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Regionalism, majority government and the electoral system in Canada : the case for two-seat constituencies Sutherland, Neil John 1988

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REGIONALISM, MAJORITY GOVERNMENT AND THE ELECTORAL SYSTEM IN CANADA: THE CASE FOR TWO-SEAT CONSTITUENCIES By Neil  John  Sutherland  B . S c , Western Washington U n i v e r s i t y , B.A., U n i v e r s i t y o f B r i t i s h C o l u m b i a ,  A THESIS SUBMITTED  1982 1986  IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF  THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF MASTER OF ARTS in THE FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIES (Department  We  of Political  accept t h i s t h e s i s to the required  Science)  as c o n f o r m i n g standard  THE UNIVERSITY OF B R I T I S H COLUMBIA July (c)  1988  N e i l John S u t h e r l a n d ,  1988  In  presenting  degree freely  at  this  the  available  copying  of  department publication  thesis  in  partial  fulfilment  of  the  University  of  British  Columbia,  I  agree  for  this or  thesis by  of  reference  this  for  his thesis  and  scholarly  or for  her  Department  V6T Date  DE-6(3/81)  Columbia  1Y3 /  L  ^  r  /  5 7  l*)T?  I  further  purposes  gain  shall  that  agree  may  representatives.  financial  permission.  T h e U n i v e r s i t y o f British 1956 Main Mall Vancouver, Canada  study.  requirements  It not  be is  that  the  Library  an  granted  by  allowed  advanced  shall  permission  understood be  for  the that  without  for head  make  it  extensive of  my  copying  or  my  written  ABSTRACT  A continual  problem i n Canadian p o l i t i c s  i s regional  conflict.  There a r e s e v e r a l reasons why t h e major i s s u e s i n Canadian p o l i t i c s a r e regionally-defined.  Some o f t h e s o c i o - e c o n o m i c  variables  include  e t h n i c i t y and economic bases, which a r e r e i n f o r c e d by geography.  Some o f  the p o l i t i c a l v a r i a b l e s include t h e d i v i s i o n o f powers between t h e c e n t r a l and  p r o v i n c i a l governments, and t h e r e g i o n a l  concentration  o f party  r e p r e s e n t a t i o n i n t h e c e n t r a l government l e g i s l a t u r e .  At  the level  o f t h e electorate,  Canada's n a t i o n a l  political  p a r t i e s a c t u a l l y r e c e i v e m u l t i - r e g i o n a l support.  Thus, i n t r o d u c i n g an  electoral  more  system t h a t t r a n s l a t e s votes i n t o seats  proportionately  than t h e present system should increase t h e m u l t i r e g i o n a l  representation  o f Canada's p o l i t i c a l p a r t i e s a t t h e l e v e l o f seats i n t h e l e g i s l a t u r e .  However, i n t r o d u c i n g probably  decrease  government. stability criterion  a more p r o p o r t i o n a l  t h e l i k e l i h o o d o f a party  e l e c t o r a l system would a  majority  Consequently,. i f Canada's l e g i s l a t o r s f e l t t h a t  executive  through m a j o r i t y  forming  government was a more important  normative  (along w i t h whatever vested i n t e r e s t s they might have) than a  government w i t h m u l t i r e g i o n a l representation,  then proposals f o r a more  p r o p o r t i o n a l e l e c t o r a l system w i l l remain an academic e x e r c i s e .  ii  The  o b j e c t i v e o f t h i s study was t o f i n d an a l t e r n a t i v e e l e c t o r a l  system which s a t i s f i e s both t h e c r i t e r i a o f m a j o r i t y government and m u l t i r e g i o n a l representation.  Based  on t h e p r e m i s e  that  t h e most s i g n i f i c a n t  independent  v a r i a b l e s a f f e c t i n g m a j o r i t y government and m u l t i r e g i o n a l representation are d i s t r i c t magnitude and geographical d i s t r i b u t i o n o f p a r t i s a n support, i t was hypothesized two,  t h a t Increasing t h e d i s t r i c t magnitude from one t o  o r from one t o three, would maintain  the bias  i n favour  o f and  increase t h e m u l t i r e g i o n a l representation o f a l a r g e , d i f f u s e p a r t y .  The  r e s u l t s o f t h e study  show t h a t a d i s t r i c t magnitude o f two  would provide a l a r g e d i f f u s e p a r t y w i t h a m a j o r i t y o f seats f o r t h e same v o t e r support as t h e present system does.  I n a d d i t i o n , DM2 rewards t h i s  l a r g e d i f f u s e p a r t y w i t h t h e seats necessary t o form a m i n o r i t y government a t a much lower v o t e r support l e v e l than does t h e e x i s t i n g system. DM2 solves t h e problem o f underrepresentation  Thus,  o f regions i n t h e government  p a r t y , and i s a t t h e same time even more advantageous t o a l a r g e d i f f u s e p a r t y than i s t h e present e l e c t o r a l system.  iii  CONTENTS  Chapter  Page  Abstract  i i  Tables and F i g u r e s 1.  vi  Introduction  The Problem Methodology  1 3  2. The V a r i a b l e s The E l e c t o r a l System, Federalism, and Regionalism The E l e c t o r a l System, M a j o r i t y Government, and S t a b i l i t y The E l e c t o r a l System, Regionalism, and I n s t a b i l i t y The Two C r i t e r i a t h a t an A l t e r n a t i v e E l e c t o r a l System Must Meet P r o p o r t i o n a l Representation E l e c t o r a l Systems The Largest Remainder Formula The Highest Average Formula Highest Average and Largest Remainder Formulae Compared Variables Affecting Proportionality The Objectives o f t h i s Study  12 13 14 15 17 18 31  3. Methodology C o l l e c t i o n o f Data C l a s s i f i c a t i o n o f Data  33 35  4. A n a l y s i s o f N a t i o n a l Data R e s u l t s o f t h e 1953 E l e c t i o n The 1957 E l e c t i o n The 1962 E l e c t i o n The 1963 E l e c t i o n The 1965 E l e c t i o n E f f e c t s o f D i s t r i c t Magnitude on L i b e r a l Seat Shares E f f e c t s o f D i s t r i c t Magnitude on Conservative Vote Shares  39 41 42 43 46 47 53  5. A n a l y s i s The The The  o f Regional Data L i b e r a l s i n t h e West L i b e r a l s i n Quebec R e s u l t s For t h e L i b e r a l s i n Quebec and i n the West Compared The Conservatives i n Quebec  6. Conclusions Summary o f Findings Psychological Effects A l t e r n a t i v e Proposals Clarification Present-Day Relevance Further Study  6 8 10  58 61 63 64 67 68 70 71 73 74  iv  Chapter  Page  Appendices A. B.  E l e c t i o n R e s u l t s f o r a l l P a r t i e s i n a l l the E l e c t i o n s f o r a l l D i s t r i c t Magrdtudes  75  Regional R e s u l t s f o r the L i b e r a l s i n the West and Quebec, and f o r the Conservatives i n Quebec  76  C.  P r c p o r t i o n a l i t y as a f u n c t i o n o f D i s t r i c t Magnitude  77  D.  Regression C o e f f i c i e n t s  78  Endnotes  79  Bibliography 1. 2. 3. 4. 5.  E l e c t o r a l Systems General and T h e o r e t i c a l Works Canada Data A n a l y s i s Sources of Data  v  81 83 84 86 86  TABLES AND FIGURES  Table  4.1  4.2  4.3:  Page  L i b e r a l Vote Shares and Seat Shares using DM1, DM2, DM3, DM6 and DM-PROV f o r the 1953, 1957, 1962, 1963 and 1965 E l e c t i o n s  40  L i b e r a l Vote Shares and Seat Shares using FPP from 1935 t o 1980, and Seat Shares u s i n g DM2 f o r the 1953, 1957, 1962, 1963 and 1965 E l e c t i o n s  49  Conservative Votes Shares and Seat Shares u s i n g FPP from 1935 t o 1980, and Seats Shares u s i n g DM2 and DM3 f o r the 1953, 1957, 1962, 1963, and 1965 E l e c t i o n s  54  Figure  2.1  Page  The R e l a t i o n Between P r o p o r t i o n a l i t y and D i s t r i c t Magnitude  16  4.1  L i b e r a l Seat Shares using DM1, DM2, LTD, DM6 and DM-PROV  48  4.2  L i b e r a l Seat Shares u s i n g FPP and DM2, where s c a t t e r — p l o t equals FPP r e s u l t s from 1935 t o 1980  50  Conservative Seat Shares u s i n g FPP, DM2, and DM3, where s c a t t e r p l o t equals FPP r e s u l t s from 1935 t o 1980  55  4.3  vi  CHAPTER 1  INTRDDQCTIGN  The  Problem  What s t r u c t u r a l  changes can be made t o t h e Canadian p o l i t i c a l  system, so t h a t r e g i o n a l concerns can be more e f f e c t i v e l y a r t i c u l a t e d , and regional  conflicts  more e a s i l y  resolved  c o n f l i c t - r e s o l u t i o n mechanisms are p o s s i b l e .  by accommodation?  Various  However, o n l y those t h a t do  not threaten the s e l f - i n t e r e s t o f the b e n e f i c i a r i e s o f the e x i s t i n g system have a r e a l i s t i c chance o f being  implemented.  The lower chamber would  have rKDthing t o g a i n , and probably much t o l o s e , i f there were an e l e c t e d second chamber. proportional  And r e p l a c i n g the e x i s t i n g e l e c t o r a l system w i t h a more electoral  multi-regional  system  representation  may d o more  within  than  the national  just  increase  political  party  caucuses; i t may a l s o decrease the l i k e l i h o o d t h a t any one o f them can form a one-party government.  I s i t p o s s i b l e , then, t o a l t e r the Canadian e l e c t o r a l system i n such a way as t o increase the m u l t i - r e g i o n a l representation o f the l a r g e s t p a r t y without  s u b s t a n t i a l l y decreasing  legislature?  This h y p o t h e t i c a l and p r a c t i c a l question provides the  o f the t h e s i s .  i t s t o t a l number o f seats i n t h e focus  I t w i l l be argued t h a t r e g i o n a l a l i e n a t i o n i n Canada i s a t  l e a s t p a r t i a l l y the r e s u l t o f underrepresentation  o f d i f f e r e n t regions i n  the c e n t r a l government; so t h a t increased representation o f a region i n  the  party  sense  forming t h e n a t i o n a l government would decrease t h a t  of alienation.  First-Past-the-Post  I t will  also  be argued  that  region's  the existing  (FPP) e l e c t o r a l system d i s t o r t s t h e t r a n s l a t i o n o f  votes i n t o seats, e s p e c i a l l y a t t h e r e g i o n a l l e v e l .  Consequently, i f an  e l e c t o r a l system t h a t i s more p r o p o r t i o n a l than FPP causes l e s s d i s t o r t i o n o f votes i n t o seats  a t t h e r e g i o n a l l e v e l , i t should decrease r e g i o n a l  alienation.  The  f i r s t question,  whether a more p r o p o r t i o n a l e l e c t o r a l system  would decrease t h e degree o f underrepresentation  o f various parties i n  v a r i o u s regions, i s therefore more o r l e s s taken f o r granted t o be i n t h e affirmative.  The more i n t e r e s t i n g question, and t h e question whose answer  i s more d i f f i c u l t t o p r e d i c t , i s whether t h e l a r g e s t p a r t y - and thus t h e government p a r t y  - will  have i t s l o s s o f seats i n regions where i t i s  overrepresented more than compensated f o r o r l e s s than compensated f o r by i t s g a i n o f seats i n regions where i t i s underrepresented, under a more p r o p o r t i o n a l e l e c t o r a l system. one  I f t h e l a r g e s t party's l o s s o f seats i n  r e g i o n i s i n f a c t a t l e a s t compensated f o r by i t s g a i n o f seats i n  another region, under a more p r o p o r t i o n a l e l e c t o r a l system, then we w i l l have  found  an e l e c t o r a l system t h a t  representation  may  o f t h e l a r g e s t party's  increase  the multi-regional  caucus, without decreasing i t s  chances o f forming a one-party government.  A major problem i n Canadian p o l i t i c s , then, i s r e g i o n a l c o n f l i c t . T h i s problem i s f u r t h e r i n t e n s i f i e d by a d i v i s i o n o f powers between l e v e l s o f government, by t h e absence o f a d i v i s i o n o f powers w i t h i n t h e c e n t r a l government - i n p a r t i c u l a r , the absence o f an e l e c t e d second chamber based 2  on  representation  distorts  the  by  region  regional  -  support  and  by  of  the  FPP  national  e l e c t o r a l system political  p a r t i e s when  t r a n s l a t e d from the l e v e l o f the e l e c t o r a t e t o the l e v e l o f seats.  that  legislative  Hence, our focus i s on a r e a l - l i f e problematic s i t u a t i o n , and  questions  t h a t focus our  the  i n v e s t i g a t i o n are whether a more p r o p o r t i o n a l  e l e c t o r a l system would increase the m u l t i r e g i o n a l representation of  the  n a t i o n a l p o l i t i c a l p a r t i e s , and whether such an e l e c t o r a l system would be i n the best i n t e r e s t s o f the major b e n e f i c i a r i e s o f the e x i s t i n g system.  Methodology  We want t o c o l l e c t data o f a q u a n t i f i a b l e v a r i a b l e t h a t appears t o s i g n i f i c a n t l y a f f e c t the r e l a t i o n s h i p between representation, and federalism. data.  regionalism,  We must a l s o take i n t o consideration the a v a i l a b i l i t y of  The FPP e l e c t o r a l system provides a l i n k between representation the  t r a n s l a t i o n of  votes  regionalism;  and  quantitative.  A l s o , the number o f votes c a s t f o r each candidate i n each  constituency i s published by the government. to  1965  i n t o seats  this  strictly  The e l e c t i o n r e s u l t s o f  n a t i o n a l e l e c t i o n s have been chosen because the  boundaries remained unchanged during  is  and  1953  constituency  s i x - e l e c t i o n period,  thereby  p r o v i d i n g us w i t h a r e l a t i v e l y l a r g e sample s i z e , and because the  smaller  p a r t i e s d i d not  support  undergo any  historical  decline  in total  vote  during most o f t h i s p e r i o d .  The proposed methodology i s as f o l l o w s . results  from  the  1953  to  the  1965 3  national  After collecting election elections, hypothetical  constituencies  o f two, three,  and s i x seats,  as w e l l as " r e g i o n a l "  c o n s t i t u e n c i e s based on v a r i o u s d e f i n i t i o n s o f "region" w i l l be created. This approach permits  an examination o f regionalism i n Canada from t h e  perspective o f r e g i o n a l representation i n t h e executive ( i n t h e government p a r t y , and t h e r e f o r e i n t h e cabinet) legislature.  and r e g i o n a l representation i n t h e  I n order t o c r e a t e these h y p o t h e t i c a l c o n s t i t u e n c i e s , t h e  number o f v a l i d votes c a s t i n one constituency w i l l be added t o those o f contiguous c o n s t i t u e n c i e s , which a r e o r i g i n a l l y ordered a l p h a b e t i c a l l y . However, because c o n s t i t u e n c i e s a r e n o t t h e same s i z e o r shape, they cannot be added contiguously ad i n f i r i i t u m .  Some a t t e n t i o n must a l s o be  p a i d t o r e g i o n a l urban centers, and d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n made between urban and r u r a l areas.  With  each  increase  i n district  magnitude  (the s i z e o f t h e  cxanstituencies, i n terms o f s e a t s ) , two trends w i l l be noted: f i r s t , t h e increase o r decrease i n r e g i o n a l representation o f each n a t i o n a l p o l i t i c a l p a r t y w i l l be recorded; second, t h e increase o r decrease i n t h e number o f seats h e l d by each p a r t y i n t h e l e g i s l a t u r e w i l l be recorded. the small sample s i z e  -  number o f e l e c t i o n s ,  n,  Because o f  = 5, - i t w i l l be  d i f f i c u l t t o formulate a l i n e a r r e l a t i o n s h i p between t h e number o f seats per  constituency  ( d i s t r i c t magnitude) and t h e p r o p o r t i o n a l i t y o f votes  t r a n s l a t e d i n t o seats. graph  However, these r e s u l t s can be transposed  showing t h e r e l a t i o n s h i p between votes  between 1937 and 1984.  and seats  on t o a  f o r elections  Such a t r a n s p o s i t i o n w i l l a l l o w us t o observe  whether increased d i s t r i c t magnitudes w i l l increase o r decrease t h e b i a s (the amount by which a l a r g e party's seat share exceeds i t s vote share) i n favour o f e i t h e r o r both l a r g e p a r t i e s . 4  Besides v a r i a t i o n i n s i z e and shape o f contiguous c o n s t i t u e n c i e s , there are other methodological  difficulties.  First,  the 1958 e l e c t i o n ,  when the Conservative p a r t y won a m a j o r i t y o f the seats i n the province o f Quebec, represents omitted.  an  anomaly i n our  data  s e t , and  w i l l therefore  be  Second, not every p o l i t i c a l p a r t y contested every seat i n every  election.  T h i s problem w i l l be d e a l t w i t h by t r e a t i n g a l l instances where  a p a r t y ran a candidate  i n one constituency, but not i n the  constituency  contiguous t o i t , as s i n g l e - s e a t c o n s t i t u e n c i e s .  Also, paribus. of the  time  and  s t r a t e g i c v o t i n g must be  t r e a t e d as c e t e r i s  There i s much evidence t o support the argument t h a t the spectre 'wasted vote'  i n an FPP  e l e c t o r a l system decreases the e l e c t o r a l  support o f s m a l l e r p a r t i e s , and t h a t t h i s e f f e c t i s s e l f - r e i n f o r c i n g over time;  consequently,  system  could  parties.  the  i n theory  introduction of increase  the  a more p r o p o r t i o n a l electoral  support  electoral  for  smaller  For our study t o attempt t o take i n t o account such f a c t o r s as  a l t e r n a t i v e forms o f s t r a t e g i c v o t i n g would be pure s p e c u l a t i o n - even w i t h h i n d s i g h t - and so we must assume t h a t the wasted v o t e f a c t o r had minimal impact during the 1953-1965 p e r i o d .  a  F i n a l l y , i f we are t o assume  t h a t t h i s study has present-day relevance, then we must a l s o assume t h a t the n a t i o n a l p o l i t i c a l p a r t i e s s t i l l have the same r e g i o n a l strongholds p a r t i s a n support, conflict. moment.  of  and t h a t Canada s t i l l has the same sources o f r e g i o n a l  Both o f these assumptions are  admittedly  i n doubt a t  the  I t w i l l , however, be argued t h a t we are p r e s e n t l y i n a p e r i o d of  p o l i t i c a l u n c e r t a i n t y ; so t h a t s i m i l a r patterns of r e g i o n a l support sources o f c o n f l i c t may re-emerge i n the future. 