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Palestinian nationalism from 1917 to 1989 : four stages of development King, Gabriella Louise 1989

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PALESTINIAN NATIONALISM FROM 1917 TO 1989: FOUR STAGES OF DEVELOPMENT By GABRIELLA LOUISE KING B.A., The U n i v e r s i t y of Guelph, 1988 A THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF MASTER OF ARTS i n THE FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIES Department of P o l i t i c a l Science We accept t h i s t h e s i s as conforming to the r e q u i r e d standard THE UNIVERSITY OF BRITISH COLUMBIA October 1989 ©Gabriella Louise King, 1989 In presenting this thesis in partial fulfilment of the requirements for an advanced degree at the University of British Columbia, I agree that the Library shall make it freely available for reference and study. I further agree that permission for extensive copying of this thesis for scholarly purposes may be granted by the head of my department or by his or her representatives. It is understood that copying or publication of this thesis for financial gain shall not be allowed without my written permission. Department of The University of British Columbia Vancouver, Canada Date orja#&n~\2-Wt<i DE-6 (2/88) ABSTRACT T h i s t h e s i s examines the development of P a l e s t i n i a n n a t i o n - a l i s m i n the t w e n t i e t h c e n t u r y by d i v i d i n g i t i n t o four p e r i o d s . In each of these four p e r i o d s a n t i - c o l o n i a l n a t i o n a l i s m and Arab n a t i o n a l i s m are a p p l i e d to the P a l e s t i n i a n case. S p e c i a l a t t e n - t i o n i s pa i d to the P a l e s t i n i a n v i s i o n of Zionism, the r o l e of the Arab s t a t e s i n P a l e s t i n i a n p o l i t i c s , the v i s i o n of a f u t u r e P a l e s t i n i a n s t a t e and how i t was to be achieved. In the e a r l y t w e n t i e t h century, P a l e s t i n i a n n a t i o n a l f e e l - ings were s t i r r e d as o p p o s i t i o n was organized a g a i n s t Z i o n i s t immigration and B r i t i s h r u l e . Both the Z i o n i s t s and the B r i t i s h were c o n s i d e r e d to be motivated by c o l o n i a l aims i n the s t i r r i n g phase. The second p e r i o d i n the development of P a l e s t i n i a n n a t i o n a l i s m , which was c l e a r l y a pan-Arab p e r i o d , took shape soon a f t e r the establishment of the s t a t e of I s r a e l i n 1948 a t which time the success of pan-Arabism was b e l i e v e d to be the best way to achieve an independent P a l e s t i n i a n s t a t e . The t h i r d phase i n the e v o l u t i o n of P a l e s t i n i a n n a t i o n a l i s m , which i s d e a l t with i n chapter two, i s marked by the d e f e a t of the Arab s t a t e s i n the June war of 1967, a t which time pan- Arabism l o s t much of i t s appeal. T h i s d e f e a t marked the r i s e of a i i new P a l e s t i n e L i b e r a t i o n O r g a n i z a t i o n and although there were a v a r i e t y of groups and i d e o l o g i e s w i t h i n the o r g a n i z a t i o n , i t i s p o s s i b l e t o make some g e n e r a l i z a t i o n s about P a l e s t i n i a n n a t i o n - a l i s m i n t h i s p e r i o d . The PLO attempted to reduce the r o l e of the Arab s t a t e s i n P a l e s t i n i a n a f f a i r s , they expressed M a r x i s t ideas and a m i l i t a n t l i n e , and the o r g a n i z a t i o n continued to see I s r a e l as a c o l o n i a l settlement t h a t was to be e l i m i n a t e d . F i n a l l y , t h i s t h e s i s c h a r a c t e r i s e s the f o u r t h p e r i o d i n the e v o l u t i o n of P a l e s t i n i a n n a t i o n a l i s m as a gradual process of change t h a t occurred throughout the 1970s and 1980s. I t i n v o l v e d an eventual acceptance of I s r a e l and a p a r t i t i o n of P a l e s t i n e , thus r e j e c t i n g the a n t i - c o l o n i a l ideas t h a t had been a t the centre of the movement s i n c e the s t i r r i n g phase. T h i s t h e s i s concludes by suggesting t h a t these changes are l i k e l y to make i t d i f f i c u l t f o r the PLO to maintain i t s f r a g i l e u n i t y . i i i TABLE OF CONTENTS Ab s t r a c t i i I n t r o d u c t i o n 1 Chapter 1: From A n t i - c o l o n i a l i s m to Pan-Arabism 6 N a t i o n a l i s m : A n t i - c o l o n i a l i s m and Pan-Arabism 9 A n t i - c o l o n i a l i s m i n Mandate P a l e s t i n e : the S t i r r i n g Phase 15 P a l e s t i n i a n N a t i o n a l i s m and Nasser's Pan-Arabism 28 Chapter 2: The PLO and the P a l e s t i n i a n R e v o l u t i o n 33 The I n t e r n a l S t r u c t u r e of the PLO: Fatah, the M a r x i s t s and the Arab puppets 36 Chapter 3: The P o l i t i c s of Compromise 47 Moderates, R e j e c t i o n i s t s and the Ten P o i n t P l a n 52 Attempts a t Moderation i n the 1980s: the Post B e i r u t Area, the I n t i f a d a and the Nineteenth PNC 61 C o n c l u s i o n 72 B i b l i o g r a p h y 75 i v INTRODUCTION The P a l e s t i n e L i b e r a t i o n O r g a n i z a t i o n , as the modern day e x p r e s s i o n of P a l e s t i n i a n n a t i o n a l i s m , has t r a d i t i o n a l l y expressed o b j e c t i v e s t h a t have c h a l l e n g e d I s r a e l ' s e x i s t e n c e . As an umbrella o r g a n i z a t i o n , the PLO i s made up of a v a r i e t y of groups t h a t express v a r i o u s p o l i c i e s towards I s r a e l and a f u t u r e P a l e s t i n i a n s t a t e . When the commando groups came t o dominate the PLO a f t e r the June 1967 war, the covenant of 1964 was r e v i s e d to express t h e i r more m i l i t a n t l i n e . At t h i s time, a l l of the commando groups agreed t h a t the p a r t i t i o n of P a l e s t i n e which occu r r e d i n 1947 was i l l e g i t i m a t e and the covenant expressed t h e i r b e l i e f t h a t c o l o n i a l i s m would o n l y come to an end i n P a l e s t i n e when I s r a e l was r e p l a c e d by a u n i f i e d P a l e s t i n i a n s t a t e . The P a l e s t i n i a n n a t i o n a l movement has always seen Zionism as a c o l o n i a l movement and has t h e r e f o r e r e f u s e d to compromise with i t . Prom the time of the B r i t i s h mandate, P a l e s t i n i a n o r g a n i z a t i o n s were opposed to the Z i o n i s t s ' p l a n f o r a homeland i n P a l e s t i n e and Z i o n i s t immigrants were viewed as c o l o n i a l i s t s . When the s t a t e of I s r a e l was e s t a b l i s h e d , P a l e s t i n i a n s I n s i s t e d t h a t I s r a e l was a c r e a t i o n of f o r e i g n i m p e r i a l i s t s which would 1 e v e n t u a l l y be defeated by the P a l e s t i n i a n s v i t h the a s s i s t a n c e of the Arab s t a t e s . A f t e r the Arab d e f e a t i n 1967, the commando groups took h o l d of the PLO, r e d u c i n g the r o l e of the Arab s t a t e s i n P a l e s t i n i a n a f f a i r s , but s t i l l c l a i m i n g t h a t a l l of P a l e s t i n e would be l i b e r a t e d from Zionism. P a l e s t i n i a n o r g a n i z a t i o n s from the time of the B a l f o u r D e c l a r a t i o n have been i n f l u e n c e d by pan-Arab and a n t i - c o l o n i a l i d e a s . However, the P a l e s t i n i a n n a t i o n a l movement has a t the same time experienced c o n s i d e r a b l e v a r i a t i o n s i n i t s o b j e c t i v e s and s t r a t e g i e s . The most r e c e n t change which took place i n 1988 was a two s t a t e s o l u t i o n adopted by the P a l e s t i n e N a t i o n a l C o u n c i l a t i t s n i n e t e e n t h meeting and i t marked a fundamental change i n PLO p o l i c y . By a c c e p t i n g R e s o l u t i o n 242 (1) and by c a l l i n g f o r an i n t e r n a t i o n a l conference based on t h i s r e s o l u t i o n , the PLO form- a l l y accepted a a p a r t i t i o n of P a l e s t i n e . ( 2 ) T h i s t h e s i s w i l l look a t the development of P a l e s t i n i a n n a t i o n a l i s m s i n c e the time of the B r i t i s h Mandate. More s p e c i f i c a l l y , i t attempts to c o n s t r u c t a t y p o l o g y of P a l e s t i n i a n 1. S e c u r i t y C o u n c i l R e s o l u t i o n 242 c a l l s f o r a " t e r m i n a t i o n of a l l c l a i m s or s t a t e s of b e l l i g e r e n c y and r e s p e c t f o r and acknowledgement of the s o v e r e i g n t y , t e r r i t o r i a l i n t e g r i t y and p o l i t i c a l independence of every s t a t e i n the area and t h e i r r i g h t t o l i v e i n peace w i t h i n secure and r e c o g n i z e d boundaries..." i t a l s o c a l l s f o r "a j u s t s e t t l e m e n t of the refugee problem." 2. When questioned a f t e r the PNC meeting, Yasser A r a f a t made r e c o g n i t i o n of I s r a e l e x p l i c i t : "The PNC accepted two s t a t e s , a P a l e s t i n i a n s t a t e and a Jewish s t a t e , I s r a e l . " see "PLO Leader Recognizes I s r a e l ' s Right to E x i s t " Globe and M a i l (December 8 1988):!. 2 n a t i o n a l i s m by d i v i d i n g i t i n t o four c l e a r l y d i s t i n g u i s h a b l e p e r i o d s . In the f i r s t p e r i o d P a l e s t i n i a n s a t the time of the B r i t i s h mandate were s t i r r e d out of t h e i r apathy as they organized o p p o s i t i o n t o Zionism. Zionism vas equated with c o l o n i a l i s m and P a l e s t i n i a n o r g a n i z a t i o n s argued t h a t the Z i o n i s t c l a i m s t o land were i l l e g i t i m a t e . They ob j e c t e d to the establishment of a Jewish home i n P a l e s t i n e and d i d not c o n s i d e r a p a r t i t i o n of the land t o be a f a i r outcome of the d i s p u t e . A f t e r the c r e a t i o n of I s r a e l and the exodus of hundreds of thousands of Arabs from P a l e s t i n e , pan-Arabism was b e l i e v e d t o be the most e f f e c t i v e way to r e g a i n P a l e s t i n i a n r i g h t s . I t was f e l t t h a t e l i m i n a t i o n of I s r a e l with the a i d of the Arab c o u n t r i e s was the o n l y j u s t s e t t l e m e n t t o the c o n f l i c t because I s r a e l r e p r e s e n t e d the success of Western c o l o n i a l i s m i n the Arab world. The 1967 war marked the beginning of a t h i r d phase i n P a l e s t i n i a n n a t i o n a l i s m a t which time commando groups gained c o n t r o l of the PLO and t r i e d t o remove themselves from Arab c o n t r o l as much as p o s s i b l e . The commando groups a l l agreed on the common g o a l of l i b e r a t i n g P a l e s t i n e through the armed s t r u g - g l e and r e p l a c i n g I s r a e l and the occupied West Bank and Gaza with a u n i f i e d P a l e s t i n i a n s t a t e . But as the PLO s u f f e r e d a number of d e f e a t s i n the 1970's and 1980's, moderates began t o emerge w i t h i n the o r g a n i z a t i o n , q u e s t i o n i n g PLO g o a l s . As ste p s were taken from w i t h i n the PLO towards pragmatism the PLO g r a d u a l l y s h i f t e d the nature of P a l e s t i n i a n n a t i o n a l i s m from r e f u s a l to a compromise t h a t accepted I s r a e l ' s e x i s t e n c e . 3 In order t o examine the changing nature of P a l e s t i n i a n n a t i o n a l i s m , t h i s t h e s i s w i l l be d i v i d e d i n t o three c h a p t e r s . Chapter one w i l l look a t the e a r l y t w e n t i e t h c e n t u r y u n t i l the 1967 war. T h i s s e c t i o n w i l l p r ovide a h i s t o r i c a l background to the development of P a l e s t i n i a n n a t i o n a l i s m and i t w i l l be d i v i d e d i n t o two d i s t i n c t p e r i o d s : pre-1948 and 1948-1967. The pre-1948 p e r i o d w i l l d i s c u s s P a l e s t i n i a n o r g a n i z a t i o n s , t h e i r demands f o r t e r r i t o r y , how they were to be obtained and what t h e i r s t r e n g t h s and weaknesses were. T h i s chapter w i l l a l s o look a t the twenty year p e r i o d before the 1967 war when pan-Arab u n i t y was b e l i e v e d t o be the best way to l i b e r a t e P a l e s t i n e . Chapter two w i l l look i n t o the o r g a n i z a t i o n of the P a l e s - t i n i a n n a t i o n a l movement under the PLO. I t w i l l d i s c u s s the o r g a n i z a t i o n of the PLO, the v a r i e t y of groups w i t h i n the o r g a n i z a t i o n , t h e i r i d e o l o g i e s and t h e i r v i s i o n of a f u t u r e P a l e s t i n i a n s t a t e . I t w i l l a l s o b r i e f l y d i s c u s s the PLO's r e l a t i o n s h i p v i t h the Arab s t a t e s i n the post-1967 p e r i o d . While there have been changes i n the P a l e s t i n i a n movement t h a t make i t p o s s i b l e to d i v i d e i t i n t o d i s t i n c t p e r i o d s , a t the same time the b a s i c demand f o r an independent P a l e s t i n i a n s t a t e i n a l l of Mandate P a l e s t i n e has been a c o n s i s t e n t p o l i c y which was o n l y f o r m a l l y dropped a t the n i n e t e e n t h meeting of the P a l e s t i n e N a t i o n a l C o u n c i l . Chapter three w i l l look a t hov PLO p o l i c i e s g r a d u a l l y evolved t o t h e i r most rec e n t phase which proposes a compromise v i t h I s r a e l . F i n a l l y , t h i s t h e s i s v i l l conclude v i t h some thoughts on the p o s s i b l e d i f f i c u l t i e s t h a t the 4 PLO may now face as a r e s u l t of the new p o l i c i e s t h a t i t adopted a t the n i n e t e e n t h PNC. 5 CHAPTER ONE PROM ANTI-COLONIALISM TO PAN-ARABISM In the f i r s t h a l f of the t w e n t i e t h century, when Z i o n i s t s were making plans f o r a Jewish n a t i o n a l home i n P a l e s t i n e , the P a l e s t i n i a n Arabs made e f f o r t s to organize o p p o s i t i o n to the Z i o n i s t p l a n . P a l e s t i n i a n s attempted to prevent the Z i o n i s t aims i n two ways, by a p p e a l i n g to other Arabs f o r support and by c r e a t i n g t h e i r own o r g a n i z a t i o n s to v o i c e t h e i r o p p o s i t i o n . The main g o a l s of the Arabs i n t h i s p e r i o d remained q u i t e c o n s i s t e n t . There was o p p o s i t i o n to the c r e a t i o n of a Jewish n a t i o n a l home i n P a l e s t i n e and to any p a r t i t i o n of the l a n d . The o b j e c t i v e was to e s t a b l i s h a s t a t e r u l e d by n a t i v e P a l e s t i n i a n s . During World War 1, as the Ottoman Turks' g r i p over Arab lands t h a t had been under t h e i r loose c o n t r o l f o r about four c e n t u r i e s was weakening, B r i t a i n sought an a l l i a n c e with the Arabs. An exchange of l e t t e r s between S i r Henry McMahon, B r i t a i n ' s High Commissioner i n Egypt and the Sudan, and the S h a r i f of Mecca occurred from 1915 to 1916. In the Husayn-McMahon correspondence an agreement was made i n which B r i t a i n promised S h a r i f Husayn a s s i s t a n c e i n c r e a t i n g independent Arab governments i f Husayn proclaimed an Arab r e v o l t a g a i n s t the Ottomans. The Arabs i n g r e a t e r S y r i a , i n c l u d i n g P a l e s t i n i a n Arabs, had h i g h e x p e c t a t i o n s 6 as they a n t i c i p a t e d independence a f t e r the war. But r e g a r d l e s s of what was s a i d i n the Husayn-McMahon correspondence, on November 2 1917 B r i t i s h F o r e i g n S e c r e t a r y S i r Arthur B a l f o u r i n a l e t t e r t o Lord R o t h s c h i l d of the Z i o n i s t F e d e r a t i o n pledged to provide f o r the Jewish people a homeland i n P a l e s t i n e . The l e t t e r assured the Z i o n i s t f e d e r a t i o n of the f o l l o w i n g : His Majesty's Government view with favour the e s t a b - lishment i n P a l e s t i n e of a n a t i o n a l home f o r the Jewish people, and w i l l use t h e i r best endeavours to f a c i l i t a t e the achievement of t h i s o b j e c t , i t being c l e a r l y understood t h a t nothing s h a l l be done which may p r e j u d i c e the c i v i l and r e l i g i o u s r i g h t s of e x i s t i n g non-Jewish communities i n P a l e s t i n e (3) In promising the Arabs independence i n the Husayn-McMahon c o r r e s - pondence while a t the same time promising the Jewish people t h a t B r i t a i n would use t h e i r best endeavours to achieve a Jewish homeland i n P a l e s t i n e , B r i t a i n had entered i n t o two agreements th a t were incompatible. The B a l f o u r D e c l a r a t i o n was t o have a huge e f f e c t on the Arabs of P a l e s t i n e because the Arabs were not g i v e n the indepen- dence t h a t they expected a f t e r the war. Instead, Arab t e r r i t o r i e s were d i v i d e d and a d m i n i s t e r e d by the mandate system of the League of N a t i o n s . B r i t a i n was g i v e n the mandate f o r P a l e s t i n e and Included the B a l f o u r D e c l a r a t i o n i n i t s mandate. Once P a l e s t i n e 3. c i t e d i n U n i t e d Nations, The O r i g i n s and E v o l u t i o n of the P a l e s t i n e Problem P a r t 1 (New York: United Nations P u b l i c a - t i o n , 1984), 9. 7 was separated from the r e s t of S y r i a and placed under B r i t i s h a d m i n i s t r a t i o n , the P a l e s t i n i a n s were faced with i n c r e a s e d Z i o n - i s t immigration. T h i s made t h e i r s i t u a t i o n v e r y d i f f e r e n t from t h a t of t h e i r Arab neighbours. Before B r i t a i n was g i v e n the mandate f o r P a l e s t i n e i n 1920, P r e s i d e n t Woodrow Wilson proposed at the P a r i s Peace Conference i n 1919 t h a t a commission be sent to S y r i a , i n c l u d i n g P a l e s t i n e , t o determine the wishes of the people. The King Crane Commission, as i t was known, was sent to the a r e a although the B r i t i s h and French d e c l i n e d t o send r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s . The Commission found t h a t the the people of P a l e s t i n e g e n e r a l l y agreed t h a t i f f o r e i g n t u t e l a g e was t o come they would p r e f e r i t from the United S t a t e s and there was a g e n e r a l f e a r of Zionism. The Commission s t a t e d t h a t : I f the p r i n c i p l e [of s e l f - d e t e r m i n a t i o n ] i s t o r u l e , and so the wishes of P a l e s t i n e ' s p o p u l a t i o n are to be d e c i s i v e as t o what i s to be done with P a l e s t i n e , then i t i s to be remembered t h a t the non-Jewish p o p u l a t i o n of P a l e s t i n e - n e a r l y n i n e - t e n t h s of the whole - are e m p h a t i c a l l y a g a i n s t the e n t i r e Z i o n i s t programme. The t a b l e s show t h a t there was no one t h i n g upon which the p o p u l a t i o n of P a l e s t i n e were more agreed than upon t h i s . To s u b j e c t a people so minded to u n l i m i t e d Jewish immigration, and to steady f i n a n c i a l and s o c i a l p r essure to surrender the l a n d , would be a gross v i o l a t i o n of the p r i n c i p l e s j u s t quoted...