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Soviet policies toward the Cuban and Nicaraguan revolutions : a comparison Selin, Shannon Joan 1986

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SOVIET POLICIES TOWARD THE CUBAN AND NICARAGUAN REVOLUTIONS: A COMPARISON By SHANNON JOAN SELIN B.A.(Hons.), The U n i v e r s i t y o f Saskatchewan, 1985 A THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF MASTER OF ARTS i n THE FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIES Department of P o l i t i c a l S cience We accept t h i s t h e s i s as conforming t o the r e q u i r e d standard THE UNIVERSITY OF August ©Shannon Joan BRITISH COLUMBIA 1986 S e l i n , 1986 I n p r e s e n t i n g t h i s t h e s i s i n p a r t i a l f u l f i l m e n t o f t h e r e q u i r e m e n t s f o r an a d v a n c e d d e g r e e a t t h e U n i v e r s i t y o f B r i t i s h C o l u m b i a , I a g r e e t h a t t h e L i b r a r y s h a l l make i t f r e e l y a v a i l a b l e f o r r e f e r e n c e and s t u d y . I f u r t h e r a g r e e t h a t p e r m i s s i o n f o r e x t e n s i v e c o p y i n g o f t h i s t h e s i s f o r s c h o l a r l y p u r p o s e s may be g r a n t e d by t h e h e a d o f my d e p a r t m e n t o r by h i s o r h e r r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s . I t i s u n d e r s t o o d t h a t c o p y i n g o r p u b l i c a t i o n o f t h i s t h e s i s f o r f i n a n c i a l g a i n s h a l l n o t be a l l o w e d w i t h o u t my w r i t t e n p e r m i s s i o n . D e p a r t m e n t o f Mit-icod Sden^e The U n i v e r s i t y o f B r i t i s h C o l u m b i a 1956 Main Mall V a n c o u v e r , Canada V6T 1Y3 D a t e Aatjuir ^57 l*8(> ABSTRACT T h i s t h e s i s compares S o v i e t p o l i c y toward the Cuban r e v o l u t i o n d u r i n g the p e r i o d 1959 to 1962 with t h a t toward the Nicaraguan r e v o l u t i o n from 1979 t o the present i n order to determine i f the o f t - l e v e l l e d a c c u s a t i o n t h a t Nicaragua i s "another Cuba" h o l d s t r u e . The i n i t i a l S o v i e t r e a c t i o n s t o the r e v o l u t i o n s , subsequent S o v i e t economic, p o l i t i c a l , and m i l i t a r y support f o r the new regimes, and the S o v i e t response to Cuban and Nicaraguan i d e o l o g i c a l d e c l a r a t i o n s are examined, as i s the e f f e c t of the r e v o l u t i o n s on S o v i e t d o c t r i n e and on the S o v i e t p r o g n o s i s f o r r e v o l u t i o n a r y success i n L a t i n America. In d i s c u s s i n g the s i m i l a r i t i e s and d i f f e r e n c e s i n S o v i e t o b j e c t i v e s and t a c t i c s as regards each r e v o l u t i o n , the t h e s i s looks p a r t i c u l a r l y a t the i n f l u e n c e of s e v e r a l g e n e r a l f a c t o r s on S o v i e t p o l i c y . These i n c l u d e : 1) the r e l a t i v e m i l i t a r y -s t r a t e g i c p o s i t i o n of the S o v i e t Union i n the Caribbean and the d e s i r e t o a v o i d m i l i t a r y c o n f r o n t a t i o n with the United S t a t e s ; 2) the p o l i c i e s pursued by the United S t a t e s ; 3) the p o l i c i e s pursued by the r e v o l u t i o n a r y governments; 4) the s t a t e of Soviet-American r e l a t i o n s . The impact of the c h a r a c t e r of the S o v i e t l e a d e r s h i p , the p o l i c y of other a c t o r s , the s t a t e of the S o v i e t economy, r e l a t i o n s w i t h i n the communist world, and the S o v i e t p e r c e p t i o n of American w i l l i n g n e s s t o use f o r c e to counter S o v i e t moves i n the Basin are a l s o examined. The t h e s i s concludes t h a t Nicaragua i s not "another Cuba." Although S o v i e t p o l i c y toward the e a r l y stages of the Cuban and Nicaraguan r e v o l u t i o n s f o l l o w e d a s i m i l a r p a t t e r n , the S o v i e t - i i i -Union has not chosen to support Nicaragua e c o n o m i c a l l y , p o l i t i c a l l y , and m i l i t a r i l y t o the same extent t h a t i t d i d Cuba. T h i s i s due t o past u n s a t i s f a c t o r y S o v i e t experiences with T h i r d World c l i e n t s , the l e s s e r need of the post-Khrushchev l e a d e r s h i p f o r g a i n s i n the T h i r d World, Cuba's a b i l i t y and w i l l i n g n e s s to a i d the S a n d i n i s t a government, and the S o v i e t p e r c e p t i o n t h a t the United S t a t e s i s w i l l i n g t o use f o r c e to maintain i t s hegemony i n the Caribbean B a s i n . I n , g e n e r a l , S o v i e t p o l i c y i n the Caribbean i s best c h a r a c t e r i z e d as one of "prudent opportunism." The S o v i e t Union takes advantage of o p p o r t u n i t i e s presented to enhance i t s p o s i t i o n i n the r e g i o n , but, r e s p e c t i n g American power and g e o g r a p h i c a l advantage, proceeds with c a u t i o n . - i v -TABLE OF CONTENTS A b s t r a c t i i CHAPTER I: INTRODUCTION 1 CHAPTER I I : BACKGROUND 4 CHAPTER I I I : SOVIET POLICIES i . I n i t i a l R e action 16 i i . Economic R e l a t i o n s 22 i i i . P o l i t i c a l and M i l i t a r y Support 41 i v . Ideology 55 v. Summary 62 CHAPTER IV: DOCTRINAL AND REVOLUTIONARY IMPLICATIONS i . D o c t r i n e 72 i i . R e v o l u t i o n i n L a t i n America 76 CHAPTER V: CONCLUSION 87 FOOTNOTES 98 BIBLIOGRAPHY 110 1 -CHAPTER I: INTRODUCTION Although F i d e l C a s t r o ' s 1959 New Year's d e f e a t of the Cuban d i c t a t o r B a t i s t a and the S a n d i n i s t a N a t i o n a l L i b e r a t i o n F r o n t ' s (FSLN) J u l y 1979 o u s t i n g of the Somoza dynasty i n Nicaragua are temporally separated, the shared geographic l o c a t i o n , g r i e v a n c e s , n a t i o n a l i s m , and emerging s o c i a l i s t c h a r a c t e r and f o r e i g n p o l i c y o r i e n t a t i o n of the new regimes provide a s t r o n g b a s i s f o r comparison o f the two r e v o l u t i o n s . These s i m i l a r i t i e s have not escaped the a t t e n t i o n of i n d i v i d u a l s i n the Reagan A d m i n i s t r a t i o n , who are fond o f r e f e r r i n g t o Nicaragua as "another Cuba," i n a way t h a t i s not meant t o be a commendation. For example, on February 21, 1985, Defence S e c r e t a r y Caspar Weinberger p r e d i c t e d t h a t without American m i l i t a r y p r e s s u r e on Nicaragua, t h e r e would soon be "another Cuba i n t h i s hemisphere," a S o v i e t m i l i t a r y base i n C e n t r a l America, and a d i r e c t t h r e a t t o American s t r a t e g i c i n t e r e s t s . 1 A p p e l l a t i o n i s not l i m i t e d t o o f f i c i a l d o m . R i c h a r d Staar f e e l s t h a t : " I f progress has been slow i n s u b v e r t i n g Western Europe, the o p p o s i t e i s t r u e of the T h i r d World, where the USSR has made c o n s i d e r a b l e i n r o a d s . 'Revolutionary democracies' and other governments t h a t have chosen the ' n o n - c a p i t a l i s t ' path of development e x i s t i n twenty c o u n t r i e s , with Nicaragua w e l l on i t s way t o becoming a second Cuba i n the Western Hemisphere."2 Such a l a b e l i n g of Nicaragua r e s t s , t o a g r e a t e x t e n t , on the l a b e l e r ' s p e r c e p t i o n s of the S a n d i n i s t a government's r e l a t i o n s h i p with the S o v i e t Union. T h i s paper w i l l compare S o v i e t p o l i c y toward the Cuban R e v o l u t i o n d u r i n g the p e r i o d 1959 to 1962 with t h a t toward the Nicaraguan R e v o l u t i o n from 1979 to - 2 -the p r e s e n t . 3 Four ch a p t e r s f o l l o w t h i s I n t r o d u c t i o n . Chapter Two e s t a b l i s h e s the context f o r the subsequent a n a l y s i s by p r o v i d i n g background i n f o r m a t i o n about the S o v i e t world view i n the l a t e 1950s and l a t e 1970s, the S o v i e t p e r c e p t i o n of r e v o l u t i o n a r y o p p o r t u n i t i e s i n L a t i n America, and S o v i e t involvement i n the r e v o l u t i o n a r y movements. Chapter Three, e n t i t l e d S o v i e t P o l i c i e s , i s d i v i d e d i n t o f o u r s e c t i o n s , examining i n t u r n the i n i t i a l S o v i e t r e a c t i o n t o both r e v o l u t i o n s , subsequent economic r e l a t i o n s with the new regimes, S o v i e t p o l i t i c a l and m i l i t a r y support to the new regimes, and the S o v i e t response t o Cuban and Nicaraguan i d e o l o g i c a l d e c l a r a t i o n s . Chapter Four, D o c t r i n a l and R e v o l u t i o n a r y  I m p l i c a t i o n s , looks a t the e f f e c t of the r e v o l u t i o n s on S o v i e t d o c t r i n e and on the S o v i e t p r o g n o s i s f o r r e v o l u t i o n a r y success i n L a t i n America. The C o n c l u s i o n t i e s t o g e t h e r the threads of the p r e v i o u s c h a p t e r s and a r r i v e s a t a c h a r a c t e r i z a t i o n of S o v i e t p o l i c y best designated "prudent opportunism." The paper f i n i s h e s with a d i s c u s s i o n of probable f u t u r e S o v i e t a c t i o n v i s -a - v i s Nicaragua, and i n so doing, answers the q u e s t i o n , i s Nicaragua another Cuba? In one s c h o l a r ' s words, "Ct3he g r e a t e r the understanding o f the f o r c e s behind and c o n s t r a i n t s on S o v i e t p o l i c i e s , the g r e a t e r the p o t e n t i a l to respond s u c c e s s f u l l y t o S o v i e t i n i t i a t i v e s and even t o a n t i c i p a t e those i n i t i a t i v e s . " 4 Thus, i n d i s c u s s i n g the s i m i l a r i t i e s and d i f f e r e n c e s i n S o v i e t o b j e c t i v e s and t a c t i c s as regards each r e v o l u t i o n , the paper looks p a r t i c u l a r l y a t the i n f l u e n c e of s e v e r a l g e n e r a l f a c t o r s on S o v i e t p o l i c y . These i n c l u d e : 1) the r e l a t i v e m i l i t a r y -- 3 -s t r a t e g i c p o s i t i o n of the S o v i e t Union i n the Caribbean and the d e s i r e t o a v o i d m i l i t a r y c o n f r o n t a t i o n with the United S t a t e s ; 2) the p o l i c i e s pursued by the United S t a t e s ; 3) the p o l i c i e s pursued by the r e v o l u t i o n a r y governments; 4) the s t a t e of Soviet-American r e l a t i o n s . The impact of the c h a r a c t e r of the S o v i e t l e a d e r s h i p , the p o l i c y of other a c t o r s (e.g., Cuba i n the case of Nicaragua), the s t a t e of the S o v i e t economy, r e l a t i o n s w i t h i n the communist world, and the S o v i e t p e r c e p t i o n of American w i l l i n g n e s s t o use f o r c e t o counter S o v i e t moves i n the Basin w i l l a l s o be examined. Throughout the paper, the terms " S o v i e t Union," " S o v i e t l e a d e r s h i p , " "Moscow," and " S o v i e t s " are used i n t e r c h a n g e a b l y to r e f e r t o the f o r e i g n policy-making e l i t e i n the S o v i e t Union. Although the assumption of a r a t i o n a l , u n i t a r y S o v i e t a c t o r can be questioned, too l i t t l e i s known about d i f f e r e n c e s w i t h i n the S o v i e t e l i t e over Cuba and Nicaragua t o j u s t i f y the use of any other approach.5 The author has r e l i e d mainly on secondary sources but has a l s o used S o v i e t sources, namely I n t e r n a t i o n a l A f f a i r s and the t r a n s l a t i o n s p r o v i d e d i n the Current D i g e s t of the S o v i e t P r e s s . There i s c o n t r o v e r s y about the e x t e n t to which p u b l i c S o v i e t statements r e f l e c t the a c t u a l a t t i t u d e s , p e r c e p t i o n s , and e x p e c t a t i o n s of S o v i e t policy-makers, and the e x t e n t t o which those p e r c e p t i o n s a f f e c t S o v i e t policy-making.6 However, a c a r e f u l c o n s i d e r a t i o n of statements, n o t i n g , f o r example, changes i n i d e o l o g i c a l f o r m u l a t i o n s and d i f f e r e n c e s i n emphasis over time, i n combination with a c t i o n s can g i v e c l u e s to r e a l p e r c e p t i o n s . - 4 -CHAPTER I I : BACKGROUND An understanding of S o v i e t p o l i c y toward the e a r l y s t a g e s of these two r e v o l u t i o n a r y regimes r e q u i r e s f i r s t an a p p r e c i a t i o n of the general world outlook of the S o v i e t l e a d e r s a t the time of the r e v o l u t i o n s and, more p a r t i c u l a r l y , of t h e i r assessment of r e v o l u t i o n a r y p o s s i b i l i t i e s i n L a t i n America. T h i s f i r s t corresponds to the S o v i e t e v a l u a t i o n of the " c o r r e l a t i o n of f o r c e s " which subsumes " a l l the p o l i t i c a l , s o c i a l , economic, and m i l i t a r y f a c t o r s they p e r c e i v e as i n v o l v e d to some degree i n t h e i r worldwide c o m p e t i t i o n " with the United S tates.7 The assessment of the c o r r e l a t i o n of f o r c e s shapes l e a d e r s ' p e r c e p t i o n s of o p p o r t u n i t i e s f o r S o v i e t advancement i n the world, and of the l i k e l i h o o d of success i f the S o v i e t Union chooses t o pursue these o p p o r t u n i t i e s . In the l a t e 1950s, the world view of the S o v i e t l e a d e r s h i p -- p a r t i c u l a r l y t h a t of N. S. Khrushchev--was buoyant. The s u c c e s s i o n s t r u g g l e w i t h i n the S o v i e t l e a d e r s h i p had ended; problems l e f t by S t a l i n i n the economic sphere appeared to have been s o l v e d ; the s u c c e s s f u l Sputnik launch of October 1957 and the development o f the f i r s t i n t e r c o n t i n e n t a l b a l l i s t i c m i s s i l e s s i g n a l e d the beginning of the end of American n u c l e a r supremacy. Khrushchev b e l i e v e d t h a t the world d i s t r i b u t i o n of power was s h i f t i n g i n favour of the communist b l o c . Economic co m p e t i t i o n between c a p i t a l i s m and s o c i a l i s m would l e a d t o the w i t h e r i n g away of the former and the g l o b a l v i c t o r y of the l a t t e r without a world war. Khrushchev's r e p o r t to the T w e n t y - F i r s t Congress of the Communist Party of the S o v i e t Union (CPSU) i n January 1959 was e u p h o r i c : "The s o c i a l i s t world i s now s t r o n g e r , more - 5 -u n i t e d and more i n d e s t r u c t i b l e than ever b e f o r e . I t e x e r t s a d e c i s i v e i n f l u e n c e on the e n t i r e course of the development of mankind." S o c i a l i s m , he a s s e r t e d , was e n t e r i n g a new stage i n the economic c o m p e t i t i o n with c a p i t a l i s m , and the S o v i e t Union would soon surpass the United S t a t e s i n economic power. 8 The r o l e of the emerging T h i r d World i n t h i s u n f o l d i n g of events was viewed no l e s s o p t i m i s t i c a l l y . A f r i c a and A s i a were seen t o be i n the t h r o e s of a l a r g e l y s e l f - s u s t a i n i n g r e v o l u t i o n a r y movement. I n h e r e n t l y a n t i - i m p e r i a l i s t , the n a t i o n a l l i b e r a t i o n groups were thought t o be n a t u r a l a l l i e s of the s o c i a l i s t camp. As c o m p e t i t i o n a t the c e n t r e was c o n s t r a i n e d by the danger of n u c l e a r war and the i m p e r a t i v e of p e a c e f u l c o e x i s t e n c e , the l o c u s o f the s t r u g g l e between c a p i t a l i s m and s o c i a l i s m would s h i f t t o the T h i r d World.9 At the Twentieth CPSU Congress i n February 1956, Khrushchev c h a r a c t e r i z e d the postwar " d i s i n t e g r a t i o n of the i m p e r i a l c o l o n i a l system" as being of "world h i s t o r i c a l s i g n i f i c a n c e , " and a s s e r t e d t h a t the newly independent c o u n t r i e s t o g e t h e r with the s o c i a l i s t s t a t e s c r e a t e d a " v a s t peace zone" opposed t o Western imperialism.10 The S o v i e t l e a d e r s h i p assumed t h a t the former c o l o n i e s would be a t t r a c t e d to the v i g o r o u s S o v i e t model and would g r a d u a l l y evolve toward s o c i a l i s m , thus enhancing even f u r t h e r the c o r r e l a t i o n of f o r c e s i n favour of the s o c i a l i s t b l o c . Although the process l e a d i n g to g l o b a l s o c i a l i s t triumph was p e r c e i v e d to be i n e v i t a b l e , a r e s o u r c e f u l S o v i e t f o r e i g n p o l i c y c o u l d hasten the outcome. S o c i a l i s t a i d , both m i l i t a r y and economic, to the newly independent c o u n t r i e s c o u l d help them - 6 -break away from dependence on the i m p e r i a l i s t s . F o l l o w i n g S t a l i n ' s death, the S o v i e t l e a d e r s embarked on an e f f o r t t o c o u r t the T h i r d World, sending arms t o Egypt (September 1955) and I r a q (November 195S), v i s i t i n g I n d i a , Burma, and A f g h a n i s t a n (1955), and p r o v i d i n g m i l i t a r y a i d to Guinea and Ghana (1959-60). That these s t a t e s were chosen f o r t h e i r s t r a t e g i c value i n the s t r u g g l e with the West r a t h e r than f o r any i n t e r n a l c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s or i d e o l o g i c a l p r e d i l e c t i o n s , H would seem to portend g r e a t S o v i e t i n t e r e s t i n a s u c c e s s f u l r e v o l u t i o n o c c u r r i n g i n , as the S o v i e t s c a l l L a t i n America, the " s t r a t e g i c r e a r " of the United S t a t e s . Despite i t s o v e r a l l optimism, the S o v i e t l e a d e r s h i p d i d not expect major g a i n s i n L a t i n America. Due to L a t i n America's geographic d i s t a n c e from the S o v i e t Union, the weakness of pro-S o v i e t Communist p a r t i e s i n the r e g i o n , American economic, p o l i t i c a l , and m i l i t a r y hegemony, and the p e r v a s i v e n e s s of c o n s e r v a t i v e m i l i t a r y d i c t a t o r s h i p s , the p o s s i b i l i t y of r e v o l u t i o n a r y s o c i a l i s t success appeared l i m i t e d . L a t i n America was not i n c l u d e d i n Khrushchev's "zone of peace." The A f r o -Asian People's S o l i d a r i t y O r g a n i z a t i o n , a f r o n t group founded i n Moscow i n the 1960s, by d e f i n i t i o n excluded L a t i n America. The S o v i e t Union la c k e d the r e s o u r c e s t o support an a c t i v e p o l i c y i n L a t i n America, and American s e n s i t i v i t y about o u t s i d e involvement i n the Western Hemisphere seemed t o p r e c l u d e S o v i e t i n f l u e n c e . The S o v i e t s s u b s c r i b e d to the theory of "geographic f a t a l i s m , " i . e . , a b e l i e f i n the i m p o s s i b i l i t y o f s u c c e s s f u l r e v o l u t i o n s c l o s e to the United S t a t e s . S o v i e t e x p e c t a t i o n s had been borne out i n Guatemala i n 1954, where C I A - t r a i n e d e x i l e s - 7 -overthrew the l e f t i s t government of Jacobo Arbenz on the p r e t e x t of the p e n e t r a t i o n of i n t e r n a t i o n a l communism. "The primary e f f o r t s o f the L a t i n American Communist p a r t i e s were not t o be d i r e c t e d toward the s t r u g g l e f o r s o c i a l i s m , but r a t h e r toward the s t r u g g l e t o e s t a b l i s h and broaden bourgeois democracy."12 A s i m i l a r combination of a sanguine assesment of g l o b a l c o n d i t i o n s but pessimism r e g a r d i n g L a t i n America p r e v a i l e d i n the l a t e 1970s. The P o l i t b u r o c o u l d p o i n t t o a number of f a c t o r s t o c o r r o b o r a t e the unwavering t h e s i s t h a t the c o r r e l a t i o n of f o r c e s was s h i f t i n g i n S o v i e t f a v o u r . In the twenty years s i n c e the Cuban r e v o l u t i o n , the S o v i e t Union had a t t a i n e d s t r a t e g i c n u c l e a r p a r i t y with the United S t a t e s as w e l l as i n c r e a s e d i t s c o n v e n t i o n a l f o r c e p r o j e c t i o n c a p a b i l i t i e s . The S o v i e t Union had used the l a t t e r t o advantage, undertaking a p o l i c y of unprecedented a c t i v i s m i n the T h i r d World beginning i n the mid-1970s, and had achieved s u c c e s s e s , most n o t a b l y i n Angola and E t h i o p i a . A s u c c e s s i o n of coups by p r o - S o v i e t groups i n A f g h a n i s t a n ( A p r i l 1978), South Yemen (June 1978), and Grenada (March 1979) i n a d d i t i o n t o the January 1979 overthrow of the shah of Iran and the Vietnamese v i c t o r i e s i n South Vietnam (May 1975), Laos (1975), and Kampuchea (January 1979) f u r t h e r b o l s t e r e d S o v i e t s p i r i t s . S u f f e r i n g the aftermath of Watergate and the Vietnam War, and l a b o u r i n g under a v a c i l l a t i n g p r e s i d e n t , the United S t a t e s appeared unable to counter these t r e n d s . During the 1970s, the United S t a t e s had r e g u l a r l y c a utioned the S o v i e t s t o r e f r a i n from a number of s p e c i f i c a c t i o n s , i n c l u d i n g the i n t e r v e n t i o n s i n Angola and E t h i o p i a and naval e n t r y t o Cam Ranh Bay, without - 8 -any immediate and s p e c i f i c p o l i t i c a l or m i l i t a r y consequences. With new C o n g r e s s i o n a l and p u b l i c f e a r s and r e s t r a i n t s on American f o r e i g n p o l i c y , i t appeared l e s s l i k e l y t h a t the United S t a t e s would use m i l i t a r y f o r c e d i r e c t l y t o counter S o v i e t a c t i v i t i e s i n the T h i r d World. The S o v i e t s were a l s o aware of Western assessments t h a t American g l o b a l i n f l u e n c e was f a l l i n g i n tandem with the r i s e of S o v i e t power.13 T h i s i s not to ignore S o v i e t setbacks d u r i n g the 1970s. S i n o - S o v i e t t e n s i o n s i n c r e a s e d while Chinese r e l a t i o n s with the West improved. A hoped-for improvement i n r e l a t i o n s with Japan f a i l e d t o m a t e r i a l i z e . Egypt and Somalia terminated t h e i r F r i e n d s h i p T r e a t i e s with the S o v i e t Union and a l i g n e d with the West. S t i r r i n g s of independence i n E a s t e r n Europe and the emergence of Eurocommunism i n Western Europe undermined S o v i e t a u t h o r i t y over the i n t e r n a t i o n a l communist movement. However, p a r t i c u l a r l y as f a r as T h i r d World t r e n d s were concerned, the United S t a t e s appeared t o be l o s i n g more than the S o v i e t Union. As Bruce P o r t e r w r i t e s , r e f e r r i n g to the December 24, 1979 S o v i e t i n v a s i o n of A f g h a n i s t a n : " I t seems improbable t h a t the S o v i e t l e a d e r s h i p would have dared to undertake such a r a d i c a l and r i s k - l a d e n s t e p had the experience of the preceding decade not convinced them of the r e a l i t y of a new world p o l i t i c a l and m i l i t a r y balance."14 The S o v i e t p e r s p e c t i v e v i s - a - v i s L a t i n America had changed s i n c e 1959. Between the Cuban and Nicaraguan r e v o l u t i o n s , S o v i e t i n t e r e s t and involvement i n L a t i n America had grown. By the end of the 1970s, the S o v i e t Union had d i p l o m a t i c r e l a t i o n s with nineteen L a t i n American c o u n t r i e s compared t o only t h r e e i n - 9 -1959, and enjoyed a m i l i t a r y presence i n the Caribbean v i a Cuba.15 Prompted by events i n Cuba, an I n s t i t u t e f o r the Study o f L a t i n America was e s t a b l i s h e d i n 1961, which provided a body of theory, a l b e i t h a b i t u a l l y u n s o p h i s t i c a t e d , about the r e g i o n . L a t i n America was no longer separated from the r e s t of the T h i r d World, and growing importance was attached to the r e g i o n i n the East-West balance of power. Because L a t i n America had reached a more advanced stage of socio-economic development than the s t a t e s of A s i a and A f r i c a , i n S o v i e t theory i t was a c t u a l l y b e t t e r - p l a c e d t o begin the t r a n s i t i o n t o s o c i a l i s m . The s u r v i v a l of the C a s t r o regime, the emergence of f r i e n d l y l e f t i s t governments i n Jamaica, Grenada, and Guyana, and the n a t i o n a l i z a t i o n of American economic a s s e t s i n s e v e r a l L a t i n American s t a t e s were taken as s i g n s of a weakening of the American h o l d over i t s "backyard" and of the s t r e n g t h of a n t i -i m p e r i a l i s t sentiment among L a t i n Americans. Nonetheless, as i n 1959, r e v o l u t i o n a r y success was not a n t i c i p a t e d i n L a t i n America, which the S o v i e t s s t i l l t r e a t e d as an American p r e s e r v e . S o v i e t p e r s p e c t i v e s on the r e g i o n were c o n d i t i o n e d by the 1965 American i n t e r v e n t i o n i n the Dominican Rep u b l i c , the f a i l u r e of Cuban-backed g u e r r i l l a r e v o l u t i o n a r i e s i n the 1960's i n Guatemala, Nicaragua, B o l i v i a , Peru, and Venezuela, and by the C I A - i n s t i g a t e d overthrow o f s o c i a l i s t Salvador A l l e n d e i n C h i l e i n 1973. T h i s induced c a u t i o n i n S o v i e t d e a l i n g s with L a t i n American s o c i a l i s t r e v o l u t i o n a r i e s . In n e i t h e r Cuba nor Nicaragua was the S o v i e t Union i n v o l v e d i n the r e v o l u t i o n a r y cause u n t i l immediately p r i o r t o the r e v o l u t i o n , and even then, only i n d i r e c t l y . Both F i d e l C a s t r o ' s - 10 -26th of J u l y Movement and the FSLN were indigenous, autonomous movements drawn from a l l c l a s s e s , i n s p i r e d by d i s t a s t e f o r a r e p r e s s i v e d i c t a t o r and h i s American sponsors. S o v i e t involvement i n these c o u n t r i e s was l i m i t e d t o i t s l i n k s with the l o c a l Communist p a r t i e s : the P a r t i d o S o c i a l i s t a Popular (PSP) i n Cuba and the t i n y S o c i a l i s t P a r t y of Nicaragua <PSN); i n g e n e r a l the views expressed by these p a r t i e s can be assumed to c o i n c i d e with Moscow's. Although Raul C a s t r o and Ernesto Che Guevara were sympathetic t o Marxism, F i d e l C a s t r o and the PSP shared a r e c i p r o c a l a n t i p a t h y . The PSP d e s c r i b e d C a s t r o ' s f a i l e d attempt t o take the Moncada m i l i t a r y b a r r a c k s i n Santiago de Cuba i n J u l y 1953 as " p u t s c h i s t methods c h a r a c t e r i s t i c of bourgeois p o l i t i c a l f a c t i o n s . " 1 6 The PSP i n s i s t e d t h a t only a popular, communist-led u p r i s i n g of Cuban workers c o u l d overthrow B a t i s t a ; even when o f f e r i n g l i m i t e d support f o r C a s t r o , the p a r t y d i d not a n t i c i p a t e h i s v i c t o r y . Only two months be f o r e the r e v o l u t i o n , i n November 1958, a PSP commentator wrote: "the tyranny has f a i l e d i n i t s attempt to dominate the s t r u g g l e o f the masses, but i t would be wrong t o suppose t h a t t h i s alone i m p l i e s the imminent p o s s i b i l i t y of i t s overthrow."17 Even Khrushchev, i n a d i s c u s s i o n with a B r a z i l i a n j o u r n a l i s t on October 3, 1958 about the " h e r o i c but unequal s t r u g g l e of the Cuban people," expressed no h i n t t h a t he foresaw impending v i c t o r y . I B The Communists boycotted the general s t r i k e c a l l e d f o r by C a s t r o i n A p r i l 1958. By J u l y of t h a t year, however, the PSP modified i t s stance i n l i g h t o f the g u e r r i l l a s ' e f f i c i e n c y and agreed to c o l l a b o r a t e with C a s t r o , but o n l y as a temporary - 11 -t a c t i c . The r e e s t a b l i s h m e n t of democracy promised by Castro would pave the way f o r a l a t e r s o c i a l i s t r e v o l u t i o n which on l y the PSP c o u l d b r i n g about.19 There was no i n t i m a t i o n t h a t C a s t r o h i m s e l f would implement such a r e v o l u t i o n . His movement was not a p r o l e t a r i a n one; between s i x t y and s e v e n t y - f i v e percent of the r e b e l army were peasants, and the m a j o r i t y of the l e a d e r s of the g u e r r i l l a f o r c e s and J u l y 26th Movement came from the p e t t y and middle b o u r g e o i s i e . Nor were communist sympathizers predominant; many i n the movement were a r d e n t l y anti-Communist. P r i o r t o the v i c t o r y , C a s t r o ' s program was a vague mix of a g r a r i a n reform and support f o r the r e e s t a b l i s h m e n t of the 1940 c o n s t i t u t i o n . In Jacques Levesque's words, "the r e v o l u t i o n was made with a minimum of theory."20 Moreover, at t h a t time S o v i e t d o c t r i n e d i d not allow f o r the p o s s i b i l i t y of a n a t i o n a l bourgeois l e a d e r c r e a t i n g a s o c i a l i s t s t a t e ; i t h e l d t h a t both the t r a n s i t i o n t o , and the b u i l d i n g o f , s o c i a l i s m c o u l d o n l y be a t t a i n e d under the l e a d e r s h i p of the most advanced elements of the working c l a s s , i . e . , the l o c a l communist p a r t y . Although i d e o l o g y does not p l a y a paramount r o l e i n the conduct of S o v i e t f o r e i g n p o l i c y , i t cannot be completely d i s c o u n t e d . " S o v i e t - s t y l e Marxism-Leninism shapes the l e n s e s through which S o v i e t l e a d e r s and decision-makers view the e x t e r n a l world."21 A l s o , S o v i e t l e a d e r s must j u s t i f y t h e i r behaviour i n terms of i d e o l o g i c a l requirements.22 The Nicaraguan r e v o l u t i o n was s i m i l a r l y u n a n t i c i p a t e d p r i o r t o the f i n a l s t a g e s . An a n a l y s i s i n J u l y 1978 by S o v i e t L a t i n American e x p e r t s made no mention of Nicaragua.23 As i n Cuba, the l o c a l Communist p a r t y was c r i t i c a l o f the r e v o l u t i o n a r y - 12 -movement. In the 1960s, the PSN c a l l e d the FSLN " u l t r a - l e f t " and i t s a c t i o n s "premature." Throughout the 1970s, the S o v i e t s cautioned l o c a l Communist p a r t i e s and r a d i c a l l e f t groups i n C e n t r a l America and the Caribbean a g a i n s t attempts t o overthrow t h e i r governments; r a t h e r , e f f o r t s should be c o n c e n t r a t e d on b u i l d i n g a n t i - i m p e r i a l i s t c o a l i t i o n s . 