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Sizing up the tariff : an econometric inquiry into the effect of Kennedy round tariff concessions on… Pipe, Roger Daviss 1989

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S I Z I N G U P T H E T A R I F F : A N E C O N O M E T R I C I N Q U I R Y I N T O T H E E F F E C T O F K E N N E D Y R O U N D T A R I F F C O N C E S S I O N S O N P R O D U C T I V I T Y IN T H E C A N A D I A N M A N U F A C T U R I N G S E C T O R by R O G E R D A V I S S P I P E A T H E S I S S U B M I T T E D IN P A R T I A L F U L F I L M E N T O F T H E R E Q U I R E M E N T S F O R T H E D E G R E E O F M A S T E R O F S C I E N C E in T H E F A C U L T Y O F G R A D U A T E S T U D I E S Department of Agricultural Economics We accept this thesis as conforming to the required standard T H E U N I V E R S I T Y O F B R I T I S H C O L U M B I A October, 1989 • R O G E R D A V I S S P I P E , 1989 In presenting this thesis in partial fulfilment of the requirements for an advanced degree at the University of British Columbia, I agree that the Library shall make it freely available for reference and study. I further agree that permission for extensive copying of this thesis for scholarly purposes may be granted by the head of my department or by his or her representatives. It is understood that copying or publication of this thesis for financial gain shall not be allowed without my written permission. Department of Agricultural Economics The University of British Columbia Vancouver, Canada Date October 13, 1989 DE-6 (2/88) A B S T R A C T Evidence suggests that p r o d u c t i v i t y i n the Canadian manufacturing s e c t o r has been c o n s i s t e n t l y lower than i n the United S t a t e s . During the past two decades, a concensus has a r i s e n among mainstream Canadian economists that the t a r i f f , i n c o n j u n c t i o n with other f o r c e s , i s l a r g e l y r e s p o n s i b l e f o r these i n t e r i n d u s t r y p r o d u c t i v i t y d i f f e r e n c e s and, by c o r o l l a r y , that t a r i f f r e d u c t i o n s would lead to improved performance in Canadian manufacturing. However, d e s p i t e numerous econometric s t u d i e s , no s t a t i s t i c a l evidence has ever been found to c o n c l u s i v e l y support t h i s view. Th i s t h e s i s b u i l d s upon these e a r l i e r s t u d i e s to c o n s t r u c t a model of i n t e r - i n d u s t r y r e l a t i v e p r o d u c t i v i t y change in the Canadian manufacturing s e c t o r f o r the y e ars 1970 to 1979. T h i s was the p e r i o d f o l l o w i n g the s u b s t a n t i a l t a r i f f c oncessions made du r i n g the 1965 Kennedy Round of t a r i f f n e g o t i a t i o n s of the s i g n a t o r i e s of General Agreement on "Trade and T a r i f f s , and thus provided an i d e a l time p e r i o d i n which to analyze the e f f e c t of t a r i f f r e d u c t i o n s on i n d u s t r i a l s t r u c t u r e and performance. The study makes two important c o n t r i b u t i o n s : f i r s t , newly c o l l e c t e d trade data on the t a r i f f items and commodities a f f e c t e d by the Kennedy Round enabled the c o n s t r u c t i o n of v a r i a b l e s to measure the impact of the Kennedy Round r e d u c t i o n s on i n d i v i d u a l i n d u s t r i e s , p e r m i t t i n g the c o n s t r u c t i o n of a more f i n e l y - t u n e d model than was p r e v i o u s l y p o s s i b l e . Second, the t h e s i s goes beyond the s t a t i c models developed i n e a r l i e r s t u d i e s by c r e a t i n g a dynamic model of i n t e r - i n d u s t r y r e l a t i v e p r o d u c t i v i t y change. One of the main f i n d i n g s was that i n d u s t r i e s that were s i g n i f i c a n t l y a f f e c t e d by the Kennedy Round t a r i f f concessions showed a tendency to be l e s s p r o d u c t i v e than u n a f f e c t e d i n d u s t r i e s , suggesting t h a t concessions were made in uncompetitive i n d u s t r i e s , e i t h e r because they faced l i t t l e c ompetition from f o r e i g n markets or because of a p o l i t i c a l d e c i s i o n to reduce t a r i f f support to c h r o n i c a l l y uncompetitive manufacturers. Furthermore, p r o d u c t i v i t y growth was found to be n e g a t i v e l y c o r r e l a t e d to the breadth of t a r i f f c o ncession made i n an i n d u s t r y , suggesting that other, n o n - t a r i f f , forms of p r o t e c t i o n may have p r o t e c t e d h i g h l y a f f e c t e d i n d u s t r i e s i n the ensuing years. The other f i n d i n g concerned the r o l e of the t a r i f f i n p r o d u c t i v i t y change. No evidence was found to support the view that l a r g e p r o d u c t i v i t y gains c o u l d be expected from a re d u c t i o n i n the t a r i f f . For h i g h l y concentrated i n d u s t r i e s , a one percent decrease i n the t a r i f f was estimated to r e s u l t i n a p r o d u c t i v i t y i n c r e a s e on the order of 0.013% f o r the p e r i o d 1970 to 1979. i i i TABLE OF CONTENTS Abstract i i Table of Contents i v LIST OF TABLES v i LIST OF FIGURES v i i ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS - v i i i 1. INTRODUCTION 1 2 . BACKGROUND 3 3. PROBLEM STATEMENT 5 4. LITERATURE REVIEW 10 4.1. B l u e p r i n t f o r the Review 10 4.2. Econometric Approaches to Mod e l l i n g 15 4.2.1. The Eastman/Stykolt Model 15 4.2.2. Bloch 22 4.2.3. Saunders 31 4.2.4. Caves, P o r t e r , Spence and Scott 40 4.2.5. Baldwin and Gorecki 45 4.3. Non-Econometric Approaches to Modelling 55 4.3.1. H a r r i s and Cox 55 5. THEORETICAL CONSIDERATIONS 62 5.1. On the P o l i t i c a l Economy of the Kennedy Round 62 5.2. On the Use of Nominal or E f f e c t i v e Rates of P r o t e c t i o n 68 5.3. Production Economies 69 5.3.1. Sources of production economies 70 5.3.2. Estimates of Production Economies and T h e i r Problems 73 6. PRODUCTIVITY MODELS AND REGRESSION RESULTS 79 6.1. The Fiv e Phases of the Model 79 6.2. THE 1970 PRODUCTIVITY MODEL RESULTS 91 6.3. THE 1979 PRODUCTIVITY MODEL RESULTS 97 6.4. MODELLING PRODUCTIVITY CHANGE: THE 1979-1970 RESULTS 102 7. CONCLUSION 110 ENDNOTES 113 BIBLIOGRAPHY * 114 i v . « . APPENDIX A: D e f i n i t i o n of v a r i a b l e s used i n the models . 120 Appendix I I : Concordance of t a r i f f items to CITC 129 Appendix I I I : Data used i n the models 168 v LIST OP TABLES Table 6.1 Selected Results for 1970 Productivity Model 92 Table 6.2 Selected Results for 1979 Productivity Model..... 99 Table 6.3 Selected Results for Model of Productivity Growth 1970-1979 105 v i LIST OP FIGURES F i g u r e 6.1 Frequency o f T a r i f f Changes t o Kennedy R o u n d - a f f e c t e d commodities 83 v i i ACKNOWLEDGEMENT S I would l i k e to thank the members of my t h e s i s committee—Tim Hazledine, Rick B a r i c h e l l o and Tony Boardman—for the i n s i g h t f u l comments they o f f e r e d d u r i n g the course of our meetings. Tim Hazledine, as my p r i n c i p a l a d v i s o r , went f a r beyond the c a l l of duty i n h e l p i n g me over a l l the hurdles I tended to stumble upon and provided me constant encouragement and support as only a true f r i e n d c o u l d . Most of the data on which the models presented h e r e i n were based were g r a c i o u s l y p r o v i d e d by John Baldwin and Paul G o r e c k i . A d d i t i o n a l data came from Richard Caves. Without t h e i r c o o p e r a t i o n none of t h i s would have been p o s s i b l e . Thanks too to Paul Gorecki f o r h i s h e l p f u l comments. F i n a n c i a l support for the re s e a r c h c a r r i e d out f o r the t h e s i s came from the I n s t i t u t e of I n t e r n a t i o n a l R e l a t i o n s and the Donner Foundation. T h e i r support i s most a p p r e c i a t i v e l y acknowleged. v i i i 1. INTRODUCTION In the wake of the recent t a r i f f r e d u c t i o n agreement between Canada and the United S t a t e s , and l o o k i n g forward to f u r t h e r t a r i f f r e d u c t i o n s r e s u l t i n g from the c u r r e n t Uruguay round of trade n e g o t i a t i o n s of the General Agreement on Trade and T a r i f f s , i t i s worth t a k i n g a renewed look at the e m p i r i c a l evidence a v a i l a b l e to support or r e j e c t arguments in favour of the r e d u c t i o n of domestic trade b a r r i e r s . A p e r s i s t e n t q u e s t i o n during the recent f r e e trade debate concerned the impact that t a r i f f r e d u c t i o n s c o u l d be expected to have on p r o d u c t i v i t y i n the Canadian manufacturing s e c t o r . In the hope of uncovering new evidence to h e lp r e s o l v e t h i s q u e s t i o n t h i s t h e s i s w i l l explore the r e l a t i o n s h i p between the r a t e of domestic t a r i f f p r o t e c t i o n and the l e v e l of p r o d u c t i v i t y . The goal i s to determine the extent to which domestic t a r i f f r e d u c t i o n s have a f f e c t e d p r o d u c t i v i t y . Economists have long shown an i n t e r e s t i n the e f f e c t s of a t a r i f f on a country's economic performance. Var i o u s approaches have been used to model these e f f e c t s , embodying a range of assumptions about p r i c i n g behaviour and ease of entry i n t o a market. General e q u i l i b r i u m approaches have been used to model the e f f e c t on an economy-wide s c a l e , while the I n d u s t r i a l O r g a n i z a t i o n (10) approach has been invoked to r e v e a l the nature of the impact of the f o r c e s at 1 INTRODUCTION / 2 work through e m p i r i c a l i n v e s t i g a t i o n using econometric models to e x p l a i n a range of phenomena. Within the IO camp, an important m i l e s t o n e — i n Canada, at l e a s t — h a s been the recent developments in data g a t h e r i n g which allow for more r e a l i s t i c modelling and a more accurate a n a l y s i s of i n d u s t r y ' s o r g a n i z a t i o n a l behaviour. In the e a r l y 1980's, S t a t i s t i c s Canada developed a data base that enabled a n a l y s i s of i n d u s t r i a l behaviour at the p l a n t l e v e l of a c t i v i t y . P r e v i o u s l y , i n f o r m a t i o n had only been a v a i l a b l e at the i n d u s t r y l e v e l of aggregation. T h i s t h e s i s w i l l b u i l d upon recent work based on t h i s micro database, and e m p i r i c a l l y t e s t some of the assumptions of e a r l y 10 s t u d i e s . T h i s i s of more than h i s t o r i c a l i n t e r e s t , f o r i t would appear that many of the o r i g i n a l hypotheses from t h i s e a r l i e r p e r i o d have been g e n e r a l l y accepted by f o l l o w i n g generations of economists d e s p i t e the lack of e m p i r i c a l evidence to support them. In p a r t i c u l a r , the' view that t a r i f f s are s i g n i f i c a n t l y r e s p o n s i b l e f o r the weak performance of Canada's manufacturing s e c t o r r e l a t i v e to i t s l a r g e s t t r a d i n g p a r t n e r , the United S t a t e s , has been a r e c u r r i n g one, d e s p i t e the l a c k of e m p i r i c a l evidence to support i t . 2. BACKGROUND Over the past two decades a concensus has a r i s e n amongst many students and p r a c t i t i o n e r s of i n d u s t r i a l o r g a n i z a t i o n economics regarding the performance of Canada's manufacturing s e c t o r v i s a v i s America's. According to t h i s concensus, the Canadian manufacturing sector i s i n e f f i c i e n t r e l a t i v e to that of the United S t a t e s due to the impact of domestic and f o r e i g n t a r i f f s l i m i t i n g market s i z e and r e s t r i c t i n g f o r e i g n c o m p e t i t i o n . The combined e f f e c t of small markets p l u s the t a r i f f c e i l i n g has f o s t e r e d the p r o l i f e r a t i o n of i n e f f i c i e n t l y - s i z e d u n i t s of p r o d u c t i o n . How i n e f f i c i e n c y i s manifested in an i n d u s t r y depends on two sets of f a c t o r s ; f i r s t , s t r u c t u r a l f a c t o r s such as the degree of competition and extent of market power that c h a r a c t e r i z e an i n d u s t r y ; and second, the t e c h n i c a l aspects of the production process that determine the extent of s c a l e economies and the s i z e of the c o s t penalty that i s i n c u r r e d at low output l e v e l s . One p o s s i b l e s c e n a r i o that r e s u l t s from the i n t e r p l a y of these f a c t o r s where c o n c e n t r a t i o n i s low and market power s l i g h t i s that the excess p r o f i t s earned by the t a r i f f encourages the entry of new p l a y e r s to such a degree that overcrowding d i s s i p a t e s excess p r o f i t s and discourages production at e f f i c i e n t output l e v e l s . Where r e l a t i v e l y uncompetitive c o n d i t i o n s e x i s t , t a r i f f s may l e a d to a s i t u a t i o n i n which a few l a r g e producers are able to 3 BACKGROUND / 4 set a p r i c e umbrella which allows f o r the c o e x i s t e n c e of a s m a l l , i n e f f i c i e n t f r i n g e of producers. At the same time, the t a r i f f encourages l a r g e , h i g h l y concentrated producers to grow cost i n e f f i c i e n t f o r lac k of competitive pressure. The above e x p l a n a t i o n s f o r r e l a t i v e l y low Canadian p r o d u c t i v i t y capture the essence of what has been r e f e r r e d to as the "Canadian School" of thought on the matter of p r o d u c t i v i t y performance in a r e l a t i v e l y s m a l l , open economy, (see Hazledine, 1988). 3. PROBLEM STATEMENT Despite numerous econometric s t u d i e s , no s t a t i s t i c a l evidence has ever been found to c o n c l u s i v e l y support the main tenent: that the t a r i f f , i n c o n j u n c t i o n with other f o r c e s , i s r e s p o n s i b l e f o r i n t e r i n d u s t r y p r o d u c t i v i t y d i f f e r e n c e s and, by c o r o l l a r y , that t a r i f f r e d u c t i o n s would l e a d to improved performance i n Canadian manufacturing. T y p i c a l l y the evidence i s ambiguous. A key v a r i a b l e w i l l i n one model perform w e l l , lending support to the hypothesis, on l y to be c o n t r a d i c t e d by another model's r e s u l t s . But i f a d e f i n i t i v e proof has not been forthcoming, n e i t h e r has a d i s p r o o f been o f f e r e d . In p a r t , t h i s may be because res e a r c h e r s t y p i c a l l y have begun with the assumption that the hypothesis i s t r u e . T h i s b i a s appears to have encouraged some to i n t e r p r e t the f i n d i n g s of t h e i r models i n a l i g h t t h a t favours the acceptance of the hypothesis, even in the face of s t a t i s t i c a l l y i n s i g n i f i c a n t r e s u l t s and c o n t r a d i c t o r y evidence. But i t may a l s o be the case that models to date have not a l t o g e t h e r succeeded i n f a i t h f u l l y c a p t u r i n g the dynamics of 1 0 v a r i a b l e s on p r o d u c t i v i t y . Dynamics i s indeed the word. Most of the s t u d i e s that have t e s t e d one or more components of the Canadian School hypothesis r e l i e d on a s t a t i c a n a l y s i s to e x p l a i n a given s i t u a t i o n . An exception to t h i s i s the work of John Baldwin 5 PROBLEM STATEMENT / 6 and Paul Gorecki who, with McVey and C r y s d a l e , have made an important c o n t r i b u t i o n to t h i s area of study through the dynamic focus they i n c o r p o r a t e d i n t o t h e i r models. They have looked not only at the s t a t i c e x p l a n a t i o n s f o r a given s t r u c t u r e or performance i n the Canadian manufacturing s e c t o r , but they have a l s o extended t h e i r r e s e a r c h to include dynamic models of s t r u c t u r a l change over time. On the performance side of the 10 equation, however, an important q u e s t i o n they have not addressed concerns the causes of dynamic change i n i n t e r and i n t r a i n d u s t r y p r o d u c t i v i t y l e v e l s . The task at hand, then, i s to t e s t the Canadian School p r o p o s i t i o n that t a r i f f p r o t e c t i o n i n h i g h l y c o n c e n t r a t e d i n d u s t r i e s r e s u l t s i n lower l e v e l s of p r o d u c t i v i t y . T h i s w i l l be done by c o n s t r u c t i n g an econometric model that w i l l attempt to e x p l a i n p r o d u c t i v i t y d i f f e r e n c e s i n the Canadian manufacturing s e c t o r . As with the work of Baldwin and Gorecki, the focus w i l l be on p r o d u c t i v i t y change between 1970 and 1979. This decade i s the most a t t r a c t i v e f o r a n a l y z i n g s t r u c t u r a l and performances changes caused by t a r i f f r e d u c t i o n s , f o r two reasons. F i r s t , there i s the e v e r - c r u c i a l q u e s t i o n of data a v a i l a b i l i t y . The 1970's were something of a golden epoch f o r s t a t i s t i c a l data c o l l e c t i o n i n Canada. Recent budget cutbacks at S t a t i s t i c s Canada have PROBLEM STATEMENT / 7 put the micro database on hold with the r e s u l t that f u t u r e economists may have to content themselves with working with higher l e v e l s of aggregation than that of the p l a n t . A second p o i n t to be made i n favour of the chosen time p e r i o d i s the f a c t that i t f o l l o w s the s i n g l e most important r e s c h e d u l i n g of t a r i f f s i n h i s t o r y . The Kennedy Round brought about r e d u c t i o n s of f i f t y percent, on average, of American t a r i f f s faced by Canadian manufacturers, together with s i z a b l e r e d u c t i o n s of Canadian t a r i f f s on f o r e i g n imports. Now, the Kennedy Round of T a r i f f n e g o t i a t i o n s of the GATT took p l a c e between 1963 and 1966 and the schedule of the agreement c a l l e d f o r the immediate r e d u c t i o n of t a r i f f s on some items; but on most, r e d u c t i o n s were to be phased i n over a p e r i o d of f i v e y e ars. Due to the l a g that f o l l o w s any t a r i f f r e d u c t i o n before the appearance of s t r u c t u r a l change, i t i s not u n t i l the mid to l a t e 'seventies that s t a t i s t i c a l evidence of the consequences of the Kennedy Round concessions would be seen. C e r t a i n l y by 1979, any and a l l of the impact of the concessions should have a l r e a d y r i p p l e d throughout the manufacturing s e c t o r . Thus, by l o o k i n g at the changes that took p l a c e between 1970, before much s t r u c t u r a l change would have occurred, and 1979, when the changes had been made, i t should be p o s s i b l e to spot any s t a t i s t i c a l evidence that would support c o n t e n t i o n s that t a r i f f PROBLEM STATEMENT / 8 reductions impact i n a p o s i t i v e f a s h i o n on p r o d u c t i v i t y , at l e a s t i n h i g h l y concentrated i n d u s t r i e s . And so, i n r e p l y to the i n e v i t a b l e question of why a more recent GATT event l i k e the Tokyo Round (1973-1979) was not c o n s i d e r e d f o r study, i t should be mentioned t h a t : the l a s t Tokyo Round cu t s were only implemented i n 1987, so that any r e s u l t a n t s t r u c t u r a l changes have not e n t i r e l y worked t h e i r way through the manufacturing s e c t o r ; S t a t i s t i c s Canada cutbacks l i m i t the p o s s i b i l i t y of a n a l y s i s at the i n t r a - i n d u s t r y l e v e l f o r t h i s p e r i o d ; the Tokyo round inv o l v e d f o r the f i r s t time s u b s t a n t i a l a t t e n t i o n to n o n - t a r i f f b a r r i e r s , which would only complicate the s t a t i s t i c a l i d e n t i f i c a t i o n of determinants of p r o d u c t i v i t y change; the t a r i f f r e ductions themselves were of a much smaller order of magnitude compared to the Kennedy Round; and f i n a l l y , the work that has been done to date on the consequences of the Kenndy Round has l e f t too many important questions unanswered f o r the books to be c l o s e d on i t . As Hazledine (1988, II) po i n t e d out, de s p i t e the many estimated models concerned with p r o d u c t i v i t y i n the manufacturing s e c t o r , no e f f o r t s have been made to study the dynamic e f f e c t s of the s u b s t a n t i a l GATT t a r i f f r e d u c t i o n s on p r o d u c t i v i t y . T h i s i s rather odd indeed, given that the subject of p r o d u c t i v i t y and the expected engine of p r o d u c t i v i t y change, production economies, have been PROBLEM STATEMENT / 9 explored i n such a v a r i e t y of c o n t e x t s . T h i s has l e f t a w e l l - d e f i n e d v o i d which the present study hopes to p a r t i a l l y f i l l . 4. LITERATURE REVIEW 4 . 1 . BLUEPRINT FOR THE REVIEW Th i s s e c t i o n w i l l review the e x i s t i n g l i t e r a t u r e i n which models are presented that attempt to e x p l a i n i n t e r i n d u s t y p r o d u c t i v i t y d i f f e r e n c e s i n the Canadian manufacturing s e c t o r . Of p a r t i c u l a r i n t e r e s t i s the t a r i f f , which has been int r o d u c e d as an independent v a r i a b l e to e x p l a i n d i f f e r e n c e s between i n d u s t r i e s . The survey w i l l not i n c l u d e those models that have sought to e x p l a i n the t a r i f f s t r u c t u r e i t s e l f ; t h a t i s , those models b u i l t around the t a r i f f as a dependent r e g r e s s o r . Such models, while not u n r e l a t e d to the present study, are more of a p o l i t i c a l economic persuasion. As w i l l be seen l a t e r i n s e c t i o n 5.1, i t i s prudent to i n c o r p o r a t e p o l i t i c a l economy v a r i a b l e s i n t o the study i n order to t e s t f o r the hypothesis that Kennedy Round t a r i f f r e d u c t i o n s were not a random event, but r a t h e r d e l i b e r a t e l y chosen, c l e v e r l y s e l e c t e d c h i p s on the Kennedy Round b a r g a i n i n g t a b l e . Be that as i t may, p o l i t i c a l economic f a c t o r s are not the main i n t e r e s t here. Of greater concern at t h i s juncture i s an understanding of how the t a r i f f has been s t u d i e d from an I n d u s t r i a l O r g a n i z a t i o n (10) p e r s p e c t i v e , i n p a r t i c u l a r where econometric techniques have been used. T h i s l i t e r a t u r e 10 LITERATURE REVIEW / 11 survey w i l l be d i v i d e d i n t o four s e c t i o n s . F i r s t , the focus of the models: that i s , the dependent v a r i a b l e s a g a i n s t which the t a r i f f has been regressed as an explanatory v a r i a b l e . Second, the explanatory v a r i a b l e s used, with p a r t i c u l a r a t t e n t i o n to the form of the t a r i f f - b a s e d v a r i a b l e s . T h i r d , the s t a t i s t i c a l r e s u l t s generated. F i n a l l y , the relevance of the models w i l l be c r i t i c a l l y assessed. In a d d i t i o n to a review of the 10 econometric models a general e q u i l i b r i u m model with c e r t a i n 10 c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s w i l l a l s o be reviewed. 4 .2 The Eastman/Stykolt Hypothesis To provide a reference p o i n t f o r the l i t e r a t u r e review, a u s e f u l p l a c e to begin i s with a b r i e f d e s c r i p t i o n of the t h e o r e t i c a l model put f o r t h by Harry Eastman and Stefan S t y k o l t to e x p l a i n the poor performance of the Canadian manufacturing s e c t o r r e l a t i v e to that of the United S t a t e s . Pioneers of the Canadian School approach to i n d u s t r i a l o r g a n i z a t i o n , Eastman and S t y k o l t hypothesized that the r e l a t i v e l y small s i z e of the Canadian market has r e s u l t e d i n production c o s t s that are not as low as they c o u l d be due to low s c a l e of output and, consequently, i n short production runs and high changeover c o s t s . They p o s i t e d that the t a r i f f exacerbated t h i s tendency, i n that the excess p r o f i t s made p o s s i b l e by the t a r i f f a t t r a c t e d new LITERATURE REVIEW / 12 entrants of i n e f f i c i e n t s i z e , l e a d i n g to an "overcrowding of i n d u s t r i e s with p l a n t s of sub-optimal s i z e d u p l i c a t i n g each others' output". 1 The authors hypothesized that the p r o d u c t i v e e f f i c i e n c y of an i n d u s t r y i s l a r g e l y determined by the s i z e of the r e l e v a n t market r e l a t i v e to "the s i z e of a u n i t of production that i s j u s t s u f f i c i e n t l y l a r g e enough to achieve lowest average c o s t of p r o d u c t i o n . " 2 (what has s i n c e come to be r e f e r r e d to as minimum e f f i c i e n t s c a l e , MES.) The r a t i o n a l e behind t h i s i s that the r a t i o of MES to r e l e v a n t market s i z e determines the number of e f f i c i e n t l y s i z e d producers that can c o - e x i s t at normal o p e r a t i n g l e v e l s w i t h i n a given market. T h i s , i n t u r n , w i l l p l a y a s t r o n g r o l e i n determining the conduct of producers i n an i n d u s t r y . And so, where the market i s so l a r g e that new c a p a c i t y of e f f i c i e n t s i z e has l i t t l e e f f e c t on p r i c e , no impediment to entry e x i s t s and market c o n d i t i o n s approaching those of pure competition e x i s t . At small market s i z e s , entry at e f f i c i e n t s c a l e " depresses the p r i c e , p r o v i d i n g an inducement to enter at a smaller than the most e f f i c i e n t s i z e and to incur higher than minimal c o s t s . The e f f e c t on the s t r u c t u r e of an i n d u s t r y depends on the degree [of c o l l u s i o n ] and the goal that the i n d u s t r y sets for i t s e l f i n terms of i t s time h o r i z o n f o r p r o f i t maximization". 3 Of the two components that make up the MES/market s i z e r a t i o , only MES i s exogenously determined ( i . e . , by the c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s of the p r o d u c t i o n f u n c t i o n p e c u l i a r to each i n d u s t r y , given a v a i l a b l e t e c h n o l o g i e s ) . Market s i z e i s not LITERATURE REVIEW / 13 an exogenous given. The geographical boundaries of a rel e v a n t market are set i n pa r t by t r a n s p o r t a t i o n c o s t s (which are exogenously determined), but to a much greater extent, say Eastman and S t y k o l t , by t a r i f f s - - b o t h f o r e i g n and domestic. On the one hand, f o r e i g n t a r i f f s " l i m i t the s i z e of the market open to Canadian producers by lowering the maximum p r i c e at which Canadian producers can export... [They] t h e r e f o r e r e s t r i c t Canadian producers to the Canadian market, increase the interdependence of producers i n Canada, and r a i s e the b a r r i e r s to a d d i t i o n to c a p a c i t y . " " However, buyers alone do not a market make. So while f o r e i g n t a r i f f s l i m i t the r e l e v a n t market f o r manufacturers, i t i s domestic t a r i f f s that e f f e c t i v e l y r e s t r i c t the a v a i l a b l e market f o r buyers. A domestic t a r i f f set high enough to exclude s i g n i f i c a n t f o r e i g n imports over a p o r t i o n of the demand curve f a c i n g an in d u s t r y would e s s e n t i a l l y l i m i t competition to domestic producers alone. In such a t a r i f f - p r o t e c t e d environment, domestic demand fo r made-in-Canada p r o d u c t i o n i s higher than would otherwise be the case, and i t i s not unreasonable to expect t h a t , because of higher demand f o r domestic output, l a r g e r p l a n t s a c h i e v i n g or approaching MES would r e s u l t . One might expect to f i n d that domestic t a r i f f s had a p o s i t i v e e f f e c t on p r o d u c t i v i t y i n the manufacturing s e c t o r . In p o i n t of f a c t , LITERATURE REVIEW / 14 however, t a r i f f s do not appear to have had t h i s b e n e f i c i a l e f f e c t . The reason, suggested Eastman and S t y k o l t , was that, on the supply s i d e , domestic t a r i f f s both r e s t r i c t market s i z e and l i m i t c o m p e t i t i o n . Because of i t s small s i z e , the Canadian i n d u s t r i a l landscape i s o f t e n dominated by o l i g o p o l i e s t h a t , because of t h e i r small market "interdependence", choose to produce at i n e f f i c i e n t l e v e l s of o p e r a t i o n . As was mentioned above, the a c t u a l outcome w i l l depend on the degree of c o l l u s i o n i n an i n d u s t r y . The Eastman/Stykolt hypothesis has two s i d e s to i t . One s i d e d e s c r i b e s the way i n which the present i n d u s t r i a l s t r u c t u r e has a r i s e n : small market, plus p r o t e c t i o n plus imperfect competition l e a d to l e s s than e f f i c i e n t p r o d u c t i v i t y performance. The other side of the s t o r y i s concerned with how to ameliorate t h i s s i t u a t i o n . They hypothesized that the e f f e c t of a r e d u c t i o n i n the domestic t a r i f f would i n c r e a s e competition and o b l i g e " Canadian producers who were op e r a t i n g at inadequate s c a l e to improve the e f f i c i e n c y of t h e i r o p e r a t i o n i f they were to remain i n e x i s t e n c e . If they were alre a d y o p e r a t i n g at e f f i c i e n t s c a l e and c o u l d not meet import competition, t h i s would be owing to adverse f a c t o r p r i c e s i n Canada, in other words, to i n t e r n a t i o n a l comparative advantage". 5 The l o g i c behind t h i s s c e n a r i o i s that opening the Canadian market up to f o r e i g n competition would induce manufacturers to behave more c o m p e t i t i v e l y at home; that i s , would break down the "interdependence of p l a n t s " , or c o l l u s i o n , that the LITERATURE REVIEW / 15 domestic t a r i f f p u r p o r t e d l y encourages. 4 . 2 . ECONOMETRIC APPROACHES TO MODELLING 4 . 2 . 1 . The Eastman/Stykolt Model Just as Eastman and S t y k o l t ' s hypothesis l a i d the foundation of the Canadian School approach to the qu e s t i o n of p r o d u c t i v i t y i n manufacturing, so too was the model they c o n s t r u c t e d to t e s t t h e i r h ypothesis the prototype of econometric research on the s u b j e c t . FOCUS Eastman and S t y k o l t focused on the determinants of i n d u s t r i a l e f f i c i e n c y i n the Canadian manufacturing s e c t o r . T h e i r dependent v a r i a b l e , X1, was the percentage of e f f i c i e n t l y s i z e d c a p a c i t y i n an i n d u s t r y , measured as the percentage of p l a n t s of s m a l l e s t e f f i c i e n t s c a l e or l a r g e r , where sm a l l e s t e f f i c i e n t s c a l e was determined by U.S. p l a n t - s i z e data as w e l l as Canadian engineering and e n t r e p r e n e u r i a l estimates of the output l e v e l of the l a r g e s t machine i n that p r o d u c t i o n process whose s c a l e of output i s of a minimally e f f i c i e n t l e v e l . S ixteen i n d u s t r i e s that c o n t r i b u t e d about twenty-two percent of manufacturing value-added i n Canada comprised t h e i r sample. I t should be c l a r i f i e d that the l e v e l of LITERATURE REVIEW / 16 aggregation of t h e i r " i n d u s t r i e s " v a r i e d between the four d i g i t l e v e l and the f i v e d i g i t , or commodity, l e v e l . Thus, f o r example, they included the cement in d u s t r y i n t h e i r s a m p l e — a four d i g i t i n d u s t r y i n S t a t i s t i c s Canada's taxonomy—along with e l e c t r i c range manufacturers, who produce a f i v e - d i g i t l e v e l commodity in the i n d u s t r y of major app l i a n c e manufacturers, SIC 3320. The h e t e r o g e n e i t y in the l e v e l of aggregation that makes up t h e i r sample should be kept i n mind when comparing t h e i r r e s u l t s with the other s t u d i e s i n t h i s review that were aggregated at the four d i g i t SIC l e v e l . A c h a r a c t e r i s t i c of these more h i g h l y aggregated s t u d i e s i s that by averaging the market and production c h a r a c t e r i s i t i c s of heterogeneous s u b - i n d u s t r i e s , ambiguous or m i s l e a d i n g r e s u l t s may be obtained, so that r e s u l t s must be i n t e r p r e t e d c a r e f u l l y . In Eastman and S t y k o l t ' s sample, then, data i s more disaggregated than some of the other Canadian School s t u d i e s that have s i n c e f o l l o w e d . O r i g i n a l data was obtained through surveys, which, while p e r m i t t i n g a f a i r degree of d i s a g g r e g a t i o n , r e s t r i c t e d sample s i z e due to the d i f f i c u l t i e s inherent to the survey methodology. EXPLANATORY VARIABLES Eastman and S t y k o l t regressed the percentage of e f f i c i e n t l y s i z e d p r o d u c t i v e c a p a c i t y i n t h e i r sample i n d u s t r i e s a g a i n s t f i v e explanatory v a r i a b l e s . T h e i r main LITERATURE REVIEW / 17 hypothesis was that "the s i z e of the market measured as a r a t i o of market s i z e to e f f i c i e n t p l a n t s i z e i s the p r i n c i p a l determinant of the p r o d u c t i v e e f f i c i e n c y of an i n d u s t r y " 6 . Thus, t h e i r p r i n c i p a l v a r i a b l e was X4, the r a t i o of market s i z e to MES or, i n other words, the number of MES s i z e d p l a n t s that c o u l d c o e x i s t i n the n a t i o n a l market. Other v a r i a b l e s t e s t e d were: X11, the c a p i t a l requirement of an e f f i c i e n t l y s i z e d f i r m ; X13, an index of the 10-year rate of growth of production or c a p a c i t y i n an i n d u s t r y ; X15, an index of the degree of product d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n i n an in d u s t r y ; and X18, an a l t e r n a t i v e measure of growth d e f i n e d as the 10-year rate of growth of production or c a p a c i t y d i v i d e d by the c a p a c i t y of a p l a n t of the smallest e f f i c i e n t s i z e . To summarize, one r e g r e s s i o n equation used took the form 1 . X1 = a + bX4 + cX11 + d X U +eX15 while a second r e g r e s s i o n using the a l t e r n a t e measure of grdwth was of the form 2. X1 = a + bX4 + cX11 + eX15 + f X l 8 Both of these r e g r e s s i o n forms can be thought of as models of the determinants of e f f i c i e n c y i n n a t i o n a l markets. In a d d i t i o n to these, Eastman and S t y k o l t a l s o t e s t e d a model of the determinants of e f f i e n c y i n r e g i o n a l and s e l e c t e d n a t i o n a l markets, i n the b e l i e f that c e r t a i n i n d u s t r i e s are more r e g i o n a l than n a t i o n a l i n nature, so LITERATURE REVIEW / 18 that the use of the n a t i o n a l market s i z e would l e a d to the o v e r e s t i m a t i o n of t h e i r key v a r i a b l e , X4, the number of MES p l a n t s an i n d u s t r y c o u l d support. The r e g r e s s i o n s took on s i m i l a r forms to the n a t i o n a l models, and so need not be repeated here. The r a t i o of market s i z e to MES, X4, was expected to be p o s i t i v e l y c o r r e l a t e d to X1 f o r reasons ex p l a i n e d above. XI1 should have exerted a negative i n f l u e n c e on X1 according to the b e l i e f that high c a p i t a l requirements c r e a t e b a r r i e r s to e n t r y at e f f i c i e n t s i z e . The index of the i n d u s t r y ' s 10-year growth r a t e , X13, was expected to be p o s i t i v e l y r e l a t e d to X1, based on the assumption that e n t e r p r i s e s w i l l be more i n c l i n e d to add to c a p a c i t y or enter at higher l e v e l s when markets are growing r o b u s t l y . Product d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n , captured by X15, may impact n e g a t i v e l y on the percentage of e f f i c i e n t p r o d u c t i o n , s i n c e i t too i s a b a r r i e r to entry. However, over time, a p o s i t i v e r e l a t i o n s h i p may be observed i f e s t a b l i s h e d f i r m s are able to grow with market growth and so e v e n t u a l l y achieve minimum e f f i c i e n t s c a l e . Eastman and S t y k o l t d i d n ' t make any p r e d i c t i o n e i t h e r way as to the d i r e c t i o n of i n f l u e n c e . The a l t e r n a t i v e growth v a r i a b l e , X18 was expected to have a s i m i l a r e f f e c t . No v a r i a b l e was i n c l u d e d i n the v a r i o u s e f f i c e n c y models to t e s t f o r the d i r e c t i n f l u e n c e of the t a r i f f . S T A T I S T I C A L R E S U L T S LITERATURE REVIEW / 19 Li n e a r as w e l l as l o g a r i t h m i c forms of the models were t e s t e d . With regard to the l i n e a r model, Eastman and S t y k o l t drew the f o l l o w i n g c o n c l u s i o n s : f i r s t , that the r a t i o of the n a t i o n a l market s i z e to MES, X4, was s t a t i s t i c a l l y s i g n i f i c a n t and exp l a i n e d about 27 percent of i n t e r - i n d u s t r y v a r i a t i o n i n the percentage of e f f i c i e n t l y - s i z e d p r o d u c t i v e c a p a c i t y . The explanatory power of the model in c r e a s e d s l i g h t l y with the i n t r o d u c t i o n of the l e v e l of c a p i t a l requirements at MES, but X11 proved s t a t i s t i c a l l y i n s i g n i f i c a n t , though with a negative c o e f f i c i e n t , as had been a n t i c i p a t e d . The a d d i t i o n of the two other v a r i a b l e s d i d not improve the model's explanatory power. Eastman and S t y k o l t concluded that "the best e x p l a n a t i o n f o r the v a r i a t i o n i n e f f i c i e n c y between i n d u s t r i e s thus appears to be provided by a combination of market s i z e d and c a p i t a l requirements". 7 In the l o g a r i t h m i c model, X4 alone e x p l a i n e d some 45 percent of e f f i c i e n t s i z e v a r i a t i o n and again proved s i g n i f i c a n t — i n d e e d i t was the only s i g n i f i c a n t v a r i a b l e present. The growth v a r i a b l e , X13, came out n e g a t i v e l y signed, c o n t r a r y to what theory had le a d Eastman and S t y k o l t to p r e d i c t . Once again, they obtained t h e i r best r e s u l t s when XI was regressed against X4 and X11. LITERATURE REVIEW / 20 CRITICAL ASSESSMENT AND COMMENTS Before answers c o u l d be found to the ques t i o n s Eastman and S t y k o l t r a i s e d concerning p r o d u c t i v i t y , economies of sc a l e and the domestic t a r i f f , three improvements to t h e i r model were needed: f i r s t , a d i r e c t measurement of p r o d u c t i v i t y ; second, the i n c o r p o r a t i o n of t a r i f f s i n t o the a n a l y s i s ; l a s t , a b e t t e r measurement of pro d u c t i o n economies present at the i n d u s t r y l e v e l . Focusing on p r o d u c t i v i t y Eastman and S t y k o l t ' s major concern was p r o d u c t i v i t y d i f f e r e n c e s i n the manufacturing s e c t o r , but c u r i o u s l y t h i s was not the a c t u a l focus of t h e i r model. To r e c a l l , the dependent v a r i a b l e they t e s t e d was the percentage of production u n i t s i n an industry o p e r a t i n g at or above MES. However, t h i s measure r e v e a l s l i t t l e i f any inf o r m a t i o n about p r o d u c t i v i t y per se. To see t h i s , imagine an i n d u s t r y whose long-run average cost curve i s v i r t u a l l y f l a t over a p o r t i o n of that curve extending from o n e - t h i r d MES to one-half MES. A p l a n t may then operate at an output l e v e l w i t h i n t h i s range and incur l i t t l e or no cost ( i . e . , p r o d u c t i v i t y ) disadvantage. If v a r i a t i o n s i n p r o d u c t i v i t y are the focus of i n t e r e s t , then a measurement of p r o d u c t i v i t y i s the most d i r e c t , and, t h e r e f o r e , best v a r i a b l e upon which to re g r e s s . I n c o r p o r a t i n g t a r i f f s Given the importance that Eastman and S t y k o l t LITERATURE REVIEW / 21 a t t r i b u t e d to the t a r i f f i n the for m u l a t i o n of t h e i r h y p o t h e s i s , i t i s c u r i o u s that a measure of t a r i f f p r o t e c t i o n f a i l e d to appear among the four r e g r e s s o r s they modeled. The reason behind t h i s omission would appear to be t h e i r (untested) b e l i e f that market s i z e i s e f f e c t i v e l y determined by t a r i f f s and,thus, that the r a t i o of r e l e v a n t market s i z e to MES s u f f i c e d to measure the "interdependence" or c o l l u s i v e n e s s of producers in a market. For according to Eastman and S t y k o l t , market s i z e s t r o n g l y determains both s t r u c t u r e and conduct and, hence, performance i n an i n d u s t r y . Thus, t h e i r key v a r i a b l e — t h e number of MES p l a n t s that the market could c o n t a i n — i s as c l o s e as Eastman and S t y k o l t come to i n c o r p o r a t i n g a t a r i f f v a r i a b l e as such. Perhaps without f u l l y r e a l i z i n g the consequences of t h e i r methodology, they assume, rather than t e s t , the c e n t r a l a x i s of t h e i r hypothesis. I n c o r p o r a t i n g economies of s c a l e One of the g r e a t e s t l i m i t a t i o n s that Eastman and S t y k o l t faced was an i n a b i l i t y to r e a l i s t i c a l l y model the impact of economies of s c a l e because of the u n a v a i l a b i l i t y of data that would have enabled them to estimate the shape of the long-run p l a n t average cost curve. Thus, they weren't able to include the co s t disadvantage of o p e r a t i n g at a LITERATURE REVIEW / 22 sc a l e below MES amongst the independent v a r i a b l e s they t e s t e d . As i n the above d i s c u s s i o n of t h e i r model's focus, the lack of such data handicapped t h e i r a b i l i t y to e x p l a i n the r o l e that production economies play i n determining p r o d u c t i v i t y l e v e l s i n a p l a n t or i n d u s t r y . Without knowledge of the diseconomies of small s i z e , no knowledge can be a r r i v e d at of the economies that l a r g e s i z e may b r i n g . Above and beyond t h e i r l a c k of cost disadvantage data, Eastman and S t y k o l t made no attempt to i d e n t i f y the s p e c i f i c source of any p o t e n t i a l or e x i s t i n g economies. The l e v e l of dis a g g r e g a t i o n of t h e i r data r e s t r i c t e d them to c o n s i d e r i n g p l a n t and m u l t i - p l a n t economies alone, thus i g n o r i n g economies at the product l e v e l . Furthermore, t h e i r treatment of m u l t i - p l a n t economies was r e s t r i c t e d to the importance of such economies to the l e v e l of f o r e i g n ownership i n an in d u s t r y , and was not d i r e c t l y r e l a t e d to p r o d u c t i v i t y . 