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Soviet perceptions of the correlation of forces Nadkarni, Vidya 1987

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SOVIET PERCEPTIONS OF THE CORRELATION OF FORCES By VIDYA NADKARNI B.A., The Univ e r s i t y of Bombay, 1976 M.A., Jawaharlal Nehru U n i v e r s i t y , 1978 A THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY i n THE FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIES (Department of P o l i t i c a l Science) We accept t h i s thesis as conforming to the required standard THE UNIVERSITY OF BRITISH COLUMBIA February 1987 (c) Vidya Nadkarni, 1987 In presenting this thesis in partial fulfilment of the requirements for an advanced degree at the University of British Columbia, I agree that the Library shall make it freely available for reference and study. I further agree that permission for extensive copying of this thesis for scholarly purposes may be granted by the head of my department or by his or her representatives. It is understood that copying or publication of this thesis for financial gain shall not be allowed without my written permission. Department of P o l i t i c a l Science The University of British Columbia 1956 Main Mall Vancouver, Canada V6T 1Y3 Date 10. February 1987 DF-fin/ft-n ABSTRACT This thesis examines evolving Soviet perspectives on the " c o r r e l a t i o n of f o r c e s " between the s o c i a l i s t world and the c a p i t a l i s t countries i n general and the Soviet Union and the United States i n p a r t i c u l a r . The focus i s on the Khrushchev and Brezhnev phases of Soviet h i s t o r y . The term " c o r r e l a t i o n of forces" i s p r i m a r i l y an a n a l y t i c concept used by Soviet leaders and scholars to understand and i n t e r p r e t the pace of what they view as the i n e v i t a b l e h i s t o r i c a l development i n favor of socialism. A rough Soviet equivalent of the Western concept of the "balance of power," " c o r r e l a t i o n of f o r c e s " as i t i s used by Soviet spokesmen encompasses economic, p o l i t i c a l , and m i l i t a r y - s e c u r i t y dimensions. The methodology employed i n the thesis i n charting the chronological evolution of Soviet thinking regarding the c o r r e l a t i o n of forces consists of a c a r e f u l and d i s c r i m i n a t i n g textual analysis of terminological v a r i a t i o n s i n Soviet s c h o l a r l y and o f f i c i a l use of the concept over time, with due regard to contextual f l u c t u a t i o n s i n the domestic and i n t e r n a t i o n a l realms. For i t s source material, t h i s study r e l i e d h e avily on the speeches and w r i t i n g of Soviet leaders as w e l l as u t i l i z i n g analyses of i n t e r n a t i o n a l developments published i n Soviet s c h o l a r l y journals. i i The d i f f e r i n g stress on each of the three aspects of the c o r r e l a t i o n of forces—economic, p o l i t i c a l , and military—between the Khrushchev and Brezhnev periods allowed us to trace the change and evolution of the Soviet world view from a primary stress on economic factors of the d i s t r i b u t i o n of power under Khrushchev, to an emphasis on the m i l i t a r y dimension of the balance under Brezhnev. By monitoring terminological v a r i a t i o n s i n the concept, we were able to i d e n t i f y periods of optimism and pessimism during both the Khrushchev and Brezhnev phases. We also noted the important r o l e played by the divergent p e r s o n a l i t i e s of Khrushchev and Brezhnev on Soviet p o r t r a y a l of the c o r r e l a t i o n of forces. Whereas the exuberant Soviet optimism i n the m i l i t a r y area lacked any basis i n f a c t under Khrushchev, the depiction of the m i l i t a r y c o r r e l a t i o n , while more muted under Brezhnev, was s o l i d l y based. These and other such di f f e r e n c e s , we argued, were a function of the stamp superimposed on Soviet p o l i t i c s by the respective leaders of the time. This study w i l l , by c l a r i f y i n g the context within which the Soviet leadership makes i t s choices, contribute to an enhanced understanding of the general foreign p o l i c y trends of the USSR. i i i TABLE OF CONTENTS Page PART ONE INTRODUCTION I Setting the Stage '. 1 II L e n i n i s t and S t a l i n i s t World Views 22 PART TWO THE KHRUSHCHEV PHASE III Breaking Out of the S t a l i n i s t Mold: 1953-1957. 52 IV Years of Optimism: August 1957—September 1961 82 V Steady Erosion of Confidence: 1961-1964. . . . 116 PART THREE THE BREZHNEV YEARS VI A Change i n Approach: 1964-1968 154 VII K i n d l i n g of Confidence: 1969-1974 188 VIII Crest and Ebb of the Optimistic Tide: 1975-1979 222 IX C r i s i s of Confidence: 1980-1985. 263 PART FOUR CONCLUSION X Summing Up 303 Bibliography. 328 i v CHAPTER I SETTING THE STAGE The domain and scope of Soviet power and influence on the i n t e r n a t i o n a l stage has waxed s t e a d i l y since the end of the Second World War. In l i g h t of the concern generated by such events as the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, several questions germane to an understanding of Soviet f o r e i g n p o l i c y aims and intentions assume c r i t i c a l importance: What i s the nature of the l i m i t a t i o n s and opportunities that the Soviets see themselves as being faced with i n the pursuit of t h e i r i n t e r n a t i o n a l p o l i t i c a l aims? How do they view the strength of t h e i r r e s o u r c e s — p o l i t i c a l , i d e o l o g i c a l , economic and m i l i t a r y — i n r e l a t i o n to the resources and p o t e n t i a l of the United States? Are they o p t i m i s t i c or p e s s i m i s t i c with regard to the success they hope to achieve i n the r e a l i z a t i o n of t h e i r foreign p o l i c y goals? Can we perhaps i d e n t i f y periods of pessimism and optimism i n the h i s t o r y of Soviet i n t e r n a t i o n a l r e l a t i o n s ? The attempt to seek answers to these and other r e l a t e d questions w i l l form the focus of t h i s i n q u i r y . S p e c i f i c a l l y , we s h a l l undertake t h i s quest through a l o n g i t u d i n a l analysis of published Soviet pronouncements on the c o r r e l a t i o n of forces. The concept of the " c o r r e l a t i o n of f o r c e s " i s a key t h e o r e t i c a l construct i n the Soviet i n t e r n a t i o n a l r e l a t i o n s l e x i c o n . Soviet leaders and scholars argue that the two major protagonists on the i n t e r n a t i o n a l scene are the forces of socialism and the forces of capitalism, and i n discussing the c o r r e l a t i o n of forces between these two socio-economic systems, they explore trends i n i n t e r n a t i o n a l r e l a t i o n s i n the context 1 of the global d i s t r i b u t i o n of power. A c a r e f u l exegesis of Soviet d o c t r i n a l and a n a l y t i c a l l i t e r a t u r e on t h i s subject would thus provide us with a u s e f u l barometer of Soviet perceptions on t h e i r r o l e , i n t e r e s t s , successes, and setbacks i n world a f f a i r s . In a d d i t i o n to serving as an a n a l y t i c t o o l , Soviet c a l c u l a t i o n s of the r e l a t i o n of forces provide a most convenient means f o r r a t i o n a l i z i n g both i n t e r n a l and external p o l i c i e s of the Soviet regime. For example, Lenin c i t e d Soviet weakness i n the m i l i t a r y and economic realms as the reason for signing the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk, and S t a l i n used such c a l c u l a t i o n s to j u s t i f y much of the i n t e r n a l repression of h i s regime. Later instances (which we s h a l l expand upon i n subsequent chapters) include Malenkov's and Khrushchev's c a l c u l a t i o n s of Soviet m i l i t a r y p a r i t y with the West i n t h e i r attempts to cut defense expenditures, and the l a t t e r ' s emphasis on economic competition to spur people to work harder. Some Western i n t e r n a t i o n a l r e l a t i o n s t h e o r i s t s have of l a t e come to recognize the importance of taking into account the operational code of decision makers i n seeking to understand and explain a country's foreign p o l i c y choices. Analyses of the foreign p o l i c i e s of states based s o l e l y on an objective assessment of i n t e r n a t i o n a l and domestic developments ignore the c r u c i a l r o l e of perceptions as f i l t e r i n g mechanisms through which the environment i s viewed by p o l i c y makers.* Attention to the perceptual dimension opens a window on the "black box" element of t r a d i t i o n a l approaches and enhances our understanding of a country's foreign p o l i c y trends by c l a r i f y i n g the context within which decisions are reached. In subject matter and scope, t h i s work l i e s at the nexus between the areas of Soviet p o l i t i c s and i n t e r n a t i o n a l r e l a t i o n s : i t 2 examines the Soviet world-view against the background of i n t e r n a l p o l i t i c a l dynamics by charting, over time, f l u c t u a t i o n s i n the treatment of an important concept i n Soviet i n t e r n a t i o n a l r e l a t i o n s theory. When i n the early 1970s the U.S.S.R. attained s t r a t e g i c p a r i t y with the United States i n nuclear weaponry, Soviet spokesmen heralded t h i s development by claiming that a further s h i f t had occurred i n the c o r r e l a t i o n of forces i n favor of soc i a l i s m . Western scholars, prodded i n part by the changed s t r a t e g i c s i t u a t i o n , began to demonstrate a renewed i n t e r e s t i n exploring the Soviet world-view, t h e i r doctrine on i n t e r n a t i o n a l r e l a t i o n s , and t h e i r perceptions of U.S. foreign p o l i c y . The works of Stephen Gibert (1977), Morton Schwartz (1978), Judson M i t c h e l l (1982), and John Lenczowski (1982) are representative i n t h i s regard.^ These authors take d i f f e r e n t p h i l o s o p h i c a l approaches to t h e i r subject matter and reach divergent conclusions regarding the nature of Soviet f o r e i g n p o l i c y (the offensive-defensive debate) and i t s implications f o r the American conduct of i n t e r n a t i o n a l r e l a t i o n s . But the common temporal focus i n a l l of these studies i s on the detente and post-detente phases of Soviet-American r e l a t i o n s . While Gibert, Schwartz, and Lenczowski discuss the Soviet perspective on various facets of American foreign p o l i c y , M i t c h e l l attempts to elaborate on contemporary Soviet i n t e r n a t i o n a l r e l a t i o n s doctrine. Because of the relevance of Soviet views of the " c o r r e l a t i o n of for c e s " i n any discussion of Soviet i n t e r n a t i o n a l r e l a t i o n s doctrine or U.S.-U.S.S.R. r e l a t i o n s , a l l of the above-mentioned analyses contain some assessment of t h i s concept. But the boundaries of such inquiry are circumscribed i n each instance by the time period under study and the 3 theme of a n a l y s i s . No thorough examination of the evolution of Soviet thinking about the c o r r e l a t i o n of forces i s undertaken i n these i n v e s t i g a t i o n s . The one study on t h i s topic of some s i g n i f i c a n c e appears as a chapter i n William Zimmerman's much acclaimed work, published i n 1969, 3 e n t i t l e d Soviet Perspectives on International Relations: 1956-1968. However, one of the drawbacks of Zimmerman's analysis of the concept i s that he does not adequately explore the implications of d i s t i n c t i o n s that Soviet analysts may draw between the status of the o v e r a l l c o r r e l a t i o n of forces (which includes economic, p o l i t i c a l , and m i l i t a r y aspects) and the p o s i t i o n of the m i l i t a r y equation of the c o r r e l a t i o n alone. In f a c t * h i s book devotes r e l a t i v e l y l i t t l e a t tention to the various facets of t h i s concept and focuses almost e x c l u s i v e l y on the m i l i t a r y c o r r e l a t i o n , rather than examining i t more broadly. Moreover, t h i s study i s now somewhat dated and many events of s i g n i f i c a n c e need to be incorporated i n a new analysis which spans a longer period of time and provides a firmer basis for exploring long-term trends and changes i n Soviet perceptions. The paucity of systematic and d e t a i l e d studies of Soviet views of the c o r r e l a t i o n of forces serves as a major impetus f o r the present inquiry. CHANGE AND THE MARXIST-LENINIST WELTAUNSCHAUUNG In order to make an adequate assessment of Soviet perceptions of the c o r r e l a t i o n of forces, one must examine the assumptions or f i r s t p r i n c i p l e s which underpin Soviet analyses of i n t e r n a t i o n a l p o l i t i c s , as well as t h e i r p h i l o s o p h i c a l presuppositions regarding the nature of 4 change. Such an exercise i s e s s e n t i a l because i t helps the student of Soviet p o l i t i c s i n discerning the optimism or pessimism (often veiled) which runs as an undercurrent i n Soviet discussions of the c o r r e l a t i o n of forces at p a r t i c u l a r points i n time. The issue h e r e — t h a t of uncovering often unstated Soviet assumptions—is d i s t i n c t from, though not t o t a l l y unrelated to, the point made i n the f i r s t section of t h i s chapter: that a study of perceptions i s necessary for f u l l e r understanding of a nation's p o l i c i e s . Thus, i n attempting to examine Soviet perceptions, the analyst must, to the extent possible, minimize " d i s t o r t i n g " Soviet views ei t h e r by ignoring the i n t e r n a l i d e o l o g i c a l calculus that governs Soviet thinking or by attempting, perhaps unconsciously, to disc e r n Soviet perceptions through a set of c r i t e r i a that the Soviets do not recognize. The importance of taking assumptions into account i n studying perceptions cannot be overemphasized. As Connolly writes, "To explain the p o l i t i c s of a society we must be able to make the actions, p r o j e c t s , and p r a c t i c e s of i t s members i n t e l l i g i b l e . But a simple act or pattern of action embodied i n i n s t i t u t i o n s i s not made i n t e l l i g i b l e merely by observing overt behavior. Actions and pr a c t i c e s are constituted i n part 4 by the concepts and b e l i e f s the p a r t i c i p a n t s themselves have." This observation i s e s p e c i a l l y true with regard to the Soviet school of thought, which bases i t s e l f on Marxist epistemology and d i f f e r s i n fundamental respects from mainstream Western approaches to i n t e r n a t i o n a l r e l a t i o n s . A primary Soviet assumption i s that the movement of the world h i s t o r i c a l process i n favor of soci a l i s m i s "objective" and i s therefore preordained. As a c o r o l l a r y to t h i s assumption, o f f i c i a l Soviet 5 doctrine p o s i t s the i n e v i t a b i l i t y of the ultimate collapse of c a p i t a l i s m . However, capi t a l i s m , or i t s more advanced manifestation, imperialism, does not y i e l d i t s entrenched posi t i o n s without struggle, p r i m a r i l y m i l i t a r y struggle. In general, then, c a p i t a l i s t states pursue p o l i c i e s which go against the natural flow of i n t e r n a t i o n a l development. The s o c i a l i s t states, on the other hand, fashion p o l i c i e s which flow with the current. I t i s t h i s d i a l e c t i c that i s explored i n analyses of the c o r r e l a t i o n of forces. In the Soviet schema, the p o l i c i e s pursued by states—whether s o c i a l i s t or c a p i t a l i s t — a r e "subjective" f a c t o r s e i t h e r hastening or retarding the tempo of the " o b j e c t i v e " h i s t o r i c a l movement toward socialism and communism. This "objective" process i s deemed as being " i r r e v e r s i b l e . " As an a u t h o r i t a t i v e text of Marxist-Leninist ideology explains: Marxism-Leninsim which regards s o c i a l laws d i a l e c t i c a l l y sees that they operate i n the form of a dominating tendency of development i n given s o c i a l r e l a t i o n s . This means that a law determines the general d i r e c t i o n of movement ne c e s s a r i l y ensuing from c e r t a i n objective conditions. But s o c i a l development i s contradictory, and the concrete course of events depends not only on general laws but on the actual c o r r e l a t i o n of c l a s s forces, on the p o l i c y gf the warring classes and many other s p e c i f i c conditions. International p o l i t i c s , then, are seen to be i n a state of f l u x as long as the two s o c i a l systems—the c a p i t a l i s t and the s o c i a l i s t — c o e x i s t . The notion of change as a natural phenomenon i s c e n t r a l to Soviet thinking. In most Western p o l i t i c a l analyses, s t a b i l i t y i s taken as a given and any disturbance of the status quo i s seen as deserving explanation. Soviet commentators use a very d i f f e r e n t s t a r t i n g point. For Soviet analysts, change i s a given, and therefore i s not worthy of explanation i n and of i t s e l f . What does need to be 6 explained, however, i s the rate of change, or more appropriately, forward movement. For instance, speaking i n 1982 at an i n t e r n a t i o n a l arms control symposium about contemporary i n t e r n a t i o n a l developments, Genrikh Trofimenko, a foremost Soviet Americanologist, stated: For the Soviet Union, sustaining global s t a b i l i t y means maintaining the present balance of m i l i t a r y forces i n the world. . . .At the same time the Soviet Union accepts the p o s s i b i l i t y of changes i n the s o c i o p o l i t i c a l status quo. . . . He further describes such changes as a "natural stage i n the ongoing s o c i o p o l i t i c a l evolution of the world," i n contrast, he observes, to American p o l i t i c i a n s and scholars who see these processes as "unnatural." In giving such a r e s t r i c t i v e d e f i n i t i o n to the term s t a b i l i t y , Trofimenko's analysis i l l u s t r a t e s that t h i s concept i n i t s Western connotation i s quite a l i e n to Soviet thinking. In f a c t , as Trofimenko puts i t , "In the Soviet Union p o l i t i c i a n s and academicians as a general rule do not use the term 'global s t a b i l i t y . ' They usually r e f e r instead to the global 'balance of forces'."^ The l a t t e r term, of course, embodies the notion of an i n e v i t a b l e forward movement toward socialism. In t h i s vein, Soviet analysts r i g h t l y maintain that the concept of the c o r r e l a t i o n of forces i s d i f f e r e n t from the Western notion of the balance of power i n that, unlike the l a t t e r concept i n which the attainment of s t a b i l i t y i n the International system i s seen as the ce n t r a l objective, the idea of the c o r r e l a t i o n of forces presupposes dynamic movement toward a c l e a r l y defined end. The term " c o r r e l a t i o n of forc e s " would presumably be redundant when the Marxist v i s i o n of a communist world was f i n a l l y r e a l i z e d . As one Soviet analyst has observed, " r i v a l r y , struggle, and c o n f l i c t of the two opposing systems 7 are o b j e c t i v e l y inescapable as long as two d i f f e r e n t socio-economic systems e x i s t . The idea that the phenomenon of change i s basic, and that s t a b i l i t y and f i x i t y are a r t i f i c i a l constructs imposed on r e a l i t y by observers seeking to understand and explain i t , i s not a s o l e l y Marxist world view. I t traces i t s heritage as f a r back as H e r a c l i t u s . Marxist ideology did, however, append a unique dimension to t h i s perspective i n s p e c i f y i n g the d i r e c t i o n of change: that i n t e r n a t i o n a l s o c i a l development would i n e v i t a b l y propel i t s e l f toward so c i a l i s m and communism through the instrumentality of struggling classes. The implications for our study of such a Soviet bias are quite apparent. Overt adherence to doctrine, and often i m p l i c i t f a i t h i n the correctness of the Marxist world view, i n j e c t s a note of compulsory optimism into most Soviet analyses of the c o r r e l a t i o n of forces. This i s evident i n the customary formulation that the c o r r e l a t i o n of forces i s moving i n favour of socialism. Soviet leaders and analysts do not and cannot s p e c i f i c a l l y aver that the c o r r e l a t i o n of forces i s not moving i n favor of s o c i a l i s m . To do so would not only contravene one of the basic assumptions of Marxist ideology, but would be a l o g i c a l l y f a l l a c i o u s p r o p o s i t i o n to t r y to uphold i n the context of a Marxist framework of a n a l y s i s . Hints of Soviet pessimism regarding i n t e r n a t i o n a l developments must, therefore, be gleaned from t h e i r assessment of the rate of the forward movement toward s o c i a l i s m . In other words, to help us d i s t i n g u i s h between genuine and spurious optimism, the question we have to ask ourselves i s t h i s one: having declared that the c o r r e l a t i o n of forces i s moving i n favor of socialism, i n what manner does the Soviet scholar or d e c i s i o n maker proceed to 8 evaluate contemporary i n t e r n a t i o n a l events? A f i n a l observation r e l a t e s to the Soviet view of the constituent elements which enter into any estimation of the c o r r e l a t i o n of forces. In t h e i r treatment of the concept, Soviet students of i n t e r n a t i o n a l a f f a i r s u s u a l l y r e f e r to factors which may be grouped under three major aspects: the economic, the m i l i t a r y , and the p o l i t i c a l . The economic and m i l i t a r y dimensions are self-explanatory. The p o l i t i c a l dimension i s more of a c a t c h - a l l category including i d e o l o g i c a l f a c t o r s , " c l a s s f o r c e s , " and "subjective" forces such as the p o l i c i e s of states. Class forces i s a nebulous term and i s not defined p r e c i s e l y i n Soviet w r i t i n g . In the s t r i c t Marxist sense, i t may be taken to represent the p r o l e t a r i a t or the working cla s s whose s p e c i a l r o l e i n ushering i n a new s o c i a l i s t order i s never questioned by Soviet scholars. This mix of tangible and intangible elements renders v i r t u a l l y impossible any estimation of the c o r r e l a t i o n based on s t r i c t l y q uantitative measures. As Raymond Garthoff has pointed out, the Soviets 8 do not "make e x p l i c i t any c r i t e r i a f o r c a l c u l a t i o n " of the c o r r e l a t i o n . The intangible elements, though, serve an expedient function during periods when the tangible aspects of the c o r r e l a t i o n do not appear to favor the U.S.S.R. At such times Soviet analysts can c i t e the influence of such non-quantifiable factors to support t h e i r argument f or a forward movement, a l b e i t slow, i n favor of soci a l i s m . This provides us with another clue i n our i n v e s t i g a t i o n . By c l o s e l y monitoring the aspects of the c o r r e l a t i o n which are stressed at p a r t i c u l a r points i n time, we may ascert a i n both the extent of p r e v a i l i n g optimism or pessimism and a r r i v e at some conclusions regarding the changing hierarchy of values which guides Soviet thinking on matters of i n t e r n a t i o n a l p o l i t i c s . 9 TERMS OF REFERENCE, SOURCES, AND METHODOLOGY The most common Russian rendering for the notion of a d i s t r i b u t i o n of power i s the generic term sootnoshenie s i l or c o r r e l a t i o n of forces. This expression, i n i t s e l f , i s n eutral i n i t s connotation of a favorable or unfavorable balance and needs q u a l i f i e r s to help s p e c i f y nature and d i r e c t i o n . Sootnoshenie s i l i s the concept most frequently employed by Soviet leaders and analysts i n t h e i r discussion of the power d i s t r i b u t i o n between socialism and capitalism. Another neutral expression, which i s employed les s often and i s used interchangeably with sootnoshenie s i l , i s rasstanovka s i l or d i s p o s i t i o n of forces. Two other terms which are more concise i n s p e c i f y i n g the nature of the d i s t r i b u t i o n of power are pereves s i l , or preponderance of forces, and 9 ravnovesie s i l , or equilibrium of forces. In our a n a l y s i s , we s h a l l , f or purposes of c l a r i t y , adhere to the following English equivalents of the Russian phrases outlined above: (1) sootnoshenie s i l as c o r r e l a t i o n of forces. Very often i n English-language Russian sources, t h i s term i s rendered i n English as balance of forces. In such cases we s h a l l r e t a i n t h i s p a r t i c u l a r t r a n s l a t i o n of the phrase; (2) rasstanovka s i l as d i s p o s i t i o n of forces or alignment of forces; (3) pereves s i l as preponderance of forces; and (4) ravnovesie s i l as equilibrium of forces. Soviet l i t e r a t u r e on i n t e r n a t i o n a l p o l i t i c s has p r o l i f e r a t e d since 1956 when the f i r s t major steps to encourage scholarship i n t h i s area were i n i t i a t e d by the p o s t - S t a l i n leadership. For i t s source material, 10 then, t h i s study u t i l i z e s published Soviet analyses of i n t e r n a t i o n a l a f f a i r s that appear r e g u l a r l y i n the following journals: Mirovaia  Ekonomika i Mezhdunarodnye Otnosheniia, hereinafter MEMO; International  A f f a i r s , h e r e i n a f t e r IA; and Kommunist. The f i r s t two publications are s p e c i a l i z e d journals dealing with i n t e r n a t i o n a l r e l a t i o n s . IA i s an English-language version of the Russian jo u r n a l Mezhdunarodnaia Zhizn' (International L i f e ) which started p u b l i c a t i o n i n 1955. The f i r s t issue of MEMO appeared i n p r i n t i n July 1957 and i s the o f f i c i a l p u b l i c a t i o n of the I n s t i t u t e of World Economy and International Relations of the U.S.S.R. Academy of Sciences. Kommunist i s the prime p e r i o d i c a l issued under the auspices of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. In addition, the speeches and pronouncements of Party leaders who shape and influence the conduct of Soviet f o r e i g n p o l i c y are examined, as are relevant documents of the Soviet Communist Party and the i n t e r n a t i o n a l communist movement. The methodology employed here i n charting the chronological evolution of Soviet thinking regarding the c o r r e l a t i o n of forces consists of a c a r e f u l and discr i m i n a t i n g textual analysis of v a r i a t i o n s i n Soviet s c h o l a r l y and o f f i c i a l use of the concept over time, with due regard to contextual f l u c t u a t i o n s i n the domestic and i n t e r n a t i o n a l realms. Our focus w i l l be on the years spanning the tenures of the Khrushchev, Brezhnev, and post-Brezhnev leadership. Although the use of the research methodology outlined above i s f a i r l y widespread among So v i e t o l o g i s t s seeking to tap the Soviet p o l i t i c a l mind, i t has been dogged by persistent c r i t i c i s m s which need to be examined. In t h i s section we s h a l l address both the objections that may be rais e d i n connection with the present study as well as the 11 l i m i t a t i o n s inherent i n the nature of the enterprise. Two basic queries of a very general character may be rai s e d i n connection with the task of undertaking to uncover the perceptions of any i n d i v i d u a l or group of i n d i v i d u a l s — i n t h i s instance, of Soviet scholars and policy-makers. F i r s t , i s i t possible f o r an analyst to gauge perceptions accurately? And, second* does an analysis of the printed word provide us with a r e l i a b l e operational measure of perceptions? Doubtless, an i n v e s t i g a t i o n of perceptions i s fraught with d i f f i c u l t i e s , e s p e c i a l l y since one can never be completely c e r t a i n that one's own perceptions do not cloud the c l a r i t y and a u t h e n t i c i t y of the representation of Soviet views. But even the awareness of roadblocks i n the path of inquiry i s u s e f u l , for i t can help i n a l e r t i n g the analyst to possible p i t f a l l s i n a n a l y s i s . Cognizance of one's own c u l t u r a l bias and a conscious attempt to take into account the epistemological foundations of Soviet thinking can at l e a s t minimize the r i s k s of misi n t e r p r e t i n g Soviet perceptions, and can, i n the process, endow us with better i n s i g h t s into the Soviet world-view. The preceding section of t h i s chapter i s devoted p r e c i s e l y to such a review of the assumptions underlying the Soviet perspective. In t h i s study, we hope to record the evolution of Soviet perceptions of the c o r r e l a t i o n of forces through an analysis of published Soviet materials on the subject. This presupposes a judgement that the printed and spoken word can provide us with a r e l i a b l e i n d i c a t o r of perceptions. Of course, t h i s i s not to deny that Soviet scholars and p o l i c y makers do use the written and verbal medium for multiple purposes of which manipulation and j u s t i f i c a t i o n form a part. 12 However, Soviet leaders and scholars also endeavor to understand, int e r p r e t and integrate the ebb and flow of i n t e r n a t i o n a l events into the larger p i c t u r e of h i s t o r i c a l development. One i s strengthened i n t h i s b e l i e f because, within the contraints of Marxist-Leninist doctrine, Soviet discussions of the c o r r e l a t i o n of forces between socialism and c a p i t a l i s m do attempt to deal with changed i n t e r n a t i o n a l circumstances, ei t h e r favorable or unfavorable from t h e i r perspective. Moreover, e s p e c i a l l y i n the Soviet Union, communications from the top leadership to various e l i t e s on the content and d i r e c t i o n of p o l i c y takes place, i n large measure, through writings and speeches published i n the Soviet press. Therefore, a t t e n t i o n to the context and intended audience for a p a r t i c u l a r message can help i n c l a r i f y i n g Soviet views. Through a cautious and d i s c r i m i n a t i n g approach, then, i t i s possible f o r the student of Soviet p o l i t i c s to s i f t nuggets of valuable i n s i g h t s from the chaff of verbiage. Our discussion, thus f a r , seems to imply the existence of a u n i f i e d and i d e n t i f i a b l e Soviet perspective. Whether a s i n g l e Soviet view, representative of a p a r t i c u l a r time period, can be i s o l a t e d , or may even be said to e x i s t , i s the t h i r d issue which we need to consider here. The answer, for reasons we s h a l l delineate below, i s neither absolute nor c l e a r - c u t . On balance, with reference to our inquiry into Soviet perceptions of the c o r r e l a t i o n of forces, there appears to be at any one time a basic congruence of stated opinion among Soviet leaders and analysts. The exceptions to the preceding observation occur during periods when the top Party leadership i s i t s e l f e i t h e r uncertain or i n disagreement as to socialism's r e l a t i v e standing i n the c o r r e l a t i o n of 13 forces with c a p i t a l i s m . At such times, there i s a diverse array of often contradictory views of the c o r r e l a t i o n of forces i n the Soviet press and s c h o l a r l y p u b l i c a t i o n s . Debate i s , perhaps, encouraged at t h i s stage. But once a c r y s t a l l i z a t i o n of opinion occurs within the core Party leadership, discussions again assume a tamer and more conformist character. The years between 1962 ( e s p e c i a l l y a f t e r the Cuban m i s s i l e c r i s i s ) and Khrushchev's ouster i n October 1964, f o r instance, represent a period of ferment i n Soviet discussions of the c o r r e l a t i o n of forces. Also, beginning with the l a t t e r years of Brezhnev's term of o f f i c e , Soviet i n t e r n a t i o n a l r e l a t i o n s analysts have begun to pay more attention to the methods of analysis of Western academics and have become quite adept at presenting Soviet views i n a manner palatable to informed Western audiences. Such a p r a c t i c e could have the e f f e c t of complicating our study by suggesting i n t e r p r e t a t i o n a l d i f f e r e n c e s where there are none. But the impediments to analysis posed by the dissemination of s e l e c t i v e i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s of Soviet thinking and behavior by such s c h o l a r l y good-will ambassadors as Georgi Arbatov and Genrikh Trofimenko are not insuperable as long as one i s c a r e f u l to consult communications which are intended for domestic Soviet audiences as w e l l . In the West, there has been, since the 1960s, a growing body of l i t e r a t u r e which has taken f o r i t s object the task of i d e n t i f y i n g " i n t e r e s t groups" i n Soviet p o l i t i c s . But Western analysts agree for the most part that advocacy groups function only minimally, i f at a l l , i n areas of p o l i c y that are grouped i n what Seweryn B i a l e r c a l l s "high p o l i t i c s . " * ^ Most issues of foreign p o l i c y would c e r t a i n l y f a l l w ithin 14 the purview of "high p o l i t i c s . " Because p o l i c i e s formulated on the basis of assessments of the c o r r e l a t i o n of forces involve high p o l i t i c a l stakes, there i s a greater tendency toward uniformity of opinion at t h i s l e v e l . Even here, though, there are a few important advocacy groups—such as the m i l i t a r y — w h i c h may be at odds with the p o l i t i c a l leadership over the implications, e s p e c i a l l y i n the sphere of budgetary a l l o c a t i o n s f o r defense, flowing from a given assessment of the c o r r e l a t i o n of forces. Where such differences do surface i n the course of our a n a l y s i s , we s h a l l examine t h e i r substance and impact. In general, the views expressed by Soviet s c h o l a r l y c i r c l e s more or l e s s coincide with those enunciated by the Soviet p o l i t i c a l leadership. A f i n a l methodological objection l i k e l y to be rai s e d i n connection with the present study i s that we r e f r a i n from employing a formal content-analytic mode i n conducting our i n v e s t i g a t i o n . This c r i t i c i s m i s less troubling f o r several reasons. The nature of the v a r i a b l e s we have chosen to analyse does not e a s i l y lend i t s e l f to q u a n t i f i c a t i o n . Moreover, i n our analysis of Soviet perceptions of the c o r r e l a t i o n of forces, the " o u t l i e r s " or deviations from the norm, are important. For example, the number of times the term "preponderance of for c e s " was used between 1959 and 1961, compared with the frequency of usage of the term " c o r r e l a t i o n of fo r c e s , " would render the former term s t a t i s t i c a l l y i n s i g n i f i c a n t , but i n f a c t , t h i s a l t e r n a t i v e formulation i s very important as an i n d i c a t o r of a changing trend i n Soviet perceptions of i n t e r n a t i o n a l p o l i t i c a l r e a l i t y . 