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Perestroika : a new stage in Soviet reform Felton, Gregory 1988

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PERESTROIKA—A NEW STAGE IN SOVIET REFORM By GREGORY FELTON B . A . U n i v e r s i t y of B r i t i s h Co lumbia , 1979 A THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF MASTER OF ARTS i n THE FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIES Department of P o l i t i c a l S c i e n c e , U n i v e r s i t y of B r i t i s h Columbia We accept t h i s t h e s i s as conforming to the r e q u i r e d s t a n d a r d THE UNIVERSITY OF BRITISH COLUMBIA J u l y 1988 ( £ ) Gregory F e l t o n , 1988 In presenting this thesis in partial fulfilment of the requirements for an advanced degree at the University of British Columbia, I agree that the Library shall make it freely available for reference and study. I further agree that permission for extensive copying of this thesis for scholarly purposes may be granted by the head of my department or by his or her representatives. It is understood that copying or publication of this thesis for financial gain shall not be allowed without my written permission. Department of IhuTlCA/. Sdl&Mtf The University of British Columbia 1956 Main Mall Vancouver, Canada V6T 1Y3 Date DE-6(3/81) i ABSTRACT Perestroika, u n l i k e previous attempts a t economic reform, r e p r e s e n t s the beginning of a new era i n post-war S o v i e t p o l i t i c s . I f one were to c a t e g o r i z e the major S o v i e t l e a d e r s s i n c e S t a l i n i t would be more accurate to term Khrushchev a l i b e r a l S t a l i n i s t , Brezhnev a c o n s e r v a t i v e S t a l i n i s t , and Gorbachev, may be p r o p e r l y c l a s s i f i e d as an a n t i - S t a l i n i s t . Gorbachev's a c c e s s i o n to power r e p r e s e n t s the beginning of what might be termed p o s t - p o s t - S t a l i n reform. To i l l u s t r a t e the uniqueness of p e r e s t r o i k a , t h i s t h e s i s i s s t r u c t u r e d around a comparison of Gorbachev's economic, p o l i t i c a l , and s o c i a l reforms with those of N i k i t a Khrushchev. A c o n t r a s t with Khrushchev i s necessary because i t i s impossible to determine the uniqueness of p e r e s t r o i k a and to draw informed c o n c l u s i o n s about Gorbachev u n l e s s the r e c o r d of the f i r s t - p o s t S t a l i n reformer i s examined. Because Gorbachev and Khrushchev are both reformers, i t i s to be expected t h a t they should share c e r t a i n common o b j e c t i v e s . But the s i m i l a r i t i e s are f a r l e s s s i g n i f i c a n t than the d i f f e r e n c e s . The d i f f e r e n c e s between Gorbachev's and Khrushchev's approaches to reform are a f u n c t i o n both of s u b s t a n t i v e p o l i c y d i f f e r e n c e s and h i s t o r i c a l c ircumstance. H i s t o r i c a l Context Khrushchev came to power at a time when the S o v i e t Union was weak r e l a t i v e to the United S t a t e s . E x t e r n a l l y , the most p r e s s i n g need was f o r the S o v i e t Union to achieve m i l i t a r y p a r i t y with the United S t a t e s . I n t e r n a l l y , Khrushchev's f i r s t years were ones of s t r u g g l e f o r a b s o l u t e l e a d e r s h i p with other P o l i t b u r o f i g u r e s who had d i f f e r i n g notions of reform. The world t h a t Brezhnev and h i s suc c e s s o r s bequeathed to Gorbachev bore l i t t l e resemblance to the one which S t a l i n l e f t to Khrushchev. By the time of Gorbachev's a c c e s s i o n to power, the S o v i e t Union had become the m i l i t a r y equal of the United S t a t e s . P o l i t i c a l Reform Khrushchev's main o b j e c t i v e was to weaken the power of the bureaucracy l a r g e l y i n order to enhance h i s own p e r s o n a l power. Gorbachev's focus i s l e s s S t a l i n than i t i s the S t a l i n i s t system. The lack of s u b o r d i n a t i o n of p o l i t i c a l and economic reform t o the p u r s u i t of p e r s o n a l one-man r u l e marks perestzoika as a d i s t i n c t improvement over de-S t a l i n i z a t i o n . Economic Reform In economic p o l i c y , Khrushchev followed S t a l i n ' s p r a c t i c e of meeting economic problems with a d m i n i s t r a t i v e measures. Although Khrushchev made h i s r e p u t a t i o n by denouncing S t a l i n ' s l e a d e r s h i p , he d i d nothing to address the r o o t of the S o v i e t Union's t r o u b l e s — t h e S t a l i n i s t economic system. P e r e s t r o i k a i s t h e o r e t i c a l l y s u p e r i o r to d e - S t a l i n i z a t i o n because Gorbachev eschews a d m i n i s t r a t i v e t i n k e r i n g i n favour of economic change. Gorbachev has r e d i s c o v e r e d the c o - o p e r a t i v e s o c i a l i s m and l i m i t e d i i i t o l e r a n c e f o r f r e e - e n t e r p r i s e of the 1920s. The i m p l i c a t i o n of t h i s r e t u r n t o 'Leninism' i s an admission t h a t the S t a l i n i s t system i s a f a i l u r e . CONCLUSION The essence of Khrushchev's reforms, and t h e i r subsequent f a i l u r e , can be t r a c e d to h i s f i x a t i o n with appearance over substance. For a l l of h i s ' l i b e r a l ' reforms, Khrushchev i s e s s e n t i a l l y a ' S t a l i n i s t ' p o l i t i c i a n . Perestzoika i s s u p e r i o r to d e - S t a l i n i z a t i o n both because of h i s t o r i c a l circumstance and s u b s t a n t i v e p h i l o s o p h i c a l d i f f e r e n c e s . Gorbachev's r e t u r n t o L e n i n i s t p r i n c i p l e s e f f e c t i v e l y ends the p e r i o d of reformed S t a l i n i s m . But the o b j e c t i v e need f o r reform does imply i t s necessary s u c c e s s . There are many o b s t a c l e s to e f f e c t i n g deep change i n the So v i e t Union, o b s t a c l e s which cannot be surmounted soon. I t cannot be expected t h a t a people w i l l c a s t o f f the h a b i t s of a l i f e t i m e . Nonetheless, Gorbachev's reforms are r i g o r o u s and p o t e n t i a l l y l o n g l a s t i n g , as opposed to Khrushchev's ' a d m i n i s t r a t i v e ' changes which d i d not r e a l l y address the flaws of the S o v i e t system. TABLE OF CONTENTS A b s t r a c t I n t r o d u c t i o n : History of Reform CHAPTER I H i s t o r i c a l Context CHAPTER II P o l i t i c a l Reform CHAPTER I I I Economic Reform CHAPTER IV Con c l u s i o n s Notes B i b l i o g r a p h y 1 INTRODUCTION My purpose i n writing t h i s thesis i s to demonstrate that Mikhail Gorbachev's program of perestzoika, or restructuring, marks the beginning of a new stage i n post-war Soviet p o l i t i c s . To defend t h i s position, I w i l l contrast pezeatzoika with N i k i t a Khrushchev's de-S t a l i n i z a t i o n reforms of the 1950s and 1960s. A contrast with Khrushchev i s necessary because i t i s impossible to draw informed conclusions about Gorbachev unless the record of the f i r s t p o st-Stalin reformer i s examined. It i s incumbent upon us, as would-be interpreters of perestroifca, to understand the theory and practice of Khrushchev's reforms i n order to determine why he was ousted and to conclude therefrom what si g n i f i c a n c e his p o l i t i c a l demise may mean for Gorbachev. Without an appreciation of previous reforms and the context i n which such changes take place, any analysis or prognosis of pezeBtzoika i s a h i s t o r i c a l and hence devoid of meaning. As Stephen Cohen observed,"...most Sovietological studies of c o n f l i c t (over change] i n post-Stalin p o l i t i c s lack any h i s t o r i c a l dimension, whereas much of that c o n f l i c t a c t u a l l y grows out o f — a n d thus cannot be f u l l y understood apart from—the h i s t o r i c a l events...." 1 To bu i l d the proper h i s t o r i c a l foundation for a discussion of perestroifca, t h i s thesis begins with the event that inaugurated the era of de-S t a l i n i z a t i o n — t h e death of Joseph S t a l i n . Reform—A H i s t o r i c Overview The f a c t t h a t S t a l i n d i e d i n March, 1953 d i d not d i m i n i s h the i n f l u e n c e h i s c r i m i n a l past and h i s c e n t r a l i z e d economic system had on f u t u r e generations of S o v i e t decision-makers. With h i s death, the task of h i s s u c c e s s o r s was to reform the t e r r o r i s t i c S t a l i n i s t p o l i t i c a l system while being c a r e f u l to a v o i d p r e c i p i t a t i n g a genuine, comprehensive debate on the S o v i e t system and S t a l i n ' s l e a d e r s h i p . Khrushchev's d e - S t a l i n i z a t i o n r e p r e s e n t s the f i r s t stage of p o s t - S t a l i n reform. In f a c t , a l l p o s t - S t a l i n reform i s e s s e n t i a l l y d e - S t a l i n i z a t i o n . How a leader d e a l s with the ' S t a l i n q u e s t i o n ' c l a s s i f i e s him e i t h e r as a ' l i b e r a l ' or ' c o n s e r v a t i v e ' reformer. Some might o b j e c t to my use of the terms ' l i b e r a l ' and ' c o n s e r v a t i v e ' with r e s p e c t to S o v i e t p o l i t i c s . These l a b e l s have a v e r y s p e c i f i c meaning i n Western c u l t u r e and are based upon the v a l u e - l a d e n n o t i o n s of Lockean or Burkean democracy with t h e i r attendant v i r t u e s of l a i s s e z - f a i r e c a p i t a l i s m , i n d i v i d u a l r i g h t s and u n i v e r s a l s u f f r a g e . In t h i s t h e s i s I employ ' l i b e r a l ' and ' c o n s e r v a t i v e ' i n the broadest sense: ' l i b e r a l ' r e f e r s to a reformer who seeks to e f f e c t economic and p o l i t i c a l change. The ' l i b e r a l ' reformer r e c o g n i z e s t h a t economic reform r e q u i r e s p o l i t i c a l reform and t h a t p o l i t i c a l reform r e q u i r e s a proper understanding of h i s t o r y . B r oadly speaking, Khrushchev's ' l i b e r a l i s m ' was based upon a w i l l i n g n e s s to expose S t a l i n ' s f a i l u r e s t o d i s c r e d i t h i s p e r s o n a l r u l e , while l e a v i n g the b a s i c S t a l i n i s t approach to government and economic p o l i c y i n t a c t . U l t i m a t e l y , though, Khrushchev was turned out of o f f i c e i n 1964 by ' c o n s e r v a t i v e s ' who were uncomfortable with Khrushchev's unorthodoxy. The dominant c h a r a c t e r i s t i c of the ' c o n s e r v a t i v e ' l e a d e r s h i p t h a t f o l l o w e d Khrushchev was a q u i e t c o n t i n u a t i o n of e s t a b l i s h e d Khrushchevian s o c i a l and economic reforms a t the m i d - b u r e a u c r a t i c l e v e l , coupled with a r e i m p o s i t i o n of b u r e a u c r a t i c a u t h o r i t y a t the h i g h e s t p o l i t i c a l l e v e l . T h i s r e i m p o s i t i o n of b u r e a u c r a t i c order r e q u i r e d an end to c h a l l e n g e s to S o v i e t a u t h o r i t y . Thus, the Brezhnev l e a d e r s h i p terminated Khrushchev's h i s t o r i c a l r e v i s i o n i s m i n favour of the p o s i t i v e r e - e v a l u a t i o n of S t a l i n , h i s c u l t , and h i s p o l i c i e s . T h i s r e i m p o s i t i o n of b u r e a u c r a t i c a u t h o r i t y should not be taken to mean t h a t the post-Khrushchev l e a d e r s h i p f o r m a l l y abjured reform. In f a c t , the Brezhnev/Kosygin era may be understood not as a s t r u g g l e between r e f o r m i s t and a n t i - r e f o r m i s t f o r c e s , as i t i s o f t e n argued, but r a t h e r as a c o m p e t i t i o n between two competing approaches to reform. As the reader w i l l d i s c o v e r , one of the dominant themes of t h i s t h e s i s i s the concept of reform as a constant f e a t u r e of S o v i e t p o l i t i c s from 1953 to the p r e s e n t . I t i s b e t t e r to t h i n k of p o s t - S t a l i n i s t S o v i e t h i s t o r y as a sequence of l e a d e r s h i p s d e d i c a t e d to d i f f e r i n g understandings of reform. I f one were to c a t e g o r i z e the major S o v i e t l e a d e r s s i n c e S t a l i n i t would be more ac c u r a t e to term Khrushchev a l i b e r a l S t a l i n i s t , Brezhnev a c o n s e r v a t i v e S t a l i n i s t , and Gorbachev, may be p r o p e r l y c l a s s i f i e d as an a n t i - S t a l i n i s t . Gorbachev's a c c e s s i o n t o power r e p r e s e n t s the beginning of what might be termed p o s t - p o s t - S t a l i n reform. Because of the r a r i t y of predominantly r e f o r m i s t governments throughout S o v i e t (and Russian) h i s t o r y , i t i s easy t o come to the c o n c l u s i o n t h a t Gorbachev, l i k e p r evious reformers, i s a p o l i t i c a l phenomenon who w i l l l a s t o n l y so long as i t takes a c o n s e r v a t i v e r e a c t i o n to r e a s s e r t the primacy of the s t a t u s quo. The f i r s t reform, the New Economic P o l i c y of the 1920s, was e x t i n g u i s h e d by S t a l i n ' s c o e r c i v e c e n t r a l i s m a f t e r o n l y e i g h t y e a r s , and Khrushchev's decade of d e - S t a l i n i z a t i o n from 1953 to 1964 gave way to an eighteen-year long c o n s e r v a t i v e r u l e under Leonid Brezhnev when reform was subordinated t o the need f o r order and c e n t r a l i z a t i o n . Although Brezhnev's Chairman of the C o u n c i l of M i n i s t e r s , A l e k s e i Kosygin, opposed Khrushchev's p o l i t i c a l and c u l t u r a l ' d e m o c r a t i z a t i o n s ' , he was enough of a r e a l i s t t o r e c o g n i z e the merit i n Khrushchev's i n t e n t t o d e c e n t r a l i z e economic decision-making. Kosygin put f o r t h some modest economic reforms, but i n 1965 the time f o r reform and the w i l l t o experiment had passed. Throughout the 1960s, Kosygin was sabotaged i n h i s e f f o r t s by the bureaucracy and even by Brezhnev h i m s e l f . 2 The end f o r reform f o r m a l l y came i n J u l y , 1979 i n the form of a j o i n t r e s o l u t i o n of the C e n t r a l Committee and the C o u n c i l of M i n i s t e r s which n u l l i f i e d most of h i s reform's d e c e n t r a l i z a t i o n p r o v i s i o n s . 3 Throughout t h i s t h e s i s I have i n c l u d e d Brezhnev i n my treatment of Khrushchev and d e - S t a l i n i z a t i o n because Khrushchev and Brezhnev r e p r e s e n t the expansion and c o n t r a c t i o n of one r e f o r m i s t movement. I t i s tempting to r e s o r t t o h i s t o r i c a l s t e r e o t y p e t o d e p i c t Khrushchev as the reformer and Brezhnev as the n e o - S t a l i n i s t a n t i - r e f o r m e r who s n u f f e d out attempts to r e l a x the S o v i e t Union, y e t i t would be more a c c u r a t e t o say t h a t the Brezhnev era r e p r e s e n t e d the c o n s o l i d a t i o n phase of Khrushchev's S t a l i n i s m . Beginning i n 1964, the Brezhnev/Kosygin l e a d e r s h i p "tempered and administered accomplished reforms as p a r t s of the s t a t u s quo....'"* As Richard Lowenthal wrote i n 1965, "Khrushchev was r e p l a c e d not by h i s 'con s e r v a t i v e c r i t i c s ' but by h i s own des i g n a t e d s u c c e s s o r s — m e n who have hastened to renew t h e i r commitment to the d e c i s i o n s of the three Khrushchevian congresses and to the ' r e v i s i o n i s t ' program of 1961.... " s Thus, the Brezhnev p e r i o d from 1965 to Gorbachev's a c c e s s i o n to power should be seen not as a r e v e r s a l of reform , but as the m i n i m a l i z a t i o n of change and as such should be understood as the winter of p o s t - S t a l i n r e f o r m . 6 The f a t e of Kosygin's reforms, though, i s not a proper r e f e r e n c e p o i n t from which to d e r i v e c o n c l u s i o n s about Gorbachev's pexestzoika, s i n c e Kosygin was not General S e c r e t a r y and thus c o u l d not d i r e c t the course of S o v i e t p o l i c y . The c o r r e c t antecedent f o r Gorbachev, t h e r e f o r e , i s N i k i t a Khrushchev who was both F i r s t S e c r e t a r y and Chairman of the C o u n c i l of M i n i s t e r s f o r most of h i s c a r e e r . But before proceeding to a comparative study of Khrushchev and Gorbachev, some understanding about pezestzoika, i t s e l f , i s i n o rder. PERESTROIKA M i k h a i l Gorbachev's r i s e t o power has not o n l y changed the way we p e r c e i v e the S o v i e t Union, i t has changed the way we t a l k about i t . Since he announced h i s p l a n f o r ' r a d i c a l reform' a t the 27th P a r t y Congress, no book, a r t i c l e , or commentary i s complete without a t l e a s t a p a s s i n g r e f e r e n c e to glasnost, pezestzoika, or s a m o k r i t i k a . The l a t t e r two terms are e a s i l y t r a n s l a t e d as ' r e s t r u c t u r i n g ' and ' s e l f -c r i t i c i s m ' , r e s p e c t i v e l y . Glasnost, however, i s l e s s p r e c i s e l y understood. The noun ^glasnost' i s t r a n s l a t e d e i t h e r as 'openness' or ' p u b l i c i t y ' and i s d e r i v e d from the a d j e c t i v e glasnyy which means, among other t h i n g s , ' p u b l i c ' or 'open' as i n the case of glasnyy s u d — a ' p u b l i c ' or 'open' t r i a l . I t would t h e r e f o r e seem t h a t both ' p u b l i c i t y ' and 'openness' are e q u a l l y a c c e p t a b l e t r a n s l a t i o n s of glasnost} i n f a c t 'openness' i s the g e n e r a l l y accepted E n g l i s h e q u i v a l e n t . As a t r a n s l a t i o n , however, 'openness' i s inadequate because i t does not g i v e an accurate r e n d e r i n g of the Russian sense of the word and because i t assumes a commonality of i n t e r p r e t a t i o n between Russian and E n g l i s h . In E n g l i s h , the word 'open' i n the context of r e v e a l i n g i n f o r m a t i o n , c a r r i e s with i t a sense of p r o p r i e t y , honesty, and d i s c l o s u r e . We speak of being 'open and above board 1 i n business d e a l i n g s ; a p o l i t i c a l candidate under p u b l i c s c r u t i n y wishing to p l a y up h i s honesty may c l a i m t h a t h i s l i f e i s 'an open book'; and open Western s o c i e t i e s i n g e n e r a l are based upon the p r i n c i p l e of 'free and open enquiry'. In the S o v i e t Union, a l l a c t i o n s are taken w i t h i n the context of M a r x i s t - L e n i n i s t i n s t r u m e n t a l i s m . Nothing i n S o v i e t l i f e or p o l i t i c s i s ' f r e e ' or 'open'; p e r s o n a l l i b e r t y does not have independent meaning or e x i s t e n c e . Of course, Gorbachev i s not L e n i n , and the 1980s are not the 1920s, but Gorbachev i s nonetheless a Russian and i s t h e r e f o r e an h e i r t o , and a product o f , the s p i r i t of autocracy and the l e g a c i e s of Marx and L e n i n which pervade S o v i e t p o l i t i c s . In the S o v i e t mind, Western l i b e r a l i s m i s c l o s e l y a s s o c i a t e d with a lack of commitment to hard work, i r r e s p o n s i b i l i t y and p e r m i s s i v e n e s s — t r a i t s which have become synonymous with the v e r y Brezhnevism t h a t Gorbachev seeks to u p r o o t . T When Gorbachev speaks of the need to •democratize' S o v i e t s o c i e t y , he may appear to be d e s c r i b i n g a form of democracy not too d i s s i m i l a r from the Western n o t i o n , p a r t i c u l a r l y when he h a i l s democracy as "the wholesome and pure a i r without which the s o c i a l i s t organism cannot l e a d a f u l l l i f e . ' " 3 However, i t i s not democracy but the Russian a f f i n i t y f o r s t r o n g c e n t r a l a u t h o r i t y which forms the b a s i s of glasnost. W r i t i n g i n the 1920s N i c o l a s Berdyaev observed t h a t l i b e r a l i d e a s , ideas of r i g h t as w e l l as ideas of s o c i a l reform, appeared i n Russia t o be Utopian. Bolshevism on the other hand showed i t s e l f to be much l e s s Utopian and much more r e a l i s t , much more . . . f a i t h f u l t o c e r t a i n p r i m o r d i a l Russian t r a d i t i o n s , to the Russian search f o r u n i v e r s a l j u s t i c e , understood i n a maximalizing sense and to the Russian method of government and c o n t r o l by c o e r c i o n . 9 ' P u b l i c i t y ' i s the p r e f e r r e d t r a n s l a t i o n of glasnost because i t i s n e u t r a l , t h a t i s , i t i s not laden with Western normative b i a s e s . Glasnyy, the a d j e c t i v e from which glasnost i s d e r i v e d , i s i t s e l f d e r i v e d from the noun golos, which means ' v o i c e * . I t would be more c o r r e c t t o understand the p o l i c y of glasnost as one of promoting the e x p r e s s i o n , or ' v o i c i n g ' , of d i f f e r i n g o p i n i o n s i n order to "undermine the entrenched I n t e r e s t s of the bureaucracy and ...expose those i n d i v i d u a l s and p r a c t i c e s t h a t stand i n the way of h i s r e f o r m s . . . . [ I t i s not] an acr o s s the board l i b e r a l i z a t i o n . " 1 0 The E n g l i s h word ' p u b l i c i t y ' , t h e r e f o r e , i s the p r e f e r r e d t r a n s l a t i o n because i t i s a word t h a t d e s c r i b e s glasnost but does not presume to i n t e r p r e t i t . Another b e n e f i t of ' p u b l i c i t y ' over 'openness' i s t h a t ' p u b l i c i t y ' does not breed u n r e a l i s t i c e x p e c t a t i o n s about Gorbachev's reform i n Western minds. On the one extreme, d i e - h a r d p e s s i m i s t s , who hold t o an i n t r a c t a b l e , m o n o l i t h i c image of the S o v i e t Union, view any t a l k of p r o g r e s s i v e change with a jaundiced eye. Members of t h i s s c h o o l , l i k e R i c hard Pipes and Robert Conquest, doubt t h a t a Gorbachev-l e d P o l i t b u r o would d i f f e r v e r y much from pr e v i o u s l e a d e r s h i p s , a l l of which are seen as h o s t i l e t o a l l t h i n g s Western and bent on world domination. Change when i t does occur, i s seen as a t a c t i c a l r e t r e a t n e c e s s i t a t e d by " f a i l u r e s , i n s t a b i l i t i e s and f e a r s of c o l l a p s e . " 1 1 No amount of reform would make any d i f f e r e n c e because reform would n e c e s s a r i l y l e a d t o power s h a r i n g and u l t i m a t e l y to p o l i t i c a l p l u r a l i s m . Because these are anathema to the So v i e t s t a t e any t a l k of reform as 'openness' i s i p s o facto a b s u r d . 1 2 Understood i n the Western sense of the word, t h i s statement appears t o be reasonable but when a p p l i e d t o So v i e t s o c i e t y , a s o c i e t y which has never experienced Western-style democracy, i t be t r a y s a lack of a p p r e c i a t i o n f o r the degree of c e n t r a l i z a t i o n and a u t h o r i t a r i a n i s m i n S o v i e t s o c i e t y and government. One need on l y look a t changes i n S o v i e t s o c i e t y t h a t have taken plac e s i n c e the Great T e r r o r t o r e a l i z e t h a t reform qua reform i s p o s s i b l e . Since S t a l i n ' s death we have seen the end of t w e n t y - f i v e years of o f f i c i a l t e r r o r , a reduced p o l i c e f o r c e , a curb on a d m i n i s t r a t i v e and b u r e a u c r a t i c abuses, and the l i m i t e d t o l e r a t i o n of d i s s e n t . The g r e a t e s t change has been the end to one-man d i c t a t o r s h i p . In the wake of S t a l i n ' s death, Stephen Cohen has argued t h a t there has a c t u a l l y developed "something a k i n to two d i s t i n c t p a r t i e s — r e f o r m i s t and c o n s e r v a t i v e — . . . i n s i d e S o v i e t o f f i c i a l d o m and even i n s i d e the Communist P a r t y i t s e l f , c ounterposing r i v a l i n t e r e s t s , p o l i c i e s , ideas and values i n a l l p o l i t i c a l q u a r t e r s . 1 1 1 3 T h i s c o n c l u s i o n of Cohen's i s p e r f e c t l y understandable. While there may not be the ov e r t c o m p e t i t i o n of views i n the S o v i e t Union t h a t we see i n Western s o c i e t i e s , a one-party government must by d e f i n i t i o n p l a y host to a l l p o l i t i c a l views and pe r s u a s i o n s , open or concealed. With the end of S t a l i n ' s d e s p o t i c g r i p on the apparatus of government, non-c o n f o r m i s t , t h a t i s , ' a n t i - S t a l i n i s t ' views w i t h i n the Communist P a r t y , such as those of Khrushchev, c o u l d f i n d e x p r e s s i o n and even o f f i c i a l s a n c t i o n . The ve r y e x i s t e n c e of such views should demonstrate t h a t the great monolith of the So v i e t p o l i t i c a l apparatus i s not so immutable as c o n s e r v a t i v e s would have us b e l i e v e . Many o p t i m i s t s i n the West have h a i l e d the s e l e c t i o n of Gorbachev as General S e c r e t a r y as a watershed i n S o v i e t a f f a i r s , but t h i s has been done almost e x c l u s i v e l y on the b a s i s of p e r s o n a l i t y . Gorbachev's youth and dynamism stood i n such marked c o n t r a s t to the l e t h a r g y of h i s superannuated predecessors t h a t he was judged t o be a st r o n g leader almost by d e f a u l t . Assessments about Gorbachev's charisma and competence were thus not so much made on the b a s i s of h i s statements and speeches as they were on the image of charisma and competence t h a t t e l e v i s i o n p r o j e c t e d . 1 - * One s o v i e t o l o g i s t noted f o r h i s d o v i s h views went so f a r as t o deduce t h a t Gorbachev c o n s c i o u s l y s e l e c t e d February 25th as the date f o r the 27th Communist P a r t y Congress i n order to mark the 30th a n n i v e r s a r y of Khrushchev's 1956 Secret S peech. 1 B In a d d i t i o n , i t was deduced t h a t t h i s a c t would presage a r e h a b i l i t a t i o n of Khrushchev and a more honest treatment of S t a l i n . As i t turned out, Gorbachev d i d not r e h a b i l i t a t e Khrushchev, S t a l i n was not d i s c u s s e d , and the date s e l e c t e d f o r the 27th P a r t y Congress was undoubtedly the r e s u l t of c o i n c i d e n c e . A proper understanding of glasnost may have tempered such premature enthusiasm. As columnist George W i l l observed, there have been people i n every g e n e r a t i o n s i n c e the 1950s who have i n i t i a l l y seen every s u c c e s s i v e S o v i e t l eader as 'moderate' o n l y t o be d i s i l l u s i o n e d by the p e r s i s t e n t f a c t t h a t S o v i e t s do not share Western p o l i t i c a l v a l u e s . 1 6 C l e a r l y , such a p r i o r i assessments of Gorbachev do nothing to f u r t h e r understanding of h i s prospects f o r reform. To make an informed judgment about Gorbachev, i t i s v i t a l t h a t t h i s t h e s i s begin with a d i s c u s s i o n of the h i s t o r i c a l c o ntext i n which Gorbachev must operate, how i t a f f e c t s h i s p o l i t i c a l d e c i s i o n s , and how t h i s c o ntext does or does not d i f f e r from t h a t faced by Khrushchev. I t i s o n l y i n t h i s manner t h a t i t i s p o s s i b l e to determine whether Gorbachev's r u l e w i l l inaugurate a long-term t r e n d of r e f o r m i s t ascendancy or wind up as j u s t another episode i n the " c o n g e n i t a l seesawing between openness and o s s i f i c a t i o n " i n S o v i e t p o l i t i c s . 1 7 " CHAPTER I The H i s t o r i c a l Context T h i s t h e s i s begins with a comparison of the h i s t o r i c a l circumstances surrounding Khrushchev's and Gorbachev's r i s e t o power. I t i s i n p a r t the d i f f e r e n c e s i n the l e g a c i e s bequeathed t o Khrushchev and Gorbachev by S t a l i n and Brezhnev, r e s p e c t i v e l y , t h a t l i e a t the heart of the c o n t r a s t i n g natures of d e - S t a l i n i z a t i o n and p e r e s t r o i k a . The f i r s t p a r t of t h i s chapter examines the e x t e r n a l and i n t e r n a l i n h e r i t a n c e s of Khrushchev and Gorbachev. The second p a r t takes up the d i s c u s s i o n of t h e i r p o l i c i e s i n the context of t h e i r r e s p e c t i v e backgrounds. KHRUSHCHEV'S INHERITANCE E x t e r n a l C o n d i t i o n s In the year t h a t S t a l i n d i e d , the S o v i e t Union faced a ver y h o s t i l e world. I t had s u f f e r e d great l o s s e s d u r i n g the purges, the T e r r o r , the c o l l e c t i v i z a t i o n and the Second World War. The s t a t e of the S o v i e t armed f o r c e s was a l s o v a s t l y i n f e r i o r , q u a l i t a t i v e l y a t l e a s t , t o those of the United S t a t e s . Regarding the l a t t e r , the i n f e r i o r i t y of the So v i e t Union was most ev i d e n t i n nuclear arms. Thus, i n 1953 questi o n s of n a t i o n a l s e c u r i t y continued to be of paramount p o l i t i c a l and economic importance. Khrushchev saw the f u n c t i o n of m i l i t a r y p o l i c y as designed t o a c q u i r e "...a c a p a c i t y t o secure and enfo r c e the f r u i t s of v i c t o r y [(from World War I I ) ] . . . [ a n d ] . . . b e s u f f i c i e n t i n peacetime t o a l l o w S o v i e t l e a d e r s t o pursue t h e i r ambitions i n an environment i n which the danger of war would be minimized." 1 The most p r e s s i n g need was f o r the S o v i e t Union to be a b l e , or p e r c e i v e d to be a b l e , t o be the m i l i t a r y equal of the U n i t e s S t a t e s . The S o v i e t Union's i n a b i l i t y to a s s e r t i t s e l f m i l i t a r i l y was g r a p h i c a l l y i l l u s t r a t e d when P r e s i d e n t Kennedy f o r c e d Khrushchev to withdraw nuclear m i s s i l e s from Cuba i n October, 1962. As Strobe T a l b o t t e x p l a i n s the event, the h u m i l i a t i o n of the Cuban M i s s i l e C r i s i s " c l e a r l y s t i m u l a t e d the S o v i e t Union's d e c i s i o n to undertake [a] twenty-year m i l i t a r y b u i l d - u p of which the SS-20 program was one of the most v i s i b l e and troublesome m a n i f e s t a t i o n s . " 2 The SS-20 was the S o v i e t Union's f i r s t MIRVed i n t e r m e d i a t e -range b a l l i s t i c m i s s i l e . To o f f s e t the U.S. s u p e r i o r i t y i n s t r a t e g i c n u c l e a r m i s s i l e s over the s h o r t term, Khrushchev i n i t i a t e d the development of a c l a s s of m i s s i l e s with c a p a b i l i t i e s t h a t were ab l e t o c h a l l e n g e American nu c l e a r power i n areas of development t h a t were "vacated or neg l e c t e d by the West." 3 In other words, the development of the SS-20 was t o achieve something resembling e q u a l i t y with the United S t a t e s by de v e l o p i n g an o f f s e t t i n g s u p e r i o r i t y i n medium-range m i s s i l e s , thus imposing an "asymmetrical a n x i e t y " on the U.S. 4 The need t o minimize the r i s k of t o t a l war with the West while s t r i v i n g toward nu c l e a r p a r i t y with the United S t a t e s r e q u i r e d a d r a s t i c i n c r e a s e i n S o v i e t nuclear m i l i t a r y c a p a b i l i t y . Khrushchev, l i k e Malenkov, a f f i r m e d t h a t n u c l e a r weapons had so changed the d e s t r u c t i v e p o t e n t i a l of war t h a t m i s s i l e s alone were adequate t o deter an a t t a c k . What mattered was not troops and equipment but the q u a l i t y and q u a n t i t y of one's nuclear a r s e n a l . The S o v i e t Union's nuc l e a r c a p a b i l i t y e f f e c t i v e l y began with the s u c c e s s f u l launch of the Sputnik I s a t e l l i t e i n October, 1957. More important than the s a t e l l i t e , though, was the SS-6 'Sapwood' booster r o c k e t t h a t launched i t . The SS-6 was the f i r s t r o c k e t to have i n t e r c o n t i n e n t a l range. The i n v e n t i o n of the f i r s t de f a c t o ICBM ( i n t e r c o n t i n e n t a l b a l l i s t i c m i s s i l e ) gave the impression t h a t t h a t S o v i e t m i l i t a r y technology was more advanced than t h a t of the United S t a t e s , and Khrushchev sought to e x p l o i t t h i s p e r c e p t i o n of the S o v i e t Union's nuclear c a p a b i l i t i e s . At a ceremonial s e s s i o n of the Supreme S o v i e t soon a f t e r the Sputnik launch, Khrushchev proposed a " h i g h - l e v e l meeting of c a p i t a l i s t and s o c i a l i s t c o u n t r i e s so as to reach an agreement based on the c o n s i d e r a t i o n s of t r u e r e a l i t y . ' " 3 In January 1960, Khrushchev boasted t h a t the S o v i e t Union "'possess[ed] the a b s o l u t e weapon', t h a t S o v i e t m i s s i l e s were so a c c u r a t e they c o u l d h i t a ' f l y i n outer s p a c e * " 6 The bombastic r h e t o r i c of Khrushchev's n u c l e a r p o l i c y served p r i m a r i l y to mask severe shortcomings i n S o v i e t r o c k e t r y . The appearance of s u p e r i o r i t y as being more important than a c t u a l a b i l i t y i s a c h a r a c t e r i s t i c t y p i c a l of Khrushchev's approach to p o l i t i c s . An example of Khrushchev's pre o c c u p a t i o n with pretense i s r e f l e c t e d i n the c y n i c a l a t t i t u d e he adopted toward nu c l e a r disarmament. Khrushchev maintained t h a t there were two l e v e l s to arms n e g o t i a t i o n s : r e a l n e g o t i a t i o n s and the trumpeting of disarmament as a form of propaganda. 