UBC Theses and Dissertations

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UBC Theses and Dissertations

Incorrigibility and elimination : a mentalist response Black, John Adrian 1987

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INCORRIGIBILITY AND ELIMINATION: A MENTALIST RESPONSE by JOHN ADRIAN BLACK M.A.(Cantab.) 1975, M.A. Simon F r a s e r U n i v e r s i t y 1975 A THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY i n THE FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIES . DEPARTMENT OF PHILOSOPHY We a c c e p t t h i s t h e s i s as c o n f o r m i n g t o t h e r e q u i r e d s t a n d a r d THE UNIVERSITY OF BRITISH COLUMBIA September 1987 c) John A d r i a n B l a c k , 1987 In presenting this thesis in partial fulfilment of the requirements for an advanced degree at the University of British Columbia, I agree that the Library shall make it freely available for reference and study. I further agree that permission for extensive copying of this thesis for scholarly purposes may be granted by the head of my department or by his or her representatives. It is understood that copying or publication of this thesis for financial gain shall not be allowed without my written permission. Department of lbjQ^I\y The University of British Columbia 1956 Main Mall Vancouver, Canada V6T 1Y3 pa„ Oa.^ in? DE-6(3/81) A b s t r a c t S u p e r v i s o r : Dr. Sam C. C o v a l T h i s e s s a y i s p r i m a r i l y an e x a m i n a t i o n o f a view, propounded by R i c h a r d R o r t y a t t h e b e g i n n i n g o f t h e l a s t decade, about t h e n a t u r e and e x i s t e n c e o f minds and me n t a l s t a t e s . The view i s a s p e c i e s o f e l i m i n a t i v e m a t e r i a l i s m , and one which i s o f h i s t o r i c a l i m p o r t a n c e i n t h e development o f t h i s g e n e r a l p o s i t i o n . I argue t h a t i t i s f a l s e . I a l s o a ttempt t o draw some p o s i t i v e c o n c l u s i o n s i n t h e p h i l o s o p h y o f mind from a c r i t i c i s m o f some o f i t s u n d e r l y i n g a s s u m p t i o n s . R o r t y ' s fundamental i d e a i s t h a t t h e b e l i e f i n t h e e x i s t e n c e o f minds and mental s t a t e s i s a p r i m i t i v e s c i e n t i f i c t h e o r y , w h i c h i n a l l l i k e l i h o o d i s soon t o be ov e r t h r o w n by the s u p e r i o r t h e o r y o f n e u r o p h y s i o l o g y . I t w i l l t h e n be r a t i o n a l , he c l a i m s , t o deny t h e e x i s t e n c e o f minds and mental s t a t e s . E s s e n t i a l t o R o r t y 1 s argument f o r t h i s view i s t h e n o t i o n t h a t m e n t a l s t a t e s have a p r o p e r t y which t h e n e u r a l s t a t e s o f t h e r e p l a c i n g t h e o r y l a c k , namely o f b e i n g t h e p r o p e r s u b j e c t s o f c e r t a i n i n c o r r i g i b l e r e p o r t s , and which p r e v e n t s t h e i d e n t i f i c a t i o n o f t h e two. I undermine t h i s argument by showing t h a t ( i ) i n c o r r i g i b i l i t y i s not t h e mark o f t h e mental and ( i i ) even i f i t were, i t c o u l d not ground t h e c a t e g o r i a l g u l f w h i c h R o r t y sees between mental and p h y s i c a l . I t u r n t h e n t o t h e major p r e s u p p o s i t i o n o f t h e view, t h a t m ental s t a t e s a r e t h e o r e t i c a l e n t i t i e s p o s i t e d i n t h e c a u s a l e x p l a n a t i o n o f b e h a v i o u r , t o see i f t h i s c h a r a c t e r i s a t i o n o f t h e mental i s an h y p o t h e s i s adequate t o a c c o u n t f o r t h e v a r i o u s phenomena o f m e n t a l d i s c o u r s e . A f t e r e x a m i n i n g r e a s o n - e x p l a n a t i o n , c a u s a l e x p l a n a t i o n i n terms o f mental s t a t e s , t h e r e p o r t i n g r o l e o f mental a s c r i p t i o n s and t h e n o n - c o n s t a t i v e uses o f mental language, I f i n d t h a t i t i s n o t . I n p a r t i c u l a r , R o r t y ' s view cannot a c c o u n t f o r t h e l i m i t e d e x t e n t t o which c e r t a i n mental r e p o r t s a r e i n c o r r i g i b l e , nor f o r t h e v a l i d i t y o f j u s t i f i c a t o r y and non-c o n s t a t i v e uses o f mental language. I argue t h a t t h e e x i s t e n c e o f m e n t a l s t a t e s i s g u a r a n t e e d by t h i s v a l i d i t y , and t h e r e f o r e t h a t t h e i s s u e o f t h e i r e l i m i n a t i o n goes beyond . c o n s i d e r a t i o n s o f t h e o r e t i c a l s u p e r i o r i t y t o t h e v e r y f a b r i c o f human i n t e r a c t i o n , m o r a l and o t h e r w i s e . I emerge w i t h t h e view t h a t o r d i n a r y language and n e u r o p h y s i o l o g y a r e c o m p a t i b l e ways of d e s c r i b i n g p e o p l e and t h e i r b e h a v i o u r , and t h a t f a r from b e i n g t h e murky p o s i t s o f some p r o t o - s c i e n t i f i c f o l k -p s y c h o l o g y , mental s t a t e s a r e known t o e x i s t . T a b l e o f C o n t e n t s A b s t r a c t i i T a b l e o f C o n t e n t s i v L i s t o f F i g u r e s v i Acknowledgement v i i T e x t u a l Note v i i Chapter 1: G e n e r a l I n t r o d u c t i o n 1 F o o t n o t e s t o Chapter 1 12 Chapter 2: E x p l i c a t i o n o f R o r t y 1 s View 14 (a) I n t r o d u c t i o n 14 (b) The C o n t i n g e n t I d e n t i t y Theory 15 (c) The Demon Analogy 23 (d) The C o n c e p t u a l Commitments o f M e n t a l Language 35 (e) S t r a t e g y o f t h e A t t a c k 44 F o o t n o t e s t o Chapter 2 47 Chapter 3: I n c o r r i g i b i l i t y and I n c o m p a t i b i l i t y 50 (a) D i s a p p e a r a n c e v e r s u s N o n - e x i s t e n c e . . . 50 (b) R o r t y ' s Form o f I n c o r r i g i b i l i t y 53 (c) T r a d i t i o n a l Forms o f I n c o r r i g i b i l i t y . . 58 (d) The C r i t e r i a l Form o f I n c o r r i g i b i l i t y . . 60 F o o t n o t e s t o Chapter 3 74 Chapter 4: M e n t a l S t a t e s as T h e o r e t i c a l E n t i t i e s . . . . 76 (a) I n t r o d u c t i o n 76 (b) A c t i o n s o r Movements? 82 (c) C a u s a l i t y and E x p l a n a t i o n by R e f e r e n c e t o M e n t a l S t a t e s 89 (d) A c t i o n s and Movements (Again) 91 (e) Causes and Reasons 96 ( f ) Reasons and I n t e r p r e t a t i o n 103 (g) R a t i o n a l i t y and J u s t i f i c a t i o n 107 F o o t n o t e s t o Chapter 4 I l l i v Chapter 5: H y p o t h e t i c a l i t y and t h e R e p o r t i n g R o l e o f M e n t a l Language 114 (a) I n t r o d u c t i o n 114 (b) Phenomenism and t h e Myth o f t h e G i v e n . 117 (c) M e n t a l R e p o r t s 127 (d) I n c o r r i g i b i l i t y 143 (e) An A l t e r n a t i v e Account? 157 F o o t n o t e s t o Chapter 5 166 Chapter 6: N o n - t h e o r e t i c o - c a u s a l R o l e s o f M e n t a l Language . . . 170 (a) N o n - c o n s t a t i v e Uses o f M e n t a l Language 170 (b) P r e s e n t M e n t a l Language Not T h e o r e t i c a l 178 (c) N o n - t h e o r e t i c a l Uses and N e u r a l T a l k . 186 F o o t n o t e s t o Chapter 6 192 Chapter 7: Summary, C o n c l u s i o n s and S p e c u l a t i o n s . . . 194 (a) Summary 194 (b) C o n c l u s i o n s 210 ( i ) R o r t y ' s View R e f u t e d 210 ( i i ) R o r t y ' s View: t h e G r a i n o f T r u t h . 219 ( i i i ) M a t e r i a l i s m : Where Next? . . . . 221 (c) S p e c u l a t i o n s 226 F o o t n o t e s t o Chapter 7 230 Re f e r e n c e s 232 B i b l i o g r a p h y 237 Appendix: The C r i t e r i a l View o f t h e M e n t a l 243 (a) What Are C r i t e r i a ? : F i v e Views 243 (b) E x p l a n a t i o n o f Meaning 252 (c) C r i t e r i a and E v i d e n c e 258 (d) A M o t i v a t i o n a l Example 261 (e) C r i t e r i a and M e n t a l i t y . . 266 F o o t n o t e s t o Appendix 286 v L i s t o f F i g u r e s F i g u r e 1 144 v i Acknowledgement I am d e e p l y i n d e b t e d t o my s u p e r v i s o r , Sam C o v a l , f o r p h i l o s o p h i c a l s u p p o r t t h r o u g h o u t t h e w r i t i n g o f t h i s e s s a y , t o committee-members R i c h a r d S i k o r a and Steven S a v i t t f o r h e l p f u l c r i t i c i s m , t o John Westwood, Jo n a t h a n K a t z , B r i a n S t o f f e l l , Lawrence R e s n i c k and Jon Young f o r many c o n v e r s a t i o n s on t o p i c s r e l e v a n t t o i t s s u b j e c t and t o t h e l a t e Robbie R u s s n a i k who h e l p e d me d e v e l o p my v i e w o f contemporary p s y c h o l o g y . T h i s e s s a y i s d e d i c a t e d , w i t h fond memories, t o Robbie. T e x t u a l Note F o o t n o t e s , marked by numeric s u p e r s c r i p t s , a r e c o l l e c t e d a t t h e end o f each c h a p t e r . R e f e r e n c e s t o works i n the f i n a l l i s t o f r e f e r e n c e s o c c u r as numerals i n s i d e square b r a c k e t s . v i i 1 C h a p t e r 1: G e n e r a l I n t r o d u c t i o n T h i s e s s a y i s a c o n t r i b u t i o n t o t h e d i a l e c t i c c o n c e r n i n g m a t e r i a l i s m . I t s i n t e l l i g i b i l i t y may be e n h a n c e d i f I e x p l a i n i n a d v a n c e my h o p e s and w i s h e s as r e g a r d s t h e u l t i m a t e outcome, o r a t l e a s t t h e f u t u r e d i r e c t i o n , o f t h i s d i a l e c t i c . I t i s my o p i n i o n t h a t (as a v i e w o f Humankind) m a t e r i a l i s m s h o u l d be e r a d i c a t e d : I w o u l d n o t however go so f a r as t o s u p p o s e t h a t t h e v i e w i s f a l s e , s i n c e i t i s n o t a t a l l c l e a r t o me t h a t t h e d i f f e r e n c e s b etween m a t e r i a l i s t s and t h e i r o p p o n e n t s a r e i n any o b v i o u s way d i s a g r e e m e n t s o v e r t h e t r u t h - v a l u e s o f c e r t a i n p r o p o s i t i o n s . N o n e t h e l e s s I b e l i e v e t h a t t h e v i e w g i v e s one an i n c o m p l e t e p i c t u r e o f h u m a n i t y , d e s p i t e t h e f a c t t h a t l i k e any e n d u r i n g p h i l o s o p h i c a l p o s i t i o n i t e m p h a s i s e s t r u t h s t h a t a r e w o r t h e m p h a s i s i n g , g e s t u r e s t o w a r d s i n t u i t i o n s w h i c h h a v e somewhere a s o l i d b a s i s . An i n c o m p l e t e p i c t u r e o f a human i s n o t t h e p i c t u r e o f an i n c o m p l e t e human: t h u s I do n o t s u p p o s e t h a t t h e t r o u b l e w i t h m a t e r i a l i s m i s t h a t i t o m i t s a r e p r e s e n t a t i o n o f some e l e m e n t o f t h e o b j e c t o f w h i c h i t i s a p i c t u r e . The C a r t e s i a n ego, v i e w e d as e c t o p l a s m i c , n e i t h e r h a s n o r c o u l d h a v e a p l a c e i n s u c h a p i c t u r e . The o m i s s i o n i s p e r h a p s one o f d e t a i l , p e r h a p s one o f i g n o r i n g c e r t a i n p e r s p e c t i v e s , o r o f s u p p o s i n g t h a t no o t h e r p i c t u r e i s t h e r e t o be drawn. A d o p t i n g an 2 i n c o m p l e t e p i c t u r e o f Humankind can l e a d one t o become an i n c o m p l e t e human. Thus my m o t i v a t i o n f o r t h i s s t u d y a p p e a l s t o such n o t i o n s as t h e r i c h n e s s o f human l i f e ; t h i s w i l l not i n g e n e r a l be t r u e o f my arguments, though I would not r e g r e t i t i f i t were. I f i t be asked what p o s i t i v e views I h o l d on t h e n a t u r e of mind, I can o n l y say t h a t I h e s i t a t e t o a l i g n m y s e l f w i t h any o f t h o s e p h i l o s o p h i c a l camps wh i c h p u r v e y t h e o r i e s o f mind. I f I have a view w h i c h amounts t o more t h a n a s e r i e s o f commonplaces,it i s not e n v i s a g e d i n e i t h e r o f t h e p u r p o r t e d l y e x h a u s t i v e schemes o f p o s s i b l e p o s i t i o n s i n t h e p h i l o s o p h y o f mind c o n s t r u c t e d by C D . B r o a d [1] and D.M.Armstrong [ 2 ] . I s h a l l , however, not s h r i n k from g i v i n g some acco u n t o f mental c o n c e p t s and i t w i l l become i n c r e a s i n g l y a p p arent t h a t t h i s owes much t o the l a t e r t hought o f Ludwig W i t t g e n s t e i n [3] [4] C5] [6] [ 7 ] . Having l a i d a few o f my c a r d s on t h e t a b l e , I s h o u l d make a few remarks about t h e h i s t o r y o f m a t e r i a l i s m and about how t h i s i s r e l a t e d t o the main t o p i c o f t h e e s s a y . I t seems t o me t h a t t h e h i s t o r y o f t h e c o n c e p t o f m a t t e r can be c h a r a c t e r i s e d as an i n t e r p l a y between two d i s t i n c t senses o f the terms i n whose use t h e concept i s embodied. I f we t a k e " m a t e r i a " i n " m a t e r i a l i s m " i n an A r i s t o t e l i a n s e n s e / we might t a k e t h e v i e w as one which s t r e s s e s t h e sense ( i f t h e r e i s 3 one) i n w h i c h t h i n g s can be s a i d t o be i d e n t i c a l w i t h t h e i r c o n s t i t u e n t s , o r one w h i c h supposes t h a t i f t h i n g s c o n s i s t i n o t h e r t h i n g s , t h e n i t i s o n l y t h e l a t t e r w h i c h can t r u l y ( " r e a l l y " ) be s a i d t o e x i s t . These p o s i t i o n s have t h e i r analogues i n t h e v a r i o u s r e d u c t i o n i s t s t r a n d s o f contemporary s c i e n t i f i c r e a l i s m . As m a t e r i a l i s m e x i s t s t o d a y , however, t h e n o t i o n o f m a t t e r w h i c h i s i m p o r t a n t i s more c l o s e l y a k i n t o t h a t o f what A r i s t o t l e c a l l s "prime m a t t e r " , t h e " u l t i m a t e " c o n s t i t u e n t ( s ) o f t h i n g s . For A r i s t o t l e , o f c o u r s e , "matter" and " c o n s t i t u e n t " a r e r e l a t i v e t e r ms; t h e y r e f e r t o d i f f e r e n t t h i n g s depending on what i s t h e s u b s t a n c e o f w h i c h t h o s e a r e the c o n s t i t u e n t s , and on what a r e t h e c o n d i t i o n s o f i t s coming t o be and p a s s i n g away. The i d e a o f m a t t e r as a k i n d o f s t u f f , o f w h i c h e v e r y t h i n g (or a t l e a s t e v e r y t h i n g m a t e r i a l ) i s u l t i m a t e l y composed, though h i n t e d a t i n A r i s t o t l e , i s d e r i v e d from P r e - S o c r a t i c p h i l o s o p h e r s such as Empedocles and, perhaps more n o t a b l y , T h a l e s . I t i s t h i s second i d e a whose s u r v i v a l i s more prominent i n t h e n o t i o n s o f m a t t e r a p p e a l e d t o i n D e s c a r t e s and Locke i n t h e e i g h t e e n t h c e n t u r y . Thus I would l o c a t e t h e p h i l o s o p h i c a l o r i g i n s o f modern m a t e r i a l i s m i n t h e patchwork n o t i o n o f " m a t e r i a l s u b s t a n c e " , i t s e l f t h e mutant progeny o f e a r l i e r c o n c e p t s , w h i c h has emerged from th e 2 mutual m i s u n d e r s t a n d i n g s o f t h e B r i t i s h E m p i r i c i s t s . Through the s u c c e s s o f p h y s i c s and c h e m i s t r y we do now have a f a i r l y r e s p e c t a b l e n o t i o n o f m a t t e r (o r mass/energy) and o f t h e ( r e l a t i v e l y ) u l t i m a t e c o n s t i t u e n t s o f m a t e r i a l t h i n g s . Problems a r i s e when t h i s n o t i o n i s t a k e n over by p h i l o s o p h e r s who, a p p a r e n t l y unaware o f t h e i m p o r t a n c e i n i t s h i s t o r y o f what I c l a i m a r e p h i l o s o p h i c a l m i s t a k e s , t r y t o t a l k about i t i n ways which a r e b e s t s u i t e d t o t h e o r i g i n a l 3 concept o f m a t t e r as t h i s o c c u r s i n A r i s t o t l e . The g r a d u a l r e s t r i c t i o n o f t h e a p p l i c a t i o n o f "matter" t o t h e " u l t i m a t e " c o n s t i t u e n t s o f p h y s i c a l o b j e c t s has r e s u l t e d i n t h e near-synonymy o f " m a t e r i a l i s m " and " p h y s i c a l i s m " w i t h i n p r e s e n t p h i l o s o p h i c a l d i s c o u r s e . So t h e g e n e r a l c l u s t e r o f views a t whose d o w n f a l l I aim c o u l d r o u g h l y be summed up v i a t h e c a t c h p h r a s e " E v e r y t h i n g i s r e d u c i b l e t o 4 the o b j e c t s and laws o f p h y s i c s " . I t i s not n e c e s s a r y t o t h e v i e w t h a t we r e s t r i c t o u r s e l v e s t o t h e t h e o r e t i c a l e n t i t i e s and t h e r e l a t i o n s between them wh i c h a r e a t t h e f o r e o f p h y s i c s a t t h e moment. The view i s open-ended i n so f a r as i t admits o f p r o g r e s s i n p h y s i c s . However, i f t h e view i s t o have any c o n t e n t as a t h e s i s o f o n t o l o g i c a l parsimony, i t must p l a c e some r e s t r i c t i o n upon what can count as an e n t i t y o f p h y s i c s , and t h e i m p l i c i t r e s t r i c t i o n seems t o be t o t h e e n t i t i e s o f m i c r o - a n a l y s i s . To a c e r t a i n e x t e n t we can i g n o r e t h e s e s u b t l e t i e s i n d o i n g p h i l o s o p h y o f mind, s i n c e i t i s e m p i r i c a l l y l i k e l y t h a t t h e laws w h i c h govern th e 5 n e u r o p h y s i o l o g i c a l d e t e r m i n a n t s o f b o d i l y movements c a n be s t a t e d a d e q u a t e l y w i t h o u t r e f e r e n c e t o a n y t h i n g s m a l l e r t h a n ( o r t h e o r e t i c a l l y l e s s p r i m i t i v e t h a n ) atoms and m o l e c u l e s . W i t h o u t d o u b t most o f t h e m a t e r i a l i s t c o n t e n d e r s - i n - t h e - f i e l d e n v i s a g e t h i s k i n d o f s u c c e s s f o r n e u r o p h y s i o l o g y . The s l o g a n b y w h i c h I e a r l i e r c h a r a c t e r i s e d m a t e r i a l i s m / p h y s i c a l i s m i s m u l t i p l y ambiguous. I t s most i m p o r t a n t i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s i n t h e p h i l o s o p h y o f mind a r e s i t u a t e d a l o n g a c o n t i n u u m whose p o l e s we may i d e n t i f y as t h e c o n t i n g e n t i d e n t i t y t h e o r y and e l i m i n a t i v e m a t e r i a l i s m . The f o r m e r v i e w seems t o be l o s i n g i n p o p u l a r i t y on a c c o u n t o f some a p p a r e n t l y i n s u p e r a b l e o b j e c t i o n s . The l a t t e r , w h i l e s e t up t o a v o i d t h o s e o b j e c t i o n s , h a s n e v e r g a i n e d much p o p u l a r i t y ; i t i s n e v e r t h e l e s s a s e r i o u s c o n t e n d e r , s i n c e i t h a s many t h e o r e t i c a l a d v a n t a g e s o v e r t h e " A u s t r a l i a n F a l l a c y " , i f I may presume t o c a l l t h i s by an o l d name. My t a s k i n t h i s e s s a y i s t o a r g u e a g a i n s t a c e r t a i n v e r s i o n o f e l i m i n a t i v e m a t e r i a l i s m , t h e v e r s i o n o u t l i n e d b y R i c h a r d R o r t y i n "Mind-Body I d e n t i t y , P r i v a c y and t h e C a t e g o r i e s " [ 1 0 ] and " I n c o r r i g i b i l i t y as t h e Mark o f t h e M e n t a l " [ 1 1 ] , and d e f e n d e d 5 by h i m i n " I n D e f e n s e o f E l i m i n a t i v e M a t e r i a l i s m " [ 1 2 ] . I f o c u s on t h i s v e r s i o n b e c a u s e , e v e n t h o u g h R o r t y h i m s e l f h a s s i n c e abandoned i t , I r e g a r d i t as t h e p h i l o s o p h i c a l p r o g e n i t o r o f o t h e r p o s s i b l e v e r s i o n s o f e l i m i n a t i v e m a t e r i a l i s m ; much of the work done i n more r e c e n t years on e l i m i n a t i v e m a t e r i a l i s m ( e . g . t h a t o f S . F . S a v i t t and R . K . S h o p e , which i s d i s c u s s e d i n Chapter 5) i s c o n s i s t e n t w i t h , and can be seen as an e l a b o r a t i o n o f , R o r t y ' s v iew, even though the p h i l o s o p h e r s who produced i t would not take themselves to be committed to every d e t a i l i n R o r t y ' s s emina l p a p e r s . F u r t h e r m o r e , i n so f a r as the view appea l s to the a l l e g e d i n c o m p a t i b i l i t y of n e u r a l and mental d i s c o u r s e (see Chapter 2, s e c t i o n ( b ) ) , i t has the advantage over more "Feyerabendian" v e r s i o n s o f g r o u n d i n g t h i s i n c o m p a t i b i l i t y i n what I l a t e r c a l l the c o n c e p t u a l commitments o f the two forms of e x p l a n a t i o n , and not i n the a l l e g e d i n c o m m e n s u r a b i l i t y of 7 the r e l e v a n t " t h e o r i e s " . R o r t y ' s view has a s i m i l a r advantage , I would argue , over P a u l C h u r c h l a n d ' s [51] p o s i t i o n , which appears to o f f e r no r e a s o n , over and above the s u p e r i o r i t y o f n e u r a l t h e o r y , f o r the e l i m i n a t i o n of mental s t a t e s . A f i n a l reason f o r s e l e c t i n g R o r t y ' s v e r s i o n as o b j e c t of a t t a c k i s t h a t i t a l l o w s a c o n s i d e r a t i o n of the c o n f u s i o n of the o n t o l o g i c a l s t a t u s o f the mind w i t h i t s e p i s t e m o l o g i c a l r o l e . D e a l i n g w i t h t h i s c o n f u s i o n , which appears to c h a r a c t e r i s e t r a d i t i o n a l C a r t e s i a n accounts o f the mental (and to some d e g r e e , as I argue l a t e r , the p r e s e n t v e r s i o n of e l i m i n a t i v e m a t e r i a l i s m ) , a l l o w s me to f o r m u l a t e by c o n t r a s t a more p l a u s i b l e p o s i t i v e n o n - m a t e r i a l i s t view. R o r t y 1 s v i e w may be summarised as t h e c o n j u n c t i o n o f t h e f o l l o w i n g t h e s e s : I . M e n t a l terms a r e t h e o r e t i c a l t erms, as e x p l i c a t e d i n I I -IV. I I . The p r i m a r y f u n c t i o n o f mental terms i s i n t h e c a u s a l e x p l a n a t i o n o f b e h a v i o u r . I I I . I t i s p o s s i b l e t h a t , even g i v e n what we know about p e o p l e ' s b e h a v i o u r and t h e c i r c u m s t a n c e s i n w h i c h t h e y f i n d t h e m s e l v e s , m e n t a l s t a t e s do not e x i s t . IV. A l o n g s i d e "mind-theory" t h e r e a r e competing, and i n c o m p a t i b l e , t h e o r i e s o f t h e a e t i o l o g y o f b e h a v i o u r , such as n e u r o p h y s i o l o g y and f u n c t i o n a l i s t ( m a c h i n e - t h e o r e t i c ) 4-' 8 a c c o u n t s . V. G i v e n t h e t h e o r e t i c a l s u p e r i o r i t y o f one o f t h e s e competing t h e o r i e s i t would be r a t i o n a l t o deny th e e x i s t e n c e 9 o f mental s t a t e s . V I . V i s t r u e because of t h e t h e o r e t i c a l i n c o m p a t i b i l i t y 8 (mentioned i n IV) which r u l e s o u t t h e i d e n t i t y t h e o r y . T h i s i n c o m p a t i b i l i t y i s t h e d i r e c t r e s u l t o f an i n c o m p a t i b i l i t y between t h e p r e d i c a t e s "mental" and " p h y s i c a l " . 1<") VII.The i n c o m p a t i b i l i t y between t h e p r e d i c a t e s "mental" and " p h y s i c a l " i s grounded i n t h e i n c o r r i g i b i l i t y o f c e r t a i n mental r e p o r t s . ^ I n C h apter 2 I d e v e l o p t h i s p i c t u r e o f R o r t y ' s view t h r o u g h an extended c o n s i d e r a t i o n o f h i s "demon" a n a l o g y . T h i s r e q u i r e s me t o o f f e r a b r i e f c h a r a c t e r i s a t i o n o f t h e c o r e of t h e i d e n t i t y t h e o r y , i n o p p o s i t i o n t o wh i c h R o r t y d e v e l o p e d h i s v e r s i o n o f e l i m i n a t i v e m a t e r i a l i s m . C hapter 3 b e g i n s t h e argument a g a i n s t t h i s v iew by a c o n s i d e r a t i o n o f t h e way R o r t y employs t h e n o t i o n o f i n c o r r i g i b i l i t y i n i t s s u p p o r t . I n Chap t e r s 4 - 6 I move t o a more g e n e r a l s e t o f arguments a g a i n s t the c o n c e p t i o n o f mental terms as t h e o r e t i c a l , t h e s e arguments i n v o l v i n g uses o f me n t a l terms which a r e not c a u s a l -e x p l a n a t o r y . The c o u r s e o f my a r g u m e n t a t i o n hence f l o w s r o u g h l y upwards t h r o u g h t h e l i s t o f t h e s e s by which I have c h a r a c t e r i s e d t h e v i e w I a t t a c k . A more d e t a i l e d summary o f the a r g u m e n t a t i o n a l s t r a t e g y can be found a t t h e end o f Chapter 2 . One p r e l i m i n a r y p o i n t o f i n t e r p r e t a t i o n must be d e a l t 9 w i t h b e f o r e I can p r o c e e d , and t h i s i s t h e m a t t e r o f t h e u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f t h e word "mental" i n the above e x p r e s s i o n o f R o r t y 1 s view. I s t h e t a r g e t o f e l i m i n a t i o n , i n h i s view, mental s t a t e s c o n c e i v e d o f i n a common-sense n o n - p h i l o s o p h i c a l way, o r t h e s t a t e s o f some ( C a r t e s i a n ) n o n - p h y s i c a l s u b s t a n c e , w i t h t h e i r a t t e n d a n t p h i l o s o p h i c a l baggage? On my r e a d i n g o f R o r t y , i t i s t h e f i r s t t a r g e t which i s i m p o r t a n t . My r e a s o n s f o r t h i s a r e s e v e r a l . I n t h e f i r s t p l a c e , t h e second c o n s t r u a l o f R o r t y , as o p p o s i n g o n l y mental s t a t e s as c o n c e i v e d o f as s t a t e s o f a C a r t e s i a n s u b s t a n c e , l e a v e s him i n agreement w i t h m y s e l f and most contemporary p h i l o s o p h e r s o f mind on a l l the c r u c i a l o n t o l o g i c a l q u e s t i o n s . I n p a r t i c u l a r i t i s i m p o s s i b l e t o d i s t i n g u i s h between h i s v e r s i o n o f e l i m i n a t i v e m a t e r i a l i s m and t h e c o n t i n g e n t i d e n t i t y t h e o r y : b o t h have t h e same o n t o l o g i c a l g o a l s . I t i s t r u e t h a t R o r t y sometimes m i n i m i z e s t h e d i f f e r e n c e between t h e s e two v i e w s , b u t when he does t h i s he i s q u e s t i o n i n g t h e imp o r t a n c e o f w o r r y i n g about whether t o i d e n t i f y m e n t a l and n e u r a l s t a t e s o r t o e l i m i n a t e t h e former i n f a v o u r o f t h e l a t t e r . He i s sometimes i n c l i n e d t o say t h a t t h e s e two c o n c e p t u a l moves come t o t h e same t h i n g . Whether o r not t h i s q u e s t i o n i n g i s c o n s i s t e n t w i t h h i s o t h e r s t a t e d v i e w s , i t would be u n f a i r t o c o n s t r u e "mental" as " n o n - p h y s i c a l " h e r e , because t h e n R o r t y would be wondering whether h i s e l i m i n a t i v e programme were t h e 10 same as one w h i c h i s c l e a r l y c o n c e p t u a l l y i n c o h e r e n t : non-p h y s i c a l s t a t e s cannot be i d e n t i f i e d w i t h p h y s i c a l s t a t e s . S e c o n d l y , R o r t y [11] argues a t l e n g t h t h a t t h e t r a d i t i o n a l f e a t u r e s o f n o n - p h y s i c a l s u b s t a n c e , such as non-s p a t i a l i t y , cannot be a t t r i b u t e d t o m e n t a l s t a t e s , w i t h the e x c e p t i o n o f i n c o r r i g i b i l i t y . I t i s h i s e x p l i c i t v i e w t h a t t h e d i s t i n c t i o n between p h y s i c a l and mental i s grounded o n l y on t h a t between c o r r i g i b l e and i n c o r r i g i b l e , and not on any o f the t r a d i t i o n a l d i s t i n c t i o n s a s s o c i a t e d w i t h t h e C a r t e s i a n model o f t h e mind. He a t t e m p t s , f u r t h e r m o r e , t o g i v e an account o f i n c o r r i g i b i l i t y w h i c h a v o i d s any i m p l i c a t i o n between b e i n g t h e p r o p e r s u b j e c t o f an i n c o r r i g i b l e r e p o r t and b e i n g mental " i n t h e C a r t e s i a n sense." He does say i n a f o o t n o t e t h a t t h e common concept o f t h e mind i s " i r r e d e e m a b l y C a r t e s i a n " , b u t i t i s not o b v i o u s how t h i s s h o u l d be cashed o u t . I m y s e l f have i n t h e p a s t been i n c l i n e d t o a t t r i b u t e t o R o r t y t h e view t h a t t h e use o f mental language commits one t o the e x i s t e n c e o f C a r t e s i a n s u b s t a n c e s and t h e i r s t a t e s , but I have been persuaded t o abandon t h i s i n t e r p r e t a t i o n by S.F. 12 S a v i t t , who has p o i n t e d o ut t o me t h a t R o r t y does not use (nor need t o use) t h i s view i n h i s argument f o r t h e i n c o m p a t i b i l i t y o f mental and p h y s i c a l . Even i f he h e l d i t , i t i s i r r e l e v a n t t o t h e i s s u e a t hand, and t h i s i s my t h i r d r e a s o n f o r r e s i s t i n g t h e i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s a c c o r d i n g t o w h i c h the t a r g e t o f e l i m i n a t i o n i s , f o r R o r t y , mental s t a t e s c o n s t r u e d as s t a t e s o f a C a r t e s i a n s u b s t a n c e . A c c o r d i n g l y my own use o f "mental" i n t h i s essay must never be taken as h a v i n g those C a r t e s i a n i m p l i c a t i o n s . When I t a l k of the d i f f e r e n c e between mental and p h y s i c a l I mean the commonsense d i s t i n c t i o n between h a v i n g i n d i g n a t i o n and h a v i n g i n d i g e s t i o n , between b e i n g o v e r b e a r i n g and b e i n g o v e r w e i g h t , between f e e l i n g and f a l l i n g . I am c o n v i n c e d t h a t R o r t y ' s use of the term i s the same, and t h a t he i s a r g u i n g t h a t i t c o u l d be r a t i o n a l to deny t h a t mental s t a t e s , i n t h i s sense , e x i s t . A r e s u l t o f the r e s t r i c t i o n o f my focus to R o r t y ' s view i s t h a t my t h e s i s takes on somewhat o f an h i s t o r i c a l c a s t , and I wish to address t h i s p o i n t b e f o r e p r o c e e d i n g . W h i l e R o r t y ' s v e r s i o n of e l i m i n a t i v e m a t e r i a l i s m was deve loped by him u n t i l the second h a l f o f the l a s t decade , and by such w r i t e r s as Shope [35] u n t i l i t s end, I can f i n d n o t h i n g i n the l i t e r a t u r e of the 1980's which f a l l s s q u a r e l y i n t o the mould formed by what i s d i s t i n c t i v e of R o r t y ' s v iew, namely the i n s i s t e n c e t h a t e l i m i n a t i o n i s more p l a u s i b l e than i d e n t i f i c a t i o n because of an i n c o m p a t i b i l i t y between mental and n e u r a l t a l k , an i n c o m p a t i b i l i t y which i s based on i n c o r r i g i b i l i t y . I wish to c o n f r o n t , t h e n , the p o s s i b i l i t y t h a t I have backed a l o s e r , as i t were, i n s e l e c t i n g which view to a t t a c k . I f t h i s i s a f a u l t , I can do l i t t l e to remedy i t w i t h i n 11B the framework of the p r e s e n t e s s a y . A g a i n s t the above p o s s i b i l i t y i t might be s a i d t h a t a l t h o u g h i n the l a s t e i g h t or so y e a r s s c h o l a r l y d i s c o u r s e has t u r n e d away from R o r t y ' s v e r s i o n , i t i s perhaps too e a r l y to d e c l a r e i t i n f e r i o r to the o t h e r v e r s i o n s which p r e s e n t l y enjoy p o p u l a r i t y . In f a c t I b e l i e v e i t to be s u p e r i o r , f o r the reasons e x p l a i n e d above (pp. 5 -7 ) ; I a l s o b e l i e v e t h a t i t i s a more i n t e r e s t i n g view, and one the c o n s i d e r a t i o n of which l eads me a l o n g more s i g n i f i c a n t c o n c e p t u a l p a t h s . The compar i son of R o r t y ' s view w i t h C h u r c h l a n d ' s [51] i s i n s t r u c t i v e h e r e . As I unders tand h i s p o s i t i o n , C h u r c h l a n d , i n a r g u i n g f o r the p o t e n t i a l replacement of mental s t a t e s , r e l i e s on the pure i n t u i t i o n t h a t t h e o r e t i c a l s u p e r i o r i t y l e a v e s t h i s as the most r a t i o n a l o p t i o n . Those who share the i n t u i t i o n would o f course a g r e e , but many do not share the i n t u i t i o n . R o r t y at tempts to j u s t i f y t h a t i n t u i t i o n on c o n c e p t u a l grounds . H i s view may be e a s i e r to a t t a c k , i n so f a r as i t a t tempts more, but i t i s not c l e a r to me t h a t t h i s i s a f a u l t . On the c o n t r a r y , i t adds to the c h a l l e n g e and the s i g n i f i c a n c e of c o n s i d e r i n g the v i ew. There has been a h a n d f u l of a r t i c l e s c r i t i c a l of R o r t y ' s p o s i t i o n w r i t t e n d u r i n g the 1980 ' s . W h i l e some of these echo my c o n c l u s i o n s i n t h i s e s say , the grounds adduced i n them are d i f f e r e n t from those which I r e l y o n . Thus 11C R o s e n t h a l [120] argues a g a i n s t the c l a i m e d i n c o m p a t i b i l i t y of mental and p h y s i c a l i n favour of the p l a u s i b i l i t y of an i d e n t i t y t h e o r y . R i c h a r d s o n [119] and Double [117] have b o t h argued a g a i n s t the p o s s i b i l i t y of an e l i m i n a t i v e view l i k e R o r t y ' s d e a l i n g w i t h the i n t e n t i o n a l i t y o f mental s t a t e s . I have not r a i s e d t h i s i s s u e because R o r t y h i m s e l f makes no attempt to d e a l w i t h i t , a s k i n g h i s r e a d e r s to suspend i n q u i r y i n t o t h i s a s p e c t . In f a c t I do not t h i n k the i n t e n t i o n a l i t y of mental s t a t e s i s an i n s u p e r a b l e bar to e l i m i n a t i v e m a t e r i a l i s m , though I cannot do j u s t i c e to the i s s u e h e r e . (See C h u r c h l a n d [116] f o r some thoughts on t h i s . ) My p r o j e c t i s focused e s s e n t i a l l y on the " e p i s t e m o l o g i c a l " f o r m u l a t i o n i n terms of i n c o r r i g i b i l i t y . T h i s b r i n g s me to the f i n a l few a r t i c l e s I wish to ment ion . There was a d i s p u t e i n the l i t e r a t u r e i n the l a t e 1970 1 s about the p r e c i s e i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f R o r t y ' s view - see Bush [ 5 3 ] , Lycan and Pappas [58] and Cam [115] - i n p a r t i c u l a r about how s t r o n g an e l i m i n a t i o n was p r o p o s e d . I argue i n Chapter 2 f o r an i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f R o r t y as p r o p o s i n g the p o s s i b i l i t y of the s t r o n g e l i m i n a t i o n of mental s t a t e s as w e l l as mental l anguage . To me the t e x t u a l ev idence i s so c l e a r tha t I have not thought i t worthwhi l e to go v e r y d e e p l y i n t o t h a t d i s p u t e . H i l e y [118] , however, has c r i t i c i s e d the above t h r e e a u t h o r s , and the t r a d i t i o n o f i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of R o r t y i n which I myse l f s t a n d , on the grounds t h a t R o r t y i n t e n d e d h i s view not as a s tage i n the development of m a t e r i a l i s m , but mere ly as an e p i s t e m o l o g i c a l a t t a c k on the n o t i o n of the G i v e n and f o u n d a t i o n a l i s m . My p o s i t i o n on t h i s i s s u e i s c l e a r l y s t a t e d i n my c o n c l u s i o n s i n Chapter 7: t h i s the g r a i n of t r u t h i n e l i m i n a t i v e m a t e r i a l i s m . However, any s e n s i b l e r e a d i n g of Rorty"s key a r t i c l e s must i n c l u d e the u n d e r s t a n d i n g tha t h i s g o a l extends beyond the e p i s t e m o l o g i c a l t o the o n t o l o g i c a l : he i s a t t e m p t i n g to demonstrate the p o s s i b i l i t y , of the n o n - e x i s t e n c e of mental s t a t e s . To summarise t h i s rev iew of the more r e c e n t l i t e r a t u r e , I s h a l l say t h a t n o t h i n g has been w r i t t e n i n t h i s decade which f u r t h e r s the suppor t f o r R o r t y ' s v iew. What has been w r i t t e n on the e l i m i n a t i v e m a t e r i a l i s t s i d e has been a development o f the C h u r c h l a n d i a n b r a n c h . W h i l e the s i g n i f i c a n c e o f R o r t y ' s view has not been o v e r l o o k e d by c r i t i c s o f e l i m i n a t i v e m a t e r i a l i s m , t h e i r c r i t i c i s m s have not focused on the i n c o r r i g i b i l i t y i s s u e , nor have t h e i r grounds i n v o l v e d the c o n s i d e r a t i o n s o f n o n - c o n s t a t i v e and j u s t i f i c a t o r y uses o f mental l anguage . Thus t h e r e i s a c o n s i d e r a b l e d i f f e r e n c e between t h e i r a t tempts and mine to r e f u t e R o r t y ' s v iew. As a r e s u l t , I have f e l t j u s t i f i e d i n not g i v i n g these w r i t i n g s a p l a c e i n my treatment of the i s s u e . Footnote s to Chapter 1 1. See A r i s t o t l e [8] 1029A. 2. See J . F . Bennet t [9] p . 1 8 5 . 3. An example o f t h i s c o n f l a t i o n i s a r g u a b l y to be found i n U . T . P l a c e [ 5 0 ] , where he c h a r a c t e r i s e s the c l a i m e d i d e n t i t y between mental and n e u r a l as e x p r e s s i b l e by "the ' i s ' of c o m p o s i t i o n " . The i n t e n t h e r e i s "modern", but the example o f f e r e d as a n a l o g y , t h a t o f the t a b l e which i s an o l d p a c k i n g -c a s e , i s A r i s t o t e l i a n . 4. C e r t a i n v e r s i o n s o f p h y s i c a l i s m , e . g . t h a t o f Hel lman and Thompson, are n o n - r e d u c t i v e . I d i s c u s s t h i s o p t i o n i n Chapter 7, s e c t i o n ( b ) ( i i i ) . 5. Whi l e t h e r e are d i f f e r e n c e s between the views expressed i n each of these t h r e e p a p e r s , these are l e s s s i g n i f i c a n t than the common t h r e a d which runs through them and which j u s t i f i e s my t a l k i n g of " R o r t y 1 s v iew". The major d i f f e r e n c e s are t r e a t e d i n the d i s c u s s i o n of i n c o r r i g i b i l i t y i n Chapter 5. 6. See Chapter 3. 7. I say t h i s because , on the s u r f a c e at l e a s t , the i n c o m m e n s u r a b i l i t y of two t h e o r i e s seems to imply t h e i r l o g i c a l c o m p a t i b i l i t y , not i n c o m p a t i b i l i t y . T h i s can be c o r r e c t d e s p i t e the t r u t h of the c l a i m t h a t i n c o m m e n s u r a b i l i t y i n h i b i t s j o i n t v i a b i l i t y , i n some more p r a g m a t i c sense . The i s s u e i s a complex one, to f o l l o w which would l e a d us too f a r a f i e l d . 8. Theses I - I V I a t t r i b u t e to R o r t y on the b a s i s o f h i s appea l to S e l l a r s 1 Myth of Jones and of h i s use of the demon ana logy i n e x p l i c a t i n g the r o l e of mental l anguage . W h i l e , i n d i s c u s s i n g the former , R o r t y speaks of the o r i g i n a l r o l e of mental terms b e i n g t h e o r e t i c a l , i t i s c l e a r from the contex t tha t the o n l y d i f f e r e n c e between the o r i g i n a l and p r e s e n t r o l e s i s the a d d i t i o n o f the r e p o r t i n g r o l e which may f a l l i n t o desuetude as the r e s u l t o f n e u r o p h y s i o l o g i c a l i n q u i r y . For Ror ty the e x p l a n a t o r y r o l e seems to remain the more important o f the two. P a r t i c u l a r passages which support the a t t r i b u t i o n s a r e : I : R o r t y [10] p . 1 7 9 , 1 1 . 3 3 - 3 6 ; I I : R o r t y [10] p . 1 7 9 , 1 1 . 3 6 - 3 8 ; I and I I : R o r t y [11] p . 4 1 1 , 1 1 . 1 3 - 1 6 , 2 2 - 2 4 , 3 9 -41; p . 4 1 3 , 1 1 . 3 8 - 4 0 ; I I I : R o r t y [10] p.1 8 1 , 1 1 . 3 - 5 ; p . 1 8 2 , 1 1 . 1 6 -18; p.186,11.7-8; I , I I , I I I and IV: R o r t y [11] p.422,11.37-40. See Chapter 2, s e c t i o n (d) f o r f u r t h e r arguments i n f a v o u r o f t h e s e a t t r i b u t i o n s . 9. See R o r t y [ 1 1 ] p.422,11.9-11. 10. See R o r t y [11] p.399,11.1-4; p.401,11.12-19; p.402,11.22-31; p.406,11.7-12. 11. See R o r t y [11] p.399,11.4-6; p.406,11.18-20; VI and V I I t o g e t h e r a r e s u p p o r t e d by R o r t y [11] p.414,11.10-12; p.421,11.12-19. 12. S . F . S a v i t t : p r i v a t e communication, S p r i n g 1982. Chapter 2; E x p l i c a t i o n o f R o r t y ' s View (a) I n t r o d u c t i o n The view which I w i s h t o c o n s i d e r i n t h i s e s s a y , and t o which I s h a l l f o r economy o f e x p r e s s i o n r e f e r as R o r t y ' s view, a r o s e o ut o f d i s s a t i s f a c t i o n w i t h t h e c o n t i n g e n t i d e n t i t y t h e o r y as an account o f mental states.''" My f i r s t t a s k t h e n i s t o o f f e r a b r i e f account o f t h e more s o p h i s t i c a t e d v e r s i o n s o f the l a t t e r p o s i t i o n and t o show how R o r t y ' s v e r s i o n o f e l i m i n a t i v e m a t e r i a l i s m might seem a t t r a c t i v e as an a l t e r n a t i v e . Through a c a r e f u l c o n s i d e r a t i o n o f R o r t y ' s demon ana l o g y , I d e v e l o p an account o f R o r t y 1 s view and o f how t h e d i s p u t e between t h e s e two forms o f m a t e r i a l i s m might be s e t t l e d . T h i s a l l o w s me t o f o r m u l a t e t h e s t r a t e g i c p l a n o f my own a t t a c k upon R o r t y ' s view, w h i c h I pursue i n t h e e n s u i n g c h a p t e r s . (b) The C o n t i n g e n t I d e n t i t y Theory The form o f the c o n t i n g e n t i d e n t i t y t h e o r y which I s h a l l c o n s i d e r c o n t a i n s two main p a r t s : a t h e o r y o f meaning f o r mental terms and an e m p i r i c a l h y p o t h e s i s . J . J . C . S m a r t 1 s [13] o r i g i n a l v e r s i o n o f the mean ing- theory was expres sed i n h i s a p p e a l to t o p i c - n e u t r a l t r a n s l a t i o n s : menta l a s c r i p t i o n s were rendered i n the form: "Something i s g o i n g on which i s l i k e what goes on when . . . ", the l a c u n a b e i n g f i l l e d w i t h a p h y s i c a l d e s c r i p t i o n o f the e n v i r o n m e n t a l s i t u a t i o n o f the r e l e v a n t s e n t i e n t b e i n g . Dav id Armstrong [2] f i l l s the l a c u n a w i t h a d e s c r i p t i o n o f c e r t a i n s o r t s o f b e h a v i o u r , and D a v i d Lewis [14] [15] i n c o r p o r a t e s the b e s t o f b o t h w o r l d s , by i d e n t i f y i n g menta l s t a t e s v i a t h e i r r o l e as c a u s a l i n t e r m e d i a r i e s between e n v i r o n m e n t a l i n p u t and b e h a v i o u r a l 2 o u t p u t . S i n c e the i d e n t i f i c a t i o n o f mental s t a t e s u s u a l l y i n v o l v e s the c o n s i d e r a t i o n o f bo th i n p u t and o u t p u t , I s h a l l r e g a r d Lewis 1 view as n a t u r a l l y s u p e r i o r to the o t h e r s and as 3 t h e i r r e p r e s e n t a t i v e i n the d i s c u s s i o n which f o l l o w s . The t h e o r y o f meaning f o r menta l terms then comes out as e x p r e s s i b l e w i t h the use o f the schema "Mental s t a t e M" = "Whatever has t y p i c a l causes C 1 # . . . C and t y p i c a l e f f e c t s E , , . . . E " , or w i t h the use o f a m u l t i t u d e o f such schemata, s i n c e which e f f e c t s r e s u l t w i l l depend upon wh i c h causes o c c u r r e d . T h i s t h e o r y o f meaning i s r e a l l y a t h e o r y o f r e f e r e n c e , and i s more c l e a r l y e x p r e s s e d i n t h e form "We use the term "mental s t a t e M" t o r e f e r t o whatever has t y p i c a l causes C,,...C and t y p i c a l e f f e c t s E,,...E ." A r t i c u l a t e d i n 1 n J r I n t h i s way, t h e t h e o r y i s consonant w i t h S e l l a r s ' [17] Myth about J o n e s , t h e man who i n v e n t e d t h e mind. The i d e a i s t h a t we r e c o g n i s e t h a t some i n t e r m e d i a r y e x i s t s between elements i n some s e r i e s o f c a u s a l c h a i n s , t h e i n t e r m e d i a r y u s u a l l y b e i n g r e q u i r e d t o a c c o u n t f o r i r r e g u l a r i t i e s w i t h i n some o v e r a l l r e g u l a r i t y . The mental terms w h i c h we now use r e f e r t o t h e s e i n t e r m e d i a r i e s b e f o r e we know what t h e y r e a l l y a r e , and we e v e n t u a l l y d i s c o v e r ( o r w i l l d i s c o v e r ) t h a t t h e y a r e n e u r a l s t a t e s . I t i s t h e l a s t c l a i m - t h e e m p i r i c a l h y p o t h e s i s -w h i c h completes t h e c o n t i n g e n t i d e n t i t y t h e o r y . R o r t y , as e l i m i n a t i v e m a t e r i a l i s t , d i v e r g e s a t t h i s p o i n t , f o r h i s b e l i e f i s t h a t whatever t h e i n t e r m e d i a r i e s a r e 4 t h e y a r e not r e f e r r e d t o by terms i n p r e s e n t mental language. 