15 GENERAL HYPOTHESES Over the years there has been a long-simmering debate among non-Marxist scholars over the respective r o l e s of ideology and r e a l p o l i t i k i n guiding Soviet conduct. The controversy i s not e a s i l y resolved because the mix of Marx and M a c h i a v e l l i i n Soviet w r i t i n g v a r i e s according to time and s i t u a t i o n , and r a r e l y does one encounter an unadulterated version of e i t h e r . I t i s not our purpose here to delve into the pros and cons of t h i s s c h o l a r l y controversy but merely to note i t s implications f o r our study of Soviet perceptions of the c o r r e l a t i o n of forces. An analyst who p o s i t s that ideology i s of overriding concern to Soviet leaders and scholars would expect l i t t l e or no v a r i a t i o n i n the usage and discussion of the term " c o r r e l a t i o n of f o r c e s . " On the other hand, i f one hews to the view that the Soviets do respond to events i n the changing world environment, one would i n f e r , at the very l e a s t , a le s s r i g i d a t t i t u d e toward varying formulations of t h i s concept. We hypothesize that both of the above posit i o n s bear some correspondence with Soviet p o l i t i c a l r e a l i t y . Hypothesis 1: On a higher l e v e l of a b s t r a c t i o n — t h e "grand theory" l e v e l or what the Soviets would c a l l " s t r a t e g i c " level—where Soviet scholars use the term c o r r e l a t i o n of forces i n r e f e r r i n g to the long-term movement of "ob j e c t i v e " h i s t o r i c a l forces, we expect no v a r i a t i o n i n usage. For example, i t w i l l be stated that the c o r r e l a t i o n of forces was, i s , and w i l l always be moving i n favor of soc i a l i s m . Hypothesis 2: On a lower degree of a b s t r a c t i o n — o r the " t a c t i c a l " level—when Soviet leaders and scholars are speaking of the actual and 16 contemporary s i t u a t i o n and short-term projections into the future, we expect considerable v a r i a t i o n i n usage. Soviet c a l c u l a t i o n s on the l a t t e r l e v e l perhaps d i c t a t e the choice of p a r t i c u l a r p o l i c i e s during s p e c i f i c h i s t o r i c a l periods. I t i s v a r i a t i o n s i n formulation on t h i s second l e v e l which w i l l provide the g r i s t for our analysis of the evolution of Soviet thinking on matters impinging on the c o r r e l a t i o n of forces. Marxist-Leninist ideology prides i t s e l f on having discovered s c i e n t i f i c laws of s o c i a l development—laws which operate i r r e s p e c t i v e of i n d i v i d u a l s . The "great man" theory of h i s t o r y , then, i s e s p e c i a l l y at odds with the tenets of Marxist-Leninist doctrine. Of course, i t i s not j u s t Marxist-Leninists who disagree with theories which ascribe a paramount r o l e to the i n d i v i d u a l . I t i s i n the nature of a l l macro-theories to s a c r i f i c e emphasis on the p a r t i c u l a r i n order to gain a wider and long-term h i s t o r i c a l perspective. Western t h e o r i s t s who seek to determine empirical r e g u l a r i t i e s i n International p o l i t i c a l l i f e a l s o tend to minimize the capacity of sing l e i n d i v i d u a l s to e f f e c t s i g n i f i c a n t and l a s t i n g changes on the i n t e r n a t i o n a l or domestic stage. Hypothesis 3: In the short run, however, i n d i v i d u a l s do make a di f f e r e n c e . We argue that the per s o n a l i t y and p r o c l i v i t i e s of an i n d i v i d u a l do have considerable impact on the conduct of foreign p o l i c y . The exuberant optimism of the Khrushchev period, f o r instance, contrasts sharply with the muted optimism of the Brezhnev period. On the face of i t , t h i s may not appear p a r t i c u l a r l y s i g n i f i c a n t . But the overly o p t i m i s t i c streak i n Khrushchev's pe r s o n a l i t y and the tendency to look always on the bright side of things translated e a s i l y i n t o b l u f f and bl u s t e r , and overstatement of f a c t and achievement. Many of the events 17 and occurrences during Khrushchev's tenure i n o f f i c e as well as Soviet p o l i c i e s and the American response to them, would be d i f f i c u l t to account f o r unless one introduced the impact of Khrushchev's personality into the explanatory equation. The sharp increase i n the U.S. m i l i t a r y budget f o r 1961 was occasioned i n part by Khrushchev's i n f l a t e d claims regarding Soviet m i l i t a r y might. Khrushchev's successors i n the Kremlin have as a r u l e r e f r a i n e d from the verbal excesses of t h e i r predecessor. The impact of the Brezhnev team's cautious and deliberate approach i s most evident i n very c a r e f u l characterizations of Soviet m i l i t a r y power. At a time when the m i l i t a r y arsenal of the Soviet Union has grown so v a s t l y that some Western m i l i t a r y analysts wonder i f the Soviets now do not possess an edge over the United States i n t h i s area, Soviet commentary has not come close to claiming the m i l i t a r y s u p e r i o r i t y that Khrushchev f a l s e l y boasted about i n 1960. This conscious verbal reticence, which has been the s t y l e of the Brezhnev leadership, and i s r e f l e c t e d i n contemporary s c h o l a r l y analyses of the c o r r e l a t i o n of forces, would j u s t i f y a bolder i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of any Soviet expressions of m i l i t a r y confidence, however muted, than might otherwise appear reasonable. ORGANIZATION OF STUDY This study i s chr o n o l o g i c a l l y ordered. Chapter Two w i l l b r i e f l y discuss the L e n i n i s t and S t a l i n i s t world views i n order to provide the background f o r our subsequent a n a l y s i s . For t h i s review we s h a l l r e l y mainly on the works of Lenin and S t a l i n . Chapters Three through Five w i l l discuss three phases i n the evolution of Soviet thinking during the 18 Khrushchev years. The subsequent four chapters (Six through Nine) w i l l trace changes i n Soviet views of the c o r r e l a t i o n under Brezhnev. Chapter Nine w i l l also include an analysis of developments during the Andropov-Chernenko in t e r l u d e . The general format of Chapters Three through Nine w i l l consist of an exposition of the record and tenor of Soviet statements on the c o r r e l a t i o n of forces, followed by an analysis of Soviet commentary with reference both to p o l i c y and the domestic-international context. The f i n a l chapter w i l l make a tentative e x p l o r a t i o n a l foray into the period ushered i n by Gorbachev's leadership as well as sum up the main r e s u l t s of our i n v e s t i g a t i o n into Soviet perceptions of the c o r r e l a t i o n of forces. 19 NOTES 1. For a pioneering study i n t h i s area, see Robert J e r v i s , Perception and Misperception i n International P o l i t i c s (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton U n i v e r s i t y Press, 1976). 2. Stephen P. Gibert, et a l . , Soviet Images of America (New York: Crane Russak & Co., Inc., 1977); Morton Schwartz, Soviet Perceptions of the United States (Berkeley, C a l i f . : U n i v e r s i t y of C a l i f o r n i a Press, 1978); R. Judson M i t c h e l l , Ideology of a Superpower: Contemporary  Soviet Doctrine on International Relations (Stanford, C a l i f . : Hoover I n s t i t u t e Press, 1982); John Lenczowski, Soviet  Perceptions of U.S. Foreign P o l i c y (Ithaca, N.Y.: C o r n e l l U n i v e r s i t y Press, 1982). 3. William Zimmerman, Soviet Perspectives on International  Relations: 1956-1968 (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton U n i v e r s i t y Press, 1969). 4. William E. Connolly, " E s s e n t i a l l y Contested Concepts i n P o l i t i c s , " i n W. E. Connolly, ed. The Terms of P o l i t i c a l  Discourse (Lexington, Mass.: D.C. Heath and Co., 1976), p. 36. Emphasis i n o r i g i n a l . 5. Otto Kuusinen, ed. Fundamentals of Marxism-Leninism (London: Lawrence and Wishart, 1961), p. 166. 6. Genrikh Trofimenko, "Challenges to Global S t a b i l i t y i n the 1980s: A Soviet View," i n Adam M. G a r f i n k l e , ed. Global  Perspectives on Arms Control (New York: Praeger, 1984), p. 33. For a c r i t i q u e of the notion of change i n Western i n t e r n a t i o n a l r e l a t i o n s l i t e r a t u r e , see Barry Buzan and R. J . Barry Jones, eds. Change and the Study of International Relations: The  Evaded Dimension (London: Frances Pinter,1981). 7. N. Inozemtsev, "Problemy sovremennogo mirovogo r a z v i t i i a i mezhdunarodnykh otnoshenii" [Problems of Modern World Development and International R e l a t i o n s ] , Kommunist (15), October 1976, p. 78. 8. Raymond L. Garthoff, "The Concept of the Balance of Power i n Soviet Policy-Making," IV World P o l i t i c s 1, October 1951, p. 94. 9. For a d e t a i l e d exposition of these terms, see i b i d . , pp. 86-90. 20 This does not imply, however, that no diff e r e n c e s e x i s t beneath the surface among members of the top p o l i t i c a l leadership c i r c l e . E s p e c i a l l y during the Khrushchev era, opposition to the F i r s t Secretary's s t y l e and method of conducting foreign p o l i c y often gave r i s e to debates of varying i n t e n s i t y within the Presidium. Where such differences of opinion impinged on the Soviet a t t i t u d e toward the c o r r e l a t i o n of forces, they w i l l be explored. Seweryn B i a l e r , S t a l i n ' s Successors; Leadership,  S t a b i l i t y and Change i n the Soviet Union (Cambridge: Cambridge U n i v e r s i t y Press, 1980), pp. 166-167. CHAPTER II LENINIST AND STALINIST WORLD VIEWS In November 1917, the Bolsheviks seized power i n Russia, established the f i r s t s o c i a l i s t s tate, and adopted Marxist doctrine as t h e i r o f f i c i a l credo. The leaders of the young Soviet state could not, however, turn to Marx f o r answers to vexing p o l i c y problems. In the vast corpus of his writings, Marx did not bequeath a well-elaborated theory of i n t e r n a t i o n a l r e l a t i o n s . Marx was more concerned with examining a society's i n t e r n a l economic structure and enunciating laws of h i s t o r i c a l development. As Kubalkova and Cruickshank have pointed out, the h o r i z o n t a l d i v i s i o n of society into states was, f o r Marx, merely an "epiphenomenon" of v e r t i c a l c l a s s d i v i s i o n s . * The European state-system was thought by him to be a t r a n s i t o r y s o c i a l stage brought into existence by the dominant bourgeois c l a s s i n c a p i t a l i s t society. In h i s v i s i o n of a c l a s s l e s s communist world where the state would "wither away," foreign p o l i c y concerns must have seemed extraneous at best. Class, rather than nation-state, formed the fundamental unit of Marxist a n a l y s i s . Based upon inexorable laws of class struggle, Marx predicted the eventual replacement of ca p i t a l i s m with the higher s o c i a l i s t order. World War I, however, did not prove to be the harbinger of s o c i a l i s t revolutions i n the advanced c a p i t a l i s t countries of Europe. When events i n Twentieth Century Europe f a i l e d to unfold according to the Marxian prognostic schema, Lenin i n h i s 1916 work, Imperialism, the  Highest Stage of Capitalism, undertook to revise theory to make i t accord with i n t e r n a t i o n a l r e a l i t y . Imperialism, argued Lenin, was 22 capitalism In i t s most advanced manifestation. Monopolistic groupings i n i m p e r i a l i s t countries, motivated by the p r o f i t impulse, would seek outward expansion and export c a p i t a l to backward or "oppressed" countries. In the course of t h e i r operations i n the undeveloped areas, these commercial groups would draw upon the support of t h e i r respective home governments. In t h i s way, the c a p i t a l i s t powers would acquire colonies around the world. This expansionist impetus would, i n turn, create c o n f l i c t between i m p e r i a l i s t states which would eventually lead to war. From such reasoning stemmed the L e n i n i s t thesis of the i n e v i t a b i l i t y of wars among c a p i t a l i s t countries. The p r o l e t a r i a t i n these advanced i n d u s t r i a l countries, s a t i s f i e d with the economic gains passed down to them by the c a p i t a l i s t s , would be diverted from performing t h e i r h i s t o r i c mission even when conditions would be r i p e for r e v o l u t i o n . This, Lenin concluded, was the reason for the f a i l u r e of the F i r s t World War (which was an " i m p e r i a l i s t " war) to spawn revolutionary movements i n the advanced European countries. Lenin's analysis of capitalism's " i m p e r i a l i s t stage" provided the backdrop for h i s p o s t u l a t i o n that r e v o l u t i o n would occur i n a country which represented the "weakest l i n k of the chain." In one bold stroke, then, Lenin adjusted Marxist theory, with i t s emphasis upon v e r t i c a l c l a s s d i v i s i o n s within i n d u s t r i a l s o c i e t i e s , to accord with the r e a l i t y of the h o r i z o n t a l d i v i s i o n of society into states. In e f f e c t , Lenin saw advanced i n d u s t r i a l states p i t t e d against oppressed nations. The l i n e s of b a t t l e were now re-drawn to focus p r i m a r i l y on competition at the i n t e r n a t i o n a l l e v e l . Kubalkova and Cruickshank explain the L e n i n i s t reformulation of Marxist thought thus: The v e r t i c a l and h o r i z o n t a l d i v i s i o n s were now seen to intermingle i n a h i t h e r t o unprecedented manner. Just as the 23 . bourgeoisie overflows the h o r i z o n t a l boundaries of i t s own state and becomes an i m p e r i a l i s t class spread over a l l the globe, so the working cla s s i s subjected to a s i m i l a r process. . . . No longer do the classes within states, but states (the backward ones) themselves, assume c l a s s consciousness, now on a world scale. . . . Thus, while Lenin did not at any time deny the Importance of c l a s s c o n f l i c t within states, he stressed the global i n t e r - s t a t e dimensions of t h i s struggle. According to L e n i n i s t thinking, then, the success of a r e v o l u t i o n depended not merely on a favorable c o r r e l a t i o n of c l a s s forces within a state but also on the i n t e r n a t i o n a l c o r r e l a t i o n of forces. This brings us to a discussion of the c e n t r a l theme of the present chapter: to examine L e n i n i s t and S t a l i n i s t pronouncements on the concept of the c o r r e l a t i o n and to assess the r o l e ascribed to i t i n early Soviet f o r e i g n - p o l i c y decision-making. For t h i s purpose, we s h a l l undertake a b r i e f tour d'horizon of the writings and speeches of Lenin and S t a l i n on the subject. LENIN ON THE CORRELATION OF FORCES For Lenin, as f o r h i s successors i n the Soviet leadership, the concept of the c o r r e l a t i o n of forces served three major functions. Arguments based upon an assessment of the c o r r e l a t i o n could be used: (1) to analyze and understand the i n t e r n a t i o n a l s i t u a t i o n ; (2) to o r i e n t and guide p o l i c y ; (3) to j u s t i f y and l e g i t i m i z e p o l i c y d e c i s i o n s — b o t h external and domestic. A l l of these purposes were i n e x t r i c a b l y bound together i n Lenin's expositions on the i n t e r n a t i o n a l climate and the goals of Soviet p o l i c y during the months preceding the Bolshevik r e v o l u t i o n and the years following the establishment of Soviet power i n Russia. 24 Lenin frequently underscored the need for every Marxist to a r r i v e at a " s t r i c t l y exact and o b j e c t i v e l y v e r i f i a b l e analysis of the r e l a t i o n s of classes [sootnosheniia klassov] and of the concrete 3 features p e c u l i a r to each h i s t o r i c a l s i t u a t i o n , " and argued that "Bolsheviks have always t r i e d to meet t h i s requirement which i s 4 absolutely e s s e n t i a l f or giving a s c i e n t i f i c foundation to p o l i c y . " He did not, however, d e t a i l the c r i t e r i a for estimating the c o r r e l a t i o n . Most of Lenin's arguments i n support of or against the p o l i c i e s to be pursued by the Bolsheviks tended to be based upon h i s reading of the c o r r e l a t i o n of c l a s s forces. In order to provide a framework for our analysis of L e n i n i s t thinking on t h i s subject, we s h a l l focus on three themes: the reasons adduced by Lenin to explain the success of the Bolshevik r e v o l u t i o n ; h i s arguments i n favor of the Brest-Litovsk treaty; and f i n a l l y h i s i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s of the period of C i v i l War and foreign intervention. According to Lenin, s o c i a l i s t r e v o l u t i o n i n Russia owed i t s v i c t o r y to a unique concatenation o f domestic and i n t e r n a t i o n a l circumstances. The favorable c o r r e l a t i o n of c l a s s forces within the country, achieved through an a l l i a n c e of the p r o l e t a r i a t and the peasantry, had made possible the rout of the c a p i t a l i s t c l a s s . But what of the i n t e r n a t i o n a l c o r r e l a t i o n of forces? Russia was a m i l i t a r i l y weak and economically backward nation compared with the powerful " i m p e r i a l i s t " countries. The p r o l e t a r i a n r e v o l u t i o n i n Russia, Lenin knew, could not have survived concerted opposition from the advanced c a p i t a l i s t states. The success of the r e v o l u t i o n , then, was made possible only because the countries representing " i n t e r n a t i o n a l imperialism" were locked " i n a mortal struggle with each other, were paralysed i n t h e i r offensive 25 against Russia." Revolutionary events occurred "independently of world imperialism," and Russia was "temporarily independent of i n t e r n a t i o n a l relations."*' The existence of a propitious configuration of i n t e r n a l and external f a c t o r s — t h e favorable domestic cl a s s c o r r e l a t i o n coupled with the temporary impotence of a powerful i n t e r n a t i o n a l b o u r g e o i s i e — n o t only made possibl e , but mandated revolutionary advance. Likewise, during a period when the i n t e r n a t i o n a l c o r r e l a t i o n of forces was unfavorable, r e t r e a t was permissible. This represented the crux of the L e n i n i s t argument i n favor of the Brest-Litovsk treaty. In the e a r l y days of Soviet power, the leaders of the USSR were able to acknowledge candidly the weakness of t h e i r country—both m i l i t a r i l y and e c o n o m i c a l l y — v i s - a - v i s the countries of Europe.^ But they also held the view that h i s t o r y was on t h e i r side and that s o c i a l i s m would eventually replace c a p i t a l i s m on a global scale. In other words, while the c o r r e l a t i o n of world forces at that p a r t i c u l a r h i s t o r i c a l juncture did not favor the Soviet r e p u b l i c , i t s s o c i a l i s t trend and d i r e c t i o n were regarded as indisputable. Indeed, Lenin i n 1917 and 1918 appeared to believe that a r e v o l u t i o n i n the advanced European countries was imminent. In early 1918, he wrote, ". . .we, the Russian working and exploited classes, have the honour of being the vanguard of the i n t e r n a t i o n a l s o c i a l i s t r e v o l u t i o n . . . . The Russian began i t — t h e German, the Frenchman and g the Englishman w i l l f i n i s h i t , and s o c i a l i s m w i l l be v i c t o r i o u s . " In h i s theses on the Brest-Litovsk peace, he r e i t e r a t e d , "That the s o c i a l i s t r e v o l u t i o n i n Europe must come, and w i l l come, i s beyond doubt. A l l our hopes f o r the f i n a l v i c t o r y of socialism are founded on 26 t h i s c e r t a i n t y and on t h i s s c i e n t i f i c prognosis." Lenin's expectation that the countries of Europe were on the verge of a s o c i a l i s t r e v o l u t i o n and h i s b e l i e f that Russia needed a "breathing space" led him to argue i n favor of signing the Brest-Litovsk Treaty. The c o r r e l a t i o n of cla s s forces on the domestic and the i n t e r n a t i o n a l l e v e l would not, he asserted, allow f o r Russia's continued p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n the war, even i n the form of a "revolutionary war."*^ On the domestic f r o n t , the poor peasants i n Russia, Lenin reasoned, "are not capable of agreeing to f i g h t a serious revolutionary war. . . . To ignore the objective balance of cla s s forces [sootnoshenie klassovykh s i l ] on t h i s issue would be a f a t a l e r r o r . " * * In the i n t e r n a t i o n a l arena as w e l l , the Russians, Lenin s a i d , would "have to r e t r e a t before forces that are immeasurably greater than ours, before the forces of i n t e r n a t i o n a l imperialism and finance c a p i t a l , before the m i l i t a r y might that the e n t i r e bourgeoisie with t h e i r modern weapons have mustered ..12 against us. . . . A p o l i c y of revolutionary war would " t o t a l l y disregard the objective balance of class forces and material factors at the present 13 stage of the s o c i a l i s t r e v o l u t i o n . " Neither class support nor m i l i t a r y and economic might were on the side of the Soviet Republic and Lenin staunchly advocated a "heroic r e t r e a t " while the Soviet Republic would "wait u n t i l the i n t e r n a t i o n a l s o c i a l i s t p r o l e t a r i a t " came to Its a i d . Then, Lenin predicted, a second s o c i a l i s t r e v o l u t i o n would begin 14 which would be "world-wide i n scope." The European r e v o l u t i o n did not materialize*"* and as time wore on, the Soviet Republic was faced both with c i v i l war and for e i g n i n t e r v e n t i o n . The Red Army therefore had to be organized to repel 27 attacks against the Soviet Republic. Lenin, responding to Kautsky's charge that the Bolsheviks had introduced m i l i t a r i s m instead of socialism, j u s t i f i e d the action, declaring: We are l i v i n g not merely i n a state, but i n a system of  states, and i t i s inconceivable for the Soviet Republic to e x i s t alongside of the i m p e r i a l i s t states for any length of time. One or the other must triumph i n the end. And before that end comes there w i l l have to be a s e r i e s of f r i g h t f u l c o l l i s i o n s between the Soviet Republic and the bourgeois states. I f the r u l i n g c l a s s , the p r o l e t a r i a t , wants to hold power, i t must, therefore, prove i t s a b i l i t y to do so by i t s m i l i t a r y organization. To t h i s statement of Lenin the notion of an i n e v i t a b l e clash between soci a l i s m and c a p i t a l i s m traces i t s roots. The question of m i l i t a r y organization, Lenin explained, did not e x i s t f o r Marx and neither he nor Engels expressed an opinion on t h i s subject.*^ Lenin's reasoning seems to have gone thus: During a period when Russia was weak, the s o c i a l i s t r e v o l u t i o n succeeded only because the p r o l e t a r i a t was able to c a p i t a l i z e on the contradictions of c a p i t a l i s m which had led to an i m p e r i a l i s t war between advanced European countries. With the t a c i t support of the i n t e r n a t i o n a l p r o l e t a r i a t and the favorable domestic c o r r e l a t i o n of c l a s s forces, Russia was able to transform the bourgeois r e v o l u t i o n into a s o c i a l i s t one, even when the i n t e r n a t i o n a l m i l i t a r y and economic c o r r e l a t i o n was c l e a r l y to the Russian disadvantage. Lenin believed, however, that for the s o c i a l i s t i s l a n d to ward o f f the next " i n e v i t a b l e " i m p e r i a l i s t attack and to survive i n a sea of imperialism, Russia would have to b u i l d up i t s m i l i t a r y and economic strength while maneuvering around c a p i t a l i s t c o n t r adictions. The A l l i e d leaders, before the defeat of Germany, had intervened i n the Russian c i v i l war i n order to restore the eastern f r o n t . This armed 28 intervention, though, continued even a f t e r the end of the war, appearing to confirm the L e n i n i s t prognosis. In l a t e 1919, when foreign intervention e f f o r t s were f a l t e r i n g , Lenin expressed some i n c r e d u l i t y at the f a c t that s o c i a l i s m maintained i t s foothold i n Russia i n the face of i m p e r i a l i s t resistance: From the point of view of a m i l i t a r y assessment of these forces, i t r e a l l y i s a miracle because the Entente was an^ continues to be immeasurably stronger than we are. . . . Lenin again resorted to the notion of c l a s s forces to explain t h i s "miracle." The Russian v i c t o r y "was not r e a l l y a m i l i t a r y v i c t o r y at 19 a l l . " " I t was apparent," Lenin s a i d , " . . . that i n the sphere where the grossest material factors play the greatest part, namely, i n the m i l i t a r y sphere, we defeated the Entente countries by depriving them of 20 the workers and peasants i n s o l d i e r s ' uniforms." By the f a l l of 1920, Russia enjoyed peace, and i n November 1920, Lenin expressed s a t i s f a c t i o n that even though the world s o c i a l i s t r e v o l u t i o n had been delayed, "the p o s s i b i l i t y . . . of the existence of 21 p r o l e t a r i a n rule and the Soviet r e p u b l i c " had been maintained. He returned to the theme of s o c i a l i s t Russia's v i c t o r y i n spite of i t s m i l i t a r y weakness: . . . [T]here can be no question of comparing the m i l i t a r y strength of the R.S.F.S.R. with that of a l l the c a p i t a l i s t powers. In t h i s respect we are incomparably weaker than they are, yet, a f t e r three years of war, we have forced almost a l l of these states to abandon the idea of further in t e r v e n t i o n . . . . That has been, not because we have proved m i l i t a r i l y stronger and the Entente weaker, but because throughout t h i s period the d i s i n t e g r a t i o n i n the Entente countries has i n t e n s i f i e d . . . . The workers and peasantS2f)f the c a p i t a l i s t countries could not be forced to f i g h t us. This stalemate, Lenin argued, won Russia the r i g h t to a "fundamental i n t e r n a t i o n a l existence i n the network of c a p i t a l i s t 23 s t a t e s , " and allowed "not merely" for "a breathing space, but f o r a 29 r e a l chance of a new and lengthy period of development." Marx's emphasis on v e r t i c a l c l a s s d i v i s i o n s was not so much repudiated as temporarily side-stepped. S o c i a l i s t Russia's acceptance, a l b e i t t e n t a t i v e , into the i n t e r n a t i o n a l community was, i n L e n i n i s t thinking, a step i n the p o s i t i v e d i r e c t i o n : "The entry of the s o c i a l i s t country into trade r e l a t i o n s with c a p i t a l i s t countries i s a most important f a c t o r ensuring our existence i n such a complex and absolutely 25 exceptional s i t u a t i o n . . . . " Lenin nevertheless i n s i s t e d that absolute s e c u r i t y f o r the p r o l e t a r i a n r e v o l u t i o n i n Russia would come only with world r e v o l u t i o n , when presumably the h o r i z o n t a l ordering of society into states would give way to a world society governed by the p r o l e t a r i a t . Meanwhile, war with c a p i t a l i s t countries would recur. In December 1920, Lenin stated: I said that we had passed from war to peace, but that we had not forgotten that war w i l l return. While c a p i t a l i s m and socia l i s m e x i s t side by side, they cannot l i v e In peace: one or the other w i l l u l t i m a t e l y triumph—the l a s t obsequies w i l l be observed2gither f o r the Soviet Republic or for world ca p i t a l i s m . For the moment, however, there was a "balance based on c a p i t a l i s m . " Capitalism was stronger and therefore, the " p r a c t i c a l task of communist p o l i c y " was "to take advantage of t h i s c a p i t a l i s t h o s t i l i t y and to play 27 one side o f f against the other," while Russia mustered i t s forces. As time wore on, Lenin's conviction of an impending r e v o l u t i o n i n Europe weakened. The leaders of the Soviet Republic thus set about the task of conducting i n t e r n a t i o n a l r e l a t i o n s within the framework of the state system. Lenin never gave up h i s b e l i e f that the f i n a l v i c t o r y of socialism could only be ensured by the breakdown of the c a p i t a l i s t system i n the "advanced" states and i t s replacement by p r o l e t a r i a n r u l e led by a 30 vanguard communist party. Thus, i n December 1921, a f t e r a whole year of peace, Lenin found i t hard to explain how i t was possible f o r "only one S o c i a l i s t Soviet Republic" to e x i s t "surrounded by a whole array of 28 fr e n z i e d l y h o s t i l e i m p e r i a l i s t powers." His explanation, predictably, revolved around the idea of the i n t e r n a t i o n a l s o l i d a r i t y of the working c l a s s : I t turned out that although the support of the working people of the world was not the swift and d i r e c t support that we had counted on, we did receive considerable support of another kind, not a d i r e c t support, not a swift support. . . . No matter how precarious t h i s support may be, as long as cap i t a l i s m e x i s t s i n other countries .we may say that t h i s support can already be r e l i e d on. Peace had led to "an unstable, i n e x p l i c a b l e , and yet to a c e r t a i n 30 extent, indisputable equilibrium." Lenin r e i t e r a t e d : M a t e r i a l l y — e c o n o m i c a l l y and m i l i t a r i l y — w e are extremely weak; but m o r a l l y — b y which . . . I mean not abstract morals, but the alignment of the r e a l forces of a l l classes i n a l l countries—we are ^ he strongest of a l l . This has been proved by p r a c t i c e . . . . Thus, while there was c l e a r l y a d i s e q u i l i b r i u m i n the m i l i t a r y and economic sense, Lenin declared that from the " p o l i t i c a l standpoint" an equilibrium of forces had set i n "between bourgeois society, the i n t e r n a t i o n a l bourgeoisie as a whole, and Soviet Russia." This equilibrium only r e l a t e d to the Immediate " m i l i t a r y struggle" which had temporarily ceased. Lenin emphasized that i t was "only a r e l a t i v e equilibrium and a very unstable one," because the old world of 32 cap i t a l i s m would never surrender v o l u n t a r i l y , and that intervention 33 was only a "hair's breadth away." There was much improvisation i n Lenin's use and a p p l i c a t i o n of the idea of the c o r r e l a t i o n of forces. The march of events and the r e a l i t y of i n t e r n a t i o n a l l i f e gave both shape and content to Lenin's expositions 31 on t h i s theme. In the end, Lenin was forced to accept and attempt to explain within the Marxist framework, the r e a l i t y of the continued existence of a s i n g l e s o c i a l i s t state i n spite of the f a i l u r e of the i n t e r n a t i o n a l r e v o l u t i o n to m a t e r i a l i z e . In a report to the Russian Communist Party i n July 1921, Lenin stated: Before the r e v o l u t i o n , and even a f t e r i t , we thought: ei t h e r r e v o l u t i o n breaks out i n other countries, i n the c a p i t a l i s t i c a l l y more developed countries, immediately, or at l e a s t very quickly or we must p e r i s h . . . . A c t u a l l y , however, events did not proceed along as s t r a i g h t a l i n e as we had expected. In the other b i g , c a p i t a l i s t i c a l l y more developed countries the r e v o l u t i o n has not broken out to t h i s day. True, we can say with s a t i s f a c t i o n that the r e v o l u t i o n i s developing a l l over the world, and i t i s only thanks to t h i s that the i n t e r n a t i o n a l bourgeoisie i s unable to strangle us, i n spite of the f a c t that m i l i t a r i l y and ^ economically, i t i s a hundred times stronger than we are. This, however, constituted a very feeble e f f o r t at explaining a circumstance that seemed extraordinary to Lenin even as i t existed. Witness h i s oft-expressed i n c r e d u l i t y i n such statements as: But i s the existence of a s o c i a l i s t republic i n a c a p i t a l i s t environment at a l l conceivable? I t seemed inconceivable from the p o l i t i c a l and m i l i t a r y aspects. That i t i s possible both p o l i t i c a l l y and m i l i t a r i l y has now been proved; i t i s a  f a c t . I t was l e f t to S t a l i n , who took on Lenin's mantle, to endeavor to integrate doctrine with r e a l i t y . THE STALINIST PERSPECTIVE The leaders pf the young Soviet Republic had quickly r e a l i z e d that there were inherent problems i n attempting to coordinate simultaneously i n t e r e s t s of state and i n t e r e s t s of world r e v o l u t i o n . The i n c o m p a t i b i l i t y between these goals became c l e a r i n the c r u c i b l e of experience. The inconsistent p o l i c i e s pursued i n the early 1920s by the 32 Soviet government and the Comintern, for instance, resulted i n the quashing by the German government of the Comintern-sponsored 1923 u p r i s i n g i n Hamburg with arms supplied to the German m i l i t a r y by the Red Army. As prospects of a world r e v o l u t i o n grew dimmer over the years, the Soviet leadership under S t a l i n subordinated the goal of world revo l u t i o n to the i n t e r e s t s of the Soviet state. The former aim was never shelved, merely postponed to an i n d e f i n i t e future. The Marxist conviction that socialism would eventually replace c a p i t a l i s m ran deep among the Bolsheviks. Lenin had estimated the outlook f o r world r e v o l u t i o n i n terms of weeks, then months, and then years. By 1925, S t a l i n could assume that "the v i c t o r y of socialism i n the advanced countries. . ." 