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UBC Theses and Dissertations

Soviet perceptions of the correlation of forces Nadkarni, Vidya 1987

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SOVIET PERCEPTIONS OF THE CORRELATION OF FORCES By VIDYA NADKARNI B.A., The U n i v e r s i t y M.A.,  o f Bombay, 1976  J a w a h a r l a l Nehru U n i v e r s i t y ,  1978  A THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY  in THE FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIES (Department o f P o l i t i c a l  We accept t h i s t h e s i s as to the r e q u i r e d  Science)  conforming  standard  THE UNIVERSITY OF BRITISH COLUMBIA February  1987  ( c ) Vidya Nadkarni,  1987  In  presenting  degree  at the  this  thesis in partial fulfilment of the  of  department  this thesis for scholarly or  for  by  his  or  her  I further agree that permission for  purposes  representatives.  permission.  Political  Science  The University of British Columbia 1956 Main Mall Vancouver, Canada V6T 1Y3 Date  DF-fin/ft-n  advanced  10. February 1987  extensive  may be granted by the head of It  is  understood  that  publication of this thesis for financial gain shall not be allowed without  Department of  an  University of British Columbia, I agree that the Library shall make it  freely available for reference and study. copying  requirements  copying  my or  my written  ABSTRACT  T h i s t h e s i s examines e v o l v i n g of f o r c e s " between the general  and  Soviet perspectives  s o c i a l i s t world and  the S o v i e t Union and  i s on the Khrushchev and  the U n i t e d  on the " c o r r e l a t i o n  the c a p i t a l i s t States  countries  in particular.  Brezhnev phases of S o v i e t h i s t o r y .  The  " c o r r e l a t i o n of f o r c e s " i s p r i m a r i l y an a n a l y t i c concept used by leaders  and  scholars  to understand and  as the i n e v i t a b l e h i s t o r i c a l Soviet  equivalent  in The  focus  term Soviet  i n t e r p r e t the pace o f what they view  development i n f a v o r o f s o c i a l i s m .  A rough  o f the Western concept o f the "balance of power,"  " c o r r e l a t i o n of f o r c e s " as i t i s used by S o v i e t spokesmen encompasses economic, p o l i t i c a l , and m i l i t a r y - s e c u r i t y dimensions. The  methodology employed i n the t h e s i s i n c h a r t i n g the  e v o l u t i o n of Soviet a c a r e f u l and  thinking regarding  For  the c o r r e l a t i o n of f o r c e s c o n s i s t s of  d i s c r i m i n a t i n g t e x t u a l a n a l y s i s of t e r m i n o l o g i c a l v a r i a t i o n s  i n S o v i e t s c h o l a r l y and regard  chronological  to c o n t e x t u a l  o f f i c i a l use  of the concept over time, w i t h  f l u c t u a t i o n s i n the domestic and  i n t e r n a t i o n a l realms.  i t s source m a t e r i a l , t h i s study r e l i e d h e a v i l y on the speeches  w r i t i n g of S o v i e t l e a d e r s as w e l l as u t i l i z i n g a n a l y s e s developments p u b l i s h e d  i n Soviet  scholarly journals.  ii  due  and  of i n t e r n a t i o n a l  The d i f f e r i n g s t r e s s on each of the t h r e e a s p e c t s o f the c o r r e l a t i o n of forces—economic, p o l i t i c a l ,  and m i l i t a r y — b e t w e e n the Khrushchev  and  Brezhnev p e r i o d s a l l o w e d us t o t r a c e the change and e v o l u t i o n o f the S o v i e t world view from a p r i m a r y s t r e s s on economic f a c t o r s o f the d i s t r i b u t i o n of power under Khrushchev, t o an emphasis on the m i l i t a r y dimension o f the b a l a n c e under Brezhnev.  By m o n i t o r i n g t e r m i n o l o g i c a l v a r i a t i o n s i n the  concept, we were a b l e to i d e n t i f y p e r i o d s o f optimism and pessimism d u r i n g both the Khrushchev and Brezhnev phases. We  a l s o noted the important r o l e p l a y e d by the d i v e r g e n t  personalities  of Khrushchev and Brezhnev on S o v i e t p o r t r a y a l o f the c o r r e l a t i o n o f f o r c e s . Whereas the exuberant S o v i e t optimism i n the m i l i t a r y a r e a l a c k e d any b a s i s i n f a c t under Khrushchev, the d e p i c t i o n o f the m i l i t a r y c o r r e l a t i o n , w h i l e more muted under Brezhnev, was d i f f e r e n c e s , we  s o l i d l y based.  These and o t h e r such  argued, were a f u n c t i o n o f the stamp superimposed on S o v i e t  p o l i t i c s by the r e s p e c t i v e l e a d e r s o f the time. T h i s study w i l l , by c l a r i f y i n g the c o n t e x t w i t h i n which the S o v i e t l e a d e r s h i p makes i t s c h o i c e s , c o n t r i b u t e t o an enhanced u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f the g e n e r a l f o r e i g n p o l i c y t r e n d s o f the USSR.  iii  TABLE OF CONTENTS  Page PART ONE I II PART TWO III IV V PART THREE VI VII VIII IX PART FOUR X  INTRODUCTION S e t t i n g the Stage  '.  1  L e n i n i s t and S t a l i n i s t World Views  22  THE KHRUSHCHEV PHASE B r e a k i n g Out o f the S t a l i n i s t Mold: Years o f Optimism:  August  1953-1957.  52  1957—September 1961  82  Steady E r o s i o n o f C o n f i d e n c e :  1961-1964. . . .  116  THE BREZHNEV YEARS A Change i n Approach: K i n d l i n g of Confidence:  1964-1968 1969-1974  C r e s t and Ebb o f the O p t i m i s t i c T i d e : C r i s i s of Confidence:  154  1980-1985.  188 1975-1979  222 263  CONCLUSION Summing Up  303  Bibliography.  328  iv  CHAPTER I SETTING THE  The  domain and  international War.  stage has  In l i g h t of the  invasion  concern generated by  n a t u r e o f the  How  do  resources—political, the  r e s o u r c e s and  or p e s s i m i s t i c  the  end  l i m i t a t i o n s and  they view the  of the  opportunities pursuit  Second World  the  Soviet  understanding  that  of t h e i r  s t r e n g t h of  the  Soviets  international  their  m i l i t a r y — i n r e l a t i o n to  p o t e n t i a l of the U n i t e d S t a t e s ?  w i t h r e g a r d to the  the  assume c r i t i c a l importance:  i d e o l o g i c a l , economic and  Are  they  optimistic  success they hope to a c h i e v e i n  r e a l i z a t i o n of t h e i r f o r e i g n p o l i c y g o a l s ? p e r i o d s of pessimism and  on  such events as  intentions  themselves as b e i n g f a c e d w i t h i n the  p o l i t i c a l aims?  influence  q u e s t i o n s germane to an  f o r e i g n p o l i c y aims and  What i s the  power and  waxed s t e a d i l y s i n c e  of A f g h a n i s t a n , s e v e r a l  of S o v i e t  see  scope of S o v i e t  STAGE  Can  we  the  perhaps i d e n t i f y  optimism i n the h i s t o r y of S o v i e t  international  relations? The  attempt to seek answers to these and  w i l l form the  f o c u s of  this inquiry.  S p e c i f i c a l l y , we  t h i s quest through a l o n g i t u d i n a l a n a l y s i s pronouncements on The  c o r r e l a t i o n of  concept of the  c o n s t r u c t i n the and  the  scholars  scene are discussing  Soviet  argue t h a t  the the  forces  of  other r e l a t e d  s h a l l undertake  of p u b l i s h e d  Soviet  forces.  " c o r r e l a t i o n of f o r c e s " i s a key international the  two  relations lexicon.  major p r o t a g o n i s t s on  socialism  and  c o r r e l a t i o n of f o r c e s  questions  the  forces  the  theoretical Soviet  international  of c a p i t a l i s m ,  between these two  and  in  socio-economic  systems, they e x p l o r e t r e n d s i n i n t e r n a t i o n a l r e l a t i o n s i n the  1  leaders  context  of the g l o b a l d i s t r i b u t i o n of power. d o c t r i n a l and  A c a r e f u l exegesis  Soviet  a n a l y t i c a l l i t e r a t u r e on t h i s s u b j e c t would thus  us w i t h a u s e f u l barometer of S o v i e t p e r c e p t i o n s i n t e r e s t s , successes,  and  setbacks i n world  on t h e i r  the r e l a t i o n of f o r c e s p r o v i d e both i n t e r n a l and  provide  role,  affairs.  In a d d i t i o n to s e r v i n g as an a n a l y t i c t o o l , S o v i e t  Lenin c i t e d  of  c a l c u l a t i o n s of  a most c o n v e n i e n t means f o r r a t i o n a l i z i n g  e x t e r n a l p o l i c i e s o f the S o v i e t regime.  S o v i e t weakness i n the m i l i t a r y and  For  example,  economic realms as  r e a s o n f o r s i g n i n g the T r e a t y of B r e s t - L i t o v s k , and  the  S t a l i n used such  c a l c u l a t i o n s to j u s t i f y much of the i n t e r n a l r e p r e s s i o n of h i s regime. Later instances  (which we  i n c l u d e Malenkov's and p a r i t y with  s h a l l expand upon i n subsequent  Khrushchev's c a l c u l a t i o n s of S o v i e t  chapters) military  the West i n t h e i r attempts to cut defense e x p e n d i t u r e s ,  the l a t t e r ' s emphasis on economic c o m p e t i t i o n  and  t o spur people to work  harder. Some Western i n t e r n a t i o n a l r e l a t i o n s t h e o r i s t s have of l a t e come to recognize  the importance of t a k i n g i n t o account the o p e r a t i o n a l code of  d e c i s i o n makers i n s e e k i n g policy choices.  to understand and  e x p l a i n a country's  A n a l y s e s of the f o r e i g n p o l i c i e s of s t a t e s based  on an o b j e c t i v e assessment of i n t e r n a t i o n a l and i g n o r e the c r u c i a l r o l e of p e r c e p t i o n s  as f i l t e r i n g mechanisms through A t t e n t i o n to  dimension opens a window on the " b l a c k box"  t r a d i t i o n a l approaches and  solely  domestic developments  which the environment i s viewed by p o l i c y makers.* perceptual  foreign  the  element of  enhances our u n d e r s t a n d i n g of a  country's  f o r e i g n p o l i c y trends by c l a r i f y i n g the c o n t e x t w i t h i n which d e c i s i o n s are r e a c h e d .  In s u b j e c t matter and  scope, t h i s work l i e s a t the nexus  between the areas of S o v i e t p o l i t i c s and  2  international relations: i t  examines the S o v i e t world-view a g a i n s t  the background o f i n t e r n a l  p o l i t i c a l dynamics by c h a r t i n g , over time, f l u c t u a t i o n s i n the treatment of an important concept i n S o v i e t i n t e r n a t i o n a l r e l a t i o n s t h e o r y . When i n the e a r l y 1970s the U.S.S.R. a t t a i n e d s t r a t e g i c p a r i t y w i t h the U n i t e d  S t a t e s i n n u c l e a r weaponry, S o v i e t  spokesmen h e r a l d e d  development by c l a i m i n g t h a t a f u r t h e r s h i f t had o c c u r r e d c o r r e l a t i o n of forces i n favor of s o c i a l i s m .  this  i n the  Western s c h o l a r s , prodded  i n p a r t by the changed s t r a t e g i c s i t u a t i o n , began t o demonstrate a renewed i n t e r e s t i n e x p l o r i n g the S o v i e t world-view, t h e i r d o c t r i n e on i n t e r n a t i o n a l r e l a t i o n s , and t h e i r p e r c e p t i o n s The  works o f Stephen G i b e r t  Mitchell  o f U.S. f o r e i g n p o l i c y .  (1977), Morton Schwartz (1978), Judson  (1982), and John Lenczowski (1982) a r e r e p r e s e n t a t i v e i n t h i s  regard.^ These a u t h o r s take d i f f e r e n t p h i l o s o p h i c a l approaches t o t h e i r s u b j e c t matter and r e a c h  divergent  conclusions  regarding  the n a t u r e o f  S o v i e t f o r e i g n p o l i c y ( t h e o f f e n s i v e - d e f e n s i v e debate) and i t s i m p l i c a t i o n s f o r the American conduct o f i n t e r n a t i o n a l r e l a t i o n s . But the common temporal f o c u s post-detente  i n a l l o f these s t u d i e s i s on the d e t e n t e and  phases o f S o v i e t - A m e r i c a n r e l a t i o n s .  While G i b e r t ,  Schwartz, and Lenczowski d i s c u s s the S o v i e t p e r s p e c t i v e  on v a r i o u s  f a c e t s o f American f o r e i g n p o l i c y , M i t c h e l l attempts t o e l a b o r a t e on contemporary S o v i e t i n t e r n a t i o n a l r e l a t i o n s d o c t r i n e . Because o f the r e l e v a n c e  o f S o v i e t views o f the " c o r r e l a t i o n o f  f o r c e s " i n any d i s c u s s i o n o f S o v i e t i n t e r n a t i o n a l r e l a t i o n s d o c t r i n e or U.S.-U.S.S.R. r e l a t i o n s , a l l o f the above-mentioned a n a l y s e s some assessment o f t h i s concept. circumscribed  contain  But the b o u n d a r i e s o f such i n q u i r y a r e  i n each i n s t a n c e by the time p e r i o d under study and the  3  theme of a n a l y s i s .  No  thorough e x a m i n a t i o n of the e v o l u t i o n of  Soviet  t h i n k i n g about the c o r r e l a t i o n of f o r c e s i s undertaken i n these investigations. The chapter  one  study on t h i s t o p i c of some s i g n i f i c a n c e appears as a  i n W i l l i a m Zimmerman's much acclaimed  work, p u b l i s h e d  in  1969,  3 e n t i t l e d Soviet Perspectives However, one t h a t he  does not a d e q u a t e l y e x p l o r e  c o r r e l a t i o n of f o r c e s and  the i m p l i c a t i o n s of  draw between the  s t a t u s of the  the p o s i t i o n of the m i l i t a r y e q u a t i o n  In f a c t * h i s book devotes r e l a t i v e l y l i t t l e  various  f a c e t s of t h i s concept and  Moreover, t h i s study i s now s i g n i f i c a n c e need to be  focuses  and  f o r c e s serves  military  of the c o r r e l a t i o n the  almost e x c l u s i v e l y on  the  broadly.  provides  i n a new  a n a l y s i s which spans a  a firmer basis for exploring  changes i n S o v i e t p e r c e p t i o n s .  The  paucity  of  d e t a i l e d s t u d i e s of S o v i e t views of the c o r r e l a t i o n of as a major impetus f o r the p r e s e n t  CHANGE AND  In order  and  somewhat dated and many events of  incorporated  l o n g e r p e r i o d of time and and  overall  a t t e n t i o n to  m i l i t a r y c o r r e l a t i o n , r a t h e r than examining i t more  long-term t r e n d s  distinctions  (which i n c l u d e s economic, p o l i t i c a l ,  alone.  systematic  1956-1968.  of the drawbacks of Zimmerman's a n a l y s i s o f the concept i s  that S o v i e t a n a l y s t s may  aspects)  on I n t e r n a t i o n a l R e l a t i o n s :  THE  inquiry.  MARXIST-LENINIST WELTAUNSCHAUUNG  to make an adequate assessment of S o v i e t p e r c e p t i o n s  the c o r r e l a t i o n of f o r c e s , one must examine the assumptions or p r i n c i p l e s which u n d e r p i n S o v i e t a n a l y s e s  first  of i n t e r n a t i o n a l p o l i t i c s ,  w e l l as t h e i r p h i l o s o p h i c a l p r e s u p p o s i t i o n s  4  of  regarding  the n a t u r e of  as  change.  Such an e x e r c i s e  Soviet p o l i t i c s  i s e s s e n t i a l because i t h e l p s  the student o f  i n d i s c e r n i n g the optimism o r pessimism  (often veiled)  which runs as an u n d e r c u r r e n t i n S o v i e t d i s c u s s i o n s o f the c o r r e l a t i o n of f o r c e s a t p a r t i c u l a r p o i n t s uncovering often unstated not  t o t a l l y unrelated  chapter:  i n time.  Soviet a s s u m p t i o n s — i s d i s t i n c t  t o , the p o i n t made i n the f i r s t  t h a t a study o f p e r c e p t i o n s  understanding of a nation's Soviet perceptions,  The i s s u e h e r e — t h a t  i s necessary f o r  policies.  of  from, though  s e c t i o n of t h i s fuller  Thus, i n a t t e m p t i n g t o examine  the a n a l y s t must, t o the e x t e n t  p o s s i b l e , minimize  " d i s t o r t i n g " S o v i e t views e i t h e r by i g n o r i n g the i n t e r n a l i d e o l o g i c a l c a l c u l u s t h a t governs S o v i e t unconsciously,  t h i n k i n g o r by a t t e m p t i n g , perhaps  to d i s c e r n Soviet perceptions  through a s e t o f c r i t e r i a  t h a t the S o v i e t s do not r e c o g n i z e . The  importance o f t a k i n g assumptions i n t o account i n s t u d y i n g  perceptions  cannot be overemphasized.  As C o n n o l l y  w r i t e s , "To e x p l a i n  the p o l i t i c s o f a s o c i e t y we must be a b l e t o make the a c t i o n s , p r o j e c t s , and  p r a c t i c e s o f i t s members i n t e l l i g i b l e .  But a simple a c t o r p a t t e r n  of a c t i o n embodied i n i n s t i t u t i o n s i s n o t made i n t e l l i g i b l e merely by observing  overt behavior.  Actions  and p r a c t i c e s a r e c o n s t i t u t e d i n p a r t 4  by  the concepts and b e l i e f s the p a r t i c i p a n t s themselves have."  observation  i s e s p e c i a l l y true with regard  thought, which bases i t s e l f fundamental r e s p e c t s  on M a r x i s t  This  t o the S o v i e t s c h o o l of  epistemology and d i f f e r s i n  from mainstream Western approaches t o i n t e r n a t i o n a l  relations. A p r i m a r y S o v i e t assumption i s t h a t the movement o f the w o r l d h i s t o r i c a l p r o c e s s i n f a v o r o f s o c i a l i s m i s " o b j e c t i v e " and i s t h e r e f o r e preordained.  As a c o r o l l a r y t o t h i s assumption, o f f i c i a l  5  Soviet  d o c t r i n e p o s i t s the  i n e v i t a b i l i t y o f the u l t i m a t e  c o l l a p s e of  capitalism.  