4.2.2 . Bloch Research that followed i n Eastman and S t y k o l t ' s f o o t s t e p s bore f r u i t towards the end of the 1970's and the e a r l y 1980's i n the form of a surge of academic p u b l i c a t i o n s on the question of p r o d u c t i v i t y d i f f e r e n c e s between Canada and i t s competitors and on the suspected r o l e of the t a r i f f LITERATURE REVIEW / 23 in i n c u bating i n e f f i c i e n c y at home in the manufacturing s e c t o r . Harry Bloch had begun to study the importance of the t a r i f f and c o n c e n t r a t i o n d u r i n g the e a r l y ' s e v e n t i e s . He i n c o r p o r a t e d h i s i n i t i a l r e s u l t s i n t o a 1981 paper that added c o n s i d e r a b l y to Eastman and S t y k o l t with the i n t r o d u c t i o n of v a r i a b l e s measuring the height of t a r i f f p r o t e c t i o n , H e r f i n d a h l i n d i c e s of i n d u s t r i a l c o n c e n t r a t i o n and m u l t i p l i c a t i v e v a r i a b l e s that sought to capture the presumed i n t e r a c t i o n that occurs when both t a r i f f r a t e s and c o n c e n t r a t i o n l e v e l s are high. FOCUS Bloch i n v e s t i g a t e d the determinants of s c a l e e f f i c i e n c y i n 52 Canadian manufacturing i n d u s t r i e s (SICs), p l a c i n g s p e c i a l emphasis on the r o l e played by t a r i f f p r o t e c t i o n . As a dependent v a r i a b l e he chose a measure of s c a l e e f f i c i e n c y , SCALE, d e f i n e d as the weighted sum of above-MES production i n an i n d u s t r y . INDEPENDENT VARIABLES SCALE was regressed a g a i n s t 14 independent v a r i a b l e s : minimum e f f i c i e n t s c a l e , MES; market s i z e , MSIZE; market growth r a t e , GROW; degree of i n d u s t r y r e g i o n a l i s m , REGD; a product d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n dummy, COND; a c o s t disadvantage estimate, COSTE; a H e r f i n d a h l index of c o n c e t r a t i o n , HINDEX; LITERATURE REVIEW / 24 nominal and e f f e c t i v e rates of p r o t e c t i o n , NTAR and ETAR; and f i v e compound v a r i a b l e s d e r i v e d from the other seven. Four of these f i v e introduced, a l t e r n a t e l y , the nominal and e f f e c t i v e t a r i f f r a t e i n a m u l t i p l i c a t i v e r e l a t i o n s h i p with the H e r f i n d a h l index and the cost disadvantage r a t i o . The f i f t h compound v a r i a b l e combined the H e r f i n d a h l measure with the cost disadvantage r a t i o . Bloch argued that the r e l a t i o n s h i p between the independent v a r i a b l e s and SCALE was m u l t i p l i c a t i v e because the independent v a r i a b l e s " a f f e c t output l e v e l s through changing the slope of the revenue and cost f u n c t i o n s " . 8 Furthermore, MES and MSIZE were m u l t i p l i e d to c r e a t e a compound v a r i a b l e to r e f l e c t the f a c t that MES i s only a s i g n i f i c a n t b a r r i e r to s c a l e e f f i c i e n c y when market s i z e i s s u f f i c i e n t l y small to preclude entry at an e f f i c i e n t s c a l e . The r e g r e s s i o n equation, then, took the form 1. l og SCALE = a^ogCMES) + a 2log(MSIZE) + a3GROW + a«REGD + a5COND + a 6COSTE + a 7HINDEX + a 8NTAR + a 9HCOND + aHNTAR + aCNTAR Of p a r t i c u l a r i n t e r e s t are the t a r i f f based v a r i a b l e s : the nominal and e f f e c t i v e t a r i f f r a t e s and the four compound v a r i a b l e s HNTAR, HETAR, CNTAR AND CETAR. HNTAR i s cr e a t e d through the m u l t i p l i c a t i o n of a H e r f i n d a h l measure of co n c e n t r a t i o n with the nomimal t a r i f f . HETAR i s cr e a t e d LITERATURE REVIEW / 25 analogously, but the e f f e c t i v e r a t e i s s u b s t i t u t e d f o r the nominal t a r i f f r a t e . The two v a r i a b l e s are intended to capture the expected i n t e r p l a y that Eastman and S t y k o l t p o s t u l a t e d e x i s t e d between the degree of c o n c e n t r a t i o n i n an ind u s t r y and the height of t a r i f f p r o t e c t i o n . The other two v a r i a b l e s , CNTAR and CETAR, were s i m i l a r l y formed, but there the nominal and e f f e c t i v e t a r i f f r a t e s were combined with a dummy v a r i a b l e to f l a g consumer goods i n d u s t r i e s , where greater market power i s expected due to higher product d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n than e x i s t s i n non-consumer goods i n d u s t r i e s . With regard to the nominal and e f f e c t i v e r a t e s of p r o t e c t i o n , Bloch hypothesized three p o s s i b l e outcomes. In export o r i e n t e d i n d u s t r i e s , t a r i f f s were not expected to a f f e c t output. In other i n d u s t r i e s , the e f f e c t of t a r i f f s on output would depend on the degree of competition i n an i n d u s t r y : under p e r f e c t competition a nonnegative r e l a t i o n s h i p was p r e d i c t e d , while i n c o l l u s i v e s i t u a t i o n s t a r i f f s were expected to impact n e g a t i v e l y on output. I t was expected that t h i s tendency would be exacerbated when the cost disadvantage of op e r a t i n g at below MES was s m a l l . LITERATURE REVIEW / 26 S T A T I S T I C A L R E S U L T S Two models were t e s t e d : the f i r s t u s i n g nominal t a r i f f r a t e s of p r o t e c t i o n and the second u s i n g e f f e c t i v e t a r i f f r a t e s . The r e s u l t s of the two models were f a i r l y c o n s i s t e n t . Each explained about 72 percent of i n t e r - i n d u s t r y v a r i a t i o n i n the degree of s c a l e e f f i c i e n c y . In both cases, three v a r i a b l e s proved s t a t i s t i c a l l y s i g n i f i c a n t at the 90% l e v e l of confidence or g r e a t e r : log(MES), log(MSIZE) and HINDEX. Notably, the expected i n t e r a c t i o n between t a r i f f p r o t e c t i o n and c o n c e n t r a t i o n was not found. However, a negative c o e f f i c i e n t was reported on the t a r i f f and the other t a r i f f - d e r i v e d terms, supp o r t i n g the expected r e l a t i o n s h i p between these v a r i a b l e s and the degree of s c a l e e f f i c i e n c y . An i n t e r e s t i n g r e s u l t was obtained with regard to the compound v a r i a b l e s CNTAR and CETAR which t e s t e d the nature of the i n t e r p l a y of below-MES c o s t disadvantage with the l e v e l of t a r i f f p r o t e c t i o n . Bloch p o s i t e d that the two f a c t o r s combined would n e g a t i v e l y a f f e c t SCALE, however the r e s u l t s suggested a p o s i t i v e r e l a t i o n s h i p between CNTAR and CETAR on SCALE. C R I T I C A L ASSESSMENT The f i r s t o b s e r v a t i o n to be made regarding Bloch's model concerns the methodology used to d e r i v e the dependent LITERATURE REVIEW / 27 v a r i a b l e , SCALE. L i k e Eastman and S t y k o l t , Bloch d e r i v e d a measure of an i n d u s t r y ' s l e v e l of s c a l e e f f i c i e n c y by t a k i n g the r a t i o of the value of an i n d u s t r y ' s shipments o r i g i n a t i n g from above-MES production u n i t s to the i n d u s t r y t o t a l of shipments. Instead of engineering or e n t r e p r e n e u r i a l estimates, Bloch r e l i e d upon the s u r v i v o r method to estimate minimum e f f i c i e n t s c a l e , on which the d e r i v a t i o n of SCALE depended. Using U.S. data, he t a b u l a t e d the value of shipments f o r v a r i o u s employment c l a s s s i z e s , measuring the growth r a t e of the share of i n d u s t r y value of shipments accounted f o r by p l a n t s i n each c l a s s s i z e between 1958 and 1967. The f o l l o w i n g c r i t e r i o n was introduced: a c l a s s s i z e was d e f i n e d as e f f i c i e n t i f the share of i n d u s t r y value of shipments accounted fo r by p l a n t s i n a p a r t i c u l a r c l a s s s i z e grew by more than .005 percent between 1958 and 1967. Then the MES was estimated simply by the number of employees at the lower l i m i t of the s m a l l e s t e f f i c i e n t c l a s s s i z e . Three o b j e c t i o n s to t h i s methodology suggest themselves: the f i r s t i s the ad hoc nature of the .005 c r i t e r i o n used. Why t h i s value should be p r e f e r r e d over another i s never e x p l a i n e d . The c h o i c e seems to have a r i s e n not from t h e o r e t i c a l c o n s i d e r a t i o n s but rather due to s t a t i s t i c a l expediency. S e v e r a l s c e n a r i o s can be imagined according to which d i f f e r e n t c l a s s s i z e c a t e g o r i e s might LITERATURE REVIEW / 28 prosper, not out of e f f i c i e n c y but rather due to combinations of i n e f f i c i e n c y and uncompetitiveness. Thus, f o r example, a regime of high t a r i f f b a r r i e r s and low c o s t disadvantage plus high c o n c e n t r a t i o n r a t i o s might allow a s m a l l , i n e f f i c i e n t f r i n g e to grow. A l t e r n a t e l y , high b a r r i e r s to entry p l u s high c o n c e n t r a t i o n might allow a l a r g e r — y e t s t i l l i n e f f i c i e n t — s i z e category to grow d e s p i t e o p e r a t i n g at a l e v e l below MES. In both cases, MES would be underestimated. A second c r i t i c i s m i s that the use of employment l e v e l s may be i n a p p r o p r i a t e i n c a p i t a l i n t e n s i v e i n d u s t r i e s where increased t e c h n i c a l e f f i c i e n c y i s not n e c e s s a r i l y a s s o c i a t e d with higher employment l e v e l s . In f a c t , i n c r e a s e d mechanization and r o b o t i c s may introduce a negative c o r r e l a t i o n between employment c l a s s s i z e and e f f i c i e n c y . A f i n a l c r i t i c i s m i s that the e s t i m a t i o n of MES using employment c l a s s s i z e s i s too crude a methodology, s i n c e i t has the e f f e c t of l i m i t i n g the p o s s i b l e range of MES i n the manufacturing sector to only f i v e i n t e g e r s , corresponding to the lower boundary of the f i v e employment s i z e c l a s s e s that manufacturing data i s aggregated i n t o . The tendency here would be to overestimate the degree of e f f i c i e n c y i n an i n d u s t r y . On the p o s i t i v e s i d e , s c a l e e f f i c i e n c y estimates d e r i v e d using the employment s i z e c l a s s methodology allowed LITERATURE REVIEW / 29 f o r the c o l l e c t i o n of data on a l a r g e r sample of i n d u s t r i e s , and thus higher s t a t i s t i c a l degrees of freedom. Perhaps the most i n t e r e s t i n g aspect of the model, in the context of t h i s t h e s i s , are the i n s i g h t s i t o f f e r s i n t o the Canadian School's h y p o t h e s i s . Bloch improved upon Eastman and S t y k o l t by i n c l u d i n g three t a r i f f - d e r i v e d v a r i a b l e s : the t a r i f f l e v e l i t s e l f , a t a r i f f / c o n c e n t r a t i o n r a t e v a r i a b l e , and a t a r i f f / c o s t curve v a r i a b l e . U n f o r t u n a t e l y , there i s some concern about the way i n which the v a r i a b l e s were modeled. The concern stems from the simultaneous i n c l u s i o n of the three t a r i f f - b a s e d v a r i a b l e s t a r i f f - b a s e d v a r i a b l e s and from the h i g h degree of c o r r e l a t i o n that t h i s undoubtedly lead t o , given the s i m i l a r i t y of the three v a r i a b l e s . However, the extent of the problem can not be assessed, however, s i n c e Bloch d i d n ' t i n c l u d e a c o r r e l a t i o n matrix i n h i s paper. A more se r i o u s problem ( i n l i g h t of the f a c t that none of " the t a r i f f - b a s e d v a r i a b l e s proved s t a t i s t i c a l l y s i g n i f i c a n t ) may have been the r e l a t i o n s h i p between MES and the dependent v a r i a b l e , SCALE. The i n c l u s i o n of MES may have introduced a spurious r e l a t i o n s h i p i n t o the model, since the estimate of the former was used to d e r i v e SCALE. Since log(MES) i s one of the two main d r i v i n g v a r i a b l e s behind the model (MSIZE being the other one) both i t s s t a t i s t i c a l s i g n i f i c a n c e and the impressive c o e f f i c i e n t s of LITERATURE REVIEW / 30 determination must be regarded c a u t i o u s l y . As f o r the Canadian school hypothesis, no s t a t i s t i c a l l y s i g n i f i c a n t evidence was found to support i t . In f a c t , none of the t a r i f f - d e r i v e d v a r i a b l e s proved s i g n i f i c a n t . Furthermore, at a c r u c i a l stage i n the model, the sign of the ES-type v a r i a b l e was i n c o r r e c t : Bloch's i n t e r a c t i o n v a r i a b l e s f o r c o n c e n t r a t i o n and t a r i f f l e v e l d i s p l a y e d a p o s i t i v e r e l a t i o n s h i p between high t a r i f f s / h i g h c o n c e n t r a t i o n and the degree of s c a l e e f f i c i e n c y — t h e opposite of what the theory had suggested. Bloch attempted to c o r r e c t f o r t h i s unexpected turn of events by using an a l t e r n a t e measure of c o n c e n t r a t i o n . Instead of a H e r f i n d a h l index, he t r i e d a measure of p l a n t s i z e v a r i a n c e , arguing that a spurious r e l a t i o n s h i p may e x i s t between the H e r f i n d a h l index and p l a n t s i z e . T h i s a l t e r n a t i v e model performed p o o r l y , however, producing few s t a t i s t i c a l l y s i g n i f i c a n t v a r i a b l e s . C u r i o u s l y , i n one of these a l t e r n a t i v e r e g r e s s i o n s , the net t a r i f f v a r i a b l e proved s i g n i f i c a n t f o r the f i r s t time. But d i s c r e p a n c i e s elsewhere r a i s e questions about the v a r i a n c e model. For one t h i n g , the c o e f f i c i e n t s of determination i n the va r i a n c e v e r s i o n showed a greater v a r i a t i o n between the explanatory a b i l i t y of the p l a n t s i z e model and the s c a l e e f f i c i e n c y model. In the H e r f i n d a h l model, the d i f f e r e n c e between the R f 2 ' s was on the order of .03, while i n the v a r i a n c e model, LITERATURE REVIEW / 31 the gap jumped to greater than .3. Since the only d i f f e r e n c e , as has been s a i d , between the pl a n t s i z e model and the s c a l e model was the i n c l u s i o n of the one v a r i a b l e , MES, one wouldn't expect such a change i n v a r i a n c e of so great magnitude between one v e r s i o n and the other. Another problem with the varia n c e model i s the discrepancy that arose between the combined v a r i a n c e / t a r i f f v a r i a b l e s . Run using net t a r i f f r a t e s , the outcome suggested a p o s i t i v e r e l a t i o n s h i p between a high c o n c e n t r a t i o n / t a r i f f mix. But when run using e f f e c t i v e t a r i f f r a t e s , the outcome suggested a negative r e l a t i o n s h i p . Whatever the m e r i t s of net over e f f e c t i v e measures of p r o t e c t i o n , they should have i n f l u e n c e d the outcome in i d e n t i c a l d i r e c t i o n s . In c o n c l u s i o n , then, Bloch's models do not len d any s t a t i s t i c a l l y s i g n i f i c a n t support to the t h e s i s that t a r i f f l e v e l s have i n any w a y — e i t h e r on t h e i r own or i n tandem with other i n f l u e n c e s — a f f e c t e d the extent of e f f i c i e n t production i n an i n d u s t r y . 4.2.3. Saunders Ronald Saunders of the U n i v e r s i t y of Toronto d i s p l a y e d marked c r e a t i v i t y i n h i s attempt to model the determinants of p r o d u c t i v i t y . The gr e a t e s t c o n t r i b u t i o n , perhaps, of h i s work, was the a t t e n t i o n he devoted to the quest i o n of s c a l e economies. He introduced a measure of the cost disadvantage LITERATURE REVIEW / 32 r a t i o as w e l l as a market-adjusted measure of MES, the l a t t e r of which i n c o r p o r a t e d Eastman and S t y k o l t ' s market s i z e v a r i a b l e . Saunders used a more r e l i a b l e measure of MES than c o u l d be d e r i v e d from a s i m p l i s t i c breakdown i n t o c l a s s s i z e . A d d i t i o n a l l y , he c o n s t r u c t e d h i s dependent v a r i a b l e using a measure of i n d u s t r y ' s p r o d u c t i v i t y rather than the percentage of s c a l e e f f i c i e n c y as Eastman and S t y k o l t and Bloch had done. So Saunders moved s e v e r a l steps c l o s e r to an accurate model of p r o d u c t i v i t y . FOCUS In a 1980 a r t i c l e , Saunders sought to e x p l a i n the i n t e r i n d u s t r y v a r i a t i o n of the p r o d u c t i v i t y of Canadian manufacturing i n d u s t r i e s r e l a t i v e to the p r o d u c t i v i t y of counterpart i n d u s t r i e s i n the United S t a t e s . The dependent v a r i a b l e , ZQ, was a r a t i o of the p h y s i c a l value added per employee i n Canada at the three d i g i t Standard I n d u s t r i a l C l a s s i f i c a t i o n (SIC) l e v e l , to the p h y s i c a l value added per employee i n the U.S. counterpart i n d u s t r y . P h y s i c a l p r o d u c t i v i t y f o r Canada was measured as f o l l o w s : V c = E C [ P C - (1 + t ) a ] where V c = value added per employee i n the Canadian i n d u s t r y E c = p h y s i c a l net output per employee, Canada P c = Canadian p r i c e of output t = Canadian nominal t a r i f f on inputs LITERATURE REVIEW / 33 a = u n i t cost of m a t e r i a l s U.S. p h y s i c a l p r o d u c t i v i t y estimates were then d e r i v e d and the r a t i o s were taken to a r r i v e at a measure of r e l a t i v e p r o d u c t i v i t y . T h i s r a t i o was then transformed i n t o one based on the e f f e c t i v e rate of t a r i f f p r o t e c t i o n of output using the assumption that P^ , = P „ d + n) where n i s the Canadian nominal t a r i f f i n outputs. INDEPENDENT VARIABLES ZQ was regressed against 11 explanatory v a r i a b l e s u s i n g a sample s i z e of 84 t h r e e - d i g i t Canadian manufacturing i n d u s t r i e s with data from 1967. The p r i n c i p a l explanatory v a r i a b l e , dominating the e n t i r e model, was an i n t e r e s t i n g c o n s t r u c t , c h r i s t e n e d SP25, designed to measure the importance of s c a l e economies i n r e l a t i v e i n t e r - i n d u s t r y p r o d u c t i v i t y d i f f e r e n c e s . SP25 was de f i n e d i n the f o l l o w i n g manner: SP25 = (0.25 - EFT) X (LOG MESR) X O/CDRU) where EFT = rate of e f f e c t i v e t a r i f f p r o t e c t i o n , Canadian i n d u s t r y . MESR = MABU/RMS MABU = Average shipments per establishment, l a r g e s t establishments accounting f o r 50% of employment i n the in d u s t r y , U.S. Th i s i s used as a proxy f o r miniumum e f f i c i e n t s c a l e p l a n t s i z e . LITERATURE REVIEW / 34 RMS = an estimate of the s i z e of the market to which Canadian producers have access d i v i d e d by the s i z e of the market to which American producers have a c c e s s . CDRU = the c o s t disadvantage r a t i o , United S t a t e s i n d u s t r y (value added per employee in the s m a l l e s t e s t a b l i s h m e n t s accounting f o r h a l f of employment i n the i n d u s t r y d i v i d e d by value added per worker in the l a r g e s t establishments a c c o u n t i n g f o r the other h a l f ) . Without e n t e r i n g i n t o unnecessary d e t a i l over the mechanics of the v a r i a b l e , a few worthwhle p o i n t s can be made. The v a r i a b l e i s designed to measure the importance of plant economies of s c a l e . Where t a r i f f s are higher than 25 percent, SP25 w i l l be negative. By c o r o l l o r y , where t a r i f f s are lower than 25 percent, SP25 would be p o s i t i v e . Given the t a r i f f l e v e l . SP25 inc r e a s e s or decreases the higher the MES/market s i z e and c o s t disadvantage r a t i o s a r e . The r a t e of increase or decrease d i m i n i s h e s a s y m p t o t i c a l l y . In a d d i t i o n to SP25, the f o l l o w i n g v a r i a b l e s were a l s o i n c l u d e d : LABR, the l a b o u r / c a p i t a l r a t i o ; a measure of the r e l a t i v e p r o f e s s i o n a l worker i n t e n s i t y , PTMR; FSE, the percentage of shipments accounted f o r by f o r e i g n - c o n t r o l l e d f i r m s ; IMPDD, the share of imports i n domestic disappearance; C4Cd, the s e l l e r c o n c e n t r a t i o n r a t i o when cost disadvantage and t a r i f f s are h i g h ; REG, a r e g i o n a l dummy; NPWR, a measure of nonproduction ( s k i l l e d ) p e r s onnel; and RDRJ, a measure of r e s e a r c h and development i n t e n s i t y . LITERATURE REVIEW / 35 A d d i t i o n a l l y , two dummy v a r i a b l e s , PRC and PRV were i n c l u d e d i n an attempt to account f o r any d e v i a t i o n from the l i m i t p r i c i n g behaviour that might r e s u l t from a combination of low import competition and high s e l l e r c o n c e n t r a t i o n or from an i n d u s t r y ' s p o s i t i o n of comparative advantage (proxied by a high export/shipments r a t i o ) . Thus, the r e g r e s s i o n took the form presented below. The expected sig n of the c o e f f i c i e n t s i s shown below the r e s p e c t i v e v a r i a b l e . ZQ= a,SP25 + a 2FSE + a 3IMPDD + a„C4CD + a 5 RDRJ + a 6PRC + a 7PRU + a 8REG + a 9LABR + a10NPWR + a,,PTMR STATISTICAL RESULTS The model was run using both OLS and two-stage l e a s t - s q u a r e s e s t i m a t i o n techniques. In both v e r s i o n s , the four v a r i a b l e s SP25, FSE, NPWR, and PTMR were s i g n i f i c a n t at the 90 percent l e v e l of c o n f i d e n c e . A comparison of expected and a c t u a l signs r e v e a l s no s u r p r i s e s here. The remaining v a r i a b l e s were g e n e r a l l y i n s i g n i f i c a n t although C4CD and RDRJ were both weakly s i g n i f i c a n t i n the OLS v e r s i o n . A l s o , s i g n switching occurred i n two cases (IMPDD and the p r i c i n g behaviour c o r r e c t i o n a l dummy, PRC), c r e a t i n g ambiguity regarding the impact of those v a r i a b l e s on p r o d u c t i v i t y . Two r e s u l t s are of p a r t i c u l a r i n t e r e s t . The f i r s t i s the performance of C4CD, the v a r i a b l e that t e s t e d the LITERATURE REVIEW / 36 c e n t r a l Canadian School tenent concerning the i n t e r p l a y of s e l l e r c o n c e n t r a t i o n / c o s t disadvantage/high t a r i f f s . The v a r i a b l e proved weakly s i g n f i c a n t i n the OLS v e r s i o n but i n s i g n i f i c a n t in the two-stage l e a s t squares v e r s i o n . In both instances i t was p o s i t i v e l y signed, i n c o n t r a s t to the Canadian School p r e d i c t i o n . T h i s l e d Saunders to quest i o n the hypothesis that firms with market power provide a p r i c e umbrella that enables s m a l l - s c a l e firms to s u r v i v e . Even i f such an umbrella does e x i s t , he concluded that " i t appears not to have a s i g n i f i c a n t e f f e c t on the p r o d u c t i v i t y of an i n d u s t r y " . 9 The other v a r i a b l e of p a r t i c u l a r i n t e r e s t i s SP25. The r e g r e s s i o n r e s u l t s suggested that the presence of p l a n t economies of s c a l e i s s i g n i f i c a n t l y and p o s i t i v e l y a s s o c i a t e d with r e l a t i v e Canada/U.S. p r o d u c t i v i t y d i f f e r e n c e s . That i s , s c a l e economies e x i s t , but market power and high t a r i f f s provide i n s o l a t i o n from competition, p e r m i t t i n g and encouraging i n e f f i c i e n t l y small s c a l e s of output. At f i r s t glance t h i s s c e n a r i o would seem to c o n t r a d i c t the r e s u l t s implied by C4CD. On f u r t h e r c o n s i d e r a t i o n , though, the " s t o r y " n e a t l y f i t s t ogether: where SP25 i s high and n e g a t i v e , ( i e . , p l a n t economies are important and cost disadvantage and t a r i f f s are h i g h ) , no small s c a l e f r i n g e e x i s t s because i n e f f i c i e n t l y small producers incur too great a cost disadvantage to s u r v i v e . LITERATURE REVIEW / 37 However, where SP25 i s low, then cost disadvantage i s l i k e l y low as w e l l , so that the b a r r i e r to entry at low l e v e l s need not e n t a i l the same degree of i n e f f i c i e n c y , nor take the same t o l l on p r o d u c t i v i t y , as i t would when co s t disadvantage i s g r e a t . A f i n a l o b s e r v a t i o n to be made regarding the s t a t i s t i c a l r e s u l t s concerns the performance of IMPDD, the v a r i a b l e that p r o x i e d the extent of import c o m p e t i t i o n . The Canadian school hypothesis suggests that a p o s t i v e r e l a t i o n s h i p should e x i s t between the degree of import competition that domestic i n d u s t r i e s are exposed to and t h e i r l e v e l of p r o d u c t i v i t y . That no s i g n i f i c a n t r e l a t i o n s h i p was found and that a negative r e l a t i o n s h i p was reported i n the TSLS model c o u l d be d i s c o n c e r t i n g . Saunders pointed to the high degree of c o r r e l a t i o n between IMPDD and the p r i c i n g c o r r e c t o r PRC as a probable cause. CRITICAL ASSESSMENT The f i r s t o b s e r v a t i o n to be made regards the methodology used to d e r i v e the dependent v a r i a b l e . Inherent in Saunders' p r o d u c t i v i t y measure was the assumption that producers f o l l o w an u p - t o - t h e - t a r i f f l i m i t p r i c e p o l i c y . By " p r i c i n g - u p - t o - t h e - t a r i f f " , i t i s meant that firms i n an ind u s t r y w i l l set t h e i r p r i c e at a l e v e l that j u s t excludes the f u l l y e l a s t i c supply assumed a v a i l a b l e i n i n t e r n a t i o n a l markets. In other words, they would set the LITERATURE REVIEW / 38 p r i c e equal to the import p r i c e p l u s the t a r i f f . T h i s s o r t of behaviour would only be p l a u s i b l e f o r those commodities f o r which imports and domestic output are p e r f e c t s u b s t i t u t e s . Thus, t h i s p r i c i n g behaviour excludes a wide range of products, i n c l u d i n g most consumer products. Furthermore, an u p - t o - t h e - t a r i f f p r i c i n g p o l i c y i s u n l i k e l y save where market power and b a r r i e r s to entry combine with c o n c e n t r a t i o n . I t should be noted that the Canadian School hypothesis a l s o a t t r i b u t e d an u p - t o - t h e - t a r i f f p r i c i n g behaviour to those i n d u s t r i e s with s u f f i c i e n t market power to l i m i t new e n t r a n t s and set p r i c e s , whether through c o l l u s i o n or unorchestrated p r o f i t - m a x i m i z i n g behaviour by i n d i v i d u a l f i r m s . But to b u i l d t h i s behaviour i n t o a model in an attempt to v e r i f y the v a l i d i t y of such a hypothesis i s i n a p p r o p r i a t e , given the t a u t o l o g i c a l nature of the s p e c i f i c a t i o n . I d e a l l y , a more f l e x i b l e form must be found to ^allow f o r a range of p r i c i n g behaviours i n c l u d i n g that of l i m i t p r i c i n g , but not at the expense of e x c l u d i n g other p o s s i b l e and indeed observed p r i c i n g behaviours. The same comment can be made with regard to the s p e c i f i c a t i o n of the explanatory v a r i a b l e SP25. By i t s very design, t h i s complex v a r i a b l e introduced a negative r e l a t i o n s h i p between the t r i n i t y of high t a r i f f s / M E S / c o s t disadvantage and p r o d u c t i v i t y — o n e of the main tenents of LITERATURE REVIEW / 39 the Canadian School hypothesis. As can be seen, SP25 i s set up i n such a way that a reduction of the e f f e c t i v e r a t e below 0.25 percent leads to an i n c r e a s e i n p r o d u c t i v i t y . Rather than t e s t t h i s hypothesis, Saunders merely designs h i s model to act as he imagines i t must and then randomly (that i s , without t h e o r e t i c a l foundation or j u s t i f i c a t i o n ) set out the s p e c i f i c a t i o n of the s c a l e economies v a r i a b l e , SP25, to a r r i v e at the best p o s s i b l e f i t f o r the r e g r e s s i o n p l o t using l e a s t squared econometric e s t i m a t i o n methodology. Notwithstanding the a r b i t r a r y way i n which the value of 0.25 was a r r i v e d a t , i t nonetheless h i t s upon an important i s s u e : perhaps there e x i s t s a watershed above and below which the e f f e c t of t a r i f f s has a d i s t i n c t i n f l u e n c e upon the r e a l i z a t i o n of economies of s c a l e i n the production process. In the Saunders model, the t u r n i n g point i s 0.25. Thus, f o r a given l e v e l of MES and a given cost disadvantage for o p e r a t i n g below MES, a v a i l a b l e economies of s c a l e w i l l or w i l l not be r e a l i z e d depending upon the degree of p r o t e c t i o n a f f o r d e d an i n d u s t r y . A high t a r i f f a llows i n e f f i c i e n t l y small producers to operate, which w i l l impart a negative i n f l u e n c e on o v e r a l l p r o d u c t i v i t y . When p r o t e c t i o n i s reduced, so are the number of i n e f f i c i e n t producers that can continue to e x i s t ; some e x i t , and p r o d u c t i v i t y as a whole c o u l d be expected to r i s e . LITERATURE REVIEW / 40 Having s a i d t h i s , however, i t should be immediately s t a t e d that there i s no t h e o r e t i c a l l y imaginable j u s t i f i c a t i o n f o r imposing a s i n g l e switching p o i n t uniformly across a l l i n d u s t r i e s . So Saunders' s p e c i f i c a t i o n , while f l a g g i n g an i n t e r e s t i n g p o s s i b i l i t y , i s i n i t s e l f unconvincing. By way of summary, Saunders o f f e r s a p e r f e c t example of how u n q u e s t i o n i n g l y the Eastman/Stykolt hypothesis has been accepted by c e r t a i n r e s e a r c h e r s . T h i s becomes apparent i n the s p e c i f i c a t i o n of the SP25 v a r i a b l e . By i t s very design, t h i s complex v a r i a b l e i n t r o d u c e s a negative r e l a t i o n s h i p between high t a r i f f s and p r o d u c t i v i t y . I t i s set up i n such a way that a r e d u c t i o n of the e f f e c t i v e t a r i f f r a t e below 0.25 percent leads to an i n c r e a s e i n p r o d u c t i v i t y . But rather than t e s t t h i s h ypothesis, Saunders merely designs h i s model to act as he imagines i t must, and then sets out the s p e c i f i c a t i o n s of the v a r i a b l e to a r r i v e at the best p o s s i b l e f i t f o r the r e g r e s s i o n p l o t . 4.2 .4 . Caves, P o r t e r , Spence and S c o t t FOCUS Caves et a l (1980) looked at the q u e s t i o n of p r o d u c t i v i t y w i t h i n the context of a m u l t i f a c e t e d study of competition i n the small and open Canadian economy. The LITERATURE REVIEW / 41 study was based on data on 150 s t r u c t u r e and performance v a r i a b l e s f o r 84 Canadian manufacturing i n d u s t r i e s . The time period was between 1961 and 1974. One of the focuses of the study was the determinants*of t e c h n i c a l e f f i c i e n c y . The dependent v a r i a b l e was a measure of t e c h n i c a l e f f i c i e n c y i n Canada r e l a t i v e to the United S t a t e s , measured as log TE = log V c + log wu + rQ u - log (1 + E) V w + F Q u c c xc where V i s the value added per worker w i s the wage rate r i s the cost of c a p i t a l w i s the shadow p r i c e of labour r i s the shadow p r i c e of c a p i t a l E i s the e f f e c t i v e r a t e of p r o t e c t i o n Q i s the output l e v e l and the s u b s c r i p t s c and u i n d i c a t e Canada and the United States. C a l c u l a t i o n of TE depended h e a v i l y upon the assumption that manufacturers follow an u p - t o - t h e - t a r i f f p r i c i n g p o l i c y . T h i s can be seen from the formula used to d e r i v e an estimate of the e f f e c t i v e rate of p r o t e c t i o n , E = p u ( l + n) - m u ( l + t) P.. ~ m u u LITERATURE REVIEW / 42 where is the U.S. price n i s the nominal rate of protection m i s the unit materials cost. The key part of the assumption i s that p = p (1+n) c u and that m = m (1+t) c u where t is the Canadian nominal t a r i f f on materials. INDEPENDENT VARIABLES To provide their model more f l e x i b l i t y than the r i g i d p r i c i n g assumption would otherwise have allowed, six variables were incorporated to capture the extent to which such pricing policy i s not followed. Each variable sought to capture an industry c h a r a c t e r i s t i c that was thought to lessen the a b i l i t y of firms to price up to the t a r i f f and r e a l i z e the monopoly rent potential that the t a r i f f i s expected to generate. As a whole, the six variables were intended to proxy the lack of barriers to entry and the presence of a degree of competition that would lessen the "interdependence of firms" (to use Eastman and Stykolt's LITERATURE REVIEW / 43 e x p r e s s i o n ) . The s i x v a r i a b l e s i n c l u d e d : the degree of f o r e i g n ownership; imports as a f r a c t i o n of domestic disappearance; exports as a f r a c t i o n of t o t a l shipments; 3 c o n c e n t r a t i o n rate dummies for convenience, non-convenience and producer goods i n d u s t r i e s ; and the d i f f e r e n c e between the Canadian and U.S. cost disadvantage r a t i o , CDRC - CDRU. In a d d i t i o n , four v a r i a b l e s , considered to be d i r e c t determinants of t e c h n i c a l e f f i c i e n c y , were i n c l u d e d amongst the explanatory v a r i a b l e s . These were: a measure of U.S. MES; the co s t disadvantage r a t i o of smaller p l a n t s to l a r g e r i n the United S t a t e s ; a consumer good dummy; and a r e g i o n a l dummy. S T A T I S T I C A L RESULTS R e s u l t s were r e p o r t e d using three d i f f e r e n t e s t i m a t i o n techniques. Ordinary l e a s t - s q u a r e s r e g r e s s i o n s were run using only those i n d u s t r i e s f o r which a complete set of obse r v a t i o n s for the modelled v a r i a b l e s were a v a i l a b l e . A second OLS r e g r e s s i o n s was run using an enhanced sample i n which missing o b s e r v a t i o n s were f i l l e d by the p r e d i c t e d r e s u l t . A t h i r d r e g r e s s i o n was run using two-stage l e a s t - s q u a r e s e s t i m a t i o n techniques with the enhanced sample. The outcomes, f o r each v a r i a b l e tended to show c o n s i d e r a b l e v a r i a t i o n between r e g r e s s i o n techniques. Sign LITERATURE REVIEW / 44 switching occurred i n s i x of the eleven v a r i a b l e s as we l l as in the constant. Only CDRC-CDRU proved c o n s i s t e n t l y s i g n i f i c a n t . However, f i v e other varables were s i g n i f i c a n t i n both the OLS and TSLSL: the c o n c e n t r a t i o n r a t e i n convenience good i n d u s t r i e s (-ve); minimum e f f i c i e n t s c a l e (-ve);. the cost disadvantage r a t i o (-ve); and the consumer goods and r e g i o n a l dummies (-ve and +ve). Because the t h i r d e s t i m a t i o n technique i n v o l v e d the e l i m i n a t i o n of i n d u s t r i e s f o r which data was incomplete, a reduced sample r e s u l t e d i n only twenty degrees of freedom (as opposed to 72 for the f u l l sample), c r e a t i n g problems r e l a t e d to the v i o l a t i o n of assumptions of a normally d i s t r i b u t e d sample. For t h i s reason, i t may be ap p r o p r i a t e to focus on the OLS and TSLS estimates to t r y to determine the v a l i d i t y of the r e g r e s s i o n r e s u l t s . Looked at i n t h i s manner, the f o l l o w i n g c o n c l u s i o n s may be drawn: f o r e i g n ownership appears to p o s i t i v e l y a f f e c t t e c h n i c a l e f f i c i e n c y , as"does exposure to imports and the r e g i o n a l i t y of the manufacturing a c t i v i t y . F i v e v a r i a b l e s demonstrated a c o n s i s t e n t l y negative i n f l u e n c e on t e c h n i c a l e f f i c i e n c y . These i n c l u d e d : the c o n c e n t r a t i o n / convenience good dummy; the d i f f e r e n c e between the Canadian and American c o s t disadvantage r a t i o ; minimum e f f i c i e n t s c a l e ; the American co s t disadvantage; and a consumer dummy v a r i a b l e . The remaining v a r i a b l e s d i s p l a y e d ambiguous r e s u l t s between the LITERATURE REVIEW / 45 two e s t i m a t i o n techniques. CRITICAL ASSESSMENT The r e s u l t s obtained by Caves et a l po i n t e d to the importance of economies of s c a l e i n the r e a l i z a t i o n of t e c h n i c a l e f f i c i e n c y ; MESU, CDRU, and CDRC-CDRU a l l were c o n s i s t e n t l y s i g n i f i c a n t and n e g a t i v e l y signed. However, the study r e v e a l e d l i t t l e concerning the Canadian School's p o s i t i o n on the i n t e r a c t i v e r o l e of c o n c e n t r a t i o n and t a r i f f s . In f a c t , the t a r i f f d i d not even appear amongst the independent v a r i a b l e s , f o r the reason that i t was an i n t e g r a l p a r t of the formula used to d e r i v e the measure of t e c h n i c a l e f f i c i e n c y i t s e l f . The three c o n c e n t r a t i o n / p r o d u c t nature v a r i a b l e s sought to capture the r e l a t i o n s h i p between demand sid e f a c t o r s and s e l l e r c o n c e n t r a t i o n on the one hand, and t e c h n i c a l e f f i c i e n c y on the other, but these, again, were intended to capture the extent by which the a c t u a l s e l l i n g p r i c e d i f f e r s from the U.S. p r i c e p l u s t a r i f f . So n e i t h e r the design nor i n t e n t of the v a r i a b l e can r e a l l y be thought of as i n keeping with the Canadian School. 