2 4 Although d u r i n g the 1970's Cuba was t r a i n i n g some S a n d i n i s t a s and p r o v i d i n g the movement with l i m i t e d arms and f i n a n c e s , i t was not u n t i l the September 1978 i n s u r r e c t i o n i n f i v e Nicaraguan c i t i e s t h a t the S o v i e t s and Cubans began to be h o p e f u l about the FSLN's pro s p e c t s of s u c c e s s . S o v i e t press r e f e r e n c e s t o the Nicaraguan g u e r r i l l a s ' s t r u g g l e began around t h i s time.25 Castro encouraged the t h r e e Nicaraguan g u e r r i l l a f a c t i o n s t o u n i t e and, i n 1979, sent c l a n d e s t i n e shipments of S o v i e t arms to the r e b e l s . However, Panama, Mexico, Venezuela, and Costa R i c a provided more he l p t o the i n s u r g e n t s than d i d e i t h e r Cuba or the S o v i e t Union.26 "Moscow's most d i r e c t r o l e probably took the form of f o r c i n g the p r o - S o v i e t Nicaraguan S o c i a l i s t p a r t y to switch ( A p r i l 1979) from r i v a l r y t o c o l l a b o r a t i o n with the S a n d i n i s t a s . " 2 7 I t i s apparent from the above d i s c u s s i o n t h a t the S o v i e t s d i d not a n t i c i p a t e , l e t alone i n i t i a t e , the Cuban and Nicaraguan r e v o l u t i o n s . Subsequent S o v i e t involvement was a response t o the o p p o r t u n i t i e s presented by indigenous, anti-American r e v o l u t i o n i n the Caribbean Basin.28 Because the r e v o l u t i o n s o c c u r r e d , i n S o v i e t terms, i n the " s t r a t e g i c r e a r " of the United S t a t e s , they were e n t i c i n g t o Moscow. A S o v i e t g a i n i n L a t i n America, though unexpected, i s of g r e a t e r p o l i t i c a l and - 13 -p s y c h o l o g i c a l value than anywhere e l s e i n T h i r d World because L a t i n America i s g l o b a l l y regarded as the s p e c i a l preserve of the United S t a t e s . A primary o b j e c t i v e of S o v i e t p o l i c y i n L a t i n America i s the undermining of American power and i n f l u e n c e and a concomitant i n c r e a s e i n S o v i e t i n f l u e n c e . I n f l u e n c e i s d e s i r e d f o r p o l i t i c a l , i d e o l o g i c a l , and p r e s t i g e reasons. S o v i e t l e a d e r s see f o r e i g n successes (the spread of S o v i e t i n f l u e n c e and power) as e s s e n t i a l c o n d i t i o n s f o r the p r e s e r v a t i o n of t h e i r regime. The S o v i e t Union i s thus i n t e r e s t e d i n any development t h a t w i l l erode the American p o s i t i o n and open o p p o r t u n i t i e s f o r the S o v i e t Union. A pro-S o v i e t s t a t e i n L a t i n America weakens the American p o s i t i o n , enhances tremendously the USSR's r e p u t a t i o n , opens the p o s s i b i l i t y of i n c r e a s i n g S o v i e t m i l i t a r y involvement i n the r e g i o n and, as i s t r u e anywhere i n the T h i r d World, a l l o w s the S o v i e t Union to demonstrate i t s c a p a c i t y t o promote economic development. In s i m p l e s t terms, Moscow sees L a t i n America as an e s p e c i a l l y important arena of the g l o b a l a n t i -i m p e r i a l i s t s t r u g g l e which the Kremlin seeks t o conduct a g a i n s t the U.S. and the West g e n e r a l l y . In the S o v i e t view, the e x a c e r b a t i o n of the ' n a t i o n a l l i b e r a t i o n ' process i n L a t i n America aimed at e r o d i n g U.S. i n t e r e s t s ... can s i g n i f i c a n t l y c o n t r i b u t e t o a f u r t h e r s h i f t i n the ' c o r r e l a t i o n of world f o r c e s ' i n Moscow's f a v o r , and a t the same time l a y the f o u n d a t i o n f o r an i n c r e a s i n g a n t i - c a p i t a l i s t o r i e n t a t i o n i n the r e g i o n , thus p r e p a r i n g the way f o r eventual L e f t i s t and Communist-led regimes. E q u a l l y important, S o v i e t a b i l i t y t o be i n c r e a s i n g l y a c t i v e i n the ' s t r a t e g i c r e a r ' of the U.S. i s p e r c e i v e d by Moscow as evidence of the growing might and g l o b a l reach of the S o v i e t Union. T h i s not o n l y r e f l e c t s f a v o r a b l y on the S o v i e t power image but a l s o f u r t h e r s the S o v i e t g o a l , f i r s t s t a t e d by Brezhnev i n March 1970, t h a t 'no q u e s t i o n of any importance i n the world can be s o l v e d without our p a r t i c i p a t i o n , without t a k i n g i n t o account our economic and m i l i t a r y might.'29 - 14 -As w i l l be d i s c u s s e d i n the next chapter, the S o v i e t non-e x p e c t a t i o n o f r e v o l u t i o n i n L a t i n America and pessimism about a r e v o l u t i o n ' s probable outcome shaped i n p a r t the pace and nature of S o v i e t response to events i n Cuba and Nicaragua. Past experience with r e v o l u t i o n a r y regimes i n the Western Hemisphere d i c t a t e d c a u t i o n . Yet, although unexpected, the r e v o l u t i o n s i n Cuba and Nicaragua served to c o r r o b o r a t e the o p t i m i s t i c i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f the c o r r e l a t i o n of f o r c e s h e l d by S o v i e t l e a d e r s i n the l a t e 1950s and l a t e 1970s. P a r t i c u l a r l y i n the Cuban i n s t a n c e , t h i s o p t i m i s t i c i n t e r p r e t a t i o n imparted a dynamism t o S o v i e t p o l i c y t h a t made the S o v i e t Union a c u t e l y disposed to take advantage of the o p p o r t u n i t y p r o v i d e d by the r e v o l u t i o n t o undermine American hegemony i n the Caribbean B a s i n . Before proceeding with the a n a l y s i s , a word of c a u t i o n needs to be i n s e r t e d l e s t the events to be examined subsequently are taken out of t h e i r proper p e r s p e c t i v e . In s t u d y i n g S o v i e t p o l i c y i n the Caribbean B a s i n , one must always bear i n mind t h a t , f o r the S o v i e t Union, L a t i n America i s a d i s t a n t and t r a d i t i o n a l l y i n h o s p i t a b l e area of the world. While the S o v i e t Union i s i n t e r e s t e d i n enhancing i t s p o s i t i o n i n L a t i n America, making g a i n s t h e r e i s not easy, nor i s i t as i n t r i n s i c a l l y important to the S o v i e t Union as, f o r example, m a i n t a i n i n g the hegemonic r e l a t i o n s h i p with E a s t e r n Europe, or r e t a i n i n g the S o v i e t p o s i t i o n i n the i n t e r n a t i o n a l communist movement. Nicaragua has never, and Cuba has o n l y r a r e l y , been anything resembling a p r i o r i t y i n S o v i e t f o r e i g n p o l i c y . N u r t u r i n g a r e l a t i o n s h i p with these two new. regimes was s u b o r d i n a t e to other - 15 -concerns, such as Khrushchev's d e s i r e i n the l a t e 1950's f o r a settlement o f the B e r l i n i s s u e , or the pr e o c c u p a t i o n of the S o v i e t l e a d e r s h i p i n the e a r l y 1980's with A f g h a n i s t a n , E a s t e r n Europe, s u c c e s s i o n i s s u e s , and the domestic economy. Although the Cuban and Nicaraguan r e v o l u t i o n s each i n t h e i r t u r n heightened S o v i e t i n t e r e s t i n the r e g i o n , i t i s s t i l l of low p r i o r i t y . - 16 -CHAPTER I I I : SOVIET POLICIES i . I n i t i a l Reaction Despite being caught somewhat unaware by the speed of developments, Moscow n a t u r a l l y p a i d a t t e n t i o n to events i n the Western Hemisphere t h a t appeared unfavourable f o r i t s primary competitor. Because they saw B a t i s t a and Somoza as American agents,30 the S o v i e t s p e r c e i v e d both the Cuban and the Nicaraguan r e v o l u t i o n s as a h u m i l i a t i n g d e f e a t f o r Washington. The f i r s t a n a l y t i c a l a r t i c l e i n Pravda f o l l o w i n g the Cuban r e v o l u t i o n d e s c r i b e d i t as a v i c t o r y i n "the s t r u g g l e a g a i n s t the o p p r e s s i o n of the Yankee i m p e r i a l i s t s , " not a g a i n s t the o p p r e s s i o n of a c o r r u p t d i c t a t o r . 3 1 I t i s i n the i n t e r e s t s of the S o v i e t l e a d e r s h i p to be a s s o c i a t e d with p r o g r e s s i v e developments i n the T h i r d World t o prove t h a t the c o r r e l a t i o n of f o r c e s c o n t i n u e s t o s h i f t i n S o v i e t f a v o u r . Although a d e c l i n e i n American i n f l u e n c e i n the T h i r d World does not a u t o m a t i c a l l y t r a n s l a t e i n t o an i n c r e a s e i n S o v i e t i n f l u e n c e , t o the extent t h a t i t a l t e r s the r e l a t i v e c o r r e l a t i o n of f o r c e s i t b e n e f i t s the S o v i e t Union and does open the p o s s i b i l i t y o f f u t u r e S o v i e t involvement. The primary a t t r i b u t e of the S o v i e t response i n both cases, however, was c i r c u m s p e c t i o n , b o r d e r i n g on ambivalence. Throughout 1959, t h e r e was no mention of S o v i e t support f o r Cuba i n the S o v i e t p r e s s . There were fr e q u e n t r e f e r e n c e s to the danger of American i n t e r v e n t i o n i n Cuba, and the Guatemalan example was o f t e n c i t e d . 3 2 a r e c u r r i n g theme was the d e n i a l of any communist involvement i n Cuba; Cuba was p o r t r a y e d as p a t r i o t i c and independent.33 The S o v i e t s d i d not attempt t o - 17 -e s t a b l i s h s t r o n g economic t i e s with the new government. In A p r i l 1959, the S o v i e t Union arranged to buy 170,000 tons of Cuban sugar, which was l e s s than i t had purchased from the B a t i s t a regime, and the S o v i e t s o f f e r e d a lower p r i c e than the Americans were paying Cuba f o r the commodity.34 Due to the Cuban precedent, the S o v i e t Union responded with g r e a t e r a l a c r i t y t o the propaganda o p p o r t u n i t i e s p rovided by the Nicaraguan R e v o l u t i o n . "Within hours of the S a n d i n i s t a s ' o c c u p a t i o n of Nicaragua, General S e c r e t a r y Brezhnev's message c o n g r a t u l a t i n g the Nicaraguan people on t h e i r v i c t o r y was broadcast i n the c i t y . " 3 5 However, press commentary on the FSLN triumph was l e s s than e n t h u s i a s t i c . Bleak warnings of American m i l i t a r y i n t e r v e n t i o n , which had s u r f a c e d even b e f o r e the S a n d i n i s t a v i c t o r y , predominated: The f e a r t h a t Nicaragua w i l l become a 'second Cuba' or t h a t Somoza's overthrow w i l l cause a c h a i n r e a c t i o n i n such s t a t e s as Guatemala, Honduras or E l Salvador c o u l d prompt armed i n t e r v e n t i o n i n Nicaragua, i f not d i r e c t l y by the United S t a t e s then by the d i c t a t o r i a l regimes o f the afore-mentioned c o u n t r i e s with American support.36 From a l l i n d i c a t i o n s , the p o l i t i c a l 'hawks' i n Washington, e s p e c i a l l y those who were members o f the Somoza lobby on C a p i t o l H i l l , a l s o do not i n t e n d t o r e c o n c i l e themselves t o the Nicaraguan people's v i c t o r y . Already the 'major p r e s s ' i n the United S t a t e s i s f u l l of c a l l s f o r a c t i o n t o prevent the new government from f o l l o w i n g an independent path....37 The above, coupled with emphasis on the economic problems f a c e d by the f l e d g l i n g government, suggests t h a t the S o v i e t s d i d not a n t i c i p a t e a long l i f e s p a n f o r the r e v o l u t i o n . The death t h r o e s of the d i c t a t o r s h i p , accompanied by the d e s t r u c t i o n o f the c a p i t a l and other c i t i e s , the k i l l i n g of c i v i l i a n s and a r u i n e d economy, have l e f t the people a burdensome legacy.38 Somoza l e f t behind him a country i n r u i n s , plundered and devastated. Almost QOH o f Nicaragua's economy i s shut - 18 -down, the s t a t e t r e a s u r y i s empty, the banks are c l o s e d , t r a d e i s p a r a l y z e d , and t h e r e are no food reserves.39 Yet, while adding mass unemployment t o the l i t a n y of Nicaraguan d i f f i c u l t i e s , the same commentators two days l a t e r r e f e r r e d t o the May 1977 FSLN program wherein "the f i n a l g oal s e t f o r the s t r u g g l e was the c o n s t r u c t i o n of a s o c i a l i s t s o c i e t y i n Nicaragua,"40 thus h i n t i n g t h a t the new regime would be watched with a n t i c i p a t i o n . There was scant p r e s s a t t e n t i o n to Nicaragua d u r i n g the remainder of 1979. S o v i e t emergency donations to the new regime were l e s s than those p r o v i d e d by the American, Mexican, and Venezuelan governments.41 Although three days a f t e r the FSLN v i c t o r y Brezhnev expressed S o v i e t w i l l i n g n e s s " t o develop m u l t i f a c e t e d t i e s with Nicaragua,"42 as i n Cuba these t i e s were slow i n d e v e l o p i n g . D i p l o m a t i c r e l a t i o n s were f o r m a l i z e d October 18, 1979, a t which time the S o v i e t ambassador proposed s e v e r a l long-term economic agreements, but these were not signed u n t i l the f o l l o w i n g year. In 1980, Moscow's exports to Nicaragua amounted t o o n l y $100,000 worth of p u b l i c a t i o n s . 4 3 There are s e v e r a l e x p l a n a t i o n s f o r t h i s guarded r e a c t i o n t o what would appear t o be golden o p p o r t u n i t i e s f o r the S o v i e t Union. F i r s t , the S o v i e t Union was u n c e r t a i n o f the i d e o l o g i c a l and f o r e i g n p o l i c y o r i e n t a t i o n the new regimes would take. Castro had given no i n d i c a t i o n t h a t he had any more sympathy f o r communism than he d i d f o r c a p i t a l i s m . As Khrushchev w r i t e s i n h i s memoirs: "At the time t h a t F i d e l C a s t r o l e d h i s r e v o l u t i o n to v i c t o r y and entered Havana with h i s t r o o p s , we had no idea what p o l i t i c a l course h i s regime would f o l l o w . We knew t h e r e were i n d i v i d u a l Communists p a r t i c i p a t i n g i n the movement which - 19 -Castro l e d , but the Communist p a r t y of Cuba had no c o n t a c t with him."44 The S o v i e t Union r e c o g n i z e d the new government on January 10, 1959, but C a s t r o d i d not r e c i p r o c a t e . Although Castro l e g a l i z e d the PSP, no members of the Party were i n v i t e d t o j o i n the government. The new government proclaimed the o f f i c i a l r e v o l u t i o n a r y ideology "humanism," d e f i n e d as "government by the people, without d i c t a t o r s h i p and without o l i g a r c h y ; l i b e r t y with bread and without t e r r o r . " On January 13, 1959, C a s t r o announced t h a t Cuba "would adopt an e q u i d i s t a n c e between the United S t a t e s and the S o v i e t Union," a p o s i t i o n he r e a f f i r m e d i n A p r i l 1959. On March 22, 1959, Castro d e c l a r e d t h a t Cuba would be n e u t r a l " i n the event of a world war."45 During h i s A p r i l v i s i t t o the United S t a t e s , C a s t r o p u b l i c l y condemned communism and, on May 21, accused the Cuban communists of " a n t i - r e v o l u t i o n a r y " a c t i v i t i e s . 4 6 i n 1979, the new S a n d i n i s t a regime appeared s i m i l a r l y ambivalent to communism. The FSLN spanned a broad s e c t i o n of the p o l i t i c a l spectrum; even those who advocated s o c i a l i s m were vague about the k i n d of s o c i a l i s m they would l i k e t o see. U n t i l 1981, the pro-Cuban/Soviet commandantes on the N a t i o n a l D i r e c t o r a t e of the FSLN were outnumbered by moderate, pragmatic l e a d e r s who favoured nonalignment, a mixed economy, and p o l i t i c a l p l u r a l i s m . Second, the S o v i e t s wanted to a v o i d g i v i n g j u s t i f i c a t i o n f o r American m i l i t a r y i n t e r v e n t i o n a g a i n s t a regime t h a t , because of i t s anti-American o r i g i n s , c o u l d be promising f o r the S o v i e t s i n the f u t u r e , i f as nothing more than an embarrassment to the United S t a t e s . D e s p i t e the o f f i c i a l b e l i e f i n s o c i a l i s t power, a f a v o u r a b l e c o r r e l a t i o n of f o r c e s and the i m p l i c a t i o n s - 20 -th e r e o f f o r the T h i r d World, the S o v i e t approach was " c h a r a c t e r i z e d by e x t r a o r d i n a r y prudence marked by f e a r o f U.S. m i l i t a r y i n t e r v e n t i o n . " 4 7 The S o v i e t l e a d e r s h i p was cog n i z a n t of the 1823 Monroe D o c t r i n e and the 1901 P i a t t Amendment, which gave the United S t a t e s the r i g h t t o i n t e r v e n e i n Cuba t o preserve independence and maintain a s t a b l e government. American f e a r o f S o v i e t i n f l u e n c e would c e r t a i n l y p r o v i d e a p r e t e x t . The f i r s t q u e s t i o n of a S o v i e t r e p o r t e r t o Ca s t r o f o l l o w i n g the r e v o l u t i o n was, what guarantee d i d he have t h a t the United S t a t e s would not invade Cuba as i t had G u a t e m a l a ? 4 8 As can be seen i n the q u o t a t i o n s above, the S o v i e t Union harboured s i m i l a r concerns about Nicaragua. Ever mindful o f the C h i l e a n e x p e r i e n c e , the S o v i e t s d i d not want t o support a government t h a t was i n danger of imminent c o l l a p s e . T h i r d , the S o v i e t Union wanted t o av o i d u n n e c e s s a r i l y a n t a g o n i z i n g the United S t a t e s . S i n c e the Twentieth Party Congress, Khrushchev had been c u l t i v a t i n g p e a c e f u l c o e x i s t e n c e with the Americans. In September 1959, he v i s i t e d the United S t a t e s , g i v i n g b i r t h t o the amicable " S p i r i t o f Camp David." Khrushchev was hoping f o r a r e s o l u t i o n o f the B e r l i n i s s u e i n S o v i e t f a v o u r , and c o r r e c t l y assumed t h a t apparent S o v i e t meddling i n an area regarded as an American pr e s e r v e would j e o p a r d i z e the m e l i o r a t i v e Soviet-American r e l a t i o n s t h a t made attainment o f t h i s goal seem p o s s i b l e . Although the detente of the 1970s was s e v e r e l y f r a y e d by the time o f the Nicaraguan r e v o l u t i o n , SALT II had been si g n e d i n June 1979 and the S o v i e t s d i d not want t o i m p e r i l Senate r a t i f i c a t i o n o f the t r e a t y by a n g l i n g f o r u n c e r t a i n g a i n s i n a r e g i o n o f low p r i o r i t y . Even - 21 -a f t e r the i n v a s i o n o f Af g h a n i s t a n , the S o v i e t s hoped t h a t detente, a t l e a s t i n the form of superpower arms c o n t r o l n e g o t i a t i o n s and an expansion o f East-West t r a d e , would co n t i n u e . Jonathan S t e e l e notes of the S o v i e t r e a c t i o n t o A l l e n d e ' s 1970 v i c t o r y t h a t " C o l v e r i d e n t i f i c a t i o n with C h i l e c o u l d [have led] to a f a l l i n g - o u t with other L a t i n American n a t i o n s and the United S t a t e s , i f the A l l e n d e government turned out to be too r a d i c a l . " 4 9 i t i s probable t h a t the same thought ran through P o l i t b u r o minds when c o n s i d e r i n g the Nicaraguan r e v o l u t i o n . A f o u r t h f a c t o r a f f e c t i n g the S o v i e t response was the p o l i c y pursued by the United S t a t e s . The Americans adopted an a t t i t u d e o f "malevolent n e u t r a l i t y ' ' ^ 0 toward C a s t r o ' s regime. Washington d i d not immediately c o n s i d e r C a s t r o a communist. An A p r i l 1959 Nixon memorandum s a i d t h a t C a s t r o was " e i t h e r i n c r e d i b l y naive about Communism or under Communist d i s c i p l i n e , " but Nixon thought t h a t h i s was a m i n o r i t y view i n the ad m i n i s t r a t i o n . 5 1 Although Cuba was r o u t i n e l y a t t a c k e d i n Congress and the p r e s s , and t h e r e were demands f o r a cut i n the sugar quota, the Americans were ready t o en t e r i n t o loan n e g o t i a t i o n s when Ca s t r o v i s i t e d the United S t a t e s i n m i d - A p r i l 1959.52 i n 1959, over t w o - t h i r d s of Cuba's t r a d e was with the United S t a t e s ; " i t s value equaled 39 percent of Cuban GNP, with the United S t a t e s s u p p l y i n g over 70 percent of Cuba's imports and t a k i n g 66 percent of i t s exports."53 S i m i l a r l y , upon the S a n d i n i s t a v i c t o r y the A d m i n i s t r a t i o n q u i c k l y switched from a p o l i c y o f t r y i n g t o prevent the FSLN from dominating the post-Somoza government t o a p o l i c y of t r y i n g t o prevent - 22 -r a d i c a l i z a t i o n of the r e v o l u t i o n , u s i n g a mix of economic i n c e n t i v e s and t h r e a t s of American h o s t i l i t y . Dependent on American support f o r the r e c o n s t r u c t i o n of i t s war-damaged economy and c o g n i z a n t of the c o n d i t i o n s i m p l i c i t i n American g e n e r o s i t y , Nicaragua was c a r e f u l not to appear too f r i e n d l y with the S o v i e t Union. During the f i r s t e i g h t e e n months of the r e v o l u t i o n the United S t a t e s p r o v i d e d Nicaragua with S117.6 m i l l i o n i n s o f t loans and $20.3 m i l l i o n i n t r a n s f e r payments. The Americans a l s o promoted $189.1 m i l l i o n from the I n t e r -American Development Bank and $102.7 m i l l i o n from the World Bank.54 Thus a major s t i m u l u s f o r l a t e r S o v i e t r a p p o r t with Cuba and Nicaragua, namely American h o s t i l i t y toward the new regimes, was not p r e s e n t . S o v i e t h e s i t a t i o n was a l s o c o n d i t i o n e d by the general S o v i e t non-involvement i n L a t i n America, and the non-expectation of r e v o l u t i o n mentioned i n Chapter I I . Time was needed to a d j u s t p e r c e p t i o n s and to develop a response t o an unexpected event i n a r e g i o n of low s a l i e n c e . In a d d i t i o n , beginning i n l a t e 1979, the S o v i e t Union was preoccupied with events i n A f g h a n i s t a n , and, s t a r t i n g i n the summer of 1980, with the s i t u a t i o n i n Poland. The Cuban and Nicaraguan r e v o l u t i o n s were not p r i o r i t i e s , but the S o v i e t s watched them with i n t e r e s t . They wanted to wait and see whether or not the r e v o l u t i o n s would s u r v i v e , what course they would take, and what the American r e a c t i o n would be. i i . Economic R e l a t i o n s The f i r s t n o t able economic t i e s with each of the new - 23 -regimes were not e s t a b l i s h e d u n t i l more the year a f t e r the r e v o l u t i o n . In Cuba, the o c c a s i o n was the v i s i t o f S o v i e t deputy Prime M i n i s t e r Anastas Mikoyan to Havana with a S o v i e t trade f a i r from February 4 t o 13, 1960. The S o v i e t Union agreed t o buy 425,000 tons of sugar i n 1960, and 1 m i l l i o n tons per year f o r the next f o u r years; i t a l s o granted a $100 m i l l i o n loan a t 2.5 percent i n t e r e s t f o r the purchase o f i n d u s t r i a l equipment.55 On February 12, Khrushchev spoke about Cuba f o r the f i r s t time i n p u b l i c . The f i r s t shipment of S o v i e t o i l i n exchange f o r Cuban products a r r i v e d i n Havana on A p r i l 19. On May 8, formal d i p l o m a t i c r e l a t i o n s were e s t a b l i s h e d . S o v i e t -Nicaraguan economic r e l a t i o n s got underway with the v i s i t o f a l a r g e d e l e g a t i o n from Managua, i n c l u d i n g M i n i s t e r of Defence Humberto Ortega, M i n i s t e r of the I n t e r i o r Tomas Borge, M i n i s t e r of Economic P l a n n i n g Henry Ruiz, and the M i n i s t e r of Trade, to Moscow from March 17 to 22, 1980. A s e r i e s of agreements on t r a d e , t e c h n i c a l and economic c o o p e r a t i o n , c i v i l a v i a t i o n , c o n s u l a r t i e s , and c u l t u r a l and s c i e n t i f i c c o o p e r a t i o n were si g n e d . The s h i f t i n S o v i e t p o l i c y toward Cuba was prompted i n p a r t by the p r o g r e s s i v e and unexpected (by the S o v i e t s ) r a d i c a l i z a t i o n of the r e v o l u t i o n beginning i n the summer of 1959. Cuba metamorphosed from a democratic, re f o r m i n g regime i n t o a r e v o l u t i o n a r y d i c t a t o r s h i p . In June, C a s t r o r e c o n c i l e d with the PSP. In J u l y , he r e p l a c e d moderate p r e s i d e n t Manuel U r r u t i a with former PSP member Osvaldo D o r t i c o s . He removed anti-Communist l e a d e r s from the N a t i o n a l D i r e c t o r a t e of the 26th of J u l y Movement, from command p o s i t i o n s i n the Rebel Army, and - 24 -began to r e p l a c e 26th of J u l y members with communists i n l e a d i n g p o s i t i o n s i n p r o v i n c i a l and town a d m i n i s t r a t i o n s . 5 6 A n ew economic p o l i c y i n September s i g n a l e d the phasing out of a mixed economy by i n t r o d u c i n g c o l l e c t i v i z a t i o n of a g r i c u l t u r e and s t a t e c o n t r o l of i n d u s t r y . At the U n i v e r s i t y Student F e d e r a t i o n e l e c t i o n s i n October and the t r a d e union congress e l e c t i o n s i n November, Castro p e r s o n a l l y i n t e r v e n e d i n favour of " u n i t y " ( i . e . , pro-PSP) ca n d i d a t e s a g a i n s t 26th of J u l y members.57 A r e o r i e n t a t i o n i n f o r e i g n p o l i c y was concomitant with the domestic changes. C a s t r o abandoned h i s " e q u i d i s t a n t " stance, became s t r i d e n t l y anti-American, and made o v e r t u r e s t o the S o v i e t Union. I t was the Cubans, not the S o v i e t s , who i n i t i a t e d the r e r o u t i n g of Mikoyan's Mexican v i s i t through Havana. While F. Parkinson a t t r i b u t e s Cuba's p r o - S o v i e t i s m to the i n f l u e n c e of Che Guevara and Raul C a s t r o , o t h e r s suggest t h a t C a s t r o a l i g n e d with the PSP and embarked on a s o c i a l i s t path to f o r c e the S o v i e t hand i n h i s favour.58 C a s t r o ' s r e v o l u t i o n was f l o u n d e r i n g . Although he enjoyed widespread p e r s o n a l p o p u l a r i t y , C a s t r o lacked a c l e a r l y d e f i n e d o r g a n i z a t i o n a l base. The 26th of J u l y Movement was not a p o l i t i c a l p a r t y . The implementation of the May 17 A g r a r i a n Reform law encountered much o p p o s i t i o n . C a s t r o turned to the PSP, one of the b e s t -o r g a n i z e d p a r t i e s i n Cuba, to help him c o n s o l i d a t e power as h i s reforms i n c r e a s i n g l y a l i e n a t e d Cuban vested i n t e r e s t s . Across the G u l f of Mexico, American t o l e r a n c e faded as C a s t r o s e i z e d American-owned land without compensation, n a t i o n a l i z e d some U.S.-owned h o t e l s , and, i n mid-June, o r c h e s t r a t e d a f a i l e d e x p e d i t i o n to l i b e r a t e the Dominican R e p u b l i c . A c c u s a t i o n s of - 25 -Cuban communism were f o r t i f i e d when, t h a t same month, a commander of the Rebel A i r Force d e f e c t e d to the United S t a t e s and t e s t i f i e d about communist i n f i l t r a t i o n o f the Cuban armed fo r c e s . 5 9 F e a r i n g American r h e t o r i c would f i n d o u t l e t i n deed, C a s t r o wanted weapons. The Americans had r e f u s e d Cuba's June 1959 request f o r the purchase of $9 m i l l i o n worth of arms, l e a v i n g Belgium as the s o l e supplier.6° C a s t r o ' s u n s u c c e s s f u l Dominican i n v a s i o n had i s o l a t e d Cuba from many p o t e n t i a l s u p p o r t e r s i n L a t i n America. In February 1960, the United S t a t e s p l a c e d an embargo on shipments of arms and munitions of war to Cuba. C a s t r o saw Moscow as a promising source of the f i n a n c i a l and m i l i t a r y support necessary to counter American a c t i o n s , and to pursue h i s r e v o l u t i o n a r y ambitions throughout the Caribbean. His o v e r t u r e s t o the S o v i e t Union were supplemented by PSP p r e s s u r e s on Moscow t o extend a s s i s t a n c e to Cuba.61 A caveat i s i n o r d e r about the t h e s i s t h a t American p o l i c y pushed C a s t r o , and l a t e r , the S a n d i n i s t a s , i n t o S o v i e t arms.62 Castro began to c o u r t the Communists i n 1959 when American p o l i c y — d e s p i t e the p r o v o c a t i v e anti-American r h e t o r i c emanating from Havana--was s t i l l one of f o r b e a r a n c e . A p u b l i c statement by Eisenhower on January 26, 1960 r e a f f i r m e d the p o l i c y of non-i n t e r v e n t i o n i n Cuban domestic a f f a i r s . Eisenhower d i d not a u t h o r i z e the t r a i n i n g of Cuban e x i l e s t o overthrow Castro u n t i l March 17, 1960. During h i s A p r i l 1959 v i s i t t o the United S t a t e s , C a s t r o forbade h i s f i n a n c i a l e x p e r t s to accept Washington's i n v i t a t i o n t o e n t e r i n t o d i s c u s s i o n s about economic a s s i s t a n c e . 6 3 S i m i l a r l y , i n c i t e m e n t of the Soviet-Nicaraguan - 26 -r e l a t i o n s h i p came i n no s m a l l degree from the T h i r d World p a r t n e r b e f o r e American p o l i c y became p u n i t i v e . As l a t e as September 1980, C a r t e r c e r t i f i e d t o Congress t h a t Nicaragua was not e x p o r t i n g v i o l e n c e to E l Salvador and thus was e l i g i b l e f o r $75 m i l l i o n i n economic a s s i s t a n c e . 