36 could be "delayed for another ten or twenty years." This premise of a long-delayed revolutionary process, coupled with the de facto existence of a single s o c i a l i s t state surviving i n the midst of a h o s t i l e c a p i t a l i s t r i n g , provided the basis for the S t a l i n i s t thesis of " s o c i a l i s m i n one country." Doctrine was once again adjusted to take account of i n t e r n a t i o n a l r e a l i t i e s . In a statement made by Lenin i n 1923, S t a l i n found t h e o r e t i c a l j u s t i f i c a t i o n — a l b e i t with some e f f o r t — f o r his argument that the Soviet republic could go i t alone without immediate help from the world p r o l e t a r i a t . Lenin had then remarked: . . . the power of state over a l l large-scale means of production, the power of state i n the hands of the p r o l e t a r i a t , the a l l i a n c e of the p r o l e t a r i a t with the m i l l i o n s of small and very small peasants, the assured leadership of the peasantry by the p r o l e t a r i a t , e t c . — i s not t h i s a l l that i s necessary i n order to b u i l d a complete s o c i a l i s t society from the cooperatives. . . . Is t h i s not a l l that i s necessary for the purpose of b u i l d i n g a complete s o c i a l i s t society? This i s not yet the b u i l d i n g of s o c i a l i s t society, but ^t, i s a l l that i s necessary and s u f f i c i e n t f or t h i s b u i l d i n g . 33 Contrasting h i s own thesis with Trotsky's notion of "permanent r e v o l u t i o n , " S t a l i n argued that the l a t t e r idea was " p l a i n l y sinning 38 against r e a l i t y " and was a doctrine of "permanent hopelessness." "Socialism i n one country" was no more than an o f f i c i a l acknowledgement of e x i s t e n t i a l r e a l i t y : Formerly, the v i c t o r y of the r e v o l u t i o n i n one country was considered impossible, on the assumption that i t would require the combined action of the p r o l e t a r i a n s of a l l or at l e a s t a majority of the advanced countries to achieve v i c t o r y over the bourgeoisie. Now t h i s point of view no longer f i t s with the  f a c t s . Now we must proceed from the p o s s i b i l i t y of such a v i c t o r y , for the uneven and spasmodic character of the development of the various c a p i t a l i s t countries under the conditions of imperialism, the development, within imperialism of catastrophic contradictions leading to i n e v i t a b l e wars, the growth of the revolutionary movement i n a l l countries of the w o r l d — a l l t h i s leads, not only to the p o s s i b i l i t y , but also to the necessity of t h j v i c t o r y of the p r o l e t a r i a t i n i n d i v i d u a l countries. While S t a l i n held that s o c i a l i s m i n one country was not only possible but necessary, he argued that the " f i n a l " v i c t o r y of socialism, by which he meant "the f u l l guarantee against attempts at intervention and hence against r e s t o r a t i o n . . . with the support of i n t e r n a t i o n a l c a p i t a l , " would be assured only with "the support of our r e v o l u t i o n by the workers of a l l countries, and s t i l l more, the v i c t o r y of the workers 40 i n at l e a s t several countries. . . . " " C a p i t a l i s t encirclement" represented a c o r o l l a r y theme to the " s o c i a l i s m i n one country" doctrine: The v i c t o r y of s o c i a l i s m could not be considered " f i n a l " as long as c a p i t a l i s t encirclement of the s o c i a l i s t state existed. Meanwhile, "two camps" confronted one another i n the i n t e r n a t i o n a l arena, "the c a p i t a l i s t camp, headed by Anglo-American c a p i t a l and the s o c i a l i s t camp, headed by the Soviet 41 Union." The idea of the i n e v i t a b l e clash between the s o c i a l i s t state and c a p i t a l i s t countries ran as a l e i t m o t i f i n S t a l i n i s t thinking. 34 With S t a l i n ' s d o c t r i n a l modifications, the process of a l i g n i n g Marxist-Leninist theory with the h o r i z o n t a l state-structure of i n t e r n a t i o n a l society was complete. As Kubalkova and Cruickshank have aptly noted, " . . . the Soviet s t a t e — a l l e g e d l y of a d i f f e r e n t nature but remaining s t i l l a state (horizontal unit)—assumed the d i s t i n c t and rather asymmetrical place that Lenin had envisaged for the Comintern, 42 namely, the epicentre of the ( v e r t i c a l ) c l a s s s c a l e . " Under S t a l i n , the Comintern became a mere adjunct of the Soviet state and i n 1943 the organization was dissolved when i t proved to be a hindrance to the normal conduct of diplomatic r e l a t i o n s with other states. U t i l i z i n g t h i s b r i e f background as our framework, we s h a l l now attempt to trace the S t a l i n i s t perspective on the c o r r e l a t i o n of forces between the "two camps." In h i s report to the Fourteenth Congress i n December 1925, S t a l i n announced that the d e c i s i v e feature that has a f f e c t e d a l l the events i n the sphere of foreign r e l a t i o n s during t h i s period, i s the fact that a c e r t a i n temporary equilibrium of forces has been established between our country . . . and the countries of the c a p i t a l i s t world. . . . What we at one time regarded as a b r i e f r e s p i t e a f t e r the war has become a whole period of r e s p i t e . Hence a c e r t a i n equilibrium of forces and a c e r t a i n period of peaceful coexistence between the bourgeois world and the p r o l e t a r i a n world. Lenin i n 1921 had characterized the equilibrium as a "highly unstable" one. S t a l i n ' s view i n 1925 was of a more stable equilibrium, a l b e i t a temporary one, for no state of permanent peace could be envisaged between the Soviet state and i n t e r n a t i o n a l p r o l e t a r i a t on the one hand, and the c a p i t a l i s t countries on the other. The conjunction of several f a c t o r s — d o m e s t i c and i n t e r n a t i o n a l — m u s t have provided the impetus for the S t a l i n i s t assessment of the i n t e r n a t i o n a l c o r r e l a t i o n of 35 forces. On the domestic f r o n t , S t a l i n was arguing the v i a b i l i t y of his " s o c i a l i s m i n one country" t h e s i s , even as he was vigorously opposing Trotsky's theory of permanent r e v o l u t i o n . In such a scenario, a benign view of the contemporary i n t e r n a t i o n a l s i t u a t i o n would most c e r t a i n l y have bolstered the S t a l i n i s t viewpoint. Apart from s e l f - s e r v i n g reasons, however, the revolutionary t i d e i n 1925 was at an ebb and the notion of an equilibrium of forces helped to account f o r the waning of revolutionary fervor. This equilibrium, according to S t a l i n , was brought about by the temporary s t a b i l i z a t i o n of c a p i t a l i s m along with the s t a b i l i z a t i o n and consolidation of the Soviet system. But the equilibrium of forces between the two camps implied not equality of' the two systems but s t a b i l i t y i n the form of a temporary phase of peaceful coexistence. Thus, elaborating on t h i s theme i n an e a r l i e r address to the Fourteenth Party Congress i n May 1925, S t a l i n noted: Why are there two s t a b i l i s a t i o n s , one p a r a l l e l with the other? . . . Because there i s no longer a s i n g l e , all-embracing c a p i t a l i s m i n the world. Because the world has s p l i t into two camps. . . . Because the i n t e r n a t i o n a l s i t u a t i o n w i l l to an increasing degree be determined by the r e l a t i o n of forces between these two camps. Thus, the c h a r a c t e r i s t i c feature of the present s i t u a t i o n i s not only that c a p i t a l i s m and the Soviet system have become s t a b i l i s e d , but also that the forces of these two camps have reached a c e r t a i n temporary equilibrium, with a s l i g h t  advantage for c a p i t a l , and hence, a s l i g h t disadvantage for the revolutionary movement; f o r compared with a revolutionary upsurge, the l u l l that has now set i n i s undoubtedly a^ disadvantage for s o c i a l i s m , although a temporary one. The s t a b i l i s a t i o n of c a p i t a l i s m , S t a l i n observed, would eventually lead to an aggravation of i t s contradictions even as i t temporarily strengthened the c a p i t a l i s t system. S t a l i n ' s view of the c o r r e l a t i o n of forces s k i l l f u l l y addressed personal p o l i t i c a l considerations, the dynamics of the i n t e r n a t i o n a l s i t u a t i o n , and the " l u l l " i n the 36 revolutionary movement. Only two years l a t e r , however, at the F i f t e e n t h Party Congress i n 1927, S t a l i n declared the s t a b i l i z a t i o n of cap i t a l i s m to be at an end and h i s emphasis changed from the themes of peaceful coexistence and temporary s t a b i l i t y to the ideas of c a p i t a l i s t encirclement and the i n e v i t a b i l i t y of i m p e r i a l i s t wars, as we l l as clashes between the Soviet state and imperialism: Whereas a year or two ago i t was possible and necessary to speak of a c e r t a i n equilibrium and "peaceful coexistence" between the U.S.S.R. and the c a p i t a l i s t countries, today we have every ground for b e l i e v i n g that the period of "peaceful  coexistence" i s receding into the past, giving place to a period of i m p e r i a l i s t assaults and^preparation f o r inte r v e n t i o n against the U.S.S.R. He also observed that the world was "on the eve of a new revolutionary 46 upsurge." In these conditions, the task f o r the U.S.S.R., S t a l i n said, was "to take into account the contradictions i n the camp of the i m p e r i a l i s t s , to postpone war by 'buying o f f the c a p i t a l i s t s and to 47 take a l l measures to maintain peaceful r e l a t i o n s . . . ." This, presumably, was the expedient course to follow when the Soviet state was s t i l l i n a p o s i t i o n of m i l i t a r y and economic i n f e r i o r i t y v i s - a - v i s a c a p i t a l i s t world i n which "production i s growing . . . tec h n i c a l 48 progress and production p o t e n t i a l i t i e s are increasing. . ." even while i t s contradictions i n t e n s i f i e d . In other words, the e x i s t i n g c o r r e l a t i o n of forces dictated a p o l i c y of maneuvering from the s i d e l i n e s . With S t a l i n ' s proclamation of a new period of revolutionary upsurge, t h i s t hesis was adopted as the basis of Comintern p o l i c y i n 1928. I n t e r n a l l y , with Trotsky's e l i m i n a t i o n from the p o l i t i c a l scene and the denouncing of the Right deviation, S t a l i n had moved to the l e f t 37 with the u n v e i l i n g of h i s Five-Year Plan. Since the Comintern, as Isaac Deutscher describes i t , "not only shone with the r e f l e c t e d l i g h t of the Russian party, but . . . r e f l e c t e d each of i t s i n t e r n a l alinements i n 49 turn," that organization was also forced to move to the l e f t . Socialism i n one country, however, continued to represent the dominant S t a l i n i s t l i n e both i n the Russian party and i n the Comintern. The m i l i t a n t l y r a d i c a l p o l i c i e s pursued by the Comintern i n the l a t e 1920s envisaged no cooperation between the Communists and the S o c i a l i s t s . In Germany e s p e c i a l l y , t h i s s p l i t i n the l e f t contributed to the r i s e of Nazism. Only i n 1935, a f t e r Nazism had become a palpable danger, did the Comintern, no doubt under S t a l i n ' s d i r e c t i o n , move toward a strategy of the "united front against fascism and war." A l l of S t a l i n ' s energies during t h i s period, u n t i l the German invasion of Soviet Russia i n 1941, were geared toward warding o f f the threat of an attack against the USSR—the 1939 Nazi-Soviet pact i s an outstanding example. With the 1941 invasion of the USSR by H i t l e r ' s forces, the " i m p e r i a l i s t war" of 1939^* began to be characterized by S t a l i n as an " a n t i f a s c i s t war": a designation which allowed S t a l i n both to draw a d i s t i n c t i o n between c a p i t a l i s t states and to account f o r the c o a l i t i o n between the USSR and the A l l i e d countries. U n t i l the end of the war, S t a l i n r e f r a i n e d from i s s u i n g i d e o l o g i c a l pronouncements which would most c e r t a i n l y have jeopardized "the c o a l i t i o n of the USSR, Great B r i t a i n and the United States of America against the German f a s c i s t 52 i m p e r i a l i s t s . " But i d e o l o g i c a l scores were not so much forgotten as put on the back burner, for i n the aftermath of the Second World War, S t a l i n revived the two-camp thesis and abandoned h i s e a r l i e r d i s t i n c t i o n 38 between f a s c i s t and democratic c a p i t a l i s t states. Also, the cause of revol u t i o n was vigorously pursued a f t e r the war. But, as Deutscher explains, S t a l i n ' s method of promoting r e v o l u t i o n d i f f e r e d greatly from the L e n i n i s t conception of world re v o l u t i o n : The old Bolshevism, . . . believed i n revo l u t i o n from below, such as the upheaval of 1917 had been. The r e v o l u t i o n which S t a l i n now c a r r i e d into eastern and c e n t r a l Europe was p r i m a r i l y a r e v o l u t i o n from above. . . . Although the l o c a l Communist p a r t i e s were i t s immediate agents and executors, the great party of the r e v o l u t i o n ^ w h i c h remained i n the background, was the Red Army. With most of the eastern European states well on t h e i r way to becoming Soviet s a t e l l i t e s , S t a l i n ' s cordon s a n i t a i r e was almost i n place. In these favorable conditions, Andrei Zhdanov, speaking i n September 1947 at the founding conference of the Communist Information Bureau (Cominform) and reviewing what he saw as p o s i t i v e p o l i t i c a l change i n the countries of eastern Europe, confidently asserted that the end of the Second World War and the defeat of fascism "sharply a l t e r e d the alignment of forces [sootnoshenie s i l ] between the two systems—the 54 S o c i a l i s t and the c a p i t a l i s t — i n favour of Socialism." With World War I, he stated, "the united i m p e r i a l i s t front was breached and . . . Russia dropped out of the world c a p i t a l i s t system." World War II resulted i n a further blow against i m p e r i a l i s t p o s i t i o n s , because "the enhanced strength of the a n t i - f a s c i s t movement resulted i n a number of countries i n c e n t r a l and southeastern Europe dropping out of the i m p e r i a l i s t system.""'"' Only the United States of America, of a l l the i m p e r i a l i s t powers, emerged from the war "considerably stronger economically and m i l i t a r i l y . " " ^ Thus, two camps—one led by the Soviet Union and the other led p r i n c i p a l l y by the U.S.A.—confronted each other i n the 39 i n t e r n a t i o n a l arena. According to Soviet thinking, s o c i a l i s m as a world force was gaining i n strength, but no claims of " e q u a l i t y " with c a p i t a l i s m i n any s p h e r e — p o l i t i c a l , economic or m i l i t a r y — w e r e advanced. The Soviets at t h i s juncture appeared to l i m i t t h e i r world view to the notion that s o c i a l i s m was s t e a d i l y enhancing i t s i n t e r n a t i o n a l p o s i t i o n . In other words, the Soviets were content with decla r i n g that the c o r r e l a t i o n of forces was moving i n favor of s o c i a l i s m , and for good reason. The United States had i n 1945 s u c c e s s f u l l y detonated a nuclear bomb, the immense destructive power of which was amply demonstrated at Hiroshima and Nagasaki. A f t e r the Hiroshima bombing, S t a l i n i s reported to have asked of the People's Commissar for Munitions: "A s i n g l e demand of you, comrades, provide us with atomic weapons i n the shortest possible time. You know that Hiroshima has shaken the whole world. The balance has been destroyed. Provide the bomb—it w i l l remove a great danger from u s . " ^ In h i s Cominform speech, Zhdanov i d e n t i f i e d the " c a r d i n a l purpose" of the i m p e r i a l i s t camp as being "to strengthen imperialism, to hatch a new i m p e r i a l i s t war, to combat Socialism and democracy, and to support reactionary and anti-democratic p r o - f a s c i s t regimes and movements 58 everywhere," though he also observed that "Soviet foreign p o l i c y proceeds from the premise that the two s y s t e m s — c a p i t a l i s m and 59 S o c i a l i s m — w i l l e x i s t side by side f o r a long time." The o f f i c i a l Soviet post-war view as outlined by Zhdanov upheld the thesis of an i n e v i t a b l e war unleashed by imperialism upon s o c i a l i s t forces, while simultaneously embracing the idea of coexistence of the s o c i a l i s t and c a p i t a l i s t systems. In the aftermath of the Second World War, the notion of an ever-present external threat perhaps allowed 40 S t a l i n to j u s t i f y to h i s peoples the need "to organize a new mighty upsurge i n the n a t i o n a l economy . . . " with a l l the human s a c r i f i c e that i t e n t a i l e d . S t a l i n s t i p u l a t e d In 1946: We must achieve a s i t u a t i o n where our industry can produce annually up to 50 m i l l i o n tons of p i g i r o n , up to 60 m i l l i o n tons of s t e e l , up to 500 m i l l i o n tons of c o a l , and up to 60 m i l l i o n tons of o i l . Only under such conditions can we consider that our homeland w i l l be guaranteed against a l l  possible accidents. That w i l l take three more Five-Year Plans, I shgyld think, i f not more. But i t can be done and we must do i t . To achieve such an economic upswing, however, Russia would need a period of peace. There was thus an intertwining of two apparently contradictory p o s i t i o n s — p e a c e f u l coexistence and the i n e v i t a b i l i t y of war with c a p i t a l i s m — i n the post-war Soviet world view. Thus, while S t a l i n stressed the i n e v i t a b i l i t y of war theme, he appears to have believed that war was not imminent. Toward the end of h i s stewardship of Soviet f o r e i g n p o l i c y , S t a l i n again ventured to make public h i s somewhat modified views on the i n t e r r e l a t i o n s h i p s between the s o c i a l i s t and c a p i t a l i s t worlds. In a c o l l e c t i o n of papers e n t i t l e d Economic Problems of Socialism, S t a l i n i n 1952 argued f o r c e f u l l y on behalf of the proposition that wars between c a p i t a l i s t countries were i n e v i t a b l e but appeared to soft-pedal the notion of the I n e v i t a b i l i t y of wars between the s o c i a l i s t and c a p i t a l i s t systems. He observed that while " t h e o r e t i c a l l y " i t was "true" that the "contradictions between c a p i t a l i s m and s o c i a l i s m are stronger than the contradictions among the c a p i t a l i s t countries," the contradictions among c a p i t a l i s t countries "proved i n p r a c t i c e to be stronger" because of the "struggle of the c a p i t a l i s t countries for markets and t h e i r desire to crush t h e i r competitors."*** However, neither S t a l i n nor any other o f f i c i a l Soviet spokesman 41 during t h i s period e x p l i c i t l y d e t a i l e d t h e i r view of the then obtaining c o r r e l a t i o n of forces: Was the s o c i a l i s t camp stronger or weaker than the c a p i t a l i s t camp? And i n what spheres? S t a l i n ' s 1946 argument o u t l i n i n g the need to spur Soviet i n d u s t r i a l production i n order to fend o f f i m p e r i a l i s t attacks, coupled with hi s assessment of a United States that had emerged from the war "considerably stronger economically and m i l i t a r i l y , " appeared to imply that the Soviet Union required time to catch up with the c a p i t a l i s t world i n these areas. While the Soviet Union i n 1949 su c c e s s f u l l y tested i t s f i r s t atomic bomb, the United States continued to maintain i t s edge i n nuclear technology.*'"' That the p o l i t i c a l power, i n t e r n a t i o n a l prestige and sec u r i t y of the USSR was greatly enhanced as a r e s u l t of the Second World War, however, was also not i n doubt. And i t was c e r t a i n l y with t h i s context i n mind that Soviet spokesmen argued from 1947 onward that the c o r r e l a t i o n of forces was moving i n favor of socialism. The nature of the Western response during S t a l i n ' s 1948 " t e s t of nerves" i n B e r l i n , while d r i v i n g home the fir m resolve of the United States, B r i t a i n and France not to allow any further Soviet encroachment i n Europe, must also have proved to S t a l i n that the West was not poised for a b a t t l e with the s o c i a l i s t countries, a b a t t l e that the Soviet Union did not want. Peace, therefore, was an attainable goal and was seen through the S t a l i n i s t prism as being made possible by the contemporary unspecified nature of the c o r r e l a t i o n between the forces of "imperialism" and the forces of "peace and democracy." The theme of c a p i t a l i s t encirclement, however, was never formally repudiated, perhaps because of i t s important function i n i n t e r n a l propaganda. S t a l i n had argued that encirclement was a " p o l i t i c a l " and 42 not a "geographical" concept, and therefore presumably remained i n force even a f t e r the formation of a s o c i a l i s t camp embracing several countries. For instance, one writer observed i n an a r t i c l e i n Pravda i n February 1953: Certain propagandists have engaged i n an academic dispute over whether c a p i t a l i s t encirclement of the Soviet Union continues to e x i s t or has faded into the past. Dogmatists and do c t r i n a i r e people have been found who have begun to assert that once the people's democracies f r i e n d l y to us appeared on our western and eastern f r o n t i e r s the question of c a p i t a l i s t encirclement was removed. Certain would-be theoreticians have even gone so f a r as to say that since the powerful camp of soc i a l i s m has been formed, imperialism has ceased to be a ^ danger to us. Such discourses are anti-Marxist and harmful. But the idea of c a p i t a l i s t encirclement was l a r g e l y preempted i n the post World War II period by the two-camp doctrine. S t a l i n ' s 1952 thesis of an amelioration " i n p r a c t i c e " i n the contradictions between the s o c i a l i s t and c a p i t a l i s t camps appeared to s i g n a l a desire on the part of the Soviet leader to avoid m i l i t a r y entanglements with the c a p i t a l i s t countries. What r o l e the advent of nuclear weapons played i n t h i s assessment i s unclear, f o r S t a l i n , at l e a s t p u b l i c l y , disparaged the r o l e and s i g n i f i c a n c e of nuclear weapons i n the conduct or character of a future war. The S t a l i n i s t i n sistence on the continued relevance of "permanently operating f a c t o r s " ^ even i n the nuclear age did much to stymie Soviet m i l i t a r y thought. I t i s quite l i k e l y , as Holloway suggests, that while S t a l i n appreciated the importance of the atomic bomb, "he may w e l l have thought that . . . i t would not change the 68 character of war." Thus, i t was only a f t e r S t a l i n ' s death i n March 1953 that Soviet leaders and analysts began to address issues r e l a t i n g to the e f f e c t of the nuclear r e v o l u t i o n on m i l i t a r y strategy. 43 CONCLUSION With the establishment of the f i r s t s o c i a l i s t state i n l a t e 1917, the concept of the " c o r r e l a t i o n of c l a s s f o r c e s " assumed an i n t e r n a t i o n a l dimension. As Lenin c l e a r l y understood, the balance of c l a s s forces within Russia alone could no longer be the sole determinant eit h e r of p a r t i c u l a r p o l i c y choices or outcomes. Soviet Russia was part of an i n t e r n a t i o n a l system of states and w i l l y n i l l y was forced to play by i t s r u l e s . In the event, i t was hardly s u r p r i s i n g that when "r e v o l u t i o n " came to Europe i n the mid-1940s, i t was, except i n i s o l a t e d instances, not as a r e s u l t of an e n t i r e l y spontaneous upsurge of p r o l e t a r i a n w i l l , as Marx had foreseen and Lenin had expected, but was for the most part ushered i n with the backing of the Red Army. Lenin's polemical use of the concept of the c o r r e l a t i o n of forces, most evident i n h i s arguments i n favor of revolutionary a c t i o n i n e a r l y 1917 and of the Brest-Litovsk peace i n 1918, a t t e s t to the f a c t that h i s view of the c o r r e l a t i o n was not n e c e s s a r i l y shared by h i s Bolshevik colleagues. Moreover, even assuming general agreement on what constituted the c o r r e l a t i o n at any point i n time, the course of a c t i o n (or inaction) to be adopted, based upon that p a r t i c u l a r reading of the c o r r e l a t i o n , was not immediately evident even to seasoned Marxists. Thus, at the Seventh Party Congress i n March 1918, Zinoviev noted: No one can say how long t h i s breathing s p e l l w i l l l a s t . I t seems to me that i t i s c l e a r only that t h i s peace, acquired by us at Brest, appears as a more or l e s s exact photograph of . that r e l a t i o n a l forces which e x i s t s i n the world a r e n a . . . . Commenting on Zinoviev's stand, Bukharin rejoined: Comrade Zinoviev stands on a completely f a t a l i s t i c point of view. He says that now the r e a l r e l a t i o n of forces i s 44 unpleasant, and nothing more. On that he i s ready to quiet down, and proposes to others to do likewise. This p o s i t i o n i s absolutely inadmissible. Revolutionary Marxists have never said that the r e a l r e l a t i o n of forces i s such and such; one task i n the capacity of r e a l i s t i c p o l i t i c i a n s consists i n the fact that we constantly s t r i v e to change the r e l a t i o n of actual forces. Debates between party members on the r o l e and p o l i c y of Soviet Russia on the i n t e r n a t i o n a l stage pointed to the c e n t r a l i t y of the " c o r r e l a t i o n of f o r c e s " concept i n early Soviet foreign p o l i c y decisionmaking. At the Tenth Party Congress i n March 1921, however, the ri g h t to organized dissent was proscribed, and by the time S t a l i n consolidated h i s hold on the Party leadership, h i s ex cathedra pronouncements on the c o r r e l a t i o n of forces were f u l l y backed by the rule of unanimity. The o l i g a r c h i c a l nature of p o s t - S t a l i n leadership has perhaps precluded the Party leader from assuming the p o s i t i o n of a "repository of t r u t h , " and within the boundaries of an i d e o l o g i c a l consensus, one may argue that debate over foreign p o l i c y choices does take place. For Lenin, assessments of the c o r r e l a t i o n of forces were intimately connected with the issues of war and peace and the s u r v i v a l of the s o c i a l i s t s t ate. The pursuit of peace was a p o l i c y d i c t a t e d by the unfavorable i n t e r n a t i o n a l c o r r e l a t i o n , due i n large part to the m i l i t a r y and economic weakness of the young Soviet r e p u b l i c . I t Is i n t e r e s t i n g to note that Lenin's ad hoc resort to a class-based explanation to account for the continued existence of Soviet Russia as a s i n g l e s o c i a l i s t state surrounded by h o s t i l e c a p i t a l i s t countries has since been adopted as an a r t i c l e of f a i t h by Soviet leaders and analysts. Lenin had then declared that Russia had s u c c e s s f u l l y b a t t l e d a m i l i t a r i l y and economically stronger i m p e r i a l i s t force because i t s 45 leaders c o r r e c t l y appraised the c o r r e l a t i o n of c l a s s forces. An explanation which was fashioned by Lenin only i n response to a circumstance that seemed to him t h e o r e t i c a l l y improbable assumed the force of an i d e o l o g i c a l tenet and has frequently been c i t e d by Soviet leaders and analysts to argue a favorable s o c i a l i s t d i r e c t i o n i n the movement of the c o r r e l a t i o n of forces, when m i l i t a r y and economic factors do not appear to be i n t h e i r favor. Both Lenin and S t a l i n subscribed to a Eurocentric view of world a f f a i r s i n discussing the, i n t e r n a t i o n a l c o r r e l a t i o n . Even though Lenin, and l a t e r S t a l i n , expressed the p o s s i b i l i t y of r e v o l u t i o n breaking out i n the c o l o n i a l areas of the world, both linked the " f i n a l " v i c t o r y of s o c i a l i s m to the success of the revolutionary movement i n Europe. While the post-World War I I era was one of great i f not cataclysmic changes i n the Third World, S t a l i n f a i l e d to enunciate any c l e a r Soviet p o l i c y with regard to n a t i o n a l l i b e r a t i o n movements and the r o l e of communist pa r t i e s within those movements. With the f a i l u r e of h i s China p o l i c y i n the years when the Kuomintang and Communists were vying f o r power and influence, S t a l i n took an i n d i f f e r e n t view with regard to happenings i n A s i a . His two-camp doctrine precluded the consideration of any " t h i r d f o r c e " i n the i n t e r n a t i o n a l arena, and while he did not make e x p l i c i t h i s views of the c o r r e l a t i o n , i t appears reasonable to surmise that h i s energies were directed toward an estimation of the balance between the s o c i a l i s t and advanced c a p i t a l i s t countries. For Lenin and S t a l i n , peaceful coexistence with c a p i t a l i s m constituted a p o l i c y which the Soviet Union was obliged to pursue i n the face of an unfavorable i n t e r n a t i o n a l c o r r e l a t i o n . This was seen as a temporary phase l a s t i n g u n t i l the i n e v i t a b l e clash between the two camps 46 occurred. But the advent of nuclear technology was soon to change the Soviet calculus of war and peace. Whereas e a r l i e r Soviet m i l i t a r y and economic weakness made necessary the p o l i c y of peaceful coexistence, the development of m i l i t a r y technology and the introduction of nuclear weapons soon mandated such a p o l i c y f or the foreseeable future. S t a l i n ' s successor i n the Kremlin would undertake to modify Marxist-Leninist doctrine to take into account both post-war global p o l i t i c a l changes and the e f f e c t s of the nuclear r e v o l u t i o n . 