  Its p o l i t i c a l  1 5  well-structured  also  propaganda  foment  However,  i t s c e n t r a l command  military  was  of  movements.  the  and  EROS  i t s importance  into a  political  the  effect."  structure  c e n t r a l i z e d c o n t r o l of p o l i c y - m a k i n g  decentralized  the  the  than  organization  LTTE d e v e l o p e d  w i t h the  with  fratricide.  the  to  its  result,  inter-group  and  T a m i l Nadu  maturity  from a s s e s s i n g  (prior  highly  a  organizational  i n t e r n a l network c o n n e c t i n g  its  the  that  close  1987)  political  Wood, " w i t h o u t  the  i n the  cooperate  secessionist guerrilla  guerrillas  organization,  to  g r o u p s . As  upheavals  groups prevent  development  and  group to avoid  "Secessionists," writes  guerrillas  guerrilla  may  determine  c e n t r a l government. The  experience  s u c c e s s of  areas  A  group's  e s t a b l i s h i n g such  bases,  185  thus  reinforcing  Indian  army's s u c c e s s  illustrates lack  the t h e o r e t i c a l  the  geographical  area  But t h e  i n t a k i n g c o n t r o l of the J a f f n a  peninsula  region a  the Indian  capability  to  e s t a b l i s h i n g base a r e a s discusses  t h e base a r e a s  superior  i n a disadvantageous  Unlike  in  a d v a n t a g e . Mao  making a m o u n t a i n understandably,  o f Mao.  weaknesses  expectations  military  terrain  their  cooperation, public people  a guerrilla  without  the north.  and  that  the 1 7  of  may  be  support.  Mao a s s e r t s , " w i t h  the  country  mobilized,  insurgents defeated may  also  in  LTTE  we s h a l l it."  Iraq  partly  accommodating  the  guerrilla  to i t s  i f they  are to  1  8  common  suggests,  as  public ethnic  by  related people  the  Mao,  i s imperative f o r  f o r c e . In S r i Lanka,  create a vast  But,  Also,  may mix w i t h t h e  as suggested  directly  the  to i t s public of  the  whole  s e a o f humanity and example  of  Kurdish  a s e c e s s i o n i s t s t r u g g l e may be  support  group's  economic and s o c i a l  reforms,  communist  in Philipines.  insurgents  due  1 6  by a government d e s p i t e p u b l i c s u p p o r t . undermine  military  s u c c e s s f u l l y . With p u b l i c  b u i l d i n g mass-support  success  drown t h e enemy i n  —  Clearly,  the development of a v i a b l e g u e r r i l l a the  a base  may be d i s g u i s e d a s a c i v i l i a n .  betrayed.  O'Neill,  warfare;  But t h e I n d i a n  i s essential  operations  ensures being  lacked  its jungles.  p u b l i c support  guerrilla  support  Guevara  f o r example  in  such as the J a f f n a p e n i n s u l a .  e x e r c i s e c o n t r o l over  guerrillas,  conduct  in a guerrilla  f o r c e s , t h e S r i Lankan army  advantageous t e r r a i n ,  advantage  f o r c e may d e s t r o y  army h a s been bogged down i n t h e e a s t  For  the  which  Ramon  of  demands. Magasaysay  The government insurgents By  by  introducing  defeated  the  186  The  guerrilla  organization i s able the  to  emerged as  resist  world  —  Finally,  struggle.  as  the  the  base  resources  base a r e a s ,  of  the  r e s p o n s e of  by  the  the the  of  social  inferior  rival to  destroy the could  d i v i s i o n s among i f unity  can  the be  support  demonstrates that  mobilization  a unified  and  of p u b l i c leadership  m i l i t a r y and force.  is significantly  c e n t r a l government  political  not  diminish.  sufficient  guerrillas  movements  armed f o r c e s  itself  i t s m i l i t a r y c a p a b i l i t y and and  may  good  warfare.  groups, p u b l i c  organizations  s u r v i v i n g as  and  d e v e l o p m e n t s emerge i n  therefore  the  PLOTE's  economic  secessionist  intra-group  begin  than a c q u i r i n g  power o r even t h a n  extent  may  the  leadership,  them o u t r i g h t . F i n a l l y ,  b u i l d i n g strong  ability  and  and  and  Divisiveness  S r i Lanka's  LTTE  leadership  in a g u e r r i l l a  guerrilla  decade.  the  in  of  able  if  and  l a r g e s t army  i t s committed  a b s e n c e o f an  a n n i h i l a t i n g the  of  fourth  limitations  Lanka e x p e r i e n c e  important  economic,  to  f o r c e . Today  TELO's d e s t r u c t i o n  inter-group  by  Sri  establishment  the  a  to eliminate  only  The  more  The  disunity,  c o n t r o l over  well  due  mass s u p p o r t  over  e x p l o i t the  guerrillas  as  a  army —  movements i f c o m p e n s a t i o n  secessionist  and  be  i n the  and  survived  achieved  powerful  illustrate  despite  guerrilla  not  may  resources  organization  the  Indian  ability.  disintegration  have  the  it  organizational  military  group which enjoyed c a p a b l e l e a d e r s h i p  —  the  support may  be  economic  Importantly, influenced for  by  example,  implementation  reforms.  6. F o r t h e u l t i m a t e success of armed secessionist movements, guerrillas must be m i l i t a r i l y a c t i v e and manoeuver t h e government into abandoning credible accommodative policies and into employing an  of  187  i n c r e a s i n g l e v e l of r e p r e s s i o n a g a i n s t the minority civilian population. These successes enable enable g u e r r i l l a s t o win p o p u l a r s u p p o r t and t o d e c r e a s e t h e a u t h o r i t y of the c e n t r a l government i n t h e home territory.  Guerrilla guerrillas Wood, or  warfare  confront  "command  have  access task  central  influence  and  other  to external is  secessionist violently attacks  or  succumbs  indeed.  response  to  this  public. First,  radicalize  a  stable  Wood r e c o g n i z e response  Tamil  minority  faction  guerrillas was  public  i t retaliates achieve support  political  tends  during  terrorist government  of  two  and,  the  central  objectives: second,  arduous task conservative  in  ties.  As O ' N e i l l with t h e i r  with the  notes, own  an i n s u r r e c t i o n . On one hand, e t h n i c  selling  and  an  they  government's  identified  sympathize  b a s e . B u t , on t h e o t h e r  the  struggle.  insurgents  ethnic to  against  hand, t h e s e g u e r r i l l a s  "ideology  individualistic  of  Tamils.  violence"  Political  the  ethnic loyalty  one way i n w h i c h t h e T a m i l s s e c e s s i o n i s t e s t a b l i s h e d  support  react  e n v i r o n m e n t . B o t h O ' N e i l l and  importance  of t h e i r  to  when, i n i t s f r u s t r a t e d a t t e m p t s t o  secessionist  on a c c o u n t  a main s t r a t e g y o f  central  i n t h e outcome o f t h e s e c e s s i o n i s t  The public  the  better  insurgents'  government  The  simultaneously  t h e r e b e l s win t h e  ... have  i s o l a t e d but deadly  from c i v i l i a n s ,  Guerrillas  financial  secessionist  the  operations.  