5  and  CHAPTER 2  THE VARIABLES  T h e E l e c t o r a l System. Federalism, and Regionalism  The F i r s t - P a s t - t h e - P o s t (FPP) e l e c t o r a l system vised i n Canada t o e l e c t members o f t h e lower chamber i s a s i g n i f i c a n t determinant o f s e v e r a l aspects o f t h e Canadian p o l i t i c a l tendency  t o produce  system.  F o r example, i t has a greater  one-party m a j o r i t y  p r o p o r t i o n a l e l e c t o r a l systems. P r o p o r t i o n a l Representation  governments  than  do more  A l s o , FPP has a greater tendency than  (PR) e l e c t o r a l systems t o produce two dominant  p a r t i e s a t t h e constituency l e v e l .  However, between c o n s t i t u e n c i e s i t i s  not always t h e same two p a r t i e s t h a t  dcndnate;  cxariseguently,  a t the  n a t i o n a l l e v e l there may be more than two l a r g e p a r t i e s .  Having more than two l a r g e p a r t i e s decreases t h e l i k e l i h o o d o f one-party m a j o r i t y gcvernment; and i n a p o l i t i c a l  system w i t h a t r a d i t i o n  of one-party government, a one-party m i n o r i t y gcvernment i s more probable than a c o a l i t i o n government.  Having more than two l a r g e p a r t i e s competing  i n an FPP system a l s o increases t h e l i k e l i h o o d t h a t each p a r t y w i l l have their  strongest  sectional  bases  interests.  o f support amongst Thus, there  i s a high  geographically-concentrated p r o b a b i l i t y t h a t an FPP  e l e c t o r a l system w i l l produce a one-party m a j o r i t y o r m i n o r i t y government w i t h l i t t l e o r no representation o f one o r more regions i n i t s caucus.  6  The  preceding  hypothesis  assumes t h a t there  i s a fusion of the  executive and l e g i s l a t i v e branches, and t h a t t h e l e g i s l a t u r e i s i n e f f e c t unicameral. chamber  I f t h e l e g i s l a t u r e was bicameral, w i t h members o f t h e second  elected  on  some b a s i s  other  than  population,  that i s ,  representation by region, then a t l e a s t one source o f r e g i o n a l c o n f l i c t highly-populated  regions c ^ - ^ o t i n g l e s s e r populated  regions  - would be  A second e l e c t e d l e g i s l a t i v e chamber based cn representation  alleviated.  by region would a l s o mean a formal forum f o r expressing r e g i o n a l i n t e r e s t s at  t h e c e n t r a l government l e v e l .  legislative  chamber  exists,  However, where no second  elected  some a l t e r n a t i v e means o f a r t i c u l a t i n g  r e g i o n a l concerns must be found.  I n a u n i t a r y , e f f e c t i v e l y unicameral, FPP system, such as B r i t a i n , regional  aspirations  'nationalist'  movements  and f r u s t r a t i o n s may running  be e x p r e s s e d  and e l e c t i n g candidates  through  i n central  government e l e c t i o n s . However, t h e i n f l u e n c e o f these n a t i o n a l i s t p a r t i e s i s a f u n c t i o n o f t h e i r parliamentary strength, which i s i n c o n s i s t e n t over time.  I n c o n t r a s t , where a f e d e r a l system d i v i d i n g powers between a  c e n t r a l government and l o c a l governments has been transplanted on t o a system where t h e executive and l e g i s l a t u r e a r e fused, and t h e l e g i s l a t u r e is  e f f e c t i v e l y unicameral  and e l e c t e d u s i n g t h e FPP system, t h e l o c a l  governments can be expected t o take on t h e r o l e o f constant defenders o f regional interests.  However, t h e experiences  o f t h e Canadian p o l i t i c a l  system have shown t h a t p r o v i n c i a l government a r t i c u l a t i o n  of regional  concerns i s j u s t as l i k e l y t o exacerbate as t o r e s o l v e r e g i o n a l c o n f l i c t s .  7  The E l e c t o r a l System. Majority GcMernment, and S t a b i l i t y  The party  seminal  system,  a r t i c l e r e l a t i n g r e g i o n a l c o n f l i c t i n Canada t o t h e  and t h e p a r t y  w r i t t e n by A l a n  Cairns  system t o t h e FPP e l e c t o r a l  i n 1968 .  system, was  I n t h i s and l a t e r p a p e r s ,  1  Cairns  2  begins by comparing t h e normative values  o f FPP and more p r o p o r t i o n a l  e l e c t o r a l systems.  Cairns l i s t s t h e d i s t o r t i o n o f votes when t r a n s l a t e d i n t o seats as the  principal  fault  democratic t h e o r y .  o f t h e FPP system,  from t h e p o i n t  o f view o f  However, i t i s u n l i k e l y t h a t t h e advocates o f FPP  3  would deny t h a t as a mechanical device f o r t r a n s l a t i n g votes i n t o seats FPP  i s imccurate  stability  and i n e f f i c i e n t .  i s a more important  Rather, FPP advocates argue  that  normative c r i t e r i o n than t h e procedural  n i c e t i e s o f f a i r n e s s and consistency.  They then go on t o l i n k s t a b i l i t y  w i t h s i n g l e - p a r t y m a j o r i t y government, and note t h a t s i n g l e - p a r t y m a j o r i t y government occurs more frequently where FPP i s used.  Edmond Morgan argues t h a t a l l governments r e s t on o p i n i o n , and t h e opinions widely  they r e s t on a r e g e n e r a l l y accepted  " f i c t i o n s " ; that i s , propositions  even though known t o be ccritrary t o f a c t . 4  Cairns  bypasses t h e argument between advocates o f FPP and advocates o f more proportional  electoral  criteria.  Instead,  systems over t h e primacy o f d i f f e r e n t normative he accepts,  f o r t h e sake o f argument, t h e FPP  advocates' c r i t e r i o n o f s t a b i l i t y .  As we s h a l l see, he then proceeds t o  argue t h a t t h e occurrence o f m a j o r i t y government where FPP i s used i s l e s s frequent  than i t i s o f t e n generalized t o be, and t h a t t h e l i n k between 8  executive  stability  and  the o v e r a l l s t a b i l i t y  o f a p o l i t i c a l system i s  generally a f i c t i o n .  F i r s t , regarding the tendency o f FPP t o manufacture an  artificial  m a j o r i t y o f seats f o r the p a r t y w i t h the most, but l e s s than h a l f , o f the votes.  Cairns p o i n t s out t h a t i n Canadian n a t i o n a l e l e c t i o n s from 1921 t o  1965, FPP helped t o transform a m i n o r i t y o f votes i n t o a m a j o r i t y o f seats only s i x out o f twelve times - a 50 percent success r a t e .  In h i s  5  1979  paper, Cairns a l s o notes the "perverse c a p a c i t y " o f FPP t o sometimes award the p a r t y w i t h the most votes w i t h the second l a r g e s t amount o f s e a t s ; thus  denying  the  l a r g e s t party,  i n terms o f  votes,  of  having  cpportunity t o even form a s i n g l e - p a r t y m i n o r i t y government .  the  Hence, i n  6  our quest t o f i n d a more appealing e l e c t o r a l system than FPP, we do  not  need t o f i n d one w i t h a 100% success r a t e a t awarding the p a r t y w i t h the most votes w i t h a m a j o r i t y o f the seats. we  will  be  looking  government; w h i l e two  at,  only  the  I n f a c t , f o r the f i v e e l e c t i o n s  1953  others, the 1957  e l e c t i o n produced a  and  1962  majority  e l e c t i o n s , awarded the  Conservative p a r t y more seats than the L i b e r a l s even though they r e c e i v e d a lower percent o f the popular  Regarding the overall  stability,  account. link.  One  vote . 7  l i n k between s i n g l e - p a r t y m a j o r i t y government  there  are  two  f a c t o r s t h a t have t o be  taken  i s whether o r  not  e m p i r i c a l evidence s u b s t a n t i a t e s  and into the  The other i s the assumption t h a t m a j o r i t y government i s the most o r  only s i g n i f i c a n t v a r i a b l e a f f e c t i n g s t a b i l i t y .  As Cairns argues, the l i n k  i s e m p i r i c a l l y i n v a l i d , and the assumption i s f a l s e . 8  9  U n t i l the 1960's, the most caramon g e n e r a l i z a t i o n when comparing FPP t o systems o f p r o p o r t i o n a l representation was t h a t p o l i t i c a l  systems  t h a t used FPP were s t a b l e , w h i l e systems t h a t used PR were p o l i t i c a l l y unstable.  The  most commonly c i t e d  examples  of p o l i t i c a l  instability  associated w i t h PR e l e c t o r a l systems were the German Weimar Republic the French Fourth Republic. cultural,  T h i s g e n e r a l i z a t i o n ignored the  and  historical,  economic and other f a c t o r s t h a t a f f e c t e d p o l i t i c s i n Germany and  France d u r i n g these periods. s t a b i l i t y i n Scandinavian  I t a l s o ignored counter-examples o f r e l a t i v e  c o u n t r i e s , the Benelux c o u n t r i e s , and the A l p i n e  c o u n t r i e s o f Europe, a l l o f which use PR e l e c t o r a l systems. ignored s e v e r a l examples o f p o l i t i c a l i n s t a b i l i t y  I t further  occurring i n countries  which use the FPP e l e c t o r a l system.  The E l e c t o r a l System. Regional ism, and  The  point  Instability  i s t h a t there a r e other  f a c t o r s t h a t are much more  important t o maintaining the s t a b i l i t y o f a p o l i t i c a l system than whether a s i n g l e - p a r t y m a j o r i t y government government  must be  sustained.  a f f e c t i n g the s t a b i l i t y Deductive reasoning  i s formed, o r a m i n o r i t y o r c o a l i t i o n I n Canada, the most important  o f the p o l i t i c a l  system i s r e g i o n a l  factor conflict.  t h e r e f o r e leads us t o argue t h a t i t i s e s s e n t i a l t o  have a s t r u c t u r a l mechanism w i t h i n the c e n t r a l government resolving regional conflict.  apparatus f o r  And observation leads us t o conclude t h a t  the e x i s t i n g Canadian n a t i o n a l government l a c k s such a mechanism.  10  I t was argued i n the i n t r o d u c t i o n t h a t a second chamber e l e c t e d on the b a s i s o f r e p r e s e n t a t i o n by region was p o l i t i c a l l y inexpedient from the p o i n t o f view o f the l a r g e s t p a r t y , which governs by means o f i t s c o n t r o l of the lower chamber. conflict  Yet i f the lower chamber i s t o f u l f i l l a r e g i o n a l  r e s o l u t i o n function, i t w i l l  e l e c t o r a l system other than FPP;  have t o  be  elected using  an  which manufactures a government p a r t y  a r t i f i c i a l l y underrepresented i n one o r more regions j u s t as frequently as i t manufactures a government p a r t y w i t h an a r t i f i c i a l m a j o r i t y .  I n order  f o r the  c e n t r a l government t o be viewed as a n e u t r a l  a r b i t e r of r e g i o n a l c o n f l i c t , i t must be able t o present  i t s e l f to  the  c i t i z e n s o f every province as a spokesman f o r r e g i o n a l i n t e r e s t s equal i n l e g i t i m a c y t o t h a t o f the p r o v i n c i a l governments.  I t h a r d l y seems l i k e l y  t h a t the c i t i z e n s o f a province would perceive a c e n t r a l government w i t h few o r no representatives from t h a t province i n i t s p a r t y caucus o r i n the cabinet, as a defender o f the province's they run contrary t o the  i n t e r e s t s i n s i t u a t i o n s where  i n t e r e s t s o f provinces  i n another region w i t h  s u b s t a n t i a l representation w i t h i n the c e n t r a l government party's caucus. Of  course  the  central  government  may  well  be  acting  in  the  underrepresented province o r region's best i n t e r e s t s ; but t h e i r perception of biased decision-making  may  s t i l l persist.  Furthermore, i t i s i n the  p r o v i n c i a l p o l i t i c i a n s ' s e l f - i n t e r e s t t o e x p l o i t any opportunity t o appear as the l e g i t i m a t e defender o f p r o v i n c i a l i n t e r e s t s . t o the p r o v i n c i a l p o l i t i c i a n ' s maximum p o l i t i c a l  Consequently, i t i s  advantage t o make the  c e n t r a l government appear t o be a h o s t i l e f o r e i g n power; and nothing gives him more ammunition than t o be seated across the n e g o t i a t i n g t a b l e from a c e n t r a l government l a c k i n g i n representation from t h a t province. 11  I f the above assumptions are c o r r e c t , then i n c r e a s i n g the power o f p r o v i n c i a l governments cannot be expected t o a l l e v i a t e r e g i o n a l c o n f l i c t . Rather, the s t a b i l i t y o f the Canadian p o l i t i c a l system depends upon the c e n t r a l government being regional  interests.  perceived  I t can  as a n e u t r a l a r b i t e r o f  only do  this  conflicting  i f the government p a r t y  has  m u l t i - r e g i o n a l representation.  The Two C r i t e r i a t h a t an A l t e r n a t i v e E l e c t o r a l System Must Meet  I n Canada, then, there i s indeed a l i n k between s t a b i l i t y and  the  e l e c t o r a l system; but t h i s l i n k has l e s s t o do w i t h s t a b i l i t y associated w i t h one-party m a j o r i t y government, than w i t h s t a b i l i t y associated c e n t r a l government l e g i t i m a c y as a r e s o l v e r o f r e g i o n a l c o n f l i c t .  with Thus,  t o s a t i s f y the normative c r i t e r i o n o f s t a b i l i t y i n the Canadian p o l i t i c a l system, the e l e c t o r a l system must achieve two goals, s i n g l e - p a r t y m a j o r i t y government and m u l t i - r e g i o n a l representation w i t h i n the government p a r t y . These two  goals may  o r may  not be  r e a l i z a b l e under a s i n g l e e l e c t o r a l  formula.  I t has already been noted t h a t the FPP system has had a 50  percent  success r a t e a t producing m a j o r i t y governments i n Canada; and t h a t a l l o f Canada's n a t i o n a l p o l i t i c a l p a r t i e s , i n c l u d i n g the l a r g e s t party, have had their  strongest  sectional  bases o f  interests.  We  support amongst geographically  must t h e r e f o r e  i n q u i r e i n t o the  concentrated abilities  of  a l t e r n a t i v e e l e c t o r a l systems t o produce a b i a s i n favour o f the l a r g e s t 12  party/  comparable t o t h a t produced by FPP,  and a t t h e same time, t o  provide a g r e a t e r i n c e n t i v e f o r l a r g e p a r t i e s t o broaden t h e geographical base o f t h e i r support, than does FPP.  P r o p o r t i o n a l Representation E l e c t o r a l Systems  There  are l i t e r a l l y  dozens  of different  p r e s e n t l y i n use i n v a r i o u s c o u n t r i e s around t h e world.  electoral  systems  However, w i t h t h e  exception o f B r i t a i n , a l l t h e c o u n t r i e s o f Western Europe use what a r e commonly  referred  t o a s P r o p o r t i o n a l Representation  (PR) e l e c t o r a l  systems.  There a r e t h r e e p r o p e r t i e s t h a t a l l PR systems share, which a r e all  related  t o d i s t r i c t magnitude.  First,  as t h e name suggests, t h e  t r a n s l a t i o n o f votes i n t o seats i s l i k e l y t o be more p r o p o r t i o n a l under PR systems; and, more s p e c i f i c a l l y , there should be a p o s i t i v e r e l a t i o n s h i p between p r o p o r t i o n a l i t y and d i s t r i c t magnitude.  According t o Douglas Rae,  t h i s r e l a t i o n s h i p i s c u r v i l i n e a r and asymptotic: increases,  the proportionality  "as d i s t r i c t  magnitude  o f outcome increases a t a decreasing  r a t e . . . .When d i s t r i c t magnitudes a r e r a i s e d s u b s t a n t i a l l y beyond twenty, a "plateau" e f f e c t relationship.  seems t o take p l a c e . "  Figure 2.1 i l l u s t r a t e s  9  this  A l o g i c a l extension o f t h i s i s t h a t s i n c e FPP i s b i a s e d i n  favour o f t h e l a r g e s t p a r t y o r two l a r g e s t p a r t i e s , as d i s t r i c t magnitude increases, t h e b i a s i n favour o f the l a r g e s t p a r t y decreases. d i s t r i c t magnitude increases, t h e p a r t i e s  1  F i n a l l y , as  shares o f a l l t h e votes a r e  l e s s a f f e c t e d by how g e o g r a p h i c a l l y concentrated o r d i f f u s e t h e i r v o t e r support i s . 13  The  Largest Remainder Formula  Amongst PR systems, some o f the most cxanmonly used axe r e f e r r e d t o as  " l a r g e s t remainder"  systems.  In  i t s simplest  form, the  largest  remainder formula works as f o l l o w s : each v o t e r uses one vote t o e l e c t more than one r e p r e s e n t a t i v e per constituency.  Votes are then t r a n s l a t e d i n t o  seats u s i n g a "quota", which i s c a l c u l a t e d by d i v i d i n g t h e number o f v a l i d votes i n a constituency by the number o f seats i n the constituency; o r , i n terms o f percentages,  a  quota i s equivalent t o  (l/# o f seats)  *  100  percent.  To see how the l a r g e s t remainder formula works i n theory, consider an example where t h e r e i s a ten-seat constituency (from now on the number of  seats  in a  constituency  will  be  referred to  magnitude") and f o u r p a r t i e s are competing. * 100 = 10 percent.  as  the  "district  The quota i s t h e r e f o r e (1/10)  Each p a r t y i s then awarded i t s share o f the seats by  d i v i d i n g i t s share o f the votes by the quota.  So i f p a r t y A r e c e i v e d 40  percent o f the votes, p a r t y B received 30 percent o f the votes, p a r t y C r e c e i v e d 20 percent, and p a r t y D 10 percent, then p a r t y A would be awarded 40 percent/10 percent = 4 seats, p a r t y B 30/10 = 3 seats, p a r t y C 20/10 2  seats, and  hypothetical  party D  10/10  ten-seat  = 1 seat.  constituency  Compare t h i s t o FPP, broken  up  into  ten  with  = the  one-seat  c o n s t i t u e n c i e s , and w i t h the d i s t r i b u t i o n o f p a r t y support amongst v o t e r s constant across the t e n c o n s t i t u e n c i e s .  I n such a scenario, p a r t y A, w i t h  f o r t y percent o f the votes, would be awarded a l l ten seats. 14  I n the  above example, a l l the  seats  conveniently a l l o c a t e d by use o f the quota. integers,  the  f o u r p a r t i e s had  necessary  f o r a quota?  