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ASEAN's diplomatic strategy after the Vietnamese invasion of Kampuchea Darmono, Juanita Amanda 1987

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ASEAN'S DIPLOMATIC STRATEGY AFTER THE VIETNAMESE INVASION OF KAMPUCHEA By JUANITA AMANDA DARMONO B.A., The U n i v e r s i t y o f B r i t i s h C o l u m b i a , 1986 A THESIS SUBMITTED I N PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF MASTER OF ARTS i n THE FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIES ( D e p a r t m e n t o f P o l i t i c a l S c i e n c e ) We a c c e p t t h i s t h e s i s a s c o n f o r m i n g t o t h e r e q u i r e d s t a n d a r d THE UNIVERSITY OF B R I T I S H COLUMBIA O c t o b e r 1987 © J u a n i t a Amanda Darmono, 1987 In presenting this thesis in partial fulfilment of the requirements for an advanced degree at the University of British Columbia, I agree that the Library shall make it freely available for reference and study. I further agree that permission for extensive copying of this thesis for scholarly purposes may be granted by the head of my department or by his or her representatives. It is understood that copying or publication of this thesis for financial gain shall not be allowed without my written permission. Department of fbUTtCAL SC\EHC& The University of British Columbia 1956 Main Mall Vancouver, Canada V6T 1Y3 DE-6G/81) i i A b s t r a c t T h i s t h e s i s examines the d i p l o m a t i c s t r a t e g y adopted by the A s s o c i a t i o n o f Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) i n response t o the 1978 Vietnamese i n v a s i o n of Cambodia and the subsequent s h i f t i n the r e g i o n a l d i s t r i b u t i o n of power with regard t o the s e c u r i t y of the ASEAN n a t i o n s . I argue t h a t ASEAN has demonstrated c o n s i d e r a b l e success i n p r e v e n t i n g a c o l l a p s e of r e g i o n a l order i n Southeast A s i a . I t i s important t o understand t h a t ASEAN i s a product and t o o l o f i t s members' f o r e i g n p o l i c y and should t h e r e f o r e be assessed i n the f o r e i g n p o l i c y , r a t h e r than i n the r e g i o n a l i n t e g r a t i o n i s t , context. T h i s w i l l be examined from the p o i n t o f view of a group of r e l a t i v e l y weak, i n s i g n i f i c a n t s t a t e s w i t h i n the i n t e r n a t i o n a l arena, h i s t o r i c a l l y plagued by c o n f l i c t and i n t e r v e n t i o n by e x t e r n a l powers, exacerbated by a h i s t o r y of i n t r a - r e g i o n a l enmity r a t h e r than c o o p e r a t i o n , m i l i t a r y weakness, and no c o l l e c t i v e t r a d i t i o n of d i p l o m a t i c e x p e r t i s e . Yet, d e s p i t e these shortcomings and ASEAN's p r e v i o u s i n a b i l i t y t o come toge t h e r on i s s u e s o f economic i n t e g r a t i o n , ASEAN's response t o the T h i r d Indochina c o n f l i c t has allowed i t s member n a t i o n s t o maintain t h e i r independence, p r e s e r v e t h e i r freedom of a c t i o n , r a l l y i n t e r n a t i o n a l support, and c o n f r o n t the gre a t powers i n v o l v e d i n t h i s i s s u e through the use of a r e g i o n a l o r g a n i z a t i o n . T h i s t h e s i s w i l l a l s o counter the p r e v a i l i n g view t h a t e x i s t i n g intra-ASEAN d i f f e r e n c e s r e g a r d i n g the primary e x t e r n a l t h r e a t i n the i s s u e (namely Vietnam, China or the S o v i e t Union) have s e r i o u s l y d i v i d e d i t s members to the p o i n t o f p o t e n t i a l l y t h r e a t e n i n g the o r g a n i z a t i o n ' s e x i s t e n c e . Instead, I w i l l argue t h a t the combination of ASEAN's c u r i o u s mode of " c o n f l i c t r e s o l u t i o n " through " c o n f l i c t avoidance", as w e l l as i t s d i p l o m a t i c " d i v i s i o n o f l a b o u r , " have e f f e c t i v e l y i n c o r p o r a t e d e x i s t i n g intra-ASEAN d i f f e r e n c e s as b a r g a i n i n g a s s e t s f o r the o r g a n i z a t i o n ' s p o l i t i c a l v i a b i l i t y . These i n t e r n a l c leavages have been f a r from r e s o l v e d or r e c o n c i l e d , but r a t h e r s k i r t e d over by a web of unw r i t t e n laws, i m p l i c i t r u l e s and mutual understandings r e g a r d i n g one another's accepted r o l e w i t h i n the o r g a n i z a t i o n . T h i s i m p l i c i t "regime" has served s e v e r a l purposes: i t has allowed ASEAN t o s u s t a i n i t s image of u n i t y , boosted i t s p o l i t i c a l v i s a b i l i t y i n the i n t e r n a t i o n a l forum, and prevented the " l o s s o f f a c e " of f e l l o w members on p o i n t s o f c o n t e n t i o n . Research f o r t h i s t h e s i s was conducted i n p a r t at the ASEAN S e c r e t a r i a t and the Center f o r S t r a t e g i c and I n t e r n a t i o n a l S t u d i e s (CSIS) i n J a k a r t a , and the I n s t i t u t e of Southeast Asian S t u d i e s (ISEAS) i n Singapore. i v TABLE OF CONTENTS A b s t r a c t i i Acknowledgements v 1. INTRODUCTION 1 ASEAN: A Case Study 6 2. ASEAN, 1967-1978: ECONOMIC ASPIRATIONS VERSUS POLITICAL REALITIES 15 I n c e n t i v e s and C o n s t r a i n t s 15 The F i r s t Decade 24 Decision-Making: The "ASEAN" Way 38 The S t r a t e g i c Context: ZOPFAN and the B a l i Summit..41 China's R e l a t i o n s h i p t o the Region 47 C o n c l u s i o n 52 3. THE INVASION OF KAMPUCHEA AND ITS CONSEQUENCES 54 The China Dilemma 64 The S o v i e t Dilemma 70 The United S t a t e s Dilemma 74 4. ASEAN'S DIPLOMATIC STRATEGY 78 I n t r o d u c t i o n 78 The C o a l i t i o n Government of Democratic Kampuchea...84 M a i n t a i n i n g U n i t y : ASEAN i n the I n t e r n a t i o n a l Forum 88 Indonesia's "Dual-Track" Diplomacy 98 Vietnam: S t r a t e g y and T a c t i c s 107 The ASEAN Response 112 C o n c l u s i o n s : At the Impasse 117 CONCLUSION 123 CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS 130 BIBLIOGRAPHY 131 V Acknowledgements I would l i k e t o g r a t e f u l l y acknowledge the f o l l o w i n g people: Kal H o l s t i , my t h e s i s a d v i s o r , with a p o l o g i e s f o r i n f r i n g i n g upon h i s p r e c i o u s s a b b a t i c a l time; Diane Mauzy f o r her support and f r i e n d s h i p d u r i n g my time at U.B.C.; t o Mr. Bambang G u r i t n o of the Indonesian Consulate i n Vancouver, f o r h i s a s s i s t a n c e i n p r e p a r i n g my r e s e a r c h ; and t o Mr. Endang T a h i r f o r h i s p a t i e n c e i n b a t t l i n g the b u r e a u c r a c i e s of J a k a r t a . To Martin, a s p e c i a l thank you f o r enduring the agonies of e n d l e s s p r o o f - r e a d i n g . And f i n a l l y , t o my parents, f o r t h e i r c o n t i n u a l l o v e and support. 1 Chapter One: I n t r o d u c t i o n T h i s t h e s i s examines and e v a l u a t e s the attempt, by a group of s m a l l s t a t e s , to use a r e g i o n a l o r g a n i z a t i o n to c o o r d i n a t e t h e i r f o r e i g n p o l i c i e s i n c o n f r o n t i n g a d i v e r s e range of e x t e r n a l t h r e a t s to t h e i r i n d i v i d u a l and c o l l e c t i v e s e c u r i t y . Small n a t i o n s i n a p o s i t i o n where they are p o t e n t i a l l y or a c t u a l l y t h r eatened by Great Powers f a c e a d i s t i n c t s e c u r i t y dilemma. Not only are they not f r e e to choose p o l i c i e s independently of the Great Powers, but the s o l u t i o n t o any " s e c u r i t y dilemma" must come from an o u t s i d e source i n i n s t a n c e s where o u t s i d e support i s o f t e n ambiguous. R a r e l y can s m a l l s t a t e s merely i n c r e a s e t h e i r own power t o a f f e c t the outcome. They may r i s e by t h e i r own e f f o r t s , but u l t i m a t e l y they need and d e s i r e r e c o g n i t i o n by the Great Powers bef o r e they can become e f f e c t i v e members of the i n t e r n a t i o n a l s o c i e t y . Economically, s m a l l n a t i o n s s u r v i v e by v i r t u e of t r a d e and s p e c i a l i z a t i o n , but s u b j e c t to the v a g a r i e s of the i n t e r n a t i o n a l system, these are at the same time t h e i r s t r e n g t h s and t h e i r weaknesses. P o l i t i c a l l y , s m a l l n a t i o n s have more d i f f i c u l t y i n m a i n t a i n i n g a high g u a l i t y of l e a d e r s h i p over a long p e r i o d , f o r as P o l i t i c a l S e c r e t a r y (Defence) B r i g a d i e r - G e n e r a l Lee Hsieng Loong of Singapore once remarked, "the t a l e n t p o o l i s s m a l l e r . 2 and [because o f ] the danger of mediocracy by d e f a u l t , government by the mediocre i s always p r e s e n t . " 1 On matters of n a t i o n a l s e c u r i t y , t h e r e are few p o l i c y o p t i o n s and l i m i t e d c h o i c e s , and the margin of e r r o r i s u s u a l l y s m a l l or n o n - e x i s t e n t . With few resources, u n c e r t a i n f r i e n d s and a s m a l l area of t e r r i t o r y , c a u t i o n and f e a r of t a k i n g r i s k s c h a r a c t e r i z e s t h e i r f o r e i g n p o l i c y , which i s o f t e n marked by a p r e o c c u p a t i o n with short-term concerns to the o b f u s c a t i o n of a long-range p e r s p e c t i v e . For a s m a l l s t a t e , the danger of "gambler's r u i n " i s a c u t e l y preeminent i n a game which they cannot d e c l i n e to play. M a i n t a i n i n g autonomy over one's n a t i o n a l d e c i s i o n s , and s e c u r i t y from e x t e r n a l and i n t e r n a l attack, are important to both developed and d e v e l o p i n g c o u n t r i e s . For the powerful s t a t e s the l o g i c f o l l o w s t h a t the more autonomous they are, the more t h e i r s e c u r i t y i s enhanced. E q u a l l y , the more secure a n a t i o n i s , the more i s autonomy a v a i l a b l e . For s m a l l s t a t e s , however, the r e v e r s e i s o f t e n t r u e . Lacking the power or r e s o u r c e s t o defend themselves a g a i n s t enemies ( r e a l or imagined), they are o f t e n compelled to s a c r i f i c e a p o r t i o n of t h e i r autonomy f o r e x t e r n a l m i l i t a r y p r o t e c t i o n . Whether i t i s i n p o l i t i c a l , economic or m i l i t a r y matters, f o r a s m a l l s t a t e an i n c r e a s e i n s e c u r i t y almost always e n t a i l s some l o s s of autonomy or v i c e v e r s a . s 1. B r i g a d i e r - G e n e r a l Lee Hsiang Loong, " S e c u r i t y Options f o r Small S t a t e s , " S t r a i t s Times (Singapore), 6 Nov. 1984. 2. See M a r s h a l l R. Singer, "The F o r e i g n P o l i c i e s of Small Developing S t a t e s , " i n World P o l i t i c s , eds. James N. Rosenau, Kenneth W. Thompson and Gavin Boyd (New York: The Free Press, 1976), p. 289. 3 R o t h s t e i n w r i t e s t h a t those s m a l l n a t i o n s not i n a p o l i t i c a l l y exposed or s t r a t e g i c area have achieved what one might c a l l a "negative" s e c u r i t y by v i r t u e of t h e i r own weakness. 3 The l a c k of an i n d u s t r i a l base and governmental framework encourage the s m a l l hope t h a t they can be p r o t e c t e d by t h e i r own i n s i g n i f i c a n c e , being too detached, d i s i n t e r e s t e d and powerless to a f f e c t i s s u e s . P o l i c i e s of n e u t r a l i t y and non-alignment may be adopted to l i m i t entanglement with the Great Powers, but are s e n s i b l e o n l y i f the s m a l l n a t i o n i s s t r a t e g i c a l l y i r r e l e v a n t and p o l i t i c a l l y non-provocative. For them, the p r i n c i p l e s of s o v e r e i g n t y and r e s p e c t f o r t e r r i t o r i a l i n t e g r i t y are the essence of s u r v i v a l , which i s why a t h r e a t by a Great Power c o n s t i t u t e s no l e s s than a t o t a l t h r e a t to t h e i r independent e x i s t e n c e . On the other hand, t h e i r very powerlessness and yet equal r i g h t to an audience i n o r g a n i z a t i o n a l forums permit them to be f o r t h r i g h t l y c r i t i c a l of Great Power p o l i c i e s . T h e i r i n s i s t e n c e on p e a c e f u l procedures b l u r s the d i s t i n c t i o n between the m i l i t a r i l y powerful and the m i l i t a r i l y weak, p r o v i d i n g a forum f o r some d i p l o m a t i c p r e s t i g e and s o p h i s t i c a t i o n . As L i s k a remarks: Having g u i t e a s p e c i a l i n t e r e s t i n i n t e r n a t i o n a l o r g a n i z a t i o n , the s m a l l e r s t a t e s l i k e t o v i s u a l i z e themselves as a q u a l i t a t i v e and moral f a c t o r i n world a f f a i r s . They s t r e s s normative p r i n c i p l e s a g a i n s t power and e x c e s s i v e p o l i t i c a l d i s c r e t i o n ; o b j e c t i v i t y , independence, and good f a i t h a g a i n s t opportunism and s a t e l l i t i s m . They wish t o shape the s t r u c t u r a l e q u i l i b r i u m so as t o maximize t h e i r i n f l u e n c e and compensate f o r t h e i r weakness.* 3. Robert L. R o t h s t e i n , A l l i a n c e s and Small Powers (New York: Columbia U n i v e r s i t y Press, 1968), pp. 18-22. 4. L i s k a , I n t e r n a t i o n a l E q u i l i b r i u m , op. c i t . , p. 67. 4 Small s t a t e s are o f t e n a l s o new s t a t e s whose f r a g i l e i n t e r n a l s t r u c t u r e s make them v u l n e r a b l e t o e x t e r n a l e x p l o i t a t i o n and manipulation. P o l i t i c a l i n s t i t u t i o n s such as p a r t i e s , o f f i c e s , and e l e c t i o n s are at the embryonic stage and o f t e n facades f o r i n s t i t u t i o n a l i z e d p e r s o n a l r u l e , c o r r u p t i o n and nepotism -- Indonesia and T h a i l a n d being examples. For others, such as Malaysia, e t h n i c f a c t i o n s , schisms, c l a s s s t r u g g l e s and r e l i g i o u s s t r i f e c o n s t i t u t e fundamental and p o t e n t i a l l y e x p l o s i v e problems. High r a t e s of economic growth are not accompanied by a c o r r e s p o n d i n g r a t e of d i s t r i b u t i o n , c r e a t i n g huge d i s p a r i t i e s i n economic wealth and f e r t i l e breeding ground f o r i n s u r g e n t groups. These weaknesses, i n turn, a t t r a c t e x t e r n a l o p p o r t u n i s t s who w i l l d e l i b e r a t e l y manipulate or exacerbate e x i s t i n g problems t o f a c i l i t a t e t h e i r i n t r u s i o n . I t i s t h e r e f o r e i n a p p r o p r i a t e to emphasize the s t r u c t u r e of the e x t e r n a l environment on s m a l l s t a t e s ' f o r e i g n p o l i c y d e c i s i o n s t o the e x c l u s i o n of domestic c o n s i d e r a t i o n s . Given t h a t the f o r e i g n p o l i c i e s of s t a t e s -- and p a r t i c u l a r l y s m a l l s t a t e s -- are a f f e c t e d by t h e i r i n t e r n a l and e x t e r n a l s t r u c t u r a l c o n s t r a i n t s , what s t r a t e g i e s are a v a i l a b l e to s m a l l s t a t e s t h a t are threatened by l a r g e r e x t e r n a l powers? F i r s t , they may be a b l e t o manipulate the a s s e t s valued by the l a r g e power, such as " r e a l e s t a t e " f o r m i l i t a r y bases, economic concessions, as w e l l as d i p l o m a t i c support. In extreme cases, they may engage i n " c o m p e t i t i v e b i d d i n g " between the l a r g e powers, as North Korea has managed to do f o r decades v i s - a - v i s China and the S o v i e t Union. On the other hand, the s m a l l power 5 may have to ba r g a i n from a p o s i t i o n of weakness by p l e a d i n g the i n a b i l i t y t o do something d e s i r e d by the l a r g e r power due to i t s economic or p o l i t i c a l weakness. Other b a r g a i n i n g t a c t i c s which may be used a r e : p r o c r a s t i n a t i o n , b l u f f i n g , m a n i p u l a t i n g i n f o r m a t i o n , s t a g i n g s u r p r i s e performances which w i l l i m p l i c a t e the l a r g e power, and engaging i n what i s c a l l e d " i n t e r s e c t i n g n e g o t i a t i o n s , " when the advantage goes t o the p a r t y t h a t can p e r s u a s i v e l y p o i n t t o an a r r a y of other n e g o t i a t i o n s i n which i t s p o s i t i o n would be p r e j u d i c e d i f i t made a c o n c e s s i o n on t h i s one. s A l l i a n c e s are t r a d i t i o n a l balance o f power s t r a t e g i e s t o i n c r e a s e a s t a t e ' s b a r g a i n i n g power by a s c r i b i n g t o a phi l o s o p h y -- i n i t s s i m p l e s t terms -- of "one f o r a l l and a l l f o r one". The g o a l o f a m i l i t a r y a l l i a n c e i s t o d e t e r p o t e n t i a l aggressors by c l e a r l y i n d i c a t i n g t o an enemy t h a t an a t t a c k upon any of i t s members w i l l be countered by combined f o r c e s . A p o l i t i c a l a l l i a n c e i s a s t r a t e g y o f d i p l o m a t i c support c o n d i t i o n e d by the nature of the immediate environment. I t i s a defence of the s t a t u s quo a g a i n s t m i l i t a r y r e v i s i o n , or a g a i n s t p o t e n t i a l l y dangerous c o n f i g u r a t i o n s of power. One should s t r e s s t h a t the d i s t i n c t i o n between a p o l i t i c a l and m i l i t a r y a l l i a n c e i s not c l e a r l y drawn nor mutually e x c l u s i v e . As R o t h s t e i n p o i n t s out, " I t i s , o f course, d i f f i c u l t t o f i n d a p u r e l y m i l i t a r y a l l i a n c e , without p o l i t i c a l undertones, as i t would be to f i n d a p o l i t i c a l a l l i a n c e from which some m i l i t a r y b e n e f i t s were not sought." s 5. See f o r example, C h a r l e s E. Morrison and A s t r i Suhrke, S t r a t e g y f o r Small S t a t e S u r v i v a l (New York: St. Mar t i n ' s Press, 1978), esp. chapt. 1. 6. R o t h s t e i n , op. c i t . , p. 50. 6 One p o s s i b l e d i s t i n c t i o n , he suggests, i s between those designed t o cope with an immediate t h r e a t as opposed to a d i s t a n t or p o t e n t i a l t h r e a t . I f the t h r e a t i s a p o t e n t i a l one, c o n c e i v a b l y the a l l i a n c e must c o n c e n t r a t e on p o l i t i c a l g o a l s u n t i l the t h r e a t takes form. The d e c i s i o n to a l l y , however, r a r e l y stems from p r i n c i p l e and i s i n s t e a d a c a l c u l a t i o n of expediency. To quote L i s k a : " A l l i a n c e s are a g a i n s t , and o n l y d e r i v a t e l y f o r , someone or something. The sense of community may c o n s o l i d a t e a l l i a n c e s ; i t r a r e l y b r i n g s them about." 7 S t a t e s r a r e l y a l i g n f o r the sake of f r i e n d s h i p . The system of i n t e r n a t i o n a l r e l a t i o n s i s motivated by s e l f - i n t e r e s t , s u s p i c i o n , d i s t r u s t and f e a r , and f o r t h i s reason a l l i a n c e s and r e g i o n a l o r g a n i z a t i o n s are only e f f e c t i v e so long as they serve the i n t e r e s t s of t h e i r members. T h e i r value r e s t s on t h e i r a b i l i t y t o p r o v i d e order, p r e d i c t a b i l i t y and p r e c i s i o n to a s i t u a t i o n and community of i n t e r e s t s . They f a c i l i t a t e common a c t i o n , and add c r e d i b i l i t y t o t h r e a t s by e n s u r i n g t h a t a c t i o n w i l l be c o l l e c t i v e . As w i l l be i l l u s t r a t e d by the s m a l l s t a t e s of ASEAN, they may a l s o improve t h e i r c o l l e c t i v e b a r g a i n i n g power, r e g i o n a l l y as w e l l as i n t e r n a t i o n a l l y . ASEAN: A Case Study ASEAN r e f u s e s t o be r e f e r r e d to as a s e c u r i t y a l l i a n c e and p u r p o r t e d l y e n t e r t a i n s no i n t e n t i o n s of becoming one. C r i t i c s 7. L i s k a , Nations i n A l l i a n c e , op. c i t . , p. 12. 7 have r e f e r r e d t o i t as a "gentlemen's t e a p a r t y , " as an acronym f o r (A)lways ( S ) e n s a t i o n a l (E)xcept ( A ) f t e r <M)egotiations, as w e l l a s f o r (A)dhoc ( S ) t r a t e g i c ( E ) n t i t y of an (A)mbiguous (N) a t u r e . 8 Indeed, a c c o r d i n g t o much of the e x i s t i n g l i t e r a t u r e on the s u b j e c t , the c l i m a t e o f c a u t i o u s s k e p t i c i s m f o l l o w i n g the c r e a t i o n of ASEAN has p r o g r e s s i v e l y g i v e n way to one of i n c r e a s i n g impatience and s k e p t i c i s m , p a r t i c u l a r l y a s the success of i t s c o u n t e r p a r t , the European Economic Community (EEC), i s o f t e n the i m p l i c i t y a r d s t i c k f o r e v a l u a t i o n . For the s i x member n a t i o n s o f the A s s o c i a t i o n of Southeast Asian Nations T h a i l a n d , Malaysia, Indonesia, Singapore, the P h i l i p p i n e s , and s i n c e 1984, Brunei -- the f a c t t h a t ASEAN has s u r v i v e d a s an autonomous r e g i o n a l o r g a n i z a t i o n i s i t s e l f an achievement. Given Southeast A s i a ' s s t r a t e g i c importance and the un s t a b l e p o l i t i c a l c l i m a t e o f the 1960s, t h e r e was understandable c o n f u s i o n around ASEAN's ne b u l o u s l y d e f i n e d s t a t u s as a " r e g i o n a l o r g a n i z a t i o n . " Was i t to be a r e g i o n a l p o l i t i c a l and s e c u r i t y a l l i a n c e l i k e SEATO, the A s i a n arm of America's post-war f o r e i g n p o l i c y ? Was i t an attempt t o make Southeast A s i a a f r e e - t r a d e area l i k e the EEC? Or was i t t o be an indigenous, anti-communist f r o n t along the l i n e s of i t s d i s m a l l y i l l - f a t e d predecessors, the A s s o c i a t i o n of Southeast A s i a (ASA) and MAPHILINDO (an acronym of Malaysia, P h i l i p p i n e s and Indonesia)? 8. See Guy S a c e r d o t i , " P h i l i p p i n e s : What's i n i t f o r us? Not a l l t h a t much." Far E a s t e r n Economic Review, 13 August 1982; K a r l D. Jackson and M. Hadi Soesastro, eds., ASEAN S e c u r i t y and Economic Development (Berkeley, C a l i f . : I n s t i t u t e o f East A s i a n S t u d i e s , 1983). 8 The Bangkok D e c l a r a t i o n , ASEAN's c o n s t i t u t i o n a l mandate at i t s f o r m a t i o n i n 1967, b r i e f l y d e f i n e d ASEAN's aim and purpose as being "to a c c e l e r a t e the economic growth, s o c i a l p rogress and c u l t u r a l development i n the r e g i o n through j o i n t endeavors... B References to r e g i o n a l i n t e g r a t i o n as an o b j e c t i v e , or to p o l i t i c a l and s e c u r i t y concerns i n the document were c o n s p i c u o u s l y absent. Whether the Bangkok D e c l a r a t i o n ' s d e l i b e r a t e vagueness was a s i g n of prudence and accommodation, or i f i t was an i n s t i t u t i o n a l i z e d c a r t e blanche to non-commitment and i n c o n s i s t e n c y , i e open to debate. What seems evident, however, i s t h a t ASEAN has had to s t r u g g l e a g a i n s t the l e g a c i e s of i t s r e g i o n a l predecessors i n s t r i v i n g t o a s s e r t i t s own i d e n t i t y . Throughout i t s development ASEAN has spent as much energy i n arguing a g a i n s t what, as a r e g i o n a l o r g a n i z a t i o n , i t i s not r a t h e r than what i t i s . ASEAN's i n i t i a l ambiguity about i t s e l f i s e v i d e n t i n a r e t r o s p e c t i v e speech by Singapore's F o r e i g n M i n i s t e r at ASEAN's annual M i n i s t e r i a l Meeting i n 1974: You may r e c o l l e c t at the f i r s t meeting i n 1967, when we had to d r a f t our communique, i t was a very d i f f i c u l t problem of t r y i n g t o say nothing i n ten pages, which we d i d . Because at t h a t time we o u r s e l v e s having launched ASEAN, were not q u i t e sure where i t was going or whether i t was going anywhere at a l l . 9 In i t s broadest terms, r e g i o n a l i n t e g r a t i o n i s based on t h r e e f a c t o r s : p o l i t i c a l convergence, geographic p r o x i m i t y and economic f u n c t i o n a l i s m . I t envisages the harmonization of 9. ASEAN's Seventeenth F o r e i g n M i n i s t e r s ' Meeting, May 1974 i n J a k a r t a . In K.K. Nair, ASEAN-Indochina R e l a t i o n s Since 1975:  The P o l i t i c s of Accommodation (Canberra: A u s t r a l i a U n i v e r s i t y Press, 1984), p. 2. 9 i n t e r e s t s based on a d i v i s i o n of labour, g r e a t e r s p e c i a l i z a t i o n and mutual reinforcement, l e a d i n g t h e o r e t i c a l l y t o p o l i t i c a l and economic union. " I n t e g r a t i o n " i t s e l f i s a process whereby p o l i t i c a l and s o c i a l a c t o r s s h i f t e x p e c t a t i o n s , l o y a l t i e s and a c t i v i t i e s t o new ce n t e r s , u s u a l l y e n t a i l i n g some degree of s a c r i f i c e i n i n the n a t i o n a l i n t e r e s t f o r t h a t of the r e g i o n a l c o l l e c t i v e whole. Acco r d i n g t o E r n s t B. Haas, the study o f r e g i o n a l i n t e g r a t i o n i s l a r g e l y normative, "concerned with tasks, t r a n s a c t i o n s , p e r c e p t i o n s , and l e a r n i n g , not with s o v e r e i g n t y , m i l i t a r y c a p a b i l i t y , and balances o f power...It r e f u s e s t o dichotomize the behavior of a c t o r s between "high" p o l i t i c a l and "low" f u n c t i o n a l concerns; i t i s preoccupied with a l l concerns of a c t o r s i n s o f a r as they can be used f o r s k e t c h i n g processes f o r ad a p t a t i o n and l e a r n i n g f r e e from c o e r c i o n . " 1 0 Examined a g a i n s t t h i s model, ASEAN a c c o r d i n g t o i t s c r i t i c s i s a weak example of r e g i o n a l i n t e g r a t i o n . 1 1 A f t e r twenty years of defending i n t e g r a t i o n as a "process; not a c o n d i t i o n , " i n t r a -ASEAN t r a d e remains a sad 15 percent of t o t a l t r a d e ( i n c o n t r a s t to 60 percent f o r i n t r a - E E C t r a d e ) . The r e g i o n i s a l s o plagued by huge d i s p a r i t i e s i n economic and i n d u s t r i a l development among i t s members which e f f e c t i v e l y s t i f l e s agreement on economic c o o p e r a t i o n -- l e t alone hopes f o r economic i n t e g r a t i o n i n the 10. See E r n s t B. Haas, "The Study of Regional I n t e g r a t i o n : R e f l e c t i o n s on the Joy and Anguish of P r e t h e o r i z i n g " i n Regional  P o l i t i c s and World Order, eds. R i c h a r d A. F a l k and Saul H. Mendlovitz, (San F r a n c i s c o : W. H. Freeman and Co., 1973), p. 104. 11. See f o r example, Susumo Awanohara, " P l a t i t u d e s , pious hopes and m e d i o c r i t y , " Far E a s t e r n Economic Review, 15 March 1984, pp. 61-63; P a i s a l S r i c h a r a t c h a n y a , "Was ASEAN r e a l l y planned t o move as s l o w l y as t h i s , " Far E a s t e r n Economic Review, 15 March 1984, pp. 65-68. near f u t u r e . As d e v e l o p i n g c o u n t r i e s , the ASEAN c o u n t r i e s are j u s t emerging from an i m p o r t - s u b s t i t u t i o n p o l i c y and s t i l l r e l u c t a n t to f o r c e the degree of economic r a t i o n a l i z a t i o n needed f o r i n t e g r a t i o n . With regard to ASEAN's achievements i n s o c i a l and c u l t u r a l i n t e g r a t i o n , mention "ASEAN" to the t y p i c a l Southeast A s i a n v i l l a g e r and i t w i l l mean l i t t l e - 1 8 I t i s t h e r e f o r e i r o n i c t h a t where ASEAN as a r e g i o n a l o r g a n i z a t i o n has been most a c t i v e , p a r t i c u l a r l y s i n c e the post-1978 events i n Cambodia, i s i n the p o l i t i c a l and s e c u r i t y f i e l d s , even though i t l a c k s the formal s t r u c t u r e of a c o l l e c t i v e s e c u r i t y o r g a n i z a t i o n , and imposes no m i l i t a r y o b l i g a t i o n s on member s t a t e s . Consequently, ASEAN i s not an example of " i n t e g r a t i o n " , but n e i t h e r i s i t a s e c u r i t y " a l l i a n c e " . N evertheless, as Donald Weatherbee p o i n t s outs, ASEAN i s more than a j u s t a "cumulation of ad hoc e p i s o d i c adventures i n c o o p e r a t i o n . " 1 3 The study of r e g i o n a l i n t e g r a t i o n i s concerned with e x p l a i n i n g how and why s t a t e s cease to be wholly s o v e r e i g n . I t i s concerned with "how and why they v o l u n t a r i l y mingle, merge, and mix with t h e i r neighbours so as to l o s e the f a c t u a l a t t r i b u t e s of s o v e r e i g n t y while a c q u i r i n g new techniques f o r 12. For a q u a n t i t a t i v e a n a l y s i s i n the t r a n s n a t i o n a l i s t t r a d i t i o n see H. Monte H i l l , "Community f o r m a t i o n w i t h i n ASEAN", I n t e r n a t i o n a l O r g a n i z a t i o n , 32 ( S p r i n g 1978), pp. 61-63. H i l l argues t h a t community for m a t i o n w i t h i n ASEAN i s more myth than r e a l i t y . For a c o n t r a r y view, see E s t r e l l a D. Solidum, Towards a  Southeast A s i a n Community (Quezon C i t y : U n i v e r s i t y of P h i l i p p i n e s Press, 1976), pp. 210-211. 13. Donald Weatherbee, "ASEAN Regionalism: The S a l i e n t Dimension", i n ASEAN S e c u r i t y and Economic Development, eds. K a r l D. Jackson and M. Hadi S o e s a s t r o (Berkeley, C a l i f o r n i a : I n s t i t u t e of East Asian S t u d i e s , 1983), p. 264. 11 r e s o l v i n g c o n f l i c t s among themselves. Regional c o o p e r a t i o n , o r g a n i z a t i o n , systems and subsystems should not be confused with the r e s u l t i n g c o n d i t i o n . " 1 * However, r e g i o n a l o r g a n i z a t i o n s of new s t a t e s u s u a l l y r e p r e s e n t instruments f o r enhancing n a t i o n a l independence, autonomy, b a r g a i n i n g s t r e n g t h , and a n t i - c o l o n i a l sentiments, r a t h e r than as a v e h i c l e f o r r e g i o n a l i n t e g r a t i o n i n the E.E.C. sense. For example, ASEAN and i t s d e v e l o p i n g c o u n t e r p a r t s , the O r g a n i z a t i o n of American S t a t e s (OAS), the O r g a n i z a t i o n of A f r i c a n U n i t y (OAU) and the Arab League p r o v i d e a forum to s e t t l e intra-member d i s p u t e s and f o s t e r a common p o l i c y i n f a c e of i n t e r v e n t i o n from o u t s i d e the r e g i o n . A r e g i o n a l o r g a n i z a t i o n c o n s t i t u t e s the i n s t i t u t i o n a l i z e d form of i n t e r - s t a t e c o o p e r a t i o n . Yet the measure of i t s "success" i s too o f t e n e v a l u a t e d i n terms of the o r g a n i z a t i o n as the c e n t e r of concern r a t h e r than i t s impact upon i t s members. For the r o l e and e f f e c t i v e n e s s of i n t e r n a t i o n a l o r g a n i z a t i o n s stem not so much from t h e i r f o r m a l - l e g a l covenants as from the changing c o n f i g u r a t i o n s and d i s t r i b u t i o n s of power, systemic i s s u e s and f o r c e s , and the a t t i t u d e s and r e s o u r c e s of member s t a t e s . The approach taken by t h i s study, t h e r e f o r e , assumes the n a t i o n a l i n t e r e s t s of the member n a t i o n s as the independent v a r i a b l e s , with ASEAN as the dependent v a r i a b l e . ASEAN, with regard to the Indochina i s s u e , c o n s t i t u t e s a t o o l of t h e i r f o r e i g n p o l i c y outputs and must, t h e r e f o r e be examined i n the f o r e i g n p o l i c y , r a t h e r than the i n t e g r a t i o n i s t , context. 14. Haas, op. c i t . , p. 108. 12 The Vietnamese i n v a s i o n of Kampuchean was s i g n i f i c a n t f o r thr e e reasons. F i r s t , i t a s s e r t e d Vietnam's s t a t u s as a r e g i o n a l , hegemonic power. Second, the r e s u l t i n g improvement i n S i n o - T h a i r e l a t i o n s r e i n t r o d u c e d s u s p i c i o n s w i t h i n ASEAN concerning China's r e g i o n a l ambitions. T h i r d , f o r the f i r s t time the S o v i e t -Vietnamese a l l i a n c e has p r o j e c t e d the S o v i e t f a c t o r i n t o ASEAN s e c u r i t y concerns, and therewith, the s p i l l o v e r i n t o Southeast A s i a of e x i s t i n g S i n o - S o v i e t t e n s i o n s . The fundamental p o i n t of c o n t e n t i o n among the ASEAN members on the Indochina i s s u e i s the d i f f e r i n g p e r c e p t i o n s over which s t a t e c o n s t i t u t e s the primary r e g i o n a l t h r e a t -- Vietnam at the l o c a l , immediate l e v e l ; or China as a l a t e n t , though p o t e n t i a l l y g r e a t e r long-term t h r e a t . Given t h i s disagreement, and the h i s t o r i c a l t r a d i t i o n of r e g i o n a l enmity, s u s p i c i o n and l a c k of p o l i t i c a l c o o p e r a t i o n , why have the Southeast Asian l e a d e r s chosen t o speak through the v o i c e of ASEAN r a t h e r than t o d e a l with the p e r c e i v e d t h r e a t s b i l a t e r a l l y and c o n c e i v a b l y with g r e a t e r expedience, at l e s s c o s t t o t h e i r i n d i v i d u a l i n t e r e s t s ? More s p e c i f i c a l l y , how have the ASEAN l e a d e r s manipulated t h e i r d i f f e r e n c e s i n t o an e q u i l i b r i u m of complementary d i p l o m a t i c competence? Far from attempting t o r e s o l v e or, at a minimum, to r e c o n c i l e t h e i r d i f f e r i n g t h r e a t p e r c e p t i o n s and i n t e r e s t s , e x i s t i n g i n t e r n a l t e n s i o n s are manifested i n ASEAN's h i g h l y c a u t i o u s and s u b t l e path of d i p l o m a t i c maneuvering between i t s members, Vietnam, China and the S o v i e t Union. T h i s unconventional s t r a t e g y of " t i p - t o e i n g " around hidden d i p l o m a t i c landmines has proven s u r p r i s i n g l y e f f e c t i v e as a model of 13 r e g i o n a l p o l i t i c a l c o o p e r a t i o n toward c o n f l i c t r e s o l u t i o n . The s t r a t e g y and i t s r e s u l t s w i l l be the focus o f t h i s t h e s i s . ASEAN, i n t h i s study, w i l l be approached i n the f o r e i g n p o l i c y context of i t s member n a t i o n s . On a broader, t h e o r e t i c a l l e v e l i t w i l l be examined i n the f o r e i g n p o l i c y context of a group of sma l l , r e l a t i v e l y weak n a t i o n s t h a t f a c e the dilemma of being d i r e c t l y i n v o l v e d , p o l i t i c a l l y and s t r a t e g i c a l l y , i n r e l a t i o n t o the Great Powers. Chapter two w i l l p r o v i d e a b r i e f , c o n t e x t u a l h i s t o r y of ASEAN as a r e g i o n a l o r g a n i z a t i o n -- the p o l i t i c a l c l i m a t e which spurred i t s c r e a t i o n , both at the r e g i o n a l and systemic l e v e l , the o r g a n i z a t i o n ' s u n d e r l y i n g p h i l o s o p h y and r a i s o n d'etre, and i t s e v o l u t i o n i n f a c e o f changing power c o n f i g u r a t i o n s throughout the 1970s. Chapters t h r e e and f o u r w i l l d i s c u s s the Vietnamese i n v a s i o n i n t o Cambodia i n 1978, the subseguent s h i f t i n the r e g i o n a l balance of power and i t s impact upon ASEAN, and fo c u s on ASEAN's d i p l o m a t i c s t r a t e g y t o preserve i t s r e g i o n a l s e c u r i t y and freedom of a c t i o n i n the f a c e o f armed agg r e s s i o n . In p a r t i c u l a r , Chapter f o u r w i l l i l l u s t r a t e ASEAN's demonstration of d i p l o m a t i c r e s o u r c e f u l n e s s , and t a c t i c a l maneuvering, while m a i n t a i n i n g a u n i f i e d v o i c e , which would not have been p o s s i b l e i f i t had become the r i g i d l y s t r u c t u r e d , h i g h l y i n t e g r a t e d r e g i o n a l o r g a n i z a t i o n advocated by i t s c r i t i c s . I w i l l conclude t h i s study by a s s e s s i n g ASEAN's f o r m i d a b l e accomplishments i n the wake of the Indochinese c o n f l i c t . T h i s c o n c l u s i o n , however, w i l l a l s o q u e s t i o n the p r o s p e c t s f o r ASEAN's more long-term development as a m u l t i - d i m e n s i o n a l r e g i o n a l o r g a n i z a t i o n , and whether i t w i l l 14 be a b l e t o channel i t s r e c e n t d i p l o m a t i c and p o l i t i c a l success i n t o p o l i c i e s which address i t s more de e p l y - r o o t e d economic and s t r u c t u r a l shortcomings. 