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ASEAN's diplomatic strategy after the Vietnamese invasion of Kampuchea Darmono, Juanita Amanda 1987

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A S E A N ' S D I P L O M A T I C S T R A T E G Y A F T E R THE V I E T N A M E S E I N V A S I O N OF KAMPUCHEA  By J U A N I T A AMANDA DARMONO B.A., T h e U n i v e r s i t y  of B r i t i s h  Columbia,  1986  A T H E S I S S U B M I T T E D I N P A R T I A L F U L F I L L M E N T OF THE R E Q U I R E M E N T S MASTER  FOR THE DEGREE OF  OF  ARTS  in THE F A C U L T Y OF GRADUATE S T U D I E S (Department  We  accept to  of P o l i t i c a l  this  thesis  the required  as  Science)  conforming  standard  THE U N I V E R S I T Y OF B R I T I S H October ©Juanita  COLUMBIA  1987  Amanda Darmono, 1987  In  presenting  degree  this  at the  thesis in  University of  partial  fulfilment  of  of  department  this or  publication of  thesis for by  his  or  her  representatives.  SC\EHC&  The University of British Columbia 1956 Main Mall Vancouver, Canada V6T 1Y3  DE-6G/81)  for  an advanced  Library shall make  it  agree that permission for extensive  It  this thesis for financial gain shall not  fbUTtCAL  that the  scholarly purposes may be  permission.  Department of  requirements  British Columbia, I agree  freely available for reference and study. I further copying  the  is  granted  by the  understood  that  head of copying  my or  be allowed without my written  ii  Abstract  This  t h e s i s examines t h e d i p l o m a t i c  the  Association  the  1978 V i e t n a m e s e i n v a s i o n  in  the regional  of  the  ASEAN  o f Southeast  nations. success  in  Asia.  It tool  is  of  important  in  the  by  and  no  Third  maintain rally  ASEAN  has  understand  on  foreign policy  and  policy, rather This  external  will  weak,  powers,  should than  of  of  insignificant plagued  exacerbated  involved  in  this  regional  states  by by  within  conflict a  and  history  of  m i l i t a r y weakness,  diplomatic  has a l l o w e d  independence,  international  the  be  expertise.  Yet,  inability  t o come  e c o n o m i c i n t e g r a t i o n , ASEAN's r e s p o n s e t o  Indochina c o n f l i c t their  therefore  in  than cooperation,  tradition  order  be e x a m i n e d f r o m t h e p o i n t o f  historically  enmity r a t h e r  issues  demonstrated  ASEAN i s a p r o d u c t and  t h e s e s h o r t c o m i n g s and ASEAN's p r e v i o u s  together the  that  shift  to the security  that  arena,  collective  despite  argue  of r e l a t i v e l y  international  intra-regional  o f Cambodia and t h e s u b s e q u e n t  to  context.  a group  intervention  (ASEAN) i n r e s p o n s e t o  a collapse of regional  the foreign  integrationist, view o f  I  a d o p t e d by  i n preventing  i t s members'  assessed  Nations  d i s t r i b u t i o n o f power w i t h r e g a r d  considerable Southeast  Asian  strategy  preserve  support, issue  and  i t s member n a t i o n s  their  confront  through  the  counter  the  freedom the  use  of action,  great  of  to  a  powers regional  organization. This existing  thesis  will  intra-ASEAN  also  differences regarding  prevailing  view  the primary  that  external  threat  in  the issue  have s e r i o u s l y threatening that  the  divided  the  a web  organization. purposes: boosted  prevented  This  i t has  its  Instead, mode  I will of  as  bargaining These  reconciled,  laws,  implicit  well  implicit  "regime"  as i t s  incorporated f o r the  internal  has  cleavages  rather  rules  accepted  argue  "conflict  assets  but  Union)  of potentially  have e f f e c t i v e l y  one a n o t h e r ' s  allowed  political  the  or  of unwritten  the point  avoidance",  viability.  resolved  understandings regarding  to  curious  d i f f e r e n c e s as  political  f a r from  ASEAN's  of labour,"  intra-ASEAN  have been  of  China or the Soviet  existence.  "conflict  "division  organization's  members  organization's  through  diplomatic  o v e r by  its  combination  resolution"  existing  (namely V i e t n a m ,  skirted  and  mutual  r o l e within the served  several  ASEAN  t o s u s t a i n i t s image o f u n i t y ,  visability  i n t h e i n t e r n a t i o n a l forum, and  "loss of  face"  of  f e l l o w members  on  points  of  contention. Research f o r Secretariat  and  this the  t h e s i s was c o n d u c t e d Center  Studies  (CSIS)  i n Jakarta,  Studies  (ISEAS) i n S i n g a p o r e .  for  Strategic  i n part and  a t t h e ASEAN International  and t h e I n s t i t u t e o f S o u t h e a s t  Asian  iv TABLE OF CONTENTS Abstract  i i  Acknowledgements  v  1. INTRODUCTION ASEAN: A Case Study  1 6  2. ASEAN, 1967-1978: ECONOMIC ASPIRATIONS VERSUS POLITICAL REALITIES 15 I n c e n t i v e s and C o n s t r a i n t s 15 The F i r s t Decade 24 Decision-Making: The "ASEAN" Way 38 The S t r a t e g i c C o n t e x t : ZOPFAN and t h e B a l i Summit..41 China's R e l a t i o n s h i p t o t h e Region 47 Conclusion 52 3. THE INVASION OF KAMPUCHEA AND The C h i n a Dilemma The S o v i e t Dilemma The U n i t e d S t a t e s Dilemma  I T S CONSEQUENCES  54 64 70 74  4. ASEAN'S DIPLOMATIC STRATEGY 78 Introduction 78 The C o a l i t i o n Government o f D e m o c r a t i c Kampuchea...84 Maintaining Unity: ASEAN i n t h e I n t e r n a t i o n a l Forum 88 Indonesia's "Dual-Track" Diplomacy 98 Vietnam: S t r a t e g y and T a c t i c s 107 The ASEAN R e s p o n s e 112 Conclusions: A t t h e Impasse 117 CONCLUSION  123  CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS  130  BIBLIOGRAPHY  131  V  Acknowledgements I would l i k e t o g r a t e f u l l y a c k n o w l e d g e t h e f o l l o w i n g p e o p l e : K a l H o l s t i , my t h e s i s a d v i s o r , w i t h a p o l o g i e s f o r i n f r i n g i n g upon his precious s a b b a t i c a l time; D i a n e Mauzy f o r her s u p p o r t and friendship during my t i m e a t U.B.C.; t o Mr. Bambang G u r i t n o o f the Indonesian Consulate i n Vancouver, f o r his assistance in p r e p a r i n g my r e s e a r c h ; and t o Mr. Endang T a h i r f o r h i s p a t i e n c e i n b a t t l i n g the bureaucracies of Jakarta. To M a r t i n , a special t h a n k you f o r e n d u r i n g t h e endless proof-reading. And f i n a l l y , to my p a r e n t s , c o n t i n u a l l o v e and s u p p o r t .  agonies of for their  1  C h a p t e r One:  This thesis of small their  e x a m i n e s and  states, to  use  foreign policies  threats to  their  nations  a position  in  threatened only  are  Great  Great  they  not  come f r o m an often own  efforts,  Powers  and  attempt,  collective  where t h e y  by  to  f r e e to the  solution  Rarely the  to  any  group  coordinate external Small  or  actually  dilemma.  independently  "security  Not  of  dilemma"  the must  i n i n s t a n c e s where o u t s i d e s u p p o r t can  s m a l l s t a t e s merely i n c r e a s e  outcome.  They  u l t i m a t e l y they  need and  before  become  they  security  choose p o l i c i e s  a  security.  are p o t e n t i a l l y  Powers f a c e a d i s t i n c t  to affect but  the  i n c o n f r o n t i n g a d i v e r s e range of  outside source  ambiguous.  power  Great  but  evaluates  regional organization  individual  by  Powers,  a  Introduction  can  may  rise  their  their  own  d e s i r e r e c o g n i t i o n by  the  effective  by  is  members  of  the  international society. Economically, specialization, system,  these  weaknesses. maintaining as  Political  Loong o f  small  but are  nations  subject to the at  the  same  Politically, a  high  once  of  by  virtue  vagaries of the  time t h e i r  small  guality  Secretary  Singapore  survive  nations  remarked,  and  their  h a v e more d i f f i c u l t y a long  Brigadier-General "the  talent  and  international  strengths  l e a d e r s h i p over  (Defence)  of trade  pool  period, Lee  in for  Hsieng  i s smaller.  2 and by  [because the  d a n g e r o f m e d i o c r a c y by  mediocre i s always  On  matters  options small  o f ] the  and  of  limited  security,  choices,  and  area  of  territory,  characterizes their preoccupation  W i t h few  i s acutely  cannot d e c l i n e to  play.  security  and  follows  developing that  the  autonomy a v a i l a b l e .  compelled  often true.  to  sacrifice  protection.  military  matters,  almost  a  For  a  small  or  are  and  risks  of  danger which  important  and  to  both  states  are,  more  a nation  imagined),  they  the  their  i s , the  however,  resources  a  they  powerful the  a  of  decisions,  states,  power o r  portion of t h e i r  small  the  national  the  taking  game  more s e c u r e  the  (real  Whether  for a  always e n t a i l s  the  Lacking  enemies  military  in  friends  obfuscation  state,  For  Equally,  policy  o f t e n marked by  the  more autonomous t h e y  enhanced.  themselves against  small  countries.  more i s  is  to  attack,  is  of  which i s  one's  few  uncertain  fear  internal  security  reverse  and  preeminent  over  f r o m e x t e r n a l and  developed logic  autonomy  a  are  margin of e r r o r i s u s u a l l y  concerns  For  "gambler's r u i n "  there  resources,  caution  short-term  long-range perspective.  Maintaining  the  foreign policy,  with  government  1  national  or non-existent.  a small  present."  default,  the  to  defend  are  often  autonomy f o r e x t e r n a l  it is  in political,  state  an  increase  some l o s s o f autonomy o r  vice  economic in  or  security  versa.  s  1. B r i g a d i e r - G e n e r a l Lee H s i a n g Loong, "Security Options for S m a l l S t a t e s , " S t r a i t s T i m e s ( S i n g a p o r e ) , 6 Nov. 1984. 2. See Marshall R. Singer, "The Foreign Policies of Small Developing States," i n World P o l i t i c s , eds. James N. Rosenau, K e n n e t h W. Thompson and G a v i n Boyd (New Y o r k : The F r e e P r e s s , 1976), p. 289.  3 Rothstein politically might  exposed  call  weakness.  writes  a  or  lack  framework e n c o u r a g e their  own  alignment Powers,  may but  strategically them, t h e integrity Great  the  affect be  an  are  are  Power  the  constitutes  organizational  forums  blurs  the  militarily  limit  permit  insistence  d i s t i n c t i o n between providing  sophistication.  As  be  a  Liska  the forum  own  by  with  and  and  non-  the  Great  nation  is  non-provocative. respect  for  to  threat  an  For  territorial  a threat  hand,  by  on  a  to  their  their  very  audience  forthrightly critical peaceful  militarily for  their  protected  small  other  them t o  one  disinterested  a total  right  a  governmental  be  w h i c h i s why  than  in  what  neutrality  the  and  the  equal  p o l i c i e s . Their  weak,  of  if  survival,  On  yet  t h e y can  politically  less  of  and  detached,  sovereignty  no  virtue  entanglement  only  and  existence. and  Power  to  essence of  powerlessness  Great  of  too  not  achieved  base  Policies  sensible  irrelevant  by  hope t h a t  being  nations  a r e a have  industrial  small  adopted  small  security  issues.  principles  independent  and  of  insignificance,  powerless to  those  strategic  "negative"  The  3  that  of  procedures  p o w e r f u l and  some d i p l o m a t i c  the  prestige  remarks:  Having guite a special interest in international organization, the smaller states like to visualize t h e m s e l v e s as a qualitative and m o r a l f a c t o r i n w o r l d affairs. They stress normative principles against power and excessive p o l i t i c a l discretion; objectivity, i n d e p e n d e n c e , and good f a i t h against opportunism and satellitism. They wish to shape the structural e q u i l i b r i u m so as to maximize their influence and c o m p e n s a t e f o r t h e i r weakness.*  3. R o b e r t L. R o t h s t e i n , A l l i a n c e s and S m a l l Powers (New C o l u m b i a U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s , 1968), pp. 18-22. 4. L i s k a , I n t e r n a t i o n a l E q u i l i b r i u m , op. c i t . , p. 67.  in  York:  4  Small internal and  states  are  structures  often  also  Political  offices,  and  e l e c t i o n s are  facades  for  institutionalized  nepotism  --  such as  Malaysia,  Indonesia  strife  problems.  T h e s e weaknesses,  their  fertile  i n turn,  parties, and  For  class struggles  potentially not  exacerbate It i s the  explosive  accompanied  opportunists existing  therefore  external  policy decisions  and  by  c r e a t i n g huge d i s p a r i t i e s  attract external  intrusion.  and  others,  b r e e d i n g ground f o r i n s u r g e n t  or  often  corruption  examples.  of economic growth are  s t r u c t u r e of  foreign  being  as  stage  rule,  f a c t i o n s , schisms,  manipulate  emphasize the states'  Thailand  of d i s t r i b u t i o n ,  e c o n o m i c w e a l t h and  facilitate  personal  fragile  exploitation  such  embryonic  c o n s t i t u t e f u n d a m e n t a l and  rate  deliberately  the  whose  to external  institutions  at  and  ethnic  High r a t e s  corresponding  states  make them v u l n e r a b l e  manipulation.  religious  new  t o the  a in  groups. who  will  problems  to  inappropriate  to  environment exclusion  on  of  small  domestic  considerations. Given  that  particularly external  states  First,  they  large  power,  concessions, may  powers, China  small  foreign  states  --  policies are  structural constraints,  small  they  the  that may  and  be  as  well in  able  Soviet  to  "real as  by  Union.  larger  manipulate the estate"  bidding"  and  available  to  the  powers?  valued  by  the  economic  In e x t r e m e between  and  internal  external  assets  support.  managed On  their  --  f o r m i l i t a r y bases,  diplomatic  has  states  what s t r a t e g i e s a r e  "competitive  North Korea the  a f f e c t e d by  threatened  s u c h as  engage as  are  of  the  cases, large  t o do  f o r decades v i s - a - v i s  other  hand,  the  small  power  5 may have  to bargain  inability  to  economic o r may  be  do s o m e t h i n g d e s i r e d by t h e l a r g e r power due t o i t s political  used  information, the  large  power,  persuasively  one.  increase  The by  in  a  in  t h e advantage t o an a r r a y  which  manipulating  which w i l l  implicate  what i s  called "intersecting  goes t o  the party  of other  be p r e j u d i c e d  i fi t  i t s simplest  goal  alliance  traditional  t e r m s --  of a military  clearly  nature  are  state's bargaining  indicating  members w i l l  negotiations  made a  of  that  can  i n which i t s  concession  t h e immediate  on  this  clearly is,  without alliance  between  drawn  o f course, political from  o f "one  a political  undertones,  or  and m i l i t a r y  to find  A  conditioned  by t h e  a defence  of the  alliance  As R o t h s t e i n  a purely  benefits  potentially  stress that  the  i s not  p o i n t s out,  military  a s i t would be t o f i n d  military  political  against  One s h o u l d  exclusive.  difficult  w h i c h some  It i s  aggressors  upon any o f i t s  forces.  support  revision,  o f power.  potential  an a t t a c k  combined  environment.  philosophy  f o r a l l and a l l f o r one".  i s to deter  of diplomatic  nor mutually  strategies to  power by a s c r i b i n g t o a  by  military  dangerous c o n f i g u r a t i o n s distinction  o f power  t o an enemy t h a t  a strategy  against  balance  alliance  be c o u n t e r e d  is  s t a t u s quo  "It  bluffing,  s u r p r i s e performances engaging  tactics  s  Alliances  --  when  Other b a r g a i n i n g  procrastination,  and  point  would  weakness.  are:  staging  negotiations,"  position  f r o m a p o s i t i o n o f weakness by p l e a d i n g t h e  a  were n o t  alliance, political sought."  5. See f o r example, C h a r l e s E. M o r r i s o n and A s t r i S u h r k e , S t r a t e g y f o r S m a l l S t a t e S u r v i v a l (New Y o r k : St. Martin's P r e s s , 1978), e s p . c h a p t . 1. 6. R o t h s t e i n , op. c i t . , p. 50.  s  6  One to  possible cope  w i t h an  potential the  distinction,  takes  is  instead  rarely  brings  rests  political  to  a  designed  distant  one,  or  conceivably  goals u n t i l  The  system  the  their  precision  to  facilitate ensuring the  of  the  to  a situation  that small  collective  action,  action states  only  derivately  for,  will of  threat  align  of  provide  their  and  community  and  add  be  only  As  may  for  will  Their  also  power,  regionally  referred  to  so  value and They  threats be  of  this  effective  to  it  motivated  interests.  credibility  they  and  sake  predictability  of  collective.  the is  members.  order,  or  alliances;  for  fear,  Liska:  someone  relations  and  principle  quote  consolidate  o r g a n i z a t i o n s are  ASEAN,  bargaining  may  distrust  interests  ability  common  To  international  regional  stems from  expediency.  States rarely  7  suspicion, and  rarely  of  community  them a b o u t . "  they serve  on  and  sense of  reason a l l i a n c e s  by  opposed  i s a potential  however,  calculation  self-interest,  as  ally,  against,  The  friendship.  to  a  are  something.  long  threat  must c o n c e n t r a t e on  decision  "Alliances  by  I f the  as  i s between t h o s e  form. The  and  suggests,  immediate t h r e a t  threat.  alliance  he  by  illustrated  improve as  their  well  as  internationally.  ASEAN: A C a s e  Study  ASEAN r e f u s e s purportedly 7.  Liska,  to  entertains  be no  intentions  Nations i n Alliance,  op.  as  a security  of  becoming  c i t . , p.  12.  alliance one.  and  Critics  7 have r e f e r r e d for  (A)lways  well  as  the  subject, of  increasing of  its  often  ASEAN  implicit  of  Thailand,  the  has  unstable confusion  progressively  given  alliance  political  of  Indonesia, --  the fact  t h e EEC?  along  Association  i t  an a t t e m p t  P h i l i p p i n e s and  Asia  (EEC),  is  Nations  importance there  defined  of  and a s an  an a c h i e v e m e n t .  was  and  the  understandable  s t a t u s as a " r e g i o n a l  a regional p o l i t i c a l  and s e c u r i t y  arm o f A m e r i c a ' s p o s t - w a r f o r e i g n  t o make S o u t h e a s t  of i t s dismally i l l - f a t e d  o f Southeast  one  has s u r v i v e d  Asia a free-trade  Or was i t t o be an i n d i g e n o u s ,  the l i n e s  to  a s the success  Asian  t h a t ASEAN  c l i m a t e o f t h e 1960s,  t o be  way  the Philippines,  strategic  SEATO, t h e A s i a n  area  Malaysia,  Asia's  Was i t  Was  front  literature  F o r t h e s i x member  Southeast  Singapore,  a r o u n d ASEAN's n e b u l o u s l y  policy? like  as  (A)mbiguous  Community  yardstick f o r evaluation.  Southeast  like  an  particularly  European Economic  Association  Brunei  organization."  of  t o much o f t h e e x i s t i n g  autonomous r e g i o n a l o r g a n i z a t i o n i s i t s e l f Given  <M)egotiations,  (E)ntity  and s k e p t i c i s m , the  Malaysia,  1984,  (A)fter  a s an acronym  the climate of cautious skepticism following the  impatience  the  (S)trategic  according  counterpart,  nations  since  (A)dhoc Indeed,  8  creation  as a "gentlemen's t e a p a r t y , "  (S)ensational (E)xcept  for  (N)ature. on  to i t  anti-communist  predecessors,  (ASA) and MAPHILINDO  the  (an acronym o f  Indonesia)?  8. See Guy S a c e r d o t i , "Philippines: What's i n i t f o r u s ? Not a l l that much." Far Eastern E c o n o m i c Review, 13 A u g u s t 1982; K a r l D. J a c k s o n and M. H a d i S o e s a s t r o , e d s . , ASEAN S e c u r i t y and Economic Development (Berkeley, C a l i f . : I n s t i t u t e of East Asian S t u d i e s , 1983).  8 The its  Bangkok  formation  being  "to  cultural  i n 1967,  briefly  the  in  regional  and  an  inconsistency, is  that  of  regional  ASEAN  is  Foreign  its  against  t h a n what evident  Minister  has  a  carte  Bangkok  to struggle in  what,  as  seems  to  the  assert has  ASEAN's  initial  legacies its  spent  annual M i n i s t e r i a l  by  own  as  ambiguity  speech  or  evident,  a regional organization,  retrospective  a t ASEAN's  were  non-commitment  against  d e v e l o p m e n t ASEAN  to  accommodation,  What  striving  or  B  Declaration's  blanche to  had  and  document  p r u d e n c e and  as  endeavors...  objective,  the  debate.  i t is.  in  the  purpose  progress  joint  an  to  predecessors  energy i n arguing  itself  i e open  Throughout  rather  a sign of  institutionalized  however,  not  in  Whether  if  identity.  concerns  and  social  through as  absent.  v a g u e n e s s was  its  region  integration  security  deliberate  and  ASEAN's aim  development to  was  defined  c o n s t i t u t i o n a l mandate a t  e c o n o m i c growth,  conspicuously  i t  ASEAN's  a c c e l e r a t e the  References political  Declaration,  much i t is about  Singapore's  Meeting  in  1974:  You may r e c o l l e c t a t t h e f i r s t m e e t i n g i n 1967, when we had t o d r a f t our communique, i t was a v e r y d i f f i c u l t p r o b l e m o f t r y i n g t o s a y n o t h i n g i n t e n pages, w h i c h we did. B e c a u s e a t t h a t t i m e we o u r s e l v e s h a v i n g l a u n c h e d ASEAN, were not q u i t e sure where i t was going or w h e t h e r i t was g o i n g anywhere a t a l l . 9  In three  its  broadest  factors:  economic  terms,  political  functionalism.  regional integration convergence, It  envisages  based  on  geographic proximity  and  the  is  harmonization  of  9. ASEAN's Seventeenth Foreign M i n i s t e r s ' Meeting, May 1974 i n Jakarta. In K.K. Nair, ASEAN-Indochina R e l a t i o n s S i n c e 1975: The P o l i t i c s o f Accommodation (Canberra: Australia University P r e s s , 1984), p. 2.  9 interests and  based  mutual  on a d i v i s i o n  reinforcement,  economic  union.  political  and  activities sacrifice collective regional  in  whole.  military  According  perceptions,  the  insofar  adaptation  behavior  as they  a  weak example  of defending ASEAN t r a d e t o 60 by its  huge  entailing  to  this  for  which  of  --  not with  "high" with  1 1  tasks,  refuses  to  p o l i t i c a l and  processes f o r  to i t s c r i t i c s  A f t e r twenty  not a c o n d i t i o n , "  of t o t a l  trade  The r e g i o n  i n e c o n o m i c and i n d u s t r i a l  hopes f o r  with  of  1 0  of regional i n t e g r a t i o n .  l e t alone  study  a l l concerns of  ASEAN a c c o r d i n g  stifles  of  sovereignty,  power...It  coercion."  trade).  and  degree  the  used f o r s k e t c h i n g  model,  effectively  some  "concerned  i t i s preoccupied  intra-EEC  loyalties  Haas,  a c t o r s between  r e m a i n s a s a d 15 p e r c e n t  disparities  cooperation  normative,  c a n be  whereby  f o r that of the regional B.  i n t e g r a t i o n as a "process;  percent  members  Ernst  balances  of  process  usually  and l e a r n i n g f r e e f r o m  Examined a g a i n s t is  and  a  expectations,  and l e a r n i n g ,  f u n c t i o n a l concerns;  actors  is  the national interest  capability,  dichotomize  itself  specialization  t o p o l i t i c a l and  shift  integration i s largely  transactions,  "low"  actors  new c e n t e r s ,  in  greater  leading theoretically  "Integration"  social  to  of labour,  intra-  ( i n contrast  i s also  plagued  development  agreement  years  on  among  economic  economic i n t e g r a t i o n i n t h e  10. See E r n s t B. Haas, "The S t u d y o f R e g i o n a l I n t e g r a t i o n : R e f l e c t i o n s on t h e J o y and A n g u i s h o f P r e t h e o r i z i n g " i n R e g i o n a l P o l i t i c s and W o r l d O r d e r , e d s . R i c h a r d A. F a l k and S a u l H. Mendlovitz, (San F r a n c i s c o : W. H. Freeman and Co., 1973), p. 104. 11. See f o r example, Susumo Awanohara, " P l a t i t u d e s , p i o u s h o p e s and m e d i o c r i t y , " F a r E a s t e r n E c o n o m i c Review, 15 March 1984, pp. 61-63; P a i s a l S r i c h a r a t c h a n y a , "Was ASEAN r e a l l y p l a n n e d t o move a s s l o w l y a s t h i s , " F a r E a s t e r n E c o n o m i c Review, 15 March 1984, pp. 65-68.  near f u t u r e . just  emerging  reluctant for  As  to  from force  integration.  and  cultural  Southeast It  is  1978  the  regard  villager  has  security member  it  organization, states.  than a  as  just a  cooperation." The explaining  that  "ASEAN"  where  active,  i s i n the  still  formal  and  imposes  "cumulation of  and  structure no  of  not  a  a  hoc  a  regional the  post-  fields,  collective  obligations  on  an  of  security  points  typical  security  military is  it  ad  as  p a r t i c u l a r l y since  ASEAN is  the  social  1 8  ASEAN  political  the  to  mean l i t t l e -  Donald Weatherbee  study how  with  a t t r i b u t e s of  i t will  neither  and  are  outs,  example  "alliance".  ASEAN i s  episodic  more  adventures  in  1 3  concerned mix  but  policy  t o ASEAN's a c h i e v e m e n t s i n  Consequently,  "integration", Nevertheless,  and  been most  lacks  ASEAN c o u n t r i e s  economic r a t i o n a l i z a t i o n needed  mention  ironic  e v e n t s i n Cambodia,  the  import-substitution degree of  With  therefore  even though  and  an  countries,  integration,  Asian  organization  is  developing  of and  with  regional why  "how  their  states and  integration cease to  why  neighbours  sovereignty  while  be  is  concerned  wholly  sovereign.  they v o l u n t a r i l y mingle, so  as  acquiring  to  lose new  with  the  It  merge, factual  techniques  for  12. F o r a q u a n t i t a t i v e a n a l y s i s i n t h e t r a n s n a t i o n a l i s t t r a d i t i o n s e e H. Monte H i l l , "Community f o r m a t i o n w i t h i n ASEAN", International Organization, 32 ( S p r i n g 1978), pp. 61-63. Hill a r g u e s t h a t community f o r m a t i o n w i t h i n ASEAN i s more myth t h a n reality. F o r a c o n t r a r y view, s e e E s t r e l l a D. S o l i d u m , Towards a S o u t h e a s t A s i a n Community (Quezon C i t y : U n i v e r s i t y of P h i l i p p i n e s P r e s s , 1976), pp. 210-211. 13. D o n a l d Weatherbee, "ASEAN R e g i o n a l i s m : The S a l i e n t D i m e n s i o n " , i n ASEAN S e c u r i t y and E c o n o m i c Development, eds. Karl D. J a c k s o n and M. H a d i S o e s a s t r o ( B e r k e l e y , C a l i f o r n i a : I n s t i t u t e o f E a s t A s i a n S t u d i e s , 1983), p. 264.  11 resolving  conflicts  organization,  systems  the  resulting  new  states  sentiments,  Organization  face  the  form  of  "success" the  center  For  the  Organization  ASEAN  often  and  outside  evaluated rather  and  i s s u e s and  the  forces,  and  with of  national  anti-colonial  and  the  its  States  developing (OAS),  a  f o s t e r a common p o l i c y  region. the  Yet  institutionalized  the  measure  i n terms of the  of  and  as  upon i t s members. organizations  f o r m a l - l e g a l c o v e n a n t s as distributions  its  organization  international  attitudes  the  Arab League p r o v i d e  than i t s impact  from t h e i r  changing c o n f i g u r a t i o n s  and  the  constitutes  e f f e c t i v e n e s s of  much  and  American  cooperation.  of concern  so  of  (OAU)  organization  r o l e and  stem n o t  example,  i n t e r v e n t i o n from  i s too  confused  a vehicle for regional integration in  For  inter-state  be  regional organizations  strength,  intra-member d i s p u t e s  A regional  not  cooperation,  instruments f o r enhancing  of A f r i c a n Unity  settle of  However,  bargaining  t h a n as  sense.  Regional  subsystems should 1  autonomy,  counterparts,  in  and  condition. " *  rather  E.E.C.  forum t o  themselves.  usually represent  independence,  the  among  of  from  power,  resources  the  systemic of  member  states. The  approach  national  interests  variables,  with  regard  the  to  t a k e n by  this  of the  member  ASEAN as Indochina  foreign  policy  foreign  policy, rather  14.  Haas,  op.  the  c i t . , p.  108.  as  assumes  the  variable.  constitutes  must,  than the  therefore,  nations  dependent  issue,  o u t p u t s and  study,  therefore  a be  integrationist,  the  independent ASEAN,  tool  of  examined context.  with their  in  the  12 The three  Vietnamese  reasons.  invasion of  First,  h e g e m o n i c power.  i t asserted  Second,  relations  reintroduced  regional  ambitions.  security Asia  the  Indochina  immediate  greater  political  with  the  greater  the  ASEAN c o n c e r n i n g first  Given  this  why  enmity,  have  the  the voice  cost  their internal  cautious  and  subtle  Vietnam,  unconventional landmines  has  path  proven  of  which at the  threat are  and  and  the  and l a c k o f  Asian  leaders  than t o deal with  individual interests? manipulated  complementary  their  diplomatic  t o r e s o l v e o r , a t a minimum, t o perceptions  manifested  of diplomatic  China  strategy  over  conceivably  t h e ASEAN l e a d e r s  attempting  tensions  and  to their  equilibrium  differing  existing  members,  how have  suspicion  o f ASEAN r a t h e r  at l e s s  reconcile  members  -- V i e t n a m  Southeast  expedience,  F a r from  Southeast  disagreement,  bilaterally  competence?  into  perceptions  regional threat  of regional  an  Soviet-  among t h e ASEAN  differing  threats  into  the  f a c t o r i n t o ASEAN  the s p i l l o v e r  perceived  differences  China's  o r China as a l a t e n t , though p o t e n t i a l l y  speak t h r o u g h  More s p e c i f i c a l l y ,  time  the Soviet  of contention  threat.  cooperation,  i n Sino-Thai  tensions.  i s the  level;  tradition  chosen t o  for  the primary  long-term  historical  point  issue  state constitutes local,  within  and t h e r e w i t h ,  fundamental  as a r e g i o n a l ,  r e s u l t i n g improvement  suspicions  of e x i s t i n g Sino-Soviet  significant for  Vietnam's s t a t u s  has p r o j e c t e d  concerns,  The on  the  Third,  Vietnamese a l l i a n c e  Kampuchean was  the  in  and  interests,  ASEAN's  m a n e u v e r i n g between i t s Soviet  Union.  o f " t i p - t o e i n g " around hidden surprisingly  highly  effective  as  a  This diplomatic model  of  13 regional  political  strategy  and i t s r e s u l t s w i l l  ASEAN, policy level  in  this  context i t  will  group o f being  be  in  politically  o f ASEAN  political  climate  which  and  systemic  level,  r a i s o n d'etre,  c h a n g i n g power  configurations  in  and f o u r  1978,  and  its  strategy in  the  will  will  the subseguent impact to face  of  voice,  become  the  organization  question  and  ASEAN's  the prospects  a multi-dimensional  In  n o t have  This  organization both  -- t h e at  the  underlying in  face  of  Chapters  into  Cambodia  b a l a n c e o f power  ASEAN's  diplomatic  of  diplomatic  been p o s s i b l e highly I will  four  while maintaining i f  integrated  a  i t had regional  conclude t h i s  study  a c c o m p l i s h m e n t s i n t h e wake o f conclusion,  however,  f o r ASEAN's more l o n g - t e r m  regional  a brief,  p a r t i c u l a r , Chapter  maneuvering,  formidable  in  s e c u r i t y and f r e e d o m o f a c t i o n  by i t s c r i t i c s .  conflict.  provide  t h e 1970s.  on  of a  strategically,  the regional focus  structured,  ASEAN's  foreign  t h e dilemma o f  i t s evolution  demonstration  tactical  advocated  Indochinese  in  the  organization's  throughout  i t s regional  rigidly  assessing  the and  shift  w h i c h would  and  face  the Vietnamese i n v a s i o n  ASEAN,  and  in  i t s creation,  armed a g g r e s s i o n .  illustrate  unified  the  upon  preserve  resourcefulness,  by  discuss  that  regional  spurred  thesis.  p o l i c y context  C h a p t e r two w i l l as a  and  three  the foreign  Powers.  The  On a b r o a d e r , t h e o r e t i c a l  involved,  the Great  resolution.  of this  approached  weak n a t i o n s  history  philosophy  be  relatively  contextual  regional  conflict  be t h e f o c u s will  examined  directly to  study,  toward  o f i t s member n a t i o n s .  small,  relation  cooperation  organization,  will  also  development as  and w h e t h e r i t w i l l  14 be a b l e into  to channel  policies  structural  i t s recent  which a d d r e s s  shortcomings.  d i p l o m a t i c and p o l i t i c a l  success  i t s more d e e p l y - r o o t e d e c o n o m i c  and  15  CHAPTER  ASEAN,  1967-1978;  TWO  Economic A s p i r a t i o n s v e r s u s  Political  Realities  I n c e n t i v e s and  Rich  in  religion, spanning the by  Constraints  natural resources,  boasting the  strategic  South China the  a total  Sea,  Dutch r u l e ,  Malaysia  Philippines  under the  States,  Thailand  experience  of  Straits  and  Like  of Malacca to the A s i a has  and  Singapore  under  Spanish only  colonialism.  