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Commonwealth and civility : a study of Thomas Hobbes Stoffell, Brian Frederick 1984

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COMMONWEALTH AND C I V I L I T Y : A STUDY OF THOMAS HOBBES by B r i a n F r e d e r i c k S t o f f e l l B . A . ( H o n s ) , U n i v e r s i t y o f W e s t e r n A u s t r a l i a A THESIS SUBMITTED I N PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY i n THE FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIES (Depa r tmen t o f P h i l o s o p h y ) We^a^cep t 1^his t h e s i s a s c o n f o r m i n g ' t o t h ^ j r e q u i r e d standqfltf_ / THE UNIVERSITY OF BRrVlsVi COLUMBIA S e p t e m b e r , 1984 © B r i a n F r e d e r i c k S t o f f e l l , 1984 In presenting t h i s thesis i n p a r t i a l f u l f i l m e n t of the requirements for an advanced degree at the University of B r i t i s h Columbia, I agree that the Library s h a l l make i t f r e e l y available for reference and study. I further agree that permission for extensive copying of t h i s thesis for scholarly purposes may be granted by the head of my department or by his or her representatives. I t i s understood that copying or publication of t h i s thesis for f i n a n c i a l gain s h a l l not be allowed without my written permission. Department of The University of B r i t i s h Columbia 1956 M a i n M a l l Vancouver, Canada V6T 1Y3 - 6 n/Rn - i i -ABSTRACT The pr i n c i p a l claim of t h i s thesis i s that Hobbes neither argues for , nor i s committed to, psychological egoism. More p o s i t i v e l y , I construct a reading of Hobbes which gives a non-egoistic theory of character the role of supporting his p o l i t i c a l theory. In so doing I present a Hobbes whose mechanistic psychology and account of self-preservation are neutral with respect to the character of men in c i v i l l i f e . I deny that there are any compelling reasons to treat Hobbesian individuals as predisposed to some form of egoism. What I refer to as a "theory of character" i s what Hobbes treats under the headings of "dispositions" and "manners". I conclude that Hobbes has ample room within his psychology for c i v i c virtues and for motivations at odds with psychological egoism. Contrary to Gauthier, who argues that Hobbes i s committed to psychological egoism because of details i n his mechanistic psychology, I contend that the mechanistic basis of the psychology i s what disallows any ascription of egoism to Hobbes. I do t h i s without following either McNeilly or Gert: the former of whom believes that Hobbes1 materialism i s irrelevant to the remainder of his philosophy, and the l a t t e r of whom believes that the materialism i s destructive of any motivational theory at a l l . Disagreeing with a l l three, I argue for a positive and constructive relationship between Hobbes' materialism and psychology. In particular I claim that one aspect of Hobbes' materialism - the account of endeavour or conatus - constitutes a general theory of dispositions, one implication of which i s that human dispositions are not fixed i n any - i i i -way that would be necessary to create the character of the egoist. So, far from being the reason why Hobbesian individuals are egoists, his materialism provides what I take to be the best reason for thinking that they are not. To argue that Hobbesian individuals are not eg o i s t i c , and to base that claim on features of his materialism i s one thing; but of course the reason alluded to - features of his materialism - i s arcane to say the. l e a s t . There are other reasons available to support the same conclusion, and these reasons are far more accessible than the f i r s t . These reasons derive from descriptions Hobbes gives of the character of the best kind of men (those whom I use the term "magnanimous" to refer t o ) . I consider the range of character t r a i t s i n question, and conclude that Hobbes was certainly impressed by older c h i v a l r i c and martial v i r t u e s , despite being a strong proponent of a more c i v i l i a n code of virtues. My method for looking into these q u a l i t i e s of character assumes a particular point of view. The point of view i n question i s h i s t o r i c a l : I consider what Hobbes says about character i n terms of the s o c i a l context centring on the Jacobean and Caroline aristocracy. My strategy here i s designed to do two things. F i r s t l y , I wish to support the claim that Hobbes discusses character t r a i t s for which there are no obvious -egoi s t i c interpretation. And secondly, I wish to shed some l i g h t on why Hobbes was so exercised by the s o c i a l impact of certain motives; p a r t i c u l a r l y those connected with power, honour, and worth. The material I cover i s precisely that which interested Macpherson. However, unlike him I do not believe that Hobbes1 analysis of s o c i a l - i v -interactions was one unwittingly suffused with details taken from early English capitalism. Rather, my argument i s that Hobbes' conception of the p i t f a l l s i n the path of c i v i l i t y was largely based on his understanding of a r i s t o c r a t i c character. Following Keith Thomas I suggest that Hobbes was a c r i t i c of the culture for which honour was the dominant concern; although i n some respects a sympathetic c r i t i c . - V -C G N T E N T S A c k n o w l e d g e m e n t v i i i R e f e r e n c e s t o w o r k s b y H o b b e s v i i A b s t r a c t i i I n t r o d u c t i o n 1 C h a p t e r 1 H I S T O R Y AND I N T E R P R E T A T I O N I . 1 1 1 . 1 Q u e n t i n S k i n n e r 12 1 . 2 T h e I m a g e o f t h e B e a s t 2 4 C h a p t e r 2 D A V I D G A U T H I E R ' S H O B B E S I A N MAN 3 8 2 . 1 T h e S t a t e o f N a t u r e a s T e r m i n a l , 3 9 2 . 2 T h e M a t e r i a l B a s i s 4 8 2 . 3 D e s i r e 5 2 2 . 4 C o n c e p t i o n s a n d P a s s i o n s 5 8 2 . 5 J u s t i c e a s a V i r t u e 6 2 2 . 6 C o n c l u s i o n 7 5 C h a p t e r 3 C O N A T U S . 7 7 3 . 1 E g o i s m a n d M a t e r i a l i s m 7 8 3 . 2 C o n a t u s I 8 0 - v i -3.3 Descartes' Optics 92 3.A Conatus I I 97 Chapter 4 CHARACTER AND SELF-PRESERVATION j 0 g ; 4.1 From Conatus to Character 109 4.2 Cn Dispositions and Manners 114; 4.3 Self-Preservation 123 4.4 Self-Maintenance 111 4.5 Natural Necessity and Suicide 131 4.6 The Preservation of the Self 137: 4.7 Preservation and Reason 140 Chapter 5 HISTORY AND INTERPRETATION II 143 5.1 Introduction 144: 5.2 The Macpherson Thesis 146 5l3 Keith Thomas 150 5.4 Human Nature 152 5^5 The State of Nature 158 5.6 Power, Honour, and Value 176 5.7 The Magnanimous Man 188 Notes 200 Bibliography 209, - V 1 T -REFERENCES TO -WORKS BY -HOBBES The English Works of Thomas Hobbes of Malmesbury, edited by S i r William Molesworth, London 1839-45. References to these volumes are cited as follows: (E.W.III, 283). The - -Elements of Law, edited by Ferdinand Tonnies, second edition, London 1969. Referred to as (E.L., 43). De Homine, from Thomas Hobbes: Man and C i t i z e n , edited with an introduction by Bernard Gert, New York 1972, Citation i s as follows: (DeH., 34). Thomas White's De Mundo Examined, translated from Hobbes' Latin by Harold Whitmore Jones, Bradford UK., 1979. Cited as (T.W., 445). A Dialogue Between a Philosopher and a Student of the Common  Laws of England, edited by Joseph Cropsey, Chicago 1971. Cited as (D., 123). The Autobiography of Thomas Hobbes, translated from the Latin by Benjamin Farrington, Rationalist Annual, 1958, pp. 22-31. Cited as (A., 25). - v i i i -ACKNOWLEDGEMENT My interest i n Hobbes stems from contact with Bob Ewin, and was developed by discussions with Ed Hundert and Steve Straker. My supervisor Don Brown has been a source of sound c r i t i c i s m and s o l i d support; I owe him a debt of gratitude for both. Peter Remnant has read t h i s thesis i n successive drafts. Each time he has provided me with detailed and searching c r i t i c i s m s , without which the work could hardly have proceeded. Peter's painstaking e f f o r t s have eliminated many errors. Those which remain I alone must take r e s p o n s i b i l i t y for. - 1 -Introduction This thesis examines Hobbes' theory of character, exploring i t s relevance for what i s arguably his major concern: the question of c i v i l i t y within the commonwealth. This subject has never received a sustained treatment; something which must count as surprising when you consider the attention given to what Hobbes says about human nature. Indeed, i t would be plausible to hold that Hobbes' reputation as a p o l i t i c a l theorist i s largely derived from what others have taken his theory of human nature to be. The conventional wisdom i s that Hobbes took human nature to be bas i c a l l y unsocial, and used t h i s as a premise to convince his audience of the need for the form of sovereign prerogative he favoured. Like most others I believe that what Hobbes says about character i s part of an argument for univocal sovereignty; however, unlike most I do not believe that Hobbes1 theory of character can properly be described as egoistic or his individuals properly thought of as unrestrained u t i l i t y maximizers. It i s perfectly understandable that Hobbes i s read i n th i s way, since the basis of his theory of character i s obscure to say the l e a s t , and i n the prominent places where he u t i l i z e s views about human nature he simply summarizes res u l t s . The motivation for t h i s study i s twofold. F i r s t l y , there i s my di s s a t i s f a c t i o n with what prevailing opinions about Hobbes' psychology e n t a i l for the nature of his commonwealth. David Gauthier makes i t clear that i n his view Hobbes1 p o l i t i c a l theory collapses because i t s premises are too i n d i v i d u a l i s t i c and eg o i s t i c . Hence irrespective of what Hobbes might have wished, his ,2-psychology i s destructive of his aims: i t allows only anarchy and does not provide any basis for c i v i l i t y . S i m i l a r l y , irrespective of what Hobbes might have said - and he said quite a l o t - about j u s t i c e as a v i r t u e , his psychology i s taken to reduce j u s t i c e to a species of prudence or nothing. Hobbes1 version of the commonwealth may encompass many just acts (non-violations of contract) but i t w i l l contain no just men. Hobbes could be committed to t h i s dismal prospect, but i t i s my b e l i e f that he i s not. Oakeshott, Strauss, Minogue, and Goldsmith have a l l drawn attention to the person that Hobbes extols as just and magnanimous; yet without some plausible theory about the development of such a character on Hobbesian grounds, and without some attempt to meet the power of Gauthier's attack, Hobbes1 chivalrous individual remains as either an unobtainable ideal or a puzzling attachment to an image of honour that was fast fading by the seventeenth century. The second motivating factor i s closely connected with the f i r s t . I f Hobbes did have a theory of character r i c h enough to allow types that are inconsistent with egoism, then presumably