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Conserving liberalism : an interpretation of truth, hope and power in the philosophy of Karl Popper Williams, Douglas E. 1985

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C O N S E R V I N G L I B E R A L I S M : AN I N T E R P R E T A T I O N OF T R U T H , HOPE AND POWER I N THE P H I L O S O P H Y OF KARL P O P P E R B y D o u g l a s E . W i l l i a m s B . A . , C a l i f o r n i a S t a t e U n i v e r s i t y , 1 9 7 1 M . A . , C a l i f o r n i a S t a t e " U n i v e r s i t y , 1 9 7 3 A T H E S I S S U B M I T T E D I N P A R T I A L F U L F I L L M E N T OF T H E R E Q U I R E M E N T FOR T H E DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF P H I L O S O P H Y i n THE F A C U L T Y OF G R A D U A T E S T U D I E S ( D e p a r t m e n t o f P o l i t i c a l S c i e n c e ) We a c c e p t t h i s t h e s i s a s . c o n f o r m i n g t o t h e r e q u i r e d s t a n d a r d THE U N I V E R S I T Y OF B R I T I S H C O L U M B I A J a n u a r y 1 9 8 5 . © D o u g l a s E ; W i l l i a m s , 1 9 8 5 In presenting t h i s thesis i n p a r t i a l f u l f i l m e n t of the requirements for an advanced degree at the University of B r i t i s h Columbia, I agree that the Library s h a l l make i t f r e e l y available for reference and study. I further agree that permission for extensive copying of t h i s thesis for scholarly purposes may be granted by the head of my department or by his or her representatives. I t i s understood that copying or publication of t h i s thesis for f i n a n c i a l gain s h a l l not be allowed without my written permission. Department of P o l i t i c a l Science The University of B r i t i s h Columbia 1956 Main Mall Vancouver, Canada V6T 1Y3 Date March 20. 1985 i i ABSTRACT This study i s an in te rp re ta t ion of the s o c i a l and p o l i t i c a l thought and methodology of Kar l Popper, one of the most heralded yet cont rovers ia l philosophers of our t ime. The goal has been to provide a more coherent, accurate, and systematic account of Popper's thought and of i t s relevance to students of p o l i t i c s and society than current ly ex i s ts by, f i r s t , emphasizing ce r ta in h i s t o r i c a l and contextual factors i n connection with the s t ructure and development of h is ideas which ru le out ce r ta in contemporary misunderstandings of h is thought, and secondly, by al lowing Popper's own formula-t ions to take precedence over those of h is commentators, regardless of the i r sympathies and estimate of Popper's massive i n t e l l e c t u a l legacy. I t i s my p r i n c i p a l argument that the unity of Popper's philosophy l i e s i n i t s moral dimension, h is l i f e long determina-t ion to conserve the i n t e l l e c t u a l foundations of hope and progress that human autonomy requires — the d i s t i n c t i v e l y Kantian b e l i e f that mind can and should be dec is ive i n p r a c t i a l a f f a i r s no less than i n the struggle with nature, the twin p i l l a r s of the Enlightenment and modern l i b e r a l i s m a l i k e . Given the nature of our times - - a century of " t o t a l " wars, i i i endless c r i s e s , and one i n t e l l e c t u a l revo lut ion a f te r another — such an endeavour i s no small achievement. I have t r i e d to capture the proposit'ionai cutt ing-edge of my in te rp re ta t ion of Popper's thought i n the keywords of the s u b t i t l e of th i s study: that , without the b e l i e f i n the p o s s i b i l i t y of object ive t ruth — knowledge that i s independent of whether we wish to acknowledge i t s existence or not, there i s l i t t l e hope i n the future prospects of the "open s o c i e t i e s " of the Western wor ld, and that one of the gravest errors of the l i b e r a l i s m of the past was i t s under-est imation of the need to i n s t i t u t i o n a l i s e i t s best in te res ts against the threat of many forms of i l l i b e r a l power known i n our t ime, p a r t i c u l a r l y of the "unintended" v a r i e t y . I accordingly argue that Popper's v i s i o n i s best character ised as a combat-toughened conception of r e a l i t y , and of the corresponding r a t i o n a l i t y necessary to surv ive , l e t alone to l i v e w e l l , as the Western t r a d i t i o n of p o l i t i c a l theory has held to be des i rab le . iv TABLE OF CONTENTS Page Acknowledgments ' v Preface w i t h a Note on Methodology v i - x i Key to the Ab b r e v i a t i o n s of Popper's works v i i Chapter 1: I n t r o d u c t i o n 1-10 Notes 11-15 Chapter 2: A P o r t r a i t of Popper's E a r l y L i f e and Times 16-39 Notes 40-45 Chapter 3 : The Metaphysical Foundations of Orderly Growth: Kant, Popper, and the C r i s i s i n the Id e a l s of the Enlightenment 46-84 Notes 85-92 Chapter 4: Truth As Consequences: The U n i t y of Popper's Thought 93-146 Notes 147-155 Chapter 5: C r i t i c a l R a t i o n a l i s m and the Logic of the S o c i a l Sciences 156-220 Notes * 221-229 Chapter 6: Conserving L i b e r a l i s m : An I n t e r p r e -t a t i o n of Truth, Hope,.and Power i n Popper's Philosophy 230-283 Notes 284-286 Chapter 7: Conclusion: The L i m i t s of Popper's L i b e r a l i s m 287-320 Notes 321-322 B i b l i o g r a p h y 323-338 V Acknowledgements During the course of a number of years, research f o r this study received generous f i n a n c i a l assistance from the Univer-s i t y of B r i t i s h Columbia, the Canada Council, and the Canadian P o l i t i c a l Science Association to attend the European Consortium of P o l i t i c a l Research at the University of Essex. I would also l i k e to g r a t e f u l l y acknowledge a Research Fellowship from the Dean of Arts and Sciences of Queen's University at Kingston, which made i t possible to see t h i s project through i t s l a s t stages. I would l i k e to thank each of these i n s t i t u t i o n s , agen-ci e s , and o f f i c e r s f o r t h e i r kind support. Gratitude of a more personal va r i e t y i s due to Professors Alan C. Cairns and Robert H. Jackson, friends and teachers of mine who have j o i n t l y supervised t h i s study since i t s inception. I also appreciate the comments of Professors George A. Feaver and J . A. Laponce on an e a r l i e r draft of t h i s work. And, f i -n a l l y , I cannot begin to express my indebtedness to my wife, Cynthia. Her love, understanding, patience, and scepticism • were es s e n t i a l to the completion of my labours; her own f i n e capacities as a scholar were undoubtedly at play. v i Preface with a Note On Methodology There seems l i t t l e purpose i n recording h i t s on a target that has no existence out-s ide our own m i n d s . . . . John Dunn, The P o l i t i c a l Thought  of John Locke This study i s an i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of the s o c i a l and p o l i t i -c a l thought of one of the most heralded yet c o n t r o v e r s i a l p h i -losophers of our time, K a r l Popper. In crude o u t l i n e what i s aimed at i s a more coherent, accurate, and systematic account I of Popper's thought and of i t s relevance to students of p o l i -t i c s and soc ie ty than i s c u r r e n t l y a v a i l a b l e . A c t u a l l y , any-one f a m i l i a r with the mammoth commentary on h i s thought might reasonably ask, " w i l l the r e a l K a r l Popper please stand up"? Such, I b e l i e v e , are the r a d i c a l l y disparate and, by and l a r g e , misleading accounts of Popper's wri t ings c u r r e n t l y i n vogue.^ I see few s c h o l a r l y v a l u e s , present or f u t u r e , being served by a l lowing Popper 's commentators to score " h i t s " against a "Popper" (or an a l l e g e d part of a "Popper") that simply does 2 not e x i s t . And the same i s even more true of those who attempt to e n l i s t Popper's ideas i n support of causes whose existence he v i g o r o u s l y d e t e s t s — s c e p t i c i s m , r e l a t i v i s m , and h i s t o r i c i s m , f o r example.^ I have t r i e d to remedy these confusions about Popper's thought by, f i r s t , emphasising c e r t a i n h i s t o r i c a l and contextual f a c t o r s i n connection with the s t ructure and develop-ment of Popper 's ideas which r u l e out c e r t a i n m i s i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s of h i s thought and, secondly, by a l lowing Popper's own formu-l a t i o n s to take precedence over those of h i s commentators, of whatever sympathies, i n disputes of i n t e r p r e t a t i o n over what the " r e a l " meaning of h i s views are . I t i s my p r i n c i p a l argument that the u n i t y of Popper's p h i -losophy l i e s i n i t s moral dimension, h is l i f e - l o n g determination to conserve i n a d i s t i n c t i v e l y Kantian fashion the i n t e l l e c t u a l foundations of hope and progress that human autonomy r e q u i r e s , the b e l i e f that mind can and should be d e c i s i v e i n p r a c t i c a l v i i a f f a i r s no l e s s t h a n i n the s t r u g g l e w i t h n a t u r e — t h e t w i n p i l l a r s o f the E n l i g h t e n m e n t and modern L i b e r a l i s m a l i k e . G i v e n the n a t u r e o f o u r t i m e s — a c e n t u r y o f " t o t a l " war, e n d -l e s s c r i s e s , and one i n t e l l e c t u a l r e v o l u t i o n a f t e r a n o t h e r — such an endeavour i s no s m a l l a c h i e v e m e n t . I n d e e d , few t h i n -k e r s i n o u r c e n t u r y have p o s s e s s e d the i n t e l l e c t u a l powers , the c o u r a g e , and the f a i t h i n mankind n e c e s s a r y to s u s t a i n such a p r o j e c t . B e r t r a n d R u s s e l l i s perhaps the l a s t t h a t comes to m i n d . I f a t h i n k e r l i k e Popper c a n a l s o f i n d hope i n the p r o s p e c t s f o r the o r d e r l y growth o f mind and s o c i e t y a l i k e , t h e n we c e r t a i n l y owe i t to o u r s e l v e s to pay v e r y s p e c i a l a t t e n t i o n to the s t r u c t u r e and to the heat o f P o p p e r ' s v i s i o n — t h a t i s , to the s o u r c e o f the l i g h t he seeks to p r o v i d e . O n l y t h e n w i l l i t s shadows, o r i t s l i m i t s , be e q u a l l y e v i d e n t . I have t r i e d to c a p t u r e the p r o p o s i t i o n a l c u t t i n g - e d g e o f my i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f P o p p e r ' s thought i n the keywords o f the s u b t i t l e o f t h i s s t u d y : t h a t , w i t h o u t the b e l i e f i n the p o s s i -b i l i t y o f o b j e c t i v e t r u t h — k n o w l e d g e t h a t i s i n d e p e n d e n t o f whether we w i s h to acknowledge i t s e x i s t e n c e o r n o t , t h e r e i s l i t t l e hope i n the f u t u r e p r o s p e c t s o f the " o p e n s o c i e t i e s " o f the Western w o r l d , and t h a t one o f the g r a v e s t e r r o r s o f the l i b e r a l i s m o f the p a s t was i t s u n d e r - e s t i m a t i o n o f the need to i n s t i t u t i o n a l i z e i t s b e s t i n t e r e s t s a g a i n s t the t h r e a t o f many forms o f i l l i b e r a l power known i n o u r t i m e , p a r t i c u l a r l y o f the " u n i n t e n d e d " v a r i e t y . B e l o w , I a c c o r d i n g l y argue t h a t P o p p e r ' s v i s i o n i s b e s t c h a r a c t e r i s e d as a combat- toughened c o n c e p t i o n o f r e a l i t y , and o f the c o r r e s p o n d i n g r a t i o n a l i t y n e c e s s a r y to s u r v i v e , l e t a l o n e to l i v e w e l l , as the Western t r a d i t i o n o f p o l i t i c a l t h e o r y c o n s i s t e n t l y has h e l d to be u l t i m a t e l y d e s i -r a b l e . W i t h the b e n e f i t o f h i n d s i g h t , I can r e a d i l y d i s c e r n the need to comment on s e v e r a l assumptions a t p l a y i n t h i s s t u d y . A l t h o u g h I h a r b o u r no i l l u s i o n s about a b r i e f d i s c u s s i o n b e i n g a b l e to do j u s t i c e to the c o m p l e x i t y o f the i s s u e s i n v o l v e d , I do b e l i e v e t h a t the f o l l o w i n g o b s e r v a t i o n s a r e o f c o n s i d e r a b l e I v i i i r e l e v a n c e to an adequate u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f t h i s s t u d y o f P o p p e r ' s , work, f o r they a d d r e s s the a l l - i m p o r t a n t q u e s t i o n o f the metho-d o l o g y here a t p l a y . A t s e v e r a l s t a g e s i n the f o l l o w i n g s t u d y , I d i s c u s s , though do not j u s t i f y , the m e r i t s o f the p r e s e n t i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f P o p p e r ' s t h o u g h t ' i n terms o f t h r e e l e v e l s o f a n a l y s i s : the t e x t s , t h e m s e l v e s ; the n a t u r e o f the e x i s t i n g commentaries on P o p p e r ' s t h o u g h t ; and my judgment and l i n e o f r e a s o n i n g as to what i s needed to be done most i n c o n n e c t i o n w i t h h i s i m p r e s -s i v e i n t e l l e c t u a l l e g a c y . W i t h r e g a r d to the s t u d y o f t e x t s , a l t h o u g h P o p p e r i s s t i l l a contemporary f i g u r e , the c r i t e r i a I have drawn upon i n a p p r o a c h i n g h i s works have been c l a r i f i e d and d e v e l o p e d i n c o n n e c t i o n w i t h the h i s t o r y o f i d e a s and p o l i -t i c a l t h o u g h t . To a v e r y l a r g e e x t e n t , however, the a d o p t i o n o f s u c h c r i t e r i a has been the r e s u l t o f the second l e v e l o f a n a l y -s i s , the s t a t e o f the c r i t i c a l debate c o n c e r n i n g P o p p e r ' s works . S t a t e d b l u n t l y , the n a t u r e o f t h i s l i t e r a t u r e i s d e e p l y p o -l a r i s e d and e x c e s s i v e l y s p e c i a l i s e d . Under s u c h c i r c u m s t a n c e s , the u n i f y i n g themes and u n d e r l y i n g u n i t y o f P o p p e r ' s p h i l o s o p h y r u n the r i s k o f b e i n g l o s t a n d / o r s e v e r e l y m i s r e p r e s e n t e d i f c a r e i s not t a k e n to p r e s e r v e t h e i r i n t e g r i t y b e f o r e so many " P o p p e r s " b l u r the r e a l n a t u r e o f h i s c o n t r i b u t i o n . I n f a c t , i t i s p r e c i s e l y because so many " P o p p e r s " have emerged w i t h i n the commentary on h i s thought t h a t I f e l t i n c l i n e d to embrace c e r t a i n g u i d e l i n e s from the most o u t s t a n d i n g r e c e n t work i n the h i s t o r y o f p o l i t i c a l thought where s u c h problems a r e r e g u l a r l y e n c o u n t e r e d . I n a v a r i e t y o f c o n t e x t s , u n f o r t u n a t e l y f a r too c o m p l i -c a t e d to e x p l o r e h e r e , Q u e n t i n S k i n n e r , J o h n Dunn, and J . G . A . P o c o c k , among o t h e r s , have done t h e i r v e r y b e s t to d i s a b u s e us o f a number o f anachronisms and o t h e r m e t h o d o l o g i c a l e r r o r s i n 4 the s t u d y o f the p o l i t i c a l t h e o r y o f the p a s t . I n h i s o u t s t a n -d i n g s t u d y o f L o c k e , f o r example, Dunn b e g i n s by n o t i n g : The c l a i m t h a t the account g i v e n here o f L o c k e ' s argument . . • i s ' h i s t o r i c a l ' i m p l i e s t h a t i t s ix s t a t u s depends upon the adequacy o f i t s i d e n -t i f i c a t i o n o f L o c k e ' s own meaning . . . By ' h i s -t o r i c a l t h e n , i s meant an a c c o u n t o f what L o c k e was t a l k i n g a b o u t , n o t a d o c t r i n e w r i t t e n ( p e r -haps u n c o n s c i o u s l y ) by him i n a s o r t o f i n v i s i b l e i n k which becomes a p p a r e n t o n l y when h e l d up to r-the l i g h t ( o r heat ) o f the t w e n t i e t h - c e n t u r y m i n d . A n d , i n h i s n o w - s e m i n a l a r t i c l e , " M e a n i n g and U n d e r s t a n d i n g i n the H i s t o r y o f I d e a s " , S k i n n e r s i m i l a r l y warns us a g a i n s t s u c -cumbing to a number o f " m y t h o l o g i e s " i n the s t u d y o f t e x t s , d o c t r i n e s w h i c h a l l b e l i e the g e n e r a l danger o f " t h e p r i o r i t y o f p a r a d i g m s " — t h a t i s , o f o u r p r e c o n c e p t i o n s d e t e r m i n i n g o u r p e r c e p t i o n s . ^ As f a r as I c a n t e l l , t h e r e a r e no c o m p e l l i n g reasons f o r l i m i t i n g the f o r c e and a p p l i c a t i o n o f such c r i t e r i a o f adequacy and i n t e r p r e t a t i o n to t e x t s o f the p a s t . I n the f i r s t i n s t a n c e , they s h o u l d a p p l y e q u a l l y to the s t u d y o f o u r c o n t e m p o r a r i e s , p a r t i c u l a r l y i n the absence o f a s c h o l a r l y consensus as to the n a t u r e o f the i n d i v i d u a l ' s c o n t r i b u t i o n . O n l y t h e n , I b e l i e v e , can c r i t i c i s m c l a i m to be w e l l i n f o r m e d , t h e p r o d u c t o f s c h o l a r -l y c o n c e r n s r a t h e r t h a n some u l t e r i o r m o t i v e . I n the f o l l o w i n g s t u d y , I have t r i e d to a b i d e by these p r i n c i p l e s whenever p o s -s i b l e . As a f i e r c e g l a d i a t o r i n the r e a l m o f i d e a s , t h e r e c a n be l i t t l e doubt t h a t P o p p e r h i m s e l f has c o n t r i b u t e d to the p r o l i -f e r a t i o n o f p o l a r i s e d and t y p i c a l l y o n e - s i d e i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s o f h i s t h o u g h t . I r o n i c a l l y , g i v e n P o p p e r ' s h o s t i l i t y to h i s p h i l o s o p h y , i t was H e g e l who perhaps b e s t u n d e r s t o o d , the n a t u r e o f s u c h a phenomenon when he o b s e r v e d t h a t d i f f e r e n t p h i l o s o -p h i c systems t y p i c a l l y e v o l v e i n such a " o n e - s i d e d " f a s h i o n s i n c e " t h e y owe t h e i r o r i g i n s to a r e a c t i o n a g a i n s t what has 7 gone b e f o r e . " N o t w i t h s t a n d i n g h i s p r o f o u n d d i s t a s t e f o r e v e r y -t h i n g H e g e l i a n , however , P o p p e r would s u r e l y have to agree w i t h H e g e l ' s i n s i g h t , f o r one o f the most prominent f e a t u r e s o f h i s own p h i l o s o p h y i s the r o l e t h a t "enemies" have p l a y e d i n h i s t r e a t m e n t o f o t h e r t h i n k e r s and p h i l o s o p h i c i d e a s . I n C h a p t e r 3 , I a rgue t h a t the p o s i t i v e i d e a l s Popper seeks to d e f e n d a r e X e s s e n t i a l l y those o f the E n l i g h t e n m e n t , and t h a t the m e t a -p h y s i c a l s t r u c t u r e (and l i m i t a t i o n s ) o f . h i s a s s a u l t on t h e i r p u t a t i v e " e n e m i e s " i s p r o f o u n d l y K a n t i a n i n i n s p i r a t i o n and d e s i g n . As f a r as I know, v i r t u a l l y n o t h i n g has been w r i t t e n about P o p p e r ' s thought i n t h i s c o n n e c t i o n o f the c r i s i s and a s s a u l t upon the c u l t u r a l i d e a l s and s u p p o r t s o f Western s o c i e t y . I f s u c h a d i s c u s s i o n succeeds i n a m p l i f y i n g the s u s t a i n i n g u n i t y and heat o f P o p p e r ' s v i s i o n , t h e n one o f the p r i m a r y aims o f t h i s s t u d y w i l l have been a c h i e v e d . I assume t h a t o t h e r r e l a t e d s t u d i e s i n the s t i l l - e v o l v i n g debate between K a n t i a n i s m and H e g e l i a n i s m — b e t w e e n t r a n s c e n d e n -t a l i s t s and f o r m a l i s t s , on the one h a n d , and h i s t o r i c i s t s and c o n t e x t u a l i s t s , on the o t h e r — w o u l d e n l a r g e o u r u n d e r s t a n d i n g and a p p r e c i a t i o n o f P o p p e r ' s p h i l o s o p h y i n ways o t h e r t h a n those p u r s u e d i n the p r e s e n t c o n t e x t . T h i s has c e r t a i n l y been' t r u e o f the debate c o n c e r n i n g a d i f f e r e n t v a r i e t y o f l i b e r a l p o l i t i -c a l t h e o r y e q u a l l y K a n t i a n i n c o m p l e x i o n , the " d e o n t o l o g i c a l " p h i l o s o p h y o f J o h n R a w l s . ^ I am sure t h a t f u t u r e s t u d i e s o f P o p p e r ' s " c o n s e q u e n t i a l i s m " and " m o d i f i c a t i o n o f u t i l i t a r i a n i s m " from w i t h i n an e s s e n t i a l l y K a n t i a n p e r s p e c t i v e w i l l p r o v e . e q u a l -l y i l l u m i n a t i n g i n ways f a r beyond the scope and d e s i g n o f the p r e s e n t i n t e r p r e t a t i o n . I am a l s o o f the b e l i e f , based upon a good d e a l o f r e s e a r c h t h a t has not f o u n d i t s way d i r e c t l y i n t o t h i s s t u d y , t h a t f u r -t h e r i n q u i r i e s i n t o the s o c i o - p o l i t i c a l and i n t e l l e c t u a l m i l i e u x i n w h i c h Popper was r a i s e d would deepen, r a t h e r t h a n c o n t r a d i c t , the p r e l i m i n a r y r e f e r e n c e s to s u c h f a c t o r s i n C h a p t e r s 1, 2 and 7» Seldom have the c u l t u r a l and i n s t i t u t i o n a l s u p p o r t s n e c e s -s a r y f o r g e n u i n e l i b e r a l i s m been as weak and v u l n e r a b l e to s u b -v e r s i o n b o t h f rom w i t h i n and from w i t h o u t as they were i n the V i e n n a o f P o p p e r ' s y o u t h . By the same t o k e n , seldom has a m i l i e u , been as c o n d u c i v e to the s o r t o f i n t e l l e c t u a l f e r m e n t , c r e a t i v i t y , i n d e e d " r e v o l u t i o n s " , so t y p i c a l o f o u r a g e . I f t ime and space a l l o w e d , I b e l i e v e t h a t P o p p e r ' s a b i l i t y to d i s c e r n I and f o r g e the f o u n d a t i o n s o f o r d e r l y growth i n mind and s o c i e t y x i amidst such a kaleidoscope of i n t e l l e c t u a l chaos would stand out as a l l the more remarkable, and enr ich our understanding of y e t - t o - b e - e x p l o r e d expanses of i n t e l l e c t u a l h i s t o r y and contemporary s o c i a l theory—contrasts and convergences, f o r example, with the work of l i b e r a l compatriots such as Joseph Schumpeter, Hans K e l s e n , Paul L a z a r s f e l d , and F r i e d r i c h Hayek. The f a c t that "enemies" have played such a prominent r o l e i n Popper's philosophy i s c e r t a i n l y not an unmixed b l e s s i n g when i t comes to the h i s t o r y of ideas , tending as i t does to -wards a Manichean-l ike "good guys and bad guys" forma mentis. I r o n i c a l l y , i t thus tends towards p r e c i s e l y the sor t of ana-c h r o n i s t i c approach to other thinkers that I have t r i e d to r e s -cue Popper's thought from at c e r t a i n stages of t h i s study. But , except i n pass ing , l i t t l e i s sa id here about the obvious l i m i -ta t ions and inadequacies of Popper's approach to e a r l i e r p h i l o -sophers and i d e a s , f o r a good deal of the secondary l i t e r a t u r e that already e x i s t s exposes these problems i n h i s thought at great l e n g t h . Bearing a l l t h i s i n mind, what fol lows i s p r i m a r i l y a con-s t r u c t i v e i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of Popper's attempt to conserve the i n t e l l e c t u a l and moral foundations of the l i b e r a l way of l i f e i n an e s s e n t i a l l y h o s t i l e environment. That , even w i t h i n the con-s t r a i n t s of such a p o s i t i v e and construct ive design, there i s ample need and room f o r c r i t i c i s m w i l l be c l e a r at several stages of what f o l l o w s , but t h i s i s p a r t i c u l a r l y the case i n Chapter 7 when the l a r g e r task of " l i g h t i n g the way" i s behind me. x i i NOTES 1 F o r an ex tended r e v i e w o f the secondary l i t e r a t u r e on P o p p e r ' s t h o u g h t , see my "Masons , E v a n g e l i s t s , and H e r e t i c s i n P o p p e r ' s C a t h e d r a l " , Q u e e n ' s Q u a r t e r l y , 1 9 8 4 ( F o r t h c o m i n g ) . 2 The most r e c e n t example o f s u c h an a p p r o a c h i s D a v i d S t o v e , Popper and A f t e r ( O x f o r d , 1 9 8 2 ) . 3 F o r a t r e a t m e n t o f P o p p e r ' s thought a l o n g these l i n e s , see T . E . B u r k e , The P h i l o s o p h y o f Popper ( M a n c h e s t e r , 1 9 8 3 ) . Q u e n t i n S k i n n e r , " M e a n i n g and U n d e r s t a n d i n g i n the H i s t o r y o f I d e a s " , H i s t o r y and T h e o r y , V I I I ( 1 9 6 9 ) , 3 - 5 3 , and "Some P r o b -lems i n the A n a l y s i s o f P o l i t i c a l Thought and A c t i o n , " P o l i - t i c a l T h e o r y , I I ( 1 9 7 4 ) , 2 7 9 - 2 8 5 ; J o h n Dunn, "The I d e n t i t y o f the H i s t o r y o f I d e a s " , P h i l o s o p h y ( A p r i l , 1 9 6 8 ) , 8 5 - 1 0 4 ; and J . G . A . P o c o c k , P o l i t i c s , Language , and Time (New Y o r k , 1 9 7 1 ) . 5 J o h n Dunn, The P o l i t i c a l Thought o f John L o c k e (Cambridge , 1 9 6 9 ) i x . 6 Q u e n t i n S k i n n e r , " M e a n i n g and U n d e r s t a n d i n g i n the H i s t o r y o f I d e a s " , o p . c i t . , 6 . 7 W a l t e r Kaufmann, "The H e g e l Myth and I t s M e t h o d " , The P h i l o - s o p h i c a l Review ( O c t o b e r , 1 9 5 1 ) , r e p r i n t e d i n h i s H e g e l ' s P o l i -t i c a l P h i l o s o p h y (New Y o r k , 1 9 7 0 ) , 1 3 8 . 8 On t h i s a s p e c t o f R a w l s ' p o l i t i c a l t h e o r y , see M i c h a e l J . S a h d e l , L i b e r a l i s m and the L i m i t s o f J u s t i c e ( C a m b r i d g e , 1 9 8 2 ) . 9 F o r example, see R. Bambrough. e d . , P o p p e r , P l a t o and P o l i t i c s (Cambridge and New Y o r k , 1 9 6 7 ) ; W a l t e r Kaufmann, o p . c i t . ; and R o n a l d B . L e v i n s o n , I n Defense o f P l a t o ( C a m b r i d g e , M a s s . , 1 9 5 3 ) . - 1 -CHAPTER 1 I n t r o d u c t i o n ...our p o l i t i c a l i d e a s and what we c a l l the r e s t o f o u r i d e a s a r e n o t i n f a c t two independent w o r l d s , ... though they majy come to us as s e p a r a t e t e x t and c o n t e x t , the meaning l i e s , as i t always must l i e , i n a u n i t y i n wh i c h t h e s e p a r a t e e x i s t e n c e o f t e x t and c o n t e x t i s r e s o l v e d . M i c h a e l O a keshott When we b e g i n to s t u d y the immediate h i s t o r i c a l back-ground o f contemporary p h i l o s o p h y we e n c o u n t e r a c u r i o u s fact.;: one o f the most i m p o r t a n t p a r t s o f t h i s background i s p r e c i s e l y the d i s a p p e a r a n c e o f t h i s background from o u r f i e l d o f v i s i o n . W. W. B a r t l e y , I I I i S i n c e t ime immemorial, fundamental c r i s e s o f i n t e l l e c t u a l and p o l i t i c a l o r i e n t a t i o n have s e t the s t a g e f o r o u r most en-d u r i n g v i s i o n s o f man and s o c i e t y . P l a t o ' s R e p u b l i c , the f i r s t g r e a t paradigm o f Western p o l i t i c a l a n a l y s i s , was a d i r e c t r e s -ponse to t h e i n s t i t u t i o n a l breakdown o f the A t h e n i a n p o l i s . As he r e c o u n t s i n h i s S e v e n t h E p i s t l e , . . .our c i t y was no l o n g e r a d m i n i s t e r e d a c c o r d i n g to t h e s t a n d a r d s and p r a c t i c e s o f o u r f a t h e r s . . .. , the w r i t t e n l a w and t h e customs were b e i n g c o r r u p t e d a t an a s t o u n d i n g r a t e , [ a n d ] I, who a t f i r s t had been f u l l o f eagerness f o r a p u b l i c c a r e e r , as I gazed upon the w h i r l p o o l o f p u b l i c l i f e and saw the i n c e s s a n t movement o f s h i f t i n g c u r r e n t s , a t l a s t f e l t d i z z y . 