7 As he t o l d Arkady Shevchenko, former Un d e r s e c r e t a r y General of the United Nations: "Never f o r g e t . . . t h e appeal t h a t the idea of disarmament has i n the o u t s i d e world. A l l you have to do i s say 'I'm i n favor of i t ' and t h a t pays b i g d i v i d e n d s . . . .A s e d u c t i v e s l o g a n i s a most powerful p o l i t i c a l i n s t r u m e n t . " 0 Shevchenko b e l i e v e d Khrushchev's adoption of Lenin's credo of 'peaceful c o e x i s t e n c e ' was merely a "smokescreen" to obscure h i s plans to expand S o v i e t i n f l u e n c e . " 9 Shevchenko's assessment i s l a r g e l y c o r r e c t because, d u r i n g Khrushchev's l e a d e r s h i p , the S o v i e t Union changed from the inward-looking i s o l a t i o n i s t g i a n t of S t a l i n ' s time to a major p l a y e r i n i n t e r n a t i o n a l r e l a t i o n s . Khrushchev's inroads i n t o the T h i r d World i n search of p o l i t i c a l a l l i e s r e p r e s e n t the S o v i e t Union's d e s i r e to be able to compete with the United S t a t e s as a world superpower and the need to be r e c o g n i z e d as a p o l i t i c a l , m i l i t a r y and economic co-equal of the United S t a t e s . Because of the emphasis placed upon m i l i t a r y development, p a r t i c u l a r l y i n n u c l e a r weapons, the m i l i t a r y -i n d u s t r i a l complex had f i r s t c a l l on the i n t e l l e c t u a l , f i n a n c i a l , and n a t u r a l r e s o u r c e s of the S o v i e t Union. Consequently, any n o t i o n of d i v e r t i n g resources away from the m i l i t a r y to e f f e c t deep, s t r u c t u r a l reform of the heavy-i n d u s t r y based S t a l i n i s t economic model was not p o s s i b l e . I n t e r n a l C o n d i t i o n s The domestic p o l i t i c a l environment of the immediate p o s t - S t a l i n p e r i o d presented the government of the day with two daunting c h a l l e n g e s . The f i r s t was the task of r e b u i l d i n g a n a t i o n a l economy i n the wake of the Second World War. In order to a v o i d s t a g n a t i o n , G e o r g i i Malenkov, the Chairman of the C o u n c i l of M i n i s t e r s , s a i d i n the summer of 1953 t h a t the s t a t e must r a i s e s h a r p l y i n 2 or 3 years the p o p u l a t i o n ' s supply of f o o d s t u f f s , meat, and meat produce, f i s h , and f i s h products, b u t t e r , sugar, eggs, c o n f e c t i o n a r y , t e x t i l e s , c l o t h e s footwear, c r o c k e r y , f u r n i t u r e , and other c u l t u r a l and household g o o d s . 1 0 > Khrushchev, the F i r s t S e c r e t a r y of the Communist P a r t y , would echo t h i s p r eoccupation with speed throughout h i s l e a d e r s h i p . At the 1954 C e n t r a l Committee Plenum, f o r example, Khrushchev r e p e a t e d l y i n s i s t e d t h a t measures to in c r e a s e a g r i c u l t u r a l p r o d u c t i o n had to be accomplished " i n the next 2-3 y e a r s . " 1 1 Khrushchev's pr e o c c u p a t i o n with appearance and speed i s r e f l e c t e d i n h i s frequent e x c u r s i o n s and marathon speaking t o u r s which took him among the people, e s p e c i a l l y i n the c o u n t r y s i d e . On these frequent t r i p s , he would exhort farmers to meet o f t e n u n r e a l i s t i c and u n r e a l i z a b l e g o a l s . Khrushchev's frequent o u t b u r s t s of e l a n and f e r v o u r were attempts t o combine Lenin's r e v o l u t i o n a r y fervour with S t a l i n ' s m o b i l i z i n g e n e r g i e s . 1 3 These frequent t r i p s a l s o served the u l t e r i o r motive of a l l o w i n g Khrushchev to g a i n maximum exposure and to accentuate the i n d i s p e n s a b i l i t y of h i s l e a d e r s h i p as a man who c o u l d get t h i n g s d one. 1 3 The haste with which Khrushchev implemented economic reform i s demonstrated by the s i g n i f i c a n t p e r s o n a l , p o l i t i c a l , and f i n a n c i a l c a p i t a l Khrushchev i n v e s t e d i n such programs as the V i r g i n Lands, the Corn Campaign, and the sovnaxkhoz program. The second c h a l l e n g e f a c i n g the p o s t - S t a l i n l e a d e r s h i p was more p o l i t i c a l l y d i s q u i e t i n g . The pending r e l e a s e of m i l l i o n s of v i c t i m s from f o r c e d - l a b o u r camps n e c e s s i t a t e d an o f f i c i a l response t o S t a l i n ' s c r u e l t y . I t i s estimated t h a t 12-13 m i l l i o n people were sent to labour camps d u r i n g S t a l i n ' s r u l e . The head of the S o v i e t s e c u r i t y apparatus, L a v r e n t i B e r i a , argued f o r keeping them i n the camps permanently, while o n l y those with s p e c i a l p e r m i s s i o n from the M i n i s t r y of I n t e r n a l A f f a i r s would be permitted to r e t u r n to t h e i r homes. 1 4 T h i s p r o p o s a l was supported p a s s i o n a t e l y by f e a r f u l c o n s e r v a t i v e reformers l i k e Malenkov and Kaganovich who, l i k e B e r i a , were r e s p o n s i b l e f o r the death and internment of m i l l i o n s of innocent people. In f a c t , many de t a i n e e s d i d remain i n f o r c e d - l a b o u r camps f o r three years between S t a l i n ' s death and the Secret Speech i n 1956. Four thousand were r e l e a s e d i n 1953, and up to 12,000 were r e l e a s e d i n 1954-55. These, however, were "a ve r y s p e c i a l 12000", r e p r e s e n t i n g i n f l u e n t i a l p a r t y and government o f f i c i a l s and Khrushchev's a i d e s and f r i e n d s from h i s days i n the Ukraine and d u r i n g the war. In 1956-57, a c c o r d i n g to "best e s t i m a t e s " , 7-8 m i l l i o n were r e l e a s e d and 5-6 m i l l i o n posthumously r e h a b i l i t a t e d . 1 3 A t h i r d f a c t o r t h a t needs to be mentioned i s the c o m p e t i t i o n f o r power t h a t f o l l o w e d S t a l i n ' s death. S t a l i n ' s paranoid d i c t a t o r i a l r u l e l e f t a power vacuum i n i t s wake. As one of S t a l i n ' s ambitious l i e u t e n a n t s , Khrushchev's f i r s t task was to o u t f l a n k the i n f l u e n c e of h i s c h i e f r i v a l f o r a b s o l u t e power—Malenkov. The main o b s t a c l e to t h i s task was the s t a t e of the government and p a r t y apparatus. The S t a l i n i s t bureaucracy had come to m a t u r i t y at the c o s t of the near t o t a l emasculation of the P a r t y membership, and, under S t a l i n ' s d i c t a t o r s h i p , the P o l i t b u r o and the C e n t r a l Committee had ceased to f u n c t i o n i n any meaningful c a p a c i t y . Toward the end of S t a l i n ' s r e i g n , the P o l i t b u r o became dominated by o n l y a handful of powerful men, even though i t s membership o f f i c i a l l y stood a t 12 members. 1 6 S h o r t l y before h i s death, though, S t a l i n decreed t h a t P o l i t b u r o membership should i n c r e a s e to 11-25 f u l l members and 11 candidate members and the S e c r e t a r i a t should be doubled from 5 to 10 members.17" The p o l i t i c a l c l i m a t e i n s i d e the S o v i e t Union was no l e s s v i o l e n t than the one o u t s i d e , perhaps even more so. Khrushchev not o n l y had to wage a b i t t e r p o l i t i c a l b a t t l e with Malenkov and other c o n s e r v a t i v e s , but he a l s o had to begin the process of d e - S t a l i n i z a t i o n . S t a l i n ' s death may have allowed c r i t i c a l v o i c e s to be heard but i t a l s o c r e a t e d a p o l i t i c a l vacuum. With no s i n g l e f i g u r e s u f f i c i e n t l y s t r o n g to emerge as l e a d e r , even i n a c o l l e c t i v e l e a d e r s h i p , the years 1953-57 were ones of sharp s t r u g g l e and p o l i t i c a l manoeuvering. GORBACHEV'S INHERITANCE E x t e r n a l C o n d i t i o n s The world t h a t Brezhnev and h i s succ e s s o r s bequeathed to Gorbachev i n March 1985 bore l i t t l e resemblance to the one which S t a l i n l e f t to Khrushchev i n March 1953. By the time of Gorbachev's a c c e s s i o n to power, the S o v i e t Union had become the m i l i t a r y equal of the United S t a t e s , as a r e s u l t of the massive c o n v e n t i o n a l and nucl e a r m i l i t a r y b u i l d - u p conducted throughout the 1960s and 70s. Today, the p r i n c i p a l t h r e a t to S o v i e t n a t i o n a l s e c u r i t y and superpower s t a t u s i s l e s s the t h r e a t of m i l i t a r y c o n f l i c t with the United S t a t e s than i t i s the economic and m i l i t a r y c o s t s of m a i n t a i n i n g a t e c h n o l o g i c a l l y backward economy. I t i s the r e c o g n i t i o n t h a t the S o v i e t Union must modernize i t s economy t h a t forms the essence of Gorbachev's 'new t h i n k i n g 1 i n arms c o n t r o l , f o r e i g n p o l i c y , economic p o l i c y and elsewhere. The Brezhnev l e a d e r s h i p which overthrew Khrushchev i n 1964 brought s t a b i l i t y and c o n s i s t e n c y to a f o r e i g n p o l i c y t h a t had been governed by brinkmanship and a d v e n t u r i s m . 1 0 However, Leonid Brezhnev "...shared the b a s i c o b j e c t i v e s of [Khrushchev's] s t r a t e g y i n the T h i r d W o r l d " 1 9 namely, the expansion of S o v i e t i n f l u e n c e , c u l t i v a t i o n of a l l i e s a g a i n s t the West, and the enhancement of S o v i e t p r e s t i g e a t home and abroad. L e a r n i n g from the h u m i l i a t i o n of the Cuban M i s s i l e C r i s i s , Brezhnev s e t out on a d e l i b e r a t e course to i n c r e a s e d r a m a t i c a l l y the s i z e of the S o v i e t c o n v e n t i o n a l f o r c e s so t h a t "the S o v i e t m i l i t a r y would be an instrument capable of s u p p o r t i n g an a c t i v e f o r e i g n p o l i c y . " 2 0 From 1965-1975 Brezhnev p r e s i d e d over one of the most p r o d i g i o u s peacetime m i l i t a r y b u i l d - u p s i n h i s t o r y , d u r i n g which time the m i l i t a r y became the primary instrument by which the S o v i e t Union expanded i t s i n f l u e n c e throughout the T h i r d World.. Today, however, Seweryn B i a l e r p o i n t s out, t h a t " [ t l h e p o l i c y of guns, b u t t e r and g r o w t h — t h e p o l i t i c a l c ornerstone of the Brezhnev e r a — i s no longer p o s s i b l e . . . . [ a n d ] . . . t h e S o v i e t Union w i l l face an economic crunch f a r more severe than anything i t encountered i n the 1960s and 1970s". 2 1 The r e l a t i v e m i l i t a r y and t e c h n o l o g i c a l gap between the U.S. and the S o v i e t Union t h a t had narrowed s l i g h t l y d u r i n g Brezhnev's f i r s t decade has now begun to w i d e n . 2 2 T h i s has had s i g n i f i c a n t economic r e p e r c u s s i o n s . The m i l i t a r y - i n d u s t r i a l complex i n the 1980s i s no longer the d r i v i n g economic f o r c e i t was f o r Khrushchev and Brezhnev. The m i l i t a r y - i n d u s t r i a l complex, which i s the l a r g e s t consumer of s c i e n t i s t s , e n gineers, money, and n a t u r a l r e s o u r c e s , now accounts f o r 16% of the S o v i e t Union's gross n a t i o n a l product (compared with 7% i n the United S t a t e s ) and i s an impediment to economic expansion and modernization i n areas l i k e high technology and secondary i n d u s t r y . 2 3 The need to curb m i l i t a r y spending i n favour of economic reform i s demonstrated by S o v i e t concerns 21 expressed over P r e s i d e n t Ronald Reagan's S t r a t e g i c Defence I n i t i a t i v e : Having i n v e s t e d h e a v i l y i n the m i l i t a r y , e s p e c i a l l y i n land-based m i s s i l e s , f o r two decades, and having achieved rough p a r i t y with the United S t a t e s , the S o v i e t s now p e r c e i v e a new c h a l l e n g e t h a t t h r e a t e n s t o n u l l i f y many of these gains and f o r c e them i n t o u n b r i d l e d c o m p e t i t i o n i n an area where they are weak and America i s s t r o n g : high technology. Even i f the SDI does not work — and many s c i e n t i s t s doubt t h a t i t w i l l — t h e S o v i e t s f e a r t h a t there w i l l be major t e c h n o l o g i c a l s p i n o f f s , e s p e c i a l l y i n c o n v e n t i o n a l weapons and other a r e a s . These c o u l d g i v e the United S t a t e s important, a l b e i t temporary, p o l i t i c a l and m i l i t a r y advantages. A f u l l - b l o w n defense race would a l s o f o r c e the d i v e r s i o n of s t i l l more resources to the m i l i t a r y s e c t o r and undermine Gorbachev's plans f o r economic modernization and r e f o r m . 2 4 Under Gorbachev, there i s a t a n g i b l e s h i f t away from an o f f e n s i v e toward a r e s t r a i n e d m i l i t a r y s t r a t e g y . In other words, Gorbachev i s not l o o k i n g to take on new m i l i t a r y a l l i e s but r a t h e r i s i n t e r e s t e d i n s t a b i l i z i n g e x i s t i n g r e l a t i o n s . 2 3 T h i s sober assessment of S o v i e t commitments can be seen i n Gorbachev's d e s i r e t o end the S o v i e t involvement i n the war i n Af g h a n i s t a n as e x p e d i t i o u s l y as p o s s i b l e , 2 6 and h i s w i l l i n g n e s s t o make concessions to the United S t a t e s i n n u c l e a r arms r e d u c t i o n t a l k s t h a t were unthinkable as few as f i v e years ago. The c u l m i n a t i o n of attempts t o b r i n g about a r e a l r e d u c t i o n i n the nuc l e a r c o m p e t i t i o n came on 9 December, 1987 when Gorbachev and P r e s i d e n t Ronald Reagan signed a t r e a t y t o a b o l i s h a l l intermediate-range n u c l e a r weapons i n E u r o p e . 2 7 Such a sober a p p r a i s a l of the world i s a f a r c r y from Khrushchev's adventurism. I n t e r n a l C o n d i t i o n s Upon r e p l a c i n g Khrushchev as F i r s t S e c r e t a r y (renamed General S e c r e t a r y ) , Leonid Brezhnev f o r m a l l y e l i m i n a t e d reform as a l e a d i n g government p o l i c y . Amid a broad-based demand f o r p o l i t i c a l and economic s t a b i l i t y (see Chapter I I ) , Brezhnev was l e f t with l i t t l e c h o i c e except to i n c r e a s e economic r e l a t i o n s with the West as the o n l y v i a b l e a l t e r n a t i v e to s t r u c t u r a l reform as a way to a v o i d a r e l a p s e i n t o S t a l i n i s t autarky. The c o r o l l a r y to t h i s i s t h a t the i n s t i n c t f o r order d i d not permit the u n d e r l y i n g flaws of the S o v i e t system to be addressed. As a consequence, i t was d u r i n g the Brezhnev era t h a t problems of s l o t h , c o r r u p t i o n , and nepotism became endemic. The e f f e c t of the r e i m p o s i t i o n of s t r i c t c e n t r a l i z e d b u r e a u c r a t i c P a r t y c o n t r o l by Khrushchev's s u c c e s s o r s was t h a t the d e f i c i e n c i e s of Khrushchev's meddling, micro-management s t y l e of l e a d e r s h i p were masked by a s t u l t i f y i n g , p l o d d i n g conservatism. The Brezhnev era was t y p i f i e d by an u n c r i t i c a l defence of the s t a t u s quo and r i g i d i m p o s i t i o n of i d e o l o g i c a l orthodoxy. T h i s c l i m a t e s t i f l e d popular i n i t i a t i v e and i n n o v a t i o n and permitted s l o t h and c o r r u p t i o n to f l o u r i s h . T h i s i s the Brezhnev l e g a c y t h a t p r o v i d e s the impetus f o r M i k h a i l Gorbachev's campaign f o r r a d i c a l r e f o r m — p e r e s t r o i k a . What i s t h i s n e g ative l e g a c y and how does Gorbachev int e n d to combat i t ? Leonid Brezhnev was a b l e to maintain both a high l e v e l of domestic spending and a p r o d i g i o u s c o n v e n t i o n a l and nuclear arms b u i l d - u p because, up u n t i l 1976, Brezhnev compensated f o r the s t r u c t u r a l inadequacies of the S o v i e t system with g r e a t l y i n c r e a s e d Western imports. During t h i s time the S o v i e t economy experienced reasonably s u s t a i n e d economic growth and a r i s i n g standard of l i v i n g . A f t e r twelve years of r e l a t i v e p r o s p e r i t y , however, the economy began to s t a g n a t e . 2 0 As Timothy C o l t o n w r i t e s , i n order to cushion the defense budget and s o c i a l programs, [the P o l i t b u r o ] bankfed] on the soundness of Brezhnev's c o n s e r v a t i v e management p o l i c y . . . . a n d [decided to pare] growth and investment t a r g e t s . . . . In s e c t o r a f t e r s e c t o r throughout the l a t e 1970s and e a r l y 1980s, 'once the break i n t r e n d o ccurred, performance continued to d e t e r i o r a t e e r r a t i c a l l y a long the new, s t e e p l y d e c l i n i n g t r e n d l i n e . ' As imbalances m u l t i p l i e d , 'plan d i s c i p l i n e ' was undermined, midyear r e v i s i o n s i n p r o d u c t i o n plans being made i n each year from 1979 o n . 2 9 From 1976 u n t i l Brezhnev's death i n 1982 the economy v i r t u a l l y ground to a h a l t . In 1976, o v e r a l l i n d u s t r i a l growth f e l l 2.6% over the p r e v i o u s y e a r — t h e g r e a t e s t one-year d e c l i n e s i n c e 1950. 3 0 Included i n t h i s f i g u r e are a g r i c u l t u r e p r o d u c t i o n , o i l p r o d u c t i o n , m i l i t a r y spending, c o n s t r u c t i o n p r o j e c t s , and mining. S o v i e t economic d e c l i n e can be t r a c e d to the 1971-75 f i v e - y e a r p l a n . T h i s was the f i r s t p l a n to emphasize growth i n l i g h t i n d u s t r y and consumer goods over investment i n heavy i n d u s t r y . 3 1 Table 1-1 c l e a r l y i l l u s t r a t e s the negative e f f e c t of Brezhnev's p o l i c y of i n c r e a s i n g imports from the West, i n t h i s case g r a i n , t o compensate f o r the s t r u c t u r a l inadequacy of the S t a l i n i s t economic system. Note the r a t i o between exports and imports over these twenty years with r e s p e c t to s i m i l a r 24 harvests. While v a r i a t i o n i s evident throughout, i t i s i n Table 1-1 Soviet Grain Harvests, Exports and Imports (sillion metric tons) Year Harvest Bxoorts Imports 1950 81 2.9 0.2 1955 104 3.7 0.3 1956 125 3.2 0.5 1957 103 7.4 0.2 1958 135 5.1 0.8 1959 120 7.0 0.3 1960 126 6.8 0.2 1961 131 7.5 0.7 1962 140 7.8 — 1963 108 6.3 3.1 1964 152 3.5 7.3 1965 121 4.3 6.4 1966 171 3.6 7.7 1967 148 6.2 2.2 1968 170 5.4 1.6 1969 162 7.2 0.6 1970 187 5.7 2.2 1971 181 8.6 3.5 1972 168 4.6 15.5 1973 223 4.9 23.9 1974 196 7.0 7.1 1975 140 3.6 15.9 1976 224 1.5 20.6 1977 196 3.0b 10.5a 1978 237 1.5b 23.0a 1979 179 3.0b 25.5a 1980 189 2.0b 30-35a 1981 160b 3.0b 43.0a 1982 170b 2.0b 35.0b 1983 190b 1.8b 34.0a %m 17Pb — 43iOa Souxcei Marshall I Goldman, "The Burden of the Stalinist Model: The Case of Soviet Agriculture, Industry, and Consumer Goods" in Uri Ra'anan and Charles Perry eds., The VS8R Today and Tomorrow, (Lexington, Massachussets: D.C. Heath, 1987) p.73. a: U.8. Department of Agriculture estimates, b: Marshall Goldman's estimates. (for f u l l l i s t of Soviet and American sources for this table, see Ra'anan and Perry, p.73). the mid-1970s, around the time of Brezhnev's c o n s o l i d a t i o n of power, t h a t the d i f f e r e n c e s become pronounced. Note p a r t i c u l a r l y the d i f f e r e n c e s between 1974 and 1977: with i d e n t i c a l 196 m i l l i o n - t o n h a r v e s t s , the r a t i o of imports to exports b a l l o o n e d from 1.01:1 to 3.5:1. In 1983 with a harvest of 190 m i l l i o n tons the r a t i o was 18.89:11 Such enormous d i s p a r i t i e s cannot be a s c r i b e d s o l e l y t o poor weather or i n c r e a s e d concern over the p u b l i c ' s d i e t . They must be seen as the consequence of the f a i l u r e of the S t a l i n i s t a g r i c u l t u r a l s t r u c t u r e to meet the needs of the S o v i e t people. For example, i n the S o v i e t Union 20-25% of a l l g r a i n r o t s i n the f i e l d s because there i s no e f f i c i e n t means to h a r v e s t i t , and h a l f of a l l a v a i l a b l e t r a c t o r s t o harvest the g r a i n are used i n s t e a d to haul t r u c k s which become bogged down i n mud f o r want of paved r o a d s . 3 2 The hallmark of the Brezhnev years was the s u b o r d i n a t i o n of i n v e n t i v e n e s s and c r i t i c i s m to the defence of the b u r e a u c r a t i c order and the s t a t u s quo. P o l i c y debates were l a r g e l y e x e r c i s e s designed to a v o i d a d d r e s s i n g problems. The e f f e c t of t h i s c o n s e r v a t i s m was t h a t deep-rooted flaws i n the S o v i e t system were not addressed and grew worse over time. T h i s i s p a r t i c u l a r l y the case with S o v i e t a g r i c u l t u r e and the 1979 Food Programme—Brezhnev's attempt to 'reform' every aspect of S o v i e t a g r i c u l t u r e i n one f e l l swoop. The Food Programme was a l s o the one p o l i c y of the Brezhnev era with which Gorbachev was the most deeply i n v o l v e d . The Food Programme Plenum is s u e d decrees f o r t a r g e t s i n a l l areas of food p r o d u c t i o n , a g r i c u l t u r a l machinery, food p r o c e s s i n g , s a l e s , and e x p o r t s . 3 3 T h i s was the c l e a r e s t m a n i f e s t a t i o n of Brezhnev's p o l i c y of r e s o l v i n g problems by b l i n d l y expanding investment. The Brezhnev l e a d e r s h i p ' s c r e d i b i l i t y was founded on the promise of b e t t e r food s u p p l i e s . However, as Zhores Medvedev w r i t e s , the l e a d e r s h i p c o u l d not d i s t i n g u i s h between r e a l i s t i c and impossible goals and d i d not know how to s e t about a c h i e v i n g the t a r g e t s they s e t f o r themselves. 3'* The Programme f a i l e d because "there was not a s i n g l e change which c o u l d be c l a s s i f i e d as a r e f o r m . " 3 3 The v a s t amounts of money spent i n the Food Programme—35% of the State budget—were wasted because i t s d r a f t e r s d i d not address the r o o t cause of the problem of S o v i e t a g r i c u l t u r e : the S t a l i n i s t economic system. "[TJhere was to be no l i b e r a l i z a t i o n of the decision-making process a t the bottom l e v e l and no freedom of c h o i c e f o r i n d i v i d u a l c o l l e c t i v e and s t a t e f a r m s " — i n f a c t , b u r e a u c r a t i z a t i o n of the decision-making process was compounded. 3 6 The r i t u a l i s t i c cant of Marxism-Leninism cannot s u f f i c e f o r Gorbachev the way i t d i d f o r h i s p r e d e c e s s o r s . The advances of Western technology and the d e c r e p i t s t a t e of the S o v i e t economy today demand t h a t the P o l i t b u r o address the endemic, s t r u c t u r a l c r i s e s both i n government and the P a r t y , c r i s e s which are t r a c e a b l e to the r e g r e s s i v e i n f l u e n c e of the S o v i e t economic system, which, i n t u r n , i s rooted i n the S t a l i n i s t p r a c t i c e s of r i g i d c e n t r a l i z a t i o n and c o l l e c t i v i z e d a g r i c u l t u r e . Khrushchev, by c o n t r a s t , c o u l d get away with i g n o r i n g the r o o t cause of the S o v i e t Union's economic c r i s i s because the i l l u s i o n of of Marxism-Leninism as a dynamic, p r o g r e s s i v e world d o c t r i n e and the s u p e r i o r i t y of the S t a l i n i s t economic model were s t i l l d e f e n s i b l e . T h i s i s not so any more. APPROACHES TO REFORM Khrushchev—The O p t i m i s t i c World-view For Khrushchev, the world was d i v i d e d i n t o c a p i t a l i s t , communist, and c o l o n i a l worlds with the S o v i e t Union i n the vanguard of the communist world and as the champion of p r o g r e s s i v e r e v o l u t i o n a r y f o r c e s i n the T h i r d World. Khrushchev foresaw the e c l i p s e of the " c a p i t a l i s t e n c i r c l e m e n t " of the S o v i e t Union by "the c o n d i t i o n s c r e a t e d by the e x i s t e n c e of a world s o c i a l i s t system...." 3' 7 The i n c r e a s i n g numbers of ' n a t i o n a l democrats' and 'wars of l i b e r a t i o n ' i n the T h i r d World "supposedly heralded the de v e l o p i n g world's i r r e v e r s i b l e march toward s o c i a l i s m - - a n d alignment with Moscow. " 3 B U n l i k e S t a l i n who disparaged the l e a d e r s of former c o l o n i a l p o s s e s s i o n s as 'lackeys of i m p e r i a l i s m ' , Khrushchev a c t i v e l y courted T h i r d World n a t i o n s i n order t o expand S o v i e t i n f l u e n c e (to compete with American i n f l u e n c e ) , and to e n l i s t t h e i r a i d i n the S o v i e t Union's i d e o l o g i c a l s t r u g g l e with the West. 3 9 Khrushchev's understanding of i n t e r n a t i o n a l r e l a t i o n s was rooted i n the b e l i e f t h a t the high standard of l i v i n g enjoyed i n Western s o c i e t i e s was the r e s u l t of c o l o n i a l e x p l o i t a t i o n and was doomed to f a l l as c o l o n i e s achieved independence. Because c a p i t a l i s t c o u n t r i e s need c o l o n i e s to absorb excess p r o d u c t i o n , Khrushchev took the disappearance of c o l o n i e s to mean th a t the d e c l i n e and f a l l of the Western economies was i n t e r n a l l y generated and i n e v i t a b l e . T h i s o p t i m i s t i c i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of the M a r x i s t - L e n i n i s t h i s t o r i c a l d i a l e c t i c l e d Khrushchev to the c o n c l u s i o n t h a t the S o v i e t Union need have no f e a r of war with the West. Furthermore, the S o v i e t Union had an o b l i g a t i o n to help b r i n g about workers* r e v o l u t i o n s i n other c o u n t r i e s . Khrushchev's optimism about the f u t u r e of communism and h i s d e v o t i o n t o communist i d e a l s are b a s i c to h i s economic and p o l i t i c a l b e l i e f s . Khrushchev, born i n 1894, grew up b e l i e v i n g i n the romantic i d e a l of "...a c l a s s l e s s s o c i e t y with one s i n g l e form of p u b l i c ownership of the means of pr o d u c t i o n and f u l l s o c i a l e q u a l i t y of a l l members of s o c i e t y . . . . " " * 0 By the end of the C i v i l War i n 1921, he was p e r s o n a l l y prepared to s u f f e r " c o l d , hunger and d e p r i v a t i o n " to implement the "ideas of L e n i n " i n the r e b u i l d i n g of S o v i e t heavy i n d u s t r y and m i l i t a r y f o r c e , and he extended t h i s w i l l i n g n e s s to s u f f e r " f o r the P a r t y ' s sake" t o the people as a whole.* 1 Khrushchev, f i r m l y convinced of the moral s u p e r i o r i t y of communism over c a p i t a l i s m , b e l i e v e d t h a t communism would one day dominate the world . * 2 Khrushchev's optimism l e d him to r e j e c t the t r a d i t i o n a l L e n i n i s t maxim t h a t there must be a f i n a l war between c a p i t a l i s m and communism. His promotion of p e a c e f u l co-e x i s t e n c e with the West, e s p e c i a l l y with the United S t a t e s , i s Khrushchev's most s i g n i f i c a n t c o n t r i b u t i o n to communist theory. Khrushchev, though, d i d not s t a r t out as a f o r e i g n p o l i c y reformer. Premier G e o r g i i Malenkov was the f i r s t p o s t - S t a l i n i s t leader to advocate a p o l i c y of p e a c e f u l coexistence."* 3 In f a c t , Khrushchev's i n i t i a l views on f o r e i g n p o l i c y r e f l e c t e d S t a l i n ' s xenophobic d e f e n s i v e n e s s and had the support of the a r c h - c o n s e r v a t i v e Vyacheslav Molotov, S t a l i n ' s long-time F o r e i g n Minister.'*'* In c o n t r a s t to the views of Malenkov and other ' c o n s e r v a t i v e s ' , Khrushchev, i n 1954, b e l i e v e d t h a t c a p i t a l i s m , not c i v i l i z a t i o n would p e r i s h i n a nucl e a r war."*55 Over the f i r s t t h r ee y e a r s , Khrushchev d i d f i n a l l y come to r e a s s e s s h i s p o l i c y i n l i g h t of the d e s t r u c t i v e p o t e n t i a l of n u c l e a r weapons "...and by the end of 1955 he was prepared to advance the Malenkov view as h i s own." 4 6 Khrushchev's p o l i t i c a l views were shaped by the b r u t i s h p o l i t i c a l environment t h a t f o l l o w e d Lenin's death. The S t a l i n / T r o t s k y r i v a l r y and the e a r l y stages of S t a l i n ' s t e r r o r and f o r c e d c o l l e c t i v i z a t i o n of a g r i c u l t u r e f o s t e r e d an environment wherein reason and debate were v i r t u a l l y outlawed and where an a t t i t u d e of sycophancy toward one's s u p e r i o r was necessary to ensure one's p o l i t i c a l and per s o n a l w e l l - b e i n g . For example, Khrushchev, i n 1924, wrote a s t r o n g polemic a g a i n s t Leon T r o t s k y to please h i s s u p e r i o r , Lazar Kaganovich, and i t d i d not seem to matter to Khrushchev t h a t T r o t s k y had decorated him the previous year ."*r Khrushchev's p o l i t i c a l e d u c a t i o n f o r m a l l y began i n 1929. I t was i n t h a t year t h a t he went to Moscow to study m e t a l l u r g y a t the J.V. S t a l i n I n d u s t r i a l Academy. At the Academy, Khrushchev became i t s p o l i t i c a l s e c r e t a r y and i n the process developed a f r i e n d s h i p with f e l l o w student Nadezhda A l l i l u y e v a , S t a l i n ' s w i f e . Khrushchev was always concerned t h a t A l l i l u y e v a t a l k e d to S t a l i n about the p o l i t i c a l properness of the d i r e c t i v e s he gave to her and other s t u d e n t s . As a consequence, Khrushchev was c a r e f u l to ensure t h a t h i s views agreed with the g e n e r a l p a r t y l i n e , t h a t i s , with S t a l i n . Through h i s wif e ' s r e p o r t s , S t a l i n came to t r u s t Khrushchev and, with the help of Lazar Kaganovich, Khrushchev moved i n t o the Moscow P a r t y apparatus where he began h i s p o l i t i c a l c a r e e r . * 3 Khrushchev c r e d i t s A l l i l u y e v a ' s i n f l u e n c e with S t a l i n f o r h i s advancement i n the Moscow p a r t y apparatus. Because Khrushchev's p o l i t i c a l l i f e was formed by S t a l i n ' s s e c r e t i v e , n e p o t i s t i c , and i n s u l a r s t y l e of p o l i t i c a l d ecision-making, i t should not come as a s u r p r i s e to see t h i s t r a i t r e f l e c t e d i n Khrushchev's own l e a d e r s h i p . Throughout h i s p o l i t i c a l c a r e e r , Khrushchev sought advice p r i n c i p a l l y from a c o t e r i e of p e r s o n a l a i d e s who were not from the P a r t y and who d i d not have good c r e d e n t i a l s . These a i d e s were T r o f i m D. Lysenko, A.S. Shevchenko, V.S. Lebedev, and A l e k s e i Adzhubei. Adzhubei was Khrushchev's son-in-law. These men owed t h e i r p o s i t i o n and i n f l u e n c e t o t h e i r p e r s o n a l r e l a t i o n s h i p to Khrushchev and not to any p a r t i c u l a r s k i l l . 4 9 Khrushchev's economic reforms were c o l o u r e d by a p e r s o n a l u n f a m i l i a r i t y with the essence of the reforms being conducted i n h i s name and under h i s d i r e c t i o n . Even though he staked h i s p o l i t i c a l f u t u r e almost e n t i r e l y upon a dramatic i n c r e a s e i n a g r i c u l t u r a l p r o d u c t i o n , Khrushchev was l a r g e l y ignorant of a g r i c u l t u r a l methods or the problems faced by farmers. In 1928, Khrushchev asked h i s s u p e r i o r i n the U k r a i n i a n P a r t y apparatus, Lazar Kaganovich, to a s s i g n him to an i n d u s t r i a l area on the grounds t h a t he " d i d n ' t have much experience i n farming and would have been out of h i s element i n an a g r i c u l t u r a l area.'" 3 0 In 1947, before he was made a g r i c u l t u r e spokesman, Khrushchev pleaded ignorance about a g r i c u l t u r e to S t a l i n i n order to "beg out o f " d e l i v e r i n g the gen e r a l r e p o r t to a s p e c i a l C e n t r a l Committee plenum on a g r i c u l t u r e . 