the theory had better be consistent with his often repeated account of the mechanics of action: the v i t a l and voluntary motion story. Furthermore, i f most people's appreciation of Hobbesian psychology i s based on t h i s account of v i t a l and voluntary motion, then i n disagreeing with the common understanding I am obliged to show both why the v i t a l and voluntary motion story i s non-egoistic and how i t f i t s with material on the dispositions from De - Homine, and, more sur p r i s i n g l y , from De Corpore. Since De Homine does contain a f a i r l y detailed discussion of character t r a i t s , and since Hobbes was -3-adamant that the subject o f the book was e t h i c s , i t i s not hard to view the book as designed to underpin the p o l i t i c a l theory elaborated i n De Cive. But then o f course i f t h i s support does h o l d , the general theory o f d i s p o s i t i o n s developed i n De Corpore may be the bottom rung of the whole account. I b e l i e v e t h a t what Hobbes says about v i t a l and vol u n t a r y motion i s intended by him to be part o f h i s p h y s i o l o g i c a l psychology, and not something o f moral or p o l i t i c a l s i g n i f i c a n c e . What i s o f moral and p o l i t i c a l s i g n i f i c a n c e i s h i s theory o f human character d e l i v e r e d as h i s e t h i c s and formulated i n De Homine. The f i x a t i o n on the mechanics o f a c t i o n i s a mistake. I d i d not set out to v i n d i c a t e Hobbes' systematic pretensions; yet once the connection between conatus (as a general theory of d i s p o s i t i o n s worked out at the l e v e l o f o b j e c t s ) and character (the p o l i t i c a l l y r e l e v a n t s et o f human d i s p o s i t i o n s ) i s pos t u l a t e d , we can see a q u i t e c l e a r respect i n which Hobbes has l i n k e d h i s physics with h i s p o l i t i c s . The f o c a l point o f p o l i t i c s i s an object - the c i t i z e n - without i t being t r u e that p o l i t i c s i s concerned with mere o b j e c t s ; that i s the preoccupation of p h y s i c s , much as the concern with human d i s p o s i t i o n s more g e n e r a l l y i s the concern o f e t h i c s . But i f the p o l i t i c a l assessment o f c i t i z e n s turns on t h e i r propensity f o r c i v i l i t y on the one hand, or i t s absence on the othe r , and those p r o p e n s i t i e s are genuinely d i s p o s i t i o n s in_ p h y s i c a l e n t i t i e s , then what i s ma n i f e s t l y an i n c l i n a t i o n to accord others equal s t a t u s (Hobbes' n i n t h law) i s e s s e n t i a l l y a set o f conatus motions i n the p a r t i c l e s c o n s t i t u t i n g c e r t a i n organs i n the e q u i t a b l e person. -4-Hobbes' psychology has, I have suggested, commonly been equated with the story he t e l l s about v i t a l and voluntary motion. This story i s taken to portray animal motivation as a self-preservatory mechanism. In human beings t h i s mechanism i s conscious but i t s teleology remains the same: preservation. As a consequence of being more careful about what i s contained within the ambit of "Hobbes' psychology" I was led to make the following d i s t i n c t i o n s : physiological psychology (the v i t a l and voluntary motion account); descriptive psychology (dreams, imagining e t c . ) ; human nature as a l o g i c a l postulate (the four elements of strength, passion, reason, and i n t e l l i g e n c e ) ; and f i n a l l y the theory of character i t s e l f (the account of dispositions). With these d i s t i n c t i o n s made, i t can be argued that far too much weight has been placed on the story of animal motion. In particular i t has been thought to provide an analysis of motivation as i n t r i n s i c a l l y e g o i s t i c . This I argue i s fal s e . There i s good reason to believe that Hobbes' account of human motivation i s closely connected with what he says about conceptions of the good. I f , as Hobbes stresses, humans act i n order to re a l i z e that which they see as good, and i f self-preservation i s everywhere and always the paramount good, then acts i n defiance of i t would be impossible. So the well known story goes. However, i f self-preservation i s not genuinely part of the conscious motivational structure, or at least not inexorably so, then i t would be quite l i k e l y that some people do not accord preservation such a preeminent place among reasons for action. I believe that what Hobbes has to say about preservation as a motive i s to be found as part of what he c a l l s "manners", and not at the - 5 -l e v e l of the physiological mechanism which makes action possible. There i s ample evidence i n Hobbes' work to show that he was fam i l i a r with men whose conception of the good led them into courses of action inimical to bodily s u r v i v a l . Duelling i s merely one of the courses of action Hobbes alludes to which allows us to conclude that for some dishonour was considered worse than grave r i s k or death i t s e l f . Hobbes mentions others, l i k e being prepared to die i n an attempt to f o r e s t a l l the capture and execution of one's k i n . If-we seriously believe that Hobbes made self-preservation an inexorable motive, then the behaviour of the honour culture becomes inexplicable. This would be a very serious flaw i f we grant that many members of t h i s culture would have been amongst Hobbes1 intended audience. It i s of course possible that Hobbes' intention was to r i d i c u l e t h i s r i s k taking behaviour by c a l l i n g i t an insane aberration; a plausible view to take i n l i g h t of what Hobbes apparently says about suicide i n the dialogue between the philosopher and the student of the common law. One need only extend the suicide point to coyer cases of serious r i s k , and i t would be allowable to conclude that those who so risked t h e i r l i v e s must be non - compos mentis. Hobbes once said of some of those who had been led to duel that, "having engaged themselves rashly they are forced to the f i e l d with shame & cold hearts & prayers"."'' I take i t that Hobbes i s chiding the rashness of youth, not arguing that i t i s a form of d i s t r a c t i o n . It i s a strength of my interpretation that i t provides a place for self-preservation without allowing i t to negate a recognizable species of human motivation. The f i r s t two chapters of t h i s thesis present two versions of what I have labelled as the "orthodox" interpretation of Hobbes on human nature. The f i r s t chapter reviews some themes that were recurrent i n seventeenth and eighteenth century reactions to Hobbes, while the second chapter concentrates on what I take to be the best modern formulation of the orthodoxy: David Gauthier's The Logic of  Leviathan. The early reactions do not of course speak as one; however, there i s arguably a common thread i n what they take Hobbes to be suggesting about the basic nature of human beings. Quentin Skinner's understanding of Hobbes i s b u i l t on a close study of that author's work i n the context of the work of his contemporaries and contemporary c r i t i c s . I t i s hardly surprising then to find Skinner's Hobbes as someone characterized i n ways that would have been congenial to Hobbes' seventeenth and eighteenth century English c r i t i c s . However, i t i s i r o n i c a l that despite Skinner's adherence to the orthodox image of Hobbes, there are some clues i n his detailed research into Hobbes' correspondence which provide reason to doubt that the orthodox view i s correct. There are no s t a r t l i n g new det a i l s of theory brought to l i g h t ; and indeed i f there were then no doubt Skinner would have revised his position. Rather, i t i s the tantalizing fact that Hobbes was so well received by his Continental c i r c l e - his theory of human nature included - while at the same time being systematically studied by them. Of course there are quite a few explanations possible for t h i s , but one st r i k e s me as more interesting than any other. Namely, that Hobbes' warm reception among the c i r c l e around Mersenne (which included Englishmen l i k e Petty) was based on their deeper understanding of the connections between his psychological postulates, their -7-theoretical underpinnings, and the p o l i t i c a l theory that comes l a s t I The willingness of these men to accept Hobbes' position on the character of human beings could rest on t h e i r appreciation of why he was not vulnerable to the range of c r i t i c i s m s that his views received i n his own country. This i s obviously a conjecture, yet i s none the worse for that. Its re a l interest l i e s i n the fact that i t can generate a new l i n e of questioning about Hobbes on human nature, and more to the point, a l i n e of questioning whose detailed elaboration leads us away from the surface statements i n the p o l i t i c a l tracts and into the theory of character which, I claim, supports them. In the t h i r d chapter I attempt an investigation of Hobbes' fundamental physical theory, namely that of conatus or endeavour. The overall conclusion partly argued for i s as follows: Hobbes' analysis of character t r a i t s i s given i n terms of dispositions, and the analysis i s offered by him as the psychological data relevant to the study of p o l i t i c s . I f i t can be shown that Hobbes' most fundamental physical theory (conatus) provides a basis for his account of human dispositions (ethics), then there might be features of the primary theory which either allow or disallow certain characterizations of the ethics (the account of human disposi t i o n s ) . I argue that there i s reason to view Hobbes' story about conatus as delimiting what can be said about his ethics or theory of character. In p a r t i c u l a r , i t i s asserted that there i s evidence i n Hobbes' primary theory to suggest that character i s importantly malleable, and hence that no characterization of his ethics as egoistic w i l l be allowable i f that characterization - 8 -requires a r i g i d d i s p o s i t i o n a l structure. Since the only plausible view of psychological egoism i s one stressing what human beings are l i k e of necessity, and since the only plausible sense of necessity here i s physical necessity, then Hobbesian individuals cannot correctly be thought of as psychological egoists i f their d i s p o s i t i o n a l nature i s not r i g i d i n the required sense. The t h i r d chapter does not establish a l l of t h i s ; i t looks to the primary theory alone. The task of connecting the primary theory of dispositions with that part of Hobbes' psychology I have chosen to c a l l his theory of character ("character" being my_ term and not h i s ) , i s undertaken i n the fourth chapter. In making t h i s part of my case I was obliged to confront what many people would see as hard evidence against my thesis; namely what Hobbes has to say about self-preservation. I have shown to my s a t i s f a c t i o n that what he says about self-preservation i s not a part of his theory of