(4) Although the commission r e p o r t e d t h a t the Arabs were opposed to Zionism and the B a l f o u r D e c l a r a t i o n , the A l l i e d powers agreed to grant the P a l e s t i n e mandate to B r i t a i n and i n c l u d e d the B a l f o u r 4. c i t e d i n I b i d . , 28. 8 D e c l a r a t i o n i n the mandate. Because the B a l f o u r D e c l a r a t i o n was i n c l u d e d i n the mandate f o r P a l e s t i n e , t h i s mandate was u n l i k e others which were to a s s i s t the n a t i v e p o p u l a t i o n s i n developing independent governments. The mandate system t h a t was s e t up i n A r t i c l e 22 of the Covenant of the League of Nations e s t a b l i s h e d the need f o r undeveloped areas to be advanced under the " t u t e l a g e . . . o f advanc- ed n a t i o n s " (5) so t h a t these l e s s developed t e r r i t o r i e s might be able to govern themselves i n the f u t u r e . P r e s i d e n t Woodrow Wilson i n s i s t e d t h a t the r i g h t to s e l f - d e t e r m i n a t i o n t h a t was valued i n the West should a l s o apply to the non-Western world, and i n accordance with t h i s p r i n c i p l e the Covenant s t a t e d t h a t "the wishes of these communities must be a p r i n c i p a l c o n s i d e r a t i o n i n the s e l e c t i o n of a Mandatory." (6) The r i g h t t o n a t i o n a l s e l f - d e t e r m i n a t i o n as embodied i n the Covenant of the League of Nations i s g e n e r a l l y b e l i e v e d to be an idea t h a t became popular i n the West a f t e r the French RevoJJultitxm. The French R e v o l u t i o n marked the b i r t h of the modern era and i t brought v i t h i t the ideas of l i b e r t y , e q u a l i t y , f r a t e r n i t y and p r o g r e s s . With n a t i o n a l s e l f - d e t e r m i n a t i o n as the b a s i s of p o l - i t i c a l o rder, the people vere t o r u l e i n p l a c e of k i n g s . N a t i o n a l i s m i s t h e r e f o r e g e n e r a l l y c o n s i d e r e d to be a European phenomenon which e v e n t u a l l y spread around the v o r l d and had 5. c i t e d i n I b i d . , 21. 6. c i t e d i n I b i d . , 29. 9 u n i v e r s a l a p p e a l . N a t i o n a l i s m i s a complex idea and i s thus d i f f i c u l t t o d e f i n e . An attempt to l i s t the f a c t o r s t h a t are r e q u i r e d i n the formation of a n a t i o n proves f u t i l e . Although f a c t o r s such as language, c u l t u r e and r e l i g i o n c o u l d be c o n s i d e r e d important i n the formation of a n a t i o n , none of these f a c t o r s on t h e i r own could be deemed s u f f i c i e n t . Hans Kohn i n s i s t s t h a t the most e s s e n t i a l element i n the formation of a n a t i o n i s a l i v i n g and a c t i v e c o r p o r a t e w i l l , as he simply s t a t e s t h a t " n a t i o n a l i t y i s formed by the d e c i s i o n to form a n a t i o n a l i t y . " (7) While a d e f i n i t i o n of the n a t i o n may be d i f f i c u l t , a more s p e c i f i c e x p l a n a t i o n of a n a t i o n could be as f o l l o w s : A n a t i o n i s a group of people who wish to l i v e t o gether i n a g i v e n t e r r i t o r y which they p e r c e i v e t o be u n i q u e l y t h e i r own; they have a sense of p r i d e i n a shared p a s t (which may or may not be based on f a c t ) and they dream of a shared f u t u r e . A n a t i o n u s u a l l y possesses u n i f y i n g c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s such as a common language, c u l t u r e or r e l i g i o n . A n a t i o n a l group f e a r s f o r e i g n motives and r e s e n t s f o r e i g n r u l e , s i n c e f o r e i g n e r s are unable to understand or a p p r e c i a t e the n a t i o n ' s accomplishments and i t s purpose i n h i s t o r y . N a t i o n a l f e e l i n g s are o f t e n a c t i v a t e d by a p e r c e i v e d f o r e i g n t h r e a t as n a t i o n a l i s m teaches people t h a t f o r e i g n r u l e i s an i n s u l t to t h e i r human d i g n i t y . In the n i n e t e e n t h and t w e n t i e t h c e n t u r i e s people under c o l o n i a l r u l e l e a r n e d t h a t t h e i r treatment was wrong a c c o r d i n g to Western p r i n c i p l e s and they expected that t h i n g s would be b e t t e r i f they c o u l d govern themselves. 7. Hans Kohn, The Idea of N a t i o n a l i s m (New York: Macmillan Company, 1944), 15. 10 N a t i o n a l i s m , t h e r e f o r e , i s q u i t e f r e q u e n t l y a r e a c t i o n to f o r e i g n i n t e r v e n t i o n , and i n f a c t , as K.R. Minogue argues, " n a t i o n a l i s m cannot be p u r e l y a s t r u g g l e of i n t e r n a l f a c t i o n s w i t h i n a country." (8) One of the main forms of n a t i o n a l i s m i s a n t i - c o l o n i a l n a t i o n a l i s m . Nehru d e s c r i b e d n a t i o n a l i s m i n c o l o n i z e d c o u n t r i e s as " e s s e n t i a l l y an a n t i - f e e l i n g " t h a t grew "on h a t r e d and anger a g a i n s t other n a t i o n a l groups, and e s p e c i a l l y a g a i n s t the f o r e i g n r u l e r s of a s u b j e c t country." (9) N a t i o n a l i s m i n c o l o n i z e d c o u n t r i e s i s a way of o r g a n i z i n g p o l i t i c a l o p p o s i t i o n to a l i e n governments i n an e f f o r t t o b r i n g c o l o n i a l i s m to an end. C o l o n i a l r u l e r s can c o n t r i b u t e s i g n i f i c a n t l y t o the r o u s i n g of n a t i o n a l f e e l i n g s among c o l o n i z e d people. C o l o n i z a t i o n sparks the d e s i r e to p r o t e c t ones l i f e - s t y l e from f o r e i g n e r s whose p o l i c i e s may t h r e a t e n t r a d i t i o n s and a l t e r s o c i a l s t r u c t u r e s . For example, r e l i g i o u s d i f f e r e n c e s between r u l e r s and the r u l e d may i n s p i r e p r o t e s t s a g a i n s t the c o l o n i a l i s t power who does not respect or understand the r e l i g i o u s b e l i e f s of the n a t i v e s . Under these circumstances c o l o n i z e d people become opposed t o f o r e i g n r u l e and s u s p i c i o u s of f o r e i g n motives. Thus c o l o n i a l governments, i n an i n d i r e c t manner, a s s i s t i n the development of n a t i o n a l i s m i n the colony. The n a t i v e s are a b l e to u n i t e a g a i n s t what they p e r c e i v e 8. K.R.Minogue, N a t i o n a l i s m (New York: B a s i c Books Inc., 1967), 26. 9. c i t e d i n Boyd Shafer, Faces of N a t i o n a l i s m (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich Inc., 1972), 279. 11 to be a common t h r e a t where they may have otherwise been d i v i d e d . The t y p i c a l a n t i - c o l o n i a l movement may be g e n e r a l i z e d i n the f o l l o w i n g manner. As European c o l o n i a l i s t s s e t t l e d i n A s i a and A f r i c a , r i v a l r y e v e n t u a l l y grew between the Europeans and the n a t i v e s as the n a t i v e s grew to r e s e n t being t r e a t e d as second <rJass c i t i z e n s . As the n a t i v e s , u s u a l l y the t r a d i t i o n a l e l i t e , came i n c l o s e r c o n t a c t with Western i d e a s , they l e a r n e d of the r i g h t t o s e l f - d e t e r m i n a t i o n t h a t i s valued i n the West and they demanded equal treatment. Humiliated by f o r e i g n r u l e , n a t i o n a l movements i n the d e v e l o p i n g world demanded independence. A fear of l o s i n g what i s valued by them mixed with the resentment of being t r e a t e d as second c l a s s c i t i z e n s helped to s t i r a c o l o n i z e d people out of t h e i r apathy. With hi g h e x p e c t a t i o n s of l i f e without c o l o n i a l r u l e r s , the n a t i v e p o p u l a t i o n w i l l s e t t l e f o r nothing l e s s than a t o t a l withdrawal of the c o l o n i a l power. I t i s b e l i e v e d t h a t o n l y a complete withdrawal can b r i n g a complete end to c o l o n i a l o p p r e s s i o n . Any s e t t l e m e n t t h a t would r e q u i r e the compromise of one's land i s c o n s i d e r e d unacceptable because the r e l a t i o n s h i p between a n a t i o n and i t s t e r r i t o r y i s c e n t r a l . "In the i d e o l o g y of almost every n a t i o n . . . i t s h i s t o r i c a l t e r r i t o r y i s looked upon almost as a l i v i n g p e r s o n a l i t y which cannot be p a r t i t i o n e d without d e s t r o y i n g i t a l t o g e t h e r . " (10) N a t i o n a l i s m emphasises a 10. F r e d e r i c k H e r t z , N a t i o n a l i t y i n H i s t o r y and P o l i t i c s (London: Kegan P a u l , Trench, Trubner & Co., 1945), 151. 12 c o n t i n u i t y with the past and t h i s c o n t i n u i t y i s e s p e c i a l l y important when i t comes to t e r r i t o r y . ( 1 1 ) Arab n a t i o n a l i s m , v i t h i t s s t r o n g a n t i - c o l o n i a l elements, attempted to overcome the p o l i t i c a l p a r t i t i o n of Arab t e r r i t o r y t h a t o c c u r r e d a f t e r World War 1. P a n - A r a b i s t s b e l i e v e d t h a t Arabs c o n s t i t u t e d one n a t i o n and t h e r e f o r e should not have been separated by p o l i t i c a l boundaries. Because Arabs share a number of charac- t e r i s t i c s t h a t are commonly b e l i e v e d t o group people t o g e t h e r , Arab n a t i o n a l i s t s argue that Arab u n i t y , as such, i s an end i n i t s e l f f o r i t r e f l e c t s the community of language, c u l t u r e , exper- iences and a s p i r a t i o n v h i c h a l l Arabs share d e s p i t e p o l i t i c a l boundaries. I t i s a p o s i t i v e movement i n the sense t h a t i t a s p i r e s t o a t t a i n the same norm of l i f e v h i c h the Arab people had shared i n the past and v h i c h vas o n l y i n t e r r u p t e d a f t e r World War 1, vhen Arab lands vere d i v i d e d by European povers a g a i n s t the v i l l of t h e i r peoples. (12) Arab n a t i o n a l i s t s o n l y opposed Ottoman r u l e i n the e a r l y t v e n t i e t h c e n t u r y a f t e r the Turks made attempts a t t i g h t e n i n g t h e i r c o n t r o l over the Arabs. Islam had o r i g i n a l l y g i v e n the Ottoman r u l e r s l e g i t i m a c y among the m a j o r i t y of Arabs, t h i s being a r e s u l t of Muslim b e l i e f s t h a t o r i g i n a t e d v i t h the prophet Muhammed. The prophet proclaimed the e s t a b l i s h m e n t of the Muslim ummah, or n a t i o n , i n Medina and the Muslims c o n s i d e r e d themselves 11. R.J. Johnson, David B Knight and Eleonore Kofman ( e d s . ) , N a t i o n a l S e l f - D e t e r m i n a t i o n and P o l i t i c a l Geography (London: Croom Helm L t d . , 1988), 24. 12. c i t e d i n L o u i s Snyder, The Dynamics of N a t i o n a l i s m ( P r i n c e t o n : D. Van Nostrand Company Inc., 1964), 313. 13 to be a community d i s t i n c t from a l l other peoples. As a r e s u l t as long as the Ottoman Empire was seen t o embody the I s l a m i c f a i t h there was l i t t l e o p p o s i t i o n t o i t . The break-up of an I s l a m i c power i n t o a number of s m a l l e r u n i t s would have been regarded as r e t - rograde. (13) However, Arab n a t i o n a l i s t s began t o p r o t e s t Ottoman r u l e i n the e a r l y t w e n t i e t h c e n t u r y when Ottoman p o l i c i e s began to take on a T u r k i s h f l a v o u r . T u r k i s h reforms t h a t i n c l u d e d such t h i n g s as an o f f i c i a l language r e f l e c t e d the growth of n a t i o n a l f e e l i n g s among the Turks. As the Young Turks attempted a g r e a t e r c e n t r a l i z a t i o n of power, Arabs took counter-measures. Because there had always been a c l o s e h i s t o r i c a l development between Arab c u l t u r e and Islam, one of the c e n t r a l r a l l y i n g p o i n t s f o r the Arabs a g a i n s t the Turks was Islam. The pr o c l a m a t i o n i s s u e d by the S h e r i f of Mecca i n 1916 which sparked an Arab r e v o l t , f o r example, accused the Turks of i n d i f f e r e n c e t o Islam. The Arabs claimed t h a t the Turks had usurped the C a l i p h a t e and th a t i t coul d a p p e r t a i n o n l y to an Arab, p r e f e r a b l y from Muhammad's t r i b e , the Quraysh. The f a c t o r s t h a t u n i f i e d the Arabs were t h e i r language, t h e i r c u l t u r e , and t h e i r common h i s t o r i c a l e x p e r i e n c e . A r a b i c was an e s p e c i a l l y important f o r c e u n i f y i n g Arabs as i t was the language of the Koran and the Mosque. I t was g e n e r a l l y b e l i e v e d t h a t f o r e i g n i n f l u e n c e was r e s p o n s i b l e f o r the deg e n e r a t i o n of 13. John B r e u i l l y , N a t i o n a l i s m and the S t a t e (Manchester: Manchester U n i v e r s i t y P ress, 1982), 120. 14 the Arab n a t i o n so t h a t Arab n a t i o n a l i s m became a way of p r o t e s t i n g f o r e i g n i n f l u e n c e and i m p e r i a l i s m , f i r s t a g a i n s t the Ottoman Empire and then a g a i n s t the European powers. Many Arabs f e l t t h a t f o r e i g n r u l e was a c o r r u p t i n g i n f l u e n c e i n the Arab world and they were t h e r e f o r e opposed to the mandate system imposed on them and the European domination t h a t i t brought wi t h i t . Arab o p p o s i t i o n t o f o r e i g n r u l e t h a t was promoted by the B r i t i s h and the French i n the e a r l y t w e n t i e t h c e n t u r y soon became a n t i - B r i t i s h and a n t i - F r e n c h . The European r u l e r s were worse than the Ottomans, however, because they had a d i f f e r e n t r e l i g i o n and a d i f f e r e n t c u l t u r e . The Z i o n i s t p l a n to e s t a b l i s h a Jewish n a t i o n a l home i n P a l e s t i n e was one of the main f a c t o r s t h a t c o n t r i b u t e d to the development of a n a t i o n a l movement among P a l e s t i n i a n s . In the e a r l y t w e n t i e t h c e n t u r y o p p o s i t i o n to Z i o n i s t immigrants s t i r r e d n a t i o n a l f e e l i n g s and i n t e n s i f i e d f e e l i n g s of u n i t y among P a l e s t i n i a n Arabs. The mandate years marked the f i r s t stage i n the development of P a l e s t i n i a n n a t i o n a l i s m , a phase t h a t may best be l a b e l l e d as the s t i r r i n g phase. P a l e s t i n i a n s began to develop a p e r c e p t i o n of t h e i r land as being u n i q u e l y t h e i r own and they expressed a f e a r of Z i o n i s t motives. They c o n s i d e r e d Z i o n i s t immigration and Z i o n i s t c l a i m s to a homeland i n P a l e s t i n e to be i l l e g i t i m a t e and they developed t h e i r own image of how P a l e s t i n e was to be governed. P a l e s t i n i a n o r g a n i z a t i o n s , maximal- i s t i n t h e i r demands, expressed o p p o s i t i o n to Zionism and the B r i t i s h Mandate. 15 As a r e s u l t of t h e i r a t t i t u d e s towards B r i t a i n and the Z i o n i s t s i n the pre-1948 p e r i o d , P a l e s t i n i a n o r g a n i z a t i o n s r e f u s e d any se t t l e m e n t t h a t r e q u i r e d a surrender of land to the Jewish immigrants. P a l e s t i n i a n s p e r c e i v e d both the B r i t i s h and the Z i o n i s t s as c o l o n i a l i s t s so they r e f u s e d to cooperate v i t h e i t h e r of them. Because many of the J e v i s h immigrants came from Europe they vere seen as c o l o n i a l i s t s not much d i f f e r e n t from the B r i t i s h . As many P a l e s t i n i a n Arabs sav i t , t h e i r land had been passed from the hands of the Ottomans to the B r i t i s h , v i t h the B r i t i s h making plans t o pass i t on to another group of c o l o n i - a l i s t s , the Z i o n i s t s . J e v i s h c l a i m s t o land i n P a l e s t i n e vere g e n e r a l l y considered to be motivated by c o l o n i a l aims, not n a t i o n a l ones. P a l e s t i n i a n o r g a n i z a t i o n s d i d not d i f f e r e n t i a t e betveen Western c o l o n i a l i s m i n A s i a and A f r i c a , f o r example, and Zionism. Because the Z i o n i s t s vere v l e v e d as c o l o n i a l i s t s , i t vas f e l t t h a t a complete a b o l i t i o n of t h e i r plans f o r a n a t i o n a l home vas necessary before P a l e s t i n i a n s c o u l d e x e r c i s e t h e i r l e g i t i m a t e r i g h t s . Hovever, as a s e t t l e r n a t i o n a l i s m , the Z i o n i s t s ' g o a l vas for Jevs t o migrate t o P a l e s t i n e and e s t a b l i s h a s t a t e vhere Jevs c o u l d l i v e permanently. Because the o b j e c t i v e of the Z i o n i s t movement vas f o r the Jevs to aq u i r e a n a t i o n a l home of t h e i r ovn by r e t u r n i n g t o the Holy Land, making Hebrev t h e i r o f f i c i a l language, and e s t a b l i s h i n g s o v e r e i g n t y over the l a n d , Zionism d i f f e r e d from other n a t i o n a l movements. I t s aim vas to f r e e the 16 Jews by a l l o w i n g them t o move to another country, P a l e s t i n e . There was, however, some ambiguity over what t e r r i t o r y was to be i n c l u d e d i n the Jewish s t a t e . Although the Jordan River has o f t e n served as a p o l i t i c a l d i v i s i o n , h i s t o r i c a l l y P a l e s t i n e and E r e t z I s r a e l had v a r i o u s borders and many Z i o n i s t s expected that p a r t s of the East Bank would be i n c l u d e d i n a Jewish s t a t e . At the t h i r t e e n t h Z i o n i s t Congress i n 1923 f o r example, the Congress passed the f o l l o w i n g r e s o l u t i o n : R e cognizing t h a t e a s t e r n and western P a l e s t i n e are i n r e a l i t y and de f a c t o one u n i t h i s t o r i c a l l y , geo- g r a p h i c a l l y , and econ o m i c a l l y , the Congress expresses i t s e x p e c t a t i o n t h a t the f u t u r e of TransJordan s h a l l be determined i n accordance with the l e g i t i m a t e demands of the Jewish people. (14) Adding t o t h i s c o n f u s i o n , i n 1920 B r i t a i n c a l l e d the e n t i r e area on both s i d e s of the r i v e r the "madate f o r P a l e s t i n e . " But by 1921 the mandate was d i v i d e d i n t o two p a r t s a l o n g the r i v e r . The Z i o n i s t s , however, were to l a t e r argue t h a t the e a s t s i d e of the Jordan r i v e r was made an Arab P a l e s t i n i a n s t a t e with the west s i d e being l e f t f o r the Jews to e s t a b l i s h t h e i r own s t a t e . But those on the west s i d e of the Jordan R i v e r , P a l e s t i n i a n Arabs, were d e v e l o p i n g n a t i o n a l aims of t h e i r own and were c l e a r l y u n w i l l i n g t o accept the establishment of a Jewish s t a t e i n P a l e s t i n e . These two n a t i o n a l i s m s were bound t o c o l l i d e as they s t r u g g l e d f o r the same t e r r i t o r y , both c l a i m i n g t o have l e g i t - 14Pipes, D a n i e l and Adam G a r f i n k l e , "Is Jordan P a l s t i n e ? " Commentary (October 1988): 37. 