15 CHAPTER TWO ASEAN, 1967-1978; Economic A s p i r a t i o n s versus P o l i t i c a l R e a l i t i e s I n c e n t i v e s and C o n s t r a i n t s R i c h i n n a t u r a l resources, d i v e r s e i n c u l t u r e , language and r e l i g i o n , b o a s t i n g a t o t a l p o p u l a t i o n of about 200 m i l l i o n , and spanning the s t r a t e g i c S t r a i t s of Malacca to the Indian Ocean and the South China Sea, Southeast A s i a has long been an area c o u r t e d by the l a r g e powers. With Indonesia under t h r e e hundred years of Dutch r u l e , M a l a y s i a and Singapore under the B r i t i s h , and the P h i l i p p i n e s under the Spanish to be l a t e r succeeded by the United S t a t e s , T h a i l a n d i s the o n l y Southeast A s i a n country spared the e x p e r i e n c e of c o l o n i a l i s m . T h i s was due i n l a r g e p a r t to the d i p l o m a t i c a s t u t e n e s s of T h a i l a n d ' s r u l e r s who were ab l e to balance and accommodate t h e i r European s u i t o r s . L i k e many former c o l o n i e s , the r e s i d u e of c o l o n i a l i s m i n Southeast A s i a was manifested i n i t s impeded i n d u s t r i a l and economic development, embryonic p o l i t i c a l i n s t i t u t i o n s , low l e v e l s of p o l i t i c a l s o c i a l i z a t i o n , and a d i s t i n c t l y f r a g i l e sense of s o c i a l cohesion and n a t i o n a l u n i t y . One of the major themes s t r e s s e d by many Asi a n l e a d e r s and statesmen who urged v a r i o u s forms of c o o p e r a t i o n i s t h a t some degree of "Asianess," though 16 not u n i t y , e x i s t e d i n the r e g i o n b e f o r e i t was carved and b a l k a n i z e d by the Europeans. T h i s process of b a l k a n i z a t i o n , they argue, exacerbated r a t h e r than a l l e v i a t e d p r e - e x i s t i n g , i n t r a -r e g i o n a l f e a r s and s u s p i c i o n s . 1 3 S t r u c t u r a l l y , economic t i e s were more tuned to the r e s p e c t i v e "motherlands" than with r e g i o n a l neighbours of o f t e n s i m i l a r r a c i a l and c u l t u r a l a f f i n i t y . I n t r a - r e g i o n a l communication as a p r e - r e q u i s i t e t o r e g i o n a l development was so d i f f i c u l t t h a t i t had not been p o s s i b l e t o make d i r e c t c o n t a c t between Bangkok and Kuala Lumpur, or between Saigon and Djakarta, or Rangoon and Manila, f o r such communications would have to be f o r m a l l y and c o r r e c t l y addressed to some Western c a p i t a l s and l i t e r a l l y t r a n s m i t t e d h a l f around the world b e f o r e e v e n t u a l l y r e a c h i n g t h e i r intended d e s t i n a t i o n . * 6 Thanat Khoman, F o r e i g n M i n i s t e r of T h a i l a n d and one of the i n i t i a l founders of ASEAN, e l a b o r a t e d on the s i t u a t i o n as f o l l o w s : the m o t i v a t i o n s which prompted me to push the i d e a of r e g i o n a l c o o p e r a t i o n were l e s s l o f t y and i d e a l i s t i c but stemmed from more p r a c t i c a l and r e a l i s t i c c o n s i d e r a t i o n s , among them the f a c t t h a t Southeast Asian n a t i o n s are c o m p a r a t i v e l y weak and s m a l l . . . S e p a r a t e l y , they r e p r e s e n t l i t t l e , i f any, s i g n i f i c a n c e i n world a f f a i r s . P o l i t i c a l l y , they are " b a l k a n i z e d " by prolonged d i v e r s e c o l o n i a l r u l e which o r i e n t e d them towards t h e i r r e s p e c t i v e m e t r o p o l i t a n c e n t e r s r a t h e r than towards t h e i r neighbours i n the a r e a . . . 1 7 15. Bernard K. Gordon, The Dimensions of C o n f l i c t i n Southeast  A s i a (New J e r s e y : P r e n t i c e - H a l l , 1966), pp. 163-164. 16. P r i n c e Wan Waith Yaskorn, Regional Economic Cooperation: ASA-ASEAN and ASPAC (Bangkok, 1968), p. 1. Quoted i n B a s i c Documents of Asian R e g i o n a l O r g a n i z a t i o n s , V o l . VIII, ed. Micheal Haas (New York: Oceana Pub., 1980), p. 2. 17. "The 'ASEAN' Problems and P r o s p e c t s i n Changing World," i n The ASEAN: Problems and P r o s p e c t s i n a Changing World, S a r a s i n V i r a p h o l et. a l . , (Bangkok: Chulalongkorn U n i v e r s i t y , 1976), p. 4; quoted i n C h a r l e s E. Morrison and A s t r i Suhrke, S t r a t e g i e s of 17 Indeed, the p r e v a i l i n g p o l i t i c a l c l i m a t e on the eve of ASEAN's fo r m a t i o n was c e r t a i n l y not conducive to r e g i o n a l c o o p e r a t i o n . Because of the Vietnam war and as p a r t of i t s l a r g e r p o l i c y of containment, the United S t a t e s drew i n c r e a s i n g l y c l o s e r t o T h a i l a n d and the P h i l i p p i n e s f o r access to naval bases and other b i l a t e r a l m i l i t a r y c o o p e r a t i o n . Indonesia at t h i s time was t r y i n g t o break out of i t s r e g i o n a l i s o l a t i o n brought on by Sukarno's " k o n f r o n t a s i " episode a g a i n s t M a l a y s i a ( r a l l i e d by the slogan of "Crush M a l a y s i a ! " ) . 1 8 Malay-Indonesian r e l a t i o n s reached t h e i r lowest p o i n t d u r i n g the p e r i o d of k o n f r o n t a s i i n 1963, d u r i n g which "angry v e r b a l exchanges continued between J a k a r t a and Kuala Lumpur, with Sukarno and the Tunku a p p a r e n t l y v y i n g with each other i n t h e i r search f o r the most o f f e n s i v e e p i t h e t s t o h u r l a c r o s s the Java S e a . " 1 9 The k o n f r o n t a s i i n c i d e n t l e d t o Indonesia's dubious "withdrawal" from the United Nations, while Sukarno's flamboyant a n t i - c o l o n i a l r h e t o r i c appealed more to A f r i c a n and communist n a t i o n s than to Indonesia's Southeast Asian neighbours. In Singapore, r a c i a l t e n s i o n s between the Chinese and Malay communities l e d to i t s e x p u l s i o n from the F e d e r a t i o n of Malaysia. As a t i n y , newly-independent c i t y - s t a t e sandwiched between two i n h o s p i t a b l e Malay neighbours, Singapore had l e g i t i m a t e s e c u r i t y concerns though l i t t l e c l o u t i n the S u r v i v a l : The F o r e i g n P o l i c y Dilemmas of Smaller A s i a n S t a t e s (New York: St. M a r t i n ' s Press, 1978), p. 265. 18. For a d i s c u s s i o n on " k o n f r o n t a s i " see Bernard K. Gordon, op. c i t . , chapt. 3. 19. J.D. Legge. Sukarno: A P o l i t i c a l Biography (London: A l l e n Lane Press, 1972), p. 366; i n R e g i o n a l O r g a n i z a t i o n and Order i n Southeast A s i a , A r n f i n n Jorgensen-Dahl, (London: Macmillan Press, 1982)," p. 172. 18 i n t e r n a t i o n a l arena. However, M a l a y s i a was perhaps i n the most unenviable p o s i t i o n , f o r i n a d d i t i o n to the t e n s i o n s with Indonesia and Singapore, T h a i - M a l a y s i a n r e l a t i o n s were s t r a i n e d over a l a c k of governmental c o o p e r a t i o n to c o n t r o l t h e i r insurgency movements. The Communist Party of Malaya g u e r r i l l a s (who were predominantly Chinese) o f t e n enjoyed s a n c t u r i e s a c r o s s T h a i l a n d ' s border because of Thai r e l u c t a n c e to allow t h e i r p u r s u i t by Malaysian troops, while the Malaysian government r e f u s e d t o allow the p u r s u i t of Thai Muslim r e b e l s i n t o Malaysian t e r r i t o r y because of s t r o n g I s l a m i c sentiments i n the border s t a t e s of Kelantan, Kedah and P e r i l s . s 0 R e l a t i o n s between Ma l a y s i a and the P h i l i p p i n e s were e q u a l l y s t r a i n e d by the unresolved Sabah i s s u e . 8 1 Located on the n o r t h e r n t i p of the i s l a n d of Borneo, Sabah was t r a n s f e r r e d to some B r i t i s h a dventurers i n 1878 a f t e r they had secured r i g h t s t o the t e r r i t o r y from i t s dual claimants, the S u l t a n of Sulu and the S u l t a n of Brunei. The crux of the c u r r e n t d i s p u t e l i e s i n the document, si g n e d by the S u l t a n of Sulu, which concludes with the ambiguous Malay word padjak, which i n 1878 c o u l d have meant e i t h e r t o l e a s e or to cede. The P h i l i p p i n e government c l a i m s t h a t t h i s 1878 agreement p r o v i d e d merely f o r the lease, r a t h e r than the c e s s i o n of the Sabah t e r r i t o r y . Sabah came under Malaysian j u r i s d i c t i o n when Mal a y s i a was e s t a b l i s h e d i n 1963, and has s i n c e remained a s u b j e c t of f r i c t i o n between the two governments. 20. Rodney Tasker, "ASEAN '82: Musyawarah gets the key to the door," Far E a s t e r n Economic Review, 13 August 1982, p. 42. 21. For a d i s c u s s i o n of the Sabah i s s u e , see Gordon, op., c i t . , chapt. 1. 19 ASEAN was not the f i r s t indigenous attempt to b u i l d r e g i o n a l c o o p e r a t i o n . The A s s o c i a t i o n of Southeast A s i a (ASA) was e s t a b l i s h e d i n J u l y 1961, s e t t i n g f o r i t s e l f a s i m i l a r s e t of g u i d e l i n e s based on promoting s o c i a l w e l l - b e i n g and r e g i o n a l economic progress. However, Sukarno r e f u s e d t o j o i n , branding the a s s o c i a t i o n as "a stooge of SEATO and the American i m p e r i a l i s t s , " s 2 thus l i m i t i n g ASA's membership to o n l y T h a i l a n d , M a l a y s i a and the P h i l i p p i n e s . Consequently, ASA lapsed i n t o limbo when the P h i l i p p i n e s broke o f f r e l a t i o n s with M a l a y s i a over the Sabah i s s u e i n 1963. MAPHILINDO, the second attempt at r e g i o n a l c o o p e r a t i o n (MAPHILINDO i s an acronym f o r Malaysia, the P h i l i p p i n e s and Indonesia) s u f f e r e d a s i m i l a r demise due to the " k o n f r o n t a s i " between Indonesia and M a l a y s i a and the f e s t e r i n g Sabah d i s p u t e between M a l a y s i a and the P h i l i p p i n e s , which was now backed by Indonesia. Obviously, more d i v i d e d the ASEAN n a t i o n s than u n i t e d them. At ASEAN's formation, r e g i o n a l i n t e g r a t i o n seemed to be the f a r t h e s t thought from the minds of ASEAN's s i g n a t o r i e s ; any c o o p e r a t i o n would have been a major achievement. What brought the n a t i o n s t o g e t h e r was a shared concern to prevent p r e c i o u s energy and other r e s o u r c e s r e q u i r e d f o r n a t i o n a l development g o a l s being d i v e r t e d t o a v o i d a b l e i n t r a - r e g i o n a l d i s p u t e s . A l l f i v e n a t i o n s were s t a u n c h l y anti-communist i n t h e i r domestic p o l i t i c s , but f a c e d s e r i o u s t h r e a t s from communist i n s u r g e n c i e s . Four out of the f i v e had at one time hosted Western m i l i t a r y bases, but t h e r e 22. G h a z a l i e S h a f i e , "Malaysia i n A f r o - A s i a , " i n Malaysia:  I n t e r n a t i o n a l R e l a t i o n s , M. G h a z a l i e S h a f i e , (Kuala Lumpur: C r e a t i v e E n t e r p r i s e Sdn. Bhd, 1982), p. 43. 20 was a growing b e l i e f t h a t the support of o u t s i d e r s c o u l d not be r e l i e d upon i n times of major s e c u r i t y c h a l l e n g e s . The g r e a t e s t s e c u r i t y concern f a c i n g the ASEAN c o u n t r i e s has always been the t h r e a t of i n t e r n a l s u b v e r s i o n . D i r e c t a g g r e s s i o n by a communist power i s h i g h l y improbable, but given the experience of Chinese i n s u r g e n t support, e x t e r n a l l y - b a c k e d i n t e r n a l s u b v e r s i o n has been, and s t i l l i s , a constant concern. I t was thus i m p e r a t i v e t h a t a r e g i o n a l forum be e s t a b l i s h e d to d i s c u s s p o l i t i c a l d i f f e r e n c e s , a v o i d d i r e c t m i l i t a r y c o n f r o n t a t i o n s , and reduce dependence upon e x t e r n a l powers. The purpose of r e g i o n a l c o o p e r a t i o n was not n e c e s s a r i l y to add to the r e g i o n ' s m i l i t a r y c a p a c i t y a g a i n s t e x t e r n a l enemies, but r a t h e r to prevent d i p l o m a t i c i s o l a t i o n , enhance the r e g i o n ' s i n t e r n a t i o n a l b a r g a i n i n g power, and p r o v i d e a forum f o r managing l o c a l c o n f l i c t s between member s t a t e s . Amid the s e n s i t i v e p o l i t i c a l c l i m a t e of the 1960s, the ASEAN l e a d e r s f e l t i t important t o a v o i d being seen as a p o l i t i c a l or m i l i t a r y o r g a n i z a t i o n . They t h e r e f o r e emphasised the p o t e n t i a l f o r c o o p e r a t i o n i n n o n - p o l i t i c a l i s s u e - a r e a s , i . e . economic, s o c i a l and c u l t u r a l c o o p e r a t i o n , with economic c o o p e r a t i o n g i v e n top p r i o r i t y . P o l i t i c a l c o n s i d e r a t i o n s determined ASEAN's membership, d e f i n e d i t s scope of a c t i v i t i e s and gave i t s i g n i f i c a n c e , but i t was t a c i t l y agreed t h a t p o l i t i c a l q u e s t i o n s were to be d i s c u s s e d o u t s i d e the formal framework. M i l i t a r y c o o p e r a t i o n between members would be on p u r e l y b i l a t e r a l (or t r i l a t e r a l ) bases. 21 I t i e worth r e i t e r a t i n g t h a t one of the foremost misconceptions with regard t o ASEAN i s the aeeumption t h a t i t wae e e t a b l i e h e d with r e g i o n a l i n t e g r a t i o n ae i t e aim. ASEAN wae c r e a t e d ae a v e h i c l e to support i t e members' n a t i o n a l i n t e r e s t s . I t e purpoee was not t o c r e a t e a s u p r a - n a t i o n a l i n e t i t u t i o n , but to help r e s o l v e r e g i o n a l c o n f l i c t s and s t r e n g t h e n i t e members ae n a t i o n - s t a t e s through the s h a r i n g of b e n e f i t e , reeources and the accommodation of needs. Cooperation, t h e r e f o r e , d i d not o b l i g e the ASEAN c o u n t r i e s to s a c r i f i c e t h e i r n a t i o n a l i n t e r e e t s . The Bangkok D e c l a r a t i o n , ASEAN'e i n i t i a l mandate, p r o v i d e d no c e n t r a l S e c r e t a r i a t , no t r e a t y b a s i s , and was e u f f i c i e n t l y vague t o a v o i d e l i c i t i n g any l e g a l membership o b l i g a t i o n e or commitments a s i d e from an endorsement of ASEAN'e g e n e r a l aims and purposes. Southeast Asian n a t i o n s ' previoue attempts at r e g i o n a l c o o p e r a t i o n had been e x t e r n a l l y i n e p i r e d and guaranteed. T h e i r e x p e r i e n c e with SEATO c l e a r l y showed t h a t m i l i t a r y power d i d not i n i t e e l f d e f i n e s e c u r i t y , nor was i t an a p p r o p r i a t e response to p r e s s i n g domestic problems, such as a l a c k of p o l i t i c a l and a d m i n i s t r a t i v e resources, e t h n i c c o n f l i c t , communist i n s u r g e n c i e s , p o p u l a t i o n p r e s s u r e s and e x t e r n a l i n t e r f e r e n c e . The Bangkok D e c l a r a t i o n of 1967 d i d not e x p l i c i t l y d e f i n e s e c u r i t y , but P r e s i d e n t Suharto, i n a epeech at the F i r e t Meeting of ASEAN's Heade of State, remarked t h a t "our concept of s e c u r i t y i s inward l o o k i n g , namely t o e e t a b l i e h an o r d e r l y , p e a c e f u l , and e t a b l e c o n d i t i o n w i t h i n each i n d i v i d u a l t e r r i t o r y . " 2 3 Singapore's 23. P r e s i d e n t Suharto, F i r e t Meeting of Heade of S t a t e s of ASEAN, B a l i , 23 February 1976. Quoted i n E s t r e l l a D. Solidum, " S e c u r i t y P e r s p e c t i v e s i n ASEAN," i n Aspects of ASEAN, Werner P f e n n i g and 22 F o r e i g n M i n i s t e r was more e x p l i c i t i n d i s c o u n t i n g ASEAN's s e c u r i t y r o l e : . . . s e c u r i t y problems...should not and cannot be secured through ASEAN. In any case the s e c u r i t y and i n t e g r i t y of the c o u n t r i e s of Southeast A s i a are more l i k e l y t o be j e o p a r d i z e d through economic s t a g n a t i o n and c o l l a p s e . . . I t i s economic weakness and p o l i t i c a l i n s t a b i l i t y which i s more l i k e l y to tempt unwelcome i n t e r f e r e n c e and i n t e r v e n t i o n from the o u t s i d e . 8 * Sin c e ASEAN was s t i l l too weak f o r any semblance of m i l i t a r y defence, s e c u r i t y was t h e r e f o r e best served by a " c o l l e c t i v e p o l i t i c a l defence", t o c o i n Thanat Khoman's phrase. However, the only mention of defence i n the Bangkok D e c l a r a t i o n s t i p u l a t e s merely t h a t ASEAN n a t i o n s "are determined t o ensure t h e i r s t a b i l i t y and s e c u r i t y from e x t e r n a l i n t e r f e r e n c e i n any form or m a n i f e s t a t i o n . " T h i s was designed t o g i v e ASEAN some f l e x i b i l i t y s i n c e t h r e a t s tend t o take d i f f e r e n t forms through time. As Adam Malik, Indonesia's former M i n i s t e r f o r F o r e i g n A f f a i r s and one of ASEAN's c h i e f a r c h i t e c t s , e x p l a i n e d t o a student group i n J a k a r t a i n December 19S6, the need f o r a r e g i o n a l grouping was to enhance autonomy and a c t as: ... a s t r o n g bulwark a g a i n s t i m p e r i a l i s t m a n i p u l a t i o n s as w e l l as a d e c i s i v e s t a b i l i z i n g f a c t o r i n t h i s p a r t of the world...ending once and f o r a l l f o r e i g n i n f l u e n c e , domination and intervention...stemming the "yellow" as w e l l as the "white" i m p e r i a l i s m i n Southeast A s i a . 8 3 Mark M.B. Suh, eds., (Munich, Germany: Weltforum V e r l a g , 1984), p. 94. 24. Dept. of Information, R e p u b l i c of Indonesia. The A s s o c i a t i o n of Southeast A s i a n Nations ( J a k a r t a , 1969), pp. 57-58. In Haas, op. c i t . , p. 210. 25. Antara News B u l l e t i n , 15 December 1966. In Understanding  ASEAN, ed. A l i s o n Broinowski (London: Macmillan Press, 1982), p. 16 ( i t a l i c s added). 23 In keeping with i t s non-bloc p o l i c y , Indonesia f a v o r e d the i n c l u s i o n of a c l a u s e i n the D e c l a r a t i o n t o end the presence of f o r e i g n m i l i t a r y bases i n the r e g i o n . However, with U. S. bases a l r e a d y e s t a b l i s h e d i n T h a i l a n d and the P h i l i p p i n e s , these s t a t e s were h e s i t a n t to accede to such hasty and abrupt a c t i o n . Singapore was e q u a l l y concerned t h a t i t might cause B r i t a i n and the United S t a t e s to withdraw immediately, l e a v i n g behind a vacuum open to p e n e t r a t i o n by China or the S o v i e t Union. Moreover, T h a i l a n d and Singapore's f o r e i g n p o l i c y had been t r a d i t i o n a l l y premised on a balance of power s t r a t e g y through the use of counterweights and by not r e l y i n g too much on any one e x t e r n a l source. A f t e r i n t e n s e debate over the document, a compromise was e v e n t u a l l y r e a c h e d . 8 6 I t s t i p u l a t e d t h a t a l l f o r e i g n bases were temporary, e s t a b l i s h e d and maintained on l y with the express concurrence of the c o u n t r i e s concerned, and are not intended to be used d i r e c t l y or i n d i r e c t l y t o "subvert the n a t i o n a l independence and freedom" of the ASEAN s t a t e s . Furthermore, the o r g a n i z a t i o n ' s p r i n c i p l e s r e g a r d i n g ASEAN's e x t e r n a l r e l a t i o n s with the major powers, groups of c o u n t r i e s , and i n t e r n a t i o n a l o r g a n i z a t i o n s h e l d t h a t : a) c o o p e r a t i o n should not be at the expense of e x i s t i n g b i l a t e r a l arrangements; b) c o o p e r a t i o n should complement, not supplant ASEAN c a p a b i l i t i e s ; c) c o o p e r a t i o n should be f o r p r o j e c t s of r e g i o n a l c h a r a c t e r and b e n e f i t a l l c o u n t r i e s ; 4) c o o p e r a t i o n should be u n c o n d i t i o n a l . 8 7 I t should 2G. For a good d i s c u s s i o n of the debate w i t h i n ASEAN, see Jorgensen-Dahl, op. c i t . , pp. 37-41. 27. See Mark M.B. Suh, " P o l i t i c a l Cooperation Among ASEAN C o u n t r i e s , " i n , eds. P f e n n i g and Suh, op. c i t . 24 a l s o be noted t h a t Burma and Kampuchea and the two Vietnams to j o i n ASEAN.8 8 The F i r s t Decade I n i t i a l l y , the p r o p o s a l to e s t a b l i s h an a s s o c i a t i o n of Southeast A s i a n Nations was not as r e a d i l y greeted by the f i v e s t a t e s as one might have expected. Years of mutual f e a r and s u s p i c i o n rendered p r o s p e c t s of s e r i o u s c o o p e r a t i o n as j u s t another i l l u s o r y hope. The A s s o c i a t i o n of Southeast A s i a n Nations was p r i m a r i l y the b r a i n c h i l d of Thanat Khoman and Adam Malik, the M i n i s t e r s f o r F o r e i g n A f f a i r s of T h a i l a n d and Indonesia r e s p e c t i v e l y , who were the most eager t o see i t e s t a b l i s h e d . T h a i l a n d was anxious to reduce i t s m i l i t a r y r e l i a n c e on the United S t a t e s , which was n e i t h e r permanent nor d e s i r a b l e , and ASEAN was p e r c e i v e d ae a u s e f u l supplement t o i t s a l l i a n c e with the U.S. Under Suharto's New Order, Indonesia was e q u a l l y anxious to r e a s s u r e i t s neighbours of i t s p e a c e f u l i n t e n t i o n s , d e s p i t e having the l a r g e s t army i n the r e g i o n and the l a r g e s t t e r r i t o r y . The P h i l i p p i n e s were at f i r s t r e l u c t a n t to j o i n , f e e l i n g f a i r l y secure under the United S t a t e s ' p r o t e c t i v e umbrella. On the other hand, i t saw ASEAN as an o p p o r t u n i t y to 28. ASEAN o f f i c i a l s concede p r i v a t e l y t h a t i f a request came from Vietnam now to j o i n the a s s o c i a t i o n , i t would be " a c u t e l y embarrassing. " See Inge Sons B a i l e y , ASEAN: The Nature of R e g i o n a l O r g a n i z a t i o n f o r Development and S e c u r i t y M.A. T h e s i s , Simon F r a s e r U n i v e r s i t y , 1981, p. 91. S r i Lanka and Papua New Guinea have a l s o p l a c e d a request to j o i n ASEAN, but were p o l i t e l y r e f u s e d . Brunei's membership was granted on January 1, 1984 because of i t s l o c a t i o n , c u l t u r a l a f f i n i t y and o i l . the Indochinese c o u n t r i e s -- Laos, -- d e c l i n e d an i n v i t i a t i o n i n 19S7 25 reduce i t s image of t o t a l dependence on the United S t a t e s , and prove i t s bona f i d e s t a t u s as a Southeast Asian s t a t e . Thus ASEAN was not an a l l i a n c e , but an entente. Through the development of "mutual c o n s u l t a t i o n and consensus," i t s purpose was to p r o v i d e a framework w i t h i n which the l e a d e r s c o u l d c o n s u l t one another on i n d i v i d u a l problems t o a v o i d dangerous misunderstandings and to c o o r d i n a t e c o l l e c t i v e f o r e i g n p o l i c y i n i t i a t i v e s . Emphasis was pl a c e d on a v o i d i n g a c t i o n s which might c o n c e i v a b l y i n c r e a s e e x t e r n a l or i n t e r n a l p o l i t i c a l p r e s s u r e on another member. The m i d - s i x t i e s was a time of d i f f i c u l t f o r e i g n p o l i c y adjustments f o r the s m a l l s t a t e s of Southeast A s i a and ASEAN helped t o compensate f o r the d e c l i n e and u n c e r t a i n t y of support from the United S t a t e s . Most i m p o r t a n t l y , ASEAN's l o o s e o r g a n i z a t i o n a l s t r u c t u r e and f l e x i b l e r u l e s of procedure assured i t s member s t a t e s t h a t c o o p e r a t i o n would not be at the expense of n a t i o n a l i n t e r e s t s . For an o r g a n i z a t i o n s t i l l c u l t i v a t i n g c o o p e r a t i o n , such f l e x i b i l i t y was a source of s t r e n g t h . As Adam Malik remarked, Although from the o u t s e t ASEAN was conceived as an o r g a n i z a t i o n f o r economic, s o c i a l and c u l t u r a l co-o p e r a t i o n , and although c o n s i d e r a t i o n s i n these f i e l d s were no doubt c e n t r a l , i t was the f a c t t h a t t h e r e was a convergence i n the p o l i t i c a l outlook of the f i v e p r o s p e c t i v e member-nations...which p r o v i d e d the main s t i m u l u s t o j o i n t ogether i n ASEAN. . . There was e a r l y r e c o g n i t i o n t h a t meaningful progress c o u l d only be achieved by g i v i n g f i r s t p r i o r i t y t o the task of o v e r a l l and r a p i d economic development. I t was a l s o r e a l i s e d t h a t , t o t h i s end, p o l i c i e s should be c o n s c i o u s l y geared towards s a f e g u a r d i n g t h i s p r i o r i t y o b j e c t i v e , not onl y i n p u r e l y economic terms but si m u l t a n e o u s l y a l s o t o secure the e s s e n t i a l c o n d i t i o n s 26 of peace and s t a b i l i t y , both d o m e s t i c a l l y and i n t e r n a t i o n a l l y i n the surrounding r e g i o n . 8 9 ASEAN's progress throughout the 1970s was e x c e e d i n g l y slow. De s p i t e hundreds of rounds of meetings at the m i n i s t e r i a l , committee and subcommittee l e v e l s , o n l y a s m a l l percentage of the p r o p o s a l s passed d u r i n g the f i r s t nine years were implemented. The Bangkok D e c l a r a t i o n c o n t a i n e d no s p e c i f i c p o l i t i c a l or economic programme to be achieved a c c o r d i n g to a t i m e t a b l e --however vague -- and d e s p i t e a p r o f e s s e d agreement to promote economic c o o p e r a t i o n , the f i v e member s t a t e s were remarkably r e t i c e n t t o make c o n c r e t e commitments and to f o r m u l a t e long term p o l i c i e s and s t r a t e g i e s . L i t t l e headway had been made i n e s t a b l i s h i n g any s o r t of f r e e t r a d e area and intra-ASEAN t r a d e as a percentage of t o t a l ASEAN t r a d e d e c l i n e d from 15.5 percent to 12.6 percent d u r i n g the p e r i o d 1970-1975. 3 0 Donald Crone's e x c e l l e n t study i l l u s t r a t e s t h a t through the 1970's, the ASEAN s t a t e s adopted a g l o b a l s t r a t e g y of trade, i n d u s t r i a l and investment d i v e r s i f i c a t i o n t o decrease t h e i r economic dependence on the great powers, but which i n e f f e c t undermined r e g i o n a l economic i n t e r d e p e n d e n c e . 3 1 Today, the vast bulk of ASEAN's t r a d e (roughly 85 percent) c o n t i n u e s t o be with e x t e r n a l n a t i o n s . 29. "Regional Cooperation i n I n t e r n a t i o n a l P o l i t i c s , " i n Regionalism i n Southeast A s i a ( J a k a r t a : Center f o r S t r a t e g i c and I n t e r n a t i o n a l S t u d i e s ) , proceedings of a conference h e l d i n J a k a r t a , 22-25 October, 1974, pp. 161-2. Quoted i n Broinowski, op. c i t . , p 14. 30. See Khaw Guat Hoon, "ASEAN i n I n t e r n a t i o n a l P o l i t i c s , " i n P o l i t i c s i n the ASEAN S t a t e s , ed. Diane K. Mauzy (Kuala Lumpur: Marican & Sons Sdn. Bhd, 1984), p. 229. 31. See Donald Crone, The ASEAN S t a t e s : Coping with Dependence (New York: Praeger Pub., 1983). 27 mainly Japan, the United S t a t e s and the EEC, i n t h a t order of importance. According t o the ASEAN argument, the main reason f o r t h i s i s t h a t the ASEAN s t a t e s are s t r u c t u r a l l y c o m p e t i t i v e r a t h e r than complementary i n t r a d e . 3 8 As n a t i o n s j u s t emerging from the i m p o r t - s u b s t i t u t i o n phase, they are r e l u c t a n t t o f o r c e the degree of economic r a t i o n a l i z a t i o n needed f o r i n t e g r a t i o n . Export-o r i e n t e d s t r a t e g i e s , they argue, were chosen s i n c e t h e i r own n a t i o n a l markets l a c k the economic s c a l e t o support i n d u s t r i a l i z a t i o n . As mainly producers of primary commodities and l i g h t manufactured goods (with the e x c e p t i o n of Singapore), the ASEAN s t a t e s r e q u i r e f i n a n c e , machinery and technology from the West. Moreover, t h e i r c o m p e t i t i o n to be the f i r s t i n the area of technology t r a n s f e r induces b i l a t e r a l l i n k s with i n d u s t r i a l n a t i o n s i n p a r t i c u l a r l y d e s i g n a t e d i n d u s t r i e s . As r e c e n t l y as 1984, an ASEAN Task Force r e p o r t i n q u i r i n g i n t o the o r g a n i z a t i o n ' s l a c k of economic progress concluded t h a t : Intra-ASEAN economic a c t i v i t i e s c o u l d become s e l f -g e n e r a t i n g when ASEAN economies are more mature and complementary t o one another. . . i t has been found t h a t i n i n d u s t r y and trade, e s p e c i a l l y i n manufactured goods, c o o p e r a t i o n has been slow t o m a t e r i a l i z e because the i n d u s t r i a l s t r u c t u r e s o f the member c o u n t r i e s are s i m i l a r . At present they produce s i m i l a r goods or pl a n to do so i n the f u t u r e . 3 3 32. See K a r l D. Jackson and M. Hadi Soesastro, eds., ASEAN  S e c u r i t y and Economic Development (Berkeley, C a l i f . : I n s t i t u t e of East Asian S t u d i e s ) , i n t r o . See a l s o Bruce Glassburner, "Southeast A s i a : Economic Problems and P r o s p e c t s , " i n Economic,  P o l i t i c a l , and S e c u r i t y Issues i n Southeast A s i a i n the 1980's, eds. Robert A. S c a l a p i n o and Jusuf Wanandi, (Berkeley, C a l i f . : I n s t i t u t e o f East A s i a n S t u d i e s , 1982), pp. 42-43. 33. Susumo Awanhara, " P l a t i t u d e s , pious hopes and m e d i o c r i t y . " Far E a s t e r n Economic Review, 15 March 1964, p. 64. 28 O f f i c i a l s argue t h a t the o b j e c t i v e of ASEAN i s not economic i n t e g r a t i o n , such as a customs union, but i n s t e a d economic c o o p e r a t i o n through the p o o l i n g of r e s o u r c e s r a t h e r than markets. Acco r d i n g t o A.R. Soehoed, "the c r i t i c i s m o f t e n l e v e l e d t h a t the pro g r e s s toward a c h i e v i n g the o b j e c t i v e s of ASEAN i s too s l u g g i s h i n comparison with, say, the European Economic Community (EEC) i s i n f a c t measuring with the wrong y a r d s t i c k . " 3 4 Soehoed c o n t i n u e s by drawing a d i s t i n c t i o n between economic c o o p e r a t i o n and i n t e g r a t i o n i n the ASEAN c o n t e x t : Economic co o p e r a t i o n , however c l o s e , i s d i s t i n c t from economic i n t e g r a t i o n not on l y i n i t s i n s t i t u t i o n a l s e t t i n g but a l s o i n i t s f u n c t i o n . The former can be a l o o s e arrangement and does not r e q u i r e a formal i n s t i t u t i o n a l framework whereas the l a t t e r depends on i t . Economic c o o p e r a t i o n i n c l u d e s v a r i o u s measures designed t o harmonize economic p o l i c i e s and t o minimize d i s c r i m i n a t i o n ; the process l e a d i n g toward economic i n t e g r a t i o n e n t a i l s the u n i f i c a t i o n of economic p o l i c i e s and the complete a b o l i t i o n of d i s c r i m i n a t i o n . More imp o r t a n t l y , under economic i n t e g r a t i o n , p o l i c i e s and measures are to be s u b o r d i n a t e d t o a g e n e r a l i z e d market i n t e g r a t i o n s t r a t e g y . But w i t h i n the framework of economic co o p e r a t i o n , market i n t e g r a t i o n i s a means th a t may be a p p l i e d s e l e c t i v e l y . 3 3 C l e a r l y , n a t i o n a l economic growth and s e l f - r e l i a n c e c o n t i n u e to be the main g o a l s f a r ASEAN member s t a t e s , impeding the growth of s p e c i a l i z a t i o n and i n t r a - r e g i o n a l trade. For example, Indonesia, w e l l endowed with petroleum and n a t u r a l gas, i s eminently q u a l i f i e d t o become a s u p p l i e r of chemical f e r t i l i z e r s t o i t s neighbours. On the other hand, Singapore o f f e r s an abundant supply of c a p i t a l , e x c e l l e n t t r a d i n g i n f r a - s t r u c t u r e , both p h y s i c a l and f i n a n c i a l , a well-developed i n d u s t r i a l s e c t o r , 34. A.R. Soehoed, "Economic Dimensions of S e c u r i t y i n the ASEAN Region," i n , eds. S c a l a p i n o and Wanandi, op. c i t . , p. 53. 35. I b i d . , p. 53. 29 and a l a r g e supply of e n t r e p r e n e u r s h i p . However, as B. Glassburner p o i n t s out, t r u e i n t e g r a t i o n r e q u i r e s the f r e e m o b i l i t y of labour, f i n a n c i a l c a p i t a l and p h y s i c a l c a p i t a l , and d e s p i t e the much-needed c a p i t a l resources, Singapore i s w i l l i n g and a b l e t o o f f e r , p r o t e c t i o n i s m and the p r e f e r e n c e t o f o s t e r indigenous e n t r e p r e n e u r s h i p remain s e r i o u s h i n d r a n c e s . 3 6 One needs t o remember t h a t Singapore's 75 percent Chinese p o p u l a t i o n i s s t i l l a s e n s i t i v e i s s u e f o r the other f i v e ASEAN c o u n t r i e s which c o n t a i n an e c o n o m i c a l l y powerful Chinese m i n o r i t y . J u s t as pr o b l e m a t i c are the i m p l i c a t i o n s of labour m o b i l i t y . Both Singapore and M a l a y s i a are a l r e a d y e x p e r i e n c i n g problems with Indonesian l a b o u r e r s seeking work i n t h e i r c o u n t r i e s . No doubt t h e i r own workers, as w e l l as those of T h a i l a n d and the P h i l i p p i n e s , w i l l r e s i s t an onslaught of l a r g e - s c a l e , imported l a b o u r from the most p l e n t i f u l source i n the area. T h i s i s not to say t h a t ASEAN has made no pro g r e s s i n economic c o o p e r a t i o n . A f t e r the B a l i Summit of 1976, intra-ASEAN econmic c o o p e r a t i o n has taken t h r e e forms: 1) the P r e f e r e n t i a l T r a d i n g Arrangements (PTA) of 1977, aimed at expanding i n t r a -r e g i o n a l t r a d e through an item-by-item approach t o t r a d e l i b e r a l i z a t i o n ; 2) ASEAN i n d u s t r i a l p r o j e c t s (AIP), wherein one l a r g e - s c a l e , mainly Japanese-financed p r o j e c t was designated to each country: a urea p r o j e c t f o r Indonesia and Malaysia, superphosphate f o r the P h l i p p i n e s , soda ash f o r T h a i l a n d and d i e s e l engines f o r Singapore; 3) the ASEAN I n d u s t r i a l Complementation Schemes (AIC) designed f o r each country to 36. See Glassburner, op. c i t . , pp. 42, 51. 30 produce a s p e c i f i c i n d u s t r i a l product which w i l l be given p r e f e r e n t i a l treatment w i t h i n the ASEAN r e g i o n . 3 7 However, with the P r e f e r e n t i a l T r a d i n g Agreement (PTA), the e f f o r t thus f a r has been more apparent than r e a l . Although the agreement i n v o l v e d an i m p r e s s i v e 7,500 items i n 1980, 6000 were goods worth $50,000 or l e s s (each) i n t r a d e at the time they were l i s t e d . In other words, many of the items on the l i s t are marginal to intra-ASEAN t r a d e . 