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UBC Theses and Dissertations

Canadian public opinion and free trade Mayer, Michael Allan 1988

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CANADIAN PUBLIC OPINION AND FREE TRADE By MICHAEL ALLAN MAYER B.A., Western Washington.University, 1987 A THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF MASTER OF ARTS in THE FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIES Department of P o l i t i c a l Science' We accept t h i s thesis as conforming to the required standard THE UNIVERSITY OF BRITISH COLUMBIA August 1988 © Michael Allan Mayer, 1988 In presenting this thesis in partial fulfilment of the requirements for an advanced degree at the University of British Columbia, I agree that the Library shall make it freely available for reference and study. I further agree that permission for extensive copying of this thesis for scholarly purposes may be granted by the head of my department or by his or her representatives. It is understood that copying or publication of this thesis for financial gain shall not be allowed without my written permission. Department of The University of British Columbia 1956 Main Mal l Vancouver, Canada V6T 1Y3 DE-6(3/81) ABSTRACT This thesis begins with a review of the e l i t e debate over free trade with the United States. It then uses a three-fold t h e o r e t i c a l framework to formulate predictions of how mass opinion should l i n e up. It then analyzes public opinion data on free trade through the use of crosstabulations. Using a theory of changing exposure to inte r n a t i o n a l trade upon domestic p o l i t i c a l cleavages formulated by Ronald Rogowski, i t predicts that labour w i l l oppose free trade because i t i s a scarce factor of production, and c a p i t a l w i l l support i t because i t i s an abundant factor of production. It next uses work by, among others, W.A. Mackintosh to predict that respondents in the " i n d u s t r i a l heartland" regions of Canada--Quebec and Ont a r i o - - w i l l oppose free trade because i t threatens to remove the protective t a r i f f that rewards import replacement industries concentrated in those two regions. In contrast, residents of the "resource extracting and processing hinterland" r e g i o n s — B r i t i s h Columbia, the P r a i r i e s and the A t l a n t i c — w i l l , on balance, support free trade because i t promises to improve th e i r export performance. The thesis then predicts that women and lower income Canadians w i l l oppose free trade. Women because many of the services that they consume—health and day care, for example—will become more d i f f i c u l t to obtain under a free trade regime. Women w i l l also oppose free trade because i t may be threaten the service sector jobs that many women now hold. Lower income Canadians should oppose free trade because of the possible deleterious e f f e c t s greater reliance on the market to all o c a t e s o c i a l services could have on poorer Canadians. F i n a l l y , the thesis predicts that better-educated Canadians w i l l oppose free trade because i t threatens one of the "core-values" of Canadian society: independence from the United States. Data analysis reveals, however, that opinion i s remarkably balanced. For example, the difference between union and nonunion respondents i s only f i v e percent. Regionally, the largest differences in support for free trade i s between B r i t i s h Columbia and Ontario, but i t amounts to l i t t l e more than a twenty percent dif f e r e n c e . Women are s l i g h t l y more l i k e l y to oppose free trade than men; income appears to play l i t t l e role in the formation of opinion on free trade. Last, differences in opinion between a r t i c u l a t e and less well educated Canadians also appears to be i n s i g n i f i c a n t . iv page Abstract i i L i s t of Tables v Acknowledgements x i Chapter One: A Review of the E l i t e Debate 1 Chapter Two : Theory 32 Chapter Three: Analysis 52 Chapter Four: Conclusion 66 Bibliography 73 V LIST OF TABLES page Table 1: Overall Opinion by Union Membership ...54 Table 2: Overall Opinion by Region 55 Table 3: Overall Opinion by Union Membership by Region...57 Table 4: Overall Opinion by Gender 59 Table 5: Overall Opinion by Income 60 Table 6: Overall Opinion by Income by Region 61 Table 7: Overall Opinion by Education 63 v i ACKOWLEDGEMENTS I thank Richard Johnston for his invaluable advice both on and off the S o f t b a l l diamond. I am g r a t e f u l to Mike Dreajer for his help in the use of the SPSS programme—he i s the sine qua non of t h i s t h e s i s . 1 Chapter One A „ . M ¥ I F J _ Q E . J ^ Much has been written about the Canada-US Free Trade Agreement(FTA), but l i t t l e or no analysis i s available on how the Canadian public sees the deal. This thesis begins to f i l l t h i s research gap. It w i l l discuss the e l i t e debate on free trade, s i f t from t h i s debate and from the models and t h e o r e t i c a l expectations on the domestic p o l i t i c s of in t e r n a t i o n a l trade hypotheses on mass opinion about the issue, and then analyze data from an August 1987 p o l l on free trade to see i f mass public attitudes are as suggested or assumed by the e l i t e debate. The FTA represents one of the most comprehensive free trade pacts ever negotiated. Couple the far-reaching nature of the agreement with the h i s t o r i c suspicion many Canadians have of American motives, and one can see why there has not been overwhelming support for the FTA. The debate in Canada over free trade with the United States in the past three years r e f l e c t s a robust p o l i t i c a l environment wherein both 2 opponents and supporters b a t t l e each other for the support of the Canadian p u b l i c . &AGKSBQIIHQ The Mulroney-Reagan FTA i s not the f i r s t time Canada and the United States have forged a new economic r e l a t i o n s h i p . The Canadian i n t e r e s t in free trade with i t s southern neighbour dates as far back as the repeal of the Corn Laws in Great B r i t a i n , which eliminated the old system of c o l o n i a l preference. For Canada the United States offered a convenient and large replacement for the l o s t imperial market. Some went as far "as to argue that r e c i p r o c i t y was e s s e n t i a l i f f u l l annexation—which would otherwise gather i r r e s i s t i b l e support as a solution to Canada's economic problems--was to be avoided." 1 Because of the increasingly b e l l i g e r e n t attitude of American fishermen who had gained r i g h t s to f i s h in and around Newfoundland and Labrador in 1818, and because of the f r i c t i o n t h i s caused between the United States and B r i t a i n , "those who had been pressing for a t a r i f f agreement (between the United States and Canada) saw the opportunity to combine the two questions." 2 B r i t i s h and Canadian representatives s u c c e s s f u l l y negotiated a r e c i p r o c i t y treaty with Washington l uThe P o l i t i c s of Canada's Economic Relationship with the United States: An Introduction." I.h.e.JPja^ Ejcjojnjmij^^ . Denis S t a i r s and G i l b e r t Winham, eds. (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1985.) p. 2 2Kenneth McNaught, Xh.e__..P^  (London: Pelican Books, 1982) p. 107. 3 by convincing Southern senators that an economic agreement of t h i s scope would make the Canadian economy strong enough to r e s i s t annexationist pressures of Northern states, therefore preventing the addition of " f r e e - s o i l " t e r r i t o r y to the United States. The Americans abrogated the 1854 Reciprocity Treaty in 1866 for two major reasons. F i r s t , the United States was " s t a r t l e d to r e a l i z e that in some years i t was buying more from Canada than i t was s e l l i n g . " 3 Second, B r i t a i n ' s assistance to the Confederate states during the American C i v i l War—the use, for example, of Canadian t e r r i t o r y by rebel raiders into the North—coupled with complaints of effected economic i n t e r e s t s on both sides of the border a l l helped lead the Americans to cancel the treaty. The early governments of Canada worked hard to negotiate a new agreement. Even though Prime Minister Macdonald f i n a l l y gave up and created the "National P o l i c y , " he s t i l l argued that the new t a r i f f structure would probably entice the United States into bargaining for another r e c i p r o c i t y agreement. Thus, only l a t e r did the l i n k between the t a r i f f wall and the s u r v i v a l of Canada as a d i s t i n c t i v e p o l i t i c a l unit come to be stressed at the governmental l e v e l . " 4 For example, the Conservatives s u c c e s s f u l l y campaigned against the L i b e r a l p o s i t i o n in the 1891 e l e c t i o n equating unrestricted r e c i p r o c i t y with a 3 J . L . Granatstein, "Free Trade Between Canada and the United States: The Issue That W i l l Not Go Away," in S t a i r s and Winham, op. c i t . , p. 14 4 S t a i r s and Winham, op. c i t . , p. 2 4 betrayal of Canada's independence and of the B r i t i s h connection. The L i b e r a l majority in 1896 brought l i t t l e i nterest in dismantling Macdonald's National P o l i c y . But by 1911 Prime Minister Laurier negotiated a r e c i p r o c i t y agreement, which was confined mainly to natural products. Parliament did not r a t i f y the deal for fear of American annexation 5, and because Robert Borden's Conservatives suc c e s s f u l l y exploited the issue by a l l y i n g the party with the business and manufacturing i n t e r e s t s of central Canada. These business in t e r e s t s believed the agreement would lead to the abandonment of t a r i f f s on manufactured goods as well. In spite of t h i s , the volume of trade between Canada and the United States grew apace. Under the impetus of the Great Depression, the two countries negotiated in 1935, and again in 1938, t a r i f f reductions on selected products. These reductions did not carry the emotional baggage of the 1911 pact because they were seen as simply a renegotiation of the t a r i f f schedule and an attempt to get the economy moving and create jobs. It was not considered to be a move . to s e l l Canada out to the Americans. Economic integration continued through the Second World War. Indeed, i f Mackenzie King had supported a comprehensive economic agreement—which would have created a 5The legendary statement of Speaker of the House "Champ" Clark who "hoped to see the day when the American f l a g w i l l f l o a t over every square foot of the British-North American possessions clear to the North Pole," i s now f a m i l i a r to any educated Canadian. customs union--hammered out i n 1948, t h i s i n t e g r a t i o n would hfaYe gone even f u r t h e r . King, however, was worried about Canadian- independence, and h i s p l a c e in h i s t o r y - - h e d i d not want to be remembered as the prime m i n i s t e r who " s o l d Canada out to the Americans.". The 1965 Auto Pact was the next major economic agreement between Canada and the United S t a t e s . The Auto Pact p r o v i d e s d u t y - f r e e access to the U.S. market f o r most Canadian automotive p r o d u c t s and i t has been a major reason f o r the Canadian auto i n d u s t r y ' s improved e f f i c i e n c y and r i s i n g exports i n the pa s t twenty years. Automotive exports to the United S t a t e s now make up about seven percent of Canadian gross domestic p r o d u c t . 6 But by the l a t e 1960s many Canadians began to worry about the i n f l u e n c e - o f American c a p i t a l in Canada. N a t i o n a l i s t s i n the p a r l i a m e n t a r y L i b e r a l p a r t y sought to change Canada's t r a d e p a t t e r n s as a means to deal with the investment problem. Walter Gordon, f o r example, trumpeted economic p o l i c i e s t h a t he thought would reduce American c o n t r o l of the Canadian economy. The 1972 " T h i r d Option" was a d i r e c t r e s u l t of t h i s push toward autarky. B r i e f l y , t h i s p o l i c y sought to d i v e r t from the United S t a t e s a s i g n i f i c a n t amount of Canadian trade to the EEC and A s i a . The T h i r d Option was doomed from the s t a r t . The poor economic performance experienced by the i n d u s t r i a l i z e d 6 P a u l Wonnacott, "The Auto Pact: Plus or Minus?" i n John C r i s p o , ed. Free Trade: The Real Story. (Toronto: Gage P u b l i s h i n g , 1988) p. 54. 6 nations soon aft e r the p o l i c y ' s announcement "simply destroyed a strategy that might have worked in a more prosperous e r a . " 7 The 1973 o i l shock promised troubles ahead for the i n t e r n a t i o n a l economy. The energy c r i s i s , to be sure, was a tangible consequence of the increasing integration and interdependence of the world economy. For Canada, i t exposed the weaknesses of the Third Option. In other words, the option was: ...fundamentally in error from the s t a r t . The d i r e c t i o n i t t r i e d to set for Canada was wrong because the democracies were moving...not toward greater national independence but toward the acceptance, often r e l u c t a n t l y , to the r e a l i t y of interdependence and the consequent l i m i t a t i o n s on sovereignty.... 8 Canadians f e l t the ramifications of the f a i l u r e of the Third Option—which never achieved i t s ambitious goals anyway--during the recession of the early 1980s. In response, the Trudeau government sought se c t o r a l free-trade t a l k s with the Americans. However, the Reagan administration showed l i t t l e i n t e r e s t in s t a r t i n g such negotiations. The fear that p r o t e c t i o n i s t sentiment on C a p i t o l H i l l would soon become uncontrollable constitutes the major feature of the immediate background to the Mulroney government's decision to pursue b i l a t e r a l free trade talks with the United States. Canada believed that i t would be the most detrimentally affected of a l l American trading 7Anthony Westell, "Economic Integration with the USA." I.n..t.ej£^ ^ November/December 1984. p. 5 e i b i d . 7 partners i f i t did not achieve some l e v e l of exemption from any American discriminatory practices. Along with t h i s , Canada r e a l i z e d that i t was the only i n d u s t r i a l i z e d country that had unguaranteed access to a market of at least 100 m i l l i o n . In addition, the Macdonald Royal Commission's recommendation of free trade with the United States provided i n t e l l e c t u a l support for the p o l i c y . 9 On January 1, 1988 Brian Mulroney and Ronald Reagan signed copies of the FTA in th e i r respective c a p i t a l s . The basic features of a free-trade agreement such as the one under study here should now be made cle a r . It di c t a t e s that: member countries r e t a i n the power to f i x t h e i r own separate t a r i f f s on imports from the rest of the world; and second, the area i s equipped with rules of o r i g i n , designed to confine intra-area free trade to products o r i g i n a t i n g i n , or mainly produced i n , the a r e a . 