t o be  Southeast  of Thailand's  accommodate t h e i r  Asia  was  economic  development,  social  stressed forms of  cohesion by  the in  socialization, and  many A s i a n  cooperation  is  residue  t h a t some  and and  courted  and  the  of the  United  spared  large part  the  to  the  able  to  of c o l o n i a l i s m  in  who  were  industrial  and  institutions,  low  a distinctly fragile  national unity. l e a d e r s and  country  impeded  political and  by  and  suitors.  its  embryonic  area  British,  in  rulers  European  Southeast  manifested  due  Ocean  hundred years  succeeded Asian  T h i s was  former c o l o n i e s ,  of  later  the  million,  Indian  been an  under t h r e e  i s the  of p o l i t i c a l  long  Indonesia  many  levels  o f a b o u t 200  With  diplomatic astuteness balance  population  Southeast  l a r g e powers.  d i v e r s e i n c u l t u r e , language  One  of the  s t a t e s m e n who degree of  major urged  "Asianess,"  sense themes  various though  16 not  unity,  balkanized argue,  existed by  fears  similar  and  difficult  economic  racial as  carved  and  This process of balkanization,  they  suspicions.  "motherlands"  communication  region  r a t h e r than  Structurally, respective  the  the Europeans.  exacerbated  regional  in  and  than  before  alleviated  i t  was  pre-existing  ,  intra-  1 3  ties  were  with  regional  cultural  a pre-requisite  more  to  neighbours  affinity. to regional  tuned  the  of often  Intra-regional d e v e l o p m e n t was  so  that  i t had n o t been p o s s i b l e t o make d i r e c t c o n t a c t between Bangkok and Kuala Lumpur, or between Saigon and Djakarta, or Rangoon and Manila, for such c o m m u n i c a t i o n s would have t o be f o r m a l l y and c o r r e c t l y addressed to some Western capitals and literally transmitted half around the world before eventually reaching t h e i r intended destination.* 6  T h a n a t Khoman, initial  founders  Foreign Minister of  ASEAN,  o f T h a i l a n d and  elaborated  on  the  one  of  the  situation  as  follows: the m o t i v a t i o n s w h i c h prompted me t o push t h e i d e a o f r e g i o n a l c o o p e r a t i o n were l e s s l o f t y and i d e a l i s t i c b u t stemmed from more practical and realistic c o n s i d e r a t i o n s , among them the fact that Southeast Asian nations are comparatively weak and small...Separately, they represent little, i f any, significance in world a f f a i r s . P o l i t i c a l l y , they are " b a l k a n i z e d " by p r o l o n g e d d i v e r s e c o l o n i a l r u l e which o r i e n t e d them towards their respective metropolitan centers rather than towards t h e i r neighbours in the area... 1 7  15. B e r n a r d K. Gordon, The D i m e n s i o n s of C o n f l i c t i n Southeast A s i a (New J e r s e y : P r e n t i c e - H a l l , 1966), pp. 163-164. 16. P r i n c e Wan W a i t h Yaskorn, Regional Economic Cooperation: ASA-ASEAN and ASPAC (Bangkok, 1968), p. 1. Quoted in Basic Documents o f A s i a n R e g i o n a l O r g a n i z a t i o n s , V o l . V I I I , ed. M i c h e a l Haas (New Y o r k : Oceana Pub., 1980), p. 2. 17. "The 'ASEAN' P r o b l e m s and P r o s p e c t s i n Changing World," i n The ASEAN: Problems and P r o s p e c t s i n a C h a n g i n g World, S a r a s i n Viraphol et. a l . , (Bangkok: C h u l a l o n g k o r n U n i v e r s i t y , 1976), p. 4; q u o t e d i n C h a r l e s E. M o r r i s o n and A s t r i S u h r k e , S t r a t e g i e s o f  17 Indeed, ASEAN's  the  formation  cooperation. policy  closer  to  other  was  trying  reached  their  "Crush  out  with  which Kuala  epithets to led  while  appealed  more  Indonesia's  Malay communities Malaysia. between  As two  legitimate  a  with  the  security  to naval  bases  at t h i s brought  (rallied  time on  by  by the  relations  Sea."  continued the  for  apparently  most  offensive  the  The  1 9  konfrontasi  from the  anti-colonial  communist  between  Tunku  "withdrawal"  tensions  nations  between t h e  i t s expulsion  newly-independent  inhospitable  its  United  rhetoric than  to  neighbours.  racial  led to  search  flamboyant  Asian  of  period of konfrontasi i n  S u k a r n o and  and  of  regional  as p a r t  Indonesia  exchanges  dubious  eve  S t a t e s drew i n c r e a s i n g l y  the  Java  African  tiny,  to  Malay-Indonesian  1 8  verbal  Sukarno's  In S i n g a p o r e ,  and  against Malaysia  in their  across  Southeast  war  United  during  "angry  to  conducive  cooperation.  episode  to Indonesia's  Nations,  the  the  of i t s r e g i o n a l i s o l a t i o n  Lumpur,  hurl  not  on  P h i l i p p i n e s f o r access  point  each other  climate  Vietnam  Malaysia!").  lowest  during and  the  the  "konfrontasi"  of  incident  certainly  military  t o break  slogan  vying  and  bilateral  Sukarno's  political  of containment,  Thailand  and  Jakarta  was  Because of  larger  1963,  prevailing  Malay  concerns  from the  Federation  city-state  neighbours,  though  Chinese  little  and of  sandwiched  Singapore  had  clout  the  in  Survival: The F o r e i g n P o l i c y Dilemmas of Smaller Asian States (New Y o r k : S t . M a r t i n ' s P r e s s , 1978), p. 265. 18. F o r a d i s c u s s i o n on " k o n f r o n t a s i " s e e B e r n a r d K. Gordon, op. c i t . , c h a p t . 3. 19. J.D. Legge. S u k a r n o : A P o l i t i c a l B i o g r a p h y (London: A l l e n Lane P r e s s , 1972), p. 366; i n R e g i o n a l O r g a n i z a t i o n and O r d e r i n S o u t h e a s t A s i a , A r n f i n n J o r g e n s e n - D a h l , (London: M a c m i l l a n Press, 1982)," p. 172.  18 international unenviable  arena.  position,  Indonesia  and  over  lack  a  However, for  Singapore, of  movements.  (who  predominantly  Thailand's  border  pursuit  by  refused  to allow  territory states  and  Sabah  of  territory  in  from  Sultan of document,  this the  p u r s u i t of Thai  signed  after  The the  jurisdiction  Party  to  crux  of  control  sancturies to  had  the  the  a subject of f r i c t i o n  Malaysian  the  northern  secured  border  by  rights Sulu  dispute  could  the  to  the  and  the  lies  in  the  with  the  have  lease,  rather  Sabah came u n d e r  e s t a b l i s h e d i n 1963, between t h e  two  and  the  British  P h i l i p p i n e government c l a i m s merely f o r  the  t i p of  which c o n c l u d e s 1878  between  some  Sultan of  current  which i n  Sabah t e r r i t o r y . was  in  to  their  government  strained  transferred  across  allow  Relations  s 0  their  guerrillas  Malaysian  the  S u l t a n of Sulu,  The  were s t r a i n e d  o f Malaya  equally on  claimants,  when M a l a y s i a  tensions  relations  Perils.  they  word p a d j a k ,  of the  with  the  were  was  agreement p r o v i d e d  cession  remained  and  Sabah  t o l e a s e o r t o cede.  1878  the  Muslim r e b e l s i n t o  Located  8 1  i t s dual  by  to  Islamic sentiments  Kedah  issue.  1878  most  reluctance  while  Philippines  Brunei.  ambiguous M a l a y either  troops,  Borneo,  adventurers  Thai  of strong  the  perhaps i n the  Chinese) o f t e n enjoyed  Kelantan,  unresolved island  the  was  cooperation  Communist  because of  because  Malaysia  addition  Thai-Malaysian  The  Malaysian  of  in  governmental  insurgency were  Malaysia  meant that than  Malaysian has  since  governments.  20. Rodney T a s k e r , "ASEAN '82: Musyawarah g e t s t h e d o o r , " F a r E a s t e r n E c o n o m i c Review, 13 A u g u s t 1982, p. 21. F o r a discussion o f t h e Sabah i s s u e , s e e Gordon, c h a p t . 1.  key t o t h e 42. op., c i t . ,  19 ASEAN was  not  cooperation. established  the  The in  on  Malaysia limbo the  However,  association  and  Sabah  regional  "a  thus  s 2  the  when t h e  as  to join,  SEATO  and  branding  the  American  ASA's membership t o o n l y  Thailand,  Malaysia  over  1963.  MAPHILINDO,  (MAPHILINDO i s an  Indonesia)  more  thought  suffered  Indonesia  and  and  the  the  second  acronym  a similar Malaysia  attempt  at  f o r Malaysia,  the  d e m i s e due  the  and  the  Philippines,  d i v i d e d the  together  from the  was  resources to  had  regional  ASEAN n a t i o n s  to  festering  w h i c h was  integration  minds  of  than  seemed  ASEAN's  now  a shared  to  them.  be  intra-regional  anti-communist t h r e a t s from  in  to prevent  communist  time hosted  disputes.  their  domestic  precious  A l l five  any  being  nations but  Four out  bases,  the  energy  politics,  insurgencies.  Western m i l i t a r y  the  What b r o u g h t  r e q u i r e d f o r n a t i o n a l development g o a l s  avoidable  a t one  concern  united  signatories;  would have been a m a j o r a c h i e v e m e n t .  serious  five  regional  with  and  were s t a u n c h l y  the  of  and  of  P h i l i p p i n e s broke o f f r e l a t i o n s  formation,  cooperation  faced  well-being  set  Indonesia.  ASEAN's  diverted  similar  into  Obviously,  other  a  was  lapsed  between M a l a y s i a  and  itself  (ASA)  ASA  Sabah d i s p u t e  nations  Asia  regional  Consequently,  between  farthest  Southeast for  stooge  "konfrontasi"  At  to b u i l d  Sukarno r e f u s e d  limiting  cooperation  b a c k e d by  attempt  social  Philippines.  issue in  Philippines  of  setting  promoting  economic p r o g r e s s .  imperialists,"  indigenous  Association  J u l y 1961,  g u i d e l i n e s based  the  first  but  of  there  22. Ghazalie Shafie, "Malaysia in Afro-Asia," in Malaysia: International Relations, M. Ghazalie Shafie, (Kuala Lumpur: C r e a t i v e E n t e r p r i s e Sdn. Bhd, 1982), p. 43.  20 was  a  growing b e l i e f  relied  upon i n t i m e s  The  t h a t the  support  o f major s e c u r i t y  greatest security  concern  of o u t s i d e r s could  not  be  challenges.  f a c i n g the  ASEAN c o u n t r i e s  has  a l w a y s been t h e  t h r e a t of i n t e r n a l  subversion.  Direct  aggression  by  power  improbable,  but  given  a  communist  experience internal It  was  of  discuss  to  top  direct  military  necessarily external  provide  t o add  enemies,  enhance  the  a forum  They  The to but  region's  f o r managing  discussed  cooperation  between  trilateral)  bases.  s e e n as  issue-areas, with  scope  tacitly  o u t s i d e the members would  of  the  i.e.  on  and  that p o l i t i c a l  formal  framework. purely  ASEAN  a political  determined  activities  agreed  be  the  or  potential economic,  economic c o o p e r a t i o n  considerations  its  i t was  being  1960s,  t h e r e f o r e emphasised  cooperation,  Political  but  c l i m a t e of the  to avoid  non-political  defined  significance, be  in  cultural  priority.  were t o  political  i t important  membership,  not  isolation, and  established to  upon e x t e r n a l powers.  against  power,  organization.  and  was  concern.  between member s t a t e s .  cooperation  social  i s , a constant  avoid  the  externally-backed  r e g i o n a l f o r u m be  capacity  diplomatic  sensitive  leaders f e l t  still  reduce dependence  bargaining  Amid t h e  for  and  prevent  conflicts  military  that a  support,  differences,  military  international local  and  regional cooperation  region's  rather  been,  imperative  confrontations,  the  insurgent  has  political  purpose of  highly  Chinese  subversion thus  is  given  ASEAN's gave  it  questions Military  bilateral  (or  21 It  ie  worth  reiterating  misconceptions with  regard  with  created  a v e h i c l e to support  I t e purpoee to help  regional integration  was  not  through  accommodation o f the  to create  ASEAN  needs.  countries  eliciting from  an  no  any  and of  sacrifice  and  membership  cooperation  had  experience  with  their  in  define  iteelf  pressing  been e x t e r n a l l y  domestic  administrative  problems, resources,  insurgencies,  population  The  Declaration  Bangkok  security,  but  showed t h a t  such  President  Suharto,  of  ASEAN's Heade o f S t a t e ,  is  inward  looking,  1967  a  The  central  aside  purposes. at  regional  guaranteed.  of  external  did  not  response  political  territory."  not to and  communist interference.  Firet  concept  orderly,  Their  power d i d  explicitly  i n a epeech at the  each i n d i v i d u a l  oblige  commitments  conflict,  "our  no  the  avoid  and  remarked t h a t  not  ae  vague t o  military  lack  namely t o e e t a b l i e h an  condition within  did  appropriate  ethnic  pressures of  i t an as  but  r e e o u r c e s and  attempts  i n e p i r e d and  was  interests.  provided  a i m s and  wae wae  i t e members  eufficiently  previoue  s e c u r i t y , nor  ASEAN  national intereets.  mandate,  was  i t  inetitution,  strengthen  o b l i g a t i o n e or  nations'  SEATO c l e a r l y  foremost  aim.  benefite,  e n d o r s e m e n t o f ASEAN'e g e n e r a l Asian  ite  therefore,  ASEAN'e i n i t i a l  legal  Southeast  etable  sharing  treaty basis,  the  aeeumption t h a t  a supra-national  Cooperation,  to  Bangkok D e c l a r a t i o n , Secretariat,  the  ae  of  i t e members' n a t i o n a l  resolve regional conflicts  nation-states  one  t o ASEAN i s t h e  eetabliehed ae  that  define Meeting  of s e c u r i t y  peaceful, 2 3  and  Singapore's  23. P r e s i d e n t S u h a r t o , F i r e t M e e t i n g o f Heade o f S t a t e s o f ASEAN, B a l i , 23 F e b r u a r y 1976. Q u o t e d i n E s t r e l l a D. S o l i d u m , " S e c u r i t y Perspectives i n ASEAN," i n A s p e c t s o f ASEAN, Werner P f e n n i g and  22 Foreign  Minister  security  role:  was  more  explicit  in  discounting  ASEAN's  . . . s e c u r i t y p r o b l e m s . . . s h o u l d n o t and c a n n o t be s e c u r e d t h r o u g h ASEAN. I n any c a s e t h e s e c u r i t y and i n t e g r i t y o f t h e c o u n t r i e s o f S o u t h e a s t A s i a a r e more l i k e l y t o be jeopardized through economic stagnation and collapse...It is economic weakness and political i n s t a b i l i t y which i s more l i k e l y t o tempt unwelcome i n t e r f e r e n c e and i n t e r v e n t i o n f r o m t h e o u t s i d e . * 8  S i n c e ASEAN was s t i l l defence,  security  political only  merely  that  stability  ASEAN  and  security This  Thanat  i n the  nations from  best served Khoman's  "are  Indonesia's former  ASEAN's c h i e f  architects,  Minister  a  "collective  phrase.  determined  external  was d e s i g n e d  by  However, t h e  Bangkok D e c l a r a t i o n to  interference  forms through  stipulates  ensure  their  i n any f o r m o r  t o g i v e ASEAN some  t h r e a t s tend t o take d i f f e r e n t  Malik,  in  to coin  of defence  manifestation." since  was t h e r e f o r e  defence",  mention  t o o weak f o r any s e m b l a n c e o f m i l i t a r y  flexibility  time.  As Adam  f o r Foreign A f f a i r s  and one o f  e x p l a i n e d t o a s t u d e n t group  i n Jakarta  December 19S6, t h e need f o r a r e g i o n a l  grouping  was t o e n h a n c e  autonomy and a c t a s : ... a s t r o n g bulwark a g a i n s t imperialist manipulations as w e l l as a decisive s t a b i l i z i n g factor i n t h i s part of the world...ending once and f o r a l l f o r e i g n influence, domination and i n t e r v e n t i o n . . . s t e m m i n g the "yellow" as well as the "white" imperialism i n Southeast A s i a . 8 3  Mark M.B. Suh, e d s . , (Munich, Germany: W e l t f o r u m V e r l a g , 1984), p. 94. 24. Dept. o f I n f o r m a t i o n , R e p u b l i c o f I n d o n e s i a . The A s s o c i a t i o n of Southeast Asian Nations ( J a k a r t a , 1969), pp. 57-58. I n Haas, op. c i t . , p. 210. 25. A n t a r a News B u l l e t i n , 15 December 1966. In Understanding ASEAN, ed. A l i s o n B r o i n o w s k i ( L o n d o n : M a c m i l l a n P r e s s , 1982), p. 16 ( i t a l i c s a d d e d ) .  23  In k e e p i n g inclusion  of  with  a clause  foreign  military  already  established  were  hesitant  S i n g a p o r e was the  United  vacuum  use  of  to  to  accede  such  to  concerned  penetration and  p r e m i s e d on  intense  t o end  the  by  w i t h U. S.  and  i t might  China  or  abrupt  leaving the  a balance of  power s t r a t e g y  not  states action.  policy  r e l y i n g too  and  behind  Soviet  foreign  of  bases  cause B r i t a i n  Singapore's  by  the  presence  P h i l i p p i n e s , these  hasty  that  the  However,  immediately,  debate over  reached.  temporary,  established  concurrence of used  the  directly  i n d e p e n d e n c e and organization's the  expense of  a  Union.  had  been  through  much on  countries;  not  countries or  any  the  the one  regarding  a)  supplant of  cooperation  to  and  with are  countries,  should  be  intended  to  national  Furthermore,  the  relations  international  should  character  express  the  and  not  be  cooperation  capabilities;  regional  not  external  a r r a n g e m e n t s ; b)  ASEAN  the  "subvert  ASEAN's  cooperation  was  a l l f o r e i g n b a s e s were  ASEAN s t a t e s .  groups of  that:  a compromise  only  concerned,  indirectly  freedom" of  for projects 4)  document,  maintained  existing bilateral  complement, be  and  principles  held  the  It s t i p u l a t e d that  8 6  m a j o r powers,  organizations  should  to  withdraw  eventually  with  region.  Indonesia favored  source.  After  be  the  c o u n t e r w e i g h t s and  external  Declaration  and  Thailand  traditionally  i n the  i n Thailand  equally  open  non-bloc p o l i c y ,  bases i n  States  Moreover,  its  c) and  unconditional.  2G. F o r a good discussion of the debate within J o r g e n s e n - D a h l , op. c i t . , pp. 37-41. 27. See Mark M.B. Suh, "Political Cooperation C o u n t r i e s , " i n , eds. P f e n n i g and Suh, op. c i t .  at  the  should  cooperation benefit 8 7  It  should  ASEAN, Among  all  see ASEAN  24 also  be  noted that  Kampuchea and  the  to  8 8  The  join  ASEAN.  First  Southeast  one  suspicion  was  the  Asian  as  another  two  V i e t n a m s --  proposal  might  rendered  illusory  Ministers  hope.  for  The  Foreign  anxious to  States,  the  Under  U.S.  anxious to  territory.  the  The  Laos,  in  19S7  neither a useful  secure the  of  to  were a t  o t h e r hand,  the i t saw  it  on  the  desirable,  and  i t s a l l i a n c e with  region  was  and  reluctant States'  ASEAN as  the  established.  i t s peaceful  United  Nations  Indonesia  reliance nor  and just  Adam M a l i k ,  Indonesia  first  as  Asian  of five  fear  and  see  supplement t o  the  the  mutual  Southeast  permanent  army i n  by  cooperation  military  Order,  under  of  Thailand  neighbours of  largest  association  T h a n a t Khoman and  reduce i t s  Philippines  fairly On  its  of  most e a g e r  S u h a r t o ' s New  reassure  having  ae  an  Years  serious  Affairs  w h i c h was  perceived  umbrella.  --  invitiation  r e a d i l y greeted  Association  were t h e  ASEAN was  as  of  b r a i n c h i l d of  Thailand  was  not  prospects  who  feeling  an  establish  have e x p e c t e d .  respectively,  despite  Indochinese countries declined  to  N a t i o n s was  p r i m a r i l y the  United  and t h e  Decade  Initially,  states  Burma  an  equally  intentions, the to  largest join,  protective  opportunity  to  28. ASEAN o f f i c i a l s c o n c e d e p r i v a t e l y t h a t i f a r e q u e s t came f r o m V i e t n a m now to join the association, i t would be "acutely embarrassing. " See Inge Sons B a i l e y , ASEAN: The Nature of Regional Organization f o r Development and S e c u r i t y M.A. Thesis, Simon F r a s e r U n i v e r s i t y , 1981, p. 91. S r i L a n k a and Papua New G u i n e a have also placed a request to join ASEAN, but were p o l i t e l y refused. B r u n e i ' s membership was g r a n t e d on J a n u a r y 1, 1984 b e c a u s e o f i t s l o c a t i o n , c u l t u r a l a f f i n i t y and o i l .  25 reduce i t s  image o f  p r o v e i t s bona f i d e Thus ASEAN development o f  total  dependence  on t h e U n i t e d  s t a t u s as a Southeast  was n o t an a l l i a n c e , "mutual c o n s u l t a t i o n  Asian  States,  state.  b u t an e n t e n t e .  Through t h e  and c o n s e n s u s , "  i t s purpose  was t o p r o v i d e  a framework w i t h i n w h i c h t h e l e a d e r s c o u l d  one  on  another  individual  m i s u n d e r s t a n d i n g s and initiatives. conceivably  E m p h a s i s was p l a c e d increase  a n o t h e r member. policy  f o r the  t o compensate  support  the United  organizational  structure  interests.  cooperation, Malik  collective  internal  small  such  states  f o r the  States.  and f l e x i b l e  For  an  flexibility  dangerous policy  a c t i o n s which  political  d e c l i n e and  might  pressure  of Southeast  on  foreign A s i a and  uncertainty of ASEAN's  r u l e s of procedure  loose  assured  would n o t be a t t h e e x p e n s e o f  organization was  consult  foreign  Most i m p o r t a n t l y ,  member s t a t e s t h a t c o o p e r a t i o n  national  avoid  The m i d - s i x t i e s was a t i m e o f d i f f i c u l t  adjustments  from  to  on a v o i d i n g  external or  ASEAN h e l p e d  its  problems  to coordinate  and  a source  still  cultivating  of strength.  As Adam  remarked, A l t h o u g h from the outset ASEAN was conceived a s an o r g a n i z a t i o n f o r economic, social and c u l t u r a l coo p e r a t i o n , and although c o n s i d e r a t i o n s i n these f i e l d s were no d o u b t c e n t r a l , i t was t h e f a c t t h a t t h e r e was a convergence i n the p o l i t i c a l outlook of the five p r o s p e c t i v e member-nations...which provided t h e main stimulus to j o i n together i n ASEAN. . . T h e r e was e a r l y recognition that meaningful progress could only be a c h i e v e d by giving first priority t o the task of o v e r a l l and r a p i d e c o n o m i c development. I t was a l s o realised that, to this end, policies should be c o n s c i o u s l y geared towards s a f e g u a r d i n g this priority objective, not only i n purely economic terms but simultaneously also t o secure the e s s e n t i a l c o n d i t i o n s  26 of peace and internationally  stability, both i n the surrounding  ASEAN's p r o g r e s s D e s p i t e hundreds c o m m i t t e e and  of  Bangkok  rounds  subcommittee  p r o p o s a l s passed The  Declaration  however vague  economic c o o p e r a t i o n , to  policies  establishing  strategies. any  sort  of t o t a l  12.6  during the  percent  states  on  the  study  adopted  investment  at  years  no  period  global  diversification  g r e a t powers,  ( r o u g h l y 85  were  but 3 1  percent)  that  and  1970-1975. through  strategy  of  to decrease which  the  their  15.5  term  made  in  trade  as  percent  to  Crone's the  industrial  economic  ASEAN and  dependence  undermined r e g i o n a l  the vast  c o n t i n u e s t o be  been  1970's,  trade,  promote  long  Donald  30  --  remarkably  intra-ASEAN  in effect  Today,  to  were  had  or  timetable  to formulate  headway  the  political  to a  states  of  implemented.  p r o f e s s e d agreement member  slow.  ministerial,  specific  according  Little  illustrates a  the  ASEAN t r a d e d e c l i n e d f r o m  economic i n t e r d e p e n d e n c e . trade  nine  of f r e e trade area  a percentage  exceedingly  only a small percentage  achieved  the f i v e  1970s was  meetings  first  despite a  and  8 9  make c o n c r e t e commitments and  and  excellent  of  contained  t o be  -- and  the  levels,  d u r i n g the  e c o n o m i c programme  reticent  throughout  domestically region.  with  bulk  of  ASEAN's  external nations.  29. "Regional Cooperation in International Politics," in R e g i o n a l i s m i n S o u t h e a s t A s i a ( J a k a r t a : C e n t e r f o r S t r a t e g i c and International Studies), proceedings of a conference held in J a k a r t a , 22-25 O c t o b e r , 1974, pp. 161-2. Quoted i n B r o i n o w s k i , op. c i t . , p 14. 30. See Khaw Guat Hoon, "ASEAN in International Politics," in Politics in t h e ASEAN S t a t e s , ed. D i a n e K. Mauzy ( K u a l a Lumpur: M a r i c a n & Sons Sdn. Bhd, 1984), p. 229. 31. See D o n a l d Crone, The ASEAN S t a t e s : C o p i n g w i t h Dependence (New Y o r k : P r a e g e r Pub., 1983).  27 mainly  Japan,  the United  S t a t e s and  t h e EEC,  i n that order of  importance. According that  the  t o t h e ASEAN argument,  ASEAN s t a t e s  complementary  in  of economic  are s t r u c t u r a l l y  trade.  import-substitution  phase,  they  strategies,  national  markets  they  industrialization.  needed  the  As m a i n l y  and  light  manufactured goods  the  ASEAN  states require  the  West.  area  Moreover,  of  technology  industrial recently  as  nations  organization's  from  the  integration.  economic producers  since  scale of  machinery  competition  l a c k o f economic p r o g r e s s  their  own  support  commodities  of Singapore),  and t e c h n o l o g y the f i r s t  bilateral  designated  ASEAN T a s k F o r c e  Export-  to  primary  t o be  induces  i n particularly  1984, an  for  (with the exception  transfer  than  emerging  were c h o s e n  finance,  their  just  rather  a r e r e l u c t a n t t o f o r c e t h e degree  argue,  lack  for this i s  competitive  As n a t i o n s  3 8  rationalization  oriented  t h e main r e a s o n  from  i n the  links  with  industries.  As  report inquiring concluded  into the  that:  Intra-ASEAN economic activities could become selfg e n e r a t i n g when ASEAN e c o n o m i e s a r e more mature and c o m p l e m e n t a r y t o one a n o t h e r . . . i t h a s been f o u n d t h a t in industry and t r a d e , especially i n manufactured goods, c o o p e r a t i o n h a s been s l o w t o m a t e r i a l i z e b e c a u s e the i n d u s t r i a l s t r u c t u r e s o f t h e member c o u n t r i e s a r e similar. At p r e s e n t they produce s i m i l a r goods o r p l a n t o do s o i n t h e f u t u r e . 33  32. See K a r l D. J a c k s o n and M. Hadi Soesastro, e d s . , ASEAN S e c u r i t y and E c o n o m i c D e v e l o p m e n t (Berkeley, C a l i f . : Institute of East Asian Studies), intro. See a l s o Bruce Glassburner, "Southeast A s i a : E c o n o m i c P r o b l e m s and P r o s p e c t s , " i n Economic, P o l i t i c a l , and S e c u r i t y I s s u e s i n S o u t h e a s t A s i a i n t h e 1980's, eds. R o b e r t A. S c a l a p i n o and J u s u f Wanandi, ( B e r k e l e y , C a l i f . : I n s t i t u t e o f E a s t A s i a n S t u d i e s , 1982), pp. 42-43. 33. Susumo Awanhara, " P l a t i t u d e s , p i o u s hopes and m e d i o c r i t y . " F a r E a s t e r n E c o n o m i c Review, 15 March 1964, p. 64.  28 Officials integration, cooperation  argue  such  that  as  a  the o b j e c t i v e customs  through the pooling  According to  A.R.  Soehoed,  p r o g r e s s toward a c h i e v i n g  o f ASEAN i s n o t  union,  but  the o b j e c t i v e s  often  leveled  that  the  (EEC) i s  f a c t m e a s u r i n g w i t h t h e wrong y a r d s t i c k . "  integration  markets.  say, t h e E u r o p e a n E c o n o m i c Community  in  a  than  sluggish  comparison with,  drawing  economic  o f ASEAN i s t o o  in  by  instead  of resources rather  "the c r i t i c i s m  economic  distinction  i n t h e ASEAN  between  Soehoed  3 4  economic  continues  cooperation  and  context:  Economic c o o p e r a t i o n , however c l o s e , i s d i s t i n c t from economic i n t e g r a t i o n not only in i t s institutional s e t t i n g but a l s o i n i t s f u n c t i o n . The f o r m e r c a n be a loose arrangement and does not require a formal i n s t i t u t i o n a l framework whereas t h e l a t t e r d e p e n d s on it. Economic c o o p e r a t i o n includes various measures d e s i g n e d t o h a r m o n i z e e c o n o m i c p o l i c i e s and t o m i n i m i z e d i s c r i m i n a t i o n ; the process leading toward economic integration entails the unification of economic p o l i c i e s and the complete a b o l i t i o n o f d i s c r i m i n a t i o n . More i m p o r t a n t l y , under economic i n t e g r a t i o n , p o l i c i e s and m e a s u r e s are to be s u b o r d i n a t e d to a generalized market i n t e g r a t i o n strategy. But w i t h i n t h e framework o f economic cooperation, market i n t e g r a t i o n i s a means t h a t may be a p p l i e d s e l e c t i v e l y . 3 3  Clearly, to of  national  be t h e main  goals  specialization  Indonesia,  well  e c o n o m i c g r o w t h and s e l f - r e l i a n c e c o n t i n u e  f a r ASEAN member s t a t e s , and  endowed  intra-regional  trade.  with  and  petroleum  e m i n e n t l y q u a l i f i e d t o become a s u p p l i e r to  its  abundant  neighbours. supply  both p h y s i c a l  On  impeding t h e growth  the  of capital, and f i n a n c i a l ,  34. A.R. Soehoed, "Economic Region," i n , eds. S c a l a p i n o 35. I b i d . , p. 53.  other  of  hand,  excellent  For  natural  chemical Singapore  trading  a well-developed  example, gas,  is  fertilizers offers  an  infra-structure, industrial  sector,  D i m e n s i o n s o f S e c u r i t y i n t h e ASEAN and Wanandi, op. c i t . , p. 53.  29 and  a  large  supply  of  entrepreneurship.  Glassburner  points  out,  mobility  labour,  financial  despite and  of the  able  integration capital  much-needed c a p i t a l  to offer,  indigenous  true  remember t h a t S i n g a p o r e ' s  is  a sensitive  issue f o r  w h i c h c o n t a i n an e c o n o m i c a l l y problematic Singapore  and  Indonesian their  are  the  Malaysia  labourers  own  l a b o u r from  will  as  resist  not t o  econmic c o o p e r a t i o n  regional  trade  large-scale,  2)  Complementation  source  Schemes  See G l a s s b u r n e r ,  of  the B a l i  ASEAN c o u n t r i e s  mobility.  Both  problems  with  No  Thailand  doubt  and  large-scale,  made  no  the  imported  progress  Summit o f 1976,  1977, aimed  project  approach  (AIC) d e s i g n e d  and  for  the  ASEAN  for  each  op. c i t . , pp. 42, 51.  intra-  to  trade  w h e r e i n one  was d e s i g n a t e d  Indonesia  soda ash 3)  intra-ASEAN  at expanding  p r o j e c t s (AIP),  for  in  1) t h e P r e f e r e n t i a l  item-by-item  Singapore;  J u s t as  countries.  t h r e e forms:  project  population  minority.  of  ASEAN h a s  the Phlippines,  for  five  One  3 6  i n the area.  Japanese-financed urea  superphosphate f o r engines  those  ASEAN i n d u s t r i a l  a  Chinese  labour  onslaught  (PTA) o f an  hindrances.  i n their  as  has taken  through  mainly  each country:  36.  an  After  Arrangements  liberalization;  diesel  well  say t h a t  economic c o o p e r a t i o n .  Trading  work  t h e most p l e n t i f u l  This i s  to foster  already experiencing  seeking  workers,  Philippines,  are  and  the preference  Chinese  of  free  i s willing  the other  implications  the  B.  Singapore  75 p e r c e n t  powerful  as  and p h y s i c a l c a p i t a l ,  remain s e r i o u s  needs t o still  requires  resources,  p r o t e c t i o n i s m and  entrepreneurship  However,  to  Malaysia,  Thailand  and  Industrial country  to  30 produce  a specific  preferential  treatment  However, effort  thus  agreement  industrial  with  within  f a r has  impressive  g o o d s w o r t h $50,000 o r l e s s words,  marginal to  intra-ASEAN  that  tariff  while  "nontariff b a n s on barriers  AIP  to trade expansion  Indeed,  of  plan,  only  into  the f i v e the  The  urea  and  lobbied  the establishment  would  from  whose goods market. sake  of  progress,  37. 38.  be  But  Although  the  the  of a  would be  sold  i t finally  "unity". Singapore  were are  some e c o n o m i s t s  feel  t h e r e a r e numerous  and  projects  export quotas  to  significant  in  project  Indonesia  under  ASEAN p r o j e c t on  t h e open  diesel  to a  financial  See Khaw Guat Hoon, op. c i t . , pp. G l a s s b u r n e r , op. c i t . , p. 43.  from  plant  national  of  project  regional)  a l t o g e t h e r f o r the a t ASEAN's l a c k  support  233-234.  in  diesel  the s t a t u s  (rather than  Expressing disappointment  soon  Indonesia  fledgling  changing  abandoned t h e p r o j e c t  withdrew i t s  been  pressure  project.  regional  suggested  has  i n the P h i l i p p i n e s  Singapore,  of a  designated i n the  c o m p e t i t i o n w i t h i t s own Singapore  that  6000 were  list  t o abandon i t s d i e s e l  in  At f i r s t  the plant  import  project  superphosphate  compelled  industry.  the  i n the region.  I n d o n e s i a was  Singapore  from  industrial  difficulties  that  real.  (PTA),  p r o c e s s i n g at p o r t s o f e n t r y . These a r e  implemented. ran  ranging  3 7  i t e m s on  Moreover,  3 8  given  i n t r a d e at the time they  of the  trade.  be  7,500 i t e m s i n 1980,  (each) many  than  r e d u c t i o n s are important,  barriers"  paper  will  T r a d i n g Agreement  been more a p p a r e n t an  In o t h e r  which  t h e ASEAN r e g i o n .  the P r e f e r e n t i a l  involved  listed.  