strategy  separate g u e r r i l l a s  force  to  ... c o n t r o l  budget,  In t h i s c o n t e x t ,  to  Generally,  according  institutions the  The  1 9  to their  guerrilla  which,  l e v e r s o f t h e economy  guerrillas  in  over  support."  difficult  o f t h e weak.  governments  ... s y s t e m m a i n t e n a n c e  greater  institutions  i s the strategy  their  f a c e d an to the  propaganda  188  may be one o f t h e e f f e c t i v e mobilize support  public  support  reduced  chances  traditional  homeland.  expands, e f f e c t i v e n e s s g r o u p s improves to  Regis  principal  "born  and  the conduct  Debray  correctly  notes,  " t h e most  in  (and  military  secrecy, impact  in  of  group  form  of p o l i t i c a l  2 0  which  consistently  Undoubtedly,  the  to  Its  victories.  organizational  s t r u c t u r e and t r a i n i n g  develop  an  into  invincibility guerrilla killing  around  itself  of  government.  Alfred  Duraiappa  bolder The p u b l i c  defeated. Invariably,  winners,  by  success  effectively  government  loses  related  effective  military  programmes h e l p e d The LTTE b u i l t  carrying  i t to  an image o f  out  successful  p e r i o d . Beginning  operations  was ' c o n v i n c e d '  that  the Tamil public  with the  against  the  the m i l i t a r y  could  identified  with  the  base f o r t h e LTTE w i d e n e d .  o f t h e LTTE d e m o n s t r a t e d :  (a) t h e government  be c h a l l e n g e d and d e m o r a l i z e d . A the  LTTE's  i n 1975, t h e LTTE was engaged i n  guerrilla  hence t h e s u p p o r t  The could  group.  o p e r a t i o n s f o r an e x t e n d e d  progressively  be  efficient  of the  operations.  group i s d i r e c t l y  military  these  on t h e p u b l i c i s  emergence a s t h e s t r o n g e s t g u e r r i l l a its  the  guerrillas  one  terrorist)  successful  operations.  popular  i n s e c r e c y . " When  i s successful military operation."  in  for  to  movement, a c c o r d i n g  develops  LTTE was t h e o n l y g u e r r i l l a  engaged  betrayal  and m i l i t a r y )  a positive  of g u e r r i l l a  Increased  support  (both p o l i t i c a l  of c r e a t i n g  through  The  active  movements a r e s h r o u d e d  ways  propaganda  for guerrillas' When  is  to guerrillas  f o r armed c o n f l i c t .  c o n s i d e r a b l y . The g u e r r i l l a  Debray,  secessionist  mediums a v a i l a b l e  will  to  fight  a  demoralized  l o n g war; (b) armed  189  secession  turned  concessions  out  from  t o be  the  a  viable  strategy  government.  The  accommodated more T a m i l s demands i n t h e ever  before;  could  protect  the by  the  capability the  other  LTTE g u e r r i l l a  civilians  to e x e r c i s e  from the  LTTE's  guerrilla  significant longer  military g r o u p s . The  military  PLOTE  considered  a potent  major  successful  the  only  guerrilla  group other  operations. of  military  training.  Tamil  the  group  than  period)  possessed monopolized  a t t a c k s . For the  to  guerrilla  due  the  attacks  on  faction  Tamils,  the  minority.  distinguish  by  the  guerrillas  not  match t h e  EROS  effective military  l e a d e r s h i p and  the  i n the  summer of public  against and  p u b l i c . Again,  poor  government  t e r r o r i s m or  army's f r u s t r a t i o n from the  was  TELO  to  guerrilla  s p r i n g of 1983  1981  following  support.  disenchanted  reprisals  and  g o v e r n m e n t . The conduct  weak  alienated  any  any  to  in forcing  also  out  to d i r e c t  the  thus l o s i n g i t s remaining  Indiscriminate  explained  the  the  any  government; hence i t s  p o l i c e rampage  them  overreaction  the  LTTE  in  carried  EPRLF f a i l e d  its  matched by  o r g a n i z a t i o n . The  i n c i d e n t s of  retaliation  government's of  to  isolated  not  TELO c o u l d  succeeded  instance,  army's  the  not  post-1983 p e r i o d  against  t h a n the  But  LTTE  guerrillas  violently  had  sabotage a g a i n s t  operations  prowess  partly  period  earlier  were  guerrilla  e x p l o i t s were l i m i t e d . The  the  government  post-1985  army. The  o p e r a t i o n s , i n the  military  and  post-1983  ( i n the  successes  i n economic  react  S r i Lankan  power, w h i c h was  believed  was  extracting  central authority.  The  no  (c) the  for  moderate  leverage the  The  public  over were  its inability such  to  reprisals  190  were for  counter-productive guerrillas.  insurrection  since  Hence t h e  into  they widened the  government h e l p e d  to  increasingly  Furthermore, political  parties), the  of  Tamil  some  which  government  politics.  The  guerrillas and  of  these  have had  from  bringing  failure  to  defeat  the  became more r e p r e s s i v e government  therefore  Sinhalese  elites  outbid  by  the  relied  more on  the  could  not  of  to solve  the  a military  correctly  may  created  attacks  sympathizers as  influence  s t r u g g l e . B o t h Wood and undermine the  to  with  the a  on  the  prevented  in  for  its  government  opposition. consensus To  among  avoid  the  being  government  violent,  political  i n both the  draw t h e  groups.  government's uncommitted  public could  also  the of  theory, the  to  convert  into a c t i v e supporters.  outcome  The  political  that  in  the  essentially  chauvinism  could  The  mainstream  the  conflict.  a  suggested  on  east.  political  into  extremists,  anticipates  to g u e r r i l l a  and  (e.g.  a result,  s o l u t i o n t o an  guerrillas  government's response, considerable  As  ethnic  Sinhala-Buddhist  passive  the  destroying  government  establish  rebel's side. Its r e t a l i a t i o n pool  i t s right  secessionism  t o the  in i t s dealings  w.hich e n c o u r a g e d e t h n i c  a  of T a m i l  guerrillas.  condition  the  small  short,  in  north  Tamils  opposition  Tamil  overreaction  a  integrative capacity,  problem.  Guevara  i n the  institutions  over e f f e c t  south generated Sinhalese  succeeded  ethos  may  spill  and  support  challenged.  institutions  elimination  turn  a mass s e c e s s i o n i s t movement. In  government's l e g i t i m a c y d e c l i n e d c o n s i d e r a b l y , g o v e r n was  public  has  The a  secessionist  O ' N e i l l a g r e e t h a t a c e n t r a l government  support  base  of  the  guerrillas  through  a  191  mixture  of  guerrilla reach  accommodation  r e s p o n s e may be t o t h w a r t any government  a  reliance  negotiated  settlement.  