4.2.5. Baldwin and Gorecki Baldwin and Gorecki were mentioned i n the i n t r o d u c t i o n as two of t h i s decade's more p r o l i f i c authors i n the area of Canadian res e a r c h on the determinants of p r o d u c t i v i t y and LITERATURE REVIEW / 46 r e l a t e d f a c t o r s . They have s t u d i e d the determinants of entry to and e x i t from Canadian manufacturing; the determinants of sub-optimal c a p a c i t y ; of length of production run; of p l a n t s i z e ; of product d i v e r s i t y . Much of the e x p e r t i s e and wisdom accumulated from these s t u d i e s was in c o r p o r a t e d i n t o t h e i r 1986 study on the Role of Scale i n Canada-U.S. P r o d u c t i v i t y D i f f e r e n c e s i n the Manufacturing Sector from 1970 to 1979. In p a r t i c u l a r , the e a r l i e r s t u d i e s had l e a d Baldwin and Gorecki to the co n c l u s i o n that the degree of product d i v e r s i t y at the p l a n t l e v e l and the l e n g t h of the production r u n s — a n d not pl a n t s i z e as had p r e v i o u s l y been thought—were the keys to understanding p r o d u c t i v i t y d i f f f e r e n c e s . While p l a n t s i z e s t i l l may be an important explanatory v a r i a b l e , i t was deemed l e s s important than the other two. T h i s , i n turn, was r e f l e c t e d i n the design of the r e g r e s s i o n models that they t e s t e d . FOCUS The focus of t h i s study was the r o l e that economies of sc a l e p l a y i n determining p r o d u c t i v i t y d i f f e r e n c e s i n the manufacturing s e c t o r . One of the d i s t i n g u i s h i n g features of Baldwin and Gorecki*s p r o d u c t i v i t y models i s the l e v e l of aggregation on which they were c o n s t r u c t e d . Improving upon e a r l i e r s t u d i e s t h a t , f o r p a u c i t y of in f o r m a t i o n , had r e l i e d s o l e l y on i n d u s t r i a l l e v e l data, Baldwin and Gorecki were LITERATURE REVIEW / 47 able to i n c o r p o r a t e economies of s c a l e at the product l e v e l i n t o t h e i r a n a l y s i s , i n t r o d u c i n g f o r the f i r s t time i n d i c e s of i n d u s t r y p l a n t l e v e l d i v e r s i t y . Four estimates of TFP were d e r i v e d : TFP1 through TFP4. To d e r i v e the f i r s t estimate, TFP1, constant r e t u r n s to s c a l e were assumed, and labour was assumed to earn i t s marginal product. For the remaining three measures, the data fo r the two sample years were pooled, and from t h i s pooled sample s c a l e economy estimates ( i . e . , the sum of the labour and c a p i t a l c o e f f i c i e n t s ) were d e r i v e d . The second t o t a l f a c t o r p r o d u c t i v i t y measure, TFP2, used these estimates to adjust the constant returns r e s u l t s , while TFP3 and TFP4 repl a c e d the constant returns r e s u l t s with the s c a l e economy estimates. These f i n a l two measures were d i s t i n c t from one another by v i r t u e of the l e v e l of aggregation of the production f u n c t i o n for which the labour and c a p i t a l e l a s t i c i t i e s were estimated: TFP3 was estimated at the ind u s t r y l e v e l , while establishment l e v e l data was used to d e r i v e TFP4. Of the four estimates, Baldwin and Gorecki s i n g l e d out TFP4 as t h e i r p r e f e r r e d measure. The models upon which these estimates were b u i l t to t e s t i n t e r - i n d u s t r y p r o d u c t i v i t y d i f f e r e n c e s were i d e n t i c a l , with the exception of the TFP1 model (which i n c o r p o r a t e d an a d d i t i o n a l v a r i a b l e that sought to proxy s c a l e economy e f f e c t s ) . As the r e s u l t s between models were s i m i l a r , the f o l l o w i n g d i s c u s s i o n w i l l LITERATURE REVIEW / 48 focus on the TFP4 model and r e s u l t s , and then these r e s u l t s w i l l be b r i e f l y compared and c o n t r a s t e d with those of the TFP1 and TFP3 models (the TFP2 model r e s u l t s were not rep o r t e d ) . INDEPENDENT VARIABLES TFP4 was regressed a g a i n s t 13 independent v a r i a b l e s that attempted to capture the market c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s of the 102 4 - d i g i t i n d u s t r i e s i n c l u d e d i n the Baldwin and Gorecki sample. These v a r i a b l e s are l i s t e d below: IMP: imports as a p r o p o r t i o n of domestic disappearance, where the l a t t e r c o n s i s t of domestic production minus exports p l u s imports. ERP: the e f f e c t i v e r a t e of p r o t e c t i o n i n an i n d u s t r y . MPLNT: dummy v a r i a b l e which takes on the value 1 when the average number of p l a n t s per f i r m i s grea t e r than the mean, zero otherwise. FOR.: the p r o p o r t i o n of i n d u s t r y shipments accounted f o r by foreign-owned e n t e r p r i s e s . EXP: the p r o p o r t i o n of domestic production that i s exported. RELDIV5:an i n d u s t r y average d i v e r s i t y measured at the commodity l e v e l . ADVDM: the a d v e r t i s i n g / s a l e s r a t i o f o r consumer non-durable goods i n d u s t r i e s , zero otherwise LITERATURE REVIEW / 49 CDR1: a measure of the cost disadvantage of small p l a n t s r e l a t i v e to l a r g e p l a n t s . MESMSD: the r a t i o of domestic disappearance to USMES. RD: the r a t i o of research and development personnel to a l l wage and s a l a r y e arners. HVTRHCT:a dummy v a r i a b l e set equal to 1 when c o n c e n t r a t i o n , e f f e c t i v e t a r i f f p r o t e c t i o n and f o r e i g n ownership are high, zero otherwise. EASTV: HVTRHCR * MESMSD. The r a t i o of domestic disappearance to MES where both c o n c e n t r a t i o n and e f f e c t i v e t a r i f f p r o t e c t i o n are greater than t h e i r r e s p e c t i v e means, zero otherwise. REG: a r e g i o n a l dummy t a k i n g on a value of 1 when the industry was c l a s s i f i e d r e g i o n a l , zero otherwise. The n u l l hypothesis of the model was that competition a s s e r t s a p o s i t i v e i n f l u e n c e on e f f i c i e n c y — h e n c e that a p o s i t i v e r e l a t i o n s h i p e x i s t s between competition and p r o d u c t i v i t y . The two i n t e r a c t i v e v a r i a b l e s , HVTRHCT and EASTV were included to t e s t the Eastman S t y k o l t h y p o t h e s i s . However, only HVTRHCT was t r u l y an ES-type v a r i a b l e , being the composite of hig h t a r i f f s , h i g h c o n c e n t r a t i o n and high f o r e i g n ownership. The other i n t e r a c t i v e v a r i a b l e , EASTV, added an a d d i t i o n a l f a c t o r to HVTRHCT by m u l t i p l y i n g i t with a measure of the Canadian market s i z e r e l a t i v e to MES. Since p l a n t s i z e increases with market s i z e , Baldwin and Gorecki expected to f i n d a p o s i t i v e r e l a t i o n s h i p between domestic market s i z e and p r o d u c t i v i t y . LITERATURE REVIEW / 50 The remaining v a r i a b l e s were included f o r the f o l l o w i n g reasons: Import i n t e n s i t y (IMP) was p o s i t e d to be p o s i t i v e l y r e l a t e d to p r o d u c t i v i t y , f o r i t s competitive impact on an i n d u s t r y . The e f f e c t i v e t a r i f f r a t e (ERP) was a l s o i n c l u d e d , on the e x p e c t a t i o n that i t w i l l a f f e c t r e l a t i v e e f f i c i e n c y through a negative impact on c o m p e t i t i o n . Export i n t e n s i t y (EXP), proxying an i n d u s t r y ' s a b i l i t y to compete in f o r e i g n markets, was expected to p o s i t i v e l y impact on p r o d u c t i v i t y . MPLNT was included with the e x p e c t a t i o n that the greater the number of p l a n t s the greater the opportunity f o r experimentation with new production techniques and the higher should be r e l a t i v e e f f i c i e n c y . ADVDM was thought to "attenuate competition by p r o v i d i n g firms with secure l o c a l market n i c h e s " . 1 1 REG, or the degree of r e g i o n a l fragmentation, was b e l i e v e d to impede c o l l u s i o n and promote competiton. FOR was i n c l u d e d as something of a w i l d c a r d i n that Baldwin and Gorecki d i d n ' t commit themselves to p r e d i c t i n g how i t w i l l be signed. They noted that the l i t e r a t u r e has found both p o s i t i v e and negative r e s u l t s , both of which can be l o g i c a l l y defended. A negative r e s u l t c o u l d be found i f f o r e i g n ownership leads to below-MES r e p l i c a s of U.S.-based p l a n t s . A p o s i t i v e r e s u l t , though, may occur from p o s i t i v e LITERATURE REVIEW / 51 s p i l l o v e r s of technology t r a n s f e r s . Because of the d i s c r e p e n c i e s i n e a r l i e r r e s u l t s , no p r e d i c t i o n was p o s s i b l e , although Baldwin and Gorecki d i d note that the negative i n f l u e n c e on p r o d u c t i v i t y a t t r i b u t e d to f o r e i g n ownership may be "captured by the t a r i f f and c o n c e n t r a t i o n v a r i a b l e s " 1 2 that e a r l i e r t e s t s have u s u a l l y i n c l u d e d . RD was inc l u d e d to compensate f o r the f a c t that i n the d e r i v a t i o n of the measure of p r o d u c t i v i t y , labour was not disaggregated to in c l u d e "engineers and other s c i e n t i s t s " whose work might be expected to le a d to t e c h n i c a l innovation that would p o s i t i v e l y a f f e c t p r o d u c t i o n . CDR1 was inc l u d e d to approximate the importance of s c a l e economies; i f the cost disadvantage of o p e r a t i n g at a l e v e l below MES i s s u f f i c i e n t l y low, then of course the r e a l i z a t i o n of MES w i l l not be as imperative to the s u r v i v a l of the f i r m . STATISTICAL RESULTS The r e s u l t s were reported f o r two v e r s i o n s of the three models, corresponding, r e s p e c t i v e l y , to reduced samples of 99 and 95 i n d u s t r i e s , where o u t l i e r s i n p r o d u c t i v i t y estimates were e l i m i n a t e d . The r e g r e s s i o n s tended to d i s p l a y c o n f l i c t i n g r e s u l t s i n terms of the d i r e c t i o n of i n f l u e n c e of the independent v a r i a b l e s on t o t a l f a c t o r p r o d u c t i v i t y . Only two v a r i a b l e s were c o n s i s t e n t without exception i n a l l r e g r e s s i o n s . These were ERP and RD, both of which were LITERATURE REVIEW / 52 n e g a t i v e l y signed. In the case of RD, t h i s r e s u l t was c o n t r a r y to that p r e d i c t e d , s i n c e research and development expenditure was expected to have a p o s i t i v e impact on p r o d u c t i v i t y . The remaining v a r i a b l e s d i s p l a y e d v a r y i n g degrees of i n s t a b i l i t y . F i v e v a r i a b l e s were r e l a t i v e l y s t a b l e , switching signs only once. These i n c l u d e d IMP and FOR (both p o s i t i v e ) and EXP, CDR1 and REG ( n e g a t i v e ) . Of these, a l l were signed as p r e d i c t e d , with the exception of EXP. Since a robust export s e c t o r should compensate f o r the r e l a t i v e l y small Canadian market and i n d i c a t e comparative advantage over i n t e r n a t i o n a l competitors, the r a t i o of exports to domestic shipments should be p o s i t i v e l y a s s o c i a t e d w i t h p r o d u c t i v i t y . The i n f l u e n c e of the remaining s i x v a r i a b l e s was more ambiguous, switc h i n g e i t h e r from sample to sample, year to year or model to model. TFP4 was more s t a b l e between the two sample years than was TFP3, e x p e c i a l l y i n the reduced sample of 95 i n d u s t r i e s , where no sw i t c h i n g occurred. However, the Canadian School v a r i a b l e s HVTRHCT and EASTV were signed opposite to the p r e d i c t e d d i r e c t i o n of i n f l u e n c e , b e l y i n g e i t h e r the explanatory power of the model or the accuracy of the Canadian School h y p o t h e s i s . I n t e r e s t i n g l y , the 99 i n d u s t r y sample model performed as expected i n t h i s r e s p e c t . A n a l y s i s of the r e s i d u a l s i n each v e r s i o n of the TFP4 model LITERATURE REVIEW / 5 3 would perhaps have helped to r e v e a l the cause of t h i s f i c k l e n e s s i n the two key v a r i a b l e s . Only one v a r i a b l e , IMP, proved s t a t i s t i c a l l y s i g n f i c a n t c o n s i s t e n t l y across models f o r both years. At no time were any of the Canadian School v a r i a b l e s s i g n i f i c a n t ; The c o e f f i c i e n t s of determination ranged from about ten to twenty percent. CRITICAL ASSESSMENT Baldwin and Gorecki r a i s e d the q u a l i t y of econometric work on the q u e s t i o n of p r o d u c t i v i t y . Two f e a t u r e s of t h e i r research stand out. F i r s t , the micro data base they used permitted them to perform a c e r t a i n amount of a n l y s i s at the 5 d i g i t I n t e r n a t i o n a l Commodity Code (ICC) or commodity l e v e l . T h i s allowed them to analyze the importance of product d i v e r s i t y economies, through the v a r i a b l e RELDIV5D, and m u l t i - p l a n t economies, through the v a r i a b l e MPLNT. A second c o n t r i b u t i o n made by Baldwin and Gorecki was the methodology they used to d e r i v e s c a l e - c o r r e c t e d measures of t o t a l f a c t o r p r o d u c t i v i t y . I t i s of c o n s i d e r a b l e i n t e r e s t , then, that d e s p i t e the improvements they made, no c l e a r p i c t u r e comes from t h e i r r e s u l t s that would allow any p r e c i s e i d e n t i f i c a t i o n of the determinants of i n t e r - i n d u s t r y p r o d u c t i v i t y d i f f e r e n c e s . Baldwin and Gorecki concluded from t h e i r r e s u l t s that "...a strong argument can be made that the trade l i b e r a l i z a t i o n LITERATURE REVIEW / 54 process over the postwar p e r i o d has improved the competitiveness of Canadian i n d u s t r y and that continued emphasis on a r e d u c t i o n of trade b a r r i e r s of t h e i r maintenance at present low l e v e l s i s i n Canada's best i n t e r e s t s " , 3 . However, the s t a t i s t i c a l support they o b t a i n from t h e i r models can only be construed as m i l d and c i r c u m s t a n t i a l support at best. Of t h e i r TFP1 model they admit that "apart from perhaps d i v e r s i t y , no v a r i a b l e s . . . s i g n i f i c a n t l y a f f e c t e d r e l a t i v e e f f i e n c y . " In the case of TFP3 they say " v i r t u a l l y nothing i s s i g n i f i c a n t " and of TFP4, "the e n t i r e sample y i e l d s l i t t l e of i n t e r e s t " . 1 4 T h e i r most c o n s i s t e n t f i n d i n g concerns "the negative i n f l u e n c e of t a r i f f b a r r i e r s and the p o s i t i v e e f f e c t of imports" as w e l l as a p o s i t i v e i n f l u e n c e of f o r e i g n ownership. But i n a l l honesty, the econometric evidence can h a r d l y be s a i d to endorse a "strong argument" for t a r i f f r e d u c t i o n , e s p e c i a l l y s i n c e even the e f f e c t i v e r a t e of p r o t e c t i o n (ERP) i s not c o n s i s t e n t l y s i g n i f i c a n t . LITERATURE REVIEW / 55 4 . 3 . NON-ECONOMETRIC APPROACHES TO MODELLING 4 . 3 . 1 . H a r r i s and Cox No review of the l i t e r a t u r e would be complete without a b r i e f d e s c r i p t i o n of the general e q u i l i b r i u m model of the Canadian manufacturing sector that Richard H a r r i s of Queen's U n i v e r s i t y and David Cox of the U n i v e r s i t y of Western Ontario c o l l a b o r a t e d on under the aegis of the O n t a r i o Economic C o u n c i l . The work c r e a t e d q u i t e a s t i r f o r i t s p r e d i c t i o n of the great gains to be r e a l i z e d i n Canada from a move to f r e e r trade with the United S t a t e s . From the p e r s p e c t i v e of the present study, the r e s u l t s of t h e i r work on the u n i l a t e r a l e l i m i n a t i o n of t a r i f f s are of p a r t i c u l a r i n t e r e s t . H a r r i s and Cox estimated that a u n i l a t e r a l e l i m i n a t i o n of t a r i f f s by Canada would lead to an expansion i n output by 75 percent of manufacturing i n d u s t r i e s , 60 percent of which would i n v o l v e output changes of greater than 10 percent. Manufacturing as a whole would experience a trade s u r p l u s of some $3.02 b i l l i o n . Labour p r o d u c t i v i t y would improve by greater than 10.8 percent f o r manufacturing as a whole, and up to 43 percent i n one instance (the c l o t h i n g i n d u s t r y ) . These are bold p r e d i c t i o n s indeed, but H a r r i s and Cox f e l t that the general p a t t e r n of change " f i t s w e l l with the LITERATURE REVIEW / 56 p r e d i c t i o n s of the i n d u s t r i a l - o r g a n i z a t i o n view", [p. 107] However, the r e l i a b i l i t y of t h e i r r e s u l t s and the appropriateness of a general e q u i l i b r i u m approach in t h i s area of p o l i c y a n a l y s i s must be questioned, as the remainder of t h i s s e c t i o n w i l l show. Applied general e q u i l i b r i u m trade models seek t o analyze the long-run changes i n trade p a t t e r n s that r e s u l t from changes i n r e l a t i v e p r i c e s , t a k i n g i n t o c o n s i d e r a t i o n consumer preferences, f a c t o r s u p p l i e s and i n d u s t r i a l s t r u c t u r e . Through the use of comparative s t a t i c a n a l y s i s , short-term and long-run e q u i l i b r i u m p o s i t i o n s are estimated and compared for given changes to s e l e c t e d parameters of the model. A c h a r a c t e r i s t i c of previous general e q u i l i b r i u m (GE) work had been the n e o - c l a s s i c a l foundation of i t s assumptions regarding i n d u s t r i a l s t r u c t u r e . Two s a l i e n t assumptions were those of p e r f e c t competition and constant returns to sca l e w i t h i n the manufacturing sector. Both assumptions, c o u n t e r f a c t u a l to observed i n d u s t r i a l s t r u c t u r e , reduced the usefulness of a general e q u i l i b r i u m approach to the a n a l y s i s of t a r i f f r e d u c t i o n s . An important innovation of H a r r i s and Cox's modelling e f f o r t s was t h e i r g r a f t i n g of two I n d u s t r i a l O r g a n i z a t i o n features onto the standard n e o - c l a s s i c a l , g e n e r a l - e q u i l i b r i u m model. They introduced i m p e r f e c t l y LITERATURE REVIEW / 57 competitive behaviour i n the product markets, as w e l l as one aspect of pr o d u c t i o n economies—namely, production-run economies. This i n i t s e l f marked a b i g step forward i n GE modelling, but not a s u f f i c i e n t l y l a r g e one to capture other e q u a l l y important IO c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s . Hazledine observed that absent from the Harris-Cox model, are non-heterogeneous f i r m s , imperfect competition i n the input markets, non-production-run economies, and p r i c e d i s c r i m i n a t i o n between domestic and f o r e i g n markets. [Hazledine, 1984] Furthermore, H a r r i s and Cox only p a r t i a l l y succeeded i n modelling the c o m p e t i t i v e behaviour found i n the product market. The p r i c i n g formula they b u i l t i n t o t h e i r model was a r r i v e d at i n an ad hoc f a s h i o n , being the equal-weighted sum of an u p - t o - t h e - t a r i f f p o l i c y and the inv e r s e of the e l a s t i c i t y of p e r c e i v e d product demand: P i = a p ^ + d - a ) p i 2 where p ^ = *(1 + t^) and q^ i s the domestic p r i c e of good i and t ^ the domestic t a r i f f on good i . Pi2 = 1 / e i a = 0.5 The second term i n the expression tends to be much smaller than the f i r s t , with the r e s u l t that the p r i c i n g formula i s dominated by the u p - t o - t h e - t a r i f f assumption. T h i s tendency i s exacerbated by the extent to which the e l a s t i c i t y in the second term i s over-estimated, of which LITERATURE REVIEW / 58 there i s some s u s p i c i o n [see Hazledine, 1984: p.15]. Thus, H a r r i s and Cox's formula probably p r o v i d e s an upward b i a s to p r i c e s . Such a bias would c o n s i d e r a b l y a f f e c t the other numbers generated by the model. Given the model's s p e c i f i c a t i o n , the greater the p r i c e r e d u c t i o n , the g r e a t e r the r e s u l t a n t pressure f o r r a t i o n a l i z a t i o n . In the Harris/Cox model, the pressure f o r r a t i o n a l i z a t i o n begins with a lower p r i c e on imported s u b s t i t u t e s f o r domestic demand, inducing domestic consumers to s h i f t away from the domestic product. To meet the c h a l l e n g e posed by l o w e r - p r i c e d imports, the domestic in d u s t r y responds with a lower p r i c e . With a major redu c t i o n in t a r i f f , the r e q u i r e d p r i c e f a l l i s such that i n e f f i c i e n t f i r m s , no longer able to compete, must e x i t . (Hence, the importance of the Harris/Cox p r i c i n g formula, which may exaggerate the a b i l i t y of firms to p r i c e up to the t a r i f f and thus, the d i f f i c u l t i e s that firms w i l l face upon removal of a t a r i f f ) . The remaining firms improve t h e i r e f f i c i e n c y through two sources: f i r s t , through c a p i t a l / l a b o u r s u b s t i t u t i o n , and second, by squeezing a v a i l a b l e economies of s c a l e . S u b s t i t u t i o n of c a p i t a l f o r labour i s one of the long-run consequences of a u n i l a t e r a l e l i m i n a t i o n of t a r i f f s i n the Harris/Cox model. In the short-run, t a r i f f e l i m i n a t i o n has the e f f e c t of reducing the markup of firms LITERATURE REVIEW / 59 on variable costs. Survival depends on the a b i l i t y of firms to r a t i o n a l i z e their production, and in so doing, increase their productivity. In Harris and Cox, production-run economies are the key to r a t i o n a l i z a t i o n . The void l e f t by the exit of r e l a t i v e l y i n e f f i c i e n t firms permits the survivors to expand their plant size through long production runs. As a result, productivity increases, along with the mark-up on variables costs and, hence, p r o f i t s . However, from their IO-enhanced, general equilibrium perspective, Harris and Cox are interested in the long-run effects of the t a r i f f ' s elimination. And in the long run, c a p i t a l earns a normal rate of return and no pure economic p r o f i t i s realized. New entry, attracted by excess p r o f i t s , is the mechanism through which short-run economic p r o f i t is dissipated. In the interim period, though, sometime between the short-run and the long-run, the increased productivity achieved by lengthening production runs i s translated into higher wages, r a i s i n g unit production costs. This, in turn, provides firms the impetus to substitute c a p i t a l for labour, causing an additional increase in productivity. The degree of s h i f t in the capital/labour r a t i o depends on the extent of the productivity gains stemming from augmented production runs. This, in turn, i s sensitive to the accuracy of the measurement of available production economies. LITERATURE REVIEW / 60 Hazledine (1984) has c a l l e d i n t o question the r e l i a b i l i t y of the Harris/Cox methodology, p o i n t i n g out that t h e i r p r a c t i c e of averaging i n d u s t r y data to d e r i v e a " r e p r e s e n t a t i v e ' f i r m of average s i z e may g r o s s l y overestimate the extent of below-MES production i n an i n d u s t r y and, hence, the gains that t a r i f f e l i m i n a t i o n would b r i n g . Furthermore, they r e l i e d f o r t h e i r estimates of s c a l e economies on the work of Gupta and Fuss. As w i l l be d i s c u s s e d i n s e c t i o n 5.4.2, there i s some qu e s t i o n as to the r e l i a b i l i t y of these estimates. In c o n c l u s i o n , i t may be observed that H a r r i s and Cox's p r e d i c t i o n of sweeping p r o d u c t i v i t y gains stemming from u n i l a t e r a l t a r i f f e l i m i n a t i o n — o r , by extension, mere r e d u c t i o n — a r e suspect. Moreover, the c o r r e c t c o n s t r u c t i o n of a general e q u i l i b r i u m model presupposes a knowledge of the f o r c e s that shape the economy. The Harris/Cox model l i n k s p r o d u c t i v i t y gains with t a r i f f r e d u c t i o n , i t i s t r u e . But i s t h i s evidence that such a nexus indeed e x i s t s ? T h e i r r e s u l t s f o l l o w d i r e c t l y from the model's s p e c i f i c a t i o n . That i t was s p e c i f i e d to r e s u l t i n such sweeping gains i s not so much a proof of so strong a r e l a t i o n s h i p between the t a r i f f and p r o d u c t i v i t y , but rather of the extent to which such a l i n k has been accepted by mainstream economists and i n c o r p o r a t e d i n t o t h e i r modelling e f f o r t s , d e s p i t e the f a c t t h a t no c o n c l u s i v e e m p i r i c a l evidence has been found to L I T E R A T U R E R E V I E W / 61 support that hypothesis. 5. THEORETICAL CONSIDERATIONS The models reviewed i n Chapter 4 provide p l e n t y of ideas on how to proceed to b u i l d a dynamic model to t e s t f o r e m p i r i c a l evidence of the determinants of p r o d u c t i v i t y change. Before t u r n i n g to that task, however, i t w i l l prove u s e f u l to give some thought to c e r t a i n t h e o r e t i c a l c o n s i d e r a t i o n s that w i l l a f f e c t the model. D i s c u s s i o n w i l l be l i m i t e d to three t o p i c s . The f i r s t concerns the question of how best to inc o r p o r a t e the p o l i t i c a l economy of the Kennedy Round; the second d e a l s with the iss u e of the app r o p r i a t e measure of the ra t e of t a r i f f p r o t e c t i o n ; f i n a l l y , the apparent impact of production econmies on p r o d u c t i v i t y p o i n t s to the n e c e s s i t y of a review of the va r i o u s types of production economies to help r e v e a l the nature of the f o r c e s at work th e r e . 5.1. ON THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF THE KENNEDY ROUND Most e f f o r t s to model the s t r u c t u r a l e f f e c t s of p r o t e c t i v e b a r r i e r s have f a i l e d to recognize the r o l e played by the m u l t i l a t e r a l n e g o t i a t i o n s that have taken plac e under the General Agreement on Trade and T a r i f f s (GATT) i n reducing the t a r i f f l e v e l of a l l GATT s i g n a t o r i e s [exceptions are Cheh, 1974 and H e l l e i n e r , 1977]. Ignoring the GATT process may have r e s u l t e d i n the se r i o u s m i s s p e c i f i c a t i o n of e a r l i e r modelling attempts. Even 62 THEORETICAL CONSIDERATIONS / 63 those authors who have a l s o s t u d i e d the p o l i t i c a l economy of t a r i f f s tend to t r e a t the GATT reduc t i o n s by simply r e v e r s i n g the l o g i c and assumptions of t h e i r s t a t i c t a r i f f enhancement models. That i s , they t a c i t l y assume that t a r i f f p r o t e c t i o n i s reduced i n the same way that i t i s augmented. But the process by which t a r i f f s were reduced as the r e s u l t of GATT was not n e c e s s a r i l y the m i r r o r image of the process by which t a r i f f s had been imposed. The n o n - r e v e r s i b i l i t y of the t a r i f f enhancement models i s r evealed through an understanding of the p o l i t i c a l economy v a r i a b l e s that are i n c o r p o r a t e d i n models that attempt to e x p l a i n a given t a r i f f s t r u c t u r e . Such models i d e n t i f y four i n t e r e s t groups i n v o l v e d i n the process of t a r i f f b u i l d - u p : labour, consumers, c a p i t a l i s t s and the f o r e i g n country i n v o l v e d i n a t e n t a t i v e t a r i f f . Each group i s able to a f f e c t the t a r i f f l e v e l to the extent that i t i s able to i n f l u e n c e the government, through lobbying, to support i t s cause. Government, i n t u r n , has i t s own i n t e r e s t i n t a r i f f s . We can di s m i s s the c o n t r i b u t i o n of t a r i f f revenues to f e d e r a l c o f f e r s as an unimportant concern: any pu r e l y economic concern i s probably e c l i p s e d by the p o l i t i c a l i n t e r e s t government has vested i n the t a r i f f outcomes. T h i s i n t e r e s t may be p u r e l y s e l f - s e r v i n g , as i n the d i s t r i b u t i o n of economic rents i n order to maximize the p o l i t i c a l r ents THEORETICAL CONSIDERATIONS / 64 p a i d to government ( i n terms of votes, or d i r e c t c o n t r i b u t i o n s to the t a r i f f - b e s t o w i n g party) by the a f f e c t e d i n t e r e s t groups. A l t e r n a t i v e l y , or simultaneously, the government may have a p o l i c y - r e l a t e d stake in the outcome of t a r i f f n e g o t i a t i o n s . There may, f o r instance, be a p o l i c y of reducing r e g i o n a l d i s p a r i t y or enhancing Canadian u n i t y ; of maximizing GNP or minimizing f o r e i g n dependence i n a s t r a t e g i c area. T a r i f f models introduce an a r r a y of v a r i a b l e s to assess the r o l e that lobby groups and government p o l i c y may play i n the determination of t a r i f f l e v e l s . Thus, f o r example, the s e l l e r c o n c e n t r a t i o n l e v e l may be used to proxy the a b i l i t y of an i n d u s t r y to organize and lobby government; the u n s k i l l e d labour/value-added r a t i o may proxy the height of labour's concerns and government's p o l i t i c a l s e n s i t i v i t y to labour's vote. Underlying the vested i n t e r e s t of lobby groups and governments a l i k e are the 10 c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s of an in d u s t r y that shape i t s s t r u c t u r e , determine i t s conduct and decide i t s a b i l i t y to perform c o m p e t i t i v e l y i n the marketplace. I t i s on t h i s 10 plane that the t a r i f f enhancement models share a common ground with the models surveyed i n s e c t i o n 4. Thus, t a r i f f models, l i k e the models d i s c u s s e d e a r l i e r , a l s o o f t e n i n c l u d e v a r i a b l e s to proxy the impact of s p e c i f i c i n d u s t r i a l c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s on t a r i f f l e v e l s . THEORETICAL CONSIDERATIONS / 65 The d i s t i n g u i s h i n g feature between s t a t i c t a r i f f models and t a r i f f r e d u c t i o n models i s that the former i s e s s e n t i a l l y a u n i l a t e r a l ( i n t r a - c o u n t r y ) d e c i s i o n , while the l a t t e r i s m u l t i l a t e r a l in nature. In the context of the GATT t a r i f f rounds, the GATT s i g n a t o r i e s engage i n b i l a t e r a l d i s c u s s i o n with main t r a d i n g p a r t n e r s , who negotiate with one another to lower t a r i f f s with a view to mutually enhancing one another's f o r e i g n market. A l l r e s u l t i n g b i l a t e r a l l y agreed upon t a r i f f r e d u c t i o n s are then a p p l i e d to the ma j o r i t y of the s i g n a t o r i e s (the Most Favoured Nations or MFNs). In the GATT d i s c u s s i o n s , then, a new group of p l a y e r s j o i n s the four previous i d e n t i f i e d ones (labour, consumers, c a p i t a l i s t s , government): namely, the trade n e g o t i a t o r s themselves, who become the " f i f t h business" of the n e g o t i a t i o n process. Though they don't have a personal i n t e r e s t , presumably, i n the outcome of the m u l t i l a t e r a l n e g o t i a t i o n s , they nonetheless s t r o n g l y i n f l u e n c e i t through t h e i r methods of n e g o t i a t i o n . When c o n s i d e r i n g the t a r i f f r e d u c t i o n process of the GATT, i t i s important to consid e r the input and impact of t h i s f i f t h group. Thus, the t a r i f f r e ductions of the Kennedy Round t a l k s were a cau t i o u s process during which Canadian n e g o t i a t o r s attempted to wrest maximum concessions from Canada's major t r a d i n g p a r t n e r s while minimizing the concessions o f f e r e d i n r e t u r n . Concessions were not made f l i p p a n t l y by our THEORETICAL CONSIDERATIONS / 66 n e g o t i a t o r s , but rather f o r very s p e c i f i c reasons. T h i s view i s supported by government statements made upon the c o n l u s i o n of the Kennedy Round n e g o t i a t i o n s to the e f f e c t t h a t , " i n a number of important s e c t o r s the r e d u c t i o n s made i n the Canadian t a r i f f r e f l e c t recommendations made by the T a r i f f Board i n recent r e p o r t s on t a r i f f items which had been r e f e r r e d to the Board f o r c a r e f u l r e v i e w " 1 6 F i v e p o s s i b l e reasons can be i d e n t i f i e d why Canada might make a concession on an imported good's t a r i f f d u r i n g m u l t i l a t e r a l n e g o t i a t i o n s : 1. The imported good doesn't compete with domestic production. 2. Canada i s competitive i n the c o n c e s s i o n a l item. Concession made to gain r e c i p r o c a l concession on same or d i f f e r e n t item f o r which a l a r g e r export market i s d e s i r e d . 3. Canada i s c h r o n i c a l l y uncompetitive i n the c o n c e s s i o n a l item. 4. ; Canada uses concession item as an input. Concession made to b e n e f i t i n d u s t r y of f i n a l use. Concessional item may or may not be produced d o m e s t i c a l l y . I f produced d o m e s t i c a l l y , domestic production of item may or may not be c o m p e t i t i v e . 5. Canada makes a genuine (unwanted) concession. Although the p o l i t i c a l economy of the t a r i f f i s not the main concern of the present study, i t w i l l be important to i n c l u d e some proxy to capture the p o l i t i c a l economy a f f e c t s . One way to achieve t h i s d e t a i l would be to c l a s s i f y the THEORETICAL CONSIDERATIONS / 67 Kennedy Round concession items a c c o r d i n g to the above f i v e c r i t e r i a , using dummy v a r i a b l e s to f l a g the d i s t i n c t i o n s between groups. By thus a s s i g n i n g the concession items, i t would be p o s s i b l e to reduce any p o t e n t i a l c o r r e l a t i o n that might e x i s t between the percentage change in t a r i f f and p r i o r p r o d u c t i v i t y performance. Suppose, f o r instance, that a good f a l l s i n t o the t h i r d category of being c h r o n i c a l l y uncompetitive and d e s t i n e d f o r e x t i n c t i o n . Perhaps t h i s good b e n e f i t t e d from high t a r i f f p r o t e c t i o n p r i o r to Kennedy Round, but for p o l i t i c a l f a c t o r s i s being " s a c r i f i c e d " to gain advantage i n another area, or to d e f l e c t c r i t i c i s m of an u n a f f e c t e d t a r i f f on some other good. Many s c e n a r i o s c o u l d be imagined, of course. Such c l a s s i f i c a t i o n s would provide the model with g r e a t e r f l e x i b i l i t y . U n f o r t u n a t e l y , the i n f o r m a t i o n r e q u i r e d to a s s i g n items to s p e c i f i c c a t e g o r i e s i s a n o n - t r i v i a l task and i s beyond the l i m i t s of the present t h e s i s . A simpler proxy w i l l be sought i n s t e a d — o n e that w i l l p o i n t to the i n f l u e n c e of the p o l i t i c a l economy of the Kennedy Round i n a more gen e r a l way. The p r e c i s e shape that t h i s proxy takes w i l l be r e v e a l e d i n s e c t i o n 6.1. THEORETICAL CONSIDERATIONS / 68 5 . 2 . ON THE USE OF NOMINAL OR EFFECTIVE RATES OF PROTECTION What i s the a p p r o p r i a t e measure of p r o t e c t i o n that should be used to model the s t r u c t u r a l e f f e c t s of t a r i f f r e d u c t i o n s ? The choices at hand are nominal r a t e s of t a r i f f p r o t e c t i o n and e f f e c t i v e r a t e s of p r o t e c t i o n . For guidance, i t i s u s e f u l to turn to the authors whose models were p r e v i o u s l y considered. Most f i n d i t convenient to i n c l u d e both nominal and e f f e c t i v e r a t e s i n t h e i r models and l e t the reader (or the c o e f f i c i e n t of determination) decide which i s the more ap p r o p r i a t e of the two. The obvious c r i t i c i s m to be made of such an approach i s i t s ad hoc nature. A more r i g o r o u s method would be to look f o r guidance from the theory u n d e r l i n i n g each r e s p e c t i v e measure and choose the most a p p r o p r i a t e one a v a i l a b l e . The main point that should be made concerns the assumptions that u n d e r l i e the c a l c u l a t i o n of the e f f e c t i v e r a t e of p r o t e c t i o n (ERP). The problem with t h i s measurement i s that i t s c a l c u l a t i o n depends upon the assumption of u p - t o - t h e - t a r i f f p r i c i n g . As was i n d i c a t e d e a r l i e r , u p - t o - t h e - t a r i f f p r i c i n g behaviour i s only p l a u s i b l e f o r a l i m i t e d segment of manufacturers. Moreover, i t i n c o r p o r a t e s i n t o the model—by d e s i g n — t h e very behaviour that i s to be t e s t e d f o r . For t h i s reason, c e r t a i n authors (Hazledine, Wilkinson and N o r r i e ) discount the s u i t a b i l i t y of an ERP regressor to THEORETICAL CONSIDERATIONS / 69 model s t r u c t u r a l changes r e s u l t i n g from t a r i f f r e d u c t i o n s . C l e a r l y , the adoption of ERP p o t e n t i a l l y introduces spurious and t a u t o l o g i c a l problems. I f an accurate measure of e f f e c t i v e p r o t e c t i o n were a v a i l a b l e , there i s no quest i o n that i t would be the t h e o r e t i c a l c h o ice of pr e f e r e n c e . However, i n the absence of a r e l i a b l e measure, i t would seem more prudent to proceed using nominal p r o t e c t i o n . Not only i s i t f a r simpler, but i t in c o r p o r a t e fewer problematic assumptions. 5 . 3 . PRODUCTION ECONOMIES The e f f e c t of the t a r i f f on an i n d u s t r y ' s p r o d u c t i v i t y hinges, u l t i m a t e l y , on the e x i s t e n c e of pro d u c t i o n economies in the production process of that i n d u s t r y , and on the breadth and depth of those economies. I f production economies are not important to an i n d u s t r y ( e i t h e r because they do not e x i s t or because the cost disadvantage of producing at low output i s i n s i g n i f i c a n t ) , then a reduc t i o n i n the t a r i f f s on competing imports w i l l not spur any n o t i c a b l e r a t i o n a l i z a t i o n i n that i n d u s t r y . Most of the recent work on p r o d u c t i v i t y a n a l y s i s has attempted to account i n some way f o r the presence of production economies. Often, u s u a l l y because of l i m i t e d data a v a i l a b i l i t y , researchers have i n c l u d e d only c e r t a i n types of economies, the most common being economies present at the THEORETICAL CONSIDERATIONS / 70 l e v e l of the p l a n t . Only r e c e n t l y , beginning with Baldwin and Gorecki, has e m p i r i c a l r e s e a r c h begun to move to a l e v e l below that of the p l a n t . Because of the importance of production economies i n t h i s i n v e s t i g a t i o n of the impact of the t a r i f f on p r o d u c t i v i t y , the v a r i o u s sources of production economies w i l l be b r i e f l y reviewed i n order to be c l e a r about what i s being measured i n these models a n d — e q u a l l y importantly—what i s not. Secondly, a survey of the a v a i l a b l e estimates of pr o d u c t i o n economies w i l l be presented. 