3 8 Moreover, some economists f e e l t h a t while t a r i f f r e d u c t i o n s are important, t h e r e are numerous " n o n t a r i f f b a r r i e r s " r a nging from import and export quotas to bans on paper p r o c e s s i n g at p o r t s of entry. These are s i g n i f i c a n t b a r r i e r s t o t r a d e expansion i n the r e g i o n . Indeed, of the f i v e i n d u s t r i a l p r o j e c t s d e s i g n a t e d i n the AIP plan, only the urea p r o j e c t i n Indonesia has been implemented. The superphosphate p r o j e c t i n the P h i l i p p i n e s soon ran i n t o d i f f i c u l t i e s and Singapore, under p r e s s u r e from Indonesia was compelled t o abandon i t s d i e s e l p r o j e c t . Indonesia l o b b i e d t h a t the e s t a b l i s h m e n t of a r e g i o n a l d i e s e l p l a n t i n Singapore would be i n c o m p e t i t i o n with i t s own f l e d g l i n g d i e s e l i n d u s t r y . At f i r s t Singapore suggested changing the s t a t u s of the p l a n t from t h a t of a ASEAN p r o j e c t t o a n a t i o n a l p r o j e c t whose goods would be s o l d on the open ( r a t h e r than r e g i o n a l ) market. But i t f i n a l l y abandoned the p r o j e c t a l t o g e t h e r f o r the sake of " u n i t y " . E x p r e s s i n g disappointment at ASEAN's l a c k of progress, Singapore withdrew i t s f i n a n c i a l support of the AIP 37. See Khaw Guat Hoon, op. c i t . , pp. 233-234. 38. Glassburner, op. c i t . , p. 43. 31 pl a n s h o r t of a token one percent c o n t r i b u t i o n , i n s t e a d o f the normal 10 p e r c e n t . 3 9 I t i s not d i f f i c u l t t o be c r i t i c a l o f ASEAN's e x c e s s i v e l y slow pace of economic cooperaton. As Khaw Guat Hoon w r i t e s , "while the F i v e see the p o l i t i c a l need t o e x p e d i t e economic c o o p e r a t i o n , they at the same time h e s i t a t e t o g i v e c o n c e s s i o n s to each other, i f by doing so t h e i r own economic i n t e r e s t s may by a d v e r s e l y a f f e c t e d . " * 0 Of course, ASEAN's d i f f i c u l t i e s i n i t s economic j o i n t p r o j e c t s do not mean t h a t i t has f a i l e d t o make prog r e s s i n economic c o o p e r a t i o n . What progress has taken place, however, has been i n ASEAN's e x t e r n a l economic r e l a t i o n s as a r e g i o n a l grouping and i n the economic performance of i n d i v i d u a l c o u n t r i e s -- not i n i n t r a - r e g i o n a l c o o p e r a t i o n . A l l f i v e n a t i o n s enjoyed d o u b l e - d i g i t growth r a t e s i n export e a r n i n g s over the decade of the 1970's, and a l l but T h a i l a n d exceeded 20 percent per annum. A l l of these r a t e s exceed the world r a t e of p r i c e i n f l a t i o n by a wide margin, thus r e f l e c t i n g r a p i d export growth. Indonesia d i s p l a y e d the f a s t e s t growth, r a i s i n g i t s r e a l per c a p i t a income 75 percent i n f o u r t e e n years — a l b e i t o i l played a major r o l e and much of t h i s i n c r e a s e has not been accompanied by a c o r r e s p o n d i n g r e d i s t r i b u t i o n o f income.* 1 ASEAN has a l s o been q u i t e s u c c e s s f u l i n defending the i n t e r e s t s of i t s members at m u l t i l a t e r a l forums such as GATT, UNCTAD, the United Nations Development Plan (UNDP), and the Economic and S o c i a l Commission f o r A s i a and the P a c i f i c (ESCAP). 39. See Robert L. Rau, "The r o l e of Singapore i n ASEAN," Contemporary Southeast A s i a . 3 (Sept. 1981), pp. 104-110. 40. Khaw Guat Hoon, op. c i t . , p. 234. 41. See Glassburner, op. c i t . 32 An ASEAN B r u s s e l s Committee was formed i n June 1982 to c o o r d i n a t e p o l i c i e s and maintain day-to-day r e l a t i o n s with the EEC Commission. A s i m i l a r i n s t i t u t i o n a l i z a t i o n of r e l a t i o n s has o c c u r r e d between ASEAN's economic " d i a l o g u e " c o u n t r i e s -- Japan, A u s t r a l i a , New Zealand, Canada and the United S t a t e s . 4 8 In terms of t h e i r a t t i t u d e s towards expanding r e g i o n a l trade, Singapore and Indonesia are at the o p p o s i t e ends of a spectrum which Jorgensen-Dahl d e s c r i b e s as ranging "from the most p o s i t i v e and l e a s t apprehensive to the l e a s t p o s i t i v e and most apprehensive, with M a l a y s i a c l o s e r t o the Indonesian p o s i t i o n and the P h i l i p p i n e s and T h a i l a n d somewhat nearer to t h a t of S i n g a p o r e . " 4 3 Singapore, ASEAN's s m a l l e s t member, i s the most ec o n o m i c a l l y advanced, while Indonesia, the l a r g e s t and p o l i t i c a l l y most i n f l u e n t i a l member, i s the most e c o n o m i c a l l y backward. As a r e s u l t , Indonesia determines the type and format of any j o i n t p r o j e c t p r o p o s a l . Singapore, on the other hand, has been the most s u p p o r t i v e of the e s t a b l i s h m e n t of an ASEAN Free Trade Area, but because Indonesia and M a l a y s i a need to p r o t e c t t h e i r l a b o u r - i n t e n s i v e i n d u s t r i e s , i t has to accept s e l e c t i v e t r a d e l i b e r a l i z a t i o n on a product-by-product b a s i s . Singapore's main f o r e i g n p o l i c y concern has always been s u r v i v a l , both r e g i o n a l l y and i n t e r n a t i o n a l l y . The i n t e r n a t i o n a l i z a t i o n of i t s economy i s p a r t of Singapore's s t r a t e g y of s e c u r i t y . As an e t h n i c a l l y Chinese s t a t e , Singapore 42. For a good d i s c u s s i o n of ASEAN's i n t e r n a t i o n a l economic achievements, see Jorgensen-Dahl, op. c i t . , chapter 6; Donald Crone, The ASEAN S t a t e s : Coping with Dependence (New York: Praeger Pub., 1983), esp. chapt. 6. 43. Jorgensen-Dahl, op. c i t , p. 135. 33 i s s e n s i t i v e t o the f a c t t h a t i t i s a s m a l l i s l a n d l o c a t e d i n a "Malay sea" of s t a t e s predominantly or wholly Malay. As Lee Kuan Yew once quipped, "your best f r i e n d s are never your neighbours."** I t s f e a r o f being m i l i t a r i l y annexed or "swallowed" by these l a r g e r c o u n t r i e s i s manifested i n i t s so-c a l l e d "Timor complex" and i s an important f a c t o r i n i t s impatient, though r e s t r a i n e d p o s i t i o n on ASEAN economic i s s u e s . Singaporean o f f i c i a l s are i n h i b i t e d from advancing novel i d e a s f o r c o l l e c t i v e a c t i o n f o r f e a r of being i n t e r p r e t e d as "pushy Chinese."* 8 N a t i o n a l images and c u l t u r a l s t e r e o t y p e s with n e g a t i v e c o n n o t a t i o n s r e t a i n a l a t e n t potency. Malays tend t o t h i n k of Chinese as s o u l l e s s m a t e r i a l i s t s w h ile the l a t t e r r e g a rd the former as l a z y dreamers.* 6 Singapore's impatience with ASEAN i s r e f l e c t e d i n i t s h e s i t a t i o n t o f i n a n c e improvements t o the C e n t r a l S e c r e t a r i a t i n the absence of c o s t e f f e c t i v e n e s s . With a per c a p i t a income s i g n i f i c a n t l y l a r g e r than some of i t s neighbours, Singapore r e a l i z e s t h a t prudence means c r e a t i n g interdependence i n the g l o b a l market, and i t i s r e s i g n e d t o the f a c t t h a t the pace of r e g i o n a l economic interdependence w i l l be d i c t a t e d by ASEAN's slowest member, Indonesia. Indonesia, on the other hand, with i t s 165 m i l l i o n people and 13,000 i s l a n d s spanning a d i s t a n c e of 5,000 k i l o m e t e r s , i s 44. Alex Josey, Lee Kuan Yew (Singapore: Donald Moore Press, 1968), p. 486. Quoted i n Hans Indorf, Impediments of Regionalism i n Southeast A s i a : B i l a t e r a l C o n s t r a i n t s Among ASEAN Member S t a t e s (Singapore: I n s t i t u t e of Southeast Asian S t u d i e s , 1984), p. 12. 45. For an i n t e r e s t i n g d i s c u s s i o n , see i b i d . 46. S t a n l e y S. Bedlington, M a l a y s i a and Singapore: The B u i l d i n g  of New S t a t e s (Ithaca, New York: C o r n e l l Univ. Press, 1978), p. 126".'"" 34 more than h a l f the s i z e of the whole of ASEAN i n both area and p o p u l a t i o n . I t i s r i c h i n n a t u r a l resources, has d i s p l a y e d Southeast A s i a ' s f a s t e s t r a t e of economic growth, and has been l a b e l l e d by some as a r i s i n g "middle" power. For these reasons i t s l e a d e r s have f e l t i t o n l y n a t u r a l t h a t Indonesia p l a y a l e a d i n g r o l e i n r e g i o n a l p o l i t i c s . However, d u r i n g the 1960s, Sukarno was more concerned with c r e a t i n g a g l o b a l , r a t h e r than r e g i o n a l , emphasis. Consequently, both Singapore and A u s t r a l i a c o n s t a n t l y worried about c o - e x i s t i n g with a v o l a t i l e and p o s s i b l y e x p a n s i o n i s t neighbour. A f t e r Sukarno, the succeeding Suharto government sought to change Indonesia's i n t e r n a t i o n a l image as one t h a t was n o n - a d v e r s a r i a l , pragmatic and non-aligned. Indonesia's new f o r e i g n p o l i c y s t y l e , though c l e a r l y non-e x p a n s i o n i s t v i s - a - v i s i t s e x t e r n a l neighbours, d i d not tame the p o l i t i c a l and m i l i t a r y e l i t e s ' views on r e g i o n a l p o l i t i c a l e n t i t l e m e n t . As F r a n k l i n Weinstein argues, Indonesia's n o t i o n s of an "independent and a c t i v e " f o r e i g n p o l i c y i s an i n t e g r a l p a r t of the e l i t e ' s o p e r a t i o n a l code. In the view of most [Indonesian] l e a d e r s , an a c t i v e f o r e i g n p o l i c y was i n t e g r a l l y r e l a t e d t o independence. In f a c t , the mere e x i s t e n c e of an a c t i v e , a s s e r t i v e f o r e i g n p o l i c y was taken as a mark of independence. For many of those who emphasized t h i s , the c h i e f c o n s i d e r a t i o n was not so much an e x p e c t a t i o n of a c h i e v i n g the avowed goals, but more a f e e l i n g t h a t p a s s i v i t y connotes acquiescence to c i r c u m s c r i b e d independence. P a r t l y t h i s was a matter of demonstrating t h e i r independence to themselves. The Indonesian l e a d e r s o f t e n spoke of an a c t i v e f o r e i g n p o l i c y as e s s e n t i a l t o the p r e s e r v a t i o n of t h e i r s e l f -r e s p e c t , n a t i o n a l i d e n t i t y and image...a p a s s i v e 35 i n t e r n a t i o n a l r o l e conveys a f e e l i n g of being taken f o r granted, of being l e s s than f u l l y independent.* 7 Indonesia's p o l i t i c a l ambitions, however, are f r u s t r a t e d by i t s economic inadequacies. The f r u s t r a t i o n i s f u r t h e r aggravated by an impatient neighbour, Singapore, which i s ASEAN's s m a l l e s t and undeniably most dynamic member with a per c a p i t a income ten times l a r g e r than t h a t of Indonesia. The ASEAN c o u n t r i e s r e c o g n i z e Indonesia's l a t e n t ambitions, t a k i n g care to show i t the a p p r o p r i a t e deference, while at the same time they are g r a t e f u l t h a t Indonesia has showed a c o r r e s p o n d i n g (though r e l u c t a n t ) e f f o r t at p o l i t i c a l r e s t r a i n t . The i n t e r n a l e q u i l i b r i u m of ASEAN depends on t h i s t a c i t understanding, as w i l l be e v i d e n t i n Indonesia's conduct i n the Kampuchean c r i s i s . ASEAN's loose, d e c e n t r a l i z e d i n s t i t u t i o n a l s t r u c t u r e a l s o does l i t t l e t o o f f s e t s t r o n g n a t i o n a l i n t e r e s t s and to f a c t i l i t a t e the implementation of p r o p o s a l s . U n t i l 1976 ASEAN had no C e n t r a l S e c r e t a r i a t (which i s now l o c a t e d i n J a k a r t a ) . Instead, each country had, and s t i l l has, an ASEAN N a t i o n a l S e c r e t a r i a t which i s l o c a t e d i n the r e s p e c t i v e f o r e i g n a f f a i r s departments. The p r i n c i p a l decision-making body, the annual meeting of the f o r e i g n m i n i s t e r s , r o t a t e s among i t s members i n a l p h a b e t i c a l order. The Standing Committee, which c o o r d i n a t e s and reviews the o r g a n i z a t i o n ' s a c t i v i t i e s , a l s o r o t a t e s annually, as do the personnel i n ASEAN's many committees and sub-committees. The reason f o r t h i s d e c e n t r a l i z a t i o n was p a r t l y due to a r e l u c t a n c e i n 1967 i n a d v e r t a n t l y t o g i v e any one s t a t e the 47. F r a n k l i n Weinstein, Indonesian F o r e i g n P o l i c y and the Dilemma  of Dependence (Ithaca, New York: C o r n e l l Univ. Press, 1976), p. 189. 36 edge i n r e g i o n a l s t a t u s by h o s t i n g the C e n t r a l S e c r e t a r i a t , as w e l l as to a v o i d the emergence of a s u p r a - n a t i o n a l o r g a n i z a t i o n which might i g n o r e n a t i o n a l c o n s i d e r a t i o n s . However, the high degree of d e c e n t r a l i z a t i o n has o f t e n proved an to be an o b s t a c l e to implementing p r o p o s a l s . Added to the customary s l u g g i s h n e s s of l a r g e b u r e a u c r a c i e s , ASEAN t e c h n o c r a t s are not i s o l a t e d from n a t i o n a l p o l i t i c a l i n t e r e s t s or d e c i s i o n s , and no l e g a l s t r u c t u r e imposes the r e g i o n a l o b l i g a t i o n s of members. The f r e q u e n t r o t a t i o n of committee s t a f f i n h i b i t s e f f i c i e n c y and c o n t i n u i t y . Moreover, as f i n a l d e c i s i o n -making a u t h o r i t y r e s t s with the f o r e i g n m i n i s t e r s , many of t h e i r d e c i s i o n s on economic matters are merely a p p r o v a l s of p o l i c y d e c i s i o n s a l r e a d y made by the economic m i n i s t e r s who meet much more f r e g u e n t l y . A problem t h a t has been p a r t i c u l a r l y acute s i n c e the r e c e n t Kampuchean i s s u e i s the f a c t t h a t ASEAN's s t r u c t u r e r e v o l v e s around the annual meeting of the f o r e i g n m i s t e r s who tend to be more i n t e r e s t e d i n e x t e r n a l a f f a i r s and t h e i r p o l i t i c a l dimensions at the expense of economic d i a l o g u e . In the p o l i t i c a l realm, ASEAN's peacekeeping a b i l i t y was q u i c k l y t e s t e d by the C o r r e g i d o r A f f a i r and the subsequent suspension of r e l a t i o n s between M a l a y s i a and the P h i l i p p i n e s . B a r e l y a year a f t e r ASEAN's establishment, a s p e c i a l f o r c e of Muslim r e c r u i t s was found on C o r r e g i d o r I s l a n d , a l l e g e d l y to i n f i l t r a t e and undermine the Malay government i n Sabah. A second c h a l l e n g e arose i n October 1968 when two Indonesian marines, who had been found g u i l t y of a c t s of sabotage and murder d u r i n g " k o n f r o n t a s i , " were executed i n Singapore d e s p i t e appeals from 37 Indonesia and Malaysia. The Singapore embassy and r e s i d e n c e s i n J a k a r t a were sacked and r e l a t i o n s between the two governments remained d i s t i n c t l y c o o l f o r s e v e r a l years a f t e r the i n c i d e n t . In both i n c i d e n t s , while d i p l o m a t i c e f f o r t s between ASEAN and the n a t i o n a l l e a d e r s d i d not r e s o l v e the i s s u e s e n t i r e l y , they were abl e s u c c e s s f u l l y t o defuse p o l i t i c a l t e n s i o n s b e f o r e they e s c a l a t e d t o more open v i o l e n c e . 4 8 Aside from the containment of these i n t r a - r e g i o n a l d i s p u t e s , ASEAN's progress d u r i n g the f i r s t nine years was, as Adam Malik d e s c r i b e s , mostly " i n t a n g i b l e . " I t was p r i m a r i l y a " p e r i o d of consensus i n c o n s u l t a t i o n , p l a n n i n g and a d a p t a t i o n . " 4 9 Lee Kuan Yew, at the opening speech of the F i f t h ASEAN M i n i s t e r i a l Meeting i n 1972, a d d i t i o n a l l y remarked t h a t "...perhaps the most v a l u a b l e achievement of ASEAN s i n c e i t s i n c e p t i o n was the understanding and g o o d w i l l c r e a t e d at the v a r i o u s ASEAN meetings which had helped to l u b r i c a t e r e l a t i o n s h i p s which c o u l d otherwise have generated f r i c t i o n - 3 0 On the same s u b j e c t i n a speech i n 1982, Lee Kuan Yew continued by e x p l a i n i n g t h a t : The process of e s t a b l i s h i n g mutual t r u s t and confidence, r e s p e c t and understanding f o r each o t h e r ' s p o s i t i o n ; d e v e l o p i n g our r e l a t i o n s t o a p o i n t where our F o r e i g n M i n i s t e r s f e e l f r e e t o c o n s u l t each other on the telephone -- a l l these cannot be c r e a t e d by our o r d e r i n g them so. These r e l a t i o n s are the r e s u l t of n u r t u r i n g and n a t u r a l e v o l u t i o n over many y e a r s . 3 1 48. Khaw Guat Hoon, op. c i t . , p. 229. 49. Hans H. Indorf, ASEAN: Problems and P r o s p e c t s O c c a s i o n a l Paper, no. 38 (Singapore: I n s t i t u t e of Southeast Asian S t u d i e s , 1975). 50. ASEAN S e c r e t a r i a t , Ten Years ASEAN ( J a k a r t a : ASEAN S e c r e t a r i a t , 1978), pp. 273-274. 51- Newsletter, Bonn ASEAN Committee, No. 4/1983, Nov. 1983, p. 2. Quoted i n Suh, " P o l i t i c a l Cooperation Among ASEAN C o u n t r i e s , " i n P f e n n i g and Suh, op. c i t . , p. 77. 38 Decision-making: The "ASEAN" Way One must remember t h a t u n l i k e the EEC, ASEAN l e a d e r s have no e x t e n s i v e or i n f l u e n t i a l e l i t e groups which support or oppose them on r e g i o n a l c o o p e r a t i o n . ASEAN's continued e x i s t e n c e depends i n l a r g e p a r t upon the e f f o r t , commitment and c o o p e r a t i o n of the e x c l u s i v e c i r c l e of i t s top l e a d e r s h i p . Given t h i s , and the h i s t o r i c a l and c u l t u r a l background of the Southeast Asian c o u n t r i e s , one cannot underestimate the importance of good p e r s o n a l r e l a t i o n s among the l e a d e r s of ASEAN i n c o n t r i b u t i n g to the success of the o r g a n i z a t i o n . In t h i s context Micheal Haas has drawn a c l e a r d i s t i n c t i o n between how the West and A s i a view human and i n t e r n a t i o n a l r e l a t i o n s g e n e r a l l y , and how t h i s view a f f e c t s p r a c t i c e s and procedures i n c o n c r e t e s i t u a t i o n s . There i s no acceptance i n Confucian d o c t r i n e of the Western concept of r a i s o n d'etat, the view t h a t s t a t e s are not bound by the moral p r i n c i p l e s a p p l i e d to i n d i v i d u a l s . Instead of Westerners' G e s e l l s c h a f t i s h penchant f o r r a t i o n a l and impersonal c a l c u l a t i o n s p r e p a r a t o r y t o agreements, i t i s necessary f o r A s i a n s to develop p e r s o n a l r e l a t i o n s h i p s with one another i n order to develop mutual t r u s t , whence agreements become p o s s i b l e . 3 2 The "Asian way" s t r e s s e s the value of a n o n - i n s t i t u t i o n a l framework f o r d i s c u s s i o n s , such as i n f o r m a l d e l i b e r a t i o n s conducted i n p r i v a t e once t o e s t a b l i s h a f o u n d a t i o n of t r u s t . In c o n t r a s t to what Asians c a l l the West's pre o c c u p a t i o n with " b u s i n e s s - s u i t " diplomacy, t h e i r own s t y l e of " s p o r t s - s h i r t " diplomacy r e q u i r e s no w r i t t e n r e c o r d s u n t i l the p u b l i c s e s s i o n . 52. Michael Haas, "The 'Asian Way' t o Peace," P a c i f i c Community, 4 ( J u l y 1973), p. 503. 39 In t h i s way, the l o s s of f a c e i s s o f t e n e d i n times of c o n f l i c t and everyone shares j o i n t r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r what pro g r e s s i s achieved. Haas a l s o p o i n t s out t h a t the As i a n way of d e c i s i o n -making s e p a r a t e s matters o f p r i n c i p l e and i d e a l s from those o f implementation. D e c i s i o n s are p r e s c r i b e d by p o l i t i c i a n s on the b a s i s o f a b s t r a c t p r i n c i p l e s ; q u e s t i o n s of f e a s i b i l i t y and the implementation o f these d e c i s i o n s are l e f t f o r the bureaucracy t o r e s o l v e . ASEAN's modus operandi i s through a process o f consensus through mutual c o n s u l t a t i o n , or i n i t s o r i g i n a l Malay terms, mufakat-musyawarah. At the v i l l a g e l e v e l musyawarah means "that a l e a d e r should not act a r b i t r a r i l y or impose h i s w i l l , but r a t h e r make g e n t l e s u g g e s t i o n s of the path a community should f o l l o w , being c a r e f u l always t o c o n s u l t a l l other p a r t i c i p a n t s f u l l y and t o take t h e i r views and f e e l i n g i n t o c o n s i d e r a t i o n b e f o r e d e l i v e r i n g h i s s y n t h e s i s c o n c l u s i o n s . " 3 3 Musyawarah, the s p i r i t or conduct of d i s c u s s i o n , continued i n d e f i n i t e l y u n t i l mufakat (consensus) was achieved. Transposed i n t o the i n t e r n a t i o n a l c ontext where, of course, t h e r e i s no a u t h o r i t a t i v e l eader, musyawarah takes p l a c e "not as between o p p o s i t e s but as between f r i e n d s and b r o t h e r s , " where unanimity i s the go a l o f n e g o t i a t i o n s and temporary compromised deals, t r a d e - o f f s , power p l a y s and modi v i v e n d i eschewed. By a v o i d i n g the r i s k of c o n f r o n t a t i o n , musyawarah a l l o w s d i s c u s s a n t s t o d i c u s s problems u n t i l consensus o c c u r s without the c o n s t r a i n t o f r i g i d agendas, nor the r i s k o f l o s i n g one's d i g n i t y . 53. Herbert F e i t h , The D e c l i n e of C o n s t i t u t i o n a l Democracy i n  Indonesia (Ithaca, New York: C o r n e l l Univ. Press, 19S2), p. 40. 40 C r i t i c s of the mufakat-musyawarah process maintain t h a t i t h i n d e r s more than helps ASEAN's progress. I t r e q u i r e s t h a t the ASEAN c h a i n i s o n l y as s t r o n g as i t s weakest l i n k and can o n l y move as f a s t as i t s slowest member. Consensus a l s o promotes a tendency toward postponement or p r o c r a s t i n a t i o n of c o n t r o v e r s i a l i s s u e s such as those d e a l i n g with i n d u s t r i a l complementarity, f r e e - t r a d e and the e s t a b l i s h m e n t of a s t r o n g c e n t r a l S e c r e t a r i a t . I t s p r e o c c u p a t i o n with p r e v e n t i n g one's l o s s of f a c e means t h a t i f t h e r e i s l i k e l y t o be c o n s i d e r a b l e f r i c t i o n at a forthcoming meeting t h a t meeting w i l l be i n d e f i n i t e l y postponed. Most s e r i o u s l y , i t i n s t i t u t i o n a l i z e s the o r g a n i z a t i o n ' s impotence i n a c h i e v i n g c o n c l u s i v e d e c i s i o n s on the premise t h a t more c o n s u l t a t i o n s are needed. D e s p i t e i t s shortcomings, however, ASEAN o f f i c i a l s i n s i s t on mufakat-musyawarah as most compatible with t h e i r h i s t o r i c a l and c u l t u r a l temperament. Through consensus, the i n t e r e s t s of the u n i t are p r o t e c t e d . The ASEAN s t a t e s had f l i r t e d with Western p a r l i a m e n t a r y democracy d u r i n g the e a r l y days of independence, but f o r most of them the experiment was a f a i l u r e ; f o r Indonesia s t r u g g l i n g through the '50's, i t was a f i a s c o : Indonesian democracy, much misunderstood o u t s i d e our shores, works on consensus, not a show of hands. We c o u l d no l o n g e r a f f o r d t h i s Western democracy with i t s m a j o r i t y v o t i n g , where 51 percent win and 49 percent ends up with a grudge. As we d i s c o v e r e d with our 40 p o l i t i c a l p a r t i e s , the d i s s a t i s f i e d segment r e t a l i a t e s by s u c k i n g the l i f e b l o o d of the other. I t ' s a good way f o r a baby n a t i o n to s t u n t i t s growth. 3 4 54. Sukarno, Sukarno: An Autobiography, as t o l d t o Cindy Adams ( J a k a r t a : Gunung Agung Press, 1960), p. 278. 41 For the l e a d e r s at ASEAN, i t va and c a u t i o u s l y than t o not mov s t a y with t h e i r own brand o " c o n f l i c t - a v o i d a n c e . " s t h e r e f o r e b e t t e r to move s l o w l y e at a l l . They were content to f " c o n f l i c t - r e s o l u t i o n " through The S t r a t e g i c Context; ZOPFAN and the B a l i Summit The p e r i o d i n which ASEAN was s t r u g g l i n g to c o n s o l i d a t e i t s e l f as a r e g i o n a l o r g a n i z a t i o n was a l s o marked by s i g n i f i c a n t g l o b a l p o l i t i c a l developments which had r e g i o n a l r a m i f i c a t i o n s , manifested f i r s t i n the D e c l a r a t i o n of ZOPFAN i n 1971, and the B a l i Summit of 197S. ASEAN's f i r s t major t u r n i n g p o i n t was the d e s i g n a t i o n of Southeast A s i a as a Zone of Peace, Freedom and N e u t r a l i t y (ZOPFAN), proposed by M a l a y s i a i n response t o a number of m i l i t a r y changes i n the r e g i o n . B r i t a i n ' s review i n 1968 of i t s m i l i t a r y commitments east of the Suez l e d to the sudden d e c i s i o n to withdraw a l l i t s m i l i t a r y f o r c e s from M a l a y s i a and Singapore by 1971. Having p r e v i o u s l y assured both c o u n t r i e s t h a t no such a c t i o n would take p l a c e u n t i l at l e a s t the mid-seventies, B r i t a i n ' s announcement came as a g r e a t shock to the m i l i t a r i l y i l l - p r e p a r e d c o u n t r i e s . 3 3 In the same year, the Tet o f f e n s i v e launched by North Vietnam l e d t o a r e - e v a l u a t i o n of U.S. commitments i n Southeast A s i a . The Guam D o c t r i n e of 1969 r e s t r i c t e d the U.S. r o l e i n Southeast A s i a ' s s e c u r i t y by s t i p u l a t i n g t h a t the United S t a t e s c o u l d no l o n g e r be expected to 55. See Jorgensen-Dahl, op. c i t . , pp. 74-86. 42 commit i t s ground f o r c e s to a s s i s t an Asian a l l y a g a i n s t e x t e r n a l aggression. I t d i d , however, allow a i r and naval power t o be used to i n t e r d i c t aggressors, a t t a c k aggressor f o r c e s d i r e c t l y , or p r o v i d e s u p p l i e s to f r i e n d l y governments. The S o v i e t Union susequently t r i e d t o f i l l the vaccuum by proposing to the ASEAN c o u n t r i e s i t s s o - c a l l e d A s i a n C o l l e c t i v e S e c u r i t y sphere. A l l these events c r e a t e d a sense of uneasiness and v u l n e r a b i l i t y i n the ASEAN c o u n t r i e s . As l a t e as November 1967 B r i t a i n ' s M i n i s t e r of Defence, Dennis Healey, assured M a l a y s i a and Singapore t h a t i t would withdraw i t s m i l i t a r y f o r c e s by the mid-1970's, thereby g i v i n g them a rough t i m e t a b l e to b u i l d up t h e i r own f o r c e s . B r i t a i n ' s announcement i n January 1968 was t h e r e f o r e met with g r e a t shock and c o n s t e r n a t i o n , e s p e c i a l l y by Singapore, which had l i t t l e i n the way of indigenous defence and had p r o v i d e d the l a r g e s t B r i t i s h base i n the r e g i o n . The ASEAN c o u n t r i e s agreed t h a t the United S t a t e s should p l a y a s e c u r i t y r o l e i n the r e g i o n but were undecided over what t h a t r o l e should be. They saw the Guam D o c t r i n e as a "device to cover an American abandonment of r e s p o n s i b i l i t y i n the r e g i o n , " and the United S t a t e s as a war-weary, u n c e r t a i n and u n r e l i a b l e a l l y . 5 6 T h e i r apprehensions were confirmed by the s i g n s of Sino-U.S. rapprochement which r e p r e s e n t e d a mixed b l e s s i n g to ASEAN. For the P h i l i p p i n e s , i t s i g n a l l e d a r e t u r n t o a r e a l "balance of power" i n A s i a , whereas Indonesia and M a l a y s i a were more 56. Donald E. Weatherbee, The United S t a t e s i n Southeast A s i a :  C o n t i n u i t y and D i s c o n t i n u i t y . Paper presented at the I n t e r n a t i o n a l S t u d i e s A s s o c i a t i o n meeting, March 1982, p. 4. Quoted i n Donald G. McCloud, System and Process i n Southeast A s i a : The E v o l u t i o n of a Region (Boulder, Colo. : Westview Press, 1986)," p.~4.~ 43 s u s p i c i o u s of China's i n t e n t i o n s . U n c e r t a i n t y about China l e d to the c a u t i o u s e s t a b l i s h m e n t of d i p l o m a t i c r e l a t i o n s with Peking by some of the ASEAN c o u n t r i e s , f i r s t by M a l a y s i a i n 1969, f o l l o w e d soon a f t e r by T h a i l a n d and the P h i l i p p i n e s . D i p l o m a t i c t i e s between China and Indonesia were broken i n 1967 a f t e r Peking's a l l e g e d c o m p l i c i t y i n the GESTAPU coup. Indonesia s t i l l p e r s i s t e n t l y r e f u s e s to resume r e l a t i o n s u n t i l a formal apology of i t s r o l e i s o f f e r e d by the Chinese government as w e l l as guarantees of complete n o n - i n t e f e r e n c e i n Indonesia's domestic a f f a i r s , i . e . through Indonesia's banned communist party, the PKI. S i m i l a r l y , c h a r a c t e r i s t i c of i t s pragmatism, Singapore has stuck by i t s statement t h a t i t w i l l not e s t a b l i s h formal d i p l o m a t i c r e l a t i o n s with B e i j i n g u n t i l a l l i t s ASEAN neighbours, and s p e c i f i c a l l y Indonesia, have done so. T h i s stems not so much out of a d i s t r u s t of Chinese i n t e n t i o n s (many i n f o r m a l t i e s are maintained), but r a t h e r out of f e a r of Singapore's suspected r o l e as a Chinese t r o j a n horse and the r e a c t i o n s of Indonesia t o a Peking embassy next door. To help prevent d i p l o m a t i c i s o l a t i o n , the ASEAN members agreed i n November 1971 to keep each other informed on the r e l a t i o n s with China to prevent c o m p e t i t i o n i n e v o l v i n g r e l a t i o n s with the g r e a t powers. By c o o r d i n a t i n g t h e i r a c t i o n s , the People's R e p u b l i c of China (PRC) c o u l d not pursue a d i v i d e and r u l e s t r a t e g y . T h i s e x p l i c i t understanding has a l s o worked w e l l i n ASEAN's search f o r a r e s o l u t i o n t o the Kampuchean i s s u e . Cognizant of Indonesia's f e a r s , " f r i e n d s i n c o u r t " such as T h a i l a n d , convey the views of t h e i r a l l i e s t o B e i j i n g . D e s p i t e 44 the warning s i g n a l s around T h a i l a n d ' s de f a c t o a l l i a n c e with the Chinese, ASEAN i s at l e a s t assured t h a t the o r g a n i z a t i o n s t i l l r e p r e s e n t s a co r n e r s t o n e of T h a i l a n d ' s f o r e i g n p o l i c y . D e c l a r i n g Southeast A s i a a Zone of Peace, Freedom and N e u t r a l i z a t i o n (ZOPFAN) i n 1971 was an e f f o r t at m a i n t a i n i n g a p o l i c y of e q u i d i s t a n c e from the gre a t powers. Proposed i n Kuala Lumpur by Ma l a y s i a ' s Tun Abdul Razak, he envisaged the r e g i o n under ZOPFAN to r e j e c t entanglements or f l i r t a t i o n with any f o r e i g n country or power b l o c . Tun Razak i n i t i a l l y proposed two l e v e l s of implementation of ZOPFAN: f i r s t , the ASEAN n a t i o n s must espouse non-aggression p r i n c i p l e s based on mutual r e s p e c t f o r s o v e r e i g n t y and t e r r i t o r i a l i n t e g r i t y and d e v i s e a means of en s u r i n g peace and s e c u r i t y among themselves; secondly, as the great powers, the United S t a t e s , the S o v i e t Union and China would be the p r o s p e c t i v e guarantors or s u p e r v i s o r s of Southeast A s i a ' s n e u t r a l i t y . The other ASEAN c o u n t r i e s d i d not gr e e t ZOPFAN with any grea t enthusiasm, f e e l i n g t h a t i t probably would not prove any more e f f e c t i v e i n d e t e r r i n g great power i n t e r f e r e n c e as t h e i r present p o l i c y without ZOPFAN. Indonesia's p o s i t i o n h e l d t h a t "...the product of one-way benevolence on the p a r t of the b i g powers would perhaps prove as b r i t t l e and u n s t a b l e as the i n t e r r e l a t i o n s h i p between the major powers t h e m s e l v e s . " 3 7 Malik r e j e c t e d " n e u t r a l i z a t i o n " because i t s t i l l meant t h a t Southeast A s i a depended on o u t s i d e powers, and to depend on e x t e r n a l guarantees would be an even g r e a t e r f o l l y . Instead, ASEAN's 57. Micheal L e i f e r , "ASEAN and the Problem of Common Response." I n t e r n a t i o n a l J o u r n a l 38 (S p r i n g 1983), p. 319. 45 s e c u r i t y c o u l d only be guaranteed i f each country c o n c e n t r a t e d on i t s own " n a t i o n a l r e s i l i e n c e " , and t h i s i n t u r n would ( t h e o r e t i c a l l y ) t r a n s l a t e i n t o r e g i o n a l r e s i l i e n c e v i s - a - v i s e x t e r n a l i n t e r f e r e n c e . A d i s t i n c t l y Indonesian p h i l o s o p h i c a l concept, n a t i o n a l and subsequently, r e g i o n a l , " r e s i l i e n c e " i s a comprehensive n o t i o n "comprising a l l a s p e c t s of n a t i o n a l l i f e , i n c l u d i n g t h a t of defence and s e c u r i t y as an i n t e g r a l and i n s e p a r a b l e e l e m e n t . . . r e s i l i e n c e [ i m p l i e s ] the p r i n c i p l e of s e l f -r e l i a n c e , without undue r e l i a n c e on f o r e i g n powers." 3 8 In a d d i t i o n , t h e r e was an e q u a l l y r e l e v a n t though l e s s a r t i c u l a t e d c o n s i d e r a t i o n : Indonesia was d i s c o n c e r t e d at Ma l a y s i a ' s u n i l a t e r a l attempt t o p r e s c r i b e the management of r e g i o n a l order. The p r o v i s i o n f o r e x t e r n a l power guarantees c l a s h e d with Indonesia's sense of r e g i o n a l l e a d e r s h i p . Singapore a l s o f e l t ZOPFAN to be a f u t i l e e x e r c i s e , p r e f e r r i n g t o r e l y on i t s t r a d i t i o n a l p o l i c y of b a l a n c i n g the grea t powers a g a i n s t each other. A f t e r much d i s c u s s i o n and disagreement, ZOPFAN was e v e n t u a l l y watered down i n t o a p o l i c y of n e u t r a l i t y , without c a l l i n g f o r e x t e r n a l power guarantees. The other ASEAN n a t i o n s accepted i t as the o r g a n i z a t i o n ' s common d i p l o m a t i c response and a symbol of r e g i o n a l purpose, though not e n t i r e l y out of a f i r m support f o r the p o l i c y i t s e l f . They r e a l i z e d t h a t ZOPFAN was proposed i n time f o r a c r u c i a l e l e c t i o n i n Tun Razak's c a r e e r . His i n t e n t i o n with ZOPFAN was to demonstrate t o M a l a y s i a ' s a l i e n a t e d Chinese community and to the 58. S o e d j a t i Djiwandono, "The ASEAN a f t e r the B a l i Summit." Indonesian Q u a r t e r l y , 4 ( S p e c i a l Issue, 1976), p. 9. Quoted i n B a i l e y , op. c i t . , p. 288. 46 PICA (Malaysian Chinese A s s o c i a t i o n ) t h a t the l e g i t i m a c y o f the Kuala Lumpur government was r e c o g n i z e d and endorsed by P e k i n g . 3 9 C r i t i c s such as Micheal L e i f e r have l a b e l l e d ZOPFAN an " e x e r c i s e i n c r e a t i v e a m b i g u i t y . " 6 0 P a r t of i t s ambiguity stems from the f a c t t h a t ZOPFAN i s l e s s a p r e s c r i p t i o n f o r a c t i o n than d e s c r i p t i o n of a c o n d i t i o n and a p o l i c y o f d e n i a l . ZOPFAN had as i t s g o a l "the d i p l o m a t i c d e n i a l of the l e g i t i m a c y of o u t s i d e m i l i t a r y a c t i v i t y i n Southeast A s i a r a t h e r t h a t the development of any k i n d of new r e g i o n a l defence arrangement." 