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Freedom of association in Canada : the dilemma for trade unions in a liberal society Hudson, Stephanie Lee 1989

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FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION IN CANADA: THE DILEMMA. FOR TRADE UNIONS IN A LIBERAL SOCIETY by STEPHANIE LEE HUDSON B.A., The U n i v e r s i t y o f B r i t i s h Columbia, 1988 A THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF MASTER OF ARTS i n THE FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIES ( P o l i t i c a l Science) We accept t h i s t h e s i s as conforming t o the r e q u i r e d standard THE UNIVERSITY OF BRITISH COLUMBIA October 1989 (c)Stephanie Lee Hudson, 1989 In presenting this thesis in partial fulfilment of the requirements for an advanced degree at the University of British Columbia, I agree that the Library shall make it freely available for reference and study. I further agree that permission for extensive copying of this thesis for scholarly purposes may be granted by the head of my department or by his or her representatives. It is understood that copying or publication of this thesis for financial gain shall not be allowed without my written permission. The University of British Columbia Vancouver, Canada DE-6 (2/88) i i ABSTRACT Trade unions i n a l i b e r a l society are caught on the horns of a dilemma over freedom of association. In respect to the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, unions are faced with r e l y i n g on the p o s i t i v e freedom to associate as a defence f o r union security clauses, and, at the same time, denying freedom from association claims of those who do not wish to p a r t i c i p a t e i n union membership and/or union a c t i v i t i e s . The aim of t h i s thesis i s to explore that dilemma, and to assess some of the possible strategies union leaders could employ to come to terms with i t . The dilemma that trade unions face consists of several elements. The source of the dilemma i s found i n the c o n f l i c t over negative and p o s i t i v e l i b e r t y and the nature of freedom, and more s p e c i f i c a l l y over competing vi s i o n s of freedom of association i n the trade union context. This c o n f l i c t has found i t s way int o the courts; i n p a r t i c u l a r , the Lavigne case, which challenges p o l i t i c a l expenditures by unions (in cert a i n circumstances), has generated much controversy and resulted i n two opposing j u d i c i a l decisions. However, the courts are not the only arena i n which an attempt i s being made to balance the competing claims of l i b e r t y ; the p o l i t i c a l realm o f f e r s another avenue through which trade unions could attempt to influence labour l e g i s l a t i o n . However, unlike other intervenors such as women's or aboriginal groups, the trade union movement was lar g e l y absent from pre-Charter Joint Committee hearings. In hindsight i t i s quite c l e a r that labour's non-participation represented a missed opportunity to influence the wording of freedom o f a s s o c i a t i o n i n a way t h a t would make c h a l l e n g e s from a n e g a t i v e l i b e r t y s t a n d p o i n t more d i f f i c u l t . In a d d i t i o n , the p o s t - C h a r t e r p r o s p e c t s o f l o b b y i n g government t o implement l e g i s l a t i o n which would prevent n e g a t i v e l i b e r t y c l a i m s from succeeding ( p o s s i b l y through the "notwithstanding" c l a u s e i n the Charter) appear q u i t e d i s m a l . Thus, a t r a d e union s t r a t e g y which would lo o k f o r a p o l i t i c a l avenue out o f i t s dilemma was not implemented p r e - C h a r t e r and l o o k s d o u b t f u l p o s t - C h a r t e r . Nonetheless, i n terms o f the i n d i v i d u a l and h i s freedom (of a s s o c i a t i o n ) i n a l i b e r a l s o c i e t y , a f a i r balance between n e g a t i v e and p o s i t i v e l i b e r t y c l a i m s should be s t r u c k ; one which all o w s l i m i t e d c o e r i o n o f the i n d i v i d u a l i n the form o f union s e c u r i t y (the agency shop), but a l s o r e s t r i c t s t r a d e unions i n the form o f l i m i t s on p o l i t i c a l e x p e n d i t u r e s . T h i s balance may, however, s e r i o u s l y t h r e a t e n the p o l i t i c a l r o l e o f the t r a d e union community. But, w h i l e i n d i v i d u a l s r e t a i n t h e i r r i g h t t o e x e r c i s e n e g a t i v e l i b e r t y c l a i m s , whether o r not they e x e r c i s e them depends upon t h e i r moral b e l i e f s . And an i n d i v i d u a l c onvinced o f the importance o f the t r a d e union community and the t h r e a t t o t h a t community posed by n e g a t i v e l i b e r t y c l a i m s , w i l l be much l e s s l i k e l y t o e x e r c i s e h i s r i g h t t o invoke freedom from a s s o c i a t i o n . Unions might be a b l e t o meet t h i s d i f f i c u l t y , however, by working towards a consensus about the importance o f the t r a d e union community and, more p a r t i c u l a r l y , i t s p o l i t i c a l o b j e c t i v e s . Such a s t r a t e g y may be the most s u i t a b l e a l t e r n a t i v e t h a t t r a d e unions can adopt i n a l i b e r a l s o c i e t y . i v TABLE OF CONTENTS A b s t r a c t i i I n t r o d u c t i o n 1 Chapter One: Negative versus P o s i t i v e Freedom 9 Chapter Two: The Dilemma Reaches the Courts 20 Chapter Three: P o l i t i c s and the Dilemma 39 Chapter Four: The Dilemma i n R i g h t s Theory 53 Footnotes 68 Table o f Cases 83 B i b l i o g r a p h y 84 1 INTRODUCTION Trade unions meet almost a l l the p r i n c i p a l requirements of associations as defined i n law. 1 They are made up of members who are governed by a constitution, and they continue i n existence independent of any change that may occur i n the composition of the association. In most associations, a member i s normally free to j o i n or leave the association at w i l l ; but trade union membership i n Canada does not have the same voluntary nature. At the very least, workers i n a unionized s e t t i n g are required to pay union dues, whether or not they support the union's objectives and i n t e r e s t s . With passage of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms i n 1982, involuntary and voluntary trade unionists have increasingly connected the ri g h t of freedom of association with the debate about whether the requirements surrounding trade union membership are reasonable i n a 'free and democratic society'. For example, i n 1987 the B r i t i s h Columbia Federation of Labour sent a l e t t e r to a number of lawyers whose c l i e n t s included Federation- a f f i l i a t e d unions, asking them not to take on any Charter cases involving unions u n t i l approval had been obtained from the Federation. In March of that same year, the Canadian Labour Congress issued a dire warning: " I f these [Charter] cases are not taken seriously, we are going to be ri g h t back i n the 1930s i n terms of what rights labour has i n t h i s country."2 Almost f i v e years a f t e r the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms came int o force, union leadership i n Canada f i n a l l y began to r e a l i z e that l i t i g a t i o n under the Charter could seriously jeopardize what they took to be union "r i g h t s " i n 2 contemporary society. Freedom of association, "the very essence of democracy i t s e l f " 3 , stands as a beacon i n the Charter for unions, guaranteeing t h e i r freedom to organize workers. Organized workers, they argue, are more able to redress the enormous i n e q u a l i t i e s i n bargaining power between c a p i t a l and labour 4, which i n turn i s important f o r democracy because economic strength a f f e c t s the d i s t r i b u t i o n of power within society. But freedom of association i s also an i n d i v i d u a l right, and therefore also focuses on protection of the i n d i v i d u a l against the power of a c o l l e c t i v e . This problem i s p a r t i c u l a r l y acute i n the i n d u s t r i a l r e lations f i e l d , where the desire to protect i n d i v i d u a l l i b e r t y may c o n f l i c t with the need to maintain s t a b i l i t y i n the workplace and some kind of a balance-of-power i n the c o l l e c t i v e bargaining process. Unions as a c o l l e c t i v e e n t i t y arguably play an important role i n the democratic system, but they do have a negative side v i s - a - v i s loss of i n d i v i d u a l freedom, as i n d i v i d u a l autonomy i s forced to give way to the majority of the c o l l e c t i v e . When a worker does not wish to become a member of the union i n his or her workplace, and claims the r i g h t not to associate, Canadian courts (emphasizing the freedom aspect of freedom of association) have been divided on the question of whether compulsion to j o i n a union r e s t r i c t s freedom, and i f , therefore, the i n d i v i d u a l ' s (negative) freedom of association has been infringed. In e f f e c t , the question arises as to whether freedom of association i s a discretionary r i g h t - an option to associate or not associate- or a mandatory right, i n which only one way of 3 exercising i t i s permitted.5 i m p l i c i t (and sometimes e x p l i c i t ) i n freedom of association as a mandatory r i g h t i s the assertion t h i s kind of association ( i . e . a trade union) i s a "guaranteed option" to secure a p a r t i c u l a r l y important benefit; a benefit that i s paid f o r by some s a c r i f i c e of freedom, s i m i l a r to, f o r example, the r i g h t to education. Trade union e l i t e s argue that the consequence of a Supreme Court decision defining freedom of association as a discretionary r i g h t could be (based on the American experience) a s i t u a t i o n of c o n s t i t u t i o n a l l y l e g a l p r o v i n c i a l right-to-work l e g i s l a t i o n , which would have serious ramifications f o r (at least) the economic goals of trade unions. Equally as s i g n i f i c a n t i s the j u d i c i a l i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of p o s i t i v e freedom of association as i t relates to the protection of the objectives of an association. Trade unions leaders argue that simply to declare freedom of association as a mandatory rig h t i s not enough; attention must be paid to the 'association' part of freedom of association. Associational a c t i v i t i e s such as c o l l e c t i v e bargaining (ranging from the "right to s t r i k e " to f i n a n c i a l support f o r the New Democratic Party) are i n need of protection i f freedom of association i s to have any meaning fo r trade unions. But the Supreme Court has already ruled that ce r t a i n aspects of the c o l l e c t i v e bargaining process are not c o n s t i t u t i o n a l l y protected. C l e a r l y trade unions are caught on the horns of a dilemma over freedom of association i n the Charter. This dilemma could be defined i n a h i s t o r i c a l frame i n two ways; f i r s t , before passage of the Charter, as a s i t u a t i o n requiring a choice 4 between equally undesirable alternatives, i n t h i s case between no c o n s t i t u t i o n a l protection of the "right to associate" and con s t i t u t i o n a l protection that, from the union e l i t e s ' viewpoint, may be f a t a l l y flawed. That was the s i t u a t i o n facing trade unions i n the years of debate preceding passage of the Charter, a debate which, as we s h a l l see, unions took l i t t l e part i n . That dilemma was "solved" i n 1982 by entrenchment of freedom of association i n the Charter. In the second and current dilemma (which arises as a consequence of the solution to the f i r s t dilemma), unions are faced with r e l y i n g on the po s i t i v e freedom to associate as a defence f o r union security clauses, and, at the same time, denying freedom from association claims of those who do not wish to p a r t i c i p a t e i n union membership and/or union a c t i v i t i e s . In l i b e r a l terms, the dilemma r e s u l t s when the same freedom that guarantees the ri g h t to combine with others to pursue mutual int e r e s t s (for example, economic security) i s used by an i n d i v i d u a l to claim the ri g h t not to associate, to pursue his or her inte r e s t s free from interference (in t h i s case, by the trade union).6 This kind of dilemma consists of two sides, i n which "the i n t e r n a l administration of each seems to be impeccable, but t h e i r diplomatic r e l a t i o n s with one another seem to be internecine. The aim of t h i s thesis i s to explore the conceptual and le g a l elements of that dilemma as i t e f f e c t s trade unions, and to canvass some of the possible strategies union leaders could employ to come to terms with the dilemma facing them i n the Canadian l i b e r a l context. Each of the four chapters that follows sets out d i f f e r e n t aspects of t h i s theme, beginning with 5 the philosophical roots of the dilemma. The f i r s t chapter, then, i s concerned with the source of the dilemma; i n general with the debate about p o s i t i v e and negative l i b e r t y and the nature of freedom, and more s p e c i f i c a l l y over competing v i s i o n s of freedom of association i n a trade union context. The chapter concludes with the observation that a conceptual solution to the dilemma appears unlikely, and unions w i l l be faced with the ramifications of the dilemma i n court. Since passage of the Charter, there have been a number of cases before the courts concerning freedom of association, i n which a l e g a l resolution to the questions posed by the debate between advocates of negative and p o s i t i v e freedom has been sought. Many of these cases have been brought by individ u a l s who have attempted to convince the court that union security clauses or the expenditure of union dues f o r p o l i t i c a l purposes s i g n i f i c a n t l y i n f r i n g e t h e i r (negative) freedom from association. In response, the unions affected have argued i n the main that the practices i n question are not subject to Charter scrutiny (because they do not constitute government action under the Charter), and/or that trade unions are a special type of association, one which deserves protection from negative l i b e r t y claims. In p a r t i c u l a r , the Lavigne case, which challenges p o l i t i c a l expenditures by unions (in c e r t a i n circumstances), has generated much controversy about the aforementioned arguments; and i t has resulted i n two opposing j u d i c i a l decisions. In contrast, the s i g n i f i c a n t cases brought by unions (rather than individuals) to the court ( i . e . the Labour Trilogy) a l l dealt with protection of the objectives of 6 an association under the Charter, s p e c i f i c a l l y union " r i g h t s " l o s t under the challenged l e g i s l a t i o n , and lawyers representing unions were unsuccessful i n t h e i r attempt to convince the courts that freedom to associate was "meaningless" unless the association could pursue i t s objectives. It has become apparent that the doctrine of "government action" i s and w i l l continue to be a major factor i n the court's response to freedom of association cases involving labour issues; i n many of these cases the court has made i t s reluctance to " i n t e r f e r e " i n the labour market ( i . e . the balance struck between labour and capital) clear. In the few cases where the Charter has been found to apply, union attempts to resolve t h e i r dilemma by denying negative l i b e r t y claims have generally not been successful. In the meantime, the challenges brought against trade unions by individ u a l s have not been exhausted, and the p o s s i b i l i t y remains that some additional aspects of labour law w i l l be decided by the court under the Charter. But courts are not the only arena i n which an attempt i s being made to balance the competing claims of l i b e r t y , and while arguments advanced by trade unions have not met with much success there, the p o l i t i c a l realm o f f e r s another avenue through which trade unions could attempt to influence labour l e g i s l a t i o n . However, unlike other intervenors such as women's or aboriginal groups, the trade union movement has been l a r g e l y absent from pre-Charter Joint Committee hearings. As i s clea r i n Chapter Three, labour's largest umbrella organization, the Canadian Labour Congress, d i d not take part i n any of these hearings i n the 1970s or 1980s. In fact, u n t i l unions launched 7 the cases t h a t made up the Labour T r i l o g y , i t would be f a i r t o say t h a t o r g a n i z e d l a b o u r ' s involvement i n the C h a r t e r p r o c e s s was minimal a t b e s t . A number o f f a c t o r s account f o r t h i s , not the l e a s t o f which i s l a b o u r ' s t r a d i t i o n a l economism and i t s r e s u l t i n g emphasis on "bread and b u t t e r " i s s u e s . In h i n d s i g h t i t i s q u i t e c l e a r t h a t l a b o u r ' s n o n - p a r t i c i p a t i o n r e p r e s e n t e d a missed o p p o r t u n i t y t o i n f l u e n c e the wording o f freedom o f a s s o c i a t i o n i n a way t h a t would make c h a l l e n g e s from a n e g a t i v e l i b e r t y s t a n d p o i n t more d i f f i c u l t . In a d d i t i o n , the p o s t -C h a r t e r p r o s p e c t s o f l o b b y i n g government t o implement l e g i s l a t i o n which would prevent n e g a t i v e l i b e r t y c l a i m s from succeeding ( p o s s i b l y through the "notwithstanding" c l a u s e i n the Charter) appear q u i t e d i s m a l . Thus, a t r a d e union s t r a t e g y which would lo o k f o r a p o l i t i c a l avenue out o f i t s dilemma was not implemented p r e - C h a r t e r and looks d o u b t f u l p o s t - C h a r t e r . But what balance between the competing c l a i m s o f n e g a t i v e and p o s i t i v e l i b e r t y would be f a i r i n a l i b e r a l s o c i e t y t h a t r e c o g n i z e s the v a l u e o f c h o i c e as an aspect o f freedom and t h e r e f o r e the e x i s t e n c e o f n e g a t i v e and p o s i t i v e l i b e r t y ? Are t h e r e circumstances i n which s o c i e t y i s j u s t i f i e d i n r e s t r i c t i n g the i n d i v i d u a l ' s r i g h t t o a c t a g a i n s t the community ( i n t h i s case by r e s t r i c t i n g n e g a t i v e l i b e r t y c l a i m s a g a i n s t t r a d e u n i o n s ) , o r are r i g h t s simply, as Marx argued, a t t a c h e d t o " e g o i s t i c man", i n essence n o t h i n g but "the r i g h t o f s e l f i s h n e s s " ^ , t o be e x e r c i s e d a t w i l l . I w i l l argue t h a t i n terms o f the i n d i v i d u a l and h i s freedom (of a s s o c i a t i o n ) i n a l i b e r a l s o c i e t y , a f a i r balance between n e g a t i v e and p o s i t i v e l i b e r t y c l a i m s would a l l o w l i m i t e d c o e r c i o n o f the i n d i v i d u a l i n 8 the form o f union s e c u r i t y (the agency shop), but would a l s o r e s t r i c t t r a d e union p o l i t i c a l e x p e n d i t u r e s . However, what i s f a i r i n terms o f the i n d i v i d u a l and h i s r i g h t s may s e r i o u s l y t h r e a t e n the p o l i t i c a l r o l e o f the t r a d e union community. But while i n d i v i d u a l s r e t a i n t h e i r r i g h t t o e x e r c i s e n e g a t i v e l i b e r t y c l a i m s , whether o r not they e x e r c i s e them depends upon t h e i r moral b e l i e f s . And an i n d i v i d u a l convinced o f the importance o f the t r a d e union community and the t h r e a t t o t h a t community posed by n e g a t i v e l i b e r t y c l a i m s w i l l be much l e s s l i k e l y t o e x e r c i s e h i s r i g h t t o invoke freedom from a s s o c i a t i o n . Unions may be a b l e t o meet t h i s d i f f i c u l t y , however, by working towards a consensus about the importance o f the t r a d e union community and, more p a r t i c u l a r l y , i t s p o l i t i c a l o b j e c t i v e s . Such a s t r a t e g y may be the most s u i t a b l e a l t e r n a t i v e t h a t t r a d e unions can adopt i n a l i b e r a l s o c i e t y . L e t us now t u r n t o a more i n depth examination o f those competing c l a i m s . 9 CHAPTER ONE: NEGATIVE VERSUS POSITIVE FREEDOM I am normally s a i d t o be f r e e t o the degree t o which no human b e i n g i n t e r f e r e s w i t h my a c t i v i t y . I s a i a h B e r l i n , Two Concepts o f L i b e r t y ^ Human r i g h t s i n a l i b e r a l s o c i e t y are p r i m a r i l y a v a i l a b l e t o the i n d i v i d u a l f o r p r o t e c t i o n a g a i n s t the s t a t e , not n e c e s s a r i l y because governments are h o s t i l e t o freedom, but because governments have a unique power t o r e s t r i c t freedom, one t h a t i n d i v i d u a l s are g e n e r a l l y h e l p l e s s t o respond t o u n l e s s they have s p e c i f i c l e g a l remedies. 1** P o s i t i v e freedom o f a s s o c i a t i o n i s deemed e s s e n t i a l t o human l i b e r t y i n t h a t i n d i v i d u a l s must have the c a p a c i t y t o make t h e i r own c h o i c e s and pursue t h e i r own i n t e r e s t s , i n c l u d i n g the r i g h t t o be f r e e t o combine w i t h o t h e r s t o pursue mutual i n t e r e s t s . But c o n t r o v e r s y a r i s e s over what i t means i n a l i b e r a l s o c i e t y t o be " f r e e " . D i sputes over the presence o r absence o f freedom i n s o c i e t i e s are o f t e n r o o t e d i n the r e l a t i o n s h i p between freedom and o t h e r s o c i a l g o a l s . Because freedom i s not the o n l y b e n e f i t s o c i e t y may secure, d i s p u t e s over b a l a n c i n g o f b e n e f i t s may occur, and o f t e n these d i s p u t e s r e l a t e back t o n e g a t i v e and p o s i t i v e concepts o f f r e e d o m . 1 1 The p h i l o s o p h i c a l q u e s t i o n u n d e r l y i n g much o f the debate about freedom o f a s s o c i a t i o n and unions p e r t a i n s t o the circumstances, i f any, when i n d i v i d u a l freedom o f c h o i c e should be s u b o r d i n a t e d t o t h a t o f the group i n o r d e r t o achieve a s o - c a l l e d common good. 1 2 The freedom o f a s s o c i a t i o n dilemma f o r unions a r i s e s from t h i s debate. G e r a l d MacCallum agues t h a t t o d e f i n e the debate s o l e l y i n terms o f the p o s i t i v e "freedom t o " versus the n e g a t i v e "freedom 10 from" r e s u l t s i n emphasizing the importance of only one part of what i s always present i n any case of freedom. Freedom i s a t r i a d i c rather than a dyadic relationship, "always of something (an agent or agents), to do, not do, become, or not become something". Thus i t encompasses the r e l a t i o n s h i p between agents, "preventing conditions...