2 S i m i l a r l y , a n e q u a l l y p r o f o u n d sense t h a t t h e i r " w o r l d had be-come deranged" was the m o t i v a t i n g f o r c e b e h i n d the thought o f as d i v e r s e a group as M a r s i l i u s o f Padua, M a c h i a v e l l i , B o d i n , Hobbes, L o c k e , T o c q u e v i l l e , and Marx, to name a few o f the more o b v i o u s i l l u s t r a t i o n s . ^ As i s w e l l known by now, d u r i n g the c l o s i n g decades o f t h e l a s t c e n t u r y , an e q u a l l y d i s t u r b i n g r i f t began to d e v e l o p be-tween what L i o n e l T r i l l i n g has characterized as "the master idea of the modern age" and the dominant i n s t i t u t i o n s through which i t o r i g i n a l l y was expected to f i n d expression. I f i t had become a commonplace certitude since the Renaissance to assume that "what the mind might, encompass of knowledge of the physical universe has a d i r e c t bearing upon the quality of hu-man existence, and ... that mind can, and should be decisive i n p o l i t i c a l l i f e " , ^ by the 1870s and 80s, few but the most naive of thinkers could escape the seeds of r a d i c a l doubt that were beginning to surface with respect to these claims. As the juggernaut of an "emancipated science" pushed Western society's apparently i r r e v e r s i b l e r a t i o n a l i z a t i o n to new heights, i t s most se n s i t i v e students began to voice profound reservations about the disruptive e f f e c t that such "progress" was having upon a l l a u t h o r i t i e s , whether of a r e l i g i o u s , philosophical, or p o l i -5 t i c a l v a r i e t y . Nietzsche observed with c h a r a c t e r i s t i c i n s i g h t , "... i t i s the disorganizing p r i n c i p l e s that give our age i t s character." Amidst what Arnold Haultain ( f o r many years personal secre-tary to Goldwin Smith, and a scholar i n h i s own right) r e c a l l e d as the "rather smug" and "myopic" assumptions of the l a t e 19th century, with i t s v e r i t a b l e c u l t of material progress and a nearly u n i v e r s a l worship of a mechanistic and u n c r i t i c a l posi-tivism, i t increasingly became more d i f f i c u l t (to quote a re-cent h i s t o r i a n of the period) "to assume that i n any large de-gree men were free to choose, were conscious of t h e i r own mo-7 t i v e s , were susceptible to r a t i o n a l argument." For a b r i e f time, to be sure, the masses seemed content to reap and c o n t i -nue the struggle f o r the material gains and concrete improve-ments i n t h e i r standard of l i v i n g , brought on by the march of i n d u s t r i a l capitalism. But, i n one i n t e l l e c t u a l community a f t e r another, a "growing s e n s i t i v i t y to [the] d i s s o l v i n g cer-t a i n t i e s " of the two preceding centuries "displaced the axis - 3 -of s o c i a l thought" to such a degree that even the soberly-courageous Max Weber had to confess that "not summer's bloom l i e s ahead of us, but rather a polar night of i c y darkness and hardness, no matter which group may triumph externally now". Caught i n the d i s i l l u s i o n i n g grips of the newly d i s -covered worlds of i t s own conditioning - whether of a Dar-winian, Nietzschean, Marxian, Durkheimian, or Freudian va-r i e t y - an embattered reason stood "shivering timorously at the brink" and was "obliged to walk a razor's edge" between II the d i s c r e d i t e d naiveties and confident optimism of the 18th century (what C a r l y l e l a t e r decried as the "mechanical s p i r i t " of his own day and age) and the horrors of the i r r a t i o n a l f o r -ces of destruction that seemed to l i e i n the immediate future.^ Doubts that the worst of i n t e l l e c t u a l fears had been exag-gerated were quickly d i s p e l l e d as one European power a f t e r an-other was battered by the u n p a r a l l e l l e d forces of s o c i a l d i s -order, economic c r i s i s , and i n s t i t u t i o n a l decay that accom-panied the events of the 1880s and'90s. Whether one's baro-meter was f i x e d on the moral and p o l i t i c a l c r i s i s that c r y s t a l -l i z e d i n France during the tumult of the Dreyfus- a f f a i r , or on the r a d i c a l d i s o r i e n t a t i o n of t r a d i t i o n a l p o l i t i c a l ideolo-gies and practices that the mounting " s o c i a l question" provoked throughout Europe ( p a r t i c u l a r l y i n the l a t e developing economies of Central and Southern Europe following the Great Depression of 10 1873-96), or on the a r t i f i c i a l l y contrived (and hence v u l -nerable) nature of the regimes which national u n i f i c a t i o n "had endowed upon Germany, I t a l y , and the Habsburg Empire, the " i c y darkness" seemed inescapable. Indeed, i t was at hand. Thus, although scholars and i n t e l l e c t u a l s may have hoped to provide a firmer foundation f o r a science of society than t h e i r 18th and 19th century predecessors had achieved, t h e i r searching discussions and learned disputations were rudely cut short as "forces prepared to raze rather than refurbish the Enlighten-ment's house of i n t e l l e c t " 1 1 seized the opportunity and trans-- 4 -formed the n a t u r e o f p o l i t i c s from a debate and p u b l i c d i a -l o g u e i n t o u n b r i d l e d a g g r e s s i o n and c r u d e c h a u v i n i s m . H a v i n g w i t n e s s e d mass d e s t r u c t i o n and a c o n c o m i t a n t b l u n t i n g o f c o n s c i e n c e on an u n p r e c e d e n t e d s c a l e d u r i n g the s o - c a l l e d G r e a t War, by the 1 9 3 0 s " a n i n c r e a s i n g number o f European i n t e l l e c t u a l s were c o n c l u d i n g t h a t an a t t i t u d e o f 12 p o l i t i c a l commitment was the o n l y p o s s i b l e c h o i c e " and b a s i s f o r hope o f b r i n g i n g the b e s t i n the t r a d i t i o n o f the p h i l o -sophes to b e a r upon t h e p o l i t i c a l t u r m o i l o f the a g e . T h i s s t u d y examines the s o c i a l and p o l i t i c a l thought and methodo-l o g y o f one o f the most p r o l i f i c and c o n t r o v e r s i a l champions o f s u c h E n l i g h t e n m e n t i d e a l s to have endured t h i s c r i s i s i n p o l i t i c a l o p t i m i s m , S i r K a r l R. P o p p e r . D u r i n g the l a s t f o u r d e c a d e s , a n d s p a n n i n g a s e e m i n g l y e n d l e s s number o f f i e l d s o f i n q u i r y , Popper has e s t a b l i s h e d h i m s e l f as one o f the most s i g n i f i c a n t t h i n k e r s o f o u r c e n -t u r y . He has a l r e a d y been h a i l e d as perhaps " t h e J o h n L o c k e o f o u r t i m e " , and a n o t h e r has argued t h a t "nobody c a n do s e r i o u s work" i n the f i e l d s touched by h i s i d e a s w i t h o u t coming to terms w i t h h i s work ( t h o s e m e n t i o n e d b e i n g e p i s t e m o l o g y , m e t a p h y s i c s , the p h i l o s o p h i e s o f s c i e n c e , s o c i a l s c i e n c e and h i s t o r y , l o g i c , a n c i e n t p h i l o s o p h y , s o c i a l and p o l i t i c a l p h i l o s o p h y , quantum m e c h a n i c s , e v o l u t i o n a r y t h e o r y , and m a t h e m a t i c s ) . ^ I f one c o n s i d e r s more p r a c t i c a l , a p p l i e d a r e a s o f endeavor ( s u c h as m e d i c i n e , n e u r o p h y s i o l o g y , b i o l o g y , and g e o g r a p h y ) , the l i s t o f t r i b u t e s f rom n o t e d a u t h o r i t i e s grows a l l the more i m p r e s -s i v e . ^ S i r P e t e r Medawar ,xwinner o f the N o b e l p r i z e f o r m e d i -c i n e a n d , h i m s e l f , a keen s t u d e n t o f s c i e n t i f i c thought and p r a c t i c e , w r i t e s , " I t h i n k Popper i s i n c o m p a r a b l y the g r e a t e s t p h i l o s o p h e r o f s c i e n c e t h a t has e v e r b e e n . " I n the same v e i n , S i r John E c c l e s , a n o t h e r N o b e l L a u r e a t e i n n e u r o p h y s i o l o g y , t e s t i f i e s to the immense impact o f P o p p e r ' s w r i t i n g s on h i s r e s e a r c h when he w r i t e s , "my s c i e n t i f i c l i f e owes so much to my conversion i n 1 9 4 5 . . . to Popper's teaching on the con-duct of i n v e s t i g a t i o n s . . . I have endeavoured to f o l l o w Popper i n the formulat ion and i n the i n v e s t i g a t i o n of funda-mental problems i n neurobiology" . Yet another Nobel p r i z e -winner, the noted mathematician and t h e o r e t i c a l astronomer, S i r Hermann B o n d i , has exclaimed that , "There i s no more to science than i t s method, and there i s no more to i t s method 15 than Popper has s a i d " . Summing up the range of Popper's i n -fluence on contemporary thought and c u l t u r e , and not ing that t h i s even extends to a r t h i s t o r i a n s of great stature (such as E . H . Gombrich) and l e a d i n g p o l i t i c i a n s (the instances c i t e d being the l a t e Anthony Crosland and B r i t a i n ' s S i r Edward B o y l e ) , Bryan Magee states simply that his impact i s "unapproached by that of any Engl ish-speaking philosopher now l i v i n g . " For those of us who are p r i m a r i l y students of p o l i t i c s and s o c i e t y , Popper 's wri t ings have been equally s i g n i f i c a n t though l e s s the object of systematic study than other facets 17 of h i s thought. ' In h i s biography of K a r l Marx, S i r I s a i a h B e r l i n has described one of the two of Popper's s e l f - p r o c l a i m e d "war e f f o r t s " , The Open Society and I t s Enemies ( 1 9 4 5 ) , as "a work of exceptional o r i g i n a l i t y and power . . . . p r o v i d [ i n g ] the most scrupulous and formidable c r i t i c i s m of the p h i l o s o -p h i c a l and h i s t o r i c a l doctr ines of Marxism by any l i v i n g w r i -1 ft t e r . W r i t i n g i n the Int roduct ion to the F i r s t Ser ies of the Philosophy, P o l i t i c s and Society essays, Peter L a s l e t t des-c r ibes Popper as "perhaps the most i n f l u e n t i a l of contemporary 19 philosophers who have addressed themselves to p o l i t i c s " . J Upon i t s p u b l i c a t i o n i n 1 9 5 7 , Popper's other major work i n the f i e l d of s o c i a l theory, The Poverty of H i s t d r i c i s m , was p r o -claimed by Arthur K o e s t l e r to be "probably the only book pub-l i s h e d t h i s year which w i l l o u t l i v e t h i s century" , and has since become the object of two recent books c o n s o l i d a t i n g t h i s 20 c l a i m . His views concerning the u n i t y of s c i e n t i f i c method - 6 -and the r o l e o f s o - c a l l e d h y p o t h e t i c o - d e d u c t i v e e x p l a n a t i o n s i n the s o c i a l as w e l l as the n a t u r a l s c i e n c e s have become s t a p l e s to c o n s i d e r a b l e numbers o f e c o n o m i s t s , s o c i o l o g i s t s , p o l i t i c a l s c i e n t i s t s , and even a n t h r o p o l o g i s t s w i s h i n g to p l a c e t h e i r d i s c i p l i n e s on a more c r e d i b l e and s o p h i s t i c a t e d 21 s c i e n t i f i c f o u n d a t i o n . And h i s m e t h o d o l o g i c a l c o n c e p t i o n o f l i b e r a l i s m as an " o p e n s o c i e t y " p r e d i c a t e d upon the a d o p -t a t i o n o f a f a l l i b i l i s t v i e w o f human n a t u r e and knowledge , to be i n s t i t u t i o n a l i z e d as a " p i e c e - m e a l s o c i a l t e c h n o l o g y " , has been r e f e r r e d to on more t h a n one o c c a s i o n as " t h e i d e a l l y a p p r o p r i a t e m e t a p h y s i c a l p e r s p e c t i v e " and "most f o r m i d a b l e " d e f e n s e o f l i b e r a l v a l u e s y e t to be advanced - a v a s t i m p r o v e -ment , so t h e s e commentators c l a i m , upon J o h n S t u a r t M i l l ' s 22 p h i l o s o p h y . P o p p e r ' s work has a lways been c o n t r o v e r s i a l , and t h i s has p a r t i c u l a r l y been the case w i t h h i s s t u d i e s i n the h i s t o r y o f p o l i t i c a l thought and the l o g i c o f the s o c i a l s c i e n c e s . Amongst p h i l o s o p h e r s , i t has f r e q u e n t l y been s a i d t h a t one may p h i l o s o p h i s e f o r o r a g a i n s t K a n t , but t h a t one may not p h i l o s o p h i s e w i t h o u t h i m . T h e r e a r e g r o w i n g s i g n s t h a t f u t u r e g e n e r a t i o n s o f s c h o l a r s w i l l say much the same, and f o r many o f the same r e a s o n s , o f P o p p e r ' s i d e a s . I n a d d i t i o n to the s u b s t a n c e o f h i s thought (some o f which w i l l be e x p l o r e d s h o r t -l y ) , a s p e c t s o f P o p p e r ' s i n t e l l e c t u a l s t y l e a p p e a r to have g r e a t l y c o n t r i b u t e d to t h i s e f f e c t , and l e n d c redence to the c o m p a r i s o n w i t h K a n t . As had been the case w i t h K a n t and so many o t h e r E n l i g h t e n m e n t f i g u r e s , i n P o p p e r ' s hands the h i s -t o r y o f i d e a s and q u e s t i o n s o f method become v e r i t a b l e b a t t l e -f i e l d s where the f o r c e s o f r e a s o n and p a s s i o n , f a l l i b i l i s m and j u s t i f i c a t i o n i s m , h i s t o r i c i s m and i n d e t e r m i n i s m , and so o n , c l a s h a t e v e r y c o n c e i v a b l e t u r n . As one p o l i t i c a l t h e o r i s t s u c c i n c t l y o b s e r v e d , " P o p p e r i s the s o r t o f w r i t e r who produces hot o r c o l d r e s p o n s e s i n h i s r e a d e r s , f o r h i s i s s e l f - a d m i t t e d l y i - 7 -23 a combative prose." J Thus, i n the second of his three major I volumes of essays on epistemology and methodology, Conjectures and Refutations; The Growth of S c i e n t i f i c Knowledge (1963), Popper frankly admits that " l i k e many other philosophers I am at times i n c l i n e d to c l a s s i f y philosophers as belonging to two main groups - those with whom I disagree and those who agree 24 with me." Small wonder, then, that, while some have hailed ' Popper as " t h i s century's Locke", and as propounding the " i d e a l metaphysics" of a l i b e r a l society, others have been most im-pressed by diam e t r i c a l l y opposed implications and habits of his thought. One well-known student of p o l i t i c a l thought, f o r example, has complained of "the ar b i t r a r i n e s s of Popper's fundamental p r i n c i p l e s " , that "the use of 'we' employed throughout [The Open Society] takes on an insidious tone f o r a l l who are not of the charmed community" of C r i t i c a l Rationalism, and that his l i b e r a l meliorism "sanctions a dangerous extension of the 25 i n t e r v e n t i o n i s t state." From a r a d i c a l l y d i f f e r e n t perspec-t i v e , several s o c i a l theorists have charged that Popper has provided a " j u s t i f i c a t i o n f o r the c u l t of empiricism and prag-matic conservatism" and a "comprehensive defense of the admini-s t r a t i v e technologists - indeed a manifesto f o r them, no l e s s " 26 ef f e c t i v e f o r being unread by many who most p r o f i t from i t . In short, i t appears that , pr e c i s e l y as Kant had done a cen-tury and a h a l f before, Popper has polarised the thought of his contemporaries and that of at lea s t the next generation oh the most pressing questions of modern l i f e : What can I know?, What ought I to do?, and What may I hope for? Not co-i n c i d e n t a l l y , from the standpoint of ultimately assessing Popper's s o c i a l and p o l i t i c a l thought and methodology, these happen to be Kant's three great questions, each the subject of one of hi s monumental C r i t i q u e s . In the leading stanza of the f i n a l chapter to P o l i t i c s and - 8 -V i s i o n , S h e l d o n W o l i n n o t e s t h a t " to d e s c r i b e a d e q u a t e l y r e -c e n t and contemporary c o n c e p t i o n s o f what i s p o l i t i c a l i s a r i s k y u n d e r t a k i n g f u l l o f the p i t f a l l s t h a t come from s t a n -ii 07 d i n g so c l o s e to events and i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s o f e v e n t s . I n the case o f a t h i n k e r as i n f l u e n t i a l and c o n t r o v e r s i a l as P o p p e r , s u c h r i s k s must n o t o n l y be acknowledged b u t s p e c i f i -c a l l y a d d r e s s e d . Perhaps the most n o t a b l e r i s k stems from the tendency o f a c o n s i d e r a b l e body o f commentary on h i s thought to l a p s e i n t o a t y p e o f " w h i g g i s h p r e s e n t i s m " , s i m p l y m i r -| r o r i n g h i s c u r r e n t s u c c e s s and t o d a y ' s most f a s h i o n a b l e c r i -t e r i a o f e v a l u a t i o n . I n c r e a s i n g numbers o f o b s e r v e r s have n o t e d t h i s tendency when they lament P o p p e r ' s h a v i n g become a " c u l t f i g u r e " whose d i s c i p l e s have v i e d f o r the m a s t e r ' s m a n t l e and d o c t r i n e s have been s c r u t i n i z e d as much f o r h e r e s y as f o r 29 e r r o r . " S i m i l a r l y , a w e l l - k n o w n p h i l o s o p h e r who i s o t h e r w i s e q u i t e f a v o u r a b l y d i s p o s e d toward much o f P o p p e r ' s thought w r i t e s t h a t , " a l l too many o f the c o n t r i b u t o r s [ t o the L i b r a r y o f L i v i n g P h i l o s o p h e r s v o l u m e s ] come u n c o m f o r t a b l y c l o s e to g r o v e l l i n g . " ^ Henry V e a t c h goes so f a r as to o b s e r v e t h a t "Time was when o n l y a pope was deemed a f i t o f f i c e r to draw a l i n e o f d e m a r c a t i o n [between d i f f e r e n t modes o f e x p e r i e n c e ] ; but nowadays t h i s o n e - t i m e p a p a l f u n c t i o n would a p p e a r to have II "5 1 d e v o l v e d upon a u n b l u s h i n g and ever ready S i r K a r l . J Whatever the a p p r o p r i a t e e x p l a n a t i o n f o r these u n c r i t i c a l , t r i u m p h a l i s t r e s p o n s e s to P o p p e r ' s thought may b e , I b e l i e v e they do h i s i d e a s , o u r s e l v e s , and o u r p o s t e r i t y a g r e a t d i s s e r v i c e . O b -v i o u s l y , the same i s even more t r u e o f t h o s e who c a r i c a t u r e h i s thought and p o r t r a y i t as something t h a t n e i t h e r P o p p e r n o r a c a r e f u l s t u d e n t o f h i s work would r e c o g n i z e as h i s a c t u a l v i e w s . One ( a d m i t t e d l y i m p e r f e c t and d i f f i c u l t to execute) means o f a v o i d i n g t h e s e p i t f a l l s , o r a t l e a s t the worst o f them, i s to c o n d u c t o u r d i s c u s s i o n , whenever p o s s i b l e , as a n immanent c r i t i q u e - t a k i n g P o p p e r ' s p r e m i s e s and i d e a s as o u r own and - 9 -s u b m i t t i n g them to the f a c t s o f e x p e r i e n c e and the t r i b u n a l o f r e a s o n . I n l i g h t o f p r o c e e d i n g i n s u c h a manner, the f a c t t h a t o u r c o n c l u s i o n s a r e not always " P o p p e r i a n " themselves c o n s t i t u t e s a g a i n , n o t .a l o s s , i n the o v e r a l l a p p r e c i a t i o n o f h i s thought and the f u t u r e o f l i b e r a l s o c i e t y which i s h i s o v e r r i d i n g c o n c e r n . A n d , h a p p i l y , we f i n d c o n s i d e r a b l e s u p -p o r t f o r s u c h a b e l i e f i n P o p p e r ' s own work. He i s p a r t i c u -l a r l y f o n d o f q u o t i n g E i n s t e i n ' s v iew t h a t " t h e r e c o u l d be no f a i r e r d e s t i n y f o r any . . . t h e o r y t h a n t h a t i t s h o u l d p o i n t the way to a more comprehensive t h e o r y i n which i t l i v e s o n , as a l i m i t i n g c a s e " (CR: 32). I take i t t h a t what- e v e r the c o m p l e x i o n o f "more c o m p r e h e n s i v e " t h e o r i e s o f p o l i -t i c a l l i b e r a l i s m i n the f u t u r e may b e , P o p p e r ' s i d e a s and a r -guments w i l l i n d e e d c o n s t i t u t e a " l i m i t i n g c a s e " . As we s h a l l see i n C h a p t e r 3» the e n t i r e s t r u c t u r e o f h i s t h o u g h t , e s s e n -t i a l l y K a n t i a n i n n a t u r e , i s i d e a l l y s u i t e d to t h i s t a s k o f s e c u r i n g o r d e r l y g r o w t h . U l t i m a t e l y , i t w i l l be argued t h a t a good d e a l o f P o p p e r ' s work ( i n c l u d i n g h i s e p i s t e m o l o g y and p h i l o s o p h y o f s c i e n c e i n t h e i r p o i n t s o f d e p a r t u r e ) i s b e s t u n d e r s t o o d as an a t tempt to c o n s e r v e l i b e r a l i s m i n the f a c e o f tremendous c h a l l e n g e s to the t r a d i t i o n a l bases o f i t s i n t e l l e c t u a l c o n f i d e n c e and p o l i t i c a l o p t i m i s m . H i s e a r l y l i f e i n V i e n n a d u r i n g the 1920s and e a r l y 30s was i n e v e r y sense p i v o t a l i n the f o r m a t i o n o f h i s t h o u g h t , and i t i s w i t h t h i s p e r i o d t h a t I w i l l be b e g i n n i n g the a n a l y -s i s i n C h a p t e r 2. U l t i m a t e l y , we s h a l l see t h a t the a i r o f paradox c o n t a i n e d i n the t i t l e and u n i f y i n g theme o f t h i s s t u d y i n h e r e s i n the n a t u r e o f contemporary l i b e r a l d i s c o u r s e i t s e l f -h i s t o r i c a l l y and p h i l o s o p h i c a l l y so f a r removed from ( a n d , h e n c e , i g n o r a n t o f ) i t s b e g i n n i n g s , f r e q u e n t l y the v i c t i m o f i t s own s u c c e s s , and i n c r e a s i n g l y s u r r o u n d e d by h o s t i l e , i l l i b e r a l s o c i a l f o r c e s and i d e a s . A g r e a t d e a l o f P o p p e r ' s deservedly-l a r g e r e p u t a t i o n and f o l l o w i n g stems from the f a c t t h a t he has sharpened o u r p e r c e p t i o n o f these problems " f r o m w i t h i n " our Enlightenment heri tage - i n t e r r o g a t i n g l i b e r a l i s m ' s own u t i l i t a r i a n vocabulary of d e s i r i n g by reasser t ing the deter -mined demands of a sobered, combat-toughened r a t i o n a l i t y . Future h i s t o r i a n s of p o l i t i c a l thought may thus d i s c e r n i n Popper's work a sustained and sytematic e f f o r t to save l i b e -r a l soc ie ty from i t s e l f , as much as from i t s enemies - from expecting and asking too much of p o l i t i c s , from embracing erroneous ideas and f a l s e i d o l s and, above a l l , from asking such questions and b e l i e v i n g what we b e l i e v e i n the "wrong" or methodological ly mistaken manner* An explora t ion of these themes i s pursued i n Chapters 5 and 6 of t h i s study. That Popper's own f a i t h i n the powers and progress of s c i e n t i f i c reason may be at odds with the maintenance and s u r v i v a l of the i n d i v i d u a l freedom and autonomy he so much cherishes w i l l be one of the p r i n c i p a l paradoxes ra ised i n connection with his methodological l i b e r a l i s m i n my conclus ion . - 11 -NOTES 1 Michael Oakeshott, Introduction to the Leviathan by Thomas Hobbes (Oxford, 1 9 4 6 ) , i x ; and W. W. Bartley, I I I , "Theory of Language and Philosophy of Science as Instruments of Edu-cational Reform: Wittgenstein and Popper as Austrian School-teachers", i n R. S. Cohen and M. W. Wartofsky, eds., Boston  Studies i n the Philosophy of Science, Vol. XIV ( 1 9 7 4 ) , 307. 2 Plato, The Collected Dialogues, edited by Edith Hamilton and Huntington Cairns (Princeton, 1961), 1575 (Letter VII:325e). 3 Sheldon S. Wolin, "Paradigms and P o l i t i c a l Theories", i n P. King and B. C. Parekh, eds., P o l i t i c s and Experience (Cambridge, 1968), 147-8. ' 4 L i o n e l T r i l l i n g , Mind i n the Modern World (New York, 1 9 7 3 ) , 6. 5 i This notion i s developed with great s k i l l by Michael D. Biddiss, The Age of the Masses: Ideas and Society i n Europe Since 1870 (Harmondsworth, Middlesex England, 1977), Chapter 2. 6 F r i e d r i c h Nietzsche, The W i l l to Power, trans, by W. Kaufmann and R. J . Hollingdale (New York, 1968), section 65 (written between Nov., 1887 and March, 1888), 43. 7 Haultain i s quoted i n S. E. D. Shortt, The Search f o r an Ideal: Six Canadian I n t e l l e c t u a l s and Their Cohvictions i n an Age of  Tra n s i t i o n 1890-1930 (Toronto, 1976), 3: and Michael D. Biddiss, op. c i t . , 142. 8 H. Stuart Hughes, Consciousness and Society (New York, 1958), I 66, and Max Weber, " P o l i t i c s As A Vocation", i n H. Gerth and C. W. M i l l s , eds., From Max Weber: Essays i n Sociology (New York, 1946), 128, respectively. 9 H. Stuart Hughes, i b i d . , 430, and Thomas Ca r l y l e , "Sign of the Times", i n Selected Writings, edited by A. Shelston (Harmonds-worth, Middlesex England, 1971), 61-85, respectively. : 10 Hans Rosenberg, " P o l i t i c a l and S o c i a l Consequences of the Great Depression of 1873-1896 i n Central Europe", Economic H i s t o r i c a l - 12 -Review, Vol. XIII ( 1943), 58-73; c f . , George Lichtheim, Europe i n the Twentieth Century (New York, 1972), 3-42 and 99-164, and Reinhard Bendix, Nation-Building and Citizenship (New York, 1969), Chapters 2, 3 and 6. 11 Michael D. Biddiss, op. c i t . , 143; c f . . Robert Nisbet, History  of the Idea of Progress (New York, 1980), Chapter 9. 12 H. Stuart Hughes, op. c i t . , 402. The effects of these events on i n t e l l e c t u a l a c t i v i t y i n Germany and Austr i a (Popper's main c u l t u r a l reference points at the time) have been discussed at great length by F r i t z K. Ringer, The Decline of the German Man- darins (Cambridge, Mass., 1969), 128-252, and by William M. John-ston i n his seminal study, The Austrian Mind: An I n t e l l e c t u a l  and S o c i a l History 1848-1938 (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1972), 76-111, 323-34, and 365-379. 