character i n any respect that would support an egoistic reading. Hobbes employs premises which assert that men i n c i v i l interaction with strangers are almost exclusively concerned with their own well-being; he does not assert that self-preservation i s a s t r u c t u r a l l y inevitable element in human nature. Hobbes often seems to be taken as asserting the l a t t e r . One of the strongest reasons for doubting that Hobbes would have constructed a psychology which made self-preservation an inevitable motive i n human action was simply that he was constantly confronted with behaviour which he characterized as flagrantly self-destructive: duelling. But more general than t h i s s p e c i f i c - 9 -consideration i s the fact that Hobbes was privy to the workings of a culture premised on the notion of honour. Such inside knowledge about a r i s t o c r a t i c interactions would have made Hobbes aware that many considerations might take precedence over bodily preservation; and of course he said so often enough when discussing reactions to s l i g h t s . So, my response to some of the philosophical constructions of Hobbes1 psychology e x p l i c i t l y draws upon what I know of his s o c i a l context. Others have also alluded to Hobbes' s o c i a l context i n the construction of th e i r readings, but none more dramatically than Crawford Macpherson. He argued that Hobbes' pri n c i p a l device -his state of nature - was suffused with s o c i a l d e t a i l derived from the proto-capitalist England of Hobbes' time. However, one can agree that Hobbes' milieu i s c r u c i a l for the sense that we make of his theory without agreeing either that Hobbes was unconscious of i t s impact (Macpherson's postulate) or that the milieu i n question was a possessive market society. I f there i s a s o c i a l stamp on Hobbes' thought then i t i s , as Thomas noted, an a r i s t o c r a t i c one. And far from being an unconscious scribe for i t s features Hobbes was a sharp and deliberate c r i t i c . Thus the f i f t h and f i n a l chapter analyses Hobbes' role as a c r i t i c of the Jacobean and Caroline aristocracy. Its intention i s to follow a l i n e of interpretation pioneered by Keith Thomas i n his study of Hobbes* p o l i t i c a l thought. It was Thomas who pointed out that the milieu I have characterized as a r i s t o c r a t i c was far from homogeneous, being deeply divided over the nature of honour for example. My aim i s to show that Hobbes entered a debate which had significance for the factions within the Court and the opposition - 1 0 -peers; both of whom u t i l i z e d honour as a weapon i n an ideological c o n f l i c t . The Hobbes who emerges from t h i s study i s certainly one whose p o l i t i c a l theory rests firmly on stated psychological assumptions; but those assumptions are, I hope to have shown, neither crudely nor sophisticatedly e g o i s t i c . My argument i s that Hobbes goes into real psychological d e t a i l of p o l i t i c a l relevance when he discusses character t r a i t s . In the past i t has been conventional to read egoism into what he says about self-preservation; for some reason ignoring the range of motivations that are indicated i n the examples he actually chooses. Furthermore, the concentration on what I have characterized as Hobbes' physiological psychology obscures the role of his laws of nature i n the construction of a sketch of character. I f these laws find t h e i r r e a l i z a t i o n anywhere i t must be within people. Hobbes argues as i f thei r place i n the character of men was a condition of the success of c i v i l i z e d s o c i e t i e s . I take i t that people who embody the laws of nature are f u l l y c i v i l i n the respect that interested Hobbes. •11-C H A P T E R I H I S T O R Y AND I N T E R P R E T A T I O N I I l l Quentin Skinner Thomas Hobbes' p o l i t i c a l theory, and i n particular i t s embodiment i n Leviathan, has held a powerful fascination for generations of philosophers and students of p o l i t i c a l theory. Many have found the work both awe in s p i r i n g and repellent; most have sensed an a i r of alienated majesty about i t . What tends to repel i s the defence of sovereign prerogative, while methodological rigor sets the work apart. In the Epistle Dedicatory to his De Cive, Hobbes chided previous writers on morals and p o l i t i c s for thei r f a i l u r e to adopt an "idoneous pri n c i p l e of tra c t a t i o n " . (E.W.II, v i ) Despite his own avowed adoption of such a prin c i p l e there has been no peace for Hobbes during the l a s t four centuries. Disagreement has raged over the substance of Hobbes' sta r t i n g point and over the soundness of his subsequent inferences. A considerable role i n the enterprise of working out just who Hobbes was, and why he wrote when he did, has beenplayed by one man: Quentin Skinner. In a series of a r t i c l e s spanning the middle s i x t i e s to middle-seventies Skinner has restored Hobbes to the two main milieux within which he operated. F i r s t l y , Hobbes was placed within the paper war attendant on the combat of the c i v i l war: what we have come to know as the Engagement controversy. Secondly, thanks in the main to Skinner's research at Chatsworth, we now have a l i v e l y image of the t i e s that bound Hobbes to the world of Continental science. Cn the Engagement question I s h a l l have l i t t l e to say, since i t does not bear on my concerns. However, the matter of Hobbes' connections with the c i r c l e of s c i e n t i s t s around Marin - 1 3 -Mersenne i s important. Without wishing to suggest for a moment that Skinner misleads us about Hobbes and t h i s group, i t i s arguable that another look at Hobbes1 contributions to their debates w i l l allow us to see a neglected aspect of his thought. His connections with the French - p r i n c i p a l l y unearthed by Skinner - show that we may have to reconsider the estimation made by Skinner of Hobbes1 place among the theorists whom Skinner refers to as taking a de facto l i n e i n the C i v i l War debate. In p a r t i c u l a r , t h i s estimation i s dubious because i t depends for i t s p l a u s i b i l i t y on a view about Hobbes' conception of human nature. Skinner holds the orthodox view that Hobbes' o r i g i n a l i t y as a p o l i t i c a l philosopher rests on the way i n which he made deductions from premises which characterized human beings as essentially a n t i - s o c i a l : Hobbes' contribution i s to be sought "at the epistemological l e v e l , i n the reasons he gave for holding his p o l i t i c a l b e l i e f s , rather than i n the be l i e f s themselves.""1" The reasons i n question are taken to arise from Hobbes' psychology, or at least that aspect of i t dealing with the d i v i s i v e nature of human i n c l i n a t i o n s . Skinner does not simply report that Hobbes gained a certain notoriety because of his views. Were that the case he might wish to go on to say that despite the reputation Hobbes acquired, he i n fact did not hold the views he was commonly thought to. He i s quite c l e a r l y prepared to assert that Hobbes was notorious because he was taken to have argued that human nature was essentially a n t i - s o c i a l , and furthermore that t h i s thesis accurately captured Hobbes' view. Following Skinner, l e t us refer to the orthodox view about - 1 4 -Hobbes' basic psychological premise as the • innate wickedness  hypothesis. From his f i r s t piece on Hobbes, the review of Hood's The Divine P o l i t i c s of Thomas Hobbes, Skinner has argued d i r e c t l y for the truth of the innate wickedness hypothesis. The reason for Skinner's adherence to t h i s view i s i n part an excellent one, namely that Hobbes never t i r e d of pointing out that his conclusions about the rights of the sovereign and the duties of the c i t i z e n were based upon the known i n c l i n a t i o n s of mankind. in other words Skinner i s strongly r e s i s t i n g any attempt, i n the present instance that of Hood, to detach Hobbes' theory of obligation from his psychological postulates. However, there i s no inconsistency i n applauding Skinner's stance while at the same time rejecting his position on the wickedness hypothesis. In order to do t h i s i t w i l l be necessary to show that there are psychological premises stated by Hobbes that are both powerful enough to ground the wanted p o l i t i c a l conclusions, yet too weak to be properly equated with the wickedness hypothesis. The position argued for i n t h i s thesis i s that such premises are presented by Hobbes i n De Homine, backed by the more "general theory of dispositions i n De- - Corpore. The argument for t h i s comes i n Chapters 3 and 4; for the moment I s h a l l turn to some looser, more impressionistic reasons for feeling d i s s a t i s f i e d with Skinner's rather easy acceptance of the orthodox position on Hobbes" psychology. (a) Hobbes' wish for an uncontentious s t a r t i n g point. In a l l three of the p o l i t i c a l works Hobbes makes the claim that the premises with which he begins would be endorsed by a l l who gave them due consideration. In De Cive he says that: In the f i r s t place I set down for a p r i n c i p l e , by experience known to a l l men, and denied by none, to wit. that the dispositions of men are naturally such, that except they be restrained through fear of some coercive power, every man w i l l d i s t r u s t and dread each other. (E.W.II, xiv-xv) As noted above, there i s a similar claim made i n both Leviathan and i n The- Elements of - Law.3 I f Hobbes' i n i t i a l premises are rejected out of hand, then Leviathan stands as a tomb - sealed at the entrance. His fear that the book might be "as useless, as the commonwealth of Plato" (E.W. I l l , 357) i s well known, and i t i s reasonable to believe that Hobbes would take every available step to ensure that the groundwork was acceptable. However, irrespective of what Hobbes' intentions were, and irrespective of how uncontentious he himself took his i n i t i a l premises to be, there i s every p o s s i b i l i t y that they were contentious nonetheless. Hobbes might have believed that the psychological content of his premises was self-evident, and he might well have been alone i n believing t h i s . It has been suggested to me that what Hobbes asserts i n the above quote is_ contentious, and that independently of whether or not Hobbes held that men were a l l egoists at heart, i t would be ludicrous to believe that one could carry assent, l e t alone universal assent, for the "principle by experience known to a l l A men". Since there i s no doubt at a l l that Hobbes thought of his p r i n c i p l e as uncontentious we need to be convinced that he was j u s t i f i e d i n so thinking. To begin with, Hobbes alluded to the p o l i t i c a l l y relevant - 1 6 -emotions or inc l i n a t i o n s under two heads: those which lead us to "accommodate ourselves, and to leave others as far as we can behind", and those "by which we s t r i v e mutually to accommodate each other". (E. !