[such as] constraints, r e s t r i c t i o n s , interferences and b a r r i e r s " , and "actions or conditions of character and circumstance".13 Applying MacCallum's variables to the debate at hand w i l l allow the differences between the negative and p o s i t i v e concepts of freedom to become clearer. The f i r s t part of t h i s discussion focuses on the legitimacy of negotiated union security clauses, of which there are three kinds: 1. the closed shop, wherein an i n d i v i d u a l must be a member of the union before being hi r e d by an employer. This i s common i n Canada to ' c r a f t ' type occupations such as carpentry. 2. the union shop, wherein a l l employees covered by the c o l l e c t i v e agreement must become members of the union within a s p e c i f i e d number of days. 3. the agency (or dues) shop, the weakest form of union security, wherein no-one i s required to be a member of the union, but a l l employees under the c o l l e c t i v e agreement must pay dues. 1 4 Conceptually, the agency shop requires the l e a s t degree of s o l i d a r i t y , while the union and closed shop imposes a much ti g h t e r association among workers. Although there i s no compulsory trade union membership within these clauses i n the s t r i c t e s t sense (ie. a worker can choose to f i n d another job i n 11 a non-union environment), unions are not i n r e a l i t y voluntary organizations l i k e clubs, and agents who choose not to associate are l i k e l y choosing between working and not working f o r that employer, and the serious consequences of that decision. Who are these agents? Adherents of negative freedom define them as r e a l i n d i v i d u a l persons, while defenders of p o s i t i v e freedom often see agents i n a contracted or expanded version, i e . as the r a t i o n a l or moral person hidden within, who perhaps wants something d i f f e r e n t than the " s e l f i s h " outward i n d i v i d u a l , or would i f he or she was reasonable, or moral, or prudent. 1 5 This d i v i s i o n may be represented by an even larger gap: "the r e a l s e l f may be conceived as something wider than the i n d i v i d u a l . . . as a s o c i a l 'whole' of which the i n d i v i d u a l i s an element or aspect-a t r i b e , a race, a church, [or] a s t a t e " . ^ Interests are then influenced by our b e l i e f s concerning ways i n which our destinies are t i e d to the destinies of "our families, nations, and so forth". 1"' This expanded view of agents i s p a r t i c u l a r l y germane to t h i s discussion because freedom of association under the Charter i s an i n d i v i d u a l freedom, attached to indi v i d u a l s rather than c o l l e c t i v i t i e s . Unions argue that the in t e r e s t s of trade union agents are affected by the power of the c o l l e c t i v e ; without the c o l l e c t i v e there can be no power at the bargaining table f o r unions, and the destiny of each union member i s t i e d to the destiny of the c o l l e c t i v e . This e n t i t y i s then i d e n t i f i e d as representing the "true s e l f " , which (accompanied by the v i r t u e of majority decision-making) i s j u s t i f i e d i n imposing i t s single w i l l upon r e c a l c i t r a n t members i n order to achieve " i t s own, and therefore, t h e i r , 'higher' 12 freedom".18 Obstacles to freedom f o r those who argue f o r negative freedom are what i s commonly meant by "obstacle", although the d e f i n i t i o n changes with variations attached to the ideas of consent and coercion. 19 But the difference between what advocates of p o s i t i v e and negative freedom mean by obstacle can not be revealed s o l e l y by focusing on differences i n the concept of freedom. Because there are differences on what an agent i s , there w i l l be consequent differences on what obstacles are. One way to look at the difference i s to focus on r e s t r a i n t ; on the negative side, freedom arises from lack of r e s t r a i n t , but f o r those who take the p o s i t i v e position, freedom can be achieved by means of r e s t r a i n t . For example, a person who t r i e s to cross a road with no crosswalks and where cars have the right-of-way w i l l be restrained from his purpose. When crosswalks are i n s t a l l e d , the i n d i v i d u a l i s l e g a l l y restrained i n that he can only cross the street there, but i s also freed because he now has the r i g h t -of-way i n the crosswalk, and car drivers have a consequent duty to stop. This crosswalk, therefore, i s not r e a l l y r e s t r a i n t , because the person " i s being helped to do what he r e a l l y wants to do", i e . t o cross the street with the l e a s t r i s k to his person. Because of the r e s t r a i n t put upon him, a genuine constraint was l i f t e d , and freedom increased.20 HOW would the two sides i n the debate at hand respond to t h i s analogy? Those who stand f o r negative freedom might s t i l l complain that the compulsion element must be seen as a option, that the i n d i v i d u a l s t i l l retains the r i g h t to choose where to cross the road as long as he or she i s not harming someone else i n that 13 c h o i c e . But the inducement t o j o i n a t r a d e union i s s t r o n g enough ( i n the l e g a l sense) t o negate any i d e a o f freedom o f c h o i c e (a "your money o r your l i f e " type o f q u e s t i o n ) . How can an i n d i v i d u a l be s a i d t o have freedom o f a s s o c i a t i o n and a t the same time be f o r c e d t o j o i n (or a t l e a s t f i n a n c i a l l y support) a union? F o r example, i f t h e r e was a l e g a l requirement f o r an i n d i v i d u a l t o j o i n o r c o n t r i b u t e funds t o a gun c l u b , even though t h a t person was opposed t o the ownership o f guns, would t h e r e be much doubt t h a t the i n d i v i d u a l ' s freedom o f a s s o c i a t i o n r i g h t s were b e i n g i n f r i n g e d ? 2 1 Real freedom f o r the i n d i v i d u a l would mean the l i b e r t y t o have a j ob f r e e from the requirement t h a t he or she become a member o f o r be a f f i l i a t e d w i t h a union. But i n h i s a n a l y s i s o f c o e r c i o n , L o r d H e r s c h e l l argues t h a t i f p r e s s u r e t o a s s o c i a t e i s a p p l i e d t o f u r t h e r one's own i n t e r e s t , then t o compare t h a t s i t u a t i o n t o a "your money o r your l i f e " q u e s t i o n appears t o be grotesque...those who see the c l o s e d shop simply i n terms o f c o e r c i o n might be s a i d t o h o l d a view o f i n d i v i d u a l freedom o f a p u r i t y which would be q u i t e s t a r t l i n g i f a p p l i e d t o o t h e r comparable s i t u a t i o n s 2 2 . . . such as p a y i n g taxes o r obeying the law. T h i s argument speaks t o the gun c l u b example as w e l l , because c l e a r l y the c l u b i s not pr e s e n t e d as f u r t h e r i n g the r e l u c t a n t member's i n t e r e s t , and thus i s not analogous t o union s e c u r i t y . But t h e r e i s more i n t h i s analogy than f u r t h e r i n g one's i n t e r e s t . Paying taxes and/or obeying the law appear t o have a much more s i g n i f i c a n t n a t i o n a l purpose than p a y i n g union dues, so the q u e s t i o n a r i s e s o f whether the b e n e f i t t r a d e - o f f i s the same. Being c o e r c e d t o pay taxes i s q u a l i t a t i v e l y and c o n s e q u e n t i a l l y d i f f e r e n t from r e l u c t a n t 14 payment of union dues. We can see i n these questions of i n t e r e s t and benefit trade-o f f the attachment between the variables of agent and obstacle. The reluctant member's i n t e r e s t would be defined by the advocate of negative freedom as whatever he outwardly defines i t as, or whatever he chooses or says i t to be. The p o s i t i v e stand defines the reluctant member's i n t e r e s t (in the case of trade union membership) as the same as the other union members, p a r t l y because the reluctant member would receive the same benefits. The " f r e e - r i d e r " argument, that elementary notions of j u s t i c e and fairness would suggest that those who i n t e n t i o n a l l y choose to share i n a benefit should likewise be required to share i n the costs of obtaining i t (both f i n a n c i a l and organizational) i s bolstered by Mancur Olson's cost/benefit analysis, which demonstrates that persons w i l l not be encouraged to j o i n an association to pursue common goals i f non-members share i n the f r u i t s of t h e i r labour without cost.23 j n addition, the free-r i d e r puts himself i n a po s i t i o n to fru s t r a t e a c o l l e c t i v e goal through h i s non-participation.24 g u t Peter G a l l argues that the closed shop provision (at least) goes beyond maintaining union strength f o r c o l l e c t i v e bargaining purposes; i t allows the union to control employment opportunities i n an industry, and while t h i s may benefit the union, i t s members, and even the employers involved, there i s a r e a l question whether that benefit i s a s u f f i c i e n t j u s t i f i c a t i o n f o r i n f r i n g i n g employees' freedom of association. Here we see what MacCallum refers to as the kinds of controversies that surround questions of freedom: the weighing or balancing of benefits. The common t a c t i c i n t h i s kind of 15 argument, i s f o r p a r t i s a n s t o l i n k the presence or absence o f freedom as c l o s e l y as p o s s i b l e t o the presence o r absence o f those o t h e r s o c i a l b e n e f i t s b e l i e v e d t o be secured o r d e n i e d by the forms o f s o c i a l o r g a n i z a t i o n advocated o r condemned. Each s o c i a l b e n e f i t i s , a c c o r d i n g l y , t r e a t e d as e i t h e r a r e s u l t o f o r a c o n t r i b u t i o n t o freedom, and each l i a b i l i t y i s connected somehow t o the absence o f freedom.25 In t h i s way, (consenting) t r a d e u n i o n i s t s argue t h a t the b e n e f i t s o f economic s e c u r i t y and p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n decision-making g r e a t l y outweigh the m i n o r i t y " r i g h t " t o d i s a s s o c i a t e , w h i l e d i s s e n t i n g members argue they have l o s t a f a r more important b e n e f i t , t h e i r l i b e r t y and o p p o r t u n i t y t o n e g o t i a t e t h e i r own terms and c o n d i t i o n s o f employment. Advocates o f n e g a t i v e l i b e r t y argue t h a t union s t r e n g t h i s not a p r e r e q u i s i t e f o r economic s e c u r i t y . There are those who d e c l a r e t h a t i n d i v i d u a l s c o u l d e a s i l y b a r g a i n f o r t h e i r own (and perhaps b e t t e r ) pay 26; and, i n the same v e i n , F.A. Hayek argues t h a t the motive f o r c l o s e d shops i s t o " r a i s e r e a l wages above the l e v e l t h a t would p r e v a i l i n a f r e e market", although t h i s a c t i o n does not, i n the end, r a i s e r e a l wages or s u s t a i n employment.27 Hayek assumes t h a t unions p r o v i d e o n l y o r p r i n c i p a l l y economic b e n e f i t s , r a t h e r than, f o r example, job s e c u r i t y , p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n d e c i s i o n making, o r t r a i n i n g f o r p o l i t i c a l r o l e s . T h i s "pure market l i b e r t a r i a n i s m " i s perhaps expressed b e s t by R i c h a r d E p s t e i n , who argues t h a t l a b o u r i s l i k e any o t h e r commodity i n the market. Employers compete f o r l a b o u r and employees compete f o r jobs, and out o f t h i s f r e e c o m p e t i t i o n a r i s e s an "optimal package o f wage r a t e s and employment 16 conditions". But the market r e l a t i o n s h i p i s disturbed when the state becomes involved i n regulating the market through devices such as minimum wage laws or l e g a l i z i n g unions. As a consequence, rights such as the negative freedom of association are required to protect i n d i v i d u a l s from state interference.28 Furthermore, to reap what one does not sow i s not unusual i n society because people constantly reap the benefit of voluntary e f f o r t s to which they have made no contribution; and "not only those who pay t h e i r annual subscription to the National Trust enjoy the scenery and architecture i t preserves."29 But, advocates of p o s i t i v e freedom argue, t h i s analogy f a i l s i n that the scenery and architecture ( i . e . the benefits) are not established by members of the National Trust, as benefits are established by union members through negotiation. Additionally, the argument that some constantly benefit at the expense of others can hardly be used to j u s t i f y that action. The t h i r d variable i n the statement, freedom to do or become, w i l l usually be interpreted by defenders of negative freedom as free or not free 'to do what the p a r t i c u l a r i n d i v i d u a l wants', i n t h i s case free to j o i n or not j o i n the union (to associate or disassociate); as David Beatty argues, "people are not free to govern t h e i r l i v e s by t h e i r own l i g h t s . . . i f they are required to j o i n with people whose views and purposes they do not share."30 Champions of p o s i t i v e freedom, on the other hand, stress conditions of character rather than actions, and w i l l be influenced i n t h e i r d e f i n i t i o n of the t h i r d variable by the differences noted i n the f i r s t two variables. For them, freedom to associate means freedom to j o i n together to obtain economic 17 strength, or influence p o l i t i c a l events, or whatever the majority of union members choose to be active i n - freedom to become a responsible and active member of the workplace. The debate about freedom of association i n a trade union context i s being pushed farther than the question of whether there i s freedom from association as well as freedom to associate. An additional question has arisen i n Canadian courts i n a number of guises; at the heart of the matter i s a d e f i n i t i o n of the 0 p o s i t i v e freedom to associate, i . e . what does association (the t h i r d v a r i a b l e - to do, not do, become, or not become something) mean? The f i r s t part of the question involves protection of the objectives of an association, i n t h i s case c o l l e c t i v e bargaining. Paul Cavalluzzo argues that i n t e r p r e t i n g freedom of association as simply the r i g h t to associate i s unnecessarily r e s t r i c t i v e , because i f the state has unbridled power to regulate the means and objects of an association, i t then has the a b i l i t y to n u l l i f y the purposes of an association, r e s u l t i n g i n an e s s e n t i a l l y meaningless freedom.31 The most obvious way i n which l e g a l support f o r the c o l l e c t i v e i n t e r e s t of a trade union can be expressed i s through protection of c o l l e c t i v e bargaining. This objective, therefore, i s i n need of protection i f freedom of association i s to have any u t i l i t y f o r trade unions. I f union e l i t e s are unable to bargain with t h e i r corporate counterparts, then what relevance does the r i g h t to organize have? Unions would become simply "toothless" organizations, unable to serve the purpose they were constituted f o r . The denial of labour's r i g h t to act c o l l e c t i v e l y i s , i n e f f e c t , a denial of i t s freedom 18 to associate, because "the two are too intertwined to be separated".32 But they can be separated, G a l l argues; how can i t be that when individuals band together f o r c e r t a i n purposes, t h e i r purposes assume a co n s t i t u t i o n a l importance of t h e i r own, independent from the rights and freedoms of the in d i v i d u a l s involved, i . e . why should there be co n s t i t u t i o n a l value i n numbers?33 The second part of the debate over the d e f i n i t i o n of association i s the question of whether freedom of association i s inf r i n g e d when a union contributes i t s dues to p o l i t i c a l p a r t i e s or causes that a minority of i t s members do not support. What does i t mean to associate i n t h i s context? Does union support of a cause a member opposes mean that the member i s "associating" against h i s or her w i l l with the support, and, i f that i s true, i s that member's freedom of association infringed? Freedom of association i n a Canadian context, Beatty argues, "can only be understood as embracing a f u l l , robust ' b i l a t e r a l ' l i b e r t y which recognizes the indiv i d u a l ' s freedom of choice".34 Freedom of association i n a l i b e r a l society such as Canada i s seen as a ri g h t which inheres i n the i n d i v i d u a l , but i t also i s c l e a r l y one which can only be exercised j o i n t l y ; a freedom "intended to allow indiv i d u a l s to engage i n a c t i v i t i e s together and to pursue commonly held goals which cannot be achieved i n isolation".35 The question facing the courts and the dilemma facing unions i s not whether there i s freedom to associate, but whether there i s also a ri g h t not to associate, and when (and i f ) that r i g h t i s infringed. Canadian courts are now i n the process of answering those controversies about freedom and the weighing and ranking of benefits. 20 CHAPTER TWO: THE DILEMMA REACHES THE COURTS With passage of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms i n 1982, advocates of the negative and p o s i t i v e freedom positions i n the trade union context quickly began to employ the courts i n an attempt to have t h e i r interpretation p r e v a i l . The dilemma confronting trade unions i s that the same freedom they would r e l y on to protect t h e i r r i g h t to organize workers into a union, and protect the objectives of that union, could also be used protect the i n d i v i d u a l from what he or she perceives as union coercion. Challengers to l e g i s l a t i o n regulating trade unions focus on the requirement of choice i n freedom of association, arguing that freedom of association includes both freedom to associate, and freedom from association. In a l i b e r a l context, freedom arises from the lack of r e s t r a i n t and the i n s t i t u t i o n of choice. In response, those advocates of p o s i t i v e l i b e r t y attempt to convince the court that choice i s not warranted i n t h i s s e t t i n g . Trade unions, they argue, are a s p e c i a l type of association, and would su f f e r unduly from free r i d e r s ; those i n d i v i d u a l s who would accept the benefits that c o l l e c t i v e action has to o f f e r but would not be subject to the costs inherent i n achieving those benefits. The dilemma has reached the courts i n a number of guises, and these cases w i l l be the subject of t h i s chapter. Under the Charter, the courts are charged with the task of j u d i c i a l review, l i t e r a l l y , the ultimate c o n s t i t u t i o n a l power of courts to pass on executive and l e g i s l a t i v e actions and to rule on t h e i r compatibility or otherwise with the c o n s t i t u t i o n a l charter's express terms, and also with more general notions of constitutionalism.3*> 21 J u d i c i a l review i n Canada i s expressly provided f o r i n the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms under section 24, although the Supreme Court has served as the f i n a l court of appeal since 1949 i n disputes over the d i v i s i o n of powers i n the Constitution. Although decisions made by the courts i n Canada can be set aside i n c e r t a i n conditions and at c e r t a i n times by l e g i s l a t u r e s using the notwithstanding c l a u s e 3 7 , (a subject we s h a l l return to l a t e r ) , a number of cases involving freedom of association i n a trade union context have been dealt with by the courts, almost a l l of them controversial and the subject of much scholarly debate. However, a number of these decisions have not dealt with the issue of freedom of association, turning instead on the question of government action. P a r t i c u l a r l y germane i n the trade union context i s the Supreme Court's r u l i n g i n Dolphin Delivery38, which i s concerned with the public/private dichotomy defined by the court to delineate what kind of cases f a l l under the ambit of the Charter; a d i v i s i o n which i m p l i c i t l y relates to the power of trade unions i n society. The question of whether the Charter applies to a case before the court focuses on the doctrine of 'governmental action'. Section 32 of the Charter reads: (1) This Charter applies (a) to the Parliament and government of Canada i n respect of a l l matters within the authority of Parliament including a l l matters r e l a t i n g to the Yukon Te r r i t o r y and Northwest T e r r i t o r i e s ; and (b) to the l e g i s l a t u r e and government of each province i n respect to a l l matters within the authority of the l e g i s l a t u r e of each province. Based on an analysis of the text and the proceedings of the Joint Senate-Commons Committee on the Constitution, part of the l e g a l 22 and academic community argue that Charter i s intended to regulate only the 'acts' of government.39 According to t h i s interpretation, the Charter "protects our fundamental rights and freedoms only against invasions by our governors and not from abuse by our neighbours and fellow c i t i z e n s " . 4 0 Accordingly, there i s a private realm i n which indivi d u a l s are not obliged to comply with the dictates of the Charter, and the problem i n defining what cases are Charter cases can be solved merely by drawing the l i n e between public and private. Radical l e f t c r i t i c s c a l l t h i s public/private d i v i s i o n "unnatural" and l o g i c a l l y unworkable, arguing that a l l apparently private a c t i v i t i e s take place within and are e f f e c t i v e because of an underlying substratum of l e g a l r i g h t s and duties j o i n t l y fashioned by our courts and l e g i s l a t u r e s . 4 1 E f f e c t i v e l y excluded from the Charter, they argue, i s the major source of inequality i n our society: "the maldistribution of property entitlements among i n d i v i d u a l s " . 4 2 The Supreme Court judgment i n Dolphin Delivery raises several of these issues. Dolphin D e l i v e r y 4 ^ was the f i r s t major decision by the Supreme Court that d i r e c t l y concerned the rights of labour under the Charter. Members of the R e t a i l , Wholesale and Department Store Union were locked out by Purolator Courier Inc., and believed that another courier, Dolphin Delivery, was acting as a business a l l y of P u r o l a t o r . 