13 Gerard Radnitzky, Contemporary Schools of Metascience, Third E d i t i o n (three volumes i n one) (Chicago, 1973), 331. 14 For discussions of Popper's influence on contemporary biology, see Michael Ruse, "Karl Popper's Philosophy of Biology", P h i l o - sophy of Science, Vol. XXXXIV (1977), 638-661, and Melvin Cohn, "Reflections on a Discussion with K a r l Popper: The Molecular Biology of Expectation", A l l - I n d i a I n s t i t u t e of Medical Science  B u l l e t i n , V ol. I (1967), 8-16. Some of the implications and i n -fluence of Popper's work on geography are discussed by James H. Bi r d , "Methodological Implications f o r Geography from the P h i l o -sophy of K a r l R. Popper", Sc o t t i s h Geographical Magazine, Vol. LXXXXI( 1975), 153-63-15 Peter Medawar, BBC Radio 3 talk of 28 July 1972, John Eccles, Facing Reality (1970), and Hermann Bondi (no source given) are a l l quoted by Bryan Magee i n his b r i e f and excessively sympa-thetic introduction to Popper's thought, Popper (London, 1973), 9-10. 16 Ibid., 10; c f . , his "Karl Popper: The Useful Philosopher", Heritage, 1974, 52-57, and Edward Boyle, "Karl Popper's Open . Society: A Personal Appreciation", i n Paul A. Schilpp, ed., ;'. The Philosophy of K a r l Popper (La S a l l e , 1974), Vol. I I , 843-58. 17 Incredibly, Popper's s o c i o - p o l i t i c a l thought and methodology have yet to be the subject of a single published book. In com-parison, during the l a s t decade, there has been a v e r i t a b l e - 1 3 -f l o o d of i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s of various members of the F r a n k f o r t School, some of whom are among Popper's major t a r g e t s i n de-bates concerning the l o g i c of the s o c i a l sciences. A casual (by no means exhaustive) p e r u s a l of my bookshelf r e v e a l s some 14 such books (!). I n an otherwise h e l p f u l i n t r o d u c t i o n to h i s thought, Robert Ackermann goes so f a r as to doubt that Popper has made any o r i g i n a l c o n t r i b u t i o n to " t h e o r e t i c a l debates about s o c i a l theory", The Philosophy of K a r l Popper (Amherst, 1976)» 157« I n view of so very many t e s t i m o n i a l s from w i t h i n the ranks of s o c i a l s c i e n t i s t s to the c o n t r a r y , i t would seem that e i t h e r Ackermann's view r e s t s on the c l a i m to know more about the " t h e o r e t i c a l dimension" of t h e i r work than they do, or (as I suspect i s more l i k e l y the case) that he operates with an o v e r l y r e s t r i c t i v e and erroneous concept of a t h i n k e r ' s o r i -g i n a l i t y . At l e a s t two unpublished Ph.D. d i s s e r t a t i o n s e x i s t on Popper's thought, but n e i t h e r has seen the l i g h t of day since being completed. See Charles R. Embry, A C r i t i c a l Examination  of the Thought of K a r l Popper (Duke U n i v e r s i t y , 1972), and J o e l K a s s i o l a , F a l l i b i l i s m and P o l i t i c a l Knowledge: A N o n - J u s t i f i - c a t i o n i s t Epistemology and I t s I m p l i c a t i o n s f o r Normative P o l i - t i c a l Theory i n Our Contemporary Age D e s t i t u t e of F a i t h ( P r i n c e -ton, 1974). For reasons b e t t e r l e f t to the body of t h i s study, I do not share the assumptions of e i t h e r of these i n t e r e s t i n g works. 18 I s a i a h B e r l i n , K a r l Marx, His L i f e and Environment, T h i r d E d i t i o n (London, Oxford, and New York, 1963), 287. This' a l s o seems to have been the judgment of G i l b e r t Hyle who r e p o r t e d l y s a i d that w i t h the appearance of The Open S o c i e t y , "Marxist exegesis would never be the same again". Quoted i n George A. Feaver, "Popper and Marxism", Studies i n Comparative Communism, July-October, 1971, 21. 19 P e t e r L a s l e t t , I n t r o d u c t i o n to Philosophy, P o l i t i c s and S o c i e t y , F i r s t S e r i e s (Oxford, 1956), x i i . 20 Quoted by Bryan Magee, Popper, 13« The two s t u d i e s of Popper's philosophy of h i s t o r y r e f e r r e d to are P e t e r Skagestad, Making  Sense of H i s t o r y : The P h i l o s o p h i e s of Popper and Collingwood (Oslo, Bergen, and Troms, 1975;, and B u r l e i g h T. W i l k i n s , Has  H i s t o r y Any Meaning? A C r i t i q u e of Popper's Philosophy of  H i s t o r y (Hassocks, Sussex, 1978). 21 To c i t e but a few examples from each of the d i s c i p l i n e s mentioned i n the t e x t , see: T. W. Hutchison, Knowledge and Ignorance i n  Economics (Chicago and Oxford, 1977), Chapters 3 and 4, and Mark Blaug, The Methodology of Economics (Cambridge, 1980), Chapters - 14 -1, 2 and 15; Stephen Mennell, "Sociology", i n C. B. Cox and A. E. Dyson, eds., The Twentieth Century Mind; History, Ideas and L i t e r a t u r e i n B r i t a i n (London, 1972), 154-5 i n p a r t i c u l a r , and John O ' N e i l l , "Scientism, Historicism and the Problem of Rat i o n a l i t y " , i n J . O'N e i l l , ed., Modes of Individualism and Co l l e c t i v i s m (London, 1973), 3-26; David R i c c i , "Reading Thomas Kuhn i n the Post-Behavioral Era", Western P o l i t i c a l Quarterly, Vol. XXX (March, 1977), 8-11, i n p a r t i c u l a r , and Alan Ryan, "'Normal' Science or P o l i t i c a l Ideology?", i n P. L a s l e t t , W. G. Runciman, and Q. Skinner, eds., Philosophy, P o l i t i c s and Society, Fourth Series (Oxford, 1972), 86-100; and I. C. Jarvie, The Revo- l u t i o n i n Anthropology, with a Foreword by Ernest Gellner (Lon-don, 1964), Chapters 1 and 6. 22 John N. Gray, "The Liberalism of K a r l Popper", Government and  Opposition, Vol. XI (Summer, 1976), 354 and 339, respectively; c.f., Anthony Quinton, "Karl Popper: P o l i t i c s Without Essences", i n A. de Crespigny and K. Minogue, eds., Contemporary P o l i t i c a l  Philosophers (New York, 1975), 167: "Popper's aim i s d i r e c t l y continuous with M i l l ' s , and the measure of his sup e r i o r i t y to M i l l i n th i s respect i s that of the su p e r i o r i t y of the Logik  der Forschung to M i l l ' s System of Logic". 23 George A. Feaver, op. c i t . , 10. 24 Second E d i t i o n (New York, 1965), 228. Hereafter c i t e d as CR. 25 Dante Germino, "Karl Popper's Open Society", The P o l i t i c a l  Science Reviewer, Vol. VIII ( F a l l , 1978), 60-61; c.f., his "Pre-liminary Reflections On the Open Society: Bergson, Popper, Voegelin", i n D. Germino and K. von Beyme, eds., The Open So- c i e t y i n Theory and Practice (The Hague, 1974), 12-20. 26 James Petras, "Popperism: The Scarcity of Reason", Science and Society, V o l . XXX (1966), 1, and Norman Birnbaum, " S o c i a l Con-s t r a i n t s and Academic Freedom", U n i v e r s i t i e s and L e f t Review, Vol. V (1958), 50. ~ 27 (Boston, 1960), 352. 28 George W. Stocking, J r . , E d i t o r i a l , "On the Limits of 'Presen-tism' and 'Historicism' i n the Historiography of the Behavioral Sciences", Journal of the History of the Behavioral Sciences, Vol. I (1965), 211-218. ~" - 15 -29 D . H . M e l l o r , "The Popper Phenomenon", P h i l o s o p h y , V o l . L I I (1977), 195. 30 | J o h n K e k e s , o p . c i t . , 37; c . f . , Anthony M. M a d i r o s , " K a r l Popper As a S o c i a l P h i l o s o p h e r " , C a n a d i a n J o u r n a l o f P h i l o s o p h y , V o l . V ( S e p t . , 1975), 157, f o r a s i m i l a r d i s a p p o i n t m e n t w i t h " t h e l a c k o f c r i t i c a l b i t e " i n the S c h i l p p e s s a y s . 31 Henry V e a t c h , " A N e g l e c t e d Avenue i n Contemporary R e l i g i o u s A p o l o g e t i c s " , R e l i g i o u s S t u d i e s , V o l . X I I I (1977), 31. - 16 -CHAPTER 2 A P o r t r a i t of Popper's E a r l y L i f e and Times . . . from the c r i t i c i s m of a t e x t to the c r i t i c i s m of a s o c i e t y , the way i s s h o r t e r than i t seems. - , r, , . 1 — J o s e p h Schumpeter i K a r l Raimund Popper was born i n J u l y , 1902, i n the Ober 3 t . V e i t d i s t r i c t of Vienna. The only son and youngest of three c h i l d r e n of Dr. Simon Siegmund C a r l and Jenny (nee S c h i f f ) Popper, he r e c a l l s having been g r e a t l y i n f l u e n c e d by h i s f a t h e r ' s i n t e l l e c t u a l achievements as w e l l as h i s mother's c u l t u r a l i n t e r e s t s . His mother i s remembered as being very m u s i c a l , having heard Brahms, L i s z t , and Bulow perform i n t h e i r prime, and having "played Mozart and Beet-hoven very simply and b e a u t i f u l l y " on the Bosendorfer concert 2 grand i n t h e i r d i n i n g room. Given h i s mother's f a m i l i a l back-ground and extensive i n t e r e s t s i n c l a s s i c a l music, Popper notes, " f o r a time - between the autumn of 1920 and perhaps 1922 - I myself thought q u i t e s e r i o u s l y of becoming a musician. But as w i t h so many other things - mathematics, p h y s i c s , and c a b i n e t -making - I f e l t i n the end I was not r e a l l y good enough".^ Hence, a f t e r a year's study i n the Vienna Konservatorium ("Aca-demy of M u s i c " ) , Popper turned h i s a t t e n t i o n and considerable energies to other p u r s u i t s . S t i l l , to t h i s day, he c r e d i t s the e a r l y i n f l u e n c e of c l a s s i c a l music and h i s "unbounded ad-m i r a t i o n f o r the great composers of o l d " w i t h having been r e s -p o n s i b l e f o r "at l e a s t three ideas which i n f l u e n c e d me f o r l i f e " : one having to do w i t h the c o n t r a s t between "dogmatic" and " c r i t i c a l t h i n k i n g " and the s i g n i f i c a n c e of dogmas and t r a -d i t i o n s , which stemmed from h i s e a r l y s t u d i e s i n educational psychology; another having to do w i t h what he f e l t was the "im-mensely important" d i f f e r e n c e between two kinds of musical com-p o s i t i o n (which he c h a r a c t e r i s t i c a l l y terms " o b j e c t i v e " and " s u b j e c t i v e " ) ; and, f i n a l l y , "a r e a l i z a t i o n of the i n t e l l e c t u a l - 17 -poverty and destructive power of h i s t o r i c i s t ideas i n music and i n the a r t s i n general" ("IA," 42-3). His father was a professor of law hut, as Popper remarks I i n his i n t e l l e c t u a l autobiography, "he was r e a l l y more of a scholar than a lawyer" ("IA", 6). Elsewhere, he describes his father as "a poet, and excellent c l a s s i c a l scholar and h i s t o r i a n , p a r t i c u l a r l y interested i n the Hellenic period to which a considerable part of his l i b r a r y of ten thousand books was devoted.^ As Popper r e c a l l s , "there were books everywhere; the atmosphere i n which I was brought up was decidedly bookish" ("IA", 5). The q u a l i t i e s of personality his father seems to have embodied included a tremendous capacity f o r long hours of hard work i n both his professional and l e i s u r e l y a c t i v i t i e s , "a l i g h t touch and strong sense of humour", a keen i n t e r e s t i n " s o c i a l problems", and a studied reluctance to impose his own views on those around him ( p a r t i c u l a r l y his son) ( c f . , "IA", 6-7). Popper notes that, l i k e most Austrians, his father "res-pected the Emperor", but, p o l i t i c a l l y , "was a r a d i c a l l i b e r a l of the school of J . S. M i l l , and not at a l l a supporter of the government". ("IA", 5). Indeed, i n 1904, Popper's father wrote what his son r e f e r s to as "a b r i l l i a n t p o l i t i c a l s a t i r e , Anno  1903" under the pen name of Siegmund K a r l Pflung, which "was seized by the p o l i c e on i t s p u b l i c a t i o n . . . and remained on the index of prohibited books u n t i l 1918" ( i b i d ) . Although he apparently never discussed the matter with his son, Popper's father was very active i n "two committees which were running homes f o r the homeless", whose numbers continued to swell as a r e s u l t of severe a g r i c u l t u r a l depressions i n the outlying provinces of the Empire and as the lure of employment i n Vienna continued to mount. As Popper learned l a t e r , one of those com-mittees ran "a freemasons lodge,for which he was f o r many years the Master, which ran a home f o r orphans, while the other com-mittee (not masonic) b u i l t and administered a large i n s t i t u t i o n f o r homeless adults and f a m i l i e s " (one of whose "inmates" was Adolf H i t l e r , during his early years i n Vienna) ( i b i d ) . I r o n i -- 18 -c a l l y , g i v e n h i s o p p o s i t i o n to the government and h i s member-s h i p i n the freemasons ( w h i c h a t the t ime was an i l l e g a l s o -c i e t y ) , the " o l d Emperor" h i m s e l f , F r a n z J o s e p h , k n i g h t e d P o p p e r ' s f a t h e r i n t o the R i t t e r d e r F r a n z J o s e f Ordens f o r I 5 h i s c o n t r i b u t i o n s to s u c h c h a r i t a b l e c a u s e s . As f o r h i m s e l f , Popper r e c a l l s , h i s p h i l o s o p h i c a l d e v e l o p -ment " c e r t a i n l y s t a r t e d l a t e r t h a n my e m o t i o n a l and m o r a l d e -v e l o p m e n t " . As a c h i l d , he n o t e s , " I was, I s u s p e c t , somewhat p u r i t a n i c a l , even p r i g g i s h , though t h i s . . . was perhaps tem-- p e r e d by the f e e l i n g t h a t I had no r i g h t to s i t i n judgement o f anybody except m y s e l f " ( " I A " , 4). He h i g h l i g h t s " f r e q u e n t f e e l i n g s o f a d m i r a t i o n f o r my e l d e r s and b e t t e r s " as some o f h i s " e a r l i e s t m e m o r i e s " , and n o t e s t h a t he was "what Americans might c a l l a ' s o f t y ' , [ w i t h ] compassion one o f the s t r o n g e s t emotions I remember" ( i b i d ) . I n s t a r k c o n t r a s t to the r e l a -t i v e a f f l u e n c e and c o m f o r t o f h i s own s u r r o u n d i n g s , " t h e s i g h t o f a b j e c t p o v e r t y i n V i e n n a was one o f the main problems which a g i t a t e d me when I was s t i l l a v e r y s m a l l c h i l d - so much so t h a t i t was a l m o s t a lways a t the back o f my m i n d " . C o n t i n u i n g i n the same v e i n , he n o t e s t h a t : few p e o p l e now l i v i n g i n one o f the Western D e m o c r a c i e s know what p o v e r t y meant a t the b e g i n n i n g o f t h i s c e n t u r y ; men, women, and c h i l d r e n s u f f e r i n g from h u n g e r , c o l d , and h e l p l e s s n e s s ( " I A " , 4). Popper was t w e l v e y e a r s o l d when the F i r s t W o r l d War broke o u t , and as he has f r e q u e n t l y p o i n t e d o u t , " t h e war and i t s a f t e r m a t h were , i n e v e r y r e s p e c t , d e c i s i v e f o r my i n t e l l e c t u a l development . They made me c r i t i c a l o f a c c e p t e d o p i n i o n s , e s -p e c i a l l y p o l i t i c a l o p i n i o n s " ( " I A " , 8). Above a l l , Popper r e -c a l l s h a v i n g been " s t a g g e r e d " a t the s i g h t o f so many o f h i s f o r m e r l y and " d e c i d e d l y p a c i f i s t " f r i e n d s s w i n g i n g o v e r to b e -come s u p p o r t e r s o f the a l l i a n c e between A u s t r i a and Germany and o f A u s t r i a ' s e x p a n s i o n i s t p o l i c y i n the B a l k a n s ( e s p e c i a l l y S e r b i a ) . Though a d m i t t i n g t h a t h e , t o o , had become " a l i t t l e i n f e c t e d by the g e n e r a l mood" , t h i s l a s t e d but " a few weeks" , a f t e r which time ( i . e . , during the winter of 1915-16) "I be-came convinced - under the influence, no doubt, of prewar s o c i a l i s t propaganda - that the cause of Au s t r i a and Germany was a bad cause and that we deserved to lose the war (and therefore that we would lose i t , as I naively argued)" ("IA", 9). Throughout the next three to four years, Popper points out, Vienna was besieged by rumours and a sense of imminent doom; rumours about the d i s s o l u t i o n of the Empire that be-gan to mount amid growing defections of Czechs, Slavs, and I t a l i a n s from the Austrian army, "and then we heard rumours about the death sentences f o r treason, and the t e r r o r d i r e c -ted by the Austrian authorities against people suspected of d i s l o y a l t y " ("IA", 9-10). K a r l Kraus, one of the leading l i t e r a r y figures of the period captured t h i s sense of doom and defeat well when he observed that A u s t r i a "served as a dress rehearsal f o r the apocalypse" - an opinion echoed by one of the great Austrian n o v e l i s t s , Robert Musil, i n his Man Without Q u a l i t i e s . ^ For those who cherished the t r a -d i t i o n a l l i b e r a l i d e a ls of peace, progress, and order, these 7 indeed must have seemed l i k e "the l a s t days of mankind." In the words of a well-known h i s t o r i a n , the forces that rose to challenge, and ultimately prevailed against the belated ascendancy of l i b e r a l i s m i n A u s t r i a "could not f a i l to b a f f l e an observer who viewed them through a l i b e r a l conceptual screen Q and with a l i b e r a l ' s expectations of history." I t was during the l a s t year or so of the war that Popper made one of the most s i g n i f i c a n t decisions of his l i f e i n terms of his subsequent i n t e l l e c t u a l development. Having suffered from an i l l n e s s f o r over two months, Popper " r e a l i z e d very c l e a r l y what I had f e l t i n my bones f o r a considerable time: that i n our famous Austrian secondary schools ( c a l l e d "Gym-nasium" and h o r r i b i l e d i c t u - "Realgymnasium") we were wasting our time shockingly" ("IA", 23). As he points out, the fact that much of the teaching "was boring i n the extreme - hours and hours of hopeless torture" was c e r t a i n l y "not new to me", - 20 -but, upon hi s return from h i s convalescence, he "found that my class had made .hardly any progress, even i n mathematics," which had been the one subject i n which he had "an i n t e r e s -ting and t r u l y i n s p i r i n g teacher". By his own accounts, " t h i s was the eye-opener: i t made me eager to leave school"("IA", 24). The following year brought defeat to the Central Powers i n the war and the imposed d i s s o l u t i o n of the Empire, the aftermath of which, he now r e c a l l s , "destroyed the world i n which I had grown up" ( i b i d ) . This gave Popper the opportunity to leave school and he eagerly seized i t . Popper notes " i t was a time of upheavals, though not only p o l i t i c a l ones". Runaway i n f l a t i o n , famine, and widespread hunger r i o t s were the order of the day i n what he elsewhere Q r e c a l l s as "starving post-war Vienna". He notes "there was l i t t l e to eat; and as f o r clothing, most of us could a f f o r d only discarded army uniforms, adapted f o r c i v i l i a n use" ("IA", 24). Few thought "seriously of careers - there were none" (ex-cept perhaps i n commerce, which never interested him i n the l e a s t ) . Perhaps with the marked contrast to our own times i n mind, he continues, "we studied not f o r a career but f o r the sake of studying. V/e studied and we discussed p o l i t i c s " ( i b i d ) . From the point of view of his subsequent vocational success, i t i s most i n t e r e s t i n g to note Popper's r e c o l l e c t i o n that: i f I thought of a future, I dreamt of one day founding a school i n which young people could le a r n without boredom, and would be stimulated to pose problems and. discuss them; a school i n which no unwanted answers to unasked questions would have to be l i s t e n e d to; i n which one did not study f o r the sake of passing examinations ("IA", 31). He r e c a l l s having been "close enough to hear the b u l l e t s whistle when, on the occasion of the Declaration of the Austrian Republic, s o l d i e r s started shooting at members of the Pro-v i s i o n a l Government assembled at the top of the steps leading to the Parliament building" ("IA", 24). Soon thereafter, - 21 -Popper notes, "there began a period of cold and hot c i v i l war which ended with H i t l e r ' s invasion of Austria, and l e d to the Second World War". I t was against this background of nearly incessant p o l i t i c a l s t r i f e and economic r u i n that Popper f i n a l l y decided to "stage my own private revolution" and leave school to study on h i s own as a non-matriculated student at the Uni-v e r s i t y of Vienna. Revealingly, Popper r e c a l l s that i t was "the revolution" that " i n c i t e d me to stage my ...revolution" ("IA", 24). Revealing, because Popper's characterization of the settlement that the A l l i e s imposed on Germany and Au s t r i a following the war as a "revolution" r e f l e c t s the same type of , p o l i t i c a l pathos and i n c l i n a t i o n to moralize about p o l i t i c a l questions ( i n the absence of a firm s o c i a l base and e f f e c t i v e control of power) that characterized the educated middle-class and sad p l i g h t of Austrian l i b e r a l i s m the generation before. A u s t r i a was not s i g n i f i c a n t l y l i b e r a l i z e d , l e t alone democra-ti z e d , with the "Declaration of the Austrian Republic", but instead foreed to see i f i t could f i n a l l y become so. As a number of excellent studies have pointed out, though the post-war settlement represented a change i n constitutions, an over-throw of dynasties, the underlying s o c i a l , p o l i t i c a l and eeo-10 nomic structure of the bygone Empire remained untouched. And, as the next decade and a h a l f t r a g i c a l l y demonstrated, the republican c o n s t i t u t i o n , that "foreign import", c l e a r l y 11 did not f i t with the t r a d i t i o n s of the nation. I t was shortly a f t e r staging his "private revolution" that Popper resolved another issue of momentous import to his subse-quent i n t e l l e c t u a l development, what he terms his "encounter with Marxism". He notes that "although the years a f t e r the F i r s t World War were grim f o r most of my friends and also f o r myself, i t was an exhilarating time" ("IA", 29). As one would expect under the circumstances, "there was an upsurge of ideals of the French Revolution, and of Marxism, and a hope of esta-b l i s h i n g a f r e e r and better world, and to banish war and autho-12 r i t a r i a n i s m forever." Given the a n t i - l i b e r a l tendencies of - 22 -both the German Nationals ( l a t e r absorbed by the Nazis) and the : C h r i s t i a n S o c i a l i s t s , the sole p o l i t i c a l options were to support either the r e l a t i v e l y large S o c i a l Democratic party or the Com-munists (who were smaller i n numbers). I n i t i a l l y , Popper r e c a l l s , i t was v i r t u a l l y impossible to t e l l the two apart, since " t h e i r Marxist b e l i e f s were then very s i m i l a r " and "they both dwelt, r i g h t l y , on the horrors of war" ("IA", 24). At the time, he observes, the communists "claimed they had proven t h e i r pacifism by ending the war, at Brest-Litovsk. Peace, they said, was what they primarily stood for; [and] • . • not only f o r peace but, i n t h e i r propaganda at l e a s t , against a l l 'unnecessary' violence" ( i b i d ) . Thus, as a member of "the association of s o c i a l i s t pupils of secondary schools" ( s o z i a l i s t i c h e M ittelschuler) and at the meetings of the so-c i a l i s t u n i v e r s i t y students, Popper l i s t e n e d to numerous spea-kers of both s o c i a l democratic and communist leanings and " f o r about two or three months I regarded myself as a communist" ("IA", 24-25). Then, shortly before his seventeenth birthday, Popper experienced what he frequently has referred to as "one of the most important incidents i n my l i f e " . Given i t s s i g n i f i c a n c e , perhaps Popper's own reconstruction should speak f o r i t s e l f : In Vienna, shooting broke out during a demon-s t r a t i o n by unarmed s o c i a l i s t s who, in s t i g a t e d by the communists, t r i e d to help some communists to escape who were under arrest i n the c e n t r a l p o l i c e s t a t i o n i n Vienna. Several young so c i a -l i s t and communist workers were k i l l e d . I was h o r r i f i e d and shocked at the p o l i c e , but also at myself. For I f e l t that as a Marxist I bore part r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r the tragedy - at l e a s t i n p r i n c i p l e . Marxist theory demands that the class struggle be i n t e n s i f i e d , i n order to speed up the coming of socialism. I t s thesis i s that although the revolution may claim some victims, capitalism i s claiming more victims than the whole s o c i a l i s t revolution. That was the Marxist theory - part of so c a l l e d ' s c i e n t i f i c socialism'. I now asked my-s e l f whether such a c a l c u l a t i o n could ever be supported by 'science'. The whole experience, - 23 -and e s p e c i a l l y this question, l e d me to a l i f e - l o n g revulsion of f e e l i n g ("IA", 25). Though he s t i l l "hoped f o r a better world, a less v i o l e n t and a more just world", Popper r e c a l l s , "I questioned whether I r e a l l y knew - whether what I had thought was knowledge was not perhaps mere pretence". Continuing, he asks i n the mea-sured manner of a presiding judge, "had I examined i t c r i t i c a l -l y , as anybody should do before he accepts a creed which jus-t i f i e s i t s means by some distant end?" ("IA", 25)• And, sadly, he was soon forced to admit, . • . not only had I accepted a complex theory somewhat u n c r i t i c a l l y , but I had also a c t u a l l y noticed quite a b i t that was wrong, i n the theory as well as i n the practice of communism, but had repressed t h i s - p a r t l y out of l o y a l t y to my frie n d s , p a r t l y out of l o y a l t y to 'the cause', and p a r t l y because there i s a mechanism f o r get-t i n g oneself more and more deeply involved: once one has s a c r i f i c e d one's i n t e l l e c t u a l conscience over a minor point one does not wish to give up too e a s i l y ("IA", 25). Though i t was "awfully depressing to have f a l l e n into such a trap", p a r t i c u l a r l y " f o r an i n t e l l e c t u a l , . . . who can read and think" ( i b i d , 26), Popper's subsequent career and i n t e r e s t would have been v i r t u a l l y inconceivable as we now know them without h i s "encounter with Marxism". As he r e a d i l y admits, "the experience enabled me to understand l a t e r things which otherwise I would not have understood" and i t "taught me a num-ber of lessons which I have never forgotten". Above a l l , i t taught him "the wisdom of the Socratic saying, 'I know that I do not know'. " I t made me a f a l l i b i l i s t , and impressed on me the value of i n t e l l e c t u a l modesty. And i t made me most con-scious of the difference between dogmatic and c r i t i c a l t h i n -king" ("IA", 27-28). Thus, as he reminds us i n an i n t e r e s t i n g essay written i n memory of Otto Neurath, i t was these c r i t i c a l ideas with regard to Marxism that "led me to become interested i n problems of the theory of knowledge and of the philosophy of science" and, i n turn, of " t h e i r bearing on p o l i t i c a l problems". - 24 -Perhaps a b r i e f pause to comment upon the s i g n i f i c a n c e of , these early events i n Popper's l i f e would be h e l p f u l before com-pl e t i n g our sketch of his i n t e l l e c t u a l t rajectory. Given his own reconstruction of the p r i o r i t y of s o c i a l and p o l i t i c a l c r i - ses to the formation of his l a t e r , more professional i n t e r e s t s i n epistemological and methodological resolutions of those c r i -ses, i t seems i l l - c o n c e i v e d to i n s i s t that p o l i t i c s has only been a peripheral focus of his work, or that he " s h i f t e d " his i n t e r e s t s at "mid-career" to problems i n the s o c i a l sciences and the threat of t o t a l i t a r i a n i s m , thereafter returning hap-p i l y to more basic concerns with l o g i c , methodology, and epis-14 / temology. I believe (and w i l l pursue at greater length i n several chapters to come) that the categorical structure of Popper's epistemology and the basis of his methodological pre-s c r i p t i o n s are inherently and d i s t i n c t i v e l y p o l i t i c a l - domi-nated by a " l i f e - l o n g revulsion of f e e l i n g " against the alleged causes and t r a g i c costs of the War and i t s aftermath, and de-termined to prevent t h e i r recurrence. To t h i s end, Popper has remained steadfast i n his early conviction that questions of knowledge have such p r a c t i c a l , p o l i t i c a l consequences that to separate the two can only lead to further c r i s e s , i f not d i -saster, f o r l i b e r a l democracies. Furthermore, as we s h a l l see i n Chapter 4, Popper has not s i g n i f i c a n t l y altered the major tenets of his philosophy during the post-War period. By the time he was seventeen, "I had become an anti-Marxist", though the decision to publish his views only came some sixteen years l a t e r " i n an atmosphere poisoned by facism and l a t e n t c i -v i l war" ("IA", 26). Popper notes that he "remained a s o c i a l i s t f o r several years" more but observes with obvious reference to his experience during t h i s period that, " i f there could be such a thing as socialism combined with i n d i v i d u a l l i b e r t y , I would be a s o c i a l i s t s t i l l . For nothing could be better than l i v i n g a modest, simple, and free l i f e i n an e g a l i t a r i a n society" ( i b i d . 