3 1 N e v e r t h e l e s s , i n 1950 S t a l i n appointed Khrushchev P o l i t b u r o spokesman f o r a g r i c u l t u r a l p o l i c y . Khrushchev was give n t h i s p o s i t i o n because he earned S t a l i n ' s favour by t h i n k i n g up a c o s t - f r e e a d m i n i s t r a t i v e 'breakthrough' to improve the stagnant s t a t e of S o v i e t a g r i c u l t u r e . Khrushchev's p l a n was to r e v i t a l i z e S o v i e t a g r i c u l t u r e through i n c r e a s e d a d m i n i s t r a t i v e e f f i c i e n c y . S p e c i f i c a l l y , t h i s e n t a i l e d the amalgamation of the e x i s t i n g 6069 c o l l e c t i v e farms of the Moscow oblast i n t o 1668 by June 1950. 3 2 While some c o n s o l i d a t i o n c o u l d have been j u s t i f i e d , Khrushchev took the idea too f a r . The reason f o r t h i s was t h a t Khrushchev had an u l t e r i o r motive f o r s u g g e s t i n g the amalgamation, one which demonstrates the i n f l u e n c e of h i s romantic optimism and the l i n k a g e of p o l i t i c a l and economic circumstances. T h i s u l t e r i o r motive was h i s idea of c o n s t r u c t i n g ' a g r o t o w n s ' — s e l f - c o n t a i n e d , s e l f - s u f f i c i e n t , modern farming communities. The b e n e f i t s to the S o v i e t h i e r a r c h y from such a program would be the d e s t r u c t i o n of the v i l l a g e , and with i t the powerful bond between the peasant, the v i l l a g e and the la n d , and a l s o the r e l o c a t i o n of the peasantry i n t o a more e a s i l y c o n t r o l l e d environment. However, a f t e r a p i l o t p r o j e c t i n 1950-51 f a i l e d and the agrotown p r o j e c t was p u b l i c l y condemned by Malenkov i n a 1952 speech, Khrushchev no longer served as a g r i c u l t u r e spokesman and he re t u r n e d t o P a r t y work. 3 3 Khrushchev p r e f e r r e d t o work behind the scenes to purge Malenkov supporters i n key b u r e a u c r a t i c p o s i t i o n s and i n s t a l l h i s own 'Ukra i n i a n ' a l l i e s . 3 * Khrushchev r e - e n t e r e d the a g r i c u l t u r e arena a f t e r S t a l i n ' s death and began with a speech designed to undermine Malenkov's p o l i t i c a l s t a n d i n g . In denouncing Malenkov, Khrushchev d i s c l o s e d f o r the f i r s t time the unvarnished, t r u t h about the s o r r y s t a t e of S o v i e t a g r i c u l t u r e and animal husbandry. However, " [ a ] t no p o i n t i n the speech d i d [Khrushchev] so much as begin to h i n t at the t r u e reasons f o r the continued f a i l u r e : the system i t s e l f . " 3 3 The essence of Khrushchev's reforms, and t h e i r subsequent f a i l u r e , can be t r a c e d to h i s f i x a t i o n with appearance over substance. The reason t h a t I have c i t e d the example of Khrushchev's agrotown p o l i c y a t t h i s p o i n t i s to demonstrate t h a t , f o r a l l of h i s ' l i b e r a l ' reforms, Khrushchev i s e s s e n t i a l l y a ' S t a l i n i s t ' p o l i t i c i a n : Khrushchev's s t r u g g l e f o r one-man r u l e , h i s use of 'purges' a l b e i t without t e r r o r , to s o l i d i f y h i s hold on power, h i s patronage of a s m a l l c i r c l e of l o y a l i s t s , h i s lack of formal e d u c a t i o n , and h i s impulsive approach to decision-making are a l l t y p i c a l of S t a l i n ' s l e a d e r s h i p . The S t a l i n i s t element i n Khrushchev's d e - S t a l i n i z a t i o n reforms w i l l be explored i n l a t e r c h a p t e r s . GORBACHEV The P e s s i m i s t i c World-view M i k h a i l Gorbachev i s not possessed of grand i l l u s i o n s about the demise of c a p i t a l i s m or of the imminent v i c t o r y of communism. In f a c t , u n l i k e Khrushchev, Gorbachev i s d i s t i n c t l y p e s s i m i s t i c about the f u t u r e of the S o v i e t Union. As Gorbachev d e c l a r e d i n h i s speech to the 27th P a r t y Congress, [c]hanges i n present-day world development are so profound and s i g n i f i c a n t t h a t they r e q u i r e the r e i n t e r p r e t a t i o n and comprehensive a n a l y s i s of a l l i t s f a c t o r s . The s i t u a t i o n of n u c l e a r c o n f r o n t a t i o n makes necessary new approaches, methods and forms of r e l a t i o n s h i p s among d i f f e r e n t s o c i a l systems, s t a t e s and r e g i o n s . 5 6 Gorbachev's pessimism i s a product of an u p b r i n g i n g t h a t was much d i f f e r e n t than Khrushchev's. Whereas Khrushchev was p o l i t i c a l l y a c t i v e d u r i n g the i n i t i a l years of S t a l i n ' s r e i g n , which i n c l u d e d the f o r c e d c o l l e c t i v i z a t i o n of a g r i c u l t u r e (1929-31) and the purges (1934-38), Gorbachev was born i n the year c o l l e c t i v i z a t i o n reached i t s z e n i t h — 1 9 3 1 . Gorbachev was too young to have had p e r s o n a l experience with the p o l i t i c a l and economic upheavals of the time, although h i s f a m i l y was deeply a f f e c t e d . 5 5 7 Gorbachev, l i k e Khrushchev, grew up i n peasant surroundings. As a teenager, he worked summers as a Machine T r a c t o r S t a t i o n combine o p e r a t o r . I t was expected t h a t the young Gorbachev would continue i n the a g r i c u l t u r a l or a g r i c u l t u r a l machine i n d u s t r y as a p r o f e s s i o n . His e v e n t u a l choice of law i n 1950 as a c a r e e r was u n e x p e c t e d . 3 0 while a t u n i v e r s i t y , Gorbachev shared a room with Zdenek Mlynar the l i b e r a l Czech communist. As Zhores Medvedev p o i n t s out, " t i ] t i s extremely l i k e l y t h a t a f t e r f i v e years of s h a r i n g a room with a Czech i n t e l l e c t u a l Gorbachev must have been p r o f o u n d l y i n f l u e n c e d . . . " 3 9 F u r t h e r , Medvedev s t a t e s t h a t Gorbachev's Western manners and appearance are due to h i s prolonged exposure to "the c u l t u r e and a t t i t u d e s of a t r a d i t i o n a l l y Western n a t i o n . " 6 0 Concerning h i s p o l i t i c a l development, Gorbachev spent h i s youth i n the Komsomol, the Young Communist League, and i t was not u n t i l 1961 t h a t he decided to pursue a c a r e e r i n the P a r t y . His r i s e through the P a r t y ranks was r a p i d , and i n 1968 he was promoted to second, or a g r i c u l t u r a l , s e c r e t a r y of the S t a v r o p o l kraikom ( d i s t r i c t c o u n c i l ) without having served as the t h i r d s e c r e t a r y whose r e s p o n s i b i l i t y i s i d e o l o g y . J u s t two years t h e r e a f t e r , Gorbachev was made the kraikom's f i r s t s e c r e t a r y . 6 1 His tenure as second s e c r e t a r y was augmented by correspondence courses through the S t a v r o p o l A g r i c u l t u r a l I n s t i t u t e i n p l a n t and stock breeding, a g r o - i n d u s t r y , a g r i c u l t u r a l machinery, f i e l d c rops, a g r i c u l t u r a l o r g a n i z a t i o n , and kolkhoz/sovkhoz f i n a n c e . 6 2 Gorbachev was graduated i n 1967. Gorbachev's r a p i d advancement can be a t t r i b u t e d t o h i s e x p e r t i s e i n a g r i c u l t u r e and h i s p e r s o n a l l e a d e r s h i p s k i l l s , but the major f a c t o r i n h i s p o l i t i c a l success was the i n f l u e n c e of h i s p o l i t i c a l p atron, Y u r i Andropov. His i n f l u e n c e was l a r g e l y r e s p o n s i b l e f o r Gorbachev's appointment as the C e n t r a l Committee S e c r e t a r y f o r A g r i c u l t u r e i n Brezhnev's P o l i t b u r o . P e r e s t r o i k a i s a s s o c i a t e d with M i k h a i l Gorbachev yet the idea of r a d i c a l reform was f i r s t a r t i c u l a t e d by Y u r i Andropov i n an address i n November, 1982. 6 3 Andropov was the immediate h e i r to Brezhnev's Ru s s i a and was the f i r s t to address the problems of b u r e a u c r a t i c i n e r t i a . Ten days a f t e r becoming General S e c r e t a r y , Andropov spoke of the need "'to expand the independence' of l o w e r - l e v e l management, which he i n s i s t e d , c o u l d be 'combined with g r e a t e r a c c o u n t a b i l i t y and with concern f o r n a t i o n a l i n t e r e s t s . ' " 6 - * Gorbachev's own p o l i c y f o r s t r e a m l i n i n g the economy and i n s t i t u t i n g a c c o u n t a b i l i t y i s based upon a January 1984 r e s o l u t i o n by Y u r i Andropov. 6 8 3 In a J u l y 1985 r e s o l u t i o n , Gorbachev a f f i r m e d t h a t Andropov's experiment of s t r e a m l i n e d management i s to be made mandatory by 1987, and a l r e a d y i n 1985 and 1986 other m i n i s t r i e s have been combined. 6 6 The e r u d i t e , c u l t u r e d background of Gorbachev's e a r l y years i s a b l y r e f l e c t e d i n the high q u a l i t y of people he has gathered around him, e s p e c i a l l y i n economic p o l i c y . The l e v e l of i n t e l l e c t u a l input behind p e r e s t r o i k a i s f a r s u p e r i o r t o t h a t of d e - S t a l i n i z a t i o n . Gorbachev's a d v i s o r s f a l l under the r u b r i c of ' t e c h n o c r a t s ' — p e o p l e who possess t e c h n i c a l , managerial and p o l i t i c a l s k i l l s . 6 " 7 For example, i n economics, Abel G. Aganbegyan i s Gorbachev's c h i e f a d v i s o r . Aganbegyan leads a group of reform-minded i n t e l l e c t u a l s which i n c l u d e s Leonid A b a l k i n and Tatyana Zaslavskaya. A b a l k i n i s the D i r e c t o r of the I n s t i t u t e of Economics and a member of the e d i t o r i a l boards of two major economic j o u r n a l s . 6 0 Zaslavskaya i s a pioneer i n the f i e l d of s o c i o l o g y . Aganbegyan and Zaslavskaya have been r e s p e c t e d i n the economic and s o c i o l o g i c a l communities r e s p e c t i v e l y s i n c e the e a r l y 1960s, even though t h e i r u n c o n v e n t i o n a l , o b j e c t i v e , and c r i t i c a l o p i n i o n s c a r r i e d l i t t l e i n f l u e n c e amid the a n t i - i n t e l l e c t u a l orthodoxy t h a t p r e v a i l e d under Brezhnev. What i s p o s s i b l e today i n s t r u c t u r a l reform, i n c l u d i n g c r i t i c i s m of the past and m i l i t a r y accommodation with the West i s not the same as i t was twenty or t h i r t y years ago. The passage of time between Khrushchev's g e n e r a t i o n and Gorbachev's and the i n c r e a s i n g s e r i o u s n e s s of economic s t a g n a t i o n permit a g r e a t e r degree of candour today than was p r e v i o u s l y p o s s i b l e . A d d i t i o n a l l y , because Gorbachev does not bear any r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r S t a l i n ' s c r i m i n a l past, there i s no pressure to denounce him i n such a c o n t r o v e r s i a l and condemnatory f a s h i o n as d i d Khrushchev i n order to p r o t e c t h i m s e l f and to f u r t h e r h i s own p o l i t i c a l a mbitions. Khrushchev and Gorbachev are , t h e r e f o r e , two v e r y d i f f e r e n t r e f o r m e r s . By v i r t u e of t h e i r d i f f e r e n t u pbringings and the p o l i t i c a l c l i m a t e of t h e i r r e s p e c t i v e g e n e r a t i o n s , each saw reform as having to meet d i f f e r e n t p r i o r i t i e s . S i m i l a r i t i e s D i f f e r e n c e s i n p o l i t i c a l c l i m a t e and u p b r i n g i n g n o t w i t h s t a n d i n g , i t would be wrong to leave the impression t h a t Gorbachev i s a b s o l u t e l y d i f f e r e n t from Khrushchev. I t i s expected t h a t , as reformers, Khrushchev and Gorbachev should share c e r t a i n common o b j e c t i v e s : both men came to power a f t e r prolonged p e r i o d s of c o n s e r v a t i v e r u l e , and both came to power as champions of m e r i t o c r a c y a g a i n s t an i n e f f i c i e n t and p r i v i l e g e d bureaucracy. A d d i t i o n a l l y , they both support economic d e c e n t r a l i z a t i o n and the l o o s e n i n g of c l a u s t r o p h o b i c s o c i a l c o n t r o l s . For i n s t a n c e , Gorbachev's themes of d e m o k r a t i z a t s i y a and s a m o k r i t i k a are almost a verbatim r e i t e r a t i o n of Khrushchev's appeals t w e n t y - f i v e years e a r l i e r . In h i s address to the 22nd P a r t y Congress i n 1961, Khrushchev s a i d t h a t the task of the S o v i e t l e a d e r s h i p i s "to draw a l l c i t i z e n s without e x c e p t i o n i n t o the a f f a i r s of s o c i e t y . . . . E v e r y S o v i e t c i t i z e n should take an a c t i v e p a r t i n the management of p u b l i c a f f a i r s — t h a t ' s our s l o g a n , our t a s k . " 6 9 In h i s speech to the 27th Congress Gorbachev s i m i l a r l y d e c l a r e d t h a t : The success of any endeavor i s determined, to a d e c i s i v e extent, by how a c t i v e l y and c o n s c i o u s l y the masses p a r t i c i p a t e i n i t . To convince broad s t r a t a of the working people of the c o r r e c t n e s s of our chosen path, to give them a moral and a m a t e r i a l i n t e r e s t , to r e s t r u c t u r e the psychology of cadres--these are h i g h l y important c o n d i t i o n s f o r a c c e l e r a t i n g our g r o w t h . 7 0 On the s u b j e c t of samokritikaf or s e l f - c r i t i c i s m , Khrushchev s a i d : S u p e r v i s i o n by the g e n e r a l p u b l i c , and s t r i c t v e r i f i c a t i o n of the way d e c i s i o n s have been c a r r i e d out, i s a method by which the p r i n c i p l e of c r i t i c i s m and s e l f - c r i t i c i s m can be put i n t o e f f e c t . 7 1 I t i s necessary to i n t r o d u c e a system t h a t w i l l make i t d i f f i c u l t f o r comrades who have been e l e c t e d to l e a d i n g posts to bar the way to f r e s h forces....[Some of our l o n g - s e r v i n g comrades] have l o s t the a b i l i t y to work c r e a t i v e l y , have l o s t a l l sense of the new, and have become a hindrance. To keep them on i n these posts j u s t because they were e l e c t e d to them i n the past would be wrong....The proposed system of forming e l e c t i v e bodies opens new o p p o r t u n i t i e s f o r d e v e l o p i n g c r i t i c i s m and s e l f - c r i t i c i s m . . . . " 7 2 : Furthermore, Khrushchev s t a t e d t h a t Every good i n n o v a t i o n , every good i d e a , every v a l u a b l e p r o p o s a l should be given the most t h o u g h t f u l c o n s i d e r a t i o n and support, and should be r e a l i z e d . . . . [ T h e promotion of p a r t y l e a d e r s ] from among the p a r t y membership [should be] on the b a s i s of merit of t h e i r t a l e n t s and t h e i r p o l i t i c a l and business c a p a c i t y , t h a t they have c l o s e t i e s with the communists, with the p e o p l e . " 7 3 On the same t o p i c Gorbachev has s t a t e d : The P a r t y w i l l continue to see to i t that the most worthy people...are e l e c t e d d e p u t i e s . . . . I n t h i s r e s p e c t , a p p a r e n t l y the time has come to make necessary adjustments i n our e l e c t o r a l p r a c t i c e . . . . One cannot help s e e i n g t h a t o f f i c i a l s i n the apparatus who remain i n the same posts f o r a long time f r e q u e n t l y l o s e t h e i r t a s t e f o r the new, fence themselves o f f from people through i n s t r u c t i o n s they themselves have concocted, and sometimes even r e t a r d the work of the e l e c t i v e a g e n c i e s . Apparently i t i s time...to conduct the c e r t i f i c a t i o n of e x e c u t i v e s i n t h e i r apparatus and make urgent personnel changes a f t e r every e l e c t i o n . . . . . . . [ I ] t i s the duty of the o l d e r g e n e r a t i o n t o do e v e r y t h i n g i t can to see to i t t h a t i t s suc c e s s o r s are even more i n t e l l i g e n t , more capable and more educated.... C r i t i c i s m and s e l f - c r i t i c i s m are a n a t u r a l p r i n c i p l e of the v i t a l a c t i v i t y of our s o c i e t y . Without them, there i s no development. I t i s time f o r l i t e r a r y and a r t c r i t i c i s m to shake o f f complacency and s e r v i l i t y to s u p e r i o r s , which corrodes h e a l t h y m o r a l i t y , remembering t h a t c r i t i c i s m i s a p u b l i c matter, not a sphere s e r v i n g authors' v a n i t y and ambitions. 7 -* From a d i s c u s s i o n of the d i f f e r e n c e s and s i m i l a r i t i e s behind S o v i e t reform, the next two chapters w i l l c o n t r a s t the p o l i t i c a l and economic aspects of p e r e s t r o i k a and de-S t a l i n i z a t i o n . The f o u r t h chapter w i l l d i s c u s s the uniqueness of p e r e s t r o i k a as a reform and o f f e r some c o n c l u s i o n s about the f u t u r e of S o v i e t reform. CHAPTER II P o l i t i c a l Reform A f t e r h i s death, i t was S t a l i n and h i s l e g a c y of c r i m i n a l i t y , not the development of communism i t s e l f , t h a t became the primary focus of p o l i t i c a l reform. Addressing S t a l i n ' s l e g a c y remains today "the most fundamental and a b i d i n g c o n f l i c t i n S o v i e t p o l i t i c a l l i f e . " 1 Because Khrushchev and Gorbachev, both came to power c h a l l e n g i n g the S t a l i n l e g a c y and the h i g h l y b u r e a u c r a t i z e d and c e n t r a l i z e d economic order, there does not appear to be much to d i s t i n g u i s h the p o l i t i c a l o b j e c t i v e s of glasnost from de-S t a l i n i z a t i o n . Khrushchev's ' l i b e r a l i s m ' was based on the assumption t h a t there was an "immense untapped c a p a c i t y f o r growth i n the r u r a l s e c t o r " 2 and t h a t t h i s c a p a c i t y c o u l d not be tapped un l e s s system were changed so t h a t the people were f r e e to use t h e i r i n i t i a t i v e . S i m i l a r l y , on the day a f t e r becoming General S e c r e t a r y , Gorbachev s t a t e d : "The b e t t e r people are informed the more c o n s c i o u s l y they w i l l a c t , the more a c t i v e l y they w i l l support the p a r t y , i t s p l a n s , and i t s programmatic g o a l s . " 3 A l s o common to both d e - S t a l i n i z a t i o n and p e r e s t r o i k a i s the focus on the government and p a r t y bureaucracy as the b§te-noize of the S t a l i n i s t system. Gorbachev, l i k e Khrushchev, intends to render i t "more c l i e n t and l e a d e r -oriented.'"* But the s i m i l a r i t y ends t h e r e . While both Khrushchev and Gorbachev accepted " c o n f l i c t , open and c l a n d e s t i n e , as an i n e v i t a b l e concomitant of h i s p o l i c i e s , " 5 5 the d i f f e r e n c e l i e s i n the i n t e n t of the c o n f l i c t . As w i l l be shown, Gorbachev uses c o n f l i c t t o f o s t e r h e a l t h y and p r o g r e s s i v e change, whereas Khrushchev used c o n f l i c t d e s t r u c t i v e l y i n order to c r e a t e an atmosphere of c o n t r o l l e d t e n s i o n between the bureaucracy and the masses which was designed to enhance h i s p e r s o n a l r o l e as leader and problem-s o l v e r . e THE STALIN QUESTION—Khrushchev In c o n t r a s t to Malenkov, Molotov, and the other ' c o n s e r v a t i v e ' reformers who sought p o l i t i c a l and p e r s o n a l s e c u r i t y f o r s t a t e and p a r t y o f f i c i a l s , and a l i m i t e d d i s c l o s u r e of S t a l i n ' s legacy, the ' l i b e r a l ' Khrushchev advocated a thorough a i r i n g of S t a l i n ' s crimes. Furthermore, Khrushchev b e l i e v e d t h a t the decompression of p o l i t i c a l c o n t r o l s t h a t would f o l l o w such d i s c l o s u r e s "would not f o s t e r p o l i t i c a l d e v i a n c e " 7 and r a n k - a n d - f i l e workers would p o l i c e themselves without the need of " a d m i n i s t r a t i v e methods" or " p o l i c e power." 0 In imagery r e m i n i s c e n t of Bukharin, [Khrushchev] he l d out a v i s i o n of a S o v i e t s o c i e t y i n which c i t i z e n s c o u l d breathe more f r e e l y , o f f i c i a l d o m c o u l d e x e r c i s e i n i t i a t i v e without f e a r i n g the consequences, the bond between p a r t y and people would be strengthened, and the a u t h o r i t y of the regime would be b u i l t on the r a t i o n a l foundations of r e g u l a r i z e d procedures, concern and popular w e l f a r e , and confidence r a t h e r than f e a r . 9 But i f Khrushchev's r h e t o r i c b r i n g s Bukharin to mind, h i s advocacy of r e l a x e d s o c i a l c o n t r o l s and h i s d e n u n c i a t i o n of S t a l i n were themselves h i g h l y ' S t a l i n i s t 1 . As Richard Lowenthal wrote i n 1965, " [ i ] n Khrushchev's mind, the abandonment of S t a l i n - s t y l e mass t e r r o r i s m d i d not a t f i r s t mean the r e n u n c i a t i o n of S t a l i n ' s program of r e v o l u t i o n a r y s o c i a l change i n s i d e and ou t s i d e R u s s i a . " 1 0 Por example, Khrushchev knew " [ t ] h e S t a l i n brand of c o l l e c t i v i z a t i o n had brought [the S o v i e t people] nothing but misery and b r u t a l i t y , " 1 1 but he d i d not s e t about to dismantle i t . To expose and reverse the excesses of c o l l e c t i v i z a t i o n would at l e a s t mean t h a t the e n t i r e S t a l i n era was i l l e g i t i m a t e , a b e t r a y a l of the October r e v o l u t i o n , and t h a t the B u k h a r i n i t e o p p o s i t i o n of 1928-9 was c o r r e c t . At worst i t would a l s o brand the c u l t of p e r s o n a l i t y as " b l i n d a d m i r a t i o n f o r a u t h o r i t y ' , thus t h r e a t e n i n g t h a t e x i s t i n g system of c o n t r o l s . " 1 2 Khrushchev re c o g n i z e d t h a t the l e g i t i m a c y of the communist p a r t y "and the p a r t y l e a d e r s h i p r e s t e d e n t i r e l y on the the S t a l i n i s t legend of fo r c e d c o l l e c t i v i z a t i o n as a spontaneous, v o l u n t a r y , and benevolent process of the peasants t h e m s e l v e s . " 1 3 Because a thorough, o b j e c t i v e i n v e s t i g a t i o n of the S t a l i n i s t p e r i o d would have i m p l i c a t e d the P a r t y and members of the r u l i n g e l i t e i n the commission of S t a l i n ' s crimes, Khrushchev's main motive f o r denouncing S t a l i n was to d i s t a n c e the P a r t y from the S t a l i n i s t r e c o r d as much as p o s s i b l e and to f r e e him s e l f p e r s o n a l l y from any g u i l t by h i s a s s o c i a t i o n with S t a l i n . 1 * * The C e n t r a l Committee, i n 1955, e s t a b l i s h e d a s p e c i a l commission under the d i r e c t i o n of P o l i t b u r o member P.N. Pospelov to i n v e s t i g a t e a l l aspects of S t a l i n ' s T e r r o r . N a t u r a l l y , i t had nothing to say about the f a c t t h a t Khrushchev advanced up through the Moscow apparatus on the backs of the r e p u t a t i o n of Bukharin, t h a t Khrushchev p e r s o n a l l y supported f o r c e d c o l l e c t i v i z a t i o n , or t h a t , as S t a l i n ' s v i c e r o y , Khrushchev was a major f i g u r e i n the 1938 purge of the U k r a i n i a n Communist P a r t y and i n the r e p r e s s i o n and exe c u t i o n of U k r a i n i a n n a t i o n a l i s t s . 1 5 5 Information gathered by Pospelov's commission made up much of Khrushchev's Secret Speech, but given the dangers of too comprehensive a r e n d e r i n g of the f a c t s , "the commission was not expected to present the t o t a l p i c t u r e i n the f u l l l i g h t of d a y — r a t h e r i t was to give a p a r t i a l view with s p e c i a l l i g h t i n g e f f e c t s . " 1 6 O b j e c t i v e l y , Khrushchev went i n t o great d e t a i l c oncerning s p e c i f i c abuses of a u t h o r i t y such as the murder of Leningrad P a r t y c h i e f S e r g e i K i r o v , the wholesale s l a u g h t e r of p a r t y cadres d u r i n g the Great Purge of 1937-38, S t a l i n ' s f a i l u r e to defend the S o v i e t Union on the eve of the Nazi a t t a c k , and the f a b r i c a t e d c o n s p i r a c y cases of the 'Leningrad A f f a i r ' and the ' D o c t o r s ' P l o t ' . 1 7 The s u b j e c t i v e aspect of the speech was t h a t i t served the narrow p o l i t i c a l purpose of a l l o w i n g Khrushchev t o "[ p r e s e n t ] h i m s e l f as the one man who dared to speak o u t , " 1 0 thus enhancing h i s own r e p u t a t i o n a t the expense of S t a l i n ' s l e g a c y and of h i s h e i r s , p a r t i c u l a r l y Malenkov and B e r i a . 1 9 While Khrushchev condemned S t a l i n ' s abuses of power, he defended as i n e v i t a b l e and necessary c e r t a i n measures l i k e the l i q u i d a t i o n of the ' l e f t ' and ' r i g h t ' d e v i a t i o n s , the r u t h l e s s c o l l e c t i v i z a t i o n of farms and the b r u t a l treatment of the k u l a k s . Khrushchev's d e n u n c i a t i o n of S t a l i n was l i m i t e d to crimes committed a g a i n s t the P a r t y and the army—no mention was made of the wrongs done to i n d i v i d u a l r a n k - a n d - f i l e p a r t y members or innocent non-party members, whose a r r e s t r a t e was seven times t h a t of p a r t y members. 2 0 In f a c t , among the r e h a b i l i t a t i o n and e x o n e r a t i o n of thousands of p a r t y , government, m i l i t a r y , and c u l t u r a l f i g u r e s , not one word was mentioned about N i k o l a i Bukharin, A l e k s e i Rykov, G r i g o r i i Z i n o v i e v , or Lev Kamenev. 2 1 Stephen Cohen argues t h a t Khrushchev d i d not o f f i c i a l l y r e h a b i l i t a t e Bukharin because he "lacked r e s o l v e " or because h i s p o l i t i c a l o p p o s i t i o n was too s t r o n g . 2 2 The f a i l u r e to r e h a b i l i t a t e Bukharin p r o p e r l y , however p o l i t i c a l l y i m p ossible i t may have been, impoverished the i n t e l l e c t u a l and t h e o r e t i c a l dimension of Khrushchev's reforms. The paradox of Khrushchev's reforms i s t h a t while he made h i s r e p u t a t i o n by denouncing S t a l i n , Khrushchev was nonetheless "a t r u e b e l i e v e r i n S t a l i n ' s i d e o l o g i c a l v i s i o n . " 2 3 THE STALIN QUESTION—Gorbachev Gorbachev's f i r s t statement on S t a l i n was i n an i n t e r v i e w with the French communist d a i l y 1'Humanity, i n February, 1986> i n which he d i s p l a y e d a s i g n i f i c a n t lack of candour about the l a t e d i c t a t o r ' s r e p r e s s i o n s . Gorbachev was u n w i l l i n g to acknowledge t h a t S t a l i n i s m was a l e g i t i m a t e s u b j e c t f o r d i s c u s s i o n , much l e s s a problem: " S t a l i n i s m i s a concept thought up by opponents of communism and i s wid e l y used i n order to blacken the image of the S o v i e t Union and of s o c i a l i s m i n g e n e r a l . " 2 4 F u r t h e r i n the i n t e r v i e w , Gorbachev made r e f e r e n c e to the r e s o l u t i o n of the 20th P a r t y Congress r e g a r d i n g the q u e s t i o n of S t a l i n ' s ' c u l t of p e r s o n a l i t y ' and how i t was "a t e s t of P a r t y p r i n c i p l e s and f a i t h i n Leninism." He then a s s e r t e d that "we [ i . e . the Party] passed the t e s t with merit and have drawn from the past the necessary c o n c l u s i o n s . . . [ r e f e r r i n g to] the l i f e of the P a r t y i t s e l f and S o v i e t s o c i e t y i n g e n e r a l . " 2 3 T h i s euphemistic c i r c u m l o c u t i o n was inadequate because i t omitted any s p e c i f i c r e f e r e n c e to S t a l i n or h i s abuses of power. The f a l l a c i o u s argument t h a t S t a l i n i s m was simply a c o n t r i v a n c e of f o r e i g n provocateurs was a s e r i o u s i n d i c a t i o n t h a t Gorbachev's p o l i t i c a l s t a n d i n g a t the time was not secure and that too much glasnost about S t a l i n was not p o l i t i c a l l y p o s s i b l e . Admittedly, t h i s i n t e r v i e w took p l a c e d u r i n g Gorbachev's c a u t i o u s phase, a time before Aleksandr Yakovlev, N i k o l a i Slyunkov, D m i t r i i Yazov and other a l l i e s entered the P o l i t b u r o . 2 6 As such, a d e f e n s i v e tone toward S t a l i n was to be expected. Even s t i l l , i t i s hard to understand how s t o n e w a l l i n g about S t a l i n c ould f u r t h e r the cause of a leader who i s s t a k i n g h i s f u t u r e on a campaign of glasnost.27 Gorbachev's next pronouncement on S t a l i n came on 2 November 1987, i n a major speech on S o v i e t h i s t o r y . E x p e c t a t i o n s were t h a t , i n the s p i r i t of glasnost and 'new t h i n k i n g , * Gorbachev would provide a more ' o b j e c t i v e ' v e r s i o n of S o v i e t h i s t o r y i n c l u d i n g a p o s i t i v e assessment of N i k i t a Khrushchev, and a r e h a b i l i t a t i o n of past v i c t i m s of the S t a l i n i s t T e r r o r i n c l u d i n g N i k o l a i Bukharin. What emerged, however, was a speech t h a t was t e n t a t i v e and e q u i v o c a l . S t a l i n ' s past was d i s c u s s e d only b r o a d l y , while NEP supp o r t e r s were not gi v e n a t o t a l l y p o s i t i v e treatment. Instead of being f o r m a l l y r e h a b i l i t a t e d , Bukharin and h i s supporters were d e p i c t e d l a r g e l y u n s y m p a t h e t i c a l l y as "dogmatists" who d i d not f u l l y understand the " d i a l e c t i c a l c o n d i t i o n s " of the time. 2 1 3 Gorbachev even went so f a r as to mention t h a t the B u k h a r i n i t e s l a t e r confessed t h e i r ' e r r o r s ' but without mentioning how such ' c o n f e s s i o n s ' were coerced and t h a t t h e i r t r i a l s were f r a u d u l e n t . Nonetheless, by the very f a c t t h a t he even mentioned Khrushchev, S t a l i n , T r o t s k y , and Bukharin, Gorbachev r e - e s t a b l i s h e d t h e i r l e g i t i m a c y as h i s t o r i c a l f i g u r e s . The item of g r e a t e s t s i g n i f i c a n c e i n h i s speech was Gorbachev's announcement t h a t the P o l i t b u r o w i l l s e t up a commission t o conduct a comprehensive examination of a l l past and present i n f o r m a t i o n r e g a r d i n g the S t a l i n c u l t . 2 9 In February 1988, the commission f o r m a l l y repealed the c r i m i n a l c o n v i c t i o n s of Bukharin, Rykov and o t h e r s . The commission d e c l a r e d t h a t t h e i r condemnations to be "gross v i o l a t i o n s of s o c i a l i s t l e g a l i t y . " 3 0 Stephen Cohen argues that the r e p e a l of Bukharin's c r i m i n a l c o n v i c t i o n r e p r e s e n t s a " r a d i c a l a c t of a n t i - S t a l i n i s m " . 