17 imate h i s t o r i c a l t i e s to the land. As a r e s u l t of the pe r c e i v e d t h r e a t of Zionism, P a l e s t i n i a n s Arabs were ab l e t o organize and cooperate where they may not fojcwp. been a b l e t o otherwise. For example, the P a l e s t i n i a n s , u n l i k e the Z i o n i s t s , lacked r e l i g i o u s u n i t y , which was compounded by economic d i s u n i t y . Although the Muslims made up the m a j o r i t y of the p o p u l a t i o n , they were mainly peasants l i v i n g i n r u r a l a r e a s . The C h r i s t i a n s on the other hand were mainly c i t y d w e l l e r s and although they were a m i n o r i t y many of them h e l d jobs i n i n f l u e n - t i a l s e c t o r s of s o c i e t y such as government, commerce and educa- t i o n . Because of t h e i r r e l i g i o u s d i f f e r e n c e s , C h r i s t i a n s saw l i t t l e appeal i n pan-Islam while Muslims accused C h r i s t i a n s of being l e s s c r i t i c a l of the B r i t i s h . ( 1 5 ) However, Muslims and C h r i s t i a n s agreed i n t h e i r o p p o s i t i o n t o Zionism and together they j o i n e d committees t h a t opposed i t . Middle c l a s s C h r i s t i a n s d i d not want c o m p e t i t i o n from Jewish immigrants i n p r o f e s s i o n s and s k i l l e d t r a d e s while the Muslim peasants d i d not want to compete over r u r a l l a n d . But d i v i s i o n s a l s o e x i s t e d between i n f l u e n t i a l f a m i l i e s i n P a l e s t i n e which were not as e a s i l y overcome. There were a few powerful f a m i l i e s i n P a l e s t i n e i n the e a r l y t w e n t i e t h c e n t u r y who were competing f o r c o n t r o l amongst themselves. The two most notable f a m i l i e s were the Husaynis and the N a s h a s h i b i s . Members of the Husayni f a m i l y t r a d i t i o n a l l y h e l d p o s i t i o n s of i n f l u e n c e i n 15. Ann Mosely Lesch, Arab P o l i t i c s i n P a l e s t i n e 1917-1939 ( I t h a c a : C o r n e l l U n i v e r s i t y Press, 1979), 60-61. 18 the m u n i c i p a l i t y of Jerusalem, most n o t a b l y as mayor. The Husaynis g e n e r a l l y had the support of the w e l l - e s t a b l i s h e d f a m i l i e s i n P a l e s t i n e . The Nashashibis, on the other hand, had the support of the r i s i n g middle c l a s s . But while a t r a d i t i o n a l r i v a l r y between these two f a m i l i e s prevented the formation of a common f r o n t f o r much of the mandate y e a r s , there vas l i t t l e d i f f e r e n c e i n the n a t i o n a l goals of both groups. Although the d i v i s i o n of Arab t e r r i t o r i e s by the mandate system caused each group of Arabs, i n c l u d i n g P a l e s t i n i a n Arabs, to c o n c e n t r a t e on the i s s u e s c r e a t e d by t h e i r ovn mandate, the P a l e s t i n i a n s b e l i e v e d t h a t t h e i r c o n f l i c t vas an Arab problem and they t h e r e f o r e appealed to Arabs i n neighbouring c o u n t r i e s f o r support. In an attempt to a t t r a c t support from members of the same e t h n i c group, P a l e s t i n i a n s sent m i s s i o n s to v a r i o u s Arab c o u n t r i e s . They a l s o t r i e d to get the support of Muslims around the v o r l d , i n s i s t i n g t h a t the problems f a c i n g the P a l e s t i n i a n s should concern a l l Muslims because Jerusalem vas the t h i r d h o l i e s t c i t y i n Islam. Muslims and Arabs i n c o o p e r a t i o n v i t h P a l e s t i n i a n s d i d demonstrate and form committees i n o p p o s i t i o n to Zionism. When Lord B a l f o u r v i s i t e d Damascus i n 1925 f o r example, there vere v i o l e n t demonstrations. Pan-Arab meetings, such as those t h a t took p l a c e i n Damascus i n 1937 and C a i r o i n 1938, s t r e s s e d o p p o s i t i o n t o any p a r t i t i o n of P a l e s t i n e . But v h i l e most Arabs may have g i v e n the P a l e s t i n i a n s t h e i r sympathy, they had l i t t l e p o l i t i c a l c l o u t so that t h e i r p r o t e s t s vere of l i t t l e v a l u e . 19 The fragmentation of the Arab v o r l d c o n t r i b u t e d s i g n i f i c a n t l y t o the development of a P a l e s t i n i a n n a t i o n a l move- ment under the B r i t i s h Mandate. Because of t h e i r d i f f e r e n t circumstances, P a l e s t i n i a n s developed an i d e n t i t y separate from other Arabs. Hovever, the r o l e of other Arabs i n the P a l e s t i n e q u e s t i o n a l v a y s remained important. What e v e n t u a l l y developed i n P a l e s t i n e vas a separate P a l e s t i n i a n n a t i o n a l i t y a l o n g s i d e Arab n a t i o n a l i s m . By the 1920's, P a l e s t i n i a n o p p o s i t i o n began t o take on an organized s t r u c t u r e . The Arab E x e c u t i v e , v h i c h vas a c t i v e from 1920 t o 1934, vas the f i r s t s i g n i f i c a n t o r g a n i z a t i o n e x p r e s s i n g P a l e s t i n i a n n a t i o n a l aims. The o r g a n i z a t i o n used mainly p e a c e f u l means to express i t s o p p o s i t i o n to Zionism and B r i t i s h r u l e . I t sent numerous l e t t e r s t o the B r i t i s h government demanding t h a t P a l e s t i n e not be t r e a t e d as a c o l o n y and t h a t the g o a l s of the B a l f o u r D e c l a r a t i o n be abandoned. The Arab E x e c u t i v e i n s i s t e d t h a t the B a l f o u r D e c l a r a t i o n "vas made v i t h o u t our being c o n s u l t e d and ve cannot accept i t as d e c i d i n g our d e s t i n i e s . " ( 1 6 ) At a meeting of the T h i r d Arab Congress a t H a i f a i n 1921 the demands t h a t vere t y p i c a l of the mandate years vere o u t l i n e d . The Congress demanded t h a t no compromise be made i n favour of a J e v i s h home i n P a l e s t i n e and i t expressed the d e s i r e f o r P a l e s t i n e to remain Arab. The committee's f i v e b a s i c demands vere 16. c i t e d i n I b i d . , 79. 20 as f o l l o w s : 1) a government was to be e l e c t e d by the n a t i v e p o p u l a t i o n i n P a l e s t i n e ; 2) there was to be an a b o l i t i o n of the Jewish n a t i o n a l home p r i n c i p l e ; 3) Jewish immigration was to end u n t i l a government was e l e c t e d which c o u l d d e c i d e immigration p o l i c y ; 4) P a l e s t i n e was to be governed by Ottoman law r a t h e r than B r i t i s h law; and 5) P a l e s t i n e was not to be separated from i t s neighbouring Arab s t a t e s . (17) The demands and g r i e v a n c e s o u t l i n e d i n t h i s document are remarkably c o n s i s t e n t with the b a s i c demands of P a l e s t i n i a n o r g a n i z a t i o n s throughout the mandate years. In the 1920's organized o b j e c t i o n t o Zionism and B r i t i s h r u l e was g e n e r a l l y p e a c e f u l . But as Z i o n i s t immigration in c r e a s e d so to d i d f r u s t r a t i o n among the Arabs. P a l e s t i n i a n o r g a n i z a t i o n s f e l t e s p e c i a l l y d i s s a t i s f i e d because they were not r e c o g n i z e d by the B r i t i s h . The Arab E x e c u t i v e (1920-1934) and l a t e r the Arab Higher Committee (1936-1937), were not c o n s i d e r e d t o be r e p r e s e n t a t i v e of the Arab p o p u l a t i o n by the B r i t i s h because they were not e l e c t e d r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s . In a d d i t i o n , f o r an Arab o r g a n i z a t i o n to be considered r e p r e s e n t a t i v e by the B r i t i s h , i t c o u l d not issue r e s o l u t i o n s c o n t r a r y to the mandate, i n c l u d i n g the B a l f o u r D e c l a r a t i o n . (18) Quite c l e a r l y , Arab o r g a n i z a t i o n s c o u l d not meet t h i s requirement. By the l a t e 1920s smal l outbreaks of v i o l e n c e were becoming 17. W i l l i a m Quandt, The P o l i t i c s of P a l e s t i n i a n N a t i o n a l i s m (Berkeley: U n i v e r s i t y of C a l i f o r n i a Press,1973), 14-16. 18. I b i d . , 21. 21 more frequent and i n the next two decades v i o l e n c e climaxed. With the Nazi r i s e t o power i n Germany i n 1933, many Jews f l e e i n g p e r s e c u t i o n went to P a l e s t i n e . The sudden i n c r e a s e i n immigration sparked r i o t s as the Arabs became concerned t h a t they would soon become a m i n o r i t y i n P a l e s t i n e . Small g u e r r i l l a groups harassed Jewish s e t t l e m e n t s and a c t s of sabotage and g u e r r i l l a a c t i v i t i e s vere used by both the Z i o n i s t s and the Arabs. By the 1930s s i x main P a l e s t i n i a n p o l i t i c a l o r g a n i z a t i o n s had developed, the most powerful of v h i c h vere dominated by the Nashashibis and the Husaynis. Haj al-Amin a l - H u s a y n i , the M u f t i of Jerusalem, vas the most popular n a t i o n a l leader i n P a l e s t i n e a t t h i s time. When the Arab Higher Committee vas formed i n 1936 a l l s i x p o l i t i c a l p a r t i e s j o i n e d and Haj al-Amin a l - H u s a y n i became the Committee's p r e s i d e n t . In 1936 a ge n e r a l s t r i k e vas s u c c e s s f u l l y o r g a n i z e d by the Arab Higher Committee to p r o t e s t Z i o n i s t immigration and to demand a n a t i o n a l government. As s t a t e d by the Arab Higher Committee, the s t r i k e vas "to c o n t i n u e . . . u n t i l the B r i t i s h government changes i t s present p o l i c y i n a fundamental manner, the beginning of v h i c h i s the stoppage of J e v i s h immigration." (19) The o r g a n i z a t i o n and c o n t i n u a t i o n of the g e n e r a l s t r i k e i s g e n e r a l l y v i e v e d as one of the most u n i f i e d e x p r e s s i o n s of P a l e s t i n i a n o p p o s i t i o n to J e v i s h immigration d u r i n g the mandate y e a r s . The 19. c i t e d i n W.F. Abboushi, The Unmaking of P a l e s t i n e (Kent: Whitstable L i t h o L t d . , 1985), 92. 22 s t r i k e brought v i r t u a l l y a l l Arab business and t r a n s p o r t to a f u l l s t o p . While Arabs i n government p o s i t i o n s d i d not s t r i k e f o r fear t h a t they would loose t h e i r jobs to the Z i o n i s t s , they c o n t r i b u t e d t e n percent of t h e i r s a l a r i e s to the s t r i k e r s . The peasants a l s o continued to work so t h a t they c o u l d provide food t o the s t r i k e r s . However, the g e n e r a l s t r i k e proved to be u n s u c c e s s f u l i n many ways. I t l a s t e d f o r s i x months d u r i n g which time the Jews became more s e l f - s u f f i c i e n t by d e v e l o p i n g those i n d u s t r i e s t h a t the Arabs had brought to a h a l t . In a d d i t i o n the B r i t i s h government r e f u s e d t o suspend the immigration of Jews d u r i n g the s t r i k e and a c t u a l l y i n c r e a s e d immigration quotas. The c h a o t i c s i t u a t i o n t h a t surrounded the s t r i k e prompted the B r i t i s h t o send a commission, known as the P e e l Commission, t o i n v e s t i g a t e the outbreaks of v i o l e n c e . Speaking before the commission Haj al-Amin al-Husayni o u t l i n e d four r e q u e s t s : 1) that B r i t a i n abandon i t s plans f o r a Jewish home i n P a l e s t i n e ; 2) t h a t Jewish immigration come to a h a l t ; 3) t h a t the s a l e of Arab land t o Jews be p r o h i b i t e d ; and 4) t h a t the q u e s t i o n of P a l e s t i n e be d e a l t with i n the same manner as other Arab t e r r i t o r i e s has been d e a l t with. The Commission, commenting on the p o s i t i o n of the Arabs over the f u t u r e of P a l e s t i n e q u i t e a c c u r a t e l y observed that t h e i r demands had "not s h i f t e d by an i n c h " s i n c e 1920. (20) The P e e l Commission suggested t h a t P a l e s t i n e be p a r t i t i o n e d 20. c i t e d i n I b i d . , 117. 23 so t h a t B r i t a i n c o u l d meet i t s c o n f l i c t i n g o b l i g a t i o n s . The Commission s t a t e d : M a n i f e s t l y the problem cannot be s o l v e d by g i v i n g e i t h e r the Arabs or the Jevs a l l they vant. The ansver t o the q u e s t i o n 'Which of them i n the end v i l l govern P a l e s t i n e ? 1 must s u r e l y be N e i t h e r . . . . . . P a r t i t i o n seems to o f f e r a t l e a s t a chance of u l t i m a t e peace. We can see none i n any other plan.(21) But the Arabs r e j e c t e d any p a r t i t i o n of P a l e s t i n e due t o t h e i r b e l i e f t h a t the Z i o n i s t s d i d not have l e g i t i m a t e c l a i m s t o P a l e s t i n i a n l a n d . A f t e r a c l o s e r examination of the pl a n the B r i t i s h government a l s o concluded t h a t the p l a n vas i m p r a c t i c a l . In the f o l l o w i n g years Arab a t t a c k s on J e v i s h s e t t l e m e n t s i n c r e a s e d throughout the c o u n t r y s i d e and a f u l l s c a l e r e b e l l i o n seemed t o be e v o l v i n g . The B r i t i s h government took severe measures, p r a c t i s i n g c o l l e c t i v e punishment, d e t a i n i n g suspects and d e c l a r i n g the Arab Higher Committee u n l a w f u l . The B r i t i s h a r r e s t e d P a l e s t i n i a n n a t i o n a l l e a d e r s , and many members of the Arab Higher Committee, i n c l u d i n g P r e s i d e n t Haj al-Amin a l - Husayni, f l e d the country. But even a f t e r the B r i t i s h implemented such measures v i o l e n c e continued, although the Arabs vere nov v i t h o u t e f f e c t i v e l e a d e r s h i p and o r g a n i z a t i o n . In 1939, on the verge of var, B r i t a i n i s s u e d a White Paper t h a t vas the most agreeable p r o p o s a l t h a t the Arabs had seen i n some y e a r s . The paper allowed f o r the immigration of 75,000 Jevs 21. c i t e d i n United Nations, The O r i g i n s and E v o l u t i o n of the P a l e s t i n e Problem P a r t 1, 57. 24 over f i v e y e a r s , a f t e r which time immigration would end. Jews and Arabs were to share a r o l e i n government a c c o r d i n g to the s i z e of t h e i r p o p u l a t i o n . The paper s a i d t h a t P a l e s t i n e would become independent i n ten years time as long as the B r i t i s h government was s a t i s f i e d t h a t "adequate p r o v i s i o n had been made f o r . . . t h e s p e c i a l p o s i t i o n i n P a l e s t i n e of the Jewish N a t i o n a l Home." (22) The paper a l s o s a i d t h a t independence would be granted as long as Arab-Jewish r e l a t i o n s had developed to a p o i n t "as would make good government p o s s i b l e . " (23) Since the B r i t i s h White Paper was c l e a r l y the best o f f e r t h a t the Arabs had seen, some Arabs c o n s i d e r e d a c c e p t i n g the pl a n . However, many d i d not t r u s t the B r i t i s h and were s u s p i c i o u s of the c o n d i t i o n s t h a t were t o be met p r i o r t o independence. P a l e s t i n i a n o r g a n i z a t i o n s d i d not b e l i e v e t h a t the B r i t i s h were a t r u s t w o r t h y a l l y and because some of the aspects of the paper were vague, the Arabs h e s i t a t e d t o accept i t . The B r i t i s h were p e r c e i v e d t o be a c l o s e a l l y of the Z i o n i s t s because i t appeared as though the Z i o n i s t s had a g r e a t d e a l of i n f l u e n c e i n London. In the end both the Arabs and the Z i o n i s t s r e j e c t e d the White Paper. V i o l e n c e i n P a l e s t i n e continued as the B r i t i s h attempted to implement the White Paper. The B r i t i s h t r i e d , u n s u c c e s s f u l l y to maintain order i n P a l e s t i n e , and they made attempts a t l i m i t i n g 22. c i t e d i n Abboushi, The Unmaking of P a l e s t i n e , 163. 23. c i t e d i n I b i d . , 162. 25 land purchases and immigration. However, the Arabs complained t h a t the p o l i c i e s were i n e f f e c t i v e and the Z i o n i s t s c r i t i c i s e d them as c o n t r a r y to the B a l f o u r D e c l a r a t i o n and the mandate. Throughout the Second World War a l l d i p l o m a t i c e f f o r t s aimed a t r e s o l v i n g the d i f f e r e n c e s betveen the Z i o n i s t s and the Arabs f a i l e d . While the Z i o n i s t s c a l l e d f o r an independent J e v i s h s t a t e , the Arabs vanted to prevent a p a r t i t i o n of P a l e s - t i n e . World War Tvo i n t e n s i f i e d the problem because i n i t s aftermath, many Jevs f l e e i n g Europe sought refuge i n P a l e s t i n e . B r i t a i n , f i n d i n g the s i t u a t i o n i n the mandated t e r r i t o r y impos- s i b l e , took the problem to the United Nations i n 1947. The General Assembly, through r e s o l u t i o n 181 (1947), voted f o r the c r e a t i o n of an Arab and a J e v i s h s t a t e i n P a l e s t i n e . The Z i o n i s t s vere happy v i t h the p a r t i t i o n p l a n , a l t h o u g h some vanted more land. The Arabs on the other hand c h a l l e n g e d the l e g a l i t y of the r e s o l u t i o n and they made i t c l e a r t h a t they vere going to t r y to prevent a p a r t i t i o n . The q u e s t i o n of hov the UN vas going to e n f o r c e i t s r e s o l u t i o n became pr o b l e m a t i c . When the B r i t i s h t roops l e f t P a l e s t i n e on May 14 1948, amongst much f i g h t i n g , the s t a t e of I s r a e l vas e s t a b l i s h e d . Although the armies of f i v e Arab coun- t r i e s came to the a s s i s t a n c e of the P a l e s t i n i a n s on the f o l l o w i n g day, the I s r a e l i s proved to be much more p o v e r f u l and b e t t e r o r g a n i z e d . The r e s u l t vas a l a r g e s c a l e exodus of P a l e s t i n i a n s , many of vhom f l e d to neighbouring Arab c o u n t r i e s . 