_., 85) If a l l men were bent on attending to the needs of others before thei r own, there would be an orgy of altruism. Equally, i f a l l were e n t i r e l y self-accommodating i n a situation lacking any form of s o c i a l coordination, then there would be egoistic chaos. Whereas gratitude i s the appropriate reponse to kindness, caution and anxiety are more chara c t e r i s t i c t r a i t s of people facing clear and evident danger. ..'V hold that i n asserting his p r i n c i p l e "known to a l l men", Hobbes i _ s tating the obvious, because i f we assume that the De Cive passage refers to the whole class of human dispositions, then the p r i n c i p l e would imply that charity and kindness - along with the d i v i s i v e i n c l i n a t i o n s -occasion fear in a l l men. That i s absurd. Cn the other hand, i f Hobbes i s read as taking a more narrow view of the i n c l i n a t i o n s , that i s , as distinguishing the self-accommodating from the other-accommodating, then we are faced with an obvious truth. Hobbes would hardly claim that charity occasions fear, but i t i s eminently plausible that unrestrained s e l f - i n t e r e s t might count for him as the trigger for fear. The construction suggested for Hobbes1 p r i n c i p l e might be summarized as follows: human dispositions (passions) are such a mixed bag, that unless we can interact through the mediation of some s o c i a l constraining device the tone of our interactions w i l l be one of fear and dread. I f anything has a chance of being uncontentious then that does. (b) Disavowal of the wickedness hypothesis. The f i r s t edition of De Cive appeared i n Paris during 1642, but as many have noted, t h i s edition was produced i n such small numbers that i t s impact was confined to those immediately connected with the Mersenne c i r c l e . There i s no exaggeration i n claiming that De Cive was to the French c i r c l e what The Elements of Law had been to the men at Welbeck around Newcastle, and at Great Tew around Falkland. 5 However, i n 1646 Samuel Sorbiere piloted a second edition through the Elzevi r press i n Amsterdam; the f i r s t of three which were to come out by the end of 1647.^ A comparison of the f i r s t with subsequent editions shows that Hobbes prepared a long Preface to the Reader for the second edi t i o n . He also wrote some notes on matters queried by those who read the f i r s t edition: "I have therefore i n some places added some annotations, whereby I presume I might give some sa t i s f a c t i o n to the i r d i f f e r i n g thoughts". (E.W.II, x x i i i ) Hobbes says that some of those o r i g i n a l readers were "staggered at the principles themselves" (Ibid), and among the principles i n question i s that concerning "the nature of men" (Ibid). There are at least two things referred to here. The f i r s t i s the nature of men i n so far as they are s o c i a l , and the second i s the matter of their putative wickedness! The f i r s t i s treated by Hobbes i n an annotation to the f i r s t chapter, whereas the second - the one I am now d i r e c t l y concerned with - i s answered i n the Preface i t s e l f . Hobbes' direct response to the rejection of the p r i n c i p l e , "by experience known to a l l men and denied by none, to wit, that the - 1 8 -dispositions of men are naturally such, that except they be restrained through fear of some coercive power, every man w i l l d i s t r u s t and dread each other;" ( i b i d . , xiv-xv) gives one the uneasy sensation of worlds i n c o l l i s i o n , for what i s supposed to be "denied by none", i s immediately a bone of contention. However, Hobbes denies that his pr i n c i p l e i s genuinely denied: those who refuse to accept the truth of t h i s p r i n c i p l e do not constitute real opposition because they f a l l into a species of contradiction i n uttering their objection: You w i l l object perhaps, that there are some who deny t h i s . Truly so i t happens, that very many do deny i t . But s h a l l I therefore seem to fight against myself, because I affirm that the same men confess and deny the same thing? ( i b i d . , xv) What i s Hobbes' evidence for t h i s ? The f i r s t thing to note i s that Hobbes' prin c i p l e i s r e a l l y designed to capture an att i t u d e . Thus his claim i s that a l l who are not at verbal loggerheads with their own practice w i l l admit that a tone of anxiety pervades certain human interactions. The evidence then comes forward: countries maintain forces along th e i r borders to keep watch on th e i r neighbours, individuals t r a v e l l i n g abroad go armed to defend against v i l l a i n s and members of the one household take precautions to ensure t h e i r treasure i s safe from the thieving hands of th e i r servants. Anthony Quinton, i n his remarks on Clarendon's c r i t i q u e of Hobbes, commented that, "when we lock our doors on leaving home i t i s to keep out criminals; we are not defending ourselves from mankind at l a r g e " . 7 Clarendon, and presumably Quinton too, holds that Hobbes i s claiming that a -19-precautionary attitude i s appropriate i n our dealing with mankind at large. They are quite wrong about t h i s , and to understand why we need only turn to what Hobbes has to say about the innate wickedness of men. To back up the claim that precautions and heedfulness are j u s t i f i e d Hobbes employs a much weaker premise than that a l l men are wicked, namely the claim that: For though the wicked were fewer than the righteous, yet because we cannot distinguish them, there i s a necessity of suspecting...ever incident to the most honest and f a i r e s t conditioned, ( i b i d . , xvi) Hobbes rejoinder to Clarendon and Quinton i s simply that we lock our doors because we know that some among our country-men are rogues, and because there i s no litmus paper test to separate the rogues from the honest men; not because we suspect that a l l are e v i l . As a f i n a l counter against those who accused him of portraying human nature as innnately wicked, Hobbes admits that there are wicked men and then goes on to add that i t does not follow from t h i s admission that, "those who are wicked, are so by nature". (Ibid) The argument to support t h i s claim i s illumin a t i n g . To begin with, since human nature i s made up of reason, passion, strength, and experience, and since the human condition i s a precarious one i n part because of the effects of passions, our desires are a necessary condition of wickedness, but they are not s u f f i c i e n t i n and of themselves. Passions are blameless, and thus not wicked, u n t i l they f a l l foul of precepts which only a p o l i t i c a l education can provide. Since man does not receive t h i s education from the bountiful hand of - 2 0 -nature (one reason why man i s not a p o l i t i c a l animal), i t follows that no man can be wicked or malicious by nature. Here, as i n other places, Hobbes stic k s firmly to the view that there i s nothing wrong with man qua material; that i s , as either deficient or flawed, but rather i t i s man as maker or a r t i f i c e r who i s at f a u l t . 8 How does a l l t h i s bear on Skinner? Recall that through his Hobbes studies Skinner remained aligned with the view that Hobbes held the innate wickedness thesis. Our suggestions to date are intended to throw some doubt on the truth of Skinner's assumption. A further reason for feeling uneasy about the orthodox assumption comes d i r e c t l y out of Skinner's work on Hobbes' French d i s c i p l e s . The aim of Skinner's, "Thomas Hobbes and his Disciples i n France and England" i s to explore "the significance of Hobbes' l i n k s with the more sympathetic i n t e l l e c t u a l society which he found i n 9 Paris during his e x i l e . " This aim i s accomplished by scrutiny of the correspondence which passed from the Continent to Hobbes after his return to England i n 1651. Quite apart from the surprise of learning just how many topics Hobbes was taken to be an authority on: p o l i t i c a l philosophy, metaphysics, optics and mathematics, one i s struck by the tone of these l e t t e r s , unlike most of the English material with which we are so fa m i l i a r , the French reactions to Hobbes are mild, measured, and often laudatory. The evidence arrayed points straight to Skinner's conclusion that "Hobbes was widely denounced i n England, but was widely accepted abroad.""'"0 Allowing for both too ready praise and some unthinking re j e c t i o n , i t i s of singular interest that Hobbes was so well accepted by Mersenne's c i r c l e . - 2 1 -There i s a real question about what to make of t h i s acceptance. Skinner would seem to be committed to the view that those who accepted Hobbes1 theory of human nature for the right reason did so because they accepted what he had to say about the innate wickedness of human nature. Hence the French acceptance of Hobbes, i f an educated one, would e n t a i l that the French agreed with Hobbes' innate wickedness thesis. But i f that i s so, as i t might be, why was the English reaction so ut t e r l y different? Why was Hobbes roundly rejected on t h i s point i n his homeland?''""'" Skinner actually provides what might be a clue i n the solution of t h i s puzzle, but one that he himself never exploits. In discussing Hobbes' Continental reception Skinner notes that "some of his followers recognized and sympathized with his most ambitious hopes for a Science of P o l i t i c s . . . s u g g e s t i n g ] that his l i n k s with popular attempts to construct mechanistic explanations for every type of phenomenon may well have extended further than his obvious 12 preoccupation with Matter and Motion." The clue i s that when Hobbes came to the notice of the Mersenne c i r c l e he was flushed with just such a vision of unified science, but that unlike most of them Hobbes was equipped with a view about the nature of human passions which he believed stood as a basis for a science of p o l i t i c s . The reasons for believing that Hobbes was understood to be offering a psychological basis for p o l i t i c s , and one that meshed i n neatly with wider pretensions to a science of motion, are as follows. F i r s t l y , on the t h i r d Continental t r i p of 1634 to 1636 Hobbes claimed to have been obsessed with the omnipresence of motion; but p a r a l l e l with t h i s preoccupation he must have been -22-forging views on human passions because i n a l e t t e r to Newcastle dated August 25th 1635 he intimates c l e a r l y that he hopes to be the f i r s t person to "give good reasons for the facultyes and passions of the soule, such as may be expressed i n plain English.""'"