1 0 Main elements of the Mulroney-Reagan Free Trade Agreement are, b r i e f l y : a ) t a r i f f s w i l l be phased out over ten years from 1989. On average, t a r i f f s are already t i n y - - l e s s than one percent for America's imports and less than f i v e percent for i t s exports. The averages, however, "obscure high t a r i f f s on items l i k e timber and c l o t h e s . " 1 1 aThe commission generated a three volume report which, among other things, spelled out the j u s t i f i c a t i o n s for free trade with the United States. The commision also sponsored seventy-two volumes of research under the rubrics of economics, p o l i t i c s and i n s t i t u t i o n s of government, and law and c o n s t i t u t i o n a l issues. 1 °Pe t e r Robson , Ihe__.E.c.Q.n-Q^ ^ • (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1980.) p. 30. 11T_h.e._.E.c_o.n_ojDLiat., February 6, 1988. 8 b) investment regulations w i l l be l i b e r a l i z e d . R e s t r i c t i o n s on es t a b l i s h i n g new firms w i l l be reduced; The United States w i l l l i k e l y be the beneficiary; i t s firms had d i r e c t investments of " f i f t y b i l l i o n in Canada in 1986, va s t l y overshadowing the eighteen b i l l i o n that went the other way." l z c) national preference on a l l government contracts worth more than $25,000 w i l l be eliminated. d) many a g r i c u l t u r a l quotas w i l l be l i f t e d ; r e s t r i c t i o n s on trade in energy w i l l end. e) trade disputes w i l l be s e t t l e d under the appropriate national law; appeals w i l l be heard by a panel to ensure that national laws are f a i r l y applied. Both sides of the contemporary debate on free trade have generated vast amounts of l i t e r a t u r e . Most of the discussion has been car r i e d out in the opinion and e d i t o r i a l pages of major Canadian newspapers such as T.hfi._.Gl.ob_e„anjl M_a.ll, M.a_cJ.ejin_3. and The.JllnsJlslsJ^J^si,. Two of the most representative and popular books devoted to a debate on free trade has been a volume edited by Duncan Cameron in 1986 e n t i t l e d The Free Trade P a p e r s 1 3 — i t adopted an ant i - f r e e trade e d i t o r i a l stance. On the pro side of the argument i s " I b i d . 1 3Duncan Cameron, ed. Th.e.„i^^ Lorimer and Co., 1986) (Toronto: 9 John Crispo's thinner and less ambtious 1988 Er.e.e„..Jxadj&i_jrjb.B. Rej3Ll._S..t_o.r_X..14 In many ways, the discussion r e f l e c t s themes popular in Canada for generations. For instance, there i s s t i l l a concern about the asymmetry of the Canadian-American r e l a t i o n s h i p , the so-called "elephant and mouse" characterization of the r e l a t i o n s h i p coined by Pierre Trudeau; there i s an uneasiness, although not as strong as twenty years ago, about the lev e l s of foreign d i r e c t investment in Canada; today as yesterday there are c a l l s for an " i n d u s t r i a l strategy" to prevent Canadians from forever being hewers of wood and drawers of water. There are, however, some important differences with the past. Most importantly, dialogue on the issue i s ca r r i e d out in a milieu influenced by the rapid transformation of the i n t e r n a t i o n a l economic system. That i s , almost a l l p a r t i c i p a n t s accept that Canada can not "go i t alone" in the economic sphere and expect to maintain or improve i t s high standard of l i v i n g . In other words, Canada i s an integrated member of a larger economic whole that i s characterized by the mobility of c a p i t a l , labour and ideas. The elimination of the gold standard and the adoption of f l o a t i n g exchange rates has caused another change in the debate over Canada's economic r e l a t i o n s h i p with the United States. In f a c t , t h i s concern for the value of the Canadian d o l l a r i s a further r e s u l t of a recognition that the rest of "John Crispo, ed. Free.Jxadej..^ (Toronto: Gage Publishing, 1988) 10 the world impinges on Canada's economic decisions. The 1985 Plaza Agreement by the f i v e largest i n d u s t r i a l i z e d n a t i o n s — Japan, the United States, West Germany, B r i t a i n and F r a n c e -was calculated to make American exports more a t t r a c t i v e in the riche r nations in order to reduce the American trade d e f i c i t . Canada was ignored during the clandestine negotiations leading up to the arrangement, despite the fact that such an action could have a great impact on the Canadian economy. The r e l a t i v e l y cheap value of the Canadian d o l l a r in r e l a t i o n to the American one gives Canada a trading advantage--it makes Canadian exports that much more a t t r a c t i v e to the American market. A kh + ^ d diffvwvn&v i s fehafe fehe United Sfeafeew bass increasingly become Canada's largest consumer of Canadian exports. In 1986, the US accounted for almost eighty percent of Canada's t r a d e — a value of over C$93 b i l l i o n . 1 5 One upshot of t h i s concentration i s that the Canadian economy has become so dependent upon and intertwined'with the American economy, only a d r a s t i c restructuring of Canada's economy could change present trade patterns. This dependence, as stated above, makes Canadian exporters p a r t i c u l a r l y vulnerable to any p r o t e c t i o n i s t measure adopted in the United States. S t i l l another influence on the free trade debate i s the amount of foreign d i r e c t investment in the United States and elsewhere controlled by Canadians. Between 1975 and 1986, 1 5 A s reported in TJl^ FdJ..Qjjjojai.s.t., October 10, 1987. 11 the value of Canadian d i r e c t investment in the United States (the target of well over half of Canada's foreign d i r e c t investment) soared from C$5.6 b i l l i o n to C$39.9 b i l l i o n . Canadian assets in America now include Bloomingdale's, Harris Bankcorp (the t h i r d largest bank holding firm in I l l i n o i s ) , and twenty-three percent of Dupont. The leading dairy producer in New York, the largest jewellery r e t a i l e r in the United States, and the largest school-bus operator in North America are a l l Canadian-controlled. 1 8 On average, every Canadian now owns a square foot of Manhattan. The f i n a l difference i s the new threat of the non-t a r i f f b a r r i e r s (NTB) to trade between Canada and the United States. The GATT's success in promoting trade l i b e r a l i z a t i o n has induced countries to search for a l t e r n a t i v e ways to impede trade among nations. NTBs include such things as outright p r o h i b i t i o n , quotas, voluntary export r e s t r a i n t s and r e s t r i c t i o n s , a l l ostensibly put in place for reasons of health, safety and other regulations. Increased NTB a c t i v i t y was also another major reason for Canadian inter e s t in a comprehensive FTA. In summary, the the contemporary e l i t e debate over the d i r e c t i o n of Canada's economic r e l a t i o n s h i p with the United States in general, and over the 1988 FTA in p a r t i c u l a r , i s conditioned by the recognition that Canada's economy has become an integrated member of an in t e r n a t i o n a l trading system which i s characterized by the mobility of c a p i t a l , 1 8The Economist, July 16, 1988. 12 labour and ideas. The best way to approach t h i s interdependence i s the crux of the argument between the supporters and opponents of the FTA. Canadians have always had to pay a pri c e for maintaining t h e i r independence from the United States. But the FTA's possible ramifications upon Canada's society and economy generate the disputes over the Mulroney government's i n i t i a t i v e . The rest of t h i s chapter w i l l review the e l i t e debate on the FTA. It w i l l use the headings of economics, p o l i t i c s , society and culture to structure the discussion. It i s beyond the scope of t h i s chapter to pass judgment on the merits of the various arguments made, or to c o l l e c t evidence to support or refute the claims made by the protagonists. Rather, the purpose of t h i s review i s to describe the points made in order to make hypotheses on mass opinion. THE_ECONQMia AXES Economists have long trumpeted the benefits of eliminating market r e s t r i c t i o n s and d i s t o r t i o n s . Indeed, the idea that nations benefit from free trade i s as old as economics. It i s no more than an int e r n a t i o n a l extension of the p r i n c i p l e s of comparative advantage. That i s , producers, whether they are firms or countries w i l l p r o f i t by s p e c i a l i z i n g in the areas which they have the biggest advantage, or the smallest disadvantage over t h e i r competitors. The role today of trade in determining the comparative advantage of a firm or country i s summed up by recent KQ.0j7.0jn.ls_t leader: Trade means competition. Competition means greater e f f i c i e n c y and higher l i v i n g standards. International competition i s often the only competition there can be between today's largest companies: domestic economies provide too small a marketplace.... 1 7 But the new twist on the old saw that free trade increases e f f i c i e n c y and incomes i s the prediction that i t w i l l also create jobs. Economists are divided over the FTA's e f f e c t s upon employment: there have been reports that the FTA w i l l either create or destroy thousands of jobs. Supporters of the FTA consider f o o l i s h any move toward autarky—given the g l o b a l i z a t i o n of the world's economy. Complex l i n k s among the i n d u s t r i a l i z e d states make economic independence a c o s t l y venture. Canadians should r e a l i z e t h i s f a c t of l i f e and pursue greater economic integration with the United States, to protect themselves from the po t e n t i a l shocks of any American discriminatory trade p o l i c y . Supporters of the FTA, in fa c t , argue that along with exemption from p r o t e c t i o n i s t measures, eliminating trade b a r r i e r s between Canada and the United States w i l l bring at least three tangible benefits to the Canadian economy. 1 7The Economist, June 4 1988. 14 F i r s t , i t w i l l improve the e f f i c i e n c y of Canada's ind u s t r i e s . Supporters assume that the cost of maintaining t a r i f f b a r r i e r s i s too great because, among other things, i t promotes an i n e f f i c i e n t secondary manufacturing sector. T a r i f f s protect industries from exposure to competitive i n t e r n a t i o n a l market forces, which tends to benefit only the owners and employers of protected sectors instead of promoting industries that can compete world wide. Free traders point to a p r o d u c t i v i t y gap of twenty to twenty-five percent "between Canadian and American manufacturers and suggest that i t can best be closed by integrating the Canadian market into the U.S. market." 1 8 Second, the FTA w i l l reduce the number of branch plants in Canada. This i s c l o s e l y related to the e f f i c i e n c y argument. Protective p o l i c i e s sustain a branch-plant organization of the economy. These branch plants control f i f t y percent of Canadian manufacturing, and they are designed to service the Canadian market, not seek addi t i o n a l markets abroad. This in turn adds costs and creates problems for managerial and research and development s k i l l s in the Canadian work force. Related to t h i s argument i s the prediction that the FTA w i l l bring gains through heightened competition. Richard Lipsey and Robert York argue that: the FTA w i l l help unleash competitive forces that improve the economy's dynamism. Competition 1 8Duncan Cameron, "Introduction," op. c i t . , p. xxxi. 15 induces the use of the most c o s t - e f f e c t i v e inputs and production p r o c e s s e s . 1 8 Presumably, Lipsey and York expect industries to be able to move into new economic sectors and out of old ones more quickly than they are able to now with t a r i f f and other forms of protection. Third, there w i l l be fewer instances of r e t a l i a t i o n . T a r i f f walls and a r t i f i c i a l b a r r i e r s can serve to encourage r e c i p r o c a l American action. R e t a l i a t i o n could weaken the economic r e l a t i o n s h i p between the two countries and hinder Canadian access to the all-important American market. One of the provisions of the FTA reduces the chance that t h i s w i l l happen. Canada has gained exemption from the so-called "sideswipe" problem--US p r o t e c t i o n i s t or r e t a l i a t o r y measures aimed at other unfair traders being applied to Canada as w e l l . 2 0 Supporters also argue that the FTA extends and confirms the rules of the GATT to the Canadian-American association. GATT rules incorporate the p r i n c i p l e of non-discrimination which ensures that countries treat a l l t h e i r trading partners a l i k e . One of the arguments made against the FTA i s that i t v i o l a t e s the s p i r i t of the GATT treaty. Reliance on the GATT to solve Canada-US trade problems i s , however, scorned by supporters of the FTA. A r t i c l e 24 of the GATT permits free trade agreements as long as they cover a substantial i e R i c h a r d Lipsey and Robert York, " T a r i f f s and Other Border Measures," in John Crispo, op. c i t . , p. 27. 2°Ibid, p. 16 portion (around eighty percent) of a trading r e l a t i o n s h i p . GATT i s considered to be a cumbersome and unpredictable option; negotiating rounds can l a s t anywhere from f i v e to twenty years. Frank Stone argues that the FTA " w i l l not replace the GATT as a trade agreement between the two countries, nor can i t be viewed as an al t e r n a t i v e to the GATT. " 21 So, given the urgency of many North American trade issues, and given the assumption that there i s l i t t l e chance that Canadian grievances w i l l be e f f e c t i v e l y handled v i a GATT there are c a l l s for a b i l a t e r a l deal. Again, the new threat to i n t e r n a t i o n a l trade in recent years i s not the t a r i f f but the n o n - t a r i f f b a r r i e r (NTB), something which the GATT i s i l l prepared to deal with. It i s believed that reliance on the GATT option w i l l bring about a scenario in which Canadian i n t e r e s t s could be hurt by p r o t e c t i o n i s t l e g i s l a t i o n from C a p i t o l H i l l while GATT negotiations drag on. Better to s t r i k e a b i l a t e r a l deal now than to suffer the possible ramifications of an unprotected trading r e l a t i o n s h i p with America. Supporters also r e j e c t the notion that the FTA w i l l reduce Canadian trade t i e s with other nations. They say that the federal government does not want to eliminate trade with other partners, but rather hopes simply to guarantee access to Canada's preeminent market. 