27). Unfortunately, Popper continues, t h i s i s "no more than a b e a u t i f u l dream". Popper then d i s t i l l s the essence of his i i -- 25 -beralism i n the form of three axiom-like propositions: "f r e e - ' dom i s more important than equality"; "the attempt to r e a l i z e I equality endangers freedom"; and that, " i f freedom i s l o s t , there w i l l not even be equality among the unfree" ( i b i d , 27). Needless to say, the i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of "the most relevant aspect" of Popper's p o l i t i c a l theory as i t s "philosophy of so-c i a l democracy" finds very l i t t l e support i n these remarks. Moreover, these cornerstones of his p o l i t i c a l thought suggest that, to the extent that one can f i n d i n Popper's writings a j u s t i f i c a t i o n f o r "a dangerous extension of the i n t e r v e n t i o n i s t 16 state", t h i s must be traced to one of the c r i t i c a l , though un-acknowledged tensions i n his thought - that between his techno-l o g i c a l conception of r a t i o n a l i t y and his commitment to the maxi-mization of i n d i v i d u a l l i b e r t y and autonomy - than to any con-scious i n t e n t i o n or design on his part (as the commentator i n question implies). As he observed a decade ago, by the time he wrote the Open Society, he considered himself an " i n d i v i d u a l i s t " , opposed i n theory to such dangerous abstractions as "class"/'man-kind", and "meaning i n h i s t o r y " , and i n practice to proposals to nationalize the means of production whether Marxist or non-Marxist 17 ( i . e . , S o c i a l Democratic) i n i n s p i r a t i o n . i i Popper passed his "Matura" (entrance examination) as a non-matriculated student at the University of Vienna i n .1922, just one year l a t e r than would have been the case had he continued i n secondary school. Although he sampled courses i n a number of sub-jects (he mentions hi s t o r y , l i t e r a t u r e , psychology, philosophy, and even medicine), he r e c a l l s that he "soon gave up going to lectures, with the exception of mathematics and t h e o r e t i c a l physics" ("IA", 30). In 1923, he passed a second "Matura" at a teacher's t r a i n i n g college, which q u a l i f i e d him to teach p r i -mary school. But "there were no posts avai l a b l e f o r teachers" -r 26 -so, having concluded an apprenticeship as a cabinetmaker, he became a s o c i a l worker (Horterzieher) with neglected children. I t was early during t h i s period, Popper r e c a l l s , that he f u r -ther developed h i s ideas, i n i t i a l l y prompted by his "encounter with Marxism", about the demarcation between s c i e n t i f i c theories ( l i k e Einstein's) and pseudoscientific theories ( l i k e Marx's " s c i e n t i f i c socialism", A l f r e d Adler's i n d i v i d u a l psychology, and Freud's psychoanalysis) ( i b i d , 3 1 ) • Having been "brought up i n an atmosphere i n which Newton's mechanics and Maxwell's electrodynamics were accepted side by side as unquestionable truths", and therefore to being admit-tedly "dazed" upon f i r s t hearing E i n s t e i n lecture i n Vienna, Popper r e c a l l s that "what impressed me most was Einstein's own c l e a r statement that he would regard his theory untenable i f i t should f a i l i n c e r t a i n t e s t s " ("IA", 28-29). Thus, E i n s t e i n observed, that " I f the r e d s h i f t of spectral l i n e s due to g r a v i -t a t i o n a l p o t e n t i a l should not exist, then the general theory 1 ft of r e l a t i v i t y w i l l be untenable". In May, 1919, Einstein's eclipse predictions were successfully tested by two teams of B r i t i s h researchers, and Popper observes that, "a new theory of g r a v i t a t i o n and a new cosmology suddenly appeared, not just as a mere p o s s i b i l i t y , but as a r e a l improvement on Newton - a better approximation to the truth" ("IA", 28). Einstein's me-thod, Popper contends, l e d him to look f o r " c r u c i a l experiments whose agreement with h i s predictions would by no means es t a b l i s h his theory", but whose disagreement "would show his theory to be untenable", whereas i n the work of Marx, Freud, Adler, and even more so that of t h e i r followers, an " u t t e r l y d i f f e r e n t " , dog-matic a t t i t u d e prevailed ( i b i d ) . As he observes elsewhere, theirs was a world: f u l l of v e r i f i c a t i o n s . . . I t was p r e c i s e l y t h i s f a c t - that they [ i . e . , the theories i n dispute] always f i t t e d , that they were always confirmed -which i n the eyes of t h e i r admirers constituted the strongest argument i n favour of these theories. I t began to dawn on me that t h i s apparent strength was i n fa c t t h e i r weakness (CR, 3 5 ) . - 27 -On the contrary, Popper maintains that "what made a theory, or a statement, s c i e n t i f i c , was i t s power to rule out, or exclude the occurrence of these events: the more a theory forbids, the  more i t t e l l s us" ("IA", 31; i t a l i c s i n o r i g i n a l ) . In 1925, the c i t y of Vienna founded a new i n s t i t u t e of edu-cation, The Pedagogic I n s t i t u t e . I t had been inspire d by the nationwide educational reform movement of Otto Glockel. Popper r e c a l l s that the I n s t i t u t e was linked somewhat loosely with the University, and that along with several other s o c i a l workers, he I was admitted as a student. He also notes that "the purpose of the new I n s t i t u t e was to further and support the reform, then i n progress, of the primary and secondary schools" that had been pr e c i p i t a t e d by the chaos of the aftermath of the F i r s t World War ("IA", 57). Although the pre-war Austrian system of education compared quite well with the most progressive systems i n Europe, It was nonetheless, i n the words of a well-known student of the move-ment, "hardly a paradigm of progressive thinking: i n s t r u c t i o n , l a r g e l y i n the hands of the Roman Catholic Church, was mechanical 19 and as uniform as was p r a c t i c a l . " J To a large extent, the school reformers found that the major impediments to a thoroughly secular, l i b e r a l p o l i t i c a l culture, one i n which a genuine clash of ideas and the development of each in d i v i d u a l ' s capacities could take place, were the product of the thought of the 19th century Ger-man thinker, Johann F r i e d r i c h Herbart (1776-1841). Having himself never set foot i n A u s t r i a , the influence of Herbart's philosophy was mainly secured by followers, such as Robert Zimmerman (1824-1898), whose own teachings dominated the University of Vienna's f a c u l t i e s of philosophy, psychology, and education u n t i l the 1920s. Herbart's doctrine sought to restore the c l a s s i c a l harmony of Leibniz's monadology that had prevailed among Austrian t h i n -kers throughout the 18th century. Among other things, " i t reaf-firmed a modified realism against speculative idealism, and sub-- 2 8 -s t i t u t e d f o r Hegel's d i a l e c t i c a formal l o g i c and a s t a t i c on-20 tology". Above a l l , b i s doctrine was e a s i l y accommodated by the Catholic a u t h o r i t i e s , " f o r whom his very omissions became 21 advantages". In p a r t i c u l a r , by talcing a metaphysically neu-t r a l view of theology, Herbart was not self-consciously or c r i -t i c a l l y Protestant l i k e Kant, Schelling, or Hegel had been. When read i n connection with his l i f e - l o n g antipathy toward revolution and p r o g r e s s i v i s t philosophies of history, Herbart's thought i n Austr i a thus "tended to t r a i n d o c i l e , law-abiding c i t i z e n s , who 22 r e l i s h e d work while despising unrest". As Count Rottenham, royal advisor, observed while defining the aim and purpose of the state's lower schools, they were "to make thoroughly pious, good, tractable, and industrious men of the labouring classes 23 of people". Even more e x p l i c i t with regard to the state's best in t e r e s t s i n the pursuit and production of knowledge was the con-s t i t u t i o n of the common schools issued by the Emperor, himself: The method of i n s t r u c t i o n . . . , must endeavour f i r s t and foremost to t r a i n the memory; then however, according to the pressure of the circum-stances, the i n t e l l e c t and the heart. The t r i a l schools w i l l s t r i c t l y r e f r a i n from any explanation . other than those exactly prescribed i n the 'school and method' book. . • .24 By encouraging students "to understand what i s already known, rather than to goad them into making discoveries", Herbart and his followers thus tended to produce "connoisseurs, not creators, just as i n philosophy he fostered scholars of the subject, not 25 creative geniuses". According to Herbart's version of a s s o c i a t i o n i s t psychology, the human mind was neutral and passive, t o t a l l y lacking i n i n -nate f a c u l t i e s or structures f o r producing ideas from within i t -s e l f . Though ideas themselves might be a c t i v e , Bartley notes that f o r Herbart and followers, "they lead t h e i r l i v e s i n passive 27 storehouse minds". I t was pr e c i s e l y this theory of mind and the obstacles i t posed f o r school reform that came i n f o r sustained attack at Vienna's Pedagogic I n s t i t u t e under the guidance and i n -- 29 -t e l l e c t u a l leadership of the noted c h i l d psychologist, K a r l Buhler ( 1 8 7 9 - 1 9 6 3 ) , and h i s wife, Charlotte, also a well-known Gestalt psychologist. More important f o r the purposes at hand, Herbart's doctrine also bears a s t r i k i n g resemblance to the view that Popper severely c r i t i c i z e d i n one of his e a r l i e s t (and s t i l l untranslated) a r t i c l e s as "the bucket theory of the mind." 2 8 Against the a s s o c i a t i o n i s t and empiricist tenets of Locke and Hume - the p r i n c i p l e s of contiguity and frequency - Buhler maintained that a basic and perhaps the most uniquely human function of the mind, that of theory-making, was independent of successive associations of sense impressions. For the Ges-t a l t i s t s , Bartley observes, s t r u c t u r a l properties of the human mind gave p r i -o r i t y to the organizing and theorizing a c t i v i t y of the'mind, which i n turn determined the kinds of wholes with which we would deal as 'elements' of our t h i n k i n g . 2 9 it Buhler also rejected what has variously been referred to as "the picture theory of language" or " l o g i c a l atomism", des-cribed by Bertrand Russell as follows: In a l o g i c a l l y correct symbolism there w i l l always be a c e r t a i n fundamental i d e n t i t y of structure be-tween a f a c t and the symbol f o r i t ; and . . . the complexity of the symbol corresponds very c l o s e l y with the complexity of the fact symbolized by i t . 30 Buhler d e r i s i v e l y dismissed such attempts at viewing language as physiognomy because of his deep, ultimately Kantian con-v i c t i o n that abstract words cannot be reduced to sense impres-sions. As we w i l l see below and i n the next two chapters, such a conviction i s also at the heart of Popper's thought. As one can imagine, the pedagogical implications of Buhler's ideas were profound and far-reaching v i s - a - v i s the methodology of the Herbartian educators and administrators of the Habsburg era. The c h i l d was now to be seen as an active being "whose mind was f a r more than a bucket to be f i l l e d with appropriate •31 information". The reformers believed that the e a r l i e r emphasis - 30 -on so-called "unit ideas" has produced an excessively compart-mentalized and "atomistic" curriculum and teaching methodology. And we have Popper's own re c o l l e c t i o n s as to just how boring and s t u l t i f y i n g such an education a c t u a l l y was. Throughout the reform movement, p a r t i c u l a r l y at the I n s t i t u t e , experiments accordingly were designed to promote active p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n lessons, aimed ultimately at the development of the indiv i d u a l ' s c a p a b i l i t i e s or " s e l f - a c t i v i t y " ( S e l b s t t a t i g k e i t ) . ^ 2 During h i s sixteen years i n Vienna, Buhler attracted a num-ber of students and d i s c i p l e s , many of whom have gone on to at-t a i n great d i s t i n c t i o n i n t h e i r own right - among others, Paul Lazarsfeld, Egon Brunswik, Else Frenkel-Brunswik, Albert Wellek, Edward Tolman, Konrad Lorenz, Ludwig Wittgenstein, and the young ex-social worker, E a r l Popper. Popper r e c a l l s that,having "had access to the psychological laboratory" at the I n s t i t u t e , he con-ducted a few experiments of his own: which convinced me that sense dataj 'simple' ideas or impressions, and other such things, did not e x i s t : they were f i c t i t i o u s - i n -ventions based on mistaken attempts to trans-f e r atomism (or A r i s t o t e l e a n l o g i c . . .) from physics to psychology ("IA", 60). In th i s connection, Popper s p e c i f i c a l l y c r e d i t s Buhler's book, The Mental Development of the Child -^with having had far-reaching implications f o r h i s subsequent thought on the psychology of d i s -covery and the growth of knowledge ("IA", 5 8 ) . Most important was Buhler's theory of the three l e v e l s or functions of language: the expressive function (Kundgabefunktion), the signal or release function (Auslosefunktion) and, "on a higher l e v e l " , the descrip-t i v e function (Darstellungsfunktion). Popper notes that Buhler /'explained that the two lower functions were common to human and animal languages and were always present, while the t h i r d function was c h a r a c t e r i s t i c of human language alone, and sometimes (as i n exclamations) absent even from that" ("IA", 5 8 ) . This theory confirmed Popper's e a r l i e r views concerning a r t , s p e c i f i c a l l y that the conception of a r t as either self-expression - 31 -or as communication or "release" were "equally empty, since these two functions were t r i v i a l l y present i n a l l languages, even animal languages" (Ibid). More importantly, Popper cre-d i t s Buhler's ideas, as well as his discussions with Heinrich Gomperz (a Professor of philosophy at the U n i v e r s i t y ) , with "strengthening [ h i s ] ' o b j e c t i v i s t ' approach" - that " c r i t i c a l thinking or error elimination can be better characterized i n l o g i c a l than psychological terms" ( i b i d , 37), and his realism, "my conviction that there i s a re a l world, and that the prob-lem of knowledge i s the problem of how to discover this world" ( i b i d , 5 9 ) • Moreoever, i t was by way of searching l o g i c a l c r i -tique of Buhler's (and Oswald Kulpe's) conception of arguments that eventually l e d Popper to formulate his views about a fourth, argumentative function of language. As he observes, "The argu-mentative function became p a r t i c u l a r l y important to me because I regarded i t as the basis of a l l c r i t i c a l thought" ( i b i d , 5 8 ) . In 1 9 2 8 , Popper submitted a Ph.D. thesis i n which, he notes, "I f i n a l l y turned away from psychology". The thesis, "On the Problem of Method i n the Psychology of Thinking", was "a kind of hasty l a s t minute a f f a i r o r i g i n a l l y intended only as a methodological introduction to my psychological work, though now i n d i c a t i v e of my changeover to methodology" ( i b i d ) . Popper " f e l t badly" about the thesis and, he notes, has "never again even glanced at i t " . He also f e l t badly about his two public o r a l examinations (or "Rigorosum"), one i n the history of music, the other i n philosophy and psychology. Buhler was one of his examiners and Moritz Schlick, founder of the Vienna C i r c l e (or Wiener Kreis) of Logical Positivism, was the other. Popper remembers having done "so badly on Leibniz that I thought I had f a i l e d . I could hardly believe my ears when I was t o l d that I had passed with the highest grade, 'einstimming mit  Auszeichnung'" ( i b i d , 6 2 ) . The following year, Popper q u a l i f i e d as a teacher of mathematics and physical science i n the (lower) secondary schools i n Vienna, continuing his employment i n that - 3 2 -capacity u n t i l he and his wife, also a teacher, emigrated to New Zealand i n 1 9 3 7 . Although the now well-known "changeover to methodology" had already occurred by the time bf his Ph.D. examinations, Popper observes that i t was only afterwards "that I put two and two together, and my e a r l i e r ideas f e l l into place" ( i b i d , 6 2 ) . To a large extent, t h i s process of putting "two and two together" was the product of Popper's e f f o r t to "point out what seemed to me a number of fundamental mistakes" i n the philoso-phies of the Machian p o s i t i v i s t s and Wittgensteinians of the Vienna C i r c l e ( i b i d , 6 9 ; c.f., 6 3 - 6 6 ) . Though never i n v i t e d to attend any of the Thursday evening meetings of the C i r c l e at Schlick's house, Popper became friends with several of i t s leading members ( e s p e c i a l l y Herbert F e i g l and V i c t o r Kraft) and presented h i s c r i t i c i s m s of t h e i r views both p r i v a t e l y and i n a number of seminars or " e p i c y c l i c " fringe groups which met regularly i n one of t h e i r homes. The main bone of contention, Popper r e c a l l s , was that of the proper c r i t e r i o n f o r demarcating science from pseudoscience. Whereas Schlick's C i r c l e was " t r y i n g to f i n d a c r i t e r i o n which 1 made metaphysics meaningless nonsense, sheer gibberish", Popper f e l t t h i s was "bound to lead to trouble, since metaphysical ideas are often forerunners to s c i e n t i f i c ones" ("IA", 6 3 ) . Besides which, demarcating science from pseudoscience i n terms of meaningfulness versus meaninglessness "merely s h i f t e d the problem", since i t presupposed and required yet another c r i -t e r i o n to d i s t i n g u i s h between meaning and lack of meaning which the WienerKreis' notion of v e r i f i a b i l i t y could not i t s e l f con-s i s t e n t l y provide. More p o s i t i v e l y , Popper f e l t that now at l a s t he under-stood why Schlick and his C i r c l e had succumbed to th i s mistaken | theory of science,and could explain to them why he believed that he "held i n my hands f o r many years a better c r i t e r i o n of demar-cation: t e s t a b i l i t y or f a l s i f i a b i l i t y " ( i b i d , 62). In essence, - 33 -t h e i r error had been to confuse the Baconian method of induction with the laudable goal of finding a sound c r i t e r i o n of demar-cation, compounded by t h e i r attempt to " j u s t i f y t h e i r theories by an appeal to the sources of knowledge comparable i n r e l i a -b i l i t y to the sources of r e l i g i o n " ( i b i d ) . But, according to Popper, "a f a i r l y commonplace consequence of the E i n s t e i n i a n revolution" was"the hypothetical character of a l l s c i e n t i f i c theories" ( i b i d , 64). When combined with his e a r l i e r interpre-t a t i o n of Buhler's psychology, p a r t i c u l a r l y the view that "the-ories are e s s e n t i a l l y argumentative systems, . . . [which] ex-p l a i n deductively",Popper's ideas concerning the demarcation of science from pseudoscience, as well as the nature of scien-t i f i c progress, had indeed, as he put i t , f a l l e n "into place": The f a l s i f i c a t i o n or refu t a t i o n of theories through the f a l s i f i c a t i o n or r e f u t a t i o n of t h e i r deductive consequences was, c l e a r l y , a deductive inference (modus t o l l e n s ) . This view implied that s c i e n t i f i c theories are  either f a l s i f i e d or f o r ever remain hypothe- ses or conjectures. . . . Progress consisted i n moving towards theories which t e l l us more and more - theories of ever greater content. But the more a theory says the more i t excludes or forbids, and the greater are the opportunities f o r f a l s i f y i n g i t . So a theory with greater content i s one which can be more severely tested. This con-s i d e r a t i o n l e d to a theory i n which s c i e n t i f i c progress turned out not to consist i n the accu-mulation of observations but i n the overthrow of l e s s good theories and t h e i r replacement by better ones, i n p a r t i c u l a r by theories of grea-t e r content. Thus there was competition between theories - a kind of Darwinian struggle f o r sur-v i v a l ( i b i d , 62-63). Popper notes that " i t had never occurred to me to write a book", whether to a i r his c r i t i c i s m s of the Vienna C i r c l e or to advance the p o s i t i v e views outlined above. But a f t e r a "nightlong session" with Herbert F e i g l , who " t o l d me not only that he found my ideas important, almost revolutionary, but - 34 -also that I should publish them i n book form" ( i b i d , 65), Popper set to work on The Two Fundamental Problems i n the Theory of  Knowledge, those being the problems of induction and of de-duction. Early i n 1932, Popper completed what he then regar-ded as the f i r s t of the two volumes he hoped to comprise the work as a whole. Much to his delight, i n the following year, Schlick and P h i l l i p Frank accepted the book f o r publication i n t h e i r series S c h r i f t e n zur wissenschaftlichen Weitanffassung (most of whose volumes were written by members of the C i r c l e ) . However, not only did the publishers demand that the volume be r a d i c a l l y shortened, but by the time they accepted i t , Popper had written most of the second volume. With the agreement of Schlick and Frank, Popper then submitted a new manuscript con-s i s t i n g of extracts from both volumes but, alas, this too was returned by the publishers as too long. In the end, "the f i -nal extract", ultimately published l a t e i n 1934 as Logik der  Forschung, was made by Popper's uncle, Walter S c h i f f (also a Professor of S t a t i s t i c s and Economics at the University of Vienna). The Logik was not translated and published i n English u n t i l 1959, appearing under the t i t l e of The Logic of S c i e n t i f i c 35 Discovery. P u b l i c a t i o n of the Logik der Forschung brought Popper im-mediate acclaim. Indeed, as he r e c a l l s , the book "was s u r p r i -singly successful, f a r beyond Vienna. There were more reviews, i n more languages, than there were twenty-five years l a t e r of The Logic of S c i e n t i f i c Discovery, and f u l l e r reviews even i n English" ("IA", 85). Having decided as early as July, 1927, that "the democratic bastions of Central Europe would f a l l , and that a t o t a l i t a r i a n Germany would s t a r t another world war". ( i b i d , 83), Popper took advantage of some of the numerous i n v i t a t i o n s I he had received to lecture abroad i n the hope of f i n d i n g a tea-ching post and safe refuge from the r i s i n g tide of Nazism f o r himself and his wife. During 1935-6, Popper accordingly went. on. leave without pay from his teaching p o s i t i o n and paid two long - 35 -v i s i t s to England, l e c t u r i n g at a number of i n s t i t u t i o n s on ' topics such as A l f r e d Tarski's semantics and theory of truth, p r o b a b i l i t y theory, and the l i k