a  few  i n the  constituency  were  But what i f i n s t e a d o f whole  l e s s votes  o r more votes  than  What i f p a r t y A received 42 percent o f the votes,  p a r t y B 28 percent, p a r t y C 24 percent, and p a r t y D 6 percent?  Under t h i s  scenario, o n l y e i g h t o f the t e n seats c o u l d be a l l o c a t e d by use o f the quota.  The l a r g e s t remainder formula solves t h i s problem by awarding the  p a r t i e s w i t h the seats.  " l a r g e s t remainders" o f votes w i t h the remaining  two  I n our example, the remaining seats would be awarded t o p a r t y B,  w i t h a remainder o f 8 percent, and p a r t y D, w i t h a remainder o f 6 percent.  Because o f i t s r e l a t i v e s i m p l i c i t y , the l a r g e s t remainder formula w i l l be used i n the a n a l y s i s o f our data; except t h a t i n s t e a d o f a quota base on # o f votes/# o f seats, the "Droop quota", # o f votes/(# o f seats + 1), w i l l be used. the quota being 100  = 33.4  For example, f o r a two-seat constituency, i n s t e a d o f  (1/2) * 100 = 50 percent, the Droop quota would be (1/3 *  percent.  Using the Droop quota allows us t o a l l o c a t e more  seats on the b a s i s o f quotas than on the b a s i s o f l a r g e s t remainders, f o r c o n s t i t u e n c i e s w i t h d i s t r i c t magnitudes o f 2 o r 3.  I t i s presumed t h a t  t h i s w i l l make our c a l c u l a t i o n s much simpler.  The Highest Average Formula  Along w i t h l a r g e s t remainder, the most commonly used PR are r e f e r r e d t o as "highest average". 15  The  formulas  simplest form o f the highest  j ! !  FIGURE  *.1  PM>PORTIONAUTY O P V O T I S T K A M . H A T B D INTO A S A FUNCTION OP DISTfllCT MAQNITUOE  PROPORTIONALITY 1 .OQ_  -99_  -98_  .97. Proportionality la b a n d o n th* avarag* deviation between vote a n d s e a t s h a r e s .  .96_  Proportionality Increases a t a decreasing rate a s district magnliud* Increases. Proportionality approaches, but never r e a c h e s , 1 0 0 %  -94_  .93.  .20.  (%)  H  1  r  5.0  -I  1  h  1O.0  DISTRICT  MAGNITUDE  15.0  H  1  h  20.0  average formula i s t h e d'Hondt.  Under t h i s procedure, r a t i o s o f votes t o  seats a r e c a l c u l a t e d f o r each p a r t y , and t h e f i r s t seat i s awarded t o t h e p a r t y w i t h t h e highest r a t i o . party/  n, equal  Beginning w i t h number o f seats h e l d by each  t o zero, t h e r a t i o s a r e c a l c u l a t e d u s i n g t h e equation  party's votes/n + 1 = party's votes/1.  So a f t e r t h e l a r g e s t p a r t y has  been awarded t h e f i r s t seat, i t s new r a t i o w i l l be party's votes/(n + 1) = party's votes/2.  Highest Average and l a r g e s t Remainder Formulae Compared  To see why l a r g e r p a r t i e s would consider highest average t o be a fairer  system than  l a r g e s t remainder,  recall  t h e second h a l f o f our  e a r l i e r example.  Using l a r g e s t remainder, p a r t y A was awarded 4 seats and  p a r t y D 1 seat.  Yet p a r t y A received 42% o f the votes, compared t o p a r t y  D's 6%.  P a r t y A could t h e r e f o r e r i g h t l y c l a i m t h a t s i n c e i t received  seven times as many votes as p a r t y D, i t i s e n t i t l e d t o seven times as many seats. Using t h e d'Hondt highest average formula, t h e seats would be a l l o c a t e d as f o l l o w s : p a r t y A would be awarded 5 seats, p a r t y B, 3 seats, party  C, 2 seats, and p a r t y D would r e c e i v e no seats.  illustrates  a general  d i f f e r e n c e between highest  This  example  average and l a r g e s t  remainder; highest average tends t o be more biased i n favour o f l a r g e r parties  and more b i a s e d  against  smaller  p a r t i e s than does l a r g e s t  remainder.  The  equations  used  by l a r g e s t remainder and highest  average  formulae can be and have been adjusted such t h a t t h e above tendencies a r e 17  reversed.  However, as  proportionality  noted by  is district  Rae,  the most powerful determinant  magnitude.  Thus, i f a p o l i t i c a l  10  of  system  wished t o increase the p r o p o r t i o n a l i t y of i t s e l e c t o r a l outcome, i t would be simpler and more e f f i c i e n t rather  t o increase the average d i s t r i c t magnitude  than s w i t c h t o another PR  then, we  w i l l assume t h a t  the  formula. impact on  a l t e r n a t i v e formula, would be minimal.  I n the a n a l y s i s o f our our  r e s u l t s , had  we  data,  used  an  We w i l l assume t h a t comparing the  e f f e c t of d i f f e r e n t d i s t r i c t magnitudes on the t r a n s l a t i o n of votes i n t o seats i s much more r e v e a l i n g .  Based on these assumptions, we w i l l use  the  equation which makes our r e s u l t s simplest t o c a l c u l a t e - the Droop quota.  Variables Affecting Prctxxrtlonality  Based on  the  hypothesis t h a t  there  i s a positive  curvilinear  asymptotic r e l a t i o n s h i p between p r o p o r t i o n a l i t y and d i s t r i c t magnitude, we would  assume t h a t  by  increasing  single-member constituency used by  the FPP  district  magnitude  from  t o a d i s t r i c t magnitude of  the two,  there would be a dramatic increase i n p r o p o r t i o n a l i t y ; i n other words, we would expect the l a r g e s t p a r t y t o s u f f e r a dramatic decrease i n seats. this  i s the case, then our  f i r s t objective,  executive s t a b i l i t y through  m a j o r i t y government, w i l l became v i r t u a l l y unobtainable. criterion  f a i l s , our  second c r i t e r i o n ,  as-a-whole through m u l t i r e g i o n a l worth pxirsuing i n p r a c t i c a l two  criteria  are  terms.  intricately  large party with multiregional  If  And  i f our f i r s t  s t a b i l i t y of the p o l i t i c a l system  representation  i n government, i s  not  However, i t i s p r e c i s e l y because the  related that  the p o s s i b i l i t y  exists for  support a t the l e v e l of the e l e c t o r a t e 18  a to  gain  just  as many seats w i t h  a district  magnitude o f two as w i t h a  d i s t r i c t magnitude o f one.  The  degree t o which a party's l o s s o f seats i n one region i s  compensated  f o r by a g a i n  i n seats  i n another region under a more  p r o p o r t i o n a l e l e c t o r a l system i s a f u n c t i o n o f three f a c t o r s : t h e party's t o t a l share o f votes, t h e d i s t r i b u t i o n o f i t s vote share, and t h e number o f p a r t i e s competing i n each region.  These three v a r i a b l e s i n t e r a c t  d i f f e r e n t l y depending on t h e d i s t r i c t magnitude.  To i l l u s t r a t e  how these  v a r i a b l e s would i n t e r a c t u s i n g an FPP  system, l e t us use t h e example o f a country w i t h two "regions" o f equal p o p u l a t i o n and f o u r p o l i t i c a l p a r t i e s .  Party A receives 40 percent o f t h e  t o t a l vote, P a r t y B r e c e i v e s 30 percent, Party C 20 percent, and P a r t y D 10 percent. country,  I f v o t e r support f o r each p a r t y i s constant throughout t h e  then under FPP, P a r t y A w i l l be awarded a l l t h e seats i n t h e  legislature.  However, i f Party B r e c e i v e s 45 percent o f v o t e r  support  throughout one r e g i o n , and only 15 percent i n t h e other region, then Party B w i l l r e c e i v e h a l f t h e seats. "pay-off",  I n other words, there i s more p o l i t i c a l  i n terms o f seats, f o r t h e second l a r g e s t p a r t y i n an FPP  system t o seek r e g i o n a l l y concentrated v o t e r support. it  A t t h e same time,  i s t o n e i t h e r t h e advantage nor t h e disadvantage  more  regionally  concentrated  increase nor decrease  i t s total  support,  o f Party A t o seek  s i n c e doing  number o f seats  so would  neither  i n the legislature.  Meanwhile, P a r t y A f i n d s i t s e l f i n a s i t u a t i o n where i t represents  only  one r e g i o n i n t h e l e g i s l a t u r e , even though i t i s supported by 40 percent o f t h e v o t e r s i n t h e other region. 19  The above example i s imaginary, b u t not u n r e a l i s t i c o f how t h e FPP system a c t u a l l y operates.  Describing t h e tendencies  o f t h e FPP system  w i t h i n t h e Canadian p o l i t i c a l system, Cairns made t h e observation t h a t FPP is  biased  against  t h e N.D.P., a small p a r t y w i t h  relatively diffuse  support, and b i a s e d i n favour o f t h e S o c i a l C r e d i t p a r t y , a s m a l l p a r t y with  quite  concentrated  regional support .  As a r e s u l t ,  11  a party  representing i n t e r e s t s t h a t c u t across r e g i o n a l boundaries i s continuously underrepresented symbolic  i n t h e c e n t r a l government l e g i s l a t u r e ,  of regional protest  legislature.  i s overrepresented  while a party  i n t h e Canadian  I n an a r t i c l e w r i t t e n i n 1977, Richard Johnston and Janet  Ballantyne made t h e a d d i t i o n a l observation t h a t f o r l a r g e p a r t i e s i n t h e Canadian p o l i t i c a l system, t h e FPP e l e c t o r a l system i s biased i n favour o f a  large party  with  d i f f u s e support  r e g i o n a l l y concentrated  more so than a l a r g e p a r t y  with  support . 12  However, i n t h e previous example we saw t h a t w h i l e FPP was biased in  favour  o f both  large parties,  r e g i o n a l l y concentrated support  i t rewarded t h e l a r g e p a r t y  support t h e most.  with  The explanation i s t h a t v o t e r  f o r t h e two l a r g e p a r t i e s i n t h e Canadian p o l i t i c a l  system i s  n e i t h e r as d i f f u s e n o r as concentrated as t h a t f o r t h e two l a r g e s t p a r t i e s i n t h e example.  To determinant  provide  a n even more extreme example o f how powerful  of electoral  outcome geographical  support can be, consider t h e f o l l o w i n g case. voter  support,  r e c e i v e s a l l o f i t s support 20  distribution  o f voter  Party C, w i t h 20 percent i n one region.  a  of  Party A  r e c e i v e s 35 percent o f v o t e r support i n one region, and 45 percent i n t h e other, w h i l e P a r t y B receives 25 percent i n one region, and 35 percent i n the  other.  I f v o t e r support  f o r each p a r t y i s constant w i t h i n each  region, then t h e FPP system w i l l award P a r t y C, w i t h 20 percent o f t o t a l votes, w i t h h a l f t h e t o t a l seats.  The  Meanwhile, Party B r e c e i v e s no seats.  example o f t h e e f f e c t o f geographical d i s t r i b u t i o n o f p a r t y  support on t h e t r a n s l a t i o n o f votes i n t o seats when t h e FPP system i s used a l s o provides an i l l u s t r a t i o n o f how t h e term "wasted vote" can be used. The most caramon usage o f t h e term "wasted vote", t o r e f e r t o a s i t u a t i o n where v o t e r s f e e l t h a t t h e i r votes a r e wasted when they vote f o r a p a r t y t h a t f i n i s h e s t h i r d and out o f t h e race, w i l l be d e a l t w i t h a t a l a t e r point.  F o r now, we want t o confine ourselves t o s i t u a t i o n s where p a r t i e s  g a i n more o r l e s s votes  than necessary  R e f e r r i n g t o t h e previous  t o g a i n a constituency  seat.  1 3  example, i n one region P a r t y A received 35  percent o f t h e votes and no seats.  Since Party A has nothing t o show f o r  the 35 percent o f v o t e r support i t received, i n e f f e c t those 35 percent o f votes were wasted.  Meanwhile, i n t h e other region, Party A received 45  percent o f t h e votes, when a l l i t needed t o r e c e i v e i n order t o w i n a l l the seats was 35.1 percent.  I n e f f e c t , t h e 10 percent o f t h e votes P a r t y  A r e c e i v e d above what i t needed t o w i n a l l t h e seats i n t h e region ( i t s "margin o f v i c t o r y " ) were wasted.  Understanding t h e d i s t r i b u t i o n  of voter  support  for political  p a r t i e s i n terms o f wasted votes and margin o f v i c t o r y g i v e s us a b e t t e r idea o f how p r o p o r t i o n a l i t y w i l l be a f f e c t e d when d i s t r i c t magnitude i s increased.  If a  simple  bivariate 21  relationship  existed  between  proportionality  and  district  magnitude,  then  p r o p o r t i o n a l i t y t o increase when d i s t r i c t magnitude was (FPP)  t o two.  we  would  increased from one  S i m i l a r l y , i n c r e a s i n g d i s t r i c t magnitude t o two would be  expected t o decrease the b i a s i n favour o f the l a r g e s t p a r t y . the next example i l l u s t r a t e s , support,  and  concentrated  expect  there  are  v o t e r support,  However, as  i f the l a r g e s t p a r t y has r e l a t i v e l y d i f f u s e  one  or  more p a r t i e s w i t h  more r e g i o n a l l y  then when d i s t r i c t magnitude i s increased t o  two, the number o f wasted votes o f the l a r g e s t p a r t y may decrease. the b i a s i n favour o f the l a r g e s t p a r t y may  a c t u a l l y increase.  Hence, This of  course i s the f i r s t c r i t e r i o n t h a t the a l t e r n a t i v e e l e c t o r a l system must meet.  I n t h i s next example, there are three regions o f equal population, and v o t e r support i s constant w i t h i n each region. by an e t h n i c m i n o r i t y .  The l a r g e s t p a r t y i n Region One i s the N a t i o n a l i s t  Party/ which r e c e i v e s 51 percent inhabited  by  the  Region One i s i n h a b i t e d  ethnic  o f the vote.  majority,  and  Regions Two  Region Two  and Three are  i s the  economic  metropolis o f the country, w h i l e Region Three i s an economic h i n t e r l a n d . The  l a r g e s t p a r t y i n Region Three i s the Anti-Establishment  r e c e i v e s 51 percent remaining  o f the vote.  The Accommodation Party r e c e i v e s  49 percent o f the vote i n Region One,  Region Two,  The A l t e r n a t i v e  We thus have a s i t u a t i o n where  p a r t i e s are confined t o s i n g l e regions and a t h i r d p a r t y has  support ranging from 30 percent t o 70 percent across regions.  22  the  70 percent o f the vote i n  and 30 percent o f the vote i n Region Three.  P a r t y r e c e i v e s the remainder o f the votes. two  Party, which  voter  Using the FPP  system, there w i l l be the f o l l o w i n g outcome.  In  Region One,  the N a t i o n a l i s t Party's margin o f v i c t o r y i s 2 percent.  In  Region Two,  the Aocxammodation Party's margin o f v i c t o r y i s 40 percent.  In  Region Three, the percent.  Anti-Establishment  Party's margin o f v i c t o r y  is  20  Assuming t h a t a p o l i t i c a l p a r t y has l i m i t e d resources w i t h which  t o compete i n an e l e c t i o n campaign, the Accommodation P a r t y has a cushion of 40 percent i n Region Two,  which i n terms o f p o l i t i c a l pay-off i n the  way o f votes, would be b e t t e r spent i n seeking more v o t e r support i n other regions.  As i t stands now,  the AcccnrnxxJation P a r t y has wasted the excess  40 percent o f the votes i t received i n Region Two, the 49 percent  i n Region One  r e s u l t e d i n no seats.  j u s t as i t has wasted  and the 30 percent i n Region Three which  I n f a c t , i f we add the t h r e e margins o f v i c t o r y  together w i t h the percentage o f votes o f a l l the l o s i n g p a r t i e s i n each region, we f i n d t h a t on average 64 percent o f the votes were wasted.  I f p r o p o r t i o n a l i t y i s measured i n terms o f votes t r a n s l a t e d i n t o seats, the outcome i s e q u a l l y d i s t o r t e d .  The Anti-Establishment P a r t y and  the N a t i o n a l i s t P a r t y , each w i t h one-sixth o f the t o t a l votes, r e c e i v e o n e - t h i r d each o f the t o t a l seats.  Meanwhile, the A l t e r n a t i v e P a r t y , a l s o  w i t h one-sixth o f the t o t a l votes, but w i t h l e s s r e g i o n a l l y support, r e c e i v e s no seats. Accommodation Party,  The  concentrated  other p a r t y w i t h d i f f u s e support,  received one-half  o n e - t h i r d o f the t o t a l seats.  23  of  the  total  votes,  but  the only  I t was noted e a r l i e r t h a t i n Canada the FPP system has been biased i n favour o f a l a r g e p a r t y w i t h d i f f u s e support.  However, t h i s example i s  not meant t o be a r e f l e c t i o n o f how the FPP system has a c t u a l l y operated within  the  context  o f the  Canadian p o l i t i c a l  system.  Rather,  i t is  intended t o i l l u s t r a t e t h a t geographical d i s t r i b u t i o n o f p a r t i s a n support is  an  independent  variable  that  can  significantly  affect  the  p r o p o r t i o n a l i t y o f e l e c t o r a l outcome.  We are t h e r e f o r e p r e d i c t i n g t h a t as d i s t r i c t magnitude increases, two trends w i l l occur. a decrease  F i r s t , p r o p o r t i o n a l i t y w i l l increase, and w i t h i t  i n the b i a s i n favour o f l a r g e p a r t i e s .  A l s o , the b i a s i n  favour o f p a r t i e s w i t h r e g i o n a l l y cxsncentrated support w i l l decrease d i s t r i c t magnitude increases. trends are p r e d i c t e d .  as  With respect t o i n d i v i d u a l p a r t i e s , f o u r  Small p a r t i e s w i t h d i f f u s e support are expected t o  g a i n more seats as d i s t r i c t magnitude i s increased.  Conversely,  large  p a r t i e s w i t h concentrated support are expected t o l o s e s e a t s .  However, i n  the  we  case  of  small  parties  with  concentrated  support,  have  t^ro-predictor equation where the s i g n o f one slope i s p o s i t i v e and  a the  s i g n o f the other slope i s negative; so t h a t whether s m a l l r e g i o n a l l y concentrated  parties  gain or  l o s e seats when d i s t r i c t  magnitude i s  increased w i l l v a r y depending on t h e i r i n d i v i d u a l s i z e and c o r c e n t r a t i o n . The e f f e c t o f d i s t r i c t magnitude on l a r g e p a r t i e s w i t h d i f f u s e support i s a l s o represented by a two-predictor equation w i t h one p o s i t i v e slope and one negative slope, except t h a t the s i g n s are reversed.  