4 . . . . These terms r e f e r t o m y t h i c a l t h e o r e t i c a l e n t i t i e s w h i c h a r e about t o bow out o f t h e a r e n a o f p s y c h o l o g y i n f a v o u r o f n e u r a l s t a t e s . I n one s m a l l way, t h e b a s i c a c c o u n t o f the meaning of m e n t a l terms remains n o m i n a l l y t h e same: one view r e g a r d s mental s t a t e s as s u c c e s s f u l t h e o r e t i c a l c o n s t r u c t s , t h e o t h e r as u n s u c c e s s f u l t h e o r e t i c a l c o n s t r u c t s . T h i s i s t h e r a t i o n a l e b e h i n d R o r t y 1 s [10] c h a r a c t e r i s a t i o n o f t h e two views as t h e " t r a n s l a t i o n form" and " d i s a p p e a r a n c e form" o f t h e i d e n t i t y t h e o r y . I t a l s o e x p l a i n s h i s penchant f o r 5 r e f e r r i n g t o t h e o r e t i c a l r e p l a c e m e n t as one form o f i d e n t i t y . I t s h o u l d be n o t e d , however, t h a t t h e two forms o f m a t e r i a l i s m h e r e compared employ r a t h e r d i f f e r e n t c o n c e p t i o n s o f t h e t h e o r e t i c a l n a t u r e o f mental terms. For t h e i d e n t i t y -t h e o r i s t t h e s e terms a r e t o p i c - n e u t r a l : a n y t h i n g c o u l d be d i s c o v e r e d t o be t h e r e f e r e n t o f a mental term, p r o v i d e d i t s t a n d i n t h e c o r r e c t c a u s a l r e l a t i o n s . F o r R o r t y , however, mental terms a r e (and must be) i n a sense t h e o r y - l a d e n : i t i s p a r t o f t h e concept o f a mental s t a t e t h a t i t have f e a t u r e s i n c o m p a t i b l e w i t h i t s b e i n g a p h y s i c a l s t a t e . T h i s d i f f e r e n c e i s c r u c i a l t o an u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f t h e s u p e r i o r i t y o f R o r t y ' s view over t h e t r a d i t i o n a l forms o f t h e i d e n t i t y t h e o r y . As R o r t y ( [ 1 1 ] p.401, fns.7&8) p o i n t s o u t , t h e s e views have t y p i c a l l y f o u n d ered on t h e e x i s t e n c e o f t o o many c o u n t e r -examples t o t h e s c h e m a t i c t o p i c - n e u t r a l " t r a n s l a t i o n s " o f mental a s c r i p t i o n s w h i c h t h e y p r o p o s e . He t h i n k s he has an argument which demonstrates t h e s u p e r i o r i t y o f h i s e l i m i n a t i v e a l t e r n a t i v e o v er t h e v a r i o u s o p t i o n s he o u t l i n e s as p o s s i b l e r e a c t i o n s t o t h e s e o b j e c t i o n s . A g a i n , each o f t h e l a t t e r s t r a t e g i e s g i v e s an a c c o u n t o f t h e meaning o f mental terms a c c o r d i n g t o which i t i s an open q u e s t i o n whether t h e r e f e r e n t s o f t h o s e terms t u r n o u t t o be p h y s i c a l i t e m s , p e r t u r b a t i o n s i n some g h o s t l y a e t h e r o r what-have-you. The o b j e c t i o n t o t h i s i s t h a t a l l e g e d l y i t l e a v e s us w i t h no wor k a b l e d i s t i n c t i o n between "mental" and " p h y s i c a l " , no range o f r e f e r e n t s a c r o s s w h i c h t o s t r e t c h t h i s b i p o l a r i t y , and t h e r e f o r e w i t h no sense t o e i t h e r o f t h e p o l a r terms. These n e o - K a n t i a n c l a i m s d r i v e R o r t y t o t h e c o n c l u s i o n t h a t t h e r e must be some way o f s p e c i f y i n g t h e d i f f e r e n c e between m e n t a l and p h y s i c a l by s u p p l y i n g a p r o p e r t y which a l l m ental t h i n g s have (even i f i n some cases o n l y d e r i v a t i v e l y ) b u t which a l l p h y s i c a l t h i n g s do n o t . Thus he g i v e s an account o f mental c o n c e p t s a c c o r d i n g t o which a n y t h i n g m e n t a l , and n o t h i n g p h y s i c a l , i s t h e p r o p e r s u b j e c t o f an i n c o r r i g i b l e r e p o r t . T h i s i s t h e major p a r t o f R o r t y 1 s c l a i m t h a t common sense t a l k about t h e mind i s i r r e d e e m a b l y C a r t e s i a n . S i m i l a r o b j e c t i o n s t o t h e i d e n t i t y t h e o r y have been r a i s e d by p h i l o s o p h e r s , such as K u r t B a i e r [ 1 8 ] , who a r e not m a t e r i a l i s t s . They r a i s e deep i s s u e s w h i c h w i l l r e c e i v e t r e a t m e n t l a t e r i n t h i s e s s a y ; f o r t h e moment I w i l l a t t e m pt s i m p l y t o d e f u s e R o r t y 1 s v e r s i o n o f t h e argument. The f i r s t p r o b l em i s t h a t i t i s not c l e a r t h a t "mental" and " p h y s i c a l " are p o l a r terms, each o f wh i c h g e t s i t s sense from a c o n t r a s t w i t h t h e o t h e r . R o r t y ( [ 1 1 ] p.402, f i r s t p a r a g r a p h ) s u p p o r t s t h e c l a i m by i d e n t i f y i n g t h e p h y s i c a l w i t h t h e m a t e r i a l , t h e mental w i t h the i m m a t e r i a l , and n o t i n g t h a t " m a t e r i a l " and " i m m a t e r i a l " a r e such p o l a r terms. Even a l l o w i n g t h a t , we can q u e s t i o n t h e i d e n t i f i c a t i o n o f t h e mental w i t h t h e i m m a t e r i a l , f o r economies, c o n s t i t u t i o n s , even p r o p o s i t i o n s , a r e i m m a t e r i a l w i t h o u t t h e r e b y b e i n g m e n t a l . Thus even i f t h e s t r u c t u r e o f t h e argument i s sound (which I d o u b t ) , t h i s p a r t i c u l a r a p p l i c a t i o n o f i t w i l l not work. Even though I r e j e c t R o r t y 1 s argument t o t h e c o n c l u s i o n t h a t t o p i c - n e u t r a l a c c o u n t s o f t h e mental must be f l a w e d , I am p r e p a r e d t o admit t h a t h i s view i s s u p e r i o r t o them i n so f a r as i t i s not s u b j e c t t o t h e same o b j e c t i o n s by c o u n t e r -example, f o r no attempt i s made t o o f f e r " t r a n s l a t i o n s " o f mental a s c r i p t i o n s . The same t h i n g can be s a i d i n r e l a t i o n t o a f u r t h e r s e t o f o b j e c t i o n s b r o u g h t a g a i n s t c e r t a i n forms o f the i d e n t i t y t h e o r y by, among o t h e r s , Norman Malc o l m [19] and T y l e r Burge [ 2 0 ] . These o b j e c t i o n s , i n my o p i n i o n t h e most c o n v i n c i n g a t t e m p t s a t r e f u t a t i o n o f t h e c r u d e r v e r s i o n s o f the i d e n t i t y t h e o r y , t u r n on t h e i d e a t h a t t h e t r u t h -c o n d i t i o n s f o r t h e a s c r i p t i o n s o f many me n t a l s t a t e s i n c l u d e , on o b v i o u s i n s p e c t i o n , f a c t s about t h e w o r l d o t h e r t h a n t h e c e n t r a l nervous system o f t h e b e i n g t o whom t h e y a r e a s c r i b e d , and t h a t t h e r e f o r e t h e s e s t a t e s ( o r t h e f a c t t h a t t h e y e x i s t ) cannot be i d e n t i c a l t o s t a t e s o f , p r o c e s s e s i n ( o r t h e f a c t t h a t t h e r e e x i s t s a c e r t a i n s t a t e o f , o r p r o c e s s i n ) t h e c e n t r a l nervous system. I s h a l l not h e r e r e p e a t t h e arguments o f t h e p h i l o s o p h e r s who have r a i s e d t h i s o b j e c t i o n . Both t h i s and t h e o b j e c t i o n s p r e v i o u s l y mentioned a r e d i r e c t e d more a t t h e e m p i r i c a l h y p o t h e s i s i n c o r p o r a t e d i n t o e a r l i e r v e r s i o n s o f the i d e n t i t y t h e o r y t h a n a t t h e t o p i c - n e u t r a l i t y t h e o r y o f meaning f o r m ental terms t h a t i s t h e major c o n c e p t u a l component. An i d e n t i t y t h e o r y which does not l i m i t t h e scope o f t h e p o s s i b l e r e f e r e n t s o f m e n t a l terms t o t h e c e n t r a l nervous system o f t h e r e l e v a n t s u b j e c t can evade t h e second t y p e o f o b j e c t i o n q u i t e e a s i l y , i t s h o u l d be c l e a r . S i m i l a r l y , t h e r e a r e s t r a t e g i e s a v a i l a b l e t o t h e i d e n t i t y - t h e o r i s t f o r overcoming o b j e c t i o n s o f t h e f i r s t t y p e , as R o r t y h i m s e l f n o t e s . I f I am r i g h t i n c l a i m i n g t h a t R o r t y 1 s argument from t h e a l l e g e d p o l a r o p p o s i t i o n o f "mental" and " p h y s i c a l " i s unsound, t h e n t h e move t o some s o r t o f e l i m i n a t i v e m a t e r i a l i s m does not appear t o be f o r c e d . I n my d i s c u s s i o n o f t h e demon a n a l o g y I s h a l l e n q u i r e whether t h i s p r o v i d e s us w i t h an independent argument f o r t h e s u p e r i o r i t y o f R o r t y ' s view t o any form o f t h e c o n t i n g e n t i d e n t i t y t h e o r y . Of c o u r s e , even i f t h e r e were no argument f o r t h e s u p e r i o r i t y o f R o r t y ' s view, i t would be w o r t h e l a b o r a t i n g as an h y p o t h e s i s w h i c h d i f f e r s i n i m p o r t a n t ways from t h e i d e n t i t y t h e o r y . D i s t i n c t i v e o f e l i m i n a t i v e m a t e r i a l i s m , i n the form i n which i t was o r i g i n a l l y espoused by R o r t y , are some c l a i m s about the t r u t h - c o n d i t i o n s f o r the a s c r i p t i o n of mental s t a t e s which are w r i t t e n i n t o the use of mental language . R o r t y [11] t h i n k s t h a t i t i s i m p o r t a n t l y c h a r a c t e r i s t i c of mental concepts t h a t c e r t a i n r e p o r t s i n which they are employed are i n c o r r i g i b l e . T h i s i s the key f e a t u r e which , f o r h im, a l l o w s us to s e p a r a t e mental and p h y s i c a l . G r a n t e d t h i s c o n c e p t i o n the argument goes through v e r y q u i c k l y : at some t ime i n the f u t u r e t h e r e w i l l be no such i n c o r r i g i b l e r e p o r t s ; t h e r e f o r e t h e r e w i l l be no mental s t a t e s . ^ Here the f i r s t premis s r e p r e s e n t s the r e s u l t s of a s u c c e s s f u l n e u r o p h y s i o l o g y , one which f i n d s no need to appea l to the C a r t e s i a n p i c t u r e of the mind to y i e l d a complete account o f the c a u s a t i o n of human b e h a v i o u r . I s h a l l postpone u n t i l Chapters 4 and 5 my c r i t i c i s m s of the g e n e r a l t h e o r y of meaning f o r mental terms which t r e a t s them as t h e o r e t i c a l t erms . The i n i t i a l purpose of the p r e s e n t s e c t i o n i s to examine i n g r e a t e r d e t a i l the grounds which might i n c l i n e one to favour R o r t y 1 s v e r s i o n o f e l i m i n a t i v e m a t e r i a l i s m as a s o l u t i o n to the mind/body p r o b l e m . I s h a l l c o n s i d e r R o r t y ' s [10] model o f t h e o r e t i c a l change - the demon ana logy - n o t i n g t h a t p o s i t i o n s analogous to t h a t ment ioned, as w e l l as to o t h e r p o s i t i o n s i n the p h i l o s o p h y of mind, are p o s s i b l e w i t h r e s p e c t to the demon/germ d i s p u t e . I s h a l l argue t h a t one can d e c i d e between t h e s e competing p o s i t i o n s on th e b a s i s o f a d e t a i l e d a n a l y s i s o f t h e use o f language b o t h p r i o r t o and p o s t e r i o r t o t h e i n t r o d u c t i o n o f a new t h e o r y . A f o r t i o r i t h e d i s p u t e c o n c e r n i n g R o r t y 1 s v e r s i o n o f e l i m i n a t i v e m a t e r i a l i s m can be d e c i d e d on t h e same b a s i s . Here t h e e l i m i n a t i v e a d j u n c t t o t h e t h e o r e t i c a l i s t t h e o r y o f meaning f o r m e n t a l terms, t h a t c e r t a i n m ental r e p o r t s a r e ( " n e c e s s a r i l y " ? ) i n c o r r i g i b l e , i s c r u c i a l . A f t e r p o i n t i n g o u t some d i f f i c u l t i e s i n t h e assessment o f t h e p l a u s i b i l i t y o f t h i s c l a i m , I postpone t h a t t a s k u n t i l l a t e r c h a p t e r s . (c) The Demon Ana logy In the hope t h a t the reader w i l l s u s t a i n the above p i c t u r e o f my s t r a t e g y through what f o l l o w s , I t u r n now to a c o n s i d e r a t i o n o f the demon ana logy (see R o r t y [ 1 0 ] ) . The b a s i c s t o r y concerns a p r i m i t i v e t r i b e the members of which " e x p l a i n " d i s e a s e by r e f e r e n c e to d i f f e r e n t - c o l o u r e d demons. The demons can be "seen" under v a r i o u s c o n d i t i o n s ( u s u a l l y i n t o x i c a t i o n r e s u l t i n g from the i n g e s t i o n o f s a c r e d mushrooms) by the w i t c h - d o c t o r s o f the t r i b e . We are to assume, though i t i s d i f f i c u l t to see how, t h a t t h e r e i s a r e a s o n a b l e amount o f consensus on such b e l i e f s as what c o l o u r o f demon causes what d i s e a s e and on what form of e x o r c i s m w i l l b e s t e f f e c t a c u r e ; w i thout t h i s assumpt ion i t i s a d i s t o r t i o n to a t t r i b u t e a t h e o r y of d i s e a s e to the t r i b e . Into t h i s c o n c e p t u a l s e t t i n g comes the c i v i l i s e d a n t h r o p o l o g i s t and her m e d i c a l team, who oppose the demon-theory , b r i n g i n g ev idence i n favour of t h e i r own g e r m - t h e o r y . I f the team i s more s u c c e s s f u l i n e x p l a i n i n g , p r e d i c t i n g , c o n t r o l l i n g and c u r i n g d i s e a s e , and i f i n a d d i t i o n they can s u p p l y an e x p l a n a t i o n of the s o - c a l l e d s i g h t i n g s o f the v a r i o u s demons, then the demon-theory w i l l g r a d u a l l y be r e p l a c e d by the g e r m - t h e o r y . Those members of the t r i b e who become educated i n the new ways w i l l d e c i d e t h a t t h e r e never were demons, and t h a t whatever methods were f o r m e r l y employed i n the t reatment o f d i s e a s e , the r e s u l t s a c h i e v e d were c o i n c i d e n t a l , a c c i d e n t a l or e x p l i c a b l e i n terms of the new t h e o r y . I t seems e m i n e n t l y r e a s o n a b l e , g i v e n the s i t u a t i o n as d e s c r i b e d , to deny the e x i s t e n c e of demons, and so i t i s w i t h s e n s a t i o n s and o t h e r mental s t a t e s , a c c o r d i n g to R o r t y . The f i r s t s t ep i n q u e s t i o n i n g the c l o s e n e s s o f the ana logy i s to d i s c o v e r whether i n the demon case t h e r e c o u l d be some analogue of the i d e n t i t y t h e o r y which c o u l d be a p l a u s i b l e t h e o r e t i c a l a l t e r n a t i v e . T h i s I now d o . L e t i t be assumed from the o u t s e t t h a t the germ-theory i s c o r r e c t , j u s t as i n the mental case i t i s assumed t h a t we w i l l at some t ime i n the f u t u r e be c o n f r o n t e d w i t h a c o r r e c t n e u r o p h y s i o l o g i c a l t h e o r y of b e h a v i o u r . Now suppose t h a t some b r i g h t son of a w i t c h - d o c t o r , w i s h i n g to p r e s e r v e h i s p a r e n t ' s p r e s t i g e , argues as f o l l o w s : "Your new t h e o r y , which speaks o f germs i n the body of the p a t i e n t , i s good and e f f e c t i v e but does not show t h a t the core o f our o l d t h e o r y was f a l s e . On the c o n t r a r y , i t shows t h a t i t i s t r u e , f o r the two t h e o r i e s are i d e n t i c a l . We use d i f f e r e n t terms f o r the p r i n c i p a l c a u s a l agents i n d i s e a s e -you ' g e r m ' , I 'demon' - but i n f a c t demons and germs are i d e n t i c a l . A l l you have r e a l l y shown us i s t h a t demons are v e r y s m a l l . " T h i s s u g g e s t i o n i s an i n t r i g u i n g one w h i c h can be d e v e l o p e d i n any o f s e v e r a l d i f f e r e n t d i r e c t i o n s . What t h e s e a r e can be d i s c o v e r e d by a t t e m p t i n g t o argue a g a i n s t i t . One way t o go - t h e " c o n c e p t u a l commitment" r o u t e - i s t o c l a i m t h a t demons have, by v i r t u e o f t h e n a t u r e o f t h e c oncept "demon", p r o p e r t i e s i n c o m p a t i b l e w i t h t h e i r b e i n g germs. A p a r t from th e p r o blem w i t h s i z e , demons a r e supposed t o be p e r s o n a l i n some sense, c o l o u r e d depending on t h e d i s e a s e , a b l e t o move around f r e e l y i n t h i s space and o t h e r s , and so on. I t seems t h a t none o f t h e s e p r o p e r t i e s p e r t a i n s t o germs and so (by L e i b n i z ' s Law!) germs and demons cannot be i d e n t i c a l . Here our t r i b a l i d e n t i t y - t h e o r i s t can make s e v e r a l moves, a l l o f w h i c h have t h e i r analogues i n t h e debate i n t h e p h i l o s o p h y o f mind. He can a v o i d t h e o b j e c t i o n s c o n c e r n i n g i r r e d u c i b l y s u p e r n a t u r a l p r o p e r t i e s by r e c a s t i n g h i s proposed i d e n t i t i e s , i n N a g e l i a n [16] f a s h i o n , i n terms o f a p e r s o n ' s body b e i n g i n h a b i t e d by germs and i t s b e i n g i n h a b i t e d by . demons, f o r none o f t h e quoted p r o p e r t i e s d i f f e r e n t i a t e s t h e s s t a t e s - o f - a f f a i r s . S t i l l , i f he wants t o show t h a t t h i s i s more th a n s l e i g h t - o f - t o n g u e , he must s u p p l y an a c c o u n t o f the o r i g i n a l use o f t h e demon-theory which makes i t seem n a t u r a l t o r e g a r d t h i s as a p r i m i t i v e v e r s i o n o f t h e germ-theory. What t h i s amounts t o i n t h i s case i s i s o l a t i n g some common b e l i e f s about demons - t h a t t h e y a r e p e r s o n a l e t c . - from any c o n n e c t i o n w i t h t h e concept o f "demon". T h i s move i s analogous t o d e n y i n g o f t h e concept o f mind t h a t i t i n v o l v e s i n c o r r i g i b i l i t y . My i n s i s t e n c e upon t h e c e n t r a l i t y o f t h e i s s u e o f what i s p a r t o f t h e concept o f "demon" might be seen as s l i p p e r y p h i l o s o p h i c a l p r a c t i c e , f o r we have become accustomed, i n t h e po s t - Q u i n e a n e r a , t o r e g a r d i n g i t as i m p o s s i b l e t o d i s t i n g u i s h between t h o s e t r u t h s about t h e r e f e r e n c e - c l a s s o f some term which a re t r u e c o n c e p t u a l l y ( o r i n v i r t u e o f t h e meaning o f the term) and t h o s e which a r e m e r e l y w e l l - s u p p o r t e d e m p i r i c a l g e n e r a l i s a t i o n s . F o r t h e t i m e b e i n g I s h a l l l e a v e a s i d e t h e c l u s t e r o f arguments g a t h e r e d by Quine and o t h e r s i n f a v o u r o f t h i s c o n c l u s i o n ; I m e r e l y s t a t e my o p i n i o n t h a t t h e arguments do not show as much as i s d e s i r e d . My j u s t i f i c a t i o n f o r r e l y i n g on t h e " b e l i e f / c o n c e p t " d i s t i n c t i o n i s t h a t , i n t h e case under d i s c u s s i o n , i t seems t o me t h a t t h e p l a u s i b i l i t y o f R o r t y ' s c l a i m s about what goes on when demon-thought i s r e j e c t e d i n f a v o u r o f germ-thought depends upon t h e assumption t h a t c e r t a i n t r u t h s a r e p a r t o f t h e concept o f demon. What I mean by t h i s i s t h a t , f o r most sp e a k e r s o f E n g l i s h a t l e a s t , something w h i c h was not p e r s o n a l , f o r example, would not count .as a demon, and t h i s f o r reas o n s w h i c h have n o t h i n g t o do w i t h the w e i g h i n g o f e v i d e n c e f o r o r a g a i n s t any e m p i r i c a l h y p o t h e s i s about demons. The r e a d e r i s c l e a r l y i n t e n d e d by R o r t y t o re a d such i m p l i c a t i o n s about demons i n t o t h e t r i b a l use o f "demon" and t h i s i s where t h e d i f f i c u l t i e s a r i s e , f o r t h e r e i s a q u e s t i o n , g i v e n t h e t h e o r y o f t h e w i t c h - d o c t o r ' s son, about whether t h e t r i b e uses "demon" i n t h e same way as most o t h e r E n g l i s h s p e a k e r s . D i f f i c u l t i e s , b u t not i m p o s s i b i l i t i e s . What i s a t i s s u e i s whether "demon", as t h i s i s used by most E n g l i s h s p e a k e r s , i s an adequate t r a n s l a t i o n o f t h e t r i b a l homophone, the p r i m i t i v e i d e n t i t y - t h e o r i s t p r o f f e r r i n g "whatever causes d i s e a s e " as an a l t e r n a t i v e . I t does not seem t o me t h a t i t i s always ( o r even o f t e n ) i m p o s s i b l e t o d e c i d e between two such a l t e r n a t i v e s , though t h e p r o j e c t o f s e t t i n g out t o do so r e q u i r e s some b a s i s f o r communication between t h e members o f the t r i b e and members o f t h e e x p e d i t i o n . L e t us assume t h a t t h i s e x i s t s , whatever account we w i s h t o g i v e o f i t s g e n e s i s . Then t h e o b v i o u s way out o f our d i f f i c u l t y i s f o r t h e team t o d i s c u s s t h e m a t t e r w i t h members o f t h e t r i b e . " I s t h e r e ( c o u l d t h e r e be) such a t h i n g as a demon wh i c h was not a p e r s o n , o r not v e r y l i k e a p e r s o n i n c e r t a i n r e s p e c t s ? " I f t h e t r i b e was unable t o h a n d l e t h e modal v e r s i o n o f t h i s q u e s t i o n , t h e team would have t o ask how t h e t r i b e came t o know t h a t a l l demons a r e p e r s o n a l , i f t h a t i s what t h e y b e l i e v e . Here t h e answer might be a l o n g the l i n e s o f "Because t h a t ' s what we mean by 'demons'" or might be a long the l i n e s o f "Because demons cause d i s e a s e and a n y t h i n g which causes harm to a person i n t h i s manner i s wicked and o n l y persons and t h i n g s l i k e them can be w icked" . There are o f course many o t h e r answers, but the i s s u e between the team, as e l i m i n a t i v i s t s (who wish to r e j e c t demons on the grounds , p a r t l y , t h a t they are " e s s e n t i a l l y " p e r s o n a l ) , and the t r i b a l i d e n t i t y - t h e o r i s t c o u l d be s e t t l e d by s e e i n g which o f these two answers was the c l o s e r a p p r o x i m a t i o n . ( I f n e i t h e r , then we need an a l t e r n a t i v e account o f the meaning o f "demon".) The f a c t t h a t when the w i t c h - d o c t o r s "see" a demon around the body of a s i c k person what they "see" has more or l e s s the shape of a human b e i n g i s i m p o r t a n t , but can be accommodated by e i t h e r t h e o r y of meaning. I have been somewhat o p t i m i s t i c about the success of these i n v e s t i g a t i o n s , and I have to admit t h a t i t i s p o s s i b l e t h a t no u n e q u i v o c a l answer w i l l be r e a c h e d . There may, f o r example, be l i t t l e or no consensus about how t h e i r term f o r demon i s used amongst members o f the t r i b e . The p o i n t I wish to emphasise i s t h a t where t h e r e ^s consensus about use , coup led w i t h agreement i n use , the a n t h r o p o l o g i c a l l i n g u i s t has a h a n d l e to g r i p i n her a t t t empt to d e c i d e whether the t r i b a l i d e n t i t y - t h e o r i s t i s c o r r e c t i n h i s " t o p i c - n e u t r a l " account o f the meaning o f "demon". I t seems o b v i o u s t h a t f a c t s about th e p r i o r use o f language and t h e r e a c t i o n t o t h e germ t h e o r y w i l l be o f immense im p o r t a n c e i n h e l p i n g h e r t o d e c i d e . I t i s d i f f i c u l t t o g i v e a p r e c i s e a c c o u n t o f what d e t a i l e d c o n d i t i o n s would have t o be f u l f i l l e d f o r t h e demon-germ i d e n t i t y t h e o r y t o be c o r r e c t . The g e n e r a l p i c t u r e , however, would be something l i k e t h i s : t h e r e must be a c e r t a i n k i n d o f c o n t i n u i t y i n t h e use o f "demon" and r e l a t e d e x p r e s s i o n s b e f o r e and a f t e r t h e d i s c o v e r y o f t h e p u t a t i v e i d e n t i t y . Most o f t h e s t a t e m e n t s about demons wh i c h were c o n s i d e r e d t r u e b e f o r e t h e change w i l l a l s o be c o n s i d e r e d t r u e a f t e r i t , w i t h o r w i t h o u t t h e s u b s t i t u t i o n o f "germ" f o r "demon". There w i l l o f c o u r s e be some s t a t e m e n t s which change i n t r u t h - v a l u e w i t h t h e i n t r o d u c t i o n o f t h e new t h e o r y , b u t i f t h e s e a r e few enough i n number, o r perhaps t h e o r e t i c a l l y i n s i g n i f i c a n t t o a s u f f i c i e n t degree, i t w i l l be r e l a t i v e l y easy f o r t h e t r i b a l d o c t o r s t o amend them w i t h o u t t o o much s t r a i n on t h e demon-germ i d e n t i t y . On t h e o t h e r hand, i f t h e number o f b e l i e f s w hich must be dropped i s l a r g e , o r i n c l u d e s t h e most i m p o r t a n t b e l i e f s about demons, t h i s i s e v i d e n c e t h a t w i t h t h e i n t r o d u c t i o n o f t h e new t h e o r y came a new t h e o r e t i c a l term, "germ", wh i c h cannot be r e g a r d e d as synonymous, nor even 7 c o - e x t e n s i v e w i t h "demon". One n e c e s s a r y c o n d i t i o n which i t w i l l be i m p o r t a n t t o mention o f t h e a p p r o p r i a t e n e s s o f a demon-germ i d e n t i t y t h e o r y i s the e x i s t e n c e o f ( a l m o s t ) e x c e p t i o n l e s s c o r r e l a t i o n s between demon- and g e r m - a s c r i p t i o n s . I s h a l l not pause h e r e t o i n q u i r e i n t o t h e form such c o r r e l a t i o n s must t a k e ( i n t h e mind/body case t h i s has been th e s u b j e c t o f much d e b a t e ) . T h i s c o n d i t i o n on i t s own i s not s u f f i c i e n t f o r i d e n t i f i c a t i o n , I would argue, b u t combined w i t h some o f t h e o t h e r s mentioned above i t may be. A l o n g w i t h l i n g u i s t i c c o n t i n u i t y , and p a r t l y c o n s t i t u t i v e o f i t , one would e x p e c t some c o n t i n u i t y i n m e d i c a l p r a c t i c e . T h i s i m p l i e s t h a t i n t h e i r c h o i c e o f remedies, t h e w i t c h - d o c t o r s had a l r e a d y a n t i c i p a t e d , t o a f a i r d egree, t h e t r e a t m e n t s which a r e s a n c t i o n e d and recommended by the germ-theory. The a n t i c i p a t i o n may be more o r l e s s o f a c o i n c i d e n c e , b u t a r a d i c a l break i n t h e r a p y would seem t o b e t o k e n a r a d i c a l break i n t h e o r y . I f , f o r example, t h e p r e v i o u s t r e a t m e n t f o r pneumonia was c h a n t i n g "Ngudul" w h i l e waving around t h e head o f t h e p a t i e n t s t i c k s w i t h s m a l l b e l l s a t t a c h e d t o t h e end, whereas t h e p r e s e n t one i s t h e a d m i n i s t e r i n g o f a n t i b i o t i c s , t h i s i n d i c a t e s t h a t t h e d o c t o r s c o n c e i v e v e r y d i f f e r e n t l y o f t h e (two?) p r o j e c t s o f g e t t i n g r i d o f demons and g e t t i n g r i d o f germs; and t h i s i s some ev i d e n c e towards th e c o n c l u s i o n t h a t f o r them demons and germs a r e not i d e n t i c a l . To s e t t l e t h e q u e s t i o n one would need t o know more about t h e i r j u s t i f i c a t i o n f o r t h e o r i g i n a l t r e a t m e n t ( s i n c e by t h e l i g h t s o f modern s c i e n c e i t can h a r d l y be j u s t i f i e d by s u c c e s s 1) b u t i t seems f a i r l y c l e a r t h a t any such j u s t i f i c a t i o n w h i c h c o u l d save th e demon-germ i d e n t i t y t h e o r y would i n v o l v e p r e t t y b i z a r r e b e l i e f s (about t h e c a u s a l r e l a t i o n s between words and m i c r o b e s ) , t hemselves l i k e l y t o be g i n c o n s i s t e n t w i t h t h e germ-theory. ( I n t h e c o n t e x t o f t h e i s s u e o f s u c c e s s f u l e x p l a n a t i o n and t r e a t m e n t o f d i s e a s e , I w i s h t o add a s h o r t d i g r e s s i o n on t h e s u i t a b i l i t y o f t h e demon-analogy f o r R o r t y ' s g e n e r a l c a s e . Even were t h i s i s s u e not c o m p l i c a t e d by t h e p o s s i b i l i t y , not t r e a t e d by R o r t y , o f an analogue t o t h e c o n t i n g e n t i d e n t i t y t h e o r y , i t i s not o b v i o u s t h a t t h e a n a l o g y i s c l o s e enough, i n t h e c r u c i a l a r e a o f e x p l a n a t i o n and p r e d i c t i o n , t o be u s e f u l . For from our p r e s e n t s c i e n t i f i c p e r s p e c t i v e i t seems t h a t t h e demon-theory s h o u l d have no p r e d i c t i v e v a l u e whatever. I f t h i s i s s o , t h e n i t i s u n c l e a r what would have t o be t r u e f o r us t o be j u s t i f i e d i n t r e a t i n g demon-talk among members o f t h e t r i b e as t h e e x p r e s s i o n o f an e x p l a n a t o r y t h e o r y o f d i s e a s e , as opposed, say, t o i r r e l e v a n t r e l i g i o u s r i g a m a r o l e . Assuming t h a t t h i s p r o b l e m can be overcome - i f , f o r i n s t a n c e , demon-t a l k i s s u f f i c i e n t l y s i m i l a r and s i m i l a r l y - t r e a t e d t o o t h e r a r e a s o f t r i b a l d i s c o u r s e w h i c h a r e i n d i s p u t a b l y t h e o r e t i c o -e x p l a n a t o r y - I see no r e a s o n t o r e s i s t t h e c o n c l u s i o n t h a t t h e germ-theory s h o u l d r a t i o n a l l y be a c c e p t e d on t h e grounds of i t s s u c c e s s i n p r o v i d i n g t r e a t m e n t s and c u r e s f o r d i s e a s e . U n l e s s the w i t c h - d o c t o r t a k e s t h i s s t e p s/he i s l e f t w i t h t h e f a c t , g l a r i n g l y d i f f i c u l t t o e x p l a i n , t h a t t h e germ-theory f u n c t i o n s so w e l l , even i f i n h i s / h e r v i e w m e r e l y as an h e u r i s t i c d e v i c e . F o r s i m i l a r r easons s/he may be o b l i g e d t o a c c e p t t h e h a l l u c i n a t i o n e x p l a n a t i o n o f t h e s o - c a l l e d o b s e r v a t i o n s o f demons (though t h i s i s t o a c c e p t something o t h e r t h e n t h e g e r m - t h e o r y ) . On t h e assu m p t i o n t h a t t h e demon-theory i s e x p l a n a t o r i l y u s e l e s s , i t i s t h u s e a s i l y r e j e c t e d , b u t t h e n the demon a n a l o g y i s not c l o s e enough t o t h e case o f t h e mind f o r i t t o prove i l l u m i n a t i n g . M e n t a l e n t i t i e s , by c o n t r a s t w i t h s u p e r n a t u r a l ones, do appear t o be s u c c e s s f u l l y used i n something w h i c h a t l e a s t p a s s e s f o r t h e e x p l a n a t i o n and p r e d i c t i o n o f b e h a v i o u r , even i f t h i s something does not y i e l d many p r e d i c t i o n s which a r e i n c o n t r o v e r t i b l e . I f we suppose t h a t t h i s f e a t u r e o f mental t a l k i s i n f a c t s h a r e d by demon-t a l k , i t i s not so easy t o d i s p o s e o f t h e l a t t e r i n t h e absence o f an e x p l a n a t i o n f o r i t s p a r t i a l p r e d i c t i v e s u c c e s s . Such an e x p l a n a t i o n i s not p r o v i d e d by R o r t y i n t h e demon-ca s e , b u t must be f o r t h c o m i n g i n t h e case o f t h e mind l e s t we be l e f t i n t h e u n c o m f o r t a b l e p o s i t i o n o f t h e w i t c h - d o c t o r 33 above, of b e i n g unable t o e x p l a i n a f a c t which c r i e s out f o r e x p l a n a t i o n . ) I t i s now time t o a s s e s s the r e l e v a n c e o f my e x t e n s i o n of the demon-example t o the case o f m i n d - b r a i n i d e n t i t y . The moral of the d i s c u s s i o n i s t h a t whether or not t h e i n t r o d u c t i o n of a n o v e l t h e o r y ( w i t h n o v e l t h e o r e t i c a l terms) i s a replacement or an e m b e l l i s h m e n t can be d e c i d e d by d e t a i l e d r e f e r e n c e t o the f a c t s , l i n g u i s t i c and o t h e r , which c o n s t i t u t e the use of the r e l e v a n t e x p r e s s i o n s b o t h p r i o r t o 9 and p o s t e r i o r t o the p u r p o r t e d t h e o r e t i c a l change. F u r t h e r m o r e , t h e s e same f a c t s a r e what a r e r e l e v a n t t o an assessment o f how R o r t y ' s v e r s i o n o f e l i m i n a t i v e m a t e r i a l i s m i t s e l f s t a n d s v i s - a - v i s the mind/body problem. T h i s i s perhaps h i d d e n from us by the f a c t t h a t the demon-analogy, w h i l e i t p r o v i d e s f o r the p o s s i b i l i t y of an i d e n t i t y t h e o r y as an a l t e r n a t i v e t o e l i m i n a t i o n , i s not i n t r i c a t e enough t o a l l o w f o r the f o r m u l a t i o n o f any p l a u s i b l e analogues t o d u a l i s m , phenomenalism or t h e view which would be analogous t o my own, t h a t the demon-theory and germ-theory a r e c o m p a t i b l e i n a way which does not i n v o l v e the i d e n t i t y of germs and demons. The demon-example l o o k s more l i k e an open-and-shut case of t h e o r e t i c a l s u p e r i o r i t y ; the mind/body case r e q u i r e s a wider range of c o n s i d e r a t i o n . S i n c e t h e example i s so s c h e m a t i c , I have been a b l e o n l y t o h i n t a t the i m p o r t a n t k i n d s o f c o n s i d e r a t i o n , b u t I hope t o be a b l e t o say more i n r e l a t i o n t o t h e case w h i c h i s my r e a l o b j e c t o f i n t e r e s t . My g e n e r a l c o n c l u s i o n about R o r t y 1 s a p p e a l t o t h e demon-analogy i s t h a t w h i l e t h e a n a l o g y i s not c l o s e enough t o the mind/body case t o p r o v i d e s t r o n g s u p p o r t f o r R o r t y 1 s view, i t i s r i c h enough t o a l l o w f o r an e l a b o r a t i o n - t h e one I have made - w h i c h i n d i c a t e s t h e s o r t s o f c o n s i d e r a t i o n s r e l e v a n t t o the a c c e p t a n c e o r r e j e c t i o n o f t h a t view. I pursue t h e s e i n what f o l l o w s . 35 (d) The C o n c e p t u a l Commitments o f M e n t a l Language As soon as we t u r n from the f a b r i c a t e d w o r l d o f example t o t h e r e a l w o r l d o f t h e mind/body problem we e n c o u n t e r a number o f f u r t h e r d i f f i c u l t i e s . Prominent amongst t h e s e i s the o b v i o u s f a c t t h a t t h e r e i s l i t t l e o r no consensus about how mental language i s a c t u a l l y used, what c o n c e p t u a l commitments i t i n v o l v e s and so f o r t h . (That i s t h e q u e s t i o n . ) T h i s i s not s u r p r i s i n g when one c o n s i d e r s t h e f a c t t h a t we a r e d e a l i n g h e r e w i t h a v a s t and v a r i e g a t e d a r e a o f language and not w i t h t h e use o f a s i n g l e word, as i n t h e demon c a s e . I t may be r e a s o n a b l e t o agree w i t h R o r t y t h a t t h e common c o n c e p t i o n o f t h e mind i s C a r t e s i a n , where t h i s means t h a t most p e o p l e t h i n k o f s t a t e m e n t s about t h e mind as i n v o l v i n g a commitment t o i n c o r r i g i b i l i t y , b u t i t i s l e s s c l e a r how s i g n i f i c a n t t h i s i s t o t h e q u e s t i o n o f whether t h e c o n c e p t s o f the mind and o f t h e mental i n v o l v e a commitment t o i n c o r r i g i b i l i t y . I am h e r e assuming a d i s t i n c t i o n between t h e concept o f mind and c o n c e p t i o n s o f t h e mind. The former i s t h a t t h e g r a s p o f w h i c h i s m a n i f e s t e d i n t h e use o f mental language i n t h e normal, c o r r e c t way ( i n c l u d i n g w i t h c e r t a i n commitments). The l a t t e r i s a s e t o f b e l i e f s one would a s s e n t t o , b e l i e f s about minds and me n t a l s t a t e s , about mental language and about mental c o n c e p t s . F o r e v e r y i n d i v i d u a l , t h e r e i s an i s s u e about whether h e r o r h i s c o n c e p t i o n s a r e o r are not i n l i n e w i t h t h e concept e n s h r i n e d , i n p a r t , i n t h e commitments o f t h e use o f mental language. The c o m p l e x i t y o f the i s s u e seems t o be t o o g r e a t f o r t h e o r d i n a r y u s e r o f the language t o cope w i t h i n a s y s t e m a t i c manner, u n l e s s s/he be t r a i n e d i n some such d i s c i p l i n e as p h i l o s o p h y o r p s y c h o l o g y . As a r e s u l t t h e r e i s a g r e a t e r gap th a n i n t h e demon case between what commitments a r e i n v o l v e d i n t h e use o f mental language and what commitments a r e b e l i e v e d t o be i n v o l v e d , so t h a t t h e l a t t e r i s o n l y tenuous e v i d e n c e f o r t h e former. T h e r e f o r e R o r t y ' s c l a i m t h a t t h e concept o f mind i n v o l v e s a commitment t o i n c o r r i g i b i l i t y i s o n l y t e n u o u s l y s u p p o r t e d by the f a c t t h a t many o r most p e o p l e so c o n c e i v e o f t h e mind and i t s s t a t e s . I make t h e f u r t h e r s u p p o s i t i o n t h a t c o n c e p t u a l commitments a r i s e o u t o f t h e use o f language o n l y i n so f a r as language i s a communal o r i n t e r s u b j e c t i v e a c t i v i t y . Thus t h e b e l i e f s o f t h e p a r t i c u l a r u s e r about t h e r e f e r e n t s o f h e r / h i s terms do not on t h e i r own det e r m i n e what commitments a r e i n v o l v e d i n h e r / h i s use o f them. To t h e e x t e n t t h a t we sh a r e a language we share a c o n c e p t u a l scheme. Commitments a r i s e where p e o p l e agree i n t h e use o f language (where t h e i r usages c o a l e s c e ) r a t h e r t h a n where t h e y have t h e same b e l i e f s about t h e s e m a n t i c s o f t h e i r language, though t h e l a t t e r p l a c e may 37 be on the e v i d e n t i a l r o u t e t o t h e f o r m e r . 1 0 I w i l l not argue f o r t h i s s u p p o s i t i o n , nor t h e t h e o r y o f language i n w h i c h i t i s embedded, a t t h i s p o i n t ; I hope t o s u p p o r t i t by t h e p l a u s i b i l i t y o f t h e r e s u l t s i t y i e l d s i n a p p l i c a t i o n t o t h e p r o b l e m a t i c a t hand. I f t h e s u p p o s i t i o n i s c o r r e c t , t h e n , we can i g n o r e t h e l a c k o f consensus about what i t i s t o use m ental language, as a t h e o r e t i c a l p h y s i c i s t can i g n o r e t h e l a c k o f consensus about what i t i s t o use quantum-m e c h a n i c a l l a n g u a g e , 1 1 and c o n t i n u e our i n v e s t i g a t i o n i n t o what commitments a r e i n v o l v e d i n t h a t use, c o n c e i v e d as an i n t e r s u b j e c t i v e e n t e r p r i s e . I n any c a s e , d e s p i t e t h e d i f f i c u l t i e s i n v o l v e d i n s p e c i f y i n g t h e c o n c e p t u a l commitments of t h e use o f m ental language, i t seems c l e a r t h a t R o r t y must a p p e a l t o some such n o t i o n i n t h e defence o f h i s view. S i n c e a t t h e t i m e of w r i t i n g "Mind-Body I d e n t i t y , P r i v a c y and t h e C a t e g o r i e s " R o r t y 12 d i d not acknowledge t h i s p o i n t , i t would be w e l l f o r me t o examine t h e grounds he mentions t h e r e f o r p r e f e r r i n g e l i m i n a t i o n t o i d e n t i t y . These a r e , i n t h e case o f Xs b e i n g i d e n t i f i e d w i t h / r e p l a c e d by Ys ( R o r t y [10] p.184),: (A) The Y-laws must be b e t t e r a t e x p l a i n i n g t h e k i n d s o f phenomena e x p l a i n e d by t h e X-laws (not j u s t e q u a l l y good). Indeed, t h e y must be s u f f i c i e n t l y b e t t e r so t h a t t h e i n c o n v e n i e n c e o f  c h a n g i n g one's l i n g u i s t i c h a b i t s by c e a s i n g t o make  i n f e r e n t i a l r e p o r t s about Xs i s l e s s t h a n t h e i n c o n v e n i e n c e o f g o i n g t h r o u g h the r o u t i n e o f  t r a n s l a t i n g one's X - r e p o r t s i n t o Y - r e p o r t s i n o r d e r  t o get s a t i s f a c t o r y e x p l a n a t i o n s of the phenomena  i n q u e s t i o n . (B) E i t h e r Y - r e p o r t s may themselves be made non-i n f e r e n t i a l l y , or X - r e p o r t s may be t r e a t e d as r e p o r t s o f mental e n t i t i e s . For we must be a b l e t o have some answer t o t h e q u e s t i o n "What am I r e p o r t i n g when I n o n - i n f e r e n t i a l l y r e p o r t about an X?", and the o n l y answers a v a i l a b l e a r e "you're r e p o r t i n g on a Y" or "you're r e p o r t i n g on some mer e l y mental e n t i t y . " R o r t y proposes t h e s e o n l y as n e c e s s a r y c o n d i t i o n s o f the a d v i s a b i l i t y o f e l i m i n a t i o n over i d e n t i f i c a t i o n ; as such 13 t h e y a r e f a i r l y p l a u s i b l e . However, an argument f o r e l i m i n a t i o n r e q u i r e s s u f f i c i e n t c o n d i t i o n s , as R o r t y appears t o acknowledge i n w r i t i n g " I n c o r r i g i b i l i t y as t h e Mark of the M e n t a l " , and the s e cannot be s u p p l i e d by A and B. The main re a s o n f o r t h i s i s , I s u g g e s t , t h a t they i g n o r e t h e p o s s i b i l i t y t h a t c o n f r o n t e d by the s u p e r i o r i t y o f Y-laws t o X-laws we may t a k e the o p t i o n o f p r e s e r v i n g Xs by cha n g i n g the X-laws t o r e d r e s s the imb a l a n c e . T h i s i s mer e l y a s p e c i a l case of the s u r v i v a l of an e n t i t y t h r o u g h the r e s t r u c t u r i n g of b e l i e f s about i t . (See, f o r example, Putnam [23] f o r an a p p l i c a t i o n of t h i s n o t i o n t o t h e concept of a c i d . ) T h i s d i s c u s s i o n may appear t o be v i t i a t e d by the f a c t t h a t R o r t y admits t h a t (A) w i l l not be f u l f i l l e d i n the case of s e n s a t i o n s , b u t I do not t h i n k t h a t t h i s i s so. For t h i s a d m i s s i o n i s i n c o n s i s t e n t w i t h R o r t y s g e n e r a l view, s i n c e i t i n v o l v e s r e t r e a t i n g t o a p o s i t i o n (which R o r t y c a l l s " t r a d i t i o n a l m a t e r i a l i s m " ) w h i c h does not d i s t i n g u i s h between the i d e n t i t y t h e o r y and e l i m i n a t i v e m a t e r i a l i s m . I f a l l t h a t i s i m p o r t a n t t o m a t e r i a l i s m i s t h a t "at no g r e a t e r c o s t t h a n an i n c o n v e n i e n t l i n g u i s t i c r e f o r m , we c o u l d drop [ m e n t a l ] terms," t h e n m a t e r i a l i s m i s t r i v i a l , f o r any term c o u l d be dropped, i t might be argued, w i t h no g r e a t e r c o s t t h a n i n c o n v e n i e n c e . F u r t h e r m o r e , i t does not f o l l o w from a term's b e i n g dropped t h a t i t s r e f e r e n t does not e x i s t ; so i f we a r e t o t a k e R o r t y s e r i o u s l y as an e l i m i n a t i v e m a t e r i a l i s t , t h i s f o r m u l a t i o n o f t h e view he i s e x p r e s s i n g i s much t o o weak. And R o r t y does argue f o r t h e " d i s a p p e a r a n c e t h e o r y " . A second p o i n t t o n o t i c e about (A) i s t h a t s t r i c t l y i t w i l l not be f u l f i l l e d i f p e r f e c t c o r r e l a t i o n s a r e e s t a b l i s h e d between m e n t a l s t a t e s and b r a i n s t a t e s . As R o r t y says ( [ 1 1 ] p.423): I f such c o r r e l a t i o n s o c c u r r e d , e v e r y e x p l a n a t i o n i n terms o f mental s t a t e s would be i s o m o r p h i c t o an e x p l a n a t i o n i n terms o f n e u r a l s t a t e s , n e i t h e r mode of e x p l a n a t i o n b e i n g s i m p l e r o r more e l e g a n t o r more f r u i t f u l t h a n the o t h e r . I t would seem t h a t under t h e s e c o n d i t i o n s i t would not be c o n v e n i e n t t o e l i m i n a t e m e n t a l s t a t e s as opposed t o i d e n t i f y i n g them w i t h n e u r a l s t a t e s . However, t h e r e seems t o be an i n c o n s i s t e n c y i n R o r t y a t t h i s p o i n t , f o r i m m e d i a t e l y f o l l o w i n g t h e above passage he i n s i s t s t h a t t h e e x i s t e n c e o f c o r r e l a t i o n s i s a n e c e s s a r y c o n d i t i o n f o r t h e e l i m i n a t i o n o f mental s t a t e s ( v i a t h e o v e r t h r o w i n g o f i n c o r r i g i b i l i t y ) . T h i s echoes a f o o t n o t e i n t h e p r e v i o u s paper ( R o r t y [10] p . l 7 7 , f n . ) which makes t h e same c l a i m . The appearance o f i n c o n s i s t e n c y i s h e i g h t e n e d by t h e c o n c l u d i n g remarks i n t h e l a t t e r p aper, where R o r t y c l a i m s t h a t , g i v e n a p a r a l l e l i s m o f t h e form d e s c r i b e d above, " [ i ] n s i s t e n c e on t h e " i d e n t i t y " o f t h e mental and p h y s i c a l would seem t o be an u n n e c e s s a r y r h e t o r i c a l f l o u r i s h . " F o r i f t h e f l o u r i s h _is m e r e l y r h e t o r i c a l , t h e n i t i s i r r e l e v a n t whether i t be made o r n o t ; b u t t h i s i s t o say t h a t t h e r e i s no s i g n i f i c a n t d i f f e r e n c e between p a r a l l e l i s m and i d e n t i t y , i n w h i c h case p a r a l l e l i s m can h a r d l y be a n e c e s s a r y c o n d i t i o n o f t h e e l i m i n a t i v e a l t e r n a t i v e t o i d e n t i t y . I t seems t o me t h a t t h e b e s t r e a c t i o n f o r R o r t y would be t o drop t h e r e l i a n c e o f h i s view on p s y c h o p h y s i c a l c o r r e l a t i o n s , and t h i s i s t h e p o s i t i o n w h i c h I s h a l l c o n s i d e r him t o have t a k e n . A p a r t from b e i n g a way o u t o f t h e i n c o n s i s t e n c y o u t l i n e d above, t h i s move has o t h e r advantages. I t e n a b l e s R o r t y t o s i d e s t e p any o b j e c t i o n s , such as t h o s e o f Malcolm and Burge mentioned i n s e c t i o n ( b ) , w h i c h s t r e s s t h e overwhelming e m p i r i c a l l i k e l i h o o d o f i t s b e i n g i m p o s s i b l e f o r n e u r a l s c i e n c e t o come up w i t h t r u e c o r r e l a t i o n s o f t h e r e l e v a n t k i n d . T h i s i s a f u r t h e r way i n w h i c h th e t h u s -amended e l i m i n a t i v e view o f R o r t y i s s u p e r i o r t o t r a d i t i o n a l i d e n t i t y - t h e o r i e s , though o f c o u r s e t h e f a i l u r e o f p a r a l l e l i s m i s not s u f f i c i e n t f o r i t s j u s t i f i c a t i o n . I c o n c l u d e t h a t R o r t y 1 s i n i t i a l d i s c u s s i o n o f t h e demon an a l o g y does not p r o v i d e him w i t h s u f f i c i e n t grounds f o r j u s t i f y i n g h i s v e r s i o n o f e l i m i n a t i v e m a t e r i a l i s m . I f e l i m i n a t i o n i s t o be p r e f e r r e d t o i d e n t i f i c a t i o n t h i s must be because o f t h e c o n c e p t u a l commitments i n v o l v e d i n t h e e n t i t y -t o - b e - r e p l a c e d . I n t h e demon c a s e , i t seems t o me t h a t t h e r e a s o n f o r e l i m i n a t i n g demons i s t h e i r p o s s e s s i o n o f p r o p e r t i e s ( s i z e , personhood) i n c o m p a t i b l e w i t h t h e i r b e i n g germs. Whether t h e term "demon" s u r v i v e s i s a m a t t e r o f t h e c o n v e n i e n c e o f t h e w h o l e s a l e r e s t r u c t u r i n g o f b e l i e f s ; whether i f i t i s r e t a i n e d i t w i l l r e f e r t o t h e same t h i n g s seems more o f a foregone c o n c l u s i o n : i t w i l l not - i n s t e a d i t w i l l r e f e r t o germs. Whatever t h e m e r i t s o f t h e case I make h e r e f o r t h e e l i m i n a t i o n o f demons, i t seems t o be what R o r t y r e q u i r e s i n t h e mind/body c a s e , and what he commits h i m s e l f t o i n " I n c o r r i g i b i l i t y as t h e Mark o f t h e M e n t a l " . I t i s i m p o r t a n t t o n o t e , o f c o u r s e , t h a t even i f R o r t y were c o r r e c t i n h i s argument a g a i n s t t h e i d e n t i t y t h e o r y , t h i s 42 by i t s e l f would not e s t a b l i s h h i s view. I t seems t o me t h a t i t i s p o s s i b l e t h a t t h e p r e d i c a t e s "mental" and " p h y s i c a l " be i n c o m p a t i b l e i n t h e way R o r t y d e s i r e s , so t h a t n o t h i n g f a l l s under b o t h p r e d i c a t e s , and t h a t t h e r e e x i s t a complete p h y s i c a l ( n e u r o p h y s i o l o g i c a l ) e x p l a n a t i o n o f b e h a v i o u r , y e t t h a t m ental s t a t e s e x i s t . A u s e f u l comparison h e r e i s o f t h e mind/body case w i t h t h a t o f t h e r e l a t i o n between s t r u c t u r a l and f u n c t i o n a l (hardware and s o f t w a r e ) e x p l a n a t i o n s o f t h e b e h a v i o u r o f complex machines. I n an u n p u b l i s h e d paper [24] I argue t h a t what we have h e r e i s t h e e x i s t e n c e o f two p a r a l l e l c a u s a l e x p l a n a t i o n s which a r e not i n c o m p a t i b l e , d e s p i t e t h e f a c t t h a t i t may not be p l a u s i b l e t o i d e n t i f y f u n c t i o n a l w i t h s t r u c t u r a l s t a t e s . ( I do not argue t h i s p o i n t h e r e . ) A t t h e v e r y l e a s t i t seems p l a u s i b l e t o s uggest t h a t f u n c t i o n a l terms would have a p p l i c a t i o n whether o r not i d e n t i f i c a t i o n were p o s s i b l e , and t h e r e f o r e we a r e e n t i t l e d t o say t h a t f u n c t i o n a l s t a t e s e x i s t . So t o o do m e n t a l s t a t e s , i n my view. I t i s not i m p o r t a n t f o r me t o argue f o r t h i s v i e w i n the p r e s e n t c o n t e x t ; a l l t h a t i s n e c e s s a r y i s t h a t i t be a p o s s i b l e v i e w , f o r t h e n R o r t y w i l l need f u r t h e r argument i n o r d e r t o j u s t i f y h i s c l a i m t h a t t h e s u c c e s s o f n e u r o p h y s i o l o g y as an e x p l a n a t i o n o f b e h a v i o u r r e n d e r s i t r a t i o n a l t o deny the e x i s t e n c e o f m e n t a l s t a t e s . Thus I am i n c l i n e d t o suppose t h a t R o r t y i s committed t o something l i k e T h e s i s IV, whether or not he grounds the t h e o r e t i c a l i n c o m p a t i b i l i t y o f o r d i n a r y mental t a l k and n e u r o p h y s i o l o g y i n t h e a l l e g e d i n c o m p a t i b i l i t y between m e n t a l and p h y s i c a l , as I have supposed. R o r t y g i v e s us a s t o r y about how we might s t o p t a l k i n g about mental s t a t e s , b u t i t i s not a t a l l c l e a r how t h i s would impugn t h e i r e x i s t e n c e u n l e s s T h e s i s IV were t r u e . R o r t y h i m s e l f does not acknowledge t h a t t h e p a r a l l e l e x p l a n a t i o n s account i s p o s s i b l e . The o n l y a l t e r n a t i v e he o f f e r s t o e l i m i n a t i o n o r i d e n t i f i c a t i o n i s , i n t h e demon c a s e , the p o s s i b i l i t y o f a t t r i b u t i n g d i s e a s e t o "the compresence o f demons and germs", and he p o i n t s o u t , p r o b a b l y c o r r e c t l y , t h a t t h i s t a c t i c f a l l s t o Ockham's Razor. But t h i s i s not t h e a l t e r n a t i v e I have s u g g e s t e d , as s h o u l d be c l e a r . I s h a l l r e t u r n t o t h e assessment o f T h e s i s IV i n Chapter 4. (e) S t r a t e g y o f t h e A t t a c k I n C h apter 3 I t a c k l e R o r t y 1 s use o f t h e n o t i o n o f i n c o r r i g i b i l i t y i n s u p p o r t o f h i s view. I s h a l l d i s t i n g u i s h between t h e " d i s a p p e a r a n c e " and " n o n - e x i s t e n c e " forms o f t h i s view, and e x p l a i n why I g i v e prominence t o t h e l a t t e r . I s h a l l argue t h a t ( i ) mental a s c r i p t i o n s ( f i r s t - p e r s o n , p r e s e n t - t e n s e e t c . ) a r e not i n c o r r i g i b l e i n R o r t y 1 s sense, nor i n t h e t r a d i t i o n a l s ense; ( i i ) R o r t y ' s form o f i n c o r r i g i b i l i t y f a i l s t o d i s t i n g u i s h between m e n t a l and p h y s i c a l , i n t h a t i t a p p l i e s t o some p h y s i c a l a s c r i p t i o n s ; ( i i i ) even i f R o r t y 1 s form o f i n c o r r i g i b i l i t y were th e mark of t h e m e n t a l , i t c o u l d not ground t h e c a t e g o r i a l i n c o m p a t i b i l i t y between m e n t a l and p h y s i c a l w h i c h he seems t o r e q u i r e ; t h e r e f o r e T h e s i s V I I i s f a l s e . H aving t r e a t e d t h e argument i n f a v o u r o f R o r t y 1 s view, I move on t o a c o n s i d e r a t i o n o f t o what e x t e n t t h e v i e w a c c o u n t s f o r t h e phenomena o f mental d i s c o u r s e , a s s e s s i n g i t now i n terms o f i t s e x p l a n a t o r y v a l u e . R o r t y h i m s e l f d i s t i n g u i s h e s two r o l e s o f m e n t a l language, t h e e x p l a n a t o r y and t h e r e p o r t i n g u s e s , t h e r e p l a c e m e n t o f w h i c h i s a n e c e s s a r y p a r t o f t h e e l i m i n a t i o n o f t h e m e n t a l . I suggest t h a t t h i s i s a p a r t i a l view. I n C hapter 4 I argue t h a t r e a s o n - e x p l a n a t i o n s a r e d i s t i n c t from, though r e l a t e d t o , c a u s a l e x p l a n a t i o n s and t h a t t h e y pose a pr o b l e m f o r t h e i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f men t a l c o n c e p t s as t h e o r e t i c a l , t h i s n o t i o n b e i n g f i r s t e x p l a i n e d . A d i s c u s s i o n o f t h e s i g n i f i c a n c e o f t h i s p r o b l e m f o r R o r t y 1 s view i s postponed u n t i l C h apter 6, except t h a t h e r e I adduce some reasons f o r d o u b t i n g T h e s i s IV. In C h apter 5 I d i s c u s s t h e r e p o r t i n g r o l e o f mental language, a r g u i n g t h a t ( i ) R o r t y ' s s u p p o s i t i o n t h a t mental r e p o r t s can be c o n s t r u e d as r e p o r t s about b r a i n - s t a t e s i s f a l s e ; ( i i ) i n so f a r as mental r e p o r t s a r e i n c o r r i g i b l e , t h i s cannot be ac c o u n t e d f o r on R o r t y ' s ( S e l l a r s i a n ) v i e w ; ( i i i ) R o r t y has f a i l e d t o s u p p l y adequate s u p p o r t f o r T h e s i s VI (and hence f o r T h e s i s V ) ; ( i v ) t h i s removes a l a r g e p a r t o f t h e j u s t i f i c a t i o n f o r b e l i e v i n g T h e s i s I I I . In C h apter 6 I l o o k a t n o n - c o n s t a t i v e uses o f mental language, and t h e e x i s t e n t i a l commitments t h e y i n v o l v e , as w e l l as t h e c a u s a l commitments i n v o l v e d i n r e a s o n - e x p l a n a t i o n s (as d e s c r i b e d i n Chapter 4) . I argue t h a t ( i ) as a r e s u l t o f the e x i s t e n c e o f t h e s e uses o f mental language T h e s i s I I i s q u e s t i o n a b l e , i f not f a l s e , and so i s T h e s i s I ; ( i i ) even i f we a l l o w T h e s i s I I , i t i s by no means c l e a r t h a t t h e uses d e s c r i b e d above can be accommodated by n e u r a l t a l k ( i n p a r t i c u l a r , t h e a d o p t i o n o f n e u r a l t a l k w i l l n e c e s s i t a t e s i g n i f i c a n t changes i n t h e s t r u c t u r e o f our systems o f moral j u s t i f i c a t i o n ) ; ( i i i ) hence, whether o r not we s h o u l d use mental language i s not m e r e l y a m a t t e r o f t h e o r e t i c a l s u p e r i o r i t y c o u p l e d w i t h l i n g u i s t i c c o n v e n i e n c e ; ( i v ) i t would be r a t i o n a l t o m a i n t a i n t h e use o f mental language f o r t h e f u n c t i o n s d e s c r i b e d above; (v) t h e s e uses commit one t o t h e e x i s t e n c e o f mental s t a t e s (though t h i s i s f a i r l y t r i v i a l g i v e n t h e f a l s i t y o f T h e s i s V I ) ; ( v i ) t h e r e f o r e , T h e s i s V i s f a l s e . I n C h apter 7 I s h a l l summarise t h e argument and draw my f i n a l c o n c l u s i o n s about R o r t y 1 s view. I s h a l l be s a t i s f i e d t h a t I have d e a l t a d e q u a t e l y w i t h i t s main t h r u s t i f I can e s t a b l i s h t h a t T h e s i s V i s i n d e e d f a l s e . I pass on now t o t h e f i r s t s t e p i n t h i s p l a n . F o o t n o t e s t o Chapter 2 1. Throughout t h i s e ssay I use t h e terms "mental s t a t e s " and " b r a i n - s t a t e s " w i t h o u t r e g a r d t o t h e d i s t i n c t i o n between s t a t e s , p r o c e s s e s , e v e n t s , even p r o p e r t i e s , e x c e p t where one o r more o f t h e s e d i s t i n c t i o n s becomes i m p o r t a n t i n the c o n s i d e r a t i o n o f some p a r t i c u l a r view. Thus a c r e a t u r e i s i n some mental s t a t e whenever some mental p r e d i c a t e i s t r u e o f i t - I l e a v e open f o r now t h e q u e s t i o n o f what q u a l i f i e s as a mental p r e d i c a t e . 2. L e w i s ' view i s a c t u a l l y more s o p h i s t i c a t e d t h a n t h i s s i n c e some o f t h e laws w h i c h b i n d mental s t a t e s i n v o l v e c a u s a l c o n n e c t i o n s between mental s t a t e s . Smart's and Armstrong's c o n s i d e r e d views seem t o d i f f e r from h i s o n l y i n emphasis. 3. The o n l y improvement o f major s i g n i f i c a n c e w h i c h c o u l d u s e f u l l y be made t o L e w i s ' v e r s i o n i s t h e i n c o r p o r a t i o n o f Thomas Nag e l ' s [16] s u g g e s t i o n t h a t p s y c h o p h y s i c a l i d e n t i t i e s s h o u l d be c o n s i d e r e d t o h o l d not between s t a t e s b u t between f a c t s . I do not b e l i e v e t h a t t h i s amendment would g r e a t l y a l t e r t h e s u b s t a n c e o f my comments on t h e c o n t i n g e n t i d e n t i t y t h e o r y . 4. The s i t u a t i o n i s a c t u a l l y more c o m p l i c a t e d t h a n t h i s . See t h e d i s c u s s i o n o f d i f f e r e n t senses o f " r e f e r " i n C h a p t e r 5. 