institutions  by  government's  Initially,  excessive  to the replacement  challenge  stimulates  goal  of  reduce  the  legitimacy  the  o f t h e g r o u p s t o be m i l i t a r i l y  government  factors,  some  leadership,  of  which  organization  guerrillas  objectives  to react  were  through  violently have  popular  i s two-fold:  of  the  central  support.  However,  a c t i v e and t o compel  depends on a c o m b i n a t i o n o f  already  been  discussed  e t c . S r i Lankan e v i d e n c e  fairly  as  movements.  of the g u e r r i l l a s  (2) win and c o n s o l i d a t e  ability  grievances,  the growth of g u e r r i l l a  the primary and  for redressing  government;  the  to  o f a m i l i t a r y e n v i r o n m e n t and t h e s i m u l t a n e o u s c l o s i n g  Guevara argues,  the  attempt  m i l i t a r y m a c h i n e r y . The s u b s e q u e n t  down o f t h e e s t a b l i s h e d c h a n n e l s  (1)  A  on a m i l i t a r y s o l u t i o n may l e a d  political creation  and m i l i t a r y m e a s u r e s . An e f f e c t i v e  successful  suggests  in achieving  this  that twin  violence.  7. The way an i n t e r e s t e d p o w e r f u l e x t e r n a l neighbour defines i t s strategic goals with regard t o the secessionist war may significantly i n f l u e n c e the outcome o f a s e c e s s i o n i s t c o n f l i c t . Outside on the the  various  involvement  f a c t o r s . Wood s u g g e s t s two f a c t o r s  external  involvement:  political  international governments support  in a secessionist conflict  system, systemic  in their  first, and  second,  regional  points  to maintain  t h e c e n t r a l government  which  depend  influence  t h e d e g r e e of p e n e t r a b i l i t y of  f a c t o r s . He desire  may  out  and/or that  the s t a t u s  global external  quo t e n d t o  i n a s e c e s s i o n i s t war. But t h e r e  192  are  a few i n s t a n c e s  ideological  or  where t h e f o r e i g n  economic  reasons  government  may  back  for strategic,  the  secessionist  rebels. Indian  intervention  in  the  ( m o t i v a t e d m a i n l y by h e r s t r a t e g i c role  in  the  Bangladesh confirmed Indira  dismemberment  in  1971.  India's  her r e g i o n a l  that  geopolitical  interests  movements emerged  assert  militarily  i n the region.  the "Indian  her  factor"  T a m i l Nadu p o l i t i c i a n s . Sirimavo  alignment  interventionist In India Desai a-vis  and  adopted a strong  secessionist Jayewardene's  Lanka rebels.  both  But I n d i r a and  when I n d i a  was  politically  and  guerrillas  since.both  radical  Gandhi's p e r s o n a l  friendship  the  anti-west)  The  was  pro-western  Gandhi  i f her  l i n k s with  latter's  strong  influenced  non-  India's  non-  i n t h e 1970s.  new I n d i a n  openly  But when G a n d h i  relationship.  a  p r o - w e s t e r n g o v e r n m e n t s took power i n  and  opposite  created  close  prime m i n i s t e r  non-interventionist  diametrically  1971,  secessionist  secessionist  approach t o S r i Lanka  S r i Lanka.  Sri  Tamil  actively established  1977, r i g h t - w i n g ,  After  initiatives  into consideration  (inpractice  also  may be used by I n d i a  Tamil  major  Pakistan  i n South A s i a .  leadership,  Bandaranaike  stand  over  policy  a  war  and t h e c r e a t i o n o f  threatened.  The  moderate s e c e s s i o n i s t  with  played  i n the post-Bangladesh period  to  and  triumph  foreign  were  beginning  took  Pakistan  a m i l i t a r y option  secessionist  interests)  power s t a t u s  Gandhi's a g g r e s s i v e  perception  of  Bengalis'  foreign  to her's, increasingly  foreign  hostile  returned  paid  policy  to  vis-  the  t o power  policy,  strained  Morarji  Tamil  i n 1980,  which  the Indo-Sri attention  was Lankan  to  the  193  changing The  political  developments  e s t a b l i s h m e n t of new  a  i n her  southern  concern  with  perceive  S r i Lanka a s a t h r e a t  command  developments  in  to ensure  India's 1982  refusal  was  regard  to e x t r a d i t e  one  of  the  second  major  Lankan p o l i t i c s  Despite  the  consciousness into  Successive been  remained  h i g h and  of  in  i n the s t a t e ,  accusation  of  Gandhi  possibly With  and  central  she was  Inevitably, Sri  Lankan  population.  sentiments  declining  After  Indian  a l l , as  Tamil  to  Nadu.  Nehru  central  in S r i  it  government  Lanka  could  i t could  could  reemergence  produce  lead  to  to a l i e n a t e minister  of  the  to the  secessionist  f o r t u n e s i n the n o r t h ,  t h e s o u t h t o win  attempts  have  c o n s e q u e n t l y , have been  electoral  prime  government  ethnic  transformed  in  back  violence  second  the  not p r e p a r e d  the  with  necessity.  government's i n s e n s i t i v i t y  encouraging  the  in  about  India,  readily  T a m i l Nadu. F i r s t ,  came t o r e l y more on  context,  the  the  political  i s s u e s . The  continued ethnic  instability  forces.  be  ministers dating  linguistic  repercussions  Tamils,  could  concern  i n South  T a m i l n a t i o n a l i s m and,  that  security.  Maheswaran  Gandhi's  secessionism  anti-Hindu  on  secessionist  of I n d i a ' s s t a n d  to domestic  of  more accommodating anticipated  explaining  linked  I n d i a n prime  aware  produce  factor  and  signals  Uma  A  conflict.  'death'  anti-Delhi  and  began t o  interests.  to i t s long-term  Prabakaran  earliest  was  geopolitical  2 1  India's  India  intervene in a  outcome b e n e f i c i a l  t o the s e c e s s i o n i s t  The Sri  an  neighbour.  reinforced  S r i Lanka.  t o her  r e g i o n a l power, s u g g e s t s Wood, may war  southern  elections.  the was  to  Tamil  openly  In  this  support.  critical  control  Howard W r i g g i n s a r g u e s ,  its a  of  Tamil ruler's  194  first  imperative  i s to r e t a i n  T a m i l Nadu's m o r a l and extended  to  logistical  Undoubtedly,  crucial  f o r t h e growth of  Indian  support  groups  moral  and  logistical  secessionist  i n the  activity.  beginning  security  early  support In t h e  was  absence  c o u l d not have s u r v i v e d  long run. L a l i t h  m i n i s t e r of n a t i o n a l  i n the  m a t e r i a l a s s i s t a n c e i n the  s a n c t u a r i e s , the g u e r r i l l a s  as e f f e c t i v e former  the  2 2  political  and  1980s.  of  power.  Athulathmudali,  a  observed:  Now the t e r r o r i s t a c t i v i t i e s would have been c u r b e d and would have ended a l o n g t i m e ago i f not for the fact t h a t t h e y had o b t a i n e d f o r t h e m s e l v e s b a s e s and a r e a s of o p e r a t i o n i n w h i c h our w r i t does not l i e , because i t i s outside our c o u n t r y . I do not t h i n k anybody doubts the fact that i f there were no terrorist bases i n T a m i l Nadu, t h e t e r r o r i s t s would not be i n a p o s i t i o n t o do a n y t h i n g at a l l . It is this base that has g i v e n them s u c c o u r , t h e s u p p o r t and t h e a b i l i t y t o c o n t i n u e with their hit-and-run methods. 