6 1 As Donald Weatherbee c o r r e c t l y p o s i t s , a p o l i c y o f n e u t r a l i t y i s d i f f i c u l t t o implement because i t "depends not onl y on those who d e s i r e i t but r a t h e r on s e l f - d e n y i n g guarantees by gre a t powers with r e s p e c t t o t h e i r own i n t e n t i o n s . " 6 a The aim of ZOPFAN was t o r e a s s u r e the communist n a t i o n s --China, Vietnam and the USSR -- t h a t ASEAN was not a d v e r s a r i a l nor a stooge of the Western n a t i o n s . I t was hoped t h a t through ZOPFAN, a p o l i c y of d e n i a l would i n e f f e c t r e p l a c e t h a t of an a l l i a n c e with the West. Moreover, ASEAN o f f i c i a l s were quick t o i n s i s t t o o f f s h o r e o b s e r v e r s t h a t ZOPFAN i s more a process than a go a l . Perhaps the most i n t e r e s t i n g achievement about ZOPFAN was i t s demonstration of ASEAN s o l i d a r i t y . Although ZOPFAN was greeted c o u r t e o u s l y and u n e n t h u s i a s t i c a l l y , each of the ASEAN member n a t i o n s was — and s t i l l i s -- a c u t e l y s e n s i t i v e of i t s 59. On t h i s p o i n t , see Micheal L e i f e r , Indonesia's F o r e i g n P o l i c y (London: George A l l e n & Unwin, 1983). 60. L e i f e r , op. c i t . , p. 320. 61. Sheldon W. Simon, The ASEAN S t a t e s and Regional S e c u r i t y (Stanford, C a l i f . : Hoover I n s t i t u t i o n Press, 1982), p. 13. 62. Donald Weatherbee, "U.S. P o l i c y and the Two Southeast A s i a s , " A s i a n Survey, 18 ( A p r i l 1978), p. 412. 47 own i n d i v i d u a l i n t e r n a l f r a g i l i t y and r e a l i z e d the need t o c o o r d i n a t e f o r e i g n p o l i c i e s . Indeed, ZOPFAN succeeded i n winning China's endorsement of both Tun Razak's government and ASEAN's s t a t u s as a bona f i d e , non-aligned o r g a n i z a t i o n . Upon ASEAN's form a t i o n i n 1967, China had brandished the new r e g i o n a l o r g a n i z a t i o n as "part o f the U.S.-Soviet, a n t i - C h i n a r i n g , " a " c r i m i n a l d e s i g n , " " j o i n t l y i n s t i g a t e d by the S o v i e t r e v i s i o n i s t s and U.S. i m p e r i a l i s t s . " 6 3 China's a t t i t u d e a b r u p t l y changed a f t e r ZOPFAN and ASEAN's r e j e c t i o n of the S o v i e t Union's r e g i o n a l C o l l e c t i v e S e c u r i t y p r o p o s a l . In a d d i t i o n t o s u i t i n g ASEAN's s e c u r i t y needs, ZOPFAN a l s o s u i t e d B e i j i n g ' s d e s i r e to o b s t r u c t S o v i e t designs i n the re g i o n . China's R e l a t i o n s h i p t o the Region While China may not appear much of a t h r e a t e n i n g power i n Western c i r c l e s , from the p o i n t o f view of the As i a n c o u n t r i e s c o - e x i s t i n g i n China's "backyard", i t looms as a f o r m i d a b l e t h r e a t , not i n the c o n v e n t i o n a l sense of o u t r i g h t a g g r e s s i o n but i n terms of access t o t h e i r e t h n i c Chinese communities and i n s u r g e n c i e s . The ASEAN c o u n t r i e s ' f e a r o f China's hegemonic ambitions do not go e n t i r e l y without fo u n d a t i o n . T h e i r f e a r s o r i g i n a t e d c e n t u r i e s ago du r i n g the d y n a s t i c era of China as an i m p e r i a l power over i t s many s u z e r a i n t i e s i n North and Southeast A s i a . The Chinese concept of "Nanyang", or "Southern Seas" en c a p s u l a t e s the t e r r i t o r i e s of Th a i l a n d , Cambodia, Vietnam and 63. See B a i l e y , op. c i t . , p. 169. 48 Indonesia w i t h i n i t s sphere of i n f l u e n c e , r e q u i r i n g them to be m i l i t a r i l y a q uiescent and p o l i t i c a l l y " a c c e s s i b l e . " Nanyang a l s o r e f e r s t o the 18 m i l l i o n overseas Chinese i n Southeast A s i a whose economic predominace v a s t l y outweighs t h e i r t i n y r e p r e s e n t a t i o n i n the t o t a l p o p u l a t i o n . The Nanyang ph i l o s o p h y e s s e n t i a l l y d i c t a t e s t h a t every Chinese must show l o y a l t y t o the motherland. 6 4 During Chinese Vice-Premier Teng's v i s i t t o t h r e e ASEAN c a p i t a l s i n 1978, the l e a d e r s of Singapore and M a l a y s i a p u b l i c l y took a f i r m stance i n s t r e s s i n g t o him t h a t the e t h n i c Chinese i n t h e i r c o u n t r i e s were Malaysians and Singaporeans. To make Singapore's n a t i o n a l i d e n t i t y c l e a r , Premier Lee Kwan Yew t o l d h i s Chinese guest t h a t "Singaporeans have come t o r e a l i z e t h a t j u s t as they cannot a f f o r d t o s a c r i f i c e t h e i r n a t i o n a l i n t e r e s t s f o r China, so they cannot expect China to s a c r i f i c e her n a t i o n a l i n t e r e s t s f o r S i n g a p o r e . " s a However, Yew's assurances to the Chinese Vice-Premier were not always c o n v i n c i n g enough to Singapore's Sino-phobic neighbours. Singapore had long advocated a p o l i c y of m u l t i l i n g u a l i s m because the government f e l t i t unwise to a ccord the Chinese language predominant s t a t u s . Thus when a re c e n t "Speak Mandarin" campaign was launched to o f f s e t the r i s i n g preeminence of l o c a l d i a l e c t s -- and to a l e s s e r extent, E n g l i s h -- as the i s l a n d ' s spoken language, i t r a i s e d eyebrows i n 64. See Peter Lyon, "War and Peace," Far E a s t e r n Economic Review, 21 March 1975, p. 9. 65. See Thakur Phanit, Regional I n t e g r a t i o n Attempts i n Southeast A s i a ; A Study of ASEAN's Problems and Progress Ph. D. d i s s e r t a t i o n , Pennsylavania S t a t e U n i v e r s i t y , 1980, p. 229. 49 neighbouring Indonesia and Mal a y s i a who f e l t i t was an attempt by Singapore t o a s s e r t i t s e t h n i c s t a t u s . 6 6 A f u r t h e r source of i r r i t a t i o n with B e i j i n g i s China's m a t e r i a l and moral support f o r ASEAN's i n s u r g e n t communist movements and the t h e i r i n s i s t e n c e on d i s t i n g u i s h i n g between government-to-government r e l a t i o n s and p a r t y - t o - p a r t y r e l a t i o n s . D i p l o m a t i c r e l a t i o n s based on the former, China maintains, should not be p r e j u d i c e d by the l a t t e r which i s both separate and d i s t i n c t . Indonesia i s the most adamant i n r e f u s i n g t o accept t h i s argument s i n c e the d i s t i n c t i o n g u i t e e v i d e n t l y does not apply t o China. The second major t u r n i n g p o i n t i n ASEAN's development o c c u r r e d a f t e r the United S t a t e s was defeated i n the Vietnam War i n 1975. Saigon f e l l t o the Northern f o r c e s and two more c o u n t r i e s , Laos and Cambodia, f e l l t o communism. While o t h e r s r e j o i c e d , the U.S. withdrawal from Southeast A s i a was met with a n x i e t y and apprehension by ASEAN. The i n t e r n a t i o n a l order p r i o r to 1975 was the b a s i s on which the ASEAN c o u n t r i e s had f a s h i o n e d t h e i r f o r e i g n p o l i c i e s . But th e r e was now uneasiness with S o v i e t -American r e l a t i o n s , with the open S i n o - S o v i e t c o n f l i c t and the u n c e r t a i n r o l e s of China, the U.S., the S o v i e t Union and Japan. Vietnam proved i t s e l f t o be a f o r m i d a b l e f i g h t i n g f o r c e a g a i n s t the world's most powerful n a t i o n , c o n d i t i o n e d by decades of war and a potent r e v o l u t i o n a r y f e r v o u r . Most worrisome t o ASEAN was t h a t Vietnam was now a l s o i n p o s s e s s i o n o f f i v e b i l l i o n d o l l a r s worth of American m i l i t a r y equipment. What new i n t e r n a t i o n a l and 66. See i b i d . 50 r e g i o n a l order would r e p l a c e the old? How would Southeast A s i a f i t i n t o the new power c o n f i g u r a t i o n ? On the one hand, the American withdrawal i n 1975 presented an o p p o r t u n i t y f o r the r e g i o n f i n a l l y t o develop a modus v i v e n d i with the Indochinese n a t i o n s without e x t e r n a l i n t e r v e n t i o n . On the other hand, as p o t e n t i a l "dominos", the ASEAN s t a t e s might be v u l n e r a b l e to the v i c t o r s - Vietnam, the USSR, and China. In f a c t , n e i t h e r happened. T h i s was p a r t l y due to i n t e r n a l d i s s e n s i o n among the communists i n Southeast A s i a , but a l s o to the a b i l i t y of the ASEAN s t a t e s to cooperate and promote r e g i o n a l s e c u r i t y and economic growth. T h i s was achieved i n two ways; f i r s t , by a f f i r m i n g and f o r m a l i z i n g ASEAN's p o l i t i c a l r o l e at the B a l i Summit, and second, by m a i n t a i n i n g communication with Vietnam. F i r s t , the seminal B a l i Summit of 1976 convened not o n l y ASEAN's f o r e i g n m i n i s t e r s , but a l s o the n a t i o n a l heads of s t a t e to a s sess r e c e n t developments and to determine what measures ASEAN should take. The outcome of the summit was the D e c l a r a t i o n of the ASEAN Concord and the T r e a t y of Amity and Cooperation. B r i e f l y , the ASEAN Concord r e s o l v e d to e l i m i n a t e t h r e a t s posed by subversion, take a c t i v e s t e p s toward ZOPFAN, and to r e l y on e x c l u s i v e l y p e a c e f u l p rocesses i n the s e t t l e m e n t of r e g i o n a l d i f f e r e n c e s . The Treaty of Amity and Cooperation o u t l i n e d s t e p s to promote " p e r p e t u a l " peace, based on: a) mutual r e s p e c t f o r independence and t e r i t o r i a l i n t e g r i t y ; b) the r i g h t of s t a t e s to l e a d t h e i r e x i s t e n c e f r e e from e x t e r n a l i n t e r f e r e n c e ; c) n o n - i n t e r f e r e n c e i n th d) the sett l e m e n t e) the r e n u n c i a t i o f ) e f f e c t i v e coope Both of these doc ASEAN's f i r s t e x p l i c i t o f a concern f o r the e s t a b l i s h e d p r i o r i t i e s on a shared sense of r e l a t i o n s t o i n i t i a t e a of common assumptions Concord s t i p u l a t e s t h a t The s t a b i l i t y of r e g i o n i s an esse peace and s e c u r i t t h r e a t s posed by s t r e n g t h e n i n g n a t i In other words, p o l i t i c a l s t a b l i t y of i n s t a b i l i t y i n one s t a whole. The Tr e a t y of f o r i n t e r s t a t e conduct s o v e r e i g n t y and t e r r i t as a p o l i t i c a l b r i d g e accommodation was p o s s i b l e framework of the r e g i o n . a l a f f a i r s of one another; f u l means; a t s or f o r c e ; ant because they are nts. Having grown out , the B a l i conference n f o r c e r e l a t i o n s based use the strengthened am and e s t a b l i s h a s e t order. The ASEAN and o f the ASEAN t o i n t e r n a t i o n a l Ives t o e l i m i n a t e s t a b i l i t y , thus ience. d a s s e r t e d t h a t the l e ; the presence of s f o r the r e g i o n as a n p r o v i d e d a framework s a n c t i t y of n a t i o n a l was intended t o serve aking i t c l e a r t h a t the e x i s t i n g p o l i t i c a l 51 e i n t e r n of d i s p u t e s by peace n of the use of t h r e r a t i o n . 6 7 uments are s i g n i f i c l y p o l i t i c a l docume communist v i c t o r i e s t o r e a f f i r m and r e i t h r e a t , and to d i a l o g u e with V i e t n c o n cerning r e g i o n a l each member s t a t e n t i a l c o n t r i b u t i o n y. Each member reso s u b v e r s i o n t o i t s onal and ASEAN r e s i l the ASEAN Concor ASEAN was i n d i v i s i b t e had r e p e r c u s s i o n Amity and Cooperatio I t s t r e s s e d the o r i a l i n t e g r i t y . I t to Indochina by m w i t h i n 67. Interview with Mochtar Kusumaatmadja, "Indonesia, ASEAN and Peace i n Southeast A s i a , " Kaleidoscope I n t e r n a t i o n a l , 1984, p. 45. 52 A f t e r the summit meeting, ASEAN r e s o l v e d not to adopt a h o s t i l e a t t i t u d e towards Indochina, emphasizing n o n - i n t e r v e n t i o n and p o t e n t i a l accommodation. In a j o i n t p r e s s statement: The CASEAN F o r e i g n ] M i n i s t e r s expressed the hope t h a t these developments [ i n Indochina] would open up pro s p e c t s f o r r e a l peace, progress and s t a b i l i t y i n the r e g i o n of Southeast A s i a . The M i n i s t e r s expressed t h e i r r e a d i n e s s t o en t e r i n t o a f r i e n d l y and harmonious r e l a t i o n s h i p with each n a t i o n o f I n d o c h i n a . 6 8 T h a i l a n d and Ma l a y s i a had a l r e a d y approached Hanoi i n 1975 with an i n v i t a t i o n t o j o i n ASEAN, but i t was r e j e c t e d along with c r i t i c a l comments of ASEAN as being a " n e o - c o l o n i a l i s t " , U.S. replacement o f SEATQ. C o n c l u s i o n The advent of ASEAN was not d i s t i n g u i s h e d by a common p e r c e p t i o n of e x t e r n a l t h r e a t , but i n s t e a d by a common r e c o g n i t i o n o f the p o t e n t i a l dangers a r i s i n g out of con t i n u e d i n t r a - r e g i o n a l h o s t i l i t i e s , l a c k o f economic c o o p e r a t i o n , and too grea t a r e l i a n c e on o u t s i d e powers. The ASEAN co n c e p t i o n of r e g i o n a l s e c u r i t y was conceived i n developmental terms, underpinned by p o l i t i c a l s t a b i l i t y t o prevent the w a s t e f u l d i v e r s i o n of e n e r g i e s from economic development. I t was a l s o a p r e s c r i p t i o n f o r r e g i o n a l order based on mutual r e s p e c t f o r one another's n a t i o n a l s o v e r e i g n t y . During i t s e v o l u t i o n a r y p e r i o d throughout the 1970s, ASEAN was l e s s concerned with producing c o n c r e t e r e s u l t s (such as economic i n t e g r a t i o n ) than with Press Statement, E i g h t h ASEAN F o r e i g n M i n i s t e r s Meeting, Kuala Lumpur, 14 May 1975. 53 c u l t i v a t i n g a durable f o u n d a t i o n of t r u s t , s o l i d a r i t y and p o l i t i c a l g o o d w i l l among i t s members. T h i s was, and c o n t i n u e s to be, ASEAN's foremost and e v e r - f r a g i l e p r i o r i t y . In Chan Heng Chee's words: That ASEAN was conceived p r i m a r i l y as an o r g a n i z a t i o n whose major a c t i v i t i e s l a y i n economic, s o c i a l and c u l t u r a l c o o p e r a t i o n , but whose r a i s o n d ' e t r e was p o l i t i c a l c o o r d i n a t i o n to cope with t h r e a t s t o s u b r e g i o n a l peace and s e c u r i t y , i n t e r n a l l y or e x t e r n a l l y , i s a r e v e a l i n g statement of the maximal attainment p o s s i b l e i n a s i t u a t i o n of minimal c o n s e n s u s . " 6 9 As a r e g i o n a l o r g a n i z a t i o n , ASEAN evolved as a forum i n which i t s member s t a t e s c o o r d i n a t e d t h e i r p o l i c i e s and n a t i o n a l o b j e c t i v e s ; ASEAN d i d not c o o r d i n a t e t h e i r p o l i c i e s f o r them. 69. Chan Heng Chee, "ASEAN: Su b r e g i o n a l R e s i l i e n c e , " i n S e c u r i t y Interdependence i n the A s i a P a c i f i c Region, ed. James W. Morley (Massachusetts: Lexington Books, 1986), p. 114. 54 CHAPTER THREE The Invasion of Kampuchea and i t s Consequences A t h r e a t i s d e f i n e d as "any c o n d i t i o n t h a t i s p e r c e i v e d to reduce or wipe out the enjoyment of v a l u e s or decrease a f e e l i n g of s e c u r i t y . " 7 0 In d i s c u s s i n g the Kampuchean c r i s i s i t i s p a r t i c u l a r l y important to keep i n mind t h a t i t i s the s t r e n g t h of the p e r c e p t i o n t h a t counts, not the degree of i t s accuracy. A c o u n t r y ' s p e r c e p t i o n of a t h r e a t i s c o n d i t i o n e d by t h r e e f a c t o r s . 7 1 The f i r s t i s the nature of c a p a b i l i t i e s . The more r e l a t i v e c a p a b i l i t i e s a country possesses the l e s s threatened i t w i l l f e e l . The ASEAN n a t i o n s are s t i l l f o c u s i n g a l l t h e i r e n e r g i e s on economic development, insurgency movements and widening s o c i a l i n e q u i t i e s pose s e r i o u s i n t e r n a l s e c u r i t y problems, and the ASEAN c o u n t r i e s ' m i l i t a r y f o r c e s remain w o e f u l l y u n d e r - t r a i n e d and i l l - e q u i p p e d to c o n f r o n t any major e x t e r n a l t h r e a t . The second f a c t o r i s the c o n s i d e r a t i o n of d i s t a n c e . The f a r t h e r removed a country i s from a c o n f l i c t , the l e s s immediacy the t h r e a t w i l l have. Secure i n i t s detached a r c h i p e l a g i c s t a t u s , Indonesia has been the most u n r u f f l e d by and c o n c i l i a t o r y t o the Vietnamese t h r e a t . S i m i l a r l y , f o r the P h i l i p p i n e s , the impact of the Kampuchean c o n f l i c t has been v i r t u a l l y n o n - e x i s t e n t and what involvement they have i n the 70. E s t r e l l a D. Solidum, " S e c u r i t y P e r s p e c t i v e s i n ASEAN," i n Aspects of ASEAN, eds. Werner Pf e n n i g and Mark M. B. Suh (Munich, Germany: Weltforum Verlag, 1984), p. 101. 71. I b i d . , pp. 101-102. 55 i s s u e i s by v i r t u e of t h e i r membership i n ASEAN. The t h i r d f a c t o r r e s t s on the p e r c e p t i o n s of the decision-makers i n the policy-making process. Beyond decision-making r u l e s and standard o p e r a t i n g procedures, i n d i v i d u a l s , p a r t i c u l a r l y i n the ASEAN c o u n t r i e s , are a key f a c t o r i n f o r e i g n p o l i c y processes. As i n d i v i d u a l s , t h e i r p e r c e p t i o n s are c o n d i t i o n e d (or clouded) by past experiences, time c o n s t r a i n t s , r e s i d u a l s u s p i c i o n s and c o n d i t i o n s of ambiguity with l i t t l e " r e l i a b l e " i n f o r m a t i o n . 7 8 The r e s u l t i n g s i t u a t i o n i s t h a t e x t e r n a l t h r e a t s w i l l be p e r c e i v e d d i f f e r e n t l y depending on one or a combination of these f a c t o r s : some decision-makers w i l l be threatened by p o t e n t i a l or even f i c t i t i o u s t h r e a t s -- what the Asians c a l l " t i g e r s at the doorstep," " t i g e r s i n the j u n g l e , " or "paper t i g e r s . " The c r o s s i n g of 120,000 Vietnamese t r o o p s a c r o s s the Cambodian border on December 25, 1978 and the subsequent es t a b l i s h m e n t of the Heng Semrin regime i n Phnom Penh a month l a t e r , marked a s h i f t i n the r e g i o n a l d i s t r i b u t i o n o f power and a t u r n i n g p o i n t i n ASEAN's development as an o r g a n i z a t i o n . The i n v a s i o n v i o l a t e d ASEAN's p r i n c i p l e s of r e s p e c t f o r n a t i o n a l s o v e r e i g n t y and n o n - i n t e r v e n t i o n . I t came as a p a r t i c u l a r shock a f t e r a r e c e n t 1978 v i s i t by Vietnamese Premier Pham Van Dong to the ASEAN c a p i t a l s , which was supposed t o r e p r e s e n t a gesture of c o n c i l i a t i o n and p o l i t i c a l g o o d w i l l . The ASEAN r e a c t i o n was s w i f t and uncompromising. A j o i n t statement i s s u e d on January 19, 1979 condemned the armed 72. Robert 0. Tilman, Southeast A s i a and the Enemy Beyond: ASEAN P e r c e p t i o n s of E x t e r n a l T h r e a t s (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1987), p. 26. 56 i n t e r v e n t i o n , " a f f i r m e d the r i g h t of Kampuchea to determine i t s i n t e r n a l a f f a i r s " , and c a l l e d f o r an "immediate withdrawal of a l l f o r e i g n f o r c e s . " One notes, however, t h a t by not naming Vietnam d i r e c t l y and by u s i n g the term "armed i n t e r v e n t i o n " r a t h e r than " a g g r e s s i o n , " ASEAN's condemnation was e x p l i c i t l y unprovocative. The January j o i n t statement was c a r e f u l l y worded to condemn Vietnam's a c t i o n s but not to appear o v e r t l y anti-Vietnamese. As Kampuchea's neighbour and the only ASEAN country d i r e c t l y a f f e c t e d by the i n v a s i o n , T h a i l a n d took a tough stance while the o t h e r s were w i l l i n g t o maintain n e g o t i a t i n g f l e x i b i l i t y . A c c o r d i n g to Thai F o r e i g n M i n i s t e r S i d d h i S a v e t s i l a , he was o f f e r e d a hot l i n e between Bangkok and Hanoi, a measure to prevent t r o o p c l a s h e s , and even a non-aggression pact by h i s Vietnamese c o u n t e r p a r t , Nguyen Co Thach. But these o f f e r s were r e j e c t e d by S i d d h i : "I j u s t r e f u s e d to accept t h a t , because i f you do so you accept the f a i t accompli of the presence of Vietnamese t r o o p s along the Thai b o r d e r . " 7 3 T h a i l a n d has t r a d i t i o n a l l y competed with Vietnam f o r i n f l u e n c e i n Laos and Kampuchea and these two s t a t e s have t r a d i t i o n a l l y served as b u f f e r s t a t e s . In l i g h t of Vietnam's h i s t o r i c a l c l a i m to s i x t e e n Thai p r o v i n c e s as p a r t of i t s g o a l of a g r e a t e r Indochina F e d e r a t i o n , T h a i l a n d would have p r e f e r r e d a weak Vietnam, d i v i d e d i n t o North and South, s i n c e two Vietnams would have been weaker than one. D e s p i t e f e a r s of expansion when the United S t a t e s withdrew i n 1975, the Thai government adopted a c a u t i o u s , f l e x i b l e , c o o p e r a t i v e p o l i c y toward Vietnam. In 73. Rodney Tasker, "Avoiding Vietnam's Trap." Far E a s t e r n Economic Review, 19 Apr. 1984, p. 16. 57 keeping with i t s t r a d i t i o n of seeking a s t r o n g e x t e r n a l power to p r o v i d e c o u n t e r v a i l i n g f o r c e a g a i n s t i t s main adversary, the T h a i s t e n t a t i v e l y turned t o China f o r added support, t a k i n g c a r e to a v o i d having the r e l a t i o n s h i p l a b e l l e d as an a l l i a n c e . When Vietnam's 1978 i n v a s i o n e f f e c t i v e l y d estroyed Kampuchea's b u f f e r s t a t u s , i t r e v i v e d Thai f e a r s of Vietnam's e x p a n s i o n i s t ambitions, which were f u r t h e r r e i n f o r c e d by the S o v i e t Union's s p o n s o r s h i p r o l e . Bangkok's m i l i t a r y - b u r e a u c r a t i c e s t a b l i s h m e n t was concerned with the r a m i f i c a t i o n s i f Hanoi was t o c o n s o l i d a t e a p o s i t i o n of dominance. A new c e n t e r of r e g i o n a l power would e f f e c t i v e l y emerge to which T h a i l a n d would be most u n p a l a t a b l y subordinated. As a f r o n t - l i n e s t a t e , T h a i l a n d a l s o s h o u l d e r s the huge s p i n - o f f c o s t s of armed c o n f l i c t -- the massive i n f l u x of r e fugees and consequent s o c i a l d i s r u p t i o n , i n c u r s i o n s i n t o Thai t e r r i t o r y by SRV f o r c e s , and the f e a r t h a t Hanoi c o u l d "export" i t s r e v o l u t i o n t o Thai t e r r i t o r y . T h a i l a n d ' s i n s i s t e n c e t h a t ASEAN support i t s p o s i t i o n a l s o stems from i t s p e r c e p t i o n of Vietnam's t h r e a t not only t o i t s e l f , but to the r e g i o n . To quote the F o r e i g n M i n i s t e r , " T h a i l a n d ' s e a s t e r n boundary has become the f r o n t i e r of the Free World a g a i n s t the c o n t r o l of the s t r a t e g i c P e r s i a n Gulf, T h a i l a n d i s the s t r o n g h o l d a g a i n s t f u r t h e r advance of what Vietnam has e u p h e m i s t i c a l l y c a l l e d ' S o c i a l i s m ' s Outpost' i n Southeast A s i a . " 7 * Singapore has adopted, i f not surpassed, T h a i l a n d ' s hard-l i n e stance i n condemning Vietnam's a c t i o n s . Singapore i s 74. Tilman, op. c i t . , p. 72. 58 ASEAN's s t r o n g e s t and most outspoken c r i t i c i n the Kampuchean i s s u e , i n complete c o n t r a s t to i t s low p r o f i l e i n ASEAN's economic d i s c u s s i o n s . Singapore's customary p r a c t i c e of speaking b l u n t l y and i n s i s t i n g t h a t ASEAN "stay the course" again stems d i r e c t l y from a deep sense of v u l n e r a b i l i t y as an i s l a n d - n a t i o n , and i t s extreme dependence on f o r e i g n investment which r e q u i r e s r e g i o n a l s t a b i l i t y . Thus a c c o r d i n g to the Singaporean l e a d e r s h i p , a t h r e a t to T h a i l a n d i s a t h r e a t to ASEAN. However, support f o r i t s f r o n t - l i n e neighbour stems not so much out of f e a r f o r T h a i l a n d ' s welfare, nor even out of a d i r e c t f e a r of Vietnam. Instead, Singapore f e e l s t h a t the Vietnamese t h r e a t i s secondary and merely an adjunct or p r e t e x t f o r what are u l t i m a t e l y S o v i e t designs f o r Southeast A s i a . As Lee Kuan Yew a s s e r t e d i n September 1982, "The main i s s u e was whether the S o v i e t s w i l l become a major power i n the r e g i o n because of V i etnam." 7 3 Singapore's major f e a r of the S o v i e t Union i s p r i m a r i l y commercial; i t i s concerned with the p r o t e c t i o n of i t s s e a - l a n e s through the S t r a i t s of Malacca upon which i t s l i f e -blood r e s t s , but a l s o upon which the S o v i e t Union depends to l i n k i t s Black Sea and P a c i f i c f l e e t s . S i n c e the 1960s, the f o r e i g n p o l i c y of Singapore, and s p e c i f i c a l l y Lee Kuan Yew, has been i n f u s e d with a d i s t i n c t , i d e o l o g i c a l d i s t r u s t of S o v i e t p o l i c y . Addressing two Japanese r e p o r t e r s i n 1981, Lee remarked t h a t " S o v i e t a c t i o n s and p o l i c y have been r e l e n t l e s s l y c o n s i s t e n t : to 75. Singapore B r o a d c a s t i n g C o r p o r a t i o n , 9 September, 1982. In Hans Indorf, Impediments t o Regionalism i n Southeast A s i a : B i l a t e r a l C o n s t r a i n t s Among ASEAN Member S t a t e s (Singapore: I n t s t i t u t e of Southeast A s i a n S t u d i e s , 1984), p. 36. 59 secure the Russian h e a r t l a n d from attack, to communize the world, and...to keep i t under Communist c o n t r o l . 6 Compared to T h a i l a n d and Singapore, Indonesia and M a l a y s i a adopted a "wait and see" a t t i t u d e immediately a f t e r the i n v a s i o n . Indonesia and, to a l e s s v o c a l extent, Malaysia, took a d i a m e t r i c a l l y o p p o s i t e view i n comparison t o the vehement stance of t h e i r two ASEAN neighbours. They f e e l t h a t ASEAN's main t h r e a t i s n e i t h e r Vietnam nor the S o v i e t Union, but China, and s p e c i f i c a l l y i t s growing c o o p e r a t i v e t i e s with T h a i l a n d i n c o n f r o n t i n g Vietnam. In January 1979, s h o r t l y a f t e r the f a l l of Phnom Penh, China launched a m i l i t a r y p u n i t i v e r a i d a c r o s s the Vietnamese border to demonstrate i t s " p a t e r n a l " d i s c o n t e n t with Vietnam's r e c e n t a c t i o n s and aimed a l s o at " t e a c h i n g i t a l e s s o n . " China has a l s o taken measures to "assure the f r a t e r n a l T h a i people" t h a t i f Hanoi d i d not "stop provoking" T h a i l a n d , then China " w i l l not stand i d l y b y . " 7 7 S i n c e then, China has s u p p l i e d T h a i l a n d with tanks, a n t i - a i r c r a f t guns and a r t i l l e r y weapons. An o p e r a t i o n a l m i l i t a r y l i n k was e s t a b l i s h e d i n December 1985 between Northwest T h a i l a n d and Southeast C h i n a . 7 8 Indonesia i s at the f o r e f r o n t i n warning a g a i n s t China's l a t e n t ambitions i n the r e g i o n , f e a r i n g t h a t the present c o n f l i c t p r o v i d e s China with an unwelcome " f o o t i n the door" t o the 76. Tilman, op. c i t . , p. 63. 77. See J u s t u s M. Van Der Kroef, "The United S t a t e s and Cambodia: The L i m i t s of Compromise and I n t e r v e n t i o n , " Contemporary  Southeast A s i a , 7 (March 1986). 78. See Lau Teik Soon, " S h i f t i n g Alignments i n Regional P o l i t i c s , " i n Southeast Asian A f f a i r s 1986 (Singapore: I n s t i t u t e of Southeast Asian S t u d i e s , 1987). 60 r e g i o n . Indonesia takes the p o s i t i o n t h a t while T h a i l a n d ' s f e a r s of Vietnam are perhaps l e g i t i m a t e , i t i s an immediate short-term t h r e a t . I t f e e l s t h a t a modernizing China should be ASEAN's main worry. Both Indonesia and M a l a y s i a s u f f e r problems of e t h n i c s t a b i l i t y , where r e l a t i o n s between the e t h n i c a l l y Chinese m i n o r i t y (3% and 35% r e s p e c t i v e l y ) and the indigenous p o p u l a t i o n are extremely unstable. China's r e f u s a l to sever l i n k s with t h e i r outlawed communist p a r t i e s i s a p e r s i s t a n t i r r i t a t i o n which they f e e l a t t e s t s t o China's u l t e r i o r motives i n the Kampuchean i s s u e . A survey of Indonesian e l i t e s r e v e a l e d t h a t the Chinese t h r e a t i s viewed as more n a t i o n a l i s t i c than i d e o l o g i c a l . 7 9 What i s meant by t h i s i s t h a t the communist i d e o l o g y p l a y s a secondary r o l e to the views of China as i n h e r e n t l y "a hungry g i a n t " and the Chinese people as e x p a n s i o n i s t by nature. In f a c t , Indonesia b e l i e v e s t h a t a s t r o n g , r e c o n s t r u c t e d , ASEAN-supported Vietnam would p r o v i d e an e x c e l l e n t bulwark a g a i n s t any Chinese e x p a n s i o n i s t designs. T h a i l a n d ' s f r o n t - l i n e s t a t u s and p o l i t i c a l r e l i a n c e on China's t h r e a t of the use of f o r c e has caused the r e s t of ASEAN to r e l u c t a n t l y f o l l o w i t s f r o n t - l i n e member f o r the sake of u n i t y . T h a i l a n d t h e r e f o r e walks a f i n e l i n e with i t s ASEAN f r i e n d s by i n f o r m a l l y s a n c t i o n i n g Chinese p o l i t i c a l and m i l i t a r y support, though n e i t h e r f o r m a l l y acknowledging nor denying i t . D e s p i t e i n c r e a s e d U.S. m i l i t a r y a s s i s t a n c e s i n c e the c o n f l i c t began, the Thai government i s f u l l y aware t h a t China poses an i n f i n i t e l y more e f f e c t i v e d e t e r r e n t a g a i n s t f u r t h e r Vietnamese 79. Tilman, op. c i t . , pp. 118-121. 61 a g g r e s s i o n than the United S t a t e s or, f o r t h a t matter, ASEAN. As a s e n i o r o f f i c i a l i n the Thai M i n i s t e r y of F o r e i g n A f f a i r s remarked: "With us i t i s not an academic question, i t i s a matter of s u r v i v a l . China i s on our s i d e , and t h a t i s a l l t h a t matters. 1 , 8 0 In sh o r t , the de f a c t o C h i n a - T h a i l a n d a l l i a n c e i s p u r e l y short-term. Moreover, i t s t r u s t i n China i s s t i l l new and untested, t h e r e f o r e making i t u n l i k e l y t h a t T h a i l a n d w i l l r i s k o f f e n d i n g Indonesia and Malaysia. ASEAN's d i p l o m a t i c p o s i t i o n i n the c o n f l i c t demands a withdrawal of Vietnamese t r o o p s from Kampuchean t e r r i t o r y , but th e r e i s disagreement r e g a r d i n g , f i r s t , the motives behind Vietnam's a c t i o n s and, second, the extent t o which ASEAN should accommodate a Vietnamese c o n t r o l l i n g i n t e r e s t i n Kampuchea. The p r e v a i l i n g T h a i view i s t h a t Vietnam's i n v a s i o n was an o u t r i g h t "act of a g g r e s s i o n " i n gross v i o l a t i o n of one of ASEAN's foremost p r i n c i p l e s of r e s p e c t f o r n a t i o n a l s o v e r e i g n t y . To condone such a v i o l a t i o n would c r e a t e dangerous precedents f o r the f u t u r e . The Thai p o s i t i o n c l e a r l y f o c u s e s on r e v i v i n g the s t a t u s quo ante, though with Kampuchea under the l e a d e r s h i p of the deposed P r i n c e Sihanouk and not the Khmer Rouge under P o l Pot. Indonesia and Malaysia, i n c o n t r a s t , are somewhat more sympathetic to Vietnam's s e c u r i t y concerns and thus more open t o a c c e p t i n g the s t a t u s quo. They f e e l t h a t Vietnam's occ u p a t i o n was l e s s an act d r i v e n by a g g r e s s i v e or e x p a n s i o n i s t motives than a means of s e c u r i n g i t s n a t i o n a l s o v e r e i g n t y v i s - a - v i s an i n c r e a s i n g l y menacing China. According to t h i s argument, the i n v a s i o n was not 80. I b i d . , p. 84. 62 an e x c l u s i v e l y b i l a t e r a l a f f a i r between Vietnam and Kampuchea, but drew i t s r o o t s i n l a r g e p a r t from the Sino-Vietnamese c o n f l i c t which, i n turn, was p e r c e i v e d i n Moscow and B e i j i n g as an adjunct of S i n o - S o v i e t t e n s i o n s . Sino-Vietnamese r e l a t i o n s , d e s c r i b e d by the Chinese as once " c l o s e as t e e t h to l i p s " , have, through the c e n t u r i e s of Chinese s u z e r a i n t y , p e r i o d i c a l l y f l a r e d up i n t o c o n t e s t s between a b e l l i g e r e n t s u b o r d i n a t e and an overbearing, self-assumed mentor. Sino-Vietnamese r e l a t i o n s once again d e t e r i o r a t e d r a p i d l y i n the e a r l y 1970s. By 1973, Hanoi was aware t h a t China, l i k e T h a i l a n d , d i d not f a v o r u n i f i c a t i o n of North and South Vietnam, but an independent (and pro-Western) regime i n Saigon. T h i s was f o l l o w e d by Vietnam's d r i f t c l o s e r to the S o v i e t o r b i t , membership i n COMECON, the l a r g e - s c a l e e x p u l s i o n of e t h n i c Chinese Vietnamese and the subsequent i n f l u x of the s o - c a l l e d "boat people," c u l m i n a t i n g i n China's abrupt t e r m i n a t i o n of an estimated $18 b i l l i o n o f a i d which l e f t a devasted and impoverished Vietnam c r i p p l e d . Compounding t h i s was Kampuchea's growing s i g n s of resentment toward Vietnam. 8 1 L i k e Laos, Kampuchea was t r a d i t i o n a l l y assumed by Hanoi t o be w i t h i n Vietnam's sphere of i n f l u e n c e and any tendency toward Chinese c o o p e r a t i o n was p e r c e i v e d as a d i r e c t t h r e a t to Vietnam's n a t i o n a l s e c u r i t y . T h i s p o i n t s h a l l become c l e a r e r l a t e r . Indonesia and M a l a y s i a draw a c l e a r d i s t i n c t i o n between i d e o l o g y and Vietnam's s e c u r i t y i m p e r a t i v e s . Vietnam's r e s o r t to 81. By 1977, Kampuchea was d i s p u t i n g r i g h t s over o f f s h o r e i s l a n d s , e x p e l l i n g Vietnamese n a t i o n a l s , and h a r r a s s i n g Vietnam on the borders of the Mekong d e l t a . 63 f o r c e , they argue, was due not to e x p a n s i o n i s t ambitions but to e s c a l a t i n g a t t a c k s along t h e i r borders by P o l Pot and i n c r e a s i n g Chinese involvement i n Kampuchea. David E l l i o t sums up t h e i r p o s i t i o n as f o l l o w s : To the extent t h a t Vietnam i s an e x p a n s i o n i s t s t a t e , the d r i v e t o extend i t s i n f l u e n c e and c o n t r o l i s not a simple p r o j e c t i o n of i t s ideology, and to the extent t h a t i d e o l o g y i s a f a c t o r i n i t s e x p a n s i o n i s t behavior ( s p e c i f i c a l l y the Vietnamese i n v a s i o n o f Kampuchea), i t i s not the i d e o l o g y i t s e l f or even the s t r a t e g i c p r e c e p t s drawn from t h a t i d e o l o g y which are c r i t i c a l , but the a p p l i c a t i o n of the i d e o l o g y and s t r a t e g y t o s p e c i f i c c i r c u m s t a n c e s . 8 8 In other words, the i n v a s i o n o f Kampuchea was more of a s t r a t e g i c n e c e s s i t y , and l e s s a requirement of Vietnam's Communist d o c t r i n e . A comment made by Vietnam's F o r e i g n M i n i s t e r Nguyen Co Thach d u r i n g a Bangkok v i s i t i n May 1980 made t h i s p o i n t c l e a r i n r e l a t i o n t o ASEAN: The s o l i d a r i t y o f the Indochinese n a t i o n s i s as important t o Vietnam as i s the s o l i d a r i t y o f ASEAN to Th a i l a n d . We have no i n t e n t i o n o f making an ASEAN country as a b u f f e r zone between our c o u n t r i e s and we cannot accept the premise t h a t an Indochina country be made a b u f f e r zone between these groups of c o u n t r i e s . " 8 3 For Indonesia, the memory of the Indonesian R e v o l u t i o n a g a i n s t the Dutch i s s t i l l s t r o n g . An o c c a s i o n a l p o i n t of i r r i t a t i o n among Indonesian o f f i c i a l s i s t h a t Indonesia i s alone among the ASEAN s t a t e s t o have a c t u a l l y had to f i g h t f o r i t s independence. Reminded of the b i t t e r r e v o l u t i o n a r y s t r u g g l e and the m i l i t a r y ' s h e r o i c r o l e d u r i n g the coup of 1965, many 82. David W.P. E l l i o t , "Vietnam i n A s i a : S t r a t e g y and Diplomacy i n a New Context," I n t e r n a t i o n a l J o u r n a l , 38 ( S p r i n g 1983), p. 291. 