5. As R o r t y [11] p u t s i t : . ..the sense o f i d e n t i t y i n q u e s t i o n i s t h e sense i n w h i c h [ c a l o r i c ] i s i d e n t i c a l w i t h ( i s r e p l a c e d by, i s e l i m i n a t e d i n f a v o u r o f ) t h e k i n e t i c m o tion o f m o l e c u l e s , (p.401) (I i n s e r t " c a l o r i c " i n p l a c e o f " p h l o g i s t o n " because t h e l a t t e r n o t i o n , though i t had a r o l e i n former e x p l a n a t i o n s o f combustion, was o n l y a r g u a b l y r e l e v a n t t o t h e m a t t e r o f h e a t c o n t e n t . ) A l t h o u g h i t seems t o me t h a t t h e r e i s no such sense o f " i d e n t i t y " , t h a t i s m o s t l y a v e r b a l m a t t e r : i t does seem t o be a r e s u l t o f modern t h e o r y o f h e a t t h a t c a l o r i c (and p h l o g i s t o n ) do not e x i s t , and I f i n d i t odd t h a t someone s h o u l d w i s h t o i d e n t i f y t h e k i n e t i c m o t i o n o f m o l e c u l e s w i t h something w h i c h does not e x i s t , a t l e a s t i n t h e absence o f some s t r o n g j u s t i f i c a t i o n f o r t h e a n a l o g y t h e r e b y s u g g e s t e d between rep l a c e m e n t and s t r i c t L e i b n i z i a n i d e n t i t y . These t h o u g h t s , however, l e a v e the r e a l i s s u e s untouched . 6. T h i s f o r m u l a t i o n i s ambiguous. The c l a i m might be tha t when mental r e p o r t s cease to be regarded as immune to c h a l l e n g e mental s t a t e s w i l l cease to e x i s t , or t h a t when t h i s happens they w i l l be d i s c o v e r e d never to have e x i s t e d . Throughout t h i s essay I g i v e prominence to the second of these a l t e r n a t i v e s , f o r reasons which w i l l be e x p l a i n e d i n the f o l l o w i n g c h a p t e r . R o r t y [11] h i m s e l f t h i n k s t h e r e i s n o t h i n g to choose between them, but I argue l a t e r t h a t t h i s i s i n c o r r e c t . 7. Here I a p p e a l to some ideas (about meaning and c o n c e p t u a l change) which I c u l l from W i t t g e n s t e i n . See f o r example W i t t g e n s t e i n [5] ## 79 and 87, though these passages are s u b j e c t to o t h e r i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s . 8. At t h i s p o i n t i t may be worth w h i l e to i n q u i r e i n t o the f e a s i b i l i t y o f a w i t c h - d o c t o r ' s r e j e c t i n g the germ-theory and c l i n g i n g i n s t e a d to the t r a d i t i o n a l v iew. T h i s s tance would c o r r e s p o n d , p e r h a p s , t o d u a l i s m or phenomenalism i n the p h i l o s o p h y of mind . R o r t y ' s s u p p o s i t i o n i s t h a t i t would be i r r a t i o n a l to r e j e c t the new t h e o r y i f i t p r o v i d e d b e t t e r p r e d i c t i o n and c o n t r o l of d i s e a s e , a lon g w i t h an e x p l a n a t i o n of the o b s e r v a t i o n s which are taken to suppor t the o l d t h e o r y . The l a t t e r i s a c c o m p l i s h e d not indeed by the new t h e o r y i t s e l f but by another p a r t o f the more g e n e r a l m e d i c a l v i e w p o i n t i n which i t i s embedded, i n t h i s case psychopharmacology , s i n c e the a c c u s a t i o n i s made t h a t the a l l e g e d s i g h t i n g s of demons are mere ly the p r o d u c t s of h a l l u c i n a t i o n . Of c o u r s e , such an a c c u s a t i o n i s h a r d l y l i k e l y to c o n v i n c e any w i t c h - d o c t o r who has h i s / h e r w i t s about h i m / h e r , s i n c e s /he can p a r r y i t w i t h the c l a i m t h a t the s c i e n t i s t s h a l l u c i n a t e through t h e i r m i c r o s c o p e s , or i f the concept o f h a l l u c i n a t i o n i s not a v a i l a b l e to h i m / h e r , at l e a s t s /he can c l a i m demonaic p o s s e s s i o n ! U l t i m a t e l y , I suppose , the coherence o f the s c i e n t i s t s ' posses sed r a n t i n g s w i l l s e t t l e the i s s u e i n t h e i r f a v o u r . 9. The d i r e c t i o n h i n t e d a t by Hooker [21] as p o s s i b l e f o r a t h e o r y o f r e t e n t i o n / r e p l a c e m e n t seems not to be a p p l i c a b l e to e i t h e r of the p r e s e n t c a s e s , a s , on the s u r f a c e at l e a s t , i t r e q u i r e s t h a t the o l d and new t h e o r i e s be f o r m u l a b l e i n the mathemat ica l s c i e n c e s . (See p p . 2 2 3 - 4 . ) Perhaps some analogue of h i s s u g g e s t i o n c o u l d be c o n s t r u c t e d f o r the mind/body case - I cannot t e l l ye t whether t h i s would be consonant w i t h or i n c o n f l i c t w i t h the view I am h e r e e n d o r s i n g and a t t r i b u t i n g to R o r t y . 10. These v e r y g e n e r a l remarks must be q u a l i f i e d , f o r t h e y do not a p p l y a t t h e b o r d e r s o f our c o n c e p t u a l f i e l d where t h e c r e a t i v e development o f our c o n c e p t s i s o f t e n i n t h e hands o f a few o r even o f one; however, mental c o n c e p t s have been s u f f i c i e n t l y i n c o r p o r a t e d f o r t h i s s u b t l e t y t o be i g n o r e d . 11. I have i n mind t h e o p p o s i t i o n between t h e Copenhagen and o t h e r i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s o f quantum mechanics. 12. That R o r t y d i d e v e n t u a l l y come t o r e l y on t h i s argument i s e v i d e n c e d by ( i ) h i s use o f t h e n o t i o n o f i n c o r r i g i b i l i t y i n " I n c o r r i g i b i l i t y as t h e Mark o f t h e M e n t a l " - see my f o o t n o t e 9 t o Theses VI and V I I i n Chapter 1 - and ( i i ) h i s a d m i s s i o n , i n a l e t t e r t o R i c h a r d S i k o r a - see S i k o r a [22] p . l 9 2 , f n . -, t h a t t h i s i s t h e c a s e . 13. I have some q u a r r e l w i t h ( B ) . The second a l t e r n a t i v e , t h a t X - r e p o r t s may be t r e a t e d as r e p o r t s o f mental e n t i t i e s , has no a p p l i c a t i o n t o s c i e n t i f i c advances o u t s i d e t h e demon anal o g y and c o n f u s e s h a l l u c i n a t i o n s w i t h t h e i r c o n t e n t s . R e p o r t s o f demons a r e not r e p o r t s on h a l l u c i n a t i o n s - t h e y a r e r e p o r t s on n o t h i n g . T h i s a l t e r n a t i v e , i n t h e case o f mental s t a t e s , a l s o c o u l d o f f e r no e x p l a n a t i o n o f second- and t h i r d -p e r s o n r e p o r t s o f mental s t a t e s . C l e a r l y t h e f i r s t a l t e r n a t i v e i s t h e o n l y one p l a u s i b l e , and a d i s c u s s i o n o f R o r t y 1 s a p p e a l t o t h e i d e a o f n o n - i n f e r e n t i a l r e p o r t i n g on b r a i n - s t a t e s w i l l be found i n Chapter 5. I n r e l a t i o n t o (A) I s h o u l d mention t h a t w h i l e I s h o u l d r e s i s t t he n o t i o n t h a t g e n e r a l i s a t i o n s about mental s t a t e s a r e laws i n a s c i e n t i f i c a l l y r i g o r o u s sense, I s h a l l a l l o w t h i s mode o f e x p r e s s i o n t o R o r t y f o r t h e sake o f argument. Chapter 3; I n c o r r i g i b i l i t y and I n c o m p a t i b i l i t y (a) D i s a p p e a r a n c e v e r s u s N o n - e x i s t e n c e As I noted i n Chapter 2, s e c t i o n ( b ) , R o r t y ( [ 1 1 ] p.421-2) t h i n k s t h e r e a re two p o s s i b l e s c e n a r i o s f o r t h e o v e r t h r o w i n g o f t h e i n c o r r i g i b i l i t y o f c e r t a i n m ental r e p o r t s w hich would j u s t i f y h i s v e r s i o n o f e l i m i n a t i v e m a t e r i a l i s m . B e f o r e I examine h i s arguments i n f a v o u r o f t h e r e l e v a n c e o f i n c o r r i g i b i l i t y t o t h e mind/body problem, I w i s h t o e x p l a i n why, f i n d i n g one o f t h e s e s c e n a r i o s much more p l a u s i b l e t h a n th e o t h e r , I g i v e i t prominence i n t h e e n s u i n g d i s c u s s i o n . The two p o s s i b i l i t i e s a r e ( i ) t h a t when c e r e b r o s c o p e s come t o be used t o o v e r r i d e s i n c e r e f i r s t - p e r s o n p r e s e n t - t e n s e mental r e p o r t s , t h e s t a t e s t h u s r e p o r t e d on w i l l , l o s i n g t h e i r i n c o r r i g i b l e s t a t u s , cease t o be m e n t a l , and ( i i ) t h a t when mental r e p o r t s cease t o be i n c o r r i g i b l e , i t w i l l have been d i s c o v e r e d t h a t t h e r e a r e no me n t a l s t a t e s (nor ever were). The second a l t e r n a t i v e i s t h e one o u t l i n e d i n "Mind-Body I d e n t i t y , P r i v a c y and t h e C a t e g o r i e s " and i s , I w i s h t o argue, much more p l a u s i b l e t h a n t h e f i r s t . My r e a s o n s f o r t h i s a r e as f o l l o w s : f i r s t , even though on t h e f i r s t a l t e r n a t i v e m ental s t a t e s would l o s e t h e i r s t a t u s as m e n t a l , t h e y would c o n t i n u e t o e x i s t , t h a t i s t o say, s e n s a t i o n s , t h o u g h t s , b e l i e f s , emotions and so on would e x i s t though t h e y would not m e r i t t h e e p i t h e t "mental". To an opponent such as m y s e l f o f t h e e l i m i n a t i o n o f m e n t a l s t a t e s t h e l o s s o f t h i s word seems a s m a l l p r i c e t o pay f o r t h e c o n t i n u e d e x i s t e n c e o f t h o s e s t a t e s 1^ To p u t t h e p o i n t l e s s d r a m a t i c a l l y , i t i s h a r d t o see how t h i s s c e n a r i o c o n s t i t u t e s t h e e l i m i n a t i o n o f mental s t a t e s from t h e o n t o l o g y o f t h e u n i v e r s e , as opposed m e r e l y t o t h e i r r e d e s c r i p t i i o n . To r e g a r d t h e f i r s t a l t e r n a t i v e as v i a b l e i s t o r e g a r d e l i m i n a t i v e m a t e r i a l i s m as an e p i s t e m o l o g i c a l t h e s i s (concerned m e r e l y w i t h t h e o v e r t h r o w o f i n c o r r i g i b i l i t y ) as opposed t o an o n t o l o g i c a l one, and t h i s seems i n c o r r e c t . Second, i f m e n t a l i t y i s a temporary s t a t u s , i t i s h a r d t o see how t h i s s t a t u s c o n s t i t u t e s t h e c a t e g o r i a l gap which R o r t y seems t o r e q u i r e between mental and p h y s i c a l . Suppose t h a t w i t h t h e advent o f c e r e b r o s c o p e s p e o p l e l e a r n t o s e l f - a s c r i b e n e u r a l s t a t e s , b u t t h a t t h e y never need t o be c o r r e c t e d , o r a t l e a s t t h a t t h e p r a c t i c e comes i n t o b e i n g o f never q u e s t i o n i n g t h e s e a s c r i p t i o n s . A c c o r d i n g t o R o r t y 1 s c l a i m t h a t such i n c o r r i g i b i l i t y i s t h e mark o f t h e m e n t a l , i t would seem t h a t under t h e s e c o n d i t i o n s n e u r a l s t a t e s w i l l have become m e n t a l ; y e t i t seems u n d e n i a b l e t h a t t h e y a r e p h y s i c a l 2 s t a t e s a l s o . T h i s i s not however a l l o w e d by R o r t y ' s g e n e r a l views about t h e o p p o s i t i o n between mental and p h y s i c a l , and f o r the sake o f c o n s i s t e n c y he must r e j e c t the f i r s t a l t e r n a t i v e i n favour o f the second . T h i s , t h e n , i s my j u s t i f i c a t i o n f o r r e g a r d i n g the second a l t e r n a t i v e which R o r t y o f f e r s as the r e p r e s e n t a t i v e of h i s views i n the d i s c u s s i o n which f o l l o w s . Where p o s s i b l e , I s h a l l t r y to i n d i c a t e whether my arguments a g a i n s t h i s views a r t i c u l a t e d i n accordance w i t h t h i s o p t i o n are r e l e v a n t to the r e j e c t e d i n t e r p r e t a t i o n , even though t h i s appears i n c o n s i s t e n t w i t h R o r t y ' s more g e n e r a l v i ews . I b e g i n by a r g u i n g t h a t mental r e p o r t s o f the r e l e v a n t k i n d are not i n c o r r i g i b l e i n the sense o u t l i n e d by R o r t y , nor i n the t r a d i t i o n a l " l o g i c a l " sense . (b) R o r t y ' s Form o f I n c o r r i g i b i l i t y The sense i n which R o r t y [11] b e l i e v e s c e r t a i n m ental r e p o r t s t o be i n c o r r i g i b l e , and t h i s i n c o r r i g i b i l i t y t o be t h e mark o f t h e mental out o f w h i c h a r i s e s t h e fundamental g u l f between t h e me n t a l and the p h y s i c a l , i s a r e i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f the o r i g i n a l n o t i o n . B a s i c a l l y , he s h i e s away from t h e i d e a of l o g i c a l i n c o r r i g i b i l i t y (see R o r t y [11] pp.414-5) w h i c h has h i s t o r i c a l l y been a s s o c i a t e d w i t h e x p e r i e n t i a l r e p o r t s , and f o r good r e a s o n : f o r i f e x p e r i e n t i a l r e p o r t s a r e thus i n c o r r i g i b l e , any s i n c e r e ones w i l l be t r u e , and i t i s h a r d t o see how R o r t y c o u l d r e c o n c i l e t h i s w i t h h i s b e l i e f t h a t 3 p o s s i b l y t h e r e a r e no mental i t e m s , e x p e r i e n c e s e t c . . I n s t e a d he uses a sense o f " i n c o r r i g i b l e " i n which some s e t o f r e p o r t s i s i n c o r r i g i b l e i f t h e r e a r e no a c c e p t e d p r o c e d u r e s , i n some l i n g u i s t i c community, a t some t i m e , f o r o v e r t h r o w i n g them. The d i f f i c u l t y h e r e i s t h a t t h i s d e f i n i t i o n appears t o l e t i n as i n c o r r i g i b l e much t h a t i s not m e n t a l , f o r t h e ph r a s e "no a c c e p t e d p r o c e d u r e s " i s somewhat vague. I n v a r i o u s d i f f e r e n t senses o f i t , t h e r e a r e , f o r example, no a c c e p t e d p r o c e d u r e s f o r o v e r t h r o w i n g a p e r s o n ' s r e p o r t t h a t s/he spoke w i t h God y e s t e r d a y , t h a t s/he has i n d i g e s t i o n o r i s c o n s t i p a t e d , b u t we would not say t h a t t h e s e r e p o r t s were o f mental e v e n t s . I n a s o c i e t y w i t h a t o t a l taboo on nakedness, t h e r e might be no a c c e p t e d p r o c e d u r e s f o r d i s p u t i n g p e r s o n s 1 d e s c r i p t i o n s o f t h e i r own b o d i e s . I f i t i s r e p l i e d t h a t i n such cases t h e r e always c o u l d be such p r o c e d u r e s , i t might be worth n o t i n g t h a t t h i s sounds l i k e a r e l a p s e towards the n o t i o n o f l o g i c a l i n c o r r i g i b i l i t y . R o r t y owes us an account of the l i m i t s o f a c c e p t a b i l i t y , i n t h e sense w h i c h he t h i n k s i s h e r e r e l e v a n t , b e f o r e we can judge whether o r not h i s d e f i n i t i o n i s t o o b r o a d . I b e l i e v e t h a t i t would not be p o s s i b l e f o r any such account t o d e a l a d e q u a t e l y w i t h t h e t h e o l o g i c a l example, i n any c a s e , and so am l e d t o c o n c l u d e t h a t i n d e e d i t i s t o o b r o a d . On t h e o t h e r s i d e o f t h e c o i n , R . I . S i k o r a [22] has p o i n t e d o u t t h a t t h e r e a r e a c c e p t e d p r o c e d u r e s f o r o v e r t h r o w i n g p e o p l e ' s c l a i m s t o be p e r c e i v i n g a f t e r - i m a g e s w i t h a c e r t a i n number o f s i d e s . I t appears t h a t R o r t y ' s d e f i n i t i o n o f i n c o r r i g i b i l i t y p e r i s h e s between t h e S c y l l a o f e x c e s s i v e narrowness and t h e C h a r y b d i s o f e x c e s s i v e b r e a d t h . In r e s ponse t o t h e above c r i t i c i s m by S i k o r a , R o r t y d i d amend h i s n o t i o n o f i n c o r r i g i b i l i t y [ 2 5 ] , b u t a t a p r i c e , as S i k o r a [26] has argued i n r e b u t t a l . A c c o r d i n g t o S i k o r a ' s o r i g i n a l counter-example we would o v e r r u l e someone's c l a i m t o be h a v i n g a f o u r t e e n - s i d e d (say) a f t e r - i m a g e i f we knew t h a t the p h y s i c a l o b j e c t which caused t h e a f t e r - i m a g e had (say) o n l y t h i r t e e n s i d e s . R o r t y a dmits t h i s b u t i n s i s t s t h a t i f the s u b j e c t p e r s i s t e d i n t h e c l a i m t h a t t h e a f t e r - i m a g e had f o u r t e e n s i d e s , we s h o u l d e v e n t u a l l y be f o r c e d t o a c c e p t t h e c l a i m and t o d e c l a r e a f a u l t i n h e r / h i s v i s u a l " a p p a r a t u s " o r i n t h e t h e o r y e x p l a i n i n g t h e o c c u r r e n c e o f a f t e r - i m a g e s . T h i s " r e p e a t e d r e p o r t " form o f i n c o r r i g i b i l i t y i s t h e one w h i c h R o r t y , i n t h e end, c o n s i d e r s t o be d i s t i n c t i v e o f t h e m e n t a l . As S i k o r a p o i n t s out [ 2 6 ] , however, t h e s c e n a r i o w h i c h i s h e r e supposed t o persuade us t h a t m ental r e p o r t s o f t h e r e l e v a n t k i n d a r e i n c o r r i g i b l e i n some sense i s p r e c i s e l y t h a t w h i c h , a c c o r d i n g t o R o r t y [ 1 1 ] , would be r e q u i r e d t o o v e r t h r o w th e i d e a t h a t t h e r e e x i s t s t a t e s w h i c h can be r e p o r t e d on i n c o r r i g i b l y , e x c e p t t h a t t h e d e c i s i o n t o f a v o u r r e p o r t o ver t h e o r y i s a r b i t r a r i l y r e v e r s e d . R o r t y 1 s a t t e m p t t o make the i n c o r r i g i b i l i t y c r i t e r i o n o f t h e m e n t a l p l a u s i b l e e a t s away d i r e c t l y a t t h e p l a u s i b i l i t y o f h i s c l a i m t h a t m ental r e p o r t s w i l l cease t o be i n c o r r i g i b l e a t some s t a g e i n t h e development o f n e u r a l t e c h n o l o g y . I t seems t o me, t h e n , t h a t t h i s exchange between R o r t y and S i k o r a , as w e l l as t h e c o n s i d e r a t i o n s I mention a t t h e b e g i n n i n g o f t h i s s e c t i o n , t o g e t h e r r e f u t e t h e c l a i m t h a t t h e i n c o r r i g i b i l i t y ( i n e i t h e r o f R o r t y ' s senses) o f c e r t a i n mental r e p o r t s i s d i s t i n c t i v e o f them and them a l o n e , and t h e r e f o r e t h a t R o r t y has no s u p p o r t f o r h i s f u r t h e r c l a i m t h a t i n c o r r i g i b i l i t y , b e i n g the ground o f t h e a l l e g e d i n c o m p a t i b i l i t y between mental and p h y s i c a l , can be used t o j u s t i f y e l i m i n a t i n g m ental s t a t e s . F u r t h e r m o r e , even i f t h e r e were no counter-examples t o t h e a p p l i c a t i o n o f R o r t y ' s n o t i o n of i n c o r r i g i b i l i t y , h i s argument would s t i l l not be s u c c e s s f u l . The pr o b l e m i s t h a t t h e e x i s t e n c e o f t h e " e m p i r i c a l " form o f i n c o r r i g i b i l i t y i s t o o weak a b a s i s upon which t o found t h e i n c o m p a t i b i l i t y o f mental and p h y s i c a l : from t h e mere f a c t t h a t some r e p o r t s a r e not q u e s t i o n e d i t does not f o l l o w t h a t t h e y cannot be about p h y s i c a l e n t i t i e s . ( I f , f o r example, i t became t h e p r a c t i c e n o t t o q u e s t i o n remarks made by Prime M i n i s t e r s , t h i s would not mean, a l a s , t h a t a r e p o r t o f c r u i s e m i s s i l e t e s t i n g i n A l b e r t a made by B r i a n Mulroney would be a r e p o r t about m e r e l y m e n t a l e v e n t s . ) Perhaps t h i s i s t a c i t l y a d m i t t e d by R o r t y a t t h o s e p o i n t s a t whi c h he i s i n c l i n e d t o e x p r e s s h i s view ( p a r a d o x i c a l l y ) as the view t h a t mental s t a t e s w i l l cease t o e x i s t when mental r e p o r t s cease t o be ( t r e a t e d as) i n c o r r i g i b l e . I d i s c u s s e d t h i s o p t i o n i n s e c t i o n (a) o f t h e p r e s e n t c h a p t e r . I c o n c l u d e t h a t R o r t y ' s way o f a r g u i n g f o r T h e s i s V I I does not and c o u l d not work. There i s no l o g i c a l c o n n e c t i o n between i n c o r r i g i b i l i t y (as he means i t ) and t h e i n c o m p a t i b i l i t y o f me n t a l and p h y s i c a l . Hence, as R o r t y i n t e n d s T h e s i s V I I t o be t a k e n , i t i s f a l s e . I n Chapter 5 I s h a l l make some f u r t h e r remarks about t h e r e l a t i o n s h i p between what I c a l l t h e t h e o r e t i c a l i s t a s p e c t o f R o r t y ' s view and h i s t r e a t m e n t o f i n c o r r i g i b i l i t y i n an attempt t o show t h a t t h e l a t t e r cannot be encompassed w i t h i n a t h e o r e t i c a l i s t framework. F o r now I am c o n t e n t t o r e f u t e h i s a c t u a l argument. (c) T r a d i t i o n a l Forms o f I n c o r r i g i b i l i t y By way o f a d i g r e s s i o n , I w i s h t o add a few comments on t h e t r a d i t i o n a l a ccount o f i n c o r r i g i b i l i t y . A c c o r d i n g t o t h i s n o t i o n , as found, say, i n D e s c a r t e s , i t f o l l o w s from A's b e i n g i n p a i n t h a t s/he knows s/he i s i n p a i n , and t h e r e f o r e t h a t i f s/he says s/he i s not i n p a i n ( i n some language w h i c h s/he u n d e r s t a n d s ) , t h e n s/he i s l y i n g , o r a t l e a s t a t t e m p t i n g t o d e c e i v e : i t i s l o g i c a l l y i n c o n c e i v a b l e t h a t A s h o u l d be i n p a i n and not know i t . I do not t h i n k t h a t t h i s c l a i m i s v i a b l e , f o r i f we had s t r o n g e v i d e n c e o f a n e u r o p h y s i o l o g i c a l k i n d f o r A's b e i n g i n p a i n , and a w e l l - s u p p o r t e d n e u r a l t h e o r y o f p a i n , we c o u l d o v e r r u l e A's o b v i o u s l y s i n c e r e r e p o r t t h a t 4 s/he i s not i n p a i n . I t i s i m p o r t a n t t o note t h a t t h i s o b j e c t i o n does not r e s t on any form o f t h e i d e n t i t y t h e o r y ; i t m e r e l y presupposes some w e l l - e s t a b l i s h e d c o r r e l a t i o n s between p e o p l e ' s b e i n g i n p a i n and t h e i r b r a i n s ' b e i n g i n a c e r t a i n s t a t e . The " l o g i c a l " form o f i n c o r r i g i b i l i t y i s a l s o open t o S i k o r a ' s " a f t e r - i m a g e " o b j e c t i o n , though t h i s i s , as i n t e n d e d , more l i m i t e d i n scope t h a n mine above. W h i l e i t i s more p l a u s i b l e t o suppose t h a t t h e e x i s t e n c e o f t h i s form o f i n c o r r i g i b i l i t y would b e t o k e n some k i n d o f deep i n c o m p a t i b i l i t y between m e n t a l and p h y s i c a l , I have a l r e a d y noted t h a t R o r t y cannot a p p e a l t o t h i s n o t i o n , f o r i f t h e r e are i n t h i s sense i n c o r r i g i b l e r e p o r t s o f mental s t a t e s , i t f o l l o w s t h a t t h e r e a r e mental s t a t e s , and t h i s i s i n c o n s i s t e n t w i t h T h e s i s I I I . T r a d i t i o n a l forms o f i n c o r r i g i b i l i t y a r e th e n o f l i m i t e d r e l e v a n c e t o t h e p r e s e n t p r o b l e m a t i c . (d) The C r i t e r i a l Form o f I n c o r r i g i b i l i t y B e f o r e I go on w i t h t h e argument a g a i n s t R o r t y 1 s view I w i s h t o r e c o r d t h e f a c t t h a t I do b e l i e v e t h a t c e r t a i n m ental r e p o r t s a r e i n c o r r i g i b l e i n a c e r t a i n sense, though t h i s may not be as s i g n i f i c a n t as was o r i g i n a l l y t h o u g h t . I p r e f e r t o e x p r e s s t h e c l a i m t h a t i n c o r r i g i b i l i t y i s a f e a t u r e o f f i r s t -p e r s o n p r e s e n t - t e n s e mental r e p o r t s ( t h e i n c o r r i g i b i l i t y t h e s i s ) i n W i t t g e n s t e i n i a n f a s h i o n ; i t t h e n r e f e r s t o t h e f o l l o w i n g mesh o f c r i t e r i a l r e l a t i o n s h i p s : ( i ) s a y i n g t h a t one i s i n p a i n i s a c r i t e r i o n o f b e i n g i n p a i n ; ( i i ) s a y i n g t h a t one i s not i n p a i n i s a c r i t e r i o n o f not b e i n g i n p a i n ; ( i i i ) t h e r e a re c e r t a i n n o n - v e r b a l b e h a v i o u r a l c r i t e r i a f o r b e i n g i n p a i n ; ( i v ) t h e r e a r e c e r t a i n n o n - v e r b a l b e h a v i o u r a l c r i t e r i a f o r not b e i n g i n p a i n ; (v) t h e j o i n t f u l f i l l m e n t o f t h e c r i t e r i a mentioned i n ( i i ) and ( i i i ) i s a c r i t e r i o n f o r one's not b e i n g a b l e t o speak t h e language o f p a i n , o r f o r one's b e i n g i n s i n c e r e i n one's r e p o r t , o r f o r f e i g n i n g ; ( v i ) t here are independent c r i t e r i a f o r l i n g u i s t i c a b i l i t y , s i n c e r i t y and f e i g n i n g ; ( v i i ) i f the c r i t e r i a mentioned i n ( i i ) , ( i i i ) and ( v i ) are f u l f i l l e d j o i n t l y , we should conclude t h a t one i s not i n p a i n , u n l e s s there are independent reasons f o r not doing so and there i s an a l t e r n a t i v e e x p l a n a t i o n f o r the behaviour mentioned i n ( i i i ) (again governed by independent c r i t e r i a ) . T h i s i s of course o n l y a fragment o f the l i s t o f r e l e v a n t c r i t e r i a l r e l a t i o n s h i p s (which i s i n any case open-ended). The l i s t i s c o n s i s t e n t because the s a t i s f a c t i o n of a c r i t e r i o n does not e n t a i l the e x i s t e n c e of t h a t f o r which i t i s a c r i t e r i o n . The p o s s i b i l i t y envisaged i n ( v i i ) of other c r i t e r i a f o r b eing i n p a i n i s j u s t the p o s s i b i l i t y of the r e l e v a n c e of n e u r o p h y s i o l o g i c a l f a c t s and of t h e i r employment as c r i t e r i a . There i s nothing i n W i t t g e n s t e i n t o deny (and much t o support) the p o s s i b i l i t y t h a t c r i t e r i a may change to i n c o r p o r a t e such new i n f o r m a t i o n . The form of i n c o r r i g i b i l i t y which I have o u t l i n e d i s midway between " l o g i c a l " and " e m p i r i c a l " i n c o r r i g i b i l i t y as I have d e s c r i b e d them, f o r i t allows t h a t f i r s t - p e r s o n p r e s e n t -tense r e p o r t s about p a i n s may be o v e r r u l e d (at a l a t e r stage of s c i e n t i f i c development) without supposing t h a t i t i s a mere f a c t of s o c i o l o g y t h a t such r e p o r t s are not a t p r e s e n t o v e r r u l e d . I t i s a f a c t w h i c h i s c e n t r a l t o t h e a p p l i c a t i o n o f t h e c o n c e p t - c l u s t e r : " p a i n " , " s i n c e r i t y " , " l i n g u i s t i c competence" e t c . . T h i s a c c o u n t s t a n d s i n need o f f u r t h e r e x p l a n a t i o n . W h i l e t h i s may appear t o i n v o l v e a f u r t h e r d i g r e s s i o n , i t i s e s s e n t i a l t o a t l e a s t one o f my arguments i n C hapter 5 t h a t I o f f e r some c h a r a c t e r i s a t i o n o f an a c c e p t a b l e v e r s i o n o f t h e i n c o r r i g i b i l i t y - t h e s i s , and i t seems b e s t t o do t h a t h e r e f o r t h e sake o f c o n t r a s t w i t h t h e o t h e r forms o f i n c o r r i g i b i l i t y mentioned. The f i r s t s t e p i n t h i s e x p l a n a t i o n i s t o o f f e r a 5 summary o f what I c a l l t h e c r i t e r i a l view o f m ental language. T h i s i s t a k e n from an u n p u b l i s h e d paper by m y s e l f [ 2 7 ] , though many of t h e b a s i c n o t i o n s a r e adumbrated i n my M.A. T h e s i s [ 2 8 ] . I s h o u l d emphasise t h e f a c t t h a t , as i t i s p r e s e n t e d h e r e , t h i s summary c o n t a i n s no argument f o r t h e c r i t e r i a l v iew. The c r i t e r i a l v i ew i s a v i e w about t h e meaning o f c e r t a i n t e rms, t h a t i s t o say about t h e i r use: I have n o t h i n g t o say a g a i n s t t h e e x i s t e n c e o f meanings, but as e n t i t i e s t h e s e a r e none t o o p o p u l a r t h e s e days and I s h a l l have l e s s t r o u b l e i f I c h a r a c t e r i s e them i n terms o f use. I have i n mind the c o n v e n t i o n a l use o f terms, t h e i r p o t e n t i a l i t y f o r a c t i n g as v e h i c l e s f o r human i n t e r c o u r s e . The c o r r e c t d e s c r i p t i o n o f t h e use o f c r i t e r i a l l y - g o v e r n e d terms, m e n t a l terms i n c l u d e d , i s enormously c o m p l i c a t e d . I b e g i n w i t h t h e r e j e c t i o n o f two forms o f a c c o u n t . There i s some c o n n e c t i o n between t h e a s c r i p t i o n o f mental s t a t e s and t h e a t t r i b u t i o n t o t h e s u b j e c t o f p i e c e s o f b e h a v i o u r , d i s p o s i t i o n s t o behave and c i r c u m s t a n t i a l p o s i t i o n . What i s i t ? A c c o r d i n g t o one vi e w r e j e c t e d , t h e r e a r e e n t a i l m e n t r e l a t i o n s between m e n t a l a s c r i p t i o n s and c i r c u m s t a n t i a l / b e h a v i o u r a l a t t r i b u t i o n s : t h i s i s ( l o g i c a l ) b e h a v i o u r i s m . I t i s r e j e c t e d on account o f a p l e t h o r a o f s t a n d a r d c o u n t e r - e x a m p l e s , t h e most f a t a l b e i n g perhaps t h a t s u p p l i e d by Putnam [ 2 9 ] . A c c o r d i n g t o t h e o t h e r v i e w r e j e c t e d , R o r t y ' s v e r s i o n o f t h e o r e t i c a l i s m , ^ m ental s t a t e s a r e p o s i t e d as c a u s a l i n t e r m e d i a r i e s between c i r c u m s t a n c e s and b e h a v i o u r . Here t h e c o n n e c t i o n between b e h a v i o u r and mental s t a t e s i s e v i d e n t i a l , i t b e i n g a c l e a r p o s s i b i l i t y t h a t something e l s e c o u l d have t a k e n on t h e j o b . A c c o r d i n g t o t h e c r i t e r i a l view t h e r e l e v a n t c o n n e c t i o n i s t h a t o f a r e a s o n t o t h a t f o r w h i c h i t i s a r e a s o n . The f u l f i l l m e n t o f a c r i t e r i o n i s a r e a s o n f o r a s c r i b i n g a me n t a l s t a t e . I t i s i m p o r t a n t t o see t h a t (and how) t h i s c l a i m i s p a r t o f a t h e o r y o f t h e meaning o f mental terms. The t h e o r y s h o u l d be e x p r e s s e d as f o l l o w s : "Mental terms, a t l e a s t i n so f a r as t h e y o c c u r i n mental a s c r i p t i o n s , a r e used i n t h i s way: t h e i r a p p l i c a t i o n t o a p a r t i c u l a r case i s t a k e n t o be j u s t i f i e d i f a s u f f i c i e n t number o f t h e r e l e v a n t c r i t e r i a l s t a t e m ents a r e ( o r can be) known t o be t r u e . " What j u s t i f i c a t i o n amounts t o must be e x p l a i n e d i n a n o n - q u e s t i o n -begging way: a statement i s j u s t i f i e d i f i t i s ( o r would be) c o n s i d e r e d (by most members o f t h e r e l e v a n t l i n g u i s t i c community) t o be a c c e p t a b l e , p e n d i n g any f u t u r e change i n t h e  c r i t e r i a f o r t h e use o f t h e s t a t e m e n t . There i s t h u s a c e r t a i n p r o v i s i o n a l i t y i n t h e use o f c r i t e r i a l l y - g o v e r n e d e x p r e s s i o n s . The word " c o n s i d e r e d " h e r e must be i n t e r p r e t e d l i g h t l y , f o r I do not w i s h t o say t h a t c r i t e r i a a r e e s t a b l i s h e d by p e o p l e a g r e e i n g i n t h e i r o p i n i o n s about whether something counts as a r e a s o n or j u s t i f i c a t i o n f o r making a c e r t a i n a t t r i b u t i o n . They agree i n u s i n g t h e c r i t e r i a l l y - g o v e r n e d e x p r e s s i o n i n a c e r t a i n way; t h e y j u s t i f y i t s a p p l i c a t i o n i n p a r t i c u l a r c a ses by a p p e a l t o c e r t a i n o t h e r f a c t s . T h i s i s a c o i n c i d e n c e i n p r a c t i c e , n ot i n o p i n i o n . The f i n e d e t a i l o f t h e a c c o u n t o f t h e form o f t h e c r i t e r i a f o r mental terms i s h a n d l e d i n terms o f t h e concept of " p a t t e r n " . M e n t a l a s c r i p t i o n s a r e j u s t i f i e d when c e r t a i n p a t t e r n s e x i s t i n t h e c i r c u m s t a n c e s and b e h a v i o u r o f t h e s u b j e c t . C o n s i d e r t h e c l u s t e r o f e vents w h i c h happen and c o n d i t i o n s w h i c h h o l d when someone i s i n a m e n t a l s t a t e . That i s a p a t t e r n . Connected w i t h each t y p e o f m e n t a l a s c r i p t i o n i s a d i s j u n c t i o n o f p a t t e r n s , c o n n e c t i o n s among w h i c h a r e e s t a b l i s h e d by bonds o f s i m i l a r i t y and f a m i l y - r e s e m b l a n c e ; t h e d i s j u n c t i o n i s open-ended i n so f a r as n o v e l p a t t e r n s may be added t o i t as th e y c r o p up ( i t i s a l s o p o s s i b l e f o r p a t t e r n s t o be c u t l o o s e ) . The open-endedness a c c o u n t s i n p a r t f o r t h e f a i l u r e o f e n t a i l m e n t r e l a t i o n s between p a t t e r n and mental s t a t e . I n l e a r n i n g t o use me n t a l language we l e a r n t o a s s o c i a t e m ental a s c r i p t i o n s w i t h f a m i l i a r p a t t e r n s . Much o f t h i s l e a r n i n g i s p i e c e m e a l . Not a l l o f a p a t t e r n i s a v a i l a b l e t o o b s e r v a t i o n on any p a r t i c u l a r o c c a s i o n . The n e u r o p h y s i o l o g i c a l p a r t i s h a r d l y ever a v a i l a b l e and so i s not used a t p r e s e n t as a means o f i d e n t i f y i n g f a m i l i a r p a t t e r n s . T h i s may change. When o n l y a s m a l l p a r t o f t h e c i r c u m s t a n t i a l and b e h a v i o u r a l p a r t s o f a p a t t e r n i s a v a i l a b l e , we a r e i n c l i n e d t o r e g a r d t h i s as m e r e l y  e v i d e n c e f o r t h e r e l e v a n t m e n t a l s t a t e . Here judgment i s l e s s c e r t a i n , f o r t h e same elements o c c u r i n many d i f f e r e n t p a t t e r n s a s s o c i a t e d w i t h many d i f f e r e n t m ental s t a t e s . An a s c r i p t i o n based on such a s m a l l f r a c t i o n i s hence an h y p o t h e s i s o f a c e r t a i n k i n d . T h i s k i n d o f s i t u a t i o n appears t o add p l a u s i b i l i t y t o the t h e o r e t i c a l i s t view o f t h e meaning o f mental terms, because we say we e x p l a i n t h e b e h a v i o u r a l e v i d e n c e by t h e mental a s c r i p t i o n , suppose t h a t t h e mental s t a t e caused t h e 66 b e h a v i o u r and so on. A c c o r d i n g t o the p a t t e r n - v i e w , however, t h i s appearance i s mere appearance. The form of e x p l a n a t i o n i s not t h e o r e t i c o - c a u s a l : I e x p l a i n the p a r t o f a p a t t e r n when I make a s u g g e s t i o n about what p a t t e r n i t i s a p a r t o f . The use of the c a u s a l c o n s t r u c t i o n i s a l s o of l i t t l e s i g n i f i c a n c e : I may be a l l o w e d t o say " H i s p a i n caused him t o wince" but t h i s does not have t h e o r e t i c a l i s t i m p l i c a t i o n s . ( I t s h o u l d a l s o be noted t h a t not a l l o f the r e l a t i o n s between p a t t e r n -elements a r e c a u s a l : some may be m e r e l y t h o s e of c o n c u r r e n c e and t e m p o r a l c o n t i g u i t y . ) Of c r u c i a l i mportance i n a l l t h i s i s the q u e s t i o n of the p o s s i b i l i t y of an a l t e r n a t i v e e x p l a n a t i o n . When the o bserved p o r t i o n of the p a t t e r n i s s m a l l , a l t e r n a t i v e e x p l a n a t i o n s abound, a l t h o u g h many of them w i l l be m e n t a l . When much more of the p a t t e r n i s o b s e r v a b l e , t h i s i s not t r u e - t h e r e a r e v e r y few s i t u a t i o n s i n r e a l l i f e where i n v e s t i g a t i o n of the p a t t e r n w i l l not s e t t l e the q u e s t i o n o f the s u b j e c t ' s mental s t a t e . (The e x c e p t i o n s c o u l d m o s t l y be h a n d l e d by n e u r o p h y s i o l o g i c a l i n q u i r y , but the o p e n - t e x t u r e of mental c o n c e p t s p r o b a b l y makes i t i m p o s s i b l e t o s e t t l e a b s o l u t e l y e v e r y case e x c e p t by l i n g u i s t i c d e c i s i o n . ) M e n t a l a s c r i p t i o n s hence admit of c e r t a i n t y . T h i s c e r t a i n t y i s s u p p o r t e d by an i m p o r t a n t t h e o r e t i c a l c o n s i d e r a t i o n . One can e x p l a i n why c e r t a i n p a t t e r n - e l e m e n t s a r e c onnected e v i d e n t i a l l y w i t h a c e r t a i n p a t t e r n - because th e y t e n d t o o c c u r t o g e t h e r and i t i s l i n g u i s t i c a l l y e c o n o m i c a l t o t a l k about common c o n c u r r e n c e s ( f a m i l i a r p a t t e r n s ) . One can a l s o e x p l a i n why a f a i r l y d i v e r s e s e t o f p a t t e r n s i s a s s o c i a t e d w i t h a s i n g l e mental s t a t e - t h e r e a r e o v e r l a p p i n g s i m i l a r i t i e s between t h e p a t t e r n s , p a r t i c u l a r l y i n the b e h a v i o u r a l p o r t i o n (thus s u p p l y i n g p r e d i c t i v e power t o mental a s c r i p t i o n ) , and, perhaps most i m p o r t a n t , we, as human b e i n g s , w i s h t o t r e a t t h o s e who i n s t a n t i a t e t h e v a r i o u s p a t t e r n s i n t h e same way. (Those who s u f f e r from h e a r t a c h e d e s e r v e sympathy as w e l l as t h o s e who s u f f e r from headaches.) There i s however no e x p l a n a t i o n ( a p a r t from t h e t r i v i a l l i n g u i s t i c o b s e r v a t i o n ) o f why t h i s c o l l e c t i o n o f p a t t e r n s i s a s s o c i a t e d w i t h t h i s m e ntal term. T h i s i s why t h e c r i t e r i a l v i e w i s a t h e o r y o f meaning.^ I now t u r n t o t h e form o f i n c o r r i g i b i l i t y w h i c h I w i s h t o endorse v i a t h i s view. The f o r e g o i n g a c c o u n t o f t h e meaning o f me n t a l terms d e a l s e x c l u s i v e l y w i t h t h i r d - p e r s o n a s c r i p t i o n s o f mental s t a t e s . These a r e assumed t o be b a s i c , i n so f a r as t h e meanings o f o t h e r mental s t a t e m e n t s a r e t o be e x p l i c a t e d i n terms o f t h e c r i t e r i a f o r t h i r d - p e r s o n a s c r i p t i o n s . (E.g., t o say t h a t sadness i s an element i n g r i e f i s t o say t h a t one who f u l f i l l s t h e c r i t e r i a f o r t h e a s c r i p t i o n o f g r i e f a l s o f u l f i l l s t h o s e f o r t h e a s c r i p t i o n o f 68 sadness; t o say t h a t s e l f - h a t r e d resembles e g o t i s m i s t o say t h a t t h e c r i t e r i a f o r t h e two o v e r l a p t o some e x t e n t . ) The purpose o f t h e f o l l o w i n g c o n s i d e r a t i o n s i s t o acco u n t i n c r i t e r i a l terms f o r the a l l e g e d i n c o r r i g i b i l i t y o f f i r s t -p e r s o n p r e s e n t - t e n s e mental a s c r i p t i o n s . Some o f t h e s e , o f c o u r s e , a r e governed by c r i t e r i a i n the normal way and pose no new pr o b l e m - e.g. I might a t t r i b u t e t o m y s e l f a s u b c o n s c i o u s h a t r e d o f Americans by o b s e r v a t i o n o f my b e h a v i o u r i n c e r t a i n c i r c u m s t a n c e s . The same goes f o r a l l s o - c a l l e d " d i s p o s i t i o n a l " s t a t e s . When I say t h a t I am i n p a i n , however, I do not base my judgment on the t h i r d - p e r s o n c r i t e r i a . Do I have a d i f f e r e n t c r i t e r i o n i n my own case? On t h e view w h i c h I am s u p p o r t i n g , t h e answer t o t h i s q u e s t i o n i s a s i m p l e "No": me n t a l s e l f - a s c r i p t i o n s o f t h i s t y p e a r e based on no c r i t e r i a a t a l l . T h i s i s , o f c o u r s e , t h e view o f W i t t g e n s t e i n . I t i s e a s i l y demonstrated t h a t f i r s t - p e r s o n a s c r i p t i o n s o f s o - c a l l e d " o c c u r r e n t " s t a t e s a r e not based on c r i t e r i a . On the one hand, t o employ some s t a t e - o f - a f f a i r s as a c r i t e r i o n , as a r e a s o n f o r j u s t i f y i n g some judgment, I must make a judgment about t h e s t a t e - o f - a f f a i r s i t s e l f (though t h i s need not be a c o n s c i o u s p r o c e s s , nor one e s s e n t i a l l y l i n g u i s t i c ) . However, t h e judgment t h a t I am i n p a i n i s based on no o t h e r g judgment. On t h e o t h e r hand, t h e l o g i c a l r e l a t i o n s h i p between a s e l f - a s c r i p t i o n and i t s e l f i s one o f e n t a i l m e n t , w h i c h i s enough t o r e n d e r i t n o n - c r i t e r i a l a c c o r d i n g t o t h e view o f c r i t e r i a h e r e espoused. The i n c o r r i g i b i l i t y o f c e r t a i n m ental s e l f - a s c r i p t i o n s 9 stems from t h e i r d u a l n a t u r e as r e p o r t s and i n d i c a t o r s . I n so f a r as t h e y a r e r e p o r t s t h e y can be t r u e o r f a l s e , a c c u r a t e o r i n a c c u r a t e , known f o r c e r t a i n by o t h e r s , h e l d t o be q u e s t i o n a b l e o r d e n i e d . I n so f a r as t h e y a r e i n d i c a t o r s t h e y can be r e l i a b l e o r u n r e l i a b l e . A p e r s o n ' s v e r b a l b e h a v i o u r , i n c l u d i n g h i s / h e r m ental s e l f - a s c r i p t i o n s , i s p a r t o f t h e s e t o f c r i t e r i a f o r h i s / h e r b e i n g i n a me n t a l s t a t e ( o f t h e r e l e v a n t k i n d ) , and s i n c e i t i s o n l y p a r t , i t w i l l not s e t t l e w i t h a b s o l u t e c e r t a i n t y t h e q u e s t i o n o f whether t h e p e r s o n jls i n t h a t s t a t e . What t h e i n c o r r i g i b i l i t y - t h e s i s demands i s weaker t h a n t h i s u n f u l f i l l e d r e q u i r e m e n t - i t i s t h a t t h e s e l f - a s c r i p t i o n i s t o be r e g a r d e d as r e l i a b l e u n l e s s t h e s e l f -a s c r i b e r i s i n s i n c e r e i n making t h e a s c r i p t i o n o r does not un d e r s t a n d t h e language used i n making t h e a s c r i p t i o n . There a r e independent c r i t e r i a f o r s i n c e r e i t y h e r e , i n t h e demeanour o f t h e s e l f - a s c r i b e r , h i s / h e r p a s t t r u s t w o r t h i n e s s e t c . , and so t h a t q u a l i f i c a t i o n w i l l be p a s s e d over w i t h o u t f u r t h e r comment. I s h o u l d l i k e t o f o c u s our a t t e n t i o n on t h e c r i t e r i a f o r l i n g u i s t i c competence. The g e n e r a l c l a i m t o be urged ( w i t h some q u a l i f i c a t i o n s t o be i n t r o d u c e d l a t e r ) i s t h a t t h e c r i t e r i a f o r l i n g u i s t i c competence i n t h e making o f t h e r e l e v a n t m ental s e l f -a s c r i p t i o n s a r e such t h a t t o be counted as competent a p e r s o n must a s c r i b e m ental s t a t e s t o h e r / h i m s e l f , o r be p r e p a r e d t o do so, i n p r e c i s e l y t h o s e c i r c u m s t a n c e s i n w h i c h i t would be c o r r e c t ( j u s t i f i e d ) f o r o t h e r s t o make t h e same judgment about her/him, i . e . where th e r e l e v a n t c r i t e r i a a r e f u l f i l l e d . ( T h i s can be so even though t h e c r i t e r i a do not e n t e r i n t o t h e j u s t i f i c a t i o n o f h e r / h i s own a s s e r t i o n . ) A l l I have t o o f f e r i n s u p p o r t o f t h i s c l a i m i s t h e o b s e r v a t i o n t h a t we o n l y r e g a r d someone as competent, and, f o r example, cease t r a i n i n g h e r/him, when t h i s c o n d i t i o n i s f u l f i l l e d . Now i t must be remembered t h a t t h e above p a r a g r a p h i s not an a c c o u n t o f t h e n e c e s s a r y c o n d i t i o n s f o r b e i n g l i n g u i s t i c a l l y competent i n t h e making o f mental s e l f -a s c r i p t i o n s . L i n g u i s t i c competence i s a mental s t a t e and so a s c r i p t i o n s o f l i n g u i s t i c competence a r e governed by c r i t e r i a . Hence i t i s p o s s i b l e t h a t t h e grounds upon wh i c h judgments o f l i n g u i s t i c competence a r e based may change i n t h e f u t u r e , e.g. as a r e s u l t o f n e u r o p h y s i o l o g i c a l d i s c o v e r y . I f t h a t happens, t h e r e may be e x c e p t i o n s t o t h e g e n e r a l c l a i m urged above ( t h a t f o r one t o be counted as competent one's s e l f - a s c r i p t i o n s must a c c o r d w i t h t h e a s c r i p t i o n s o f o t h e r s ) and t h u s e x c e p t i o n s t o the i n c o r r i g i b i l i t y - t h e s i s . I t seems u n l i k e l y , however, t h a t t h i n g s w i l l change so much as t o r u l e o u t t h e g e n e r a l i n c o r r i g i b i l i t y o f mental s e l f - a s c r i p t i o n s . The c r i t e r i a l a c count o f i n c o r r i g i b i l i t y has c e r t a i n advantages o v e r t h o s e p r e v i o u s l y c o n s i d e r e d . I n t h e f i r s t p l a c e i t r e p r e s e n t s i n c o r r i g i b i l i t y as e p i s t e m o l o g i c a l l y u s e l e s s , i n so f a r as i t i s m e r e l y a c r i t e r i a l c o n d i t i o n o f l i n g u i s t i c c o m p e t e n c e , ^ and hence p r o v i d e s f o r a h o s t o f ways i n w h i c h one can q u e s t i o n r e p o r t s w h i l e a d m i t t i n g t h a t t h e y a r e i n c o r r i g i b l e . One can t h e r e f o r e admit t h a t i n c o r r i g i b i l i t y i s a g e n e r a l f e a t u r e o f mental s e l f -a s c r i p t i o n s w i t h o u t b e i n g committed t o t h e C a r t e s i a n / f o u n d a t i o n a l i s t programme i n e p i s t e m o l o g y . I n t h e second p l a c e , i t o f f e r s an e x p l a n a t i o n o f why t h e r e e x i s t s t h e s o c i a l p r a c t i c e o f r e g a r d i n g s e l f - a s c r i p t i o n s as i n c o r r i g i b l e , a q u e s t i o n w h i c h i s l e f t unanswered by R o r t y ' s e l i m i n a t i v e m a t e r i a l i s t a c c o u n t . The answer i s i n terms o f t h e u t i l i t y o f t r a i n i n g p e o p l e so t h a t t h e i r s e l f - a s c r i p t i o n s match up w i t h t h e a s c r i p t i o n s o f o t h e r s ( t h e l a t t e r b e i n g g e n e r a l l y g u a ranteed by t h e f a c t t h a t t h e y r e s t on t h e c r i t e r i a w h i c h f i g u r e i n t h e account o f t h e meaning o f t h e r e l e v a n t m e n t a l t e r m s ) . A g a i n i t i s not t h a t we make a c o n s c i o u s c h o i c e t o f o l l o w a cause o f a c t i o n w h i c h appears t o us t o have t h i s u t i l i t y ; i t ' s j u s t t h a t t h e development o f mental language has t u r n e d out t o be l i n g u i s t i c a l l y e c o n o m i c a l i n t h i s r e s p e c t . The t h i r d advantage o f t h e p r e s e n t a c c o u n t i s t h a t i t e n a b l e s us t o e x p l a i n t h e r e s t r i c t i o n s upon t h e scope o f i n c o r r i g i b i l i t y w h i c h a r e r e q u i r e d by t h e e x i s t e n c e o f counter-examples t o t h e i n c o r r i g i b i l i t y - t h e s i s . One o f t h e s e , a l r e a d y mentioned i n s e c t i o n ( b ) , i s due t o R.I. S i k o r a . The s u b s t a n c e o f t h e c o u n t e r - e x a m p l e , i t w i l l be remembered, i s t h a t one's c l a i m t o have a f o u r t e e n - s i d e d a f t e r - i m a g e , f o r i n s t a n c e , can be o v e r r u l e d by t h e o b s e r v a t i o n t h a t t h e p h y s i c a l image used t o i n d u c e t h e a f t e r - i m a g e has o n l y t h i r t e e n s i d e s . Hence not a l l s e l f - a s c r i p t i o n s o f s e n s a t i o n s are i n c o r r i g i b l e . The c r i t e r i a l v i e w has a s t o r y t o t e l l about t h i s s i t u a t i o n : h e r e we have a case where t h e r e _is a gap between making a c o r r e c t r e p o r t and b e i n g l i n g u i s t i c a l l y competent (a gap which i s m i s s i n g i n t h e case o f p a i n -a s c r i p t i o n s , p e r h a p s ) , f o r t o make a n u m e r i c a l judgment o f t h i s s o r t c e r t a i n , one must f u l f i l l t h e c r i t e r i a f o r h a v i n g counted c o r r e c t l y , t h i s b e i n g something more t h a n u n d e r s t a n d i n g how t o c o u n t . I n t h i s case i t seems c l e a r t h a t t h e o n l y a p p l i c a b l e c r i t e r i o n o f h a v i n g counted c o r r e c t l y i s t h e agreement o f one's answer w i t h t h e r e s u l t o f c o u n t i n g the s i d e s o f t h e o r i g i n a l p h y s i c a l t e m p l a t e . Hence we can see how t h e c l a i m o f i n c o r r i g i b i l i t y s h o u l d be d e n i e d i n t h i s example. T h i s , t h e n , i s t h e form o f i n c o r r i g i b i l i t y w hich I am p r e p a r e d t o admit e x i s t s . I n Chapter 5 I s h a l l r e t u r n t o t h i s t o p i c i n an attempt t o see whether R o r t y 1 s g e n e r a l t h e o r e t i c a l i s m can account f o r t h e e x i s t e n c e o f i n c o r r i g i b i l i t y ( i n any f o r m ) . The a r g u m e n t a t i v e , as opposed t o a d u m b r a t i v e , purpose o f t h e p r e s e n t c h a p t e r has been t o show t h a t t h e c o n n e c t i o n between i n c o r r i g i b i l i t y and t h e a l l e g e d i n c o m p a t i b i l i t y o f m e n t a l and p h y s i c a l i s not as R o r t y t h i n k s . I t h i n k t h i s has been a c h i e v e d . F o o t n o t e s t o Chapter 3 1. N o t i c e t h a t i n t h i s c o n t e x t R o r t y cannot a p p e a l t o t h e i d e a , t o be d i s c u s s e d i n C hapter 5, t h a t m ental r e p o r t s a r e r e a l l y r e p o r t s on b r a i n - s t a t e s , f o r i t i s an i m p o r t a n t p a r t o f h i s v iew t h a t t h o s e s t a t e s cannot be m e n t a l , and so cannot l o s e t h e i r s t a t u s as m e n t a l . 2. A t f i r s t g l a n c e , a t l e a s t , i t l o o k s as i f t h e same c o u l d be s a i d o f any p h y s i c a l a s c r i p t i o n s w h i c h might cease t o be q u e s t i o n e d a t some t i m e o r o t h e r , b u t I s h a l l be c h a r i t a b l e i n r e s t r i c t i n g my o b j e c t i o n t o t h e g e n e r a l a r e a o f t h e e x p l a n a t i o n o f b e h a v i o u r . 3. I have h e a r d R o r t y i n c o n v e r s a t i o n a p p e a l t o a p r a g m a t i c t h e o r y o f t r u t h t o s u p p o r t t h e c l a i m t h a t s t a t e m e n t s about (even r e p o r t s o f ) s e n s a t i o n s can be t r u e even though t h e r e a r e no s e n s a t i o n s . I do not know what he would say about t h e s t a t e m e n t , " S e n s a t i o n s e x i s t " . I t a k e up t h e s e m a t t e r s a g a i n i n Chapter 5. 4. I s h o u l d be i n c l i n e d t o say t h e same t h i n g about b o t h o f R o r t y 1 s forms ( " s i n g l e r e p o r t " and " r e p e a t e d r e p o r t " ) o f i n c o r r i g i b i l i t y , a l t h o u g h i t i s u n c l e a r t o what e x t e n t he would agree w i t h me, as n o t e d i n s e c t i o n ( b ) . E x c e p t where he a p p e a l s t o t h e l a t t e r form, he seems t o agree w i t h me t h a t n e u r a l e v i d e n c e c o u l d o v e r t h r o w i n c o r r i g i b i l i t y i n any o f t h e forms mentioned so f a r . We d i f f e r i n so f a r as he does, w h i l e I do n o t , b e l i e v e t h a t such an o v e r t h r o w would impugn t h e e x i s t e n c e o f m e n t a l s t a t e s . 5. T h i s v i e w i s t a k e n from t h e mature work o f W i t t g e n s t e i n , though some o f my i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s may not be beyond d i s p u t e . 6. See Theses I- I V i n C hapter 1. 