4 4 The union n o t i f i e d Dolphin by l e t t e r that i t intended to picket i t s premises unless i t agreed to cease doing business with Purolator. Before that could happen, Dolphin sought and obtained a court injunction preventing the picketing from going ahead. The matter had to be resolved 23 under common law because the d e l i v e r y companies were s u b j e c t t o f e d e r a l , r a t h e r than p r o v i n c i a l , l a b o u r law, and the f e d e r a l code was s i l e n t on the s t a t u s o f secondary p i c k e t i n g . In i t s attempt t o o v e r t u r n the i n j u n c t i o n , the union argued t h e i r members' freedom o f e x p r e s s i o n under the C h a r t e r was i n f r i n g e d by the common law r u l e ( i n d u c i n g breach o f c o n t r a c t ) , w h i l e the owners o f D o l p h i n D e l i v e r y took the p o s i t i o n t h a t the C h a r t e r had no a p p l i c a t i o n i n p r i v a t e d i s p u t e s o f t h i s k i n d . The Court agreed w i t h D o l p h i n . M c l n t y r e J . r u l e d t h a t the C h a r t e r would apply t o common law o n l y when t h e r e was a government a c t i o n a t t a c h e d t o i t . « P r o p e r t y and i d e o l o g y are key t o t h i s d e c i s i o n , A l a n Hutchison argues; workers are f r e e t o express themselves, but not f r e e t o use someone e l s e ' s p r o p e r t y t o do so. By c r e a t i n g a p r i v a t e realm, judges are p r o t e c t i n g the p r i v a t e p r o p e r t y s t a t u s quo, and t u r n i n g a " b l i n d eye t o u n d e r l y i n g d i s p a r i t i e s o f wealth and power". 4^ Some l i b e r a l s are e q u a l l y c r i t i c a l o f j u d i c i a l attempts t o d e f i n e a p u b l i c and a p r i v a t e realm; Beatty, f o r example, condemns the D o l p h i n D e l i v e r y d e c i s i o n as " h i g h l y e l i t i s t and p r o f o u n d l y undemocratic". The Charter, he argues, i s i n t e n d e d t o apply t o common law ( i n t h a t the C h a r t e r i s s u p e r i o r t o a l l o t h e r forms and e x p r e s s i o n s o f law), and t h e r e f o r e must apply t o ( i n B e a t t y ' s words) "judge-made law". T h e r e f o r e , the government a c t i o n r e q u i r e d under the C h a r t e r i s simply the a c t i o n o f the j u d i c i a r y i n a p p l y i n g the law. I f the j u d i c i a r y i s not i n c l u d e d , B eatty d e c l a r e s , a g r e a t d e a l o f c o e r c i v e a u t h o r i t y o f the s t a t e w i l l be e f f e c t e d by persons who are not d i r e c t l y e l e c t e d and "without r e g a r d t o the c o n s t i t u t i o n a l e n t i t l e m e n t s o f 24 C a n a d i a n s " . 4 7 In response, one c o u l d argue t h a t i m p l i c i t i n B e a t t y ' s "judge-made law" i s the b e l i e f t h a t judges are making law r a t h e r than a p p l y i n g p r i n c i p l e s . But even i f they are making law, the C h a r t e r c l e a r l y s t a t e s t h a t governments are t o be r e s t r a i n e d , not p r i v a t e c i t i z e n s . The i n t e n t i o n o f the framers o f the C h a r t e r was t o make a d i s t i n c t i o n between p u b l i c and p r i v a t e a c t s , and between c o u r t s and the a d m i n i s t r a t i v e and l e g i s l a t i v e arms o f government ( s e c t i o n 32), and i f t h a t d i s t i n c t i o n i s ignored, c o n f u s i o n s r e i g n s . As M c l n t r y r e J . w r i t e s i n h i s judgment, o f course the c o u r t s ought t o apply and develop the p r i n c i p l e s o f common law i n a manner c o n s i s t e n t w i t h the fundamental v a l u e s e n s h r i n e d i n the c o n s t i t u t i o n . . . B u t t h i s i s d i f f e r e n t [and d i s t i n c t from] the p r o p o s i t i o n t h a t one p r i v a t e p a r t y owes a c o n s t i t u t i o n a l duty t o another.48 A p p l y i n g the C h a r t e r t o a l l law would r e s u l t i n a p p l i c a t i o n o f the C h a r t e r t o the p r i v a t e sphere, a s i t u a t i o n the framers o f the C h a r t e r c l e a r l y wanted t o a v o i d . Hutchison's c r i t i c i s m , t h a t r e a l p r o p e r t y d i s p a r i t i e s i n the p r i v a t e sphere are i g n o r e d by the c o u r t , i s c o r r e c t ; but the C h a r t e r does not r e c o g n i z e economic d i f f e r e n c e s between p r i v a t e p a r t i e s , o n l y the d i s p a r i t y i n power between the s t a t e and the c i t i z e n . A c c e p t i n g t h a t t h e r e i s a l i n e between p u b l i c and p r i v a t e (however vague), t h i s d i v i s i o n i s p a r t i c u l a r l y c o n t e n t i o u s i n freedom o f a s s o c i a t i o n q u e s t i o n s i n the t r a d e union c o n t e x t . P a u l Bender argues t h a t the C h a r t e r s e c t i o n which appears most l i k e l y t o be h e l d a p p l i c a b l e t o p r i v a t e as w e l l as p u b l i c a c t s i s s e c t i o n 2, which i n c l u d e s freedom o f a s s o c i a t i o n . The use o f the word 'freedom', he argues "seems somewhat l e s s s u g g e s t i v e o f a 25 government action requirement than does the use of the word ' r i g h t ' C e r t a i n l y the government action doctrine does not a f f e c t the conceptual dilemma posed by negative and p o s i t i v e freedom, but the j u d i c i a l question of whether government action i s involved w i l l e f f e c t whether the courts (versus the p o l i t i c i a n s ) are the definers of the meaning and scope of freedom of association under the Charter. The courts have never been given a p a r t i c u l a r l y broad mandate i n the formulation of l e g a l p r i n c i p l e s that make up the federal and p r o v i n c i a l labour codes i n Canada. By and large rules have been framed by l e g i s l a t o r s , and t h e i r scope and substance has, according to Beatty, changed dramatically since the turn of the century. Legislatures have endeavoured to provide f a i r e r processes of decision-making, through which the competing in t e r e s t s of workers and those who purchase t h e i r services can be reconciled more equitably.50 This i s not to say that the courts have been s i l e n t pre-Charter on freedom of association questions. The h i s t o r i c a l l y most important judgment on union security i n Canada was delivered by Justice I.C. Rand i n 1946 i n settlement of the Windsor autoworkers' s t r i k e over union recognition.51 The Ford Motor Company, with the help of the province, desperately strove to break the s t r i k e ^ 2 , u n t i l Justice Rand of the Supreme Court was brought i n to a r b i t r a t e a solution. In his award he denied the union's demand fo r a union shop, and i n s t i t u t e d instead the so-called 'Rand formula', which requires employees to pay dues to the union even i f they are not members (the agency shop). His judgment presaged Galbraith's thesis that 26 unions provide a p o s i t i v e countervailing power to business, s i m i l a r to the theory of checks and balances i n the American system of government. 5^ Rand noted that unions need to "become strong" i n order to redress the lopsided balance of power that favoured c a p i t a l : ...the power of organized labour, the necessary co-partner of c a p i t a l , must be available to redress the balance of what i s c a l l e d s o c i a l j u s t i c e ; the just protection of a l l interests i s an a c t i v i t y which the s o c i a l order approves and encourages. 5 4 However, while the assumption was that unions were es s e n t i a l for a l l workers, Rand e x p l i c i t l y declared that s o c i a l j u s t i c e required that c a p i t a l should r e t a i n the upper hand. 5 5 Since that time, l e g i s l a t o r s have attempted to f i n d a middle ground between c a p i t a l and labour, with mixed r e s u l t s . Some would protest that the balance between the two has since swung strongly i n favour of labour. In Arlington Crane 56, Dorothy and Richard Foran, owners of a unionized crane rental company, attacked sections of the Ontario labour law that permits closed-shop contracts. The Forans wanted to employ t h e i r grandson, but when he applied f o r union membership, he was turned down (or refused to join) because he was unwilling to undertake an apprenticeship program required by the union f o r membership. As a consequence, the Forans were unable to hire him. The case has advanced as f a r as the Ontario High Court, where the Foran's grandson argued that his freedom of choice, the freedom not to associate with the union, was infringed. The respondents' p o s i t i o n was that the section of the act permitting closed shop contracts 27 neither requires nor encourages negotiating p a r t i e s to include a union security provision i n the c o l l e c t i v e agreement, but leaves that decision to the parties as a matter of free negotiation.57 Judge Henry's decision i n t h i s p a r t i c u l a r aspect of the case turned on governmental action. While he agreed with the respondents that the Ontario Labour Code was "neutral" as f a r union security c l a u s e s ^ , he ruled that the bargaining agents i n t h i s case were not governmental actors but private parties, and moreover were not performing a governmental function, but merely instruments i n carrying out a public policy.59 Judge Henry's decision r e l i e d p a r t l y on a s i m i l a r B r i t i s h Columbia case, Bhindi and B.C. P r o j e c t i o n i s t s * ^ , i n which the appellants were p r o j e c t i o n i s t s who were not members of the union. They applied f o r membership and were denied entry and therefore could not be employed by Famous Players. In that decision, Nemetz C.J. noted that i t i s a rare commercial contract which does not ex f a c i e i n f r i n g e on some freedom set out i n s.2, or some l e g a l r i g h t under s.7. To include such private commercial contracts under the scrutiny of the Charter could create havoc i n the commercial l i f e of the country.61 Contracts entered into by private parties do not r e f l e c t p u b l i c p o l i c y , he asserted, and the B. C. Labour Code "neither mandates nor encourages the parties to include a closed-shop provision". In contrast, the Lavigne62 c a s e resulted i n acknowledgement of negative freedom of association under the Charter. In the Ontario High Court, White J. concluded that the compulsory check-o f f provision ( i . e . the agency shop clause) i n the c o l l e c t i v e agreement between Ontario Council of Regents and the union 28 (O.P.S.E.U.) inf r i n g e d on a college employee's (Lavigne) freedom of a s s o c i a t i o n ^ . white concluded that the Council of Regents was a governmental actor** 4 performing a governmental action (bargaining), and therefore the c o l l e c t i v e agreement was subject to Charter scrutiny. Further, he found that there was support f o r the negative freedom of association i n the Charter; ...the recognition of the r i g h t not to associate appears to flow from the word 'freedom'. A r i g h t to freedom of association which does not include a r i g h t not to associate would not r e a l l y ensure 'freedom'.65 Not only was the finding of government action d i f f e r e n t than the closed-shop cases, but the l e g i s l a t i o n (Colleges C o l l e c t i v e Bargaining Act) was judged to give legitimacy to union security clauses rather than providing merely permissive or neutral ground. However, White J. also found under section 1, the reasonable l i m i t s clause^**, that government i n t e r e s t i n fostering c o l l e c t i v e bargaining and establishing a means of financing i t (ie. the agency shop) generally outweighed the non-members' freedom of association.67 But i n a strong reversal, the Ontario Appeal Court found that there was no governmental action i n Lavigne, because the appellant d i d not challenge the union security clause, only the spending of dues. The Council of Regents was i n no way involved i n the Union's spending decisions, and "the mere making of the funds available to the union by the Council...does not convert the union'.s expenditures into governmental action".68 N O action, no Charter scrutiny; but the Court did not stop there. Even i f there was an action under the Charter, they argued, Lavigne's 29 freedom of association was not i n f r i n g e d i n any way^9. The court di d not seek to determine whether a freedom of non-association existed ( c i t i n g the Supreme Court's admonition against commenting on c o n s t i t u t i o n a l issues by way of o b i t e r ) , but did spend some time making a strong case f o r the p o s i t i v e r i g h t . The question of whether freedom of association can be invoked as the freedom to pursue.the lawful objects and a c t i v i t i e s e s s e n t i a l to the purposes of the association, or at l e a s t protection of fundamentally democratic objectives, i s one that has received most of the attention under freedom of association jurisprudence i n the Supreme Court. Cavalluzzo proposes that the objectives of a group be protected i f they are an "interest fundamental to our [democratic] society": r e l i g i o u s , p o l i t i c a l , e g a l i t a r i a n , and economic. Economic objectives should be included, he argues, because guaranteed freedoms are frequently used to advance economic inter e s t s , and because "advancement of one's economic wellbeing i s an important and legitimate goal f o r any citizen."70 Needless to say, the protection of economic inte r e s t s i s controversial, p a r t i c u l a r l y i n the absence of any c o n s t i t u t i o n a l protection of property r i g h t s . Besides the assertion that economic int e r e s t s are not e s s e n t i a l components of assured democracy, G a l l argues that constitutions are supposed to enshrine the fundamental p r i n c i p l e s of i n d i v i d u a l l i b e r t y , but (for example) c o l l e c t i v e bargaining "does not have t h i s same timeless q u a l i t y " . 7 1 Freedom of association was immediately seized upon by trade unions as an avenue of attack on l e g i s l a t i o n imposing r e s t r a i n t s 30 on c o l l e c t i v e bargaining. From 1980 to 1982, the federal and some p r o v i n c i a l governments passed wage r e s t r a i n t l e g i s l a t i o n a f f e c t i n g unionized public servants. In Ontario, the l e g i s l a t i o n c l e a r l y affected the scope of bargaining by l i m i t i n g compensation increases, and resulted i n Service Employees Union, l o c a l 204 v.  Broadway Manor Nursing Home.72 The Ontario D i v i s i o n a l Court ruled that "freedom of association includes the r i g h t to organize, bargain c o l l e c t i v e l y , and s t r i k e " . Galligan J, i n a judgment r e f l e c t i n g the need fo r a "large and l i b e r a l construction" of freedom of association, wrote (in what i s now known as the "Broadway Manor Test") that "freedom of association, i f i t i s to be meaningful, must include freedom to engage i n conduct which i s reasonably consonant with the lawful objects of an association." Therefore, freedom of association must protect the fundamental lawful objects and/or purposes of a group, because otherwise the association i s rendered "barren and useless". The I n f l a t i o n Restraint Act, which in f r i n g e d on freedom of association and could not be j u s t i f i e d under section 1, was rendered inoperative and of no e f f e c t . 7 ^ Not s u r p r i s i n g l y , the case was appealed, and decided on an i n t e r p r e t a t i o n issue, completely avoiding the freedom of association question. From a labour lawyer's point of view, "the only s a t i s f y i n g aspect of the judgment was that i t l e f t untouched the D i v i s i o n a l Court's pronouncement on the content of freedom of a s s o c i a t i o n . " 7 4 That s a t i s f a c t i o n was s h o r t l i v e d . The Labour Trilogy, a set of cases propelled into the Supreme Court by union opposition to c o l l e c t i v e bargaining l e g i s l a t i o n , turned on a much narrower reading of freedom of association. The c a s e s 7 5 arose over the 31 c o n s t i t u t i o n a l i t y o f l e g i s l a t i o n p r o h i b i t i n g s t r i k e s i n p a r t i c u l a r p u b l i c s e c t o r s , r e s t r a i n i n g c o l l e c t i v e b a r g a i n i n g i n o t h e r s , and o r d e r i n g d a i r y employees back t o work. However, w h i l e the s u b j e c t s o f the l e g i s l a t i o n were p u b l i c s e c t o r workers (with the e x c e p t i o n o f the d a i r y workers), the Court d i d not c o n f i n e t h e i r remarks t o them. In g e n e r a l , the Court r u l e d t h a t the r i g h t t o b a r g a i n c o l l e c t i v e l y and t o s t r i k e are not fundamental freedoms; they ar e a c r e a t i o n o f l e g i s l a t i o n . . . t h e c o u r t s hould not d e f i n e freedom o f a s s o c i a t i o n t o i n c l u d e the r i g h t t o b a r g a i n c o l l e c t i v e l y . . . f o r t h i s would r e q u i r e the c o u r t t o become i n v o l v e d , under s . l , i n a review o f l e g i s l a t i v e p o l i c y f o r which i t i s r e a l l y not fitted. 7° Thus the p o s i t i v e freedom was narrowed t o p r e c l u d e C h a r t e r p r o t e c t i o n f o r c o l l e c t i v e b a r g a i n i n g ; and the d e f i n i t i o n o f a s s o c i a t i o n was broadened. J u s t i c e Le Dain reminded the unions t h a t i t i s e s s e n t i a l t o keep i n mind t h a t [ a s s o c i a t i o n ] . . . m u s t be a p p l i e d t o a wide range o f a s s o c i a t i o n s . . . I t i s i n t h i s l a r g e r p e r s p e c t i v e . . . t h a t one must c o n s i d e r the i m p l i c a t i o n s o f extending the concept o f freedom o f a s s o c i a t i o n ...the premise t h a t without such a d d i t i o n a l c o n s t i t u t i o n a l p r o t e c t i o n the guarantee o f freedom o f a s s o c i a t i o n would be a meaningless and empty one must be r e j e c t e d . 7 7 M c l n t r y r e J . made more e x p l i c i t the Court's t h i n k i n g . Guarantees i n the Charter, a p a r t from a b o r i g i n a l r i g h t s , were i n d i v i d u a l r a t h e r than group r i g h t s , thus freedom o f a s s o c i a t i o n belongs t o the i n d i v i d u a l and not t o the group formed through i t s e x e r c i s e . . . [ i t ] does not c o n s t i t u t i o n a l l y p r o t e c t a l l a c t i v i t i e s e s s e n t i a l t o the l a w f u l g o als o f an a s s o c i a t i o n [ r e f e r e n c e t o the Broadway Manor t e s t ] . . . i t guarantees the 32 c o l l e c t i v e exercise of co n s t i t u t i o n a l rights and insures that whatever action an i n d i v i d u a l can lawfully pursue as an in d i v i d u a l , he can pursue i t with others ...[and] there i s no analogy between the cessation of work by an i n d i v i d u a l and a s t r i k e . 7 ^ [Further], l e g i s l a t i v e h i s t o r y and the omission of reference to a rig h t to s t r i k e i n the Charter, taken with the fact that the overwhelming preoccupation of the Charter i s with i n d i v i d u a l , p o l i t i c a l and democratic rights, speaks against any implication of the rig h t to s t r i k e . 7 9 And Mclntrye echoed Justice Le Dain's concern about the role of the courts i n balancing the forces of labour and c a p i t a l ; care must be taken i n considering whether co n s t i t u t i o n a l protection should be given to one aspect of t h i s dynamic and evolving process while leaving the other subject to the s o c i a l pressures of the day.80 To protect c o l l e c t i v e bargaining, i n Mclntrye's opinion, would c u r t a i l the process of evolution "necessary to meet the changing circumstances of a modern society i n a modern world". But the decisions i n the Labour Trilogy were not unanimous, which has l e d l e g a l scholars l i k e Paul Weiler to believe that i t i s not at a l l c l e a r that the debate i s o v e r . 8 1 One member of the Court's "left-wing"82, Dickson C.J.C., supported protection of the objectives of an association, arguing that i f freedom of association only protects the joi n i n g together of persons f o r common purposes, but not the pursuit of the very a c t i v i t i e s for which association was formed, then the freedom i s indeed l e g a l i s t i c , ungenerous, indeed vapid.83 However, Dickson l e f t open the d e f i n i t i o n of what a c t i v i t i e s should be protected. Clearly Dickson disagreed with the majority of his colleagues, but he provided no answer as to whether (for example) economic objectives should be protected under the 33 Charter. Freedom of association, Dickson argued, i s most important i n circumstances "where the i n d i v i d u a l i s l i a b l e to be prejudiced by the actions of some larger and more powerful entity, l i k e the government or an employer", and simply because there are occasions when no analogy involving i n d i v i d u a l s can be found f o r associational a c t i v i t y , objectives are not rendered unprotectable. Whether or not freedom of association extends to protection of a c t i v i t i e s "for the pursuit of exclusively pecuniary ends" (note here he does not define which objectives should be protected), " c o l l e c t i v e bargaining protects important employee int e r e s t s which cannot be characterized as merely pecuniary i n nature". However, Dickson was prepared to admit that the federal government was j u s t i f i e d i n imposing wage controls on the federal public sector under sec. 1 of the Charter, although he d i d not f i n d that the removal of the ri g h t to s t r i k e over non-compensatory issues was a j u s t i f i a b l e l i m i t under section 1. But generally he endorsed a broad sphere of government intervention, arguing that l e g i s l a t u r e s are j u s t i f i e d i n abrogating the r i g h t to s t r i k e and substituting a f a i r a r b i t r a t i n g scheme, i n circumstances when a s t r i k e or lock-out would be injurious to the economic int e r e s t s of t h i r d parties.84 In the other dissenting opinion, Wilson J. (also i d e n t i f i e d by Russell as a "left-winger" on the Court) agreed with Dickson that the employees' freedom of association had been infringed; but she went further, arguing that the progressive expansion of "essential services" by l e g i s l a t u r e s means that the d e f i n i t i o n of injury to t h i r d parties i s expanded as well, f a r beyond what i t should be. 34 In p a r t i c u l a r , ordering dairy workers back i n Saskatchewan would not s a t i s f y "injury" to a t h i r d party under section 1, because injury would be to the dairy companies, hardly an "innocent" t h i r d party. The Lavigne case, which also seeks to define p o s i t i v e freedom of association, asks the question of whether an i n d i v i d u a l has the ri g h t under negative freedom of association to opt out of expenditure of union dues on p o l i t i c a l causes to which he i s h o s t i l e , i . e . does t h i s expenditure constitute a form of unwanted association? Frances Lavigne i s a community college teacher and a member of the bargaining union, but not a member of the union. In h is action against the union and the college board (Council of Regents), Lavigne objected both to the compulsory payment of union dues by non-union members, and to the use of those dues i n support of p o l i t i c a l and s o c i a l causes with which he d i d not agreed, white J., i n the Ontario High Court judgment, agreed with the appellant that the case involved government action (see above); to hold otherwise, White argued, "would be to permit 'government'...to impose terms i n a contract that i t could not impose by statute or regulation because they breach the Charter." Accordingly, the f i e l d was now open to deal with the question of freedom of association i n t h i s case. While i t i s true, White admitted, that