However, c a p i t a l i s m , or i t s more advanced  imperialism,  does not y i e l d  i t s entrenched p o s i t i o n s w i t h o u t  primarily m i l i t a r y struggle. p o l i c i e s which go The  socialist  against  In general,  then, c a p i t a l i s t  struggle,  s t a t e s pursue  the n a t u r a l f l o w of i n t e r n a t i o n a l development.  s t a t e s , on the other hand, f a s h i o n p o l i c i e s which  w i t h the c u r r e n t .  I t i s t h i s d i a l e c t i c that i s explored  the c o r r e l a t i o n of  forces.  In the  manifestation,  Soviet  schema, the p o l i c i e s pursued by  s o c i a l i s t or c a p i t a l i s t — a r e  flow  i n analyses  states—whether  " s u b j e c t i v e " f a c t o r s e i t h e r hastening  r e t a r d i n g the  tempo of the " o b j e c t i v e " h i s t o r i c a l movement toward  s o c i a l i s m and  communism.  "irreversible."  As  of  T h i s " o b j e c t i v e " p r o c e s s i s deemed as  an a u t h o r i t a t i v e t e x t of M a r x i s t - L e n i n i s t  or  being  ideology  explains: Marxism-Leninsim which r e g a r d s s o c i a l laws d i a l e c t i c a l l y sees t h a t they o p e r a t e i n the form of a dominating tendency of development i n g i v e n s o c i a l r e l a t i o n s . T h i s means t h a t a law determines the g e n e r a l d i r e c t i o n of movement n e c e s s a r i l y ensuing from c e r t a i n o b j e c t i v e c o n d i t i o n s . But s o c i a l development i s c o n t r a d i c t o r y , and the c o n c r e t e course of events depends not o n l y on g e n e r a l laws but on the a c t u a l c o r r e l a t i o n of c l a s s f o r c e s , on the p o l i c y gf the w a r r i n g c l a s s e s and many other s p e c i f i c c o n d i t i o n s . International p o l i t i c s , l o n g as the two  The  notion  c e n t r a l to S o v i e t t h i n k i n g .  seen as d e s e r v i n g  the  of change as a n a t u r a l phenomenon i s  and  explanation. For  i n a s t a t e of f l u x as  In most Western p o l i t i c a l  i s taken as a g i v e n  starting point.  seen to be  s o c i a l s y s t e m s — t h e c a p i t a l i s t and  socialist—coexist.  stability  then, are  any  disturbance  of the s t a t u s quo  S o v i e t commentators use  S o v i e t a n a l y s t s , change i s a g i v e n ,  i s not worthy of e x p l a n a t i o n  i n and  of i t s e l f .  6  analyses, is  a very d i f f e r e n t and  therefore  What does need to  be  explained,  however, i s the r a t e o f change, o r more a p p r o p r i a t e l y ,  forward movement. For  instance,  speaking i n 1982 a t an i n t e r n a t i o n a l arms c o n t r o l  symposium about contemporary i n t e r n a t i o n a l developments, G e n r i k h Trofimenko, a foremost S o v i e t A m e r i c a n o l o g i s t ,  stated:  For the S o v i e t Union, s u s t a i n i n g g l o b a l s t a b i l i t y means m a i n t a i n i n g the p r e s e n t b a l a n c e o f m i l i t a r y f o r c e s i n the w o r l d . . . .At the same time the S o v i e t Union a c c e p t s the p o s s i b i l i t y o f changes i n the s o c i o p o l i t i c a l s t a t u s quo. . . . He f u r t h e r d e s c r i b e s  such changes as a " n a t u r a l stage i n the ongoing  s o c i o p o l i t i c a l e v o l u t i o n o f the w o r l d , " i n c o n t r a s t , he o b s e r v e s , t o American p o l i t i c i a n s and s c h o l a r s who see these p r o c e s s e s as "unnatural."  I n g i v i n g such a r e s t r i c t i v e d e f i n i t i o n t o the term  s t a b i l i t y , Trofimenko's a n a l y s i s i l l u s t r a t e s t h a t t h i s concept i n i t s Western c o n n o t a t i o n  i s quite a l i e n to Soviet  thinking.  I n f a c t , as  Trofimenko p u t s i t , " I n the S o v i e t Union p o l i t i c i a n s and academicians as a general  r u l e do not use the term ' g l o b a l s t a b i l i t y . '  refer instead  t o the g l o b a l 'balance o f f o r c e s ' . " ^  They u s u a l l y  The l a t t e r  term, o f  c o u r s e , embodies the n o t i o n o f an i n e v i t a b l e forward movement toward socialism. In t h i s v e i n , S o v i e t a n a l y s t s r i g h t l y m a i n t a i n t h a t the concept of the c o r r e l a t i o n o f f o r c e s i s d i f f e r e n t from the Western n o t i o n o f t h e b a l a n c e o f power i n t h a t , u n l i k e the l a t t e r concept i n which the attainment o f s t a b i l i t y i n the I n t e r n a t i o n a l system i s seen as the c e n t r a l o b j e c t i v e , the i d e a o f the c o r r e l a t i o n o f f o r c e s presupposes dynamic movement toward a c l e a r l y d e f i n e d  end.  The term " c o r r e l a t i o n o f  f o r c e s " would presumably be redundant when the M a r x i s t communist world was f i n a l l y r e a l i z e d .  As one S o v i e t a n a l y s t has  observed, " r i v a l r y , s t r u g g l e , and c o n f l i c t  7  v i s i o n of a  o f the two opposing systems  are o b j e c t i v e l y i n e s c a p a b l e  as long as two  d i f f e r e n t socio-economic  systems e x i s t . The and  i d e a t h a t the phenomenon of change i s b a s i c , and  fixity  seeking view.  are a r t i f i c i a l c o n s t r u c t s  to understand and  ideology  imposed on r e a l i t y by  e x p l a i n i t , i s not  I t traces i t s heritage  that  observers  a s o l e l y Marxist  as f a r back as H e r a c l i t u s .  stability  world  Marxist  d i d , however, append a unique dimension to t h i s p e r s p e c t i v e  s p e c i f y i n g the d i r e c t i o n of change:  in  that i n t e r n a t i o n a l s o c i a l  development would i n e v i t a b l y p r o p e l  itself  toward s o c i a l i s m  and  communism through the i n s t r u m e n t a l i t y of s t r u g g l i n g c l a s s e s . The  i m p l i c a t i o n s f o r our  apparent.  study of such a S o v i e t b i a s are  Overt adherence to d o c t r i n e , and  correctness  of the M a r x i s t  world view, i n j e c t s a note of  optimism i n t o most S o v i e t a n a l y s e s i s evident  and  of s o c i a l i s m .  To do  the b a s i c assumptions of M a r x i s t  leaders  and  Hints  so would not  ideology,  but would be  of S o v i e t pessimism  a  declared  ourselves  of  logically  of a  Marxist  regarding  gleaned from  other words, to h e l p us d i s t i n g u i s h between genuine and have to ask  not  o n l y contravene one  their  assessment of the r a t e of the forward movement toward s o c i a l i s m .  we  forces  c o r r e l a t i o n of f o r c e s i s not  i n t e r n a t i o n a l developments must, t h e r e f o r e , be  optimism, the q u e s t i o n  This  a n a l y s t s do  f a l l a c i o u s p r o p o s i t i o n to t r y to uphold i n the context framework of a n a l y s i s .  compulsory  t h a t the c o r r e l a t i o n of  Soviet  cannot s p e c i f i c a l l y aver t h a t the  moving i n f a v o r of s o c i a l i s m .  f a i t h i n the  o f the c o r r e l a t i o n of f o r c e s .  i n the customary f o r m u l a t i o n  i s moving i n favour  often i m p l i c i t  quite  In  spurious  i s t h i s one:  having  t h a t the c o r r e l a t i o n of f o r c e s i s moving i n f a v o r o f s o c i a l i s m ,  i n what manner does the S o v i e t  s c h o l a r or d e c i s i o n maker proceed  8  to  e v a l u a t e contemporary i n t e r n a t i o n a l A f i n a l observation relates  events?  t o the S o v i e t  view o f the  constituent  elements which e n t e r i n t o any e s t i m a t i o n o f the c o r r e l a t i o n o f f o r c e s . In t h e i r treatment o f the concept, S o v i e t affairs usually aspects: and  students o f i n t e r n a t i o n a l  r e f e r t o f a c t o r s which may be grouped under t h r e e major  the economic, the m i l i t a r y , and the p o l i t i c a l .  m i l i t a r y dimensions a r e s e l f - e x p l a n a t o r y .  i s more o f a c a t c h - a l l c a t e g o r y i n c l u d i n g forces," forces  and " s u b j e c t i v e "  forces  The p o l i t i c a l  dimension  ideological factors,  "class  such as the p o l i c i e s o f s t a t e s .  i s a nebulous term and i s not d e f i n e d p r e c i s e l y  writing.  The economic  Class  i n Soviet  I n the s t r i c t M a r x i s t sense, i t may be taken t o r e p r e s e n t the  p r o l e t a r i a t o r the working c l a s s whose s p e c i a l r o l e i n u s h e r i n g i n a new s o c i a l i s t o r d e r i s never q u e s t i o n e d by S o v i e t T h i s mix o f t a n g i b l e  and i n t a n g i b l e  scholars.  elements r e n d e r s v i r t u a l l y  i m p o s s i b l e any e s t i m a t i o n o f the c o r r e l a t i o n based on s t r i c t l y quantitative  measures.  As Raymond G a r t h o f f has p o i n t e d o u t , the S o v i e t s  8 do The  not "make e x p l i c i t any c r i t e r i a f o r c a l c u l a t i o n " o f the c o r r e l a t i o n . intangible  elements, though, s e r v e an expedient f u n c t i o n  p e r i o d s when the t a n g i b l e f a v o r the U.S.S.R.  a s p e c t s o f the c o r r e l a t i o n do not appear t o  A t such times S o v i e t  of such n o n - q u a n t i f i a b l e f a c t o r s movement, a l b e i t another c l u e the  during  a n a l y s t s can c i t e the i n f l u e n c e  t o support t h e i r argument f o r a forward  slow, i n f a v o r o f s o c i a l i s m .  i n our i n v e s t i g a t i o n .  c o r r e l a t i o n which a r e s t r e s s e d  T h i s p r o v i d e s us w i t h  By c l o s e l y m o n i t o r i n g the a s p e c t s of a t p a r t i c u l a r p o i n t s i n time, we may  a s c e r t a i n b o t h the e x t e n t o f p r e v a i l i n g optimism o r pessimism and a r r i v e at some c o n c l u s i o n s r e g a r d i n g the changing h i e r a r c h y of v a l u e s which guides S o v i e t  thinking  on m a t t e r s o f i n t e r n a t i o n a l  9  politics.  TERMS OF REFERENCE, SOURCES, AND  The  most common R u s s i a n r e n d e r i n g  of power i s the g e n e r i c This expression,  Soviet  of a d i s t r i b u t i o n  in itself,  i s n e u t r a l i n i t s c o n n o t a t i o n of a needs q u a l i f i e r s to h e l p  and  analysts  favorable and  employed  by  i n t h e i r d i s c u s s i o n of the power  d i s t r i b u t i o n between s o c i a l i s m and  capitalism.  which i s employed l e s s o f t e n and  w i t h sootnoshenie s i l ,  forces.  s p e c i f y nature  Sootnoshenie s i l i s the concept most f r e q u e n t l y  leaders  expression,  f o r the n o t i o n  term sootnoshenie s i l or c o r r e l a t i o n of  or u n f a v o r a b l e b a l a n c e and direction.  METHODOLOGY  Another  i s used  neutral  interchangeably  i s r a s s t a n o v k a s i l or d i s p o s i t i o n of f o r c e s .  o t h e r terms which are more c o n c i s e  i n s p e c i f y i n g the n a t u r e of  d i s t r i b u t i o n of power are pereves s i l ,  Two  the  or preponderance of f o r c e s ,  and  9 ravnovesie s i l , In our  or e q u i l i b r i u m of  a n a l y s i s , we  s h a l l , f o r purposes of c l a r i t y , adhere to  following English equivalents (1)  forces.  of the R u s s i a n phrases o u t l i n e d above:  sootnoshenie s i l as c o r r e l a t i o n of f o r c e s .  Very o f t e n  in  E n g l i s h - l a n g u a g e R u s s i a n s o u r c e s , t h i s term i s rendered i n E n g l i s h b a l a n c e of f o r c e s . t r a n s l a t i o n of the  the  In such cases we  as  shall retain this particular  phrase;  (2) r a s s t a n o v k a s i l as d i s p o s i t i o n of f o r c e s or alignment of forces; (3) pereves s i l as preponderance of f o r c e s ; (4) r a v n o v e s i e s i l as e q u i l i b r i u m of Soviet 1956  and  forces.  l i t e r a t u r e on i n t e r n a t i o n a l p o l i t i c s has  when the  p r o l i f e r a t e d since  f i r s t major s t e p s to encourage s c h o l a r s h i p  were i n i t i a t e d by  the p o s t - S t a l i n l e a d e r s h i p .  10  For  i n t h i s area  i t s source m a t e r i a l ,  then, t h i s study u t i l i z e s p u b l i s h e d  Soviet  a f f a i r s t h a t appear r e g u l a r l y i n the  analyses o f i n t e r n a t i o n a l  following journals:  Mirovaia  Ekonomika i Mezhdunarodnye O t n o s h e n i i a , h e r e i n a f t e r MEMO; I n t e r n a t i o n a l A f f a i r s , h e r e i n a f t e r IA; The  first  and Kommunist.  two p u b l i c a t i o n s are  international relations.  s p e c i a l i z e d journals dealing with  IA i s an E n g l i s h - l a n g u a g e v e r s i o n o f t h e  R u s s i a n j o u r n a l Mezhdunarodnaia Z h i z n ' s t a r t e d p u b l i c a t i o n i n 1955. in July  ( I n t e r n a t i o n a l L i f e ) which  The f i r s t  i s s u e o f MEMO appeared i n p r i n t  1957 and i s the o f f i c i a l p u b l i c a t i o n o f the  Economy and I n t e r n a t i o n a l R e l a t i o n s  I n s t i t u t e o f World  o f the U.S.S.R. Academy o f S c i e n c e s .  Kommunist i s the prime p e r i o d i c a l i s s u e d under the a u s p i c e s o f t h e Communist P a r t y  o f the  pronouncements o f P a r t y  S o v i e t Union.  I n a d d i t i o n , the speeches and  l e a d e r s who shape and i n f l u e n c e the conduct o f  Soviet  f o r e i g n p o l i c y are examined, as are  Soviet  Communist P a r t y  The  and the  r e l e v a n t documents o f t h e  i n t e r n a t i o n a l communist movement.  methodology employed here i n c h a r t i n g the  evolution of Soviet  thinking regarding  chronological  the c o r r e l a t i o n o f f o r c e s  c o n s i s t s o f a c a r e f u l and d i s c r i m i n a t i n g t e x t u a l a n a l y s i s o f v a r i a t i o n s i n Soviet regard realms.  s c h o l a r l y and o f f i c i a l use o f the concept over time, w i t h due  to contextual  f l u c t u a t i o n s i n the domestic and i n t e r n a t i o n a l  Our f o c u s w i l l be on the y e a r s spanning the  Khrushchev, Brezhnev, and post-Brezhnev A l t h o u g h the use o f the r e s e a r c h  leadership.  methodology o u t l i n e d above i s  f a i r l y widespread among S o v i e t o l o g i s t s s e e k i n g t o tap p o l i t i c a l mind, i t has to be examined.  t e n u r e s o f the  the  Soviet  been dogged by p e r s i s t e n t c r i t i c i s m s which need  I n t h i s s e c t i o n we s h a l l address b o t h the  objections  t h a t may be r a i s e d i n c o n n e c t i o n w i t h the p r e s e n t study a s w e l l as the  11  l i m i t a t i o n s inherent  i n the n a t u r e o f the e n t e r p r i s e .  Two b a s i c q u e r i e s o f a v e r y connection any  with  g e n e r a l c h a r a c t e r may be r a i s e d i n  the task o f u n d e r t a k i n g  t o uncover the p e r c e p t i o n s o f  i n d i v i d u a l o r group o f i n d i v i d u a l s — i n t h i s i n s t a n c e , o f S o v i e t  s c h o l a r s and p o l i c y - m a k e r s . gauge p e r c e p t i o n s  First,  accurately?  p r i n t e d word p r o v i d e  i s i t p o s s i b l e f o r an a n a l y s t t o  And, second* does an a n a l y s i s o f the  us w i t h a r e l i a b l e o p e r a t i o n a l measure o f  perceptions? Doubtless, difficulties,  an i n v e s t i g a t i o n o f p e r c e p t i o n s  e s p e c i a l l y s i n c e one can never be c o m p l e t e l y  one's own p e r c e p t i o n s  a conscious  foundations  i n analysis.  i n a l e r t i n g the a n a l y s t  Cognizance o f one's own c u l t u r a l b i a s  attempt t o take i n t o account the e p i s t e m o l o g i c a l  o f S o v i e t t h i n k i n g can a t l e a s t minimize the r i s k s o f  m i s i n t e r p r e t i n g Soviet perceptions,  and can, i n the p r o c e s s ,  w i t h b e t t e r i n s i g h t s i n t o the S o v i e t world-view. of t h i s c h a p t e r underlying  c e r t a i n that  But even the awareness o f r o a d b l o c k s i n  the p a t h o f i n q u i r y i s u s e f u l , f o r i t can h e l p to p o s s i b l e p i t f a l l s  with  do not c l o u d the c l a r i t y and a u t h e n t i c i t y o f the  r e p r e s e n t a t i o n of Soviet views.  and  i s fraught  endow us  The p r e c e d i n g  section  i s devoted p r e c i s e l y t o such a r e v i e w o f the assumptions  the S o v i e t  perspective.  In t h i s study, we hope t o r e c o r d the e v o l u t i o n o f S o v i e t perceptions published  o f the c o r r e l a t i o n o f f o r c e s through an a n a l y s i s o f  S o v i e t m a t e r i a l s on the s u b j e c t .  t h a t t h e p r i n t e d and spoken word can p r o v i d e indicator of perceptions.  Of c o u r s e ,  T h i s presupposes a judgement us w i t h  a reliable  t h i s i s not t o deny t h a t  Soviet  s c h o l a r s and p o l i c y makers do use the w r i t t e n and v e r b a l medium f o r m u l t i p l e purposes o f which m a n i p u l a t i o n  12  and j u s t i f i c a t i o n form a p a r t .  However, S o v i e t i n t e r p r e t and  l e a d e r s and  s c h o l a r s a l s o endeavor to understand,  i n t e g r a t e the ebb  and  f l o w of i n t e r n a t i o n a l events i n t o  the l a r g e r p i c t u r e of h i s t o r i c a l development.  