7. The l a c k o f an e x p l a n a t i o n has f u r t h e r consequences. Most i m p o r t a n t l y , i t p l a c e s t h e g e n e r a l e x i s t e n c e o f m e n t a l s t a t e s beyond d i s p u t e . M e n t a l s t a t e s a r e not t o be i d e n t i f i e d w i t h p a t t e r n s , o r p a r t s o f p a t t e r n s , b u t nor a r e t h e y something o t h e r t h a n t h e p a t t e r n s , f o r t h e e x i s t e n c e o f w h i c h th e p a t t e r n s a r e mere e v i d e n c e . A m ental s t a t e i s t h a t whose e x i s t e n c e we a r e e n t i t l e d t o a s s e r t (pending c o n c e p t u a l r e v i s i o n i n t h e l i g h t o f f u t u r e d i s c o v e r y ) when a p a t t e r n o f a c e r t a i n k i n d e x i s t s . There i s t h u s no p o s s i b i l i t y o f a d i f f e r e n t and i n c o m p a t i b l e e x p l a n a t i o n , o f a t h e o r e t i c a l k i n d , 75 of the e x i s t e n c e of a p a t t e r n . Mental s t a t e s are here t o s t a y . However, i t i s not r e l e v a n t t o argue t h i s p o i n t here. 8. In normal circumstances. One can of course imagine very b i z a r r e circumstances i n which I might have t o base my s e l f -a s c r i p t i o n of p a i n on (e.g.) n e u r o p h y s i o l o g i c a l evidence, but i n o r d i n a r y l i f e such circumstances do not occur. 9. Mental s e l f - a s c r i p t i o n s are a l s o e x p r e s s i o n s of one's mental s t a t e . T h i s s t a t u s may or may not be r e d u c i b l e t o the other two. 10. My view i s d i s t i n g u i s h e d from the one Rorty [10] a t t r i b u t e s t o W i t t g e n s t e i n by the f a c t t h a t the c o n d i t i o n here i s c r i t e r i a l , not e m p i r i c a l . T h i s p o i n t i s developed i n Chapter 5. 76 Chapter 4: M e n t a l S t a t e s as T h e o r e t i c a l E n t i t i e s  (a) I n t r o d u c t i o n I n C h apter 2, s e c t i o n ( b ) , I r e p r e s e n t e d an i m p o r t a n t s i m i l a r i t y between R o r t y ' s v e r s i o n o f e l i m i n a t i v e m a t e r i a l i s m and t h e c o n t i n g e n t i d e n t i t y t h e o r y as t h e c l a i m t h a t m ental s t a t e s a r e , i n one sense o r a n o t h e r , t h e o r e t i c a l e n t i t i e s . T h i s i s t h e i s s u e I w i s h t o t a k e up now. I s h a l l speak i n d i s c r i m i n a t e l y o f m ental s t a t e s as t h e o r e t i c a l e n t i t e s , o f mental c o n c e p t s as t h e o r e t i c a l c o n c e p t s and o f m ental terms as t h e o r e t i c a l t e rms: whatever d i f f e r e n c e s one can f i n d between t h e s e f o r m u l a t i o n s o f t h e c e n t r a l t o p i c a r e not o f i n t e r e s t t o me h e r e . I s h a l l argue t h a t t h e c l a i m i s f a l s e . I t w i l l be remembered t h a t t h e d i f f e r e n c e between the two views i n t h i s m a t t e r was c h a r a c t e r i s e d by my s a y i n g t h a t whereas the c o n t i n g e n t i d e n t i t y t h e o r y r e g a r d e d m e n t a l s t a t e s as s u c c e s s f u l t h e o r e t i c a l e n t i t i e s ( t o be i d e n t i f i e d w i t h b r a i n - s t a t e s " 1 - ) , R o r t y ' s v e r s i o n o f e l i m i n a t i v e m a t e r i a l i s m r e g a r d e d them as u n s u c c e s s f u l . The grounds f o r t h e l a t t e r charge were ( i ) the g r e a t e r e x p l a n a t o r y power o f n e u r o p h y s i o l o g y as an account o f t h e c a u s a t i o n o f b e h a v i o u r , and ( i i ) the i n c o m p a t i b i l i t y o f n e u r o p h y s i o l o g y w i t h o r d i n a r y m e ntal e x p l a n a t i o n . I have s u g g e s t e d t h a t R o r t y argues f o r ( i i ) by c l a i m i n g t h a t t h e o r d i n a r y c oncept o f mind i s i r r e d e e m a b l y C a r t e s i a n ( i n t h e sense i n v o l v i n g i n c o r r i g i b i l i t y ) , and t h e p r e v i o u s c h a p t e r was devo t e d t o an attempt t o c o u n t e r t h i s argument. My a t t a c k a g a i n s t ( i i ) , i f s u c c e s s f u l , p r o v i d e s some grounds f o r r e f u s i n g t o r e g a r d m e ntal s t a t e s as t h e o r e t i c a l e n t i t i e s , i n t h e sense espoused by R o r t y , s i n c e such r e g a r d i s a l l p a r t o f t h e p i c t u r e o f mental c o n c e p t s competing w i t h t h o s e o f n e u r o p h y s i o l o g y i n t h e ra c e t o appear i n a b e t t e r c a u s a l t h e o r y o f b e h a v i o u r , b u t t h e s e grounds a r e s l i m . That ( i ) i s p a r t o f t h e p u t a t i v e r e a s o n f o r r e j e c t i n g mental c o n c e p t s r a i s e s a number o f q u e s t i o n s . The normal j u s t i f i c a t i o n f o r t h e r e l e v a n c e o f ( i ) i s t h a t t h e f u n c t i o n o f such c o n c e p t s , and o f the uses o f language i n wh i c h t h e y a r e employed, i s p r e t t y w e l l e xhausted by t h e attempt t o g i v e a c a u s a l , t h e o r e t i c a l a c c o u n t o f human (and o t h e r ? ) b e h a v i o u r . I f m e ntal terms had some f u r t h e r f u n c t i o n s , i t would seem t h a t even i n t h e f a c e o f t h e s c i e n t i f i c s u c c e s s o f n e u r o p h y s i o l o g y we c o u l d p r e s e r v e m e n t a l t a l k f o r t h o s e f u n c t i o n s , u n l e s s i n d e e d n e u r o p h y s i o l o g i c a l t a l k c o u l d come t o f u l f i l l t h o s e f u n c t i o n s t o o . I g n o r i n g t h i s l a s t m a t t e r f o r t h e t i m e b e i n g , I t a k e i t , t h e n , t h a t t h e c l a i m t h a t m ental s t a t e s a r e t h e o r e t i c a l e n t i t i e s i m p l i e s t h e c l a i m t h a t t h e use o f mental language i s ( p r e t t y l a r g e l y ) exhausted by i t s r o l e i n t h e 78 c a u s a l e x p l a n a t i o n o f b e h a v i o u r . As I s a i d b e f o r e , I s h a l l argue t h a t t h e l a t t e r c l a i m i s f a l s e . I t i s perhaps t o o n a i v e t o mention t h e o b v i o u s p o i n t t h a t m ental language d i d not grow up i n t h e l a b o r a t o r y , b u t i n the w o r l d o f g e n e r a l human a f f a i r s . W h i l e i t would be a c c e p t a b l e , even p e r s u a s i v e , t o me t o argue t h a t t h e o n t o l o g i c a l and e p i s t e m o l o g i c a l r u l e s and c o n v e n t i o n s which govern t h e development o f s c i e n t i f i c t h e o r y a r e d i f f e r e n t from t h o s e which govern t h a t o f o r d i n a r y d i s c o u r s e , I do not ex p e c t p o i n t s o f t h i s k i n d t o c a r r y much w e i g h t w i t h p r o p o n e n t s o f the e m p i r i c i s t / s c i e n t i f i c r e a l i s t t r a d i t i o n . The i n s t i t u t i o n a l d i f f e r e n c e s betweeen t h e o r y - p r o d u c t i o n and human l i f e t e n d t o be under-emphasised by t h e l a t t e r p h i l o s o p h e r s ; a l t h o u g h I t h i n k t h e y a re i m p o r t a n t , showing t h i s t o be t h e case i s t o o l o n g an endeavour f o r t h i s e s s a y , and I must p r o c e e d as i f i t c o u l d not be done. Perhaps t h e s u c c e s s o f t h i s work w i l l h e l p p a r t i a l l y t o d i s p e l t h e i l l u s i o n o f t h e s c i e n t i f i c homogeneity o f human d i s c o u r s e . The normal (and R o r t y ' s ) s t a r t i n g - p o i n t f o r d i s c u s s i o n o f t h e t h e o r e t i c a l i t y o f me n t a l s t a t e s i s S e l l a r s ' Myth o f Jon e s , t h e I n v e n t o r o f t h e Mind [ 1 7 ] . We a r e encouraged t o suppose, by t h i s a c c o u n t , t h a t t h e concept o f t h e mind, t o g e t h e r w i t h o t h e r m ental c o n c e p t s , f u n c t i o n s as i f t h e f o l l o w i n g s c h e m a t i c h i s t o r y o f i t s g e n e s i s were t r u e : Caveman Jones n o t i c e s c e r t a i n o v e r a l l p a t t e r n s o f s i m i l a r i t y i n "how o t h e r c a v e p e o p l e behave i n p a r t i c u l a r c i r c u m s t a n c e s , and a l s o e x c e p t i o n a l c i r c u m s t a n c e s where t h e p a t t e r n s a r e a l t e r e d , where t h e normal c o n n e c t i o n s do not h o l d ; i n o r d e r t o account c a u s a l l y f o r t h e e x c e p t i o n s , he proposes a system o f i n t e r v e n i n g v a r i a b l e s ( b e l i e f s , d e s i r e s e t c . ) ; e v e n t u a l l y t h e t h e o r y becomes p o p u l a r , i s extended and e l a b o r a t e d u n t i l i t becomes t h e c o m p l i c a t e d s t r u c t u r e o f f o l k - p s y c h o l o g y w h i c h i s 2 common t o a l m o s t a l l human b e i n g s t o d a y . Of c o u r s e , s i n c e t h e above s c e n a r i o i s not supposed t o be a t r u e account o f t h e g e n e s i s o f mental c o n c e p t s , one must ask what r e s t r i c t i o n t h e s t o r y i s tho u g h t t o p l a c e upon t h e p r e s e n t use o f mental language, i f we a r e t o approach an a p p r e c i a t i o n o f t h e p o i n t o f t h e Myth. I t would o f c o u r s e be p o s s i b l e f o r a term o r s e t o f terms t o e n t e r t h e language much as d e s c r i b e d above, b u t f o r i t t h e n t o come t o have a d i f f e r e n t r o l e l a t e r . T h i s p o s s i b i l i t y i s n o t , I t h i n k , e n v i s a g e d as p a r t o f t h e Myth. What t h e l a t t e r i m p l i e s , t h e n , i s t h a t t h e r o l e o f t h e con c e p t o f mind i s p r e t t y much now as i t was i n t h e s t o r y - a t h e o r e t i c a l c o n s t r u c t f o r t h e c a u s a l e x p l a n a t i o n o f b e h a v i o u r . L e t me mention some p r e l i m i n a r y d i f f i c u l t i e s w i t h t h i s view. The f i r s t c o n c erns t h e r e l a t i o n s h i p between t h e mind and p a r t i c u l a r m ental s t a t e s . There a r e two p o s s i b l e g e n e r a l l i n e s w h i c h might be f o l l o w e d on t h i s q u e s t i o n . The f i r s t i s t h a t t h e mind i s a t h e o r e t i c a l c o n s t r u c t a t a deeper l e v e l t h a n p a r t i c u l a r m ental s t a t e s - t h a t i s t o say, f i r s t we e x p l a i n e d b e h a v i o u r by r e f e r e n c e t o p a r t i c u l a r m e n t a l s t a t e s , t h e n t h e l a t t e r by r e f e r e n c e t o a mind. T h i s l i n e I do not f i n d i n t u i t i v e l y s a t i s f y i n g : g i v e n a s u f f i c i e n t l y c o m p l i c a t e d a r r a y o f me n t a l s t a t e s a t t r i b u t a b l e t o an i n d i v i d u a l , I can see no l o g i c a l l y p o s s i b l e a l t e r n a t i v e t o h i s / h e r / i t s h a v i n g a 3 mind. What e l s e c o u l d e x p l a i n t h e p r e s e n c e o f mental s t a t e s ? To suppose t h a t t h e concept o f mind i s o n l y one o f a number o f c o m p e t i t o r s i n t h e t h e o r e t i c a l b a t t l e f o r t h e c a u s a l e x p l a n a t i o n o f t h e p o s s e s s i o n o f mental s t a t e s i s t o t r e a t i t i n a C a r t e s i a n manner, as h a v i n g some f e a t u r e s o t h e r t h a n b e i n g t h e u n d e r p i n n i n g f o r me n t a l s t a t e s (which might d i s a l l o w , f o r i n s t a n c e , t h e i d e n t i f i c a t i o n o f mental and p h y s i c a l ) . I have argued a g a i n s t t h i s p i c t u r e o f t h e concept o f mind. One o f t h e g r e a t advantages o f S e l l a r s ' Myth, one might add, i s t h a t i t s a d o p t i o n e n a b l e s us t o escape t h e C a r t e s i a n p i c t u r e o f t h e mind: f o r i n s t a n c e , one a v o i d s the c o n c e p t i o n t h a t m ental a s c r i p t i o n i s b a s i c a l l y s e l f - a s c r i p t i o n i n a way w h i c h makes o t h e r - a s c r i p t i o n d e r i v a t i v e and more-or-l e s s d o u b t f u l . Reasons such as t h e s e suggest t o me t h a t i t would be more c o n s i s t e n t t o r e j e c t t h i s l i n e o f development o f S e l l a r s 1 view. I cannot however show t h a t i t i s i m p o s s i b l e t o t a k e i t . The second a l t e r n a t i v e i s t o t a k e X's h a v i n g a mind as a l o g i c a l consequence o f h e r / h i s h a v i n g m e n t a l s t a t e s . H i l a r y Putnam [30] i s one example o f a p h i l o s o p h e r from t h e e m p i r i c a l r e a l i s t camp who f i n d s t h i s p a t h a t t r a c t i v e . I t i s i n s u f f i c i e n t t o supposee t h a t t h e a s c r i p t i o n o f any s i n g l e m e ntal s t a t e to. an o b j e c t i m p l i e s t h e o b j e c t ' s p o s s e s s i o n o f a mind, f o r i t appears t o make p e r f e c t (even i f a l i t t l e m e t a p h o r i c a l ) sense t o a t t r i b u t e a few mental s t a t e s t o computers wh i c h y e t l a c k t h e s o p h i s t i c a t i o n t o q u a l i f y as h a v i n g minds. However, i f t h e a r r a y o f i n t e r c o n n e c t e d m e n t a l s t a t e s a t t r i b u t a b l e t o an o b j e c t i s b o t h l a r g e enough and c o m p l i c a t e d enough, I see no r e a s o n t o deny t h e i m p l i c a t i o n t h a t t h e o b j e c t has a mind. A t t h e moment o n l y human b e i n g s and h i g h e r a n i m a l s , w i t h i n our ken, q u a l i f y f o r t h i s e n t i t l e m e n t , b u t I see no r e a s o n why r o b o t s t o o s h o u l d not a c h i e v e t h e s t a n d a r d a t some l a t e r p o i n t i n t h e development o f c y b e r n e t i c s . On t h i s view, "X has a mind" says n o t h i n g more th a n "X i n s t a n t i a t e s a l a r g e and complex a r r a y o f m e n t a l s t a t e s " - o f c o u r s e one can s t i l l argue about what mental s t a t e s a r e . (b) A c t i o n s o r Movements? The p r e v i o u s m a t t e r does not make d i f f i c u l t i e s f o r t h e view t h a t m e n t a l s t a t e s a r e t h e o r e t i c a l e n t i t i e s . I i n t r o d u c e i t o n l y t o show t h a t t h e view r e q u i r e s c l a r i f i c a t i o n on one p o i n t and t o foreshadow what I t a k e t o be a g r e a t e r d i f f i c u l t y . T h i s i s t h e q u e s t i o n o f what e x a c t l y i s t o be e x p l a i n e d by r e f e r e n c e t o m e n t a l s t a t e s . So f a r I have been u s i n g t h e d e l i b e r a t e l y vague term " b e h a v i o u r " t o c o v e r an o p p o s i t i o n w h i c h must now be u n e a r t h e d . " B e h a v i o u r " can be t a k e n t o mean " s e t o f a c t i o n s " o r " s e t o f p h y s i c a l movements" - w h i c h i s r e l e v a n t h e r e ? The problem w i t h c h o o s i n g t h e f i r s t a l t e r n a t i v e i s t h a t a l o g i c a l c o n n e c t i o n , analogous t o t h e one i l l u s t r a t e d above between t h e p o s s e s s i o n o f m e n t a l s t a t e s and t h e p o s s e s s i o n o f a mind, might be argued t o e x i s t between b e i n g t h e agent o f c e r t a i n a c t i o n s and t h e p o s s e s s i o n o f mental s t a t e s . The p o i n t i s e a s i l y e s t a b l i s h e d i f we do not r e q u i r e s p e c i f i c i t y i n t h e account o f what mental s t a t e s a r e t i e d l o g i c a l l y t o c e r t a i n a c t i o n s , f o r t h e n " h a v i n g mental s t a t e s " comes t o much the same t h i n g as "having a mind" and t h e p o s s e s s i o n o f a mind i s i m p l i e d i n t h e a s c r i p t i o n t o b e i n g s o f such a c t i o n -p r e d i c a t e s as "... i s g o i n g f o r a walk", d e s p i t e t h e f a c t t h a t t h i s i s not a p r e d i c a t e d e s c r i b i n g t h e s u b j e c t ' s m ental s t a t e s . Many a s c r i p t i o n s o f p h y s i c a l a c t i o n s a r e w r i t t e n i n the language o f t h e m e n t a l , t h e v a l i d i t y o f t h e use o f such a s c r i p t i o n s t h e r e f o r e p r e s u p p o s i n g t h e l e g i t i m a c y o f mental c o n c e p t s . I t i s more d i f f i c u l t t o demonstrate e n t a i l m e n t s between b e i n g t h e agent o f an a c t i o n and p o s s e s s i n g some p a r t i c u l a r m e n t a l s t a t e s , b u t i t i s a l s o d i f f i c u l t t o deny, f o r example, t h a t most a s c r i p t i o n s o f i n t e n t i o n a l a c t i o n , w h i l e not r e f e r r i n g t o t h e r e l e v a n t i n t e n t i o n , b e a r some s o r t of i m p l i c a t i o n t h a t t h e a c t i o n was u n d e r t a k e n w i t h t h i s c e r t a i n i n t e n t i o n . T h ink o f such a s c r i p t i o n s a s : "He p r e s s e d on towards t h e warmth o f t h e c a b i n " , "She murdered h e r s i s t e r " , "He c a r r i e d t h e c h i l d a l l t h e way t o t h e h o s p i t a l " . I t may be t h a t some a c t i o n - a s c r i p t i o n s do not have t h i s c h a r a c t e r , b u t I am i n c l i n e d t o t h i n k t h a t i t is_ a g e n e r a l f e a t u r e o f t h e language o f a c t i o n . The p o i n t I am making i s not t h e Humean one, n o t o r i o u s i n t h e c o n t e x t o f t h e d i s c u s s i o n "Reason v e r s u s Cause", t h a t because o f t h e l o g i c a l c o n n e c t i o n between a c t i o n s and mental s t a t e s t h e l a t t e r cannot be r e g a r d e d as causes o f the former ( I t h i n k t h i s v iew i s f a l s e ) , b u t t h e more modest c l a i m t h a t on account o f t h i s k i n d o f c o n n e c t i o n , mental s t a t e s cannot be t a k e n t o be t h e o r e t i c a l e n t i t i e s f o r t h e c a u s a l e x p l a n a t i o n o f a c t i o n s . I t a k e i t t h a t f o r Ys t o be t h e o r e t i c a l e n t i t i e s a p p e a l e d t o i n t h e c a u s a l e x p l a n a t i o n o f some phenomenon A, i t must be l o g i c a l l y p o s s i b l e f o r A t o o c c u r even i f t h e r e a r e no Ys ( i n o t h e r words, some competing t h e o r y i s p o s s i b l e ) . I do not t h i n k t h a t t h i s c o n d i t i o n i s f u l f i l l e d i n t h e p r e s e n t c a s e . Some o r d i n a r y - l a n g u a g e d e s c r i p t i o n s o f b e h a v i o u r might be thought t o f a l l between t h e c a t e g o r i e s o f a c t i o n and movement w h i c h I have s e p a r a t e d . An example might be " A r t h u r s m i l e d b r o a d l y " . I do not mind c a l l i n g s m i l i n g something o t h e r t h a n an a c t i o n , but I i n s i s t t h a t t h e a s c r i p t i o n o f s m i l e s s h a r e s t h e f e a t u r e s w h i c h above I a l l o t t e d t o a c t i o n -a s c r i p t i o n . The sentence j u s t quoted b e a r s t h e i m p l i c a t i o n , i n i t s normal use, t h a t A r t h u r i s i n some sense happy, p l e a s e d o r j o y f u l ( o r , a r g u a b l y , p r e t e n d i n g t o be s o ) . Thus i t i s not m e r e l y a d e s c r i p t i o n o f t h e topography o f A r t h u r ' s f a c e . T h i s can be seen by t a k i n g the two cases where A r t h u r i s , f i r s t , a p e r s o n and, second, a chimpanzee. When b o t h o f t h e s e A r t h u r s s m i l e , the t o p o g r a p h i e s o f t h e i r f a c e s have l i t t l e i n common, but t h e i r s t a t e s o f mind have much. I t seems t o me t h a t t h e o n l y i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f " b e h a v i o u r " c o n s i s t e n t w i t h t h e c o n d i t i o n w h i c h I p l a c e on t h e t h e o r e t i c a l i t y o f c a u s a l e x p l a n a t i o n s o f b e h a v i o u r i s as " p h y s i c a l movements", where t h e s e a r e d e s c r i b e d i n t h e non-q u e s t i o n - b e g g i n g language i n w h i c h r e c o r d - p l a y e r arms can move j u s t as s e n s i b l y as human ones. I s h a l l argue l a t e r t h a t t h e s y s t e m a t i c c a u s a l e x p l a n a t i o n o f such movements i s not p r i m a r y among the f u n c t i o n s o f o r d i n a r y - l a n g u a g e m e n t a l a s c r i p t i o n and e x p l a n a t i o n . T h i s i n t e r p r e t a t i o n does a l l o w us t o see how n e u r o p h y s i o l o g y i s a v i a b l e c o n t e n d e r f o r t h e r o l e o f f u l f i l l i n g t h i s f u n c t i o n , s i n c e i t i s c o n c e p t u a l l y c o n t i n u o u s w i t h t h e d e s c r i p t i o n o f b o d i l y movements. I must now a n t i c i p a t e a g e n e r a l l i n e o f o b j e c t i o n t o t h e s e l a s t c o n s i d e r a t i o n s . Many m a t e r i a l i s t s would, I t h i n k , argue t h a t t h e dichotomy I have s t r e s s e d - t h e o p p o s i t i o n between a c t i o n s and movements - i s a bogus one, s i n c e i t i s p o s s i b l e i n some way t o reduce a c t i o n s t o movements. There a r e v a r i o u s a c c o u n t s o f what such a r e d u c t i o n would amount t o , and t h u s v a r i o u s p o s i t i o n s p a r a l l e l t o r e d u c t i o n i s t p o s i t i o n s i n t h e p h i l o s o p h y o f mind. I s h a l l c o n s i d e r two o f them, analogous t o t h e i d e n t i t y t h e o r y and a v e r s i o n o f e l i m i n a t i v e m a t e r i a l i s m , i n t h e hope t h a t t h i s t r e a t m e n t w i l l s u p p l y t h e g e n e r a l o u t l i n e o f an approach t o a l l o f them. The " i d e n t i t y t h e o r y " would suppose, t h e n , t h a t a c t i o n s a r e i d e n t i c a l t o p h y s i c a l movements, o r , i n a more s o p h i s t i c a t e d v e r s i o n , t h a t t h e f a c t t h a t an agent c a r r i e d out a c e r t a i n a c t i o n i s i d e n t i c a l t o t h e f a c t t h a t h e r / h i s body moved i n a c e r t a i n way. Our a t t e n t i o n h e r e i s r e s t r i c t e d t o t h o s e a c t i o n s w h i c h i n v o l v e (as I would p u t i t ) p h y s i c a l movement; p u r e l y m ental a c t i o n s , such as c a l c u l a t i n g i n one's head o r d e c i d i n g t o l e a r n German, can be i g n o r e d as o f dubious s t a t u s , e x c e p t i n so f a r as t h e y can be reduced t o t h e n e u r o p h y s i o l o g y o f t h e agent. My o b j e c t i o n s t o t h i s v e r s i o n can be f a i r l y e a s i l y s t a t e d . F i r s t , n o t i c e t h a t t y p e - t y p e i d e n t i t i e s a r e i m p l a u s i b l e i n t h i s c o n t e x t , f o r a s i n g l e a c t i o n - t y p e , f o r 4 example " p o i s o n i n g t h e i n h a b i t a n t s " , can be a c c o m p l i s h e d t h r o u g h an enormously wide range o f p h y s i c a l movements, and a s i n g l e p h y s i c a l movement can be i n v o l v e d i n a v a s t range o f t y p e s o f a c t i o n - t h e movement wh i c h summons a f r i e n d t o t h e door o f h e r / h i s apartment i s t h e same as t h a t w h i c h might d e s t r o y t h e e a r t h t h r o u g h t h e d e t o n a t i o n o f a n u c l e a r d e v i c e . The o n l y way I can see t o a v o i d t h i s c o n c l u s i o n i s t o i n s i s t t h a t t h e d e s c r i p t i o n s o f b o d i l y movements must i n c l u d e not o n l y t h e f a c t s about t h e motions o f t h e agent's l i m b s , b u t a l s o t h o s e about t h e m a n i p u l a t i o n s o f t h e p h y s i c a l w o r l d t h e s e i n v o l v e . The p r o b l e m w i t h t h i s r e s p i t e i s t h a t t h e l i s t o f r e l e v a n t m a n i p u l a t i o n s may be e n d l e s s , and i t i s i n t u i t i v e l y i m p l a u s i b l e t h a t such a l i s t i s p a r t o f t h e d e s c r i p t i o n o f a p h y s i c a l movement, r a t h e r t h a n o f i t s e f f e c t s . Even i f t h e a l l e g e d i d e n t i t i e s a r e e x p r e s s e d i n t o k e n -t o k e n form, t h e r e a r e d i f f i c u l t i e s f o r t h i s v e r s i o n o f t h e " r e d u c t i o n i s t " view, f o r i f my e a r l i e r argument i s c o r r e c t , a c t i o n - a s c r i p t i o n s have i m p l i c a t i o n s not o n l y f o r t h e e f f e c t s o f t h e p h y s i c a l movements i n v o l v e d , b u t a l s o f o r t h e t y p e s o f mental s t a t e u n d e r l y i n g t h e a c t i o n , whereas d e s c r i p t i o n s o f p h y s i c a l movements l a c k such i m p l i c a t i o n s . The arguments o f Burge and Malcolm, mentioned i n Chapter 2, s e c t i o n ( b ) , show t h a t , f u r t h e r m o r e , mental s t a t e s cannot be i d e n t i f i e d w i t h n e u r o p h y s i o l o g i c a l s t a t e s a l o n e (nor mental f a c t s w i t h n e u r o p h y s i o l o g i c a l f a c t s a l o n e ) because t h e i m p l i c a t i o n s w h i c h mental a s c r i p t i o n s have f o r t h e s u r r o u n d i n g s , s o c i a l and o t h e r w i s e , o f t h e s u b j e c t . So t h e g e n e r a l e x p r e s s i o n o f my d i s s a t i s f a c t i o n w i t h t h e " i d e n t i t y t h e o r y " v e r s i o n i s t h a t a c t i o n - a s c r i p t i o n s have t r u t h - c o n d i t i o n s w h i c h s p r e a d out o v e r a much l a r g e r p o r t i o n o f t h e s p a t i o - t e m p o r a l w o r l d t h a n t h o s e of a s c r i p t i o n s o f p h y s i c a l movements. The second a l t e r n a t i v e , analogous t o an e l i m i n a t i v e m a t e r i a l i s m , would c e n t r e around t h e s u p p o s i t i o n t h a t because o f d i f f i c u l t i e s l i k e t h e above, we s h o u l d r e j e c t a c t i o n -a s c r i p t i o n s en b l o c i n f a v o u r o f physical-movement-a s c r i p t i o n s . T h i s r e d u c t i o n - b y - d i s a p p e a r a n c e has t h e v e r y c l e a r - c u t consequence t h a t t h e t h e o r e t i c a l r o l e o f mental language i s i n t h e c a u s a l e x p l a n a t i o n o f p h y s i c a l movements. The r e l a t i o n o f t h e l a t t e r t o a c t i o n s i s , on t h i s view, l a r g e l y i r r e l e v a n t . T h i s r e d u c t i o n i s t o b j e c t i o n , t h e n , w h i l e i t may f i n d f a u l t i n my a p p e a l t o t h e concept o f a c t i o n i n my e a r l i e r c o n s i d e r a t i o n s , cannot f o r c e t h e r e j e c t i o n o f my c o n c l u s i o n t h a t when me n t a l s t a t e s a r e spoken o f as t h e o r e t i c a l e n t i t i e s , i t i s the c a u s a l e x p l a n a t i o n o f movements which p r o v i d e s t h e arena i n w h i c h such e n t i t e s a r e p u t t o t h e t e s t . (The second a l t e r n a t i v e i n f a c t r e q u i r e s t h i s c o n c l u s i o n . ) I s h a l l now p r o c e e d t o some more d i r e c t arguments a g a i n s t t h e s u f f i c i e n c y o f t h i s a c c o u n t o f t h e f u n c t i o n o f mental language. (c) C a u s a l i t y and E x p l a n a t i o n by Reference to M e n t a l S t a t e s I remind the reader t h a t the n o t i o n of " t h e o r e t i c a l " r e l e v a n t h e r e has two a s p e c t s , the c a u s a l and the h y p o t h e t i c a l . To say t h a t an e n t i t y i s t h e o r e t i c a l i s then to say t h a t r e f e r e n c e to the e n t i t y o c c u r s i n some system of c a u s a l e x p l a n a t i o n ( T h e s i s I I ) and a l s o t h a t i t i s l o g i c a l l y p o s s i b l e t h a t , g i v e n what we know about o t h e r t h i n g s , e n t i t i e s 5 of t h i s s o r t do not e x i s t ( T h e s i s I I I ) . The c o n s i d e r a t i o n s I s h a l l b r i n g to bear are aimed at one or the o t h e r of these a s p e c t s , u s u a l l y not at b o t h . I s h a l l c o n c e n t r a t e my a t t e n t i o n f i r s t on the c a u s a l i t y - a s p e c t o f the c l a i m t h a t mental s t a t e s are t h e o r e t i c a l e n t i t i e s . The t h e s i s to be a t t a c k e d , i t w i l l be remembered, i s t h a t mental s t a t e s are p o s i t e d as f a c t o r s i n the c a u s a l e x p l a n a t i o n of b o d i l y movements, and t h a t t h i s i s the b e s t account of t h e i r r o l e i n human d i s c o u r s e . There i s such a t h i n g as the o r d i n a r y - l a n g u a g e e x p l a n a t i o n of b e h a v i o u r ; i t i s a v a r i e d and c o m p l i c a t e d assortment o f a c t i v i t i e s which i t i s perhaps h o p e l e s s to contemplate c h a r a c t e r i s i n g i n a few b r o a d s t r o k e s . I t w i l l be s u f f i c i e n t to my purposes i f I succeed i n showing what i t i s not - the c a u s a l e x p l a n a t i o n o f b o d i l y movement. Even t h i s c l a i m must be q u a l i f i e d , f o r i t would not s u r p r i s e me i f some uses of mental terms had t h i s s o r t of f u n c t i o n ; my t a r g e t i s more the view t h a t the p r i m a r y and p e r v a s i v e f u n c t i o n of mental language i s c a u s a l e x p l a n a t i o n and hence t h a t o r d i n a r y language e x p l a n a t i o n i s p r i m a r i l y and p e r v a s i v e l y c a u s a l e x p l a n a t i o n . ^ My reasons f o r t h i n k i n g tha t t h i s t h e s i s i s f a l s e are expressed i n the f o l l o w i n g s e c t i o n s . (d) A c t i o n s and Movements (Again) B e g i n n i n g a t t h e movement end o f t h e e x p l a n a t o r y c h a i n , we can ask f o r an example i n w h i c h some b o d i l y movement i s e x p l a i n e d by r e f e r e n c e t o a m e n t a l s t a t e . I r a i s e my arm and e x ecute a number o f q u a s i - c i r c u l a r movements w i t h my i n d e x -f i n g e r . Somebody asks why: t h e r e a s o n i s t h a t I am f e e l i n g l o n e l y . T h i s e x p l a n a t i o n i s u n d o u b t e d l y i n c o m p l e t e - not even a devout c a u s a l i t a r i a n would q u e s t i o n t h i s - b u t what i s i m p o r t a n t i s what i t would t a k e t o remove t h i s sense o f i n c o m p l e t e n e s s . L e t us s u p p l y some more r e l e v a n t m e n t a l s t a t e s - a d e s i r e t o a v o i d l o n e l i n e s s , a b e l i e f t h a t e x e c u t i n g such a s e r i e s o f movements w i l l e n a b l e me t o f u l f i l l t h a t d e s i r e . We must note t h a t t h e movements can o n l y be e x p e c t e d t o have t h a t e f f e c t i f t h e y a r e u n d e r t a k e n i n c e r t a i n c i r c u m s t a n c e s , namely the f a v o u r a b l e p o s i t i o n o f a t e l e p h o n e , so f o r t h e f u l l e x p l a n a t i o n we s h a l l r e q u i r e t h e f u r t h e r b e l i e f t h a t t h e r e i s a t e l e p h o n e i n such a p o s i t i o n . These b e l i e f s and t h e a s s o c i a t e d d e s i r e s combine t o form an i n t e n t i o n and upon t h i s I a c t (move my f i n g e r s ) . I f t h i s e x p l a n a t i o n sounds s t r a n g e l y m e c h a n i s t i c , I must be f o r g i v e n , f o r t h a t i m p r e s s i o n i s t h e r e s u l t o f my t r y i n g t o r e p r e s e n t as c a u s a l e x p l a n a t i o n something w h i c h I deny i s such. The p o i n t I w i s h t o make now i s , however, more l i m i t e d t h a n t h i s . The example i l l u s t r a t e s t h e f o l l o w i n g f e a t u r e o f o r d i n a r y - l a n g u a g e e x p l a n a t i o n o f b e h a v i o u r , t h a t i t a c c o m p l i s h e s an e x p l a n a t i o n o f my A - i n g i n terms o f my b e l i e f s about A - i n g , my d e s i r e s t o A, my i n t e n t i o n t o A and so f o r t h ; t h e e x p l a n a t i o n f a i l s , i n g e n e r a l , u n l e s s what i s t o be 7 e x p l a i n e d i s t h e o b j e c t o f t h e r e l e v a n t m ental s t a t e s . What I f i n d odd about th e example above i s t h a t t h e r e l e v a n t A i s t a k e n t o be a v e r y s p e c i f i c s e r i e s o f movements ( t h i s i s what i s t o be e x p l a i n e d ) and i t i s most i m p l a u s i b l e t o a t t r i b u t e t o t h e agent i n t e n t i o n s and b e l i e f s whose o b j e c t i s t h a t s e r i e s o f movements. The o n l y r e a s o n f o r d o i n g t h i s would be t o b o l s t e r some p h i l o s o p h i c a l t h e o r y o f a c t i o n - nobody i n o r d i n a r y l i f e would a t t r i b u t e t o me t h e i n t e n t i o n t o move my f i n g e r s a c c o r d i n g t o some e l a b o r a t e d g e o m e t r i c a l i t i n e r a r y . I n t h e r e l e v a n t sense o f " o b j e c t " t h e o b j e c t o f an i n t e n t i o n g i s an a c t i o n (e.g. t e l e p h o n i n g my f r i e n d ) , and t h i s was o m i t t e d from t h e e x p l a n a t i o n . Of c o u r s e , t h a t r e f e r e n c e t o an a c t i o n i s an e s s e n t i a l s t a g e i n t h e e x p l a n a t i o n does not e n t a i l t h a t t h e u l t i m a t e explanandum i s not a p h y s i c a l movement, but i t has c e r t a i n consequences f o r t h e r e l a t i o n s h i p between d i f f e r e n t s t a g e s i n t h e e x p l a n a t i o n . So f a r t h e s e r e l a t i o n s h i p s , on t h e t h e o r y b e i n g a t t a c k e d , have been r e f e r r e d t o under t h e g e n e r a l d e n o m i n a t i o n c a u s a l , but i t i s a m i s t a k e t o h o l d t h a t c a u s a l r e l a t i o n s e x i s t between a l l r e f e r e n t s a p p e a l e d t o i n t h e d i f f e r e n t s t a g e s . I f r e f e r e n c e t o an a c t i o n i s an e s s e n t i a l p a r t o f o r d i n a r y - l a n g u a g e e x p l a n a t i o n o f b e h a v i o u r , and i t i s h e l d t h a t what i s t o be e x p l a i n e d h e r e i s u l t i m a t e l y p h y s i c a l movement, t h e n i t sounds as i f t h e r e s h o u l d be c a u s a l r e l a t i o n s between a c t i o n s and movements, t h a t i s t o say between an a c t i o n and t h e movements i n whi c h i t i s c a r r i e d o u t . But t h i s i s nonsense. However a r g u a b l e i t might be t h a t a c t i o n s and movements are i d e n t i c a l , i t i s not i n t h e l e a s t 9 p l a u s i b l e t h a t t h e former cause t h e l a t t e r . A l o n g s i d e t h i s o b s e r v a t i o n , i t s h o u l d a l s o be noted t h a t we do speak o f a c t i o n s e x p l a i n i n g movements. Sometimes when I ask "Why i s she moving h e r hands l i k e t h a t ? " t h e s i m p l e a c t i o n - d e s c r i p t i o n "She i s r i n g i n g t h e b e l l " may s u f f i c e as an  e x p l a n a t i o n o f h e r movement w i t h o u t i t s b e i n g t r u e t h a t h e r r i n g i n g t h e b e l l caused h e r thus t o move h e r hands. The a c t i o n - a s c r i p t i o n i s an i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f t h e movement, not a r e f e r e n c e t o i t s c a u s a l a n t e c e d e n t s . My c a l l i n g t h i s form o f e x p l a n a t i o n " i n t e r p r e t a t i o n " i s y e t but t o name a d i f f i c u l t y , not t o r e s o l v e i t . The p o i n t t o be made i s t h a t t h e r e i s i n t h e a r e a o f a c t i o n - t h e o r y a form of e x p l a n a t i o n which i s not s t r a i g h t f o r w a r d l y a s s i m i l a b l e t o c a u s a l e x p l a n a t i o n as we know i t i n t h e s p e c i a l s c i e n c e s ; i t i s hoped t h a t t h e o b s e r v a t i o n s w h i c h l e d t o t h i s c o n c l u s i o n w i l l m o t i v a t e t h e demand f o r a g e n e r a l a c c o u n t o f a c t i o n -e x p l a n a t i o n w h i c h can encompass b o t h t h i s form and t h a t o f t h e e x p l a n a t i o n i n terms o f m e n t a l s t a t e s . I approach such a g e n e r a l account i n t h e next s e c t i o n . The r e s u l t s o f the p r e s e n t argument a r e as f o l l o w s : t h e form of e l i m i n a t i v e m a t e r i a l i s m b e i n g d e a l t w i t h r e p r e s e n t s the o r d i n a r y - l a n g u a g e e x p l a n a t i o n o f b e h a v i o u r as c a u s a l e x p l a n a t i o n , as i n v o l v i n g a f o l k - p s y c h o l o g i c a l t h e o r y w h i c h i s (or w i l l be) a d i r e c t c o m p e t i t o r w i t h n e u r o p h y s i o l o g y i n a c a u s a l / t h e o r e t i c a l b a t t l e f o r t h e e x p l a n a t i o n o f b e h a v i o u r . I t i s an a s s u m p t i o n o f t h i s v iew t h a t , pace Feyerabend [ 3 2 ] , t h e two t h e o r i e s compete t o e x p l a i n t h e same d a t a , namely the p h y s i c a l movements o f (human) b o d i e s . However, i t i s e s s e n t i a l t o o r d i n a r y e x p l a n a t i o n i n terms o f mental s t a t e s t h a t a c t i o n s appear i n some s t a g e o f t h e e x p l a n a t i o n . The r e l a t i o n between a c t i o n s and movements i s e x p l a n a t o r y , b u t not c a u s a l : t h a t i s t o say, a c t i o n s a r e not c a u s a l a n t e c e d e n t s o f t h e movements by which one c a r r i e s them o u t . For t h i s r e a s o n th e e x p l a n a t o r y r o u t e v i a a c t i o n s cannot be r e g a r d e d as homogeneously c a u s a l ; t h e r e f o r e t h e o r d i n a r y - l a n g u a g e e x p l a n a t i o n o f b e h a v i o u r i s not s i m p l y c a u s a l . Having e s t a b l i s h e d some m o t i v a t i o n f o r t h i s b e l i e f I can t u r n t o t h e p o s i t i v e s i d e o f my account o f t h e o r d i n a r y - l a n g u a g e 95 e x p l a n a t i o n o f b e h a v i o u r . (e) Causes and Reasons Up u n t i l now I have been s p e a k i n g o f t h e o r d i n a r y -language e x p l a n a t i o n o f b e h a v i o u r as i f i t were a homogeneous t y p e . T h i s p r e t e n c e must now c e a s e . I f I am t o j u s t i f y my c l a i m t h a t o r d i n a r y - l a n g u a g e e x p l a n a t i o n i s not p r i m a r i l y and p e r v a s i v e l y c a u s a l e x p l a n a t i o n , I must i s o l a t e from i t s c e n t r a l c a ses t h o s e w h i c h n o n - c o n t r o v e r s i a l l y i n v o l v e c a u s a l e x p l a n a t i o n . We do, i n o r d i n a r y l i f e , a s c r i b e t o b o t h a c t i o n s and b o d i l y movements causes w h i c h c o n s i s t i n e v e n t s and s t a t e s - o f -a f f a i r s i n t h e w o r l d o u t s i d e t h e agent o r mover and w h i c h do not o p e r a t e v i a h i s / h e r m e n t a l s t a t e s . A l f r e d f e l l o v e r because t h e 'bus swerved; B e t t y s p i l l e d t h e m i l k because t h e cow k i c k e d h e r ; C y r i l burned th e cakes because h i s c a r broke down on t h e way home. On t h e s u r f a c e t h e r e i s n o t h i n g e x c e s s i v e l y t h e o r e t i c a l about such e x p l a n a t i o n s ; however, t h e y a r e u n d e n i a b l y c a u s a l , a r g u a b l y i n v o l v e o n l y e v e n t s and s t a t e s - o f - a f f a i r s w h i c h have a p h y s i c a l d e s c r i p t i o n and, i t seems, a r e e a s i l y subsumable under p h y s i c a l ( o r p h y s i c o -c h e m i c a l ) t h e o r y - i n d e e d o f not t o o s o p h i s t i c a t e d a k i n d . E x cept i n so f a r as my f u t u r e remarks must a l l o w f o r t h e e x i s t e n c e o f t h e s e forms o f e x p l a n a t i o n , t h e y w i l l not be r e l e v a n t t o t h e s u b j e c t a t hand. So t h e f i r s t r e s t r i c t i o n on t h e scope o f " o r d i n a r y -language e x p l a n a t i o n o f b e h a v i o u r " i s t o e x p l a n a t i o n s i n v o l v i n g t h e m e n t a l s t a t e s o f t h e agent/mover. However, i t must be noted a g a i n t h a t much o f such e x p l a n a t i o n i s s t r a i g h t f o r w a r d l y (and me r e l y ) c a u s a l i n n a t u r e . There a r e cases where what i s i s o l a t e d as " t h e " cause i s an event o r s t a t e - o f - a f f a i r s o u t s i d e t h e agent y e t where t h e c a u s a l r o u t e t o h e r / h i s a c t i o n p a s s e s t h r o u g h h e r / h i s m e n t a l s t a t e s . D a v i d dropped t h e pan because i t was h o t (but he wouldn't have dropped i t i f t h e h e a t had not caused p a i n ) . I n cases such as t h e s e we have no h e s i t a t i o n i n s u p p o s i n g t h a t t h e m e n t a l s t a t e causes t h e action/movement as w e l l - t h a t i s t o say, i t i s an e s s e n t i a l p a r t o f . t h e f u l l c a u s a l s t o r y . F o r my purposes cases o f t h i s k i n d a re not s i g n i f i c a n t l y d i f f e r e n t from cases where mental s t a t e s a r e s a i d t o cause a c t i o n s o r movements w i t h o u t mention o f any e x t e r n a l causes f o r t h e mental s t a t e s . E l l e n t u r n e d r e d , screamed and p u t h e r f i s t t h r o u g h t h e w a l l because she was angry; Frank f a i l e d t o n o t i c e t h e s t o p - s i g n because o f h i s headache; G r e t a stopped and s t a r e d a t t h e ground, because t h e thought had s u d d e n l y o c c u r r e d t o h e r t h a t perhaps a l l was not w e l l a t t h e manor; H a l was l e d i n t o e r r o r because he b e l i e v e d t h a t God demanded t h e r e n u n c i a t i o n o f human t i e s ; as a r e s u l t o f t h e same b e l i e f , I a n t h e l i v e d a v e r y l o n e l y o l d age. I n c ases such as t h e s e we have no d i f f i c u l t y i n su p p o s i n g t h a t t h e e x p l a n a t i o n o f f e r e d c o u l d i n p r i n c i p l e be complemented by one i n terms o f t h e n e u r o p h y s i o l o g y o f t h e agent and i n terms o f whatever o t h e r p h y s i c a l systems a r e r e l e v a n t . Where I do see a d i f f i c u l t y i s i n t h e c l a i m t h a t t h e development o f a s u c c e s s f u l n e u r o p h y s i o l o g i c a l ( e t c . ) e x p l a n a t i o n would show t h a t t h e o r d i n a r y ones i n s t a n c e d above were f a l s e . T h i s s t r i k e s me as most i m p l a u s i b l e . My s u g g e s t i o n , once a g a i n , i s t h a t we have two p a r a l l e l c a u s a l s t o r i e s , each t o l d i n i t s own terms and each t r u e , by a n a l o g y w i t h t h e h a r d w a r e / s o f t w a r e case mentioned i n Chapter 2, s e c t i o n ( d ) . On t h e l e v e l o f t h e o r e t i c a l e x p l a n a t i o n , t h a t w h i c h i s e x p l a i n e d by t h e p h y s i c a l i s t s t o r y w i l l be t h e embodiment i n p h y s i c a l terms o f t h e a c t i o n o r r e a c t i o n w h i c h i s e x p l a i n e d i n o r d i n a r y terms, b u t a t a more i n f o r m a l l e v e l we can a l l o w f o r mongrel e x p l a n a t i o n s which mix t h e two modes. I t might be thought t h a t my a d m i s s i o n o f a c a u s a l r o l e f o r m ental s t a t e s i n t h e p r e c e d i n g examples i s a t odds w i t h my c l a i m t h a t m e n t a l e x p l a n a t i o n i s not p r i m a r i l y and p e r v a s i v e l y c a u s a l . Perhaps I need t o m o d i f y my c l a i m : t h e p o i n t i s t h a t t h e r e i_s an a c t i v i t y , c a l l e d e x p l a n a t i o n o f a c t i o n , w h i c h does not c o n s i s t i n t h e s u p p l y i n g o f a c a u s a l a c c o u n t o f t h e a c t i o n , but wh i c h i n v o l v e s m e n t i o n i n g t h e me n t a l s t a t e s o f the agent ( t h i s i s t h e g i v i n g o f reas o n s f o r a c t i o n ) , and t h a t t h i s a c t i v i t y c o u l d ground our b e l i e f i n t h e e x i s t e n c e o f mental s t a t e s . Some p r e l i m i n a r y d i f f i c u l t i e s must be d e a l t w i t h b e f o r e I can g i v e my acc o u n t o f t h i s form o f e x p l a n a t i o n . The e a r l y p a r t s o f t h e h i s t o r i c a l debate about t h e a l l e g e d o p p o s i t i o n betwen rea s o n s and causes were v i t i a t e d because t h e argument c e n t r e d on t h e attempt ( o r t h e f u t i l i t y o f t h e a t t e m p t ) t o f i n d and ground a d i s t i n c t i o n between two d i f f e r e n t k i n d s o f t h i n g s , namely rea s o n s and c a u s e s . I t was t h o u g h t by t h e proponents o f t h e d i s t i n c t i o n t h a t t h e s e k i n d s were m u t u a l l y e x c l u s i v e - a m i s t a k e which l e f t them unable t o cope w i t h a m u l t i t u d e o f c o u n t e r - e x a m p l e s . The d i s t i n c t i o n I suggest i s between two a c t i v i t i e s , two forms o f e x p l a i n i n g , namely g i v i n g a r e a s o n f o r an a c t i o n and g i v i n g i t s cause, and hence between two f u n c t i o n s f o r o r d i n a r y m e n t a l language. I t i s p a r t o f my view t h a t t h e same mental s t a t e may o c c u r i n b o t h forms o f t h e e x p l a n a t i o n o f some a c t i o n : J u s t i n t o o k h i s u m b r e l l a because he b e l i e v e d i t would r a i n , and J u s t i n ' s b e l i e f t h a t i t would r a i n caused h im t o t a k e h i s u m b r e l l a . However, some causes cannot be r e a s o n s , and v i c e v e r s a . Ken's unhappy c h i l d h o o d caused h im t o become an a l c o h o l i c , but was no p a r t o f h i s r e a s o n f o r so d o i n g . L o l i t a e n t e r e d t h e convent t o f i n d h a p p i n e s s , b u t f i n d i n g h a p p i n e s s d i d not cause h e r t o a c t i n t h i s way. My comments on t h i s l a s t example must be q u i c k l y q u a l i f i e d . When a r e a s o n f o r some a c t i o n i s e x p r e s s e d i n terms o f a g o a l , some f u t u r e s t a t e - o f - a f f a i r s w h i c h i s sought but not y e t a c t u a l , i t i s o f c o u r s e nonsense t o t a k e t h e s t a t e - o f - a f f a i r s as p a r t o f t h e cause o f t h e a c t i o n . However we can a t t r i b u t e t o t h e agent some d e s i r e , w i s h , hope o r whatever f o r t h e a t t a i n m e n t o f t h e g o a l , and t h i s w i l l p resumably have a r o l e i n t h e c a u s a t i o n o f t h e a c t i o n . "^ T h i s o b s e r v a t i o n s u g g e s t s th e g e n e r a l p r i n c i p l e t h a t i t i s a ( c o n c e p t u a l ) c o n d i t i o n o f some g o a l ' s b e i n g t h e r e a s o n f o r a p a r t i c u l a r a c t i o n t h a t t h e agent have some form o f desire'*'"'' f o r the a t t a i n m e n t o f t h a t g o a l and t h a t t h i s d e s i r e be ( c a u s a l l y ) e f f e c t i v e i n b r i n g i n g about th e a c t i o n . T h i s p r i n c i p l e about f o r w a r d - l o o k i n g reasons has an o bverse about c e r t a i n k i n d s o f b a c k w a r d - l o o k i n g r e a s o n , namely t h o s e w h i c h a r e d e s c r i b e d i n terms o f some f a c t about t h e w o r l d o t h e r t h a n th e m ental s t a t e s o f t h e agent. Take t h e case where M i c h a e l f i r e d N i c h o l a s because he ( t h e l a t t e r ) d i d not t u r n up f o r p r a c t i c e . Here i t i s N i c h o l a s ' f a i l u r e t o a t t e n d w h i c h i s g i v e n as t h e r e a s o n f o r M i c h a e l ' s a c t i o n , and even though t h i s f a i l u r e _ i s , i n c o n t r a d i s t i n c t i o n t o t h e case o f g o a l s , p a r t o f t h e cause o f t h e a c t i o n , we a r e e n t i t l e d t o demand t h e f u r t h e r c o n d i t i o n t h a t M i c h a e l be i n some mental s t a t e w h i c h i n v o l v e s , a t l e a s t , t h e b e l i e f t h a t N i c h o l a s d i d not t u r n up f o r p r a c t i c e . O t h e r w i s e t h a t c o u l d not have been the r e a s o n f o r M i c h a e l ' s f i r i n g him. I n such a case i t w i l l be f u r t h e r t r u e t h a t t h e b e l i e f - i n v o l v i n g m e n t a l s t a t e i s c a u s a l l y r e l a t e d t o t h e a c t i o n . The demand f o r a d e s i r e i s more prominent i n t h e f o r w a r d -l o o k i n g case and t h a t f o r a b e l i e f i n t h e b a c k w a r d - l o o k i n g c a s e , bu t i n f a c t each case i n v o l v e s each demand. I n t h e f i r s t , i t i s a f u r t h e r c o n d i t i o n o f t h e g o a l ' s b e i n g t h e 12 r e a s o n f o r t h e a c t i o n t h a t t h e agent b e l i e v e t h a t t h e a c t i o n w i l l a t l e a s t f a c i l i t a t e t h e a t t a i n m e n t o f t h e g o a l , and t h a t t h i s b e l i e f be e f f e c t i v e i n d e t e r m i n i n g t h e a c t i o n . L i k e w i s e M i c h a e l must d e s i r e t o f i r e N i c h o l a s and t h i s d e s i r e must be p a r t o f t h e cause o f t h e f i r i n g . I am t h u s l e d t o propose th e f o l l o w i n g p r i n c i p l e : e x t e r n a l i s e d reasons (e.g. g o a l s and f a c t s about t h e e x t e r n a l w o r l d ) r e q u i r e i n t e r n a l i s e d r e a s o n s , c o n s i s t i n g o f a b e l i e f / d e s i r e p a i r o f w h i c h i t can a l s o be s a i d t h a t i t i s p a r t o f t h e cause o f t h e r e l e v a n t a c t i o n . ( T h i s i s what Davidson [33] c a l l s a p r i m a r y r e a s o n . W i t h t h i s p a r t o f h i s v i ew I am i n agreement. I d i f f e r i n t h e a c c o u n t o f t h e f u n c t i o n o f r e a s o n - e x p l a n a t i o n s t h e m s e l v e s : he b e l i e v e s , whereas I do n o t , t h a t r e a s o n - e x p l a n a t i o n s a r e c a u s a l e x p l a n a t i o n s . ) I t i s t h e r e l a t i o n s h i p between a c t i o n s and i n t e r n a l i s e d 1 0 2 reasons w h i c h i s o f i n t e r e s t t o us i n t h e d i s c u s s i o n o f how mental s t a t e s a r e r e l a t e d t o a c t i o n s . Having a l l o w e d t h e n e c e s s i t y f o r a c a u s a l c o n n e c t i o n h e r e , I now w i s h t o c l a i m t h a t more i s r e q u i r e d a d e q u a t e l y t o c h a r a c t e r i s e t h i s r e l a t i o n s h i p . I s h a l l p r e s e n t ( i n dogmatic f a s h i o n ) a b r i e f t h e o r y o f r e a s o n s c u l l e d from a c o n s i d e r a t i o n o f t h e r o l e o f r e a s o n - g i v i n g i n human i n t e r a c t i o n . ( f ) Reasons and I n t e r p r e t a t i o n Reasons a r e g i v e n i n response t o q u e s t i o n s , posed by-o t h e r s o r by o n e s e l f ; such a q u e s t i o n asks why t h e r e l e v a n t a c t i o n was committed, o r movement made. E x p r e s s e d i n t h e most g e n e r a l terms, t h e f a c t i s t h a t t h e q u e s t i o n e r i s m i s s i n g t h e a p p r e c i a t i o n o f some c h a r a c t e r i s t i c o f t h e a c t i o n o r movement whic h t h e p e r s o n q u e s t i o n e d i s asked t o s u p p l y . ( I t i s i r r e l e v a n t whether e i t h e r p e r s o n i s t h e agent.) Sometimes t h e s e e k i n g o f t h i s c h a r a c t e r i s t i c i s m o t i v a t e d by t h e d e s i r e f o r knowledge o f t h e c a u s a l a n t e c e d e n t s o f t h e a c t i o n , and sometimes i n t h e s e cases i t i s t h e men t a l s t a t e s o f t h e agent which a r e o b s c u r e t o t h e q u e s t i o n e r . A t o t h e r t i m e s , t h e q u e s t i o n i s not m e r e l y a r e q u e s t f o r f a c t u a l i n f o r m a t i o n o f t h i s k i n d , b u t a l s o a form o f c h a l l e n g e : what t h e q u e s t i o n e r l a c k s i s t h e a p p r e c i a t i o n o f t h e a c t i o n as r a t i o n a l , as t h e a c t o f a r a t i o n a l a gent. What we c a l l g i v i n g t h e r e a s o n f o r an a c t i o n i s a response t o a c h a l l e n g e o f t h i s form. What t h e q u e s t i o n e r g a i n s as t h e r e s u l t o f a c o r r e c t r e s p o n s e t o h i s q u e s t i o n i s an i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f t h e a c t i o n o r movement as r a t i o n a l . The forms o f r e s p o n s e , and hence t h e k i n d s o f r e a s o n , a r e v a r i o u s , and dependent upon what k i n d o f l a c k i s s u f f e r e d by t h e q u e s t i o n e r - t h e r e i s thus a g r e a t d e a l o f r e l a t i