6 4 While l a t e r (post-March 1960, post-January 1981) American p u n i t i v e a c t i o n s a c c e l e r a t e d the development of t i e s with the S o v i e t Union, Nicaragua and Cuba d i d not t u r n t o the S o v i e t Union s o l e l y because of p o s t - r e v o l u t i o n American p o l i c y . The h i s t o r y of American i n t e r v e n t i o n i n Cuba and Nicaragua and of support f o r B a t i s t a and Somoza made i t l i k e l y t h a t the r e v o l u t i o n a r i e s would t r y t o d i s t a n c e themselves from the United S t a t e s . Many S a n d i n i s t a l e a d e r s had spent the 1960s i n Cuba and the S o v i e t Union; they were committed to M a r x i s t - L e n i n i s t p r i n c i p l e s and looked n a t u r a l l y to Moscow f o r support. Some comandantes went so f a r as to argue t h a t the United S t a t e s had not i n t e r v e n e d m i l i t a r i l y a g a i n s t the r e v o l u t i o n i n 1979 because of the s h i f t i n the c o r r e l a t i o n of f o r c e s i n favour of the S o v i e t Union. In t h e i r o p i n i o n , the dependent nature of Nicaragua's economy r u l e d out independent s o c i a l i s m . There was no c h o i c e but t o i n t e g r a t e a s o c i a l i s t Nicaragua with the S o v i e t bloc.65 Even moderate l e a d e r s f e l t t h a t the S o v i e t s c o u l d a s s i s t with the " i d e o l o g i c a l and pragmatic i m p e r a t i v e to develop and equip a r e v o l u t i o n a r y armed f o r c e s " and the "urge t o develop enduring r e v o l u t i o n a r y i n s t i t u t i o n s and a s t r o n g c e n t r a l i z e d s t a t e . " 6 6 C a s t r o ' s o b j e c t i v e s f o r the Cuban r e v o l u t i o n , vague though they were, i n c l u d e d overcoming p o l i t i c a l and economic dependence on the United S t a t e s . Bearing i n mind Guatemala, - 27 -C a s t r o b e l i e v e d t h a t , u l t i m a t e l y , the United S t a t e s had no c h o i c e but to oppose h i s r e v o l u t i o n . " . . . C a s t r o ' s concern d u r i n g t h i s e a r l y p e r i o d was based not so much on what the United S t a t e s had done, as on what he f e a r e d i t was doing or c o u l d do."67 C a s t r o knew t h a t the dependent Cuban economy c o u l d not break with the United S t a t e s without s u b s t a n t i a l o u t s i d e support. He concluded t h a t he had no a l t e r n a t i v e but to a l l y with the S o v i e t Union, whose i d e o l o g y was not i n c o m p a t i b l e with h i s r e v o l u t i o n a r y o b j e c t i v e s . In so doing, C a s t r o hastened the American p o l i c y he f e a r e d . That the S o v i e t s were s t i l l wary of c l o s e r e l a t i o n s with Cuba u n t i l the beginning of 1960 i s i n d i c a t e d by the absence of S o v i e t press coverage of the r a d i c a l developments i n Cuba.68 The p r e v i o u s l y mentioned f e a r of another Guatemala and r e l u c t a n c e t o j e o p a r d i z e a B e r l i n s e t t l e m e n t remained predominant i n the Kremlin. In a d d i t i o n , the S o v i e t s may have worried t h a t s t r o n g e r t i e s with C a s t r o would a d v e r s e l y a f f e c t S o v i e t e f f o r t s t o normalize r e l a t i o n s with other L a t i n American s t a t e s . B r a z i l i a n and C h i l e a n t r a d e d e l e g a t i o n s were due to a r r i v e i n Moscow i n l a t e 1959 and e a r l y 1960.69 Yet Cuba's anti-American stance served S o v i e t i n t e r e s t s . In l a t e 1959, the S o v i e t press began to r e f e r t o the importance of the Cuban r e v o l u t i o n f o r the r e v o l u t i o n a r y movement i n L a t i n America and f o r the changing world d i s t r i b u t i o n of power. In February, Mikoyan was f a v o u r a b l y impressed by the c o n s o l i d a t i o n and i n t e r n a l p o p u l a r i t y of the regime. Once the l e a d e r s h i p was c o n f i d e n t t h a t the new regime would s u r v i v e , a t l e a s t over the short-term, the o p t i m i s t i c world view of Khrushchev began to - 28 -shape p e r c e p t i o n s . The S o v i e t s began t o s p e c u l a t e on the unprecedented o p p o r t u n i t i e s opened by the Cuban expe r i e n c e . Events i n Cuba were t a i l o r - m a d e t o f i t Khrushchev's b l i t h e assumptions about the T h i r d World. E v i n c i n g as i t d i d the d e c l i n e of i m p e r i a l i s m i n i t s own backyard, the r e v o l u t i o n c o u l d be of g r e a t p o l i t i c a l , s t r a t e g i c , and i d e o l o g i c a l value t o the S o v i e t Union. A p r o - S o v i e t Cuba c o u l d serve as testimony t o the v i t a l i t y o f the S o v i e t system and the atrophy of American c a p i t a l i s m . I t c o u l d enhance S o v i e t p r e s t i g e a t home and abroad. I t c o u l d serve as a guide t o other r e v o l u t i o n a r y movements. S o v i e t a i d to Cuba would show t h a t Khrushchev was i n a p o s i t i o n t o help L a t i n American c o u n t r i e s who r e b e l l e d a g a i n s t i m p e r i a l i s m . Khrushchev was i n p a r t i c u l a r need of a f o r e i g n p o l i c y success a t t h i s time. He was being c r i t i c i z e d both a t home and i n the i n t e r n a t i o n a l communist movement f o r pursuing a p o l i c y of pe a c e f u l c o e x i s t e n c e with the United S t a t e s with no t a n g i b l e r e s u l t s . "Open d e f i a n c e of the United S t a t e s over Cuba may have gone some d i s t a n c e towards d e f l e c t i n g such c r i t i c i s m and i n a d d i t i o n d i v e r t e d a t t e n t i o n away from the i n c r e a s i n g l y c h a o t i c domestic economic s i t u a t i o n . " 7 0 The s t a t e o f Soviet-American r e l a t i o n s no longer precluded a Soviet-Cuban rapprochement. The May 1960 U-2 i n c i d e n t and subsequent c a n c e l l a t i o n of the P a r i s summit meeting meant t h a t Khrushchev no longer a n t i c i p a t e d a r a p i d r e s o l u t i o n of the B e r l i n i s s u e . The S o v i e t Union had l i t t l e t o l o s e i n other areas by openly s u p p o r t i n g the Cuban r e v o l u t i o n . Khrushchev may have thought he c o u l d b r i n g p r e s s u r e t o bear on the United - 29 -S t a t e s f o r a B e r l i n s e t t l e m e n t by c u l t i v a t i n g r e l a t i o n s with Cuba. The i d e o l o g i c a l c h a l l e n g e of China provided an i n c e n t i v e f o r the development of Soviet-Cuban r e l a t i o n s . The f e s t e r i n g S i n o - S o v i e t d i s p u t e seeped i n t o the open i n A p r i l 1960 when the Chinese p u b l i s h e d t h e i r f i r s t s y s t e m a t i c c r i t i q u e of S o v i e t f o r e i g n p o l i c y . China was a c c u s i n g the S o v i e t Union of being s o f t on i m p e r i a l i s m . S o v i e t a i d to Cuba would v i n d i c a t e S o v i e t p o l i c y by demonstrating t h a t p e a c e f u l c o e x i s t e n c e d i d not e n t a i l a b e t r a y a l of the r e v o l u t i o n a r y i m p e r a t i v e of Marxism-Leninism. D i r e c t c o m p e t i t i o n with China f o r Cuban a l l e g i a n c e a c c e l e r a t e d the development of Soviet-Cuban t i e s . C a s t r o ' s r u r a l - b a s e d g u e r r i l l a r e v o l u t i o n had more i n common with Mao's s t r a t e g y than L e n i n ' s , and Cuba and China each evinced i n t e r e s t i n the o t h e r . At the end of A p r i l 1960, Mao f o r the f i r s t time o f f e r e d Chinese support t o the Cuban r e v o l u t i o n and an i n s p e c t o r - g e n e r a l of the Cuban Rebel Army v i s i t e d Peking. In J u l y , the Cubans signed a commercial, t e c h n i c a l , and c u l t u r a l agreement with the Chinese, and openly supported some of the Chinese views i n the Sino-S o v i e t c o n f l i c t . In September, Cuban-Chinese d i p l o m a t i c r e l a t i o n s were e s t a b l i s h e d . Guevara spent October and November of 1960 i n the S o v i e t Union, p l e a d i n g i n v a i n f o r f u r t h e r support. A f t e r he emerged from China, however, with a communique of November 30 s t a t i n g t h a t the Chinese would buy one m i l l i o n tons of Cuban sugar i n 1961 and would grant 60 m i l l i o n d o l l a r s a s s i s t a n c e to Cuba, the S o v i e t s on December 19 agreed to purchase 2.7 m i l l i o n tons of sugar the f o l l o w i n g year."71 S o v i e t economic t i e s with both Cuba and Nicaragua - 30 -m u l t i p l i e d as the new regimes were denied access t o American markets and funds. In A p r i l 1960, American o i l companies r e f u s e d to r e f i n e S o v i e t o i l i n Cuba. Moscow began t o send r e f i n e d o i l , thus e n a b l i n g Castro to e x p r o p r i a t e the Texaco r e f i n e r y on June 29 and the S h e l l and Standard O i l r e f i n e r i e s two days l a t e r . A f t e r the United S t a t e s responded by suspending i t s Cuban sugar quota on J u l y 6, the S o v i e t Union o f f e r e d to purchase the 700,000 remaining tons. On October 19, 1960 the United S t a t e s imposed a t r a d e embargo on Cuba. From l e s s than $100 m i l l i o n i n 1960, the t o t a l volume of Soviet-Cuban t r a d e grew t o $550 m i l l i o n i n 1961 and $750 m i l l i o n i n 1962.72 The Soviet-Nicaraguan economic agreement of March 1980 was signed a f t e r an American a i d package to Nicaragua was much s m a l l e r than requested and c a r r i e d with i t s t r i c t c o n d i t i o n s . 7 3 S o v i e t a i d to Nicaragua i n c r e a s e d i n 1982, the year the c o n t r a s were in t r o d u c e d , f o l l o w i n g an a m p l i f i c a t i o n of h o s t i l e American a c t i o n s the p r e v i o u s year. The United S t a t e s h a l t e d economic a i d t o Nicaragua on January 22, 1981 and the f o l l o w i n g month "delayed" a $9.6 m i l l i o n wheat s a l e to the country. Beginning i n November 1981, the United S t a t e s voted a g a i n s t a l l loans to Nicaragua i n the World Bank and the Inter-American Development Bank. In 1979, Nicaragua r e c e i v e d $179 m i l l i o n from these i n s t i t u t i o n s ; by 1983 the t o t a l had dropped t o $30 m i l l i o n . 7 4 S o v i e t support rose from $110 m i l l i o n i n c r e d i t s and a i d i n 1980-81 to approximately $150 m i l l i o n i n 1982. 7 5 According to S o v i e t Trade M i n i s t r y f i g u r e s , t r a d e between the two jumped from a value of 10.4 m i l l i o n r u b l e s i n 1981 to 42.5 m i l l i o n r u b l e s i n 1982, with the g r e a t m a j o r i t y of the i n c r e a s e due to i n c r e a s e d - 31 -S o v i e t exports.76 However, S o v i e t economic r e l a t i o n s with Nicaragua d i d not develop as r a p i d l y or t o the same extent as they d i d with Cuba. There were i n d i c a t i o n s a t the March 1980 rendezvous i n Moscow t h a t Nicaragua was of more than p a s s i n g concern t o the S o v i e t s . The S o v i e t s i d e was l e d by P o l i t b u r o member K i r i l e n k o and the head of the I n t e r n a t i o n a l Department of the C e n t r a l i Committee (which oversees r e l a t i o n s with the T h i r d World), B. Ponomarev. An agreement on c o o p e r a t i o n i n p l a n n i n g was concluded, which opened the p o s s i b i l i t y of c l o s e r economic r e l a t i o n s than are normal with a non-communist country. In a d d i t i o n , t a l k s were conducted between the FSLN and the CPSU as w e l l as through government channels, even though the FSLN was not o f f i c i a l l y a p a r t y . A p a r t y - t o - p a r t y agreement of the type g e n e r a l l y r e s e r v e d f o r " s t a t e s of s o c i a l i s t o r i e n t a t i o n " was signed between the CPSU and FSLN, s u g g e s t i n g S o v i e t e x p e c t a t i o n s t h a t the l a t t e r would become a vanguard p a r t y . However, a f t e r these e a r l y i n t i m a t i o n s of i n t e r e s t , Nicaragua appeared t o l a p s e back i n t o o b s c u r i t y . At the Twenty-Sixth CPSU Congress i n February 1981, C e n t r a l Committee spokesman Leonid Zamyatin had " t a n g i b l e d i f f i c u l t y " i n remembering whether Nicaraguans spoke Spanish or Portuguese.77 Brezhnev made no mention of Nicaragua i n the s e c t i o n on "The development of r e l a t i o n s with the l i b e r a t e d c o u n t r i e s , " i n h i s r e p o r t to the Congress.78 /\t the Congress, Brezhnev met with the l e a d e r s of E t h i o p i a and Angola, but denied an audience to C a r l o s Nunez T e l l e z , p r e s i d e n t of the governing c o u n c i l of Nicaragua.79 E i g h t y percent of a l l a i d to Nicaragua i n 1981 came from Western sources.80 Despite the - 32 -above-mentioned i n c r e a s e i n Soviet-Nicaraguan t r a d e i n 1982, t o t a l East b l o c t r a d e accounted f o r o n l y 6.2 percent of Nicaraguan e x p o r t s and 11.5 percent of Nicaraguan imports d u r i n g t h a t year.81. i n 1983, S o v i e t t r a d e rose o n l y s l i g h t l y t o a t o t a l turnover of 51.9 m i l l i o n rubles.82 According t o Pravda. only twelve percent of Nicaragua's 1983 imports came from s o c i a l i s t countries.®3 The S o v i e t l e a d e r s have e s t a b l i s h e d c o r d i a l p e r s o n a l r e l a t i o n s with the S a n d i n i s t a l e a d e r s and are s t r o n g on symbolic g e s t u r e s of support f o r Nicaragua. S o v i e t Prime M i n i s t e r N i k o l a i Tikhonov welcomed Ortega at the a i r p o r t on h i s May 1982 v i s i t ; Brezhnev gave a banquet i n h i s honour and promised t o v i s i t Managua soon. "Some of the F r o n t l e a d e r s i n s i s t e d t h a t the more s i g n i f i c a n t f a c t was t h a t Comandante Ortega stayed o v e r n i g h t i n the Kremlin i t s e l f , while Nixon...in 1972, had s l e p t o n l y i n the o u t s k i r t s of Moscow." 8 4 The S o v i e t s appear w i l l i n g t o a s s i s t with long-term development p r o j e c t s . In September 1981, a f i s h e r i e s agreement was s i g n e d , and over the next two years a number of agreements concerning water power re s o u r c e s , mining and g e o l o g i c a l surveys, communications and s c i e n t i f i c and c u l t u r a l c o o p e r a t i o n were completed. In May 1982, Nicaragua became a f f i l i a t e d with I n t e r s p u t n i k , the S o v i e t -sponsored telecommunications o r g a n i z a t i o n , and the S o v i e t s a s s i s t e d i n b u i l d i n g a ground s t a t i o n as p a r t of the system. As i n Cuba, Nicaraguan students were sent t o the USSR f o r t e c h n i c a l t r a i n i n g . In 1982, an estimated 700 Nicaraguan students and 15 t e a c h e r s were i n the S o v i e t U n i o n . 8 ^ However, the S o v i e t Union has not been as forthcoming as - 33 -the S a n d i n i s t a s d e s i r e i n other areas. On h i s May 1982 v i s i t t o Moscow f o r the c o n c l u s i o n of a s e r i e s of economic agreements, junta c o o r d i n a t o r D a n i e l Ortega obtained a promise of $166.8 m i l l i o n i n r u b l e c r e d i t s f o r farm machinery and o t h e r t e c h n i c a l a i d from the S o v i e t Union to be d i s t r i b u t e d over a f i v e - y e a r p e r i o d , but no help f o r Nicaragua's desperate short-term f o r e i g n exchange needs.®6 Given t h a t by mid-1982 Nicaragua was f a c i n g d r a s t i c r e d u c t i o n s i n Western economic a s s i s t a n c e , c o n s t r i c t i o n of i t s t r a d i t i o n a l American market, h o s t i l e r h e t o r i c from Washington, i n c r e a s i n g border t e n s i o n s with Honduras, and c o u n t e r r e v o l u t i o n a r y a t t a c k s , t h i s a s s i s t a n c e does not look s p e c t a c u l a r . U n l i k e i t s e a r l i e r p o l i c y toward Cuba, the S o v i e t Union d i d not p i c k up the American sugar quota a f t e r i t was reduced i n May 1983. Where the S o v i e t s have made t a n g i b l e c o n t r i b u t i o n s , i t has been, as one observer noted, when "propaganda d i v i d e n d s were conspicuous.''^? T h i s was the case with a shipment of 20,000 tons of wheat worth approximately $4 m i l l i o n i n the s p r i n g of 1981, a f t e r the Americans ended government f i n a n c i n g of wheat s a l e s t o Nicaragua, and with the S o v i e t o i l d e l i v e r i e s of January 1984 to o f f s e t an a n t i c i p a t e d s h o r t f a l l . On September 16, 1983, Nicaragua became an observer i n the C o u n c i l f o r Mutual Economic A s s i s t a n c e (CMEA), but Nicaraguan requests f o r f u l l membership were r e p o r t e d l y denied. Tass excluded Nicaragua from a l i s t of "developing s t a t e s of s o c i a l i s t o r i e n t a t i o n " with whom c o o p e r a t i o n through CMEA " i s most i n t e n s i v e l y developing."8^ By the f a l l o f 1983, the S o v i e t s claimed to have put a hold on c o n c e s s i o n a r y t r a d e c r e d i t s to Nicaragua, the - 34 -major means of f i n a n c i n g S o v i e t imports, d e s p i t e Nicaraguan re q u e s t s f o r m ore.^ The p i c t u r e c o n t i n u e s to be mixed. On the one hand, th e r e are s i g n s t h a t Nicaragua's s t a t u s has been upgraded. S o v i e t -Nicaraguan t r a d e , e x c l u d i n g m i l i t a r y a i d , rose from $60 m i l l i o n i n 1983 t o $165 m i l l i o n i n 1984.90 T h i s means t h a t Nicaragua has surpassed B r a z i l as the second most important r e c i p i e n t of S o v i e t goods i n L a t i n America, f o l l o w i n g Cuba. The S o v i e t Union has r e p l a c e d the United S t a t e s as the primary s u p p l i e r of chemical f e r t i l i z e r , machinery, motor v e h i c l e s , and other c a p i t a l goods to Nicaragua. In February 1984, K o n s t a n t i n Chernenko met p r i v a t e l y with D a n i e l Ortega f o l l o w i n g Y u r i Andropov's f u n e r a l ; Andropov had denied a s i m i l a r audience f o l l o w i n g Brezhnev's death.91 On the other hand, Ortega ret u r n e d empty-handed from h i s June 1984 p i l g r i m a g e t o Moscow where he sought massive S o v i e t a s s i s t a n c e . "The absence of the customary communique <a sharp departure from S o v i e t p r o t o c o l ) suggested sharp d i f f e r e n c e s between Ortega and S o v i e t P r e s i d e n t K o n s t a n t i n Chernenko."92 The S o v i e t s sent only a lower l e v e l d e l e g a t i o n (headed by a deputy chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme S o v i e t ) t o Managua f o r the o c c a s i o n of the f i f t h a n n i v e r s a r y of the Nicaraguan r e v o l u t i o n i n J u l y 1984.93 S o v i e t shipments to Nicaragua i n 1984 were s t i l l l i t t l e more than one-t h i r t i e t h the l e v e l of exports t o Cuba.94 In g e n e r a l , the S o v i e t s appear l e s s than e n t h u s i a s t i c about g e t t i n g i n v o l v e d i n Nicaragua. The S o v i e t Union w i l l p r ovide l i m i t e d economic a s s i s t a n c e f o r s p e c i f i c p r o j e c t s , but i s not i n t e r e s t e d i n u n d e r w r i t i n g the Nicaraguan economy. T h i s - 35 -r e s t r a i n t i s i n keeping with g e n e r a l S o v i e t a i d p o l i c y i n the T h i r d World. S i n c e the mid-1970s, the S o v i e t s have a s s e r t e d t h a t , under new i n t e r n a t i o n a l c o n d i t i o n s , " m a t e r i a l a i d on the p a r t of the s o c i a l i s t s t a t e s has ceased t o be a f a c t o r d i r e c t l y promoting the t r a n s i t i o n t o a n o n - c a p i t a l i s t path." Instead, the main f a c t o r was "the p o l i t i c a l , m i l i t a r y - s t r a t e g i c , and moral i n f l u e n c e of the s t a t e s of the s o c i a l i s t community."95 No doubt t h i s stems from the f a c t t h a t the r a t e of S o v i e t economic growth has been d e c l i n i n g s i n c e the mid-1970s while the war p r o d u c t i o n and m i l i t a r y s t r e n g t h of the S o v i e t Union has i n c r e a s e d , making the S o v i e t s r e l a t i v e l y s t r o n g e r m i l i t a r i l y and weaker eco n o m i c a l l y than d u r i n g the e a r l y 1960s. The d i s a p p o i n t i n g r e s u l t s of Khrushchev's e f f o r t s to woo the T h i r d World with economic a s s i s t a n c e have a l s o convinced h i s s u c c e s s o r s t o p l a c e g r e a t e r r e l i a n c e on m i l i t a r y means as a channel of p o l i t i c a l i n f l u e n c e . S o v i e t m i l i t a r y a s s i s t a n c e t o d e v e l o p i n g c o u n t r i e s d u r i n g the Khrushchev p e r i o d (1955-64), at an average of $375 m i l l i o n per year, was surpassed by the approximately $425 m i l l i o n per year given i n economic a s s i s t a n c e . S i n c e 1972, an average of $3,553 m i l l i o n i n S o v i e t m i l i t a r y equipment and s u p p l i e s has been d e l i v e r e d to the developing world each year, almost s e v e n f o l d the average $515 m i l l i o n i n economic a s s i s t a n c e . ^ Moscow has cautioned c o u n t r i e s such as Nicaragua not to p l a c e e x c e s s i v e hopes on economic support from the S o v i e t Union, and has encouraged the S a n d i n i s t a s to d i v e r s i f y t h e i r t r a d i n g p a r t n e r s and a i d donors. In a June 15, 1983 address to the C e n t r a l Committee plenum, Andropov s a i d : - 36 -I t i s one t h i n g to p r o c l a i m s o c i a l i s m as one's goal and another t h i n g to b u i l d i t . A c e r t a i n l e v e l of p r o d u c t i v e f o r c e s , c u l t u r e and s o c i a l c onsciousness are needed f o r t h a t . S o c i a l i s t c o u n t r i e s express s o l i d a r i t y with these p r o g r e s s i v e c o u n t r i e s , render a s s i s t a n c e to them i n the sphere of p o l i t i c s and c u l t u r e , and promote the s t r e n g t h e n i n g of t h e i r defense. We c o n t r i b u t e , to the extent of our a b i l i t y , t o t h e i r economic development as w e l l . But, on the whole, t h e i r economic development j u s t as the e n t i r e s o c i a l progress of these c o u n t r i e s , can be, of course, o n l y the r e s u l t of the work of t h e i r peoples and of a c o r r e c t p o l i c y of t h e i r l e a d e r s h i p . 9 7 However, one should not draw c o n c l u s i o n s about S o v i e t w i l l i n g n e s s to p r o v i d e a i d to T h i r d World c o u n t r i e s , or l a c k t h e r e o f , simply from the s t a t e of the S o v i e t economy. P r e d i c t i o n s of c o n s t r a i n t s on S o v i e t a b i l i t y and r e a d i n e s s t o f u r n i s h l a r g e - s c a l e a i d t o T h i r d World c o u n t r i e s have i n many i n s t a n c e s proved wrong i n the p a s t . While t h e r e are c l e a r l y l i m i t s on S o v i e t economic c a p a b i l i t i e s t o a i d o t h e r c o u n t r i e s , i t i s a l s o e v i d e n t t h a t p o l i t i c a l c o n s i d e r a t i o n s have guided S o v i e t p o l i c y i n t h i s sphere and t h a t Moscow i s capable of assuming s i g n i f i c a n t economic burdens where these appear j u s t i f i e d by p r o s p e c t s of s i g n i f i c a n t p o l i t i c a l gains.98 Even i n Cuba th e r e were i n d i c a t i o n s of S o v i e t r e s e r v a t i o n s about assuming the economic burden of the r e v o l u t i o n . As mentioned above, the S o v i e t s d i d not bother t o i n c r e a s e t h e i r Cuban sugar quota u n t i l prodded by the Chinese purchase, even though the one m i l l i o n tons the S o v i e t Union had agreed t o purchase up t o t h a t p o i n t f a r from compensated f o r the f i v e and one h a l f m i l l i o n tons Cuba had produced f o r the now l o s t American market. The December 1960 communique signed by Guevara and Mikoyan i n d i c a t e d t h a t , " I f the United S t a t e s buys a c e r t a i n q u a n t i t y of Cuban sugar, the S o v i e t Union w i l l cut i t s sugar purchases by a corresponding amount," and t h a t the S o v i e t Union would supply Cuba with " v i t a l and e s s e n t i a l p r o d u c t s " only "when they cannot be purchased from other c o u n t r i e s . " 9 9 The S o v i e t s - 37 -viewed with concern C a s t r o ' s n a t i o n a l i z a t i o n of the Cuban p r i v a t e s e c t o r and e x p r o p r i a t i o n o f Cuban-owned land i n the autumn of 1960. They f e a r e d t h a t too r a p i d economic change would t h r e a t e n Cuba's i n t e r n a l s t a b i l i t y and i n c r e a s e the S o v i e t c o s t s of s u p p o r t i n g the r e v o l u t i o n . On the b a s i s o f experience with o t h e r s o c i a l i s t c o u n t r i e s , the S o v i e t Union "c o n s i d e r e d i t i n d i s p e n s a b l e f o r a p r i v a t e s e c t o r to be preserved f o r an Indeterminate p e r i o d of time while the s t a t e s e c t o r and p l a n n i n g system were being e s t a b l i s h e d and organized, i n order to f a c i l i t a t e t r a n s i t i o n and l i m i t economic imbalance."100 Given t h a t i n 1960 the S o v i e t s h e l d the same concern about the burden on the S o v i e t economy e n t a i l e d i n g r e a t e r support o f the r e v o l u t i o n and the a d d i t i o n a l concern about unwise Cuban economic p o l i c i e s , why d i d they underwrite the Cuban r e v o l u t i o n but not the Nicaraguan? One must look f i r s t t o d i f f e r e n c e s i n the circumstances and p e r s o n a l i t y of the S o v i e t l e a d e r s h i p . Khrushchev was p e r s o n a l l y committed t o the S o v i e t Union's T h i r d World p o l i c y . He e a g e r l y a n t i c i p a t e d a s o c i a l i s t v i c t o r y , and needed one t o j u s t i f y h i s o p t i m i s t i c i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f the c o r r e l a t i o n o f f o r c e s and h i s T h i r d World s t r a t e g y to h i s c o l l e a g u e s . In terms o f the i n t e r n a t i o n a l communist movement (as opposed t o S o v i e t domestic f o r t u n e s ) , the 1950s had been bleak with the s t r e n g t h e n i n g of Yugoslav independence, the development of the S i n o - S o v i e t s p l i t , A l b a n i a ' s alignment with China, and unrest i n East Germany, Hungary, and Poland. Suddenly an anti-American l e a d e r on the t h r e s h o l d of the United S t a t e s was a l l y i n g with the l o c a l Communists, implementing s o c i a l i s t reforms, and a s k i n g f o r - 38 -Moscow's support. Khrushchev c o u l d not pass up the o p p o r t u n i t y . The Brezhnev P o l i t b u r o was i n h e r e n t l y more c a u t i o u s and i t s r e p u t a t i o n was not t i e d t o immediate success i n the T h i r d World. By 1980, the S o v i e t Union had had a number of e x p e r i e n c e s with T h i r d World c l i e n t s , not a l l of them p l e a s a n t . Khrushchev was more w i l l i n g than Brezhnev t o stake S o v i e t p r e s t i g e on the f l e d g l i n g regime. The Chinese c h a l l e n g e , which hastened S o v i e t involvement i n Cuba i s not present i n Nicaragua. The FSLN r e t a i n e d r e l a t i o n s with Taiwan u n t i l l a t e 1985. In a d d i t i o n , the S o v i e t s i n the e a r l y 1980s were preoccupied with events i n A f g h a n i s t a n and Poland. The Brezhnev P o l i t b u r o c o u l d a f f o r d t o r e l e g a t e the Nicaraguan r e v o l u t i o n t o low p r i o r i t y s t a t u s . A second f a c t o r e x p l a i n i n g the v a r i a t i o n i n pace and extent o f S o v i e t involvement with the new regimes i s the d i f f e r e n t p o l i c i e s pursued by the Cuban and Nicaraguan governments. The Nicaraguan r e v o l u t i o n d i d not r a d i c a l i z e t o the same degree as the Cuban. The S a n d i n i s t a s s t i l l t o l e r a t e some p r i v a t e e n t e r p r i s e , some p r i v a t e ' a g r i c u l t u r e , and a l i m i t e d p o l i t i c a l p l u r a l i s m . C a s t r o l o s t h i s American markets w i t h i n two years of the r e v o l u t i o n and f a c e d the S o v i e t Union with almost a l l of Cuba's produce needing a buyer. Nicaragua has not cut a l l t i e s with the West, and the American withdrawal o f access t o markets has been much more g r a d u a l . By the time the Americans imposed a complete t r a d e embargo i n May 1985, Nicaragua had a l r e a d y s h i f t e d e i g h t y percent of i t s t r a d e t o other markets.101 The S a n d i n i s t a s presumably r e a l i z e t h a t a t l e a s t l i p s e r v i c e must be p a i d t o l i b e r a l democracy and non-alignment i f they want Western a i d t o c o n t i n u e . Moreover, Nicaragua probably does not want t o - 39 -become "another Cuba," with a troublesome economy and depressed standard o£ l i v i n g , h i g h l y dependent on a s i n g l e crop (sugar) and a s i n g l e t r a d i n g p a r t n e r (the S o v i e t Union). C a s t r o has c o u n s e l l e d the S a n d i n i s t a s a g a i n s t r e v o l u t i o n i z i n g s o c i e t y too r a p i d l y and a g a i n s t c u t t i n g t i e s with Western economies. The presence of Cuba i n the r e g i o n l e s s e n s the need f o r a l a r g e r S o v i e t r o l e i n Nicaragua. The Cubans have been the most a c t i v e f o r e i g n s u p p o r t e r s of the FSLN government, a s s i s t i n g p a r t i c u l a r l y i n the f i e l d s o f e d u c a t i o n and h e a l t h c a r e . By the end o f 1979, t h e r e were an estimated 3000 Cuban t e a c h e r s and medical personnel i n Nicaragua.102 The S o v i e t Union and Cuba share an i n t e r e s t i n encroaching on the American sphere i n C e n t r a l America. Cuban a i d t o the S a n d i n i s t a s promotes S o v i e t o b j e c t i v e s i n the area, and i t i s much e a s i e r f o r Cuba, with i t s shared language, c u l t u r e , and geography, t o f i n d a sympathetic h e a r i n g i n Managua. Cuban c r e d i t s and a i d t o Nicaragua t o t a l l e d approximately $150 m i l l i o n between 1980 and 1 9 8 2 . 1 0 3 The e x i s t e n c e of C a s t r o ' s Cuba m i l i t a t e s a g a i n s t e x t e n s i v e S o v i e t f i n a n c i a l support f o r Nicaragua i n yet another way. While Cuba has provided many p o l i t i c a l b e n e f i t s t o the S o v i e t Union, i t has been an economic l i a b i l i t y . The S o v i e t Union's subsidy ( d i r e c t and i n d i r e c t ) t o Cuba i s approximately $8 m i l l i o n per day or $3 b i l l i o n per year, which i s roughly f i v e times the t o t a l American a i d t o L a t i n A m e r i c a . ! 0 4 Given the present problems with the S o v i e t economy, the S o v i e t Union i s not anxious t o r e p l i c a t e t h i s burden. V i k t o r Volsky, D i r e c t o r of the USSR's I n s t i t u t e f o r L a t i n America, noted i n a 1984 i n t e r v i e w i n London t h a t the S o v i e t Union had spent a g r e a t d e a l - 40 -"t o send o i l t o Cuba--two t a n k e r s a day f o r twenty yea r s " and t h a t "we would not l i k e t o have t o repe a t t h a t on a l a r g e r scale."105 With e x i s t i n g o b l i g a t i o n s i n Vietnam, A f g h a n i s t a n , E a s t e r n Europe, and Cuba, among o t h e r s , the S o v i e t Union wants t o a v o i d c o s t l y new c l i e n t s t a t e s . Goure and Rothenberg argue t h a t the " l e s s o n s " o f Cuba are not c l e a r . The a c t u a l c o s t t o the S o v i e t Union (of S o v i e t a i d t o Cuba) may be c o n s i d e r a b l y s m a l l e r i f account i s taken of the q u a l i t y and p r i o r i t y o f goods d e l i v e r e d t o Cuba, the p r i c e s charged f o r them by Moscow, and some of the r e t u r n s from the i m p o r t a t i o n o f Cuban produce. I f support o f Cuba has proved t o be expensive f o r the S o v i e t Union, i t has a l s o demonstrated a S o v i e t a b i l i t y t o p r o v i d e a i d to a d i s t a n t country on a l a r g e s c a l e , and beyond t h a t i t s w i l l i n g n e s s t o i n c r e a s e t h i s a i d from year t o year d e s p i t e Cuba's growing t r a d e d e f i c i t . 1 0 6 Nicaragua, with i t s p o p u l a t i o n o f j u s t under 3 m i l l i o n , would not be as g r e a t a burden as the 10 m i l l i o n i n h a b i t a n t s of Cuba. Although Moscow i s c l e a r l y capable o f making s u b s t a n t i a l economic commitments where i t f e e l s the p o l i t i c a l b e n e f i t s are worthwhile, i t i s apparent t h a t , thus f a r , the S o v i e t s do not f e e l t h a t Nicaragua m e r i t s the investment. As s h a l l become even c l e a r e r i n the next s e c t i o n , the S o v i e t Union judges the b e n e f i t s of g r e a t e r support of Nicaragua not worth the probable c o s t s . - 41 -i i i . P o l i t i c a l and M i l i t a r y Support In the Cuban case, the e s t a b l i s h m e n t of d i p l o m a t i c and economic r e l a t i o n s was f o l l o w e d by e x p r e s s i o n s of S o v i e t p o l i t i c a l and m i l i t a r y support. On J u l y 9, 1960 i n an address t o the a l l - R u s s i a n Teachers' Congress i n Moscow, Khrushchev announced: I t i s c l e a r t o everyone t h a t the economic blockade of the American monopolies may prove t o be the beginning of p r e p a r a t i o n s f o r i n t e r v e n t i o n a g a i n s t Cuba. We must t h e r e f o r e r a i s e our v o i c e i n Cuba's defense and g i v e n o t i c e t h a t these are no longer the times when the i m p e r i a l i s t s plundered and carved up the world as they wished.... I t should not be f o r g o t t e n t h a t the United S t a t e s i s not so i n a c c e s s i b l y d i s t a n t from the S o v i e t Union as i t used to be. F i g u r a t i v e l y speaking, i n case of need S o v i e t a r t i l l e r y m e n can support the Cuban people with t h e i r r o c k e t f i r e i f the a g g r e s s i v e f o r c e s i n the Pentagon dare to launch an i n t e r v e n t i o n a g a i n s t Cuba. Far from being a c a u t i o u s move, t h i s was an open c h a l l e n g e to the United S t a t e s . The S o v i e t l e a d e r s h i p was no l e s s aware of Cuba's v u l n e r a b i l i t y than p r e v i o u s l y . S i n c e the February t r a d e agreements, Soviet-Cuban economic t i e s had grown i n tandem with the d e t e r i o r a t i o n of Cuban-American r e l a t i o n s . In a d d i t i o n , no l a t e r than June 1960 C a s t r o made arrangements f o r l a r g e arms d e l i v e r i e s from the East b l o c , and the f i r s t shipment (from Czechoslovakia) a r r i v e d s h o r t l y a f t e r Khrushchev's statement. The g r e a t e r the S o v i e t involvement i n Cuba, the more p r e s t i g e would be l o s t i f the Americans chose t o crush C a s t r o . Now t h a t the S o v i e t Union c o u l d no longer c l a i m non-involvement i n Cuba, i t was i n need of a f r e s h t a c t i c f o r d e t e r r i n g the a u t h e n t i c danger of American i n t e r v e n t i o n a g a i n s t t h a t country. Khrushchev's speech can be viewed as an example of the new t a c t i c : t h r e a t e n d i r e c t S o v i e t response t o American m i l i t a r y - 42 -a c t i o n a g a i n s t Cuba. The American d e c i s i o n s t o arm a Cuban c o u n t e r r e v o l u t i o n a r y f o r c e and to cut the sugar quota enabled Castro to persuade the S o v i e t Union t o support him. P r i o r t o these s a n c t i o n s the S o v i e t Union was h e s i t a n t to underwrite the r e v o l u t i o n or to assume s t r a t e g i c r i s k s on i t s b e h a l f . Cuba c o u l d not long s u r v i v e without an a l t e r n a t i v e market f o r i t s main export, and C a s t r o was powerless i n the f a c e of American m i l i t a r y might. I f the S o v i e t Union wanted the Cuban r e v o l u t i o n to s u r v i v e , i t had to s t e p i n . American s a n c t i o n s made the S o v i e t Union ready t o g i v e C a s t r o the support he sought.108 They drove the S o v i e t Union i n t o C a s t r o ' s arms r a t h e r than v i c e v e r s a . The S o v i e t Union was not a r e l u c t a n t p a r t n e r : "the S o v i e t a t t i t u d e toward Cuba was dominated by enthusiasm and a c t i v e support, a t l e a s t u n t i l the l a t t e r h a l f of 1961. "109 _J Ut American s a n c t i o n s f o r c e d the S o v i e t Union to take a stand on Cuba e a r l i e r than i t would have p r e f e r r e d . I t was u n c l e a r how f a r the S o v i e t Union would a c t u a l l y go t o defend Cuba. The S o v i e t Union laggged d r a s t i c a l l y i n the s t r a t e g i c balance and was completely e c l i p s e d i n c o n v e n t i o n a l c a p a b i l i t i e s i n the Caribbean. S o v i e t i n a c t i o n d u r i n g the Bay of P i g s adventure and i t s behaviour d u r i n g the Cuban M i s s i l e C r i s i s suggest t h a t the r o c k e t t h r e a t was a b l u f f ; c e r t a i n l y the Americans thought so. The prime purpose of the statement may have been t o r e a s s u r e C a s t r o of S o v i e t s u p p o r t . H O T h i s speech, and other statements t o the same e f f e c t , were vague enough to leave the S o v i e t Union with room f o r f l e x i b i l i t y should the t a c t i c f a i l . Khrushchev i n d i c a t e d the p o s s i b i l i t y , but not the c e r t a i n t y , o f response. Apparent boldness d i s g u i s e d genuine - 43 -f e a r s . The speech had much to do with Khrushchev's penchant f o r the grand, dramatic gesture (witness h i s B e r l i n ultimatums), h i s m i s s i l e d e c e p t i o n s t r a t e g y , and the f a c t t h a t he had staked h i s p e r s o n a l r e p u t a t i o n on S o v i e t success i n the T h i r d World. He may have overstepped h i s a u t h o r i t y . L a t e r S o v i e t statements i n support of Cuba were much more g e n e r a l , with no s p e c i f i c r e f e r e n c e t o r o c k e t s . For example: "The S o v i e t people w i l l not stand a s i d e i f m i l i t a r y i n t e r v e n t i o n i s undertaken a g a i n s t Cuba.... The S o v i e t Union, r e l y i n g on i t s own might, w i l l g i v e the necessary a i d to Cuba. " H I The primary goal i n S o v i e t p o l i c y toward Cuba through the remainder of 1960 and i n t o 1961 was t o prevent a r e v e r s a l of the r e v o l u t i o n . The S o v i e t Union was not c o n f i d e n t t h a t Khrushchev's " r o c k e t r a t t l i n g " alone c o u l d guarantee the s u r v i v a l of the C a s t r o regime. The S o v i e t p r e s s continued t o p o i n t t o American pressure on Cuba and t o s t r e s s the p o s s i b i l i t y of American i n t e r v e n t i o n , hoping t o focus i n t e r n a t i o n a l a t t e n t i o n on the p e r i l . 