26 In t h i s f i r s t phase i n the e v o l u t i o n of P a l e s t i n i a n n a t i o n - a l i s m a number of f a c t s are noteworthy. P a l e s t i n i a n s developed an image of t h e i r separate i d e n t i t y , not o n l y from B r i t i s h and the Z i o n i s t s but a l s o from t h e i r Arab neighbours. The mandate years can best be d e s c r i b e d as a s t i r r i n g phase, when n a t i o n a l f e e l i n g s were developed i n r e a c t i o n t o the Z i o n i s t immigrants who seemed to be t h r e a t e n i n g the l i f e s t y l e t h a t the P a l e s t i n i a n Arabs wished t o p r e s e r v e . P a l e s t i n i a n o r g a n i z a t i o n s had h o l i s t i c g o a ls i n the s t i r r i n g phase. They c a l l e d f o r P a l e s t i n i a n self-government, the stoppage of Jewish immigration and an a b o l i t i o n of the Z i o n i s t p l a n f o r a Jewish home i n P a l e s t i n e . The t r a d i t i o n a l P a l e s t i n i a n s o c i e t y was moved out of i t s apathy. The major weakness of the P a l e s t i n i a n n a t i o n a l movement i n the s t i r r i n g phase was the f a i l u r e t o r e a l i z e both t h e i r l i m i t a t i o n s and the s t r e n g t h of t h e i r opponents. P a l e s t i n i a n n a t i o n a l s faced a dilemma, they were u n w i l l i n g t o cooperate with the B r i t i s h because they were seen as c o l o n i a l i s t s , but i f they wished t o weaken the Z i o n i s t p l a n f o r a homeland i n P a l e s t i n e , c o o p e r a t i o n with the B r i t i s h would probably have been the best way of a c c o m p l i s h i n g t h i s . The r e f u s a l t o compromise, r e g a r d l e s s of how l e g i t i m a t e they f e l t t h e i r c l a i m s to be, r e s u l t e d i n missed o p p o r t u n i t i e s such as the White Paper of 1939, which was the most f a v o u r a b l e o f f e r t h a t the B r i t i s h presented to the Arabs d u r i n g the mandate y e a r s . In a d d i t i o n , Arab c o n f r o n t a t i o n with the B r i t i s h r e s u l t e d i n s t r o n g B r i t i s h counter measures such as the steps t h a t were taken i n response to the u p r i s i n g s of the 27 l a t e 1930's. B r i t i s h p o l i c i e s brought chaos to the P a l e s t i n i a n n a t i o n a l movement as i t vas l e f t exhausted and unable to r e g a i n e f f e c t i v e o r g a n i z a t i o n . In the end the P a l e s t i n i a n s vere not able to a v o i d the e s t a b l i s h m e n t of the s t a t e of I s r a e l and the e x i l e of hundreds of thousands of P a l e s t i n i a n s . Because the m a j o r i t y of P a l e s t i n i a n refugees vent to neigh- bouring Arab c o u n t r i e s , f o r the next tvo decades the P a l e s t i n e problem vas to be p r i m a r i l y an Arab problem. The p e r i o d betveen 1948 and 1967 vas a stagnant and i n a c t i v e time f o r P a l e s t i n i a n organized o p p o s i t i o n to I s r a e l , a t v h i c h time Arab p o l i t i c i a n s dominated P a l e s t i n i a n p o l i t i c s . Pan-Arab u n i t y had a l v a y s been a f a c t o r i n P a l e s t i n i a n p o l i t i c s , but betveen 1948 and 1967 many P a l e s t i n i a n s b e l i e v e d t h a t t h e i r r e t u r n to P a l e s t i n e depended p u r e l y upon the a c h i e v e - ments of Arab u n i t y . As i n the f i r s t p e r i o d of P a l e s t i n i a n n a t i o n a l i s m , i n the the post-1948 p e r i o d I s r a e l c o n t i n u e d to be seen as a c o l o n i a l s t a t e and the P a l e s t i n i a n s f e l t t h a t they had a r i g h t to r e g a i n a l l of mandate P a l e s t i n e . But i n the post-1948 p e r i o d Arab u n i t y vas f e l t to be the best vay to e l i m i n a t e " c o l o n i a l " I s r a e l and the most s i g n i f i c a n t spokesman of pan- Arabism i n t h i s p e r i o d vas the c h a r i s m a t i c l e a d e r of Egypt, Gamal Abdel Nasser. Nasser's thoughts on Arab u n i t y and the s i t u a t i o n of the Arab people vas expressed i n h i s book Egypt's L i b e r a t i o n ; The P h i l o s - ophy of the R e v o l u t i o n . In t h i s book Nasser expressed g r e a t g r i e f over the veakness of the Arabs. M e n t a l l y p a r a l y s e d f o r c e n t u r i e s , 28 the Arabs had been dominated by f o r e i g n e r s and had been "robbed ... of a l l sense of s t r e n g t h and honour." (24) Over the c e n t u r i e s , Nasser argued, f o r e i g n r u l e suppressed the Arabs and made them f e e l i n f e r i o r . F o r e i g n s t a t e s such as B r i t a i n , France and the United S t a t e s behave i n a s u p e r i o r and i n s u l t i n g manner towards the Arabs, d r a i n i n g the Arabs of t h e i r p r i d e and d i g n i t y . Nasser c a l l e d Western i m p e r i a l i s m "the gre a t f o r c e t h a t i s imposing a murderous, i n v i s i b l e s i e g e upon the whole r e g i o n . " (25) In order t h a t the Arabs might be awakened from t h e i r slumber, they were t o u n i t e and achieve n a t i o n a l d i g n i t y . Nasser b e l i e v e d t h a t when the Arabs were u n i f i e d and s t r o n g they would ga i n a f e e l i n g of n a t i o n a l p r i d e and would then have r e s p e c t f o r themselves and t h e i r c i v i l i z a t i o n . U n i f i c a t i o n of the Arabs was p o s s i b l e not o n l y because they shared a common c u l t u r e , language and h i s t o r y , but a l s o because they had a common d e s i r e to r i d themselves of f o r e i g n h u m i l i a t i o n . Arab u n i t y would be s t r o n g enough t o b r i n g f o r e i g n e x p l o i t a t i o n t o an end and g i v e the Arabs a sense of p r i d e . Nasser b e l i e v e d t h a t Egypt had a s p e c i a l r o l e t o p l a y i n the s t r u g g l e a g a i n s t f o r e i g n oppression because of i t s s p e c i a l l o c a - t i o n i n A f r i c a , i n the Arab world and i n the I s l a m i c world. Nasser e n v i s i o n e d three c i r c l e s s urrounding Egypt which made Egypt's r o l e i n the s t r u g g l e a g a i n s t i m p e r i a l i s m c e n t r a l . The 24. Gamal Abdul Nasser, Egypt's L i b e r a t i o n : The P h i l o s o p h y of the R e v o l u t i o n (Washington: P u b l i c A f f a i r s P r e s s , 1955), 63. 25. I b i d . , 103. 29 f i r s t c i r c l e was the Arab c i r c l e , which, a c c o r d i n g to Nasser, was the most important one to Egyptians as i t was the one t h a t was c l o s e s t to them. Egyptians were t i e d to the Arab world because of t h e i r common h i s t o r y and c i v i l i z a t i o n and Nasser b e l i e v e d that the Arabs had g r e a t p o t e n t i a l , t h i s being a r e s u l t of t h e i r u n i t y , the s t r a t e g i c s i t u a t i o n of t h e i r t e r r i t o r y and t h e i r o i l . The second c i r c l e was the A f r i c a n c i r c l e , i n which Egypt, as a p a r t of A f r i c a had a r e s p o n s i b i l i t y to h e l p A f r i c a n s s t r u g g l e a g a i n s t white i m p e r i a l i s t s . The t h i r d c i r c l e was the I s l a m i c c i r c l e , i n which a l l Muslims were i n c l u d e d . Nasser b e l i e v e d t h a t the p i l g r i m a g e to Mecca co u l d be developed i n t o an i n s t i t u t i o n that would u n i f y a l l Muslims, i n s i s t i n g t h a t i t was "an i n s t i t u - t i o n of g r e a t p o l i t i c a l power." (26) Mecca c o u l d become the meeting place f o r an I s l a m i c world parliament where mutual c o o p e r a t i o n among Muslims co u l d be e s t a b l i s h e d from year to year. Because he b e l i e v e d t h a t Egypt's r o l e was t h a t of leader a g a i n s t i m p e r i a l i s m i n the Arab world, i t was o n l y obvious that Nasser would c o n s i d e r Egypt to be an important a c t o r i n the P a l e s t i n i a n problem. Nasser e l e v a t e d the P a l e s t i n i a n q u e s t i o n to the c e n t r e of Arab p o l i t i c s because i t i n c l u d e d two elements t h a t he wished to promote; pan-Arabism and a n t i - c o l o n i a l i s m . I s r a e l was a symbol of Western power over Arab la n d s , as i t was c r e a t e d and p r o t e c t e d by the West. Speaking on the i s s u e of P a l e s t i n e , Nasser argued t h a t 26. I b i d . , 112. 30 The i m p e r i a l i s t s intended t h i s t e r r i t o r y to be a b a r r i e r d i v i d i n g the Arab East from the Arab West, and a constant d r a i n on the energy of the Arab n a t i o n , d i v e r t i n g i t from p o s i t i v e c o n s t r u c - t i o n . (27) The e s t a b l i s h m e n t of the s t a t e of I s r a e l vas, f o r the Arabs, a constant reminder of t h e i r veakness and t h e i r i n a b i l i t y to c o n t r o l t h e i r land and t h e i r d e s t i n y . What vas needed t o r e g a i n P a l e s t i n e vas Arab u n i t y . Because Egypt vas to le a d the Arab n a t i o n , Nasser f e l t t h a t he had a l e g i t i m a t e r i g h t to le a d the P a l e s t i n i a n s and many P a l e s t i n i a n s , f e e l i n g v i c t i m i z e d by the West and i m p e r i a l i s m , vere a t t r a c t e d t o Nasser's p r o g r e s s i v e and a n t i - c o l o n i a l i d e a s . Nasser vas important t o P a l e s t i n i a n s because he c a l l e d f o r Arab u n i t y and e x c i t e d a P a l e s t i n i a n audience i n h i s c a l l s f o r the r i g h t s of the P a l e s t i n i a n s , vhat he c a l l e d the "sacred cause." To P a l e s t i n i a n s pan-Arabism vas seen to be the best means to achieve the sought a f t e r end, a P a l e s t i n i a n s t a t e i n a l l of mandate P a l e s t i n e . In 1964 a t the F i r s t Arab Summit Conference, P r e s i d e n t Nasser i n i t i a t e d the c r e a t i o n of the P a l e s t i n e L i b e r a t i o n Organ- i z a t i o n . The PLO vas manipulated by Arab s t a t e s and t h i s vas j u s t i f i e d on the grounds that the l i b e r a t i o n of P a l e s t i n e vas p a r t of a l a r g e r g o a l of l i b e r a t i n g the e n t i r e Arab v o r l d from i m p e r i a l i s m . Hovever, vhen the Arab s t a t e s s u f f e r e d a h u m i l i a t i n g 27. c i t e d i n Aaron David M i l l e r , The Arab S t a t e s and the P a l e s t i n e Question, (Nev York: P r a e g e r ) , 61. 31 d e f e a t i n 1967, pan-Arabism was d i s c r e d i t e d as the best way to achieve an independent P a l e s t i n i a n s t a t e and P a l e s t i n i a n o r g a n i z a t i o n s t h a t c a l l e d f o r independent P a l e s t i n i a n l e a d e r s h i p took over i n p l a c e of pan-Arabism. 32 CHAPTER TWO THE PLO AND THE PALESTINIAN REVOLUTION A f t e r the d e f e a t of the Arab s t a t e s i n the S i x Days War, I s r a e l occupied a l l of Mandate P a l e s t i n e and many P a l e s t i n i a n s became d i s i l l u s i o n e d over the p o s s i b i l i t y of pan-Arab u n i t y a c h i e v i n g a P a l e s t i n i a n homeland. Prom 1948 to 1967 P a l e s t i n i a n s played a secondary r o l e i n the s t r u g g l e a g a i n s t I s r a e l but a f t e r 1967 a number of groups expressed resentment towards Arab domina- t i o n and the d e s i r e t o minimize Arab i n f l u e n c e i n P a l e s t i n i a n a f f a i r s . The most prominent c r i t i c of pan-Arabism i n the post-1967 p e r i o d was Yasser A r a f a t , leader of the commando group a l - F a t a h . Fatah l e a d e r s b o l d l y c a l l e d f o r the n o n - i n t e r v e n t i o n of the Arab s t a t e s i n the i n t e r n a l a f f a i r s of the P a l e s t i n i a n s . The o l d PLO was c r i t i c i s e d as being i n s u f f i c i e n t l y r e v o l u t i o n a r y and too c l o s e to the Arab s t a t e s . As a d i r e c t a t t a c k on Nasser's ideas, a Fatah spokesman s t a t e d t h a t Fatah r e f u s e d "...the c o n f i s c a t i o n of the P a l e s t i n i a n s e l f and i t s m e l t i n g i n the wider c i r c l e , the 33 c i r c l e of [Arab] n a t i o n a l i s m . (28) Fatah emphasized the c e n t r a l r o l e t h a t P a l e s t i n i a n s were t o p l a y i n the s t r u g g l e a g a i n s t I s r a e l and the group i n s i s t e d t h a t P a l e s t i n i a n s had the r i g h t to c o n s t r u c t t h e i r ovn independent p o l i t i c s . In the post-1967 p e r i o d the commando groups gained c o n t r o l of the PLO e x p r e s s i n g M a r x i s t ideas and a m i l i t a n t p o l i c y tovards I s r a e l . The d e f e a t of the Arab armies marked the beginning of a nev phase i n P a l e s t i n i a n n a t i o n a l i s m a t v h i c h time the commando groups t r i e d to remove themselves as much as p o s s i b l e from Arab c o n t r o l . The armed s t r u g g l e vas seen as the best vay to l i b e r a t e P a l e s t i n e from the Z i o n i s t o c c u p i e r s and the P a l e s t i n i a n s t r u g g l e vas seen i n the same framework as Vietnam, A l g e r i a and black A f r i c a . In the l a t e 1960's Yasser A r a f a t expressed the f e e l i n g of the commando groups vhen he s a i d : "We have b e l i e v e d t h a t the only vay to r e t u r n to our homes and land i s the armed s t r u g g l e . We b e l i e v e i n t h i s theory v i t h o u t any c o m p l i c a t i o n s , and t h i s i s our aim and our hope." (29) The PLO covenant of 1968, a r e v i s e d v e r s i o n of the 1964 covenant, r e f l e c t e d t h i s i n c r e a s e d m i l i t a n c y . The r e v i s e d coven- ant d i f f e r s from the e a r l i e r covenant i n t h a t i t emphasizes the importance of the armed s t r u g g l e , i n s i s t i n g t h a t the "armed s t r u g g l e i s the o n l y vay to l i b e r a t e P a l e s t i n e . Thus i t i s an 28. c i t e d i n Muhammad Mu s l l h , "Moderates and R e j e c t i o n i s t s Within the P a l e s t i n e L i b e r a t i o n O r g a n i z a t i o n , " Middle East J o u r n a l ( S p r i n g 1976): 129. 29. c i t e d i n " S t u f f of Arab Legends," New York Times (September 26 1970), A2. 34 o v e r a l l s t r a t e g y , not merely a t a c t i c a l phase." (30) The document re p u d i a t e s the e x i s t e n c e of I s r a e l c o m pletely and i n s i s t s t h a t a l l of P a l e s t i n e must be r e s t o r e d to the P a l e s t i n i a n people so t h a t they might e x e r c i s e t h e i r r i g h t to s e l f - d e t e r m i n a t i o n . The PLO covenant c o n t a i n s a s t r o n g indictment of Zionism and i t l i n k s the P a l e s t i n i a n s t r u g g l e f o r l i b e r a t i o n with the s t r u g g l e of a l l oppressed peoples: Zionism i s a p o l i t i c a l movement o r g a n i c a l l y a s s o c i a t e d with i n t e r n a t i o n a l i m p e r i a l i s m and a n t a g o n i s t i c t o a l l a c t i o n s f o r l i b e r a t i o n and to p r o g r e s s i v e movements i n the world. I t i s r a c i s t and f a n a t i c i n i t s nature, a g g r e s s i v e , e x p a n s i o n i s t and c o l o n i a l i s t i n i t s aim, and f a s c i s t i n i t s method. (31) The PLO covenant i s c o n s i s t e n t with the t r a d i t i o n of past P a l e s t i n i a n o r g a n i z a t i o n s as A r t i c l e 20 d e c l a r e s the B a l f o u r D e c l a r a t i o n , the B r i t i s h mandate as w e l l as a l l of t h e i r conse- quences, to be n u l l and void.(32) The covenant i n s i s t s on the P a l e s t i n i a n s ' r i g h t to t h e i r h i s t o r i c homeland and i t a s s e r t s t h a t any p a r t i t i o n of P a l e s t i n e i s unacceptable. A r t i c l e 19 s t a t e s t h a t "The p a r t i t i o n of P a l e s t i n e , which took p l a c e i n 1947, and the e s t a b l i s h m e n t of I s r a e l , are fundamentally i n v a l i d , however long they l a s t " (33) Once Zionism was e l i m i n a t e d i t was b e l i e v e d t h a t P a l e s t i n i a n s would be a b l e to r e t u r n to P a l e s t i n e and e x e r c i s e t h e i r r i g h t to s e l f - d e t e r m i n a t i o n . 30. Yehoshafat Harkabi, The P a l e s t i n i a n Covenant and I t s Meaning (London: M i t c h e l Co L t d . , 1979), 114. 31. I b i d . , 123. 32. I b i d . , 122. 33. I b i d . , 122. 35 The covenant serves as a u n i f y i n g f o r c e t y i n g together a l l of the groups i n the PLO. The main p o l i c y making bodies i n the o r g a n i z a t i o n c o n s i s t of the N a t i o n a l C o u n c i l , the C e n t r a l C o u n c i l and the E x e c u t i v e Committee. Membership of the P a l e s t i n e N a t i o n a l C o u n c i l has v a r i e d over the years numbering anywhere from 200 to over 400 persons who are chosen from the P a l e s t i n i a n community around the v o r l d . The PNC f u n c t i o n s as a "parliament i n e x i l e " and i t s members are of three c a t e g o r i e s ; m i l i t a n t o r g a n i z a t i o n s such as Fatah , popular a s s o c i a t i o n s such as unions, and inde- pendents. The C e n t r a l C o u n c i l vas e s t a b l i s h e d i n the e a r l y 1970's as an i n t e r m e d i a r y betveen the PNC and the E x e c u t i v e Committee. The C e n t r a l C o u n c i l meets about once every three months and i s made up of approximately f o r t y members i n c l u d i n g a l l of the members of the E x e c u t i v e Committee and other members e l e c t e d by the PNC. The Exe c u t i v e Committee i s made up of f o u r t e e n persons and a chairman and i t i s r e s p o n s i b l e f o r implementing the p o l i c i e s adopted by the PNC. Since 1969 Yasser A r a f a t has been the chairman of the Ex e c u t i v e Committee. By f a r the l a r g e s t and most i n f l u e n t i a l group i n the PLO i s a l - F a t a h under the l e a d e r s h i p of Yasser A r a f a t . Although the group vas e s t a b l i s h e d i n the 1950's vhen pan-Arabism vas a t i t s s t r o n g e s t , Fatah has a l v a y s emphasized the c e n t r a l r o l e t h a t P a l e s t i n i a n s vere to p l a y i n t h e i r s t r u g g l e . Fatah l e a d e r s sav the P a l e s t i n i a n s t r u g g l e as a var of l i b e r a t i o n a g a i n s t c o l o n i a l - ism and f o r e i g n o p p r e s s i o n i n s i s t i n g t h a t "[a111 ve vant i s to 36 l i b e r a t e our homeland from t h i s f o r e i g n o c c u p a t i o n . " (34) The Jews of I s r a e l were seen i n the same l i g h t as the French i n A l g e r i a , f o r example. Fatah*s success can be l a r g e l y a t t r i b u t e d t o the f a c t t h a t the group has no c l e a r cut i deology, as i t d e f i n e s i t s e l f merely as "a n a t i o n a l l i b e r a t i o n movement s t r u g g l i n g a g a i n s t i m p e r i a l i s m and Zionism." (35) U n l i k e many other groups w i t h i n the PLO, Fatah s h i e s away from i d e o l o g y . In f a c t , Yasser A r a f a t has i n s i s t e d t h a t s i n c e i t i s our c o n v i c t i o n t h a t the P a l e s t i n i a n must d e d i c a t e h i m s e l f above a l l to the P a l e s t i n i a n s t r u g g l e , we r e q u i r e t h a t candidates f o r membership sever a l l t i e s with any p a r t y formations. (36) I t i s the group's nebulous c h a r a c t e r which a l l o w s a v a r i e t y of f a c t i o n s t h a t are o f t e n opposing each other to c o e x i s t w i t h i n i t . As one member remarked, " I d e o l o g i c a l l y , Fatah i s a wide super- highway with few s t o p s i g n s . " (37) Fatah r e j e c t e d the pan-Arab ideas t h a t had been so important i n P a l e s t i n i a n p o l i t i c s before the 1967 war, and the group's r i s e to power came a t a time when many P a l e s t i n i a n s f e l t a need to 34. Abdullah S c h l e i f e r , " A l Fatah Speaks; A C o n v e r s a t i o n with 'Abu Amar," Evergreen Review ( J u l y 1968): 85. 