v i t y t o c o n t e x t and c i r c u m s t a n c e s i n whether some X i s a ( o r t h e ) r e a s o n f o r some Y. "Why d i d he r a i s e h i s arm?" - "To s t a r t t h e r a c e " : h e r e an a c t i o n - d e s c r i p t i o n o f f e r s a r a t i o n a l i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f h i s movement; i . e . t h e movement i s r e p r e s e n t e d as a r a t i o n a l means t o t h e end o f s t a r t i n g t h e r a c e . "Because he wanted t o s t a r t t h e r a c e " would i n many c i r c u m s t a n c e s s u p p l y t h e same i n t e r p r e t a t i o n by r e f e r e n c e t o the m e n t a l s t a t e s o f t h e agent. "Why d i d he s t a r t t h e r a c e ? " - "Because i t was t i m e " ; "Because t h a t ' s h i s j o b " ; "Because he doesn't want t o be f i r e d " ; "Because u r g e n t b u s i n e s s needed t o be a t t e n d e d t o " . Responses such as t h e s e a r e a p p r o p r i a t e t o the r e q u e s t f o r a r e a s o n i n p a r t i c u l a r c i r c u m s t a n c e s , where t h e p e r s o n q u e s t i o n e d knows from t h e c o n t e x t o f p r e v i o u s d i s c o u r s e what element i s m i s s i n g from t h e q u e s t i o n e r ' s comprehension o f t h e a c t i o n . I t does not need t o be p o i n t e d out t h a t t h e examples o f re a s o n s g i v e n h e r e form a v e r y mixed bag. So t o o do t h e senses o f " r a t i o n a l i t y " , o r t h e k i n d s o f r a t i o n a l i t y , i n v o l v e d i n t h e ( r e q u e s t i n g , ) g i v i n g (and r e p o r t i n g ) o f r e a s o n s . A t one end o f t h e s c a l e i s t h e f a i r l y s i m p l e "means-end" r a t i o n a l i t y o f d e c i s i o n t h e o r y , where a per s o n ' s a c t i o n i s judged t o be r a t i o n a l t o t h e e x t e n t t h a t i t i s a s u c c e s s f u l means t o t h e f u l f i l l m e n t o f some d e s i r e o f h i s o r h e r s . Here what counts as r a t i o n a l i s r e l a t i v e l y d e t e r m i n a t e - we a r e i n c l i n e d t o t h i n k t h a t whether o r not an a c t i o n i s r a t i o n a l i n t h i s sense i s a f a c t u a l m a t t e r ; a l t h o u g h t h e r e can be d i s p u t e s about such a m a t t e r , t h e s e w i l l be r e s o l v a b l e t h r o u g h t h e a c q u i s i t i o n o f new i n f o r m a t i o n . The same t h i n g cannot be s a i d , however, about t h e o t h e r end(s) o f t h e s c a l e , f o r example i n t h e a r e a o f moral r a t i o n a l i t y . I t does not seem t o be a s i m p l e m a t t e r o f f a c t whether i t i s r a t i o n a l t o condone p r o s t i t u t i o n , and new i n f o r m a t i o n w i l l n o t a s s i s t us i n s e t t l i n g t h i s i s s u e . M o r a l q u e s t i o n s such as t h e s e , and even more o b v i o u s l y b r o a d e r e t h i c a l q u e s t i o n s about how one s h o u l d l i v e , a r e open t o r a t i o n a l d i s a g r e e m e n t - t h a t i s t o say, t h e r e may be no s i n g l e d e t e r m i n a t e answer t o t h e q u e s t i o n o f w h i c h o f two c o n t r a r y p o s i t i o n s i s t h e r a t i o n a l one t o h o l d . The c l a i m t h a t one o f t h e s e p o s i t i o n s i s t h e o n l y r a t i o n a l one t o h o l d i s t h e n t o be seen l e s s as a f a c t u a l 1 3 c l a i m t h a n as an e v a l u a t i v e one. To r e t u r n t o t h e s c a l e o f senses o f " r a t i o n a l i t y " , we s h o u l d note t h a t not o n l y a r e a c t i o n s judged as r a t i o n a l i n r e l a t i o n t o t h e m ental s t a t e s o f t h e agent, o r i n r e l a t i o n t o a s e t o f " e x t e r n a l i s e d " v a l u e s , b u t a l s o t h e m ental s t a t e s themselves a r e judged t o be r a t i o n a l o r i r r a t i o n a l . Sometimes t h e i s s u e i s t h e c o m p a r a t i v e l y d e t e r m i n a t e one o f l o g i c a l c o n s i s t e n c y (e.g. among b e l i e f s ) , sometimes t h e c o m p a r a t i v e l y i n d e t e r m i n a t e one o f whether t h e p o s s e s s i o n o f such a s t a t e ( b e l i e f , d e s i r e , a t t i t u d e , f e e l i n g , e t c . ) i s r a t i o n a l t o u t  c o u r t ; t h i s i s c l e a r l y an e v a l u a t i v e m a t t e r i n many c a s e s . What a l l t h e s e c a s e s , senses and t y p e s o f r a t i o n a l i t y have i common i s t h a t t h e y a r e t a u t o l o g i c a l l y i n v o l v e d w i t h j u s t i f i c a t i o n and t o t h i s I now t u r n . (g) R a t i o n a l i t y and J u s t i f i c a t i o n To ask whether an a c t i o n i s r a t i o n a l i s t o ask whether i t i s r a t i o n a l l y j u s t i f i e d , but t h i s can mean a number o f t h i n g s . Sometimes our i n t e r e s t i s o n l y i n whether an agent has a r e a s o n f o r h i s / h e r a c t i o n ; we say t h e a c t i o n i s j u s t i f i e d i f i t i s i n r a t i o n a l a c cordance w i t h h i s / h e r b e l i e f s and d e s i r e s . T h i s n o t i o n o f accordance i s n o r m a t i v e - a p r o f f e r e d r e a s o n o n l y counts b o t h as a r e a s o n and as a j u s t i f i c a t i o n o f some a c t i o n i f we ( i n g e n e r a l ) so r e g a r d i t , would a t l e a s t f e e l p r i m a f a c i e i n c l i n e d t o a c t t h a t way g i v e n t h a t r e a s o n - b u t i t i s not d a n g e r o u s l y so. What I mean by t h i s i s t h a t i n t h e s e cases t h e c o n s t r a i n t s upon r a t i o n a l i t y do not t o any g r e a t e x t e n t i n v o l v e e v a l u a t i v e o p i n i o n . The d e s i r e t o a v o i d hunger, c o u p l e d w i t h t h e b e l i e f t h a t e a t i n g p o t a t o c r i s p s w i l l a l l e v i a t e hunger, i s a r e a s o n ( i f a n y t h i n g i s i ) f o r e a t i n g them; t h e d e s i r e t o a v o i d t h i r s t , c o u p l e d w i t h t h i s b e l i e f , i s n o t . I n t h i s p r e l i m i n a r y sense o f " r a t i o n a l l y j u s t i f i e d " I would f u r t h e r suppose t h a t t h e d e s i r e t o a v o i d t h i r s t , c o u p l e d w i t h t h e b e l i e f t h a t p o t a t o c r i s p s quench t h i r s t , would be s u f f i c i e n t j u s t i f i c a t i o n f o r e a t i n g them. Any attempt t o c r i t i c i s e t h i s t h i r s t y agent upon grounds o f i r r a t i o n a l i t y would p r o c e e d from q u e s t i o n i n g t h e r a t i o n a l i t y o f h i s / h e r s e t o f b e l i e f s , i n terms b o t h o f c o n s i s t e n c y and o f what s/he ought, g i v e n h i s / h e r l i f e , t o have p i c k e d up about the w o r l d . I t can be seen t h a t f u r t h e r n o r m a t i v e elements c r e e p i n h e r e . There a r e o t h e r o c c a s i o n s , n o t a b l y b u t not e x c l u s i v e l y i n m oral l i f e , where our i n t e r e s t extends beyond t h e q u e s t i o n of whether t h e agent had a r e a s o n f o r h i s / h e r a c t i o n , o r even a good r e a s o n f o r h i s / h e r a c t i o n . We can admit t h a t a p e r s o n has a p r i m a f a c i e r e a s o n f o r a c t i n g i n such-and-such a way, y e t q u e s t i o n whether h e r / h i s a c t i o n i s r a t i o n a l l y j u s t i f i e d . T h i s may be because s/he has o t h e r r e a s o n s ( o t h e r b e l i e f s and d e s i r e s ) w h i c h i n d i c a t e a d i f f e r e n t c o u r s e o f a c t i o n and which are more i m p o r t a n t t o h e r / h i m . O l i v e r (who had no thought o f s u i c i d e ) was i r r a t i o n a l t o r u s h i n t o h i s b u r n i n g house t o t r y t o save h i s d a u g h t e r ' s t e d d y - b e a r , though h i s l o v e f o r h i s daughter p r o v i d e d him w i t h a good r e a s o n f o r t r y i n g t o save the t e d d y - b e a r . ( H i s a c t i o n i s c o n s i s t e n t w i t h t h e suggested r e l a t i v e w e i g h t i n g o f h i s d e s i r e s f o r l i f e and f o r a l l e v i a t i n g h i s d a u g h t e r ' s sorrow i f we suppose t h a t t h e former was " s h e l v e d " i n t h e h e a t o f t h e moment.) There a r e o t h e r cases where th e q u e s t i o n o f j u s t i f i c a t i o n a r i s e s f o r an a c t i o n f o r w h i c h t h e r e i s a d m i t t e d l y a r e a s o n , b u t where our c o n c e r n i s d i r e c t e d not a t the f a c t t h a t t h e agent has o t h e r r e a s o n s f o r d o i n g something e l s e , b u t m e r e l y a t t h e p o s s i b i l i t y t h a t h i s r e a s o n does not j u s t i f y h i s a c t i o n . One t y p e o f case would be o v e r r e a c t i o n -the gamekeeper who sh o o t s t h e p o a c h e r ; a n o t h e r would be where we o b j e c t t o some i n s t i t u t i o n a l i s e d r e a s o n - a c t i o n j u s t i f i c a t i o n r e l a t i o n , such as t h e b e l i e f t h a t c a p i t a l punishment i s w a r r a n t e d i n ca s e s o f murder. P e o p l e sometimes argue t h a t j e a l o u s y i s i r r a t i o n a l - i f i t i s , t h i s i s because the grounds f o r j e a l o u s y do not j u s t i f y t h e r e a c t i o n . These " u l t i m a t e " q u e s t i o n s o f j u s t i f i c a t i o n , not r e l a t i v e t o t h e b e l i e f s and d e s i r e s o f t h e agent i n t h e s i m p l e manner o f d e c i s i o n - t h e o r y - r a t i o n a l i t y , a r e e v a l u a t i v e q u e s t i o n s , and i t i s by no means c l e a r t h a t t h e y always have d e t e r m i n a t e answers. Perhaps t h i s i s a r e a s o n f o r t h i n k i n g t h a t a d i f f e r e n t sense o f " r a t i o n a l i t y " i s i n v o l v e d i n them; perhaps n o t . What i s i m p o r t a n t t o my case i s t h e c h a r a c t e r i s a t i o n w h i c h t h e s e cases p r o v i d e o f an e n t e r p r i s e , namely t h e j u s t i f i c a t i o n (and i t s q u e s t i o n i n g ) by (and i n terms o f ) r e a s o n s , w h i c h i s b o t h p r e v a l e n t and i m p o r t a n t i n human s o c i e t y . G i v e n t h a t t h e me n t a l s t a t e s o f t h e agent have t h e a b i l i t y t o j u s t i f y h e r / h i s a c t i o n s , we s h o u l d c o n c l u d e t h a t mental language has h e r e a f u n c t i o n o v e r and above t h e t h e o r e t i c o - c a u s a l e x p l a n a t i o n o f b e h a v i o u r . As w i l l be seen l a t e r , t h e open-ended n a t u r e o f t h i s e n t e r p r i s e , t h e f a c t t h a t i n i t not a l l q u e s t i o n s have d e t e r m i n a t e answers, p r o v i d e s some r e a s o n f o r t h i n k i n g t h a t i t i s r e s i s t a n t t o t h e r e p l a c e m e n t o f mental language by t h a t o f n e u r o p h y s i o l o g y . These c o n c l u s i o n s remain t o be drawn i n Chapter 6. The immediate c o n c l u s i o n s o f t h e p r e s e n t c h a p t e r a r e t h a t ( i ) i n so f a r as m e n t a l language i s employed i n c a u s a l e x p l a n a t i o n , i t need not be viewed as competing w i t h n e u r o p h y s i o l o g y ( o r any o t h e r proposed c a u s a l a c c o u n t ) , and ( i i ) g i v e n t h a t t h e purpose o f r e a s o n - e x p l a n a t i o n i s j u s t i f i c a t i o n , n o t c a u s a l e x p l a n a t i o n , t h e r e e x i s t s an i m p o r t a n t f u n c t i o n o f mental language t h e v a l i d i t y o f which i s not a s c i e n t i f i c i s s u e . These c o n c l u s i o n s c a s t doubt on Theses IV and I I r e s p e c t i v e l y . I t u r n next t o the r e p o r t i n g r o l e o f m e n t a l a s c r i p t i o n s , i n an attempt t o d i s c o v e r whether t h i s can be a c c o u n t e d f o r a d e q u a t e l y by R o r t y 1 s view, i n v o l v i n g as i t does t h e c l a i m t h a t m ental s t a t e s a r e t h e o r e t i c a l e n t i t i e s . I n i t i a l l y my f o c u s w i l l be on T h e s i s I I I . Footnotes to Chapter 4 1. T h i s l o o s e mode of e x p r e s s i o n i g n o r e s the N a g e l i a n r e f o r m u l a t i o n of the i d e n t i t y t h e o r y i n terms of f a c t -i d e n t i t y . T h i s o m i s s i o n , under taken on grounds o f economy, i s not of importance h e r e . What I say c o u l d q u i t e s t r a i g h t f o r w a r d l y be r e i n t e r p r e t e d as r e l e v a n t to the c l a i m t h a t mental f a c t s are t h e o r e t i c a l f a c t s . 2. T h i s i s b o t h a s i m p l i f i c a t i o n and an embel l i shment o f S e l l a r s 1 Myth , but n e i t h e r q u a l i f i c a t i o n a f f e c t s the use to which I put the M y t h . The s i m p l i f i c a t i o n i s made because S e l l a r s ' v e r s i o n , where thoughts are t o be p o s t u l a t e d f i r s t as c a u s a l s u b s t i t u t e s f o r spoken s en tences , i n v o l v e s the q u e s t i o n a b l e s u p p o s i t i o n t h a t speech c o u l d be a s s i g n e d a r o l e i n the c a u s a l e x p l a n a t i o n of b e h a v i o u r i n the absence o f any b e l i e f s about the p s y c h o l o g y of the s p e a k e r . The embel l i shment i s made because s imple one-one c o r r e l a t i o n s between sensory i n p u t and b e h a v i o u r a l output would not r e q u i r e the p o s t u l a t i o n o f mental s t a t e s as i n t e r v e n i n g v a r i a b l e s . 3. N o t h i n g , t h e r e f o r e t h i s n e i t h e r . 4. To borrow an example from E l i z a b e t h Anscombe [ 3 1 ] . 5. T h i s c o n d i t i o n o f h y p o t h e t i c a l i t y i s perhaps not c l e a r l y e x p r e s s e d . I t i s meant to r u l e out o f the c l a s s o f t h e o r e t i c a l e n t i t i e s t h i n g s l i k e p i s t o n s which q u a l i f y by the f i r s t c o n d i t i o n . I t might be o b j e c t e d t h a t i t i s wrong to c h a r a c t e r i s e h y p o t h e t i c a l i t y as a c o n d i t i o n o f t h e o r e t i c a l i t y - t h e r e seeems to be a sense i n which e l e c t r o n s are s t i l l t h e o r e t i c a l e n t i t i e s even now t h a t t h e i r e x i s t e n c e i s more or l e s s accepted f a c t . In r e p l y , I would say t h a t I do not mind i f " t h e o r e t i c a l " i s sometimes used i n t h i s way, a l t h o u g h I would i n s i s t tha t t h e r e i s a l s o a use i n which h y p o t h e t i c a l i t y is^ a c o n d i t i o n of t h e o r e t i c a l i t y . The d e s i r e to c a l l e l e c t r o n s t h e o r e t i c a l has a number o f s o u r c e s : the f a c t t h a t f a i r l y r e c e n t l y they were h y p o t h e t i c a l e n t i t i e s (and t h e r e f o r e t h e o r e t i c a l i n my sense) i s one; another i s the c o n f l a t i o n of the t h e o r e t i c a l 7 n o n - t h e o r e t i c a l d i s t i n c i o n w i t h the n o n -o b s e r v a b l e / o b s e r v a b l e d i s t i n c t i o n , t o g e t h e r w i t h the (now dubious ) assumpt ion tha t e l e c t r o n s are n o n - o b s e r v a b l e ; a t h i r d i s the f a c t t h a t e l e c t r o n s are mentioned i n t h e o r i e s , a l t h o u g h t h i s i s of q u e s t i o n a b l e s i g n i f i c a n c e s i n c e the word " e l e c t r o n " o n l y appears i n d i s c u r s i v e appendices to m a t h e m a t i c a l l y -e x p r e s s e d t h e o r i e s and i n e x p l a n a t i o n s - f o r - t h e - l a y p e r s o n . Whatever t h e m e r i t s o f t h e usage, t h e f a c t remains t h a t R o r t y i s committed t o t h e h y p o t h e t i c a l i t y o f mental s t a t e s , and so I s h a l l have r e f u t e d h i s p o s i t i o n i f I can show c o n c l u s i v e l y t h a t m ental s t a t e s a r e not h y p o t h e t i c a l . 6. I cannot o f f e r a s t r i c t d e f i n i t i o n o f what I mean by " p r i m a r y f u n c t i o n " and " p r i m a r y and p e r v a s i v e f u n c t i o n " . There a r e , however, a number o f i d e a s w h i c h I am t r y i n g t o c a p t u r e i n t h e c l a i m t h a t t h e p r i m a r y f u n c t i o n o f m e n t a l lamguage i s i n c a u s a l e x p l a n a t i o n : ( i ) most uses o f mental a s c r i p t i o n s s e r v e t h e f u n c t i o n o f c a u s a l e x p l a n a t i o n , ( i i ) t h e a p p r o p r i a t e way t o j u s t i f y most a s c r i p t i o n s o f m e n t a l s t a t e s i s i n terms o f t h e i r s u c c e s s i n a c c o u n t i n g c a u s a l l y f o r b e h a v i o u r , and ( i i i ) t h e main r e a s o n f o r r e g a r d i n g mental s t a t e s as e x i s t i n g i n t h e w o r l d i s t h e s u c c e s s o f r e f e r e n c e t o them i n c a u s a l e x p l a n a t i o n . I am p a r t i c u l a r l y c oncerned w i t h q u e s t i o n i n g ( i i i ) because I b e l i e v e t h a t t h e e x i s t e n c e o f mental s t a t e s i s g u a r a n t e e d by t h e n o n - c a u s a l f u n c t i o n s o f mental language. I f t h i s i s so, t h e n R o r t y i s wrong i n r e p r e s e n t i n g t h e i s s u e o f whether mental s t a t e s e x i s t as l a r g e l y a s c i e n t i f i c m a t t e r . I t u r n t o t h i s i n C h a p t e r 6. 7. Sometimes my B - i n g i s e x p l a i n e d i n terms o f mental s t a t e s whose o b j e c t i s my A - i n g , when B - i n g i s an a c c i d e n t a l r e s u l t o f A - i n g . But h e r e t h e e x p l a n a t i o n works v i a my A - i n g , w i t h an added h y p o t h e s i s t o t h e e f f e c t t h a t i n t h e s e c i r c u m s t a n c e s A - i n g i n v o l v e s B - i n g . 8. I n some c a s e s , e.g. i n t h e a c t i v i t y o f dance, t h e o b j e c t may be a p h y s i c a l movement pure and s i m p l e . On my view, t h i s would be t r e a t e d , I suppose, as t h e l i m i t i n g case o f an a c t i o n . What I am concerned t o deny i s t h a t i n e v e r y case t h e o b j e c t s o f my i n t e n t i o n s a r e p h y s i c a l movements. 9. We sometimes speak o f movements c a u s i n g t h e a c t i o n s w h i c h t h e y c o n s t i t u t e , e s p e c i a l l y i n cases o f i n a d v e r t e n c e . E.g., " I n t w i s t i n g round s u d d e n l y he d i s l o d g e d and broke t h e v a s e " might a l s o be e x p r e s s e d as "His t w i s t i n g round s u d d e n l y caused him t o d i s l o d g e and break t h e vase". N o t i c e t h a t t h i s k i n d o f l o c u t i o n i s out o f p l a c e when t h e a c t i o n i n s e r t e d i s t h e i n t e n d e d a c t i o n (e.g. "His t w i s t i n g round s u d d e n l y caused him t o p i r o u e t t e " ) . I n b o t h t h e s e c a s e s , f u r t h e r m o r e , i t i s an a c t i o n w h i c h i s e x p l a i n e d u l t i m a t e l y , not a movement, as t h e view under d i s c u s s i o n assumes, and t h e y a r e t h e r e f o r e not counter-examples t o my p r e s e n t t h e s i s . 10. The p o s i t i o n I recommend h e r e draws h e a v i l y upon t h e work o f Donald D a v i d s o n [ 3 3 ] . 11. I use " d e s i r e " h e r e as a g e n e r a l term f o r a l l s o r t s o f v o l i t i o n a l a t t i t u d e s , such as t h o s e c a p t u r e d by "wish", "hope f o r " , " l o n g f o r " . The a t t r i b u t i o n o f d e s i r e , i n a more normal sense, may not be a p p r o p r i a t e i n a l l c a s e s , b u t t h i s f a c t s h o u l d not be t a k e n as i n c o n s i s t e n t w i t h my p r e s e n t c l a i m . 12. A g a i n I r i d e roughshod over t h e s u b t l e t y o f o r d i n a r y language by u s i n g " b e l i e f " and i t s cognates as g e n e r a l terms t o c o v e r a l l s o r t s o f d o x a s t i c a t t i t u d e s such as t h o s e c a p t u r e d by "know", " f e a r t h a t " , "hope t h a t " , " c a l c u l a t e t h a t " . 13. T h i s i s not t h e p l a c e t o d e v e l o p a mor a l and e t h i c a l t h e o r y , b u t l e s t t h e p r e c e d i n g remarks be m i s u n d e r s t o o d I s h o u l d s u p p l y , by way o f a few r i d e r s , a s k e t c h o f t h e one I h o l d . I do not t h i n k t h e i n d e t e r m i n a c y o f r a t i o n a l i t y i n f e s t s m oral judgment a l l the way t h r o u g h . S p e c i f i c q u e s t i o n s about s p e c i f i c a c t i o n s a r e most o f t e n s e t t l e d , i n d e t e r m i n a t e f a s h i o n , by f i n d i n g out i f some c o u r s e o f a c t i o n i s s u f f i c i e n t l y s u p p o r t e d by some s e t o f m o r a l r e a s o n s . (There a r e q u e s t i o n s , b u t a l s o w i d e s p r e a d agreement, about what counts as s u f f i c i e n t and what as a mor a l reason.) The i n d e t e r m i n a c y c r e e p s i n o n l y i n t h e a r e a o f t h e e v a l u a t i o n o f g e n e r a l m o r a l p r i n c i p l e s and o f t h e j u s t i f i c a t o r y r e l a t i o n s between t h e s e . Sometimes an i n d e t e r m i n a c y a t t h i s l e v e l w i l l show t h r o u g h i n some s p e c i f i c m o r a l d i s p u t e , such as t h e r e c e n t one about a b o r t i o n . Chapter 5: H y p o t h e t i c a l i t y and t h e R e p o r t i n g R o l e o f M e n t a l  Language (a) I n t r o d u c t i o n Having begun my argument a g a i n s t t h e c l a i m t h a t m ental s t a t e s a r e t h e o r e t i c a l i n t h e sense e x p r e s s e d by T h e s i s I I , I t u r n t o t h e i s s u e o f whether t h e y a r e such i n t h e sense e x p r e s s e d by T h e s i s I I I . I n a r g u i n g t h a t t h e y a r e not I f i r s t c o n s i d e r a poor r e a s o n f o r b e l i e v i n g my c o n c l u s i o n - t h e Myth o f t h e G i v e n - a g a i n s t which R o r t y 1 s view can sometimes be seen as d i r e c t e d , and s u c c e s s f u l l y so. My own r e a s o n s f o r b e l i e v i n g t h a t T h e s i s I I I i s f a l s e stem from t h e c r i t e r i a l v iew o f m e n t a l language s u g g e s t e d by W i t t g e n s t e i n , and i t would perhaps not be r e l e v a n t t o mention them i n f u l l h e r e . What I s h a l l a t t e mpt t o do, t h e n , i s t o show t h a t R o r t y 1 s attempt t o j u s t i f y T h e s i s I I I does not work, i n so f a r as h i s view cannot a c c o u n t f o r t h e phenomena o f mental d i s c o u r s e , most n o t a b l y t h e i n c o r r i g i b i l i t y o f c e r t a i n m e n t a l r e p o r t s . I t i s a consequence o f R o r t y 1 s v e r s i o n o f e l i m i n a t i v e m a t e r i a l i s m t h a t as f a r as we know mental s t a t e s may not  e x i s t . T h i s i s what I mean by t h e c l a i m t h a t m e n t a l s t a t e s a r e h y p o t h e t i c a l ( t h i s n o t i o n t h u s h a v i n g n o t h i n g t o do w i t h t h e a l l e g e d d i s p o s i t i o n a l n a t u r e o f many men t a l s t a t e s ) . I am t r e a t i n g t h e c l a i m e d h y p o t h e t i c a l i t y o f mental s t a t e s as one a s p e c t o f t h e i r c l a i m e d t h e o r e t i c a l i t y because I b e l i e v e t h i s approach o f f e r s t h e deepest i n s i g h t s i n t o t h e m o t i v a t i o n t o deny t h e e x i s t e n c e o f m e n t a l s t a t e s w h i c h i s embodied i n R o r t y 1 s view. I t w i l l be remembered from Chapter 2, s e c t i o n ( b ) , t h a t on t h e c o n t i n g e n t i d e n t i t y t h e o r y t h e h y p o t h e t i c a l i t y o f mental s t a t e s i s not a f e a t u r e o f t h e i r t h e o r e t i c a l i t y . T h i s view, i n i t s more s o p h i s t i c a t e d v e r s i o n s , has a r a t h e r s p e c i a l a ccount o f t h e o r e t i c a l i t y , a t l e a s t f o r m e n t a l s t a t e s , a c c o r d i n g t o w h i c h i t i s a r e s u l t o f t h e meaning o f mental terms t h a t t h e y r e f e r t o whatever mediates p e r c e p t i o n and b e h a v i o u r ( i n c e r t a i n d e s c r i b a b l e ways). Hence on t h e assumption t h a t something has t h i s c a u s a l p r o p e r t y , t h e e x i s t e n c e o f t h e mental i s g u a r a n t e e d i n advance, as i t were, o f t h e s c i e n t i f i c d i s c o v e r i e s w h i c h l o c k i t i n t o our view o f the w o r l d . T h i s view o f t h e o r e t i c a l t i y i s n o t , however, sh a r e d by R o r t y , f o r on h i s view t h e r e a r e competing t h e o r i e s f o r t h e e x p l a n a t i o n o f b e h a v i o u r , m i n d - t h e o r y b e i n g m e r e l y one o f t h e s e , and a poor one a t t h a t . I n what f o l l o w s I s h a l l use " t h e o r e t i c a l " i n t h e sense adhered t o by R o r t y , i n w h i c h t h e o r e t i c a l i t y i m p l i e s h y p o t h e t i c a l i t y . 1 I t seems t o me t h a t m e n t a l s t a t e s a r e not h y p o t h e t i c a l , t h a t we a l r e a d y know, so t o speak, f u r t h e r t h a n t h e i r p o s s i b l e n o n - e x i s t e n c e . T h i s i s t h e t h e s i s o f t h e p r e s e n t c h a p t e r . Now t h e r e i s b o t h a r i g h t way and a wrong way o f a r g u i n g t o t h i s c o n c l u s i o n . What I propose t o do i s t o d i s p l a y t h e wrong way, t o show how R o r t y 1 s v i e w i s a j u s t i f i e d r e a c t i o n t o t h i s a b e r r a t i o n w h i c h y e t i s founded on t h e same fundamental m i s t a k e , and t h e n t o pursue t h e r i g h t way i n t h e l i g h t o f t h e p r e c e d i n g d i a g n o s i s . 1 1 7 (b) Phenomenism and the Myth of the Given For want of a b e t t e r name I s h a l l r e f e r t o the wrong 2 way as "phenomenism". The view has i t s c r u d e s t e x p r e s s i o n i n the i n t u i t i o n t h a t our knowledge of the e x i s t e n c e of s e n s a t i o n s (and other mental s t a t e s ) i s grounded i n t h e i r phenomenal immediacy - they as i t were h i t you i n the f a c e . Those who have t h i s i n t u i t i o n might argue a g a i n s t m a t e r i a l i s m by p i n c h i n g themselves (and p o s s i b l y others too) and a p p e a l i n g to the evidence of i n t r o s p e c t i o n . However, t h i s v e r s i o n of phenomenism has l i t t l e t o recommend i t . Severe headaches do not have more e x i s t e n c e than m i l d ones, nor i s one more sure of t h e i r e x i s t e n c e . To put the o b j e c t i o n l e s s f a c e t i o u s l y , the i s s u e i s not whether something can be known to be going on when I p i n c h myself, but whether t h a t something i s c o r r e c t l y d e s c r i b e d as p a i n . A more p r i n c i p l e d v e r s i o n of phenomenism i s expressed i n terms of the a l l e g e d i n c o r r i g i b i l i t y of f i r s t - p e r s o n , p r e s e n t - t e n s e s e n s a t i o n - a s c r i p t i o n s . Provided I speak the language c o r r e c t l y , I simply can't be wrong about whether ( f o r i n s t a n c e ) I am i n p a i n , nor t h e r e f o r e about whether p a i n s e x i s t - such, at any r a t e , i s the t r a d i t i o n a l view. I have a l r e a d y ( i n Chapter 3) g i v e n my reasons f o r q u e s t i o n i n g t h i s v e r s i o n o f the i n c o r r i g i b i l i t y - t h e s i s . However, even i f u l t i m a t e l y the t h e s i s i s c o r r e c t , i t s h o u l d be c l e a r t h a t i n t h i s c o n t e x t i t i s q u e s t i o n - b e g g i n g to i n s i s t upon an i n c o r r i g i b i l i t y whose e x i s t e n c e i s den ied by R o r t y . Moreover , the same o b j e c t i o n can be made to the s o p h i s t i c a t e d as to the crude v e r s i o n of phenomenism: the i s s u e i s not whether I have knowledge, but whether whatever knowledge I have i s c o r r e c t l y 3 expressed by the s e l f - a s c r l p t i o n of s e n s a t i o n s such as p a i n . Phenomenism i s a v e r s i o n of the Myth of the G i v e n . As such i t p r o v i d e s much f u e l f o r the at tempts of p o s t - S e l l a r s i a n p h i l o s o p h e r s to a t t a c k t h i s Myth , and t h u s , I now hope to show, i s r e s p o n s i b l e f o r the p l a u s i b i l i t y o f some v e r s i o n of e l i m i n a t i v e m a t e r i a l i s m , which to many appears to be the o n l y a l t e r n a t i v e . I t i s perhaps i m p o s s i b l e to s t a t e the Myth of the G i v e n wi thout a p p e a l to metaphor. I t i s something l i k e the b e l i e f t h a t t h e r e i s a se t of t h i n g s whose e x i s t e n c e i s obv ious and u n d e n i a b l e , which would have to be admi t t ed i n t o every o n t o l o g i c a l a c c o u n t i n g of the w o r l d . What t h i s comes to i s perhaps b e s t unders tood by examining the arguments i n favour of views which can be d e s c r i b e d as v e r s i o n s of the M y t h . Perhaps S trawson ' s [36] n e o - K a n t i a n arguments f o r the b a s i c r o l e of m a t e r i a l - o b j e c t - c o n c e p t s i n our c o n c e p t u a l scheme can be c o n s t r u e d as a l l o t t i n g to m a t e r i a l o b j e c t s the p r i v i l e g e d o f f i c e o f t h e G i v e n . Most v e r s i o n s o f t h e Myth, however, p l a c e i n t h e r o l e o f t h e G i v e n s e n s a t i o n s and o t h e r phenomenal o c c u r r e n c e s . The l a t t e r a r e i d e a l c a n d i d a t e s , e s p e c i a l l y i f one g r a n t s some C a r t e s i a n b e l i e f s about t h e mind and about knowledge, and t h e phenomenism wh i c h t h e s e i n v o l v e . F o r , i t i s h e l d , my knowledge of my own s e n s a t i o n s i s i n c o r r i g i b l e and i t i s out o f t h i s t h a t I c o n s t r u c t ( o r p o s i t ) my b e l i e f s about e v e r y t h i n g e l s e , so t h a t i f knowledge of a n y t h i n g i s p o s s i b l e , knowledge o f s e n s a t i o n s i s a l s o - i t i s a c o n d i t i o n o f a l l o t h e r knowledge. I t i s c h a r a c t e r i s t i c o f t h e C a r t e s i a n view t h a t no d i s t i n c t i o n i s made between s e n s a t i o n s and o t h e r m e ntal s t a t e s , t h e l a t t e r a r e t r e a t e d on t h e model o f the former, and hence the view has a r i s e n t h a t what i s G i v e n , t o a p e r s o n a t a t i m e , i s t h e knowledge o f h i s o r h e r m ental s t a t e s a t t h a t t i m e . T h i s l a s t s t a tement i s t h e e p i s t e m o l o g i c a l f o r m u l a t i o n o f one v e r s i o n o f t h e Myth; but a l s o i n v o l v e d i n t h e Myth i s t h e b e l i e f t h a t t h i s s t a tement has an o n t o l o g i c a l consequence, namely, t h a t m ental s t a t e s must e x i s t . I am not s u r e whether t o t a k e t h e Myth as i m p l y i n g t h e n e c e s s a r y e x i s t e n c e o f the G i v e n , i n w h i c h case i t c l e a r l y i n v o l v e s a modal f a l l a c y , o r as i m p l y i n g t h e e x i s t e n c e o f t h e G i v e n r e l a t i v e t o what we know. The f i r s t a l t e r n a t i v e i s f a l s e , t h e second t r i v i a l , o r so i t seems. The o n l y way I can t h i n k o f t o i n v e s t t h e Myth w i t h c o n t e n t , w h i l e p r e s e r v i n g i t s p r i m a f a c i e p l a u s i b i l i t y i n th e f a c e o f t h i s dilemma, i s t o t a k e i t as i n v o l v i n g t h e s u p p o s i t i o n t h a t t h e r e a r e c e r t a i n f a c t s w h i c h we cannot h e l p  but know, t h e c o n s t i t u e n t s o f wh i c h t h e r e f o r e we cannot but  admit e x i s t . The above f o r m u l a t i o n o f t h e Myth o f t h e G i v e n g e t s us a s t e p f a r t h e r , b u t l e a v e s many q u e s t i o n s open (Who a r e we? Under what c o n d i t i o n s c a n ' t we a v o i d knowledge o f c e r t a i n f a c t s ? ) - so many q u e s t i o n s , i n d e e d , t h a t I doubt whether a co h e r e n t n o t i o n o f t h e G i v e n i s even a v a i l a b l e t o us. Here I agree w i t h many e l i m i n a t i v e m a t e r i a l i s t s and o t h e r p o s t -S e l l a r s i a n s t h a t t h e n o t i o n o f t h e G i v e n i s a s u i t a b l e o b j e c t f o r a t t a c k . Where I s t r o n g l y d i s a g r e e i s i n t h e m a t t e r o f whether t h e de a t h o f t h e G i v e n i n v o l v e s t h e a b o l i t i o n o f m e n t a l i t y . I c l a i m n o t . I am i n c l i n e d t o suppose t h a t R o r t y , i n h i s e l i m i n a t i v e p a p e r s , m i s c o n s t r u e d t h e p r e s e n t p r o b l e m a t i c by assuming t h a t t h e o n l y a l t e r n a t i v e t o m a t e r i a l i s m i s phenomenism, and hence t h a t t h e o n l y r e a s o n f o r b e l i e v i n g i n t h e e x i s t e n c e o f t h e mental i s a t h o r o u g h l y bad one. Roughly s p e a k i n g , he a c c e p t s t h e i d e n t i f i c a t i o n , i m p l i e d by phenomenism, o f t h e G i v e n w i t h t h e m e n t a l , t a k i n g t h i s t o be p a r t and p a r c e l o f t h e o r d i n a r y c o n c e p t s o f t h e mind and o f men t a l s t a t e s . The j u s t i f i c a t i o n o f the a t t r i b u t i o n to R o r t y of the above c o n f u s i o n i s by no means easy , s i n c e I would not expect him to avow the p o s i t i o n o p e n l y , even i f I am r i g h t i n t h i n k i n g t h a t i t u n d e r l i e s h i s g e n e r a l v iew. We can note i n support o f t h i s m o t i v a t i o n a l h y p o t h e s i s the f o l l o w i n g p o i n t s : ( i ) R o r t y ' s main d i s s a t i s f a c t i o n w i t h mental s t a t e s i s t h e i r a l l e g e d i r r e d e e m a b l y C a r t e s i a n c h a r a c t e r , the a l l e g e d . . . . . 5 i n c o r r i g i b i l i t y o f f i r s t - p e r s o n , p r e s e n t - t e n s e a s c r i p t i o n s ; he argues , f u r t h e r m o r e , t h a t t h i s i n c o r r i g i b i l i t y ex tends , though i n a d e r i v a t i v e sense , not o n l y over the f a m i l i a r " o c c u r r e n t " s t a t e s , but a l s o over those commonly thought of as " d i s p o s i t i o n a l " . ^ My treatment of h i s remarks about the C a r t e s i a n n a t u r e of the mind has so f a r been concerned o n l y w i t h the manner i n which the s u p p o s i t i o n t h a t mental s t a t e s are i n c o r r i g i b l e has p r o v i d e d grounds f o r deny ing i n advance the p l a u s i b i l i t y o f any p s y c h o - p h y s i c a l i d e n t i t y t h e o r y . Now, however, more must be s a i d , f o r those f e a t u r e s o f the mental which R o r t y marks out as the d i s t i n c t i v e ones , and t h e r e f o r e the ones r e s p o n s i b l e , as i t were, f o r the n o n - e x i s t e n c e o f the mental i n the face o f the t h e o r e t i c a l s u p e r i o r i t y of n e u r o p h y s i o l o g y , are p r e c i s e l y those f e a t u r e s which l e n d p l a u s i b i l i t y to phenomenism, the i d e n t i f i c a t i o n o f the mental w i t h the G i v e n . Phenomenism i n v o l v e s the view t h a t mental s t a t e s are s t a t e s o f which one has i n c o r r i g i b l e knowledge; even the tendency of phenomenism to t r e a t a l l mental s t a t e s as a k i n to s e n s a t i o n s has i t s p a r a l l e l i n the c l a i m t h a t i n c o r r i g i b i l i t y extends to d i s p o s i t i o n a l s t a t e s . ( i i ) In h i s l a t e r work R o r t y sometimes w r i t e s as i f the main o b j e c t o f a t t a c k were the Myth of the G i v e n , as a g e n e r a l e p i s t e m o l o g i c a l / o n t o l o g i c a l t h e s i s , the p h i l o s o p h y of mind p r o v i d i n g o n l y a c o n t e x t f o r t h i s g e n e r a l d e b a t e . The s u p p o s i t i o n t h a t he sees a c l e a r d i s t i n c t i o n between the i s s u e of the Given and t h a t of m e n t a l i t y l eaves i t as at most f o r t u i t o u s t h a t the p h i l o s o p h y o f mind p r o v i d e the r e l e v a n t c o n t e x t , f o r o f course i f the Myth i s f a l s e , then at l e a s t mental s t a t e s are no worse o f f than a n y t h i n g e l s e , f o r no e n t i t y i s such t h a t we cannot but admit i t s e x i s t e n c e . ( E v e r y Q e n t i t y can be f i n e s s e d . ) The f a c t t h a t he t h i n k s t h e r e i s something e s p e c i a l l y wrong w i t h mental s t a t e s i s then ev idence for my m o t i v a t i o n a l h y p o t h e s i s . I t cannot be s u f f i c i e n t l y emphasised t h a t t h i s m o t i v a t i o n a l h y p o t h e s i s i s no more than j u s t t h a t , and t h a t i t s u s e f u l n e s s i s thus l i m i t e d . I wish to s t r e s s t h a t I am not a s s e r t i n g t h a t R o r t y ' s v e r s i o n o f e l i m i n a t i v e m a t e r i a l i s m , as a t h e s i s , i m p l i e s the i d e n t i f i c a t i o n o f the Given w i t h the m e n t a l , but a view can be based upon a mis take wi thout i m p l y i n g t h a t m i s t a k e , and i t may s t i l l be o f i n t e r e s t to expose t h a t m i s t a k e . ( i i i ) S e l l a r s [ 1 7 ] , from whom R o r t y d e r i v e s t h e t h e o r e t i c a l i s t a s p e c t o f h i s view, e x p l i c i t l y d i s t i n g u i s h e s t h e Myth o f t h e G i v e n from t h e view t h a t t h e r e a r e no m e n t a l s t a t e s ( o r , i n t h e c o n t e x t o f h i s debate, s e n s e - d a t a ) , b u t makes a d i f f e r e n t e r r o r t o emerge w i t h t h e same f a l s e dilemma between phenomenism and t h e o r e t i c a l i s m . The e r r o r i s t o l e a n t o o h e a v i l y on t h e d i s t i n c t i o n between " t h e o r e t i c a l " and " o b s e r v a b l e " . S e l l a r s appears t o equate t h e t h e s i s t h a t 9 mental s t a t e s a r e o b s e r v a b l e w i t h phenomenism, w i t h t h e consequence, t y p i c a l l y C a r t e s i a n , t h a t m e n t a l s t a t e s a r e r e a l l y o b s e r v a b l e o n l y by t h e i r p o s s e s s o r s . S e l l a r s i s c o r r e c t t o o b j e c t t h a t t h i s view l e a v e s us u n a b l e t o a c c o u n t f o r t h e i n t e r s u b j e c t i v i t y o f m ental language, th e f a c t t h a t t o a l l appearances we e x p e r i e n c e no d i f f i c u l t y , i n o r d i n a r y l i f e , i n a s c r i b i n g m e n t a l s t a t e s t o o t h e r s and i n t e s t i n g , c o n f i r m i n g and d i s c o n f i r m i n g such a s c r i p t i o n s . H i s c o n c l u s i o n i s t h a t m e ntal s t a t e s a r e not o b s e r v a b l e and t h e r e f o r e a r e t h e o r e t i c a l , t h e Myth o f Jones p r o v i d i n g a p l a u s i b l e s c e n a r i o f o r t h e i r i n t r o d u c t i o n i n t o d i s c o u r s e . W h i l e t h e i n i t i a l t e n o r o f h i s remarks might l e a d one t o s u s p e c t t h a t he i s o n l y p r o v i d i n g a way t o see t h a t t h e r e ij3 an a l t e r n a t i v e t o phenomenism, h i s f i n a l comments i n d i c a t e t h a t he sees t h e o r e t i c a l i s m as t h e o n l y t r u e a l t e r n a t i v e and i n d e e d as t h e o n l y t r u e a c c o u n t o f t h e m e n t a l . I say t h a t the r e l i a n c e on the t h e o r e t i c a l / o b s e r v a b l e d i s t i n c t i o n i s an e r r o r because the sense o f "observable" to which S e l l a r s appea l s i s the e m p i r i c i s t , p o s i t i v i s t i c one i n which o n l y p r e s e n t mental s t a t e s can be o b s e r v e d , and these o n l y by t h e i r p o s s e s s o r s . In t h i s sense t a b l e s are u n o b s e r v a b l e s . I t does not f o l l o w from t h i s , however, t h a t t a b l e s are t h e o r e t i c a l e n t i t i e s , p o s i t e d f o r the c a u s a l e x p l a n a t i o n of some as ye t u n s p e c i f i e d t a b u l a r e f f e c t s . Nor does the c o r r e s p o n d i n g c o n c l u s i o n f o l l o w i n the case o f mental s t a t e s . (My own p o s i t i o n i s , moreover , t h a t the mental s t a t e s of o t h e r s are o b s e r v a b l e ( i n a v e r y good sense , though not the one a b o v e ) . I t remains to be seen whether t h i s form of o b s e r v a b i l i t y has any consequences v i s - a - v i s t h e i r t h e o r e t i c a l i t y . ) To r e t u r n to my m o t i v a t i o n a l h y p o t h e s i s about R o r t y , we have seen t h a t the p u b l i s h e d views of b o t h S e l l a r s and R o r t y i n v o l v e the s u p p o s i t i o n t h a t the o n l y r e a l a l t e r n a t i v e to t h e i r t h e o r e t i c a l i s m (of which , a d m i t t e d l y , they h o l d s l i g h t l y d i f f e r e n t b r a n d s 1 0 ) i s phenomenism. T h i s i s the e p i s t e m o l o g i c a l p a r a l l e l of the o n t o l o g i c a l t h e s i s , a l s o h e l d by both (though not c e n t r a l to the t o p i c of t h i s e s s a y ) , t h a t the o n l y a l t e r n a t i v e to m a t e r i a l i s m i s C a r t e s i a n i s m . My p o s i t i o n i s t h a t w h i l e m a t e r i a l i s m / t h e o r e t i c a l i s m has d e r i v e d much of i t s support from i t s success as an a l t e r n a t i v e to Cartesianism/phenomenism, and has p r o v i d e d s t r o n g arguments a g a i n s t t h e l a t t e r , t h e r e i s a t e r t i a v i a . T h i s can be d e r i v e d , I argue i n t h e Appendix t o t h i s e s s a y , from t h e c r i t e r i a l v i e w o f mental language. I c l a i m e d e a r l i e r t h a t b o t h phenomenism and R o r t y ' s e l i m i n a t i v e m a t e r i a l i s m r e s t e d on t h e same fundamental m i s t a k e . What I meant by t h i s i s t h a t t h e y b o t h a c c e p t a c e r t a i n c o n c e p t i o n o f m e n t a l i t y , a c c o r d i n g t o wh i c h a n y t h i n g m e n t a l has a c e r t a i n f e a t u r e , namely t h e o f f i c e o f b e i n g t h e s u b j e c t o f an i n c o r r i g i b l e report. 1"'" Phenomenism says t h e r e a r e t h i n g s , namely mental s t a t e s , w h i c h have t h i s f e a t u r e . R o r t y says t h a t i t i s p o s s i b l e t h a t t h e r e a r e no t h i n g s w h i c h have t h a t f e a t u r e , b u t t h a t t h e co n c e p t s o f t h e mind and o f mental s t a t e s i m p l y t h a t m e n t a l s t a t e s have i t , f o r which r e a s o n i t i s p o s s i b l e t h a t t h e r e a r e no me n t a l s t a t e s . My own view, p a r t o f wh i c h I have o u t l i n e d i n Chapter 3, i s t h a t t h e r e a r e t h i n g s , namely m e n t a l s t a t e s , w h i c h have been tho u g h t t o have t h a t f e a t u r e , b u t which i n f a c t d o n ' t. ( A c t u a l l y some a r e t h e p r o p e r s u b j e c t s o f r e p o r t s w h i c h , though not i n c o r r i g i b l e i n t h e t r a d i t i o n a l , l o g i c a l sense, a r e so i n a v e r y d i f f e r e n t ( c r i t e r i a l ) sense, t o be d i s c u s s e d i n s e c t i o n (e) below.) I t i s by a r e t u r n t o t h e n o t i o n s o f r e p o r t and o f i n c o r r i g i b i l i t y t h a t I b e g i n my a t t a c k on t h e h y p o t h e t i c a l i t y a s p e c t o f t h e o r e t i c a l i s m . I t w i l l be remembered t h a t R o r t y [ 1 0 ] supposes t h a t t h e r e p l a c e m e n t o f mental t a l k i n v o l v e s t h e t a k i n g o v e r b o t h o f i t s e x p l a n a t o r y and o f i t s r e p o r t i n g , o r o b s e r v a t i o n a l , f u n c t i o n s . W h i l e I agree w i t h him t h a t t h e phenomenist ac c o u n t o f t h e l a t t e r , a c c o r d i n g t o w h i c h c e r t a i n m e ntal r e p o r t s a r e l o g i c a l l y i n c o r r i g i b l e , w i t h t h e a t t e n d a n t o n t o l o g i c a l consequences, i s wrong, I cannot agree t h a t h i s own account o f m e n t a l r e p o r t i n g , w h i c h appears t o a l l o w an easy p r o g r e s s i o n i n t o t h e key o f n e u r o p h y s i o l o g y , i s adequate. (c) M e n t a l R e p o r t s A d i s c u s s i o n o f t h e a l l e g e d i n c o r r i g i b i l i t y o f me n t a l r e p o r t s s h o u l d b e g i n w i t h t h e n o t i o n o f r e p o r t . What I s h a l l mean by " r e p o r t " i s any u t t e r a n c e w h i c h i s used t o a s s e r t ( o r t o attempt t o a s s e r t ) the e x i s t e n c e o f some p a r t i c u l a r s t a t e -o f - a f f a i r s , o r a l l e g e d s t a t e - o f - a f f a i r s . The c l a s s o f r e p o r t s i s thus a p r o p e r s u b s e t o f t h e c l a s s o f c o n s t a t i v e u t t e r a n c e s . What I s h a l l mean by "mental r e p o r t " i s a r e p o r t o f a me n t a l s t a t e ( o r event e t c . ) , where t h i s means no more t h a n a r e p o r t a s c r i b i n g a mental s t a t e t o a p e r s o n , o r o t h e r b e i n g , and e x p r e s s e d i n mental language. ( I do not say " r e p o r t on a mental s t a t e " , f o r as t h i s p h r a s e i s commonly used t h e r e would be no such r e p o r t s i f t h e r e were no me n t a l s t a t e s . I w i s h t o c o n s i d e r t h e a n a l y s i s o f a c e r t a i n c l a s s o f u t t e r a n c e s , w i t h o u t p r e j u d i c e t o t h e q u e s t i o n o f whether t h e r e a r e me n t a l s t a t e s . ) The above d e f i n i t i o n o f " r e p o r t " a l l o w s f o r t h e e x i s t e n c e o f t h e o r e t i c a l as w e l l as n o n - t h e o r e t i c a l r e p o r t s . I do not t h i n k i t w o r t h a t t e m p t i n g a r i g o r o u s d e f i n i t i o n o f the c o n t r a s t I have i n mind h e r e , f o r such a d e f i n i t i o n would c o n t a i n elements w h i c h were h e a v i l y r e l a t i v e t o t h e c o n t e x t o f d i s c o u r s e , b u t a p a i r o f examples may s u f f i c e . R e p o r t s o f quarks made by p h y s i c i s t s on t h e e v i d e n c e o f o b s e r v a t i o n s o f cloud-chambers a r e t h e o r e t i c a l ; r e p o r t s o f b a s e b a l l s c o r e s a r e n o n - t h e o r e t i c a l . I t seems t o me t h a t o ver t i m e t h e o r e t i c a l r e p o r t s come t o be n o n - t h e o r e t i c a l r e p o r t s , as t h e e n t i t i e s whose e x i s t e n c e i s t h e r e b y r e p o r t e d a c q u i r e an a c c e p t e d o n t o l o g i c a l s t a t u s , b u t t h e s e a r e m a t t e r s w h i c h a r e b e s t d e a l t w i t h e l s e w h e r e . F o r t h e moment I w i s h s i m p l y t h a t my t e r m i n o l o g y be n e u t r a l on t h e q u e s t i o n o f whether m e n t a l e n t i t i e s a r e or a r e not t h e o r e t i c a l . I t appears t o be a consequence o f R o r t y ' s view t h a t i t i s p o s s i b l e t h a t a l l m ental r e p o r t s a r e f a l s e , s i n c e i t i s h e l d t o be p o s s i b l e t h a t no men t a l s t a t e s e x i s t . S t r a n g e l y enough, t h i s consequence i s r e s i s t e d by R o r t y and o t h e r e l i m i n a t i v e m a t e r i a l i s t s on t h e grounds t h a t i t i s t o o c o u n t e r - i n t u i t i v e . I t i s i n d e e d c o u n t e r - i n t u i t i v e : c o n s i d e r two men, Da v i d and M i c h a e l , t h e former o f whom has , and t h e l a t t e r o f whom has n o t , as we s h o u l d o r d i n a r i l y say, a headache. Now even i f t h e a s c r i p t i o n o f headaches has horrendous C a r t e s i a n i m p l i c a t i o n s w h i c h we s h o u l d w i s h t o deny, t h e r e seems t o be some sense i n whi c h we a r e r i g h t when we say "David has a headache" and wrong when we say " M i c h a e l has a headache". A c c o r d i n g t o R o r t y t h e r e a s o n f o r t h i s i s t h a t D a v i d i s i n some n e u r a l s t a t e i n which M i c h a e l i s n o t , and t h a t we m i s d e s c r i b e o r m i s i d e n t i f y h i s b e i n g i n t h i s s t a t e as o r w i t h h i s h a v i n g a headache, w i t h a l l i t s m e n t a l i s t i c o v e r t o n e s . There i s a sense i n wh i c h mental r e p o r t s a r e r e p o r t s about n e u r a l s t a t e s : t h i s a l l o w s R o r t y t o admit t h a t t h e r e can be t r u e s e n s a t i o n - r e p o r t s even though t h e r e a r e no s e n s a t i o n s (and, more g e n e r a l l y , t r u e m e n t a l r e p o r t s even 12 though no me n t a l s t a t e s ) . However, h a v i n g saved us from t h e f a t e o f b e l i e v i n g a l a r g e number o f f a l s i t i e s ( o r d i n a r y a s c r i p t i o n s o f me n t a l s t a t e s ) , R o r t y runs i n t o f u r t h e r d i f f i c u l t i e s , f o r t h e n o t i o n o f r e p o r t w h i c h he i s p r e s e n t l y employing seems t o d i f f e r r a t h e r a l o t from any f a m i l i a r n o t i o n . We s h o u l d n o r m a l l y suppose t h a t t h e f o l l o w i n g p r i n c i p l e , w h i c h I c a l l t h e r e f e r e n c e - p r i n c i p l e , i s t r u e : ( R ) : I t i s a c o n d i t i o n o f X's b e i n g a r e p o r t about Y t h a t e i t h e r ( i ) X c o n t a i n an e x p r e s s i o n r e f e r r i n g 13 t o Y, or ( i i ) t h e u t t e r a n c e o f X i m p l y some f u r t h e r p r o p o s i t i o n , Z, w h i c h c o n t a i n s a term r e f e r r i n g t o Y. T h i s c o n d i t i o n i s not f u l f i l l e d i n t h e p r e s e n t c a s e . M e n t a l 13 r e p o r t s do not c o n t a i n e x p r e s s i o n s r e f e r r i n g t o n e u r a l s t a t e s , nor do t h e y i m p l y any p r o p o s i t i o n s about n e u r a l s t a t e s . I n what sense, t h e n , a r e t h e y r e p o r t s about n e u r a l 130 s t a t e s ? A p o s s i b l e answer t o t h i s q u e s t i o n has been o f f e r e d by Shope [ 3 6 ] . We s h o u l d note f i r s t o f a l l t h a t t h e above c o n d i t i o n i s o n l y p l a u s i b l e as a c o n d i t i o n o f X's b e i n g a r e p o r t o f Y. There i s a l s o t h e e x p r e s s i o n "X i s a r e p o r t on Y" w h i c h o p e r a t e s under no such c o n s t r a i n t . To employ Shope's examples, a p e r s o n may g i v e a r e p o r t o f a p i e c e o f p l a y - a c t i n g w h i c h i s i n f a c t a r e p o r t on a murder. S i m i l a r l y , a r e p o r t o f a b r e a k - i n may be m e r e l y a r e p o r t on a h o u s e h o l d e r ' s r e g a i n i n g e n t r y t o h e r house h a v i n g l o s t h e r key. The r e c o u r s e f o r R o r t y i s t h e n t o say t h a t r e p o r t s o f m e n t a l s t a t e s a r e r e p o r t s on n e u r a l s t a t e s . U n f o r t u n a t e l y t h i s g r a m m a t i c a l s a n c t u a r y p r o v i d e s s h e l t e r o n l y a t a f u r t h e r c o s t . I n most o r d i n a r y c a s e s where someone makes an ( a p p a r e n t l y f a l s e ) r e p o r t o f (a) Y, w h i c h t u r n s out t o be a ( t r u e ) r e p o r t on some W, t h e f o l l o w i n g p r i n c i p l e , w h i c h I c a l l t h e b e l i e f - p r i n c i p l e , seems p l a u s i b l e : ( B ) : I f A makes a r e p o r t (X) o f a Y w h i c h i s a l s o a r e p o r t on some W, t h e n A b e l i e v e s , o f W, t h a t i t i s a Y, o r , i n c ases o f d e c e p t i o n , i n t e n d s h i s / h e r h e a r e r t o assume t h a t s/he has t h a t b e l i e f . (Note t h a t I do not say t h a t s/he b e l i e v e s t h a t W was a Y, f o r s/he may have no de d i c t o b e l i e f s about W.) Now i t seems a b i t odd t o say o f a l l o f us t h a t we b e l i e v e , f o r example o f the f i r i n g o f our C - f i b r e s , t h a t i t i s a p a i n , even when we r e p o r t b e i n g i n p a i n . T h i s , however, i s an i n t u i t i o n w h i c h I do not e x p e c t t o share w i t h t h e e l i m