47 NOTES 1. V. Kubalkova and A.A. Cruickshank, Marxism-Leninism and the Theory of International Relations (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1980), p. 35. 2. I b i d . , pp. 94-95. 3. V. I. Lenin, Collected Works, v o l . 24, Second P r i n t i n g (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1974), p. 43. 4. I b i d . 5. V. I. Lenin, "Report to the Congress of Soviets on the Brest-Litovsk Treaty," March 14, 1918, i n Myron Rush, ed. The International S i t u a t i o n and Soviet Foreign  P o l i c y : Key Reports by Soviet Leaders from the Revolution  to the Present (Columbus, Ohio: Charles E. M e r r i l l Publishing Co., 1970), p. 4. 6. I b i d . , p. 3. 7. It has not been so easy for Soviet leaders to acknowledge weakness—military, economic, or p o l i t i c a l — s i n c e the USSR emerged as one of the two world superpowers i n the years since S t a l i n ' s death. 8. Lenin, Collected Works, v o l . 26, p. 472. 9. I b i d . , p. 443. Emphasis i n o r i g i n a l . 10. I b i d . , p. 447. 11. Ibi d . 12. Lenin, "Report," i n Rush, ed. The International  S i t u a t i o n , p. 4. 13. Lenin, Collected Works, v o l . 26, p. 447. 14. Lenin, "Report," i n Rush, ed. The International  S i t u a t i o n , p. 8. 15. In 1918-1919, revolutionary ferment i n Germany led to the s h o r t - l i v e d establishment of a Soviet government i n Bavaria, but such r e v o l t s were soon suppressed. S i m i l a r l y , Bela Kun's 1919 r e v o l u t i o n i n Hungary proved temporary. The f a i l u r e of movements such as these gradually l e d the Bolshevik leaders to understand that world r e v o l u t i o n was not going to occur soon. 48 16. Lenin, Collected Works, v o l . 29, p. 153. Emphasis i n o r i g i n a l . 17. I b i d . 18. Lenin, 1919, "Report to the Congress of Soviets," December 5, i n Rush, ed. The International S i t u a t i o n , p. 14. 19. I b i d . , p. 16. 20. Ib i d . , p. 17. 21. Lenin, Collected Works, v o l . 31, p. 411. 22. I b i d . , pp. 411-412. 23. I b i d . , p. 412. 24. Ib i d . , p. 413. 25. I b i d . , p. 414. 26. Ibi d . , p. 457. 27. I b i d . , p. 442, 443. 28. Lenin, 1921, "Report to the Congress of Soviets," December 23, i n Rush, ed. The International S i t u a t i o n , p. 29. 29. I b i d . 30. Ib i d . 31. I b i d . , p. 32. 32. Lenin, Collected Works, v o l . 32, p. 478. 33. Lenin, "Report," December 23, 1921, i n Rush, ed. The International S i t u a t i o n , p. 31. 34. Lenin, Collected Works, v o l . 32, p. 480. 35. Lenin, "Report," December 23, 1921, i n Rush, ed. The International S i t u a t i o n , p. 33. Emphasis added. 36. J . V. S t a l i n , Works, v o l . 7 (Moscow: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1954), p. 168, 37. Quoted i n J . V. S t a l i n , Problems of Leninism (Moscow: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1953), p. 129. 38. I b i d . , p. 128. Emphasis added. 49 39. Quoted i n I b i d . , p. 188. The doctrine of " s o c i a l i s m i n one country" was f u l l y endorsed at the Fourteenth Party Congress i n A p r i l 1925. 40. Quoted i n I b i d . , p. 191. 41. J . V. S t a l i n , Works, v o l . 7, p. 95. As Garthoff points out, S t a l i n had used the concept of two camps as early as 1919. He further states that " [ u ] n t i l 1947, however, i t was a subordinate theme, accepted as an i m p l i c i t and i n c i d e n t a l aspect of c a p i t a l i s t encirclement." See Raymond L. Garthoff, Soviet M i l i t a r y P o l i c y ; A H i s t o r i c a l  Analysis (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1966), p. 70. 42. Kubalkova and Cruickshank, Marxism-Leninism, p. 141. 43. S t a l i n , "Report to the XIV Party Congress," December 3, 1925, i n Rush, ed. The International S i t u a t i o n , p. 38. 44. S t a l i n , Works, v o l . 7, pp. 95-96. Emphasis added. 45. S t a l i n , "Report to the XV Party Congress," December 3, 1927, i n Rush, ed. The International S i t u a t i o n , p. 60. Emphasis i n o r i g i n a l . 46. I b i d . , p. 59. 47. I b i d . , p. 61. 48. I b i d . , p. 54. 49. Isaac Deutscher, S t a l i n : A P o l i t i c a l Biography (London: Oxford U n i v e r s i t y Press, 1949), p. 398. 50. For more on t h i s issue, see I b i d . , pp. 404-409. 51. See S t a l i n , "Report to the XVIII Party Congress," March 10, 1939, i n Rush, ed. The International S i t u a t i o n , p. 90, where S t a l i n speaks of a "new i m p e r i a l i s t war." 52. S t a l i n , "Report Delivered on the 24th Anniversary of the October Revolution," November 6, 1941, i n Rush, ed. The International S i t u a t i o n , p. 114. 53. Deutscher, S t a l i n , p. 554. Yugoslavia was perhaps the only instance where the l o c a l Communists were strong enough to e f f e c t a r e v o l u t i o n . But the independence demonstrated by T i t o ' s Yugoslavia r e s u l t e d by 1948 i n a schism between T i t o and S t a l i n . 50 54. A. Zhdanov, The International S i t u a t i o n , Speech delivered at the Informatory Conference of. representatives of a number of Communist P a r t i e s held i n Poland i n the l a t t e r part of September 1947 (Moscow: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1947), p. 7. 55. I b i d . , p. 8. 56. I b i d . , p. 12. 57. Quoted i n David Holloway, The Soviet Union and the Arms  Race (New Haven: Yale U n i v e r s i t y Press, 1983), p. 20. 58. I b i d . , p. 18. 59. I b i d . , p. 22. 60. S t a l i n , " E l e c t i o n Speech," February 9, 1946, i n Rush, ed. The International S i t u a t i o n , p. 123. 61. J . S t a l i n , Economic Problems of Socialism i n the  U.S.S.R. (Moscow: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1952), p. 39, 40. 62. I b i d . , p. 39. 63. Malenkov, "Report to the XIX Party Congress," October 5, 1952, i n Rush, ed. The International S i t u a t i o n , p. 153. 64. Pravda e d i t o r i a l , October 18, 1952. Quoted i n Garthoff, Soviet M i l i t a r y P o l i c y , p. 73. 65. On t h i s point, see Holloway, The Soviet Union and the  Arms Race, pp. 23-27. 66. N. Kosev, "On Revolutionary V i g i l a n c e , " Pravda, February 6, 1953, as quoted i n Garthoff, Soviet M i l i t a r y  P o l i c y , p. 71. 67. These factors included such elements as "leadership, morale, good weapons and a quantity of trained s o l d i e r s . " See Joseph L Nogee and Robert H. Donaldson, Soviet  Foreign P o l i c y Since World War I I , (New York: Pergamon Press, 1981), p. 27. 68. See Holloway, The Soviet Union and the Arms Race, p. 28. 69. Quoted i n Garthoff, Soviet M i l i t a r y P o l i c y , p. 85. 70. Quoted i n Ib i d . 71. As we have seen above, Lenin recognized the importance of the m a t e r i a l — m i l i t a r y and economic—force which the p r o l e t a r i a t and the bourgeoisie could muster i n the c l a s s c o n f l i c t which would p i t them against one another. 51 CHAPTER I I I BREAKING OUT OF THE STALINIST MOLD: 1953-1957 S t a l i n ' s death i n March 1953 and the Soviet launching of Sputnik I i n October 1957 roughly circumscribe the chronological boundaries of t h i s chapter. Both events, i n a sense, represented h i s t o r i c a l watersheds. The demise of the d i c t a t o r freed Soviet scholars and p o l i c y makers from the i r o n grip of S t a l i n i s t orthodoxy and paved the way for new thinking and research i n the area of i n t e r n a t i o n a l p o l i t i c s . The pioneering launch of Sputnik, which occurred soon a f t e r Khrushchev's June-July 1957 defeat of h i s p o l i t i c a l r i v a l s i n the Kremlin, ushered i n an era of confidence and optimism with regard to the p o s i t i o n of the U.S.S.R. on the i n t e r n a t i o n a l stage. This chapter, then, w i l l examine Soviet perceptions of the c o r r e l a t i o n of forces at a time when p o l i t i c s and p o l i c y i n the Soviet Union were i n a state of f l u x . The S t a l i n i s t legacy i n matters pertaining to the r o l e and p o s i t i o n of the U.S.S.R. i n world a f f a i r s was, i n many ways, anachronistic. Along with h i s upholding of the r i g i d l y defined two-camp doctrine which, i n p r a c t i c e , allowed the Soviet Union very l i t t l e room for maneuver both i n i t s r e l a t i o n s with the West and the newly independent Third World countries, S t a l i n had refused to permit any inquiry into the e f f e c t s of the nuclear r e v o l u t i o n on m i l i t a r y doctrine. I t was l e f t to h i s successors to grapple with nuclear and i n t e r n a t i o n a l p o l i t i c a l r e a l i t i e s . Of the inner c o t e r i e which sat at the apex of power i n the Soviet Union i n the immediate aftermath of S t a l i n ' s demise, Molotov emerged as the strongest defender of the S t a l i n i s t hard-line fo r e i g n p o l i c y 52 approach. But the more reasonable and pragmatic outlook espoused f i r s t by Malenkov and then with some modifications by Khrushchev eventually won, with far-reaching implications for the conduct of Soviet foreign p o l i c y . The constraining influence of the i s o l a t i o n i s t posture so assiduously c u l t i v a t e d by S t a l i n i n the post World War II years was abandoned, and Soviet leaders sought to reorient p o l i c y toward the s o c i a l i s t world, the newly independent countries, and the West, i n the d i r e c t i o n of greater f l e x i b i l i t y . * The impact of these developments on Soviet assessments of the c o r r e l a t i o n was considerable. In t h i s chapter, we w i l l examine Soviet depictions of t h e i r strengths and weaknesses i n the economic, m i l i t a r y , and p o l i t i c a l areas i n the context of leadership debates on the d i r e c t i o n s to be pursued by Soviet f o r e i g n p o l i c y . We w i l l also note the e f f e c t s on Soviet assessments of the c o r r e l a t i o n of d o c t r i n a l modifications introduced by Khrushchev at the Twentieth Party Congress i n February 1956. We w i l l conclude with an analysis of Soviet discussions on the subject with a view to determining the congruence, or lack thereof, between Soviet assertions and actual c a p a b i l i t i e s , and between Soviet statements and Soviet actions i n the f o r e i g n p o l i c y realm. By and large, Soviet commentators during t h i s period, and p a r t i c u l a r l y a f t e r the Twentieth Party Congress, exhibited a cautious and expectant confidence i n a brighter future; chose to stress the p o s i t i v e impact on the c o r r e l a t i o n of favorable developments i n the economic and p o l i t i c a l realms; and tended to be defensive i n t h e i r discussions of Soviet m i l i t a r y c a p a b i l i t i e s . Consonant with the generally cautious tenor of the discussions, the operative terms used by Soviet leaders and analysts remained unchanged throughout t h i s period. 53 The two generic formulations with neutral connotations were employed: usually sootnoshenie s i l , and o c c a s i o n a l l y rasstanovka s i l . THE MALENKOV INTERLUDE: 1953-1954 S t a l i n ' s theory of c a p i t a l i s t encirclement and the dangers i t e n t a i l e d f or s o c i a l i s m contained an e x p l i c i t acknowledgement of Soviet weakness v i s - a - v i s the c a p i t a l i s t world. As l a t e as January 1953, the Soviet press continued to denounce, i n the strongest terms, "the aggressive p o l i c y of the i m p e r i a l i s t camp headed by the United States," and a Pravda a r t i c l e i n February 1953 upheld the thesis of c a p i t a l i s t encirclement even i n the context of the formation of a "powerful and united s o c i a l i s t camp," asserting that " c a p i t a l i s m s t i l l r u l e s In most of the countries of the world, including a large number of economically 3 developed countries." The t h e o r e t i c a l underpinnings of Stalinism were not o f f i c i a l l y repudiated u n t i l the Twentieth Party Congress convened i n early 1956. D o c t r i n a l reformulations t r a i l e d modifications i n s t y l e and conduct of foreign p o l i c y by some years. This lag was p a r t l y the r e s u l t , perhaps, of the f r a c t i o u s debates among top Party leaders on the content and d i r e c t i o n of p o l i c y . I t may also be explained, to some extent, by the understandable state of p o l i t i c a l disarray following the removal from the scene of a f i g u r e who had dominated Soviet l i f e f o r almost three decades. Thus, writers continued to uphold the thesis of c a p i t a l i s t encirclement while simultaneously expounding at great length on the p o s s i b i l i t y f o r a prolonged period of peace and peaceful coexistence between the two systems. 54 While the accession of a new regime i n Moscow brought about no sub s t a n t i a l a l t e r a t i o n i n such basic goals of Soviet f o r e i g n p o l i c y as the preservation of soc i a l i s m at home and within the s o c i a l i s t commonwealth, and the extension of Soviet influence wherever f e a s i b l e , both the methods employed to achieve these aims and the tone of Soviet pronouncements underwent a transformation. This change was evident, i n the months immediately following S t a l i n ' s death, when Soviet overtures of peace to the West, and avowals of a p o s i t i v e a t t i t u d e toward a peaceful r e s o l u t i o n of outstanding problems, became standard diplomatic f a r e . These p a c i f i c expressions were not fatuous, however, f or the Soviets took concrete steps, e a r l y i n 1953, to s e t t l e past grievances i n t h e i r b i l a t e r a l r e l a t i o n s with such countries as Greece, Turkey, and I s r a e l . These developments, coupled with a negotiated end to the then stalemated Korean c o n f l i c t , s i g n a l l e d the dawn of a new era represented by a l e s s r e c a l c i t r a n t Soviet a t t i t u d e In the sphere of i n t e r n a t i o n a l r e l a t i o n s . In June 1953, a major a r t i c l e appeared i n Kommunist which summed up the essence of the Soviet peace proposals of the past few months and argued i n favor of peaceful coexistence between the c a p i t a l i s t and s o c i a l i s t systems. Peace, the author averred, was made possible by the " s t e a d i l y growing economic and p o l i t i c a l might of the Soviet Union, the moral and p o l i t i c a l unity of the Soviet people, . . . the might of the Soviet armed forces . . . , the further strengthening of the camp of 4 peace, democracy and socialism. . . . " The author maintained that the factors strengthening the i n t e r n a t i o n a l p o s i t i o n of the U.S.S.R. "have e s p e c i a l l y grown and gained i n strength as a r e s u l t of the fundamental change i n the c o r r e l a t i o n of forces on the i n t e r n a t i o n a l arena, caused 55 by the world h i s t o r i c v i c t o r y of the Soviet Union over fascism i n the Second World War.""' In essence, then, the Soviets advanced the notion that peace between the two opposing systems was made possible by a fundamental change i n the c o r r e l a t i o n of forces: " I t i s known that aggressive forces would long ago have unleashed war against the U.S.S.R. i f they were confident of success i n t h i s | war. But they do not and cannot have such confidence."** As the above quotations demonstrate, beyond very general statements regarding the Soviet standing along various axes of the c o r r e l a t i o n , both leaders and analysts at t h i s stage c a r e f u l l y avoided any further e l u c i d a t i o n on the theme. Indeed, mindful perhaps of t h e i r disadvantageous p o s i t i o n i n most areas, they s k i l l f u l l y maneuvered around the thorny issues of Soviet weaknesses and American strengths. The l a t t e r point i s w e l l i l l u s t r a t e d by the following observation by A. Leont'ev. Speaking of people i n the West, including "those occupying high p o s i t i o n s i n the government," who count on peaceful coexistence as a means f o r "the i m p e r i a l i s t s to impose t h e i r w i l l and p o l i c i e s on the countries of the s o c i a l i s t camp," the writer declared: The truth of the matter i s that the p o l i c y of d i k t a t i n r e l a t i o n s with countries of the s o c i a l i s t camp has not, cannot and w i l l not have even the s l i g h t e s t chance f o r success. This should be e s p e c i a l l y c l e a r i n our days, given the^contemporary c o r r e l a t i o n of forces on the i n t e r n a t i o n a l arena. Another reason f o r the reluctance on the part of Soviet commentators to be s p e c i f i c i n t h e i r views of the c o r r e l a t i o n of forces was perhaps because the adequacy of Soviet m i l i t a r y strength and the requirements of the armed forces were subjects of some controversy i n the highest leadership c i r c l e s during t h i s period, and Moscow was not speaking with one voice. The reformist p o s i t i o n , which was outlined by 56 Malenkov i n a speech to the Supreme Soviet i n August 1953, i m p l i c i t l y rested on the key assumption that the introduction of nuclear weapons had changed the calculus of war, rendering i t most u n l i k e l y . Such a stance had wide ramifications i n the areas of domestic and foreign p o l i c y . If war between s o c i a l i s t and c a p i t a l i s t countries was u n l i k e l y , then funds could be channeled away from heavy and defense i n d u s t r i e s into consumer sectors of the economy. The t r a d i t i o n a l l y favored heavy and defense sectors need only be supported to the extent necessary to a t t a i n a "minimum deterrent" against an American nuclear attack, while Soviet f o r e i g n p o l i c y should aim at defusing i n t e r n a t i o n a l tensions and promoting peace. Malenkov seemed to endorse p r e c i s e l y t h i s view when he spoke of increasing considerably "the investment of funds i n development of l i g h t industry, food industry, . . . to make adjustment i n the d i r e c t i o n of s u b s t a n t i a l l y increasing the plans for production of consumers' goods. . . . " Elsewhere he stated that the search for a peaceful s o l u t i o n of i n t e r n a t i o n a l problems was the " o b l i g a t i o n " of any government "which s e r i o u s l y cares for the fate of g i t s people." On the non-military dimension of the c o r r e l a t i o n , Malenkov chose to stress the p o s i t i v e aspects: "Even the b i t t e r e s t enemies of our country admit that since the end of the Second World War, there has been a su b s t a n t i a l advance i n the economy, c u l t u r e , and people's well-being 9 year a f t e r year i n the Soviet Union." He r e f r a i n e d from making any comparative a l l u s i o n s to the U.S. economy which might show up Soviet shortcomings. Malenkov's speech also lauded the p o t e n t i a l for p o l i t i c a l success i n many of the new i n i t i a t i v e s undertaken or contemplated by the U.S.S.R. i n i t s r e l a t i o n s with countries l i k e Yugoslavia, India, 57 Afghanistan, and Turkey. Growing out of the outlook he adopted, Malenkov's p o s i t i o n on the m i l i t a r y c o r r e l a t i o n was that the U.S.S.R. possessed a l l the means necessary for purposes of d e f e n s e — a view he expressed i n a speech i n March 1954, during the course of which he also uttered the now oft-quoted statement that world c i v i l i z a t i o n would perish i n a nuclear war and that the thrust of Soviet p o l i c y should be to prevent such a war from breaking out.*^ Thus, while Malenkov must have recognized U.S. s u p e r i o r i t y over the U.S.S.R. i n quantity of nuclear weapons and range of d e l i v e r y c a p a b i l i t i e s , he appears to have believed that the Soviet Union possessed an adequate deterrent. In h i s August speech, he had reported with s a t i s f a c t i o n the Soviet detonation of a hydrogen bomb and denied the idea of Soviet "weakness." Malenkov asserted: I t i s necessary to r e a l i z e that i n the present configuration of forces and i n the firm resolve of the Soviet Union and the countries of the democratic camp to defend t h e i r v i t a l i n t e r e s t s i n the i n t e r n a t i o n a l arena, a p p l i c a t i o n of the p o l i c y of peaceful coexistence of the two systems i s the duty not only of the countries of the democratic camp but of a l l countries. The other way^is the way of desperate adventures and i n e v i t a b l e f a i l u r e s . Malenkov's views diverged rather sharply from those held by h i s colleagues i n the Presidium. Not subscribing to Malenkov's thesis that world c i v i l i z a t i o n would perish i n a nuclear war, h i s main p o l i t i c a l r i v a l s , Khrushchev and Molotov, argued f o r continued emphasis on the defense and heavy industry sectors of the economy i n order to strengthen the armed forces of the Soviet Union. Khrushchev, f o r instance, r e f e r r e d to heavy industry as the "very basis of the Soviet economy" and argued f o r strengthening " t i r e l e s s l y " the "defense capacity of the 12 U.S.S.R." I d e o l o g i c a l l y too, Malenkov was on s o f t ground. I t was well nigh impossible to uphold a key Marxist assumption that socialism 58 would be ult i m a t e l y v i c t o r i o u s the world over If one conceded the p o s s i b i l i t y that s o c i a l i s t countries along with others would perish i n a nuclear war. In the face of a concerted opposition to h i s views, Malenkov was compelled to recant. " [ I ] f the aggressive c i r c l e s , r e l y i n g on atomic weapons should decide on madness and desire to test the strength and might of the Soviet Union," he said i n h i s formal r e t r a c t i o n , "then there can be no doubt that the aggressor w i l l be crushed by those same weapons, and that such an adventure w i l l i n e v i t a b l y lead to the 13 breakdown of the c a p i t a l i s t system." Consonant with the new p o s i t i o n he was forced to embrace p u b l i c l y , Malenkov agreed that the Soviet armed forces "have and w i l l have everything necessary to carry out t h e i r noble 14 mission." With t h i s setback, Malenkov's career suffered an e c l i p s e even though he continued i n h i s post of Premier u n t i l February 1955. The Soviet leadership appeared to regard i t as a matter of prime importance to improve the Soviet p o s i t i o n v i s - a - v i s the American i n the area of the m i l i t a r y c o r r e l a t i o n of forces. In h i s attempt to achieve primacy and hence a determining voice i n the conduct of Soviet a f f a i r s , Khrushchev had perhaps exaggerated the extent of the differences that separated h i s views from those of Malenkov. While h i s staunch f a i t h i n the communist creed did not permit him to acknowledge the p o s s i b i l i t y of the destruction of world c i v i l i z a t i o n i n a nuclear war, Khrushchev's p o s i t i o n on the more substantive issues of foreign p o l i c y did not d i f f e r very much, i f at a l l , from the Malenkov viewpoint. There appears to have been a broad agreement between them on such key areas as the need to achieve a rapprochement with Yugoslav leaders; 59 the necessity for l i b e r a l i z i n g Soviet p o l i c y i n r e l a t i o n s with the people's democracies of Eastern Europe; the promotion of a p o l i c y of peaceful coexistence between s o c i a l i s t and c a p i t a l i s t countries; and the active c u l t i v a t i o n of sympathetic sentiment i n the newly independent Asian countries. But before he could proceed to launch major new i n i t i a t i v e s i n these areas, Khrushchev had to contend with the r i v a l views propounded by Molotov—a S t a l i n i s t p a rtisan. In a v e r b a l joust between these two leaders at a party plenum i n mid-1955, the winds of change proved stronger and helped set the course for a more f l e x i b l e Soviet foreign policy.*"' NASCENT CONFIDENCE: 1955-1957 In a three-pronged strategy aimed at improving the Soviet i n t e r n a t i o n a l p o s i t i o n , Khrushchev moved toward a more accommodating posture v i s - a - v i s the countries of the s o c i a l i s t bloc, the West, and the Third World. The Austrian State Treaty which was signed i n May 1955 guaranteed the n e u t r a l i t y of A u s t r i a . The Geneva summit of the same year s i g n a l l e d an end to the i s o l a t i o n i s m of the post-war years. The l i b e r a l i z a t i o n of Soviet East European p o l i c y set the stage f o r a rapprochement with Yugoslavia i n mid-1956. The year 1955 also saw the v i s i t of the Khrushchev-Bulganin team to India, Burma, and Afghanistan i n a vigorous e f f o r t to tap " a n t i - i m p e r i a l i s t " tendencies i n these countries. Even though l a t e r events were to b e l i e the confident hopes of the Soviet leadership, these moves e f f e c t i v e l y wrested Soviet fo r e i g n p o l i c y from the clutches of the S t a l i n i s t s t r a i t j a c k e t . Moreover, these 60 i n i t i a t i v e s i n the area of foreign p o l i c y s i g n a l l e d a more confident view of the Soviet p o s i t i o n i n the o v e r a l l c o r r e l a t i o n of forces. The d o c t r i n a l adjustments needed to j u s t i f y and l e g i t i m i z e new foreign p o l i c y approaches were made i n February 1956. From the prominent p u l p i t of the Twentieth Party Congress, Khrushchev promulgated the thesis of the n o n - i n e v i t a b i l i t y of wars i n the present era, pronounced that peaceful coexistence was the general l i n e of Soviet foreign p o l i c y , and declared the p o s s i b i l i t y of a peaceful t r a n s i t i o n to s o c i a l i s m and communism. Khrushchev stated that the "Marxist-Leninist precept that wars are i n e v i t a b l e as long as Imperialism e x i s t s " was formulated at a time when "imperialism was an all-embracing system" and the " s o c i a l and p o l i t i c a l forces which did not want war were weak, poorly organized, and hence unable to compel the i m p e r i a l i s t s to renounce war." But the c o r r e l a t i o n of forces was r a p i d l y moving i n favor of s o c i a l i s m . Arguing that the s i t u a t i o n had changed " r a d i c a l l y " i n the years since World War I I , Khrushchev elaborated: Now there i s a world camp of socialism, which has become a mighty force. In t h i s camp the peace forces f i n d not only the moral, but also the material means to prevent aggression. There i s a large group of other countries, moreover, with a population running into many hundreds of m i l l i o n s , which i s a c t i v e l y working to avert war. The workers' movement i n the c a p i t a l i s t countries has become a tremendous force today. The movement of peace supporters has sprung up and developed into a powerful f a c t o r . Under such conditions, war was not " f a t a l i s t i c a l l y i n e v i t a b l e . " Khrushchev was equivocal about whether h i s thesis of the n o n - i n e v i t a b i l i t y of war applied to wars inv o l v i n g c a p i t a l i s t states alone or to wars between s o c i a l i s t and c a p i t a l i s t s t a t e s . But as Nogee and Donaldson have pointed out, "the message was cle a r that he meant 61 both to be avoidable." While Khrushchev did not s p e c i f i c a l l y c r e d i t the nuclear r e v o l u t i o n with n e c e s s i t a t i n g a change i n doctrine, such a calculus must have played an important r o l e i n h i s thinking. He did provide a clue pointing i n that d i r e c t i o n when he declared that the U.S.S.R. was " r e s o l u t e l y against war" and i n favor of peaceful coexistence, f o r "[i]ndeed, there are only two ways: eit h e r peaceful coexistence or the most destructive war i n h i s t o r y . There i s no t h i r d „18 way. In pronouncing peaceful coexistence to be the "general l i n e " of Soviet foreign p o l i c y , Khrushchev argued f o r s h i f t i n g the frame of reference of East-West competition from the m i l i t a r y to the economic sphere. For Khrushchev, i t was the improving Soviet p o s i t i o n i n the economic c o r r e l a t i o n of forces that was to provide the major impetus f o r global s o c i a l and p o l i t i c a l change. He explained: When we say that the s o c i a l i s t system w i l l win i n the competition between the two systems—the c a p i t a l i s t and the s o c i a l i s t — t h i s by no means s i g n i f i e s that i t s v i c t o r y w i l l be achieved through armed interference by the s o c i a l i s t countries i n the i n t e r n a l a f f a i r s of c a p i t a l i s t countries. Our ce r t a i n t y of the v i c t o r y of communism i s based on the fac t that the s o c i a l i s t mode of production possesses decisive s u p e r i o r i t y over the c a p i t a l i s t mode of production. . . . We believe that a l l the working people on earth, once they have become convinced of the advantages communism brings, w i l l sooner or l a t e r take the^road of struggle f o r the construction of a s o c i a l i s t s ociety. Khrushchev also r a i s e d the t h e o r e t i c a l p o s s i b i l i t y that some countries might achieve a peaceful t r a n s i t i o n to soc i a l i s m . War would no longer be the sole midwife of r e v o l u t i o n . We s h a l l now examine the considerable impact of p o s t - S t a l i n foreign p o l i c y moves and reformulations of the Marxist-Leninist creed on Soviet assessments of the c o r r e l a t i o n of forces. War, according to Khrushchev, had ceased to be i n e v i t a b l e , due to the action of a wide range of 62 f a c t o r s , among which the tremendous growth of "peace forces" was primary i n importance. But i f the " i m p e r i a l i s t s " started a war, there were "mighty s o c i a l and p o l i t i c a l forces possessing formidable means . . . to give a smashing rebuff to the aggressors and f r u s t r a t e t h e i r adventurist 20 plans." The s i g n i f i c a n c e of m i l i t a r y power, then, was not ignored. Soviet leaders and analysts, however, re f r a i n e d from presenting a c l e a r p i c t u r e of Soviet m i l i t a r y might. For example, while K. Ivanov opined that "[t]here i s every ground to believe that not only the friends of the Soviet Union but also i t s enemies are well aware of i t s r e a l l y tremendous strength," he avoided discussing the s p e c i f i c s of that 21 "strength." Rather than compare o v e r a l l Soviet m i l i t a r y power with that of the United States, commentators chose e i t h e r to indulge i n favorable comparisons of contemporary Soviet m i l i t a r y c a p a b i l i t i e s with 22 pre-war Soviet strength or to a t t e s t to a "further strengthening of 23 the defence capacity of the Soviet Union." Soviet p o r t r a y a l of the c o r r e l a t i o n of m i l i t a r y forces strongly suggests that scholars and leaders a l i k e were keenly aware of the i n f e r i o r m i l i t a r y p o s i t i o n of the U.S.S.R. v i s - a - v i s the United States i n s t r a t e g i c nuclear weaponry and chose to discuss t h i s aspect of the c o r r e l a t i o n i n a manner that would permit them to avoid conceding Soviet i n f e r i o r i t y . M i l i t a r y analysts, though, did intimate a Soviet i n t e r c o n t i n e n t a l d e l i v e r y c a p a b i l i t y : "The present development of the means of atomic attack makes i t possible to s t r i k e powerful blows across oceans as w e l l . By mid-1955, the Soviet Union had acquired a l i m i t e d number of long range bombers capable of reaching American t e r r i t o r y . Whereas Soviet m i l i t a r y strategy p r i o r to 1955 was predicated on the calculus of 63 deterring an American nuclear attack on the U.S.S.R. by holding out the specter of a Europe that would be a Soviet hostage i n the event h o s t i l i t i e s occurred, now the Soviet Union could, i n theory at l e a s t , s t r i k e the American continent i t s e l f . Even though Moscow's Inventory of such d e l i v e r y v e h i c l e s was small, i t did mean, as Edgar Bottome has pointed out, that " [ a ] f t e