5.3.1. Sources of pro d u c t i o n economies Production economies are the resource savings that are r e a l i z e d i n the pro d u c t i o n process through the b e n e f i t s generated by s p e c i a l i z a t i o n and s i z e . They are important because of t h e i r impact on the c o s t of p r o d u c t i o n . Four major types of production economies e x i s t at d i s t i n c t l e v e l s of the production process: economies of s c a l e , economies of s p e c i a l i z a t i o n , economies of d i v e r s i f i c a t i o n and economies of plant branching. THEORETICAL CONSIDERATIONS / 71 Economies of p l a n t s c a l e Economies of s c a l e have to do with the l a r g e s s of largene s s : being b i g may reduce production c o s t s e i t h e r through pecuniary savings or the t e c h n i c a l nature of the production process. On the one hand, pecuniary economies may accrue to a pr o d u c t i o n u n i t through lower p r i c e d inputs generated by bulk o r d e r s . On the other hand, t e c h n i c a l economies may be r e a l i z e d i f the production process i s homogeneous of a degree greater than u n i t y , such that output in c r e a s e s more than p r o p o r t i o n a t e l y f o r a given increase i n the f a c t o r s of p r o d u c t i o n . A t h i r d way i n which economies of s c a l e come i n t o p l ay i s through the spreading of f i x e d c o s t s over a wider output base. Up to a p o i n t , l a r g e r production u n i t s face lower per u n i t c o s t s f o r the t o t a l f i x e d payments to cover a m o r t i z a t i o n allowances, non-production maintenance c o s t s , managerial and s u p e r v i s o r y s a l a r i e s , and other non-production dependent o u t l a y s . Economies of s p e c i a l i z a t i o n Economies of s p e c i a l i z a t i o n lower u n i t production c o s t s i n two ways. In the f i r s t i n s t a n c e , economies are r e a l i z e d by reducing the amount of time spent changing over from one production process to another. T h i s i s e s p e c i a l l y important f o r i n d u s t r i e s with product l i n e s t a r t - u p c o s t s that are l a r g e r e l a t i v e to t o t a l c o s t s . A c l a s s i c example i s THEORETICAL CONSIDERATIONS / 72 found i n book p u b l i s h i n g , where t y p e - s e t t i n g c o s t s account f o r a l a r g e share of the t o t a l . More examples can be found i n the engineering s e c t o r , where t o o l i n g - u p c o s t s are s u b s t a n t i a l . S p e c i a l i z a t i o n a l s o imparts economies by p e r m i t t i n g labour to move down i t s l e a r n i n g curve. Economies of d i v e r s i f i c a t i o n I f s p e c i a l i z a t i o n i s a p o s i t i v e a t t r i b u t e , i t may, at f i r s t glance, seem p a r a d o x i c a l that d i v e r s i f i c a t i o n a l s o i s a p o t e n t i a l source of production economies. Often r e f e r r e d to as "economies of scope" in the l i t e r a t u r e , economies of d i v e r s i f i c a t i o n allow producers to tap i n t o economies of s c a l e i n s i t u a t i o n s where p r o d u c t - l i n e s p e c i a l i z a t i o n i s not economically f e a s i b l e . That i s , when market s i z e prevents production at output l e v e l s near the minimum on the production u n i t ' s average cost curve, a f i r m may overcome small s i z e disadvantage by extending the scope of i t s p r o d u c t i o n . M u l t i p l e production output may o f f s e t the absence of t e c h n i c a l economies with pecuniary savings. Economies of plant branching These economies are t i e d to the d i s t r i b u t i o n a l c o s t s a s s o c i a t e d with p r o d u c t i o n . I f the market area served i s an i n c r e a s i n g f u n c t i o n of the l e v e l of output, u n i t t r a n s p o r t a t i o n c o s t s may increase with p r o d u c t i o n as w e l l , THEORETICAL CONSIDERATIONS / 73 although l e s s than p r o p o r t i o n a t e l y . In a s s e s s i n g the best method to supply an expanding market, a f i r m must choose between expanding e x i s t i n g p l a n t p r o d u c t i o n , or spreading production by c r e a t i n g a new f a c i l i t y . By o p e r a t i n g two or more p l a n t s , a f i r m can concentrate p r o d u c t i o n c l o s e to the market i t serves, or, perhaps, c l o s e r to i t s input sources. M u l t i - p l a n t production may a l s o allow f o r higher degrees of s p e c i a l i z a t i o n at each p l a n t , and t h i s s p e c i a l i z a t i o n may, as was mentioned above, o f f s e t the diseconomies a s s o c i a t e d with small plant s i z e . 5.3.2. Estimates of Production Economies and T h e i r Problems In the present t h e s i s no attempt i s made to generate o r i g i n a l estimates of production economies w i t h i n the Canadian manufacturing s e c t o r . Instead, e x i s t i n g estimates by others w i l l be used. There are but t h r e e : those of Gupta and Fuss (1981), Baldwin and Gorecki (1986) and Robidoux and L e s t e r (1988). The task of s e l e c t i n g the most a p p r o p r i a t e one i s a simple matter; as i n other areas of i n d u s t r i a l o r g a n i z a t i o n economics, e s t i m a t i o n techniques have tended to improve with time, e i t h e r because of new theory or b e t t e r raw data. In the case of p r o d u c t i o n economy estimates there have been a l i t t l e of both. B e t t e r data (the micro database, once again) has permitted the r e l a x a t i o n of c e r t a i n dubious r e s t r i c t i o n s that generated some co n t e n t i o u s r e s u l t s i n THEORETICAL CONSIDERATIONS / 74 e a r l i e r s t u d i e s . Robidoux and L e s t e r ' s production economy estimates have been s e l e c t e d f o r the reason that they are the most s o p h i s t i c a t e d and most r e l i a b l e estimates a v a i l a b l e , both i n terms of the range of data estimates and u n d e r l y i n g theory. How r e l i a b l e i s "most r e l i a b l e " can best be decided upon by l o o k i n g at the s a l i e n t p o i n t s of each e s t i m a t i o n team's work i n order to understand the inherent weakness of the e a r l i e r two attempts and the r e l a t i v e s t r e n g t h of the l a t t e r , keeping i n mind a l l the while that p e r f e c t i o n i n these q u e s t i o n s b o i l s down to what i s f e a s i b l e given data a v a i l a b i l i t y . Gupta and Fuss Gupta and Fuss began t h e i r work towards the end of the 1970's. At that time, f o u r - d i g i t Canadian manufacturing data c o u l d n ' t be obtained at the i n d i v i d u a l p l a n t l e v e l . Thus, Gupta and Fuss had to r e l y upon data i n which p l a n t l e v e l i n f o r m a t i o n was aggregated i n t o seven size-groups of p l a n t s . T h e i r main c o n t r i b u t i o n was to s h i f t the focus of a t t e n t i o n to cost f u n c t i o n approaches to e s t i m a t i n g the s c a l e parameters that determine the d i r e c t i o n and extent of s c a l e economies or diseconomies e x i s t i n g i n a given i n d u s t r y . A l l three s c a l e economies estimates have made an assumption of h o m o t h e t i c i t y , a necessary e v i l that a r i s e s from the lack of p l a n t - l e v e l data on the extent to which the THEORETICAL CONSIDERATIONS / 75 c a p i t a l / o t h e r inputs r a t i o v a r i e s with v a r i a t i o n i n establishment s i z e . Gupta and Fuss maintained t h a t , i n the aggregate, bias e s are apt to c a n c e l one another out, thereby p r o v i d i n g a c l o s e approximation of MES and the c o s t disadvantage r a t i o d e r i v e d from the shape of the cost curve. P a r t i c u l a r to Gupta and Fuss i s the assumption that wage r a t e s and product d i v e r s i t y are not a f u n c t i o n of establishment s i z e . The wage r a t e assumption a f f e c t s p r o d u c t i v i t y measures while the product d i v e r s i t y measure has the e f f e c t of p l a c i n g a l l the onus f o r p r o d u c t i v i t y gains on p l a n t - l e v e l economies, masking and perhaps m i s s i n g a l t o g e t h e r the importance of pro d u c t i o n economies w i t h i n the p l a n t . The assumption of constant wage across p l a n t s i z e s would a f f e c t the es t i m a t i o n of the shape of the pr o d u c t i o n f u n c t i o n and thus a l l estimates of minimum e f f i c i e n t s c a l e and cost penalty a s s o c i a t e d with production below, or p o s s i b l y above ( i n the e v e n t u a l i t y of a U-shaped cost curve) minimum e f f i c i e n t s c a l e . Baldwin and Gorecki Baldwin and Gorecki were the f i r s t to c a r r y out estimates based on data at the p l a n t l e v e l of d i s a g g r e g a t i o n . A f t e r t e s t i n g the extent to which the form of the production f u n c t i o n (be i t Cobb Douglas, general t r a n s l o g or something inbetween i n terms of f l e x i b i l i t y of the e l a s t i c i t y of s u b s t i t u t i o n and the e l a s t i c i t y of r e t u r n s THEORETICAL CONSIDERATIONS / 76 to sca l e ) a f f e c t e d the estimate of s c a l e economies, they opted f o r a simple Cobb Douglas (CD) form, d e s i r a b l e f o r i t s avoidance of m u l t i c o l l i n e a r i t y problems inherent i n the g e n e r a l i z e d t r a n s l o g (GT) form. But while t h e i r estimates of the d i f f e r e n c e s i n varia n c e between CD and GT forms i s small, the ch o i c e of a g e n e r a l i z e d t r a n s l o g f u n c t i o n has one f a t a l flaw: i t imposes the assumption of homogeneity on the production f u n c t i o n and, hence, the co s t curve. As Robidoux and L e s t e r i n d i c a t e , t h i s "methodology adopted by Baldwin and Gorecki c o n s t r a i n s . . . the s c a l e e l a s t i c i t y to be the same at a l l l e v e l s . " 1 7 On the b a s i s of a comparative t e s t they perform using the two f u n c t i o n a l forms, Baldwin and Gorecki argued that t h i s does not unduly bias the r e s u l t s of t h e i r s c a l e economy estimates. But the s i m i l a r i t y of the r e s u l t s they d e r i v e d for s c a l e economies using the two forms i s m i s l e a d i n g , given that the t r a n s l o g f u n c t i o n ' s s c a l e economy estimate was taken at the geometric mean—a ra t h e r ad hoc way to go about i t . Even i f i t i s allowed that the e i g h t i n d u s t r i e s f o r which they t e s t e d were indeed r e p r e s e n t a t i v e of the manufacturing sector as a whole (there i s reason to question t h i s , though: from Robidoux and Le s t e r ' s e s t i m a t i o n t a b l e s i t can be deduced that four of the e i g h t i n d u s t r i e s have homogeneous production f u n c t i o n s which, i f t r u e , should d i s q u a l i f y them from the comparison), an o b j e c t i o n to the comparison would s t i l l p r e v a i l on the THEORETICAL CONSIDERATIONS / 77 grounds t h a t , for a non-homogeneous production f u n c t i o n , i t i s not p o s s i b l e to make general statements about the extent of economies of s c a l e from s i n g l e - p o i n t measurement. In short, the meaning of an estimate of s c a l e economies taken at the geometric mean of a non-homogeneous production f u n c t i o n i s not at a l l c l e a r . For t h i s reason Baldwin and Gorecki's arguments about the unbiasedness of the Cobb Douglas form should be regarded with c a u t i o n . Robidoux and L e s t e r Robidoux and L e s t e r improved upon e a r l i e r works by r e l a x i n g the homogeneity assumption that r e s t r i c t e d production f u n c t i o n s to s t r i c t l y l i n e a r forms. Thus, the production f u n c t i o n estimates they d e r i v e d have s u f f i c i e n t f l e x i b i l i t y to allow for the presence of U-shaped and h y p e r b o l i c u n i t c o s t curves. Estimates were d e r i v e d for 146 manufacturing i n d u s t r i e s using p l a n t - l e v e l data. Robidoux and L e s t e r used a methodology s i m i l a r to that developed by Gupta and Fuss to d e r i v e a s p e c i f i c a t i o n of the cost f u n c t i o n at the p l a n t l e v e l . Assuming h o m o t h e t i c i t y , they were able to d e s c r i b e the t o t a l c ost f u n c t i o n without c a p i t a l c o s t i n f o r m a t i o n , since h o m o t h e t i c i t y i m p l i e s that the r e l a t i v e l e v e l s of c a p i t a l and n o n - c a p i t a l inputs are constant i r r e s p e c t i v e of p r i c e . Using OLS r e g r e s s i o n techniques, the shape of the cost curve was estimated f o r each i n d u s t r y using the equation THEORETICAL CONSIDERATIONS / 78 ln(C/Q) = a 1 + a 2Q + a 3 Q - 1 + a 4 l n p w 1 + A 5 l n p w 2 + a 6 l n d + u a where Q i s gross output; C i s the sum of labour, m a t e r i a l s and energy c o s t s ; p w l and p w 2 are the wage r a t e s f o r production and a d m i n i s t r a t i v e workers; d i s a product d i v e r s i t y index; and u i s an e r r o r term. Where these estimates do not r e s u l t i n constant c o s t curves, Robidoux and L e s t e r d e r i v e estimates of minimum e f f i c i e n t s c a l e , the cost disadvantage r a t i o and "a new measure of c o s t penalty a s s o c i a t e d with suboptimal c a p a c i t y ; the c o s t saving achievable i n a l l p l a n t s with the minimum e f f i c i e n t s i z e " 1 8 6 . PRODUCTIVITY MODELS AND REGRESSION RESULTS B e n e f i t i n g from the i n s i g h t s p rovided by the models d e s c r i b e d i n chapter 4, and keeping i n mind the t h e o r e t i c a l c o n s i d e r a t i o n s d i s c u s s e d i n chapter 5, i t i s now time to move on to the main task of c o n s t r u c t i n g a dynamic model of p r o d u c t i v i t y change to t e s t the Canadian School hypothesis d e s c r i b e d e a r l i e r . 6 . 1 . THE FIVE PHASES OF THE MODEL As has been d i s c u s s e d e a r l i e r , the p r o d u c t i v i t y model developed by Baldwin and Gorecki was able to go f u r t h e r than previous models due to access to p l a n t l e v e l data that permitted the e l a b o r a t i o n of v a r i a b l e s to b e t t e r proxy the impact of var i o u s production economies on p r o d u c t i v i t y . Beyond t h i s t e c h n i c a l improvement, Baldwin and Gorecki i n c o r p o r a t e d a l l of the accepted determinants of p r o d u c t i v i t y i n t o t h e i r models, and broke new ground i n t h e i r i n v e s t i g a t i o n of the t a r i f f / c o n c e n t r a t i o n nexus p o s i t e d by the Canadian School. For these reasons, Baldwin and Gorecki's p r o d u c t i v i t y model seems a p a r t i c u l a r l y sound b a s i s on which to b u i l d f u r t h e r m o d e l l i n g e f f o r t s . Further work based on t h e i r model i s c a l l e d f o r for two reasons. F i r s t , while Baldwin and Gorecki looked at var i o u s components of p r o d u c t i v i t y change and t e s t e d models of the determinants of these components, they never a c t u a l l y 79 PRODUCTIVITY MODELS AND REGRESSION RESULTS / 80 advanced to the p o i n t of e m p i r i c a l l y t e s t i n g the impact of t a r i f f changes on p r o d u c t i v i t y . They looked at v a r i o u s r e l a t e d aspects of p r o d u c t i v i t y change, but not at p r o d u c t i v i t y change i t s e l f . Thus, they c o n s i d e r e d the determinants of r e l a t i v e p l a n t s c a l e and changes i n r e l a t i v e p l a n t s c a l e over time; of product d i v e r s i t y and l e n g t h of production run, and changes over time i n both. Then they moved on to the q u e s t i o n of p r o d u c t i v i t y and explored the determinants of i n t e r - i n d u s t r y p r o d u c t i v i t y d i f f e r e n c e s i n two years, 1970 and 1979, b u i l d i n g seperate s t a t i c models for each year. But whereas they t e s t e d f o r the determinants of change in the other r e l a t e d areas, they drew t h e i r study to a c l o s e before t e s t i n g f o r the determinants of p r o d u c t i v i t y change between 1970 and 1979. T h i s l e f t that dynamic model begging to be t e s t e d . A second m o t i v a t i o n f o r advancing t h e i r model a step or two f u r t h e r concerns the way i n which Baldwin and Gorecki modelled the impact of the t a r i f f on p r o d u c t i v i t y . The micro database they used permitted Baldwin and Gorecki to " f i n e - t u n e " t h e i r a n a l y s i s with regard to production economies. However, they f a i l e d to f i n e tune t h e i r study to account f o r the s p e c i f i c s of the reductions i n t a r i f f s that r e s u l t e d from the Kennedy Round n e g o t i a t i o n s . Only c e r t a i n commodities wi t h i n c e r t a i n i n d u s t r i e s faced r e d u c t i o n . And, as was hypothesized i n s e c t i o n 5.1, these commodities were PRODUCTIVITY MODELS AND REGRESSION RESULTS / 81 put upon the bargaining t a b l e f o r a v a r i e t y of m o t i v e s — t h e p r i n c i p a l one being, presumably, that o v e r a l l the n e g o t i a t o r s b e l i e v e d t h a t , on whole, the agreements they worked out were going to r e s u l t i n a net b e n e f i t f o r Canada. A r e l a t e d issue of equal import has to do with the e s t i m a t i o n problems that a r i s e when 4 d i g i t or i n d u s t r y l e v e l aggregates are used to estimate p r o d u c t i v i t y changes in i n d u s t r i e s that experienced t a r i f f r e d u c t i o n s over l e s s than the f u l l range of commodities they produced. Since t a r i f f reductions were made on s p e c i f i c commodities, i t would be sounder to b u i l d a model c o n s i s t i n g of only the a f f e c t e d commodities. T h i s , however, i s i m p o s s i b l e : data i s not a v a i l a b l e at the commodity l e v e l f o r the kind of v a r i a b l e s that make up a p r o d u c t i v i t y model. However, a reasonable compromise would be to c o l l e c t as much data as p o s s i b l e concerning the commodities that were put on the Kennedy Round bargaining t a b l e , and to a d j u s t the i n d u s t r y aggregates using t h i s more d e t a i l e d i n f o r m a t i o n . Thus, i t may be p o s s i b l e to improve upon the accuracy of Baldwin and Goreck's study by i n c o r p o r a t i n g commodity l e v e l data i n order to f i n e - t u n e the econometric a n a l y s i s . To a s s i s t i n t h i s task, a database was compiled c o n s i s t i n g of trade v a r i a b l e s f o r the commodities that underwent s i g n i f i c a n t t a r i f f r e d u c t i o n s between the years 1970 and 1979. " S i g n i f i c a n t " i n the present context was PRODUCTIVITY MODELS AND REGRESSION RESULTS / 82 chosen to be an ad valorem t a r i f f r e d u c t i o n of f i v e percentage p o i n t s or more. No d i s t i n c t i o n was made between those commodities that faced a r e l a t i v e l y higher t a r i f f to begin with. I m p l i c i t i n t h i s i s the assumption that the absolute and not the r e l a t i v e t a r i f f change i s important. As was mentioned e a r l i e r , there i s reason to qu e s t i o n t h i s . I t should a l s o be mentioned that the c u t o f f l i m i t of f i v e percent i s not as ad hoc as i t might sound. As the histogram of t a r i f f cut shown below i n d i c a t e s , the m a j o r i t y of cuts were of f i v e percentage p o i n t s or more. Concessions that were made below that l e v e l tended to be on the order of one or two percentage p o i n t s — n o t enough, i n a l l l i k e l i h o o d , to act as a c a t a l y s t f o r change i n p r o d u c t i v i t y l e v e l s . And so, " f i v e and over" was the g u i d e l i n e that was adopted to i d e n t i f y a l l t a r i f f items that were s i g n i f i c a n t l y a f f e c t e d by Kennedy Round con c e s s i o n s . The next step was to i d e n t i f y the f i v e d i g i t Canadian I n d u s t r i a l Trade C l a s s i f i c a t i o n (CITC) commodities that corresponded to each of the thus-flagged t a r i f f item numbers. A c o n v e r t i b i l i t y index was used to match up t a r i f f items to the usual commodity c l a s s ( e s ) a s s o c i a t e d with them. The r e s u l t of t h i s e x c e r c i s e was the concordance of t a r i f f items to CITC i n Appendix B. Any c o n v e r t i b i l i t y index i s imperfect, however. The one that was used to assemble the commodity-level database was PRODUCTIVITY MODELS AND REGRESSION RESULTS / 83 \ -V^-lkO .o| .el. FIGURE €. 1 Frequency of Tariff Changes to Kennedy Round-affected commodities. Each bar indicates the number of t a r i f f items that underwent the shown change i n nominal t a r i f f protection as a result of concessions made during the Kennedy Round negotiations. PRODUCTIVITY MODELS AND REGRESSION RESULTS / 84 designed, s a i d i t s compilers, to "record...the t a r i f f items under which goods are i n i t i a l l y entered [ i n customs records] with more than o c c a s i o n a l frequency". A caveat was i n c l u d e d warning that " t h i s [index] can not be used to determine the proper t a r i f f s t a t u s of any commodity". 1 9 Nonetheless, there was no r e a l i s t i c a l t e r n a t i v e at hand. While some e r r o r s may have been i n a d v e r t e n t l y i n c o r p o r a t e d i n t h i s way i n t o the database, i t was f e l t that t h i s was the best t o o l a v a i l a b l e and t h a t , i n any event, i t would i n f a c t cause l i t t l e problem s t a t i s t i c a l l y . Having determined the commodities a s s o c i a t e d with each flagged item, trade s t a t i s t i c s were c o l l e c t e d on each commodity. Value and q u a n t i t y data were c o l l e c t e d for the two years 1966 and 1979 for t o t a l imports and d u t i e s p a i d . S t a t i s t i c s were c o l l e c t e d for the world t o t a l s and t o t a l s from the United S t a t e s alone. The f i n a l step i n c o n s t r u c t i o n of the database was to a s s i g n the commodity items to i n d i v i d u a l four d i g i t SIC i n d u s t r i e s . T h i s c l a s s i f i c a t i o n posed problems as w e l l , s i n c e a s i n g l e commodity may be produced by more than one i n d u s t r y at the l e v e l s of d i s a g g r e g a t i o n used. E f f o r t s have been made by others to i d e n t i f y the percentage of p r o d u c t i o n of a commodity eminating from source i n d u s t r i e s . But such estimates are plagued with problems at l e a s t as great as those that present themselves i n a methodology that a s s i g n s PRODUCTIVITY MODELS AND REGRESSION RESULTS / 85 one hundred percent of a commodity's production to the ind u s t r y r e s p o n s i b l e f o r the m a j o r i t y of i t s ouput. For one t h i n g , the percentage of output most c e r t a i n l y changes from year to year. For these reasons, i t was decided to use a c l a s s i f i c a t i o n that assigned commodites to i n d u s t r i e s on an a l l - o r - n o t h i n g b a s i s . J u s t i f i c a t i o n f o r the commodity-level database With the t a r i f f - d r i v e n commodity database, i t w i l l be p o s s i b l e to t e s t whether the s e l e c t e d c r o s s - s e c t i o n of i n d u s t r i e s and s u b - i n d u s t r i e s (as d e l i n e a t e d by the f l a g g e d commodites w i t h i n a given i n d u s t r y ) performed d i f f e r e n t l y than the i n d u s t r i e s that were u n a f f e c t e d by t a r i f f r e ductions during the p e r i o d 1970 to 1979. T h i s would c o n s t i t u t e an improvement on the approach used by Baldwin and G o r e c k i , and repr e s e n t s , perhaps, the main c o n t r i b u t i o n of the present t h e s i s . A l s o , t h i s promises to be the most e x c i t i n g part of the modelling p r o j e c t . For i f , a f t e r c a r e f u l l y f i n e - t u n i n g the model to the frequency of the post-Kennedy Round epoch i n Canadian manufacturing, no evidence i s found of a s t a t i s t i c a l l y s i g n i f i c a n t r e l a t i o n s h i p between t a r i f f r e d u c t i o n s and p r o d u c t i v i t y , then the p o s s i b i l i t y must be s e r i o u s l y e n t e r t a i n e d that the time has f i n a l l y come to l a y to r e s t the Eastman/Sykolt hypothesis. A f i n a l j u s t i f i c a t i o n f o r c o n t i n u i n g the work of PRODUCTIVITY MODELS AND REGRESSION RESULTS / 86 Baldwin and Gorecki i s that new measures of production economies have come out s i n c e the p u b l i c a t i o n of t h e i r model, and i t w i l l prove i n t e r e s t i n g to determine the e f f e c t that these have on the models' explanatory power and on other independent v a r i a b l e s . The task at hand, then, i s to begin by reproducing Baldwin and Gorecki*s model and attempting to d u p l i c a t e t h e i r r e s u l t s . The a b i l i t y to s u c c e s s f u l l y d u p l i c a t e these r e s u l t s i s not a foregone c o n c l u s i o n , s i n c e a d i f f e r e n t sample of i n d u s t r i e s has been assembled than that used by Baldwin and G o r e c k i . The sample s i z e i s 99, compared to t h e i r 102, but 24 i n d u s t r i e s i n the present sample do not appear in t h e i r s . However, i f the r e s u l t s obtained by Baldwin and Gorecki were robust, then the d i f f e r e n c e s in the r e s u l t s f o r the two samples should not be great, at l e a s t i n the d i r e c t i o n of signs and, perhaps, i n the s i g n i f i c a n c e of v a r i a b l e s . For the database used i n t h i s t h e s i s i s i n l a r g e measure i d e n t i c a l to Baldwin and G o r e c k ' s — i n f a c t , i t was obtained from them—a p o i n t that should be, again, g r a t e f u l l y acknowledged. D i s s i m i l a r i t i e s i n the database stem from the f a c t t h a t , f o r some of the 24 d i s t i n c t i n d u s t r i e s , data f o r c e r t a i n v a r i a b l e s had to be d e r i v e d from secondary sources. Otherwise, the b a s i c database was i d e n t i c a l , except f o r the f a c t t h a t p l a n t - l e v e l data was aggregated to the i n d u s t r y l e v e l i n accordance with PRODUCTIVITY MODELS AND REGRESSION RESULTS / 87 S t a t i s t i c Canada's information g u i d e l i n e s . Of course, the database was extended with the Kennedy Round-specific i n f o r m a t i o n , but t h i s would n e i t h e r enter i n t o nor a f f e c t i n i t i a l d u p l i c a t i o n e f f o r t s . The i n i t i a l form of the model, then, took the form TFP = a, + a 2IMP - a 3EXP + a,FOR + a 5ERP + a 6RELDIV + a 7ADVCF + a8CONSDUR + a 9CFR + a 10MESMSD + a M R D + a 1 2HERFCR + a 1 3HVTR + a 1 4EASTV + a 1 5 REG where the v a r i a b l e s are as d e s c r i b e d on page 49. The model w i l l be t e s t e d f o r the two years 1970 and 1979 and the r e s u l t s compared with those obtained by Baldwin and G o r e c k i . At t h i s stage, for the 1979 model, the Kennedy Round v a r i a b l e s w i l l be introduced. The hypothesis i s that the commodities on which concessions were made were not randomly s e l e c t e d , but r a t h e r c a r e f u l l y chosen to minimize any negative impact on Canada. Thus, Kennedy Round v a r i a b l e s should be c o n s t r u c t e d so as to capture the extent to which i n d u s t r i a l p r o d u c t i v i t y performance d e v i a t e s from the expected performance of high c o n c e n t r a t i o n / h i g h t a r i f f i n d u s t r i e s . That i s , i f an i n d u s t r y faced no s i g n i f i c a n t Kennedy Round concession, then the Canadian School would be t e s t e d f o r along the usual l i n e s . However, the behaviour p r e d i c t e d by the Canadian School would d e v i a t e — i f the p o l i t i c a l economy of the Kennedy Round was a s i g n i f i c a n t PRODUCTIVITY MODELS AND REGRESSION RESULTS / 88 f a c t o r — i n accordance with the percentage of i n d u s t r y shipments a f f e c t e d by t a r i f f changes. One way to t e s t f o r the i n f l u e n c e of the p o l i t i c a l economy of the Kennedy Round i s to separate the database i n t o two groups by c r e a t i n g a v a r i a b l e (KR1) which would be equal to Kennedy Round-affected imports d i v i d e d by domestic disappearance (equal to value of shipments p l u s imports minus exports) i n 1966 when that r a t i o was i t s e l f g r e a t e r than some s i g n f i c a n t value. I t was decided to experiment with values between 30 and 40 percent, which would seem to represent a greater than marginal share of t o t a l i n d u s t r y a c t i v i t y . An a l t e r n a t i v e f o r m u l a t i o n (KR2) c o u l d use the value of shipments as the denominator i n s t e a d of domestic disappearance (the l a t t e r of which must r e l i e on 1970 data to d e r i v e the f i g u r e f o r exports, and so may b i a s the estimate of domestic disappearance upwards). A second approach w i l l be to keep the sample whole and d e r i v e v a r i a b l e s that proxy the degree to which an i n d u s t r y was a f f e c t e d by the Kennedy Round. One p o s s i b l e way i n which to proceed i s to c o n s t r u c t a v a r i a b l e that would impact on the nominal r a t e of p r o t e c t i o n , i n c r e a s i n g i t i n r e l a t i o n to the extent of Kennedy Round concessions made. The i n t u i t i o n behind t h i s i s the f o l l o w i n g : i f no Kennedy Round concessions were made, then the i n t e r a c t i v e v a r i a b l e should not a f f e c t the nominal t a r i f f r a t e . I f concessions were PRODUCTIVITY MODELS AND REGRESSION RESULTS / 89 made, however, the hypothesis i s that they were made i n areas i n which Canada has a comparative advantage, i n which case p r o d u c t i v i t y w i l l be hig h e r , ceteris paribus, f o r a given t a r i f f / c o n c e n t r a t i o n l e v e l , and p r o d u c t i v i t y change lower f o r a given t a r i f f / c o n c e n t r a t i o n l e v e l change. I f , on the other hand, concessions were made i n a c h r o n i c a l l y uncompetitive segment of an i n d u s t r y ' s a c t i v i t y , t h i s would be r e f l e c t e d i n a higher than normal change i n p r o d u c t i v i t y l e v e l s i n an i n d u s t r y . Thus, i t i s not evident a priori the d i r e c t i o n of the r e l a t i o n s h i p between a high l e v e l of Kennedy Round concessions and p r o d u c t i v i t y , but i t seems l i k e l y that a r e l a t i o n s h i p does e x i s t . As a f i r s t approach to the problem of determining the nature of the r e l a t i o n s h i p , the f o l l o w i n g v a r i a b l e s was c o n s t r u c t e d : KRDEVNOR = (1 + KRMW66/MW66)(DCW66/DW66) where KRMW66 i s the value of imports a f f e c t e d by Kennedy Round concession; MW66 i s the t o t a l value of imports i n 1966; DCW66 i s the value of t o t a l d u t i e s c o l l e c t e d i n 1966; DW66 i s the value of t o t a l d u t i a b l e imports i n 1966. In a d d i t i o n , the simple r a t i o of Kennedy Round-affected imports over t o t a l imports, KRMWMW, w i l l be t r i e d . For both 1970 and 1979 the next step i n the model-building process w i l l be to s u b s t i t u t e the nominal r a t e of p r o t e c t i o n f o r the e f f e c t i v e r a t e used by Baldwin PRODUCTIVITY MODELS AND REGRESSION RESULTS / 90 and G o r e c k i . As d i s c u s s e d i n s e c t i o n 5.2, the nominal r a t e avoids the t h e o r e t i c a l problems of up-to-the t a r i f f p r i c i n g a s s o c i a t e d with the e f f e c t i v e r a t e . Data was c o l l e c t e d f o r 1966 f o r imports, the value of shipments and the nominal t a r i f f r a t e . These were used to co n s t r u c t 1966 measures of domestic disappearance and, i n tu r n , IMP, MESMSD, HVTRHCR and EASTV. The f o u r t h phase of the model b u i l d i n g process w i l l i n v o l v e s u b s t i t u t i n g the 1966 value of these v a r i a b l e s f o r those of 1970. Foll o w i n g t h i s , Robidoux and L e s t e r ' s estimates of s c a l e economies w i l l be introduced, r e p l a c i n g MESMSD with RLMESMSD and NEAST with RLNEAST. The same steps w i l l be followed to c r e a t e a 1979 p r o d u c t i v i t y model. The f i n a l stage w i l l be to model p r o d u c t i v i t y d i f f e r e n c e s between the years 1970 and 1979. To r e c a p i t u l a t e , the modelling s t r a t e g y w i l l i n c l u d e the f o l l o w i n g phases: p h a s e 1 . R e p l i c a t e Baldwin and Gorecki's model of the determinants of r e l a t i v e p r o d u c t i v i t y d i f f e r e n c e s between Canada and the Un i t e d States f o r 1970 and 1979. p h a s e 2 . ( f o r the 1979 model) Fine-tune the model with the commodity-level database of Kennedy Round t a r i f f v a r i a b l e s . p h a s e 3 . ( f o r the 1970 model) S u b s t i t u t e 1966 nominal t a r i f f r a t e s f o r e f f e c t i v e r a t e s , making a p p r o p r i a t e changes to a f f e c t e d v a r i a b l e s . A l s o , s u b s t i t u t e 1966 import and value of shipments data. PRODUCTIVITY MODELS AND REGRESSION RESULTS / 91 phase 4.Substitute Robidoux and L e s t e r ' s estimates of production economies f o r those used by Baldwin and Gorecki making necessary accomodation f o r a f f e c t e d v a r i a b l e s . phase 5.Build a model of p r o d u c t i v i t y change by tak i n g the d i f f e r e n c e between the years 1979 and 1970. 6.2. THE 1970 PRODUCTIVITY MODEL RESULTS The r e g r e s s i o n r e s u l t s f o r the 1970 p r o d u c t i v i t y model are presented i n t a b l e 1. Column 1 r e p o r t s the r e s u l t s that Baldwin and Gorecki obtained f o r t h e i r 1970 p r o d u c t i v i t y model. The model they reported c o n s i s t e d of the f i v e explanatory v a r i a b l e s that had proven s i g n i f i c a n t throughout t h e i r t e s t i n g . Two v a r i a b l e s were signed c o n t r a r y to exp e c t a t i o n s : the r a t i o of exports to t o t a l domestic production, EXP, was n e g a t i v e l y signed, as was the a d v e r t i s i n g dummy v a r i a b l e , ADVCF. The remaining v a r i a b l e s performed as a n t i c i p a t e d . The ad j u s t e d R 2 was 0.192. Column 2 took the form of t h i s same f i v e v a r i a b l e model using the 99 i n d u s t r y sample compiled f o r t h i s t h e s i s . Four v a r i a b l e s came out signed i d e n t i c a l l y to Baldwin and G o r e c l i ' s r e s u l t s : EXP(-ve), FOR(+ve), ERP(-ve) and ADVCF(-ve). Only IMP d i s p l a y a c o n t r a r y s i g n (-ve). However, the v a r i a b l e was i n i t s e l f i n s i g n i f i c a n t . A l s o i n s i g n i f i c a n t were ERP and ADVCF—again i n c o n t r a s t to Baldwin and Gorecki, who found a l l f i v e v a r i a b l e s to be s i g n i f i c a n t . In both v e r s i o n s EFFIT played a dominant r o l e , d i s p l a y i n g the TABLE 6.1 SELECTED RESULTS FOR 1970 PRODUCTIVITY MODEL 92 1 2 3 4 5 IMP 0.251 -0.16 -0.13 -0.21 -0.72 (2.37) (-0.61) (-0.46) (-0.75) (-.29) EXP -0.170 -0.37 -0.39 -0.36 -0.34 (-1.62) (-1.96) (-1.87) (-1.78) (-1.63) POR 0.123 0.33 0.28 0.40 0.40 (2.08) (1.59) (1.12) (1.65) (1.67) ERP -0.43 -0.25 -0.70 (-0.73) (-0.40) (0.95) RELDIV -0.04 -0.03 (-0.12) (-0.1) ADVCF -1.81 -2.20 0.04 -1.74 -1.1 (-2.43) (-0.83) (0.09) (-0.63) (-0.40) CONSDUR 0.27 .023 (1.5) (1.33) CDR -0 . 09 -0.11 (-0.67) (0.79) MESMSD 0.003 0.003 (1.35) (1.56) RD 0.00007 0 . 0 0 2 (0 . 0 2 ) (0.51) HERFCR 0 . 04 .011 (0 . 4 8 ) (0.18) HVTR -0 . 0 1 ( - 0 . 0 4 ) EASTV -0 . 0 0 6 ( - 0 . 2 0 ) REG -0 . 13 -0.10 (-0.93) (-0.75) EFF1T 0.151 0.20 0.31 0.17 0.18 (4.49) (4.70) (5.45) (3.47) (3.57) NRP 0.05 (0.05) NHVTR -0.16 (-0.64) NEASTV -.002 (-0.46) RLMES RLCD RLMESPD R 0.192 .24 .33 .22 .22 F na 6.20 7.0 2.85 2.86 N 102 99 75 99 99 93 SELECTED RESULTS FOR 1970 PRODUCTIVITY MODEL (CON'T) 6 7 8 IMP -0.29 -0.06 (-1.12) (-0.25) EXP -0.44 -0.37 -0.32 (-1.96) (-1.8) (-1.73) FOR 0.59 0.44 0.38 (2.29) (1.84) (2.03) ERP RELDIV -0.06 -0.11 (-0.18) (-0.35) ADVCF -0.29 0.44 (-0.10) (0.16) CONSDUR 0.33 0.26 0.23 (1.78) (1.53) (1.55) CDR -0.38 -0.15 (-2.88) (-1.19) MESMSD 0.003 0.003 (1.60) (1.77) RD -0.002 0.001 (-0.43) (0.27) HERFCR 0.19 0.16 0.10 (1.83) (1.67) (1.77) HVTR EASTV REG -0.11 -0 . 10 (-0.73) (-0.71) EFFIT 0.17 0.19 (3.44) (4.31) NRP -1.40 0.08 (-1.62) (0.09) NHVTR -0.20 -0.24 -0.22 (-0.70) (-0.91) (-1.33) NEASTV -0.004 -0.003 (-0.1) (-0.08) RLMES -0.00001 (-1.4) RLCD 0.001 (0.11) RLMESPD -0.02 (-1.73) R .10 .25 .28 F 1.61 3.05 6.32 N 99 99 99 PRODUCTIVITY MODELS AND REGRESSION RESULTS / 94 most s i g n i f i c a n t t s t a t i s t i c of the f i v e v a r i a b l e s . Column 3 r e p o r t s the r e s u l t s of a t e s t with only the 75 i n d u s t r i e s that appeared i n both Baldwin and Gorecki's sample as we l l as the t h e s i s sample. In t h i s v e r s i o n , ADVCF changed s i g n s , d i s p l a y i n g a negative c o e f f i c i e n t . However, the v a r i a b l e remained i n s i g n i f i c a n t . At t h i s p o i n t i t i s worth mentioning that d i s c u s s i o n of the d i r e c t i o n of the c o e f f i c i e n t s of i n s i g n i f i c a n t v a r i a b l e s i s not a p a r t i c u l a r l y u s e f u l e x c e r c i s e . For t h i s reason, the remainder of the d i s c u s s i o n of the r e g r e s s i o n r e s u l t s w i l l be r e s t r i c t e d to only s i g n i f i c a n t v a r i a b l e s . As a broad c u t o f f p o i n t , a t-value of 1 was chosen, corresponding to a 64% l e v e l of confidence. From a comparison of the f u l l and reduced t h e s i s sample (columns 2 and 3) with Baldwin and Go r e c k i s ' s r e s u l t s (column 1), i t would appear that the d i f f e r e n t sample of i n d u s t r i e s i s not the cause of the d i f f e r e n c e s i n the outcomes. And while these d i f f e r e n c e s are not great, i t i s c u r i o u s , given the common data base used, that even c l o s e r d u p l i c a t i o n of Baldwin and Gorecki's r e s u l t s was not achieved. Column 4 r e p o r t s the r e s u l t s of a r e g r e s s i o n run on Baldwin and Gorecki's f u l l p r o d u c t i v i t y models using the t h e s i s sample of 99 i n d u s t r i e s . The model e x p l a i n s about twenty-two percent of i n t e r - i n d u s t r y p r o d u c t i v i t y PRODUCTIVITY MODELS AND REGRESSION RESULTS / 95 d i f f e r e n c e s . As with the e a r l i e r v e r s i o n s , the s c a l e economy proxy, EFF1T, proved s t r o n g l y s i g n i f i c a n t . In a d d i t i o n , EXP, FOR, and CONSDUR showed moderate s i g n i f i a n c e , while MESMSD came out weakly s i g n i f i c a n t . Of these s i g n i f i c a n t v a r i a b l e s , a l l were signed as theory had p r e d i c t e d , with the exception of EXP, with i t s negative c o e f f i c i e n t . I n t e r e s t i n g l y , Baldwin and Gorecki had a l s o found EXP to impact n e g a t i v e l y on i n t e r - i n d u s t r y p r o d u c t i v i t y v a r i a t i o n . None of the Canadian School v a r i a b l e s performed very w e l l . Neither of the i n t e r a c t i v e t a r f f / c o n c e n t r a t i o n r a t e v a r i a b l e s proved s i g n i f i c a n t ; nor, f o r that matter, d i d the e f f e c t i v e t a r i f f or c o n c e n t r a t i o n rate alone. The next step i n the model b u i l d i n g process (column 5) was to s u b s t i t u t e 1966 values of IMP for the 1971 values used by Baldwin and Gorecki and then to s u b s t i t u t e 1966 nominal ra t e s of p r o t e c t i o n f o r the 1970 e f f e c t i v e estimates that they p r e f e r r e d . Moving the years f o r the two v a r a i b l e s back to 1966 should allow the model to b e t t e r capture the nature of the competitive environment that e x i s t e d p r i o r to the Kennedy Round n e g o t i a t i o n s . The process of s u b s t i t u t i n g nominal ra t e s of p r o t e c t i o n f o r e f f e c t i v e r a t e s a l s o a f f e c t e d the i n t e r a c t i v e v a r i a b l e s HVTR and EASTV. The nominally d e r i v e d v e r s i o n s of these v a r i a b l e s are NHVTR and NEASTV. From a comparison of the nominal model reported i n PRODUCTIVITY MODELS AND REGRESSION RESULTS / 96 column 5 with the e f f e c t i v e model i n column 4, i t can be seen that the s u b s t i t u t i o n had v i r t u a l l y no impact. The same f i v e v a r i a b l e s remained s i g n i f i c a n t , no sign switching occurred, and the c o e f f i c i e n t s and t - s t a t i s t i c s proved robust. The s i x t h stage i n the model-building process i n v o l v e d s u b s t i t u t i n g Robidoux and L e s t e r ' s s c a l e economy estimates f o r those of Baldwin and G o r e c k i . Thus, EFF1T became rep l a c e d by the estimate of minimum e f f i c i e n t s c a l e , RLMES, and the cost disadvantage of o p e r a t i n g at 50% of miniumum e f f i c i e n t s c a l e , RLCD, as w e l l as RLMESPD, the percentage of in d u s t r y production of miniumum e f f i c i e n t s c a l e . In a d d i t i o n , the Caves estimates (used by Baldwin and Gorecki) of USMES i n the d e r i v a t i o n of MESMSD and NEAST were rep l a c e by Robidoux and L e s t e r ' s estimates ot c r e a t e RLMESMSD and RLNEAST f o r 1970 and 1966. Two of the Robidoux and L e s t e r v a r i a b l e s , RLMES and RLMESPD proved moderately s i g n i f i c a n t , and negative signed as theory had suggested. However, the ad j u s t e d R 2 f e l l to 0.10 from 0.22. T h i s d i s a p p o i n t i n g r e s u l t prompted a d i s c o n t i n u a t i o n of the Robidoux and L e s t e r based v a r i a b l e s in favour of the ones that had been used up to that p o i n t . The seventh and f i n a l stage was to use backward e l i m i n a t i o n to a r r i v e at a core of robust explanatory v a r i a b l e s . During t h i s process the v a r i a b l e s IMP, RELDIV, PRODUCTIVITY MODELS AND REGRESSION RESULTS / 97 ADVCF, CDR, RD, REG, NRP and NEASTV, were e l i m i n a t e d , l e a v i n g the seven v a r i a b l e s r e p o r t e d i n column 8. As throughout the other stages of the model b u i l d i n g process, the f i v e v a r i a b l e s EXP, FOR, CONSDUR, MESMSD and EFF1T proved the most s i g n i f i c a n t . The p o s i t i v e i n f l u e n c e of f o r e i g n ownership on p r o d u c t i v i t y d u p l i c a t e s the r e s u l t obtained by Baldwin and G o r e c k i . The i m p l i c a t i o n i s that the p o s i t i v e gains i n e f f i c i e n c y a c c r u i n g from the r e l a t i o n s h i p with the parent company o f f s e t the negative production economy a f f e c t s that stem from the c r e a t i o n of r e l a t i v e l y small branch p l a n t s . A l s o , there i s the p o s s i b i l i t y that the Canadian s u b s i d i a r i e s , o p e r a t i n g with c o n s i d e r a b l e independence from the parent company, are compelled to prove t h e i r v i a b i l i t y , and t h i s i s t r a n s l a t e d i n t o b e t t e r p r o d u c t i v i t y performance. During the process of backward e l i m i n a t i o n , the v a r i a b l e NHVTR became i n c r e a s i n g l y s i g n i f i c a n t , a l b e i t weakly so. NHVTR a s s e r t e d a negative i n f l u e n c e on p r o d u c t i v i t y , l e n d i n g some support to the Canadian School p o s i t i o n regarding the combined e f f e c t of the t a r i f f and c o n c e t r a t i o n on i n d u s t r i a l performance. The net r e s u l t , then, of the model b u i l d i n g process culminated i n the model re p o r t e d i n column 8, and took the form: TFP70 = 0.30 -0.32EXP + 0.38FOR + 0.23CONSDUR + 0.003MESMSD PRODUCTIVITY MODELS AND REGRESSION RESULTS / 98 + 0.10 HERFCR + 0.19EFF1T -0.22NHVTR It i s recognized that some con t r o v e r s y surrounds the process of backward e l i m i n a t i o n . For one t h i n g , the e l i m i n a t i o n of i n s i g n i f i c a n t v a r i a b l e s w i l l always improve the c o e f f i c e n t of determination and, hence, the adju s t e d R 2 of a model, but t h i s i s h a r d l y s u f f i c i e n t grounds f o r concluding that the explanatory power of the model has been s i m i l a r l y i n c r e a s e d . On the other hand, p a r i n g down a model to i t s s i g n i f i c a n t core can help c o n f i r m the robustness of those v a r i a b l e s and focus the d i s c u s s i o n of a model's i m p l i c a t i o n s f o r p o l i c y d e c i s i o n s . Thus, notwithstanding the inherent methodological concerns, backward e l i m i n a t i o n would seem to have i t s place i n r e g r e s s i o n a n a l y s i s , as long as ca u t i o n i s e x e r c i s e d i n a p p r a i s i n g the ensuing r e s u l t s . 