3 1 In i n t e r p r e t i n g Gorbachev's November speech, i t i s important to r e c o g n i z e t h a t i t came a scant week a f t e r a c h a l l e n g e by then Moscow P a r t y boss, B o r i s Y e l t s i n , t h a t Gorbachev was f o s t e r i n g a ' c u l t of p e r s o n a l i t y ' and proceeding too s l o w l y with reform. T h i s accounts f o r the o v e r l y c a u t i o u s tone which was undoubtedly the r e s u l t of l a s t - m i n u t e c o n s e r v a t i v e i n f l u e n c e . Although, i n f a i r n e s s to Gorbachev, h i s i n t e n t was not to give a f u l l and o b j e c t i v e expose of S o v i e t h i s t o r y but to b u i l d h i s t o r i c a l and d o c t r i n a l l e g i t i m a c y f o r p e r e s t r o i k a . One can see a d i s t i n c t p a r a l l e l between Gorbachev's and Khrushchev's treatment of S t a l i n i s m : both reformers s e t up commissions to i n v e s t i g a t e the S t a l i n i s t r e c o r d and both gave major speeches r e g a r d i n g S t a l i n ' s past, and both used a t t a c k s on S t a l i n to promote t h e i r reforms, although to d i f f e r e n t degrees. Khrushchev was content to focus on S t a l i n and use h i s past as a t a c t i c to weaken h i s p o l i t i c a l opponents. However f o r c e f u l l y he denounced S t a l i n , Khrushchev was c o n s p i c u o u s l y s i l e n t on the s u b j e c t of the major p o l i t i c a l f i g u r e s who opposed S t a l i n and s u f f e r e d p e r s e c u t i o n because of i t . Gorbachev, on the other hand, i s l e s s s t r i d e n t i n h i s c r i t i c i s m of S t a l i n . The a n t i - S t a l i n i s t aspect of glasnost serves to f o s t e r "the beginning of of a p o l i t i c a l debate over the f u t u r e of the S o v i e t s y s t e m . " 3 2 Through glasnost, Gorbachev has succeeded in introducing debate and r a t i o n a l i t y into areas previously considered sacrosanct; S t a l i n ' s m i l i t a r y leadership, his system prison camps, and the p r i v i l e g e s of the Party e l i t e . By speaking p o s i t i v e l y about Bukharin, Rykov and others, i t could be argued that Gorbachev has done as least as much to destroy the memory of S t a l i n as did Khrushchev who devoted an extraordinary meeting of the Party Congress to denounce S t a l i n . By defending Bukharin, the champion of Lenin's New Economic Pol i c y of the 1920s, Gorbachev in v i t e s far-reaching questions as to the legitimacy of Sta l i n ' s claim to be Lenin's legitimate heir and the necessity of the entire S t a l i n i s t period. If i t could be demonstrated that the purges, the Terror, and the c o l l e c t i v i z a t i o n were a l l a horrible mistake and not the product of Lenin's thought, for what purpose did the Soviet people suffer? For Gorbachev to succeed in promoting r a d i c a l reform, he must not only attack S t a l i n , but must also d i s c r e d i t the mythology surrounding his legacy, p a r t i c u l a r l y among the el d e r l y who hold a romantic nostalgia for that period, and who are among the most re s i s t a n t to perestroika. But Gorbachev has to pay a price for his candour. As he tears down S t a l i n , he lacks an alternate ideological force to att r a c t the minds and energies of the Soviet public. The deterioration of the appeal of t r a d i t i o n a l communist dogma has l e f t perestroika without a s p i r i t u a l focus. Unlike Khrushchev who defended the legitimacy of Stalin's rule, who c r e a t e d h i s own ' c u l t of p e r s o n a l i t y ' , and who h e l d out dreams of a g l o r i o u s p l e n t i f u l f u t u r e f o r S o v i e t c i t i z e n s , t h e r e i s l i t t l e i n c e n t i v e t h a t Gorbachev can g i v e h i s people f o r h a v i n g t o work h a r d e r , be more p r o d u c t i v e , and t o a c c e p t g r e a t e r r e s p o n s i b i l i t y and c r i t i c i s m e x cept s e l f - i n t e r e s t and r e f o r m f o r r e f o r m ' s sake. Without i d e o l o g y , S o v i e t s o c i e t y l o s e s i t s most c o h e s i v e f o r c e , and w i t h o u t s o c i a l c o h e s i o n the S o v i e t Union would f a c e a n a r c h y . 3 3 POLITICAL REFORMS--Khrushchev Khrushchev's p o l i t i c a l r e f o r m s can be broken down i n t o two p e r i o d s . The f i r s t p e r i o d , from 1953-57, was dominated by h i s power s t r u g g l e w i t h Malenkov. D u r i n g t h i s f i r s t p e r i o d , Khrushchev's r e f o r m s f o c u s e d g e n e r a l l y on r e d u c i n g the a u t h o r i t y of the p o l i c e system, e n d i n g the use of t e r r o r , and e f f e c t i n g some manner of w e l f a r e r e f o r m . 3 4 Up u n t i l the 22nd Congress i n 1961, Khrushchev's p o l i c i e s i n c l u d e d elements of a n t i - e l i t i s m but d i d not y e t f u l l y embody h i s p o p u l i s t o p t i m i s m because of the r e s t r i c t i v e p o l i t i c a l c l i m a t e . Khrushchev, i n 1954, began h i s a s s a u l t on the b u r e a u c r a c y by p u b l i c l y c r i t i c i z i n g S t a l i n ' s r e s t r i c t i v e P a r t y e n r o l l m e n t p o l i c y . 3 5 5 C i t i n g the need f o r "the i n d i v i d u a l r e c r u i t m e n t of f r o n t - r a n k p e o p l e " , Khrushchev, a t the 20th P a r t y Congress i n 1956, " o b l i g e d " p a r t y o r g a n i z a t i o n s t o seek out such people " c h o o s i n g them f i r s t and foremost from the r a n k s of the workers and c o l l e c t i v e f a r m e r s . " 3 6 To b u i l d up a power base of h i s own, Khrushchev brought young communists i n to f i l l the v o i d i n S t a l i n ' s n e g l e c t e d p a r t y apparatus to help him oust h i s P r e s i d i u m r i v a l s . 3' 7 The d i l u t i o n of i n d i v i d u a l power t h a t was the o b j e c t of Khrushchev's expanded enrollment p o l i c y made a l l i a n c e b u i l d i n g w i t h i n the P a r t y and government apparatus extremely important. In order to promote himself above Malenkov and the other c o n s e r v a t i v e s , Khrushchev sought to " c u l t i v a t e the image of a problem s o l v e r who would s y n t h e s i z e p o p u l i s t p o l i t i c a l reforms and assure p o l i t i c a l cohesion i n ways t h a t would serve the goals of economic e f f e c t i v e n e s s and p o l i t i c a l l e g i t i m a c y . " 3 e Khrushchev needed to s e t h i m s e l f apart because, i n the p e r i o d immediately f o l l o w i n g S t a l i n ' s death, there was a consensus over the o b j e c t i v e s of reform. There was to be i n c r e a s e d involvement of the c i t i z e n r y i n the a d m i n i s t r a t i o n of p o l i c y ; i n c r e a s e d input from s p e c i a l i s t s before d e c i s i o n s were taken; a t r a n s f e r e n c e of minor a d m i n i s t r a t i v e f u n c t i o n s to s o c i a l a c t i v i s t s and mass o r g a n i z a t i o n s ; and i n c r e a s e d r i g h t s f o r c i t i z e n s and mass o r g a n i z a t i o n s a g a i n s t e x e c u t i v e a u t h o r i t y . 3 9 Most im p o r t a n t l y , S t a l i n ' s s u c c e s s o r s c o l l e c t i v e l y abjured t e r r o r as a p o l i t i c a l t o o l . "There was to be no successor to S t a l i n , no supreme boss, no second S t a l i n with the power of l i f e and death...."* 0 One of the g u i d i n g p r i n c i p l e s i n Khrushchev's p o l i t i c a l thought was h i s image of the CPSU as the motivator and leader of the people. In Lenin's phrase he was "the energizer in policy-making and implementation". 4 1 Khrushchev considered i t the task of the party to draw a l l c i t i z e n s into p o l i t i c a l l i f e and to be the instrument which modernizes production methods and p o l i t i c a l outlook. 4 2 Throughout the period of d e - S t a l i n i z a t i o n , Khrushchev adopted a h i g h - p r o f i l e , populist leadership s t y l e , c a l l e d upon Soviet o f f i c i a l s to abandon leadership from above, and to inspire the masses without t e r r o r . 4 3 Thus, we can see a two-stage process to Khrushchev's reform: the expansion of the bureaucracy to d i l u t e the individual power of his r i v a l s , and then the promotion of populism not only to continue the assault on his r i v a l s but also to undermine the power of the newly expanded bureaucracy. In a l l of t h i s , the system i t s e l f and the c i t i z e n ' s place as an obedient servant of the Party l i n e and Khrushchev's p o l i c i e s were never questioned. It was after Khrushchev acquired the position of Chairman of the Council of Ministers in 1958 that he consolidated his power and the second period of his p o l i t i c a l reforms began. Khrushchev's anti-Stalinism at t h i s time, as Cohen argues, "came to include quasi populist ideas and p o l i c i e s that impinged d i r e c t l y upon the nature of the central party-state bureaucracy and i t s power rel a t i o n s with society rather than with the leadership regime from above." 4 4 It was at t h i s time also that Khrushchev began to free himself from the "self-imposed shackles" forged by the t a c t i c a l a l l i a n c e he had b u i l t up within the bureaucracy. 4 3 Once Khrushchev established himself as primus inter pares in the Kremlin, the predominant theme of his d e - S t a l i n i z a t i o n became the enhancement of his own power and prestige and the depreciation of bureaucratic authority. The f i r s t of Khrushchev's intraparty reorganizations was the i n s t i t u t i o n of a mandatory 'rotation system' for party o f f i c i a l s which was a r t i c u l a t e d at the Twenty-second Party Congress in 1961.**s At each congress, one-third of a l l raion, oblast and Central Committee members would be replaced, while members of the Presidium would be able to serve no more than three 5-year terms while c i t y and regional o f f i c i a l s would have to stand for e l e c t i o n more frequently and serve only a t o t a l of six years.**7' This "regular renewal of the composition of the leading party bodies", said Khrushchev, would apply also to elected state and public organizations and represent a "big step forward in the development of our democracy." 4 0 Ostensibly, the rotation was meant to preclude the reoccurence of a 'cult of the individual'.**' 3' Yet the fact that Khrushchev's proposal did not apply to the F i r s t Secretary and to "experienced party members of special merit" 5 3 0 strongly suggests that t h i s purge of party o f f i c i a l s was not genuinely democratic but merely a device to get r i d of c r i t i c s . Another t a c t i c Khrushchev used to d i l u t e the power of the bureaucracy was his practice of expanding plenums and conferences to include non-voting, non-party s p e c i a l i s t s who by-passed the standard p o l i t i c a l t r a i n i n g of the party schools and who were d i r e c t l y accountable to the Secretariat, that i s , Khrushchev. Khrushchev used these expanded meetings to show respect and deference to the s p e c i a l i s t s at the intended expense of the voting, party apparatchiki whom Khrushchev treated with contempt and d e r i s i o n . 3 1 The second s t r u c t u r a l change was the decision to s p l i t o b l a s t - l e v e l party committees into equally senior i n d u s t r i a l and a g r i c u l t u r a l branches. Khrushchev believed that the workload of party organizations was too heavy, and by doubling the s t a f f and separating areas of r e s p o n s i b i l i t y , Khrushchev hoped to increase the l e v e l of t r a i n i n g and s p e c i a l i z a t i o n of the party secretaries. By having s p e c i a l i s t s in each sector concentrate on a smaller number of problems, party o f f i c i a l s would be better able to react to urgent problems and devote more energy to long-term planning. 3 2 The object, of the separate administrations, according to Khrushchev, was to "lead the apparatchiks to become more deeply involved in economic a c t i v i t i e s " so that, party functionaries would become more " q u a l i f i e d " , "concrete", and "systematic". 3 3 In t o t a l , the 'bifurcation' created 156 new obkoms and kraikoms and 1711 t e r r i t o r i a l a g r i c u l t u r a l production administrations. In a l l , the campaign lasted from the 22nd Party Congress u n t i l Khrushchev's removal from power in October 1964. A scant month after his overthrow, the Central Committee issued a decree ordering the r e u n i f i c a t i o n of i n d u s t r i a l and a g r i c u l t u r a l obkoms and kraikoms. 3 - 4 Ultimately, the negative administrative aspects of the b i f u r c a t i o n far outweighed any ideological or organizational benefits. F i r s t , the t o t a l separation of r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s l e f t the a g r i c u l t u r a l sector without adequate manpower, with fewer administrative or f i n a n c i a l resources, and without a ready pool of factory and o f f i c e workers to help bring in the harvests. Since each sector was responsible for i t s own a f f a i r s , there was no longer any incentive for the i n d u s t r i a l party apparatus to want to help t h e i r a g r i c u l t u r a l bretheren. More generally, under the b i f u r c a t i o n there was a lack of clear authority. With two equally senior organizations there was no one person, for example, to receive complaints from Soviets or production administrators. 3 5 5 In addition to i t s i n e f f i c i e n c y , the break-up of the party apparatus engendered a competition for influence that bore a l l the signs of a nascent pluralism. The a g r i c u l t u r a l and i n d u s t r i a l sectors each had to defend and promote i t s own p a r t i c u l a r interests in order to compete for the same resources. Further, since one of Khrushchev's primary goals was to d i l u t e the the power of the Presidium, (now Politburo) and the' bureaucracy, i t was e s s e n t i a l for Khrushchev's opponents to arrest t h i s development before the next Party Congress l e s t the b i f u r c a t i o n i n v i t e the creation of two Central Committees or two KGBs. 3 6 The r e s u l t was that Khrushchev's decentralization schemes produced decentralization without order and without d i s c i p l i n e . Some party o f f i c i a l s who lent their support to the program did so only to ensure that Khrushchev would i n i t i a t e or continue other programs of p a r t i c u l a r in t e r e s t . Others did so purely out of careerest ambitions. 3 7 As i t turned out, the b i f u r c a t i o n program, which the Central Committee approved for the period November 1962 to November 1964, was never f u l l y implemented and only came to include one-third of the obkoms and kraixoms. s s In essence, as George Breslauer has suggested, d e - S t a l i n i z a t i o n f a i l e d because i t was intimately bound up with Khrushchev's personal p o l i t i c a l fortunes as "either a product of his personal p o l i t i c a l i n i t i a t i v e or as a r e f l e c t i o n of his problem solving strategy." 5 5 9 POLITICAL REFORMS—Gorbachev Broadly speaking, Gorbachev's p o l i t i c a l reforms are designed to accomplish three objectives: the sharp reduction in the intermediate levels of the bureaucracy; the curtailment of e l i t e prerogatives at the upper l e v e l s ; and the independence of the lower bureaucratic functionaries through a p o l i c y of consultation rather than d i c t a t i o n . 6 0 At the upper l e v e l of the p o l i t i c a l apparatus, Gorbachev, l i k e Khrushchev,has proposed l i m i t i n g the length of service of party and government o f f i c i a l s . The Central Committee reported that, to avoid abuses of power and poor job performance [ a ] l l party committees s t a r t i n g at the d i s t r i c t and c i t y l e v e l s h a l l be elected for a standard term of fiv e years. Simultaneously a Communist s h a l l not hold an elected post in the C.P.S.U. for more than two terms in a row. E l e c t i o n for a t h i r d term in a row s h a l l be possible only on the i n i t i a t i v e of Communists and s h a l l require a preliminary decision on admission to the el e c t i o n s . Such a decision s h a l l be passed by no less than three-fourths of the membership of the party committee concerned. The voting s h a l l be by secret b a l l o t . 6 1 Gorbachev's proposal goes farther than Khrushchev's because there are no exceptions made for the General Secretary or "exceptional party members of special merit." Although, i t is not yet clear whether th i s proposal i s to apply to Gorbachev as the incumbent l e a d e r . 6 2 At the regional and factory l e v e l , Gorbachev's plan for p o l i t i c a l decentralization i s based upon an i n i t i a t i v e of his predecessor, Yuri Andropov. The intent of Gorbachev's promotion of limited l o c a l and f a c t o r y - l e v e l democracy i s to stimulate productivity and individual accountability. Gorbachev argues that i t i s necessary to "[strengthen] the independence and activeness of the l o c a l bodies of power" and that t h i s i s only possible i f "every c i t i z e n [had] a re a l opportunity to a c t i v e l y influence...managerial decisions...." It i s up to the Party to ensure that management no longer continues to be the p r i v i l e g e of a narrow c i r c l e of professionals but to ensure that "the most worthy people capable of conducting state a f f a i r s at a high l e v e l are elected Deputies, and that the composition of the Soviets i s systematically renewed." 6 3 Gorbachev announced, in January 1987> that, as an experiment, there would be l o c a l government elections in selected raions and oblasts that June.6** G o r b a c h e v d o e s n o t a d v o c a t e c o m p e t i t i v e , W e s t e r n - s t y l e e l e c t i o n s , b u t r a t h e r a s t r u c t u r e w h e r e i n ' c o l l e c t i v e s ' a r e t o d i s c u s s s e v e r a l c a n d i d a t e s , w h i l e t h e P a r t y i s t o h a v e f i n a l a u t h o r i t y t o a c c e p t o r n o t t o a c c e p t a n o m i n e e . 6 3 G o r b a c h e v h a s a n n o u n c e d t h a t h i s e x p e r i m e n t w i t h e l e c t o r a l r e f o r m w i l l i n c l u d e s e v e r a l c a n d i d a t e s f r o m w h i c h t o c h o s e , l a r g e r e l e c t o r a l d i s t r i c t s , s e v e r a l d e p u t i e s e l e c t e d , i n c r e a s e d v o t i n g r e p r e s e n t a t i o n a n d v o t e r w i s h e s , a n d a s e c r e t b a l l o t f o r a l l s e c r e t a r i e s . 6 6 T h e f o u n d a t i o n o f G o r b a c h e v ' s d r i v e t o p r o m o t e s e l f -c r i t i c i s m , e c o n o m i c e f f i c i e n c y , a n d ' d e m o c r a t i z a t i o n ' i s glasnost, o r ' p u b l i c i t y ' . A s G o r b a c h e v d e c l a r e d i n h i s s p e e c h t o t h e P a r t y C o n g r e s s : " [ w ] i t h o u t p u b l i c o p e n n e s s , t h e r e i s n o t a n d c a n n o t b e a n y d e m o c r a c y . . . [ i t i s o n l y b y ] . . . c o m b i n i n g c e n t r a l i s m w i t h d e m o c r a c y " t h a t s u c h d e m o c r a c y i s r e a l i z a b l e . 6 7 L i k e K h r u s h c h e v , G o r b a c h e v h a s a f f i r m e d t h a t glasnost " w o u l d n o t c a u s e o r d e r t o c o l l a p s e , " 6 0 b u t i t i s g r o w i n g i n c r e a s i n g l y a p p a r e n t t h a t glasnost w i l l n o t s u b m i t t o g o v e r n m e n t c o n t r o l s . P o l i t i c a l o p p o s i t i o n t o glasnost A m a j o r c a u s e o f p o l i t i c a l o p p o s i t i o n t o glasnost i s t h a t w h i l e G o r b a c h e v h a s s p o k e n a b o u t ' d e m o c r a t i z i n g ' S o v i e t s o c i e t y a n d ' p s y c h o l o g i c a l r e s t r u c t u r i n g ' , h e h a s h a d l i t t l e t o s a y a b o u t t h e r o l e t h e C o m m u n i s t P a r t y i s t o p l a y . G o r b a c h e v h a s o n l y s p o k e n o f t h e P a r t y i n v a g u e , n e g a t i v e t e r m s - - t h a t i t s h o u l d n o t o b s t r u c t p e r e s t r o i k a . 6 9 A s h e s t a t e d i n M a y 1 9 8 5 : " . . . [ A ] n y o n e w h o i s n o t p r e p a r e d t o a d a p t a n d w h o m o r e o v e r i m p e d e s t h e r e s o l u t i o n o f t h e s e n e w t a s k s s h o u l d g e t o u t o f t h e w a y . G e t o u t o f t h e w a y a n d d o n ' t i n t e r f e r e ! " 7 0 B y f a i l i n g t o a r t i c u l a t e a c l e a r , p o s i t i v e f u n c t i o n f o r t h e P a r t y , G o r b a c h e v d o e s n o t a p p e a r t o h a v e g i v e n m u c h t h o u g h t t o w h a t i s t o r e p l a c e i t s f u n c t i o n s . " . . . [ E ] v e n i n t h e l a t e s t [ J u n e 1 9 8 7 ] v e r s i o n o f r e f o r m . . . m a r k e t m e c h a n i s m s o n l y s u p p l e m e n t , n o t s u p p l a n t a d m i n i s t r a t i v e l e a d e r s h i p . 7 1 P e r e s t r o i k a i s l i k e l y t o b e r a t h e r s h o r t - l i v e d u n l e s s G o r b a c h e v m o v e s q u i c k l y t o e s t a b l i s h u n e q u i v o c a l a u t h o r i t y o v e r t h e p o l i t i c a l l e a d e r s h i p i n o r d e r t h a t h e m a y h a v e t h e s e c u r i t y a n d c o n f i d e n c e t o i m p l e m e n t f u n d a m e n t a l e c o n o m i c a n d s o c i a l r e f o r m s . O f t h e m a j o r p l a y e r s i n t h e P o l i t b u r o , Y e g o r L i g a c h e v , N i k o l a i R y z h k o v , V i k t o r C h e b r i k o v , V i t a l i i V o r o t n i k o v a n d L e v Z a i k o v a l l w e r e b r o u g h t i n t o t h e C e n t r a l C o m m i t t e e b y Y u r i A n d r o p o v . 7 2 A l t h o u g h L i g a c h e v , R y z h k o v , a n d C h e b r i k o v w e r e m a d e f u l l m e m b e r s o f t h e P o l i t b u r o b y G o r b a c h e v , t h e y c a n n o t b e c o n s i d e r e d a s a l l i e s . Z a i k o v , t h o u g h , m o r e s t r o n g l y s u p p o r t s G o r b a c h e v ' s v e r s i o n o f ' r a d i c a l r e f o r m ' a n d glasnost.73 A s a r e s u l t , G o r b a c h e v l e a d s a p r e d o m i n a t e l y i n d e p e n d e n t P o l i t b u r o a n d C e n t r a l C o m m i t t e e , c a n n o t r u l e b y f i a t a s d i d K h r u s h c h e v , a n d t h u s w i l l h a v e m o r e d i f f i c u l t y i n p u s h i n g t h r o u g h r e f o r m s . W i t h i n G o r b a c h e v ' s P o l i t b u r o , t h e s t r o n g e s t c o n s e r v a t i v e r e s i s t a n c e c o m e s f r o m s e c o n d s e c r e t a r y Y e g o r L i g a c h e v . H e h a s d i f f e r e d w i t h G o r b a c h e v o n s u c h m a j o r i t e m s a s s e c r e t b a l l o t s , m a n d a t o r y r e t i r e m e n t f o r p a r t y o f f i c i a l s and has supported greater emphasis on m i l i t a r y development. 7 4 But, the differences between Gorbachev and Ligachev are less ideological than they are t a c t i c a l : both recognize the need for reform but d i f f e r over how far and how fast reform should be implemented. One can see in Ligachev a r e f l e c t i o n of the cautious reformism of Andropov. Ligachev's less-than-total commitment to glasnost was evident in an interview he gave with the French d a i l y Le Monde in early December, 1987. Ligachev gave what amounted to a pro forma endorsement of perestroika and glasnost. Although he stated that talk of perestroika without glasnost i s " f o o l i s h " , throughout the interview he consistently spoke favourably of instances where ' p u b l i c i t y ' was compromised in favour of assertions of i d e o l o g i c a l orthodoxy. Typical of his discomfiture with glasnost i s his attitude toward Gorbachev's re-examination of Soviet history. Ligachev contended in the interview that . . . i t i s not necessary to review our history: what has happened has happened. We are not re-examining history but the manner in which i t has been presented, we are eliminating the 'gaps' l e f t by the past. The l i m i t s of t h i s reappraisal are p e r f e c t l y c l e a r — t o learn h i s t o r i c a l truth. 7 S(my emphases) Like the cautious reformers of the post-Stalin leadership, Ligachev does not want to challenge established myths and perceived truths about S t a l i n , and other aspects of the Soviet past. Because of the consensual nature of Soviet p o l i t i c s Ligachev's reservations about glasnost must be inferred from i n d i r e c t c r i t i c i s m s , such as the absence of any overt support. At the beginning of the interview, Ligachev made a point of explaining how i t was his r e s p o n s i b i l i t y , not Gorbachev's, to chair meetings of the Secretariat. This assertion i s s i g n i f i c a n t because the General Secretary usually presides over these meetings. More than the substance of the statement, though, i s that Ligachev f e l t the need to mention the matter at a l l . According to the Central Intelligence Agency's senior expert on the Soviet leadership, Ligachev has "sent signals" that he would prefer a more cautious approach to reform. By giving t h i s impression, "he's l e t t i n g i t be known that should the Central Committee become fed up with Gorbachev, he can continue with the change but at a much slower, more moderate pace."7"6 The analyst, Marc Zlotnik, concludes that there i s indeed a threat to Gorbachev. It i s expected that Gorbachev w i l l move to consolidate his power within the Politburo by the next Party Congress in 1991. Already, i t appears that Gorbachev has had some success in t h i s area. In May 1987, the Mathias Rust incident gave Gorbachev an excellent opportunity to r i d himself of obstructionist elements in the Politburo and the armed forces by f i r i n g Sergei Sokolov, the Defence Minister, and General Aleksandr Koldunov, the commander of the Soviet a n t i - a i r c r a f t f o r c e s . 7 7 These f i r i n g s and the subsequent purge of the m i l i t a r y did not so much r e f l e c t embarrassment over the Rust incident as i t did "a d'eeper and longstanding t e n s i o n — e v e n h o s t i l i t y — b e t w e e n . . . G o r b a c h e v a n d h i s g e n e r a l s . . . . " 7 B T h e t h r e a t t o G o r b a c h e v ' s a u t h o r i t y i s m o r e c o m p l i c a t e d t h a n w e r e t h e c h a l l e n g e s t o K h r u s h c h e v ' s a u t h o r i t y . U n l i k e K h r u s h c h e v w h o w a s t h e s u p r e m e a u t h o r i t y i n t h e P o l i t b u r o , a t l e a s t f r o m 1 9 5 8 o n w a r d , p e r e s t r o i k a ' s f u t u r e i s c l o s e l y r e l a t e d t o G o r b a c h e v ' s p o l i t i c a l s t a n d i n g w i t h i n t h e P o l i t b u r o w h i c h i s n o t b e y o n d c h a l l e n g e . I n a d d i t i o n , G o r b a c h e v m u s t b u i l d c o a l i t i o n s b e h i n d h i s p r o g r a m s . B o t h K h r u s h c h e v a n d B r e z h n e v w e r e s u p p o r t e d b y t h e s t r o n g U k r a i n i a n p a r t y m a c h i n e ; G o r b a c h e v d o e s n o t h a v e a c o m p a r a b l e a p p a r a t u s i n h i s n a t i v e R u s s i a n r e p u b l i c . T h e i n d e p e n d e n c e o f G o r b a c h e v ' s P o l i t b u r o h a s e x p o s e d G o r b a c h e v t o c r i t i c i s m f r o m o t h e r r e f o r m e r s — a p r o b l e m K h r u s h c h e v d i d n o t h a v e t o c o n s i d e r . O n O c t o b e r 2 1 , 1 9 8 7 , a t a f u l l m e e t i n g o f t h e C e n t r a l C o m m i t t e e , B o r i s Y e l t s i n , C e n t r a l C o m m i t t e e S e c r e t a r y f o r t h e c i t y o f M o s c o w a n d c a n d i d a t e m e m b e r o f t h e P o l i t b u r o , i s r e p o r t e d t o h a v e a c c u s e d G o r b a c h e v o f " d e v e l o p i n g a c u l t o f p e r s o n a l i t y t h a t t h r e a t e n e d t o u n d e r m i n e h i s p r o g r a m s . " 7 9 T h i s o u t b u r s t o f d i s c o n t e n t f r o m a n a r d e n t s u p p o r t e r o f r e f o r m h i g h l i g h t s t h e p r o b l e m G o r b a c h e v f a c e s b e c a u s e h e e n c o u r a g e s o p e n e x p r e s s i o n o f v i e w s . I n a s e n s e , K h r u s h c h e v w a s f o r t u n a t e t h a t h e h a d t o d e a l w i t h a n e a r l y f o r m a l c h a l l e n g e t o h i s a u t h o r i t y b e c a u s e i n h i s v i c t o r y , h e w a s f o r c e d t o c o n s o l i d a t e h i s p o w e r . A f t e r t h e d e f e a t o f t h e ' a n t i - p a r t y g r o u p ' i n 1 9 5 7 , K h r u s h c h e v s u p p l a n t e d N i k o l a i B u l g a n i n a s P r e m i e r a n d t h e r e a f t e r w a s e s s e n t i a l l y t h e s u p r e m e l e a d e r o f t h e P o l i t b u r o . U n d e r d e - S t a l i n i z a t i o n , t h e r e w a s n o d o u b t a s t o w h a t c o n s t i t u t e d t h e o f f i c i a l l i n e o r w h o m a d e i t . K h r u s h c h e v w a s t h e o f f i c i a l a u t h o r i t y i n t h e P o l i t b u r o , a n d h i s p o l i c y o f p r o m o t i n g d i f f e r i n g v i e w s d i d n o t e x t e n d t o h i s P r e s i d i u m c o l l e a g u e s . B e c a u s e G o r b a c h e v h a s a t w o - f r o n t w a r t o f i g h t , h e n o w n o l o n g e r f i n d s h i m s e l f o n " t h e c u t t i n g e d g e " o f r e f o r m b u t i n t h e r o l e o f a m a n a g e r " t r y i n g t o p o s i t i o n h i m s e l f b e t w e e n t h e e x t r e m e s o f t h e e n t r e n c h e d p a r t y b u r e a u c r a t s a n d c h a n g e -m i n d e d ' r e f o r m e r s ' w h o w a n t h e a v y d o s e s o f p e r e s t r o i k a a n d g l a s n o s t . " s o T h e l o n g - t e r m p r o b l e m f o r G o r b a c h e v i s l e s s t h e s u c c e s s o r f a i l u r e o f h i s r a d i c a l r e f o r m t h a n i t i s t h e f a c t t h a t i t s s u c c e s s w i l l h a v e s e r i o u s s o c i o - p o l i t i c a l r e p e r c u s s i o n s f o r t h e f u t u r e s t a b i l i t y o f t h e S o v i e t r e g i m e w h i c h i s r o o t e d i n i d e o l o g y a n d m y t h o l o g i z e d h i s t o r y . T h e u p s h o t o f G o r b a c h e v ' s d i l e m m a i s t h a t h e i s a s m u c h a p r i s o n e r o f t h e S t a l i n i s t s y s t e m a s h e i s a r e f o r m e r o f i t . ' D e m o c r a c y ' i n e c o n o m i c m a n a g e m e n t , f o r e x a m p l e , i s e v i d e n t o n l y a t t h e m i c r o i n d u s t r i a l a n d m i c r o s o c i e t a l l e v e l w i t h n o e v i d e n c e o f m a c r o i n d u s t r i a l d e m o c r a c y . 3 1 I n t h e e l e c t i o n a t t h e T r a n s p o r t C o n s t r u c t i o n R e s e a r c h I n s t i t u t e , t h e P a r t y i n t e r v e n e d t o a d d t w o c a n d i d a t e s o f i t s c h o o s i n g t o t h e f o u r t h a t w e r e a l r e a d y c h o s e n b y t h e w o r k e r s . T h e a d d i t i o n s w e r e t h e h i g h l y u n p o p u l a r d e p u t y d i r e c t o r a n d a n o u t s i d e r w h o w a s a s c i e n t i s t . A f t e r p r i v a t e m e e t i n g s w i t h a r e p r e s e n t a t i v e o f t h e M i n i s t r y o f T r a n s p o r t , t h e f o u r popular candidates suddenly withdrew. In addition, i t was determined that only active s t a f f members " i n the party and other o f f i c i a l agencies were deemed e l i g i b l e to vote, a t o t a l of 300 people [out of 2000]". Preferring the d e v i l they did not know to the one they did, the outsider was elected. As one s t a f f member commented: "At the beginning every one was excited by the process, but as time passed people slowly understood that nothing would come of the ele c t i o n . We re a l i z e d that the ministry, just as i t has always done would pick the d i r e c t o r . " 6 1 2 As he stated in his report to the 27th Party Congress, the tasks of the Central Committee and the Politburo include enhancing the effectiveness of the centralized management of the economy and the strengthening of the role of the center in r e a l i z i n g the basic goals of the Party's economic strategy and in determining the rates and proportions of the development of the national economy and i t s balance. 6 , 3 But the promotion of s o c i a l tolerance should not lead one to believe that either Khrushchev or Gorbachev i s w i l l i n g to entertain genuine dissent. It goes without saying that giving some degree of decision-making independence to c i t i z e n s is integral to a reform strategy designed both to tap the i n t e l l e c t u a l potential of Soviet society and to strengthen the economy. But the unwanted sid e - e f f e c t of economic reform i s that the loosening of controls precipitates demands for p o l i t i c a l change. Such a change, is anathema to the Soviet state. Public Dissent It i s Gorbachev's relaxation of s o c i a l taboos and tolerance of dissent that have provided much of the tangible evidence of r a d i c a l reform and have most strongly suggested a p a r a l l e l with Khrushchev. In the l i t e r a r y f i e l d , glasnost has made possible the publication of A n a t o l i i Rybakov's Children of the Arbat and the showing of the long-supressed Georgian f i l m , Repentance--both frank and unvarnished accounts of l i f e under Stalin's t e r r o r . 3 4 Taking Gorbachev's November, 1987 speech to be a sign of o f f i c i a l willingness to expand the boundaries of disclosure and examination of the Soviet past, the journal Ogonyek, for example, published an a r t i c l e documenting Stalin's r e s p o n s i b i l i t y for the 1929-32 famine in the Ukraine and exploding the f i c t i o n that the famine was due to to a poor harvest. Additionally, the a r t i c l e broke new ground by c i t i n g the victims of Stalin's Terror in the m i l l i o n s , not thousands as is o f f i c i a l l y claimed. B = In the performing a r t s , Mikhail Shatrov's play, The Brest Peace, portrays the negotiations surrounding the singing of the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk and depicts Trotsky and Bukharin as important h i s t o r i c a l f i g u r e s . a s S i m i l a r l y , during the c u l t u r a l thaw from 1961-64, Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn' s One Day in the L i f e of Ivan Denisovich was published, researchers and writers generally enjoyed a freedom not experienced since the early 1930s, and a n t i -establishment expression was encouraged. 