2 i F r a n k Stone, "Relationship to the GATT," in John Crispo, ed . , op. c i t . , p. 171. One of the primary arguments against the FTA i s the b e l i e f that i t w i l l increase the amount of foreign d i r e c t investment in Canada. This w i l l , in turn, do nothing to ameliorate economic problems in four areas of the economy: entrepreneurship, research and development, export performance, and miniature r e p l i c a e f f e c t . Opponents of the FTA believe the pervasiveness of foreign-owned s u b s i d i a r i e s in the Canadian economy leads to a reduced entrepreneurial s p i r i t . W. H. Pope argues in The FJ,ep..h^ that Canadian p o l i c i e s such as t a r i f f s , tax laws favouring foreign investment and lack of c a p i t a l gains taxes have "had the s e l f - r e i n f o r c i n g e f f e c t s of discouraging Canadian entrepreneurship and encouraging American entrepreneurship within Canada." 2 2 The corporate e l i t e are seen by opponents of further economic integration as doing l i t t l e more than carrying out orders issued from head o f f i c e s located outside of the country. The existence of a successful entrepreneurial class i s e s s e n t i a l to the achievement of the n a t i o n a l i s t goal of increased domestic control of the Canadian economy. Opponents also contend that the prevalence of foreign-owned s u b s i d i a r i e s has a detrimental impact upon the amount of research and development car r i e d out in Canada. Jack Baranson believes that "under free market forces, where least-cost procurement rules would p r e v a i l . . . research and 2 2 W . H. Pope, TJbLe__El.eBJm^  (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1971.) p. 14. 18 development engineering f a c i l i t i e s would dwindle and d i s a p p e a r . " 2 3 Corporations seeking to r a t i o n a l i z e t h e i r operations w i l l concentrate research and development at company headquarters. Canadians consequently depend on an external source which can have the e f f e c t of increasing overhead costs. Much research i s done, moreover, with a market other than the Canadian one in mind. This can neglect the tastes and i n t e r e s t s of Canadians. Furthermore, r e a d i l y available foreign technology reduces the incentive to foster a native-born research and development sector. In turn, foreign owned and based research i n h i b i t s the opportunities for a home-grown R & D industry to ever take root. F i n a l l y , a limited number of jobs w i l l be available to Canadians looking for employment in the research and development f i e l d . Another argument against increased foreign investment v i a the FTA i s that i t w i l l a f f e c t Canada's export performance. Branch plants of foreign corporations are constrained by the nature of t h e i r subservient r e l a t i o n s h i p from engaging in vigorous export-related performance. Here again, multi-national corporations wishing to r a t i o n a l i z e t h e i r operations w i l l commonly seek to avoid competition in t h e i r own market from t h e i r subsidiary. Since most multi-national corporations in Canada are American owned, i t stands to reason that a Canadian subsidiary w i l l be 2 3 J a c k Baranson, "What Happens to Branch Plants?" in Duncan Cameron, ed., op. c i t . , p. 113. 19 frustrated in i t s attempt to break into and thrive in the American market. S t i l l another argument against the FTA and the increased foreign investment i t w i l l bring concerns the miniature r e p l i c a structure of the Canadian economy. Opponents say the branch-plant organization of the Canadian economy encourages too many manufacturers of a product for the s i z e of the Canadian market. The r e s u l t i s increased costs to Canadian consumers. Those against the FTA propose at least three a l t e r n a t i v e p o l i c i e s . F i r s t , they want Canada to improve trade l i n k s with with a l l p a r t n e r s — n o t j u s t the United States. Opponents fear that a b i l a t e r a l deal w i l l discourage or even eliminate trade t i e s between Canada and other states, thereby reducing Canada's trade options. Second, opponents suggest that Canada promote in t e r n a t i o n a l l i b e r a l i z e d trade by means of the GATT. Canadian trade representatives presently at work at the Uruguay rounds of GATT negotiations should continue to push for t a r i f f reductions on a world-wide basis. Canada has been successful in the past using t h i s method, and should not r e j e c t i t now for the short term gains the FTA may bring. The f i n a l a l t e r n a t i v e proposal i s that Canada open up s e c t o r a l free trade talks with Washington. This means that Canada's trade with America w i l l be of a "managed" nature, much l i k e the 1965 Auto Pact manages the amount and d i r e c t i o n of trade in the auto industry. As mentioned above, however, the Trudeau government attempted to reach s e c t o r a l deals in the early 1980s, but the Reagan administration showed no in t e r e s t in s t a r t i n g negotiations of t h i s type. CULTJJLBE The FTA's rami f i c a t i o n upon Canada's culture i s probably the most d i f f i c u l t aspect of the deal to understand. This i s because there i s no u n i v e r s a l l y accepted d e f i n i t i o n or any r e a d i l y available standards of "culture" by which to judge the statements made in the c u l t u r a l debate. I m p l i c i t in many of the arguments i s that, on the one hand, Canadians should do what they can to r e s i s t the creeping intrusion of America's more l i b e r a l and dynamic culture on Canada's more t r a d i t i o n a l and conservative one. But, on the other hand, some argue that there i s l i t t l e Canadians can do to stem the tide of a l l things American--from books to p o l i t i c a l philosophies--that pours over the border each year. ARGUMENTS EQR;_CJllLTUBE It i s d i f f i c u l t for supporters of the FTA to counter many of the c u l t u r a l arguments against the FTA because one who takes the p o s i t i o n that the FTA w i l l not a f f e c t Canadian culture or i t s c u l t u r a l industry can appear u n p a t r i o t i c . 21 Opponents thus occupy the moral and p o l i t i c a l high ground. Notwithstanding, supporters of the FTA i n s i s t that closer economic integration, assuming i t brings added economic benefits to Canada, would in the end allow Canadians to strengthen t h e i r culture, not weaken i t . Increased wealth w i l l permit Canada to have a more robust subsidy programme for a r t i s t s , c u l t u r a l events, and other c u l t u r a l services such as the CBC. In addition, supporters i n s i s t that "culture" has been broadly defined in the FTA and has been t o t a l l y exempted from the national treatment obligations imposed on other sectors of the economy. 2 4 Some supporters of the deal even go as far as to reject the idea that economic p o l i c y influences s o c i a l p o l i c y . In other words, there are those who assume that on© can d i f f e r e n t i a t e between what occurs in the economic and the p o l i t i c a l sphere. Thus, the idea that economic factors determine the culture of a nation i s anathema to many supporters of the FTA. Fundamental to supporters arguments under the c u l t u r a l axis i s the assertion that Canadians are not alone in the trend toward and a f f i n i t y for a l l things American. It i s a global phenomenon. Some supporters even argue that since Canadians have dealt, with American encroachment on c u l t u r a l sovereignty longer than most other countries, they are well positioned to to deal with any further erosion of Canadian c u l t u r e — a growing challenge for every country as the world 2 4 R i c h a r d Lipsey and Robert York, op. c i t . , p. 154. 22 continues to shrink. Canadians, in other words, have an advantage over other countries who are only beginning to grapple with the homogenization of Western culture. Thus, Canadians should not worry about the future of t h e i r culture under the FTA. Opponents of the FTA fear that increased economic integration with the United States w i l l obstruct the development of a d i s t i n c t Canadian culture. The two primary obstacles on the way to a unique Canadian culture are "branch-plant mentality" and "Americanization." Opponents argue that branch-plant mentality perpetuates a s i t u a t i o n wherein Canadians constantly look to the United States for standards of excellence in a l l f i e l d s of human endeavour. This propensity dampens national o r i g i n a l i t y . Thus, the emergence of an unique national i d e n t i t y that does not look elsewhere for standards by which to judge i t s e l f becomes v i r t u a l l y impossible. The Canadian Conference ofthe Arts argues that free trade with the United States w i l l compound the: degree of foreign penetration in the ownership of the means of production and d i s t r i b u t i o n of c u l t u r a l products as well as the preponderance of foreign c u l t u r a l products on the Canadian market...(therefore) we can only fear the worse in terms of the loss of our s p i r i t and i d e n t i t y . 2 5 2 5Canadian Conference of the Arts, "As Canadian as Possible, under the Circumstances," in Duncan Cameron, ed., op. c i t . , p. 173. 23 Americanization, while s i m i l a r to branch-plant mentality, i s recognized as a world-wide phenomenon. Nevertheless, opponents believe that even further l i n k s between the US and Canada w i l l accelerate t h i s process u n t i l i t w i l l become inexorable. Canada w i l l soon become "the Scotland of North America." E O L I T I C S The possible impact on Canadian sovereignty and pressure to harmonize Canadian s o c i a l programmes with those of the United States dominates the debate over the p o l i t i c a l impact of the FTA. That signing the FTA reduces Canadian sovereignty i s beyond doubt. However, almost a l l countries give up some sovereignty to achieve a higher standards of l i v i n g . But Canadians have had to compromise t h e i r sovereignty to a degree unknown by most other states. Nevertheless, American trade negotiators and l e g i s l a t o r s often do not understand Canada's s e n s i t i v i t y over sovereignty. This i s because Canadians and Americans have d i f f e r e n t i n t e r e s t s and define the concept d i f f e r e n t l y . Americans define i t narrowly: they r e l y p r i m a r i l y on d e f i n i t i o n s out of i n t e r n a t i o n a l law. Canadians think of sovereignty in broad terms—a consequence of having a sparse population stretched out along a huge land mass. To i l l u s t r a t e the d ifference, any move by the Americans to v i o l a t e Canadian sovereignty as defined by Canadians (moving 24 through the Northwest Passage without Canadian permission, for instance) upsets Canadians. Americans, by contrast, mistrust the Canadian desire to create a trade dispute settlement t r i b u n a l capable of making binding decisions independent of Congress. This, Americans say, i s a true v i o l a t i o n of sovereignty. One of the arguments in opposition to the FTA i s that more complex economic linkages with the United States w i l l mean that the Canadian government w i l l be less able, among other things, to pursue an independent foreign p o l i c y . R. A. Young says "free trade w i l l undermine (Canada's) c r e d i b i l i t y as an honest broker in i n t e r n a t i o n a l diplomacy." 2 6 This means,for example, that such moves as the diplomatic recognition of the Peoples's Republic of China, or the removal of Canada's troops from Western Europe would be more d i f f i c u l t to accomplish for fear of American economic r e t a l i a t i o n in response to Canadian r e c a l c i t r a n c e in i n t e r n a t i o n a l r e l a t i o n s . The possible invoking by the United States of " e x t r a t e r r i t o r i a l i t y " i s a related issue. Opponents believe that t h i s constitutes ipso facto a v i o l a t i o n of Canadian sovereignty. Opponents assert that no government but the Canadian one should ultimately decide what companies on Canadian s o i l do or do not do. No resident firms should 2eTh§.^ls>&J^Ml±Ji3d.±, March 9, 1985. 25 become the d i r e c t instrumentalities of another country's foreign p o l i c y thus diminishing Canadian sovereignty. MQIIMJSilIS_.FI3B jL.iOJ.IJICS Supporters of the FTA tend to be i n d i f f e r e n t to the sovereignty issue. They believe that attempts to achieve increased Canadian sovereignty would e n t a i l d r a s t i c changes in the course of economic and s o c i a l p o l i c i e s . They underscore the interdependence of the i n d u s t r i a l i z e d nations and ask how can Canadians — or even why should — r e s i s t the pressure towards g l o b a l i z a t i o n and i t s concomitant r e s t r i c t i o n s on sovereignty. In addition, supporters reach d i f f e r e n t conclusions about how to best deal with the invoking of e x t r a t e r r i t o r i a l i t y by the American government. They figure that "the best approach... i s to act by b i l a t e r a l or multi-l a t e r a l agreements and not by meeting provocation with p r o v o c a t i o n . 2 7 Supporters see no reason why the presence of large multi-national firms in Canada which may be under the auspices of American corporate law "means that Canadian i n t e r e s t s are not taken into account or are minimized?" 2 8 In reply to the charge that the FTA w i l l reduce Canada's foreign p o l i c y options, supporters c r i t i c i z e Canadians for not r e a l i z i n g that they have more power than 2 7A.E. Safarian, "Some Myths About Foreign Investment in Canada." JjojtirjrLaL 1969. p. 2 8 I b i d . they are w i l l i n g to c r e d i t themselves w i t h . Beyond s a t i s f y i n g the n o n - n e g o t i a b l e r e q u i r e m e n t tha t Canada pose no t h r e a t to the s e c u r i t y of the U n i t e d S t a t e s — w h i c h Canada would have to s a t i s f y r e g a r d l e s s of the l e v e l of i n t e g r a t i o n — C a n a d i a n s "can do a g r e a t . d e a l , e s p e c i a l l y i f we are p r e p a r e d to manipu la te the powers and p o l i c i e s we now have- to s erve a r e a s c l e a r l y of n a t i o n a l i n t e r e s t . " 2 0 SOCIAL POLICY S u p p o r t e r s and opponents both agree that there w i l l be a d d i t i o n a l p r e s s u r e to harmonize Canadian and American s o c i a l p o l i c i e s in the wake of the FTA. The rub i s over how f a r and how deep the p r e s s u r e w i l l be. W i l l medicare be t h r e a t e n e d ? W i l l the f e d e r a l government s t i l l be ab le to use s u b s i d i e s and g r a n t s to reduce r e g i o n a l economic d i s p a r i t i e s ? ARGUMENTS AGAINST: SOCIAL POLICY The n e c e s s i t y f o r some change in Canada's s o c i a l p o l i c i e s to keep Canadian i n d u s t r y c o m p e t i t i v e c o n s t i t u t e s the s h a r p e s t arrow in the opponents ' q u i v e r . James L a x e r , former r e s e a r c h d i r e c t o r of the n a t i o n a l New Democrat ic P a r t y , has i d e n t i f i e d at l e a s t f o u r s o c i a l p o l i c y areas that he b e l i e v e s w i l l be a f f e c t e d by the FTA. F i r s t , the "payment of unemployment insurance to C a n a d i a n workers c o u l d be b a r r e d as an e x p o r t - s u p p o r t z s i b i d . 27 measure." 