6.3. THE 1979 PRODUCTIVITY MODEL RESULTS The r e g r e s s i o n r e s u l t s f o r the 1979 model are presented i n t a b l e 2. Regression 1 d u p l i c a t e s the r e s u l t s that Baldwin and Gorecki obtained f o r t h e i r 1979 p r o d u c t i v i t y model. As with t h e i r 1970 model, only the s i g n i f i c a n t v a r i a b l e s were reported. Of the s i x s i g n i f i c a n t v a r i a b l e s , f i v e are signed as expected. Only EXP, which came up n e g a t i v e l y signed, was an ex c e p t i o n . I n t e r e s t i n g l y , none of the Canadian School v a r i a b l e s proved s i g n i f i c a n t . Column 2 shows the r e s u l t s of Baldwin and Gorecki's TABLE 6.2 SELECTED RE8ULT8 FOR 1979 PRODUCTIVITY MODEL 99 1 2 IMP 0.399 0.57 (3.23) (1.89) EXP -0.245 -0.63 (-1.85) (-2.18) FOR 0.150 0.19 (1.77) (0.85) ERP RELDIV -0.445 0.49 (-3.43) (1.34) ADVCF CONSDUR CDR -0.108 0.07 (-2.143) (0.41) MESMSD RD HERFCR HVTR EASTV REG EFFIT 0.097 0.26 (2.59) (6.74) NRP NHVTR NEASTV KRMWMW RLMES RLCD RLMESPD 3 4 5 0.58 0.52 0.51 (3.60) (1.62) (1.59) -0.46 -0.52 (-2.83) (-1.63) 0.13 0.31 0.32 (1.35) (0.63) (1.22) 0.56 0.68 (0.63) (0.76) 0.35 0.46 0.45 (2.30) (1.22) (1.17) -0.59 -0.71 (-0.15) (-0.18) 0.18 0.14 (0.92) (0.69) 0.01 0.08 0.07 (0.19) (0.45) (0.42) 0.001 0.002 (1.05) (1.07) 0.001 0.002 (0.34) (0.41) -0.05 -0. 06 (-0.69) (-0.77) 0.18 0.17 (0.75) (0.74) -0.02 -0. 02 (-1.5) (-1.6) -0.10 -0.11 (-0.64) (-0.73) 0.11 0.28 0.28 (2.75) (6.17) (5.95) -0.15 (-0.93) R F N 0.268 na 102 .22 4.51 99 .34 9.49 75 .34 4.4 99 0.34 4.2 99 SELECTED RESULTS FOR 1979 PRODUCTIVITY MODEL (CON'T) 100 6 7 8 9 IMP 0.52 0.49 0.0006 0.48 0.47 (1.62) (1.53) (0.002) (1.58) (1.56) EXP -0.54 -0.51 -0.53 -0.56 -0.57 (-1.67) (-1.55) (-1.36) (-1.36) (-1.94) FOR 0.28 0.26 0.82 0.23 0.23 (1.08) (0.96) (2.61) (1.0) (1.02) ERP RELDIV 0.47 0.50 0.07 0.48 0.48 (1.23) (1.28) (0.14) (1.34) (1.32) ADVCF -0.66 -0.05 -1.60 (-0.17) (-0.01) (-0.34) CONSDUR 0.19 0.15 0.10 0.23 0.21 (0.92) (0.69) (0.41) (1.30) (1.14) CDR 0.07 0.04 0.72 (0.41) (0.23) (1.04) MESMSD 0.001 0.001 0.004 (1.00) (0.93) (2.59) RD 0.001 0.002 -0.0006 (0.310 (0.40) (-0.13) HERFCR -0.06 -0.09 0.09 -0.08 -0.09 (-0.73) (-1.09) (.96) (-1.35) (1.44) HVTR 0.21 (0.93) EASTV -0.02 (-1.5) REG -0.10 -0.24 -0.15 -0.17 (-0.65) (-1.35) (-1.09) (-1.19) EFFIT 0.28 0.27 0.27 (6.16) (7.04) (6.69) NRP 0.61 0.59 0.24 (0.40) (0.37) (0.13) NHVTR 0.18 -0.08 (0.49) (-0.21) NBASTV -0.005 0.01 (-0.11) (0.28) KRMWMW -0.13 -0.29 -0.11 (-0.79) (-1.56) (-0.72) RLMES -0.000006 (-1.34) RLCD -0.003 -0.20 RLMESPD -0.02 (-1.32) R 0.34 .32 .10 .36 .36 F 4.4 3.9 1.58 8.08 7.20 N 99 99 99 99 99 PRODUCTIVITY MODELS AND REGRESSION RESULTS / 101 model using the t h e s i s sample of 99 manufacturing i n d u s t r i e s . Two var i a b l e s - - E X P and EFF1T—proved s t r o n g l y s i g n i f i c a n t , while IMP was moderately s i g n i f i c a n t and RELDIV was weakly s i g n i f i c a n t . Both FOR and CDR were i n s i g n i f i c a n t . Use of the reduced sample based on those i n d u s t r i e s shared with Baldwin and Gorecki's sample r e s u l t e d i n EFF1T and RELDIV l o s i n g some of t h e i r s i g n i f i c a n c e , and FOR and IMP i n c r e a s i n g i n s i g n i f i c a n c e . But e s s e n t i a l l y the model changed l i t t l e . Of the s i g n i f i c a n t v a r i a b l e s , one v a r i a b l e , RELDIV, came out signed opposite to the r e s u l t obtained by Baldwin and G o r e c k i . However, the p o s i t i v e c o e f f i c i e n t obtained with the t h e s i s sample i s a c t u a l l y what theory had p r e d i c t e d , since g r e a t e r r e l a t i v e d i v e r s i t y should h e l p o f f s e t the diseconomies engendered by small market s i z e . In column 4 the r e s u l t s of Baldwin and Gorecki's " f u l l y loaded" p r o d u c t i v i t y model are reported. Only two v a r i a b l e s , EFF1T and EXP showed strong s i g n i f i c a n c e . Four o t h e r s — I M P , RELDIV, MESMSD and EASTV—were e i t h e r weakly or moderately s i g n i f i c a n t . As i n the 1970 model, ERP came up p o s i t i v e l y signed and EXP n e g a t i v e l y signed. The d i r e c t i o n of i n f l u e n c e of the s i g n i f i c a n t v a r i a b l e s was the same i n 1979 as i n 1970, but two of the v a r i a b l e s that had proven s i g n i f i c a n t i n 1970 (FOR and CONSDUR) were i n s i g n i f i c a n t i n 1979. S i m i l a r l y , EASTV and RELDIV were s i g n i f i c a n t i n 1979, but not i n 1970. The adjus t e d c o e f f i c i e n t of determination i n PRODUCTIVITY MODELS AND REGRESSION RESULTS / 102 the f u l l model was 0.34, compared to 0.22 i n 1970. At t h i s stage the v a r i o u s Kennedy Round v a r i a b l e s were t e s t e d . The r a t i o of Kennedy Round-affected imports to t o t a l imports, KRMWMW, produced the only r e s u l t s approaching a s i g n i f i c a n t l e v e l , but with a t s t a t i s t i c of only -0.93, the nature of i t s impact on p r o d u c t i v i t y i s not c l e a r . However, the negative c o e f f i c i e n t suggests that t a r i f f concessions tended to be made i n those i n d u s t r i e s which were l e s s p r o d u c t i v e than the non-concession i n d u s t r i e s at the time of Kennedy Round. However, t h i s hypothesis must be s u b s t a n t i a t e d with s t a t i s t i c a l s i g n i f i c a n c e i f i t i s to be s e r i o u s l y considered. At t h i s p o i n t i t i s i n t e r e s t i n g merely to f l a g i t as a p o s s i b i l i t y . The next phase was to introduce nominal r a t e s of p r o t e c t i o n . In column 6, NRP was s u b s t i t u t e d f o r ERP, and i n column 7 the remaining nominal changes were in t r o d u c e d . The switch to nominal measures l e a d to a s l i g h t r e d u c t i o n i n the adj u s t e d R 2, form 0.34 to 0.32. In a d d i t i o n , the t s t a t i s t i c f o r most v a r i a b l e s tended to d e c l i n e somewhat. An exception was HERFCR, the s i g n i f i c a n c e of which strengthened m a r g i n a l l y . In any event, the changes brought on by the i n t r o d u c t i o n of nominal measures were s l i g h t . In column 8 the r e s u l t s are presented of the v e r s i o n i n which Robidoux and L e s t e r ' s s c a l e economy estimates were introduced. As i n the 1970 model, the a d j u s t e d c o e f f i c i e n t PRODUCTIVITY MODELS AND REGRESSION RESULTS / 103 of determination f e l l c o n s i d e r a b l y . A l s o , the two v a r i a b l e s RLMES and RLMESPD d i s p l a y e d weak s i g n i f i c a n c e . But the model's poor performance r e v e a l e d EFF1T to be a b e t t e r proxy of s c a l e economies. Thus, the model-building continued, as before, using that measure. The next stage was to e l i m i n a t e i n s i g n i f i c a n t v a r i a b l e s through backward e l i m i n a t i o n (column 9). With an a d j u s t e d R 2 of 0.36, e i g h t v a r i a b l e s remained: IMP, EXP, FOR, RELDIV, CONSDUR, HERFCR, REG and EFF1T. A l l v a r i a b l e s came out signed according to e x p e c t a t i o n s with the exception of EXP, which, as i n 1970, came out n e g a t i v e l y signed. The negative c o e f f i c i e n t on EXP i s d i f f i c u l t to e x p l a i n . The r e s u l t should be i n t e r p r e t e d with c a u t i o n , s i n c e i n a s i n g l e - e q u a t i o n , c r o s s - s e c t i o n a l model such as the present one, the d i r e c t i o n of c a u s a t i o n i s not always c l e a r . The usual i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of the r e s u l t s would be that i n d u s t r i e s with a high degree of exports are r e l a t i v e l y l e s s p r o d u c t i v e , which would be odd, given the i n c r e a s e d exposure to world competition that e x p o r t e r s face, i n a d d i t i o n to the opportunity that e x p o r t i n g may provide to overcome the l i m i t a t i o n s of a small domestic market and achieve minimum e f f i c i e n t s c a l e . Turning the c a u s a l l i n k around, however, r e s u l t s i n the e q u a l l y implausable s c e n a r i o that h i g h l y p r o d u c t i v e i n d u s t r i e s export l e s s and that l e s s p r o d u c t i v e i n d u s t r i e s export more. PRODUCTIVITY MODELS AND REGRESSION RESULTS / 104 Perhaps an e x p l a n a t i o n f o r the negative c o e f f i c i e n t on EXP can be t r a c e d to the way i n which the measure of T o t a l Factor P r o d u c t i v i t y (TFP) was d e r i v e d . Because value added per manhour worked i s one of the main components used f o r i t s c a l c u l a t i o n , TFP i s a l s o a proxy f o r p r o f i t a b i l i t y , s i n c e value added i s d e r i v e d by c a l c u l a t i n g the mark-up over c o s t of p r o d u c t i o n , of which pure p r o f i t i s a p a r t . Thus, the negative c o e f f i c i e n t on EXP c o u l d be e x p l a i n e d to the extent that high e x p o r t i n g i n d u s t r i e s are r e l a t i v l e y l e s s p r o f i t a b l e than non-exporting i n d u s t r i e s . But t h i s e x p l a n a t i o n i s not very appealing on an i n t u i t i v e l e v e l , s i n c e companies that export presumably do so because the p r o f i t s are there to be r e a l i z e d . Thus, the performance of EXP i n the 1979 model i s something of a p u z z l e . Otherwise, the model seems p l a u s i b l e . Notably, none of the Canadian School v a r i a b l e s proved s i g n i f i c a n t . N e i t h e r d i d the Kennedy Round v a r i a b l e s . 6 .4 . MODELLING PRODUCTIVITY CHANGE: THE 1979-1970 RESULTS The t h i r d and f i n a l stage of the model b u i l d i n g process e n t a i l e d c o n s t r u c t i n g a dynamic model to e x p l a i n p r o d u c t i v i t y d i f f e r e n c e s between 1970 and 1979. The dependent v a r i a b l e was the d i f f e r e n c e between the t o t a l f a c t o r p r o d u c t i v i t y l e v e l i n 1970 and 1979. On the r i g h t TABLE 6.3 105 SELECTED RESULTS FOR MODEL OF PRODUCTIVITY CHANGE: 1979-1970 1 2 3 4 5 IMP -0.14 0.01 0.68 0.11 0.14 (-0.49) (0.05) (0.51) (0.83) (1.09) EXP 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.006 0.006 (0.003) (1.75) (1.91) (2.04) (2.31) FOR 0.14 0.16 0.17 0.21 0.23 (1.27) (1.63) (1.70) (2.06) (2.24) ERP 0.06 0.06 (0.32) (0.29) RELDIV -0.26 -0.04 -0.05 -0.12 -0.20 (-0.97) (-0.28) (-0.30) (-0.74) (-1.16) ADVCF 0.53 1.14 1.07 0.86 0.39 (0.28) (1.0) (0.91) (0.74) (0.32) CONSDUR -0.01 -0.09 -0.08 -0.09 -0.10 (-0.14) (-1.22) (-1.20) (-1.31) (-1-39) CDR 0.004 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.10 (0.06) (1.34) (1.43) (1.46) (1.57) MESMSD -0.003 -0.0002 -0.0002 -0.0002 -0.0003 (-1.45) (-0.29) (-0.25) (-0.28) (-0.43) RD -0.002 0.0008 0.0003 0.001 0.001 (-0.10) (0.57) (0.24) (0.74) (0.88) HERFCR 0.03 -0.007 -0.008 -0. 02 -0.06 (0.75) (-0.19) (-0.21) (-0.49) (-1.65) HVTR -0.12 -0. 06 (-1.39) (-0.83) EASTV -0.008 -0.002 (-1.17) (-0.33) REG -0.10 -0.08 -0.70 -0.09 (-1.64) (-1.35) (-1.29) (-1-52) EFFIT 0.10 0.03 0.03 0. 02 (2.03) (1.20) (1-30) (0.81) NRP -0.17 -0.36 -1.01 (-0.20) (-0.43) (-0.01) NHVTR -0.05 -0.02 (-0.59) (-0.27) NEASTV -0.003 -0.003 (-0.55) (-0.70) KR2 -0.14 (-1.55) HNRP -1.36 (-1.52) HEMP 0. 07 (0.68) R 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.07 0.08 F 1.27 1.34 1. 34 1.43 1.57 N 75 99 99 99 99 SELECTED RESULTS FOR MODEL OF PRODUCTIVITY CHANGE (CON'T) IMP 0.13 (1.02) EXP 0.006 (2.25) FOR 0.26 (2.94) ERP RELDIV -0.17 (-1.03) ADVCF CONSDUR -0.10 (-1.46) CDR 0.10 (1.56) MESMSD RD HERFCR -0.64 (-1.81) HVTR EASTV REG -0.08 (-1.52) EFFIT 0.03 (1.37) NRP NHVTR NEASTV KR23 -0.13 (-1.64) HNRP -1.28 (-1.86) HENP R 0.12 F 2.22 N 99 PRODUCTIVITY MODELS AND REGRESSION RESULTS / 107 hand s i d e , explanatory v a r i a b l e s were of two types: s t r u c t u r a l and t r a d e - r e l a t e d . The s t r u c t u r a l v a r i a b l e s i n c l u d e d c o n c e n t r a t i o n r a t e , degree of f o r e i g n ownership, a d v e r t i s i n g , as w e l l as research and development. The app r o p r i a t e form to use was the 1970 value, s i n c e f o r these v a r i a b l e s , change over time i s s l i g h t and not i n d i c a t i v e of the impact they have on p r o d u c t i v i t y change. For the remaining v a r i a b l e s , values were d e r i v e d by t a k i n g the d i f f e r e n c e between t h e i r l e v e l s i n 1970 and 1979. For those v a r i a b l e s , such as HVTRHCR and EASTV, c o n s t r u c t e d from the two types of v a r i a b l e s , 1970 values were used i n the s t r u c t u r a l components and the d i f f e r e n c e between the two years i n the trade v a r i a b l e s . A summary of the r e g r e s s i o n r e s u l t s i s reported i n t a b l e 3. In column 2, the r e s u l t s from a dynamic v e r s i o n of Baldwin and Gorecki's models are presented. Six v a r i a b l e s proved s i g n i f i c a n t : EXP, FOR, CONSDUR, CDR, REGf and EFF1T. Of these, a l l were signed as expected save CONSDUR, which came out n e g a t i v e l y signed. No c o n v i n c i n g e x p l a n a t i o n f o r t h i s d e v i a t i o n suggests i t s e l f . In the f u l l t h e s i s sample of 99 i n d u s t r i e s , none of the Canadian School v a r i a b l e s proved s i g n i f i c a n t . However, the same r e g r e s i o n was run using the 75 common i n d u s t r e s and i n that v e r s i o n (column 1), both HVTR and EASTV were weakly s i g n i f i c a n t . Moreover, both of the Canadian School v a r i a b l e s were signed n e g a t i v e l y , PRODUCTIVITY MODELS AND REGRESSION RESULTS / 108 c o n t r a r y to e x p e c t a t i o n s . Because both were formed by c r e a t i n g a dummy v a r i a b l e of high c o n c e n t r a t i o n r a t e m u l t i p l i e d by high t a r i f f change, a p o s i t i v e s i g n was expected for the two v a r i a b l e s . However, the lack of robustness of the v a r i a b l e s , i n d i c a t e d by the l o s s of s i g n i f i c a n c e when the f u l l sample was employed, should discourage any strong c o n c l u s i o n from being drawn at t h i s stage. The adjusted c o e f f i c i e n t of determination for both the f u l l and reduced samples was low: 0.05. Furthermore, the F s t a t i s t i c of 1.27 i n d i c a t e s that the n u l l hypothesis regarding the model's s t a t i s t i c a l s i g n i f i c a n c e should be accepted. The s h i f t from e f f e c t i v e r a t e s of p r o t e c t i o n to nominal rates and the i n t r o d u c t i o n of the 1966 values for the r e l e v a n t v a r i a b l e s (column 3) d i d not a f f e c t the explanatory power of the model. The v a r i a b l e s NRP, NHVTR and NEASTV proved i n s i g n i f i c a n t , as had t h e i r e f f e c t i v e c ounterparts i n the" f u l l sample v e r s i o n . Introducing the Kennedy round v a r i a b l e s revealed that a l l of the various measures proved n e g a t i v e l y signed and at l e a s t weakly s i g n f i c a n t . The most s i g n i f i c a n t r e s u l t was obtained with KR23, the r a t i o of Kennedy Round-affected imports to value of i n d u s t r y shipments when the value of that r a t i o was g r e a t e r than 0.30, zero otherwise. Column 4 reports the r e s u l t s of the nominal model run with KR230. The PRODUCTIVITY MODELS AND REGRESSION RESULTS / 109 i n c l u s i o n of the v a r i a b l e l e d to an improvement i n the adjust e d r 2 from 0.05 to 0.07, and a marginal increase i n the F s t a t i s t i c . At t h i s juncture an e x p l o r a t o r y r e g r e s s i o n was run using a l t e r n a t i v e measure of the Canadian School v a r i a b l e s NHVTR and NEASTV. Neither of the v a r i a b l e s had d i s p l a y e d any s t a t i s t i c a l s i g n i f i c a n c e , but given the importance of the c o n c e n t r a t i o n / t a r i f f nexus to the Canadian School h y p o t h e s i s , i t was decided to c r e a t e a semi-dummy form of the v a r i a b l e s . The evidence up to t h i s stage had not been very s u p p o r t i v e of the Canadian School's p o s i t i o n , but i t was f e l t that an a l t e r n a t i v e measure was c a l l e d f o r — o n e with g r e a t e r f l e x i b i l i t y than the pure dummy forms c o u l d p r o v i d e — i n order to r i g o r o u s l y explore the impact of t a r i f f s and c o n c e n t r a t i o n on p r o d u c t i v i t y . Thus, two v a r i a b l e s were c r e a t e d : HNRP, equal to the a c t u a l change i n nominal t a r i f f s between 1979 and 1970 when the c o n c e n t r a t i o n rate i n an i n d u s t r y was gr e a t e r than the sample mean, zero otherwise; and HENP, equal to HNRP times the change i n the r a t i o of domestic disappearance to USMES. Column 5 r e p o r t s the r e g r e s s i o n r e s u l t s when the two new v a r i a b l e s were run i n the nominal model. One of the v a r i a b l e s , HNRP, indeed proved moderately s i g n i f i c a n t , i n d i c a t i n g that the semi-dummy form was capable of b e t t e r proxying the combined e f f e c t of c o n c e n t r a t i o n and t a r i f f PRODUCTIVITY MODELS AND REGRESSION RESULTS / 110 reducti o n on p r o d u c t i v i t y change. HNRP came out n e g a t i v e l y signed, as the Canadian School hypothese would have p r e d i c t e d . The semi-dummy cou n t e r p a r t of NEASTV, HENP, d i d not prove s i g n i f i c a n t . Backward e l i m i n a t i o n l e d to the r e s u l t s presented i n re g r e s s i o n 6. Two v a r i a b l e s — E X P and FOR—proved s t r o n g l y s i g n i f i c a n t . CDR, HERFCR, REG, KR2d and HNRP were moderately s i g n i f i c a n t and IMP, RELDIV, CONSDUR and EFF1T came out weakly s i g n i f i c a n t . With the exception of RELDIV and CONSDUR, a l l v a r i a b l e s d i s p l a y e d the expected d i r e c t i o n of in f l u e n c e on the change i n t o t a l f a c t o r p r o d u c t i v i t y . RELDIV was i n s i g n i f i c a n t i n 1970 and weakly s i g n i f i c a n t and ne g a t i v e l y signed i n 1979. Apparantly, product d i v e r s i f i c a t i o n was not able to o f f s e t the negative e f f e c t on p r o d u c t i v i t y of small market s i z e , suggesting that changeover c o s t s may have negated any b e n e f i t s a t t r i b u t a b l e to p l a n t s c a l e economies. Consumer goods i n d u s t r i e s were expected to have grea t e r recourse to a d v e r t i s i n g as a means of i n c r e a s i n g t h e i r market share, and so were expected to d i s p l a y r e l a t i v e l y higher p r o d u c t i v i t y i n the 1970 and 1979 s t a t i c models. T h i s was borne out by the r e s u l t s of the 1979 model, but i s apparantly c o n t r a d i c t e d i n the p r o d u c t i v i t y change model. The Canadian School's p o s i t i o n i s supported by the negative and moderately s i g n i f i c a n t c o e f f i c i e n t attached to PRODUCTIVITY MODELS AND REGRESSION RESULTS / 1 1 1 HNRP, the semi-dummy c o n c e n t r a t i o n / t a r i f f v a r i a b l e . The c o n c e n t r a t i o n rate alone was a l s o moderately s i g n f i c a n t and n e g a t i v e l y signed. The Kennedy Round v a r i a b l e , KR23, provewd moderately s i g n i f i c a n t and n e g a t i v e l y signed as w e l l . T h i s r e s u l t would seem to support the r e s u l t i n the 1979 model attached to KRMWMW, suggesting that the group of commodities and, hence, i n d u s t r i e s that were chosen to make co n c e s s s i o n s were somehow d i f f e r e n t from the remainder of the sample. The negative c o e f f i c i e n t suggests, moreover, that concessions were made i n those i n d u s t r i e s which were l e s s p r o d u c t i v e than the non-concession i n d u s t r i e s . The f i n a l v e r s i o n of the p r o d u c t i v i t y change model took the form: TFP7970 = 0.11 + 0.13IMP + 0.006EXP + 0.26FOR - 0.17RELDIV -0.10CONSDUR + 0.10CDR - 0.64HERFCR - 0.08REG + 0.03EFF1T -0.13KR23 -1.28HNRP Taking i n t o account the c o e f f i c i e n t s , i t i s p o s s i b l e to estimate the impact of each v a r i a b l e on p r o d u c t i v i t y change. For example, a one percent i n c r e a s e i n the import r a t i o would l e a d to a 0.0013% i n c r e a s e i n p r o d u c t i v i t y . S i m i l a r l y , a decrease of one percent i n the nominal r a t e of p r o t e c t i o n i n h i g h l y concentrated i n d u s t r i e s was r e s p o n s i b l e f o r a 0.013% increase i n p r o d u c t i v i t y . I t i s i n t e r e s t i n g to note, PRODUCTIVITY MODELS AND REGRESSION RESULTS / 112 though, that only 32 of the 99 i n d u s t r i e s comprising the sample were " h i g h l y concentrated" a c c o r d i n g to the adopted c r i t e r i o n of a c o n c e n t r a t i o n r a t e greater than the sample mean. Thus, the support that the s i g n i f i c a n c e of HNRP lends to the Canadian School hypothesis does not n e c e s s a r i l y imply that important p r o d u c t i v i t y gains can be expected from t a r i f f r e d u c t i o n s . I t would seem that the gains that e a r l i e r s t u d i e s p r e d i c t e d would r e s u l t from t a r i f f r e d u c t i o n s have not been s u b s t a n t i a t e d by the present model. The model tends to support the Canadian School p o s i t i o n , but doesn't e x p l a i n a very high l e v e l of p r o d u c t i v i t y change, suggesting that other f a c t o r s may play a much more s i g n i f i c a n t r o l e i n e x p l a i n i n g the l e v e l of i n t e r - i n d u s t r y r e l a t i v e p r o d u c t i v i t y change. 7. CONCLUSION I n t e r - i n d u s t r y p r o d u c t i v i t y v a r i a t i o n i s n o t o r i o u s l y d i f f i c u l t to model. T y p i c a l l y , modelling e f f o r t s have met with modest success at best, d i s p l a y i n g low c o e f f i c i e n t s of determination with small confidence i n t e r v a l s attached to many of the explanatory v a r i a b l e s . The three models developed i n t h i s t h e s i s continue i n t h i s t r a d i t i o n : the p r e f e r r e d model f o r 1970 had an adjus t e d R squared of 0.28; that of 1979 was 0.36, while the dynamic model ex p l a i n e d only twelve percent of change in i n t e r - i n d u s t r y p r o d u c t i v i t y v a r i a t i o n . One of the more i n t e r e s t i n g o b s e r v a t i o n s that can be made concerns the c o n t r a d i c t o r y r e s u l t s that were observed for the p r o d u c t i v i t y models on the one hand, and the p r o d u c t i v i t y change model on the other. For instance, product d i v e r s i t y was found to le a d to higher p r o d u c t i v i t y i n 1979, but had a negative impact on p r o d u c t i v i t y change. And while the extent of competition from imports was found to p o s i t i v e l y a f f e c t both p r o d u c t i v i t y and p r o d u c t i v i t y change, the impact of exports i s not as c l e a r : a p o s i t i v e i n f l u e n c e was found i n the model of p r o d u c t i v i t y change, but in the 1970 and 1979 models, a negative c o r r e l a t i o n was found. F i n a l l y , the group of consumer durable i n d u s t r i e s showed higher p r o d u c t i v i t y i n both 1970 and 1979, but a negative r e l a t i o n s h i p was found i n the model of p r o d u c t i v i t y 113 CONCLUSION / 1 1 4 change. The most c o n s i s t a n t r e s u l t s were obtained f o r the Kennedy Round and Canadian School v a r i a b l e s . With regard to the performance of the Kennedy Round v a r i a b l e s , the f o l l o w i n g c o n c l u s i o n s may be drawn. The modest success d i s p l a y e d by KR23 in the model of p r o d u c t i v i t y change lends c r e d i b i l i t y to the hypothesis that the t a r i f f concessions that Canada agreed to d u r i n g Kennedy Round were indeed chosen with a p a r t i c u l a r s t r a t e g y i n mind. R e c a l l i n g that the Kennedy Round v a r i a b l e was n e g a t i v e l y signed, and r e t u r n i n g to the f i v e f o l d reasons of why Canada might want to make concessions, the evidence suggests that n e g o t i a t o r s sought to grant concessions f o r t a r i f f items i n which Canada was e i t h e r uncompetitive, or f o r which f o r e i g n competition was l i m i t e d . In both i n s t a n c e s , the concession c o u l d have been made to gain a r e c i p r o c a l concession on e i t h e r the same or another item f o r which a l a r g e r export market was d e s i r e d . I t may a l s o be that i n some of the Kennedy Round-affected i n d u s t r i e s , n o n - t a r i f f b a r r i e r s were introduced to compensate f o r the reduced t a r i f f p r o t e c t i o n , which would help e x p l a i n the negative c o e f f i c i e n t on KR23. T h i s p o s s i b i l i t y wasn't expl o r e d i n t h i s t h e s i s , but should be addressed i n f u t u r e s t u d i e s . As regards the Canadian School hypothesis concerning the impact of t a r i f f s and c o n c e n t r a t i o n on p r o d u c t i v i t y and CONCLUSION / 115 p r o d u c t i v i t y change, c o n s i d e r a b l e support was found i n the 1970 model and the model of p r o d u c t i v i t y change. The v a r i a b l e NHVTR was moderately s i g n i f i c a n t and n e g a t i v e l y signed i n 1970, as was HNRP i n the 1979-1970 model. That the negative e f f e c t of t a r i f f and c o n c e n t r a t i o n was not observed i n 1979 may be an i n d i c a t i o n of the s t r u c t u r a l and performance changes that occurred as a r e s u l t of the Kennedy Round r e d u c t i o n s . The model d i d not support the conten t i o u s view h e l d by mainstream Canadian School economists regarding the magnitude of the gains to be r e a l i z e d from t a r i f f r e d u c t i o n s . For those i n d u s t r i e s marked by high c o n c e n t r a t i o n , a one percent decrease i n the t a r i f f was estimated to be r e s p o n s i b l e f o r a p r o d u c t i v i t y increase on the order of 0.013%. However, only about one t h i r d of the 99 i n d u s t r i e s sampled were estimated to be s u f f i c i e n t l y concentrated f o r the t a r i f f / c o n c e n t r a t i o n i n t e r p l a y to be important. A l s o , no evidence was found i n e i t h e r the 1970, 1979 or 1979-1970 model that the nominal rate of p r o t e c t i o n was i n i t s e l f s i g n i f i c a n t l y r e s p o n s i b l e f o r p r o d u c t i v i t y d i f f e r e n c e s . Thus, the sweeping gains p r e d i c t e d by e a r l i e r r e s e a r c h on the p o t e n t i a l f o r gain from a move to t a r i f f r e d u c t i o n or e l i m i n a t i o n are not borne out here. ENDNOTES 1. H.C. Eastman and S. S t y k o l t , (1967), The T a r i f f and  Competition i n Canada, p. 7 2. i b i d , p. 21 3. i b i d , p. 19 4. i b i d , p. 21 5. i b i d , p. 24 6. i b i d , p. 53 7. i b i d , p. 74 8. Harry Bloch, (1981), "Scale E f f i c i e n c y i n Canadian Manufacturing", p. 20 9. Ronald S. Saunders, (1980, December), "The Determinants of P r o d u c t i v i t y i n Canadian Manufacturing I n d u s t r i e s " , p. 9 10. John R. Baldwin and Paul K. G o r e c k i , (1984), The Role of  Scale i n Canada-U.S. P r o d u c t i v i t y D i f f e r e n c e s i n the  Manufacturing Sector, 1970-1979, p. 162 11. i b i d , p. 162 12. i b i d , p. 163 13. ; i b i d , p. 171 14. i b i d , p. 165 15. Richard G. H a r r i s and David Cox, 1984, Trade, I n d u s t r i a l  P o l i c y , and Canadian Manufacturing, p. 107 16. Government of Canada news r e l e a s e , J u l y 1, 1967. 17. Benoit Robidoux and John L e s t e r , 1988, "Econometric Estimates of Scale Economies i n Canadian Manufacturing", p. 8 18. i b i d , p. 8 19. c o n v e r t i b i l i t y index 116 BIBLIOGRAPHY B a l a s s a , Bela (1965; December). " T a r i f f P r o t e c t i o n i n I n d u s t r i a l C o u n t r i e s : an E v a l u a t i o n " . J o u r n a l of  P o l i t i c a l Economy, no. 73, pp. 573-594 Baldwin, John W. and Paul K. Gorecki (1984; May). "The Determinants of Small Plant Market Share i n Canadian Manufacturing I n d u s t r i e s i n the 1970s". The Review  of Economics and S t a t i s t i c s , pp. 156-161 (1985; A p r i l ) . "The Determinants of the Canadian T a r i f f S t r u c t u r e Before and A f t e r the Kennedy Round: 1966, 1970". Economics C o u n c i l of Canada, D i s c u s s i o n Paper no. 280 (1986). The Role of Scale i n Canada-U.S. P r o d u c t i v i t y D i f f e r e n c e s i n the Manufacturing Sector  1970-1979. U n i v e r s i t y of Toronto Press. Baldwin, John R., Paul K. G o r e c k i , J . McVey and J . Crysdale (1983; May). "Trade, T a r i f f s and R e l a t i v e Plant Scale i n Canadian Manufacturing I n d u s t r i e s : 1970-1979". Economic C o u n c i l of Canada, D i s c u s s i o n paper no. 280 [???] (1983; August). "The R e l a t i o n s h i p Between Plant Scale and Product D i v e r s i t y i n Canadian Manufacturing I n d u s t r i e s " . Economic C o u n c i l of Canada, D i s c u s s i o n paper no. 237 __ (1983; November). "Trade, T a r i f f s , Product D i v e r s i t y and Length of Production Run i n Canadian Manufacturing I n d u s t r i e s : 1970-1979". Economics C o u n c i l of Canada, D i s c u s s i o n Paper'no. 247 Bloch, Harry (1974; November). " P r i c e s , Costs and P r o f i t s i n Canadian Manufacturing: the Influence of T a r i f f s and Concentration", Canadian J o u r n a l of Economics, pp. 594-610 (1981). "Scale E f f i c i e n c y i n Canadian Manufacturing", p r e l i m i n a r y d r a f t , Queen's U n i v e r s i t y and U n i v e r s i t y of Denver. Caves, Richard E., Michael E. P o r t e r , A. Michael Spence, John T. S c o t t (1980). Competition i n the Open  Economy: a Model A p p l i e d to Canada. Harvard U n i v e r s i t y Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts. Diwan, Romesh K. (1966; November). " A l t e r n a t i v e S p e c i f i c a t i o n s of Economies of S c a l e " . Econometrica, pp. 442-453 Eastman, H.C. and S. S t y k o l t (1967). The T a r i f f and  Competition i n Canada. Macmillan, Toronto. G o l l o p , Frank WT, Dale W. Jorgenson (1980). "U.S. P r o d u c t i v i t y Growth by Industry, 1947-73" i n New  Developments in P r o d u c t i v i t y Measurement and  A n a l y s i s , John W. Kendrick and B e a t r i c e N. Vaccara, eds. The U n i v e r s i t y of Chicago Press, Chicago. Gupta, Vinod K., Melvyn A. Fuss (1981). "A Cost Function Approach to the E s t i m a t i o n of Miniumum E f f i c i e n t S c a le, Returns to Scale, and Suboptimal C a p a c i t y , 117 / 1 18 with an A p p l i c a t i o n to Canadian Manufacturing", European Economic Review no. 15, pp. 123-135. H a r r i s , Richard G~. (1984; December). "Applied General E q u i l i b r i u m A n a l y s i s of Small Open Economies with Scale Economies and Imperfect Competition", The  American Economic Review, V o l . 74, no. 5 pp. 1016-1032. _ _ and David Cox (1984). Trade, I n d u s t r i a l P o l i c y , and Canadian Manufacturing" O n t a r i o Economic C o u n c i l , Toronto. Hazledine, Tim (1984; October). "Trade, I n d u s t r i a l P o l i c y and Canadian Manufacturing: the Harris/Cox Model and an A l t e r n a t i v e " . Department of A g r i c u l t u r a l Economics, U n i v e r s i t y of B r i t i s h Columbia, D i s c u s s i o n Paper no. 84-04 (1988; August). "Assessing the C a n a d i a n School' of Open Economy I n d u s t r i a l O r g a n i z a t i o n . I: Theory". P r e l i m i n a r y D r a f t , Department of A g r i c u l t u r a l Economics, U n i v e r s i t y of B r i t i s h Columbia. , Steve Guiton and Robert Wall (1988; August). "Assessing the ^Canadian School' of Open Economy I n d u s t r i a l O r g a n i z a t i o n I I : E m p i r i c s " . P r e l i m i n a r y D r a f t , Department of A g r i c u l t u r a l Economics, U n i v e r s i t y of B r i t i s h Columbia. H e l l e i n e r , G.K. (1977; May). 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"The P o l i t i c a l Economy of E f f e c t i v e T a r i f f P r o t e c t i o n i n Canada's Manufacturing S e c t o r " . Canadian J o u r n a l of  Economics, X I I I , no. 2 ~ (1980;December). "The Determinants of P r o d u c t i v i t y i n Canadian Manufacturing I n d u s t r i e s " , The J o u r n a l of I n d u s t r i a l Economics, pp. 167-184. Volume XXIX, no. 2 Solow, R.M. (1957). " T e c h n i c a l Change and the Aggregate / 1 19 Production F u n c t i o n " , Review of Economics and  S t a t i s t i c s , V o l 39 Wonnacott, Ronald J . , Paul Wonnacott (1967). Free Trade  Between the United States and Canada: the P o t e n t i a l  Economic E f f e c t s . Harvard U n i v e r s i t y Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts APPENDIX A: DEFINITION OF DEFINITION OF VARIABLES USED VARIABLES USED IN THE MODELS IN 1970 MODELS. Sources f o r the f o l l o w i n g v a r i a b l e s are coded by a number i n square parentheses f o l l o w i n g the d e s c r i p t i o n of the v a r i a b l e . The sources corresponding to each number are as f o l l o w s : [1] p r o v i d e d by John Baldwin and Paul G o r e c k i . [2] p r o v i d e d by Richard Caves [3] obtained from Canada Trade Imports, S t a t i s t i c s Canada 65-203 [4] S t a t i s t i c s Canada 32-210 [5] 1977 U.S. Census of Manufacturers, volume II [6] Benoit Robidoux and John L e s t e r (1988) DEFINITION OF VARIABLES USED IN THE 1970 MODELS TFP70: t o t a l f a c t o r p r o d u c t i v i t y i n 1970 = exp(A) where A = ln(VA /VA )- a l n ( L /L ) - bln(K /K ) where VA i s value added; L i s labour measured i n manhours; K i s c a p i t a l ; c i s Canada; u i s U.S.; a i s labour e l a t i c i t y ; and b= 1-a = c a p i t a l e l a s t i c i t y . [1] IMP71: t o t a l value of imports as a p r o p o r t i o n of domestic disappearance i n 1971, where the l a t t e r c o n s i s t s of domestic production minus exports plus imports. [1] 120 / 121 ERP70: the e f f e c t i v e r a t e of p r o t e c t i o n i n an i n d u s t r y [1] NRP66: The nominal r a t e of p r o t e c t i o n i n an i n d u s t r y i n 1966, c a l c u l a t e d as the r a t i o of the value of d u t i e s c o l l e c t e d over t o t a l d u t i a b l e . [3] NRP70: the nominal rate of p r o t e c t i o n i n an in d u s t r y i n 1970. [1] FOR70: the pr o p o r t i o n of in d u s t r y shipments accounted f o r by foreign-owned e n t e r p r i s e s i n 1970. [1] EXP70: the pr o p o r t i o n of domestic production exported i n 1970. [1] RELDIV70: an i n d u s t r y ' s average d i v e r s i t y i n 1970, measured at the commodity l e v e l . [1] ADVCF70: a semi-dummy form equal to the 1970 a d v e r t i s i n g / s a l e s r a t i o f o r consumer non-durable goods i n d u s t r i e s , zero otherwise. [1] CONSDUR: a consumer durable dummy. [1] MESMSD: the r a t i o of domestic disappearance to USMES. [1] RD: the r a t i o of resear c h and development personnel to a l l wage and s a l a r y e a r n e r s . [1] CDR70: where MESMSD i s l e s s than i t s median, equals the / 122 r a t i o of value-added per manhour of the sma l l e s t p l a n t s accounting f o r 50% of i n d u s t r y employment d i v i d e d by the value aded per manhour f o r the l a r g e s t p l a n t s accounting f o r 50% of i n d u s t r y employment, zero otherwise. [1] [3] HERFCR70: a H e r f i n d a h l measure of the c o n c e n t r a t i o n r a t i o i n 1970. [1] HVTR70: a dummy v a r i a b l e set equal to 1 when c o n c e n t r a t i o n and e f f e c t i v e t a r i f f p r o t e c t i o n are gr e a t e r than t h e i r means in 1970, zero otherwise. [1] NHVTR66: a dummy v a r i a b l e set equal to 1 when c o n c e n t r a t i o n in 1970 and the nominal r a t e of p r o t e c t i o n i n 1966 are greater than t h e i r r e s p e c t i v e means, zero otherwise [1] [3] NHVTR70: same as NHVTR66, with the 1970 nominal rate of p r o t e c t i o n s u b s t i t u t e d f o r that of 1966. [3] RLMES70: Estimate of Canadian minimum e f f i c i e n t s c a l e f o r i n d u s t r i e s with U-shaped or asymptotic c o s t curve, zero otherwise. [6] RLCD: Cost disadvantage f a c i n g Canadian manufacturers at 50% of MES f o r i n d u s t r i e s with U-shaped or asymptotic c o s t curve, zero otherwise. [6] RLMESPD: Percent of i n d u s t r y production of minimal e f f i c i e n t s c a l e . [6] / 123 RLMSD70: same as MESMSD70 with RLMES70 s u b s t i t u t e d f o r USMES70. [1] [6] RLMSMD66: same as MESMSD70 with RLMES70 s u b s t i t u t e d f o r USMES70 and domestic disappearance c a l c u l a t e d using 1966 import data. [1] [3] [6] EASTV70: HVTR70*MESMSD70. The r a t i o of domestic disappearance to USMES where both c o n c e n t r a t i o n and e f f e c t i v e t a r i f f p r o t e c t i o n are greater than t h e i r r e s p e c t i v e means i n 1970, zero otherwise. [1] NEASTV70: same as EASTV70 using 1970 nominal r a t e s of p r o t e c t i o n i n place of the e f f e c t i v e r a t e s of p r o t e c t i o n . [1] NEASTV66: same as EASTV70 using 1966 nominal r a t e s of p r o t e c t i o n i n place of the e f f e c t i v e r a t e s of p r o t e c t i o n . [1] [3] RLNEST70: same as EASTV70 using Canadian estimates of MES and 1970 nominal r a t e s of p r o t e c t i o n i n place of the e f f e c t i v e r a t e s of p r o t e c t i o n . [1] [6] RLNEST66: same as EASTV70 using Canadian estimates of MES and the 1966 nominal r a t e s of p r o t e c t i o n i n s t e a d of the e f f e c t i v e r a t e s . [1] [3] [6] REG: a r e g i o n a l dummy ta k i n g on a value of 1 when the / 124 industry was c l a s s i f i e d as regional, zero otherwise. [1] KR1: the rat i o of the value of Kennedy Round-affected imports to domestic disappearance in 1966 when that r a t i o was greater than 0.40, zero otherwise. [3] [4] KR2: the rat i o of the value of Kennedy Round-affected imports to industry value of shipments when that r a t i o was greater than 0.40, zero otherwise. [3] [4] KRMWMW66: rat i o of the value of Kennedy Round-affected imports to t o t a l industry imports. [3] KRDEVNOR66: (1 + KRMWMW66)(DCW66/DW66) where DCW66/DW66 i s the ratio of duties collected over total dutiable in 1966. [3] EFF1T70: AVSZT/USMES, where AVSZT i s the average size (measured in toal a c t i v i t y value shipments) of the smallest number of the largest plants accounting for 50 percent of industry employment and USMES is the average shipments of the largest U.S. plants which account for the top 50 percent of industry shipments. [1] [2] [4] [5] DEFINITION OF VARIABLES USED IN 1979 MODELS The 1979 variables were derived as in 1966 and 1970 variables. / 125 DEFINITION OF VARIABLES USED IN PRODUCTIVY CHANGE MODELS, 1979-1970 TFP7970: TFP79-TFP70 IMP7971: IMP79-IMP71 ERP7870: ERP78-ERP70 NRP7870: NRP78-NRP70 NRP7866: NRP78-NRP66 EXPR7870: EXPR78-EXPR70 RELDIV7970: RELDIV79-RELDIV70 CDR7970: CDR79-CDR70 MESMSD7970: MESMSD79-MESMSD70 HVT7970: HERFC70*(ERP79-ERP70) NHVT7970: HERFC70*(NRP79-NRP70) NHVT7966: HERFC70*(NRP79-NRP66) RLMD7966: RLMSMD79-RLMSMD66 RLMD7970: RLMSMD79-RLMSMD66 EAST7970: HVTR7970*MESMSD7970 / 126 NEST7966: NHVT7966*MESMSD7970 NEST7970: NHVT7970*MESMSD7970 RLNET7966: NHVT7966*RLMSMD7966 RLNET7970: NHVT7970*RLMESMD7970 EFF1T7970: EFF1T79-EFF1T70 V A R I A B L E S USED TO A S S E M B L E KENNEDY ROUND V A R I A B L E S KRVS66: 1966 value of shipments of items a f f e c t e d by Kennedy Round concessions of f i v e percentage p o i n t s or g r e a t e r . [4] KRVS79: same as KRVS66 f o r 1979. [4] KRIMW66: 1966 value of imports a f f e c t e d by Kennedy Round concessions of f i v e percentage p o i n t s or greater f o r which the d i f f e r e n c e in the r a t i o of duty c o l l e c t e d over d u t i a b l e was l e s s than 0.04 percentage p o i n t s between 1979 and 1966. [4] KRIMW79: same as KRIMW66 f o r 1979. [4] KRIDW66: 1966 value of t o t a l d u t i a b l e imports corresponding to KRIMW66. [4] KRIDW79: 1979 value of t o t a l d u t i a b l e imports corresponding to KRIMW79. [4] / 127 KRIDCW66: 1966 value of t o t a l d u t i a b l e c o l l e c t e d corresponding to KRIMW66. [4] KRIDCW79: 1979 value of t o t a l d u t i a b l e c o l l e c t e d corresponding to KRIMW79. [4] KRSMW66: 1966 value of imports a f f e c t e d by Kennedy Round concessions of f i v e percentage p o i n t s or greater f o r which the d i f f e r e n c e i n the r a t i o of duty c o l l e c t over d u t i a b l e was equal to or grea t e r than 0.04 percentage p o i n t s between 1979 and 1966. [4] KRSMW79: same as KRSMW66 f o r 1979. [4] KRSDW66: 1966 value of t o t a l d u t i a b l e imports corresponding to KRSMW66. KRSMW79: 1979 value of t o t a l d u t i a b l e imports corresponding to KRSMW79. [4] KRSDCW66: 1966 value to t o t a l d u t i a b l e c o l l e c t e d corresponding to KRSMW66. [4] KRSDCW79: 1979 value of t o t a l d u t i a b l e c o l l e c t e d corresponding to KRSMW79. [4] NKRMW66F: 1966 value of duty f r e e imports that were not a f f e c t e d by Kennedy Round c o n c e s s i o n s . NKRMW66D: 1966 value of d u t i a b l e imports that were not a f f e c t e d by Kennedy Round c o n c e s s i o n s . / 128 NKRMW66DC: 1966 value of d u t i e s c o l l e c t on imports that were not a f f e c t e d by Kennedy Round concessions. A P P E N D I X I I : 129 C O N C O R D A N C E O F T A R I F F I T E M S A F F E C T E D B Y K E N N E D Y ROUND T A R I F F C O N C E S S I O N S I N T H E C A N A D I A N M A N U F A C T U R I N G S E C T O R O F F I V E P E R C E N T A G E P O I N T S OR G R E A T E R T O C A N A D I A N I N D U S T R I A L T R A D E C L A S S I F I C A T I O N C O M M O D I T I E S . 