private associations "can serve to increase opportunities for s e l f r e a l i z a t i o n , counterbalancing the strength of centralized power" i n a democracy, "there i s support f o r a negative r i g h t as well i n these democratic values". Compelled payment of union dues ( i . e . the agency shop clause) forces non-members to associate with the 35 union, and therefore "there i s a prima f a c i e breach of t h e i r freedom of association". Is t h i s infringement j u s t i f i e d i n a free and democratic society? Under section 1, the Supreme Court has established the "proportionality t e s t " , which attempts to balance the i n t e r e s t s of the i n d i v i d u a l against those of society, recognizing that the rights and freedoms under the Charter are not absolute. The f i r s t branch of the t e s t asks whether there i s a r a t i o n a l connection between the governmental means and ends. The objective i n t h i s case i s the fostering of c o l l e c t i v e bargaining and promotion of labour peace; and the l e g i s l a t i v e requirement of an agency shop and therefore forced dues paying i s r a t i o n a l l y connected to t h i s objective. But does the means chosen to achieve the objective "impair the rights and freedoms of the non-members as l i t t l e as possible"? No, White declares, there i s a less r e s t r i c t i v e means. I t i s possible, he argues, to draft a clause i n a c o l l e c t i v e agreement providing f o r compulsory dues check-off that r e s t r i c t s the use of such dues to finance a c t i v i t i e s that are d i r e c t l y related to the objective sought to be achieved, that i s to c o l l e c t i v e bargaining and the administration of the c o l l e c t i v e agreement.86 And the t h i r d prong of the p r o p o r t i o n a l i t y test, whether there i s a balance between the means and ends, also f a i l s . P o l i t i c a l a c t i v i t i e s of a union are "legitimate and appropriate", but should not be financed by unwilling workers, and workers must therefore have the option of "opting-out" of payment of dues fo r those purposes.87 On appeal, the decision was e s s e n t i a l l y reversed; the nexus question under governmental action was not the forced payment of 36 dues, but the ( l a c k of) governmental a c t i o n i n v o l v e d i n d e c i s i o n s taken r e l a t i n g t o the expenditure o f union dues88. The mere making o f funds a v a i l a b l e t o the union without d i r e c t i o n o f any k i n d as t o use does not convert the union's expenditures i n t o governmental a c t i o n . The use o f the dues by OPSEU was a p r i v a t e a c t i v i t y by a p r i v a t e o r g a n i z a t i o n and hence beyond the reach o f the Charter.89 Having found no governmental a c t i o n , the c o u r t d i d not have t o c o n s i d e r whether t h e r e was a v i o l a t i o n o f freedom o f a s s o c i a t i o n , but i n view o f the arguments p l a c e d b e f o r e them, they d i d . The agency shop does not i m p a i r p o s i t i v e freedom o f a s s o c i a t i o n , the c o u r t argued, and even i f the C h a r t e r does c o n t a i n a guarantee o f n e g a t i v e freedom , "the simple requirement o f a monetary payment t o OPSEU i s not v i o l a t i v e o f h i s freedom". The compelled payment does not f o r c e Lavigne t o j o i n the union, t o p a r t i c i p a t e i n i t s a c t i v i t i e s , o r t o be i d e n t i f i e d w i t h any o f the p o l i t i c a l , s o c i a l o r i d e o l o g i c a l o b j e c t i v e s which the union may support f i n a n c i a l l y o r otherwise; "nor does i t impose any o b l i g a t i o n on him t o adapt o r conform t o the views advanced by the union". A r i g h t not t o a s s o c i a t e does not, i n t h i s c o u r t ' s o p i n i o n , " n e c e s s a r i l y i n c l u d e a r i g h t not t o be r e q u i r e d t o support an o r g a n i z a t i o n f i n a n c i a l l y . " The i n t e r e s t Lavigne may have i n b e i n g l e f t alone o r i n b e i n g unencumbered by any monetary o b l i g a t i o n t o the b a r g a i n i n g agent s e l e c t e d by the m a j o r i t y o f the b a r g a i n i n g u n i t . . . i s not, i n our view, an i n t e r e s t o f c o n s t i t u t i o n a l s t a t u s e n t i t l e d t o p r o t e c t i o n under the Charter.90 J u d i c i a l v a l u e s should not be imposed i n determining whether a union expenditure i s r e l a t e d t o c o l l e c t i v e b a r g a i n i n g . T h i s matter i s b e s t l e f t t o the unions, or, i f r e s t r i c t i o n s are t o be 37 imposed, they should be imposed by government; "the court should not be c a l l e d upon to monitor and examine every j o t and t i t t l e of union expenditure". Lavigne i s portrayed i n t h i s decision as an i n d i v i d u a l r e l a t i n g to the union almost on a "fee f o r service" basis. In t h i s kind of relationship, the union i s an association that provides a bargaining function to non-members, i n return f o r payment of a fee. The non-members are free to j o i n or pay fees to other associations, and are not i d e n t i f i e d i n any way with the union, just as a c l i e n t i s not i d e n t i f i e d with the other a c t i v i t i e s undertaken by a lawyer who i s handling his divorce. The Lavigne case w i l l be heard by the Supreme Court, and there w i l l doubtless be other Charter challenges to union security and union a c t i v i t i e s . The misgivings expressed by a number of judges about t h e i r expertise i n balancing the in t e r e s t s of labour and c a p i t a l , and "freezing" that balance, may signal a retreat from intervention i n the name of the Charter i n i n t e r e s t s deemed "economic". Certainly decisions rendered so f a r have not revolutionized labour law. P a r t l y t h i s i s because of the intermingling of public and private a c t i v i t y ; as F i n k e l s t e i n notes, "private actors work within an elaborate scheme and exercise powers granted by statute within an overarching regulatory scheme", and i t i s often d i f f i c u l t to sort out what constitutes government action and whether government action has taken place i n a p a r t i c u l a r s i t u a t i o n . A d d i t i o n a l l y , the decisions rendered are s i t u a t i o n s p e c i f i c , and i t i s not cl e a r what e f f e c t a decision which recognized negative l i b e r t y claims could have on the scope of labour relations generally. However, 38 the j u d i c i a r y i s c l e a r l y going to look at, and take seriously, the negative r i g h t of freedom from association; and i n the decisions already rendered, p o s i t i v e freedom of association has been given a much narrower reading than many trade union e l i t e s would have l i k e d . While Justices Dickson and Wilson r e a l i z e the dilemma trade unions face under negative and p o s i t i v e freedom, and appear to be w i l l i n g to go further than t h e i r colleagues i n giving weight to p o s i t i v e l i b e r t y arguments, they do not make up the majority of the court. It i s thus u n l i k e l y then that the courts w i l l put an end to the dilemma facing trade unions by grasping the p o s i t i v e "horn". And there are strong arguments why they should not. Besides the aforementioned arguments fo r choice ( p a r t i c u l a r l y the concern over coerced f i n a n c i a l support f o r p o l i t i c a l causes), to give credence to union i n i t i a t e d p o s i t i v e l i b e r t y claims exclusively would seem to be an odd way of balancing negative and p o s i t i v e freedom. In these cases, the discretionary r i g h t of the in d i v i d u a l must be given weight, as should the need f o r unions to protect themselves against f r e e - r i d e r s . How t h i s balance could be struck w i l l be the subject of Chapter Four. 39 C H A P T E R T H R E E : P O L I T I C S A N D T H E D I L E M M A I w a n t t o s a y t h a t w h e n c o m p l e t e d i n a j u s t f o r m , I w o u l d l i k e t h i s r e s o l u t i o n , p a r t i c u l a r l y t h e C h a r t e r o f R i g h t s a n d F r e e d o m s , t o h a n g o n t h e w a l l o f e v e r y c l a s s r o o m i n e v e r y r e g i o n o f C a n a d a . E d B r o a d b e n t , l e a d e r o f t h e N D P , H o u s e o f C o m m o n s D e b a t e s ^ 2 T h e d i l e m m a f a c i n g t r a d e u n i o n s a r i s e s f r o m t h e " t w o c o n c e p t s o f l i b e r t y " i m p l i c i t i n f r e e d o m o f a s s o c i a t i o n ; t h e f r e e d o m t o a n d t h e f r e e d o m n o t t o a s s o c i a t e . I n t h e l a s t c h a p t e r , a r e v i e w w a s u n d e r t a k e n o f t h e p o s i t i v e l i b e r t y a r g u m e n t s a d v a n c e d b y u n i o n l a w y e r s i n t h e c o u r t s . T h e s e a r g u m e n t s d i d n o t m e e t w i t h m u c h s u c c e s s , a n d t h e u n i o n s i n v o l v e d w e r e u n a b l e t o p e r s u a d e t h e c o u r t t o r e s o l v e t h e i r d i l e m m a b y g r a s p i n g o n l y i t s p o s i t i v e h o r n . B u t t r a d e u n i o n s m i g h t h a v e a v o i d e d t h e l e g a l d i l e m m a t h e y n o w f a c e b y a c t i n g p o l i t i c a l l y t o p e r s u a d e t h e g o v e r n m e n t t o a d o p t w o r d i n g i n t h e C h a r t e r w h i c h w o u l d l i m i t o r p r e v e n t t h e k i n d o f l e g a l c a s e s d e s c r i b e d i n C h a p t e r 2. B a r g a i n i n g b e t w e e n c a p i t a l a n d l a b o u r h a s b e e n s u b j e c t t o d e t a i l e d s t a t u t o r y r e g u l a t i o n s i n c e 1944, w h e n a f u l l s y s t e m o f l a b o u r r e l a t i o n s l a w w a s e s t a b l i s h e d b y t h e f e d e r a l g o v e r n m e n t u n d e r r e g u l a t i o n PC1003.93 B u t a t n o t i m e h a v e t h e r u l e s a n d r e g u l a t i o n s b e e n m a d e d i r e c t l y b y t h e p a r t i e s t o t h e r e l a t i o n s h i p ; i n t h e m a i n , g o v e r n m e n t s , b o t h p r o v i n c i a l a n d f e d e r a l , h a v e t a k e n o n t h a t r e s p o n s i b i l i t y . A n d l a b o u r l a w , a c c o r d i n g t o B e a t t y , i s v e r y m u c h a f u n c t i o n o f t h e r e l a t i v e i n f l u e n c e w h i c h t h e c o m p e t i n g i n t e r e s t s o f c o n s u m e r s , e m p l o y e r s , a n d p r o d u c e r s ( o r , m o r e a c c u r a t e l y , o r g a n i z e d s e g m e n t s w i t h i n t h e s e g r o u p s ) , a r e a b l e t o e x e r t o n t h e p o l i t i c a l p r o c e s s e s o f g o v e r n m e n t . 9 4 40 Both marxists and p l u r a l i s t s are able to subscribe to t h i s d e f i n i t i o n of how public p o l i c y i s made; although marxists would stress the omnipotent role of employers. Nevertheless, there are those who argue that organized labour has had some influence on pol i c y ; and many of those who argue that labour law has evolved to provide a more balanced c o l l e c t i v e bargaining process give some c r e d i t to trade unions as p o l i t i c a l actors f o r those gains.95 However, constitution-making ( i . e . the supreme law) has always been an e l i t e process i n Canada. Ideologically, Canada and Canadians emerged from anti-revolutionary roots, reinforced by the "profoundly anti-democratic strains i n the p o l i t i c a l ideology of nineteenth-century p o l i t i c a l leaders l i k e S i r John A. Macdonald."96 i n s t i t u t i o n a l b a r r i e r s to public involvement i n decision-making, the most important being federalism and the concentration of power i n the hands of the Cabinet, serve to l i m i t p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n the formulation of public p o l i c y to ministers, senior c i v i l servants and well-organized i n t e r e s t groups. The Special Joint Committee hearings on co n s t i t u t i o n a l reform, p a r t i c u l a r l y those i n 1980/1981, focused on the charter, and provided a forum f o r in t e r e s t groups to influence the debate. Both women's and native groups were p a r t i c u l a r l y successful i n getting the issue of t h e i r rights on the p o l i t i c a l agenda, and i n influencing the wording and strength of those r i g h t s . While neither group achieved a l l they set out to do, important gains were made.97 Yet i n the debate leading up to passage of the Charter, trade unions were (for the most part) 41 curiously s i l e n t , even though a structured i n t e r e s t group with funds and experience was already i n place. The Canadian Labour Congress represents 2.2 m i l l i o n trade unionists through a f f i l i a t i o n of 92 international and national unions, the three largest of which are public sector unions.9 8 Neither the CLC, nor any other labour body, attended the Joint Committee hearings on the Charter9 9 ; and only the B r i t i s h Columbia Federation of Labour submitted a b r i e f . The BCFL's in t e r e s t i n the Charter appears to have developed i n the l a t e 1970's, and was f i r s t o f f i c i a l l y recorded i n the 1980 Report of the P o l i t i c a l Education Committee to the annual conference. The Committee declared that a new constitu t i o n should protect the rights of workers by "guarantee[ing] them the co n s t i t u t i o n a l r i g h t to organize, bargain c o l l e c t i v e l y with t h e i r employer and...[it should include] the r i g h t to s t r i k e . " 1 0 0 In 1981, that concern was taken more seriously as part of the Executive Council report, which noted that Council research "unfortunately leads us to believe that eventual court interpretations of that Charter [the 1981 version] w i l l not be t o t a l l y to our l i k i n g " . 1 0 1 The BCFL's submission to the Joint Committee, made that same year, urged the government to protect the rig h t to organize trade unions and the rig h t to s t r i k e . 1 0 2 Not long a f t e r the Fed's submission, Svend Robinson, the New Democratic Party c r i t i c on the constitution 1°3, suggested an amendment to the proposed charter to the Joint Committee. C i t i n g precedents i n the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the International Covenant on C i v i l and P o l i t i c a l Rights, and the European Convention on Human Rights, Robinson argued that freedom 42 of association should e x p l i c i t l y include "the freedom to organize and bargain c o l l e c t i v e l y " . 1 0 4 Robinson hastened to assure the Committee however, that his amendment, while recognizing "one of the most fundamental values of Canadian society", d i d not go so f a r as to entrench i n the constitution the r i g h t to s t r i k e . l Q 5 The L i b e r a l response was to assert that these freedoms were already i m p l i c i t i n freedom of association, and that by s i n g l i n g out association f o r bargaining one might tend to diminish a l l the other forms of association which are contemplated- church associations, associations of f r a t e r n a l organizations or community associations. 1 0© Besides, one of the Liberals asked, i f t h i s amendment i s so important, why have no labour groups come before the Committee asking f o r i t ? The best Robinson could muster was to r e f e r to the b r i e f s from the B.C. Federation of Labour, the United Church of Canada, and one other unnamed group; therefore, he concluded, "there have been a number of submissions i n that respect". Needless to say, the other Committee members were not convinced, and the amendment f a i l e d . 1 0 7 That i s the only reference to freedom of association and unions i n the Joint Committee hearings (from the 1970 Molgat/McGuigan to the 1980/1981 s e s s i o n s ) . 1 0 8 How can we account f o r labour's lack of action? No single reason can supply the whole answer, but undoubtedly labour's " t r a d i t i o n a l economism" played a large part i n the CLC decision not to involve themselves a c t i v e l y i n the debate. Trade unions were sharply c r i t i c a l of the federal government's devotion of "excess time and energy to the c o n s t i t u t i o n a l debate at the expense of t h e i r other r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s " . Unemployment had been 4 3 hovering around the m i l l i o n mark i n the early 1980s, i n f l a t i o n was above eleven percent and r i s i n g , and i n t e r e s t rates had "rocketed to l e v e l s that threaten[ed] to destroy our economy". 1 09 Canadians unions were attempting to hold t h e i r ground economically by refusing to follow the same path as American unions and engage i n concession bargaining. But they had l i t t l e to celebrate; r e a l wages were i n decline, the wage gap between union and non-union workers was closing, and there was a decline i n s t r i k e a c t i v i t y with a corresponding increase i n l e g i s l a t e d back-to-work measures. 1 1 0 Union members expected t h e i r union executive to protect the economic gains they believed they had won from employers, and thus the " o f f i c i a l " reason advanced by the CLC executive f o r i t s lack of action on the Charter was t h e i r concern about the state of the economy and i t s e f f e c t on t h e i r members. Although the economy during the early 1970s, when the Molgat-McGuigan hearings began, was not i n the same serious condition at i t was i n the l a t e 1970s and early 1980s, the t r a d i t i o n a l focus on 'business unionism' remained, complicated by a number of other factors, including the long-standing i n t e r n a l problems at the CLC. There were a number of d i v i s i o n s i n regard to the charter both within and between the CLC a f f i l i a t e d unions; over the need f o r s o c i a l and economic rights, over the role of the courts and entrenchment of rights, and, most seriously, over the Quebec/Ottawa c r i s i s that p r e c i p i t a t e d the new round of c o n s t i t u t i o n a l negotiations i n the l a t e 1970s. 1 1 1 The Quebec Federation of Labour (a CLC a f f i l i a t e ) supported the P a r t i Quebecois p o s i t i o n i n the c o n s t i t u t i o n a l d e b a t e . 1 1 2 The province 44 o f Quebec was the c e n t r a l focus o f f e d e r a l / p r o v i n c i a l t e n s i o n s and the e l e c t i o n o f the P a r t i Quebecois i n 1976, committed t o e s t a b l i s h i n g p o l i t i c a l s o v e r e i g n t y f o r Quebec, c a l l e d i n t o q u e s t i o n the b a s i c p o l i t i c a l arrangements o f f e d e r a l i s m . As Quebec modernized a f t e r the Qu i e t R e v o l u t i o n , a new Quebecois m i d d l e - c l a s s emerged, much o f i t u n i o n i z e d p u b l i c s e r v a n t s . E n g l i s h and French groups began t o compete f o r the same p o s i t i o n s , and as E n g l i s h / F r e n c h t e n s i o n s grew, economic g r i e v a n c e s f o c u s e d on comparisons between the e n g l i s h economic e l i t e and the f r e n c h 'factory-workers' and ' e l e v a t o r o p e r a t o r s ' . The PQ response on the n a t i o n a l l e v e l was d i r e c t e d t o s e p a r a t i o n o f Quebec from Canada, a l b e i t w i t h a c o n t i n u i n g economic r e l a t i o n s h i p . In 1980, the Levesque government " t e s t e d " Quebec n a t i o n a l i s m w i t h a referendum on s o v e r e i g n t y - a s s o c i a t i o n ; and even though the "no" vote c a r r i e d the referendum, arguments f o r s p e c i a l s t a t u s continued. T h i s view contends t h a t the Quebec government i s and must be the primary p o l i t i c a l v o i c e o f the Quebecois, and t h e r e f o r e r e q u i r e s e x t r a o r d i n a r y l e g i s l a t i v e and f i s c a l powers. Most i m p o r t a n t l y , i t must be a b l e t o p r o t e c t the f r e n c h language and c u l t u r e , and have the power t o d e f i n e how t h a t be accomplished. H 3 But Prime M i n i s t e r Trudeau's v i s i o n o f Canada was i n c o n f l i c t w i t h any n o t i o n o f Quebec s p e c i a l s t a t u s . I n s t e a d Trudeau p l a c e d v a l u e on i n d i v i d u a l r i g h t s , making a fundamental d i s t i n c t i o n between the f r e n c h l i n g u i s t i c group and the Quebec government. Reform, he agreed, was needed, but reform i m p l i e d the promotion o f i n d i v i d u a l French-Canadian i n t e r e s t s a c r o s s Canada, not the s t r e n g t h e n i n g o f the government o f Quebec. 45 " R e n e w e d f e d e r a l i s m " w a s T r u d e a u ' s p r o m i s e t o t h e Q u e b e c o i s , b u t w h e n i t c a m e t i m e t o s i g n t h e c o n s t i t u t i o n a l a g r e e m e n t , t h e Q u e b e c g o v e r n m e n t w a s n o t a t t h e t a b l e . T h i s d i v i s i o n w a s r e f l e c t e d i n t h e C L C ; t h e Q F L s u p p o r t e d t h e P a r t i Q u e b e c o i s , a n d t h e r e s t o f t h e p r o v i n c i a l l a b o u r f e d e r a t i o n s s u p p o r t e d f o r t h e N D P . W h i l e t h a t d i v i s i o n w o u l d h a v e p e r h a p s l e f t r o o m f o r s o m e u n i t e d a c t i o n o n m a t t e r s s u c h a s f r e e d o m o f a s s o c i a t i o n , t h e C L C w a s u n p r e p a r e d o r u n a b l e t o m e n d t h e s p l i t . A s P a n i t c h o b s e r v e s , i t w a s u n l i k e l y t h a t a w e a k a n d i d e o l o g i c a l l y c o n f u s e d c e n t r a l l a b o u r f e d e r a t i o n l i k e t h e C L C w o u l d s u d d e n l y f i n d t h e c a p a c i t y , n o t j u s t t o m e d i a t e s u c h s e c t i o n a l i s m , b u t t o o v e r c o m e i t a n d l e a d a c o - o r d i n a t e d s t r u g g l e . 1 1 4 T h i s d i v i s i o n r e s u l t e d p a r t l y f r o m y e a r s o f n e g l e c t o f t h e " s o c i a l m o v e m e n t " s i d e o f u n i o n i s m , w i t h a c o r r e s p o n d i n g e m p h a s i s o n " b u s i n e s s u n i o n i s m " a n d e c o n o m i c i s s u e s ; a s C . B . M a c P h e r s o n n o t e s , u n i o n s h a v e ( i n t h e m a i n ) u s e d t h e i r p o w e r " t o g e t i m m e d i a t e m a t e r i a l b e n e f i t s o r t o h o l d o n t o t h e i r s h a r e 1 1 ^ T h u s i t i s n o s u r p r i s e t h a t t h e C L C e x e c u t i v e w o u l d c h o o s e t o o p t o u t o f t h e c o n s t i t u t i o n a l d e b a t e , a n d s t i c k w i t h t h e i s s u e s i t k n e w a n d c o u l d h a n d l e b e s t . 1 1 * * B e s i d e s , t h e C L C a l l i a n c e w i t h t h e N D P w a s a i m e d t o w a r d a d i v i s i o n o f l a b o u r ; p o l i t i c s c o u l d a n d / o r s h o u l d b e l e f t t o t h e p o l i t i c i a n s . B u t t h e N D P d i d n o t s e e t h e C h a r t e r d e b a t e a s t h e i r o p p o r t u n i t y t o c o n c e n t r a t e o n a d v a n c i n g o r e v e n d e f e n d i n g t h e i n t e r e s t s o f t h e i r m o s t i m p o r t a n t c o n s t i t u e n c y . W h i l e t h e r e w a s a b o d y o f o p i n i o n i n t h e p a r t y o p p o s e d t o a c h a r t e r ( e s p e c i a l l y a n e n t r e n c h e d b i l l o f r i g h t s 1 1 7 ) , m o s t N D P m e m b e r s s u p p o r t e d t h e 46 i d e a ( l ) o f r i g h t s , a s d i d t h e m a j o r i t y o f C a n a d i a n s . 