3 0 Laxer believes that the Americans w i l l argue that t h i s i s an unfair subsidy to, for example, A t l a n t i c fishermen. New England fishermen are considered to be s e l f -employed and are therefore i n e l i g i b l e for unemployment insurance during the off-season. Next, Laxer says that a FTA " w i l l mean that Canadian governments cannot use any d i r e c t means to Canadianize the ownership of i n d u s t r i e s . " 3 1 This has been a long held goal of many economic n a t i o n a l i s t s , e s p e c i a l l y by those who want Canada to adopt s o c i a l i s t p r i n c i p l e s . In e f f e c t , he c a l l s for forced "Canadianization" of Canadian industry. Laxer's t h i r d c r i t i c i s m of an FTA i s more general. He thinks that: Canada's more expensive s o c i a l programmes could wither, under the ceaseless pressure to keep our economy competitive with regions to the south where such programmes are not in p l a c e . 3 2 Laxer believes that Canadian industry and society w i l l have to go through extensive r e s t r u c t u r i n g in order to keep up and compete with the more e f f i c i e n t American economy. Laxer's f i n a l point i s that he foresees a s i t u a t i o n wherein "employers... could move t h e i r operations south to j u r i s d i c t i o n s with less expensive programmes." 3 3 This assumes that Canadian industries w i l l always seek the cheapest labour and that, indeed, labour and c a p i t a l are mobile enough to take advantage of the prospective savings 3°James Laxer, Le_ap.....Qf_.£a.i__ii.. (Edmonton: Hurtig Publishers, 1986.) p. 96. 3 1 I b i d . 3 2 I b i d . 3 3 I b i d . in overhead provided by cheaper s o c i a l programmes and higher p r o d u c t i v i t y a v a i l a b l e south of the border. Opponents also argue that women w i l l bear the brunt of the job losses that are sure to occur as a r e s u l t of the rest r u c t u r i n g process post-FTA. This i s a s o c i a l p o l i c y matter because many women now work to supplement a spouse's income or even, in increasing numbers, to support a family. They argue, furthermore, that as a r e s u l t of the FTA many of the service-sector jobs women now hold w i l l be eliminated. This i s because they are the sort of jobs--data processing, f i n a n c i a l services, communications, transportation, c u l t u r a l in d u s t r i e s , and the l i k e — w h i c h can be done without regard for national boundaries. Related to t h i s i s the argument that the FTA's national treatment p r i n c i p l e s w i l l have an impact upon the provision of services women predominantly consume, such as daycare and health services. Marjorie Cohen states that as a resu l t of a FTA, "there w i l l be strong forces which w i l l compel those services to be increasingly p r i v a t i z e d . " 3 4 P r i v a t i z a t i o n , in turn, w i l l a f f e c t the a v a i l a b i l i t y of many of these services. I t w i l l also a f f e c t working conditions of those employed in these industries. 3 4 M a r j o r i e Cohen, Er e.e..._ir ad^ l.Qm.en..l3.._.M.firk. (Ottawa: Canadian Centre for P o l i c y Alternatives, 1987.) P. 82. 29 Supporters of the FTA respond to the c r i t i c i s m s about s o c i a l p o l i c y by asserting that there i s l i t t l e chance that s p e c i f i c s o c i a l programmes such as unemployment insurance w i l l be in danger. They point to the fac t that United States' trade o f f i c i a l s have never ruled that s o c i a l programmes give Canadian business an unfair advantage... under US trade law government programmes that are universal in nature and not aimed at a s p e c i f i c industry are not considered to be u n f a i r . 3 5 In addition, supporters also underline that even the GATT has ruled that "generally a v a i l a b l e s o c i a l welfare programmes are not countervailable." That i s , as long as a l l unemployed workers are e l i g i b l e for unemployment in s u r a n c e — o r any other generally available s o c i a l service such as medicare—a p e t i t i o n e r cannot l e g a l l y argue that the s o c i a l programme i s an unfair subsidy and therefore s u f f i c i e n t reason to impose t a r i f f s on goods coming from an offending country. Supporters are quick to point out, moreover, that.even without a b i l a t e r a l deal such as the FTA, there w i l l s t i l l be pressure to restructure and harmonize some of Canada's s o c i a l p o l i c i e s . Richard Gwyn, for example, has written that Canada already: has no- choice but to r e c a l i b r a t e many of i t s s o c i a l . . . p o l i c i e s to those i n i t i a t e d in the United States, as in the instances of deregulation and f l a t rate income t a x . 3 6 35!.u£.._.y_an^ March 15, 1988. 3 8 R i c h a r d Gwyn, The.-49Jt.h.-PJir.ad.QX. (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1985.) p. 295. Canada has for years also been unable to peg intere s t rates independently of the Federal Reserve in Washington. This has e f f e c t i v e l y eliminated another "quasi" s o c i a l p o l i c y : the Bank of Canada cannot relax i n t e r e s t rates to increase the a v a i l a b i l i t y of c r e d i t , consequently generate more consumption, and ( i t i s hoped) create more jobs. F i n a l l y , in contrast to opponents of the FTA, supporters assert that women w i l l in fact be "winners" under the new economic r e l a t i o n s h i p with the United States. Katie Macmillan, for instance, states that free trade w i l l bring s u b s t a n t i a l benefits to Canadian women both as consumers and wage-earners. She believes that the elimination of t a r i f f and n o n - t a r i f f b a r r i e r s w i l l help to reduce the cost of consumer goods. This w i l l help women because they "generally spend a greater share of the i r incomes on basic n e c e s s i t i e s . " 3 7 CQMCLUSIDS This chapter has b r i e f l y outlined and described the major themes of the contemporary e l i t e debate over the d i r e c t i o n of Canada's economic r e l a t i o n s h i p with the United States in general and the 1988 FTA in p a r t i c u l a r . It i s clear that many of the points made in the debate have been around for generations. What makes the debate that rages today unique i s that economic interdependence has become an irremovable constraint on the freedom of v i r t u a l l y every 3 7 K a t i e Macmillan, "Women and Free Trade," in John Crispo, ed., op. c i t . (Toronto: Gage Publishing, 1988) p. 118. 31 government, but e s p e c i a l l y the Canadian one. As a r e s u l t , governments cannot pursue independent macro-economic p o l i c i e s for more than a few years without paying a high p r i c e . The next chapter w i l l discuss theories on how we can expect opinion on free trade to look. 32 Chapter 2 THEORY How does mass opinion lirie-up? The three rubrics under which theory on mass preference toward free trade w i l l be presented in t h i s chapter are economic, c u l t u r a l and s o c i a l p o l i c y . The economic axis has both a " v e r t i c a l " and a "horizontal" p r e d i c t i o n . The v e r t i c a l prediction refers to a c a p i t a l versus" labour o r i e n t a t i o n . It i s expected that c e r t a i n groups of respondents w i l l support or oppose the free trade agreement based pr i m a r i l y on how they believe i t w i l l a f f e c t t h e i r personal economic i n t e r e s t s . Broadly speaking, labour w i l l r eject free trade because i t stands to lose from l i b e r a l i z e d trade, and c a p i t a l w i l l support i t because i t w i l l gain from free trade. Reasons why t h i s i s so w i l l be explained below. The horizontal prediction r e f e r s to d i f f e r e n t i a l s in comparative advantage among the regions of Canada. Some regions of Canada stand to gain more from a t a r i f f - f r e e 33 r e l a t i o n s h i p with the United States than others. Theory holds that, for reasons that w i l l become clear below, the " i n d u s t r i a l heartland"--Oritario and Quebec--shouId oppose free trade more than the "resource extracting and processing h i n t e r l a n d " - - B r i t i s h Columbia, the P r a i r i e s and the A t l a n t i c . The c u l t u r a l axis argues for differences in le v e l s of education p r i m a r i l y . It i s assumed that the more educated a respondent i s the more l i k e l y he i s to oppose further economic and p o l i t i c a l integration with the United States because i t w i l l v i o l a t e one of the "core-values" of Canadian culture. Work by Richard Johnston on several Gallup p o l l s over many years i l l u s t r a t e s t h i s tendency; he states, for example, that "university educated respondents are r e l a t i v e l y unsympathetic to free trade...with the United S t a t e s . " 1 The s o c i a l p o l i c y axis argues that certain demographic groups within Canadian society w i l l oppose free trade because of the predicted deleterious e f f e c t s the FTA may have on some Canadian s o c i a l programmes. We w i l l , accordingly, analyze the opinion of women and lower income Canadians. The structure of chapter two i s as follows. It w i l l f i r s t outline the " v e r t i c a l " economic axis, using a model of iRichard Johnston, Public Opinion .a.o.d..._.E.u.bl.i.c.„PjpJLi_Q.y_._An. Canada. (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1985.) p. 115. 34 p o l i t i c a l cleavages created by Ronald Rogowski. 2 Then, we w i l l look at the "horizontal" economic axis. For the horizontal axis i t w i l l be necessary to review some of the underlying reasons why certain regions should support or oppose free trade. This w i l l be done v i a work on the regional impact of Canadian r e s t r i c t i v e i n t e r n a t i o n a l trade p o l i c i e s by W. A. Mackintosh 3, John Whalley 4, James Melvin 5 and Ronald Shearer 6. A review of theories by Ronald Rogowski and Michael W a l l e r s t e i n 7 , with a minor relaxation for l o g i c a l completeness, on the e f f e c t s of exposure to int e r n a t i o n a l trade on s p a t i a l cleavages follows. A b r i e f look at reasons for the existence and strength of regionalism in Canada w i l l then be reviewed. Following t h i s , predictions of mass preference on s o c i a l p o l i c y i s presented. Last i s theory on the c u l t u r a l axis--we discuss what Johnston's conclusions about education and opinion portend for mass preferences towards the FTA. 2Ronald Rogowski, " P o l i t i c a l Cleavages and Changing Exposure to Trade." Aj_ejdLcan Polit ical Science Review. • December 1987. p. 1121-1138. 3W. A. Mackintosh, T.he.._E.c.Q.no.mi.c._..Backg.E.Q.urji.d of. Qom.ini.Qjri -Ex.oyincXaL-RjeXat-lans„• (Toronto: Macmillan of Canada, 1978.) 4John Whalley, "Regional Considerations and Canadian Trade Po l i c y , " John Whalley, C.an.ad.a.-.Ujc^  . (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1985.) pp. 295-310. 5James Melvin, "The Regional Impact of T a r i f f s , " in John Whalley, op. c i t . , pp. 313-324. 6Ronald Shearer, op. c i t . , pp. 325-366. 7Michael Wallerstein, "Unemployment, C o l l e c t i v e Bargaining, and the Demand for Protection." Me.oc.an....jQ.UXn.sl......Qf. P_oJJJJj£al_£aijBJU^. November 1987. p. 729-752. 35 THE VERTICAL AXIS Rogowski seeks to discover how changing exposure to trade creates or exacerbates p o l i t i c a l cleavages in an i n d u s t r i a l i z e d society. He combines Stolper-Samuelson (the proof that protection benefits a factor of production that i s scarce) with a model of p o l i t i c s derived from Becker 8 (a theory of competition among pressure groups for p o l i t i c a l influence) to suggest the relevance of a factor that has u n t i l now been widely neglected: externally induced changes in exposure to i n t e r n a t i o n a l trade. Rogowski argues that basic r e s u l t s of the theory of i n t e r n a t i o n a l trade imply that increases or decreases in the cost and d i f f i c u l t y of i n t e r n a t i o n a l trade should powerfully a f f e c t "domestic p o l i t i c a l cleavages and should do so d i f f e r e n t l y , but predictably, in countries with d i f f e r e n t factor endowments."8 His model of factor endowment allows him to put any country's economy into one of four c e l l s according to l)whether i t i s advanced or backward or 2) whether i t s land-labour r a t i o i s high or low. He only recognizes economies that are l ) c a p i t a l r i c h , land r i c h , and labour poor; 2 ) c a p i t a l r i c h , land poor, and labour r i c h ; 3 ) c a p i t a l poor, land r i c h , and labour poor; or 4 ) c a p i t a l poor, land poor and labour r i c h . 1 0 Canada i s considered to be an advanced—mean ing capital-abundant--land-r ich economy; 8Gary S. Becker, "A Theory of Competition Among Pressure Groups for P o l i t i c a l Influence." <=Ma£JL^ ^^  E_c.0JQi2mi_c_3.. August 1983, pp. 371-400. sRonald Rogowski, op. c i t . , p. 1122. 1 0 I b i d , p. 1123. 36 i t thus f i t s under the f i r s t c e l l of Rogowski's model. He predicts that under conditions in which: both land and c a p i t a l are abundant, c a p i t a l i s t s , c a p i t a l - i n t e n s i v e industries and agriculture w i l l a l l benefit from, and w i l l endorse, free trade; labor being scarce, workers in labor-intensive industries w i l l embrace protection and ( i f need be) imperialism. The benefited sector w i l l seek to expand t h e i r p o l i t i c a l power, i f not by disenfranchisement then by curtailment of workers' economic prerogatives and suppression of t h e i r o r g a n i z a t i o n s . 1 1 Rogowski uses h i s t o r i c a l examples to support his predictions. In 19th century land-rich but c a p i t a l and labour poor " f r o n t i e r " economies such as Canada's, "expanding trade benefits and strengthens land owners and farmers against p r o t e c t i o n i s t c a p i t a l i s t s and workers." 1 2 This helps explain the outcome of the 1911 e l e c t i o n . Ontario manufacturing in t e r e s t s a l l i e d themselves with the Conservative party against a L i b e r a l negotiated r e c i p r o c i t y treaty, the scope of which was confined mainly to natural products. During the Depression, Rogowski i n s i s t s that the f i t between theory and r e a l i t y seems even more strong. Canada by t h i s time was an advanced, land-rich economy. Labour benefited from shrinking i n t e r n a t i o n a l trade because i t was the only scarce factor: workers became more mi l i t a n t and p o l i c y s h i f t e d to the l e f t . The r e s u l t was burgeoning union power which culminated in progressive labour l e g i s l a t i o n introduced in the f o r t i e s and in the years hence. The long " I b i d , p. 1124 1 2 I b i d , p. 1129. 