2 3  Tamil  Nadu  opposed  s t r o n g l y the e x t r a d i t i o n  Maheswaran t o S r i L a n k a . E x t r a d i t i o n for  the  Tamil  guerrilla  inactive  after  the  1981.  arrests  The  secessionist M.G.  c o u l d have been a  movements.  capture  of t h e s e  of P r a b a k a r a n  The  TELO  of T h a n g a t h u r a i  two  disaster  was  and  already  Kuttimani  l e a d e r s c o u l d have c r i p p l e d  Ramachandran,  the  provided  forced  link  the  his  between  the  Indian  government  to  exert  t h e S r i Lankan government. In h i s " g o d - f a t h e r " large financial  assistance.  p r o p a g a n d a m a c h i n e r y o p e r a t i n g from and  international Nadu  LTTE,  was  p r e s s u r e on  t o t h e L T T E , he  the  who  and  organized  in  guerrillas.  government  Tamil  and  very  effective  in  image f o r T a m i l s . The  connection  t o the d e v e l o p m e n t  Finally,  T a m i l Nadu was  creating importance of  2 4  a of  secessionist  role  highly  sympathetic the  Tamil  guerrillas  195  is  clear. A  complex  political to  the  set  of  strategic  n e c e s s i t y determined  S r i Lankan e t h n i c c r i s i s .  I n d i a w i t h an L a n k a . But  India f a i l e d main  secessionists, measures  to compell  Tamil  accommodative  constrained  by  boycotted  insurgency  rejection  and  imposing  of  the  of  Indira  pressure  from  to the Tamil  prepared  to l e t the  guerrillas.  the  Finally,  provided  the  a  on  the  t o r e l y more f o r the  on  Indian  Tamil  pressure  SLFP —  Sinhala-Buddhist conference;  (b)  the  of  the  I n d i a from  t a k i n g any  Sri  Lanka.  strong India's  demand would l i m i t  in his analysis  the peace t a l k s  secessionist  from  increasing  to  to  find  c h a l l e n g e . But  government  continued  S r i Lanka  the  secessionism.  attempting  S r i Lankan  the  support  nature  on  to  f o l l o w i n g reasons:  under  secessionist  while  Sri  military  secessionist  solution  Tamil  on  S r i Lankan government, p a r t i c u l a r l y  s e c e s s i o n i s t s and  on  prevent  G a n d h i , used  solution  deterred  crush  t o some e x t e n t c o r r e c t  Delhi,  which  To  all-party  Sikhs'  dilemma. The  the death  a large  t h a t the  would  Jayewardene was  Tamil  riots  response  t h e S r i Lankan government  steps  the  Indian manoeuverability  India's  1983  t h e S i n h a l e s e o u t b i d d e r s . The  government's assumption  measures  July  initiatives  main o p p o s i t i o n p a r t y h a v i n g  Tamil  The  Jayewardene c o n t i n u e d  than  —  domestic  I n d i a n government's  demands.  (a) t h e P r e s i d e n t ' s peace  base  and  opportunity to exert diplomatic pressure  accommodate  were  the  interests  forces  after  ward a  of  off  military  I n d i a was defeat  not the  to apply d i p l o m a t i c pressure,  undertaking  P a k i s t a n and  the  'final  Israeli  assault'  involvement  196  in  the  secessionist  Delhi's  'soft'  intervention  tacit  summer  1987,  to  however, I n d i a by  neither  i s within of  Accordingly,  However,  the  normalcy  to  become i n v o l v e d As  India  latter  to  accept  a  role in  She  helped  In t h e S r i Lankan victory  the  on b o t h t h e  significant  in  destabilization of  d i d not  i n S r i Lanka)  events  was  longest  war  of  case,  achieved  a  war  in  intervened  the  r e g i o n ) and  and  ethnic  enjoy  ties  reasons. the Indian  and  Instead  a  quick  I n d i a has  post-independent  i f secessionist  and t h e s e c e s s i o n i s t g u e r r i l l a s  likely  power  rebels  the  regional  isa  indicate that  materialize..  t h e o r e t i c a l l y noted,  support  of  Congress  war w i t h t h e T a m i l  i n her  the  as the r e g i o n a l  post-1987  return  the  pressure  a sphere of i n f l u e n c e  T a m i l s and T a m i l s  of a short  external  h e r . By  i f a s e c e s s i o n i s t war t a k e s p l a c e i n  necessity  expectation  prevail  to  implied  and t h a t any  sub-continent.  Pakistan.  the  (prevent  (electoral  between I n d i a n  period.  the  little  This  region  a very  India's  was  guerrillas  t o ensure that  has argued t h a t  strategic  domestic  action.  to exert  Tamil  on  from  intervened  involvement  prospect.  There  in this  h a s now p l a y e d  secede  a c o u n t r y which  for  was a b l e  on  with  t h e government n o r t h e g u e r r i l l a s .  Wood  power,  grounds."  dominance  secessionist conflicts  Bangladesh  brought  war must be a c c e p t a b l e  India  India  Nadu's d i s c o n t e n t  India's  Lankan government a n d t h e  peace-treaty. two  against  of Indian  Tamil  S r i Lanka,  "humanitarian  to the ethnic of  and  on  protest  approval  solution  Sri  stand on  international  war,  preconditions  public  support,  t o t h e government may n o t make a d i f f e r e n c e i n  s t r u g g l e . The I n d i a n  m i l i t a r y and d i p l o m a t i c  stakes  in S r i  197  Lanka a r e h i g h .  I n d i a Today  reported:  F o r I n d i a n d i p l o m a c y , S r i Lanka represents perhaps t h e b i g g e s t c h a l l e n g e s i n c e 1971. S u c c e s s w i l l e n s u r e that i t s regional status i s commensurate w i t h i t s size and geopolitical legacy. Failure will c i r c u m s c r i b e I n d i a ' s d i p l o m a t i c and m i l i t a r y r o l e f o r decades t o come. 25  Due  to  the  secessionist outcome. can  present  war,  Yet  no  some  highly  firm  Nadu s u p p o r t There  general, although  was  government  f o r the success muted  being  hostile  openly  Ramachandran's rely and  death,  be  the Tamil  made  on  the  speculative observations  to  July  entrepreneurs could  —  checked.the Tamil the  central  the Indian  S r i Lanka t o  elections  will  assumes  power had  government  support  power  by  not  But  with  no  t h e L T T E . The  l e a d e r , M.  also  on  longer  f o r the a c c o r d political  Karunanidhi  —  "anti-Tamil" role  in  the  a n t i - I n d i a n peace k e e p i n g  i n Tamil  state.  The  accord.  force  (IPKE)  Nadu, t h e a c c o r d c o u l d c o l l a p s e .  acted  as  the  link  between  and t h e L T T E . Thus t h e government  i n f l u e n c e i t had o v e r  seems u n l i k e l y  protest  could  government's  political  accord,  Ramachandran  central  accord.  p o s s i b l y d e t e r m i n e t h e f a t e of t h e p e a c e  an a n t i - p e a c e  party  t h e DMK  on t h e I n d i a n regain  peace  government.  