1 1 2 Although the S o v i e t s f r e q u e n t l y proclaimed S o v i e t r e a d i n e s s to come to Cuba's a i d , they emphasized the importance of other f a c t o r s i n the defense of Cuba. The November 1960 i s s u e of World M a r x i s t Review c r e d i t e d Cuban f i r m n e s s and u n i t y and L a t i n American s o l i d a r i t y ahead of S o v i e t b l o c support as reasons why Cuba had not yet been i n v a d e d . H 3 Beginning i n the summer of 1960, the S o v i e t Union i n s t r u c t e d a l l L a t i n American communist p a r t i e s t o make the defence of the Cuban r e v o l u t i o n t h e i r f i r s t p r i o r i t y , even i f i t meant c o o p e r a t i n g with bourgeois governments t h a t supported Cuba.H4 - 44 -Because of the p e r c e i v e d Cuban v u l n e r a b i l i t y , the S o v i e t Union viewed with m i s g i v i n g c e r t a i n Cuban developments. Castro was c a l l i n g f o r a n t i - i m p e r i a l i s t r e v o l u t i o n and armed s t r u g g l e throughout L a t i n America. Although events i n Cuba had l e d to a reassessment of the r e v o l u t i o n a r y p o t e n t i a l i n the Western Hemisphere, the S o v i e t Union continued t o b e l i e v e t h a t broad communist-national bourgeois f r o n t s working f o r p e a c e f u l change would be more e f f e c t i v e than g u e r r i l l a a c t i v i t y on the road to s o c i a l i s m . C a s t r o ' s a c t i o n s were i n o p p o s i t i o n to the S o v i e t -proposed model f o r L a t i n America, which suggested a long p e r i o d of t r a n s i t i o n t o s o c i a l i s m ; Moscow f e l t i t was prudent t o c o n s o l i d a t e the r e v o l u t i o n i n Cuba f i r s t . C a s t r o was t a k i n g unnecessary r i s k s and a l i e n a t i n g p o t e n t i a l l y sympathetic L a t i n American governments. Moscow p e r c e i v e d the severance of Cuban-American d i p l o m a t i c r e l a t i o n s a t the beginning of 1961 as another s t e p toward p o s s i b l e American i n v a s i o n of Cuba.HS S o v i e t f e a r s r e g a r d i n g Cuba's s e c u r i t y proved to be j u s t i f i e d when, on A p r i l 17, 1961, a group of C I A - t r a i n e d Cuban e x i l e s landed a t the Bay of P i g s i n an attempt to t o p p l e C a s t r o . Needless t o say, the S o v i e t s d i d not f i r e r o c k e t s i n support of Cuba. They d i d not r e a c t u n t i l the day a f t e r the i n v a s i o n , a t which time Khrushchev sent a message to P r e s i d e n t Kennedy n o t i n g t h a t " m i l i t a r y technology and the world p o l i t i c a l s i t u a t i o n are such today t h a t any so-c a l l e d ' l i t t l e war' can g i v e r i s e t o a c h a i n r e a c t i o n i n a l l p a r t s of the globe. As f o r the S o v i e t Union...we w i l l g i v e the Cuban people and t h e i r government every a s s i s t a n c e necessary to r e p u l s e the armed a t t a c k on Cuba."116 The S o v i e t response - 45 -appears even more delayed given t h a t on A p r i l 15 American planes d i s g u i s e d as Cuban a i r c r a f t and p i l o t e d by e x i l e s had bombed Cuba, ca u s i n g C a s t r o to a n t i c i p a t e imminent invasion.117 The i n v a s i o n was crushed i n t h r e e days. Although C a s t r o i n a speech on A p r i l 23 c r e d i t e d the v i c t o r y t o the heroism of the Cubans and the s t u p i d i t y of the United S t a t e s , i n the S o v i e t view, the f a c t t h a t the United S t a t e s d i d not d i r e c t l y i n t e r v e n e to save the attempt e x e m p l i f i e d the s h i f t i n power i n favour of the s o c i a l i s t camp. Khrushchev's message—which C a s t r o d i d not even mention i n h i s speech—was s a i d t o have d e t e r r e d the United S t a t e s . B. N. Ponomarev wrote: "The world s o c i a l i s t system i s a r e l i a b l e s h i e l d f o r the independence of the l i b e r a t e d nations."118 According to James Reston, as a r e s u l t ' of the Bay of P i g s , "Khrushchev decided he was d e a l i n g with an i n e x p e r i e n c e d young l e a d e r who c o u l d be i n t i m i d a t e d and b l a c k m a i l e d , " H 9 l e a d i n g to an even g r e a t e r S o v i e t involvement i n Cuba. There has been no s i m i l a r S o v i e t commitment to the defence of the Nicaraguan R e v o l u t i o n . The nearest approximations have been a December 7, 1981 statement by the S o v i e t Ambassador t o Nicaragua t h a t "the S o v i e t people have supported Nicaragua s i n c e the war a g a i n s t Somoza's d i c t a t o r s h i p , w i l l support i t i n i t s f i g h t f o r peace, the defence of i t s country, and the r e c o n s t r u c t i o n of the nation,"120 a n d the avowal of Y u r i F o k i n , general s e c r e t a r y of the S o v i e t f o r e i g n m i n i s t r y , on August 3, 1983, t h a t the S o v i e t s " w i l l support Nicaragua p o l i t i c a l l y i n every way" i n the event of a d i r e c t a g g r e s s i o n a g a i n s t Nicaragua.121 The b o l d Khrushchevian s t r a t e g y of t h r e a t e n i n g a - 46 -d i r e c t S o v i e t response t o an American a t t a c k on the new regime does not appeal to the more c a u t i o u s c u r r e n t Kremlin i n h a b i t a n t s , even though they are i n a much b e t t e r p o s i t i o n t o c a r r y out such a t h r e a t . Whereas Khrushchev p e r c e i v e d Kennedy to be a weak l e a d e r e a s i l y dissuaded by such a b l u f f , the S o v i e t l e a d e r s h i p sees Reagan as b e l l i c o s e and u n p r e d i c t a b l e . The S o v i e t s t r a t e g y i n Nicaragua i s a k i n t o t h a t p r a c t i c e d i n Cuba be f o r e and a f t e r Khrushchev's r o c k e t t h r e a t : t o deter American i n t e r v e n t i o n through a propaganda campaign d e t a i l i n g American p r e s s u r e s on the new regime and the danger of American m i l i t a r y a c t i o n i n C e n t r a l America. The October 29, 1981 i s s u e of Pravda r e f e r r e d t o "Operation O r i o n , " a supposed American p l o t "designed t o d e s t a b i l i z e the s i t u a t i o n i n Nicaragua and to put a stop t o the r e v o l u t i o n a r y process i n t h a t country a t a l l c o s t s , i n c l u d i n g d i r e c t m i l i t a r y i n t e r v e n t i o n . " 1 2 2 J u s t as Guatemala was c i t e d as the precedent f o r United S t a t e s ' p l a n s v i s - a - v i s Cuba, American a c t i o n toward Nicaragua was compared with t h a t p r eceding "the f a s c i s t coup i n Chile,"123 a n d i n c u r s i o n s of American-funded c o u n t e r r e v o l u t i o n a r i e s (contras) from Honduras were c o n s i d e r e d r e m i n i s c e n t of the Bay of Pigs.124 The S o v i e t Union hopes to generate i n t e r n a t i o n a l o p p o s i t i o n t o American p r e s s u r e on Nicaragua and to play on f e a r s i n Europe and L a t i n America about the American use of f o r c e . T h i s i s to counter an American p o l i t i c a l o f f e n s i v e aimed at i s o l a t i n g Nicaragua from L a t i n America and Western Europe. e The S o v i e t s have a l s o focused on the v i r t u e s of a p o l i t i c a l s e t tlement t o r e g i o n a l c o n f l i c t . They p u b l i c l y support Mexican and Contadora e f f o r t s t o show t h a t they support peace and to put - 47 -pressure on the United S t a t e s not t o use m i l i t a r y i n t e r v e n t i o n . However, the S o v i e t s emphasize Cuban and Nicaraguan peace pr o p o s a l s as w e l l , t o i n d i c a t e t h a t they w i l l not " s e l l out" the Nicaraguans,125 a n d they " c a r e f u l l y avoided endorsing [Mexican P r e s i d e n t P o r t i l l o ' s l c a l l f o r s t e p s to a l l a y the apprehensions of n e i g h b o r i n g c o u n t r i e s about Nicaragua's m i l i t a r y buildup."126 Moscow probably welcomes peace t a l k s i n s o f a r as they d e t e r the United S t a t e s from t a k i n g m i l i t a r y a c t i o n and complicate United S t a t e s - L a t i n American r e l a t i o n s , but i s apprehensive about how f a r Managua w i l l go. The S o v i e t s do not want the S a n d i n i s t a s to j e o p a r d i z e t h e i r monopoly of power. "A 1983 S o v i e t a r t i c l e argued a g a i n s t demands t h a t Nicaragua hold Western-style e l e c t i o n s . " 1 2 7 Moscow's p u b l i c p o s i t i o n i s t h a t the S a n d i n i s t a s are han d l i n g the c o n t r a s i t u a t i o n s u c c e s s f u l l y on t h e i r own. In a March 25, 1983 meeting between Andropov and Nicaraguan j u n t a c o o r d i n a t o r , D a n i e l Ortega, the l a t t e r " s t r e s s e d t h a t Nicaragua's r e v o l u t i o n a r y government possesses the necessary c a p a b i l i t i e s t o defend the homeland and crush the i n t e r v e n t i o n i s t s , " and the former "expressed c o n f i d e n c e t h a t Nicaragua would succeed i n defending i t s freedom and independence."128 j n t h e i r J u l y 19, 1983 a n n i v e r s a r y g r e e t i n g s to Nicaragua, the S o v i e t s noted t h a t the Nicaraguans are "courageously defending t h e i r r e v o l u t i o n a r y g a i n s " a g a i n s t "U.S. t h r e a t s and crude p r e s s u r e , " but d i d not express support f o r t h a t e f f o r t . They added t h a t "the S o v i e t people are s a t i s f i e d " with t h e i r r e l a t i o n s h i p with Nicaragua.129 when Nicaragua's waters were mined by the CIA i n the s p r i n g of 1984, Pravda s a i d - 48 -only t h a t "the S o v i e t people are on Nicaragua's s i d e . " 1 ^ I f Cuba has not yet been a b l e to get a t r e a t y commitment from the S o v i e t Union f o r i t s defence, i t i s h i g h l y u n l i k e l y t h a t Nicaragua w i l l be a b l e t o do so. V i k t o r Volsky, D i r e c t o r of the USSR's I n s t i t u t e of L a t i n America, i n d i c a t e d the l i m i t s of S o v i e t support f o r Nicaragua. "Volsky c a r e f u l l y c o n t r a s t e d the USSR's ' f e e l i n g of s o l i d a r i t y ' f o r Nicaragua with the ' p r i n c i p l e s of i n t e r n a t i o n a l i s m ' t h a t a p p l i e d to S o v i e t r e l a t i o n s with 'the c o u n t r i e s of the world s o c i a l i s t system, which of course i n c l u d e s Cuba.' In response to a q u e s t i o n about 'what happens' when ' s o l i d a r i t y ' i s not enough, Volsky r e p l i e d : 'Well, the s t r u g g l e i s a long one. There have been d e f e a t s b e f o r e . Sandino h i m s e l f was defeated.'"131 The g r e a t e s t reason f o r l a c k of S o v i e t committal i s r e a l i s m about the r e l a t i v e m i l i t a r y - s t r a t e g i c p o s i t i o n of the superpowers i n the Caribbean, coupled with r e c o g n i t i o n of Washington's p e r c e p t i o n t h a t the S a n d i n i s t a s pose a t h r e a t to America's v i t a l i n t e r e s t s t h a t must be removed. As one S o v i e t o f f i c i a l t o l d v i s i t i n g j o u r n a l i s t s i n March 1981, " I f the Americans invaded Nicaragua, what would we do? What c o u l d we do? Nothing?"132 In the T h i r d World, the S o v i e t Union tends t o moderate i t s behaviour i n reponse to i t s e v a l u a t i o n of i n h e r e n t r i s k . Although the United S t a t e s responded with as much h o s t i l i t y t o Cuba as to Nicaragua,133 Khrushchev was o p t i m i s t i c about the c o r r e l a t i o n of f o r c e s and the p o s s i b i l i t y of p e a c e f u l c o e x i s t e n c e . Kennedy's i n a c t i o n over the Bay of P i g s , h i s l a c k l u s t e r performance at the Vienna summit i n June 1961, and - 49 -American acceptance of the c o n s t r u c t i o n o f the B e r l i n Wall the f o l l o w i n g August l e d Khrushchev t o t h i n k t h a t the United S t a t e s was u n w i l l i n g t o use f o r c e t o defend i t s i n t e r e s t s . The a c t i o n s of the Reagan A d m i n i s t r a t i o n have given Brezhnev and h i s su c c e s s o r s a very d i f f e r e n t p e r c e p t i o n . The S o v i e t Union does not want t o make a m i l i t a r y commitment i t might have t o f o l l o w through on. Nicaragua i s not worth a Soviet-American war, and abandoning a commitment t o Nicaragua's defence i n the event of an American i n v a s i o n would l e a d t o a l o s s o f S o v i e t p r e s t i g e . The Reagan A d m i n i s t r a t i o n views C e n t r a l America as the l a t e s t f r o n t i n the g l o b a l East-West s t r u g g l e . In t h i s i n t e r p r e t a t i o n , the S a n d i n i s t a s are not noble p a t r i o t s concerned with r e b u i l d i n g a country devastated by years of d i c t a t o r s h i p , economic e x p l o i t a t i o n , and c i v i l war, but " c a r r i e r s o f a r e v o l u t i o n a r y v i r u s t h a t came from the S o v i e t Union by way of Cuba, and with which they w i l l s u r e l y attempt t o i n f e s t the r e s t of C e n t r a l America."134 The "domino t h e o r y " has been r e s u r r e c t e d and t r a n s p o r t e d a c r o s s the P a c i f i c t o C e n t r a l America.135 Having taken the s i t u a t i o n i n C e n t r a l America as a t e s t of American r e s o l v e t o oppose Communist expansionism i n the T h i r d World, the A d m i n i s t r a t i o n i n 1982 began p r o v i d i n g arms, money, and t r a i n i n g t o Nicaraguan e x i l e s (contras) based i n Honduras. O r i g i n a l l y presented as an attempt t o h a l t the flow of S o v i e t and Cuban arms through Nicaragua to Salvadoran i n s u r g e n t s , by 1985 t h i s c o v e r t war was openly admitted t o have as i t s o b j e c t i v e the overthrow of the S a n d i n i s t a regime as p r e s e n t l y c o n s t i t u t e d . 1 3 6 The United S t a t e s a l s o c o n t r i b u t e d t o a massive m i l i t a r y b u i l d u p i n Hondurasl37 and engaged i n war - 50 -games i n Honduras and m i l i t a r y manoeuvres o f f the Nicaraguan coa s t of unprecedented s c a l e and duration.138 E x e r c i s e s d u r i n g the summer of 1984 bore the t i t l e Grenadero I i n more than a c o i n c i d e n t a l resemblance to the name of the i s l a n d invaded by United S t a t e s marines i n October 1983. American f a i l u r e a t the Bay of P i g s emboldened Khrushchev; he d i d not expect t h a t g r e a t e r S o v i e t involvement i n Cuba would le a d t o a m i l i t a r y c o n f r o n t a t i o n , as i s i n d i c a t e d by the emplacement of m i s s i l e s i n Cuba i n the f a l l o f 1962. The October 1983 American i n v a s i o n of Grenada had the a n t i p o d a l e f f e c t on the S o v i e t l e a d e r s h i p . Grenada was a setback f o r S o v i e t p o l i c y i n the Caribbean; i t showed the l i m i t s of Cuban and S o v i e t power i n the r e g i o n and " r e v e a l e d the u n w i l l i n g n e s s of Cuba and e s p e c i a l l y the USSR to r i s k a d i r e c t m i l i t a r y c o n f r o n t a t i o n with the United S t a t e s i n order t o save a c l i e n t regime i n the Basin."139 S o v i e t press commentary warned t h a t the Grenadan i n v a s i o n was simply a prelude f o r s i m i l a r American a c t i o n a g a i n s t Nicaragua. "The cowboy a s s a u l t on t i n y Grenada...has c a l l e d t o mind the CIA's c r i m i n a l , undeclared war a g a i n s t Nicaragua...."140 I n t e r n a t i o n a l A f f a i r s r e f e r r e d to Western o b s e r v e r s who "surmise t h a t the o p e r a t i o n Grenada co u l d be a d r e s s r e h e a r s a l of a d i r e c t American a g g r e s s i o n a g a i n s t Nicaragua."141 Moscow i s a l s o concerned about a p e r c e i v e d American t h r e a t to Cuba a r i s i n g out of events i n C e n t r a l America.142 E a r l y i n 1980 candidate Reagan suggested a naval blockade of Cuba as a response t o the S o v i e t i n v a s i o n of Afghanistan.143 i n February 1981, S e c r e t a r y of S t a t e Alexander Haig i m p l i e d t h a t the United - 51 -S t a t e s was contemplating m i l i t a r y o p t i o n s a g a i n s t Cuba when he warned t h a t the United S t a t e s would "go to the source" of the a g g r e s s i o n i n E l S a l v a d o r - 1 4 4 The S t a t e Department p u b l i s h e d a s e r i e s of r e p o r t s with such t i t l e s as "Cuba's Renewed Support f o r V i o l e n c e i n L a t i n America" (December 14, 1981) and "Cuban and Nicaraguan Support f o r the Salvadoran Insurgency" (March 20, 1982). Although Cuba i s a c o s t l y dependent, i t i s an important adjunct of S o v i e t p o l i t i c a l , m i l i t a r y , propaganda, and i n t e l l i g e n c e a c t i v i t i e s . Moscow has an enormous stake i n the p e r p e t u a t i o n and success of C a s t r o ' s regime; i t i s not w i l l i n g to r i s k Cuba f o r the s u r v i v a l of the Nicaraguan r e v o l u t i o n . Since the Reagan a d m i n i s t r a t i o n came to power, the S o v i e t Union has stepped up i t s m i l i t a r y a i d and r e a f f i r m e d i t s s e c u r i t y commitments to Cuba. In a February 1981 speech, Brezhnev e l e v a t e d Cuba to membership i n the " s o c i a l i s t community," an honour p r e v i o u s l y l i m i t e d t o E a s t e r n Europe and o c c a s i o n a l l y Mongolia. In November 1981, Moscow warned the United S t a t e s about the " s e r i o u s consequences" of p u n i t i v e a c t i o n a g a i n s t Cuba.145 The f a c t t h a t the S o v i e t s want to a v o i d a m i l i t a r y c o n f r o n t a t i o n with the United S t a t e s does not mean t h a t they have s h i e d away from a m i l i t a r y r e l a t i o n s h i p with Nicaragua. S i n c e 1981, the S o v i e t s have made c a u t i o u s arms t r a n s f e r s to the Nicaraguans. " S o v i e t postmortems on C h i l e emphasize t h a t ... r e v o l u t i o n s must be a b l e to defend themselves, both by s e i z i n g c o n t r o l of a country's armed f o r c e s and by o b t a i n i n g a l l the m i l i t a r y a i d they c a n . " l 4 6 Beginning i n the f a l l of 1979, the S o v i e t Union sent boots, packs and r i f l e s t o the Nicaraguan - 52 -army. The f i r s t heavy S o v i e t b l o c weaponry a r r i v e d i n the s p r i n g of 1981, and d e l i v e r i e s over the next two years i n c l u d e d s m a l l e r t r a n s p o r t planes, h e l i c o p t e r s , and t r a i n e r s . In 1982-83 the S o v i e t s sent tanks, armoured personnel c a r r i e r s , a r t i l l e r y , and a i r c r a f t . In l a t e 1984, S o v i e t s h i p s d e l i v e r e d h e l i c o p t e r gunships, capable of d e f e n s i v e , but not o f f e n s i v e a c t i o n . As i n Cuba, S o v i e t m i l i t a r y a i d to Nicaragua grew as Managua was denied Western m i l i t a r y a s s i s t a n c e . As with economic a i d , m i l i t a r y a i d has i n c r e a s e d , but has not reached e x c e s s i v e l e v e l s . The volume of d e l i v e r i e s of S o v i e t b l o c m i l i t a r y equipment t o t a l l e d 10,000 me t r i c tons i n each of 1981 and 1982. T h i s doubled to 20,000 i n 1983 with the i n c r e a s e i n c o n t r a a c t i v i t y , but f e l l back t o 18,000 tons i n 1984.147 T h i s i s low i n comparison with the 250,000 me t r i c tons of S o v i e t weapons sent to Cuba i n 1962, 40,000 i n 1963, and 20,000 i n 1964.148 The t o t a l appears even more f r u g a l i n l i g h t of the c i v i l war i n Nicaragua and the i n c r e a s e s i n c e the 1960s i n the S o v i e t a b i l i t y t o p r o v i d e i t s c l i e n t s with m i l i t a r y a i d . S i m i l a r l y , the S o v i e t m i l i t a r y presence i n Cuba, which began i n the summer of 1962, has not been d u p l i c a t e d i n Nicaragua. By the end of 1982, t h e r e were onl y 98 S o v i e t s e c u r i t y and m i l i t a r y a d v i s o r s i n Nicaragua. The S o v i e t Union appears to be r e l y i n g on Cuba to take up the s l a c k ; t h e r e were 3,000 Cuban a d v i s o r s at the same time.149 "Moscow p r o v i d e s only enough m i l i t a r y a i d to make United S t a t e s m i l i t a r y i n t e r v e n t i o n c o s t l y and save the S o v i e t ' r e v o l u t i o n a r y ' r e p u t a t i o n , not enough to guarantee s u r v i v a l or r i s k c o n f r o n t a t i o n . " 1 5 0 T h i s a i d does not come cheap; payment i s sometimes made i n hard c u r r e n c y . - 53 -The i n c r e a s e i n m i l i t a r y a i d to Nicaragua a l s o corresponded to a d e c l i n e i n detente. By 1982, the S o v i e t Union had concluded t h a t detente with the United S t a t e s was i m p o s s i b l e . T h i s was due to such measures as the t i g h t e n i n g of American s a n c t i o n s on the S o v i e t Union as a r e s u l t of the i m p o s i t i o n of m a r t i a l law i n Poland, the American attempt to convince Western European companies not t o b u i l d a S o v i e t n a t u r a l gas p i p e l i n e , the l a c k of progress i n arms c o n t r o l t a l k s , an i n c r e a s e d American defence budget, and c o n t i n u a l l y s t r i d e n t American r h e t o r i c . In September 1982, Leonid Zamyatin, the Kremlin's c h i e f spokesman, c a l l e d the Reagan a d m i n i s t r a t i o n "the most m i l i t a r i s t i c and r e a c t i o n a r y " American government s i n c e World War Two.151 There was l i t t l e i n c e n t i v e f o r r e s t r a i n t i n Nicaragua. The S o v i e t Union has taken p a i n s to reduce the r i s k s of i n c u r r i n g American r e t a l i a t i o n as a r e s u l t of i t s Nicaraguan involvement. The S o v i e t Union has never p u b l i c l y acknowledged m i l i t a r y a i d t o Nicaragua and u s u a l l y r e l i e s on Cuba to t r a n s f e r the arms t o Nicaragua. The S o v i e t Union has a c c e l e r a t e d arms shipments to Cuba, presumably to help cover t h i s , as w e l l as t o r a i s e the i s l a n d ' s s e l f - d e f e n s e p o t e n t i a l and as reimbursement f o r Cuba's A f r i c a n adventures. S o v i e t arms d e l i v e r i e s t o Cuba du r i n g the 1970s were approximately 15,000 tons per year; at 63,000 tons, the d e l i v e r i e s t o Cuba i n 1981 were the l a r g e s t s i n c e the Cuban M i s s i l e C r i s i s . 1 5 2 Not only S o v i e t a l l i e s such as B u l g a r i a , East Germany and Cuba have d e l i v e r e d arms to Nicaragua, but seemingly more n e u t r a l s h i p p e r s , l i k e A l g e r i a , have been pressed i n t o s e r v i c e . 1 5 3 By r e l y i n g on t h i r d p a r t i e s t o d e l i v e r weapons, the S o v i e t s are a b l e to d i s c l a i m d i r e c t - 54 -m i l i t a r y involvement i n Nicaragua, g i v i n g t h e i r c a l l s f o r C e n t r a l American peace more c r e d i b i l i t y i n i n t e r n a t i o n a l eyes and l e s s e n i n g the n e c e s s i t y of s u p p o r t i n g Nicaragua should the United S t a t e s d e c i d e to i n t e r v e n e . A l s o i n deference to America's r e g i o n a l m i l i t a r y might and Reagan's apparent i n c l i n a t i o n to u t i l i z e i t , Moscow seems to be o b s e r v i n g t a c i t l i m i t s on i t s m i l i t a r y a i d to Nicaragua. The weapons d e l i v e r e d thus f a r are more s u i t a b l e f o r combatting i n s u r g e n t s than f o r la u n c h i n g a t t a c k s a g a i n s t p r o f e s s i o n a l t r o o p s . Although with East b l o c a i d , the S a n d i n i s t a s have transformed the Nicaraguan army i n t o the l a r g e s t i n the r e g i o n , the combined f o r c e s of E l Salvador, Honduras, and Guatemala are twice as l a r g e as Nicaragua's and possess s u p e r i o r f i r e p o w e r . T h e S o v i e t s have not yet granted Managua's p e r s i s t e n t r e q u e s t s f o r the modern j e t bombers and f i g h t e r s t h a t would permit the S a n d i n i s t a s to c o n t e s t Honduran a i r supremacy. The B u l g a r i a n s have t r a i n e d Nicaraguan p i l o t s on S o v i e t MiG-21 f i g h t e r a i r c r a f t , Nicaraguan a i r f i e l d s have been expanded to accommodate the planes, and MiGs have been d e l i v e r e d to Cuba, but they have not been deployed i n Nicaragua, presumably because the S o v i e t s conclude t h a t t h i s would i n v i t e r e t a l i a t i o n from Washington, which has warned t h a t any o f f e n s i v e weapons i n Nicaragua would be "unacceptable."155 The S o v i e t l e a d e r s h i p a l s o muted i t s r e a c t i o n to Reagan's J u l y 1983 statement t h a t S o v i e t m i l i t a r y a i d t o Nicaragua "cannot be allowed to c o n t i n u e , " and p r o t e s t e d q u i e t l y when American warships h a l t e d Nicaragua-bound S o v i e t f r e i g h t e r s to q u e s t i o n them about t h e i r cargo.156 - 55 -To summarize, f o l l o w i n g the e s t a b l i s h m e n t of d i p l o m a t i c and economic r e l a t i o n s , the S o v i e t Union provided the new Cuban and Nicaraguan governments with m i l i t a r y a s s i s t a n c e , both as a means of i n c r e a s i n g S o v i e t i n f l u e n c e with the regime and as a means of augmenting the r e v o l u t i o n ' s p o t e n t i a l t o defend i t s e l f . As i s the case i n the economic sphere, the S o v i e t s have not given Nicaragua as much m i l i t a r y and p o l i t i c a l support as they d i d Cuba. The d e c l a r a t i o n t h a t the S o v i e t Union would come to the defence of Cuba i f necessary has not been repeated f o r Nicaragua because, gi v e n t h a t the Reagan a d m i n i s t r a t i o n has s i g n a l e d i t s r e s o l v e t o overthrow the S a n d i n i s t a s , such a move would draw the S o v i e t Union i n t o unmanageable r i s k s . The S o v i e t Union nonetheless c o n t i n u e s t o p r o v i d e Nicaragua with m i l i t a r y a i d s u f f i c i e n t t o c o n t i n u e the c o n t r a b a t t l e . The danger of S o v i e t -American c r i s i s i s minimized by keeping involvement i n d i r e c t and by a v o i d i n g measures deemed unacceptable to the United S t a t e s . i v . Ideology On A p r i l 16, 1961, F i d e l C a s t r o p u b l i c l y proclaimed the s o c i a l i s t c h a r a c t e r of the Cuban r e v o l u t i o n . The S o v i e t l e a d e r s h i p d i d not o f f i c i a l l y acknowledge Cuban s o c i a l i s m u n t i l i t r e c e i v e d p a s s i n g mention i n a j o i n t communique of September 21, 1961, probably a t Cuban i n s i s t e n c e . ! 