35. Johnathan Randal, "PLO's Armed S t r u g g l e R h e t o r i c , " Washington Post (March 2 1980), 1. 36. c i t e d i n Abdullad S c h e i f e r , " A l Fatah Speaks: A Conversation With Abu 'Amar,": 84. 37. c i t e d i n Johnathan Randal, "PLO's Armed S t r u g g l e R h e t o r i c , " : 1. 37 a s s e r t t h e i r independence i n determining t h e i r own f u t u r e . The t u r n i n g p o i n t f o r Fatah occurred i n March of 1968 when the group fought with the a s s i s t a n c e of the Jo r d a n i a n army a g a i n s t I s r a e l i troops a t Karameh. The " v i c t o r y " f o r Fatah a t Karameh r a i s e d the morale of many P a l e s t i n i a n s , as w e l l as many Arabs throughout the Middle E a s t , who u n t i l then f e l t t h a t the I s r a e l i army was i n v i n c i b l e . W i t h i n two days of the b a t t l e 5000 r e c r u i t s were i n s p i r e d to j o i n the fedayeen ranks, s w e l l i n g Fatah membership and making i t the most popular and powerful group i n the o r g a n i z a t i o n . Fatah's p o p u l a r i t y i s a r e s u l t of i t s l e a d e r s h i p , i t s d i f f u s e of i d e o l o g y and i t s wide range of support. For many years A r a f a t has had a commanding g r i p on the PLO and A r a f a t ' s c o n t r o l over Fatah d i s p l a y s s t a b i l i t y unknown to any other PLO group. Because the group r e c e i v e s a wide range of support from a number of Arab s t a t e s i n c l u d i n g Kuwait, Saudi A r a b i a , A l g e r i a and jPxTiV&te P a l e s t i n i a n s , i t has been able t o a v o i d complete depend- ence on any s i n g l e Arab s t a t e . However, Fatah has to be c a r e f u l not to o f f e n d the Arab s t a t e s i n i t s c a l l s f o r independence, as i t has o f t e n been charged with abandoning Arab i n t e r e s t s . Although Fatah has been the most s i g n i f i c a n t group i n the PLO i n the post-1967 e r a , other groups are a l s o i n f l u e n t i a l so t h a t Fatah i s by no means f r e e to s e t PLO p o l i c y . There are s i x main groups i n the PLO. A number of groups express M a r x i s t ideas and while Fatah attempts to minimize the r o l e of the Arab s t a t e s i n the PLO, many groups a s s i g n an important r o l e to the 38 Arab s t a t e s i n the s t r u g g l e f o r P a l e s t i n e . (38) The Popular F r o n t f o r the L i b e r a t i o n of P a l e s t i n e i s the most c r e d i b l e a l t e r n a t i v e to Fatah because the group has notable support i n the P a l e s t i n i a n community. The PFLP views the P a l e s - t i n i a n s t r u g g l e i n M a r x i s t terms and i t c r i t i c i s e s Fatah as being a c o l l e c t i o n of P a l e s t i n i a n bourgeois. George Habash, the leader of the group, i d e n t i f i e s the enemies of the P a l e s t i n i a n s t r u g g l e t o be world Zionism, i m p e r i a l i s m and Arab r e a c t i o n a r y regimes. A f t e r the 1967 d e f e a t Habash was q u i t e c r i t i c a l of the Arab s t a t e s , c l a i m i n g t h a t : The Arab armies have f a i l e d the P a l e s t i n i a n s three times now: i n 1936 they gave us hollow promises; i n 1948 they entered the war a g a i n s t I s r a e l and l o s t h a l f of P a l e s t i n e ; and i n 1967 they a g a i n entered the war a g a i n s t I s r a e l and l o s t the other h a l f of P a l e s t i n e . (39) George Habash b e l i e v e s t h a t the P a l e s t i n i a n s cannot achieve t h e i r o b j e c t i v e s u n t i l s o c i a l and p o l i t i c a l r e v o l u t i o n s occur i n most of the Arab world. The group has i n s i s t e d t h a t there i s to be no d e a l i n g with the enemy and although the PFLP i s q u i t e 38. The s i x major groups w i t h i n the PLO are Fatah, ( n a t i o n a l i s t , i n d e p e n d e n t i s t ) , the Popular Front f o r the L i b e r a t i o n of P a l e s t i n e ( M a r x i s t ) , Sa'iqa ( p r o - S y r i a n p a n - A r a b i s t ) , the Pop- u l a r Democratic Front f o r the L i b e r a t i o n of P a l e s t i n e ( M a r x i s t ) , the Popular Front f o r the L i b e r a t i o n of P a l e s t i n e - General Command ( M a r x i s t ) , and the Arab L i b e r a t i o n Front (pro- I r a q i p a n - A r a b i s t ) . Smaller r e s i s t a n c e groups w i t h i n the PLO are the P a l e s t i n i a n Popular S t r u g g l e F r o n t ( p r o - S y r i a n ) , which has never had a seat on the E x e c u t i v e Committee and the P a l e s t i n e L i b e r a t i o n Front ( p r o - I r a q i ) , which had a s e a t i n 1983. The Communist p a r t y was g i v e n a s e a t on the E x e c u t i v e Committee i n 1987. 39. John W Amos, P a l e s t i n i a n R e s i s t e n c e : O r g a n i z a t i o n of a N a t i o n a l i s t Movement (New York: Pergamon P r e s s , 1980), 77. 39 c r i t i c a l of " i m p e r i a l i s t i c " Arab s t a t e s , the group i s w i l l i n g to a s s o c i a t e with " n o n - r e a c t i o n a r y " regimes such as L i b y a , South Yeman and A l g e r i a . The PFLP was formed i n 1967 by combining three s m a l l e r groups. Two of these three groups, the Heroes of Return and the N a t i o n a l Front f o r the L i b e r a t i o n of P a l e s t i n e , were c l o s e l y a f f i l i a t e d v i t h the M a r x i s t Arab n a t i o n a l i s t movement. Because the PFLP's h e r i t a g e i s i n the Arab n a t i o n a l movement, the group b e l i e v e s t h a t a s o c i a l r e v o l u t i o n i n much of the Arab v o r l d i s needed before P a l e s t i n i a n s can r e s t o r e t h e i r r i g h t s . Q u i t e on the c o n t r a r y to Fatah, v h i c h sees no value i n d e s c r i b i n g the shape and d e t a i l of P a l e s t i n e a f t e r i t s l i b e r a t i o n , the PFLP bases i t s s t r u g g l e on a M a r x i s t i d e o l o g y and as a r e s u l t of i t s i d e a l i s m the group seems q u i t e i n f l e x i b l e . While Fatah has not d e s c r i b e d the type of s o c i e t y t h a t i t v i s h e s t o c r e a t e i n c l a s s terms, the PFLP i s q u i t e concerned v i t h the s o c i a l context of the r e v o l u t i o n . Although Fatah seems t o be r e l a t i v e l y f l e x i b l e i n t h i s r e s p e c t , the PFLP appears to be so c o n s t r a i n e d by Marxism and the pan-Arab r e v o l u t i o n t h a t i t i s u n v i l l i n g t o a l t e r i t s p l a t f o r m f o r a more pragmatic, p r o g r e s s i v e and moderate p o l i c y . The Popular F r o n t ' s i d e a l i s m i s c l e a r l y r e p r e s e n t e d i n the f o l l o w i n g statement made by a PFLP r e p r e s e n t a t i v e : The f u t u r e s t a t e of P a l e s t i n e a f t e r the l i b e r a t i o n v i l l be run a c c o r d i n g to M a r x i s t - L e n i n i s t p r i n c i p l e s . There v i l l be a M a r x i s t - L e n i n i s t p a r t y and the PFLP v i l l be the leader of the r e v o l u t i o n . T h i s f i g h t f o r the l i b e r - a t i o n of P a l e s t i n e v i l l take another 20 to 30 y e a r s , and a f t e r the r e v o l u t i o n e v e r y t h i n g v i l l be d i f f e r e n t . Not o n l y v i l l P a l e s t i n e be f r e e from Zionism, but Lebanon and Jordan v i l l be f r e e from r e a c t i o n , and S y r i a and Iraq from p e t i t b o u r g e o i s i e . They v i l l be transformed i n a 40 t r u l y s o c i a l i s t sense and u n i t e d . P a l e s t i n e w i l l be p a r t of a M a r x i s t - L e n i n i s t A r a b i a . (40) The PFLP i s not the o n l y group i n the PLO t h a t i s committed to a M a r x i s t i d e o l o g y . Two s m a l l e r groups which came about as a r e s u l t of a s p l i t i n the PFLP are the Popular Democratic Front f o r the L i b e r a t i o n of P a l e s t i n e and the Popular F r o n t f o r the L i b e r a t i o n of P a l e s t i n e - G e n e r a l Command. The PDFLP (or DFLP) s p l i t from the PFLP because i t saw the PFLP as too r i g h t wing. The DFLP takes i t s Marxism very s e r i o u s l y and i s probably the most l e f t of a l l of the groups w i t h i n the PLO. S i m i l a r to the PFLP, the DFLP b e l i e v e s t h a t P a l e s t i n e w i l l be l i b e r a t e d a f t e r a r e v o l u t i o n occurs i n the r e s t of the Arab world. "The v i c t o r y of the P a l e s t i n e l i b e r a t i o n movement over the Z i o n i s t enemy" a DFLP spokesman s t a t e d , "depends on v i c t o r y over i m p e r i a l i s m i n the Arab r e g i o n . " (41) But while i t i s r a d i c a l i n i t s i d e o l o g y , the DFLP enjoys support i n P a l e s t i n i a n community and has a r e l a t i v e l y moderate a t t i t u d e towards I s r a e l i s , f r e q u e n t l y l e a d i n g the PLO i n moderating i t s p o l i c i e s towards I s r a e l . The other s p i n - o f f of the PFLP, i s the PFLP-GC, a group that does not have s i g n i f i c a n t i n f l u e n c e over PLO p o l i c i e s . The PFLP- GC i s probably the most m i l i t a n t group i n the o r g a n i z a t i o n as i t has t r a d i t i o n a l l y been opposed to any p o l i t i c a l s e t t l e m e n t of the c o n f l i c t . The l e a d e r of the group, Ahmad J i b r i l , i s a P a l e s t i n - 40. W i l l i a m B Quandt, The P o l i t i c s of P a l e s t i n i a n N a t i o n a l i s m (Berkeley: U n i v e r s i t y of C a l i f o r n i a P r e s s , 1973), 108. 41. Riad N El-Rayyes and Dunia Nahas, G u e r r i l l a s f o r P a l e s t i n e ( B e i r u t : An-Nahar Press S e r v i c e s , 1974), 39. 41 i a n o f f i c e r from the S y r i a n army who o f t e n r e j e c t s PNC d e c i s i o n s and wishes to concentrate on the armed s t r u g g l e . While the group i s c r i t i c a l of the commando groups t h a t a f f i l i a t e them- s e l v e s with Arab c o u n t r i e s , the group i t s e l f r e c e i v e s a i d from S y r i a and L i b y a . A PFLP-GC spokesman has complained t h a t "The r e s i s t a n c e movement has become a t e s t i n g ground f o r the v a r i o u s Arab regimes." (42) The PFLP-GCs c r i t i c i s m s are by no means i n a c c u r a t e . Pan-Arabism has always played a s i g n i f i c a n t r o l e i n P a l e s - t i n i a n p o l i t i c s and i n the post-1967 e r a the Arab s t a t e s c o n t i n - ued t o support the PLO. Even though pan-Arabism had l o s t much of i t s appeal a f t e r the Arab d e f e a t i n 1967, the PLO c o u l d not operate o u t s i d e of Arab i n f l u e n c e , because the o r g a n i z a t i o n could not v e r y w e l l accept the support of the Arab s t a t e s while a t the same time r e f u s i n g t h e i r guidance. As a r e s u l t , the Arab s t a t e s were a b l e to use support f o r the PLO to pursue t h e i r own i n t e r e s t s . Arab i n f l u e n c e i s c l e a r l y demonstrated by the f a c t that groups d i r e c t l y under the c o n t r o l of the Arab s t a t e s are ab l e t o a f f e c t PLO p o l i c y and even the l e a d e r s of the most i n f l u e n t i a l group, Fatah, a c t c a r e f u l l y so as not to i n s u l t the Arab s t a t e s i n t h e i r c a l l s f o r independence. Many of the Arab s t a t e s would l i k e t o a l t e r the g o a l s of the PLO so t h a t they c o u l d correspond v i t h t h e i r ovn. The t h r e a t that a s t r o n g and u n i t e d movement vould pose to the Arab s t a t e s has 42. I b i d . , 44. 42 motivated Arab r u l e r s to l i m i t the u n i t y and independence of the movement. Arab i n f l u e n c e has helped t o prevent any s i n g l e group from d e t e r m i n i n g the p o l i c i e s of the o r g a n i z a t i o n , so t h a t v h i l e Arab support has kept the PLO a l i v e , pan-Arab r h e t o r i c has a l s o made i t p o s s i b l e f o r the Arab s t a t e s to j u s t i f y t h e i r meddlesome p o l i t i c s and to r e s t r a i n PLO p o l i c y makers. There are a few groups w i t h i n the PLO t h a t are puppets of Arab s t a t e s , c r e a t e d by Arab s t a t e s to p r o t e c t t h e i r own i n t e r - e s t s . S a ' i q a , a S y r a i n puppet, was c r e a t e d i n the 1960's out of P a l e s t i n i a n s i n the S y r i a n Ba'th p a r t y . In the l i b e r a t i o n of P a l e s t i n e Sa'iqa members argue t h a t a r e v o l u t i o n i n the Arab world i s necessary and they b e l i e v e t h a t the r e v o l u t i o n w i l l r e s u l t i n a new Arab s o c i e t y t h a t w i l l be s o c i a l i s t . A Sa'iqa r e p r e s e n t a t i v e has i n s i s t e d t h a t " n e i t h e r the P a l e s t i n i a n s alone nor any p a r t of the r e s i s t a n c e movement are e n t i t l e d t o determine on t h e i r own a s o l u t i o n f o r the f a t e of P a l e s t i n e a f t e r v i c t o r y . " (43) But Sa'iqa's t i e s to S y r i a have o f t e n made i t s p o l i c i e s unpopular among P a l e s t i n i a n s , as i n 1976 when Sa'iqa supported S y r i a n m i l i t a r y i n t e r v e n t i o n a g a i n s t the PLO i n Lebanon. Another Arab puppet i n the PLO i s the Arab L i b e r a t i o n Front, and as i t s name makes c l e a r , the group i s more concerned with the Arab r a t h e r than the P a l e s t i n i a n nature of the s t r u g g l e . At the time of i t s c r e a t i o n an ALF statement d e c l a r e d t h a t the s t r u g g l e was becoming too e x c l u s i v e l y P a l e s t i n i a n o r i e n t e d . The ALF 43. c i t e d i n W i l l i a m Quandt, P a l e s t i n i a n N a t i o n a l i s m : I t s P o l i t i c a l and M i l i t a r y Dimensions, 69. 43 f o l l o w s the p o l i c i e s of the I r a q i Ba'ath p a r t y and i t was c r e a t e d i n an e f f o r t to counter S y r i a n i n f l u e n c e i n the PLO. However, the ALF i s much l e s s I n f l u e n t i a l than the S y r i a n puppet Sa'iqa. A n o t a b l y high number of i t s members are not P a l e s t i n i a n s and ALF has a weak r e p r e s e n t a t i o n i n the occupied t e r r i t o r i e s and the refugee camps. A few g e n e r a l i z a t i o n s can be made about the d i r e c t i o n t h a t the P a l e s t i n i a n movement took a f t e r the 1967 d e f e a t . As an i n t e r n a l look a t the PLO demonstrates, the PLO houses a v a r i e t y of i d e o l o g i c a l b e l i e f s and the m a j o r i t y of groups w i t h i n the PLO see the s t r u g g l e f o r P a l e s t i n e i n a s o c i a l i s t c o n t e x t . A f t e r 1967 a l l of the commando groups vere a b l e to agree on tvo t h i n g s ; the g o a l of an independent P a l e s t i n i a n s t a t e and the armed s t r u g g l e as the best vay to achieve t h i s g o a l . But beyond agreement on these tvo i d e a s , the v a r i o u s groups v i t h i n the PLO vere q u i t e d i v i d e d i n t h e i r i d e o l o g y and t h e i r support. The most i n f l u e n t i a l group v i t h i n the PLO, Fatah, emphasizes the importance of P a l e s t i n i a n independence i n t h e i r ovn a f f a i r s and most of the groups i n the PLO have spoken out a g a i n s t c o l o n i a l i s m and Arab r e a c t i o n a r y regimes. But even though Arab i n f l u e n c e vas reduced s i g n i f i c a n t l y a f t e r 1967, the PLO vas by no means independent of the Arab s t a t e s because they depended on the Arabs f o r f i n a n c e s and a t e r r i t o r i a l base due t o the f a c t t h a t I s r a e l occupied a l l of mandate P a l e s t i n e . While the v a r i o u s groups d i s a g r e e d on the r o l e of the Arab s t a t e s i n the P a l e s t i n - ian s t r u g g l e , a l l of the groups d i d agree on the fragmentation of 44 the Arab world. The Ma r x i s t s attempted to overcome t h i s fragment- a t i o n with a s o c i a l r e v o l u t i o n i n the Arab world, while Fatah wished to be independent of Arab p o l i t i c s . So while 1967 marked a change i n the d i r e c t i o n of the P a l e s t i n i a n movement, there was a l s o some c o n t i n u i t y i n the movement i n the post-1967 p e r i o d . Regardless of how much some of the commando groups may have wanted to be s e l f - r e l i a n t , i n the post-1967 p e r i o d the Arab s t a t e s continued t o be important a c t o r s i n P a l e s t i n i a n a f f a i r s . As with e a r l i e r o r g a n i z a t i o n s , the PLO c a l l e d f o r an end to Z i o n i s t r u l e i n P a l e s t i n e so t h a t P a l e s t i n i a n s c o u l d e x e r c i s e t h e i r r i g h t t o s e l f - d e t e r m i n a t i o n . They l i n k e d the P a l e s t i n i a n s t r u g g l e with the s t r u g g l e of a l l oppressed peoples of the world. The Z i o n i s t s were p e r c e i v e d as having c o l o n i a l aims i n the s t i r r i n g phase, and l a t e r the s t a t e of I s r a e l was viewed as a c o l o n i a l o c c u p a t i o n . In s p i t e of I s r a e l ' s permanence and i n t e r - n a t i o n a l support, the commando groups f e l t t h a t they would e v e n t u a l l y be s u c c e s s f u l i n d e f e a t i n g I s r a e l . However, the goal of d e s t r o y i n g the s t a t e of I s r a e l and e s t a b l i s h i n g an independent P a l e s t i n i a n s t a t e i n a l l of mandate P a l e s t i n e v i a the armed s t r u g g l e was u n r e a l i s t i c i n t h a t i t r e q u i r e d c a p a b i l i t i e s much beyond the o r g a n i z a t i o n ' s r e s o u r c e s . While the PLO had gained some independence and was sure of t h e i r b a s i c g o a l and how i t was to be obtained, the o r g a n i z a t i o n was unaware of i t s l i m i t a t i o n s . G r a d u a l l y , changes d i d occur t h a t took I s r a e l ' s permanence and the l i m i t s of Arab support i n t o account and these changes e v e n t u a l l y began to a l t e r some of the 45 fundamentals of the P a l e s t i n i a n n a t i o n a l movement. Pan-Arabism was to become even more p a i n f u l l y d i s i l l u s i o n i n g and burdensome and some groups i n the PLO began to adopt a t t i t u d e s t h a t c o n t r a d i c t e d the PLO's p o s i t i o n t h a t I s r a e l was a c o l o n i a l s ettlement t h a t must e v e n t u a l l y be d e f e a t e d . 