product  of the  of AIP  31 plan  short  of a  n o r m a l 10 It  token  percent.  is  slow pace  one  o f economic F i v e see  cooperation,  they  to each other, adversely  t o be  critical  cooperaton.  i f by d o i n g  so t h e i r  Of  0  progress  i n economic c o o p e r a t i o n .  however,  has  regional  grouping  by  Indonesia  displayed  of  UNCTAD, t h e E c o n o m i c and  a l s o been  i t s members United Nations Social  interests  may by  difficulties  What p r o g r e s s  in i t s t o make  has taken  place,  economic r e l a t i o n s  cooperation. i n export  A l l five  as a  nations  e a r n i n g s over  the world  reflecting growth,  rapid  raising  i n fourteen years  the  —  rate of price export  growth.  i t s real  albeit  per  o i l played a  i n c r e a s e h a s n o t been a c c o m p a n i e d by  redistribution  ASEAN h a s interests  thus  the f a s t e s t  and much o f t h i s  a corresponding  concessions  t h a t i t has f a i l e d  r a t e s exceed  a wide m a r g i n ,  income 75 p e r c e n t  major r o l e  economic  and a l l b u t T h a i l a n d e x c e e d e d 20 p e r c e n t  A l l o f these  inflation  expedite  writes,  t h e economic performance o f i n d i v i d u a l  growth r a t e s  t h e 1970's,  Hoon  to give  ASEAN's  ASEAN's e x t e r n a l  and i n  to  own e c o n o m i c  n o t mean  -- n o t i n i n t r a - r e g i o n a l  annum.  capita  in  double-digit  decade o f per  p r o j e c t s do  Guat  hesitate  course,  joint  been  need  same t i m e  economic  enjoyed  instead of the  o f ASEAN's e x c e s s i v e l y  As Khaw  the p o l i t i c a l  at the  affected."*  countries  contribution,  3 9  not d i f f i c u l t  "while the  percent  o f income.*  1  quite successful  at m u l t i l a t e r a l Development  Commission  i n defending  forums such Plan  (UNDP),  f o r A s i a and t h e P a c i f i c  39. See R o b e r t L. Rau, "The r o l e of Singapore in C o n t e m p o r a r y S o u t h e a s t A s i a . 3 ( S e p t . 1981), pp. 104-110. 40. Khaw Guat Hoon, op. c i t . , p. 234. 41. See G l a s s b u r n e r , op. c i t .  the  a s GATT, and  the  (ESCAP). ASEAN,"  32 An  ASEAN B r u s s e l s Committee was  policies  and  maintain  Commission. occurred  Australia, In trade,  day-to-day  A similar  between New  terms  Zealand,  Singapore  Indonesia  which Jorgensen-Dahl  positive  and  the  Singapore."  economically  advanced,  politically  most  backward.  As  of  any  joint  been t h e  influential  a result,  project  least  Singapore,  industries,  trade  liberalization  a product-by-product  both  regionally  internationalization strategy  of  security.  of  its As  positive  and  most  largest  has  t h e t y p e and  economy  an e t h n i c a l l y  format  ASEAN  accept  has Free  protect  selective  has  always  internationally. is  most  basis.  concern  and  of  and  t h e o t h e r hand,  to  and  economically  M a l a y s i a need t o  i t  policy  that  i s the  e s t a b l i s h m e n t o f an  labour-intensive  survival,  most  most  on  a  the  the  i s the  I n d o n e s i a and  foreign  ends o f  s m a l l e s t member,  their  main  regional  to  Area,  on  48  "from  nearer  Indonesia,  of the  Japan,  somewhat  Trade  Singapore's  because  has  position  member,  proposal.  relations  to the Indonesian  Indonesia determines  most s u p p o r t i v e but  ASEAN's while  EEC  the o p p o s i t e  to the  Thailand  Singapore,  4 3  the  expanding  d e s c r i b e s as r a n g i n g  apprehensive  and  of  towards  are at  with Malaysia c l o s e r  Philippines  with  the United S t a t e s .  attitudes  spectrum  least  relations  to coordinate  " d i a l o g u e " c o u n t r i e s --  Canada and  their and  i n J u n e 1982  institutionalization  ASEAN's e c o n o m i c  of  apprehensive,  formed  part  Chinese  of  been The  Singapore's  state,  Singapore  42. F o r a good discussion of ASEAN's international economic achievements, see J o r g e n s e n - D a h l , op. c i t . ,chapter 6; Donald Crone, The ASEAN S t a t e s : Coping with Dependence (New York: P r a e g e r Pub., 1983), esp. c h a p t . 6. 43. J o r g e n s e n - D a h l , op. c i t , p. 135.  33 is  sensitive  to the  fact  that  i t i s a small island  "Malay s e a " o f s t a t e s  predominantly  Yew  "your  once  quipped,  neighbours."**  Its  fear  " s w a l l o w e d " by  these  larger  called  complex"  "Timor  impatient,  though  Singaporean for  collective  Chinese."*  of Chinese  the former is  Central per  capita  neighbours,  fact  that  dictated  and  images  13,000  on  islands  of  a  issues.  with  Malays tend t o  while the l a t t e r  Singapore's  ideas  a s "pushy  stereotypes  potency.  materialists  to  in i t s  novel  interpreted  cultural  latent  6  factor  advancing  being  and  i n i t s so-  on ASEAN e c o n o m i c from  or  impatience  regard  with  ASEAN to the  i n t h e absence o f c o s t e f f e c t i v e n e s s .  With a  significantly realizes  the global  spanning  that  than  prudence  some means  of i t s creating  and i t i s r e s i g n e d t o t h e  economic i n t e r d e p e n d e n c e  member,  the other  larger  market,  of regional  by ASEAN's s l o w e s t  Indonesia,  fear  annexed  manifested  important  your  f i n a n c e improvements  Singapore  t h e pace  an  in a  As L e e Kuan never  militarily  position  hesitation  income  in  being  is  retain  in its  interdependence  and  dreamers.*  Secretariat  are  countries i s  as s o u l l e s s  as l a z y  reflected  of  for  National  negative connotations think  friends  are inhibited  action  8  Malay.  best  restrained  officials  or wholly  located  hand,  will  be  Indonesia. with  a distance  i t s 165 m i l l i o n  people  o f 5,000 k i l o m e t e r s , i s  44. A l e x J o s e y , L e e Kuan Yew (Singapore: D o n a l d Moore P r e s s , 1968), p. 486. Q u o t e d i n Hans I n d o r f , Impediments o f R e g i o n a l i s m i n Southeast Asia: B i l a t e r a l C o n s t r a i n t s Among ASEAN Member States (Singapore: I n s t i t u t e o f S o u t h e a s t A s i a n S t u d i e s , 1984), p. 12. 45. F o r an i n t e r e s t i n g d i s c u s s i o n , s e e i b i d . 46. S t a n l e y S. B e d l i n g t o n , M a l a y s i a and S i n g a p o r e : The B u i l d i n g o f New S t a t e s ( I t h a c a , New Y o r k : C o r n e l l U n i v . P r e s s , 1978), p. 126".'""  34 more t h a n  h a l f the  population. Southeast labelled its  It i s  Asia's by  S u k a r n o was  that  was  expansionist  After  t o change  of  an  "independent  of  the e l i t e ' s  Franklin and  Singapore  Sukarno,  the  pragmatic  and  elites'  a  1960s, than  Australia  and  possibly Suharto image  as  non-aligned. though  neighbours,  views  reasons  rather  succeeding  on  Weinstein argues,  clearly  d i d not  regional  non-  tame t h e political  Indonesia's  a c t i v e " f o r e i g n p o l i c y i s an  operational  the  and  been  play  Indonesia's i n t e r n a t i o n a l  i t s external  military As  both  has  Indonesia during  and  displayed  and  a global,  foreign policy style,  vis-a-vis  entitlement.  However,  with c r e a t i n g  non-adversarial,  and  that  area  For these  c o - e x i s t i n g with a v o l a t i l e  neighbour.  I n d o n e s i a ' s new  political  politics.  has  growth,  power.  natural  Consequently,  w o r r i e d about  government sought  "middle"  i t only  in regional  resources,  o f economic  a rising  more c o n c e r n e d  expansionist  one  natural  in  fastest rate  emphasis.  constantly  rich  have f e l t  role  regional,  t h e whole o f ASEAN i n b o t h  some a s  leaders  leading  s i z e of  notions  i n t e g r a l part  code.  In t h e view o f most [ I n d o n e s i a n ] l e a d e r s , an active foreign policy was i n t e g r a l l y r e l a t e d t o i n d e p e n d e n c e . In f a c t , t h e mere existence of an a c t i v e , assertive foreign policy was t a k e n as a mark o f independence. F o r many of those who emphasized this, the chief consideration was not so much an expectation of a c h i e v i n g the avowed g o a l s , b u t more a feeling that passivity connotes acquiescence to circumscribed independence. Partly this was a matter of demonstrating t h e i r independence t o themselves. The Indonesian leaders o f t e n spoke o f an active foreign p o l i c y as e s s e n t i a l to the preservation of t h e i r s e l f respect, national i d e n t i t y and image...a passive  35 i n t e r n a t i o n a l r o l e conveys a f e e l i n g of being taken f o r granted, of being l e s s than f u l l y independent.* 7  Indonesia's its by  economic an  and  ambitions,  inadequacies.  The  impatient neighbour,  undeniably  times  than  that  Indonesia's  appropriate  grateful  that  deference,  while has  o f ASEAN d e p e n d s on  political  little  had  no  to the  each  Secretariat  which  meeting  of  alphabetical and  reviews  as  do  the  committees.  i s located  The  principal  the f o r e i g n order.  of  and  The  reason  reluctance i n  in  for this  1967  many  will  structure  an  also  and  1976  to  ASEAN  i n Jakarta).  ASEAN  body,  National affairs  the  annual  among i t s members i n  also  which c o o r d i n a t e s rotates annually,  committees  decentralization  inadvertantly  as  crisis.  Until  Committee,  ASEAN's  internal  respective foreign  the o r g a n i z a t i o n ' s a c t i v i t i e s , personnel  The  located  rotates  are  (though  interests  decision-making  Standing  they  understanding,  has,  i n the  t o show i t  corresponding  now  still  47. F r a n k l i n W e i n s t e i n , I n d o n e s i a n o f Dependence ( I t h a c a , New Y o r k :  189.  tacit  is  countries  time  proposals.  ministers,  The  a  same  national  (which  c o u n t r y had,  departments.  a  implementation  income t e n  taking care  institutional  strong  Central Secretariat  Instead,  aggravated  ASEAN  i n t h e Kampuchean  decentralized offset  The  the  by  i s ASEAN's s m a l l e s t  restraint.  this  e v i d e n t i n Indonesia's conduct  factilitate  to  at  showed  equilibrium  does  which  ambitions,  effort  ASEAN's l o o s e ,  i s further  Indonesia.  reluctant)  be  are f r u s t r a t e d  member w i t h a p e r c a p i t a  latent  at  frustration  of  Indonesia  however,  Singapore,  most d y n a m i c  larger  recognize the  political  was  t o g i v e any  one  and  sub-  partly  due  state  the  F o r e i g n P o l i c y and t h e Dilemma C o r n e l l U n i v . P r e s s , 1976), p.  36 edge i n  regional  well  to avoid  as  which might  the  an  the  ignore  However, proved  status  emergence o f  high  an  customary  decisions,  and  no  obligations  of  members.  not  on  decisions  already  structure misters their  the  quickly  of  to  be  recruits  was  merely  challenge  arose  i n October  had  found g u i l t y  of  been  Affair  Malaysia  acts in  when two of  policy  meet much  the  foreign  affairs  ability  the  was  subsequent Philippines.  a special Island,  force  allegedly  i n Sabah.  Indonesian  Singapore despite  and  dialogue.  the  and  acute ASEAN's  economic  and  sabotage  their  that  of  and  Malay government 1968  of  who  fact  meeting  Corregidor  decision-  particularly  the  expense of  staff  many o f  ASEAN's p e a c e k e e p i n g  on  executed  final  approvals  ASEAN's e s t a b l i s h m e n t , found  regional  committee  as  to  ASEAN  the  ministers  is  Added  i n t e r e s t s or  interested in external  Corregidor  undermine the  were  Moreover,  annual  r e l a t i o n s between  Muslim  "konfrontasi,"  issue  more  imposes  r o t a t i o n of  has  .  often  bureaucracies,  economic  that  realm,  the  year a f t e r  and  the  has  proposals  foreign ministers, are  around the  by  a  been  the  problem  political  Barely  infiltrate  continuity.  dimensions at the  tested  suspension  frequent  Kampuchean  tend  political In  A  revolves  who  large  structure  The  and  as  organization  decentralization  implementing of  legal  made by  recent  Secretariat,  a supra-national  of  economic matters  more f r e g u e n t l y . the  to  r e s t s with  decisions  Central  i s o l a t e d from n a t i o n a l p o l i t i c a l  efficiency  making a u t h o r i t y  since  degree  sluggishness  are  the  considerations.  obstacle  technocrats  inhibits  hosting  national  the  t o be  by  A  to  second  marines,  murder  of  who  during  appeals  from  37 Indonesia Jakarta  Malaysia.  were  remained In b o t h  sacked  distinctly incidents,  national able  and  leaders  from  describes,  to  generated Lee  defuse  of these  first  remarked t h a t  created at  lubricate friction-  the  continued  On by  the  incident.  between ASEAN and  tensions  they  before  intra-regional  n i n e y e a r s was, I t was  the were they  disputes,  a s Adam  primarily  a  adaptation."  Malik  "period of Lee  4 9  ASEAN M i n i s t e r i a l  Kuan  Meeting  " . . . p e r h a p s t h e most v a l u a b l e  i t s inception various  relationships  3 0  the  48  of the F i f t h  ASEAN s i n c e  after  governments  issues entirely,  political  "intangible."  speech  residences in  t h e two  s e v e r a l years  c o n s u l t a t i o n , p l a n n i n g and  of  Kuan Yew  embassy and  between  r e s o l v e the  during the  additionally  goodwill  helped  for  the containment  at the opening  achievement and  cool  to  mostly  consensus i n  1972,  relations  d i d not  ASEAN's p r o g r e s s  in  and  t o more open v i o l e n c e .  Aside  Yew,  Singapore  while diplomatic e f f o r t s  successfully  escalated  The  was  the  understanding  ASEAN m e e t i n g s  which  same s u b j e c t  could  which  otherwise  i n a speech  in  had have 1982,  explaining that:  The process of establishing mutual trust and confidence, respect and u n d e r s t a n d i n g f o r e a c h o t h e r ' s p o s i t i o n ; d e v e l o p i n g o u r r e l a t i o n s t o a p o i n t where o u r Foreign Ministers f e e l free to consult e a c h o t h e r on the telephone -- a l l t h e s e c a n n o t be c r e a t e d by o u r o r d e r i n g them so. These r e l a t i o n s are the r e s u l t of n u r t u r i n g and n a t u r a l e v o l u t i o n o v e r many y e a r s . 3 1  48. Khaw Guat Hoon, op. c i t . , p. 229. 49. Hans H. I n d o r f , ASEAN: P r o b l e m s and Prospects Occasional P a p e r , no. 38 ( S i n g a p o r e : I n s t i t u t e of Southeast Asian Studies, 1975). 50. ASEAN Secretariat, Ten Years ASEAN (Jakarta: ASEAN S e c r e t a r i a t , 1978), pp. 273-274. 51- N e w s l e t t e r , Bonn ASEAN Committee, No. 4/1983, Nov. 1983, p. 2. Q u o t e d i n Suh, " P o l i t i c a l C o o p e r a t i o n Among ASEAN C o u n t r i e s , " i n P f e n n i g and Suh, op. c i t . , p. 77.  38  Decision-making:  One  on  influential  regional  depends i n l a r g e of the  the  historical  personal  drawn a  effort,  organization.  In  and  leadership.  underestimate leaders  support  of  existence cooperation  Southeast  importance  and  Asian  of  good  ASEAN i n c o n t r i b u t i n g  t h i s context  between how  the  generally,  procedures i n concrete  M i c h e a l Haas  West  and  and  no  oppose  Given t h i s ,  the  the  have  or  continued  background of  among t h e  and  ASEAN l e a d e r s  commitment  top  international relations  practices  EEC,  ASEAN's  its  clear distinction  human and affects  of  cannot  the  the  groups which  upon t h e  cultural  relations  success of  unlike  elite  circle  and  one  Way  cooperation.  part  exclusive  countries,  the  "ASEAN"  must remember t h a t  e x t e n s i v e or them  The  Asia  how  this  to has  view view  situations.  There i s no a c c e p t a n c e i n Confucian d o c t r i n e of the Western concept o f r a i s o n d ' e t a t , the view t h a t s t a t e s a r e not bound by the moral principles applied to individuals. Instead of Westerners' Gesellschaftish penchant for rational and impersonal calculations preparatory to agreements, i t i s necessary f o r Asians to develop personal relationships w i t h one a n o t h e r i n o r d e r t o d e v e l o p m u t u a l t r u s t , whence a g r e e m e n t s become possible. 3  The  "Asian  framework conducted contrast  way"  for in to  stresses  the  discussions, private  what  "business-suit" diplomacy  2  once t o  Asians  diplomacy,  requires  no  52. M i c h a e l Haas, "The 4 ( J u l y 1973), p. 503.  such  as  of  a  non-institutional  informal  deliberations  establish a foundation  call  the  their  written  value  West's  of  records u n t i l  the  to  trust.  preoccupation  style  ' A s i a n Way'  own  of  In  with  "sports-shirt" public  session.  P e a c e , " P a c i f i c Community,  39 In t h i s and  way, t h e  everyone  achieved.  loss of  shares  face i s softened i n times  joint  Haas a l s o  responsibility  matters  implementation.  Decisions are prescribed  of  principle  abstract principles;  implementation  what p r o g r e s s  is  p o i n t s o u t t h a t t h e A s i a n way o f d e c i s i o n -  making s e p a r a t e s  basis of  for  of c o n f l i c t  o f these  and  ideals  those o f  by p o l i t i c i a n s  questions of  decisions are l e f t  from  feasibility  on t h e and t h e  f o r the bureaucracy  to  resolve. ASEAN's through  modus o p e r a n d i  mutual  i s through  consultation, or  in its  mufakat-musyawarah.  At t h e v i l l a g e  a leader  act arbitrarily  rather  make  follow, fully  should  gentle suggestions  being  and  not  careful  t o take  always  their  h i s synthesis  spirit  of  or  mufakat  conduct  international leader,  musyawarah  between f r i e n d s  nor  temporary  consensus  the r i s k  occurs  of losing  into 3 3  but  should  participants consideration  Musyawarah, t h e  indefinitely  until  into  the  t h e r e i s no a u t h o r i t a t i v e  where u n a n i m i t y  By  deals,  i s the  the constraint  goal of  trade-offs,  avoiding  allows discussants  one's  will,  community  Transposed  compromised  without  terms,  " n o t a s between o p p o s i t e s b u t a s  eschewed.  musyawarah  his  a  conclusions."  o f course,  takes place  modi v i v e n d i  confrontation, until  where,  Malay  a l l other  and f e e l i n g  achieved.  and b r o t h e r s , "  n e g o t i a t i o n s and p l a y s and  was  context  path  discussion, continued  (consensus)  o f consensus  musyawarah means " t h a t  o r impose  to consult  before d e l i v e r i n g  original  level  of the  views  a process  the  power  risk  of  t o d i c u s s problems of rigid  agendas,  dignity.  53. H e r b e r t F e i t h , The D e c l i n e o f C o n s t i t u t i o n a l Democracy i n I n d o n e s i a ( I t h a c a , New Y o r k : C o r n e l l U n i v . P r e s s , 19S2), p. 40.  40 Critics  of  h i n d e r s more ASEAN c h a i n  than  fast  tendency  toward  i s s u e s such  Its if  helps  i s only  move a s  free-trade  t h e mufakat-musyawarah  as  i t s slowest  meeting  meeting  achieving  conclusive are  unit  protected.  parliamentary but  for  indefinitely the  democracy  through  only  promotes a  controversial  complementarity, Secretariat.  at a  forthcoming  postponed.  Most  o r g a n i z a t i o n ' s impotence i n  on  the  however,  premise  that  the  ASEAN o f f i c i a l s  most c o m p a t i b l e Through The  ASEAN  the  s t a t e s had  during the  '50's,  with t h e i r  consensus,  most o f them t h e e x p e r i m e n t  struggling  can  the  o n e ' s l o s s o f f a c e means t h a t  decisions  i t s shortcomings,  temperament.  are  that i t  more  needed.  mufakat-musyawarah as cultural  of  of a strong c e n t r a l  be  institutionalizes  and  Consensus a l s o  considerable f r i c t i o n  will  link  industrial  preventing  t o be  i t  Despite  d e a l i n g with  with  seriously,  consultations  i t s weakest  member.  the establishment  is likely that  as  maintain  It requires that  postponement or p r o c r a s t i n a t i o n  preoccupation there  ASEAN's p r o g r e s s .  as s t r o n g  as t h o s e and  process  i t was  early was a  historical  interests  flirted  days  insist  of  a failure;  with  of  on and the  Western  independence, for  Indonesia  fiasco:  I n d o n e s i a n democracy, much m i s u n d e r s t o o d outside our s h o r e s , works on c o n s e n s u s , not a show o f hands. We c o u l d no l o n g e r a f f o r d t h i s Western democracy w i t h i t s majority voting, where 51 p e r c e n t win and 49 p e r c e n t e n d s up with a grudge. As we d i s c o v e r e d w i t h o u r 40 p o l i t i c a l parties, t h e d i s s a t i s f i e d segment r e t a l i a t e s by s u c k i n g t h e l i f e b l o o d o f t h e o t h e r . I t ' s a good way f o r a baby n a t i o n t o s t u n t i t s g r o w t h . 3 4  54. S u k a r n o , Sukarno: An A u t o b i o g r a p h y , as t o l d (Jakarta: Gunung Agung P r e s s , 1960), p. 278.  to Cindy  Adams  41 For  the  and  cautiously  stay  leaders  with  a t ASEAN, than to  their  i t va s t h e r e f o r e mov e  not  own  at a l l .  of  brand  better  t o move  slowly  They were c o n t e n t  "conflict-resolution"  to  through  "conflict-avoidance."  The  S t r a t e g i c Context;  The  period  i n which  itself  as  global  political first  Summit o f  Asia  (ZOPFAN),  proposed  as  would  a  i n the  place  and  the  designation  of  that  Southeast  the  United  Jorgensen-Dahl,  op.  response  and to  Suez l e d t o the  assured  In  least  a great the  led  in States  same to  a  The  c i t . , pp.  number  i n 1968 sudden and  the  year,  the  no  74-86.  Singapore no  such  militarily  Tet  Doctrine Asia's  longer  of i t s  mid-seventies,  re-evaluation Guam  of  decision  that  shock t o the  Southeast could  Neutrality  a  both c o u n t r i e s  at  Asia.  role  Freedom  f o r c e s from M a l a y s i a  came as 3 3  the  B r i t a i n ' s review  until  Vietnam  U.S.  in  the  military  previously  North  stipulating  of  was  Peace,  region.  east  countries.  the  of  Malaysia  announcement  restricted  See  Zone  by  take  commitments i n  55.  Declaration  major t u r n i n g p o i n t  all its  by  significant  ZOPFAN i n 1971,  Having  launched  a l s o marked by  of  commitments  ill-prepared  consolidate  i n the  military  Britain's  was  to  regional ramifications,  changes  1971.  struggling  had  military  t o withdraw  Summit  197S.  Southeast  action  ASEAN was  Bali  developments which  ASEAN's f i r s t  by  the  a regional organization  manifested Bali  ZOPFAN and  offensive of  U.S.  of  1969  security be  expected  by to  42 commit  i t s ground f o r c e s t o a s s i s t  aggression. used t o  It did,  interdict  however,  aggressors,  or provide  supplies to  susequently  tried  countries these the  its  events  so-called created a  ASEAN c o u n t r i e s .  of Defence,  giving  them  Britain's great  s h o c k and  little  in  largest  the  way  ASEAN  that  role  should  an  American  and  the  ally. U.S. For  security  5 6  United  power"  ASEAN  Collective  Security  sphere.  Asia,  Malaysia  f o r c e s by  i n the  1968  by  defence  Singapore  that i t thereby  own  forces.  t h e r e f o r e met Singapore,  and  in  Britain's Minister  their  was  All  vulnerability  mid-1970's,  up  especially  a  that the  r e g i o n but  They saw  had  with  which  had  provided  United  States  were u n d e c i d e d  t h e Guam D o c t r i n e a s of r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  war-weary,  the  by  the  should  over  what  "device  i n the  to  region,"  unreliable  signs of  Sino-  a mixed b l e s s i n g t o ASEAN.  a return to a real  Indonesia  a  u n c e r t a i n and  were c o n f i r m e d  i t signalled  whereas  and  and  the  build  which r e p r e s e n t e d  Philippines, in  to the  region.  T h e i r apprehensions  rapprochement the  proposing  i n January  as  directly,  vaccuum by  as November 1967  abandonment  States  forces  be  Union  of indigenous  be.  power t o  Soviet  timetable to  role  naval  The  c o u n t r i e s agreed  a  against external  governments.  assured  base i n the  play  cover  late  consternation,  British The  Asian  i t s military  announcement  a i r and  sense of uneasiness  As  a rough  ally  attack aggressor  the  Dennis Healey,  would w i t h d r a w  Asian  allow  friendly  to f i l l  an  and  Malaysia  "balance were  of  more  56. D o n a l d E. Weatherbee, The U n i t e d S t a t e s i n Southeast A s i a : Continuity and Discontinuity. Paper presented at the International Studies A s s o c i a t i o n meeting, March 1982, p. 4. Quoted i n D o n a l d G. McCloud, System and P r o c e s s in Southeast Asia: The E v o l u t i o n o f a R e g i o n ( B o u l d e r , C o l o . : Westview P r e s s , 1986)," p.~4.~  43  suspicious of  China's  intentions.  U n c e r t a i n t y about  the c a u t i o u s establishment of d i p l o m a t i c r e l a t i o n s some o f  t h e ASEAN c o u n t r i e s ,  soon a f t e r  by  Thailand  between C h i n a alleged  and  in  persistently  refuses  of  is  role  guarantees affairs,  of  through  Similarly,  stuck  by  its  and  specifically  out  of  maintained), role  as  To agreed  in  rule in  trojan  great  strategy.  ASEAN's  to prevent By  of China  search f o r of  Thailand,  convey  as  not  and  still apology  well  as  domestic  party,  the  Singapore  establish  a l l i t s ASEAN  intentions  t o keep  has  formal  neighbours,  T h i s stems not  so  much  (many i n f o r m a l t i e s  of Singapore's  the r e a c t i o n s of  are  suspected Indonesia  to  isolation, each  the views  other  coordinating could  not  understanding  a resolution  Indonesia's  the  ASEAN  informed  members on  the  competition i n evolving r e l a t i o n s  (PRC)  This e x p l i c i t  Cognizant  government  have done so.  diplomatic  powers.  Republic  a formal  i n Indonesia's  until  of fear  Peking's  door.  prevent  with China  until  will  ties  Indonesia  banned communist  i t  Beijing  horse  after  o f i t s pragmatism,  that  r a t h e r out  November 1971  the  People's  Indonesia's  of Chinese  embassy n e x t  relations with  but  help  relations  non-inteference  with  i n 1967  by  followed  Diplomatic  coup.  the Chinese  Indonesia,  a Chinese  a Peking  by  statement  a distrust  Philippines.  l e d to  with Peking  M a l a y s i a i n 1969,  GESTAPU  characteristic  relations  by  were b r o k e n  the  offered  PKI.  the  t o resume  complete  i.e.  diplomatic  and  Indonesia  complicity  its  first  China  fears,  to  allies  actions,  pursue has  the  "friends  of t h e i r  their  also  a divide worked  Kampuchean in  court"  to Beijing.  the and well  issue. such  as  Despite  44 the  warning  Chinese,  s i g n a l s around T h a i l a n d ' s  ASEAN  represents  i s at  least  a cornerstone  Declaring  Southeast  Neutralization  (ZOPFAN)  policy  of  Malaysia's  u n d e r ZOPFAN foreign levels  great be  the  Zone  the great  bloc. of  ZOPFAN:  powers.  the  b a s e d on  integrity  prospective guarantors  a  i n Kuala  the region  flirtation  first,  and  at maintaining Proposed  with  any  proposed  two  ASEAN  nations  mutual  respect  and d e v i s e  among t h e m s e l v e s ;  States,  Freedom  he e n v i s a g e d  principles  and s e c u r i t y  Peace,  effort  or  still  policy.  Tun Razak i n i t i a l l y  and t e r r i t o r i a l  the United  of  was an  entanglements  non-aggression  peace  powers,  a  foreign  A b d u l Razak,  o r power  sovereignty  ensuring  Tun  implementation  must e s p o u s e for  from  to reject  country of  Asia  with the  that the organization  of Thailand's  i n 1971  equidistance  Lumpur by  assured  de f a c t o a l l i a n c e  a means o f  secondly,  as t h e  t h e S o v i e t U n i o n and C h i n a  or s u p e r v i s o r s of Southeast  would Asia's  neutrality. The great  other  ASEAN c o u n t r i e s  enthusiasm,  feeling  that  more e f f e c t i v e  i n deterring  present  policy  without  "...the  product  powers would  interrelationship rejected Asia  "neutralization"  depended  on o u t s i d e  g u a r a n t e e s would  be an  great  power  brittle  with  position the part  and  powers, even  and  greater  still to  meant t h a t  folly.  that  of the b i g  unstable  depend  their  held  t h e major powers t h e m s e l v e s . " because i t  any  would n o t p r o v e any  Indonesia's  as  ZOPFAN  i n t e r f e r e n c e as  b e n e v o l e n c e on  prove  between  greet  i t probably  ZOPFAN.  o f one-way  perhaps  d i d not  on  Instead,  as 3 7  the Malik  Southeast external ASEAN's  57. M i c h e a l L e i f e r , "ASEAN and t h e P r o b l e m o f Common R e s p o n s e . " I n t e r n a t i o n a l J o u r n a l 38 ( S p r i n g 1983), p. 319.  45 security its  could  own  only  be g u a r a n t e e d  "national  (theoretically)  resilience",  translate  external  interference.  concept,  national  that  inseparable  into  A  of  distinctly  "comprising defence  without  addition,  there  undue was an  to prescribe  The  attempt  provision  for  Singapore preferring great  to  powers  other  nations response  entirely  out  realized  that  in  Tun  power  of a  Razak's  demonstrate t o  for  integral  powers."  at  guarantees  to  be  and  In  3 8  Malaysia's order.  clashed  a  After  with  much  His  exercise,  balancing  discussion  the and  w a t e r e d down i n t o a p o l i c y o f  i t as  the  f o r the  was p r o p o s e d  futile  policy of  external  f i r m support  career.  life,  though l e s s a r t i c u l a t e d  power g u a r a n t e e s . organization's  and a symbol o f r e g i o n a l  ZOPFAN  isa  leadership.  other.  accepted  an  foreign  i t s traditional  calling  national  t h e management o f r e g i o n a l  ZOPFAN  each  vis-a-vis  "resilience"  disconcerted  ZOPFAN was e v e n t u a l l y  without  ASEAN  diplomatic  on  against  disagreement, neutrality,  rely  felt  as  would  philosophical  aspects of  relevant  external  also  regional,  on  was  Indonesia's sense of r e g i o n a l  turn  on  [implies] the p r i n c i p l e of s e l f -  equally  unilateral  in  resilience  security  reliance  Indonesia  concentrated  Indonesian  all  and  consideration:  this  regional  element...resilience  reliance,  and  and s u b s e q u e n t l y ,  comprehensive notion including  i f each c o u n t r y  purpose,  common  though not  policy itself.  i n time f o r a c r u c i a l  intention  with  ZOPFAN  M a l a y s i a ' s a l i e n a t e d C h i n e s e community  58. S o e d j a t i Djiwandono, "The ASEAN after the B a l i Indonesian Quarterly, 4 (Special I s s u e , 1976), p. 9. B a i l e y , op. c i t . , p. 288.  The  They election was  to  and t o t h e Summit." Quoted i n  46 PICA ( M a l a y s i a n  Chinese Association)  that  K u a l a Lumpur g o v e r n m e n t was r e c o g n i z e d Critics  such  "exercise  in  from  fact  the  description its  goal  any  that  of  ZOPFAN  of  t o implement but  rather  respect  China,  Vietnam  ZOPFAN,  goal. its  own  Asia  rather  with  guarantees  to offshore  -- t h a t  that  by  was —  than  ZOPFAN had a s of  outside  t h e development As D o n a l d  6 1  great  was hoped  with  nations  ZOPFAN  that  replace  ASEAN o f f i c i a l s  --  through  that  o f an  were q u i c k  to  i s more a p r o c e s s t h a n a  solidarity.  and u n e n t h u s i a s t i c a l l y , and s t i l l  powers  t h e communist  P e r h a p s t h e most i n t e r e s t i n g a c h i e v e m e n t  member n a t i o n s  stems  on t h o s e who d e s i r e i t  i n effect  Moreover,  o f ASEAN  an  ASEAN was n o t a d v e r s a r i a l n o r It  d e n i a l would  observers that  courteously  ZOPFAN  3 9  6 a  Western n a t i o n s .  t h e West.  Peking.  a policy of neutrality i s d i f f i c u l t  was t o r e a s s u r e  and t h e USSR  policy of  of the  of i t s ambiguity  defence arrangement."  intentions."  o f ZOPFAN  demonstration  greeted  posits,  self-denying  of the a  alliance insist  on  labelled  the legitimacy  b e c a u s e i t "depends n o t o n l y  aim  a stooge  denial of  new r e g i o n a l  to their  The  have  by  and a p o l i c y o f d e n i a l .  i n Southeast  Weatherbee c o r r e c t l y  and e n d o r s e d  Part  6 0  legitimacy  i s less a prescription f o r action  a condition  activity kind  Leifer  creative ambiguity."  "the d i p l o m a t i c  military of  as Micheal  the  a b o u t ZOPFAN  Although each o f  i s -- a c u t e l y  ZOPFAN the  was was  ASEAN  sensitive of i t s  59. On t h i s p o i n t , s e e M i c h e a l L e i f e r , I n d o n e s i a ' s F o r e i g n P o l i c y (London: G e o r g e A l l e n & Unwin, 1983). 60. L e i f e r , op. c i t . , p. 320. 61. S h e l d o n W. Simon, The ASEAN S t a t e s and R e g i o n a l Security (Stanford, C a l i f . : Hoover I n s t i t u t i o n P r e s s , 1982), p. 13. 62. D o n a l d Weatherbee, "U.S. P o l i c y and t h e Two S o u t h e a s t A s i a s , " A s i a n S u r v e y , 18 ( A p r i l 1978), p. 412.  47  own i n d i v i d u a l coordinate  foreign  Indeed, b o t h Tun  fragility  ZOPFAN  succeeded  organization.  brandished  U.S.