1 1 8 T h e f e d e r a l p a r t y s u p p o r t e d t h e L i b e r a l s o n t h e C h a r t e r , c o n f l i c t i n g o n l y o n c e o v e r p r o p e r t y r i g h t s . T h e o n l y N D P M e m b e r o f P a r l i a m e n t t o v o t e a g a i n s t t h e C h a r t e r w a s S v e n d R o b i n s o n , n o t b e c a u s e o f h i s d e f e a t e d a m e n d m e n t o n f r e e d o m o f a s s o c i a t i o n , b u t i n p r o t e s t o v e r t h e o v e r r i d e c l a u s e . W h y d i d t h e N D P n o t t a k e a n y f u r t h e r a c t i o n t h a n t h e a b o v e - m e n t i o n e d C o m m i t t e e a t t e m p t t o a m e n d f r e e d o m o f a s s o c i a t i o n ? P a n i t c h a r g u e s t h a t b o t h l a b o u r a n d t h e N D P e i t h e r a c c e p t e d o r w e r e w i l l i n g t o b e l i e v e t h a t t h e p r o p o s e d c h a r t e r " h a d n o t h i n g t o d o w i t h p o w e r , e i t h e r s o c i a l p o w e r o r j u d i c i a l p o w e r , t h a t i t w a s a n o n - p a r t i s a n d o c u m e n t u n a m b i g u o u s l y a d v a n c i n g h u m a n r i g h t s " . 1 1 ^ i t i s d i f f i c u l t t o r e f u t e t h i s i n t e r p r e t a t i o n , g i v e n t h e l a c k o f a c t i o n o n t h e p a r t o f b o t h l a b o u r a n d t h e N D P ; b u t e q u a l l y d i f f i c u l t t o s u p p o r t i t o n t h e b a s i s o f a v a i l a b l e e v i d e n c e . H o w e v e r , i m p l i c i t i n P a n i t c h ' s a r g u m e n t i s t h e a s s u m p t i o n t h a t l a b o u r a n d t h e N D P a g r e e d o n a p a r t i c u l a r a p p r o a c h t o t h e C h a r t e r . B u t t h e r e h a v e b e e n a n d c o n t i n u e t o b e d i f f i c u l t i e s i n t h e N D P / l a b o u r r e l a t i o n s h i p . T h e p r e s i d e n t o f t h e C a n a d i a n A u t o W o r k e r s , B o b W h i t e , o f f e r e d h i s p u b l i c a n a l y s i s o f t h e ' p a r t n e r s h i p ' b e t w e e n u n i o n s a n d t h e N D P a f t e r t h e l a s t e l e c t i o n i n w h i c h t h e N D P w a s u n s u c c e s s f u l a t c o n v i n c i n g e n o u g h C a n a d i a n s a b o u t t h e " d i s a s t e r " a w a i t i n g t h e m u n d e r f r e e t r a d e . D u r i n g t h e d e b a t e , u n i o n s o f t e n w o r k e d i n f r e e - t r a d e c o a l i t i o n s , c i r c u m v e n t i n g t h e N D P a n d w h a t t h e y p e r c e i v e d o f t e n a s a n u n i n f o r m e d " p o l i t i c a l " d e b a t e . T h e N D P c a n n o t s u r v i v e w i t h o u t u n i o n i n v o l v e m e n t , W h i t e a r g u e s , b u t u n i o n m e m b e r s a r e s c e p t i c a l a b o u t t h e p a r t y . O v e r c o m i n g t h a t 47 scepticism requires that the NDP demonstrates i t i s r e a l l y on our side; that i t c l e a r l y i d e n t i f i e s i t s constituency and i d e n t i f i e s with t h i s constituency; that i t joins our struggles inside and outside Parliament, between elections as well as during e l e c t i o n s . 1 2 0 The attitude of many i n the party, White complains, i s that union leaders do not 'deliver the v o t e ' 1 2 1 , and the union l i n k serves only to decrease the NDP's popularity and thus e l e c t a b i l i t y . To White, and presumably to other union leaders as well, the party must be ready to defend i t s "natural constituents", or i t w i l l s u f f e r both at e l e c t i o n time and between elections when party organization and strength could be increased. But A l l a n Blakeney, the NDP premier of Saskatchewan, did t r y to persuade Dennis McDermott, the leader of the CLC, that he should become involved i n the Joint Committee hearings. However, McDermott was not about to take advice from "some f a r m e r " . 1 2 2 In fact, the CLC executive had withdrawn t h e i r representatives from a number of ongoing t r i p a r t i t e government-sponsored committees a f t e r Trudeau had i n s t i t u t e d the 6 and 5 program i n 1975. 1 2^ McDermott was furious with Trudeau over wage controls and absolutely refused to have anything to do with the Joint Committee, which he saw as simply another attempt by Trudeau to co-opt labour. McDermott even went to the extent of blocking a scheduled B.C. Federation of Labour appearance before the Committee. Consequently, the BCFL b r i e f , which could have had quite an impact at the hearings, r e a l l y got ' l o s t i n the s h u f f l e ' . Paul Cavalluzzo, a well-known trade union lawyer, credits McDermott's personal animosity towards Trudeau as a major reason 48 why the CLC d i d not involve i t s e l f i n the 1980/1981 h e a r i n g s . 1 2 4 Interestingly enough, business was equally as uninvolved i n the "debate" over freedom of association. The major lobby groups that represent the business community, such as the Canadian Chamber of Commerce and the Business Council on National Issues, did play an active role at the Joint Committee hearings, but t h e i r focus was on property rights, not freedom of association. That campaign was derailed when the NDP threatened to withdraw t h e i r support from the Charter i f property rights were i n s t i t u t e d ; but apparently, business, l i k e trade unions, did not attempt to influence the wording of freedom of association. There i s l i k e l y a connection between those two actions; since the unions d i d not focus on freedom of association, neither d i d b u s i n e s s . 1 2 5 Of course, a l l these reasons why the unions d i d not act assume that unions have the power to change (some) government decisions. There i s , of course, the debate between marxists and p l u r a l i s t s as to whether labour has the a b i l i t y to influence public p o l i c y ; but that question aside, there i s , f o r some union executives, a f e e l i n g of powerlessness, an i n a b i l i t y to influence the p o l i t i c a l because of the s t r u c t u r a l ennui inside t h e i r unions. J. C. Parrot (leader of the Postal Workers Union, j a i l e d f o r two months fo r refusing to order his members back to work), i n an interview i n Studies i n P o l i t i c a l Economy, states that union leaders f i n d themselves overwhelmed by the l e g a l ramifications of " f i g h t i n g i n the streets", unable to maintain grassroots connections with t h e i r membership, unable (and often unwilling) to work with other unions, and often unable to develop 49 t h e i r o w n p o l i c i e s e x c e p t f o r t h o s e t h r u s t u p o n t h e m f r o m a b o v e b y t h e C L C . 1 2 * * I f t h o s e i n t h e t r a d e u n i o n e l i t e f e e l p o w e r l e s s , o r i n c a p a b l e o f i n t e r n a l s t r u c t u r a l c o n t r o l , i t i s n o t s u r p r i s i n g s o l i t t l e w a s d o n e t o a f f e c t t h e w o r d i n g a n d / o r m e a n i n g o f f r e e d o m o f a s s o c i a t i o n u n d e r t h e C h a r t e r . H o w e v e r , o n t h e w h o l e i t w o u l d a p p e a r , a s R e g i n a l d W h i t a k e r a r g u e s , t h a t b o t h t h e N D P a n d t h e C L C a c c e p t e d t h a t " d e m o c r a c y i n C a n a d a s e e m s p r e t t y w e l l d e f i n e d b y l i b e r a l l i m i t s " 1 2 * 7 ; a n d p e r h a p s t h i s i s q u i t e u n d e r s t a n d a b l e . F r e e d o m o f a s s o c i a t i o n i s a p a r t i c u l a r l y i m p o r t a n t r i g h t f o r l a b o u r , a n d i t m a y b e t h a t b o t h N D P a n d t h e C L C m e m b e r s b e l i e v e d t h a t , i n a s o c i e t y i n w h i c h p e o p l e a r e e d u c a t e d a b o u t a n d s u p p o r t c i v i l l i b e r t i e s , l a b o u r w o u l d b e n e f i t . A t t h a t t i m e l a b o u r s a w i t s e l f a s u n d e r s e i g e . P u b l i c a n d p o l i t i c a l o p i n i o n w a s c o o l , i f n o t h o s t i l e , t o a l e g a l a n d s o c i a l e n v i r o n m e n t w h i c h a p p e a r e d " f a r t o o a c c o m m o d a t i n g t o t h e w i s h e s a n d w h i m s o f w o r k e r s " . 1 2 8 A g a i n s t c a l l s f o r w a g e a n d p r i c e c o n t r o l s , e c o n o m i c f r e e z o n e s , r e s t r i c t i o n s o n t h e r i g h t t o s t r i k e i n t h e p u b l i c s e c t o r , a n d t h e r e p e a l o f p r o g r e s s i v e l a b o u r c o d e s ( s u c h a s i n B r i t i s h C o l u m b i a ) , a n " i m p e r f e c t " f r e e d o m o f a s s o c i a t i o n m a y w e l l h a v e b e e n p e r c e i v e d q u i t e f a v o u r a b l y . B u t n o w t h a t t h e t r a d e u n i o n s a r e a w a r e o f t h e d i l e m m a i n h e r e n t i n f r e e d o m o f a s s o c i a t i o n , t h e r e i s , p e r h a p s , a n o t h e r a v e n u e o f i n f l u e n c e o p e n t o t h e m ; t h e y c a n a p p e a l j u d i c i a l d e c i s i o n s d i r e c t l y t h r o u g h t h e o p e n i n g l e f t i n s e c t i o n 3 3 . J u d i c i a l r e v i e w i n C a n a d a d o e s n o t h a v e t h e s a m e f i n a l s t a t u s t h a t i t d o e s i n t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s . T h e e l i t e ( a n d s o m e w h a t p u b l i c ) d e b a t e o v e r p a r l i a m e n t a r y s o v e r e i g n t y v e r s u s j u d i c i a l r e v i e w ( i . e . w h e t h e r r i g h t s s h o u l d b e e n t r e n c h e d ) i n t h e 50 C h a r t e r e n d e d w i t h a ' t y p i c a l C a n a d i a n c o m p r o m i s e , t h e n o n o b s t a n t e c l a u s e . In t h e w o r d s o f P a u l W e i l e r , t h e n o t w i t h -s t a n d i n g c l a u s e o f f e r e d " a c o m p r o m i s e b e t w e e n t h e B r i t i s h v e r s i o n o f f u l l - f l e d g e d parliamentary s o v e r e i g n t y a n d t h e American v e r s i o n o f f u l l - f l e d g e d j u d i c i a l a u t h o r i t y o v e r c o n s t i t u t i o n a l m a t t e r s " . 1 2 ^ B y e n t r e n c h i n g r i g h t s , Weiler a r g u e d , w e m a k e i t c l e a r t o t h e c o u r t t h a t o u r i n t e n t i s t o g i v e a "deeper l e g a l s t a t u s t o o u r f u n d a m e n t a l r i g h t s " ; b u t o n c e t h e j u d g e s h a v e h a d t h e i r ' f i n a l s a y ' , g o v e r n m e n t s h o u l d h a v e i t s . H o w e v e r , i n o r d e r f o r a g o v e r n m e n t t o o v e r r i d e a S u p r e m e C o u r t r u l i n g ( o r t h e s u p p o s i t i o n t h a t t h e S u p r e m e C o u r t w o u l d s t r i k e d o w n l e g i s l a t i o n f o r i n f r i n g i n g o n a . p a r t i c u l a r f r e e d o m ) , i t w i l l h a v e t o o v e r c o m e c o n s i d e r a b l e p o l i t i c a l h u r d l e s , i n c l u d i n g t h e ' f u l l g l a r e o f p u b l i c i t y ' a n d a f i v e y e a r r e n e w a l r e q u i r e m e n t . S e c t i o n (33), " e x p r e s s l y p e r m i t [ s ] t h e f e d e r a l P a r l i a m e n t o r a p r o v i n c i a l l e g i s l a t u r e t o e x e m p t a s t a t u t e f r o m c o m p l i a n c e w i t h c e r t a i n p r o v i s i o n s " . T h e f u n d a m e n t a l f r e e d o m s u n d e r t h e C h a r t e r - f r e e d o m o f r e l i g i o n , e x p r e s s i o n , a s s e m b l y a n d a s s o c i a t i o n - a r e s u b j e c t t o l e g i s l a t i v e o v e r r i d e u n d e r s e c t i o n 33. A l t h o u g h t h e n o n o b s t a n t e h a s b e e n u s e d a n u m b e r o f t i m e s i n Q u e b e c l 3 0 , f o r e c a s t s o f f r e q u e n t a n d e x c e s s i v e p r o v i n c i a l u s e h a v e n o t c o m e t o p a s s . H o w e v e r , i n v o k i n g s e c t i o n 33 d o e s o f f e r a w a y o f s o l v i n g a n e g a t i v e f r e e d o m o f a s s o c i a t i o n j u d g m e n t f o r u n i o n s , i f t h e p o l i t i c a l c l i m a t e i s s u c h t h a t a g o v e r n m e n t c a n b e p e r s u a d e d t o o v e r r u l e a j u d i c i a l d e c i s i o n . T h e o n l y t i m e t h e n o t w i t h s t a n d i n g h a s b e e n i n v o k e d o u t s i d e Q u e b e c , i t w a s u s e d i n S a s k a t c h e w a n t o o v e r r i d e f r e e d o m o f a s s o c i a t i o n a n d o r d e r p u b l i c s e r v a n t s b a c k t o w o r k . I n t h a t c a s e , t h e Devine C o n s e r v a t i v e 5 1 g o v e r n m e n t l e g i s l a t e d a n e n d t o r o t a t i n g s t r i k e s b y t h e S a s k a t c h e w a n G o v e r n m e n t E m p l o y e e s U n i o n b y i n s e r t i n g a n o v e r r i d e c l a u s e i n b a c k - t o - w o r k l e g i s l a t i o n , p r e v e n t i n g a c h a l l e n g e t o t h e l e g i s l a t i o n o n t h e b a s i s o f t h e C h a r t e r . 1 3 1 o b v i o u s l y w e c a n n o t d r a w a c o n c l u s i o n b a s e d o n a s i n g l e c a s e , b u t i t i s p e r h a p s s i g n i f i c a n t t h a t t h e o n l y t i m e a g o v e r n m e n t h a s b e e n w i l l i n g t o u n d e r g o t h e ' f u l l g l a r e o f p u b l i c i t y ' a n d i n v o k e t h e n o t w i t h s t a n d i n g ( e x c e p t f o r Q u e b e c ) h a s b e e n w h e n u n i o n s a r e i n v o l v e d . T h a t f a c t o r d o e s n o t b o d e w e l l f o r e i t h e r g o v e r n m e n t o r p u b l i c o p i n i o n r e g a r d i n g u n i o n s i n ' S a s k a t c h e w a n . H a v e t h e o t h e r f a c t o r s t h a t s e r v e d t o p r e v e n t a c t i o n o n f r e e d o m o f a s s o c i a t i o n c h a n g e d ? T h e m a j o r d i f f e r e n c e i s i n u n i o n a w a r e n e s s o f t h e s e r i o u s n e s s o f t h e l e g a l c a s e s f a c i n g t h e m . A C L C s p o k e s p e r s o n a c k n o w l e d g e d i n l a t e 1 9 8 5 , t h r e e y e a r s a f t e r p a s s a g e o f t h e C h a r t e r , t h a t a v i c t o r y f o r L a v i g n e m i g h t " r e n d e r t h e l a b o u r m o v e m e n t a b s o l u t e l y i m p o t e n t " . 1 3 2 N o t w i t h s t a n d i n g t h e o u t c o m e o f v a r i o u s j u d i c i a l d e c i s i o n s , t h e c o s t t o u n i o n s i n l e g a l f e e s a n d d i r e c t i o n o f e n e r g i e s h a s b e e n h i g h . 1 3 3 j n a d d i t i o n , t h a t t i m e l a g a l l o w e d a r i g h t w i n g l o b b y g r o u p , t h e N a t i o n a l C i t i z e n s ' C o a l i t i o n , t o r a i s e f u n d s t o p a y l e g a l f e e s f o r M e r v L a v i g n e , a m a n t h e y c o m p a r e t o W i n s t o n C h u r c h i l l . T h e i r a p p e a l f o r " v o l u n t a r y s u p p o r t " i s p h r a s e d i n t e r m s o f ' f r e e d o m ' ; MERV LAVIGNE DOESN'T QUIT. NEITHER DOES THE NATIONAL CITIZENS' COALITION. . . . P l e a s e f i l l i n t h e c o u p o n b e l o w a n d t a k e a s t a n d f o r f r e e d o m - t o d a y . 1 3 4 T h e N C C i s r u n b y a b o a r d o f " w e a l t h y b u s i n e s s p e o p l e " , w h o p e r c e i v e t h e u n i o n m o v e m e n t a s t h e i r " m o r t a l e n e m y " 1 3 5 ( p r e s u m a b l y t h e s a m e w a y u n i o n s p e r c e i v e t h e N C C ) . S o n o w , b e s i d e s h a v i n g t o 52 o v e r c o m e t h e a b o v e m e n t i o n e d d i f f i c u l t i e s , t h e r e i s o r g a n i z e d , w e l l - f u n d e d o p p o s i t i o n t o t h e p r e s e n t t r a d e u n i o n s t a n d s o n f r e e d o m o f a s s o c i a t i o n q u e s t i o n s , o p p o s i t i o n t h a t w a s n o t o r g a n i z e d b e f o r e t h e C h a r t e r . A d d t o t h a t t h e d i f f i c u l t y o f c h a n g i n g d e c i s i o n s a f t e r t h e f a c t , a n d t h e c o n t i n u i n g " u n e a s i n e s s " b e t w e e n t h e N D P a n d t h e l a b o u r m o v e m e n t , t h e p o s s i b i l i t y o f t r a d e u n i o n e l i t e s p e r s u a d i n g g o v e r n m e n t s t o a d o p t a m a n d a t o r y ( p o s i t i v e ) r i g h t o f f r e e d o m o f a s s o c i a t i o n i n t h e t r a d e u n i o n c o n t e x t s e e m s u n l i k e l y . T r a d e u n i o n e l i t e s a r g u e , h o w e v e r , t h a t t h e i r u n i o n s m u s t t o b e f r e e t o c o n t i n u e t h e i r p o l i t i c a l e f f o r t s t o i n f l u e n c e g o v e r n m e n t , i n f l u e n c e t h a t m a y b e s e r i o u s l y w e a k e n e d b y a c o u r t d e c i s i o n t h a t a l l o w s d i s s e n t i n g d u e s p a y e r s t o o p t o u t o f u n i o n p o l i t i c a l e x p e n d i t u r e s . H o w g o v e r n m e n t s a n d t h e c o u r t s r e s p o n d t o t h a t a r g u m e n t w i l l d e p e n d p a r t l y o n h o w m u c h i m p o r t a n c e t h e y a t t a c h t o t h e i n d i v i d u a l c h o i c e . I w i l l a r g u e i n t h e n e x t c h a p t e r t h a t t h e c o s t ( i n t e r m s o f l o s s o f f r e e d o m ) t o c o e r c e t h e d i s s e n t i n g i n d i v i d u a l t o f i n a n c i a l l y s u p p o r t p o l i t i c a l a c t i o n t o w h i c h h e i s i n d i s a g r e e m e n t i s t o o h i g h . 53 C H A P T E R F O U R : T H E D I L E M M A I N R I G H T S T H E O R Y T h e s o u r c e o f t h e d i l e m m a f a c i n g t r a d e u n i o n s h a s b e e n i d e n t i f i e d a s t h e c o m p e t i n g c l a i m s o f n e g a t i v e a n d p o s i t i v e l i b e r t y , a n d e v i d e n c e o f t h a t d e b a t e h a v e b e e n c i t e d i n t h e l e g a l a n d p o l i t i c a l a r e n a s . B u t m a r x i s t t h e o r i s t s w o u l d a r g u e t h a t t h e u n d e r l y i n g c a u s e o f t h e f r e e d o m o f a s s o c i a t i o n d i l e m m a f o r t r a d e u n i o n s ( w h i l e i t a r i s e s f r o m t h e c o n f l i c t b e t w e e n n e g a t i v e a n d p o s i t i v e f r e e d o m ) i s l i b e r a l r i g h t s t h e o r y , i e . i n d i v i d u a l s a s s e r t i n g t h e i r r i g h t s i n a s e l f i s h a n d s e l f - i n t e r e s t e d m a n n e r . W h a t o c c u r s i n t h e l e g a l a n d p o l i t i c a l a r e n a s w i t h r e g a r d t o r i g h t s i s t h e n s i m p l y a m a n i f e s t a t i o n o f t h e u n d e r l y i n g p r o b l e m i n l i b e r a l r i g h t s t h e o r y . T h e m a r x i s t c r i t i q u e i s b a s e d o n a d e s c r i p t i o n o f r i g h t s i n l i b e r a l s o c i e t y a s a n a l o g o u s t o h a v i n g a w a r r a n t , p r o v i d e d b y s o c i a l l y e s t a b l i s h e d r u l e s , t h a t h o l d s a g a i n s t s o m e a t l e a s t l o o s e l y s p e c i f i e d r a n g e o f o b j e c t i o n s a n d t h a t a u t h o r i z e s A , u s u a l l y o n h i s d e c i s i o n , t o e n g a g e i n a t y p e o f a c t i o n t h a t A j u d g e s t o b e a d v a n t a g e o u s t o h i m s e l f a n d t h a t i s o f t e n j u d g e d , o r c a n b e e x p e c t e d o f t e n t o b e j u d g e d , d i s a d v a n t a g e o u s t o s o m e B o r B s . 1 3 * " ' T h e p r o b l e m w i t h l i b e r a l r i g h t s , a c c o r d i n g t o M a r x , w a s t h a t n o n e o f t h e m w e n t b e y o n d " e g o i s t i c m a n , . . . a n i n d i v i d u a l w i t h d r a w n b e h i n d h i s p r i v a t e i n t e r e s t s a n d w h i m s a n d s e p a r a t e d f r o m t h e c o m m u n i t y " . A 3 7 ^ h e i n d i v i d u a l i n a c a p i t a l i s t s o c i e t y , M a r x d e c l a r e s , n e e d s s o m e c o e r c i v e l y m a i n t a i n e d g u a r a n t e e t h a t a c t s o f o t h e r s w i l l n o t i m p e r i l t h e p u r s u i t a n d f u l f i l m e n t o f h i s i n t e r e s t s ( w h i c h a r e c o n c e r n e d m a i n l y w i t h h i s o w n p r o p e r t y a n d h i s f r e e d o m t o b u y a n d s e l l ) . F r e e d o m i n a l i b e r a l s o c i e t y i s a f r e e d o m w h i c h p e r t a i n s o n l y t o m a n " t r e a t e d a s a n i s o l a t e d m o n a d 54 a n d w i t h d r a w n i n t o h i m s e l f " ; a n d r i g h t s a c c o r d i n g l y " l e a d m a n t o s e e i n o t h e r m e n n o t t h e r e a l i z a t i o n , b u t t h e l i m i t a t i o n o f h i s o w n f r e e d o m s " . 1 3 8 M a r x ' s c r i t i q u e o f r i g h t s i s b o u n d u p w i t h h i s g e n e r a l v i e w o f m a n i n a c a p i t a l i s t s o c i e t y , i n w h i c h t h e i l l u s i o n i s f o s t e r e d o f m a n a s a n i n d i v i d u a l f r e e o f a n y e s s e n t i a l d e p e n d e n c e o n o t h e r s , b u t w h i c h i n r e a l i t y f i n d s m a n u n c u l t u r e d a n d u n s o c i a l . . . c o r r u p t e d b y t h e w h o l e o r g a n i z a t i o n o f s o c i e t y , l o s t t o h i m s e l f , s o l d , g i v e n o v e r t o t h e d o m i n a t i o n o f i n h u m a n c o n d i t i o n s a n d e l e m e n t s . . . [ h e ] t r e a t s o t h e r m e n a s m e a n s , d e g r a d e s h i m s e l f t o a m e a n s , a n d b e c o m e s t h e p l a y t h i n g o f a l i e n p o w e r s . ^ 3 9 R i g h t s t h e n s y m b o l i z e t h e a l i e n a t i o n o f m a n f r o m " s p e c i e s - b e i n g " ( t h e m a n i f e s t a t i o n o f l i f e i n a n d t h r o u g h s o c i a l a c t i v i t y a n d s o c i a l e n j o y m e n t 1 4 0 ) a n d i n s t e a d p r e s e n t s o c i a l l i f e " a s a f r a m e w o r k e x t e r i o r t o i n d i v i d u a l s , a l i m i t a t i o n o f t h e i r o r i g i n a l s e l f - s u f f i c i e n c y " . 1 4 1 T h e l i b e r a l t h e o r y o f r i g h t s r e f l e c t s a n i n d i v i d u a l i s t i c m o d e l o f s o c i e t y , c l a s s d i v i d e d a n d c o n f l i c t r i d d e n . R i g h t s " e x p r e s s t h e g r o u n d r u l e s o f a t y p e o f s o c i e t y w h i c h c o n s i s t s o f i s o l a t e d o r a t o m i c i n d i v i d u a l s i n p e r p e t u a l c o n f l i c t w i t h e a c h o t h e r i n a s t r u g g l e f o r w e a l t h a n d d o m i n a t i o n . " 1 4 2 F u r t h e r m o r e , t h i s a b s t r a c t i o n o f r i g h t s p r i n c i p l e s l i k e f r e e d o m o f a s s o c i a t i o n a l l o w s u s t o n e g l e c t o r i g n o r e t h e n o n -e g a l i t a r i a n a s p e c t s o f c a p i t a l i s t s o c i e t y : w h i l e ' e q u a l ' h o l d i n g o f r i g h t s a r e e m p h a s i z e d , t h e d i f f e r e n c e s a n d i n e q u a l i t i e s b e t w e e n t h o s e w h o d o a n d d o n o t h a v e c o n t r o l o v e r t h e m e a n s o f p r o d u c t i o n g o l a r g e l y i g n o r e d . E q u a l r i g h t s , f a r f r o m b r i n g i n g e q u a l i t y , s i m p l y m e a n t h a t " e a c h m a n s h a l l w i t h o u t d i s c r i m i n a t i o n b e t r e a t e d a s a s e l f - s u f f i c i e n t m o n a d " . 1 4 ^ R e a l f r e e d o m d o e s n o t 55 b e g i n , a c c o r d i n g b o M a r x , u n t i l " l a b o u r w h i c h i s d e t e r m i n e d b y n e c e s s i t y a n d m u n d a n e c o n s i d e r a t i o n s c e a s e s . . . a n d t h e r e i s t i m e f o r s e l f - t r a n s f o r m a t i o n , s e l f - r e a l i z a t i o n , a n d t h e f r e e d e v e l o p m e n t o f t h e i n d i v i d u a l " . 