e . I t was also during t h i s pe-ri o d that Popper read his controversial paper, "The Poverty of Historicism", i n F r i e d r i c h Hayek's seminar at the London School of Economics. ( I t had been delivered shortly before i n German at the home of h i s f r i e n d A l f r e d Braunthal i n Brussels). In November, 1936, Popper received an i n v i t a t i o n of aca-demic h o s p i t a l i t y i n the name of the Moral Sciences Faculty of Cambridge Univ e r s i t y from Dr. A. C. Ewing, together with a l e t -t e r of support from the Academic Assistance Council, which was "t r y i n g to help many refugee s c i e n t i s t s from Germany, and had I already begun to help some from Austria" ( i b i d , 8 8 ) . On C h r i s t -mas Eve, 1936, however, Popper received a cable o f f e r i n g him a normal p o s i t i o n as l e c t u r e r of philosophy i n New Zealand (as op-posed to refugee status attached to the Cambridge o f f e r ) . Though both he and his wife would have preferred going to Cambridge, Popper thought that the " o f f e r of h o s p i t a l i t y might be trans-ferable to somebody else. So I accepted the i n v i t a t i o n to New Zealand and asked . . . Cambridge to i n v i t e F r i t z Waismann, of the Vienna C i r c l e , i n my stead. They agreed to this request" ( i b i d , 8 8 ) . Within a month, he and his wife had resigned t h e i r teaching positions and l e f t f o r London. A f t e r spending but f i v e days i n London, Popper notes, "we s a i l e d f o r New Zealand, a r r i -ving just i n time f o r beginning the New Zealand academic year" ( i b i d ) . I t was during these next few years as a l e c t u r e r i n p h i l o -sophy i n New Zealand that Popper established his reputation as a leading p o l i t i c a l theorist with the p u b l i c a t i o n of his two self-described "war e f f o r t s " , The Poverty of Hi s t o r i c i s m and The Open Society and I t s E n e m i e s . P o p p e r r e c a l l s that, with the news i n March, 1938, of H i t l e r ' s occupation of Austria, he "could no longer hold back whatever knowledge of p o l i t i c a l prob-lems I had acquired since 1919" ("IA", 9 0 ) . Both works, he t e l l s - 36 -us, grew out of the theory of knowledge of Logik  der Forschung and out of my conviction that our often unconscious views on the theory of knowledge and i t s central problems ('What can we know?', 'How c e r t a i n i s our knowledge?') are decisive f o r our attitudes towards our-selves and towards p o l i t i c s ( i b i d , 9 1 ) . Nothing could be c l e a r e r as to the target and context of Popper's polemics against the "historicism" and "essentialism" of Plato, Hegel, and Marx than the famous dedication to The Poverty of His- toricism: In memory of the countless men and women of a l l creeds or races who f e l l v i c t i m to the f a s c i s t and Communist b e l i e f i n Inexorable Laws of His-t o r i c a l Destiny. As was the case with his e a r l i e r work on s c i e n t i f i c inquiry, p u b l i c a t i o n of The Open Society i n 1945 brought Popper immediate success, a l b e i t of a controversial kind. Incredibly, The Poverty  of Historicism was rejected f o r publication by the editors of Mind t the leading journal of L i n g u i s t i c Analysis at the time, and had to be published during 1 9 4 4 - 4 5 i n instalments i n Economics whOse acting editor, F. A. Hayek, was obviously familiar with, and very sympathetic toward, the thrust of Popper's attack against a l l forms of c o l l e c t i v i s t thinking. In f a c t , so much so that, just as the war i n Europe was coming to an end, Popper received a cable, i signed by Hayek, o f f e r i n g Popper a readership at the University of London, tenable at the L.S.E., and thanking him f o r o f f e r i n g The Poverty to Economica ( c f . , i b i d , 9 6 ) . Popper's gratitude rah deep, and h i s response was swift: "I f e l t that Hayek had saved my l i f e once more. From that moment I was impatient to leave New Zealand". From 1946 u n t i l his retirement from the L.S.E. i n 1969, Popper enjoyed immense success as a teacher, scholar, and leading public f i g u r e . He was knighted i n 1965; has been the r e c i p i e n t of numerous honorary degrees from some of the world's leading u n i v e r s i t i e s ; and has seen his works translated into more than - 37 -twenty languages. These years also saw the long-awaited release of The Poverty of Historicism as a book, as well as the p u b l i -cation of two wide-ranging volumes of essays, Conjectures and  Refutations ( 1 9 6 3 ) and Objective Knowledge ( 1 9 7 2 ) , i n which his concern with the o b j e c t i v i t y of knowledge, the increasingly "Dar-winian" dimension of h i s epistemology, and the problems of r a t i o -37 n a l i t y figure most prominently. During this period, Popper also regularly found himself embroiled i n the major controversies of the day, whether these be i n the philosophy of the natural s c i -ences (perhaps best evidenced i n his attack on the " h i s t o r i c i s t " and "psychologistic" views of Thomas S. Kuhn) or i n the area of the l o g i c of the s o c i a l sciences (his role i n the so-called " P o s i t i v i s t Dispute" i n German sociology and his c r i t i q u e of the Frankfurt School's p o s i t i o n i n this context comes re a d i l y to m ind).^ S t i l l more recently, Popper co-authored a massive tome with h i s longstanding f r i e n d , S i r John Eccles, The S e l f  and I t s Brain ( 1 9 7 7 ) , i n which he further develops his theory of evolutionism and i t s implications f o r the nature and objec-40 t i v i t y of knowledge. And, f i n a l l y , just l a s t year saw the re-lease of his massive, three volume Postscript to the Logic of S c i e n t i f i c Discovery, i n which a number of c r i t i c i s m s of the 41 e a r l i e r work are probed i n great d e t a i l . i i i . A p o r t r a i t i s neither a thumb-nail sketch, a photograph from afar, nor an x-ray. I t s intention i s to capture c e r t a i n d e t a i l and nuance which otherwise would be l o s t i n presentation and r e f r a c t i o n from other conceivable vantage points. And, i n the history of ideas, p o r t r a i t u r e more s p e c i f i c a l l y helps us to appreciate the impact that c e r t a i n phases and experiences of one's l i f e have had upon the author's s t y l e of thought, his/her commitments, vocabulary and the l i k e . With regard to Popper's s o c i a l and p o l i t i c a l thought, there can be no doubt as to the - 3 8 -primacy of his experience i n the war-torn Vienna of his youth. * I f nothing else, his own testimony should have established t h i s point by now. And yet, v i r t u a l l y nothing has been writ-ten about these events i n connection with Popper's thought. This chapter has t r i e d to reconstruct at l e a s t the rudiments of Popper's perception of th i s period and of i t s impact on his subsequent philosophy. I m p l i c i t i n such an approach i s the b e l i e f that these early, formative influences have played a much more s i g n i f i c a n t role i n Popper's thinking about p o l i t i c s and society than l a t e r events i n his l i f e . In f a c t , Popper has said v i r t u a l l y nothing about the p o l i t i c a l c r i s e s and controversies of the l a s t three de-cades; everything he has written on these subjects was cast against the background of H i t l e r ' s seizure of power and his eventual defeat. In t h i s respect, to the extent that Popper's thought has developed or evolved i n new di r e c t i o n s , i t has done so i n terms of h i s epistemology and c e r t a i n more or le s s tech-n i c a l areas of p h i l o s o p h y — l o g i c , p r o b a b i l i t y theory, and evo-lutionary theory. But (as we s h a l l see), even i n these areas of inquiry, Popper has not s i g n i f i c a n t l y altered the i n i t i a l tenets of h i s thought as found, f o r example, i n The Logic of  S c i e n t i f i c Discovery. The next chapter also t r i e s to draw attention to a hitherto neglected area of concern i n connection with Popper's work: the c r i s i s i n the ideals of the Enlightenment and of the profound im-pact that Kant's thought has had on Popper's l i f e - l o n g attempt to defend and conserve those ideals i n an increasingly h o s t i l e environment. Then, i n Chapter 4, I outline the underlying unity and "heat" of Popper's v i s i o n . Chapters 5 and 6 are concerned respectively with the implications for the conduct of s o c i a l science that Popper draws from his r e f l e c t i o n s on the nature of [ the growth of knowledge, and with the conservative tenor of his methodological and Neo-Kantian i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of l i b e r a l i s m . And, f i n a l l y , In conclusion, I raise several c r i t i c i s m s that a r i s e on even the most constructive and appreciative reading of his thought such as I have t r i e d to provide. - 40 -NOTES 1 Joseph Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy f (New York, 1962), Third E d i t i o n , 14b. 2 Quoted i n Stanley J . Kunitz, Twentieth Century Authors, F i r s t  Supplement: A Biographical Dictionary of Modern L i t e r a t u r e (New York, 1955), 783. 3 , K a r l R. Popper, " I n t e l l e c t u a l Autobiography", i n Paul A. Schilpp, ed., op. c i t . , Vol. I, 41-2. Hereafter c i t e d as "IA". 4 In Stanley J . Kunitz, op. c i t . , 783* 5 William M. Johnston, points out that the granting of t i t l e s of n o b i l i t y was one of the recurring Habsburg forms of p o l i t i c a l cooptation and means of checking a n t i - t r a d i t i o n a l i s t thought and i n s t i f u t i o n a l innovation, op. c i t . , 39-44. 6 Peter Berger has underscored the convergence of Kraus and Musil on t h i s point i n "The Problem of Multiple R e a l i t i e s : A l f r e d Schutz and Robert Musil", i n Thomas Luckmann, ed., PhenomenOlogy  and Sociology (Harmondsworth, Middlesex England, 1978), 344. 7 This was the apocalyptic t i t l e of one of Kraus 1 most important novels, Die Letzten Tage der Menscheit (1922). Several excel-lent commentaries on Kraus are now availa b l e i n English; see i n p a r t i c u l a r E r i c h H e l l e r , "Karl Kraus: The Last Days of Mankind", i n The D i s i n h e r i t e d Mind (Cleveland and New York, 1959), 235-58, Frank F i e l d , The Last Days of Mankind: K a r l Kraus and His Vienna (London, Melbourne, and Toronto, 1967), and Wilma Abeles Iggers, K a r l Kraus: A Viennese C r i t i c of the Twentieth Century (The Hague 1967). 8 C a r l E. Schorske, " P o l i t i c s In A New Key: An Austrian Triptych", Journal of Modern History, Vol. XXXIX (December, 1967), 343. 9 "Memories of Otto Neurath", i n Empiricism and Sociology, edited by Marie Neurath and R. S. Cohen (Holland and Boston, 1973), 52. 10 C f . , Henry S c h n i t z l e r , "Gay Vienna 1—Myth and R e a l i t y " , Journal  of the History of Ideas,.Vol. XV (1954), 94-118; C a r l E. Schorske, - 41 -" P o l i t i c s and Psyche i n f i n de s i e c l e Vienna: S c h n i t z l e r and Hoffmansthai", American H i s t o r i c a l Review, LXVI ( 1 9 6 1 ) , 9 3 0 - 4 6 ; and John Torrance, "The Emergence of Sociology i n Austria, 1 8 8 5 -1 9 3 5 " , European Journal of Sociology, XVII ( 1 9 7 6 ) , 1 8 5 - 2 1 9 . 11 A. J . P. Taylor, "National Independence and the 'Austrian Idea'" The P o l i t i c a l Quarterly. Vol. XVI ( 1 9 4 5 ) , 2 3 4 - 4 6 . 12 "Memories of Otto Neurath", op. c i t . , 53« 13 Ibid., 54 . 14 The f i r s t view has been advanced by Michael Lessnoff, "Review A r t i c l e : The P o l i t i c a l Philosophy of K a r l Popper, " B r i t i s h  Journal of P o l i t i c a l Science, Vol. X ( 1 9 7 ) , 100, and the second by Raymond A l l e n Morrow, Conjectures Without Refutations: K a r l  Popper's C r i t i c i s m s of Mannheim's Sociology of Knowledge (Unpub-li s h e d Master's Thesis, University of B r i t i s h Columbia, Socio-logy and Anthropology Department, 1 9 7 3 ) , 1 and 2 5 . 15 The best-known proponent of this i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of Popper's po-l i t i c a l thought i s Bryan Magee, Popper, 87« 16 Dante Germino, op. c i t . 17 K a r l R. Popper. "On Reason and the Open Society", Encounter, Vol. XXXVIII, (May, 1 9 7 2 ) , 13 . 18 Albert E i n s t e i n , R e l a t i v i t y : Special and General Theory ( 1 9 2 0 ; o r i g i n a l l y published i n German i n 1916), quoted i n POpper, "IA", 2 9 . 19 W. W. Bartley, I I I , og^ c i t . , 309. 20 John Torrance, oju c i t . , 204. For an excellent introduction to Herbart's thought and i t s subsequent impact on the development of Austrian philosophy, see William M. Johnston, op. c i t . , 281-8 6 . I t may be h e l p f u l to r e c a l l that G o t t f r i e d Wilhelm Leibniz (1644-1716), the progenitor of Austrian philosophy referred to i n the text, was a l t e r n a t e l y a celebrated mathematician, phy-- 42 -s i c i s t , h i s t o r i a n , engineer, and philosopher. He was best known for his c o n c i l i a t o r y and ecumenical s p i r i t i n an age when such an attitude was a l l too rare ("I have found that most sects are right i n a good part of what they affirm, but not so much i n what they deny", he wrote, i n a l e t t e r to Nicolas Resmond on January 10, 1714; quoted by Johnston, i b i d . , 453, note 1). S t a r t i n g from the assumption that the universe was composed of one hierarchy a f t e r another of sentient beings (known as monads), Leibniz f e l t he could combine the advantages of both pluralism and monism since each monad was s e l f - s u s t a i n i n g yet intercon-nected with the r e s t . Ultimately, f o r Leibniz, harmony suffused the whole universe as God had so arranged these s e l f - r e g u l a t i n g monads as to guarantee that they would function i n preestablished harmony. Against Spinoza's monism, Leibniz defended "free w i l l " , arguing (as Johnston points out) that "man i s a p r i v i l e g e d monad, who dwells i n equilibrium between God and nature. Delighting i n the balance of forces that he contemplates, a r e f l e c t i v e person has every reason to r e j o i c e i n creation" ( i b i d . , 274). His doc-trines commanded progressively more support throughout most of the Empire during the 19th century, most notably i n the exposition of Bernard Bolzano ( 1 7 8 1 - 1 8 4 8 ) , and i n conscious opposition to Kant's C r i t i c a l Idealism and Hegel's d i a l e c t i c , whose philosophies were associated with speculative idealism, "free-thinking" Pro-testantism, and the anti-feudal developments i n the North. For a penetrating exposition of Leibniz, see Lewis White Beck., Early  German Philosophy: Kant and h i s Predecessors (Cambridge, Mass., 1969), 196-240; also compare William Johnston, i b i d . , Chapter 19, and Frederick C. Copleston, A History of Philosophy, Volume IV (New York, 1963), 270-336. 21 William M. Johnston, op. c i t . , 284. 22 Ibi d . , 283. 23 K a r l Strack, Geschicte des Deutschen Volksschulwesens (Guter-sloh, 1872), 327., quoted by W. W. Bartley, I I I , op. c i t . , 309-24 Ibid. 25 William M. Johnston, op. c i t . , 285. 26 Heinrich Gomperz, "Philosophy i n Austria During the Last Sixty Years", The Personalist (1936), 307-311. -• 43 -27 W. W. Bartley, I I I , op. c i t . , 309; c f . , 310-313, and William M. Johnston, op. c i t . , 2B2~and 285-286. 28 "Die Gedachtnispflege unter dem Gesichtspunkt der S e l b s t t a t i g -k e i t " , Die Quelle, LXXXI (1931), 607-619. Popper has repeated this expression often i n l a t e r writings, though somewhat cu-r i o u s l y without reference to i t s o r i g i n or philosophical back-ground i n Glockel's movement. See, f o r example, The Open So-c i e t y and i t s Enemies, Vol. I I , 213-14, 260 and 361, and "The Bucket and the Searchlight: Two Theories of Knowledge", Appen-dix to Objective Knowledge, 341-36 1. Die Quelle was one of the two ma^or publications of Glockel's school reformers, the other being Schulreform. In 1934, when the Dollfuss d i c t a t o r s h i p brought a l l "progressive" educational reform to an abrupt h a l t , Die Quelle and Schulreform were both permanently forced to stop publishing. As early as 1927, C h r i s t i a n S o c i a l i s t and Roman Catholic pressure increasingly mounted against Glockel's program (sometimes referred to as "School Bolshevism" by i t s opponents), and censorship and per-secution increased d r a s t i c a l l y even i n Vienna, the l a s t S o c i a l Democratically controlled enclave i n the Empire. Both journals were p e r i o d i c a l l y seized and locked-up (gesperrt) i n the National Library during this period, thereby rendering them i n -accessible to the general p u b l i c Under the Dollfuss regime, this state of a f f a i r s merely became the permanent p l i g h t of the educational reformers as many of i t s leaders (including Glockel, himself) were arrested, i t s journal t o t a l l y and permanently s i -lenced,and many of i t s younger associates, l i k e Popper and Lazars-f i e l d , f l e d i n fear and disgusted disillusionment with Austria's tragic f a i l u r e to prevent the r i s e of fascism. 29 W. W. Bartley, I I I , op. c i t . , 3*4-30 Bertrand R u ssell, "The Philosophy of L o g i c a l Atomism", The Monist, 1918-19, quoted i n Bartley, i b i d . , 314-315. 31 W. W. Bartley, I I I , i b i d . , 313. 32 Ibid., 311. 33 Karl Buhler, Die g e i s t i g e Entwickling English t r a n s l a t i o n (London, 1930). des Kindes (Jena, 19 18), - 44 -34 Herbert F e i g l r e c a l l s Popper's relationship to the C i r c l e as follows: There were two outstandingly b r i l l i a n t minds i n Vienna who, though close to us i n philoso-p h i c a l orientation, never joined the C i r c l e : Edgar Z i l s e l and K a r l Popper. Both were con-vinced of t h e i r i n t e l l e c t u a l independence from us, and t r i e d to preserve that indepen-dence by remaining outside the c i r c l e . In-deed, I f e l t that both these men, each i n his own way, were among our most valuable c r i t i c s . "The.Welner Kreis i n America", i n P. Fleming and B. Bailyn, eds., The I n t e l l e c t u a l Migration: Europe and America, 1930-1960 (Cambridge, Mass., 1969), 641. S i m i l a r l y , Carl Hempel notes that . • . though Popper car r i e d on an intensive and f r u i t f u l exchange of ideas with various l o g i c a l p o s i t i v i s t s , and although there were important a f f i n i t i e s between his views and t h e i r s , he has consistently represented him-s e l f as an outside c r i t i c of the movement, and he cannot, therefore be reckoned among i t s proponents. "Logical Positivism and the S o c i a l Sciences", i n P. Achinstein and S.F. Barker, eds., The Legacy of Logical Positivism ( B a l t i -more, 1969), 164-165. Nevertheless, f o r reasons that should be cle a r during the next chapter, the view ( i n this case of Maurice Cranston) that "Popper did not share the b e l i e f s of the Wiener  Kreis" can be, and frequently has been, overstated i n discus-sions of his thought. See M. Cranston, Philosophy and Language (Toronto, 1969), 11. V i c t o r Kraft r i g h t l y notes that although "Popper never belonged to the Vienna C i r c l e , never took part i n i t s meetings, . . . [he] cannot be thought of as outside i t " , and that " i f Popper was c a l l e d an 'opponent' of the Vienna C i r c l e , his opposition s t i l l rested on a common ground on which the d i s -pute took place". See "Popper and the Vienna C i r c l e " , i n Paul A. Schlipp, ed., op. c i t . , Volume I, 185 and 187, respectively. The best discussion of the "common ground" referred to by Kraft can be found i n J . F. Malherbe, l a philosophie de Ka r l Popper  et l e positiyisme logique (Presses U n i v e r s i t a i r e s de Namur et France, 1976). 35 (New York and Evanston, Harper and Row Publishers, 1968 Revised ed i t i o n ) . Hereafter c i t e d as LSD. 36 (New York and Evanston, Harper and Row Publishers, 1964 Re-vised Third edition) and (Princeton, New Jersey, 1971 Revised F i f t h e d i t i o n ) . Hereafter c i t e d as PH and OS, I and I I , res-pectively. 37 (Oxford U n i v e r s i t y Press, 1972). Hereafter c i t e d as OK. 38 "Normal Science and i t s Dangers", i n Imre Lakatos and Alan Mus-grave, eds., C r i t i c i s m and the Growth of Knowledge (Cambridge University Press, 1970), 51-58. Hereafter c i t e d as "NSD"• 39 "The Logic of the S o c i a l Sciences", i n T. W. Adorno, et a l . , The P o s i t i v i s t Dispute i n German Sociology. Translated by Glyn Adey and David Frisby (London, Heinemann Educational Books, Ltd., 1976). O r i g i n a l l y published i n German i n 1969. Hereafter c i t e d as "LSS". 40 ( B e r l i n , Heidelberg, London, and New York, Springer Verlag In-ternational, 1977). Hereafter c i t e d as SB. 41 (New Jersey and London, 1982). Hereafter c i t e d as Post s c r i p t , I, I I , or III [ r e s p e c t i v e l y e n t i t l e d : Realism and the Aim of  Science, The Open Universe: An Argument for Indeterminism, and Quantum Theory and the Schism i n Physics]. - 46 -i "CHAPTER 3 ; The Metaphysical Foundations of Orderly Growth: Kant, Popper  and the C r i s i s i n the I d e a l s of the Enlightenment S c i e n c e — t h e transformation of nature i n t o concepts f o r the purpose of mastering n a t u r e — belongs under the r u b r i c of 'means'. . . . But the purpose and w i l l of man must grow i n the same way, the i n t e n t i o n i n regard to the whole. I F r i e d r i c h Nietzsche The movements of the s t a r s have become c l e a r e r ; but to the mass of people the movements of t h e i r masters are s t i l l i n c a l c u l a b l e . B e r t o l t Brecht 1 Popper's place i n the t r a d i t i o n of Western thought should be seen a g a i n s t the r i c h h i s t o r i c a l background of the problems and i n t e l l e c t u a l c r i s e s h i s thought addresses. Modern p h i l o s o -phy has been p e r s i s t e n t l y haunted by two problems which we might c a l l the problems of v a l i d a t i o n and enchantment. The  problem of v a l i d a t i o n concerns how o n e — o r , more a c c u r a t e l y , one's c u l t u r e — j u s t i f i e s h o l d i n g c e r t a i n b e l i e f s to be true and, more s p e c i f i c a l l y , how one j u s t i f i e s a p a r t i c u l a r " s t y l e 2 of c o g n i t i o n amongst others". Since the l a t e 16th century i n the West, t h i s has meant j u s t i f y i n g s c i e n t i f i c knowledge v i s - a - v i s o t h e r modes of thought and parts of i n t e l l e c t u a l c u l t u r e . The problem of enchantment, on the other hand, con-cerns the question of the meaningfulness of the universe and, above a l l , of human s t r i v i n g known as h i s t o r y . Not c o i n c i d e n -t a l l y , t h i s question of meaning or enchantment has become i n -c r e a s i n g l y acute i n the West s i n c e the emergence and triumph of modern s c i e n c e , w i t h i t s commitment to " i m p a r t i a l sub-sumption [ o f phenomena] under symmetrical g e n e r a l i z a t i o n s , . . . t r e a t i n g a l l data as equal"^ and i t s p o l i t i c a l counterpart, - 47 -bureaucratic administration and r a t i o n a l i z e d p r o d u c t i o n — i n short, technocratic p o l i t i c s . Ernst Cassirer, Leo Strauss, and Isaiah B e r l i n have taught us that modernity began with Machiavelli, the f i r s t c r i t i c of a l l v a r i e t i e s of transcendant philosophy.