24  Returning t o our previous example, we have a case where there i s an extremely l a r g e party, i n terms o f votes, which i s a l s o very d i f f u s e , i n t h e sense t h a t i t i s a " l a r g e " p a r t y i n every region. the  FPP system,  legislature.  i t receives  only  one-third  However, u s i n g  o f t h e seats  i n the  The next step i s t o increase t h e d i s t r i c t magnitude t o two,  and observe whether t h e l a r g e s t p a r t y and t h e other three p a r t i e s gain o r l o s e seats.  With percent.  a district  magnitude o f two, t h e Droop quota  i s 33.4  I n Region One, t h i s r e s u l t s i n t h e N a t i o n a l i s t P a r t y winning  h a l f t h e seats and t h e Accamncdation Party winning t h e other h a l f . Region Three, t h e Anti-Establishment  In  P a r t y wins h a l f t h e seats, and t h e  Accommodation Party t h e other h a l f , s i n c e i t has t h e l a r g e s t remainder. I n Region Two, t h e Accranmodation Party's 70 percent o f t h e votes exceeds the  total  f o r both  quotas,  and consequently  i t wins a l l t h e seats.  Comparing t h i s r e s u l t t o t h a t u s i n g t h a t FPP, we see t h a t t h e two small regionally ore-third  concentrated t o one-sixth  p a r t i e s each have t h e i r o f the t o t a l .  seat  Conversely,  share c u t from  the large diffuse  p a r t y ' s seat share has increased from o n e - t h i r d t o two-thirds.  From t h e r e s u l t s o f t h i s example, we can s e t f o r t h as a working hypothesis  that  f o r small  district  magnitudes,  the  geographical  d i s t r i b u t i o n o f p a r t i s a n support can be a more s i g n i f i c a n t determinant than p a r t y s i z e o f t h e b i a s i n favour o f o r against a p a r t y .  I n addition,  i n t h e above example when t h e d i s t r i c t magnitude was increased t o two, the Accommodation P a r t y increased i t s t o t a l number o f seats w h i l e a t t h e same time  i n c r e a s i n g i t s m u l t i - r e g i o n a l representation. 25  These c r i t e r i a o f  course are the c r i t e r i a t h a t the a l t e r n a t i v e e l e c t o r a l system must meet. So even though the p a r t i e s i n our example d i f f e r i n s i z e and geographical distribution Canada has  from Canada's n a t i o n a l  p o l i t i c a l parties,  more than t h r e e regions, when we  Canadian n a t i o n a l  e l e c t i o n r e s u l t s , we  and  even though  look a t the  w i l l be  1953  to  1965  looking f o r a t l e a s t  p a r t y t o d i s p l a y e l e c t o r a l tendencies s i m i l a r t o those of the  one  hypothetical  Accomodation Party.  The above examples are meant t o i l l u s t r a t e the p o t e n t i a l e f f e c t of partisan  geographical d i s t r i b u t i o n on  outcome; they are  not  the  proportionality  meant t o p o r t r a y the  actual  of  electoral  e f f e c t of  partisan  geographical d i s t r i b u t i o n on e l e c t o r a l outcome i n Canada during the i n question.  A more d i r e c t comparison between the e f f e c t s of  magnitude and  geographical d i s t r i b u t i o n of p a r t i s a n  support on  period  district electoral  outcomes i n Canada i s p o s s i b l e , by u s i n g the Rae-Taylor f r a c t i o n a l i z a t i o n index , 1 4  the  Herfindahl-Hirschman  Taagepera's d e f i n i t i o n of the  concentration  index,  " e f f e c t i v e " number of p a r t i e s , and relationship  magnitude and  1 6  how  much o f  the  effective p a r t i e s .  f r a c t i o n a l i z a t i o n of the  accounted f o r by d i s t r i c t magnitude, and  Here we  between  and Rein  1 5  Taagepera's mathematical formula f o r the number o f  Laakso  district  want t o compare  Canadian p a r t y system can how  much must be a t t r i b u t e d  be to  other f a c t o r s , i n c l u d i n g r e g i o n a l concentration of p a r t i s a n support.  The interested FPP  reader w i l l  i n proportionality,  electoral  because the  note t h a t ,  FPP  and  up not  until  t h i s point,  fractionalization.  system i s synonymous w i t h the  we  have been  However,  the  two-party system.  Thus,  e l e c t o r a l system i s biased i n favour of the two  largest  26  p a r t i e s , the huge d i s p r o p o r t i o n a l i t y of e l e c t o r a l outcome t h a t would occur i f FPP  were used i n a m u l t i p a r t y  actual  outcomes.  Hence, p r i o r  system i s s t a t i s t i c a l l y absent i n most to  measuring the  proximal  effects  of  d i s t r i c t magnitude on the p r o p o r t i o n a l i t y of e l e c t o r a l outcome i n Canada a t the n a t i o n a l and to  measure  the  r e g i o n a l l e v e l s between 1953 distal  effects  of  and  district  f r a c t i o n a l i z a t i o n o f the Canadian p a r t y system. see  the  link,  in  mathematical  terms,  1965,  we  f i r s t want  magnitude  on  the  T h i s should enable us  between  geographical d i s t r i b u t i o n o f p a r t i s a n support, and  district  to  magnitude,  proportionality, while  bypassing • the r e c i p r o c a l r e l a t i o n s h i p between the e l e c t o r a l system and  the  p a r t y system.  F i r s t , we have t o determine the Herfir*iaM-Hirschman concentration index (HH),  which i s c a l c u l a t e d by adding the squares of the vote shares  f o r each p a r t y ; HH share)' . 6  2  +  parties,  (Party  l ' s vote s h a r e )  For example, i f there are  i n proporations of (.2)  =  (.l) N,  30%,  20%,  .3.  Next, we  u s i n g the  formula N  2  =  40%,  10%,  ...  then HH  calculate  e f f e c t i v e number o f p a r t i e s would be  +  +  (Party n's  1/HH. 1/.3  the In  =  (.4)  +  2  the  = 3.33.  above example, Taagepera has  number o f p a r t i e s and d i s t r i c t magnitude (M), where N = 1.25 Rae-Taylor f r a c t i o n a l i z a t i o n index, F,  the formula 1-1/N.  27  can  (.3)  2  " e f f e c t i v e " number  devised a formula f o r c a l c u l a t i n g the r e l a t i o n s h i p between the  The  vote  f o u r p a r t i e s , w i t h the vote shares  and  =  2  + of the  also  effective  (2 + l o g  then be c a l c u l a t e d  M).  using  According t o  c a l c u l a t i o n s done by  Rae  f o r the  period  Canada's p a r t y system had a f r a c t i o n a l i z a t i o n o f 0.66 . 17  Taagepera's  formula  predicts that  for a  f r a c t i o n a l i z a t i o n would equal 1-1/2.5 = 0.60; o f two, infer  district  district  By comparison,  magnitude o f  one,  and f o r a d i s t r i c t magnitude  f r a c t i o n a l i z a t i o n would equal 1-1/2.9 = 0.655. that  1945-65,  magnitude alone does not  From t h i s we  explain  Canada's  can party  system.  Taagepera's  formula  for  the  r e l a t i o n s h i p between  district  magnitude and number o f e f f e c t i v e p a r t i e s p r e d i c t e d a two p a r t y system f o r Canada. 1/.33  Yet, according  t o Laakso and Taagepera's d e f i n i t i o n , Canada  = three e f f e c t i v e parties.  Taagepera and  has  Bernard Grofman e x p l a i n  t h i s d i f f e r e n c e by concluding t h a t the number o f p a r t i e s i s a f u n c t i o n o f d i s t r i c t magnitude and of the number o f p o l i t i c a l l y s a l i e n t i s s u e s . 1 8  I t was concentration  argued e a r l i e r t h a t Canadian p o l i t i c a l p a r t i e s v a r y i n the o r d i f f u s i o n of t h e i r r e g i o n a l p a r t i s a n support.  a l s o been argued t h a t the FPP system ( d i s t r i c t magnitude o f one) the  regional  translated  differences  from  the  i n partisan  level  l e g i s l a t u r e ; t h i s i s the  of  the  has  magnifies  support between p a r t i e s , when  electorate  to  ''mechanical'' e f f e c t o f FPP.  " p s y c h o l o g i c a l " e f f e c t o f FPP.  It  the  level  of  There i s a l s o  As noted by Johnston and Ballantyne,  the a the  d e n i a l o f a p a r t y ' s proportionate share of seats i n a region can l e a d t o a ''cumulative and  self-reinforcing" c y c l e . 1 9  28  Maurice Duverger  describes  t h i s psycholcgical e f f e c t o f FPP as follows: In cases where there are three p a r t i e s operating under the [FPP] system, the e l e c t o r s soon r e a l i z e that t h e i r votes are wasted i f they continue t o g i v e them t o the t h i r d party: whence t h e i r natural tendency t o t r a n s f e r t h e i r vote t o the l e s s e v i l o f i t s two adversaries i n order t o prevent the success o f the greater e v i l . 2 0  This f a c t o r i s a l t e r n a t i v e l y r e f e r r e d t o as a wasted vote, a s p l i t o r s t r a t e g i c voting. to  d e c l i n e with  In any case, support f o r the t h i r d party  each  subsequent e l e c t i o n u n t i l  eventually  vote,  continues  the  "third"  In Canada the mechanical and psychological e f f e c t s of FPP  operate  party i s relegated t o the status of a " f r i n g e " party.  on a regional b a s i s .  The two most important issue dimensions i n Canada at  the n a t i o n a l l e v e l , the ecx>nomy and Thus, unless  two  e t h n i c i t y , both have regional bases.  national p a r t i e s both have i d e n t i c a l p o l i c y platforms,  they w i l l have t o b u i l d t h e i r planks i n d i f f e r e n t regions. if  a  third  particular  party  i s established  that  region,  then under an  FPP  appeals  to  system, one  the of  Consequently, interests of  the  two  a  original  p a r t i e s , i e . , the one whose platform represents the opposing i n t e r e s t s o f another region, w i l l eventually become a marginal party In  other  regional  words, d i s t r i c t  magnitude can  d i s t r i b u t i o n of  partisan  have a  support,  i n that  region.  long-term e f f e c t an the  the  number  of e f f e c t i v e  confident  i n making an  p a r t i e s , and the number o f s a l i e n t issues..  We inventory  are now of  a t the point where we  relevant  variables;  can be  however,  we  must  still  use  regarding the c o r r e l a t i o n and causation amongst these v a r i a b l e s .  29  caution  F i r s t , we a r e on s o l i d ground when we d e a l w i t h t h e t r a n s l a t i o n o f votes  into  seats:  translation  there  o f votes  is a  into  strictly  seats,  f u n c t i o n o f t h e i r v o t e shares.  mechanical  with parties'  e f f e c t between the seat  shares  being  However, t h i s i s n o t a simple b i v a r i a t e  r e l a t i o n s h i p ; t h e p r o p o r t i o n a l i t y o f votes t o seats i s a f u n c t i o n d i s t r i c t magnitude, t h e geographical d i s t r i b u t i o n o f p a r t i s a n and  t h e number  illustrates  of parties.  how d i s t r i c t  a  The aforementioned  series  of  support , 21  o f examples  magnitude, p a r t y d i s t r i b u t i o n o f votes, and  number o f p a r t i e s a f f e c t t h e p r o p o r t i o n a l i t y o f e l e c t o r a l outcomes. increasing  t h e number and b r o a d e n i n g  hypothetical  examples, we could express t h i s m u l t i v a r i a t e r e l a t i o n s h i p i n  the form o f a t h r e e - p r e d i c t o r have  a  four-variable  t h e range o f e m p i r i c a l  By  l i n e a r equation.  causal  model;  and  A t t h i s p o i n t , then, we  where t h e dependent  variable,  p r o p o r t i o n a l i t y , changes acxxjrding t o changes i n t h e values o f t h e three independent v a r i a b l e s .  We thus have a t r i p l e - c a u s e caused model. triple-effect  c a u s a l model;  i n addition  But we a l s o have a  t o proportionality,  district  magnitude a l s o a f f e c t s how many e f f e c t i v e p a r t i e s t h e r e w i l l be, and how concentrated r e g i o n a l p a r t i s a n support w i l l be. parties  is a  dimensions. function  function  The number o f e f f e c t i v e  o f d i s t r i c t magnitude and t h e number o f  The geographical  distribution of partisan  support  o f d i s t r i c t magnitude and other p o l i t i c a l v a r i a b l e s ,  federalism,  and sccic>-econamic  issue is a  such as  v a r i a b l e s , such as e t h n i c i t y and economic  geography.  30  However, parties  and  on  psychological  the  e f f e c t s of  regional  district  magnitude on  cxxicentration o f  than mechanical.  partisan  the  number  support are  Consequently, these e f f e c t s o f  measured u s i n g  a  time-series  of  more  district  magnitude would have t o  be  study,  with  d i f f e r e n t assumptions and  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s from those used i n t h i s study.  I n other words, i n the a n a l y s i s of our data we w i l l o n l y be measuring the short-term and  not  the  long-term e f f e c t s o f d i s t r i c t magnitude on  Canadian p o l i t i c a l system.  More s p e c i f i c a l l y , we  the  w i l l be measuring the  short-term e f f e c t o f d i s t r i c t magnitude on the b i a s i n favour o f a l a r g e , d i f f u s e party.  This b i a s depends on hew much a l o s s o f seats by a p a r t y  i n a r e g i o n where i t i s overrepresented i s compensated f o r by a g a i n seats  in  another region  magnitude i s increased. made  regarding  where i t i s underrepresented, when  of  district  A t the same time, no a p r i o r i assumptions w i l l be  the  long-term  effects  of  district  magnitude  on  p r o p o r t i o n a l i t y through the intervening v a r i a b l e s o f number o f p a r t i e s and d i s t r i b u t i o n o f support.  The Ctoiectives o f t h i s Study  Our o b j e c t i v e s i n constructing an a l t e r n a t i v e e l e c t o r a l system are as f o l l o w s : F i r s t , we same time maintaining We  want t o increase d i s t r i c t magnitude, w h i l e a t  the  o r i n c r e a s i n g the b i a s i n favour o f a l a r g e party.  know a p r i o r i t h a t l a r g e p a r t i e s g e n e r a l l y have a l a r g e r swing r a t i o  than small p a r t i e s , and party,  the  l a r g e r the  t h a t the more d i f f u s e support i s f o r a swing r a t i o .  We  a l s o know t h a t  as  large  district  magnitude increases, the swing r a t i o f o r l a r g e p a r t i e s tends t o decrease. 31  In  order  f o r the  bias  i n favour  of  a  large party  not  to  decrease,  t h e r e f o r e , the degree o f d i f f u s i o n o f i t s support must have a  stronger  e f f e c t than i t s s i z e ; t h a t i s , i f d i f f u s i o n o f p a r t y support causes the b i a s i n favour o f a l a r g e d i f f u s e p a r t y t o increase, w h i l e i t s s i z e w i l l tend  t o make the b i a s decrease, when d i s t r i c t magnitude i s increased,  which change i s more important?  Since the importance of d i s t r i b u t i o n of  p a r t i s a n support decreases as d i s t r i c t magnitude increases, t h i s question i s o n l y r e l e v a n t f o r small d i s t r i c t magnitudes.  Second, we want t o increase the m u l t i r e g i o n a l representation of a large party.  Since the geographical d i s t r i b u t i o n of p a r t i s a n support i s  p a r a l l e l t o the r e g i o n a l d i s t r i b u t i o n o f p a r t i s a n support, that  i t i s impossible  to f u l f i l l  the  f i r s t o f our  i t i s obvious  objectives  without  simultaneously f u l f i l l i n g our second o b j e c t i v e .  Thus, we w i l l be the  l o o k i n g t o increase the b i a s i n favour o f ,  m u l t i r e g i o n a l representation o f a  and  l a r g e d i f f u s e Canadian p o l i t i c a l  p a r t y by i n c r e a s i n g the d i s t r i c t magnitude from one t o two o r from one t o three.  I f the r e s u l t s are p o s i t i v e , we w i l l proceed t o argue t h a t the  respective electoral  system i s p r e f e r a b l e t o a l l others, i n c l u d i n g FPP,  w i t h i n the s i t u a t i o n a l context o f Canadian p o l i t i c s .  32  CHAPTER 3  METHODOIDGY  C o l l e c t i o n o f Data  Canadian federal e l e c t i o n r e s u l t s f o r the period 1953 t o 1965 were obtained from a computer tape compiled by Donald E. B l a k e . 22  Each case  contained t h e constituency number, the province o f the constituency, voter turnout i n the constituency, the votes obtained by each candidate, the election  year,  and the t o t a l  valid  votes  cast.  published by Howard A. Scarrow, Canada Votes the  1953 t o 1962 elections,  These data  are a l s o  (New Orleans: 1 9 6 3 ) , f o r 23  and by the Report  o f the Chief E l e c t o r a l  O f f i c e r f o r the 1963 and 1965 e l e c t i o n s . 2 4  In  order  t o c r e a t e hypothetical multiple-seat constituencies,  contiguous constituencies have t o be added together.  Since the data are  o r i g i n a l l y i n alphabetical order, new multiple-seat constituencies cannot be  created  Consequently,  simply  by adding  the original  adjacent cases  data  i n the o r i g i n a l  s e t has been re-ordered such  data s e t . t h a t the  cases a r e i n sets o f s i x , where within each set adjacent cases represent constituencies contiguous with one another.  Unless the data s e t i s again  re-ordered i n t o smaller o r l a r g e r sets, we are l e f t with the options o f dividing  the sets  constituencies.  into  subsets  o f one, two, t h r e e ,  or  six-seat  We can a l s o divide the data set on a province-by-province  33  basis.  I n order t o re-arrange the data s e t i n t o subsets o f constituencies, Maps .  The  2 5  together  was  reference  was  d e c i s i o n as based  on  to  made t o which  boundaries,  s e v e r a l geographical  the  Electoral  District  c o n s t i t u e n c i e s should be  adherence t o within-province subsets. provincial  Federal  contiguous  criteria.  Foremost  Whenever subsets  northernmost  added  had  to  was  cross  c o n s t i t u e n c i e s were used.  Otherwise, s t a r t i n g from one corner o f each province, c o n s t i t u e n c i e s were added  to  Brunswick,  w i t h i n - p r o v i n c e c o n s t i t u e n c i e s adjacent  to  them.  subsets were created along l i n g u i s t i c l i n e s .  In  New  I n a l l other  cases, the next c r i t e r i a f o r adding c o n s t i t u e n c i e s were physiographic and rural-urban d i v i s i o n s . i n t o separate  Metropolitan areas and r u r a l areas were arranged  subsets wherever p o s s i b l e .  