46 CHAPTER THREE THE POLITICS OF COMPROMISE A f t e r the 1967 war, a l l of the P a l e s t i n i a n commando groups agreed t h a t the Arab v o r l d i n i t s present s t a t e vas too d i v i d e d f o r pan-Arabism t o succeed. The PLO, n e v e r t h e l e s s , remained i n f l u e n c e d by Arab s t a t e s and many of the commando groups assigned an important r o l e t o the Arab s t a t e s i n the s t r u g g l e t o r e g a i n P a l e s t i n e . Hovever, i n the decades a f t e r 1967, the fragmentation of the Arab v o r l d made the p o s s i b i l i t y f o r a pan- Arab r e v o l u t i o n l e s s r e a l i s t i c . S i m i l a r l y , the r e a l i t y of I s r a e l ' s e x i s t e n c e g r a d u a l l y l e d the PLO to q u e s t i o n i t s p o l i c y that p e r c e i v e d I s r a e l as a c o l o n i a l s e t t l e m e n t t h a t vas to be e l i m i n a t e d . The h i g h l y i d e a l i s t i c PLO t h a t expressed i t s g o a l s i n the covenant of 1968 demanded the d e s t r u c t i o n of the s t a t e of I s r a e l by means of the armed s t r u g g l e . Hovever, t h i s g o a l has g r a d u a l l y been toned dovn so t h a t the covenant has been v i o l a t e d by s e v e r a l of the PLO's o f f i c i a l and u n o f f i c i a l p o l i c i e s . A number of f a c t o r s have l e d some groups to conclude t h a t I s r a e l cannot be defeated m i l i t a r i l y and that a p o l i t i c a l s o l u t i o n t h a t accepts I s r a e l ' s e x i s t e n c e c o u l d perhaps b r i n g b e t t e r r e s u l t s . The 47 "moderates" l e d by Yasser A r a f a t , have expressed a w i l l i n g n e s s to i n s i d e r c o e x i s t e n c e with I s r a e l and i n f a c t Yasser A r a f a t has s a i d on many occ a s i o n s t h a t he would be w i l l i n g t o s e t up a P a l e s t i n i a n s t a t e i n any t e r r i t o r y : " t e l v e n j u s t i n J e r i c h o , i f that were a l l they would give me." (44) T h i s i n c r e a s e d pragmatism, which c o n t r a s t s with P a l e s t i n i a n o r g a n i z a t i o n s which have t r a d - i t i o n a l l y adopted an a l l or nothing p o l i c y , has g r a d u a l l y s h i f t e d the nature of P a l e s t i n i a n n a t i o n a l i s m from r e f u s a l to compromise. In the f i n a l phase of P a l e s t i n i a n n a t i o n a l i s m a p o l i c y of c o e x i s t e n c e with I s r a e l has evolved, being f o r m a l i z e d a t the n i n e t e e n t h meeting of the PNC. By a l t e r i n g i t s p o l i c i e s the moderates were to face severe c r i t i c i s m from w i t h i n the PLO as they c h a l l e n g e d some of the i d e o l o g i c a l foundations t h a t have been a t the c e n t r e of the movement s i n c e the s t i r r i n g phase. One of the PLO's f i r s t s teps a t moderation was with regards to the Jews of I s r a e l . The o r i g i n a l PLO under Ahmad Shuqairy c a l l e d f o r the d e s t r u c t i o n of I s r a e l and i t s i n h a b i t a n t s and the PLO covenant of 1968 s t a t e d that o n l y "Jews who were normally r e s i d e n t i n P a l e s t i n e up to the beginning of the Z i o n i s t i n v a s i o n are P a l e s t i n i a n s . " (45) Because the Jews were b e l i e v e d t o be c o l o n i a l i s t s , i t was f e l t t h a t c o l o n i a l i s m c o u l d o n l y come to an end when the Jewish immigrants l e f t P a l e s t i n e . However, PLO p o s i t i o n s continued to change u n t i l p r o v i s i o n s were made f o r the 44. c i t e d i n Helena Cobban, The P a l e s t i n e L i b e r a t i o n Organiza- t i o n : People, Power and P o l i t i c s (Cambridge: Cambridge Univer- s i t y P r e s s , 1984), 18. 45. Yehoshafat Harkabi, The P a l e s t i n i a n Covenant, 120. 48 r i g h t s of Jews, C h r i s t i a n s and Muslims i n a f u t u r e P a l e s t i n i a n s t a t e . At the f i f t h PNC meeting i n February of 1969 the PNC accepted the idea of a s e c u l a r democratic s t a t e and i n 1970 Yasser A r a f a t s a i d there could be a democratic, n o n - Z i o n i s t , s e c u l a r s t a t e where we would a l l l i v e i n peace and e q u a l i t y as we d i d f o r thousands of y e a r s . I f the Z i o n i s t s would accept t h i s p r i n c i p l e , we could share power on a democrat- i c b a s i s . We would not i n s i s t on having an Arab m a j o r i t y . (46) T h i s was a s i g n i f i c a n t s t e p because the PLO accepted the r i g h t of those people who they b e l i e v e d had e s t a b l i s h e d a s t a t e i n P a l e s t i n e by conquest, to remain i n P a l e s t i n e w i t h equal r i g h t s a f t e r l i b e r a t i o n . Statements vere never made, hovever, t h a t accepted I s r a e l ' s e x i s t e n c e or suggested a p a r t i t i o n of P a l e s t i n e . A l l o w i n g the Jevs to remain i n a f u t u r e P a l e s t i n i a n s t a t e vas one t h i n g , but a c c e p t i n g a p a r t i t i o n of the land t h a t they f e l t vas u n i q u e l y t h e i r ovn vas q u i t e another. In the e a r l y 1970's Fatah, g e n e r a l l y b e l i e v e d to be the most pragmatic group i n the PLO, vas s t i l l r e j e c t i n g the idea of a West Bank s t a t e a l o n g s i d e I s r a e l and a Fatah spokesman i n s i s t e d t h at "ItJhe c o n d i t i o n , s i n e qua non of the nev P a l e s t i n e i n v o l v e s the d e s t r u c t i o n of the p o l i t i c a l , economic and m i l i t a r y foundations of the c h a u v i n i s t r a c i s t 46. " P a l e s t i n e : A Case of Right v. R i g h t , " Time Magazine (December 21 1970), 18. 49 c o l o n i a l s t a t e . " (47) A p o l i c y of moderation and acceptance of the s t a t e of I s r a e l was considered to be n o t h i n g s h o r t of n a t i o n a l t r e a s o n by the commando groups because t h i s would mean a c c e p t i n g a c o l o n i a l s t a t e , a compromise t h a t a n a t i o n a l l i b e r a t i o n move- ment which saw i t s s t r u g g l e i n the same c o n t e x t as A l g e r i a and black A f r i c a , c o u l d t h e o r e t i c a l l y never c o n s i d e r . Since the armed s t r u g g l e was b e l i e v e d to be the best way t o m o b i l i z e the masses and to l i b e r a t e P a l e s t i n e from Zionism, the PLO r e q u i r e d a t e r r i t o r i a l base near I s r a e l from which to c a r r y out i t s s t r u g g l e . G u e r r i l l a groups such as Fatah had used J o r d a n i a n t e r r i t o r y f o r t h i s purpose i n the l a t e 1960's. PLO r a i d s i n t o I s r a e l brought harsh I s r a e l i r e t a l i a t i o n i n t o Jordan, o f t e n a t Jordan's expense. When the PLO's presence i n Jordan, which had l i t e r a l l y developed i n t o a s t a t e w i t h i n a s t a t e , began to t h r e a t e n the s t a b i l i t y of the J o r d a n i a n regime, King Hussein moved to suppress PLO o p e r a t i o n s , making i t c l e a r t h a t he would no longer t o l e r a t e PLO m i l i t a r y r a i d s from h i s t e r r i t o r y . Septem- ber of 1970, "Black September" as i t has come to be known by P a l e s t i n i a n s , i n v o l v e d a b a t t l e between the PLO and the Jordanian army. The b a t t l e destroyed the PLO's most s i g n i f i c a n t base of o p e r a t i o n s a g a i n s t I s r a e l . In so doing, Black September had a dramatic e f f e c t on the PLO, as i t confirmed the PLO's v u l n e r - a b i l i t y due to i t s dependence on the Arab s t a t e s , whose support was c l e a r l y l i m i t e d . 47. c i t e d i n Irene Gendzier "The P a l e s t i n i a n R e v o l u t i o n , the Jews, and Other Matters," New Middle Bast (January 1971), 40. 50 The PLO, i n need of a t e r r i t o r i a l base as a s u b s t i t u t e f o r Jordan, e s t a b l i s h e d i t s e l f i n Lebanon and the weakness of the Lebanese government prevented a c o n f r o n t a t i o n s i m i l a r to Black September. However, the need f o r a secure base was a s e r i o u s concern among PLO o f f i c i a l s , and when the Arab s t a t e s f a i l e d to l i b e r a t e any Arab t e r r i t o r y i n the October War of 1973, the l i k e l i h o o d of the armed s t r u g g l e a c h i e v i n g the long term goal of a s e c u l a r s t a t e i n a l l of P a l e s t i n e was being questioned by some of the groups w i t h i n the PLO. A f t e r the October War P r e s i d e n t Sadat of Egypt began to doubt the value of the armed s t r u g g l e and he expressed support f o r a p o l i t i c a l s o l u t i o n t o the c o n f l i c t . Because Egypt played a s i g n i f i c a n t r o l e i n PLO p o l i t i c s , Sadat was a b l e t o i n f l u e n c e PLO p o s i t i o n s . He seemed w i l l i n g t o r e s o l v e the c o n f l i c t with I s r a e l and i n 1975 Sadat signed an agreement i n which he promised not to use f o r c e a g a i n s t I s r a e l . In the years f o l l o w i n g the October War e f f o r t s were made by Sadat to have an i n t e r n a t i o n a l peace conference which was to i n c l u d e the c o n f r o n t a t i o n s t a t e s and the PLO. The purpose of the conference, Sadat s a i d , would be "to d i s c u s s the f i n a l s o l u t i o n and l a s t i n g peace i n order t o c a r r y out UN r e s o l u t i o n s which are l i n k e d t o one another, i e . a r e t u r n t o the 1967 borders and the es t a b l i s h m e n t of a P a l e s t i n i a n s t a t e . " (48) Sadat was w i l l i n g to accept I s r a e l ' s e x i s t e n c e as w e l l as a P a l e s t i n i a n s t a t e i n the occupied t e r r i t o r i e s and he 48. c i t e d i n Moshe Shemesh, The P a l e s t i n i a n E n t i t y 1959-1974 (London: Prank Cass, 1988), 275. 51 wanted the PLO to adopt a more r e a l i s t i c g o a l , r a t h e r than pursuing i t s a l l or nothing p o l i c y . Setbacks such as Black September and the Arab d e f e a t i n 1973 made the more pragmatic o f f i c i a l s i n the PLO q u e s t i o n t h e i r a l l or nothing p o l i c i e s and they became i n c r e a s i n g l y aware of the l i m i t a t i o n s of Arab support. Groups such as Fatah and the Democratic F r o n t began to speak of a p o l i t i c a l s e t t l e m e n t t o the c o n f l i c t . However, moderation w i t h i n the PLO ranks was to proceed g r a d u a l l y and ambiguously, because while the armed s t r u g - g l e may not have been the best way to l i b e r a t e P a l e s t i n e , i t was the best way to maintain i n t e r n a l c o h e s i o n i n the PLO, and while an e l i m i n a t i o n of I s r a e l may have been u n r e a l i s t i c , i t was s t i l l c o n s i d e r e d by most groups i n the PLO to be the o n l y f a i r outcome of the c o n f l i c t . The l eader of the Popular Democratic f r o n t f o r the L i b e r a - t i o n of P a l e s t i n e , N a i f Hawatmeh, was the f i r s t t o propose the idea of P a l e s t i n i a n n a t i o n a l a u t h o r i t y on the West Bank and Gaza and he d i d so as e a r l y as 1973. In a statement he made i n the S o v i e t Union, Hawatmeh r e a f f i r m e d "the a b s o l u t e r i g h t of the P a l e s t i n i a n people i n the West Bank of Jordan and the Gaza S t r i p t o determine t h e i r own f u t u r e . " (49) The DFLP was h e a v i l y c r i t i - c i s e d f o r i t s s u g g e s t i o n . C r i t i c i s m came from Arab n a t i o n a l i s t s i n the Arab L i b e r a t i o n F r o n t , the Popular F r o n t f o r the L i b e r a - t i o n of P a l e s t i n e , and the General Command. But Hawatmeh was not 49. c i t e d i n A l a i n Gresh, The PLO: The S t r u g g l e W i t h i n (London: Zed Books L t d . , 1988), 139. 52 persuaded by those who accused him of b e t r a y i n g the Arab cause because he b e l i e v e d t h a t the need f o r a P a l e s t i n i a n homeland should take p r i o r i t y over pan-Arab ideas and he b e l i e v e d that the PLO should r e a l i z e the l i m i t s of Arab support: Yes ve are Arabs: but ve a r e , a t the same time, P a l e s t i n i a n s . J u s t as every Arab people has f u l l r i g h t to an independent n a t i o n a l e x i s t e n c e , so the P a l e s t i n i a n people too has a f u l l r i g h t t o an independent n a t i o n a l e x i s t e n c e . (50) While the proposed idea of n a t i o n a l a u t h o r i t y i n the occu- pied t e r r i t o r i e s vas f l a t l y r e j e c t e d by s e v e r a l groups i n the PLO, Fatah, Sa'iqa and OFLP b e l i e v e d t h a t i t vas i n the PLO's best i n t e r e s t t o adopt t h i s p o l i c y . Fatah emphasized the need f o r a secure P a l e s t i n i a n t e r r i t o r y , as Salah K h a l a f , one of the o r i g i n a l l e a d e r s of Fatah, argued t h a t " u n t i l ve achieve the s t r a t e g i c aim ve need a safe base, vhose f a t e should not be s i m i l a r to the one i n Jordan." (51) At the t v e l f t h meeting of the PNC i n June of 1974 Fatah, Sa'iqa and the DFLP succeeded i n having a phased p l a n adopted. The pl a n vas knovn as the ten p o i n t p l a n and although i t s t r e s s e d t h a t n a t i o n a l a u t h o r i t y i n the occupied t e r r i t o r i e s vas to be merely a t r a n s i t i o n a l program, i t vas s i g n i f i c a n t i n t h a t i t vas the f i r s t time t h a t the PNC had ever c o n s i d e r e d a p a r t i t i o n of P a l e s t i n e . The p l a n c a l l e d f o r "a P a l e s t i n i a n n a t i o n a l a u t h o r i t y i n any P a l e s t i n i a n areas l i b e r a t e d 50. c i t e d i n I b i d . , 140. 51. c i t e d i n Moshe Shemesh, The P a l e s t i n i a n E n t i t y , 289. 53 from I s r a e l i c o n t r o l . " (52) The PNC ten p o i n t p l a n was s u f f i c i e n t l y vague to be adopted by an overwhelming m a j o r i t y i n the PNC, as o n l y four of the 187 members r e j e c t e d the p l a n . There was, however, some o p p o s i t i o n to the p l a n . George Habash was e s p e c i a l l y outspoken about the ten p o i n t p l a n or a n y t h i n g t h a t i m p l i e d r e c o g n i t i o n of I s r a e l and he argued t h a t the r e a l i z a t i o n of a s e c u l a r democratic P a l e s t i n i a n s t a t e c o u l d o n l y come about as a r e s u l t of the armed s t r u g g l e . Habash pleaded with the supporters of t h i s p l a n who, i n h i s view, had abandoned the p r i n c i p l e s of t h e i r s t r u g g l e : Have we r e a l i z e d t h a t t h i s s t a t e w i l l be squeezed between I s r a e l on the one s i d e and the r e a c t i o n - a r y J o r d a n i a n regime on the other? Have we r e a l i z e d t h a t t h i s s t a t e would be the r e s u l t of an Arab and i n t e r n a t i o n a l g i f t ? T h i s s o l u t i o n w i l l be the " f i n a l s o l u t i o n " to the Middle E a s t problem. Habash continued, arguing t h a t An e s s e n t i a l c o n t r a d i c t i o n w i l l e x i s t between the s t a t e and the P a l e s t i n i a n masses from the 1948 areas whose v i t a l q uestions w i l l not be s o l v e d by t h i s s t a t e . (53) Habash b e l i e v e d t h a t i f the PLO wished t o be c o n s i s t e n t i n l i b e r a t i n g P a l e s t i n e through an armed s t r u g g l e , then an i n t e r i m p o l i t i c a l s o l u t i o n would be f u t i l e . Habash and those t h a t sup- ported him f e l t t h a t the p r i n c i p l e s of the covenant should not be 52. c i t e d i n Helena Cobban, "The PLO i n the mid-1980's: between the Gun and the O l i v e Branch," I n t e r n a t i o n a l J o u r n a l 38 no. 4 (Autumn 1983), 643. 53. c i t e d i n A l a i n Gresh, The PLO: The S t r u g g l e Within, 148. 54 compromised to achieve part of P a l e s t i n e and the a l l or nothing s t r a t e g y would b r i n g b e t t e r r e s u l t s i n the long run. Because the PFLP i s r i g i d i n i t s ideology, i t has found i t d i f f i c u l t t o a l t e r i t s p o l i c i e s towards more r e a l i s t i c and p r o g r e s s i v e goals and as f u r t h e r attempts a t moderation were made by Fatah, o p p o s i t i o n was v o i c e d by Habash. In e f f e c t , the two l e a d e r s , A r a f a t and Habash, were debating two forms of P a l e s t i n i a n n a t i o n - a l i s m . A r a f a t was pushing for a compromise while Habash wanted to pursue t r a d i t i o n a l h o l i s t i c g o a l s . But r e g a r d l e s s of Habash's o p p o s i t i o n to the ten p o i n t p l a n , Fatah and A r a f a t were moving towards a l t e r i n g some of the PLO's t r a d i t i o n a l p o l i c i e s . In r e a c t i o n to Yasser A r a f a t ' s own p e r s o n a l i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of the ten p o i n t p l a n , i n which he seemed to overlook the t r a n s i t i o n a l nature of the p l a n , (54) a number of groups expres- sed o p p o s i t i o n to A r a f a t , arguing t h a t h i s p o l i t i c a l s t r a t e g y was bound to f a i l . The PFLP b e l i e v e d t h a t A r a f a t was compromising the p r i n c i p l e s of the movement and i t s l e a d e r s I n s i s t e d t h a t h i s p o l i t i c a l s t r a t e g y w i l l not succeed i n a t t r a c t i n g c oncessions from I s r a e l . The PFLP-GC b e l i e v e d t h a t a p o l i c y t h a t suggested anything l e s s than the l i b e r a t i o n of a l l of P a l e s t i n e was, f o r the l i b e r a t i o n movement, a " d e f e a t e s t s o l u t i o n " . (55) Together, 54. S h o r t l y a f t e r the t w e l f t h meeting of the PNC, f o r example, A r a f a t announced: "Now, a t the present stage of the s t r u g g l e and i n the c o n d i t i o n s t h a t have taken shape i n the Middle E a s t , we have decided to s e t up an independent P a l e s t i n i a n a u t h o r i t y i n any l i b e r a t e d p a r t of the t e r r i t o r y . " c i t e d i n "Yasser A r a f a t on the Problems of the P a l e s t i n e Movement," New Times (August 1974), 11. 55. c i t e d i n A l a i n Gresh, The PLO: The S t r u g g l e W i t h i n , 164. 