1 4 4 B u t M a r x w a s w i l l i n g t o s u p p o r t o n e c a t e g o r y o f r i g h t s i n a c a p i t a l i s t s o c i e t y , p o l i t i c a l r i g h t s . U n l i k e t h e " r i g h t s o f e g o i s t i c m a n " , p o l i t i c a l r i g h t s i n c l u d e d e m o c r a t i c r i g h t s i n g e n e r a l , a n d a r e r i g h t s t h a t c o u l d n o t b e m a d e s e n s e o f e i t h e r a s r i g h t s o f ' a n i s o l a t e d m o n a d w i t h d r a w n i n t o h i m s e l f , o r a s r i g h t s t o d o s o m e t h i n g ' w i t h o u t r e g a r d f o r o t h e r m e n ' . T h e s e r i g h t s a r e " e x p l i c i t l y c o n s t i t u t i v e o f c e r t a i n f o r m s o f a c t i o n i n c o m m o n w i t h o t h e r s " a n d w o u l d h e l p t o c o m p r i s e t h e s o r t o f c o m m u n i t y t h a t M a r x e x p e c t e d t o s e e i n t h e f i n a l p h a s e s o f h u m a n e m a n c i p a t i o n . 1 4 5 C l e a r l y p o l i t i c a l r i g h t s a r e r i g h t s M a r x b e l i e v e d s h o u l d b e t a k e n s e r i o u s l y i n a c a p i t a l i s t s o c i e t y . B u t t h a t i s n o t t o s a y t h a t M a r x h a d n o d o u b t s a s t o t h e i r i m p a c t . R e m o v a l o f t h e p r o p e r t y q u a l i f i c a t i o n f r o m t h e f r a n c h i s e , f o r e x a m p l e , c o u l d n o t c o u n t a s f u l l e m a n c i p a t i o n , b e c a u s e p e o p l e ' s l i v e s w o u l d c o n t i n u e t o b e d o m i n a t e d b y p r o p e r t y c o n s i d e r a t i o n s . W h i l e s o c i o - e c o n o m i c d i f f e r e n c e s w o u l d n o l o n g e r h o l d f o r m a l p o l i t i c a l s t a t u s , t h e y w o u l d s t i l l " h a v e a n e f f e c t i n t h e i r o w n m a n n e r " . 1 4 6 F u r t h e r m o r e , p o l i t i c a l r i g h t s e x i s t i n t a n d e m w i t h t h e r i g h t s o f ( i n d i v i d u a l ) m a n . T h i s c r e a t e s a ' d u a l i s m ' b e t w e e n s p e c i e s - l i f e a n d i n d i v i d u a l l i f e 1 4 7 , a n d t h e r e f o r e a c o n t r a d i c t i o n b e t w e e n t h e c o m m u n a l a n d a t o m i s t i c c h a r a c t e r o f r i g h t s . T h u s t h e c o n c e r n w i t h f r e e d o m o f a s s o c i a t i o n , a c c o r d i n g t o m a r x i s t t h e o r y , i s t h a t w h i l e i t h a s t h e a p p e a r a n c e o f a p o l i t i c a l r i g h t ( a n d t h e r e f o r e 56 s h o u l d n o t b e r e j e c t e d o u t o f h a n d ) , i t c a n o p e r a t e a l s o a s a a t o m i s t i c " r i g h t o f m a n " w h e n n e g a t i v e l i b e r t y i s e x e r c i s e d . M o r e o v e r , t h e r i g h t s o f m a n , t h e o r e t i c a l l y b a s e d o n " n a t u r a l r i g h t s " , t a k e p r i m a c y o v e r t h e r i g h t s o f c i t i z e n s , b e c a u s e " s e l f i s h n e s s r e t a i n s p o w e r o v e r c o m m u n i t y , f o r u n d e r c a p i t a l i s m i t i s s e l f i s h n e s s t h a t i s a s s o c i a t e d w i t h t h e n a t u r a l , m a t e r i a l l i f e o f m a n " . 1 4 8 C o m m u n i t y i s n o t , a n d c a n n o t , b e s e r v e d b y t h e d o u b l e " s i n s " o f e g o i s m a n d i n d i v i d u a l i s m . T h e r a d i c a l l e f t c r i t i q u e o f t h e C h a r t e r e c h o e s t h e m a r x i s t a n a l y s i s . T h e C h a r t e r , H u t c h i s o n d e c l a r e s , i s a " p o t e n t p o l i t i c a l w e a p o n - o n e t h a t i s b e i n g u s e d t o b e n e f i t v e s t e d i n t e r e s t s i n s o c i e t y a n d t o w e a k e n t h e r e l a t i v e p o w e r o f t h e d i s a d v a n t a g e d a n d u n d e r p r i v i l e g e d " . 1 4 9 B e c a u s e t h e c o u r t s a r e u n a b l e ( o r u n w i l l i n g ) t o r e c o g n i z e " t h e f a c t s o f s o c i a l p o w e r , t h e f a l s e , p o w e r - s e r v i n g a s s u m p t i o n o f t h e ' e q u a l i t y ' o f i n d i v i d u a l s a n d t h e ' f r e e d o m ' o f t h e i r c h o i c e s " , t h e y h a v e w e i g h e d i n o n t h e s i d e o f p o w e r . B a s i c i n e q u a l i t i e s i n C a n a d i a n s o c i e t y a r e l e g i t i m a t e d , , " o f w h i c h t h e s u b o r d i n a t i o n o f l a b o u r t o b u s i n e s s i s o n e o f t h e m o s t b a s i c " . 1 5 0 T h e L a b o u r T r i l o g y c a s e s , w h i c h P a n i t c h c a l l s " t h e j u d i c i a l s a n c t i o n i n g o f t h e l e g i s l a t i v e a s s a u l t o n t r a d e u n i o n s " 1 5 1 , p r o v i d e a j u d i c i a l r a t i o n a l e f o r a s t a t e l e s s c o n c e r n e d w i t h s e c u r i n g ' s o c i a l h a r m o n y ' 1 5 2 i n l a b o u r r e l a t i o n s a n d m o r e [ c o n c e r n e d ] w i t h u n d o i n g t h e c o l l e c t i v e p o w e r o f l a b o u r o r g a n i z a t i o n s i n t h e c o n t e x t o f . . . c a p i t a l i s t i c r e s t r u c t u r i n g . 1 5 ^ R e f u s i n g t o g r a n t c o n s t i t u t i o n a l s t a t u s t o t h e r i g h t t o s t r i k e o n t h e v i e w t h a t i n d i v i d u a l s c a n n o t o b t a i n m o r e r i g h t s b y j o i n i n g a g r o u p ( t h a n t h e y c o u l d p o s s e s s a s i n d i v i d u a l s ) i s t o s u b v e r t t h e 57 w h o l e r a i s o n d ' e t r e o f u n i o n s ; t o f o s t e r s o c i a l s o l i d a r i t y a n d t o e s t a b l i s h a c o l l e c t i v e p r e s e n c e t h a t c o u l d o v e r c o m e w o r k e r v u l n e r a b i l i t y t o t h e g r e a t e r p o w e r o f c a p i t a l . ""-54 A c c o r d i n g t o t h e r a d i c a l l e f t c r i t i q u e t h e d i l e m m a f a c i n g u n i o n s i s l a r g e l y i g n o r e d b y t h e c o u r t s b e c a u s e t h e j u d i c i a r y i s b i a s e d i n f a v o u r o f c a p i t a l . T h e i r v e r d i c t s l a r g e l y r e f l e c t t h e i r o w n p e r s o n a l v a l u e s a n d p o l i t i c a l v i e w p o i n t s ( o l d , m a l e a n d u p p e r c l a s s ) , a n d t h e r e e x i s t s n o g e n u i n e l y o b j e c t i v e , n e u t r a l p r i n c i p l e s o f l a w u p o n w h i c h d e c i s i o n s c a n b e b a s e d . S o m e , a l t h o u g h c e r t a i n l y n o t a l l , l i b e r a l c r i t i c s a g r e e t h a t b e f o r e p a s s a g e o f t h e C h a r t e r , u n i o n s w e r e o f t e n u n j u s t l y t r e a t e d i n t h e h a n d s o f t h e c o u r t . B e a t t y , f o r e x a m p l e , d e c l a r e s t h a t t r u s t i n g t o t h e p r o c e s s e s o f l a w a n d t h e i n s t i t u t i o n o f t h e c o u r t w i l l n o t , " b e s o m e t h i n g t h a t w i l l c o m e e a s i l y o r n a t u r a l l y t o t h e w o r k i n g c l a s s a n d i t s r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s " , g i v e n t h e t r e a t m e n t w o r k e r s a n d u n i o n s h a v e r e c e i v e d i n t h e p a s t . B u t t r u s t i n t h e S u p r e m e C o u r t t h e y s h o u l d . C o u r t s w i l l ( n o w ? ) b e g u i d e d b y " r e a s o n n o t r h e t o r i c , p r i n c i p l e , n o t m a t e r i a l r e s o u r c e s " a n d w i l l l o o k m o r e f a v o u r a b l y u p o n w o r k e r s t h a n t h e p o l i t i c i a n s w i l l , b e c a u s e , a c c o r d i n g t o B e a t t y , t h e C h a r t e r " o f f e r s a f o r u m o f p r i n c i p l e i n w h i c h t h e i r [ l a b o u r ' s ] r e l a t i v e l a c k o f r e s o u r c e s s h o u l d n o t c o u n t h e a v i l y a g a i n s t t h e m " . 1 5 5 i n r e s p o n s e t o r e c e n t S u p r e m e C o u r t d e c i s i o n s s u c h a s t h e L a b o u r T r i l o g y , w h i c h h a v e g o n e a g a i n s t l e g a l a r g u m e n t s a d v a n c e d b y u n i o n s , B e a t t y a s s e r t s t h a t u n i o n s s h o u l d c o n t i n u e t o t r u s t i n t h e c o u r t s b e c a u s e t h e j u d g m e n t s h a v e n o t b e e n e n t i r e l y o n e - s i d e d 1 5 * 5 , s o p r e s u m a b l y t h e r e i s s o m e o p p o r t u n i t y f o r r e v e r s a l . F r e e d o m o f a s s o c i a t i o n m u s t g u a r a n t e e i n d i v i d u a l c h o i c e a t t h e 58 w o r k p l a c e , a c c o r d i n g t o B e a t t y , b e c a u s e w o r k i s a s i g n i f i c a n t p a r t o f l i f e , p r o v i d e s a c r e a t i v e o u t l e t a n d a s e n s e o f s e l f w o r t h a n d a c c o m p l i s h m e n t , a w a y t o s e l f - r e a l i z a t i o n . 1 5 7 W h i l e h e d o e s c o n c e d e a t h r e a t t o t h e i n d i v i d u a l ' s f u n d a m e n t a l h u m a n f r e e d o m e x i s t s i n t h e e m p l o y e r ' s p o w e r t o e s t a b l i s h w o r k i n g c o n d i t i o n s , h e a r g u e s t h a t t o d e n y n e g a t i v e l i b e r t y ( f r e e d o m f r o m a s s o c i a t i o n ) w o u l d b e i l l o g i c a l . O n l y o n e f o r m o f u n i o n s e c u r i t y w o u l d b e a r e a s o n a b l e l i m i t o n l i b e r t y u n d e r s e c t i o n 1 o f t h e C h a r t e r - t h e a g e n c y s h o p . H o w e v e r , B e a t t y a r g u e s , t h e r e m u s t b e a l i m i t o n h o w u n i o n d u e s a r e s p e n t ; t h e y s h o u l d b e a p p l i e d o n l y t o t h e " p r e s e r v a t i o n a n d e n h a n c e m e n t o f t h e c o l l e c t i v e p r o c e s s e s o f i n d u s t r i a l s e l f - g o v e r n m e n t " , a d e f i n i t i o n h e w o u l d l e a v e t o t h e c o u r t s t o f l e s h o u t . 1 5 8 O t h e r l i b e r a l s s u c h a s P a u l W e i l e r 1 5 ^ a r e c r i t i c a l o f t h e c o u r t ' s r o l e i n l a b o u r c a s e s . T h e c o u r t , h e a r g u e s , d o e s n o t r e c o g n i z e s o c i a l c o n d i t i o n s t h a t e x i s t b u t a r e n o t b r o u g h t b e f o r e i t . I n t h e L a v i g n e c a s e , f o r e x a m p l e , t h e c o u r t " i g n o r e d " t h e f a c t f a r m o r e c o r p o r a t e d o l l a r s a r e d o n a t e d t o p o l i t i c a l p a r t i e s t h a n u n i o n d o l l a r s , a n d w i t h n o c o n s e n t i n g m a j o r i t y v o t e t a k e n a m o n g s h a r e h o l d e r s , a s t h e r e i s a m o n g u n i o n m e m b e r s . 1 6 0 B e c a u s e c o u r t s c a n n o t t a k e c o g n i z a n c e o f c i r c u m s t a n c e s b e y o n d t h e c a s e b e f o r e i t , W e i l e r a r g u e s t h e y s h o u l d n o t b e i n v o l v e d a s a " s o c i a l c u r e - a l l " i n l a b o u r / f r e e d o m o f a s s o c i a t i o n c a s e s . C o u r t s s h o u l d a d o p t a " h a n d s - o f f a t t i t u d e " a n d a l l o w p u b l i c p o l i c y t o b e d e c i d e d i n t h e p o l i t i c a l s p h e r e . 1 ^ 1 B e a t t y , o n t h e o t h e r h a n d , a p p e a r s t o o f f e r l i t i g a t i o n a s a s u b s t i t u t e f o r p o l i t i c s , i n f a c t , a l m o s t a s u p e r i o r f o r m o f p o l i t i c s . W h a t , t h e n , a r e w e t o m a k e o f t h i s d e b a t e ? A c c o r d i n g t o t h e 5 9 m a r x i s t a r g u m e n t , t h e p r o b l e m w i t h r i g h t s i n a l i b e r a l s o c i e t y i s t w o f o l d : f i r s t , t h e y a r e a t t a c h e d t o i n d i v i d u a l s , a n d s e c o n d , i n d i v i d u a l s a c t i n a s e l f i s h , e g o i s t i c m a n n e r w h e n t h e y e x e r c i s e t h o s e r i g h t s . I n r e s p o n s e t o t h e f i r s t c r i t i q u e , W a l d r o n a r g u e s t h a t t h e i n d i v i d u a l c h a r a c t e r o f r i g h t s c a n n o t b e e x o r c i s e d i n a l i b e r a l s o c i e t y ; " w e a r e c o n s t r u c t e d ( n a t u r a l l y o r s o c i a l l y ) a n d w e t r e a t o u r s e l v e s a s i n d e p e n d e n t c e n t r e s o f c o n s c i o u s n e s s , t h o u g h t a n d r e s p o n s i b l e a g e n c y " . " " - 6 2 T h e t h e o r y o f r i g h t s i s a t h e o r y b a s e d o n i n d i v i d u a l s . R i g h t s s e c u r e g o o d s f o r i n d i v i d u a l s , e v e n t h o u g h , i n t h e c a s e o f r i g h t s l i k e p o s i t i v e f r e e d o m o f a s s o c i a t i o n , t h e r i g h t i s e x e r c i s e d i n t h e c o m p a n y o f o t h e r s . I n t h e c a s e o f t h e C h a r t e r , r i g h t s c l e a r l y a r e , i n t h e m a i n , b a s e d o n a n d a t t a c h e d t o i n d i v i d u a l s ; a n d i t m u s t b e w i t h i n t h a t p a r a m e t e r t h a t a s o l u t i o n , i f t h e r e i s o n e , b e f o u n d f o r t h e d i l e m m a f a c i n g t r a d e u n i o n s . T h e s e c o n d p a r t o f t h e m a r x i s t c r i t i q u e - t h a t r i g h t s a r e " n o t h i n g b u t t h e r i g h t s o f . . . e g o i s t i c m a n , s e p a r a t e d f r o m o t h e r m e n a n d t h e c o m m u n i t y . . . t h e r i g h t o f s e l f i s h n e s s " 1 ^ 3 - c o n s i s t s o f t h r e e s e p a r a t e c h a r g e s . 1 * 5 4 T h e f i r s t c h a r g e i s t h a t t h e p o s s e s s i o n o f a r i g h t e n c o u r a g e s t h e i n d i v i d u a l t o e x e r c i s e t h a t r i g h t s e l f i s h l y , w i t h o u t r e g a r d f o r o t h e r s . I s t h i s t o s a y , t h e n , t h a t a c t i n g s e l f i s h l y n e c e s s a r i l y i n d i c t s r i g h t s a s t h e c a u s e o f s e l f i s h n e s s ? W a l d r o n a r g u e s n o t . R i g h t s , h e s t a t e s , c a n b e e x e r c i s e d " p h i l a n t h r o p i c a l l y a s w e l l a s m e a n l y 1 , 1 6 5 ; t h e r e f o r e , e v e n i f w e t a k e t h e v i e w t h a t e x e r c i s i n g n e g a t i v e l i b e r t y i s a s e l f i s h a c t , t h e r e i s n o t h i n g i n r i g h t s t h a t r e q u i r e s t h e n e g a t i v e l i b e r t y t o b e e x e r c i s e d . O f c o u r s e t h e r e i s , p e r h a p s , a n e q u a l d a n g e r i n e x e r c i s i n g r i g h t s a l t r u i s t i c a l l y . 6 0 B e r l i n , i n h i s c r i t i q u e o f p o s i t i v e l i b e r t y , w a r n s t h a t t h o s e w h o c l a i m t o a c t a l t r u i s t i c a l l y m a y b e m i s t a k e n a b o u t w h a t a l t r u i s m r e q u i r e s i n a p a r t i c u l a r c i r c u m s t a n c e . F u r t h e r m o r e , b y c l a i m i n g t o k n o w w h a t i s ' t r u l y n e e d e d ' , t h e y r i s k p u t t i n g t h e m s e l v e s i n a p o s i t i o n " t o i g n o r e t h e a c t u a l w i s h e s o f m a n o r s o c i e t i e s , t o b u l l y , o p p r e s s , t o r t u r e . . . i n t h e n a m e , a n d o n b e h a l f , o f [ m a n o r s o c i e t y ' s ] . . . ' r e a l ' s e l v e s . " ! 6 6 T h e s e c o n d c h a r g e , t h a t r i g h t s l e a d i n d i v i d u a l s t o s e e i n o t h e r s t h e l i m i t a t i o n o f t h e i r f r e e d o m ( b e c a u s e r i g h t s a r e c l a i m s a g a i n s t o t h e r p e o p l e ) , d e a l s o n l y w i t h c i r c u m s t a n c e s w h e n a n i n d i v i d u a l i s c l a i m i n g a r i g h t f o r h i m s e l f . B u t , a r e t h e r e n o t , a s W a l d r o n a r g u e s , m a n y c a s e s i n w h i c h h u m a n r i g h t s a r e i n v o k e d o n a n o t h e r i n d i v i d u a l ' s b e h a l f ? . F o r e x a m p l e , t h e r e a r e a n u m b e r o f g r o u p s t h a t d e m a n d h u m a n r i g h t s f o r b l a c k s i n S o u t h A f r i c a , o r u n i v e r s i t y s t u d e n t s i n C h i n a . I n t h e L a b o u r T r i l o g y c a s e s , g o v e r n m e n t s a r g u e t h a t t h e y a r e d e m a n d i n g r i g h t s f o r " i n n o c e n t " t h i r d p a r t i e s , w h o w o u l d b e i n j u r e d u n d u l y b y s t r i k e s i n t h e p u b l i c s e c t o r . B u t i n d i v i d u a l s w h o d o n o t w a n t t o b e l o n g t o t h e u n i o n , o r d o n o t w a n t t h e u n i o n t o m a k e c e r t a i n e x p e n d i t u r e s , l i k e l y s e e o t h e r u n i o n m e m b e r s a s p r e v e n t i n g t h e m f r o m e x e r c i s i n g t h e i r f r e e d o m t o n o t a s s o c i a t e . A n d t h o s e w h o c l a i m p o s i t i v e f r e e d o m o f a s s o c i a t i o n q u i t e p o s s i b l y s e e d i s s e n t e r s i n t h e s a m e w a y . N e v e r t h e l e s s , i t c a n b e s a i d t h a t w h i l e r i g h t s a r e a t t a c h e d t o i n d i v i d u a l s , i n d i v i d u a l s a r e s t i l l c a p a b l e o f c o n c e r n f o r o t h e r ' s i n t e r e s t s . S t i l l , t h e c h a r g e i s m a d e t h a t a l i b e r a l t h e o r y o f r i g h t s a d v o c a t e s a n i n d i v i d u a l ' s f r e e d o m o f c h o i c e r e g a r d i n g r i g h t s ( i n t h i s c a s e t o c h o o s e e i t h e r t h e n e g a t i v e o r p o s i t i v e l i b e r t y ) , 61 e v e n w h e n t h a t c h o i c e m a y b e m a d e a t t h e e x p e n s e o f t h e c o m m u n i t y . T h i s i s , o f c o u r s e , r e m i n i s c e n t o f t h e d e b a t e b e t w e e n u t i l i t a r i a n i s m a n d r i g h t s - t h a t w h a t i s b e s t t o d o i s w h a t i s b e s t f o r t h e m a j o r i t y i n t h e c o m m u n i t y - t h e g r e a t e s t g o o d f o r t h e g r e a t e s t n u m b e r . B u t w h e r e r i g h t s o f f e r a c o n c e s s i o n t o u t i l i t a r i a n i s m i n t h a t t h e y a r e n o t a b s o l u t e , c r i t i c i s m s c a n b e m a d e b o t h o f u t i l i t a r i a n i s m ( f o r e x a m p l e , t h e i m p o s s i b i l i t y a n d p e r h a p s i m m o r a l i t y o f w e i g h i n g c e r t a i n f a c t o r s ) , a n d o f m a j o r i t y r u l e ( f o r e x a m p l e , a v o i d a n c e o f " t y r a n n y o f t h e m a j o r i t y " ) . A s i s p o i n t e d o u t b y W a l d r o n , r i g h t s i n l i b e r a l t h e o r y s i m p l y s e t c e r t a i n s t a n d a r d s o f d e m o c r a c y , l i k e t h e f r e e d o m t o a s s o c i a t e , t h a t c a n n o t b e n e g a t e d b y t h e m a j o r i t y w i t h o u t n e g a t i n g d e m o c r a c y . H o w e v e r t h e q u e s t i o n r e m a i n s : a r e t h e r e s i t u a t i o n s i n w h i c h s o c i e t y i s j u s t i f i e d i n r e s t r i c t i n g a n i n d i v i d u a l ' s r i g h t t o a c t ' a g a i n s t ' t h e c o m m u n i t y ? F i r s t , l e t u s d e f i n e t h e t r a d e u n i o n c o m m u n i t y i n t e r m s t h a t m i g h t w e l l b e u s e d b y i n d i v i d u a l s l i k e M e r v L a v i g n e . W h a t L a v i g n e o b j e c t s t o i s t h e ' d e v i a t i o n ' f r o m m a r k e t u n i o n i s m i n t o s o c i a l u n i o n i s m , a n d t h e e n s u i n g s u p p o r t o f p o l i t i c a l c a u s e s h e i s f u n d a m e n t a l l y o p p o s e d t o . H e i s n o t c h a l l e n g i n g t h e l e g a l r e q u i r e m e n t u n d e r t h e R a n d f o r m u l a t h a t h e p a y u n i o n d u e s . H i s c h a l l e n g e i s d i r e c t e d o n l y t o t h a t p a r t o f u n i o n d u e s s p e n t o n c o n c e r n s n o t d i r e c t l y r e l a t e d t o c o l l e c t i v e b a r g a i n i n g . N o m a t t e r t h a t t h e u n i o n a r g u e s i t h a s i n t e r n a l m e c h a n i s m s b y w h i c h t h e m e m b e r s c a n d e m o c r a t i c a l l y a f f e c t i t s p o l i c y d e c i s i o n s ; a n d n o m a t t e r t h a t , a c c o r d i n g t o t h e u n i o n , t h e m e m b e r s a r e n o t n e c e s s a r i l y a s s o c i a t e d w i t h t h e m e s s a g e o f t h e u n i o n , t h a t t h e y a r e f r e e t o w o r k a g a i n s t t h e u n i o n p o s i t i o n b o t h w i t h i n a n d 62 without i t s s t r u c t u r e . 1 6 7 what Lavigne i s , i n e f f e c t , a r g u i n g i s t h a t he has the r i g h t t o d i s a g r e e (to not be ' t y r a n n i z e d ' by the m a j o r i t y ) , and t o g i v e f o r c e t o t h a t disagreement by non-payment o f p a r t o f h i s union dues. L e g i t i m a t e union expenses i n c l u d e o n l y those " b u s i n e s s " c o s t s o f n e g o t i a t i n g and a d m i n i s t e r i n g the c o l l e c t i v e - b a r g a i n i n g c o n t r a c t , s e t t l i n g g r i e v a n c e s and d i s p u t e s , and the expenses "normally o r reasonably employed t o implement o r e f f e c t u a t e the d u t i e s o f the union as e x c l u s i v e r e p r e s e n t a t i v e o f the employees i n the b a r g a i n i n g unit." 1-68 The Lavigne argument (which i s a l s o advanced by Beatty) i s c o m p e l l i n g . In terms o f the i n d i v i d u a l armed wi t h the d i s c r e t i o n a r y l i b e r a l r i g h t o f freedom o f a s s o c i a t i o n w i t h i n the c u r r e n t t r a d e union context (as d e s c r i b e d i n Chapter Three), the b e s t response t o the dilemma posed by n e g a t i v e and p o s i t i v e l i b e r t y must be found i n a balance: a balance between the freedom t o a s s o c i a t e and the freedom from a s s o c i a t i o n ; between f r e e r i d e r s h i p and r e s t r i c t i n g freedom; between p o s i t i v e and n e g a t i v e l i b e r t y ; and i m p l i c i t l y , between l a b o u r and c a p i t a l . What might t h i s balance l o o k l i k e ? F i r s t , r e c o g n i t i o n must be g i v e n t o the union concern r e g a r d i n g f r e e r i d e r s . The Rand formula has gained wide r e c o g n i t i o n as a method o f b a l a n c i n g union s e c u r i t y concerns, and i s w i d e l y accepted by government, by management, and by o r g a n i z e d l a b o u r . I t i s a l i m i t t o freedom t h a t can be ' j u s t i f i e d i n a f r e e and democratic s o c i e t y ' on the b a s i s o f concerns about f r e e r i d e r s and i n d u s t r i a l p e a c e 1 6 9 ; a s j u s t i c e Rand noted, 63 I d o u b t i f a n y c i r c u m s t a n c e p r o v o k e s m o r e r e s e n t m e n t i n a p l a n t t h a n . . . s h a r i n g o f t h e f r u i t s o f u n i o n i s t w o r k a n d c o u r a g e b y t h e n o n - m e m b e r . 1 7 0 T h e a g e n c y s h o p , a c c o r d i n g t o B e a t t y , o f f e r s b o t h i n d i v i d u a l c h o i c e ( w h i c h , h e a r g u e s , i s t h e p a t h t o s e l f - r e a l i z a t i o n ) , c o u p l e d w i t h r e c o g n i t i o n t h a t t h i s f o r m o f u n i o n s e c u r i t y p r o v i d e s s o m e ' i n s u r a n c e ' a g a i n s t c o r p o r a t e c o e r c i o n o f e m p l o y e e s . B u t b e c a u s e u n i o n m e m b e r s h i p i s n o t v o l u n t a r y i n t h e s a m e w a y a s m e m b e r s h i p , f o r e x a m p l e , i n a g r o u p o f c o m p a n y s t o c k h o l d e r s 1 7 1 , t h e r e m u s t b e a b a l a n c e s t r u c k i n r e g a r d s t o d u e s e x p e n d i t u r e s . I n d e f i n i n g t h e ' a s s o c i a t i o n ' p a r t o f f r e e d o m o f a s s o c i a t i o n , L a v i g n e ( a n d o t h e r s l i k e h i m ) a r g u e t h a t t h e u n i o n ' s p u r p o s e i s t o s e c u r e j o b s e c u r i t y a n d e c o n o m i c b e n e f i t s f o r i t s m e m b e r s . G i v e n t h i s ' m a r k e t - o r i e n t e d ' v i e w o f t h e t r a d e u n i o n c o m m u n i t y , ( a n d l a b o u r ' s t r a d i t i o n a l e c o n o m i s m ) a n o p t o u t f o r m u l a i n t h e s a m e s p i r i t o f t h e R a n d f o r m u l a w o u l d s e e m t o s t i k e a f a i r b a l a n c e w i t h t h e a g e n c y s h o p . T h o s e w h o d i s a g r e e w i t h n o n -c o l l e c t i v e b a r g a i n i n g e x p e n s e s s h o u l d h a v e t h e c h o i c e t o o p t o u t o f t h e m , r e c o g n i z i n g , h o w e v e r , t h e " r e a s o n a b l e n e s s o f t h e r e q u i r e m e n t o f t h e d i s s i d e n t e m p l o y e e ' s o b l i g a t i o n t o m a k e k n o w n h i s d i s s e n t " . 