Where r u r a l areas had  to  be  j o i n e d s e p a r a t e l y , c l i m a t i c d i f f e r e n c e s , and p h y s i c a l b a r r i e r s , such  as  mountains and bodies o f water, were used as d i v i d i n g l i n e s .  As included.  was  mentioned  earlier,  the  1958  election  data  are  There are s e v e r a l r e l a t e d reasons f o r d e c i d i n g t h a t the  e l e c t i o n should be t r e a t e d as an anomaly. d i d not need the FPP  not 1958  F i r s t , the Conservative p a r t y  system t o h e l p i t form a m a j o r i t y government by  t r a n s l a t i n g a m i n o r i t y o f votes i n t o an a r t i f i c i a l m a j o r i t y of s e a t s ; the Conservatives won a m a j o r i t y o f the votes.  Second, the 1958 e l e c t i o n d i d  not r e s u l t i n a s i t u a t i o n where the government p a r t y was underrepresented  i n one  o r more regions; the  l a r g e s t p a r t y i n every region.  34  significantly  Conservatives were  the  A l s o , we expect t h e mean o f our sample s e t f o r Conservative vote shares t o d e v i a t e from t h e population mean (the p o p u l a t i o n equals a l l n a t i o n a l e l e c t i o n s from approximately 1935 t o t h e p r e s e n t ) .  However, t h e  r e s u l t s o f t h e 1958 e l e c t i o n would skew t h e d i s t r i b u t i o n o f i n d i v i d u a l r e s u l t s w i t h i n t h e s m a l l sample s e t s i g n i f i c a n t l y more than they would t h e d i s t r i b u t i o n o f t h e population.  I f we i n c l u d e t h e r e s u l t s o f t h e 1958  e l e c t i o n , t h e population mean equals 34.27. 32.86.  I f we exclude 1958, i t equals  I n c o n t r a s t , i f we i n c l u d e 1958 i n our sample, t h e sample mean  equals 37.67, w h i l e i f we exclude 1958, i t equals 34.4.  F o r the province  o f Quebec, t h e skewing o f t h e population mean versus t h e skewing o f t h e sample mean by t h e 1958 e l e c t i o n r e s u l t s i s even more s i g n i f i c a n t than t h a t on a n a t i o n a l s c a l e .  By e m i t t i n g t h e 1958 e l e c t i o n , t h e r e f o r e , we  s i g n i f i c a n t l y decrease the standard e r r o r o f the mean o f our sample s e t .  C l a s s i f i c a t i o n o f Data  We a r e now i n a p o s i t i o n t o begin c r e a t i n g h y p o t h e t i c a l outcomes f o r t h e 1953, 1957, 1962, 1963 and 1965 n a t i o n a l e l e c t i o n s .  First, i n  order t o c r e a t e ocjnstituencies w i t h a d i s t r i c t magnitude o f two, the t o t a l v a l i d votes c a s t a r e added together i n s e t s o f two adjacent cases.  Then  we c a l c u l a t e what f r a c t i o n o f t h e new t o t a l i s contained i n each case. For example, i f there were 40,000 t o t a l v a l i d votes c a s t i n one case, and 60,000 i n t h e adjacent case, then one case would c o n t a i n 40,000/(40,000 + 60,000) = .4 o f t h e t o t a l v a l i d votes c a s t i n the constituency o f d i s t r i c t magnitude two.  Next, t h e percent o f t o t a l votes each p a r t y obtained i n  each case a r e c a l c u l a t e d by d i v i d i n g t h e votes obtained by each p a r t y by 35  the t o t a l v a l i d votes cast. the  new  Then each party's share o f the t o t a l vote f o r  constituency o f d i s t r i c t  roagrdtude  two  can be  calculated,  by  multiplying the percent o f t o t a l votes each party obtained i n each case by each case's f r a c t i o n o f the new t o t a l o f v a l i d votes cast, and adding the two.  For example, i f the L i b e r a l party received 50 percent o f the vote i n  one case and 30 percent i n the adjacent case, and f r a c t i o n s o f v a l i d votes were the same as i n the above example, then the L i b e r a l party would obtain (.4 X 50%) + (.6 X 30%) = (.2 + .18) = 38 percent o f the vote.  We then c a l c u l a t e the hypothetical outcome using the Droop quota, which  for district  magnitude o f two  i s 33.4  percent.  In the above  example, f o r instance, the L i b e r a l party would be rewarded one o f the two seats.  A problem occurs i n our c a l c u l a t i o n s when we add -two contiguous constituencies where a party runs a candidate i n one o f the two cases but not  i n the other case.  where  This s i t u a t i o n occurred most often i n Quebec,  the Conservatives and NDP  occasions.  failed  t o run a candidate  on several  Where a party received l e s s than 5 percent o f the votes i n the  constituency where i t d i d run, i t was assumed t h a t had t h a t party run a candidate i n the constituency adjacent t o i t , i t would have received a s i m i l a r l y low vote share, and thus would not have affected the a l l o c a t i o n of seats.  Where a party received more than 5 percent o f the votes i n the  constituency where  i t d i d run, i t becomes l e s s c e r t a i n what would have  happened, had i t run a candidate i n the adjacent constituency. circumstances,  there  i s little  choice  but t o t r e a t  these  Under such cases  as  single-seat constituencies, omit them from the r e s u l t s , and t o assume that t h i s inconsistency does not s i g n i f i c a n t l y skew our r e s u l t s . 36  To  c r e a t e h y p o t h e t i c a l c o n s t i t u e n c i e s and h y p o t h e t i c a l outcomes  f o r d i s t r i c t magnitudes o f t h r e e , we f o l l o w b a s i c a l l y t h e same method o f c a l c u l a t i o n s as we d i d f o r d i s t r i c t magnitudes o f two.  F i r s t , the v a l i d  votes o f each case a r e d i v i d e d by t h e sum o f t h e v a l i d votes f o r a l l three cases.  Then we m u l t i p l y these three values by t h e percent o f votes each  p a r t y obtained i n each r e s p e c t i v e case, and add t h e three.  F o r example,  i f t h e number o f v a l i d votes i n three adjacent cases were i n d e n t i c a l , a l l three f r a c t i o n s would be .33. So i f t h e L i b e r a l p a r t y r e c e i v e d 50% o f the vote i n one case, 40% i n another, and 30% i n t h e t h i r d case, then the L i b e r a l p a r t y would o b t a i n (.33 X 50%) + (.33 X 40%) + (.33 X 30%) = 40 percent o f the vote i n t h e constituency o f d i s t r i c t magnitude three.  The Droop quota f o r d i s t r i c t magnitude o f three i s (l/# seats + 1) *100 = 25 percent.  I n t h e above example, t h i s would r e s u l t i n t h e L i b e r a l  p a r t y being awarded one o f t h e three a v a i l a b l e seats on t h e b a s i s o f a quota, and being l e f t w i t h a remainder o f 15 percent.  The same method o f c a l c u l a t i o n s i s used t o determine each party's share o f t h e vote i n h y p o t h e t i c a l c o n s t i t u e n c i e s o f d i s t r i c t magnitude s i x as was used f o r t h a t o f d i s t r i c t magnitude two and d i s t r i c t magnitude three.  Each p a r t y ' s seat share f o r d i s t r i c t magnitude o f s i x i s a l l o c a t e d  u s i n g a Droop quota o f (1/7) *100 = 14.3.  The same method o f c a l c u l a t i o n s can a l s o be used t o determine each p a r t y ' s vote share and seat share i n r e g i o n a l c o n s t i t u e n c i e s , f o r example, province-wide c o n s t i t u e n c i e s .  37  I n order t o c a l c u l a t e what the e l e c t i o n outcomes would have been i f d i s t r i c t magnitudes o f two, three, s i x o r province-wide i n the  1953,  seats won  1957,  1962,  1963  o r 1965  elections,  had been used  c e t e r i s paribus,  by each p a r t y u s i n g the above method were counted.  the  Appendix A  shows the percentage o f the vote won by each p a r t y i n each e l e c t i o n ,  and  the percentage o f seats won by each p a r t y u s i n g d i s t r i c t magnitudes o f one (FPP), two, three, s i x and  province-wide.  38  0  CHAPTER 4  ANALYSIS OF NATIONAL DATA  R e s u l t s o f t h e 1953 E l e c t i o n  Looking f i r s t  a t r e s u l t s an a nation-wide s c a l e , and beginning  w i t h t h e 1953 e l e c t i o n , we see from Table 4.2 t h a t t h e L i b e r a l s won a m a j o r i t y o f t h e seats w i t h only a m i n o r i t y o f t h e votes. Conservatives  Meanwhile, t h e  r e c e i v e d a f a r smaller percentage o f seats than o f votes.  A t t h e r i s k o f s i d e - t r a c k i n g from t h e main i s s u e a t hand, i t i s worth noting  that  Cairns  "arbitrarily"  necessary t o a working parliamentary seats  i n the l e g i s l a t u r e . 2 6  defines  an " e f f e c t i v e o p p o s i t i o n "  system as a t l e a s t o n e - t h i r d o f t h e  I n t h e 1953 e l e c t i o n , a l l t h e o p p o s i t i o n  p a r t i e s combined r e c e i v e d j u s t over a t h i r d o f t h e seats. the outcome another way, t h e Conservatives  received l e s s than orie—quarter  o f t h e L i b e r a l and Conservative seats combined. parties'  seat  shares  a r e observed  Or, t o look a t  Thus, when changes i n t h e  f o r increased  district  magnitudes  a p p l i e d t o t h e 1953 e l e c t i o n , we should l o o k f o r d i s t r i c t magnitudes t h a t preserve t h e L i b e r a l p a r t y ' s seats m a j o r i t y , b u t t h a t a l s o produces a more effective opposition.  We see from Table 4.1 t h a t f o r a d i s t r i c t magnitude o f two, t h e L i b e r a l s g a i n a m a j o r i t y o f seats.  Although not as s i z e a b l e a m a j o r i t y o f  seats as they r e c e i v e d when FPP was used, i t i s s u f f i c i e n t l y l a r g e t h a t a handful  o f d e f e c t i o n s o r r e s i g n a t i o n s would not r e s u l t i n the L i b e r a l 39  gcjvernment losing a vote of non-oonfidence.  In addition, not only do the  Liberals continue to win a majority of seats with a minority of votes when d i s t r i c t magnitude i s increased from one to two, but the Conservatives are no longer relegated to the status of a small party.  TABLE 4.1:  L i b e r a l Vote Snares and Seat Shares  Year  DM1  DM2  DM3  DM6  DM-Province  Votes  1953  64.5  56.4  54.2  49.6  50.0  49.0  1957  39.6  48.9  42.8  42.6  42.9  41.0  1962  37.7  43.6  37.5  37.3  36.7  37.0  1963  48.7  49.6  45.5  43.2  41.8  42.0  1965  49.4  46.2  44.7  39.8  40.6  40.0  EMI  = Actual Liberal seats  DM2  = Liberal seats using d i s t r i c t magnitude of 2  DM3  = Liberal  "  "  ••'  "  •• of 3  DM6  = Liberal  "  "  "  "  " of 6  DM-province = Liberal  "  " province-wide constituencies  Votes  = Liberal votes  When d i s t r i c t magnitude i s increased to three, the results are basically the same as those for d i s t r i c t magnitude of two.  However, when  d i s t r i c t magnitude i s increased to six, the Liberals no longer win a majority of seats.  Also worth noting i s that the Conservatives pass the  threshold from receiving a smaller share to a larger share of seats than 40  the  share o f votes  they received; however, t h i s outcome i s made l e s s  s i g n i f i c a n t by t h e f a c t t h a t t h e CCF and S o c i a l C r e d i t p a r t i e s a l s o passed the t h r e s h o l d .  The 1957 E l e c t i o n  When we look a t t h e r e s u l t s o f t h e 1957 e l e c t i o n , we see t h a t t h e Liberals  received  Conservatives, seats.  a  l a r g e r share  o f the popular  vote  than the  b u t t h a t t h e FPP system awarded t h e Conservatives  more  As a r e s u l t , t h e Conservatives, t h e second-largest p a r t y i n terms  o f v o t e r support, were able t o form a m i n o r i t y government.  When t h e d i s t r i c t outcome i s much d i f f e r e n t .  magnitude i s increased  t o two, t h e e l e c t i o n  Not only do t h e L i b e r a l s g a i n more seats than  votes, and not o n l y do they g a i n more seats than t h e Conservatives, but w i t h a v o t e share o f 41 percent they come w i t h i n one percent o f r e c e i v i n g a  majority  o f t h e seats.  From t h e p o i n t  o f view o f o b t a i n i n g our  o b j e c t i v e o f awarding t h e l a r g e s t p a r t y a t l e a s t as many seats as i t r e c e i v e d under FPP, t h i s r e s u l t i s spectacular; but i s i t anomalous w i t h i n our data set?  Before going on t o compare t h i s r e s u l t t o t h a t o f l a t e r e l e c t i o n s , let  us f i r s t  continue  t o look  a t t h e 1957 e l e c t i o n outcomes.  When  d i s t r i c t magnitude i s increased t o three, t h e r e l a t i o n s h i p between votes and  seats  approaches  magnitude o f three  complete  o r higher,  proportionality.  there i s l i t t l e 41  Hence, a t d i s t r i c t  likelihood that a large  p a r t y w i l l have a s u b s t a n t i a l l y l a r g e r seat share than v o t e share; t h a t i s , a d i s t r i c t magnitude o f t h r e e , i f used i n t h e 1957 e l e c t i o n , would not have s i g n i f i c a n t l y favoured e i t h e r l a r g e p a r t y .  When d i s t r i c t magnitude i s increased from three t o s i x , and from s i x t o province-wide, t h e r e i s only a 0.3 percent v a r i a t i o n i n L i b e r a l seat share.  T h i s r e s u l t i n d i c a t e s t h a t an increase i n d i s t r i c t magnitude  beyond t h r e e does not r e s u l t i n an increase i n p r o p o r t i o n a l i t y .  Based on t h e h y p o t h e t i c a l outcomes f o r t h e 1957 e l e c t i o n , then, we w i l l be l o o k i n g f o r t h e f o l l o w i n g patterns i n t h e next e l e c t i o n we look at,  1962.  Liberals'  When d i s t r i c t magnitude i s increased from one t o two, seat  share  i n c r e a s e s w h i l e t h e Conservatives'  seat  the  share  decreases; when d i s t r i c t magnitude i s increased from two t o t h r e e , t h e e l e c t o r a l system i s n o t biased i n favour o f t h e two l a r g e p a r t i e s ; an increase i n d i s t r i c t magnitude beyond three does n o t r e s u l t i n any change i n L i b e r a l seat share.  The 1962 E l e c t i o n  In received  t h e 1962 e l e c t i o n , 37 percent  both  t h e L i b e r a l s and t h e Conservatives  o f t h e votes.  Y e t t h e FPP system awarded t h e  Conservatives s i x percent more s e a t s ; consequently, t h e Conservatives, as in  1957, formed a m i n o r i t y government.  increased  When d i s t r i c t  magnitude i s  from one t o two, however, t h e r o l e s a r e reversed, and t h e  L i b e r a l s a r e awarded three percent more seats. 42  What t h e r e s u l t s o f t h e  1957 and 1962 e l e c t i o n s seem t o suggest, then, i s t h a t when t h e two l a r g e p a r t i e s a r e o f equal s i z e , FPP i s biased i n favour o f t h e p a r t y w i t h more r e g i o n a l l y cxancentrated support, w h i l e a d i s t r i c t magnitude o f two would be b i a s e d i n favour o f t h e p a r t y w i t h more d i f f u s e support.  When t h e d i s t r i c t magnitude i s increased from two t o three, t h e Liberal  seat  approximately  share  drops down t o what i t was under FPP, which i s  an equal p r o p o r t i o n o f votes t o seats.  seat share, on t h e other hand, goes back up again.  The Conservative This i s the only  e l e c t i o n i n t h e sample s e t i n which t h e L i b e r a l vote share was not g r e a t e r than  the Conservative  vote  share,  so i t i s d i f f i c u l t t o base any  conclusions on t h i s outcome; but i t does appear as though i n c r e a s i n g t h e d i s t r i c t magnitude from two t o three may increase t h e b i a s i n favour o f a l a r g e concentrated p a r t y .  Finally, magnitude  as was t h e case  f o r t h e 1957 e l e c t i o n , when d i s t r i c t  i s increased beyond three, t h e L i b e r a l  seat  share  remains  unchanged.  The 1963  Election  The r e s u l t s o f t h e 1963 e l e c t i o n a r e notably d i f f e r e n t from those o f 1953 and a l s o from those o f 1957 and 1962.  1953 was t h e l a s t e l e c t i o n  i n which t h e L i b e r a l p a r t y received more than 45 percent o f t h e vote. the other percent  four elections  o f t h e vote.  In  i n t h e sample s e t , t h e L i b e r a l s averaged 40  P r i o r t o 1957, and between 1963 and 1984, t h e 43  Conservatives  received vote shares i n t h e lower 30 percent range.  i n t h e 1963 e l e c t i o n , t h e Conservatives  Thus,  returned t o a vote share i n t h e  lower 30's and t h e L i b e r a l s s h i f t e d t o a new vote range i n t h e lower 40's.  With t h e L i b e r a l s only r e c e i v i n g 42 percent o f the vote i n the 1963  e l e c t i o n , i t would have been d i f f i c u l t f o r t h e FPP e l e c t o r a l system t o manufacture  an a r t i f i c i a l  Conservatives  1  majority  o f seats.  However, because t h e  v o t e r support dropped t o 33 percent, t h e cxancentration o f  Conservative p a r t y v o t e r support was unable t o compensate f o r i t s l a c k o f size.  Consequently, whereas t h e L i b e r a l s r e c e i v e d 41 percent o f t h e vote  i n 1957, b u t received fewer seats than votes, i n 1963 they received 42 percent  o f t h e vote and came w i t h i n 1.3 percent  o f a m a j o r i t y o f the  seats.  When t h e d i s t r i c t magnitude i s increased from one t o two, t h e b i a s in  favour  o f t h e L i b e r a l s i s increased,  percent o f a m a j o r i t y o f t h e seats.  so t h a t they a r e w i t h i n 0.4  Of t h e f o u r e l e c t i o n s we have looked  a t t o t h i s p o i n t , t h e L i b e r a l seat share increased, when t h e d i s t r i c t magnitude was increased t o two, i n three o f t h e four cases. exception transformed  was  1953, when  an undesirable  increasing the d i s t r i c t  The only  magnitude t o two  landslide Liberal victory into a  comfortable  majority.  I t thus appears from these r e s u l t s t h a t t h e swing r a t i o f o r t h e L i b e r a l p a r t y i s much l a r g e r f o r FPP than f o r a d i s t r i c t magnitude o f two, and t h a t t h e d i s t r i c t magnitude o f two i s biased i n favour o f t h e L i b e r a l p a r t y a t a lower vote percentage than FPP i s . This means t h a t a d i s t r i c t magnitude o f two tends t o award t h e L i b e r a l p a r t y a m a j o r i t y o f seats a t a 44  lower vote snare than does FPP, w h i l e FPP begins awarding e x o r b i t a n t l y more seats t o t h e L i b e r a l s than does d i s t r i c t magnitude o f two only when such seats a r e superfluous and an impediment t o a working parliamentary system.  