6 7 Because Khrushchev staked his p o l i t i c a l future on dramatic increases in a g r i c u l t u r a l production, and because increased a g r i c u l t u r a l production required strong leadership and proper organization in a g r i c u l t u r e , Khrushchev f e l t an increase in the l i b e r a l i z a t i o n of p o l i t i c a l expression and the d e p o l i t i c i z a t i o n of many s o c i a l i n i t i a t i v e s would lead to the breakthrough that was needed to stimulate the dormant energies of the people. B B Khrushchev f e l t that such relaxation would not require police methods to enforce them. One reason for t h i s was that dissent was limited to c r i t i c i s m that supported Khrushchev and his p o l i c i e s . In May 1959, in his address to the Third Writers Congress, Khrushchev deprecated the worth of c r i t i c s of the Soviet system while openly espousing 1varnishers', those writers who write only about positive aspects of Soviet l i f e . 3 9 By contrast, the a n t i - S t a l i n i s t element of glasnost is evident in the lack of the overt subordination of s o c i a l p o l i cy to personal p o l i t i c a l ambition. Gorbachev's refusal to c u l t i v a t e one-man rule in his drive to e f f e c t deep, str u c t u r a l change, combined with a lack of manipulation of doctrine from above has l e f t Soviet society freer to express i t s e l f than at any time since the 1920s. As a r e s u l t , s o c i a l expression i s not uniform and there has developed a variety of interpretations of what prec i s e l y is meant by perestroika. Most importantly, there has developed a discrepancy between the o f f i c i a l Party-sanctioned glasnost and the u n o f f i c i a l and spontaneous demands for public reform. This has been a mixed blessing for Gorbachev. A case in point is the recent arrest of Sergei Grigoriyants and police raid on the o f f i c e s of the magazine Glasnost, of which Grigoriyants is the editor. Grigoriyants was arrested because of his a f f i l i a t i o n with the Democratic Union, a group that has proclaimed i t s e l f to be an opposition p a r t y . 9 0 The arrest was seen as a serious setback for advocates of glasnost because Glasnost had already existed for ten months and had published i t s material with the consent of the Politburo. Roy Medvedev explains that Grigoriyants was singled out for arrest because of the nature of his dissent. Andrei Sakharov and he are l e f t alone, Medvedev says, because they see reform of the communist system as possible, while Grigoriyants "sees Communism as beyond reform." 9 1 On the positive side, there i s i s the appearance of u n o f f i c i a l p o l i t i c a l associations. The Perestroika Club in Moscow, for example, is but one of a core group of 50 p o l i t i c a l clubs boasting a membership of over 250 a c t i v i s t s , 9 2 which belong to the Federation of S o c i a l i s t Clubs. The aim of the clubs i s to "[combine] Western-style freedoms and legal rights with the economic protections of a s o c i a l i s t welfare s t a t e . 9 3 In a l l , Pravda estimates that there are some 30,000 u n o f f i c i a l organizations including environmental, c u l t u r a l humanitarian and peace groups, many having th e i r own samizdat publications. U n l i k e t h e samizdat p u b l i c a t i o n s o f t h e 1 9 6 0 s a n d 1 9 7 0 s , u n o f f i c i a l p u b l i c a t i o n s t o d a y n o t o n l y r e f l e c t t h e v i e w s o f d i s s e n t e r s , b u t a l s o o f t h o s e w h o s e e k t o c o - e x i s t w i t h t h e s y s t e m a n d d e s i r e o n l y e d i t o r i a l i n d e p e n d e n c e . 9 4 L e v T i m o f e y e v , t h e p u b l i s h e r o f R e f e r e n d u m , a n u n o f f i c i a l o p i n i o n m a g a z i n e , c o n f i d e n t l y a s s e r t s t h a t " [ m l o d e r n t e c h n o l o g y w i l l s p r e a d a n d c o m e i n t o i t s o w n . . . . T h e a u t h o r i t i e s a r e a l r e a d y l o s i n g c o n t r o l o v e r t h e s p r e a d o f i n f o r m a t i o n . " 9 3 T h i s f e e l i n g i s e s p e c i a l l y s t r o n g a m o n g t h e Komsomol l e a d e r s h i p w h i c h s e e s d e v e l o p m e n t s l i k e t h e P e r e s t r o i k a C l u b a s a t h r e a t t o i t s o f f i c i a l m o n o p o l y o n t h e m i n d s o f S o v i e t y o u t h . 9 6 O f f i c i a l t o l e r a n c e o f d i s s e n t i s l i m i t e d t o t h o s e a c t i v i t i e s w h i c h d o n o t c r i t i c i z e t h e r e g i m e . A P r a v d a e d i t o r i a l d e c l a r e d " i l l e g a l " s u c h a c t s a s d e m o n s t r a t i o n s w h i c h a r e c o n d u c t e d " [ w l i t h o u t t h e p e r m i s s i o n o f t h e a u t h o r i t i e s " a n d a l s o t h e p r i n t i n g a n d d i s s e m i n a t i o n o f " l i t e r a t u r e h o s t i l e t o s o c i a l i s m . " 9 , 7 I n a s t a t e m e n t c r i t i c a l o f Moscow News e d i t o r , Y e g o r Y a k o v l e v , L i g a c h e v s a i d : " I t i s r e a l l y g o i n g b e y o n d t h e b o u n d s o f d e m o c r a t i c p r a c t i c e w h e n i t e m s a r e p u b l i s h e d a c c o r d i n g t o t h e e d i t o r ' s p e r s o n a l d e c i s i o n , w i t h o u t e x a m i n a t i o n b y t h e e d i t o r i a l b o a r d o f t h e n e w s p a p e r o r m a g a z i n e . " 9 0 C r i t i c i s m h a s a l s o b e e n l e v i e d a g a i n s t Ogonyek a n d Sovetskaya Kultuza. A d d i t i o n a l l y , i t w o u l d a p p e a r t h a t V i k t o r C h e b r i k o v , t h e h e a d o f t h e K G B , i s u n c o m f o r t a b l e w i t h t h e p u b l i c a t i o n o f l o n g - b a n n e d l i t e r a t u r e , c r i t i c i s m o f S t a l i n , a n d f a r - r e a c h i n g e c o n o m i c r e f o r m . 9 9 P o l i t i c a l d i s c o m f i t u r e o v e r glasnost i s e v i d e n t i n t h e c o n t e m p t Y e g o r L i g a c h e v a n d o t h e r s h a v e s h o w n t o w a r d c e r t a i n p u b l i c a t i o n s , e s p e c i a l l y Moscow News w h i c h h a s b e e n t h e m o s t c o n s p i c u o u s f o r c e i n t h e s t r u g g l e t o s t r e t c h t h e l i m i t s o f s a m o k r i t i k a a n d glasnost. I n l a t e M a r c h 1 9 8 7 , Moscow News p u b l i s h e d a l e t t e r f r o m p r o m i n e n t e m i g r e d i s s i d e n t s c a l l i n g f o r G o r b a c h e v t o p u l l t h e R e d A r m y o u t o f A f g h a n i s t a n , 1 0 0 a n d m o s t r e c e n t l y i t c r i t i c i z e d t h e g o v e r n m e n t ' s d e c i s i o n t o i m p o s e a b l a c k o u t o n n e w s r e g a r d i n g n a t i o n a l i s t d e m o n s t r a t i o n s i n A r m e n i a . T h e A r m e n i a n d e m o n s t r a t i o n s w e r e a n e x p r e s s i o n o f l o c a l d i s c o n t e n t a g a i n s t a p e r c e i v e d b u r e a u c r a t i c i n j u s t i c e - - t h e a w a r d i n g o f N a g o r n o - K a r a b a k h t o A z e r b a i j a n . 1 0 1 T h e s e d e m o n s t r a t i o n s w e r e n o t d i r e c t e d a g a i n s t S o v i e t a u t h o r i t y , u n l i k e t h o s e i n t h e B a l t i c r e p u b l i c s ; i n f a c t t h e A r m e n i a n d e m o n s t r a t o r s i n v o k e d pezestroika a s p a r t o f t h e i r c a u s e . T o q u e l l t h e u n r e s t , G o r b a c h e v a p p o i n t e d a n A r m e n i a n t o l e a d t h e N a g o r n o - K a r a b a k h g o v e r n m e n t b u t d i d n o t a c c e d e t o d e m a n d s t h a t t h e r e g i o n b e g i v e n t o A r m e n i a . M o s c o w ' s d e c i s i o n s i m p l y t o a p p o i n t a n A r m e n i a n a s r e g i o n a l l e a d e r h a s n o t d i f f u s e d t h e i s s u e . T h e c o n f l i c t h a s n o w b e c o m e a c o n s t i t u t i o n a l c r i s i s . T h e A r m e n i a n l e g i s l a t u r e u n a n i m o u s l y e n d o r s e d t h e c a l l t o a n n e x N a g o r n o - K a r a b a k h a n d j u s t i f i e d i t s p o s i t i o n a c c o r d i n g t o A r t i c l e 7 0 o f t h e S o v i e t C o n s t i t u t i o n w h i c h p r o v i d e s f o r " f r e e s e l f - d e t e r m i n a t i o n o f n a t i o n s " w i t h i n t h e U S S R , w h i l e j u s t a s f o r c e f u l l y , t h e A z e r b a i j a n i l e g i s l a t u r e c i t e d A r t i c l e 7 8 w h i c h a f f i r m s t h a t t h e t e r r i t o r y o f a r e p u b l i c " m a y n o t b e a l t e r e d w i t h o u t i t s c o n s e n t . " 1 0 2 T h e C a u c a s i a n u n r e s t i s j u s t o n e o f s e v e r a l i n s t a n c e s o f p o p u l a r d i s c o n t e n t o v e r t h e l a s t f i f t e e n m o n t h s . I n D e c e m b e r 1 9 8 6 , c i t i z e n s i n t h e K a z a k h c a p i t a l o f A l m a - A t a r i o t e d i n t h e s t r e e t s a f t e r i t w a s a n n o u n c e d t h a t a n e t h n i c R u s s i a n w a s t o t a k e t h e p l a c e o f f i r e d K a z a k h P a r t y b o s s , D i n m u k h a m e d K u n a y e v . I n J u l y 1 9 8 7 , T a t a r s d e m o n s t r a t e d i n M o s c o w f o r t h e r i g h t t o r e t u r n t o t h e i r h o m e l a n d i n t h e C r i m e a . ( T h e e n t i r e p o p u l a t i o n o f C r i m e a n T a t a r s w e r e d e p o r t e d e n m a s s e t o S i b e r i a a n d e a s t e r n K a z a k h s t a n b y S t a l i n i n 1 9 4 4 ) . T h e f o l l o w i n g m o n t h , i n t h e c a p i t a l s o f t h e B a l t i c R e p u b l i c s o f E s t o n i a , L a t v i a , a n d L i t h u a n i a , a n t i -S o v i e t d e m o n s t r a t i o n s m a r k e d t h e 4 8 t h a n n i v e r s a r y o f t h e 1 9 3 9 N a z i - S o v i e t P a c t t h a t e f f e c t i v e l y c o n s i g n e d t h e t h r e e r e p u b l i c s t o S o v i e t d o m i n a t i o n . 1 0 3 R e c e n t l y t h e a u t h o r i t i e s i n E s t o n i a t o o k t h e a u d a c i o u s s t e p o f s a n c t i o n i n g t h e c r e a t i o n o f " t h e f i r s t l a r g e - s c a l e p o l i t i c a l g r o u p o u t s i d e t h e C o m m u n i s t P a r t y " . 1 0 4 T h e E s t o n i a n g r o u p , t h e Peoples Front, i s o p e n t o a n y o n e w h o s u p p o r t s perestroika a n d o p p o s e s " S t a l i n i s t , c o n s e r v a t i v e v i e w p o i n t s . " 1 0 3 M o r e t h a n j u s t a s o c i e t y o r c l u b , t h e F r o n t , w h i c h h a s s i m i l a r o r g a n i z a t i o n s i n M o s c o w , L e n i n g r a d , Y a r o s l a v l , K i e v , a n d i n L i t h u a n i a i s a n a g g r e s s i v e p o l i t i c a l o r g a n i z a t i o n d e d i c a t e d t o t h e p r o m o t i o n o f r e f o r m a n d f i g h t i n g conservative reaction. In Latvia, c u l t u r a l leaders have taken the boldest step to date by advocating sovereign status for Latvia within the Soviet Union, including separate representation at the United Nations, control over i t s own press, and greater control over i t s own internal and external s e c u r i t y . 1 0 6 The Caucasian and B a l t i c issues and the ambivalent attitude of the authorities toward dissent represent a long-term problem for Gorbachev. Gorbachev is not yet prepared to ri s k the p o l i t i c a l consequences that a strong move toward economic reform requires. Gorbachev's change of t a c t i c from leading advocate of reform to c e n t r i s t manager of d i f f e r i n g interests was underscored when he "firmly distanced himself from more r a d i c a l advocates of change, severing p o l i t i c a l and philosophical l i n k s to a wing of that party movement for which he had 'shown considerable sympathy e a r l i e r . 1 " 1°' 7 On issues of dissent, Gorbachev has so far resisted taking substantive decisions, preferring instead to allow the aggrieved parties to channel th e i r dissent into the press and l o c a l l e g i s l a t u r e s . But problems l i k e the Caucasian and B a l t i c disputes and the v a c i l l a t i n g o f f i c i a l attitude toward tolerance of dissent w i l l not soon go away; they w i l l have to be faced sooner or later with s i g n i f i c a n t consequences. CONCLUSION The future for glasnost and p o l i t i c a l reform in general is s t i l l unclear. The need for candour about the past and unease over the potential ramifications of th i s candour have created a dynamic between the forces of glasnost and t r a d i t i o n in Soviet p o l i t i c s that i s l i k e l y to l a s t for years. As Gorbachev has recognized, " [ i ] t was the absence of a proper l e v e l of democratization in Soviet society that made possible the personality c u l t , the v i o l a t i o n s of l e g a l i t y , the wanton repressive measures of the 30's." i c , < 3 Yet, however necessary p o l i t i c a l change may be, i t must not be forgotten that the regime harbours a deep mistrust of the population and would no doubt resort to force to maintain i t s vanguard role should perestroika begin to undermine the Party's monopoly of p o l i t i c a l a u t h o r i t y . 1 0 9 It i s for thi s reason that that Gorbachev at the current Communist Party Plenum sought to make i r r e v e r s i b l e his plan to l i m i t the role of the Communist Party in the day-to-day a f f a i r s of Soviet l i f e . It i s widely believed that a successful Plenum is necessary to set the proper p o l i t i c a l climate for the introduction of far-reaching economic reforms that are expected at the Twenty-eighth Party Conference in 1991. While i t i s expected that the Party w i l l endorse perestroika in general, i t w i l l not be the great opportunity to purge the Party of conservatives, because most of the 5000 delegates to the Plenum were chosen from the conservative r a n k s . 1 1 0 The predominance of conservative delegates should not come as too much of a surprise because a society that has only known authoritarian d i c t a t o r s h i p w i l l not e a s i l y cast off the habits of a l i f e t i m e . I t c o u l d b e a r g u e d t h a t G o r b a c h e v ' s p o l i t i c a l s u r v i v a l i s j u s t a s d e p e n d e n t u p o n m a s s s u p p o r t a s w a s K h r u s h c h e v ' s . I n K h r u s h c h e v ' s c a s e , t h e m o r e h e u s e d t h e m a s s e s t o u n d e r m i n e t h e b u r e a u c r a c y , t h e m o r e h e b e c a m e d e p e n d e n t u p o n c o n t i n u e d p u b l i c s u p p o r t , a s u p p o r t t h a t l a s t e d o n l y s o l o n g a s S o v i e t e c o n o m i c p e r f o r m a n c e m a t c h e d K h r u s h c h e v ' s r h e t o r i c a n d a n t i - S t a l i n i s m r e m a i n e d p o p u l a r . B y 1 9 6 4 , t h o u g h , K h r u s h c h e v ' s b r a n d o f a n t i - S t a l i n i s m h a d l o s t m u c h o f i t s e a r l i e r m o m e n t u m . T h e m i l i t a r y a n d t h e c i v i l i a n l e a d e r s h i p n o w h a d h a d e n o u g h o f K h r u s h c h e v ' s h a r e b r a i n e d s c h e m e s a n d p e r s o n a l s t y l e o f l e a d e r s h i p w h i c h t h r e a t e n e d t h e p r i v i l e g e s a n d p o w e r o f t h e e l i t e . I n O c t o b e r 1 9 6 4 , K h r u s h c h e v w a s o v e r t h r o w n a n d r e p l a e d b y L e o n i d B r e z h n e v a s G e n e r a l S e c r e t a r y . I n t h e 1 9 6 0 s , t h e S o v i e t l e a d e r s h i p w a s n o t r e a d y t o a c c e p t s u c h r e f o r m s a n d i t i s n o t c l e a r w h e t h e r t h e P a r t y l e a d e r s h i p , o r e v e n S o v i e t s o c i e t y , i s s u f f i c i e n t l y ' e n l i g h t n e d ' t o a c c e p t G o r b a c h e v ' s p r o p o s a l s . Y e t , t h e s t r u g g l e b e t w e e n s u p p o r t e r s a n d o p p o n e n t s o f g l a s n o s t a n d p e r e s t r o i k a w i t h i n t h e l e a d e r s h i p a n d w i t h i n S o v i e t s o c i e t y i s a n e c e s s a r y a n d h e a l t h y d e v e l o p m e n t , a n d t h e s u r e s t s i g n t h a t t h e S o v i e t U n i o n i s f a c i n g u p t o i t s h i s t o r y . S o f a r , G o r b a c h e v h a s s u c c e e d e d " m o r e a t i m p r o v i n g h u m a n p e r f o r m a n c e t h a n a t p r o m o t i n g s t r u c t u r a l c h a n g e . " 1 1 1 b e c a u s e p e r e s t r o i k a d o e s n o t y e t s e e m t o h a v e f o u n d u n i v e r s a l f a v o u r a m o n g t h e e l i t e o r t o h a v e f i l t e r e d d o w n t o t h e l o w e r l e v e l o f t h e b u r e a u c r a c y . T h e f u t u r e f o r r e f o r m , though, must not be judged in the present; i t s ultimate success i s a long-term proposition. By promoting elections, party accountability, and a balanced assessment of Soviet history, Gorbachev's p o l i t i c a l reforms are rigorous and p o t e n t i a l l y longlasting, as opposed to Khrushchev's 'administrative' changes which did not r e a l l y address the flaws of the Soviet system. 74 CHAPTER III Economic Reform The one broad s i m i l a r i t y between Khrushchev's and Gorbachev's remedies for the Soviet Union's economic woes i s that both men advocate decentralization. However, the decentralization Gorbachev advocates bears l i t t l e resemblance to the kind of decentralization that Khrushchev practiced. Khrushchev argued on administrative grounds for the need to decentralize economic decision-making, but he did not change the decision-making monopoly of the centre or Moscow's monopoly on the a l l o c a t i o n of key resources. Mikhail Gorbachev, by contrast, eschews administrative tinkering. Gorbachev is the f i r s t p o s t - S t a l i n i s t reformer to advocate systemic economic change (change of the economic structure i t s e l f ) , as opposed to systematic change (change within the existing structure). It is t h i s willingness to take on the S t a l i n i s t economic system that distinguishes Gorbachev from Khrushchev as a risk-taker. This chapter begins with Khrushchev's economic reforms. It w i l l show that a l l Khrushchev accomplished was to substitute one form of empire building with another, and in the process, he exacerbated the problem of overcentralization by increasing centralized meddling in day-to-day business a f f a i r s . K H R U S H C H E V A s t h i s t h e s i s h a s a l r e a d y a r g u e d , K h r u s h c h e v ' s e c o n o m i c r e f o r m s w e r e p r i n c i p a l l y c o n c e r n e d w i t h a g r i c u l t u r e . I n J a n u a r y 1 9 5 4 , d u r i n g t h e m i d s t o f h i s c o m p e t i t i o n w i t h M a l e n k o v , K h r u s h c h e v b e g a n t h e f i r s t o f h i s a g r i c u l t u r a l r e f o r m s w i t h t h e a n n o u n c e m e n t t h a t h e i n t e n d e d t o c u l t i v a t e t h e v a s t r e g i o n o f v i r g i n a n d f a l l o w l a n d s i n e a s t e r n K a z a k h s t a n a n d s o u t h w e s t e r n S i b e r i a , l a r g e l y f o r s p r i n g w h e a t . T h e t o p p r i o r i t y f o r K h r u s h c h e v w a s n o t t h e g r a d u a l d e v e l o p m e n t o f t h e s e l a n d s b u t r a t h e r t h e a c h i e v e m e n t o f r a p i d r e s u l t s . K h r u s h c h e v r e j e c t e d t h e t r a d i t i o n a l a g r i c u l t u r a l p r a c t i c e o f c o n c e n t r a t i n g t h e c u l t i v a t i o n , f e r t i l i z a t i o n , a n d r a i s i n g o f c r o p s o n t h e b e s t s o i l i n f a v o u r o f e x p a n d i n g t h e t o t a l a r e a u n d e r c u l t i v a t i o n . I n h i s d r i v e t o a c h i e v e a d r a m a t i c s u c c e s s K h r u s h c h e v i g n o r e d c o n s i d e r a t i o n o f t h e v a s t a m o u n t s o f l a b o u r , f e r t i l i z e r , s u n l i g h t , m e c h a n i c a l e q u i p m e n t t h a t w o u l d b e n e e d e d , t h e e n v i r o n m e n t a l i m p a c t o f w i n d a n d s o i l e r o s i o n , o r t h e l i m i t s o f r i c h s o i l . 1 T h e f i r s t y e a r o f t h e ' V i r g i n L a n d s ' c a m p a i g n w a s s u c c e s s f u l , b u t t h i s w a s d u e t o g o o d w e a t h e r a n d n o t t o g o o d m a n a g e m e n t . T h e n e x t y e a r , 1 9 5 5 , w a s e x t r e m e l y d r y a n d t h e h a r v e s t w a s p o o r . T h e f a i l e d h a r v e s t p r e c i p i t a t e d c r i t i c i s m f r o m t h e C e n t r a l C o m m i t t e e a n d K h r u s h c h e v ' s m a i n r i v a l s . K a g a n o v i c h , M a l e n k o v , M o l o t o v a n d o t h e r s c o m p l a i n e d a b o u t t h e " p o i n t l e s s " f l o w o f e q u i p m e n t a n d m a n p o w e r t o t h e e a s t , n o t i n g t h a t t h e V i r g i n L a n d s h a r v e s t w o u l d r e q u i r e t h e mobilization of some 300,000 'volunteers', mostly from the Komsomol, 50,000 tractors, and over 6000 trucks. 2 Khrushchev's p o l i t i c a l d i f f i c u l t i e s abated for a time the following year, however, when the summer of 1956 brought abundant rain to the region and the V i r g i n Lands produced a bumper crop. This year was the zenith of Khrushchev's success in a g r i c u l t u r a l reform. It was during t h i s year that Khrushchev embarked on his other second major a g r i c u l t u r a l undertaking. This was his promotion of corn as a feed crop to increase meat production. The corn-as-fodder campaign started off successfully in 1956. Cornfields grew from 4.3 m i l l i o n hectares in 1954 to 18 m i l l i o n in 1955, reached 20 m i l l i o n by 1960, and by 1962 had reached 37 m i l l i o n . But the a g r i c u l t u r a l successes that silenced Khrushchev's c r i t i c s bred other problems. Khrushchev's growing prestige in the wake of the 1956 bumper grain and corn harvests generated a co-ordinated reaction from conservatives led by Malenkov, Molotov, and Kaganovich. To diminish Khrushchev's personal authority and enhance the power of the bureaucracy, they proposed, at a Plenum of the Central Committee in December 1956, that the Gosekonomissiya3 become a superministry to issue orders to other economic m i n i s t r i e s . In order to eliminate t h i s i n s t i t u t i o n a l challenge, Khrushchev responded by dismantling the entire m i n i s t e r i a l structure. Khrushchev's f i r s t major str u c t u r a l economic reform, therefore, was his decision to remove the management of i n d u s t r i a l production from Moscow closer to l o c a l centres of consumption and supply which were under the control of his own regional and d i s t r i c t party ch i e f s . In addition to undermining his p o l i t i c a l opposition, there was an economic rationale behind Khrushchev's assault on the m i n i s t e r i a l structure. Khrushchev believed that decentralization would counteract the competitive "empire building" that existed among ministries and would eliminate the i n e f f i c i e n c i e s of the r i g i d and centralized S t a l i n i s t economic system."* Thus, Khrushchev, in 1957, abolished individual ministries in favour of sovety narodnogo khozyaistva--sovnarkhozy (regional economic councils). These bodies were to be subordinated to the governments of the 15 union republics. In the case of smaller p o l i t i c a l administrative units, their boundaries were to be "coextensive with a sovnarkhoz."s But while Khrushchev successfully combatted the problem of m i n i s t e r i a l empire-building by decentralizing m i n i s t e r i a l functions, the a b o l i t i o n of ministries did not af f e c t Moscow's central control over resource a l l o c a t i o n . The end res u l t was that the sovnarkhoz structure bred a new, regional parochialism. Among sovnarkhozy there was no r e d i s t r i b u t i o n of materials even between individual i n d u s t r i a l s e c t o r s , 6 and o f f i c i a l s of each sovnarkhoz sought to promote only the interests of their region even to the detriment of other sovnarkhozy. At about the same time as he started his sovnarkoz reorganization, Khrushchev decided to decentralize machine equipment d i s t r i b u t i o n to the c o l l e c t i v e farms. Machine Tractor Stations had provided kolkhozy with farm equipment, t r a i n i n g , and maintenance in exchange for produce, but after the amalgamation of the kolkhozy under S t a l i n , Khrushchev f e l t that i t would be more e f f i c i e n t i f each new consolidated kolkhoz owned i t s own equipment. The concept of a "gradual and selective reorganization of MTSs" was feasible, but in March 1958 Khrushchev succumbed to impatience and against preponderant. moderate advice Khrushchev forced a l l kolkhozy regardless of wealth to purchase th e i r own equipment within one year and at a price that was double that what the state o r i g i n a l l y paid for i t . 7 In theory, Khrushchev sought to replace a s e l f - s e r v i n g m i n i s t e r i a l structure with a more e f f i c i e n t , co-ordinated network of regional authorities working for the common good. However, the sovnarkhoz and machine tractor reorganizations made matters worse. In the case of the sovnazkhozy the result of the sovnarkhoz was regulation without genuine d e c e n t r a l i z a t i o n . 3 It turned out that part of the function of the sovnarkhozy was to parti c i p a t e in the dra f t i n g and organization of the plans and to supervise the f u l f i l l m e n t of supply contracts. As a re s u l t the central authority, Gosplan was saddled with the task of managing the a f f a i r s of the sovnarkhozy but with only a portion of i t s former authority. 9 The fundamental weakness of the program was that t h e sovnarkhozy d i d n o t h a v e t h e a c t u a l a u t h o r i t y t o a c t i n d e p e n d e n t l y b u t o n l y t o f u l f i l l p l a n s d i c t a t e d b y Gosplan. T h e r e a s o n f o r t h i s w a s t h a t w h e n K h r u s h c h e v a b o l i s h e d e c o n o m i c m i n i s t r i e s i n 1 9 5 7 , t h e i m p l e m e n t a t i o n o f g o v e r n m e n t p o l i c i e s f e l l t o c e n t r a l g o v e r n m e n t a l a g e n c i e s . A s f o r t h e a b o l i t i o n s o f t h e M T S s , t h e e f f e c t o n S o v i e t a g r i c u l t u r e w a s d e v a s t a t i n g : f a r m e r s n o w w e r e c o e r c e d i n t o s p e n d i n g e x o r b i t a n t s u m s f o r e q u i p m e n t , s t o r a g e f a c i l i t i e s , m a i n t e n a n c e , a n d o p e r a t o r s * w a g e s . N o t h i n g w a s n o w l e f t t o p r o v i d e f o r e q u i p m e n t r e p a i r s o r i n v e s t m e n t a n d m o s t w e r e f o r c e d t o b u y t h e i r e q u i p m e n t o n c r e d i t . K h r u s h c h e v g a v e n o c o n s i d e r a t i o n t o t h e a b i l i t y o f t h e kolkhozniki t o u s e t h e m a c h i n e r y s i n c e m o s t h a d l i t t l e o r n o e x p e r i e n c e w i t h i t . T o d e m o n s t r a t e t h e a b s u r d t i m e t a b l e K h r u s h c h e v d e m a n d e d o f h i s f a r m e r s , i t t o o k t h e s t a t e e i g h t y e a r s t o e x p a n d t h e n u m b e r o f M T S s f r o m 2 4 4 6 t o 7 0 6 9 . B y 1 9 5 8 t h e r e w e r e a p p r o x i m a t e l y 8 0 0 0 . B y t h e e n d o f 1 9 5 8 , o v e r 8 0 % o f a l l kolkhozy h a d b e e n c o m p e l l e d t o p u r c h a s e t h e i r o w n e q u i p m e n t . B y J a n u a r y 1 9 5 9 , 3 4 5 M T S s r e m a i n e d - - b y D e c e m b e r t h e n u m b e r w a s 3 4 . 1 0 T h e p o l i t i c i z a t i o n o f K h r u s h c h e v ' s e c o n o m i c p o l i c y m a k e s i t d i f f i c u l t t o d e t e r m i n e w h e r e e c o n o m i c c o n s i d e r a t i o n s b e g a n a n d w h e r e p o l i t i c a l e x p e d i e n c y a n d s h o w m a n s h i p s t o p p e d . W h i l e K h r u s h c h e v c l a i m e d t o b e e m u l a t i n g L e n i n ' s p r a c t i c e o f f o r g i n g " [ s ] t r o n g e r t i e s w i t h t h e m a s s e s " 1 1 b o t h p o l i t i c a l l y a n d p e r s o n a l l y , t h e r e w a s " a s t r o n g s m e l l o f o p p o r t u n i s m t o K h r u s h c h e v ' s L e n i n i s m . " 1 2 T h e V i r g i n L a n d s a n n o u n c e m e n t , f o r e x a m p l e , w a s e s s e n t i a l l y a d r a m a t i c a n d b o l d p u b l i c i t y s t u n t t o p e r m i t K h r u s h c h e v " t o b r i n g h i m s e l f i n t o t h e l i m e l i g h t a n d k e e p h i m t h e r e . " 1 3 T y p i c a l l y , K h r u s h c h e v m a d e t h i s a n n o u n c e m e n t i n a d v a n c e o f t h e F e b r u a r y ' 1 9 5 4 p l e n u m w i t h o u t f i r s t c o n s u l t i n g t h e P r e s i d i u m . 1 , 4 K h r u s h c h e v ' s a g r i c u l t u r a l p r o g r a m s o v e r s t r e t c h e d f i n a n c i a l a n d m a n p o w e r r e s o u r c e s t o t h e p o i n t t h a t i n v e s t m e n t i n h e a v y i n d u s t r y a n d t h e m i l i t a r y h a d t o b e s a c r i f i c e d . R e f o r m s F a i l T h e e c o n o m i c p r o g r a m s w h i c h s h o w e d s o m e i n i t i a l s u c c e s s i n t h e 1 9 5 0 s w e r e p r o v e n t o b e d i s m a l f a i l u r e s b y 1 9 6 0 . T h e V i r g i n L a n d s c a m p a i g n , o r i g i n a l l y m e a n t t o b e a t e m p o r a r y m e a s u r e u n t i l t r a d i t i o n a l f o o d p r o d u c t i o n a r e a s c o u l d b e d e v e l o p e d , b e c a m e a p e r m a n e n t a n d n e c e s s a r y f i x t u r e o f S o v i e t a g r i c u l t u r e , e v e n t h o u g h t h e c l i m a t e o f t h e r e g i o n i s o n l y s u i t a b l e f o r w h e a t 2 o u t o f e v e r y 5 y e a r s . 1 3 A s f o r K h r u s h c h e v ' s c o r n c a m p a i g n , 7 0 - 8 0 % o f t h e 1 9 6 2 s u m m e r h a r v e s t w a s l o s t b e c a u s e o f t o o m u c h r a i n . 1 6 I n t h e e n d , t h e r e w a s a n e m b a r r a s s i n g g a p b e t w e e n K h r u s h c h e v ' s b o a s t i n g a b o u t t h e f u t u r e o f S o v i e t a g r i c u l t u r a l p r o d u c t i o n a n d h a r d e c o n o m i c r e a l i t y . 1 7 T h e e s s e n c e o f K h r u s h c h e v ' s e c o n o m i c r e f o r m s , a n d t h e i r u l t i m a t e f a i l u r e c a n b e t r a c e d t o h i s f i x a t i o n w i t h a p p e a r a n c e o v e r s u b s t a n c e . K h r u s h c h e v c o u l d h a v e e m p l o y e d t r a d i t i o n a l a g r i c u l t u r a l p r a c t i c e s t o i n c r e a s e c r o p y i e l d s , b u t t h e p e r c e i v e d n e e d f o r a d r a m a t i c i n c r e a s e i n t o t a l o u t p u t a n d t h e n e e d t o d e m o n s t r a t e t o t h e w o r l d t h a t t h e S o v i e t s y s t e m c o u l d m e e t t h e c h a l l e n g e o f a f o o d s h o r t a g e a n d s u r p a s s t h e W e s t i n t h e p r o c e s s , l e d t o s e r i o u s b l u n d e r s . G O R B A C H E V P r i n c i p l e s o f p e r e s t r o i k a G o r b a c h e v ' s a c c e s s i o n t o p o w e r i n M a r c h , 1 9 8 5 s i g n a l s t h e e n d o f t h e r e f o r m e d S t a l i n i s t e r a . Pexestzoika i s a r e t u r n t o L e n i n i s t e c o n o m i c p r i n c i p l e s i n o r d e r t o a d d r e s s t h e i n e f f i c i e n c y a n d c o r r u p t i o n i n h e r e n t i n t h e S t a l i n i s t s o c i o - e c o n o m i c s y s t e m . I n h i s r e p o r t t o t h e 2 7 t h P a r t y C o n g r e s s , G o r b a c h e v r e c o g n i z e d t h e i n a b i l i t y o f t h e S o v i e t U n i o n t o m e e t i t s s t a t e d e c o n o m i c g o a l s : D i f f i c u l t i e s b e g a n t o b u i l d u p i n t h e e c o n o m y i n t h e 1 9 7 0 s , w i t h t h e r a t e s o f e c o n o m i c g r o w t h d e c l i n i n g v i s i b l y . A s a r e s u l t , t h e t a r g e t s f o r e c o n o m i c d e v e l o p m e n t s e t i n t h e C o m m u n i s t P a r t y p r o g r a m , a n d e v e n t h e l o w e r t a r g e t s o f t h e 9 t h a n d 1 0 t h f i v e - y e a r p l a n s w e r e n o t a t t a i n e d . N e i t h e r d i d w e m a n a g e t o c a r r y o u t t h e s o c i a l p r o g r a m c h a r t e d f o r t h i s p e r i o d . A l a g e n s u e d i n t h e m a t e r i a l b a s e o f s c i e n c e a n d e d u c a t i o n , h e a l t h p r o t e c t i o n , c u l t u r e , a n d e v e r y d a y s e r v i c e s . T h o u g h e f f o r t s h a v e b e e n m a d e o f l a t e , w e h a v e n o t s u c c e e d e d i n w h o l l y r e m e d y i n g t h e s i t u a t i o n . T h e r e a r e s e r i o u s l a g s i n e n g i n e e r i n g , t h e o i l a n d c o a l i n d u s t r i e s , t h e e l e c t r i c a l e n g i n e e r i n g i n d u s t r y , i n f e r r o u s m e t a l s a n d c h e m i c a l s a n d i n c a p i t a l c o n s t r u c t i o n . N e i t h e r h a v e t h e t a r g e t s b e e n m e t f o r t h e m a i n i n d i c a t o r s o f e f f i c i e n c y a n d t h e i m p r o v e m e n t o f p e o p l e s ' s t a n d a r d o f l i v i n g . 