^ The c l a s s i c a l connection, so dear to Greek, Roman, and C h r i s t i a n thinkers a l i k e , between s t a t e c r a f t and soulc r a f t was emphati-c a l l y dissolved and a penetrating j u s t i f i c a t i o n was advanced for conceiving of reason as purely an instrument i n the pur-s u i t of worldly in t e r e s t s and goods. Knowledge thenceforth would progressively approximate Bacon's equation of t h e o r e t i -c a l knowledge with our power to manipulate and contrive the elements of nature as we see f i t . And the underlying moti-vation of t h i s v i s i o n of a d i s t i n c t i v e l y modern philosophy was an unprecedented degree of optimism and r a d i c a l s e l f -confidence* that what mind could encompass with i t s own power was s u f f i c i e n t to the task of making and remaking nature 5 i n the image of i t s own design. Although the apogee of t h i s f a i t h i n the power of reason to secure p r a c t i c a l and moral progress occurred during the En-lightenment, the metaphysical foundations of modernity's o p t i -mism and self-confidence were l a i d the century before when thinkers such as G a l i l e o , Descartes, Newton, and Hobbes, among others, systematically redefined the nature of philosophy. And the outward signs of m o d e r n i t y — i t s manifold technologies and the deep-seated f a i t h i n t h e i r progressive c h a r a c t e r — a r e tes-timonies to the longevity and promise of such i n t e l l e c t u a l self-confidence and optimism. Indeed, without t h i s f a i t h i n these ideals and accomplishments, r a d i c a l doubt or disenchant-ment has surfaced with regard to the very meaningfulness of modern l i f e i t s e l f . Kant's great achievement during the twi-l i g h t of the German Enlightenment was to rescue the optimism i n our power to know and the all-important l i b e r a l c o r o l l a r y - — that mind could be "decisive" i n p o l i t i c a l l i f e — a m i d s t a. growing chorus of scepticism and doubt. Like Kant, except - 48 -during f a r more traumatic times, Popper has also proved to he an unrelenting advocate of the r a t i o n a l p o s s i b i l i t y of pro- gress i n mind and c i v i l society a l i k e . Theirs are philosophies of orderly growth—formal, methodical, dichotomous, and an-thropologically transcendental and evolutionary i n design. In l i g h t of the s i m i l a r i t y of purpose of t h e i r respective p h i l o -sophies, as well as the marked pa r a l l e l i s m i n the metaphysical structure and l i m i t a t i o n s of t h e i r thought, an i n i t i a l over-view of Kant's epistemology and the c r i s i s to which i t was a response w i l l be h e l p f u l before turning our attention to Popper's C r i t i c a l Rationalism. i i Perhaps the greatest obstacle to natural science as we now "know" i t to have evolved was the influence of A r i s t o -telianism on Scholastic patterns of thought p r i o r to the i n -strumentalization of reason i n the 17th century. According to A r i s t o t l e ' s cosmology, the "natural" state of a body was when at rest; a body at rest needed no further explanation, whereas bodies i n motion were phenomena to be explained by discovering the relevant disturbing factors. And yet, A r i s -t o t l e maintained, the movements of nature were also to be viewed as the a c t u a l i z a t i o n of p o t e n t i a l i t y (or t e l o s ) : "the f u l f i l l m e n t of what exists p o t e n t i a l l y , i n so f a r as i t exists, p o t e n t i a l l y , i s motion." While both of these propo-s i t i o n s accord n i c e l y with a good number of our commonsense experiences of motion, by the l a t e 14th century, persistent d i s s a t i s f a c t i o n with several applications of A r i s t o t l e ' s theory began to mount ( p a r t i c u l a r l y i t s i n a b i l i t y to explain simple locomotion, l i k e the behaviour of f a l l i n g bodies and p r o j e c t i l e s ) . Ultimately, such problems i n A r i s t o t l e ' s phy-si c s were simply set aside, as subsequent thinkers such as Galileo and Descartes discovered the great benefits of ab-s t r a c t i n g from the sense manifestations of motion to i t s mathematical properties. - 49 -For his part, Galileo i s most remembered fo r the "mar-riage of the empiricism of technics with the rationalism of philosophy and mathematics" that has proven to be of such power and near l i m i t l e s s p o s s i b i l i t y i n the struggle with 7 nature. Both the o r i g i n of Galileo's mathematical education and the manner i n which the problems of A r i s t o t l e ' s physics came to his attention and were ultimately solved render e f f o r t s to divorce the so-called "context of the discovery" of a theory or idea from the context of i t s cognitive j u s t i f i c a t i o n ex-tremely problematic with regard to his achievement. As opposed to the t y p i c a l empiricist " l o g i c a l reconstruction" of Gal i l e o ' s triumph, which "saw him as appealing to the facts against Ptolemy and A r i s t o t l e " , what he actually did was "to give a Q new account of what an appeal to the facts had to be". A b r i e f digression on the matter i s revealing i n terms of under-scoring the profound connection between technological advance and the underlying philosophical categories of i n t e l l e c t u a l progress within our culture. And even more revealingly, of how the p a r t i c u l a r means by which such a "new account" of "the fac t s " was achieved; indeed, the very p o s s i b i l i t y of perceiving such a " c r i s i s " i n A r i s t o t l e ' s physics, was i n d i c a t i v e of the process by which engineering and i t s methods "gradually rose from the workshops of craftsmen and eventually penetrated the 9 f i e l d of academic i n s t r u c t i o n " . In a famous l e t t e r to M a r s i l i , G alileo t e l l s us that his greatest achievement (the detection of the r e l a t i v i t y of motion and the law of c i r c u l a r i n e r t i a ) developed from the most vexing 10 problem of f a l l i n g bodies i n contemporary gunnery. In his youth, when he studied medicine at the University of Pisa (the 1590s), mathematics was not yet taught. He came to study i t p r i v a t e l y with O s t i l i o R i c c i , a former teacher at the Academia  del Disegno i n Florence, which was founded i n 1592 by the great painter, Vasari, f o r young a r t i s t s and artist-engineers. Upon hi s a r r i v a l at the Uni v e r s i t y of Padua, where he spent nearly two decades as a Professor of Mathematics and Astronomy - 50 -(1592-1610), Ga l i l e o established several workrooms i n his house with craftsmen as his apprentices where he began his s c i e n t i f i c career with studies on pumps, the control of r i v e r s , and the construction of fortresses. Not coinciden-t a l l y , the scene of the dialogue i n his major work, the D i s c o r s i (1638), i s the arsenal of Venice. In fact, his f i r s t published work was a description of a measuring device f o r m i l i t a r y purposes which he had invented; and, more im-portantly, the single most d i f f i c u l t problem f o r the physics and b a l l i s t i c s of his day, the solution of which he can r i g h t l y claim c r e d i t , "had often been discussed by the gun-11 ners of the period". But, whereas T a r t a g l i a and other leading engineers had been unable to answer the question cor-r e c t l y , owing i n no small degree to having lacked access to the (soon-to-be) necessary tools of mathematical analysis, Gal i l e o ' s case was r a d i c a l l y d i f f e r e n t . In one of his path-breaking studies of the period, Edgar I Z i l s e l points out that the d i f f e r e n t s o c i a l o r i g i n s of the two components of G a l i l e o ' s method, i t s marriage of the em-p i r i c i s m of technics and the rationalism of mathematics and l o g i c , i s obvious i n the D i s c o r s i themselves, "since he gives the mathematical deductions i n L a t i n and the experiments i n 12 I t a l i a n " . In f a c t , a f t e r 1610, Galileo gave up writing learned L a t i n t r e a t i s e s altogether and addressed the vast majority of his work to non-scholars, writing completely i n the vernacular. By simultaneously appealing to an audience that was temperamen-t a l l y opposed to the old ideas and standards of learning of the status quo, G a l i l e o thus combined a new account of "what the facts had to be" with a c l e a r conception of the methods ' and organization of s c i e n t i f i c practice f o r generations to come. G a l i l e o ' s workrooms were t y p i c a l examples of a r a d i -c a l l y new o r i e n t a t i o n toward the proper understanding and d i v i s i o n of i n t e l l e c t u a l a c t i v i t y . In one country a f t e r an-other, hitherto unheard of academies of science and learned , s o c i e t i e s of various sorts were founded i n an atmosphere of - 51 -confidence, where the methodical t r a i n i n g of the mind (above a l l , through mathematical analysis) could be systematically combined with the experimental, u t i l i t a r i a n , and causal d i s - positions of the engineers and craftsmen. I t would be hard to overestimate the p r a c t i c a l implications of this new s t y l e of philosophizing on Western culture; as Whitehead noted just a few decades ago, "every unive r s i t y i n the world organizes i t s e l f " i n accordance with "the s c i e n t i f i c philosophy which closed the 17th century", above a l l , t h e i r "grand doctrine of nature as a s e l f - s u f f i c i e n t meaningless complex of f a c t s — j the doctrine of the autonomy of physical science". Here, i n these immediate precursors of the modern uni-v e r s i t y laboratory and of f a c u l t i e s a s p i r i n g to the mantle of "science", were fashioned new standards of i n t e l l e c t u a l • merit, achievement, and r e s p o n s i b i l i t y , whose primary function was to safeguard the future means by which the "advancement of learning" and the control of nature could produce "a l i n e and race of inventions that may i n some degree subdue and overcome the ne c e s s i t i e s and miseries of humanity".^ Par-tisans of the "new science" contended that nothing less than the fate of Western c i v i l i z a t i o n i t s e l f depended upon the patient cooperation of successive generations of experts, ' themselves firm l y convinced of the progress that would follow so long as they tackled t h e i r problems i n "the right way". In a very r e a l sense, progress i n mind and society were very near-l y coterminus with the growth of s c i e n t i f i c knowledge—the future or enchantment as v a l i d a t i o n . As we s h a l l see, these , hopes and i d e a l s resonate deeply i n the philosophies of Kant and Popper. An early expression of the new s t y l e of s c i e n t i f i c p h i l o -sophizing i s found i n the writings of Francis Bacon. Against the " n i c e t i e s " of Scholasticism and the antique i d o l s of the humanistic l i t e r a t i , Bacon put forward a passionate argument fo r the s u p e r i o r i t y of the "mechanical a r t s " and t h e i r induc-t i v e methodology; there, knowledge was indeed power. Any be-- 52 -l i e f to the c o n t r a r y was l i t e r a l l y dismissed as c h i l d i s h . I n the New A t l a n t i s (1627), f o r i n s t a n c e , the "Ancients" were por-trayed as seldom, i f ever, r i s i n g above a s t a t e of "choked and overgrown" i n t e l l e c t u a l s t a g n a t i o n , whereas t i r e l e s s groups of s p e c i a l i s t s made unending, cumulative progress toward e s t a -b l i s h i n g "the power and dominion of the human race i t s e l f over 1 5 the u n i v e r s e " . ' S i m i l a r l y , r e c a l l the i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of the f a b l e of Pan i n the Wisdom of the A n c i e n t s . Pan i s s a i d to represent the "Universe or the A l l of Things". Pan wants f o r nothing s u b s t a n t i a l outside of i t s e l f , f o r eros, Bacon warns us, i s a d e s i r e o f something l a c k i n g . Consequently, Pan's only p o s s i b l e o b j e c t of l o v e comes to be found i n Echo, and t h e i r ensuing marriage i s i n g e n i o u s l y intended to s i g n i f y the s e l f - s u f f i c i e n c y and u n d e r l y i n g u n i t y of nature, presuppo-s i t i o n s which encountered b i t t e r o p p o s i t i o n from the Schoolmen and l i t e r a t i a l i k e . Bacon reassures us, however, that i t i s w e l l devised that of a l l words and voices Echo alone should be chosen f o r the world's w i f e ; f o r i t i s the true philosophy which echoes most f a i t h f u l l y the world i t s e l f , and i s w r i t t e n as i t were at the world's own d i c t a t i o n ; being nothing e l s e but the image and r e f l e c t i o n thereof, to which i t adds nothing of i t s own, but only i t e r a t e s and gives i t back. 1° Echoing G a l i l e o ' s warcry against A r i s t o t e l i a n i s m , that 17 "nature i s w r i t t e n i n mathematical language", Descartes added yet another, more momentous methodological and epistemo-l o g i c a l dimension to the "new science" when he observed that e a r l i e r attempts to l a y a genuine foundation for our knowledge j had been l i k e t r y i n g "to f i n d a knot i n a b u l r u s h " . Expanding upon t h i s charge i n h i s epoch-making Rules f o r the D i r e c t i o n of  the Mind (apparently w r i t t e n i n 1628, though only published posthumously), Descartes argued that the major f a i l u r e of A r i s -t o t e l i a n i s m had been i t s i n a b i l i t y to draw a f i r m and l a s t i n g "methodical" d i s t i n c t i o n ( o r v i t a methodica) between that which we can be s c i e n t i f i c a l l y c e r t a i n of k n o w i n g — v i z . , the " c l e a r - 53 -and d i s t i n c t ideas" or "undoubting. conception of the pure attentive mind"—and that which necessarily cannot be so known—the " f l u c t u a t i n g testimony of the senses" and the "mis-leading judgement that proceeds from the blundering con-1 Pi s t r u c t i o n of the imagination". As he observed i n his new F i r s t Rule f o r the conduct of mind, the problem has been that whenever men notice some s i m i l a r i t y between two things, they are wont to ascribe to each, even i n those respects i n which they d i f f e r , what they have found to be true of the other. Thus they erroneously compare the sciences, which e n t i r e l y consist i n the cognitive exer- cis e of the mind, with the a r t s , which depend , q upon an exercise and d i s p o s i t i o n of the body. * Provided that philosophers and natural s c i e n t i s t s would "metho-d i c a l l y " subordinate t h e i r "bodily d i s p o s i t i o n s " , the " f l u c -tuating testimony of the senses" and t h e i r nature as h i s t o r i -c a l beings and agents to the "sure speedy path of Arithmatic and Geometry", which "alone was free from any t a i n t of f a l s i t y or uncertainty", Descartes argued that the " c l a r i t y and sim-p l i c i t y of the mind", with i t s "firm and l a s t i n g structure i n the sciences", could be progressively extended as a program of "universal mathematics" u n t i l we f i n a l l y possess a u n i f i e d , a l l -encompassing •corpus of impersonal, t o t a l l y indubitable, objec- t i v e knowledge. One would be hard pressed to f i n d a c l e a r e r j u s t i f i c a t i o n f o r the h i s t o r i c a l divorce, and recently f e l t 20 estrangement, of the sciences from the humanities. Perhaps of even more consequence are i t s implications f o r d i s c i p l i n e s , such as the various "policy sciences", wishing to embrace the c a l l i n g s of both of the "two cultures". No sooner had G a l i l e o , Descartes, and Newton banished a l l purpose from nature,then nature i t s e l f came to be seen as a vast mechanism. "Bits of matter q u a l i f i e d by mass s p a t i a l re-l a t i o n s , and the change of r e l a t i o n s " was how Descartes con- : 21 ceived of the new cosmic machine. And shortly thereafter, thinkers such as Hobbes, Spinoza, and Harvey paved the way f o r - 54 -a s i m i l a r understanding of mankind. But, beneath the surface optimism p r o p e l l i n g t h i s endeavor, the modern s e n s i b i l i t i e s rebelled, and severe tensions i n the depths of self-conscious-ness began to surface with regard to the l o g i c a l incompati-b i l i t y and "disharmony between the object of science and the op human ends science i s made [or intended] to serve". While the new Newtonian cosmology presupposed (and strove a f t e r ) universal order, lawfulness, and all-pervasive r e g u l a r i t y i n nature, i t became increasingly c l e a r to a number of thinkers that man's own status as a free, autonomous, goal-setting agent had been jeopardized. In other words, i f nature and human nature a l i k e were both understood according to the En-lightenment's common denominator of the "geometric s p i r i t " and the l i b i d o s c i e n d i , as i n works such as Condillac's Treatise  on Sensations or Hobbes' Elements of Philosphy (or De Corpore), what was the epistemological status of human purposiveness or 23 enchantment i t s e l f ? This i s perhaps the most urgent and con-t r o v e r s i a l problem i n modern philosophy insofar as the two com-peting and incompatible c o n v i c t i o n s — v i z . , the idea of nature as a vast, s e l f - r e g u l a t i n g mechanism and the idea of knowledge as purposeful power—are equally fundamental to Western society and deeply entrenched within our tr a d i t i o n s and i n s t i t u t i o n s . Indeed, they take us to the heart of that great i n t e l l e c t u a l tension and experiment known as modernity. As a talented an-thropologist of the mind notes, "man, i t appears, can only be maintained i n the s t y l e to which he wishes to be accustomed at the price of abstract science, powerful technology and large-scale organization,. . . [and] these i n t h e i r turn des-troy warmth, idiosyncracy, individualism, magic, and enchant-ment". 2 4 Many of Kant's predecessors were acutely aware of thi s tension and, broadly speaking, four d i s t i n c t p h i l o s p h i c a l s t r a -tegies were advanced as possible solutions: a) Some, such as Descartes and many orthodox C h r i s t i a n thinkers, denied the problem by exempting man from - 55 -the laws of nature through various ad hoc hypo-theses. b) Others, l i k e Malebranche, at times, Descartes, and again many orthodox C h r i s t i a n philosophers, argued that the problem was i r r e s o l v a b l e and ultimately transferred the issue to a higher court of " f a i t h " . c) Thinkers such as Hobbes and Spinoza maintained that the problem i t s e l f was i l l u s o r y because purpose i s not an ultimate vocation even f o r man-kind. d) And s t i l l others, l i k e Leibniz and Berkeley,also thought that the problem was i l l u s o r y but be-25 cause mechanism i s not ultimate even i n nature. Kant's manifest and consummate greatness, as well as the deepest problematic i n his thought, stems from the fact that he refused, unlike those mentioned above, to lessen the con-f l i c t by weakening one or both of the contending commitments. For Kant, both the knower as purposeful agent and the known were givens not to be s a c r i f i c e d or compromised. And, as a point of h i s t o r i c a l record, Kant drove the tension between the two—"the starry heavens above" and "the moral l i g h t with-i n " was how he expressed them i n his Cri t i q u e of P r a c t i c a l  Reason—to i t s l o g i c a l extreme, integrating his predecessor's "dogmatic" answers into a new system that constantly strove to balance, or more c o r r e c t l y , to l i m i t or demarcate, t h e i r p o t e n t i a l l y antagonistic demands. i i i A u s e f u l way of understanding Kant's epistemology i s i n terms of what he was reacting against. While having been trained i n the "Leibniz-Wolffian" rationalism that dominated the German Aufklarung (or Enlightenment), Kant nonetheless had been exposed to the ideas of B r i t i s h empiricism and Newton's mechanics through h i s many friends at the B e r l i n Academy, and - 56 -took the certainty of the l a t t e r f a r too seriously to remain s i l e n t i n the face of David Hume's trenchant c r i t i q u e of cau-sation. Kant's greatest challenge, accordingly, was to "answer Hume" by proving the v a l i d i t y and legitimate foundation of s c i e n t i f i c knowledge, while simultaneously destroying the ex-cessive claims of the older speculative metaphysics. Thus, from his own early love f o r "dogmatic metaphysics", Kant pain-f u l l y struggled to censure reason's "leap out beyond the con-text of s e n s i b i l i t y " (A 563-B 59 0 , i t s "soaring so f a r above a l l possible experience" (A 638-B 666), or any movement which indicates i t s leaving "the ground of experience" (A 689-B 717), such as wandering into the realm of "mere p o s s i b i l i t i e s " (A 630-27 B 658) where i t cannot legitimately operate. Kant ultimately came to f e e l that rationalism and empiricism both needed r e v i s i o n before they could stand the acid test of his " c r i t i c a l p h i l o -sophy" and i t s "transcendental method", the task of which was to subject reason i t s e l f to a c r i t i q u e of i t s own powers to p Q know. As we s h a l l see, Popper has performed a s i m i l a r operation on the epistemological maladies of our time. The groundwork of Hume's empiricism i s contained i n Part I of the f i r s t book of A Treatise of Human Nature. There, he states three remarkably simple p r i n c i p l e s that were of such momentous and devastating import to the r a t i o n a l i s t s of his day and age. B r i e f l y , Hume formulated those p r i n c i p l e s as follows: a) The Genetic P r i n c i p l e : " A l l our simple ideas, i n t h e i r f i r s t appearance, are derived from sim-ple impressions which are correspondent to them and which they exactly resemble". b) The Atomic P r i n c i p l e : "There are not any two propositions which are p e r f e c t l y separable". c) The Associative P r i n c i p l e : The assertion of a "gentle force, which commonly prevails (sc. to united ideas), and i s the cause why, among other things, languages so nearly correspond to each - 57 -other, nature, i n a manner, pointing out to every one those simple ideas, which are most pq proper to "be united into a complex one." Reason, he maintained, while c l e a r l y an instrument f o r advan-cing our knowledge, was to be whittled down to a circumscribed sphere of a c t i v i t y through r a t i o n a l analysis and the "experi-mental method": Reason i s the discovery of truth or falsehood. Truth or falsehood consists i n an agreement or disagreement either to real r e lations of ideas, or to r e a l existence and matters of fa c t . What-ever, therefore, i s not susceptible of this agreement or disagreement i s incapable of being true or f a l s e , and can never be an object of reason.30 Thus, f o r Hume, facts ultimately are derived from commonsense observation rather than reason, and what people describe as cause-and-effect i s not, i n f a c t , a deductive conclusion of reason but, instead, the product of experience. That i s , the b e l i e f that every event must have a cause has no r a t i o n a l jus-t i f i c a t i o n and, instead, simply represents our habit of ex-| pectation which re s u l t s from the constant association of con-tinuous experiences i n the past ( c . f . , Book I, part 3 of A Treatise of Human Nature). Moreover, insofar as facts are derived from common sense, reason can neither prove nor d i s -prove t h e i r existence. In the end, Hume viewed human be-haviour as being governed by unanalyzed experience (the "gentle force of association" and "ce r t a i n manners") and habit: "cus-torn i s the great guide of human l i f e " . The l o g i c a l conclusion of Hume's empiricism was to deny the v a l i d i t y of a good deal of what, i n fa c t , we cannot avoid assuming. For example, not only does Humean empiricism force j us to view "things" as nothing but the sum of t h e i r properties but, more importantly, i t implies that we no longer have the right to use the word "property" at a l l . Furthermore, many of the concepts we employ i n our dealings with the external ' world seem to collapse i f Hume's premises are granted. For - 58 -example, i f a "thing"(such as a piece of wax) undergoes a change ( i n temperature), we could not on Hume's l i n e of reasoning maintain that i t was the same thing i f we were also to argue that a thing i s the sum of i t s properties. Also, the phrases we o r d i n a r i l y use to di s t i n g u i s h between an event being caused by another event (such as "causes", "brings about", "leads to", etc.), and an event merely following a f t e r another temporally, are u n j u s t i f i e d on Hume's account. Ultimately, Hume's empiricism denies us any answer to the question of how one knows that things w i l l continue to happen i n the way they always have happened. As Hartnack observes: The r e s u l t of Humean empiricism, the re s u l t of thinking that knowledge builds upon and contains nothing other than that which i s given i n sense experience, i s consequently a denial of knowledge and the collapse of those concepts we employ i n order to speak about and to understand r e a l i t y . I f Humean empiricism i s true, then there i s no knowledge. And conversely, i f there i s knowledge, then Humean empiricism i s false. 3 2 In short, not to "answer Hume" would have been to abandon a necessary precondition of modernity's optimism and self-con-fidence, a concession hardly palatable to Kant. Popper came to the same conclusion when confronted i n the 1930s with a s i m i l a r l y profound c r i s i s i n . i n t e l l e c t u a l o r i e n t a t i o n pre-c i p i t a t e d by the discoveries of Ei n s t e i n , Planck and t h e i r associates. I f Hume's world was one of no non-sense, i t was also a world with no sense i n i t either, f o r quite l i t e r a l l y , there i s nobody i n i t . " ^ For Hume, the s e l f i s simply a bundle of "impressions" and, on his own p r i n c i p l e s , there i s nothing else that the s e l f possibly could be. As he conceded i n the Appendix to the Treatise, "associative mechanisms" cannot ever make a "person". I f , as he held to be true, there i s no l o g i c a l or r a t i o n a l necessity to what we know, then there i s no responsible agent to assent to our knowing i t . Since the mind passively received sense impressions or perceptions, and a l l perceptions are necessarily separable, how do we then - 59 -account f o r the togetherness, cohesiveness, or unity of that "bundle" we commonly designate as "mind" or " s e l f " ? Hume's response was: "For my part, I must plead the p r i v i l e g e of a sceptic, and confess that this d i f f i c u l t y i s too hard f o r my understanding" (A Treatise of Human Nature, Appendix). Here, more than i n his c r i t i q u e of causation, l i e s Hume's ultimate scepticism. Though much impressed by Hume's courage and philosophic r i g o r , Kant could not accept his scepticism since i t entailed that the securely established laws of Newtonianism did not describe objective r e l a t i o n s i n nature, but merely r e f l e c t e d the habitual and subjective judgements of p a r t i c u l a r i n d i -viduals or s o c i e t i e s . Yet as early as 1770, i n his Inaugural  Di s s e r t a t i o n: Form and P r i n c i p l e s of the Sensible and I n t e l - l i g i b l e World, Kant admitted that empiricists were right to emphasize that sense experience i s essential to human knowledge. Therefore, by 1781, when the Critique of Pure Reason f i r s t ap-peared, Kant had come to believe that his celebrated "Coper-nican revolution" i n philosophic method had to, and could, overcome the anomalies i n both empiricism and the "dogmatic rationalism" of his time. In Kant's view, while the former could not explain the v a l i d i t y of objective knowledge i n the natural sciences, the l a t t e r ultimately produced a series of "antinomies" that a r i s e from the i n a b i l i t y of reason to meet I i t s own demands on thought. The crux of Kant's c r i t i c a l epis-temology i s captured i n his "answer to Hume" and the so-called "Copernican revolution" i n thinking i t represented. A b r i e f review of these two aspects of his thought w i l l complete our se t t i n g of the i n t e l l e c t u a l stage for a more extended d i s -cussion i n the next chapter of Popper's philosophy of mind, his views on language, and his conception of objective know-ledge. - 60 -i v Ever s ince A r i s t o t l e , i t has been customary to consider a judgment about r e a l i t y as cons is t ing of a subject and a predicate . By a subject of a judgment i s meant that about which the judgment af f i rms something, and the predicate i s that which i s predicated of the subject. -^ 4 For centur ies to come, there was l i t t l e r e v i s i o n i n th i s l o g i c a l schema of A r i s t o t l e ' s ; philosophers before Kant accordingly maintained that judgments were e i ther ana ly t i c or synthet ic . An a n a l y t i c judgment, such as "a t r iang le has three angles" , i s one i n which the predicate i s found by analys is of the concept of the subject ; such judgments are very important i n organiz ing and a r t i c u l a t i n g our knowledge. But ana ly t i c judgments do not extend our knowledge beyond what we already know about the subject i n quest ion, nor do they t e l l us anything about the existence of the subject i t s e l f . Thus, they are true a p r i o r i and necessar i l y true regardless of empir ica l referent and sense data. On the other hand, a judgment i s synthetic when the predicate i s not l o g i c a l l y included i n the concept of the subject , as i n "the woods are green". The t ru th o r ' f a l s i t y of such judgments can only be determined through recourse to experience; that i s , they are a p o s t e r i o r i . But, even i f t rue , such a judgment i s not necessar i l y true i n the l o g i c a l sense; i t i s quite conceivable when we make synthet ic judg-ments that our senses betray us , etc . Hume recognized th i s type of c l a s s i f i c a t i o n and he and i Kant agreed that ana l y t i c judgments do not give us any s c i e n -t i f i c knowledge of r e a l i t y . They also concurred on the e x i s -tence of synthet ic a p o s t e r i o r i judgments. For Hume, how?