37 process of improving the q u a l i t y of l i f e for Canadian workers thus began under the impetus of increased labour power. Of course, today Canadian wage labour i s among the best paid and most productive in the world. Under post-war American hegemony, c a p i t a l and land r i c h economies such as Canada's expanded as never before. Rogowski predicts that these economies w i l l , as they become increasingly exposed to i n t e r n a t i o n a l trade: experience class c o n f l i c t and a considerable suppression of labor. C a p i t a l and land w i l l for the most part unite in support of the free trade that benefits them; labor, as a l o c a l l y scarce factor, w i l l favor protection and i m p e r i a l i s m . 1 3 Rogowski's model dictates that the v e r t i c a l prediction of opinion on free trade between the United States and Canada should look l i k e t h i s : FOR AGAINST 1. owners of c a p i t a l ; 1. owners of labor c a p i t a l i s t s 2. labour unions 2. landowners 3. labour-intensive 3. owners and employees industries; eg, food-of c a p i t a l intensive processing industries, eg, banks The means by which t h i s c a p i t a l versus labour axis w i l l be tested i s by looking at data on those respondents who l a b e l l e d themselves "union" or "nonunion." It i s assumed that union means labour; nonunion means c a p i t a l . This does not ignore that there i s within the survey population those who do not belong to unions but do in fact work in jobs that have many of the t r a d i t i o n a l c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s of a labour i 3 I b i d , p. 1130 38 class occupation. Several service sector jobs, for example, are considered white c o l l a r but look more l i k e t r a d i t i o n a l blue c o l l a r , manual labour or factory occupations. However, i t would be rare for a union member to own large enough amounts of c a p i t a l , or to l i v e and work in a c i r c l e that w i l l lead him to adopt anti-labour mass preferences. S i m i l a r l y , a nonunion respondent w i l l probably not l i v e in an environment that w i l l help him adopt and then reinforce a n t i - c a p i t a l i s t opinions. THE HORIZONTAL AXIS The uneven economic development of Canada i s another p o t e n t i a l influence upon opinion on free trade. This i r r e g u l a r pattern of i n d u s t r i a l i z a t i o n means, among other things, that the d i f f e r e n t regions of Canada have separate economic i n t e r e s t s to advance and protect. Thus, there are several economic bases for regional c o n f l i c t : o i l producing versus o i l consuming regions, a g r i c u l t u r a l versus i n d u s t r i a l areas, resource-rich versus poorer provinces, and so on. Regionalism i s defined here as having one main dimension: differences in economic structure. This does not r e f e r simply to d i s p a r i t i e s in wealth, the reliance on primary or secondary industry, the role of d i f f e r e n t natural resources, the nature of foreign ownership, and so on, but rather to differences in comparative reliance on imports and exports to f u e l a province's economic prosperity. 39 Some argue that past r e s t r i c t i v e trade p o l i c i e s , such as the National P o l i c y — t h e creation of high t a r i f f w a l l s — have helped exacerbate economic d i s p a r i t i e s across the country. To be sure, t a r i f f p o l i c y has been another staple of regional c o n f l i c t , at least among the e l i t e s , from v i r t u a l l y the beginning of P r a i r i e settlement. M e r c a n t i l i s t trade p o l i c i e s , many believe, have reduced the opportunity for the hinterland regions to move away from resource extraction and toward increased i n d u s t r i a l i z a t i o n . In 1938, the government of B r i t i s h Columbia put i t s economic position in Confederation c l e a r l y . Canada's r e s t r i c t i v e trade p o l i c i e s makes i t necessary for B. C. to "buy in a protected market and s e l l in an unprotected market, or, in other words, to buy in the dearest market and s e l l in the cheapest." 1 4 F i f t y years ago, W. A. Mackintosh wrote that the protective t a r i f f has: imposed a "burden" on the export regions of the country in that the aggregate re a l incomes of populations of the regions have been less than they would have been in the absence of the protective t a r i f f ; 1 5 Recent work confirms and updates Mackintosh's conclusion. Ronald Shearer asserts, for example, that the long-run benefits of free trade w i l l "accrue to the owners of immobile resources and...to p r o v i n c i a l governments who 1 4Quotation taken from Ronald Shearer, op. c i t . , p. 357. 15W. A. Macintosh, op. c i t . , p. 146. 40 own land and r e s o u r c e s . . . . " 1 8 From a h i s t o r i c a l perspective, Fergus Chambers claims that: resource-abundant regions have been more interested in freer b i l a t e r a l trade...than i n d u s t r i a l regions because they depend more on exports and r e l y heavily on access to the American market. 1 7 Shearer, in f a c t , reinforces Chambers' argument by s t a t i n g that Canada's r e s t r i c t i v e trade p o l i c i e s , in general, create a s i t u a t i o n wherein "Canadian producers of substitutes for imports are rewarded and...and producers of exportable goods and services are p e n a l i z e d . " 1 8 This i s i l l u s t r a t e d by Canada West Foundation s t a t i s t i c s which show that in 1983 Ontario received a subsidy per person of C$56 from t a r i f f s on imports. The A t l a n t i c and Western provinces had to pay roughly the same amount for the protection of eastern Canada's manufacturing i n d u s t r y . 1 9 Rogowski also helps explain how p o l i t i c a l allegiances to free trade in the f i v e regions should look. Rogowski seeks, as stated above, to explain why countries endowed with d i f f e r i n g amounts of a factor of production w i l l have contrasting approaches to free trade. He and Michael Wallerstein state that the Stolper-Samuelson theorem—the proof that protection benefits the owners of a factor of production with which a country i s poorly endowed—dictates that "labor w i l l benefit and c a p i t a l w i l l lose when labor-intensive industries are protected and vice-versa when 1 6Ronald Shearer, op. c i t . , p. 297. 1 7 F e r g u s Chambers, as quoted in John Whalley, op. c i t . , p. 299. 1 8Ronald Shearer, op. c i t . , p. 340. l sReported in TiLe^JLcoBjamisi., February 15, 1986. 41 c a p i t a l - i n t e n s i v e industries are p r o t e c t e d . " 2 0 Wallerstein assumes that exporting industries that consume imported products and are vulnerable to foreign r e t a l i a t i o n may well lobby for free trade. Rogowski i s p r i m a r i l y interested in the e f f e c t of exposure to i n t e r n a t i o n a l trade on a country's domestic cleavages; so, i f we substitute "countries" for "regions," his model can be adapted with ease to Canada. The regional orientations to free trade can then be p a r t l y predicted using the d i f f e r e n t l e v e l s of factor of production endowments a region has as a basis for the p r e d i c t i o n . In other words, the horizontal prediction of opinion on free trade in Canada can be based in part on the r a t i o s of lartd, labour and c a p i t a l in the provinces. A region in which c a p i t a l and land are abundant w i l l trumpet free trade because i t i s in t h e i r economic inter e s t to do so. But a region that has a scarce and p o l i t i c a l l y powerful factor of production such as l a b o u r 2 1 w i l l r e s i s t l i b e r a l i z e d trade for the same economic reason. The t a r i f f i s not, however, the only source of regional mistrust and c o n f l i c t . The size of Canada also plays a r o l e . Huge distances between urban centres make i t d i f f i c u l t and expensive to move about the country. There i s the a d d i t i o n a l fact that unlike most other Western 2°Michael Wallerstein, op. c i t . p. 733. 2 1 S e e the GJLob.e„..jan.d M.a.iX!..s..._B.ejoQx..t o n Business. August 3, 1988. It i s reported that "Ontario has shortages in at least 159 s k i l l e d occupations" and that "compounding the problem of dwindling labour supply i s increased demand." 42 s o c i e t i e s , there i s a serie s of "core/periphery" re l a t i o n s h i p s that divide Canada into more-or-less s e l f -contained regions and communications networks. Federalism compounds these factors. That i s , r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s are divided between the federal and p r o v i n c i a l governments and regional interests are primarily a r t i c u l a t e d by p r o v i n c i a l governments in competition with each other or with the federal government. Some argue that t h i s competition encourages p r o v i n c i a l governments to exaggerate and encourage the notion of differences between and among the regions of Canada. Richard Simeon has argued that the p r o v i n c i a l governments have a "vested i n t e r e s t in maintaining and strengthening the salience of the regional dimension...."; each one, therefore, i s motivated to "accentuate the degree of in t e r n a l unity, and to exaggerate the extent of the differences with Ottawa...." 2 2 Climates of opinion in the respondent's region w i l l therefore undoubtedly play a role in influencing opinion on free trade. The economic sector within which a respondent works should not be assumed to be the only purchase on opinion. Region of residence also has an impact. P r o v i n c i a l governments attempt to generate opinion support for for th e i r positions on p o l i t i c a l issues. These endevours operate, in turn, on residents of a region as an 2 2 R i c h a r d Simeon, "Regionalism and Canadian P o l i t i c a l I n s t i t u t i o n s , " in J.P. Meekison, ed., Canadian_...F.ed.ecali.sm: ttyJ_Jl_Qf_BflflliJtLZ, 3d edition (Toronto: Methuen, 1977) p. 301-302. 43 alternate to economic s e l f - i n t e r e s t as an influence on preferences toward an issue. For instance, an Alberta resident employed as an roughneck on an o i l r i g , who for a l l appearances should oppose free trade—because of i t s possible detrimental e f f e c t s upon labour in Canada—may in fact support i t . The milieu within which he l i v e s constantly reinforces support for free trade because the consensus i s that i t w i l l be advantageous for Alberta. I predict that, on balance, regional opinion on free trade w i l l l i n e up in t h i s manner: the i n d u s t r i a l heartland (considered here to be Ontario and Quebec) w i l l be opposed to l i b e r a l i z e d trade because i t stands to lose the benefits i t accrues from a protected Canadian market. The resource extraction and processing regions ( B r i t i s h Columbia, the P r a i r i e s and the A t l a n t i c ) w i l l support free trade because of the economic advantages that enhanced access to t h e i r largest export market coupled with lower t a r i f f s on imported goods and c a p i t a l should bring. I m p l i c i t in these predictions i s the assumption that residents of these regions are aware of their economic interests and that there opinion w i l l r e f l e c t t h i s recognition. THE SOCIAL POLICY AXIS Chapter one outlined the major arguments concerning the impact of the FTA upon Canada's s o c i a l programmes. It i s generally accepted that increased reliance on market forces 44 could lead to harmonization of Canadian and American s o c i a l p o l i c y . Many Canadians fear that t h i s means that some of Canada's superior and more generally available s o c i a l programmes such as medicare and unemployment insurance are in danger. Other Canadians argue that there i s pressure to harmonize s o c i a l programmes with or without a FTA, as in the case of deregulation. Both camps generally agree, however, that women and lower income Canadians should expect to experience changes in th e i r economic position to a greater degree than most other groups in Canadian society. Marjorie Cohen states that women are vulnerable under free trade because they are more l i k e l y than men to have service sector occupations—data processing, f i n a n c i a l processing, communications, transportation, c u l t u r a l industries and the l i k e — that can be e a s i l y done without regard to national boundaries. 2 3 Cohen has stated that women who work as these sorts of jobs "tend to be poor, many are immigrants and most have l i t t l e l i k e l i h o o d of fin d i n g other jobs when these d i s a p p e a r . " 2 4 She believes, in addition, that: considering the current structure of the Canadian economy and the industries that w i l l be adversely affected by free trade, women w i l l be the major losers in a b i - l a t e r a l free trade deal with the United S t a t e s . 2 5 Cohen thinks that a FTA which enforces the concept of national treatment w i l l also have an impact upon the manner 2 3Mar j or ie Cohen , Er_ejj!.._.I.m itoxk. (Ottawa: Canadian Centre of P o l i c y Alternatives, 1987.) 24T.h..e_.GJLQ^ ^^  June 3, 1985. 2 5 I b i d , p. 13. i n which c e r t a i n s e r v i c e s , such as day care and he a l t h s e r v i c e s , are p r o v i d e d . Women are the preponderant consumers of these s e r v i c e s . Cohen argues that "there w i l l be s t r o n g f o r c e s which w i l l compel those s e r v i c e s to be i n c r e a s i n g l y p r i v a t i z e d , " 2 6 which w i l l a f f e c t the a v a i l a b i l i t y of many s e r v i c e s which women consume and the c o n d i t i o n s of work f o r those employed i n the i n d u s t r i e s . The t h e o r e t i c a l b a s i s f o r b e l i e v i n g that lower income Canadians w i l l be a d v e r s e l y a f f e c t e d by f r e e trade comes from the assumption that i n c r e a s e d harmonization of Canadian and American s o c i a l p o l i c y caused by pressure to reduce the r o l e of the s t a t e i n the economy w i l l i n e x o r a b l y lead to a l o s s of many s o c i a l programmes designed to help the poor. I m p l i c i t i n the argument that lower income Canadians w i l l be adv e r s e l y a f f e c t e d by f r e e trade with the United St a t e s i s the b e l i e f that Canadians w i l l think that the market should govern the a l l o c a t i o n of s o c i a l s e r v i c e s . Poorer Canadians w i l l be unable to ensure that the " s o c i a l s a f e t y net" that allows them to s u r v i v e w i l l not be removed. I t h e r e f o r e p r e d i c t t hat women w i l l , on balance, oppose f r e e to a l a r g e r degree than men. Furthermore, lower income Canadians w i l l , on balance, oppose f r e e trade more than higher income Canadians. 2 6 I b i d . 