-5 My conjecture i s that the manuscript version of The Elements of Law, and especially the f i r s t section on "Men as persons natural", i s Hobbes' completed work on the soul. Secondly, since i t was on th i s t r i p abroad that Hobbes "got to know Mersenne...and communicated to him my meditations on the motion of things","^ i t seems reasonable to believe that Hobbes' reception was connected with the nature of his endeavours, and perhaps i n particular with his views on how to begin p o l i t i c a l philosophy. His boast of De Cive being the f i r s t genuine work of C i v i l Philosophy i s germane here. (E.W.I, i x ) If t h i s conjecture about the nature of Hobbes' reception i n Paris i s sound, i t might serve as a springboard for another proposal; namely that since Mersenne's c i r c l e was aware of Hobbes' systematic endeavours they may have been able to appreciate the wider context of Hobbes' thinking on the question of human nature. Their knowledge, and the ignorance of those who saw only the p o l i t i c a l texts, might explain the divergence i n reception. To properly support t h i s contention we w i l l need to consider i n d e t a i l the course that Hobbes' enterprise took i n the 1630's. In parti c u l a r we need to look at the significance of the general theory of dispositions he formed during that period. However, there i s one respect i n which the s c i e n t i f i c c i r c l e i n Paris and Hobbes' work with them constitutes only a part of the t o t a l context that needs to be explored. The Engagement controversy i s of course another. But -23-a further aspect, and one that Skinner does not trea t , i s the nature of the a r i s t o c r a t i c concerns that affected those i n Hobbes' immediate s o c i a l environment. Chapter fi v e w i l l address t h i s t h i r d aspect, but for the moment i t should be stressed that more than theoretical matters conditioned the way i n which Hobbes presented his views about human nature. So, my conjecture i s that Hobbes' warm reception i n France did go hand i n hand with the acceptance of his view about human nature and the role i t should play i n p o l i t i c a l theory. Unlike Skinner however, I do not believe that the French accepted the innate wickedness hypothesis. What they showed sympathy for was importantly d i f f e r e n t , and why they accepted i t has a l o t to do with t h e i r privileged position with respect to the f u l l sweep of Hobbes' thought. To date I have claimed the following: ( i ) that Skinner agrees with what I have cal l e d the orthodox view on Hobbes' psychological premises; ( i i ) that the orthodox view enshrines the - innate wickedness  hypothesis; ( i i i ) that there are some reasons to believe that Hobbes did not accept t h i s characterization of himself; (iv) that Hobbes' warm reception among the French might - given thei r knowledge of his systematic pretensions - argue against the a t t r i b u t i o n of the orthodox position to him. In the following section an attempt i s made to explain what the orthodox understanding of Hobbes involved. This i s done by taking an h i s t o r i c a l view of interpretations of Hobbes' psychology. - 2 4 -1.2 The Image of the Beast Despite the fact that Hobbes had two versions of his p o l i t i c a l theory i n c i r c u l a t i o n by 1649, i t was not u n t i l 1650 and 1651 that he was to have an impact i n England. Versions of a l l three of Hobbes' p o l i t i c a l works: De Corpore P o l i t i c o (part 2 of The Elements  of- Law), De Cive i n an English translation made by Hobbes, and Leviathan, which was f i r s t i n English and l a t e r translated into L a t i n , brought a c r i t i c a l reaction that was immediate and unparalleled. One of the e a r l i e s t attacks was Alexander Ross' Leviathan Drawn  Out With a Hook. Ross accused Hobbes of every conceivable heresy, but only two are of interest to my case: what he c a l l s anthropomorphism, and characterizing human nature as e v i l . Since one of the s t r i k i n g things about Hobbes' theology i s his refusal to apply human attributes to God i t seems plain that Ross' charge of anthropomorphism must point elsewhere. When discussing Ross, John Bowie says that behind the heat and vehemence of his reaction to Hobbes lay the b e l i e f that the l a t t e r was a l i v i n g embodiment "of the pagan attempt to be s e l f - s u f f i c i e n t , the anthropomorphic arrogance which can end only i n catastrophe."^ 5 This comment chimes i n perfectly with Skinner's b e l i e f that Hobbes eschewed a l l p r o v i d e n t i a l i s t a s s u m p t i o n s . R o s s ' accusation i s thus that i n Hobbes we witness impious anthropocentrism, and within his framework of assumptions Ross was r i g h t . What many might find both l i b e r a t i n g and exhilarating Ross found t e r r i f y i n g . On the question of why Hobbes maligns human nature, i t might be -25 -worth noting that Ross was already i n print as a defender of George Hakewill, whose An Apology for the Power and Providence of God was intended as a rebuttal of Godfrey Goodman's assertion that nature was i n a downward s p i r a l of corruption and decay.''"7 For a man with Ross' preoccupations Hobbes may well have appeared as someone arguing for a psychological variant of the Goodman thesis. For reasons that are not altogether clear Ross took i t that Hobbes was saying something i n f i n i t e l y worse than the conventional claim that man was f a l l e n . Presumably he saw Hobbesian man as u t t e r l y , irredeemably e v i l ; what Hobbes would have ca l l e d "wicked by nature". The problem with t h i s l i n e of interpretation of Ross' view i s that when his book f i r s t appeared i n 1653 the English version of De Cive was available, and indeed had been for some two years. As was mentioned i n the previous section the new Preface incorporates a c a r e f u l l y wrought passage on the putative wickedness of human nature. Hobbes claimed that he was committed to nothing more profound than that men were accidentally wicked i f wicked at a l l , and that only some men were actually so. Moreover, he thought that i t would be impious to claim that men were essent i a l l y e v i l , or e v i l by nature. We have no evidence one way or the other, but either Ross had not read the passage i n question or i f he had he took i t as insincere. William Lucy provides an excellent example of a tone that was common to Hobbes' early opponents. Observations, Censures and  Confutations of Notorious Errors i n Mr Hobbs His Leviathan was an attack on fi v e out of the forty-seven chapters that compose Leviathan. Lucy makes copious mention of the Hobbesian treatment of -26-human nature, the g i s t o f which seems to be that Hobbes had made " v i l l a i n o u s aspersions on human nature", p o r t r a y i n g man as nothing 1 8 more than "an incarnate d e v i l . " Two of Lucy's charges go more to the heart o f t h i n g s : he b e l i e v e s that Hobbes has been wickedly impious i n g i v i n g law a n o n - p r o v i d e n t i a l i s t b a s i s , and he a l s o holds t h a t Hobbesian men d e r i v e t h e i r pleasure from destroying t h e i r f e l l o w s . The f i r s t i s i n t e r e s t i n g because i t i s true and because Lucy got so l i t t l e e l s e about Hobbes r i g h t , whereas the second i s f a l s e but s t i l l a q u i t e p l a u s i b l e reading of what Hobbes had to say, not i n Leviathan, but i n those a c i d soaked e a r l y pages o f De Cive: I hope no body w i l l doubt, but t h a t men would much more g r e e d i l y be c a r r i e d by nature, i f a l l fear were removed, to o b t a i n dominion, than to gain s o c i e t y . (E.W.II, 5) Even t h i s passage does not capture q u i t e what Lucy was c l a i m i n g , and a moment's r e f l e c t i o n on the question of i n f l i c t i n g s u f f e r i n g as a good w i l l remind us that Lucy i s r e a l l y r e c a s t i n g Hobbes i n the form of Thrasymachus. As Glaucon reformulates the l a t t e r ' s argument conventional j u s t i c e i s a s t r a t e g y opted for by those who are q u i t e happy to i n f l i c t s u f f e r i n g , but have an o v e r r i d i n g d e s i r e not to 1 9 s u f f e r themselves. At the deepest l e v e l both Ross and Lucy share the b e l i e f that Hobbes' views are a moral outrage; they are profoundly d i s t u r b e d by what they understand h i s d o c t r i n e to be, but e q u a l l y by the f a c t t h a t he p h i l o s o p h i z e d about s o c i a l l i f e i n such b o l d l y s e c u l a r terms. There i s a b s o l u t e l y no doubt that Lucy took Hobbes to be arguing an u t t e r l y general t h e s i s about human wickedness. The evidence for t h i s i s provided by the f a c t t h a t he attacked Hobbes with a simple counter-instance: the unblemished character o f h i s -27-patron " William Seymour. Once s a t i s f i e d that he has deflated Hobbes' general thesis Lucy sets about f l o a t i n g one of his own. on "Humanity i s writ i n every heart" he claimed; by which he meant that a l l men were naturally cooperative s o c i a l creatures. This i s simply Lucy's rendering of A r i s t o t l e ' s claim that man i s a p o l i t i c a l animal whose unfolding nature leads to the r e a l i z a t i o n of wellbeing within the p o l i s . In so far as Lucy's response i s the standard one, he i s no doubt t y p i c a l of a whole class of Hobbes1 opponents. Equally, his response i s symptomatic of an i n a b i l i t y to grasp the novelty of what Hobbes was urging against the c l a s s i c a l t r a d i t i o n i n p o l i t i c a l philosophy. Lucy's error i s roughly t h i s : from the truth that Hobbes does not endorse the A r i s t o t e l i a n thesis that man i s a p o l i t i c a l animal i t i s mistakenly concluded that he asserts that a l l men are beasts incapable of s o c i a l l i f e . This comes over cl e a r l y enough from the assimilation of Hobbes and Thrasymachus/Glaucon: men look upon on another as prey. To a certain extent such an impression seems warranted; after a l l i t was Hobbes who said that "man to man i s an arrant wolf". (E.W.II,ii) The nature of the misimpression becomes obvious however when that l i n e i s replaced i n context: [B]oth sayings are very true: that man to man i s a  kind of God; and that man to man i s an arrant wolf. The f i r s t i s true, i f we compare c i t i z e n s amongst themselves; and the second, i f we compare c i t i e s , (ibid) I f there i s anything wrong with t h i s admission i t i s that Hobbes has been too optimistic about the interactions among c i t i z e n s ; on the matter of international relations who could possibly gainsay him? -28-John Bramhall was among the group of Royalists who escaped Marston Moor and England i n July of 1644. It was as a member of Newcastle's household i n Paris that Bramhall f i r s t met Hobbes i n the l a t t e r part of 1645. At th e i r host's request the two men argued about the freedom of the w i l l , and l a t e r Hobbes committed some of his argument to p r i n t . When the exchange broke o f f i n 1646 Hobbes gave his notes to John Davy for the purpose of producing a French translation for another of Hobbes' friends. Davy must have kept a copy because i n 1654 he published Hobbes' manuscript under the t i t l e Of Liberty and Necessity. Bramhall f a l s e l y assumed that t h i s pirate edition had Hobbes1 approval, and concluded that their pact of non-publication had been violated. Bramhall brought