1 7 2 O f c o u r s e , t h e r e r e m a i n s t h e d i f f i c u l t y o f d e c i d i n g w h e r e t h e l i n e i s d r a w n b e t w e e n c o l l e c t i v e a n d n o n - c o l l e c t i v e b a r g a i n i n g e x p e n s e s , e s p e c i a l l y v i s - a - v i s c o n t r i b u t i o n s t o t h e N D P . T h e O P S E U a r g u e d i n t h e L a v i g n e c a s e t h a t " s o m e b a r g a i n i n g u n i t o b j e c t i v e s c a n n o t b e a c h i e v e d t h r o u g h c o l l e c t i v e b a r g a i n i n g a n d m u s t b e p u r s u e d i n t h e p r o v i n c i a l l e g i s l a t u r e " . A l t h o u g h W h i t e J . a c c e p t e d t h a t p o l i t i c a l c o n t r i b u t i o n s b y u n i o n s m a y i n a s e n s e 6 4 a d v a n c e c o l l e c t i v e b a r g a i n i n g c a u s e s , " e v e n t h e p r o b a b i l i t y t h a t w o r k e r s ' i n t e r e s t w i l l b e a d v a n c e d b y u n i o n s u p p o r t f o r a s p e c i f i c p o l i t i c a l p a r t y c a n n o t j u s t i f y " i n f r i n g i n g f r e e d o m o f a s s o c i a t i o n . 1 7 3 C l e a r l y , d r a w i n g t h e l i n e w i l l b e d i f f i c u l t a n d t h e r e s u l t s h o t l y d e b a t e d , b u t c o e r c i n g u n i o n m e m b e r s i n t o f i n a n c i a l l y s u p p o r t i n g p o l i t i c a l c a u s e s t h e y a r e o p p o s e d t o ( w h e t h e r o r n o t t h e y a r e p u b l i c l y i d e n t i f i e d w i t h t h e m ) p l a c e s t o o g r e a t a s t r a i n o n l i b e r a l s e l f - r e a l i z a t i o n , a n d t h e r e f o r e , t o o g r e a t a s t r a i n o n m u c h n e e d e d s o l i d a r i t y . W h a t t h i s b a l a n c e d o e s n o t s o l v e , h o w e v e r , i s t h e d i l e m m a i n t e r m s o f t h e w a y m a n y t r a d e u n i o n s l e a d e r s ( a n d p r e s u m a b l y m a n y m e m b e r s ) d e f i n e t h e t r a d e u n i o n c o m m u n i t y . O s t e n s i b l y , t h e i r c o m m u n i t y i s m u c h d i f f e r e n t t h a n t h a t o f t h e ' L a v i g n e s ' , a n d c o u l d b e s e r i o u s l y t h r e a t e n e d b y a B e a t t y - t y p e s o l u t i o n . F o r e x a m p l e , a p p r o x i m a t e l y t h i r t y p e r c e n t o f u n i o n m e m b e r s v o t e N D P i n f e d e r a l e l e c t i o n s . I f t h e r e m a i n i n g s e v e n t y p e r c e n t o p t e d o u t o f n o n - c o l l e c t i v e b a r g a i n i n g d u e s ( a s d e f i n e d i n t h e L a v i g n e N o . 2 c a s e ) , t h e u n i o n m o v e m e n t w o u l d b e p o l i t i c a l l y p a r a l y s e d . W h i l e t h i s s i t u a t i o n m a y p o s e n o s e r i o u s p r o b l e m t o t h e d i s s e n t i n g i n d i v i d u a l s , i t w o u l d t o t h o s e w h o h o l d t h a t t r a d e u n i o n i n t e r e s t s g o b e y o n d ( a l t h o u g h c e r t a i n l y i n c l u d e ) t h e p u r e l y e c o n o m i c . G a l b r a i t h a r g u e s t h a t o r g a n i z e d w o r k e r s m a y p r o v i d e a " c o u n t e r v a i l i n g p o w e r " t o ' b i g b u s i n e s s ' , w h i c h s e r v e s t o a l l e v i a t e s o c i a l t e n s i o n s b y a l l o w i n g u n i o n m e m b e r s t o d e v e l o p " a g r e a t e r s e n s e o f c o n f i d e n c e a n d e q u a l i t y " . 1 7 4 i n a d d i t i o n , u n i o n s , o p e r a t i n g u n d e r a f a i r c o l l e c t i v e b a r g a i n i n g s y s t e m , e s t a b l i s h a m u c h m o r e m e a n i n g f u l l i b e r t y o f c o n t r a c t b e t w e e n c a p i t a l a n d l a b o u r . P a r t i c i p a t i o n i n l a b o u r - o r i e n t e d d e c i s i o n -65 m a k i n g i s e n c o u r a g e d a n d ( p e r h a p s m o s t i m p o r t a n t l y i n a d e m o c r a t i c p l u r a l s o c i e t y ) , u n i o n s a c t a s " p o l i t i c a l l y r e l e v a n t g r o u p s " t h a t f a c i l i t a t e c i t i z e n i n f l u e n c e o n p u b l i c p o l i c y . 1 7 5 T h a t u n i o n s t r e n g t h n o t b e s e r i o u s l y c o m p r o m i s e d b y f r e e r i d e r s o r l i m i t s t o i t s p o l i t i c a l a c t i o n s c a u s e d b y t h e e x e r c i s e o f n e g a t i v e l i b e r t y i s , i n t h i s v i e w , o f c e r t a i n i m p o r t a n c e f o r d e m o c r a c y . B u t h o w i s t h i s t o b e a c c o m p l i s h e d ? A s W a l d r o n a r g u e s , a t h e o r y o f r i g h t s d o e s n o t s t a n d o n i t s o w n . I t a c c o m p a n i e s a g e n e r a l t h e o r y o f m o r a l a c t i o n w h i c h g u i d e s t h e c o n d u c t o f r i g h t - b e a r e r s i n t h e e x e r c i s e o f t h e i r r i g h t s . 1 7 * 5 T h i s m o r a l c o d e i s w h a t g r a n t s o r d e n i e s " p e r m i s s i o n " t o a c t a g a i n s t t h e c o m m u n i t y . I n d i v i d u a l s h a v e t h e r i g h t t o e x e r c i s e t h e i r n e g a t i v e l i b e r t y ( w i t h i n c e r t a i n l i m i t s ) i n t h e t r a d e u n i o n c o n t e x t , b u t w h e t h e r o r n o t t h e y e x e r c i s e t h a t r i g h t d e p e n d s u p o n t h e i r m o r a l b e l i e f s . T r a d e u n i o n m e m b e r s m u s t b e c o n v i n c e d t h a t t h e v a l u e o f t h i s c o m m u n i t y i s s u c h t h a t i t s h o u l d n o t b e t h r e a t e n e d b y t h e r i g h t t o d i s a g r e e . I f u n i o n m e m b e r s w o r k t o w a r d s a c o n s e n s u s r e g a r d i n g t h e i m p o r t a n c e o f t h i s k i n d o f t r a d e u n i o n c o m m u n i t y a n d t h e p o t e n t i a l d a n g e r t o i t s p u r p o s e s p o s e d b y t h e e x e r c i s e o f n e g a t i v e l i b e r t y , f e w e r i n d i v i d u a l s w o u l d b e p r e p a r e d t o i n v o k e f r e e d o m f r o m a s s o c i a t i o n . B u t t h e g o a l o f c o n v i n c i n g u n i o n m e m b e r s t h a t c h o i c e s h o u l d n o t b e e x e r c i s e d a g a i n s t t h e c o m m u n i t y w i l l n o t b e a n e a s y o n e t o a t t a i n . U n i o n s m u s t w o r k t o o v e r c o m e w h a t m a r x i s t s c a l l e s t r a n g e m e n t . T h e m o s t i m p o r t a n t r e l a t i o n s h i p o n t h e " s h o p f l o o r " i s b e t w e e n t h e w o r k e r a n d t h e o w n e r o f t h e m e a n s o f p r o d u c t i o n , t h e p e r s o n e m p o w e r e d t o h i r e a n d f i r e a n d d i r e c t t h e p r o c e s s e s o f m a n u f a c t u r e . T h u s , t h e d e v e l o p m e n t o f w o r k e r 66 s o l i d a r i t y i s m a d e d i f f i c u l t w h e n i n d i v i d u a l s r e g a r d e a c h o t h e r a s c o m p e t i t o r s f o r w a g e s , r a t h e r t h a n w o r k e r s w i t h a c o m m o n g r o u p i n t e r e s t . 1 7 7 B y c o n c e n t r a t i n g o n " m a r k e t u n i o n i s m " , t r a d e u n i o n s h a v e f a i l e d t o c a p i t a l i z e o n t h e s o l i d a r i t y o f o t h e r c o m m o n i n t e r e s t s t h a t p o t e n t i a l l y e x i s t i n a w o r k f o r c e . C e r t a i n l y t h e e c o n o m i c c o m m o n i n t e r e s t i s r e c o g n i z e d ; b u t w o r k , a s B e a t t y a r g u e s , i s m u c h m o r e t h a n j u s t e c o n o m i c s . T h i s a p p r o a c h m u s t , o f c o u r s e , b e u s e d w i t h c a r e . I n v i e w o f t h e c u r r e n t s t a t e o f t r a d e u n i o n s , u n i o n e l i t e s w o u l d b e w e l l a d v i s e d t o s t a y a w a y f r o m c o n t r o v e r s i a l i s s u e s t h a t a r e n o t r e s o l v a b l e t h r o u g h d e b a t e , a n d w h i c h i n s p i r e m u c h e m o t i o n - b a s e d r h e t o r i c ( l i k e t h e i s s u e o f a b o r t i o n ) . T h e o b j e c t i v e i s t o a g r e e o n a p e r s p e c t i v e t h a t w o u l d " c o n c e n t r a t e o n t h e q u a l i t y o f p e o p l e ' s l i v e s a n d h o w t h o s e l i v e s c o u l d b e i m p r o v e d , r a t h e r t h a n o n e n t i t l e m e n t s t h a t d e r i v e f r o m p e o p l e ' s s t a t u s e s " , ( t o b e c o m e g o a l o r i e n t e d r a t h e r t h a n s t a t u s o r i e n t e d ) 1 7 8 , b u t t h e p r o c e s s w i l l o f n e c e s s i t y b e i n c r e m e n t a l , a s i s a n y m a j o r a t t e m p t a t c h a n g e . 1 7 * * T h i s a p p r o a c h w o u l d h a v e t o b e a s s e s s e d i n t h e l i g h t o f e x p e r i e n c e , a n d m a y h a v e t o b e m o d i f i e d , o r e v e n a b a n d o n e d i f i t i s u n s u c c e s s f u l . O f c o u r s e , t h e c o n c e p t u a l d i l e m m a w o u l d r e m a i n , b u t t h e l e g a l a n d p o l i t i c a l r a m i f i c a t i o n s f l o w i n g f r o m t h e d i l e m m a w o u l d b e c o n s i d e r a b l y l e s s r e l e v a n t . ' L e s s r e l e v a n t ' t h a t i s , i n t h a t n o ' s o l u t i o n ' t o t h e t r a d e u n i o n d i l e m m a i s f o o l p r o o f . T h e r e w i l l p r o b a b l y a l w a y s b e t h o s e w h o d o n o t a g r e e w i t h t h e i r u n i o n ' s a i m s , a n d g o v e r n m e n t s w i l l r e t a i n t h e a b i l i t y t o p a s s l e g i s l a t i o n e n c r o a c h i n g o n u n i o n " r i g h t s " , a l t h o u g h t h a t i s p e r h a p s l e s s l i k e l y i f u n i o n s b e c o m e m o r e p o l i t i c a l l y o r i e n t e d . B u t i f a l l b u t a f e w m e m b e r s a t t a c h e d 67 i m p o r t a n c e t o t h e w e l l - b e i n g o f t h e t r a d e u n i o n c o m m u n i t y , t h e n t h e d i l e m m a u n i o n s f a c e o v e r n e g a t i v e a n d p o s i t i v e l i b e r t y w o u l d b e p o s i t i v e l y - i n f a c t s i g n i f i c a n t l y - e f f e c t e d . A s s u m i n g t h e r i g h t t o d i s a g r e e w i l l r e m a i n , t h i s r e s p o n s e m a y b e t h e b e s t o n e , t h e b e s t r o u t e f o r u n i o n l e a d e r s t o t a k e i f t h e y a r e t o p r o t e c t t h e i r c o m m u n i t y f r o m t h e e x e r c i s e o f n e g a t i v e l i b e r t y . U n i o n l e a d e r s n e e d t o p r e s e n t a s p e c i a l c a s e t o t h e i r m e m b e r s t h a t i n t h i s c o m m u n i t y , t h e r i g h t t o i n v o k e n e g a t i v e l i b e r t y i s o u t w e i g h e d o r o u t b a l a n c e d b y t h e c o m m u n i t y c o s t s o f e x e r c i s i n g t h a t r i g h t . D o n e s u c c e s s f u l l y , m o s t i n d i v i d u a l s w i l l n o t w i s h t o e x e r c i s e n e g a t i v e l i b e r t y c l a i m s . U n t i l o r u n l e s s t h e r e i s s o m e c h a n g e i n t h e m o r a l b e l i e f s a c c o m p a n y i n g t h e e x e r c i s e o f f r e e d o m o f a s s o c i a t i o n i n t h e t r a d e u n i o n c o n t e x t , t h e d i l e m m a f a c i n g t r a d e u n i o n s o v e r n e g a t i v e a n d p o s i t i v e l i b e r t y w i l l r e m a i n a s e r i o u s t h r e a t t o t h e t r a d e u n i o n m o v e m e n t t h a t w i s h e s t o a c c o m p l i s h p o l i t i c a l g o a l s . 68 ENDNOTES 1. Ferdinand von Prondzynski, Freedom of Association and  Industrial Relations: A Comparative Study (London: Mansell Publishing Limited, 1987) 4-5. 2. Globe and Mail, 30 March 1987: A13. Quoted in Michael Mandel, The Charter of Rights and the  Legalization of Politics in Canada (Toronto: Wall and Thompson, 1989) 186. 3. Irwin Cotler, "Freedom of Assembly, Association, Conscience and Religions (S.2(a), (c), and (d))", The Canadian Charter  of Rights and Freedoms: Commentary, eds. Walter S. Tarnopolsky and Gerald-A. Beaudoin (Toronto: The Carswell Company Limited, 1982) 155. 4. As Frank Scott puts i t , "that union i s strength i s a maxim too obvious to need proof". Frank R. Scott, A New Endeavour: Selected P o l i t i c a l Essays,  Letters, and Addresses, ed. Michiel Horn (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1986) 51. 5. Joel Feinberg, Rights, Justice, and the Bounds of Liberty:  Essays in Social Philosophy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1980) 233. 6. In other words, freedom of association i s not a collective right, a right which would accrue to a group as a group (such as trade unionists). 7. Gilbert Ryle, Dilemmas (Cambridge: University Press, 1956) 1. 8. Jeremy Waldron, Nonsense Upon S t i l t s : Bentham, Burke and Marx on the Rights of Man (London: Methuen, 1987) 191. 9. Isaiah Berlin, "Two Concepts of Liberty," P o l i t i c a l  Philosophy, ed. Anthony Quinton (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1967) 142. 10. von Prondzynski 1. There are, of course, other rights in l i b e r a l democracies which could not be characterized this way. For example, participation rights such as the right to vote, or language rights in Canada, would not f i t into this category. 11. G e r a l d C . M a c C a l l u m J r . , " N e g a t i v e a n d P o s i t i v e F r e e d o m , " T h e P h i l o s o p h i c a l R e v i e w , V o l u m e L X X V I (1967): 312. 1 69 12. Thomas R. Haggard, Compulsory Unionism, the NLRB, and the Courts: A Legal Analysis of Union Security Agreements (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania, 1977) 8. 13. MacCallum 314. 14. von Prondzynski 216. 15. As B e r l i n writes, human nature under p o s i t i v e freedom i s divided into the "dominant s e l f " , i d e n t i f i e d with reason, with a "higher nature", and "with the s e l f which calculates and aims at what w i l l s a t i s f y i t i n the long run"; versus the subordinate s e l f , i r r a t i o n a l , impulsive, concerned only with the pursuit of immediate pleasures. B e r l i n 150. 16. B e r l i n 150. 17. MacCallum 324. 18. B e r l i n 150. 19. MacCallum 323. 20. MacCallum 331. While i t i s true that freedom re s u l t s f o r the pedestrian when cars are l e g a l l y restrained from entering the crosswalk when he i s there, freedom also r e s u l t s from the l e g a l r e s t r a i n t on the pedestrian to cross only i n the crosswalk, no matter how inconvenient that may be. 21. Peter A. G a l l , "Freedom of Association and Trade Unions: A Double-Edged Constitutional Sword," L i t i g a t i n g the  Values of a Nation: The Canadian Charter of Rights and  Freedoms, eds. Joseph M. Weiler and Robin M. E l l i o t (Vancouver: The Carswell Company Limited, 1986) 249. 22. A l l e n v. Flood [1898] A.C.I Quoted i n von Prondzynski 126. 23. Mancur Olson, The Rise and Decline of Nations (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1982) Chapter 2. 24. Sam LaSelva, notes, August 1, 1989. 25. MacCallum 313. 26. S. Dunn and J. Gennard, The Closed Shop i n B r i t i s h Industry (London: MacMillan Press, 1984) 4. 27. F. A. Hayek, The Constitution of Liberty (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1960) 268-275. 70 28. R i c h a r d A. E p s t e i n , "In Defense o f the C o n t r a c t a t W i l l , " The U n i v e r s i t y o f Chicago Law Review, V o l . 51 #4, F a l l (1984): 947-982. Quoted i n : Pa u l W e i l e r , "The C h a r t e r a t Work: R e f l e c t i o n s on the C o n s t i t u t i o n a l i z i n g o f Labour and Employment Law": 24. 29. Otto Kahn-Freund, Labour and the Law (London: Stevens and Sons, 1977) 244. By s h a r i n g i n the b e n e f i t s , non-union employees are not t a k i n g away from or adding t o the c o s t s o f the union t h a t sought the b e n e f i t . 30. David M. Beatty, P u t t i n g the C h a r t e r t o Work: De s i g n i n g  a C o n s t i t u t i o n a l Labour Code (Kingston: McGill-Queens U n i v e r s i t y Press, 1987) 123. 31. P a u l J . J . C a v a l l u z z o , "Freedom o f A s s o c i a t i o n and the Righ t t o B a r g a i n C o l l e c t i v e l y , " L i t i g a t i n g the Values o f a Na t i o n :  The Canadian C h a r t e r o f R i g h t s and Freedoms, eds. Joseph M. W e i l e r and Robin M. E l l i o t (Vancouver: The C a r s w e l l Company L i m i t e d , 1986) 201. 32. Tom Mcintosh, "The P o s t - C h a r t e r Labour Regime: The T r i l o g y and Beyond," Presented t o the Annual Meeting o f the Canadian P o l i t i c a l Science A s s o c i a t i o n , Quebec C i t y , June 1989, 18. 33. G a l l quoted i n C a v a l l u z o 191. 34. B e a t t y 123. 35. Lavigne v. O n t a r i o P u b l i c S e r v i c e Employees Union e t a l . [1989], 31 O.A.C., 59. 36. Edward McWhinney, C o n s t i t u t i o n - m a k i n g : P r i n c i p l e s , Process,  P r a c t i c e (Toronto: U n i v e r s i t y o f Toronto Press, 1981) 111. 37. The non obstante c l a u s e ( s e c t i o n 33) p r o v i d e s an o p p o r t u n i t y f o r the f e d e r a l o r p r o v i n c i a l governments t o s e t a s i d e judgments o f the co u r t , o r t o p r o t e c t l e g i s l a t i o n from j u d i c i a l s c r u t i n y and review. Fundamental freedoms, i n c l u d i n g freedom o f a s s o c i a t i o n , are s u b j e c t t o s e c t i o n 33. 38. R e t a i l , Wholesale and Department Store Union, L o c a l 580 e t a l . v. Dolphin D e l i v e r y L t d . [1986] 2 S.C.R. 573. 39. Government d e f i n e d as the e x e c u t i v e and a d m i n i s t r a t i v e branches o f government, " r a t h e r than a l l the l e g a l s t r u c t u r e s and i n s t i t u t i o n s which e x e r c i s e some c o e r c i v e a u t h o r i t y o f the s t a t e " , i . e . e x c l u d i n g the j u d i c i a l branch. David Beatty, " C o n s t i t u t i o n a l C o n c e i t s : The C o e r c i v e A u t h o r i t y o f Cou r t s , " U n i v e r s i t y o f Toronto Law J o u r n a l 37 71 (1987): 188. 40. Beatty, C o n s t i t u t i o n a l 186. The more r a d i c a l c r i t i q u e i s o u t l i n e d i n Hutchison: "In the C h a r t e r v i s i o n , the main enemy o f freedom i s not d i s p a r i t y i n wealth o r c o n c e n t r a t i o n o f p r i v a t e power, but the s t a t e . " A l l a n C. Hutchison and Andrew P e t t e r , " P r i v a t e r i g h t s / p u b l i c wrongs: The l i b e r a l l i e o f the C h a r t e r , " U n i v e r s i t y o f  Toronto Law J o u r n a l V o l . XXXVIII, No. 3 (1988): 283. 41. W e i l e r , "The C h a r t e r " 53. Note t h i s i s not W e i l e r ' s o p i n i o n . 42. Hutchison 292. 43. R e t a i l , Wholesale 175. 44. In o t h e r words, the union b e l i e v e d t h a t D o l p h i n was i n e f f e c t " s t r i k e b r e a k i n g " because Do l p h i n employees were doing the work o f P u r o l a t o r employees by d e l i v e r i n g P u r o l a t o r packages w i t h i n t h e i r a r ea. 45. In h i s words: "However, the C h a r t e r d i d not apply t o p r i v a t e l i t i g a t i o n between p u r e l y p r i v a t e p a r t i e s i n the absence o f any e x e r c i s e o f o r r e l i a n c e on government a c t i o n t h a t would invoke the C h a r t e r . " R e t a i l , Wholesale 175. 46. Hutchison 292. 47. Beatty, C o n s t i t u t i o n a l 188-189. 48. R e t a i l , Wholesale 177. 49. Paul Bender, "The Canadian C h a r t e r o f R i g h t s and Freedoms and the U n i t e d S t a t e s B i l l o f R i g h t s : A Comparison," M c G i l l Law J o u r n a l V o l . 28, No. 4 (1983): 828. 50. Beatty, P u t t i n g 44. 51. Free c o l l e c t i v e b a r g a i n i n g o n l y began i n Canada i n 1944 under a f e d e r a l government o r d e r i n c o u n c i l (#1003). I t " e s t a b l i s h e d l e g a l r e c o g n i t i o n o f the r i g h t s o f p r i v a t e s e c t o r workers...to organize, t o b a r g a i n c o l l e c t i v e l y , and t o s t r i k e , and backed these r i g h t s w i t h s t a t e s a n c t i o n s a g a i n s t employers who r e f u s e d t o r e c o g n i z e and b a r g a i n w i t h t r a d e unions". The p r o v i n c e s (with the e x c e p t i o n o f Quebec) adopted b r o a d l y s i m i l a r l e g i s l a t i o n . Leo P a n i t c h and Donald Swartz, The A s s a u l t on Trade Union  Freedoms: From Consent t o C o e r c i o n R e v i s i t e d (Toronto: Garamond Press, 1988) 1. 72 52. F o r example, when p o l i c e attempted t o break through p i c k e t l i n e s , s t r i k i n g workers blockaded a l l the s t r e e t s i n downtown Windsor and surrounded the p l a n t s w i t h t h e i r c a r s -parked, locked, and abandoned. James H. Marsh, e d i t o r i n c h i e f , The Canadian E n c y c l o p e d i a , 2nd ed., 4 v o l s . (Edmonton: H u r t i g P u b l i s h e r s , 1988) 3: 2315. 53. John Kenneth G a l b r a i t h , American C a p i t a l i s m : The Concept o f  C o u n t e r v a i l i n g Power (Boston: Houghton M i f f l i n Company, 1952) . 54. Quoted i n P a n i t h 10. 55. Labour, he argued, i s the subordinate f o r c e " i n a s o c i e t y whose economic l i f e has p r i v a t e e n t e r p r i s e as i t s dynamic". Quoted i n P a n i t c h 60. 56. A r l i n g t o n Crane S e r v i c e L t d . v. O n t a r i o ( M i n i s t e r o f Labour) [1988] 56 DLR (4th) 209-269. 57. A r l i n g t o n 263. 58. i . e . n e i t h e r denying nor r e q u i r i n g a union s e c u r i t y c l a u s e i n a c o l l e c t i v e agreement. 59. Judge Henry i n t e r p r e t s D o l p h i n D e l i v e r y t o d e f i n e p r i v a t e as " n e i t h e r o f the p a r t i e s r e l i e d on a s t a t u t o r y p r o v i s i o n , nor was t h e r e any governmental presence o r i n t e r v e n t i o n " . A r l i n g t o n 266. 60. Re B h i n d i and B.C. P r o j e c t i o n i s t s , Loc. 348. [1986], 29 DLR (4th) 47. 61. B h i n d i 54. 62. Lavigne v. O n t a r i o P u b l i c S e r v i c e Employees Union e t a l . [1989] 31 O.A.C. 63. Lavigne was a c t u a l l y concerned w i t h a p p l i c a t i o n o f union dues t o purposes o t h e r than c o l l e c t i v e b a r g a i n i n g , but the c h a l l e n g e was on freedom o f a s s o c i a t i o n and e x p r e s s i o n grounds. 64. "...charged by s t a t u t e w i t h the t a s k o f a s s i s t i n g the M i n i s t e r " . Quoted i n A r l i n g t o n 267. 65. Re Lavigne and O n t a r i o P u b l i c S e r v i c e Employees Union e t a l . [1986] DLR 11-29 (4th) 323. 66. S e c t i o n 1 o f the C h a r t e r guarantees the r i g h t s and freedoms s e t out i n i t " s u b j e c t o n l y t o such reasonable l i m i t s . . . a s can be demonstrably j u s t i f i e d i n a f r e e and democratic 73 s o c i e t y " . 67. Lavigne [1986] 324-325. The i s s u e i n the Lavigne case r e g a r d i n g p r o t e c t i o n o f the o b j e c t i v e s o f a s s o c i a t i o n s w i l l be d e a l t w i t h below. 68. Lavigne [1988] 57. 69. i e . not i n f r i n g e d by pa y i n g union dues which c o u l d be used f o r n o n - c o l l e c t i v e b a r g a i n i n g purposes. 70. C a v a l l u z z o 207. 71. G a l l 248. 72. Re S e r v i c e Employees' I n t e r n a t i o n a l Union, L o c a l 204 and Broadway Manor Nu r s i n g Home e t a l . [1983] 4 DLR (4th) 231. The A c t i n q u e s t i o n extended the l i f e o f c o l l e c t i v e agreements c o v e r i n g p u b l i c s e c t o r employees and t h e r e f o r e had the e f f e c t o f d e p r i v i n g workers o f the r i g h t t o r e p r e s e n t a t i o n by the union o f t h e i r c h o i c e , and the r i g h t t o b a r g a i n c o l l e c t i v e l y and t o s t r i k e i n re g a r d t o non-compensatory matters. 73. Broadway Manor 232. 74. C a v a l l u z z o 191. 