46 THE CULTURAL AXIS Chapter one states that free trade's e f f e c t s upon Canada's culture and n a t i o n a l i t y are probably the most d i f f i c u l t aspect of the debate to understand. This i s in part because "culture" i s an abstract concept. In many ways, someone t r y i n g to d i s t i n g u i s h "Canadian" from "American" culture i s confronted with as s i m i l a r a problem as U.S. Supreme Court j u s t i c e Harry Blackmum was when he sought to i d e n t i f y pornography. He, of course, had to f i n a l l y resort to the unsatisfactory: "I know i t when I see i t . " Opponents of free trade say they know Canadian culture when they see i t ; however, they fear that under free trade there soon w i l l be none l e f t to recognize. There i s a b e l i e f that free trade w i l l perpetuate a branch-plant mentality and speed-up Americanization. Supporters, by contrast, repeatedly point out that i t i s impossible for Canada to c u r t a i l the homogenization of Western culture, and that, at any rate, Canadian c u l t u r a l industries have been exempted from the fre.e trade deal. Culture can be defined as the sum t o t a l of ways of l i v i n g b u i l t up by a group of human beings and transmitted from one generation to another. S i m i l a r l y , n a t i o n a l i t y "grows out of prolonged s o c i a l and p o l i t i c a l cooperation among a people sharing a common homeland, obeying the same laws, respecting the same customs and cherishing the same 47 v a l u e s . " 2 7 One upshot of t h i s sharing i s the evolution and acceptance of ce r t a i n "core-values." A core value of Canadian society i s the determination to remain separate from the American republic. George Grant describes the 19th century quest for a new nation in B r i t i s h North America as a manifestation of a conservative desire, transported here by B r i t i s h o f f i c i a l s , L o y a l i s t s and immigrants, to b u i l d " i n these cold and forbidding regions, a society with a greater sense of propriety than the United S t a t e s . " 2 8 Grant talks about an "inherited determination not to be Americans" 2 8 in the early s e t t l e r s of the northern half of North America. The adoption, furthermore, of certai n B r i t i s h i n s t i t u t i o n s , such as responsible government and l o y a l t y to the Crown, i s seen by Grant to have been a way of "preserving at every l e v e l of our l i f e . . . certain forms of existence that d i s t i n g u i s h us from the United S t a t e s . " 3 0 S i m i l a r l y , Alexander Brady states that one of the p r i n c i p a l reasons for Confederation "was simply a means f o r . . . the preempting of half a continent from American expansion." 3 1 French Canada had s i m i l a r "anti-American" reasons for wanting to j o i n Confederation. But the French also saw banding together with the B r i t i s h North American possessions as a means to to protect and maintain a 2 7Alexander Brady, "The Meaning of Canadian Nationalism." I.aLexna..t,i.Q^  Summer 1964. p. 348. 2 8George Grant, Lament fo r ...a. NaJtion. • (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1965. p. 69. 2 8 I b i d 3°Ibid, p. 70. 3 1Alexander Brady, op. c i t . , p. 349 48 t r a d i t i o n a l , ultramontane French speaking society in anglo-saxon, Protestant North America. The desire to perpetuate a "Quebecois" way of l i f e constitutes the core value of that society. One of the means by which Canadians achieve a sense of group i d e n t i t y and cohesion, however tenuous i t may be, i s through education. Herbert McClosky and Al i d a B r i l l say that "a great deal of the s o c i a l learning most of us experience, of course, derives from education." 3 2 Of course, one of the most generally accepted ways of d i s t i n g u i s h i n g between the mass and the e l i t e of a society i s by looking at lev e l s of education. McClosky and B r i l l say that "for some people a good education w i l l carry them as far as they are ever l i k e l y to go toward the recognition and adoption (of s o c i a l norms)." 3 3 They conclude, in f a c t , that e l i t e s in a society "experience a greater measure of s o c i a l l e a r n i n g . . . . " 3 4 S o c i a l learning i s l i k e l y to be greater among the e l i t e s of a society than among the mass public. Although McClosky and B r i l l are concerned with what they consider to be the predominant " s o c i a l norm" in the United S t a t e s — c i v i l l i b e r t a r i a n values—we can use s t i l l use t h e i r model of s o c i a l learning for the Canadian case. 3 2 H e r b e r t McClosky and A l i d a B r i l l , .Dim.e.n.sijQ.n.s.....o.f. To!er.an.C.fi.• (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1983) p. 238. 3 3 I b i d . In the o r i g i n a l , the parenthesized words are " l i b e r t a r i a n values." 3 4 I b i d . 49 In Canada the p r e v a i l i n g s o c i a l norm—or core value--in t h i s country i s , for lack of a better term, "anti-Americanism." Marketable s k i l l s are a common by-product of education, and the economic rewards may work to counter our s o c i a l learning expectations. In most i n d u s t r i a l i z e d s o c i e t i e s , high lev e l s of education and/or t r a i n i n g increase the chances of f i n d i n g and keeping a job. In the event of s h i f t s in the labour market, well educated members of a society are less l i k e l y to experience a lengthy period of unemployment. They are more l i k e l y to have higher incomes, and be happy in t h e i r occupations. The well-educated are also among the most mobile group in a given society, and are less l i k e l y to r e s i s t change and, conversely, are more l i k e l y to embrace innovation and change. Work by Richard Johnston sheds l i g h t on, among other things, a r t i c u l a t e Canadian opinion toward t a r i f f p o l i c y and free trade with the United States. Johnston discovered that "un i v e r s i t y educated respondents are r e l a t i v e l y unsympathetic to free trade with...the United S t a t e s . " 3 5 His analysis of the 1959 and 1967 Gallup p o l l s reveals that in the 1959 survey u n i v e r s i t y educated respondents were more in favour of the related issue of American investment than were less well educated respondents, but "by 1967 that d i f f e r e n c e had disappeared. Opinion on investment i s simply homogeneously negaitive . " 3 6 The reason why u n i v e r s i t y educated respondents seem to be unsympathetic to free trade 3 5 R i c h a r d Johnston, op. c i t . , p. 115. 3 6 I b i d , p. 79. and American investment i s puzzling e s p e c i a l l y in the face of evidence that points to an a f f i n i t y amongst Canadians for cosmopolitanism. Johnston addresses t h i s apparent contradiction. He postulates that in Canada among educated Canadians "there seems to be a resistance to xenophobic appeals, except when they involve the United S t a t e s . " 3 7 The above discussion on culture and education leads to the pr e d i c t i o n that a r t i c u l a t e Canadians w i l l , on balance, oppose further economic integration with the United States because integration v i o l a t e s one of the core-values of Canadian society: resistance to absorption into the American republic. Educated Canadians, i t i s asserted, have adopted or understand t h i s p a r t i c u l a r s o c i a l norm more thoroughly than the average Canadian, and w i l l therefore be the ones most l i k e l y to agree with or adopt t h i s core value. As McClosky and B r i l l state " s o c i a l learning i s l i k e l y to be greater among the i n f l u e n t i a l s ( e l i t e s ) of the society than among the mass p u b l i c . " 3 8 SUHHARY This chapter has presented four theories concerning opinion on free trade in Canada. I predicted that labour in Canada w i l l oppose free trade because i t i s a scarce factor of production; c a p i t a l in Canada w i l l favour free trade because i t i s an abundant factor of production. I also predicted that the " i n d u s t r i a l heartland regions"--Ontario 3 7 I b i d , p. 115. 3 8McClosky and B r i l l , op. c i t . , p. 233. 51 and Quebec--will oppose l i b e r a l i z e d trade because the r e s t r i c t i v e trade p o l i c i e s reward import replacement industries. The "resource extraction and processing r e g i o n s " - - B r i t i s h Columbia, the P r a i r i e s , and the A t l a n t i c - -w i l l favour free trade because they w i l l benefit from enhanced access and increased trade with t h e i r largest export market. I then predicted that a gender analysis of opinion should reveal that women oppose free trade to a greater degree than men because of the impact a FTA should have on certain s o c i a l services which women consume, and because of the ramifications the FTA may have upon the jobs many women have. An income analysis should also show that lower income Canadians are, on balance, more against l i b e r a l i z e d trade with the United States than are higher income Canadians. F i n a l l y , I predicted that a r t i c u l a t e Canadians w i l l oppose free trade because i t v i o l a t e s a core value in Canadian society. Chapter 3 w i l l turn to the free trade survey data and test the hypotheses delineated in t h i s chapter. 52 Chapter 3 ANALYSIS The most important intent of t h i s chapter i s to discover i f d i v i s i o n s on mass opinion on free trade correspond to the predictions made in chapter two, and to the e l i t e positions reviewed in chapter one. For example, does the opposition to free trade by Canada's major union leaders translate into opposition by the rank and f i l e ? Is support for free trade greatest in those regions that stand to gain the most from free trade? The survey (Decima #2377) was conducted by Decima Research Limited between May 27 and June 7, 1987 for the Department of External A f f a i r s . To f a c i l i t a t e i n t e r -p r o v i n c i a l comparisons, Decima interviewed a minimum of one hundred respondents in each province 1. The most s t r i k i n g f thing that a preliminary analysis of the data reveals i s i A l l figures in the tables have been weighted, however. The weighting i s f r a c t i o n a l ; the 1500 raw cases are downweighted to 1161. The reader should therefore i n f l a t e numbers by a factor of about 30%. 53 balanced opinion. Frequently the numbers show that no clear p o s i t i o n emerges from the data. At times, opinion i s 50/50, as, for example, a look at u n i v e r s i t y graduate preferences show. The analysis undertaken here follows the pattern of chapter two. Accordingly, i t w i l l f i r s t look at the " v e r t i c a l " economic axis—what has otherwise been termed the c a p i t a l versus labour p r e d i c t i o n . Next i s the "horizontal" economic, or regional, axis. Following t h i s i s a gender and income analysis. Last, chapter three turns to a look at the c u l t u r a l p r e d i c t i o n on free trade opinion. THE VERTICAL AXIS: ANALYSIS Data in table 1 show that ignoring region, there i s l i t t l e d i f f e rence, on balance, in opinion between union and nonunion respondents. 2 The question crosstabulated with union or nonunion membership i s : " o v e r a l l , would you say i t would be a very good idea, a good idea, a bad idea, or a very bad idea for Canada to enter into a free trade agreement with the United States." Unsurprisingly, s l i g h t l y more nonunion members than union members support free trade. S t i l l , the differences between the two groups are so small that one would be f o o l i s h to read too much into them. 2 F o r purposes of s i m p l i c i t y and c l a r i t y , "union members" are considered to be "labour" as that factor of production i s treated by Rogowski. TABLE 1 - OVERALL OPINION by UNION MEMBERSHIP (% SUPPORT) UNION NONUNION 50.8 (392) 55.6 (676) CHI-SQUARE: 3.91 P= 0.27, n.s The small differences between union and nonunion opinion i s the most s t r i k i n g revelation of table 1. Contrary to our t h e o r e t i c a l expectations, and the review of the e l i t e debate, the contrast between union and nonunion be refuted. Labour looks to be s l i g h t l y in favour of a p o l i c y that w i l l benefit c a p i t a l . One cannot, however, be confident that Table 1 confirms t h i s conclusion, p r i m a r i l y because the chi-square shows that, with three degrees of freedom, the r e s u l t s come no where near being within acceptable boundaries of not occurring by chance. Thus i t would be unwise to make any d e f i n i t e conclusions based oh t h i s crosstabulation. THE HORIZONTAL AXIS: ANALYSIS Table 2 shows o v e r a l l opinion on free trade by region of residence. B r i t i s h Columbians are, on balance, the strongest supporters of free trade; Ontarians are the least support ive. opinion i s almost imperceptible. Rogowski also appears to 55 TABLE 2 - OVERALL OPINION BY PROVINCE (% SUPPORT) B..J1-. PRAIRIES ONTARIO QUEBEC ATLANTIC 64.2 (86) 57.0 (116) 44.2 (137) 54. 7 (165) 58.4 (75) CHI-SQUARE: 24.10 P= 0.02 The chi-square in t h i s Table shows that the observed r e l a t i o n s h i p i s considered to be s t a t i s t i c a l l y s i g n i f i c a n t for twelve degrees of freedom at the 0.05 l e v e l . According to the models on regional opinion by Mackintosh, et. a l . , we can see that opinion, at least s u p e r f i c i a l l y , seems to conform to our predictions. We anticipated that the i n d u s t r i a l heartland regions--0ntario and Quebec — should favour r e s t r i c t i v e trade p o l i c i e s that reward import replacement industries, and the resource extracting and processing r e g i o n s - - B r i t i s h Columbia, the P r a i r i e s and the A t l a n t i c — should seek and promote free trade with the largest consumer of i t s exports. B r i t i s h Columbia's strong support b e l i e s , in some ways, i t s history. In the past, B.C. has not been a "free trade province." In the 1911 federal e l e c t i o n not one constituency moved against the province wide norm of support for the Conservative platform of "no truck or trade with the Yankees." 3 That i t i s now the most supportive of a l l the regions says something about B r i t i s h Columbia's changing 3See Johnston and Percy, "Reciprocity, Imperial Sentiment and Party P o l i t i c s in the 1911 E l e c t i o n . " C a n a d i a n J_QUjrja.a.l af....P_Qlit.i_s..aJL_i5...c_ieii..c.e.. December 1 9 8 0 . pp. 7 1 1 - 7 2 9 . 56 role as an i n t e r n a t i o n a l exporter of goods to many parts of the world. Why Quebec i s d i s s i m i l a r to Ontario i s puzzling. Perhaps the burgeoning corporate cl a s s , a f t e r generations of eschewing commerce, have come to consider free trade as a means by which Quebec companies can break into and prosper in a new, l u c r a t i v e market. The bonus of being able to r e s i s t the homogenization pressures that may come with increased business contacts between Quebec and English Canadian firms may also influence Quebec to be less .like Ontario. Differences between Quebec and Ontario may also be caused by leadership. David Peterson opposes free trade; Robert Bourassa supports i t . The disparate stands taken by the two premiers may provide cues for respondents from these provinces; moreover, the legitimacy of the opinions of these two men on free trade have, undoubtedly, legitimacy due to t h e i r positions in society. UNION-NONUNION BY REGION Region and union may be o f f s e t t i n g variables. The empirical findings thus far d i c t a t e a further breakdown of opinion. C o n t r o l l i n g for region may show greater differences between union and nonunion respondents. Table 3 shows that B r i t i s h Columbia's non-union respondents are the most supportive of free trade, while non-union respondents from Ontario are the least supportive. 