83. Bangkok Post, 22 May 1980. Quoted i n Micheal L e i f e r , " O bstacles t o a P o l i t i c a l Settlement i n Indochina," P a c i f i c  A f f a i r s . 58 (Winter 1985-86), p. 633. 64 Indonesians, p a r t i c u l a r l y i n m i l i t a r y c i r c l e s , f e e l an a f f i n i t y with Vietnam whom they see as p r e s e n t l y engaged i n a s t r u g g l e f o r i t s n a t i o n a l independence v i s - a - v i s Chinese dominance. General Benny Murdani, Commander of Indonesia's armed f o r c e s and the most accommodative as w e l l as c o n t r o v e r s i a l advocate i n the i s s u e , sent r i p p l e s of a n x i e t y through ASEAN when he u n i l a t e r a l l y announced t h a t Vietnam was not a t h r e a t t o Southeast A s i a . 8 4 Murdani reasoned t h a t c o u n t r i e s such as I s r a e l and Vietnam, which are surrounded by h o s t i l e powers, tend to take an a g g r e s s i v e g e o p o l i t i c a l stance. The China Dilemma The primary source of the q u a r r e l i n the Kampuchean i s s u e and the most important i n seeking a modus V i v e n d i i s China. Sheldon Simon a p t l y d e s c r i b e s the r e g i o n as d i v i d e d i n t o "Two Southeast A s i a s " -- ASEAN and Indochina -- wherein the p i v o t a l r o l e of China i s important to both. a 3 Each r e l a t e s t o the o t h e r i n terms of China's p o s s i b l e r o l e s , c a p a b i l i t i e s and i n t e n t i o n s . For some, the PRC r e p r e s e n t s a source of support and guarantor; f o r o t h e r s i t i s a f u t u r e predator. China has never been i n v i t e d t o any r e g i o n a l conferences hosted by ASEAN or Indochina, and i t s involvement has g e n e r a l l y been i n f o r m a l , o f f - s t a g e and c l a n d e s t i n e . Nonetheless, the p r o s p e c t s of r e c o n c i l i a t i o n or c o n f l i c t between the "Two Southeast A s i a s " depends on how each group r e l a t e s t o China and p e r c e i v e s i t . 84. Nayan Chanda, "ASEAN's Odd Man Out," Far E a s t e r n Economic Review, 1 March 1984, pp. 8-9. 85. Sheldon Simon, "The Two Southeast A s i a s and China," Asian Survey, 24 (May 1984), pp. 579-533. 65 An e q u a l l y important c o n s i d e r a t i o n i s how China p e r c e i v e s the s i t u a t i o n . The problem f o r China i s t w o - f o l d : Vietnam's unsavory alignment with the S o v i e t Union and i t s r i v a l d e s i g n s f o r r e g i o n a l hegemony. I f the 1978 i n v a s i o n accomplished anything, i t i n t r o d u c e d f o r the f i r s t time the S i n o - S o v i e t c o n f l i c t d i r e c t l y i n t o the Southeast A s i a n t h e a t e r . The S o v i e t -Vietnamese a l l i a n c e , the es t a b l i s h m e n t of na v a l bases i n Da Nang and Cam Ranh Bay, and the e v e n t u a l o c c u p a t i o n of Kampuchea s h a r p l y r e i n f o r c e d China's p e r c e p t i o n of e n c i r c l m e n t by the S o v i e t Union. As M a r t i n Stuart-Fox e x p l a i n s , " i t i s not Vietnamese i n f l u e n c e i n Laos and Kampuchea per se which bothers the Chinese, nor even the presence of Vietnamese t r o o p s i n both c o u n t r i e s . Rather, i t i s t h a t s i n c e Vietnam i s a l i g n e d with the S o v i e t Union, the n e u t r a l i t y of Laos and Kampuchea v i s - a - v i s China has been undermined." a s Taking an even more extreme p o s i t i o n t o t h a t of T h a i l a n d , B e i j i n g i n s i s t s on t o t a l Vietnamese withdrawal of i t s t r o o p s from Kampuchea as the p r e c o n d i t i o n f o r any s t a r t i n n e g o t i a t i o n s both with Hanoi and Moscow. Vietnam i s seen as an u p s t a r t , two-faced, " r e b e l l i o u s t e r t i a r y " whose i n v a s i o n of Kampuchea caused China t o l o s e f a c e . While Hanoi may g i v e s i g n a l s o f accommodation, these are, a c c o r d i n g t o China, merely t a c t i c a l and u n l i k e l y t o be genuine g e s t u r e s toward a p o l i t i c a l s o l u t i o n t o the c o n f l i c t . Vietnam w i l l c o n t i n u e t o f o l l o w a p o l i c y of "Dam, dam. Danh, danh" (Talk, t a l k . F i g h t , f i g h t ) as i t d i d d u r i n g the war a g a i n s t the United 86. M a r t i n Stuart-Fox, " R e s o l v i n g the Kampuchean Problem: The Case f o r an A l t e r n a t i v e Regional I n i t i a t i v e " Contemporary Southeast A s i a , 4 (September 1982), p. 216. 66 S t a t e s . China warns t h a t the only language Hanoi w i l l understand i s m i l i t a r y p r e s s u r e ; any other approach w i l l be m i s i n t e r p r e t e d as a s i g n of weakness. I t i s f o r t h i s reason t h a t any prospect f o r a s o l u t i o n r e q u i r e s a demand f o r complete withdrawal, s i n c e "to condone ag g r e s s i o n would on l y breed a g g r e s s i o n . " A r e p o r t i s s u e d by the New China News Agency s t r o n g l y expounded China's f e a r s : Vietnam's t a c t i c s of "cannons p l u s s m i l i n g f a c e s " i s meant t o serve i t s s t r a t e g i c g o a l . . . t h a t Vietnam's oc c u p a t i o n of Kampuchea i s to wipe out Democratic Kampuchea and form an "Indochina F e d e r a t i o n , " and then invade Th a i l a n d , take a p o s s e s s i o n of the S t r a i t of Malacca and c o n t r o l South-East A s i a . Vietnam w i l l use m i l i t a r y pressure, p o l i t i c a l d e c e p t i o n and d i p l o m a t i c d i s i n t e g r a t i o n s i m u l t a n e o u s l y . . . t o o b s t r u c t the u n i t y among the ASEAN c o u n t r i e s , and the u n i t y between China and T h a i l a n d and the other ASEAN c o u n t r i e s so t h a t Vietnam can wipe out these c o u n t r i e s one by o n e . " 8 7 Vietnam's t a c t i c s r e i n f o r c e China's b e l i e f t h a t the o n l y p o s s i b i l i t y f o r a s o l u t i o n i s by " b l e e d i n g i t white." Vietnam's domestic and postwar r e c o n s t r u c t i o n t r o u b l e s should be exacerbated not ameliorated, thus e x t e r n a l economic l i n k a g e s should be discouraged. Moreover, Vietnam's f i n a n c i a l , i n d u s t r i a l and m i l i t a r y dependency should be d r i v e n c l o s e r t o the USSR so t h a t the r e l a t i o n s h i p w i l l s e l f - d e s t r u c t . With t r o o p s p o i s e d at the Sino-Vietnamese border ready to "teach Vietnam a second l e s s o n , " China has i n d i c a t e d i t i s prepared f o r a long, drawn-out p r o t r a c t e d war a g a i n s t Vietnam, to l a s t s e v e r a l decades i f necessary. The important p o i n t to remember here i s t h a t the f o c u s of China's f e a r i s u l t i m a t e l y the S o v i e t Union; Vietnam i s S7. New China News Agency, B e i j i n g , 21 Feb. 1982, i n B r i t i s h B r a o d c a s t i n g C o r p o r a t i o n , Summary of World Broadcasts, FE/6962/A3/1. 67 merely a s u r r o g a t e which c o u l d be c o n t a i n e d at r e l a t i v e l y l i t t l e c o s t . In the meantime, China's goal i s not to l e t ASEAN c a p i t u l a t e t o Hanoi's ploys, f o r t h i s would mean a f u r t h e r notch i n Moscow's f a v o r . Some obs e r v e r s are even of the o p i n i o n t h a t China might accept Vietnamese hegemony i f i t were not backed by the S o v i e t Union. 8 8 Whereas ASEAN r e c o g n i z e s t h a t Vietnam has l e g i t i m a t e s e c u r i t y concerns, t h e r e i s no co r r e s p o n d i n g view f o r China. Within ASEAN c i r c l e s , t h e r e i s a l s o disagreement with China's p o l i c y of " b l e e d i n g " Vietnam. According t o Singapore's F o r e i g n M i n i s t e r S. Dhanabalan i n an i n t e r v i e w with the S t r a i t s Times, "We are not happy with the i d e a o f the Vietnamese being b l e d i n Kampuchea...We never s a i d we want Kampuchea to a c t as a dam a g a i n s t the Vietnamese, t h a t would be a n o n - s t a r t e r . " 8 9 Moreover, China's t h r e a t o f a "second l e s s o n " i s s t e a d i l y l o s i n g credence with ASEAN a f t e r at l e a s t s i x major Vietnamese m i l i t a r y i n c u r s i o n s i n t o T h a i t e r r i t o r y s i n c e the f i r s t i n v a s i o n i n 1979 and no s i g n s o f r e p r i s a l from China. I f China c o n t i n u e s t o l a c k a s s e r t i v e n e s s , ASEAN o f f i c i a l s are a f r a i d i t may appear as a "paper t i g e r " t o Vietnam. On the other hand, China f u l l y r e a l i z e s the r i s k s i n v o l v e d i n such a c t i o n . Any l a r g e - s c a l e a t t a c k on Vietnam would abort present e f f o r t s toward S i n o - S o v i e t rapprochement and r i s k a S o v i e t m i l i t a r y response. In a d d i t i o n , B e i j i n g has s i n c e 1985 extended more a i d f o r the Kampuchean c o a l i t i o n r e s i s t a n c e f o r c e s but stop s s h o r t o f promising a 88. New S t r a i t s Times, 12 Aug. 1981, p. 19. 89. New S t r a i t s Times, 6 June 1980. 68 "second l e s s o n " , c a u s i n g ASEAN o f f i c i a l s t o q u e s t i o n China's commitment to T h a i l a n d . 9 0 Yet even i f China d i d f i n d i t i n i t s i n t e r e s t s t o take more a s s e r t i v e a c t i o n , one needs t o take i n t o account i t s l i m i t e d c a p a b i l i t i e s , l a c k of e x p e r t i s e i n m i l i t a r y l o g i s t i c s and the p o s s i b l e r e p e r c u s s i o n s . As Paul H.B. Goodwin p o i n t s out, " I f China's m i l i t a r y o p e r a t i o n s i n 1979 were any t e s t , the combination of t r u c k s and human p o r t e r s used to support the b a t t l e areas l i m i t s the PLA's speed of advance t o the pace of human p o r t e r s and i t s range to not much more than 50 m i l e s . " 9 1 Nor were China's a i r c r a f t a b l e to achieve a i r s u p e r i o r i t y over Northern Vietnam where Hanoi deploys 60 percent of i t s r e g u l a r f o r c e s . Most d i s t u r b i n g l y , China's 1979 border a s s a u l t p r o v i d e d j u s t the i n c e n t i v e the S o v i e t s r e q u i r e d t o convince Hanoi to open up the A m e r i c a n - b u i l t naval and a i r bases i n southern Vietnam to Russian f o r c e s . Immediately a f t e r , the USSR rushed m i l i t a r y a i d to Vietnam and stepped up naval s u r v e i l l a n c e of the South China Seas, t h e i r a c t i o n s j u s t i f i e d by China's m i l i t a r y p r e s s u r e at the border. For ASEAN, the f a c t t h a t China i s not yet a major 90. Lee Kuan Yew once s t a t e d : "Our dilemma i s acute. I f t h e r e had been no [Chinese] i n t e r v e n t i o n , we would f a c e Vietnamese supremacy which i n t h i s case means S o v i e t supremacy. I f the i n t e r v e n t i o n i s o v e r - s u c c e s s f u l , i t means th a t i n ten, f i f t e e n y ears t h e r e w i l l be an a s s e r t i o n of i n f l u e n c e . . . by a Communist power t h a t has i n f l u e n c e over a l l g u e r r i l l a movements i n the c o u n t r i e s of T h a i l a n d , Malaysia, Singapore and Indonesia." Singapore B u l l e t i n , August 1979, i n Micheal L e i f e r , "The Balance of Advantage i n Indochina," World Today, 38 (June 1982), p. 490. 91. Paul G.B. Goodwin, "Chinese Defence and N a t i o n a l S e c u r i t y P o l i c i e s i n the 1980's." Paper prepared f o r the annual meeting of the I n t e r n a t i o n a l S t u d i e s A s s o c i a t i o n , Mexico C i t y , March 1983, p. 18. In "The Two Southeast A s i a s and China, " Sheldon Simon, op. c i t . , p. 523. 69 n e g o t i a t i n g p l a y e r nor an u n c o n d i t i o n a l l y welcome one, the prospect of a PRC " l e s s o n " i s more alarming than r e a s s u r i n g . China's g r e a t e s t p o l i t i c a l g a i n i n the i s s u e i s t h a t now through i t s a l l i a n c e with T h a i l a n d , i t has a f o o t i n ASEAN's door. While i t has reduced m a t e r i a l support f o r the i n s u r g e n t Communist P a r t y of T h a i l a n d (CPT), China i s f o s t e r i n g l i n k s with the more hawkish members of the Thai m i l i t a r y , S i n o - T h a i b u s i n e s s i n Bangkok, and the Mass L i n e Party under Sudsai Hasdin (former head of the I n t e r n a l S e c u r i t y Operations Command). Yet B e i j i n g has continued t o i n s i s t on i t s p a r t y - t o - p a r t y and government-to-government d i s t i n c t i o n with r e s p e c t to i t s l i n k s with Communist r e b e l s . China's main c h a l l e n g e now i s t h a t i t must support the r e b e l s enough so t h a t they w i l l not opt f o r Moscow or Hanoi, but at the same time assure the ASEAN governments not t o i n t e f e r e i n q u e l l i n g domestic r e b e l l i o n s . 9 8 P u b l i c l y , T h a i l a n d p r e f e r s t o maintain a n e u t r a l posture r e g a r d i n g i t s r e l a t i o n s h i p with China. T h a i l a n d has n e i t h e r r e j e c t e d nor accepted Chinese a i d i n the event of a l a r g e - s c a l e Vietnamese i n v a s i o n , but i t d i d r e j e c t PRC inducements f o r i t to j o i n the anti-Vietnamese case openly. Among these inducements was a " f r i e n d s h i p o p t i o n " i n exchange f o r much-needed o i l , but which Thai o f f i c i a l s , a c t i n g i n the i n t e r e s t of ASEAN, r e j e c t e d . Although T h a i l a n d f u l l y r e c o g n i z e s China i s a more c r e d i b l e a l l y and d e t e r r e n t , i t i s not prepared to l o s e ASEAN support i n the 92. During a v i s i t by a Chinese o f f i c i a l , M a l a y s i a was assured t h a t what a i d China gave t o Southeast A s i a n i n s u r g e n t s was " p u r e l y moral." See Leszek Buszynski, " T h a i l a n d : The E r o s i o n of a Balance F o r e i g n P o l i c y , " A sian Survey, 22 (November 1982), pp. 1051. 70 i s s u e . Each s t e p taken by T h a i l a n d t o move c l o s e r t o China i s an i n e v i t a b l e (and r e l u c t a n t ) s t e p c l o s e r by ASEAN. Other ASEAN members such as Indonesia are c l e a r l y most anxious not t o be i n d e n t i f i e d with any semblance of an anti-Vietnam, pro-China a x i s . Meanwhile, Bangkok's f r o n t - l i n e p o s i t i o n i n the c o n f l i c t l e n d s a c e r t a i n degree of urgency and l e g i t i m a c y t o i t s p r e c a r i o u s d i p l o m a t i c p o s i t i o n . The other ASEAN members, though v i s i b l y uneasy about the r e l a t i o n s h i p , are c a r e f u l not encourage T h a i l a n d ' s f r i e n d s h i p with China. The S o v i e t Dilemma U n l i k e China or the United St a t e s , the S o v i e t Union has never p l a y e d a major r o l e i n Southeast A s i a . I t g i v e s no a i d to the r e g i o n except to Indochina, and maintains no l i n k s with the v a r i o u s communist insurgency groups. In the l a t e 1960s, s h o r t l y a f t e r the Chinese border a t t a c k at the U s s u r i River, the S o v i e t Union attempted to put f o r t h i t s r a t h e r vague p r e s c r i p t i o n of an A s i a n C o l l e c t i v e S e c u r i t y sphere through b i l a t e r a l p o l i t i c a l t i e s and new a i r and naval bases. The scheme had no t a k e r s as n e i t h e r A s i a n nor Vietnam was w i l l i n g t o be i n v o l v e d i n a formal a l l i a n c e a g a i n s t China. The Soviet-Vietnamese a l l i a n c e , however, s i g n a l l e d a sharp r e v e r s a l ; no longer was the S o v i e t Union a remote power. Not on l y d i d Moscow now maintain a d i r e c t m i l i t a r y presence i n Da Nang and Cam Ranh Bay, but even more t h r e a t e n i n g by v i r t u e of having gained an a l l y on the southern f l a n k of China, i t brought 71 the S i n o - S o v i e t c o n f l i c t d i r e c t l y i n t o the ASEAN t h e a t e r . In the ASEAN view, a permanent S o v i e t presence i n China's p r o v e r b i a l "backyard" d r a m a t i c a l l y i n c r e a s e d the chances of an outbreak of c o n f l i c t between the two powers. Adding t o ASEAN and China's f e a r s i s t h a t the Soviet-Vietnamese 25-Year T r e a t y of F r i e n d s h i p and Cooperation was sig n e d on November 3, 1978, onl y one month befo r e Vietnam's i n v a s i o n o f Kamupuchea. Moscow had f i r s t approached Vietnam t o j o i n COMECON i n 1976 but onl y t h r e e years l a t e r -- e v i d e n t l y a f t e r Hanoi had secured Moscow's guarantee t o underwrite the i n v a s i o n — d i d i t f i n a l l y accepted the i n v i t a t i o n and agreed t o grant r i g h t s t o i t s m i l i t a r y bases. The 1978 Soviet-Vietnamese T r e a t y of F r i e n d s h i p was s i m i l a r t o t h a t c o n s o l i d a t e d between I n d i a and the USSR i n August 1971, which served t o n e u t r a l i z e China and f a c i l i t a t e d the dismemberment of Pa k i s t a n . No doubt one of the main i n c e n t i v e s i n drawing up the Vietnam document was the rec e n t Sino-Japanese F r i e n d s h i p Pact concluded with an e x p l i c i t "anti-hegemony c l a u s e " which condemned the hegemonial sphere of i n f l u e n c e by any s i n g l e power i n the r e g i o n . Though no names were mentioned, the document's c l a u s e was c l e a r l y aimed at the S o v i e t Union as p a r t of China's s t r a t e g y of e n c i r c l e m e n t with Japan, the United S t a t e s and ASEAN. The Soviet-Vietnamese Treaty, i n response, attended t o Vietnam's post-war r e c o n s t r u c t i o n and " a d v e n t u r i s t " needs (to the tune of an estimated $5 m i l l i o n a day), and at the same time guaranteed a g a i n s t a t r i p a r t i t e , a n t i - S o v i e t , u n i t e d f r o n t . For ASEAN and China, one of the most d i s t u r b i n g c l a u s e s of the 72 document i s A r t i c l e S i x which r e q u i r e s each par t y to a i d the other i n the event of an a t t a c k . The p o s s i b i l i t y of S o v i e t m i l i t a r y involvement has e f f e c t i v e l y d iscouraged the p a r t i e s i n v o l v e d -- ASEAN, China and the United S t a t e s -- from c o u n t e r i n g Hanoi d i r e c t l y . As M a l a y s i a ' s former F o r e i g n M i n i s t e r Tun S r i G h a z a l i S h a f i e once p o i n t e d out, the USSR i s not so much a d i r e c t t h r e a t to ASEAN as a p r o j e c t i o n of power t o provoke Chinese counter-measures. 9 3 In f a c t , c ontinued Soviet-Vietnamese r e l a t i o n s would be a c c e p t a b l e t o ASEAN as long as i t was not f o r m i l i t a r y purposes. Some c i r c l e s i n Indonesia and M a l a y s i a even go so f a r as to say t h a t a S o v i e t m i l i t a r y presence enhances r e g i o n a l s t a b i l i t y by b l o c k i n g China. However, ASEAN's f e a r s of a l o n g -term Vietnam-USSR a l l i a n c e are t w o - f o l d : f i r s t , the e v e n t u a l c o n t r o l of Southeast A s i a ' s sea l a n e s (a s p e c i f i c a l l y Singaporean f e a r ) ; and secondly, the p o s s i b i l i t y of a Soviet-backed, Vietnamese e x p a n s i o n i s t d r i v e (a Thai as w e l l as Singaporean f e a r ) . D e s p i t e the h e f t y $5 m i l l i o n tab and ASEAN's d i p l o m a t i c o v e r t u r e s , the i n c e n t i v e s f o r the S o v i e t Union to s t a y i n Vietnam f a r outweigh the i n c e n t i v e s f o r i t to leave. The bases at Da Nang and Cam Ranh Bay f o r the f i r s t time p r o v i d e the S o v i e t s with a warm-water p o r t and a secure s t a t i o n between the B a l t i c and Black Seas and major P a c i f i c bases at V l a d i v o s t o k and Petropavlovsk. They i n c r e a s e the c a p a b i l i t y of r a p i d deployment 93. See Chan Heng Chee, "ASEAN: Su b r e g i o n a l R e s i l i e n c e , " i n S e c u r i t y Interdependence i n the A s i a P a c i f i c Region, ed. James W. Morley (Massachusetts: Lexington Books, 1986), pp. 111-143. 73 i n the Indian Ocean, the P e r s i a n G u l f and Southeast A s i a , and r e l i e v e S o v i e t p e r c e p t i o n s of e n c i r c l e m e n t while keeping China e f f e c t i v e l y contained. Moscow's p r i v i l e g e s i n Southeast A s i a depend l a r g e l y on continued good r e l a t i o n s with the government i n Hanoi. I t i s becoming i n c r e a s i n g l y evident, however, t h a t t e n s i o n and at times o u t r i g h t h o s t i l i t y c h a r a c t e r i z e s the a l l i a n c e . On the one hand, the Kremlin i s l e s s than p l e a s e d with Vietnam's repeated r e q u e s t s f o r more a i d i n l i g h t of i t s a p p a l l i n g r e c o r d of f i n a n c i a l waste and b u r e a u c r a t i c i n e f f i c i e n c y . 9 * On the other hand, the Vietnamese r e s e n t the open presence of S o v i e t t e c h n o c r a t s on t h e i r s o i l , which on o c c a s i o n has r e s u l t e d i n outbreaks of v i o l e n c e . 9 3 The Chinese f e e l t h a t the Soviet-Vietnamese r e l a t i o n s h i p i s wholly u n n a t u r a l . There i s no h i s t o r i c a l or c u l t u r a l a f f i n i t y between the two c o u n t r i e s and the Vietnamese are a f i e r c e l y independent and deeply n a t i o n a l i s t i c people with whom the S o v i e t s w i l l have to be c a r e f u l . Moreover, Kampuchea i s f a s t becoming Vietnam's "Vietnam", as w e l l as one f o r the S o v i e t Union. A comment i n the Bei.jinq Review remarked upon the weak l i n k of commonality between the two c o u n t r i e s : "They are t o g e t h e r by t h e i r common go a l of expansion i n Southeast A s i a . " 9 S 94. During Le Duan's v i s i t t o Moscow i n J u l y 1985, Moscow d i d not respond p o s i t i v e l y t o the Vietnamese request f o r more m i l i t a r y a i d . 95. For an i n t e r e s t i n g d i s c u s s i o n , see Sheldon Simon, " E x p l a i n i n g American S e c u r i t y I n t e r e s t s i n Southeast A s i a , " i n I n t e r n a t i o n a l S e c u r i t y i n the Southeast A s i a n and Southwest P a c i f i c Region, ed. T.B. M i l l a r (St. L u c i a , Queensland: Univ. of Queensland Press, 1983), p. 61-63. 96. B e i j i n g Review, 29 March 1982, p. 10. 74 Vietnamese o f f i c i a l s are quick to emphasize t h a t the S o v i e t s have " f a c i l i t i e s " , not bases, although observers doubt very much th a t Vietnamese are even allowed on the p r e m i s e s . 9 7 I t i s t h e r e f o r e c u r i o u s t h a t i n a 1984 i n t e r v i e w , Vietnam's Prime Mins t e r Pham Van Dong i n s i s t e d t h a t "we would never...grant any country the r i g h t t o have bases i n Vietnam." 9 a The same view was r e i t e r a t e d by F o r e i g n M i n i s t e r Nguyen Co Thach, who added t h a t "the Soviet-Vietnamese r e l a t i o n s h i p w i l l never become a m i l i t a r y a l l i a n c e i n the f u t u r e . " 9 9 Perhaps these comments c o u l d be i n t e r p r e t e d as a ploy or s i g n a l t o ASEAN and China t h a t the r e l a t i o n s h i p with the USSR i s s t i l l n e g o t i a b l e . Nevertheless, t o ASEAN's detriment, i t i s c l e a r t h a t the e v i d e n t t e n s i o n i n the Soviet-Vietnamese r e l a t i o n s h i p has not yet i n t e r f e r e d with t h e i r p r a c t i c a l a s s o c i a t i o n . The United S t a t e s Dilemma C o n s i d e r a b l e d i s s a t i s f a c t i o n e x i s t s w i t h i n ASEAN over the United S t a t e s ' r o l e -- or r a t h e r , l a c k of a r o l e -- i n seeking a s o l u t i o n t o the c o n f l i c t . However, the g u e s t i o n i s not whether the United S t a t e s should p l a y a r o l e , but what k i n d of r o l e i t should p l a y . 1 0 0 With Singapore at the f o r e f r o n t , T h a i l a n d and 97. Robert C. Horn, "The USSR and the Region," Southeast Asian  A f f a i r s 1985 (Singapore: I n s t i t u t e of Southeast Asian S t u d i e s , 1986)", p. 75. 98. Newsweek ( I n t e r n a t i o n a l E d i t i o n ) , 14 May 1984. 99. See Sheldon Simon, "The Two Southeast A s i a s and China," op. c i t . , p. 525. 100. Only Indonesia, Singapore and M a l a y s i a are non-aligned. 75 the P h i l i p p i n e s would welcome a prominent American p r o f i l e i n the r e g i o n to maintain the balance of power. Not o n l y d i d the ASEAN c o u n t r i e s encourage P r e s i d e n t Marcos to renew American r i g h t s to C l a r k and Subic Bay, but Vietnam's i n v a s i o n a l s o allowed Bangkok to r e v i v e the moribund Manila Pact, which r a t i o n a l i z e d an i n c r e a s e of American m i l i t a r y a i d to T h a i l a n d . 1 0 1 I t may be r e c a l l e d t h a t at ASEAN's formation, these t h r e e c o u n t r i e s were the most r e l u c t a n t to ban the presence of f o r e i g n bases i n the r e g i o n . Wishing to maintain i t s non-aligned s t a t u s , Indonesia i s the most opposed to a heightened American r o l e , claming t h a t such a move would i n c r e a s e ASEAN's dependence, c r e a t e a western-o r i e n t e d t e c h n i c a l e l i t e , and d i m i n i s h J a k a r t a ' s l e a d e r s h i p on the i s s u e . Nevertheless, ASEAN member s t a t e s r e c o g n i z e t h a t some American i n f l u e n c e i s necessary to d e t e r the S o v i e t Union, although they do not want to become pawns i n the c o l d war. In e f f e c t , they are caught i n a Catch-22 s i t u a t i o n . The American m i l i t a r y presence i s j u s t i f i e d by the t h r e a t posed by Vietnam and the S o v i e t Union. However, the l a t t e r s t a t e s i n s i s t t h a t c o r d i a l r e l a t i o n s are p o s s i b l e o n l y i f ASEAN abandons the American s e c u r i t y umbrella. In sum, n e i t h e r s i d e a c c e p t s the o t h e r ' s non-a l i g n e d s t a t u s , and as a r e s u l t , American support b r i n g s c o s t s as w e l l as b e n e f i t s . As Bernard Gordon argues, The common s t r a n d i n [ l e a d e r s h i p ] views [ i n the r e g i o n ] i s a b e l i e f t h a t the United S t a t e s tends to o v e r e s t i m a t e the S o v i e t t h r e a t , t h a t i t misunderstands the problem posed by China, and t h a t based on o v e r l y narrow estimates, i t sometimes presses f o r p o l i c i e s 101. United S t a t e s ' m i l i t a r y a i d to T h a i l a n d i n c r e a s e d from $40 m i l l i o n i n 1979 to $80 m i l l i o n i n 1982. 76 t h a t aggravate r a t h e r than help r e s o l v e d i f f i c u l t i e s i n the r e g i o n . The q u e s t i o n i n c r e a s i n g l y posed by U.S. p o l i c y i s whether i t i s pa r t of the s o l u t i o n or pa r t o f the p r o b l e m . 1 0 e For example, the growing t i e s between China and the United S t a t e s are more a source of uneasiness than reassurance. Indonesia's a n x i e t y was made c l e a r when Washington l i f t e d r e s t r i c t i o n s on the s a l e o f " n o n - l e t h a l " m i l i t a r y equipment and technology without c o n s u l t i n g ASEAN. Indonesia's f e a r s were based on the p o s s i b i l i t y of t h i s equipment f i n d i n g i t s way to s u b v e r s i v e groups i n the ASEAN s t a t e s . ASEAN a l s o f e a r s t h a t the United S t a t e s i s n a i v e l y r e l y i n g on China t o become something of a r e g i o n a l "policeman". The United S t a t e s now urges ASEAN to see China as a f r i e n d l y s t a t e , s u g g e s t i n g t h a t Southeast A s i a i s of secondary importance and t h a t i t should d e f e r t o American judgement. However, s t a t e s l i k e M a l a y s i a and Indonesia cannot help but f e a r China's power p o t e n t i a l over the next few decades. While the ASEAN n a t i o n s share Washington's concern of the USSR, they do not want t o exclude the S o v i e t r o l e as a counterbalance t o China. I f anything, Washington's pro-China t i l t shows to ASEAN i t s weakness i n d e a l i n g with the USSR. I t s m i l i t a r y s a l e s t o China, coupled by u r g i n g s f o r Japan t o i n c r e a s e i t s defence c a p a b i l i t y , are seen as p o t e n t i a l l y d e s t a b i l i z i n g a c t i o n s f o r the r e g i o n . Nor does Washington's p r o - I s r a e l , Mid-East p o l i c y do much to boost i t s c r e d i b i l i t y i n the eyes of the I s l a m i c n a t i o n s of Indonesia and Malaysia. 102. Bernard K. Gordon, "The Outdated U.S. P e r s p e c t i v e on Asian S e c u r i t y , " Asian Wall S t r e e t J o u r n a l , 11 May 1982, p. 6. 77 Although T h a i l a n d i s one of the main advocates of the American presence, i t f e e l s t h a t a p r o l i f e r a t i o n of American bases i s unnecessary s i n c e China r e p r e s e n t s a more e f f e c t i v e d e t e r r e n t . Bangkok's purpose i n i n v i t i n g Washington t o p l a y a r o l e was, i n e f f e c t , t o balance and p r o v i d e a counterweight t o i t s r e l a t i o n s h i p with China. E q u a l l y , Indonesia's F o r e i g n M i n i s t e r Mochtar Kusumaatmadja saw l i t t l e need f o r an i n c r e a s e i n American m i l i t a r y f o r c e s , but f o r d i f f e r e n t reasons. Instead, he urged the Un i t e d S t a t e s t o use d i p l o m a t i c p r e s s u r e t o i n f l u e n c e China and the USSR to reduce r e g i o n a l t e n s i o n . Some c i r c l e s i n Indonesia a l s o c r i t i c i z e Washington's u n w i l l i n g n e s s t o compete with the USSR f o r Vietnam's a f f e c t i o n s and f o r not being a b l e t o overcome i t s post-war "Vietnam syndrome." American o f f i c i a l s f e e l i t would be wiser i f ASEAN s e t -- or be p e r c e i v e d t o s e t -- the pace i n r e s o l v i n g the Kampuchean c r i s i s . In a v i s i t with ASEAN's F o r e i g n M i n i s t e r s i n Bangkok i n June 1983, S e c r e t a r y of S t a t e George S h u l t z assured ASEAN o f f i c i a l s : "We f o l l o w your lead...we know t h a t the chances of persuading Vietnam t o change i t s course are g r e a t e r i f the message comes from i t s neighbours."103 J u s t the same, i t would probably be r e l u c t a n t t o have t o r e l i n q u i s h i t s l e a d e r s h i p r o l e t o the United S t a t e s . ASEAN's g r e a t e s t c h a l l e n g e now i n assuming a l e a d e r s h i p r o l e i s i n f i n d i n g a s o l u t i o n which w i l l not f o r s a k e i t s own r e g i o n a l p r i o r i t i e s f o r the g l o b a l concerns of the great powers i n v o l v e d . June 1983. 78 CHAPTER FOUR  ASEAN's D i p l o m a t i c S t r a t e g y I n t r o d u c t i o n ASEAN's e f f o r t s t o oppose Vietnam over the Kampuchean i s s u e are an attempt t o prevent i t s oc c u p a t i o n from a c q u i r i n g i n t e r n a t i o n a l l e g i t i m a c y by d e f a u l t , which might have o c c u r r e d i f i t had not been c o n t e s t e d so r i g o r o u s l y by ASEAN. Yet as Leszek Buszynski argues, "ASEAN has d e f i n e d a c l e a r d i p l o m a t i c p o s i t i o n on the Kampuchean i s s u e without, however, any means of implementing t h a t p o s i t i o n . " 1 The Kampuchean c r i s i s has thus pro v i d e d a c r u c i a l t e s t of ASEAN's p o l i t i c a l v i a b i l i t y . As Indonesia's F o r e i g n M i n i s t e r Mochtar Kusumaatmadja remarked, " . . . i f we had not taken the stand t h a t we d i d then i t c o u l d w e l l be t h a t ASEAN would have gone i n t o o b l i v i o n . " s I t was t h e r e f o r e important t h a t ASEAN be a b l e to prove i t s r e g i o n a l worth as an e f f e c t i v e , c r e d i b l e , and co h e s i v e d i p l o m a t i c v e h i c l e which would not s u f f e r the same ignominious f a t e of i t s r e g i o n a l predecessors. 1. Leszek Buszynski, "ASEAN: A Changing Role," A s i a n Survey, 27 ( J u l y 1987), p. 765. 2. Bangkok Post, 7 August 1985, i n i b i d . , p. 765. 79 Yet, at l e a s t p r i v a t e l y , ASEAN members were f a r from u n i f i e d on many p i v o t a l a s p e c t s of the i s s u e . They were thus f a c e d with a c h o i c e . A p r o j e c t i o n of u n i t y depended upon t h e i r a b i l i t y t o agree, compromise and accomodate each other -- a process sometimes e n t a i l i n g a s a c r i f i c e of i n d i v i d u a l members' i n t e r e s t s . ASEAN was not a s u p r a - n a t i o n a l o r g a n i z a t i o n bestowed e i t h e r with the r i g h t or power to impose a d e c i s i o n r e g a r d l e s s of a s i n g l e member's m i s g i v i n g s ; the p r e s e r v a t i o n of the n a t i o n a l i n t e r e s t was s t i l l paramount. ASEAN's s o l u t i o n to the problem i s p e r i o d i c a l l y t o i s s u e a common j o i n t statement of the "ASEAN response", i f a l l s i x member n a t i o n s unanimously agree on an i s s u e or a course of a c t i o n . 3 When i n t e r e s t s diverge, and consensus proves i m p o s s i b l e or o f f e r s no r e s o l u t i o n , the ASEAN members "agree to d i s a g r e e " and the s o l u t i o n i s l e f t t o b i l a t e r a l e f f o r t s . T h i s way each n a t i o n maintains the p r e r o g a t i v e of an "independent" f o r e i g n p o l i c y while s t i l l r e c e i v i n g the b e n e f i t s of a r e g i o n a l o r g a n i z a t i o n through s e l e c t i v e c o o p e r a t i o n . The o n l y s t i p u l a t i o n i n t h i s t a c i t agreement i s t h a t the consequences of one member's independent route should not n e g a t i v e l y a f f e c t the n a t i o n a l i n t e r e s t of another member. Further, each member i s r e q u i r e d t o inform the o t h e r s of any major impending f o r e i g n p o l i c y arrangements. I t i s , i n e f f e c t , an agreement of " d i v i d e d u n i t y " : ASEAN's image of s o l i d a r i t y i s i n the i n t e r e s t s of each member i n s o f a r as i t c o n t r i b u t e s to g r e a t e r c o l l e c t i v e b a r g a i n i n g 3. See Khaw Guat Hoot, "ASEAN i n I n t e r n a t i o n a l P o l i t i c s , " i n P o l i t i c s i n the ASEAN Sta t e s , ed. Diane K. Mauzy (Kuala Lumpur: Marican & Sons, 1984), p. 226. See a l s o M. G h a z a l i e S h a f i e , M a l a y s i a : I n t e r n a t i o n a l R e l a t i o n s (Kuala Lumpur: C r e a t i v e E n t e r p r i s e Sdn, Bhd., 1982), pp. 221-222. 