One  i s strengthened i n  t h i s b e l i e f because, w i t h i n the c o n t r a i n t s of M a r x i s t - L e n i n i s t  doctrine,  S o v i e t d i s c u s s i o n s of the c o r r e l a t i o n of f o r c e s between s o c i a l i s m  and  c a p i t a l i s m do attempt to d e a l w i t h changed i n t e r n a t i o n a l c i r c u m s t a n c e s , either favorable  or u n f a v o r a b l e from t h e i r  Moreover, e s p e c i a l l y i n the top l e a d e r s h i p takes p l a c e ,  to v a r i o u s  S o v i e t Union, communications from  e l i t e s on the c o n t e n t and  i n l a r g e measure, through w r i t i n g s and  i n the S o v i e t p r e s s .  Therefore,  Through a c a u t i o u s  and  and  and  intended  i n c l a r i f y i n g Soviet views.  to s i f t nuggets of v a l u a b l e  i n s i g h t s from  d i s c u s s i o n , thus f a r , seems to imply the e x i s t e n c e  i d e n t i f i a b l e Soviet perspective.  third  The  answer, f o r reasons we  nor  clear-cut.  of a u n i f i e d  Whether a s i n g l e S o v i e t view,  of a p a r t i c u l a r time p e r i o d , can be  s a i d to e x i s t , i s the  perceptions  published  verbiage.  representative be  speeches  d i s c r i m i n a t i n g approach, then, i t i s p o s s i b l e f o r  the student of S o v i e t p o l i t i c s the c h a f f of  the  d i r e c t i o n of p o l i c y  a t t e n t i o n to the context  audience f o r a p a r t i c u l a r message can h e l p  Our  perspective.  i s s u e which we  i s o l a t e d , or may  need to c o n s i d e r  s h a l l d e l i n e a t e below, i s n e i t h e r  On b a l a n c e , w i t h r e f e r e n c e  to our  of the c o r r e l a t i o n of f o r c e s , there  even  here. absolute  inquiry into  appears to be  time a b a s i c congruence of s t a t e d o p i n i o n among S o v i e t l e a d e r s  Soviet at any  one  and  analysts. The when the  exceptions top P a r t y  to the p r e c e d i n g leadership  observation  occur during  periods  i s i t s e l f e i t h e r u n c e r t a i n or i n  disagreement as to s o c i a l i s m ' s r e l a t i v e s t a n d i n g  13  i n the c o r r e l a t i o n of  forces with capitalism.  At such times, there  i s a diverse array  o f t e n c o n t r a d i c t o r y views o f the c o r r e l a t i o n of f o r c e s i n the press  and  scholarly publications.  t h i s stage.  But  Debate i s , perhaps, encouraged at  core P a r t y  l e a d e r s h i p , d i s c u s s i o n s again  conformist  character.  Cuban m i s s i l e c r i s i s ) and instance,  represent  c o r r e l a t i o n of  Soviet  once a c r y s t a l l i z a t i o n of o p i n i o n o c c u r s w i t h i n  The  assume a tamer and  y e a r s between 1962  the  more  ( e s p e c i a l l y a f t e r the  Khrushchev's o u s t e r  i n October 1964,  for  a p e r i o d of ferment i n S o v i e t d i s c u s s i o n s o f  the  forces.  A l s o , b e g i n n i n g w i t h the l a t t e r y e a r s of Brezhnev's term of Soviet  of  office,  i n t e r n a t i o n a l r e l a t i o n s a n a l y s t s have begun to pay more a t t e n t i o n  to the methods of a n a l y s i s of Western academics and  have become q u i t e  adept at p r e s e n t i n g  S o v i e t views i n a manner p a l a t a b l e to  Western a u d i e n c e s .  Such a p r a c t i c e c o u l d have the e f f e c t of  complicating  our  there are none. dissemination b e h a v i o r by  study by But  suggesting  consult  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n a l d i f f e r e n c e s where  the impediments to a n a l y s i s posed by  of s e l e c t i v e i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s of S o v i e t  such s c h o l a r l y g o o d - w i l l  G e n r i k h Trofimenko are not  the  thinking  and  ambassadors as G e o r g i A r b a t o v  insuperable  communications which are  informed  as l o n g as one  intended  and  i s c a r e f u l to  f o r domestic S o v i e t  audiences  as w e l l . In the West, t h e r e has l i t e r a t u r e which has  been, s i n c e the  taken f o r i t s o b j e c t  " i n t e r e s t groups" i n S o v i e t p o l i t i c s .  But  1960s, a growing body of  the task of i d e n t i f y i n g Western a n a l y s t s agree f o r  the most p a r t t h a t advocacy groups f u n c t i o n o n l y m i n i m a l l y ,  i f at a l l ,  i n areas of p o l i c y t h a t are grouped i n what Seweryn B i a l e r c a l l s  "high  politics."*^  within  Most i s s u e s of f o r e i g n p o l i c y would c e r t a i n l y f a l l  14  the purview  of " h i g h p o l i t i c s . "  b a s i s o f assessments  Because p o l i c i e s f o r m u l a t e d on the  o f the c o r r e l a t i o n o f f o r c e s i n v o l v e h i g h  s t a k e s , t h e r e i s a g r e a t e r tendency  toward  political  uniformity of opinion at t h i s  level. Even here, though, t h e r e a r e a few important advocacy as the m i l i t a r y — w h i c h may be a t odds w i t h the p o l i t i c a l the i m p l i c a t i o n s , e s p e c i a l l y i n the sphere o f budgetary  groups—such  l e a d e r s h i p over allocations for  defense, f l o w i n g from a g i v e n assessment o f the c o r r e l a t i o n o f f o r c e s . Where such d i f f e r e n c e s do s u r f a c e i n the course o f our a n a l y s i s , we s h a l l examine t h e i r substance  and impact.  I n g e n e r a l , the views  expressed by S o v i e t s c h o l a r l y c i r c l e s more o r l e s s c o i n c i d e w i t h  those  e n u n c i a t e d by the S o v i e t p o l i t i c a l l e a d e r s h i p . A f i n a l m e t h o d o l o g i c a l o b j e c t i o n l i k e l y t o be r a i s e d i n c o n n e c t i o n w i t h the p r e s e n t study i s t h a t we r e f r a i n from employing c o n t e n t - a n a l y t i c mode i n c o n d u c t i n g our i n v e s t i g a t i o n . i s l e s s t r o u b l i n g f o r s e v e r a l reasons. have chosen  a formal This c r i t i c i s m  The n a t u r e o f the v a r i a b l e s we  t o a n a l y s e does not e a s i l y l e n d i t s e l f  to q u a n t i f i c a t i o n .  Moreover, i n our a n a l y s i s o f S o v i e t p e r c e p t i o n s o f the c o r r e l a t i o n o f f o r c e s , the " o u t l i e r s " o r d e v i a t i o n s from the norm, a r e i m p o r t a n t . example, the number o f times the term "preponderance  For  o f f o r c e s " was used  between 1959 and 1961, compared w i t h the frequency o f usage o f the term " c o r r e l a t i o n o f f o r c e s , " would render the former term  statistically  i n s i g n i f i c a n t , but i n f a c t , t h i s a l t e r n a t i v e f o r m u l a t i o n i s v e r y important as an i n d i c a t o r o f a changing international p o l i t i c a l  reality.  15  t r e n d i n S o v i e t p e r c e p t i o n s of  GENERAL HYPOTHESES  Over the y e a r s t h e r e has been a long-simmering debate among non-Marxist s c h o l a r s over the r e s p e c t i v e r o l e s o f i d e o l o g y and r e a l p o l i t i k i n guiding  S o v i e t conduct.  The c o n t r o v e r s y  i s not e a s i l y  r e s o l v e d because the mix of Marx and M a c h i a v e l l i i n S o v i e t w r i t i n g v a r i e s according unadulterated  t o time and s i t u a t i o n , and r a r e l y does one encounter an  version of either.  I t i s n o t our purpose here t o d e l v e  i n t o the p r o s and cons o f t h i s s c h o l a r l y c o n t r o v e r s y  but merely t o note  i t s i m p l i c a t i o n s f o r our study o f S o v i e t p e r c e p t i o n s  o f the c o r r e l a t i o n  of  forces. An a n a l y s t who p o s i t s t h a t i d e o l o g y  Soviet  i s o f o v e r r i d i n g concern t o  l e a d e r s and s c h o l a r s would expect l i t t l e  o r no v a r i a t i o n i n the  usage and d i s c u s s i o n o f the term " c o r r e l a t i o n o f f o r c e s . "  On the o t h e r  hand, i f one hews t o the view t h a t the S o v i e t s do respond t o events i n the changing world environment, one would i n f e r , a t the v e r y less r i g i d  a t t i t u d e toward v a r y i n g  formulations  least, a  of t h i s concept.  We  h y p o t h e s i z e t h a t b o t h o f the above p o s i t i o n s bear some correspondence with Soviet p o l i t i c a l H y p o t h e s i s 1:  reality.  On a h i g h e r  l e v e l of a b s t r a c t i o n — t h e  l e v e l o r what the S o v i e t s would c a l l  "grand  "strategic" level—where  theory"  Soviet  s c h o l a r s use the term c o r r e l a t i o n o f f o r c e s i n r e f e r r i n g t o the long-term movement o f " o b j e c t i v e " h i s t o r i c a l f o r c e s , we expect no v a r i a t i o n i n usage.  For example, i t w i l l be s t a t e d t h a t the c o r r e l a t i o n  of f o r c e s was, i s , and w i l l always be moving i n f a v o r o f s o c i a l i s m . H y p o t h e s i s 2: level—when Soviet  On a lower degree o f a b s t r a c t i o n — o r  the " t a c t i c a l "  l e a d e r s and s c h o l a r s a r e speaking o f the a c t u a l and  16  contemporary s i t u a t i o n and s h o r t - t e r m p r o j e c t i o n s expect c o n s i d e r a b l e  v a r i a t i o n i n usage.  l a t t e r l e v e l perhaps d i c t a t e the c h o i c e s p e c i f i c h i s t o r i c a l periods.  Soviet  c a l c u l a t i o n s on the  of p a r t i c u l a r p o l i c i e s during  I t i s v a r i a t i o n s i n formulation  second l e v e l which w i l l p r o v i d e the g r i s t evolution of Soviet  i n t o the f u t u r e , we  on t h i s  f o r our a n a l y s i s o f the  t h i n k i n g on m a t t e r s impinging on the c o r r e l a t i o n o f  forces. Marxist-Leninist scientific  ideology  i t s e l f on h a v i n g  discovered  laws o f s o c i a l d e v e l o p m e n t — l a w s which operate i r r e s p e c t i v e  of i n d i v i d u a l s .  The " g r e a t man" t h e o r y o f h i s t o r y , then, i s e s p e c i a l l y  a t odds w i t h the t e n e t s not  prides  of M a r x i s t - L e n i n i s t  just Marxist-Leninists  who d i s a g r e e  paramount r o l e t o the i n d i v i d u a l .  doctrine.  Of c o u r s e , i t i s  w i t h t h e o r i e s which a s c r i b e a  I t i s i n the n a t u r e o f a l l  m a c r o - t h e o r i e s t o s a c r i f i c e emphasis on the p a r t i c u l a r i n o r d e r t o g a i n a wider and long-term h i s t o r i c a l p e r s p e c t i v e .  Western t h e o r i s t s who  seek t o determine e m p i r i c a l r e g u l a r i t i e s i n I n t e r n a t i o n a l p o l i t i c a l  life  a l s o tend t o minimize the c a p a c i t y o f s i n g l e i n d i v i d u a l s t o e f f e c t s i g n i f i c a n t and l a s t i n g changes on the i n t e r n a t i o n a l o r domestic H y p o t h e s i s 3: difference.  I n the s h o r t run, however, i n d i v i d u a l s do make a  We argue t h a t the p e r s o n a l i t y and p r o c l i v i t i e s o f an  i n d i v i d u a l do have c o n s i d e r a b l e The  impact on the conduct o f f o r e i g n p o l i c y .  exuberant optimism o f the Khrushchev p e r i o d ,  f o r instance,  s h a r p l y w i t h the muted optimism o f the Brezhnev p e r i o d . it,  stage.  t h i s may n o t appear p a r t i c u l a r l y s i g n i f i c a n t .  o p t i m i s t i c streak  contrasts  On the f a c e o f  But the o v e r l y  i n Khrushchev's p e r s o n a l i t y and the tendency t o l o o k  always on the b r i g h t s i d e o f t h i n g s  t r a n s l a t e d e a s i l y i n t o b l u f f and  b l u s t e r , and overstatement o f f a c t and achievement.  17  Many o f the events  and  occurrences  d u r i n g Khrushchev's tenure i n o f f i c e as w e l l as S o v i e t  p o l i c i e s and the American response to them, would be d i f f i c u l t t o account f o r u n l e s s  one i n t r o d u c e d  i n t o the e x p l a n a t o r y  equation.  budget f o r 1961 was o c c a s i o n e d regarding  the impact o f Khrushchev's p e r s o n a l i t y  The sharp i n c r e a s e i n the U.S. m i l i t a r y i n p a r t by Khrushchev's i n f l a t e d  claims  S o v i e t m i l i t a r y might.  Khrushchev's s u c c e s s o r s  i n the K r e m l i n  have as a r u l e r e f r a i n e d  from the v e r b a l excesses o f t h e i r p r e d e c e s s o r . Brezhnev team's c a u t i o u s  The impact o f the  and d e l i b e r a t e approach i s most e v i d e n t  c a r e f u l c h a r a c t e r i z a t i o n s o f S o v i e t m i l i t a r y power.  i n very  At a time when the  m i l i t a r y a r s e n a l o f the S o v i e t Union has grown so v a s t l y t h a t some Western m i l i t a r y a n a l y s t s wonder i f the S o v i e t s now do n o t p o s s e s s an edge over the U n i t e d  States i n t h i s area,  S o v i e t commentary has n o t come  c l o s e t o c l a i m i n g the m i l i t a r y s u p e r i o r i t y t h a t Khrushchev b o a s t e d about i n 1960.  This conscious  v e r b a l r e t i c e n c e , which has been  the s t y l e o f the Brezhnev l e a d e r s h i p , and i s r e f l e c t e d s c h o l a r l y analyses  falsely  i n contemporary  o f the c o r r e l a t i o n o f f o r c e s , would j u s t i f y a b o l d e r  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f any S o v i e t e x p r e s s i o n s muted, than might otherwise appear  of m i l i t a r y confidence,  however  reasonable.  ORGANIZATION OF STUDY  T h i s study i s c h r o n o l o g i c a l l y o r d e r e d .  Chapter Two w i l l  d i s c u s s the L e n i n i s t and S t a l i n i s t w o r l d views i n o r d e r background f o r our subsequent a n a l y s i s . m a i n l y on the works o f L e n i n and S t a l i n .  briefly  t o p r o v i d e the  F o r t h i s r e v i e w we s h a l l  rely  Chapters Three through F i v e  w i l l d i s c u s s t h r e e phases i n the e v o l u t i o n o f S o v i e t t h i n k i n g d u r i n g the  18  Khrushchev y e a r s .  The  subsequent f o u r  t r a c e changes i n S o v i e t  chapters  ( S i x through Nine) w i l l  views of the c o r r e l a t i o n under Brezhnev.  Chapter Nine w i l l a l s o i n c l u d e  an a n a l y s i s of developments d u r i n g  Andropov-Chernenko i n t e r l u d e .  The  through Nine w i l l Soviet  of S o v i e t  the  explorational sum  foray up  p e r c e p t i o n s of the  of the r e c o r d  c o r r e l a t i o n of f o r c e s , f o l l o w e d  commentary w i t h r e f e r e n c e  domestic-international  as w e l l as  g e n e r a l format of Chapters Three  c o n s i s t of an e x p o s i t i o n  statements on  context.  both to p o l i c y and  The  i n t o the p e r i o d  and  tenor of  by an  ushered i n by  forces.  19  analysis  the  f i n a l c h a p t e r w i l l make a  the main r e s u l t s of our c o r r e l a t i o n of  the  Gorbachev's  investigation into  tentative leadership  Soviet  NOTES  1.  For a p i o n e e r i n g study i n t h i s a r e a , see Robert J e r v i s , P e r c e p t i o n and M i s p e r c e p t i o n i n I n t e r n a t i o n a l P o l i t i c s ( P r i n c e t o n , N.J.: P r i n c e t o n U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s , 1976).  2.  Stephen P. G i b e r t , e t a l . , S o v i e t Images of America (New York: Crane Russak & Co., I n c . , 1977); Morton Schwartz, S o v i e t P e r c e p t i o n s o f the U n i t e d S t a t e s (Berkeley, C a l i f . : U n i v e r s i t y o f C a l i f o r n i a P r e s s , 1978); R. Judson M i t c h e l l , I d e o l o g y of a Superpower: Contemporary S o v i e t D o c t r i n e on I n t e r n a t i o n a l R e l a t i o n s ( S t a n f o r d , C a l i f . : Hoover I n s t i t u t e P r e s s , 1982); John L e n c z o w s k i , S o v i e t P e r c e p t i o n s of U.S. F o r e i g n P o l i c y ( I t h a c a , N.Y.: Cornell U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s , 1982).  3.  W i l l i a m Zimmerman, S o v i e t P e r s p e c t i v e s on I n t e r n a t i o n a l Relations: 1956-1968 ( P r i n c e t o n , N.J.: Princeton U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s , 1969).  4.  W i l l i a m E. C o n n o l l y , " E s s e n t i a l l y C o n t e s t e d Concepts i n P o l i t i c s , " i n W. E. C o n n o l l y , ed. The Terms o f P o l i t i c a l D i s c o u r s e ( L e x i n g t o n , Mass.: D.C. Heath and Co., 1976), p. 36. Emphasis i n o r i g i n a l .  5.  O t t o Kuusinen, ed. Fundamentals o f Marxism-Leninism (London: Lawrence and W i s h a r t , 1961), p. 166.  6.  G e n r i k h Trofimenko, " C h a l l e n g e s t o G l o b a l S t a b i l i t y i n the 1980s: A S o v i e t View," i n Adam M. G a r f i n k l e , ed. G l o b a l P e r s p e c t i v e s on Arms C o n t r o l (New York: P r a e g e r , 1984), p. 33. For a c r i t i q u e of the n o t i o n o f change i n Western i n t e r n a t i o n a l r e l a t i o n s l i t e r a t u r e , see B a r r y Buzan and R. J . B a r r y Jones, eds. Change and the Study o f I n t e r n a t i o n a l R e l a t i o n s : The Evaded Dimension (London: F r a n c e s P i n t e r , 1 9 8 1 ) .  7.  N. Inozemtsev, "Problemy sovremennogo mirovogo r a z v i t i i a i mezhdunarodnykh o t n o s h e n i i " [Problems of Modern World Development and I n t e r n a t i o n a l R e l a t i o n s ] , Kommunist (15), October 1976, p. 78.  8.  