A l s o , under FPP t h e t h r e s h o l d i s 40 percent o f t h e vote share;  anywhere below t h i s m i n o r i t y government  and t h e chances o f t h e L i b e r a l s appear remote.  forming  On t h e other hand, when  even a district  magnitude o f two i s used, t h e t h r e s h o l d f o r t h e L i b e r a l p a r t y i s probably below  30 p e r c e n t ,  and t h e L i b e r a l s  are l i k e l y  t o form a m i n o r i t y  government w i t h as l i t t l e as 35 percent o f t h e vote.  When t h e d i s t r i c t magnitude i s increased from two t o three f o r the 1963  election,  f o r t h e f o u r t h consecutive case L i b e r a l  w h i l e Conservative seats increase.  seats  decrease  F i n a l l y , when d i s t r i c t magnitude i s  increased from three t o s i x , and from s i x t o province-wide, both L i b e r a l and Conservative  seat shares decrease  as d i s t r i c t magnitude increases,  u n t i l t h e i r seat shares a r e p r o p o r t i o n a l t o t h e i r vote shares.  The p a t t e r n so f a r , then, i s f o r FPP t o be b i a s e d i n favour o f t h e Conservatives moreso than t h e L i b e r a l s , w h i l e d i s t r i c t magnitude o f two s h i f t s the larger bias t o the L i b e r a l party.  When d i s t r i c t magnitude i s  increased from two t o t h r e e , however, t h e l a r g e r b i a s s h i f t s back t o t h e Conservative p a r t y ; b u t both l a r g e p a r t i e s ' b i a s e s become smaller, as t h e increased d i s t r i c t magnitude i s l e s s b i a s e d against small p a r t i e s .  Also,  the r a t i o o f seat shares t o vote shares approaches p r o p o r t i o n a l i t y a t d i s t r i c t magnitude o f s i x .  45  The 1965 E l e c t i o n  In the l a s t e l e c t i o n i n the sample s e t , 1965, the L i b e r a l s , w i t h 40 percent  o f the vote, came w i t h i n 0.6  s e a t s ; thus, the FPP e l e c t o r a l system was  percent o f a m a j o r i t y o f  the  almost able t o manufacture an  a r t i f i c i a l m a j o r i t y o f seats out o f a m i n o r i t y o f votes.  However, the  L i b e r a l s had t o s e t t l e f o r another m i n o r i t y government.  When d i s t r i c t magnitude i s increased from one t o two, the L i b e r a l p a r t y ' s seat share decreases criteria  from 49.4  t o 46.2  percent.  Based on  our  t h a t an a l t e r n a t i v e e l e c t o r a l system should award the l a r g e s t  p a r t y a t l e a s t as many seats as does FPP (at l e a s t u n t i l i t has a m a j o r i t y o f the s e a t s ) , t h i s i s the o n l y case i n our s e t where d i s t r i c t magnitude o f two  has  failed.  L i b e r a l s s t i l l won  However, under a d i s t r i c t magnitude o f two,  the  more seats than the second and t h i r d l a r g e s t p a r t i e s  combined, even though these two p a r t i e s together received a m a j o r i t y of the  votes.  Thus,  the  L i b e r a l s would  still  have formed a  minority  government.  When d i s t r i c t magnitude i s increased from two t o three, both l a r g e p a r t i e s ' seat shares decreased. the New  T h i s i s because the t h i r d l a r g e s t p a r t y ,  Democratic P a r t y (NDP), had continued t o grow i n v o t e r support,  u n t i l by 1965  i t r e c e i v e d 18 percent o f the vote share.  number o f  effective  affecting  the  geographical  p a r t i e s began t o  proportionality  distribution  of  of  be  a  electoral  more s i g n i f i c a n t v a r i a b l e cuteame; which means  p a r t i s a n support  e f f e c t , a t l e a s t f o r l a r g e r d i s t r i c t magnitudes. 46  As a r e s u l t , the  would have l e s s  of  the an  E f f e c t s o f D i s t r i c t Maojrirude can T . i i w a l Seat Shares  F i g u r e 4.1 shows t h e r e l a t i o n between L i b e r a l votes and seats f o r the 1953, 1957, 1962, 1963 and 1965 e l e c t i o n s f o r d i s t r i c t nagnitudes o f one (FPP), two, three, s i x and province-^wide. the  slope  Liberal  (regression coefficient)  votes  to Liberal  seats  As t h e f i g u r e i l l u s t r a t e s ,  f o r the l i n e a r  i s steeper  equation  f o r FPP than  relating  for district  magnitude o f two.  Meanwhile, t h e i n t e r c e p t (regression constant) o f FPP  i s much s m a l l e r .  However, when d i s t r i c t magnitude i s increased from two  to  t h r e e , t h e slope increases again and the i n t e r c e p t decreases  again.  This would seem t o i n d i c a t e t h a t the geographical d i s t r i b u t i o n o f v o t e r support  f o r the Liberal party s t i l l  has a s i g n i f i c a n t  e f f e c t on t h e  t r a n s l a t i o n o f votes i n t o seats a t a d i s t r i c t magnitude o f three.  The l i n e passing a t a 45 degree angle through the o r i g i n i n Figure 4.1  represents  an e q u a l i t y between votes  t h e r e f o r e 1.0 and i t s i n t e r c e p t i s zero.  and seats.  I t s slope i s  I f we t r a n s l a t e t h i s i n t o t h e  terminology we have been u s i n g so f a r , a p a r t y w i t h a r e l a t i o n o f votes t o seats t h e same as t h i s l i n e would have a swing r a t i o o f 1.0 and a zero bias  f o r a l l values o f votes:  Liberal  party  when  district  This i s almost the s i t u a t i o n magnitude  i s increased  f o r the  t o s i x or  province-^wide.  Figure 4.2 shows the r e l a t i o n between L i b e r a l votes and seats f o r the 1953, 1957, 1962, 1963 and 1965 e l e c t i o n s f o r a d i s t r i c t magnitude o f two, and between 1935 and 1980 f o r FPP. 47  (Note: the data f o r t h i s f i g u r e  are revealed below i n Table 4.2) graph.  There a r e three h o r i z o n t a l l i n e s on t h e  The l i n e a t seats = 41% represents t h e s m a l l e s t seat share any  p a r t y has ever r e c e i v e d and s t i l l managed t o form a m i n o r i t y government. The l i n e a t seats = 50% represents t h e miriimum number o f seats necessary t o form a m a j o r i t y government.  The l i n e a t seats = 66% represents t h e  maximum number o f seats h e l d by a government p a r t y before problems such as the  l a c k o f an e f f e c t i v e  government  backbenchers  o p p o s i t i o n and t h e overabundance o f u n r u l y begin  t o hinder  the workability  parliamentary system.  Table 4.2: LIBERAL VOTES AND SEATS FOR DM2 and FPP  Year  L i b e r a l Seats (%)  L i b e r a l Votes (%)  L i b e r a l Seats  1935  71  45  1940  74  51  1945  51  41  1949  74  49  -  1953  65  49  56  1957  40  41  49  1958  18  34  -  1962  38  37  44  1963  49  42  50  1965  49  40  46  1968  59  45  1972  41  38  1974  53  43  1979  40  40  1980  52  44  49  of the  LIBERAL SEAT SHARES  FIGURE 4.x  1o  USINQ FPP AND  DM2  __  H  10  1  1  1  1  1  1  20  30  40  50  60  70  VOTES  (%)  Recalling  that  our  primary o b j e c t i v e i s t o  increase  m u l t i r e g i o n a l representation o f a l a r g e d i f f u s e p a r t y without i t s t o t a l number o f seats, Figure 4.2 which can be i n t e r p r e t e d as p o s i t i v e .  the  decreasing  has s e v e r a l i m p l i c a t i o n s , a l l o f F i r s t , regarding FPP's tendency t o  manufacture a m a j o r i t y o f seats out o f a m i n o r i t y o f votes, we see t h a t both FPP and a d i s t r i c t magnitude o f two  (DM2)  produce a m a j o r i t y o f seats  w i t h between 42 and 43 percent o f votes.  IjDok±ng next a t m i n o r i t y governments, the reader w i l l r e c a l l t h a t in  two  of  the  e l e c t i o n s i n our  sample s e t  the  Conservatives  formed  m i n o r i t y governments, even though the L i b e r a l s received more votes. c o n t r a s t , i f we compare FPP t o DM2  In  we see t h a t whereas the L i b e r a l s need  on average 40 percent o f votes i f they wish t o form a m i n o r i t y government under FPP, they would need only 34 percent under DM2.  In other words, i f  a l a r g e d i f f u s e p a r t y f a l l s short o f forming a m a j o r i t y government, i t stands a f a r b e t t e r chance o f a t l e a s t forming a m i n o r i t y government i f DM2  i s used, then i f FPP  i s used.  I n our sample s e t , f o r example, the  L i b e r a l s would have formed m i n o r i t y governments i n the  1957  and  1962  e l e c t i o n s i f DM2 had been used.  We see from Figure 4.2 of the  seats, they begin  under DM2.  percent  r e c e i v i n g more seats per vote under FPP  than  However, t h i s does not mean t h a t a l a r g e d i f f u s e p a r t y w i t h  more than approximately t o DM2.  t h a t once the L i b e r a l s get over 50  42 percent o f votes would n e c e s s a r i l y p r e f e r  C e r t a i n l y a government would not want t o be  i n the  FPP  precarious  p o s i t i o n o f having t h e i r m a j o r i t y l o s t i f one o r two o f t h e i r seats i n the 51  l e g i s l a t u r e were somehow l o s t .  Both FPP and DM2 produce a comfortable  margin o f e x t r a seats a t 44 percent o f votes; hence, i t i s o n l y a t between 42 percent and 44 percent o f votes t h a t t h e L i b e r a l s would encounter an uncomfortably s l i m m a j o r i t y o f seats under DM2.  Cn t h e other hand, once t h e L i b e r a l s g a i n more than approximately 47 percent o f t h e votes, under FPP they r e c e i v e so many seats t h a t t h e i r l o p s i d e d v i c t o r y begins t o a c t t o t h e detriment o f themselves parliamentary system.  Regarding  and the  t h e problems i n c u r r e d by a government  w i t h an e x t r a o r d i n a r y m a j o r i t y , t h e prime m i n i s t e r i s unable t o reward everyone i n t h e government caucus w i t h p o s i t i o n s o f r e s p o n s i b i l i t y . i d l e baddoenchers then become r e s t l e s s backbenchers.  The  Also, the larger the  caucus, t h e more increased i s t h e l i k e l i h o o d o f disagreement o f opinion. The most l i k e l y outcome i s f o r t h e cabinet t o f i n d t h e most formidable o p p o s i t i o n t o same o f i t s p o l i c i e s coming from a group o f d i s a f f e c t e d backbenchers w i t h i n i t s own caucus. opposition party o r p a r t i e s  A t t h e same time, t h e a b i l i t y o f t h e  to effectively  fulfill  their  function of  c o n s t r u c t i v e l y c r i t i c i z i n g government p o l i c i e s i s s e r i o u s l y hindered by a shortage o f personnel.  F i n a l l y , when we look a t F i g u r e 4.2, we see t h a t there a r e s e v e r a l occasions when t h e number o f seats won by t h e L i b e r a l s under FPP was much g r e a t e r o r l e s s than t h a t p r e d i c t e d by t h e l i n e a r equation.  Hence, i f t h e  L i b e r a l s were d e c i d i n g whether o r n o t t o c a l l an e l e c t i o n based on t h e i r p o p u l a r i t y amongst decided v o t e r s , they would have t o be h i g h l y u n c e r t a i n about how many seats those votes would t r a n s l a t e i n t o , i f FPP were used. For example, there i s one occasion where t h e L i b e r a l s , w i t h 41 percent o f 52  the vote, were unable t o win enough seats t o form a itiinority government; meanwhile, on another occasion 41 percent o f the vote was enough f o r the L i b e r a l s t o w i n a m a j o r i t y o f t h e seats. elections  I n c o n t r a s t , f o r the f i v e  i n t h e sample s e t , there i s l e s s than one percent v a r i a n c e  between a c t u a l outcomes, i n terms o f the L i b e r a l seats, and t h e outcomes p r e d i c t e d by t h e l i n e a r equation f o r DM2.  E f f e c t s o f D i s t r i c t Magnitudes on Conservative Seat Shares  Before l o o k i n g a t the r e g i o n a l breakdown o f L i b e r a l support,  we  should f i r s t observe t h e e f f e c t s o f increased d i s t r i c t magnitude on t h e Conservative p a r t y ' s t o t a l  seat share.  Figure 4.3  shows the r e l a t i o n  between Conservative votes and seats f o r the 1953, 1957, 1962, 1963 and 1965 e l e c t i o n s f o r d i s t r i c t magnitudes o f one (FPP), two (DM2), three, s i x and province-wide.  Conservative seat shares f o r 1935 t o 1980 are a l s o  shown and a r e represented by the s c a t t e r p l o t diagram i n Figure 3.1. data  f o r F i g u r e 4.3  are l i s t e d  i n Table  4.3)  (The  The p a t t e r n f o r t h e  t r a n s l a t i o n o f votes i n t o seats f o r t h e Conservative p a r t y when d i s t r i c t magnitude i s increased from one t o two and from two t o t h r e e i s b a s i c a l l y the same as f o r t h e L i b e r a l p a r t y .  The slope f o r FPP i s steeper than f o r  DM2, w h i l e t h e i n t e r c e p t f o r FPP i s s m a l l e r than f o r DM2.  When d i s t r i c t  magnitude i s increased from two t o three, the slope increases again and the i n t e r c e p t decreases again, j u s t as i t does f o r the L i b e r a l s . w h i l e the slopes f o r the L i b e r a l s and Conservatives f o r DM2 identical,  the Liberal  party's  i n t e r c e p t f o r DM2  53  However,  are n e a r l y  i s approximately  6  seat-share percentages higher.  This 6 percent bias i n favour of the  Liberals results i n same fundamental differences i n electoral outcomes for the two parties.  Table 4.3: CONSERVATIVE VOTES AND SEATS FOR FPP, DM2 and DM3  Year  Cons. Seats  Cons. Votes  1935 1940 1945 1949 1953 1957 1958 1962 1963 1965 1968 1972 1974 1979 1980  16 16 27 16 19 42 78 44 36 37 27 41 36 48 37  30 31 27 30 31 39 54 37 33 32 31 35 35 36 33  DM2 Seats _  28  —  28  36  41  -  --  41 33 34  —  54  DM3 Seats  41 37 34  —  FIGURE 4 . 3 SEATS  CONSERVATIVE SEAT SHARES USING FPP,DM2 A N D D M 9 (FPP result* Includ* •taction from 1S3S-SO)  (%)  80  70  EFFECTIVE  FPP  OPPOSITION  60  50  MAJORITY  GOVERNMENT  MINORITY  GOVERNMENT  40  30 LEGEND •  20  FPP  1 0  1 0  20  30  4-0  50  60  70  VOTES  (%)  The h o r i z o n t a l l i n e i n Figure 4.3 a t seats = 41% represents t h e minimum seat share necessary t o form a m i n o r i t y government. 50%  represents  government.  t h e minimum seat  share  necessary  The l i n e a t  t o form a m a j o r i t y  We see from Figure 4.3 t h a t under FPP t h e Conservatives need  approximately 37 percent o f t h e v o t e share t o form a m i n o r i t y government. With a d i s t r i c t magnitude o f three, they heed 39 percent, and w i t h DM2, 41 percent.  To  approximately  form a m a j o r i t y government,  the Conservatives  need  41 percent o f t h e vote share under FPP, w h i l e a d i s t r i c t  magnitude o f t h r e e would r e q u i r e 45 percent, and w i t h DM2 they would need 49  percent.  Hence,  government u s i n g DM2  what t h e Conservatives  need t o form a m i n o r i t y  (41 percent o f t h e v o t e share) would be enough t o  c a t a p u l t them t o a m a j o r i t y government under FPP.  The l i n e s o f t h e equations  f o r t h e r e l a t i o n between votes  and  seats f o r t h e Conservative p a r t y when FPP, DM2 and d i s t r i c t magnitude o f t h r e e are used a l l cross t h e t h r e s h o l d a t about 34 percent. threshold, the l i n e  f o r d i s t r i c t magnitude o f t h r e e l i e s  e q u i d i s t a n t between FPP and DM2. o f t h e Conservatives  Above t h e  approximately  Thus, t h e decrease i n t h e b i a s i n favour  i s o n l y h a l f as great when d i s t r i c t magnitude i s  increased from one t o t h r e e , as when i t i s increased from one t o two.  Thus, w h i l e DM2 would be t h e most p r e f e r r e d e l e c t o r a l system f o r the L i b e r a l p a r t y , t h e Conservatives b e n e f i t more under FPP.  I n terms o f  a l t e r i n g t h e outcome o f an e l e c t i o n , t h e most important advantage t o one party  over  the other  occurs  with  56  respect  to  forming  a minority  government.  Under FPP, t h e Conservatives need approximately 37 percent o f  the vote share t o form a m i n o r i t y government, w h i l e t h e L i b e r a l s need approximately 39 percent.  I n contrast, when DM2 i s used t h e L i b e r a l s need  approximately 34 percent o f the votes t o form a m i n o r i t y government, w h i l e the Conservatives need approximately 41 percent.  57  CHAPTER 5  ANALYSIS OF REGIONAL DATA  Looking  now  a t t h e r e g i o n a l breakdown o f p a r t i s a n support and  e l e c t o r a l outcome, t h e two regions where t r a n s l a t i o n o f v o t e r support i n t o representation i n t h e l e g i s l a t u r e i s most skewed a r e Quebec and t h e f o u r western-most provinces. increases  i n district  p a r t y seat shares.  I t i s therefore magnitude w i l l  i n these two "regions"  result  that  i n s u b s t a n t i a l changes i n  With respect t o t h e L i b e r a l p a r t y , we w i l l be l o o k i n g  f o r a decrease i n i t s overrepresentation i n Quebec, and an increase i n i t s r e p r e s e n t a t i o n i n t h e West.  Hopefully, t h e g a i n o f seats f o r t h e L i b e r a l s  i n t h e West w i l l a t l e a s t compensate f o r t h e i r l o s s o f seats i n Quebec, when d i s t r i c t magnitude i s increased.  The T.iherals i n t h e West  Appendix B shews t h e breakdown o f support f o r t h e L i b e r a l s i n Quebec and i n t h e West, and f o r t h e Conservatives  i n Quebec.  Looking  f i r s t a t t h e L i b e r a l s i n t h e West, we see t h a t i n 1953 t h e L i b e r a l p a r t y r e c e i v e d a seat share equal t o i t s vote  share.  Assuming t h a t t h e FPP  system has t h e same tendencies, w i t h respect t o t h e t r a n s l a t i o n o f votes i n t o seats, on a r e g i o n a l s c a l e as i t does on a n a t i o n a l s c a l e , i t appears t h a t t h e t h r e s h o l d i s approximately  35 percent o f t h e votes.  J u s t above  t h i s t h r e s h o l d , a p a r t y begins winning 3 seat shares f o r every one percent 58  increase i n vote shares.  J u s t below t h i s t h r e s h o l d , a p a r t y begins l o s i n g  e q u a l l y dramatic seat shares f o r every one percent decrease i n i t s vote share.  I n B r i t i s h Columbia, the impact o f Diefenbaker on L i b e r a l v o t e r support was s h o r t - l i v e d .  From 1962 u n t i l 1972 L i b e r a l v o t e shares i n B.C.  rebounded t o pre-1957 l e v e l s .  However, w h i l e L i b e r a l  support  i n the  P r a i r i e provinces a l s o rebounded i n 1962, i t never reached pre-1957 l e v e l s again.  