out his version of the transactions i n 1655 and added some prefacing remarks on Leviathan. Then i n 1658 Bramhall made his concluding contribution, incorporating a long appendix e n t i t l e d The Catching- of • The  Leviathan, or the Great Whale. Bramhall was certa i n l y very astute, and rather a l o t of what he urges against Hobbes i s worthy of attention. However, for my rather special concerns I s h a l l focus only on what he argues on the question of Hobbesian man. F i r s t l y , Bramhall claimed that Hobbes advanced the view that the "nature of man i s worse than the nature 21 of bears or wolves, or the most savage wild beasts." This i s an echo of the homo homini lupus point, but i t i s something else as w e l l . Bramhall i s invoking the b e l i e f that there i s a natural hierarchy into which man f i t s - above the beasts and below the angels - and with which Hobbes has meddled. Clarendon also understood Hobbes to be making t h i s point, as can be gathered from -29-his comment on Leviathan that "God did not make man lower than the b e a s t s . " 2 2 Another of Bramhall's objections to Hobbes has a si m i l a r cast to the claim that Hobbesian man i s sub-bestial. After considering the t h i r d part of Leviathan Bramhall was moved to exclaim that "by t h i s doctrine he maketh not only the angels, but God himself to be nothing." (E.W.IV,348) That however i s but half of the dreadful story: If perchance T.H. hath given his d i s c i p l e s any discontent i n his doctrine of heaven and the holy  angels, and t h e - g l o r i f i e d souls of the- saints, he w i l l make them amends i n his doctrine of h e l l , and the d e v i l s , and the damned s p i r i t s . F i r s t of the d e v i l s ; he fancieth that a l l those devils which our Saviour did cast out, were phrenzies; and a l l demoniacs, or persons possessed, no other than madmen: So T.H. hath k i l l e d the great infernal Devil, and a l l his black angels, and l e f t no devils to be feared, but devils incarnate, that i s , wicked men. ( i b i d . , 356) Bramhall's account of Hobbes' demonology i s perfectly accurate; what i s debatable i s the claim that i n denying any source of supernatural e v i l Hobbes was concomitantly demonizing men. Bramhall's image of Hobbesian man i s something l i k e t h i s : a malicious creature whose r a t i o n a l i t y sets him apart from the sometimes savage but ultimately innocent beasts. This viciousness i s now enthroned at the centre of an empty universe since Hobbes has extinguished both the rosy glow of h e l l and the clear l i g h t of heaven. Bramhall has grasped Hobbes' intention to r i d the universe of a l l but human and perhaps divine i n t e l l i g e n c e , but i t s t i l l remains for us to get an accurate picture of the place Hobbes provided for man among the other animals. Perhaps the best strategy for understanding Hobbes' position on the place of man among his fellow animals i s to see i t set against -30-that work of A r i s t o t l e ' s which Hobbes so much admired. In the Histori a Animalium A r i s t o t l e makes the following set of connected claims: Some animals are gregarious, some are solitary...some partake of both characters...of the gregarious, some are disposed to combine for s o c i a l purposes, others to l i v e each for i t s own self...Man, by the way, presents a mixture of the two characters, the gregarious and the s o l i t a r y . . .Social creatures are such as have some one common object i n view; and t h i s property i s not common to a l l creatures that are gregarious. Such s o c i a l creatures are man, the bee, the wasp, the ant, and the crane. (488al-l0) In his P o l i t i c s A r i s t o t l e asserted that "man i s more of a p o l i t i c a l animal than bees or any other gregarious animals" (1253a8), his reason being that man i s capable of speech and thus able to order "the expedient and the inexpedient, and therefore likewise the just and the unjust." (1253al4f) Hobbes never t i r e d of pointing out that A r i s t o t l e counted the bees among the p o l i t i c a l animals; and did so without ever hinting that A r i s t o t l e himself had made certain clear q u a l i f i c a t i o n s to t h i s claim. The reason why he does not i s perhaps because he wants as a target the unequivocal assertion that men and bees are p o l i t i c a l animals as a pure function of their natures as men and bees. Such a bald claim i n v i t e s the rejoinder Hobbes wishes to make: men unlike bees cannot attain s o c i a l harmony as a pure function of their natures, "natural concord, such as i s amongst those creatures, i s the work of God by the way of nature; but concord amongst men i s a r t i f i c i a l , and by way of covenant." (E.L., 102-3) Putting Hobbes' point i n Daniel Dennett's terms, bees are 24 hard-wired for good s o c i a l order but men are not. Both Hobbes and A r i s t o t l e believe that r a t i o n a l i t y sets man -31-apart from the other animals, but so far as Hobbes can see t h i s i s no occasion for self-congratulation: Man excelleth beasts only i n the making of rules to himself, that i s to say, i n remembering, and i n reasoning aright upon that which he remembereth. They which do so, deserve an honour above brute beasts. But they which mistaking the use of words, deceive themselves and others, introducing error, and seducing men from the t r u t h , are so much less to be honoured than brute beasts, as error i s more v i l e than ignorance. (E.W.v, 186) The use of reasoning i n the ordering of our l i v e s genuinely does give man an elevated s t a t i o n , but the ordering i n question i s not ea s i l y attained for a reason that involves yet another feature Hobbes notes to be peculiarly human, boundless appetite: Man surpasseth i n rapacity and cruelty the wolves, bears, and snakes that are not rapacious unless hungry, and not cruel unless provoked, whereas man i s famished even by future hunger. (DeH., 40) It follows from t h i s passage and the previous one, that any judgement of human capacities - as d i s t i n c t from purely shared animal ones - w i l l i n part be a judgement about the extent to which we cope with problems that are s p e c i f i c to our species; the management of our desiring natures being f i r s t i n importance among them. If mankind does stand alone, bereft of either angelic or demonic company, then perhaps the f i r s t and most obvious observation to make from the Hobbesian point of view i s that we are here together. From Bramhall's position the most important question i s about whether or not Hobbesian men can interact on anything resembling an interdependent basis. He says of Hobbes that: -32-He hath devised us a trim commonwealth, which i s founded neither upon r e l i g i o n towards God, nor j u s t i c e toward men; but merely upon s e l f - i n t e r e s t , and self-preservation. (E.W.IV,286) This i s a shrewd observation, yet i t begs an important question. It remains to be seen i f Hobbes' reliance on s e l f - i n t e r e s t and self-preservation as motives exclude other considerations, especially that which Bramhall captures i n the phrase, "justice toward men". Despite the fact that Bramhall's c r i t i c a l acumen was not matched by either Lucy or Ross, a l l three shared a tone of moral outrage that was quite untinged by any trace of humour. Not so John Eachard's witty and irreverent Mr Hobb's State of Nature Considered (1672). While the tone of Eachard's book i s light-hearted, there i s no reason to assume that he was anything but serious about refuting Hobbes. A l l parodies r i d i c u l e , but not a l l are utter travesties^ The stated aim of the book i s to demonstrate that "human nature (or reason) i s not so very v i l e and ra s k a l l y , as he (Hobbes) writes his 25 own to be". As a dialogue between the young Eachard (Timothy) and the wily old Hobbes (Philautus) the book opens with the l a t t e r giving what he takes to be a f a i r presentation of the Hobbesian case: Men naturally are a l l ravenous and curish, of a very snarling and b i t i n g nature; to be short, they are i n themselves mere Wolves, Tygers, and Centaurs...every man i s s t i l l to t h i s very day afrai d of every man; and...this i s a natural t a i n t and infe c t i o n that runs through the whole human blood: and i s so deeply seated therein, that i t w i l l never be u t t e r l y washed out t i l l Doomsday.26 Philautus puts the Hobbesian position forward as an e x p l i c i t piece -33-of s e l f - a n a l y s i s , and thus lays i t open to easy rebuttal: the psychological d e t a i l that introspection reveals cannot be universalized as human nature since i t may, as i n Philautus's case, be wildly i d i o s y n c r a t i c . Eachard creates Philautus from fear, loathing and rank nastiness i n roughly equal portions - i n one respect t h i s caricature i s the state of nature and Eachard has struck on a c r u c i a l vein i n Hobbes. In a perfectly clear sense the state of nature, although a war of a l l against a l l , i s not necessarily a state of actual c o n f l i c t of arms, but rather a time during which c o n f l i c t might break out at any moment. Hobbes often states t h i s in terms of intentions being f u l l y declared. Thus via the character of Philautus we are presented with the w i l l to contest and damage, bridled only by the fear of harm. Missing from Eachard's study, but present i n Hobbes, i s the b e l i e f that we can come to know which of our passions are d i v i s i v e , and learn how to be c i v i l by c o n t r o l l i n g those of our passions which we would loathe to find ourselves the 27 objects of. I f the reactions considered to date are t y p i c a l of the period between 1650 and 1679, then there i s certainly no reason to think that Hobbes' death i n the l a t t e r year did anything to mollify the attack. In the Preface he wrote for Benjamin Whichcote's Selected  Sermons (1698) Shaftesbury commented coldly that Hobbes "has done very l i t t l e service i n the moral world. And however other parts of philosophy may be obliged to him, ethicks w i l l appear to have no great share i n the obligation. He has, indeed with great zeal and -34-learning, been opposed by a l l the eminent and worthy divines of the 98 Church of England." The claim about "great learning" i s a controvertible one, but that Hobbes was opposed with "great z e a l " i s incontrovertible, and t e s t i f i e d to i n the pages of the Journal of  the Commons for 1666. I t i s noted there that some among the house -worthy divines as i t turns out - urged that Hobbes and his friend Thomas White be burned as heretics. Cooler heads prevailed, but not before Hobbes had destroyed a portion of his work at Hardwick. Cudworth, Clarke, Shaftesbury and Hutcheson are taken to have composed something of a united front i n defence of human nature against i t s Hobbesian detractors. Of these four Cudworth was perhaps the most obsessed by Hobbes, a point John Passmore emphasizes: Hobbes i s never for long out of Cudworth's mind, but among the multitude of references to that a t h e i s t i c  p o l i t i c i a n (never mentioned by name - l i k e the devil) not one i s unreservedly favourable. 