-. . ever, these judgments deal with nothing other than that with which our senses provide us . But, as we have seen, i f know-ledge cons is ts only of successive sense impressions, there can be no l o g i c a l , o r r a t i o n a l grounds to our knowledge, i n -c luding that of natura l sc ience. Su f f i ce to say, the seep-- 61 -t i c a l implications that Hume and others drew from a l l t h i s posed the gravest of problems f o r the v a l i d a t i o n of a newly emergent s c i e n t i f i c and i n d u s t r i a l c i v i l i z a t i o n . For his part, Kant believed that i n the natural sciences and mathematics there exists a t h i r d type of .judgment, which i s both synthetic (going "beyond" the subject) and a p r i o r i (requiring no experience i n order to amplify the subject). Kant was the f i r s t i n the history of philosophy to believe that there are such synthetic a p r i o r i s and, before his f i r s t C r i t i q u e , the very thought of t h e i r existence would have been dismissed as a contradictio i n adjecto. But, f o r Kant, they were absolutely es s e n t i a l even f o r synthetic a p o s t e r i o r i judgments, since any judgment based upon experience presup-poses an a p r i o r i synthetic judgment f o r connecting or l i n -king one event to another as cause-and-effect. Thus, i n eff e c t , Kant's general "answer to Hume" was to show that Hume's own thesis gains i t s very p l a u s i b i l i t y only by pre-supposing the p r i n c i p l e whose necessity he i s denying.^ i Accordingly, the main epistemological task of the Criti q u e  of Pure Reason i s to answer the question, "how are synthetic a p r i o r i judgments possible?" Kant's reply i s most v i v i d l y described i n what has be-come known as his "Copernican revolution" i n philosophy. In the famous Preface to the Second e d i t i o n of the Criti q u e (1787), Kant observed that the "students of metaphysics" could manage so l i t t l e agreement that "metaphysics [should] rather . . . be regarded as a battleground", though one where very l i t t l e t e r r i t o r y had been gained or l o s t (B, xv). While metaphysicians were "groping and fumbling", caught i n the I throes of t o t a l l y inconclusive "opinion-mongering", Kant was convinced that mathematics and the physical sciences had ob-tained "the sure path of science". The mathematician does not - 62 -inspect what he discerns either i n the figure or the mere concept of i t , and from t h i s , as i t were, read o f f i t s properties, but brings  out what was necessarily implied i n the con-cepts he has himself formed a p r i o r i and has put into the figures i n the construction by which he presents i t to himself (B, x i i ; emphasis added). According to Kant, the "sure path" i n mathematics had been discovered long ago by the Greeks: . . . [and] the transformation must have been due to a revolution brought about by the happy thought of a single man i n an experiment—an experiment a f t e r which the road that must be taken could never again be missed, and the sure path of a science was entered upon and sign-posted f o r a l l time to come and into the i n -f i n i t e distance (B, x - x i ) . The "revolutionary experiment" Kant had i n mind was c l e a r l y the f i r s t ancient geometrical construction: "A l i g h t flashed upon the mind of the f i r s t man . . . who demonstrated the pro-perties of the isoceles t r i a n g l e " ( i b i d . , x i - x i i ) . Thus, the great achievement of the ancient geometers was t h e i r discovery of a "true method", a Cartesian-like v i t a methodica, which r a d i c a l l y transformed t h e i r fumbling guess-work into the cumulative, incremental development of objec-t i v e , s c i e n t i f i c knowledge. S p e c i f i c a l l y , . t h e i r discovery was that, i f he i s to know anything with a p r i o r i c e r t a i n -ty he must not ascribe to the figure anything but what necessarily follows from what he has  himself put into i t i n accordance with his con- cept ( i b i d . , x i i ; emphasis added). Kant also maintained that the development of the natural sciences had been s i m i l a r to that of mathematics, although somewhat slower: Natural science was much longer i n entering upon the highway of science. I t i s , indeed, only about a century and a h a l f since Bacon, by h i s ingenious proposal, p a r t l y i n i t i a t e d t h i s discovery, p a r t l y inspired fresh vigour - 6 3 -i n those who were already on the way to i t . In t h i s case also the discovery can be ex-plained as being the sudden outcome of an i n t e l l e c t u a l revolution ( i b i d . ) . A f t e r having discussed the contributions of G a l i l e o , T o r r i c e l l i , and Stahl to t h i s i r r e v e r s i b l e " i n t e l l e c t u a l revolution", Kant notes, . . . a fresh l i g h t broke upon a l l students of nature. They learned that reason has i n - sight only into that which i t produces a f t e r  a plan of i t s own, and that i t must not allow i t s e l f to be kept, as i t were, on nature's leading-strings, but must i t s e l f show the way with p r i n c i p l e s of judgement based on fix e d laws, constraining nature to give answers to  questions of reason's own determining ( i b i d . , x i - x i i ; emphasis added). In other words, Kant points out that nature w i l l answer only such questions as we ask of her. We can have ce r t a i n , u n i -v e r s a l knowledge, an accumulated body of synthetic a p r i o r i judgments, only i n s o f a r as our mind a c t i v e l y contributes to nature i t s e l f the concepts through which we come to un-derstand i t . Reason, holding i n one hand i t s p r i n c i p l e s , according to which alone concordant appearances can be admitted as equivalent to laws, and i n the other hand the experiment which i t has de-vised i n conformity with these p r i n c i p l e s , must approach nature i n order to be taught by i t . I t must not, however, do so i n the character of a p u p i l who l i s t e n s to everything that the tea-cher chooses to say, but of an appointed judge who compels the witnesses to answer questions  which he himself formulated ( i b i d . , x i i i ; em-phasis added). In the case of metaphysics, however, such a "sure path" and "true method" had not yet been found. The problem, Kant t e l l s us, has been that - 64 -i t has hitherto been assumed that a l l our know-ledge must conform to objects. But a l l attempts to extend our knowledge of objects by e s t a b l i -shing something i n regard to them a p r i o r i by means of concepts have, on this assumption, ended i n f a i l u r e . We must therefore make t r i a l whether we may not have more success i n the tasks of metaphysics i f we suppose that objects  must conform to our knowledge . . . We should then be p r e c i s e l y along the l i n e s of Copernicus' p r i n c i p a l thought ( i b i d . , x v i ; emphasis added). Kant's a l l u s i o n to Copernicus i s meant to focus our attention on the fact that i n the great discoveries of Bacon, G a l i l e o , T o r r i c e l l i , Stahl and, above a l l , Copernicus himself, the mind was somehow attending to what i t i t s e l f had "put into" i t s objects. Analogously, philosophers before Kant ( i n c l u -ding Hume) had found i t impossible to explain how there could be a p r i o r i knowledge of things on the assumption that knowledge of things consists of passive conformity to an ob-j e c t . Therefore, as Copernicus had hypothesized that the complex observed planetary motions were not r e a l motions, but rather apparent motions dependent upon the r e a l motion ( i . e . , the perspective) of the, observer, so Kant maintained that i f the phenomenal c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s of objects are ex-plained i n terms of the constructions of the active knowing mind, i t i s possible to see how knowledge of them can be, and indeed must be, a p r i o r i . Rather than "turning the knower around the world, we change our d i r e c t i o n and move the world around the knower". That i s , a l l objects of knowledge must conform to the structure and a c t i v i t y of the knowing mind which, i n turn, constitutes the ground or pos- s i b i l i t y of such knowledge. Ultimately, we can be c e r t a i n only of our own constructions. Kant's "Copernican revolution" i n philosophy thus yielded a powerful method of transcendental analysis with which he t r i e d to answer three p r i n c i p a l questions of the C r i t i q u e : a) What are the grounds of the p o s s i b i l i t y of mathematics?—answered i n the Trans-cendental Aesthetic. - 65 -b) What are the grounds of the p o s s i b i l i t y of pure natural science?—answered i n the Trans-cendental An a l y t i c . c) Given both of the above answers, i s a science of metaphysics possible?—answered i n the Transcendental D i a l e c t i c . J J In l i g h t of t h e i r significance f o r those, l i k e Popper, who develops a s i m i l a r metaphysical p o s i t i o n i n the wake of Einstein's theories of r e l a t i v i t y , two other aspects of Kant's philosophy deserve mention: his conception of the mind, and the antinomies of reason i t s e l f . F i r s t l y , the emphasis placed upon the ac t i v e , constructive, and synthetic capacity of the mind necessitates and presupposes a cle a r d i s t i n c t i o n between the phenomenal and r e a l c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s of objects. Kant was the f i r s t philosopher to consistently formulate a "three f a -culty" conception Of the mind, though Johann Tetans (the "Ger-man Locke", according to Herder) c l e a r l y anticipated him i n t h i s , and i t was upon th i s foundation that Kant distinguished the r e a l from the phenomenal realms of existence. According to Kant, the mind i s composed of three cogni-t i v e f a c u l t i e s . S e n s i b i l i t y , or our r e c e p t i v i t y to sense data, i s the fa c u l t y by which we gain sensations f o r our conceptions and through which our conceptions are, i n turn, related to actual objects. Kant argues that the a p r i o r i "forms of sense i n t u i t i o n " , to which a l l objects we can ever know must conform, are space and time. In other words, a l l objective knowledge, v i z . , possessing a p r i o r i u n i v e r s a l i t y and necessity, must be spatiotemporal i n nature. In some of the most frequently c i t e d passages from the C r i t i q u e , Kant makes i t cl e a r that we cannot bring a p r i o r i concepts, p r i n c i p l e s , and forms to bear upon objects without sense i n t u i t i o n , and thi s bears a s t r i k i n g s i -m i l a r i t y to Hume's "c e r t a i n manners": In whatever manner and by whatever means cog-n i t i o n may relate to objects, i n t u i t i o n i s that through which i t i s i n immediate r e l a t i o n to them, and to which a l l thought as a means i s d i -! I - 66 -rected. . . . A l l thought must d i r e c t l y or i n -d i r e c t l y be related to i n t u i t i o n s (A 19-B 7 5 ) . Thoughts without contents are empty, i n -t u i t i o n s without concepts are b l i n d (A 51-B 7 5 ) . Understanding (Verstand) i s the second f a c u l t y of the mind and i t s function i s to connect our perceptual con-ceptions of things into synthetic judgments of knowledge about phenomenal objects. Kant explicates these a p r i o r i rules f o r the syntheses of concepts into judgments about objects i n the Transcendental Analytic and c a l l s them " p r i n -c i p l e s of pure understanding". B a s i c a l l y , he derives these "categories" from t r a d i t i o n a l ( A r i s t o t e l i a n ) l o g i c and they can be summarized as follows: a) "Axioms of I n t u i t i o n " — i n these the mind em-ploys the three categories of quantity (unity, p l u r a l i t y , and t o t a l i t y ) . b) "Anticipations of Perception"—these re f e r to the categories of quality ( r e a l i t y , negation, and l i m i t a t i o n ) . These two sets of categories together simply state the grounds by which mathematical ope-rations can be applied to objects (e.g., a l l phenomena must be spatiotemporal, extensive, and intensive i f we are to measure "forces", e t c . ) . c) "Analogies of Experience"—here, the mind em-ploys the three categories of r e l a t i o n (sub-stanti a l i t y / i n h e r e n c e , causality/dependence, and community/interaction). Without a doubt, these are the most important categories inasmuch as they constitute the foundation of Newtonian physics: the f i r s t , s t a t i n g the "conservation of matter", the second,"the law of uniformity" or universal determinism, and the t h i r d , Newton's Third Law of Motion. They are the crux of Kant's - 67 -more s p e c i f i c "answer to Hume" and of his r e v a l i d a t i o n of modern science against scepticism, d) "Postulates of Empirical Thought"—these r e f e r to the categories of modality (pos-s i b i l i t y , existence, and necessity). Kant argued that these were necessary i n order to j u s t i f y the a p p l i c a t i o n of s c i e n t i f i c hypotheses to phenomena and to confirm i n -40 ductive inferences. Kant's main point i s that without these "categories" we would simply be l e f t with a "b l i n d , buzzing confusion" of chaotic sensations. Thus, he drew a r i g i d demarcation between the form of knowledge, which i s supplied by our understanding, and i t s content or substance, which we " i n t u i t " from the phe-nomenal world. As i s well known, an at times f i e r c e b a t t l e has been waged ever since over the r i g i d i t y and transcenden-t a l nature of t h i s dualism of nature and mind. The combined constructions of s e n s i b i l i t y and understan-ding are "subjective" i n the sense that they are the form or structure of our experience and do not correspond to metaphy-s i c a l r e a l i t i e s or "things-in-themselves". Moreover, as "pure" systems of measurement and frames of reference, they extend beyond the l i m i t s of our fragmentary observations and therefore are transcendentally i d e a l . Yet they are also "ob-j e c t i v e " (or empirically real) i n that they are not personal, s u b j e c t i v i s t i c , or psychological p e c u l i a r i t i e s of a given person; they are the boundaries of our ordered, conceptual, public knowledge of phenomena. Thus, Wittgenstein's famous claim i n the Tractatus that language l i m i t s the world i s de-cidedly Kantian i n i n s p i r a t i o n and design. 4^ Reminiscent of L e i b n i z ' New Essays i n t h i s respect, Kant observes, There can be no doubt that a l l our knowledge begins with experience. • . But though a l l our knowledge begins with experience, i t does not follow that i t a l l arises out of experience. - 68 -For i t may well be that even our empirical knowledge i s made up of what we receive through impressions and of what our own f a -cul t y of knowledge supplies from i t s e l f ( B , i ) . * 2 As we w i l l see i n the next chapter, Popper s p e c i f i c a l l y refers to t h i s i n s i g h t as holding the key to "the r i d d l e of natural s c i e n c e " — t h a t i s , though science i s based upon ex-perience, our theories are not derived from observations ( c f . , CR, Chapter 8). While i n s e n s i b i l i t y and understanding, and the world of experience they underlie, there i s no way to prevent an i n f i n i t e regress of phenomenal conditions ( i . e . , every phe-nomenon has other phenomena as i t s condition), reason, our t h i r d f a c u l t y of the mind, demands a t o t a l i t y of these con-d i t i o n s . Otherwise, everything remains contingent. For Kant, reason i s the f a c u l t y of systematic thought, "of providing a wherefore f o r every therefore", as Beck observ e s , ^ and i t s demands cannot be met by a faculty such as our understanding which merely seeks out fragmentary, proximate (or " e f f i c i e n t " ) causes. Therefore, i f reason i s to achieve i t s own demands fo r a causa s u i , i t must speculate beyond any possible ex- peri ence to f i n d the unconditioned, the supersensible realm of "things-in-themselves" (dinge-an-sich). Kant accordingly maintains that i n speculating beyond and negating the r e s t r i c t i o n s of the " c a t e g o r i e s " — t h a t i s , beyond nature i t s e l f i n s ofar as i t i s simply phenomena un-der the laws of understanding—reason necessarily transcends the spatiotemporal order. As Randall notes, "the pattern of r _ 4 4 'pure reason' l±s] timeless and eternal". Thus, while a category and i t s schema are con s t i t u t i v e of nature, the ob-ject of speculative reason can function only as a "regu- l a t i v e idea". In other words, the "regulative p r i n c i p l e s of Reason" do not extend our objective knowledge i n the sense that the categories do, but guide reason i n i t s quest f o r greater unity (or t o t a l i t y ) beyond s e n s i b i l i a ( c . f . , A 680-B 708). But to r e c a l l an e a r l i e r point, since a category can - 69 -be applied, or "schematized", to an object only v i a a sensuous representation (or " i n t u i t i o n " ) , they w i l l not permit us to know the supersensible realm, but only to think of i t . Again, as we w i l l see i n the following chapter, Popper also t r i e s to take advantage of these assumptions i n formulating the l o g i c a l demarcation between genuine " s c i e n t i f i c " knowledge and metaphysics. By so doing, he hopes to preserve the empirical foundation of cognitive progress without denying the p o s i t i v e role of speculative reasoning i n the process as well. Kant's epistemology thus necessarily r e f l e c t s reason divided against i t s e l f . While t h e o r e t i c a l reason does i t s best to organize and "reduce our knowledge into l o g i c a l l y formal and mathematical systems which give us parsimonious explanations of phenomena, speculative reason pushes onwards and upwards f o r " f i n a l answers", outside and beyond our cau-s a l l y ordered knowledge of "objective r e a l i t y " , towards the noumenal realm of the "ding-an-sich". Despite the fact that speculative reason must necessarily cut i t s e l f o f f from the world of conditioned or "determined" phenomena, i t neverthe-l e s s must r e l y on the "categories" of thought i n order to do so. In short, Kant met modernity's underlying tension be-tween the v a l i d a t i o n of s c i e n t i f i c knowledge and the enchant- ment or meaning of i t s effects on modern l i f e by f i n d i n g v i r -tue i n both t h e i r demands. This leads us to one f i n a l dimension of Kant's epistemo-logy, namely, the "antinomies of Pure Reason" found i n the Transcendental D i a l e c t i c (A 4 4 4 - 5 5 8 - B 4 7 2 - 5 8 6 ) . In the se-cond C r i t i q u e of P r a c t i c a l Reason ( 1 7 8 8 ) , Kant wrote that "the antinomy of pure reason, which becomes obvious i n i t s d i a l e c t i c , i s , i n f a c t , the most fortunate perplexity i n which human reason could ever have become involved, since 4 i t f i n a l l y compels us to seek to escape from t h i s l a b y r i n t h " . Indeed, some ten years l a t e r , Kant wrote to his good f r i e n d and follower, C h r i s t i a n Garve, that the discovery of the a n t i -- 7 0 -nomy of speculative reason was the beginning of his " c r i t i -c a l philosophy". In the Critique of Pure Reason, Kant t r i e s to explicate the problem by exploring four "antinomies  within speculative reason. That i s , he proceeds to demon-strate that f o r every synthetic a p r i o r i judgment, there i s an equally v a l i d and "necessary" ( i n the l o g i c a l sense) argu ment that could prove i t s contradiction, and which also ex-presses an inescapable i n t e r e s t of reason. The " t h i r d a n t i -nomy" i s perhaps the most revealing i n that i t exposes the c o n f l i c t within the idea of causality i t s e l f . B r i e f l y , the thesis states the existence of causes not subsumed under the laws of nature, or causation other than mechanical causation while the a n t i t h e s i s asserts the s u f f i c i e n c y of natural cau-sation, or causation under the laws of nature (both those a l ready known and yet to be discovered). Kant believed that uncovering such antinomies was "the most fortunate perplexity" into which reason could ever f a l l because " c r i t i c a l l y " understood, they need not be taken se-r i o u s l y at a l l . Instead, "they can be laughed at, as mere chi l d ' s play" (A 743-B 7 7 1 ) . Continuing, he notes, Both parties beat the a i r , and wrestle with t h e i r own shadows, since they go beyond the  l i m i t s of nature, where there i s nothing they can seize and hold with t h e i r dogmatic grasp. Fight as they may, the shadows which they cleave asunder grow together again forthwith, l i k e the heroes of V a l h a l l a , to disport them-selves anew i n bloodless contests (A 756-B 7 8 6 ; Kemp-Smith t r a n s l a t i o n , emphasis added). Therefore, the only adequate resolution of the t h i r d a n t i -nomy, Kant maintained, l i e s i n the recognition that both the thesis and a n t i t h e s i s may be true i f t h e i r respective  spheres of a p p l i c a t i o n are distinguished. Each i s defined, by the nature of the experience supporting i t , and neither can possibly be v a l i d i f employed beyond the realm to which t h e i r respective proofs extend. The thesis presents the claims of reason, which require a s u f f i c i e n t cause f o r every phenomena. However, as we have - 71 -seen, such a s u f f i c i e n t cause cannot be found within the realm of phenomena due to an i n f i n i t e regress of phenomenal conditions. The a n t i t h e s i s , on the other hand, represents the i n t e r e s t of understanding i n i t s e f f o r t s to apply the law of ca u s a l i t y to a spatiotemporal series of events. As Beck r i g h t l y notes, the whole argument shows "that the assumption of a free cause among phenomena would i n t e r -47 rupt the continuity required by natural law". 