5 7 There was a s i m i l a r delay between C a s t r o ' s December 1, 1961 s e l f - p r o c l a m a t i o n as a M a r x i s t - L e n i n i s t and the S o v i e t r e c o g n i t i o n of the f a c t i n mid-A p r i l 1962.158 I t was not u n t i l 1963 t h a t Cuba was c l e a r l y r e c o g n i z e d as a member of the s o c i a l i s t camp and S o v i e t w r i t i n g s c e l e b r a t e d the new s o c i a l i s t s t a t e , i n some i n s t a n c e s with - 56 -u n r e s t r a i n e d hyperbole: Four and a h a l f years ago a second Columbus d i s c o v e r e d A m e r i c a — F i d e l C a s t r o who d i s c o v e r e d S o c i a l i s t America to the joy of i t s working people. The compass of Marxism-Leninism had guided him through the f i e r c e storm of b a t t l e , the death-bearing h a i l of i m p e r i a l i s t p r o v o c a t i o n s and the h u r r i c a n e of economic d i f f i c u l t i e s caused by the United S t a t e s . F i d e l C a s t r o r a l l i e d m i l l i o n s of Cubans around the f l a g of the S o c i a l i s t r e v o l u t i o n — a n d each of them became the f i r s t d i s c o v e r e r of h i s transformed n a t i v e l a n d . One may b o l d l y say t h a t today seven m i l l i o n Cubans are seven m i l l i o n Columbuses and t h e i r f e a t i s wondrous and noble.159 S o v i e t r e l u c t a n c e t o r e c o g n i z e s o c i a l i s m i n Cuba stemmed p r i m a r i l y from s e c u r i t y concerns. Admitting Cuba to the s o c i a l i s t camp would o b l i g a t e Moscow to p r o t e c t the Cuban r e v o l u t i o n . Concentrated i n a b l o c around the S o v i e t Union, the c u r r e n t s o c i a l i s t camp was r e l a t i v e l y easy to defend. A s o c i a l i s t s t a t e w i t h i n one hundred m i l e s of the c o a s t of F l o r i d a would pose unprecedented s t r a t e g i c problems. American i n t e r v e n t i o n a g a i n s t Cuba would r e v e a l S o v i e t impotence i n the Caribbean. Loss of a " n a t i o n a l democratic" Cuba, while a blow to S o v i e t plans arid p r e s t i g e , would be t o l e r a b l e ; l o s s of a s o c i a l i s t Cuba would be a d i s a s t e r . Khrushchev makes t h i s p o i n t i n h i s d i s c u s s i o n of the Cuban M i s s i l e C r i s i s i n h i s memoirs: I knew [ l o s s of Cuba] would have been a t e r r i b l e blow to Marxism-Leninism. I t would g r a v e l y d i m i n i s h our s t a t u r e throughout the world, but e s p e c i a l l y i n L a t i n America. I f Cuba f e l l , other L a t i n American c o u n t r i e s would r e j e c t us, c l a i m i n g t h a t f o r a l l our might the S o v i e t Union hadn't Htteen a b l e to do anything f o r Cuba except to make empty p r o t e s t s to the United Nations.160 The S o v i e t s were a l s o worried t h a t C a s t r o ' s proclamation would o c c a s i o n a f u r t h e r r e d u c t i o n i n Cuban s e c u r i t y . The l e s s o n o f Guatemala was t h a t the United S t a t e s would not permit a r a d i c a l L a t i n American regime t o s u r v i v e , p a r t i c u l a r l y i f communism was thought to be the governing i d e o l o g y . A common - 57 -S o v i e t theme had been d e n i a l of the communist t h r e a t i n Cuba, i n the hopes of a v e r t i n g such a p o s s i b i l i t y . S o v i e t f e a r s were j u s t i f i e d ; the f o r e i g n m i n i s t e r s ' conference of the O r g a n i z a t i o n of American S t a t e s (OAS) h e l d a t Punta d e l E s t e i n l a t e January 1962, unanimously adopted an American-proposed r e s o l u t i o n s t a t i n g t h a t : "the present Cuban government which has o f f i c i a l l y proclaimed i t s e l f a M a r x i s t - L e n i n i s t government i s i n c o m p a t i b l e with the aims and p r i n c i p l e s o f the pan-American system."161 Cuba was e x p e l l e d from the OAS, and a l l member-s t a t e s ' arms t r a f f i c with Cuba was suspended. As p a r t of i t s commitment to p e a c e f u l c o e x i s t e n c e , the S o v i e t Union d e s i r e d to a v o i d sudden s h i f t s i n the i n t e r n a t i o n a l system t h a t might lead t o war. C a s t r o ' s a c t i o n s r e p r e s e n t e d a dangerous--and, i n S o v i e t eyes, u n w a r r a n t e d — p r o v o c a t i o n of the United S t a t e s . The S o v i e t l e a d e r s h i p probably a l s o a n t i c i p a t e d d i f f i c u l t i e s with i t s new c l i e n t . C a s t r o showed l i t t l e " d i s c i p l i n e " ; h i s Second D e c l a r a t i o n of Havana i n e a r l y February 1962 s a i d nothing about the S o v i e t pet themes of p e a c e f u l c o e x i s t e n c e , n a t i o n a l democracy, and the p e a c e f u l t r a n s i t i o n t o s o c i a l i s m . C a s t r o was c a l l i n g f o r g u e r r i l l a a c t i v i t y throughout L a t i n America d e s p i t e S o v i e t d i s a p p r o v a l , and had proclaimed Cuba s o c i a l i s t without c o n s u l t i n g the leader of the s o c i a l i s t camp. "Perhaps [the S o v i e t s ] were a l s o concerned t h a t h i s brand of r e v o l u t i o n might prove a more a t t r a c t i v e a l t e r n a t i v e i n L a t i n America than the orthodox communist model."162 Although a s o c i a l i s t Cuba was a long-term g o a l , the S o v i e t Union would have p r e f e r r e d t o postpone i t s achievement u n t i l i t - 58 -had d e r i v e d maximum b e n e f i t from the t h e n - c u r r e n t Cuban s i t u a t i o n . The Cuban r e v o l u t i o n had demonstrated t h a t change c o u l d take p l a c e i n the g l o b a l d i s t r i b u t i o n of power, t h a t the S o v i e t Union was sympathetic to the cause of n a t i o n a l independence movements, and t h a t the S o v i e t Union c o u l d p r o t e c t n a t i o n a l i s t l e a d e r s who wanted t o break out of the i m p e r i a l i s t system. C a s t r o ' s d e c l a r a t i o n of s o c i a l i s m l o s t him sympathy i n L a t i n America, so the expected b e n e f i t s of h i s r e v o l u t i o n a r y example d i d not have time t o take f u l l e f f e c t . In November 1961 Venezuela broke d i p l o m a t i c r e l a t i o n s with Cuba; Peru and Colombia f o l l o w e d s u i t s h o r t l y t h e r e a f t e r . A s o c i a l i s t Cuba co u l d p r o v i d e few immediate advantages, but many more r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s . Once the r e v o l u t i o n was more s o l i d l y entrenched and the United S t a t e s had abandoned the aim of overthrowing C a s t r o , Cuba c o u l d take slow, gradual s t e p s toward s o c i a l i s m . As Khrushchev w r i t e s i n h i s memoirs: Before the f o r c e s of i n v a s i o n had been e n t i r e l y crushed, C a s t r o came out with a d e c l a r a t i o n t h a t Cuba would f o l l o w a S o c i a l i s t course. We had t r o u b l e understanding the t i m i n g of t h i s statement. C a s t r o ' s d e c l a r a t i o n had the immediate e f f e c t of widening the gap between hi m s e l f and the people who were a g a i n s t S o c i a l i s m , and i t narrowed the c i r c l e of those he c o u l d count on f o r support a g a i n s t the i n v a s i o n . As f a r as C a s t r o ' s p e r s o n a l courage was concerned, h i s p o s i t i o n was admirable and c o r r e c t . But from a t a c t i c a l s t a n d p o i n t , i t d i d n ' t make much sense.163 Castro f o r c e d the S o v i e t Union's hand. He was attempting to g a i n s e c u r i t y , i n the form o f a S o v i e t m i l i t a r y guarantee, and g r e a t e r S o v i e t economic support now t h a t the United S t a t e s had abandoned him. There has been a s i m i l a r S o v i e t r e l u c t a n c e to admit Nicaragua t o the s o c i a l i s t camp, d e s p i t e the f a c t t h a t the - 59 -M a r x i s t - L e n i n i s t , c r e d e n t i a l s o f s e v e r a l S a n d i n i s t a l e a d e r s are l e s s q u e s t i o n a b l e than C a s t r o ' s were. They had spent the 1960s i n Cuba and the S o v i e t Union, and they admired the s o c i a l i s t system. The "72-Hour Document," a r e c o r d of a s p e c i a l three-day p r e s e n t a t i o n by the S a n d i n i s t a D i r e c t o r a t e t o FSLN cadres from September 21 t o 23, 1979, "shows the S a n d i n i s t a s speaking of t h e i r i n t e n t i o n t o e j e c t t h e i r non-Marxist a l l i e s a t a s u i t a b l e o p p o r t u n i t y and t o b u i l d a M a r x i s t - L e n i n i s t system under the p r o t e c t i o n of the S o v i e t Union." In September 1980, I n t e r i o r M i n i s t e r Tomas Borge Martinez s a i d : "We propose to c r e a t e an org a n i z e d r e v o l u t i o n a r y p a r t y , l e a d i n g on the b a s i s of s c i e n t i f i c p r i n c i p l e s , r e a l i z i n g i t s l e a d e r s h i p r o l e , the guardian of high morals, a p a r t y with a c l e a r p o l i t i c a l s t r a t e g y , which does not l i m i t i t s e l f t o the s t r u g g l e f o r p a r t i a l reforms."164 Cognizant of how the S o v i e t s i n c r e a s e d t h e i r commitment to C a s t r o a f t e r h i s s o c i a l i s t d e c l a r a t i o n s , i n 1981 even more moderate FSLN l e a d e r s began t o p r o c l a i m t h e i r f e a l t y t o Marxism-Leninism. In a speech much r e l i s h e d by the Reagan a d m i n i s t r a t i o n , on August 25, 1981, D i r e c t o r a t e member Humberto Ortega equated Sandinism and Marxism-Leninism: "without Sandinism one cannot be M a r x i s t - L e n i n i s t , and Sandinism without Marxism-Leninism cannot be revolutionary.. Because of t h i s they are i n d i s s o l u b l y u n i t e d , and t h e r e f o r e our moral f o r c e i s Sandinism, our p o l i t i c a l f o r c e i s Sandinism and our d o c t r i n e i s Marxism-Leninism."165 i n A p r i l 1982, the FSLN adopted the " c o n s t r u c t i o n of s o c i a l i s m " as an o f f i c i a l o b j e c t i v e of the r e v o l u t i o n . 1 6 6 - 60 -The S o v i e t s presumably look f a v o u r a b l y on Nicaragua's L e n i n i s t i n c l i n a t i o n s , which make i t e a s i e r t o j u s t i f y to c o n s t i t u e n c i e s a t home and abroad the a i d t o Nicaragua. Theodore Schwab and Harold Sims c l a i m t o see a l i n k between Nicaraguan c l a i m s of s o c i a l i s m and S o v i e t g r a n t s o f a i d : I t i s worth n o t i n g t h a t Hugo T o r r e s , Head of the P o l i t i c a l L e a dership o f the Popular S a n d i n i s t a Army, made such c l a i m s Cof Marxism-Leninism] most v i g o r o u s l y on the eve of the major t r e k t o Moscow of May 1982, d u r i n g which the S o v i e t s granted Nicaragua s i z a b l e a i d . . . . C o n s i d e r . . . t h e $50 m i l l i o n of t r a d e c r e d i t s o f September 1981 t h a t f o l l o w e d the August 1981 p r o c l a m a t i o n , and the $166.8 m i l l i o n p a c t . . . t h a t f o l l o w e d a s i m i l a r p r o c l a m a t i o n i n A p r i l . T h i s p a t t e r n suggests t h a t S o v i e t a i d may have been f a c i l i t a t e d by the Nicaraguan commitment t o s o c i a l i s m . 1 6 7 C e r t a i n l y C a s t r o ' s pronouncements prompted a s t r e n g t h e n i n g of the S o v i e t economic commitment. On May 14, 1962, one month a f t e r the S o v i e t s r e c o g n i z e d C a s t r o as M a r x i s t - L e n i n i s t , the Cubans were a b l e to secure S o v i e t assent t o the commercial agreement f o r 1962 which had been l a n g u i s h i n g i n n e g o t i a t i o n s s i n c e the p r e v i o u s September.168 The p a r t y - t o - p a r t y agreement between the FSLN and CPSU of March 1980, and the admission of Nicaragua as an observer to CMEA i n September 1983 i n d i c a t e c l o s e r r e l a t i o n s than i s customary with a noncommunist coun t r y . In 1982, the S o v i e t s began to r e f e r t o the Nicaraguan r e v o l u t i o n as a "people's democratic r e v o l u t i o n , " a term p r e v i o u s l y r e s e r v e d f o r Eastern Europe. However, with the s o l e e x c e p t i o n of a June 13, 1983 Pravda a r t i c l e t h a t i n c l u d e d Nicaragua on a l i s t o f s o c i a l i s t -o r i e n t e d c o u n t r i e s , the S o v i e t s have s t u d i o u s l y ignored S a n d i n i s t a p r e t e n s i o n s of s o c i a l i s m . No S o v i e t source has c a l l e d the r e v o l u t i o n i r r e v e r s i b l e , L e n i n i s t , or s o c i a l i s t , and - 61 -no source has c a t e g o r i z e d the FSLN as a r e v o l u t i o n a r y democratic movement, i . e . , as a s t a t e t h a t i s b u i l d i n g the necessary p r e r e q u i s i t e s f o r s o c i a l i s m . 1 6 9 i n 1983, Nicaragua reg r e s s e d to the more n e u t r a l "democratic" or " p r o g r e s s i v e " category,170 while "by 1984, S o v i e t sources had begun t o s t r e s s t h a t 'the people of Nicaragua' were 'defending t h e i r r e v o l u t i o n ' without adding any of the more e s o t e r i c q u a l i f y i n g terms t h a t u s u a l l y accompany S o v i e t i d e o l o g i c a l l y o r i e n t e d commentaries."171 As i n Cuba, the d i s i n c l i n a t i o n t o r e c o g n i z e Nicaragua as s o c i a l i s t stems from concerns about the r e v o l u t i o n ' s s t a b i l i t y , about the probable American r e a c t i o n t o such a move, and about the i m p l i e d i n c r e a s e i n economic and p o l i t i c a l r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r Nicaragua. U n l i k e the e a r l y 1960s, the S o v i e t Union i s not p r e s e n t l y i n need of a g r e a t T h i r d World s o c i a l i s t v i c t o r y , e s p e c i a l l y not one t h a t i s the o b j e c t o f American-backed c o u n t e r r e v o l u t i o n a r y attempts. Given Nicaragua's economic d i s a r r a y and low l e v e l of development, a d i r e c t t r a n s i t i o n t o s o c i a l i s m would be premature and q u i x o t i c . At the moment, Nicaragua can s t i l l s ecure f i n a n c i n g from Western and L a t i n American sources; t h i s would l i k e l y dry up i f Nicaragua became a r e c o g n i z e d S o v i e t c l i e n t . As mentioned e a r l i e r , a t the moment the S o v i e t Union i s not i n t e r e s t e d i n a c q u i r i n g a l a r g e economic burden. Nore i m p o r t a n t l y , a s o c i a l i s t s t a t e f a l l s under the Brezhnev D o c t r i n e . I f the r e v o l u t i o n i s supposedly i r r e v e r s i b l e , S o v i e t armed might must be committed t o upholding i t . The S o v i e t s c o n t i n u a l l y s t r e s s t h a t l o c a l wars can l e a d to world wars. A S o v i e t Union committed t o the p r e s e r v a t i o n o f the - 62 -Nicaraguan r e v o l u t i o n a r y regime would be on a c o l l i s i o n course with a United S t a t e s committed t o the d e s t r u c t i o n of the same. Avoidi n g d i r e c t m i l i t a r y c o n f r o n t a t i o n with the United S t a t e s i s a f a r h i g h e r p r i o r i t y than a d m i t t i n g a second L a t i n American member t o the s o c i a l i s t camp. S o v i e t r e t r e a t i n such a s i t u a t i o n would be an i n c r e d i b l e blow t o S o v i e t p r e s t i g e . The r e l u c t a n c e o f the S o v i e t Union t o commit l a r g e economic and m i l i t a r y r e s o u r c e s t o Nicaragua suggests t h a t the S o v i e t Union would p r e f e r t o keep Nicaragua i n t h i s p r e - s o c i a l i s t limbo f o r a time, d e r i v i n g the propaganda b e n e f i t s without o v e r l y a n t a g o n i z i n g the United S t a t e s and without i n c r e a s i n g S o v i e t r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s . v. Summary S o v i e t p o l i c y toward the e a r l y stages o f the Cuban and Nicaraguan r e v o l u t i o n s f o l l o w e d a s i m i l a r p a t t e r n . I n i t i a l l y , the S o v i e t Union eschewed a s i g n i f i c a n t commitment t o the support of the r e v o l u t i o n ; i t adopted a "wait and see" a t t i t u d e while the o r i e n t a t i o n o f the new regime, i t s s t a b i l i t y , and the r e a c t i o n o f the, United S t a t e s were e s t a b l i s h e d . Once i t became apparent t h a t the regime was not i n danger of immediate c o l l a p s e and c o u l d be amenable t o S o v i e t i n f l u e n c e , the S o v i e t s e s t a b l i s h e d economic and d i p l o m a t i c r e l a t i o n s . T h i s was not a u n i l a t e r a l move; Ca s t r o and the FSLN j u n t a both sought Moscow's support. S o v i e t r e l a t i o n s with the r e v o l u t i o n a r y governments strengthened as American h o s t i l i t y toward these governments became more pronounced. The S o v i e t Union responded t o Cuban and Nicaraguan r e q u e s t s f o r m i l i t a r y a i d , and, i n the Cuban case. - 63 -proclaimed i t s w i l l i n g n e s s t o defend the r e v o l u t i o n . The S o v i e t goal was the n u r t u r i n g o f an anti-American, p r o - S o v i e t regime which would v a l i d a t e the r e v o l u t i o n a r y c l a i m s o f S o v i e t i d e o l o g y , t e s t i f y t o the v i t a l i t y o f world s o c i a l i s m , strengthen S o v i e t i n f l u e n c e i n L a t i n America and the T h i r d World, support S o v i e t f o r e i g n p o l i c y i n i n t e r n a t i o n a l forums, a c t as a counter a g a i n s t the Chinese i n the i n t e r n a t i o n a l communist movement, o f f e r the S o v i e t Union a s t r a t e g i c f o o t h o l d i n the Caribbean, and g e n e r a l l y a c t as a thor n i n the American s i d e . T h i s goal was s u b o r d i n a t e t o other f o r e i g n p o l i c y concerns, such as Khrushchev's d e s i r e i n the l a t e 1950s f o r a se t t l e m e n t o f the B e r l i n i s s u e , or the preo c c u p a t i o n o f the S o v i e t l e a d e r s h i p i n the e a r l y 1980s with A f g h a n i s t a n , E a s t e r n Europe, and the domestic economy. S e v e r a l f a c t o r s have shaped S o v i e t p o l i c y toward the Cuban and Nicaraguan r e v o l u t i o n s . These i n c l u d e : 1) the r e l a t i v e m i l i t a r y - s t r a t e g i c p o s i t i o n o f the S o v i e t Union i n the Caribbean and the d e s i r e t o av o i d m i l i t a r y c o n f r o n t a t i o n with the United S t a t e s ; 2) the p o l i c i e s pursued by the United S t a t e s ; 3) the p o l i c i e s pursued by the r e v o l u t i o n a r y governments; 4) the s t a t e of Soviet-American r e l a t i o n s . The d i s t a n c e o f L a t i n America from the S o v i e t Union, which makes m i l i t a r y o p e r a t i o n s i n the r e g i o n d i f f i c u l t t o conduct and support, and the p r o x i m i t y o f the United S t a t e s with i t s overwhelming m i l i t a r y power, do much t o e x p l a i n the conspicuous c a u t i o n i n S o v i e t p o l i c y toward the Cuban and Nicaraguan r e v o l u t i o n s . S o v i e t a c t i v i t y i n the r e g i o n i s c o n d i t i o n e d by the overwhelming d e s i r e t o minimize the l i k e l i h o o d o f d i r e c t - 64 -m i l i t a r y c o n f r o n t a t i o n with the United S t a t e s . The S o v i e t Union r e c o g n i z e s the s t r a t e g i c and p s y c h o l o g i c a l importance attached t o the Caribbean B a s i n by policy-makers i n Washington and the consequent l i m i t s t o S o v i e t a c t i v i t y i n the r e g i o n . D i f f e r e n t o p p o r t u n i t i e s and c o n s t r a i n t s e x i s t t h e r e than elsewhere i n the T h i r d World. The S o v i e t s have been much more circumspect and i n d i r e c t with arms t r a n s f e r s t o Nicaragua than, f o r example, to Angola, E t h i o p i a , and Mozambique. Des p i t e a s s e r t i o n s t h a t the might o f the s o c i a l i s t camp d e t e r s the United S t a t e s from u s i n g f o r c e i n L a t i n America, i n n e i t h e r Cuba nor Nicaragua has the S o v i e t Union e x p l i c i t l y s a i d i t would meet American use o f f o r c e i n k i n d . Even Cuba does not have a formal defence t r e a t y with the S o v i e t Union. S o v i e t p o l i c y has s t r a i n e d t o p r e c l u d e not o n l y American-S o v i e t m i l i t a r y c o n f r o n t a t i o n but a l s o American i n t e r v e n t i o n a g a i n s t the new regime. I n t e r e s t e d from the beginning i n the p o t e n t i a l of the r e v o l u t i o n s f o r undermining American i n f l u e n c e i n the Caribbean, the S o v i e t s r e f r a i n e d from any a c t i v i t y t h a t would have p r o v i d e d an excuse f o r American i n t e r v e n t i o n . They s u s t a i n e d a propaganda campaign designed t o c r e a t e a c l i m a t e of o p i n i o n unfavourable t o such i n t e r v e n t i o n . They looked askance at C a s t r o ' s premature avowals of s o c i a l i s m and h i s obstreperous promotion of armed insurgency i n L a t i n America. They encouraged the FSLN to maintain t i e s with Western n a t i o n s . A f t e r the Bay o f P i g s , the S o v i e t s even pr e s s u r e d C a s t r o t o seek a modus v i v e n d i with the Americans. Witness t h i s broad h i n t by Khrushchev i n a speech a t Yerevan on May 6, 1961: Cuba and the U.S. are neighbors, and they should l i v e l i k e good neighbors. Some level- h e a d e d people i n the - 65 -U.S. are a p p e a l i n g t h a t a c t i o n s be guided by the ' l i v e and l e t l i v e ' p r i n c i p l e . ... That approach would be t o the mutual p r o f i t of Cuba and the U.S., without causing . anyone t o l o s e face.172 Once the S o v i e t s had v e r b a l l y committed themselves t o Cuba's p r o t e c t i o n , American i n t e r v e n t i o n would have caught Moscow between S c y l l a and Charybdis. A move t o defend the regime would e n t a i l r i s k i n g n u c l e a r war with the United S t a t e s ; i n a c t i o n or r e t r e a t would mean l o s s o f Cuba and h u m i l i a t i o n b e f o r e a c t u a l and p o t e n t i a l a l l i e s . Because the S o v i e t Union wants t o av o i d m i l i t a r y c o n f r o n t a t i o n with the United S t a t e s , S o v i e t p o l i c y toward Cuba and Nicaragua has been guided t o a l a r g e e x t e n t by American p o l i c y toward the r e v o l u t i o n a r y governments. Moscow d i d not i n v e s t S o v i e t p r e s t i g e or m a t e r i a l r e s o u r c e s i n the new regimes u n t i l r easonably c e r t a i n t h a t the United S t a t e s was not going t o immediately crush the r e v o l u t i o n s . The S o v i e t s f o l l o w e d a s t r a t e g y o f incremental involvement, a d j u s t i n g t h e i r behaviour a c c o r d i n g t o t h e i r p e r c e p t i o n o f what degree o f S o v i e t a c t i v i t y the Americans would f i n d t o l e r a b l e . The delay i n acknowledging Cuba and the f a i l u r e t o acknowledge Nicaragua as s o c i a l i s t stem i n p a r t from concern f o r the American r e a c t i o n . Q u a l i t a t i v e l i m i t s on m i l i t a r y a i d t o Nicaragua betoken r e s p e c t f o r American warnings. American p o l i c y a f f e c t e d the degree of S o v i e t involvement i n another, i n d i r e c t , f a s h i o n . Although Cuba and Nicaragua had t h e i r own r e a s o n s — h i s t o r y , sympathies, a s p i r a t i o n s — f o r s e e k i n g t i e s with the S o v i e t Union, American p o l i c y a c c e l e r a t e d the development of these t i e s . In both Cuba and Nicaragua, American a c t i o n s designed t o punish the r e v o l u t i o n a r y government caused - 66 -t h a t government t o seek a s s i s t a n c e from the S o v i e t Union. Cut o f f from t h e i r t r a d i t i o n a l market and source of f i n a n c i a l and m i l i t a r y a i d , Havana and Managua turned t o the o n l y other power abl e t o f i l l the gap. At the same time t h a t the Americans denied weapons to C a s t r o and the S a n d i n i s t a s , they heightened the new governments' need f o r m i l i t a r y a s s i s t a n c e by sponsoring c o u n t e r r e v o l u t i o n a r y attempts, thereby i n c r e a s i n g Cuban and Nicaraguan dependence on the S o v i e t Union. The s t r a t e g y o f the r e v o l u t i o n a r y government i n f l u e n c e d S o v i e t p o l i c y . In n e i t h e r case d i d the S o v i e t Union i n i t i a t e the r e l a t i o n s h i p ; Moscow responded t o o v e r t u r e s from the Caribbean p a r t n e r s . C a s t r o ' s p u r s u i t o f Chinese f r i e n d s h i p caused the S o v i e t Union t o extend more a s s i s t a n c e to Cuba. In g e n e r a l , S o v i e t support i n c r e a s e d as the regimes adopted s o c i a l i s t reforms, and as t h e i r l e a d e r s proclaimed devo t i o n to Marxism-Leninism. The s t a t e o f Soviet-American r e l a t i o n s a f f e c t e d S o v i e t w i l l i n g n e s s to respond to Cuban and Nicaraguan r e q u e s t s f o r a s s i s t a n c e . Greater S o v i e t involvement i n both Cuba and Nicaragua corresponded with a d e c l i n e i n detente. A notable i n c r e a s e i n economic a i d to Cuba, s o c i a l i s t b l o c arms d e l i v e r i e s , and Khrushchev's r o c k e t t h r e a t a l l f o l l o w e d the c r a s h of an American spy plane i n the S o v i e t Union and the c a n c e l l a t i o n of the P a r i s summit meeting. As Soviet-American r e l a t i o n s worsened i n 1961 with the unproductive Vienna summit, Khrushchev's B e r l i n ultimatums, the c o n s t r u c t i o n o f the B e r l i n Wall, and announced i n c r e a s e s i n both the S o v i e t and American defence budgets, the S o v i e t Union had l i t t l e i n c e n t i v e t o - 67 -moderate i t s behaviour towards Cuba. There has been a s i m i l a r tendency f o r the S o v i e t s t o i n c r e a s e a i d t o Nicaragua as S o v i e t -American r e l a t i o n s sour. I t i s worth n o t i n g t h a t a t the same Party Congress t h a t Brezhnev ignored the Nicaraguans' p l i g h t (February 1981), he d e l i b e r a t e l y took a c o n c i l i a t o r y stance on arms c o n t r o l and o f f e r e d a summit meeting t o the new American p r e s i d e n t . 1 7 3 By 1982-83, Reagan's " e v i l empire" r h e t o r i c , h i s containment p o l i c y , the i n c r e a s e d American defence budget, and lack o f p r o g r e s s on arms c o n t r o l had n o t a b l y removed t h i s reason f o r S o v i e t r e s t r a i n t . While the p a t t e r n of S o v i e t involvement i n Cuba and Nicaragua has been s i m i l a r , the l e v e l o f involvement has been l e s s i n Nicaragua. The S o v i e t Union has not not taken on the burden of the Nicaraguan economy as i t d i d the Cuban, has not v e r b a l l y committed i t s e l f t o Nicaragua's defence i n the event of an i n v a s i o n , has not g i v e n Nicaragua as much m i l i t a r y a i d as Cuba, and has f a i l e d t o r e c o g n i z e Nicaragua as s o c i a l i s t . The f i r s t f a c t o r a f f e c t i n g the d i f f e r e n t l e v e l o f support i s Khrushchev's need f o r f o r e i g n p o l i c y g a i n s and h i s p r e d i s p o s i t i o n t o search f o r such i n the d e v e l o p i n g world. The Cuban R e v o l u t i o n corresponded p e r f e c t l y t o the g l o b a l v i s i o n and s t r a t e g y espoused by Khrushchev.* As the f i r s t s t a t e o u t s i d e of E u r a s i a t o v o l u n t a r i l y choose s o c i a l i s m , and the f i r s t advance of communism s i n c e the Chinese r e v o l u t i o n , Cuba represented a major triumph f o r the S o v i e t Union. Khrushchev became committed t o the Cuban cause and had t o defend i t a g a i n s t h i s r i v a l s . The g r e a t e r the S o v i e t investment i n Cuba, the more S o v i e t p r e s t i g e depended on the r e v o l u t i o n ' s c ontinued s u c c e s s . - 68 -r e q u i r i n g the S o v i e t Union t o i n v e s t even f u r t h e r t o prevent f a i l u r e . That the S o v i e t Union continued t o support C a s t r o d e s p i t e h i s imprudent economic p o l i c i e s , h i s advocacy of g u e r r i l l a warfare, and h i s d i s l o d g i n g of o l d guard communists i n d i c a t e s how p o l i t i c a l l y important Cuba became t o the S o v i e t Union. By 1962, Cuba was Khrushchev's o n l y t a n g i b l e g a i n i n f o r e i g n p o l i c y . Investments i n other d e v e l o p i n g c o u n t r i e s had not t r a n s l a t e d i n t o p o s i t i o n s of i n f l u e n c e f o r the S o v i e t Union. S o v i e t a s s i s t a n c e d i d not prevent Lumumba's d e f e a t i n the Congo i n 1960. P e a c e f u l c o e x i s t e n c e had f a i l e d t o p r o v i d e the expected r e t u r n s i n the form o f a B e r l i n s e t t l e m e n t . Khrushchev was e x p e r i e n c i n g domestic economic d i f f i c u l t i e s and c h a l l e n g e s t o h i s r u l e . The Chinese were h i g h l y c r i t i c a l o f h i s f o r e i g n p o l i c y . The S o v i e t Union was f a l l i n g behind i n the s t r a t e g i c n u c l e a r c o m p e t i t i o n as the United S t a t e s moved t o c l o s e the i l l u s o r y " m i s s i l e gap" by beginning the Minuteman and P o l a r i s programmes. When C a s t r o o f f e r e d h i m s e l f on the S o v i e t Union's doorstep, Khrushchev c o u l d not a f f o r d t o k i c k him o f f . The l e s s e b u l l i e n t g e r i a t r i c l e a d e r s h i p o f the e a r l y 1980s d i d not need a T h i r d World v i c t o r y i n the same sense, nor were they i n c l i n e d t o take g r e a t r i s k s on b e h a l f o f one, e s p e c i a l l y i n a d i s t a n t area dominated by the United S t a t e s . The S o v i e t s have met the d i f f i c u l t i e s o f the 1980s by retrenchment, not search f o r g a i n s , e.g., Gorbachev's emphasis, a t l e a s t v e r b a l l y , on domestic economic reform. "In the 1980s, Moscow has evaded new T h i r d World commitments. Instead of new m i l i t a r y f a c i l i t e s or c l i e n t s , i t has sought to c o n s o l i d a t e and defend 'the gains o f s o c i a l i s m ' "174 - 69 -In attempting t o secure g r e a t e r S o v i e t support, the S a n d i n i s t a s do not have as much leve r a g e as Ca s t r o d i d . Cuba was the f i r s t T h i r d World g a i n f o r i n t e r n a t i o n a l communism, and the f i r s t country t o have a M a r x i s t - L e n i n i s t r e v o l u t i o n without a Communist p a r t y vanguard. As w i l l be d i s c u s s e d i n the next chapter, Khrushchev was probably e x c i t e d by the d o c t r i n a l p o s s i b i l i t i e s , which c o u l d be a p p l i e d t o other T h i r d World s t a t e s t h a t the S o v i e t s wanted t o c o u r t . "Cuba proved an important experiment i n the problems of c o n t r o l l i n g , s u s t a i n i n g , and p r o t e c t i n g a s e l f - p r o c l a i m e d Communist regime i n a country g e o g r a p h i c a l l y remote from the USSR, as w e l l as a t e s t o f S o v i e t t h e o r i e s concerning the f e a s i b i l i t y o f r a p i d t r a n s f o r m a t i o n o f an e s s e n t i a l l y a g r a r i a n s o c i e t y i n t o an i n d u s t r i a l one."175 Since 1959, the S o v i e t s have had a number of exp e r i e n c e s with M a r x i s t - L e n i n i s t a l l i e s i n the T h i r d World. They know t h a t " s o c i a l i s t - o r i e n t e d " s t a t e s cannot be r e l i e d o n — w i t n e s s Egypt, Somalia, the Sudan—and t h a t d e v e l o p i n g s t a t e s "cannot e a s i l y be turned i n t o permanent S o v i e t a l l i e s except a t c o n s i d e r a b l e c o s t . " l 7 6 A s o c i a l i s t Nicaragua would p r o v i d e a s m a l l e r increment o f b e n e f i t s than Cuba while adding t o S o v i e t c o s t s , and would not supply e s s e n t i a l testimony t o the c o r r e c t n e s s o f contemporary S o v i e t s t r a t e g y . The Chinese c h a l l e n g e i s l e s s p r e s s i n g i n the 1980s as the S i n o - S o v i e t d i s p u t e i s not as acrimonious and China has not d i s p l a y e d much i n t e r e s t i n Nicaragua. I n s o f a r as the Sino-S o v i e t d i s p u t e has a f f e c t e d S o v i e t p o l i c y toward Nicaragua, i t has probably worked a g a i n s t S oviet-Nicaraguan r e l a t i o n s because the S o v i e t Union has sought American c o o p e r a t i o n i n c u r b i n g the - 70 -growing Chinese n u c l e a r a r s e n a l . 1 7 7 Not o n l y was Khrushchev i n g r e a t e r need of a f o r e i g n p o l i c y v i c t o r y than h i s s u c c e s s o r s of the 1980s, he a l s o h e l d a d i f f e r e n t p e r c e p t i o n of the r i s k s i n h e r e n t i n pursuing such a v i c t o r y i n the American domain. The S o v i e t s were t e s t i n g the waters of the Caribbean with Cuba. The r e v o l u t i o n i t s e l f was so unexpected t h a t i t l e d the S o v i e t s t o b e l i e v e former pessimism about American c o n t r o l over the B a s i n was u n j u s t i f i e d . American f a i l u r e a t the Bay of P i g s emboldened Khrushchev; he d i d not expect t h a t g r e a t e r S o v i e t involvement i n Cuba would l e a d to a m i l i t a r y c o n f r o n t a t i o n , as i s i n d i c a t e d by the emplacement of m i s s i l e s i n Cuba i n the f a l l o f 1962. Ever s i n c e the Cuban M i s s i l e C r i s i s , the S o v i e t Union has accepted t a c i t l i m i t s on i t s m i l i t a r y a c t i v i t i e s i n the Western Hemisphere. While Washington has begrudgingly r e f r a i n e d from o v e r t m i l i t a r y i n t e r v e n t i o n a g a i n s t Cuba, i t w i l l not a l l o w a comparable S o v i e t involvement elsewhere. Reagan's u n f l a g g i n g campaign a g a i n s t Nicaragua coupled with t h r e a t s t o Cuba and the i n v a s i o n of Grenada had an o p p o s i t e e f f e c t from the Bay of P i g s on the S o v i e t l e a d e r s h i p . The presence of Cuba i n the r e g i o n o b v i a t e s the need f o r a l a r g e r S o v i e t r o l e i n Nicaragua. C a s t r o ' s e a r l y r e v o l u t i o n a r y accomplishments and h i s d e f i a n c e of the United S t a t e s make Cuba an a t t r a c t i v e hemispheric model, and Havana has g r e a t e r experience i n b u i l d i n g s o c i a l i s m i n L a t i n American c o n d i t i o n s . Thus f a r Cuban p o l i c y toward Nicaragua has not been c o n t r a r y to S o v i e t i n t e r e s t s , and Cuba s h e l t e r s the S o v i e t Union from the r i s k s of d i r e c t involvement i n Nicaragua. - 71 -In a d d i t i o n , Cuba's e x i s t e n c e makes the need f o r a second S o v i e t c l i e n t - s t a t e i n the Caribbean l e s s p r e s s i n g . Nicaragua can add l i t t l e t h a t Cuba does not a l r e a d y p r o v i d e . A s o c i a l i s t Nicaragua would not be a n o t a b l e s t r a t e g i c a s s e t . Cuba a l r e a d y s a t i s f i e s most S o v i e t m i l i t a r y needs i n the Caribbean, p r o v i d i n g a convenient l o c a t i o n f o r the s e r v i c i n g of S o v i e t submarines, s u r f a c e v e s s e l s , and long-range a i r c r a f t , the t r o p i c a l t r a i n i n g of the S o v i e t m i l i t a r y , and the s u r v e i l l a n c e of the southeastern United S t a t e s and the A t l a n t i c . I t has enabled the S o v i e t Union to e s t a b l i s h a "presence" i n the a r e a . However, Cuba i s v i r t u a l l y i n d e f e n s i b l e should the United S t a t e s determine t o take i t , and Nicaragua i s l e s s d e f e n s i b l e than Cuba. The economic c o s t s of Cuba have a l s o made the S o v i e t s h e s i t a n t t o assume a second burden i n the Caribbean. The more subdued response t o Nicaragua i s e x p l a i n e d a l s o by d i f f e r e n c e s i n Caribbean l e a d e r s h i p and s t r a t e g y . The S o v i e t s were drawn i n t o Cuba f a s t e r than they would have p r e f e r r e d because of C a s t r o ' s audacious a c t i o n s . There was a l s o , no doubt, a p e r s o n a l a t t r a c t i o n between Castro and Khrushchev, both "flamboyant and u n r e s t r a i n e d p o l i t i c i a n s . " I 7 8 The S a n d i n i s t a s have no s t r o n g , c h a r i s m a t i c c a u d i l l o comparable t o C a s t r o and have not been as s k i l l f u l a t manipulating S o v i e t s e n s i b i l i t i e s . The S o v i e t s have lea r n e d from t h e i r experience i n Cuba and w i l l not be as quick t o embrace Nicaragua. - 72 -CHAPTER IV: DOCTRINAL AND REVOLUTIONARY IMPLICATIONS i . D o c t r i n e The r a p i d r a d i c a l i z a t i o n of the Cuban r e v o l u t i o n under the l e a d e r s h i p o f members of the p e t t y b o u r g e o i s i e r e q u i r e d a r e t h i n k i n g of S o v i e t i d e o l o g y , which he l d t h a t both the t r a n s i t i o n t o and the b u i l d i n g of s o c i a l i s m r e q u i r e d the l e a d e r s h i p of a communist p a r t y guided by M a r x i s t - L e n i n i s t d o c t r i n e . The S o v i e t model was t h a t of Lenin's two-stage r e v o l u t i o n : a f t e r the i n i t i a l c o l o n i a l r e v o l u t i o n the a l l i a n c e of the b o u r g e o i s i e and Communist p a r t y would end, and c o n f l i c t between the p r o l e t a r i a t and the n a t i o n a l b o u r g e o i s i e would begin.179 At a 1959 conference i n L e i p z i g sponsored by the World M a r x i s t Review. " S o v i e t and f o r e i g n communist s p e c i a l i s t s s t r e s s e d the v a c i l l a t i n g and e x p l o i t a t i v e c h a r a c t e r of the n a t i o n a l b o u r g e o i s i e , i t s u n w i l l i n g n e s s t o i n v o l v e the masses i n the r e v o l u t i o n , and, consequently, the n e c e s s i t y f o r the p r o l e t a r i a t t o r e t a i n i t s o r g a n i z a t i o n a l independence and to assume the l e a d e r s h i p of the n a t i o n a l l i b e r a t i o n revolution."180 Yet C a s t r o , a member of the n a t i o n a l b o u r g e o i s i e , was undertaking r a d i c a l s o c i a l i s t - s t y l e reforms and i n 1961 c a l l e d the r e v o l u t i o n s o c i a l i s t . O p t i m i s t i c S o v i e t s began to t h i n k t h a t n a t i o n a l bourgeois l e a d e r s c o u l d l e a d t h e i r s t a t e s t o s o c i a l i s t paths of development. In March 1962, a r e s e a r c h e r a t Moscow's I n s t i t u t e of World Economy and I n t e r n a t i o n a l R e l a t i o n s wrote: The experience o f f e r e d by the development of the Cuban R e v o l u t i o n has shown how r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s of the r a d i c a l p e t t y b o u r g e o i s i e , d u r i n g the p rocess of a t r u l y n a t i o n a l r e v o l u t i o n , can adopt working c l a s s p o s i t i o n s - 73 -and s o c i a l i s t , p o s i t i o n s and become a c t i v e f i g h t e r s f o r the s o c i a l i s t r e c o n s t r u c t i o n o f s o c i e t y . 