Raymond L . G a r t h o f f , "The Concept o f the Balance of Power i n S o v i e t P o l i c y - M a k i n g , " IV World P o l i t i c s 1, October 1951, p. 94.  9.  For a d e t a i l e d e x p o s i t i o n o f these terms, see pp. 86-90.  20  ibid.,  T h i s does n o t imply, however, t h a t no d i f f e r e n c e s e x i s t beneath the s u r f a c e among members o f the top p o l i t i c a l leadership c i r c l e . E s p e c i a l l y d u r i n g the Khrushchev e r a , o p p o s i t i o n t o the F i r s t S e c r e t a r y ' s s t y l e and method o f c o n d u c t i n g f o r e i g n p o l i c y o f t e n gave r i s e t o debates o f v a r y i n g i n t e n s i t y w i t h i n the Presidium. Where such d i f f e r e n c e s o f o p i n i o n impinged on the S o v i e t a t t i t u d e toward the c o r r e l a t i o n o f f o r c e s , they w i l l be e x p l o r e d . Seweryn B i a l e r , S t a l i n ' s S u c c e s s o r s ; Leadership, S t a b i l i t y and Change i n the S o v i e t Union (Cambridge: Cambridge U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s , 1980), pp. 166-167.  CHAPTER I I LENINIST AND STALINIST WORLD VIEWS  In November 1917, the B o l s h e v i k s s e i z e d power i n R u s s i a , e s t a b l i s h e d the f i r s t  socialist  t h e i r o f f i c i a l credo.  s t a t e , and adopted M a r x i s t d o c t r i n e as  The l e a d e r s o f the young S o v i e t s t a t e c o u l d n o t ,  however, t u r n t o Marx f o r answers t o v e x i n g p o l i c y problems. v a s t corpus  I n the  o f h i s w r i t i n g s , Marx d i d n o t bequeath a w e l l - e l a b o r a t e d  theory of i n t e r n a t i o n a l  relations.  Marx was more concerned  w i t h examining a s o c i e t y ' s i n t e r n a l  economic s t r u c t u r e and e n u n c i a t i n g laws o f h i s t o r i c a l development. Kubalkova and Cruickshank  As  have p o i n t e d out, the h o r i z o n t a l d i v i s i o n o f  s o c i e t y i n t o s t a t e s was, f o r Marx, merely an "epiphenomenon" o f v e r t i c a l class divisions.*  The European s t a t e - s y s t e m was thought  by him t o be a  t r a n s i t o r y s o c i a l stage brought i n t o e x i s t e n c e by the dominant class i n capitalist  society.  In h i s v i s i o n of a c l a s s l e s s  bourgeois  communist  world where the s t a t e would "wither away," f o r e i g n p o l i c y concerns have seemed extraneous  at best.  C l a s s , r a t h e r than n a t i o n - s t a t e , formed  the fundamental u n i t o f M a r x i s t a n a l y s i s .  Based upon i n e x o r a b l e laws o f  c l a s s s t r u g g l e , Marx p r e d i c t e d the e v e n t u a l replacement w i t h the h i g h e r s o c i a l i s t  must  of capitalism  order.  World War I , however, d i d n o t prove t o be the h a r b i n g e r o f socialist  r e v o l u t i o n s i n the advanced c a p i t a l i s t c o u n t r i e s o f Europe.  When events  i n Twentieth  Century  Europe f a i l e d t o u n f o l d a c c o r d i n g t o  the M a r x i a n p r o g n o s t i c schema, L e n i n i n h i s 1916 work, I m p e r i a l i s m , the Highest  Stage o f C a p i t a l i s m , undertook t o r e v i s e t h e o r y t o make i t  accord with i n t e r n a t i o n a l r e a l i t y .  I m p e r i a l i s m , argued L e n i n , was  22  c a p i t a l i s m In i t s most advanced m a n i f e s t a t i o n . in imperialist  c o u n t r i e s , motivated  outward expansion countries.  Monopolistic  by the p r o f i t  impulse, would seek  and export c a p i t a l to backward or  In the course  "oppressed"  of t h e i r o p e r a t i o n s i n the undeveloped  these commercial groups would draw upon the support home governments.  In t h i s way,  c o l o n i e s around the w o r l d .  areas,  of t h e i r r e s p e c t i v e  the c a p i t a l i s t powers would a c q u i r e  T h i s e x p a n s i o n i s t impetus would, i n t u r n ,  c r e a t e c o n f l i c t between i m p e r i a l i s t to war.  groupings  s t a t e s which would e v e n t u a l l y l e a d  From such r e a s o n i n g stemmed the L e n i n i s t t h e s i s of  the  i n e v i t a b i l i t y of wars among c a p i t a l i s t c o u n t r i e s . The  proletariat  i n these advanced i n d u s t r i a l c o u n t r i e s , s a t i s f i e d  w i t h the economic g a i n s passed d i v e r t e d from p e r f o r m i n g  down to them by the c a p i t a l i s t s , would  be  t h e i r h i s t o r i c m i s s i o n even when c o n d i t i o n s  would be r i p e f o r r e v o l u t i o n .  T h i s , L e n i n concluded,  the f a i l u r e of the F i r s t World War  (which was  was  the r e a s o n f o r  an " i m p e r i a l i s t " war)  to  spawn r e v o l u t i o n a r y movements i n the advanced European c o u n t r i e s . L e n i n ' s a n a l y s i s of c a p i t a l i s m ' s " i m p e r i a l i s t  stage" provided  backdrop f o r h i s p o s t u l a t i o n t h a t r e v o l u t i o n would occur i n a which r e p r e s e n t e d  the "weakest l i n k o f the c h a i n . "  the  country  In one b o l d s t r o k e ,  then, L e n i n a d j u s t e d M a r x i s t t h e o r y , w i t h i t s emphasis upon v e r t i c a l c l a s s d i v i s i o n s w i t h i n i n d u s t r i a l s o c i e t i e s , to a c c o r d w i t h the of the h o r i z o n t a l d i v i s i o n o f s o c i e t y i n t o In e f f e c t , L e n i n saw oppressed  nations.  The  states.  advanced i n d u s t r i a l s t a t e s p i t t e d a g a i n s t  l i n e s of b a t t l e were now  re-drawn to f o c u s  p r i m a r i l y on c o m p e t i t i o n a t the i n t e r n a t i o n a l l e v e l . Cruickshank  reality  Kubalkova and  e x p l a i n the L e n i n i s t r e f o r m u l a t i o n of M a r x i s t thought  The v e r t i c a l and h o r i z o n t a l d i v i s i o n s were now seen to i n t e r m i n g l e i n a h i t h e r t o unprecedented manner. J u s t as  23  the  thus:  . b o u r g e o i s i e o v e r f l o w s the h o r i z o n t a l b o u n d a r i e s of i t s own s t a t e and becomes an i m p e r i a l i s t c l a s s spread over a l l the g l o b e , so the working c l a s s i s s u b j e c t e d to a s i m i l a r process. . . . No l o n g e r do the c l a s s e s w i t h i n s t a t e s , but s t a t e s (the backward ones) themselves, assume c l a s s c o n s c i o u s n e s s , now on a w o r l d s c a l e . ... Thus, w h i l e L e n i n d i d not  a t any  c o n f l i c t within  s t a t e s , he  this struggle.  A c c o r d i n g to L e n i n i s t  revolution forces  a s t a t e but  T h i s b r i n g s us  present chapter: the  global  Soviet  a l s o on  the  then, the  international  to a d i s c u s s i o n  c o r r e l a t i o n and  foreign-policy  of the  and  S t a l i n on  the  L e n i n , as  concept of the  decision-making.  THE  f o r h i s s u c c e s s o r s i n the  and  guide p o l i c y ;  external  and  understand the (3)  domestic.  revolution  and  and  on  to i t i n  speeches of  shall  Lenin  FORCES  Soviet  leadership,  situation;  legitimize policy  the  functions.  c o r r e l a t i o n c o u l d be  international  to j u s t i f y and  (2)  used: to  orient  decisions—both  A l l of these purposes were i n e x t r i c a b l y bound  t o g e t h e r i n L e n i n ' s e x p o s i t i o n s on g o a l s of S o v i e t  the  t h i s purpose, we  s e r v e d t h r e e major  Arguments based upon an assessment o f the to a n a l y z e and  of  theme of  role ascribed  For  CORRELATION OF  c o r r e l a t i o n of f o r c e s  (1)  class  S t a l i n i s t pronouncements  to a s s e s s the  a  subject.  LENIN ON  For  s u c c e s s of  correlation  central  undertake a b r i e f t o u r d ' h o r i z o n o f the w r i t i n g s and  class  i n t e r - s t a t e dimensions of  thinking,  to examine L e n i n i s t  concept of the  early  the  Importance of  depended not merely on a f a v o r a b l e c o r r e l a t i o n of  within  forces.  stressed  time deny the  the  international  c l i m a t e and  p o l i c y d u r i n g the months p r e c e d i n g the the y e a r s f o l l o w i n g  the  Russia.  24  the  Bolshevik  establishment of Soviet  power i n  L e n i n f r e q u e n t l y underscored at a " s t r i c t l y  the need f o r every M a r x i s t to a r r i v e  exact and o b j e c t i v e l y v e r i f i a b l e a n a l y s i s of the  r e l a t i o n s of c l a s s e s [ s o o t n o s h e n i i a k l a s s o v ] and  of the  concrete  3 f e a t u r e s p e c u l i a r to each h i s t o r i c a l s i t u a t i o n , " " B o l s h e v i k s have always t r i e d  and argued t h a t  to meet t h i s requirement  which i s  4 a b s o l u t e l y e s s e n t i a l f o r g i v i n g a s c i e n t i f i c f o u n d a t i o n to p o l i c y . " d i d n o t , however, d e t a i l the c r i t e r i a f o r e s t i m a t i n g the Most of L e n i n ' s arguments i n support be pursued  by the B o l s h e v i k s tended  c o r r e l a t i o n of c l a s s f o r c e s .  correlation.  of o r a g a i n s t the p o l i c i e s  to be based upon h i s r e a d i n g of  to the  In order to p r o v i d e a framework f o r our  a n a l y s i s of L e n i n i s t  t h i n k i n g on t h i s s u b j e c t , we  themes:  adduced by L e n i n to e x p l a i n the s u c c e s s of  the reasons  He  s h a l l f o c u s on  three the  B o l s h e v i k r e v o l u t i o n ; h i s arguments i n f a v o r of the B r e s t - L i t o v s k t r e a t y ; and  f i n a l l y h i s i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s of the p e r i o d of C i v i l War  and  foreign intervention. According  to L e n i n , s o c i a l i s t r e v o l u t i o n i n R u s s i a owed i t s v i c t o r y  to a unique c o n c a t e n a t i o n o f domestic The  and  international  circumstances.  f a v o r a b l e c o r r e l a t i o n of c l a s s f o r c e s w i t h i n the c o u n t r y ,  through  an a l l i a n c e of the p r o l e t a r i a t and  p o s s i b l e the r o u t of the c a p i t a l i s t  class.  i n t e r n a t i o n a l c o r r e l a t i o n of f o r c e s ?  the p e a s a n t r y , had made But what of  R u s s i a was  The  the  a m i l i t a r i l y weak and  e c o n o m i c a l l y backward n a t i o n compared w i t h the p o w e r f u l countries.  achieved  "imperialist"  p r o l e t a r i a n r e v o l u t i o n i n R u s s i a , L e n i n knew, c o u l d not  have s u r v i v e d c o n c e r t e d o p p o s i t i o n from the advanced c a p i t a l i s t The  success o f the r e v o l u t i o n , then, was  states.  made p o s s i b l e o n l y because  the c o u n t r i e s r e p r e s e n t i n g " i n t e r n a t i o n a l i m p e r i a l i s m " were l o c k e d " i n a m o r t a l s t r u g g l e w i t h each o t h e r , were p a r a l y s e d i n t h e i r o f f e n s i v e  25  against Russia." imperialism,"  Revolutionary  and  R u s s i a was  events o c c u r r e d  "temporarily  " i n d e p e n d e n t l y of world  independent of i n t e r n a t i o n a l  relations."*' The  existence  of a p r o p i t i o u s c o n f i g u r a t i o n of i n t e r n a l and  external f a c t o r s — t h e favorable  domestic c l a s s c o r r e l a t i o n coupled w i t h  the temporary impotence of a p o w e r f u l i n t e r n a t i o n a l  bourgeoisie—not  o n l y made p o s s i b l e , but mandated r e v o l u t i o n a r y advance. during  a p e r i o d when the  unfavorable,  Likewise,  i n t e r n a t i o n a l c o r r e l a t i o n of forces  r e t r e a t was  permissible.  This represented  L e n i n i s t argument i n f a v o r of the B r e s t - L i t o v s k  treaty.  was  the crux of In the  the  early  days of S o v i e t power, the l e a d e r s of the USSR were a b l e to acknowledge candidly  the weakness of t h e i r c o u n t r y — b o t h m i l i t a r i l y  economically—vis-a-vis  the c o u n t r i e s of Europe.^  the view t h a t h i s t o r y was eventually  replace  on t h e i r s i d e and  But  and they a l s o h e l d  t h a t s o c i a l i s m would  c a p i t a l i s m on a g l o b a l s c a l e .  In other words, w h i l e  the c o r r e l a t i o n of w o r l d f o r c e s at t h a t p a r t i c u l a r h i s t o r i c a l did  not  f a v o r the  were r e g a r d e d as  Soviet r e p u b l i c , i t s s o c i a l i s t  t r e n d and d i r e c t i o n  indisputable.  Indeed, L e n i n  i n 1917  and  1918  appeared to b e l i e v e t h a t  r e v o l u t i o n i n the advanced European c o u n t r i e s was 1918,  he wrote, ".  . .we,  have the honour of b e i n g revolution.  juncture  . . . The  the R u s s i a n working and the vanguard of the  R u s s i a n began i t — t h e  imminent.  a In e a r l y  exploited classes,  international socialist German, the Frenchman  and g  the Englishman w i l l f i n i s h his  i t , and  s o c i a l i s m w i l l be v i c t o r i o u s . "  t h e s e s on the B r e s t - L i t o v s k peace, he r e i t e r a t e d , "That  socialist doubt.  In  the  r e v o l u t i o n i n Europe must come, and w i l l come, i s beyond  A l l our hopes f o r the f i n a l v i c t o r y of s o c i a l i s m are founded  26  on  t h i s c e r t a i n t y and on t h i s s c i e n t i f i c Lenin's expectation  prognosis."  t h a t the c o u n t r i e s o f Europe were on the verge  of a s o c i a l i s t r e v o l u t i o n and h i s b e l i e f  that Russia  needed a  s p a c e " l e d him t o argue i n f a v o r o f s i g n i n g the B r e s t - L i t o v s k The  "breathing Treaty.  c o r r e l a t i o n o f c l a s s f o r c e s on the domestic and the i n t e r n a t i o n a l  l e v e l would n o t , he a s s e r t e d ,  a l l o w f o r R u s s i a ' s continued p a r t i c i p a t i o n  i n the war, even i n the form o f a " r e v o l u t i o n a r y war."*^ On the domestic f r o n t , the poor peasants i n R u s s i a , "are not capable o f a g r e e i n g To  ignore  s i l ] on t h i s i s s u e would be a f a t a l e r r o r . " * * arena as w e l l , the R u s s i a n s , L e n i n  [sootnoshenie k l a s s o v y k h In the i n t e r n a t i o n a l  s a i d , would "have t o r e t r e a t  f o r c e s t h a t a r e immeasurably g r e a t e r  than o u r s , b e f o r e  and f i n a n c e  t h a t the e n t i r e b o u r g e o i s i e  reasoned,  t o f i g h t a s e r i o u s r e v o l u t i o n a r y war. . . .  the o b j e c t i v e b a l a n c e o f c l a s s f o r c e s  international imperialism  Lenin  c a p i t a l , before  before  the f o r c e s o f the m i l i t a r y might  w i t h t h e i r modern weapons have mustered  ..12 against  us. . . .  A p o l i c y o f r e v o l u t i o n a r y war would " t o t a l l y d i s r e g a r d the o b j e c t i v e b a l a n c e o f c l a s s f o r c e s and m a t e r i a l f a c t o r s a t the p r e s e n t 13 stage o f t h e s o c i a l i s t r e v o l u t i o n . "  Neither  c l a s s support nor  m i l i t a r y and economic might were on the s i d e o f the S o v i e t R e p u b l i c Lenin  staunchly  advocated a " h e r o i c r e t r e a t " w h i l e the S o v i e t  and  Republic  would "wait u n t i l the i n t e r n a t i o n a l s o c i a l i s t p r o l e t a r i a t " came t o I t s aid.  Then, L e n i n p r e d i c t e d , a second s o c i a l i s t r e v o l u t i o n would b e g i n 14  which would be "world-wide i n scope." The  European r e v o l u t i o n d i d not m a t e r i a l i z e * " * and as time wore on,  the S o v i e t R e p u b l i c intervention.  was f a c e d both w i t h c i v i l war and f o r e i g n  The Red Army t h e r e f o r e had t o be o r g a n i z e d 27  to r e p e l  attacks against  the S o v i e t R e p u b l i c .  charge t h a t the B o l s h e v i k s socialism, j u s t i f i e d  had  L e n i n , r e s p o n d i n g to Kautsky's  introduced  m i l i t a r i s m i n s t e a d of  the a c t i o n , d e c l a r i n g :  We are l i v i n g not merely i n a s t a t e , but i n a system of s t a t e s , and i t i s i n c o n c e i v a b l e f o r the S o v i e t R e p u b l i c to e x i s t a l o n g s i d e of the i m p e r i a l i s t s t a t e s f o r any l e n g t h of time. One or the o t h e r must triumph i n the end. And b e f o r e t h a t end comes t h e r e w i l l have to be a s e r i e s of f r i g h t f u l c o l l i s i o n s between the S o v i e t R e p u b l i c and the b o u r g e o i s states. I f the r u l i n g c l a s s , the p r o l e t a r i a t , wants t o h o l d power, i t must, therefore, prove i t s a b i l i t y to do so by i t s m i l i t a r y organization. To  t h i s statement of L e n i n  s o c i a l i s m and The  capitalism traces i t s roots.  question  of m i l i t a r y o r g a n i z a t i o n , L e n i n e x p l a i n e d ,  e x i s t f o r Marx and subject.*^  the n o t i o n of an i n e v i t a b l e c l a s h between  n e i t h e r he nor E n g e l s expressed an o p i n i o n on  Lenin's  when R u s s i a was  d i d not  reasoning  seems to have gone t h u s :  weak, the s o c i a l i s t  the p r o l e t a r i a t was  During a period  r e v o l u t i o n succeeded o n l y because  a b l e to c a p i t a l i z e on the c o n t r a d i c t i o n s of  c a p i t a l i s m which had  l e d to an i m p e r i a l i s t war  countries.  