3 8 G o r b a c h e v h a s a l s o a d m i t t e d p u b l i c l y t h a t t h e S o v i e t s y s t e m i s b a c k w a r d a n d n e e d s t o i m p o r t n o t o n l y W e s t e r n t e c h n o l o g y b u t a l s o , a n d p e r h a p s m o r e i m p o r t a n t l y , W e s t e r n m a n a g e m e n t a n d p r o d u c t i o n t e c h n i q u e s . 1 9 T h i s r e c o g n i t i o n l i e s b e h i n d G o r b a c h e v ' s b r e a k w i t h p r e v i o u s r e f o r m s i n t h e s h i f t t o w a r d q u a l i t a t i v e f r o m q u a n t i t a t i v e i n d i c a t o r s o f output and his new focus on economic accountability. Chief among Gorbachev's economic objectives, therefore, is the elimination of the "petty tutelage of...the day-to-day a c t i v i t i e s . . . o f enterprises by ministries and departments. 1 1 : 2 0 This new approach to economic reform w i l l be conducted in part through the v e r t i c a l integration of industries. This change w i l l compel planners to take into account s o c i a l preferences to ensure that goods are sold, thus ending the practice of producing junk year after year. 2 1 Under th i s structure, prices and p r o f i t s are to determine i n d i r e c t l y the business considerations of plant managers who are to have greater operational independence. 2 2 This policy, khozraschet, formally went into e f f e c t on 1 January, 1988. From th i s time, managers of 60% of a l l Soviet industry are to be accountable for their own operations. By 1990, the khozraschet i s to have universal a p p l i c a t i o n . 2 3 This movement towards managerial s e l f - r e s p o n s i b i l i t y i s a repudiation of Khrushchev's practice of using 'administrative levers', such as the d i r e c t intervention of state agencies into the day-to-day a f f a i r s of firms, to ef f e c t change. Another of Gorbachev's innovations is his attack on the established practice of basing wages on f l a t pay-scales and s e n i o r i t y , and in particular the practice of u r a n i l o v k a — wage-leveling. As a consequence, Gorbachev is putting forth the position that wage differences between professional and m a n a g e r i a l p e r s o n n e l o n t h e o n e h a n d , a n d l a b o u r e r s o n t h e o t h e r o u g h t t o b e w i d e n e d . 2 4 T h i s i s u n a v o i d a b l e . T h e p r o b l e m w i t h c u r r e n t a t t e m p t s t o i n c r e a s e p r o d u c t i v i t y i s t h a t t h e r e i s n o t a n g i b l e b e n e f i t t o t h e c o n s u m e r : w a g e s t e n d t o ' l e v e l o u t ' l e a v i n g o n l y m o r a l e b o o s t e r s s u c h a s m e d a l s , a n d a w a r d s a s c o m p e n s a t i o n f o r h a r d w o r k . 2 S T h i s n e w a p p r o a c h t o w a r d t h e s t r u c t u r i n g o f w a g e s c a n b e s e e n i n G o r b a c h e v ' s p r o m o t i o n o f a p r o d n a l o g , o r t a x - i n -k i n d , t o p e r m i t p e a s a n t s t o s e l l t h e i r p r o d u c e p r i v a t e l y a f t e r t a x e s a s a s t h e c a s e w i t h t h e p r o d n a l o g o f t h e N e w E c o n o m i c P o l i c y . T h e s t a t e u n d e r p e r e s t r o i k a w o u l d s e t f i x e d f i v e - y e a r t a r g e t s f o r s t a t e p r o c u r e m e n t s o t h a t p e a s a n t s w o u l d n o t h a v e t o s u f f e r y e a r l y i n c r e a s e s a n d a l s o s o t h a t p e a s a n t s c o u l d f r e e l y s e l l t h e i r s u r p l u s e s . 2 6 T h e i n t e n t i s t h a t t h e p r o d n a l o g w o u l d " [ l o o s e n ] t h e c r e a t i v e e n e r g y o f t h e m a s s e s " a n d h e l p t o b r e a k d o w n b u r e a u c r a t i c i m p e d i m e n t s t o p r o g r e s s , 2 7 e v e n t h o u g h t h e s t a t e w o u l d s t i l l b e t h e p r i n c i p a l p u r c h a s e r o f a g r i c u l t u r a l p r o d u c t s . A g r a d u a t e d t a x i s n o t a n e n t i r e l y n e w c o n c e p t . I n h i s C r i t i q u e o f t h e G o t h a P r o g r a m , K a r l M a r x a s s e r t s t h e p r i n c i p l e t h a t a l l p e o p l e d o n o t h a v e " e q u a l p r o d u c t i o n c a p a c i t y " a n d t h u s h a v e a l e g i t i m a t e c l a i m t o a n u n e q u a l s h a r e o f t h e " s o c i a l c o n s u m p t i o n f u n d . " I n o t h e r w o r d s , M a r x r e j e c t s t h e i d e a t h a t a l l c i t i z e n s i n s o c i a l i s t s o c i e t y m u s t b e p a i d t h e s a m e w a g e . I n t h e C r i t i q u e , M a r x a s s e r t s t h a t " t h e e c o n o m i c b a s i s o f t h e s t a t e [ i s ] a s i n g l e p r o g r e s s i v e i n c o m e t a x . " 2 6 3 I r o n i c a l l y , i t w a s K h r u s h c h e v t h a t a b o l i s h e d t h e p r o g r e s s i v e t a x i n f a v o u r o f t h e l e v e l i n g p r a c t i c e o f r a i s i n g t h e m i n i m u m i n c o m e l e v e l . 2 9 T h e p r a c t i c e o f r a i s i n g l o w e r w a g e s a n d f r e e z i n g h i g h e r w a g e s w a s c o n t i n u e d u n d e r B r e z h n e v a n d c o m b i n e d w i t h s u b s t a n t i a l s u b s i d i e s o n s u c h b a s i c s a s f o o d s t u f f s , t r a n s p o r t a t i o n , a n d h o u s i n g . 3 0 T o d a y , s u c h s u b s i d i e s a n d l e v e l i n g p r a c t i c e s a r e p r i m e t a r g e t s o f e c o n o m i c r e s t r u c t u r i n g . W i t h i n t h e u p p e r - l e v e l o f t h e b u r e a u c r a c y , t h e n u m e r o u s e c o n o m i c m i n i s t r i e s o f t h e S o v i e t b u r e a u c r a c y a r e t o b e a m a l g a m a t e d i n t o s u p e r - m i n i s t r i e s w h i c h w o u l d a c t i n a s u p e r v i s o r y a s o p p o s e d t o a n i n t e r v e n t i o n i s t c a p a c i t y . G o r b a c h e v ' s f i r s t s u p e r - m i n i s t r y , t h e G o s a g r o p r o m ( t h e S t a t e A g r o - I n d u s t r i a l C o m m i t t e e ) u n d e r t h e d i r e c t i o n o f V s e v o l o d M u r a k h o v s k y , w a s f o r m e d i n N o v e m b e r , 1 9 8 5 . 3 1 G o r b a c h e v s e e k s t o " r e l i e v e [Gosplan] o f r o u t i n e m a n a g e m e n t q u e s t i o n s " s o t h a t i t m a y b e c o m e " t h e t r u e e c o n o m i c r e s e a r c h h e a d q u a r t e r s o f t h e c o u n t r y . " 3 2 B y c o n t r a s t , u n d e r t h e sovnarkhoz c a m p a i g n , K h r u s h c h e v r e d u c e d Gosplan t o t h e l e v e l o f p a r t n e r i n t h e d r a f t i n g a n d e x e c u t i o n o f f a r m plans. G o r b a c h e v r e c o g n i z e s t h a t [ i ] t i s s e n s e l e s s t o i n c r e a s e t h e o u t p u t o f f o o d s t u f f s a n d n o t t o s h o w c o n c e r n f o r d e l i v e r i n g t h e p r o d u c t s t o c o n s u m e r s . " 3 3 H e t h e r e f o r e r e j e c t s a m b i t i o u s d e v e l o p m e n t a l p r o j e c t s [ i n f a v o u r o f ] i n c r e a s t i n g ] t h e y i e l d f r o m f e r t i l e f a r m a r e a s , d i v e r t i n g i n v e s t m e n t i n t o a l r e a d y d e v e l o p e d l a n d s a n d e n c o u r a g i n g f a m i l y a n d g r o u p e n t e r p r i s e s . " 3 4 I n h i s r e p o r t t o t h e 2 7 t h P a r t y C o n g r e s s G o r b a c h e v d e c l a r e d : G e n u i n e e c o n o m i c a c c o u n t a b i l i t y a n d t h e d e p e n d e n c e o f e n t e r p r i s e s o n f i n a l r e s u l t s s h o u l d b e c o m e t h e n o r m f o r a l l u n i t s o f t h e a g r o - i n d u s t r i a l c o m p l e x , a n d a b o v e a l l f o r c o l l e c t i v e f a r m s a n d s t a t e f a r m s . " 3 S I n a t h i n l y v e i l e d c r i t i c i s m o f K h r u s h c h e v ' s V i r g i n L a n d s p r o g r a m , G o r b a c h e v r e p u d i a t e d ' h a r e b r a i n e d s c h e m e s ' i n h i s s p e e c h t o t h e 2 7 t h P a r t y C o n g r e s s . 3 6 T h i s p e r c e p t i o n o f e c o n o m i c r e f o r m a s b e i n g m o r e t h a n j u s t a q u e s t i o n o f i n c r e a s i n g p r o d u c t i o n w a s a b s e n t f r o m K h r u s h c h e v ' s a g r i c u l t u r a l r e f o r m s . G o r b a c h e v ' s a d o p t i o n o f W e s t e r n e c o n o m i c c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s i s a l s o e v i d e n t i n h i s r e c o g n i t i o n . o f t h e n e e d t o t a p t h e c r e a t i v i t y o f t h e S o v i e t p e o p l e . I t i s G o r b a c h e v ' s d e p e n d e n c e u p o n p u b l i c p a r t i c i p a t i o n a n d c o -o p e r a t i o n t h a t r e q u i r e s s o c i a l a n d p o l i t i c a l r e f o r m t o c r e a t e t h e p r o p e r c l i m a t e f o r e c o n o m i c r e f o r m . I n N o v e m b e r 1 9 8 6 , f o r t h e f i r s t t i m e , t h e S o v i e t g o v e r n m e n t o f f i c i a l l y r e c o g n i z e d a n d l e g i t i m i z e d t h e u n d e r g r o u n d e c o n o m y , a n d s i n c e M a y 1 9 8 7 , a n e w l a w h a s b e e n i n e f f e c t p e r m i t t i n g i n d i v i d u a l s t o s e t u p t h e i r o w n b u s i n e s s e s . I t i s e s t i m a t e d t h a t t h e r e a r e 1 7 - 2 0 m i l l i o n p e o p l e p r o d u c i n g U S $ 7 . 3 - 8 . 8 b i l l i o n p e r y e a r . B e c a u s e t h e h i r i n g o f w o r k e r s b y i n d i v i d u a l s i s p r o h i b i t e d b y S o v i e t l a w , t h e s e e n t e r p r i s e s a r e m o r e a k i n t o s m a l l - s c a l e c o t t a g e i n d u s t r i e s t h a n m a j o r f i n a n c i a l u n d e r t a k i n g s . T h e p o t e n t i a l f o r s i g n i f i c a n t t a x r e v e n u e a n d h i g h e r q u a l i t y g o o d s a n d s e r v i c e s h a s g i v e n G o r b a c h e v a d d e d i n c e n t i v e t o c o - o p t t h e u n d e r g r o u n d e c o n o m y i n s t e a d o f f i g h t i n g i t . 3 7 I n a f u r t h e r l o o s e n i n g o f c o n t r o l s , i n J u n e 1 9 8 7 , t h e s t a t e p a s s e d a n e w l a w t o p r o t e c t i n t e l l e c t u a l p r o p e r t y a n d t o p r o v i d e f o r p a t e n t p r o t e c t i o n a n d r o y a l t y p a y m e n t s t o i n v e n t o r s . 3 9 T h i s n e w l a w c o i n c i d e s r o u g h l y w i t h t h e e s t a b l i s h m e n t o f a l e v e l o f i n t e r m e d i a t e m a r k e t s o r ' c o -o p e r a t i v e s t o r e s ' b e t w e e n t h e s t a t e a n d t h e f a r m e r s ' m a r k e t s ; t h e s e t t i n g u p o f r o u g h l y 7 0 ' e n t e r p r i s e c e n t r e s ' w i t h i n t h e e c o n o m i c m i n i s t r i e s t o s e r v e a s ' p r o f i t c e n t r e s ' t o h a n d l e n e a r l y 6 5 % o f a l l e x p o r t s ; a n d j o i n t v e n t u r e s w i t h f o r e i g n i n v e s t o r s . 3 9 I n s u m , i t m a y b e a r g u e d t h a t G o r b a c h e v i n t e n d s t o e f f e c t a l o o s e n i n g o f s t r i c t c e n t r a l i z e d c o n t r o l o v e r production, a n d f o s t e r a n e w c e n t r a l i s m i n e c o n o m i c m a n a g e m e n t . A g r i c u l t u r a l P o l i c y G o r b a c h e v ' s o b j e c t i v e s f o r S o v i e t a g r i c u l t u r e a t f i r s t g l a n c e d i f f e r l i t t l e f r o m t h o s e o f M a l e n k o v , a n d l a t e r K h r u s h c h e v : " A p r o b l e m w e w i l l h a v e t o s o l v e i n t h e s h o r t e s t t i m e p o s s i b l e i s t h a t o f f u l l y m e e t i n g o u r c o u n t r y ' s f o o d n e e d s . . . t o i n s u r e a s u b s t a n t i a l i n c r e a s e i n t h e p e r c a p i t a c o n s u m p t i o n o f m e a t , m i l k , v e g e t a b l e s , a n d f r u i t . " " * 0 B u t a s w e h a v e s e e n , K h r u s h c h e v ' s r e f o r m s w e r e a d m i n i s t r a t i v e , n o t e c o n o m i c . T h e a n t e c e d e n t f o r G o r b a c h e v i s L e n i n ' s N e w E c o n o m i c P o l i c y , a n d t h e r e i n l i e s t h e p o t e n t i a l f o r m e a n i n g f u l c h a n g e . G o r b a c h e v a n d h i s a d v i s o r s h a v e r e p e a t e d l y d r a w n p a r a l l e l s b e t w e e n p e r e s t r o i k a a n d N E P . " * 1 T h i s i s n o t s i m p l y p r o p a g a n d a - - t h e s i m i l a r i t i e s a r e p r o f o u n d . U n d e r N E P , t h e B u k h a r i n i t e s a d v o c a t e d r a i s i n g g r a i n p r i c e s s u f f i c i e n t l y t o i n d u c e p e a s a n t s t o p a r t w i t h t h e i r s u r p l u s e s v o l u n t a r i l y . T h e y f o u g h t f o r a b a l a n c e d i n v e s t m e n t p o l i c y t h a t w o u l d c o m b a t t h e g o o d s f a m i n e b y m a i n t a i n i n g a m o d i c u m o f d e v e l o p m e n t i n l i g h t -i n d u s t r y r a t h e r t h a n c o n c e n t r a t i n g n e a r l y a l l a v a i l a b l e r e s o u r c e s o n h e a v y - i n d u s t r y e x p a n s i o n . " * 2 M o r e o v e r , [ t ] h e S o v i e t s t a t e r e t a i n e d c o n t r o l o f h e a v y i n d u s t r y , f o r e i g n t r a d e , b a n k i n g , a n d t r a n s p o r t a t i o n . B u t l e s s e r e n t e r p r i s e s w e r e d e n a t i o n a l i z e d , t h e p r i n c i p l e o f p r i v a t e p e a s a n t f a r m i n g r e a f f i r m e d , a n d m a r k e t r e l a t i o n s . . . r e s t o r e d . . . . t h e C o m m u n i s t P a r t y m a i n t a i n e d i t s d i c t a t o r s h i p . . . b u t t h e p a r t y - s t a t e o f t h e 1 9 2 0 s w a s l i m i t e d a n d r e l a t i v e l y t o l e r a n t , a l l o w i n g a g r e a t e r d e g r e e o f s o c i a l , c u l t u r a l a n d a n d i n t e l l e c t u a l p l u r a l i s m t h a n h a s e v e r e x i s t e d i n [ t h e S o v i e t U n i o n ] . . . . [ a l t h o u g h ] [ t ] h e 1 9 2 0 s w e r e n e i t h e r d e m o c r a t i c n o r , i n o u r s e n s e , l i b e r a l . M "* 3 W e c a n s e e t h i s s a m e p h i l o s o p h y i n G o r b a c h e v ' s p r o g r a m s o f c o - o p e r a t i v e s t o r e s a n d i n c r e a s e o f l o c a l d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g a u t h o r i t y . L e n i n s u m m a r i z e d t h e s p i r i t o f " c o - o p e r a t i v e " s o c i a l i s m i n h i s 1 9 2 3 a r t i c l e O n C o o p e r a t i o n : A l l w e a c t u a l l y n e e d u n d e r N E P i s t o o r g a n i z e t h e p o p u l a t i o n o f R u s s i a i n c o - o p e r a t i v e s o c i e t i e s o n a s u f f i c i e n t l y l a r g e s c a l e , f o r w e h a v e f o u n d t h a t d e g r e e o f c o m b i n a t i o n o f p r i v a t e i n t e r e s t , o f p r i v a t e c o m m e r c i a l i n t e r e s t , w i t h s t a t e s u p e r v i s i o n a n d c o n t r o l o f t h i s i n t e r e s t , t h a t d e g r e e o f i t s s u b o r d i n a t i o n t o t h e c o m m o n i n t e r e s t . . . . [ T h o s e w h o ] l o o k d o w n u p o n o u r c o - o p e r a t i v e s o c i e t i e s [ f a i l ] t o a p p r e c i a t e t h e i r e x c e p t i o n a l i m p o r t a n c e , f i r s t f r o m t h e s t a n d p o i n t o f p r i n c i p l e ( t h e m e a n s o f p r o d u c t i o n a r e o w n e d b y t h e s t a t e ) , a n d , s e c o n d , f r o m t h e s t a n d p o i n t o f t r a n s i t i o n t o t h e n e w s y s t e m b y m e a n s t h a t a r e t h e s i m p l e s t , e a s i e s t a n d m o s t acceptable to the peasant .**"* G o r b a c h e v m u s t r e p u d i a t e t h e l e g a c y o f f o r c e d c o l l e c t i v i z a t i o n b e c a u s e i t p o s e s a n i n s u r m o u n t a b l e o b s t a c l e t o l o n g - t e r m r e f o r m . I n h i s s p e e c h o f 2 N o v e m b e r , 1 9 8 7 G o r b a c h e v a c k n o w l e d g e d t h a t S t a l i n a n d h i s a i d e s ( w h o w e r e n e v e r m e n t i o n e d b y n a m e ) h a d p e r m i t t e d " m a s s i v e r e p r e s s i o n s a n d v a s t u n p a r d o n a b l e a c t s o f l a w l e s s n e s s " i n t h e p u r s u i t o f c o l l e c t i v i z a t i o n , b u t n e v e r t h e l e s s h e p r a i s e d t h e c o l l e c t i v i z a t i o n a s a n e v e n t w h i c h " c r e a t e d t h e s o c i a l i s t b a s i s f o r t h e m o d e r n i z a t i o n o f t h e a g r a r i a n s e c t o r a n d s e t i t o n t h e r a i l s o f p r o p e r m a n a g e m e n t . " ' 4 3 A s f o r t h e r i s e o f t h e T e r r o r , G o r b a c h e v b l a m e d i t o n " t h e a b s e n c e o f a p r o p e r l e v e l o f d e m o c r a t i z a t i o n i n t h e S o v i e t s o c i e t y . " F u r t h e r m o r e , G o r b a c h e v j u s t i f i e d t h e c o l l e c t i v i z a t i o n a s " a t r a n s f o r m a t i o n o f f u n d a m e n t a l i m p o r t a n c e " w h i c h l e d t o " e x c e s s e s " o n l y b e c a u s e " t h e r e h a d [ n o t ] b e e n a c o n s i s t e n t l i n e t o p r o m o t e t h e a l l i a n c e w i t h t h e m i d d l e p e a s a n t r y " - -h o n e s t p e a s a n t s w h o w e r e l u m p e d t o g e t h e r w i t h t h e k u l a k s . I n f a c t , i t i s f a i r t o s a y t h a t p e r e s t r o i k a ' s e c o n o m i c a s p e c t i s a r e a f f i r m a t i o n o f t h e p r i n c i p l e s o f t h e N E P : e c o n o m i c e x p a n s i o n , l i m i t e d p r i v a t e e n t e r p r i s e , r e s p e c t f o r d i f f e r i n g v i e w s , y e t a l s o d i s c i p l i n e d , a u t h o r i t a r i a n l e a d e r s h i p . I n a g r i c u l t u r e p a r t i c u l a r l y , G o r b a c h e v m u s t u n q u i v o c a l l y r e p u d i a t e t h e s y s t e m o f S t a l i n i s t c o l l e c t i v i z a t i o n b e c a u s e i t p o s e s a " p a r a l y z i n g i d e o l o g i c a l o b s t a c l e " t o a s u c c e s s f u l r e s t r u c t u r i n g o f t h e e c o n o m y . 4 6 U n l e s s S t a l i n i s m i s r e j e c t e d i n p r a c t i c e , n o t j u s t i n s p e e c h e s , p e r e s t r o i k a w i l l s u f f o c a t e . I t i s t h e r e f o r e v i t a l f o r G o r b a c h e v t h a t h i s c o m m i t m e n t t o L e n i n i s m b e t o t a l -h a l f - m e a s u r e s w i l l n o t d o . O b s t a c l e s t o p e r e s t r o i k a A s w e s a w i n C h a p t e r I I , t h e r e i s s i g n i f i c a n t o p p o s i t i o n t o f u n d a m e n t a l r e f o r m . T h r o u g h o u t t h e u p p e r l e v e l s o f t h e g o v e r n m e n t a n d p a r t y a p p a r a t u s , t h e r e a r e s t i l l t h o u s a n d s o f a n t i - r e f o r m i s t o b s t r u c t i o n i s t s , a n d e v e n m a n y e c o n o m i s t s d i s a p p r o v e o f G o r b a c h e v ' s c a p i t a l i s t p r o f i t m o t i v e . ' 4 7 ' A s y e t t h e r e i s n o i n d i c a t i o n t h a t G o r b a c h e v ' s p r o m o t i o n o f e c o n o m i c i n s t r u m e n t s o v e r a d m i n i s t r a t i v e m e a s u r e s " . . . w i l l c h a n g e t h e b a s i c i r r a t i o n a l i t y o f t h e e x i s t i n g e c o n o m i c m o d e l , " 4 6 ' b e c a u s e M o s c o w c o n t i n u e s t o i n t e r f e r e i n t h e a f f a i r s o f i n d i v i d u a l e n t e r p r i s e s . T h i s i n t e r f e r e n c e h a s l e d G a v r i l P o p o v , a n e c o n o m i c s p r o f e s s o r a t M o s c o w S t a t e U n i v e r s i t y t o f o r m a n u n c h a r a c t e r i s t i c a l l y c r i t i c a l a n d p e s s i m i s t i c p r o g n o s i s o f p e r e s t r o i k a . P o p o v a d m i t t e d t h a t " f a c t o r y m a n a g e r s a n d w o r k e r s w h o a r e n o w s u p p o s e d t o r u n t h e i r o w n b u s i n e s s e s w i l l a c t u a l l y b e h a m s t r u n g b y c e n t r a l c o n t r o l s t h a t r e m a i n i n p l a c e . " I n S v e r d l o v s k oblast, f o r e x a m p l e , t h e l o c a l P a r t y s e c r e t a r y h a s r e p o r t e d t h a t " 6 0 0 f a c t o r i e s w o r k i n g u n d e r t h e n e w s y s t e m h a d n o t b e e n r e l e a s e d f r o m t h e a l l - p o w e r f u l c l u t c h o f p l a n n e r s a n d m i n i s t r i e s i n M o s c o w . 1 , 4 9 A n i n d i c a t i o n t h a t G o r b a c h e v d o e s n o t y e t h a v e a d e q u a t e s u p p o r t w i t h i n t h e e l i t e i s t h a t " t h e m o s t p o l i t i c a l l y e x p l o s i v e f e a t u r e o f G o r b a c h e v ' s e c o n o m i c p l a n — t h e e n d o f f o o d p r i c e s u b s i d i e s - - [ i s t o ] b e i n t r o d u c e d i n t w o o r t h r e e y e a r s . " 3 0 A c c o r d i n g t o N i k o l a i S l y u n k o v , t h e t h r e e - y e a r t r a n s i t i o n p e r i o d i s t o p e r m i t G o r b a c h e v t i m e t o c o n d u c t a m o r e m o d e r a t e " m e t h o d i c a l l o o s e n i n g " o f c o n t r o l s . 3 1 I t i s h a r d l y a c o i n c i d e n c e t h a t t h e t h r e e - y e a r t r a n s i t i o n p e r i o d e n d s a t a b o u t t h e s a m e t i m e t h a t t h e n e x t P a r t y C o n g r e s s i s s c h e d u l e d t o t a k e p l a c e , b y w h i c h t i m e i t i s e x p e c t e d t h a t G o r b a c h e v w i l l h a v e c o n s o l i d a t e d h i s a u t h o r i t y w i t h i n t h e C e n t r a l C o m m i t t e e a n d t h e S e c r e t a r i a t . B u t m o r e t h a n h i g h - l e v e l p o l i t i c a l r e s i s t a n c e , t h e m o s t s e r i o u s p r o b l e m f o r G o r b a c h e v i s t h a t m a n y S o v i e t c i t i z e n s m a y n o t w a n t p e r e s t r o i k a . T h e y a n d s o m e P a r t y o f f i c i a l s h a v e s h o w n h o s t i l i t y t o w a r d G o r b a c h e v ' s p o l i c i e s o f m e r i t o c r a c y a n d m a t e r i a l i n c e n t i v e s . 3 2 M u c h o f t h e c a u s e o f t h i s r e s i s t a n c e i s i n h e r e n t i n t h e v e r y n a t u r e o f p e r e s t r o i k a i t s e l f . G i v e n t h a t G o r b a c h e v i n t e n d s t o c u t i n e f f i c i e n c y a t t h e m i d - b u r e a u c r a t i c l e v e l , i t i s s m a l l w o n d e r t h a t , o u t s i d e M o s c o w , l o w e r - l e v e l b u r e a u c r a t s e q u a t e e c o n o m i c a n d s o c i a l r e f o r m w i t h r e d u c e d p o l i t i c a l p o w e r . F o r t h e s e w o r k e r s , G o r b a c h e v ' s s u p p o r t o f l o c a l e l e c t i o n s m e a n s t h e l o s s o f t h e i r p r i v i l e g e d c o n t r o l o v e r t h e p o l i t i c a l m a c h i n e r y w i t h o u t a n y v i s i b l e s i g n o f c o m p e n s a t i o n . A s a r e s u l t , p e r e s t r o i k a i s m e t w i t h l i t t l e e n t h u s i a s m . T h i s i s e s p e c i a l l y t r u e i n a g r i c u l t u r e , w h e r e t h e a t t a c k o n t h e S t a l i n i s t e c o n o m i c s t r u c t u r e " w i l l u n d e r c u t t h o r o u g h l y t h e p o w e r b a s e o f t h e r u r a l p a r t y a p p a r a t u s . " 3 3 A s u r v e y t a k e n b y L i t e r a t u r n a y a Gazeta i n d i c a t e d t h a t n o m o r e t h a n h a l f o f [ i t s ] r e a d e r s s u p p o r t t h e e x p a n s i o n o f p r i v a t e i n i t i a t i v e a n d n o m o r e t h a n o n e - t h i r d s u p p o r t t h e i d e a o f e l e c t i n g m a n a g e r s . O n e - q u a r t e r o f t h e r e s p o n d e n t s d i r e c t l y c h a l l e n g e d t h e r a t i o n a l i t y o f g l a s n o s t , d e c l a r i n g t h a t i t b r i n g s m o r e h a r m t h a n g o o d t o S o v i e t s o c i e t y . 3 4 W h i l e g i v i n g g r e a t e r s e l f - r e l i a n c e t o S o v i e t c i t i z e n s m a y w e l l b e a n e c o n o m i c n e c e s s i t y , i t " r u n s a g a i n s t a d e e p g r a i n o f t r a d i t i o n . " s s I n t h o s e a r e a s w h e r e m a r k e t f o r c e s a r e h a v i n g a n i m p a c t , t h e i n e v i t a b l e r i s e i n p r i c e s f o r s c a r c e g o o d s a n d s e r v i c e s a n d h i g h e r w a g e s f o r c e r t a i n c i t i z e n s h a v e t h e e f f e c t o f t a i n t i n g perestroika w i t h t h e o d o u r o f c a p i t a l i s m . T h e r e s u l t i s t h e a l i e n a t i o n o f o l d e r S o v i e t c i t i z e n s w h o s t i l l c l i n g t o c o m m u n i s t i d e a l s a n d o f t h e p o p u l a t i o n i n g e n e r a l b y d e m a n d i n g h a r d e r w o r k w i t h o u t g i v i n g t h e m i m m e d i a t e b e n e f i t s i n r e t u r n . S G T h e c r a d l e - t o - g r a v e s e c u r i t y o f t h e S o v i e t w e l f a r e s t a t e i s t h e f u n d a m e n t a l b o n d b e t w e e n t h e p e o p l e a n d t h e P a r t y . W h e n t h i s p o l i t i c a l r e a l i t y i s c o m b i n e d w i t h t r a d i t i o n a l R u s s i a n p r i k h o d l i v o s t - - a n i n n a t e r e s i s t a n c e t o c h a n g e a n d s t o i c r e s i g n a t i o n i n t h e f a c e o f a d v e r s i t y - - t h e p e o p l e , n o t t h e P a r t y , a r e i n f a c t t h e g r e a t e s t c o n s e r v a t i v e f o r c e a g a i n s t r e f o r m . W h i l e o n a r e c e n t t r i p t o t h e S o v i e t U n i o n , T i m e e d i t o r R o g e r R o s e n b l a t t p e r c e i v e d t h e s p i r i t u a l b o n d b e t w e e n t h e p e o p l e , t h e i r g o v e r n m e n t a n d t h e i r h i s t o r y : " . . . s o m e t i m e s o n e a l s o f e e l s t h a t . . . m a s s i n e f f i c i e n c y a n d o l d - f a s h i o n e d n e s s i s w i l l e d b y t h e p e o p l e t h e m s e l v e s a s a m e a n s o f r e t a i n i n g t h e p a s t a n d h o l d i n g m o d e r n i t y a w a y . " 5 7 T h u s t h e g r e a t p a r a d o x o f p e r e s t r o i k a i s t h a t , b y p r o m o t i n g e c o n o m i c s e l f - r e l i a n c e , G o r b a c h e v w i l l l i k e l y a l i e n a t e t h o s e w h o m h e n e e d s m o s t — w o r k i n g - c l a s s S o v i e t s . A s M a r s h a l l G o l d m a n o b s e r v e s , " [ f ] o r w o r k e r s t o p r o d u c e m o r e , G o r b a c h e v n e e d s t o o f f e r t h e m m o r e c o n s u m e r g o o d s a n d s e r v i c e s . Y e t i n o r d e r t o b e a b l e t o o f f e r t h e m m o r e g o o d s a n d s e r v i c e s h e n e e d s m o r e p r o d u c t i v e w o r k e r s . " 3 8 I f t h e y o u t h a n d m i d d l e - c l a s s p r o f e s s i o n a l s , t h e p e o p l e G o r b a c h e v i s d e p e n d i n g o n t o b e i n t h e v a n g u a r d o f h i s r a d i c a l r e f o r m , a r e n o t g i v e n t h e m a t e r i a l i n c e n t i v e s a n d o p p o r t u n i t i e s t h e y d e m a n d , t h e y c o u l d " b o y c o t t t h e s y s t e m . . . b y p e r f o r m i n g t h e i r d u t i e s i n a p e d e s t r i a n w a y " , t h u s d e p r i v i n g G o r b a c h e v o f h i s b a s i s o f s u p p o r t . s * T h e r e a l r e a d y a p p e a r s t o b e s o m e e v i d e n c e o f l o n g - t e r m s o c i a l r e s i s t e n c e . F o r t h e y o u t h , t h e r e s p o n s e t o perestroika a p p e a r s t o b e r e s i s t a n c e o r a t b e s t i n d i f f e r e n c e . W h i l e t h e K o m s o m o l l e a d e r s h i p d u t i f u l l y r a i l s a g a i n s t " f o r m a l i s m " i n p a r t y p o l i c y , " [ a ] l o t o f y o u n g p e o p l e [ i n t h e w o r d s o f o n e y o u t h ] a r e s i c k a n d t i r e d o f t h e o f f i c i a l i d e o l o g y . . . P e r e s t r o i k a i s j u s t t h e s a m e i d e o l o g y , o n l y m o r e c u n n i n g . " 6 0 A c c o r d i n g t o t h e Y o u n g C o m m u n i s t L e a g u e i t s e l f , " o n l y 8 % o f y o u n g p e o p l e r e p o r t e d s o m e s i g n i f i c a n t c h a n g e i n t h e i r o r g a n i z a t i o n . . . [ a n d ] o n l y 2 0 % o f m a n a g e r s b e l i e v e t h a t • r e s t r u c t u r i n g a t t h e i r e n t e r p r i s e s i s p r o g r e s s i n g s u c c e s s f u l l y ' " a s c o m p a r e d w i t h 4 0 % w h o " p r e f e r r e d t h e o l d s y s t e m . " 6 1 F o r a l l o f G o r b a c h e v ' s n e e d f o r p u b l i c c o -o p e r a t i o n a n d h i s r e l a x a t i o n o f t h e p o l i t i c a l c l i m a t e t o a l l o w p e o p l e t o p a r t i c i p a t e i n t h e e c o n o m i c r e c o n s t r u c t i o n , t h e p e o p l e w h o a r e e x p e c t e d t o c o n t r i b u t e t h e m o s t w h i l e receiving the fewest benefits are the consumers. "...Gorbachev nowhere suggests channeling new resources toward consumpt i on." s a In Moscow, today there are complaints that there i s less food i n the stores than there was even 5 years ago, and shortages outside the Moscow area are worse, including a lack of housing.* a Seweryn Bi a l e r has noted the long-term socio-economic problem t h i s poses: "Today the main danger to the Soviet system may emanate from the i n d u s t r i a l working c l a s s , which i s being disrupted by the dismantling of the old s o c i a l c o n t r a c t — a process already begun.MG"* There i s also a t h i r d obstacle f r u s t r a t i n g Gorbachev's restructuring: the s t r u c t u r a l backwardness of the Soviet Union. Theoretical breakthroughs i n science and technology, when they occur, can r a r e l y pass the drawing-board stage. For a l l of Gorbachev's r h e t o r i c , encouragement, d i s c i p l i n e , and glasnost, i t i s clear that the Soviet Union lacks the sophisticated s c i e n t i f i c foundation to become the modern technological superpower that Gorbachev envisages. It i s one thing to know that reform i s neccessary but quite another to put i t into p r a c t i c e . In a very r e a l sense, t h i s gap between theory and practice i n p o l i t i c s r e f l e c t s the main s t r u c t u r a l problem of Soviet industry. For one thing, Soviet industry suffers from a c r i p p l i n g lack of r e l i a b l e , p l e n t i f u l , modern equipment. In a land that boasts one-quarter of the world's s c i e n t i s t s and one-half of i t s engineers, research and technical equipment are "hopelessly obsolete". e s The problem i s p a r t i c u l a r l y acute i n genetic engineering which has not yet f u l l y recovered from Lysenko's charlatanism. There are two basic reasons why Soviet industry i s loathe to assimilate innovation. The f i r s t i s that, despite Gorbachev's exhortations, plant managers are s t i l l preoccupied with the quantitative approach to production. They are too concerned with meeting quotas and a f r a i d to negotiate the maze of bureaucratic obstacles to acquire new equipment. Even i f a plant should get new equipment, the time lag between the order and d e l i v e r y usually renders t h i s equipment obsolete. The second reason i s the i n s t i t u t i o n a l i z e d separation of science and industry and the concomitant r e s t r i c t i o n s on the s c i e n t i f i c community. Unlike Western society, where industries have an intimate r e l a t i o n s h i p with the s c i e n t i f i c community and s c i e n t i s t s are encouraged to make discoveries and conduct experiments, the structure of the Soviet command economy i s such that any innovation must be prescribed from above. A s i t u a t i o n i n which, for example, a computer 'hacker' i s given f r e e - r e i n to develop new software i s s t i l l v i r t u a l l y impossible even in Gorbachev's Russia where the state s t i l l zealously guards i t s monopoly over information c o n t r o l . S c i e n t i s t s have d i f f i c u l t y obtaining o f f i c i a l permission to attend conferences overseas and even s c i e n t i f i c journals are s t i l l censored. Bureaucrats i n Moscow have absolute authority to determine whether a given good should be produced or whether an innovation w i l l be adopted. Thus, even though the Soviet Union can boast of having world-class t h e o r e t i c a l s c i e n t i s t s , Soviet s c i e n t i s t s avoid dealing with industry and t h e i r ideas r a r e l y get a hearing outside of the classroom. F i n a l l y , Gorbachev's own p r e s c r i p t i o n for change— acceleration of growth of national income and an increase i n the q u a l i t y of production—may be too ambitious. Gorbachev has declared his intention to double national income by the year 2000, but i t i s a moot point as to whether t h i s objective attainable. For the Soviet Union to meet i t s food and production targets, the agriculture and consumer goods sectors w i l l require greatly increased investment at the expense of heavy industry and the m i l i t a r y . As Bruce Parrott observes, Gorbachev's commitment to high-technology and increased investments "...have i n t e n s i f i e d short-term demands on economic resources and have strengthened the temptation to d i v e r t inputs previously earmarked for current m i l i t a r y spending." 6 S According to a j o i n t report by the Central Intelligence Agency and the Defence Intelligence Agency, the benefits to the c i v i l i a n economy from such a transfer would be "enormous". According to the report's estimates, "...the non-defense component of gross national product could be as much a 2 percent higher than i t otherwise would be by the turn of the century." 