80 power, thus each i m p l i c i t l y understands the t h r e s h o l d p o i n t beyond which f u r t h e r d i v i s i o n becomes a t h r e a t to the c o l l e c t i v e i n t e r e s t of ASEAN. The acceptance of ASEAN's somewhat unconventional d e c i s i o n -making process evolved only a f t e r an i n i t i a l p e r i o d d u r i n g which a system of standard o p e r a t i n g procedures to d e a l with the c r i s i s had yet to be determined. Since i s s u i n g a statement i n January 1980 f o r m a l l y condemning Vietnam's i n v a s i o n of Kampuchea, ASEAN's d i p l o m a t i c s t r a t e g y has been t h r e e - f o l d : f i r s t , t o " i n t e r n a t i o n a l i z e " the i s s u e and launch a campaign to i s o l a t e Vietnam d i p l o m a t i c a l l y from the i n t e r n a t i o n a l community. ASEAN's successes have been i n the s p o n s o r s h i p and passage of condemnation r e s o l u t i o n s i n the United Nations General Assembly and at the 1981 I n t e r n a t i o n a l Conference on Kampuchea i n New York. Second, ASEAN has sought t o i s o l a t e Vietnam e c o n o m i c a l l y by c o n v i n c i n g the i n t e r n a t i o n a l community to d e p r i v e Hanoi of much-needed m u l t i l a t e r a l a s s i s t a n c e . T h i r d , i t has made a p e r s i s t e n t e f f o r t t o deny l e g i t i m a c y to the Heng Semrin regime i n s t a l l e d i n Phnom Penh by Vietnam, by s e t t i n g up and s u p p o r t i n g the t r i p a r t i t e C o a l i t i o n Government of Democratic Kampuchea (CGDK) to r e p r e s e n t Kampuchea i n t e r n a t i o n a l l y . The acceptance of ASEAN's unconventional decision-making process d i d not m a t e r i a l i z e overnight, but evolved only a f t e r a p e r i o d of u n c e r t a i n t y and t r i b u l a t i o n . By mid-1980, two s e t s of o p i n i o n s began emerging from ASEAN: T h a i l a n d and Singapore emphasized the r o l e of China i n a f u t u r e s e t t l e m e n t at about the same time Indonesia and M a l a y s i a began p u b l i c i z i n g China as a 81 t h r e a t . T h a i l a n d , Singapore and to a l e s s e r extent, the P h i l i p p i n e s , f a v o r e d a continued strong, u n i f i e d stance a g a i n s t Vietnam, c a l l i n g f o r a t o t a l withdrawal of f o r c e s . The hope was t h a t i f i n t e r n a t i o n a l p r e s s u r e at the United Nations were s u s t a i n e d , economic a i d denied, and anti-Vietnamese r e s i s t a n c e f o r c e s s u s t a i n e d at the border, along with the t h r e a t of a second Chinese attack, then Vietnam would e v e n t u a l l y be f o r c e d to compromise. I t was a view premised on continued good r e l a t i o n s with the Sino-American a l l i a n c e and an o p p o s i t i o n to accomodating Hanoi. However, Indonesia, M a l a y s i a and some members of the U.S. S t a t e Department f e l t t h a t ASEAN should not become more c l o s e l y a l i g n e d with China s i n c e i t would on l y l e a d to a p r o t r a c t e d war i n Kampuchea and c r e a t e a g r e a t e r r e l i a n c e by Vietnam on the USSR. A more f l e x i b l e posture, c a l l i n g f o r a p a r t i a l withdrawal and t h e r e f o r e p a r t i a l r e c o g n i t i o n of the Heng Semrin regime would reduce r e g i o n a l t e n s i o n and block S i n o - S o v i e t i n f l u e n c e . A f t e r a l l , Vietnam's hegemonic ambitions were only l i m i t e d t o Indochina and i f i t s dependence on the S o v i e t Union were reduced i t might have an i n c e n t i v e to resume t i e s with China. Issued by Indonesia's P r e s i d e n t Suharto and M a l a y s i a ' s Prime M i n i s t e r Tun Hussein Onn, the Kuantan D e c l a r a t i o n of 1981 marked the f i r s t p u b l i c m a n i f e s t a t i o n of ASEAN's d i f f e r i n g o p i n i o n s . The Kuantan D e c l a r a t i o n was an apprehensive response at the improving r e l a t i o n s between China and T h a i l a n d (and hence, ASEAN), s p u r r i n g the l e a d e r s of the two c o u n t r i e s to seek a t e n t a t i v e b i l a t e r a l s o l u t i o n to the problem. E s s e n t i a l l y , the Kuantan P r i n c i p l e r e c o g n i z e d i n t e r a l i a Vietnam's l e g i t i m a t e 82 i n t e r e s t s i n Kampuchea, i m p l i c i t l y a c c e p t i n g Vietnamese hegemony i n the r e g i o n . R e j e c t i n g China's p o l i c y of " b l e e d i n g " the SRV, the D e c l a r a t i o n showed a w i l l i n g n e s s to accept SRV f o r c e s i n Kampuchea i f i t s t i e s with the S o v i e t Union were cut. Further, the Kuantan p r i n c i p l e s t a t e s t h a t Vietnam must remain o u t s i d e the S o v i e t Union's and China's spheres of i n f l u e n c e . Likewise, the major powers should not i n t e r v e n e i n the a f f a i r s of Indochina, and both China and the USSR should not i n t e r f e r e i n Vietnam. Not wishing to o f f e n d i t s neighbours' s i n c e r e i n t e n t i o n s , T h a i l a n d d i d not r e j e c t the Kuantan p r o p o s a l o u t r i g h t . P r i v a t e l y , however, T h a i l e a d e r s were a p p a l l e d t h a t a s e r i o u s r e g i o n a l problem was to be s o l v e d through the b i l a t e r a l i n i t i a t i v e of two Muslim s t a t e s not even b o r d e r i n g Kampuchea! Hanoi r e j e c t e d the D e c l a r a t i o n because i t f a i l e d t o mention the United S t a t e s presence i n the r e g i o n , but was s e c r e t l y p l e a s e d and anxious to e x p l o i t ASEAN's evi d e n t cleavage. I t was not long b e f o r e the Indonesian and Malaysian d e l e g a t e s r e a l i z e d t h a t b i l a t e r a l i s m without p r i o r c o n s u l t a t i o n was p r o c e d u r a l l y wrong and p o t e n t i a l l y d i v i s i v e . In an attempt to maintain ASEAN's p u b l i c image of u n i t y . Tun Hussein Onn was quick t o add, "...we have agreed to c o n s u l t the l e a d e r s i n Bangkok...[and] myself and P r e s i d e n t Suharto are of the view t h a t t h e r e i s no urgency f o r h o l d i n g an ASEAN s u m m i t . T h e s t i l l b o r n Kuantan D e c l a r a t i o n r e a f f i r m e d the i m p l i c i t understanding t h a t T h a i l a n d , as the country most d i r e c t l y a f f e c t e d by the Vietnamese occupation, h e l d 4- S t r a i t s Times, 14 May 1980, p. 77. 83 the f i n a l veto, thereby d i c t a t i n g the pace and ti m i n g of ASEAN's course of a c t i o n whatever the d i f f e r e n c e s . A s i m i l a r c l a s h of w i l l s o c c u r r e d when Singapore u n i l a t e r a l l y t r i e d t o f o r g e the CGDK t r i p a r t i t e c o a l i t i o n . The CGDK government-in-exile c o n s i s t s o f the combined f o r c e s of Kampuchea's deposed P r i n c e Sihanouk; Democratic Kampuchea's (DK) former Head of State, Khieu Samphan; former premier Son Sann; as w e l l as the m i l i t a r y f o r c e s of the Khmer Rouge. As the s t r o n g e s t advocate of the Kampuchean c o a l i t i o n , Singapore l e d ASEAN's campaign t o seat the CGDK i n Kampuchea's vacant spot at the United Nations and New D e l h i Non-Aligned Meetings, as w e l l as p r e s s u r i n g Japan t o w i t h o l d f u r t h e r a i d from Vietnam. I n t e r e s t i n g l y , although a gre a t d e a l of ASEAN's success i n the United Nations i s a t t r i b u t e d t o the a r t i c u l a t e f o r c e and p e r s o n a l i t y of Singapore's Tommy Koh -- ASEAN's o f f i c i a l spokesperson -- t h e r e i s sometimes a f e e l i n g w i t h i n ASEAN t h a t Singapore i s too v o c a l f o r i t s s m a l l s i z e , t a k i n g p u b l i c stands on i s s u e s having no d i r e c t concern t o i t . Singapore's ASEAN r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s Rajaratnam and Dhanabalan advanced the CGDK p r o p o s a l i n November 1981, prematurely dubbing i t an ASEAN pr o p o s a l . While T h a i l a n d and Mal a y s i a agreed with i t i n substance, Indonesia's F o r e i g n M i n i s t e r Mochtar Kusumaatmadja e v i d e n t l y took o f f e n c e t o Singapore's a c t i o n s , s t a t i n g t h a t " u n f o r t u n a t e l y , Singapore has taken the step without c o n s u l t i n g f i r s t with the other ASEAN n a t i o n s . " s S i n c e the CGDK i n c i d e n t 5. See Hans Indorf, Impediments t o Regionalism i n Southeast A s i a : B i l a t e r a l C o n s t r a i n t s Among ASEAN Member S t a t e s (Singapore: I n s t i t u t e of Southeast Asian S t u d i e s , 1984). 84 Singapore has continued to maintain i t s b l u n t d i p l o m a t i c s t y l e , but has r e f r a i n e d from undertaking any i n i t i a t i v e s without p r i o r c o n s u l t a t i o n with i t s p a r t n e r s . The C o a l i t i o n Government of Democratic Kampuchea: The f o r m a t i o n of the C o a l i t i o n Government of Democratic Kampuchea (CGDK) was important because the occupant of Kampuchea's vacant s e a t i n i n t e r n a t i o n a l c o n f e r e n c e s determined who — e i t h e r Heng Semrin or the ousted Democratic Kampuchea (DK) regime -- would be c o n s i d e r e d the l e g i t i m a t e government i n Phnom Penh. I f ASEAN was s u c c e s s f u l l y t o deny Vietnam's c l a i m i n the i n t e r n a t i o n a l community, i t r e q u i r e d an a l t e r n a t i v e t o the s t a r k c h o i c e s of e i t h e r Heng Semrin or Kampuchea's former government under the Khmer Rouge. The CGDK was to p r o v i d e t h i s a l t e r n a t i v e . However, twenty years of b i t t e r animosity and bloodshed among the t h r e e Khmer groups was going t o be extremely d i f f i c u l t t o overcome. 6 P r i n c e Sihanouk's u n p r e d i c t a b l e and flamboyant c h a r a c t e r made him s i m u l t a n e o u s l y an a s s e t and a l i a b i l i t y . R e f e r r e d to at times as the "unguided m i s s i l e " of Southeast A s i a , Sihanouk's i n t e r n a t i o n a l p r o f i l e , g r a s s - r o o t s peasant support, and f e r v e n t d e s i r e to maintain Khmer s o v e r e i g n t y made him the n a t u r a l c h o i c e f o r the c o a l i t i o n l e a d e r s h i p d e s p i t e the f a c t t h a t h i s MOULINAKA f a c t i o n had the lowest number of t r o o p s (approximately 10,000). The 15,000 t r o o p s of Sonn Sann's Khmer People's N a t i o n a l L i b e r a t i o n Front (KPNLF) i s r i d d e n with 6. A d i s t i n c t i o n must be made between the Khmers as an e t h n i c group, and the Khmer Rouge which i s a p o l i t i c a l movement. 85 i n t e r n a l f a c t i o n s and power s t r u g g l e s between Son Sann and the younger l e a d e r s . Repugnance at the Khmer Rouge's b e s t i a l r e c o r d under P o l Pot was enough reason f o r them to be shunned by t h e i r p r o s p e c t i v e p a r t n e r s . However, as the r e s i s t a n c e group's only c r e d i b l e t h r e a t to the Vietnamese f o r c e s , the Khmer Rouge's 30,000 tr o o p s are by f a r b e t t e r armed and more capable m i l i t a r i l y , although by v i r t u e of t h i s f a c t p r o v i d e a r a t i o n a l e f o r the SRV f o r c e s ' continued o c c u p a t i o n f o r the sake of Kampuchea's s e c u r i t y . Most c o n t r o v e r s i a l l y , the Khmer Rouge r e c e i v e s f a v o r e d m i l i t a r y (and at times, p o l i t i c a l ) support from China and because of t h e i r m i l i t a r y and numerical s u p e r i o r i t y , they have r e p e a t e d l y attempted to dominate the r e s i s t a n c e sometimes through sheer f o r c e . ASEAN i s l o a t h e to support such a group, but as Singapore F o r e i g n M i n i s t e r Suppiah Dhanabalan t r i e d t o e x p l a i n i n l a t e 1981, the Khmer Rouge " i s the o n l y group t h a t o f f e r s r e s i s t a n c e at the present moment. One must be r e a l i s t i c and p r a c t i c a l . Without the r e s i s t a n c e of t h a t group, Vietnam would have c o n s o l i d a t e d i t s hold on Cambodia and we would not be t a l k i n g about a p o l i t i c a l s o l u t i o n . " 7 A c u r i o u s menage 'a t r o i s , the s t r u c t u r e of the CGDK i s l e s s l i k e a government-in-exile than an armed t r u c e . At a p r e s s conference i n Bangkok, Sihanouk was reminded as having once w r i t t e n t h a t f o r Khmer n a t i o n a l i s t s and the Khmer Rouge to j o i n a u n i t e d f r o n t was "tantamount t o p u t t i n g a s t a r v i n g and b l o o d t h i r s t y wolf i n with a lamb." Sihanouk's r e p l y was i n d i c a t i v e of h i s predicament; "but the q u e s t i o n i s t h i s : 7. Far E a s t e r n Economic Review, 13-19 November 1981, p. 9. In Hoon, op. c i t . p. 247. 86 whether to be eaten by the Khmers or to be eaten by the Vietnamese." a P o l i t i c a l l y , the CGDK i s a u n i t e d f r o n t ; m i l i t a r i l y t h e r e i s l i t t l e c o o r d i n a t i o n or c o o p e r a t i o n . The r e s i s t a n c e f o r c e s operate i n separate border enclaves, d i s t r u s t each o t h e r ' s p o l i t i c a l ambitions and o f t e n seem to be more i n t e r e s t e d i n f i g h t i n g each other than the Vietnamese. ASEAN, as the CGDK's i n t e r n a t i o n a l sponsor, r e c o g n i z e s the need t o s u s t a i n the c o a l i t i o n v i s - a - v i s Vietnam but f i n d s i t i n c r e a s i n g l y d i f f i c u l t to j u s t i f y the CGDK's l e g i t i m a c y , which i n some ways appears as hollow as t h a t of the Heng Semrin regime. A c c o r d i n g t o ASEAN, the purpose of the CGDK c o a l i t i o n i s t o f o r g e a c o a l i t i o n which the Khmer Rouge cannot dominate, s u s t a i n the government of Democratic Kampuchea d u r i n g the q u e s t i o n of r e p r e s e n t a t i o n each year i n the United Nations, f o s t e r popular support w i t h i n Kampuchea, and convince Vietnam of the a t t r a c t i v e n e s s of a p o l i t i c a l s e t t l e m e n t i f assured t h a t Phnom Penh would not become a c l i e n t of China. However, while ASEAN was t r y i n g t o c o n s t r u c t a longer-term path toward a p o l i t i c a l s o l u t i o n , the i r o n y o f the i n i t i a l s i t u a t i o n was t h a t ASEAN was not committed t o the CGDK as a f u t u r e government i n Kampuchea, l e t alone t o any one of i t s f a c t i o n s , g i v e n t h e i r i n d i v i d u a l weaknesses. The s t r a t e g i c o b j e c t i v e s of the Khmer p a r t i e s and t h e i r ASEAN patrons d i f f e r e d 8. " Return t o Kampuchea: Sihanouk's U n l i k e l y C o a l i t i o n , " Business i n T h a i l a n d , 8 August 1982, p. 31. Quoted i n Donald Weatherbee, "Southeast A s i a n A f f a i r s 1982: Marking Time," i n Southeast A s i a n A f f a i r s 1983 (Singapore: I n s t i t u t e of Southeast Asian S t u d i e s , 1983). 87 i n t h a t the former's g o a l was to oust and r e p l a c e the Heng Semrin regime, whereas ASEAN's go a l i s to p r o v i d e an i n t e r i m a l t e r n a t i v e at the d i p l o m a t i c l e v e l , l e a v i n g Kampuchea's f u t u r e regime as an e l e c t o r a l d e c i s i o n "by the people of Cambodia." ASEAN i s f a c e d with the paradox of pushing f o r the CGDK's l e g i t i m a t e r e c o g n i t i o n while denying i t u l t i m a t e r u l e . S i n c e the c o a l i t i o n ' s anti-communist f o r c e s are too weak, ASEAN r e a l i z e s t h a t any f u t u r e government i n Phnom Penh w i l l be l e d by the Khmer Rouge. Thus f a r , M a l a y s i a i s the o n l y ASEAN country t o name an ambassador to the CGDK. In c o n t r a s t , Indonesia, which i s most opposed to the Khmer Rouge, has t r i e d t o d i s t a n c e i t s e l f from them. During a November 1980 m i n i s t e r i a l meeting of the Colombo Plan i n J a k a r t a , the CGDK's r e p r e s e n t a t i v e , Ieng Sary, was not greeted as a formal S t a t e r e p r e s e n t a t i v e and was p e r m i t t e d only b r i e f meetings with Indonesia's P r e s i d e n t and F o r e i g n M i n i s t e r . U n f o r t u n a t e l y , t h e r e i s no de f a c t o independent or s o v e r e i g n government of Kampuchea which can l e g i t i m a t e l y c l a i m t o r e p r e s e n t the country: the CGDK i s wholly dependent upon China f o r m a t e r i a l support, upon T h a i l a n d f o r sanctuary and upon ASEAN f o r i n t e r n a t i o n a l r e c o g n i t i o n ; the Heng Semrin regime i s dependent on Vietnam. In short, the f u t u r e of Kampuchea depends on, and w i l l be decided by, f o r e i g n powers. 88 M a i n t a i n i n g U n i t y : ASEAN i n the I n t e r n a t i o n a l Forum One of ASEAN's most no t a b l e successes has been i t s l o b b y i n g e f f o r t s i n m a i n t a i n i n g the DK seat i n the i n t e r n a t i o n a l forum. ASEAN's i n i t i a l campaign at the Non-Aligned Conference of the Heads of Government i n Havana i n 1979 was not very f r u i t f u l . The Kampuchean seat remained vacant, although t h i s was a l l e g e d l y a t t r i b u t e d t o p r e s s u r e from Cuba, Vietnam and other "non-aligned" n a t i o n s . ASEAN's r e c o r d i n the United Nations General Assembly has been c o n s i s t e n t l y more s u c c e s s f u l . T h i s i s i n d i c a t e d by the t a b l e of UN v o t i n g p a t t e r n s below: 9 United Nations V o t i n g R e s o l u t i o n s to R e t a i n the DK Seat Year 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 For 91 97 100 105 105 110 114 115 Against 21 23 25 23 23 22 21 21 The f i r s t d r a f t r e s o l u t i o n i n 1979 exceeded the e x p e c t a t i o n s of i t s t h i r t y sponsors, winning a 91 to 21 v i c t o r y with 21 a b s t e n t i o n s . 1 0 The Asian c o u n t r i e s a g a i n s t the r e s o l u t i o n were Vietnam, Laos and Afghanistan. Others opposed i n c l u d e d Cuba, Czec h o s l o v a k i a , East Germany, Hungary, Poland, the Ukraine and the S o v i e t Union. Those a b s t a i n i n g were mostly Middle E a s t e r n and A f r i c a n c o u n t r i e s , and those i n f a v o r i n c l u d e d Romania, 9. "Biggest m a j o r i t y so f a r f o r t r o o p withdrawal from Kampuchea," ASEAN Newsletter, P u b l i c a t i o n of the ASEAN S e c r e t a r i a t , J a k a r t a , 12(Nov. -Dec." 1985), p. 7. 10. See K.K. Nair, ASEAN-Indochina R e l a t i o n s S i n c e 1975: The P o l i t i c s of Accomodation (Canberra: A u s t r a l i a n N a t i o n a l Univ. Press, 1984). 89 Yugoslavia, China, the United S t a t e s , Japan and the United Kingdom. Causing some degree of resentment to ASEAN, the o n l y non-aligned n a t i o n not s u p p o r t i n g the 1980 d r a f t and t h e r e a f t e r was India, which was more concerned with m a i n t a i n i n g good r e l a t i o n s with the S o v i e t Union. Other f a c t o r s which i n f l u e n c e d the United Nations v o t i n g p a t t e r n was the r e c e n t S o v i e t i n v a s i o n of A f g h a n i s t a n which caused some n a t i o n s to show t h e i r d i s p l e a s u r e at the S o v i e t a c t i o n by v o t i n g f o r the ASEAN p o s i t i o n . ASEAN's primary burden was i n e l i c i t i n g i n t e r n a t i o n a l support f o r a government which i n c l u d e d P o l Pot and the Khmer Rouge. The d r a f t r e s o l u t i o n drew t e p i d support from A u s t r a l i a and France due to r e v u l s i o n at the Khmers' r e p r e h e n s i b l e r e c o r d on human r i g h t s . At the United Nations, ASEAN r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s argued t h a t they were not i n favour of a Khmer Rouge l e d by P o l Pot, but t h a t i t was necessary to d i s t i n g u i s h between the man, and the t e r r i t o r i a l e n t i t y and s o v e r e i g n t y of Democratic Kampuchea which were the r e a l o b j e c t s of ASEAN's support. In a speech i n October 1980, Singapore's r e p r e s e n t a t i v e to the United Nations, Tommy Koh, argued t h a t " i f Democratic Kampuchea were to l o s e i t s s e a t i n the United Nations, i t would be tantamount to s a y i n g t h a t i t i s p e r m i s s i b l e f o r a powerful m i l i t a r y s t a t e to invade i t s weaker neighbour, to overthrow i t s government and to impose a puppet regime on i t . " 1 1 M a l a y s i a ' s permanent r e p r e s e n t a t i v e added t h a t i f the i n t e r n a t i o n a l community accepted 11. United Nations General Assembly, 35th Session, General  Assembly P r o v i s i o n a l Verbatim Record of the 34th Meeting, 13 Oct. 19867 < A7~35/PV34)~ pp. 27-36. In" ~~Horen,"~op7" c7t™7"7^~246-247. 90 the p r i n c i p l e of f o r e i g n m i l i t a r y i n t e r v e n t i o n , then no country c o u l d be secure. Moreover, although other regimes such as Hungary i n 1956 and C z e c h o s l o v a k i a i n 1968 are l e g a l l y r e c o g n i z e d on account of t h e i r de f a c t o power, Koh argued t h a t the Heng Semrin case was d i f f e r e n t . The Heng Semrin regime i s a s u r r o g a t e of Hanoi, backed by the S o v i e t Union, and w i e l d s power on l y through the a s s i s t a n c e of a f o r e i g n army of 200,000 Vietnamese. While Vietnam's d e l e g a t i o n argued t h a t i t s i n t e r v e n t i o n was an act of " n a t i o n a l s a l v a t i o n " and t h a t the Kampucheans welcomed them as l i b e r a t o r s from P o l Pot, ASEAN r e t o r t e d t h a t the Vietnamese o c c u p a t i o n and i n t e r v e n t i o n was not requested by a l e g i t i m a t e r e p r e s e n t a t i v e of the Kampuchean p e o p l e . 1 8 (Heng Semrin was a d i s g r u n t l e d member of P o l Pot's f a c t i o n who ran to the Vietnamese hoping t o s t r i k e a d e a l ) . However, many w i t h i n the United Nations General Assembly f e l t t h a t n e i t h e r of the two governments c l a i m i n g power t r u l y r e p r e s e n t e d the Kampuchean people and what was needed was a r e a l i s t i c p o l i t i c a l s o l u t i o n . L i k e t h e i r i n i t i a l statement immediately a f t e r the i n v a s i o n , ASEAN's United Nations statement of condemnation was, once again, c a r e f u l l y worded and r e f r a i n e d from conveying an o v e r t l y a n t i -Vietnamese tone t o keep open l i n e s with Hanoi. The d r a f t r e s o l u t i o n c a l l e d on a l l p a r t i e s f u l l y t o observe fundamental human r i g h t s , advocated t h a t d i f f e r e n c e s be s e t t l e d by p e a c e f u l 12. Lee Kuan Yew once remarked, "I am q u i t e sure t h a t i n time we w i l l f i n d out the d i f f e r e n c e between...national l i b e r a t i o n and n a t i o n a l s a l v a t i o n . Maybe t h e r e i s a n i c e d i s t i n c t i o n : when one s u b v e r t s a non-Communist neighbor i t i s c a l l e d l i b e r a t i o n . When one s u b v e r t s a Communist neighbor i t i s c a l l e d s a l v a t i o n . " Quoted i n Thakur Phanit, Regional I n t e g r a t i o n Attempts i n Southeast A s i a : A Study of ASEAN's Problems and Progress Ph.D. D i s s e r t a t i o n , P ennsylvania S t a t e Univ., 1980, p. 231. 91 means, and proposed t h a t the Kampuchean people be allowed t o choose t h e i r own government f r e e of o u t s i d e i n t e r f e r e n c e , s u b v e r s i o n or c o e r c i o n . ASEAN's second major i n t e r n a t i o n a l undertaking was the I n t e r n a t i o n a l Conference on Kampuchea (ICK) convened i n New York i n October 1981 under United Nations auspices. Vietnam's i n t r a n s i g e n c e over troop withdrawals a f t e r repeated UNGA r e s o l u t i o n s i n e v i t a b l y drew ASEAN to the Chinese p o s i t i o n , a s i t u a t i o n i t was anxious t o avoid. The ICK conference p r o v i d e d an o p p o r t u n i t y f o r ASEAN to d i s a s s o c i a t e i t s e l f from China. ASEAN has p e r s i s t e n t l y t r i e d t o p r o j e c t the i s s u e as an i n t e r n a t i o n a l one which would t h e r e f o r e r e q u i r e an i n t e r n a t i o n a l l y supported p o l i t i c a l s o l u t i o n . ASEAN's purpose i n convening the ICK conference was to present a p r o p o s a l which had been d r a f t e d e a r l i e r t h a t month by ASEAN f o r e i g n m i n i s t e r s i n Manila. At t h i s conference, a l l the ASEAN c o u n t r i e s , i n c l u d i n g T h a i l a n d , agreed t h a t the d r a f t was to be the b a s i s of a comprehensive p o l i t i c a l s o l u t i o n . The ASEAN m i n i s t e r s were seeking a formula which would make a d i s t i n c t i o n between t h e i r d i s p u t e with Vietnam, and the Sino-Vietnamese c o n f l i c t . They a l s o hoped t o i n c o r p o r a t e Vietnam's s e c u r i t y concerns, permit the withdrawal of Vietnamese tr o o p s from Kampuchea and p r o v i d e the e x t e r n a l means to ensure t h a t Kampuchea c o u l d once again become a n e u t r a l , democratic and non-aligned n a t i o n . While on the one hand, Vietnam needed t o be assured t h a t i t s withdrawal would not l e a d a u t o m a t i c a l l y t o the esta b l i s h m e n t of a h o s t i l e Khmer Rouge regime a l l i e d with China, the ASEAN 92 m i n i s t e r s a l s o needed e x t e r n a l means to ensure t h a t the Khmer Rouge would never come to power again. The pre-ICK d r a f t s o l u t i o n i n Manila comprised f o u r p o i n t s : a) the d i s p a t c h of a United Nations peacekeeping f o r c e t o Kampuchea and the est a b l i s h m e n t of an i n t e r i m a d m i n i s t r a t i o n , b) the withdrawal of f o r e i g n t r o o p s under United Nations s u p e r v i s i o n , c) the disarming of a l l Khmer f a c t i o n s immediately a f t e r the Vietnamese withdrawal; and d) f r e e e l e c t i o n s under United Nations s u p e r v i s i o n . 1 3 The ICK conference was attended by 92 c o u n t r i e s , although i t was boycotted by Vietnam. ASEAN r e a l i z e d t h a t an ICK s o l u t i o n had no b a s i s without Chinese support, so i t was c r u c i a l t h a t an agreement be reached. The Chinese, however, r e j e c t e d any s o l u t i o n which would weaken t h e i r Khmer Rouge a l l y . They demanded P o l Pot exempt from mandatory disarmament, i n s i s t i n g t h a t Vietnam's troop withdrawal from Kampuchea be e x p e d i t e d w i t h i n a d e s i g n a t e d "time l i m i t , " and o b j e c t e d t o an " i n t e r i m a d m i n i s t r a t i o n " which would prevent i n s u r g e n t a l l i e s from moving i n once the Vietnamese were out. Tommy Koh i n s i s t e d t h a t the ASEAN demand f o r disarming a l l f a c t i o n s was "non-negotiable". China argued t h a t the Khmers were the s t r o n g e s t element i n the r e s i s t e n c e and hence should not be weakened. The acrimonious debate between the two reached such i n t e n s i t y on J u l y 15 t h a t m i n i s t e r i a l l e v e l meetings had to be arranged between ASEAN and China. P h i l i p p i n e F o r e i g n M i n i s t e r C a r l o s Romulo b l u n t l y t o l d Chinese a c t i n g F o r e i g n M i n i s t e r Han 13. Buszynski, op. c i t . , p. 1049. 93 Nianlong t h a t i f China h e l d up the working of the conference by i t s i n f l e x i b l e p o s i t i o n i t would l o s e ASEAN sympathy and would be seen as b u l l y i n g f i v e s m a l l s t a t e s . 1 4 Indonesian F o r e i g n M i n i s t e r Mochtar Kusumaatmadja a l s o warned Han t h a t i f China wanted to drag the i s s u e t o a vote, i t would l o s e . Q u i t e as d i s t u r b i n g t o ASEAN was the U n i t e d S t a t e s ' w i l l i n g n e s s t o s u b o r d i n a t e ASEAN t o China i n t h i s i s s u e . A c c o r d i n g t o an American observer, "behind the scenes. U n i t e d S t a t e s diplomats l a b o r e d f o r China's cause, eager t o cement the new r e l a t i o n s h i p with P e k i n g . " 1 5 But what was most d i s t u r b i n g t o ASEAN was T h a i F o r e i g n M i n i s t e r S i d d h i S a v e t s i l a ' s e l e v e n t h hour r o l e i n b a c k t r a c k i n g from the p r e v i o u s l y agreed Manila d r a f t i n f a v o u r o f the Chinese and Khmer p o s i t i o n . From the Thai p o i n t of view "a demonstration of s o l i d a r i t y with ASEAN over an empty formula would not b r i n g p r e s s u r e t o bear upon Vietnam to withdraw from Cambodia, nor would i t o f f e r r e a s s u r r a n c e a g a i n s t Vietnamese m i l i t a r y r e t a l i a t i o n . " 1 6 A p o s s i b l e e x p l a n a t i o n f o r T h a i l a n d ' s sudden change i n p o s i t i o n i s that, as mentioned e a r l i e r , T h a i l a n d ' s f o r e i g n p o l i c y h i s t o r i c a l l y adapted i t s e l f t o the dominant power i n the r e g i o n and, when necessary, t i l t e d i n the d i r e c t i o n i n which an e x p e c t a t i o n of immediate backing was h i g h e s t . For example, i t escaped c o l o n i a l i s m by e x p l o i t i n g the d i f f e r e n c e s between the French i n Indochina and the B r i t i s h i n Burma and 14. Far E a s t e r n Economic Review, 24 J u l y 1981, p. 13. 15. Bernard N o s s i t e r , New York Times, 18 J u l y 1981. In J u s t u s M. van der Kroef, "Kampuchea: The D i p l o m a t i c L a b y r i n t h , " A s i a n  Survey 22 (Oct. 1982). 16. Leszek Buszynski," T h a i l a n d : The E r o s i o n of a Balanced F o r e i g n P o l i c y , " A s i a n Survey, 22 (Nov. 1982), p. 1051. 94 Malaya, d u r i n g the Second World War i t r e f r a i n e d from opposing the Japanese, and l a t e r T h a i l a n d a l s o supported the United S t a t e s i n the Vietnam War. E v i d e n t l y , ASEAN d i d not p r o v i d e enough i n c e n t i v e t o abandon a d i p l o m a t i c s t r a t e g y which h i s t o r i c a l l y had served i t so w e l l . China's p o s i t i o n i n opposing the disarmament of P o l Pot at the ICK conference was supported o n l y by C h i l e and P a k i s t a n . The m a j o r i t y of the 92 n a t i o n s a t t e n d i n g the conference determined i t was necessary t h a t any document passed had t o win the unanimous ap p r o v a l o f a l l p a r t i c i p a n t s so as t o show no d i v i s i o n t o Vietnam. To achieve t h i s , the r e s o l u t i o n would have t o emphasize the p r i n c i p l e s agreed to and i g n o r e the d e t a i l s on which t h e r e were d i f f e r e n c e s . 1 7 The deadlock was e v e n t u a l l y broken by a formula d r a f t e d by the French d e l e g a t i o n . W r i t t e n i n French, the f i n a l communique made no mention of d i s a r m i n g any f a c t i o n s or e s t a b l i s h i n g an i n t e r i m a d m i n i s t r a t i o n i n Kampuchea a f t e r the Vietnamese withdrawal -- both of which were the main f e a t u r e s of the ASEAN p r o p o s a l . In l i e u of those p o i n t s , i t spoke i n vague terms of u n s p e c i f i e d " a p p r o p r i a t e measures" t o ensure no armed f a c t i o n s would coerce or d i s r u p t the h o l d i n g of f r e e e l e c t i o n s . Although ASEAN d i d not achieve i t s g o a l s at the ICK conference, i t d i d succeed i n f o c u s i n g i n t e r n a t i o n a l o p i n i o n upon Vietnam's i l l e g a l o c c u p a t i o n of Kampuchea. For ASEAN, the conference was s i g n i f i c a n t i n two r e s p e c t s . F i r s t , i t showed to Hanoi, Moscow and Phom Penh t h a t ASEAN wanted t o be c o n c i l i a t o r y . In c o n t r a s t t o the Chinese p o s i t i o n which sought a p r o t r a c t e d 17. I n t e r n a t i o n a l H e r a l d Tribune, 20 J u l y 1981, p. 5. 95 war, ASEAN was w i l l i n g t o compromise with Vietnam, r e c o g n i z i n g i t s l e g i t i m a t e s e c u r i t y concerns. Secondly, T h a i l a n d ' s e l e v e n t h hour change of h e a r t showed t h a t i t c o u l d indeed f o r g e an alignment with the Chinese over the Kampuchean i s s u e while r e t a i n i n g the p u b l i c support of ASEAN. At a time when some ASEAN members such as Indonesia and M a l a y s i a were t r y i n g t o accentuate ASEAN's d i f f e r e n c e s with China, Thai F o r e i g n M i n i s t e r S i d d h i S a v e t s i l a t r i e d t o harmonize them as a "minor m i s u n d e r s t a n d i n g . " 1 8 Thai Deputy Prime M i n i s t e r Thanat Khoman f u r t h e r denied having veered too c l o s e t o China, e x p l a i n i n g t h a t "the S o v i e t Union i s the key t o the s o l u t i o n of the Kampuchean p r o b l e m . " 1 9 On the one hand, Indonesia and M a l a y s i a both b e l i e v e t h a t S i n o -Vietnamese an i m o s i t y i s the source of the problem and f e a r t h a t China i s u s i n g ASEAN as a v e h i c l e f o r a s s e r t i n g d i p l o m a t i c i n f l u e n c e i n the r e g i o n . On the o t h e r hand, " C t l h e i n e l u c t a b l e l o g i c of T h a i l a n d ' s s e c u r i t y dilemmas has r e s u l t e d i n the apparent concurrence of Chinese and ASEAN i n t e r e s t s such t h a t the Kuala Lumpur d e c l a r a t i o n [ZOPFAN] becomes d i r e c t e d s o l e l y a g a i n s t the S o v i e t U n i o n . " 8 0 T h a i l a n d ' s unenviable dilemma i s how t o maintain ASEAN s o l i d a r i t y while s t e e r i n g a middle course between China and the Khmers on the one hand, Vietnam on the other --without provoking e i t h e r Vietnam or ASEAN. 18. Buszynski, " T h a i l a n d : The E r o s i o n of a Balanced F o r e i g n P o l i c y , " op. c i t . , p. 1051. 19. BBC SWB, 16 Nov. 1981. In Buszynski, "Thailand, the S o v i e t Union and the Kampuchean Imbroglio," op. c i t . , p. 72. 20. Buszynski, " T h a i l a n d : The E r o s i o n of a Balanced F o r e i g n P o l i c y , " op. c i t . , p. 1052. 96 U n l i k e Indonesia, M a l a y s i a has a d i r e c t i n t e r e s t i n T h a i l a n d ' s s t a b i l i t y . With the Malayan Communist Party (MCP) r e b e l s s h a r i n g a border with t h e i r T h a i c o u n t e r p a r t s , the Kuala Lumpur government i s a f r a i d t h a t i n c r e a s e d t e n s i o n might allow the MCP t o draw r e s o u r c e s from a c r o s s the border. The apparent Indonesia-Malaysia f r o n t i n the Kampuchea i s s u e has not been ig n o r e d by the T h a i press, which accuses M a l a y s i a of b l i n d l y f o l l o w i n g Indonesia's l e a d . A comment i n Bangkok's Nation Review s t r e s s e d the Malaysian tendency t o back " i d e a l i s t i c p r i n c i p l e s u s u a l l y i n c o n j u n c t i o n with I n d o n e s i a . . . [ a f t e r which] they [would] persuade the other t h r e e members t o f o l l o w . . . j u s t as i n the case of ZOPFAN i n 1971." 8 1 M a l a y s i a i s compelled to t r e a d a c a u t i o u s path i n not pushing i t s g r i e v a n c e s too s t r e n o u s l y upon T h a i l a n d . I t does not want t o see i n c r e a s e d Chinese i n f l u e n c e i n Bangkok, but f e a r s t h a t i f i t pushes too hard, T h a i l a n d may t u r n towards China. S h o r t l y a f t e r the ICK conference, Malaysian Premier Mahathir v i s i t e d Bangkok from August 23-24, presumably out of concern over the extent of T h a i i d e n t i f i c a t i o n with Chinese views. Mahathir emerged from the t a l k s s t a t i n g t h at, "I don't t h i n k t h a t M a l a y s i a has a very s t r o n g view about how c l o s e or how d i s t a n t i s T h a i l a n d ' s r e l a t i o n s h i p with China," and expressed the view t h a t T h a i l a n d ' s f r a t e r n i z a t i o n with B e i j i n g was an advantage s i n c e T h a i l a n d c o u l d c o n t a c t China "more f r e e l y " f o r ASEAN's b e n e f i t . 8 8 21. Nation Review, 15 May 1980, p. 2. 22. Buszynski, " T h a i l a n d : The E r o s i o n on a Balanced F o r e i g n P o l i c y , " op. c i t . p. 1051. 97 Indeed, T h a i l a n d has taken advantage o f i t s g e o g r a p h i c a l importance by a c t i n g as a n e g o t i a t i n g "go-between" among ASEAN, Vietnam and China. As mentioned, Indonesia, which has no d i p l o m a t i c l i n k s with the PRC, communicates i t s views through " f r i e n d s i n c o u r t . " S i m i l a r l y , T h a i F o r e i g n M i n i s t e r S i d d h i o f f e r e d Hanoi t h a t i f i t had a message f o r B e i j i n g , ASEAN (Thailand) was w i l l i n g t o a c t as "go-between." 8 3 E x p l o i t i n g t h e i r h i s t o r i c a l and c u l t u r a l l i n k s f o r i n t e r n a t i o n a l support i n the United Nations, Indonesia and Ma l a y s i a r a l l i e d f e l l o w I s l a m i c C o u n t r i e s o f the Middle East, Singapore appealed t o f e l l o w Commonwealth na t i o n s , the P h i l i p p i n e s c o n c e n t r a t e d on the Spanish-speaking c o u n t r i e s o f Europe and L a t i n America, and Tha i l a n d , the only ASEAN country spared c o l o n i a l domination, l o b b i e d the EEC c o u n t r i e s with whom i t has h i s t o r i c a l l y enjoyed good r e l a t i o n s . 