1 The contra-d i c t i o n disappears, however, when the thesis i s applied to rela t i o n s between noumena ("things-in-themselves") and the ant i - t h e s i s to rel a t i o n s among phenomena. As Kant observes i n the Cr i t i q u e of P r a c t i c a l Reason, • • . there i s no true c o n f l i c t i f the events and even the world i n which they occur are re-garded as only appearances (as they should be) • . . one and the same being acting as ap- pearance (even to h i s own inner sense) has a caus a l i t y i n the sensuous world always i n ac- cordance with the mechanism of nature; while with respect of the same event, so f a r as the acting person regards himself as noumenon (as pure i n t e l l i g e n c e , e x i s t i n g without temporal determination), he can contain a determining  ground of that cau s a l i t y according to natural  laws, and t h i s determining ground of natural ca u s a l i t y i s free from every natural law (Pr. Reas., TT8-19; emphasis added). Without th i s dualism between homo noumenon and homo pheno- menon, obviously of Platonic provenance, Kant's entire " c r i -t i c a l " project collapses into either one of i t s dominant mo-ments or p o l a r i t i e s : l o g i c a l empiricism or positivism, on the one hand, or some va r i e t y of absolute idealism or roman-48 ticism, on the other. For his part, Kant argued f o r the necessity of the dualism to the very l a s t . Against the disenchantment and "unhappy consciousness" of the early German Romantics (or Sturm und  Drangers), es p e c i a l l y Herder and Jacobi, Kant repeatedly c r i -t i c i z e d t h e i r claims of being able to "know" the super-sen-s i b l e realm of noumena and f o r having ignored the necessity - 7 2 -of both poles of his " c r i t i c a l " r e v i s i o n of metaphysics. For instance, Fichte's Absolute Idealism with i t s claim of being a more f a i t h f u l descendant of " c r i t i c a l philosophizing" than even Kant's own l a t e r work had been brought stern rebuke from the old master himself. Kant argued to the end that i t was only by embracing such a transcendental dualism that we can consistently defend ourselves against Hume's scepticism and be able to af f i r m our p r a c t i c a l freedom. Thus, as he observed i n the Preface to the second e d i t i o n of the f i r s t C r i t i q u e , "I have found i t necessary to deny knowledge i n order to make room f o r f a i t h " ( B , xxx; emphasis added). Theo-r e t i c a l knowledge of the noumenal realm, he argued, would destroy the very p o s s i b i l i t y of "free", undetermined actions. And only such an assumption can j u s t i f y our b e l i e f that the moral demands we place upon ourselves can be met; i n other words, only through t h e o r e t i c a l ignorance of the future can there be a secure basis f o r our p r a c t i c a l f a i t h i n the im-provement of mankind. Popper extends th i s view i n several i n t e r e s t i n g directions i n his denial that there can ever be such a thing as "laws" i n history, but that nonetheless, though "history as such" has no "meaning" or enchantment, there i s s t i l l hope i n proceeding as jlf we can "give i t meaning" through our endeavours. I w i l l return to these themes i n chapters to follow, but esp e c i a l l y i n Chapter 6 t and some of the p a r t i c u l a r problems that a r i s e i n connection with Kant's and Popper's equally d u a l i s t i c form of transcendenta-lism w i l l be the subject of Chapter 7 . In the f i r s t C r i t i q u e , Kant's defense of the r a t i o n a l i t y of our f a i t h i n freedom—and, by implication, of the possi-b i l i t y of progress upon which i t r e s t s — a s a supersensible, noumenal mode of ca u s a l i t y , was li m i t e d to his f i x i n g a boundary beyond which s c i e n t i f i c knowledge cannot v a l i d l y aspire, and to hi s proof that mechanism i s not the only pos-s i b l e form of ca u s a l i t y . But, for Kant, the r e a l i t y of fr e e -dom has to be grounded i n the same transcendental manner as - 7 3 -pure t h e o r e t i c a l reason had been defended against Hume's empiricism and scepticism. Therefore, i n the Groundwork  for the Metaphysics of Morals ( 1 7 8 5 ) and the C r i t i q u e of  P r a c t i c a l Reason, Kant j u s t i f i e s freedom more p o s i t i v e l y by i n d i c a t i n g i t s existence as a necessary a p r i o r i con-d i t i o n of a c e r t a i n type of experience, namely, of mora-l i t y with i t s un i v e r s a l and necessary injunctions. Kant's point i s that, i n order to r a t i o n a l l y j u s t i f y the p o s s i b i -l i t y and phenomenon of moral necessitation, we must pre-suppose a "free cause". Only i f free causes are held to ac t u a l l y exist can the unconditional necessity of moral law be explained: Freedom . . . among a l l the ideas of specu-l a t i v e reason i s the only one whose p o s s i b i -l i t y we know a p r i o r i . We do not understand i t , but we know i t as the condition of the moral law which we do know. There r e a l l y i s freedom, f o r t h i s Idea i s revealed by moral law.49 There i s thus a perfect p a r a l l e l i s m between Kant's " t h e o r e t i c a l " and " p r a c t i c a l " philosophies insofar as the function of reason i s concerned. In both phases, reason functions as the active law-giver and i s bound by the laws  o r rales which i t gives. While the a p r i o r i t y of knowledge can be guaranteed and secured only by rooting i t i n our transcendental understanding, so too the a p r i o r i t y of moral duty and o b l i g a t i o n can be preserved only by basing i t on an equally "pure", a l b e i t acting, p r a c t i c a l reason. Kant com-pares the two functions as follows: The L e g i s l a t i o n of human reason (philosophy) has two objects, nature and freedom, and therefore contains not only the laws of nature, but also the moral law, presenting them at f i r s t i n two d i s t i n c t systems, but ultimately i n one single p h i l o s o p h i c a l system. The philosophy of nature deals with a l l that i s , the philosphy of morals with a l l that which ought to be (A 840-B 8 6 8 ; emphasis added). - 74 -Accordingly, there i s much wisdom i n Tarhet's obser-vation that "there i s ju s t i c e i n c a l l i n g the l e g a l metaphor the main s t r u c t u r a l metaphor of the ( f i r s t ) C r i t i q u e " , and i n affirming Kant's b e l i e f that "the c r i t i q u e of pure reason can be regarded as the true t r i b u n a l of a l l disputes of pure reason, . . . i n which our disputes have to be con-ducted by the recognized methods of l e g a l action" (A 751-B 779)• On Kant's view, the only r a t i o n a l response to the c r i s i s of Enlightenment i d e a l s — e s p e c i a l l y the p o t e n t i a l l y destructive r i f t between the v a l i d a t i o n of the Baconian maxim that know-ledge i s power and the threat t h i s poses to the enchantment and meaningfulness of modern l i f e — w a s to s e t t l e the matter " i n court", as i t were, before the tribunal of a once-again sovereign, because methodically f o r t i f i e d , reason. v The most valuable insights are arrived at l a s t ; but the most valuable insights are methods. t - , — F r i e d r i c h Nietzsche I t would be d i f f i c u l t to overestimate the impact of Kant's " c r i t i c a l " philosophy on 19th and 20th century phi-losophy and the s o c i a l sciences. Hence, the widespread view referred to i n the previous chapter that one may philoso-phize f o r or against but not without a serious consideration of his thought. Insofar as my in t e r p r e t a t i o n of Popper's thought i s concerned, the following points deserve pa r t i c u -l a r note at t h i s juncture (the c r i t i c a l discussion of which w i l l follow i n chapters to come): F i r s t , with regard to the general function of philoso-phy, Kant's greatest concern was to retrieve our r a t i o n a l f a i t h i n "progress" understood as the p o s s i b i l i t y of u l t i -mately knowing r e a l i t y and of increasing human autonomy. - 7 5 -As we have seen, while scepticism and i r r a t i o n a l i s m had come to pose the severest of challenges to the f i r s t of these phi-losophical p i l l a r s of modernity, the very v a l i d i t y of New-tonian mechanism i t s e l f seemed to jeopardize our status as "free", self-determining h i s t o r i c a l agents. To the extent that t h i s c r i s i s i n optimism and i n t e l l e c t u a l self-confidence went unanswered, Kant knew a l l too well that we would be l e f t i n a state of unenlightened " s e l f - i n c u r r e d immaturity", i n -conclusive "opinion-mongering", and b l i n d "fumbling and guess-work" as to the future course of events. In the absence of an adequate response, no longer—indeed, perhaps never again^— would we be able to believe (as had been the custom since the Renaissance and Enlightenment) that "what mind might encom-pass of knowledge of the physical universe has a di r e c t bearing upon the quality of human existence, and . . . that 53 mind can . . . be decisive i n p o l i t i c a l l i f e " . J Taking a step back from the pa r t i c u l a r s of his thought, Kant's solu t i o n to thi s dilemma was to propose a set of r a d i -c a l l y new "methodical" c r i t e r i a and philosophical premises for the reenchantment of reason, and thus, of renewing our f a i t h i n the prospects and p o s s i b i l i t y of orderly, purposeful  growth i n mind and society a l i k e . Above a l l , t h i s entailed subjecting reason i t s e l f to a transcendental c r i t i q u e of i t s own powers of knowing. And ultimately, this meant set t i n g  l i m i t s to the p o t e n t i a l l y destructive, contradictory a s p i -rations that thought i t s e l f can be seen to embody—reckless-l y "leaving the ground of experience" i n quest of a sense of greater " t o t a l i t y " and the discovery of an ultimate causa s u i . As Kant observed i n the Criti q u e of Pure Reason, he considered himself, along with David Hume, "one of those geographers of human reason" (A 760-B 7 8 8 ) , forever mapping or demarcating the respective spheres and inte r e s t s of our understanding nature as an order of contingent, " e f f i c i e n t l y " caused (but "meaningless") phenomena and of reason which continually presses "onwards and upwards" beyond the categories of our - 76 -phenomenal s e n s i b i l i t y and de facto determination toward the mundus i n t e l l i g i b u s of "ends". Unfortunately, Kant l e f t a l l the relationships and precise mediations between the two v a l u e s — t h e realms of necessity and freedom—quite obscure i n l i g h t of his purely formal characterisation of the "trans-cendental" and a p r i o r i nature of the s e l f . I w i l l return to this problem,in connection with Popper's thought,in Chapter 7. This emphasis, i n Kant, on the preventative or prophy-l a c t i c function of philosophy as a necessary precondition f o r progress toward "enlightenment" ideals i s f a r from a c c i -dental. On the contrary, i t takes us to the center of his metaphysics and universe of discourse. Whether i t be i n the Preface to the f i r s t C r i t i q u e , where he r e c a l l s "having found i t necessary to deny knowledge i n order to make room f o r f a i t h " (B, xxx), or the concluding paragraph of the Critique of Prac- t i c a l Reason, where he c h a r a c t e r i s t i c a l l y notes "that the i n -scrutable wisdom through which we exist i s not less worthy of veneration i n respect to what i t denies us than i n what i t has 54 granted", Kant's underlying presupposition was the same: Nature i t s e l f f i x e s l i m i t s to how we should conduct our i n -vestigations, l i m i t s which we ignore only at great p e r i l to the future development of the species. In t h i s context, i t i s also i n t e r e s t i n g to note the cen-t r a l i t y of Seneca's Stoicism i n Kant's p o l i t i c a l thought and philosophy of hist o r y as best evidenced by his frequent re-ference to one of the E p i s t l e s , "Duncunt volentum f a t a , nolen-tum trahunt/The fates lead him who i s w i l l i n g , but drags him 55 who i s unwilling". Kant's project i s thus best understood as an attempt to formulate the necessary, l o g i c a l l i m i t s to what we can know and, accordingly, what we ought to do and may hope f o r . Above a l l else, his i s a metaphysics of orderly, lawful growth, of p o s s i b i l i t i e s and progress within predeter- mined l i m i t s . Seldom have these central assumptions and ideals of l i -beralism and the Enlightenment suffered from as many assaults, - 77 -and from as many directions of both an i n t e l l e c t u a l and s o c i a l kind, as during the f i r s t h a l f of Popper's l i f e . I f , as the l a t e George Lichtheim observed, "the decade 1914-24 witnessed the greatest upheaval Europe had undergone since 56 Napoleon", t h i s was even more true during the next decade and a h a l f f o r i n t e l l e c t u a l s such as Popper, who not only endured the tragic aftermath of the war, but who t r i e d to make sense of i t s causes and provide the necessary means with which to combat t h e i r possible recurrence. And i t i s pr e c i s e l y i n that context that the metaphysical structure of Kant's thought emerges as of such importance i n s i t u a t i n g Popper's work v i s - a - v i s the p a r t i c u l a r series of c r i s e s his theories were intended to address. More s p e c i f i c a l l y , f o r Popper the underlying motivation and structure of Kant's "reply to Hume" came to serve as the cornerstone of a systematic defense of r a t i o n a l i t y and pro-gress during a period i n which they were under f a r more serious attack than anything Kant ever envisioned. I f Enlightenment ideals about the e f f i c a c y of reason i n c l a r i f y i n g and helping us to solve s o c i a l and p o l i t i c a l problems are once again "be-coming increasingly t h i n and unconvincing" to many sensitive 57 thinkers among us, so much les s secure must t h e i r stature and place have been i n what Popper r e c a l l s as "starving post-war Vienna"—the aftermath of a war that "had destroyed the world i n which [he] had grown up". There i s strong evidence to suggest that Popper's experience during the 1920s and 30s i n Vienna of the widespread assault upon Enlightenment i d e a l s , not only i n s o c i a l and p o l i t i c a l a f f a i r s but within the natural sciences and espitemology as well, i s of decisive importance to an understanding of h i s thought and the widespread reception i t subsequently has received. As we s h a l l see i n the chapters to follow, the doctrines and "enemies" Popper i n i t i a l l y chose and continues to attack, the weapons he u t i l i z e s i n attempting to counteract, i f not t o t a l l y defeat, t h e i r c r e d i b i l i t y and p o t e n t i a l influence, - 78 -and the p o s i t i v e thrust of his own philosophy are profoundly Kantian and deeply committed to defending the p r o s p e c t s — o r what Weber and, more recently, Dahrendorf c a l l the " l i f e chan-58 ces" of a r a t i o n a l , l i b e r a l way of l i f e against forms of i r -rationalism and authoritarianism that were endemic i n the post-war c a p i t o l of the, by-then, truncated Austrian Republic. Popper himself, l i k e Kant, t e l l s us that philosophy un-derstood as the " l e g i s l a t i o n of human reason" has "two objects, nature and freedom". And, l i k e Kant, Popper contends that these "two objects" must ultimately be presented i n one uni-f i e d philosophy f o r , i n both contexts, i t i s man's reason, the knowing mind, that determines t h e i r respective natures and the conditions of t h e i r p o s s i b i l i t y . Thus, i n the opening section of The S e l f and I t s Brain, f i t t i n g l y e n t i t l e d , "Kant's Argument", Popper observes that "Kant i s es-sentially ri g h t " i n seeing the seriousness of the p o t e n t i a l contradiction be-tween the v a l i d a t i o n of s c i e n t i f i c knowledge and the prospects of leading an enchanted, meaningful existence. But, f o r both Kant and Popper, disenchantment with the p o s s i b i l i t y of pro-gress and "enlightenment" need not follow. Theirs are p h i l o -sophies of hope i n orderly growth. In Popper's own words, though s c i e n t i f i c knowledge "annihilates the importance of a man, considered as a part of the physical universe", a pro-per understanding of "the i n v i s i b l e s e l f " and the human per-sonality "raises immeasurably his value as an i n t e l l i g e n t and responsible being" (SB, 3). Echoing Josef Popper-Lynkeus (1838-1921), a well-known engineer-inventor, s o c i a l reformer, and leading l i t e r a r y figure i n Vienna during the f i r s t two decades of the century, Popper notes that "every time a man dies, a whole universe i s destroyed. (One r e a l i z e s t h i s when one i d e n t i f i e s oneself with that man)". Human beings, he continues, are irreplaceable; and i n being irreplaceable they are c l e a r l y very d i f f e r e n t from machines. They are capable of suffering, and of facing death consciously. They are selves; they are ends i n themselves, as Kant said ( i b i d ) . - 79 -Underlying everything Popper has written i s this conviction that i n d i v i d u a l human beings are "irreplaceable", the pre-servation and development of which ultimately should govern a l l our attitudes and actions. As he c h a r a c t e r i s t i c a l l y ob-served i n a recent essay, "How I see Philosophy", We do not know how i t i s that we are a l i v e on t h i s wonderful l i t t l e p l a n e t — o r why there should be something l i k e l i f e , to make our planet so b e a u t i f u l . But here we are, and we have every reason to wonder at i t , and to f e e l g r a t e f u l f o r i t . I t comes close to being a miracle. • . • There may be many other planets with l i f e on them. Yet i f we pick out at random a place i n the universe, then the p r o b a b i l i t y . • . of f i n d i n g a l i f e - c a r r y i n g body at that place w i l l be zero, or almost zero. So l i f e has at any rate the value of something rare; i t i s precious. We are i n c l i n e d to forget t h i s , and treat l i f e cheaply, perhaps out of thought-lessness; or perhaps because this b e a u t i f u l earth of ours i s , no doubt, a b i t overcrowded. . . . There are those who think that l i f e i s valueless because i t has an end. They do not think that the opposite argument might also be proposed: that i f there were no end to l i f e , i t would have no value; that i t i s , i n part, the ever-present danger of l o s i n g i t which helps to bring home to us the value of l i f e ("Philo-sophy", 55). Not only i s t r e a t i n g human beings as "ends i n themselves" rather than as mere "means" thus incompatible "with the ma-t e r i a l i s t doctrine that men are machines", but equally, i f not more importantly, with any and a l l denials that mind or " c r i t i c a l " r a t i o n a l i t y can be "decisive" i n i n t e l l e c t u a l and p o l i t i c a l a f f a i r s . This Kantian-inspired c r i t i q u e of a l l "determinisms" because of t h e i r i n t e l l e c t u a l and moral con- sequences—above a l l , t h e i r anti-humanitarian i m p l i c a t i o n s — represents the underlying and sustaining motivation to Popper's better-known views concerning epistemological f a l l i b i l i s m , methodological f a l s i f i c a t i o n i s m , and the philosophies of h i s -tory and p o l i t i c s (the subjects of the l a s t three chapters - 80 -of this study). In the follwing chapter, I w i l l characterize t h i s moral and i n t e l l e c t u a l consequentialism of Popper's thought as a kind of L o g i c a l Pragmatism, the view of "truth as consequences". There, we s h a l l see that what distinguishes Popper's thought from other v a r i e t i e s of Neo-Kantianism i s i t s pragmatic, prob-lem-solving, evolutionary core, while what distances his thought from most other types of pragmatism (that of C. S. Peirce being the one notable exception), i s his logicism, the presupposition which he shares with the members of the Vienna C i r c l e that formal l o g i c occupies a p r i v i l e g e d , es-s e n t i a l l y normative, j u r i d i c a l role i n the philosophy of science which, i n turn, represents our best standard of r a t i o n a l i t y , the growth of knowledge, and a free and "open" society as a whole. And, u n i t i n g the two poles of Popper's thought—the dynamic and the s t a t i c , the anthropological and the transcendental, the pragmatic and the l o g i c a l , the demands of order and growth—is Kant's conception of human autonomy, the view of man as p o t e n t i a l l y " c i t i z e n and b u i l d e r of his 59 own world". This, Popper never t i r e s of reminding us, is a hope worth f i g h t i n g f o r i n the realm of ideas. I believe that t h i s aspect of Popper's thought i s one of the primary reasons f o r the tremendous—some have claimed, un-precedented—following his thought now enjoys, evidenced by both the quantity of secondary l i t e r a t u r e and commentary his writings have commanded, and the presence of organized bodies and i n s t i t u t i o n s now conducting themselves with the i n s p i r a t i o n and d o c t r i n a l guidance of Popper foremost i n mind.^ In a cen-tury known primarily f o r i t s wars and b r u t a l i t i e s , i t s sense of quiet desperation and meaninglessness, and a profoundly deep resignation to a future of n e g l i g i b l e , i f any, improve-ments i n the condition of the species as a whole, Popper's i s a message of hopeful but l i m i t e d p o s s i b i l i t i e s — o f s u r v i v a l and purposeful growth f o r those who are s t i l l w i l l i n g to learn. Not c o i n c i d e n t a l l y , as we s h a l l see at greater length i n -•81 -the next chapter, Popper's i n t e l l e c t u a l odyssey began i n the area of educational psychology and learning theory. And, i n spite of his subsequent "changeover" from the psychology to the methodology of knowledge, Popper's thought i s reminiscent of John Dewey's i n i t s l i f e - l o n g attempt to l i n k the s u r v i v a l and proper understanding of the values and purposes we cherish most with the reform of our habitual ways of thinking, edu-cat i o n a l p r a c t i c e , and pedagogical methodology. The rationa-l i t y of a free, open, and progressive society, he t e l l s us, i s above a l l else successful problem-solving understood as the methodical elimination of error. More than anything else, as merchants of the mind we must learn to teach our society how to l i v e within the l o g i c and l i m i t s of our experience. Though many have r i g h t l y taken offense at Popper's f r e -quently combative s t y l e and the strident tone of his prose, ( i n many but the more technical of his writings), one would do well to bear i n mind the moral consequentialism and the r a d i c a l humanitarianism and individualism that motivates and sustains such rhetoric and his use of the language. Time and time again, Popper argues, The choice before us i s not simply an i n t e l l e c t u a l a f f a i r , or a matter of taste. I t i s a moral de-c i s i o n . . . . For the question whether we adopt some more or le s s r a d i c a l form bf i r r a t i o n a l i s m , or whether we adopt . . . ' c r i t i c a l rationalism', w i l l deeply a f f e c t our whole attitude towards other men, and towards the problems of s o c i a l l i f e . • . • , [And] whenever we are faced with a moral decision of a more abstract kind, i t i s most h e l p f u l to analyse c a r e f u l l y the conse- quences which are l i k e l y to r e s u l t from the a l -ternatives between which we have to choose. For only i f we can v i s u a l i z e these consequences i n a concrete and p r a c t i c a l way, do we r e a l l y know what our decision i s about; otherwise we decide b l i n d l y (OS, I I , 232; emphasis added). Ideas, he notes i n one of his l a t e r c o l l e c t i o n s of essays, "are dangerous and powerful things" (CR, 5). In spite of the - 82 -fact that the theory of knowledge or epistemology i s "reputed ~ to be the most abstract and remote and altogether i r r e l e v a n t region of pure philosophy", Popper reminds us that Kant's a t t i -tude toward the subject was completely d i f f e r e n t . Popper be-l i e v e s that Kant and, more recently, Bertrand Russell, were both r i g h t i n a t t r i b u t i n g "to epistemology p r a c t i c a l conse-quences f o r science, ethics, and even p o l i t i c s " ( i b i d , 4). C i t i n g Russell's Let the People Think (1941), Popper concurs with the view that "epistemological r e l a t i v i s m , or the idea that there i s no such thing as objective truth, and epistemo-l o g i c a l pragmatism, or the idea that truth i s the same as usefulness, are c l o s e l y linked with authoritarian and t o t a -l i t a r i a n ideas" ( i b i d , 4-5)• I t i s c h a r a c t e r i s t i c of Popper's thought that, The s i t u a t i o n i s r e a l l y very simple. The b e l i e f of a l i b e r a l — t h e b e l i e f i n the p o s s i b i l i t y of a rule of law, of equal j u s t i c e , of fundamental r i g h t s , and a free s o c i e t y — c a n e a s i l y survive the recognition that judges are not omniscient and may make mistakes about facts and that, i n p r a c t i c e , absolute j u s t i c e i s hardly ever rea-l i z e d i n any p a r t i c u l a r l e g a l case. But t h i s b e l i e f i n the p o s s i b i l i t y of a rule of law, of j u s t i c e , and of freedom, cannot well survive the acceptance of an epistemology which teaches that there are no objective f a c t s ; not merely i n t h i s p a r t i c u l a r case, but i n any other case; and that the judge cannot have made a f a c t u a l mistake because he can no more be wrong about the facts than he can be right ( i b i d , 5; empha-s i s added). Indeed, Popper has gone so f a r as to argue that i t i s the acceptance of such a conception of standards of r a t i o n a l c r i t i c i s m and objective truth which creates the dignity of the i n d i v i d u a l man; which makes him responsible, morally as well as i n t e l l e c t u a l l y ; which enables him not only to act r a t i o n a l l y , but also to contemplate and adjudicate, and to discriminate between, competing theories. These standards of objective truth and c r i t i -cism may teach him to try again, and to think - 83 -again; • . • They may teach him to apply the method of t r a i l and error i n every f i e l d , and e s p e c i a l l y i n science; and thus they may teach him how to learn from his mistakes, and how to search f o r them. These standards may help him to discover how l i t t l e he knows, and how much there i s that he does not know. . . . They may help him to become aware of the fact that he owes hi s growth to other people's c r i t i c i s m s , and that reasonableness i s readiness to l i s t e n to c r i t i c i s m . And i n this way they may even help him to transcend his animal past, and with i t that subjectivism and voluntarism i n which romantic and i r r a t i o n a l i s t philosophies may try to hold him captive (CR, 3 8 4 ) . One would be hard pressed to f i n d a more p r i n c i p l e d and outspoken h e i r to Kant's defense of the p o s s i b i l i t y and ideals of "enlightenment" than Popper. In this connection, i t i s a l l too frequently forgotten that Kant ultimately answered the question,"What i s Enlightenment?" i n terms of the philosophy 61 of history, not metaphysically or epistemologically. In 1784, he thus defined enlightenment as mankind's departure from i t s own s e l f - i n c u r r e d immaturity and s e r v i t u d e — i n short, as autonomy. And, s i g i f i c a n t l y , Kant defined the h i s t o r i c a l place and s i g n i f i c a n c e of his own philosophy by viewing the epoch i n which he l i v e d as a whole as one of enlightenment. To the extent that enlightenment could be achieved, Kant con-tended, i t was not as a private accomplishment, but instead as a general c u l t u r a l and h i s t o r i c a l , universal process. As a keen student of the concept observes, In r e l i g i o n , i t means the struggle f o r tolerance against s u p e r s t i t i t o n and a revolt of reason against the orthodox priesthood; i n p o l i t i c s , the struggle f o r freedom before the law against the a r b i t r a r y despotism of estates; i n natural science, empiricism; i n philosophy, the l i -beration from the tutelage of theology and the f i g h t against dogmatism and metaphysics. 5 2 Confronted with the imminent threat of a new Dark Age, Popper was understandably wary of a l l "pr o g r e s s i v i s t " p h i l o -sophies of h i s t o r y which Kant's thought inspired, but none-- 84 -theless, he realizes^ the depths of our longing f o r meaning and purpose i n l i f e , f o r having some r a t i o n a l grounds f o r hope and progress. And, l i k e Kant, these he would eventually come to locate i n our understanding of the orderly and metho-d i c a l growth of knowledge: "our mind grows and transcends i t s e l f . I f humanism i s concerned with the growth of the hu-man mind, what then i s the t r a d i t i o n of humanism i f not a t r a d i t i o n of c r i t i c i s m and reasonableness?" (CR, 384). Thus, "although hi s t o r y has no meaning, we can give i t a meaning" provided we lear n to l i v e within the l i m i t s of how l i t t l e we r e a l l y know (OS, I I , 269, 278). Like the j u r i s t i n Musil's Man Without Q u a l i t i e s , Popper "does not go to Nature f o r his concepts; what he does i s to penetrate into Nature with the flame of i n t e l l e c t and the sword of the moral law". J The remainder of t h i s study traces the impact of this metaphysical structure and moral impulse of Kantianism on Popper's epistemology and methodology of the natural sciences (Chapter 4), his corresponding recommendations f o r the con-duct of s o c i a l inquiry (Chapter 5), as well as his defense of l i b e r a l democracies against a host of challenges of both an i n t e l l e c t u a l and p r