r 1955 there could be no c e r t a i n t y that the United States would not receive a devastating nuclear attack on i t s 25 major c i t i e s i n the event of war with the Soviet Union." The U.S.S.R. i n t h i s period chose not to deploy large numbers of long-range bombers. Khrushchev's thesis of the n o n - i n e v i t a b i l i t y of war had meant, at the very l e a s t , that i n the judgement of the Party leaders, the l i k e l i h o o d of a general war was remote. Soviet s e c u r i t y from an American attack was not seen as an imminent concern. Therefore, rather than engage i n an expensive competition with the United States i n the area of procuring long-range bombers, the Soviet leadership had opted to a l l o c a t e resources to the research and development of the 26 b a l l i s t i c m i s s i l e rocket. A n t i c i p a t i n g a breakthrough i n t h i s venture, Soviet leaders and analysts were, at t h i s stage, cautiously o p t i m i s t i c about the future prospects of the U.S.S.R. i n the m i l i t a r y sphere. I f the Soviets were guarded i n t h e i r discussions of the m i l i t a r y c o r r e l a t i o n , no such reticence was i n evidence i n t h e i r commentary on the economic dimension. At the Twentieth Party Congress, Khrushchev declared that socialism would prove i t s s u p e r i o r i t y over c a p i t a l i s m i n the economic sphere. Encouraged by the c o n s i s t e n t l y high post-war rates of growth i n i n d u s t r i a l production, Soviet commentators waxed eloquent about the great advantages of the s o c i a l i s t economy. As one observer 64 wrote: Comparison of the rate of i n d u s t r i a l development i n the Soviet Union and i n the c a p i t a l i s t countries furnishes proof of the tremendous s u p e r i o r i t y of the s o c i a l i s t economic system over the c a p i t a l i s t system. . . . The economic success of the Soviet Union, as even many bourgeois newspapers acknowledge, i s astonishing and t e s t i f i e s that the Soviet people are winning round a f t e r round i n t h i s competition. Soviet commentators were also s e n s i t i v e to the p o l i t i c a l s i g n i f i c a n c e of high economic growth ra t e s . They believed that the example of Soviet economic successes would make other c o u n t r i e s — e s p e c i a l l y the newly independent countries In search of an optimum development s t r a t e g y — l o o k to the Soviet Union as a model f or development. The be n e f i t s of the s o c i a l i s t method of production with i t s " n o n - c r i s i s " and " i n f l a t i o n f r e e " atmosphere were a frequent topic f o r discussion and perhaps played the r o l e of a morale booster i n the Soviet 28 body p o l i t i c . Any evidence of economic c r i s i s and stagnation i n western countries was assiduously c i t e d to support the argument of the 29 s u p e r i o r i t y of the s o c i a l i s t economy over the c a p i t a l i s t . The emphasis was upon "overtaking and outstripping the most advanced c a p i t a l i s t countries i n per capita production i n an h i s t o r i c a l l y short 30 period." This goal was defined as the p r i n c i p a l economic aim of the Soviet Union, according to the Draft D i r e c t i v e s of the Sixth Five-Year Plan. How soon the Soviets expected t h i s "economic task" to be accomplished became c l e a r only l a t e r i n 1959, when the time frame was defined i n terms of one decade. This provides an idea of the degree of economic optimism then current i n Soviet leadership c i r c l e s . The Soviets did confess to t h e i r current i n f e r i o r economic p o s i t i o n i n r e l a t i o n to that of the United States. But they held that t h i s was 65 only a temporary phenomenon. Consider, f or instance, the argument of Kuzminov: True, the l e v e l of the development of production i n the Soviet Union i s as yet lower than i n the U.S.A. The reason f or t h i s i s the shocking economic backwardness which we i n h e r i t e d from the old Russia. But on the basis of socialism, the s o c i a l i s t economy i s showing rates of growth which no c a p i t a l i s t country, in c l u d i n g the U.S.A., could dream of. These high rates have already enabled us to o u t s t r i p such old i n d u s t r i a l countries as B r i t a i n , France, and Germany and to draw considerably close r to the U.S.A. i n l e v e l of development. The time w i l l come—and i t i s n<j>t so far distant—when we s h a l l overtake even the U.S.A. Cl e a r l y , then, t h i s was s u p e r i o r i t y i n the making, for while Soviet commentators claimed s u p e r i o r i t y f o r the s o c i a l i s t system of economy, they did not claim Soviet s u p e r i o r i t y i n the economic c o r r e l a t i o n of forces. The most dramatic e f f e c t s of the p o s t - S t a l i n d o c t r i n a l r e v i s i o n s were f e l t i n the area of the p o l i t i c a l c o r r e l a t i o n of forces. Khrushchev j e t t i s o n e d the S t a l i n i s t two-camp approach which treated the leaders of the newly independent countries as mere "lackeys" of imperialism. Rather than stress a r i g i d s o c i a l i s t / i m p e r i a l i s t dichotomy, Khrushchev attempted to integrate the forces of socialism, the nonaligned movement, and peace supporters i n the c a p i t a l i s t countries, into a "vast zone of peace." The forces of peace have been considerably augmented by the emergence i n the world arena of a group of peace loving European and Asian states which have proclaimed non-participation i n blocs as a p r i n c i p l e of t h e i r f o r e i g n p o l i c y . . . . As a r e s u l t , a vast 'peace zone' including both s o c i a l i s t and n o n - s o c i a l i s t peace loving states i n Europe and Asia, has emerged i n the world arena. This zone embraces 1,500,000,000 p e o p l e — t h a t i s , the majority of the population of our planet. Because of t h i s Khrushchevian reconceptualization, the camp of peace, democracy, and socialism swelled i t s ranks overnight and came to 66 embrace a larger percentage of the earth's t e r r i t o r y and population. Soviet analysts now stressed that "[t]he numerical strength and power of the peace forces i s much superior to the forces of aggression and ,,33 war. The acknowledgement of the p o s s i b i l i t y of d i f f e r e n t paths to s o c i a l i s m eased the way for the Soviet r e c o n c i l i a t i o n with Yugoslavia. The appearance of s o c i a l i s t unity that such a rapprochement s i g n i f i e d meant that Soviet analysts could count Yugoslavia among i t s s o c i a l i s t a l l i e s rather than " l o s i n g " that country to the c a p i t a l i s t camp. Whereas i n e a r l y 1955 commentators were defensive i n t h e i r discussions of the o v e r a l l c o r r e l a t i o n of forces, a f t e r the Twentieth Party Congress they were more upbeat i n t h e i r analyses. The contrast i n tone and emphasis between the following two assessments, one from early 1955, the other from l a t e 1956, i s revealing: Today nobody can deny that the balance of strength [sootnoshenie s i l ] between the Soviet Union and the United States has become c l e a r l y defined. I t should be r e a l i z e d that the Soviet Union, with a l l i t s manpower resources and i t s a l l i e s abroad, plus the moral and p o l i t i c a l support which the popular masses i n other countries give to i t s p o l i c y of peace, represents an i n v i n c i b l e force i n the struggle for peace and s e c u r i t y of the nations. A comparison between the Soviet Union as i t i s today and the United States, taking these f a c t s into account, makes i t p e r f e c t l y obvious that the U.S.S.R. i s not weaker than the United States. To an ever.increasing extent the course of i n t e r n a t i o n a l events i s today determined by the new world system—that of s o c i a l i s m . . . . The achievement of n a t i o n a l independence by almost 1,200,million people i n A s i a , A f r i c a and the Middle East has s t i l l further changed the world b a l a n c e ^ f forces to the advantage of peace, democracy, and progress. The former evaluation of the c o r r e l a t i o n was f i r s t made by Molotov i n h i s February 1955 report to the U.S.S.R. Supreme Soviet i n which he discussed the general d i r e c t i o n of Soviet foreign p o l i c y i n the context 36 of the i n t e r n a t i o n a l s i t u a t i o n . I t may be hypothesized that u n t i l the 67 formal defeat of h i s S t a l i n i s t approach toward i n t e r n a t i o n a l a f f a i r s , Soviet analyses of the c o r r e l a t i o n of forces r e f l e c t e d Molotov's latent suspicion and pessimism with regard to any basic r e o r i e n t a t i o n of Soviet foreign p o l i c y . Assessments of the c o r r e l a t i o n , therefore, were negatively formulated and based l a r g e l y on those elements which were more or l e s s under Soviet control—manpower resources, Soviet a l l i e s , and popular support f o r the Soviet p o l i c y of peace. A f t e r the Twentieth Party Congress, commentators were much more p o s i t i v e and outward looking i n t h e i r analyses of the c o r r e l a t i o n . The influence of Khrushchev was now manifest. Arzumanyan i n 1963 was to write of t h i s period thus: The peace-loving foreign p o l i c y of the U.S.S.R. leapt into a c t i v i t y i n 1953, e s p e c i a l l y a f t e r the Twentieth Congress of the CPSU, greatly increasing i t s influence on the e n t i r e course o f ^ i n t e r n a t i o n a l r e l a t i o n s i n the i n t e r e s t of the peoples. It should be noted, however, that even i n the l a t t e r 1956 estimate, the claim was merely one of an improving s i t u a t i o n . The Soviets did not argue that the s o c i a l i s t system was an equal or even almost equal of the c a p i t a l i s t world i n the o v e r a l l c o r r e l a t i o n of forces. What had happened from t h e i r perspective i s that they had seized the p o l i t i c a l i n i t i a t i v e to t h e i r advantage; caused uncertainty i n the minds of American p o l i c y makers regarding the c r e d i b i l i t y of the massive r e t a l i a t i o n doctrine; and managed to maintain, over a period of time, a strong edge over the United States i n rates of growth of I n d u s t r i a l production. They therefore perceived an invigorated s o c i a l i s m as an ascendant force i n world a f f a i r s . This confidence was temporarily shaken when the Hungarian c r i s i s erupted into open defiance of Soviet authority. By and large, Soviet 68 analysts blamed the Hungarian problem on the machinations of Western powers. But some writ e r s did attempt to grapple with the issues underlying the d i s a f f e c t i o n of the Hungarians without, however, mentioning the r o l e of Soviet p o l i c y i n the eruption of the Hungarian c r i s i s . By early 1957, however, a f t e r enough time had elapsed since the successful quashing of the Hungarian re v o l u t i o n , a note of self-assurance crept back i n t o Soviet analyses. S o c i a l i s t unity had been restored, a l b e i t f o r c i b l y , and a f t e r the i n i t i a l shock, Soviet leaders and analysts portrayed the Hungarian episode as an unsuccessful i m p e r i a l i s t attempt to change the movement of the c o r r e l a t i o n of forces i n t h e i r own favor. During the f i r s t h a l f of 1957, the Soviets held a succession of t a l k s at the government and party l e v e l with representatives of the People's Republic of China, Poland, Rumania, Czechoslovakia, the German Democratic Republic, Bulgaria, Hungary, and Albania. These ta l k s had the e f f e c t of r e i n s t a t i n g Soviet confidence i n the v i a b i l i t y of the s o c i a l i s t a l l i a n c e . Thus, i n early 1957, an e d i t o r i a l i n IA reasserted: "Our time i s distinguished above a l l by the f a c t that socialism has transcended the boundaries of a s i n g l e country and become a world system t i p p i n g the 39 i n t e r n a t i o n a l scales i n i t s own favour." Soviet commentary during 1957 once again returned to the theme of s o c i a l i s t ascendence i n the world: "In t h i s contest between the two s o c i a l systems, socialism i s d a i l y becoming stronger p o l i t i c a l l y and economically, while c a p i t a l i s m 40 i s c o n t i n u a l l y growing weaker." 69 ANALYSIS For the most part, Soviet assessments of the c o r r e l a t i o n of forces were a f a i r l y accurate r e f l e c t i o n of the contemporary balance of m i l i t a r y and economic c a p a b i l i t i e s and the promising p o l i t i c a l p o t e n t i a l a r i s i n g from a more accommodative recasting of foreign p o l i c y approaches toward the West, the s o c i a l i s t countries, and the Third World. Soviet perceptions of the c o r r e l a t i o n of forces i n the m i l i t a r y sphere were shaped by t h e i r r e l a t i v e l y vulnerable p o s i t i o n i n the face of superior American m i l i t a r y strength. Under the Eisenhower administration, the United States was b u i l d i n g up i t s nuclear arsenal, was strengthening the North A t l a n t i c Treaty Organization (NATO) by rearming West Germany and admitting that country into the NATO a l l i a n c e , and was sponsoring the formation of anti-Soviet a l l i a n c e s i n various 41 parts of the world. By 1955, the United States had also succeeded i n introducing t a c t i c a l nuclear weapons i n Europe. Medium-range bombers stationed at overseas bases r i n g i n g the Soviet Union and long-range bombers operating from U.S. t e r r i t o r y rendered the U.S.S.R. very vulnerable i n the event of war. America also held a very considerable lead over the Soviet Union i n numbers of nuclear weapons throughout t h i s period. That commentators took note of the greater m i l i t a r y might of the United States i s evident i n the defensive tone of Soviet w r i t i n g on t h i s theme. Aft e r 1955, however, when long-range bombers entered Moscow's inventory, Soviet analysts began to speak t e n t a t i v e l y of the " p o s s i b i l i t y " of the U.S.S.R. making i n t e r c o n t i n e n t a l nuclear s t r i k e s . But f i r m repudiations of American i n v u l n e r a b i l i t y came only a f t e r the 70 successful Soviet launch of a b a l l i s t i c rocket i n the l a t t e r part of 1957. If the Soviets were not sanguine about the e x i s t i n g m i l i t a r y c o r r e l a t i o n , the same could not be said about t h e i r perceptions of developments i n the economic and p o l i t i c a l spheres. Indeed, i f we view dispassionately what was happening at the time i n these areas, the expectations of Soviet leaders and scholars do not appear unreasonable. Heavy industry was being strengthened; the v i r g i n lands program was rejuvenating Soviet a g r i c u l t u r e ; and i n d u s t r i a l output was r e g i s t e r i n g 43 very high rates of growth. When Soviet analysts compared t h i s impressive performance with the f a l t e r i n g economies of the c a p i t a l i s t countries, they could only be confident about the p o s s i b i l i t i e s for bridging the economic gap at some point i n the future. On the p o l i t i c a l scene, there was also scope for optimism. O v e r a l l Soviet strategy as i t was fashioned i n the years a f t e r S t a l i n ' s demise became more confident and outward-looking i n i t s approach. The Soviet leadership opened l i n e s of communication between East and West and attempted to create an amelioration i n tensions a f t e r long years of the Cold War. Discarding the suspiciousness of the S t a l i n i s t period* t h i s new approach was enshrined i n Khrushchev's oft-repeated phrase that peaceful coexistence with the West represented the general l i n e of Soviet foreign p o l i c y . The Geneva Summit of 1955 between President Eisenhower and Khrushchev represented the f i r s t major meeting between the leaders of the U.S. and U.S.S.R. since the Potsdam Conference of 1945. While the summit was short on substantive r e s u l t s , i t s true s i g n i f i c a n c e lay i n the f a c t that i t marked an end to Soviet i s o l a t i o n i s m . 71 With regard to the s o c i a l i s t sphere, Soviet commentators argued that the i n t e g r i t y of the world s o c i a l i s t system could not be breached. This perception was strengthened by the successful weathering of the 44 c r i s i s surrounding the Hungarian r e v o l t of 1956. The rapprochement with Yugoslavia provided a d d i t i o n a l weight to the notion of s o c i a l i s t " u nity," and the Sino-Soviet r i f t was only i n i t s i n c i p i e n t stage at t h i s time. The primacy of the U.S.S.R. was acknowledged, i f not l i k e d , by most other Communist countries, and i n return Moscow magnanimously promulgated i t s doctrine of d i f f e r e n t paths to socialism. The i d e o l o g i c a l s h i f t i n the Soviet a t t i t u d e toward the nonaligned countries allowed commentators to integrate the l a t t e r into a "vast peace zone" and to p o s i t a s i g n i f i c a n t change i n the c o r r e l a t i o n of forces i n favor of s o c i a l i s m and peace. Such a p o l i t i c a l strategy was doubly advantageous to the Soviet Union i n the face of the r i g i d l y negative a t t i t u d e adopted by U.S. Secretary of State John Foster Dulles toward the nonaligned movement. The Soviets were indeed l a r g e l y successful i n i t i a l l y i n tapping the strong r e s e r v o i r of a n t i c o l o n i a l i s t sentiment i n many Third World sta t e s . However, Khrushchev's hopes regarding the r i c h p o t e n t i a l of such countries for conversion to 45 so c i a l i s m were to be b e l i e d i n l a t e r years. But major Soviet setbacks i n the Third World were to manifest themselves only l a t e r . Thus while events such as the c r i s i s i n Hungary, and the f a i l u r e of h i g h - l e v e l Soviet-Western p o l i t i c a l conferences to y i e l d r e s u l t s on such contentious issues as the fate of Germany, might have had the e f f e c t of temporarily dampening t h e i r enthusiasm, the Soviets appear c l e a r l y to have f e l t that the i n t e r n a t i o n a l p o l i t i c a l momentum favored the s o c i a l i s t cause. 72 In keeping with the i d e o l o g i c a l innovations introduced by Khrushchev at the Twentieth Party Congress, the o v e r a l l thrust of Soviet fo r e i g n p o l i c y was aimed at fu r t h e r i n g the influence of the U.S.S.R. i n world a f f a i r s while simultaneously taking care not to provoke a nuclear confrontation between the United States and the Soviet Union. These dual goals did not always prove compatible. Soviet i n t e r n a t i o n a l p o l i t i c a l strategy had to be developed i n the context of a m i l i t a r y c o r r e l a t i o n which was unfavorable to the U.S.S.R. This meant that any p o l i c y aimed at the e x p l o i t a t i o n of what the Soviets perceived as a favorable p o l i t i c a l c o r r e l a t i o n would have to take account of the probable American re a c t i o n to i t . Fortunately f o r the Soviet Union, the United States under the Eisenhower Presidency had declared American adherence to the massive r e t a l i a t i o n doctrine. The c r e d i b i l i t y of "massive r e t a l i a t i o n " i n any instance other than a d i r e c t Soviet attack on the United States came into question a f t e r the U.S.S.R. developed an i n t e r c o n t i n e n t a l d e l i v e r y c a p a b i l i t y i n 1955. The starkness of the p o l i c y a l t e r n a t i v e s presented to the United States by the doctrine of massive r e t a l i a t i o n allowed the Soviet Union a greater maneuverability i n t h e i r i n t e r n a t i o n a l conduct than would have been possible under a l e s s r i g i d doctrine. For instance, Soviet m i l i t a r y a c t i o n i n q u e l l i n g the Hungarian r e b e l l i o n was d e f i n i t e l y undertaken a f t e r the leadership weighed the r i s k of a Western m i l i t a r y response against the r i s k of allowing a breach i n the s o c i a l i s t a l l i a n c e that might w e l l spread to other Eastern European countries. The Soviets must r i g h t l y have counted on a low p r o b a b i l i t y of Western involvement i n the Hungarian incident because, among other reasons, the Western p o l i c y of r e l y i n g on a nuclear response 73 to a wide range of c r i s e s was hardly c r e d i b l e . S i m i l a r l y , Soviet behavior during the Suez c r i s i s of 1956 provided a u s e f u l i l l u s t r a t i o n of the d i f f i c u l t i e s involved i n attempting to project a Soviet image of befriending Third World countries while steering c l e a r of a d i r e c t m i l i t a r y confrontation with the West, e s p e c i a l l y the United States. Khrushchev's threats of rocket attacks against France and B r i t a i n during the course of the Suez a f f a i r were c a l i b r a t e d , f o r instance, to avoid any danger of a c t u a l l y embroiling the U.S.S.R. In the c o n f l i c t . In response to a severe American re a c t i o n to t h i s threat, Khrushchev h a s t i l y retreated from h i s ominous and threatening posture, thus revealing the value placed by the Soviet leadership on avoiding a d i r e c t confrontation with the United States i n the face of an asymmetrical s t r a t e g i c r e l a t i o n s h i p . Khrushchev had c l e a r l y sought p o l i t i c a l gains i n h i s r e s o r t to "miss i l e diplomacy," as the timing of h i s rocket threats aimed at France and B r i t a i n demonstrated. To some extent, the U.S.S.R. did win the favor of the Third World, I f only f o r i t s diplomatic and "moral" support of Egypt against c o l o n i a l powers (even though Khrushchev's b l u f f f a i l e d miserably v i s - a - v i s the United States). Moreover, the Soviets could point to t h e i r investment of economic resources i n the underdeveloped Third World as proof of t h e i r desire to promote economic development and 46 genuine p o l i t i c a l independence i n these countries. The Soviets were able to c a p i t a l i z e p o l i t i c a l l y on t h e i r a i d programs by emerging as an a l t e r n a t i v e source to c a p i t a l i s t " a i d with s t r i n g s " and by concentrating t h e i r l i m i t e d resources on conspicuous and highly v i s i b l e p r o j e c t s . By winning over the sympathy of nonaligned countries i n the Third World through o f f e r s of economic help, the Soviets hoped to undercut the 74 influence of the West i n these areas. The Soviet leadership also attempted to pierce the wall of Western-sponsored m i l i t a r y a l l i a n c e s that surrounded the U.S.S.R. In September 1955, an arms agreement worth $250 m i l l i o n was signed with the m i l i t a n t l y n a t i o n a l i s t Egyptian leader 47 Nasser. But even as the Soviets were t r y i n g to cast wide t h e i r nets of influence, they were c h a r a c t e r i s t i c a l l y cautious: the arms deal with Egypt was arranged through an intermediary—Czechoslovakia. Soviet p o l i c i e s during t h i s period, then, were c a r e f u l l y orchestrated to ex p l o i t p o l i t i c a l strengths without exposing m i l i t a r y shortcomings. CONCLUSION Throughout the period between March 1953 and August 1957, the Soviet Union was i n a markedly i n f e r i o r m i l i t a r y and economic p o s i t i o n i n r e l a t i o n to the United States, and the same could be said generally about the standing of the s o c i a l i s t bloc v i s - a - v i s the West as a whole. Soviet leaders took due account of t h i s f a c t both i n t h e i r evaluation of the c o r r e l a t i o n and i n the p o l i c i e s they pursued i n the i n t e r n a t i o n a l sphere. But by 1955 the U.S.S.R. had achieved a s t r a t e g i c deterrent c a p a b i l i t y , a l b e i t a very l i m i t e d one, and was a n t i c i p a t i n g an imminent breakthrough i n the development of an in t e r c o n t i n e n t a l b a l l i s t i c rocket. These developments, coupled with economic and e s p e c i a l l y p o l i t i c a l successes, were to set the stage f o r a period of optimism and confidence i n Soviet commentary on the c o r r e l a t i o n of forces. For S t a l i n , c a p i t a l i s m had continued to be the dominant world system, even following highly s i g n i f i c a n t post-war p o l i t i c a l changes. 75 By 1956, the Soviet perception of the i n t e r n a t i o n a l system began to change: capitalism's erstwhile dominant p o s i t i o n was seen as being i n the process of being v i t i a t e d . Capitalism was deemed to be "powerless" to hinder the world h i s t o r i c process of s o c i a l i s t transformation, even as the " i n t e r n a t i o n a l camp of s o c i a l i s m " had begun to exert an "ever-growing influence on the course of world events." Over the next few years t h i s burgeoning confidence would inc r e a s i n g l y be r e f l e c t e d i n very o p t i m i s t i c assessments of the c o r r e l a t i o n of forces. 76 NOTES 1. As a Soviet observer wrote, " S t a l i n ' s erroneous approach to the nature of the n a t i o n a l l i b e r a t i o n movement a f t e r the Second World War impeded the development of f r i e n d l y r e l a t i o n s between the U.S.S.R. and countries which had discarded the yoke of co l o n i a l i s m . The s o l u t i o n of a number of i n t e r n a t i o n a l problems was unwarrantedly protracted. The l i n e of s e l f - i s o l a t i o n which S t a l i n conducted hampered expansion of the U.S.S.R.'s foreign p o l i t i c a l contacts. . . ." V. A. Zorin, Vneshniaia p o l i t i k a SSSR na novom etape (Moscow, 1964), p. 8. Quoted i n Sidney Ploss, To the  Twenty-third Congress of the Soviet Communist Party, FPRI Research Monograph Series, No. 8, U n i v e r s i t y of Pennsylvania, 1965, p. 75. 2. See E d i t o r i a l , " P o l i c y of Fascism and War," I z v e s t i a , January 14, 1953, p. 1. Trans, i n V Current Digest of the  Soviet Press 2 (hereinafter CDSP), February 21, 1953, p. 7. 3. S. Titarenko, "Continually Strengthen the Might of Soviet State," Pravda, February 12, 1953, p. 2. Trans, i n V CDSP 6, March 22, 1953, p. 26. 4. A. Nikonov, "Vneshniaia p o l i t i k a S S S R — p o l i t i k a mira i mezhdunarodnogo sotrudnichestva" [USSR Foreign P o l i c y i s a P o l i c y of Peace and International Cooperation], Kommunist (7) May 1953, p. 29. 5. Ibi d . 6. Ib i d . 7. A. Leont'ev, "0 mirnom sosushchestvovanii dvukh sistem" [Concerning Peaceful Coexistence Between the Two Systems], Kommunist (13) September 1954, p. 57. 8. See Malenkov's speech to the USSR Supreme Soviet. Trans, i n V CDSP 30, September 5, 1953, p. 4, 10. 9. I b i d . , p. 11. 10. For text of Malenkov's speech see Pravda, March 13, 1953, p. 2. Even as l a t e as January 1955, Y. Frantsev w r i t i n g i n IA was perhaps echoing the Malenkov p o s i t i o n when he declared, "The Soviet state has at i t s command a l l the means r e q u i s i t e f o r the defence of i t s borders. . . . " Frantsev, "Lenin—Founder of Soviet Foreign P o l i c y , " IA (1) January 1955, p. 15. Emphasis added. Such a statement did not reappear a f t e r Malenkov's dismissal as Premier i n February 1955. 11. V CDSP 30, p. 26. 77 12. See Khrushchev's A p r i l 1954 speech. Trans, i n VI CDSP 22, June 26, 1954, p. 5, 9. 13. Text of Malenkov's A p r i l 1954 speech. Trans, i n VI CDSP 24, July 10, 1954, p. 10. 14. I b i d . , p. 10. 15. On Khrushchev-Molotov foreign p o l i c y disagreements, see David J . D a l l i n , Soviet Foreign P o l i c y A f t e r S t a l i n (Philadelphia, Penn.: J . B. L i p p i n c o t t Co., 1961), pp. 227-233. 16. See Leo Gruliow, ed. Current Soviet P o l i c i e s — l i t The  Documentary Record of the 20th Party Congress and I t s  Aftermath (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1957), p. 37. 17. Joseph L. Nogee and Robert H. Donaldson, Soviet Foreign  P o l i c y Since World War II (New York: Pergamon Press, 1981), p. 29. 18. Gruliow, Current Soviet P o l i c i e s — I I , p. 37. Emphasis added. Khrushchev himself was l a t e r to say i n rep l y to a western j o u r n a l i s t who had asked whether a prewar s i t u a t i o n was non-existent i n the r e l a t i o n s among c a p i t a l i s t countries or i n general: "Not only between c a p i t a l i s t countries, but i n general between c a p i t a l i s t and s o c i a l i s t c ountries." N. S. Khrushchov, Speeches and Interviews on  World Problems: 1957 (Moscow: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1958), p. 203. 19. Gruliow, Current Soviet P o l i c i e s — I I , p. 37. 20. I b i d . Emphasis added. 21. K. Ivanov, "Soviet Foreign P o l i c y and the Present International S i t u a t i o n , " IA (11) November 1955, p. 25. 22. See N. Talensky, "An H i s t o r i c V i c t o r y : F i f t e e n t h Anniversary of the Defeat of H i t l e r ' s Armies at the Approaches to Moscow," IA (1) January 1957, p. 47. 23. E d i t o r i a l , "An H i s t o r i c Congress," IA (2) February 1956, p. 7. 24. N. Talensky, "Atomic and Conventional Arms," IA (1) January 1955, p. 29. 25. Edgar M. Bottome, The Balance of Terror: A Guide to the  Arms Race (Boston: Beacon Press, 1971), p. 24. 78 26. President Eisenhower was to observe i n early 1958, "we should not t r y to excel i n everything." The Soviets, he argued, had "done much better than we have i n t h i s matter." "They stopped t h e i r Bison and Bear production, but we have kept on going, on the basis of inc o r r e c t estimates and at tremendous expense i n a mistaken e f f o r t to be 100% secure." Quoted i n John Lewis Gaddis, Strategies of  Containment: A C r i t i c a l Appraisal of Postwar American  National Security P o l i c y (New York: Oxford U n i v e r s i t y Press, 1982), p. 188. Bears and Bisons r e f e r to Soviet long-range bombers. As Edgar Bottome points out, under the impetus of the "bomber gap" scare, the Americans soon held a 5-1 lead over the Russians i n bombers. See The Balance of Terror, p. 36. 27. E d i t o r i a l , "An H i s t o r i c Congress," IA (2) February 1956, p. 6, 8. On the same theme see also A. Alexeev, "Ekonomicheskoe sorevnovanie sotsializmom i capitalismom" [Economic Competition Between Socialism and Capitalism], MEMO (2) August 1957, p. 20. 28. See, for instance, I. Kuzminov, "Deepening of the General C r i s i s of Capitalism A f t e r the Second World War," IA (1) January 1955, p. 32. 29. See Khrushchev's report to the Twentieth Party Congress i n Gruliow, Current Soviet P o l i c i e s — I I , pp. 30-32. 30. See E d i t o r i a l on the Draft D i r e c t i v e s of the Sixth Five-Year Plan e n t i t l e d "1956," IA (1) January 1956, p. 6. 31. I. Kuzminov, Concluding Remarks i n "Discussion Concerning 'People's Capitalism'," IA (5) May 1956, p. 106. Emphasis i n o r i g i n a l . 32. Gruliow, Current Soviet P o l i c i e s — I I , p. 33. 33. E d i t o r i a l , "The New Stage In the Struggle f o r Peace," IA. (1) January 1957, p. 12. 34. E d i t o r i a l , "The U.S. 'Policy of S t r e n g t h ' — I t s Mi s c a l c u l a t i o n s and F a i l u r e s , " IA (2) February 1955, p. 9. This cumbersome and negatively worded formulation was repeated verbatim the same month i n an e d i t o r i a l i n Kommunist (3) February 1955, e n t i t l e d "Za uprochenie mira mezhdu narodami," p. 20. I t can be traced to Molotov's Report of February 8, 1955, to the Second Session of the USSR Supreme Soviet. See V. M. Molotov, 0 mezhdunarodnom polo z h e n i i I vneshnei p o l i t i k e p r o v i t e l ' s t v a  SSSR [On the International S i t u a t i o n and the Foreign P o l i c y of the USSR Government] (Moscow: G o s p o l i t i z d a t , 1955), p. 45. 35. V. Korionov, "Some Problems of Present-Day America," IA (10) October 1956, p. 43. 79 36. See above, f n . 34. 37. A. A. Arzumanyan, "Peaceful Coexistence and the World Revolutionary Process," IA (8) August 1963, p. 4. 38. Sh. Sanakoyev and V. Knyazhinsky, "Lenin's P o l i c y of Peace and Friendship Among Nations," IA (12) December 1956, p. 29. 39. E d i t o r i a l , "Growing Unity of the S o c i a l i s t Countries," IA (2) February 1957, p. 5. 40. A. Alexeyev, "Two Systems—Two Results," IA (7) July 1957, p. 6. 41. Bottome, The Balance of Terror, p. 33; and Gaddis, Strategies of Containment, p. 153. 42. For numbers of nuclear weapons i n the arsenals of the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. between 1953 and 1957, see Bottome, The Balance of Terror, Appendix A, p. 155. 43. Between 1953 and 1957, the annual percent growth rate of Soviet i n d u s t r i a l production was as follows: 1953 1954 1955 1956 1957 9.1 10.1 11.0 8.2 7.7 As the V i r g i n Lands were brought under c u l t i v a t i o n , Soviet a g r i c u l t u r a l production during 1955 and 1956 shot up 13.3% and 14.7% r e s p e c t i v e l y , and the rate of growth of Soviet GNP during those same years r e g i s t e r e d 8.6% and 8.4% r e s p e c t i v e l y . See "Annual Growth Rates of Soviet GNP (Percent)," i n USSR: Measures of Economic Growth and  Development, 1950-80, Studies prepared [by the Central I n t e l l i g e n c e Agency] for the use of the J o i n t Economic Committee of the United States, December 8, 1982 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government P r i n t i n g O f f i c e , 1982), pp. 56-58. 