government  offensive against  particularly  capitalize  1987  o p p o s i t i o n to India's attack  on t h e s t a t e g o v e r n m e n t ' s c o n t i n u e d t h e I n d i a n army's  M.G.  of the  Indian Tamil  Ramachandran,  any  can  of  o f I n d i a depends h e a v i l y on t h e T a m i l  t h e L T T E . M.G.  If  prediction  state  be made.  1. The c e n t r a l  in  fluid  t h e L T T E . Thus a permanent  i n the near f u t u r e .  has  the lost  settlement  198  2.  J.R.  Sri  Jayewardene  L a n k a . But  the  main  Marxist  the the  has  few  willing  Sinhalese  withdraw  3.  supporters  been  any  How  the  the  and  the  Tamils  army. The the  the  anti-accord  remodelled The  leaders  the  accord  t o honour the  want  to  r e s p o n d ? The b e n e f i t s of  accord.  Indian  benefits  include  the  high  her  i n the the  Indo-Sri  India 'ethnic  may  be  —  —  one  politician likely  that  India  to  not  be  able  alienating  f o r c e s away  anti-Indian may  from  access  to  to return  relationship.  may  the  t o meet s t r a t e g i c  She  to may  i n t e r e s t s permanently her  hold.  to e s t a b l i s h a rapport she  by  costs  supporting  willing  to c o n s o l i d a t e  a r e g i o n a l power, she s t r a t e g i c and  determined  guaranteeing  Lankan  solidarity,'  centuries-old As  in  support  Mel  ask  be  p r i c e of  f o r c e s h o s t i l e t o her  in  Sinhalese.  their  prestige,  ability  t h r o u g h m i l i t a r y f o r c e , and  eliminate  This  succeeded  i s very  keeping a n t i - I n d i a n  flank, demonstrating  LTTE. t h r o u g h  is  Sinhala-  Sinhalese  move may  and  future  a  R o n n i e de  It  JVP  heir s t r a t e g i c i n t e r e s t s . The  i s l a n d in order  objective  no  i n South I n d i a  keep  has  s u c c e e d i n g Jayewardene w i l l  away from t h e the  --  of  international  status-quo  on  withdraw  resignation  T r i n c o m a l e e h a r b o u r . I n d i a may  the  JVP  to  The  sentiments.  itself  damage t o her  southern  interests  is fierce.  in  island.  India  costs  the  the  of  leader  from the  will  include  Since  peace a c c o r d ' s s u c c e s s  accord  ideology.  Sinhalese  accord.  to the  t o the  has  chauvinistic the  key  of  organization  intimidating  of  opposition  beneficiary  Buddhist  for  i s the  find  with  the  it difficult  to  sentiments not  Although  achieve  g e o p o l i t i c a l concerns  —  among her without  the main the  199  public to  support.  be p a r t i a l  west ethnic  and  Thus,  i n the l o n g run, her a c t i o n s a r e  t o t h e T a m i l s due t o s t r a t e g i c  anti-India),  domestic  (religious-linguistic  (Colombo  ( T a m i l Nadu s u p p o r t  links)  factors.  is  likely pro-  b a s e ) and  200  NOTES  1  S c h w a r z , p . 7.  2  D i a n e K. Mauzy,  in Malaysia,  Ph.D.  Consociationalism Thesis,  and C o a l i t i o n P o l i t i c s  The U n i v e r s i t y o f B r i t i s h  Columbia  ( 1 9 7 8 ) , p . 375. 3  O b e y s e k e r e , p . 72.  "Coomaraswamy, p. 178. 5  S a m a r a s i n g h e , pp. 176-179.  6  Nordlinger,  p . 36.  'Wood, p . 125. 8  no in by  A  senior  instances  S r i Lankan army o f f i c e r  in military  troops  case.  The  British  could  get  away  were  with  military  solution  ability  across  fighting  measures  really  from  insurgency  b a r r i n g M a l a y a . But t h a t  I n t e r n a t i o n a l many h e a r t nor  "we  h i s t o r y t o take heart  t h e w o r l d has a p o p u l a r i t y - b a c k e d government  noted,  a  destroyed different  i n someone e l s e ' s l a n d and that  will  give  a t t a c k s . We have n e i t h e r  Today  (October  Amnesty  the p o l i t i c a l  t o do t h a t and t h u s t h e o n l y  the t a b l e . " India  ... nowhere  been  was  have  way o u t i s a  15, .1985),  p.  55. 9  Wood, p . 12.  1  "Committee F o r R a t i o n a l  1 1  James  Manor, "The Dynamics o f P o l i t i c a l  Disintegration" 1 2  first  D e v e l o p m e n t , p . 21.  i n W i l s o n and D a l t o n  'Lieutenant'  LTTE g u e r r i l l a  Lucas  Charles  betrayed  I n t e g r a t i o n and  ( e d s . ) , The S t a t e s , Anthony  and k i l l e d  (Seelan)  in Jaffna.  p. 89.  was  the  201  Mao  13  Tse-Tung  quoted  i n K a t z e n b a c h , J r . and Hanrahan,  p.  131. "Globe  1  15  Mail  (November  10, 1987).  Wood, p. 124.  1 6  to  and M a i l  The  Bryan  LTTE  i s in virtual  Johnson,  a  control  Globe and M a i l  in  Batticaloa  according  c o r r e s p o n d e n t , G l o b e and  ( J a n u a r y 13, 1987). 1 7  Ibid.  "Katzenbach  1  19  2 0  and Hanrahan,  Wood, p. 18. Scott  Predisposing  G. M c N a l l and M a r t h a and  22  Lanka  W.  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"The Politics of Devolution: Competing C o n c e p t i o n s of C o u n c i l s i n S r i Lanka" i n Goldman and Independence t o S t a t e h o o d .  the pp.  Allocation" ( e d s . ) , From  Decentralization of District Development Wilson (eds.), From  Tambiah, S.J. S r i Lanka: E t h n i c F r a t r i c i d e D i s m a n t l i n g o f Democracy. C h i c a g o : The University of P r e s s (1986).  and t h e Chicago  206  Thornton, E.M. and R. N i t h t h y a n a n t h a m . S r i L a n k a , I s l a n d of t e r r o r : An I n d i c t m e n t . Middlesex: Eelam Research O r g a n i z a t i o n (1985). Vaidik, O p t i o n s . New  V.P. E t h n i c C r i s i s i n S r i L a n k a , and D e l h i : N a t i o n a l P u b l i s h i n g House ( 1 9 8 6 ) .  Vittachi, ( 1958). Asian  Tarzie.  Emerging  '58.  London:  Andre  India's Deutsch  Warnapala, Wiswa. "The New C o n s t i t u t i o n of S r i Lanka," S u r v e y , Volume 13, No. 12 (December 1974), pp. 1179-1192.  . "Parliamentary Dictatorship," India Quarterly, December 1982), pp. 267-288. Wijesinha, Rajiva. Current Navrang ( 1 9 8 6 ) .  Government Volume 38,  Crisis  or No.  One 34  i n S r i L a n k a . New  Party (JulyDelhi:  Wilson, A. Jeyaratnam. " S r i Lanka and i t s Future Sinhalese versus Tamils," i n A. J e y a r a t n a m W i l s o n and D e n n i s D a l t o n ( e d s . ) , The S t a t e s o f S o u t h A s i a , pp. 295-312. . "The T a m i l F e d e r a l P a r t y i n C e y l o n Politics," J o u r n a l o f Commonwealth P o l i t i c a l S t u d i e s , Volume IV, No. 2 ( J u l y 1966), pp. 117-137. MacMillan London: of  . P o l i t i c s i n S r i Lanka, P r e s s L t d . (1979).  Cambridge  S r i Lanka  1948," i n K.M. 311.  1947-1979. London:  E l e c t o r a l P o l i t i c s i n an Emergent U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s (1975).  State.  The G a u l l i s t System i n A s i a : The C o n s t i t u t i o n ( 1 9 7 8 ) . London: The M a c M i l l a n P r e s s L t d . ( 1 9 8 0 ) . . "Politics and Political Development de S i l v a ( e d . ) , S r i Lanka - A S u r v e y , pp.  