55 i n September of 1974, the PFLP, the PFLP-GC, the ALF and a s m a l l group, the F r o n t of the P a l e s t i n e Popular S t r u g g l e , formed the C e n t r a l C o u n c i l of the R e j e c t i o n F r o n t , on the grounds that the PLO vas d e v i a t i n g from i t s proper course. The c r e a t i o n of the Front f o r m a l i z e d a p a r t i t i o n i n the PLO t h a t vas to p e r s i s t throughout the 1970's and 1980's. A d i v i s i o n e x i s t e d betveen those t h a t vere v i l l i n g to c o n s i d e r a p o l i t i c a l s o l u t i o n to the c o n f l i c t and vere s a t i s f i e d v i t h a West Bank s t a t e and those vho supported the armed s t r u g g l e , h e l d to the covenant and v i s h e d to l i b e r a t e a l l of P a l e s t i n e from i t s " c o l o n i a l o c c u p i e r s . " While the r e a c t i o n from v i t h i n the PLO to A r a f a t ' s i n t e r p r e - t a t i o n of the ten p o i n t plan vas p r o b l e m a t i c , the r e a c t i o n from many p a r t s of the v o r l d community to the PLO's s l i g h t moderation i n p o l i c y vas g e n e r a l l y p o s i t i v e . A f t e r the a d o p t i o n of the ten p o i n t p l a n the Arab s t a t e s appeared to be more comfortable v i t h the PLO's plans f o r a P a l e s t i n i a n homeland and a t the Rabat conference i n November of 1974 the PLO vas g i v e n f u l l a u t h o r i t y by the Arab l e a d e r s as v e i l as backing from them to form t h e i r ovn s t a t e . Although King Hussein vas r e l u c t a n t t o accept the PLO as the r e p r e s e n t a t i v e of the P a l e s t i n i a n s , a r e s o l u t i o n vas passed a t the Arab Summit v h i c h a s s e r t e d the P a l e s t i n i a n people's r i g h t to e s t a b l i s h i t s ovn independent n a t i o n a l a u t h o r i t y under the l e a d - e r s h i p of the PLO-the s o l e l e g i t i m a t e r e p r e s e n t a t i v e of the P a l e s t i n i a n p e o p l e - i n a l l l i b e r a t e d P a l e s t i n - ia n t e r r i t o r y . " (56) 56. c i t e d i n I b i d . , 179. 56 A f u r t h e r v i c t o r y came f o r the PLO when Yasser A r a f a t vas i n v i t e d to speak a t the General Assembly of the U n ited Nations i n November of 1974. In A r a f a t ' s speech to the General Assembly he expressed the PLO's t r a d i t i o n a l p o l i c y vhen he spoke of the PLO's dream of a s e c u l a r democratic s t a t e . "The P a l e s t i n e of tomorrov v i l l i n c l u d e a l l Jevs l i v i n g there vho choose t o remain t o l i v e i n peace and v i t h o u t d i s c r i m i n a t i o n . " (57) In h i s speech A r a f a t made a c l e a r d i s t i n c t i o n betveen the Jev and the Z i o n i s t , i n s i s t i n g t h a t Zionism vas r a c i s t and i m p e r i a l i s t . "The P a l e s t i n - i a n r e v o l u t i o n i s not aimed at the Jev but a t r a c i s t Zionism and a g g r e s s i o n . The goal of the s t r u g g l e i s f o r Jev, C h r i s t a i n and Moslem t o l i v e i n e q u a l i t y . " (58) Instead of g i v i n g any h i n t of a p a r t i t i o n p l a n or of any compromise v i t h I s r a e l , A r a f a t argued t h a t the UN p a r t i t i o n e d i n 1947 a t e r r i t o r y t h a t i t had no r i g h t to d i v i d e . The p o l i c i e s that A r a f a t expressed a t the UN, r e j e c t - ing a West Bank s t a t e and equating Zionism v i t h c o l o n i a l i s m , vere p o l i c i e s t h a t c o u l d keep the f r a g i l e PLO u n i t e d . The t v e l f t h PNC had g i v e n A r a f a t enough f l e x i b i l i t y t o express the PLO's t r a d i - t i o n a l l i n e a t the UN. A f t e r the q u e s t i o n of P a l e s t i n e vas d i s c u s s e d a t the United Nations, r e s o l u t i o n 3236 vas passed v h i c h r e c o g n i z e d "the r i g h t of the P a l e s t i n i a n people to r e g a i n i t s r i g h t s by a l l means i n accordance v i t h the purposes and p r i n c i p l e s of the C harter of the 57. "Question of P a l e s t i n e , " UN Monthly C h r o n i c l e (December 1974), 82. 58. I b i d . , 81. 57 United N a t i o n s . " (59) In a d d i t i o n the PLO was q i v e n observer s t a t u s a t the UN. But while the PLO had a c hieved i n t e r n a t i o n a l r e c o g n i t i o n , t h i s r e c o g n i t i o n was mainly from t h i r d world and s o c i a l i s t c o u n t r i e s . The PLO lacked support i n the Western world; most no t a b l y , i t lacked American r e c o g n i t i o n . D i f f i c u l t i e s i n judging the i n t e n t i o n s of PLO p o l i c i e s were a r e s u l t of i n t e r n a l s t r u g g l e s and c o n f l i c t i n g statements. The "moderates", the name given to those groups who were s h i f t i n g t h e i r p o l i c y to p o l i t i c a l a c t i o n r a t h e r than m i l i t a r y , were aware th a t the PLO had never been a s e r i o u s t h r e a t to I s r a e l ' s s t a b i l i t y and they b e l i e v e d i n the need to q u e s t i o n the success of the armed s t r u g g l e . They were b i t t e r l y opposed by the Rejec- t i o n Front and the leader of the R e j e c t i o n i s t s , George Habash, c a l l e d the moderates "Arab d e v i a t i o n i s t s " who had been misnamed moderates. Habash l a b e l l e d the moderates r i g h t i s t s and argued t h a t " [ t J h i s c u r r e n t i s c a p t i v e of i t s c l a s s a f f i l i a t i o n s . " (60) The R e j e c t i o n F r o n t ' s a c c u s a t i o n s t h a t the moderates were abandoning t h e i r o b l i g a t i o n s to the Arab world and compromising the p r i n c i p l e s of the r e v o l u t i o n , were unable to r e v e r s e PLO p o l i c i e s . In 1977 ALF and PFLP-GC r e j o i n e d the E x e c u t i v e Commit- tee. However, t e n s i o n s were to p e r s i s t i n the PLO's i n t e r n a l s t r u c t u r e between those who wished to moderate t h e i r p o l i c y and 59. c i t e d i n J.R. Gainsborough, The A r a b - I s r a e l i C o n f l i c t ( B r o o k f i e l d : Gower, 1986), 191. 60. "George Habash: The Future of the P a l e s t i n i a n N a t i o n a l Movement," J o u r n a l of P a l e s t i n e S t u d i e s (Summer 1985), 5-7. 58 those who d i d not. The u n d e r l y i n g c o n f l i c t was based on whether the PLO should c o n s i d e r a c c e p t i n g I s r a e l ' s e x i s t e n c e and what type of s t r a t e g y would be the most s u c c e s s f u l i n a c h i e v i n g a P a l e s t i n i a n s t a t e . In 1977 and 1978, the PLO s u f f e r e d s e r i o u s s e t b a c k s . In November of 1977 P r e s i d e n t Anwar e l - S a d a t of Egypt t r a v e l l e d to I s r a e l and spoke i n the Knesset about A r a b - I s r a e l i peace. There were many angry r e a c t i o n s throughout the Arab world to Sadat's v i s i t because i t was seen as a w i l l i n g n e s s on Sadat's p a r t t o d e s e r t the Arabs, e s p e c i a l l y the P a l e s t i n i a n s , and n e g o t i a t e a separate peace with I s r a e l . By t a k i n g s t e p s towards u n i l a t e r a l peace and by going to Jerusalem, the PLO f e l t t h a t Sadat had abandoned them and had enhanced I s r a e l ' s c l a i m s t o Jerusalem. In March of 1978 I s r a e l invaded southern Lebanon, the country i n which the PLO had b u i l t i t s most e x t e n s i v e i n f a s t r u c - t ure s i n c e i t s e v a c u a t i o n from Jordan i n 1970. As Menachem Begin s t a t e d , I s r a e l ' s g o a l was to "cut o f f the e v i l arm of t e r r o r i s m . " (61) While the o p e r a t i o n may have succeeded i n d i s p e r s i n g PLO troops i n Lebanon, i t f a i l e d i n a c h i e v i n g i t s o b j e c t i v e of e l i m i n a t i n g the PLO and the o r g a n i z a t i o n c o n t i n u e d to use Lebanese t e r r i t o r y f o r i t s o p e r a t i o n s a g a i n s t I s r a e l . In yet a f u r t h e r blow to the PLO, i n September of 1978 Egypt signed a peace t r e a t y with I s r a e l . The PLO was d i s t a n c e d from one 61. c i t e d i n Bernard Gwertzman, "US Seeks P u l l o u t by I s r a e l i Troops," New York Times (March 18 1978), 1. 59 of i t s most v a l u a b l e a l l i e s and the Arab world i s o l a t e d Egypt f o r i t s move. Although the Camp David agreement r e f e r r e d to P a l e s t i n - i a n r i g h t s and c a l l e d f o r P a l e s t i n i a n p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n a s e t t l e - ment, the PLO saw i t as a huge d e f e a t because the o r g a n i z a t i o n b e l i e v e d t h a t Sadat had no r i g h t t o n e g o t i a t e f o r the P a l e s t i n - ians and he had made too many c o n c e s s i o n s , r e c e i v i n g o n l y ambiguous guarantees f o r the P a l e s t i n i a n s i n r e t u r n . The agree- ment a l s o made the p o s s i b i l i t y of a f u t u r e A r a b - I s r a e l i war to r e g a i n P a l e s t i n e u n l i k e l y , s i n c e without Egypt an Arab d e f e a t was i n s u r e d . Remarking on the Camp David agreement, Hawatmeh point e d out t h a t the f a i l u r e of the moderates i n the PLO to e x t r a c t c o n c e s s i o n s from I s r a e l c o u l d work t o the b e n e f i t of the R e j e c t i o n s t s . "Sadat's cowardice and I s r a e l ' s o b s t i n a t e r e f u s a l to contemplate a compromise... are d r i v i n g us i n e l u c t a b l y towards the p o s i t i o n s of our opponents i n the R e j e c t i o n F r o n t . " (62) In f a i l i n g to e l i m i n a t e PLO a c t i v i t i e s i n Lebanon to t h e i r s a t i s f a c t i o n , I s r a e l launched a f u l l s c a l e i n v a s i o n of Lebanon i n June of 1982, the o b j e c t i v e t h i s time being to "get r i d of the PLO once and f o r a l l . " (63) Between 1971 and 1982 the PLO had b u i l t a s i g n i f i c a n t presence i n Lebanon and i t had c l o s e r e l a - t i o n s with the P a l e s t i n i a n r e f u g e e s . But I s r a e l ' s i n v a s i o n a l l the way to B e i r u t succeeded i n f o r c i n g the PLO to evacuate Lebanon, d i s p e r s i n g i t a c r o s s nine Arab c o u n t r i e s . The f o r c e d e v a c u a t i o n of Lebanon was a huge blow to the PLO because i t had 62. c i t e d i n A l a i n Gresh, The PLO: The S t r u g g l e W i t h i n , 215. 63. c i t e d i n Abdullah F r a n g i , The PLO and P a l e s t i n e ( F r a n k f u r t : Zed Books L t d . , 1983), 198. 60 been gi v e n c o n s i d e r a b l e p o l i t i c a l freedom i n t h a t c o u n t r y . The PLO had l o s t yet another border s t a t e from which i t c o u l d conduct i t s o p e r a t i o n s . Since the PLO had p r e v i o u s l y l o s t Jordan as a place of o p e r a t i o n s , and because the Egypt would not a l l o w the PLO to conduct r a i d s i n t o I s r a e l from i t s t e r r i t o r y , the PLO became dangerously dependent on S y r i a , dangerously because Pres- ident Hafez e l - A s s a d d i d not agree v i t h A r a f a t on a number of PLO p o l i c i e s , most n o t a b l y A r a f a t ' s c a l l s f o r n o n - i n t e r v e n t i o n i n PLO a f f a i r s . The moderates i n the PLO ranks b e l i e v e d t h a t the var i n Lebanon vas a f i n a l i n d i c a t i o n t h a t the m i l i t a r y s t r u g g l e vas no longer a s e n s i b l e o p t i o n . While the PLO may have been comfortable v a l t i n g f o r the l i b e r a t i o n of P a l e s t i n e before i t vas evacuated from B e i r u t , a f t e r the Lebanon var t h i s p o l i c y of v a i t i n g no longer seemed r a t i o n a l . The PLO vas nov d i s p e r s e d a c r o s s the Arab v o r l d so t h a t the armed s t r u g g l e had i n p r a c t i c e been e l i m i n a t e d . T h i s vas a s e r i o u s problem because v h i l e the moderates may have been v e i l avare t h a t the armed s t r u g g l e c o u l d not b r i n g about a c o l l a p s e of I s r a e l , the armed s t r u g g l e remained the best vay to maintain u n i t y i n the PLO. As a r e s u l t , a f t e r t h e i r e v a c u a t i o n of Lebanon, the PLO vas to face the c h a l l e n g e of hov i t vas to preserve i t s e l f as a n a t i o n a l l i b e r a t i o n movement. The p o s t - B e i r u t era d i s p l a y e d the most e x t e n s i v e e f f o r t s on the p a r t of the moderates to abandon past p o l i c i e s and t o c o n s i d e r other vays v h i c h the PLO c o u l d achieve an independent P a l e s t i n i a n s t a t e . When Yasser A r a f a t vas r e - e l e c t e d unanimously 61 a t the PNC meeting i n 1983, PNC r e s o l u t i o n s were s u f f i c i e n t l y ambiguous to a l l o w him room to maneuver. For example, the PNC d i d not r e j e c t the Reagan plan which c a l l e d f o r peace on the b a s i s of r e s o l u t i o n 242. Although the p l a n d i d not favour an independent P a l e s t i n i a n s t a t e and d i d not a l l o w the PLO to p a r t i c i p a t e i n n e g o t i a t i o n s , the PNC c a l l e d the p l a n inade- quate. In a d d i t i o n , the PNC accepted the Fez p l a n . The Fez p l a n , adopted by the Arab s t a t e s and the PLO i n September of 1982, c a l l e d f o r the r i g h t of a l l s t a t e s i n the r e g i o n , i n c l u d i n g an independent P a l e s t i n i a n s t a t e , to l i v e i n peace. A r a f a t made a number of p o l i t i c a l moves i n an e f f o r t t o improve the PLO's desperate s i t u a t i o n . A r a f a t ' s diplomacy i n - cluded, f o r example, a w r i t t e n statement to an American congress- man e x p r e s s i n g a w i l l i n g n e s s to abide by " a l l the U n i t e d Nations r e s o l u t i o n s c o n c e r n i n g P a l e s t i n e . " (64) T h i s i m p l i e d r e c o g n i t i o n of r e s o l u t i o n s t h a t the PLO had always r e j e c t e d , i n c l u d i n g 181 of 1947 ( p a r t i t i o n ) , as w e l l as 242 of 1967. A r a f a t a l s o expressed a w i l l i n g n e s s to f o r m a l l y accept R e s o l u t i o n 242, knowing t h a t t h i s would have p l a c e d an enormous burden on I s r a e l . However, A r a f a t was not w i l l i n g to take t h i s r i s k without g e t t i n g anything i n r e t u r n , knowing too that t h i s r e c o g n i t i o n would have placed an enormous burden on the PLO, p o s s i b l y c a u s i n g another s p l i t i n the o r g a n i z a t i o n . 64. c i t e d i n E r i c Rouleau, "The Future of the PLO," F o r e i g n A f f a i r s ( F a l l 1983), 146. 62 In f u r t h e r e f f o r t s a t improving the PLO's s i t u a t i o n , con- t a c t s with Egypt were renewed, and i n 1983 A r a f a t met with I s r a e l i peace a c t i v i s t s , a move t h a t the r e j e c t i o n i s t s c a l l e d " n a t i o n a l t r e a s o n . " (65) While the d i s g u s t t h a t the r e j e c t i o n - i s t s expressed towards diplomacy may not have s u r p r i s e d A r a f a t , a more s i g n i f i c a n t r e p u d i a t i o n of A r a f a t ' s moves o c c u r r e d w i t h i n h i s own group. In A p r i l of 1983 Fatah's C e n t r a l Committee r e j e c t e d A r a f a t ' s proposed agreement w i t h King Hussein of Jordan which was based on Reagan's pl a n to accept R e s o l u t i o n 242 and a j o i n t P a l e s t i n i a n - J o d a n i a n d e l e g a t i o n i n peace t a l k s . J u s t as attempts a t moderating PLO p o l i c i e s had s p l i t the PLO i n 1974, a group of r e j e c t i o n i s t s emerged from v i t h i n the PLO i n r e a c t i o n to A r a f a t ' s nev attempts a t moderation. T h i s time hovever, A r a f a t had to face o p p o s i t i o n from v i t h i n h i s ovn group. Fatah's d i s s i d e n t s , sponsored by S y r i a and L i b y a , spoke out a g a i n s t A r a f a t ' s a u t h o r i t a r i a n s t y l e of l e a d e r s h i p and they demanded a more equal d i s t r i b u t i o n of pover. The d i s s i d e n t s vere opposed to the t e n p o i n t plan of 1974, they vere opposed to the Reagan p l a n and the Fez p l a n and they vanted to break o f f r e l a t i o n s v i t h c o n s e r v a t i v e Arab regimes such as Jordan and Egypt. They v i s h e d to resume the armed s t r u g g l e , adhere to the covenant t h a t A r a f a t had v i o l a t e d on numerous o c c a s i o n s and improve r e l a t i o n s v i t h n o n - r e a c t i o n a r y regimes such as S y r i a , L i b y a and South Yemen. The d i s s i d e n t s v i t h i n Fatah along v i t h the 65. c i t e d i n Emile S a h l i y e h , The PLO A f t e r the Lebanon War (London: Westviev P r e s s , 1986), 105. 63 PFLP-GC and Sa'iqa c a l l e d f o r an end to A r a f a t ' s p r a c t i c e of diplomacy without PLO a p p r o v a l . They b e l i e v e d t h a t time was on t h e i r s i d e , making a compromise u n n e c e s s a r i l y . Two a l l i a n c e s were formed i n o p p o s i t i o n to A r a f a t ' s p o l i - c i e s . One was made up of the PFLP-GC, S a ' i q a , the d i s s i d e n t s from Fatah and the Popular Struggle Front who formed the P a l e s t i n e N a t i o n a l S a l v a t i o n F r o n t . The N a t i o n a l S a l v a t i o n F r o n t , r e j e c t i n g a p o l i t i c a l s o l u t i o n to the c o n f l i c t and r e j e c t i n g any r e c o g n i - t i o n of I s r a e l , p r e f e r r e d the m i l i t a r y o p t i o n and they had no d e s i r e to n e g o t i a t e with " i m p e r i a l i s t s . " A second c o a l i t i o n , the Democratic A l l i a n c e , was made up of the PFLP, the DFLP and the Communists and they agreed with the N a t i o n a l S a l v a t i o n Front i n t h e i r o p p o s i t i o n to A r a f a t . However, the members of the Demo- c r a t i c A l l i a n c e were " l o y a l i s t s " because they c r i t i c i s e d A r a f a t ' s l e a d e r s h i p but were l o y a l to the PLO. Although both the Democrat- i c A l l i a n c e and the N a t i o n a l S a l v a t i o n F r o n t c h a l l e n g e d A r a f a t ' s l e a d e r s h i p , A r a f a t was able to minimize the r o l e of the r e b e l s and he succeeded i n p o r t r a y i n g them as c l i e n t s of S y r i a . C l e a r l y l a c k i n g the support t h a t A r a f a t enjoyed, (66) those i n o p p o s i - 66. Fatah and A r a f a t are w e l l known to have c o n s i d e r a b l e support among P a l e s t i n i a n s i n the occupied t e r r i t o r i e s . Although p o l l s taken under the circumstances t h a t e x i s t i n the West Bank always r i s k i n a c c u r a c y , numerous p o l l s i n d i c a t e m a j o r i t y sup- po r t f o r A r a f a t and Fatah. For example, a p o l l sponsored by the newspaper A l - F a j r , Newsday and the A u s t r a l i a n Broadcasting C o r p o r a t i o n i n September 1986, a t the time when A r a f a t ' s l e a d e r s h i p was being c h a l l e n g e d , found t h a t when P a l e s t i n i a n s i n the occupied t e r r i t o r i e s were asked to choose t h e i r p r e f e r - red leader from among Yasser A r a f a t , George Habash, Abu Musa, Ahmad J i b r i l , N a i f Hawatmeh, as w e l l as o t h e r s , seventy-nine percent chose A r a f a t , while j u s t over f i v e percent chose Habash. See " P o l l R e s u l t s , " A l - F a j r (September 12 1986), 1. 