1 8 1 An i n i t i a l attempt t o r e p a i r the shoddy f i t between d o c t r i n e and p r a c t i c e was made a t the November 1960 Communist and Workers' P a r t i e s conference i n Moscow. The concept of a " n a t i o n a l democratic s t a t e , " a stage between p r e c a p i t a l i s m and s o c i a l i s m of which Cuba was an example, was i n t r o d u c e d . T h i s i m p l i e d a t r a n s i t i o n toward s o c i a l i s m which d i d not r e q u i r e Communist p a r t y l e a d e r s h i p . T h i s was "a r a t h e r shaky compromise between the CPSU and the CCP on the one hand and between orthodox and o p p o r t u n i s t i c p e r s p e c t i v e s w i t h i n the CPSU on the other."182 The Chinese d i s t r u s t e d the n a t i o n a l b o u r g e o i s i e and saw the n a t i o n a l democratic s t a t e as a S o v i e t " r e v i s i o n i s t " excuse t o s a c r i f i c e l o c a l communist p a r t i e s t o short-term S o v i e t i n t e r e s t s . The S o v i e t l e a d e r s h i p i t s e l f appeared to be d i v i d e d on the q u e s t i o n o f s o c i a l i s m i n Cuba. Mikoyan and Khrushchev had a l l u d e d t o Cuba's " s o c i a l i s t aims" be f o r e C a s t r o d e c l a r e d h i m s e l f M a r x i s t - L e n i n i s t , but other l e a d e r s and Pravda d i d not take up the theme.183 Khrushchev's r e a d i n e s s t o embrace an unorthodox form of s o c i a l i s t t r a n s i t i o n was due i n p a r t to h i s need f o r a new s o c i a l i s t s t a t e t o a t t e s t t o the dynamism of the S o v i e t Union. At t h i s time, the S o v i e t s c a r e f u l l y avoided s a y i n g t h a t s o c i a l i s m c o u l d be achieved by n o n - p r o l e t a r i a n groups. Such a statement would undermine the p o s i t i o n o f T h i r d World communist p a r t i e s and draw i n t o q u e s t i o n the l e g i t i m a c y o f CPSU l e a d e r s h i p i n the S o v i e t Union. Rather, i t was conceded t h a t non-p r o l e t a r i a n s c o u l d begin the t r a n s i t i o n t o s o c i a l i s m . 1 8 4 The 1961 CPSU programme emphasized t h a t p r o l e t a r i a n r e v o l u t i o n and - 74 -d i c t a t o r s h i p of the p r o l e t a r i a t were necessary t o complete the t r a n s i t i o n t o s o c i a l i s m . Thus the S o v i e t Union was a b l e to j u s t i f y support f o r r a d i c a l , n o n - p r o l e t a r i a n , anti-Western T h i r d World l e a d e r s — f o r whose favour the S o v i e t s were competing with the C h i n e s e — i n s t e a d of the Communist p a r t i e s , while s t i l l i n s i s t i n g on the n e c e s s i t y of p r o l e t a r i a n l e a d e r s h i p a t a l a t e r stage i n the r e v o l u t i o n . In Cuba, power was not passed from the n a t i o n a l b o u r g e o i s i e t o the PSP f o r the completion of the t r a n s i t i o n t o s o c i a l i s m . At the end of March 1962, C a s t r o denounced s e v e r a l Old Guard Communists a f f i l i a t e d with Moscow, i n c l u d i n g A n i b a l E s c a l a n t e <PSP E x e c u t i v e - S e c r e t a r y and e d i t o r of the Communist d a i l y . Hoy) . and ousted them from key p o s i t i o n s . Moscow was i n the awkward p o s i t i o n o f having e i t h e r to censure the purge and thus d i s a s s o c i a t e i t s e l f from Cuban s o c i a l i s m , or to condone the demotion of Communist p a r t y members and r e c o g n i z e Cuban s o c i a l i s m as M a r x i s t - L e n i n i s t . The f a c t t h a t i t chose the l a t t e r course i n d i c a t e s the extent t o which Moscow wanted to maintain i t s t i e s with Cuba. The economic a i d given to Cuba, the v e r b a l commitment t o the r e v o l u t i o n ' s defence, and the consequent S o v i e t p r e s t i g e i n v e s t e d i n Cuba gave C a s t r o leverage i n h i s d e a l i n g s with the S o v i e t Union. Khrushchev c o u l d not a f f o r d t o l e t the Cuban r e v o l u t i o n s l i p out of h i s hands. S i m i l a r l y , Moscow accepted the f u s i o n of the PSP with the 26th of J u l y Movement i n 1960-61, even though t h i s was a r a d i c a l departure i n the p r a c t i c e of communist p a r t i e s . Ever s i n c e the d i s a s t r o u s r e s u l t s i n China i n 1927, communists had kept t h e i r o r g a n i z a t i o n a l i n t e g r i t y i n c o o p e r a t i v e and u n i t e d f r o n t s . - 75 -C a s t r o ' s s e l f - a p p o i n t m e n t as the l e a d e r of Communist p a r t y was unusual. The S o v i e t Union was a c c e p t i n g a r a d i c a l r e d u c t i o n i n the r o l e o f communists i n c r e a t i n g s o c i a l i s t s t a t e s . There was a " s t r o n g impulse t o c e l e b r a t e the v i c t o r y of communism i n the backyard of the s t r o n g e s t i m p e r i a l i s t s t a t e without c l o s e s c r u t i n y of what k i n d of communism i t was."185 D o c t r i n a l l o o s e ends were t i e d up i n the December 1963 f o r m u l a t i o n of " r e v o l u t i o n a r y democracy." The a m b i g u i t i e s of the " n a t i o n a l democratic s t a t e " were removed; with the S o v i e t s p r o v i d i n g support, the t r a n s i t i o n to s o c i a l i s m c o u l d occur under bourgeois n a t i o n a l i s t l e a d e r s . According to Khrushchev, a " r e v o l u t i o n a r y democrat" was a l e a d e r who " s i n c e r e l y advocated n o n - c a p i t a l i s t methods f o r the s o l u t i o n of n a t i o n a l problems and d e c l a r e d [ h i s ] d e t e r m i n a t i o n t o b u i l d s o c i a l i s m . " 1 8 6 How c o u l d the t r a n s i t i o n t o s o c i a l i s m be guaranteed without a Communist pa r t y vanguard? According t o S o v i e t t h e o r i s t s , " d u r i n g the c u r r e n t p e r i o d , the world s o c i a l i s t system, i n a m a t e r i a l , moral, and p o l i t i c a l c o n t e x t , p l a y s the r o l e o f p r o l e t a r i a n vanguard,"187 thereby p r e s e r v i n g the necessary r o l e of the CPSU and other Communist p a r t i e s . In s h o r t , C a s t r o ' s s t e e r i n g of the Cuban r e v o l u t i o n i n a s o c i a l i s t d i r e c t i o n caused the S o v i e t s t o modify t h e i r d o c t r i n e . Khrushchev's e l e v a t e d hopes f o r the Cuban r e v o l u t i o n , both i n i t s own r i g h t and as an example f o r the r e s t o f the T h i r d World, made him eager t o g i v e h i s b l e s s i n g s t o t h i s unorthodox' form of s o c i a l i s t t r a n s f o r m a t i o n . Yet, the adoption of d o c t r i n a l postures c o n s i s t e n t with c l o s e c o l l a b o r a t i o n with non-communist T h i r d World regimes should not be viewed s o l e l y as a c y n i c a l - 76 -attempt t o c o u r t T h i r d World l e a d e r s , or t o j u s t i f y f o r e i g n p o l i c y i n i t i a t i v e s t o the S o v i e t people. In p a r t , i t r e p r e s e n t e d "a s i n c e r e attempt t o square theory with new p e r c e p t i o n s of the changing r e a l i t y t h a t d o c t r i n e was meant t o explain."188 C a s t r o was the f i r s t example of a non-communist r u l e r l e a d i n g h i s people down the s o c i a l i s t path. S o v i e t i d e o l o g i s t s were s t i l l f a s h i o n i n g theory about the newly independent s t a t e s . With i t s unexpected s o c i a l i s t t w i s t , the Cuban r e v o l u t i o n provided a f e r t i l e t e s t i n g - g r o u n d . The Nicaraguan r e v o l u t i o n has l e d to no comparable r e v i s i o n of d o c t r i n e on n o n - p r o l e t a r i a n t r a n s i t i o n t o s o c i a l i s m . S i n c e the mid-1970s the S o v i e t s have again h e l d a more orthodox view of n a t i o n a l forms of s o c i a l i s m ; o n l y a p r o l e t a r i a n d i c t a t o r s h i p can complete the s o c i a l i s t r e v o l u t i o n . T h i s r e f l e c t s the d e f e c t i o n t o the West of such important non-Communist S o v i e t T h i r d World c l i e n t s as Egypt and Somalia, and the appearance o f s e v e r a l s e l f - p r o c l a i m e d M a r x i s t - L e n i n i s t regimes (Angola, Mozambique, E t h i o p i a , South Yemen). I8 9 The S o v i e t Union i s c o n f i d e n t t h a t i t need not a d j u s t d o c t r i n e t o a t t r a c t p o t e n t i a l l y f i c k l e r e c r u i t s . i i . R e v o l u t i o n i n L a t i n America Both the Cuban and Nicaraguan r e v o l u t i o n s , and t h e i r s u r v i v a l d e s p i t e American p r e s s u r e , a l t e r e d the S o v i e t Union's assessment o f the American a b i l i t y t o maintain hegemony i n L a t i n America, of the r e v o l u t i o n a r y p o s s i b i l i t i e s i n the Western Hemisphere, and of the S o v i e t a b i l i t y t o c a p i t a l i z e on those o p p o r t u n i t i e s . P r i o r t o the Cuban r e v o l u t i o n , n a t i o n a l - 77 -l i b e r a t i o n movements had a f f e c t e d o n l y the empires of d e c l i n i n g European powers. Cuba touched the most powerful c a p i t a l i s t power i n i t s own sphere. The overthrow of B a t i s t a ' s d i c t a t o r i a l regime i n Cuba was a major mi l e s t o n e i n the h i s t o r y o f the n a t i o n a l -l i b e r a t i o n movement of L a t i n America. ... I t i s the f i r s t popular and a n t i - i m p e r i a l i s t r e v o l u t i o n i n the Western Hemisphere, d i r e c t e d a g a i n s t ' n e o c o l o n i a l i s m ' i n a l l the forms i n which i t e x i s t s i n L a t i n America.190 The Cuban r e v o l u t i o n d e a l t a death blow to "geographic f a t a l i s m . " I t i n d i c a t e d t h a t the United S t a t e s c o u l d no longer prevent r e v o l u t i o n a r y s o c i a l and p o l i t i c a l change i n L a t i n America. On J u l y 12, 1960, t h r e e days a f t e r h i s r o c k e t speech, Khrushchev d e c l a r e d t h a t the Monroe D o c t r i n e had d i e d "a n a t u r a l death."191 i n mid-August 1960, B. N. Ponomarev, head of the I n t e r n a t i o n a l Department of the C e n t r a l Committee, i n charge of r e l a t i o n s with n o n r u l i n g Communist p a r t i e s , admitted L a t i n America t o the zone of peace.192 The f a c t t h a t United S t a t e s f a i l e d t o e x t i n g u i s h the r e v o l u t i o n was taken as c o n f i r m a t i o n of a change i n the c o r r e l a t i o n of f o r c e s . The Cuban R e v o l u t i o n has proved t h a t a t the present day, when a mighty S o c i a l i s t system e x i s t s , t h e r e i s no f o r c e i n the world capable of checking the peoples' advance t o s o c i a l i s m and t h a t even the c l o s e presence of the s t r o n g e s t i m p e r i a l i s t power i s unable t o prevent the b u i l d i n g up o f a new, r a d i a n t l i f e under s o c i a l i s m . 1 9 3 The r e v o l u t i o n demonstrated t h a t the s o c i a l i s t b l o c c o u l d p r o v i d e i n v a l u a b l e a i d to c o u n t r i e s s t r u g g l i n g f o r independence from the i m p e r i a l i s t s . The e x p e r i e n c e of the Cuban r e v o l u t i o n p r o v i d e s s t r i k i n g evidence t h a t the e x i s t e n c e of the world s o c i a l i s t system can ensure the success of the s t r u g g l e waged a g i n s t i m p e r i a l i s m by the peoples of c o l o n i a l and dependent c o u n t r i e s . The support g i v e n to Cuba by the - 78 -S o v i e t Union and the other s o c i a l i s t c o u n t r i e s has enabled the Cuban people t o come through with f l y i n g c o l o u r s i n t h e i r f i g h t a g a i n s t the economic blockade imposed by the United S t a t e s and oth e r i m p e r i a l i s t s t a t e s and has helped them to develop t h e i r n a t i o n a l economy s u c c e s s f u l l y . 1 ^ 4 Coming a f t e r a decade and a h a l f o f r e v o l u t i o n a r y f r u s t r a t i o n i n L a t i n America, the Nicaraguan r e v o l u t i o n was s i m i l a r l y h a i l e d as a breakthrough f o r p r o g r e s s i v e f o r c e s . Commentaries on the r e v o l u t i o n immediately r e c o g n i z e d Nicaragua's geographic importance, e.g., " t h i s 'hot spot' i s i n d i r e c t p r o x i m i t y t o the c i t a d e l o f world imperialism."195 Taken i n c o n j u n c t i o n with other developments around the globe, t h i s evidence of d e c l i n i n g American a b i l i t y t o c o n t r o l events i n the Western Hemisphere s u b s t a n t i a t e d the S o v i e t b e l i e f i n an improved c o r r e l a t i o n o f f o r c e s . According t o a 1983 S o v i e t pamphlet on Nicaragua: "the S a n d i n i s t a r e v o l u t i o n , being an i n t e g r a l p a r t o f the world r e v o l u t i o n a r y process, s e r v e s as yet one more c o n v i n c i n g c o n f i r m a t i o n o f the h e l p l e s s n e s s o f i m p e r i a l i s m t o r e s t o r e i t s l o s t h i s t o r i c i n i t i a t i v e and to tu r n back the development o f the modern world."196 A November 1980 a r t i c l e i n Kommunist by B.Ponomarev i n c l u d e d the " v i c t o r y o f the people" i n Nicaragua along with the c o l l a p s e o f the Portuguese empire, Zimbabwean independence, the s t r e n g t h e n i n g o f the " l i b e r a t i o n s t r u g g l e " i n Namibia and South A f r i c a , the v i c t o r y of Vietnamese, L a o t i a n , and Kampuchean " p a t r i o t i c f o r c e s , " and the r e v o l u t i o n s i n E t h i o p i a , A f g h a n i s t a n , and Iran as events t h a t demonstrated t h a t the age of c l a s s i c i m p e r i a l c o l o n i a l i s m was ended and a dynamic, p o s t c o l o n i a l age was commencing.1^7 The S o v i e t Union heralded both the Cuban and Nicaraguan r e v o l u t i o n s as h a r b i n g e r s o f r e v o l u t i o n a r y ferment i n L a t i n - 79 -America. Cuba was to p r o v i d e a "contagious example" t o the r e s t o f the c o n t i n e n t . I t i s not without reason t h a t the cause of h e r o i c Cuba...has today become the banner of a l l L a t i n America, which i s p r o c l a i m i n g i t s s o l i d a r i t y with the ideas of the Cuban r e v o l u t i o n and i t s support o f the Cuban people. 'Cuba, yes! Yankees, no!' T h i s mighty shout i s resounding today throughout L a t i n America, from the G u l f of Mexico to T i e r r a d e l Fuego.198 The December 1960 d e c l a r a t i o n of 81 Communist p a r t i e s i n Moscow s t a t e d t h a t : "The v i c t o r y o f the Cuban r e v o l u t i o n has p o w e r f u l l y s t i m u l a t e d the s t r u g g l e of the L a t i n American peoples f o r complete n a t i o n a l independence" and opened up "a f r o n t of a c t i v e s t r u g g l e a g a i n s t i m p e r i a l i s m " i n the e n t i r e region.199 S i m i l a r l y , even b e f o r e the S o v i e t s extended support t o the new regime, the Nicaraguan r e v o l u t i o n l e d the S o v i e t Union to a n t i c i p a t e an imminent surge of r e v o l u t i o n a r y change to sweep C e n t r a l America. "Immediately foil-owing the v i c t o r i o u s r e v o l u t i o n i n Nicaragua, p o l i t i c a l o b s e r v e r s unanimously agreed t h a t E l Salvador would be the next C e n t r a l American country to be enveloped by the flames of the a n t i - d i c t a t o r s t r u g g l e . T h i s i s no coincidence."200 The r e v o l u t i o n r e f o c u s e d S o v i e t a t t e n t i o n on the r e g i o n . " P r i o r t o 1979, S o v i e t w r i t e r s had consigned most of the r e g i o n to the ' r e a c t i o n a r y and p r o - i m p e r i a l i s t i c ' b l o c w i t h i n the hemisphere." Only approximately s i x t y - e i g h t S o v i e t a r t i c l e s and f o u r books were p u b l i s h e d on C e n t r a l America between 1970 and 1975. In the two years f o l l o w i n g the Nicaraguan r e v o l u t i o n , the f i g u r e s jumped t o 267 and seven r e s p e c t i v e l y . 2 0 1 Commentators noted the worsening socio-economic c o n d i t i o n s and growing anti-American n a t i o n a l i s m i n the isthmus. S i n c e the 1960s, the American m i l i t a r y and - 80 -economic presence i n C e n t r a l America had d e c l i n e d s h a r p l y , while t h a t o f the S o v i e t Union and Cuba had i n c r e a s e d . The p r e c o n d i t i o n s f o r s u c c e s s f u l r e v o l u t i o n appeared unmatched. High p a r t y o f f i c i a l s echoed the academicians' o p t i m i s t i c b e l i e f s i n C e n t r a l America's r e v o l u t i o n a r y p o t e n t i a l . An October 20, 1980 speech by B. Ponomarev i n c l u d e d the s t a t e s of C e n t r a l America f o r the f i r s t time with those expected t o undergo r e v o l u t i o n a r y changes of "a s o c i a l i s t o r i e n t a t i o n . " 2 0 2 In the November 1980 i s s u e o f Kommunist. Ponomarev acclaimed the Nicaraguan r e v o l u t i o n as an event comparable t o developments i n Angola and E t h i o p i a . 2 0 3 According t o a March 10, 1983 memorandum found among captured Grenadan documents, then S o v i e t army c h i e f of General S t a f f , Marshal N i k o l a i V. Ogarkov, t o l d the Grenadans t h a t whereas o n l y Cuba had e x i s t e d two decades ago, "today t h e r e are Nicaragua, Grenada, and a s e r i o u s b a t t l e i s going i n E l Salvador."204 "The e x i s t e n c e o f r e g i o n a l and i n t e r n a t i o n a l c o n d i t i o n s f a v o r i n g r e v o l u t i o n a r y advance was the u n d e r l y i n g theme a t an i n t e r n a t i o n a l conference on r e v o l u t i o n a r y s t r a t e g y hosted by Havana i n the s p r i n g of 1982."205 Pedro Ramet and Fernando Lopez-Alves conclude t h a t by 1982 Moscow expected r e v o l u t i o n i n E l Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, C h i l e , Uruguay, Colombia, Costa R i c a , and B o l i v i a . 2 0 6 The type of r e v o l u t i o n a r y example t o be p r o v i d e d by the Cuban and Nicaraguan r e v o l u t i o n s was, however, q u i t e d i s s i m i l a r . Although they endorsed the a n t i - i m p e r i a l i s t a s p e c t s of the Cuban r e v o l u t i o n , the S o v i e t s d i d not advocate the Cuban path of armed s t r u g g l e . At the Twentieth Party Congress i n 1956, the CPSU had adopted the s t r a t e g y of " p e a c e f u l t r a n s i t i o n t o s o c i a l i s m , " and - 81 -t h i s remained i n p l a c e d e s p i t e the Cuban e x p e r i e n c e . Comments on the changed c o r r e l a t i o n o f f o r c e s n o t w i t h s t a n d i n g , the S o v i e t s d i d not f e e l t h a t v i o l e n t r e v o l u t i o n a r y attempts i n L a t i n American would succeed. Rather, they s t r e s s e d t h a t the p o s s i b i l i t y of p e a c e f u l s o c i a l i s t r e v o l u t i o n i n L a t i n America " i s now i n c r e a s i n g i n view of the r a d i c a l change i n the r e l a t i o n o f world f o r c e s and the g r e a t e r s t r i v i n g of the masses f o r Socialism."207 Cuba's example l a y i n her economic and s o c i a l changes, not i n her r e v o l u t i o n a r y path: "The i d e a s of the Cuban r e v o l u t i o n are e x e r t i n g a s t e a d i l y growing i n f l u e n c e on the popular masses of L a t i n America. They see i n the Cuban r e v o l u t i o n an example o f how t o s o l v e urgent economic and s o c i a l problems."208 The Cuban r e v o l u t i o n s t i m u l a t e d "a r a d i c a l r e a p p r a i s a l of ways o f s o l v i n g L a t i n America's b a s i c problems through n o n - c a p i t a l i s t development" and showed the p o s s i b i l i t y of advancing r a p i d l y from a p r e - c a p i t a l i s t stage of development to s o c i a l i s m . 2 0 9 The S o v i e t s f e a r e d t h a t Cuban c a l l s f o r g u e r r i l l a a c t i v i t y would a l i e n a t e those L a t i n American governments f r i e n d l y t o Cuba and thus l e s s e n the p r e s s u r e on the United S t a t e s not t o i n t e r v e n e a g a i n s t Cuba. U n l i k e i t s Cuban predecessor, the Nicaraguan r e v o l u t i o n l e d t o a r e v i s i o n i n S o v i e t s t r a t e g y i n L a t i n America. For the f i r s t time, the S o v i e t s endorsed the Cuban n o t i o n of armed r e v o l u t i o n a r y s t r u g g l e as a means of change, to be adopted by M a r x i s t i n s u r g e n t groups and by Communist p a r t i e s i n L a t i n America. In the March 1980 i s s u e of L a t i n s k a v a Amerika. B o r i s Koval wrote: "the Nicaraguan experience [has] demolished the p r e v i o u s s i m p l i s i t i c i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of g u e r r i l l a a c t i o n s . - 82 -confirmed the j u s t i c e of many of Che Guevara's s t r a t e g i c p r i n c i p l e s , and c r y s t a l l i z e d h i s i dea of c r e a t i n g a powerful popular g u e r r i l l a movement."210 E d i t o r Sergo Mikoyan p o i n t e d out t h a t "up t o now o n l y the armed path has l e d t o r e v o l u t i o n a r y v i c t o r y i n L a t i n America" and N. Leonov concluded t h a t "the armed road... i s the most promising i n the s p e c i f i c c o n d i t i o n s o f most of the L a t i n American countries."211 T h i s was not a b l a n k e t s a n c t i o n of armed s t r u g g l e i n L a t i n America; s t r a t e g y was t o be determined by " o b j e c t i v e c o n d i t i o n s " i n each country. In g e n e r a l , c o u n t r i e s of g r e a t e r economic development such as A r g e n t i n a , B r a z i l , and Mexico, r e q u i r e d p o l i c i e s o f p e a c e f u l t r a n s i t i o n ; those of low economic development r e q u i r e d armed struggle.212 i t i s no c o i n c i d e n c e t h a t the c o u n t r i e s s u i t e d f o r armed s t r u g g l e a r e , without e x c e p t i o n , those with which the S o v i e t Union does not have good r e l a t i o n s . The S o v i e t s were a l s o s t r u c k by the broad base of support f o r the S a n d i n i s t a s ; both M a r x i s t and non-Marxist c i v i l i a n p o l i t i c a l o p p o s i t i o n supported the g u e r r i l l a s t r u g g l e . " N e i t h e r the e a r l i e r Cuban foco s t r a t e g y of g u e r r i l l a s t r u g g l e i n the 1960s ... nor the n o n v i o l e n t p o l i t i c a l s t r a t e g y o f the Moscow-o r i e n t e d Communist p a r t i e s d u r i n g the 1970s, had been ab l e t o a t t r a c t broad-based c i v i l i a n support. For the f i r s t time s i n c e the Cuban r e v o l u t i o n , g u e r r i l l a movements under M a r x i s t or M a r x i s t - L e n i n i s t l e a d e r s h i p were c r e a t i n g popular f r o n t - t y p e a l l i a n c e s with c i v i l i a n s e c t o r s , c u t t i n g a c r o s s c l a s s , i d e o l o g i c a l , g e n e r a t i o n a l and u r b a n - r u r a l l i n e s . " 2 1 3 S o v i e t commentators concluded t h a t such m i l i t a r y - p o l i t i c a l f r o n t s as the J u l y 26 Movement or the FSLN c o u l d , i n c e r t a i n - 83 -cases, s u b s t i t u t e f o r p r o l e t a r i a n p o l i t i c a l p a r t i e s as a r e v o l u t i o n a r y vanguard. The p o l i t i c a l a c t i v i t y o f these f r o n t s , o p e r a t i n g with c l o s e l i n k s t o the masses, on the b a s i s of m i l i t a r y and m i l i t a r y - o r g a n i z a t i o n a l power, turned out t o be so e f f e c t i v e t h a t they, being a t f i r s t p u r e l y m i l i t a r y o r g a n i z a t i o n s , g r a d u a l l y a c q u i r e d i n f a c t the f u n c t i o n s of p o l i t i c a l p a r t i e s . And on the c o n t r a r y i n both cases, not a s i n g l e p o l i t i c a l p a r t y , i n c l u d i n g the Communists was a b l e even t o come c l o s e t o them i n t h e i r p o t e n t i a l as a vanguard.214 In L a t i n American d i c t a t o r s h i p s not f r i e n d l y t o the S o v i e t Union (e.g., E l S a l v a d o r , Guatemala, C h i l e , Paraguay), communists were c o u n s e l l e d t o j o i n the r a d i c a l n a t i o n a l i s t s . These d o c t r i n a l changes were s i g n a l l e d i n L a t i n s k a v a  Amerika and echoed i n Kommunist and World M a r x i s t Review. " I t i s arguable, of course, whether S o v i e t academicians w r i t i n g i n L a t i n s k a y a Amerika. I n t e r n a t i o n a l A f f a i r s , and other S o v i e t p u b l i c a t i o n s i n f l u e n c e the p o l i c i e s of the CPSU, KGB or other organs o f the S o v i e t government.... S t i l l , such a u t h o r i t a t i v e commentators as Sergo Mikoyan, e d i t o r of L a t i n s k a v a Amerika. presumably c a r r y weight with S o v i e t p o l i c y makers, and t h e i r p u b l i c pronouncements thus form p a r t o f the evidence t h a t o u t s i d e a n a l y s t s must s i f t and weigh i n a n a l y z i n g S o v i e t p o l i c y . " 2 1 5 The S o v i e t s encouraged the emulation of the Nicaraguan expe r i e n c e elsewhere i n the r e g i o n . V i k t o r Volsky c a l l e d the armed v i c t o r y i n Nicaragua a "model" t o be f o l l o w e d i n other c o u n t ries.216 j n January 1980, the p r o - S o v i e t Communist part y o f E l Salvador (PCES) d e c l a r e d t h a t armed s t r u g g l e was the only path t o power, "the f i r s t a b s o l u t e endorsement of g u e r r i l l a s t r u g g l e by a L a t i n American Communist p a r t y , " and soon a f t e r - 84 -adopted a program c a l l i n g f o r the f o r c i b l e overthrow of the government and the subsequent i n t r o d u c t i o n of "profound s o c i a l t r a n s f o r m a t i o n s " on the L e n i n i s t model.217 i n May, the PCES f o r m a l l y endorsed v i o l e n t r e v o l u t i o n a t i t s 7th N a t i o n a l Congress. In 1980, Cuba helped t o u n i f y the fragmented extreme l e f t f a c t i o n s i n E l Salvador, much as i t had done i n Nicaragua the p r e v i o u s year. Cuba and Nicaragua p r o v i d e d the Salvadoran i n s u r g e n t s with propaganda support, money, sanctuary, arms, s u p p l i e s , t r a i n i n g , communications, i n t e l l i g e n c e , and l o g i s t i c s . Cuba i n c r e a s e d i t s a i d t o Salvadoran l e f t i s t i n s u r g e n t s u n t i l t h e i r f a i l e d o f f e n s i v e o f January 1981. S o v i e t optimism about r e v o l u t i o n i n C e n t r a l America reached a peak d u r i n g the winter of 1980-81. By 1983, pessimism governed S o v i e t assessments of C e n t r a l America's r e v o l u t i o n a r y p o t e n t i a l . The Cuban arms flow t o E l Salvador dwindled f o l l o w i n g the f a i l u r e of the g u e r r i l l a s ' " f i n a l o f f e n s i v e " i n January 1981 and the assumption of o f f i c e by the Reagan A d m i n i s t r a t i o n . There was no more on the Salvadoran s t r u g g l e i n the S o v i e t media and no mention of E l Salvador or C e n t r a l America i n Brezhnev's "assessment o f the world s i t u a t i o n " a t the Twenty-sixth CPSU Congress.218 With the harsh Reagan r h e t o r i c , the i n c r e a s e i n American m i l i t a r y spending, and the c o v e r t war a g a i n s t Nicaragua, the S o v i e t s concluded t h a t the United S t a t e s c o u l d no longer be regarded as impotent i n the Caribbean B a s i n . T h i s was r e i n f o r c e d by a n e g a t i v e s h i f t i n the c o r r e l a t i o n o f f o r c e s brought about by the war i n A f g h a n i s t a n , the r i s e of S o l i d a r i t y , and the NATO d e c i s i o n t o deploy c r u i s e and P e r s h i n g m i s s i l e s i n Europe. T h i r d World a l l i e s i n Kampuchea, E t h i o p i a , - 85 -Angola, and Mozambique were under a t t a c k by g u e r r i l l a s . I r a q , I n d i a , and A l g e r i a were t u r n i n g t o the West f o r a i d and t r a d e . By 1983, S o v i e t commentators were d i v i d e d i n t h e i r assessment of whether g u e r r i l l a triumph i n E l Salvador c o u l d be expected i n the near or d i s t a n t future.219 jn the summer of 1983, Moscow and Havana urged the Salvadoran g u e r r i l l a s t o n e g o t i a t e with the United S t a t e s i n order t o decrease the l i k e l i h o o d o f a s u b s t a n t i a l American m i l i t a r y b u i l d u p i n the region.220 The S o v i e t s have toned down t h e i r a d v i c e t o r e v o l u t i o n a r i e s , p a r t i c u l a r l y i n Honduras and Costa R i c a ; they are t o conc e n t r a t e on p r e v e n t i n g a t t a c k s on Nicaragua, not on fomenting r e v o l u t i o n . 