Because o f the d i s t o r t i o n o f votes i n t o seats by FPP, a decrease  o f 12 percent i n L i b e r a l v o t e r support i n t h e West would be enough t o deny the L i b e r a l s  any seat r e p r e s e n t a t i o n i n the n a t i o n a l l e g i s l a t u r e .  The  post-1962 l e v e l o f L i b e r a l v o t e r support i n the West i s approximately 6 t o 7 percent lower than the pre-1957 l e v e l . not  completely wiped  out  approximately 20 percent.  As a r e s u l t , the L i b e r a l s were  i n the West, but  their  seat share  From 1963 t o 1972, the L i b e r a l s were s t i l l  " l a r g e " p a r t y i n the West, i n terms o f vote shares percent).  dropped a  (approximately 30  However, w i t h o n l y 11 percent o f the seats i n the West, the  L i b e r a l s were a Western " f r i n g e " p a r t y , i n terms o f r e p r e s e n t a t i o n i n the legislature.  If  B.C.,  where L i b e r a l  support returned t o pre-1957 l e v e l s , i s  taken out o f the Western equation, the h i s t o r i c l o s s o f L i b e r a l v o t e r support i n t h e West i s even greater. percent l o s s t h a t we  I n f a c t , i t i s almost e x a c t l y the 12  p r e d i c t e d would completely wipe out the  Liberals;  w i t h approximately one-quarter o f the v o t e share, they r e c e i v e d cn average 4  percent o f the seats i n the P r a i r i e s  elections. 59  i n the  1962,  1963,  and  1965  The b i g g e s t l o s e r s when L i b e r a l fortunes i n t h e P r a i r i e s d e c l i n e d were n o t t h e L i b e r a l s - they s t i l l l o s e r s were t h e people  formed t h e government.  The biggest  o f t h e P r a i r i e provinces, who were deprived o f  r e p r e s e n t a t i o n i n t h e government caucus and i n t h e cabinet.  One o f t h e  two main o b j e c t i v e s o f t h i s study i s o f course t o a l l e v i a t e t h i s problem o f r e g i o n a l imbalance i n t h e n a t i o n a l p o l i t i c a l p a r t i e s . achieving  this  o b j e c t i v e i s by increasing d i s t r i c t  p r o p o r t i o n a l i t y i s achieved.  The means o f  magnitude  When p r o p o r t i o n a l i t y i s achieved,  until  Liberal  seat shares w i l l equal vote shares i n t h e f o u r Western provinces, which averaged 27 percent f o r t h e 1957, 1962, 1963 and 1965 e l e c t i o n s .  As  c a n be s e e n  from  Table  B - l , when d i s t r i c t  magnitude i s  increased from one t o two, L i b e r a l seat shares increase t o 29.5 percent, a c t u a l l y exceeding t h e i r vote share.  I n a two-party system, t h i s would be  an unexpected r e s u l t , s i n c e t h e quota f o r a DM2 system i s 33.4 percent. In a two-party system, a p a r t y w i t h 27 percent o f t h e vote would not begin r e c e i v i n g seats u n t i l d i s t r i c t magnitude was increased t o three, f o r which the quota i s 25 percent.  However, i n Western Canada during t h i s p e r i o d  t h e r e was a t h r e e - p a r t y system, and i n B.C. and A l b e r t a there were four effective parties.  As a r e s u l t , most o f t h e seats a r e awarded u s i n g t h e  l a r g e s t remainder i n s t e a d o f t h e quota.  When d i s t r i c t magnitude i s increased from two t o three, i n s t e a d o f the  seats  Liberals  being  a l l o c a t e d u s i n g t h e quota o f 25 percent,  with the  t h e r e f o r e being awarded o n e - t h i r d o f t h e seats, t h e L i b e r a l  p a r t y ' s seat share decreases  t o 26 percent. 60  When d i s t r i c t magnitude i s  increased from three t o s i x , t h e L i b e r a l seat share i s 28 percent. the  Liberal  vote-to-seat  ratio  reaches  proportionality  Hence,  at district  magnitude o f three, w h i l e t h e i r seat share a c t u a l l y exceeds t h e i r vote share under DM2.  The number o f seats i n Quebec and t h e West a r e unequal.  Thus, i n  order t o compare t h e g a i n o f L i b e r a l seats i n t h e West t o t h e l o s s o f L i b e r a l seats i n Quebec, t h e average number o f seats gained o r l o s t , and not t h e average percent, must be used. 11.4 seats i n t h e West.  Using DM2,  Under FPP, t h e L i b e r a l s averaged t h e L i b e r a l s average 23.6 seats.  There i s t h e r e f o r e an average g a i n o f 12.2 seats i n t h e West f o r the L i b e r a l s when DM2 i s used. will  The L i b e r a l l o s s o f seats i n Quebec under DM2  be c a l c u l a t e d and compared t o t h e g a i n i n t h e West s h o r t l y .  f i r s t we want t o go through t h e same s o r t o f a n a l y s i s  But  f o r the L i b e r a l  p a r t y i n Quebec as we have gone through f o r t h e L i b e r a l s i n t h e West.  The L i b e r a l s i n Quebec  As shewn by Table B-2, t h e FPP system has t h e same tendencies i n Quebec as i t does i n t h e West and on a n a t i o n a l  scale.  However, the  L i b e r a l p a r t y ' s vote share i s above 35 percent i n Quebec.  So instead o f  the Tliberal p a r t y l o s i n g three seat shares f o r every l o s s o f one percent i n vote shares, as i t does i n the West, i t gains t h r e e seat shares f o r every increase o f one percent i n vote shares. t h i s equation no longer a p p l i e s percent.  The reader w i l l note t h a t  when L i b e r a l vote shares a r e above 50  This i s because t h e r e l a t i o n between votes and seats i s a c t u a l l y 61  an S-shaped curve.  For the n a t i o n a l r e s u l t s and r e s u l t s i n the West,  L i b e r a l v o t e percentages have a l l been i n the range where the S-shaped curve  can  be  approximated  by  a  simple l i n e a r  however, L i b e r a l vote shares o f t e n exceed  equation.  I n Quebec,  50 percent, above which  the  vote-to-seat r a t i o r a p i d l y decreases; thus, a 57 percent v o t e share does not r e s u l t i n a 100 percent seat share.  I f t h e tendencies o f FPP and DM2  are the same i n Quebec as on a  n a t i o n a l s c a l e , then above 42 percent o f the votes the L i b e r a l s w i l l get more s e a t s when FPP i s used, w h i l e below 42 percent they w i l l get more seats when DM2  i s used.  A l s o , above 50 percent o f the votes the swing  r a t i o f o r DM2 i s again l a r g e r than t h a t o f FPP.  From Table B-2  we see t h a t i n o n l y one of the f i v e e l e c t i o n s d i d  the Tliberals r e c e i v e l e s s than 42 percent o f the votes.  We thus expect  FPP t o reward more seats t o the L i b e r a l s i n Quebec than would DM2, of  the  five  elections.  I n order t o  consider our  results  i n four positive,  t h e r e f o r e , t h e L i b e r a l s must continue t o r e c e i v e more seats than votes i n Quebec when DM2  i s used, and the L i b e r a l s must on average g a i n more seats  i n the West than they l o s e i n Quebec when FPP i s replaced by  DM2.  Comparing the r e s u l t s i n Quebec u s i n g FPP and DM2, we see t h a t i n t h e one e l e c t i o n where the L i b e r a l s r e c e i v e d l e s s than 42 percent o f the v o t e share, they were awarded more seats by DM2 than by FPP.  Also, while  the L i b e r a l s r e c e i v e d w e l l over 50 percent o f the votes i n two o f the e l e c t i o n s , FPP o n l y rewarded them w i t h a few more seats than i t would have had they they o n l y r e c e i v e d 50 percent o f the votes. 62  As a r e s u l t o f these  outcomes and the outcomes o f the other two e l e c t i o n s , the L i b e r a l s gained 1.4 seat shares f o r every vote share under FPP, and 1.2 u s i n g DM2.  So the  r e s u l t s are p o s i t i v e w i t h respect t o the L i b e r a l s c o n t i n u i n g t o r e c e i v e more seats than votes i n Quebec when DM2  i s used.  The R e s u l t s F a r t h e T.iherals i n Quebec and i n t h e West Compared  I n order t o compare the l o s s o f seats by the L i b e r a l s i n Quebec when FPP i s replaced w i t h DM2 average  number o f  calculated. DM2, in  w i t h t h e i r g a i n o f seats i n the West, the  individual  seats  lost  i n Quebec must f i r s t  Under FPP, the L i b e r a l s averaged 53.2 seats i n Quebec.  they average 43.6.  There i s t h e r e f o r e an average l o s s o f 9.6  Quebec f o r the L i b e r a l s when DM2  i s used.  By  be  Using seats  comparison, i t was  c a l c u l a t e d t h a t the L i b e r a l s on average gained 12.2 seats i n the West when DM2  i s used.  Liberals.  There i s t h e r e f o r e a  I n other words, the  net  loss of  gain of  2.6  seats  for  the  L i b e r a l seats i n Quebec when  d i s t r i c t magnitude i s increased from one t o two  i s more than compensated  f o r by t h e i r g a i n o f seats i n the West.  However, our o b j e c t i v e i s not t o increase the number o f seats o f the  more d i f f u s e  large party.  Our  objective i s to  increase  the  m u l t i r e g i o n a l representation o f a l a r g e p a r t y without a t the same time decreasing i t s seat t o t a l .  Having a t t a i n e d t h i s o b j e c t i v e by u s i n g  DM2,  we should t u r n our a t t e n t i o n t o the other l a r g e party/ the Conservatives.  63  The Conservatives i n Quebec  The geographical d i s t r i b u t i o n o f support f o r the Conservatives i s also  quite diffuse.  We  would t h e r e f o r e expect t h a t i n c r e a s i n g the  d i s t r i c t magnitude would a l s o increase t h e m u l t i r e g i o n a l r e p r e s e n t a t i o n o f the Conservative party/ but a t the expense o f i t s seat t o t a l .  Table B-3 shows the breakdown o f support f o r the Conservatives i n Quebec i n the 1953, 1957, 1962, 1963 and 1965 e l e c t i o n s . o f these e l e c t i o n s , 1953  and 1957,  I n the f i r s t two  the Conservatives averaged 30 percent  o f the votes, but r e c e i v e d o n l y 8.5  percent o f the s e a t s .  p o s i t i o n o f the Conservative p a r t y i n Quebec was  Thus, the  s i m i l a r t o t h a t o f the  L i b e r a l p a r t y i n the West: they were a l a r g e p a r t y i n terms o f v o t e r support,  but  a  marginal  party  i n terms  of  representation i n  the  legislature.  The elections.  situation The  i n Quebec i n 1963  was  different  from  previous  S o c i a l C r e d i t p a r t y e q u a l l e d the Conservative p a r t y i n  v o t e shares, and exceeded the Conservatives i n seats from Quebec. three-party system a l t e r e d the tendencies o f the FPP Where three p a r t i e s competed i n a needed over h a l f the votes.  e l e c t o r a l system.  constituency, the winner no  s t r a t e g y whereby  longer  A l s o , the Conservatives and S o c i a l C r e d i t  c o u l d agree not t o s p l i t the ''anti-Liberal'' vote, and election  This  the  third-place party  constituency would not run a candidate.  thus f o l l o w an  i n an  individual  As a r e s u l t , a p a r t y might run  candidates i n only h a l f the r i d i n g s and r e c e i v e an average o f 50 percent 64  o f t h e votes where they d i d run; however, i n t h e f i n a l e l e c t i o n r e s u l t s i t would appear t h a t t h i s p a r t y o n l y won 25 percent o f t h e votes.  This i s  b a s i c a l l y t h e same s i t u a t i o n as t h e one i n o u r examples i l l u s t r a t i n g t h e effect  o f geographical d i s t r i b u t i o n  o f partisan  support  cn electoral  outcomes.  Aware, then, t h a t t h e Conservatives may not have r u n candidates i n every r i d i n g , and t h a t they may have faced one other p a r t y i n some r i d i n g s and two i n others, we can proceed w i t h c a u t i o n t o look a t t h e outcomes i n Quebec o f t h e 1962, 1963 and 1965 e l e c t i o n s .  I n these t h r e e e l e c t i o n s ,  the Conservatives averaged 23.3 o f t h e votes, and r e c e i v e d 13.7 percent o f the seats.  They thus received 7 percent fewer votes but 5 percent more  seats i n t h i s p e r i o d than i n 1953 and 1957.  When d i s t r i c t magnitude i s  increased from one t o two, t h e r e f o r e , t h e changes i n Conservative  seat  share a r e n o t expected t o be t h e same f o r t h e two periods.  When d i s t r i c t magnitude i s increased from one t o two f o r 1953 and 1957, Conservative seat shares increase from 8.5 percent t o 23.5 percent. Over t h e 1962 t o 1965 p e r i o d , Conservative seat shares increase from 13.7 percent t o 20 percent.  The e f f e c t s o f FPP and t h e e f f e c t s o f i n c r e a s i n g  district  magnitude  a r e thus  different  f o r two-party  and three-party  systems.  However, t h e tendencies a r e t h e same; i n c r e a s i n g t h e d i s t r i c t  magnitude r e s u l t s i n a s i g n i f i c a n t increase i n Conservative seat shares i n Quebec.  Over t h e course o f t h e f i v e e l e c t i o n s i n t h e sample, i n c r e a s i n g  the d i s t r i c t magnitude t o two r e s u l t s i n t h e Conservative p a r t y r e c e i v i n g  65  an average o f 2 1 . 4 percent o f the s e a t s , as compared t o the 11.6 percent they r e c e i v e d under FPP,  and the 25.8  received.  i s only s l i g h t l y  This result  regarding the L i b e r a l s i n the West.  66  percent o f the Quebec vote they less  s i g n i f i c a n t than t h a t  CHAPTER 6  OONCLDSICNS  Summary o f F i r r i i n q s  I n conclusion, r e p l a c i n g t h e sirgle-member constituency  electoral  system p r e s e n t l y used i n Canada w i t h d i s t r i c t magnitudes o f two would increase t h e m u l t i - r e g i o n a l representation o f Canada's n a t i o n a l p o l i t i c a l parties.  A t t h e same time,  DM2 would have no immediate e f f e c t on t h e  t r a d i t i o n o f s i n g l e - p a r t y government. criteria  necessary  DM2 thus s a t i s f i e s both o f t h e  f o r an e l e c t o r a l  system  parliamentary-federal h y b r i d system o f government. other tendencies  t o complement  a  I n a d d i t i o n , DM2 has  which make i t s u p e r i o r t o F i r s t - P a s t - t h e - P o s t , and t o  other e l e c t o r a l systems t h a t have p r e v i o u s l y been o f f e r e d as a l t e r n a t i v e s t o FPP.  Regarding t h e f i r s t c r i t e r i o n , manufacturing a m a j o r i t y government f o r a p a r t y w i t h a m i n o r i t y o f seats, FPP and DM2 both award t h e L i b e r a l P a r t y during t h e p e r i o d o f t h e sample w i t h 50 percent o f t h e seats when i t receives  42 percent  Conservative elections,  party  o f t h e votes. more seats  However, whereas FPP rewarded t h e  than t h e L i b e r a l s i n t h e 1957 and 1962  even though t h e L i b e r a l s received more votes,  DM2 a l l o c a t e s  more seats t o t h e L i b e r a l s .  Thus, under DM2, t h e L i b e r a l s , w i t h more  votes  would have formed m i n o r i t y governments i n  1957  than t h e Conservatives, and 1962.  A l s o , whereas t h e FPP e l e c t o r a l system rewards a p a r t y 67  winning a m a j o r i t y o f t h e votes w i t h an extraordinary m a j o r i t y o f t h e seats,  DM2  majority.  tends t o award  i t with  a smaller, but s t i l l  DM2 thus prevents parliaments  comfortable,  lacking i n e f f e c t i v e opposition  and governments burdened w i t h unruly backbenchers.  F i n a l l y , t h e outcomes  o f e l e c t i o n s u s i n g FPP a r e h i g h l y uncertain, even i f t h e v o t e shares a r e known ahead o f time.  I n c o n t r a s t , t h e outcomes o f e l e c t i o n s u s i n g DM2 a r e  more p r e d i c t a b l e .  Regarding t h e second c r i t e r i o n , national p o l i t i c a l  m u l t i r e g i o n a l representation o f  p a r t i e s , under FPP a l a r g e d i f f u s e p a r t y which i s  " l a r g e " i n terms o f v o t e r support i n a region, i s a f r i n g e p a r t y i n terms o f seats i n t h a t region.  By comparison, under DM2 a p a r t y which i s l a r g e  i n terms o f votes i n a region i s a l s o l a r g e i n terms o f seats.  Hence, i f  DM2 had been used during t h e period o f t h e sample s e t , t h e L i b e r a l p a r t y would have been a l a r g e p a r t y i n Western Canada, and t h e Conservative p a r t y would have been a l a r g e .party i n Quebec.  Psvcfxjlocrlcal E f f e c t s  However, w h i l e  DM2  does not have  an immediate e f f e c t on t h e  t r a d i t i o n o f s i n g l e - p a r t y government, i t may i n t h e long-term a f f e c t t h e number o f p a r t i e s and t h e geographical d i s t r i b u t i o n o f p a r t i s a n support. According  t o Taagepera' s formula,  there  i s a r e l a t i o n s h i p between t h e  number o f e f f e c t i v e p a r t i e s and d i s t r i c t magnitude, w i t h t h e number o f p a r t i e s i n c r e a s i n g when d i s t r i c t magnitude increases.  But there i s a l s o a  r e l a t i o n s h i p between t h e number o f p a r t i e s and t h e number o f p o l i t i c a l l y 68  salient  issues.  At  the  same t i m e ,  changes  i n the  geographical  d i s t r i b u t i o n o f p a r t i s a n support may a l t e r the n a t i o n a l p o l i t i c a l p a r t i e s ' platforms, which may  i n t u r n a l t e r the number and types of i s s u e s t h a t are  most s a l i e n t .  Historically, issue-dimensions  and  a t present,  i n Canadian  the  politics  two  are  most s a l i e n t both  political  regionally  defined.  Probably not c o i n c i d e n t a l l y , a l l o f Canada's " n a t i o n a l " p o l i t i c a l p a r t i e s have  historically  had  r e g i o n a l l y - c o n c e n t r a t e d support  r e g i o n a l l y - b i a s e d p o l i c y platforms.  bases  and  However, even i n regions where the  two l a r g e s t p a r t i e s are r e l a t i v e l y weak, they a r e s t i l l " l a r g e " p a r t i e s i n terms o f v o t e shares.  Consequently,  i f DM2  were used i n s t e a d o f FPP,  the  two l a r g e s t p a r t i e s would f i n d t h a t i n s t e a d o f being marginal p a r t i e s i n one o r two regions, they would be l a r g e p a r t i e s i n those regions. i n terms o f the p o l i t i c a l pay-off, i n s t e a d o f a p a r t y being a second o r t h i r d i n i n d i v i d u a l r i d i n g s when FPP i s used, under DM2  Also, distant  i t would  f i n d i t s e l f e i t h e r winning the second seat o r coming w i t h i n a few percentages  of  doing  so.  