tacit  With the  support  between advanced European  o f the i n t e r n a t i o n a l p r o l e t a r i a t  the f a v o r a b l e domestic c o r r e l a t i o n of c l a s s f o r c e s , R u s s i a was transform  this  the b o u r g e o i s r e v o l u t i o n i n t o a s o c i a l i s t  i n t e r n a t i o n a l m i l i t a r y and  economic c o r r e l a t i o n was  one,  able  and to  even when the  c l e a r l y to  the  Russian disadvantage. L e n i n b e l i e v e d , however, t h a t f o r the s o c i a l i s t the next " i n e v i t a b l e " i m p e r i a l i s t a t t a c k and i m p e r i a l i s m , R u s s i a would have to b u i l d up  c i v i l war  the d e f e a t  i n order  of Germany, had  to r e s t o r e the e a s t e r n  28  to s u r v i v e i n a sea  i t s m i l i t a r y and  s t r e n g t h w h i l e maneuvering around c a p i t a l i s t leaders, before  i s l a n d t o ward o f f  contradictions.  intervened front.  i n the  T h i s armed  of  economic The  Allied  Russian  i n t e r v e n t i o n , though, c o n t i n u e d to c o n f i r m  the L e n i n i s t  In l a t e  1919,  even a f t e r the end  o f the war,  appearing  prognosis.  when f o r e i g n i n t e r v e n t i o n e f f o r t s were f a l t e r i n g ,  L e n i n expressed some i n c r e d u l i t y at the f a c t t h a t s o c i a l i s m m a i n t a i n e d i t s foothold i n Russia  i n the f a c e of i m p e r i a l i s t r e s i s t a n c e :  From the p o i n t of view of a m i l i t a r y assessment of these f o r c e s , i t r e a l l y i s a m i r a c l e because the Entente was an^ c o n t i n u e s to be immeasurably s t r o n g e r than we a r e . ... L e n i n a g a i n r e s o r t e d to the n o t i o n of c l a s s f o r c e s to e x p l a i n "miracle."  The  R u s s i a n v i c t o r y "was  this  not r e a l l y a m i l i t a r y v i c t o r y at  19 all."  " I t was  apparent," Lenin s a i d , " . . .  t h a t i n the sphere where  the g r o s s e s t m a t e r i a l f a c t o r s p l a y the g r e a t e s t p a r t , namely, i n the m i l i t a r y sphere, we  the workers and By  defeated  the Entente c o u n t r i e s by d e p r i v i n g them of 20  peasants i n s o l d i e r s ' u n i f o r m s . "  the f a l l  of 1920,  Russia  enjoyed peace, and  i n November  L e n i n expressed s a t i s f a c t i o n t h a t even though the world r e v o l u t i o n had  been d e l a y e d ,  p r o l e t a r i a n r u l e and returned  to the  "the p o s s i b i l i t y  the S o v i e t r e p u b l i c " had  theme of s o c i a l i s t R u s s i a ' s  ...  1920,  socialist  of the e x i s t e n c e 21  been m a i n t a i n e d .  He  v i c t o r y i n s p i t e of i t s  m i l i t a r y weakness: . . . [T]here can be no q u e s t i o n of comparing the m i l i t a r y s t r e n g t h of the R.S.F.S.R. w i t h t h a t of a l l the c a p i t a l i s t powers. In t h i s r e s p e c t we are incomparably weaker than they a r e , y e t , a f t e r t h r e e y e a r s of war, we have f o r c e d almost a l l of these s t a t e s to abandon the i d e a of f u r t h e r i n t e r v e n t i o n . . . . That has been, not because we have proved m i l i t a r i l y s t r o n g e r and the Entente weaker, but because throughout t h i s p e r i o d the d i s i n t e g r a t i o n i n the E n t e n t e c o u n t r i e s has i n t e n s i f i e d . . . . The workers and peasantS2f)f the c a p i t a l i s t c o u n t r i e s c o u l d not be f o r c e d to f i g h t us. T h i s stalemate, L e n i n argued, won R u s s i a the r i g h t to a "fundamental i n t e r n a t i o n a l e x i s t e n c e  i n the network of  capitalist  23 states,"  and  allowed  "not m e r e l y " f o r "a b r e a t h i n g 29  space, but  for a  of  r e a l chance o f a new and l e n g t h y p e r i o d o f development." Marx's emphasis on v e r t i c a l c l a s s d i v i s i o n s was n o t so much r e p u d i a t e d as t e m p o r a r i l y s i d e - s t e p p e d . albeit  S o c i a l i s t Russia's  t e n t a t i v e , i n t o the i n t e r n a t i o n a l community was, i n L e n i n i s t  t h i n k i n g , a s t e p i n the p o s i t i v e d i r e c t i o n : country  acceptance,  "The e n t r y o f the s o c i a l i s t  i n t o t r a d e r e l a t i o n s w i t h c a p i t a l i s t c o u n t r i e s i s a most  important  f a c t o r e n s u r i n g our e x i s t e n c e i n such a complex and a b s o l u t e l y 25  exceptional situation.  . . . "  L e n i n n e v e r t h e l e s s i n s i s t e d t h a t a b s o l u t e s e c u r i t y f o r the p r o l e t a r i a n r e v o l u t i o n i n R u s s i a would come o n l y w i t h world r e v o l u t i o n , when presumably the h o r i z o n t a l o r d e r i n g o f s o c i e t y i n t o s t a t e s would g i v e way t o a w o r l d with c a p i t a l i s t  s o c i e t y governed by the p r o l e t a r i a t .  c o u n t r i e s would r e c u r .  Meanwhile, war  I n December 1920, L e n i n s t a t e d :  I s a i d t h a t we had passed from war t o peace, but t h a t we had not f o r g o t t e n t h a t war w i l l r e t u r n . While c a p i t a l i s m and s o c i a l i s m e x i s t s i d e by s i d e , they cannot l i v e I n peace: one or the o t h e r w i l l u l t i m a t e l y t r i u m p h — t h e l a s t obsequies w i l l be o b s e r v e d 2 g i t h e r f o r the S o v i e t R e p u b l i c o r f o r w o r l d capitalism. For the moment, however, t h e r e was a "balance  based on c a p i t a l i s m . "  C a p i t a l i s m was s t r o n g e r and t h e r e f o r e , the " p r a c t i c a l t a s k o f communist p o l i c y " was " t o take advantage o f t h i s c a p i t a l i s t h o s t i l i t y and t o p l a y 27 one  s i d e o f f a g a i n s t the o t h e r , " w h i l e R u s s i a mustered i t s f o r c e s .  As  time wore on, L e n i n ' s c o n v i c t i o n o f an impending r e v o l u t i o n i n Europe weakened.  The l e a d e r s o f the S o v i e t R e p u b l i c  thus s e t about the t a s k of  conducting  i n t e r n a t i o n a l r e l a t i o n s w i t h i n the framework o f the s t a t e  system. L e n i n never gave up h i s b e l i e f t h a t the f i n a l v i c t o r y o f s o c i a l i s m c o u l d o n l y be ensured  by the breakdown o f the c a p i t a l i s t  system i n t h e  "advanced" s t a t e s and i t s replacement by p r o l e t a r i a n r u l e l e d by a 30  vanguard communist p a r t y .  Thus, i n December 1921, a f t e r a whole year o f  peace, L e n i n found i t hard  t o e x p l a i n how i t was p o s s i b l e f o r " o n l y one  Socialist  S o v i e t R e p u b l i c " t o e x i s t "surrounded by a whole a r r a y o f 28  f r e n z i e d l y h o s t i l e i m p e r i a l i s t powers."  His explanation, predictably,  r e v o l v e d around the i d e a o f the i n t e r n a t i o n a l s o l i d a r i t y o f the working class: I t turned out t h a t a l t h o u g h the support o f the working people o f the world was n o t the s w i f t and d i r e c t support t h a t we had counted on, we d i d r e c e i v e c o n s i d e r a b l e support o f another k i n d , not a d i r e c t support, not a s w i f t s u p p o r t . . . . No m a t t e r how p r e c a r i o u s t h i s support may be, as l o n g as c a p i t a l i s m e x i s t s i n other c o u n t r i e s .we may say t h a t t h i s support can a l r e a d y be r e l i e d on. Peace had l e d t o "an u n s t a b l e , extent,  i n e x p l i c a b l e , and y e t t o a c e r t a i n  30 indisputable equilibrium."  Lenin  reiterated:  M a t e r i a l l y — e c o n o m i c a l l y and m i l i t a r i l y — w e a r e extremely weak; but m o r a l l y — b y which . . . I mean not a b s t r a c t m o r a l s , but the alignment o f the r e a l f o r c e s o f a l l c l a s s e s i n a l l c o u n t r i e s — w e a r e ^he s t r o n g e s t o f a l l . T h i s has been proved by p r a c t i c e . . . . Thus, w h i l e  t h e r e was c l e a r l y a d i s e q u i l i b r i u m i n the m i l i t a r y and  economic sense, L e n i n d e c l a r e d t h a t from the " p o l i t i c a l e q u i l i b r i u m o f f o r c e s had s e t i n "between b o u r g e o i s  s t a n d p o i n t " an  s o c i e t y , the  i n t e r n a t i o n a l b o u r g e o i s i e as a whole, and S o v i e t R u s s i a . "  This  e q u i l i b r i u m o n l y r e l a t e d t o the Immediate " m i l i t a r y s t r u g g l e " which had t e m p o r a r i l y ceased.  L e n i n emphasized t h a t i t was " o n l y a r e l a t i v e  e q u i l i b r i u m and a v e r y u n s t a b l e c a p i t a l i s m would never s u r r e n d e r  one," because the o l d world of voluntarily,  32  and t h a t i n t e r v e n t i o n  33 was o n l y a " h a i r ' s b r e a d t h  away."  There was much i m p r o v i s a t i o n i n L e n i n ' s use and a p p l i c a t i o n o f the i d e a o f the c o r r e l a t i o n o f f o r c e s . of i n t e r n a t i o n a l l i f e  The march o f events and the r e a l i t y  gave b o t h shape and content  31  to Lenin's  expositions  on  t h i s theme.  explain within existence  In the end,  L e n i n was  the M a r x i s t  forced  framework, the r e a l i t y o f the  of a s i n g l e s o c i a l i s t  s t a t e i n s p i t e of the  i n t e r n a t i o n a l r e v o l u t i o n to m a t e r i a l i z e . Communist P a r t y  in July  to accept and  1921,  Lenin  In a r e p o r t  attempt  to  continued  f a i l u r e of to the  the  Russian  stated:  B e f o r e the r e v o l u t i o n , and even a f t e r i t , we thought: either r e v o l u t i o n b r e a k s out i n o t h e r c o u n t r i e s , i n the c a p i t a l i s t i c a l l y more developed c o u n t r i e s , immediately, or at l e a s t v e r y q u i c k l y or we must p e r i s h . . . . A c t u a l l y , however, events d i d not proceed a l o n g as s t r a i g h t a l i n e as we had expected. In the o t h e r b i g , c a p i t a l i s t i c a l l y more developed c o u n t r i e s the r e v o l u t i o n has not broken out to t h i s day. True, we can say w i t h s a t i s f a c t i o n t h a t the r e v o l u t i o n i s d e v e l o p i n g a l l over the w o r l d , and i t i s o n l y thanks to t h i s t h a t the i n t e r n a t i o n a l b o u r g e o i s i e i s unable to s t r a n g l e us, i n s p i t e of the f a c t t h a t m i l i t a r i l y and ^ e c o n o m i c a l l y , i t i s a hundred times s t r o n g e r than we a r e . T h i s , however, c o n s t i t u t e d a v e r y f e e b l e e f f o r t a t e x p l a i n i n g c i r c u m s t a n c e t h a t seemed e x t r a o r d i n a r y Witness h i s o f t - e x p r e s s e d  to L e n i n  a  even as i t e x i s t e d .  i n c r e d u l i t y i n such statements  as:  But i s the e x i s t e n c e of a s o c i a l i s t r e p u b l i c i n a c a p i t a l i s t environment at a l l c o n c e i v a b l e ? I t seemed i n c o n c e i v a b l e from the p o l i t i c a l and m i l i t a r y a s p e c t s . That i t i s p o s s i b l e b o t h p o l i t i c a l l y and m i l i t a r i l y has now been proved; i t i s a fact. I t was  left  to S t a l i n , who  integrate doctrine with  reality.  THE  The  leaders  took on L e n i n ' s mantle, to endeavor to  STALINIST PERSPECTIVE  pf the young S o v i e t R e p u b l i c had  t h e r e were i n h e r e n t  quickly r e a l i z e d that  problems i n a t t e m p t i n g to c o o r d i n a t e  i n t e r e s t s of s t a t e and  i n t e r e s t s of world r e v o l u t i o n .  The  i n c o m p a t i b i l i t y between these g o a l s became c l e a r i n the experience.  The  i n c o n s i s t e n t p o l i c i e s pursued i n the  32  simultaneously  c r u c i b l e of  e a r l y 1920s by  the  S o v i e t government and quashing by  the Comintern, f o r i n s t a n c e , r e s u l t e d i n the  the German government of the Comintern-sponsored  1923  u p r i s i n g i n Hamburg w i t h arms s u p p l i e d to the German m i l i t a r y by the  Red  Army. As p r o s p e c t s  of a world r e v o l u t i o n grew dimmer over the y e a r s ,  S o v i e t l e a d e r s h i p under S t a l i n s u b o r d i n a t e d to the  i n t e r e s t s of the  Soviet state.  The  merely postponed to an i n d e f i n i t e f u t u r e . s o c i a l i s m would e v e n t u a l l y r e p l a c e Bolsheviks.  L e n i n had  the  the g o a l o f w o r l d r e v o l u t i o n former aim was The  Marxist  never  shelved,  conviction  that  c a p i t a l i s m ran deep among the  e s t i m a t e d the o u t l o o k f o r w o r l d r e v o l u t i o n i n  terms o f weeks, then months, and  then y e a r s .  By  1925,  Stalin  could  assume t h a t "the v i c t o r y of s o c i a l i s m i n the advanced c o u n t r i e s .  . ."  36 c o u l d be  " d e l a y e d f o r another ten or twenty  T h i s premise of a l o n g - d e l a y e d the de  facto existence  revolutionary process,  of a s i n g l e s o c i a l i s t  midst of a h o s t i l e c a p i t a l i s t r i n g , p r o v i d e d t h e s i s of " s o c i a l i s m i n one  country."  i n 1923,  coupled with  s t a t e s u r v i v i n g i n the the b a s i s f o r the  Doctrine  to take account of i n t e r n a t i o n a l r e a l i t i e s . Lenin  years."  was  once a g a i n  Stalinist adjusted  In a statement made by  S t a l i n found t h e o r e t i c a l j u s t i f i c a t i o n — a l b e i t  w i t h some e f f o r t — f o r  h i s argument t h a t the  alone w i t h o u t immediate h e l p  S o v i e t r e p u b l i c c o u l d go i t  from the w o r l d p r o l e t a r i a t .  L e n i n had  remarked: . . . the power of s t a t e over a l l l a r g e - s c a l e means of p r o d u c t i o n , the power of s t a t e i n the hands of the p r o l e t a r i a t , the a l l i a n c e of the p r o l e t a r i a t w i t h the m i l l i o n s o f s m a l l and v e r y s m a l l p e a s a n t s , the a s s u r e d l e a d e r s h i p of the p e a s a n t r y by the p r o l e t a r i a t , e t c . — i s not t h i s a l l t h a t i s n e c e s s a r y i n order to b u i l d a complete s o c i a l i s t s o c i e t y from the c o o p e r a t i v e s . . . . Is t h i s not a l l t h a t i s n e c e s s a r y f o r the purpose of b u i l d i n g a complete s o c i a l i s t s o c i e t y ? T h i s i s not y e t the b u i l d i n g of s o c i a l i s t s o c i e t y , but ^t, i s a l l t h a t i s n e c e s s a r y and s u f f i c i e n t f o r t h i s b u i l d i n g .  33  then  Contrasting  h i s own  thesis with Trotsky's  r e v o l u t i o n , " S t a l i n argued t h a t the  n o t i o n of "permanent  l a t t e r i d e a was  "plainly  sinning 38  against  r e a l i t y " and  " S o c i a l i s m i n one of e x i s t e n t i a l  was  a d o c t r i n e of "permanent h o p e l e s s n e s s . "  c o u n t r y " was  no more than an o f f i c i a l acknowledgement  reality:  F o r m e r l y , the v i c t o r y of the r e v o l u t i o n i n one c o u n t r y was c o n s i d e r e d i m p o s s i b l e , on the assumption t h a t i t would r e q u i r e the combined a c t i o n of the p r o l e t a r i a n s o f a l l or a t l e a s t a m a j o r i t y of the advanced c o u n t r i e s to a c h i e v e v i c t o r y over the bourgeoisie. Now t h i s p o i n t of view no l o n g e r f i t s w i t h the facts. Now we must proceed from the p o s s i b i l i t y of such a v i c t o r y , f o r the uneven and spasmodic c h a r a c t e r of the development of the v a r i o u s c a p i t a l i s t c o u n t r i e s under the c o n d i t i o n s of i m p e r i a l i s m , the development, w i t h i n i m p e r i a l i s m of c a t a s t r o p h i c c o n t r a d i c t i o n s l e a d i n g to i n e v i t a b l e wars, the growth of the r e v o l u t i o n a r y movement i n a l l c o u n t r i e s of the w o r l d — a l l t h i s l e a d s , not o n l y to the p o s s i b i l i t y , but a l s o to the n e c e s s i t y o f t h j v i c t o r y of the p r o l e t a r i a t i n individual countries. While S t a l i n h e l d t h a t s o c i a l i s m i n one p o s s i b l e but  not  only  n e c e s s a r y , he argued t h a t the " f i n a l " v i c t o r y of s o c i a l i s m ,  by which he meant "the and  c o u n t r y was  hence a g a i n s t  f u l l guarantee a g a i n s t  restoration . . .  w i t h the support of i n t e r n a t i o n a l  c a p i t a l , " would be a s s u r e d o n l y w i t h "the the workers o f a l l c o u n t r i e s , and  attempts a t i n t e r v e n t i o n  support of our  revolution  by  s t i l l more, the v i c t o r y o f the workers 40  i n at l e a s t s e v e r a l c o u n t r i e s . " C a p i t a l i s t encirclement" " s o c i a l i s m i n one be  considered  ..." represented  country" doctrine:  The  a c o r o l l a r y theme to  v i c t o r y of s o c i a l i s m could  " f i n a l " as l o n g as c a p i t a l i s t  encirclement  of  the  socialist  camp, headed by  the  not  the  s o c i a l i s t s t a t e e x i s t e d . Meanwhile, "two camps" c o n f r o n t e d one i n the i n t e r n a t i o n a l arena, "the c a p i t a l i s t camp, headed by Anglo-American c a p i t a l and  the  another  Soviet  41 Union." and  The  capitalist  i d e a of the i n e v i t a b l e c l a s h between the s o c i a l i s t c o u n t r i e s r a n as a l e i t m o t i f i n S t a l i n i s t 34  thinking.  