-Soviet, instigated China's  t h e new  of  proposal.  in  need  to  winning C h i n a ' s endorsement o f  and ASEAN's  ring,"  a  status  "criminal  revisionists  abruptly  the Soviet  changed  Union's  a s a bona  Beijing's desire  after  of  design,"  the  "jointly  imperialists."  ZOPFAN  and  Collective  Soviet  6 3  ASEAN's Security  ASEAN's s e c u r i t y needs,  to obstruct  fide,  i n 1967, C h i n a  as " p a r t  and U.S.  regional  In a d d i t i o n t o s u i t i n g  also suited  the  Upon ASEAN's f o r m a t i o n  the Soviet  attitude  rejection  realized  regional organization  anti-China  by  and  policies.  Razak's government  non-aligned had  internal  designs  ZOPFAN i n the  region.  China's Relationship While China  may n o t  Western c i r c l e s , co-existing threat, in  in  not  terms  63.  n o t go  centuries  power  over  The C h i n e s e  encapsulates  point  the  See B a i l e y ,  of  "backyard",  to  The ASEAN  a m b i t i o n s do  Asia.  China's  a p p e a r much  i n the conventional  insurgencies.  imperial  from t h e  of access  originated  t o t h e Region  their  of a threatening view o f t h e A s i a n  i t  looms  a  countries formidable  sense o f o u t r i g h t aggression ethnic  Chinese  countries' fear  entirely  as  power i n  without  ago d u r i n g  communities  of China's  foundation.  the dynastic  but and  hegemonic Their  fears  e r a o f C h i n a a s an  i t s many s u z e r a i n t i e s i n N o r t h and S o u t h e a s t concept o f  territories  of  op. c i t . , p. 169.  "Nanyang", Thailand,  or  "Southern  Cambodia,  Seas"  V i e t n a m and  48 Indonesia within militarily refers  i t s sphere  a q u i e s c e n t and  to the  18 m i l l i o n  economic predominace in  the  total  dictates  motherland.  6  took their  Chinese  in  a firm  every  1978,  countries  for  as  interests Chinese  Chinese  were  must  identity  guest that  afford  clear,  expect  Singapore."  the Chinese  recent  "Speak  rising  preeminence  English  Mandarin"  s a  were  Asia  be  also whose  representation essentially  loyalty  to  the  have  Yew's  To  make told  come t o r e a l i z e  that  national  interests  her  national  assurances to  convincing  S i n g a p o r e had  enough  the to  long  advocated  t h e government f e l t  i t unwise  predominant was  dialects  spoken  Chinese i n  Kwan Yew  their  Lee  ASEAN  publicly  Singaporeans.  always  because  of l o c a l  Malaysia  China to s a c r i f i c e  not  campaign  to three  the e t h n i c  Premier  However,  language  -- a s t h e i s l a n d ' s  that  to s a c r i f i c e  of multilingualism  accord  Nanyang  philosophy show  and  "Singaporeans  so they cannot for  t o him  Singapore's Sino-phobic neighbours.  to  tiny  Teng's v i s i t  Malaysians  Vice-Premier  a policy  their  Nanyang  them t o  i n Southeast  t h e l e a d e r s o f S i n g a p o r e and  they cannot  China,  The  stance i n s t r e s s i n g  Chinese  just  outweighs  Vice-Premier  Singapore's national his  "accessible."  overseas Chinese  vastly  requiring  4  During capitals  politically  population.  that  of influence,  status.  launched -- and  language,  to  Thus when a offset  to a l e s s e r  i t raised  the  extent,  eyebrows i n  64. See P e t e r Lyon, "War and P e a c e , " F a r E a s t e r n E c o n o m i c Review, 21 March 1975, p. 9. 65. See T h a k u r P h a n i t , R e g i o n a l I n t e g r a t i o n A t t e m p t s i n S o u t h e a s t Asia; A Study of ASEAN's Problems and Progress Ph. D. d i s s e r t a t i o n , P e n n s y l a v a n i a S t a t e U n i v e r s i t y , 1980, p. 229.  49 neighbouring Singapore  Indonesia  to assert  A further material  and M a l a y s i a  i t s ethnic s t a t u s .  source  and  moral  movements and  of  the t h e i r  not  be  relations  distinct. this  argument  apply  after  1975.  rejoiced, anxiety  the  which  China's  communist  distinguishing  China  between  is  maintains,  both  guite  should  separate  adamant i n r e f u s i n g  distinction  to  the  and Cambodia, U.S.  withdrawal  policies.  roles  point  evidently  in  Northern  ASEAN's  and  t o accept does  not  to  from  Southeast  development  i n t h e Vietnam  forces  fell  by ASEAN.  and  communism.  two  While  War more  others  A s i a was met  The i n t e r n a t i o n a l  proved  potent Vietnam  See i b i d .  But t h e r e was now  with  the  o f China, itself  to  order  with prior  also  military  with S o v i e t -  conflict  and t h e  t h e S o v i e t U n i o n and J a p a n .  be a f o r m i d a b l e f i g h t i n g  force against  n a t i o n , c o n d i t i o n e d by d e c a d e s o f war  revolutionary was now  uneasiness  open S i n o - S o v i e t  t h e U.S.,  most p o w e r f u l  worth o f American  66.  fell  relations,  the world's  that  insurgent  t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s was d e f e a t e d  Laos  foreign  uncertain  a  is  was t h e b a s i s on w h i c h t h e ASEAN c o u n t r i e s had f a s h i o n e d  American  and  on  on t h e f o r m e r ,  turning  and a p p r e h e n s i o n  1975  Vietnam  major  Saigon  countries,  their  Beijing  and p a r t y - t o - p a r t y r e l a t i o n s .  t h e most  since the  second  occurred  to  is  by  t o China. The  in  relations  the l a t t e r  Indonesia  with  ASEAN's  insistence  based  p r e j u d i c e d by  for  i t was an a t t e m p t  6 6  irritation  support  government-to-government Diplomatic  who f e l t  f e r v o u r . Most w o r r i s o m e t o ASEAN i n possession of f i v e  equipment.  What  new  billion  was  dollars  i n t e r n a t i o n a l and  50 regional fit  i n t o the On  an  order  the  would r e p l a c e  the  power  configuration?  one  hand,  the  f o r the  o t h e r hand,  fact,  to  as  security  Bali  of  and  by  victors  happened.  among  ability  first,  region  potential  the  neither  dissension the  American  the  the  ASEAN s t a t e s  - Vietnam,  the  USSR,  This  partly  economic growth.  Summit,  and  This  formalizing  second,  by  was  and  due  i n Southeast to cooperate  China.  but  in  In  also  to  regional  two  ASEAN's p o l i t i c a l  be  internal  promote  achieved  On  might  to  Asia,  and  maintaining  vivendi  intervention.  the  was  Asia  presented  t o d e v e l o p a modus  "dominos",  communists  and  would S o u t h e a s t  without e x t e r n a l  ASEAN s t a t e s  affirming  How  w i t h d r a w a l i n 1975  finally  Indochinese nations  vulnerable  old?  new  opportunity  with the  the  ways;  r o l e at  communication  the with  Vietnam. First,  the  ASEAN's f o r e i g n to  assess  recent  ASEAN s h o u l d of  the  Briefly,  seminal  ministers,  take.  take  exclusively  peaceful  to  The  promote  The  but  and  and  the  of  peace,  and  based  Amity  Declaration Cooperation.  threats  posed  by on  settlement  of  regional  Cooperation  outlined  steps  on:  b)  the  states  interference;  measures  rely  f o r i n d e p e n d e n c e and  external  and  state  to  mutual r e s p e c t  to  the  only  and  a)  r i g h t of  what  summit was of  not  heads of  determine  to eliminate  the  Amity  convened  national  t o w a r d ZOPFAN,  processes i n  Treaty  to the  resolved  1976  the  Treaty  active steps  "perpetual"  also  outcome o f  ASEAN C o n c o r d  subversion,  differences.  Summit o f  developments  ASEAN C o n c o r d the  Bali  lead  their  teritorial existence  integrity; free  from  51 c) n o n - i n t e r f e r e n c e i n t h e  i n t e r na l  affairs  d) t h e s e t t l e m e n t o f d i s p u t e s by p e a c e f u l e)  Both  of  e x p l i c i tly  concern  established a  a r e s i g n i f i cant  political  sense  v i c t o r i e s,  to r e a f f i r m  of  threat,  stipulates  the  use  to  grown o u t  Bali  conference  the  based  strengthened  V i e t n am and e s t a b l i s h  regional  are  Having  and r e nif o r c e r e l a t i o n s  and  assumptions concerning  because they  docume n t s .  t o i n i t i a t e a dialogue with  o f common Concord  6 7  f o r t h e communist  priorities  shared  relations  c o o p er a t i o n .  t h e s e d o c uments  ASEAN's f i r s t  on  means;  t h e r e n u n c i a t i o n o f t h e u s e o f t h r ea t s o r f o r c e ;  f) effective  of a  o f one a n o t h e r ;  order.  The  aset ASEAN  that  The s t a b i l i t y o f each member s t a t e and o f t h e ASEAN r e g i o n i s an e s s e n t i a l contribution to international p e a c e and s e c u r i t y. E a c h member r e s o I v e s t o e l i m i n a t e t h r e a t s posed by s u b v e r s i o n to i t s stability, thus s t r e n g t h e n i n g n a t i o n a l and ASEAN r e s i l i e n c e . In political  other  stablity  instability whole. for  in  the  o f ASEAN  one s t a te  interstate  conduct  and  political  accommodation  It  t e r r i to r i a l bridge  was  to  ASEAN was  Concord  the  that  presence  the of  f o r t h e r e g i o n as a  and C o o p e r a t i o n p r o v i d e d a framework the sanctity  stressed  within  of national  I t was i n t e n d e d t o s e r v e  integrity.  Indochina  possible  asserted  i n d i v i s i ble;  had r e p e r c u s s i o n s  The T r e a t y o f A m i t y  sovereignty as a  words,  by  making  the  i t clear  existing  that  political  framework o f t h e r e g i o n .  67. I n t e r v i e w with Peace i n Southeast 45.  Mochtar Kusumaatmadja, " I n d o n e s i a , Asia," Kaleidoscope International,  ASEAN and 1984, p.  52 After hostile and  the  summit m e e t i n g ,  attitude  potential  ASEAN r e s o l v e d  towards Indochina,  accommodation.  not t o  emphasizing  In a j o i n t  press  adopt  a  non-intervention statement:  The CASEAN F o r e i g n ] M i n i s t e r s e x p r e s s e d t h e hope t h a t these developments [ i n Indochina] would open up p r o s p e c t s f o r r e a l peace, p r o g r e s s and s t a b i l i t y i n t h e region o f Southeast Asia. The M i n i s t e r s expressed t h e i r r e a d i n e s s t o e n t e r i n t o a f r i e n d l y and h a r m o n i o u s r e l a t i o n s h i p with each n a t i o n o f I n d o c h i n a . 6 8  Thailand an  and  Malaysia  invitation  to join  critical  comments  replacement  had  a l r e a d y a p p r o a c h e d H a n o i i n 1975 w i t h  ASEAN,  o f ASEAN  but  i t was  as being  rejected  along  with  a "neo-colonialist",  U.S.  o f SEATQ.  Conclusion  The  advent  perception  of  recognition  of  intra-regional great  a  was  external  threat,  the potential hostilities,  reliance  regional  diversion  by  of  prescription another's throughout  on  security  underpinned  concrete  o f ASEAN  not  common  but  by  a  common  was  conceived  The in  stability  ASEAN  (such  out o f  continued  based  as  Press Statement, E i g h t h K u a l a Lumpur, 14 May 1975.  was l e s s economic  and t o o  ASEAN c o n c e p t i o n  developmental  to  prevent  economic development.  sovereignty. During  1970s,  instead  dangers a r i s i n g  f o r r e g i o n a l order  results  a  o u t s i d e powers.  e n e r g i e s from  the  by  l a c k o f economic c o o p e r a t i o n ,  political  national  distinguished  of  terms,  the  wasteful  I t was a l s o a  on m u t u a l r e s p e c t f o r one i t s evolutionary concerned  with  integration)  ASEAN F o r e i g n  period  producing than  Ministers  with  Meeting,  53 cultivating political be,  a  durable  foundation  of  g o o d w i l l among i t s members.  ASEAN's  foremost  and  trust,  T h i s was,  ever-fragile  solidarity and  priority.  continues In  and to  Chan Heng  Chee's words: T h a t ASEAN was c o n c e i v e d p r i m a r i l y a s an o r g a n i z a t i o n whose m a j o r a c t i v i t i e s lay in economic, social and cultural cooperation, but whose raison d'etre was political coordination to cope with threats to subregional peace and security, internally or e x t e r n a l l y , i s a r e v e a l i n g statement of the maximal attainment possible in a situation of minimal consensus." 6 9  As its  a  regional organization, member  objectives;  states  ASEAN  coordinated  ASEAN d i d n o t  evolved their  coordinate their  as a forum  policies policies  and  i n which national  f o r them.  69. Chan Heng Chee, "ASEAN: Subregional R e s i l i e n c e , " i n Security Interdependence i n the A s i a P a c i f i c R e g i o n , ed. James W. Morley (Massachusetts: L e x i n g t o n Books, 1986), p. 114.  54  CHAPTER THREE  The  Invasion  A threat reduce or of  security."  the  Kampuchea and  i s defined  wipe o u t  particularly  of  the  In  7 0  that  enjoyment  relative will  The  7 1  counts,  widening problems,  is  capabilities  feel.  energies  first  The  on  not  social and  the  of  of  values  the  the  ASEAN n a t i o n s  the  ASEAN  a threat  countries'  threat.  second f a c t o r  distance. less  The  immediacy  The  archipelagic  status,  conciliatory  to  Philippines,  the  virtually  threat  ill-equipped  the  Vietnamese of  the  and  what  by The  more  movements  and  security  forces  remain  any  major  consideration  i s from Secure  a conflict, in i t s  Similarly,  Kampuchean  conflict  involvement  they  have  of the  detached  most u n r u f f l e d by  threat.  it  their  internal  the  been t h e  three  all  to confront  is  have.  I n d o n e s i a has  impact  non-existent  will  focusing  military  f a r t h e r removed a c o u n t r y the  of  l e s s threatened  serious  external  strength  i t s accuracy.  insurgency  and  is  i s conditioned  still  pose  to  it  of c a p a b i l i t i e s .  are  under-trained  crisis  i t i s the  possesses the  woefully  i s perceived  or decrease a f e e l i n g  degree of  development,  inequities  that  Kampuchean  nature  a country  economic  condition  t o keep i n mind t h a t  A country's perception factors.  "any  discussing  important  perception  as  i t s Consequences  for has in  and the been the  70. E s t r e l l a D. S o l i d u m , "Security Perspectives i n ASEAN," in Aspects of ASEAN, eds. Werner P f e n n i g and Mark M. B. Suh (Munich, Germany: W e l t f o r u m V e r l a g , 1984), p. 101. 71. I b i d . , pp. 101-102.  55 issue  is  factor  by  virtue  rests  on  policy-making operating  the  process.  are  individuals,  individuals, factor  time  c o n d i t i o n s of ambiguity situation  differently  on  some d e c i s i o n - m a k e r s threats  doorstep,"  "tigers  The  point  invasion  the  a  ASEAN  and  recent  The statement  120,000  1978  visit  by  (or  It  As  clouded)  suspicions  will  be  by and The  7 8  perceived  of these  factors: or  "tigers  troops and  even  at  the  across  the  the  i n Phnom  as  an  of  respect  subsequent Penh a month  o f power and  organization. for  Pham Van  supposed t o r e p r e s e n t  a The  national  came as a p a r t i c u l a r  Vietnamese Premier  w h i c h was  shock  Dong  to  a gesture  of  goodwill.  r e a c t i o n was on  processes.  regional distribution  development  ASEAN  tigers."  1978  Semrin regime  i n the  political  issued  "paper  25,  the  information.  call  the  standard  potential  Vietnamese  December Heng  by  Asians  non-intervention.  and  ASEAN  the  ASEAN's p r i n c i p l e s  capitals,  conciliation  threatened  j u n g l e , " or  i n ASEAN's  violated  sovereignty  the  of  on  marked a s h i f t  turning  after  of  "reliable"  or a combination  be  third in  and  in  residual  external threats  what  i n the  border  establishment later,  --  conditioned  little  one  will  crossing  Cambodian  with  rules  foreign policy  constraints,  i s that  depending  fictitious  in  The  decision-makers  particularly  perceptions are  experiences,  resulting  the  ASEAN.  Beyond d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g  a key  their  membership i n  perceptions of  procedures,  countries,  past  of t h e i r  swift  January  72. R o b e r t 0. T i l m a n , S o u t h e a s t Perceptions of E x t e r n a l Threats 1987), p. 26.  19,  and  uncompromising.  1979  condemned  A  joint  the  armed  A s i a and t h e Enemy Beyond: (Boulder, Colo.: Westview  ASEAN Press,  56 intervention,  "affirmed  the  right  o f Kampuchea t o d e t e r m i n e i t s  internal  affairs",  and  called  f o r an  foreign  forces."  One  notes,  however,  directly  and  by  "aggression," The  January  using  ASEAN's joint  statement not  by  the  were  According offered  a  prevent  troop  Thai  hot  was  to  Foreign  line  the  maintain  and  accept  Vietnamese t r o o p s Thailand influence  in  traditionally  the  along  has Laos served  the  accompli  Thai  border."  as  Kampuchea buffer  claim to s i x t e e n Thai  a greater  Indochina  would have been weaker t h a n the  United  cautious,  and  73. Rodney Tasker, "Avoiding E c o n o m i c Review, 19 Apr. 1984, p.  these  pact  these  the  to his  offers  were  because i f  presence  with  Vietnam  two  states  as  part of  Thailand  the  was  by  that,  provinces  of  of  for have  Vietnam's  i t s goal  of  would have p r e f e r r e d a  South,  Despite  he  measure  light  one.  the  7 3  competed  N o r t h and  cooperative  a  In  S t a t e s w i t h d r e w i n 1975, flexible,  of  directly  flexibility.  states.  Federation,  divided into  But  to accept  fait  traditionally and  Hanoi,  Thach.  condemn  while  Savetsila,  non-aggression  refused  historical  weak V i e t n a m ,  ASEAN c o u n t r y  and  than  anti-Vietnamese.  Siddhi  even a  just  S i d d h i : "I  so you  to  negotiating  Minister  rejected do  only  between Bangkok  clashes,  Vietnam  unprovocative.  worded  t o appear o v e r t l y  Nguyen Co  you  explicitly  carefully  Vietnamese counterpart, by  naming  i n v a s i o n , T h a i l a n d took a tough stance  willing  to  not  "armed i n t e r v e n t i o n " r a t h e r  Kampuchea's n e i g h b o u r and  affected others  term  t h a t by  c o n d e m n a t i o n was  Vietnam's a c t i o n s but As  the  "immediate w i t h d r a w a l o f a l l  s i n c e two  Vietnams  f e a r s of expansion  Thai  policy Vietnam's 16.  government  toward Trap."  adopted  Vietnam. Far  when a In  Eastern  57 keeping  with  i t s t r a d i t i o n of  provide countervailing Thais t e n t a t i v e l y to  avoid  status,  revived which  sponsorship  concerned  against  to China  its  Thai  external  main  as  fears  of  an  the  a position  of  effectively  emerge  ramifications  dominance. to  A  new  i f H a n o i was  center  of  which  Thailand  would  f r o n t - l i n e state,  Thailand  also  buffer  Union's  establishment to  regional be  care  expansionist Soviet  Bangkok's m i l i t a r y - b u r e a u c r a t i c  with the  the  taking  Kampuchea's  by  to  a l l i a n c e . When  Vietnam's  reinforced  power  adversary,  f o r added s u p p o r t ,  e f f e c t i v e l y destroyed  were f u r t h e r  role.  a strong  relationship labelled  invasion  it  ambitions,  was  turned  having the  V i e t n a m ' s 1978  force  seeking  consolidate power  most  would  unpalatably  subordinated. As  a  spin-off  costs  of  armed  r e f u g e e s and  consequent  territory  SRV  its  by  revolution  ASEAN s u p p o r t Vietnam's the  frontier Persian  to Thai  the  Gulf,  of  what  in  Southeast  not  has  74.  stance  Tilman,  the  also to  World  fear  that  stems  eastern  against  the  incursions  into  its the  against  called  "export" that  perception  region.  b o u n d a r y has  To  of quote  become  the  the  strategic  further  'Socialism's  of Thai  insistence  c o n t r o l of  stronghold  euphemistically  to  huge  influx  Hanoi c o u l d  from  but  the  massive  Thailand's  itself,  i s the  the  disruption,  "Thailand's  Thailand  Vietnam  --  territory.  only  Free  advance Outpost'  Asia." * 7  S i n g a p o r e has line  and  i t s position  Minister,  of  social  forces,  threat  Foreign  conflict  shoulders  in  op.  adopted,  condemning  c i t . , p.  72.  i f  not  surpassed,  Vietnam's  actions.  Thailand's  hard-  Singapore  is  58 ASEAN's s t r o n g e s t issue,  in  and  complete  most  contrast  economic d i s c u s s i o n s . bluntly  and  insisting  that  from  and  extreme dependence stability.  a threat  to Thailand  However, of  fear  Vietnam.  threat  ultimately asserted Soviets  become a  commercial;  sea-lanes through blood its  rests,  Black  policy infused  of  Sea  m e r e l y an  and  a distinct,  two  actions  an  or  stems  island-nation, which  requires  leadership,  the of  Since  specifically  Lee  As  the  Kuan  1960s,  Kuan Yew,  p o l i c y have been r e l e n t l e s s l y  the of  Union  is  of i t s  its  Union depends to  Lee  Yew  because  protection  upon w h i c h  the  are  whether  Soviet  i d e o l o g i c a l d i s t r u s t of i n 1981,  Vietnamese  Lee  region  so  a direct  f o r what  was  with the  Soviet  of  the  pretext  Asia.  of Malacca  fleets.  again  even out  issue  in  fear  Japanese r e p o r t e r s and  course"  f e e l s that  main  m a j o r power  Pacific  speaking  n e i g h b o u r stems not  nor  Southeast  a l s o upon w h i c h t h e  and  p r a c t i c e of  Singaporean  adjunct  "The  Straits  ASEAN's  ASEAN.  i t i s concerned  the  Singapore,  with  Addressing "Soviet  but  to  welfare,  S i n g a p o r e ' s major  7 3  to the  Singapore  1982,  in  the  for i t s front-line  designs f o r  September  will  primarily  and  "stay  Kampuchean  profile  f o r e i g n investment  i s a threat  Instead,  Soviet  in  Vietnam."  on  fear for Thailand's  i s secondary  low  i n the  v u l n e r a b i l i t y as  Thus a c c o r d i n g  support  much o u t  its  ASEAN  a deep s e n s e o f  regional  of  to  Singapore's customary  directly its  outspoken c r i t i c  the  link  foreign  has  Soviet  life-  been  policy.  remarked  that  consistent:  to  75. S i n g a p o r e Broadcasting Corporation, 9 September, 1982. In Hans Indorf, Impediments to Regionalism in Southeast Asia: Bilateral Constraints Among ASEAN Member States (Singapore: I n t s t i t u t e o f S o u t h e a s t A s i a n S t u d i e s , 1984), p. 36.  59 secure  the Russian  h e a r t l a n d from  attack,  a n d . . . t o keep i t u n d e r Communist Compared adopted  to  a  "wait  Indonesia  and,  T h a i l a n d and and  see"  to  diametrically  opposite  of t h e i r  ASEAN  threat  two  is  less  confronting  its  China  Vietnamese border Vietnam's r e c e n t  vocal  growing  nor  Indonesia  extent,  to demonstrate actions  and  the i n v a s i o n .  that  took  but  and  Thailand  in  after  punitive raid  also  at  main  China,  the f a l l  of  across  the  i t s "paternal" discontent  aimed  a  stance  ASEAN's  with  shortly  a military  Malaysia  t o t h e vehement  ties  1979,  and  Malaysia,  S o v i e t Union,  cooperative  In J a n u a r y  launched  after  They f e e l the  world,  6  immediately  neighbours.  Vietnam.  Phnom Penh,  Singapore,  view i n comparison  n e i t h e r Vietnam  specifically  control.  attitude  a  t o communize t h e  "teaching  with i t  a  lesson." China people" China  has  that  "will  Thailand  taken  i f Hanoi not  with  operational  also  stand  tanks,  measures t o  d i d not idly  link  by."  Indonesia latent  is  ambitions  provides China  7 7  was  between N o r t h w e s t T h a i l a n d and at the  S i n c e then, guns and  Southeast  forefront  in  an  unwelcome  "foot  fraternal  Thai  Thailand,  then  China  artillery  established  i n the region, f e a r i n g with  the  "stop provoking"  anti-aircraft  military  "assure  in  China.  has  weapons.  December  An 1985  7 8  warning a g a i n s t that the in  supplied  the  present door"  China's conflict to  the  76. T i l m a n , op. c i t . , p. 63. 77. See J u s t u s M. Van Der K r o e f , "The U n i t e d S t a t e s and Cambodia: The Limits of Compromise and Intervention," Contemporary S o u t h e a s t A s i a , 7 (March 1986). 78. See Lau Teik Soon, "Shifting Alignments in Regional Politics," in Southeast Asian Affairs 1986 (Singapore: I n s t i t u t e o f S o u t h e a s t A s i a n S t u d i e s , 1987).  60 region. of  Indonesia  Vietnam  threat. worry.  are  It  Indonesia  stability,  are  feel  v i e w e d as this  suffer  Malaysia  between  p e o p l e as that  a  provide  indigenous  C h i n a as  that  ideology  the  reconstructed,  e x c e l l e n t bulwark  plays  In  fact,  with  any  their  which  they  issue.  Chinese threat  is  What i s meant  7 9  a secondary and  role  the  Indonesia  ASEAN-supported against  Chinese  population  links  "a h u n g r y g i a n t "  nature.  ethnic  Kampuchean  than i d e o l o g i c a l .  inherently by  motives i n the  revealed  communist  expansionist  an  of  parties i s a persistant irritation  the  strong,  ASEAN's main  ethnically  China's r e f u s a l to sever  more n a t i o n a l i s t i c  views of  the  be  fears  short-term  problems  the  r e s p e c t i v e l y ) and  Indonesian e l i t e s  i s that  immediate  and  a t t e s t s to China's u l t e r i o r of  i t i s an  China should  unstable.  communist  A survey  the  35%  while Thailand's  a modernizing  relations  and  extremely  outlawed  by  where  (3%  p o s i t i o n that  perhaps l e g i t i m a t e ,  f e e l s that  Both  minority  takes the  Chinese believes  Vietnam  Chinese  to  would  expansionist  designs. Thailand's  front-line  China's threat  of  the  use  to r e l u c t a n t l y  follow  its  unity.  Thailand  f r i e n d s by support, Despite began,  neither  increased  U.S.  infinitely 79.  Tilman,  Thai more op.  force  walks a  sanctioning  though  the  of  and  formally military  government  caused  member  reliance  the  r e s t of  for  fine line  the  with  assistance  since  aware t h a t against  its  on  ASEAN  sake  and  acknowledging nor  is fully  118-121.  political  Chinese p o l i t i c a l  e f f e c t i v e deterrent c i t . , pp.  has  front-line  therefore  informally  status  of  ASEAN  military  denying i t . the  conflict  China poses  further  an  Vietnamese  61 aggression a senior  than  official  remarked:  purely  short-term. therefore  offending  Indonesia  ASEAN's  is  accommodate a  of  a violation The ante,  though  by  securing  Ibid.,  in  that  Thailand  the  conflict  new and  will  risk  first,  the extent  demands  territory,  the  motives  interest  violation  clearly  focuses  should  i n Kampuchea.  The  o f one o f ASEAN's  To c o n d o n e  are  on r e v i v i n g  somewhat thus  expansionist sovereignty  According  such  f o r the future.  more  t h e s t a t u s quo  to this  Indonesia  sympathetic  to  more open t o a c c e p t i n g t h e  t h a t Vietnam's occupation  or  foremost  under t h e l e a d e r s h i p o f t h e deposed  c o n c e r n s and  i t s national  but  t h a t V i e t n a m ' s i n v a s i o n was an o u t r i g h t  Kampuchea  aggressive  a  behind  t o w h i c h ASEAN  f o r national sovereignty.  They f e e l  p. 84.  a  alliance i s  is still  f r o m Kampuchean  regarding,  i n contrast,  menacing China.  80.  i tis  and n o t t h e Khmer Rouge u n d e r P o l P o t .  Vietnam's s e c u r i t y  driven  i n China  unlikely  position  i n gross  position with  Affairs  and M a l a y s i a .  respect  Malaysia,  s t a t u s quo.  i t s trust  making i t  view i s  P r i n c e Sihanouk and  Moreover,  facto China-Thailand  would c r e a t e d a n g e r o u s p r e c e d e n t s  Thai  Foreign  As  i s on o u r s i d e , and t h a t i s a l l t h a t  and, s e c o n d ,  of aggression"  of  ASEAN.  academic q u e s t i o n ,  Vietnamese c o n t r o l l i n g  Thai  principles  n o t an  t h e de  disagreement  prevailing  Ministery  Vietnamese t r o o p s  Vietnam's a c t i o n s  "act  China  diplomatic  withdrawal of  Thai  i tis  In s h o r t ,  1 , 8 0  S t a t e s or, f o r t h a t matter,  the  survival.  untested,  there  in  "With us  matter o f matters.  the United  was l e s s  motives  than  vis-a-vis  an  argument,  a  an a c t  means  of  increasingly  t h e i n v a s i o n was n o t  62 an  exclusively  but  drew  its  conflict an  bilateral roots  which,  adjunct  in  affair large  i n turn,  of Sino-Soviet  between V i e t n a m  was  part  perceived  "close  as  teeth  Chinese suzerainty, a  belligerent  the  to l i p s " ,  subordinate  described have,  periodically  flared  and  an  up  but  an  did  not  favor  independent  followed  by  membership  Vietnam's in  COMECON,  Chinese Vietnamese "boat  people,"  estimated  growing  billion  Vietnam  signs  Kampuchea  and  of  was  drift the the  ideology  and  in  and  of  China,  South  and  as  This point  the  influx  a  a  shall  draw  a  was  threat  an and  to  Laos,  be  within  to  Chinese Vietnam's  later.  distinction  Vietnam's s e c u r i t y imperatives.  of  Like  tendency toward  clear  ethnic  Kampuchea's  8 1  become c l e a r e r  81. By 1977, Kampuchea was disputing i s l a n d s , e x p e l l i n g Vietnamese n a t i o n a l s , on t h e b o r d e r s o f t h e Mekong d e l t a .  of  devasted  Hanoi  direct  was  orbit,  termination  Vietnam.  any  This  of the s o - c a l l e d  left  by  like  Vietnam,  Soviet  Compounding t h i s toward  between  self-assumed  expulsion  which  assumed  influence  Malaysia  to  China's abrupt aid  resentment  perceived  and  closer  crippled.  cooperation  Indonesia  centuries  deteriorated rapidly  of North  subsequent  of  of  security.  the  as  aware t h a t  large-scale  traditionally  was  as  Chinese  pro-Western) regime i n Saigon.  Vietnam's sphere  national  H a n o i was  unification  culminating  $18  impoverished  (and  the  overbearing,  e a r l y 1970s.  Thailand,  Beijing  into contests  in  1973,  by  through  S i n o - V i e t n a m e s e r e l a t i o n s once a g a i n By  Sino-Vietnamese  i n Moscow and  mentor. the  Kampuchea,  tensions.  Sino-Vietnamese r e l a t i o n s , once  from  and  between  Vietnam's r e s o r t  to  r i g h t s over offshore and h a r r a s s i n g V i e t n a m  63 force,  they  escalating  argue, attacks  was along  Chinese involvement position  due n o t t o e x p a n s i o n i s t their  ambitions  but t o  b o r d e r s by P o l P o t and i n c r e a s i n g  i n Kampuchea.  David  Elliot  sums up  their  as f o l l o w s :  To t h e e x t e n t t h a t V i e t n a m i s an e x p a n s i o n i s t s t a t e , the d r i v e t o e x t e n d i t s i n f l u e n c e and c o n t r o l i s n o t a simple p r o j e c t i o n o f i t s i d e o l o g y , and t o t h e e x t e n t that ideology i s a f a c t o r i n i t s expansionist behavior ( s p e c i f i c a l l y t h e V i e t n a m e s e i n v a s i o n o f Kampuchea), i t i s not the ideology itself o r even the s t r a t e g i c p r e c e p t s drawn from t h a t i d e o l o g y which a r e c r i t i c a l , but t h e a p p l i c a t i o n o f t h e i d e o l o g y and s t r a t e g y to s p e c i f i c circumstances. 8 8  In o t h e r strategic  the  necessity,  Communist  doctrine.  Nguyen Co point  words,  invasion  and  less  A comment  Thach d u r i n g  clear i n relation  of a  Kampuchea was requirement  more o f a  of  made by V i e t n a m ' s F o r e i g n  a Bangkok  visit  in  May 1980  Vietnam's Minister made  this  t o ASEAN:  The solidarity o f the Indochinese nations i s as i m p o r t a n t t o V i e t n a m a s i s t h e s o l i d a r i t y o f ASEAN t o Thailand. We have no i n t e n t i o n o f making an ASEAN c o u n t r y as a b u f f e r z o n e between o u r c o u n t r i e s and we cannot accept t h e p r e m i s e t h a t an I n d o c h i n a c o u n t r y be made a buffer zone between these groups of countries." 8 3  For against  Indonesia, the  the  Dutch i s  irritation  among  among t h e  ASEAN s t a t e s  independence. the  still  of  strong.  Indonesian o f f i c i a l s  Reminded  military's  memory  heroic  t o have of the role  the An  Indonesian occasional  i s that  during  of  i s alone  to fight  forits  revolutionary the  point  Indonesia  a c t u a l l y had bitter  Revolution  coup  of  s t r u g g l e and 1965,  many  82. D a v i d W.P. E l l i o t , " V i e t n a m i n A s i a : S t r a t e g y and D i p l o m a c y in a New C o n t e x t , " I n t e r n a t i o n a l J o u r n a l , 38 ( S p r i n g 1983), p. 291. 83. Bangkok P o s t , 22 May 1980. Quoted i n Micheal Leifer, "Obstacles to a P o l i t i c a l Settlement i n Indochina," Pacific A f f a i r s . 58 ( W i n t e r 1985-86), p. 633.  64 Indonesians,  particularly  with  whom t h e y s e e a s p r e s e n t l y  its  Vietnam national General  and  the  the  Benny M u r d a n i ,  sent  unilaterally  ripples  China  i s s u e and Sheldon  in  of  aptly  Asias" China  terms  that  by h o s t i l e  such  powers,  forces  advocate  ASEAN  not a t h r e a t  countries  source of  to  as  when  in he  Southeast  Israel  and  tend to take  an  -- ASEAN  of China's t h e PRC  the q u a r r e l  and  the r e g i o n  a 3  roles,  conferences hosted  Nonetheless,  relates  generally  the  to China  "Two and  by  been  the  pivotal  relates  to the  other  capabilities  has  and  intentions.  and  never  guarantor;  been  invited  ASEAN o r I n d o c h i n a ,  and i t s  informal,  prospects  Southeast  "Two  the  Each  China  into  -- w h e r e i n  represents a source of support  clandestine.  