6 7 The report further showed that the t o t a l output of goods and services rose only 0.5% i n 1987 as compared with 3.9% i n 1986. s e CONCLUSION It may be concluded that, as economist Thomas Naylor writes, the root cause of Soviet economic i n e r t i a " i s not ideology but rather the lack of f a m i l i a r i t y with market mechanisms". 6 9 Soviet managers have no idea how to market products, set prices or handle employee r e l a t i o n s . 7 0 To combat t h i s problem, Soviet managers and bureaucrats are being sent to i n s t i t u t e s i n Moscow to be schooled i n Western market-oriented management techniques. Thus, in Gorbachev's drive to impel Soviet society into the twentieth (to say nothing of the twenty-first) century, i t i s clear that pezestzoika must be more than merely an economic r e f o r m — i t cannot succeed without broad governmental and public support for genuine decentralization. It i s f a i r to say that perestroika i s dependent on nothing less than Gorbachev's a b i l i t y of to force the Soviet economy to pass through two socio-economic revolutions at the same time—the second i n d u s t r i a l , or 'consumption' revolution, and the t h i r d , p o s t - i n d u s t r i a l , or 'information', revolution. 7" 1 If my conclusions are v a l i d , how successful i s perestroika l i k e l y to be? Mikhail Gorbachev has been General Secretary of the Communist Party for three years, yet already there i s talk of the Gorbachev ' E r a 1 7 * just as there was with Lenin, S t a l i n , Khrushchev, and Brezhnev. Before Gorbachev i s invested with such terminological longevity, i t must be remembered that every leader since S t a l i n b u i l t his reputation on the repudiation of the p o l i c i e s of his predecessor. We have already had de-S t a l i n i z a t i o n , de-Khrushchevization, and de-Brezhnevization-- i s there to be a de-Gorbachevization? 7" 3 It i s t h e o r e t i c a l l y possible that Gorbachev could s t i l l be overthrown as Party leader. Such an event would resemble Khrushchev's fate i n that there was no obvious successor and i t was conducted s w i f t l y and with complete surprise. But such a fate i s highly improbable: for one thing, the conservative opposition does not have champion around whom to r a l l y , and for another there i s no a l t e r n a t i v e to r a d i c a l reform. But the best we can do i s speculate about Gorbachev's future. An unavoidable shortcoming of t h i s thesis i s that while Khrushchev's reforms can be examined with h i s t o r i c a l hindsight, perestroika i s s t i l l evolving and thus i t s eventual outcome cannot be predicted with any accuracy. There i s , however, one preliminary conclusion that may be drawn at t h i s time. In his crash program to bring the twentieth century to the Soviet Union, Gorbachev exhibits some Khrushchev's dynamism, but by recognizing that r a d i c a l reform w i l l p r e c i p i t a t e socio-economic d i s l o c a t i o n s , Gorbachev demonstrates a coherent understanding of reform and a willingness to take r i s k s that was absent i n de-S t a l i n i z a t i o n . CHAPTER IV Conclusion; The Uniqueness of Pezestzoika From a comparison of some of the s p e c i f i c s of pezestzoika and d e - S t a l i n i z a t i o n , t h i s chapter focuses on the uniqueness of pezestzoika as a stage of S o v i e t reform. I s t a t e d i n the i n t r o d u c t i o n t h a t p e r e s t r o i k a r e p r e s e n t s "a new sta g e " i n S o v i e t p o l i t i c s . I s t a t e d f u r t h e r t h a t S o v i e t h i s t o r y c o u l d be d i v i d e d i n t o t h r e e major p e r i o d s . The f i r s t p e r i o d , the L e n i n i s t e r a , began i n the years l e a d i n g up t o 1917 and continued under Bukharin*s l e a d e r s h i p t o 1929. The second p e r i o d , the S t a l i n i s t e r a , began i n 1929 and continued e f f e c t i v e l y u n t i l Gorbachev's a c c e s s i o n t o power i n 1985. Wi t h i n the S t a l i n i s t e r a , I i d e n t i f i e d two sub-p e r i o d s : the p e r i o d of S t a l i n i s m (1929-53) and of reformed S t a l n i s m (1953-85). T h i s l a t t e r p e r i o d was f u r t h e r d i v i d e d i n t o p e r i o d s of ' l i b e r a l S t a l i n i s t ' reform (1953-64) and 'co n s e r v a t i v e S t a l i n i s t ' reform (1964-85).* The t h i r d major e r a , the Gorbachev p e r i o d , began i n 1985 and con t i n u e s t o the p r e s e n t . Gorbachev's p e r e s t r o i k a r e p r e s e n t s the end of the S t a l i n i s t p e r i o d and the beginning of the t h i r d e r a i n S o v i e t h i s t o r y . Judging from the c o n t r a s t between p e r e s t r o i k a and de-S t a l i n i z a t i o n , one might conclude t h a t Gorbachev's reforms re p r e s e n t merely a r e a p p l i c a t i o n of Leninism. When Gorbachev says t h a t h i s p e r e s t r o i k a i s "a r e t u r n t o 'Leninist p r i n c i p l e s ' that were sidetracked by Lenin's death in 1924, 1 , 2 i t i s understandable how t h i s impression could gain wide currency. Some observers might conclude that perestroika i s l i t t l e more than a composite of other attempts at reform: Gorbachev's crusade against alcoholism, absenteeism and drug abuse are based upon Yuri Andropov's crusade for s o c i a l d i s c i p l i n e ; N i k i t a Khrushchev i s the proper antecedent for Gorbachev's campaign for debate and candour about Soviet history and samokzitika; and the limited competition of ideas and support for limited free enterprise may be seen as a return to Lenin's New Economic Pol i c y . In t h i s chapter, the Leninist element in pezestzoika w i l l be examined i n greater d e t a i l in order to reinforce areas of congruence and to i d e n t i f y points of d i s s i m i l a r i t y . Through t h i s analysis, I intend to i d e n t i f y pezestzoika as a unique stage i n Soviet p o l i t i c s . Pezestzoika and the New Economic P o l i c y The f i r s t point to be made in establishing the connection between Gorbachev and Lenin i s the recognition that Stalinism was, in the main, a betrayal of Lenin's philosophy. Where Lenin saw the state as a means to a greater end, the establishment of a communist society, S t a l i n saw the state under his absolute control as the end in i t s e l f . The a n t i - L e n i n i s t element in Stalinism i s evident in the fact that the p o l i c i e s of forced c o l l e c t i v i z a t i o n and 100 r i g i d p a r t y c o n t r o l over economic e n t e r p r i s e s , the foundation of S t a l i n i s t economic p o l i c y , had been shown t o be misguided and s e l f - d e f e a t i n g by 1921. During the p e r i o d of the C i v i l War (1918-20), L e n i n p r a c t i c e d a p o l i c y of r e p r e s s i v e c e n t r a l i z e d a u t h o r i t y with o p p r e s s i v e measures designed to e x t r a c t g r a i n from peasants at low p r i c e s . These o p p r e s s i v e measures, c o l l e c t i v e l y c a l l e d War Communism, were j u s t i f i e d because the r e v o l u t i o n a r y communist s t a t e , i n Lenin's words, had t o f i g h t o f f the " g i g a n t i c f o r c e s of world i m p e r i a l i s m . " 3 A f t e r the C i v i l War, L e n i n was f o r c e d to r e c o g n i z e two f a c t s . F i r s t , t h a t the p r a c t i c e s of f o r c e d g r a i n r e q u i s i t i o n s and c o l l e c t i v i z a t i o n of the peasantry, which occured d u r i n g the p e r i o d of War Communism, were mistakes and d e t r i m e n t a l t o the welfare of the young r e v o l u t i o n a r y s t a t e . Second, t h a t i n 1921 i t was too soon to t a l k of p o l i t i c a l change among the peasantry.* L e n i n concluded t h a t i t would "take g e n e r a t i o n s t o remould the s m a l l farmer and r e c a s t h i s m e n t a l i t y and h a b i t s . " 8 The NEP, thus, marked a s i g n i f i c a n t change i n Lenin's thought; i n s t e a d of a v i o l e n t , c o e r c i v e t r a n s f o r m a t i o n i n t o s o c i a l i s m , L e n i n argued t h a t R u s s i a would proceed g r a d u a l l y along the path to s o c i a l i s m . T h i s new t o l e r a n c e would e n t a i l i n c r e a s i n g the r e l a t i v e economic w e l f a r e of the middle and poor peasants by ending the r e q u i s i t i o n of f i x e d quotas of produce i n favour of a f l e x i b l e t a x - i n - k i n d , a prodnalog. The i n t e n t of the prodnalog was to encourage a l l peasants, poor and r i c h , t o show e n t e r p r i s e and i n n o v a t i o n so t h a t the c i t i e s would not s t a r v e . 6 Furthermore, L e n i n argued t h a t , because of accomplished land r e d i s t r i b u t i o n , most of the kulaks had been e l i m i n a t e d and farmers were l a r g e l y middle-peasants, and thus there was no need to f e a r a p o l i t i c a l c h a l l e n g e from the kulaks. 7* A f t e r the I n t e r v e n t i o n , i t was time to develop the a g r i c u l t u r a l c l a s s , s o c i a l l y , e c o n o m i c a l l y , and p o l i t i c a l l y . 3 The main t h r e a t t o B o l s h e v i k power d u r i n g the 1920s thus was the d e c r e p i t s t a t e of the ecomomy a f t e r years of "war, r u i n , d e m o b i l i z a t i o n , and the d i s a s t e r o u s crop f a i l u r e s " 9 . Consequently, the prime d i r e c t i v e of the P a r t y ' s p o l i c y was to respond to t h i s t h r e a t by removing r e s t r i c t i o n s on the peasantry. The t o l e r a n t nature of the New Economic P o l i c y was t r e a t e d b r i e f l y i n Chapter I I I . The economic aspect of the NEP was accompanied by fundamental p o l i t i c a l reforms to c r e a t e the proper c o n d i t i o n s f o r economic improvement. The p o l i t i c a l a s pect of the NEP i s based on the frank r e c o g n i t i o n t h a t the task of b u i l d i n g communism c o u l d not be accomplished by the e f f o r t s of Communists a l o n e . Communists, L e n i n s a i d , "are but a drop i n the ocean, a drop i n the ocean of p e o p l e . " 1 0 L e n i n made t h i s d e c l a r a t i o n a t the E l e v e n t h P a r t y Congress i n 1922 which i s a l s o noteworthy f o r a p o s i t i v e reassessment of the value of f r e e - e n t e r p r i s e , as t h i s e xcerpt shows: During the past year we showed q u i t e c l e a r l y t h a t we cannot run the economy. That i s the fundamental l e s s o n . E i t h e r we prove the opposite i n the coming year,or S o v i e t power w i l l not be a b l e t o e x i s t . And the g r e a t e s t danger i s t h a t not everybody r e a l i z e s t h i s . * * * The mixed companies t h a t we have begun to form, i n which p r i v a t e c a p i t a l i s t s , Russian and F o r e i g n , and Communists p a r t i c i p a t e , p rovide one of the means by which we can l e a r n t o o r g a n i s e c o m p e t i t i o n p r o p e r l y and show t h a t we are no l e s s able t o e s t a b l i s h a l i n k with the peasant economy than the c a p i t a l i s t s ; t h a t we can meet i t s requirements; t h a t we can h e l p the peasant make progress even a t h i s present l e v e l , i n s p i t e of h i s backwards; f o r i t i s impossible to change him i n a b r i e f span of time. 1 1 For L e n i n and Bukharin, s o c i a l i s m d i d not r e p r e s e n t simply the c o l l e c t i v e ownership of the means of p r o d u c t i o n : " [ i t ] s i g n i f i e d an e c o n o m i c a l l y and c u l t u r a l l y advanced s o c i e t y with machine technology and an educated populace imbued with a s o c i a l i s t c o n s c i o u s n e s s , p a r t i c i p a t i n g i n c o o p e r a t i v e forms of work. , l t a However, L e n i n b e l i e v e d t h a t the bureaucracy stood i n the way of the people and the l e a d e r s h i p and was i n f a c t a t h r e a t to the a u t h o r i t y of the l e a d e r s h i p . 1 5 9 S h o r t l y before h i s death i n 1924, L e n i n warned t h a t the p a r t y apparatus was becoming too b u r e a u c r a t i z e d , resembling l i t t l e more than the o l d t s a r i s t apparatus underneath a t h i n veneer of B o l s h e v i s m . 1 4 Thus, the p o l i t i c a l a spect of the NEP i s e v i d e n t i n Lenin's c r i t i c i s m of a b s o l u t e P a r t y c o n t r o l over economic p o l i c y . The s i m i l a r i t i e s between the New Economic P o l i c y and p e r e s t r o i k a should be obvious. F i r s t , they were both motivated by economic n e c e s s i t y . The t h r e a t to the w e l f a r e of the S o v i e t s t a t e t h a t i n e f f i c i e n t a g r i c u l t u r e posed to L e n i n and Bukharin i s no l e s s s e r i o u s f o r Gorbachev. Second, both L e n i n and Gorbachev r e c o g n i z e the d e b i l i t a t i n g i n f l u e n c e of s t r i c t P a r t y c o n t r o l of the economy. Gorbachev's khozraschet i s a r e d i s c o v e r y of Lenin's r e c o g n i t i o n t h a t the Communist d i c t a t o r s h i p has l i m i t a t i o n s and t h a t 'co-operative s o c i a l i s m ' i s the o n l y means by which the S o v i e t Union can develop. In sum, both reforms r e p r e s e n t the s u p e r i o r i t y of pragmatic, r a t i o n a l decision-making over b l i n d d e v o t i o n t o i d e o l o g y . Gorbachev's d e t e r m i n a t i o n to r e a p p l y L e n i n i s t p r i n c i p l e s cannot be overemphasized because i t s i m p l i c a t i o n s f o r the f u t u r e of the S o v i e t Union and of Gorbachev i n p a r t i c u l a r are enormous. By even i n t i m a t i n g t h a t a r e t u r n to L e n i n i s t p r i n c i p l e s i s necessary, Gorbachev c h a l l e n g e s the l e g i t i m a c y and even the n e c e s s i t y of the e n t i r e S t a l i n i s t p e r i o d . I t undermines the b a s i c myths of contemporary S o v i e t c u l t u r e : t h a t every aspect of S o v i e t p o l i t i c a l and economic l i f e s i n c e L e n i n i s the o n l y p o s s i b l e m a n i f e s t a t i o n of Lenin's v i s i o n , and t h a t S t a l i n continued and upheld the b a s i c t h e o r e t i c a l t e n e t s of Leninism. In s h o r t , perestroika i s an admission t h a t S t a l i n i s m was a mistake and t h a t the L e n i n i s t path must be p i c k e d up a g a i n . To d i s t i n g u i s h reformed S t a l i n i s m from p e r e s t r o i k a a f u r t h e r d i s c u s s i o n of the d o c t r i n a l aspect of S t a l i n i s m i s necessary. I intend to show t h a t reformed S t a l i n i s m i s a c o n t i n u a t i o n of S t a l i n i s m . Reformed S t a l i n i s m and S t a l i n i s m In a speech d e l i v e r e d i n 1926, N i k o l a i Bukharin argued t h a t the NEP was the proper course because " c l a s s s s t r u g g l e w i l l d i m i n i s h l i t t l e by l i t t l e u n t i l i t d i e s out i n communist s o c i e t y without any t h i r d r e v o l u t i o n " . 1 1 3 Bukharin a l s o argued elsewhere t h a t c u l t u r a l and i n t e l l e c t u a l l i f e should be "based on the ' p r i n c i p l e of f r e e and a n a r c h i s t i c c o m p e t i t i o n ' r a t h e r than squeezing everybody i n t o one f i s t " as S t a l i n a d v o c a t e d . 1 6 However, a f t e r L e n i n d i e d i n 1924, the p o l i t i c a l f o r c e behind the New Economic P o l i c y was s i g n i f i c a n t l y weakened. The r e s u l t was t h a t L enin's and Bukharin's e v o l u t i o n a r y path toward s o c i a l i s m gave way to i n t e n s i v e heavy i n d u s t r y and f o r c e d c o l l e c t i v i z a t i o n a f t e r S t a l i n outmanoeuvered Bukharin and others i n 1929. Where Gorbachev founded h i s economic reforms upon the NEP, the S t a l i n i s t " t h i r d r e v o l u t i o n " t h a t Bukharin opposed, served as the model f o r Khrushchev. I r o n i c a l l y , the d o c t r i n a l b a s i s f o r S t a l i n ' s r e p r e s s i v e d i c t a t o r s h i p was L e n i n , h i m s e l f . The tyranny t h a t S t a l i n unleashed was p a r t l y due to the o v e r c o n c e n t r a t i o n of a u t h o r i t y i n the hands of the Communist P a r t y t h a t occured under L e n i n . R e c e n t l y the j o u r n a l i s t V a s i l y S e l y u n i n t r a c e d the o r i g i n s of labour camps and f o r c e d c o l l e c t i v i z a t i o n t o L e n i n and the p e r i o d of War Communism. 1 7 In an e a r l i e r A p r i l a r t i c l e i n Sovetskaya K u l t u r a the S o v i e t h i s t o r i a n N i k o l a i Popov wrote t h a t "the c o n c e n t r a t i o n of e x c e s s i v e power i n the hands of the Communist P a r t y s t a r t e d under L e n i n and t h a t t h i s paved the way f o r S t a l i n ' s c r e a t i o n of 'the p e r f e c t t o t a l i t a r i a n s t a t e " l l B Where L e n i n and Bukharin employed economic measures to i n c r e a s e p r o d u c t i v i t y i n order to squeeze out the kulaks, S t a l i n employed u n b r i d l e d c o e r c i o n to bludgeon the peasantry i n t o c o l l e c t i v i z a t i o n . I t i s r e g a r d i n g the c o l l e c t i v i z a t i o n of a g r i c u l t u r e t h a t S t a l i n ' s f i x a t i o n with a b s o l u t e power and r e v e r s a l of NEP p r i n c i p l e s i s the c l e a r e s t . I t i s impossible t o separate S t a l i n ' s d r i v e f o r a b s o l u t e power from the c o l l e c t i v i z a t i o n . Bukharin's "no t h i r d r e v o l u t i o n theme c o l l i d e d with S t a l i n ' s inner v i s i o n of h i m s e l f and h i s d e s t i n y . " 1 9 For S t a l i n , the d e c i s i o n t o c o l l e c t i v i z e S o v i e t a g r i c u l t u r e was a p o l i t i c a l t a c t i c t o g i v e the regime c o n t r o l over food s u p p l i e s by l i m i t i n g the economic independence and b a r g a i n i n g power of the peasantry. As an amendment t o the 15th P a r t y Congress, S t a l i n added: "At the present time, the task of t r a n s f o r m a t i o n and amalgamation of s m a l l i n d u s t r i a l farms i n t o l a r g e - s c a l e c o l l e c t i v e farms must be s e t as the p a r t y ' s fundamental task i n the c o u n t r y s i d e . " 2 0 A l e c Nove argues t h a t some form of coerced c o l l e c t i v i z a t i o n was i n e v i t a b l e d u r i n g 1928-29, r e g a r d l e s s of who was i n power, because v o l u n t a r y c o - o p e r a t i o n from the kulaks was not producing enough g r a i n . While Nove does not imply t h a t the eve n t u a l l e a d e r , S t a l i n , was a necessary consequence of Bolshevism, c e r t a i n aspects of S t a l i n i s m , l i k e f o r c e d c o l l e c t i v i z a t i o n , was necessary i n p r i n c i p l e . 2 1 Throughout the l a t t e r h a l f of the 1920s the ku l a k s , although d e c l i n i n g i n number r e l a t i v e t o newly c r e a t e d middle-peasants, were s t i l l the most p r o d u c t i v e peasants. But the mutually imcompatible o b j e c t i v e s of e l i m i n a t i n g the kulaks as a c l a s s s of peasants and pursuing a t o l e r a n t a g r i c u l t u r a l 106 p o l i c y to i n c r e a s e t o t a l food output, l e d to wide p o l i c y swings between r e p r e s s i o n and t o l e r a n c e of kulaks duing t h i s p e r i o d . 2 2 The t r a g i c aftermath of S t a l i n ' s f o r c e d c o l l e c t i v i z a t i o n was a v i c i o u s c i r c l e of r e p r e s s i o n : the coerced c o l l e c t i v i z a t i o n , meant to i n c r e a s e food s u p p l i e s d r a m a t i c a l l y , l e d to reduced h a r v e s t s ; reduced food s u p p l i e s l e d to decreased l i v i n g standards and shortages i n the c i t i e s ; shortages p r e c i p i t a t e d more r u t h l e s s enforcement of S t a l i n ' s "emergency measures"; the i n c r e a s e d c o e r c i v e a u t h o r i t y of the p o l i c e s t a t e l e d to c e n s o r s h i p and d i s i n f o r m a t i o n which, among other t h i n g , exacerbated the food s h o r t a g e . 2 3 In h i s book, Children of the Arbat, A n a t o l i i Rybakov p a i n t s a d e t a i l e d p i c t u r e of S t a l i n ' s paranoid f i x a t i o n with a b s o l u t e power. In a d i c t a t i o n t o N i k o l a i Yezhov, successor t o G.G. Yagoda as head of the NKVD (the forerunner of the KGB), S t a l i n a r t i c u l a t e d the need f o r absolute P a r t y c o n t r o l over the economy: The i n d u s t r i a l machine i s changing from a S o v i e t machine i n t o a t e c h n o c r a t i c machine. A grave danger!...The t e c h n o c r a t i c machine i s s t r i v i n g f o r economic supremacy, and i t i s one of the fundamental t r u t h s of Marxism t h a t economic supremacy i s p o l i t i c a l supremacy. We cannot a l l o w the economic, and hence the p o l i t i c a l , supremacy of the technocracy, as i t would mean the end of the d i c t a t o r s h i p of the p r o l e t a r i a t . . . . What does t h i s s i g n i f y ? T h i s s i g n i f i e s t h a t the t e c h n o c r a t i c machine f e e l s i t s e l f to be beyond c o n t r o l and beyond r e p r o a c h . . . [ C l o n t r o l of the economic machine must be c a r r i e d out a t the e q u i v a l e n t P a r t y l e v e l . The P a r t y machine must c o n t r o l a l l the country's a d m i n i s t r a t i o n s , i n c l u d i n g the economic and above a l l the i n d u s t r i a l machine, which has a t i t s d i s p o s a l the most dependent, most educated and most arrogant personnel ( i t a l i c s i n o r i g i n a l ) . 2 - * As our d i s c u s s i o n of the agrotown and sovnarkhoz campaigns has shown, Khrushchev eschewed the t e r r o r i s t i c a s p e c t s of S t a l i n i s m but d i d not reform the S t a l i n i s t system. Gorbachev i s c l e a r l y unique among post-war S o v i e t reformers because he r e c o g n i z e s t h a t Lenin's economic reform was betrayed by S t a l i n ' s tyranny. The 'Cult of P e r s o n a l i t y ' An i n t e g r a l p a r t of S t a l i n ' s v i s i o n of h i m s e l f and p u r s u i t of a b s o l u t e c o n t r o l was h i s need to present h i m s e l f not o n l y as Le n i n ' s successor but as Lenin's only legitimate heir. Because he was on l y a minor r e v o l u t i o n a r y i n the years l e a d i n g up to the r e v o l u t i o n , S t a l i n embarked upon a conscious p l a n to f a l s i f y h i s t o r y t o present t h i s image. As Robert Tucker e x p l a i n s , i [ s l i n c e there was no formal o f f i c e of vozhd' [supreme l e a d e r ] . . . t h e o n l y way i n which S t a l i n c o u l d f i n a l l y e s t a b l i s h and c o n s o l i d a t e h i m s e l f i n the successor r o l e was to g a i n g e n e r a l p a r t y r e c o g n i t i o n i n i t . To be the supreme leader he had to be p u b l i c l y acknowledged and acclaimed as such. A f u r t h e r major move was c a l l e d f o r i n the p o l i t i c s of b i o g r a p h y — a c e l e b r a t i o n of S t a l i n as p a r t y c h i e f . 2 S T h i s p o l i c y of s e l f - a c c l a m a t i o n was the beginning of a f u l l - f l e d g e d c u l t of p e r s o n a l i t y , a development which became a f e a t u r e of l e a d e r s h i p throughout the p e r i o d of reformed S t a l i n i s m . As an a r t i c l e i n L i t e r a t u r n a y a Gazeta r e c e n t l y r e p o r t e d , "the S o v i e t Union had endured not j u s t one c u l t of 108 p e r s o n a l i t y , but s e v e r a l , i n c l u d i n g the p e r i o d s of N i k i t a S. Khrushchev and Leonid I. B rezhnev." 2 6 A concommitant of the c u l t of p e r s o n a l i t y was the l e a d e r ' s f e a r of c h a l l e n g e s to h i s a u t h o r i t y . Because S t a l i n and h i s s u c c e s s o r s s u f f e r e d from a c r i s i s of p o l i t i c a l l e g i t i m a c y , the S t a l i n i s t s t y l e of l e a d e r s h i p i n c l u d e d the d e n i g r a t i o n and removal of people of i n t e l l i g e n c e and a b i l i t y from governing apparatus i n favour of b l i n d l y obedient l o y a l i s t s . S e r g e i K i r o v and N i k o l a i Bukharin were but two of the i n t e l l i g e n t , popular P a r t y members of the f i r s t rank t h a t were executed on S t a l i n ' s orders because they d i d not subordinate themselves to S t a l i n ' s w i l l , and who knew the d i f f e r e n c e between h i s t o r i c a l t r u t h and S t a l i n ' s f a l s i f i e d v e r s i o n of h i s p a s t . They were r e p l a c e d by r e l i a b l e yes-men l i k e Kliment V o r o s h i l o v , Lazar Kaganovich, and G e o r g i i Malenkov. 2 T We saw i n Chapter II how Khrushchev surrounded h i m s e l f with l o y a l people of poor q u a l i t i t y , and how Brezhnev crowded out the r e f o r m i s t Kosygin element a f t e r 13 y e a r s . Where the l e a d e r s h i p under L e n i n was meant to serve the P a r t y , under S t a l i n communist id e o l o g y degenerated i n t o a dogma which h e l d as the h i g h e s t v i r t u e the a p o t h e o s i s of the leader and the " j u s t i f i c a t i o n of the b u r e a u c r a t i c - d i c t a t o r i a l system" of government. 2 0 Glasnost and d e - S t a l i n i z a t i o n Gorbachev's candour about the past and h i s i n n o v a t i o n s i n f o r e i g n p o l i c y may a l s o be sourced to an e a r l i e r reform. But u n l i k e economic reform, the antecedent here i s mainly Khrushchev, not L e n i n . Since I mentioned i n the i n t r o d u c t i o n t h a t a l l p o s t - S t a l i n reform i s e s s e n t i a l l y d e - S t a l i n i z a t i o n , and s i n c e S t a l i n f o l l o w e d L e n i n , i t i s to Khrushchev, the f i r s t p o s t - S t a l i n i s t reformer, t h a t glasnost about the S o v i e t Union and i t s h i s t o r y must be t r a c e d . T h i s t h e s i s has d e a l t a t l e n g t h with the the reasons why Khrushchev was not t o t a l l y forthcoming about S t a l i n and t h i s d i s c u s s i o n w i l l not be repeated here, but i t must be noted t h a t the opening of the S o v i e t past t h a t Khrushchev s t a r t e d i s the reason why Gorbachev has accomplished as much as he has. Gorbachev has s u c c e s s f u l l y employed glasnost to f o s t e r "the beginning of a p o l i t i c a l debate over the f u t u r e of the S o v i e t s y s t e m " 2 9 by r e l a x i n g c o n t r o l s i n areas not c r i t i c a l t o P a r t y l e g i t i m a c y . Most of a l l , Gorbachev has succeeded i n r e i n t r o d u c i n g debate and r a t i o n a l i t y i n t o areas p r e v i o u s l y c o n s i d e r e d s a c r o s a n c t : S t a l i n ' s m i l i t a r y l e a d e r s h i p , h i s p r i s o n camps, and the p r i v i l e g e s of the P a r t y e l i t e . 3 0 But such c r i t i c i s m i s not remarkable i n i t s e l f : c r i t i c i s m r e g a r d i n g S t a l i n and p a r t y p r i v i l e g e s has e x i s t e d openly t o v a r y i n g degrees ever s i n c e Khrushchev denounced S t a l i n i n h i s 1956 Secret Speech. One notable aspect of glasnost i s the speed with which the bounds of a l l o w a b l e c r i t i c i s m are being extended. In p u b l i c a t i o n s , the myth of S t a l i n has almost been e n t i r e l y exploded. An a r t i c l e i n the magazine Znamya has now d e s c r i b e d S t a l i n i s m as "perver t e d Communism" and " c o u n t e r r e v o l u t i o n . " Bukharin i s now o f f i c i a l l y r e c o g n i z e d as Lenin's t r u e h e i r . 3 1 Even L e n i n and the p e r i o d of War Communism, h e r e t o f o r e untouchable, i s now w i t h i n the bounds of a l l o w a b l e c r i t i c i s m . 3 2 However, t h i s i s l e s s a c r i t i c i s m of Lenin's l e a d e r s h i p than an i n d i r e c t s l a p at S t a l i n who r e v i v e d the p o l i c i e s of War Communism. In f o r e i g n p o l i c y , i t i s the d e c l i n e of the S o v i e t system, the achievement of m i l i t a r y p a r i t y with the United S t a t e s , and estrangement from S t a l i n i s m t h a t has allowed Gorbachev t o be bo l d and i n n o v a t i v e . Where Khrushchev spoke of f o r c i n g the West to re c o g n i z e a 'new r e a l i t y ' , Gorbachev's f o r e i g n p o l i c y i s based upon "an o r i e n t a t i o n toward d i a l o g u e and mutual u n d e r s t a n d i n g . " 3 3 Gorbachev recog n i z e d the need f o r a new a t t i t u d e i n h i s r e p o r t to the 27th P a r t y Congress: Changes i n present-day world development are so profound and s i g n i f i c a n t t h a t they r e q u i r e the r e i n t e r p r e t a t i o n and comprehensive a n a l y s i s of a l l i t s f a c t o r s . The s i t u a t i o n of nucl e a r c o n f r o n t a t i o n nakes necessary new approaches, methods and forms of r e l a t i o n s h i p s among d i f f e r e n t s o c i a l systems, s t a t e s and regions. 3" 4 Gorbachev's s t r u c t u r a l economic reforms, h i s c r i t i c i s m of S t a l i n i s m , and h i s d r i v e f o r a ' p s y c h o l o g i c a l r e s t r u c t u r i n g ' should be seen as the c o n t i n u a t i o n of the dynamic s p i r i t of Khrushchev's reforms t h a t was a r r e s t e d by Brezhnev. But r a t h e r t h a t simply c o n t i n u i n g reform i n the Khrushchevian s t y l e , Gorbachev has added the pragmatism of the NEP p e r i o d , p a r t i c u l a r l y i n the r e c o g n i t i o n t h a t the Communist P a r t y cannot run the country by i t s e l f and must e n l i s t the a i d of the S o v i e t people. As Seweryn B i a l e r notes, "Gorbachev r e a l i z e s t h a t the S o v i e t Union's systemic c r i s i s i s not p r i m a r i l y economic but s o c i a l and p o l i t i c a l — even moral, e t h i c a l and e x i s t e n t i a l . Economic backwardness and d e c l i n e are symptoms of a deeper m a l a i s e . 3 5 5 Pezestzoika i s s u p e r i o r to d e - S t a l i n i z a t i o n as much because of h i s t o r i c a l circumstance as any s u b s t a n t i v e p o l i c y d i f f e r e n c e s . Gorbachev's r e t u r n to L e n i n i s t p r i n c i p l e s e f f e c t i v e l y ends the p e r i o d of reformed S t a l i n i s m . Gorbachev's over t s e l f - i d e n t i f i c a t i o n with Bukharin and the NEP and comprehensive a s s a u l t on S t a l i n and h i s myth may be seen as an attempt to give h i s l e a d e r s h i p the l e g i t i m a c y t h a t Khrushchev and Brezhnev l a c k e d . T h e r e i n l i e s the uniqueness of p e r e s t r o i k a . NOTES TO INTRODUCTION 01. Stephen Cohen, R e t h i n k i n g The S o v i e t Experience (New York: Oxford U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s , 1985), p. 129. 02. Timothy J . C o l t o n , The Dilemma of Reform i n the S o v i e t Union (New York: C o u n c i l on F o r e i g n R e l a t i o n s P r e s s , 1986), pp. 167-8. 03. Fyodor I. Kushnirsky, "The L i m i t s of S o v i e t Economic Reform," Problems of Communism, (July-August, 19 84) p. 33. 04. Cohen, p. 138. 05. R i c h a r d Lowenthal, "The R e v o l u t i o n Withers Away,11 Problems of Communism (January-February 1965), V o l . 14 p. 78. 06. Cohen, p. 154. 07. Seweryn B i a l e r and Joan A f f e r i c a , "Gorbachev's Preference For Technocrats," New York Times (11 February, 1986) p. 31. T h i s a r t i c l e i s adapted from a longer essay which appeared i n F o r e i g n A f f a i r s — A m e r i c a and the World, 1986. 08. M i k h a i l S. Gorbachev, " P o l i t i c a l Report of the CPSU C e n t r a l Committee t o the 27th Congress of the Communist P a r t y of the S o v i e t Union" (25 February, 1986) t r a n s l a t e d i n Current D i g e s t of the S o v i e t Press ( V o l . 38, No. 8.), p. 23. 09. N i c o l a s Berdyaev, The O r i g i n s of Russian Communism (Ann Arbor: U n i v e r s i t y of Michigan P r e s s , 1972), p. 113. 10. D i m i t r i Simes "Gorbachev: A New F o r e i g n P o l i c y , " F o r e i g n A f f a i r s ( V o l . 65 No. 3), p. 479; and "Democracy i n Russia? Don't Hold Your Breath", Los Angeles Times r e p r i n t e d i n the Vancouver Sun (12 February, 1987), p. B5. 11. R i c h a r d P i p e s , "Can the S o v i e t Union Reform?" F o r e i g n A f f a i r s ( V o l . 63 No. 1), p. 56. The quote r e f e r r e d s p e c i f i c a l l y t o change i n Gorbachev's f o r e i g n p o l i c y but may be g e n e r a l l y a p p l i e d t o change i n the S o v i e t Union. See a l s o Robert Conquest "The Human Righ t s Issue" i n Robert Conquest e t . a l . , Defending America (New York: B a s i c Books, 1977). For a r e c e n t a r t i c u l a t i o n of t h i s view see former S e c r e t a r y of State Alexander Haig, "Haig Says Russia Seeks Accord From Weakness", New York Times (4 December, 1987), p. 15. 