state  With S t a l i n ' s d o c t r i n a l m o d i f i c a t i o n s , Marxist-Leninist  the p r o c e s s of a l i g n i n g  t h e o r y w i t h the h o r i z o n t a l s t a t e - s t r u c t u r e  i n t e r n a t i o n a l s o c i e t y was  complete.  a p t l y noted, " . . .  the  but  a state  remaining s t i l l  Soviet  r a t h e r asymmetrical p l a c e  As Kubalkova and  of  Cruickshank have  s t a t e — a l l e g e d l y of a d i f f e r e n t nature  ( h o r i z o n t a l u n i t ) — a s s u m e d the d i s t i n c t  t h a t L e n i n had  e n v i s a g e d f o r the  and  Comintern,  42 namely, the e p i c e n t r e  of the  (vertical) class scale."  the Comintern became a mere a d j u n c t of the S o v i e t o r g a n i z a t i o n was  r e l a t i o n s with other  t h i s b r i e f background as our  attempt to t r a c e the S t a l i n i s t p e r s p e c t i v e between the  "two  i n 1943  the  the  states.  framework, we  shall  now  on the c o r r e l a t i o n o f  forces  camps."  In h i s r e p o r t announced  s t a t e and  Stalin,  d i s s o l v e d when i t proved to be a h i n d r a n c e to  normal conduct of d i p l o m a t i c Utilizing  Under  to the F o u r t e e n t h Congress i n December 1925,  Stalin  that  the d e c i s i v e f e a t u r e t h a t has a f f e c t e d a l l the events i n the sphere of f o r e i g n r e l a t i o n s d u r i n g t h i s p e r i o d , i s the f a c t t h a t a c e r t a i n temporary e q u i l i b r i u m o f f o r c e s has been e s t a b l i s h e d between our c o u n t r y . . . and the c o u n t r i e s of the c a p i t a l i s t w o r l d . . . . What we at one time r e g a r d e d as a b r i e f r e s p i t e a f t e r the war has become a whole p e r i o d of respite. Hence a c e r t a i n e q u i l i b r i u m of f o r c e s and a c e r t a i n p e r i o d of p e a c e f u l c o e x i s t e n c e between the b o u r g e o i s world and the p r o l e t a r i a n w o r l d . Lenin unstable"  i n 1921 one.  had  characterized  S t a l i n ' s view i n 1925  a l b e i t a temporary one, envisaged between the one  hand, and  the e q u i l i b r i u m as a  f o r no  Soviet  was  and  equilibrium,  s t a t e of permanent peace c o u l d  s t a t e and  the c a p i t a l i s t c o u n t r i e s  several factors—domestic  of a more s t a b l e  "highly  be  i n t e r n a t i o n a l p r o l e t a r i a t on on the o t h e r .  international—must  The  conjunction  have p r o v i d e d  the of  the  impetus f o r the S t a l i n i s t assessment of the i n t e r n a t i o n a l c o r r e l a t i o n of  35  forces.  On  the domestic f r o n t , S t a l i n was  " s o c i a l i s m i n one Trotsky's  theory  arguing  c o u n t r y " t h e s i s , even as he was of permanent r e v o l u t i o n .  the v i a b i l i t y of h i s vigorously  opposing  In such a s c e n a r i o , a b e n i g n  view of the contemporary i n t e r n a t i o n a l s i t u a t i o n would most c e r t a i n l y have b o l s t e r e d the S t a l i n i s t v i e w p o i n t .  Apart from s e l f - s e r v i n g  r e a s o n s , however, the r e v o l u t i o n a r y t i d e i n 1925  was  a t an ebb  and  the  n o t i o n of an e q u i l i b r i u m of f o r c e s h e l p e d to account f o r the waning of revolutionary  fervor.  This equilibrium, according  t o S t a l i n , was  brought about by  the  temporary s t a b i l i z a t i o n of c a p i t a l i s m a l o n g w i t h the s t a b i l i z a t i o n c o n s o l i d a t i o n of the S o v i e t system. between the two stability  camps i m p l i e d not  But  the e q u i l i b r i u m of  e q u a l i t y of' the two  coexistence.  Thus, e l a b o r a t i n g on t h i s theme i n an e a r l i e r address to the 1925,  forces  systems but  i n the form of a temporary phase of p e a c e f u l  P a r t y Congress i n May  and  Fourteenth  S t a l i n noted:  Why are there two s t a b i l i s a t i o n s , one p a r a l l e l w i t h the o t h e r ? . . . Because there i s no l o n g e r a s i n g l e , a l l - e m b r a c i n g c a p i t a l i s m i n the w o r l d . Because the world has s p l i t i n t o two camps. . . . Because the i n t e r n a t i o n a l s i t u a t i o n w i l l to an i n c r e a s i n g degree be determined by the r e l a t i o n of f o r c e s between these two camps. Thus, the c h a r a c t e r i s t i c f e a t u r e of the p r e s e n t s i t u a t i o n i s not o n l y t h a t c a p i t a l i s m and the S o v i e t system have become s t a b i l i s e d , but a l s o t h a t the f o r c e s of these two camps have reached a c e r t a i n temporary e q u i l i b r i u m , w i t h a s l i g h t advantage f o r c a p i t a l , and hence, a s l i g h t disadvantage f o r the r e v o l u t i o n a r y movement; f o r compared w i t h a r e v o l u t i o n a r y upsurge, the l u l l t h a t has now s e t i n i s undoubtedly a^ disadvantage f o r s o c i a l i s m , a l t h o u g h a temporary one. The  s t a b i l i s a t i o n of c a p i t a l i s m , S t a l i n observed, would  l e a d t o an a g g r a v a t i o n  of i t s c o n t r a d i c t i o n s even as i t  s t r e n g t h e n e d the c a p i t a l i s t forces s k i l l f u l l y  system.  addressed p e r s o n a l  eventually  temporarily  S t a l i n ' s view of the c o r r e l a t i o n of p o l i t i c a l considerations,  dynamics o f the i n t e r n a t i o n a l s i t u a t i o n , and  36  the " l u l l "  i n the  the  r e v o l u t i o n a r y movement. Only two y e a r s l a t e r , however, a t the F i f t e e n t h P a r t y 1927, and  S t a l i n declared  the s t a b i l i z a t i o n o f c a p i t a l i s m t o be a t an end  h i s emphasis changed from the themes o f p e a c e f u l  temporary s t a b i l i t y  Congress i n  t o the i d e a s o f c a p i t a l i s t  c o e x i s t e n c e and  encirclement  and the  i n e v i t a b i l i t y o f i m p e r i a l i s t wars, as w e l l as c l a s h e s between the S o v i e t s t a t e and i m p e r i a l i s m : Whereas a y e a r o r two ago i t was p o s s i b l e and n e c e s s a r y to speak o f a c e r t a i n e q u i l i b r i u m and " p e a c e f u l c o e x i s t e n c e " between the U.S.S.R. and the c a p i t a l i s t c o u n t r i e s , today we have every ground f o r b e l i e v i n g t h a t the p e r i o d o f " p e a c e f u l c o e x i s t e n c e " i s r e c e d i n g i n t o the p a s t , g i v i n g p l a c e t o a period of i m p e r i a l i s t assaults and^preparation f o r i n t e r v e n t i o n a g a i n s t the U.S.S.R. He a l s o observed t h a t the w o r l d was "on the eve o f a new r e v o l u t i o n a r y 46 upsurge."  I n these c o n d i t i o n s , the t a s k f o r the U.S.S.R., S t a l i n  s a i d , was " t o take i n t o account the c o n t r a d i c t i o n s i n the camp o f the imperialists,  t o postpone war by 'buying o f f the c a p i t a l i s t s and t o 47  take a l l measures t o m a i n t a i n p e a c e f u l  r e l a t i o n s . . . ."  This,  presumably, was the expedient course t o f o l l o w when the S o v i e t s t a t e was still  i n a p o s i t i o n o f m i l i t a r y and economic i n f e r i o r i t y v i s - a - v i s a  c a p i t a l i s t world i n which " p r o d u c t i o n  p r o g r e s s and p r o d u c t i o n  i s growing . . . t e c h n i c a l 48  p o t e n t i a l i t i e s a r e i n c r e a s i n g . . ."  i t s contradictions intensified.  even w h i l e  I n other words, the e x i s t i n g  c o r r e l a t i o n o f f o r c e s d i c t a t e d a p o l i c y o f maneuvering from the sidelines. With S t a l i n ' s p r o c l a m a t i o n o f a new p e r i o d o f r e v o l u t i o n a r y upsurge, t h i s t h e s i s was adopted as the b a s i s o f Comintern p o l i c y i n 1928. and  I n t e r n a l l y , with Trotsky's  the denouncing o f the R i g h t  e l i m i n a t i o n from the p o l i t i c a l  scene  d e v i a t i o n , S t a l i n had moved t o the l e f t  37  with  the u n v e i l i n g o f h i s F i v e - Y e a r  Plan.  S i n c e the Comintern, as  Deutscher d e s c r i b e s i t , "not o n l y shone w i t h the r e f l e c t e d Russian  p a r t y , but  . . . reflected  each of i t s i n t e r n a l  Isaac  l i g h t of  alinements  the in  49 turn,"  t h a t o r g a n i z a t i o n was  S o c i a l i s m i n one Stalinist  country,  however, c o n t i n u e d  l i n e both i n the R u s s i a n  The m i l i t a n t l y late  a l s o f o r c e d to move to the to r e p r e s e n t i n the  r a d i c a l p o l i c i e s pursued by  1920s envisaged  Socialists.  p a r t y and  Comintern.  the Comintern i n the  In Germany e s p e c i a l l y ,  this split  Only i n 1935,  i n the l e f t  the  contributed  a f t e r Nazism had become a  danger, d i d the Comintern, no doubt under S t a l i n ' s toward a s t r a t e g y of the " u n i t e d f r o n t  direction,  palpable  move  a g a i n s t f a s c i s m and war."  A l l of  e n e r g i e s d u r i n g t h i s p e r i o d , u n t i l the German i n v a s i o n of  Soviet Russia  i n 1941,  were geared toward warding o f f the t h r e a t of  a t t a c k a g a i n s t the U S S R — t h e 1939 example.  the dominant  no c o o p e r a t i o n between the Communists and  to the r i s e of Nazism.  Stalin's  left.  With the  "imperialist  war"  1941  Nazi-Soviet pact  i s an  outstanding  i n v a s i o n of the USSR by H i t l e r ' s  f o r c e s , the  of 1939^* began to be c h a r a c t e r i z e d by S t a l i n as  " a n t i f a s c i s t war":  a d e s i g n a t i o n which allowed  d i s t i n c t i o n between c a p i t a l i s t s t a t e s and between the USSR and  B r i t a i n and  ideological  have j e o p a r d i z e d  the U n i t e d  an  S t a l i n b o t h to draw a  to account f o r the  the A l l i e d c o u n t r i e s .  S t a l i n r e f r a i n e d from i s s u i n g most c e r t a i n l y  an  coalition  U n t i l the end o f the  war,  pronouncements which would  "the c o a l i t i o n of the USSR, Great  S t a t e s o f America a g a i n s t the German f a s c i s t  52 imperialists." But  ideological  s c o r e s were not  back b u r n e r , f o r i n the a f t e r m a t h r e v i v e d the two-camp t h e s i s and  so much f o r g o t t e n as put  of the Second World War,  abandoned h i s e a r l i e r 38  on  Stalin  distinction  the  between f a s c i s t r e v o l u t i o n was  and d e m o c r a t i c c a p i t a l i s t  states.  v i g o r o u s l y pursued a f t e r the war.  A l s o , the cause of But, as Deutscher  e x p l a i n s , S t a l i n ' s method of promoting r e v o l u t i o n d i f f e r e d g r e a t l y from the L e n i n i s t c o n c e p t i o n of w o r l d r e v o l u t i o n : The o l d B o l s h e v i s m , . . . b e l i e v e d i n r e v o l u t i o n from below, such as the upheaval o f 1917 had been. The r e v o l u t i o n which S t a l i n now c a r r i e d i n t o e a s t e r n and c e n t r a l Europe was p r i m a r i l y a r e v o l u t i o n from above. . . . A l t h o u g h the l o c a l Communist p a r t i e s were i t s immediate agents and e x e c u t o r s , the g r e a t p a r t y of the r e v o l u t i o n ^ w h i c h remained i n the background, was the Red Army. With most o f the e a s t e r n European s t a t e s w e l l on t h e i r way becoming place.  Soviet s a t e l l i t e s ,  almost i n  I n these f a v o r a b l e c o n d i t i o n s , A n d r e i Zhdanov, s p e a k i n g i n  September 1947 Bureau  S t a l i n ' s cordon s a n i t a i r e was  to  a t the f o u n d i n g c o n f e r e n c e o f the Communist I n f o r m a t i o n  (Cominform)  and r e v i e w i n g what he saw as p o s i t i v e  political  change i n the c o u n t r i e s o f e a s t e r n Europe, c o n f i d e n t l y a s s e r t e d t h a t the end o f the Second World War the alignment o f f o r c e s  and the d e f e a t o f f a s c i s m " s h a r p l y  [ s o o t n o s h e n i e s i l ] between the two  altered  systems—the  54 Socialist  and the c a p i t a l i s t — i n  favour of Socialism."  I , he s t a t e d , "the u n i t e d i m p e r i a l i s t  With World  f r o n t was breached and  R u s s i a dropped out o f the w o r l d c a p i t a l i s t  system."  War  . . .  World War  II  r e s u l t e d i n a f u r t h e r blow a g a i n s t i m p e r i a l i s t p o s i t i o n s , because "the enhanced  s t r e n g t h o f the a n t i - f a s c i s t movement r e s u l t e d i n a number o f  c o u n t r i e s i n c e n t r a l and s o u t h e a s t e r n Europe d r o p p i n g out o f the imperialist  system.""'"'  Only the U n i t e d S t a t e s o f America, of a l l the i m p e r i a l i s t emerged from the war militarily.""^  powers,  " c o n s i d e r a b l y s t r o n g e r e c o n o m i c a l l y and  Thus, two camps—one l e d by the S o v i e t Union and the  o t h e r l e d p r i n c i p a l l y by the U . S . A . — c o n f r o n t e d each o t h e r i n the  39  i n t e r n a t i o n a l arena. f o r c e was  gaining  c a p i t a l i s m i n any advanced.  The  According  to S o v i e t  i n s t r e n g t h , but no  claims  of " e q u a l i t y " w i t h  s p h e r e — p o l i t i c a l , economic or  Soviets at t h i s juncture  view to the n o t i o n  t h i n k i n g , s o c i a l i s m as a world  t h a t s o c i a l i s m was  international position.  appeared to l i m i t  I n o t h e r words, the S o v i e t s were content w i t h  f o r good r e a s o n .  s u c c e s s f u l l y detonated a n u c l e a r which was  The  United  moving i n f a v o r S t a t e s had  "A s i n g l e demand of you,  shaken the whole w o r l d .  The  the b o m b — i t w i l l remove a g r e a t  new  i m p e r i a l i s t camp as b e i n g  i m p e r i a l i s t war,  r e a c t i o n a r y and  "to strengthen  the  People's  comrades, p r o v i d e You  danger from  to combat S o c i a l i s m and  anti-democratic  After  us  know t h a t  b a l a n c e has been  In h i s Cominform speech, Zhdanov i d e n t i f i e d of the  1945  to have asked of the  w i t h atomic weapons i n the s h o r t e s t p o s s i b l e time. H i r o s h i m a has  of  bomb, the immense d e s t r u c t i v e power of  H i r o s h i m a bombing, S t a l i n i s r e p o r t e d  Provide  in  amply demonstrated at H i r o s h i m a and N a g a s a k i .  Commissar f o r M u n i t i o n s :  t h e i r world  s t e a d i l y enhancing i t s  d e c l a r i n g t h a t the c o r r e l a t i o n o f f o r c e s was s o c i a l i s m , and  military—were  destroyed.  us."^  the " c a r d i n a l purpose" imperialism,  democracy, and  p r o - f a s c i s t regimes and  to h a t c h a to support  movements  58 everywhere,"  though he a l s o observed t h a t " S o v i e t  proceeds f r o m the premise t h a t the two  foreign policy  systems—capitalism  and  59 S o c i a l i s m — w i l l e x i s t s i d e by The  official  forces, while simultaneously  War,  time."  S o v i e t post-war view as o u t l i n e d by  t h e s i s of an i n e v i t a b l e war  s o c i a l i s t and  side f o r a long  capitalist  unleashed by  imperialism  Zhdanov upheld upon s o c i a l i s t  embracing the i d e a of c o e x i s t e n c e  systems.  the n o t i o n of an e v e r - p r e s e n t  the  of  the  In the a f t e r m a t h of the Second World e x t e r n a l t h r e a t perhaps a l l o w e d  40  S t a l i n to j u s t i f y to h i s p e o p l e s the need " t o o r g a n i z e upsurge i n the n a t i o n a l economy . . . " it  entailed.  S t a l i n s t i p u l a t e d In  a new  mighty  w i t h a l l the human s a c r i f i c e  that  1946:  We must a c h i e v e a s i t u a t i o n where our i n d u s t r y can produce a n n u a l l y up to 50 m i l l i o n tons of p i g i r o n , up to 60 m i l l i o n tons of s t e e l , up to 500 m i l l i o n tons of c o a l , and up to 60 m i l l i o n tons o f o i l . Only under such c o n d i t i o n s can we c o n s i d e r t h a t our homeland w i l l be guaranteed a g a i n s t a l l possible accidents. That w i l l take t h r e e more F i v e - Y e a r P l a n s , I s h g y l d t h i n k , i f not more. But i t can be done and we must do i t . To  a c h i e v e such an economic upswing, however, R u s s i a would need a  p e r i o d of peace.  There was  thus an i n t e r t w i n i n g of two  contradictory p o s i t i o n s — p e a c e f u l coexistence war  and  the  inevitability  w i t h c a p i t a l i s m — i n the post-war S o v i e t w o r l d view.  S t a l i n stressed believed  the i n e v i t a b i l i t y o f war  t h a t war  was  Toward the end  not  apparently of  Thus, w h i l e  theme, he appears to have  imminent.  of h i s stewardship of S o v i e t f o r e i g n p o l i c y , S t a l i n  a g a i n v e n t u r e d to make p u b l i c h i s somewhat m o d i f i e d i n t e r r e l a t i o n s h i p s between the  s o c i a l i s t and  views on  the  c a p i t a l i s t worlds.  In a  c o l l e c t i o n of papers e n t i t l e d Economic Problems of S o c i a l i s m , S t a l i n i n 1952  argued f o r c e f u l l y on b e h a l f  of the p r o p o s i t i o n t h a t wars between  c a p i t a l i s t c o u n t r i e s were i n e v i t a b l e but  appeared to s o f t - p e d a l  n o t i o n of the I n e v i t a b i l i t y of wars between the systems.  