Kampuchean  as d i v i d e d  Indochina  to both.  possible  has  between  i n the  i n s e e k i n g a modus V i v e n d i i s C h i n a .  describes  involvement  group  dominance.  stance.  i s important  regional  conflict  affinity  in a struggle for  through  was  others i t i s a future predator.  t o any  an  as c o n t r o v e r s i a l  anxiety  Vietnam  t h e most i m p o r t a n t  F o r some, for  primary  Simon  Southeast  feel  Dilemma The  role  of  are surrounded  aggressive g e o p o l i t i c a l  engaged  Chinese  as w e l l  announced t h a t  which  circles,  Commander o f I n d o n e s i a ' s armed  Murdani reasoned  8 4  Vietnam,  The  vis-a-vis  most a c c o m m o d a t i v e  issue,  Asia.  independence  in military  of  Asias"  off-stage reconciliation  d e p e n d s on how  and or each  perceivesi t .  84. Nayan Chanda, "ASEAN's Odd Man Out," Far E a s t e r n Economic Review, 1 March 1984, pp. 8-9. 85. S h e l d o n Simon, "The Two S o u t h e a s t A s i a s and C h i n a , " Asian S u r v e y , 24 (May 1984), pp. 579-533.  65 An  equally  important  the s i t u a t i o n . unsavory for  The  alignment  regional  anything, conflict  i t  problem with  into  Cam  Ranh Bay,  sharply  reinforced  Soviet  Union.  countries. Soviet China  Union, has  position  start  tertiary" While  is  whose  to  may  will talk.  continue Fight,  seen  time  Sino-Soviet  of  give  a political  as  Kampuchea  encirclment  by  the  " i t is  not  bothers  and  i s a l i g n e d with the Kampuchea  an  insists  even  vis-a-vis  more  on t o t a l  extreme  Vietnamese  Kampuchea a s t h e p r e c o n d i t i o n f o r with  an  H a n o i and Moscow.  upstart,  of  tactical solution  to follow a policy fight)  of  o f Vietnamese t r o o p s i n both  Beijing  signals  merely  The S o v i e t -  explains,  Taking  from  as  the  occupation  two-faced,  i n v a s i o n o f Kampuchea c a u s e d  China,  g e s t u r e s toward  accomplished  o f n a v a l b a s e s i n Da Nang  o f Laos  a s  designs  invasion  i t i s t h a t s i n c e Vietnam  i n n e g o t i a t i o n s both  Hanoi  according  the presence  i t s troops  Vietnam's  and Kampuchea p e r s e w h i c h  the n e u t r a l i t y  of  perceives  two-fold:  Asian theater.  Stuart-Fox  i n Laos  China  and i t s r i v a l  first  perception  been u n d e r m i n e d . "  Vietnam  the  eventual  to that of Thailand,  withdrawal any  the  Martin  n o r even  is  1978  the Southeast  China's  Rather,  the  the establishment  Vietnamese i n f l u e n c e the Chinese,  for  and  As  China  i s how  S o v i e t Union  If  introduced  directly  for  the  hegemony.  Vietnamese a l l i a n c e , and  consideration  China  accommodation, and to  o f "Dam,  unlikely  "rebellious to lose  face.  these  are,  t o be g e n u i n e  the c o n f l i c t . dam.  Danh, danh"  Vietnam (Talk,  i t d i d d u r i n g t h e war a g a i n s t t h e U n i t e d  86. M a r t i n Stuart-Fox, "Resolving t h e Kampuchean Case f o r an Alternative Regional Initiative" S o u t h e a s t A s i a , 4 (September 1982), p. 216.  Problem: The Contemporary  66 States.  China  is  military  as  a  for  warns t h a t  pressure;  sign of a  any  weakness.  solution requires  " t o condone issued  by  the  aggression the  New  only  other  language Hanoi w i l l approach  It i s for this a  will  reason  be  understand  misinterpreted  that  any  prospect  demand f o r c o m p l e t e w i t h d r a w a l ,  would  only  C h i n a News  breed  aggression."  Agency s t r o n g l y  A  expounded  since report  China's  fears: Vietnam's t a c t i c s o f "cannons plus smiling faces" i s meant t o serve i t s strategic goal...that Vietnam's occupation of Kampuchea is to wipe out Democratic Kampuchea and f o r m an " I n d o c h i n a F e d e r a t i o n , " and t h e n invade Thailand, take a possession of the S t r a i t of M a l a c c a and c o n t r o l South-East A s i a . V i e t n a m w i l l use m i l i t a r y pressure, p o l i t i c a l deception and diplomatic disintegration simultaneously...to o b s t r u c t the unity among t h e ASEAN c o u n t r i e s , and t h e u n i t y between C h i n a and T h a i l a n d and t h e o t h e r ASEAN countries so that V i e t n a m c a n wipe o u t t h e s e c o u n t r i e s one by o n e . " 8 7  Vietnam's t a c t i c s possibility domestic  for  and  exacerbated should and  a s o l u t i o n i s by postwar  not  the  lesson,"  protracted necessary. focus  of  Moreover,  relationship will  C h i n a has war The  "bleeding  thus  dependency s h o u l d  Sino-Vietnamese  belief  reconstruction  ameliorated,  discouraged.  military  that the  be  r e i n f o r c e China's  external  be  driven  to  Vietnam,  important  China's fear  point  to to  last  industrial  With t r o o p s Vietnam  Soviet  USSR  poised a  f o r a long, several  so at  second  drawn-out  decades i s that  Union; Vietnam  Beijing, 21 Feb. 1982, Summary of World  be  linkages  c l o s e r to the  remember h e r e  i s u l t i m a t e l y the  S7. New C h i n a News Agency, Braodcasting Corporation, FE/6962/A3/1.  should  economic  "teach  only  Vietnam's  Vietnam's f i n a n c i a l ,  i n d i c a t e d i t i s prepared  against  the  i t white." troubles  self-destruct.  border ready  that  if the is  in British Broadcasts,  67 merely a cost.  surrogate In the  capitulate in  Moscow's  China the  to  might  Soviet  meantime,  Hanoi's ploys, Some  accept  Vietnamese  Union.  ASEAN  policy  of  ASEAN  S.  "We  n o t happy  is  there  Dhanabalan i n  against  Vietnamese,  China's  incursions and  no  said  threat  signs  Thai  of reprisal  "paper t i g e r "  t o Vietnam.  attack  on  Beijing  has  coalition  88. 89.  New New  risks  Vietnam  rapprochement  would mean a f u r t h e r  notch  even o f t h e o p i n i o n  an i n t e r v i e w  we  that  since  1985  resistance  Times, Times,  would  are  On  with  i n such present  China's Foreign  with the S t r a i t s  Times,  to act  be  a  lesson"  bled i n  as  a  dam  non-starter."  i s steadily  the f i r s t  8 9  losing military  invasion  i n 1979  I f China continues  to lack  i t  other  may  appear  hand,  China  action. efforts  military  but  China.  to Singapore's  afraid  the  extended  forces  for  s i x major Vietnamese  since  a Soviet  legitimate  view  want Kampuchea  at least  would a b o r t  has  o f t h e Vietnamese being  that  involved  risk  Vietnam  According  officials  and  Straits Straits  to  disagreement  from China.  ASEAN  the  i s also  territory  assertiveness,  realizes  ASEAN  no c o r r e s p o n d i n g  o f a "second  ASEAN a f t e r  into  let  that  with the idea  never  credence with  not  little  hegemony i f i t were n o t b a c k e d by  Vietnam.  Kampuchea...We  Moreover,  is  observers are  there  "bleeding"  the  for this  recognizes  circles,  Minister are  goal  at r e l a t i v e l y  8 8  concerns,  Within  be c o n t a i n e d  China's  favor.  Whereas security  which c o u l d  more stops  Any  aid  for  short  12 Aug. 1981, p. 19. 6 J u n e 1980.  fully  Sino-Soviet In a d d i t i o n ,  the of  a  large-scale  toward  response.  as  Kampuchean  promising  a  68 "second  lesson",  commitment  to T h a i l a n d .  Yet even assertive  c a u s i n g ASEAN  capabilities,  one  lack  did find needs  repercussions.  China's  military  combination battle  of  areas  Nor  were  Northern  just up  and  China's Vietnam  forces.  the  its  in  range  to  and  Seas,  actions  their  border.  stepped  F o r ASEAN,  up  China's  used  the f a c t  to  1979  and  the  out,  "If  test,  the  support  the  t o the pace o f  border  50 m i l e s . "  assault  9 1  over  provided  t o c o n v i n c e Hanoi  military  of the South  military  China  t o open  i n s o u t h e r n Vietnam  t h e USSR r u s h e d  by C h i n a ' s that  limited  percent of i t s regular  a i r bases  after,  more  achieve a i r s u p e r i o r i t y  naval surveillance  justified  any  o f advance  the S o v i e t s required  to Vietnam  were  d e p l o y s 60  Immediately  logistics  n o t much more t h a n  able to  where H a n o i  its  Goodwin p o i n t s  1979  PLA's s p e e d  Most d i s t u r b i n g l y ,  forces.  China's  to take  account  in military  P a u l H.B.  A m e r i c a n - b u i l t n a v a l and  Russian  into  human p o r t e r s  aircraft  the i n c e n t i v e  the  As  t r u c k s and  human p o r t e r s  to take  operations  limits  question  i t in i t s interests  of expertise  possible  to  9 0  i f China  action,  officials  i s not  a  aid  China  pressure at yet  to  the  major  90. L e e Kuan Yew once s t a t e d : "Our dilemma i s a c u t e . I f there had been no [ C h i n e s e ] i n t e r v e n t i o n , we would face Vietnamese supremacy which in this c a s e means S o v i e t supremacy. If the i n t e r v e n t i o n i s o v e r - s u c c e s s f u l , i t means t h a t i n ten, f i f t e e n years there w i l l be an a s s e r t i o n o f i n f l u e n c e . . . by a Communist power t h a t has i n f l u e n c e o v e r a l l g u e r r i l l a movements in the countries of Thailand, Malaysia, Singapore and Indonesia." Singapore B u l l e t i n , A u g u s t 1979, i n M i c h e a l L e i f e r , "The B a l a n c e of Advantage i n Indochina," W o r l d Today, 38 (June 1982), p. 490. 91. P a u l G.B. Goodwin, "Chinese Defence and N a t i o n a l Security Policies in t h e 1980's." Paper p r e p a r e d f o r the annual meeting of the International Studies Association, Mexico City, March 1983, p. 18. In "The Two S o u t h e a s t A s i a s and C h i n a , " S h e l d o n Simon, op. c i t . , p. 523.  69 negotiating prospect  player  o f a PRC  China's its  door.  While  alliance i t  Party  an  unconditionally  welcome  has  political with  gain  i n the  Thailand, i t  reduced  of Thailand  issue  has  a  (CPT),  China  Bangkok,  head o f has  and  the  the  continued  Security  to i n s i s t  on  rebels.  c h a l l e n g e now  China's  at  the  so t h a t  same t i m e  quelling  domestic  Publicly, regarding rejected  its nor  main  was  the a  rebellions.  Thailand  accepted  Although and  but  deterrent,  opt  case  fully  i t is  Hasdin Yet  (former Beijing  government-towith  Communist  f o r Moscow o r H a n o i ,  but  to intefere  a  a i d i n the event PRC  openly.  in  of a  posture  has  neither  large-scale  inducements f o r i t t o  Among t h e s e  inducements  f o r much-needed o i l ,  i n the i n t e r e s t  prepared  neutral  Thailand  r e c o g n i z e s China  not  business  the  China.  i n exchange  acting  with  i t must s u p p o r t  maintain  i t did reject  option"  officials,  Thailand  i s that  links  9 8  with  Chinese  anti-Vietnamese  which T h a i  not  prefers to  relationship  "friendship  will  to i t s l i n k s  a s s u r e t h e ASEAN g o v e r n m e n t s n o t  Vietnamese i n v a s i o n , join  they  respect  now  ASEAN's  Sino-Thai  i t s p a r t y - t o - p a r t y and  with  that  in  i s fostering  O p e r a t i o n s Command).  government d i s t i n c t i o n  r e b e l s enough  the  f o r the insurgent  Mass L i n e P a r t y u n d e r S u d s a i  Internal  is  foot  m a t e r i a l support  t h e more h a w k i s h members o f t h e T h a i m i l i t a r y , in  one,  " l e s s o n " i s more a l a r m i n g t h a n r e a s s u r i n g .  greatest  through  Communist  nor  o f ASEAN,  rejected.  i s a more c r e d i b l e  to lose  but  ASEAN s u p p o r t  ally  i n the  92. D u r i n g a visit by a C h i n e s e o f f i c i a l , M a l a y s i a was a s s u r e d t h a t what a i d China gave to Southeast Asian insurgents was "purely moral." See L e s z e k B u s z y n s k i , " T h a i l a n d : The E r o s i o n o f a Balance Foreign P o l i c y , " A s i a n S u r v e y , 22 (November 1982), pp. 1051.  70 issue.  Each  inevitable  s t e p t a k e n by  (and  members s u c h indentified axis.  reluctant)  a  with  any  uneasy  degree  about  Thailand's friendship  The  Soviet  an  played  the region  position and  the r e l a t i o n s h i p ,  or the  United States,  a major r o l e except  its  though  encourage  Union  attempted  t o put  Asian  Collective  Security  a t t a c k at the U s s u r i  forth  sphere  n a v a l bases.  nor Vietnam  was  i t s rather through  The  willing  links  with  1960s,  River,  bilateral no  involved  has  a i d to  the  Soviet  political  t a k e r s as  i n a formal  the  shortly  vague p r e s c r i p t i o n  scheme had  t o be  Union  I t g i v e s no  border  a i r and  Indochina,  Asia.  the  Chinese  to  i n Southeast  after  of  an  ties  neither alliance  China.  The  Soviet-Vietnamese  reversal;  no  only  Moscow now  Nang and  to  not  the Soviet  In t h e l a t e  did  conflict  China.  i n s u r g e n c y groups.  against  be  pro-China  i n the  are c a r e f u l  v a r i o u s communist  Asian  not t o  o t h e r ASEAN members,  m a i n t a i n s no  new  ASEAN  legitimacy  and  and  Other  ASEAN.  anti-Vietnam,  urgency The  i s an  most a n x i o u s  front-line of  t o China  Dilemma  Unlike China never  of  position.  with  by  are c l e a r l y  Bangkok's  certain  t o move c l o s e r  closer  semblance  precarious diplomatic visibly  step  as I n d o n e s i a  Meanwhile,  lends  Thailand  Cam  having gained  l o n g e r was  Ranh an  alliance, the Soviet  maintain a Bay,  ally  on  but  even  however, Union  direct more  a  signalled  sharp  r e m o t e power.  military  presence  t h r e a t e n i n g by  the southern f l a n k  a  of China,  Not i n Da  virtue  of  i t brought  71 the  Sino-Soviet  ASEAN view,  conflict  directly  a permanent  Soviet  "backyard" d r a m a t i c a l l y conflict fears and  between  is  that  later  --  invasion  Vietnam  The to that which  t o grant  1978  drawing  Friendship  to  of Friendship  Moscow  India  neutralize  had  first  three  years  Moscow's g u a r a n t e e t o  accepted  the i n v i t a t i o n  bases.  of Friendship  was  similar  and t h e USSR i n A u g u s t 1971,  China  and  facilitated  No d o u b t one o f t h e main  V i e t n a m document was t h e r e c e n t with  one month  an e x p l i c i t  the  incentives  Sino-Japanese  "anti-hegemony  clause"  t h e h e g e m o n i a l s p h e r e o f i n f l u e n c e by any s i n g l e  the region.  document's c l a u s e  Though  was c l e a r l y  of China's strategy and  Kamupuchea.  did i t finally  between  concluded  w h i c h condemned power i n  ASEAN and C h i n a ' s  November 3, 1978, o n l y  H a n o i had s e c u r e d  —  proverbial  COMECON i n 1976 b u t o n l y  Pakistan.  up t h e Pact  Adding t o  Soviet-Vietnamese Treaty  dismemberment o f in  of  In t h e  c h a n c e s o f an o u t b r e a k o f  rights to i t s military  consolidated served  on  to join  evidently after  agreed  powers.  was s i g n e d  underwrite the invasion and  the  i n China's  t h e S o v i e t - V i e t n a m e s e 25-Year T r e a t y  Vietnam's  approached  presence  increased  t h e two  Cooperation  before  i n t o t h e ASEAN t h e a t e r .  no  names  were  mentioned,  aimed a t t h e S o v i e t  of encirclement  with  Japan,  the  Union as p a r t  the United  States  ASEAN. The  Soviet-Vietnamese Treaty,  Vietnam's post-war r e c o n s t r u c t i o n tune o f  an e s t i m a t e d  guaranteed  against  ASEAN and  China,  one  of the  response,  and " a d v e n t u r i s t "  $5 m i l l i o n  a tripartite,  in  a day),  and a t  attended needs  most  disturbing  (tothe  t h e same  anti-Soviet, united  front.  clauses  to  of  time For the  72 document other  is  in  Article  the  event  involvement  involved  --  has  The  effectively  ASEAN, C h i n a and  Malaysia's  once p o i n t e d ASEAN a s  the  to a i d  possibility  discouraged  United  out,  the  In f a c t ,  9 3  acceptable  purposes. to  former Foreign USSR i s  a projection  measures.  as  attack.  each p a r t y  States  --  of  Soviet  the  from  the  parties  countering  directly. As  be  which r e q u i r e s  o f an  military  Hanoi  Six  of  as  Some c i r c l e s  say  stability  that by  t e r m Vietnam-USSR  of Southeast  fear);  and  Vietnamese e x p a n s i o n i s t  as  military  much a  direct  provoke  Chinese  it  was  and  Malaysia  Shafie  threat  to  counter-  lanes  for  e v e n go  enhances  first,  the  (a s p e c i f i c a l l y  the  possibility  of  drive  (a  well  Thai  military so  as  a  far  regional  ASEAN's f e a r s o f a  two-fold:  sea  not  presence  However,  are  Asia's  S r i Ghazali  S o v i e t - V i e t n a m e s e r e l a t i o n s would  China.  secondly,  to  long  alliance  control  so  i n Indonesia  a Soviet  blocking  not  power  continued  t o ASEAN  M i n i s t e r Tun  long-  eventual  Singaporean  Soviet-backed, as  Singaporean  fear). Despite overtures, far  the  outweigh  Nang and  the  Cam  hefty  the  incentives  Ranh Bay  f o r the  port  and  Black  and  major  Petropavlovsk.  million  i n c e n t i v e s f o r the  a warm-water Seas  $5  Soviet  for i t first  a secure Pacific  They i n c r e a s e  tab  the  and  ASEAN's  diplomatic  Union t o s t a y  i n Vietnam  to leave.  The  time provide  station bases  the  between at  capability  bases at Soviets  the  Baltic  Vladivostok of r a p i d  Da  with and and  deployment  93. See Chan Heng Chee, "ASEAN: Subregional Resilience," in S e c u r i t y I n t e r d e p e n d e n c e i n t h e A s i a P a c i f i c R e g i o n , ed. James W. Morley (Massachusetts: L e x i n g t o n Books, 1986), pp. 111-143.  73 in  the  I n d i a n Ocean,  relieve  Soviet  effectively  the Persian  perceptions of  good  hostility  more  and  violence. The wholly  9  t h e open on  record On  9  which  Chinese  presence of  occasion  feel  unnatural.  independent have  Vietnam's  two and t o be  that  There  has  On  at  times  t h e one  hand,  of f i n a n c i a l  the  other  Soviet  resulted  and  It i s  repeated requests waste  hand,  technocrats in  the Soviet-Vietnamese i s no  countries  and  historical  the  deeply n a t i o n a l i s t i c careful.  "Vietnam",  outbreaks  the on of  the Bei.jinq  commonality  between  a s one  common g o a l o f e x p a n s i o n  are  a  Kampuchea i s f a s t f o r the  Soviet  upon t h e  countries: i n Southeast  "They a r e Asia."  affinity fiercely  p e o p l e w i t h whom t h e  Review r e m a r k e d  t h e two  relationship i s  or c u l t u r a l  Vietnamese  Moreover,  as w e l l  comment i n  their  tension  on  3  between t h e  will  that  of i t s a p p a l l i n g  inefficiency. *  resent  soil,  and  China  largely  i n Hanoi.  than p l e a s e d with Vietnam's  bureaucratic  their  Asia,  keeping  depend  t h e government  e v i d e n t , however,  aid in light  Vietnamese  with  Asia  c h a r a c t e r i z e s the a l l i a n c e .  the Kremlin i s l e s s for  encirclement while  i n Southeast  relations  becoming i n c r e a s i n g l y outright  Southeast  contained.  Moscow's p r i v i l e g e s continued  G u l f and  Soviets becoming  Union.  A  weak l i n k  of  t o g e t h e r by  9 S  94. D u r i n g Le Duan's v i s i t t o Moscow i n J u l y 1985, Moscow d i d n o t respond p o s i t i v e l y to the Vietnamese request f o r more m i l i t a r y aid. 95. F o r an i n t e r e s t i n g d i s c u s s i o n , s e e S h e l d o n Simon, " E x p l a i n i n g American S e c u r i t y I n t e r e s t s i n Southeast A s i a , " i n I n t e r n a t i o n a l S e c u r i t y i n t h e S o u t h e a s t A s i a n and S o u t h w e s t P a c i f i c R e g i o n , ed. T.B. M i l l a r (St. Lucia, Queensland: Univ. o f Queensland Press, 1983), p. 61-63. 96. B e i j i n g Review, 29 March 1982, p. 10.  74 Vietnamese o f f i c i a l s have  "facilities",  that  Vietnamese  Pham  country  the  reiterated  Van right  by  Dong  signal still  these  ASEAN and  negotiable.  clear  that  the  relationship  observers the  interview,  that  "we  It  9 7  Vietnam's  is  Prime  The  9 a  Thach,  any  same v i e w who  added  n e v e r become a  was that  military  9 9  comments China  c o u l d be  that the  Nevertheless, evident  has  will  much  would n e v e r . . . g r a n t  M i n i s t e r Nguyen Co relationship  Soviets  doubt v e r y  premises.  t o have b a s e s i n V i e t n a m . "  i n the f u t u r e . "  to  on  1984  insisted  Foreign  Perhaps  a  t o emphasize t h a t the  although  allowed  that i n  "the Soviet-Vietnamese alliance  bases,  a r e even  therefore curious Minster  not  are quick  not  relationship t o ASEAN's  tension  yet  i n t e r p r e t e d as  in  interfered  with  a ploy  the  detriment,  or  USSR i s i t  is  the  Soviet-Vietnamese  with  their  practical  association.  The  United  States  Considerable United  States'  solution the  to  United  should  the  Dilemma  dissatisfaction  role  -- o r r a t h e r ,  conflict.  States should  play.  1 0 0  With  exists  lack of a r o l e  However, play a  Singapore  within  the  role, at  guestion but  ASEAN o v e r --  the  i n seeking  i s not  a  whether  what k i n d o f r o l e i t  the f o r e f r o n t ,  Thailand  and  97. R o b e r t C. Horn, "The USSR and t h e R e g i o n , " S o u t h e a s t A s i a n A f f a i r s 1985 (Singapore: I n s t i t u t e of Southeast Asian Studies, 1986)", p. 75. 98. Newsweek ( I n t e r n a t i o n a l E d i t i o n ) , 14 May 1984. 99. See S h e l d o n Simon, "The Two S o u t h e a s t A s i a s and C h i n a , " op. c i t . , p. 525. 100. O n l y I n d o n e s i a , S i n g a p o r e and M a l a y s i a a r e n o n - a l i g n e d .  75 the  P h i l i p p i n e s would welcome a p r o m i n e n t  region  to  maintain  countries  encourage  Clark to  and  Subic  revive  the  increase  of  recalled  that  the  most  President  Bay,  moribund  American at  Manila  military  ASEAN's  technical  Pact,  a i d to  formation,  ban  would i n c r e a s e  Not  Vietnam's i n v a s i o n  the  Wishing to maintain  oriented  only  in  d i d the  also allowed  which  the  ASEAN  these  three  status,  role,  dependence,  and  diminish  countries  be were  f o r e i g n bases i n  i t s non-aligned American  an  I t may  1 0 1  create  Jakarta's  the  Indonesia  claming  that  a  to  Bangkok  rationalized  Thailand.  presence of  ASEAN's  elite,  is  such  western-  leadership  on  issue. Nevertheless,  American  influence  although  they  effect,  they  military the  but  power.  profile  M a r c o s t o renew A m e r i c a n r i g h t s  most o p p o s e d t o a h e i g h t e n e d  a move  the  balance of  r e l u c t a n t to  region. the  the  American  are  relations  not  are  want t o  umbrella. status,  well  benefits.  In sum,  and As  as  by  the  latter i f  threat  the  Gordon  insist  abandons  support  some Union,  c o l d war. The  p o s e d by  In  American  Vietnam  and  that c o r d i a l the  s i d e a c c e p t s the  American  that  Soviet  i n the  states  ASEAN  neither  a result,  Bernard  deter  Catch-22 s i t u a t i o n .  the  only  to  recognize  become pawns  in a  However,  possible  states  necessary  caught  Union.  aligned as  is  member  presence i s j u s t i f i e d  Soviet  security  do  ASEAN  American  other's  brings  costs  nonas  argues,  The common s t r a n d i n [ l e a d e r s h i p ] v i e w s [ i n t h e region] is a belief that the United States tends to overestimate the Soviet threat, that i t misunderstands the problem p o s e d by C h i n a , and t h a t b a s e d on o v e r l y narrow e s t i m a t e s , i t sometimes presses for policies 101. U n i t e d States' m i l i t a r y m i l l i o n i n 1979 t o $80 m i l l i o n  aid to Thailand in 1982.  increased  from  $40  76 that aggravate r a t h e r than help r e s o l v e d i f f i c u l t i e s i n the region. The q u e s t i o n i n c r e a s i n g l y posed by U.S. p o l i c y i s whether i t i s p a r t o f t h e s o l u t i o n o r p a r t o f the problem. 1 0  For States  example, are  e  t h e growing  more  a  Indonesia's  anxiety  restrictions  on  on  the  States  a regional China  as  was  between C h i n a  uneasiness clear  ASEAN.  this  a friendly importance  Washington  military  equipment  relying  ASEAN a l s o  on C h i n a  that  i t  based  i t s way fears  to  that the  t o become s o m e t h i n g  suggesting that  and  lifted  e q u i p m e n t and  finding  The U n i t e d S t a t e s now  state,  reassurance.  I n d o n e s i a ' s f e a r s were  i n t h e ASEAN s t a t e s .  i s naively  and t h e U n i t e d  than  when  of "non-lethal"  of  "policeman".  secondary  of  made  consulting  possibility  s u b v e r s i v e groups United  source  the sale  technology without  ties  should  urges  of  ASEAN t o s e e  Southeast defer  Asia  i s of  to  American  M a l a y s i a and I n d o n e s i a c a n n o t  help but  judgement. However, fear  China's  states  like  power p o t e n t i a l  over t h e next  ASEAN n a t i o n s s h a r e W a s h i n g t o n ' s c o n c e r n want t o e x c l u d e t h e S o v i e t anything,  role  Washington's pro-China  in  dealing  with the  by  u r g i n g s f o r Japan  as p o t e n t i a l l y  USSR.  few d e c a d e s .  o f t h e USSR,  t h e y do n o t  as a c o u n t e r b a l a n c e t o China. tilt  Its military  actions  If  shows t o ASEAN i t s weakness sales  t o i n c r e a s e i t s defence  destabilizing  While t h e  capability,  f o r the  coupled a r e seen  r e g i o n . Nor  Mid-East  credibility  o f t h e I s l a m i c n a t i o n s o f I n d o n e s i a and  t h e eyes  do much  t o boost  does  Washington's p r o - I s r a e l , in  policy  t o China,  i t s  Malaysia. 102. B e r n a r d K. Gordon, "The O u t d a t e d U.S. P e r s p e c t i v e on A s i a n Security," A s i a n W a l l S t r e e t J o u r n a l , 11 May 1982, p. 6.  77 Although American  Thailand  presence,  bases i s  i t feels  unnecessary  deterrent.  i s one  of that a  since  China  Bangkok's p u r p o s e  role  was,  i n effect,  its  relationship  main  China.  represents  American  military  States  China  and  t h e USSR  of  effective  a counterweight  Indonesia's  reasons.  t o reduce r e g i o n a l tension.  USSR f o r V i e t n a m ' s a f f e c t i o n s and f o r n o t b e i n g  American be  perceived  crisis. June  In  officials to set  a visit  1983,  "We  persuading  Vietnam  message comes be  to the United  own  pace i n  State  t o change  States.  George  Shultz  i t s course  are  Kampuchean  assured  ASEAN  greater  i f the  J u s t t h e same,  i t would  i t s leadership  ASEAN's g r e a t e s t c h a l l e n g e  i s i n finding  the  know t h a t t h e c h a n c e s o f  have t o r e l i n q u i s h  regional priorities  able to  M i n i s t e r s i n Bangkok i n  neighbours."103  reluctant to  compete  i f ASEAN s e t -- o r  resolving  your lead...we  its  to  syndrome."  ASEAN's F o r e i g n  of  follow  from  a leadership role its  with  unwillingness  i t would be w i s e r  -- t h e  Secretary  officials:  probably  feel  he  Some c i r c l e s i n  with  "Vietnam  Foreign  to influence  also  overcome i t s p o s t - w a r  to  Instead,  Indonesia the  Washington's  American  more  t o use d i p l o m a t i c p r e s s u r e  criticize  the  need f o r an i n c r e a s e i n  f o r c e s , but f o r d i f f e r e n t  United  of  Washington t o p l a y a  Equally,  M o c h t a r Kusumaatmadja saw l i t t l e  the  a  and p r o v i d e  Minister  urged  advocates  proliferation  in inviting  t o balance  with  the  a solution  role  now  i n assuming  which w i l l  not forsake  f o r the g l o b a l concerns of the great  powers i n v o l v e d .  J u n e 1983.  78  CHAPTER FOUR  ASEAN's D i p l o m a t i c  Strategy  Introduction  ASEAN's e f f o r t s are  an  attempt  international it  had  on  provided  a  that  we  which might  issue  test  Foreign  1  o f ASEAN's  Minister  effective,  ASEAN be  credible,  suffer  the  political  Mochtar  able  to  and c o h e s i v e  same  have o c c u r r e d i f  however,  The Kampuchean  that  Yet as Leszek  any crisis  fate  I t was  As  well  therefore  w o r t h a s an  v e h i c l e which of  thus  remarked,  i t could  prove i t s r e g i o n a l  ignominious  has  of  viability.  we d i d t h e n  diplomatic  position means  Kusumaatmadja  s  issue  acquiring  a clear diplomatic  without,  had n o t t a k e n t h e s t a n d  that  from  s o r i g o r o u s l y by ASEAN.  ASEAN would have gone i n t o o b l i v i o n . "  important  not  by d e f a u l t ,  position."  crucial  Indonesia's  be  that  i t s occupation  "ASEAN h a s d e f i n e d  Kampuchean  implementing  prevent  contested  argues,  the  "...if  to  legitimacy  n o t been  Buszynski  t o o p p o s e V i e t n a m o v e r t h e Kampuchean  i t s  would  regional  predecessors. 1. L e s z e k B u s z y n s k i , "ASEAN: A Changing Role," Asian ( J u l y 1987), p. 765. 2. Bangkok P o s t , 7 A u g u s t 1985, i n i b i d . , p. 765.  Survey,  27  79 Yet, on  at  least  p r i v a t e l y , ASEAN members were f a r f r o m  many p i v o t a l a s p e c t s  choice.  A projection  agree,  compromise  ASEAN was  not  the  or  right  response", issue  or  unity  to  to  if  the  consensus proves  of  This  way  of a only  stipulation  o f one the  required policy unity":  tacit  to  i n t e r e s t of inform  arrangements.  the  member i n s o f a r as  route  still  any  It i s , in effect, solidarity  i t contributes  the  major an  on  an and  ASEAN  bilateral of  benefits  cooperation. the  an  The  consequences  negatively  affect  e a c h member i s  impending  foreign  agreement o f  "divided  i s i n the  to greater  to  r e c e i v i n g the  not  is  "ASEAN  prerogative  i s that  should  with  problem  r e s o l u t i o n , the  member. F u r t h e r ,  of  process  diverge,  solution i s left  agreement  others  to  of a s i n g l e  the  m a i n t a i n s the  another  ASEAN's image o f  to  through s e l e c t i v e  member's i n d e p e n d e n t  national  the  p o l i c y while  in this  a  national interest  interests  o f f e r s no  and  regional organization  a  unanimously agree  When  3  each n a t i o n  "independent" f o r e i g n  --  statement of  member n a t i o n s  members " a g r e e t o d i s a g r e e " efforts.  solution  or  ability  bestowed e i t h e r  of the  common j o i n t  impossible  other  a decision regardless  preservation  action.  their  with  i n d i v i d u a l members' i n t e r e s t s .  ASEAN's  a l l six  each  organization  impose  issue a  a course  depended upon  of  a supra-national power  They were t h u s f a c e d  accomodate  paramount.  periodically  issue.  a sacrifice  member's m i s g i v i n g s ; still  of  and  sometimes e n t a i l i n g  was  of the  unified  i n t e r e s t s of  collective  each  bargaining  3. See Khaw Guat Hoot, "ASEAN in International Politics," in Politics in t h e ASEAN S t a t e s , ed. D i a n e K. Mauzy ( K u a l a Lumpur: Marican & Sons, 1984), p. 226. See a l s o M. Ghazalie Shafie, Malaysia: International Relations (Kuala Lumpur: Creative E n t e r p r i s e Sdn, Bhd., 1982), pp. 221-222.  80 power,  thus  each  beyond which interest  implicitly  further  acceptance  making p r o c e s s  yet  evolved  t o be  only a f t e r  collective  initial  period during  to deal with  the  successes  have  i s s u e and from  been  the  York.  1981  Second,  convincing  installed  ASEAN  effort  the  has  sought  international  t o deny  process period  acceptance did  of  not  of  by  emerging from  emphasized  the  role  same t i m e  Indonesia  of China  ASEAN's  and  passage  General  Vietnam to  in  of  New  economically  d e p r i v e Hanoi i t  has  up  of  made  t h e Heng S e m r i n  setting  of  Assembly  Kampuchea  a  regime  and  supporting  Democratic  Kampuchea  unconventional  overnight,  tribulation.  o p i n i o n s began  community.  internationally.  ASEAN's  u n c e r t a i n t y and  isolate  Third,  Government  materialize  and  community  to  campaign t o  on  to isolate  Vietnam,  Coalition  first,  United Nations  l e g i t i m a c y to  (CGDK) t o r e p r e s e n t Kampuchea The  a  sponsorship  assistance.  Phnom Penh by  tripartite  launch  I n t e r n a t i o n a l Conference  the  in  three-fold:  international  i n the  much-needed m u l t i l a t e r a l persistent  the  in  condemnation r e s o l u t i o n s at  been  a statement  crisis  ASEAN's  has  issuing  the  which  f o r m a l l y c o n d e m n i n g V i e t n a m ' s i n v a s i o n o f Kampuchea, strategy  Since  decision-  January  Vietnam d i p l o m a t i c a l l y  the  an  operating procedures  determined.  "internationalize"  by  becomes a t h r e a t t o t h e  point  in  diplomatic  and  threshold  o f ASEAN's somewhat u n c o n v e n t i o n a l  a system o f s t a n d a r d  1980  division  the  o f ASEAN.  The  had  understands  ASEAN:  but By  decision-making  evolved mid-1980,  Thailand  began  two  and  i n a future settlement  Malaysia  only a f t e r  publicizing  a  s e t s of Singapore  at about China  the as  a  81 threat.  