44. The Hungarian r e v o l t was by no means an i s o l a t e d phenomenon. There were potent signs of d i s a f f e c t i o n with Moscow In Poland. In the months following the Soviet suppression of the Hungarian Revolution, Khrushchev's p o s i t i o n within the Presidium was somewhat weakened. But by June-July 1957, he managed to reassert h i s p o l i t i c a l authority. For d e t a i l s , see Robert Conquest, Power and  P o l i c y i n the USSR (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1961), pp. 292-328. 80 45. In keeping with the Soviet strategy of c u l t i v a t i n g "national bourgeois" leaders of Third World countries and viewing them as a l l i e d with the s o c i a l i s t bloc i n the quest for peace, Soviet commentators began to speak of the r i s e of " s o c i a l and progressive f o r c e s " i n i n t e r n a t i o n a l a f f a i r s . While Khrushchev never denied the importance of the working c l a s s i n u l t i m a t e l y e f f e c t i n g the s o c i a l i s t r e v o l u t i o n , he appears to have believed that the befriending of "progressive f o r c e s " would hasten the t r a n s i t i o n to s o c i a l i s m i n these countries. 46. In 1954 Afghanistan became the f i r s t non-communist r e c i p i e n t of Soviet economic a i d . Early c r e d i t s were small and used for the construction of wheat elevators, a f l o u r m i l l , a bakery, and for the paving of Kabul s t r e e t s . In 1956, a $100 m i l l i o n c r e d i t was extended f o r various p r o j e c t s . Among others, the Soviets helped with the construction of the Bagram and Kabul a i r f i e l d s . In 1955 India received a c r e d i t of $116 m i l l i o n f or the B h i l a i s t e e l m i l l . An a d d i t i o n a l sum of $126 m i l l i o n was extended i n 1956. Indonesia was offered $100 m i l l i o n i n 1956 i n economic assistance and had also been the r e c i p i e n t of large amounts of m i l i t a r y goods i n t h i s period. See George S. Carnett and Morris H. Crawford, "The Scope and D i s t r i b u t i o n of Soviet Economic A i d , " i n U. S. Congress, J o i n t Economic Committee, Dimensions of Soviet Economic  Power (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government P r i n t i n g O f f i c e , 1962), pp. 567-469. 47. The f i g u r e of $250 m i l l i o n i s c i t e d i n Bruce Porter, The USSR i n Third World C o n f l i c t s (Cambridge: Cambridge Un i v e r s i t y Press, 1984), p. 17. As Porter explains i n f n . 13, "The agreement was a barter arrangement (Egyptian cotton and r i c e i n exchange for the arms), so the f i g u r e of $250 m i l l i o n i s only a Western estimate of the value of the weapons." I b i d . , p. 17. 81 CHAPTER IV YEARS OF OPTIMISM AUGUST 1957 — SEPTEMBER 1961 The period under review i n the present chapter spans an o p t i m i s t i c phase i n the Soviet outlook on the r o l e and influence of the U.S.S.R. i n world a f f a i r s . The opening salvo i n t h i s round of surging confidence was f i r e d by the launching of the f i r s t Soviet Sputnik on October 4, 1956.* Sputnik I exploded, as i t were, two "myths" that the Soviets had, i n the past, sought very hard to d i s p e l — t h e "myth" of the st r a t e g i c i n v u l n e r a b i l i t y of the United States, and the "myth" of the technological backwardness of the Soviet Union. This tangible display of s c i e n t i f i c and m i l i t a r y prowess, coupled with t h e i r economic and p o l i t i c a l successes, impelled Soviet leaders and analysts to regard "the continuous strengthening of the productive i n f l u e n c e " of world so c i a l i s m 2 on the h i s t o r i c a l process as "the main c h a r a c t e r i s t i c of our epoch." Just as t h i s optimism reached i t s crest i n 1960-61, the combined onslaught of the incr e a s i n g l y b i t t e r Sino-Soviet polemics, a deceleration i n the o v e r a l l rate of growth of the Soviet economy, and the inauguration i n Washington of an I n t e r n a t i o n a l l y a c t i v i s t President, prompted a Soviet reassessment of the speed with which global developments were moving i n favor of socialism. The need f or a reap p r a i s a l of e a r l i e r optimism was reinfo r c e d by the Cuban m i s s i l e episode i n October 1962. We s h a l l seek to address the following questions: (1) What, according to the Soviets, were the factors underpinning t h e i r b e l i e f that i n t e r n a t i o n a l developments were moving i n a favorable direction? 82 (2) As f a r as the outside observer i s able to t e l l , did the underlying reasons provide s u f f i c i e n t grounds for such optimism? (3) How was t h i s confidence r e f l e c t e d i n Soviet depiction of the c o r r e l a t i o n of forces between s o c i a l i s m and capitalism? (4) To what extent did the pattern of Soviet i n t e r n a t i o n a l and/or domestic p o l i c i e s conform to or deviate from the picture drawn by Soviet analysts and leaders of the c o r r e l a t i o n of forces? The f i r s t and t h i r d questions are empirical queries and may be dealt with f a i r l y e a s i l y on the basis of evidence c u l l e d from the p r o l i f i c writings of Soviet analysts and leaders. The second and fourth questions are i n f e r e n t i a l i n nature and thus require a contextual i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of Soviet assertions. For instance, i t i s simple enough to state that on March 1, 1960, Khrushchev, i n a speech i n India, declared that the Soviet Union was the world's strongest m i l i t a r y power. It i s much more problematic, however, to determine whether Khrushchev himself believed the statement to be accurate or inaccurate,, and f u r t h e r , to i n f e r the purposes he might have intended to f u l f i l i n advancing such a claim. In attempting to draw conclusions from the multi-faceted evidence, the researcher walks a methodological tightrope. Between the poles of u t t e r c r e d u l i t y and outright r e j e c t i o n , one has to keep to the middle ground of a d i s c r i m i n a t i n g analysis of Soviet w r i t i n g . The most one can hope to do i s garner contextual evidence to demonstrate that the inference drawn i s reasonable, once account i s taken of the i n t e r p l a y of events within the larger p i c t u r e of Soviet domestic and i n t e r n a t i o n a l p o l i t i c s . The major thesis of t h i s chapter i s that while the launching of 83 Sputnik, with a l l the m i l i t a r y implications flowing therefrom, played an important part i n boosting Soviet optimism, i t was only one of several ingredients i n what the Soviets saw as t h e i r recipe for i n t e r n a t i o n a l success. Soviet p o l i t i c a l and e s p e c i a l l y economic gains were seen as the bedrock upon which the i n t e r n a t i o n a l structure of a s o c i a l i s t future could securely r e s t . Khrushchev, a l l h i s r h e t o r i c to the contrary notwithstanding, appears to have held the b e l i e f that i t was through winning economic b a t t l e s that s o c i a l i s m would u l t i m a t e l y emerge v i c t o r i o u s i n the "war" against c a p i t a l i s m . The mutual recriminations exchanged by the Chinese and Soviets p r i o r to the "open break" i n 1963 are very i n s t r u c t i v e i n t h i s regard, for they forced the Russians to delineate t h e i r staunch f a i t h i n peaceful economic competition with the c a p i t a l i s t West i n the face of a vigorous i d e o l o g i c a l challenge by the Chinese. Not a l l of the events occurring between the autumn of 1957 and the autumn of 1961 were favorable from the point of the Soviet leadership. The Soviets nevertheless were o p t i m i s t i c during much of t h i s period. How and why t h i s optimism p e r s i s t e d w i l l form the primary focus of the ensuing a n a l y s i s . The most d i r e c t evidence of Soviet confidence i n the favorable i n t e r n a t i o n a l p o s i t i o n of the U.S.S.R. was the introduction of an a l t e r n a t i v e phrase to characterize the d i s t r i b u t i o n of power between so c i a l i s m and c a p i t a l i s m . Alongside the term sootnoshenie s i l , Soviet w r i t e r s , following the lead of Khrushchev, commenced i n 1959 to argue that there was, i n e f f e c t , a preponderance of forces (pereves s i l ) i n favor of socialism. Although the former term, being a more generic formulation, p r e v a i l e d q u a n t i t a t i v e l y over the l a t t e r phrase, t h i s 84 development was s i g n i f i c a n t , for i t provided an index of the evolving Soviet perspective on the growing r o l e and influence of the U.S.S.R. i n world a f f a i r s . In the discussion that follows, we w i l l begin with an exposition of Soviet commentary on the c o r r e l a t i o n of forces, and then turn to an analysis of the Soviet perspective on the d i s t r i b u t i o n of power. QUIESCENT OPTIMISM: 1957-1959 The launching of Sputnik I marked an important watershed i n Soviet discussions of the d i s t r i b u t i o n of power between s o c i a l i s m and c a p i t a l i s m . Soviet scholars were circumspect i n t h e i r immediate reactions to the m i l i t a r y implications of t h i s event. They did begin, however, vigorously to deny American m i l i t a r y s u p e r i o r i t y and to argue that the Sputniks had a l t e r e d the c o r r e l a t i o n i n an important, but unspecified, way. V. Korionov, for instance, described the c o r r e l a t i o n as " t i p p i n g s t i l l f u r t h e r " i n favor of s o c i a l i s m , and an e d i t o r i a l observation i n January 1958 spoke of " r a d i c a l changes" which had 3 occurred i n the .balance. N. Inozemtsev declared that "[t]he launching of the a r t i f i c i a l earth s a t e l l i t e brought a q u a l i t a t i v e change i n i n t e r n a t i o n a l r e l a t i o n s . " But commentators re f r a i n e d from asserting, for the most part, that the successful t e s t f i r i n g of the b a l l i s t i c m i s s i l e (with the help of which the s a t e l l i t e — S p u t n i k — w a s launched into space) conferred m i l i t a r y s u p e r i o r i t y on the Soviet Union. The lone avowal of such superior m i l i t a r y strength i n the wake of the s a t e l l i t e launching was voiced by an analyst i n e a r l y 1958. Fulminating against D u l l e s ' a t t i t u d e toward the U.S.S.R., the e d i t o r i a l writer s a i d , 85 "He [Dulles] continued to agitate f o r h i s 'negotiations of strength' p o l i c y , even a f t e r the Soviet Union had shown i t s m i l i t a r y and s c i e n t i f i c supremacy."^ Indeed, such an assertion was not echoed by other analysts or Soviet leaders u n t i l 1960, and appears to indicate that the Soviets regarded the claim as both premature and unwise. The Chinese believed that the Sputnik breakthrough had resulted i n such an overwhelming accession of strength i n favor of the s o c i a l i s t countries that the l a t t e r could pursue an aggressive revolutionary strategy i n the Third World. Imperialism was only a "paper t i g e r " when seen through the Maoist prism. The Soviets, on the other hand, drew a very d i f f e r e n t set of conclusions from the same event. They stressed that i t was now possible to demand peace from the i m p e r i a l i s t s since the U.S.S.R. possessed a c r e d i b l e deterrent. The Soviet leadership appeared reluctant to jeopardize t h e i r peaceful coexistence diplomacy, t h e i r domestic economic programs or t h e i r p o l i c y of c u l t i v a t i n g " n o n - s o c i a l i s t " a l l i e s (such as India and Egypt) by a c t i v e l y promoting a s o c i a l i s t r e v o l u t i o n i n these countries. Thus, while the Soviets showed increased confidence i n the c r e d i b i l i t y of t h e i r nuclear deterrent and r e j o i c e d over the t e r r i t o r i a l v u l n e r a b i l i t y of the United States, t h e i r assessments of the m i l i t a r y impact of Sputnik were modest and c a r e f u l l y couched, e s p e c i a l l y when contrasted with Mao's bald assertions that " . . . the East wind i s p r e v a i l i n g over the West wind" and "the s o c i a l i s t forces are overwhelmingly superior to the i m p e r i a l i s t f o r c e s . " ^ The Soviets, moreover, were reluctant even to argue that the ICBM development had served to bring about an equilibrium of forces. Khrushchev, i n a l l l i k e l i h o o d , believed i n the adequacy of the 86 e x i s t i n g Soviet deterrent. The following statement, which he made i n the course of a speech to the Supreme Soviet i n December 1956, would seem to support such a t h e s i s : We make no bones about the f a c t that i f agreement i s not reached on disarmament, the Soviet Union w i l l give due attention to developing the l a t e s t types of weapons. But i t w i l l do t h i s r a t i o n a l l y so as not to overburden our budget, our economy, and our people by heavy expenditure. The Soviets, for instance, did not embark on a crash program to produce ICBMs i n large numbers and opted instead to wait f o r the development of more sophisticated second-generation m i s s i l e s . According to Edgar Bottome, ". . . i t would appear that between 1957 and 1962 the Soviet Union b u i l t l e s s than 4 percent of the ICBMs and only 20 percent of the heavy bombers that American i n t e l l i g e n c e estimated i t s economy g could have sustained." Data on Soviet defense expenditures for t h i s period provide added force to the argument that Khrushchev wished to economize on defense. Abraham Becker's analysis of Soviet defense outlays shows a consistent drop i n defense spending between 1955 and 9 1957, with only a s l i g h t increase i n 1958, but to an amount s t i l l below that for 1955. The advantages of Sputnik were seen as having larger r a m i f i c a t i o n s i n the p o l i t i c a l and economic spheres. Soviet scholars argued that t h i s advance i n m i l i t a r y technology would serve as a c a t a l y s t i n a c c e l e r a t i n g the tempo of change. The "sobering" of Western powers i n general, and of America i n p a r t i c u l a r , was viewed as one of the c a t a l y t i c e f f e c t s of Sputnik.**' In an economic sense i t "symbolize[d] the l e v e l of the productive forces and the growth of science and technology achieved by the s o c i a l i s t system."** The following comment by a Soviet analyst captures the f l a v o r of Soviet discussions of the e f f e c t of Sputnik on 87 the d i s t r i b u t i o n of power: The successful Soviet t e s t i n g of an i n t e r c o n t i n e n t a l b a l l i s t i c m i s s i l e , Soviet successes i n j e t a i r c r a f t construction, etc. have a l l demonstrated how baseless are imperialism's claims to m i l i t a r y supremacy. But i t i s not, of course, p r i m a r i l y a question of the Soviet Union's m i l i t a r y successes. . . . The changes i n favour of socialism now taking place i n the world and which cannot be checked have deep s o c i a l and economic roots, and i t i s above a l l i n the p o l i t i c a l and economic f i e l d s t h ^ | the balance of forces between the two systems i s changing. The necessity f o r economic competition and peaceful coexistence with the c a p i t a l i s t West had been a shibboleth with Khrushchev ever since the Twentieth Party Congress i n 1956. "The v i c t o r y of a s o c i a l system," he said a f t e r the Sputnik launching, " w i l l be decided not by rockets, not by atomic and hydrogen bombs, but by the system that provides man with greater material and s p i r i t u a l b e n e f i t s . We hold that 13 socialism i s a better system of s o c i e t y . " As we have seen i n an e a r l i e r chapter, the Soviets had been o p t i m i s t i c (well before the Sputnik launching) about t h e i r p o l i t i c a l successes and economic prospects and had spoken, a l b e i t t e n t a t i v e l y , of 14 the superior strength of the peace forces. The Sputniks only served to strengthen t h i s f a i t h i n the s u p e r i o r i t y of the peace forces since the Soviets c l e a r l y recognized that t h i s technological advance would serve to n e u t r a l i z e , to a degree, the s t r a t e g i c threat posed to the Soviet heartland by the United States. As a prominent Soviet defense analyst put i t , "[t]he main thing about the ICBM i s that i t makes i t possible to s t r i k e at any part of the globe. Therefore, i f the West were deterred and i f Soviet economic and p o l i t i c a l successes proceeded unhampered, the i m p l i c a t i o n that the peace forces were superior to the forces of war followed l o g i c a l l y from the Soviet perspective. In t h i s v e in, an analyst at the close of 1958 (a 88 year during which great s t r i d e s were taken i n the economic sphere) declared that the strengthening of the " p o l i t i c a l , economic and m i l i t a r y might" of the s o c i a l i s t camp made that camp "the strongest power i n the world today, the most r e l i a b l e safeguard of peace. . . . The balance of forces on the i n t e r n a t i o n a l arena today has s u b s t a n t i a l l y a l t e r e d . The forces of peace have increased and grown stronger than ever. They are now superior to the forces of war."**' The above claim, made at a time when the Soviet economy was at peak performance whereas the United States was experiencing an economic slow-down, caused the writer to declare confidently: "The great s u p e r i o r i t y of the new s o c i a l i s t system and the i n e v i t a b i l i t y of i t s complete triumph i s being thrown into greater r e l i e f i n the course of the economic competition between the two s y s t e m s . S o v i e t and s o c i a l i s t economic might not only enhanced the a t t r a c t i o n of the s o c i a l i s t model but made possible "increased d i s i n t e r e s t e d aid to the underdeveloped countries who have won freedom from c o l o n i a l 18 oppression" and created " i n c r e a s i n g l y favourable" conditions f o r "the 19 f i g h t f or peace and i n t e r n a t i o n a l s e c u r i t y . " The a l l u s i o n to the camp of s o c i a l i s m being the "strongest power i n the world today" r e f e r r e d to more than mere m i l i t a r y might: Soviet economic successes were very important both i n the context of peaceful economic competition and i n t h e i r t r a n s l a t a b i l i t y into p o l i t i c a l gains. By both American and Soviet estimates the year 1958 was an exceptionally good economic year for the U.S.S.R. Soviet sources placed the percentage increase i n n a t i o n a l income over the previous year at 20 12.6. A contemporary Western study c a l c u l a t e d a 9.9% increase i n the Soviet GNP growth rate over the previous year. According to the l a t t e r 89 source, the U.S. GNP growth rate i n 1958 was -1.2%. Khrushchev c a p i t a l i z e d on t h i s impressive economic performance i n u n v e i l i n g the Seven-Year Plan for economic development at the Twenty-First Party Congress i n February 1959. Soviet economic optimism soared i n early 1959 and Khrushchev r e f l e c t e d t h i s confidence when he outlined the s p e c i f i c s of the Seven-Year Plan i n h i s report to the Twenty-First Congress: The p r i n c i p a l tasks of t h i s period are to e s t a b l i s h the material and t e c h n i c a l base for communism, to strengthen further the economic and defensive might of the U.S.S.R. and simultaneously to provide ever f u l l e r s a t i s f a c t i o n of the growing material and s p i r i t u a l requirements of the people. The h i s t o r i c task of overtaking and surpassing the most highly developed of the c a p i t a l i s t countries must be accomplished. He added that Soviet success i n f u l f i l l i n g the plan " w i l l lead to strengthening the forces of peace and weakening the forces of war" and r e i t e r a t e d that the "economy i s the chief f i e l d i n which the peaceful 23 competition between soc i a l i s m and c a p i t a l i s m i s unfolding. . . . " In h i s December 1957 speech to the Supreme Soviet, Khrushchev had implied the need to consider the guns vs. butter issue while a l l o c a t i n g 24 resources to acquire the " l a t e s t types of weapons." That i s , he seemed to r e a l i z e that the Soviet Union could not d i v e r t large amounts of funds from other sectors of the economy to defense without s e r i o u s l y unbalancing the budget. By 1959, however, he appeared confident that the U.S.S.R. could have both guns and butter. C e r t a i n l y , the tremendous upsurge i n the Soviet economy during 1958 must have eased to a c e r t a i n extent the problem of competing demands on the budget. Defense spending rose sharply i n 1959 and the Strategic Rocket Forces were established as 25 a separate branch of the armed forces i n the same year. In conjunction with t h e i r economic advances, the Soviets continued 90 to maintain t h e i r edge i n space technology. The f i r s t a r t i f i c i a l s olar s a t e l l i t e was launched i n January 1959 (timed perhaps d e l i b e r a t e l y to coincide with the opening of the Twenty-First Congress), and i n the c o n t r o l figures of the Seven-Year Plan approved by the Congress i t was stated that "[t]he s e r i e s production of i n t e r c o n t i n e n t a l b a l l i s t i c 26 rockets has been s u c c e s s f u l l y organized." Khrushchev repeated t h i s 27 a s s e r t i o n i n h i s report to the Congress. Claims such as these stoked the perceptions of an impending " m i s s i l e gap" i n the United States. I f t h i s were Khrushchev's i n t e n t , he did not belabor the m i l i t a r y aspect of the c o r r e l a t i o n , saying only that the Soviet Union possessed the means "to deal a crushing blow against an aggressor at any point on the g l o b e . " 2 8 Instead he proclaimed that f u l f i l l m e n t of the Seven-Year Plan would so increase the economic p o t e n t i a l of the U.S.S.R. that, along with the increasing economic p o t e n t i a l of the s o c i a l i s t countries, i t would "ensure a decisive advantage for peace i n the c o r r e l a t i o n of f o r c e s . " He went on: Indeed, when the U.S.S.R. becomes the world's leading i n d u s t r i a l power, when the Chinese People's Republic becomes a mighty i n d u s t r i a l power and a l l the s o c i a l i s t countries together w i l l be producing more than h a l f of the world's i n d u s t r i a l output, the i n t e r n a t i o n a l s i t u a t i o n w i l l change r a d i c a l l y . . . . One need have no doubt that by that time the countries working for peace w i l l be joined by new countries^ that have freed themselves from c o l o n i a l oppression. . . . In h i s concluding report to the Congress, Khrushchev s a i d : " I f we take the countries which are i n the world s o c i a l i s t system and the countries which are waging a v a l i a n t struggle f o r t h e i r freedom and n a t i o n a l Independence, the preponderance of forces i s now on the side of 30 those peace-loving countries." Khrushchev was speaking here of the o v e r a l l c o r r e l a t i o n of p o l i t i c a l , economic, and m i l i t a r y forces, rather 91 than j u s t the m i l i t a r y balance, as h i s next statement makes amply c l e a r : "In t e r r i t o r y , s i z e of population and a v a i l a b i l i t y of natural resources, 31 the peace-loving countries are superior to the i m p e r i a l i s t s t a t e s . " This claim was merely a more emphatic version of e a r l i e r assertions regarding the s u p e r i o r i t y of the peace forces. Most Soviet commentators during the f i r s t h a l f of 1959 did not re-echo the declaration that the "preponderance of f o r c e s " was on the side of peace-loving countries, but chose instead to stress the domestic and i n t e r n a t i o n a l s i g n i f i c a n c e of Soviet economic achievements and to speak of the imminent future when "the f u l f i l l m e n t of the Seven-Year plan along with the successes i n the economic development of other s o c i a l i s t countries . . . w i l l ensure the d e c i s i v e preponderance of peace-loving forces i n the i n t e r n a t i o n a l 32 arena." (As we have seen above, Khrushchev employed both these formulations i n h i s report to the Twenty-First Congress.) Analysts continued, however, to maintain that the forces of peace and democracy 33 possessed "by far the superior strength." In promoting peaceful coexistence between s o c i a l i s t and c a p i t a l i s t states, Khrushchev had drawn a d i s t i n c t i o n between sober and aggressive forces i n the West, arguing that the chances for peace were enhanced i f the former group were p o l i t i c a l l y ascendant i n i m p e r i a l i s t s o c i e t i e s . With Khrushchev's September 1959 v i s i t to the United States to meet with President Eisenhower, Soviet scholars began to evince even greater confidence i n the success of Soviet diplomacy and foreign p o l i c y and a t t r i b u t e d t h i s "turning-point" i n i n t e r n a t i o n a l r e l a t i o n s to "a great 34 and decisive s u p e r i o r i t y " of peace-loving forces over those of aggression and war. As one analyst put I t : Against the background of the predominance of the forces of peace over those of war i t has for the f i r s t time i n the 92 h i s t o r y of mankind become possible to avert wars. Statesmen  regardless of t h e i r views and a s p i r a t i o n s , have to adapt t h e i r  p o l i c y to t h i s f a c t of epochal importance i f tb^gy are not to be swept aside by the onward march of h i s t o r y . THE ASSERTIVE PHASE: 1960-1961 Khrushchev's exuberant hopes for matching the l e v e l of United States i n d u s t r i a l production by 1965 and overtaking that l e v e l by 1970 were probably based on the expectation that the United States economy would continue i t s sluggish performance of the 1950s, while the Soviet Union would maintain or surpass the economic record of 1958. Even i f such a scenario had held true, the task of overtaking the U.S. economy 36 by 1970 would not have been easy. Unfortunately for Khrushchev, the economic growth rate for 1959 registered a steep de c l i n e , mainly due to a disastrous f a l l i n a g r i c u l t u r a l production occasioned by adverse weather conditions. According to a Western estimate, the annual growth rate of the Soviet gross n a t i o n a l product f e l l to 3.9 percent i n 1959 a f t e r a high i n 1958 of 9.9 percent. The American GNP growth rate for 37 that same year was 6.6 percent. Khrushchev had made an issue of Soviet success i n peaceful economic competition with the United States. A slow-down i n the rate of growth therefore r a i s e d the question of economic p r i o r i t i e s , and i n January 1960, i n a speech to the Supreme Soviet, Khrushchev proposed cuts i n the Soviet defense budget while simultaneously presenting Soviet m i l i t a r y 38 might as more than s u f f i c i e n t to repel threats from imperialism. I t was i n t h i s period that Khrushchev and other Soviet analysts began to claim that the Soviet Union was the strongest m i l i t a r y power i n the world. The f i r s t mention of Soviet m i l i t a r y s u p e r i o r i t y came i n a 93 39 speech delivered by Khrushchev i n February 1960 i n New D e l h i , India. This theme was echoed by other Soviet leaders and commentators during the course of that year and the greater part of 1961. Mikoyan i n A p r i l of 1960 spoke of the " m i l i t a r y s u p e r i o r i t y of the Soviet U n i o n . " 4 0 M. Marinin w r i t i n g i n the same period said that "the Soviet Union r e l y i n g on i t s i n d u s t r i a l t e c h n i c a l might has achieved a d e f i n i t e m i l i t a r y preponderance over the United States and i t s i m p e r i a l i s t 41 a l l i e s . " Malinovsky i n February 1961 repeated Khrushchev's March 1960 formula that "the Soviet Union has become the strongest m i l i t a r y power 42 i n the world," and Pravda's analysis of the 1961 d r a f t program of the Communist Party chose to stress i t s m i l i t a r y aspects and claimed that 43 the Soviet Union was the strongest m i l i t a r y power i n the world. With regard to the o v e r a l l c o r r e l a t i o n , most Soviet scholars i n 1960 and 1961 i n s i s t e d that the preponderance of forces was on the side of peace and s o c i a l i s m , as the following observation i l l u s t r a t e s : "The c o r r e l a t i o n of forces between the two systems i s s t e a d i l y changing and f o r several years now these changes have obtained for s o c i a l i s m a 44 preponderance over c a p i t a l i s m i n the scales of the planet." In January 1961, a group of analysts declared that there was "a very well-defined preponderance of the forces of s o c i a l i s m and peace over the 45 forces of imperialism and war" i n the i n t e r n a t i o n a l arena. This same a r t i c l e also repeated the November 1960 formulation of the Conference of Communist and Workers Pa r t i e s that "[t]he s u p e r i o r i t y of the forces of 46 s o c i a l i s m and peace i s absolute." Soviet commentary during 1960 and most of 1961 was much more assertive i n i t s claims than between 1957 and 1959. What i s one to make of these Soviet assertions of m i l i t a r y s u p e r i o r i t y during 1960 and 1961? 94 C l e a r l y , as the record shows, the Soviet Union was i n a s t r a t e g i c a l l y i n f e r i o r p o s i t i o n v i s - a - v i s the United States throughout t h i s period. Lawrence Freedman states that by September 1961, U.S. i n t e l l i g e n c e 47 estimates placed the number of deployed Soviet ICBMs at a mere ten. It i s very probable that the Soviet leadership chose d e l i b e r a t e l y to mislead the world about Soviet m i l i t a r y power. In f a c t , Khrushchev f r e e l y admits i n h i s memoirs that one of the reasons for Soviet reluctance to cooperate with the Americans i n space technology was the fear that t h i s would apprise the U.S. of r e l a t i v e Soviet weakness i n the 48 m i l i t a r y area. Soviet boasts about t h e i r m i l i t a r y strength f u e l l e d the myth of the " m i s s i l e gap" i n the United States and became an issue 49 i n the 1960 P r e s i d e n t i a l campaign. For Khrushchev, the m i l i t a r y clout of the Soviet Union served a useful purpose—only i n the short r u n — i n staying the hand of the " i m p e r i a l i s t s , " f o r c i n g them to be " r e a l i s t i c " by compelling them to accept meekly the v e r d i c t of h i s t o r y . But i t was the deterrent and compellent values of m i l i t a r y power that he deemed important—not i t s p r a c t i c a l u t i l i t y . In the long run, only Soviet economic and p o l i t i c a l successes could, he believed, ensure a stable foundation for the spread of communism. From t h i s p h i l o s o p h i c a l standpoint, i t made eminent sense to e x p l o i t any short-term m i l i t a r y advantages that the West "perceived" the Soviet Union to possess. To t h i s end, Khrushchev brandished the m i l i t a r y club (his manufactured c r i s e s over B e r l i n are good examples), seeking to c a p i t a l i z e p o l i t i c a l l y on a putative Soviet m i l i t a r y s u p e r i o r i t y while taking care to trim Soviet defense expenditures i n order not to jeopardize the course of economic competition with the United S t a t e s . 5 0 95 Also, the assertion of m i l i t a r y s u p e r i o r i t y , following as i t did on the heels of an announcement c a l l i n g f o r cuts i n the defense budget, might have been intended to serve as verbal ammunition i n the anticipated b a t t l e with the generals over t h i s issue. By openly asserting that the Soviet Union was the world's strongest m i l i t a r y power, Khrushchev may have hoped to send a clea r s i g n a l both to the Chinese, who were accusing the Soviets of p u s i l l a n i m i t y i n pursuing the goal of r e v o l u t i o n , and to the m i l i t a r y establishment i n h i s country, that Soviet m i l i t a r y strength was adequate to meet the " i m p e r i a l i s t " challenge."