He  observed t h a t w h i l e " t h e o r e t i c a l l y " i t was  " c o n t r a d i c t i o n s between c a p i t a l i s m and c o n t r a d i c t i o n s among the c a p i t a l i s t capitalist  countries  their  capitalist  " t r u e " that  s o c i a l i s m are s t r o n g e r  than  the the  c o u n t r i e s , " the c o n t r a d i c t i o n s among  "proved i n p r a c t i c e to be  " s t r u g g l e of the c a p i t a l i s t crush  s o c i a l i s t and  the  countries  s t r o n g e r " because of  f o r markets and  their desire  the to  competitors."***  However, n e i t h e r S t a l i n nor  any  other  41  o f f i c i a l Soviet  spokesman  during  t h i s p e r i o d e x p l i c i t l y d e t a i l e d t h e i r view o f the then  c o r r e l a t i o n of forces: the c a p i t a l i s t  camp?  Was the s o c i a l i s t  camp s t r o n g e r  And i n what spheres?  obtaining  o r weaker than  S t a l i n ' s 1946 argument  o u t l i n i n g the need t o spur S o v i e t i n d u s t r i a l p r o d u c t i o n  i n order  t o fend  o f f i m p e r i a l i s t a t t a c k s , coupled w i t h h i s assessment o f a U n i t e d t h a t had emerged from t h e war " c o n s i d e r a b l y  stronger  e c o n o m i c a l l y and  m i l i t a r i l y , " appeared t o imply t h a t t h e S o v i e t Union r e q u i r e d c a t c h up w i t h the c a p i t a l i s t world i n these a r e a s . Union i n 1949 s u c c e s s f u l l y t e s t e d i t s f i r s t States  continued  States  time t o  While t h e S o v i e t  atomic bomb, t h e U n i t e d  t o m a i n t a i n i t s edge i n n u c l e a r  technology.*'"'  That the p o l i t i c a l power, i n t e r n a t i o n a l p r e s t i g e and s e c u r i t y of the USSR was g r e a t l y enhanced as a r e s u l t o f the Second World War, however, was a l s o not i n doubt. i n mind t h a t S o v i e t  And i t was c e r t a i n l y w i t h t h i s  spokesmen argued from 1947 onward t h a t the  c o r r e l a t i o n o f f o r c e s was moving i n f a v o r o f s o c i a l i s m . the Western response d u r i n g  The n a t u r e of  S t a l i n ' s 1948 " t e s t o f n e r v e s " i n B e r l i n ,  w h i l e d r i v i n g home the f i r m r e s o l v e o f the U n i t e d France not t o a l l o w any f u r t h e r S o v i e t  S t a t e s , B r i t a i n and  encroachment i n Europe, must a l s o  have proved t o S t a l i n t h a t the West was not p o i s e d socialist  context  f o r a b a t t l e w i t h the  c o u n t r i e s , a b a t t l e t h a t t h e S o v i e t Union d i d not want.  Peace, t h e r e f o r e , was an a t t a i n a b l e g o a l and was seen through t h e S t a l i n i s t prism  as b e i n g made p o s s i b l e by t h e contemporary u n s p e c i f i e d  n a t u r e o f the c o r r e l a t i o n between the f o r c e s o f " i m p e r i a l i s m "  and t h e  f o r c e s of "peace and democracy." The  theme o f c a p i t a l i s t  repudiated, propaganda.  encirclement,  however, was never  formally  perhaps because o f i t s important f u n c t i o n i n i n t e r n a l S t a l i n had argued t h a t e n c i r c l e m e n t  42  was a " p o l i t i c a l " and  not  a "geographical"  concept, and t h e r e f o r e presumably remained i n f o r c e  even a f t e r the f o r m a t i o n countries.  For instance,  o f a s o c i a l i s t camp embracing  several  one w r i t e r observed i n an a r t i c l e i n Pravda i n  February 1953: C e r t a i n p r o p a g a n d i s t s have engaged i n an academic d i s p u t e over whether c a p i t a l i s t e n c i r c l e m e n t o f the S o v i e t Union c o n t i n u e s to e x i s t o r has faded i n t o the p a s t . Dogmatists and d o c t r i n a i r e people have been found who have begun t o a s s e r t t h a t once the p e o p l e ' s democracies f r i e n d l y t o us appeared on our western and e a s t e r n f r o n t i e r s the q u e s t i o n o f c a p i t a l i s t e n c i r c l e m e n t was removed. C e r t a i n would-be t h e o r e t i c i a n s have even gone so f a r as t o say t h a t s i n c e the p o w e r f u l camp o f s o c i a l i s m has been formed, i m p e r i a l i s m has ceased t o be a ^ danger t o u s . Such d i s c o u r s e s are a n t i - M a r x i s t and h a r m f u l . But  the i d e a o f c a p i t a l i s t  encirclement  was l a r g e l y preempted i n  the post World War I I p e r i o d by the two-camp d o c t r i n e . t h e s i s o f an a m e l i o r a t i o n the s o c i a l i s t  S t a l i n ' s 1952  " i n p r a c t i c e " i n the c o n t r a d i c t i o n s between  and c a p i t a l i s t camps appeared t o s i g n a l a d e s i r e on the  p a r t o f the S o v i e t  leader  c a p i t a l i s t countries.  t o a v o i d m i l i t a r y entanglements w i t h t h e  What r o l e the advent o f n u c l e a r weapons p l a y e d i n  t h i s assessment i s u n c l e a r ,  f o r Stalin, at least p u b l i c l y ,  disparaged  the r o l e and s i g n i f i c a n c e o f n u c l e a r weapons i n the conduct o r c h a r a c t e r of a f u t u r e war.  The S t a l i n i s t  "permanently o p e r a t i n g  i n s i s t e n c e on the c o n t i n u e d  f a c t o r s " ^ even i n the n u c l e a r  stymie S o v i e t m i l i t a r y thought.  r e l e v a n c e of  age d i d much t o  I t i s q u i t e l i k e l y , as Holloway  suggests, that while S t a l i n appreciated bomb, "he may w e l l have thought t h a t  the importance o f the atomic  . . . i t would n o t change the  68 character 1953  o f war."  Thus, i t was o n l y a f t e r S t a l i n ' s death i n March  t h a t S o v i e t l e a d e r s and a n a l y s t s began t o address i s s u e s  to the e f f e c t o f the n u c l e a r  r e v o l u t i o n on m i l i t a r y s t r a t e g y .  43  relating  CONCLUSION  With the e s t a b l i s h m e n t  of the f i r s t  socialist  state i n late  the concept of the " c o r r e l a t i o n of c l a s s f o r c e s " assumed i n t e r n a t i o n a l dimension.  As L e n i n  c l a s s forces within Russia  alone c o u l d no  l o n g e r be  or outcomes.  the s o l e determinant  S o v i e t R u s s i a was  of an i n t e r n a t i o n a l system of s t a t e s and w i l l y n i l l y was i t s rules.  In the event, i t was  hardly  except i n i s o l a t e d  as Marx had  foreseen  and  L e n i n had  e x p e c t e d , but  f o r the most p a r t ushered i n w i t h the b a c k i n g o f the Red Lenin's polemical  1917  and  use  was  Army.  of the concept of the c o r r e l a t i o n of f o r c e s ,  i n h i s arguments i n f a v o r of r e v o l u t i o n a r y a c t i o n i n e a r l y  of the B r e s t - L i t o v s k peace i n 1918,  view of the c o r r e l a t i o n was colleagues.  play  as a r e s u l t of an e n t i r e l y spontaneous upsurge o f  proletarian w i l l ,  most e v i d e n t  f o r c e d to  part  s u r p r i s i n g t h a t when  " r e v o l u t i o n " came to Europe i n the mid-1940s, i t was, i n s t a n c e s , not  an  c l e a r l y understood, the b a l a n c e of  e i t h e r of p a r t i c u l a r p o l i c y choices  by  1917,  not n e c e s s a r i l y shared by h i s  Moreover, even assuming g e n e r a l  c o n s t i t u t e d the  c o r r e l a t i o n at any  (or i n a c t i o n ) to be c o r r e l a t i o n , was  not  a t t e s t to the f a c t t h a t h i s Bolshevik  agreement on what  p o i n t i n time, the course of a c t i o n  adopted, based upon t h a t p a r t i c u l a r r e a d i n g immediately e v i d e n t  even to seasoned  Thus, a t the Seventh P a r t y Congress i n March 1918,  of  Marxists.  Zinoviev  noted:  No one can say how l o n g t h i s b r e a t h i n g s p e l l w i l l l a s t . It seems to me t h a t i t i s c l e a r o n l y t h a t t h i s peace, a c q u i r e d by us a t B r e s t , appears as a more or l e s s exact photograph of . t h a t r e l a t i o n a l f o r c e s which e x i s t s i n the world arena.... Commenting on Z i n o v i e v ' s  stand,  Bukharin r e j o i n e d :  Comrade Z i n o v i e v stands on a c o m p l e t e l y f a t a l i s t i c p o i n t view. He says t h a t now the r e a l r e l a t i o n of f o r c e s i s  44  of  the  u n p l e a s a n t , and n o t h i n g more. On t h a t he i s ready t o q u i e t down, and proposes t o o t h e r s t o do l i k e w i s e . T h i s p o s i t i o n i s absolutely inadmissible. R e v o l u t i o n a r y M a r x i s t s have never s a i d t h a t the r e a l r e l a t i o n o f f o r c e s i s such and such; one t a s k i n the c a p a c i t y o f r e a l i s t i c p o l i t i c i a n s c o n s i s t s i n the f a c t t h a t we c o n s t a n t l y s t r i v e t o change the r e l a t i o n o f actual forces. Debates between p a r t y members on the r o l e and p o l i c y o f S o v i e t Russia  on the i n t e r n a t i o n a l stage p o i n t e d  t o the c e n t r a l i t y o f the  " c o r r e l a t i o n o f f o r c e s " concept i n e a r l y S o v i e t f o r e i g n p o l i c y decisionmaking. right  A t the Tenth P a r t y Congress i n March 1921, however, the  to organized  consolidated  d i s s e n t was p r o s c r i b e d ,  and by the time  Stalin  h i s h o l d on the P a r t y l e a d e r s h i p , h i s ex c a t h e d r a  pronouncements on the c o r r e l a t i o n o f f o r c e s were f u l l y backed by the r u l e of unanimity. has  The o l i g a r c h i c a l n a t u r e o f p o s t - S t a l i n l e a d e r s h i p  perhaps p r e c l u d e d  the P a r t y  leader  from assuming the p o s i t i o n o f a  " r e p o s i t o r y o f t r u t h , " and w i t h i n the b o u n d a r i e s o f an i d e o l o g i c a l consensus, one may argue t h a t debate over f o r e i g n p o l i c y c h o i c e s take  does  place. For L e n i n ,  assessments o f the c o r r e l a t i o n o f f o r c e s were i n t i m a t e l y  connected w i t h the i s s u e s o f war and peace and the s u r v i v a l o f the socialist  state.  The p u r s u i t o f peace was a p o l i c y d i c t a t e d by the  u n f a v o r a b l e i n t e r n a t i o n a l c o r r e l a t i o n , due i n l a r g e p a r t t o the m i l i t a r y and  economic weakness o f the young S o v i e t r e p u b l i c .  to note t h a t L e n i n ' s ad hoc r e s o r t t o a c l a s s - b a s e d account f o r the continued socialist  existence  of Soviet Russia  s t a t e surrounded by h o s t i l e c a p i t a l i s t  I t Is interesting explanation to as a s i n g l e  c o u n t r i e s has s i n c e  been adopted as an a r t i c l e o f f a i t h by S o v i e t l e a d e r s and a n a l y s t s . L e n i n had then d e c l a r e d  that Russia  m i l i t a r i l y and e c o n o m i c a l l y  stronger  had s u c c e s s f u l l y b a t t l e d a i m p e r i a l i s t f o r c e because i t s  45  l e a d e r s c o r r e c t l y a p p r a i s e d the e x p l a n a t i o n which was circumstance that force  of an  l e a d e r s and  seemed to him  do not  appear to be  has  frequently  in their  to the  the, i n t e r n a t i o n a l  Soviet  post-World War  the  T h i r d World, S t a l i n f a i l e d  r e g a r d to n a t i o n a l parties within  I I e r a was  correlation.  Asia.  His  two-camp d o c t r i n e  force"  i n the  Even though L e n i n , breaking  the  out  " f i n a l " victory  of While  c a t a c l y s m i c changes i n  c l e a r Soviet r o l e of  p o l i c y with  communist  f a i l u r e of h i s China p o l i c y  Communists were v y i n g f o r power  and  p r e c l u d e d the arena, and  consideration  w h i l e he  d i d not  of any  "third  make e x p l i c i t  c o r r e l a t i o n , i t appears r e a s o n a b l e to surmise t h a t  e n e r g i e s were d i r e c t e d  toward an  e s t i m a t i o n of the b a l a n c e between  advanced c a p i t a l i s t  L e n i n and  in  i n d i f f e r e n t view w i t h r e g a r d to happenings i n  international  h i s views of the  With the  Kuomintang and  S t a l i n took an  the  o f g r e a t i f not  l i b e r a t i o n movements and  influence,  view of w o r l d  movement i n Europe.  to e n u n c i a t e any  those movements.  the y e a r s when the  s o c i a l i s t and  revolutionary  one  the  economic  p o s s i b i l i t y of r e v o l u t i o n  s u c c e s s o f the  the  constituted  the  favor.  c o l o n i a l a r e a s of the w o r l d , both l i n k e d  For  been c i t e d by  S t a l i n s u b s c r i b e d to a E u r o c e n t r i c  l a t e r S t a l i n , expressed the  socialism  a  t h e o r e t i c a l l y improbable assumed  c o r r e l a t i o n of f o r c e s , when m i l i t a r y and  a f f a i r s i n discussing  i n the  L e n i n o n l y i n response to  An  a n a l y s t s to argue a f a v o r a b l e s o c i a l i s t d i r e c t i o n i n  Both L e n i n and  and  f a s h i o n e d by  i d e o l o g i c a l t e n e t and  movement o f the factors  c o r r e l a t i o n of c l a s s f o r c e s .  Soviet  f a c e of an u n f a v o r a b l e i n t e r n a t i o n a l temporary phase l a s t i n g u n t i l the  the  countries.  S t a l i n , peaceful coexistence with  a p o l i c y which the  his  Union was  capitalism  obliged  correlation.  to pursue i n  T h i s was  seen as  i n e v i t a b l e c l a s h between the  46  two  the a  camps  occurred.  But  the advent of n u c l e a r technology  S o v i e t c a l c u l u s of war  and peace.  economic weakness made n e c e s s a r y  was  soon to change the  Whereas e a r l i e r S o v i e t m i l i t a r y  the p o l i c y of p e a c e f u l c o e x i s t e n c e ,  development o f m i l i t a r y technology  and  the i n t r o d u c t i o n of n u c l e a r  weapons soon mandated such a p o l i c y f o r the f o r e s e e a b l e f u t u r e . S t a l i n ' s successor  i n the K r e m l i n would undertake to modify  M a r x i s t - L e n i n i s t d o c t r i n e to take i n t o account both post-war g l o b a l p o l i t i c a l changes and  and  the e f f e c t s of the n u c l e a r r e v o l u t i o n .  47  the  NOTES  1.  V. Kubalkova and A.A. C r u i c k s h a n k , Marxism-Leninism and the Theory o f I n t e r n a t i o n a l R e l a t i o n s (London: Routledge & Kegan P a u l , 1980), p. 35.  2.  I b i d . , pp. 94-95.  3.  V. I . L e n i n , C o l l e c t e d Works, v o l . 24, Second (Moscow: P r o g r e s s P u b l i s h e r s , 1974), p. 43.  4.  Ibid.  5.  V. I . L e n i n , "Report to the Congress o f S o v i e t s on the B r e s t - L i t o v s k T r e a t y , " March 14, 1918, i n Myron Rush, ed. The I n t e r n a t i o n a l S i t u a t i o n and S o v i e t F o r e i g n Policy: Key Reports by S o v i e t L e a d e r s from the R e v o l u t i o n to the P r e s e n t (Columbus, Ohio: C h a r l e s E. M e r r i l l P u b l i s h i n g Co., 1970), p. 4.  6.  I b i d . , p.  7.  I t has not been so easy f o r S o v i e t l e a d e r s to acknowledge w e a k n e s s — m i l i t a r y , economic, o r p o l i t i c a l — s i n c e the USSR emerged as one o f the two w o r l d superpowers i n the y e a r s s i n c e S t a l i n ' s death.  8.  L e n i n , C o l l e c t e d Works, v o l . 26, p.  9.  I b i d . , p. 443.  Printing  3.  472.  Emphasis i n o r i g i n a l .  10.  I b i d . , p.  447.  11.  Ibid.  12.  L e n i n , " R e p o r t , " i n Rush, ed. The S i t u a t i o n , p. 4.  13.  L e n i n , C o l l e c t e d Works, v o l . 26, p.  14.  L e n i n , " R e p o r t , " i n Rush, ed. The S i t u a t i o n , p. 8.  15.  In 1918-1919, r e v o l u t i o n a r y ferment i n Germany l e d t o the s h o r t - l i v e d e s t a b l i s h m e n t of a S o v i e t government i n B a v a r i a , but such r e v o l t s were soon suppressed. S i m i l a r l y , B e l a Kun's 1919 r e v o l u t i o n i n Hungary proved temporary. The f a i l u r e of movements such as these g r a d u a l l y l e d the B o l s h e v i k l e a d e r s to understand t h a t w o r l d r e v o l u t i o n was not going t o o c c u r soon.  48  International  447.  International  16.  L e n i n , C o l l e c t e d Works, v o l . 29, p. 153. Emphasis i n o r i g i n a l .  17.  Ibid.  18.  L e n i n , "Report t o the Congress of S o v i e t s , " December 5, 1919, i n Rush, ed. The I n t e r n a t i o n a l S i t u a t i o n , p. 14.  19.  I b i d . , p.  16.  20.  I b i d . , p.  17.  21.  Lenin, Collected  22.  I b i d . , pp. 411-412.  23.  I b i d . , p.  412.  24.  I b i d . , p.  413.  25.  I b i d . , p.  414.  26.  I b i d . , p.  457.  27.  I b i d . , p.  442, 443.  28.  L e n i n , "Report t o the Congress o f S o v i e t s , " December 23, 1921, i n Rush, ed. The I n t e r n a t i o n a l S i t u a t i o n , p. 29.  29.  Ibid.  30.  Ibid.  31.  I b i d . , p.  32.  Lenin, Collected  33.  L e n i n , " R e p o r t , " December 23, 1921, i n Rush, ed. The I n t e r n a t i o n a l S i t u a t i o n , p. 31.  34.  Lenin, Collected  35.  L e n i n , "Report," December 23, 1921, i n Rush, ed. The I n t e r n a t i o n a l S i t u a t i o n , p. 33. Emphasis added.  36.  J . V. S t a l i n , Works, v o l . 7 (Moscow: P u b l i s h i n g House, 1954), p. 168,  37.  