12. P i p e s , F o r e i g n A f f a i r s , p. 57. 13. Cohen, pp. 134-5, 36. The quote i s from page 136. 14. Zhores A. Medvedev, Gorbachev (New York: W.W. Norton, 1986), p. 183. 15. J e r r y Hough, "Russians Erase Some C r a z i n e s s from the Past," Los Angeles Times r e p r i n t e d i n the Vancouver Sun (28 January, 1986), p. B5. 16. George W i l l , "Ivan X: Jogger Maybe", Washington Post r e p r i n t e d i n The Morning A f t e r (New York: The Free P r e s s , 1986) , pp. 336-8. 17. M i c h e l Tatu "Gorbachev—A K r u s h c h e v t s i c ] and a Dubcek Combined", Le Monde i n Manchester Guardian Weekly (1 March, 1987) , p. 15. NOTES TO CHAPTER I 01. Benjamin S. Lambeth, Trends in Soviet Military Policy (Santa Monica: RAND P-6819 October, 1982), pp. 8-9; D i m i t r i Simes, "Deterrence and C o e r c i o n i n S o v i e t P o l i c y " , International Security ( V o l . 5, No. 3, Winter, 1980-81), p. 103. 02. Strobe T a l b o t t , Deadly Gambits (New York: A l f r e d A. Knopf, 1984), p. 206. 03. James M. McConnell, " S h i f t s i n S o v i e t Views on the Proper Focus of M i l i t a r y Development", World Politics ( V o l . 37, No. 3, A p r i l , 1985), p. 341. 04. Lambeth, p. 8. 05. Time, 18 November, 1957, p. 30. 06. Arkady Shevchenko, Breaking With Moscow (New York: A l f r e d A. Knopff, 1985), p. 93. 07. I b i d . , p. 101. 08. I b i d . , pp. 101-2. 09. I b i d . , p. 102. 10. Edward Crankshaw, Khrushchev: A Career (New York: V i k i n g , 1966), p. 192. 11. A l e c Nove, An Economic History of the USSR (London: Penguin, 1969), p. 330. 12. Zbigniew B r z e z i n s k i , "The S o v i e t P o l i t i c a l System: Transformation or Degeneration", Problems of Communism Vol.15 (January-February 1966), p. 4. 13. Crankshaw, Khrushchev, pp. 195-6. 14. N i k i t a S. Khrushchev, Khrushchev Remembers e d i t e d and t r a n s l a t e d by Strobe T a l b o t t with commentary by Edward Crankshaw (Boston: L i t t l e , Brown, 1970), pp. 43-4; and Khrushchev, The Last Testament (Boston: L i t t l e , Brown, 1974), p. 325. 15. Roy and Zhores Medvedev, Khrushchev; The Years in Power (New York: Columbia U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s , 1976), pp. 19-20. 16. Crankshaw, Khrushchev, p. 185. 17. I b i d . 18. Condoleezza R i c e , "Defence and S e c u r i t y " i n M a r t i n McCauley ed. The S o v i e t Union Under Gorbachev (London: U n i v e r s i t y of London Press, 1987), p. 193. 19. Joseph L. Nogee and Robert H. Donaldson, S o v i e t F o r e i g n P o l i c y Since World War I I (Oxford: Pergammon, 1985), p. 161. 20. R i c e , i n McCauley ed., p. 193. 21. c i t e d i n Paul Kennedy, "What Gorbachev i s Up A g a i n s t " , Atlantic (June, 1987), p. 43. 22. Bruce P a r r o t t , The Soviet Union And Ballistic Missile Defense (Boulder: Westview P r e s s , 1987), p. 45. 23. Business Week (7 December, 1987), p. 76. 24. F. Stephen Larrabee amd A l l e n Lynch, "Gorbachev: The Road to R e y k j a v i k " , F o r e i g n Policy, No.65 (Winter 1986-87), p. 25. There have been "sharp and open c l a s h e s " between the c i v i l i a n and m i l i t a r y l e a d e r s h i p over the a l l o c a t i o n of funds f o r r e s e a r c h and development. ( P a r r o t t , p. 49, and McConnell op c i t ) . 25. R i c e , i n McCauley ed., p. 203. 26. B i l l K e l l e r , "Moscow Declares I t s Aim Is To Leave A f g h a n i s t a n " , New York Times (7 January, 1988), pp. 1,6. 27. see New York Times, v a r i o u s a r t i c l e s . 28. see Table 1, Chapter IV. 29. Timothy J . C o l t o n , The Dilemma of Reform in the Soviet Union (New York: C o u n c i l on F o r e i g n R e l a t i o n s P r e s s , 1986), pp. 25-6. 30. I b i d . , p. 25. 31. M a r s h a l l I. Goldman, The USSR in Crisis: The Failure of an Economic System (New York: W.W. Norton, 1983), p. 72. 32. C o l t o n , p. 21. 33. Zhores Medvedev, Gorbachev (New York: W.W. Norton, 1986), pp. 112, 113-14. 34. I b i d . , p. 114. 35. I b i d . 36. I b i d . 37. Khrushchev, Documents I I , p. 30; Shevchenko, p. 103. 38. Larrabee and Lynch, F o r e i g n P o l i c y , p. 22. 39. Crankshaw, Khrushchev, p. 221. 40. N i k i t a S. Khrushchev, Speech to the 22nd Party Congress, t r a n s l a t e d i n Documents of the 22nd Party Congress of the CPSU Report on the Program of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union V o l II (New York: C r o s s c u r r e n t s P r e s s , 1961), p. 33. ( H e r e a f t e r , Documents II and Documents I f o r Volume I) . 41. Khrushchev, Khrushchev Remembers, p. 15. 42. V a l e r i e Bunce, Do New Leaders Make A Difference? ( P r i n c e t o n : U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s , 1981), p. 198. 43. Nogee and Donaldson, p. 106. 44. Crankshaw, pp. 218-9. 45. McConnell, World Politics, p. 320. 46. Crankshaw, Khrushchev, p. 219; Nogee and Donaldson, pp. 27-8, 110. 47. R i c h a r d H a r r i t y and Ralph G. M a r t i n , "Khrushchev: The Red R i d d l e " Look (19 November, 1963), p. 36. 48. Khrushchev, Khrushchev Remembers, pp. 43-4, and Khrushchev, The Last Testament, p. 547. 49. Medvedev and Medvedev, pp. 130-3. 50. Khrushchev, Khrushchev Remembers, p. 32. 51. I b i d . , pp. 236-7. 52. Crankshaw, Khrushchev, pp. 174-75. 53. I b i d . , p. 181. 54. I b i d . , p. 190. 55. I b i d . , p. 193. 56. M i k h a i l S. Gorbachev, " P o l i t i c a l Report of the CPSU C e n t r a l Committee to the 27th Congress of the Communist P a r t y of the S o v i e t Union" (25 February, 1986) t r a n s l a t e d i n Current D i g e s t of the S o v i e t Press ( V o l . 38, No. 8.) ( h e r e a f t e r c i t e d as Report),p. 4. 57. Zhores Medvedev, Gorbachev, pp. 22-6. 58. I b i d . , pp. 32-5. 59. I b i d . , p. 43. 60. I b i d . 61. I b i d . , pp. 63-5. 62. I b i d . , pp. 57-8; 62-3. 63. C o l t o n , p. 77. 64. I b i d . , p. 156. 65. I b i d . , pp. 156-7. 66. I b i d . , p. 157. 67. Larrabee and Lynch, F o r e i g n P o l i c y , pp. 10-11. For other changes i n personnel see pp. 11-13 and Brown, F o r e i g n A f f a i r s , pp. 1049-55. 68. P h i l i p Taubman, " A r c h i t e c t of S o v i e t Change", New York Times (10 J u l y , 1987),pp. 25-7. 69. Khrushchev, Documents II, pp. I l l , 133. 70. Gorbachev, Report, p. 12; see a l s o A n a t o l y Dobrynin, nGlavnaya Sotsial'naya Sila Sovremennosti", Kommunist No.16 (November, 1986), p. 18. 71. Khrushchev, Documents I, p. 167 see p a r t 3, chapter 2 g e n e r a l l y . 72. I b i d . , Documents I I , pp. 175, 6, 8. 73. I b i d . , pp. 177, 9. 74. Gorbachev, Report, pp. 24, 25, 39. NOTES TO CHAPTER II 01. Stephen Cohen, R e t h i n k i n g the S o v i e t Experience (New York: Oxford U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s , 1985), p. 12. 02. George W. B r e s l a u e r , Khrushchev and Brezhnev as Leaders: B u i l d i n g A u t h o r i t y i n S o v i e t P o l i t i c s (London: A l l e n & Unwin, 1982), p. 32. 03. Pravda (12 March, 1985), c i t e d i n C o l t o n , p. 161. 04. Seweryn B i a l e r , "Gorbachev's Move", F o r e i g n P o l i c y No.68 ( F a l l 1987), p. 66. 05. Timothy J . C o l t o n , The Dilemma of Reform in the Soviet Union (New York: C o u n c i l on F o r e i g n R e l a t i o n s P r e s s , 1986), pp. 132-3. 06. George W. B r e s l a u e r , Khrushchev and Brezhnev as Leaders: B u i l d i n g A u t h o r i t y i n S o v i e t Politics (London: A l l e n & Unwin, 1982), p. 59. 07. B r e s l a u e r , Khrushchev and Brezhnev, p. 26. 08. I b i d . 09. Merle F a i n s o d , "Khrushchevism i n Re t r o s p e c t " Problems of Communism, (January-February 19 65) p. 4. 10. R i c h a r d Lowenthal, "The Kremlin's D i f f i c u l t Choice" A t l a n t i c , ( A p r i l , 1965) p. 77. 11. N i k i t a S. Khrushchev, Khrushchev Remembers e d i t e d and t r a n s l a t e d by Strobe T a l b o t t with commentary by Edward Crankshaw (Boston: L i t t l e , Brown, 1970), p. 74. 12. Cohen, pp. 115-6. 13. I b i d . , p. 115. 14. R i c h a r d H a r r i t y and Ralph G. M a r t i n , "Khrushchev: The Red R i d d l e " Look, (19 November, 1963) p. 44. 15. H a r r i t y and M a r t i n , pp. 36-9. 16. Roy and Zhores Medvedev, Khrushchev: The Years i n Power (New York: Columbia U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s , 1976), p. 67. 17. S e c r e t Speech reproduced i n N i k i t a Khrushchev, Khrushchev Remembers, pp. 574, 590, 597-8, 600. 18. N i k i t a Khrushchev, Report to the 22nd Party Congress r e p r i n t e d and t r a n s l a t e d i n Documents of the 22nd Congress of the CPSU Vol. I, (New York: C r o s s c u r r e n t s P r e s s , 1963) chapters 9-10. 19. Khrushchev, Khrushchev Remembers, p. 350. see a l s o Crankshaw 1s f o o t n o t e . 20. Edward Crankshaw, i n t r o d u c t i o n to Chapter 3, P a r t 2, Khrushchev Remembers, p. 75. 21. Cohen, p. 280. 22. Cohen, p. 281. 23. Robert G. K a i s e r "The S o v i e t Pretense", F o r e i g n A f f a i r s Vol.65 No.2 (Winter 1986-87), p. 243. 24. "Otvety M.S. Gorbacheva na Voprosi Gazety 'Yumanite'", Kommunist Vol.3, No.1283 (February 1986), p. 19. 25. I b i d . 26. Slyunkov i s Gorbachev's Yazov i s the Defence M i n i s t e r . c h i e f economic planner; and 27. The essence of S t a l i n ' s b r u t a l i t y was known i n c o n s i d e r a b l e d e t a i l even d u r i n g Khrushchev's time. In h i s memoirs, Khrushchev wrote, J u s t before the Twentieth P a r t y Congress I summoned the State P r o s e c u t o r , Comrade Rudenko, who had been i n v o l v e d i n many of the cases d u r i n g the purges of the t h i r t i e s . I asked him, "Comrade Rudenko, I'm i n t e r e s t e d i n the open t r i a l s . T e l l me, how much b a s i s i n a c t u a l f a c t was there f o r the a c c u s a t i o n s a g a i n s t Bukharin, Rykov, S y r t s o v , Lominadze, K r e s t i n s k y , and many, many other people known to the C e n t r a l Committee, to the Orgbureau, and to the P o l i t b u r o ? " Comrade Rudenko answered t h a t from a standpont of j u d i c i a l norms, there was no evidence whatsoever f o r condemning or even t r y i n g those men. The case f o r p r o s e c u t i n g them had been based on p e r s o n a l c o n f e s s i o n s beaten out of them under i 19 p h y s i c a l and p s y c h o l o g i c a l t o r t u r e , and c o n f e s s i o n s e x t r a c t e d by such means are unacceptable as a l e g i t i m a t e b a s i s f o r b r i n g i n g someone to t r i a l (p.74). 28. M i k h a i l Gorbachev, "Oktyabz i Pezestzoika: Revolyutsiya Pzodolzhayetsya", Pravda (3 November, 19 87), p. 2. 29. Gorbachev, Pravda (3 November, 1987), p. 2. 30. P h i l i p Taubman, " S o v i e t Panel C l e a r s Bukharin, 50 Years A f t e r His E x e c u t i o n " , New Yozk Times (6 February, 1988), pp. 1,5. In June, the c o n v i c t i o n s of Lev Kamenev and G r i g o r i i Z i n o v i e v were a l s o overturned. B i l l K e l l e r , "Court V i n d i c a t e s 2 S t a l i n V i c t i m s Who Were A l l i e s of L e n i n ' s " , New York Times (14 June, 1988), p. 6. 31. I b i d . 32. B i l l K e l l e r , "Reporter's Notebook: Search For Outer L i m i t s of 'Glasnost'", New Yozk Times (13 August, 1987), pp. 1, 5. 33. Joseph L. Nogee and Robert H. Donaldson, S o v i e t F o r e i g n Policy Since Wozld War I I (Oxford: Pergammon, 1985), p. 39. 34. Cohen, p. 145. 35. T.H. Rigby, Communist P a r t y Membership i n the USSR 1917-1967 ( P r i n c e t o n : U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s , 1968), p. 217. The speeches were d e l i v e r e d i n B y e l o r u s s i a , the Ukraine, and Georgia; note 1, p. 297. 36. Rigby, pp. 202-3. 37. Zbigniew B r z e z i n s k i , "The S o v i e t P o l i t i c a l System: Transformation or Degeneration" Pzoblems of Communism V o l . 15 (January-February 1966), p. 4; L i f e (23 October, 1964), p. 40. 38. B r e s l a u e r , Khzushchev and Bzezhnev, p. 57. 39. B r e s l a u e r , Khzushchev and Bzezhnev, p. 127. 40. Edward Crankshaw, Khzushchev: A Career (New York: V i k i n g , 1966), p. 189. 41. Lowenthal, Atlantic, p. 81. 42. B r e s l a u e r , Khzushchev and Bzezhnev, p. 35. 43. George W. B r e s l a u e r , "Khrushchev Reconsidered" Problems of Communism Vol.25 (September-October 1976), p. 23. 44. Cohen, p. 145. 45. Lowenthal, Problems of Communism, p. 12. 46. N i k i t a S. Khrushchev, Speech to the 2 2 n d Party Congress, t r a n s l a t e d i n Documents of the 2 2 n d Party Congress of the CPSU Report on the Program of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union V o l II (New York: C r o s s c u r r e n t s P r e s s , 1961), pp. 172-83. ( H e r e a f t e r , Documents I I and Documents I f o r Volume I ) . 47. Arkady N. Shevchenko, Br e a k i n g With Moscow (New York: A l f r e d A. Knopf, 1985), pp. 125-6. 48. Khrushchev, Documents I I , pp. 124-5. 49. I b i d . , p. 177. 50. B r e s l a u e r , Problems of Communism, p. 26; Medvedev and Medvedev, p. 152. 51. W i l l i a m Hyland and Richard Wallace Shryock, The Fall of Khrushchev (New York: Funk & Wagnalls, 1968), p. 194. 52. J e r r y Hough, "A Harebrained • Scheme i n R e t r o s p e c t " , Problems of Communism Vol.14 (January-February 1965), p. 28. 53. Barbara Ann C h o t i n e r , Khrushchev's P a r t y Reform (C o n n e c t i c u t : Greenwood Press,1985), p. 277. 54. I b i d . , p. 273. 55. Hough, Problems of Communism, p. 31. 56. Medvedev and Medvedev, pp. 156-7. 57. Hyland and Shryock, p. 273; C h o t i n e r , p. 273. 58. C h o t i n e r , p. 276. 59. B r e s l a u e r , Khrushchev and Brezhnev, p. 131. 60. B i a l e r , F o r e i g n P o l i c y , pp. 69-70. 61. E x c e r p t s From the S o v i e t Proposals, d i s t r i b u t e d and t r a n s l a t e d by TASS, c i t e d i n New York Times (27 May, 1988), p. 8. 62. P h i l i p Taubman, " S o v i e t Moves to C u r t a i l Communist Pa r t y ' s Power", New York Times (27 May, 1988), pp. 1, 8. 63. M i k h a i l S. Gorbachev, " P o l i t i c a l Report of the CPSU C e n t r a l Committee to the 27th Congress of the Communist P a r t y of the S o v i e t Union" (25 February, 1986) t r a n s l a t e d i n Current D i g e s t of the S o v i e t Press ( V o l . 38, No. 8.), ( h e r e a f t e r c i t e d as Report) p. 24. 64. Theodore Shabad, " S o v i e t Competitive B a l l o t Set For June", New York Times (15 A p r i l , 1987), p. 6. 65. D i m i t r i Simes, "Democracy i n Russia? Don't Hold Your Breath", Los Angeles Times r e p r i n t e d i n Vancouver Sun (12 February, 1987), p. B5. 66. M i k h a i l S. Gorbachev, "Speech to the C e n t r a l Committee", excerpted i n New York Times (28 January, 1987), p. 4. 67. Gorbachev, Report, p. 26. 68. P h i l i p Taubman, "Gorbachev Urges Armenians To End N a t i o n a l i s t F u r o r " , New York Times (27 February, 1988), p. 6. 69. B i a l e r , F o r e i g n P o l i c y , p. 74. 70. Seweryn B i a l e r and Joan A f f e r i c a , "Gorbachev's Preference For Technocrats", New York Times (11 February, 1986) p. 31. 71. I b i d . , p. 70. 72. Ligachev i s the C e n t r a l Committee S e c r e t a r y o v e r s e e i n g i d e o l o g y and p a r t y o r g a n i z a t i o n ; Ryzhkov i s the Chairman of the C o u n c i l of M i n i s t e r s , the Prime M i n i s t e r ; Chebrikov i s head of the State S e c u r i t y Apparatus, the K.G.B.; Vorotn i k o v i s the Chairman of the Russian R e p u b l i c ; and Zaikov has the r a r e d i s t i n c t i o n of h o l d i n g two p o r t f o l i o s - - S e c r e t a r y f o r the m i l i t a r y & p o l i c e s e c t o r and economic c o - o r d i n a t i o n as w e l l as head of the Moscow c i t y apparatus. The l a t t e r post came to him a f t e r B o r i s Y e l t s i n was dismissed from the P o l i t b u r o , and subsequently from the C e n t r a l Committee, f o r c r i t i c a l remarks aimed a t Gorbachev and o t h e r s , (see below). 73. C o l t o n , p. 162. 74. P h i l i p Taubman, "Gorbachev and Ligachev, His Deputy, D i f f e r i n Ways Both Subtle and B l u n t " , New York Times (12 June, 1987), p. 5. 75. Yegor K. Ligachev, i n t e r v i e w with Le Monde (4 December, 1987) , pp. 1, 6. 76. Taubman, New York Times (12 June, 1987), p. 5. 77. Mathias Rust was the West German teenager who v i o l a t e d S o v i e t a i r s p a c e and landed i n Red Square unhindered. The embarrassment to the S o v i e t Union bred a thorough shake-up of the m i l i t a r y and earned Rust 4 years of penal s e r v i t u d e i n a p r i s o n camp. There i s s p e c u l a t i o n t h a t Gorbachev w i l l grant him a pardon before h i s sentence i s completed. See, fo r example, New York Times (31 May; 1 June; 2 September, 1987). 78. Robert C. Toth, "Ousters Over F l i g h t Seen R e f l e c t i n g S o v i e t Tension", Los Angeles Times (2 June, 1987), p. 1. Sokolov's f i r i n g r e p r e s e n t s o n l y one of s e v e r a l removals of Brezhnev-era c o n s e r v a t i v e s : i n January 1987, Kazakh p a r t y c h i e f Dinmukhamed Kunayev was e x p e l l e d from the C e n t r a l Committee; i n October, 1987 F i r s t Deputy Prime M i n i s t e r Geidar A l i e v , a lukewarm supporter of p e r e s t r o i k a , was removed from the P o l i t b u r o . The o n l y remaining holdovers from Brezhnev's time, besides Gorbachev, are P r e s i d e n t Andrei Gromyko, U k r a i n i a n P a r t y c h i e f V l a d i m i r S h c h e r b i t s k i i , and the C h i e f of the P a r t y C o n t r o l Commission, M i k h a i l Solomentsev. With t h i s removal of ' c o n s e r v a t i v e ' o p p o s i t i o n , Gorbachev has brought supporters i n t o key p o s i t i o n s . In June 1987, the C e n t r a l Committee approved three Gorbachev proteges f o r f u l l membership i n the P o l i t b u r o : Aleksandr Yakovlev, N i k o l a i Slyunkov, and V i k t o r Nikonov. A d d i t i o n a l l y , Defence M i n i s t e r D m i t r i Yazov was named a non-v o t i n g , or candidate, member to r e p l a c e Sokolov. P h i l i p Taubman, "Gorbachev P o l i c y Gains As Three A l l i e s Advance i n P a r t y " , New York Times (27 June, 1987), pp. 1, 5. On 18 February 1988, Gorbachev added two more a l l i e s to non-voting s t a t u s i n the P o l i t b u r o : Georgi P. Razumovski, an a g r i c u l t u r e expert with a long a s s o c i a t i o n with Gorbachev, and Y u r i D. Maslyukov, an experienced manager i n the defence i n d u s t r y . F e l i c i t y Barranger, " S o v i e t Ousts Y e l t s i n From R u l i n g Body," New York Times (19 February, 1988), p. 4. 79. P h i l i p Taubman, "A Challenge to Gorbachev i s Linked to Summit Delay", New York Times (30 October, 1987), pp. 1, 4. 80. W i l l i a m S a f i r e , "The Abuse of H i s t o r y " , New York Times (4 November, 1987), p. 29. 81. B i a l e r , F o r e i g n Policy, p. 64. 82. P h i l i p Taubman, "An E l e c t i o n i n Moscow Sput t e r s Out", New York Times (29 May, 1987), p. 3. 83. Gorbachev, Report, p. 15. 84. Serge Schmemann, "Moscow i n a Thaw, Awaits L i t e r a r y Bombshell", New York Times (31 October, 1986), pp. 1,7. 85. " S t a l i n A l t e r e d F i g u r e s to Hide Famine Deaths, Magazine Says", Vancouver Sun (24 December, 1987), p. H8. 86. B i l l K e l l e r , " S o v i e t A c t o r s Struggle As Unpersons Return", New York Times (24 December, 1987), p. 16. 87. B r e s l a u e r , Khrushchev and Bzezhnev, p. 130. 88. George W. B r e s l a u e r , "Khrushchev Reconsidered", Problems of Communism (September-October 1976), p. 25. 89. N i k i t a Khrushchev, "Address to T h i r d W r i t e r s Congress" 22 May, 1959, t r a n s l a t e d i n Current D i g e s t of the Soviet Press ( V o l . 11, No. 21), pp. 1, 28-9. 90. see New York Times 10 May, p. 7; 19 May, p. 6; 24 May, 1988 pp. 1, 8. 91. B i l l K e l l e r , "Pieces to a S o v i e t P u z z l e " , New York Times (20 May, 1988), pp. 1, 4. 92. B i l l K e l l e r , "For New S o v i e t Clubs, Democracy i n the Rough", New York Times (2 October, 1987), pp. 1, 4. 93. I b i d . 94. B i l l K e l l e r , "For S o v i e t A l t e r n a t i v e P r e s s , Used Computer Is New T o o l " , New York Times (12 January, 1988), pp. 1, 4. 95. I b i d . 96. K e l l e r , New York Times, (2 October, 1987). 97. B i l l K e l l e r , "Pravda Warns of Offenses by the New P o l i t i c a l Clubs", New York Times (28 December, 1987), p. 6. 98. P h i l i p Taubman, "No.2 S o v i e t O f f i c i a l Puts i n a Bad Word Against 'Glasnost'", New York Times (24 September, 1987), pp. 1, 6. 99. Paul Quinn-Judge "Big Brother i s not Pleased", C h r i s t i a n Science Monitor World Edition (September 1-7), p. 13. Moscow News i s p u b l i s h e d i n s e v e r a l f o r e i g n languages and i s intended mainly f o r v i s i t o r s to the S o v i e t Union, although about 250,000 Russian c o p i e s are a l s o a v a i l a b l e i n Moscow fo r S o v i e t s . 100. P h i l i p Taubman, "Emigres' L e t t e r P r i n t e d i n S o v i e t Draws Harsh Reply From Pravda", New York Times (26 March, 1987), p. 4. 101. See the f o l l o w i n g New York Times a r t i c l e s : P h i l i p Taubman, " S o v i e t Charges U.S. I n c i t e s T a t a r s i n Homeland P r o t e s t s " (31 J u l y , 1987), p. 3; B i l l K e l l e r "Russians Say Western Radio I n s t i g a t e d B a l t i c P r o t e s t s " (25 August, 1987), p. 3. B a l t i c P r o t e s t s broke out again i n February, 1988 i n observance of the 39th a n n i v e r s a r y of S o v i e t annexation. 124 P h i l i p Taubman, "In the S o v i e t B a l t i c , Openness Y i e l d s Unsought N a t i o n a l i s m " (10 February, 1988) pp.1, 8. 102. B i l l K e l l e r , "Armenia L e g i s l a t u r e Agrees With P r o t e s t On Annexing Area", New York Times (16 June, 1988), pp. 1, 7. 103. r e g a r d i n g the Nagorno-Karabakh i n c i d e n t see New Yozk Times, (24 February to 11 March, 1988). 104. B i l l K e l l e r , " S e t t i n g Precedent, E s t o n i a Allows A Non-Communist Fr o n t t o Form", New York Times (21 June, 1988), pp. 1, 5. 105. I b i d . 106. K e l l e r , New York Times (16 June, 1988), pp. 1, 7. 107. P h i l i p Taubman, "Gorbachev To Center", New Yozk Times (14 January, 1988), p. 8. 108. Gorbachev, Pravda (3 November, 1987), p. 3. 109. C o l t o n . p. 121. 110. P h i l i p Taubman, "The Old Guard Votes a Rebuff to Gorbachev", New York Times (9 June, 1988), p. 1, 6. 111. B i a l e r , F o r e i g n P o l i c y , p. 59. NOTES TO CHAPTER III 01. George W. B r e s l a u e r , Khrushchev and Bzezhnev as Leadezs: B u i l d i n g A u t h o r i t y i n S o v i e t P o l i t i c s (London: A l l e n & Unwin, 1982), p. 123. 02. Roy and Zhores Medvedev, Khzushchev: The Years in Power (New York: Columbia U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s , 1976), pp. 59, 60. 03. In June 1965, Gosplan was d i v i d e d i n t o two departments: the State Committee on Long-term P l a n n i n g , the Gosekonomissiya, and the State Committee f o r Current P l a n n i n g , s t i l l c a l l e d Gosplan. A l e c Nove, An Economic History of the USSR (London: Penguin, 1969), pp. 341-3. 04. Al e c Nove, The S o v i e t Economic System 2nd e d i t i o n (London: A l l e n & Unwin, 1980), p. 72. 05. I b i d . , pp. 72-3. 06. I b i d . , p. 75. 07. Medvedev and Medvedev, pp. 26, 85-8. 08. B r e s l a u e r , Khrushchev and Brezhnev, p. 127. 09. I b i d , p.73. 10. I b i d . , pp. 25, 88, 91. 11. N i k i t a S. Khrushchev, Speech to the 2 2 n d Party Congress, t r a n s l a t e d i n Documents of the 2 2 n d Party Congress of the CPSU Report on the Program of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union V o l . II (New York: C r o s s c u r r e n t s P r e s s , 1961), p. 57. ( H e r e a f t e r , Documents I I and Documents I tor Volume I) . 12. Medvedev and Medvedev, pp. 58, 118-9. 13. I b i d . , p. 125. 14. Khrushchev, Documents I, p. 162. 15. Edward Crankshaw, "Russia's Imperial Design", Atlantic (November, 1957), p. 44. 16. Edward Crankshaw, Khrushchev: A Career (New York: V i k i n g , 1966), p. 193. 17. V a l e r i e Bunce, Do New Leaders Make A Difference? ( P r i n c e t o n : U n i v e r s i t y Press, 1981), p. 198. 18. Thomas Naylor, The Gorbachev Strategy (Lexington, Massachusstes: D.C. Heath, 1988), pp. 24-5. 19. Business Week (7 December, 1987), p. 88. 20. M i k h a i l S. Gorbachev, " P o l i t i c a l Report of the CPSU C e n t r a l Committee to the 27th Congress of the Communist P a r t y of the S o v i e t Union" (25 February, 1986) t r a n s l a t e d i n Current D i g e s t of the Soviet Press (Vol.38, No.8.) ( h e r e a f t e r c i t e d as Report), pp. 15-6. 21. Timothy J . C o l t o n , The Dilemma of Reform in the Soviet Union (New York: C o u n c i l on F o r e i g n R e l a t i o n s P r e s s , 1986), p. 145. 22. I b i d . , pp. 158-9. 23. B i l l K e l l e r , "For S o v i e t , A Sharp Turn", New York Times (2 January, 1988), pp. 1-5; and "Nervous S o v i e t Awaits L o c a l F a c t o r y C o n t r o l " (31 December, 1987), pp. 1, 5. 24. C o l t o n , p. 149. 25. P h i l i p Taubman, "To Spur Work, E s t o n i a T r i e s L ures", New York Times (21 January, 1986), p. 2. 26. Robert C. Tucker, "Gorbachev and the F i g h t f o r S o v i e t Reform", World Policy Journal (Spring 1987), p. 180. 27. M i k h a i l Gorbachev, "Oktyabr i Perestroika: Revolyutsiya Prodolzhayetsya", Pravda (3 November, 1987), p. 3. 28. Reproduced i n David M c L e l l a n ed., K a r l Marx: Selected Writings (Hong Kong: Oxford U n i v e r s i t y Press, 1977), pp. 564-570. The c i t a t i o n i s on pp. 568-69. 29. Khrushchev, Documents I I , pp. 86-7. see a l s o "Russians Have Had Income Taxes Since The Czars", Letters, New York Times (5 A p r i l , 1988), p. 22. 30. C o l t o n , p. 21. C o l t o n aknowledges t h a t there i s some c o n t r o v e r s y on t h i s p o i n t — s e e h i s note p.238. 31. I b i d . , p. 158. 32. I b i d . 33. P h i l i p Taubman, "Gorbachev i s S t r i v i n g to End Food Shortages", New York Times (21 October, 1987), p. 2. 35. Gorbachev, Report, p. 15. 36. I b i d . 37. P h i l i p Taubman, "So v i e t Law Widens P r i v a t e B u s iness", New York Times (20 November, 1986), p. 5. 38. Thomas H Naylor, "Gorbachev Says R a d i c a l Reform and Means I t " , New York Times (27 June, 1987), p. 15. 39. Peter G. Peterson, "Gorbachev's Bottom L i n e " , New York Times Review of Books (13 August, 1987), p. 30. 40. Naylor, The Gorbachev Strategy, p. 27. 40. Pravda, (2 February, 1986), c i t e d i n C o l t o n , p. 146. 41. I b i d . 42. Robert C. Tucker, Stalin as a Revolutionary 1879-1929: A Study i n History and Personality (New York: W.W.Norton, 1973), p. 410. 43. Stephen Cohen, R e t h i n k i n g the S o v i e t E x perience, (New York: Oxford U n i v e r s i t y Press, 1985), pp. 75-6. 44. V l a d i m i r I. L e n i n , "On Co-operation" (January, 1923), t r a n s l a t e d i n Robert C. Tucker, The Lenin Anthology (New York: W.W. Norton, 1975), p. 708. I t a l i c s i n o r i g i n a l . 45. Gorbachev, Pravda (3 November, 1987), p. 3. 46. N i c o l a s Spulber, "Proof of Gorbachev i s i n S o v i e t T a s t i n g " , Letters, New York Times (22 October, 1987), p. 22. 47. C o l t o n , p. 159. 48. Seweryn B i a l e r , "Gorbachev's Move", F o r e i g n P o l i c y , No.68 ( F a l l 1987), pp. 60-1. 49. B i l l K e l l e r , "A Gorbachev A l l y C a l l s L a t e s t Changes ' F i c t i o n ' " , New York Times (6 January, 1988), p.3. 50. "Job Cuts Loom For S o v i e t s " , New York Times r e p r i n t e d i n Vancouver Sun (4 J u l y , 1987), p. CI. 51. B i l l K e l l e r , "Gorbachev Backing Only Some Change", New York Times (13 June, 1987) p. 5. 52. Seweryn B i a l e r and Joan A f f e r i c a , "Gorbachev's Preference f o r Technocrats", New York Times (11 February,1986), p. 31. 53. B i a l e r , F o r e i g n P o l i c y , pp. 74-75. 54. V l a d i m i r Shlapentokh,"Soviets Head For Showdown on Reforms", Toronto Globe & Mail (21 J u l y , 1987), p. A7. 55. B i l l K e l l e r , "Russia's R e s t l e s s Youth", New York Times Magazine (26 J u l y , 1987), p. 18. 56. Time (27 J u l y , 1987), p. 24. 57. Roger R o s e n b l a t t , "Enter T h i s House And Let The Ice Melt", Time (26 October, 1987), p. 87. 58. c i t e d i n i b i d . 59. J i r i Pehe, "The New and Democratizing S o v i e t Middle C l a s s " , New York Times (25 May, 1987), p. 15. 60. K e l l e r , New York Times Magazine, p. 27. 61. V l a d i m i r Shlapentokh,"Soviets Head For Showdown on Reforms", Toronto Globe & Mail (21 J u l y , 1987), p. A7. 62. Spulber, New York Times (22 October, 1987), p. A7. 63. "Poseshcheniye M.S. Gorbachevym goroda Zelenograda", Pravda (30 J u l y , 1987), p. 1. 64. B i a l e r , F o r e i g n P o l i c y , p. 87. 65. This passage i s based upon the Nova documentary, "How Good i s S o v i e t S c i e n c e ? " which a i r e d i n mid-November, 1987 on the P u b l i c B r o a d c a s t i n g System. 66. Bruce P a r r o t t , The Soviet Union And Ballistic Missile Defense (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1987), p. 49. 67. Clyde Farnsworth, "Study F i n d s S o v i e t Output i s Stagnant", New York Times (25 A p r i l , 1988), pp. Dl-2. 68. I b i d . 69. Time (27 J u l y , 1987), p. 24. 70. K e l l e r , New York Times (13, June, 1987), p. 5. 71. B i a l e r , F o r e i g n P o l i c y , p. 79. 72. Time (27 J u l y , 1987), pp. 18-19. 73. Timothy J . C o l t o n , The Dilemma of Reform i n the S o v i e t Union 2nd ed. (New York: C o u n c i l on F o r e i g n R e l a t i o n s P r e s s , 1986), p. 13. Of course, no leader has followed a program of d e - L e n i n i z a t i o n , at l e a s t not o f f i c i a l l y . NOTES TO CHAPTER IV 01. Because of the s h o r t tenures, the Andropov and Chernenko per i o d s are d i s c o u n t e d . 02. B i l l K e l l e r , "Lenin F a u l t e d on State T e r r o r , And a S o v i e t Taboo i s Broken", New York Times (8 June, 1988), pp. 1,6. 03. V l a d i m i r L e n i n , "Communism and the New Economic P o l i c y " reproduced i n Robert C. Tucker ed. The Lenin Anthology (New York: W.W. Norton, 1975), p. 518. 04. I b i d . , p. 528. 05. V l a d i m i r L e n i n , " I n t r o d u c i n g the New Economic P o l i c y " , i n Tucker ed., p. 505. 06. Roy Medvedev, L e t H i s t o r y Judge (New York: Vintage, 1971), pp. 73-4. 07. Le n i n , " I n t r o d u c t i o n to the New Economic P o l i c y " , pp. 505-9. 08. I b i d . , p. 503. 09. I b i d . 10. L e n i n , "Communism and the New Economic P o l i c y " , p. 528. 11. I b i d . , p. 521. 12. Robert C. Tucker, Stalin as a Revolutionary 1879-1929: A Study in History and Personality (New York: W.W. Norton, 1973), p. 369. 13. A n a t o l i i Rybakov, Children of the Arbat (Boston: L i t t l e , Brown, 1988), p. 214. 14. Wolfgang Leonhard, "The Bolshev i k R e v o l u t i o n Turns 70", Fo r e i g n A f f a i r s , V o l . 66, No. 2. (Winter 1987-88), pp. 395-6. 15. Robert Tucker argues t h a t Bukharin probably took the 1905 R e v o l u t i o n to be the f i r s t and the two r e v o l u t i o n s of 1917 to be the second. S t a l i n As A R e v o l u t i o n a r y , note p. 401. 16. Stephen Cohen, R e t h i n k i n g the S o v i e t Experience (New York: Oxford U n i v e r s i t y P ress, 1985), p. 77. 17. K e l l e r , New York Times (8 June), pp. 1, 6. 18. I b i d . 19. Tucker, Stalin As A Revolutionary, p. 402. 20. c i t e d i n Tucker, S t a l i n As A R e v o l u t i o n a r y , p. 407. 21. Al e c Nove, Was S t a l i n Necessary? (London: A l l e n & Unwin, 1964), p. 32. 22. Cohen, p. 82. 23. Nove, Was Stalin Necessary?, pp. 27-9; Medvedev, Let History Judge, p. 488. 24. Rybakov, pp. 370, 1, 2. 25. Tucker, Stalin As A Revolutionary, pp. 464-5. 26. B i l l K e l l e r , "In U.S.S.R., a P a i n f u l P r y i n g At Roots of S t a l i n ' s Tyranny", New York Times (11 June, 1988), pp. 1, 6. 27. Rybakov, p. 215. 28. Leonhard, F o r e i g n A f f a i r s , pp. 395-6. 29. B i l l K e l l e r , "Reporter's Notebook: Search For Outer L i m i t s of 'Glasnost'", New York Times (13 August, 1987), pp. 1, 5. 30. I b i d . 31. K e l l e r , New York Times (11 June, 1988), pp. 1, 6. 32. K e l l e r , New York Times (8 June, 1988), pp. 1, 6. 33. M i k h a i l , Gorbachev, " P o l i t i c a l Report of the CPSU C e n t r a l Committee to the 27th Congress of the Communist P a r t y of the S o v i e t Union"(25 February, 1986) t r a n s l a t e d i n Current Digest of the Soviet Press ( V o l . 38. No. 8.), p. 28. 34. I b i d . , p. 4. 35. Seweryn B i a l e r , "Gorbachev's Move", F o r e i g n P o l i c y (No.68. F a l l 1987), p. 62. BIBLIOGRAPHY Books Berdyaev, Nicolas. The Origin of Russian Communism. 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