57 B r i t i s h Columbia's nonunion opinion confirms Rogowski and Mackintosh. Ontario's non-union opinion looks, however, as i f i t refutes Rogowski, but i s consistent with Mackintosh. TABLE 3 - OVERALL OPINION by UNION MEMBERSHIP by REGION (% SUPPORT) MIPN NONUNION. BRITISH COLUMBIA 56.8 68.6 (29) (58) CHI-SQUARE: 3.28 P= 0.35 PRAIRIES 53.5 59.1 (31) (85) CHI-SQUARE: .1.21 P= 0.75 ONTARIO 43.9 44.5 (47) (88) CHI-SQUARE: 2.35 P= 0.50 QUEBEC 48.1 59.6 (62) (103) CHI-SQUARE: 4.73788 P= 0.19 ATLANTIC 63.6 55.2 (30) (44) CHI-SQUARE: 0.90444 P= 0.82 The chi-squares reveal a large p o s s i b i l i t y that these differences could have been generated by chance. Thus, we cannot confidently say, on balance, that being a union or nonunion respondent makes much difference on opinion. Nevertheless, union membership appears to have the largest e f f e c t on opinion in B r i t i s h Columbia and Quebec. More than ten points separate union and nonunion opinion in these two regions. The a n t i - f r e e trade message may be getting through 58 to union respondents in B r i t i s h Columbia and Quebec, the two provinces with the largest percentage of unionized workers in the country. Canadian unions are f a i r l y homogeneous and they provide some in s u l a t i o n against regional climates of opinion. Unions can give a respondent clues about how he should respond to an issue such as free trade. The nonunion category, however, i s much more e c l e c t i c . It includes everything from chambers of commerce presidents to students. These respondents have much less reason to look at free trade in a c e r t a i n way. Nonunion respondents are probably more l i k e l y to follow the regional climate of opinion. We expect that Ontario and Quebec would approach free trade with the United States from v i r t u a l l y the same perspective. Thus the d i s s i m i l a r i t y of both union and nonunion response in Ontario and Quebec i s i n t e r e s t i n g . Why there seems to be such a divergence of opinion in the i n d u s t r i a l heartland i s deserving of further thought and study. The small differences in opinion among the regions and between union and nonunion respondents could lead one to conclude that there are other equally important influences on opinion other than the simple c a l c u l a t i o n of economic s e l f - i n t e r e s t . That i s , i t i s possible that there are other important environmental and s o c i a l i z i n g factors at work giv i n g cues to a respondent. For instance, a respondent's knowledge about the issue of free trade, attitudes toward 59 unions and union power, the past, present and possible future economic performance of the economic sector in which a respondent i s employed, and regional pride and loy a l t y . A parochial attachment to and desire for improvement of a respondent's region may create a b e l i e f that regional i n t e r e s t s may be more important that s e l f - i n t e r e s t s . A respondent may not personally benefit from free trade but his region w i l l , in other words. THE SOCIAL POLICY AXIS: ANALYSIS Chapter two outlined the expectation that women and lower income Canadians should, on balance, oppose free trade in part because of the FTA's p o t e n t i a l impact upon the economic and s o c i a l position of women and poorer residents of Canada. Table 4 reveals that there i s more than a ten point difference between men and women when we perform a breakdown of o v e r a l l opinion on free trade by gender. The chi-square shows, in addition, that there i s l i t t l e p o s s i b i l i t y that these numbers were generated by chance. TABLE 4 - OVERALL OPINION BY GENDER (% SUPPORT) MEN WOMEN 59.2 (324) 48. O (254) CHI-SQUARE: 13.01 P= 0.0003 60 C l e a r l y there i s some reason to believe that there i s a chance that women and men disagree on the merits of free trade. Press reports that frequently reinforce an expectation that women can expect to bear the brunt of changes caused by free trade may help generate these gender dif f e r e n c e s . Table 5 shows l i t t l e of i n t e r e s t concerning the power of income on national free trade opinion. There i s v i r t u a l l y no difference between those who earn less than $29,999 and those who earn more than that. In f a c t , s t a t i s t i c s reveal that there i s almost a one hundred percent chance that table 5 was generated by chance. TABLE 5 - OVERALL OPINION BY ANNUAL HOUSEHOLD INCOME (% SUPPORT) under $30,000 $30,000 and over 54.3 48.0 (324) (254) CHI-SQUARE: 13.01 P= 0.0003 Because of the small differences between the two groups, and because of the impact region of residence has on i n c o m e — B r i t i s h Columbia and Ontario are consistently the r i c h e s t regions of the country, the A t l a n t i c the p o o r e s t -i t i s worthwhile to analyze income by region. For the lower half of the income scale, table 6 reveals that B r i t i s h Columbians are the strongest supporters of free trade among the f i v e regions. Less wealthy Ontarians are the least supportive of free trade. The same regional 61 pattern holds for those respondents that are in the top half of the income scale. That i s , wealthy B r i t i s h Columbians are the most supportive, wealthy Ontarians the least. TABLE 6 - OVERALL OPINION BY ANNUAL INCOME BY REGION (% SUPPORT) under $30,000 $30,000 and over BRITISH COLUMBIA 60.0 68.5 (24) (50) CHI-SQUARE: 1.03 P= 0.30 PRAIRIES 57.1 57.7 (57) (54) CHI-SQUARE: 0.005 P= 0.93 ONTARIO 46.1 44.4 (59) (75) CHI-SQUARE: 0.08 P= 0.76 QUEBEC 56.6 51.5 (94) (68) CHI-SQUARE: 0.77 P= 0.37 ATLANTIC 46.1 44.4 (59) (75) CHI-SQUARE: 0.08 P= 0.76 The chi-squares show that the only regions for which figures come close to being a true r e f l e c t i o n of opinion i s B r i t i s h Columbia and Quebec. The Quebec difference i s , of course, perversely small. But even in those regions the chi-square reveals that the figures do not come close to achieving acceptable l e v e l s of s i g n i f i c a n c e . In fact, differences between the two income groups i s so i n s i g n i f i c a n t that i t i s tempting to conclude that income plays l i t t l e i f any role in opinion. 62 THE CULTURAL AXIS: ANALYSIS This f i n a l section looks at the purchase of education on opinion toward free trade. The t h e o r e t i c a l discussion in the previous chapter leads to a prediction that better educated Canadians would oppose free trade because i t threatens one of the core-values of Canadian culture: resistance to the influence of the United States. A r t i c u l a t e Canadians should be the group that has been most imbued--primarily through high l e v e l s of education--with an a f f i n i t y for or understanding of t h i s core value. Educated Canadians are also expected to be better able to d i s t i n g u i s h between the p o l i t i c a l and s o c i a l systems of Canada and the United States. They w i l l be more able to understand what these differences mean for the past, present and future of the society in which we l i v e , and to understand what the ramifications of free trade upon Canadian core-values may be. Table 7 presents what appears, however, to be a pattern of divided support for free trade regardless of the l e v e l of education attained by a respondent. No clear consensus in any education group emerges. Indeed, only among respondents with "some high school" does support come close to s i x t y percent. 63 TABLE 7 - OVERALL SUPPORT by EDUCATION (X SUPPORT) X-8 IBS SOME HS ES (IMP VO-IECH SOME UNI STUDENT UNI gJRAD. 49.3 58.5 55.4 52.1 49.4 52.3 50.9 (48) (125) (166) (69) (32) (38) (94) CHI-SQUARE: 4.32765 P= 0.74 Once again, the chi-square shows that the differences in table 7 could have e a s i l y been generated by chance. Therefore, as before, we should be careful about the conclusions we reach from th i s table. Post-secondary students and un i v e r s i t y graduates are evenly s p l i t over free trade. But t h i s seems to be the case whatever l e v e l of education attained, except, of course, "some high school." Thus, there appears to be no line a r r e l a t i o n s h i p between education and opinion. This refutes the t h e o r e t i c a l expectations of the previous chapter. It i s not the case that more educated respondents are more or less l i k e l y to support or oppose free trade. But, again, i t i s clear that the chi-square figure shows that there i s good reason to believe that the re s u l t s could have been generated by chance. Thus, i t appears that once again one could argue that the r e s u l t s could have been generated by chance. SUMMARY This chapter has looked at several predictions on Canadian preference toward free trade. Generally, opinion on almost a l l questions under study e l i c i t weak differences No clear or overwhelming consensus of opinion i s r e a d i l y apparent. 4 Even so, tentative conclusions can be drawn. For instance, Rogowski's model does not hold true in Canada for the capital-labour cleavage, at least as represented by the union-nonunion contrast. A bare majority of union respondents support free trade with the United States, and the union-nonunion difference i s vanishingly small. The strongest union-nonunion cleavage appears to be in Quebec and B r i t i s h Columbia, the two provinces with the highest percentage of unionization in Canada. Rogowski's model does seem to hold true for the horizontal p r e d i c t i o n . Regions which r e l y p r i marily on exports to f u e l t h e i r economic p r o s p e r i t y - - B r i t i s h Columbia the P r a i r i e s and the Atlantic--do in fact favour free trade One region which in the past has been rewarded by the t a r i f f , Ontario, on balance opposes free trade. But the other such region, Quebec, on balance favours free trade. Most regional opinion on free trade appears to be congruent with the predictions on the role of the t a r i f f by Mackintosh, Whalley, Melvin and Shearer. But regional 4Because of the weak differences in opinion in the face of th e o r e t i c a l expectations to the contrary, a regression analysis of support for free trade by region — p a r t i c u l a r ly Quebec and B r i t i s h Columbia—and u n i v e r s i t y education was performed. No differences with the crosstabs of note were discovered. 65 differences are not large, and Quebec stands out as an anomaly. Women are more l i k e l y to oppose free trade than men. But income has no d i s c e r n i b l e e f f e c t on free trade opinion. Controls for region of residence do not e f f e c t the estimated impact of income. F i n a l l y , education does not appear to have i t s predicted impact. No l i n e a r r e l a t i o n s h i p appeared between education and preferences toward free trade. Johnston's conclusions about education are unsupportable by t h i s chapter's findings. 66 Chapter 4 CONCLUSION This thesis began with the task of fin d i n g out who does or does not support free trade with the United States. A simple answer i s nearly impossible. Analysis shows, that opinion i s , at best, balanced, notwithstanding some strong t h e o r e t i c a l expectations that d i s t i n c t groups within Canadian society should approach free trade from predictable perspect ives. Regional opinion on free trade does seem to conform to Mackintosh's model of regional animosity toward the role of the t a r i f f in the economic development of Canada but differences are unexpectedly small. The po s i t i o n of Quebec i s anomalous from an economic point of view. For the v e r t i c a l economic prediction of opinion, i t was anticipated that labour would oppose free trade and c a p i t a l would support i t . Surprisingly, we discovered that a bare majority of union respondents, on balance, back free trade with the USA, and that the union/nonunion difference i s very 67 small. Other differences in opinion confirm t h i s general pattern. There are several possible reasons for the r e s u l t s . F i r s t , there may be measurement problems. "The r e s u l t s are only as good as the questions" i s a popular adage among survey researchers. It r e f l e c t s the researcher's desire to prevent personal or i n s t i t u t i o n a l biases creeping into the content of the survey and a f f e c t i n g the data. A second influence could be what are termed "contextual fa c t o r s . " Other issues were competing for a respondent's attention at the time as well. In a l l provinces, other issues competed for a respondent's attention, and undoubtedly generated as much i f not more interest than free trade. In Ontario, for instance, a p r o v i n c i a l e l e c t i o n campaign was soon to begin. The p r o v i n c i a l L i b e r a l and Conservative p a r t i e s took opposing stands--the L i b e r a l s against, the Conservatives for--but few would argue that free trade was anything but a peripheral issue out on the hustings. The unpopularity of John Turner and Brian Mulroney at the mass l e v e l may be another contextual factor. Neither man had a large, l o y a l following independent of t h e i r party or role as party leader. In other words, neither could automatically expect support and respect for their p o l i c y pronouncements. This i s because there seems to be a large amount of skepticism directed toward both Mr. Mulroney and Mr. Turner. The prime minister had the advantage of the 68 l e g i t i m a t i z i n g functions of executive power--control, i n t e r a l i a , of the the parliamentary timetable and agenda—but his handling of issues such as patronage and the honesty of several Government minsters could have overshadowed or canceled the impact of his announcements on free trade. Mr. Mulroney's chances of su c c e s s f u l l y manipulating opinion were thus reduced. John Turner had s i m i l a r problems. A former Bay Street lawyer and minister of finance who previously supported free trade, (indeed, he leads the party that has h i s t o r i c a l l y been the champion in Canada of l i b e r a l i z e d i n t e r n a t i o n a l trade) he may appear to Canadians to be opposing what the Government proposes in order simply to score p o l i t i c a l points, or to f u l f i l l his c o n s t i t u t i o n a l role as the leader of the Opposition. Mr. Turner's c r i t i c i s m may seem insincere; consequently, his statements against free trade may not leave the intended impression. Yet another possible explanation for our unexpected r e s u l t s , i s a lack of respondent knowledge about free trade or a f e e l i n g of apathy toward the issue. Respondents may simply not have had s u f f i c i e n t information to hand to make wise or consistent choices during the interview process. The free trade negotiations took place in secret in Ottawa and Washington. Canadian and American negotiating teams refused to reveal t h e i r positions or expectations p u b l i c l y during the discussions; therefore, l i t t l e information about the deal reached the public at the mass l e v e l . Federal and 69 p r o v i n c i a l governments were briefed about what was taking shape, but at no time did Canadians know the d e t a i l s of the what had been decided. The length of the survey, moreover, may have caused survey population ennui with the subject. Many respondents simply may not care about free trade and give what they believed to be sensible answers without r e f l e c t i n g adequately upon a question. Respondents may have neglected to take the necessary time to form l o g i c a l l y coherent answers. This i s the "non-attitude" argument about b e l i e f systems in mass publics advanced by P h i l i p Converse. 