Wilson, A. J e y a r a t n a m . and D a l t o n , D e n n i s . The S o u t h A s i a . London: C. H u r s t and Co. ( 1 9 8 2 ) . Wood, John R. "Secession: A Comparative Framework," Canadian J o u r n a l of P o l i t i c a l S c i e n c e , No. 1 (March 1981), pp. 107-134. Woodward, C a l v i n A. The Growth o f a P a r t y . P r o v i d e n c e : Brown U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s ( 1 9 6 9 ) . W r i g g i n s , W. Howard. The R u l e r ' s Columbia U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s (1969). Wright Movements,"  The  (Jr.), Theodore P. in C o l l e c t e d Seminar  System  Imperative.  since 281 -  S t a t e s of Analytical Volume 14, i n Ceylon New  York:  "South Asian Separatist P a p e r s on t h e P o l i t i c s of  207  Separatism  (No.19), pp.  Newspapers and  Magazines  Far Eastern Frontline  5-18.  Economic  Review  (Hongkong).  (Madras).  G l o b e and M a i l  (Toronto).  Hindu (Madras). Indian  Express (Madras).  I n d i a Today  (New  Delhi).  Lanka G u a r d i a n  (Colombo).  New  (New  York Times  Soldier  York).  of F o r t u n e .  The E c o n o m i s t  (London).  The G u a r d i a n (London and M a n c h e s t e r ) . The Week  (Cochin).  Time  (Toronto).  Times  of I n d i a  (Bombay).  Pamphlets Amir  Speaks, Madras:  TULF P u b l i c a t i o n  D i a r y o f Combat (1975-1984), T a m i l Eelam (December 1984). Eelam  Madras:  (August  Liberation  E e l a Mulakkam ("Thunder from E e l a m " ) , London P e o p l e ' s I n f o r m a t i o n C e n t r e (June 1984).  Eelam News, (March 1985). Elluchi Organization  London:  Eelam  People's  ("Rise"), Madras: ( A p r i l - M a y 1985).  Tamil  1984). T i g e r s of  and  Information Eelam  Madras: Centre  Liberation  M a k k a l i n V i d u t h a l a i a i Venreddupom ("Let us win the p e o p l e ' s v i c t o r y " ) , M a d r a s : P e o p l e ' s L i b e r a t i o n O r g a n i z a t i o n of T h a m i l Eelam ( J a n u a r y 1985). PLOT b u l l e t i n ,  Madras:  February  1984.  T a m i l Eeelam Documentation B u l l e t i n , Ottawa: The Eeelam I n t e r n a t i o n a l R e s e a r c h and D o c u m e n t a t i o n C e n t r e ,  Tamil Volume  208  1,  No.  2  (October  TELO - On Organization.  1983).  a Mission,  Madras:  Viduthalai Pulihal ("Liberation M a d r a s : M a r c h and May 1984.  Tamil Tigers  Eelam of  Liberation  Tamil  Eelam"),  209 APPENDIX A Table 1 U n i v e r s i t y Admissions  1969-70 Course o f Study Phy.  Sc., B i o - S c . & Architecture Engineering Medicine D e n t a l Surgery Agriculture Vet. S c i e n c e TOTAL S c i e n c e  1969/70, 1973 and 1974  Sinhalese  Tamil  No.  %  No.  235  69.7  93  27.6  77 112 11 17 5 457  51.7 48.9 52.4 44.7 27.7 57.7  72 112 8 18 12 315  48.3 48.9 38.1 47.4 66.7 39.8  356  73.1  115  23.6  201 150 25 41 20 793  73.1 58.8 51.0 46.6 87.0 67.4  67 94 23 45 3 347  24.4 36.9 46.9 51.1 13.0 29.5  511  75.5  146  21.6  223 184 34 83 23 1058  78.8 70.0 69.4 83.8 71.9 75.4  46 68 14 11 9 294  16.3 25.9 28.6 11.1 28.1 20.9  1973 Phy.  Sc., B i o - S c . & Architecture Engineering Medicine D e n t a l Surgery Agriculture Vet. Science TOTAL S c i e n c e 1974 Phy.  Sc., B i o - S c . & Architecture Engineering Medicine D e n t a l Surgery Agriculture Vet. S c i e n c e TOTAL S c i e n c e  (Source: C R . de S i l v a , " S i n h a l a - T a m i l R e l a t i o n s and E d u c a t i o n i n S r i Lanka: The U n i v e r s i t y Admission Issue - The f i r s t phase 1971- -77," Robert B. Goldmann and A. Jeyaratnam W i l s o n , From Independencie t o Statehood, pp . 138-139).  210  APPENDIX A Table  Advanced L e v e l Marks Required  2  f o r Each E t h n i c Groups to E n t e r  university:  1974 S i n h a l e s e Students  Tamil  Medicine  229  250  Physics  183  204  Bio-Science  175  184  Engineering  227  250  181  206  180  194  Veterinary  Science  Architecture  (Source: Walter Schwarz, The T a m i l s of S r i Lanka, The Report No. 25 (1986), p. 10).  Students  Minority Rights  Groups  211 APPENDIX A Table 3  Recruitment  t o the S r i Lankan A d m i n i s t r a t i v e  Service  Sinhalese  Open C o m p e t i t i v e Examination Limited Competitive Examination  1970-77  1978-81  1970-77  1977-81  No.  No.  %  No.  %  No.  100.0  34  7.2  433 2  0  Tamil  g  % 91.5 ^  159 3  ^  g  M e r i t Appointment  148  82.2  48  TOTAL  789  87.4  246  77.4  1  5  >  ?  %  0 3  0.0 ?  a  27  15.0  12  19.4  93.5 100  11.1  15  5.7  (Source: M i n i s t r y o f P u b l i c A d m i n i s t r a t i o n . Quoted i n S.W.R. de A. Samarasinghe, " C e n t r a l Government Employment i n S r i Lanka" i n Goldmann and W i l s o n , From Independence t o Statehood, p. 179).  212  APPENDIX B INDO-SRI LANKA AGREEMENT TO ESTABLISH PEACE AND NORMALCY IN SRI LANKA The Prime M i n i s t e r o f the R e p u b l i c Mr. R a j i v Gandhi and the P r e s i d e n t  of India, His Excellency,  o f the Democratic S o c i a l i s t  Republic  of S r i Lanka, H i s E x c e l l e n c y Mr. J . R. Jayawardena, h a v i n g met a t Colombo on J u l y 29, 1987. Attaching ening  utmost importance to n u r t u r i n g ,  intensifying  and s t r e n g t h -  the t r a d i t i o n a l f r i e n d s h i p of I n d i a and S r i Lanka, and acknowledging  the i m p e r a t i v e  need o f r e s o l v i n g the e t h n i c problem o f S r i Lanka, and the  consequent v i o l e n c e and f o r the s a f e t y , w e l l - b e i n g belonging  and p r o s p e r i t y of people  t o a l l communities i n S r i Lanka.  Have t h i s day entered  i n t o the f o l l o w i n g agreement  to f u l f i l  this  objective. In t h i s 1.1  context:  D e s i r i n g to p r e s e r v e the u n i t y , s o v e r e i g n t y  and t e r r i t o r i a l  integrity  of S r i Lanka: 1.2  Acknowledging t h a t S r i Lanka i s a m u l t i - e t h n i c  and a m u l t i - l i n g u a l  p l u r a l s o c i e t y c o n s i s t i n g , i n t e r a l i a , of Sinhalese,  Tamils,  Muslims  (Moors) and Burghers: 1.3  R e c o g n i s i n g t h a t each e t h n i c group has a d i s t i n c t c u l t u r a l and linguistic  1.4  i d e n t i t y which has to be c a r e f u l l y  Also recognising  t h a t the n o r t h e r n  nurtured:  and the e a s t e r n  provinces  have been  a r e a s of h i s t o r i c a l h a b i t a t i o n o f S r i Lankan T a m i l speaking p e o p l e s , who have a t a l l times h i t h e r t o l i v e d together other  e t h n i c groups: .  