Thailand,  Philippines, Vietnam, that  favored  calling  if  Singapore a continued  for a total  international  sustained,  economic  at the  Chinese attack,  then  with  the  Hanoi. State  However,  in  with  and  felt  and  therefore partial  all, and  have an  i t s dependence  and  by  Prime M i n i s t e r  posture,  and  marked  the  opinions. the  ASEAN),  on  the  calling  first The  Kuantan  improving spurring  tentative  public  the  the  s o l u t i o n to recognized  the  inter  forced  to  good r e l a t i o n s accomodating  become more  U.S.  closely  Vietnam  for a partial  on  the  withdrawal  Heng S e m r i n r e g i m e  would  influence.  limited  war  to  After  Indochina i t might  China. Suharto  and  Malaysia's  Kuantan D e c l a r a t i o n of  D e c l a r a t i o n was  of the  second  lead to a p r o t r a c t e d  manifestation  leaders  were  resistance  U n i o n were r e d u c e d  r e l a t i o n s between C h i n a  bilateral  Kuantan P r i n c i p l e  Onn,  not  were o n l y  President  Hussein  was  some members o f t h e  Sino-Soviet  with  hope  Nations  opposition to  and  Soviet  The  be  continued  the  against  t h r e a t of a  r e l i a n c e by  block  Indonesia's Tun  an  a greater  the  eventually  ASEAN s h o u l d  i n c e n t i v e t o resume t i e s  Issued  at  would  Vietnam's hegemonic a m b i t i o n s i f  stance  United  with  r e c o g n i t i o n of the  tension  unified  extent,  anti-Vietnamese  i t would o n l y  create  lesser  the  and  Malaysia  that  A more f l e x i b l e  reduce r e g i o n a l  at  along  alliance  China s i n c e  Kampuchea  USSR.  border,  Indonesia,  Department  aligned  pressure  a v i e w p r e m i s e d on  Sino-American  a  withdrawal of f o r c e s .  Vietnam  I t was  to  strong,  a i d denied,  forces sustained  compromise.  and  of an  Thailand  countries  problem. alia  differing  apprehensive  and  two  ASEAN's  response  (and to  hence, seek  Essentially,  Vietnam's  1981  a the  legitimate  82 interests in the  the  in  Kampuchea,  region.  the  i t s ties  Union's  m a j o r powers  wishing did  however,  Thai  problem Muslim  Declaration presence i n exploit  without  to  an  reaffirmed country  the  it  failed but  evident  was  divisive.  In  Tun  consult Suharto  an  are  leaders of  the  view  the  implicit  Times,  14  May  to  1980,  p.  77.  that  States  anxious before  to the  bilateralism wrong  and  ASEAN's p u b l i c  t o add,  "...we have  Bangkok...[and]  myself  and  that  urgency  for  there  stillborn  the  and long  maintain  quick  understanding  a f f e c t e d by  United  procedurally  was in  ASEAN s u m m i t . T h e  the  not  H u s s e i n Onn  the  Hanoi r e j e c t e d the  realized  regional two  It  attempt  Privately,  of  pleased  was  intentions,  initiative  secretly  was  the  i n Vietnam.  serious  bilateral  the  Indochina,  outright. a  mention  cleavage.  in  Further,  of  sincere  Kampuchea!  to  consultation  that  the  Malaysian delegates  most d i r e c t l y  Straits  through bordering  region,  unity.  President holding  because  prior  image o f  even  interfere  appalled  forces  Likewise,  affairs  Kuantan p r o p o s a l  were  solved  not  and  potentially  agreed  t o be  the  i t s neighbours'  the  SRV,  must r e m a i n o u t s i d e influence.  in not  SRV  the  U n i o n were c u t .  spheres of  intervene  "bleeding"  accept  Vietnam  USSR s h o u l d  reject  ASEAN's  Indonesian  the  leaders  states  that  to offend  not  was  states  Soviet  V i e t n a m e s e hegemony  of  w i l l i n g n e s s to  with the  not  accepting  China's p o l i c y  China's  should  Thailand  -  and  b o t h C h i n a and Not  4  showed a  Kuantan p r i n c i p l e  Soviet  and  Rejecting  Declaration  Kampuchea i f  implicitly  that  i s no  Kuantan  Declaration  Thailand,  as  Vietnamese occupation,  the held  83  the f i n a l  veto,  thereby d i c t a t i n g  course of action A  whatever t h e d i f f e r e n c e s .  similar  unilaterally  clash  tried  of  Kampuchea's d e p o s e d  well  Head  as  the  campaign t o United  pressuring  Interestingly, United  personality  of  spokesperson  --  Singapore on  i s  to  i s  Delhi  the  there i s  ASEAN  in  substance, took  "unfortunately, with  aid  ASEAN's  spot  atthe  as  from  Vietnam.  to  articulate  the Koh  sometimes a  --  feeling  f o ri t s small size,  force  ASEAN's within  taking  offence  to  Singapore  and  official ASEAN  public  that  stands  to i t .  r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s Rajaratnam  While  w e l l as  ASEAN's s u c c e s s i n t h e  Tommy  concern  led  deal of  and D h a n a b a l a n  T h a i l a n d and M a l a y s i a a g r e e d  Indonesia's Foreign Minister  the other  of  Son Sann; a s  CGDK p r o p o s a l i n November 1981, p r e m a t u r e l y  an ASEAN p r o p o s a l .  first  premier  Meetings,  further  attributed  Singapore's  it  evidently  forces  The  Kampuchea's (DK)  Singapore  Non-Aligned  a great  i s s u e s h a v i n g no d i r e c t  advanced  combined  Democratic former  coalition.  Kampuchea's v a c a n t  withold  too vocal  Singapore's  the  coalition,  CGDK i n  although  Nations  Samphan;  Kampuchean  and New  Japan  of  Singapore  f o r c e s o f t h e Khmer Rouge. As t h e s t r o n g e s t  seat the  Nations  when  t h e CGDK t r i p a r t i t e  consists  o f State, Khieu  of  occurred  P r i n c e Sihanouk;  the military  advocate  wills  to forge  CGDK g o v e r n m e n t - i n - e x i l e  former  t h e p a c e and t i m i n g o f ASEAN's  Singapore's  has taken  s  with i t  M o c h t a r Kusumaatmadja  actions,  stating  the step without  ASEAN n a t i o n s . "  dubbing  that  consulting  S i n c e t h e CGDK  incident  5. S e e Hans I n d o r f , Impediments t o R e g i o n a l i s m i n S o u t h e a s t A s i a : Bilateral C o n s t r a i n t s Among ASEAN Member S t a t e s (Singapore: I n s t i t u t e o f S o u t h e a s t A s i a n S t u d i e s , 1984).  84 Singapore but  has  has  refrained  consultation  The  continued  with  Coalition  The  from  —  either  Penh.  international  Government  was  important  because  was  either  Heng  Semrin or  twenty  years of  Prince  6  c h a r a c t e r made  him  to at times  and  fervent  natural his  d e s i r e to  MOULINAKA  (approximately People's  profile,  c h o i c e f o r the c o a l i t i o n faction 10,000).  National  had The  Liberation  Democratic  t o be  an  (DK)  i n Phnom  t o the  bloodshed difficult  and  flamboyant  a  liability.  of Southeast  grass-roots  Khmer  stark  alternative.  and  and  missile"  peasant  s o v e r e i g n t y made  Asia,  support, him  l e a d e r s h i p d e s p i t e the f a c t the  lowest  the  government  extremely  asset  of  determined  Kampuchea  alternative  unpredictable  "unguided  maintain  conferences  animosity  going  simultaneously  Sihanouk's i n t e r n a t i o n a l  occupant  to provide t h i s  bitter  Sihanouk's  as t h e  the  Democratic  Kampuchea's f o r m e r  CGDK was  t h r e e Khmer g r o u p s was  t o overcome.  prior  t o deny V i e t n a m ' s c l a i m i n  i t r e q u i r e d an  The  of  l e g i t i m a t e government  successfully  u n d e r t h e Khmer Rouge.  Referred  international  considered the  community,  However,  without  Kampuchea:  Heng S e m r i n o r t h e o u s t e d  I f ASEAN  among t h e  initiatives  Coalition  seat i n  would be  choices of  any  of the  (CGDK)  r e g i m e --  undertaking  i t s blunt diplomatic style,  Government o f D e m o c r a t i c  Kampuchea's v a c a n t who  maintain  i t s partners.  formation  Kampuchea  to  number  of  the that  troops  15,000 t r o o p s o f Sonn Sann's Khmer Front  (KPNLF)  is  ridden  with  6. A d i s t i n c t i o n must be made between t h e Khmers as an e t h n i c g r o u p , and t h e Khmer Rouge w h i c h i s a p o l i t i c a l movement.  85 internal  factions  and  power  struggles  younger l e a d e r s .  Repugnance a t  under P o l  enough  Pot  prospective credible 30,000  partners.  threat  the  by  although  by  SRV  Kampuchea's receives China  forces'  and  tried that  but  offers  realistic Vietnam not  be  like  a  at  at times,  the  menage  'a t r o i s ,  written  that  united  front  Bangkok,  bloodthirsty indicative  the  the  wolf of  his  in  with  a  predicament;  7. F a r E a s t e r n Economic Hoon, op. c i t . p. 247.  the  the  Review,  to  lamb." "but 13-19  of  Rouge  support  from  resistance to  support  on  such  Dhanabalan only  One  r e s i s t a n c e of  group  must  that  Cambodia and  be  group,  we  would  7  armed  was  sake  Khmer  Suppiah  s t r u c t u r e of  an  "tantamount  the  moment.  solution."  f o r Khmer n a t i o n a l i s t s and was  for  a rationale  Khmer Rouge " i s t h e  i t s hold  Sihanouk  capable  numerical s u p e r i o r i t y ,  Minister  Without  government-in-exile than  conference i n  and  present  a political  more  provide  ASEAN i s l o a t h e  the  Rouge's  political)  t o dominate  would have c o n s o l i d a t e d t a l k i n g about  fact  only  Khmer  and  occupation  military  1981,  practical.  A curious  this  Singapore Foreign in late  armed  their  group's  the  controversially,  attempted  resistance  and  of  sheer force.  as  to explain  virtue  their  repeatedly  forces,  the  record  shunned by  resistance  better  m i l i t a r y (and  sometimes t h r o u g h a group,  far  Most  because of  t h e y have  the  continued  security.  favored  as  Sann and  Khmer Rouge's b e s t i a l  Vietnamese  are  Son  r e a s o n f o r them t o be  However,  to the  troops  militarily, for  was  the  between  the  CGDK i s l e s s  truce.  reminded the  At  as  a  having  Khmer Rouge t o  putting  a  question  November  once join  starving  Sihanouk's the  press  1981,  and  reply is p.  a  was this:  9.  In  86 whether t o  be e a t e n  Vietnamese."  a  Politically, little  in  political fighting  ambitions  hollow  Vietnam  but  within  attractiveness  path  toward  situation future  while  year  that  government  factions, objectives  given of  need  in  other's in  a s t h e CGDK's sustain  i t increasingly  the  difficult  o f t h e CGDK c o a l i t i o n  the United and  convince  as  i s to  sustain  the question foster  Vietnam assured  of  popular of  that  the Phnom  of China. trying  solution,  ASEAN  dominate,  Nations,  settlement i f  ASEAN was  was n o t  i n Kampuchea, their  each  to  Kampuchea d u r i n g  a political  a political  was  forces  regime.  t h e purpose  Penh would n o t become a c l i e n t However,  there i s  l e g i t i m a c y , w h i c h i n some ways a p p e a r s  Kampuchea, of  the  more i n t e r e s t e d  w h i c h t h e Khmer Rouge c a n n o t  each  by  resistance  ASEAN,  the finds  eaten  militarily  t o be  recognizes  be  distrust  t h e Vietnamese.  o f Democratic  representation  to  The  o f t e n seem  ASEAN,  coalition  t h e government  or  enclaves,  o f t h e Heng S e m r i n  According to  support  and  t h e CGDK's  as t h a t  forge a  border  sponsor,  vis-a-vis  justify  Khmers  cooperation.  other than  international coalition  or  separate  each  the  t h e CGDK i s a u n i t e d f r o n t ;  coordination  operate  to  by  the  irony  committed  l e t alone  individual  t h e Khmer p a r t i e s  to construct a longer-term  to  the  initial  t h e CGDK  t o any  weaknesses.  and t h e i r  of  one The  ASEAN p a t r o n s  as  a  of i t s strategic differed  8. " R e t u r n t o Kampuchea: Sihanouk's Unlikely Coalition," Business i n Thailand, 8 A u g u s t 1982, p. 31. Quoted i n Donald Weatherbee, " S o u t h e a s t Asian A f f a i r s 1982: Marking Time," i n Southeast Asian A f f a i r s 1983 ( S i n g a p o r e : I n s t i t u t e of Southeast A s i a n S t u d i e s , 1983).  87 in  that  the  regime,  former's goal  whereas  alternative regime as  at an  ASEAN i s legitimate  that  any  goal  diplomatic  electoral with  and is  level,  d e c i s i o n "by  the  recognition  coalition's  to oust  ASEAN's the  faced  was  paradox  while  anti-communist  to  the  provide  people  pushing  Heng an  of for  i t ultimate  f o r c e s are  f u t u r e government  the  Semrin interim  l e a v i n g Kampuchea's  of  denying  replace  too  i n Phnom Penh w i l l  be  Cambodia." the  rule.  weak,  future  CGDK's  Since  ASEAN l e d by  the  realizes the  Khmer  Rouge. Thus f a r , ambassador  to  opposed t o them. Plan  greeted brief  the  the  During in  Malaysia  Khmer  the  a formal  meetings with Unfortunately,  the  only  has  1980  country:  material  the  support,  international  State  Indonesia's  President  there  de  i s no  by,  decided  is  r e c o g n i t i o n ; the  be  to  meeting of  the  and  t o name  which  distance  was  the  was  not only  Minister.  f a c t o independent  or  sovereign  legitimately claim  to  represent  wholly  dependent  f o r sanctuary  upon and  China  for  upon ASEAN f o r  Heng S e m r i n r e g i m e i s d e p e n d e n t  f u t u r e o f Kampuchea d e p e n d s on,  f o r e i g n powers.  from  Colombo  permitted  Foreign  an  i s most  itself  Ieng Sary,  r e p r e s e n t a t i v e and  upon T h a i l a n d  In s h o r t ,  tried  CGDK's r e p r e s e n t a t i v e ,  CGDK  Vietnam.  Indonesia,  ministerial  g o v e r n m e n t o f Kampuchea w h i c h c a n the  ASEAN c o u n t r y  In c o n t r a s t ,  Rouge,  a November  Jakarta, as  CGDK.  is  and  on  will  88 Maintaining  One efforts  U n i t y : ASEAN i n t h e  of in  ASEAN's most n o t a b l e maintaining  ASEAN's i n i t i a l Heads o f  Kampuchean s e a t  nations. has  table  successes  seat  the  vacant,  in  the  was  United  voting patterns  Nations  Year  Voting  below:  the  very  The  this  and  forum.  Conference of fruitful. was  other  Nations  c o n s i s t e n t l y more s u c c e s s f u l .  o f UN  not  although Vietnam  been i t s l o b b y i n g  international  Non-Aligned  f r o m Cuba,  record  has  i n the  i n Havana i n 1979  to pressure  United  allegedly  "non-aligned"  General  Assembly  T h i s i s i n d i c a t e d by  Resolutions  to Retain  the  DK  Seat  1980  1981  1982  1983  1984  1985  1986  For  91  97  100  105  105  110  114  115  Against  21  23  25  23  23  22  21  21  its  first thirty  abstentions. Vietnam,  1 0  Laos  Soviet  and  African  r e s o l u t i o n i n 1979  sponsors, The and  Czechoslovakia, the  draft  Asian  a  91  to  Others  Germany, Hungary, Those a b s t a i n i n g  c o u n t r i e s , and  exceeded 21  countries against  Afghanistan.  East  Union.  winning  those  the  9  1979  The of  DK  at  remained  ASEAN's  been  the  campaign  Government  attributed  I n t e r n a t i o n a l Forum  in  the  victory the  Poland,  with  21  r e s o l u t i o n were  opposed  included the  were m o s t l y favor  expectations  Cuba,  Ukraine  Middle  included  and  Eastern Romania,  9. " B i g g e s t m a j o r i t y so f a r f o r t r o o p w i t h d r a w a l f r o m Kampuchea," ASEAN N e w s l e t t e r , P u b l i c a t i o n o f t h e ASEAN S e c r e t a r i a t , J a k a r t a , 12(Nov. -Dec." 1985), p. 7. 10. See K.K. Nair, ASEAN-Indochina R e l a t i o n s S i n c e 1975: The P o l i t i c s of Accomodation (Canberra: A u s t r a l i a n N a t i o n a l Univ. P r e s s , 1984).  89 Yugoslavia,  China,  Kingdom. C a u s i n g non-aligned was  India,  relations  the  some d e g r e e  nation  not  which  was  with  the  the  United  of  Afghanistan  United  more  Soviet  which  at  the  Japan  of resentment  supporting  Nations voting  displeasure  States,  the  1980  concerned  and  the  t o ASEAN, d r a f t and  with  Other f a c t o r s which  pattern  was  caused  Soviet  some  recent  nations  action  by  the  only  thereafter  maintaining  Union.  the  United  voting  influenced  Soviet to  good  invasion  show  their  the  ASEAN  for  position. ASEAN's support  for  Rouge. and on  human  Pot,  but  and  the  draft due  to  rights.  argued t h a t  that  Nations,  Tommy  its  saying  seat  that  which i n c l u d e d  the  in  it is  United  not  entity  1980,  real  United  the  ASEAN  impose  puppet  regime  added t h a t  Khmer  from A u s t r a l i a record  representatives Pol  t o d i s t i n g u i s h between t h e sovereignty  objects  of  man,  Democratic  o f ASEAN's s u p p o r t . to the  In  for  i t would be  tantamount  to to  state  to  t o o v e r t h r o w i t s government and  to  on i f the  it."  a powerful m i l i t a r y  a  United  " i f D e m o c r a t i c Kampuchea were  Nations,  permissible  weaker n e i g h b o u r ,  representative  and  Singapore's representative  invade i t s a  Pot  o f a Khmer Rouge l e d by  and  argued t h a t  the  Nations,  i n favour  necessary  were t h e  Koh,  Pol  international  Khmers' r e p r e h e n s i b l e  was  October  eliciting  r e v u l s i o n at the  territorial  speech i n  in  t e p i d support  At  it  was  r e s o l u t i o n drew  t h e y were  Kampuchea w h i c h  lose  burden  a government  The  France  primary  1  1  Malaysia's  i n t e r n a t i o n a l community  permanent accepted  11. United Nations General Assembly, 35th Session, General A s s e m b l y P r o v i s i o n a l V e r b a t i m R e c o r d o f t h e 3 4 t h M e e t i n g , 13 Oct. 19867 < A7~35/PV34)~ pp. 27-36. In"~~Horen,"~op7" c7t™7"7^~246-247.  90 the p r i n c i p l e could in  of foreign  military  be s e c u r e . M o r e o v e r ,  1956  then  no c o u n t r y  although other regimes  such  a s Hungary  and C z e c h o s l o v a k i a  account  of  c a s e was Hanoi,  intervention,  their  de f a c t o  different.  backed  i n 1968 power,  The Heng  by t h e S o v i e t  the a s s i s t a n c e  of a  and  While  representative of disgruntled hoping  to strike  t h e Kampucheans  ASEAN  retorted  was  claiming  power  felt  truly  However, that  was n e e d e d was a r e a l i s t i c Like their  initial  United Nations statement worded  Vietnamese  tone  resolution  called  human r i g h t s ,  and r e f r a i n e d to  keep  on a l l  advocated  legitimate  two  was  a  Vietnamese Nations  governments  people  and what  solution. after  the invasion,  o f c o n d e m n a t i o n was, conveying  lines  with  parties fully  that  by a  the United  the  immediately  from  open  of  Vietnamese  ran to the  t h e Kampuchean  political  statement  who  the  (Heng S e m r i n  1 8  many w i t h i n  neither  represented  that  people.  was an a c t o f  welcomed them a s  not requested  t h e Kampuchean  a deal).  Assembly  carefully  i t sintervention  member o f P o l P o t ' s f a c t i o n  General  ASEAN's  that  intervention  i s a surrogate of  o f 200,000 V i e t n a m e s e .  and t h a t  occupation  Semrin  army  foreign  P o l Pot,  regime  t h e Heng  through  "national  from  Semrin  that  on  and w i e l d s power o n l y  argued  liberators  Koh a r g u e d  recognized  Union,  Vietnam's d e l e g a t i o n salvation"  are l e g a l l y  differences  once a g a i n ,  an o v e r t l y Hanoi.  t o observe be s e t t l e d  The  antidraft  fundamental by p e a c e f u l  12. L e e Kuan Yew o n c e r e m a r k e d , " I am q u i t e s u r e t h a t i n t i m e we will find out the d i f f e r e n c e between...national l i b e r a t i o n and national salvation. Maybe t h e r e i s a n i c e d i s t i n c t i o n : when one subverts a non-Communist n e i g h b o r i t i s c a l l e d l i b e r a t i o n . When one s u b v e r t s a Communist neighbor i t i s called salvation." Quoted in Thakur Phanit, Regional Integration Attempts in Southeast Asia: A S t u d y o f ASEAN's P r o b l e m s and P r o g r e s s Ph.D. D i s s e r t a t i o n , P e n n s y l v a n i a S t a t e U n i v . , 1980, p. 231.  91 means,  and  choose  proposed  their  subversion  that  own  government  free  second  major  International  Conference  in  1981  October  intransigence resolutions  of  on Kampuchea  over  United  troop  persistently  one  which  tried  withdrawals  project  would t h e r e f o r e  a  between t h e i r conflict.  itself  UNGA  position,  from  a s an  Manila.  dispute  permit  a  provided  China.  ASEAN  international supported  this  once  a g a i n become  While  that  and  of  withdrawal hostile  a neutral,  would n o t l e a d Khmer  Vietnam  a l l the  the draft  solution.  the  was t o  The ASEAN distinction  Sino-Vietnamese  Vietnam's  Vietnamese  democratic  was t o  month by  conference,  incorporate  withdrawal  on t h e one hand,  that  w h i c h would make a  Vietnam,  hoped t o  conference  earlier  political  formula  with  the  At  Thailand, agreed  a comprehensive  seeking a  t h e ICK  Kampuchea and p r o v i d e t h e e x t e r n a l means t o e n s u r e  a  Vietnam's  internationally  had been d r a f t e d  including  They a l s o  concerns,  of  York  repeated  Chinese  the issue  r e q u i r e an  ministers i n  basis of  m i n i s t e r s were  its  i n New  The ICK c o n f e r e n c e  i n convening  p r o p o s a l which  ASEAN c o u n t r i e s ,  nation.  the  solution.  ASEAN f o r e i g n  could  was  auspices. after  to the  to avoid.  to  ASEAN's p u r p o s e  the  to  interference,  undertaking  Nations  drew ASEAN  was a n x i o u s  has  be  allowed  (ICK) c o n v e n e d  an o p p o r t u n i t y f o r ASEAN t o d i s a s s o c i a t e  present  be  outside  international  under  inevitably  i t  political  people  or coercion.  ASEAN's  situation  t h e Kampuchean  security  troops that  and  from  Kampuchea  non-aligned  n e e d e d t o be a s s u r e d  that  automatically to the establishment  Rouge r e g i m e  allied  with  China,  the  ASEAN  92 ministers also  needed e x t e r n a l  Rouge would  never  solution  Manila comprised  United  in  Nations  establishment foreign of  of  The  again.  four  The  points:  force  no  factions d)  to  be which  the  b) t h e w i t h d r a w a l  of  c) t h e d i s a r m i n g  elections  under  United  Chinese  would  Vietnamese  weaken  troop  designated  Nations  once t h e Vietnamese Tommy Koh was  that  the s t r o n g e s t  element  weakened.  The  acrimonious  intensity  on  between  ASEAN  in  that and told  China  Rouge  ally.  disarmament, Kampuchea  that  rejected  objected to  an any  They insisting  be  insurgent a l l i e s  debate  expedited an  "interim  from  moving  China.  13.  op. c i t . , p. 1049.  f o r disarming a l l  that  Chinese  t h e Khmers were  and h e n c e s h o u l d n o t be  between t h e  ministerial  bluntly  demand  argued  the resistence  C a r l o s Romulo  Buszynski,  and  t h e ASEAN  "non-negotiable".  15  solution  were o u t .  insisted  July  from  would p r e v e n t  an ICK  however,  Khmer  mandatory  limit,"  that  although i t  s o i t was c r u c i a l  Chinese,  withdrawal  which  realized  their  from  "time  by 92 c o u n t r i e s ,  support,  The  P o t exempt  administration"  arranged  and  the  ASEAN  reached.  Vietnam's  factions  draft  a) t h e d i s p a t c h o f a  after  by V i e t n a m .  demanded P o l  a  pre-ICK  immediately  free  b a s i s without  solution  t h e Khmer  Kampuchea  administration,  ICK c o n f e r e n c e was a t t e n d e d  agreement  that  1 3  was b o y c o t t e d  in  an i n t e r i m  and  supervision.  within  power  peacekeeping  Khmer  withdrawal;  that  to  ensure  t r o o p s under U n i t e d N a t i o n s s u p e r v i s i o n ,  a l l  had  come  means t o  level  two r e a c h e d meetings  Philippine acting  Foreign  such  had t o be Minister  Foreign Minister  Han  93 Nianlong its  that  i f China  inflexible  seen  as  position  bullying  Minister  Mochtar drag  disturbing  to  subordinate  ASEAN  with  the  But  from  ASEAN  and of  solidarity  most  change i n  eager  A  1 6  policy  in  r e g i o n and,  Quite  According  United  Manila  over  States  ASEAN  was  hour r o l e  draft  to  as to an  diplomats  relationship  is  empty f o r m u l a  Vietnam t o  withdraw from  t h a t , as  escaped  against  mentioned  adapted  when n e c e s s a r y ,  in  itself tilted  immediate b a c k i n g  colonialism Indochina  by and  Thai  Foreign  i n backtracking  i n favour of the  an  historically  French  to  possible explanation  expectation of  between t h e  i f China  willingness  t o cement t h e new  eleventh  reassurrance  position  i t  issue.  scenes.  disturbing  ASEAN  upon  foreign  example,  States'  be  Foreign  that lose.  From t h e T h a i p o i n t o f v i e w  with  offer  retaliation."  w h i c h an  cause,  Savetsila's  bear  i t  the  the  Han  i t would  United  in this  p r e v i o u s l y agreed  pressure to  a vote,  would  Indonesian  1 4  a l s o warned  the  "behind  Khmer p o s i t i o n .  would  was  to China  was  Siddhi  the  states.  and  by  1 5  what  Minister  small  issue to  China's  Peking."  i t would l o s e ASEAN sympathy  five  American observer, for  the working of the conference  Kusumaatmadja  wanted t o  labored  h e l d up  "a  Chinese  demonstration  would not  bring  Cambodia,  Vietnamese  military  f o r Thailand's earlier,  sudden  Thailand's  t o the dominant in  power  the d i r e c t i o n  was  exploiting  nor  highest. the  the B r i t i s h  in For  differences i n Burma  and  14. F a r E a s t e r n E c o n o m i c Review, 24 J u l y 1981, p. 13. 15. B e r n a r d N o s s i t e r , New Y o r k Times, 18 J u l y 1981. In J u s t u s M. van d e r K r o e f , "Kampuchea: The Diplomatic Labyrinth," Asian S u r v e y 22 ( O c t . 1982). 16. L e s z e k Buszynski," Thailand: The Erosion of a Balanced F o r e i g n P o l i c y , " A s i a n S u r v e y , 22 (Nov. 1982), p. 1051.  94 Malaya, the in  during  Japanese, the  the Second and  Vietnam  incentive served  later  War.  i t so  ICK  was  necessary of  Vietnam. the  ASEAN d i d  not  To  supported  nations  provide  States enough  only  attending  by  C h i l e and  the  document p a s s e d  had  the  t o win  r e s o l u t i o n w o u l d have t o  and  ignore  agreed  to The  1 7  the  French  made no  an  deadlock  to  show  delegation.  mention o f  Written  o f w h i c h were t h e  the  In l i e u  of those  terms of  unspecified "appropriate  f a c t i o n s would c o e r c e Although conference,  ASEAN  i t d i d succeed  Vietnam's i l l e g a l conference  was  i n French,  its  of  i n two  respects.  e n s u r e no  Chinese p o s i t i o n  International Herald  Tribune,  20  at  First,  of  p.  armed  the  ICK  opinion  upon  ASEAN,  the  i t showed  to  conciliatory.  which sought  J u l y 1981,  the  elections.  For  Phom Penh t h a t ASEAN wanted t o be  to the  after  i t s p o k e i n vague  goals  Kampuchea.  the  main f e a t u r e s  holding of f r e e  achieve  a  f a c t i o n s or  in focusing international  occupation  significant  Moscow and  In c o n t r a s t  not  there  b r o k e n by  any  measures" t o  or d i s r u p t the did  points,  to  emphasize  which  i n Kampuchea  -- b o t h  unanimous  division  eventually  disarming  interim administration  proposal.  no  t h e d e t a i l s on was  The  determined i t  the  this,  as  Pakistan.  at  conference  Vietnamese withdrawal ASEAN  had  the disarmament o f P o l Pot  achieve  d r a f t e d by  establishing  17.  United  so  communique  Hanoi,  the  a l l participants  were d i f f e r e n c e s .  final  Evidently,  t h a t any  principles  formula  a l s o supported  i n opposing  was  o f t h e 92  approval  Thailand  opposing  well.  conference  majority  i t r e f r a i n e d from  t o abandon a d i p l o m a t i c s t r a t e g y w h i c h h i s t o r i c a l l y  China's p o s i t i o n the  W o r l d War  a protracted  5.  95 war, its  ASEAN  was  legitimate  hour change  willing  t o compromise  security  concerns.  of heart  alignment  with  retaining  the p u b l i c  members s u c h  the  as  showed  Indonesia  and  Savetsila  to  Thai having  Union i s On  the  is  hand,  logic  of  apparent Kuala  in  China  as  ASEAN  and  without  a  to  while  accentuate  Minister as  Siddhi  a  "minor  of Chinese  for  dilemmas and  either  believe that  has  the  one  Vietnam or  hand,  solely  dilemma  is  course  V i e t n a m on  that  ineluctable  resulted  a middle  Sino-  fear  ASEAN i n t e r e s t s s u c h  while steering  1 9  diplomatic  "Ctlhe  [ZOPFAN] becomes d i r e c t e d  on  problem."  asserting  t h e o t h e r hand,  denied  "the S o v i e t  o f t h e p r o b l e m and  Thailand's unenviable  8 0  t h e Khmers  Khoman f u r t h e r  M a l a y s i a both  vehicle On  solidarity  provoking  an  when some ASEAN  o f t h e Kampuchean  source  security  Lumpur d e c l a r a t i o n Union."  and  i s the  the region.  concurrence  maintain  forge  issue  explaining that  solution  Indonesia  Thailand's  the S o v i e t  Foreign them  t o China,  to the  u s i n g ASEAN  influence  Thai  M i n i s t e r Thanat  too c l o s e  Vietnamese animosity China  At a time  eleventh  1 8  t h e key one  Kampuchean  harmonize  Deputy Prime  veered  indeed  M a l a y s i a were t r y i n g  with China,  misunderstanding."  Thailand's  could  the  o f ASEAN.  ASEAN's d i f f e r e n c e s tried  i t  over  support  Vietnam, r e c o g n i z i n g  Secondly,  that  Chinese  with  in  the  that  the  against how  to  between  the other  --  ASEAN.  18. B u s z y n s k i , "Thailand: The E r o s i o n of a Balanced Foreign P o l i c y , " op. c i t . , p. 1051. 19. BBC SWB, 16 Nov. 1981. In B u s z y n s k i , " T h a i l a n d , t h e S o v i e t U n i o n and t h e Kampuchean I m b r o g l i o , " op. c i t . , p. 72. 20. B u s z y n s k i , " T h a i l a n d : The Erosion of a Balanced Foreign P o l i c y , " op. c i t . , p. 1052.  96 Unlike  Indonesia,  Thailand's s t a b i l i t y . rebels sharing  t o draw  by  following  with t h e i r  front  Indonesia's  conjunction  pushing  see  that  i t pushes  i f  with  the other 1971."  compelled  increased  t e n s i o n might  allow  The  has  t o back  Malaysia  after  visited  Bangkok f r o m  the extent emerged f r o m  the  of Thai  of  "idealistic  Indonesia...[after  ICK  to  tread  a  cautious  influence  principles  path  about  how  with China," with  Premier  presumably out  that,  Chinese  "I don't close and  Beijing  21. N a t i o n Review, 15 May 1980, p. 2. 22. B u s z y n s k i , "Thailand: The E r o s i o n P o l i c y , " op. c i t . p. 1051.  views.  how  was  an  a  fears China.  over  Mahathir Malaysia  distant  is  t h e view t h a t  advantage  f o r ASEAN's  on  not  Mahathir  think that or  not  of concern  expressed  "more f r e e l y "  but  t u r n towards  Malaysian  with  in  I t does  i n Bangkok,  T h a i l a n d may  identification  could contact China  Review  8 1  A u g u s t 23-24,  Thailand's f r a t e r n i z a t i o n  blindly  as i n  conference,  view  been  t h r e e members t o f o l l o w . . . j u s t  Chinese  Thailand's relationship  Thailand  not  they  the t a l k s s t a t i n g  very strong  apparent  which]  too hard,  Shortly  a  tendency  (MCP) Kuala  Kampuchea i s s u e accuses  in  the  i t s g r i e v a n c e s t o o s t r e n o u s l y upon T h a i l a n d .  want t o  has  Thai counterparts,  A comment i n Bangkok's N a t i o n  in  is  Party  lead.  usually  Malaysia  Communist  which  Malaysian  o f ZOPFAN i n  interest  press,  the  the case  direct  a c r o s s the border.  i n the  stressed  [would] persuade  a  that increased  r e s o u r c e s from  the Thai  has  the Malayan  i s afraid  Indonesia-Malaysia ignored  With  a border  Lumpur g o v e r n m e n t t h e MCP  Malaysia  since  benefit.  Balanced  8 8  Foreign  97 Indeed,  Thailand  i m p o r t a n c e by V i e t n a m and diplomatic "friends offered  the  China. with  willing  historical  United  Countries  the  Commonwealth  lobbied  the  the  to  Middle  Thai a  the  ASEAN  Europe  with  Minister  ASEAN  support i n  fellow  appealed  Latin  Islamic  to  concentrated  and  spared  Siddhi  Exploiting  83  rallied  Singapore  country  EEC c o u n t r i e s  through  f o r Beijing,  Philippines  of  i t s views  for international  and M a l a y s i a  East,  h a s no  "go-between."  links  ASEAN,  which  Foreign  message  a c t as  Indonesia  countries only  i t s geographical  Indonesia,  PRC, c o m m u n i c a t e s  i t had  nations,  Spanish-speaking Thailand,  the  and c u l t u r a l  Nations, of  mentioned,  Similarly,  that i f  was  advantage o f  a n e g o t i a t i n g "go-between" among  As  court."  Hanoi  (Thailand) their  a c t i n g as  links  in  has taken  fellow on t h e  America,  colonial  and  domination,  whom i t h a s h i s t o r i c a l l y  enjoyed  good r e l a t i o n s . * 8  ASEAN's d i p l o m a t i c personal  level  in  ASEAN o f f i c i a l s .  Tommy Koh, f o r m e r l y  United  Nations  spokesperson. to  o f labour"  a l s o extends t o the  t a k i n g advantage o f t h e s t r e n g t h s  to the  accredited  "division  Nations,  boosting  Singapore's  was d e s i g n a t e d Koh's  Kusumaatmadja,  favorable international  between ASEAN  designated  and Vietnam.  But,  as as I  Foreign  official will  United  i s i n large part  Another d i s t i n g u i s h e d p e r s o n a l i t y i s Indonesia's Mochtar  representative  ASEAN's o f f i c i a l  diplomatic s k i l l  ASEAN's  of specific  profile. Minister  interlocutor  illustrate  below,  23. S e e S u t h i c h a i Yoon "ASEAN Security and E c o n o m i c s : New D i r e c t i o n s f o r t h e 1980's," i n ASEAN Security and Economic Development, eds. Karl D. Jackson and M. Hadi Soesastro (Berkeley, C a l i f . : Institute o f E a s t A s i a n S t u d i e s , 1983), pp. 251-255. 