** Thus i t i s l i k e l y that Khrushchev i n t h i s fashion hoped to manipulate simultaneously both h i s domestic constituency and h i s s o c i a l i s t and i n t e r n a t i o n a l audiences. In 1961, however, the Kennedy Administration increased the U.S. defense budget, adopted the doctrine of f l e x i b l e response, and announced a more a c t i v i s t i n t e r n a t i o n a l p o l i c y . These developments were accompanied by an economic recovery i n the United States; The Soviets must thus have perceived an American challenge on a l l three fronts—economic, p o l i t i c a l , and m i l i t a r y . I n i t i a l Soviet reaction to the Kennedy Administration's p o l i c i e s was sanguine. Analysts chose to emphasize the p o s i t i v e aspects of Kennedy's program and spoke of such things as the U.S. President's 52 expressed desire f o r a dialogue with the Soviet Union. The Bay of Pigs f i a s c o only served to v i n d i c a t e the Soviet f a i t h i n the "preponderance of the forces of peace and s o c i a l i s m , " and Khrushchev i n January 1961 flamboyantly declared: In the past we used to say that h i s t o r y was working for socialism. By that we meant that eventually man would consign c a p i t a l i s m to the dustbin and that s o c i a l i s m would triumph. Today we can say that s o c i a l i s m i s working for h i s t o r y , 96 because the r i s e of s o c i a l i s m and i t s a f f i r m a t i o n on a worldwide scale are the, basic content of the h i s t o r i c a l process i n our times. He also reaffirmed h i s b e l i e f that " [ v ] i c t o r y f or the Soviet Union i n i t s economic competition with the United States, and v i c t o r y for the s o c i a l i s t system as a whole over the c a p i t a l i s t system, w i l l be a major turning-point i n h i s t o r y . . . " and that "[t]he most important thing 54 today i s to win time In the economic competition with c a p i t a l i s m . " As long as t h i s view both of the m i l i t a r y and the o v e r a l l c o r r e l a t i o n was not severely c r i t i c i z e d by the Americans, Soviet leaders and analysts continued to evince great optimism. Strumilin i n September 1961 had very encouraging predictions f o r the world "twenty years from now." Speaking of the p o t e n t i a l for the expansion of the s o c i a l i s t community, he wrote: We do not know how many of these underdeveloped countries w i l l f u l l y enter the commonwealth of s o c i a l i s t countries i n the next ten or twenty years, but we can expect with c e r t a i n t y that t h e i r g r a v i t a t i o n toward t h i s camp w i l l increase with every year, rather than diminish. . . . But l e t us assume out of caution that not more than 30% of the populations of n e u t r a l countries and not more than 10% of those of the i m p e r i a l i s t camp take the s o c i a l i s t road during the next twenty years, and that i n the f i r s t decade^-up to 1970—the percentages are only h a l f of these. . . . The above assessment was made mainly on the basis of the economic a t t r a c t i o n of the Soviet model for countries wishing to telescope the period of economic development. The Draft Program of the Communist Party released i n J u l y 1961, for instance, had announced that [ i ] n the current decade (1961-1970), the Soviet Union, i n creating the material and t e c h n i c a l basis of communism w i l l surpass the . . . U.S.A. i n production per head of population. . . . In the next decade (1971-1980) the material and t e c h n i c a l basis of communism w i l l be created. This program, which was presented to the Twenty-Second Party Congress i n October 1961, was another example of Khrushchev's f a i t h i n the 97 overriding importance of the economic c o r r e l a t i o n of forces. But by October 1961, spokesmen for the Kennedy Administration had questioned the basis f o r the extreme optimism displayed by Soviet analysts with regard to the c o r r e l a t i o n of forces. Khrushchev had f a i l e d to intimidate the West with h i s B e r l i n adventure. The American press, too, began now to t a l k of a resurgence i n the i n t e r n a t i o n a l power and prestige of the United States. In the face of such adverse trends, Khrushchev i n July 1961 had perhaps r e l u c t a n t l y c a l l e d f o r an increase i n U.S.S.R. defense expenditures, and Soviet comment on the c o r r e l a t i o n of forces underwent a subtle metamorphosis. The Russian response to the "changed" s i t u a t i o n w i l l form the subject of the next chapter. ANALYSIS Were Soviet depictions of the d i s t r i b u t i o n of power between soci a l i s m and c a p i t a l i s m reasonable given the " s h i f t s " i n the m i l i t a r y , p o l i t i c a l , and economic spheres on which these assessments were based? And how did t h e i r stated views of the c o r r e l a t i o n accord with the p o l i c i e s they pursued during the period under consideration? In general, Soviet assessments of the c o r r e l a t i o n of forces from the launching of Sputnik to the close of 1959 seem r e a l i s t i c . The development of the ICBM helped the U.S.S.R. to break out of the st r a t e g i c s t r a i t j a c k e t i n which i t had e a r l i e r found i t s e l f : The i n s i g n i f i c a n t numbers of Soviet long-range bombers had hardly constituted a credible or a r e l i a b l e deterrent against the v a s t l y superior American s t r a t e g i c forces. High economic growth rates i n the U.S.S.R. during most of the 1950s reinf o r c e d Soviet f a i t h i n the 98 s o c i a l i s t economy. L a s t l y , the p o l i c y of courting the newly independent countries of the Third World for p o l i t i c a l a l legiance was quite successful, at l e a s t i n i t i a l l y . The cautious optimism that the Soviets evinced during t h i s e a r l i e r period appears to be consonant with the implications of the above developments. Perhaps a sampling of Western opinion on (1) the Sputnik development and (2) Soviet economic progress and t h e i r p o l i t i c a l moves i n the i n t e r n a t i o n a l arena would provide us with a benchmark against which to evaluate the modesty of Soviet claims during the 1957-1959 period. Popular Western reaction to Sputnik was as alarmed as i t was s w i f t . In the United States, j o u r n a l i s t s and defense spokesmen began to argue that a dangerous m i s s i l e gap was i n the m a k i n g . E v e n some scholars joined i n t h i s chorus of concern. Professor J . S t e r l i n g L ivingston i n a c o n f i d e n t i a l b r i e f i n g session of the Committee f o r Economic Development sa i d : The evidence seems to i n d i c a t e that we are lagging behind the Soviets i n the arms race because of 'calculated decisions made by the m i l i t a r y people' which res u l t e d i n our not undertaking the development the ICBM at the time the Soviets undertook i t s development. Assurances by administration spokesmen that the mere launching of an earth s a t e l l i t e did not n e c e s s a r i l y add to the m i l i t a r y strength of 59 the Soviet Union were drowned out by the media and public at large, which chose to stress the emergence of a dangerous lag i n the m i l i t a r y sphere. Soviet economic advances were also a topic of widespread discussion i n the United States.** 0 Many Americans saw i n the rapid Soviet economic progress a channel for the spread of s o c i a l i s t influence around the world with a l l the attendant negative implications for the 99 dissemination of American global power. The Soviet challenge, as i t was perceived i n the United States, was of a comprehensive character, embracing m i l i t a r y , p o l i t i c a l , and economic aspects. In the face of these perceived adverse trends, the i n f l u e n t i a l American j o u r n a l i s t Walter Lippmann opined that the global balance of power favored the Soviet Union: . . . [A]s compared with our great r i v a l and adversary, we are at t h i s time In a d e c l i n e . . . . The amazing rate of progress i n the Soviet Union p o r t e n d s — i f we do not catch up with i t — a growing Russian s u p e r i o r i t y , not only i n m i l i t a r y power, but i n p o l i t i c a l and economic influence. . . . We have to accept the hard f a c t that not only have we f a l l e n behind, but that, . . .we s h a l l continue to f a l l behind. . . . A l l things considered, then, Soviet assessments of the c o r r e l a t i o n of forces between 1957 and 1959 were not unreasonable. So, while Robert Strausz-Hupe spoke of America's "diminishing freedom of choice" and 62 wondered how the United States could "recapture the i n i t i a t i v e , " h i s Soviet counterpart, A. Arzumanian, wrote: Are we not a n t i c i p a t i n g i n asserting that imperialism has ceased to be the dominant f a c t o r of the present day? To t h i s question a s p e c i f i c answer must be given. Imperialism has l o s t forever the p o s s i b i l i t y of determining the course and d i r e c t i o n of world s o c i a l evolution. Of course imperialism s t i l l r u l e s over a wide t e r r i t o r y of the globe, i t i s s t i l l comparatively strong and capable of o f f e r i n g comparatively great resistance to the new s o c i a l system, i t can s t i l l cause mankind untold harm. But of determining the direcg^on of world evolution, imperialism i s no longer capable. From 1960 onward Soviet commentary on the c o r r e l a t i o n of forces assumed a markedly manipulative character. Soviet assertions of m i l i t a r y s u p e r i o r i t y were not consistent with objective c a p a b i l i t i e s . A l i t t l e under a year e a r l i e r , i n March 1959, Khrushchev had t o l d an East German audience that i f i t were possible to invent an instrument which would measure with p r e c i s i o n the p o l i t i c a l and m i l i t a r y strength of the s o c i a l i s t countries and the West, i t "would show that both sides are 100 s u f f i c i e n t l y strong at present." While the Soviets were s t i l l ahead of the United States i n space technology, there had been no m i l i t a r y breakthrough which would have conferred on the U.S.S.R. the m i l i t a r y s u p e r i o r i t y that the Soviets were claiming i n t h i s period. Even i n the area of the economy, the trends, as we have seen, were not encouraging. The " s i l v e r l i n i n g " on the economic cloud, as f a r as Khrushchev was concerned, perhaps resided i n the f a c t that the drop i n the Soviet growth rate i n 1959 was occasioned by a poor showing i n a g r i c u l t u r a l rather than i n d u s t r i a l production. The l a t t e r registered an increase i n the percentage rate of growth over 1958. And while the rate of i n d u s t r i a l growth f e l l i n 1960, i t was by a n e g l i g i b l e margin. 6^ Moreover, the o v e r a l l rate of growth of the Soviet economy did pick up 66 considerably i n 1960. I t was, presumably, with the facet of i n d u s t r i a l production i n mind that Khrushchev o p t i m i s t i c a l l y issued the Draft Program of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union i n J u l y 1961. The Draft Program set some rather unclear goals for Soviet a g r i c u l t u r e : "In the f i r s t decade the Soviet Union w i l l o u t s t r i p the United States i n the output of key a g r i c u l t u r a l products per head of the population." The Program did not claim to o u t s t r i p the United States i n o v e r a l l a g r i c u l t u r a l production i n a decade. Besides, the d e f i n i t i o n of "key a g r i c u l t u r a l products" could always be open to i n t e r p r e t a t i o n . For i n d u s t r i a l output the Soviet Union was to aim "within twenty years" to "leave the present o v e r a l l volume of U.S. i n d u s t r i a l output f a r b e h i n d . " 6 7 The more or l e s s simultaneous occurrence of three circumstances must have provided the impetus for Khrushchev to seek a s o l u t i o n i n a p o l i c y of d e c e i t : (1) the emergence of the "guns or b u t t e r " quandary 101 when Soviet economic growth rates dropped i n 1959; (2) the Chinese assault on Soviet global strategy, e s p e c i a l l y during 1959-60; and (3) the heated debate on the "m i s s i l e gap" issue i n the United States i n 1959-60. By proclaiming " m i l i t a r y s u p e r i o r i t y " Khrushchev may have hoped: to undercut p o l i t i c a l opposition to h i s reduction i n the arms budget while providing f o r the div e r s i o n of freed resources into other sectors of the Soviet economy; to inform the Chinese that Soviet espousal of peace and peaceful coexistence did not spring from a sense of weakness; and to score p o l i t i c a l points i n areas of c o n f l i c t with the West (such as i n B e r l i n ) . Khrushchev at t h i s time had perhaps no plans for a major expansion of Soviet m i l i t a r y forces, and sought to ex p l o i t Western perceptions of Soviet strength to the maximum. Soviet leaders and analysts emphasized the. importance of the economic aspect of the c o r r e l a t i o n of forces above a l l others. Soviet economic successes, according to commentators, would allow f o r the rapid economic development of other s o c i a l i s t countries, would make possible " d i s i n t e r e s t e d a i d " to uncommitted countries of the Third World, would enhance the strength of. the peace forces i n c a p i t a l i s t countries, and 68 provide the foundation for Soviet defensive might. Soviet p o l i c i e s r e f l e c t e d t h i s economic and p o l i t i c a l p r e d i l e c t i o n . During the Khrushchev era, economic a i d was used p r i m a r i l y as a p o l i t i c a l instrument: The Soviet leadership proffered generous economic assistance to those nonaligned countries which were anti-Western and a n t i - i m p e r i a l i s t . Soviet aid was extended i n the b u i l d i n g of large-scale projects i n the state s e c t o r — s u c h as s t e e l plants, dams, and the l i k e . Khrushchev made common cause with the n a t i o n a l i s t 102 bourgeoisie i n these countries, arguing that the desire of these leaders for peace and t h e i r sentiment against imperialism and c o l o n i a l i s m bound these countries into an a l l i a n c e with the s o c i a l i s t b loc. The " n o n - c a p i t a l i s t path of development" was touted as representing a stepping stone toward a "higher" form of development—socialism. In keeping with Khrushchev's b e l i e f that the Soviet economy was the prime b a t t l e f i e l d f or the war of i d e o l o g i e s , Soviet economic aid commitments to nonaligned countries exceeded Soviet m i l i t a r y aid commitments. 6^ That, i n the f i n a l a n a l y s i s , actual d e l i v e r i e s of arms ai d exceeded d e l i v e r i e s of economic aid does not d i l u t e the essence of the Khrushchevian b i a s . 7 0 Khrushchev pursued a forward strategy with regard to the countries c o n s t i t u t i n g what has come to be known as the Third World. But h i s p o l i c i e s v i s - a - v i s these countries were based more on using economic and p o l i t i c a l rather than m i l i t a r y means to a t t a i n influence. C e r t a i n l y , the m i l i t a r y instrument ( i n the form of arms aid) played an important r o l e , but i t never attained the predominant p o s i t i o n that i t did i n l a t e r years under Brezhnev. I t might be objected that the only reason that the Soviet Union under Khrushchev was not more active m i l i t a r i l y was because the Soviets d i d not possess the m i l i t a r y wherewithal to pursue such a course. But one must point out that under Khrushchev the very areas (conventional arms, m i l i t a r y manpower, naval development) the strengthening of which would have made possible a more active m i l i t a r y strategy i n the Third World, were areas i n which Khrushchev introduced d r a s t i c budget cuts, opting instead for nuclear firepower. 7* Even i n the l a t t e r area, the Soviet Union did not develop nuclear weapons and m i s s i l e s nearly as f a s t 103 as the West expected i t would between 1957 and 1961. Moscow i n the l a t e 1950s also undertook to reduce i t s armed forces 73 i n the German Democratic Republic and Hungary. In h i s memoirs Khrushchev defends h i s m i l i t a r y programs—such as troop cuts and, i n the naval area, the scrapping of c r u i s e r s — o n economic grounds: "We had to economize on pur army abroad as w e l l as ap home. The maintenance of a d i v i s i o n abroad—that i s , on the t e r r i t o r y of another s o c i a l i s t c o u n t r y — c o s t s twice as much as the maintenance of a d i v i s i o n on our own 74 t e r r i t o r y . " Of a i r c r a f t c a r r i e r s , he said ". . . [W]e couldn't a f f o r d to b u i l d them. They were simply beyond our means. Besides, with a strong submarine force, we f e l t able to sink the American c a r r i e r s I f i t came to war. In other words, submarines represented an e f f e c t i v e defensive c a p a b i l i t y as well as r e l i a b l e means of launching a m i s s i l e counterattack."^ 5 Soviet f o r e i g n p o l i c y during t h i s period attempted to t r a n s l a t e perceived m i l i t a r y strengths into p o l i t i c a l gains. But the Soviet leadership always stopped short of pursuing t h e i r advantage to the point of r i s k i n g a war. During the 1958 Middle East c r i s i s , f o r example, when American and B r i t i s h troops landed i n Lebanon and Jordan, Khrushchev, as Richard Lowenthal worded i t , ". . . was determined to use every conceivable p o l i t i c a l pressure to prevent the Western powers from carrying out t h e i r supposed intentions while at the same time evading a m i l i t a r y commitment of h i s own."^ Khrushchev did not engage i n s a b e r - r a t t l i n g i n t h i s instance to the same degree as he had done previously during the Suez c r i s i s of 1956, presumably because he wished to avoid a d i r e c t clash with the United S t a t e s . ^ The Soviet response 104 during the 1958 Quemoy c r i s i s was s i m i l a r l y vague and cautious. Only i n B e r l i n , a f e s t e r i n g p o l i t i c a l sore f o r the Soviet Union and East Germany, did Khrushchev attempt to press h i s perceived advantage to the f u l l e s t . Even i n t h i s instance, however, he retreated each time when confronted with the readiness of Western powers to face up to the challenge. Khrushchev did not, however, seek to secure weapons systems at any cost i n order to achieve the s t r a t e g i c s u p e r i o r i t y he so often claimed. In 1960, as we have noted, when faced with a slow-down i n the economic growth rate, Khrushchev i n s t i t u t e d cuts i n defense spending. And i n the protracted polemical dispute with the Chinese over the issue of peace and r e v o l u t i o n , the Soviets argued that r e v o l u t i o n was compatible with peace and c r i t i c i z e d "dogmatists" f o r "acknowledging i n words" that a r a d i c a l change had occurred i n the c o r r e l a t i o n of forces without 78 understanding i t s " r e a l substance." Soviet arms a c q u i s i t i o n p o l i c i e s during much of t h i s period appear to r e f l e c t Khrushchev's b e l i e f i n the adequacy of a cr e d i b l e d e t e r r e n t — a view he endorses i n h i s memoirs: I believe an important part of our m i l i t a r y doctrine should be that we not t r y to compete with our adversaries i n every area where they are ahead of us; as long as we preserve our nuclear deterrent, we w i l l be defending our country e f f e c t i v e l y and serving our people w e l l . Soviet i n t e r n a t i o n a l p o l i c i e s were for the most part i n accord with A. Sovetov's evaluation of the p o s s i b i l i t i e s and l i m i t a t i o n s on Soviet freedom of action i n the global arena. The Soviet Union would not promote r e v o l u t i o n at the cost of peace: In a world where states with d i f f e r e n t s o c i a l and economic systems e x i s t t h i s i s f i r s t of a l l a struggle f o r the consolid a t i o n of peaceful coexistence. . . . In the atmosphere of rapid s o c i a l development, c h a r a c t e r i s t i c of the present 105 era, peaceful coexistence, while not retarding s o c i a l changes i n countries where these changes are r i p e , must at the same time ensure a s i t u a t i o n i n which i n t e r n a l processes i n  p a r t i c u l a r countries dg^not lead to m i l i t a r y clashes of the two antipodal systems. CONCLUSION The years following the Sputnik launch i n the autumn of 1957 saw the r i s e and peaking of Soviet optimism regarding the c o r r e l a t i o n of forces. Socialism was now seen as the dominant f a c t o r i n shaping i n t e r n a t i o n a l development. The Soviets began to argue that the preponderance of forces was how on the side of peace and so c i a l i s m . The 1960 Moscow Statement of eighty-one Communist Pa r t i e s declared: Today i t i s the world s o c i a l i s t system and the forces f i g h t i n g  against imperialism, f o r a s o c i a l i s t transformation of  society, that determine the main content, the main trend^and  main features of the h i s t o r i c a l development of society. The Soviets, however, did not i n t e r p r e t t h i s favorable c o r r e l a t i o n as l i c e n s e to promote s o c i a l i s t revolutions i n the Third World countries. Soviet leaders i n s i s t e d that a p o l i c y of peaceful coexistence was f u l l y compatible with the spread of soc i a l i s m and i n t h e i r polemics against the Chinese argued that the working class could not v i s u a l i z e the creation of a Communist c i v i l i z a t i o n on the ruins of 82 world c u l t u r a l centers. The Soviets, during t h i s period, held that l o c a l wars should also be avoided because such wars could quickly 83 escalate into a l l - o u t nuclear c o n f l i c t . Consistent with the view that the Soviet Union should steer c l e a r of providing active m i l i t a r y support and encouragement f or s o c i a l i s t revolutions i n the Third World, Khrushchev's m i l i t a r y doctrine as he 106 enunciated i t i n early 1960 stressed a credible nuclear deterrent and denigrated the r o l e and importance of conventional forces i n any future 84 c o n f l i c t . In a sense, such a m i l i t a r y strategy mirrored the American emphasis on nuclear firepower under the Eisenhower Presidency. Perhaps one of the reasons Khrushchev was not aggressive i n using m i l i t a r y methods to pursue Soviet p o l i t i c a l ambitions i n the Third World was that u n t i l the accession of President Kennedy i n 1961, the United States was not a c t i v e l y engaged i n that area e i t h e r . But with a change i n American p o l i t i c a l and m i l i t a r y strategy and t a c t i c s i n i t i a t e d by the Kennedy Administration, Soviet confidence began to waver. As i t became inc r e a s i n g l y c l e a r that the Khrushchevian approach f a i l e d to meet adequately the new American challenge, Soviet commentary on the c o r r e l a t i o n r e f l e c t e d some uncertainty about expressing the u n q u a l i f i e d optimism of the previous years. 107 NOTES 1. On the 26th of August 1957, the Soviets had suc c e s s f u l l y t e s t - f i r e d a b a l l i s t i c rocket. But the s i g n i f i c a n c e of th i s breakthrough was generally recognized i n the West only a f t e r the launching of Sputnik I. As Khrushchev put i t , "When we announced the successful t e s t i n g of an int e r c o n t i n e n t a l m i s s i l e , some U.S. statesmen did not belie v e us. . . ." N.S. Khrushchov, Speeches and Interviews on World Problems: 1957 (Moscow: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1958), p. 203. 2. N. Inozemtsev, "Mirnoe sosushchestvovanie—Ob'ektivnaia neobkhodimost' sovremennosti" [Peaceful Coexistence—The Objective Necessity of Our Times], i n Mezhdunarodnyi  Politiko-ekonomicheskii Ezhegodnik, 1960 [International P o l i t i c a l and Economic Yearbook] (Moscow: Gosudarstvennoe Izdatel'stvo P o l i t i c h e s k o i L i t e r a t u r y , 1960), p. 9. 3. V. Korionov, "The C r i s i s of the 'Positions of Strength' P o l i c y , " IA (3) March 1958, p. 34; E d i t o r i a l , "Osnovaia zadacha sovremennosti" [The Fundamental Task of Modern Times], MEMO (1) January 1958, p. 5. 4. N. Inozemtsev, "Atomnaia di p l o m a t i i a SShA: Proekty i d e i s t v i t e l ' n o s t " [U.S. Atomic Diplomacy: Schemes and R e a l i t y ] , MEMO (3) March 1958, p. 40. Emphasis added. 5. E d i t o r i a l , "An Imperative Demand," IA (1) January 1958, 6. Cited i n Donald S. Zagoria, The Sino-Soviet C o n f l i c t ,  1956-1961 (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton U n i v e r s i t y Press, 1962), p. 160. 7. N. S. Khrushchov, Speeches and Interviews. . . 1957, p. 378. 8. Bottome, The Balance of Terror, pp. 41-42. 9. Becker's figures i n b i l l i o n s of rubles (given below) represent the estimated t o t a l high i n defense spending i n the USSR: Cited i n Bottome, The Balance of Terror, p. 192, f n . 3. p. 4. 1955 1956 1957 1958 15.00 14.81 14.39 14.63 108 10. On analyst wrote, "The Soviet Union's development of an i n t e r c o n t i n e n t a l m i s s i l e capable of d e l i v e r i n g a r e t a l i a t o r y atomic blow through cosmic space has r a d i c a l l y changed the en t i r e s t r a t e g i c s i t u a t i o n . Now Soviet i n t e r c o n t i n e n t a l m i s s i l e s can reach any point i n U.S. t e r r i t o r y . This f a c t exerts a considerable cooling e f f e c t on the hotheads of the sel f - c o n f i d e n t adventurers and helps to s t a b i l i z e the world s i t u a t i o n . " Commentator, "The Western Powers and Nuclear Tests," IA (11) November 1958, p. 71. 11. E d i t o r i a l , "The Vanguard of Progressive Mankind," IA (11) November 1957, p. 9. 12. E d i t o r i a l , "The Cardinal Problem of World P o l i t i c s , " IA (12) December 1957, p. 13. 13. N. S. Khrushchov, Speeches and Interviews. . .1957, p. 367. 14. See, for instance, E d i t o r i a l , "Soviet People Are Confident of the Future," IA (2) February 1955, p. 18; and E d i t o r i a l , "The New Stage i n the Struggle f o r Peace," IA (1) January 1957, p. 12. 15. N. Talensky, " M i l i t a r y Strategy and Foreign P o l i c y , " IA (3) March 1958, p. 27. 16. E d i t o r i a l , "The Ideas of October and the Progress of Mankind," IA (11) November 1958, p. 16. 17. I b i d . , p. 7. 18. I b i d . , p. 8. 19. I b i d . 20. The Soviet f i g u r e was obtained from a compilation of s t a t i s t i c a l information from Soviet sources i n Roger A. Clarke, Soviet Economic Facts, 1917-1970 (London: Macmillan, 1972), p. 6. 21. The Western estimate i s from U.S. Congress, Jo i n t Economic Committee, Annual Economic Indicators f or the USSR, 1964 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government P r i n t i n g O f f i c e , 1964), p. 95. 22. Leo Gruliow, ed. Current Soviet P o l i c i e s I I I : The  Documentary Record of the Extraordinary 21st Congress of  the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (New York: Columbia U n i v e r s i t y Press, 1960), p. 43. Emphasis added. 23. I b i d . , p. 55. 24. See above, f n . 8. 109 25. See David Holloway, The Soviet Union and the Arms Race (New Haven, Conn.: Yale U n i v e r s i t y Press, 1983), p. 39. 26. Gruliow, Current Soviet P o l i c i e s I I I , p. 5. I n t e r e s t i n g l y , the word " s e r i e s " had been absent i n Khrushchev's theses on the c o n t r o l f i g u r e s of the Seven-Year Plan which were published i n the Soviet press i n November 1958. I t should be noted, moreover, that Khrushchev merely said that the production of ICBMs had been organized, not that the leadership had a c t u a l l y planned to produce ICBMs en masse. 27. I b i d . , p. 43, 203. 28. I b i d . , p. 202. 29. I b i d . , p. 58. 30. I b i d . , p. 201. Emphasis added. 31. Ibid . 32. A. A. Galkin, et a l . , "Tekushchie problemy mirovoi p o l i t i k i " [Current Problems of World P o l i t i c s ] , MEMO (7) July 1959, p. 4. 33. E d i t o r i a l , "Two Worlds, Two Foreign P o l i c i e s , " IA (1) January 1959, p. 4. 34. E d i t o r i a l , "The Soviet Union, the United States and the Fate of Peace," IA (9) September 1959, p. 3. Khrushchev had proposed i n l a t e 1957 "a meeting of representatives of the two strongest powers, the U.S.A. and U.S.S.R." See N. S. Khrushchov, Speeches and Interviews. . .1957, p. 372. 35. I b i d . Emphasis i n o r i g i n a l . 110 36. One may hypothesize that Khrushchev himself was not f u l l y persuaded regarding the l i k e l i h o o d of a t t a i n i n g a l l the economic goals of the Seven-Year Plan but used high targets i n order to provide an incentive to the Soviet peoples to work harder. For instance, i n 1957, Khrushchev had announced that the USSR could "surpass the United States i n per capita meat production by 1960." The Soviet i n a b i l i t y to achieve t h i s goal was obvious i n the modest targets set f o r meat production i n the Seven-Year Plan. Khrushchev i n elaborating on the 1959-65 goals s a i d : ". . . [ I ] t i s c l e a r that the meat production assignments l a i d down by the c o n t r o l figures are below the l e v e l required to catch up with the United States i n t h i s commodity. But t h i s by no means s i g n i f i e s that our country has no chance of r a i s i n g meat production to 20 to 21 m i l l i o n tons. Thus while not r a i s i n g the state's planned assignment to 20 m i l l i o n to 21 m i l l i o n tons of meat which would s t r a i n the plan, we must at the same time not i n h i b i t but encourage the i n i t i a t i v e of i n d i v i d u a l s who launched the movement to catch up with the United States i n a short time i n per capita output of meat and other l i v e s t o c k products." Pravda, December 16, 1959. Emphasis added. Trans, i n U.S. Congress, J o i n t Economic Committee, Comparisons of the United States and Soviet  Economies, Part 1 (Washington, D.C: U.S. Government P r i n t i n g O f f i c e , 1959), p. 222, f n . 31. 37. U.S. Congress, J o i n t Economic Committee, Annual Economic  Indicators. . .1964, p. 95. 38. See h i s report to the Supreme Soviet i n N. S. Khrushchov, Disarmament for Durable Peace and Friendship (Moscow: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1960), pp. 7-67. 39. N. S. Khrushchov, Happiness and Peace for the Peoples (Moscow: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1961), p. 51. Khrushchev made a s i m i l a r statement i n Calcutta, India, i n March 1960 (Pravda, March 2, 1960, p. 1); i n Kabul, Afghanistan, i n March 1960 (see Khrushchov, Happiness and Peace, p. 312); and i n A u s t r i a i n July 1960 (Pravda, July 8, 1960). 40. Pravda, A p r i l 11, 1960, quoted i n David D a l l i n , Soviet  Foreign P o l i c y A f t e r S t a l i n (Philadelphia: J . B. L i p p i n c o t t Co., 1961), p. 525. 41. M. Marinin, "Leninizm i sovremennoe obshchestvennoe r a z v i t i e " [Leninism and Contemporary S o c i a l Development], MEMO (4) A p r i l 1960, p. 10. Emphasis added. 42. Pravda, February 23, 1961, p. 3. 43. Pravda, July 31, 1961, p. 1. I l l 44. V. Gantman, et a l . , "Tekushchie problemy mirovoi p o l i t i k i " [Current Problems of World P o l i t i c s ] , MEMO (7) July 1960, p. 32. 45. V. Gantman, et a l . , "Tekushchie problemy mirovoi p o l i t i k i " [Current Problems of World P o l i t i c s ] , MEMO (1) January 1961, p. 4. 46. I b i d . , p. 35. See also A. Arzumanian, "Novyi etap obshchego k r i z i s a kapitalizma" [New Stage i n the General C r i s i s of Capitalism], MEMO (2) February 1961, p. 18, where he t a l k s of the "even more obvious preponderance of forces i n the i n t e r n a t i o n a l arena" i n favor of world socialism. 47. Lawrence Freedman, U.S. In t e l l i g e n c e and the Soviet  Strategic Threat (London: Macmillan, 1977), p. 73. Holloway states that "only four of the SS-6 ICBMs which had been f l i g h t tested i n August 1957 were deployed,and i t was not u n t i l 1962 that the deployment of the next generation of ICBMs (the SS-7 and SS-8) got under way." He adds that " [ i ] n the early 1960s Soviet p o l i c y had given p r i o r i t y to the deployment of the SS-4 MRBM and the SS-5 IRBM, which could s t r i k e targets i n and around Europe." See Holloway, The Soviet Union and the Arms Race, p. 43. 48. N i k i t a S. Khrushchev, Khrushchev Remembers: The Last  Testament, translated and edited by Strobe Talbott (Boston: L i t t l e , Brown and Co., 1976), p. 54. 49. See Edgar M. Bottome, The Balance of Terror: A Guide to  the Arms Race (Boston: Beacon Press, 1971), pp. 39-73. 50. The U-2 f l i g h t s over the Soviet Union must have provided the Eisenhower Administration with s u f f i c i e n t data to preclude fears of Soviet m i l i t a r y s u p e r i o r i t y . Khrushchev himself could not have been unaware of t h i s p o s s i b i l i t y . While spokesmen for the Eisenhower Administration, and President Eisenhower himself, repeatedly denied that the United States was i n a s t r a t e g i c a l l y i n f e r i o r p o s i t i o n , the media continued to speak of the " m i s s i l e gap," which became, as mentioned above, an issue i n the P r e s i d e n t i a l e l e c t i o n of 1960. 51. Khrushchev's a s s e r t i o n of Soviet m i l i t a r y s u p e r i o r i t y i n a speech i n India came on the occasion of the tenth anniversary of the Sino-Soviet Friendship Treaty. 52. See V. Gantman, et a l . , "Tekushchie problemy mirovoi p o l i t i k i , " MEMO (1) January 1961, p. 32. 