i n t h i s t e r r i t o r y with  213  1.5  Conscious to  of the n e c e s s i t y of s t r e n g t h e n i n g the f o r c e s c o n t r i b u t i n g  the u n i t y , s o v e r e i g n t y and  t e r r i t o r i a l i n t e g r i t y of S r i Lanka,  and p r e s e r v i n g i t s c h a r a c t e r as a m u l t i - e t h n i c , m u l t i - l i n g u a l  and  m u l t i - r e l i g i o u s p l u r a l s o c i e t y , i n which a l l c i t i z e n s can l i v e  in  e q u a l i t y , s a f e t y and harmony, and prosper and  fulfil  their  aspirations:  2.  RESOLVE THAT:  2.1  S i n c e the government of S r i Lanka proposes to permit a d j o i n i n g p r o v i n c e s to j o i n to form one a d m i n i s t r a t i v e u n i t and a l s o by a referendum to s e p a r a t e as may  be p e r m i t t e d to the n o r t h e r n and  eastern  p r o v i n c e s as o u t l i n e d below: 2.2  During  the p e r i o d , which s h a l l be c o n s i d e r e d an i n t e r i m p e r i o d ( i . e .  from the date of the e l e c t i o n s to the p r o v i n c i a l c o u n c i l as i n para 2.8  to the date of the referendum as s p e c i f i e d  the n o r t h e r n and  e a s t e r n p r o v i n c e s as now  a d m i n i s t r a t i v e u n i t , having one u n i t w i l l have one  governor,  one  specified  i n para  constituted, w i l l  form  elected provincial council. c h i e f m i n i s t e r and one  2.3, one  Such a  board  of  ministers. 2.3  There w i l l be a referendum on or b e f o r e 31st December, 1988 the people (a)  enable  of the e a s t e r n p r o v i n c e to d e c i d e whether:  the e a s t e r n p r o v i n c e should remain l i n k e d w i t h the  p r o v i n c e as one  a d m i n i s t r a t i v e u n i t and  continue  t o g e t h e r w i t h the n o r t h e r n p r o v i n c e as s p e c i f i e d (b)  to  to be  northern governed  i n p a r a 2.2,  or  the e a s t e r n p r o v i n c e s h o u l d c o n s t i t u t e a separate a d m i n i s t r a t i v e  u n i t having governor  i t s own  district  p r o v i n c i a l c o u n c i l with a  c h i e f m i n i s t e r and board of m i n i s t e r s .  separate  214  The  P r e s i d e n t may, a t h i s d i s c r e t i o n d e c i d e to postpone such a  referendum. 2.4  A l l persons who have been d i s p l a c e d due to e t h n i c v i o l e n c e , or o t h e r r e a s o n s , w i l l have the r i g h t Necessary  to vote i n such a  referendum.  c o n d i t i o n s to enable them to r e t u r n to areas from where  they were d i s p l a c e d w i l l be c r e a t e d . 2.5  The referendum,  when h e l d , w i l l be monitored  by a committee headed  by the c h i e f j u s t i c e a member a p p o i n t e d by the P r e s i d e n t , nominated by the government o f S r i Lanka and a member a p p o i n t e d by the P r e s i d e n t , nominated by the r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s o f the T a m i l speaking people o f the eastern province. 2.6  A simple m a j o r i t y w i l l be s u f f i c i e n t  to determine  the r e s u l t o f the  referendum. 2.7  Meetings of  2.8  and o t h e r forms o f propaganda, p e r m i s s i b l e w i t h i n the laws  the c o u n t r y w i l l be a l l o w e d b e f o r e the referendum.  E l e c t i o n s to p r o v i n c i a l c o u n c i l s w i l l  be h e l d w i t h i n the next  months, i n any event b e f o r e 31st December 1987.  three  Indian observers  w i l l be i n v i t e d f o r e l e c t i o n s to the p r o v i n c i a l c o u n c i l o f the n o r t h and. e a s t . 2.9  The emergency w i l l be l i f t e d by August 15, 1987.  i n the e a s t e r n and n o r t h e r n p r o v i n c e s  Accessation of h o s t i l i t i e s  will  come i n t o  effect  a l l over the i s l a n d w i t h i n 48 hours o f the s i g n i n g of t h i s agreement. A l l arms p r e s e n t l y h e l d by m i l i t a n t i n accordance  groups w i l l be s u r r e n d e r e d  w i t h an agreed procedure  by the government of S r i Lanka.  to a u t h o r i t i e s to be d e s i g n a t e d  215  Consequent to the c e s s a t i o n of h o s t i l i t i e s by m i l i t a n t groups,  s u r r e n d e r i n g of arms and  2.10  The  1987.  The  be  p r o c e s s of  the c o n f i n i n g of s e c u r i t y p e r s o n n e l moving  back to b a r r a c k s s h a l l be completed hostilities  the s u r r e n d e r of arms  the army and o t h e r s e c u r i t y p e r s o n n e l w i l l  c o n f i n e d to b a r r a c k s i n camps as on 25 May  of  and  coming i n t o  w i t h i n 72 hours of the c e s s a t i o n  effect.  government of S r i Lanka w i l l u t i l i z e f o r the purpose of  enforcement and maintenance of s e c u r i t y i n the n o r t h e r n and  law eastern  p r o v i n c e s the same o r g a n i z a t i o n s and mechanisms of government as are used 2.11  i n the r e s t of the  country.  S r i Lanka w i l l grant a g e n e r a l amnesty to p o l i t i c a l and p r i s o n e r s now  other  h e l d i n custody under the P r e v e n t i o n of T e r r o r i s m Act  and o t h e r emergency laws, and persons accused,  charged  to combatants, as w e l l as to  those  and/or c o n v i c t e d under these laws.  government of S r i Lanka w i l l make s p e c i a l e f f o r t s to  The  rehabilitate  m i l i t a n t youth w i t h a view to b r i n g i n g them back i n t o the mainstream of 2.12  The  national l i f e .  I n d i a w i l l co-operate  government of S r i Lanka w i l l accept and abide by the above  p r o v i s i o n s and expect a l l o t h e r s to do 2.13  i n the p r o c e s s .  likewise.  I f the framework f o r the r e s o l u t i o n s i s a c c e p t e d ,  the government of  S r i Lanka w i l l implement the r e l e v a n t p r o p o s a l s f o r t h w i t h . 2.14  2.15  The  government of I n d i a w i l l underwrite  and  co-operate  i n the implementation  and guarantee  the  resolutions,  of these p r o p o s a l s .  These p r o p o s a l s are c o n d i t i o n a l to an acceptance n e g o t i a t e d from 4.5.1986 to 19.12.1986.  of the p r o p o s a l s  R e s i d u a l matters  not  finalised  d u r i n g the above n e g o t i a t i o n s s h a l l be r e s o l v e d between I n d i a and  216  2.15  S r i Lanka w i t h i n a p e r i o d of s i x weeks of s i g n i n g t h i s agreement. These p r o p o s a l s co-operating  are a l s o c o n d i t i o n a l to the government of  India  d i r e c t l y w i t h the government of S r i Lanka i n t h e i r  implementation. 2.16  These p r o p o s a l s  are a l s o c o n d i t i o n a l to the government of  t a k i n g the f o l l o w i n g a c t i o n s i f any S r i Lanka do not  India  m i l i t a n t groups o p e r a t i n g  a c c e p t t h i s framework of p r o p o s a l s  for a  in  settlement  namely, (a) I n d i a w i l l  take a l l n e c e s s a r y steps  to ensure t h a t  Indian  t e r r i t o r y i s not used f o r a c t i v i t i e s p r e j u d i c i a l to the i n t e g r i t y and (b) The  unity,  s e c u r i t y of S r i Lanka.  