i n a t i v e m a t e r i a l i s t ; t h e r e a d e r w i l l make up h e r / h i s own mind, b u t I s h a l l pass o v e r t h i s o b j e c t i o n i n f a v o u r o f one more t e l l i n g . The e l i m i n a t i v e m a t e r i a l i s t account g e t s i n t o t r o u b l e on account o f what I c a l l t h e e x i s t e n c e - p r i n c i p l e : ( E ) : I f X i s a r e p o r t ( t r u e o r f a l s e ) on W, t h e n W e x i s t s . The p r o b l e m i s t h a t t h e a n a l y s i s o f me n t a l r e p o r t s as r e p o r t s on n e u r a l s t a t e s a p p l i e s o n l y t o t h o s e r e p o r t s w h i c h ar e t r u e ( j u d g e d , as i t were, from t h e o r d i n a r y m e n t a l i s t i c p e r s p e c t i v e ) . I f I r e p o r t t h a t D a v i d has a headache, t h e r e i s some n e u r a l s t a t e on wh i c h I r e p o r t , a c c o r d i n g t o t h e p r e s e n t v e r s i o n o f t h e e l i m i n a t i v e v i e w , b u t i f I r e p o r t t h a t M i c h a e l has a headache (which i s , as we s h o u l d o r d i n a r i l y say, f a l s e ) , t h e r e i s no r e l e v a n t n e u r a l s t a t e t o be r e p o r t e d on. (The f a c t t h a t I can make t h e g e n e r a l c l a i m t o be r e p o r t i n g on M i c h a e l ' s n e u r a l s t a t e s i s n e i t h e r h e r e nor t h e r e . ) Such a r e p o r t i s t h e n n e i t h e r a r e p o r t o f a n e u r a l s t a t e , because i t v i o l a t e s t h e r e f e r e n c e - p r i n c i p l e , nor a r e p o r t on a n e u r a l s t a t e , because i t v i o l a t e s t h e e x i s t e n c e - p r i n c i p l e . I n t h a t case i t i s i n no o r d i n a r y sense a r e p o r t about a n e u r a l s t a t e . The p r e s e n t a n a l y s i s o f "mental r e p o r t " does n o t a l l o w , t h e n , f o r t h e p o s s i b i l i t y o f t h e r e b e i n g f a l s e r e p o r t s about n e u r a l s t a t e s ( o t h e r t h a n t h o s e e x p r e s s e d i n n e u r a l l a n g u a g e ) . T h i s i s a s e v e r e d e f e c t i n such an a n a l y s i s - one would not a c c e p t , f o r example, an a n a l y s i s o f " p r o p o s i t i o n " which had the r e s u l t t h a t o n l y t r u e p r o p o s i t i o n s were p r o p o s i t i o n s . The o n l y way f o r R o r t y t o a v o i d t h i s c o n c l u s i o n , w h i l e p r e s e r v i n g t h e r e l e v a n c e o f t h e "of / o n " d i s t i n c t i o n s u g g e s t e d by Shope, i s t o deny t h a t he i s t r y i n g t o s u p p l y a f u l l - b l o w n a n a l y s i s o f m ental r e p o r t s , as opposed t o a c o n v e n i e n t way o f d e a l i n g w i t h a c e r t a i n s u b s e t o f them. We s h a l l see l a t e r why t h i s move i s u n a t t r a c t i v e . I c o n c l u d e f o r t h e moment t h a t t h e r e c o u r s e t o t h e n o t i o n o f " r e p o r t i n g on" i s f r u i t l e s s . I w i s h now t o mention a n o t h e r a c c o u n t o f r e p o r t i n g w h i c h might be c l a i m e d t o be r e l e v a n t h e r e . That i s some form o f c a u s a l a c c o u n t , i n wh i c h what makes X a r e p o r t about a c e r t a i n Y i s Y's b e i n g i n v o l v e d i n a c e r t a i n way i n t h e c a u s a t i o n o f t h e u t t e r a n c e o f X. W h i l e I do not know o f anyone who has e x p l i c i t l y h e l d t h i s view i n t h e p r e s e n t c o n t e x t , I f e e l i t w o r t h w h i l e showing t h a t i t s u f f e r s from t h e same inadequacy as t h e a p p e a l above t o r e p o r t i n g on. In t h i s c o n t e x t t h e v i e w can be a r t i c u l a t e d as f o l l o w s : what makes a r e p o r t a r e p o r t about a b r a i n - s t a t e i s t h e f a c t t h a t t h a t b r a i n - s t a t e causes t h e making o f t h e r e p o r t . A g a i n I am not s u r e i f t h e a c c o u n t i s i n t e n d e d as an a n a l y s i s , o r p a r t o f t h e a n a l y s i s , o f t h e n o t i o n o f r e p o r t i n terms o f n e c e s s a r y and s u f f i c i e n t c o n d i t i o n s f o r something's b e i n g a r e p o r t about something. I s h a l l t r e a t i t as i f i t were, b u t I t h i n k my o b j e c t i o n s t o t h i s a c c o u n t would be worth c o n s i d e r i n g even i f i t i s not t o be so r i g o r o u s l y c o n s t r u e d . I t i s f a i r l y p l a u s i b l e t o assume t h a t some form o f c a u s a l c o n n e c t i o n between r e p o r t and r e p o r t e d i s a n e c e s s a r y c o n d i t i o n o f t h e r e p o r t ' s b e i n g about t h e r e p o r t e d . C e r t a i n l y f o r X t o be a r e p o r t on Y, as opposed t o a random statement w h i c h happens t o be t r u e on a c c o u n t o f something about Y, t h e u t t e r a n c e o f X must be caused, i n some way, by Y. The same appears t o be t r u e o f t r u e r e p o r t s o f Y ( t r u e qua r e p o r t s o f Y, not qua r e p o r t s on some Z ) ; however, t h e case o f f a l s e r e p o r t s o f some Y r a i s e s p r o b l e m s . I n t h i s case t h e r e i s no Y t o cause t h e r e p o r t , w h i c h i s y e t a r e p o r t o f Y, and so t h e c a u s a l c o n d i t i o n i s not n e c e s s a r y . A s s e s s i n g t h e s u f f i c i e n c y o f t h e c a u s a l c o n d i t i o n r e q u i r e s e l a b o r a t i o n o f t h e a n a l y s i s . C l e a r l y , t h a t Y causes X i s not a s u f f i c i e n t c o n d i t i o n f o r X's b e i n g a r e p o r t on Y. Lung-cancer i s not a r e p o r t on c i g a r e t t e - s m o k i n g ; t h e movement of one b i l l i a r d - b a l l not a r e p o r t o f t h e i m p i n g i n g on i t o f an o t h e r . X must a l s o f u l f i l l some l i n g u i s t i c o r q u a s i -l i n g u i s t i c c r i t e r i a f o r b e i n g a r e p o r t - i t i s f a i r l y easy t o imagine what t h e s e might l o o k l i k e w i t h o u t h a v i n g t o d i s p l a y 15 them i n d e t a i l h e r e . A l l o w i n g t h i s , we a l s o have t o be c a r e f u l about how we i d e n t i f y , out o f a l l t h e causes and c a u s a l c o n d i t i o n s r e l e v a n t t o t h e u t t e r a n c e o f a r e p o r t , t h e cause w h i c h i s t o count as i t s o b j e c t ( t h a t w h i c h i t i s a b o u t ) . L e t us suppose t h a t i n t h e case o f mental r e p o r t s t h i s can be done by r e s t r i c t i n g t h e scope o f "the cause" t o the n e u r a l s t a t e s o f t h e p e r s o n r e p o r t e d on (whether by h e r / h i m s e l f o r by a n o t h e r ) . Here a g a i n , however, f a l s e m e n t a l r e p o r t s p r e s e n t us w i t h a problem. Suppose I l i e about whether I have a headache i n o r d e r d e l i b e r a t e l y t o d e c e i v e you i n t o t h i n k i n g I have one when I don't. I have a l r e a d y made t h e p o i n t , a g a i n s t t h e n e c e s s i t y o f t h e c a u s a l c o n d i t i o n , t h a t t h e r e i s no n e u r a l s t a t e " c o r r e s p o n d i n g t o " 1 ^ t h e headache which causes me t o make t h e r e p o r t . There i s , however, a n e u r a l s t a t e w h i c h causes me t o make t h e r e p o r t - p a r t o f i t " c o r r e s p o n d s t o " my d e s i r e t o d e c e i v e you - and t h i s a p p e a r s , on t h e vi e w under c o n s i d e r a t i o n , t o f u l f i l l a l l t h e c r i t e r i a f o r b e i n g t h e o b j e c t o f t h e r e p o r t . Yet i t i s d e c i d e d l y not what I am r e p o r t i n g i n t h i s c a s e , and so t h e c a u s a l c o n d i t i o n i s not s u f f i c i e n t . The n e x t r e s o r t f o r R o r t y i n h i s a t t empt t o a v o i d t h e s e o b j e c t i o n s , w h i c h q u e s t i o n b o t h t h e n e c e s s i t y and t h e s u f f i c i e n c y o f t h e e x i s t e n c e o f a c e r t a i n k i n d o f c a u s a l c o n n e c t i o n i n each p a r t i c u l a r case o f a m e n t a l r e p o r t , i s t o i n s i s t t h a t t h e c a u s a l t h e o r y o f r e p o r t i n g demands o n l y a g e n e r a l c a u s a l c o n n e c t i o n between r e p o r t and r e p o r t e d . The s u g g e s t i o n i s t h a t what makes a r e p o r t a r e p o r t about a n e u r a l s t a t e (when i t i s not s u p e r f i c i a l l y so) i s t h a t i t i s a r e p o r t o f a c e r t a i n k i n d (mental r e p o r t s , i d e n t i f i e d l i n g u i s t i c a l l y ) and t h a t r e p o r t s o f t h i s k i n d a r e g e n e r a l l y o r n o r m a l l y caused by n e u r a l s t a t e s o f the same k i n d . S i n c e t h e normal r e p o r t s are h e r e t o be i d e n t i f i e d w i t h t h o s e which we s h o u l d n o r m a l l y a c c e p t as t r u e , t h i s s u p p o s i t i o n r e l i e s on t h e a s s u m p t i o n t h a t most m e n t a l r e p o r t s a r e t r u e , i n t h e d e r i v a t i v e sense h e r e r e l e v a n t . T h i s a ssumption may o r may not be t r u e - I do not t h i n k i t can be e s t a b l i s h e d by t r a n s c e n d e n t a l argument, as some have t h o u g h t , but t h a t i s a n o t h e r m a t t e r . My o b j e c t i o n t o t h i s form o f t h e c a u s a l t h e o r y r e q u i r e s r a i s i n g s t o n e s h i t h e r t o l e f t u n t u r n e d . S i n c e t h e t h e o r y makes no d i s t i n c t i o n between t r u e and f a l s e r e p o r t s , as r e g a r d s what b e i n g a r e p o r t about something amounts t o , i t seems s u f f i c i e n t t o n o t e , a g a i n s t t h e n e c e s s i t y o f t h e above weakened c o n d i t i o n , t h a t t h e r e a r e r e p o r t s about u n i c o r n s though no u n i c o r n s t o cause them. A g a i n s t i t s s u f f i c i e n c y I s h a l l note t h a t t h e r e a r e many o t h e r g e n e r a l f a c t o r s i n t h e c a u s a t i o n o f mental r e p o r t s , such as t h e p r e s e n c e o f oxygen a t t h e s u r f a c e o f t h e p l a n e t , t h e g e n e t i c endowment o f r e p o r t e r s and o t h e r s o f t h e i r n e u r a l s t a t e s , which a r e not p a r t o f what i s r e p o r t e d by any mental r e p o r t . I t seems c l e a r t h a t t h e s e o b j e c t i o n s a p p l y a l s o t o t h e p a r t i c u l a r i s e d c a u s a l t h e o r y , t a k e n as a t h e o r y o f r e p o r t i n g t o u t c o u r t . What emerges from t h e s e c o n s i d e r a t i o n s , t h e n , i s t h a t w h i l e t h e c a u s a l account may be p l a u s i b l e as an a n a l y s i s o f " r e p o r t on", i t cannot work f o r " r e p o r t o f " . On account o f t h e e x i s t e n c e - p r i n c i p l e t h e r e f o r e i t a p p l i e s o n l y t o ( o r d i n a r i l y ) t r u e m e n t a l r e p o r t s and cannot be r e g a r d e d as a comprehensive account o f r e p o r t i n g . What t h i s means i s t h a t I must c o n s i d e r t h e p o s s i b i l i t y t h a t t h e a c c o u n t s c r i t i c i s e d above a r e not i n t e n d e d as comprehensive a n a l y s e s o f t h e t r u t h - c o n d i t i o n s o f mental r e p o r t s , b u t m e r e l y as d e s c r i p t i o n s o f ways i n w h i c h we can sometimes admit t h a t one who makes a m e n t a l r e p o r t says something t r u e even though h i s / h e r u t t e r a n c e i s s t r i c t l y f a l s e . What I am s u p p o s i n g i s t h a t t h e l a t t e r a l t e r n a t i v e does not commit one t o any a c c o u n t o f f a l s e m ental r e p o r t s , w h i c h , i f i t were t h e c a s e , would d i s a r m my o b j e c t i o n s b o t h t o t h e c a u s a l account i n g e n e r a l and t o t h e r e l e v a n c e o f t h e " r e p o r t o f / r e p o r t on" d i s t i n c t i o n . T h i s a l t e r n a t i v e would s t r e s s t h e a n a l o g i e s between t h e case o f m e n t a l r e p o r t s and t h o s e , t o w h i c h D o n n e l l a n [40] has drawn our a t t e n t i o n , w h i c h p r o v i d e d t h e o r i g i n a l m o t i v a t i o n f o r c a u s a l t h e o r i e s o f r e f e r e n c e and r e p o r t i n g . I f , f o r example, I say t h a t t h e man w i t h t h e m a r t i n i i s t h e L o r d Mayor, I may succeed i n making a t r u e r e p o r t about him even i f t h e r e i s o n l y w a t e r i n t h e m a r t i n i - g l a s s . The f i r s t p r o b lem w i t h t h i s s t r a t e g y i s t h a t i t i s o f c o u r s e p l a u s i b l e o n l y f o r t h o s e m e n t a l r e p o r t s w h i c h c o n t a i n (what a t l e a s t p u r p o r t t o be) d e f i n i t e d e s c r i p t i o n s o f m e n t a l s t a t e s . One cannot s a l v a g e any v e s t i g e o f t r u t h f o r "David has a headache" by t h e s e means, any more t h a n one can f o r "John k i c k e d a man w i t h a m a r t i n i " , where John d i d k i c k t h e L o r d Mayor. So i f t h e e l i m i n a t i v e m a t e r i a l i s t adopts t h i s s t r a t e g y i n s t e a d o f t h e one g i v i n g a f u l l - b l o w n a n a l y s i s o f m e ntal r e p o r t i n g , t h e scope o f h i s / h e r account i s c o n s i d e r a b l y s m a l l e r t h a n i n t u i t i o n demands. I t i s by no means c l e a r t h a t t h i s a l t e r n a t i v e s t r a t e g y would be a t t r a c t i v e f o r R o r t y even f o r t h o s e r e p o r t s w h i c h a r e most c l o s e l y analogous t o t h e D o n n e l l a n examples. C o n s i d e r t h e f o l l o w i n g c a s e : I o b s e r v e P a t r i c k and Tony each i n an a g i t a t e d c o n d i t i o n , t h e former more so t h a n t h e l a t t e r . I e x p l a i n t h i s s i t u a t i o n by r e p o r t i n g t h a t P a t r i c k ' s i n d i g n a t i o n (about some unknown s t a t e - o f - a f f a i r s ) i s more i n t e n s e t h a n Tony's. L e t us suppose, however, t h a t t h e cause o f t h e i r a g i t a t i o n i s not i n d i g n a t i o n (nor any n e u r a l s t a t e a p t t o be m i s i d e n t i f i e d as i n d i g n a t i o n ) , b u t i n d i g e s t i o n . Now t h e r e i s some sense i n wh i c h my r e p o r t about r e l a t i v e i n t e n s i t i e s i s t r u e o f t h e i r s t a t e s o f i n d i g e s t i o n , o r a t l e a s t t h e r e i s some p l a u s i b i l i t y f o r t h i s c l a i m . The p o i n t I w i s h t o make i s t h a t on t h e p r e s e n t e l i m i n a t i v e m a t e r i a l i s t s t r a t e g y t h e r e i s no s i g n i f i c a n t d i f f e r e n c e between t h e above case and one i n which the t r u e cause i s supposed t o be a n e u r a l s t a t e . W h i l e I have n o t h i n g t o say d i r e c t l y a g a i n s t t h i s c o n c l u s i o n , i t seems t o me one t h a t would be u n a t t r a c t i v e t o R o r t y . A l t h o u g h , t o my knowledge, t h i s i s s u e has not been c o n f r o n t e d by him d i r e c t l y , I am i n c l i n e d t o suppose t h a t i n h i s view t h e t r u t h o f c e r t a i n m e n t a l r e p o r t s i s t o be a l l o w e d as a r e s u l t o f t h e f a c t t h a t t h e y a r e r e p o r t s i n t h e language o f a t h e o r y w h i c h i s t o be r e p l a c e d and t h a t t h e y can be r e i n t e r p r e t e d as r e p o r t s about t h e e n t i t i e s r e f e r r e d t o i n t h e r e p l a c i n g t h e o r y . The s c e n a r i o f o r t h e o r e t i c a l change does not a p p l y t o t h e i n d i g e s t i o n - e x a m p l e . F o r t h i s r e a s o n I suggest t h a t t h e r e q u i r e d a c c o u n t o f me n t a l r e p o r t s i s something more t h a n a c o l l e c t i o n o f Donnellanesque o b s e r v a t i o n s , t h a t i t i s i n d e e d i n t e n d e d as a comprehensive a n a l y s i s o f m e n t a l r e p o r t i n g , and t h a t t h e r e f o r e my o r i g i n a l o b j e c t i o n s a r e s t i l l r e l e v a n t . I am a f r a i d I can t h i n k o f no way o f amending o r complementing t h e c a u s a l a n a l y s i s o f r e p o r t i n g w h i c h would evade t h e above o b j e c t i o n s , s h o r t o f r e l y i n g on some form o f 17 t h e r e f e r e n c e - p r i n c i p l e . But t o do t h i s would d i s a l l o w n e u r a l s t a t e s from b e i n g t h e o b j e c t s o f m e n t a l r e p o r t s and so u n d e r c u t R o r t y ' s account o f t h e s e r e p o r t s . I t i s perhaps s i g n i f i c a n t t h a t t h e d i f f i c u l t c a s es f o r t h i s a ccount a r e t h o s e i n v o l v i n g f a l s e r e p o r t s ; one can o n l y assume t h a t t h e s e were o v e r l o o k e d because t h e main t o p i c o f e n q u i r y i n t h i s f i e l d has always been t h e s o - c a l l e d i n c o r r i g i b l e r e p o r t s , and i t has been assumed t h a t t h e s e a r e always t r u e . But an a n a l y s i s w h i c h o n l y works f o r s i n c e r e f i r s t - p e r s o n p r e s e n t -t e n s e m e n t a l r e p o r t s i s not an a n a l y s i s o f "mental r e p o r t " . I t might be argued t h a t my wide d e f i n i t i o n o f " r e p o r t " w hich a l l o w s f o r " t h e o r e t i c a l " , o r h y p o t h e t i c a l , r e p o r t s , i s the r e a l c u l p r i t h e r e , f o r t h e c a u s a l a n a l y s i s was d e v e l o p e d o n l y as an account o f s o - c a l l e d " o b s e r v a t i o n a l " r e p o r t s . T h i c o u n t e r - o b j e c t i o n , however, does not show enough. Even i f i t were c o r r e c t t h a t second- and t h i r d - p e r s o n m ental a s c r i p t i o n s a r e not s t r i c t l y r e p o r t s , because t h e y c o n s i s t i n t h e making o f ( c a u s a l ) h y p o t h e s e s , t h e r e remain t h e d i f f i c u l t c a s es o f ( d e l i b e r a t e l y ) f a l s e f i r s t - p e r s o n r e p o r t s w h i c h a r e by t h emselves c a p a b l e o f d e f e a t i n g t h e c a u s a l a n a l y s i s . Moreover, t o be c o n s i s t e n t w i t h R o r t y 1 s t h e o r e t i c a l i s m , t h e c a u s a l a n a l y s i s must a l l o w f o r such h y p o t h e t i c a l r e p o r t s . I t does not seem p l a u s i b l e , t h e n , t o r e g a r d t h e c a u s a l a c count as h e l p f u l t o R o r t y . I t i s p o s s i b l e , however, t h a t an account o f r e p o r t i n g can be c o n s t r u c t e d from h i s o b s e r v a t i o n s about r e f e r e n c e [ 3 9 ] . Here R o r t y d i s t i n g u i s h e s t h r e e senses o f " r e f e r " , and w h i l e I do not b e l i e v e t h a t t h i s approach i s u l t i m a t e l y s u c c e s s f u l , I t h i n k i t i s i m p o r t a n t t o c o n s i d e r i t as a p o s s i b i l i t y f o r t h e e x p r e s s i o n o f which R o r t y has g i v e n us t h e b a s i c c o n c e p t u a l t o o l s . The t r i p a r t i t e d i s t i n c t i o n i s r o u g h l y as f o l l o w s : r e f e r r i n g ^ i s t h e "commonsense" n o t i o n i n w h i c h t h e r e f e r r e n t o f an e x p r e s s i o n i s d e t e r m i n e d by t h e s p e a k e r ' s i n t e n t i o n s ; r e f e r r i n g ^ i s a " p h i l o s o p h i c a l " n o t i o n t o w h i c h th e e x i s t e n c e -p r i n c i p l e b u t not t h e r e f e r e n c e - p r i n c i p l e a p p l i e s - remember t h a t t h e sense o f " r e f e r " i n t h e r e f e r e n c e - p r i n c i p l e i s " r e f e r ^ " . A g a i n r o u g h l y , we can say t h a t r e f e r r i n g ^ i s i n v o l v e d i n r e p o r t i n g o f , and r e f e r r i n g ^ i n r e p o r t i n g on. The key n o t i o n f o r R o r t y i s r e f e r r i n g 2 - T h i s i s "an i n t e r m e d i a t e n o t i o n " i n w h i c h "one can o n l y t a l k about what e x i s t s , b u t i n which th e t r u t h o f one's remarks i s not d e t e r m i n e d by t h e d i s c o v e r y o f what one i s t a l k i n g about." When we say ( t r u l y ) t h a t D a v i d has a headache, we a r e r e f e r r i n g 2 t o t h e n e u r a l s t a t e " c o r r e s p o n d i n g t o " h i s p a i n , b u t t o a s c e r t a i n t h e t r u t h o f what we say, we do not need t o t r a c k down t h e r e l e v a n t r e f e r e n t by c a u s a l o r o t h e r means ( t h i s d i s t i n g u i s h e s r e f e r r i n g 2 from r e f e r r i n g ^ ) -W h i l e t h e n o t i o n o f r e f e r r i n g 2 a l l o w s R o r t y t o s i d e s t e p t h e debates about whether r e f e r e n c e i s c a u s a l l y o r o t h e r w i s e d e t e r m i n e d , and about whether d e t e r m i n i n g t r u t h r e q u i r e s r e f e r e n t i a l a c c e s s , i t i s i n a d e q u a t e as a r e c o u r s e i n t h e a n a l y s i s o f me n t a l r e p o r t i n g . I f mental r e p o r t s i n v o l v e r e f e r r i n g 2 / t h e n by R o r t y 1 s d e f i n i t i o n o f t h i s n o t i o n t h e y a r e s u b j e c t t o t h e e x i s t e n c e - p r i n c i p l e . The a n a l y s i s i s t h e n open t o t h e same counter-examples ( o r d i n a r i l y f a l s e m e n t a l r e p o r t s ) as were r e s p o n s i b l e f o r t h e demise o f the " r e p o r t i n g on" and c a u s a l a c c o u n t s . The d i f f e r e n c e between r e f e r r i n g 2 and r e f e r r i n g ^ i s not t h e d i f f e r e n c e r e l e v a n t t o t h e s e c o u n t e r -examples . The r e s u l t s o f t h i s s e c t i o n can be summarised u s i n g the t r i p a r t i t e d i s t i n c t i o n o f r e f e r r i n g . Shope's s u g g e s t i o n , and the c a u s a l a n a l y s i s d i s c u s s e d a f t e r i t , a r e a t t e m p t s t o a n a l y s e r e f e r e n c e ^ t o me n t a l s t a t e s i n terms o f r e f e r e n c e ^ t o n e u r a l s t a t e s . These founder on t h e e x i s t e n c e o f ( o r d i n a r i l y ) f a l s e m ental r e p o r t s . R e f e r e n c e 2 can be b r o u g h t i n t o a v o i d c e r t a i n o b j e c t i o n s t o t h e programme o f a c c o u n t i n g f o r reference.^ i n terms o f r e f e r e n c e ^ - a t a s k w h i c h R o r t y [39] does not t h i n k i s p o s s i b l e . However, r e f e r e n c e 2 f a r e s no b e t t e r : t h e same counter-examples a p p l y because t h e same c o n s t r a i n t upon t h e d e t e r m i n a t i o n o f r e f e r e n c e , namely t h e e x i s t e n c e - p r i n c i p l e , a p p l i e s . I n t h e n e x t s e c t i o n I move t o some f u r t h e r arguments a g a i n s t t h e g e n e r a l t h e o r e t i c a l i s t a n a l y s i s o f mental r e p o r t i n g w h i c h R o r t y i n h e r i t s from S e l l a r s . Here I l o o k not a t f a l s e m e n t a l r e p o r t s b u t a t t r u e , because i n c o r r i g i b l e , ones. (d) I n c o r r i g i b i l i t y I n t h i s c o n t e x t , t h e t h e o r e t i c a l i s t a n a l y s i s o f r e p o r t i n g i s p a r t o f an attempt t o overcome what appears t o be a major d i f f i c u l t y f o r any t h e o r e t i c a l i s t v iew o f t h e r o l e o f mental language. F o r i f t h e p r i m a r y c h a r a c t e r i s a t o n o f t h a t r o l e i s i n terms o f t h e making o f c a u s a l h y p o t h e s e s t o e x p l a i n o v e r t b e h a v i o u r t h e r e i s a problem about how f i r s t - p e r s o n p r e s e n t - t e n s e m ental r e p o r t s a r e even p o s s i b l e , g i v e n t h a t t h e y a r e not i n any way based upon t h e o b s e r v a t i o n o f t h e s u b j e c t ' s b e h a v i o u r . T h i s f e a t u r e o f f i r s t - p e r s o n p r e s e n t -t e n s e m e n t a l r e p o r t s i s u s u a l l y c a l l e d t h e i r n o n - i n f e r e n t i a l n a t u r e . I t i s t o be d i s t i n g u i s h e d from t h e i r a l l e g e d i n c o r r i g i b l e c h a r a c t e r , w h i c h b r i n g s problems o f i t s own, t o be d i s c u s s e d l a t e r . The S e l l a r s i a n a ccount [ 1 7 ] , adopted w i t h m o d i f i c a t i o n s by R o r t y ( [ 1 1 ] p . 4 1 1 f f . ) , o f t h e p o s s i b i l i t y o f non-i n f e r e n t i a l r e p o r t s c o n s i s t s i n a s t o r y about how we a r e t r a i n e d ( o r c o u l d be t r a i n e d ? ) t o make them. Suppose Jones t h e caveman ob s e r v e s Smith e x h i b i t i n g t h e k i n d o f b e h a v i o u r which, on Jones' m i n d - t h e o r y , l e a d s t o t h e h y p o t h e s i s t h a t Smith i s i n p a i n . Once t h e t h e o r y has been p u b l i c i s e d and g e n e r a l l y a c c e p t e d , everybody e l s e knows t h a t i t i s a p p r o p r i a t e t o say h e r e "Smith i s i n p a i n " . I n t h i s s i t u a t i o n , Smith's b e i n g i n p a i n p r o v i d e s us w i t h an i d e a l o p p o r t u n i t y t o b e g i n t r a i n i n g him t o u t t e r t h e words " I am i n p a i n " when he i s ; t h i s t r a i n i n g w i l l o f c o u r s e t a k e p l a c e o v e r a span o f t i m e , i n v o l v i n g a number o f o c c a s i o n s when Smith i s and i s not i n p a i n , w i t h s u i t a b l e rewards and punishments f o r u t t e r i n g t h e s e l f - a s c r i p t i o n . E v e n t u a l l y , and t h i s i s what c o n s t i t u t e s s u c c e s s f u l t r a i n i n g , we w i l l have e s t a b l i s h e d a d i r e c t c a u s a l c o n n e c t i o n between t h e h y p o t h e s i s e d cause o f h i s p r i o r g r i m a c i n g ( t h e p a i n ) and h i s me n t a l r e p o r t . The f o l l o w i n g diagrams c h a r t t h e c a u s a l s i t u a t i o n s b e f o r e and a f t e r t h e c o m p l e t i o n o f t r a i n i n g , where "p" = "Smith i s i n p a i n " : B e f o r e A f t e r -Smith' s p a i n By h y p o t h e s i s -L-Smith' s grimace • S m i t h 1 s p a i n Smith's grimace O t h e r s say "p" ( i n f e r e n t i a l ) + E f f e c t o f T r a i n i n g I Smith says "p" ( i n f e r e n t i a l ) S mith says "p" ( n o n - i n f e r e n t i a l ) F i g u r e 1 I n t h e e l i m i n a t i v e m a t e r i a l i s t m o d i f i c a t i o n o f t h i s p i c t u r e , t h e i n i t i a l c a u s a l h y p o t h e s i s i s i n c o r r e c t , and "Smith's p a i n " must be r e p l a c e d by t h e a c t u a l cause o f h i s b e h a v i o u r , w h i c h i s some n e u r a l s t a t e N. The c r i t e r i o n o f s u c c e s s f o r t h e t r a i n i n g i s now t h a t t h i s b r i n g s i t about t h a t N causes Smith t o say " I am i n p a i n " w i t h o u t t h e i n t e r v e n t i o n of o t h e r p e o p l e ' s r e p o r t s . ( I t i s not o f c o u r s e a f e a t u r e o f e i t h e r o f t h e s e p i c t u r e s t h a t t h e i n i t i a l cause always r e s u l t s i n a r e p o r t , even g i v e n c o r r e c t t r a i n i n g - o t h e r f a c t o r s can always b l o c k t h e d i s p o s i t i o n t o u t t e r a s e l f - a s c r i p t i o n . ) On any p a r t i c u l a r o c c a s i o n a f t e r t h e c o m p l e t i o n o f t r a i n i n g , Smith's r e p o r t w i l l be n o n - i n f e r e n t i a l i n so f a r as i t i s not caused by any p r o c e s s o f i n f e r e n c e . Smith h i m s e l f need not even know t h e t h e o r y which a t f i r s t l e d o t h e r s t o t r a i n h i m t o make such r e p o r t s . Nor i s what he says t h e e f f e c t o f any immediate p r o c e s s o f i m f e r e n c e by o t h e r p e o p l e , as i t would be i n t h e e a r l y s t a g e s o f t r a i n i n g , when t h e y reward him f o r i m i t a t i n g t h e i r r e p o r t s , w h i c h a r e i n f e r e n t i a l . T h i s s t o r y , i n b o t h i t s m e n t a l i s t and m a t e r i a l i s t forms, does a l l o w f o r t h e p o s s i b i l t y o f n o n - i n f e r e n t i a l m e n t a l r e p o r t s , i n t h e sense mentioned above. I t i s even a p l a u s i b l e a c count o f how we come t o make mental s e l f - a s c r i i p t i o n s . I b e l i e v e t h e r e a r e d i f f i c u l t i e s f o r t h e s t o r y , however, when the n o t i o n o f i n c o r r i g i b i l i t y i s i n t r o d u c e d . I t i s o b v i o u s t h a t t h e t h e o r e t i c a l i s t a ccount cannot 18 s u p p o r t any form o f l o g i c a l i n c o r r i g i b i l i t y . That Smith u t t e r s t h e sent e n c e " I am i n p a i n " ( s i n c e r e l y and i n a s t a t e o f l i n g u i s t i c competence, so t o speak, does n ot e n t a i l t h a t he i s i n p a i n . I t i s e a s i e r t o show t h i s on R o r t y ' s v e r s i o n , when o f c o u r s e t h e t r u t h i s not t h a t Smith i s i n p a i n , b u t 19 t h a t he i s i n n e u r a l s t a t e N. Even on t h e more g e n e r a l v e r s i o n , however, t h e c o n c l u s i o n i s t h e same. The f a c t t h a t I have beeen t r a i n e d t o make a c e r t a i n response i n c e r t a i n k i n d s o f s i t u a t i o n , and t o i n h i b i t t h a t r e s ponse when t h e r e l e v a n t k i n d o f s i t u a t i o n i s l a c k i n g , does not e n t a i l t h a t whenever I make t h a t r e s ponse t h e s i t u a t i o n must h o l d . One c o u l d t r y t o make t h i s d e n i e d e n t a i l m e n t a n e c e s s a r y c o n d i t i o n o f l i n g u i s t i c competence, b u t t h a t would make t h e t h e s i s t h a t s i n c e r e l i n g u i s t i c a l l y - c o m p e t e n t m ental s e l f - a s c r i p t i o n s a r e i n c o r r i g i b l e i n t o a t a u t o l o g y , s i n c e never making a m i s t a k e would be w r i t t e n i n t o t h e d e f i n i t o n o f competence. W h i l e t h e b e l i e f i n l o g i c a l i n c o r r i g i b i l i t y might be t h e r e s u l t o f b e i n g o v e r l y i m p r e s s e d by some t a u t o l o g y o f t h i s form, t h o s e who h o l d t h e b e l i e f u s u a l l y i n s i s t on a c e r t a i n amount o f d i s t a n c e between l i n g u i s t i c competence and t h e i m p o s s i b i l i t y o f e r r o r . I n any c a s e , s i n c e t h i s e s s a y i s p a r t o f an argument a g a i n s t R o r t y ' s v e r s i o n o f e l i m i n a t i v e m a t e r i a l i s m , I can a f f o r d t o c o n c e n t r a t e on t h e e l i m i n a t i v e v e r s i o n , w i t h a nod 147 of acknowledgement towards the more ge n e r a l (or m e n t a l i s t ) v e r s i o n . I t i s not, i n my o p i n i o n , a f a u l t i n Rorty's view that i t does not support l o g i c a l i n c o r r i g i b i l i t y , because I am not convinced t h a t there i s such a f e a t u r e of mental, or even of phenomenal, s t a t e s . What I am convinced of i s that there i s a good reason f o r i n s i s t i n g on a c e r t a i n k i n d of e p i s t e m i c p r i o r i t y f o r , i n t h i s context, n o n - i n f e r e n t i a l r e p o r t s over 20 i n f e r e n t i a l ones. However, t h i s form of e p i s t e m i c p r i o r i t y w i l l t u r n out to be much l e s s s i g n i f i c a n t than has u s u a l l y been thought, and a l s o to be not that i n which c o n s i s t s whatever form of i n c o r r i g i b i l i t y i s a t t r i b u t a b l e to non-i n f e r e n t i a l r e p o r t s of mental s t a t e s . These somewhat c r y p t i c remarks w i l l become c l e a r e r through a c o n s i d e r a t i o n of Rorty's account of i n c o r r i g i b i l i t y . A c c o r d i n g to t h i s , i n c o r r i g i b i l i t y c o n s i s t s i n the f a c t t h a t , f o r a c e r t a i n reason, n o n - i n f e r e n t i a l r e p o r t s are not c h a l l e n g e d by other people. T h i s " e m p i r i c a l " form of i n c o r r i g i b i l i t y would e a s i l y evaporate i f the r e l e v a n t c h a l l e n g e s were to take p l a c e and were to l e a d to the overthrowing of n o n - i n f e r e n t i a l r e p o r t s . I t s e x i s t e n c e i s a f a c t of s o c i o l o g y , not of metaphysics or epistemology. As Rorty d e f i n e s i t : S b e l i e v e s i n c o r r i g i b l y t h a t p at t i f and o n l y i f : ( i ) S b e l i e v e s that p at t , ( i i ) There a r e no a c c e p t e d p r o c e d u r e s by a p p l y i n g w hich i t would be r a t i o n a l t o come t o b e l i e v e t h a t 2 ^ n o t - p , g i v e n S's b e l i e f t h a t p a t t . ( [ 1 1 ] p.417) A c c o r d i n g t o t h i s view, t h e n , i n c o r r i g i b i l i t y c o n s i s t s i n a form o f e p i s t e m i c p r i o r i t y a l l o t t e d t o n o n - i n f e r e n t i a l r e p o r t s o v e r i n f e r e n t i a l ones, a l t h o u g h t h e k i n d o f p r i o r i t y i s c o n s i d e r a b l y watered-down compared t o t h e k i n d a s s o c i a t e d w i t h l o g i c a l i n c o r r i g i b i l i t y . F o r R o r t y i t has t h e advantage o f i n v o l v i n g no o n t o l o g i c a l commitment t o m e n t a l s t a t e s . The b are s o c i o l o g i c a l f a c t t h a t c e r t a i n s o r t s o f r e p o r t s a r e not c h a l l e n g e d and not o v e r t h r o w n does not seem s u f f i c i e n t as an account o f i n c o r r i g i b i l i t y . I f r e p o r t s by red-headed p e o p l e s u d d e n l y became s a c r o s a n c t w i t h i n some s o c i e t y , t h i s would be o f l i t t l e p h i l o s o p h i c a l i n t e r e s t , though perhaps i t might have g r e a t s o c i o l o g i c a l and p s y c h o l o g i c a l i m p l i c a t i o n s . What t u r n s t h e s o c i a l f a c t i n t o a p h i l o s o p h i c a l p o i n t i s t h e e x i s t e n c e o f a good r e a s o n why such r e p o r t s a r e not t o be c h a l l e n g e d . I n t h e m e n t a l c a s e , what we are l o o k i n g f o r i s a good r e a s o n f o r a l l o t t i n g a c e r t a i n k i n d o f e p i s t e m i c p r i o r i t y t o n o n - i n f e r e n t i a l r e p o r t s o v e r i n f e r e n t i a l ones, and R o r t y a t t e m p t s t o p r o v i d e one. Two n o n - s t a r t e r s s h o u l d be mentioned f i r s t . We cannot say t h a t t h e e p i s t e m i c p r i o r i t y o f n o n - i n f e r e n t i a l r e p o r t s r e s i d e s i n t h e p o s s e s s i o n o f b e t t e r e p i s t e m i c c r e d e n t i a l s . T h i s i s a view a s s o c i a t e d w i t h t h e Myth o f t h e G i v e n , t h a t n o n - i n f e r e n t i a l r e p o r t i n g i s done on t h e e v i d e n c e o f t h e phenomenon i t s e l f , whereas i n f e r e n t i a l r e p o r t s employ b e h a v i o u r a l , and t h e r e f o r e m e d i a t e , e v i d e n c e . On R o r t y ' s e l i m i n a t i v e m a t e r i a l i s t a c c o u n t , n o n - i n f e r e n t i a l r e p o r t s a r e made on no e v i d e n c e , and t h e i r j u s t i f i c a t i o n i s o n l y as good as t h e j u s t i f i c a t i o n o f t h e i n f e r e n t i a l r e p o r t s w h i c h a r e i n v o l v e d i n t h e c o n d i t i o n i n g p r o c e s s w h i c h i m p l a n t s t h e a b i l i t y t o make them. On t h i s v iew t h e e p i s t e m i c p r o r i t y a l l o t t e d t o n o n - i n f e r e n t i a l r e p o r t s i s a f u n c t i o n , not o f t h e i r h a v i n g sounder e p i s t e m o l o g i c a l f o u n d a t i o n s , b u t o f t h e i r b e i n g b e t t e r i n d i c a t o r s o f t h e s u b j e c t ' s n e u r a l s t a t e s t h a n t h e o t h e r b e h a v i o u r a l i n d i c a t o r s w h i c h c o u l d be used t o s u p p o r t i n f e r e n t i a l r e p o r t s about t h o s e s t a t e s ( d r e s s e d up as r e p o r t s o f m e n t a l s t a t e s , o f c o u r s e ) . The second n o n - s t a r t e r a r i s e s a f t e r t h i s way o f v i e w i n g r e p o r t s has been g r a n t e d : i t i s t h e p o s s i b i l i t y t h a t what "being a b e t t e r i n d i c a t o r " amounts t o i s a p u r e l y s t a t i s t i c a l m a t t e r , t h a t t h e r e p o r t s i s s u e from t h e n e u r a l s t a t e more o f t e n t h a n does the n o n - v e r b a l b e h a v i o u r . What we have t o note i s t h a t w h i l e t h i s may be t r u e , i t i s not a t r u t h which i s a v a i l a b l e t o us a t t h e p r e s e n t s t a g e o f t h e development o f n e u r o p h y s i o l o g y and t h e r e f o r e cannot be p a r t o f t h e u n d e r p i n n i n g o f our p r e s e n t c o n c e p t i o n s about i n c o r r i g i b i l i t y . Having d i s p o s e d o f t h e o t h e r p o s s i b i l i t i e s , I t u r n now t o what R o r t y a c t u a l l y s a y s . T h i s i s t h a t : . . . when t h e b e h a v i o r a l e v i d e n c e f o r what Smith was t h i n k i n g about c o n f l i c t e d w i t h Smith's own r e p o r t o f what he was t h i n k i n g about, a more adequate account o f t h e sum o f Smith's b e h a v i o r c o u l d be o b t a i n e d by r e l y i n g on Smith's r e p o r t t h a n by r e l y i n g on t h e b e h a v i o r a l e v i d e n c e . ( [ 1 1 ] p.416) I w i s h t o argue t h a t t h i s e x p l a n a t i o n i s e i t h e r i r r e l e v a n t o r i n c o h e r e n t . I t i s i r r e l e v a n t i f t h e range o f b e h a v i o u r a l e v i d e n c e i s c o n s t r u e d t o o n a r r o w l y . I t seems t h a t what R o r t y has i n mind i s t h e b e h a v i o u r c a r r i e d o u t by Smith a t t h e t i m e o f h i s r e p o r t , o r c l o s e t h e r e t o : Thus, f o r example, i f Smith's cave r e - e n t e r i n g and a x - g r a s p i n g b e h a v i o r seemed t o p o i n t t o h i s j u s t h a v i n g had t h e thought t h a t he had l e f t h i s ax i n the cave, h i s subsequent use o f t h e ax n e v e r t h e l e s s c o n f i r m e d t h e t r u t h o f h i s r e p o r t t h a t what he had a c t u a l l y t hought a t t h e moment i n q u e s t i o n was t h a t he might have broke n t h e ax- h a n d l e y e s t e r d a y . ( [ 1 1 ] p.416) I n terms o f our p a i n example, t h e r e l e v a n t c o n t r a s t might be between Smith's r e p o r t i n g h i s b e i n g i n p a i n and h i s f a i l i n g t o wince o r g r i m a c e . What i s s t r a n g e about t h e s e examples i s t h a t t h e y do not seem t o be c ases o f c o n f l i c t between Smith's r e p o r t and t h e b e h a v i o u r a l e v i d e n c e . I n t h e f i r s t c a s e , Smith's "cave r e - e n t e r i n g and a x - g r a s p i n g b e h a v i o r " i s i n no way 22 i n c o n s i s t e n t w i t h h i s h a v i n g had t h e t h o u g h t w h i c h he i n f a c t r e p o r t s . What i s perhaps i n c o n s i s t e n t w i t h t h e l a t t e r s t a t e - o f - a f f a i r s i s t h a t whose e x i s t e n c e i s a f f i r m e d by t h e i n f e r e n t i a l r e p o r t w h i c h i d e n t i f i e s h i s t h o u g h t ( a t t h a t t i m e ) i n c o r r e c t l y (as t h e thought t h a t he had l e f t h i s axe i n t h e c a v e ) , b u t t h i s shows t h a t t h e i n f e r e n t i a l judgment was h a s t y , based on t o o narrow a s a m p l i n g o f Smith's b e h a v i o u r . S i m i l a r l y , i n t h e p a i n c a s e , Smith's f a i l u r e t o wince i s 22 c o n s i s t e n t w i t h t h e t r u t h o f h i s r e p o r t t h a t he i s i n p a i n and by i t s e l f no more i n d i c a t e s t o us t h a t he i s not i n p a i n t h a n h i s f a i l u r e t o s i g n a l t h e f a c t i n semaphore. I t seems t o me t o be a g e n e r a l p o i n t about m e n t a l s t a t e s ( o r n e u r a l s t a t e s , as we must say i n t h i s c o n t e x t ) t h a t t h e r e a r e v a s t numbers o f m a n i f e s t a t i o n s o f any p a r t i c u l a r s t a t e , and a v a s t number o f s t a t e s w h i c h can p l a y a r o l e i n t h e e x p l a n a t i o n o f any p a r t i c u l a r m a n i f e s t a t i o n (sequence o f b e h a v i o u r ) , so t h a t t h e above-mentioned f a i l u r e o f e v i d e n t i a l c o n f l i c t w i l l be q u i t e w i d e s p r e a d . A c o n f l i c t between n o n - i n f e r e n t i a l r e p o r t and o t h e r b e h a v i o u r a l e v i d e n c e would o c c u r i f S m i t h e x h i b i t e d l i t t l e o r no b e h a v i o u r o f t h e t y p e n o r m a l l y e x p l a i n e d by t h e m e n t a l 152 a s c r i p t i o n made i n h i s r e p o r t . I f he n e i t h e r g r i m a c e d , nor winced, nor moaned, nor h e l d any p a r t o f h i s body, n o r - c a l l e d f o r an ambulance, nor s t o l e morphine, nor . . ., b u t r e p o r t e d b e i n g i n p a i n , we do appear t o have a case o f c o n f l i c t . However, h e r e t h e r e is_ l i t t l e o r no b e h a v i o u r t o be e x p l a i n e d by t h e s u p p o s i t i o n t h a t he i s i n p a i n (save h i s r e p o r t ) , and t h e r e f o r e no sense can be a t t a c h e d t o t h e s u p p o s i t i o n t h a t t a k i n g h i s word l e a d s us t o a more adequate e x p l a n a t i o n o f t h e sum o f h i s b e h a v i o u r . I n t h i s c a s e , t h e e x p l a n a t i o n o f f e r e d by R o r t y o f why we r e g a r d n o n - i n f e r e n t i a l r e p o r t s as i n c o r r i g i b l e i s i n c o h e r e n t . The e l i m i n a t i v e m a e r i a l i s t might r e t r e a t t o a weaker p o s i t i o n , and t h i s may have been t h e p o s i t i o n R o r t y was i m p l i c i t l y a r g u i n g f o r , namely t h a t t h e p r i v i l e g e d s t a t u s g i v e n t o n o n - i n f e r e n t i a l r e p o r t s i s a r e s u l t o f t h e f a c t t h a t when a l l t h e e v i d e n c e f o r a p e r s o n ' s m e n t a l ( o r n e u r a l ) s t a t e i s i n , i t happens more o f t e n t h a n not t h a t t h e r e p o r t agrees w i t h t h e h y p o t h e s i s o t h e r s make t o account f o r t h a t e v i d e n c e . On t h e t h e o r e t i c a l i s t p i c t u r e , t h i s concordance i n t h e case o f any p a r t i c u l a r i n d i v i d u a l ' s m e n t a l s e l f - a s c r i p t i o n s appears t o be a c o n d i t i o n o f s u c c e s s f u l t r a i n i n g . ( I t s h o u l d be remembered t h a t a l l t h i s i s t r u e , i f i t i s , o n l y o f s i n c e r e m ental s e l f - a s c r i p t i o n s ( f o r a l l we know p e o p l e may l i e about t h e i r m e n t a l s t a t e s more o f t e n t h a n n o t ) , and so the i n s t a n c e s which i n d u c t i v e l y support the supposed c o r r e l a t i o n between n o n - i n f e r e n t i a l r e p o r t and h y p o t h e s i s must be observed i n a c o n t e x t where t h e r e i s a l s o b e h a v i o u r a l ev idence f o r the s i n c e r i t y o f the r e p o r t . On the p r e s e n t v iew, t h i s would be ev idence f o r the s u b j e c t ' s b e i n g i n some n e u r a l s t a t e the presence of which we u n w i t t i n g l y r e p o r t when we a t t r i b u t e to him the b e l i e f t h a t what he r e p o r t s i s t r u e . ) T h i s weaker p o s i t i o n r e p r e s e n t s the r e l a t i o n s h i p between b e h a v i o u r a l ev idence and n o n - i n f e r e n t i a l r e p o r t as one of c o r r o b o r a t i o n as opposed to c o n f l i c t , at l e a s t i n g e n e r a l . I t does a l l o w f o r the o c c a s i o n a l case of c o n f l i c t , but w i t h a r e s u l t which i s not d e s i r a b l e f o r i t s h o l d e r . For i f agreement w i t h the b e h a v i o u r a l ev idence i s the (on ly ) reason why n o n - i n f e r e n t i a l r e p o r t s are to be a c c e p t e d , then d isagreement w i t h the b e h a v i o u r a l e v i d e n c e , where t h i s a r i s e s , would be a reason f o r r e j e c t i n g them. The p i c t u r e a s s o c i a t e d w i t h t h i s weaker p o s i t i o n g i v e s us no reason whatsoever f o r p r e f e r r i n g the n o n - i n f e r e n t i a l r e p o r t i n the case of a c l a s h , and every reason f o r p r e f e r r i n g the h y p o t h e s i s i n f e r r e d on the 23 b a s i s of the o t h e r b e h a v i o u r a l e v i d e n c e . The p i c t u r e above does g i v e an e x p l a n a t i o n o f why n o n -i n f e r e n t i a l r e p o r t s are accepted wi thout q u e s t i o n i n a c e r t a i n s o r t of s i t u a t i o n , namely when v e r y l i t t t l e o t h e r ev idence i s a v a i l a b l e , f o r , i n view of the g e n e r a l c o r r e l a t i o n , we are more l i k e l y t o be r i g h t t h a n wrong i n g o i n g a l o n g wth t h e r e p o r t . However, i f t h i s i s what i n c o r r i g i b i l i t y amounts t o , i t i s o f l i t t l e s i g n i f i c a n c e t o p o n t i f i c a t e about t h e i n c o r r i g i b i l i t y o f m e n t a l s e l f - a s c r i p t i o n s . F o r as a m a t t e r o f f a c t w i n c e s may be even b e t t e r c o r r e l a t e d w i t h o t h e r p a i n -e v i d e n c e t h a n n o n - i n f e r e n t i a l r e p o r t s , and t h e r e f o r e s h o u l d be c o n s i d e r e d i n c o r r i g i b l e . I f t h e f a c t t h a t winces a r e non-l i n g u i s t i c i s an i n s u p e r a b l e b a r t o t h i s , i t i s not one t o t h e c l a i m t h a t w i n c e s a r e b e t t e r e v i d e n c e f o r p a i n ( o r whatever n e u r a l s t a t e we u n w i t t i n g l y c a l l " p a i n " ) and t h e r e f o r e s h o u l d be r e l i e d on i n cases o f c o n f l i c t . F u r t h e r m o r e , most o r d i n a r y r e p o r t s about t h e w o r l d a r e i n c o r r i g i b l e i n t h i s r a t h e r e x p a n s i v e sense, f o r i f no o t h e r e v i d e n c e i s i n , we do f i r s t o f f a c c e p t t h e t e s t i m o n y o f o t h e r p e o p l e , e s p e c i a l l y i f i t i s a t t e n d e d w i t h t h e marks o f s i n c e r i t y . I c o n c l u d e t h a t R o r t y ' s account o f i n c o r r i g i b i l i t y i s s e r i o u s l y i n a d e q u a t e . I n t h e main i t s u f f e r s from i n t e r n a l d e f i c i e n c i e s r a t h e r t h a n a f a i l u r e t o measure up t o t h e a l l e g e d e x t e r n a l phenomenon o f i n c o r r i g i b i l i t y , b u t t h e l a t t e r i s a p p e a l e d t o i n my f i n a l r e j e c t i o n o f t h e weaker p o s i t i o n above. I s h a l l c o n s i d e r an a l t e r n a t i v e a ccount o f i n c o r r i g i b i l i t y i n t h e ne x t s e c t i o n . Now I must a s s e s s t h e s i g n i f i c a n c e o f my f i n d i n g s w i t h r e g a r d t o t h e p r e s e n t v e r s i o n . The acc o u n t o f n o n - i n f e r e n t i a l r e p o r t s i s not an 2 4 e s s e n t i a l p a r t o f t h e account o f mental r e p o r t s , as t h i s i s not an e s s e n t i a l p a r t o f R o r t y 1 s e l i m i n a t i v e m a t e r i a l i s m . I t remains open t o him t o come up w i t h a c c o u n t s w h i c h a v o i d my o b j e c t i o n s . I have shown s i m p l y t h a t t h o s e most commonly a s s o c i a t e d w i t h t h e view w i l l not do t h e j o b , b u t t h i s a t p r e s e n t i s s u f f i c i e n t . I t i s w o r t h r e m i n d i n g o u r s e l v e s o f under what c o n s t r a i n t s any a l t e r n a t i v e account must o p e r a t e . The purpose o f t h e acc o u n t o f n o n - i n f e r e n t i a l r e p o r t s was t o g i v e a p l a u s i b l e e x p l a n a t i o n o f t h e i r a p p a r e n t i n c o r r i g i b i l i t y ( t o t h e e x t e n t t h a t t h i s e x i s t s ) ; t h e b i g g e s t c o n s t r a i n t h e r e i s t h a t b o t h t h e e x p l a n a t i o n and i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f i n c o r r i g i b i l i t y must be c o n s i s t e n t w i t h t h e n o n - e x i s t e n c e o f mental s t a t e s , t h e apparent o b j e c t s o f t h e r e p o r t s , i f t h e account i s t o f i g u r e as p a r t o f R o r t y 1 s v e r s i o n o f e l i m i n a t i v e m a t e r i a l i s m . (The same s t r i n g e n t r e q u i r e m e n t a l s o o p e r a t e s as a c o n s t r a i n t upon t h e g e n e r a l a ccount o f m e n t a l r e p o r t s . ) The above c o n s t r a i n t engenders a weak n o t i o n o f i n c o r r i g i b i l i t y , whereby r e p o r t s can be i n c o r r i g i b l e w h i l e l a c k i n g any o n t o l o g i c a l commitment t o t h e e n t i t i e s about w h i c h t h e y a r e , a p p a r e n t l y , r e p o r t s . The account p r o v i d e d (and a r g u a b l y any acc o u n t w h i c h o p e r a t e s under t h e n o n - e x i s t e n c e c o n s t r a i n t ) has t h e d i s a d v a n t a g e t h a t , when f o l l o w e d t h r o u g h , i t a l l o t s a p r i v i l e g e d e v i d e n t i a l p o s i t i o n not t o n o n - i n f e r e n t i a l r e p o r t s b u t t o t h e g e n e r a l b e h a v i o u r a l e v i d e n c e a v a i l a b l e t o o t h e r p e o p l e , as I argued e a r l i e r . As a r e s u l t o f t h i s t h e account cannot e x p l a i n why n o n - i n f e r e n t i a l r e p o r t s cannot be o v e r r u l e d by p u r e l y b e h a v i o u r a l e v i d e n c e , why t h i s t a s k must be a s s i g n e d t o t h e use o f c e r e b r o s c o p e s o r e n c e p h a l o g r a p h s . I t seems t o me t h a t no account w h i c h i s based on t h e a s s u m p t i o n o f t h e p r i m a c y o f n o n - r e p o r t a t i v e b e h a v i o u r a l e v i d e n c e can g e n e r a t e a good re a s o n f o r r e j e c t i n g t h e l a t t e r on p a r t i c u l a r o c c a s i o n s i n f a v o u r o f some o t h e r form o f e v i d e n c e . 