53. N i k i t a S. Khrushchov, For New V i c t o r i e s For the World  Communist Movement (Published by Peace and Socialism: Prague, 1963), p. 8. 54. I b i d . , p. 19. 112 55. Strumilin, "The World Twenty Years From Now," Kommunist (14) September 1961, as translated i n XIII Current Digest of the Soviet Press 38 (October 18, 1961), p. 4. 56. See Program of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union  [Draft] (New York: Cross Currents Press, 1961), p. 53, 209. 57. See Edgar M . Bottome, The Balance of Terror, pp. 39-73. 58. Soviet Progress vs. American Enterprise, Report of a C o n f i d e n t i a l B r i e f i n g Session held at the F i f t e e n t h Anniversary Meeting of the Committee for Economic Development, on November 21, 1957, i n Washington, D.C. (Garden C i t y , N.Y.: Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1958), p. 43. 59. See, for instance, a statement by Vice President Nixon i n I b i d . , p. 16. 60. See, for instance, Lieutenant General Arthur G. Trudeau, USA, "The Economic Threat of Soviet Imperialism," i n Walter F. Hahn and John C. Neff, eds. American Strategy for  the Nuclear Age (Garden C i t y , N.Y.: Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1960), pp. 339-350. 61. See Walter Lippmann, "Why We Must Learn to Live With Russia," XXII Look 2 (January 21, 1958), p. 14. 62. Robert Strausz-Hupe, "The Diminishing Freedom of Choice," i n Hahn and Neff, eds American Strategy i n the Nuclear  Age, pp. 42-51. 63. A. Arzumanian, " V e l i k a i a Oktiabr'skaia r e v o l i u t s i i a — n a c h a l o novoi epokhi vsemirnoi i s t o r i i " [The Great October R e v o l u t i o n — t h e Beginning of a New Era i n World H i s t o r y ] , Kommunist (16) November 1960, p. 29. 64. Pravda, March 5, 1959, as c i t e d i n Zagoria, The Sino-Soviet  C o n f l i c t , p. 425, f n . 22. 65. The rate of growth of i n d u s t r i a l production rose to 11% i n 1959 from the previous year's 10%. In 1960 and 1961, i n d u s t r i a l production rose by 10% and 9% r e s p e c t i v e l y . The rate of growth of a g r i c u l t u r a l production f e l l to 0.6% i n 1959 from a high i n 1958 of 10.6%, and rose only s l i g h t l y i n 1960 and 1961, by 1.9% and 3.1% r e s p e c t i v e l y . See Clarke, Soviet Economic Facts, 1917-1970, p. 9, 11. 113 66. The 1960 rate of growth of Soviet GNP was estimated at 5%, up from 3.9% i n 1959. The rate of growth of U.S. GNP, on the other hand, f e l l from 6.6% i n 1959 to 2.7% i n 1960. The comparative 1961 figures for the U.S.S.R. and the U.S. are 6.5% and 1.9% r e s p e c t i v e l y . Even though the 1960 rate of growth of Soviet GNP did r e g i s t e r an increase over the previous year, none of the subsequent years of the decade were to reach the 9.9% GNP growth rate of 1958. See Annual Economic Indicators. . .1964, p. 95. 67. See Program of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union  [D r a f t ] , p. 65, 73. Emphasis added. Contrast the 1961 target for i n d u s t r i a l production with the following forecast outlined by Khrushchev at the 21st Party Congress i n 1959: ". . . [ I ] t w i l l probably take us another f i v e years a f t e r completing the Seven-Year Plan to catch up and surpass the United States i n i n d u s t r i a l production. Consequently, by that t i m e — o r even e a r l i e r — t h e Soviet  Union w i l l rank f i r s t i n the world both for p h y s i c a l volume  of production and production per head of population. . . ." N. S. Khrushchov, Target Figures for the Economic Development  of the Soviet Union 1959-1965: Report to the Special 21st  Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union,  Jan. 27, 1959 and Reply to Discussion (London: Soviet Booklet No. 47, 1959), p. 48. Emphasis i n o r i g i n a l . 68. See A. A. Galkin, et a l . , "Tekushchie problemy," MEMO (7) July 1959, pp. 4-5. 69. Between January 1954 and December 1963, the t o t a l Soviet economic c r e d i t s and grants extended to the non-communist Third World countries was approximately $3.3 b i l l i o n . See Annual Economic Indicators. . .1964, p. 115. Between 1954 and 1964, the t o t a l amount of Soviet weapons exports to nonaligned countries was $2.7 b i l l i o n . See Bruce D. Porter, The USSR i n Third World C o n f l i c t s : Soviet Arms and  Diplomacy i n Local Wars, 1945-1980 (New York: Cambridge Un i v e r s i t y Press, 1984), p. 19. 70. Actual drawings under Soviet economic c r e d i t s and grants during 1954-1963 total e d $1.2 b i l l i o n . See Annual Economic  Indicators. . .1964, p. 115. 71. See Matthew P. Gallagher, "Soviet M i l i t a r y Manpower—A Case Study," Problems of Communism (13) May-June 1964, pp. 53-62, f o r Khrushchev's c o n f l i c t with m i l i t a r y leaders over cuts i n conventional forces, mainly m i l i t a r y manpower. 114 72. By August 1961, the United States had 78 cruise and b a l l i s t i c m i s s i l e s , 80 sea-launched b a l l i s t i c m i s s i l e s i n f i v e P o l a r i s submarines, and 1526 s t r a t e g i c bombers. The Soviets had a few ICBMs (see f n . 48 above) and perhaps 120 Bear and 70 Bison heavy bombers, and 1100 Badger medium bombers. See John Prados, The Soviet Estimate:  U.S. I n t e l l i g e n c e Analysis and Russian M i l i t a r y Strength (New York: The D i a l Press, 1982), pp. 119-120. 73. N i k i t a S. Khrushchev, For V i c t o r y i n Peaceful Competition  with Capitalism (New York: E. P. Dutton & Co., Inc., 1960), pp. 42-43. 74. Khrushchev, Khrushchev Remembers: The Last Testament, p. 221. 75. I b i d . , p. 31. 76. Richard Lowenthal, " S h i f t s and R i f t s i n the Russo-Chinese A l l i a n c e , " Problems of Communism (1) January-February 1959, pp. 14-24, as c i t e d i n Zagoria, Sino-Soviet C o n f l i c t , p. 195. 77. See Zagoria, Sino-Soviet C o n f l i c t , p. 196. 78. See M. Marinin, "Chelbvechestvo mozhet i dolzhno z h i t ' bez v o i n " [Mankind Can and Must Live Without Wars], MEMO (8) August 1960, p. 5. 79. See Khrushchev Remembers: The Last Testament, p. 34. Emphasis i n o r i g i n a l . 80. A. Sovetov, " L e n i n i s t Foreign P o l i c y and International Relations," IA (4) A p r i l 1960, p. 9. Emphasis added. 81. The text of the 1960 Moscow Statement i s i n The Sino-Soviet  Dispute, documented and analysed by G. F. Hudson, Richard Lowenthal and Roderick MacFarquhar (The China Quarterly: 1961), p. 178. 82. A. Beliakov and P. B u r l a t s k i i , "Leninskaia t e o r i a s o t s i a l i s t i c h e s k o i r e v o l u i t s i i i sovremennost" [Lenin's Theory of S o c i a l i s t Revolution and Our Times], Kommunist (13) September 1960, p. 16. 83. See Mark N. Katz, The Third World i n Soviet M i l i t a r y Thought (London: Croom Helm, 1982), p. 30. 84. See Holloway, The Soviet Union and the Arms Race, pp. 39-43. 115 CHAPTER V STEADY EROSION OF CONFIDENCE: 1961-1964 From l a t e 1959 to l a t e 1961, Khrushchevian foreign p o l i c y had rested on the o p t i m i s t i c expectation of the dawn of a new s p i r i t of "realism" among p o l i t i c a l leaders i n the West, e s p e c i a l l y the United States. In the Soviet view, such "realism," which was forced upon the American leadership by the changed c o r r e l a t i o n of forces, was to manifest i t s e l f as an increasing r e a l i z a t i o n of and adjustment to Western impotence i n the face of the h i s t o r i c a l movement toward soci a l i s m . Proceeding from the b e l i e f that the preponderance of forces now favored the U.S.S.R. and i t s a l l i e s , Soviet leaders and analysts had appeared confident that s o c i a l i s m represented the wave of the future. According to Soviet commentators, the adoption of " r e a l i s t i c " p o l i c i e s by the United States would allow f o r an unimpeded, and therefore a f a s t e r , rate i n the movement of the c o r r e l a t i o n of forces i n favor of socialism. The e l e c t i o n of John F. Kennedy to the Presidency of the United States b e l i e d the high hopes of Khrushchev. Both the p o l i c i e s and rh e t o r i c of the Kennedy Administration set into motion the process of v i t i a t i n g the basis of the Khrushchevian approach to foreign p o l i c y . How could the premise of a " r e a l i s t i c " American leadership be upheld when, as Kennedy declared i n h i s inaugural address, the United States "would pay any p r i c e , bear any burden meet any hardship, support any f r i e n d , oppose any foe to assure the s u r v i v a l and success of l i b e r t y " ? * Moreover, the change i n o f f i c i a l American s t r a t e g i c doctrine from one of massive r e t a l i a t i o n to that of f l e x i b l e response, accompanied by 116 the necessary adjustments i n force posture, appeared to buttress the administration's resolve to pursue an i n t e r n a t i o n a l l y a c t i v i s t f oreign p o l i c y . "We intend to have a wider choice," Kennedy declared i n July 2 1961, "than humi l i a t i o n or a l l - o u t nuclear war." In thus redefining both American objectives and the means to be used i n achieving them, the Kennedy Administration exposed the shortcpmings of the r e l a t i v e l y passive and l i m i t i n g posture i m p l i c i t i n Khrushchev's c h a r a c t e r i z a t i o n of s t r a t e g i c a l t e r n a t i v e s i n terms of "peaceful coexistence or the most 3 destructive war i n h i s t o r y . " F i n a l l y , the new American administration also challenged i n the starkest terms the notion of Soviet preponderance of forces i n the m i l i t a r y s p h e r e — a claim which Khrushchev, as we have seen i n e a r l i e r chapters, f i r s t advanced i n early 1960. In October 1961, as the Twenty-Second CPSU Congress was coming to a close and the f i n a l moments of the tense B e r l i n c r i s i s drama were being played out, U.S. Deputy Secretary of Defense Roswell G i l p a t r i c issued a scathing r e b u t t a l of the idea of Soviet m i l i t a r y s u p e r i o r i t y . C i t i n g a v a i l a b l e data on m i l i t a r y forces, G i l p a t r i c asserted: The destructive power which the United States could bring to bear even a f t e r a Soviet surprise attack upon our forces would be as great as—perhaps greater t h a n — t h e t o t a l undamaged force which the enemy can threaten to launch against the United States i n a f i r s t s t r i k e . In short we have a second s t r i k e c a p a b i l i t y which i s at l e a s t as^extensive as what the Soviets can d e l i v e r by s t r i k i n g f i r s t . In h i s peroration, G i l p a t r i c again emphasized that "[t]he Soviets' b l u s t e r and threats of rocket attacks against the free world . . . must be evaluated against the hard f a c t s of United States nuclear s u p e r i o r i t y . . . . The G i l p a t r i c speech w i l l provide the take-off point for the 117 present chapter. The foreign p o l i c y challenges i t outlined were, i n e f f e c t , a c r y s t a l l i z a t i o n of the ideas a r t i c u l a t e d throughout 1961 by President Kennedy and other American government spokesmen. As we have noted above, these challenges threatened the very i n t e g r i t y of the foundation upon which Khrushchev's foreign p o l i c y was based and also questioned the unalloyed optimism underlying Soviet assessments of the c o r r e l a t i o n of forces. Soviet e f f o r t s , during the remainder of Khrushchev's years i n o f f i c e , to r e c o n c i l e these unfavorable trends with t h e i r e a r l i e r unmitigated optimism w i l l be discussed below i n two sections, with the Cuban m i s s i l e c r i s i s providing the chronological d i v i d i n g l i n e . While signs of misgivings were present from l a t e 1961 onward, i t was with the Cuban m i s s i l e c r i s i s that Soviet leaders and analysts attempted to examine the assumptions underlying t h e i r confident expectation of v i c t o r i o u s s o c i a l i s m . But only a f t e r Khrushchev's ouster d i d extravagant claims of Soviet m i l i t a r y s u p e r i o r i t y disappear completely as Soviet commentators struggled to address the f u l l scope of the American challenge. We s h a l l turn now to an examination of the impact of the changing i n t e r n a t i o n a l s i t u a t i o n on the evolving Soviet perspective on the c o r r e l a t i o n of forces. OSCILLATING CLAIMS: 1961-1962 As the months of 1961 r o l l e d by, i t was becoming very evident that Khrushchev's attempts to mislead the United States and the West about the s t r a t e g i c balance had f a i l e d . American government spokesmen 118 pointedly questioned o p t i m i s t i c Soviet assessments of a preponderance of forces i n favor of s o c i a l i s m . Even though Khrushchev seemed reluctant to abandon h i s extravagant claims e n t i r e l y , Soviet leaders and analysts were put on the defensive i n attempting to counter American c r i t i c i s m and refute the facts underlying the new U.S. optimism. The Twenty-Second CPSU Congress convened i n October 1961 and i n h i s report to t h i s assembly, Khrushchev spoke of the "aggravation of the i n t e r n a t i o n a l s i t u a t i o n " which had compelled the Soviet Union "to suspend the reduction of armed forces planned for 1961, increase defense expenditure, . . . and resume te s t s of new and more powerful weapons." "Everything necessary has been done," Khrushchev somewhat complacently declared, "to ensure the s u p e r i o r i t y of our country i n defense." 7 He further stated that the " s u p e r i o r i t y of the forces of peace and 8 s o c i a l i s m over those of imperialism and war has become more evident" and that "the f a c t that the s o c i a l i s t community of nations has a 9 preponderance of strength i s most fortunate for a l l mankind." But Khrushchev also noted that the Western Powers "had set the flywheel of t h e i r war machine turning at top speed to achieve s u p e r i o r i t y of strength over the s o c i a l i s t c o u n t r i e s . " * 0 He added c r y p t i c a l l y : We consider that at present the forces of s o c i a l i s m , and a l l the forces championing peace, are superior to the forces of i m p e r i a l i s t aggression. But even granting that the U.S. President was r i g h t i n saying a short time ago that our forces were equal, i t would be obviously unwise to threaten war. One who admits that there i s equality should draw the proper conclusions. The "proper conclusions," according to Khrushchev's reasoning, were that seeing the "important changes" i n the "alignment of world f o r c e s " in" favor of s o c i a l i s m , the United States would pursue " r e a l i s t i c " p o l i c i e s , 119 seeking accommodation with the U.S.S.R. and allowing f o r the unhampered spread of the s o c i a l i s t revolutionary process i n the world. Repudiating the basis of confident Soviet portrayals of the c o r r e l a t i o n of forces, the United States, however, was determined to pursue a c t i v i s t p o l i c i e s i n the i n t e r n a t i o n a l arena and was adjusting i t s m i l i t a r y doctrine and force structure to make such p o l i c i e s v i a b l e . To meet the American challenge head on would have necessitated a major change i n the Soviet m i l i t a r y doctrine enunciated by Khrushchev on January 14, 1960, which placed heavy r e l i a n c e on nuclear forces i n any future war. For reasons to be explored i n the a n a l y t i c section below, Khrushchev was perhaps unwilling to change the substance and course of h i s f o r e i g n and m i l i t a r y p o l i c y i n mid-stream. On the one hand, he appeared to count on a metamorphosis i n American thinking which would obviate the need to e f f e c t a change i n the Soviet i n t e r n a t i o n a l approach: " I f r e a l i s t i c thinking gains the upper hand i n U.S. p o l i c y , a 12 serious obstacle to a normal world s i t u a t i o n w i l l be removed." On the other hand, he continued to i n s i s t on Soviet m i l i t a r y s u p e r i o r i t y and the preponderance of the forces of s o c i a l i s m and peace. In h i s concluding speech to the Twenty-Second Congress, which came a f t e r the G i l p a t r i c speech mentioned e a r l i e r , Khrushchev r e i t e r a t e d : "Today the world s o c i a l i s t system i s more powerful than the i m p e r i a l i s t countries 13 i n m i l i t a r y terms as w e l l . " Soviet i n t e r n a t i o n a l a f f a i r s commentary i n the l a t t e r part of 1961 generally r e f l e c t e d some u n c e r t a i n t y — e i t h e r d i r e c t l y or i n d i r e c t l y — r e s u l t i n g from the trenchant American c r i t i c i s m of Soviet views of the m i l i t a r y and o v e r a l l c o r r e l a t i o n of forces. Analysts l i k e Inozemtsev, f o r instance, continued to assert that "[t]he s u p e r i o r i t y of 120 the forces of Socialism over imperialism on a world scale i s c h a r a c t e r i s t i c of the present stage i n the general c r i s i s of 14 c a p i t a l i s m , " but also observed that "[t]he f a c t that the i m p e r i a l i s t Powers have modern weapons represents a tremendous threat to a l l mankind,"*"* and that " [ i m p e r i a l i s m does not intend to surrender without b a t t l e . " 1 6 In the area of the m i l i t a r y c o r r e l a t i o n of forces, Soviet commentators presented a f a i r l y wide range of opinions, claiming Soviet m i l i t a r y s u p e r i o r i t y ; implying equality between the U.S. and the Soviet Union i n the m i l i t a r y sphere; and expressing strong misgivings about American m i l i t a r y strength. As we have seen above, Khrushchev appeared simultaneously to concede that the Soviet forces were equal to those of the United States and to argue that the Soviet Union and the s o c i a l i s t countries were m i l i t a r i l y stronger than the c a p i t a l i s t bloc countries. In an a r t i c l e i n Kommunist i n December 1961, two analysts lauded the pursuit by the U.S.S.R. of such "humane and progressive goals" as "peace and happiness of the peoples" even when the Soviet Union possessed " m i l i t a r y s u p e r i o r i t y . " * 7 In a MEMO January 1962 review of i n t e r n a t i o n a l a f f a i r s , i t was declared that the events of 1961 "g r a p h i c a l l y confirmed . . . that i n our epoch of world development, the course and outcome of events are . . . determined . . . by the progressive world s o c i a l i s t system which has attained s u p e r i o r i t y over 18 the countries of imperialism i n the m i l i t a r y sphere. . . . " Writing i n Kommunist i n March 1962, Arzumanian spoke of Soviet " m i l i t a r y - t e c h n o l o g i c a l s u p e r i o r i t y " over the United States and added that " [ f ] o r the f i r s t time i n h i s t o r y , the m i l i t a r y - t e c h n o l o g i c a l preponderance of a state i s being used . . . i n the i n t e r e s t s of 121 19 maintaining peace." S i m i l a r l y , another commentator asserted that the 20 "Soviet Union i s the most powerful country m i l i t a r i l y . 1 1 And yet another stated that " f a r from having i n f e r i o r m i l i t a r y strength, i t 21 [Socialism] i s ahead of the c a p i t a l i s t system i n t h i s f i e l d as w e l l . " As l a t e as September 1962, a Soviet spokesman wrote, "Today the i m p e r i a l i s t s do not have a monopoly of nuclear weapons. In terms of m i l i t a r y equipment the Soviet Union, f ar from being i n f e r i o r to them, ..22 surpasses them. Other academicians expressed grave concern about American m i l i t a r y might. One writer poignantly observed that "a disturbance of the balance tempts the reckless elements i n the i m p e r i a l i s t camp to use the temporarily favourable s i t u a t i o n to destroy those whom they consider 23 t h e i r enemies." Another commentator warned that the United States was counting on "gaining a temporary m i l i t a r y advantage over the. Soviet U n i o n . " 2 4 Further, analyses by Soviet i n t e r n a t i o n a l a f f a i r s observers were frequently dotted with statements showing a clear appreciation of the scope of American m i l i t a r y strength, such as: "Never before has the m i l i t a r y p o t e n t i a l of imperialism been so great or i t s m i l i t a r y 25 organisation so comprehensive"; ". . .U.S. imperialism . . . i s armed 26 to the teeth"; "Contemporary imperialism represents an enormous danger for the peaceful development of i n t e r n a t i o n a l r e l a t i o n s . I t should be kept i n mind that the combined m i l i t a r y machine of imperialism has ,,27 grown. . . . S t i l l other writers i n s i s t e d that the m i l i t a r y s u p e r i o r i t y of the i m p e r i a l i s t camp was " n u l l i f i e d altogether" and conceded rather r e l u c t a n t l y the notion of a m i l i t a r y equilibrium: "We are not going to 122 argue about who has more of what.- . . . We are even prepared to accept 28 the thesis of a m i l i t a r y equilibrium. . . . " A prominent spokesman of the Khrushchev period, V. Korionov, observed, "In the past few years i m p e r i a l i s t p o l i t i c i a n s have needed to learn to speak words which for them are quite unusual: the equality of the forces of socialism and 29 c a p i t a l i s m i n the m i l i t a r y sphere." As the above statements amply i n d i c a t e , there was a degree of uncertainty and ambivalence i n the Soviet p o r t r a y a l of the m i l i t a r y c o r r e l a t i o n of forces. These o s c i l l a t i n g claims, i t seems reasonable to i n f e r , r e f l e c t e d the breakdown of the consensual view of the m i l i t a r y c o r r e l a t i o n of forces following the strong American repudiation of the o f f i c i a l Soviet view of the m i l i t a r y balance. There were also t e l l t a l e signs of a wavering of Soviet confidence regarding the o v e r a l l c o r r e l a t i o n of forces. While analysts continued to speak of the " s u p e r i o r i t y of the forces of socialism over the forces of imperialism" and to maintain that there was a preponderance of forces 30 i n favor of peace and s o c i a l i s m , such assertions were tempered by l i n e s of argument employed by Soviet analysts i n combating renewed American optimism and i n defending t h e i r own assessment of the c o r r e l a t i o n . Soviet commentators, for instance, obliquely acknowledged that the s o c i a l i s t forces had suffered a r e v e r s a l when they i n s i s t e d that a correct a p p r a i s a l of the c o r r e l a t i o n could only be made when one took into account "the decisive laws of our epoch" i n which " a l l the contemporary revolutionary processes, the alignment, d i r e c t i o n , and dynamics of the development of progressive forces i n the world arena 31 strengthen the p o s i t i o n s of socialism. . . ." This presupposed the 123 " a b i l i t y to d i s t i n g u i s h temporally active factors from permanently active f a c t o r s , foreign p o l i t i c a l f l u c t u a t i o n s from basic tendencies i n 32 the development of i n t e r n a t i o n a l l i f e . " In the Soviet view, then, the successes won by " [ i m p e r i a l i s t reaction, headed by the United States of America" which i s " s t r i v i n g to give a ' h i s t o r i c a l r e p l y ' to the changes occurring i n the world In accordance with the law-governed forces of 33 s o c i a l development," were only temporary. Even "temporary" i m p e r i a l i s t successes, however, constituted a grave impediment to the movement of the c o r r e l a t i o n i n favor of socialism. Soviet analysts thus i n d i r e c t l y conceded that h i s t o r y had zigzagged. One commentator urged the peoples to v i g i l a n c e so that "no accidents and zigzags of h i s t o r i c a l development may catch them ,,34 unawares. Soviet w r i t e r s , around l a t e 1961, also attacked American optimism on the grounds that i t was based on narrow-minded and class-based arguments. Marinin c r i t i c i z e d the " i d e o l o g i s t s and s t r a t e g i s t s of imperialism" for ignoring "the many-sided essence" of the c o r r e l a t i o n of forces: Indeed, i n speaking of the c o r r e l a t i o n of forces between the two systems, the s t r a t e g i s t s of imperialism more often than not think of the d i r e c t power c o r r e l a t i o n , such as the c o r r e l a t i o n of m i l i t a r y and economic p o t e n t i a l s . . . . [T]he s c i e n t i f i c estimation of m i l i t a r y and economic p o t e n t i a l s cannot be abstracted from such v i t a l f a c t o rs as the l e v e l and scope of the development of science, the education and p o l i t i c a l awareness of the broad masses of the population, cadres, and t h e i r i d e o l o g i c a l armament. In these ar^as s o c i a l i s m has s i g n i f i c a n t l y outstripped c a p i t a l i s m . Soviet Defense M i n i s t e r Marshal M a l i n o v s k i i , a f t e r averring that " [ i ] n engaging i n competition thrust upon us by the aggressive forces f o r q u a l i t y armaments, we are not only not i n f e r i o r to those who threaten us with war, but i n many respects we are superior to 124 them. . . . ," went on to state that "the defensive strength of a state does not depend on m i l i t a r y strength alone, but on the p o l i t i c a l form of the state and i t s productive p o t e n t i a l , the l e v e l of development of science and technology and the q u a l i t a t i v e structure of the -, . ,.36 population. Another analyst wrote that the "change i n the balance of forces i n favour of Socialism which i s more and more e f f e c t i v e l y shackling the forces of war, i s far more than a change i n r e l a t i v e m i l i t a r y p o t e n t i a l s . I t also includes the economic, p o l i t i c a l and i d e o l o g i c a l 37 s u p e r i o r i t y of Socialism." Thus, while on the one hand Soviet f o r e i g n p o l i c y commentators claimed Soviet preeminence i n the m i l i t a r y sphere and argued that the s o c i a l i s t economic system was superior to the c a p i t a l i s t system of economy, on the other hand, they were at pains, from l a t e 1961 onward, to deprecate the value of estimating the c o r r e l a t i o n on the basis of these factors alone. As we have seen i n e a r l i e r chapters, Soviet leaders and analysts have always distinguished the concept of the c o r r e l a t i o n of forces from the western notion of the balance of power. The former term, according to the Soviets, encompasses p o l i t i c a l - i d e o l o g i c a l , economic, and m i l i t a r y f a c t o r s . But the i n s i s t e n c e on the need to take comprehensive account of a l l aspects of the c o r r e l a t i o n at a time when the Soviets themselves had (since 1960) made extravagant claims of a preponderance i n favor of s o c i a l i s m based on m i l i t a r y and economic s u p e r i o r i t y , did appear to allow the Soviets to e f f e c t , i n a roundabout fashion, a downgrading of t h e i r e a r l i e r claims i n these areas. With respect to the p o l i t i c a l c o r r e l a t i o n of forces, Soviet 125 confidence did indeed receive a spur from an unexpected quarter—Cuba. In December 1961, F i d e l Castro declared that "he was and always had been 38 a M a r x i s t - L e n i n i s t . " Khrushchev had e a r l i e r seemed somewhat cautious i n h i s a t t i t u d e toward the Castro regime. With the serious American fo r e i g n p o l i c y challenges during the course of 1961, however, courtship with Cuba—a country i n close geographical proximity to the United States—must i n c r e a s i n g l y have appeared to Khrushchev as an a t t r a c t i v e p o l i t i c a l opportunity. Soviet analysts began to speak of a "new" c o r r e l a t i o n of forces i n the world with the merging of s o c i a l i s t and n a t i o n a l - l i b e r a t i o n revolutions i n one gigantic stream. With the Cuban example i n mind, Marinin wrote: In the present s i t u a t i o n there i s an extremely mobile border between the s o c i a l i s t and n a t i o n a l - l i b e r a t i o n revolutions. The objective functioning of f a c t o r s i n the world stimulates the process of a c c e l e r a t i o n . . . of n a t i o n a l - l i b e r a t i o n a n t i - i m p e r i a l i s t revolutions into s o c i a l i s t r evolutions. . . . Such i s the l o g i c and d i a l e c t i c of the revolutionary process i n conditions of the new c o r r e l a t i o n of forces i n the world arena. I t i s possible to state with confidence that Cuba reveals the tomorrows for many people. . . . He further stated: Observing the necessary soberness and realism, we are r i g h t to recognize that the number of the so-called weak l i n k s of imperialism i s growing considerably. This promises new breaks i n the i m p e r i a l i s t chain . . . whether under the spontaneous blows of revolutions of the s o c i a l i s t type or under the blows of the a n t i - i m p e r i a l i s t revolutions with the tendency to grow into s o c i a l i s t revolutions. Soviet commentators, then, did appear to be r e l a t i v e l y o p t i m i s t i c i n speaking of the p o l i t i c a l c o r r e l a t i o n of forces even though they i n d i r e c t l y expressed some unease with regard to the m i l i t a r y balance. It was probably with a view to redressing the Soviet-American m i l i t a r y balance that Khrushchev embarked on h i s venture to place Russian medium 126 and intermediate-range b a l l i s t i c m i s s i l e s on the t e r r i t o r y of the new Soviet a l l y — C u b a . This action i n a country so close to American shores provoked a sharply negative reaction from Washington and culminated i n the Cuban m i s s i l e c r i s i s of October 1962. Khrushchev was forced to agree to the removal of the m i s s i l e s i n exchange for an American pledge not to intervene m i l i t a r i l y i n Cuba. With the f a i l u r e of Khrushchev's Cuban enterprise, Soviet r e a p p r a i s a l of the c o r r e l a t i o n which had been triggered by the moves of the Kennedy Administration began anew. SHAKEN CONFIDENCE: 1962-1964 Immediately following the Cuban m i s s i l e c r i s i s , Soviet commentary on the m i l i t a r y c o r r e l a t i o n of forces was thrown into d i s a r r a y . One analyst rather defensively penned that "the Soviet Union and the S o c i a l i s t countries possess at l e a s t the same weapons as the c a p i t a l i s t 41 countries." In a s i m i l a r vein another writer s a i d , "The Soviet Union's s c i e n t i f i c and t e c h n i c a l p o t e n t i a l i n defence of i t s safety i s 42 equal to that of the United States. . . . " Reporting to the USSR Supreme Soviet on the i n t e r n a t i o n a l s i t u a t i o n , Khrushchev i n December 1962 r e f r a i n e d from expressing any opinions on the comparative m i l i t a r y might of the USSR and the USA. He merely stated that " [ i ] n our times, the i m p e r i a l i s t s cannot disregard the growing might of the Soviet Union and of the other s o c i a l i s t countries. We have the necessary number of powerful i n t e r c o n t i n e n t a l rockets, which w i l l enable us to s t r i k e back i f war i s started against 43 us." And to the " l e f t i s t adventurists," he warned of the dangers of taking the i m p e r i a l i s t threat l i g h t l y : " I f i t [imperialism] i s now a 127 'paper t i g e r ' , those who say t h i s know that t h i s 'paper t i g e r ' has 44 atomic teeth. I t can use them and i t must not be treated l i g h t l y . " But by February 1963, i n an e l e c t i o n speech, Khrushchev returned to the theme of Soviet m i l i t a r y s u p e r i o r i t y : "[T]he Soviet Union and the commonwealth of s o c i a l i s t countries . . . surpass the i m p e r i a l i s t camp 45 i n armaments and armed f o r c e s . " In the same speech, however, Khrushchev also spoke of a tense i n t e r n a t i o n a l s i t u a t i o n which "requires that we constantly remember and show concern for the requirements of our defense, so that the Soviet Union can worthily oppose an i m p e r i a l i s t 46 camp that i s armed to the teeth." Khrushchev argued that while i t "would be desirable to b u i l d more enterprises that make products for s a t i s f y i n g man's requirements . . . to invest more means i n a g r i c u l t u r e . . . ," the voters "would r i g h t l y judge i t a crime, i f out of a desire to make a display of extraordinary successes i n s a t i s f y i n g people's every day needs, an underestimation of the country's defenses were permitted. . . . " ^ J u s t i f y i n g increased Soviet m i l i t a r y expenditures, Khrushchev openly acknowledged that " i f we stop paying a t t e n t i o n to our defense c a p a b i l i t i e s , then the c o r r e l a t i o n 48 of forces could change to our disadvantage." Again i n a speech i n Hungary i n July 1963, Khrushchev r e i t e r a t e d 49 that "we have now surpassed the i m p e r i a l i s t s i n m i l i t a r y matters." Soviet f o r e i g n p o l i c y commentators during t h i