I n d i a n navy/coast guard w i l l co-operate w i t h the  navy i n p r e v e n t i n g  S r i Lanka  T a m i l m i l i t a n t a c t i v i t i e s from a f f e c t i n g S r i Lanka.  (c) In the event t h a t the government of S r i Lanka r e q u e s t s government of I n d i a to a f f o r d m i l i t a r y a s s i s t a n c e proposals  the  to implement  government of I n d i a w i l l co-operate by  government of I n d i a w i l l e x p e d i t e  of I n d i a n  c i t i z e n s to I n d i a who  are  these  g i v i n g to  government of S r i Lanka such m i l i t a r y a s s i s t a n c e as and (d) The  the  the  when r e q u e s t e d .  r e p a t r i a t i o n from S r i Lanka  resident  there,  concurrently  with  the r e p a t r i a t i o n of S r i Lankan r e f u g e e s from T a m i l Nadu. (e) The  governments of I n d i a and  the p h y s i c a l s e c u r i t y and northern 2.17  The  and  eastern  S r i Lanka w i l l co-operate i n  s a f e t y of a l l communities i n h a b i t i n g  the  provinces.  government of S r i Lanka s h a l l ensure f r e e , f u l l and  p a t i o n of v o t e r s  ensuring  from a l l communities i n the n o r t h e r n  fair  and  partici-  eastern  217  2.17  p r o v i n c e s i n e l e c t o r a l p r o c e s s e s envisaged i n t h i s agreement. government of I n d i a w i l l of  2.18  extend f u l l  c o - o p e r a t i o n to the government  S r i Lanka i n t h i s r e g a r d .  The o f f i c i a l  language  English w i l l  a l s o be o f f i c i a l  The  of S r i Lanka s h a l l be S i n h a l a . T a m i l and languages.  218  ANNEXURE 1.  His Excellency  President  TO THE AGREEMENT  the Prime M i n i s t e r o f I n d i a and H i s E x c e l l e n c y the  o f S r i Lanka agree t h a t the referendum mentioned i n paragraph  2 and i t s sub-paragraphs o f the Agreement w i l l be observed by a Representative Excellency 2.  o f the e l e c t i o n commission o f I n d i a to be i n v i t e d by H i s  the P r e s i d e n t  o f S r i Lanka.  S i m i l a r l y both Heads o f Government agree t h a t the e l e c t i o n s to the  p r o v i n c i a l c o u n c i l mentioned i n paragraph 2.8 o f the Agreement w i l l be observed by a R e p r e s e n t a t i v e by 3.  the P r e s i d e n t  o f the Government o f I n d i a t o be i n v i t e d  o f S r i Lanka.  His Excellency  the P r e s i d e n t  o f S r i Lanka agrees t h a t the home  guards would be disbanded and a l l para m i l i t a r y p e r s o n n e l w i l l be w i t h drawn from the e a s t e r n and n o r t h e r n conditions  The  provinces  w i t h a view to c r e a t i n g  conducive to f a i r e l e c t i o n s to the c o u n c i l .  President  i n h i s d i s c r e t i o n s h a l l absorb such para m i l i t a r y  f o r c e s which came i n t o being  due to e t h n i c v i o l e n c e  i n t o the r e g u l a r  s e c u r i t y f o r c e s o f S r i Lanka. 4.  The Prime M i n i s t e r of I n d i a and the P r e s i d e n t  t h a t the T a m i l m i l i t a n t s s h a l l s u r r e n d e r upon to be d e s i g n a t e d take p l a c e  by the P r e s i d e n t  t h e i r arms to a u t h o r i t i e s agreed  o f S r i Lanka.  i n the presence o f one s e n i o r R e p r e s e n t a t i v e  S r i Lanka Red Cross and the I n d i a n 5.  o f S r i Lanka agree  Indo-Sri  representatives  shall  each o f the  Red C r o s s .  The Prime M i n i s t e r of I n d i a and the P r e s i d e n t  that a j o i n t  The surrender  of S r i Lanka agree  Lankan o b s e r v e r group c o n s i s t i n g o f q u a l i f i e d  of the Government o f I n d i a and the Government of S r i Lanka  would monitor the c e s s a t i o n o f h o s t i l i t i e s  from 31 J u l y 1987.  219  6.  The  Prime M i n i s t e r of I n d i a and  the P r e s i d e n t  agree t h a t i n terms of paragraph 2.14 Agreement an I n d i a n President lities  and  i f so  paragraph 2.16(C) of  peace k e e p i n g c o n t i n g e n t  of S r i Lanka to guarantee and  of S r i Lanka a l s o  may  enforce  be  the  i n v i t e d by  the  the c e s s a t i o n of h o s t i -  required.  Prime M i n i s t e r of New D e l h i J u l y 29, 1987  India  Excellency: Conscious of the f r i e n d s h i p between our two  m i l l e n i a and  more and  recognizing  the  t r a d i t i o n a l f r i e n d s h i p i t i s imperative r e a f f i r m the d e c i s i o n not  to a l l o w our  two  c o u n t r i e s s t r e t c h i n g over  importance of n u r t u r i n g  t h a t both S r i Lanka and respective  f o r a c t i v i t i e s p r e j u d i c i a l to each o t h e r ' s  territories  unity-territorial  this  India  to be  used  integrity  and  security. In t h i s s p i r i t  you  to meet some of I n d i a ' s (1)  Your E x c e l l e n c y  and  about the r e l e v a n c e  had  during  the course of our  concerns as  agreed  follows:  myself w i l l r e a c h an e a r l y u n d e r s t a n d i n g and  employment of f o r e i g n m i l i t a r y and  i n t e l l i g e n c e p e r s o n n e l w i t h a view to e n s u r i n g  (2)  discussions,  presences w i l l not  prejudice  Trincomalee or any  other  that  such  I n d o - S r i Lankan r e l a t i o n s .  p o r t s i n S r i Lanka w i l l not  a v a i l a b l e f o r m i l i t a r y use  by any  be made  c o u n t r y i n a manner p r e j u d i c i a l  to I n d i a ' s i n t e r e s t s . (3)  The  work of r e s t o r i n g and  operating  the Trincomalee o i l tank  farm w i l l be undertaken as a j o i n t venture between I n d i a  and  S r i Lanka. (4)  S r i Lanka's agreement w i t h f o r e i g n b r o a d c a s t i n g w i l l be  reviewed to ensure t h a t any  facilities  organizations s e t up  S r i Lanka are used s o l e l y as p u b l i c b r o a d c a s t i n g not  f o r any  m i l i t a r y or i n t e l l i g e n c e purposes.  by  them i n  facilities  and  220  In (1)  the same s p i r i t  India  will,  Deport a l l S r i Lankan c i t i z e n s who  are found to be  engaging  i n t e r r o r i s t a c t i v i t i e s o r a d v o c a t i n g s e p a r a t i s m or s e c e s s i o n i s m . (2)  Provide t r a i n i n g f a c i l i t i e s security  and m i l i t a r y s u p p l i e s f o r S r i Lankan  forces.  I n d i a and S r i Lanka have agreed to s e t up a j o i n t  consulatative  mechanism to c o n t i n u o u s l y review matter of common concern i n the of the  light  the o b j e c t i v e s s t a t e d i n paragraph 1 and s p e c i f i c a l l y to monitor implementation of o t h e r matters c o n t a i n e d i n t h i s  letter.  K i n d l y c o n f i r m E x c e l l e n c y t h a t the above c o r r e c t l y s e t s out the Agreement reached between us. Yours  sincerely,  Rajiv  Gandhi  

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