157 (e) An A l t e r n a t i v e A c count? I n t h e argument above I t a k e i t as g i v e n t h a t t h e r e l e v a n t n o n - i n f e r e n t i a l r e p o r t s cannot be o v e r r u l e d by b e h a v i o u r a l e v i d e n c e . T h i s remark i s s u b j e c t t o two q u a l i f i c a t i o n s : f i r s t o f a l l , i t i s c l e a r t h a t m ental s e l f -a s c r i p t i o n s a r e o f t e n o v e r r u l e d on t h e b a s i s o f b e h a v i o u r a l e v i d e n c e when t h e mental s t a t e a s c r i b e d i s o f t h e " d i s p o s i t i o n a l " k i n d , what R o r t y c a l l s a "mental f e a t u r e " ; t h i s i s a d m i t t e d on a l l s i d e s . S e c o n d l y , and more p e r t i n e n t l y , t h e r e i s t h e c l a s s o f a s c r i p t i o n s o f me n t a l e v e n t s ( s o - c a l l e d by R o r t y ) w h i c h a r e o v e r r u l e d on t h e b a s i s o f b e h a v i o u r a l e v i d e n c e . T h i s c l a s s i s not empty; a l l t h a t must be noted i s t h a t when such an o v e r r u l i n g t a k e s p l a c e i t i s f o l l o w e d by one o f two judgments, e i t h e r t h a t t h e s e l f - a s c r i p t i o n was not s i n c e r e o r t h a t t h e s e l f - a s c r i b e r i s , t o t h i s degree, l i n g u i s t i c a l l y i n c o m p e t e n t . I n t h i s a r g u a b l y t r i v i a l c i r c u m s t a n c e l i e s t h e h e a r t o f i n c o r r i g i b i l i t y . The c i r c u m s t a n c e i s temporary i n so f a r as when we a r e i n a p o s i t i o n t o a c q u i r e i t , n e u r o p h y s i o l o g i c a l e v i d e n c e might a l l o w us t o omit e i t h e r o f t h e s e judgments. Now i n " M i n d - B r a i n I d e n t i t y , P r i v a c y and t h e C a t e g o r i e s " R o r t y t r e a t s i n c o r r i g i b i l i t y i n p r e c i s e l y t h i s manner, i d e n t i f y i n g i t w i t h t h e absence o f a d i s t i n c t i o n between m i s j u d g i n g and misnaming i n t h e case o f f i r s t - p e r s o n p r e s e n t -t e n s e mental r e p o r t s ( t h e q u e s t i o n o f s i n c e r i t y b e i n g a l l o w e d t o r e s t f o r t h e moment). The " S e l l a r s i a n " a c c o u n t w h i c h up t o now I have been c r i t i c i s i n g i s t h e one drawn from R o r t y 1 s o t h e r i m p o r t a n t p a p e r, " I n c o r r i g i b i l i t y as the Mark o f t h e M e n t a l " . I t would seem t h a t t h e s e a c c o u n t s r e q u i r e d i f f e r e n t i a l t r e a t m e n t , were i t not f o r t h e f a c t t h a t R o r t y , i n t h e e a r l i e r " C a t e g o r i e s " paper, t r e a t s them as complementary - he moves from what he t a k e s t o be t h e W i t t g e n s t e i n i a n account t o t h e t h e o r e t i c a l i s t one, a l t h o u g h t h e l a t t e r i s not t h e r e d e v e l o p e d w i t h as much s o p h i s t i c a t i o n as i n t h e l a t e r p aper. We have a l r e a d y seen t h a t t h e W i t t g e n s t e i n i a n v e r s i o n i s r e p r e s e n t e d i n t h e o t h e r i n t h e shape o f t h e o b s e r v a t i o n t h a t i t i s a c o n d i t i o n o f s u c c e s s f u l t r a i n i n g t h a t n o n - i n f e r e n t i a l r e p o r t s a r e i n a c c o r d w i t h t h e h ypotheses g e n e r a l l y a r r i v e d a t by o t h e r s t o e x p l a i n t h e b e h a v i o u r a l e v i d e n c e . T h i s means t h a t i f we w i s h t o o v e r r u l e a n o n - i n f e r e n t i a l r e p o r t , we can always a t t r i b u t e i t t o l i n g u i s t i c incompetence, o r so i t seems. On t h e s u r f a c e , t h e n , t h e r e i s a c o n s i d e r a b l e a r e a o f agreement between R o r t y , m y s e l f and W i t t g e n s t e i n on t h i s m a t t e r . We a l l t h r e e oppose th e C a r t e s i a n a c c o u n t on which i n c o r r i g i b i l i t y i s t h e r e s u l t o f p r i v i l e g e d a c c e s s t o a p r i v a t e i n n e r s t a g e , s e e i n g i t more as a m a t t e r o f t h e a v a i l a b i l i t y and n o n - a v a i l a b i l i t y o f c e r t a i n l i n g u i s t i c moves. We a l l t h r e e agree t h a t n e u r o p h y s i o l o g i c a l e v i d e n c e c o u l d i n p r i n c i p l e be r e l e v a n t t o t h e o v e r t h r o w i n g o f a n o n - i n f e r e n t i a l r e p o r t w i t h o u t i t b e i n g n e c e s s a r y t o charge i n s i n c e r i t y o r l i n g u i s t i c incompetence. We d i f f e r i n t h e e x p l a n a t i o n o f t h e g e n e s i s o f i n c o r r i g i b i l i t y , and I have argued t h a t R o r t y 1 s S e l l a r s i a n a ccount o f t h i s i s u l t i m a t e l y i n c o h e r e n t . W i t t g e n s t e i n ' s e x p l a n a t i o n r e l i e s on t h e a l l e g e d p r a g m a t i c i n t e r s u b s t i t u t a b i l i t y o f e x p r e s s i o n s such as " I know I am i n p a i n " and " I am i n p a i n " w i t h i n o r d i n a r y d i s c o u r s e ( [ 5 ] #246). I am not a b s o l u t e l y c o n v i n c e d o f t h e c o r r e c t n e s s o f t h i s move, but w i l l n o t d i s c u s s t h e m a t t e r h e r e . I n Ch a p t e r 3 I have suggested t h a t a s u c c e s s f u l a c c o u n t o f i n c o r r i g i b i l i t y , w hich i s W i t t g e n s t e i n i a n i n c o n c e p t i o n , can be g e n e r a t e d from t h e i d e a t h a t m e n t a l language i s governed by c r i t e r i a . To r e t u r n t o a c o n s i d e r a t i o n o f R o r t y ' s view, we s h o u l d note t h a t t h e r e i s a d i s c o n t i n u i t y between t h e a c c o u n t s o f i n c o r r i g i b i l i t y o f f e r e d i n t h e two r e l e v a n t p a p e r s , i f t h e former account i s as l o y a l t o W i t t g e n s t e i n as R o r t y announces i t t o be. Fo r on t h i s account i t i s a c o n c e p t u a l i m p o s s i b i l i t y t h a t one s h o u l d be b o t h l i n g u i s t i c a l l y competent and s i n c e r e l y wrong i n making an n o n - i n f e r e n t i a l r e p o r t . ( I t i s not a l o g i c a l i m p o s s i b i l i t y : i t i s an i m p o s s i b i l i t y w h i c h can o n l y 160 become a p o s s i b i l i t y as t h e r e s u l t o f c o n c e p t u a l change.) The n o t i o n o f l i n g u i s t i c competence employed i n t h e l a t e r v e r s i o n o f R o r t y ' s view i s o t h e r t h a n t h i s , and i n d e e d must be so. The l a t e r v e r s i o n t e l l s us t h a t we have a good r e a s o n , i n d u c t i v e l y e s t a b l i s h e d , f o r a c c e p t i n g t h e s i n c e r e , n o n - i n f e r e n t i a l r e p o r t s o f l i n g u i s t i c a l l y competent p e o p l e . But i f t h e n o t i o n o f l i n g u i s t i c competence i s t h e same one as i n t h e e a r l i e r a c c o u n t , t h i s " a d v i c e " i s redundant o r u s e l e s s , as t h e r e i s no way o f f a i l i n g t o f o l l o w i t . T h i s i s so because t h e r e i s no way o f i d e n t i f y i n g l i n g u i s t i c competence i n a s u b j e c t i n d e p e n d e n t l y o f whether we a c c e p t a l l h e r / h i s i n t r o s p e c t i v e r e p o r t s . A n y t h i n g w h i c h w i l l l e a d us t o r e j e c t h e r / h i s s i n c e r e r e p o r t w i l l l e a d us t o r e j e c t h e r / h i s l i n g u i s t i c competence. The n o t i o n w h i c h i s r e q u i r e d f o r t h e statement o f t h e l a t e r view i s one wh i c h makes no a p p e a l t o c o n c e p t u a l i m p o s s i b i l i t y . I n t h i s sense, t h e s u b j e c t can m a n i f e s t h i s / h e r l i n g u i s t i c competence i n a s c r i b i n g m ental s t a t e s t o o t h e r s , o r t o h i m / h e r s e l f on o t h e r o c c a s i o n s , i n a more o r l e s s a c c e p t a b l e way ( s c . i n a way w h i c h a c c o r d s w i t h t h e hypotheses g e n e r a l l y made by o t h e r s ) . I n t h i s c a s e , i f we w i s h t o o v e r r u l e a p a r t i c u l a r s i n c e r e m ental s e l f - a s c r i p t i o n , we do not have a v a i l a b l e t o us t h e b l a n k e t charge o f " l i n g u i s t i c incompetence!", s i n c e t h e s u b j e c t may have demonstrated h i s / h e r competence i n c o u n t l e s s ways. The main d e f e c t i n t h e proposed e l i m i n a t i v e m a t e r i a l i s t a c c o u n t , t h a t d e s p i t e i t s e l f i t a l l o t s e p i s t e m i c p r i o r i t y t o t h e g e n e r a l b e h a v i o u r a l e v i d e n c e , i s m a n i f e s t e d h e r e i n t h e consequence t h a t such an o v e r r u l i n g would be p o s s i b l e on t h e b a s i s o f t h e e v i d e n c e p r e s e n t l y a v a i l a b l e t o us. As a r e s u l t i n c o r r i g i b i l i t y e v a p o r a t e s . I t may be t h a t R o r t y d i f f e r s from W i t t g e n s t e i n i n not t y i n g t h e mi s n a m i n g / m i s j u d g i n g account o f i n c o r r i g i b i l i t y t o n o t i o n s o f c o n c e p t u a l i m p o s s i b i l i t y . The absence o f t h e d i s t i n c t i o n between misnaming and m i s j u d g i n g t h e n would not be th e absence o f a d i f f e r e n c e between them ( i n t h e me n t a l c a s e ) , b u t s i m p l y t h a t we have no p r o c e d u r e s f o r d e c i d i n g on which s i d e a f a l s e n o n - i n f e r e n t i a l r e p o r t f a l l s , a t l e a s t u n t i l e n cephalographs are r e a d i l y a v a i l a b l e . T h i s removes t h e d i s c o n t i n u i t y , b u t a l s o t h e p o s s i b i l i t y o f r e g a r d i n g t h e e a r l i e r a c c o u n t as an a l t e r n a t i v e means o f e x p l a i n i n g t h e r e l e v a n t v e r s i o n o f t h e e l i m i n a t i v e m a t e r i a l i s t p o s i t i o n . T h i s l e a v e s us w i t h t h e l a t e r a c c o u n t , a g a i n s t w h i c h I have a l r e a d y argued. When f u l l y d e v e l o p e d , t h e W i t t g e n s t e i n i a n account o f i n c o r r i g i b i l i t y t u r n s out t o be more or l e s s i n c o m p a t i b l e w i t h R o r t y ' s approach t o mental s t a t e s , which admits t h e ( e p i s t e m i c ) p o s s i b i l i t y o f t h e i r n o n - e x i s t e n c e , and wh i c h supposes t h a t m ental r e p o r t s a r e u l t i m a t e l y r e p o r t s about b r a i n - s t a t e s . F i r s t o f a l l , i t i s a consequence o f t h i s approach t h a t i t i s f a c t s about b r a i n - s t a t e s w h i c h make mental r e p o r t s t r u e o r f a l s e , and i t i s d i f f i c u l t t o square t h i s w i t h t h e view t h a t i t i s c o n c e p t u a l l y i m p o s s i b l e t o make a m i s t a k e i n c e r t a i n o f one's mental r e p o r t s , namely t h o s e which a r e u l t i m a t e l y r e p o r t s on one's c u r r e n t b r a i n - s t a t e s . F o r t h e normal c r i t e r i a f o r t h e a p p l i c a t i o n o f n e u r a l - s t a t e -a s c r i p t i o n s , where t h e s e e x i s t , a l l o w f o r a c l e a r d i s t i n c t i o n between misnaming and m i s j u d g i n g , and hence f o r c o r r i g i b i l i t y . A p o s s i b l e r e c o u r s e i n t h e f a c e o f t h i s c r i t i c i s m i s t o s t r e s s t h e c o n t i n g e n c y o f t h e r e l a t i o n between m e n t a l r e p o r t s and n e u r a l s t a t e s . We c o u l d say t h a t what ( i t i s t h a t ) we cannot be m i s t a k e n about a r e not our b r a i n - s t a t e s ( e x c e p t perhaps i n some r a t h e r o b l i q u e de r e way), b u t something o f the form " I am i n whatever s t a t e has such-and-such p r o p e r t i e s " (e.g. c a u s a l p r o p e r t i e s ) . T h i s a l l o w s us t o s t a t e t h e t r u t h -c o n d i t i o n s f o r mental r e p o r t s w i t h o u t e x p l i c i t l y r e f e r r i n g t o n e u r a l s t a t e s , b u t t o admit t h a t t h e l a t t e r may be what make mental r e p o r t s t r u e o r f a l s e . The c o r r i g i b i l i t y o f our e x p l i c i t b e l i e f s about n e u r a l s t a t e s i s t h e n no bar t o t h e i n c o r r i g i b i l i t y o f our f i r s t - p e r s o n m ental r e p o r t s , s i n c e we can know t h e t r u t h - c o n d i t i o n s o f t h e l a t t e r t o be f u l f i l l e d w i t h o u t knowing any t r u t h s f o r m u l a t e d i n t h e language o f n e u r o p h y s i o l o g y . The o n l y p r o blem w i t h t h i s r e c o u r s e i s t h a t i t i s not a v a i l a b l e t o an e l i m i n a t i v e m a t e r i a l i s t , s i n c e i t i n v o l v e s s t e p p i n g back i n t o t h e c o n t i n g e n t i d e n t i t y t h e o r y , as f o r m u l a t e d , f o r example, by Lewis [ 1 4 ] . The r e c o u r s e i s a l s o i n c o n s i s t e n t w i t h t h e c l a i m e d h y p o t h e t i c a l i t y o f m e n t a l s t a t e s (see T h e s i s I I I ) , s i n c e t h e open-ended n a t u r e o f t h e s c h e m a t i c account o f t h e t r u t h - c o n d i t i o n s o f m ental r e p o r t s b r i n g s i t about t h a t i f a n y t h i n g causes b e h a v i o u r ( i n a s y s t e m a t i c way) mental s t a t e s do, and t h e r e f o r e e x i s t . I n g e n e r a l , t h e a t t empt by R o r t y t o p r e s e r v e our o r d i n a r y i n t u i t i o n s about t h e t r u t h and f a l s i t y o f m ental r e p o r t s i s always i n danger o f c a u s i n g h i s v iew t o c o l l a p s e 25 i n t o t h e c o n t i n g e n t i d e n t i t y t h e o r y , as t h e c l a i m t h a t n e u r a l s t a t e s make mental r e p o r t s t r u e and f a l s e i s always i n danger o f c o l l a p s i n g i n t o t h e c l a i m t h a t t h e t r u t h - c o n d i t i o n s f o r m ental r e p o r t s a r e t o be l a i d o ut i n terms o f n e u r a l s t a t e s . The l a t t e r c l a i m sounds l i k e t h e n O n-contingent i d e n t i t y t h e o r y ; t h e above r e c o u r s e r e s c u e s R o r t y from t h i s u n p a l a t a b l e c o n c l u s i o n b u t c a r r i e s him o n l y as f a r as t h e c o n t i n g e n t form o f t h e t h e o r y . To g e t any f a r t h e r he must r e l y on t h e g e n e r a l t h e o r y o f r e p o r t s w h i c h I have t r e a t e d e a r l i e r on t h i s c h a p t e r . ^ A second i n c o m p a t i b i l i t y between R o r t y ' s and W i t t g e n s t e i n ' s a c c o u n t s o f i n c o r r i g i b i l i t y s u r r o u n d s t h e n o t i o n o f e p i s t e m i c p r i o r i t y . On t h e l a t t e r view, t h i s does not r e a l l y e x i s t as a consequence o f i n c o r r i g i b i l i t y . The f a c t t h a t we cannot d i s t i n g u i s h between misnaming and m i s j u d g i n g i n t h e case o f n o n - i n f e r e n t i a l r e p o r t s does not g i v e us a r e a s o n f o r w i t h h o l d i n g c r i t i c i s m o f them. We may be l e s s i n c l i n e d t o charge bad judgment, b u t t o t h a t e x t e n t we s h a l l be more i n c l i n e d t o charge l i n g u i s t i c incompetence. ( A g a i n , a l l t h i s may change.) We do a l l o w a c e r t a i n amount o f p r i o r i t y t o f i r s t - p e r s o n o v e r t h i r d - p e r s o n r e p o r t s , b u t t h i s i s m o s t l y because t h e s u b j e c t i s i n a b e t t e r p o s i t i o n , u s u a l l y , t o be a b l e t o r u l e out v a r i o u s p o s s i b l e d e f e a t e r s o f h i s / h e r r e p o r t , such as t h a t s/he i s i n s i n c e r e i n making i t , m e r e l y p r e t e n d i n g o r w hatever; and a l l I mean by " b e t t e r p o s i t i o n " i s t h a t we would have t o do some work ( o f o b s e r v a t i o n and p o s s i b l y m a n i p u l a t i v e e x p e r i m e n t ) t o f i n d o ut what s/he a l r e a d y knows. (Of c o u r s e , sometimes s/he w i l l not 27 know, and sometimes we w i l l a l r e a d y know.) Fo r r e a s o n s such as t h e s e , i t seems t o me t h a t t h e two a c c o u n t s o f i n c o r r i g i b i l i t y do not complement each o t h e r and t h a t we s h o u l d r e g a r d t h e l a t e r , c o n s i d e r e d v e r s i o n as t h e one t r u l y r e p r e s e n t a t i v e o f R o r t y ' s e l i m i n a t i v e m a t e r i a l i s m . My main o b j e c t i o n t o t h i s a ccount i s t h a t w h i l e i t i s an attempt t o , j u s t i f y r e g a r d i n g n o n - i n f e r e n t i a l r e p o r t s as e p i s t e m i c a l l y p r i o r t o i n f e r e n t i a l , t h i r d - p e r s o n r e p o r t s , t h e manner i n which t h i s i s done l e a d s o n l y t o the c o n c l u s i o n t h a t the l a t t e r a r e t o be g i v e n p r i o r i t y i n the case of a c o n f l i c t . The attempt c o u l d perhaps be made i n another way, but i t seems u n l i k e l y t o me t h a t i t w i l l be s u c c e s s f u l . I t seems t o me, t h e n , t h a t R o r t y ' s v i e w, i n so f a r as i t i n v o l v e s a commitment t o T h e s i s I I I , cannot account f o r the e x i s t e n c e o f i n c o r r i g i b i l i t y , as e x p l i c a t e d i n terms of t h e c r i t e r i a l v iew, and t h a t i n g e n e r a l h i s e x p l a n a t i o n of the r e p o r t i n g r o l e o f mental language i s i n a d e q u a t e . My nex t t a s k i s t o p o i n t out t h a t t h e r e e x i s t f u r t h e r r o l e s f o r mental d i s c o u r s e , not c o v e r e d a t a l l by R o r t y ' s p u b l i s h e d work, which cause problems f o r h i s g e n e r a l view. T h i s p r o j e c t was begun i n Chapter 4, where I d i s t i n g u i s h e d r e a s o n - e x p l a n a t i o n s from the a p p l i c a t i o n o f the c a u s a l - e x p l a n a t o r y r o l e o f mental language. I t i s now time t o see i f t h i s and o t h e r f u r t h e r uses can be accommodated by t h i s v e r s i o n o f e l i m i n a t i v e m a t e r i a l i s m . F o o t n o t e s t o C hapter 5 1. I t might be argued t h a t h y p o t h e t i c a l i t y i s not a c o n c e p t u a l c o n d i t i o n o f t h e o r e t i c a l i t y even on t h e e l i m i n a t i v e view - i t ' s j u s t t h a t mental s t a t e s a r e u n s u c c e s s f u l t h e o r e t i c a l e n t i t i e s , t h e i r l a c k o f s u c c e s s b e i n g r e s p o n s i b l e f o r t h e i r f a i l u e t o e x i s t . I can a l l o w t h i s . I am concerned w i t h what i s d e f i n i t e l y a consequence o f t h e view, t h a t as f a r as we know mental s t a t e s may not e x i s t , and I do not mind how i t i s d e r i v e d . 2. W h i l e phenomenism may w e l l be an i n g r e d i e n t i n b o t h phenomenalism and phenomenology, t h e r e i s more t o each o f t h e l a t t e r t h a n i s r e l e v a n t t o t h e p r e s e n t d i s c u s s i o n . The crude v e r s i o n o f phenomenism appears t o be h e l d by E . S . S h i r l e y [ 3 4 ] , who a r g u e s , a g a i n s t e l i m i n a t i v e m a t e r i a l i s m , t h a t one cannot e l i m i n a t e p h y s i c a l s u f f e r i n g m e r e l y t h r o u g h l i n g u i s t i c r e t r a i n i n g . On t h i s p o i n t a l s o see R.K.Shope [ 3 5 ] . 3. The argument does not s t o p h e r e , f o r i t i s by no means o b v i o u s t h a t one can have knowledge w h i l e m i s d e s c r i b i n g , o r t h a t t h e t h e s i s o f i n c o r r i g i b i l i t y a l l o w s m i s t a k e s o f t h i s t y p e . The e f f e c t o f t h e o b j e c t i o n i s t o s h i f t emphasis t o c o n c e p t u a l m a t t e r s o f t h i s k i n d (some o f w h i c h a r e t r e a t e d e l sewhere i n t h i s e s s a y ) and away from t h e r e l e v a n c e o f t h e phenomenal immediacy o f s e n s a t i o n s e t c . . 4. There i s a m a t t e r o f i n t e r p r e t a t i o n r e l e v a n t h e r e , f o r Strawson i n s i s t s t h a t t h e b a s i c i t y o f m a t e r i a l o b j e c t s i s a f e a t u r e o f our c o n c e p t u a l scheme, not n e c e s s a r i l y o f a l l p o s s i b l e schemes. Other p h i l o s o p h e r s have argued th e g e n e r a l c l a i m , and t h i s f a c t i s a l l I need t o c r e a t e a p i c t u r e o f what i t means t o a p p e a l t o a G i v e n . 5. R o r t y [ 1 1 ] p.406. 6. R o r t y [11] p.420. 7. R o r t y [37] p.95, f o r example. 8. I n the words o f Sam C o v a l . 9. S t r i c t l y s p e a k i n g , he i s i n i t i a l l y c o ncerned o n l y w i t h s e n s e - d a t a , bu t h i s l a t e r remarks about t h e p h i l o s o p h y o f mind i n d i c a t e t h a t a l l mental s t a t e s r e c e i v e t h e same t r e a t m e n t . 167 10. S e l l a r s h i m s e l f i s not an e l i m i n a t i v e m a t e r i a l i s t , but h i s t h e o r e t i c a l i s t views are adopted by R o r t y . 11. A d m i t t e d l y they o f f e r d i f f e r e n t accounts of what i n c o r r i g i b i l i t y amounts t o . 12. Steven S a v i t t [38] has a t t a c k e d t h i s q u e s t i o n from a d i f f e r e n t a n g l e . H i s i d e a i s t h a t a s tatement such as "Sensat ions e x i s t " i s ambiguous: taken as " i n t e r n a l " to the ( t h e o r e t i c a l / c o n c e p t u a l ) framework of m i n d - t h e o r y t h i s s tatement i s t r u e , i n accordance w i t h our o r d i n a r y i n t u i t i o n s ; taken as " e x t e r n a l " to t h a t framework (the d i s t i n c t i o n d e r i v e s from C a r n a p ) , the s tatement can be d i s s e n t e d from wi thout damage to our i n t u i t i o n s . ( S a v i t t does not say t h a t on the e x t e r n a l r e n d e r i n g the s tatement i s f a l s e , s i n c e by e x t r a p o l a t i o n from h i s a p p l i c a t i o n of the d i s t i n c t i o n to P t o l e m a i c astronomy the e x t e r n a l v e r s i o n i s a "recommendation or a p r a c t i c a l judgment to use the framework of [ m i n d - t h e o r y ] , . . . and as such i s n e i t h e r t r u e nor f a l s e . " ) T h i s view appears to have the uncomfor tab le consequence t h a t t h e r e are no t r u e or f a l s e o n t o l o g i c a l s ta tements , but t h a t every t h e o r e t i c a l e x i s t e n t i a l s tatement i s t r u e ( i n t e r n a l l y , but t h a t i s the o n l y way e x i s t e n t i a l s tatements can be t r u e or f a l s e ) . 13. R o r t y [39] has d i s t i n g u i s h e d between r e f e r r i n g . . , r e f e r r i n g 2 and r e f e r r i n g . I t i s the f i r s t which i s r e l e v a n t h e r e , f o r we wish to r e t a i n the p o s s i b i l i t y t h a t t h e r e can be ( f a l s e ) r e p o r t s about something which does not e x i s t . 14. T h i s a l l o w s " Q u i c k l . . . o u t s i d e the bank. . .masked man. . .whi te h o r s e . . . s h o t c l e r k . . . h e a d e d w e s t . . . " to count as the r e p o r t of a h o l d u p . 15. An i n t e r e s t i n g d i a l e c t i c on the p l a u s i b i l i t y of the c a u s a l a n a l y s i s o f r e p o r t i n g can be e n t e r e d from a c o n s i d e r a t i o n of whether or not the t u r n i n g - r e d of a p i e c e of l i t m u s - p a p e r i s a r e p o r t on the a c i d i t y o f the s o l u t i o n i n which i t i s immersed. 16. No t h e o r e t i c a l weight i s a t t a c h e d to my use o f " c o r r e s p o n d i n g to" h e r e - i t means something l i k e "apt to be m i s i d e n t i f i e d as" . 17. That the c a u s a l account i s wrong does n o t , o f c o u r s e , show t h a t the r e f e r e n c e - p r i n c i p l e i s t r u e , but i t l eaves a l a r g e h o l e i n R o r t y ' s account which must be f i l l e d i f i t i s to be s i g n i f i c a n t , or i m p o r t a n t , t o use the term "repor t" i n t h i s p h i l o s o p h i c a l c o n t e x t . 18. I n c o r r i g i b i l i t y d e f i n e d i n terms o f l o g i c a l p o s s i b i l i t y . See R o r t y [11] pp.414-7. 19. I f anyone were t o i n s i s t t h a t Smith's r e p o r t must i n any case be t r u e (on account o f i t s i n some sense b e i n g a r e p o r t about h i s n e u r a l s t a t e ) , and t h e r e f o r e i s i n c o r r i g i b l e i n t h i s sense, I would r e p l y t h a t t h o s e who argue i n t h i s way r u n a s e v e r e r i s k o f h a v i n g t h e i r v i e w c o l l a p s e i n t o t h e i d e n t i t y t h e o r y , f o r t h e y Have begun t o i d e n t i f y t h e t r u t h - c o n d i t i o n s f o r m ental and n e u r a l r e p o r t s . 20. I mean "the s i n c e r e f i r s t - p e r s o n m ental r e p o r t s o f l i n g u i s t i c a l y - c o m p e t e n t p e o p l e made w i t h o u t e v i d e n t i a l r e l i a n c e on s e l f - o b s e r v a t i o n " o v e r "second- and t h i r d - p e r s o n mental r e p o r t s " - I s h a l l use " n o n - i n f e r e n t i a l " and " i n f e r e n t i a l " as s h o r t e r l a b e l s f o r t h e s e t y p e s u n l e s s c o n f u s i o n would r e s u l t . I t i s not p r i m a r i l y non-i n f e r e n t i a l i t y w h i c h g u a r a n t e e s e p i s t e m i c p r i o r i t y . Nor i s i t o b v i o u s t o me t h a t r e p o r t s o f t h e l a t t e r c l a s s a r e i n f e r e n t i a l i n any sense o t h e r t h a n t h a t e x p l a i n e d a t t h e b e g i n n i n g o f t h i s s e c t i o n - t h a t o f b e i n g based e v i d e n t i a l l y on t h e s u b j e c t ' s b e h a v i o u r . 21. I i g n o r e t h e f a c t t h a t t h i s d e f i n i t i o n c o n t a i n s p r i m i t i v e mental terms l i k e " b e l i e f " and " r a t i o n a l " . F o r our p u r p o s e s , as i n any case R o r t y i m p l i c i t l y acknowledges, i t would be b e t t e r t o r e p l a c e " b e l i e v e s " by " s i n c e r e l y r e p o r t s " . T h i s would a v o i d a d m i t t i n g t h e i n c o r r i g i b i l i t y o f c e r t a i n non-mental b e l i e f s (as R o r t y shows), a v o i d any h i d d e n commitment t o t h e e x i s t e n c e o f b e l i e f s and a l s o p r e s e r v e t h e c o n t i n u i t y o f t h e p r e s e n t d i s c u s s i o n , w h i c h i s concerned w i t h r e p o r t s . 22. The n o t i o n o f c o n s i s t e n c y b e i n g a p p e a l e d t o h e r e i s not t h a t o f l o g i c a l c o n s i s t e n c y , which would t r i v i a l i s e t h e p o i n t b e i n g made, b u t o f e v i d e n t i a l c o n s i s t e n c y . P i s e v i d e n t i a l l y c o n s i s t e n t w i t h Q i f f P i s not good e v i d e n c e f o r not-Q. 23. R o r t y does not c o n s i d e r any case o f a n o n - i n f e r e n t i a l r e p o r t b e i n g o v e r t h r o w n by b e h a v i o u r a l e v i d e n c e a l o n e . He i magines t h a t t h i s w i l l (can?) o n l y be done u s i n g n e u r o p h y s i o l o g i c a l e v i d e n c e ( t h e r e s u l t s o f c e r e b r o s c o p e r e a d i n g s ) . When he comes t o h i s example o f t h e l a t t e r event ( [ 1 0 ] p.190), however, he chooses one i n w h i c h th e b e h a v i o u r a l e v i d e n c e goes a l o n g w i t h t h e n e u r a l e v i d e n c e , and b o t h a r e i n c o m p a t i b l e w i t h t h e s u b j e c t ' s r e p o r t . I t i s h a r d t o know whi c h i s h e r e r e f u t i n g t h e c o n j e c t u r e . 24. E xcept i n so f a r as R o r t y b e l i e v e s t h a t i n c o r r i g i b i l i t y i s the mark o f t h e m e n t a l . T h i s a s p e c t o f h i s e l i m i n a t i v e m a t e r i a l i s m i s not under s c r u t i n y h e r e . 25. We s h o u l d have ex p e c t e d t h i s when he (on my e l a b o r a t i o n ) began t o speak o f n e u r a l s t a t e s " c o r r e s p o n d i n g t o " mental s t a t e s , f o r h e r e he was h i n t i n g a t t h e e x i s t e n c e o f c e r t a i n p s y c h o p h y s i c a l c o r r e l a t i o n s , t h e assumption o f w h i c h h i s view was s e t up t o a v o i d . See C h a p t e r 2, s e c t i o n ( d ) . 26. My i n t u i t i o n s h e r e can perhaps be s u p p o r t e d by r e f e r e n c e t o a n o t h e r o f R o r t y ' s examples: i f I w i s h t o i n t e r p r e t t h e statement "Zeus' t h u n d e r b o l t s cause f o r e s t f i r e s " as a t r u e r e p o r t about l i g h t n i n g - f l a s h e s , t h e r e seems t o be no r e a s o n f o r me t o h e s i t a t e i n i d e n t i f y i n g Zeus' t h u n d e r b o l t s w i t h l i g h t n i n g - f l a s h e s , and t h e r e f o r e no r e a s o n f o r me t o i n s i s t t h a t Zeus' t h u n d e r b o l t s do not e x i s t . 27. I suppose t h e v e r y n o n - i n f e r e n t i a l i t y . o f most s e l f -r e p o r t s o f o c c u r r e n t mental s t a t e s i s r e s p o n s i b l e f o r a c e r t a i n degree o f e p i s t e m i c p r i o r i t y , t o t h e e x t e n t t h a t , i f t h e y are not based upon i n f e r e n c e , t h e y cannot be based upon f a u l t y i n f e r e n c e . Chapter 6: N o n - t h e o r e t i c o - c a u s a l R o l e s o f M e n t a l Language (a) N o n - c o n s t a t i v e Uses o f M e n t a l Language I b e g i n by l o o k i n g a t some uses o f m e n t a l language w h i c h a re not t h e o r e t i c o - c a u s a l and a s k i n g whether t h e s e uses are c o m p a t i b l e w i t h t h e a l l e g e d r o l e o f me n t a l a s c r i p t i o n s i n the e x p l a n a t i o n o f b e h a v i o u r ( s c . p h y s i c a l movements). By a " c o n s t a t i v e " use o f some sentence I mean a use whic h s t a t e s , o r which a t t e m p t s o r p u r p o r t s t o s t a t e , a f a c t . Such a use need not be a r e p o r t , i n t h e sense i n wh i c h an h y p o t h e s i s , f o r example, i s not a r e p o r t , f o r t h e making o f an h y p o t h e s i s i s t o count as an attempt t o s t a t e a f a c t . I w i s h t o c o n c e n t r a t e our a t t e n t i o n on t h o s e uses o f mental language which are not c o n s t a t i v e i n t h e above sense. I t h i n k i t i s u n d e n i a b l e t h a t t h e r e a r e such u s e s : what we need a r e a few examples. I n c e r t a i n c i r c u m s t a n c e s my u t t e r a n c e o f t h e sentence "I hope he w i l l come" might c o n s t i t u t e an a t t e m p t 1 t o s t a t e a f a c t about m y s e l f - f o r i n s t a n c e i f i t i s p a r t o f a r e p l y t o my p s y c h i a t r i s t ' s r e q u e s t t o l i s t some o f t h e t h i n g s I hope f o r . I n o t h e r c i r c u m s t a n c e s , however, t h e u t t e r a n c e may be n o t h i n g more t h a n an e x p r e s s i o n o f my hope, i f f o r i n s t a n c e I am a l o n e and a n x i o u s about h i s a r r i v a l . W i t t g e n s t e i n [ 5 ] s u g g e s t s t h a t we r e g a r d such u t t e r a n c e s as r e p l a c e m e n t s f o r the n a t u r a l e x p r e s s i o n o f me n t a l s t a t e s , o r perhaps as developments from t h e s e ( s i n c e t h e n o n - l i n g u i s t i c e x p r e s s i o n o f so s p e c i f i c a hope i s somewhat l e s s o b v i o u s l y n a t u r a l t h a n t h e e x p r e s s i o n o f p a i n t h r o u g h s c r e a m i n g , w r i t h i n g e t c . ) . He i s perhaps more concerned w i t h d i s p e l l i n g t h e b e l i e f t h a t such u t t e r a n c e s a r e r e p o r t s about t h e events i n some p r i v a t e mental a r e n a , but I t h i n k h i s s u g g e s t i o n has w i d e r a p p l i c a t i o n and i t i s v e r y p o s s i b l e t h a t t h i s was p a r t o f h i s i n t e n t i o n . To c o n t i n u e w i t h some more examples: t h e u t t e r a n c e " I w i s h you would go away" has t h e f o r c e , i n many c i r c u m s t a n c e s , o f an i n j u n c t i o n r a t h e r t h a n a s e l f - d e s c r i p t i o n . " I t h i n k you're l y i n g 1" can p r e s e n t a c h a l l e n g e r a t h e r t h a n a p i e c e o f i n f o r m a t i o n . C e r t a i n a p p a r e n t l y "mental" c o n s t r u c t i o n s can be used t o make t e n t a t i v e judgments about t h e w o r l d : " I t l o o k s (seems) t o me as i f ( t h a t ) " I (am i n c l i n e d t o ) b e l i e v e t h a t ..." a r e examples o f t h i s t y p e o f use. T h i s phenomenon i s not c o n f i n e d t o , though i t i s more commonly found i n , f i r s t - p e r s o n u t t e r a n c e s . "You ex p e c t me t o k n e e l t o y o u l ? " i s a r e f u s a l , n o t a q u e s t i o n . "He deems i t a d v i s a b l e f o r you t o a c c e p t " may be t h e c o n v e y i n g o f an i n j u n c t i o n , n o t an a s c r i p t i o n . I m p e r s o n a l u t t e r a n c e s a l s o have n o n - c o n s t a t i v e f o r c e , depending on t h e c o n t e x t and c i r c u m s t a n c e s o f use: "One do e s n ' t p u t on a i r s a t p h i l o s o p h y conferences" may be a warning or a t h r e a t as opposed to an e m p i r i c a l g e n e r a l i s a t i o n . There are many more examples , but I t h i n k we have enough to d e a l w i t h the p h i l o s o p h i c a l p o i n t s I wish to make about such u t t e r a n c e s . As a p r e l i m i n a r y to the d i s c u s s i o n , i t s h o u l d be noted t h a t a l l the sentences I have c i t e d as examples a l s o have c o n s t a t i v e u se s , i n d i f f e r e n t c o n t e x t s and c i r c u m s t a n c e s . I wish to look f i r s t at q u e s t i o n s s u r r o u n d i n g the r e l a t i o n s h i p betweeen the two types of use , i n p a r t i c u l a r at the c l a i m t h a t n o n - c o n s t a t i v e uses are i n some way d e r i v a t i v e from c o n s t a t i v e u s e s . I f t h i s c l a i m i s t r u e , then t h e r e i s some reason f o r r e g a r d i n g the c o n s t a t i v e uses as the b a s i c uses o f mental a s c r i p t i o n s and hence some p l a u s i b i l i t y i n t a k i n g the S e l l a r s i a n , or t h e o r e t i c a l i s t , account s e r i o u s l y , s i n c e the uses of t h e o r e t i c a l a s c r i p t i o n s are c o n s t a t i v e , as I have d e f i n e d t h i s t e r m . I f , however, the c l a i m i s f a l s e , then t h e r e i s some reason f o r r e s i s t i n g the t h e o r e t i c a l i s t account i n so f a r as i t does not c a p t u r e , nor a l l o w f o r , the n o n -c o n s t a t i v e uses o f mental l anguage . ( T h i s p o i n t w i l l have to be argued l a t e r ; I i n t r o d u c e i t now s i m p l y to r e v e a l my s t r a t e g y i n what f o l l o w s . ) Care must be taken i n the e x p l i c a t i o n o f the c l a i m t h a t n o n - c o n s t a t i v e uses are d e r i v a t i v e from c o n s t a t i v e ones . I s h a l l d i v i d e the p o s s i b l e i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s o f t h e c l a i m i n t o two b road c a t e g o r i e s : the l o g i c a l and the p r a g m a t i c . The l o g i c a l i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s i n v o l v e the s u p p o s i t i o n s t h a t non-c o n s t a t i v e u t t e r a n c e s e n t a i l , i m p l y o r presuppose the p r o p o s i t i o n a s s e r t e d by the c o r r e s p o n d i n g c o n s t a t i v e use. I t might be argued, f o r example, t h a t i f I use t h e e x p r e s s i o n " I w i s h you would go away" as a way o f e n j o i n i n g someone t o d e p a r t , my u t t e r a n c e i m p l i e s t h a t I do wi s h h e r or him t o go away; i n d e e d , i t might f u r t h e r be s a i d , i t i s h e r or h i s r e c o g n i t i o n o f the f a c t t h a t such i s my d e s i r e which i s o p e r a t i v e i n b r i n g i n g h er or him t o obey the i n j u n c t i o n , i f t h i s s/he does, o r t o i g n o r e i t , i f t h i s s/he does. My o b j e c t i o n t o t h i s way o f c o n s t r u i n g the s i t u a t i o n i s i m p l y t h a t l o g i c a l r e l a t i o n s h o l d between p r o p o s i t i o n s , o r sta t e m e n t s e x p r e s s i n g p r o p o s i t i o n s , o r even s e n t e n c e s used t o make s t a t e m e n t s , but not between i n j u n c t i o n s and p r o p o s i t i o n s nor between q u e s t i o n s and p r o p o s i t i o n s . The appearance o f an i m p l i c a t i o n i n the p r e s e n t example i s d e c e p t i v e , f o r we may note t h a t the same f e a t u r e s o c c u r i n the example o f the s i m p l command "Go a w a y i " . In some way, t h e use o f t h i s i m p e r a t i v e "gets a c r o s s " the i d e a t h a t I w i s h him/her t o whom i t i s d i r e c t e d t o d e p a r t , and i f s/he goes i t w i l l p r o b a b l y be by r e c o g n i t i o n of t h i s f a c t . But few would suppose t h a t "Go awayi " e n t a i l s , i m p l i e s o r presupposes t h e p r o p o s i t i o n t h a t I 174 wish someone (him or h e r ) to go away. I would p r e f e r to say , u s i n g A u s t i n i a n t e r m i n o l o g y [ 4 1 ] , t h a t i t i s a c o n d i t i o n o f the f e l i c i t y o f b o t h the i n j u n c t i o n and the command t h a t I do i n f a c t wish the r e l e v a n t p e r s o n to go away. One of the ways i n which such an i n j u n c t i o n may m i s f i r e i s i f t h i s c o n d i t i o n i s not f u l f i l l e d . Of c o u r s e , the i n j u n c t i o n may s t i l l be e f f e c t i v e i n g e t t i n g h e r / h i m to go away ( a g a i n s t my w i s h e s ) , but t h e r e i s something amiss w i th the i n j u n c t i o n - i t i s i n s i n c e r e or whatever . F e l i c i t y - c o n d i t i o n s are not t r u t h - c o n d i t i o n s , which i s why e n t a i l m e n t i s i r r e l e v a n t , but the same p o i n t may be expressed i n terms of t r u t h - c o n d i t i o n s : one might say t h a t i t i s a c o n d i t i o n o f my s i n c e r e l y e n j o i n i n g you to go away, of my s i n c e r e l y u s i n g the e x p r e s s i o n "I wish you would go away" i n t h i s f a s h i o n , t h a t I do wish you to go away. The reader may be l e f t w i t h the i m p r e s s i o n t h a t i t i s p e r f e c t l y a l r i g h t to speak of f e l i c i t y - c o n d i t i o n s b e i n g i m p l i e d by n o n - c o n s t a t i v e uses o f language such as those above . T h i s i s p e r m i s s i b l e , p r o v i d e d i t i s remembered t h a t such an i m p l i c a t i o n i s not an e n t a i l m e n t between what i s s a i d and the f a c t which c o n s t i t u t e s the f u l f i l l m e n t o f the f e l i c i t y - c o n d i t i o n . The p r o p o s i t i o n which a s s e r t s the e x i s t e n c e o f t h i s f a c t i s not p a r t of the meaning o f what i s s a i d , s i n c e the l a t t e r i s n o n - p r o p o s i t i o n a l and no p r o p o s i t i o n can be d e r i v e d from i t . F o r t h e same r e a s o n , th e f e l i c i t y -c o n d i t i o n s a r e not presupposed by a n o n - c o n s t a t i v e use i n any d i r e c t sense. The s i n c e r e use o f a n o n - c o n s t a t i v e u t t e r a n c e i m p l i e s i t s f e l i c i t y - c o n d i t i o n s i n t h e sense t h a t , c o n f r o n t e d by such a use, i t i s r e a s o n a b l e f o r t h e h e a r e r t o assume t h a t t h o s e c o n d i t i o n s a r e f u l f i l l e d , c e t e r i s p a r i b u s . T h i s i s because i n making such an u t t e r a n c e i n your h e a r i n g , I l e t i t be known t h a t I make such an u t t e r a n c e and l e t i t be assumed t h a t I make the u t t e r a n c e s i n c e r e l y . I n t h a t case you a r e e n t i t l e d t o assume, i n t h e absence o f i n d i c a t i o n s t o t h e c o n t r a r y , t h a t t h e r e l e v a n t f e l i c i t y - c o n d i t i o n s a r e f u l f i l l e d . T h i s i s an i n f e r e n c e not from what I say, b u t from t h e f a c t t h a t I say i t . The c l a i m t h a t n o n - c o n s t a t i v e uses o f an e x p r e s s i o n a r e d e r i v a t i v e from i t s c o n s t a t i v e uses (where t h e s e e x i s t ) c o u l d be f o r m u l a t e d i n more p r a g m a t i c f a s h i o n , as t h e c l a i m t h a t u n l e s s t h e c o n s t a t i v e use were p o s s i b l e , u n l e s s , t h a t i s , i t i s a r e c o g n i s e d move i n t h e language, th e n o n - c o n s t a t i v e use would not be p o s s i b l e . Upon c l o s e e x a m i n a t i o n , however, t h i s c l a i m has l i t t l e t o recommend i t . I see no r e a s o n why t h e form o f words " I w i s h you would go away" s h o u l d be any l e s s e f f e c t i v e , as an u t t e r a n c e w i t h i n j u n c t i v e f o r c e , i n t h e absence o f t h e p o s s i b i l i t y o f t h e c o r r e s p o n d i n g use t h a n i n 176 i t s p r e s e n c e . A g a i n the compar i son w i t h grammat ica l i m p e r a t i v e s i s u s e f u l , f o r "Go awayi" does not s u f f e r by the absence of a c o n s t a t i v e u s e . The p r a g m a t i c v e r s i o n of the d e r i v a t i o n - c l a i m i s i n many cases m o t i v a t e d by the i d e a , a l r e a d y ment ioned , t h a t i t i s by the r e c o g n i t i o n o f some f a c t ( e x p r e s s i b l e by the r e l e v a n t c o n s t a t i v e use) about the speaker ( i n t h i s case) t h a t the n o n - c o n s t a t i v e use i s s u c c e s s f u l . However, t h i s f a c t can be r e c o g n i s e d wi thout our r e q u i r i n g the same form of words to express i t . F u r t h e r m o r e , t h e r e seems to be no reason why the import of the n o n - c o n s t a t i v e use c o u l d 2 not be p i c k e d up wi thout the r e c o g n i t i o n of some such f a c t . I f i t be g r a n t e d t h a t t h e r e are n o n - c o n s t a t i v e uses o f mental language independent o f , ye t e x i s t i n g s i d e - b y - s i d e w i t h f a c t - s t a t i n g uses , the next task i s to i n v e s t i g a t e the s i g n i f i c a n c e o f t h i s s t a t e - o f - a f f a i r s f o r the a l l e g e d t h e o r e t i c a l i t y o f mental t erms . We s h o u l d o b s e r v e , f i r s t o f 3 a l l , t h a t the g l o b a l f e a t u r e o f mental language to which I have been a l l u d i n g , namely i t s employment i n n o n - c o n s t a t i v e uses , i s by no means g e n e r a l l y found i n o t h e r areas o f 4 t h e o r e t i c a l d i s c o u r s e . H e r e , t h e n , i s some reason f o r r e f u s i n g to r e g a r d mental terms as t h e o r e t i c a l . I have been s t r e s s i n g a d i s a n a l o g y between the uses to which mental language can be put and those to which language which i s n o n - c o n t r o v e r s i a l l y t h e o r e t i c a l can be p u t . Those o f a t h e o r e t i c a l i s t frame of mind may q u e s t i o n t h i s p r o c e d u r e , f o r t h e y may b e l i e v e t h a t a l l language i s t h e o r e t i c a l and t h a t t h e r e f o r e t h e o r e t i c a l language ( v i z . t h a t p a r t o f i t which i s employed i n everyday n o n - s c i e n t i f i c d i s c o u r s e ) does i n d e e d e x h i b i t the n o n - c o n s t a t i v e f e a t u r e s which I have been u s i n g t o d r i v e a wedge between t h e o r e t i c a l e x p l a n a t i o n and mental d i s c o u r s e . W h i l e I t h i n k t h i s b e l i e f i s f a l s e i n the g e n e r a l case i n t h e same way as i n the mental case - i t emphasises s u r f a c e - s i m i l a r i t i e s a t the c o s t o f i g n o r i n g deeper d i f f e r e n c e s - 1 cannot hope t o c o n v i n c e everyone of t h i s by b l a n k a s s e r t i o n , nor i s t h e r e space t o argue t h e m a t t e r o u t . I s h a l l s i m p l y assume t h a t the t h e o r e t i c a l / n o n - t h e o r e t i c a l d i s t i n c t i o n has r e a l a p p l i c a t i o n t o uses o f language; I do not mind i f t h i s d i s t i n c t i o n marks a d i f f e r e n c e o n l y i n degree, f o r i t i s no l e s s a d i s t i n c t i o n f o r t h a t . Having o u t l i n e d the n o n - c o n s t a t i v e uses o f mental language, I now t u r n t o the q u e s t i o n o f whether t h e s e uses, as w e l l as the f u n c t i o n o f mental language i n r e a s o n - e x p l a n a t i o n d e s c r i b e d e a r l i e r , can be a c c o u n t e d f o r on the s u p p o s i t i o n t h a t mental language i s t h e o r e t i c a l , i n the sense e x p l i c a t e d by Theses I I and I I I . The emphasis i n i t i a l l y i s upon T h e s i s (b) P r e s e n t M e n t a l Language Not T h e o r e t i c a l I n C h a p t e r 4 and s e c t i o n (a) o f t h i s c h a p t e r I have canvassed two k i n d s o f f u n c t i o n f o r m e n t a l language, n e i t h e r o f which c o n s i s t s i n t h e t h e o r e t i c o - c a u s a l e x p l a n a t i o n o f b e h a v i o u r , a l t h o u g h one o f them, t h e f i r s t , i s o f t e n c a l l e d "the e x p l a n a t i o n o f b e h a v i o u r " . The e x i s t e n c e o f t h e s e two uses o f mental language seems t o me t o c o n s t i t u t e s u f f i c i e n t grounds f o r d e n y i n g t h a t the t h e o r e t i c o - c a u s a l model i s adequate as a c h a r a c t e r i s a t i o n o f t h e f u n c t i o n o f t h e m e n t a l , but t h i s c o n c l u s i o n w i l l be t o o q u i c k f o r some. what I f e e l i s t h e most p l a u s i b l e (and most common) j u s t i f i c a t i o n f o r r e s i s t a n c e t o my c o n c l u s i o n i s t h e view t h a t b o t h t h e s y t e m a t i c r o l e o f mental language i n n o n - c o n s t a t i v e u t t e r a n c e s and i t s f u n c t i o n i n t h e j u s t i f i c a t i o n o f a c t i o n s a r e a c c r e t i o n s p a r a s i t i c upon i t s fundamental f u n c t i o n , namely t h e c a u s a l e x p l a n a t i o n o f b e h a v i o u r . I now t u r n t o an assessment o f t h i s p o s s i b i l i t y . We s h o u l d note f i r s t t h a t t h e e x i s t e n c e o f t h e e x c r e s c e n t f u n c t i o n s marks a s t r o n g d i s a n a l o g y between t h e use o f mental language and o t h e r a r e a s o f language w h i c h are a d m i t t e d t o be t h e o r e t i c a l . We s i m p l y don't f i n d such p a r a s i t e s t h e r e . Of c o u r s e , w h i l e t h i s i s a good r e a s o n f o r t h i n k i n g t h a t m ental language i s somehow s p e c i a l , i t i s not a c o n c l u s i v e r e a s o n f o r r e f u s i n g t o r e g a r d i t as t h e o r e t i c a l . A more p r o m i s i n g l i n e o f approach runs t h r o u g h t h e q u e s t i o n o f whether t h e s o - c a l l e d p a r a s i t i c a l f u n c t i o n s c o u l d e x i s t w i t h o u t t h e s o - c a l l e d h o s t f u n c t i o n . I argued i n s e c t i o n (a) o f t h i s c h a p t e r t h a t t h i s was p o s s i b l e i n t h e case o f t h e n o n - c o n s t a t i v e u s e s : a l t h o u g h t h e n o n - c o n s t a t i v e use o f "X has M" ( f o r some s u b j e c t X and m e n t a l - s t a t e - t e r m "M") pre s u p p o s e s , i n g e n e r a l , t h e f a c t t h a t X has M, i t does not presuppose t h e f a c t t h a t t h e s e words have t h e f u n c t i o n o f a s s e r t i n g t h e e x i s t e n c e o f t h e f a c t t h a t X has M. Thus t h e n o n - c o n s t a t i v e use c o u l d s u r v i v e t h e de a t h o f t h e c o n s t a t i v e use. The same i s t r u e , I now w i s h t o argue, i n t h e case o f th e use o f m e n t a l language i n t h e j u s t i f i c a t i o n o f a c t i o n . The c i t i n g o f t h e s u b j e c t ' s m e n t a l s t a t e as t h e ( i n t e r n a l i s e d ) r e a s o n f o r h i s / h e r a c t i o n presupposes t h e f a c t t h a t t h e mental s t a t e was c a u s a l l y r e l e v a n t t o t h e a c t i o n , b u t not t h e f a c t t h a t t h e r e i s a use o f t h e r e l e v a n t m ental e x p r e s s i o n i n t h e c a u s a l e x p l a n a t i o n o f b e h a v i o u r . A g a i n t h e j u s t i f i c a t o r y f u n c t i o n c o u l d o u t l i v e t h e c a u s a l / e x p l a n a t o r y f u n c t i o n . Thus w h i l e t h e former f u n c t i o n may be h i s t o r i c a l l y a p a r a s i t e , i t i s l o g i c a l l y i n d e p e n d e n t l y v i a b l e . T h i s i s an i m p o r t a n t c o n c l u s i o n , f o r i t r e p r e s e n t s t h e d i f f e r e n t f u n c t i o n s o f me n t a l language as c o n c e p t u a l l y independent ( i n a c e r t a i n sense) and hence i n c r e a s e s t h e d i f f i c u l t y o f any e l i m i n a t i v e m a t e r i a l i s t who proposes t o do away w i t h such language. What the c o n c l u s i o n s u g g e s t s i s t h a t the b a t t l e f o r t h e l i f e o f m e n t a l language must be f o u g h t not o n l y i n t h e arena o f e x p l a n a t o r y v a l u e and p r e d i c t i v e power but a l s o on t h e f i e l d o f g e n e r a l human i n t e r a c t i o n , m o r a l and o t h e r w i s e , where e x i s t t h e a d d i t i o n a l f u n c t i o n s o f e x p r e s s i o n , j u s t i f i c a t i o n and so f o r t h . T h i s p o i n t w i l l be d e v e l o p e d l a t e r . A n o t h e r argument i n f a v o u r o f t h e c o n c l u s i o n t h a t t h e p r e s e n t use o f mental language i s not t h e o r e t i c a l can be c o n s t r u c t e d out o f my a n a l y s i s o f o r d i n a r y - l a n g u a g e e x p l a n a t i o n . T h i s I r e p r e s e n t e d as t h e r e n d e r i n g r a t i o n a l o f th e agent's a c t i o n s . I f one w i s h e s t o g e n e r a t e from t h i s a f u l l - b l o w n c a u s a l e x p l a n a t i o n o f b e h a v i o u r , as opposed t o t h e more or l e s s i n f o r m a l assignment o f "a" o r " t h e " cause o f an a c t i o n t o a m e n t a l s t a t e , one must make an a s s u m p t i o n about th e agent, t h a t s/he i s r a t i o n a l . D.C.Dennett [ 4 2 ] has argued p e r s u a s i v e l y t o t h i s c o n c l u s i o n , a l t h o u g h h i s n o t i o n o f r a t i o n a l i t y i s more r e s t r i c t e d t h a n mine. As he p o i n t s o u t , the a s s u m p t i o n o f r a t i o n a l i t y i n t h e case o f any p a r t i c u l a r agent may be amended i n t h e l i g h t o f f u r t h e r knowledge about h i s / h e r q u i r k s and f a n c i e s , b u t t h i s f a c t does not d e s t r o y t h e g e n e r a l p o i n t . The q u e s t i o n I w i s h t o ask i s "How can t h e assumption o f r a t i o n a l i t y be i n c l u d e d i n t h e p i c t u r e o f mental e x p l a n a t i o n as t h e o r e t i c o - c a u s a l ? " I t seems t o me i m p l a u s i b l e t o r e g a r d t h e r a t i o n a l i t y o f the agent s i m p l y as what I s h a l l c a l l a b a s e - c o n d i t i o n i n t h e c a u s a t i o n o f b e h a v i o u r , as f o r i n s t a n c e a gun's b e i n g l o a d e d i s a c a u s a l b a s e - c o n d i t i o n o f i t s f i r i n g when t h e t r i g g e r i s p u l l e d . There a r e c i r c u m s t a n c e s i n wh i c h i t would make sense t o say t h a t t h e cause o f t h e gun's g o i n g o f f was i t s b e i n g l o a d e d , b u t none where i t would make sense t o say t h a t t h e cause o f a p e r s o n ' s a c t i o n was h e r / h i s r a t i o n a l i t y , i n t h e mi n i m a l sense o f r a t i o n a l i t y h e r e i n v o l v e d . The grounds on which we a s c r i b e r a t i o n a l i t y t o an agent a r e t h a t , i n g e n e r a l , h e r / h i s a c t i o n s a r e a p p r o p r i a t e t o h e r / h i s environment ( b e l i e f s ) and g o a l s ( d e s i r e s ) . I t i s thus not a s c r i b a b l e i n d e p e n d e n t l y o f t h e agent's a c t i o n s and mental s t a t e s (meaning by t h i s l a s t p h r a s e b e l i e f s and d e s i r e s i n t h e extended senses o f t h e s e t e r m s ) . T h i s f a c t i s not i t s e l f damaging t o t h e s t a t u s o f r a t i o n a l i t y as a c a u s a l c o n d i t i o n . A l t h o u g h t h e r a t i o n a l i t y o f t h e agent cannot be i d e n t i f i e d i n d e p e n d e n t l y o f h e r / h i s m e ntal s t a t e s and a c t i o n s , i t can be p o s i t e d on t h e b a s i s o f p a s t b e h a v i o u r , and thus c o n s t r u e d as a t h e o r e t i c a l s t a t e f o r th e e x p l a n a t i o n o f h e r / h i s p r e s e n t b e h a v i o u r . The problem i s , however, t h a t r a t i o n a l i t y , even i n t h i s m i n i m a l sense w h i c h i n v o l v e s no e v a l u a t i o n and t h e most meagre p o r t i o n o f n o r m a t i v i t y , i s a f u n c t i o n a l c o n c e p t , not a s t r u c t u r a l one. I t i s not s i m p l y a c a u s a l c o n d i t i o n under which b e l i e f s and d e s i r e s cause a c t i o n s , but t h e a p p r o p r i a t e n e s s o f t h o s e 5 a c t i o n s t o t h o s e mental s t a t e s . A t f i r s t s i g h t , t h e n , t h e assessment o f a c t i o n s as r a t i o n a l r e q u i r e s t h e a s c r i p t i o n t o t h e agent o f mental s t a t e s . Thus r a t i o n a l i t y and t h e p a r t i c u l a r m e n t a l s t a t e s o f the agent a r e not l o g i c a l l y i ndependent t h e o r e t i c a l c o n s t r u c t s , i f t h e y a r e such a t a l l . T h i s o f c o u r s e does not show th e t h e o r e t i c a l i s t a ccount t o be wrong - i t m e r e l y shows t h a t t h e a c t i v i t i e s o f a s s e s s i n g a c t i o n s as r a t i o n a l and a s c r i b i n g m e n t a l s t a t e s s t a n d o r f a l l t o g e t h e r . The a p p r o p r i a t e n e s s o f a c t i o n t o mental s t a t e which i s i m p l i e d i n r a t i o n a l i t y i s l i n g u i s t i c a l l y g i v e n . We d i d not have t o d i s c o v e r w h i c h a c t i o n s a r e a p p r o p r i a t e t o which m e n t a l s t a t e s , t h i s b e i n g w r i t t e n i n t o t h e v e r y d e s c r i p t i o n o f t h e m e n t a l s t a t e (as t h e d e s i r e f o r X, t h e b e l i e f t h a t A - i n g w i l l produce X and so on) and sometimes o f t h e a c t i o n . A f u r t h e r argument f o r t h e n o n - t h e o r e t i c a l n a t u r e o f mental e x p l a n a t i o n branches from t h i s p o i n t . A t t e n t i o n t o t h e l i n g u i s t i c s i t u a t i o n e n a b l e s us t o e x p l a i n why a c t i o n s cannot be e x p l a i n e d by i n a p p r o p r i a t e m e n t a l s t a t e s . I n t h e absence o f some f u r t h e r b e l i e f s ( o r f a c t s ) about t h e r e l a t i o n between A - i n g and B - i n g (which, l e t us suppose, a r e e x t r e m e l y d i s p a r a t e ) , t h e d e s i r e f o r X and t h e b e l i e f t h a t A - i n g w i l l p roduce X cannot e x p l a i n my B - i n g , s i n c e t h e m e n t a l s t a t e s o f f e r no r a t i o n a l e f o r t h e a c t i o n . On t h e t h e o r e t i c a l i s t a c c o u n t , however, i t would s u r e l y be a p o s s i b i l i t y , t o be d i s c o u n t e d by e x p e r i e n c e , t h a t t h e above s t a t e s cause t h e above a c t i o n , no m a t t e r how i n a p p r o p r i a t e i t might be. But t h a t i n normal c i r c u m s t a n c e s t h e b e l i e f t h a t d r i n k i n g quenches t h i r s t does not cause one t o e a t sand i s not a f a c t w h i c h r e q u i r e d d i s c o v e r y . I t i s a t r u t h which i s w r i t t e n i n t o our ways o f i d e n t i f y i n g and i n d i v i d u a t i n g m ental s t a t e s . Hence t h i s way o f e l a b o r a t i n g t h e t h e o r e t i c a l i s t a ccount i s wrong.