2 9 Certainly The True I n t e l l e c t u a l System - of the Universe i s f u l l of references to Hobbes; i n the main s l i g h t s to his materialism. However Chapter 5 has as i t s object " a t h e i s t i c ethics and p o l i t i c s " , of which Cudworth claims that "the foundation i s f i r s t l a i d i n the v i l l a i n i z i n g of human nature; as that, which has not so much as any the least seeds either of p o l i t i c a l n e s s or ethicalness at a l l i n it...nothing of public and common concern, but a l l private and s e l f i s h . " 3 0 Twenty years after these remarks were written Shaftesbury was to claim i n his Inquiry Concerning Virtue or Merit that: According to a known way of reasoning on s e l f - i n t e r e s t , that which i s of a s o c i a l kind i n us should of right be abolished. Thus kindness of every -35-sort, indulgence, tenderness, compassion, and, i n short, a l l natural affection, should industriously be suppressed...nothing remaining i n us which was contrary to a direct self-end; nothing which might stand i n opposition to a steady and deliberate pursuit of the most narrowly confined self-interest.31 This i s the f i r s t example I have encountered of the ascription of e t h i c a l egoism to Hobbes. Shaftesbury quite sensibly assumes that i f Hobbes i s recommending egoism as i n some sense r i g h t , then he must believe that we can stray into concern for others - hence the need to check tenderness, kindness and compassion. What tends to confuse matters somewhat i s Shaftesbury's i n c l i n a t i o n to say that Hobbes has denied the very p o s s i b i l i t y of s o c i a l sentiment. Echoes of t h i s confusion reverberate s t i l l . Modern treatments of Hobbes are usually dated from George Croom Robertson's 1880 Encyclopaedia Britannica entry on Hobbes. This a r t i c l e was followed by his monograph Hobbes that appeared s i x years l a t e r . In reviewing t h i s monograph for Philosophische Monatshefte i n 1887 Ferdinand Tonnies had hinted that his own book on Hobbes was soon to appear. Hobbes: Leben und Lehre was published i n 1896, and Tonnies was merely the most prominent among a sizeable group of German scholars working on Hobbes and publishing i n the main i n Archiv fur Geschichte der Philosophle. Robertson and Tonnies knew more about Hobbes' corpus than any previous c r i t i c s , and both came to the t r a d i t i o n a l conclusion about Hobbes on human nature. With s p e c i f i c reference to The Elements of  Law Robertson was to say that Hobbes' "conception of man as moved by purely s e l f i s h impulses i s most d i s t i n c t l y marked; and there i s to be sought the true source of his theory of c i v i l government as - .36-necessary for the preservation of men from the consequences of the i r a n t i - s o c i a l d i s p o s i t i o n . " Tonnies' conclusion i s comparable, although arrived at after a rather different study of the nature of Hobbesian man. Obsessed with what he characterized as the difference between society (gesellschaft) and community (gemeinschaft), Tonnies came to think that Hobbesian man was best understood as a precursor to modern gesellschaft beings: competitive, aggressive, a c q u i s i t i v e , and "enemies by nature, 33 mutually exclusive and negating each other." The themes of selfishness, s e l f - l o v e , narrow self-centredness, and anti-socialness a l l appear i n Leslie Stephen's Hobbes (1904). Despite the unmistakable impression that Stephen i s out of sympathy with what he takes Hobbes to be advancing he makes a commendable e f f o r t to disentangle the h i s t o r i c a l Hobbes from the objectionable theory. Nonetheless Hobbes i s said to be "the most thoroughgoing of egoists", and one bold enough to speak "as though t h i s were one of the obvious truths which require no proof or explanation."" 3^ One of Stephen's most provocative claims i s to the effect that Hobbes' "uncompromising egoism i s an inevitable consequence of his 35 position", where "his position" refers to materialism. This claim gets l i t t l e support i n the book, but what Stephen argues i s as follows: F i n a l l y , his thoroughgoing materialism seems to make the assumption of selfishness inevitable. I f , indeed, i t be possible to regard man as mere mechanism, worked by the laws of motion, and yet to regard him as a self-conscious, reasoning, and a remembering animal, i t may be possible to regard him as sympathetic and unselfish. S t i l l i t i s d i f f i c u l t to see how the actions of a mere automaton affected only by the pressure of bodies i n contact with him, can be r e a l l y determined by the conditions of other automata.36 -'37-Th i s argument i s a broken reed, since the p o s s i b i l i t y outlined i n the f i r s t long conditional i s never argued against, and thus the conclusion stated i n the f i r s t sentence i s no way made more plausible. Hobbes c l e a r l y does view human beings as complex physical e n t i t i e s , but t h i s i s inconclusive one way or the other for Stephen's cause, since i n any case of aiding another there i s obviously a causal role played by perception of the other as i n need, which i s i n part to be understood as a process occurring i n the perceiver. Incidentally, Hobbes' d i s t i n c t i o n between natural and a r t i f i c i a l bodies e n t a i l s that automata are a r t i f i c i a l animals, but not that men are mechanical animals or natural automata. In the years since the appearance of Stephen's book there have been a number of different interpretations of Hobbes offered. In the main however, and despite variations over other points, most have been prepared to endorse the orthodox b e l i e f that Hobbes held a version of the wickedness thesis. Since to review a l l of the contributions would be impossible within present bounds, I have chosen to concentrate attention on the one modern work which seems most forthright and clear i n presenting an orthodox l i n e : David Gauthier's The Logic of Leviathan. -38-CHAPTER I I DAVID GAUTHIER'S HOBBESIAN MAN -39-2 . 1 The State of Nature as Terminal The-Logic of Leviathan i s the centre-piece of David Gauthier's work on Hobbes. One of the book's stated aims i s to demonstrate how and why Hobbes' theory of human nature i s the e x p l i c i t groundwork for both the moral and p o l i t i c a l theory which follows. This contention i s of course not a novel one, but i n Gauthier's hands i t receives a quite new twist: he argues that the Hobbesian structure rests on a physiological theory which gives Hobbes' psychology i t s re a l shape, and guarantees that no genuinely moral theory could spring from i t . The s t r a i n of what Gauthier sees as prudentialism i s too pure to allow anything other than a system of "common, or universal, prudence."''' To make his case, Gauthier presents an analysis of Hobbes' physiological postulates; p r i n c i p a l l y those on v i t a l and voluntary motion. This strategy has the great virtue of taking Hobbes' materialism seriously, because i t accepts that his psychology i s constructed mechanistically, and that materialism enters at the beginning of the story. I s h a l l argue that Gauthier's evidence does not support the interpretation he gives us, but nonetheless that he has indicated the l i n e s along which future studies of Hobbes' psychology must run. Quite recently, indeed some time after the main structure of t h i s chapter was s e t t l e d , Gauthier published a piece e n t i t l e d "Thomas Hobbes: Moral Theorist". The central thesis i n t h i s new a r t i c l e i s that Hobbes' "true moral theory i s a dual conventionalism, i n which a conventional reason, superseding natural reason, j u s t i f i e s a conventional morality, constraining natural - 4 0 -behaviour. And t h i s dual conventionalism i s Hobbes' enduring contribution to moral theory." In contrast with his e a r l i e r position on the relationship between Hobbes' psychology and ethics, a position which I s h a l l examine shortly, Gauthier now believes that Hobbes successfully manages "the r e c o n c i l i a t i o n of maximizing r a t i o n a l i t y with constraining m o r a l i t y . " 2 3 In t h i s new position Gauthier accounts Hobbes as having a genuine moral theory rather than merely propounding a system of "common, or universal prudence". I agree with Gauthier's new position on Hobbes' moral theory, and I give my own version of what Hobbes has to say about right reason i n the guise of the law - an i n s t i t u t e d s o c i a l decision procedure standing above individuals as embodiments of right reason - i n section 2.5 below. However, when I f i r s t confronted Gauthier's work on Hobbes I set myself the task of showing that i t s flaw lay i n at t r i b u t i n g to Hobbes a physiological psychology which would make a genuine moral theory impossible. And while I was both pleased and interested to see that Gauthier had changed his mind on t h i s matter, I was somewhat surprised to read that, "I s h a l l then s t r i k e out i n a new dir e c t i o n , by-passing my former comments on the subversion of Hobbes' moral theory by his psychology...". 2' 3 My surprise was based on the fact that i n The Logic of Leviathan Gauthier gives what must be the most elegant and sustained case ever offered for believing that Hobbes' moral theory was undermined by his psychology. In the new piece no de t a i l s whatever are given to indicate what was amiss i n t h i s o r i g i n a l case. Thus I believe that my own analysis of the e a r l i e r position i s warranted, since i t attempts to give some detailed reasons as to why a bypass i s - 4 1 -imperative. David Gauthier may not be at a l l convinced that his former position should be bypassed for the reasons that I give, but that remains to be seen. My strategy e n t a i l s u t i l i z i n g Gauthier's book on Hobbes, and a l l of the e a r l i e r a r t i c l e s , to reconstruct his model of Hobbesian man as an unrestrained u t i l i t y maximizer. Once that model i s developed I turn to the treatment of v i t a l and voluntary motion i n The- Logic of Leviathan; reason being that i t i s at t h i s most basic l e v e l of Hobbes" psychology that Gauthier finds the roots of the prudentialism which i s thought to subvert the moral theory. I s h a l l argue that t h i s aspect of Hobbes" psychology i s morally neutral, and that Gauthier's model of Hobbesian psychology i s inconsistent with much that Hobbes says, especially what he says about j u s t i c e as a v i r t u e . In P r a c t i c a l -Reasoning (1963) Gauthier outlines a possible position on reasons for action which i s actually his f i r s t sketch of Hobbesian man: It i s , no doubt, possible to conceive an agent who could treat his own wants, present and future, as reasons for acting, but who could not treat other considerations as reasons. Such an agent would (and could) concern himself only with those wants of others which he wanted to f u l f i l (or to f r u s t r a t e ) . But there i s no reason to assume that our capacity for r a t i o n a l action i s , or need be, l i m i t e d i n t h i s way. And i n the absence of such a reason, we may properly consider at face value those quite ordinary p r a c t i c a l arguments which rest on what i s desirable to persons other than the agent. 