75. Ref. re P u b l i c S e r v i c e Employees R e l . A c t , Labour R e l a t i o n s A c t and P o l i c e O f f i c e r s C o l l e c t i v e B a r g a i n i n g A c t 1985 (Alta.) [1987] 1 S.C.R., 313-423. P u b l i c S e r v i c e o f Canada v. Canada [1987] 1 S.C.R., 424-459. R e t a i l , Wholesale, and Department Store Union Loc. 544, 635, and 955 e t a l . v. Saskatchewan [1987] 1 S.C.R., 460-496. 76. A l l r e f e r e n c e s i n t h i s s e c t i o n come from the t h r e e cases mentioned i n note 75. 77. See note 75. 78. Here M c l n t r y e i s presumably r e f e r r i n g t o the American Supreme Court case C i t i z e n s A g a i n s t Rent C o n t r o l v.  Berkeley, i n which a new d o c t r i n e t h a t "whatever a c t i o n a person can [ l a w f u l l y ] pursue as an i n d i v i d u a l , freedom o f a s s o c i a t i o n must ensure he can pursue w i t h o t h e r s " was advanced by the c o u r t . T h i s case arose when the c i t y imposed a f i n a n c i a l l i m i t on i n d i v i d u a l c o n t r i b u t i o n s t o committees formed t o support o r oppose referendum d e c i s i o n s , but no l i m i t on i n d i v i d u a l ' s a c t i o n alone. The judgment h i n t e d a t p r o t e c t i o n o f the fundamental o b j e c t i v e s o f an a s s o c i a t i o n , but o n l y when i n d i v i d u a l and c o l l e c t i v e a c t i o n c o u l d be c o r r e l a t e d -so i t i s not c l e a r how the c o u r t would r e a c t i n cases l i k e " r i g h t t o s t r i k e " where t h e r e i s no i n d i v i d u a l / 74 group c o r r e l a t i o n . Laurence H. Tribe, American Constitutional Law (2nd  Edition) (New York: The Foundation Press, Inc., 1988) 1014. 79. See note 75. 80. See note 75. 81. Weiler also notes that of the six Supreme Court judges involved (so decision made only by p l u r a l i t y of court), three from the majority side have r e t i r e d and been replaced. Weiler, "The Charter" 11. 82. Peter Russell, The Judiciary i n Canada (Toronto: McGraw-H i l l Ryerson, 1987) 362. 83. See note 75. 84. See note 75. 85. The Lavigne case has an i n t e r e s t i n g predecessor i n B r i t i s h Columbia. In a 1963 case, the O i l , Chemical and Atomic Workers International Union v. Imperial O i l Ltd. and the Attorney General of B.C., a majority four to three decision rendered by the Supreme Court declared that an amendment to the labour code which prevented trade unions from using the funds contributed to them through dues f o r p o l i t i c a l purposes d i d not derogate from fundamental p o l i t i c a l freedoms (even though the l e g i s l a t i o n was passed a f t e r a 1960 e l e c t i o n i n which the Social Credit party faced a reduced majority, and unions were openly supporting the NDP). The majority argued that " t h i s l e g i s l a t i o n could be regarded as preventing trade unions from e x p l o i t i n g f o r partisan p o l i t i c a l purposes rights conferred on them by the province f o r the purpose of c o l l e c t i v e bargaining." Judson J, i n dissent, argued the act was not l e g i s l a t i o n i n r e l a t i o n to labour re l a t i o n s but l e g i s l a t i o n i n r e l a t i o n to the p o l i t i c a l a c t i v i t y of a trade union and therefore outside p r o v i n c i a l powers. Abbott J., also dissenting, argued that the l e g i s l a t i o n d i d derogate from p o l i t i c a l freedoms. Peter H. Russell ed., Leading Constitutional Decisions, 4th E d i t i o n (Ottawa: Carleton University Press, 1987) 354. The two lawyers who argued the case for the union, Frank Scott and Thomas Berger, both conclude that the judgment was "an appropriate comment on lawmaking i n a c a p i t a l i s t society: there was no equivalent p r o h i b i t i o n against contributions by private corporations." Scott x i . Thomas Berger, personal interview, August 1, 1989. 86. Lavigne [1986] 324. 75 87. R e L a v i g n e a n d O n t a r i o P u b l i c S e r v i c e E m p l o y e e s U n i o n e t a l . (No.2) [1987] 60 O . R .(2d) 486. B o t h o f t h e s e d e c i s i o n s r e f l e c t A m e r i c a n j u r i s p r u d e n t i a l t h i n k i n g o n t h e m a t t e r . S e e A b o o d v . D e t r o i t B o a r d o f E d u c a t i o n (1977), 431 U . S . 109, a n d I n t e r n a t i o n a l A s s o c i a t i o n o f M a c h i n i s t s v . S t r e e t (1961), 367 U . S . 740. 88. T h e r e a s o n f o r t h e c h a n g e d n e x u s w a s t h a t L a v i g n e w a s n o t c h a l l e n g i n g t h e u n i o n s e c u r i t y c l a u s e i t s e l f b u t t h e e x p e n d i t u r e s o f u n i o n d u e s f o r c a u s e s h e d i d n o t a g r e e w i t h . 89. L a v i g n e [1988] 57. 90. L a v i g n e [1988] 64. 91. N e i l F i n k e l s t e i n , " T h e S u p r e m e C o u r t , t h e C h a r t e r , a n d L a b o u r R e l a t i o n s , " C h a r t e r I s s u e s i n C i v i l C a s e s , e d s . N e i l R . F i n k e l s t e i n a n d B r i a n M a c L e o d R o g e r s ( T o r o n t o : C a r s w e l l , 1988) 108. D o n J o r d a n , o f J o r d a n a n d G a l l ( a V a n c o u v e r f i r m t h a t a r g u e s o n b e h a l f o f a d v o c a t e s o f n e g a t i v e l i b e r t y ) b e l i e v e s t h a t t h e d o c t r i n e o f g o v e r n m e n t a c t i o n w i l l b e m a d e m u c h c l e a r e r i n t h e u p c o m i n g S u p r e m e C o u r t j u d g m e n t s o n m a n d a t o r y r e t i r e m e n t . 92. H o u s e o f C o m m o n s D e b a t e s , N o v e m b e r 20, 1984: 13055 Q u o t e d i n M a n d e l 184. 93. M a r s h 1155. T h i s l e g i s l a t i o n w a s p a s s e d u n d e r f e d e r a l g o v e r n m e n t e m e r g e n c y p o w e r s . 94. B e a t t y , P u t t i n g 49. 95. F o r i n s t a n c e , B e a t t y a r g u e s t h e m o s t p r o m i n e n t r e a s o n f o r i n c r e a s e d f a i r n e s s i n t h e p r o c e s s i s " t h e f o r m a l e n f r a n c h i s e m e n t a n d i n c r e a s i n g i n f l u e n c e o f a l l s e g m e n t s o f t h e l a b o u r f o r c e i n t h e l e g i s l a t i v e a n d e x e c u t i v e p r o c e s s e s o f g o v e r n m e n t . " B e a t t y , P u t t i n g 45. 96. K e i t h B a n t i n g a n d R i c h a r d S i m e o n , " F e d e r a l i s m , D e m o c r a c y a n d t h e C o n s t i t u t i o n , " A n d N o O n e C h e e r e d e d s . K e i t h B a n t i n g a n d R i c h a r d S i m e o n ( T o r o n t o : M e t h u e n P u b l i c a t i o n s , 1983) 19. 97. T h i s s e e m s e s p e c i a l l y t r u e i n t h e f a c e o f t h e M e e c h L a k e A c c o r d . 98. M a r s h , V o l . 1 343. T h e p u b l i c s e c t o r u n i o n s w o u l d c o m e t o p l a y a s i g n i f i c a n t r o l e b e c a u s e g o v e r n m e n t l e g i s l a t i o n a i m e d d i r e c t l y a t t h e m w a s t h e s u b j e c t o f t h e f i r s t f r e e d o m o f a s s o c i a t i o n r u l i n g s . 76 99. Mandel 185. 100. B. C. Federation of Labour, Summary of Proceedings, 25th Annual Convention (1980): 134. 101. B. C. Federation of Labour, Summary of Proceedings, 26th Annual Convention (1981): 17. 102. B r i t i s h Columbia Federation of Labour, Presentation to the  Special Joint Committee on the Constitution of Canada, January 8, 1981. 12. The BCFL b r i e f also c a l l e d f o r s o c i a l and economic rights, and declared that while they were prepared to support entrenching rights, they were concerned about the way judges were appointed without any public scrutiny. 103. The CLC joined with the CCF i n 1962 to form the NDP. 104. Canada, Special Joint Committee of the Senate and the  House of Commons on the Constitution 1980-1981, Issue #43: 69. 105. Robinson declared the r i g h t to s t r i k e was de l i b e r a t e l y l e f t out of the amendment because "we are dealing with the fundamental incidence of freedom of association". Canada 69. 106. Canada 70. 107. The amendment was defeated 20 to 2 - the two NDP members members (Lorne Nystrom and Svend Robinson) were the only MP's i n favour. 108. Another way of tracking the lack of action on the part of unions i s to note how many times they are referred to i n books about the Charter. For example, i n a) Roy Romanow, John Whyte and Howard Leeson, Canada  ...Notwithstanding: The Making of the Constitution  1976-1982 (Toronto: Carswell/Methuen, 1984), one reference to labour, but not to do with the Charter. b) Edward McWhinney, Canada and the Constitution: 1979  1982 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1982), no references to labour. Compare t h i s to the number of references to women's and native groups: a) Romanow- women 6, natives 13. b) McWhinney- women 5, aboriginals 8. 109. B.C. Federation of Labour, Submission 2. 110. Panitch 30 and 100. There were ten instances of back to work l e g i s l a t i o n from 1965 to 1969, sixteen from 1970 to 1974, twenty-five from 1975 to 1979, and twenty-two from 1980 to 1984. 77 111. David Rice, p e r s o n a l i n t e r v i e w , J u l y 15, 1989. 112. Mandel 185. 113. J . Evenson and R. Simeon, "The Roots o f D i s c o n t e n t , " The P o l i t i c a l Economy o f C o n f e d e r a t i o n : Proceedings (Kingston: Queen's U n i v e r s i t y I n s t i t u t e o f Intergovernmental R e l a t i o n s , 1979) 165-198. 114. P a n i t c h 104. 115. C. B. MacPherson, "Interview," S o c i a l i s t S t u d i e s (Winnipeg, Man.: S o c i e t y f o r S o c i a l i s t S t u d i e s , 1983): 11. 116. T h i s t h e o r y i s a l s o confirmed by David Rice, who wrote the B.C.F.L. b r i e f t o the J o i n t Committee. Ri c e , p e r s o n a l i n t e r v i e w . 117. The most n o t a b l e o f which was the NDP premier o f Saskatchewan, A l l e n Blakeney. 118. Romanow 109. A G a l l u p p o l l done i n the s p r i n g o f 1981 showed 62% o f Canadians supported the i d e a o f a c h a r t e r t o be i n c l u d e d i n t he p a t r i a t i o n p l a n , and onl y 15% opposed. Support was g e n e r a l l y u n i v e r s a l a c r o s s a l l r e g i o n s . Reg Whitaker, "Democracy and the Canadian C o n s t i t u t i o n , " And No One Cheered eds. K e i t h B a n t i n g and R i c h a r d Simeon (Toronto: Methuen, 1983) 254. 119. Mandel 186. Ri c e agrees: he notes t h a t the " i s s u e d i d n ' t seem t o be o f major consequence". Ri c e , p e r s o n a l i n t e r v i e w . 120. Bob White, "From Defeat t o Renewal: the NDP Tomorrow," T h i s Magazine Vol.#23 (1989): 24. However, t h e r e i s no a v a i l a b l e evidence t h a t the CLC and the NDP p o s i t i o n on the C h a r t e r were d i f f e r e n t . 121. Which they do not- o n l y approximately 30 perc e n t o f union members vote NDP f e d e r a l l y . 122. T h i s i n f o r m a t i o n s u p p l i e d by Paul C a v a l l u z z o , a lawyer who o f t e n a c t s f o r t r a d e unions, and w r i t e s about these i s s u e s . P e r s o n a l i n t e r v i e w , Paul C a v a l l u z z o , August 30, 1989. 123. Wage and p r i c e c o n t r o l s are comprehensive government r e s t r i c t i o n s on the maximum r a t e o f i n c r e a s e o f wages and p r i c e s d u r i n g a s p e c i f i e d time p e r i o d . In response t o e x c e p t i o n a l l y h i g h i n f l a t i o n r a t e s i n 1974 and 1975, the f e d e r a l A n t i - I n f l a t i o n A c t e s t a b l i s h e d a t h r e e year 78 control system (from 1975 to 1978). Wage guidelines were binding on a l l firms with over 500 employees, on a l l federal employees, and (with the co-operation of most p r o v i n c i a l governments) on the majority of public sector employees. Profit-margin controls were aimed at the p r i c e and cost markup of large firms. Marsh, Vol. 3 2271. This action i n s p i r e d a CLC revolt, beginning with the withdrawl of CLC members from the federal government appointed Economic Council and Labour Relations Committee i n March of 1976. V. Pearson, " I f you can't beat 'em, quit 'em," Macleans 89 A p r i l 5, 1976: 22. Then i n the early 1980s, the federal (and many provincial) governments also moved to l i m i t the bargaining power of public sector unions through l e g i s l a t i o n such as the Public Sector Compensation Act 1980-81-82. 124. In response to the question of why union lawyers did not warn the CLC of concerns about freedom of association and unions, Cavalluzzo declared that f i r s t , "unions did not seek our advice". Second, because of many of the decisions of the Supreme Court under the B i l l of Rights ( p a r t i c u l a r l y the O i l , Chemical and Atomic Workers case described i n footnote 87), lawyers did not foresee the j u d i c i a l activism (as compared with rulings under the B i l l of Rights) present under the Charter. Cavalluzzo, August 30, 1989. 125. Joe Weiler, a law professor at the University of B r i t i s h Columbia, who was involved i n the Charter negotiations. Joe Weiler, personal interview, August 15, 1989. 126. Quoted i n Panitch 95-96. 127. Whitaker 255. 128. Beatty, Putting 4. 129. Paul Weiler, "A Constitutional B i l l of Rights?", Dalhousie  Review Vol.60 No. 2 Summer (1980): 231. 130. Quebec, as the only province not to agree to adoption of the Constitution Act of 1982, adopted instead B i l l 62, which i n e f f e c t invokes the override r e t r o a c t i v e l y and for the future, declaring that a l l such l e g i s l a t i o n i s operative despite section 2 and 7 to 15 of the Charter. Additionally, Quebec invoked the notwithstanding to put french language rights l e g i s l a t i o n ( B i l l 178) i n place. 131. "A Charter Override", Macleans Magazine, February 17, 1986: 17. 79 132. Globe and M a i l , 18 December 1985: A21. 133. B. C. F e d e r a t i o n o f Labour, Summary o f Proceedings: 29th  Annual Convention, 1984: 19. 134. One o f a number o f h a l f page advertisements i n s e r t e d i n major Canadian newspapers i n c l u d i n g the Globe and M a i l and the Vancouver Sun. Vancouver Sun, 2 February 1989: B2. 135. Mandel 207. 136. R i c h a r d E. Flathman, The P r a c t i c e o f R i g h t s (London: Cambridge U n i v e r s i t y Press, 1976) 161. 137. K a r l Marx 147. 138. Marx 146. 139. Marx 140. 140. Waldron 129. 141. Waldron 129. 142. Tom Campbell, The L e f t and R i g h t s : A Conceptual A n a l y s i s  o f the Idea o f S o c i a l i s t R i g h t s (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1983) 83. 143. Marx 146. 144. Steven Lukes, Marxism and M o r a l i t y (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1985) 58. 145. Waldron 139. 146. Marx 140. 147. As Marx w r i t e s , man "has a l i f e both i n the p o l i t i c a l community, where he i s v a l u e d as a communal being, and i n c i v i l s o c i e t y , where he i s a c t i v e as a p r i v a t e i n d i v i d u a l . " Marx 140. 148. Waldron 132. 149. Hutchison 279. 150. Mandel 58, 185. 151. P a n i t c h 61. 152. As J u s t i c e Rand c a l l e d f o r . 80 153. P a n i t c h 61. P a n i t c h g o e s o n t o a r g u e t h a t t h e r u l i n g s i n t h e L a b o u r T r i l o g y c a s e s " j u r i d i c a l l y a n d i d e o l o g i c a l l y p r o v i d e d s p a c e f o r a m u c h b r o a d e r a s s a u l t o n t r a d e u n i o n f r e e d o m s " . F o r e x a m p l e , J o h n B u l l o c k , p r e s i d e n t o f t h e C a n a d i a n F e d e r a t i o n o f I n d e p e n d e n t B u s i n e s s , n o t e s t h a t t h e r u l i n g l e f t h i s g r o u p f r e e t o p u r s u e t h e i r o b j e c t i v e t o l i m i t s t r i k e s i n t h e p o s t o f f i c e . P a n i t c h 65. 154. H u t c h i s o n 296. 155. B e a t t y , P u t t i n g 11. 156. M a n d e l n o t e s t h a t t h e L a v i g n e d e c i s i o n i n t h e O n t a r i o H i g h C o u r t " s h o w e d j u s t h o w f a r t h e f a n t a s i e s o f B e a t t y a r e f r o m t h e a c t u a l i t i e s o f C h a r t e r ' p a r t i c i p a t i o n ' a n d ' c o n v e r s a t i o n ' " . M a n d e l 211. 157. F o r e x a m p l e , " a l a w e n a c t e d b y a l e g i s l a t u r e w h i c h e m p o w e r s s o m e e m p l o y e e s t o c o m p e l o t h e r s t o j o i n a n a s s o c i a t i o n a g a i n s t t h e i r w i l l i s j u s t a s o f f e n s i v e t o a p e r s o n ' s f r e e d o m o f a s s o c i a t i o n a s r u l e s i m p o s e d b y e m p l o y e r s w h i c h i n t e r f e r e w i t h t h e a b i l i t y o f t h e i r e m p l o y e e s t o f o r m u n i o n s o f t h e i r o w n c h o o s i n g . " B e a t t y , P u t t i n g 124. 158. H e r e B e a t t y m a k e s a r e c o m m e n d a t i o n s i m i l a r t o t h a t o f t h e O n t a r i o H i g h C o u r t - s u p p o r t f o r c o l l e c t i v e b a r g a i n i n g , b u t n o t f o r ( f o r e x a m p l e ) t h e i n d e p e n d e n t s t a t e o f P a l e s t i n e . B e a t t y , P u t t i n g 122-127. 159. " P r a g m a t i c p l u r a l i s t s " i s t h e l a b e l W e i l e r g i v e s t o t h i s s c h o o l o f t h o u g h t . W e i l e r , " T h e C h a r t e r " 60. 160. A l t h o u g h L a v i g n e m a y h a v e r e p l i e d t h a t t h e c o s t t o s h a r e h o l d e r s t o o p t o u t o f a c o r p o r a t i o n i s c e r t a i n l y l e s s t h a n h i s t o o p t o u t o f t h e u n i o n . A l a n C a i r n s , A u g u s t 9/ 1989. 161. W e i l e r , " T h e C h a r t e r " 40, 60. 162. W a l d r o n 184. 163. M a r x 145. 164. W a l d r o n 191. 165. W a l d r o n 192. 166. B e r l i n 150. 81 167. Paul J.J. Cavalluzzo, "Freedom of Association- Its E f f e c t s Upon C o l l e c t i v e Bargaining and Trade Unions", (Queen's University Law School Lecture, September 24 and 25, 1987) 46. Quoted i n Mcintosh 24. 168. Re Lavigne and OPSEU (No.2), 109. Those non-voluntary union members involved i n union security cases (l i k e Arlington Crane) presumably would argue that they have the ri g h t to disagree with any form of union community, or any form of association that l i m i t s t h e i r negative l i b e r t y . 169. I t would be d i f f i c u l t to j u s t i f y the closed shop under these c r i t e r i a . An argument could be advanced that the union shop (which requires union membership as well as dues paying) would be a good compromise, but i n r e a l i t y , a reluctant union member may disrupt the trade union much more than a reluctant dues payer, so the union would be better served by the requirement only to pay dues. 170. Re Lavigne and OPSEU (No.2) 100. 171. Here I am r e f e r r i n g to shareholders i n a corporation, not ratepayers. The rel a t i o n s h i p between a monopoly u t i l i t y (such as B.C. Telephone) and i t s customers i s comparable i n some respects to that of an i n d i v i d u a l and his union. 172. Re Lavigne and OPSEU (No.2), 103. The Court ruled i n t h i s case that the opt-out formula was the f a i r e s t way to handle dissent (versus Lavigne's argument that members be required to "opt-in"). 173. Re Lavigne and OPSEU (No.2) 117. Probably much less open to debate i s the Court's decision that f i n a n c i a l support to a group f i g h t i n g f o r an independent state of Palestine would an "opt-out" expense. 174. Charles H. Hession, John Kenneth Galbraith and His C r i t i c s (New York: New American Library, 1972) 39. 175. Seymour Martin Lipset, Martin A. Trow, James S. Coleman, Union Democracy: The Internal P o l i t i c s of the International  Typographical Union (Garden City: Anchor Books, 1956) 15. 176. Waldron 194. 177. Hugh C o l l i n s , Marxism and Law (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1982) 113. 82 178. Tom Pocklington "On Native Self-Government," University of Alberta unpublished paper, 15. Quoted i n Mcintosh 28. 179. Seymour Martin Lipset's study of democracy i n the International Typographical Union looks at the e f f e c t of a number of d i f f e r e n t variables i n an attempt to explain the success of democratic self-government i n that p a r t i c u l a r union. In p a r t i c u l a r , the "factors a f f e c t i n g membership i n t e r e s t and p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n union a f f a i r s " and "factors r e l a t i n g to law, legitimacy and value systems i n unions" may o f f e r some valuable lessons to trade unionists working f o r change. Lipset 466-467. 83 TABLE OF CASES Abood v . De tro i t Board of Education (1977), 431 U . S . , 209. A r l i n g t o n Crane Service L t d . v . O n t a r i o ( M i n i s t e r o f Labour) [1988] 56 D . L . R . (4th), 209. Re Bhindi et a l . and B r i t i s h Columbia P r o j e c t i o n i s t s Local 348 of I n t ' l A l l i a n c e o f P ic ture Machine Operators of United States & Canada (1985), 20 D . L . R . (4th), 386. Dolphin Del ivery L t d . et a l . v . R e t a i l , Wholesale and Department Store Union, Local 580 et a l . [1986] 2 S . C . R . , 573. I n t ' l A s s ' n of Machinists et a l . v . S tee t et a l . (1961) 367 U . S . , 740. Lav igne v . Ontario Pub l i c Services Employees Union et a l . , Re (1986) 55 O.R. (2d), 449. Lav igne v . Ontario Pub l i c Service Employees Union et a l . (No. 2), Re (1987) 60 O.R. (2d), 486. Lavigne v . Ontario Pub l i c Service Employees Union et a l . [1989], 31 O . A . C . , 59. O i l , Chemical and Atomic Workers Internat ional Union v . Imperial O i l L t d . and Attorney General of B r i t i s h Columbia [1963] S . C . R . , 584. P u b l i c S e r v i c e A l l i a n c e of Canada v . Canada [1987] 1 S . C . R . , 424. Ref. re P u b l i c Service Employees R e l . Ac t , Labour Relat ions Act and P o l i c e O f f i c e r s C o l l e c t i v e B a r g a i n i n g A c t 1985 ( A l t a . ) [1987] 1 S . C . R . , 313. R e t a i l , Wholesale and Department Store Union, Locals 544, 496, 635 and 955 et a l . v . Saskatchewan et a l . [1987] 1 S . C . R . , 460. Re Service Employees' Internat ional Union, Local 204 v . Broadway Manor Nursing Home et a l . [1983] 4 D . L . R . ( 4 t h ) , 231. 84 B I B L I O G R A P H Y "A Charter Override". Macleans Magazine. 17 February 1986: 17. Banting, Keith and Richard Simeon. "Federalism, Democracy and the Constitution." And No One Cheered. Eds. Keith Banting and Richard Simeon. Toronto: Methuen Publications, 1983. Beatty, David. Putting the Charter to Work: Designing a  Constitutional Labour Code. Kingston: McGill-Queens University Press, 1987. Beatty, David. "Constitutional Conceits: The Coercive Authority of Courts." University of Toronto Law Journal. 37 (1987): 183-192. Bender, Paul. "The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms and the United States B i l l of Rights: A Comparison." McGill Law Journal. Vol. 28, No. 4 (1983):811-866. Berger, Thomas. Personal interview. August 1, 1989. Be r l i n , Isaiah. "Two Concepts of Liberty." P o l i t i c a l  Philosophy. Ed. Anthony Quinton. Oxford University Press, 1967: 141-152. B r i t i s h Columbia Federation of Labour. Presentation to the  Special Joint Committee on the Constitution of Canada. 8 January 1981. B r i t i s h Columbia Federation of Labour. Summary of Proceedings:  25th Annual Convention. 1980. B r i t i s h Columbia Federation of Labour. Summary of Proceedings:  26th Annual Convention. 1981. B r i t i s h Columbia Federation of Labour. Summary of Proceedings:  29th Annual Convention. 1984 Campbell, Tom. 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