^ The argument o f t h i s s e c t i o n , t h e n , runs as f o l l o w s : ( i ) the n o n - c o n s t a t i v e and j u s t i f i c a t o r y f u n c t i o n s o f m e n t a l language a r e independent o f ( c o u l d e x i s t w i t h o u t ) t h e c a u s a l -e x p l a n a t o r y f u n c t i o n ; ( i i ) i n so f a r as m e n t a l a s c r i p t i o n s a r e used i n c a u s a l e x p l a n a t i o n t h e y r e q u i r e t h e a t t r i b u t i o n t o t h e agent o f r a t i o n a l i t y - o t h e r w i s e t h e y j u s t won't work; ( i i i ) r a t i o n a l i t y i t s e l f i s not a h y p o t h e t i c a l c o n s t r u c t - i t i s t h e a p p r o p r i a t e n e s s o f a c t i o n s t o m e n t a l s t a t e s ; ( i v ) what e n a b l e s us t o o f f e r c a u s a l e x p l a n a t i o n s o f a c t i o n s i n terms o f mental s t a t e s i s t h e f a c t t h a t a s c r i p t i o n s o f m e n t a l s t a t e s may be used t o j u s t i f y a c t i o n s ; hence (v) i f e i t h e r use o f mental language i s p a r a s i t i c upon t h e o t h e r , i t i s t h e c a u s a l r o l e w h i c h i s p a r a s i t i c upon t h e j u s t i f i c a t o r y one; f u r t h e r m o r e ( v i ) our ways o f i n d i v i d u a t i n g m ental s t a t e s ( w i t h r e f e r e n c e t o t h e a c t i o n s t h e y j u s t i f y ) r u l e out t h e i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f t h e s e s t a t e s as h y p o t h e t i c a l c o n s t r u c t s . I t seems t o me t h a t i t f o l l o w s from (v) t h a t T h e s i s I I i s f a l s e , and from ( v i ) t h a t T h e s i s I I I i s f a l s e . I t might be o b j e c t e d t h a t h e r e I base my c o n c l u s i o n s on t h e r o l e o f m ental a s c r i p t i o n s i n a c c c o u n t i n g c a u s a l l y f o r a c t i o n s , not f o r movements, i t b e i n g t h e l a t t e r w h i c h a r e r e l e v a n t t o t h e i d e a t h a t o r d i n a r y m e n t a l language i s a t h e o r e t i c a l c o m p e t i t o r w i t h n e u r o p h y s i o l o g y . My r e p l y i s t h a t c a u s a l e x p l a n a t i o n s o f movements i n terms o f m e n t a l s t a t e s o p e r a t e v i a a c t i o n s , as argued i n C h a p t e r 4, so t h a t (v) above remains t r u e s i n c e ( i v ) i s t r u e a l s o o f c a u s a l e x p l a n a t i o n s o f movements. G i v e n t h i s , we have even more r e a s o n t o oppose t h e view t h a t n e u r o p h y s i o l o g y and o r d i n a r y m ental language a r e c o m p e t i t o r s , s i n c e t h e most i m p o r t a n t f u n c t i o n o f m e n t a l a s c r i p t i o n s o f t h i s t y p e i s t h e j u s t i f i c a t i o n o f a c t i o n s , not t h e c a u s a l e x p l a n a t i o n o f movements. Hence T h e s i s IV i s f a l s e . I f t h e above argument i s c o r r e c t , Theses I I - I V a r e a l l f a l s e , and so t h e r e f o r e i s T h e s i s I . Even i f i t i s i n c o r r e c t , o r i f R o r t y were w i l l i n g t o abandon Theses I - I V as p a r t o f h i s view, something o f v a l u e emerges from t h e d i s c u s s i o n o f ( i ) above. I n t h e n e x t s e c t i o n I s h a l l s u g gest t h a t t h e e x i s t e n c e o f m e n t a l s t a t e s appears t o f o l l o w from t h e v a l i d i t y o f t h e r o l e s o f m e n t a l language mentioned i n ( i ) , and argue t h a t t h e s e r o l e s c o u l d not e a s i l y be t a k e n over by n e u r a l language (c) N o n - t h e o r e t i c a l Uses and N e u r a l T a l k As I argued a t t h e end o f s e c t i o n ( a ) , t h e s u c c e s s f u l employment o f a n o n - c o n s t a t i v e m ental u t t e r a n c e i m p l i e s t h e e x i s t e n c e o f a c o r r e s p o n d i n g m ental f a c t . F o r i n s t a n c e , i f " I hope h e ' l l come" i s t r u l y an e x p r e s s i o n o f my m e n t a l s t a t e , t h e n I must i n f a c t so hope, even though t h e purpose o f my u t t e r a n c e i s not t o r e p o r t t h i s f a c t . S i m i l a r l y , t h a t some mental s t a t e o f mine i s t r u l y an ( i n t e r n a l i s e d ) r e a s o n f o r my a c t i o n i m p l i e s t h a t i t has a r o l e i n t h e c a u s a t i o n o f t h a t a c t i o n , even though th e g i v i n g o f a r e a s o n does not have the purpose o f r e p o r t i n g t h i s f a c t . Even though t h e n o n - c o n s t a t i v e and r a t i o n a l i s i n g uses c o u l d e x i s t w i t h o u t t h e c o n s t a t i v e and c a u s a l / e x p l a n a t o r y uses, i t appears t o be a c o n d i t i o n o f t h e i r s u c c e s s f u l employment t h a t t h e r e a r e mental f a c t s , and t h e r e f o r e m ental s t a t e s , w h i c h a r e c a u s a l l y e f f i c a c i o u s . T h i s p r o v i d e s us w i t h a p r i m a f a c i e argument f o r t h e e x i s t e n c e o f t h e m e n t a l , g r a n t e d t h e v a l i d i t y o f t h e n o n - c o n s t a t i v e and r a t i o n a l i s i n g u s es. A number o f r e a c t i o n s a r e p o s s i b l e from t h e s t a n d p o i n t o f R o r t y . F i r s t he c o u l d suppose t h a t o r d i n a r y language w i l l be r e t a i n e d f o r t h e n o n - c o n s t a t i v e and r a t i o n a l i s i n g r o l e s w h i l e n e u r o p h y s i o l o g y w i l l become t h e language o f r e p o r t i n g and ( c a u s a l ) e x p l a n a t i o n . T h i s a l t e r n a t i v e i s not very-a t t r a c t i v e , s i n c e i t does not q u e s t i o n t h e v a l i d i t y o f t h e p r i m a f a c i e argument, i n w h i c h case t h e e x i s t e n c e o f t h e mental remains i n t a c t . Our s i l e n c e about t h e m e n t a l i n r e p o r t i n g and e x p l a i n i n g would not be s u f f i c i e n t grounds f o r d e n y i n g i t s e x i s t e n c e . The i n t e r e s t i n g r e a c t i o n s a r e t h o s e w h i c h i n v o l v e c h a l l e n g i n g t h e p r i m a f a c i e i m p l i c a t i o n . A way t o do t h i s c o n s i s t e n t w i t h t h e f i r s t r e a c t i o n would be t o g r a f t t h e f e l i c i t y - i m p l i c a t i o n s onto n e u r o p h y s i o l o g i c a l s t a t e s i n s t e a d o f mental ones. Thus, f o r example, i t would be a c o n d i t i o n o f t h e f e l i c i t y o f my e x p r e s i o n o f p a i n t h a t my C - f i b r e s were s t i m u l a t e d , o r whatever. W h i l e I admit t h a t such a change i n t h e use o f language i s p o s s i b l e , I see two problems w i t h t h i s approach. The f i r s t i s t h a t , f o r R o r t y , t h e r e g r a f t i n g must t a k e p l a c e i n a way w h i c h a v o i d s t h e c o n c l u s i o n t h a t t h e c o n t i n g e n t i d e n t i t y t h e o r y i s c o r r e c t , i n o t h e r words we cannot suppose i n r e m a i n i n g c o n s i s t e n t w i t h t h i s v e r s i o n o f e l i m i n a t i v e 7 . . . m a t e r i a l i s m , t h a t a one-one c o r r e l a t i o n i s p o s s i b l e between c e r t a i n n e u r o p h y s i o l o g i c a l f a c t s and t h e m e n t a l f a c t s former i n c l u d e d i n t h e f e l i c i t y - c o n d i t i o n s f o r t h e n o n - c o n s t a t i v e u t t e r a n c e s and t h e t r u t h - c o n d i t i o n s o f t h e r a t i o n a l i s i n g u t t e r a n c e s . I t i s not c l e a r t o me t h a t t h i s i s a t a l l p o s s i b l e - c e r t a i n l y i t would r e q u i r e a w h o l e s a l e r e v i s i o n o t h e n o n - c o n s t a t i v e and r a t i o n a l i s i n g u s e s , and t h i s may not be a p r i c e we w i s h t o pay. The second p r o b l e m i s t h a t such a r e g r a f t i n g would not be p r a c t i c a l , s i n c e t h e new i m p l i c a t i o n -r e l a t i o n s would have t o be l e a r n e d p i e c e m e a l , t h e r e b e i n g no o b v i o u s c o n n e c t i o n o f meaning between t h e a n t e c e d e n t s and t h e consequents - t h e same s u b s t a n t i v e term never o c c u r s i n b o t h , f o r i n s t a n c e . T h i s i m p r a c t i c a l i t y does not e x i s t w i t h p r e s e n t m ental language. The second t y p e o f r e a c t i o n i n v o l v e s t h e s u p p o s i t i o n t h a t s e n t e n c e s i n t h e language o f n e u r o p h y s i o l o g y c o u l d t a k e on t h e n o n - c o n s t a t i v e and n o n - c a u s a l f u n c t i o n s o f mental language, so t h a t now t h i s would be r e p l a c e d a l l t h e way a c r o s s t h e b o a r d . I f t h i s were p o s s i b l e , i t would r e f l e c t back on my c l a i m t h a t i t i s on acc o u n t o f t h e s o - c a l l e d "secondary" f u n c t i o n s t h a t m e n t a l language i s not t h e o r e t i c a l , s i n c e n e u r o p h y s i o l o g i c a l language would have t h o s e f u n c t i o n s and i t _is t h e o r e t i c a l , o r so i t appe a r s . T h i s c o n c l u s i o n i s , however, h a r m l e s s , s i n c e a l l such an e v e n t u a l i t y would show i s t h a t n e u r o p h y s i o l o g i c a l language, once i t has a c q u i r e d t h e a d d i t i o n a l f u n c t i o n s , w i l l cease t o be (merely) t h e o r e t i c a l . I do not t h i n k t h e l i n g u i s t i c change h e r e c o n s i d e r e d i s p o s s i b l e i n any r e a l sense: t h e a l t e r n a t i v e s u f f e r s t h e same problems o f i m p r a c t i c a l i t y as t h e p r e v i o u s one - i t s i m p l y i s not c l e a r , f o r example, t h a t a c e r t a i n n e u r a l f o r m a t i o n i s a j u s t i f i c a t i o n f o r slamming the door i n someone's f a c e . In o t h e r words, the l o g i c of n e u r a l j u s t i f i c a t i o n i s not p e r s p i c a c i o u s ( to us now, and as we imagine we w i l l be) u n l e s s we f i l l i n the gaps by t a l k i n g about b e l i e f s , d e s i r e s , i n t e n t i o n s e t c . . F u r t h e r problems a r i s e from the open-ended n a t u r e o f r a t i o n a l i t y ; because i t does not c o n s i d e r such f a c t o r s r e l e v a n t , e l i m i n a t i v e m a t e r i a l i s m , i n t h i s v e r s i o n , g i v e s us no p i c t u r e o f what moral d i s p u t e would look l i k e , of what s o r t s o f c o n s i d e r a t i o n c o u l d be urged i n favour o f each of a number o f compet ing v i ews , of why they s h o u l d be regarded as r e l e v a n t . Our p r e s e n t systems of j u s t i f i c a t i o n are a d m i t t e d l y f r a y e d at the edges , but t h a t i s as i t sh ou ld be and most p e o l e have no d i f f i c u l t y o p e r a t i n g w i t h them. What we are faced w i t h i f we wish to embrace t h i s v e r s i o n o f m a t e r i a l i s m i s a s i g n i f i c a n t l y d i f f e r e n t system which i n our p r e s e n t s t a t e of knowledge i s mud-c l ear to u s . We do not know what we are b e i n g asked to embrace, n o r , t h e r e f o r e , i f i t i s p o s s i b l e to do so . I say t h a t whatever systems of j u s t i f i c a t i o n are to r e p l a c e our p r e s e n t ones must be s i g n i f i c a n t l y d i f f e r e n t because i f t h i s p o s s i b i l i t y i s to be taken as s u p p o r t i n g the r e l e v a n t v e r s i o n o f e l i m i n a t i v e m a t e r i a l i s m we are c o n s t r a i n e d to a v o i d a d m i t t i n g the t r u t h of the i d e n t i t y t h e o r y , as i n the case of the p r e v i o u s r e a c t i o n . The replacement o f mental language w i t h n e u r o p h y s i o l o g i c a l language w i l l be a P y r r h i c v i c t o r y f o r R o r t y ' s view u n l e s s t h e r e are s i g n i f i c a n t d i f f e r e n c e s between t h e two uses - o t h e r w i s e m e n t a l s t a t e s w i l l have s u r v i v e d t o be c a l l e d by d i f f e r e n t names. I t i s t o be e x p e c t e d t h a t t h e s e d i f f e r e n c e s w i l l e x t e n d beyond t h e c a u s a l / t h e o r e t i c a l a r e n a o f d i s c o u r s e i n t o t h a t o f j u s t i f i c a t o r y e x p l a n a t i o n . W h i l e none o f t h e above c o n s i d e r a t i o n s shows t h a t t h e much-vaunted r e p l a c e m e n t i s u t t e r l y i m p o s s i b l e , t h e y widen t h e grounds upon w h i c h such a l i n g u i s t i c change i s t o be c o n s i d e r e d . S i g n i f i c a n t changes i n our systems o f j u s t i f i c a t i o n are s i g n i f i c a n t m o r a l ( e t c . ) i s s u e s , and t h e y a r e not t o be d e c i d e d on grounds o f t h e o r e t i c a l p a rsimony, p r e d i c t i v e v a l u e and so f o r t h , which would be t h e s o r t s o f c r i t e r i a r e l e v a n t i f t h e i s s u e were a p u r e l y s c i e n t i f i c one, as R o r t y appears t o c l a i m . B o th t h e r e a c t i o n s t r e a t e d so f a r a c c e p t t h e v a l i d i t y o f t h e n o n - c o n s t a t i v e and j u s t i f i c a t o r y uses o f m e n t a l language b u t i g n o r e t h e c l a i m e d i m p l i c a t i o n s o f t h e s e f o r t h e e x i s t e n c e o f m ental s t a t e s - .these t h e y r e p l a c e by i m p l i c a t i o n s f o r t h e e x i s t e n c e o f n e u r a l s t a t e s . I t seems t o me t h a t t h e s e p r o j e c t s are h o p e l e s s , a l t h o u g h I have not p r o v e d t h i s , because t h e r e l e v a n t i m p l i c a t i o n s f o r t h e e x i s t e n c e o f m e n t a l s t a t e s a r e e s s e n t i a l t o t h e n o n - c a u s a l u s e s . A t h i r d r e a c t i o n i s a v a i l a b l e t o t h e e l i m i n a t i v e m a t e r i a l i s t , and t h i s I b e l i e v e i s f o r him/her t h e most c o n s i s t e n t , and t h a t i s t o admit t h e i m p l i c a t i o n s b u t t o r e j e c t t h e n o n - c o n s t a t i v e and j u s t i f i c a t o r y uses o f m e n t a l langauge a l o n g w i t h mental s t a t e s . I see no c o n c e p t u a l problem w i t h t h i s a l t e r n a t i v e , but I would i n s i s t t h a t t h e abandoning o f such l i n g u i s t i c f u n c t i o n s i s a r a d i c a l m o r a l move and t h a t m o r a l c o n s i d e r a t i o n s a r e r e l e v a n t t o i t s a d v i s a b i l i t y . ( I c o n c e n t r a t e upon mor a l j u s t i f i c a t i o n because i t i s a r g u a b l y t h e most i m p o r t a n t , b u t what I say a p p l i e s t o a e s t h e t i c s and much e l s e b e s i d e s . ) T h i s g e n e r a l t o p i c w i l l be r e v i s i t e d i n t h e c o n c l u d i n g c h a p t e r . Footnotes to Chapter 6 1. T h i s q u a l i f i c a t i o n i s i n s e r t e d to assuage the o b j e c t i o n s of e l i m i n a t i v e m a t e r i a l i s t s who might argue t h a t i t s omission renders i t f a l s e , i n the l i g h t of the non-existence of mental s t a t e s , t h a t any such sentence can s t a t e a f a c t . I t w i l l c l e a r l y be t e d i o u s t o continue t o make the q u a l i f i c a t i o n , so I s h a l l omit i t i n concreto w h i l e a d m i t t i n g i t i n a b s t r a c t o . 2. Two opposed views of language c o n f r o n t each other here. The f i r s t regards c o n s t a t i v e u t t e r a n c e s , and the a c t i v i t y of s t a t i n g f a c t s , d e s c r i b i n g the world, as b a s i c , as the main f u n c t i o n of language. The second view allows an independent f u n c t i o n t o n o n - c o n s t a t i v e u t t e r a n c e s . There i s even some p l a u s i b i l i t y , i t seems to me, i n the view t h a t i t i s the non-c o n s t a t i v e u t t e r a n c e s which are b a s i c , i f anything i s . The view pays g r e a t a t t e n t i o n to the r o l e of language i n human i n t e r a c t i o n . However, I cannot argue out t h i s i s s u e here. 3. I t i s r e l e v a n t t h a t the f e a t u r e t o which I am drawing a t t e n t i o n i s g l o b a l . That mental terms occur i n non-c o n s t a t i v e u t t e r a n c e s i s not by i t s e l f s i g n i f i c a n t - the e x i s t e n c e of the i m p e r a t i v e "Eat the l o b s t e r " has no i m p l i c a t i o n s f o r the s p e c i a l s t a t u s o f l o b s t e r s . What i s s i g n i f i c a n t i s the s y s t e m a t i c way i n which many no n - c o n s t a t i v e u t t e r a n c e s i n c l u d e a mental term as p a r t of the main verb-phrase, as i n the examples c i t e d . 4. The o n l y example of a t h e o r e t i c o - e x p l a n a t o r y context which I can t h i n k of where the terms o f the d i s c o u r s e can be (and are) used t o make no n - c o n s t a t i v e u t t e r a n c e s i s p s y c h i a t r y , f o r i n s t a n c e p s y c h o - a n a l y s i s . I t i s c h a r a c t e r i s t i c of such forms of e x p l a n a t i o n t h a t those who engage i n them, whether as t h e r a p i s t or p a t i e n t , q u i c k l y a c q u i r e the a b i l i t y t o express, e n j o i n , warn e t c . i n the language of the theory as opposed to t h a t of everyday l i f e . However, s i n c e the d i f f e r e n c e s between these two areas of language are so s m a l l , t h i s " o p p o s i t i o n " tends t o evaporate i n t o a complementattion. As a r e s u l t of t h i s , and o f the f a c t t h a t i n going over to p s y c h i a t r y we have not moved away from the mind, the e x i s t e n c e of psycho-a n a l y t i c a l (and other) e x p l a n a t i o n , even i f t h i s i s s t r a i g h t f o r w a r d l y c a u s a l (which can a l s o be q u e s t i o n e d ) , does l i t t l e t o h e l p us a v o i d the g e n e r a l d i s a n a l o g y , w i t h r e s p e c t to the p o s s i b i l i t y of n o n - c o n s t a t i v e uses, between mental language on the one hand and the language of other t h e o r e t i c a l d i s c i p l i n e s , such as the s p e c i a l s c i e n c e s , on the o t h e r . 5. T h i s p o i n t i s ( i m p l i c i t l y ? ) acknowledged by D e n n e t t t [ 4 2 ] , who, w h i l e h o l d i n g an e l i m i n a t i v e m a t e r i a l i s t view o f o r d i n a r y m e ntal c o n c e p t s , b e l i e v e s t h e y w i l l (ought t o ? ) be r e p l a c e d not by t h o s e o f n e u r o p h y s i o l o g y , b u t by t h e f u n c t i o n a l c o n c e p t s o f m a c h i n e - t h e o r y ; t h i s would l e a v e room f o r t h e a p p l i c a t i o n o f a concept s i m i l a r t o means-end r a t i o n a l i t y , b u t n o t , I s h o u l d argue, f o r t h e more e v a l u a t i v e n o t i o n o f m o r a l r a t i o n a l i t y . 6. T h i s c o n c l u s i o n may not be s e r i o u s l y damaging t o R o r t y ' s e l i m i n a t i v e m a t e r i a l i s t p o s i t i o n . The c l a i m t h a t t h e p r e s e n t use o f m ental language i s t h e o r e t i c o - c a u s a l can be seen as an i n e s s e n t i a l a d j u n c t t o t h a t p o s i t i o n , one move i n t h e a t t a c k on o r d i n a r y - l a n g u a g e e x p l a n a t i o n . That t h i s i n v o l v e s a b r o a d e r c o n c e p t u a l weave might s i m p l y be t a k e n t o mean t h a t t h i n g s a r e so much the worse f o r i t , might p r o v i d e us w i t h more grounds f o r r e p l a c i n g i t w i t h a more s c i e n t i f i c d i s c o u r s e . The i m p o r t a n t p o i n t f o r my s i d e o f t h e argument i s t h a t i f t h e c l a i m above i s f a l s e , t h e i s s u e between o r d i n a r y -language and n e u r o p h y s i o l o g y i s not one t h a t can be s e t t l e d by a p p e a l t o t h e canons o f s c i e n t i f i c methodology a l o n e . I t i s not a s t r u g g l e between two s c i e n t i f i c t h e o r i e s , b u t one between s c i e n c e and o r d i n a r y l i f e f o r t h e d e t e r m i n i n g r o l e i n o n t o l o g y . I n t h e f i n a l c h a p t e r I s h a l l s u g gest a p e a c e f u l s o l u t i o n t o t h i s problem. 7. T h i s p o i n t i s argued i n C h a p t e r 2, s e c t i o n ( d ) . 194 Chapter 7: Summary, C o n c l u s i o n s and S p e c u l a t i o n s  (a) Summary My aim i n t h i s essay has been to r e f u t e the v e r s i o n o f e l i m i n a t i v e m a t e r i a l i s m which i n Chapter 1 I a t t r i b u t e to R i c h a r d R o r t y . I b e g i n i n Chapter 2 w i t h the e x p l i c a t i o n of h i s v iew, c o n t r a s t i n g i t w i t h what I take to be the most s o p h i s t i c a t e d form of the ( n e u r a l ) c o n t i n g e n t i d e n t i t y t h e o r y , due to L e w i s . A c c o r d i n g to L e w i s , c e r t a i n p a r t s of the p h y s i c a l w i l l come to be i d e n t i f i e d w i t h the mental by b e i n g d i s c o v e r e d to occupy the same c a u s a l r o l e . I b e l i e v e t h a t t h i s v e r s i o n o f the i d e n t i t y t h e o r y i s r e l a t i v e l y sa f e a g a i n s t a l l s t a n d a r d o b j e c t i o n s . I t i s n o t , however, a s u c c e s s f u l v iew, f o r i t f a l l s to what I c a l l the "Surroundings" o b j e c t i o n , drawn from some remarks of W i t t g e n s t e i n and Malco lm w i t h some h e l p from the work of T y l e r B u r g e . What t h i s o b j e c t i o n shows i s t h a t the t r u t h - c o n d i t i o n s f o r mental a s c r i p t i o n s spread out much f a r t h e r than the c o n f i n e s o f the c e n t r a l nervous system, or indeed than the c o l l e c t i o n of n o n - r e l a t i o n a l f a c t s about the s u b j e c t h e r / h i m s e l f , w i t h the r e s u l t t h a t , g i v e n what we a l r e a d y know about the p r e s e n t use of mental language , i t w i l l not be p o s s i b l e to f o r m u l a t e t r u e c o r r e l a t i o n - s t a t e m e n t s o f t h e k i n d e n v i s a g e d t o p r o v i d e t h e o b s e r v a t i o n a l b a s e f o r t h e n e u r a l v e r s i o n o f t h e i d e n t i t y t h e o r y , w h i c h i s t h u s r e f u t e d . P h y s i c a l i s m d o e s n o t h o w e v e r d i e w i t h i t s h i s t o r i c a l l y most p o p u l a r e mbodiment. T h e r e a r e t h r e e m a i n a l t e r n a t i v e s : ( i ) one c o u l d s a y t h a t t h e s o c i a l a nd e n v i r o n m e n t a l f a c t s r e l e v a n t t o t h e t r u t h - c o n d i t i o n s f o r m e n t a l a s c r i p t i o n s c o u l d t h e m s e l v e s be r e d u c e d t o p h y s i c a l d e s c r i p t i o n and t a k e t h e i r p l a c e a l o n g s i d e t h e n e u r o p h y s i o l o g i c a l f a c t s o n one s i d e o f t h e e q u a t i o n s o f a new i d e n t i t y t h e o r y . S u c h a t h e o r y s h o u l d be immune f r o m c o u n t e r - e x a m p l e s ( a t l e a s t o f t h e s o r t w h i c h k i l l e d i t s p r e d e c e s s o r ) , t h o u g h i t m i g h t be a t t a c k e d on g r o u n d s w h i c h u n d e r m i n e t h e s i g n i f i c a n c e o f i n s i s t i n g on i d e n t i t y w h ere m a n i f e s t a t i o n , embodiment o r mere c o r r e l a t i o n w i l l d o. What seems more p l a u s i b l e t o me i s ( i i ) e l i m i n a t i v e m a t e r i a l i s m . I t i s no o b j e c t i o n t o t h i s v i e w t h a t t h e r e l e v a n t c o r r e l a t i o n - s t a t e m e n t s c a n n o t be f o u n d : r a t h e r t h e o p p o s i t e , f o r i t i s t h e a b s e n c e o f s u c h c o r r e l a t i o n s w h i c h p r o v i d e s a r e a s o n f o r d i s c a r d i n g m e n t a l c o n c e p t s i n t h e f a c e o f t h e s c i e n t i f i c s u p e r i o r i t y o f n e u r o p h y s i o l o g y . The o t h e r a l t e r n a t i v e i s ( i i i ) a f o r m o f n o n - r e d u c t i v e m a t e r i a l i s m s u c h as t h a t e s p o u s e d b y H e l l m a n and Thompson [43] [ 4 4 ] , t h e d i s c u s s i o n o f w h i c h i s o u t s i d e t h e s c o p e o f t h i s e s s a y . E l i m i n a t i v e m a t e r i a l i s m i s t h u s shown t o be a n a t u r a l r e a c t i o n t o t h e d e m i s e o f t h e i d e n t i t y t h e o r y . I n t h e remainder o f Chapter 2 I s e t up the v e r s i o n o f the view which I i n t e n d to a t t a c k , and make some e n q u i r i e s about a s u i t a b l e methodology f o r the a t t a c k . The main r e p r e s e n t a t i v e of t h i s view i s R i c h a r d R o r t y (whose more r e c e n t w r i t i n g s [37] can be i n t e r p r e t e d as i n d i c a t i n g tha t he has abandoned the v i e w ) , and i t i s upon h i s e x p o s i t i o n t h a t I c o n c e n t r a t e . I suggest t h a t what R o r t y r e q u i r e s to suppor t h i s view are ( i ) an i n c o m p a t i b i l i t y between mental and p h y s i c a l and ( i i ) an i n c o m p a t i b i l i t y between o r d i n a r y mental language and t h a t of n e u r o p h y s i o l o g y , and t h a t he grounds the second i n the f i r s t , and t h i s i n the i n c o r r i g i b i l i t y of c e r t a i n mental r e p o r t s . I argue tha t t h e r e i s no reason to expect the i n c o m p a t i b i l i t y mentioned i n ( i ) - t h a t R o r t y ' s argument f o r i t i s unsound -but t h a t i t i s e s s e n t i a l t o h i s v iew. My c h a r a c t e r i s a t i o n of h i s p o s i t i o n i s a c h i e v e d l a r g e l y through a c o n s i d e r a t i o n and an e l a b o r a t i o n o f the demon a n a l o g y . As p a r t o f t h i s attempt I t r y to c l e a r up some apparent i n c o n s i s t e n c i e s i n R o r t y ' s view r e g a r d i n g the c o n d i t i o n s under which i t would be r a t i o n a l to g i v e up "mind-theory" i n favour of n e u r o p h y s i o l o g y . I argue t h a t these i n c l u d e ( i ) the c l a i m t h a t mental concepts i n v o l v e a commitment to i n c o r r i g i b i l i t y and ( i i ) the f a i l u r e o f p e r f e c t p s y c h o p h y s i c a l c o r r e l a t i o n s . I then o u t l i n e the s t r a t e g y o f my a t t a c k . Chapter 3 i s devoted to an assessment o f the c l a i m s t h a t i n c o r r i g i b i l i t y i s t h e mark o f t h e m e n t a l and t h a t t h i s grounds t h e i n c o m p a t i b i l i t y r e q u i r e d f o r t h e e l i m i n a t i o n o f mental s t a t e s . A f t e r showing why t h e n o n - e x i s t e n c e v e r s i o n o f t h i s v iew i s s u p e r i o r t o the d i s a p p e a r a n c e v e r s i o n , I argue t h a t ( i ) m e n t a l a s c r i p t i o n s ( o f the r e l e v a n t t y p e ) a r e not i n c o r r i g i b l e i n R o r t y 1 s sense (nor i n t h e t r a d i t i o n a l s e n s e ) , ( i i ) R o r t y 1 s form o f i n c o r r i g i b i l i t y f a i l s t o d i s t i n g u i s h between m e n t a l and p h y s i c a l , i n t h a t i t a p p l i e s t o some p h y s i c a l a s c r i p t i o n s , ( i i i ) even i f R o r t y ' s form o f i n c o r r i g i b i l i t y were t h e mark o f t h e m e n t a l , i t c o u l d not ground t h e c a t e g o r i a l i n c o m p a t i b i l i t y w hich he seems t o r e q u i r e , and t h e r e f o r e t h a t ( i v ) T h e s i s V I I i s f a l s e . I n t h e f i n a l p a r t o f t h e c h a p t e r I o f f e r a summary o f the c r i t e r i a l v i ew o f me n t a l d i s c o u r s e w h i c h I have e x t r a c t e d from W i t t g e n s t e i n and e x p l a i n how t h i s a c c o u n t s f o r t h e form o f i n c o r r i g i b i l i t y w hich I t h i n k i£ c h a r a c t e r i s t i c o f c e r t a i n m e ntal r e p o r t s . T h i s account i s n e c e s s a r y f o r some o f my arguments i n Chapter 5. The ne x t t h r e e c h a p t e r s , 4, 5 and 6, a r e devoted t o an assessment o f t h e e x t e n t t o wh i c h R o r t y ' s view can account f o r the v a r i o u s r o l e s o f mental language which I c o n s i d e r ' w o r t h m e n t i o n i n g . These i n c l u d e t h e e x p l a n a t o r y and r e p o r t i n g r o l e s deemed r e l e v a n t by R o r t y , b u t a l s o r e a s o n - e x p l a n a t i o n and t h e broad c l a s s o f n o n - c o n s t a t i v e u t t e r a n c e s . My g e n e r a l p o s i t i o n i s t h a t t h e c l a i m e d t h e o r e t i c a l i t y o f mental s t a t e s (as e x p r e s s e d i n Theses I-IV) r e n d e r s h i s view i n c a p a b l e o f o f f e r i n g an adequate a c c o u n t . The c l a i m t h a t m ental terms a r e t h e o r e t i c a l terms I a n a l y s e i n t o two components, w h i c h I t r e a t s e p a r a t e l y . They are ( i ) t h a t t h e ( p r i m a r y ) use o f m e n t a l terms i s i n t h e c a u s a l e x p l a n a t i o n o f b e h a v i o u r , and ( i i ) t h a t m ental s t a t e s are h y p o t h e t i c a l e n t i t i e s , i n t h e sense t h a t as f a r as we know t h e y may not e x i s t . C h a p t e r 4 examines t h e t h e o r e t i c a l i s t v iew o f mental language (which R o r t y adopts from S e l l a r s ) w i t h t h e purpose o f e s t a b l i s h i n g t h a t t h e view i s p l a u s i b l e as a v i e w about t h e c a u s a l e x p l a n a t i o n o f p h y s i c a l movements, though not o f a c t i o n s . I t h e n c o n t r a s t t h e c a u s a l e x p l a n a t i o n o f movements w i t h r e a s o n - e x p l a n a t i o n , w h i c h c o n s i s t s p r i m a r i l y i n t h e e x p l a n a t i o n o f a c t i o n s , a r g u i n g t h a t i t i s an independent r o l e f o r m e n t a l language. I a l s o s u g g e s t t h a t some f e a t u r e s o f e x p l a n a t i o n i n mental terms make i t p l a u s i b l e t h a t i t i s not i n c o m p a t i b l e w i t h n e u r o p h y s i o l o g i c a l e x p l a n a t i o n , even i n so f a r as i t i s c a u s a l . Here I r e f e r back t o some m a t e r i a l from C h a p t e r 2 (where t h e same p o i n t was made as p a r t o f the e l u c i d a t i o n o f what t h e s e s R o r t y must deny t o e s t a b l i s h h i s own v i e w ) . I t i s i m p o r t a n t t o be c l e a r on t h e manner i n which t h i s c o m p a t i b i l i t y i s a c h i e v e d : i t i s not t h a t b o t h mental and n e u r a l f a c t s o c c u r i n t h e same t h e o r e t i c o - c a u s a l e x p l a n a t i o n s o f b e h a v i o u r , b u t t h a t t h e b e h a v i o u r can be s u c c e s s f u l l y e x p l a i n e d u s i n g e i t h e r s e t o f terms. We have a d i f f e r e n c e i n l e v e l s o f e x p l a n a t i o n , not an i n t e g r a t i o n o f e x p l a n a t o r y n e t s . I e x p l i c a t e t h e r e l a t i o n s h i p between mental and n e u r a l systems o f e x p l a n a t i o n by r e f e r e n c e t o t h e a n a l o g y between t h i s case and t h a t o f t h e e x i s t e n c e o f b o t h hardware and s o f t w a r e l e v e l s o f t h e e x p l a n a t i o n o f t h e b e h a v i o u r o f complex m a c h i n e s . 1 C h a p t e r 5 t u r n s t o t h e r e p o r t i n g r o l e o f m ental language. My g o a l i s t o show t h a t R o r t y 1 s e x p l i c a t i o n o f m e ntal r e p o r t s i s i n a d e q u a t e . B e f o r e t h i s I argue t h a t i t i s a m i s t a k e t o ground th e e x i s t e n c e o f t h e m e n t a l i n t h e phenomenal immediacy o f s e n s a t i o n , i . e . on t h e Myth o f t h e G i v e n - thus I eschew what I c a l l phenomenism, and w i t h i t i d e a l i s m , phenomenalism and t h e C a r t e s i a n p i c t u r e o f t h e mind. I t i s e s s e n t i a l f o r t h e r e a d e r t o r e a l i s e t h a t a l t h o u g h I am i n some sense a m e n t a l i s t , I am not a phenomenist e t c . . I f t h e e x i s t e n c e o f m e n t a l s t a t e s i s g i v e n , i t i s g i v e n i n t h e use o f m ental language, not i n how t h i n g s seem t o me. I s t r e s s t h i s a s p e c t o f my view because i t has u s u a l l y been assumed by m a t e r i a l i s t s t h a t some form o f phenomenism i s t h e o n l y a l t e r n a t i v e t o t h e i r view, and i t i s i m p o r t a n t f o r me t o d i s p e l t h i s i l l u s i o n l e s t I be m i s u n d e r s t o o d . Even when one abandons t h e Myth o f t h e G i v e n , however, one i s l e f t w i t h t h e s t r o n g i n t u i t i o n t h a t when, f o r example, I a t t r i b u t e a headache t o someone, I sometimes speak t r u l y . T h i s i n t u i t i o n seems t o be d e n i e d by any l i t e r a l r e a d i n g o f R o r t y ' s v e r s i o n o f e l i m i n a t i v e m a t e r i a l i s m . S u r p r i s i n g l y , we f i n d when we l o o k a t t h e w r i t i n g s o f v a r i o u s o f t h a t s c h o o l t h a t t h o s e p h i l o s o p h e r s e x e r t g r e a t e f f o r t t o accommodate t h e i r views t o t h a t i n t u i t i o n . I n view o f t h e f a i l u r e o f t h a t e x e r t i o n , a f a i l u r e w h i c h I b e l i e v e I have demonstrated, i t would perhaps have been b e s t f o r R o r t y t o chew t h e g r i s t l e w i t h the l e a n meat by d e n y i n g th e t r u t h o f o r d i n a r y m e n t a l a s c r i p t i o n s . H i s view might t h e n be l e s s p o p u l a r , b u t i t would s u r e l y be no more c o u n t e r - i n t u i t i v e t h a n i t a l r e a d y i s 2 on account o f i t s d e n i a l o f t h e e x i s t e n c e o f m e n t a l s t a t e s . The argument o f C h a p t e r 5 i s an a t t a c k on t h e c o n c i l i a t o r y e f f o r t s o f R o r t y ' s e l i m i n a t i v e m a t e r i a l i s m - i t would have no a p p l i c a t i o n i f t h e s e were not made. What R o r t y needs, t h e n , i s a way i n w h i c h o r d i n a r y mental a s c r i p t i o n s ( r e p o r t s , i n h i s t e r m i n o l o g y ) can be t r u e even though m e n t a l s t a t e s do not e x i s t . Two p o s s i b l e moves, whi c h I mention and d i s c a r d , a r e t h e a p p e a l t o a p r a g m a t i c t h e o r y o f t r u t h (which I have h e a r d R o r t y make i n c o n v e r s a t i o n ) and S a v i t t ' s c l a i m t h a t e x i s t e n c e - s t a t e m e n t s a r e ambiguous, depending on whether we t a k e them as " i n t e r n a l " o r " e x t e r n a l " t o some t h e o r y . What I b e l i e v e t o be t h e more p l a u s i b l e a t t e m p t s , and t h e ones w h i c h R o r t y 1 s p u b l i s h e d w r i t i n g s appear t o u n d e r s c o r e , i n v o l v e t h e n o t i o n t h a t mental r e p o r t s are r e a l l y about n e u r a l s t a t e s , and so can be t r u e i n v i r t u e o f t h e n e u r a l s t a t e o f t h e s u b j e c t even i f mental s t a t e s do not e x i s t . Hence t h e b u l k o f t h e s e c t i o n i s spent i n a r g u i n g a g a i n s t t h e f o r m u l a t i o n due t o Shope ( i n terms o f t h e d i s t i n c t i o n between " r e p o r t o f " and " r e p o r t on") and t h e more g e n e r a l c a u s a l t h e o r y o f r e p o r t i n g . I argue t h a t n e i t h e r o f t h e s e a n a l y s e s can cope s u c c e s s f u l l y w i t h f a l s e m e n t a l r e p o r t s , and are t h e r e f o r e i n a d e q u a t e as a n a l y s e s . I g i v e some f u r t h e r r e a s o n s f o r t h i n k i n g t h e y w i l l not do even c o n s t r u e d as ad hoc a t t e m p t s t o save c e r t a i n " t r u e " m ental r e p o r t s . A f u r t h e r argument a g a i n s t t h i s t h e o r e t i c a l i s t a ccount o f r e p o r t i n g i s i n t r o d u c e d w i t h t h e n o t i o n o f i n c o r r i g i b i l i t y . W h i l e I r e j e c t t h e phenomenist c o n c e p t i o n o f i n c o r r i g i b i l i t y , and so do not c r i t i c i s e t h e p r e s e n t v e r s i o n o f e l i m i n a t i v e m a t e r i a l i s m f o r f a i l i n g t o l i v e up t o t h a t c o n c e p t i o n , I am no more e n t h r a l l e d by t h e t h e o r e t i c a l i s t s u b s t i t u t e . The n o t i o n o f " e m p i r i c a l " i n c o r r i g i b i l i t y does not seem t o me t o f i t t h e f a c t s w h i c h g i v e r i s e t o t h e i d e a o f i n c o r r i g i b i l i t y - i t a l l o t s t o o much e p i s t e m i c p r i o r i t y t o f i r s t - p e r s o n p r e s e n t -t e n s e r e p o r t s . I a l s o argue a t g r e a t l e n g t h t h a t R o r t y ' s p u b l i s h e d a c c o u n t o f t h e g e n e s i s o f ( h i s form o f ) i n c o r r i g i b i l i t y i s s e r i o u s l y i n c o h e r e n t , and c o n s i d e r and r e j e c t v a r i o u s p o s s i b l e ways o f making up t h i s d e f i c i e n c y . The main p o i n t h e r e i s t h a t any view w h i c h a t t e m p t s t o j u s t i f y g i v i n g e p i s t e m i c p r i o r i t y t o a form o f e v i d e n c e ( f i r s t - p e r s o n r e p o r t s ) w h i c h i s m e r e l y t h e c a u s a l r e s u l t o f a more fundamental e v i d e n t i a l c o n n e c t i o n (between mental a s c r i p t i o n s and o v e r t b e h a v i o u r ) must be m i s t a k e n , f o r t h e more fundamental c o n n e c t i o n w i l l always d e s e r v e p r i o r i t y i n cases o f c o n f l i c t . Now i n o t h e r p l a c e s R o r t y f l i r t s w i t h what we b o t h c a l l t h e " W i t t g e n s t e i n i a n " n o t i o n o f i n c o r r i g i b i l i t y , he not d i s t i n g u i s h i n g i t , a p p a r e n t l y , from t h e e m p i r i c a l form. I t r y t o show how t h e two n o t i o n s a r e d i s t i n c t , t h e former d e n y i n g , w h i l e t h e l a t t e r r e q u i r e s , a d i f f e r e n c e , d e t e c t a b l e a t t h i s s t a g e o f c o n c e p t u a l development, between b e i n g l i n g u i s t i c a l l y competent i n t h e making o f a m e n t a l r e p o r t o f t h e r e l e v a n t t y p e and s p e a k i n g t r u l y ( t h e s i n c e r i t y o f t h e r e p o r t b e i n g g r a n t e d ) . The W i t t g e n s t e i n i a n n o t i o n , which I b e l i e v e f i t s t h e f a c t s o f language use b e s t , d i f f e r s from t h e s t a n d a r d phenomenist c o n c e p t i o n o f " l o g i c a l " i n c o r r i g i b i l i t y i n so f a r as i t a l l o w s t h a t we might come c o r r e c t l y t o a s s e r t t h e e x i s t e n c e o f t h i s d i f f e r e n c e t h r o u g h n e u r o p h y s i o l o g i c a l d i s c o v e r y and t h e c o n c e p t u a l change which might thence ensue. I argue t h a t R o r t y ' s " e m p i r i c a l " form o f i n c o r r i g i b i l i t y p resupposes t h a t t h i s d i f f e r e n c e e x i s t s and i s d e t e c t a b l e w i t h o u t a p p e a l t o n e u r a l e v i d e n c e , b u t r a t h e r on t h e b a s i s o f s t a n d a r d b e h a v i o u r a l e v i d e n c e . T h i s f e a t u r e i s d i s g u i s e d by R o r t y ' s c h o i c e o f examples, b u t i s l o g i c a l l y r e q u i r e d by h i s view. H a v i n g thu s e s t a b l i s h e d a d i f f e r e n c e between t h e " e m p i r i c a l " n o t i o n and t h e " W i t t g e n s t e i n i a n " one, I argue t h a t t h e l a t t e r i s i n c o m p a t i b l e w i t h some o f t h e b r o a d e r f e a t u r e s o f t h e t h e o r e t i c a l i s t a c c o u n t , and so cannot be a p p e a l e d t o as an a l t e r n a t i v e t o t h e a l r e a d y - r e j e c t e d t r e a t m e n t i n terms o f " e m p i r i c a l " i n c o r r i g i b i l i t y . Thus R o r t y ' s a c c o u n t s o f i n c o r r i g i b i l i t y , and o f me n t a l r e p o r t i n g i n g e n e r a l , p r o v e t o be s e r i o u s l y i n a d e q u a t e , and t h e a t t e m p t s t o r e s c u e our o r d i n a r y i n t u i t i o n s about i n c o r r i g i b i l i t y , as w e l l as t h e att e m p t s w i t h r e g a r d t o t h e t r u t h o f m e n t a l a s c r i p t i o n s , f a i l . He must abandon t h o s e i n t u i t i o n s t o save h i s view, b u t o b v i o u s l y t h i s m e r e l y i n c r e a s e s i t s i m p l a u s i b i l t y . W h i l e Chapter 5 removes much s u p p o r t from t h i s v e r s i o n o f e l i m i n a t i v e m a t e r i a l i s m , i t does n ot s u p p l y a knockdown argument a g a i n s t i t . T h i s i s not s u r p r i s i n g , f o r , i t would seem, no amount o f l o g i c can demonstrate t h a t m ental s t a t e s e x i s t ( t h e same a p p l i e s t o t r e e s ! ) . The most t h a t one can do i s t o d e f u s e t h e e l i m i n a t i v e m a t e r i a l i s t arguments i n f a v o u r of the c o n c l u s i o n t h a t the d e n i a l o f the e x i s t e n c e of mental s t a t e s i s a r a t i o n a l r e a c t i o n to the ( n o n - c o r r e l a t i o n a l ) s u p e r s e s s i o n o f mental t a l k by n e u r o p h y s i o l o g y . The two r o l e s o f mental language which R o r t y does not c o n s i d e r are t a c k l e d i n Chapter 6. I sh ou ld l i k e to have suppor ted a p o s i t i o n , h e l d by many p h i l o s o p h e r s o f the B r i t i s h o r d i n a r y - l a n g u a g e s c h o o l [45] [ 4 6 ] , a c c o r d i n g to which the r e l a t i o n between mental s t a t e s and b e h a v i o u r i s i n no important sense c a u s a l , but I have found t h i s p o s i t i o n too i m p l a u s i b l e to s u s t a i n . However, w h i l e I do not i n t h i s way approach a knockdown argument a g a i n s t the t h e o r e t i c a l i s t a c c o u n t , I do reach some r e l e v a n t c o n c l u s i o n s which broaden the scope of the p r o b l e m a t i c i n a manner which enables me to add f u r t h e r support f o r my own p o s i t i o n . I t w i l l be remembered t h a t I examine two main types of use f o r mental language which do not c o n s i s t i n c a u s a l e x p l a n a t i o n . The f i r s t i s the s y s t e m a t i c way i n which mental language i s employed i n n o n - c o n s t a t i v e u t t e r a n c e s , n o t a b l y those i n v o l v i n g e x p r e s s i o n (as opposed to r e p o r t i n g ) . The second, a l r e a d y d i s c u s s e d i n Chapter 4, i s what we o r d i n a r i l y c a l l "mental e x p l a n a t i o n " - the g i v i n g o f reasons f o r a c t i o n . I argue t h a t the l a t t e r a c t i v i t y , i n so f a r as i t i n v o l v e s ment ion ing the a g e n t ' s mental s t a t e s , i s a mode of j u s t i f i c a t i o n , not o f c a u s a l e x p l a n a t i o n , and t h a t b o t h "anomalous" uses o f m e n t a l language a r e c o n c e p t u a l l y independent o f t h e r o l e o f mental language i n c a u s a l e x p l a n a t i o n . I t would be p o s s i b l e f o r t h e anomalous uses t o s u r v i v e t h e abandonment (e.g. as a r e s u l t o f t h e o r y -r e p l a c e m e n t ) o f t h e c a u s a l use. I t does not f o l l o w from t h i s , however, t h a t t h e r e i s no r e l a t i o n between t h e anomalous uses and t h e c a u s a l f a c t s . On t h e c o n t r a r y , i t appears t o be a c o n d i t i o n o f t h e f e l i c i t y o f most forms o f n o n - c o n s t a t i v e mental u t t e r a n c e s t h a t t h e r e l e v a n t s u b j e c t be i n some me n t a l s t a t e ( w hich, a r g u a b l y , p l a y s a r o l e i n t h e c a u s a t i o n o f t h e r e l e v a n t u t t e r a n c e ) , and a c o n d i t i o n o f t h e a p p r o p r i a t e n e s s ( p r o p r i e t y , a c c e p t a b i l i t y , c o r r e c t n e s s ) o f a j u s t i f i c a t i o n i n mental terms t h a t t h e s u b j e c t be i n t h e mental s t a t e mentioned i n t h e j u s t i f i c a t i o n and t h a t t h i s be i n v o l v e d i n t h e c a u s a t i o n o f t h e a c t i o n t o be e x p l a i n e d . T h i s c u r i o u s r e s u l t s u p p l i e s me w i t h a v e r y q u i c k argument from t h e v a l i d i t y o f t h e anomalous uses t o t h e e x i s t e n c e o f mental s t a t e s (though not t o t h e c o n t i n u e d use o f mental language i n c a u s a l e x p l a n a t i o n ) . (The r e s u l t i s , as i t were, v e r y c o n s i s t e n t w i t h my c o n c e p t i o n o f t h e c o m p a t i b i l i t y o f c a u s a l e x p l a n a t i o n i n mental and i n n e u r a l terms.) A t t h e end o f t h e c h a p t e r I c o n s i d e r v a r i o u s p o s s i b l e e l i m i n a t i v e m a t e r i a l i s t r e a c t i o n s t o t h i s argument, w i t h more o r l e s s the same c o n c l u s i o n i n each c a s e : i t must be supposed e i t h e r t h a t n e u r a l language w i l l t a k e o v e r t h e anomalous f u n c t i o n s o f mental language, o r t h a t t h e s e f u n c t i o n s w i l l be abandoned a l s o . I n t h e f i r s t case a c e r t a i n amount o f r e s t r u c t u r i n g o f our systems o f j u s t i f i c a t i o n w i l l be r e q u i r e d ( s i n c e , ex h y p o t h e s i , t h e r e w i l l not be a s t r a i g h t f o r w a r d mapping o f mental s t a t e s o n t o n e u r a l s t a t e s ) ; i n t h e second case t h e r e s t r u c t u r i n g , b e i n g t e r m i n a l , i s even more pronounced! I n b o t h cases t h e replacement o f m e n t a l language by n e u r a l language w i l l i n v o l v e s i g n i f i c a n t m o r a l moves, s i g n i f i c a n t changes i n what we count as a case o f j u s t i f i e d a c t i o n . The i m p o r t a n c e o f t h i s c o n c l u s i o n f o r my g e n e r a l p r o j e c t i s t h a t i t shows t h a t t h e q u e s t i o n o f whether, g i v e n the t h e o r e t i c a l s u p e r i o r i t y o f n e u r a l e x p l a n a t i o n , m e n t a l language ought t o be r e p l a c e d , i s t o be answered not o n l y on s c i e n t i f i c o - m e t h o d o l o g i c a l grounds, b u t a l s o on m o r a l and e t h i c a l grounds. The p r i c e we have t o pay f o r t h e replacement may be much h i g h e r t h a n t h e " i n c o n v e n i e n c e " w i t h w h i c h R o r t y i d e n t i f i e s i t . T h i s o f c o u r s e has not been e s t a b l i s h e d - i t may be t h a t our m o r a l i n t u i t i o n s need t h e s o r t o f r e o r g a n i s i n g t h a t would o c c u r as t h e r e s u l t o f t h e w i d e s c a l e a d o p t i o n o f n e u r a l t a l k , so t h a t we s h o u l d be g l a d t o make t h e move. My own i n t u i t i o n s run c o u n t e r t o t h i s , b u t a l l I can say a g a i n s t R o r t y i s t h a t he has not c o n s i d e r e d i n a n y t h i n g l i k e enough d e t a i l t h e c o n c e p t u a l consequences o f t h e r e p l a c e m e n t o f mental language , and t h a t u n t i l he does so we are not i n a p o s i t i o n to assess h i s view w i t h any hope o f comple tenes s . T h i s i s a programmatic o b j e c t i o n . Be fore making i t I o f f e r an argument d i r e c t l y a g a i n s t Theses I I - I V , on the grounds t h a t the r e l a t i o n s h i p between the j u s t i f i c a t o r y and c a u s a l - e x p l a n a t o r y uses of mental language i s such t h a t the former i s p r i m a r y , i n the sense t h a t the concept o f r a t i o n a l i t y which i t u n d e r w r i t e s i s n e c e s s a r y f o r the success of the l a t t e r . I t would be a d v i s a b l e here f o r me to e x p l a i n my view of the c a u s a l r o l e o f mental l anguage . I t seems to me u n o b j e c t i o n a b l e , and perhaps t h e r e f o r e somewhat t r i v i a l , to a l l o w t h a t mental s t a t e s s tand i n c a u s a l r e l a t i o n s . Whi l e I am not p r e p a r e d to l a y out h e r e a t h e o r y of c a u s a l i t y , I shou l d admit t h a t I o p e r a t e w i t h a f a i r l y wide concept o f cause , which i s such as to render i n c o n t e s t a b l e the c a u s a l e f f i c a c y of mental s t a t e s ; t h i s e f f i c a c y , however, i s as i n s i g n i f i c a n t as i t i s i n c o n t e s t a b l e . A l l o w me to e l a b o r a t e : I have s a i d , f o r example, t h a t i t i s a c o n d i t i o n of the c o r r e c t n e s s o f a r e a s o n - e x p l a n a t i o n t h a t some c o r r e s p o n d i n g c a u s a l s tatement be t r u e - i f "she d i d i t because she b e l i e v e d him a v i l l a i n " j u s t i f i e s her t u r n i n g him out of d o o r s , i t must be t r u e t h a t h e r b e l i e f t h a t he was a v i l l a i n f i g u r e d c a u s a l l y i n the p r o d u c t i o n of the a c t i o n - but t h i s i s j u s t to say t h a t the c o r r e c t n e s s o f the r e a s o n -e x p l a n a t i o n l i c e n s e s a n o t h e r form o f s t a t e m e n t , which I am w i l l i n g t o c a l l " c a u s a l " . T h i s w i l l i n g n e s s i s i n f o r m e d , however, by c a u t i o n about t r e a t i n g m ental causes o f t h i s t y p e aa i m p o r t a n t l y s i m i l a r t o , say, causes w i t h i n t h e ken o f p h y s i c s , f o r t h e r e are o b v i o u s d i f f e r e n c e s . F o r i n s t a n c e , t h e r e i s a s e r i o u s q u e s t i o n whether b a c k i n g up a r e a s o n -e x p l a n a t i o n by t h e c o r r e s p o n d i n g c a u s a l s t a t e m e n t adds 3 a n y t h i n g a t a l l t o t h e o r i g i n a l e x p l a n a t i o n . T h i s , I b e l i e v e , i s c o n n e c t e d t o t h e p o i n t t h a t i t would be wrong t o suppose, o f most mental e x p l a n a t i o n s , t h a t t h e y were d i s c o v e r e d t o be ( t h e o r e t i c a l l y a c c e p t a b l e ) e x p l a n a t i o n s . (One can d i s c o v e r t h a t t h e y a p p l y t o a p a r t i c u l a r c a s e , b u t one cannot have d i s c o v e r e d t h a t , i n g e n e r a l , t h e d e s i r e t o k i l l causes one t o k i l l . ) A n o t h e r p