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0 3 8 9 1 9 1 8 9 9 3 1 3 5 6 2 2 5 3 7 5 9 9 1 8 3 2 5 6 8 0 5 3 8 9 7 9 1 8 9 9 3 1 4 5 3 2 0 5 3 7 7 0 3 1 8 2 0 5 6 8 0 5 3 8 9 9 9 1 8 9 9 3 1 5 5 3 2 1 0 3 7 7 0 3 1 8 2 0 5 6 5 1 5 4 9 3 1 6 1 8 9 9 3 1 6 5 3 2 0 5 3 7 7 0 6 1 8 2 0 5 1 6 0 0 7 4 0 7 4 1 8 9 9 3 1 7 5 3 2 2 5 3 7 7 0 6 1 8 2 0 5 0 6 0 0 7 4 0 7 4 1 8 9 9 3 1 8 5 3 2 2 5 3 7 7 0 8 1 8 2 0 5 6 8 0 5 8 4 5 0 3 1 8 9 9 3 1 9 5 3 2 2 0 3 7 7 0 8 1 8 2 0 5 6 8 0 5 8 4 5 0 5 1 8 9 9 3 2 0 5 3 2 0 5 3 7 7 0 8 1 8 2 0 5 3 4 0 5 8 4 6 3 3 1 8 9 9 3 2 1 5 3 2 1 5 3 7 7 0 8 1 8 2 0 1 9 9 0 0 8 4 7 1 1 1 8 9 9 3 2 2 5 3 2 2 0 3 7 7 3 9 1 8 2 0 1 9 9 0 0 8 4 7 3 9 1 8 9 9 3 2 3 5 3 2 1 5 3 7 7 3 9 1 8 2 0 5 7 2 0 0 8 4 8 3 9 1 8 9 9 324 5 3 2 3 0 3 7 7 3 9 1 8 2 0 5 6 8 0 5 8 4 9 9 9 1 8 9 9 3 2 5 5 3 2 1 0 3 7 7 3 9 1 8 2 0 1 9 9 0 0 8 4 9 9 9 1 8 9 9 3 2 6 5 3 2 2 5 3 7 7 3 9 1 8 2 0 4 4 6 0 3 8 6 7 3 9 1 8 9 9 3 2 7 5 3 2 0 5 3 7 7 3 9 1 8 2 0 3 6 2 1 5 8 6 7 3 9 1 8 9 9 3 2 8 5 3 2 2 0 3 7 7 4 9 1 8 2 0 5 1 9 0 2 8 6 7 3 9 1 8 9 9 3 2 9 5 3 2 0 5 3 7 7 4 9 1 8 2 0 3 5 4 0 0 8 6 7 3 9 1 8 9 9 3 3 0 5 3 2 1 0 3 7 7 4 9 1 8 2 0 5 0 6 0 0 8 6 7 3 9 1 8 9 9 3 3 1 5 3 2 1 5 3 7 7 4 9 1 8 2 0 2 2 0 0 1 8 8 0 1 0 1 8 9 9 3 3 2 5 6 2 1 0 3 7 7 5 9 1 8 3 2 5 5 3 0 3 9 6 1 5 9 1 8 9 9 3 3 3 5 6 2 0 5 3 7 7 6 5 1 8 3 2 5 6 8 0 5 9 6 1 5 9 1 8 9 9 3 3 4 5 6 2 2 5 3 7 7 6 5 1 8 3 2 5 6 8 0 5 3 8 5 1 1 2 3 9 1 3 3 5 5 6 2 2 5 3 7 7 6 9 1 8 3 2 5 6 8 0 5 3 8 5 3 9 2 3 9 1 3 3 6 5 6 2 0 5 3 7 7 6 9 1 8 3 2 5 6 8 0 5 3 8 5 4 9 2 3 9 1 3 3 7 5 6 2 2 5 3 7 7 7 5 1 8 3 2 5 6 8 0 5 3 8 5 5 9 2 3 9 1 3 3 8 5 6 2 0 5 3 7 7 7 5 1 8 3 2 5 6 8 1 0 7 8 4 6 5 2 3 9 2 3 3 9 5 6 2 2 5 3 7 7 7 9 1 8 3 2 5 6 8 0 5 7 8 4 6 5 2 3 9 2 3 4 0 5 6 2 0 5 3 7 7 7 9 1 8 3 2 5 6 8 1 0 7 8 4 7 0 2 3 9 2 341 5 6 2 0 5 3 7 7 9 9 1 8 3 2 5 6 8 0 5 7 8 4 7 0 2 3 9 2 3 4 2 5 6 8 0 5 3 8 1 1 9 1 8 9 9 5 6 8 0 5 7 8 4 7 1 2 3 9 2 3 4 3 5 7 4 0 1 3 8 1 1 9 1 8 9 9 5 6 8 1 0 7 8 4 7 1 2 3 9 2 344 5 6 2 0 5 3 8 1 8 9 1 8 3 2 5 6 8 0 5 7 8 4 7 2 2 3 9 2 3 4 5 1 9 9 6 0 3 8 1 9 1 1 8 3 2 5 6 8 0 5 7 8 4 7 8 2 3 9 2 3 4 6 1 9 9 0 0 3 8 1 9 1 1 8 3 2 5 6 8 0 5 7 8 4 7 9 2 3 9 2 3 4 7 6 1 1 2 0 3 8 3 2 8 2 4 3 0 5 6 8 0 5 7 8 4 8 5 2 3 9 2 3 4 8 5 6 2 1 0 3 8 3 3 9 1 8 9 2 5 6 8 0 5 7 8 4 8 9 2 3 9 2 3 4 9 5 4 2 1 0 3 8 3 4 2 1 8 9 2 5 6 8 1 0 7 8 4 9 9 2 3 9 2 3 5 0 5 6 2 0 5 3 8 3 4 4 1 8 9 2 6 1 1 2 0 3 8 3 2 8 2 4 3 0 3 5 1 5 3 2 2 5 3 8 3 4 9 1 8 2 0 6 1 1 2 0 3 8 3 9 9 2 4 3 0 3 5 2 5 6 8 0 5 3 8 3 9 5 1 8 9 2 5 6 8 1 0 7 8 1 4 9 2 4 3 0 3 5 3 6 1 1 2 0 3 8 3 9 9 2 4 3 0 5 6 8 1 0 7 8 1 9 9 2 4 3 0 3 5 4 5 6 8 0 5 3 8 5 1 1 2 3 9 1 6 1 1 2 0 7 8 3 1 9 2 4 3 0 3 5 5 5 6 8 0 5 3 8 5 3 9 2 3 9 1 6 1 3 0 0 7 8 3 1 9 2 4 3 0 3 5 6 5 6 8 0 5 3 8 5 4 9 2 3 9 1 6 1 9 0 5 7 8 3 1 9 2 4 3 0 CONCORDANCE OF TARIFF ITEMS TO CITC 136 ARRANGED BY CITC ARRANGED BY SIC TARIFF TARIFF ITEM CITC SIC ITEM CITC SIC 357 56805 38559 2391 61905 78336 2430 358 56805 38709 3993 61905 78337 ., 2430 359 57401 38709 3993 61905 78399 2430 360 57401 38729 '3993 61905 78899 2430 361 57401 38736 1629 55303 78119 2431 362 57401 38739 1629 56805 78149 2431 363 56205 38739 1629 55303 78199 2431 364 57401 38760 3993 56805 78199 2431 365 52500 38760 3993 55303 78314 2431 366 57300 38779 3993 55303 78319 2431 367 57401 38779 3993 55303 78324 2431 368 56205 38779 3993 55303 78325 2431 369 57401 38791 3993 55303 78369 2431 370 57401 38795 3993 55303 78390 2431 371 56910 38919 1899 55303 78395 2431 372 56805 38979 1899 56500 78399 2431 373 56805 38999 1899 55303 78399 2431 374 i400 39126 1011 55303 78349 2441 375 25900 39199 1011 55303 78921 2480 376 26515 39299 1020 56805 78921 2480 377 26505 39299 1020 56915 78618 2492 378 25915 39308 1083 56910 78618 2492 379 26605 39312 1083 56915 78635 2492 380 27731 39316 1083 56910 78649 2492 381 27732 39320 1083 56915 78649 2492 382 27712 39320 1083 56805 78649 2494 383 27713 39324 1083 56915 78899 2499 384 27733 39324 1083 50600 33904 2513 385 27810 39340 1083 50705 33507 2520 386 27734 39344 1083 50720 33515 2520 387 27714 39344 1083 50705 33515 2520 388 27715 39348 1083 50720 33517 2520 389 27735 39348 1083 50720 33519 2520 390 27716 39352 1083 50715 33546 2520 391 27718 39360 1083 50715 33547 2520 392 37738 39360 1083 50715 33551 2520 393 25800 39399 1083 50715 33553 2520 394 25805 39559 3790 50715 33558 2520 395 26505 39559 3799 50715 33559 2520 396 27610 39599 3799 50715 33579 2520 397 27615 39599 3799 50710 33599 2520 398 37736 39599 3799 50725 33599 2520 399 27720 39599 3799 50715 33599 2520 400 27711 39599 3799 50600 33599 2520 401 27820 39599 3799 50705 33716 2520 402 27805 39599 3799 50710 33719 2520 403 27600 39599 3799 50705 33719 2520 404 27800 39599 3799 50705 33799 2520 405 27815 39599 3799 50610 33609 2541 406 27701 39599 3799 50600 33609 2541 407 27719 39599 3799 50600 33635 2541 CONCORDANCE OF TARIFF ITEMS TO CITC 137 ARRANGED BY CITC ARRANGED BY SIC TARIFF TARIFF ITEM CITC SIC ITEM CITC SIC 408 27605 39599 3799 50600 33699 2541 409 27704 39599 3799 51300 33699 . 2541 410 27702 39599 > 3799 50600 33195 2542 411 37737 39S99 3799 44603 94911 2543 412 27705 39599 3799 35400 94911 2543 413 37740 39599 3799 40960 94911 2543 414 37739 39599 3799 50600 95066 2560 415 27703 39599 3799 44603 94939 2580 416 27717 39599 3799 19200 33595 2593 417 29615 40499 3782 50600 33595 2593 418 22001 40499 3782 50600 33911 2599 419 66505 41569 3790 50600 33919 2599 420 23200 42119 3790 49400 33949 2599 421 23510 42199 3790 50600 33999 2599 422 23210 42199 3790 50600 95055 2599 423 23230 42199 3790 50600 96139 2599 424 57401 42540 1650 51901 74012 2610 425 22001 42999 3799 51902 74012 2610 426 44603 44302 2910 44603 74014 2610 427 44603 44325 2940 51902 74014 2610 428 44603 44330 2940 51902 74016 2610 429 43845 44359 2910 51901 74016 2610 430 44603 44359 2910 51902 74019 2610 431 44603 44399 2910 51901 74019 2610 432 39200 44399 2910 44603 74019 2610 433 39403 44399 2910 62900 74032 2610 434 44603 44518 2910 51901 74032 2610 435 38105 44518 2910 51901 74029 2640 436 44603 44519 2910 44603 74029 2660 437 44603 44599 2910 51902 74029 2660 438 38010 44680 2910 51902 74032 2660 439 - 44603 44680 2910 51902 74039 2660 440 38010 44690 2910 44603 74039 2660 441 43030 44799 2910 36215 74039 2660 442 44603 44799 2910 35400 74039 2660 443 38715 44799 2910 51901 74039 2660 444 43810 44828 2920 51500 74042 2660 445 43810 44829 2920 44603 74049 2660 446 44603 44880 2920 36215 74049 2660 447 35307 45105 2960 51902 74049 2660 448 35301 45109 2951 42701 74049 2660 449 43845 45119 2960 51901 74049 2660 450 35400 45119 2960 44603 74069 2660 451 35302 45120 2960 51902 74069 2660 452 35302 45124 2960 50600 74076 2660 453 35400 45124 2960 51200 74076 2660 454 35302 45125 2960 51901 74099 2660 455 35400 45125 2960 44603 74099 2660 456 35302 45127 2960 51902 74099 2660 457 35400 45127 2960 35400 74099 2660 458 35400 45129 2960 44603 86720 2660 CONCORDANCE OF TARIFF ITEMS TO CITC 138 ARRANGED BY CITC ARRANGED BY SIC TARIFF TARIFF ITEM CITC SIC ITEM CITC SIC 459 35400 45131 2960 36215 86720 2660 460 35400 45132 2960 35400 86720 2660 461 35306 45132 2960 19700 35199 2710 462 35303 45136 ' 2960 19800 35199 2710 463 35400 45136 2960 19900 35199 2710 464 35400 45140 2960 19200 35199 2710 465 35305 45140 2960 19700 35233 2710 466 35400 45149 2960 19800 35249 2710 467 34800 45204 2952 19700 35249 2710 468 35800 45204 2952 19900 35249 2710 469 34815 45208 2970 19200 35250 2710 470 34815 45212 2970 19700 35255 2710 471 34825 45215 2970 19200 35255 2710 472 34815 45215 2970 19200 35265 2710 473 34815 45275 2970 19700 35265 2710 474 34905 45275 2970 19200 35275 2710 475 34900 45275 2970 19700 35280 2710 476 34900 45278 2970 19700 35299 2710 477 34905 45278 2970 19200 35591 2710 478 34815 45278 2970 19800 35591 2710 479 34905 45285 2970 19200 35610 2710 480 34900 45285 2970 19200 35619 2710 481 34815 45285 2970 19200 35631 2710 482 34905 45288 3380 19200 35641 2710 483 34905 45299 2970 19200 35651 2710 484 36100 45299 2970 19205 35676 2710 485 33700 45309 2953 19900 35676 2710 486 34100 45349 2980 19210 35690 2710 487 33800 45349 2980 19200 35699 2710 488 33900 45349 2980 19240 35719 2710 489 35800 45415 2954 19900 35749 2710 490 ; 48900 45525 2955 19200 35749 2710 491 36100 45599 2955 19220 35749 2710 492 34505 45704 2980 19200 35760 2710 493 34505 45710 2956 19200 35779 2710 494 35800 45710 2956 19200 35809 2710 495 35105 45945 2958 19700 35809 2710 496 35103 45979 2958 19235 35809 2710 497 35102 45979 2958 19200 35830 2710 498 35101 45979 2958 19200 35849 2710 499 35106 45979 2958 19800 35920 2710 500 34910 45985 2958 19300 95044 2730 501 34100 45999 2980 19900 95040 2731 502 44603 46113 3031 19800 95049 2731 503 35400 46119 3031 19945 95049 2731 504 35400 46129 3031 19900 95049 2731 505 44603 46129 3031 19900 95044 2733 506 35400 46135 3039 19710 35325 2740 507 44603 46135 3039 19700 35340 2740 508 44603 46138 3042 19700 35345 2740 509 35400 46144 3042 19700 35369 2740 CONCORDANCE OF TARIFF ITEMS TO CITC ARRANGED BY CITC ARRANGED BY SIC TARIFF TARIFF ITEM CITC SIC ITEM CITC SIC 510 44603 46144 3042 19200 35385 2740 511 35400 46150 3039 19700 35385 2740 512 44603 46150 3039 19700 35399 2740 513 44603 46172 3039 19700 35440 2740 514 35400 46172 3039 19710 35440 2740 515 44603 46173 3040 19710 35471 2740 516 35400 46173 3040 19800 35471 2740 517 35400 46199 3039 19710 35499 2740 518 44603 46199 3039 19700 35499 2740 519 44603 46329 1629 19800 35499 2740 520 44603 46332 3050 19900 354.99 2740 521 42701 46344 3050 19700 35540 2740 522 36215 46344 3050 19200 35549 2740 523 44603 46352 3050 19700 35549 2740 524 44603 46399 3050 19800 35549 2740 525 51700 46399 3050 19200 35599 2740 526 35400 46399 3050 19800 35599 2740 527 43011 46506 3050 19700 35599 2740 528 43000 46506 3050 19900 35599 2740 529 36215 46506 3050 19900 35969 2740 530 44603 46506 3050 19800 35969 2740 531 43829 46506 3050 19500 35970 2740 532 43829 46508 3050 19700 35975 2740 533 44603 46508 3050 19200 35999 2740 534 43000 46508 3050 19900 35999 2740 535 36215 46508 3050 19710 35999 2740 536 35400 46508 3050 19700 35999 2740 537 43011 46508 3050 19800 35999 2740 538 43011 46512 3050 19900 84720 2740 539 35215 46512 3050 19900 84810 2740 540 43000 46514 3050 19700 84810 2740 541 ;43011 46514 3050 19700 84924 2740 542 43011 46516 3050 19900 85066 2740 543 43000 46516 3050 19700 90109 2740 544 35216 46516 3050 19900 90119 2740 545 35216 46519 3050 19800 90119 2740 546 43000 46519 3050 19900 90124 2740 547 43011 46519 3050 19900 90128 2740 548 43829 46519 3050 19700 90149 2740 549 43011 46526 3050 19900 90149 2740 550 43807 46526 3050 19800 90149 2740 551 44603 46526 3050 19200 90149 2740 552 43000 46526 3050 19915 90432 2740 553 35400 46526 3050 19900 90432 2740 554 43829 46526 3050 19800 91564 2740 555 35400 46536 3050 19900 95047 2740 556 43025 46536 3050 19800 96149 2740 557 44603 46544 • 3050 19200 96149 2740 558 43025 46544 3050 19700 96149 2740 559 44603 46549 3050 19900 96149 2740 560 44052 46549 3050 18105 89424 2860 CONCORDANCE OF TARIFF ITEMS TO CITC 140 ARRANGED BY CITC ARRANGED BY SIC TARIFF TARIFF ITEM CITC SIC ITEM CITC SIC 561 35400 46549 3050 18105 89432 2860 562 43000 46549 3050 19900 89520 2860 563 43005 46553 ,3050 19900 89536 2860 564 44603 46553 3060 19900 89599 2860 565 35400 46553 3060 36215 90424 2860 566 36215 46553 3060 35400 90424 2860 567 36215 46556 3060 19900 90424 2860 568 44603 46556 3060 37000 52655 2870 569 36215 46558 3060 35400 52655 2870 570 36215 46560 3060 44603 44302 2910 571 44603 46560 3060 44603 44359 2910 572 36215 46562 3060 43845 44359 2910 573 35400 46562 3060 44603 44399 2910 574 36215 46564 3060 39403 44399 2910 575 35400 46564 3060 39200 44399 2910 576 44603 46564 3060 38105 44518 2910 577 44603 46569 3060 44603 44518 2910 578 35400 46569 3060 44603 44519 2910 579 36215 46569 3060 44603 44599 2910 580 36215 46575 3250 38010 44680 2910 581 43829 46575 3250 44603 44680 2910 582 44603 46575 3250 38010 44690 2910 583 43810 46575 3250 38715 44799 2910 584 3621S 46582 3060 43030 44799 2910 585 51902 46582 3060 44603 44799 2910 586 44603 46582 3060 43810 44828 2920 587 43000 46599 3050 43810 44829 2920 588 43035 46599 3060 44603 44880 2920 589 36215 46599 - 3060 44603 44325 2940 590 44603 46599 3060 44603 44330 2940 591 51902 46599 3060 40005 46851 2940 592 .35400 46599 3060 35301 45109 2951 593 "42701 46599 3060 34800 45204 2952 594 40705 46609 3150 35800 45204 2952 595 44603 46609 3150 33700 45309 2953 596 40602 46630 3090 35800 45415 2954 597 44603 46699 3090 48900 45525 2955 598 40602 46699 3090 36100 45599 2955 599 44603 46710 3050 34505 45710 2956 600 34905 46719 3050 35800 45710 2956 601 44603 46739 3050 35105 45945 2958 602 35400 46809 3090 35102 45979 2958 603 44524 46809 3090 35103 45979 2958 604 44603 46809 3090 35106 45979 2958 605 42701 46809 3090 35101 45979 2958 606 44603 46819 3090 34910 45985 2958 607 36215 46829 3090 . 35307 45105 2960 608 36215 46844 3090 35400 45119 2960 609 35400 46844 3090 43845 45119 2960 610 44603 46844 3090 35302 45120 2960 611 36215 46848 3090 35302 45124 2960 CONCORDANCE OF TARIFF ITEMS TO CITC 141 ARRANGED BY CITC ARRANGED BY SIC TARIFF TARIFF ITEM CITC SIC ITEM CITC SIC ======== ======== ======== ======== ======== ======== 612 35400 46848 3090 35400 45124 2960 613 42701 46848 3090 35400 45125 2960 614 44524 46848 3090 35302 45125 2960 615 44603 46848 3090 35302 45127 2960 616 40005 46851 2940 35400 45127 2960 617 44603 46859 3090 35400 45129 2960 618 35400 46899 3090 35400 45131 2960 619 36215 46899 3090 35306 45132 2960 620 35400 46904 2960 35400 45132 2960 621 35306 46904 2960 35303 45136 2960 622 44603 46910 3042 35400 45136 2960 623 35400 46912 2960 35400 45140 2960 624 44603 46912 3042 35305 45140 2960 625 51902 46912 3042 35400 45149 2960 626 36215 46912 3042 35400 46904 2960 627 36215 46920 3999 35306 46904 2960 628 36215 46928 3920 35400 46912 2960 629 64700 46928 3920 34815 45208 2970 630 36505 46928 3920 34815 45212 2970 631 43829 46952 3050 34825 45215 2970 632 40510 46952 3050 34815 45215 2970 633 44603 46952 3050 34905 45275 2970 634 45120 46959 3050 34815 45275 2970 635 44603 46959 3050 34900 45275 2970 636 44603 46963 3090 34900 45278 2970 637 35400 46972 3042 34815 45278 2970 638 42701 46972 3042 34905 45278 2970 639 44603 46972 3042 34905 45285 2970 640 35400 46999 3090 34900 45285 2970 641 43807 46999 3090 34815 45285 2970 642 36215 46999 3090 34905 45299 2970 643 44603 46999 3090 36100 45299 2970 644 '45120 46999 3090 34100 45349 2980 645 51902 46999 3090 33800 45349 2980 646 42701 46999 3092 33900 45349 2980 647 30710 47104 3530 34505 45704 2980 648 30520 47104 3530 34100 45999 2980 649 30715 47104 3530 42805 50119 3010 650 30900 47149 3530 44603 50149 3010 651 31000 47149 3530 42805 50149 3010 652 30525 47149 3530 42701 50149 3010 653 30610 47149 3530 42805 65129 3010 654 28220 47202 3511 42805 65149 3010 655 28200 47202 3511 46230 49699 3020 656 28220 47204 3511 35400 49699 3020 657 28200 47204 3511 35400 94915 3020 658 28205 47212 3511 44603 94915 3020 659 28220 47249 3511 44603 46113 3031 660 28200 47249 3511 35400 46119 3031 661 28110 47251 3591 35400 46129 3031 662 28110 47262 3591 44603 46129 3031 CONCORDANCE OF TARIFF ITEMS TO CITC 142 ARRANGED BY CITC ARRANGED BY SIC TARIFF TARIFF ITEM CITC SIC ITEM CITC S IC 663 28205 47262 3591 44603 46135 3039 664 30000 47281 3591 35400 46135 \ 3039 665 31400 47282 ,3591 35400 46150 3039 666 28205 47284 3591 44603 46150 3039 667 28110 47290 3591 35400 46172 3039 668 28220 47290 3591 44603 46172 3039 669 28200 47290 3591 44603 46199 3039 670 28805 47299 3591 35400 46199 3039 671 30000 47299 3591 44603 46173 3040 672 28205 47299 3591 35400 46173 3040 673 28110 47299 3591 50600 86732 3041 674 32202 47315 3561 36215 86732 3041 675 32300 47324 3561 51902 86732 3041 676 68905 47360 3561 28700 86732 3041 677 43833 47437 3599 28800 86732 3041 678 43832 47437 3599 35400 86732 3041 679 43832 47438 3599 44603 86732 3041 680 43833 47438 3599 44603 46138 3042 681 28205 47469 3599 44603 46144 3042 682 31215 47499 3599 35400 46144 3042 683 28205 47599 3549 44603 46910 3042 684 30400 47658 3750 44603 46912 3042 685 31600 47714 3399 36215 46912 3042 686 31600 47716 3399 51902 46912 3042 687 31600 47720 3399 44603 46972 3042 688 43829 47720 3399 35400 46972 3042 689 44516 47720 3399 42701 46972 3042 690 31600 47724 3399 44603 65329 3042 691 31400 47732 3399 44603 65392 3042 692 29300 47907 3599 35400 85007 3042 693 19200 47922 3599 44603 85011 3042 694 • 29300 47922 3599 43210 85013 3042 695 29650 47933 3599 28800 85019 3042 696 68905 47945 3599 36215 85019 3042 697 31400 47969 3591 44603 85019 3042 698 28205 47999 3599 35400 85024 3042 699 19200 47999 3599 44603 85024 3042 700 28800 47999 3599 36215 85024 3042 701 61300 49220 1792 50600 85034 3042 702 61300 49240 1792 28800 85034 3042 703 44603 49240 1792 36215 85034 3042 704 19900 49272 1792 44603 85039 3042 705 61300 49272 1792 28800 85039 3042 706 44603 49272 1792 35400 85039 3042 707 56515 49316 1899 50600 85039 3042 708 44603 49340 3090 36215 85039 3042 709 36215 49340 3090 43210 85039 3042 710 19200 49407 3599 36215 85069 3042 711 28410 49407 3599 44603 85069 3042 712 19200 49409 3599 50600 85069 3042 713 57305 49444 3993 50600 86716 3042 CONCORDANCE OF TARIFF ITEMS TO CITC 143 ARRANGED BY CITC ARRANGED BY SIC TARIFF TARIFF ITEM CITC SIC ITEM CITC S IC 714 57300 49447 3993 35400 86716 3042 715 57305 49447 3993 44603 86716 3042 716 57305 49485 . , 3993 51902 86799 3042 717 57305 49487 3993 35400 86799 3042 718 44518 49505 3512 43210 86799 3042 719 44518 49509 3562 28800 86799 3042 720 44524 49509 3562 36215 86799 - 3042 721 35400 49516 3360 44603 86799 3042 722 44603 49516 3360 50600 86799 3042 723 44524 49516 3360 36205 90423 3042 724 44524 49542 3399 44603 95007 3042 725 35400 49544 3399 44603 95019 3042 726 44603 49544 3399 35400 95019 3042 727 44524 49544 3399 44603 95024 3042 728 36215 49544 3399 35400 95029 3042 729 36215 49565 3399 44603 95029 3042 730 44603 49565 3399 33910 95029 3042 731 44524 49565 3399 19905 95089 3042 732 44603 49599 3399 19900 95089 3042 733 35400 49599 3399 33905 95089 3042 734 44524 49599 3399 35400 95089 3042 735 56910 49601 3399 35400 95099 3042 736 65105 49632 3992 44603 46332 3050 737 65100 49632 3992 42701 46344 3050 738 35400 49699 3020 36215 46344 3050 739 46230 49699 3020 44603 46352 3050 740 42701 49699 6020 44603 46399 3050 741 36215 49699 6020 35400 46399 3050 742 55910 49699 6020 51700 46399 3050 743 19900 49699 6020 36215 46506 3050 744 43829 49699 6020 43000 46506 3050 745 44603 49699 6020 43829 46506 3050 746 ; 42805 50119 3010 44603 46506 3050 747 42805 50149 3010 43011 46506 3050 748 42701 50149 3010 43829 46508 3050 749 44603 50149 3010 43000 46508 3050 750 42805 50209 3150 44603 46508 3050 751 42815 50218 3150 36215 46508 3050 752 42815 50219 3150 35400 46508 3050 753 42805 50219 3150 43011 46508 3050 754 44603 50219 3150 43011 46512 3050 755 44524 50219 3150 35215 46512 3050 756 42820 50225 3150 43011 46514 3050 757 42805 50225 3150 43000 46514 3050 758 43829 50229 3150 43000 46516 3050 759 42815 50229 3150 43011 46516 3050 760 42805 50229 3150 35216 46516 3050 761 44603 50229 3150 43000 46519 3050 762 42820 50229 3150 43011 46519 3050 763 42701 50239 3150 35216 46519 3050 764 42815 50299 3150 43829 46519 3050 CONCORDANCE OF TARIFF ITEMS TO CITC 144 ARRANGED BY CITC ARRANGED BY SIC TARIFF TARIFF ITEM CITC SIC ITEM CITC SIC 765 42805 50299 3150 43807 46526 3050 766 42701 50299 3150 44603 46526 3050 767 44603 50299. , 3150 43011 46526 3050 768 44524 50309 3360 43829 46526 3050 769 44514 50309 3360 43000 46526 3050 770 42701 50309 3360 35400 46526 3050 771 42805 50313 3360 35400 46536 ' 3050 772 44514 50313 3360 43025 46536 3050 773 44514 50315 3360 43025 46544 3050 774 42701 50315 3360 44603 46544 3050 775 44524 50319 3360 44603 46549 3050 776 44514 50319 3360 35400 46549 3050 777 44516 50365 3360 43000 46549 3050 778 44516 50369 3060 44052 46549 3050 779 42701 50369 3360 43005 46553 3050 780 44524 50369 3360 43000 46599 3050 781 44514 50369 3360 44603 46710 3050 782 42701 50375 3360 34905 46719 3050 783 44516 50375 3360 44603 46739 3050 784 44516 50379 3360 44603 46952 3050 785 42701 50379 3360 43829 46952 3050 786 43807 50401 3150 40510 46952 3050 787 44603 50405 3150 44603 46959 3050 788 44603 50409 3150 45120 46959 3050 789 44603 50433 3150 46800 86792 3050 790 42701 50437 3150 35400 46553 3060 791 44603 50437 3150 44603 46553 3060 792 47105 50469 3150 36215 46553 3060 793 47100 50469 3150 36215 46556 3060 794 42701 50481 3150 44603 46556 3060 795 44603 50481 3150 36215 46558 3060 796 . 42701 50483 3150 36215 46560 3060 797 42701 50485 3150 44603 46560 3060 798 42701 50487 3150 36215 46562 3060 799 44603 50489 3150 3S400 46562 3060 800 42701 50489 3150 44603 46564 3060 801 42701 50499 3150 35400 46564 3060 802 47105 50499 3150 36215 46564 3060 803 44603 50499 3150 44603 46569 3060 804 47100 50499 3150 36215 46569 3060 805 44524 50499 3150 35400 46569 3060 806 44524 50509 3150 36215 46582 3060 807 42701 50509 3150 44603 46582 3060 808 44603 50509 3150 51902 46582 3060 809 44603 50579 3150 51902 46599 3060 810 42701 50579 3150 36215 46599 3060 811 44524 50579 3150 42701 46599 3060 812 42805 50595 3150 43035 46599 3060 813 44603 50595 3150 44603 46599 3060 814 42701 50595 3150 35400 46599 3060 815 42701 50733 3150 44516 50369 3060 CONCORDANCE OF TARIFF ITEMS TO CITC 145 ARRANGED BY CITC ARRANGED BY SIC TARIFF TARIFF ITEM CITC SIC ITEM CITC SIC 816 42701 50736 3150 44603 52385 3060 817 42701 50799 3150 42701 52386 3060 818 35400 50799 - 3150 44603 52386 3060 819 44603 50799 3150 44603 52387 3060 820 42701 50804 3150 42701 52387 3060 821 44603 50850 3150 44603 52396 3060 822 42701 50850 3150 42701 52396 3060 823 44603 50879 3150 43140 75204 3060 824 42701 50879 3150 44603 75229 3060 825 42701 50895 3150 36215 75256 3060 826 44700 50895 3150 44603 75256 3060 827 44603 50895 3150 36215 7.5299 3060 828 44524 50895 3150 44603 75299 3060 829 42701 50904 3150 44603 75408 3060 830 42701 50906 3150 44603 75425 3060 831 44603 50909 3150 43135 75425 3060 832 44524 50909 3150 36215 75425 3060 833 42701 50909 3150 44603 75532 3060 834 42701 50911 3150 36215 75536 3060 835 44603 50911 3150 44603 75536 3060 836 42738 50914 3150 44603 75554 3060 837 42701 50914 3150 36215 75554 3060 838 44524 50919 3150 44603 75556 3060 839 35400 50919 3150 44524 75589 3060 840 42738 50919 3150 35400 75589 3060 841 42701 50919 3150 44603 75589 3060 842 44603 50919 3150 36215 75589 3060 843 44603 50929 3150 42701 75589 3060 844 36215 50929 3150 61300 75595 3060 845 42701 50929 3150 44603 75595 3060 846 44524 50940 3150 36215 75595 3060 847 44603 50940 3150 42907 75817 3060 848 42701 50940 3150 36215 75899 3060 849 42701 50969 3150 44603 75899 3060 850 44603 50969 3150 43140 75899 3060 851 30000 50969 3150 42515 76308 3060 852 47000 50969 3150 36215 85044 3060 853 35400 50969 3150 44603 85044 3060 854 50600 50969 3150 36215 85046 3060 855 42701 50979 3150 44603 85046 3060 856 44603 50979 3150 35400 85049 3060 857 42701 50981 3150 50600 85049 3060 858 42701 50983 3150 36215 85049 3060 859 44603 50983 3150 44603 85049 3060 860 44603 50985 3150 44603 85059 3060 861 44603 50985 3150 36215 85059 3060 862 42701 50985 3150 35400 85069 3060 863 44524 50989 3150 33.900 85069 3060 864 35400 50989 3150 51902 94630 3060 865 44603 50989 3150 51901 94630 3060 866 42701 50989 3150 42701 65199 3070 CONCORDANCE OF TARIFF ITEMS TO CITC 146 ARRANGED BY CITC ARRANGED BY SIC TARIFF TARIFF ITEM CITC SIC ITEM CITC SIC 867 42701 50991 3150 44603 65249 3070 868 42701 50999 3150 42701 65249 3070 869 44524 50999 ' 3150 35400 65249 3070 870 44603 50999 3150 44603 65436 3070 871 35400 50999 3150 44603 65449 3070 872 36215 50999 3150 44603 65499 3070 873 42701 51019 3150 40602 46630 3090 874 44603 51019 3150 44603 46699 3090 875 42701 51024 3150 40602 46699 3090 876 44603 51024 3150 42701 46809 3090 877 44524 51024 3150 44524 46809 3090 878 42701 51026 3150 35400 46809 3090 879 44524 51026 3150 44603 46809 3090 880 44603 51026 3150 44603 46819 3090 881 42701 51032 3150 36215 46829 3090 882 44603 51032 3150 36215 46844 3090 883 42701 51035 3150 44603 46844 3090 884 44603 51035 3150 35400 46844 3090 885 42701 51037 3150 44524 46848 3090 886 44603 51037 3150 42701 46848 3090 887 44603 51039 3150 35400 46848 3090 888 44524 51039 3150 44603 46848 3090 889 42701 51039 3150 36215 46848 3090 890 42701 51043 3150 44603 46859 3090 891 42701 51045 3150 35400 46899 3090 892 44603 51046 3150 36215 46899 3090 893 42701 51046 3150 44603 46963 3090 894 43829 51046 3150 35400 46999 3090 895 42701 51049 3150 44603 46999 3090 896 43829 51049 3150 43807 46999 3090 897 44603 51049 3150 45120 46999 3090 898 43910 51099 3150 51902 46999 3090 899 42701 51099 3150 36215 46999 3090 900 35400 51099 3150 44603 49340 3090 901 44603 51099 3150 36215 49340 3090 902 42701 52104 3150 44603 67199 3090 903 44603 52117 3150 28800 67199 3090 904 42701 52119 3150 35400 67199 3090 905 44603 52119 3150 36215 67199 3090 906 42701 52129 3150 43210 67199 3090 907 42701 52131 3150 36215 67219 3090 908 42701 52133 3150 44603 67299 3090 909 42701 52134 3150 35400 67299 3090 910 42701 52135 3150 36215 67299 3090 911 42701 52136 3150 43829 68166 3090 912 42701 52139 3150 44524 68173 3090 913 44603 52139 3150 44603 72044 3090 914 42701 52146 3150 44603 74059 3090 915 42701 52151 3150 44603 86724 3090 916 42701 52168 3150 51700 86724 3090 917 44603 52169 3150 44603 93016 3090 CONCORDANCE OF TARIFF ITEMS TO CITC 147 ARRANGED BY CITC ARRANGED BY SIC TARIFF TARIFF ITEM CITC SIC ITEM CITC SIC 918 42701 52169 3150 44603 94966 3090 919 42701 52179 3150 50600 94966 3090 920 44603 52179 3150 35400 96169 3090 921 42701 52199 > 3150 36215 96169 3090 922 44603 52199 3150 44603 96169 3090 923 42701 52204 3150 42701 46999 3092 924 42701 52212 3150 44603 54299 3110 925 42701 52216 3150 42701 54421 3110 926 42701 52221 3150 42701 54449 3110 927 42701 52222 3150 44603 54599 3110 928 44603 52222 3150 44603 54612 3110 929 43910 52232 3150 44603 54616 3110 930 44603 52232 3150 44603 54699 3110 931 42701 52232 3150 44603 55199 3110 932 42701 52245 3150 44603 57699 3110 933 44603 52245 3150 44603 46609 3150 934 44603 52247 3150 40705 46609 3150 935 42701 52247 3150 42805 50209 3150 936 42701 52252 3150 42815 50218 3150 937 44603 52252 3150 42805 50219 3150 938 42701 52299 3150 44524 50219 3150 939 35400 52299 3150 44603 50219 3150 940 44603 52299 3150 42815 50219 3150 941 44603 52303 3150 42820 50225 3150 942 42701 52303 3150 42805 50225 3150 943 42701 52304 3150 42805 50229 3150 944 44524 52305 3150 42820 50229 3150 945 42701 52305 3150 43829 50229 3150 946 42701 52306 3150 44603 50229 3150 947 42701 52307 3150 42815 50229 3150 948 42701 52308 3150 42701 50239 3150 949 42701 52309 3150 44603 50299 3150 950 . 42701 52315 3150 42805 50299 3150 951 42701 52320 3150 42701 50299 3150 952 42701 52329 3150 42815 50299 3150 953 44603 52329 3150 43807 50401 3150 954 44621 52345 3360 44603 50405 3150 955 44603 52349 3150 44603 50409 3150 956 44627 52349 3150 44603 50433 3150 957 42701 52349 3150 42701 50437 3150 958 42701 52364 3150 44603 50437 3150 959 42701 52365 3150 47100 50469 3150 960 42701 52366 3150 47105 50469 3150 961 44524 52369 3150 44603 50481 3150 962 42701 52369 3150 42701 50481 3150 963 44603 52377 3150 42701 50483 3150 964 42701 52377 3150 42701 50485 3150 965 44603 52385 3060 42701 50487 3150 966 42701 52386 3060 44603 50489 3150 967 44603 52386 3060 42701 50489 3150 968 42701 52387 3060 42701 50499 3150 CONCORDANCE OF TARIFF ITEMS TO CITC 148 ARRANGED BY CITC ARRANGED BY SIC TARIFF TARIFF ITEM CITC SIC ITEM CITC SIC 969 44603 52387 3060 47100 50499 3150 970 42701 52391 . 3150 44603 50499 3150 971 44603 52396 3060 47105 50499 3150 972 42701 52396 3060 44524 50499 3150 973 42701 52414 3150 44524 50509 3150 974 42701 52415 3150 42701 50509 3150 975 42701 52425 3150 44603 50509 - 3150 976 42701 52448 3150 44603 50579 3150 977 42610 52468 3781 44524 50579 3150 978 42701 52469 3150 42701 50579 3150 979 44603 52499 3150 44603 50595 3150 980 42735 52499 3150 42701 50595 3150 981 42701 52499 3150 42805 50595 3150 982 42701 52515 3150 42701 50733 3150 983 44603 52515 3150 42701 50736 3150 984 42701 52539 3150 42701 50799 3150 985 44603 52559 3150 44603 50799 3150 986 42701 52559 3150 35400 50799 3150 987 42701 52560 3150 42701 50804 3150 988 44603 52560 3150 44603 50850 3150 989 41201 52616 3150 42701 50850 3150 990 35400 52655 2870 42701 50879 3150 991 37000 52655 2870 44603 50879 3150 992 42701 52659 3150 44700 50895 3150 993 44603 52659 3150 44524 50895 3150 994 50600 52732 3150 42701 50895 3150 995 45110 52736 3999 44603 50895 3150 996 45105 52736 3999 42701 50904 3150 997 37000 52756 3150 42701 50906 3150 998 42701 52756 3150 44603 50909 3150 999 45110 52760 3150 42701 50909 3150 1000 35400 52799 3150 44524 50909 3150 i o o r 61300 52799 3150 42701 50911 3150 1002 42701 52799 3150 44603 50911 3150 1003 44603 52799 3150 42701 50914 3150 1004 50600 52799 3150 42738 50914 3150 1005 42701 52802 3150 44524 50919 3150 1006 44603 52819 3150 42738 50919 3150 1007 42701 52819 3150 35400 50919 3150 1008 42701 52828 3150 44603 50919 3150 1009 42701 52836 3150 42701 50919 3150 1010 40954 52836 3150 36215 50929 3150 1011 44603 52836 3150 44603 50929 3150 1012 44603 52852 3150 42701 50929 3150 1013 44603 52857 3150 42701 50940 3150 1014 42701 52857 3150 44524 50940 3150 1015 44603 52860 3150 44603 50940 3150 1016 42701 52860 3150 30000 50969 3150 1017 42738 52864 3150 50600 50969 3150 1018 42738 52868 3150 47000 50969 3150 1019 42701 52899 3150 44603 50969 3150 CONCORDANCE OF TARIFF ITEMS TO CITC 149 ARRANGED BY CITC ARRANGED BY SIC TARIFF TARIFF ITEM CITC. SIC ITEM CITC SIC 1020 35400 52904 3150 42701 50969 3150 1021 42701 52904 3150 35400 50969 3150 1022 44603 52904 , 3150 42701 50979 3150 1023 35400 52909 3150 44603 50979 3150 1024 42701 52909 3150 42701 50981 3150 1025 44603 52909 3150 44603 50983 3150 1026 44603 52916 3150 42701 50983 3150 1027 42701 52916 3150 42701 50985 3150 1028 42701 52920 3150 44603 50985 3150 1029 47000 52924 3150 44603 50985 3150 1030 42701 52924 3150 35400 50989 3150 1031 44524 52932 3150 44603 50989 3150 1032 42701 52932 3150 42701 50989 3150 1033 44603 52932 3150 44524 50989 3150 1034 44603 52936 3150 42701 50991 3150 1035 42701 52936 3150 44603 50999 3150 1036 42701 52940 3150 42701 50999 3150 1037 44603 52940 3150 44524 50999 3150 1038 42701 52991 3150 36215 50999 3150 1039 42701 52999 3150 35400 50999 3150 1040 44603 52999 3150 44603 51019 3150 1041 44603 54299 3110 42701 51019 3150 1042 42701 54421 3110 44524 51024 3150 1043 42701 54449 3110 42701 51024 3150 1044 44603 54599 3110 44603 51024 3150 1045 44603 54612 3110 42701 51026 3150 1046 44603 54616 3110 44603 51026 3150 1047 44603 54699 3110 44524 51026 3150 1048 42815 55185 3150 44603 51032 3150 1049 42805 55185 3150 42701 51032 3150 1050 44603 55199 3110 44603 51035 3150 1051 42815 57157 3260 42701 51035 3150 1052 42815 57158 3260 44603 51037 3150 1053 43800 57519 3260 42701 51037 3150 1054 43800 57532 3260 42701 51039 3150 1055 43800 57559 3260 44603 51039 3150 1056 43420 57628 3260 44524 51039 3150 1057 43421 57628 3260 42701 51043 3150 1058 44603 57699 3110 42701 51045 3150 1059 42701 57699 3260 44603 51046 3150 1060 44524 57699 3260 43829 51046 3150 1061 40401 57699 3260 42701 51046 3150 1062 39401 57699 3260 42701 51049 3150 1063 43800 57699 3260 44603 51049 3150 1064 43910 58447 3243 43829 51049 3150 1065 43910 58448 3243 42701 51099 3150 1066 43910 58455 3242 44603 51099 3150 1067 43910 58456. 3242 43910 51099 3150 1068 43910 58457 3242 35400 51099 3150 1069 43910 58499 3242 42701 52104 3150 1070 42815 58804 3250 44603 52117 3150 CONCORDANCE OF TARIFF ITEMS TO CITC 150 ARRANGED BY CITC ARRANGED BY SIC TARIFF TARIFF ITEM CITC SIC ITEM CITC SIC 1071 43824 58804 3250 42701 52119 3150 1072 43819 58804 3250 44603 52119 3150 1073 43819 58819 . , 3250 42701 52129 3150 1074 43829 58819 3250 42701 52131 3150 1075 43824 58819 3250 42701 52133 3150 1076 42815 58834 3250 42701 52134 3150 1077 43819 58834 3250 42701 52135 3150 1078 43829 58834 3250 42701 52136 3150 1079 43824 58834 3250 42701 52139 3150 1080 43807 58849 3250 44603 52139 3150 1081 43819 58849 . 3250 42701 52146 3150 1082 43829 58849 3250 42701 52151 3150 1083 43810 58849 3250 42701 52168 3150 1084 42805 58849 3250 44603 52169 3150 1085 44603 58849 3250 42701 52169 3150 1086 43824 58849 3250 44603 52179 3150 1087 43829 58909 3240 42701 52179 3150 1088 35400 58909 3241 42701 52199 3150 1089 44603 58910 3250 44603 52199 3150 1090 36215 58910 3250 42701 52204 3150 1091 42701 58912 3250 42701 52212 3150 1092 44603 58912 3250 42701 52216 3150 1093 3S400 58912 3250 42701 52221 3150 1094 44603 58919 3250 44603 52222 3150 1095 40402 58919 3250 42701 52222 3150 1096 39402 58919 3250 43910 52232 3150 1097 35400 58919 3250 42701 52232 3150 1098 36215 58919 3250 44603 52232 3150 1099 44524 58919 3250 44603 52245 3150 1100 42701 58935 3260 42701 52245 3150 1101 44603 58935 3260 42701 52247 3150 1102 43829 58940 3250 44603 52247 3150 1103 ; 35400 58999 3250 44603 52252 3150 1104 43807 58999 3250 42701 52252 3150 1105 44603 58999 3250 35400 52299 3150 1106 50600 58999 3250 44603 52299 3150 1107 43930 58999 3250 42701 52299 3150 1108 43829 58999 3250 44603 52303 3150 1109 36215 58999 3250 42701 52303 3150 1110 43819 58999 3250 42701 52304 3150 1111 42820 58999 3250 44524 52305 3150 1112 39402 58999 3250 42701 52305 3150 1113 42701 58999 3250 42701 52306 3150 1114 43810 58999 3250 42701 52307 3150 1115 44524 58999 3250 42701 52308 3150 1116 33900 58999 3520 42701 52309 3150 1117 44009 59169 3280 42701 52315 3150 1118 44003 59169 3280 42701 52320 3150 1119 44003 59199 3270 44603 52329 3150 1120 42815 59227 3151 42701 52329 3150 1121 42815 59229 3151 44603 52349 3150 CONCORDANCE OF TARIFF ITEMS TO CITC 151 ARRANGED BY CITC ARRANGED BY SIC TARIFF TARIFF ITEM CITC SIC ITEM CITC SIC 1122 42805 59240 3151 42701 52349 3150 1123 42701 59250 3151 44627 52349 3150 1124 44603 59255 3151 42701 52364 3150 1125 42701 59255 ' 3151 42701 52365 3150 1126 42805 59299 3151 42701 52366 3150 1127 36215 59339 3270 42701 52369 3150 1128 42701 59339 3270 44524 52369 3150 1129 44603 59339 3270 44603 52377 3150 1130 35400 59339 3270 42701 52377 3150 1131 50600 59339 3270 42701 52391 3150 1132 44044 60151 3210 42701 52414 3150 1133 44043 60151 1 3210 42701 52415 3150 1134 44047 60151 3210 42701 52425 3150 1135 44043 60155 3210 42701 52448 3150 1136 44047 60155 3210 42701 52469 3150 1137 44047 60159 3210 44603 52499 3150 1138 44043 60159 3210 42701 52499 3150 1139 44047 60329 3210 42735 52499 3150 1140 44048 60335 3210 44603 52515 3150 1141 44047 60335 3210 42701 52515 3150 1142 44047 60339 3210 42701 52539 3150 1143 44047 60349 3210 42701 52559 3150 1144 44603 60599 3210 44603 52559 3150 1145 44052 60599 3210 42701 52560 3150 1146 44524 60599 3210 44603 52560 3150 1147 44043 60599 3210 41201 52616 3150 1148 35400 60599 3210 44603 52659 3150 1149 44606 61120 3932 42701 52659 3150 1150 36215 61120 3932 50600 52732 3150 1151 44603 61120 3932 37000 52756 3150 1152 43910 61199 3290 42701 52756 3150 1153 40402 61199 3290 45110 52760 3150 1154 43920 61199 3290 50600 52799 3150 1155 61815 62105 1620 35400 52799 3150 1156 61815 62109 1620 61300 52799 3150 1157 61815 62115 1620 42701 52799 3150 1158 61815 62120 1620 44603 52799 3150 1159 61815 62129 1620 42701 52802 3150 1160 61815 62149 1620 42701 52819 3150 1161 61815 62525 1620 44603 52819 3150 1162 61815 62529 1620 42701 52828 3150 1163 61815 62539 1620 40954 52836 3150 1164 61815 62549 1620 44603 52836 3150 1165 44508 63419 3350 42701 52836 3150 1166 44524 63419 3350 44603 52852 3150 1167 44524 63445 3340 42701 52857 3150 1168 44524 63475 3340 44603 52857 3150 1169 44524 63490 3350 42701 52860 3150 1170 44524 63495 3350 44603 52860 3150 1171 44524 63499 3350 42738 52864 3150 1172 36215 63790 3994 42738 52868 3150 CONCORDANCE OF TARIFF ITEMS T O C ITC 152 ARRANGED BY CITC ARRANGED BY SIC TARIFF TARIFF ITEM CITC SIC ITEM CITC SIC 1173 35400 63790 3994 42701 52899 3150 1174 44603 63794 3350 35400 52904 3150 1175 44524 63794 . > 3350 44603 52904 3150 1176 44524 63819 3350 42701 52904 3150 1177 44621 63819 3350 42701 52909 3150 1178 44508 63819 3350 44603 52909 3150 1179 44524 63829 3350 35400 52909 . 3150 1180 44524 63833 3350 44603 52916 3150 1181 44524 63839 3350 42701 52916 3150 1182 44524 63849 3350 42701 52920 3150 1183 44508 63910 3350 42701 52924 3150 1184 44524 63910 3350 47000 52924 3150 1185 44524 63915 3350 44524 52932 3150 1186 44508 63915 3350 44603 52932 3150 1187 44508 63925 3350 42701 52932 3150 1188 44514 63925 3350 42701 52936 3150 1189 44524 63925 3350 44603 52936 3150 1190 44524 63930 3350 44603 52940 3150 1191 44524 63940 3350 42701 52940 3150 1192 44524 63945 3350 42701 52991 3150 1193 44533 63950 3350 44603 52999 3150 1194 44533 63955 3350 42701 52999 3150 1195 44533 63960 3340 42805 55185 3150 1196 44524 63992 3350 42815 55185 3150 1197 44524 63994 3350 35400 72049 3150 1198 44524 63999 3350 44603 72049 3150 1199 44335 63999 3350 42701 73063 3150 1200 42805 65129 3010 42701 73069 3150 1201 42805 65149 3010 35400 73069 3150 1202 42701 65199 3070 44524 73069 3150 1203 44603 65249 3070 44603 73069 3150 1204 35400 65249 3070 42701 73099 3150 1205 ; 42701 65249 3070 44603 73099 3150 1206 42701 65324 3320 42701 75102 3150 1207 44603 65329 3042 42701 75116 3150 1208 44524 65331 3310 42701 75122 3150 1209 44603 65353 3310 44524 75190 3150 1210 44524 65369 3310 42701 75190 3150 1211 42701 65371 3310 44603 75198 3150 1212 44524 65371 3310 42701 75198 3150 1213 44603 65371 3310 44524 75198 3150 1214 44524 65389 3310 42701 83292 3150 1215 44603 65392 3042 42815 59227 3151 1216 44524 65394 3310 42815 59229 3151 1217 44603 65394 3310 42805 59240 3151 1218 42701 65394 3310 42701 59250 3151 1219 42701 65399 3310 42701 59255 3151 1220 35400 65399 3310 44603 59255 3151 1221 44603 65399 3310 42805 59299 3151 1222 44330 65399 3310 42701 65519 3160 1223 44524 65399 3310 44052 65519 3160 CONCORDANCE OF TARIFF ITEMS TO CITC 153 ARRANGED BY CITC ARRANGED BY SIC TARIFF TARIFF ITEM CITC SIC ITEM CITC SIC 1224 44603 65436 3070 43800 65519 3160 1225 44603 65449 3070 44524 65519 3160 1226 44603 65499 . 