Quoted i n J . V. S t a l i n , Problems o f L e n i n i s m (Moscow: F o r e i g n Languages P u b l i s h i n g House, 1953), p. 129.  38.  I b i d . , p. 128.  Works, v o l . 31, p. 411.  32. Works, v o l . 32, p. 478.  Works, v o l . 32, p. 480.  Emphasis added.  49  F o r e i g n Languages  39.  Quoted i n I b i d . , p. 188. The d o c t r i n e o f " s o c i a l i s m i n one c o u n t r y " was f u l l y endorsed a t the F o u r t e e n t h P a r t y Congress i n A p r i l 1925.  40.  Quoted  41.  J . V. S t a l i n , Works, o u t , S t a l i n had used as 1919. He f u r t h e r i t was a s u b o r d i n a t e i n c i d e n t a l aspect of Raymond L. G a r t h o f f , A n a l y s i s (New York:  42.  Kubalkova and C r u i c k s h a n k , Marxism-Leninism,  43.  S t a l i n , "Report to the XIV P a r t y Congress," December 3, 1925, i n Rush, ed. The I n t e r n a t i o n a l S i t u a t i o n , p. 38.  44.  S t a l i n , Works, v o l . 7, pp. 95-96.  45.  S t a l i n , "Report t o the XV P a r t y Congress," December 3, 1927, i n Rush, ed. The I n t e r n a t i o n a l S i t u a t i o n , p. 60. Emphasis i n o r i g i n a l .  46.  I b i d . , p.  59.  47.  I b i d . , p.  61.  48.  I b i d . , p.  54.  49.  Isaac D e u t s c h e r , S t a l i n : A P o l i t i c a l Biography Oxford U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s , 1949), p. 398.  50.  For more on t h i s i s s u e , see I b i d . , pp. 404-409.  51.  See S t a l i n , "Report t o the X V I I I P a r t y Congress," March 10, 1939, i n Rush, ed. The I n t e r n a t i o n a l S i t u a t i o n , p. 90, where S t a l i n speaks o f a "new i m p e r i a l i s t war."  52.  S t a l i n , "Report D e l i v e r e d on the 24th A n n i v e r s a r y o f the October R e v o l u t i o n , " November 6, 1941, i n Rush, ed. The I n t e r n a t i o n a l S i t u a t i o n , p. 114.  53.  D e u t s c h e r , S t a l i n , p. 554. Y u g o s l a v i a was perhaps the o n l y i n s t a n c e where the l o c a l Communists were s t r o n g enough to e f f e c t a r e v o l u t i o n . But the independence demonstrated by T i t o ' s Y u g o s l a v i a r e s u l t e d by 1948 i n a schism between T i t o and S t a l i n .  i n I b i d . , p.  191. v o l . 7, p. 95. As G a r t h o f f p o i n t s the concept o f two camps as e a r l y s t a t e s t h a t " [ u ] n t i l 1947, however, theme, a c c e p t e d as an i m p l i c i t and c a p i t a l i s t e n c i r c l e m e n t . " See Soviet M i l i t a r y P o l i c y ; A Historical F r e d e r i c k A. P r a e g e r , 1966), p. 70.  50  p.  141.  Emphasis added.  (London:  54.  A. Zhdanov, The I n t e r n a t i o n a l S i t u a t i o n , Speech d e l i v e r e d at the I n f o r m a t o r y Conference of. r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s o f a number of Communist P a r t i e s h e l d i n Poland i n the l a t t e r p a r t o f September 1947 (Moscow: F o r e i g n Languages P u b l i s h i n g House, 1947), p. 7.  55.  I b i d . , p.  8.  56.  I b i d . , p.  12.  57.  Quoted i n D a v i d Holloway, The S o v i e t Union and the Arms Race (New Haven: Y a l e U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s , 1983), p. 20.  58.  I b i d . , p.  18.  59.  I b i d . , p.  22.  60.  S t a l i n , " E l e c t i o n Speech," F e b r u a r y 9, 1946, ed. The I n t e r n a t i o n a l S i t u a t i o n , p. 123.  61.  J . S t a l i n , Economic Problems o f S o c i a l i s m i n the U.S.S.R. (Moscow: F o r e i g n Languages P u b l i s h i n g House, 1952), p. 39, 40.  62.  I b i d . , p.  63.  Malenkov, "Report t o the XIX P a r t y Congress," October 5, 1952, i n Rush, ed. The I n t e r n a t i o n a l S i t u a t i o n , p. 153.  64.  Pravda e d i t o r i a l , October 18, 1952. S o v i e t M i l i t a r y P o l i c y , p. 73.  65.  On t h i s p o i n t , see Holloway, The S o v i e t Union and the Arms Race, pp. 23-27.  66.  N. Kosev, "On R e v o l u t i o n a r y V i g i l a n c e , " Pravda, February 6, 1953, as quoted i n G a r t h o f f , S o v i e t M i l i t a r y P o l i c y , p. 71.  67.  These f a c t o r s i n c l u d e d such elements as " l e a d e r s h i p , morale, good weapons and a q u a n t i t y o f t r a i n e d s o l d i e r s . " See Joseph L Nogee and Robert H. Donaldson, S o v i e t F o r e i g n P o l i c y Since World War I I , (New York: Pergamon P r e s s , 1981), p. 27.  68.  See Holloway, The S o v i e t Union and the Arms Race, p.  69.  Quoted  i n Garthoff,  70.  Quoted  i n Ibid.  71.  As we have seen above, L e n i n r e c o g n i z e d the importance of the m a t e r i a l — m i l i t a r y and e c o n o m i c — f o r c e which the p r o l e t a r i a t and the b o u r g e o i s i e c o u l d muster i n the c l a s s c o n f l i c t which would p i t them a g a i n s t one another.  i n Rush,  39.  Quoted  i n Garthoff,  28.  S o v i e t M i l i t a r y P o l i c y , p. 85.  51  CHAPTER I I I BREAKING OUT OF THE STALINIST MOLD: 1953-1957  S t a l i n ' s death i n March 1953 i n October  1957  t h i s chapter. watersheds.  and  the S o v i e t l a u n c h i n g o f Sputnik I  r o u g h l y c i r c u m s c r i b e the c h r o n o l o g i c a l boundaries Both e v e n t s , i n a sense, r e p r e s e n t e d  The  new  t h i n k i n g and  historical  demise of the d i c t a t o r f r e e d S o v i e t s c h o l a r s and  makers from the i r o n g r i p of S t a l i n i s t orthodoxy  of  and paved the way  r e s e a r c h i n the area of i n t e r n a t i o n a l p o l i t i c s .  policy for The  p i o n e e r i n g l a u n c h of S p u t n i k , which o c c u r r e d soon a f t e r Khrushchev's June-July  1957  d e f e a t of h i s p o l i t i c a l r i v a l s i n the K r e m l i n , ushered  an e r a of c o n f i d e n c e and  in  optimism w i t h r e g a r d t o the p o s i t i o n of the  U.S.S.R. on the i n t e r n a t i o n a l s t a g e .  T h i s c h a p t e r , then, w i l l  examine  S o v i e t p e r c e p t i o n s o f the c o r r e l a t i o n of f o r c e s a t a time when p o l i t i c s and p o l i c y i n the S o v i e t Union were i n a s t a t e of f l u x . The  Stalinist  l e g a c y i n m a t t e r s p e r t a i n i n g t o the r o l e and  of the U.S.S.R. i n world a f f a i r s was,  position  i n many ways, a n a c h r o n i s t i c .  A l o n g w i t h h i s u p h o l d i n g of the r i g i d l y d e f i n e d two-camp d o c t r i n e which, i n p r a c t i c e , a l l o w e d the S o v i e t Union v e r y l i t t l e i n i t s r e l a t i o n s w i t h the West and  room f o r maneuver both  the newly independent  c o u n t r i e s , S t a l i n had r e f u s e d t o permit any  i n q u i r y i n t o the e f f e c t s of  the n u c l e a r r e v o l u t i o n on m i l i t a r y d o c t r i n e . s u c c e s s o r s to g r a p p l e w i t h n u c l e a r and  T h i r d World  I t was  international  left  to h i s  political  realities. Of the i n n e r c o t e r i e which s a t a t the apex of power i n the S o v i e t Union i n the immediate a f t e r m a t h o f S t a l i n ' s demise, Molotov the s t r o n g e s t defender  emerged as  of the S t a l i n i s t h a r d - l i n e f o r e i g n p o l i c y  52  approach.  But  by Malenkov and won,  the more r e a s o n a b l e and  pragmatic o u t l o o k espoused  then w i t h some m o d i f i c a t i o n s by Khrushchev  eventually  w i t h f a r - r e a c h i n g i m p l i c a t i o n s f o r the conduct of S o v i e t  policy.  The  assiduously  c o n s t r a i n i n g i n f l u e n c e of the c u l t i v a t e d by  abandoned, and socialist  Soviet leaders  flexibility.*  The  strengths  we  w i l l examine S o v i e t d e p i c t i o n s of  We  will  their  political  a l s o note the e f f e c t s on  pursued  introduced  Congress i n February 1956.  conclude w i t h an a n a l y s i s o f S o v i e t d i s c u s s i o n s on the  areas by  Soviet  assessments of the c o r r e l a t i o n of d o c t r i n a l m o d i f i c a t i o n s Khrushchev at the T w e n t i e t h P a r t y  on  considerable.  of l e a d e r s h i p debates on the d i r e c t i o n s to be  Soviet f o r e i g n p o l i c y .  the  the West, i n the  and weaknesses i n the economic, m i l i t a r y , and  i n the context  was  impact of these developments  S o v i e t assessments of the c o r r e l a t i o n was In t h i s c h a p t e r ,  so  II years  sought to r e o r i e n t p o l i c y toward  w o r l d , the newly independent c o u n t r i e s , and  d i r e c t i o n of g r e a t e r  foreign  i s o l a t i o n i s t posture  S t a l i n i n the post World War  first  We  by  will  subject with a  view to d e t e r m i n i n g the congruence, or l a c k t h e r e o f , between S o v i e t a s s e r t i o n s and  a c t u a l c a p a b i l i t i e s , and  between S o v i e t statements  and  S o v i e t a c t i o n s i n the f o r e i g n p o l i c y r e a l m . By  and  l a r g e , S o v i e t commentators d u r i n g  p a r t i c u l a r l y a f t e r the T w e n t i e t h P a r t y and  expectant c o n f i d e n c e  this period,  and  Congress, e x h i b i t e d a  cautious  i n a b r i g h t e r f u t u r e ; chose to s t r e s s  the  p o s i t i v e impact on the c o r r e l a t i o n o f f a v o r a b l e  developments i n the  economic and  defensive  p o l i t i c a l realms; and  tended to be  d i s c u s s i o n s of S o v i e t m i l i t a r y c a p a b i l i t i e s .  in their  Consonant w i t h  of the d i s c u s s i o n s , the o p e r a t i v e  the  generally cautious  tenor  S o v i e t l e a d e r s and  a n a l y s t s remained unchanged throughout t h i s  53  terms used period.  by  The  two  g e n e r i c f o r m u l a t i o n s w i t h n e u t r a l c o n n o t a t i o n s were employed:  u s u a l l y sootnoshenie  s i l , and  o c c a s i o n a l l y rasstanovka s i l .  THE MALENKOV INTERLUDE:  S t a l i n ' s t h e o r y of c a p i t a l i s t  e n c i r c l e m e n t and  e n t a i l e d f o r s o c i a l i s m c o n t a i n e d an e x p l i c i t weakness v i s - a - v i s the c a p i t a l i s t w o r l d . Soviet press continued  the dangers i t  acknowledgement of S o v i e t  As l a t e as January  to denounce, i n the s t r o n g e s t terms,  a g g r e s s i v e p o l i c y o f the i m p e r i a l i s t and a Pravda a r t i c l e  1953-1954  i n February  1953, "the  camp headed by the U n i t e d S t a t e s , "  1953  upheld  the t h e s i s of  capitalist  e n c i r c l e m e n t even i n the c o n t e x t of the f o r m a t i o n of a " p o w e r f u l united s o c i a l i s t of  camp," a s s e r t i n g t h a t " c a p i t a l i s m s t i l l  the c o u n t r i e s of the w o r l d ,  the  and  r u l e s In most  i n c l u d i n g a l a r g e number of  economically  3 developed The  countries." t h e o r e t i c a l underpinnings  r e p u d i a t e d u n t i l the T w e n t i e t h  of S t a l i n i s m were not  officially  P a r t y Congress convened i n e a r l y  D o c t r i n a l r e f o r m u l a t i o n s t r a i l e d m o d i f i c a t i o n s i n s t y l e and f o r e i g n p o l i c y by some y e a r s . of  T h i s l a g was  conduct  understandable  I t may  a l s o be e x p l a i n e d , t o some e x t e n t , by  had  dominated S o v i e t l i f e  Thus, w r i t e r s c o n t i n u e d  to uphold  f o r almost  the t h e s i s of  f o r a prolonged  between the two  the  three  capitalist  e n c i r c l e m e n t w h i l e s i m u l t a n e o u s l y expounding a t g r e a t l e n g t h on possibility  and  s t a t e of p o l i t i c a l d i s a r r a y f o l l o w i n g the removal from  the scene of a f i g u r e who decades.  of  p a r t l y the r e s u l t , perhaps,  the f r a c t i o u s debates among top P a r t y l e a d e r s on the content  d i r e c t i o n of p o l i c y .  1956.  the  p e r i o d of peace and p e a c e f u l c o e x i s t e n c e  systems.  54  While the a c c e s s i o n o f a new regime i n Moscow brought about no s u b s t a n t i a l a l t e r a t i o n i n such b a s i c g o a l s o f S o v i e t f o r e i g n p o l i c y as the p r e s e r v a t i o n o f s o c i a l i s m a t home and w i t h i n the s o c i a l i s t commonwealth, and the e x t e n s i o n o f S o v i e t i n f l u e n c e wherever both  the methods employed t o achieve  feasible,  these aims and the tone o f S o v i e t  pronouncements underwent a t r a n s f o r m a t i o n . T h i s change was e v i d e n t , i n the months immediately  following  S t a l i n ' s death, when S o v i e t o v e r t u r e s o f peace t o the West, and avowals of a p o s i t i v e a t t i t u d e toward a p e a c e f u l r e s o l u t i o n o f o u t s t a n d i n g problems, became standard  diplomatic fare.  These p a c i f i c  expressions  were n o t f a t u o u s , however, f o r the S o v i e t s took c o n c r e t e s t e p s , e a r l y i n 1953,  to s e t t l e past grievances  i n t h e i r b i l a t e r a l r e l a t i o n s with  c o u n t r i e s as Greece, Turkey, and I s r a e l .  These developments,  w i t h a n e g o t i a t e d end t o the then stalemated  Korean c o n f l i c t ,  the dawn o f a new e r a r e p r e s e n t e d by a l e s s r e c a l c i t r a n t In the sphere o f i n t e r n a t i o n a l  such  coupled signalled  Soviet attitude  relations.  In June 1953, a major a r t i c l e appeared i n Kommunist which summed up the essence o f the S o v i e t peace p r o p o s a l s o f the p a s t few months and argued i n f a v o r o f p e a c e f u l c o e x i s t e n c e between the c a p i t a l i s t and socialist  systems.  Peace, the author  a v e r r e d , was made p o s s i b l e by the  " s t e a d i l y growing economic and p o l i t i c a l might o f the S o v i e t Union, the m o r a l and p o l i t i c a l u n i t y o f the S o v i e t people,  . . . the might o f the  S o v i e t armed f o r c e s . . . , the f u r t h e r s t r e n g t h e n i n g o f the camp o f  4 peace, democracy and s o c i a l i s m . . . . "  The author m a i n t a i n e d  t h a t the  f a c t o r s s t r e n g t h e n i n g the i n t e r n a t i o n a l p o s i t i o n o f the U.S.S.R. "have e s p e c i a l l y grown and gained  i n s t r e n g t h as a r e s u l t o f the fundamental  change i n the c o r r e l a t i o n o f f o r c e s on the i n t e r n a t i o n a l arena,  55  caused  by  the world  h i s t o r i c v i c t o r y o f the S o v i e t Union over f a s c i s m i n the  Second World War.""'  I n essence, then,  the S o v i e t s advanced the n o t i o n  t h a t peace between the two opposing systems was made p o s s i b l e by a fundamental change i n the c o r r e l a t i o n o f f o r c e s : aggressive if  f o r c e s would l o n g ago have unleashed war a g a i n s t the U.S.S.R.  they were c o n f i d e n t o f success  cannot have such  i n t h i s war. |  demonstrate, beyond v e r y g e n e r a l  statements  the S o v i e t s t a n d i n g a l o n g v a r i o u s axes o f the c o r r e l a t i o n ,  both l e a d e r s and a n a l y s t s a t t h i s stage e l u c i d a t i o n on the theme.  around the thorny  c a r e f u l l y avoided  Indeed, m i n d f u l  disadvantageous p o s i t i o n i n most a r e a s ,  The  But they do n o t and  confidence."**  As the above q u o t a t i o n s regarding  " I t i s known t h a t  any f u r t h e r  perhaps o f t h e i r  they s k i l l f u l l y maneuvered  i s s u e s o f S o v i e t weaknesses and American  strengths.  l a t t e r p o i n t i s w e l l i l l u s t r a t e d by the f o l l o w i n g o b s e r v a t i o n by A.  Leont'ev.  Speaking o f p e o p l e i n the West, i n c l u d i n g "those  occupying  h i g h p o s i t i o n s i n the government," who count on p e a c e f u l c o e x i s t e n c e as a means f o r "the i m p e r i a l i s t s t o impose t h e i r w i l l and p o l i c i e s on the c o u n t r i e s o f the s o c i a l i s t  camp," the w r i t e r d e c l a r e d :  The t r u t h o f the matter i s t h a t the p o l i c y o f d i k t a t i n r e l a t i o n s w i t h c o u n t r i e s o f the s o c i a l i s t camp has n o t , cannot and w i l l n o t have even the s l i g h t e s t chance f o r s u c c e s s . This should be e s p e c i a l l y c l e a r i n our days, g i v e n the^contemporary c o r r e l a t i o n o f f o r c e s on the i n t e r n a t i o n a l a r e n a . Another reason  f o r the r e l u c t a n c e on the p a r t o f S o v i e t  commentators t o be s p e c i f i c  i n t h e i r views o f the c o r r e l a t i o n o f f o r c e s  was perhaps because the adequacy o f S o v i e t m i l i t a r y  s t r e n g t h and the  requirements o f the armed f o r c e s were s u b j e c t s o f some c o n t r o v e r s y i n the h i g h e s t l e a d e r s h i p c i r c l e s d u r i n g t h i s p e r i o d , and Moscow was n o t speaking  w i t h one v o i c e .  The r e f o r m i s t p o s i t i o n , which was o u t l i n e d by  56  Malenkov i n a speech to the Supreme S o v i e t i n August 1953, r e s t e d on the key had  assumption t h a t the i n t r o d u c t i o n of n u c l e a r weapons  changed the c a l c u l u s of war, Such a stance  foreign policy.  implicitly  had  rendering  i t most u n l i k e l y .  wide r a m i f i c a t i o n s i n the a r e a s o f domestic  I f war  between s o c i a l i s t and  c a p i t