8 * ASEAN's d i p l o m a t i c " d i v i s i o n o f la b o u r " a l s o extends t o the pe r s o n a l l e v e l i n t a k i n g advantage of the s t r e n g t h s o f s p e c i f i c ASEAN o f f i c i a l s . Tommy Koh, f o r m e r l y Singapore's r e p r e s e n t a t i v e t o the United Nations, was desig n a t e d ASEAN's o f f i c i a l U n i t e d Nations spokesperson. Koh's d i p l o m a t i c s k i l l i s i n l a r g e p a r t a c c r e d i t e d t o b o o s t i n g ASEAN's f a v o r a b l e i n t e r n a t i o n a l p r o f i l e . Another d i s t i n g u i s h e d p e r s o n a l i t y i s Indonesia's F o r e i g n M i n i s t e r Mochtar Kusumaatmadja, desi g n a t e d as o f f i c i a l i n t e r l o c u t o r between ASEAN and Vietnam. But, as I w i l l i l l u s t r a t e below, 23. See S u t h i c h a i Yoon "ASEAN S e c u r i t y and Economics: New D i r e c t i o n s f o r the 1980's," i n ASEAN S e c u r i t y and Economic  Development, eds. K a r l D. Jackson and M. Hadi S o e s a s t r o (Berkeley, C a l i f . : I n s t i t u t e of East A s i a n S t u d i e s , 1983), pp. 251-255. 24. Far E a s t e r n Economic Review. 10 Sept. 1982, p. 11. 98 Mochtar's a d d i t i o n a l r e s p o n s i b i l i t y emerged f o r s l i g h t l y d i f f e r e n t reasons from those of Tommy Koh. Indonesia's "Dual-Track" Diplomacy: Competing Conceptions of  S e c u r i t y Indonesia's two-track diplomacy emerged out of growing impatience with the s u b o r d i n a t i o n of t h e i r i n t e r e s t s t o those of T h a i l a n d and from a h i s t o r i c , though too o f t e n f r u s t r a t e d d e s i r e t o p l a y a l e a d e r s h i p r o l e i n Southeast A s i a . A c c o r d i n g to Indonesian F o r e i g n M i n i s t e r Mochtar Kusumaatmadja , ASEAN and Vietnam have been dancing an "elegant but s t a t i c minuet." The now dismantled J a k a r t a d a i l y , S i n a r Harapan, e l a b o r a t e d : " I t i s time f o r Indonesia t o take the f l o o r with the w a l t z , " which " i s dynamic, has d i r e c t i o n and reaches every c o r n e r with s t i r r i n g m u s i c . " a 3 Another j o u r n a l i s t was more b l u n t : "We've taken such a low p r o f i l e t h a t people f o r g e t t h a t we're a b i g country and have our own s t r a t e g i c i n t e r e s t s i n mainland Southeast A s i a . " 8 6 I f ASEAN was indeed formed "at Indonesia's i n i t i a t i v e , " as Suharto claimed i n a 1968 speech b e f o r e the People's C o n s u l t a t i v e Assembly, then, as H i c h e a l L e i f e r maintains, Indonesia had e f f e c t i v e l y become i t s c a p t i v e . 8 7 I t was hoped t h a t a two-track diplomacy would r e l i e v e t h i s sense of impotence. 25. Susumo Awanohara, "Where t h e r e ' s a w i l l . . . . " Far E a s t e r n  Economic Review, 1 March 1984, p. 10. 26. Susumo Awanohara, "A meeting of minds," Far E a s t e r n Economic  Review. 9 Feb. 1984, p. 19. 27. Micheal L e i f e r , "ASEAN under s t r e s s over Cambodia," Far  E a s t e r n Economic Review, 14 Jan. 1984, p. 35. 99 D e s p i t e i t s c o n t r a d i c t o r y nature and the d i s r u p t i v e p o t e n t i a l i t c o u l d have on ASEAN's u n i t y , t h i s two-track system has been accepted and absorbed by the o r g a n i z a t i o n and i t s members. E s s e n t i a l l y , Indonesia's two-track diplomacy means t h a t Vietnam i s d e a l t with c o l l e c t i v e l y through r e g u l a r d i p l o m a t i c channels agreed t o by a l l ASEAN members. 8 8 The second t r a c k i s a d i r e c t and d i s t i n c t l y Indonesian (as opposed t o ASEAN) approach, which r e f e r s t o the " n o n - o f f i c i a l " t a l k s , or n e g o t i a t i n g e f f o r t s by i n d i v i d u a l s o u t s i d e the P r e s i d e n t ' s O f f i c e or the M i n i s t r y of F o r e i g n A f f a i r s -- u s u a l l y the army or the Center f o r S t r a t e g i c and I n t e r n a t i o n a l S t u d i e s (CSIS), an academic t h i n k - t a n k i n J a k a r t a . T h i s second t r a c k i s , as Tilman d e s c r i b e s , d i r e c t and u n i q u e l y Indonesian: " . . . [ i t ] i s d i r e c t because important i n d i v i d u a l s speak as Indonesians d i r e c t l y t o t h e i r c o u n t e r p a r t s i n Vietnam. I t i s u n i q u e l y Indonesian because t h e i r sentiments embody and r e f l e c t t h e i r p e r c e p t i o n s of Indonesia and the world t h a t surrounds i t . They do not speak as members of ASEAN; they speak as I n d o n e s i a n s . " 8 9 One might add t h a t only when the d i r e c t t a l k s b e n e f i t ASEAN as an o r g a n i z a t i o n w i l l they c l a i m t o a c t on b e h a l f of ASEAN r a t h e r than as i n d i v i d u a l s . In d i s c u s s i n g the Indonesian p e r s p e c t i v e , i t i s important t o understand t h a t a t t i t u d e s r e g a r d i n g Vietnam i n Indonesian c i r c l e s are not u n i f i e d . There i s e v i d e n t r i v a l r y f o r i n f l u e n c e over p o l i c y between the more h a r d - l i n e , a n t i - C h i n e s e Indonesian m i l i t a r y which r e t a i n s v i v i d reminders of China's c o m p l i c i t y i n 28. Tilman, op. c i t . , pp. 77-78. 29. I b i d , p. 77. 100 the 1965 coup and which p l a y s a predominant r o l e i n government, and the F o r e i g n M i n i s t r y which i s d i r e c t l y concerned with m a i n t a i n i n g ASEAN's u n i t y . 3 0 The c e n t e r of the ASEAN c o n t r o v e r s y i s Indonesia's Army C h i e f of S t a f f , General Benny Murdani, who has p a i d t h r e e v i s i t s t o Vietnam i n the past seven years and i s the most v o c a l advocate f o r accommodation with Hanoi. A f t e r a v i s i t i n February 1984, Murdani caused r i p p l e s w i t h i n ASEAN by s t a t i n g " i t i s my f i r m b e l i e f t h a t t h e r e w i l l never be a c o n f l i c t between our two c o u n t r i e s . Some c o u n t r i e s s a i d t h a t Vietnam i s a danger to Southeast A s i a but the Indonesian army and people do not b e l i e v e i t . " 3 1 During an A p r i l 1985 v i s i t , Murdani d i s c u s s e d b i l a t e r a l m i l i t a r y i s s u e s with Vietnam's Defence M i n i s t e r , General Van T i e n Dung, and added t h a t the Vietnamese were not a t h r e a t because "they are so p o o r . " 3 8 A c c o r d i n g t o Murdani, ASEAN's c u r r e n t p o l i c y would -- i n f a c e of growing Chinese i n f l u e n c e -- f o r c e Vietnam and T h a i l a n d t o r e l y more h e a v i l y on Moscow and B e i j i n g r e s p e c t i v e l y . Accommodation with Vietnam would p r o v i d e a r e l i a b l e b u f f e r by the year 2000 a g a i n s t a much-strengthened China. A f t e r the 1985 v i s i t , he a l s o suggested p o s s i b l e m i l i t a r y c o o p e r a t i o n with Hanoi, which was s t r o n g l y denied by Mochtar upon Murdani's r e t u r n t o Indonesia. 30. See Andrew J. Maclntyre, " I n t e r p r e t i n g Indonesian F o r e i g n P o l i c y : The Case of Kampuchea, 1979-1986," As i a n Survey. 27 (May 1987), pp. 515-534. 31. A s i a Yearbook 1985, Far E a s t e r n Economic Review, p. 95. 32. S i n a r Harapan ( J a k a r t a ) , 19 A p r i l 1985. 101 R e l a t i o n s between Murdani and Mochtar have been marked by a s t r e a k of p e r s o n a l competition, sometimes l e a v i n g Mochtar embarrassingly i n the dark of Murdani's movements. L i d d l e has d e s c r i b e d the Indonesian p o l i t i c a l s t r u c t u r e as a " s t e e p l y ascending pyramid i n which the h e i g h t s are dominated by a s i n g l e o f f i c e , the p r e s i d e n t , " and the p r e s i d e n t "commands the m i l i t a r y which i s primus i n t e r pares w i t h i n the b u r e a u c r a c y . " 3 3 As F o r e i g n M i n i s t e r , r e p r e s e n t i n g both the Indonesian and ASEAN p o s i t i o n s , Mochtar i s thus f a c e d with the c h a l l e n g e of s o o t h i n g Murdani's l e s s t a c t f u l a c t i o n s , w h ile Murdani, as Indonesia's "backdoor" i n i t i a t i v e , r e p r e s e n t s a good i n d i c a t o r of the c o u n t r y ' s r e a l concerns on the i s s u e . Most s i g n i f i c a n t l y , though, Murdani's a c t i o n s have Suharto's b l e s s i n g . J a k a r t a ' s Center f o r S t r a t e g i c and I n t e r n a t i o n a l S t u d i e s (CSIS) has powerful c o n n e c t i o n s i n the J a k a r t a h i e r a r c h y and has been i n f l u e n t i a l i n shaping Indonesia's f o r e i g n p o l i c y i n the past. R e p r e s e n t a t i v e s of the CSIS have p a r t i c i p a t e d i n two seminars i n Hanoi with the Vietnamese I n s t i t u t e of I n t e r n a t i o n a l R e l a t i o n s (IIR), the f i r s t j u s t p r i o r t o General Murdani's f i r s t o f f i c i a l v i s i t . Both i n s t i t u t i o n a l s i d e s emphasized t h a t the seminars were p r i v a t e and b i l a t e r a l , whose purpose was t o deepen mutual understanding. Yet f o r an " i n f o r m a l " s e s s i o n , the meeting had an unmistakably o f f i c i a l f l a v o u r , c o u n t i n g among i t s p a r t i c i p a n t s Commodore S u d i b j o Rahardjo and Muhammed A r i f i n , former d e p u t i e s of Murdani. 33. R. W i l l i a m L i d d l e , "Soeharto's Indonesia: P e r s o n a l Rule and P o l i t i c a l I n s t i t u t i o n s , " P a c i f i c A f f a i r s , 58 ( S p r i n g 1985), p. 71. In Tilman, op. c i t . , p. 39. 102 In h i s c a p a c i t y as ASEAN's i n t e r l o c u t o r with Hanoi, F o r e i g n M i n i s t e r Mochtar Kusumaatmadja's pet p r o j e c t w i t h i n Indonesia's two-track diplomacy has been h i s mediating r o l e i n the M i s s i n g i n A c t i o n (MIA) i s s u e which prevents a n o r m a l i z a t i o n of r e l a t i o n s between the United S t a t e s and Vietnam. The m o t i v a t i o n behind Mochtar's i n i t i a t i v e i s h i s b e l i e f t h a t i f t h e r e i s to be a n o r m a l i z a t i o n of r e l a t i o n s between the two c o u n t r i e s , Hanoi would be e l i g i b l e f o r American a s s i s t a n c e , h e n c e f o r t h r e d u c i n g i t s dependence on the S o v i e t Union. In A p r i l 1983, Vietnam's Premier Le Due Tho was quoted as s a y i n g i n a French news agency i n t e r v i e w t h a t a U n i t e d States-Vietnam thaw would " c o n t r i b u t e t o the e s t a b l i s h m e n t of s t a b i l i t y i n the r e g i o n . " 3 4 Washington's two s t i p u l a t i o n s f o r n o r m a l i z a t i o n are f i r s t , Vietnam's withdrawal of i t s t r o o p s from Kampuchea, and second, the handover of the remains of more than two thousand American s o l d i e r s m i s s i n g i n a c t i o n (MIA). In a l e t t e r t o Mochtar i n 1985, Vietnam's F o r e i g n M i n i s t e r Co Thach appealed f o r a " h i g h - l e v e l meeting" with American o f f i c i a l s . Washington has g r e e t e d Mochtar's i n i t i a t i v e s with a p o l i t e r e j e c t i o n , i n s i s t i n g t h a t the MIA i s s u e has no c o n n e c t i o n with n o r m a l i z a t i o n which, they s t r e s s , r e s t s on Vietnam's tro o p withdrawal. Nonetheless, on J u l y 6, 1985, United S t a t e s o f f i c i a l s were n o t i f i e d t h a t Hanoi was prepared t o r e l e a s e the 34. Aqence France Presse despatch, Ho Chi Minh C i t y , 8 A p r i l 1985 (FBIS, 9 A p r i l 1985). Quoted i n J u s t u s M. Van Der Kroef, "The United S t a t e s and Cambodia: The L i m i t s of Compromise and I n t e r v e n t i o n , " Contemporary Southeast A s i a , 7 (Mar. 1986), p. 252. 103 remains of 26 Americans, the l a r g e s t handover i n ten years which, thus f a r , has y i e l d e d only 99 remains of a t o t a l 2,464 missing. However, c r i t i c s accustomed t o Hanoi's shrewdness argued t h a t the new urgency was because the Vietnamese "now d e s p e r a t e l y want a s p e l l o f i n t e n s e d i p l o m a t i c a c t i v i t y with [Washington] t o remind Moscow t h a t i t has an American o p t i o n . " 3 8 They a l s o argued t h a t i n an e f f o r t t o upstage an upcoming ASEAN F o r e i g n M i n i s t e r ' s meeting, Vietnam was t r y i n g t o undermine Thai morale and aggravate e v i d e n t d i f f e r e n c e s i n ASEAN. In a b i d to r e l i e v e T h a i f e a r s of ASEAN concerns being f o r s a k e n f o r American i n t e r e s t s , Washington o f f i c i a l s assured t h a t they w i l l n e g o t i a t e on the MIA i s s u e without g i v i n g p o l i t i c a l ground on Kampuchea. 3 6 Mochtar's i n d i v i d u a l e f f o r t s i n seeking a breakthrough t o the Kampuchean stalemate have not been spared s u s p i c i o n among ASEAN ranks. As ASEAN's o f f i c i a l i n t e r l o c u t o r with Vietnam, Mochtar has taken h i s r o l e so s e r i o u s l y t h a t some ASEAN o f f i c i a l s are concerned t h a t h i s a c t i o n s r e f l e c t more of a d e s i r e t o p r o j e c t Indonesia as the S i x ' s l a r g e s t power than t o be a humble ASEAN s e r v a n t t o i l i n g t o implement a j o i n t p o l i c y . 3 7 T h a i l a n d , f o r one, has m i s g i v i n g s of J a k a r t a ' s "independent" s h i f t from ASEAN p o l i c y , and the e v i d e n t d i f f e r e n c e s between Mochtar and Murdani. Even a f t e r the Soviet-Vietnamese T r e a t y was c o n s o l i d a t e d i n 1978, Mochtar p r e f e r r e d not t o " i n t i m a t e t h a t Vietnam i s the proxy of any 35. R i c h a r d Nations, "Hanoi's MIA's c a r d , " Far E a s t e r n Economic  Review, 16 J u l y 1985, p. 15. 36. I b i d . , p. 15. 37. Rodney Tasker, " S t e a l i n g the Thunder," Far E a s t e r n Economic  Review, 18 J u l y 1985, p. 15. 104 c o u ntry." Equating Indonesia and Vietnam's r e v o l u t i o n a r y a f f i n i t y , he c o n t i n u e d : I have had many c o n v e r s a t i o n s with t h e i r l e a d e r s and I am aware of t h e i r p r i d e and t h e i r f e a r s s i n c e independence. So the f a c t t h a t they have s i g n e d a t r e a t y and have been o b l i g e d t o r e c e i v e a i d i s I t h i n k a r e s u l t of circumstances. They have t r i e d t o o b t a i n a s s i s t a n c e from other sources. They have encouraged investment and t r a d e but not much was f o r t h c o m i n g . 3 8 With r e g a r d to the Kampuchean i s s u e , T h a i Deputy Prime M i n i s t e r Thanat Khoman counters the Indonesian argument t h a t Vietnam i s not an e x p a n s i o n i s t t h r e a t by g i v i n g a d i s t i n c t l y Thai, f r o n t - l i n e view of Vietnam and the s i t u a t i o n : T h i s k i n d of t h r e a t i s not imagined nor p e r c e i v e d ; i t jumps i n t o the eyes of people w i l l i n g t o look. That i s why a comparison can be e s t a b l i s h e d between t i g e r s which are i n or a l r e a d y out of the woods. Vietnam i s o b v i o u s l y a t i g e r which i s s q u a t t i n g at our doorsteps backed by another t i g e r , one not f a r behind, while the other p o t e n t i a l t i g e r s t i l l l i e s hidden i n the woods. 3 9 These d i f f e r e n c e s between T h a i l a n d and Indonesia stem from two c o n c e p t i o n s of s e c u r i t y which were i n i t i a l l y mutually r e i n f o r c i n g , but s i n c e the Indochina i s s u e , have become competing a l t e r n a t i v e s . 4 0 The advent of ASEAN i n 1967 was not d i s t i n g u i s h e d by the common p e r c e p t i o n o f an e x t e r n a l t h r e a t . The ASEAN co n c e p t i o n of r e g i o n a l s e c u r i t y was conceived i n two ways: f i r s t , i t was d e f i n e d i n developmental terms whereby r e g i o n a l 38. Far E a s t e r n Economic Review. 17 Dec. 1978. Quoted i n Chan Heng Chee, "The I n t e r e s t s and Role of ASEAN i n the Indochina C o n f l i c t , " i n Indochina and Problems of S e c u r i t y and S t a b i l i t y i n  Southeast A s i a , eds. Khien T h e e r a v i t and M a c A l i s t e r Brown, papers and d i s c u s s i o n of the Conference h e l d at Chulalongkorn Univ., Bangkok, 18-21 June 1980, (Bangkok: Chulalongkorn Univ. Press, 1981), p. 190. 39. Bangkok Post. 9 Feb. 1982, p. 9. 40. See Micheal L e i f e r , "ASEAN under s t r e s s over Cambodia," Far  E a s t e r n Economic Review. 14 June 1984, pp. 34-35, f o r an e x c e l l e n t d i s c u s s i o n on t h i s p o i n t . 105 s e c u r i t y was necessary t o prevent the d i v e r s i o n of w a s t e f u l e n e r g i e s from economic development, though i t must be underpinned by p o l i t i c a l s t a b i l i t y ; second, i t was a p r e s c r i p t i o n f o r r e g i o n a l order based on r e s p e c t f o r n a t i o n a l s o v e r e i g n t y . The Indonesian view maintains t h a t Vietnam i s a n a t i o n a l i s t , not an e x p a n s i o n i s t , s t a t e which i s s t r u g g l i n g a g a i n s t s u b o r d i n a t i o n t o i t s Chinese neighbour. Kampuchea, l i k e Laos, i s e s s e n t i a l f o r Vietnam's s e c u r i t y and i t s p o l i t i c a l s t a b i l i t y . In c o n t r a s t , the Thai view i s premised on a profound d i s t r u s t of Hanoi's w i l l i n g n e s s t o r e s p e c t n a t i o n a l s o v e r e i g n t y . Vietnam i s not p e r c e i v e d as merely a n a t i o n a l i s t s t a t e . Kampuchea, f o r t h i s reason, i s a c r u c i a l b u f f e r between the two c o u n t r i e s . Thus T h a i l a n d condemns both the procedure by which Vietnam a s s e r t e d i t s c o n t r o l over Kampuchea and t h a t c o n t r o l i t s e l f . Indonesia and M a l a y s i a are concerned e s s e n t i a l l y with the procedure and l e s s by the c o n t r o l . They are thus w i l l i n g t o concede a Vietnamese " v i t a l i n t e r e s t " i n Kampuchea. ASEAN's two i n i t i a l l y complementary c o n c e p t i o n s of s e c u r i t y have s i n c e the 1978 i n v a s i o n become two d i s t i n c t l y s e p a r a t e p r i n c i p l e s , the f i r s t supported by Indonesia and the second supported by T h a i l a n d . • 1 Throughout the c o n f l i c t , the P h i l i p p i n e s has been somewhat of an "odd man out." At ASEAN's for m a t i o n i n 1967, the P h i l i p p i n e s was the only ASEAN s t a t e t o be a former colony of a superpower and at t h a t time had the most developed domestic 41. See Micheal L e i f e r , "ASEAN under s t r e s s over Cambodia," op. c i t . pp. 34-35; and Buszynski, "ASEAN: A Changing Regional Role, " op. c i t . , p. 767. 106 banking and i n d u s t r i a l s e c t o r s . Today i t holds the s m a l l e s t percentage of intra-ASEAN t r a d e and i s the onl y ASEAN s t a t e with major f o r e i g n n a v a l and a i r bases (Subic Bay and C l a r k F i e l d ) on i t s s o i l . In 1980, when Singapore exported US$4 b i l l i o n , Indonesia $3 b i l l i o n , M a l a y s i a $2.9 b i l l i o n and T h a i l a n d $1.1 b i l l i o n t o t h e i r ASEAN p a r t n e r s , the P h i l i p p i n e share was a meager $371 m i l l i o n . * 8 Fellow Southeast Asians have, perhaps r a t h e r u n f a i r l y , q u e s t i o n e d the P h i l i p p i n e s bona f i d e s t a t u s as Southeast Asians, d e s c r i b i n g them as " the stra n g e product o f th r e e c e n t u r i e s of l i f e i n a Spanish convent f o l l o w e d by f o r t y years i n Hollywood." 4 3 Among the ASEAN c o u n t r i e s i n the Kampuchean c r i s i s , the P h i l i p p i n e s has expressed no p a r t i c u l a r s t r a t e g i c p r e f e r e n c e , r a r e l y takes an i n i t i a t i v e , but j o i n e d the condemnation of Vietnam f o r the sake of ASEAN s o l i d a r i t y . No doubt i t s p e r p e t u a l p r e o c c u p a t i o n with domestic problems c o n t r i b u t e d t o Manila's a l o o f n e s s . Yet as Tom Huxley p o i n t s out, Manila's "middle-of-the-road" stance c o n c e i v a b l y i n c r e a s e s i t s p o l i t i c a l importance f o r both Vietnam and C h i n a . 4 4 Perhaps i f i t came down " o f f the fe n c e " t o take a f i r m s i d e on the i s s u e ( i . e . with Indonesia or T h a i l a n d ) , ASEAN's p o l i c y might a l s o have t o change. 42. Guy S a c e r d o t i , " P h i l i p p i n e s : What's i n i t f o r us? Not a l l t h a t much," Far E a s t e r n Economic Review, 13 August 1982. 43. Amry Vanderbosch and R i c h a r d Butwell, The Changing Face of  Southeast A s i a , (Lexington, 1966), p. 44. Quoted i n M. Rajendran, ASEAN's F o r e i g n R e l a t i o n s (Kuala Lumpur: Arenabuku, Sdn. Bhd. , 1985), p. 19. 44. Tim Huxley, Indochina and Insurgency i n the ASEAN Sta t e s ,  1975-1981. The S t r a t e g i c Defence S t u d i e s Center, Working Paper no. 67 (Canberra: A u s t r a l i a N a t i o n a l Univ.), pp. 53-54. 107 Beneath the obvious d i v e r s i t y o f ASEAN's p e r c e p t i o n s o f the Kampuchean c o n f l i c t , the m u l t i p l e d i p l o m a t i c i n i t i a t i v e s are working toward a common end: withdrawal. I f an independent i n i t i a t i v e o f one member c o n f l i c t s with the i n t e r e s t s of another, i t i s not due t o an i n t e n t i o n a l attempt t o undermine a f e l l o w neighbour, but r e f l e c t s a judgemental d i f f e r e n c e i n a d e l i c a t e s i t u a t i o n o f u n c e r t a i n o p t i o n s . A c c o r d i n g t o F o r e i g n M i n i s t e r Mochtar Kusumaatmadja, "there has been no t e n s i o n w i t h i n ASEAN over Vietnam and the Kampuchean i s s u e . . . T h e r e i s o n l y one stand on Kampuchea. There i s no d i s s e n s i o n , no d i f f e r e n c e . What e x i s t s i s a d i f f e r e n c e i n t a c t i c s . " * 3 Vietnam: S t r a t e g y and T a c t i c s Vietnam has pla y e d an e q u a l l y shrewd game, t r y i n g t o d r i v e a wedge through ASEAN's s o l i d a r i t y by t a k i n g advantage of these " t a c t i c a l " d i f f e r e n c e s . But every time Vietnam has verged on succ e s s with t h i s s t r a t e g y , ASEAN has c l o s e d ranks t o ward o f f the t h r e a t . Though p a r t o f ASEAN's s t r a t e g y has always been t o maintain an open l i n e with Hanoi, i n p r a c t i c e t h i s has mainly been a b i l a t e r a l channel. Hanoi r e f u s e s t o a t t e n d a r e g i o n a l conference without the p a r t i c i p a t i o n of the Heng Semrin regime, and ASEAN r e f u s e s t o p a r t i c i p a t e i n any n e g o t i a t i o n s which would p r o v i d e the l a t t e r any i m p l i c i t r e c o g n i t i o n o f i t s l e g i t i m a c y . As e x p l a i n e d e a r l i e r , ASEAN has sought t o i n t e r n a t i o n a l i z e the 45. Melvyn Hopper, "An i n t e r v i e w with the Indonesian F o r e i g n M i n i s t e r Mochtar Kusumaatmadja," Kaleidoscope I n t e r n a t i o n a l , 1984, pp. 39. 108 Issue; Hanoi i n s i s t s t h a t the i s s u e i s s t r i c t l y an i n t e r n a l a f f a i r o f Kampuchea and thus needs no r e g i o n a l i n t e r f e r e n c e . Hanoi p e r s i s t e n t l y t r i e s t o keep ASEAN members o f f - b a l a n c e by c a r e f u l l y planned v i s i t s t o the more h o s p i t a b l e ASEAN c a p i t a l s w h i le bypassing the r e s t , by r e g u l a r p u n i t i v e m i l i t a r y r a i d s i n t o T h a i border t e r r i t o r y and by o f f e r i n g p r o p o s a l s under the g u i s e of c o n c i l i a t i o n , knowing f u l l w e l l they are unacceptable t o ASEAN. Hanoi then uses the o p p o r t u n i t y t o accuse ASEAN i n t e r n a t i o n a l l y o f i n t r a n s i g e n c e and u n w i l l i n g n e s s t o n e g o t i a t e . For example, i n 1980, Hanoi proposed a d e m i l i t a r i z e d zone on both s i d e s of the Thai-Kampuchean border. In a 1984 J o i n t Statement of the Indochinese S t a t e s r e p l y i n g i n d i r e c t l y t o ASEAN's 1983 Appeal, i t proposed: a g l o b a l s o l u t i o n t o a l l problems i n Southeast A s i a ; a p a r t i a l settlement, i n c l u d i n g a t e r m i n a t i o n of the Chinese t h r e a t , and the " u t i l i z a t i o n " o f T h a i t e r r i t o r y by the P o l Pot regime; the e s t a b l i s h m e n t o f a s a f e t y zone on both s i d e s o f the Thai-Kampuchean border; the c o n c l u s i o n o f framework agreement between the Indochina group and ASEAN governing t h e i r r e l a t i o n s "pending a g l o b a l s o l u t i o n o f the Kampuchean i s s u e " ; and a c o n t i n u a t i o n o f the c u r r e n t s i t u a t i o n . L i k e t h e i r o t h e r numerous proposals, they s k i r t e d the p e r t i n e n t i s s u e o f Vietnam's i l l e g a l o c c u p a t i o n of Kampuchea, aiming f o r i m p l i c i t i n t e r n a t i o n a l r e c o g n i t i o n and the " i r r e v e r s i b i l i t y " of a f a i t accompli. The p r o p o s a l s t r e a t the Kampuchean s i t u a t i o n as onl y one of a number of i s s u e s , whereas ASEAN r e f u s e s t o see i t submerged i n a d i f f u s e g e n e r a l agenda on problems of peace and s t a b i l i t y . For ASEAN and the i n t e r n a t i o n a l 109 community, the number one i s s u e i s s t i l l Vietnam's m i l i t a r y o c c u p a t i o n and the r e s t o r a t i o n of Kampuchea's independence and s e l f - d e t e r m i n a t i o n . A f t e r the Kuantan D e c l a r a t i o n , Hanoi r e a l i z e d the p o t e n t i a l f o r a c c e n t u a t i n g ASEAN's d i f f e r e n c e s and p l a y i n g on i t s f e a r s of China. T h a i l a n d i s i s o l a t e d f o r being f r i e n d l y with China, Indonesia i s c o u r t e d as a p o s s i b l e means of m e l t i n g ASEAN's r i g i d stance, although at the same time i t r e c e i v e s r a d i o b r o a d c a s t s from Hanoi s u p p o r t i n g the r e b e l s i n East Timor. Once r e s o l u t i o n s are passed, Vietnam's promises t o withdraw t h e i r t r o o p s are b e l i e d by t h e i r mere r o t a t i o n and r e s h u f f l i n g . At Hanoi's request, A u s t r a l i a ' s F o r e i g n M i n i s t e r B i l l Hayden even stepped i n with a p r o p o s a l t o mediate a conference between ASEAN and the Indochinese s t a t e s i n 1984, but ASEAN remained f i r m , s u s p e c t i n g t h a t A u s t r a l i a had g u l l i b l y become an u n w i t t i n g t o o l and wedge a g a i n s t ASEAN. I t was, i n Mochtar's words, "an o l d Vietnamese ploy. " 4 6 J u s t p r i o r t o P r e s i d e n t Reagen'e v i s i t t o China i n A p r i l 1985, the Vietnamese F o r e i g n M i n i s t r y i s s u e d a statement denouncing China's " c o l l u s i o n " with the United S t a t e s as r e v e a l i n g " a l l the more c l e a r l y the dark scheme of the r e a c t i o n a r y f o r c e s w i t h i n the Chinese l e a d e r s h i p t o f u r t h e r i n c r e a s e t h e i r c o l l u s i o n with the U.S. i m p e r i a l i s t s to oppose the S o v i e t Union and the t h r e e Indochinese c o u n t r i e s and undermine peace and s t a b i l i t y i n Southeast A s i a . " 4 7 I t i s c u r i o u s t h a t the 46. A s i a 1985 Yearbook, Far E a s t e r n Economic Review, Hong Kong, 1985, p. 96. 47. Issued by the Vietnamese embassy, Kuala Lumpur. Quoted i n Robert C. Horn, "The USSR and the r e g i o n , " i n Southeast A s i a n 110 statement i n c l u d e d r e f e r e n c e s t o Sino-American e f f o r t s "to oppose the S o v i e t Union", as i f t o remind Moscow p u b l i c l y of the d i r e c t t h r e a t t o i t s i n t e r e s t s . The Chinese and S o v i e t s were at t h i s time p r e p a r i n g f o r the h i g h e s t l e v e l meeting between the two c o u n t r i e s i n f i f t e e n years, which was c o i n c i d e n t l y "postponed i n d e f i n i t e l y " at Moscow's r e q u e s t . 4 8 A f t e r a 1979 v i s i t t o Moscow f o r reass u r a n c e s r e g a r d i n g Vietnam's r e c e n t a c t i o n s . T h a i Premier Kriangsak Chamanan s t a t e d t h a t "the Kremlin l e a d e r s have assured us t h a t they are c l o s e l y a s s o c i a t e d with Vietnam. T h a i l a n d need not f e a r an a t t a c k by H a n o i . " 4 9 Yet the t o t a l of s i x major Vietnamese m i l i t a r y i n c u r s i o n s i n t o T h a i l a n d s i n c e t h i s statement was i s s u e d seems to a t t e s t t o Moscow's i n a b i l i t y t o c o n t r o l an e q u a l l y " b e l l i g e r e n t " a l l y . In the Vietnamese view, the Khmer refugee camps along the Kampuchea-Thai border are anti-Vietnamese, Kampuchean i n s u r g e n c i e s which cannot be t o l e r a t e d . The i n c u r s i o n s are o s t e n s i b l y conducted t o break up the camps and f o r c e them deeper i n t o the T h a i i n t e r i o r so t h a t they w i l l not become Khmer r e c r u i t i n g c e n t e r s . Another though l e s s important reason i s t o reduce or h a l t the d i s t r i b u t i o n o f i n t e r n a t i o n a l a i d and the r i s e o f b l a c k markets which have l u r e d Kampuchean peasants away from the f i e l d s . The continued i n c u r s i o n s have, however, a f f e c t e d Vietnam's d i p l o m a t i c r e l a t i o n s with ASEAN, and f o r Th a i l a n d , they c o n s t i t u t e the main o b s t a c l e t o s e r i o u s b i l a t e r a l n e g o t i a t i o n s . A f f a i r s 1985 (Singapore: I n s t i t u t e o f Southeast A s i a n S t u d i e s , 1986), p. 76. 48. I b i d . , p. 78. 49. Bangkok Post, 28 March 1979. D e s p i t e u r g i n g s from the i n t e r n a t i o n a l community to maintain the refugee camps, Thai f e a r s of harbouring P o l Pot f o r c e s are w e l l -founded; a sanctuary f o r overthrowing a a neighbouring government may l e a d t o a s i t u a t i o n p a r a l l e l t o the P a l e s t i n i a n s i n Jordan, i t may f o s t e r a l i n k between the Khmer and T h a i communist i n s u r g e n t s , p r o v i d e an excuse f o r i n t e n s i f i e d Vietnamese p r o v o c a t i o n , or allow SRV f o r c e s to occupy p i e c e s of Thai t e r r i t o r y as b a r g a i n i n g c h i p s . On the other hand, T h a i l a n d has demonstrated i t s r e s o u r c e f u l n e s s i n the c r i s i s i n i n f l u e n c i n g the t i m i n g and nature of the Vietnamese a t t a c k s by m a n i p u l a t i n g border t e n s i o n s . In 1980, Hanoi had forewarned the Thai government t h a t p l a n s to r e p a t r i a t e the Khmer refugees back t o Kampuchea would be "dangerous and u n p r e d i c t a b l e , " i m p l y i n g a p r o v o c a t i o n f o r a t t a c k . But i n June 1980 T h a i l a n d went ahead with the r e p a t r i a t i o n of s e v e r a l thousand refugees. On June 23, Vietnamese f o r c e s not unexpectedly responded with an a t t a c k i n t o T h a i t e r r i t o r y . The c o s t s of the a t t a c k were r e l a t i v e l y low f o r both s i d e s but T h a i l a n d succeeded i n r a l l y i n g ASEAN support a g a i n s t Vietnam i n time f o r the upcoming June 25th meeting of the ASEAN F o r e i g n M i n i s t e r s . The statement i s s u e d a f t e r t h a t meeting i d e n t i f i e d f o r the f i r s t time Vietnam by name as the aggressor ( i n s t e a d of the o b l i q u e r e f e r r a l t o " f o r e i g n powers"). ASEAN f u r t h e r noted t h a t the " l a t e s t a c t s of a g g r e s s i o n a g a i n s t T h a i l a n d have f u r t h e r undermined Vietnam's own c r e d i b i l i t y and have g r e a t l y d i m i n i s h e d the t r u s t and c o n f i d e n c e which ASEAN has p a t i e n t l y attempted to 112 f o r g e with V i etnam." 3 0 According t o Indonesia's F o r e i g n M i n i s t e r Mochtar Kusumaatmadja, ASEAN c o u l d no l o n g e r take Vietnam's assurances at " f a c e v a l u e . " However, while an ASEAN h a r d - l i n e p r e v a i l e d , b i l a t e r a l r e l a t i o n s between Indonesia and Vietnam remained good. The ASEAN Response ASEAN's d i p l o m a t i c s t r a t e g y i n the Kampuchean i s s u e must balance between sending Hanoi tough, unambiguous s i g n a l s while a l s o l e a v i n g the door open t o compromise. I t r e j e c t s Hanoi's p r o p o s a l s f o r a r e g i o n a l " b l o c - t o - b l o c " conference i n an e f f o r t t o a v o i d a permanent d i v i s i o n which might c r e a t e two r i g i d and a n t a g o n i s t i c a l l i a n c e s . Moreover, d e s p i t e the apparent d i v i s i o n s with Vietnam, i t i s s i g n i f i c a n t t h a t ASEAN avo i d s a t o t a l break. In f a c t , Hanoi's attempts t o d r i v e a wedge between ASEAN members p r o v i d e s the o r g a n i z a t i o n with an i n c e n t i v e f o r g r e a t e r i n s t i t u t i o n a l i z a i o n of i t s c o n s u l t a t i v e and decision-making p r a c t i c e s , and g r e a t e r c o o r d i n a t i o n of i t s members' "independent" i n i t i a t i v e s . For example, Bangkok asked t h a t any v i s i t s t o Southeast A s i a n c a p i t a l s by Indochina be conducted on a c o u n t r y -by-country b a s i s . T h i s way ASEAN would have an o p p o r t u n i t y t o c o n s u l t with the o t h e r members at the end of each t r i p and b e f o r e the next. For example, d u r i n g T h a i Premier Kriangsak's v i s i t t o the S o v i e t Union i n March 1979, the S o v i e t s were w e l l aware t h a t Kriangsak was not coming from a p o s i t i o n of weakness. J u s t a 50. ASEAN F o r e i g n M i n i s t e r s ' Statement, Bangkok Domestic S e r v i c e , 26 June 1980, i n FBIS, D a i l y Report A s i a / P a c i f i c , 26 June 1980, p. A2. 113 month e a r l i e r he had p a i d a v i s i t t o Washington and r e c e i v e d a r e a f f i r m a t i o n of T h a i l a n d ' s value to the Unied S t a t e s . T h a i l a n d ' s Deputy Suthorn Hongladarom had v i s i t e d B e i j i n g the p r e v i o u s month when both c o u n t r i e s agreed t h a t the Vietnamese i n v a s i o n "would not have happened without the backing of a b i g c o u n t r y . " 5 1 Another area i n which ASEAN was a b l e t o defuse a p o t e n t i a l d e s t a b i l i z i n g s i t u a t i o n by c o o r d i n a t i n g t h e i r p o l i c i e s was the refugee c r i s i s . The massive i n f l u x of Indochinese refugees i n t o Southeast A s i a and other s t a t e s began when Laos and Kampuchea f e l l under communist c o n t r o l i n the mid-70's, but d i d not reach worrisome p r o p o r t i o n s u n t i l 1978, when monthly numbers i n t o T h a i l a n d reached 17,000. As the c o u n t r i e s nearest t o Indochina, T h a i l a n d and M a l a y s i a s u f f e r e d the g r e a t e s t numbers of l a n d - and seabound refugees. F a r t h e r removed, Indonesia and the P h i l i p p i n e s were a l s o a f f e c t e d but i n i t i a l l y much l e s s so. None of the ASEAN c o u n t r i e s was w i l l i n g or prepared to f o o t the c o s t s of housing such a l a r g e and e v e r - i n c r e a s i n g i n f l u x of Indochinese refugees, p a r t i c u l a r l y as most of them were e t h n i c Chinese capable of d i s r u p t i n g the r e g i o n ' s d e l i c a t e e t h n i c balance. Indonesia and M a l a y s i a e s p e c i a l l y f e a r e d t h i s , and Singapore f l a t l y r e f u s e d t o become a haven f o r d i s p l a c e d Chinese, c l a i m i n g t h a t i t s country wae too s m a l l to accommodate them. P r e s i d e n t Marcos was even r e p o r t e d to have wondered whether the "supposedly 51. See Buszynski, "Thailand, the S o v i e t Union and the Kampuchean Imbroglio," op. c i t , pp. 66-78. 114 Vietnmese r e f u g e e s are a c t u a l l y r e f u g e e s . " s 8 On t h i s p o i n t , M a l a y s i a ' s Home A f f a i r s M i n i s t e r , Tan S r i G h a z a l i S h a f i e , added i n November 1978, "one c o u l d w e l l suspect t h a t the e j e c t i o n of overseas Chinese and even Vietnam c i t i z e n s of Chinese o r i g i n s from Ho Chi Minh C i t y . . . m i g h t be motivated by the d e s i r e of Hanoi t o remove the "Wooden Dragon," not j u s t Chinese merchants of Cholon, but P e k i n g - o r i e n t e d communists." 8 3 Some ASEAN c o u n t r i e s such as M a l a y s i a adopted d r a s t i c measures to r e j e c t and d i s c o u r a g e the docking of refugee boats, f o r c i n g them sometimes at gunpoint elsewhere t o Indonesia or to the P h i l i p p i n e s . 