1 Converse found that opinions on d i f f e r e n t , but i d e o l o g i c a l l y consistent, issues showed only weak empirical r e l a t i o n s h i p s . He found in a three wave panel survey that responses by the same ind i v i d u a l s to the same questions over a two-year i n t e r v a l were very unstable. He also discovered that the weak co r r e l a t i o n s did not become any weaker over a four year i n t e r v a l . Converse took his research r e s u l t s to mean that survey populations f a l l into two main camps. F i r s t , there are respondents with r e a l attitudes; these r e a l a ttitudes never changed. The second camp consisted of people with no a t t i t u d e s - - t h e i r responses could adventitiously appear stable, but a l l change, as measured, was random. Converse concluded from t h i s that analysts should not impute systems of b e l i e f to mass publics. i P h i l i p Converse, "The Nature of B e l i e f Systems in Mass Publics." In Ideology... and D...is..C..Q.O..t.e.I»..fc., edited by D. Apter. (New York: Wiley, 1964) pp. 206-257. 70 Converse believed that most people most of the time simply do not think about p o l i t i c s , and such thoughts as they had were.not connected with each other. It i s tempting to use Converse's conclusions to explain away the amorphous opinion on free trade under study here. Both the lack of information and i d e o l o g i c a l constraint upon the survey population, which was taken from the mass public, may explain why there i s such small group differences in opinion, despite both the v i t r i o l i c debate car r i e d out in Canada at the e l i t e l e v e l over free trade during the past three years, and the economic and s o c i a l theories outlined here which dictated that Canadians should exhibit predictable positions on free trade with the United States. Converse emphasizes the importance of information in the formation of i d e o l o g i c a l constraint. He believes that the strength of constraint in b e l i e f systems declines with decreasing p o l i t i c a l information. He believes that, "very l i t t l e information t r i c k l e s down very f a r . " 2 Perhaps the dichotomy between mass and e l i t e opinion can in part be explained by differences in type and amount of information the survey population had on free trade. Those respondents at the mass l e v e l may not have the same perspective on free trade as the e l i t e s because they either did not or could not take the time to be as informed about free trade as the e l i t e s are. Ideological constraints are present among the e l i t e s at the top of p o l i t i c a l systems but disappear rather 2 I b i d . r a p i d l y as one moves downward into the mass public. Most members of the mass public simply f a i l to "absorb contextual information that w i l l enable them to describe positions in the basic abstractions of ideology;" that i s , few explore the "fundamental why of p o l i t i c s - - i t s issue or i d e o l o g i c a l base." 3 If t h i s i s so, we can then conclude that the survey population under study here i s also unable to give t h e o r e t i c a l l y consistent responses to a complicated issue that had j u s t recently arrived on the Canadian p o l i t i c a l agenda. The p o l i t i c a l ramifications of vague and contradictory opinion may portend d i f f i c u l t i e s for the three major national p a r t i e s during the next federal e l e c t i o n campaign. Both the L i b e r a l s and the New Democrats w i l l spend time emphasizing the "emotional" aspects of the deal--the p o t e n t i a l changes in the Canadian national psyche and id e n t i t y . This means that they w i l l appeal to n a t i o n a l i s t voters; i m p l i c i t in the campaign w i l l be an address to the underlying anti-American nature of Canadian p o l i t i c a l thought. L i b e r a l and New Democratic Party s t r a t e g i s t s no doubt believe that such issues s e l l better than t a r i f f schedules or the economic theories that j u s t i f y opposition to free trade. The Conservatives, in contrast, w i l l trumpet the economic benefits of free trade with the United States. They w i l l stress that these benefits w i l l outweigh the 3 I b i d . 72 supposed c o s t s t o n a t i o n a l u n i t y o r j o b l o s s e s caused by a r e s t r u c t u r i n g o f t he economy. C o n s e r v a t i v e s w i l l p r e s e n t t h e m s e l v e s as the p a r t y t h a t b r o u g h t Wes te rn and A t l a n t i c Canada an o p p o r t u n i t y t o d i v e r s i f y t h e i r r e g i o n a l economies and p r o s p e r t h r o u g h f r e e t r a d e w i t h C a n a d a ' s l a r g e s t t r a d i n g p a r t n e r and the w o r l d ' s most l u c r a t i v e m a r k e t . The most s u c c e s s f u l s t r a t e g y d u r i n g a f r e e t r a d e campaign may be one i n w h i c h C o n s e r v a t i v e s t ap " a n t i - O n t a r i o " s e n t i m e n t . They s h o u l d u rge C a n a d i a n s t o p r e v e n t "Bay S t r e e t and T o r o n t o f rom t a k i n g t h i s economic o p p o r t u n i t y away from you . " 73 BIBLIOGRAPHY Books and Journal Articles Becker, Gary S. "A Theory of Competition Among Pressure Groups for P o l i t i c a l Pressure." The. Quarterly. J..Q.u.r.n.a.l....o_f. i.c_Qfl.Q.iic.s. August 1983. B i j u r , Peter. "Free Trade and Deregulation." Pjo_l.i..c.y Qp.ti.Qns EQ..li..ti..gue.s.. January 1988. B l a i r , R.S. and McLoed, J.T. The Canadian P o l i t i c a l Tradition..: Basic B..e.ad..ing.s.  (Toronto: Metheun, 1987.) Blumenthal, W. Michael. "The World Economy and Technological Change." Foreign Affairs.. Spring 1988 v o l . 66, no. 3 Brady, Alexander. "The Meaning of Canadian Nationalism," lnt..e.r.na.t.i.Q.nal J.QUrnal - Summer 1964. Bromke, Adam and Nossal, Kim Richard. "A Turning Point in US-Canadian Relations." Eoxeign Affairs.. F a l l 1987, v o l . 66, no. 1. Cameron, Duncan. 1 be.. E r. e.e...  £r ad e Eap e..r s . (Toronto: James Lorimer, 1986 . ) Canadian Labour Congress. Our Canada or Theirs.;. Workers. Con.front t h e... 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"Foreign Investment in Canada: Some Myths." Jjoju.rji.a.l_.M^ August 1971. Shearer, Ronald. "Regionalism and International Trade P o l i c i e s , " in John Whalley Canada.-United .States Free Trade. (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1985.) Simeon, Richard. "Regionalism and Canadian P o l i t i c a l I n s t i t u t i o n s " in Meekison, J.P., ed. Q an ..ad lan_. Fed era .1.1 s.m. : Mxt.h..j_r_.._Rj?_a.llty.. (Toronto: Methuen, 1977.) S t a i r s , Denis. "A Pig in a Poke." Policy Options. P0li.tlj3u.es.. • January 1988. and Winham, G i l b e r t . The BoHties. of Canada.Is EQ.Q.nom.i.c..R.eiat.i..Qnshi.p_wi.t.h the. U.ni.t.ed.....S..ta.t.e.s.. (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1985.) Stewart, Michael. C Qnt.ro. l l i n g.  th e EQ Q n o mic.... F.u t.u..r.e . (London: Wheatsheaf Books, 1983.) Stothart, Paul. "Bad Deal." Policy. Options Polltiaues.. January 1988. 76 Wallerstein, Michael. "Unemployment, C o l l e c t i v e Bargaining, and the Demand for Protection." American. Journal of. P o l i t i c a l Science.. November 1987. Watkins, M e l v i l l e . "A Staples Theory of Economic Growth." Ca n ad.i an..... J. Q u.rnja. 1... of.. ..E.c o n Q mlcs and-.. P o l i.t .i.c.a.1 S c ie n.c e. May 1963. Westell, Anthony. "Economic Integration with the United States." In.tarnation al E.er.s.p..ec..t.iY.e.s... November/December 1984. Whalley, John, ed. Canada-.United States Er.ee T.r.ade. • (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1985.) . Canadian Trade Policies and the World E..C..Q.n.o.my.. (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1985) Wonnacott, Paul. "The Auto Pact: Plus of Minus," in John Crispo, ed. op. c i t . Young, R.A., "Breaking the Free Trade C o i l s . " Eol.icy_.Opinions. PQli.tigu.es... March 1988. PEEIDD.ICALS.JJ_DEX (0QMESTIC1 MACLEANS 1M5 A p r i l 22: 36 September 16: 24-28, 30-31, 34-35 30: 52, 16, 18 October 21: 18 November 11: 14 December 16: 13-14 iaas January 6: 34-36, 38 20: 40 February 17: 17 March 17: 44 77 A p r i l 28: 10-11 May 5: 10-12 12: 20 June, 2: 8-9 30: 11 September 29: 12 October 27: 16 November 3: 18 17: 29 1381 January 5: 38-39, 42 26: 2, 12, 14 February 9: 18 March 16: 24-25 30: 16, 33 A p r i l 6: 4, 10-12, 17, 18-19, 20 June 1: 40, 42 22: 7a-7d 29: 30-31 July 20: 8-9 August 3: 30-31 10: 22-23 17: 34 September 7: 13 21: 36-38 October 5: 18-20, 22, 39 19: 13, 14-17, 16, 20-22, 23, 42 26: 26-27, 64 November 2: 41 9: 10-12 December 14 21 28 6, 18-19 18-19 36-37 1888 January 4: 42-43 11: 15 February 1: 9 15: 18-20, 20 29: 9 March 7: 24 EIMHCJAl POST 1985 A p r i l 20: 10, 11 27: 21 May 4:9 11: 5 25: 8 July 6: 8 20: 9 August 3: 8 31: 6 September 28: 6 October 9: 8 19: 55 November 2: 1 ,23: 97 December 14: 8 21: 1, 3, 8, 9 £986 January 4: 22 11: 7, 9 February 1: 8 8: 15-16 15: 19 March 29: 6 A p r i l 12: 38 19: 8 May 3: 9 10: 9 24: 8, 50, 53+ June 7: 9 14: 9, 10 21: 9 August 2: 7 23: 8 September 20: 8, 16 27: 8 November 1: 15 December 1: 6 1981 January 12: 8 19: 3 February 2: 10 March 2: 1, 7 9: 8, 10 16: 3 23: 4, 7, 8, 9, 12 30: 9 A p r i l 6: 1, 4, 8 13: 9 20: 11 May 4: 10 11: 9 25: 1-2 June 1: 9 15: 9 29: 8 July 6: 6 13: 8 27: 3 80 August 3: 8 10: 3, 8, 9 24: 1, 3, 5, 6, 8 31: 1-2, 5, 10, 11 September 7: 1-2, 4 14: 4, 5, 10 21: 1-2, 4, 5, 10 28: 1, 4, 10, 11, 16, 38, 41, 45, 37-48 October 5: 1, 4, 10, 11, 14 12: 1, 3, 4, 10, 11, 35, 36, 38, 39, 40 19: 4, 5, 14, 15 26: 5, 14, 18, 19 November 2: 19 9: 3, 7, 18, 19 16: 17, 32, 33 23: 4, 19 30: 5, 14, 15 December 1:6 7: 3, 14, 15 14: 1, 6, 14, 15 21: 18, 19 28: 21 1988 January 4: 1-2, 12, 13 11: 14, 15 18: 3, 10, 12, 14 25: 1-2, 5, 38 February 1: 6, 7, 13, 14, 17 6: 17 13: 32 22: 18, 19, 47 March 5: 1-2, 4, 29 QWM MR-MAIL 1985 January 17: 14 21: 1, 5 30: BI, BIO February 16 : 5 18: 7 23: 8 28: 10 March 5: 1 6: 11 13: 8, 12 19: 1, 5 21: 12 23: BI, B3 25: 5 27: B4 A p r i l 2: B24 8: 1, 12 19: 11 25: 5 27: B4 May 4 : 2 6: M5 9: 7 13 6 14 5 16 8, 21 B l l June 3: M7 4: 6 26: 6, B14 28: 7 29: 4 July 2: 7 8: 5 13: 3 16: 5 18: 5, 11 23: 8 24: 4 25: E6, 5 27: BI 29: 4 August 8: 3 9: B4 15 B2 17 4 20 4, 8 23 1, B2 24 1, 6 26 7, B l l 28 B4 82 3: 5 5: 1 6: 1, 6, 10, 7: 18 13 3 14 14 17 5, 7, BI 18 8, B2 19 6 23 1 24 1, 4 25 8, T8 27 1, 3, 6, 28 3, B3 30 4 12, 20 20 1 A5, B2 2 B2 5 A3, A15 7 A13 8 A15 9 A14 11 Al 14 A2 15 A3 19 A8 22 A12 23 A10 28 A6 29 A l , A3 30 A6, B4 31 B4 November 6 8 9 11 13 14 15 16 18 19 21 26 28 29 A l , C7 A4 Al A3, Al : A l ; A5 : G8 A6 : Al : A2 : A3 : A10 : A3, A7 A6 B7 A8 A3 2: A5, A16 3: A5 4 : A3 5: Al , A3 6: A13 7: A6, A8 9: A2 10: A17 11: A10 12: A l , A5 17: A7 19: Al 23: Al 28: A14, DI, D4 30: A7 19M6 January 4 : 36 7: A5 8: A8 9: A8 10: A8 11: A4 21: A8 22: Al 23: A4, A5 24: A l , B2 25: A4 27: A4, C16 28: A5 29: A4 31: A5 February 3: A4, A7 4: Al 5: A3 6: A5 7: A4 8: A l l 12: Al 13: A7, A8 14: A5, A15 17: A9 18: A8, B l l 19: A5, A7 20: B2 21: A12 22: A12 26: A8 27: A7 28: A l l March 6: A10 15: A5, 17: BI, 18: BI 19: BI, ,22: A l , 24: A4 27: A7 28: A3 BI, B4 B2 B5 A2, A12 A p r i l 7: A5 9: A4 11: A7 12: Al 15: A3 16: A5, BI 18: A4 19: Al 21: A3, A5 22: A l , A5, A12 23: A l , A4 24: A l , A10, A14, B8 25: A6 26: A6, A13 28: A12 29: A l , A8, A13, BI May 3: A l l 5: A l , BI, B12 6: A5 7: A3 9: A4 10: A5 13: A l l 15: A19 16: Al 19: B6 20: A5 22: Al 23: A l , A4 26: A8, A14 27: BI, B4 28: A7 30: A4 June 2: C9 3: A l , A2 4: A l , A2, A4 5: A5, A9 6: A4 9: A10 10: A8 11: A8 13: A l , A5 14: A8 .17: A4 18: A l , A4 19: Al 20: A5 27: A8 July 1: A7 2: A l , A4 3: A l , A2, A4 8: A4 10: B4 18: A4, A l l , B12 25: A7 30: A9 31: A5 August 1: A4 6: A l l 8: A8 14: A5 15: A3 18: A3 19: A3 September 3: A5 5: A4 10: B2 12: A l , A2, A3 13: D5 15: BI, B3 16: A3 17: A l , A10 18: B5 22: A3 24: A l , A2 25: A7 26: A4 29: A3 October 1: A9 17: A l , A2 18: A l , A2, DI, D2 20: A l , A2, B3 21: A8 23: A l , A2 25: A3 30: A l , A13 November 4: A18 7: A4 8: A l , A2 12: A8 17: A l , A2 86 December 18 A5 20 A14 21 B3 24 B3 9: A12 10 A7 12 A5 16 A8 17 B8 19 B3 20 A l , A2 .1987 January 6: A7 7: A7 14: A l , A2, B4 15: A4, A7 16: A l , A2 17: B5 19: A l , A2 22: A l , A2 23: A4 26: A4 28: A4 29: A4 30: A4, A7 31: D3 February 4: A8 . 5: A l , 7 : D7 9: A9 12: B7 20: A5 26: A l , A2 March 2: A2 9: A l , A8 16: A l , A2, A10 19: A l , A2 20: A4, A13 24: BIO A p r i l 4: DI, D8 6: A l , A2 10: A5 14: B2 15: A5 16: A8 21: A l , A2 22: B5 27: A5 . 28: A5 May 2: D3 5: B6 8: B2 15: B16 19: A l , A2 20: A l , A2 21: A3, A7, B5 22: A5 25: A l , A2 26: A5 June 10: A l , A2 11: A4 15: A8 17: A2, B4 18: A7, B3 23: A5 30: A3 July 1: B7 3: A l , A2, A5 6: A5 7 : A3 8: B3 9: A l , A2, A5 10: A l , A3, A2 14: A5 17: A5 18: D2 21: A5 24:. A l , A2 25: A8 29: B8 August 6: A3 12: A4, B3 13: Al. 15: A4 18: B8 19: A5 24: A l , A2 25: A l , A2, A5, A10 26: A l , A8, B5 28: A8 29: A l , A2 September 3: B3 5: DI, D5 10: A5, A14 15: A l , A4, BIO 16: A l , A4 88 18: A7 19: A l , A2 21: A l , A2, A5 23: A12, B8 24: A l , A18, BI, B2 25: A l , A5 26: A l , A2, DI, D8 28: A3, A7 29: A l , A2, B7 October 3: A l , A4, A5 5: A l , A2, A3, A5, A8 6: A l , A2, A4, A5, BI, B4, B5, B6 7: A8, A9, B6 9: A l , A2, A5, A7 10: A l , A5 12: A l , A2, A7 13: A3 .14: A3 15: A9 16: A12, B4 19: A8 20: A4 21: A l , A2, A4 22: A4, B12 24 : D2 26: A l , A2, A5 27: A l , A2, A5, A7 28: B4 30: A5, B6 31: A7 November 3 B5 4 Al , A2 5 A l , A2, A7 6 Al, A5 7 A3, A12, C15 9 A8, A15 10: A l , A2, A5, A7 12: A l , A2, A7 13: A3 14: A3 15: A9 16: A12, B4 19: A8 20: A4 21: A l , A2, A5 22: A4, B12 24: D2 26: A l , A2, A5 27: A l , A2, A5, A7 28: A l , A2, A6, A7 30: A l , A8, A12 89 December 1: A12 2: A l , A8 3: A16 4 : A5, A15 7 : .A5, B6 8: Al , A7, A9, A19, 9: A9 10 A7, A10, B3, B5 11 A l , A2 14 A l , A2, A5 15 A3, A4, B5 16 A5 17 A4, B6, B l l 18 Al , A2, A3 19 A4, A5 22 A8 24 A4 26 A l , A2 BI, B2, B l l 1988 January (ROB) 11, 95 4 5 6 7 8 9 11 12 13 14 15 Al , A2, A8 Al , A2, A9 A3 A l , A2, A4 A3, A14 A l l , D2 Al, A4, Al, B8 A5 16: Al, 20: A9 21: 22: 25: 26 28: A5, B2 A5 B5 A8 A2, A6, A2, A7 A2, B8 B2 B38 A4 BI A4 B2 A5, B6, B16 1 A5, C3 2 B9, B13 4 A7 5 A4 6 A5 8 A12 9 A7 10 • B18 11 : A10 12 : A4, A7 19 : A l , A8 22 BI, B4 23 A5, A7, 24 B7 26 B16 27 C9 29 A5, B3 1: B9 3: B3 7: B7 10 : BI 11 : B3 12 : B5 16 : B7 17 : A5 18 : A5 21 : BI, 22 : A7 23 : BI, 24 : B8 26 : B3 29 : BI, 31 : B7 TJHJELIGQHDMSX 1986 February 15 1981 September 26 October 10 1B88 February 6 March 19 A p r i l 30 Ju l y 16 

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