3070 44603 65519 3160 1227 42701 65506 3320 ' 42701 65528 3160 1228 44524 65506 3320 44603 65528 3160 1229 42701 65519 3160 44524 65528 3160 1230 44052 65519 3160 44052 65528 3160 1231 43800 65519 3160 42701 65566 3160 1232 44524 65519 3160 42701 65570 3160 1233 44603 65519 3160 42701 65582 3160 1234 44052 65528 3160 42701 65583 3160 1235 44603 65528 3160 42701 65589 3160 1236 42701 65528 3160 42701 65590 3160 1237 44524 65528 3160 50600 65599 3160 1238 42701 65566 3160 44603 65599 3160 1239 42701 65570 3160 44524 65599 3160 1240 42701 65582 3160 36215 65599 3160 1241 42701 65583 3160 42701 65599 3160 1242 42701 65589 3160 35400 65599 3160 1243 42701 65590 3160 44603 73040 3180 1244 44524 65599 3160 35220 73040 3180 1245 35400 65599 3160 44508 73040 3180 1246 44603 65599 3160 44524 73040 3180 1247 36215 65599 3160 42701 73043 3180 1248 42701 65599 3160 42701 73049 3180 1249 50600 65599 3160 44603 73049 3180 1250 44524 66189 3310 44603 77112 3180 1251 44524 66195 3330 44524 77120 3180 1252 44524 66199 3310 44524 77122 3180 1253 44603 66199 3310 44603 77128 3180 1254 44603 66289 3320 44524 77136 3180 1255 44603 67199 3090 44603 77160 3180 1256 ' 35400 67199 3090 44603 77199 3180 1257 36215 67199 3090 42701 77199 3181 1258 28800 67199 3090 42701 77199 3181 1259 43210 67199 3090 44047 60151 3210 1260 36215 67219 3090 44044 60151 3210 1261 36215 67299 3090 44043 60151 3210 1262 35400 67299 3090 44043 60155 3210 1263 44603 67299 3090 44047 60155 3210 1264 44524 68119 3330 44043 60159 3210 1265 44524 68143 3330 44047 60159 3210 1266 43829 68166 3090 44047 60329 3210 1267 44524 68173 3090 44047 60335 3210 1268 44603 68199 3330 44048 60335 3210 1269 44504 68199 3330 44047 60339 3210 1270 28205 68199 3330 44047 60349 3210 1271 35400 68199 3330 44524 60599 3210 1272 44524 68199 3330 44052 60599 3210 1273 44524 68202 3399 44603 60599 3210 1274 44504 68202 3399 35400 60599 3210 CONCORDANCE OF TARIFF ITEMS TO CITC 154 ARRANGED BY CITC ARRANGED BY SIC TARIFF TARIFF ITEM CITC SIC ITEM CITC SIC 1275 44504 68212 3399 44043 60599 3210 1276 44504 68222 3399 43829 58909 3240 1277 44524 68222 3399 35400 58909 3241 1278 44504 68232 ' 3399 43910 58455 3242 1279 44524 68232 3399 43910 58456 3242 1280 44504 68242 3399 43910 58457 3242 1281 43829 68242 3399 43910 58499 3242 1282 44504 68252 3399 43910 58447 3243 1283 44504 68262 3399 43910 58448 3243 1284 43829 68262 3399 44603 46575 3250 1285 44524 68290 3399 43810 46575 3250 1286 44524 68326 3399 36215 46575 3250 1287 44514 68326 3399 43829 46575 3250 1288 44514 68379 3399 43824 58804 3250 1289 44524 68379 3399 43819 58804 3250 1290 44514 68395 3399 42815 58804 3250 1291 44524 68395 3399 43824 58819 3250 1292 44524 68423 3399 43829 58819 3250 1293 44524 68429 3360 43819 58819 3250 1294 • 44524 68449 3360 43829 58834 3250 1295 44524 68481 3360 43824 58834 3250 1296 44524 68499 3360 42815 58834 3250 1297 42701 68859 3360 43819 58834 3250 1298 44524 68859 3360 44603 58849 3250 1299 44603 68859 3360 43824 58849 3250 1300 44603 68869 3399 43810 58849 3250 1301 44524 68869 3399 43807 58849 3250 1302 44524 68879 3360 42805 58849 3250 1303 44516 68879 3360 43819 58849 3250 1304 44514 68879 3360 43829 58849 3250 1305 44516 68908 3250 44603 58910 3250 1306 43829 68908 3250 36215 58910 3250 1307 ; 43807 68912 3250 44603 58912 3250 1308 43829 68912 3250 42701 58912 3250 1309 44514 68916 3250 35400 58912 3250 1310 43829 68916 3250 44603 58919 3250 1311 43829 68924 3250 40402 58919 3250 1312 42805 68924 3250 35400 58919 3250 1313 43819 68989 3250 39402 58919 3250 1314 42805 68989 3250 44524 58919 3250 1315 42701 68989 3250 36215 58919 3250 1316 43829 68989 3250 43829 58940 3250 1317 44524 68989 3250 42701 58999 3250 1318 43807 68989 3250 44603 58999 3250 1319 43829 68995 3250 43807 58999 3250 1320 43819 68995 . 3250 43829 58999 3250 1321 43807 68995 3250 43819 58999 3250 1322 44524 68995 3250 44524 58999 3250 1323 42805 68995 3250 43930 58999 3250 1324 42701 69215 3310 39402 58999 3250 1325 42701 69219 3310 36215 58999 3250 CONCORDANCE OF TARIFF ITEMS TO CITC 155 ARRANGED BY CITC ARRANGED BY SIC TARIFF TARIFF ITEM CITC SIC ITEM CITC SIC ======== ======== ======== ======== ======== ======== 1326 44524 69229 3310 35400 58999 3250 1327 42701 69232 3310 42820 58999 3250 1328 44512 69329 . 3391 43810 58999 3250 1329 44512 69348 ' 3391 50600 58999 3250 1330 44512 69359 3391 44516 68908 3250 1331 44512 69395 3391 43829 68908 3250 1332 42701 69704 3310 43829 68912 . 3250 1333 42701 69719 3310 43807 68912 3250 1334 42701 69754 3320 43829 68916 3250 1335 42701 69755 3320 44514 68916 3250 1336 42701 69758 3320 42805 68924 3250 1337 42701 69762 3310 43829 68924 3250 1338 44524 69762 3310 42701 68989 3250 1339 .44603 69762 3310 42805 68989 3250 1340 42701 69769 3310 43807 68989 3250 1341 44603 69769 3310 43829 68989 3250 1342 35400 69769 3310 44524 68989 3250 1343 44524 69769 3310 43819 68989 3250 1344 44524 69771 3310 43829 68995 3250 1345 44524 69799 3310 44524 68995 3250 1346 44603 69799 3310 42805 68995 3250 1347 42701 69799 3310 43819 68995 3250 1348 44524 69835 3310 43807 . 68995 3250 1349 44603 69875 3999 42815 57157 3260 1350 50600 69875 3999 42815 57158 3260 1351 42701 69899 3320 43800 57519 3260 1352 44524 70328 3911 43800 57532 3260 1353 44524 70334 3911 43800 57559 3260 1354 44603 70342 3911 43420 57628 3260 1355 44400 70342 3911 43421 57628 3260 1356 35400 70344 3911 43800 57699 3260 1357 44603 70344 3911 39401 57699 3260 1358 42701 70344 3911 40401 57699 3260 1359 44524 70348 3911 44524 57699 3260 1360 44514 70348 3911 42701 57699 3260 1361 35400 70390 3911 42701 58935 3260 1362 44603 70390 3911 44603 58935 3260 1363 44524 70390 3911 44003 59199 3270 1364 44514 70395 3911 50600 59339 3270 1365 44524 70395 3911 44603 59339 3270 1366 44603 70395 3911 42701 59339 3270 1367 35400 70395 3911 36215 59339 3270 1368 44603 70624 3911 35400 59339 3270 1369 44603 70645 3911 44009 59169 3280 1370 44524 70645 3911 44003 59169 3280 1371 44603 70649 3911 43910 61199 3290 1372 44524 70649 3911 43920 61199 3290 1373 44603 70729 3911 40402 61199 3290 1374 44524 70919 3911 44524 65331 3310 1375 44524 70927 3911 44603 65353 3310 1376 44524 70928 3911 44524 65369 3310 CONCORDANCE OF TARIFF ITEMS TO CITC ARRANGED BY CITC ARRANGED BY SIC TARIFF TARIFF ITEM CITC SIC ITEM CITC SIC 1377 42701 70949 3911 42701 65371 3310 1378 44524 70949 3911 44603 65371 3310 1379 44603 70949 .3911 44524 65371 . 3310 1380 28805 70950 '3530 44524 65389 3310 1381 30000 70952 3911 44603 65394 3310 1382 44524 70954 3911 44524 65394 3310 1383 44524 70996 3911 42701 65394 3310 1384 43210 70999 3911 44524 65399 3310 1385 42701 70999 3911 42701 65399 3310 1386 35400 70999 3911 44603 65399 3310 1387 44524 70999 3911 35400 65399 3310 1388 44603 70999 3911 44330 65399 3310 1389 44603 72039 3999 44524 66189 3310 1390 44603 72044 3090 44603 66199 3310 1391 35400 72049 3150 44524 66199 3310 1392 44603 72049 3150 42701 69215 3310 1393 44524 72054 3350 42701 69219 3310 1394 44603 72059 3350 44524 69229 3310 1395 35400 72059 3350 42701 69232 3310 1396 44524 72059 3350 42701 69704 3310 1397 42701 72069 3350 42701 69719 3310 1398 44524 72069 3350 44524 69762 3310 1399 44603 72069 3350 44603 69762 3310 1400 42701 73019 3350 42701 69762 3310 1401 44603 73019 3350 44603 69769 3310 1402 44524 73019 3350 35400 69769 3310 1403 44603 73029 3350 44524 69769 3310 1404 42701 73029 3350 42701 69769 3310 1405 44603 73040 3180 44524 69771 3310 1406 35220 73040 3180 42701 69799 3310 1407 44508 73040 3180 44603 69799 3310 1408 44524 73040 3180 44524 69799 3310 1409 - 42701 73043 3180 44524 69835 3310 1410 42701 73049 3180 28205 96189 3310 1411 44603 73049 3180 42701 65324 3320 1412 42701 73059 3999 44524 65506 3320 1413 44524 73059 3999 42701 65506 3320 1414 44603 73059 3999 44603 66289 3320 1415 42701 73063 3150 42701 69754 3320 1416 44524 73069 3150 42701 69755 3320 1417 35400 73069 3150 42701 69758 3320 1418 44603 73069 3150 42701 69899 3320 1419 42701 73069 3150 44524 66195 3330 1420 44603 73099 3150 44524 68119 3330 1421 42701 73099 3150 44524 68143 3330 1422 51901 74012 2610 35400 68199 3330 1423 51902 74012 2610 28205 68199 3330 1424 44603 74014 2610 44603 68199 3330 1425 51902 74014 2610 44504 68199 3330 1426 51902 74016 2610 44524 68199 3330 1427 51901 74016 2610 44524 63445 3340 CONCORDANCE OF TARIFF ITEMS TO CITC 157 ARRANGED BY CITC ARRANGED BY SIC TARIFF TARIFF ITEM CITC SIC ITEM CITC SIC 1428 44603 74019 2610 44524 63475 3340 1429 51901 74019 2610 44533 63960 3340 1430 51902 74019 2610 44508 63419 \ 3350 1431 51901 74029 ' 2640 44524 63419 3350 1432 51902 74029 2660 44524 63490 3350 1433 44603 74029 2660 44524 63495 3350 1434 51901 74032 2610 44524 63499 3350 1435 62900 74032 2610 44524 63794 3350 1436 51902 74032 2660 44603 63794 3350 1437 36215 74039 2660 44508 63819 3350 1438 44603 74039 2660 44621 63819 3350 1439 51901 74039 2660 44524 63819 3350 1440 35400 74039 2660 44524 63829 3350 1441 51902 74039 2660 44524 63833 3350 1442 51500 74042 2660 44524 63839 3350 1443 51901 74049 2660 44524 63849 3350 1444 42701 74049 2660 44508 63910 3350 1445 51902 74049 2660 44524 63910 3350 1446 36215 74049 2660 44524 63915 3350 1447 44603 74049 2660 44508 63915 3350 1448 44603 74059 3090 44524 63925 3350 1449 51902 74069 2660 44514 63925 3350 1450 44603 74069 2660 44508 63925 3350 1451 50600 74074 1899 44524 63930 3350 1452 51600 74074 1899 44524 63940 3350 1453 51200 74076 2660 44524 63945 3350 1454 50600 74076 2660 44533 63950 3350 1455 51901 74099 2660 44533 63955 3350 1456 51902 74099 2660 44524 63992 3350 1457 44603 74099 2660 44524 63994 3350 1458 35400 74099 2660 44335 63999 3350 1459 42701 75102 3150 44524 63999 3350 1460 - 42701 75116 3150 44524 72054 3350 1461 42701 75122 3150 44524 72059 3350 1462 44524 75190 3150 35400 72059 3350 1463 42701 75190 3150 44603 72059 3350 1464 44603 75198 3150 42701 72069 3350 1465 44524 75198 3150 44524 72069 3350 1466 42701 75198 3150 44603 72069 3350 1467 43140 75204 3060 44603 73019 3350 1468 44603 75229 3060 44524 73019 3350 1469 44603 75256 3060 42701 73019 3350 1470 36215 75256 3060 44603 73029 3350 1471 36215 75299 3060 42701 73029 3350 1472 44603 75299 3060 35400 49516 3360 1473 44603 75408 3060 44524 49516 3360 1474 36215 75425 3060 44603 49516 3360 1475 43135 75425 3060 44524 50309 3360 1476 44603 75425 3060 42701 50309 3360 1477 44603 75532 3060 44514 50309 3360 1478 36215 75536 3060 44514 50313 3360 CONCORDANCE OF TARIFF ITEMS TO CITC 15 ARRANGED BY CITC ARRANGED BY SIC TARIFF TARIFF ITEM CITC SIC ITEM CITC SIC 1479 44603 75536 3060 42805 50313 3360 1480 44603 75554 3060 44514 50315 3360 1481 36215 75554 3060 42701 50315 3360 1482 44603 75556 '3060 44514 50319 3360 1483 44603 75589 3060 44524 50319 3360 1484 36215 75589 3060 44516 50365 3360 1485 42701 75589 3060 44524 50369 3360 1486 35400 75589 3060 44514 50369 3360 1487 44524 75589 3060 42701 50369 3360 1488 61300 75595 3060 42701 50375 3360 1489 36215 75595 3060 44516 50375 3360 1490 44603 75595 3060 42701 50379 3360 1491 42907 75817 3060 44516 50379 3360 1492 43140 75866 3999 44621 52345 3360 1493 36215 75866 3999 44524 68429 3360 1494 44603 75899 3060 44524 68449 3360 1495 36215 75899 3060 44524 68481 3360 1496 43140 75899 3060 44524 68499 3360 1497 65300 76124 3991 44603 68859 3360 1498 65300 76149 3991 42701 68859 3360 1499 42515 76308 3060 44524 68859 3360 1500 43210 76389 3999 44516 68879 3360 1501 44603 76389 3999 44514 68879 3360 1502 36215 76389 3999 44524 68879 3360 1503 36215 76399 3999 34905 45288 3380 1504 35400 76399 3999 44512 69329 3391 1505 44603 76399 3999 44512 69348 3391 1506 42701 76399 3999 44512 69359 3391 1507 50600 76399 3999 44512 69395 3391 1508 44524 76399 3999 31600 47714 3399 1509 44603 77112 3180 31600 47716 3399 1510 44524 77120 3180 43829 47720 3399 1511 . 44524 77122 3180 31600 47720 3399 1512 44603 77128 3180 44516 47720 3399 1513 44524 77136 3180 31600 47724 3399 1514 44603 77160 3180 31400 47732 3399 1515 44603 77199 3180 44524 49542 3399 1516 42701 77199 3181 44524 49544 3399 1517 42701 77199 3181 36215 49544 3399 1518 55303 78119 2431 44603 49544 3399 1519 56810 78149 2430 35400 49544 3399 1520 56805 78149 2431 36215 49565 3399 1521 56810 78199 2430 44524 49565 3399 1522 55303 78199 2431 44603 49565 3399 1523 56805 78199 2431 35400 49599 3399 1524 55303 78314 2431 44603 49599 3399 1525 61905 78319 2430 44524 49599 3399 1526 61120 78319 2430 56910 49601 3399 1527 61300 78319 2430 44524 68202 3399 1528 55303 78319 2431 44504 68202 3399 1529 55303 78324 2431 44504 68212 3399 CONCORDANCE Of TARIFF ITEMS TO CITC 159 ARRANGED BY CITC ARRANGED BY SIC TARIFF TARIFF ITEM CITC SIC ITEM CITC SIC ======== ======== ======== 1530 55303 78325 2431 44524 68222 3399 1531 61905 78336 2430 44504 68222 3399 1532 61905 78337 2430 44504 68232 3399 1533 55303 78349 2441 44524 68232 3399 1534 55303 78369 2431 43829 68242 3399 1535 55303 78390 2431 44504 68242 3399 1536 55303 78395 2431 44504 68252 3399 1537 61905 78399 2430 . 44504 68262 3399 1538 56500 78399 2431 43829 68262 3399 1539 55303 78399 2431 44524 68290 3399 1540 56810 78465 2392 44524 68326 3399 1541 56805 78465 2392 44514 68326 3399 1542 56805 78470 2392 44524 68379 3399 1543 56810 78470 2392 44514 68379 3399 1544 56805 78471 2392 44514 68395 3399 1545 56810 78471 2392 44524 68395 3399 1546 56805 78472 2392 44524 68423 3399 1547 56805 78478 2392 44524 68869 3399 1548 56805 78479 2392 44603 68869 3399 1549 56805 78485 2392 44504 91908 3399 1550 56805 78489 2392 44504 91910 3399 1551 56810 78499 2392 28200 47202 3511 1552 56910 78618 2492 28220 47202 3511 1553 56915 78618 2492 28220 47204 3511 1554 56915 78635 2492 28200 47204 3511 1555 56910 78649 2492 28205 47212 3511 1556 56915 78649 2492 28220 47249 3511 1557 56805 78649 2494 28200 47249 3511 1558 61905 78899 2430 44518 49505 3512 1559 56915 78899 2499 28800 86728 3512 1560 55303 78921 2480 33900 58999 3520 1561 56805 78921 2480 30710 47104 3530 1562 ; 62900 78975 3999 30520 47104 3530 1563 51100 78999 3999 30715 47104 3530 1564 55303 78999 3999 31000 47149 3530 1565 19900 78999 3999 30610 47149 3530 1566 19700 78999 3999 30900 47149 3530 1567 36215 78999 3999 30525 47149 3530 1568 61300 78999 3999 28805 70950 3530 1569 56805 79099 1740 30800 96189 3530 1570 22800 80049 3770 28205 47599 3549 1571 22800 80049 3770 32202 47315 3561 1572 22800 80061 3760 32300 47324 3561 1573 22800 80063 3760 68905 47360 3561 1574 22800 80065 3760 44518 49509 3562 1575 22800 80065 3760 44524 49509 3562 1576 22800 80067 3760 28800 85062 3562 1577 22800 80068 3760 28700 85062 3562 1578 22800 80073 3760 35400 94958 3562 1579 64700 81017 3920 44603 94958 3562 1580 65100 81017 3920 28215 27295 3591 CONCORDANCE OF TARIFF ITEMS TO CITC 160 ARRANGED 8Y CITC ARRANGED BY SIC TARIFF TARIFF ITEM CITC SIC ITEM CITC SIC 1581 64700 81022 3920 28110 47251 3591 1582 65100 81027 3920 28205 47262 3591 1583 35400 81027 3920 28110 47262 • 3591 1584 44603 81027 3920 30000 47281 3591 1585 36215 81027 3920 31400 47282 3591 1586 64700 81027 3920 28205 47284 3591 1587 36210 81049 3920 28220 47290 3591 1588 36200 81049 3920 28110 47290 3591 1589 36600 82008 3912 28200 47290 3591 1590 36605 82008 3912 28805 47299 3591 1591 36605 82015 3912 28205 47299 3591 1592 36610 82018 3912 28110 47299 3591 1593 36800 82021 3912 30000 47299 3591 1594 36800 82023 3912 31400 47969 3591 1595 36800 82025 3912 43832 47437 3599 1596 36800 82025 3912 43833 47437 3599 1597 36800 82027 3912 43832 47438 3599 1598 44603 82028 3912 43833 47438 3599 1599 36900 82028 3912 28205 47469 3599 1600 44524 82089 3912 31215 47499 3599 1601 36900 82089 3912 29300 47907 3599 1602 36800 82089 3912 29300 47922 3599 1603 36600 82089 3912 19200 47922 3599 1604 51805 83215 3931 29650 47933 3599 1605 51100 83224 3931 68905 47945 3599 1606 . 51100 83225 3931 19200 47999 3599 1607 35400 83226 3931 28800 47999 3599 1608 43910 83226 3931 28205 47999 3599 1609 43920 83226 3931 19200 49407 3599 1610 51100 83226 3931 28410 49407 3599 1611 44603 83226 3931 19200 49409 3599 1612 43930 83226 3931 22001 87135 3740 1613 '51100 83237 3931 22001 87160 3740 1614 51100 83243 3931 22001 87165 3740 1615 51100 83247 3931 22001 87199 3740 1616 51100 83262 3931 22001 87223 3740 1617 51105 83262 3931 22001 87251 3740 1618 56910 83269 3931 22001 87299 3740 1619 56915 83269 3931 22001 87448 3740 1620 44603 83285 3911 22001 87499 3740 1621 35400 83285 3931 22001 87814 3740 1622 44603 83288 3931 22001 87849 3740 1623 35400 83288 3931 22001 87889 3740 1624 44524 83289 3931 22001 87899 3740 1625 50600 83289 3931 22001 87950 3740 1626 51100 83289 3931 22001 87960 3740 1627 36215 83289 3931 26505 87991 3740 1628 44603 83289 3931 26515 87991 3740 1629 50604 83289 3931 220O3 87999 3740 1630 42701 83289 3931 22001 87999 3740 1631 45005 83289 3931 30400 47658 3750 CONCORDANCE OF TARIFF ITEMS TO CITC 1 6 1 ARRANGED BY CITC ARRANGED BY SIC TARIFF TARIFF ITEM CITC SIC ITEM CITC SIC 1632 35400 83289 3931 22800 80061 3760 1633 42701 83292 3150 22800 80063 3760 1634 44603 83299 22800 80065 3760 1635 50600 83709 3932 22800 80065 3760 1636 19900 83709 3932 22800 80067 3760 1637 62410 83709 3932 22800 80068 3760 1638 62405 83711 3932 22800 80073 3760 1639 62410 83711 3932 22800 80049 3770 1640 62410 83715 3932 22800 80049 3770 1641 62405 83715 3932 42610 52468 3781 1642 44603 83715 3932 22001 40499 3782 1643 62410 83716 3932 29615 40499 3782 1644 62420 83720 3932 25805 39559 3790 1645 62410 83720 3932 66505 41569 3790 1646 42820 83733 3932 23200 42119 3790 1647 62410 83733 3932 23230 42199 3790 1648 62415 83733 3932 23510 42199 3790 1649 44514 83736 3932 23210 42199 3790 1650 44524 83736 3932 50600 86608 3790 1651 62415 83736 3932 26505 39559 3799 1652 62410 83739 3932 27600 39599 3799 1653 62415 83739 3932 27702 39599 3799 1654 50600 83742 3932 27720 39599 3799 1655 62410 83742 3932 27717 39599 3799 1656 62410 83748 3932 27615 39599 3799 1657 62405 83789 3932 27800 39599 3799 1658 62410 83789 3932 27704 39599 3799 1659 46205 83789 3932 27701 39599 3799 1660 50600 83789 3932 37736 39599 3799 1661 44524 83789 3932 27610 39599 3799 1662 36215 83789 3932 27705 39599 3799 1663 44603 83789 3932 27820 39599 3799 1664 ; 62415 83789 3932 37740 39599 3799 1665 44603 83799 3932 27605 39599 3799 1666 43930 83799 3932 37739 39599 3799 1667 57200 84405 1860 37737 39599 3799 1668 57200 84412 1860 27703 39599 3799 1669 57200 84418 1860 27711 39599 3799 1670 57200 84422 1860 27805 39599 3799 1671 57200 84428 1860 27815 39599 3799 1672 57200 84432 1860 27719 39599 3799 1673 57210 84432 1860 22001 42999 3799 1674 57200 84436 1860 44524 70328 3911 1675 57200 84439 1860 44524 70334 3911 1676 57200 84462 1860 44603 70342 3911 1677 57200 84469 1860 44400 70342 3911 1678 57015 84483 1860 35400 70344 3911 1679 57205 84483 1860 44603 70344 3911 1680 57000 84499 1860 42701 70344 3911 1681 57200 84499 1860 44524 70348 3911 1682 57300 84499 1860 44514 70348 3911 CONCORDANCE OF TARIFF ITEMS TO CITC 162 ARRANGED BY CITC ARRANGED BY SIC TARIFF TARIFF ITEM . CITC SIC ITEM CITC SIC 1683 57305 84499 1860 44524 70390 3911 1684 57015 84499 1860 35400 70390 3911 1685 56805 84503 1899 44603 70390 3911 1686 56805 84505 '1899 35400 70395 3911 1687 53405 84633 1899 44514 70395 3911 1688 53405 84639 1820 44524 70395 3911 1689 19900 84711 1899 44603 70395 3911 1690 19900 84720 2740 44603 70624 3911 1691 19900 84739 1899 44603 70645 3911 1692 19900 84810 2740 44524 70645 3911 1693 19700 84810 2740 44603 70649 3911 1694 57200 84839 1899 44524 70649 3911 1695 19700 84924 2740 44603 70729 3911 1696 19900 84999 1899 44524 70919 3911 1697 56805 84999 1899 44524 70927 3911 1698 35400 85007 3042 44524 70928 3911 1699 44603 85011 3042 42701 70949 3911 1700 43210 85013 3042 44603 70949 3911 1701 28800 85019 3042 44524 70949 3911 1702 36215 85019 3042 30000 70952 3911 1703 44603 85019 3042 44524 70954 3911 1704 35400 85024 3042 44524 70996 3911 1705 44603 85024 3042 35400 70999 3911 1706 36215 85024 3042 44603 70999 3911 1707 36215 85034 3042 42701 70999 3911 1708 28800 85034 3042 44524 70999 3911 1709 50600 85034 3042 43210 70999 3911 1710 36215 85039 3042 44603 83285 3911 1711 35400 85039 3042 46205 91111 3911 1712 43210 85039 3042 46205 91118 3911 1713 28800 85039 3042 46205 91139 3911 1714 50600 85039 3042 44603 91149 3911 1715 - 44603 85039 3042 44603 91219 3911 1716 36215 85044 3060 46205 91939 3911 1717 44603 85044 3060 44603 91999 3911 1718 44603 85046 3060 44524 91999 3911 1719 36215 85046 3060 35400 91999 3911 1720 50600 85049 3060 51200 91999 3911 1721 35400 85049 3060 19900 91999 3911 1722 36215 85049 3060 44603 93099 3911 1723 44603 85049 3060 36605 82008 3912 1724 44603 85059 3060 36600 82008 3912 1725 36215 85059 3060 36605 82015 3912 1726 28700 85062 3562 36610 82018 3912 1727 28800 85062 3562 36800 82021 3912 1728 19900 85066 2740 36800 82023 3912 1729 36215 85069 3042 36800 82025 3912 1730 50600 85069 3042 36800 82025 3912 1731 44603 85069 3042 36800 82027 3912 1732 35400 85069 3060 44603 82028 3912 1733 33900 85069 3060 36900 82028 3912 CONCORDANCE OF TARIFF ITEMS TO CITC 163 ARRANGED BY CITC ARRANGED BY SIC TARIFF TARIFF ITEM CITC SIC ITEM CITC SIC 1734 45110 86219 3999 44524 82089 3912 1735 45105 86219 3999 36900 82089 3912 1736 65300 86504 3991 36600 82089 3912 1737 65300 86520 • 3991 36800 82089 3912 1738 65200 86532 3999 35400 88019 3913 1739 45116 86536 3999 19900 88019 3913 1740 36215 86536 3999 22001 88019 3913 1741 65300 86549 3991 19900 88027 3913 1742 36215 86549 3999 35400 88059 3913 1743 50600 86608 3790 64700 46928 3920 1744 36215 86626 3999 36215 46928 3920 1745 36215 86626 3999 36505 46928 3920 1746 36215 86627 3999 64700 81017 3920 1747 44603 86627 3999 65100 81017 3920 1748 65620 86640 3996 64700 81022 3920 1749 65610 86640 3996 65100 81027 3920 1750 36215 86640 3999 35400 81027 3920 1751 28800 86640 3999 44603 81027 3920 1752 35400 86640 3999 36215 81027 3920 1753 44603 86640 3999 64700 81027 3920 1754 50600 86640 3999 36210 81049 3920 1755 44603 86712 3999 36200 81049 3920 1756 50600 86712 3999 51805 83215 3931 1757 35400 86712 3999 51100 83224 3931 1758 36215 86712 3999 51100 83225 3931 1759 35400 86716 3042 43910 83226 3931 1760 50600 86716 3042 43930 83226 3931 1761 44603 86716 3042 35400 83226 3931 1762 36215 86720 2660 44603 83226 3931 1763 35400 86720 2660 51100 83226 3931 1764 44603 86720 2660 43920 83226 3931 1765 51700 86724 3090 51100 83237 3931 1766 44603 86724 3090 51100 83243 3931 1767 28800 86728 3512 51100 83247 3931 1768 28700 86732 3041 51105 83262 3931 1769 28800 86732 3041 51100 83262 3931 1770 35400 86732 3041 56915 83269 3931 1771 36215 86732 3041 56910 83269 3931 1772 51902 86732 3041 35400 83285 3931 1773 44603 86732 3041 44603 83288 3931 1774 50600 86732 3041 35400 83288 3931 1775 50600 86739 1899 44603 83289 3931 1776 35400 86739 1899 42701 83289 3931 1777 44603 86739 1899 50600 83289 3931 1778 51902 86739 1899 50604 83289 3931 1779 36215 86739 1899 51100 83289 3931 1780 43930 86790 3931 36215 83289 3931 1781 46800 86792 3050 45005 83289 3931 1782 28800 86799 . 3042 35400 83289 3931 1783 50600 86799 3042 44524 83289 3931 1784 51902 86799 3042 44603 83299 3931 CONCORDANCE OF TARIFF ITEMS TO CITC I64. ARRANGED BY CITC ARRANGED BY SIC TARIFF TARIFF ITEM CITC SIC ITEM CITC SIC ======== ======== ======== ======== ======== ======== 1785 44603 86799 3042 43930 86790 3931 1786 35400 86799 3042. 36215 61120 3932 1787 43210 86799 .30.42 44603 61120 3932 1788 36215 86799 3042 44606 61120 3932 1789 22001 87135 3740 50600 83709 3932 1790 22001 87160 3740 19900 83709 3932 1791 22001 87165 3740 62410 83709 3932 1792 22001 87199 3740 62405 83711 3932 1793 22001 87223 3740 62410 83711 3932 1794 22001 87251 3740 62405 83715 3932 1795 22001 87299 3740 62410 83715 3932 1796 22001 87448 3740 44603 83715 3932 1797 22001 87499 3740 62410 83716 3932 1798 22001 87814 3740 62420 83720 3932 1799 22001 87849 3740 62410 83720 3932 1800 22001 87889 3740 62410 83733 3932 1801 22001 87899 3740 62415 83733 3932 1802 22001 87950 3740 42820 83733 3932 1803 22001 87960 3740 62415 83736 3932 1804 26515 87991 3740 44514 83736 3932 1805 26505 87991 3740 44524 83736 3932 1806 22003 87999 3740 62410 83739 3932 1807 22001 87999 3740 62415 83739 3932 1808 22001 88010 1899 62410 83742 3932 1809 19900 88019 3913 50600 83742 3932 1810 35400 88019 3913 62410 83748 3932 1811 22001 88019 3913 46205 83789 3932 1812 19900 88027 3913 62410 83789 3932 1813 35400 88059 3913 62405 83789 3932 1814 18105 89424 2860 36215 83789 3932 1815 18105 89432 2860 44603 83789 3932 1816 19900 89520 2860 44524 83789 3932 1817 19900 89536 2860 62415 83789 3932 1818 19900 89599 2860 50600 83789 3932 1819 19700 90109 2740 43930 83799 3932 1820 19900 90119 2740 44603 83799 3932 1821 19800 90119 2740 35400 94929 3970 1822 19900 90124 2740 42701 94929 3970 1823 19900 90128 2740 36215 94929 3970 1824 19900 90136 3999 51901 94929 3970 1825 19800 90136 3999 50600 94929 3970 1826 19700 90149 2740 51902 94929 3970 1827 19800 90149 2740 46505 94929 3970 1828 19900 90149 2740 43829 94929 3970 1829 19200 90149 2740 44603 94929 3970 1830 65505 90240 3991 44524 94929 3970 1831 36200 90245 3996 19900 94929 3970 1832 35400 90245 3996 65300 76124 3991 1833 36215 90245 3996 65300* 76149 3991 1834 44603 90245 3996 65300 86504 3991 1835 65505 90253 3996 65300 86520 3991 CONCORDANCE OF TARIFF ITEMS TO CITC 165 ARRANGED BY CITC ARRANGED BY SIC TARIFF TARIFF ITEM CITC SIC ITEM CITC SIC ======== ======== ======== ======== ======== ======== 1836 31400 90280 3996 65300 86549 3991 1837 43135 90299 3996 65505 90240 3991 1838 44603 90299 3996 65300 90504 3991 1839 65505 90299 3996 65100 49632 3992 1840 31100 90299 3996 65105 49632 3992 1841 35400 90299 3996 \ 65100 94418 3992 1842 36205 90423 3042 44603 94445 3992 1843 19900 90424 2860 65100 94445 3992 1844 36215 90424 2860 65105 94445 3992 1845 35400 90424 2860 45110 94455 3992 1846 44603 90424 3996 45116 94458 3992 1847 19915 90432 2740 44603 94469 3992 1848 19900 90432 2740 45130 94469 3992 1849 36215 90489 3999 36215 94469 3992 1850 50600 90489 3999 35400 94469 3992 1851 19900 90489 3999 36215 94472 3992 1852 44603 90489 3999 56805 38709 3993 1853 35400 90489 3999 57401 38709 3993 1854 45116 90499 3999 57401 38729 3993 1855 19900 90499 3999 57401 38760 3993 1856 35400 90499 3999 52500 38760 3993 1857 36215 90499 3999 56205 38779 3993 1858 55303 90499 3999 57300 38779 3993 1859 44603 90499 3999 57401 38779 3993 1860 23230 90499 3999 57401 38791 3993 1861 19800 90499 3999 57401 38795 3993 1862 65300 90504 3991 57305 49444 3993 1863 65505 90519 3996 57305 49447 3993 1864 35400 90549 3999 57300 49447 3993 1865 50600 90549 3999 57305 49485 3993 1866 46205 91111 3911 57305 49487 3993 1867 46205 91118 3911 35400 63790 3994 1868 46205 91139 3911 36215 63790 3994 1869 44603 91149 3911 59735 92124 3994 1870 44603 91219 3911 59705 92140 3994 1871 19800 91564 2740 59705 92149 3994 1872 44504 91908 3399 59735 92149 3994 1873 44504 91910 3399 59810 92152 3994 1874 46205 91939 3911 59815 92152 3994 1875 51200 91999 3911 59820 92152 3994 1876 44603 91999 3911 59810 92199 3994 1877 35400 91999 3911 44603 92199 3994 1878 44524 91999 3911 44524 92199 3994 1879 19900 91999 3911 36215 92199 3994 1880 59735 92124 3994 50600 92199 3994 1881 59705 92140 3994 65610 86640 3996 1882 59705 92149 3994 65620 86640 3996 1883 59735 92149 3994 35400 90245 3996 1884 59820 92152 3994 36215 90245 3996 1885 59810 92152 3994 36200 90245 3996 1886 59815 92152 3994 44603 90245 3996 CONCORDANCE OF TARIFF ITEMS TO CITC 1 6 6 ARRANGED BY -CITC ARRANGED BY SIC TARIFF TARIFF ITEM CITC SIC ITEM CITC SIC 1887 50600 92199 3994 65505 90253 3996 1888 44524 92199 3994 31400 90280 , 3996 1889 36215 92199 3994 65505 90299 3996 1890 59810 92199 3994 35400 90299 3996 1891 44603 92199 3994 44603 90299 3996 1892 44603 93016 3090 43135 90299 3996 1893 44603 93099 3911 31100 90299 3996 1894 65100 94418 3992 44603 90424 3996 1895 65105 94445 3992 65505 90519 3996 1896 44603 94445 3992 36215 46920 3999 1897 65100 94445 3992 45105 52736 3999 1898 45110 94455 3992 45110 52736 3999 1899 45116 94458 3992 50600 69875 3999 1900 45130 94469 3992 44603 69875 3999 1901 36215 94469 3992 44603 72039 3999 1902 44603 94469 3992 44603 73059 3999 1903 35400 94469 3992 42701 73059 3999 1904 36215 94472 3992 44524 73059 3999 1905 43135 94499 3999 43140 75866 3999 1906 44603 94499 3999 36215 75866 3999 1907 36215 94499 3999 44603 76389 3999 1908 45120 94499 3999 36215 76389 3999 1909 51902 94630 3060 43210 76389 3999 1910 51901 94630 3060 36215 76399 3999 1911 40960 94911 2543 50600 76399 3999 1912 44603 94911 2543 42701 76399 3999 1913 35400 94911 2543 44603 76399 3999 1914 44603 94915 3020 35400 76399 3999 1915 35400 94915 3020 44524 76399 3999 1916 43829 94929 3970 62900 78975 3999 1917 44524 94929 3970 19700 78999 3999 1918 50600 94929 3970 55303 78999 3999 1919 ; 19900 94929 3970 36215 78999 3999 1920 46505 94929 3970 61300 78999 3999 1921 51902 94929 3970 19900 78999 3999 1922 44603 94929 3970 51100 78999 3999 1923 36215 94929 3970 45110 86219 3999 1924 51901 94929 3970 45105 86219 3999 1925 42701 94929 3970 65200 86532 3999 1926 35400 94929 3970 45116 86536 3999 1927 44603 94939 2580 36215 86536 3999 1928 35400 94958 3562 36215 86549 3999 1929 44603 94958 3562 36215 86626 3999 1930 44603 94966 3090 36215 86626 3999 1931 50600 94966 3090 44603 86627 3999 1932 36215 94995 3999 36215 86627 3999 1933 51200 94995 3999 36215 86640 3999 1934 35400 94995 3999 35400 86640 3999 1935 19900 94995 3999 28800 86640 3999 1936 44603 94995 3999 50600 86640 3999 1937 50600 94995 3999 44603 86640 3999 CONCORDANCE OF TARIFF ITEMS TO CITC 167 ARRANGED BY CITC ARRANGED BY SIC TARIFF TARIFF ITEM CITC SIC ITEM CITC SIC ======== ======== ======== ======== ======== ======== 1938 56910 94995 3999 50600 86712 3999 1939 36215 94999 3999 36215 86712 3999 1940 44603 94999 3999 44603 86712 3999 1941 53020 94999 3999 35400 86712 3999 1942 44603 95007 3042 19800 90136 3999 1943 35400 95019 3042 19900 90136 . 3999 1944 44603 95019 3042 50600 90489 3999 1945 44603 95024 3042 19900 90489 3999 1946 33910 95029 3042 35400 .90489 3999 1947 44603 95029 3042 36215 90489 3999 1948 35400 95029 3042 44603 90489 3999 1949 19900 95040 2731 35400 90499 3999 1950 19300 95044 2730 44603 90499 3999 1951 19900 95044 2733 19800 90499 3999 1952 19900 95047 2740 23230 90499 3999 1953 19800 95049 2731 45116 90499 3999 1954 19900 95049 2731 19900 90499 3999 1955 19945 95049 2731 36215 90499 3999 1956 50600 95055 2599 55303 90499 3999 1957 50600 95066 2560 35400 90549 3999 1958 19905 95089 3042 50600 90549 3999 1959 33905 95089 3042 45120 94499 3999 1960 35400 95089 3042 36215 94499 3999 1961 19900 95089 3042 44603 94499 3999 1962 35400 95096 1650 43135 94499 3999 1963 50600 95096 1650 35400 94995 3999 1964 19900 95096 1650 50600 ' 94995 3999 1965 44603 95096 1650 56910 94995 3999 1966 36215 95096 1650 51200 94995 3999 1967 35400 95099 3042 19900 94995 3999 1968 61205 96104 1799 44603 94995 3999 1969 ' 50600 96139 2599 36215 94995 3999 1970 19200 96149 2740 53020 94999 3999 1971 19900 96149 2740 36215 94999 3999 1972 19700 96149 2740 44603 94999 3999 1973 19800 96149 2740 50600 97010 3999 1974 55303 96159 1899 55930 29119 6011 1975 56805 96159 1899 55910 29119 6011 1976 35400 96169 3090 19900 49699 6020 1977 36215 96169 3090 43829 49699 6020 1978 44603 96169 3090 42701 49699 6020 1979 28205 96189 3310 55910 49699 6020 1980 30800 96189 3530 44603 49699 6020 1981 50600 97010 3999 36215 49699 6020 APPENDIX III: DATA USED IN THE MODELS SIC TFP170 IMP71 IMP66 ERP70 NRP66 1 1011 0.868 0.06 0 . 0 6 0 . 0 9 0 . 0 5 2 1012 0.474 0.01 0.01 0.21 0.12 3 1020 0. 456 0.19 0 . 2 8 0 . 0 6 0 . 0 9 4 1031 0.625 0.17 0.18 0.07 0 . 0 9 5 1032 0.518 0.27 0.07 0.07 0.12 6 1040 0.412 0 . 0 2 0 . 0 2 0.27 0.19 7 1050 0.378 0 . 0 3 0 . 0 2 0.27 0 . 0 8 8 1060 0.257 0.01 0.01 0.18 0.07 9 1071 0 . 5 4 5 0 . 0 5 0 . 0 9 0 . 0 2 0 . 0 5 10 1072 0.556 0.01 0.01 0 . 0 8 0.17 11 1081 0.570 0.15 0 . 0 8 0 . 0 5 0 . 0 8 12 1083 1.101 0.36 0.41 0 . 0 5 0 . 0 5 13 1091 0.739 0.01 0 . 0 1 - 0 . 0 4 0 . 0 8 14 1093 0.616 0 0 0.31 0.31 15 1620 0 . 9 0 3 0 . 2 0.11 0.21 0.17 16 1720 0 . 5 3 5 0.37 0 . 2 5 0.14 0 . 0 8 17 1740 0.736 0 . 2 3 0 . 1 0.34 0 . 2 5 18 1810 0 . 6 4 9 0 . 2 5 0 . 2 7 0 . 2 0.19 19 1820 0.501 0.18 0 . 2 3 0.27 0.19 20 1831 0.596 0 . 2 8 0.19 0.18 0.17 21 1832 2.117 0 . 2 9 0.24 0.18 0 . 3 3 22 1852 0.511 0 . 3 5 0.17 0.18 0.22 23 1860 O.iO! 0.13 0.17 0.41 0 . 2 6 24 1872 0 .562 0 . 0 2 0 .02 0.01 0 . 2 3 25 1880 4.917 0 0 - 0 . 1 0 26 1891 0 .554 0.12 0.18 0.19 0.17 27 1894 0.508 0 0 0.26 0 28 2310 0.624 0 . 0 3 0 . 0 3 0 . 2 9 0.24 29 2391 0.576 0 . 3 8 0.07 0.47 0.31 30 2431 1.623 0 . 0 9 0 . 0 6 0 . 2 3 0 . 2 6 31 2441 2.321 0 . 0 5 0 . 0 4 0 . 2 3 0.26 32 2450 0.567 0.07 0.01 0 . 2 3 0 . 2 5 33 ; 2511 0.256 0 0 0 0 34 2513 0.109 0 . 1 3 0.24 0 0.01 35 2520 0.368 0.18 0 . 1 2 0.17 0 . 1 5 36 2543 0.471 0 . 0 2 0.01 0.16 0.21 37 2560 0.634 0 . 0 3 0 . 0 6 0 . 1 5 0 . 0 9 38 2593 0.213 0 0 . 0 3 0 . 0 9 0 . 2 39 2640 0.497 0 . 0 5 0 . 0 6 0.18 0 . 2 2 40 2660 0 . 8 2 3 0 . 0 4 0 . 0 3 0.16 0.21 41 2680 0.658 0.07 0 . 0 7 0.14 0.17 42 2710 0.696 0 . 0 8 0.12 0 . 0 3 0.12 43 2720 0 . 2 6 6 0 . 0 2 0 . 0 2 0.18 0.17 44 2731 0 . 5 9 0 0 . 0 5 0 . 0 5 0.19 0 . 2 45 2732 0.746 0 0 0.19 0 46 2733 0.627 0.01 • 0 .01 0 . 1 9 0.18 47 2860 0.670 0 . 0 6 0 . 2 2 0 . 0 2 0 . 0 4 48 2870 0 . 8 9 2 0.12 0 . 0 6 0 . 0 2 0 . 1 3 49 2910 0.921 0.19 0 . 2 1 0.1 0 . 0 6 50 2920 0.733 0 . 2 3 0.24 - 0 . 0 7 0 . 1 168 F0R70 EXPR70 REL0IV70 ADVCF70 CONSDUR 13.8 0.07 0.38 0 0 12.8 0.01 0 . 6 3 0 0 35 0 . 5 3 0.57 0 0 6 3 . 7 0.04 0.37 0.04 0 3 0 . 1 0.07 0.43 0.04 0 3 0 . 8 0.04 0.51 0.01 0 4 8 . 8 0 . 3 0 . 6 5 0 . 0 5 0 19.5 0.04 0.41 0.01 0 71.8 0.07 0.74 0.02 0 21.9 0.01 0.79 0.01 0 7 9 . 5 0 . 0 5 0 . 4 6 0 . 0 5 0 33 0.24 0 . 4 3 0 0 5 2 . 5 0 0 . 8 8 0.06 0 3 0 . 9 0.01 0.78 0.07 0 8 8 . 5 0.04 0.34 0.01 1 0 . 8 0.13 0.59 0 0 2 5 . 4 0 . 0 4 0 . 6 9 0.01 0 0 0 . 0 5 0.45 0 0 2 7 . 9 0.01 0 . 6 0 0 100 0.07 0 . 3 9 0.01 0 5 3 . 2 0.07 0.51 0.01 0 33 0.87 0 . 6 0 0 64.1 0 . 0 2 0.76 0.01 1 3 . 4 0 0.44 0.02 0 9 6 . 4 0 0.59 0.02 0 6 6 . 9 0 0.54 0.01 0 19.9 0 0 . 6 0 0 2 0 . 6 0.01 0.69 0.02 1 22.7 0 . 0 3 0.61 0.01 1 13.9 0 . 0 3 0.54 0.01 1 4 . 8 0 . 0 6 0 . 6 5 0.01 1 3 . 6 0 . 0 4 0.41 0.01 1 1 8 . 3 1.37 0.78 0 0 3 0 . 5 0.72 0 . 5 0 0 3 9 . 7 0 . 2 5 0.64 0 0 13.6 0 . 0 3 0.86 0.01 0 3 . 1 0 . 0 4 0.74 0 0 2 0 . 6 0 0.86 0.01 0 5 3 . 4 0 . 1 0.51 0.01 0 15.9 0 . 0 3 0.52 0.01 1 19.1 0 0.84 0 1 4 7 . 5 0 . 6 9 0.64 0 0 5 4 . 7 0.14 0.82 0.02 0 4 2 . 3 0 . 0 2 0 . 8 0.01 0 3 6 . 3 0 0.87 0 0 5 5 . 1 0 0 . 6 5 0 0 16.8 0 . 0 2 0 . 5 9 0.01 0 1.7 0 . 0 1 0.84 0.01 0 15.6 0.18 0.29 0 0 2 6 . 5 0.16 0 , 6 5 0 0 169 SIC TFP170 IMP71 IMP66 ERP70 NRP66 F0R70 EXPR70 REL0IV70 ADVCF70 CONSDUR 51 2940 0.830 0.26 0.12 0.08 0.06 38.1 0.15 0.65 0 0 52 2960 1.071 -0.79 -0.31 0.03 0.05 91.8 1.84 0.55 0 0 53 2970 0.814 0.08 0.06 0.1 0.12 50.6 0.23 0.72 0 0 54 3010 0.672 0.11 0.1 0.07 0.13 58.5 0.1 0.51 0 0 55 3020 0.901 0.01 0.02 O.07 0.19 15.7 0 0.56 0 0 56 3041 0.424 0.06 0.07 0.09 0.17 1.4 0 0.81 0 0 57 3042 0.715 0.06 0.06 0.09 0.17 59.3 0.01 0.65 0 0 58 3050 0.658 0.2 0.17 0.09 0.09 39.1 0.1 0.5 0 0 59 3060 0.569 0.32 0.3 0.12 0.17 46.7 0.16 0.71 0.03 0 60 3070 0.797 0.09 0.06 0.15 0.23 44 0.03 0.39 0.01 0 61 3080 2.131 0 0 0.03 0 6.1 0 0.76 0 0 62 3110 0.726 0.83 0.61 -0.12 0 37.2 0.7 0.38 0.02 1 63 3160 0.553 0.44 0.53 0.11 0.15 60.7 0.18 0.7 0.01 0 64 3210 0.695 0.54 0.47 -0.03 0 87.5 0.57 0.54 0 0 65 3230 0.137 0.57 0.75 -0.08 0.02 99.6 0.68 0.35 0.01 0 66 3241 1.711 0.02 0.13 0.11 0.04 39.6 0.02 0.65 0.01 0 67 3242 0.472 0.17 0.13 0.11 0.23 40.1 0.01 0.79 0.01 0 68 3243 0.677 0.1 0.05 0.11 0.22 59.7 0.01 0.46 0.01 0 69 3250 0.712 1.05 1.98 -0.05 0.02 91 1.09 0.73 0.01 0 70 3260 0.628 0.15 0.14 0.05 0.17 78.2 0.12 0.45 0 0 71 3270 0.616 0.03 0.11 0.03 0.12 25.4 0.02 0.53 0.01 0 72 3310 0.834 0.3 0.26 0.14 0.19 70.4 0.04 0.37 0.03 1 73 3320 0.677 0.2 0.27 0.11 0.11 62.1 0.04 0.4 0.03 1 74 3330 1.124 0.36 0.22 0.15 0.22 57.2 0.09 0.66 0.01 0 75 3340 0.563 0.37 0.2 0.1 0.2 74.2 0.1 0.65 0.04 1 76 3350 0.610 0.3 0.33 0.04 0.13 50.9 0.21 0.69 0.01 0 77 3360 0.973 0.28 0.23 0.11 0.19 87.5 0.09 0.35 0.01 0 78: 3380 1.326 0.03 0.04- 0.18 0.17 44.3 0.07 0.42 0 0 79 3391 0.859 0.2 0.12 0.1 0.14 98.4 0.07 0.51 0.02 0 80 3511 0.570 0.14 0.13 0.1 0.17 15.5 0.02 0.75 0.01 0 81 3512 0.717 0.51 0.41 0.1 0.07 79.8 0.02 0.74 0.01 0 82; 3520 2.047 0.02 0.01 0.03 0.04 76.4 0.11 0.91 0 0 83 3541 1.933 0 0 0.06 0 25.4 0.03 0.86 0.01 0 84 3542 0.725 0 0 0.06 0 27.8 0.04 0.84 0.01 0 85 3550 1.049 0 0 -0.03 0 44.2 0 0.88 0 0 86 3570 0.608 0.4 0.33 0.04 0.09 96.7 0.55 0.54 0.01 0 87 3591 0.892 0.49 0.59 0.01 0.07 97.6 0.19 0.63 0 0 88 3730 0.668 0.53 0.51 0.07 0.05 91.3 0.36 0.67 0.01 0 89 3740 1.383 0.16 0.13 0.08 0.12 86.8 0.06 0.35 0.08 0 90 3750 0.612 0.06 0.05 0.2 0.17 76.5 0.01 0.68 0.03 1 91 3760 0.470 0 0.03 0.06 0.15 87.5 0 0.29 0.11 0 92 3770 0.247 0.09 0.05 0.2 0.23 91.3 0.01 0.22 0.13 0 93 3781 1.042 0.43 0.38 0.07 0.05 93.3 0.03 0.92 0.01 0 94 3782 0.964 0.56 0.86 0.07 0.06 85.3 0.81 0.5 0.01 0 95 3783 0.662 0.27 0.23 0.07 0.05 79.6 0.11 0.32 0.01 0 96 3791 0.671 0.04 0.05 0.03 0.13 78.5 0.07 0.89 0.02 0 97 3911 0.699 0.65 0.69 0.03 0.07 88.2 0.36 0.56 0.04 0 98 3912 1.084 0.45 0.42 0.03 0.16 90.7 0.04 0.72 0.04 0 99 3914 0.565 0.25 0.15 0.03 0.16 30.4 0.05 0.89 0.04 0 170 SIC C0R70 MESHSD70 R070 HERFCR70 1 1011 0 20.25 3.37 1.08 2 1012 0 24.59 3.37 0.58 3 1020 0 10.33 1.21 0.62 4 1031 0 22.99 5.99 0.6 5 1032 0.6864 4.93 5.99 1*.36 6 1040 0 93.73 1.14 0.4 7 1050 1.0533 5.41 12.76 1.4 8 1060 0 66.63 0.76 0.3 9 1071 0.6892 3.16 1.58 1.7 10 1072 0 76.03 1.58 0.36 11 1081 1.2468 7.23 7.99 0.94 12 1083 1 2.77 7.99 1.96 13 1091 0 54.82 2.22 0.83 14 1093 0.9155 4.94 2.22 2.81 15 1620 0 12.1 10.4 1.21 16 1720 0 14.46 0 1.65 17 1740 0 39.84 0.62 0.27 18 1810 0 16.59 0.43 5.13 19 1820 0 11.82 4.01 0.6 20 1831 0.7713 1.92 3.5 2.1 21 1832 0 9.42 3.5 0.68 22 1852 1 0.22 3.5 2.07 23 1860 1.3422 5.13 0 0.75 24 1872 0 13.48 0 0.44 25 1880 0 34.54 0 2.39 26 1891 0.9521 1.86 3.86 2.68 27 1894 0.9944 2.01 3.86 0.89 28 2310 0 13.88 0 0.32 29 2391 1.575 9.28 0 0.49 30 2431 0 23.71 0 0.09 31 2441 0 173.98 0 0.05 32 ; 2450 0 38.06 0 0.16 33 2511 0.9174 -10.33 0.1 0.98 34 2513 0 59.07 0.1 0.19 35 2520 0 26.3 1.32 0.83 36 2543 0 16.91 0.04 0.83 37 2560 0 26.78 0 0.88 38 2593 0.5788 2.83 0.27 2.51 39 2640 0.9348 3.36 1.37 0.71 40 2660 0 42.19 0.08 0.14 41 2680 1.079 4.17 0 0.42 42 2710 0 19.57 12.74 0.51 43 2720 1.6463 4.7 7.48 2.51 44 2731 0 32.47 1.02 0.69 45 2732 0 43.91 1.02 1.11 46 2733 0 19.62' 1.02 0.6 47 2860 0 87.95 0.1 0.12 48 2870 0 59.03 0.26 0.29 49 2910 0.8885 7 5.95 1.95 50 2920 0 12.74 0 2.25 70 NHVTR66 NHVTR70 RLMES70 RLCD RLHESPD 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 7598.91 9.02 1.61 0 0 0 28055.21 0.75 4.72 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 44958.82 1.95 2.37 1 0 0 0\ 0 0 0 0 0 12497.67 8.4 1.43 0 0 0 19781.7 13.71 15.58 0 0 0 11172.67 0.32 2.54 0 0 0 26054.1 0.53 11.21 0 0 0 29638.76 33.42 10.61 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 47462.16 16.32 9.97 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 9728.23 0.79 3.58 1 1 1 88671.39 9.95 33.57 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 36503.13 8.78 9.59 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 1962.56 12.74 10.94 0 0 0 51046.4 5.48 12 0 0 0 1934.35 8.48 6.59 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 8850.18 6.18 7.85 0 0 0 12899.34 1.53 5.86 0 0 0 7990.94 0.34 1.35 0 0 0 5027.67 3.27 0.82 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3377.1 0.52 0.19 0 0 0 12797.69 0.7 3.67 0 0 0 6198.45 2.67 4.58 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 9335.32 1.14 10.34 0 0 0 3240.55 2.3 2.08 0 0 0 3423.86 1.57 1.4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 65827.11 10.36 1.77 1 1 1 6234.55 10.3 6.76 0 0 0 2689.24 1.98 1.26 0 0 0 11381.47 0.69 2.81 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 7157.1 0.65 0.79 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 7 1 SIC CDR70 MESMS070 R070 HERFCR70 HVTR70 NHVTR66 NHVTR70 RLMES70 RICO RLMESPD 51 2940 0.7678 6.48 0.95 1.02 0 0 0 0 0 0 52 2960 0.707 -1.19 3.12 3.91 0 0 0 12083.3 1.87 2.75 53 2970 1.2502 3.52 38.89 2.4 0 0 0 0 0 0 54 3010 0 18.13 1.79 0.95 0 0 0 38328.56 0.13 17.1 55 3020 0 66.9 1.18 0.79 0 0 0 15223.76 0.39 2.76 56 3041 0 38.6 2.62 0.18 0 0 0 0 0 0 57 3042 0 63.15 2.62 0.57 0 0 0 1904.98 3.74 0.17 58 3050 0 80.49 0.96 0.87 0 0 0 0 0 0 59 3060 0 10.67 1.47 0.14 0 0 0 7763.47 5.11 1.8 60 3070 0.9078 9.14 7.73 0.35 0 0 0 0 0 0 61 3080 0 219.39 2.22 0.04 0 0 0 3474.88 2.17 1.55 62 3110 1.1183 4.99 43.49 1.58 0 0 0 0 0 0 63 3160 0.8318 1.21 5.04 1.14 0 0 0 0 0 0 64 3210 0.9696 1.77 77.28 1.35 0 0 0 0 0 0 65 3230 0.9402 4.14 5.7. 