64 t i o n to h i s l e a d e r s h i p vere unable to c r e a t e a c r e d i b l e a l t e r n a - t i v e to him and they vere l e f t p o l i t i c a l l y bankrupt. In A p r i l of 1987 the PNC met f o r the f i r s t time s i n c e 1984 and although Sa'iqa and the PFLP-GC, the tvo groups most c l o s e l y a f f i l i a t e d v i t h S y r i a , d i d not atte n d the meeting, the PFLP and the DFLP d i d a t t e n d . The communists, vho have accepted the p r i n c i p l e of a West Bank s t a t e s i n c e 1974, vere g i v e n a s e a t on the E x e c u t i v e Committee and the PNC c a l l e d f o r r e l a t i o n s v i t h "democratic f o r c e s i n I s r a e l " t h a t vere a g a i n s t " I s r a e l i occupa- t i o n and expansion." (67) The PNC meeting a l s o d e c l a r e d A r a f a t ' s accord v i t h King Hussein, v h i c h c a l l e d f o r a c o n f e d e r a t i o n v i t h Jordan, t o be n u l l and v o i d and i t r e s t a t e d i t s o p p o s i t i o n to R e s o l u t i o n 242. Thus the PNC moderated i t s p o l i c i e s s l i g h t l y , by a l l o w i n g f o r n e g o t i a t i o n s v i t h I s r a e l i s , but a t the same time i t adhered to i t s t r a d i t i o n of r e j e c t i n g R e s o l u t i o n 242. The f r a g i l e PLO had been r e u n i t e d . Nineteen e i g h t y - s e v e n vas a l s o the year t h a t the I n t i f a d a began i n the West Bank and the Gaza S t r i p . The I n t i f a d a a t t r a c t e d v o r l d a t t e n t i o n to the P a l e s t i n i a n problem, c r e a t i n g an opportun- i t y t h a t A r a f a t and the PLO cou l d not a f f o r d t o miss. The PLO was o r i g i n a l l y s u r p r i s e d by the I n t i f a d a and i t f o r c e d the o r g a n i z a t i o n t o come up with a c l e a r program t h a t West Bankers would f i n d a c c e p t a b l e . In f a i l i n g t o achieve t h i s the PLO could very w e l l have been f o r c e d to stand back v h i l e West Bank leaders 67. c i t e d i n Walid K h a l i d i , "Tovards Peace i n the Holy Land," F o r e i g n A f f a i r s ( S p r i n g 1988), 786. 65 became the spokesmen f o r P a l e s t i n i a n s i n the occupied t e r - r i t o r i e s . The I n t i f a d a a l s o demonstrated t h a t there has been an increased r a d i c a l i z a t i o n of the P a l e s t i n i a n p o p u l a t i o n i n the t e r r i t o r i e s . The I s l a m i c group Hamas, f o r example, which o r g a n i z - es s t r i k e s and demonstrations of i t s own, i s opposed to any compromise with I s r a e l . Hamas i s u n w i l l i n g t o accept a two s t a t e s o l u t i o n and i t c a l l s f o r a l i b e r a t i o n of P a l e s t i n e through the armed s t r u g g l e . The group's p o p u l a r i t y has made a d i v i s i o n w i t h i n the P a l e s t i n i a n community e v i d e n t . T h i s d i v i s i o n seems to e x i s t between the s e c u l a r P a l e s t i n i a n n a t i o n a l i s t s and the I s l a m i c a c t i v i s t s , and i t makes any PLO attempt a t s e t t i n g a peace process i n motion even more d i f f i c u l t . The PLO, attempting to change the p o l i t i c a l balance i n i t s favour and f o r c e d t o make a concrete statement about i t s p o l i c y towards I s r a e l , met i n November of 1988 and passed a number of r e s o l u t i o n s i n an e f f o r t to speed up the n e g o t i a t i n g p r o c e s s . The nin e t e e n t h PNC meeting brought to a climax what had been a gradual process of moderation over a number of years as s e v e r a l r e s o l u t i o n s were passed a t t h i s meeting i n o p p o s i t i o n t o long s t a n d i n g PLO p o l i c i e s . The PNC renounced the use of t e r r o r i s m , e x c l u d i n g the year long u p r i s i n g , and the C o u n c i l voted 253 i n favour, 46 a g a i n s t with 10 a b s t e n t i o n s t o accept R e s o l u t i o n 242, thus making r e c o g n i t i o n of I s r a e l i m p l i c i t . The acceptance of R e s o l u t i o n 242 was a major achievement f o r the moderates i n the PLO because t r a d i t i o n a l l y the PLO has been s t r o n g l y opposed to the r e s o l u t i o n , f o r m a l l y r e j e c t i n g i t up to the e i g h t e e n t h PNC i n 1987. A r a f a t and the moderates q u i t e c l e a r l y i n i t i a t e d one of the g r e a t e s t r i s k s to the u n i t y of the PLO s i n c e the b i r t h of the o r g a n i z a t i o n . Hovever, t h i s r e l a t i v e l y bold move on the p a r t of the moderates vas not made v i t h o u t s e r i o u s o b j e c t i o n s , as some groups c l e a r l y s t a t e d t h e i r o p p o s i t i o n to the PNC's nev p o l i c y . For example, the PFLP-GC boycotted the PNC s e s s i o n and condemned the r e s u l t s . Ahmed J i b r i l , the leader of the group, s a i d " [ t l h i s i s a black day i n our h i s t o r y . Only f o r c e can g i v e the Arabs t h e i r r i g h t s . " (68) While the leader of the PFLP vas not as vigo r o u s i n h i s c r i t i c i s m of the new p o l i c y , George Habash a l s o expressed Tifvser v a t ions about a c c e p t i n g R e s o l u t i o n 242, a r g u i n g t h a t the PLO vas making too many concessions too soon. Habash f e l t t h a t i t was unvise to re c o g n i z e I s r a e l or to accept R e s o l u t i o n 242 p r i o r to an i n t e r n a t i o n a l peace conference. Hovever, Habash a l s o s t a t e d t h a t the PFLP had every i n t e n t i o n of remaining i n the PLO re g a r d - l e s s of the outcome of the meeting and a f t e r the meeting he vas bold enough to s t a t e t h a t he was sure t h a t "the p o l i t i c s of moderation would b r i n g b e t t e r r e s u l t s than the p o l i t i c s of p r i n c i p l e . " (69) Habash's purs u a l of the " p o l i t i c s of p r i n c i - p l e " , as one PNC member noted, appeared to be i n the past, because those who supported h i s p o s i t i o n were c l e a r l y i n the 68. John Bierman, "A Major New Step," Macleans (November 28 1988), 24. 69. I b i d . , 24. 67 m i n o r i t y : "There was a sad n o s t a l g i a f o r what he r e p r e s e n t e d , s i n c e i n e f f e c t by v o t i n g a g a i n s t him we were t a k i n g leave of the past as embodied i n h i s d e f i a n t g e s t u r e s . " (70) T"he PNC had not o n l y voted a g a i n s t what Habash had stood f o r , but i t had a l s o voted i n favour of changing some of i t s most ch e r i s h e d p r i n c i p l e s , as the C o u n c i l f o r m a l l y c o n t r a d i c t e d i t s covenant with regards to a l l the passages t h a t d e a l t with the p a r t i t i o n of P a l e s t i n e and P a l e s t i n i a n statehood. The PNC i m p l i c - i t l y accepted I s r a e l , the s t a t e t h a t was formed by the c o l o n i a l s e t t l e r s t h a t P a l e s t i n i a n o r g a n i z a t i o n s had been opposed to s i n c e the formation of t h e i r demands i n the s t i r r i n g phase. The PNC had, i n e f f e c t , o f f i c i a l l y r e j e c t e d pan-Arabism and i t had abandoned i t s a n t i - c o l o n i a l p o l i c i e s towards I s r a e l , a c c e p t i n g the e x i s t e n c e of a Jewish s t a t e i n Mandate P a l e s t i n e . The PLO f o r m a l i z e d what had been a trend towards moderation over s e v e r a l y e a r s . Yasser A r a f a t repeated the new p o l i c y of h i s o r g a n i z a t i o n a t the General Assembly i n Geneva on December 13 1988. At t h i s meeting A r a f a t reminded the Assembly of the PLO's dream of a s e c u l a r democratic s t a t e i n a l l of P a l e s t i n e t h a t he spoke of at h i s f i r s t appearance before the General Assembly i n 1974. However, A r a f a t s a i d t h a t the PLO had become aware of the gap between r e a l i t y and the dream of t h i s s t a t e . Although h i s speech was i n many ways ambiguous, A r a f a t spoke of the e q u a l i t y 70. Edward S a i d , " A r a f a t ' s Agenda," New statesman and S o c i e t y (December 2 1988), 27. 68 of the two p a r t i e s i n the c o n f l i c t and he c a l l e d f o r I s r a e l ' s withdrawal from a l l Arab t e r r i t o r i e s i t occupied i n 1967. With r e s p e c t to the United Nations p a r t i t i o n p l a n of 1947 A r a f a t d i d not express o p p o s i t i o n to the plan i t s e l f , but r a t h e r , he was c r i t i c a l of the f a c t t h a t i t had o n l y r e s u l t e d i n the c r e a t i o n of a Jewish s t a t e , I s r a e l , although i t c a l l e d f o r the esta b l i s h m e n t of two s t a t e s i n P a l e s t i n e . He i n s i s t e d t h a t the o b j e c t i v e s of the e n t i r e r e s o l u t i o n should be met and a P a l e s t i n i a n s t a t e should be c r e a t e d with the a s s i s t a n c e of the United Nations. In view of our b e l i e f i n (the) i n t e r n a t i o n a l l e g i t - imacy and the v i t a l r o l e of the United N a t i o n s . . . a c t i o n s (should) be undertaken t o place our occupied P a l e s t i n i a n land under temporary United Nations super- v i s i o n , and... i n t e r n a t i o n a l f o r c e s (should) be deployed there to p r o t e c t our people and, a t the same time, to s u p e r v i s e the withdrawal of the I s - r a e l i f o r c e s from our country. (7/1D) A r a f a t s a i d t h a t the PLO was eager to s e t t l e the c o n f l i c t w i t h i n the framework of an i n t e r n a t i o n a l conference f o r peace based on R e s o l u t i o n s 242 and 338. In the General Assembly 104 members r e c o g n i z e d the PNC's d e c l a r a t i o n of a P a l e s t i n i a n s t a t e which was made a t the n i n e - teenth meeting of the PNC and at the United Nations the o f f i c i a l t i t l e of the P a l e s t i n i a n d e l e g a t i o n was changed from the "PLO" to the "State of P a l e s t i n e . " An a d d i t i o n a l i n t e r n a t i o n a l reward occurred i n response to A r a f a t ' s press conference on December 14 71. State of P a l e s t i n e : Address of Mr. Yasser A r a f a t (Ottawa: P a l e s t i n e Information O f f i c e , 1988), 10. 69 1988, a t which he c l e a r l y s t a t e d that the PLO accepted I s r a e l ' s e x i s t e n c e and r e j e c t e d the use of t e r r o r i s m . As a r e s u l t , the US government announced that i t would be w i l l i n g to open a dialogue with the PLO. Thus, by moderating i t s stand the PLO has once again gained i n c r e a s e d r e c o g n i t i o n of i t s o b j e c t i v e s . vwhile the PLO appears to be e n t e r i n g a new phase i n i t s development, i t Is q u i t e l i k e l y t h a t the o r g a n i z a t i o n w i l l have to face some i n t e r n a l problems i n the f u t u r e . The PLO Is f a r from a u n i t e d movement and j u s t as a moderation i n p o l i c i e s threatened the u n i t y of the o r g a n i z a t i o n i n 1974 and 1983, the new changes may once agai n t h r e a t e n the u n i t y of the PLO. The moderates are by no means f r e e to s e t PLO p o l i c y and i f the new i n i t i a t i v e s prove to have l i t t l e p o s i t i v e e f f e c t , groups t h a t o n l y r e l u c t - a n t l y accepted the new p o l i c i e s may d e c l a r e them a f a i l u r e and abandon them f o r the t r a d i t i o n a l r e j e c t i o n i s t l i n e . As Yasser A r a f a t takes f u r t h e r steps towards changing PLO p o l i c y , by d e c l a r i n g the PLO covenant " n u l l and v o i d " , (72) f o r example, h i s i n i t i a t i v e s may very w e l l r e s u l t i n i n c r e a s e d o p p o s i t i o n to him and f u r t h e r s p l i t s i n the PLO. What seems to be c e r t a i n i s t h a t the t r a d i t i o n a l r e j e c t i o n i s t s w i l l continue to oppose the d i p l o m a t i c e f f o r t s that A r a f a t has made. However, i t i s h i g h l y u n l i k e l y t h a t the PFLP -GC and Sa'iqa w i l l be able to ga i n enough support t o have t h e i r p o l i c i e s f o r m a l l y implemented. These groups lack support i n the occupied t e r r i t o r i e s and the 72. c i t e d i n James Markham, "France Receives A r a f a t , " Herald Tribune (May 3 1989), 1. 70 camps and they are seen as puppets of S y r i a and L i b y a , two s t a t e s •tthat have d e m o n s t r a t e d t h e i r l i m i t e d support f o r P a l e s t i n i a n s on many o c c a s i o n s . So while o p p o s i t i o n to the new p o l i c i e s and to A r a f a t w i l l c o n t i n u e , i t i s u n l i k e l y t h a t the r e j e c t i o n i s t s w i l l be seen as a v i a b l e a l t e r n a t i v e to Fatah and A r a f a t . The g r e a t e s t success f o r the hard l i n e r s i n the f u t u r e i s most l i k e l y to be t h e i r c o n s i s t e n t a b i l i t y to f o r c e the PLO to make ambiguous statements about i t s p o l i c i e s . A r a f a t w i l l have to continue to be c a r e f u l i n the f u t u r e when he speaks f o r h i s f r a g i l e o r g a n i z a - t i o n . 71 CONCLUSION A study of the e v o l u t i o n of P a l e s t i n i a n n a t i o n a l i s m r e v e a l s t h a t the movement developed from r e j e c t i o n to compromise. In the past h o l i s t i c goals were pursued and any a l t e r n a t i v e t h a t i n v o l v e d a compromise with the Z i o n i s t s was out of the q u e s t i o n . The P a l e s t i n e L i b e r a t i o n o r g a n i z a t i o n i n h e r i t e d a t r a d i t i o n from past P a l e s t i n i a n o r g a n i z a t i o n s that p e r c e i v e d Jewish c l a i m s to land i n P a l e s t i n e to be i n s p i r e d by c o l o n i a l aims. As a r e s u l t of t h i s p e r c e p t i o n , a compromise t h a t i n v o l v e d a surrender of land was always c o n s i d e r e d to be a v i o l a t i o n of P a l e s t i n i a n r i g h t s . E q u a l l y so, a p a r t i t i o n of P a l e s t i n i a n t e r r i t o r y t h a t the P a l - e s t i n i a n Arabs f e l t was t h e i r own and d i s t i n c t i v e l y Arab, was from the time of the B r i t i s h mandate, c o n s i d e r e d to be im p o s s i b l e . In the 1970's and 1980*s the PLO g r a d u a l l y adopted a p o l i c y of compromise and c o e x i s t e n c e with I s r a e l . In 1969 the PLO a l t e r e d i t s p o l i c i e s to allow Jews who were w i l l i n g to accept equal r i g h t s with C h r i s t i a n s and Molsems to remain i n P a l e s t i n e a f t e r l i b e r a t i o n . As the PLO s u f f e r e d a number of s e r i o u s d e f e a t s such as Black September, Egypt's peace t r e a t y with I s r a e l and I s r a e l ' s i n v a s i o n of Lebanon, I s r a e l ' s permanence and the l i m i t s 72 of Arab support became i n c r e a s i n g l y apparent. I t became c l e a r to the pragmatic groups i n the o r g a n i z a t i o n t h a t the PLO's idea of a s e c u l a r democratic s t a t e i n a l l of P a l e s t i n e was, under the e x i s t i n g circumstances, u n l i k e l y to be achieved i n the near f u t u r e and the moderates i n the PLO b e l i e v e d t h a t the o r g a n i z a - t i o n had to adapt to t h i s r e a l i t y . A former PFLP r e j e c t i o n i s t who converted to Fatah expressed the p o s i t i o n of the moderates i n the f o l l o w i n g way: If the I s r a e l i s would accept the idea of l i v i n g together with equal r i g h t s with P a l e s t i n i a n s then we would form one b i g s t a t e , a more v i a b l e one probably. But s i n c e the I s r a e l i s have expressed c l e a r l y t h a t they don't want t h a t , the o n l y r e a l i s t i c t h i n g to do to a t t a i n peace i s to have a two s t a t e s o l u t i o n . (73) At the n i n e t e e n t h meeting of the PNC the moderates succeeded i n having a p o l i c y of compromise f o r m a l l y accepted. Even one of the t r a d i t i o n a l r e j e c t i o n i s t s , George Habash, expressed a w i l l i n g n e s s to t r y out the PLO's new p o l i c y . I t has been p o s s i b l e to d i v i d e the e v o l u t i o n of the P a l e s t i n i a n n a t i o n a l movement i n t o four b a s i c p e r i o d s . Under the B r i t i s h mandate t r a d i t i o n a l P a l e s t i n i a n s o c i e t y organized o p p o s i t i o n to the B r i t i s h mandate and Z i o n i s t plans f o r a homeland i n P a l e s t i n e . From 1948 to 1967 P a l e s t i n i a n s b e l i e v e d t h a t Arab u n i t y would help them r e g a i n P a l e s t i n e . A f t e r the d e f e a t of the Arab s t a t e s i n the S i x Days War, P a l e s t i n i a n 7 3 c i t e d i n S c o t t Macleod, "The New PLO," The New York Review of Books ( A p r i l 13 1989), 44. 7^ n a t i o n a l i s m took on a modernizing c h a r a c t e r and the o b j e c t i v e was f o r a s e c u l a r democratic s t a t e i n a l l of P a l e s t i n e with equal r i g h t s f o r Jews, C h r i s t i a n s and Moslems. The commando groups gained c o n t r o l of the PLO, ex p r e s s i n g a m i l i t a n t l i n e towards I s r a e l and a d e s i r e to minimize Arab i n f l u e n c e i n P a l e s t i n i a n p o l i t i c s . But throughout the 1970's and 1980's the armed s t r u g g l e began to l o s e i t s appeal to some groups i n the PLO and each time these groups were able to moderate PLO p o l i c i e s , the o r g a n i z a t i o n was "rewarded" by the i n t e r n a t i o n a l community. In the f i n a l p e r i o d i n the development of P a l e s t i n i a n n a t i o n a l i s m , the moderates i n the PLO have a l t e r e d PLO p o l i c i e s and made concessions t h a t v i o l a t e t h e i r t r a d i t i o n a l b e l i e f s i n an e f f o r t to preserve the o r g a n i z a t i o n and f u r t h e r i t s g o a l s . However, i f the moderates are to succeed i n having t h e i r p o l i c i e s maintained, numerous o b s t a c l e s remain. O p p o s i t i o n from groups such as the PFLP-GC and Sa'iqa i s evident and the r e v i v a l of I s l a m i c fundamentalism among P a l e s t i n i a n s i n the occupied t e r r i t o r i e s c o u l d prove t o be a s e r i o u s c h a l l e n g e f o r the PLO. 74 BIBLIOGRAPHY Abboushi, W.F. The Unmaking of P a l e s t i n e . Kent: Whitsable L i t h o L t d . , 1985. Ajami, Fouad. "The End of Pan-Arabism." F o r e i g n A f f a i r s (Winter 1978): 355-373. Amos, John. 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