2 2 1 The American i n v a s i o n of Grenada i n October 1983 cemented S o v i e t pessimism. P r i o r t o t h i s , the S o v i e t Union had p e r c e i v e d domestic l i m i t s on d i r e c t American m i l i t a r y a c t i o n i n C e n t r a l America and the Caribbean. The S o v i e t New Times, i n connection with the debate on c o v e r t o p e r a t i o n s i n Nicaragua, had w r i t t e n : " t h e r e i s r e s i s t a n c e t o a p o l i c y o f i n t e r v e n t i o n i n C e n t r a l America even among the m i l i t a r y . " 2 2 2 N o w the S o v i e t s a s s e r t t h a t the United S t a t e s w i l l go t o almost any extent t o keep i t s i m p e r i a l r e l a t i o n s h i p with the s t a t e s of the r e g i o n . Not only i s the U.S. a d m i n i s t r a t i o n i n s p i r i n g and making m a t e r i a l p r o v i s i o n f o r these s u b v e r s i v e a c t i o n s a g a i n s t Nicaragua and other c o u n t r i e s , i t has now a c t u a l l y made such a c t i o n s a p a r t of i t s p o l i c y . P r e s i d e n t Reagan's re c e n t statement on the ' r i g h t ' t o conduct c o v e r t o p e r a t i o n s a g a i n s t independent c o u n t r i e s was seen even i n the U.S. as c l a i m i n g freedom t o conduct a p o l i c y o f ' s t a t e terrorism.'223 'Operation Grenada' i s not j u s t another l i n k i n the long c h a i n o f Washington's a g g r e s s i v e a c t i o n s . What we have here i s a new t w i s t . ... With i t s brazen i n v a s i o n o f Grenada, the White House c y n i c a l l y shows t h a t , f o r the sake of a c h i e v i n g i t s g o a l s , i t i s prepared t o t r y - 86 -anything -- from c o v e r t CIA o p e r a t i o n s t o o v e r t armed invasion.224 To summarize, f o r the S o v i e t Union, the Cuban and Nicaraguan r e v o l u t i o n s confirmed c o n v i c t i o n s t h a t the c o r r e l a t i o n of f o r c e s s a t i n S o v i e t favour, and l e d t o the assumption t h a t the United S t a t e s c o u l d no l o n g e r e f f e c t i v e l y p r o h i b i t r e v o l u t i o n a r y s o c i o p o l i t i c a l change i n L a t i n America. Moscow expected f u r t h e r r e v o l u t i o n a r y upheavals i n the Western Hemisphere t o f o l l o w on the h e e l s of the r e v o l u t i o n s , but these e x p e c t a t i o n s were q u e l l e d by American demonstrations of f o r c e d u r i n g the Cuban M i s s i l e C r i s i s and the i n v a s i o n of Grenada. While the Cuban r e v o l u t i o n was thought t o be s u i g e n e r i s , the Nicaraguan r e v o l u t i o n prompted a r e e v a l u a t i o n of the u t i l i t y o f armed s t r u g g l e on the path t o s o c i a l i s m , and l e d t o a change i n the p o l i c y i n s t r u c t i o n s f o r L a t i n American Communist p a r t i e s . - 87 -CHAPTER V. CONCLUSION As d i s c u s s e d i n Chapter I I , a primary goal of S o v i e t p o l i c y i n L a t i n America i s the undermining of American power and i n f l u e n c e . The examination of S o v i e t p o l i c y toward the Cuban and Nicaraguan r e v o l u t i o n s i n Chapter I I I has shown t h a t the S o v i e t s manifest a s t r o n g d e s i r e t o a v o i d a m i l i t a r y c o n f r o n t a t i o n with the United S t a t e s i n the course of a c h i e v i n g t h i s o b j e c t i v e . The combination of these two c o n s i d e r a t i o n s g i v e s r i s e t o a S o v i e t p o l i c y i n the Caribbean Basin best c h a r a c t e r i z e d as "prudent opportunism." S o v i e t p o l i c y toward the Cuban and Nicaraguan r e v o l u t i o n s does not c o r r o b o r a t e the t h e s i s t h a t t h e r e i s a " S o v i e t grand s t r a t e g y , " c a r e f u l l y c o n t r i v e d i n Moscow, aimed at o u t f l a n k i n g the United S t a t e s by s u b v e r t i n g p r e s e l e c t e d t a r g e t s with l o n g -term o b j e c t i v e s i n mind.225 Although the S o v i e t s hope, i n g e n e r a l , to p r o j e c t t h e i r power i n t o an American-dominated area, p o l i c y has not f o l l o w e d a preconceived p l a n . S p e c i f i c g o a l s and t a c t i c s i n Cuba and Nicaragua underwent a change as each r e v o l u t i o n progressed; s t r a t e g y was moulded t o f i t the o p p o r t u n i t i e s presented. The S o v i e t Union n e i t h e r expected nor aided the r e v o l u t i o n s i n t h e i r i n i t i a l s t a g e s , yet heralded t h e i r occurrence as a stunning blow to the United S t a t e s . More than c u r s o r y involvement with the new regimes came onl y a t the i n s t i g a t i o n of the Caribbean p a r t n e r s . P a r t i c u l a r l y i n the Nicaraguan case, Moscow was i n i t i a l l y more i n t e r e s t e d i n a p p l y i n g the l e s s o n s of the r e v o l u t i o n t o the r e s t of L a t i n America than i n c u l t i v a t i n g a r e l a t i o n s h i p with the r e v o l u t i o n a r y government. Moscow was happy to reap the b e n e f i t s - 88 -of the d e t e r i o r a t i o n of the c l i e n t ' s r e l a t i o n s with the United S t a t e s . I t m o d i f i e d d o c t r i n e i n order t o take advantage of the Cuban s i t u a t i o n . Yet the S o v i e t Union d i s p l a y e d prudence i n i t s p r e f e r e n c e f o r c a u t i o u s , incremental moves, i n i t s concern f o r the r e v o l u t i o n s ' s t a b i l i t y and s u r v i v a l , and i n i t s attempts to avo i d c r i s i s or d i r e c t c o n f l i c t with the United S t a t e s . S o v i e t a s s i s t a n c e was c a l c u l a t e d with an eye t o what Moscow b e l i e v e d would a v o i d provoking a p u n i t i v e American response. The S o v i e t Union takes advantage of C e n t r a l American t u r m o i l , but, r e s p e c t i n g American power and g e o g r a p h i c a l advantage i n the r e g i o n , procedes with c a u t i o n . A n o t a b l e f e a t u r e of S o v i e t p o l i c y toward Cuba and Nicaragua has been the tendency to seek maximum b e n e f i t s f o r minimum r i s k s . Thus the S o v i e t Union e x p l o i t e d the a n t i -American propaganda value of the r e v o l u t i o n s w hile shunning t i e s u n t i l the regimes were s t a b l e . B e l y i n g Khrushchev's p r e v i o u s boasts, Moscow delayed a response t o the Bay o f P i g s i n v a s i o n u n t i l i t was apparent t h a t t h e r e would be no need f o r S o v i e t i n t e r v e n t i o n , then took c r e d i t f o r the i n v a s i o n ' s outcome. The S o v i e t Union garners the i n f l u e n c e i n h e r e n t i n p r o v i d i n g Nicaragua with long-term economic a i d , but r e f u s e s the f i n a n c i a l d r a i n of u n d e r w r i t i n g the Nicaraguan economy. De s p i t e American warnings, Moscow p r o v i d e s the S a n d i n i s t a s with m i l i t a r y a i d t o r e p e l the c o n t r a s , but does so i n d i r e c t l y and r e f r a i n s from g i v i n g Managua the power t o take the o f f e n s i v e i n the isthmus. The S o v i e t s c u l t i v a t e a c o r d i a l r e l a t i o n s h i p with the Nicaraguans, but o f f e r no p u b l i c commitment t o the p r e s e r v a t i o n of the regime. The S o v i e t Union was r e l u c t a n t t o take up the - 89 -r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s i m p l i c i t i n a c c e p t i n g the r e v o l u t i o n s as s o c i a l i s t , and s t i l l r e f u s e s t o do so f o r Nicaragua. S e v e r a l f a c t o r s have determined the r e l a t i v e balance o f prudence and opportunism i n S o v i e t p o l i c y . Moscow has been more prone t o take advantage o f circumstances when i t p e r c e i v e s t h a t the United S t a t e s i s unable or u n w i l l i n g t o respond, when American p o l i c y has l e f t gaps t h a t the S o v i e t s can f i l l , when the r e v o l u t i o n a r y government has adopted a p r o - S o v i e t f o r e i g n p o l i c y and M a r x i s t - L e n i n i s t domestic reforms, and when the s t a t e o f Soviet-American r e l a t i o n s i s such t h a t t h e r e are few i n c e n t i v e s f o r moderation. Conversely, the S o v i e t Union has not been keen t o take up the r e v o l u t i o n a r y cause when the United S t a t e s has demonstrated i t s r e s o l v e t o prevent S o v i e t - C a r i b b e a n t i e s , when the Un i t e d S t a t e s has been moderate toward the new regimes, when the r e v o l u t i o n a r y governments have d i s p l a y e d ambivalence t o communism, and when the S o v i e t s want t o f o s t e r amicable Soviet-American r e l a t i o n s . Competition with China f o r T h i r d World support f u e l s S o v i e t adventurism; p r e o c c u p a t i o n with problems i n other c l i e n t s and a t home does not. Is Nicaragua another Cuba? I f , by another Cuba, i s meant a S o v i e t outpost i n the Western Hemisphere, a c l i e n t - s t a t e ready to do Moscow's b i d d i n g , f o s t e r i n g anti-American r e v o l u t i o n throughout L a t i n America, the answer i s no.226 i n the seven years s i n c e the overthrow of Somoza, the S o v i e t Union has not chosen t o support Nicaragua e c o n o m i c a l l y , p o l i t i c a l l y , and m i l i t a r i l y t o the same extent t h a t i t d i d Cuba w i t h i n the f i r s t f o u r years o f the r e v o l u t i o n . A s i d e from a s m a l l number of a d v i s e r s , the S o v i e t Union has not e s t a b l i s h e d a d i r e c t m i l i t a r y - 90 -presence i n Nicaragua. Nicaraguan a i d t o r e g i o n a l i n s u r g e n t s — arguably a product more of Cuban p o l i c y than of S o v i e t — h a s d e c l i n e d s u b s t a n t i a l l y s i n c e 1980-81. The c o n g e n i a l S o v i e t -Nicaraguan r e l a t i o n s i n no way approach the c l o s e Soviet-Cuban t i e s . Comparative r e s t r a i n t up t o the present does not mean t h a t the S o v i e t Union i s not i n t e r e s t e d i n a l a r g e r r o l e i n Nicaragua i n the f u t u r e . As Robert L e i k e n p o i n t s out, t h e r e was an uneasy detente between Cuba and the S o v i e t Union d u r i n g the 1960s; the f u l l r e l a t i o n s h i p t o which the A d m i n i s t r a t i o n a l l u d e s d i d not develop u n t i l the mid-1970s.227 L i k e the Cuban R e v o l u t i o n , the Nicaraguan R e v o l u t i o n has d e a l t a blow t o "geographic f a t a l i s m " and i n c r e a s e d the p e r c e p t i o n of d e c l i n i n g American a b i l i t y t o counter r e v o l u t i o n a r y a c t i v i t y i n the Caribbean B a s i n . Cuba g i v e s the S o v i e t Union a communist outpost i n the Western Hemisphere; i t i s an example of "a noncontiguous s o c i a l i s t s t a t e amenable to p r o - S o v i e t o r i e n t a t i o n without g r o s s c o e r c i o n " and "the most s u c c e s s f u l i n s t a n c e t o which the Kremlin may p o i n t as proof t h a t S o v i e t Marxism-Leninism and economic a i d has r e l e v a n c e t o the economic and s o c i a l growth of d e v e l o p i n g nations."228 ^ s o c i a l i s t Nicaragua would prove t h a t Cuba was not an anomaly and would str e n g t h e n S o v i e t i n f l u e n c e i n the T h i r d World and non-a l i g n e d movement. S i g n i f i c a n t S o v i e t m i l i t a r y and economic a i d to Nicaragua would s e t a precedent f o r f u t u r e involvement i n another C e n t r a l American country, j u s t as Cuba has s e t a precedent f o r Nicaragua. L i k e Cuba, Nicaragua has p o t e n t i a l u t i l i t y as a m i l i t a r y f a c i l i t y and l i s t e n i n g post w i t h i n the American defense perimeter. I t c o u l d p r o v i d e new basing - 91 -f a c i l i t i e s f o r S o v i e t power p r o j e c t i o n i n the Caribbean Basin, South America and South A t l a n t i c . S o v i e t b l o c naval deployment i n the Caribbean with bases i n Nicaragua c o u l d endanger l o g i s t i c support f o r American a l l i e s i n Europe i n the event of a c o n v e n t i o n a l war, and the d e l i v e r y of o i l and s t r a t e g i c m a t e r i a l s t o the United S t a t e s . The S o v i e t Union has an i n t e r e s t i n r e i n f o r c i n g r e v o l u t i o n a r y l e f t i s t t e n d e n c i e s i n the B a s i n ; t h e r e i s a g r e a t e r p o t e n t i a l f o r e x p o r t i n g and s u s t a i n i n g g u e r r i l l a movements from mainland Nicaragua than from i s l a n d Cuba, and the Cubans are c u r r e n t l y t r a i n i n g g u e r r i l l a s t h e r e . However, while p o s s i b l y a n t i c i p a t i n g Nicaragua's eventual i n c l u s i o n i n the s o c i a l i s t camp, the S o v i e t Union i s i n no hurry t o see i t happen. In the s h o r t term, more rewarding than any i n c r e a s e i n S o v i e t i n f l u e n c e i n Nicaragua are the unearned d i v i d e n d s of the c o n t i n u i n g American e f f o r t t o remove the S a n d i n i s t a s . T h i s d i v e r t s American a t t e n t i o n and r e s o u r c e s from other S o v i e t a c t i v i t i e s (e.g., i n A f g h a n i s t a n ) , reduces the c r e d i b i l i t y of American a c c u s a t i o n s t h a t the S o v i e t s are the sponsors of g l o b a l v i o l e n c e , heightens American f o r e i g n p o l i c y d i v i s i o n s , and c r e a t e s t e n s i o n s between the United S t a t e s and i t s a l l i e s i n Europe and L a t i n America. "Indeed, from the S o v i e t p e r s p e c t i v e , a manageable t h r e a t t o Nicaragua i s probably c o n s i d e r e d a u s e f u l t o o l f o r r a l l y i n g the p o p u l a t i o n of t h a t country around the S a n d i n i s t a l e a d e r s h i p . The S o v i e t p r e s s i s r e p l e t e with r e p o r t s from i t s correspondents i n Nicaragua along j u s t those l i n e s . " 2 2 9 There has been, up t o the present, l i t t l e r i s k of the FSLN being d e f e a t e d (an u n d e s i r a b l e outcome), due to C o n g r e s s i o n a l c o n s t r a i n t s on the A d m i n i s t r a t i o n ' s p o l i c y . The - 92 -Boland Amendment of August 1982 p r o h i b i t e d American a i d t o p a r a m i l i t a r y groups " f o r the purpose of overthrowing the Government of Nicaragua or provoking a m i l i t a r y exchange between Nicaragua and Honduras," and Congress has r e g u l a r l y r e s t r i c t e d and d i l u t e d a d m i n i s t r a t i o n r e q u e s t s f o r c o n t r a funds. I t i s h i g h l y improbable t h a t the S o v i e t Union would i n t e r v e n e i n support of Nicaragua should the United S t a t e s d e c i d e t o use d i r e c t m i l i t a r y f o r c e t o overthrow the S a n d i n i s t a s . Even C a s t r o has not been a b l e t o t r a n s l a t e heightened S o v i e t concern about American m i l i t a r y a c t i o n i n the Caribbean i n t o an e x p l i c i t s e c u r i t y guarantee. C a s t r o a p p a r e n t l y t r i e d hard to get Moscow to s i g n a t r e a t y of f r i e n d s h i p and c o o p e r a t i o n (tantamount to a t r e a t y of mutual m i l i t a r y a s s i s t a n c e i f both p a r t n e r s are f u l l members of the " s o c i a l i s t commonwealth") at the Twenty-Sixth Congress of the CPSU i n February 1981, but f a i l e d . 2 3 0 Gromyko, Ustinov, and o t h e r s have warned the United S t a t e s a g a i n s t e s t a b l i s h i n g a blockade, but have n e g l e c t e d t o s p e l l out the consequences. And, although the S o v i e t Union c o n t i n u e s t o document American s u b v e r s i v e a c t i v i t y a g a i n s t Nicaragua, i t has been r e t i c e n t with v e r b a l support. An I n t e r n a t i o n a l A f f a i r s a r t i c l e of A p r i l 1986 d e t a i l s American a c t i o n s a g a i n s t Nicaragua and warns of the l i k e l i h o o e d of d i r e c t armed a g g r e s s i o n , but o f f e r s no encouragement beyond: " E l i m i n a t i o n of the dangerous hotbed of t e n s i o n i n C e n t r a l America, s t r u g g l e a g a i n s t the e s c a l a t i o n of the U.S. i n t e r f e r e n c e i n the a f f a i r s o f the r e g i o n ' s c o u n t r i e s are an important task of a l l the peace s u p p o r t e r s of the world."231 The S o v i e t Union r e c o g n i z e s t h a t the United S t a t e s - 93 -possesses both a m i l i t a r y and economic advantage i n C e n t r a l America, t h a t a S o v i e t involvement so e x t e n s i v e t h a t i t would pose a d i r e c t t h r e a t to American s e c u r i t y w i l l not be t o l e r a t e d , and t h a t the Reagan a d m i n i s t r a t i o n i s bound and determined to unseat the S a n d i n i s t a s . To the S o v i e t s , Nicaragua i s not worth a c o n f l i c t with the United S t a t e s ; i n a d d i t i o n , the S o v i e t Union does not wish to j e o p a r d i z e Cuban s e c u r i t y i n a general C e n t r a l American war. The S o v i e t s c ontinue to c u l t i v a t e an economic r e l a t i o n s h i p with Nicaragua. The Economist r e p o r t e d i n February 1985 t h a t the S o v i e t s supply Nicaragua with almost t w o - t h i r d s of i t s petroleum imports and t h a t S o v i e t b l o c s u b s i d i e s run a t over $300 m i l l i o n per year.232 "Looking back on t h e i r experience i n Cuba, the S o v i e t s may view growing economic t i e s as a pragmatic way of s t r e n g t h e n i n g t h e i r p o s i t i o n and i n f l u e n c e i n Managua and one t h a t would not undercut Moscow's d e s i r e to maintain a g e n e r a l l y low p r o f i l e on m i l i t a r y aid."233 Given past e xperience, one can conclude t h a t the May 1985 embargo on American-Nicaraguan t r a d e w i l l push Nicaragua c l o s e r t o the S o v i e t Union. S t i l l , the S o v i e t Union remains u n w i l l i n g t o underwrite the Nicaraguan economy, which i s i n a s t a t e of chaos. By 1985, Nicaragua was bankrupt, with a f o r e i g n debt of $4 b i l l i o n , S220 m i l l i o n i n l o s s e s from the g u e r r i l l a war, i n f l a t i o n running a t 100 percent, and a g r e a t shortage of consumer goods.234 Cuba's f a i l i n g economy makes the S o v i e t s p e s s i m i s t i c about the road t o s o c i a l i s m i n L a t i n America. In 1980 f o r the f i r s t time, Cuba had to import sugar r a t h e r than export i t . The Nicaraguans have c o n s i s t e n t l y f a i l e d t o r e c e i v e - 94 -the l e v e l o f a i d sought from Moscow. The S o v i e t Union sees the p o t e n t i a l f o r another Cuba and does not want i t . Nicaraguan n a t i o n a l i s m puts a l i m i t on how f a r the Nicaraguan-Soviet r e l a t i o n s h i p w i l l go. Although each s i d e has done i t s p a r t t o c u l t i v a t e a f r i e n d l y r e l a t i o n s h i p , "the p o l i t i c a l c l o u t of the S o v i e t s i n Nicaragua today i s more a r e s u l t of the legacy of U.S.-Nicaraguan r e l a t i o n s and u n d e r l y i n g d i s t r u s t than of any r e a l mutual commitment between the S o v i e t Union and Nicaragua."235 The Nicaraguans are going to the S o v i e t Union because they need o u t s i d e help t o s u r v i v e . They do not want to be another Cuba. As one FSLN j u n t a member remarked i n 1980, "We d i d n ' t go through a l l t h i s t o exchange American domination f o r S o v i e t domination."236 One should be h e s i t a n t i n d e r i v i n g c o n c l u s i o n s about the S o v i e t commitment t o Nicaragua from Cuban a c t i v i t y t h e r e . Nicaragua i s a h i g h e r p r i o r i t y f o r Cuba, and Castro has h i s own i n t e r e s t s i n s u p p o r t i n g the S a n d i n i s t a s . A s t r o n g s o c i a l i s t regime i n Nicaragua would reduce Cuba's i s o l a t i o n i n L a t i n America, a s s i s t Cuba as a r e v o l u t i o n a r y base, and, i f dependent on Havana, demonstrate Cuba's s t r e n g t h as a patron and model f o r development. I t i s l i k e l y t h a t Havana and Moscow d i f f e r on the extent of m a t e r i a l a i d and s e c u r i t y guarantees to be o f f e r e d Managua. "CT1he S o v i e t s probably see the Nicaraguan and Grenadian governments as F i d e l ' s ' o f f s p r i n g ' r a t h e r than t h e i r own and are l e s s c e r t a i n of t h e i r s u r v i v a b i l i t y and t h e r e f o r e more r e l u c t a n t t o commit S o v i e t p r e s t i g e . " 2 3 7 Cuba has complicated S o v i e t r e l a t i o n s with the United S t a t e s and other L a t i n American c o u n t r i e s i n the p a s t . Moscow may not be eager - 95 -to g i v e C a s t r o a hemispheric a l l y . One i s l e f t with the p i c t u r e of an o l d e r , wiser S o v i e t Union, who has l e a r n e d from past e x p e r i e n c e s i n Cuba and elsewhere i n the T h i r d World to a v o i d overcommitment and to be s e l e c t i v e i n choosing i t s c l i e n t s . In the f u t u r e , we are l i k e l y t o see a c o n t i n u a t i o n of "prudent opportunism"; i . e . , the S o v i e t Union w i l l g r a d u a l l y c u l t i v a t e g r e a t e r i n f l u e n c e i n Nicaragua, e x p l o r e the l i m i t s of American t o l e r a n c e , but keep involvement as i n d i r e c t as p o s s i b l e , and l i m i t r i s k s . The S o v i e t s want t o i n c r e a s e t h e i r presence i n the " s t r a t e g i c r e a r " of the United S t a t e s , but are i n no rush to do so. The d e s i r e of the S a n d i n i s t a s f o r c l o s e r t i e s with Moscow enables the l a t t e r t o pursue a low-cost p o l i c y . The S o v i e t s do not want a s o c i a l i s t Nicaragua u n t i l the United S t a t e s d e c i d e s to l e a v e i t be, and the r e v o l u t i o n i s b e t t e r a b l e to take care of i t s e l f . Nicaragua has to make i t s e l f look more a t t r a c t i v e b e f o r e the S o v i e t s w i l l s t e p i n . The S o v i e t s have not gone out of t h e i r way to promote the development of a Cuban-l i k e r e l a t i o n s h i p . To the e x t e n t t h a t t h i s i s happening anyhow, i t i s due to the need of the S a n d i n i s t a s f o r a counterweight t o the Americans. S o v i e t i n a c t i o n i s even more s t r i k i n g g i v e n the i n c r e a s e i n S o v i e t c a p a b i l i t i e s s i n c e 1959. The S o v i e t Union w i l l move with supreme c a u t i o n as long as the United S t a t e s i n d i c a t e s i t s r e s o l v e to oppose S o v i e t i n c u r s i o n s i n the hemisphere. The preceding a n a l y s i s would suggest t h a t t h e r e are more c o n s t r u c t i v e ways to do t h i s than b a n k r o l l a c o n t r a war a g a i n s t Nicaragua which only i n c r e a s e s the S a n d i n i s t a s ' dependence on the S o v i e t Union. A r e t u r n t o a p o l i c y of c a r r o t s - 96 -and s t i c k s - - f o r both the S o v i e t Union and Nicaragua, or, a t the op p o s i t e extreme, a f u l l - s c a l e American i n v a s i o n o f Nicaragua would be more l i k e l y t o achieve the d e s i r e d r e s u l t s ; needless t o say, the l a t t e r course would present a new s e t of d i f f i c u l t i e s i n terms of American domestic p o l i t i c s and r e l a t i o n s with L a t i n America and NATO. What do the f a c t o r s i n f l u e n c i n g S o v i e t p o l i c y i n the Caribbean presage? I f the United S t a t e s comes t o accept the Nicaraguan presence i n the Hemisphere, one can expect t o see an i n c r e a s e i n S o v i e t a c t i v i t y . Other developments which might l e a d t o g r e a t e r S o v i e t involvement i n Nicaragua would be an improvement i n the S o v i e t economy or a g r e a t e r emphasis by the P o l i t b u r o on the r e v o l u t i o n a r y purposes of i n t e r n a t i o n a l communism. Conversely, an improvement i n Soviet-American r e l a t i o n s should cause the S o v i e t Union t o mute i t s support f o r Nicaragua. The S o v i e t s showed i n Cuba t h a t they w i l l make t r a d e - o f f s i n the Caribbean t o s a t i s f y h i g h e r p r i o r i t y d e s i r e s . The S o v i e t s would probably be w i l l i n g c u r t a i l support f o r Nicaragua i n exchange f o r co n c e s s i o n s i n another area o f S o v i e t -American r e l a t i o n s . [ D J espite a l l i t s r h e t o r i c about the i m p o s s i b i l i t y o f ' l i n k a g e , ' the S o v i e t l e a d e r s h i p has never been i n d i f f e r e n t t o the p r o s p e c t i v e p a y o f f i n b i l a t e r a l b e n e f i t s t h a t might, i n p r i n c i p l e , flow from s e l e c t i v e a c t s o f r e s t r a i n t c a l c u l a t e d t o c o n c i l i a t e the American e l i t e . 2 3 8 S o v i e t withdrawal from Nicaragua c o u l d be exchanged f o r an end to American a s s i s t a n c e t o Afghan r e b e l s . Andropov acknowledged the s i t u a t i o n s ' s i m i l a r i t i e s i n an A p r i l 1983 i n t e r v i e w : I t i s . . . f a r from being a matter of i n d i f f e r e n c e t o us what i s happening d i r e c t l y on our southern border. Washington even goes so f a r as a r r o g a t i n g f o r i t s e l f the - 97 -r i g h t t o judge what government must be t h e r e i n Nicaragua s i n c e t h i s a l l e g e d l y a f f e c t s United S t a t e s i n t e r e s t s . . . . But Nicaragua i s over one thousand k i l o m e t r e s away from the U.S.A. and we have a r a t h e r long common border with Afghanistan.239 Other p o s s i b l e t r a d e - o f f s i n c l u d e g r e a t e r s e c u r i t y f o r Cuba or progress on arms c o n t r o l . In the immediate f u t u r e , however, the S o v i e t Union w i l l c o n t i n u e t o bide i t s time, keeping a low p r o f i l e and t a k i n g advantage of o p p o r t u n i t i e s as they present themselves while a v o i d i n g c r i s i s . While d e s i r o u s o f the p o l i t i c a l and i d e o l o g i c a l b e n e f i t s of "another Cuba," the S o v i e t s would p r e f e r t o a v o i d d u p l i c a t i o n of the economic and s e c u r i t y burdens of the o r i g i n a l . - 98 -FOOTNOTES Throughout, the f o o t n o t e s , the f o l l o w i n g a b b r e v i a t i o n has been used: CDSP f o r Current D i g e s t of the S o v i e t Press 1. "Nicaragua d e s c r i b e d as a p o t e n t i a l t h r e a t w i t h i n hemisphere," The Globe and M a i l . February 22, 1985, p. 8. 2. R i c h a r d F. S t a a r , USSR F o r e i g n P o l i c i e s A f t e r Detente ( S t a n f o r d : Hoover I n s t i t u t i o n P r e s s , 1985), p. xxv. 3. A d i s c u s s i o n of the Cuban M i s s i l e C r i s i s i s beyond the scope of t h i s paper. Though not denying i t s s i g n i f i c a n c e , I b e l i e v e t h a t a meaningful comparison of S o v i e t p o l i c y toward the two r e v o l u t i o n s can be made without r e f e r e n c e t o i t . 4. D a n i e l S. Papp, S o v i e t P e r c e p t i o n s of the Developing  World i n the 1980s (Lexington: D.C.Heath and Co., 1985), p. 138. 5. I b i d . , pp. 17-24, d i s c u s s e s v a r i o u s sources of p e r c e p t i o n s of the d e v e l o p i n g world i n the S o v i e t Union. 6. See I b i d . , P r e f a c e , f o r a d i s c u s s i o n of t h i s problem. 7. Harry Gelman, The Brezhnev P o l i t b u r o and the D e c l i n e of  Detente ( I t h a c a : C o r n e l l U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s , 1984), p. 26. 8. Pjravda, January 28, 1959, t r a n s l a t e d i n CDSP 11, no. 2 (1959), p. 13. 9. S. N. MacFarlane, Superpower R i v a l r y and T h i r d World  R a d i c a l i s m : The Idea of N a t i o n a l L i b e r a t i o n (London: Croom Helm, 1985), p. 146. 10. Pravda. February 15, 1956, t r a n s l a t e d i n CDSP 8, no. 4 (1956), p. 7. 11. Joseph L. Nogee and Robert H. Donaldson, S o v i e t F o r e i g n  P o l i c y S i n c e World War II (New York: Pergamon Press, 1981), p. 133. 12. Jacques Levesque, The USSR and the Cuban R e v o l u t i o n , t r a n s . Deanna Drendel Leboeuf (New York: Praeger, 1978), p. 5. 13. Gelman, The Brezhnev P o l i t b u r o and the D e c l i n e of Detente, p. 28. 14. Bruce D. P o r t e r , The USSR i n T h i r d World C o n f l i c t s :  S o v i e t Arms and Diplomacy i n L o c a l Wars 1945-1980 (Cambridge: Cambridge U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s , 1984), p. 34. 15. The t h r e e : Mexico, Uruguay, A r g e n t i n a . The S o v i e t Union a l s o had c o n s u l a r or commercial r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s i n B o l i v i a , B r a z i l , C h i l e , and Colombia. Hugh Thomas, Cuba: The P u r s u i t of  Freedom (New York: Harper and Row, 1971), p. 1265. By 1979, i n the Caribbean B a s i n alone, the S o v i e t s had embassies i n Costa R i c a , Grenada, Guyana, Jamaica, a t r a d e o f f i c e i n E l Salvador and nonresident ambassadors i n Suriname and Trinidad-Tobago. W. Raymond Duncan, "Moscow, the Caribbean, and C e n t r a l America," i n Communism i n C e n t r a l America and the Caribbean, ed. Robert Wesson ( S t a n f o r d : Hoover I n s t i t u t i o n P r e s s , 1982), p. 7. 16. Levesque, The USSR and the Cuban R e v o l u t i o n , p. x v i i i . Compare t h i s t o R.Karmen's subsequent d e s c r i p t i o n of the a t t a c k e r s i n an I z v e s t i a a r t i c l e of November 6, 1960 as "a group of brave p a t r i o t s l e d by the b r o t h e r s F i d e l and Raul C a s t r o . " R.Karmen, "In the Heart of Cuba," I z v e s t i a . November 6, 1960, t r a n s l a t e d i n CDSP 12, no. 45 (1960), p. 21. 17. L u i s E. A g u i l a r , "Cuba and the L a t i n American Communist - 99 -P a r t i e s : T r a d i t i o n a l P o l i t i c s and G u e r r i l l a Warfare," i n The  New Cuban Presence i n the Caribbean, ed. Barry B. Levine (Boulder: Westview P r e s s , 1983), p. 107. 18. Jonathan S t e e l e , S o v i e t Power (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1983), p. 207. 19. Levesque, The USSR and the Cuban R e v o l u t i o n , p. xx. 20. I b i d . , p. x i x . 21. Papp, S o v i e t P e r c e p t i o n s o f the Developing World, p. x i . 22. " I t r a r e l y , i f ever, s e r v e s as a m o t i v a t i n g f a c t o r when other s t a t e i n t e r e s t s and o b j e c t i v e s are not a t s t a k e , but always must l e g i t i m a t e a c t i o n s t h a t are taken." I b i d . , p. x i . See the l a t e r S o v i e t r e a c t i o n t o C a s t r o ' s s o c i a l i s m . 23. Henrik B i s c h o f , "The S o c i a l i s t C o u n t r i e s and C e n t r a l American R e v o l u t i o n s , " i n P o l i t i c a l Change i n C e n t r a l America: I n t e r n a l _ a n d E x t e r n a l Dimensions, ed. Wolf Grabendorff e t a l . (Boulder: Westview P r e s s , 1984), p. 232. 24. J i r i V a l e n t a and V i r g i n i a V a l e n t a , " S o v i e t S t r a t e g y and P o l i c i e s i n the Caribbean B a s i n , " i n R i f t and R e v o l u t i o n : The  C e n t r a l American Imbroglio, ed. Howard J . Wiarda, (Washington: American E n t e r p r i s e I n s t i t u t e f o r P u b l i c P o l i c y Research, 1984), p. 206. 25. For example: I z v e s t i a . August 26, 1978; Pravda. September 3, 1978; Pravda. September 9, 1978; Pravda. September 16, 1978; Pravda. September 23, 1978. 26. W. Raymond Duncan, The S o v i e t Union and Cuba: I n t e r e s t s  and I n f l u e n c e (New York: Praeger, 1985), p. 166. 27. M o r r i s Rothenberg, "The S o v i e t s and C e n t r a l America," i n C e n t r a l America: Anatomy of C o n f l i c t , ed. Robert S. Leiken (New York: Pergamon P r e s s , 1984), p. 133. 28. The Caribbean Basin, o r , h e n c e f o r t h , the Caribbean, i n c l u d e s the Caribbean a r c h i p e l a g o (the E n g l i s h - s p e a k i n g i s l a n d s , Guyana, Suriname, French Guinea and B e l i z e ) , Mexico, the f i v e C e n t r a l American r e p u b l i c s , Panama, Colombia, and Venezuela. 29. Leon Goure and M o r r i s Rothenberg, S o v i e t P e n e t r a t i o n of  L a t i n America (Miami: Center f o r Advanced I n t e r n a t i o n a l S t u d i e s , 1975), p. v i . 30. For example, B a t i s t a was c a l l e d the "henchman of America" (V.Levin, "Cuba i s F i g h t i n g , Cuba w i l l Win!" Pravda. January 3, 1959, t r a n s l a t e d i n CDSP 11, no. 1 (1959), p. 30.) and "Wall S t r e e t stooge" (L.Kamynin, "Concerning F i d e l C a s t r o ' s V i s i t t o the USA," I z v e s t i a . A p r i l 26, 1959, t r a n s l a t e d i n CDSP 11:17 (1959), p. 25); Somoza was "the U.S. i m p e r i a l i s t s ' c h i e f henchman and policeman i n C e n t r a l America." (S.Losev, "A New L i f e f o r Nicaragua," I n t e r n a t i o n a l A f f a i r s . February 1981, p. 114. ) 31. V. L e v i n , "Cuba i s F i g h t i n g , Cuba W i l l Win!" Pravda. January 3, 1959, t r a n s l a t e d i n CDSP 11, no. 1 (1959), p. 30. 32. For example: Pravda. February 9, 1959; I z v e s t i a . A p r i l 10, 1959; Pravda. May 12, 1959; I z v e s t i a . August 5, 1959; Pravda. August 12, 1959. 