As  a  result,  instead of w r i t i n g  constituency, o r even an e n t i r e region, a p a r t y may  vote  off  a  a l t e r i t s campaign  s t r a t e g y and formulate p o l i c i e s t h a t appeal, more t o t h a t constituency o r region.  I f vote  shares  and  seat  shares  subsequently  increased,  c r o s s - r e g i o n a l p o l i t i c a l platforms could become i n s t i t u t i o n a l i z e d .  A t the same time, i n c r e a s i n g d i s t r i c t magnitude makes i t e a s i e r f o r s m a l l e r p a r t i e s t o g a i n a seat share proportionate t o t h e i r share o f the vote.  T h i s increase i n seat a c c e s s i b i l i t y may l e a d t o an increase i n  the number o f e f f e c t i v e p a r t i e s from the present number o f three. 69  In a  scenario where there are four o r more e f f e c t i v e p a r t i e s and none has majority  of  the  seats,  the  prospect o f  a  coalition  a  cpvernment would  increase.  So parties.  i n c r e a s i n g the d i s t r i c t magnitude may But  i t w i l l more l i k e l y l e a d t o a s i t u a t i o n where the  dimensions t h a t d i v i d e the two regional differences. parties,  the  increase the number o f  cross-cut  Hence, the other f a c t o r t h a t a f f e c t s the number o f  number of  magnitude increases.  l a r g e s t p a r t i e s are ones t h a t  issue  issue dimensions, may  decrease when  district  I f t h i s were t o occur, then when d i s t r i c t magnitude  i s increased from one t o two, the number of e f f e c t i v e p a r t i e s may decrease from three  to  two.  I t i s therefore  long-term e f f e c t s o f using DM2 system.  Or i t may  impossible  would be.  I t may  l e a d t o a two-party system.  t o p r e d i c t what  the  lead t o a multiparty  Or the number o f e f f e c t i v e  p a r t i e s may remain unchanged.  A l t e r n a t i v e Proposals  Since Cairns* f i r s t a r t i c l e , s e v e r a l a l t e r n a t i v e e l e c t o r a l systems have been p r o p o s e d . 27  A l l of these proposals  have included a t w o - t i e r  system, under which some members o f the l e g i s l a t u r e would continue t o be e l e c t e d from single-member c o n s t i t u e n c i e s , w h i l e others would be from prcr/ince-wide made t o the legislators.  o r nation-wide pools.  Numerous o b j e c t i o n s have been  t w o - t i e r system, i n c l u d i n g i t s c r e a t i o n o f two  classes  However, where i t f a i l s most i n comparison w i t h DM2  terms o f p o l i t i c a l payoff. 70  chosen  of  is in  Under DM2,  there i s an  i n c e n t i v e f o r p a r t i e s t o increase  their  appeal t o a region where t h e i r vote-share borders between t h a t o f a small and  a l a r g e p a r t y ; a s l i g h t increase i n v o t e r support may  l a r g e increase i n seats. assured  result i n a  With the t w o - t i e r system, however, p a r t i e s are  o f s i g n i f i c a n t numbers o f seats, even i f there i s v i r t u a l l y  no  e f f o r t on t h e i r p a r t t o increase t h e i r appeal, w i t h respect t o p o l i c i e s o f concern t o a r e s p e c t i v e region.  I n other words, the t w o - t i e r system g i v e s  r e g i o n a l representation t o p a r t i e s t h a t do not deserve i t , and provides no i n c e n t i v e f o r them t o broaden t h e i r appeal.  Clarification  DM2  should not be confused w i t h "double r i d i n g s " .  representatives  from one  gets  while  one  Giving  vote,  however, under DM2  i n double-ridings  e l e c t o r s more than one  democratic p r i n c i p l e , and of  constituency;  Both e l e c t two each e l e c t o r  each e l e c t o r gets  vote v i o l a t e s at  l e a s t one  two  votes. important  leads t o e n t i r e l y d i f f e r e n t r e s u l t s from those  DM2.  Those who  argue t h a t e l e c t o r s g e n e r a l l y vote f o r the p a r t y ,  not f o r the i n d i v i d u a l candidate,  and  u s u a l l y use the e l e c t i o n r e s u l t s from  double-ridings as t h e i r primary evidence.  The cases abound where p a r t i e s  competing i n double-ridings have run one  candidate  whose experience  and  respect w i t h i n the community i s unquestioned, and another candidate whose  71  backgrcund  i s more dubious.  Where t h e margin o f v i c t o r y between t h e  second and t h i r d f i n i s h e r s i s q u i t e l a r g e , t h e two winners a r e i n v a r i a b l y from  t h e same p a r t y , and o n l y a handful o f votes separate t h e more  i l l u s t r i o u s winner from h i s l e s s d i s t i n g u i s h e d running-mate.  I t i s p r e c i s e l y because e l e c t o r s v o t e f o r p a r t i e s , and not f o r individuals,  t h a t d o u b l e - r i d i n g s represent same o f t h e worst cases o f  gerry mandering.  F o r example, take t h e case where P a r t y A has a margin o f  v i c t o r y o f 20 percent i n one r i d i n g , and l o s e s by a margin o f 10 percent i n t h e r i d i n g adjacent t o i t .  I f these two r i d i n g s a r e merged i n t o a  d a j b l e - r i d i n g i n t h e next e l e c t i o n , and p a r t y support remains unchanged from t h e l a s t e l e c t i o n , then instead o f P a r t y A winning o n l y one o f t h e two seats, i t w i l l w i n both seats, w i t h a margin o f v i c t o r y o f (20-10)/2 = 5 percent.  Thus, by c r e a t i n g double-ridings, a government p a r t y could  increase i t s number o f seats, even i f i t s v o t e r support d i d not increase.  In  contrast,  t h e o p p o r t u n i t y f o r a government t o manipulate  constituency boundaries t o i t s advantage i s diitunished i f FPP i s replaced by  DM2.  T h i s i s because t h e a b i l i t y  t o manipulate boundaries  is a  f u n c t i o n o f t h e wasted v o t e ; w i t h t h e a b i l i t y t o manipulate decreasing as t h e wasted vote decreases.  As we have seen, t h e amount o f wasted votes  decreases as d i s t r i c t magnitude increases. is  i n c r e a s e d from  Thus, when d i s t r i c t magnitude  one t o two, t h e a b i l i t y  decreases.  72  t o manipulate  boundaries  Present Day Relevance  A t t h i s p o i n t i n time (July, 1988), t h e nature o f Canada's p a r t y system i s notably d i f f e r e n t from t h a t o f t h e p e r i o d o f t h i s study.  Hence,  the e l e c t o r a l outcome, i f DM2 were introduced, would be d i f f e r e n t now than i t would have been then.  However, t h e two most s a l i e n t still  economics and e t h n i c i t y .  parties  take  issue-dimensions,  t h e same they  i n Canadian p o l i t i c s a r e  Thus, when a l l t h r e e  of the largest  p o l i c y p o s i t i o n on o n e o f t h e s e  effectively  favour an opposing p o s i t i o n .  issues  disenfranchise  a l l the voters  two who  Meanwhile, u s i n g t h e FPP system means t h a t  only one o f t h e p a r t i e s w i l l be rewarded f o r t h e i r p o s i t i o n . Depending on how r e l a t i v e l y s a l i e n t t h i s i s s u e i s i n a p a r t i c u l a r region, and depending on whether o r not t h e p l u r a l i t y o f v o t e r s i n t h e r e s p e c t i v e region favour the opposing p o s i t i o n , t h e only options open t o t h e other two p a r t i e s a r e t o e i t h e r l o s e t h e e l e c t i o n and f i n d  themselves without  any r e g i o n a l  support-base, o r t o appeal t o t h e i n t e r e s t s o f t h e p l u r a l i t y o f v o t e r s i n the  r e s p e c t i v e region.  I f no p a r t y  appeals t o t h e i n t e r e s t s o f t h e  p l u r a l i t y o f v o t e r s i n t h e r e s p e c t i v e region, then t h e door i s open f o r a new p a r t y t o do so.  I n other words, when FPP i s used i n a country where  the most s a l i e n t i s s u e s a r e r e g i o n a l l y - d e f i n e d , r e g i o n a l l y cx>ncentrated political  parties  are the rule,  r e p r e s e n t a t i o n a r e t h e exception. use  and p a r t i e s w i t h  multiregional  Oansecpently, i f Canada continues t o  FPP, then i n t h e long-term r e g i o n a l c o n f l i c t s w i l l continue t o be a  major source o f i n s t a b i l i t y . 73  I n c o n t r a s t , i f DM2 p o s i t i o n s favoured  i s used, a p a r t y does not have t o have p o l i c y  by the p l u r a l i t y o f v o t e r s i n a region, i n order  g a i n a l a r g e seat share i n t h a t region. used  i n Canada,  i t i s possible  to  I n other words, i f DM2 were t o be  that  parties with  multiregional  representation could become the r u l e .  Further Study  I t has already been noted t h a t the h i g h values f o r the c o r r e l a t i o n c o e f f i c i e n t s was sample.  This  i n p a r t the r e s u l t o f the degrees o f freedom o f the small i s probably  not the only small-sample phenomenon i n the  r e s u l t s ; i t i s probable t h a t the swing r a t i o s are a l s o a t l e a s t s l i g h t l y off.  The  only way  t o decrease the  standard  e r r o r o f the  regression  c o e f f i c i e n t i s o f course t o increase the s i z e o f the sample.  I n order t o increase the sample-size,  the same methodology would  have t o be a p p l i e d t o the e l e c t i o n r e s u l t s o f another p e r i o d i n which the e l e c t o r a l boundaries were not changed.  I n a d d i t i o n , changes i n the t o t a l  number o f c o n s t i t u e n c i e s , and h i s t o r i c a l realignments  i n p a r t y support and  geographical d i s t r i b u t i o n , would have t o be taken i n t o account. more  e l e c t i o n s i n the  p r o p e r t i e s of DM2,  sample would  increase  cur  So, w h i l e  knowledge o f  the  the amount of research i n v o l v e d i s beyond the scope of  t h i s study.  74  APPENDIX A The Percentage o f t h e Vote Won by Each forty I n Each E l e c t i o n , and t h e Percentage o f Seats Won by Each Party Using D i s t r i c t Magnitudes o f One, Two, Three, S i x , and Provirice--Wide  Party  Year  0M1 Seats  DM2 (X)  Seats  (%)  DM3 Seats  (X)  DM6 Seats  (X)  Province-Wide Seats  (X)  Votes (X)  Liberal  1953  64.5  56.4  54.2  49.6  50.0  49.0  Conservative  1953  19.2  27.7  28.4  31.7  29.6  31.0  CCF  1953  8.7  8.3  9.5  11.1  11.2  11.0  1953  5.7  5.3  6.4  5.6  5.8  5.0  Creditiste  1953  n/a  n/a  n/a  n/a  n/a  n/a  Independents  1953  1.9  2.3  1.5  2.0  3.5  4.0  Social  Credit  Liberal  1957  39.6  48.9  42.8  42.6  42.9  41.0  Conservative  1957  42.3  36.4  40.5  37.6  39.4  39.0  CCF  1957  9.4  6.4  8.3  9.7  10.6  11.0  1957  7.2  6.1  6.1  7.4  6.7  7.0  Creditiste  1957  n/a  n/a  n/a  n/a  n/a  n/a  Independents  1957  1.9  2.3  2.3  2.7  0.4  2.0  Social  Credit  Liberal  1962  37.7  43.6  37.5  37.3  36.7  37.0  Conservative  1962  43.8  40.5  41.3  38.1  37.8  37.0  N.D.P.  1962  7.2  6.4  10.2  13.1  13.1  14.0  1962  11.3  9.5  11.0  11.5  12.0  12.0  Social  Credit  Creditiste  1962  n/a  n/a  n/a  n/a  n/a  n/a  Independents  1962  n/a  n/a  n/a  n/a  n/a  n/a  Liberal  1963  48.7  49.6  45.5  43.2  41.8  42.0  Conservative  1963  35.8  33.3  36.7  33.0  33.0  33.0  N.D.P.  1963  6.4  5.7  6.4  11.0  12.6  13.0  1963  9.1  11.4  11.4  12.9  12.6  12.0  Creditiste  1963  n/a  n/a  n/a  n/a  n/a  n/a  Independents  1963  n/a  n/a  n/a  n/a  n/a  n/a  Social  Credit  Liberal  1965  49.4  46.2  44.7  39.8  40.6  40.0  Conservative  1965  36.6  34.1  33.7  32.2  32.2  32.0  N.D.P.  1965  7.9  11.4  14.0  17.8  17.6  18.0  1965  5.3  8.0  7.2  8.7  8.4  4.0  Creditiste  1965  3.4  6.1  4.9  0.0  0.0  5.0  Independents  1965  0.8  0.4  0.4  1.5  1.1  1.0  Social  Credit  75  APPENDIX B  The Regional Breakdown o f R e s u l t s f o r t h e L i b e r a l s i n t h e West and Quebec, and F a r t h e Conservatives i n Quebec  Table B - l : The L i b e r a l s i n t h e West  Year  DM1 Seats m  1953 1957 1962 1963 1965  36.0 11.0 9.0 14.0 11.0  DM3 Seats (%)  DM2 Seats (%) 47.0 31.0 29.0 29.0 29.0  38.0 25.0 22.0 28.0 29.0  DM6 Seats (%) 33.0 28.0 26.0 31.0 26.0  Votes (%) 35.0 27.0 24.0 29.0 28.0  Table B-2: The L i b e r a l s i n Quebec Year  DM1 Seats (%)  1953 1957 1962 1963 1965  88.0 82.7 46.7 62.7 74.7  DM2 Seats (%)  DM3 Seats (%)  71.6 64.9 47.3 56.8 54.1  DM6 Seats (%)  70.8 62.5 44.4 50.0 55.6  62.5 59.7 40.3 45.8 44.4  Votes (%) 62.7 60.3 39.2 45.3 45.3  Table B-3: The CcHTservatives i n Quebec Year  DM1 Seats m  DM2 Seats (%)  DM3 Seats (%)  DM6 Seats (%)  1953 1957 1962 1963 1965  5.0 12.0 19.0 11.0 11.0  20.0 27.0 30.0 12.0 18.0  25.0 29.0 29.0 21.0 21.0  31.0 32.0 31.0 19.0 22.0  76  Votes (%) 28.0 31.0 30.0 19.0 21.0  PROPORTIONAUTY 100  DB3-PROV 99 _  98 _  97 _  96 _  95 _  Proportionality I n c r e a s e s at a d e c r e a s i n g rat* as district m a g n i t u d e Increases. Proportionality approaches, but never r e a c h e s , 100%  94  93 _  92 _  91  (%)  _  5.0  10.0  DISTRICT  MAGNITUDE  15.0  20.0  APPENDIX D Regression C o e f f i c i e n t s  T liberals  DM2  Seat Snare = -43.6 +2.2 Vote Share (.56) Seat Share = 4.15 + 1.07 Vote Share  DM3  Seat Share = -10.6  DM6  Seat Share = -0.47  DM-Prov  Seat Share = -2.58  DKL  T = 3.9 (.08) T = 1 2 . 9 + 1.33 Vote Share (.17) = 7.7 + 1.03 Vote Share (.09) T = 1 1 . 2 +1.08 Vote Share (.11) T = 9 .8 T  Conservatives  DM1 DM2 DM3  Note:  Seat Share = -41.2 + 2.23 Vote Share (1.02) Seat Share = -2.1 + 1.06 Vote Share (0.49) T Seat Share = -11.0 + 1.37 Vote Share (0.40)  T=2.184 =2.159 T=3.444  E n t r i e s i n parentheses a r e standard e r r o r s o f b reject n u l l hypothesis i f t 4  78  > 0  5  >  2  -  1 3 2  ENDNOTES  1  A l a n C. C a i r n s , "The E l e c t o r a l System and the P a r t y System i n Canada, 1921-1965." Canadian J o u r n a l o f P o l i t i c a l S c i e n c e , No. 1 (1968).  2  A l a n C. C a i r n s , "The S t r o n g Case F o r Modest E l e c t o r a l Reform i n Canada," A Paper D e l i v e r e d t o the H a r v a r d U n i v e r s i t y Seminar on C a n a d i a n - U n i t e d S t a t e s R e l a t i o n s , Sept. 25, 1979.  3  C a i r n s , "The E l e c t o r a l , " p. 55.  4  Edmond S. Morgan, "Government by F i c t i o n : The Idea of R e p r e s e n t a t i o n , " The Y a l e Review, 72 (1983), p. 321.  .5  C a i r n s , "The E l e c t o r a l , " p. 56.  6  C a i r n s , "The S t r o n g  Case," p. 8.  7  Howard A. Scarrow, Canada V o t e s , (New O r l e a n s : P r e s s , 1963).  8  C a i r n s , "The E l e c t o r a l , " pp. 56, 57.  9  Douglas W. Rae, The P o l i t i c a l Consequences of E l e c t o r a l Laws, (New Haven": Y a l e U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s , (1971), pp. 139, 117-118.  10  Rae, p. 139.  11  C a i r n s , "The E l e c t o r a l , " p. 60.  12  R i c h a r d J o h n s t o n and J a n e t B a l l a n t y n e , "Geography and the E l e c t o r a l System," Canadian J o u r n a l of P o l i t i c a l S c i e n c e , 10 (1977), p. 861. Edward R. T u f t e s t a t e s the same t h i n g i n more g e n e r a l terms when he argues t h a t the more d i f f u s e s u p p o r t i s f o r a l a r g e p a r t y , t h e l a r g e r , t h e swing r a t i o (swing r a t i o r e f e r s t o t h e r a t e o f t r a n s l a t i o n o f v o t e s i n t o s e a t s ) i n "The R e l a t i o n Between Seats and Votes i n Two-Party Systems", i n American J o u r n a l of P o l i t i c a l S c i e n c e Review, 67 (1973) , pT 547.  13  J o h n s t o n and B a l l a n t y n e , I b i d , p. 862, d e f i n e the term "wasted v o t e " i n t h i s way. Advocates of E r o p o r t i o n a l R e p r e s e n t a t i o n a l s o f r e q u e n t l y use t h i s n o t i o n o f wasted vote.  14  Douglas Rae d e f i n e s " f r a c t i o n a l i z a t i o n " as " t h e p r o p o r t i o n of p a i r s o f members i n a system which c o n t a i n s persons who have voted f o r d i f f e r e n t p a r t i e s i n the l a s t p r e v i o u s e l e c t i o n i n ; "A Note on t h e F r a c t i o n a l i z a t i o n of Some European P a r t y Systems," Comparative P o l i t i c a l S t u d i e s , 1 (1968), p. 414.  '  Hanser  '  (  79  15  Markku Laasko and R e i n Taagepera, " E f f e c t i v e Number of P a r t i e s : A Measure w i t h A p p l i c a t i o n to West Europe," Comparative P o l i t i c a l S t u d i e s , 12 (1979), pp. 3-27.  16  R e i n Taagepera, "The E f f e c t of D i s t r i c t Magnitude and P r o p e r t i e s of Two-Seat D i s t r i c t s , " i n Arendt L i j p h a r t and Bernard Grofman, eds., Choosing an E l e c t o r a l System: I s s u e s and A l t e r n a t i v e s " ! (New York: P r a e g e r , 1984), p. 97.  17  Taagepera,  18  R e i n Taagepera and B e r n a r d Grofman, " R e t h i n k i n g Duverger's Law: P r e d i c t i n g the e f f e c t i v e number of p a r t i e s i n p l u r a l i t y and P.R. systems," European J o u r n a l of P o l i t i c a l R e s e a r c h , 13 (1985), pp. 341-352.  19  J o h n s t o n and B a l l a n t y n e , p.  20  M a u r i c e Duverger, P o l i t i c a l P a r t i e s , W i l e y & Sons, 1963), p. 224.  21  J o h n s t o n and B a l l a n t y n e , "Geography," measure the g e o g r a p h i c a l d i s t r i b u t i o n of p a r t i s a n s u p p o r t u s i n g a c o e f f i c i e n t of v a r i a t i o n of a p a r t y ' s v o t e a c r o s s p r o v i n c e s , p. 860. Duff S p a f f o r d s e p a r a t e s the d i s t r i b u t i o n of v o t e s i n t o urban and r u r a l c a t e g o r i e s i n , "The E l e c t o r a l System of Canada," American P o l i t i c a l S c i e n c e Review, 64 (1970), p. 168. V o t i n g d a t a c o u l d of c o u r s e be c l a s s i f i e d a c c o r d i n g to v a r i o u s o t h e r a l t e r n a t i v e d e f i n i t i o n s of ' r e g i o n ' .  22  Donald E. B l a k e , "Canadian Census and F e d e r a l E l e c t i o n Data, 1908-1968." U n i v . of B.C. d a t a l i b r a r y .  23  Scarrow, Canada V o t e s ,  24  Canada. C h i e f E l e c t o r a l O f f i c e r . Report of the e l e c t i o n and r e p o r t of the 1965 e l e c t i o n .  25  Canada. Dept. of Mines and T e c h n i c a l S u r v e y s , Surveys and Mapping Branch, E l e c t o r a l D i s t r i c t Maps. Ottawa, 1953.  26  C a i r n s , "The E l e c t o r a l , " p. 57.  27  W i l l i a m P. 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