24. F a r E a s t e r n E c o n o m i c Review. 10 S e p t . 1982, p. 11.  98 Mochtar's  additional  different  reasons  Indonesia's  responsibility  from  those  "Dual-Track"  o f Tommy  emerged  for  slightly  Koh.  Diplomacy:  Competing  Conceptions  of  Security  Indonesia's impatience  with  two-track  and  to play  a leadership  Vietnam now  from  for  has  a 3  Another  a low  profile  have our  own  If  was  ASEAN  effectively diplomacy  people  strategic indeed  become  as  was  forget  formed  "at  speech  Hicheal  this  Asia.  but  desire  According  static  of  to  ASEAN  and  minuet."  The  elaborated:  "It i s  with t h e w a l t z , " which " i s  every  corner with  more b l u n t : that  stirring  "We've t a k e n  we're  i n mainland  a big country Southeast  Indonesia's  such and  Asia."  initiative,"  8 6  as  before the People's C o n s u l t a t i v e  Leifer  i t s captive.  would r e l i e v e  growing  i n t e r e s t s to those  S i n a r Harapan,  interests  i n a 1968  then,  "elegant  reaches  journalist  that  claimed  Assembly,  and  of  Kusumaatmadja ,  take the f l o o r  direction  music."  Suharto  Jakarta daily, to  Southeast  Mochtar an  out  though too o f t e n f r u s t r a t e d  in  Minister  Indonesia  dynamic,  role  been d a n c i n g  dismantled  time  a historic,  Foreign  have  emerged  the s u b o r d i n a t i o n of t h e i r  Thailand  Indonesian  diplomacy  8 7  sense  maintains,  I t was of  Indonesia  hoped t h a t  a  had  two-track  impotence.  25. Susumo Awanohara, "Where there's a will...." Far Eastern E c o n o m i c Review, 1 March 1984, p. 10. 26. Susumo Awanohara, "A m e e t i n g o f m i n d s , " F a r E a s t e r n E c o n o m i c Review. 9 Feb. 1984, p. 19. 27. M i c h e a l L e i f e r , "ASEAN under stress over Cambodia," Far E a s t e r n E c o n o m i c Review, 14 J a n . 1984, p. 35.  99 Despite  i t s  contradictory  potential  i t  has  a c c e p t e d and  been  members. Vietnam  c o u l d have  Essentially, i s  dealt  with  nature  on ASEAN's u n i t y , absorbed  by  the  and  the  this  two-track  organization  Indonesia's two-track collectively  disruptive  diplomacy  through  and i t s means  regular  t o by a l l ASEAN m e m b e r s .  88  The s e c o n d  a  and  distinctly  (as  opposed  which  refers  approach, negotiating or  the  efforts  Ministry  Center  for  of  because  counterparts  their  sentiments  "non-official"  i n Jakarta.  to  ASEAN)  talks,  or  T h i s second  ASEAN; t h e y  as Indonesians  reflect  surrounds  their  it.  only  when t h e d i r e c t  will  they  claim  act  talks benefit on  behalf  of  an  i s , as Tilman  "...[it]  is  direct  directly to because  perceptions  of  They do n o t s p e a k a s  speak as I n d o n e s i a n s . "  that  to  track  (CSIS),  I t i s uniquely Indonesian  and  the world that  t h e army o r t h e  Studies  Indonesian:  i n Vietnam. embody  -- u s u a l l y  International  i n d i v i d u a l s speak  their  members o f  and  and u n i q u e l y  important  I n d o n e s i a and  the  Foreign A f f a i r s  Strategic  direct  to  track i s  by i n d i v i d u a l s o u t s i d e t h e P r e s i d e n t ' s O f f i c e  academic t h i n k - t a n k describes,  Indonesian  that  diplomatic  channels agreed direct  system  One m i g h t  8 9  add  ASEAN a s an o r g a n i z a t i o n ASEAN  rather  than  as  individuals. In  discussing  understand are  not  policy military 28. 29.  that  which  perspective, i t i s important t o  a t t i t u d e s r e g a r d i n g Vietnam  unified. between  the Indonesian  There the  i s  more  retains vivid  i n Indonesian  evident r i v a l r y hard-line, reminders  T i l m a n , op. c i t . , pp. 77-78. I b i d , p. 77.  circles  f o r influence  anti-Chinese o f China's  over  Indonesian  complicity i n  100 the  1965  and  the  c o u p and Foreign  maintaining The Chief  of  of  i n the  the  past  accommodation  belief  unity.  a predominant  which  is  that  ASEAN c o n t r o v e r s y  countries. Southeast  s e v e n y e a r s and  Some Asia  but  the  with  is  Indonesia's  Army  has  paid  i s the  said  a  stating " i t  advocate  is  a  p e o p l e do  1984,  i s my  firm  our  two  danger  to  between  Vietnam  I n d o n e s i a n army and  visits  i n February  conflict  that  three  most v o c a l  a visit  ASEAN by  n e v e r be  countries  who  After  ripples within will  concerned  3 0  with Hanoi.  there  r o l e i n government,  directly  S t a f f , G e n e r a l Benny M u r d a n i ,  Murdani caused  it. "  Ministry  ASEAN's  center  t o Vietnam for  which p l a y s  not  believe  3 1  During military Dung,  April  issues  and  with  so  would  China.  buffer A f t e r the  cooperation  the  in  face to  the  1985  with Hanoi,  Murdani's r e t u r n  of  to  discussed  rely  with  y e a r 2000 visit,  t o Murdani,  more h e a v i l y  he  w h i c h was  on  a  a l s o suggested strongly  Tien  a threat  because  ASEAN's  current  influence  Vietnam  against  bilateral  G e n e r a l Van  were n o t  growing Chinese  Accommodation by  Murdani  Vietnamese  According  3 8  Thailand  respectively.  visit,  Vietnam's Defence M i n i s t e r ,  poor." --  V i e t n a m and  reliable  1985  added t h a t  "they are policy  an  Moscow and would  --  force  Beijing  provide  a  much-strengthened possible military  denied  by  Mochtar  upon  Indonesia.  30. See Andrew J . Maclntyre, " I n t e r p r e t i n g Indonesian Foreign Policy: The C a s e o f Kampuchea, 1979-1986," A s i a n S u r v e y . 27 (May 1987), pp. 515-534. 31. A s i a Y e a r b o o k 1985, F a r E a s t e r n E c o n o m i c Review, p. 95. 32. S i n a r H a r a p a n ( J a k a r t a ) , 19 A p r i l 1985.  101 R e l a t i o n s between streak  of  personal  embarrassingly described  in  the  the  which i s Foreign  inter  "backdoor"  tactful  concerns  powerful  been i n f l u e n t i a l  in  Hanoi  (IIR),  official  visit.  seminars  were  on  by  a  single  military As  3 3  and  ASEAN  the issue.  i n shaping  Indonesia's  indicator  of  Most s i g n i f i c a n t l y ,  the  though,  blessing. and  International  Indonesia's foreign t h e CSIS  have  with the Vietnamese the f i r s t Both  private  unmistakably  deputies of  good  as  Studies  c o n n e c t i o n s i n t h e J a k a r t a h i e r a r c h y and  p a r t i c i p a n t s Commodore former  a  for Strategic  mutual u n d e r s t a n d i n g . an  "steeply  Indonesian  w h i l e Murdani,  represents  Representatives of  Relations  had  actions,  a c t i o n s have S u h a r t o ' s  has  seminars  the  has  a  the bureaucracy."  r e p r e s e n t i n g both  Jakarta's Center  past.  as  t h e p r e s i d e n t "commands t h e  pares within  initiative,  country's r e a l  (CSIS)  Mochtar  movements. L i d d l e  structure  a  Mochtar i s thus f a c e d with the c h a l l e n g e o f s o o t h i n g less  Murdani's  leaving  i n which t h e h e i g h t s a r e dominated  Minister,  Murdani's  political  p r e s i d e n t , " and  positions,  sometimes  o f Murdani's  Indonesian  primus  M o c h t a r have been marked by  competition,  the dark  ascending pyramid office,  M u r d a n i and  just  prior  institutional and  bilateral,  Yet  f o r an  participated  I n s t i t u t e of  in  the  in  two  International  t o General Murdani's sides  emphasized  whose p u r p o s e  session,  flavour,  counting  Rahardjo  and  first  that  was  "informal"  official Sudibjo  policy  has  the  t o deepen  the  meeting  among  Muhammed  its  Arifin,  Murdani.  33. R. W i l l i a m L i d d l e , "Soeharto's Political Institutions," Pacific 71. I n T i l m a n , op. c i t . , p. 39.  Indonesia: A f f a i r s , 58  P e r s o n a l R u l e and ( S p r i n g 1985), p.  102 In h i s Minister  Mochtar  two-track Action  capacity  has  project  prevents a  United States  initiative  and  i s his  Vietnam.  belief  The  that  be e l i g i b l e  assistance,  f o r American  that  Tho  a  the Soviet  was  United  establishment stipulations its  troops  remains action  of  relations  i s to  countries,  1983,  be  Hanoi  would  reducing  Vietnam's  a  its  Premier  as s a y i n g i n a F r e n c h news a g e n c y i n t e r v i e w  stability  thaw  in  would  the r e g i o n . "  f o r n o r m a l i z a t i o n are f i r s t , Kampuchea,  more t h a n  two  "contribute  and  Washington's  3 4  Vietnam's withdrawal  second,  thousand  to  the  American  handover soldiers  of  the two of the  missing i n  (MIA).  Thach  letter  to  appealed  officials. polite  of  Indonesia's  m o t i v a t i o n behind  henceforth  In A p r i l  States-Vietnam  from  In a Co  quoted  Union.  Foreign  i n the Missing i n  i f there  between t h e two  Le Due  within  normalization of  normalization of r e l a t i o n s  d e p e n d e n c e on  w i t h Hanoi,  been h i s m e d i a t i n g r o l e  i s s u e which  between t h e Mochtar's  Kusumaatmadja's p e t  diplomacy  (MIA)  a s ASEAN's i n t e r l o c u t o r  M o c h t a r i n 1985, for  a  "high-level  Washington has  rejection,  with normalization  that  they  withdrawal.  Nonetheless,  officials  notified  were  meeting"  g r e e t e d Mochtar's  insisting which,  Vietnam's F o r e i g n  that  t h e MIA stress,  on  July  Hanoi  was  Minister  with  American  initiatives  i s s u e has  no  with a  connection  r e s t s on V i e t n a m ' s t r o o p 6,  1985, prepared  United  States  to release  the  34. A q e n c e F r a n c e P r e s s e d e s p a t c h , Ho C h i Minh C i t y , 8 A p r i l 1985 (FBIS, 9 A p r i l 1985). Quoted i n J u s t u s M. Van Der K r o e f , "The United States and Cambodia: The Limits of Compromise and Intervention," Contemporary Southeast Asia, 7 (Mar. 1986), p. 252.  103 r e m a i n s o f 26 A m e r i c a n s , thus f a r , has y i e l d e d However, that  the  want a  spell  Minister's  i n t e n y e a r s which,  99 r e m a i n s o f a t o t a l  accustomed  to  of intense diplomatic that  i t  i n an  of  to  Vietnam  evident  fears  h a s an  effort  meeting,  aggravate  interests,  handover  Hanoi's  2,464  Washington  trying  concerns officials  Mochtar's i n d i v i d u a l  efforts  s t a l e m a t e have  in  They ASEAN  t o undermine  also  Foreign  Thai  morale  In a b i d t o r e l i e v e  forsaken  for  they w i l l  American negotiate  g r o u n d on K a m p u c h e a .  seeking  n o t been  desperately  3 8  upcoming  assured that political  argued  with [Washington] t o  i n ASEAN. being  "now  option."  u p s t a g e an  was  on t h e MIA i s s u e w i t h o u t g i v i n g  t h e Kampuchean  American  differences  ASEAN  activity  missing.  shrewdness  new u r g e n c y was b e c a u s e t h e V i e t n a m e s e  argued t h a t  Thai  only  critics  r e m i n d Moscow  and  the largest  a  36  breakthrough to  spared suspicion  among  ASEAN r a n k s . As ASEAN's his role that  official  interlocutor  so s e r i o u s l y  that  h i s actions reflect  the S i x ' s l a r g e s t t o implement  evident  differences  preferred  not  ASEAN o f f i c i a l s  has taken  are concerned  more o f a d e s i r e t o p r o j e c t  policy.  3 7  Thailand,  "independent" s h i f t  Soviet-Vietnamese  Mochtar  I n d o n e s i a as  power t h a n t o be a humble ASEAN s e r v a n t  a joint  of Jakarta's  some  w i t h Vietnam,  from  between M o c h t a r Treaty  to "intimate  was that  toiling  f o r one, h a s m i s g i v i n g s ASEAN  policy,  and M u r d a n i .  consolidated Vietnam  35. R i c h a r d N a t i o n s , " H a n o i ' s MIA's c a r d , " Review, 16 J u l y 1985, p. 15. 36. I b i d . , p. 15. 37. Rodney Tasker, " S t e a l i n g t h e Thunder," Review, 18 J u l y 1985, p. 15.  and  the  Even a f t e r t h e  in  1978,  Mochtar  i s the  proxy  of  any  Far Eastern  Economic  Far Eastern  Economic  104 country."  Equating  affinity,  he  Indonesia  and  Vietnam's  revolutionary  continued:  I have had many c o n v e r s a t i o n s w i t h t h e i r l e a d e r s and I am aware of their pride and their fears since independence. So t h e fact that t h e y have signed a t r e a t y and have been o b l i g e d t o r e c e i v e a i d i s I t h i n k a result of circumstances. They have t r i e d t o o b t a i n a s s i s t a n c e from other sources. They have e n c o u r a g e d i n v e s t m e n t and t r a d e b u t n o t much was f o r t h c o m i n g . 3  With r e g a r d Minister Vietnam Thai,  Thanat is  to the  Kampuchean  Khoman c o u n t e r s  not  an  front-line  expansionist  view o f  issue,  the  Deputy  Indonesian  threat  V i e t n a m and  Thai  by  8  Prime  argument  giving  a  that  distinctly  the s i t u a t i o n :  This kind of t h r e a t i s not imagined nor p e r c e i v e d ; i t jumps i n t o t h e e y e s o f p e o p l e w i l l i n g t o l o o k . That i s why a comparison can be established between tigers which are i n or a l r e a d y o u t o f t h e woods. Vietnam i s obviously a t i g e r which i s s q u a t t i n g at our d o o r s t e p s b a c k e d by a n o t h e r t i g e r , one n o t f a r b e h i n d , w h i l e t h e o t h e r p o t e n t i a l t i g e r s t i l l l i e s h i d d e n i n t h e woods. 3 9  These d i f f e r e n c e s two  conceptions  reinforcing,  but  alternatives. distinguished  i t  was  security  since The  4 0  by  ASEAN c o n c e p t i o n first,  of  the  between T h a i l a n d  the  which  Indochina  advent  defined  were  issue,  of  common p e r c e p t i o n  of r e g i o n a l  and  ASEAN  i n developmental  from  initially  mutually  have become  competing  in  o f an  s e c u r i t y was  I n d o n e s i a stem  1967  external  conceived  was  not  threat. i n two  t e r m s whereby  The  ways:  regional  38. F a r E a s t e r n Economic Review. 17 Dec. 1978. Q u o t e d i n Chan Heng Chee, "The I n t e r e s t s and R o l e o f ASEAN i n the Indochina C o n f l i c t , " i n I n d o c h i n a and P r o b l e m s o f S e c u r i t y and S t a b i l i t y i n Southeast Asia, eds. Khien Theeravit and MacAlister Brown, p a p e r s and d i s c u s s i o n of the Conference held at Chulalongkorn U n i v . , Bangkok, 18-21 June 1980, (Bangkok: C h u l a l o n g k o r n Univ. P r e s s , 1981), p. 190. 39. Bangkok P o s t . 9 Feb. 1982, p. 9. 40. See M i c h e a l L e i f e r , "ASEAN u n d e r s t r e s s o v e r Cambodia," F a r E a s t e r n E c o n o m i c Review. 14 J u n e 1984, pp. 34-35, f o r an e x c e l l e n t d i s c u s s i o n on t h i s p o i n t .  105 security  was  e n e r g i e s from by  necessary to  economic development,  political  stability;  regional  o r d e r based  The  Indonesian  nationalist, against Laos,  not  view  an  essential  for  distrust  of  Hanoi's  Vietnam  is  for  countries. Vietnam itself.  I n d o n e s i a and  the procedure concede  a  initially  first  Thailand.•  for  merely  Indonesia  and  political  on a p r o f o u n d  nationalist  buffer  state.  between t h e two  the procedure and  concerned  that  by  which  control  essentially  with  They a r e t h u s w i l l i n g t o i n Kampuchea.  conceptions of distinctly  i t s  like  national sovereignty.  o v e r Kampuchea  interest"  a  struggling  Kampuchea,  and  a  condemns b o t h  is  security  separate the  ASEAN's  have  since the  principles,  second  two  supported  the by  1  Throughout o f an  by  as  i s a crucial  "vital  become two  supported  is  i s premised  by t h e c o n t r o l .  complementary  1978 i n v a s i o n  Vietnam  which  security  Malaysia are  and l e s s  Vietnamese  state  willingness to respect  i t s control  underpinned  prescription  that  t h e T h a i view  Thus T h a i l a n d  asserted  a  wasteful  f o r national sovereignty.  Vietnam's  reason,  of  i t must be  was  maintains  perceived  this  diversion  t o i t s Chinese neighbour.  In c o n t r a s t ,  Kampuchea,  i t  expansionist,  stability.  not  the though  second,  on r e s p e c t  subordination  is  prevent  "odd  man  P h i l i p p i n e s was s u p e r p o w e r and  the  conflict,  out." the only at that  At  the  P h i l i p p i n e s h a s been  ASEAN's  ASEAN t i m e had  formation  in  s t a t e t o be a f o r m e r the  most  somewhat  1967,  the  colony of a  developed  domestic  41. S e e M i c h e a l L e i f e r , "ASEAN u n d e r s t r e s s o v e r Cambodia," op. c i t . pp. 34-35; and B u s z y n s k i , "ASEAN: A Changing Regional R o l e , " op. c i t . , p. 767.  106  b a n k i n g and  industrial  sectors.  percentage of  intra-ASEAN  major f o r e i g n  naval  its  soil.  Indonesia billion  In $3  to  rather  million.*  centuries  of l i f e  years  i n Hollywood."  rarely  takes  Vietnam f o r preoccupation aloofness. road" both  Vietnam to  Thailand),  no  an i n i t i a t i v e ,  and T h a i l a n d  Philippine  as "  domestic  conceivably and C h i n a . a  share  Asians  have,  the strange  $1.1 was  a  perhaps s t a t u s as  product  convent f o l l o w e d  i n the  Kampuchean  particular but  of  by  forty  crisis,  the  strategic  joined  t h e s a k e o f ASEAN s o l i d a r i t y .  take  billion,  P h i l i p p i n e s bona f i d e  Spanish  with  4 3  expressed  with  US$4  problems  the  firm  4 4  increases Perhaps  No d o u b t  i t s political  s i d e on t h e i s s u e  ASEAN's p o l i c y  of  i t s perpetual  contributed  i fi t  preference,  condemnation  Y e t a s Tom H u x l e y p o i n t s o u t , M a n i l a ' s  stance  fence"  in a  smallest  ASEAN s t a t e  exported  Southeast  the  ASEAN c o u n t r i e s  P h i l i p p i n e s has  the  the  Bay and C l a r k F i e l d ) on  $2.9 b i l l i o n  d e s c r i b i n g them  three  Among t h e  Singapore  Fellow  questioned  Asians,  (Subic  partners,  8  i t holds  and i s t h e o n l y  Malaysia  ASEAN  unfairly,  Southeast  when  billion,  meager $371  trade  and a i r b a s e s  1980,  their  Today  to  Manila's  "middle-of-theimportance f o r  came down  ( i . e . with  " o f f the  Indonesia  or  m i g h t a l s o have t o change.  42. Guy Sacerdoti, "Philippines: What's i n i t f o r u s ? Not a l l t h a t much," F a r E a s t e r n E c o n o m i c Review, 13 A u g u s t 1982. 43. Amry V a n d e r b o s c h and R i c h a r d B u t w e l l , The C h a n g i n g F a c e o f Southeast Asia, (Lexington, 1966), p. 44. Quoted i n M. R a j e n d r a n , ASEAN's Foreign Relations ( K u a l a Lumpur: Arenabuku, Sdn. Bhd. , 1985), p. 19. 44. T i m H u x l e y , I n d o c h i n a and I n s u r g e n c y i n t h e ASEAN S t a t e s , 1975-1981. The S t r a t e g i c D e f e n c e S t u d i e s Center, Working Paper no. 67 ( C a n b e r r a : A u s t r a l i a N a t i o n a l U n i v . ) , pp. 53-54.  107 Beneath t h e  obvious d i v e r s i t y  Kampuchean c o n f l i c t , working toward initiative it  is  a common  neighbour,  t o an  but of  over Vietnam Kampuchea.  exists  reflects  uncertain  "tactical" success  with  There  has  i s no  maintain  an  ASEAN  refuses  the l a t t e r  explained  earlier,  t o undermine a f e l l o w  been no  dissension,  an e q u a l l y  But  strategy, part  open l i n e  conference without  independent  i n a delicate  to Foreign tension  no  Minister  within  i s only  one  difference.  ASEAN stand What  3  and T a c t i c s  Though  bilateral  are  the i n t e r e s t s o f another,  According  ASEAN's s o l i d a r i t y  this  I f an  judgemental d i f f e r e n c e  options.  differences.  threat.  provide  with  i s a difference i n tactics."*  wedge t h r o u g h  and  withdrawal.  of the  initiatives  Kampuchean i s s u e . . . T h e r e  Vietnam has p l a y e d  been a  a  "there  and t h e  Vietnam: Strategy  the  end:  diplomatic  i n t e n t i o n a l attempt  M o c h t a r Kusumaatmadja,  on  multiple  o f one member c o n f l i c t s  n o t due  situation  the  o f ASEAN's p e r c e p t i o n s  by t a k i n g  every  time  ASEAN h a s  advantage o f  Vietnam has closed  o f ASEAN's s t r a t e g y  with  channel.  shrewd game, t r y i n g t o d r i v e a  Hanoi, Hanoi  the p a r t i c i p a t i o n  to  has always been t o this  has mainly  attend  a regional  o f t h e Heng S e m r i n  t o p a r t i c i p a t e i n any n e g o t i a t i o n s any i m p l i c i t ASEAN  has  v e r g e d on  r a n k s t o ward o f f  i n practice refuses  these  regime,  which  would  recognition of i t s legitimacy. sought  45. M e l v y n Hopper, "An interview M i n i s t e r Mochtar Kusumaatmadja," 1984, pp. 39.  to  As  i n t e r n a t i o n a l i z e the  with the Indonesian Foreign Kaleidoscope International,  108 Issue;  Hanoi  insists  that  affair  o f Kampuchea and t h u s n e e d s no r e g i o n a l  Hanoi p e r s i s t e n t l y by  c a r e f u l l y planned  while bypassing Thai of  border  ASEAN.  For  of  of  Appeal,  i t  Chinese  the  Pol  threat,  and  issue for  global  solution  ASEAN r e f u s e s  as only  accuse to  negotiate.  Statement  to  1983  a l l problems  in  a termination  of  of Thai  territory  by  of a safety  z o n e on b o t h  the conclusion  o f framework  solution of  t h e Kampuchean  their  issue";  situation. proposals,  illegal  accompli.  they  occupation  skirted of  recognition  the  Kampuchea, and  the  The p r o p o s a l s t r e a t t h e  one o f a number o f i s s u e s ,  t o s e e i t submerged i n a d i f f u s e g e n e r a l  p r o b l e m s o f p e a c e and s t a b i l i t y .  to  ASEAN  t o ASEAN's  including  international  a fait  to  g r o u p and ASEAN g o v e r n i n g  o t h e r numerous  Kampuchean s i t u a t i o n  into  unacceptable  indirectly  the " u t i l i z a t i o n "  of the current  of  are  I n a 1984 J o i n t  settlement,  o f Vietnam's  "irreversibility"  military raids  a d e m i l i t a r i z e d z o n e on b o t h  the establishment  implicit  off-balance  ASEAN c a p i t a l s  and u n w i l l i n g n e s s  replying  a global  their  internal  interference.  opportunity  border.  the Indochina  "pending  Like  aiming  the  they  t h e Thai-Kampuchean b o r d e r ;  a continuation  pertinent  a  a partial  a g r e e m e n t between relations  well  intransigence  Pot regime;  of  punitive  i n 1980, H a n o i p r o p o s e d  Asia;  the  and  uses  proposed:  an  by o f f e r i n g p r o p o s a l s u n d e r t h e g u i s e  Indochinese States  Southeast  sides  of  strictly  keep ASEAN members  by r e g u l a r  and  then  is  t o t h e more h o s p i t a b l e  t h e Thai-Kampuchean  the  to  knowing f u l l  Hanoi  example,  sides  visits  territory  internationally  tries  the rest,  conciliation,  the issue  whereas  agenda on  F o r ASEAN and t h e i n t e r n a t i o n a l  109 community,  the  number one  occupation  and  the  issue  restoration  is of  still  Vietnam's  Kampuchea's  military  independence  and  self-determination. After for  the  Kuantan D e c l a r a t i o n ,  accentuating  China.  ASEAN's d i f f e r e n c e s and  Thailand  Indonesia stance,  is  isolated for  i s courted  although  as  at  passed,  belied  by  request, with a  the  mere  rebels  to  to  Minister  mediate a  Bill  but  that  gullibly  become an  against ploy. "  4  ASEAN.  prior  the  in  broadcasts resolutions  their  troops At  are  Hanoi's  Hayden e v e n s t e p p e d ASEAN and  ASEAN r e m a i n e d f i r m , unwitting  M o c h t a r ' s words,  China's  revealing  "all  reactionary increase  Reagen'e v i s i t  Foreign  more  within  the  stability  three  with  clearly the  c o l l u s i o n with the and  Ministry  "collusion"  the  forces  their  Union  p e a c e and  to President  Vietnamese  denouncing  Soviet  was,  Once  rigid  the  suspecting  t o o l and  "an  in  old  wedge  Vietnamese  6  Just 1985,  It  radio  of  China,  ASEAN's  c o n f e r e n c e between  i n 1984,  had  i t s fears  reshuffling.  Indochinese s t a t e s Australia  Timor.  potential  with  melting  withdraw  and  on  friendly  i t receives  i n East  rotation  A u s t r a l i a ' s Foreign proposal  being  same t i m e  Vietnam's promises their  playing  a p o s s i b l e means o f  the  from Hanoi s u p p o r t i n g are  Hanoi r e a l i z e d the  Chinese U.S.  a  States  scheme  leadership  April  statement  United  dark  in  to  of  Asia."  4 7  countries  and  It i s curious  as the  further  i m p e r i a l i s t s t o oppose  Indochinese  i n Southeast  issued  the the  to China  the  undermine that  the  46. A s i a 1985 Y e a r b o o k , F a r E a s t e r n E c o n o m i c Review, Hong Kong, 1985, p. 96. 47. I s s u e d by t h e V i e t n a m e s e embassy, K u a l a Lumpur. Quoted i n R o b e r t C. Horn, "The USSR and the r e g i o n , " i n Southeast Asian  110 statement the  included  Soviet  threat  Union",  to  in  After  f o r the fifteen  indefinitely"  "the  years,  Thai  leaders  with  Vietnam.  Hanoi."  Yet  the  attest  Moscow's i n a b i l i t y  ally.  insurgencies ostensibly the  border  which  Thai  recruiting  reassurances  us t h a t  need  six  they  not f e a r  regarding  major  are closely  Vietnamese  statement  stated  an a t t a c k  by  military  was i s s u e d  t o c o n t r o l an e q u a l l y  seems t o  "belligerent"  t h e Khmer r e f u g e e camps a l o n g t h e  are  c a n n o t be  conducted  for  this  I n t h e V i e t n a m e s e view,  Kampuchea-Thai  into  since  two  "postponed  P r e m i e r K r i a n g s a k Chamanan  of  into Thailand  the  4 8  Thailand  incursions  were a t t h i s  coincidently  have a s s u r e d  total  of the d i r e c t  m e e t i n g between  w h i c h was  t o Moscow  associated  to  level  request.  actions.  Kremlin  4 9  e f f o r t s " t o oppose  C h i n e s e and S o v i e t s  highest  1979 v i s i t  Vietnam's r e c e n t that  The  a t Moscow's  a  t o Sino-American  a s i f t o r e m i n d Moscow p u b l i c l y  i t s interests.  time preparing countries  references  anti-Vietnamese,  tolerated.  The  Kampuchean  incursions  are  t o b r e a k up t h e camps and f o r c e them d e e p e r  interior  centers.  so  that  Another  they  will  not  become  though l e s s important  reason  Khmer i s to  r e d u c e o r h a l t t h e d i s t r i b u t i o n o f i n t e r n a t i o n a l a i d and t h e r i s e of the  black  markets which  have l u r e d Kampuchean p e a s a n t s away  from  fields. The  continued  diplomatic constitute  incursions  relations the  with  main o b s t a c l e  have, ASEAN,  however, and  to serious  affected  for  Thailand,  bilateral  A f f a i r s 1985 (Singapore: I n s t i t u t e o f Southeast 1986), p. 76. 48. I b i d . , p. 78. 49. Bangkok P o s t , 28 March 1979.  Vietnam's they  negotiations. Asian  Studies,  Despite  urgings  refugee  camps,  from the Thai  founded; a sanctuary may it  lead may  to a  f e a r s of harbouring f o r overthrowing  situation  foster a  link  provide  provocation,  or  territory  bargaining  On  the  nature In  other  of the  1980,  the  in  several  the  in  refugees.  On  with  has  Jordan,  communist Vietnamese  pieces  of  Thai  demonstrated  its  influencing  the  manipulating  border  Thai back  an  June  in rallying June 25th  timing  tensions. to  to  be  Kampuchea  a provocation  23,  attack  and  government t h a t p l a n s  ahead w i t h  were r e l a t i v e l y  upcoming  Thai  occupy  implying  went  attack  the  refugees  Thailand  succeeded  time f o r  crisis  forewarned the  unexpectedly responded  Thailand  to  well-  government  intensified  Thailand  unpredictable,"  thousand  costs of  for  and  the  chips.  Khmer  J u n e 1980  f o r c e s are  Palestinians in  Khmer  forces  hand, the  to maintain  a a neighbouring  the  excuse  SRV  P o l Pot  t o the  V i e t n a m e s e a t t a c k s by  " d a n g e r o u s and But  in  H a n o i had  repatriate  an  allow  resourcefulness  parallel  between  insurgents,  as  i n t e r n a t i o n a l community  the  Vietnamese  for  ASEAN s u p p o r t meeting of  for  attack.  repatriation  i n t o Thai low  would  forces  not  territory. both  against the  The  sides  but  Vietnam  ASEAN  of  in  Foreign  Ministers. The first  time  oblique the  statement  V i e t n a m by  referral  "latest  issued after  to  acts of  undermined Vietnam's the  trust  and  name a s  that the  meeting i d e n t i f i e d  own  confidence  the  of  the  ASEAN f u r t h e r n o t e d  that  aggressor  " f o r e i g n powers"). aggression  for  against  credibility  and  w h i c h ASEAN has  (instead  Thailand  have  have g r e a t l y  further  diminished  p a t i e n t l y attempted  to  112 forge  with  Vietnam."  According  3 0  M o c h t a r Kusumaatmadja, assurances at prevailed, remained  The  "face  ASEAN  longer  between  an  Minister  take  Vietnam's  ASEAN  hard-line  Indonesia  and  Vietnam  good.  ASEAN  Response  b a l a n c e between leaving  the  door  for  to avoid  a permanent  antagonistic  strategy  sending  proposals  with  no  However, w h i l e  relations  ASEAN's d i p l o m a t i c  also  Indonesia's Foreign  could  value."  bilateral  to  Hanoi  Vietnam,  Kampuchean  unambiguous  compromise.  issue  must  signals  while  I t r e j e c t s Hanoi's  "bloc-to-bloc" conference  division  alliances.  the  tough,  open t o  a regional  in  which  Moreover,  i t i s significant  might c r e a t e  despite  that  the  i n an two  effort  rigid  and  apparent d i v i s i o n s  ASEAN a v o i d s  a total  break.  In f a c t ,  H a n o i ' s a t t e m p t s t o d r i v e a wedge between ASEAN  members  provides  the  greater  organization  institutionalizaion practices,  and  initiatives. Southeast  greater For  Asian  with  the  next.  the  Soviet  the  For  its  example,  This other  not  of  way  I n d o c h i n a be ASEAN  during  coming  decision-making  that  the  end  "independent"  any  c o n d u c t e d on  would have an  Thai  from a  and  for  i t s members'  Bangkok a s k e d  members a t t h e  example,  incentive  consultative  U n i o n i n March 1979,  K r i a n g s a k was  an  coordination  c a p i t a l s by  by-country basis. consult  of  with  visits a  to  country-  opportunity  o f each t r i p  and  before  Premier Kriangsak's v i s i t Soviets  were w e l l aware  p o s i t i o n of  weakness.  to  to  that  Just  a  50. ASEAN F o r e i g n M i n i s t e r s ' S t a t e m e n t , Bangkok D o m e s t i c S e r v i c e , 26 J u n e 1980, in FBIS, D a i l y R e p o r t A s i a / P a c i f i c , 26 J u n e 1980, p. A2.  113 month e a r l i e r  he  reaffirmation  of  Thailand's  month  invasion  "would  when b o t h not  Southeast  value  to  the  had  visited  agreed  received  Unied  that  happened w i t h o u t  The  Asia  under  i n which  and  Thailand  reached  Thailand  and  seabound  the  States.  Beijing  the  a  the  Vietnamese  backing  of a  big  P h i l i p p i n e s were  until  refugees, capable of Indonesia  its  M a r c o s was  the  Farther  was  as  disrupting  the  Malaysia  when L a o s  mid-70's,  but  nearest  greatest  removed,  numbers  into  to  Indochina,  the  much l e s s so.  None  to f o o t the  were  delicate  feared  reach  and  most  especially  d i d not  Indonesia  prepared  them  of  ethnic ethnic  this,  wae  too  even r e p o r t e d  small  t o h a v e wondered w h e t h e r t h e  51. See B u s z y n s k i , "Thailand, the I m b r o g l i o , " op. c i t , pp. 66-78.  Soviet  U n i o n and  the  Chinese balance.  and  t o accommodate them.  costs  Indochinese  Singapore  t o become a haven f o r d i s p l a c e d C h i n e s e ,  country  into  and  influx  region's  the  land-  ever-increasing of  was  Kampuchea  numbers o f  initially or  and  monthly  countries  willing  policies  Indochinese refugees  when  a l s o a f f e c t e d but  particularly  refused  1978,  As  s u c h a l a r g e and  and  i n the  s u f f e r e d the  ASEAN c o u n t r i e s  of  to defuse a p o t e n t i a l  their  s t a t e s began  17,000.  Malaysia  able  coordinating  control  refugees.  of housing  by  other  communist  ASEAN was  massive i n f l u x  worrisome p r o p o r t i o n s  that  t o W a s h i n g t o n and  countries  have  situation  refugee c r i s i s .  flatly  visit  5 1  destabilizing  of the  a  S u t h o r n Hongladarom  Another area  fell  paid  Thailand's  Deputy  previous  country."  had  claiming President  "supposedly  Kampuchean  114 Vietnmese refugees M a l a y s i a ' s Home in  November  overseas from to  Ho  are  actually  Affairs  1978,  Chinese  Minister,  "one and  Cholon,  the  but  Some  even  reject  them  5 4  country's success another.  and  As  By  by  just  as  gunpoint  responding  i n doing  the urgency for  such  point, added  the e j e c t i o n  Chinese  of  origins  the d e s i r e of  Hanoi  merchants  of  8 3  Malaysia  adopted  elsewhere  always  drastic  of refugee  boats,  to Indonesia  to the c r i s i s  s o was  this  of Chinese  discourage the docking  sometimes a t  the P h i l i p p i n e s .  motivated  communists."  countries  that  citizens  Dragon," not  On  s 8  S r i Ghazali Shafie,  suspect  Vietnam  Peking-oriented  measures t o forcing  "Wooden  ASEAN  Tan  could well  C h i Minh C i t y . . . m i g h t be  remove  refugees."  