5 4 By responding to the c r i s i s i n d i v i d u a l l y , one c o u n t r y ' s success i n doing so was always at the expense of another. As the urgency i n c r e a s e d , ASEAN r e c o g n i z e d the need f o r a s p e c i a l meeting f o r a c o o r d i n a t e d s o l u t i o n t o the severe p o l i t i c a l , socio-economic and s e c u r i t y d i s r u p t i o n caused by the refugees. ASEAN's e f f o r t s e v e n t u a l l y l e d t o the s p o n s o r s h i p of the Conference on Indochinese Refugees which was h e l d on Geneva under Un i t e d Nations a u s p i c e s i n J u l y 1979. By g i v i n g the i s s u e i n t e r n a t i o n a l a t t e n t i o n through t h i s conference, ASEAN was a b l e t o o b t a i n a i d and r e s e t t l e m e n t assurances from the Western c o u n t r i e s . The conference, however, f a i l e d t o s o l v e the i s s u e of the l a n d refugees who c o n t i n u e t o f l o c k t o T h a i l a n d , but i t d i d 52. Barry Wain, The Refused: The Agony of the Indochinese  Refugees (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1981), p. 134. Quoted i n Hoon, p. 242. 53. Micheal Richardson, "ASEAN and Indo-Chinese Refugees," i n Understanding ASEAN, ed. A l i s o n Broinowski (London: Macmillan Press, 1982), p. 105. 54. See Thakur Phanit, op. c i t . , pp. 235-237. 115 a l l e v i a t e p r e s s u r e s on the other ASEAN members. The refugee c r i s i s demonstrated once again ASEAN's a b i l i t y t o achieve a common p o l i c y by l o o k i n g at the source of the problem, i n t e r n a t i o n a l i z i n g i t , and o b t a i n i n g o u t s i d e support. The United S t a t e s ' r e t i c e n c e or i n a b i l i t y t o manage the Kampuchean i s s u e on ASEAN's be h a l f , e i t h e r though a n o r m a l i z a t i o n with Vietnam or through p r e s s u r e on the S o v i e t Union, has been an i n c e n t i v e t o approach the S o v i e t Union d i r e c t l y . 8 s ASEAN c a r r i e d a d i s t a n t hope t h a t perhaps the S o v i e t Union would be a t t r a c t e d by b e t t e r r e l a t i o n s with the ASEAN c o u n t r i e s than by a burdensome Vietnam. But d u r i n g a v i s i t t o Southeast A s i a ' s c a p i t a l s i n March 1987, S o v i e t F o r e i g n M i n i s t e r Edouard Shevardnadze responded t o ASEAN's o v e r t u r e s by s t a t i n g : "We have s t r e s s e d everywhere t h a t the s o l u t i o n t o the Cambodian problem i s the a f f a i r of the Cambodian people themselves. 1 , 3 6 The USSR i s g e n e r a l l y s k e p t i c a l o f ASEAN's e f f o r t s toward a s o l u t i o n , but i t i s w i l l i n g t o endorse any s o l u t i o n which i s ac c e p t a b l e t o both Vietnam and ASEAN. I t i s s i g n i f i c a n t t h a t n e i t h e r T h a i l a n d nor ASEAN has been condemned o u t r i g h t by the S o v i e t Union, and while Moscow w i l l not f o r c e Vietnam t o s e t t l e the c o n f l i c t , i t i s w i l l i n g t o d i s c u s s the i s s u e with c o u n t r i e s opposed t o V i e t n a m . 3 7 ASEAN sees t h i s as a f a v o r a b l e s i g n , s i n c e 55. See Buszynski, "ASEAN: A Changing Regional Role," op. c i t . , p. 771. 56. Murray Hiebert, "The s u b t l e s t h i n t , " Far E a s t e r n Economic  Review, 26 March 1987, p. 17. 57. In an i n t e r e s t i n g c o u r t i n g b i d , the S o v i e t Union has even proposed t o become a formal " d i a l o g u e p a r t n e r " with ASEAN (on par with i t s present p a r t n e r s ) . The o f f e r was r e j e c t e d . As on Western diplomat quipped: "Can you imagine the United S t a t e s , A u s t r a l i a , Canada and o t h e r s s i t t i n g at the same t a b l e with the S o v i e t s and f r e e l y t a k i n g about s e c u r i t y , defence, p o l i t i c a l and 116 the S o v i e t s ' w i l l i n g n e s s t o t a l k with c o u n t r i e s l i k e China and T h a i l a n d must make Hanoi uncomfortable. However, Moscow i s c a u t i o u s i n d e a l i n g with China. Given the f a c t t h a t Vietnam s t i l l has the p r e r o g a t i v e to revoke i t s r i g h t s i n the country, Moscow does not want t o o f f e n d Hanoi u n l e s s an agreement with China i s c e r t a i n . According to one s e n i o r T h i r d World diplomat, "how f a r and hard Moscow w i l l p r e s s Vietnam depends on i t s p r o g r e s s with China...They are not c o n f i d e n t t h a t i f they l e t go of Vietnam, they w i l l get C h i n a . " 5 8 Some ob s e r v e r s d i s a g r e e with ASEAN's r i g i d s tance f o r the s t a r t of s e r i o u s t a l k s with Vietnam. J. S o e d j a t i Djiwandono argues t h a t a " p o l i t i c a l " s o l u t i o n r e q u i r e s a compromise f o r a l l p a r t i e s i n v o l v e d , yet ASEAN has used s t i c k a l l along but no c a r r o t . 3 9 I t i s not t h a t Vietnam i s u n w i l l i n g to n e g o t i a t e , s i n c e i t too would l i k e a n o r m a l i z a t i o n of r e l a t i o n s f o r economic a s s i s t a n c e , but l i k e ASEAN, i t wants n e g o t i a t i o n s o n l y under c e r t a i n c o n d i t i o n s . C o n s i d e r i n g t h a t the Kampuchean c o n f l i c t i s p r e s e n t l y dragging i n t o i t s n i n t h year, one wonders i f problems of how, when and where n e g o t i a t i o n s w i l l be h e l d should c o n t i n u e t o be so d i p l o m a t i c a l l y c r u c i a l when immediate t a l k s are needed. Some observers, i n c l u d i n g r e p o r t e d l y the S e c r e t a r y - G e n e r a l of the economic matters, as we do now?" See " S o v i e t p r o p o s a l s spurned," As i a n B u l l e t i n . March 1987, p. 31. 58. "Hanoi L i n k : A S o v i e t O b s t a c l e or Vietnam?" Asian B u l l e t i n . June 1987, p. 17. A c c o r d i n g to another diplomat, China i s p u l l i n g a s i m i l a r b a l a n c i n g a c t : "Peking seems to have combined s t r o n g m a t e r i a l support f o r the Cambodia r e s i s t a n c e to r e a s s u r e the T h a i s with a s o f t e r p u b l i c l i n e on Cambodia t o probe Gorbachav's p o s i t i o n . " In R i c h a r d Nations, "Khmer Double T a l k , " Far E a s t e r n Economic Review, 1 August 1985, p. 13. 59. See J. S o e d j a t i Djiwandono, "The Kampuchean C o n f l i c t and the Future of ASEAN," The Indonesian Q u a r t e r l y , 13 (Oct. 1985), pp. 435-440. 117 United Nations have asked, how do we know what Vietnam wants i f we do not t a l k with i t ? 6 0 Has ASEAN pushed Vietnam i n t o a corner, l e a d i n g to stalemate? Jusuf Wanandi, D i r e c t o r of the Center f o r S t r a t e g i c and I n t e r n a t i o n a l S t u d i e s i n J a k a r t a has the f o l l o w i n g view: I n i t i a l l y , i t seemed t h a t ASEAN and Vietnam were coming c l o s e r to one another's p o s i t i o n on two i s s u e s which had u n t i l then d i v i d e d them, namely: the p r i n c i p l e s on which the s o l u t i o n to the c o n f l i c t were to be based; and the mechanism by which a s o l u t i o n were to be sought ( s i c ) . However, what has prevented them from coming t o the conference t a b l e was and s t i l l i s the l a c k of i n i t i a t i v e on e i t h e r s i d e to take the f i r s t d a r i n g step. Each time when the p o s i t i o n s of the two s i d e s seem t o converge and come c l o s e r t o a g r e e i n g on s t a r t i n g a n e g o t i a t i o n , the p rocess tends t o r e v e r s e i t s e l f . T h i s seems t o be due to the l a c k of mutual t r u s t between T h a i l a n d and Vietnam and the l a c k of c o n f i d e n c e i n the w i l l i n g n e s s of both s i d e s to compromise. 6 1 The Malaysian New S t r a i t s Times, which i s p u r p o r t e d l y c l o s e t o the o f f i c i a l view i n Kuala Lumpur, p r i n t e d the f o l l o w i n g e d i t o r i a l echoing ASEAN's d i f f i c u l t y i n m a i n t a i n i n g s o l i d a r i t y : P o s s e s s i o n i s nine p o i n t s of the law. The Vietnamese are t h e r e i n Kampuchea, with Heng Semrin more or l e s s f i r m l y i n p l a c e . Over time, the thought a r i s e s : why not l e t s l e e p i n g dogs l i e ? I t can get t o the p o i n t where, p a r a d o x i c a l l y , i t i s ASEAN Cwhich i s ] seen as h i n d e r i n g s t a b l e r e g i o n a l r e l a t i o n s . The appearance of a r e p e t i t i v e , seemingly i n f l e x i b l e ASEAN stand on the c o n f l i c t can be c o u n t e r p r o d u c t i v e . 6 8 60. I n s t i t u t e of A s i a n S t u d i e s . The Kampuchean Problem i n Thai  P e r s p e c t i v e : P o s i t i o n s and Viewpoints h e l d by F o r e i g n M i n i s t r y  O f f i c i a l s and T hai Academics (Chulalongkorn U n i v e r s i t y : Asian S t u d i e s Monographs, no. 32, Aug. 1985). 61. Jusuf Wanandi, "Zopfan and the Kampuchean C o n f l i c t , " The  Indonesian Q u a r t e r l y , 13 (Apr. 1985), p. 210. 62. Far E a s t e r n Economic Review. 19 Sept. 1980, p. 13. Quoted i n A s t r i Suhrke, "ASEAN: A d j u s t i n g t o New Regional Alignments," A s i a P a c i f i c Community. 12 ( S p r i n g 1981), p. 28. 118 C o n c l u s i o n s : At The Impasse The Kampuchean c o n f l i c t i s now e n t e r i n g i t s n i n t h year. Vietnam has announced t h a t through gr a d u a l withdrawals i t w i l l have i t s t r o o p s removed from Kampuchea by the year 1990 whether or not a p o l i t i c a l s o l u t i o n i s found. 6 3 But g i v e n t h e i r past r e c o r d , t h i s remains t o be seen. Hanoi has a l s o moved away from an e a r l i e r r e j e c t i o n o f any f u t u r e r o l e of the CGDK i n Phnom Penh once Vietnamese t r o o p s have withdrawn, and i t now accepts the p a r t i c i p a t i o n o f Sihanouk and the CGDK w i t h i n the c u r r e n t c o n s t i t u t i o n and one-party system. The on l y problem i s t h a t w i t h i n the past year the CGDK has been at i t s lowest ebb, with the p o s s i b i l i t y o f the c o a l i t i o n f a l l i n g a p a r t g r e a t e r than ever. The KPNLF f a c t i o n under Son Sann experienced an attempted mutiny, while Khmer Rouge a t t a c k s upon Sihanouk's MOULINAKA f a c t i o n l e d to Sihanouk's May 1987 announcement t o take a year's "leave of absence" from the Kampuchean i s s u e . S t r e s s i n g t h a t he had not r e s i g n e d as P r e s i d e n t of the CGDK, Sihanouk o s t e n s i b l y hoped t h a t t h i s " l e a v e " would p r o v i d e more freedom and f l e x i b i l i t y t o probe new, l e s s f ormal channels f o r a n e g o t i a t e d settlement. ASEAN's main o b s t a c l e toward a s o l u t i o n i n the Kampuchean c r i s i s i s the f a c t t h a t ASEAN, r e g a r d l e s s of what i t t r i e s t o do, i s not d i r e c t l y i n v o l v e d i n the i s s u e , and those c o u n t r i e s which are -- Vietnam, China and T h a i l a n d -- remain adamant i n the t h e i r extreme p o s i t i o n s . ASEAN i s merely a marginal inducement. I f 63. December 7, 1986, as Thach t e l l s German news magazine, S p i e g e l . the the present S i n o - T h a i a l l i a n c e i s a c ounterbalance t o the Soviet-Vietnamese a l l i a n c e , t h e r e i s bound t o be r i g i d i t y i n the r e s p e c t i v e p o s i t i o n s , making i t harder to reach a settlement. China has never been i n v i t e d to any ASEAN-sponsored meeting, yet any n e g o t i a t e d s o l u t i o n needs China's b l e s s i n g s i n c e i t must i n c l u d e an end t o the Khmer Rouge and the Sino-Vietnamese stand-o f f . The present stalemate a r i s e s because of the p e r c e p t i o n by a l l p a r t i e s i n v o l v e d t h a t time i s on t h e i r s i d e . There i s no s t r o n g d i s p o s i t i o n w i t h i n Bangkok t o compromise. T h i s i s i n l a r g e p a r t due t o T h a i l a n d ' s s t r o n g e x t e r n a l c o u n t e r v a i l i n g support i n the i s s u e and the r e a l i z a t i o n t h a t i f the c o n f l i c t was e s c a l a t e d Vietnam i s unable or r e l u c t a n t t o exact an unacceptable p r i c e upon i t s e l f i n terms of c a s u a l t i e s , f i n a n c i a l s t r a i n and s o c i a l d i s r u p t i o n . The d i f f e r e n c e s between T h a i l a n d and Indonesia have not yet n e c e s s i t a t e d any a g o n i z i n g p o l i c y c h o i c e s ; an independent Kampuchea i s a c c e p t a b l e to both, while the r i s e i n S i n o - S o v i e t antagonism at l e a s t assures t h a t Hanoi i s not being l e d t o s u b o r d i n a t i o n to Peking. Secure with the S o v i e t Union l o o k i n g over i t s shoulder and the assurance t h a t no one i s prepared to d r i v e the Vietnamese out by f o r c e , Hanoi i s convinced t h a t ASEAN r e s o l v e w i l l weaken due to d i f f e r e n c e s over China, accompanied by a g r a d u a l l o s s of i n t e r e s t i n the i s s u e i n the West. Boosting Vietnam's optimism i s I n d i a ' s formal r e c o g n i t i o n of the Heng Semrin regime which, as a l e a d e r of the Non-Aligned movement, re p r e s e n t e d a huge setback t o ASEAN. 120 The c o n f l i c t is e q u a l l y b e a r a b l e f o r the e x t e r n a l powers. B e i j i n g i s c o u n t i n g on Vietnam's e v e n t u a l war weariness, r e t a r d a t i o n of economic growth, resentment of the S o v i e t presence and Vietnamese dependence on i t , and the p e r s i s t e n c e of Kampuchean r e b e l s . China expects n e i t h e r an end nor a s o l u t i o n t o the c o n f l i c t i n the near f u t u r e . In f a c t , as Micheal L e i f e r maintains, China has enjoyed the best of a l l p o l i t i c a l worlds: Assured t h a t superpower c o l l u s i o n remains o b s t r u c t e d by c o n t i n u i n g t e n s i o n between Moscow and Washington, i t can draw comfort from S o v i e t o v e r t u r e s while s u s t a i n i n g f r u i t f u l r e l a t i o n s h i p s with the U.S. and J a p a n . 6 4 For the United S t a t e s , the c o n f l i c t p r o v i d e s a l o w - r i s k t h r e a t r e to c h a l l e n g e " S o v i e t expansionism." Likewise, the USSR i s q u i t e content with being a b l e t o maintain m i l i t a r y bases i n Southeast A s i a and a second f r o n t v i s a v i s China. I t i s indeed an i r o n y t h a t the most g a i n s f o r l e a s t c o s t s of the c o n f l i c t accrued to the t h r e e e x t e r n a l powers — not ASEAN or Indochina. However, one cannot d i s c o u n t that, l i k e China, Vietnam is an experienced p o l i t i c a l marathon runner which t h i n k s i n terms of decades r a t h e r than merely years. Without b e l i t t l i n g ASEAN's d e s i r e f o r an e a r l y settlement, the present s t a t e of p r o t r a c t e d war or stalemate ensures t h a t Vietnam i s c o n t a i n e d at a c c e p t a b l e c o s t s . ASEAN has p e r i o d i c a l l y d e p l o r e d the United S t a t e s ' d i s r e g a r d of the Southeast Asian c o n f l i c t , i t s p r e o c c u p a t i o n with the NATO t h e a t r e , and with c o u n t r i e s such as Pakstan a f t e r the S o v i e t i n v a s i o n of A f g h a n i s t a n . On the other hand, because Southeast A s i a is not 64. Micheal L e i f e r , "The road to Phnom Penh i s blocked by Moscow," Far E a s t e r n Economic Review, 25 Dec, 1986, p. 30. 121 p a r t of the c e n t r a l s t r a t e g i c balance, e x t e r n a l powers have d i f f i c u l t y i n d e f i n i n g t h e i r i n t e r e s t s i n the r e g i o n , thus g i v i n g r e g i o n a l s t a t e s an o p p o r t u n i t y t o e x p l o i t u n c e r t a i n t i e s and r i v a l r i e s . While Southeast A s i a i s no l o n g e r the main focus of the c o l d war, the superpowers do p e r c e i v e t h a t i t i s advantageous to c o n t r o l the area. Hence, "maximally the U n i t e d S t a t e s and the USSR w i l l each attempt to draw Southeast Asian n a t i o n s i n t o t h e i r o r b i t and, minimally, prevent these n a t i o n s from e n t e r i n g the o r b i t of t h e i r a n t a g o n i s t . " 6 5 The p r o t r a c t e d war has g i v e n ASEAN o p p o r t u n i t i e s to make new alignments and s t r e n g t h e n i t s b a r g a i n i n g p o s i t i o n s . While on the one hand, ASEAN wants to see a s o l u t i o n t o the problem, a r a d i c a l change may o n l y b r i n g new dangers and u n c e r t a i n b e n e f i t s . The p o s s i b i l i t y of an ASEAN-Vietnamese alignment would on l y i n v i t e a new c o n f r o n t a t i o n with China, as would a Sino-Vietnamese n o r m a l i z a t i o n . ASEAN does not n e c e s s a r i l y want t o see the Communist c o u n t r i e s on good terms, f o r the " f r a t e r n a l " c o n f l i c t s between them have thus f a r been t o the b e n e f i t of ASEAN. There i s a f e e l i n g t h a t i f ASEAN can stand f i r m without unduly a n t a g o n i z i n g Vietnam, r e l a t i o n s might improve t o everyone's advantage. An a r t i c l e w r i t t e n by K i s h o r e Mahbubani, Singapore's m i n i s t e r and c o u n s e l l o r i n the Washington embassy expressed the f o l l o w i n g view: 65. L i e Tek-tjeng, "Southeast A s i a n Regional S e c u r i t y i n the 1980's: A View from J a k a r t a , " i n I n t e r n a t i o n a l S e c u r i t y i n the  Southeast A s i a n and Southwest P a c i f i c Region, ed. T.B. M i l l a r (St. L u c i a , Queensland: Univ. of Queensland Press, 1983), p. 271. 122 I t may be u s e f u l t o attempt new d i p l o m a t i c i n i t i a t i v e s Cby ASEAN] from time t o time, but t h e r e i s a l s o the danger t h a t such moves c o u l d be i n t e r p r e t e d by Vietnam as a s i g n of weakness. The u l t i m a t e message t h a t has t o be conveyed to Vietnam i s t h a t t h i s time around time i s not working on Vietnam's s i d e . I f t h i s message i s sent i n c l e a r and s u s t a i n e d f a s h i o n , the ASEAN s t a t e s can c a l l upon t h e i r f r i e n d s t o wait and see the f r u i t s of one of the o l d e s t A s i a n v a l u e s : p a t i e n c e . 6 6 ASEAN now seems to r e a l i z e t h a t i f the S o v i e t s cannot be persuaded to withdraw v o l u n t a r i l y , o n l y the Vietnamese can get them t o leave. Hence, ASEAN diplomacy should be d i r e c t e d at c o n v i n c i n g the Vietnamese i t i s i n t h e i r best i n t e r e s t t o reduce t h e i r dependence on the S o v i e t Union -- m i l i t a r i l y , economically, d i p l o m a t i c a l l y and i d e o l o g i c a l l y . T h i s can only be achieved i f ASEAN c r e a t e s the necessary c o n d i t i o n s . A f t e r a l l , i n f l u e n c e depends l a r g e l y on two f a c t o r s : needs and o p t i o n s . At present, Vietnam has too many needs and too few o p t i o n s . 56. Rodney Tasker, "Our f u n c t i o n i n g power i s o n l y f i v e - a n d - a -h a l f , " Far E a s t e r n Economic Review, 15 March 1984, p. 60. 123 C o n c l u s i o n ASEAN's h a n d l i n g o f the Kampuchean c r i s i s demonstrates the f l e x i b i l i t y , r e s o u r c e f u l n e s s and d i p l o m a t i c s k i l l s o f a d i s p a r a t e group of s t a t e s f a c e d with a t h r e a t to t h e i r s e c u r i t y . A f t e r a prolonged i d e n t i t y c r i s i s throughout most of the 1970's, the Vietnamese i n v a s i o n of Kampuchea i n 1978 posed a c r u c i a l t e s t to ASEAN's c r e d i b i l i t y as a v i a b l e o r g a n i z a t i o n . The i n v a s i o n r e p r e s e n t e d a s h i f t i n the r e g i o n a l d i s t r i b u t i o n of power. ASEAN's response was to deny Vietnam's dominance i n Indochina and to c o a l e s c e i n t o a u n i t e d f r o n t t o s t r e n g t h e n i t s p o s i t i o n to ward o f f the new t h r e a t . However, the o n l y weapons ASEAN possessed were d i p l o m a t i c . The Kampuchean c r i s i s a l s o showed t h a t ASEAN's " i n e r t " p e r i o d of b u r e a u c r a t i c and m i n i s t e r i a l c o n s u l t a t i o n p r o v i d e d a v a l u a b l e and i n d i s p e n s a b l e f o u n d a t i o n i n a s i t u a t i o n of u n c e r t a i n t y . Without t h i s s o l i d base i t i s u n l i k e l y t h a t ASEAN would have been ab l e to weather the m u l t i p l e d i p l o m a t i c faux pas t h a t i t d i d without d i s i n t e g r a t i n g l i k e i t s r e g i o n a l predecessors, SEATO, ASA and MAPHILINDO. Nor i s i t l i k e l y t h a t ASEAN would have t o l e r a t e d i t s unique brand of r e g i o n a l u n i t y through independent n a t i o n a l i n i t i a t i v e s , and i t s r e s u l t a n t i n s t a n c e s of d i p l o m a t i c " t o e - t r i p p i n g . " 124 In a l l these i n s t a n c e s two t h i n g s remained c o n s i s t e n t : f i r s t , r e g i o n a l p o l i c y c o ntinued t o be a f u n c t i o n of each members' n a t i o n a l p o l i c y ; second, the d i f f e r e n c e s which arose may have posed a temporal t h r e a t t o ASEAN's u n i f i e d stance, but they were always defused enough so as not to pose a t h r e a t t o ASEAN's cont i n u e d e x i s t e n c e as a r e g i o n a l o r g a n i z a t i o n . I t i s important t o understand t h a t the p a r t i a l s u b l i m a t i o n o f d i f f e r e n c e s and harmonization of p o l i t i c a l responses was not the r e s u l t of i n t e g r a t i v e p rocesses but a "conscious a c t of p o l i t i c a l w i l l on the p a r t o f the l e a d e r s . " 1 ASEAN's r e g i o n a l p o l i c y took i n t o account the c r i t i c a l need of one (Thailand) while l e a v i n g room f o r o t h e r s (such as Indonesia and Malaysia) t o p l a y out t h e i r own i n i t i a t i v e s . Through i t s system o f c o n s u l t a t i o n s and consensus the c o l l e c t i v e i n t e r e s t s o f the u n i t are p r o t e c t e d . Though t h i s means t h a t ASEAN moves at the pace of i t s slowest member, i t does not r u l e out the p o s s i b i l i t y f o r another member t o "run ahead" i n i t s i n d i v i d u a l c a p a c i t y , because each r e a l i z e s j u s t how f a r i t may run. No member n a t i o n w i l l want to j e o p a r d i z e what has served i t so w e l l . In other words, ASEAN seems to operate at two l e v e l s ; i t i s a community speaking with one v o i c e , though not n e c e s s a r i l y with one mind. Accommodation r a t h e r than r e c o n c i l i a t i o n i s c h a r a c t e r i s t i c o f ASEAN. Accommodation, however, i s not the same as r e c o n c i l i a t i o n because i t a l l o w s f o r a common response and f o r "agreements t o d i s a g r e e . " 1. Donald Weatherbee, "Southeast A s i a n i n 1982: Marking Time, i n Southeast A s i a n A f f a i r s 1983 (Singapore: I n s t i t u t e of Southeast A s i a n S t u d i e s , 1981), p. 3. 125 A l a r g e p a r t o f t h i s t h e s i s s t r e s s e s how ASEAN i s used as a d i p l o m a t i c t o o l or instrument of i t s member nat i o n s , t o the detriment o f i t e s t a b l i s h i n g i t s o r g a n i z a t i o n a l s t a t u s as a v i a b l e a c t o r d i s t i n g u i s h a b l e from i t s members. However, the study a l s o demonstrates t h a t d e s p i t e the numerous tangents undertaken by i t s members, ASEAN as a d i s t i n c t and sep a r a t e e n t i t y i s always a present c o n s i d e r a t i o n among i t s i n d i v i d u a l a c t o r s . Indeed, f o r some r e g i o n a l o r g a n i z a t i o n s , the i n s t i t u t i o n a l framework i s so weak t h a t the o r g a n i z a t i o n r e p r e s e n t s l i t t l e more than the c o l l e c t i v e w i l l s and a c t i v i t i e s of i t s members. ASEAN r e p r e s e n t s more than t h i s by being something more than merely the sum of i t s p a r t s . I t s member n a t i o n s achieve much more than i f they had acted s e p a r a t e l y or on an ad hoc b a s i s without ASEAN's i n s t i t u t i o n a l framework. ASEAN i s wrought with i r o n i e s . I t i s almost as i f what i s p a r a d o x i c a l from the Western viewpoint i s onl y n a t u r a l and expected i n the ASEAN view. As Tilman notes, " c o n t r a d i c t i o n s are f r e q u e n t l y accepted by Southeast Asians i n a manner sometimes b e w i l d e r i n g t o o t h e r s . " e For example, the weakness and ambiguity of which ASEAN was accused throughout i t s development has, d u r i n g the Kampuchean c r i s i s , become a source of s t r e n g t h . The ASEAN view i s a p t l y r e f l e c t e d i n the words of M a l a y s i a ' s Prime M i n i s t e r , "ASEAN e x i s t s because i t se r v e s a need. I t co n t i n u e s to e x i s t because i t does not demand from us what we cannot give. ASEAN has been ab l e t o absorb n a t i o n a l d i f f e r e n c e s because i t i s 2. Robert Tilman, Southeast A s i a and the Enemy Beyond: ASEAN  P e r c e p t i o n s o f E x t e r n a l Threat (Boulder, C o l o . : Westview Press, 1987 ),~ p. 78. 126 a r e l a t i v e l y i n f o r m a l o r g a n i z a t i o n without r i g i d r u l e s of procedure and without e l a b o r a t e s t r u c t u r a l machinery." 3 In essence, ASEAN f u n c t i o n s under a t h i c k o p e r a t i o n a l v e i l o f unw r i t t e n laws, i m p l i c i t understandings and t a c i t agreements which u n d e r g i r d s a r e c o g n i z e d p a t t e r n of p r a c t i c e s around which e x p e c t a t i o n s converge. The h i s t o r y of ASEAN i s a p o l i t i c a l response t o developments w i t h i n the r e g i o n a l environment r a t h e r than a single-minded p u r s u i t o f i n i t i a l g o a l s . Whether or not ASEAN began as a p o l i t i c a l o r g a n i z a t i o n i s not the i s s u e at hand. The c h a l l e n g e ASEAN now f a c e s i s whether i t can t r a n s l a t e i t s r e c e n t p o l i t i c a l s u c cesses d u r i n g the Kampuchean c r i s i s i n t o economic and o r g a n i z a t i o n a l s t r e n g t h s . K a r l D. Jackson i d e n t i f i e s the b a s i c problem as f o l l o w s : "The r e a l problem with ASEAN i s not t h a t the i n i t i a l m o t i v a t i o n s were p o l i t i c a l but t h a t the feedback loop o f economic i n t e g r a t i o n r e i n f o r c i n g the o r i g i n a l p o l i t i c a l m o t i v a t i o n s w i l l remain f a i r l y weak."* ASEAN's success i n canva s s i n g i n t e r n a t i o n a l support was no s m a l l f e a t i n l i g h t o f the weak s t a t u s of i t s i n d i v i d u a l member s t a t e s . A c c r e d i t e d t o ASEAN i s the spons o r s h i p and s u c c e s s f u l passage of United Nations r e s o l u t i o n s condemning Vietnam, the 1981 I n t e r n a t i o n a l Conference on Kampuchea (ICK) i n New York, the postponement of m u l t i l a t e r a l a s s i s t a n c e t o Vietnam, the formation of the CGDK t r i p a r t i t e , and the m o b i l i z a t i o n of an i n t e r n a t i o n a l 3. Statement at opening of Meeting of the ASEAN Heads of Government, 23 Feb. 1976, Denpasar. In Ten Years ASEAN ( J a k a r t a : ASEAN S e c r e t a r i a t , 1978), p. 96. 4. K a r l D. Jackson and M. Hadi Soesastro, eds., ASEAN S e c u r i t y  and Economic Development (Berkeley, C a l i f . : I n s t i t u t e o f East A s i a n S t u d i e s , 1983), x i i i . 127 e f f o r t t o d e a l with the Indochinese refugees. On the other hand, one can e a s i l y q u e s t i o n ASEAN's r e a l s uccess i n the i s s u e by p o i n t i n g t o Vietnam's continued presence i n Kampuchea. P a c i f i c s ettlement, however, must a l s o be judged i n q u a l i t a t i v e terms which q u e s t i o n what kind, r a t h e r than merely how many, s o l u t i o n s the o r g a n i z a t i o n produces. For example, some of the United N a t i o n s ' triumphs ( i . e . the Kashmir and P a l e s t i n e i s s u e s ) were p a c i f i c "non-settlements" which may not have e n t i r e l y r e s o l v e d the c o n f l i c t but succeeded i n suspending or l i m i t i n g h o s t i l i t i e s . In some cases, the r e a l i s t i c i d e a l may be not t o achieve the permanent s e t t l e m e n t of a d i s p u t e , but to persuade the p a r t i e s t o s e t t l e down permanently with the d i s p u t e . s There i s a growing o p i n i o n t h a t the r e c e n t s e c u r i t y concerns have been pursued at the expense of i n t r a - a s s o c i a t i o n a l e v o l u t i o n . Indeed, the Kampuchean i s s u e consumes a l a r g e p o r t i o n of ASEAN F o r e i g n M i n i s t e r s meetings and t a l k s with t h e i r r e s p e c t i v e " d i a l o g u e " p a r t n e r s , t o the n e g l e c t of p r e s s i n g economic concerns. Many of the members' l i n g e r i n g s u s p i c i o n s and the r e g i o n ' s p r e - e x i s t i n g border d i s p u t e s such as the Sabah i s s u e and have not been r e s o l v e d . The i n s t i t u t i o n a l i z a t i o n o f economic measures and r e s o l v i n g such l o n g - s t a n d i n g d i s p u t e s w i l l r e q u i r e a " g r e a t e r degree of v i s i o n , p o l i t i c a l w i l l , i d e a l i s m , a l t r u i s m and stamina than c u r r e n t l y i s the case...What the Kampuchean c o n f l i c t does i s to allow the ASEAN members to d i s g u i s e t h e i r shortcomings i n the s h o r t run by dramatic demonstrations of r e g i o n a l s o l i d a r i t y and to postpone t o the morrow the more mundane but at 5. I n i s L. Claude, J r . , Swords Into Ploughshares (New York: Random House, 1964 [ t h i r d e d i t i o n ] ) , pp.216-217. 128 the same time more c r i t i c a l t a s k s of long-term o r g a n i z a t i o n a l development. 1 , 6 In September 1982, Singapore's Prime M i n i s t e r suggested t h a t perhaps i t was time f o r g r e a t e r m i l i t a r y c o o p e r a t i o n i n ASEAN,implying the s i g n i n g of a formal m i l i t a r y pact and c o o r d i n a t i o n o f m u l t i l a t e r a l e x e r c i s e s . ASEAN p u b l i c l y and v i g o r o u s l y r e j e c t e d the o f f e r , c a n c e l l i n g s p e c u l a t i o n s of the o r g a n i z a t i o n becoming a m i l i t a r y a l l i a n c e . As at ASEAN's for m a t i o n i n 1967, o r g a n i z a t i o n a l members f e e l t h a t f a r from enhancing r e g i o n a l s e c u r i t y , a m i l i t a r y a l l i a n c e w i l l only have p r o v o c a t i v e value, i n v i t i n g u n d e s i r e d c o u n t e r - a l l i a n c e s . From the ASEAN p e r s p e c t i v e , t h e r e i s l i t t l e p o i n t i n provoking Vietnam i f ASEAN has not s u f f i c i e n t b i t e t o match i t s bark. The p o s s i b i l i t y of j o i n t ASEAN m i l i t a r y a c t i o n i s s l i g h t . M i l i t a r y f o r c e s are u n s o p h i s t i c a t e d and u n d e r s u p p l i e d ; t h e r e i s no common language, d o c t r i n e or equipment s t a n d a r d i z a t i o n , and the member u n i t s have no experi e n c e f i g h t i n g on one another's s o i l . Besides, d i f f e r e n c e s over the long-term t h r e a t i n h i b i t s e c u r i t y c o l l a b o r a t i o n beyond p o l i t i c a l c o n s u l t a t i o n . For t h i s reason and a l s o t o assure the communist n a t i o n s of ASEAN's p e a c e f u l i n t e n t i o n s , the member c o u n t r i e s p r e f e r t o cope with r e g i o n a l s e c u r i t y i n an ad hoc, b i l a t e r a l f a s h i o n . •ne way of a s s e s s i n g ASEAN's success d u r i n g the Indochina c r i s i s i s by as k i n g what might have happened i f ASEAN had not e x i s t e d and i f Southeast A s i a , as a group of s m a l l , uncoordinated 6. Sukhumbhand P a r i b a t r a , Kampuchea Without D e l u s i o n ( M a l a y s i a : I n s t i t u t e of S t r a t e g i c and I n t e r n a t i o n a l S t u d i e s , ASEAN S e r i e s , 1986), p. 11. 1 2 9 s t a t e s , found i t s e l f submerged i n yet another e x t e r n a l power c o n f l i c t . I f ASEAN had not acted, i t would have i m p l i e d t h a t the Southeast A s i a n n a t i o n s accepted the argument t h a t the presence of Vietnamese t r o o p s i n Kampuchea was t o counter the Khmer Rouge t h r e a t and an i n v i t a t i o n of " n a t i o n a l s a l v a t i o n " by the Kampucheans. I t would have r e c o g n i z e d the Khmers as the r o o t cause of the problem and not Vietnam's i n v a s i o n and i l l e g a l o c c u p a t i o n of Kampuchea. Would the Southeast A s i a n n a t i o n s been a b l e to cope with the c h a l l e n g e s posed by the c r i s i s i f they had acted independently without the e x i s t e n c e of a r e g i o n a l o r g a n i z a t i o n ? In l i g h t of the f a c t t h a t China and Vietnam were q u i t e c l e a r l y wooing ASEAN f o r i t s a f f e c t i o n s , they c o u l d have e a s i l y accentuated e x i s t i n g d i f f e r e n c e s , played one Southeast Asian country o f f a g a i n s t another i f l i t t l e or no p o l i c y c o o r d i n a t i o n e x i s t e d and mutual s u s p i c i o n s s t i l l t h r i v e d . Donald Weatherbee reminds us t h a t "the Kampuchean c r i s i s s h a r p l y i l l u m i n a t e s ASEAN's p o l i t i c a l dimension. I t d i d not c r e a t e i t . " ASEAN's f o r e i g n r e l a t i o n s underwent q u a n t i t a t i v e and q u a l i t a t i v e changes at a r a t e , degree and e f f e c t i v e n e s s which probably would not have o c c u r r e d had i t not been f a c e d with a d v e r s i t y . S u r p r i s i n g many of i t s most s k e p t i c a l c r i t i c s and even themselves, the ASEAN n a t i o n s succeeded i n accommodating and harmonizing n a t i o n a l p o l i c i e s f o r c o l l e c t i v e a c t i o n . 130 The Kampuchean Issue A Chronology of S i g n i f i c a n t Events Date Events 29 June 1979 Vietnam becomes a member of COMECON. 3 J u l y 197S China makes an announcement suspending a l l a i d t o Vietnam. 3 November 1978 S i g n i n g of the F r i e n d s h i p and Cooperation T r e a t y between the S o v i e t Union and Vietnam. 25 December 1978 Vietnam sends i t s armed f o r c e s t o s e i z e Phnom Penh. 20-21 J u l y 1979 United Nations I n t e r n a t i o n a l Conference on Southeast A s i a n refugees, Geneva. 24 J u l y 1979 I n d i a makes an announcement of i t s r e c o g n i t i o n of the government of the People's R e p u b l i c of Kampuchea (under Heng Semrin). 13 February 1981 Non-aligned Meeting i n New D e l h i c a l l s f o r withdrawal of f o r e i g n t r o o p s from A f g h a n i s t a n and Vietnam. Kampuchea's seat i s vacant. 13-17 J u l y 1981 The I n t e r n a t i o n a l Conference on Kampuchea i s h e l d i n New York. Boycotted by c o u n t r i e s of S o v i e t b l o c . 22 June 1982 Formation of the C o a l i t i o n of the Government of Democratic Kampuchea. 29-30 June 1983 A u s t r a l i a n F o r e i g n M i n i s t e r B i l l Hayden v i s i t s Hanoi t o o f f e r good o f f i c e s i n mediating between Vietnam and ASEAN. 19-21 November 1983 A u s t r a l i a ' s B i l l Hayden a r r i v e s i n Bangkok f o r t a l k s t o c l e a r up misunderstandings between A u s t r a l i a and ASEAN on the Kampuchean i s s u e . 13-16 February 1984 Indonesian Armed Forces Commander Benny Murdani pays an o f f i c i a l v i s i t t o Vietnam. 25-26 February 1984 Indonesia's Center f o r S t r a t e g i c and I n t e r n a t i o n a l S t u d i e s holds j o i n t seminar i n Hanoi with the Vietnamese I n s t i t u t e of I n t e r n a t i o n a l R e l a t i o n s . 24 March 1984 The Peoples' Army of Vietnam begins a major m i l i t a r y i n c u r s i o n i n t o T h a i l a n d . 9 J u l y 1985 U.S. House of R e p r e s e n t a t i v e s g i v e s app r o v a l t o the U.S. government to spend US$5 m i l l i o n t o help a s s i s t the non-communist Kampuchea f o r c e s . 7 May 1987 P r i n c e Sihanouk announces d e c i s i o n take a year's l e a v e of absence. 131 B i b l i o g r a p h y Books Brecher, Micheal, The New S t a t e s of A s i a . 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