33. For example: Pravda. January 3, 1959; I z v e s t i a . A p r i l 10, 1959; I z v e s t i a . A p r i l 26, 1959. 34. Levesque, The USSR and the Cuban R e v o l u t i o n , p. 13. In August and September, the S o v i e t s agreed t o purchase 270,000 tons of Cuban sugar i n 1959 and and 230,000 tons i n 1960. In - 100 -1955, the S o v i e t Union had purchased 442,000 tons and i n 1957, 351,000 tons. "The 1959 agreements...appear t o have been r o u t i n e commercial t r a n s a c t i o n s with l i t t l e p o l i t i c a l s i g n i f i c a n c e . " Edward Gonzalez, " C a s t r o ' s R e v o l u t i o n , Cuban Communist Appeals, and the S o v i e t Response," World P o l i t i c s 21, no. 1 (October 1968), note, pp. 56-57. 35. Cole B l a s i e r , The G i a n t ' s R i v a l : The USSR and L a t i n  America ( P i t t s b u r g h : U n i v e r s i t y o f P i t t s b u r g h Press, 1983), p. 44. 36. Vsevolod Ovchinnikov, "A Step Toward V i c t o r y , " Pravda. J u l y 19, 1979, t r a n s l a t e d i n CDSP 31, no. 29 (1979), p. 9. See Pravda. September 23, 1978 and June 25, 1979 f o r S o v i e t p r e r e v o l u t i o n a r y f o r e b o d i n g . 37. R. Tuchnin, "The Hour of V i c t o r y has Come," I z v e s t i a . J u l y 20, 1979, t r a n s l a t e d i n CDSP 31, no. 29 (1979), p. 9. 38. I b i d . , p. 9. 39. O.Ignatyev and L.Kostanyan, " T h e i r G r i e f i s Our G r i e f , " Pravda. J u l y 23, 1979, t r a n s l a t e d i n CDSP 31, no. 29 (1979), p. 10. 40. O.Ignatyev and L.Kostanyan, " F i r s t Steps on a D i f f i c u l t Path," Pravda. J u l y 25, 1979, t r a n s l a t e d i n CDSP 31, no. 29 (1979), p.10. 41. V a l e n t a , J i r i , "The USSR, Cuba, and the C r i s i s i n C e n t r a l America," O r b i s 25, no. 3 ( F a l l 1981), p. 738. 42. Rothenberg, "The S o v i e t s and C e n t r a l America," i n Leike n , C e n t r a l America, p. 133. 43. Theodore Shabad, "Nicaragua s a i d t o t r i p l e imports from S o v i e t , " New York Times. May 12, 1985, p. A8. 44. N. S. Khrushchev, Khrushchev Remembers, with I n t r o d u c t i o n , Commentary and Notes by Edward Crankshaw, t r a n s , and ed. Strobe T a l b o t t (New York: Bantam Books, 1971), p. 540. 45. The q u o t a t i o n s i n the above t h r e e sentences come from F. Parkinson, L a t i n America, the Cold War, and the World Powers.  1945-1973 ( B e v e r l y H i l l s : Sage P u b l i c a t i o n s , 1974), pp. 69-70. 46. Gonzalez, " C a s t r o ' s R e v o l u t i o n , " p. 42. " J a v i e r Pazos maintains t h a t u n t i l the middle o f 1960 F i d e l C a s t r o c o n s i d e r e d h i m s e l f as a N a s s e r - l i k e l e a d e r o f a n e u t r a l i s t movement i n L a t i n America, who thought t h a t the United S t a t e s would u l t i m a t e l y come t o terms with him." Parkinson, L a t i n America, p. 74. 47. Levesque, The USSR and the Cuban R e v o l u t i o n , p. 9. 48. Herbert S. D i n e r s t e i n , The Making of a M i s s i l e C r i s i s ( B a l t i m o r e : The John H o p k i n s . U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s , 1976), p. 37. 49. S t e e l e , S o v i e t Power, p. 217. 50. The phrase i s Levesque's. The USSR and the Cuban  R e v o l u t i o n , p. x x i . 51. C o l e B l a s i e r , The Hovering G i a n t : US Responses t o  Re v o l u t i o n a r y Change i n L a t i n America ( P i t t s b u r g h : U n i v e r s i t y of P i t t s b u r g h P r e s s , 1976), p.182. 52. Gonzalez, " C a s t r o ' s R e v o l u t i o n , " p. 40. 53. M e r r i t t Robbins, "The Soviet-Cuban R e l a t i o n s h i p , " i n S o v i e t  F o r e i g n P o l i c y i n the 1980s, ed. Roger E. Kanet (New York: Praeger, 1982) p. 149. 54. A r t u r o Cruz S e q u e i r a , "The O r i g i n s o f S a n d i n i s t a F o r e i g n P o l i c y , " i n L e i k e n , C e n t r a l America, p. 98. 55. "Great V i c t o r i e s t o You, Cubans," Pravda. February 16, - 101 -1960, t r a n s l a t e d i n CDSP 12, no. 7 (I960), p. 19. 56. Gonzalez, " C a s t r o ' s R e v o l u t i o n , " pp. 43, 49. 57. Andres Suarez, Cuba: Castroism and Communism. 1959-1966 (Cambridge, Mass.: The M.I.T. Press, 1967), p. 77. 58. Parkinson, L a t i n America, p. 73. See Gonzalez, " C a s t r o ' s R e v o l u t i o n , " pp. 49-53, f o r measures taken by C a s t r o t o r e o r i e n t h i s domestic and f o r e i g n p o l i c i e s t o a t t r a c t S o v i e t support. Suarez a l s o h o l d s t h i s l a t t e r view. 59. Gonzalez, " C a s t r o ' s R e v o l u t i o n , " p. 43. 60. Parkinson, L a t i n America, p. 74. 61. Gonzalez, " C a s t r o ' s R e v o l u t i o n , " pp. 61-66. At the time t h a t Cuban-Soviet d i p l o m a t i c r e l a t i o n s were r e s t o r e d . B i a s Roca, le a d e r of the PSP, was i n Moscow. Conv e r s a t i o n s with Roca may have encouraged Khrushchev t o s t r e n g t h e n t i e s with Cuba. Suarez, Cuba. p. 91. 62. For example, W i l l i a m M. LeoGrande w r i t e s t h a t "Washington's h o s t i l i t y drove Cuba i n t o the arms of the S o v i e t Union," and t h a t , "as h o s t i l i t y between Nicaragua and the United S t a t e s e s c a l a t e d , the S a n d i n i s t a s were pushed even f u r t h e r i n t o the arms o f Cuba and the S o v i e t Union f o r l a c k of any a l t e r n a t i v e . " "Cuba and Nicaragua: From the Somozas to the S a n d i n i s t a s , " i n L e v i n e , The New Cuban Presence i n the  Caribbean. pp. 50, 56. 63. There are i n d i c a t i o n s t h a t t h i s was a matter of p r i d e and C a s t r o intended to accept American a i d l a t e r on. On h i s way to the United S t a t e s i n A p r i l 1959, C a s t r o t o l d h i s f i n a n c e m i n i s t e r , Rufo Lopez-Fresquet, "Look Rufo, I don't want t h i s t r i p t o be l i k e t h a t of o t h e r new L a t i n American l e a d e r s who always come to the U.S. t o ask f o r money. I want t h i s t o be a g o o d - w i l l t r i p . B e s ides, the Americans w i l l be s u r p r i s e d . And when we go back t o Cuba, they w i l l o f f e r us a i d without our asking f o r i t . Consequently we w i l l be i n a b e t t e r b a r g a i n i n g p o s i t i o n . " B l a s i e r , The Hovering G i a n t , p. 181. 64. W i l l i a m M. Leogrande, "The United S t a t e s and Nicaragua," i n Nicaragua: The F i r s t F i v e Years, ed. Thomas W. Walker (New York: Praeger, 1985), p. 427. 65. Cruz S e q u e i r a , "The O r i g i n s o f S a n d i n i s t a F o r e i g n P o l i c y , " i n Leiken, C e n t r a l America, pp. 102-03. 66. Theodore Schwab and Harold Sims, " R e l a t i o n s with Communist S t a t e s , " i n Walker, Nicaragua, p. 460. 67. B l a s i e r , The Hovering Giant, p. 186. 68. Gonzalez, " C a s t r o ' s R e v o l u t i o n , " p. 57. 69. I b i d . , p. 57. 70. S. N. MacFarlane, Superpower R i v a l r y and S o v i e t P o l i c y i n  the Caribbean B a s i n . O c c a s i o n a l Papers No.l (Ottawa: Canadian I n s t i t u t e f o r I n t e r n a t i o n a l Peace and S e c u r i t y , 1986), p. 29. 71. Information on the development of Sino-Cuban r e l a t i o n s i n t h i s paragraph comes from Suarez, Cuba. pp. 91, 103, 116-118. 72. Stephen C l i s s o l d , ed., S o v i e t R e l a t i o n s with L a t i n America  1918-1968: A Documentary H i s t o r y (London: Oxford U n i v e r s i t y Press, 1970), p. 267. 73. MacFarlane, Superpower R i v a l r y and S o v i e t P o l i c y i n the  Caribbean, p. 45. 74. Leogrande "The United S t a t e s and Nicaragua," i n Walker, Nicaragua, p.434. 75. The 1980-81 f i g u r e s are from V a l e n t a and V a l e n t a , " S o v i e t - 102 -S t r a t e g y and P o l i c i e s i n the Caribbean B a s i n , " i n Wiarda, R i f t  and R e v o l u t i o n , p. 217. The 1982 f i g u r e s are from B l a s i e r , The  G i a n t ' s R i v a l , p. 45. 76. In 1981, S o v i e t e x p o r t s t o Nicaragua were worth 4.7 m i l l i o n r u b l e s , compared to 5.7 m i l l i o n r u b l e s of imports; the corresponding f i g u r e s f o r 1982 are 36.6 m i l l i o n and 5.9 m i l l i o n r u b l e s r e s p e c t i v e l y . Vneshnaya Tor g o v l y a . March 1984. 77. Pedro Ramet and Fernando Lopez-Alves, "Moscow and the R e v o l u t i o n a r y L e f t i n L a t i n America," O r b i s 28, no. 2 (Summer 1984), p. 354. 78. Pravda. February 24, 1981, t r a n s l a t e d i n CDSP 33, no. 8 (1981), p. 7. 79. Ramet and Lopez-Alves, "Moscow and the R e v o l u t i o n a r y L e f t L a t i n America," p. 354. 80. " F r a t e r n a l i s F r u g a l , " The Economist 283 (May 22-28, 1982), p. 52. 81. Ramet and Lopez-Alves, "Moscow and the R e v o l u t i o n a r y L e f t i n L a t i n America," p. 354. 82. 42.4 m i l l i o n r u b l e s worth of e x p o r t s were sent t o Nicaragua; 9.5 m i l l i o n r u b l e s worth of imports were r e c e i v e d i n the S o v i e t Union. Vneshnaya T o r q o v l y a . March 1984. 83. Rothenberg, "The S o v i e t s and C e n t r a l America," i n Leiken, C e n t r a l America, p. 141. 84. Cruz Seque i r a , "The O r i g i n s of S a n d i n i s t a F o r e i g n P o l i c y , " i n Leiken, C e n t r a l America, p. 106. 85. V a l e n t a and V a l e n t a , " S o v i e t S t r a t e g y and P o l i c i e s i n the Caribbean B a s i n , " i n Wiarda, R i f t and R e v o l u t i o n , p. 217. T h i s f i g u r e i s low compared to the estimated 1500 Cubans s t u d y i n g i n the USSR i n 1962, i n a d d i t i o n t o 1000 Cubans f i n i s h i n g a course i n a g r i c u l t u r e . C l i s s o l d , S o v i e t R e l a t i o n s with L a t i n America, p. 269. 86. " F r a t e r n a l i s F r u g a l , " p. 52. 87. Robert S. L e i k e n , " F a n t a s i e s and F a c t s : The S o v i e t Union and Nicaragua," Current H i s t o r y 83, no. 495 (October 1984), p. 344. 88. I b i d . , p. 344. 89. Schwab and Sims, " R e l a t i o n s with Communist S t a t e s , " i n Walker, Nicaragua. p. 454. 90. " R a i s i n g the Stakes," Time. May 13, 1985, p. 33. 91. Peter Clement, "Moscow and Nicaragua: Two S i d e s of S o v i e t P o l i c y , " Comparative S t r a t e g y 5, no. 1 (1985), p. 88. P r e s i d e n t Ortega met with Gorbachev while i n Moscow f o r Chernenko's f u n e r a l i n March 1985. 92. L e i k e n , " F a n t a s i e s and F a c t s , " p. 314. 93. Clement, "Moscow and Nicaragua," p. 89. 94. Theodore Shabad, "Nicaragua s a i d t o t r i p l e imports from S o v i e t , " New York Times. May 12, 1985, p. A8. 95. Robert S. L e i k e n , " S o v i e t and Cuban P o l i c y i n the Caribbean B a s i n , " i n R e v o l u t i o n and C o u n t e r r e v o l u t i o n i n  C e n t r a l America and the Caribbean, eds. Donald E. Schulz and Douglas H. Graham, (Boulder: Westview Pr e s s , 1984), p. 460. 96. Roger E. Kanet, " S o v i e t M i l i t a r y A s s i s t a n c e t o the T h i r d World," i n Communist Nations' M i l i t a r y A s s i s t a n c e , eds. John F. Copper and D a n i e l S. Papp (Boulder: Westview Pr e s s , 1983), pp. 41, 44. 97. Rothenberg, "The S o v i e t s and C e n t r a l America," i n L e i k e n , - 103 -C e n t r a l America, p. 141. 98. Goure and Rothenberg, S o v i e t P e n e t r a t i o n of L a t i n America, p. 133. 99. Levesque, The USSR and the Cuban R e v o l u t i o n , p. 22. 100. I b i d . , p. 22. 101. J o e l B r i n k l e y , "Cuba Case S a i d t o Cast Doubt on the Embargo," New York Times. May 2, 1985, p. A10. 102. Duncan, The S o v i e t Union and Cuba, p. 165. 103. MacFarlane, Superpower R i v a l r y and S o v i e t P o l i c y i n the  Caribbean B a s i n , p. 39. 104. L e i k e n , " S o v i e t and Cuban P o l i c y i n the Caribbean B a s i n , " i n Schulz and Graham, R e v o l u t i o n and C o u n t e r r e v o l u t i o n , p. 457. 105. Clement, "Moscow and Nicaragua, " p. 85. 106. Goure and Rothenberg, S o v i e t P e n e t r a t i o n of L a t i n America, p. 134. 107. Pravda. J u l y 10, 1960, t r a n s l a t e d i n CDSP 12, no. 28 (1960), p. 5. 108. B l a s i e r , The Hovering Giant, p. 198. 109. Levesque, The USSR and the Cuban R e v o l u t i o n , p. 20. Levesque suggests t h a t g i v e n the slowness of b u r e a u c r a c i e s and t h e i r r e l u c t a n c e t o become i n v o l v e d i n r i s k y s i t u a t i o n s , the S o v i e t s a c t u a l l y a d j u s t e d r a p i d l y t o Cuban events i n 1960-61. 110. C a s t r o i n s i s t e d i n an i n t e r v i e w on J u l y 10 t h a t the S o v i e t m i s s i l e o f f e r was " a b s o l u t e l y spontaneous" and t h a t the r o c k e t s o f f e r e d were r e a l , not " f i g u r a t i v e . " Suarez, Cuba, p. 93. 111. "The Monroe D o c t r i n e i s long s i n c e dead and w i l l no longer be o f help t o the i m p e r i a l i s t c o l o n i a l i s t s , " Tass statement, Pravda. J u l y 17, 1960, t r a n s l a t e d i n CDSP 12, no. 29 (1960), p. 17. Even i n a supposed c l a r i f i c a t i o n of the r o c k e t t h r e a t i n a c o n v e r s a t i o n with Cuban j o u r n a l i s t C a r l o s Franqui on October 22, 1960, Khrushchev d i d not g i v e a d e f i n i t i v e commitment. F r a n q u i : The i m p e r i a l i s t s are c l a i m i n g t h a t the S o v i e t government's statement on the p o s s i b i l i t y of using r o c k e t weapons i n the event of armed aggression a g a i n s t Cuba i s of p u r e l y symbolic s i g n i f i c a n c e . What do you t h i n k about t h i s ? Khrushchev: I should l i k e such a statement being made by the enemies of the Cuban r e v o l u t i o n t o be r e a l l y symbolic. T h i s r e q u i r e s t h a t the i m p e r i a l i s t s ' t h r e a t of i n t e r v e n t i o n a g a i n s t Cuba not t u r n i n t o m i l i t a r y o p e r a t i o n s . There would then be no n e c e s s i t y of t e s t i n g the r e a l i t y of our statement on armed a i d to the Cuban people a g a i n s t a g g r e s s i o n . Is t h a t c l e a r ? F r a n q u i : We too s h a l l use i t as a f i g u r a t i v e e x p r e s s i o n i n the event they h o l d o f f a t t a c k i n g us? Khrushchev: R i g h t . " F r a n q u i : But i f the t h r e a t does e x i s t , i f the t h r e a t m a t e r i a l i z e s , t h e r e are ample r o c k e t s i n r e a d i n e s s f o r t h i s ? Khrushchev: No q u e s t i o n about i t . Your understanding i s c o r r e c t . I t would be good i f there were no a g g r e s s i o n . And we're doing our utmost t o a v o i d l a u n c h i n g combat r o c k e t s , because the main t h i n g i s that people not be destroyed .... Pravda. October 30, 1960, t r a n s l a t e d i n CDSP 12, no. 44 (1960), - 104 -p. 7. 112. S o v i e t w r i t e r s accused the United S t a t e s of economic, p o l i t i c a l , d i p l o m a t i c and p s y c h o l o g i c a l p r e s s u r e on Cuba i n I n t e r n a t i o n a l A f f a i r s . August 1960. Plans f o r American a g g r e s s i o n were c i t e d i n : Pravda. J u l y 21, 1960; Pravda. November 1, 1960; I z v e s t i a . November 6, 1960; Pravda November 16, 1960; I z v e s t i a and Pravda. November 19, 1960; I n t e r n a t i o n a l  A f f a i r s . December 1960; I n t e r n a t i o n a l A f f a i r s . November 1961; I n t e r n a t i o n a l A f f a i r s . A p r i l 1962. 113. Levesque, The USSR and the Cuban R e v o l u t i o n , p. 24. 114. I b i d . , p. 23. 115. "Provocateurs Receive Rebuff," Pravda. January 6, 1961, t r a n s l a t e d i n CDSP 12, no. 1 (1961), p. 30. 116. Pravda. A p r i l 19, 1961, t r a n s l a t e d i n CDSP 13, no. 16 (1961), p. 5. 117. Levesque, The USSR and the Cuban R e v o l u t i o n , note, p. 28. 118. D i n e r s t e i n , The Making of a M i s s i l e C r i s i s , p. 137. The S o v i e t s a l s o p o i n t e d t o the i n t e r n a l s o l i d a r i t y and p o p u l a r i t y of the Cuban regime and the sympathy f o r Cuba throughout L a t i n America. Levesque, The USSR and the Cuban R e v o l u t i o n , p. 29. 119. Quoted i n Suarez, Cuba, p. 164. Khrushchev o b v i o u s l y changed h i s mind f o l l o w i n g l a t e r developments; he n e g l e c t s t o mention h i s ultimatum when d i s c u s s i n g the Bay of P i g s i n h i s memoirs. 120. C l e t o Di G i o v a n n i , J r . and Mose L. Harvey, C r i s i s i n  C e n t r a l America (Advanced I n t e r n a t i o n a l S t u d i e s I n s t i t u t e , 1982), p. 92. 121. M o r r i s Rothenberg, " L a t i n America i n S o v i e t Eyes," Problems of Communism 32, no. 5 (September-October 1983), pp. 10-11. 122. S e r g e i S v i s t u n o v , "The Aim of Operation O r i o n , " Pravda. October 29, 1981, t r a n s l a t e d i n CDSP 33, no. 43 (1981), p. 19. Other warnings of American m i l i t a r y i n t e r v e n t i o n can be found i n : I z v e s t i a . May 8, 1981; Pravda November 29, 1981; I z v e s t i a . January 8, 1982; Pravda. J u l y 23, 1982; Pravda. September 5, 1982; I z v e s t i a . November 11, 1982; I z v e s t i a . March 24, 1983; Pravda. October 26, 1983; Pravda. November 11, 1984; I n t e r n a t i o n a l A f f a i r s . A p r i l 1986. 123. R.Tuchnin, "In Gendarme's Role," I z v e s t i a . January 8, 1982, t r a n s l a t e d i n CDSP 34, no. 1 (1982), p. 17. 124. For example: Pravda. J u l y 23, 1982; I z v e s t i a . November 11, 1982. 125. Clement, "Moscow and Nicaragua," p. 81. 126. Rothenberg, " L a t i n America i n S o v i e t Eyes," p. 10. 127. Rothenberg, "The S o v i e t s and C e n t r a l America," i n L e i k e n , C e n t r a l America, p. 143. 128. "Yu. V. Andropov's Meeting with D.Ortega," Pravda. March 26, 1983, t r a n s l a t e d i n CDSP 35, no. 12 (1983), p. 20. 129. Clement^ "Moscow and Nicaragua," p. 79. The S o v i e t s sent on l y a low l e v e l d e l e g a t i o n t o the a n n i v e r s a r y c e l e b r a t i o n s . 130. I b i d . , p. 80. 131. Papp, S o v i e t P e r c e p t i o n s of the Developing World, p. 136. 132. Quoted i n S t e e l e , S o v i e t Power, p. 220. 133. A White Paper on Cuba i s s u e d by the S t a t e Department i n e a r l y 1961 on the "grave and urgent c h a l l e n g e " of C a s t r o ' s Cuba bears s t r i k i n g resemblance t o many o f f i c i a l documents on - 105 -Nicaragua: The c h a l l e n g e r e s u l t s from the f a c t t h a t the l e a d e r s of the r e v o l u t i o n a r y regime betrayed t h e i r own r e v o l u t i o n , d e l i v e r e d t h a t r e v o l u t i o n i n t o the hands of powers a l i e n to the hemisphere, and transformed i t i n t o an instrument employed with c a l c u l a t e d e f f e c t t o suppress the r e k i n d l e d hope of the Cuban people f o r democracy and to i n t e r v e n e i n the i n t e r n a l a f f a i r s o f other American Republics.. Theodore Draper, C a s t r o ' s R e v o l u t i o n : Myths and R e a l i t i e s (New York: Praegar, 1962), p. 93. 134. R i c h a r d H. Ullman, "At War with Nicaragua," F o r e i g n  A f f a i r s 62. no. 1 ( F a l l 1983), p. 43. 135. Ronald Reagan: "I t h i n k we are s e e i n g the a p p l i c a t i o n of the domino theory ... and I t h i n k i t ' s time the people of the United S t a t e s r e a l i z e ... t h a t we are the l a s t domino." I n t e r n a t i o n a l H erald Tribune. October 13, 1980. Quoted i n Wolf Grabendorff, "The I n t e r n a t i o n a l i z a t i o n of the C e n t r a l American C r i s i s , " i n P o l i t i c a l Change i n C e n t r a l America: I n t e r n a l and  E x t e r n a l Dimensions, eds. Wolf Grabendorff e t a l . (Boulder: Westview P r e s s , 1984), note, p. 170. 136. On February 21, 1985 Reagan confirmed t h a t i t was the A d m i n i s t r a t i o n ' s goal t o remove the S a n d i n i s t a government i f i t remained communist. "Reagan wants Nicaragua's S a n d i n i s t a r u l e r s t o say ' u n c l e , ' " The Globe and M a i l . February 22, 1985, p. 8. 137. American m i l i t a r y a i d t o Honduras rose from $3.9 m i l l i o n i n F i s c a l Year 1980 t o $78.5 m i l l i o n i n FY 1984, while the number of American m i l i t a r y personnel went from 26 to 346. W i l l i a m M. Leogrande, "The U n i t e d S t a t e s and Nicaragua," i n Walker, Nicaragua. p. 437. The development of a i r s t r i p s i n Honduras l a r g e enough f o r American tro o p t r a n s p o r t s to land on, and the i n s t a l l a t i o n of a s o p h i s t i c a t e d radar and e l e c t r o n i c s u r v e i l l a n c e system f o r use i n the area suggest t h a t the Americans are p r e p a r i n g f o r the e v e n t u a l i t y of d i r e c t American p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n the c o n f l i c t . 138. Operation B i g Pine i n February 1982 i n v o l v e d 1,600 American p e r s o n n e l ; B i g Pine I I , which began i n the summer of 1983, i n c l u d e d a t o t a l of nineteen American warships engaging i n manoeuvres o f f the Nicaraguan c o a s t and 6,000 American troops p a r t i c i p a t i n g i n war games i n Honduras. 139. Edward Gonzalez, "The Cuban and S o v i e t Challenge i n the Caribbean B a s i n , " O r b i s 29. n o . l (Spring 1985), p. 93. 140. G. V a s i l y e v , "Urgent Fury," Pravda. Oct.31, 1983, t r a n s l a t e d i n CDSP 35, no.44 (1983), p. 16. 141. E. Nitoburg, "An Act of B a n d i t r y A g a i n s t Grenada," I n t e r n a t i o n a l A f f a i r s . February 1984, p. 68. See a l s o "Washington's T e r r o r i s m , " I z v e s t i a . November 1, 1983, t r a n s l a t e d i n CDSP 35, no.44 (1983), p.16. 142. S o v i e t r e f e r e n c e s t o American p r o v o c a t i o n s a g a i n s t Cuba: Pravda. A p r i l 18, 1980; Pravda. A p r i l 29, 1980; I z v e s t i a . May 9, 1980; Pravda. November 9, 1981. 143. J i r i V a l e n t a , "The Soviet-Cuban A l l i a n c e i n A f r i c a and the Caribbean," The World Today 37, no.2 (February 1981), p. 52. 144. Max A z i c r i , "Cuba and the United S t a t e s : What Happened to Rapprochement?" i n Levine, The New Cuban Presence i n the  Caribbean, p. 177. - 106 -145. Rothenberg, " L a t i n America i n S o v i e t Eyes," p. 4. 146. Rothenberg, "The S o v i e t s and C e n t r a l America," i n L e i k e n , C e n t r a l America, p. 134. 147. Duncan, The S o v i e t Union and Cuba, p. 165; " R a i s i n g the Stakes," p. 33. 14S. L e i k e n , " F a n t a s i e s and F a c t s , " 344. 149. V a l e n t a and V a l e n t a , " S o v i e t S t r a t e g y and P o l i c i e s i n the Caribbean B a s i n , " i n Wiarda, R i f t and R e v o l u t i o n , p. 218. W. Raymond Duncan, ed., S o v i e t P o l i c y i n the T h i r d World (New York: Pergamon P r e s s , 1980), p. 176, g i v e s the f i g u r e s 70 S o v i e t versus 2,000 Cuban m i l i t a r y p e r s o n n e l . Whoever may be c o r r e c t , i t i s c l e a r t h a t Cubans f a r outnumber S o v i e t s i n Nicaragua. 150. L e i k e n , " F a n t a s i e s and F a c t s , " p. 345. 151. S t e e l e , S o v i e t Power, p. 68 152. Wolfgang Berner, " S o v i e t I n t e r e s t s and P o l i c i e s i n C e n t r a l America," i n The S o v i e t Union 1982-85. eds. K a r i n Schmid e t a l . (New York: Holmes and Meier, 1985), p. 314. 153. Clement, "Moscow and Nicaragua," p. 82. 154. Miguel Acoca, "Why Fear Nicaragua?" New York Times. March 26, 1985, p. A27. 155. Clement, "Moscow and Nicaragua," p. 83; "Tough Tug of War," Time. March 31, 1986, p. 15. 156. C a r o l S a i v e t z and S y l v i a Woodby. S o v i e t - T h i r d World  R e l a t i o n s . (Boulder: Westview P r e s s , 1985), p. 87. 157. "Cuba has achieved i t s r e v o l u t i o n independently and has f r e e l y chosen the path of s o c i a l i s t development, which i s best s u i t e d t o ensure i t s r a p i d and e f f e c t i v e development and the h i g h e s t m a t e r i a l and s p i r i t u a l l i v i n g standards f o r i t s people." Quoted i n C l i s s o l d , S o v i e t R e l a t i o n s with L a t i n America, p. 264. Pravda and I z v e s t i a d i d not mention t h i s nor speak of s o c i a l i s m i n Cuba. Levesque, The USSR and the Cuban R e v o l u t i o n , p. 30. 158. An A p r i l 11 Pravda e d i t o r i a l s a i d Cuba was " a t the stage of s o c i a l i s t t r a n s f o r m a t i o n . " Levesque, The USSR and the Cuban  R e v o l u t i o n , p. 37. 159. Y. Gvozdev, "Cuba: Seven M i l l i o n Columbuses," I n t e r n a t i o n a l A f f a i r s . June 1963, p.71. 160. Khrushchev, Khrushchev Remembers, p. 546. 161. Levesque, The USSR and the Cuban R e v o l u t i o n , p. 32. 162. Stephen T. Hosmer and Thomas W. Wolfe. S o v i e t P o l i c y and  P r a c t i c e Toward T h i r d World C o n f l i c t s (Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books, 1983), p. 16. 163. Khrushchev, Khrushchev Remembers, pp. 544-45. 164. A l l quotes i n t h i s paragraph are from Ramet and Lopez-A l v e s , "Moscow and the R e v o l u t i o n a r y L e f t i n L a t i n America," p. 353. 165. DiGiovanni and Harvey, C r i s i s i n C e n t r a l America, p. 93. 166. MacFarlane, Superpower R i v a l r y and S o v i e t P o l i c y i n the  Caribbean, p.44. 167. Schwab and Sims, " R e l a t i o n s with Communist S t a t e s , " i n Walker, Nicaragua. p.455. 168. Suarez, Cuba, p. 155. 169. Papp, S o v i e t P e r c e p t i o n s of the Developing World, pp. 38, 100. 170. Rothenberg, " L a t i n America i n S o v i e t Eyes," p. 10. 171. Papp, S o v i e t P e r c e p t i o n s of the Developing World, p. 71. 172. Pravda. May 7, 1961, t r a n s l a t e d i n CDSP 13, no.18 - 107 -(1961), p. 7. 173. S t e e l e , S o v i e t Power, p. 221. 174. L e i k e n , " F a n t a s i e s and F a c t s " , p. 316. 175. Leon Goure with M o r r i s Rothenberg, " L a t i n America," i n The S o v i e t Union i n World P o l i t i c s , ed. Kurt London (Boulder: Westview P r e s s , 1980), p. 234. 176. S t e e l e , S o v i e t Power, p. 177. 177. Adam B. Ulam, Dangerous R e l a t i o n s . (New York: Oxford U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s , 1983), pp. 245-47. 178. S t e e l e , S o v i e t Power, p. 209. 179. D i n e r s t e i n , The Making of a M i s s i l e C r i s i s , p. 144. 180. MacFarlane, Superpower R i v a l r y and T h i r d World  R a d i c a l i s m , p. 170. 181. Levesque, The USSR and the Cuban R e v o l u t i o n , p. 62. 182. MacFarlane, Superpower R i v a l r y and T h i r d World  R a d i c a l i s m . p. 171. 183. Levesque, The USSR and the Cuban R e v o l u t i o n , p. 35. 184. MacFarlane, Superpower R i v a l r y and T h i r d World  R a d i c a l i s m . p. 163. 185. D i n e r s t e i n , The Making of a M i s s i l e C r i s i s , p. 147. 186. MacFarlane, Superpower R i v a l r y and T h i r d World  R a d i c a l i s m . p. 172. 187. Levesque, The USSR and the Cuban R e v o l u t i o n , p. 64. 188. MacFarlane, Superpower R i v a l r y and T h i r d World  R a d i c a l i s m . p. 137. 189. I b i d . , p. 166. 190. M.Kremnev, "Two Years of Cuban R e v o l u t i o n , " Ekonomicheskava gazeta. December 31, 1960, t r a n s l a t e d i n CDSP 13, n o . l (1961), p. 31. 191. "N.S.Khrushchev's Press Conference f o r S o v i e t and F o r e i g n J o u r n a l i s t s , J u l y 12, 1960." Pravda. J u l y 13, 1960, t r a n s l a t e d i n CDSP 12, no. 28 (1960), p. 9. 192. "Now s o c i a l i s m r a t h e r than i m p e r i a l i s m has become the d e c i s i v e f o r c e o f world p o l i c y . . . . The cause of peace i s a l s o being upheld by the p e a c e - l o v i n g s t a t e s o f A s i a , A f r i c a and L a t i n America, which occupy an a n t i - i m p e r i a l i s t p o s i t i o n and, together with the s o c i a l i s t c o u n t r i e s , form an ever-expanding zone of peace." B. Ponomarev, " P e a c e f u l Coexistence i s a V i t a l N e c e s s i t y , " Pravda. August 12, 1960, t r a n s l a t e d i n CDSP 12, no. 32 (1960), p. 4. 193. S. M i k h a i l o v , "The Cuban R e v o l u t i o n and L a t i n America," I n t e r n a t i o n a l A f f a i r s . December 1963, p. 45. 194. G. N. Shevyakov, Member of S t a t e committee of the c o u n c i l o f m i n i s t e r s o f the USSR on e x t e r n a l economic r e l a t i o n s , " S o v i e t Cooperation with Cuba," I n t e r n a t i o n a l A f f a i r s . March 1962, pp. 74-75. 195. Vsevolod Ovchinnikov, "A Step Toward V i c t o r y , " Pravda. J u l y 19, 1979, t r a n s l a t e d i n CDSP 31. no. 29 (1979), p. 9. 196. Rothenberg, "The S o v i e t s and C e n t r a l America," i n Le i k e n , C e n t r a l America, p. 133. 197. Papp, S o v i e t P e r c e p t i o n s of the Developing World, p. 16. 198. "The Monroe D o c t r i n e i s long s i n c e dead and w i l l no longer be of help t o the I m p e r i a l i s t c o l o n i a l i s t s , " TASS Statement, Pravda. J u l y 17, 1960, t r a n s l a t e d i n CDSP 12, no. 29 (1960), p. 16. 199. Di Giovanni and Harvey, C r i s i s i n C e n t r a l America, p. 43. - 108 -200. Yevg. B a i , " E l Salvador a f t e r the Coup," I z v e s t i a . October 26, 1979, t r a n s l a t e d i n CDSP 31, no. 43 (1979), p. 18. 201. Gonzalez, "The Cuban and S o v i e t Challenge i n the Caribbean B a s i n , " p. 80. 202. The Report of the P r e s i d e n t ' s N a t i o n a l B i p a r t i s a n  Commission on C e n t r a l America (New York: Macmillan, 1984), p. 107. 203. Gonzalez, "The Cuban and S o v i e t Challenge i n the Caribbean B a s i n , " p. 81. 204. I b i d . , p. 81. 205. I b i d . , p. 79. 206. Ramet and Lopez-Alves, "Moscow and the R e v o l u t i o n a r y L e f t i n L a t i n America," p. 352. 207. S.Mikhailov, "The Cuban R e v o l u t i o n and L a t i n America," I n t e r n a t i o n a l A f f a i r s . December 1963, p. 46. 208. "Old Promises i n New Wrapping," I z v e s t i a . A p r i l 12, 1961, t r a n l a t e d i n CDSP 13, no. 15 (1961), p. 30. 209. "The Cuban R e v o l u t i o n and L a t i n America," I n t e r n a t i o n a l  A f f a i r s . December 1963, p. 45. I t was a l s o f e l t t h a t the r e v o l u t i o n u n i t e d a n t i - i m p e r i a l i s t f o r c e s i n L a t i n America and l e d t o a l e f t w a r d swing amongst the L a t i n American middle c l a s s e s , p. 48. 210. Ramet and Lopez-Alves, "Moscow and the R e v o l u t i o n a r y L e f t i n L a t i n America," pp. 351-52. 211. I b i d . , p. 352. 212. L e i k e n , " S o v i e t and Cuban P o l i c y i n the Caribbean B a s i n , " i n Schulz and Graham, R e v o l u t i o n and C o u n t e r r e v o l u t i o n , p. 455. 213. Gonzalez, "The Cuban and S o v i e t Challenge i n the Caribbean B a s i n , " p. 78. 214. L a t i n s k a y a Amerika E d i t o r Sergo Mikoyan i n B l a s i e r , The  G i a n t ' s R i v a l . p. 95. 215. Gonzalez, "The Cuban and S o v i e t Challenge i n the Caribbean B a s i n , " note, p. 80. 216. The Report of the P r e s i d e n t ' s N a t i o n a l B i p a r t i s a n  Commission on C e n t r a l America, p. 107. 217. Ramet and Lopez-Alves, "Moscow and the R e v o l u t i o n a r y L e f t i n L a t i n America," p. 358. 218. L e i k e n , " F a n t a s i e s and F a c t s , " p. 317. 219. Rothenberg, " L a t i n America i n S o v i e t Eyes," p. 13. 220. Ramet and Lopez-Alves, "Moscow and the R e v o l u t i o n a r y L e f t i n L a t i n America," p. 350. 221. L e i k e n , " S o v i e t and Cuban P o l i c y i n the Caribbean B a s i n , " i n Schulz and Graham, R e v o l u t i o n and C o u n t e r r e v o l u t i o n , p. 471. 222. Rothenberg, "The S o v i e t s and C e n t r a l America," i n L e i k e n , C e n t r a l America, p. 146. 223. S o v i e t government statement, Pravda. October 26, 1983, t r a n s l a t e d i n CDSP 35, no. 43 (1983), p. 25. 224. E d i t o r i a l . "Washington's T e r r o r i s m , " I z v e s t i a . November 1, 1983, t r a n s l a t e d i n CDSP 35, no. 44 (1983), p. 16. 225. For example, see Richard P i p e s , " S o v i e t G l o b a l S t r a t e g y , " Commentary 69, no. 4 ( A p r i l 1980), pp. 36-39. 226. I t i s n e i t h e r the i n t e n t i o n nor w i t h i n the scope of t h i s paper t o comment on the i n t e r n a l c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s of Nicaragua which may l e a d one t o conclude t h a t i t i s , or i s not, "another Cuba. " 227. 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