or  individually,  at  the  to one  expense  of  i n c r e a s e d , ASEAN r e c o g n i z e d t h e need f o r  a special  meeting  a  political,  socio-economic  coordinated and  solution  security  to  disruption  the  severe  caused  by  the  e v e n t u a l l y l e d to the sponsorship of  the  refugees. ASEAN's e f f o r t s Conference United  on  Nations  international to  obtain  countries. the  Indochinese  land  R e f u g e e s w h i c h was  auspices i n attention  aid The  and  July  through  resettlement  conference,  r e f u g e e s who  1979. this  h e l d on  By  conference,  assurances  however,  giving  failed  continue to flock  from  Geneva  under  the  issue  ASEAN was the  able  Western  to s o l v e the i s s u e  t o T h a i l a n d , but  of  i t did  52. B a r r y Wain, The Refused: The Agony of the Indochinese R e f u g e e s (New York: Simon & S c h u s t e r , 1981), p. 134. Quoted i n Hoon, p. 242. 53. M i c h e a l R i c h a r d s o n , "ASEAN and I n d o - C h i n e s e Refugees," in U n d e r s t a n d i n g ASEAN, ed. A l i s o n B r o i n o w s k i (London: Macmillan P r e s s , 1982), p. 105. 54. See T h a k u r P h a n i t , op. c i t . , pp. 235-237.  115 alleviate crisis  pressures  on t h e  demonstrated  common  policy  The  once a g a i n  by  internationalizing United  other  looking  at  the  i t , and o b t a i n i n g  States'  incentive  reticence  by  better  hope t h a t  But d u r i n g  1987,  Soviet  responded t o  acceptable  the  but i t to  Thailand Union,  conflict,  n o r ASEAN  and w h i l e i tis  opposed t o V i e t n a m .  3 7  to  problem,  8 s  manage  the  normalization  Union,  Union d i r e c t l y .  h a s been an  ASEAN c a r r i e d  U n i o n w o u l d be a t t r a c t e d t h a n by a burdensome Asia's  capitals  Edouard  by s t a t i n g :  "We  in  Shevardnadze have  stressed  Cambodian p r o b l e m  i s the  1 , 36  t o e n d o r s e any s o l u t i o n w h i c h i s  and ASEAN. h a s been  Moscow w i l l  willing  a  s k e p t i c a l o f ASEAN's e f f o r t s t o w a r d  i s willing  both Vietnam  achieve  support.  on t h e S o v i e t  to the  refugee  the  e i t h e r though a  Minister  the s o l u t i o n  USSR i s g e n e r a l l y  a solution,  Soviet  Foreign  to  of  or i n a b i l i t y  o f t h e Cambodian p e o p l e t h e m s e l v e s . The  neither  outside  t o Southeast  ASEAN's o v e r t u r e s  everywhere t h a t affair  source  perhaps the S o v i e t  a visit  The  ability  r e l a t i o n s w i t h t h e ASEAN c o u n t r i e s  Vietnam. March  or through pressure  t o approach the Soviet  a distant  members.  ASEAN's  Kampuchean i s s u e on ASEAN's b e h a l f , with Vietnam  ASEAN  It  condemned o u t r i g h t  that  by t h e  not f o r c e Vietnam t o s e t t l e  to discuss  ASEAN s e e s t h i s  i s significant  the issue with  as a f a v o r a b l e  countries  sign,  since  55. See B u s z y n s k i , "ASEAN: A C h a n g i n g R e g i o n a l R o l e , " op. c i t . , p. 771. 56. M u r r a y H i e b e r t , "The s u b t l e s t h i n t , " Far Eastern Economic Review, 26 March 1987, p. 17. 57. I n an i n t e r e s t i n g c o u r t i n g b i d , t h e S o v i e t U n i o n h a s e v e n p r o p o s e d t o become a f o r m a l " d i a l o g u e p a r t n e r " w i t h ASEAN (on p a r with i t s present partners). The o f f e r was r e j e c t e d . As on Western diplomat quipped: "Can y o u i m a g i n e t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s , A u s t r a l i a , Canada and o t h e r s s i t t i n g a t t h e same t a b l e w i t h t h e S o v i e t s and f r e e l y t a k i n g a b o u t s e c u r i t y , d e f e n c e , p o l i t i c a l and  116 the  Soviets'  willingness to  Thailand  must  cautious  in  still  has  dealing the  Moscow d o e s China "how  is far  make H a n o i  Moscow w i l l  they  will  serious  argues that parties carrot. since  assistance,  of  how,  t o be  but  that  like  dragging when and  so  not  would l i k e  conditions.  presently  ASEAN  senior  Third  Vietnam  confident  J.  used  into i t s  agreement World  that  with  diplomat,  depends  on  i f they  its  let  is  that  ninth  where n e g o t i a t i o n s  stance f o r  Soedjati  stick  go  a compromise f o r a l l all  along  but  negotiations  year, will  only  the  under  be  is  wonders i f p r o b l e m s held  should  when i m m e d i a t e t a l k s a r e  including reportedly  economic  Kampuchean c o n f l i c t one  no  negotiate,  of r e l a t i o n s f o r  the  the  Djiwandono  u n w i l l i n g to  i t wants  Considering  an  ASEAN's r i g i d  Vietnam  diplomatically crucial  Some o b s e r v e r s ,  country,  a normalization  ASEAN,  is  5 8  with  has  Moscow  i t s r i g h t s i n the  solution requires  yet  and  Vietnam  with Vietnam.  "political"  It i s  3 9  China."  disagree  talks  involved,  i t too  certain  a  get  fact  China  that  press not  like  However,  Hanoi u n l e s s  t o one  China...They are  Some o b s e r v e r s of  to offend  and  hard  countries  Given the  to revoke  According  Vietnam,  start  China.  certain.  progress with of  with  want  with  uncomfortable.  prerogative  not  talk  Secretary-General  continue needed. of  the  e c o n o m i c m a t t e r s , as we do now?" See " S o v i e t p r o p o s a l s s p u r n e d , " A s i a n B u l l e t i n . March 1987, p. 31. 58. " H a n o i L i n k : A S o v i e t O b s t a c l e or Vietnam?" Asian B u l l e t i n . J u n e 1987, p. 17. According to another diplomat, China is pulling a s i m i l a r balancing act: " P e k i n g seems t o have combined strong material support f o r t h e Cambodia r e s i s t a n c e t o r e a s s u r e the Thais with a softer public line on Cambodia to probe Gorbachav's p o s i t i o n . " In R i c h a r d N a t i o n s , "Khmer D o u b l e T a l k , " F a r E a s t e r n E c o n o m i c Review, 1 A u g u s t 1985, p. 13. 59. See J . S o e d j a t i D j i w a n d o n o , "The Kampuchean C o n f l i c t and t h e Future of ASEAN," The I n d o n e s i a n Q u a r t e r l y , 13 (Oct. 1985), pp. 435-440.  117 United  Nations  we  not  do  corner,  have a s k e d ,  talk  with  leading  to  do  Has  6 0  and  we  know what V i e t n a m wants i f  ASEAN p u s h e d  stalemate?  Center f o r S t r a t e g i c following  it?  how  Vietnam  J u s u f Wanandi,  International  Studies  into  Director  i n Jakarta  a  of  the  has  the  view:  I n i t i a l l y , i t seemed t h a t ASEAN and V i e t n a m were c o m i n g c l o s e r to one a n o t h e r ' s p o s i t i o n on two i s s u e s w h i c h had u n t i l t h e n d i v i d e d them, n a m e l y : t h e p r i n c i p l e s on which the s o l u t i o n to the c o n f l i c t were t o be b a s e d ; and t h e mechanism by w h i c h a s o l u t i o n were t o be s o u g h t (sic). However, what has p r e v e n t e d them f r o m c o m i n g t o the c o n f e r e n c e t a b l e was and s t i l l is the lack of i n i t i a t i v e on either side to take the first daring step. Each time when t h e p o s i t i o n s o f t h e two sides seem to converge and come closer to agreeing on starting a n e g o t i a t i o n , the process tends to reverse itself. T h i s seems t o be due t o the l a c k of mutual t r u s t between T h a i l a n d and V i e t n a m and the lack of confidence in the willingness of both sides to compromise. 6 1  The  Malaysian  the  official  editorial  New  Straits  view  in  Times, Kuala  which  i s purportedly  Lumpur,  e c h o i n g ASEAN's d i f f i c u l t y  printed  i n maintaining  the  close  to  following  solidarity:  Possession i s nine points o f t h e law. The V i e t n a m e s e are there i n Kampuchea, w i t h Heng S e m r i n more o r l e s s firmly in place. Over time, t h e t h o u g h t a r i s e s : why not l e t s l e e p i n g dogs lie? I t can get to the point where, p a r a d o x i c a l l y , i t is ASEAN Cwhich i s ] s e e n as hindering stable regional relations. The a p p e a r a n c e o f a repetitive, seemingly i n f l e x i b l e ASEAN s t a n d on t h e c o n f l i c t c a n be counterproductive. 6 8  60. I n s t i t u t e of Asian Studies. The Kampuchean P r o b l e m i n T h a i Perspective: P o s i t i o n s and V i e w p o i n t s h e l d by F o r e i g n M i n i s t r y O f f i c i a l s and Thai Academics (Chulalongkorn U n i v e r s i t y : Asian S t u d i e s Monographs, no. 32, Aug. 1985). 61. J u s u f Wanandi, " Z o p f a n and t h e Kampuchean C o n f l i c t , " The I n d o n e s i a n Q u a r t e r l y , 13 (Apr. 1985), p. 210. 62. F a r E a s t e r n E c o n o m i c Review. 19 S e p t . 1980, p. 13. Quoted i n A s t r i Suhrke, "ASEAN: Adjusting to New R e g i o n a l Alignments," A s i a P a c i f i c Community. 12 ( S p r i n g 1981), p. 28.  118 Conclusions:  The  A t The Impasse  Kampuchean  Vietnam has have or  its  not  announced  this  an e a r l i e r  constitution  falling  now e n t e r i n g  through gradual  i s  found.  Sihanouk  problem  i t s lowest apart  and  the  i s that  than  ever.  issue. of  the  would  a  mutiny,  year's  Stressing CGDK,  The KPNLF  "leave that  Sihanouk  p r o v i d e more f r e e d o m  i s the fact  not d i r e c t l y -- V i e t n a m ,  o b s t a c l e toward that  ASEAN,  involved  current  7, 1986,  as  Sihanouk's  of  he  absence"  had  ostensibly  u n d e r Son  not  attacks May  from  the  resigned  hoped  that  as this  settlement.  a solution  i n t h e Kampuchean  and t h o s e c o u n t r i e s  t o do, which  -- r e m a i n adamant i n t h e t h e i r  i s merely Thach  1987  a n d f l e x i b i l i t y t o p r o b e new,  i n the issue,  ASEAN  faction  r e g a r d l e s s o f what i t t r i e s  C h i n a and T h a i l a n d  positions.  63. December Spiegel.  the  w h i l e Khmer Rouge  l e d to  formal channels f o r a negotiated  extreme  within  accepts the  of the coalition  an a t t e m p t e d  ASEAN's main  are  i t now  the p o s s i b i l i t y  take  is  from  y e a r t h e CGDK h a s  announcement t o  crisis  past  the past  MOULINAKA f a c t i o n  less  and  CGDK  within  upon S i h a n o u k ' s  "leave"  But g i v e n t h e i r  63  o f t h e CGDK i n Phnom Penh  withdrawn,  ebb, w i t h  greater  Sann e x p e r i e n c e d  President  withdrawals i t w i l l  and o n e - p a r t y system.  only  Kampuchean  year.  H a n o i h a s a l s o moved away  o f any f u t u r e r o l e  t r o o p s have of  i t s ninth  f r o m Kampuchea by t h e y e a r 1990 whether  solution  rejection  participation  The  i s  r e m a i n s t o be s e e n .  once Vietnamese  at  that  t r o o p s removed  a political  record,  been  conflict  a m a r g i n a l inducement.  tells  German  news  If  magazine,  the  the  present  Sino-Thai  alliance is  Soviet-Vietnamese a l l i a n c e ,  there  i s bound t o be  respective  positions,  C h i n a has  n e v e r been i n v i t e d t o any  any  negotiated  include  an  making i t  s o l u t i o n needs  end  t o the  a counterbalance  harder to  rigidity  reach a  ASEAN-sponsored  China's b l e s s i n g  Khmer Rouge and  the  to  the  in  the  settlement. meeting,  since  yet  i t  Sino-Vietnamese  must stand-  off. The all  present  parties  strong  involved  disposition  large part support  due  i n the  escalated price  antagonism  to subordination  by  force,  to d i f f e r e n c e s interest is  India's  a leader to  in  ASEAN.  formal the  realization  that  agonizing  i f the an  policy  t o both,  assures that  is is  by no in  countervailing conflict  was  unacceptable  casualties, financial  least  strain  and  and  Indonesia  choices;  while the  an  rise  Hanoi i s not  in  being  Peking.  Soviet one  Union l o o k i n g  i s prepared  convinced  issue  There This  external  r e l u c t a n t to exact  any  over China,  the  of  at  to  no  Hanoi i s  strong  i s acceptable  the  assurance that  t o compromise.  d i f f e r e n c e s between T h a i l a n d  Sino-Soviet  perception  side.  The  necessitated  Secure with  their  terms of  Kampuchea  the  the  on  the  in  independent  led  Bangkok  i s unable or  itself  yet  and  because of  time i s  Thailand's  issue  disruption.  have n o t  that  within  to  Vietnam  upon  social  stalemate a r i s e s  Non-Aligned  to d r i v e the  ASEAN r e s o l v e  accompanied  i n the  recognition  that  West. of  the  over i t s shoulder  by  a  Boosting  Vietnamese will  out  weaken  due  loss  of  gradual Vietnam's  optimism  Heng S e m r i n r e g i m e which,  movement, r e p r e s e n t e d  and  a huge  as  setback  120 The  conflict  Beijing  is  counting  retardation and  is e q u a l l y on  Vietnam's  o f economic growth,  Vietnamese  dependence China  to the  in  the near  has  enjoyed  conflict China  for  it,  expects  t h e e x t e r n a l powers.  eventual  resentment  on  Kampuchean r e b e l s .  maintains,  bearable  war  weariness,  of the Soviet  and  the  n e i t h e r an  persistence  end  f u t u r e . In f a c t ,  presence  nor  a  solution  as M i c h e a l  the best of a l l p o l i t i c a l  of  Leifer  worlds:  A s s u r e d t h a t s u p e r p o w e r c o l l u s i o n r e m a i n s o b s t r u c t e d by continuing tension between Moscow and W a s h i n g t o n , i t c a n draw c o m f o r t f r o m S o v i e t o v e r t u r e s w h i l e s u s t a i n i n g f r u i t f u l r e l a t i o n s h i p s w i t h t h e U.S. and J a p a n . 6 4  For the  United States, the c o n f l i c t  provides a low-risk threatre  to challenge  "Soviet expansionism."  Likewise,  content  being able  military  with  Asia  and  a second  that  the  most g a i n s  to maintain  front  v i s a v i s China.  for least  t h e t h r e e e x t e r n a l powers — one  cannot  political than  discount that, marathon r u n n e r  merely  the present  belittling state of  i s contained  deplored conflict, countries  like  bases i n  Southeast  I t i s indeed  an  irony  c o s t s of the c o n f l i c t  accrued  ASEAN o r  However,  China,  Indochina.  Vietnam  i s an  to  experienced  which t h i n k s i n terms o f decades r a t h e r  years.  Without  Vietnam  not  t h e USSR i s q u i t e  the  ASEAN's d e s i r e p r o t r a c t e d war  preoccupation  such  periodically  Southeast  theatre, Soviet  Asian  and  with  not  64. M i c h e a l L e i f e r , "The road to Phnom Penh i s blocked Moscow," F a r E a s t e r n E c o n o m i c Review, 25 Dec, 1986, p. 30.  by  o t h e r hand,  the  that  A s i a is  the  after  NATO  ensures  of  On  Pakstan  the  the  settlement,  invasion  Afghanistan.  as  ASEAN has  d i s r e g a r d of with  early  or stalemate  at acceptable c o s t s .  United States'  its  f o r an  because Southeast  121 part  of  the  difficulty regional  central  in defining their  states  rivalries. the  cold  the  to c o n t r o l the  and,  orbit  of t h e i r  area.  hand,  possibility  of  new  bring an  confrontation  normalization.  between them a  advantage. minister following  that  and  with  on  i f  Vietnam, An  Asian  article  given  giving and  main f o c u s  of  i t i s advantageous S t a t e s and  nations  into  the  their  from e n t e r i n g  the  ASEAN o p p o r t u n i t i e s t o make  a solution dangers  China,  and  as  not  positions. to the  ASEAN  can  a  a  stand might  to  w r i t t e n by  Kishore  The  invite  see  "fraternal"  improve  the  a  Sino-Vietnamese  want  firm  new  radical  the  conflicts  b e n e f i t o f ASEAN.  relations  the  problem,  would o n l y  would  f o r the  f a r been t o t h e  W h i l e on  uncertain benefits.  necessarily  good t e r m s ,  counsellor in  thus  have  6 5  ASEAN-Vietnamese a l i g n m e n t  have t h u s  feeling  antagonizing  new  the  United  nations  i t s bargaining  ASEAN d o e s  Communist c o u n t r i e s  is  has  ASEAN wants t o s e e only  perceive that  these  powers  uncertainties  longer  "maximally the  prevent  strengthen  c h a n g e may  exploit  t o draw S o u t h e a s t  p r o t r a c t e d war  external  i n the region,  A s i a i s no  Hence,  antagonist."  and  to  s u p e r p o w e r s do  minimally,  alignments one  opportunity  each attempt  orbit  The  an  balance,  interests  While Southeast  war,  USSR w i l l  strategic  without  There unduly  to  everyone's  Mahbubani,  Singapore's  W a s h i n g t o n embassy e x p r e s s e d  the  view:  65. L i e Tek-tjeng, "Southeast Asian Regional Security in the 1980's: A View f r o m J a k a r t a , " in I n t e r n a t i o n a l S e c u r i t y i n the Southeast Asian and S o u t h w e s t P a c i f i c Region, ed. T.B. Millar (St. L u c i a , Queensland: Univ. o f Queensland Press, 1983), p. 271.  122 I t may be u s e f u l t o a t t e m p t new d i p l o m a t i c i n i t i a t i v e s Cby ASEAN] from time t o time, but t h e r e i s a l s o the danger t h a t s u c h moves c o u l d be i n t e r p r e t e d by V i e t n a m as a s i g n of weakness. The u l t i m a t e message t h a t has t o be c o n v e y e d t o V i e t n a m i s t h a t t h i s t i m e a r o u n d t i m e i s not w o r k i n g on Vietnam's s i d e . I f t h i s message i s sent i n c l e a r and s u s t a i n e d f a s h i o n , t h e ASEAN s t a t e s can c a l l upon t h e i r f r i e n d s t o w a i t and s e e t h e f r u i t s o f one o f t h e o l d e s t A s i a n v a l u e s : patience. 6 6  ASEAN now persuaded them t o  to  the  Hence,  diplomatically  and  ASEAN c r e a t e s  the  depends l a r g e l y has  56. Rodney half, " Far  that  too  ASEAN  i f the  only  diplomacy  Vietnamese i t i s i n t h e i r  d e p e n d e n c e on  Vietnam  realize  withdraw v o l u n t a r i l y ,  leave.  convincing their  seems t o  on  the  Soviet  ideologically. necessary two  --  the  too  best  be  n e e d s and  directed  interest  militarily,  T h i s can  few  Vietnamese can  should  conditions.  factors:  many n e e d s and  Tasker, Eastern  Union  S o v i e t s cannot  only  to  be get at  reduce  economically, be  achieved  After a l l , options.  if  influence At  present,  options.  "Our f u n c t i o n i n g power i s only five-and-aE c o n o m i c Review, 15 March 1984, p. 60.  123  Conclusion  ASEAN's h a n d l i n g flexibility,  of  resourcefulness  group o f  states faced  prolonged  identity  credibility  represented  a  shift  Kampuchean c r i s i s and  diplomatic  with a threat  crisis  Vietnamese i n v a s i o n ASEAN's  the  of  a  viable  in  the  the  a  After  1970's,  The  distribution  test  of  power.  to coalesce  united  ward  off  the  possessed  were  The period  of  and  would h a v e  ASEAN would  and  the  SEATO,  showed  i t s position  only  weapons  foundation solid  in  to  ASEAN  and  have t o l e r a t e d  ASEAN's  multiple  provided  situation  i t s unique  Nor  its  and  of  pas  regional  regional its  a  ASEAN  faux  is i t likely  brand of  initiatives,  "toe-tripping."  diplomatic  like  MAPHILINDO.  national  a  "inert"  base i t i s u n l i k e l y t h a t  disintegrating  ASA  diplomatic  that  ministerial consultation  t o weather the  without  independent of  also  Without t h i s  did  predecessors,  However,  indispensable  been a b l e  it  instances  crisis  bureaucratic  uncertainty.  through  threat.  and  diplomatic.  Kampuchean  valuable  that  new  to strengthen  to  invasion  t o deny V i e t n a m ' s d o m i n a n c e i n I n d o c h i n a front  a  the  ASEAN's r e s p o n s e was into a  the  disparate  posed a c r u c i a l  organization.  regional  of  security.  most o f  Kampuchea i n 1978  as  skills  to t h e i r  throughout  demonstrates  that unity  resultant  124 In first,  a l l  these  regional  policy  members' n a t i o n a l have p o s e d  to  defused  that  harmonization integrative the part account for  of  the  others  threat  the  means t h a t  but a  leaders."  function  need  organization.  sublimation was  system  its  individual  so well.  I n o t h e r words,  it  i s a community mind.  characteristic  speaking  I t i s important  not  the  policy  as r e c o n c i l i a t i o n  and  result  of  will  on  room  t o play out t h e i r  o f c o n s u l t a t i o n s and  each  own  consensus  a r e p r o t e c t e d . Though member,  this  i t does  member t o " r u n a h e a d " i n realizes  just  how  far i t  want t o j e o p a r d i z e what h a s s e r v e d  ASEAN seems t o o p e r a t e  a t two  levels;  w i t h one v o i c e , t h o u g h n o t n e c e s s a r i l y  Accommodation o f ASEAN.  t o ASEAN's  (Thailand) while leaving  f o r another  may r u n . No member n a t i o n w i l l it  but they  into  the unit  c a p a c i t y , because  may  took  and M a l a y s i a )  interests of  each  of differences  ASEAN's r e g i o n a l o f one  out the p o s s i b i l i t y  of  stance,  ASEAN moves a t t h e p a c e o f i t s s l o w e s t  rule  consistent:  "conscious act of p o l i t i c a l  1  Through i t s  not  w i t h one  a  be  responses  (such as Indonesia  the c o l l e c t i v e  to  t o ASEAN's u n i f i e d  partial  political  critical  initiatives.  remained  t h e d i f f e r e n c e s which a r o s e  as a r e g i o n a l  processes  of the  second,  things  enough s o a s n o t t o p o s e a t h r e a t  existence  understand  two  continued  policy;  a temporal  were a l w a y s continued  instances  rather  Accommodation,  than  reconciliation  however,  i s  i s n o t t h e same  b e c a u s e i t a l l o w s f o r a common r e s p o n s e  and f o r  "agreements t o d i s a g r e e . "  1. D o n a l d Weatherbee, " S o u t h e a s t A s i a n i n 1982: M a r k i n g Time, i n S o u t h e a s t A s i a n A f f a i r s 1983 (Singapore: I n s t i t u t e of Southeast A s i a n S t u d i e s , 1981), p. 3.  125 A large diplomatic detriment viable  part  tool of  actor  of this  or instrument  i t  d i s t i n g u i s h a b l e from  i t s members,  a present  collective  wills  more t h a n t h i s  by b e i n g  I t s member separately  institutional  paradoxical  nations or  on  from  the  view  ad  little  much hoc  aptly  ironies.  undertaken i s always  Indeed, f o r  framework more  i s so  than  ASEAN  more t h a n basis  crisis,  It  i f t h e y had ASEAN's  Asians i n  throughout  become  reflected  only  As T i l m a n n o t e s ,  F o r example,  e  i s  in  e x i s t s because  natural  "contradictions are a manner  sometimes  i t s d e v e l o p m e n t has, of strength.  words  i t serves  of  Malaysia's  a need.  It  during  The ASEAN  "ASEAN  to e x i s t  b e c a u s e i t d o e s n o t demand f r o m us what we c a n n o t been a b l e  and  t h e weakness and a m b i g u i t y  a source the  a s i f what i s  Minister,  ASEAN h a s  the  represents  without  i s almost  viewpoint  by S o u t h e a s t  to others."  Kampuchean is  institutional  achieve  Western  w h i c h ASEAN was a c c u s e d  the  actors.  o f i t s members.  an  wrought w i t h  accepted  bewildering  a  s o m e t h i n g more t h a n m e r e l y t h e sum o f i t s  i n t h e ASEAN view.  frequently  as  framework.  ASEAN i s  of  and a c t i v i t i e s  the  However, t h e s t u d y  and s e p a r a t e e n t i t y  represents  to  status  t h e numerous t a n g e n t s  the  organization  nations,  organizational  among i t s i n d i v i d u a l  organizations,  the  expected  despite  member  i t s members.  ASEAN a s a d i s t i n c t  weak t h a t  acted  that  consideration  some r e g i o n a l  parts.  of i t s  establishing i t s  a l s o demonstrates by  t h e s i s s t r e s s e s how ASEAN i s u s e d a s a  Prime  continues give.  t o absorb n a t i o n a l d i f f e r e n c e s because i t i s  2. R o b e r t Tilman, Southeast A s i a and t h e Enemy Beyond: P e r c e p t i o n s o f E x t e r n a l Threat (Boulder, Colo.: Westview 1987 ),~ p. 78.  ASEAN Press,  126 a  relatively  procedure essence,  informal  and  without  ASEAN  unwritten  within  of  political  regional initial  faces  successes  during  organizational  1981  tacit  In  3  of  agreements which  response t o developments than not  the issue  Kampuchean Karl  a  single-minded  ASEAN  a t hand.  i n light Accredited United  crisis  D. J a c k s o n  began The  but that  reinforcing  the  and  the basic  i s not that the  the feedback original  loop of  political  ASEAN i s  the sponsorship  resolutions  was no  o f i t s i n d i v i d u a l member  condemning  C o n f e r e n c e on Kampuchea  CGDK t r i p a r t i t e ,  political  economic  identifies  a  challenge  i n t e r n a t i o n a l support  o f t h e weak s t a t u s  Nations  as  weak."*  i n canvassing  to  into  p r o b l e m w i t h ASEAN  were p o l i t i c a l  remain f a i r l y  International  the  and  of  veil  o f p r a c t i c e s around  or  postponement o f m u l t i l a t e r a l a s s i s t a n c e of  operational  rather  Whether  "The r e a l  integration  passage o f  pattern  i s not  the  ASEAN's s u c c e s s  states.  thick  rules  machinery."  i s whether i t can t r a n s l a t e i t s r e c e n t  motivations  feat  a  environment  strengths.  motivations w i l l  small  structural  i s a political  goals.  follows:  economic  rigid  converge.  ASEAN now  initial  a recognized  organization  problem as  without  understandings  h i s t o r y o f ASEAN  the  pursuit  under  implicit  which u n d e r g i r d s  The  elaborate  functions  laws,  expectations  organization  and  Vietnam,  ( I C K ) i n New  t o Vietnam,  and t h e m o b i l i z a t i o n  successful the  York, t h e  the formation  o f an i n t e r n a t i o n a l  3. S t a t e m e n t a t opening o f Meeting o f t h e ASEAN Heads o f Government, 23 Feb. 1976, D e n p a s a r . I n Ten Y e a r s ASEAN ( J a k a r t a : ASEAN S e c r e t a r i a t , 1978), p. 96. 4. K a r l D. J a c k s o n and M. H a d i S o e s a s t r o , e d s . , ASEAN S e c u r i t y and E c o n o m i c Development ( B e r k e l e y , Calif.: I n s t i t u t e o f East A s i a n S t u d i e s , 1983), x i i i .  127  effort one  to  can  deal easily  pointing  to  question  Vietnam's  settlement, which  w i t h t h e I n d o c h i n e s e r e f u g e e s . On  however,  question  continued  Nations' triumphs  I n some  cases, the  Kashmir may  realistic  down p e r m a n e n t l y  There  ideal  have  been  evolution. of  with the  i s a growing pursued Indeed,  ASEAN  at  the  Ministers  "dialogue"  economic concerns.  opinion  "greater stamina  resolving  degree  how  many,  some  of  n o t have  may  be  not t o  but t o persuade  that  the  United  issues)  resolved  hostilities. achieve the  the p a r t i e s  the recent s e c u r i t y  such  of vision,  of  meetings  intra-associational  the  and  talks  neglect  than c u r r e n t l y  portion  with of  of  long-standing disputes w i l l will,  their  pressing  suspicions  institutionalization  political  to  concerns  b o r d e r d i s p u t e s s u c h a s t h e Sabah The  were  s  expense  to  terms  solutions  entirely  or l i m i t i n g  by  Pacific  in qualitative  Many o f t h e members' l i n g e r i n g  have n o t been r e s o l v e d .  m e a s u r e s and  Kampuchea.  Palestine  dispute.  partners,  the region's p r e - e x i s t i n g and  the i s s u e  t h e Kampuchean i s s u e consumes a l a r g e  Foreign  respective  and  i n suspending  permanent s e t t l e m e n t o f a d i s p u t e , settle  judged  example,  which  but succeeded  in  than merely  For  ( i . e . the  "non-settlements"  the c o n f l i c t  be  rather  produces.  success i n  presence  must a l s o  what k i n d ,  the o r g a n i z a t i o n  pacific  ASEAN's r e a l  t h e o t h e r hand,  idealism,  and issue  economic require  altruism  i s t h e case...What t h e Kampuchean  a  and  conflict  d o e s i s t o a l l o w t h e ASEAN members t o d i s g u i s e t h e i r  shortcomings  in  of  the  solidarity  short and  run  by  t o postpone  5. I n i s L. C l a u d e , Random House, 1964  dramatic  demonstrations  regional  t o t h e morrow t h e more mundane b u t a t  J r . , Swords I n t o P l o u g h s h a r e s [ t h i r d e d i t i o n ] ) , pp.216-217.  (New  York:  128 the  same  t i m e more  development. In  i t  coordination  time  the  of  for  greater  signing  of  multilateral  rejected  the o f f e r ,  formation  1967, o r g a n i z a t i o n a l  in  enhancing r e g i o n a l provocative  value,  From  The  Military no the  common  security  r e a s o n and  also to  there  joint  over the  existed  by a s k i n g  t h e member  countries  and i f S o u t h e a s t  Asia,  far  from  only  have  in  b i t e t o match i t s i s slight. there i s  standardization,  and  one a n o t h e r ' s threat  nations prefer  of  inhibit For t h i s ASEAN's  t o cope  with  fashion.  ASEAN's s u c c e s s  what m i g h t  the  ASEAN's  point  consultation.  communist  s e c u r i t y i n an ad hoc, b i l a t e r a l  is  at  little  long-term  the  of assessing  of  that  f i g h t i n g on  regional  crisis  is  o r equipment  intentions,  way  and  and u n d e r s u p p l i e d ;  peaceful  •ne  publicly  ASEAN m i l i t a r y a c t i o n  beyond p o l i t i c a l  assure  and  counter-alliances.  no e x p e r i e n c e  collaboration  pact  As  feel  has not s u f f i c i e n t  differences  in  military alliance will  are unsophisticated  u n i t s have  Besides,  a  doctrine  cooperation  ASEAN  members  perspective,  of  that  military  alliance.  undesired  i f ASEAN  language,  member  soil.  inviting  possibility forces  formal  military  security,  t h e ASEAN Vietnam  a  a  suggested  cancelling speculations  becoming  bark.  organizational  military  exercises.  organization  provoking  of long-term  1982, S i n g a p o r e ' s P r i m e M i n i s t e r  was  ASEAN,implying  vigorously  tasks  1,6  September  perhaps  critical  during  h a v e happened  the Indochina  i f ASEAN had n o t  as a group o f s m a l l ,  uncoordinated  6. Sukhumbhand P a r i b a t r a , Kampuchea Without Delusion (Malaysia: I n s t i t u t e o f S t r a t e g i c and I n t e r n a t i o n a l S t u d i e s , ASEAN S e r i e s , 1986), p. 11.  1 2 9  states,  found  conflict.  Asian  Vietnamese  threat  and  cause of  an  invitation  and  by  Asian  the  the  fact  that China  and  for  its  affections,  they  another  i f  played little  suspicions s t i l l "the  Kampuchean  dimension.  or  It did  effectiveness  not  been  faced  not  the  invasion  the  Khmer Rouge  Khmers  as  by  the  the  root  and  illegal  policy  they  had  acted  Asian  illuminates  create  i t . "  qualitative  even and  existing  off  reminds ASEAN's  ASEAN's f o r e i g n  against mutual  us  that  political relations  changes at a r a t e ,  would n o t  have o c c u r r e d  S u r p r i s i n g many themselves, harmonizing  the  of  wooing ASEAN  c o o r d i n a t i o n e x i s t e d and  sharply  and  In l i g h t  accentuated country  the  independently  organization?  Donald Weatherbee  adversity. and  been a b l e t o c o p e w i t h  were q u i t e c l e a r l y  Southeast  accommodating  collective action.  i f  which p r o b a b l y  with  critics in  power  presence  salvation"  the  c o u l d have e a s i l y  no  crisis  nations  Vietnam  thrived.  and  succeeded  to counter  "national  a regional  one  underwent q u a n t i t a t i v e  skeptical  argument t h a t t h e  Vietnam's  crisis  existence of  differences,  the  of  not  external  i t would have i m p l i e d t h a t  have r e c o g n i z e d  Southeast  posed  the  another  Kampuchea.  Would t h e challenges  acted,  i n Kampuchea was  problem  of  i n yet  accepted  I t would  the  occupation  not  nations troops  Kampucheans.  without  submerged  I f ASEAN had  Southeast of  itself  of ASEAN  degree had i t  its  most  nations  national policies  for  130  The Kampuchean I s s u e A Chronology of S i g n i f i c a n t Events Date  Events  29 J u n e 1979 3 J u l y 197S 3 November 1978 25  December 1978  20-21 24  July  July  1979  1979  13 F e b r u a r y  13-17 22  July  1981  1981  J u n e 1982  29-30 J u n e 1983  19-21  November 1983  13-16  February  1984  25-26 F e b r u a r y  1984  24  March  9 July  7 May  1984 1985  1987  V i e t n a m becomes a member o f COMECON. C h i n a makes an announcement s u s p e n d i n g a l l a i d t o Vietnam. S i g n i n g o f t h e F r i e n d s h i p and C o o p e r a t i o n T r e a t y between t h e S o v i e t U n i o n and V i e t n a m . V i e t n a m s e n d s i t s armed f o r c e s t o s e i z e Phnom Penh. United Nations International C o n f e r e n c e on S o u t h e a s t A s i a n r e f u g e e s , Geneva. I n d i a makes an announcement o f i t s r e c o g n i t i o n o f t h e government o f t h e P e o p l e ' s R e p u b l i c o f Kampuchea ( u n d e r Heng S e m r i n ) . N o n - a l i g n e d M e e t i n g i n New D e l h i c a l l s f o r withdrawal o f f o r e i g n t r o o p s from A f g h a n i s t a n and V i e t n a m . Kampuchea's seat i s vacant. The I n t e r n a t i o n a l C o n f e r e n c e on Kampuchea i s h e l d i n New York. B o y c o t t e d by c o u n t r i e s o f S o v i e t b l o c . Formation of the C o a l i t i o n of the Government o f D e m o c r a t i c Kampuchea. Australian Foreign Minister B i l l Hayden v i s i t s H a n o i t o o f f e r good o f f i c e s i n m e d i a t i n g between V i e t n a m and ASEAN. 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