2.97 0 0 0 682111.5 0.1 6.97 66 3241 1.237 7.63 1.39 0.6 0 0 0 0 0 0 67 3242 0 20.92 1.39 0.68 0 0 0 10613.6 1.06 4.53 68 3243 0.8368 2.69 1.39 1.69 1 1 1 21441.59 0.79 11.16 69 3250 0 10.85 3.4 0.72 0 0 0 0 0 0 70 3260 1.5434 2.68 0.1 1.77 0 1 0 0 0 0 71 3270 0.9666 1.17 0 1.24 0 0 0 0 0 0 72 3310 1.2899 5.8 6.2 0.7 0 0 0 15670.1 0.58 6.48 73 3320 0.6134 2.59 10.01 1.2 0 0 0 55571.6 10.02 10.25 74 3330 0 14.22 0 0.84 0 0 0 7031.47 0.88 7.08 75 3340 1.1625 1.28 26.48 1.25 0 1 1 0 0 0 76 3350 0 12.49 132.48 1.41 0 1 1 55214.89 13.28 5.75 77 3360 0 20.1 16.64 1.2 0 0 0 18639.81 0.72 2.49 78 3380 0 11.37 3.52 2.05 1 1 1 0 0 0 79 3391 1.0036 5.15 8.83 1.89 0 1 0 15442.15 0.59 5.9 80 3511 0 17.62 1.62 0.65 0 0 0 4431.26 3.85 7.3 81 3512 0.5403 6.41 1.62 1.58 0 0 0 11311.94 10.56 30.98 82 ; 3520 0 14.96 3.94 2.35 0 0 0 0 0 0 83 3541 0 16.49 0.51 0.62 0 0 0 0 0 0 84 3542 0 35.96 0.51 0.72 0 0 0 0 0 0 85 3550 0 152.31 0 0.77 0 0 0 3663.42 1.91 1.08 86 3570 0.7467 1.81 7.14 2.73 0 0 0 20212.25 24 19.37 87 3591 0.713 8.65 10.13 2.61 0 0 0 0 0 0 88 3730 0.8924 6.15 24.44 1.1 0 0 0 23426.34 0.34 4.14 89 3740 0.6873 3.57 52.58 0.39 0 0 0 23727.66 1.37 2.89 90 3750 0 20.14 21.29 0.58 0 0 0 18287.02 0.78 5.66 91 3760 0.4873 6.15 18.42 1.84 0 1 1 176075.4 0.07 34.31 92 3770 0.7652 2.68 4.09 0.73 0 0 0 34055.49 20.15 12.34 93 3781 0.7202 3.12 25.76 1.54 0 0 0 0 0 0 94 3782 1.2586 4 25.76 0.81 0 0 0 0 0 0 95 3783 1.5239 6.32 25.76 1.2 0 0 0 0 0 0 96 3791 1.3153 8.58 26.92 1.06 0 0 0 0 0 0 97 3911 0.744 3.78 11.72 1.36 0 0 0 26252.56 12.35 4.47 98 3912 0.9654 1.16 11.72 1.88 0 1 0 0 0 0 99 3914 1.1954 3.65 11.72 2.82 0 1 0 0 0 0 172 SIC RLMSH066 RLMSHD70 EASTV70 NEASTV66 NEASTV70 RLNEST66 RLNEST70 REG KRMUDD66 KRMWVS66 1 1011 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0.01 0.01 2 1012 0 0 0 0 0 0. 0 1 0 0 3 1020 17.82 26.68 0 0 0 0 0 1 0.12 0.05 4 1031 .19.43 22.54 0 0 0 0 0 1 0.03 0.04 5 1032 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0.01 0.01 6 1040 26.67 34.09 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 7 1050 0 0 5.41 0 0 0 0 1 0.01 0.01 8 1060 47.08 57.21 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 9 1071 5.68 7.06 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.05 0.05 10 1072 46.17 51.1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0.01 0.01 11 1081 8 10.84 0 0 0 0 0 1 0.07 0.08 12 1083 4.13 5.1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.07 0.09 13 1091 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 14 1093 7.01 8.92 4.94 4.94 4.94 7.01 8.92 1 0 0 15 1620 0 0 12.1 12.1 12.1 0 0 0 0.05 0.06 16 1720 0 0 14.46 0 0 0 0 0 0.19 0.22 17 1740 23.71 30.42 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.01 0.01 18 1810 4.37 4.05 16.59 16.59 16.59 4.37 4.05 0 0.09 0.12 19 1820 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.22 0.29 20 1831 5.3 7.86 1.92 1.92 1.92 5.3 7.86 0 0.12 0.14 21 1832 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.21 0.25 22 1852 1.58 0.94 0.22 0.22 0 1.58 0 0 0.17 0.05 23 1860 2.23 3.54 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.13 0.15 24 1872 15.38 18.31 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 25 1880 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 26 1891 0 0 1.86 1.86 1.86 0 0 0 0.07 0.08 27 1894 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 28 2310 9.81 13.72 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 29 2391 8.31 16.18 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.02 0.02 30 2431 54.08 70.7 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.01. 0.01 31 2441 83.83 103.48 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.03 0.03 32 2450 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.01 0.01 33 2511 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 34 2513 48.24 111.54 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 35 2520 16.86 20.25 0 0 0 0 0 1 0.1 0.08 36 2543 11.84 15.91 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.01 0.01 37 2560 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0.06 0.07 38 2593 1.55 1.91 0 2.83 0 1.55 0 0 0.03 0.03 39 2640 21.35 28.32 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.06 0.06 40 2660 59.86 78.07 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.03 0.03 41 2680 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 42 2710 5.35 15.01 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.09 0.01 43 2720 6.48 7.69 4.7 4.7 4.7 6.48 7.69 0 0.02 0.02 44 2731 61.86 72.17 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.05 0.05 45 2732 19.01 25.1 . 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 46 2733 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0.01 0.01 47 2860 102.05 109.19 0 0 0 0 0 I 0.02 0.03 48 2870 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0.06 0.06 49 2910 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.02 0.02 50 2920 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.04 0.04 173 SIC RLMSMD66 RLHSHD70 EASTV70 NEASTV66 NEASTV70 RLNEST66 RLNEST70 REG KRHWDD66 KRMWVS66 51 2940 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0.08 0.07 52 2960 -17.1 -9.52 0 0 0 0 0 0 -0.31 0.36 53 2970 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.06 0.05 54 3010 3.79 4.98 0 D 0 0 0 0 0.07 0.07 55 3020 32.36 35.49 0 0 0 0 0 1 0.02 0.02 56 3041 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.07 0.07 57 3042 387 488.4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.05 0.06 58 3050 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.1 0.11 59 3060 38.94 48.88 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.26 0.31 60 3070 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.03 0.03 61 3080 53.56 71.02 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 62 3110 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.03 0.04 63 3160 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.52 0.79 64 3210 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.47R 0.39 65 3230 0.95 4.15 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 66 3241 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0.13 0.14 67 3242 7.19 14.59 0 0 0 0 0 1 0.13 0.15 68 3243 1.51 3.05 2.69 2.69 2.69 1.51 3.05 1 0.05 0.05 69 3250 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1.95 1.22 70 3260 0 0 0 2.68 0 0 0 0 0.12 0.12 71 3270 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.11 0.12 72 3310 10.87 13.98 0 0 0 0 0 1 0.24 0.31 73 3320 7.84 7.26 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.02 0.03 74 3330 9.1 19.11 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.22 0.25 75 3340 0 0 0 1.28 1.28 0 0 0 0.05 0.06 76 3350 12.25 17.68 0 12.49 12.49 12.25 17.68 0 0.3 0.32 77 3360 28.78 37.85 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.19 0.22 78 3380 0 0 11.37 11.37 11.37 0 0 0 0 0 79 3391 4.54 6.01 0 5.15 0 4.54 0 0 0.11 0.12 80 3511 11.46 12.42 0 0 0 0 0 1 0.04 0.05 81 3512 5.77 6.19 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.08 0.13 82 3520 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 83 3541 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 84 3542 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 85 3550 74.74 78.89 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 86 3570 2.5 2.6 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 87 3591 . 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.41 0.74 88 3730 9.25 14.3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 89 3740 , 13.61 20.99 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.12 0.13 90 3750 12.48 15.9 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 91 3760 1.41 1.69 0 6.15 6.15 1.41 1.69 0 0.02 0.02 92 3770 3.7 6.25 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.04 0.04 93 3781 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.01 94 3782 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.07 0.03 95 3783 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 96 3791 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 97 3911 15.16 21.78 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.44 0.74 98 3912 0 0 0 1.16 0 0 0 0 0.37 0.6 99 3914 0 0 0 3.65 0 0 0 0 0 0 174 SIC TFP79 1 1011 0.724 2 1012 0.439 3 1020 0.330 4 1031 0.633 5 1032 0.578 6 1040 0.572 7 1050 0.343 8 1060 0.468 9 1071 0.434 10 1072 0.528 11 1081 0.542 12 1083 1.438 13 1091 0.878 14 1093 0.821 15 1620 0.859 16 1720 0.503 17 1740 0.840 18 1810 0.628 19 1820 0.554 20 1831 1.404 21 1832 2.418 22 1852 0.640 23 1860 0.679 24 1872 0.383 25 1880 5.240 26 1891 0.935 27 1894 0.590 28 2310 0.782 29 2391 0.722 30 2431 4.449 31 2441 2.179 32 2450 0.713 33 2511 0.495 34 ; 2513 0.208 35 2520 0.433 36 2543 0.613 37 2560 0.825 38 2593 0.414 39 2640 0.538 40 2660 0.914 41 2680 0.562 42 2710 0.774 43 2720 0.447 44 2731 0.889 45 2732 0.692 46 2733 0.831 47 2860 0.824 48 2870 0.987 49 2910 0.957 50 2920 0.604 IHP79 ERP78 NRP78 0.06 0.03 0.02 0.03 0.24 0.1 0.22 0.02 0.04 0.24 0.01 0.05 0.34 0.01 0.05 0.02 -0.01 0.04 0.05 0.16 6.07 0.02 0.12 0.03 0.06 0.04 0.05 0.02 0.11 0.08 0.19 0.1 0.07 0.26 0.1 0.02 0.01 0.03 0.06 0.01 0.19 0.06 0.28 0.24 0.18 0.42 0.2 0.07 0.29 0.28 0.21 0.27 0.27 0.17 0.32 0.18 0.12 0.38 0.24 0.15 0.39 0.24 0.15 0.18 0.24 0.17 0.11 0.32 0.18 0.05 0.17 0.16 0 -0.08 0.04 0.19 0.13 0.12 0 0.31 0.22 0.13 0.29 0.2 0.34 0.36 0.24 0.11 0.24 0.2 0.12 0.24 0.2 0.14 0.24 0.2 0 0 0.01 0.14 0 0.01 0.14 0.14 0.12 0.03 0.17 0.11 0.04 0.18 0.09 0 0.05 0.08 0.1 0.14 0.16 0.09 0.17 0.14 0.06 0.1 0.11 0.12 0.02 0.07 0.02 0.13 0.12 0.11 0.16 0.11 0 0.16 0.11 0.01 0.16 0.11 0.08. 0.05 0.05 0.08 0.05 0.05 0.2 0.11 0.05 0.29 0 0.06 F0R78 EXPR79 RELDIV79 11.8 0.1 0.51 17.9 0 0.64 12.9 0.65 0.55 62.6 0.04 0.37 28.6 0.13 0.5 32.3 0.03 0.51 66.1 0.34 0.68 25.5 0.04 0.46 64.6 0.07 0.81 21.6 0.02 0.63 64.2 0.05 0.45 33 0.17 0.43 52.5 0 0.97 24.1 0.06 0.82 87.4 0.15 0.62 2.9 0.13 0.56 20.5 0.06 0.73 0 0.01 0.38 23.6 0 0.6 95.6 0.11 0.47 54.8 0.11 0.57 33 0.67 0.6 69.7 0.11 0.94 3.3 0 0.55 94.1 0 0.59 61.3 0 0.48 39.3 0 0.63 18.4 0.01 0.61 17.6 0.02 0.59 24.4 0.02 0.61 6.1 0.02 0.63 0 0.02 0.45 15.2 1.2 0.7 28.5 0.68 0.57 38.6 0.26 0.62 13 0.16 0.82 4.9 0.02 0.82 31.7 0 0.91 40.2 0.27 0.5 18.9 0.1 0.6 5.3 0 0.77 41 .2 0.73 0.68 40.3 0.19 0.91 26 0.03 0.84 23.9 0 0.86 36.5 0 0.7 13.3 0.02 0.61 8.2 0 0.71 11.1 0.19 0.3 13.9 0.32 0.53 ADVCF77 C0R79 HESMS079 0 0 22.91 0 0 28.54 0 0.79 12.64 0.03 0.66 20.22 0.03 0 8.82 0.01 0.82 104.74 0.04 0.67 5.99 0.01 0.61 56.76 0.02 0.81 3.2 0.01 0.58 40.26 0.04 0.66 7.9 0 0 8.67 0.05 0 52.45 0.06 0.75 4.72 0.01 0 18.42 0 0 11.44 0.01 0.82 55.33 0 0 18.4 0 0 16.58 0.01 0.49 2.81 0.01 0 19.82 0 0 0.6 0.01 0 9.41 0.01 0.8 15.83 0.01 0.68 89.98 0.01 0.61 2.41 0 0.77 1.74 0.02 0.83 6.9 0.01 0 12.85 0.01 0.79 36.32 0.01 0 452.88 0.01 0 51.92 0 0.82 -5.73 0 0.84 94.03 0 0 23.63 0.01 0.84 24.05 0 0.72 45.27 0.01 0 14.55 0.01 0.72 4.47 0.01 0.78 64.61 0 0 5.22 0 0 21.95 0.02 0 7.74 0 0 36.93 0 0 57.42 0 0 24.01 0.01 0.66 94.92 0.01 0.65 65.48 0 0 8.82 0 0 12.31 175 s i c tfp79 51 2940 0.E71 52 2960 0.928 53 2970 1.009 54 3010 0.596 55 3020 0.973 56 3041 0.750 57 3042 0.843 58 3050 0.134 59 3060 0.757 60 3070 0.707 61 3080 2.046 62 3110 0.724 63 3160 0.844 64 3210 0.444 65 3230 0.369 66 3241 0.705 67 3242 0.590 68 3243 1.052 69 3250 1.041 70 3260 0.308 71 3270 0.312 72 3310 0.724 73 3320 0.718 74 3330 0.982 75 3340 1.206 76 3350 0.654 77 3360 0.907 78 3380 1.129 79 3391 1.496 80 3511 0.837 81 3512 0.873 82 3520 1.927 83 3541 2.367 84 3542 1.118 85 3550 1.259 86 3570 0.514 87 3591 0 . 6 9 3 88 3730 0 . 9 5 5 89 3740 2.153 90 3750 0.547 91 3760 0.669 92 3770 0.380 93 3781 1.575 94 3782 1.154 95 3783 1.225 96 3791 1.303 97 3911 0.878 98 3912 1.401 99 3914 0.748 imp79 erp78 nrp78 0 . 2 6 0.13 0.1 0.79 0.07 0.04 0.11 0.17 0 . 0 5 0 . 1 0 . 0 5 0.07 0 0.08 0.07 0 . 0 3 0.12 , 0 . 0 9 0 . 0 6 0.12 0 . 0 9 0 . 2 5 0.07 0.07 0 . 3 5 0.08 0 . 0 9 0 . 0 9 0.17 0.13 0 0 . 0 2 0 . 0 3 0 . 8 - 0 . 0 6 0 0 . 4 3 0 . 0 9 0 . 0 9 0.71 - 0 . 0 2 0 0 . 4 - 0 . 1 1 0 . 0 2 0 . 0 5 0 . 0 9 0 . 1 0 . 0 4 0 . 0 9 0.1 0 . 1 2 0 . 0 9 0 . 1 0 . 9 8 - 0 . 0 4 0.01 0.18 0 . 0 5 0 . 0 8 0.07 0.07 0 . 0 6 0.51 0.13 0.12 0 . 2 2 0.12 0.12 0.37 0 . 0 9 0 . 0 9 0.72 0 . 0 3 0 . 0 8 0 . 4 8 0 . 0 5 0.08 0 . 3 2 0.11 0.1 0 . 0 6 0.22 0.11 0 . 2 3 0.14 0.1 0.27 0.12 0.1 0 . 6 2 0.12 0.1 0 . 0 3 0.01 0 . 0 2 0 0.11 0 . 0 8 0 0.11 0 . 0 8 0 - 0 . 0 4 0.01 0 . 4 9 0 . 0 6 0 . 0 8 0 . 5 3 0.01 0 . 0 3 0 . 4 5 0.11 0 . 0 6 0 . 2 2 0 . 0 5 0 . 0 6 0.12 0.19 0.12 0 0.12 0 . 0 9 0.17 0 . 1 5 0.12 0.41 0.07 0 . 0 5 1.79 0.07 0 . 0 5 0 . 3 3 0.07 0 . 0 5 0 . 0 5 0 . 0 6 0 . 0 6 0.71 0 . 0 3 0 . 0 6 0.57 0 . 0 3 0 . 0 6 0 . 4 0 . 0 3 0.06 f 0 r 7 8 expr79 r e l 0 i v 7 9 3 5 . 9 0.17 0.73 3 2 . 5 0 . 8 9 0.7 2 6 . 7 0 . 2 3 0.71 6 3 . 4 0 . 0 9 0 . 5 5 13.8 0 0.61 6 . 3 0 0.75 48 0 . 0 1 0 . 7 6 2 9 . 2 0.18 0 . 6 4 5 . 2 0 . 2 2 0.73 32 0 . 0 6 0 . 3 9 3 . 5 0 0.81 2 8 . 6 0 . 6 3 0 . 4 8 5 5 . 8 0 . 1 5 0 . 6 2 64 0 . 6 4 0.57 9 9 . 8 0 . 4 3 0 . 4 2 43.1 0 . 0 7 0 . 6 9 3 0 . 9 0 . 0 7 0 . 5 9 6 3 . 7 0 . 0 7 0.47 8 6 . 4 0 . 9 7 0 . 6 9 71.1 0 . 0 4 0.46 6 . 5 0 . 2 0.58 6 5 . 9 0.11 0.44 6 8 . 3 0 . 0 8 0.4 58 0 . 0 6 0.76 76.2 0 . 3 0.74 3 9 . 2 0 . 3 2 0.74 8 6 . 1 0.14 0.46 3 4 . 2 0 . 0 7 . 0 . 5 9 6 8 . 7 0 . 0 8 0.74 7.4 0 . 0 2 • 0 . 8 6 1 . 8 0 . 0 2 0.73 81 0 . 2 2 0.82 4 9 . 2 0 . 0 2 0 . 8 61.1 0 . 0 2 0 . 6 3 9 . 3 0 0 . 8 5 9 7 . 2 0 . 5 7 0.54 9 8 . 3 0 . 2 8 0.71 8 1 . 6 0 . 3 2 0.73 8 4 . 6 0 . 0 5 0 . 4 67.7 0.01 0.71 8 0 . 8 0.01 0 . 2 8 8 8 . 7 0 . 0 2 0.17 9 0 . 5 0 . 0 6 0 . 9 5 6 6 . 6 1.12 0 . 6 7 4 . 2 0 . 2 8 0.37 71.6 0 . 1 0 . 9 2 7 9 . 9 0 . 4 6 0.64 8 4 . 6 0.07 0.75 2 5 . 9 0 . 0 8 0.94 advcf77 c0r79 mesms079 0 0 5.73 0 0 1.61 0 0 3 . 2 3 0 0.79 10.04 0 0 74.18 0 0 . 6 8 3 0 . 5 0 0 . 6 2 84.79 0 0 . 6 6 107.22 0 . 0 3 0 . 7 6 15.72 0.01 0.81 19.02 0 0 . 7 96.14 0 . 0 2 0 9 . 2 2 0 0.73 2 . 6 6 0 0.76 2.73 0.01 0 8 . 8 9 0 0 6.04 0 0 . 8 2 31 .65 0 0.64 8.81 0 0.74 16.57 0 0 5.99 0 0 1 .65 0 . 0 2 0 8 . 5 6 0 . 0 2 0 . 8 4.15 0.01 0 . 6 8 10.91 0 . 0 3 0 1.57 0 0 . 6 9 15.94 0.01 0 30.92 0 0 14.97 0.01 0.81 7.16 0.01 0.72 2 2 . 5 6 0.01 0 . 6 8 . 9 2 0 0 3 3 . 8 6 0 0 . 8 26.02 0 0 . 6 4 6 3 . 2 2 0 0 230.19 0.01 0 2.17 0 0 11.74 0.01 0 . 4 9 10.93 0 . 0 6 0 6 . 6 3 0 . 0 3 0 . 6 6 24.07 0 . 0 9 0 . 5 4 8 . 2 3 0 . 1 0.61 3.87 0 . 0 1 0 1.84 0.01 0 1.79 0.01 0 12.51 0 . 0 2 0 31.32 0 . 0 3 0 . 4 9 2.79 0 . 0 3 0 1 .29 0 . 0 3 0 6.76 176 SIC HERFCR79 HVTR79 NHVTR79 RLMES79 1 1011 0.8 0 0 0 2 1012 0.52 0 0 0 3 1020 0.69 0 0 24300 4 1031 0.6 0 0 58520 5 1032 1.62 0 0 0 6 1040 0.53 0 0 103100 7 1050 1.27 1 0 0 8 1060 0.27 0 0 27900 9 1071 1.81 0 0 51600 10 1072 0.38 0 0 26740 11 1081 0.82 0 0 70260 12 1083 1.54 0 0 70320 13 1091 0.86 0 0 0 14 1093 3.21 1 0 110680 15 1620 1.09 0 0 16 1720 1.56 1 0 0 17 1740 0.26 0 21140 18 1810 7.25 1 1 204380 19 1820 0.88 0 0 20 1831 3.14 1 1 54860 21 1832 0.58 0 0 22 1852 1.42 1 1 3470 23 1860 0.81 0 0 66810 24 1872 0.34 0 0 4980 25 1880 2.04 0 0 0 26 1891 2.16 1 1 0 27 1894 0.54 0 0 0 28 2310 0.43 0 0 11380 29 2391 0.36 0 0 16980 30 2431 0.21 0 0 16180 31 2441 0.05 0 0 10180 32 2450 0.23 0 0 0 33 ; 2511 0.5 0 0 0 34 2513 0.18 0 0 10700 35 2520 0.69 0 0 34440 36 2543 0.39 0 0 14310 37 2560 1.16 0 0 0 38 2593 1.21 0 0 18290 39 2640 0.38 0 0 6170 40 2660 0.15 0 0 7460 41 2680 0.35 0 0 0 42 2710 0.44 0 0 169120 43 2720 2.49 1 1 17980 44 2731 0.9 0 0 5100 45 2732 0.97 0 0 21900 46 2733 0.38 0 0 0 47 2860 0.13 0 0 15580 48 2870 0.12 0 0 0 49 2910 1.95 1 0 0 50 2920 1.79 0 0 0 RLMSM079 EASTV79 NEASTV79 RLNEST79 KRMWDD79 KR1479 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.01 . 0 31.1 0 0 0 . 0.19 0 27.37 0 0 0 0.06 0 0 0 0 0 0.01 0 41.88 0 0 0 0 0 0 5.99 0 0 0.02 0 75.41 0 0 0 0.01 0 6.46 0 0 0 0.06 0 45.87 0 0 0 0.02 0 12.15 0 0 0 0.14 0 12.97 0 0 0 0.04 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 9.43 4.72 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.17 0 0 11.44 0 0 0.31 0 39.79 0 0 0 0.01 0 3.87 18.4 18.4 3866.28 0.05 0 0 0 0 0 0.31 0 16.05 2.81 2.81 16051.4 0.19 0 0 0 0 0 0.37 0 3.84 0.6 0.6 3836.31 0.14 0 8.25 0 0 0 0.11 0 19.7 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2.41 2.41 0 0.13 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 16.56 0 0 0 0 0 26.84 0 0 0 0.06 0 100.34 0 0 0 0.03 0 152.34 0 0 0 0.08 0 0 0 0 0 0.01 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 200.58 0 0 0 0 0 23.72 0 0 0 0.12 0 23.34 0 0 0 0.01 0 0 0 - 0 0 0.04 0 10.34 0 0 0 0.04 0 41.91 0 0 0 0.1 0 77.73 0 0 0 0.05 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 17.1 0 0 0 0.07 0 11.96 7.74 7.74 11962.13 0.02 0 92.67 0 0 0 0.1 0 36.92 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.01 0 155.33 0 0 0 0.04 0 0 0 *0 0 0.07 0 0 8.82 0 0 0.02 0 0 0 0 0 0.05 0 177 SIC HERFCR79 HVTR79 NHVTR79 RLMES79 51 2940 0 . 8 0 0 0 52 2960 4.04 0 0 28360 53 2970 2.54 1 0 0 54 3010 0.91 0 0 107270 55 3020 0.41 0 0 33140 56 3041 0 . 5 2 0 0 ' o 57 3042 0.7 0 0 4110 58 3050 0 . 9 0 0 0 59 3060 0.11 0 0 16900 60 3070 0.37 0 0 0 61 3080 0 . 0 6 0 0 6620 62 3110 1.48 0 0 0 63 3160 0 . 8 5 0 0 0 64 3210 1.56 0 0 0 65 3230 3 . 3 8 0 0 1128000 66 3241 0 . 6 3 0 0 0 67 3242 0 . 4 8 0 0 20220 68 3243 1.15 0 0 39730 69 3250 1.07 0 0 0 70 3260 2.16 0 0 0 71 3270 1.04 0 0 0 72 3310 0 . 6 0 0 22680 73 3320 1.92 1 1 91520 74 3330 0 . 6 2 0 0 15230 75 3340 2.07 0 0 0 76 3350 1.55 0 0 105190 77 3360 0.79 0 0 35140 78 3380 1 .8 1 1 0 79 3391 1.72 1 1 36340 80 3511 1.01 0 0 9690 81 3512 1.57 1 1 22400 82 3520 2 . 3 3 0 0 0 83 •- 3541 1.17 0 0 0 84 3542 2 . 6 1 0 0 85 3550 0.54 0 0 8080 86 3570 2.54 0 0 50990 87 3591 1.54 0 0 0 88 3730 1.28 1 0 55300 89 3740 0.37 0 0 36620 90 3750 0 . 4 8 0 0 37710 91 3760 1.71 1 1 300000 92 3770 0 . 6 3 0 0 59910 93 3781 1.36 0 0 0 94 3782 0 . 6 5 0 0 0 95 3783 1.26 0 0 0 96 3791 1 . 6 3 0 0 0 97 3911 1.44 0 0 40050 98 3912 1.81 0 0 0 99 3914 1 . 8 3 0 0 0 RLMSH079 EASTV79 NEASTV79 RLNEST79 KRHU0D79 KR1479 0 0 0 0 0 . 0 4 0 19.98 0 0 0 0 . 6 3 1 0 3 . 2 3 0 0 0.11 0 6 . 0 2 0 0 0 0 . 0 5 0 3 8 . 9 3 0 0 0 0 . 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 . 0 8 0 788.94 0 0 0 . 0 . 0 5 0 0 0 0 0 0.16 0 74.18 0 0 0 0 . 3 6 0 0 0 0 0 0 . 0 3 0 8 5 . 2 9 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 . 0 5 0 0 0 0 0 0 . 3 5 0 0 0 0 0 1 .04 1 9.71 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 22.41 0 0 0 0 . 0 6 0 9.54 0 0 0 0 . 0 9 0 0 0 0 0 0 . 9 8 1 0 0 0 0 0 .18 0 0 0 0 0 0.14 0 2 8 . 3 8 0 0 0 0 . 4 5 1 11.35 4.15 4 . 1 5 11353.62 0.07 0 24.03 0 0 0 0 .18 0 0 0 0 0 0 . 1 9 0 25.43 0 0 0 0.44 1 55.59 0 0 0 0 . 3 0 0 14.97 14.97 0 0 0 9.56 7.16 7.16 9560.76 0 . 2 0 19.65 0 0 0 0 . 0 7 0 8 . 8 8 . 9 2 8 . 9 2 8802.76 0 . 1 5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 6 3 . 2 2 0 0 0 0 112 0 0 0 0 0 3.49 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 . 3 4 0 29.79 1 0 . 9 3 0 0 0 0 42.36 0 0 0 0.1 0 21.08 0 0 0 0 0 2 . 8 8 8 . 2 3 8 . 2 3 2880.75 0 . 0 3 0 9 . 9 2 0 0 0 0 . 0 9 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 . 0 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 4 4 . 5 3 0 0 0 0 . 4 0 0 0 0 0 0 . 5 3 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 SIC TFP7970 IHP7971 IMP7966 ERP7870 1 1011 -0.14 0.01 0 - 0 . 0 6 2 1012 -0.03 0 . 0 2 0 . 0 2 0 . 0 3 3 1020 - 0 . 1 J 0 . 0 3 - 0 . 0 7 - 0 . 0 4 4 1031 0.01 0.07 0.06 - 0 . 0 6 5 1032 0.06 0.07 0.27 - 0 . 0 6 6 1040 0.16 0 0 - 0 . 2 8 7 1050 - 0 . 0 4 0 . 0 2 0.04 - 0 . 1 1 8 1060 0.21 0 . 0 1 0.01 - 0 . 0 6 9 1071 -0.11 0.01 - 0 . 0 3 0 . 0 2 10 1072 -0.03 0 . 0 1 0.01 0 . 0 3 11 1081 - 0 . 0 3 0 . 0 4 0.11 0 . 0 5 12 1083 0 . 3 4 - 0 . 1 - 0 . 1 5 0 . 0 5 13 1091 0.14 0 0 0.07 14 1093 0.20 0 0 - 0 . 1 2 15 1620 -0.04 0 . 0 7 0.17 0 . 0 3 16 1720 -0.03 0 . 0 5 0.17 0 . 0 6 17 1740 0.10 0 . 0 6 0.19 - 0 . 0 6 18 1810 -0.02 0 . 0 1 - 0 . 0 1 0.07 19 1820 0.05 0.14 0 . 0 9 - 0 . 0 9 20 1831 0.81 0 . 1 0.19 0.06 21 1832 0.30 0 . 1 0.15 0.06 22 1852 0.13 - 0 . 1 7 0.01 0.06 23 1860 0.08 -0.02 - 0 . 0 7 - 0 . 0 9 24 1872 -0.18 0.03 0 . 0 3 0.16 25 1880 0.32 0 0 0 . 0 2 26 1891 0.38 0 . 0 7 0.02 - 0 . 0 6 27 1894 0.08 0 0 0 . 0 5 28 2310 0.17 0 . 1 0.1 0 29 2391 0.15 - 0 . 0 4 0.27 - 0 . 1 1 30 2431 0.28 0 . 0 2 0 . 0 5 0.01 31 2441 -0.14 0.07 0.08 0.01 32" 2450 0.13 0.07 0.13 0.01 33 2511 0.24 0 0 0 34 2513 0.10 0.01 - 0 . 1 0 35 2520 0.06 - 0 . 0 4 0.02 - 0 . 0 3 36 2543 0.14 0.01 0 . 0 3 0.01 37 2560 0.19 0 . 0 1 - 0 . 0 3 0 . 0 3 38 2593 0.20 0 - 0 . 0 3 - 0 . 0 4 39 2640 0.04 0 . 0 4 0 . 0 3 - 0 . 0 4 40 2660 0.09 0 . 0 5 0.06 0.01 41 2680 - 0 . 1 0 - 0 . 0 1 - 0 . 0 1 - 0 . 0 4 42 2710 o . o a 0 . 0 4 0 - 0 . 0 1 43 2720 0.18 0 - 0 . 0 1 - 0 . 0 5 44 2731 0 . 3 0 0 . 0 6 0.06 - 0 . 0 3 45 2732 - 0 . 0 5 0 0 - 0 . 0 3 46 2733 0 . 2 0 0 0 - 0 . 0 3 47 2860 0 . 1 5 0.01 - 0 . 1 5 0 . 0 3 48 2870 0.10 - 0 . 0 4 0 . 0 2 0 . 0 3 49 2910 0 . 0 4 0 . 0 1 - 0 . 0 1 0.01 50 2920 0.07 0 . 0 6 0 . 0 5 0.07 178 NRP7870 NRP7866 EXPR7870 RELD7970 C0R7970 MESMD7970 - 0 . 0 3 - 0 . 0 3 0 . 0 3 0.13 0 2.66 0 . 0 1 - 0 . 0 2 - 0 . 0 1 0.01 0 3 . 9 5 - 0 . 0 4 - 0 . 0 5 0.01 - 0 . 0 2 0 2.31 - 0 . 0 3 - 0 . 0 4 0 0 0 - 2 . 7 7 - 0 . 0 3 - 0 . 0 7 0 . 0 5 0.07 - 0 . 3 6 3 . 8 9 - 0 . 0 3 - 0 . 1 5 - 0 . 0 2 . 0 0 11 - 0 . 0 2 - 0 . 0 1 - 0 . 0 2 0 . 0 3 0 . 3 8 0 . 5 8 - 0 . 0 1 - 0 . 0 4 0 0 . 0 5 0 - 9 . 8 6 0 0 - 0 . 0 2 0.07 - 0 . 1 2 0 . 0 4 0.01 - 0 . 0 9 0 . 0 1 - 0 . 1 6 0 - 3 5 . 7 7 0.01 - 0 . 0 1 0 - 0 . 0 1 0 . 5 9 0.67 - 0 . 0 1 - 0 . 0 2 - 0 . 0 8 0 0 . 1 5 5 . 9 0 . 0 2 - 0 . 0 2 0 0 . 0 9 0 - 2 . 3 7 - 0 . 1 9 - 0 . 2 5 0 . 0 5 0.04 0.17 - 0 . 2 2 0 . 0 5 0.01 0 . 0 9 0.28 0 6 . 3 2 0 - 0 . 0 1 - 0 . 0 1 - 0 . 0 3 - 0 . 9 5 - 3 . 0 2 - 0 . 0 2 - 0 . 0 4 0 . 0 2 0.04 0 15.49 0.01 - 0 . 0 2 - 0 . 0 4 - 0 . 0 7 0 1.81 - 0 . 0 6 - 0 . 0 7 - 0 . 0 1 0 0 4.76 - 0 . 0 1 - 0 . 0 2 0.04 0 . 0 8 0 . 2 8 0 . 8 9 - 0 . 0 1 - 0 . 1 8 0.04 0.06 0 10.39 0.14 - 0 . 0 4 - 0 . 2 1 0 0.15 0.38 - 0 . 0 5 - 0 . 0 8 0 . 0 9 0.18 0 . 4 5 4.28 0 . 0 9 - 0 . 0 7 0 0.11 0 2 . 3 5 0 0 . 0 4 0 0 0 5 5 . 4 3 - 0 . 0 2 - 0 . 0 5 0 - 0 . 0 6 0 . 3 4 0 . 5 5 0.01 0 . 2 2 0 0 . 0 3 0 . 2 2 - 0 . 2 7 - 0 . 0 2 - 0 . 0 4 0 - 0 . 0 8 - 0 . 8 3 - 6 . 9 8 - 0 . 0 6 - 0 . 0 7 - 0 . 0 2 - 0 . 0 2 1 .58 3.57 - 0 . 0 2 - 0 . 0 6 - 0 . 0 1 0.07 0 12.61 - 0 . 0 2 - 0 . 0 6 - 0 . 0 4 - 0 . 0 2 0 278.9 - 0 . 0 2 - 0 . 0 5 - 0 . 0 2 0.04 0 13.86 0 0.01 - 0 . 1 7 - 0 . 0 8 0.1 4 . 6 0 0 - 0 . 0 6 0.07 0 3 4 . 9 5 0 - 0 . 0 3 0 - 0 . 0 2 0 - 2 . 6 7 0.01 - 0 . 1 0.13 - 0 . 0 4 0 7.15 - 0 . 0 1 0 - 0 . 0 1 0 . 0 8 0 18.49 0 - 0 . 1 2 0 0 . 0 5 0 . 5 8 11.72 0 - 0 . 0 6 0.17 - 0 . 0 1 0.21 1.1 0 - 0 . 0 7 0 . 0 6 0 . 0 8 0 22.41 - 0 . 0 6 - 0 . 0 6 0 - 0 . 0 7 0 . 0 3 1 .05 - 0 . 0 1 - 0 . 0 5 0.04 0 . 0 4 0 2 . 3 8 - 0 . 0 2 - 0 . 0 5 0 . 0 5 0 . 0 9 0.54 3 . 0 4 - 0 . 0 2 - 0 . 0 9 0.01 0.04 0 4 . 4 6 - 0 . 0 2 0.11 0 - 0 . 0 1 0 13.52 - 0 . 0 2 - 0 . 0 7 0 0 . 0 5 0 4.39 0.01 0.01 0.01 0 .0 2 0 6.97 0.01 - 0 . 0 8 - 0 . 0 1 - 0 . 1 3 0 6.44 - 0 . 0 2 -0 .01 0 . 0 2 0.01 0 .03 1.81 0 - 0 . 0 4 0.16 - 0 . 1 2 - 1 . 5 2 -0 . 4 3 179 SIC TFP7970 IMP7971 IMP7966 ERP7870 51 2940 0.04 0 0.14 0 . 0 5 52 2960 - 0 . 1 4 1.58 1.1 0 . 0 4 53 2970 0.20 o!o3 0 . 0 5 0 . 0 7 54 3010 -0.08 0 0 - 0 . 0 2 55 3020 0.07 - 0 . 0 1 - 0 . 0 2 0.01 56 3041 0.33 - 0 . 0 3 - 0 . 0 4 0 . 0 3 57 3042 0.13 0 0 0 . 0 3 58 3050 - 0 . 5 2 0 . 0 4 0.07 - 0 . 0 2 59 3060 0.19 0 . 0 3 0 . 0 5 - 0 . 0 4 60 3070 - 0 . 0 9 0 0 . 0 3 0 . 0 2 61 3080 - 0 . 0 8 0 0 - 0 . 0 1 62 3110 0 . 0 0 - 0 . 0 3 0.19 0 . 0 6 63 3160 0 . 2 9 0 - 0 . 0 9 - 0 . 0 2 64 3210 - 0 . 2 5 0.17 0 . 2 3 0 . 0 1 65 3230 0 . 2 3 - 0 . 1 7 - 0 . 3 4 - 0 . 0 3 66 3241 - 0 . 1 0 0 . 0 3 - 0 . 0 8 - 0 . 0 2 67 3242 0.12 - 0 . 1 4 - 0 . 1 - 0 . 0 2 68 3243 0.38 0 . 0 2 0.07 - 0 . 0 2 69 3250 0.33 - 0 . 0 7 - 0 . 9 9 0.01 70 3260 - 0 . 3 2 0 . 0 3 0.04 0 71 3270 - 0 . 3 0 0 . 0 5 - 0 . 0 4 0 . 0 4 72 3310 -0.11 0.2 0.24 - 0 . 0 1 73 3320 0.04 0 . 0 2 - 0 . 0 6 0 . 0 1 74 3330 -0.14 0.01 0.14 - 0 . 0 6 75 3340 0.64 0 . 3 6 0 . 5 3 - 0 . 0 7 76 3350 0.04 0.18 0.15 0.01 77 3360 - 0 . 0 7 0 . 0 3 0 . 0 9 0 78 3380 -0.20 0 . 0 3 0 . 0 2 0 . 0 4 79 3391 0.64 0 . 0 3 0.11 0 . 0 4 80 3511 0.27 0 .12 0.14 0 . 0 2 81 3512 0.16 0.12 0.21 0 . 0 2 82 ; 3520 - 0 . 1 2 0.01 0 . 0 2 - 0 . 0 2 83 3541 0 . 4 3 0 0 0 . 0 5 84 3542 0.39 0 0 0 . 0 5 85 3550 0.21 0 0 - 0 . 0 1 86 3570 - 0 . 0 9 0 . 0 9 0 . 1 6 0 . 0 2 87 3591 - 0 . 2 0 0 . 0 4 - 0 . 0 6 0 88 3730 0.29 - 0 . 0 8 - 0 . 0 6 0 . 0 4 89 3740 0.77 0 . 0 5 0 . 0 9 - 0 . 0 3 90 3750 - 0 . 0 7 0 . 0 6 0.07 - 0 . 0 1 91 3760 0.20 0 - 0 . 0 2 0 . 0 6 92 3770 0.13 0.07 0.12 - 0 . 0 5 93 3781 0 . 5 3 - 0 . 0 2 0 . 0 3 0 94 3782 0.29 1.22 0 . 9 2 0 95 3783 0.56 0 . 0 6 . 0.1 0 96 3791 0.63 0.01 0 0 . 0 3 97 3911 0.18 0 . 0 6 0 . 0 2 0 98 3912 0.32 0.11 0 . 1 5 0 99 3914 0.18 0.14 0 . 2 5 0 NRP7866 EXPR7870 REL07970 CDR7970 MESM07970 0.04 0.04 0 . 0 2 0 . 0 8 - 0 . 2 2 - 0 . 7 5 0.01 - 0 . 0 1 - 0 . 9 7 0.15 - 0 . 3 1 2 . 8 0 . 0 2 - 0 . 0 7 0 - 0 . 0 1 0 . 3 9 - 0 . 2 9 - 0 . 0 1 - 0 . 0 6 - 0 . 0 1 0.04 - 0 . 7 9 - 8 . 0 8 - 0 . 0 1 - 0 . 1 2 0 0 . 0 5 0 7 . 2 8 - 0 . 0 1 - 0 . 0 8 0 - 0 . 0 6 0 - 8 . 0 9 - 0 . 0 1 - 0 . 0 8 0.01 0.11 0 2 1 . 6 3 - 0 . 0 1 - 0 . 0 2 0 . 0 7 0.1 0 2 6 . 7 3 - 0 . 0 2 - 0 . 0 8 0 . 0 5 0.02 0 5 . 0 5 0 - 0 . 1 0 . 0 3 0 0.91 9 . 8 8 - 0 . 0 2 0 . 0 3 0 0 . 0 5 0 - 1 2 3 . 2 5 - 0 . 0 1 0 - 0 . 0 7 0.1 - 0 . 0 2 4 . 2 3 - 0 . 0 3 - 0 . 0 6 - 0 . 0 2 - 0 . 0 8 0.1 1 . 4 5 - 0 . 0 1 0 - 0 . 0 3 0 . 0 3 0.21 0 . 9 5 0 0 - 0 . 2 2 0.07 - 0 . 2 8 4 . 7 5 - 0 . 0 2 0 . 0 6 0 . 0 4 0.04 0 . 2 2 - 1 . 5 9 - 0 . 0 2 - 0 . 1 3 0 . 0 6 - 0 . 2 0 10.73 - 0 . 0 2 - 0 . 1 2 0 . 0 6 0.01 0 . 2 6 . 1 2 0 - 0 . 0 1 - 0 . 1 3 - 0 . 0 4 0 5.72 - 0 . 0 1 - 0 . 0 9 0 . 2 5 0.01 0 . 3 9 3.31 0.02 - 0 . 0 6 0.17 0 . 0 5 - 0 . 0 7 0 . 4 8 - 0 . 0 1 - 0 . 0 7 0 . 0 4 0.07 0.42 2 .76 0.01 0.01 0 . 0 4 0 - 0 . 1 9 1 .56 - 0 . 0 4 - 0 . 1 3 - 0 . 0 3 0.1 - 0 . 6 8 - 3 . 3 1 - 0 . 0 4 - 0 . 1 2 0.18 0 . 0 9 - 0 . 0 7 0 . 2 9 - 0 . 0 2 - 0 . 0 5 0.11 0 . 0 5 0 3 . 4 5 - 0 . 0 1 - 0 . 0 9 0 . 0 5 0.11 0 10.82 0.01 - 0 . 0 6 0 0.17 0 3 . 6 0 . 0 2 - 0 . 0 4 0.01 0 . 2 3 0.19 2 . 0 2 0.01 - 0 . 0 7 - 0 . 0 1 0 . 0 5 0 4 . 9 4 0.01 0 . 0 3 0 - 0 . 0 1 - 0 . 0 6 2 . 5 2 - 0 . 0 1 - 0 . 0 2 0.11 - 0 . 0 9 0 18.91 0 . 0 2 0.08 - 0 . 0 2 - 0 . 0 6 0 9 . 5 4 0 . 0 2 0 . 0 8 - 0 . 0 2 - 0 . 2 4 0 2 7 . 2 6 - 0 . 0 2 0.01 0 - 0 . 0 3 0 77.88 0 - 0 . 0 1 0 . 0 2 0 - 0 . 6 9 0 . 3 6 0 - 0 . 0 4 0 . 0 8 0 . 0 8 - 0 . 7 1 3 . 0 9 0 0.01 - 0 . 0 4 0 . 0 6 0 . 4 4.77 - 0 . 0 2 - 0 . 0 6 0 0 . 0 5 - 0 . 1 7 3 . 0 7 0 - 0 . 0 5 0 0 . 0 3 0 3 . 9 3 - 0 . 0 2 - 0 . 0 6 0 . 0 1 - 0 . 0 1 - 0 . 0 6 2 . 0 8 - 0 . 0 3 - 0 . 1 1 0 . 0 1 - 0 . 0 5 0.16 1.18 - 0 . 0 1 0 0 . 0 5 0 . 0 3 - 0 . 3 4 - 1 . 2 8 - 0 . 0 1 - 0 . 0 1 0 . 9 4 0.1 - 0 . 0 6 - 2 . 2 1 - 0 . 0 1 0 0 . 1 6 0 . 0 5 0 . 6 6 . 1 9 0.01 - 0 . 0 7 0 . 0 2 0 . 0 3 1.32 22.74 0 - 0 . 0 1 0 . 0 9 0 . 0 8 0 . 2 5 - 0 . 9 9 0 - 0 . 1 0 . 0 3 0 . 0 3 0 . 0 8 0 . 1 3 0 - 0 . 1 0 . 0 3 0 . 0 5 0 . 2 3 3.11 180 SIC HVT7970 NHVT7966 NHVT7970 RLM07966 RLHD7970 1 1011 0 0 0 0 0 2 1012 0 0 0 0 0 3 1020 0 0 0 13.28 4.43 4 1031 0 0 0 7.94 4.83 5 1032 0 0 0 0 ' 0 6 1040 0 0 0 15.21 7.78 7 1050 0 1 0 0 0 8 1060 0 0 0 28.33 18.2 9 1071 1 1 1 0.77 -0.6 10 1072 0 0 0 -0.3 -5.23 11 1081 0 0 0 4.15 1.31 12 1083 1 1 0 8.84 7.87 13 1091 0 0 0 0 0 14 1093 0 0 0 2.43 0.51 15 1620 1 1 1 0 0 16 1720 1 1 1 0 0 17 1740 0 0 0 16.08 9.38 18 1810 1 1 1 -0.5 -0.18 19 1820 0 0 0 0 0 20 1831 1 1 0 10.76 8.19 21 1832 0 0 0 0 0 22 1852 1 0 1 2.26 2.89 23 1860 0 0 0 6.02 4.71 24 1872 0 0 0 4.32 1.39 25 1880 1 1 1 0 0 26 1891 0 0 0 0 0 27 1894 0 0 0 0 0 28 2310 0 0 0 6.75 2.83 29 2391 0 0 0 18.53 10.66 30 2431 0 0 0 46.26 29.64 31 2441 0 0 0 68.51 48.86 32 2450 0 0 0 0 0 33 2511 0 0 0 0 0 34 2513 0 0 0 152.34 89.05 35 2520 0 0 0 6.86 3.48 36 2543 0 0 0 11.5 7.44 37 2560 0 0 0 0 0 38 2593 0 0 1 8.8 8.43 39 2640 0 0 0 20.55 13.59 40 2660 0 0 0 17.88 -0.34 41 2680 0 0 0 0 0 42 2710 0 0 0 11.75 2.08 43 2720 0 0 0 5.48 4.27 44 2731 0 0 0 30.81 20.5 45 2732 0 0 0 17.91 11.82 46 2733 0 0 0 0 0 47 2860 0 0 0 53.28 46.14 48 2870 0 0 0 0 0 49 2910 1 1 0 0 0 50 2920 1 1 1 0 0 EAST7970 NEST7966 NEST7966 RLNET7966 RLNET7970 EFF1T7970 0 0 0 0 0 -0.06 0 0 0 0 0 0.12 0 0 0 0 0 0.09 • 0 0 0 0 0 -0.1 0 0 0 0 0 0.19 0 0 0 0 0 0.6 0 0 0.58 0 0 0.05 0 0 0 0 0 0.03 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.77 -0.6 0.06 0 0 0 0 0 -0.25 0 0 0 0 0 -0.04 5.9 0 5.9 8.84 0 0.7 0 0 0 0 0 0.15 0 0 0 0 0 0.01 6.32 6.32 6.32 0 0 -0.14 -3.02 -3.02 -3.02 0 0 -0.24 0 0 0 0 0 0.45 1.81 1.81 1.81 -0.5 -0.18 0.56 0 0 0 0 0 0.34 0.89 0 0.89 10.76 0 0.25 0 0 0 0 0 -0.06 0.38 0.38 0 0 2.89 -0.09 0 0 0 0 0 0.27 0 0 0 0 0 -0.18 55.43 55.43 55.43 0 0 6.36 0 0 0 0 0 0.16 0 0 0 0 0 -0.03 0 0 0 0 0 -0.23 0 0 0 0 0 0.02 0 0 0 0 0 0.03 0 0 0 0 0 1.35 0 0 0 0 0 0.37 0 0 0 0 0 -2.44 0 0 0 0 0 -0.55 0 0 0 0 0 -0.12 0 0 0 0 0 -0.01 0 0 0 0 0 0.3 0 11.72 0 0 8.43 0.35 0 0 0 0 0 -0.06 0 0 0 0 0 0.03 0 0 0 0 0 -0.04 0 0 0 0 0 0.24 0 0 0 0 0 0.19 0 0 0 0 0 0.02 0 0 0 0 0 -0.25 0 0 0 0 0 -0.11 0 0 0 0 0 -0.03 0 0 0 0 0 -0.24 1.81 0 1.81 0 0 0.35 -0.43 -0.43 -0.43 . 0 0 0.08 181 SIC HVT7970 NHVT7966 NHVT7970 RLHD7966 RLHD7970 EAST7970 NEST7966 NEST7966 RLNET7966 RLNET7970 EFF1T7970 51 2940 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 - 0 . 0 4 52 2960 1 1 1 37.09 2 9 . 5 2 . 8 2 . 8 2 . 8 3 7 . 0 9 2 9 . 5 - 0 . 3 9 53 2970 1 0 1 0 0 - 0 . 2 9 - 0 . 2 9 0 0 0 - 0 . 5 9 54 3010 0 0 0 2 . 2 3 L 0 4 0 0 0 0 0 - 1 . 5 7 55 3020 0 0 0 6.57 3.44 0 0 0 0 0 - 0 . 6 3 56 3041 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 - 0 . 0 9 57 3042 0 0 0 401.94 300.53 0 0 0 \ 0 0 0 . 2 2 58 3050 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 - 2 . 1 4 59 3060 0 0 0 35.24 2 5 . 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 . 0 4 60 3070 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 . 3 3 61 3080 0 0 0 31.73 14.27 0 0 0 0 0 - 0 . 4 9 62 3110 1 1 0 0 0 4 . 2 3 0 4 . 2 3 0 0 0 . 0 8 63 3160 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 . 0 7 64 3210 1 1 0 0 0 0 . 9 5 0 0 . 9 5 0 0 - 0 . 0 2 65 3230 0 1 1 8.76 5 . 5 6 0 4 . 7 5 4 . 7 5 8.76 5.56 0.31 66 3241 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 - 0 . 1 7 67 3242 0 0 0 15.22 7 . 8 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 . 3 7 68 3243 0 0 0 8 . 0 3 6 . 4 9 0 0 0 0 0 0 . 4 2 69 3250 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 . 0 3 70 3260 1 0 0 0 0 3.31 0 0 0 0 0 . 6 9 71 3270 1 0 1 0 0 0 . 4 8 0 . 4 8 0 0 0 0.01 72 3310 0 0 0 17.51 14.4 0 0 0 0 0 0.01 73 3320 0 0 0 3.51 4 . 0 9 0 0 0 0 0 0 . 0 2 74 3330 0 0 0 14.93 4 . 9 2 0 0 0 0 0 - 0 . 3 5 75 3340 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 - 0 . 0 4 76 3350 1 0 0 13.18 7.75 3 . 4 5 0 0 0 0 - 0 . 0 1 77 3360 0 0 0 26.81 17.74 0 0 0 0 0 - 0 . 0 5 78 3380 1 0 1 0 0 3 . 6 3 . 6 0 0 0 - 1 . 0 9 79 3391 1 1 1 5 . 0 2 3 . 5 5 2 . 0 2 2 . 0 2 2 . 0 2 5 . 0 2 3 . 5 5 - 0 . 3 1 80 3511 0 0 0 8.19 7 . 2 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 . 0 4 81 3512 1 1 1 3 . 0 3 2 . 6 2 2 . 5 2 2 . 5 2 2 . 5 2 3 . 0 3 2 . 6 2 0 . 0 2 82 3520 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 18.91 0 0 - 1 . 7 9 83 3541 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 . 2 5 84 3542 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 . 3 5 85 3550 0 0 0 37.26 33.12 0 0 0 0 . 0 - 6 . 6 1 86 3570 1 1 1 0 . 9 9 0 . 8 9 0 . 3 6 0 . 3 6 0 . 3 6 0 . 9 9 0 . 8 9 - 0 . 0 1 87 3591 1 1 1 0 0 3 . 0 9 3 . 0 9 3 . 0 9 0 0 - 0 . 1 4 88 3730 0 0 0 2 0 . 5 3 15.48 0 0 0 0 0 0 . 2 3 89 3740 0 0 0 2 8 . 7 5 21 .36 0 0 0 0 0 0 . 0 4 90 3750 0 0 0 8.61 5.18 0 0 0 0 0 0.12 91 3760 1 0 0 1.47 1.19 2 . 0 8 0 0 0 0 - 0 . 4 4 92 3770 0 0 0 6.21 3.67 0 0 0 0 0 0.11 93 3781 1 1 0 0 0 - 1 . 2 8 0 - 1 . 2 8 0 0 - 0 . 1 2 94 3782 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 - 0 . 3 6 95 3783 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 . 6 96 3791 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 . 6 3 97 3911 1 1 1 29.37 22.75 - 0 . 9 9 - 0 . 9 9 - 0 . 9 9 29.37 22.75 - 0 . 1 5 98 3912 1 0 1 0 0 0 . 1 3 0 . 1 3 0 0 0 - 0 . 0 4 99 3914 1 0 1 0 0 3.11 3.11 0 0 0 - 0 . 0 2 182 SIC KRVS66 1 1011 29161 2 1012 1148 3 1020 7956 4 1031 4000 5 1032 0 6 1040 48667 7 1050 0 8 1060 125480 9 1071 113 10 1072 517 11 1081 7000 12 1083 55000 13 1091 0 14 1092 0 15 1093 0 16 1530 0 17 1620 260446 18 1720 500 19 1740 0 20 1810 127000 21 1820 72000 22 1831 160000 23 1832 101900 24 1852 0 25 1860 77000 26 1872 0 27 1880 0 28 1891 1000 29 1894 0 30 2310 0 31 2391 77598 32 2431 108755 33 2441 0 34 2450 0 35 2511 0 36 2513 0 37 2520 31615 38 2543 0 39 2560 53000 40 2593 0 41 2640 66936 . « 2660 139432 43 2680 0 44 2710 1309711 45 2720 0 46 2731 10000 47 2732 0 48 2733 55000 49 2860 112451 50 2870 0 51 2910 80000 KRVS79 KRIMU66 KRIMU79 79000 6988.00 13828.00 6000 0.00 0.00 50422 0.00 0.00 9000 6868.90 38262.00 0 0.00 0.00 203360 0.00 0.00 0 0.00 0.00 438121 0.00 0.00 335 0.00 0.00 1233 0.00 0.00 29000 6532.00 83504.00 200000 0.00 0.00 0 958.80 4136.00 0 0.00 0.00 0 0.00 0.00 0 0.00 0.00 1094876 12949.00 25402.00 1000 14844.10 106420.00 0 2841.50 4220.00 355000 19340.50 17718.00 102425 8877.00 41531.00 550000 922.00 5687.00 230000 1885.00 17307.00 0 518.00 1890.00 493000 869.00 9982.00 0 0.00 0.00 0 0.00 0.00 6500 456.00 648.00 0 0.00 0.00 0 0.00 0.00 237719 566.00 25387.00 162290 5857.00 56698.00 0 10925.00 98749.00 0 755.00 4463.00 0 0.00 0.00 0 0.00 0.00 98860 2856.10 24047.00 0 0.00 0.00 90836 0.00 0.00 0 0.00 0.00 280000 0.00 0.00 363147 0.00 0.00 0 0.00 0.00 4761535 3704.00 19401.00 0 0.00 0.00 25000 3680.00 34219.00 0 0.00 0.00 95000 0.00 0.00 275389 3137.00 17915.00 0 4497.00 19659.00 440000 12798.00 60654.00 KRIDU66 KRIDU79 KRIDCW66 526.00 7771.00 81.10 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 6509.00 28468.00 633.10 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 6515.00 45496.00 919.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 975.80 3943.00 101.90 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 8107.00 22975.00 1593.00 10885.10 75385.00 978.70 2834.80 3841.00 748.80 18409.80 15906.00 4213.80 8811.00 38506.00 1805.00 922.00 5589.00 260.00 1540.00 12631.00 159.10 506.00 1767.00 113.00 838.00 8120.00 215.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 42.00 60.00 6.70 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 540.00 25010.00 124.00 5857.00 52695.00 1511.00 10925.00 90876.00 2822.00 755.00 1657.00 194.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 2791.50 23728.00 427.30 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 3600.00 3098.00 320.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 3680.00 32402.00 . 743.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 3329.00 17296.00 716.00 3478.00 15116.00 604.00 11539.00 30406.00 1702.00 183 SIC KRVS66 52 2920 0 53 2940 0 54 2960 140000 55 2970 0 56 3010 67138 57 3020 0 58 3041 0 59 3042 160606 60 3050 92648 61 3060 56496 62 3070 26446 63 3080 0 64 3110 3000 65 3160 13455 66 3180 0 67 3210 220000 68 3230 0 69 3241 20000 70 3242 3284 71 3243 43783 72 3250 486397 73 3260 150000 74 3270 119382 75 3310 58373 76 3320 20973 77 3330 65000 78 3340 2000 79 3350 645968 80 3360 255501 81 3380 0 82 3391 16199 83 3511 26887 84 3512 12788 85 ; 3520 0 86 3541 48000 87 3542 44000 88 3550 0 89 3570 0 90 3591 15000 91 3730 0 92 3740 59095 93 3750 0 94 3760 137579 95 3770 141184 96 3781 0 97 3782 0 98 3783 0 99 3791 0 100 3911 48643 101 3912 9077 102 3914 0 KRVS79 KRIMU66 KRIHU79 0 9625.00 38046.00 0 16262.00 28897.00 800000 38668.00 186423.00 201433 653.00 3603.00 236612 6848.00 18856.00 0 , 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 3466.00 21978.00 1526943 15626.00 59218.00 282123 37050.00 234689.00 189889 29304.00 151131.00 90006 1972.00 3956.00 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0 27800 15357.00 117545.00 64243 23578.00 99825.00 0 42872.00 127631.00 875528 90238.00 639607.00 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0 130402 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0 10784 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0 269949 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0 3470878 117793.00 1172113.00 590000 675.00 14569.00 349190 13434.00 52194.00 187863 12221.00 63529.00 126685 2061.00 17023.00 143649 2261.00 16741.00 6000 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0 2088445 44132.00 261834.00 628472 9999.00 51775.00 0 1315.00 2989.00 47826 6312.00 52094.00 87471 669.00 7889.00 30490 1401.00 16287.00 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0 134634 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0 155942 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0 80967 6308.00 29402.00 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0 259186 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 614.00 3270.00 496708 503.20 438.00 393199 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 318.00 1661.00 0 10324.00 8326.00 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0 147508 118925.80 270520.00 27791 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0 KRIDU66 KRI0W79 KRIDCU66 5828.00 22883.00 597.00 6087.00 18258.00 1069.00 36374.00 156532.00 1380.00 631.00 3510.00 57.00 4912.00 14471.00 8 3 5 . 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0 2954.00 19045.00 573.00 13365.00 50931.00 2204.00 16246.00 106568.00 3015.00 25738.00 86835.00 4185.00 1963.70 3623.00 427.10 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0 795.00 7641.00 123.40 19843.00 54670.00 2732.00 47406.00 89458.00 4331.50 95.00 271.00 5 . 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0 8583.00 14933.00 870.00 667.00 5281.00 116.00 2355.00 11391.00 463.00 11920.00 49451.00 1972.00 2050.00 13052.00 367.00 2261.00 16636.00 5 0 8 . 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0 39951.00 196408.00 6675.00 8284.00 42326.00 . 1228.00 1271.00 2789.00 118.00 4165.00 26539.00 793.00 669.00 7449.00 119.00 924.00 8126.00 192.00 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0 2083.00 11383.00 3 4 3 . 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0 605.00 3073.00 118.00 501.00 437.00 5 9 . 2 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0 317.00 163.00 16.00 7099.00 5498.00 1067.00 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0 58215.60 161450.00 8845.20 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0 , 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0 184 SIC KRI0CU79 KRSHU66 KRSMU79 1 1011 1186.00 8762.00 16814.00 2 1012 0.00 485.00 8830.00 3 1020 • 0.00 16530.00 140620.00 4 1031 2582.00 11609.80 53073.00 S 1032 0.00 509.00 3493.00 6 1040 0.00 526.00 ' 2199.00 7 1050 0.00 2621.00 13530.00 8 1060 0.00 2516.00 30009.00 9 1071 0.00 5241.00 20242.00 10 1072 0.00 3841.00 18800.00 11 1081 7140.00 9074.00 32002.00 12 1083 0.00 8998.00 38640.00 13 1091 278.00 0.00 0.00 14 1092 0.00 0.00 0.00 15 1093 0.00 0.00 0.00 16 1530 0.00 0.00 0.00 17 1620 3969.00 21684.00 388997.00 18 1720 7587.00 349.00 1815.00 19 1740 934.00 0.00 0.00 20 1810 3301.00 17239.00 24313.00 21 1820 8121.00 32022.00 63595.00 22 1831 1402.00 22423.00 160285.00 23 1832 1283.00 56434.00 362434.00 24 1852 365.00 0.00 0.00 25 1860 2148.00 13755.00 47947.00 26 1872 0.00 0.00 0.00 27 1880 0.00 0.00 0.00 28 1891 8.00 1198.00 8927.00 29 1894 0.00 0.00 0.00 30 2310 0.00 0.00 0.00 31 2391 6832.00 1658.00 2821.00 32 2431 13393.00 0.00 0.00 33 , 2441 22362.00 2898.00 18426.00 34 2450 438.00 0.00 0.00 35 2511 0.00 0.00 0.00 36 2513 0.00 421.00 (04.00 37 2520 - 3548.00 17972.80 77676.00 38 2543 0.00 539.00 2559.00 39 2560 0.00 2741.00 7511.00 40 2593 0.00 461.00 8104.00 41 2640 0.00 4425.00 24590.00 42 2660 0.00 6275.00 30026.00 43 2680 0.00 0.00 0.00 44 2710 488.00 26454.00 182885.00 45 2720 0.00 918.00 3229.00 46 2731 5490.00 4507.00 10922.00 47 2732 0.00 0.00 0.00 48 2733 0.00 1519.00 6444.00 49 2860 3241.00 13088.00 66832.00 50 2870 15116.00 0.00 0.00 51 2910 3959.00 15123.00 49747.00 KRSDU66 KRS0U79 KRSDCU66 KRSDCV^ 7033.00 9686.00 1528.00 1431.00 476.00 4594.00 49.00 234.00 14561.00 102515.00 2227.40 11078.00 8853.80 22478.00 1184.50 2008.00 509.00 2394.00 67.00 103.00 493.00 2159.00 74.00 226.00 2441.00 12650.00 215.00 536.00 1087.00 25205.00 193.00 1730.00 1080.00 6481.00 210.00 855.00 3408.00 9994.00 660.00 1341.00 1769.00 9350.00 254.00 951.00 5432.40 20035.00 903.30 2108.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 17377.00 351930.00 3815.50 60849.00 271.00 1715.00 58.60 281.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 12994.50 15877.00 2911.40 2981.00 29021.00 60000.00 5993.00 8980.00 19044.30 135838.00 4441.50 19877.00 55024 .00 323310.00 20456.70 82372.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 13732.00 45526.00 3673.00 9375.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1197.00 8825.00 260.00 1065.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1658.00 2786.00 569.00 762.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 2898.00 17929.00 783.00 4208.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 158.00 35.00 32.00 5.00 17503.00 66903.00 3054.20 8682.00 534.00 2480.00 113.00 374.00 1246.00 5778.00 249.00 838.00 461.00 8101.00 91.00 1215.00 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