5 Notice that Gauthier says "in the absence of such a reason", that i s , i n the absence of a reason for believing that "our capacity for r a t i o n a l action i s , or need be, limited i n t h i s way." As w i l l be - 4 2 -demonstrated shortly, i n The Logic of Leviathan Gauthier believes that such a reason can be discovered i n Hobbes' account of v i t a l and voluntary motion. That the above characterization i s t a i l o r e d for Hobbesian man i s put beyond doubt l a t e r i n P r a c t i c a l - Reasoning. Within a discussion of obligation i t i s claimed that for Hobbes, "since one i s moved to act only by one's in t e r e s t s , i t follows that one cannot consider that the making of a covenant provides a reason s u f f i c i e n t for keeping i t . " 4 To act i n one's interests i s to act i n terms of one's personal well-being and s a t i s f a c t i o n ; to act solely on that basis i s of course to be an extreme form of egoist. Such agents are, on Gauthier's account, prudent - capable of foresight and "far sighted s e l f i s h n e s s " 5 - but unable to adhere to the principles of an agreement when the tug of immediate advantage pu l l s them elsewhere. As he w i l l argue i n "Morality and Advantage", "the r a t i o n a l l y prudent man i s incapable of moral behaviour", because at the very least such behaviour requires that a man be trustworthy. To be worthy of trust i s to have that capacity "which enables i t s possessor to adhere, and to judge that he ought to adhere, to a commitment which he has made, without regard to considerations of advantage." 6 To be both prudent and worthy of trust i s not on Gauthier's grounds s u f f i c i e n t to be a f u l l y moral man, but i t i s intermediate between the merely prudent man of Hobbes and the genuinely moral man. Hobbesian man i s thus twice removed from moral status. The most v i v i d statement of the impasse facing Hobbesian man i s found i n "Reason and Maximization". Put i n terms of independent and interdependent action, where the former i s action chosen by each -43-person for himself and the l a t t e r action arrived at through agreement of a l l parties, Gauthier begins with the remark that, "interdependent action i s action i n c i v i l society...independent action, then, may be termed action i n the state of nature." 7 This d i s t i n c t i o n i s put to work i n the claim that: Hobbesian man i s unable to i n t e r n a l i z e the s o c i a l requirement that he subordinate his direct pursuit of survival and well-being to the agreed pursuit of optimal outcomes which best ensure the survival and well-being of each person. Thus i n our terms Hobbesian man actually remains i n the state of nature; the c i v i l power, the Sovereign, can effect only the appearance Of c i v i l society, of interdependent action. The r e a l difference between the state of nature and c i v i l society must be a difference i n man, and not merely i n the external relations of men.8 Hobbesian man i s a victim of his species of r a t i o n a l i t y : c o n s t i t u t i o n a l l y unable to enjoy the benefits of c i v i l l i f e because forever doomed to strategies based on unrestrained maximization. Gauthier has put his finger on a c r u c i a l issue; namely, i n what respects are human dispositions relevant to the c i v i l project, or what i s the content of c i v i l i t y ? However, i n answering as he does, Gauthier has ascribed to Hobbes a conception of r a t i o n a l i t y that denudes c i v i l i t y of any content and renders the c i v i l project at best an exercise i n the imposition of external constraints on behaviour. Prior to investigating the reasons proffered i n The  Logic of Leviathan as support for the severe doctrine found i n "Reason and Maximization", l e t us f i r s t preview some of the consequences attendant upon accepting t h i s view of Hobbes. Hobbesian men are prudent and thus have no problem recognizing the benefits to be gained through interdependent action i n c i v i l society. Nor are they blind to the fact that agreements are the -44-required means to obtaining these benefits. Hence mutual l i m i t a t i o n of the right to a l l i s a r a t i o n a l necessity and known to be such. Knowledge of the rationale for covenants i s not s u f f i c i e n t i n the face of temptation however, and thus Hobbesian men are unable to abide by the covenants they see every reason for making. For them there i s nothing about a covenant as such that grounds action; subsequently, any pa r t i c u l a r agreement which can be broken at greater benefit than cost w i l l be. Fully aware of a l l t h i s the prudent man concludes that a coercive power must be introduced to counter-balance the p u l l of advantage. Much l i k e Odysseus i n response to the advice of Circe, Hobbesian men must equip themselves against the inevitable force of their own desires. At t h i s juncture the sovereign i s introduced. The sovereign's role i s not to s t i f l e desire - that on Hobbesian grounds would be to k i l l the patient as an expedient against disease - but rather to provide a framework of sanctions adequate to the task of restraining the w i l l . The f i r s t point to be made i s that i f we follow Gauthier's characterization of both Hobbesian man and the Hobbesian sovereign, then we have i n effect a simple model of explosive energy and i t s containment. An objection to t h i s model i s that i t f a i l s to accommodate a considerable amount of what we know about Hobbesian man and his relationship to law. What I have i n mind can be stated as follows. In the f i r s t instance notice what Hobbes says i n his exchange with Bramhall: It i s the law from whence proceeds the difference between the moral and the natural goodness: so that i t i s well enough said by him, that "moral goodness i s the conformity of action with right reason"; and better said than meant; for t h i s right reason, which i s the law, i s no otherwise cer t a i n l y right than by -45-our making i t so by our approbation of i t and voluntary subjection to i t . (E.W.V, 193) This position of Hobbes1, along with his summation i n the words, "the law i s a l l the ri g h t reason we have" (Ibid., 194), requires an analysis that threatens Gauthier's simple model of constraint, i f law i s the embodiment of rig h t reason, then one's attitude toward i t need not be aversive even when i t s dictates go against an individual's desires. Hobbes1 wish to have his p o l i t i c a l doctrine taught at large i s well known, and equally evident i n the question "why may not men be taught t h e i r duty, that i s , the science of just and unjust...?" (E.W.VI, 212) Now, one could plausibly hold that the science of j u s t i c e was nothing above and beyond the effective promulgation and enforcement of law. Teaching men t h e i r duty would thus be schooling them i n what was permissible on the one hand and proscribed on the other. To carry out t h i s project one need presuppose nothing more than a populace whose actions were governed i n part by fear. This tidy interpretation runs into an acute problem once we appreciate that Hobbes envisaged two d i s t i n c t attitudes to the law, only one of which was fear based: For seeing the w i l l s of most men are governed only by fear, and where there i s no power of coercion, there i s no fear; the w i l l s of most men w i l l follow th e i r passions of covetousness, l u s t , anger, and the l i k e . (E.L., 111) The nature of the second attitude to the law i s closely a l l i e d with the virtue of j u s t i c e , whereas the adherence to law through fear of attendant punishments requires no such connection. To develop t h i s point further we s h a l l need to rehearse Hobbes' d i s t i n c t i o n between the j u s t i c e of an act and the j u s t i c e of a man. -46-Consider the passage from The Elements of Law i n which t h i s d i s t i n c t i o n i s broached: For j u s t i c e and i n j u s t i c e , when they are attributed to actions, s i g n i f y the same thing with no inj u r y , and injury; and denominate the action j u s t , or unjust, but not the man so;...But when j u s t i c e and i n j u s t i c e are attributed to men, they sign i f y proneness and affection, and i n c l i n a t i o n of nature, that i s to say, passions of the mind apt to produce just and unjust actions, ( i b i d . , 83) Citizens who act j u s t l y , who abstain from doing injury for fear of the legal sanctions, are i n a deep sense unjust, for "to be unjust i s to neglect righteous dealing, or to think that i t i s to be measured not according to my contract, but some present benefit" (E.W.II, 33). Once t h i s d i s t i n c t i o n between the j u s t i c e of acts and the j u s t i c e of men i s grasped, and once i t i s granted that the majority of ci t i z e n s lack w i l l s that qualify as just - the constant endeavour to l i v e righteously - we are i n a position to distinguish two forms in which Hobbes saw j u s t i c e as a v i r t u e . The f i r s t , as he makes plain i n De Homine, i s akin to the quality of t r a c t a b i l i t y i n c i t i z e n s , " [ f ] o r , whatsoever the laws are, not to violate them i s always and everywhere held to be a virtue i n c i t i z e n s . " (DeH., 69) As a way of pa r t i t i o n i n g the class of law abiding c i t i z e n s , and thereby reaching our second form of j u s t i c e as a vi r t u e , we might ask the question, "Which disposition(s) w i l l lead men to obey the laws of the land?" Setting aside those whose obedience i s a function of fear, we are l e f t with those whose motivation i s not fear (propulsion away from unwanted consequences) but rather love (inducement toward a desired object). Since i t i s the case that Hobbes allows but two modes of motivation, love and fear, and since - 4 7 -he distinguishes the t r u l y just man as one not moved to just acts through fear of punishments, then we are forced to conclude that, at i t s core, the virtue of j u s t i c e i s a disposition to seek some desired end i n just acts. Consistent with the t h i r d law of nature being concerned with standing to covenants made, i t s primary d i r e c t i v e to men involves embracing the virtue of j u s t i c e . Furthermore, since the laws of nature i n toto are ra t i o n a l precepts, i t might be appropriate to seek the det a i l s of the directive embedded i n the t h i r d law i n the realm of reason. That i s , i f i t i s indeed ra t i o n a l to adhere to covenants, for some reason other than to avoid the penalty for reneging, then perhaps the reason relates to the r a t i o n a l i t y of the procedure by which leg a l directives are arrived at. In short, the virtue of j u s t i c e may be based i n a particular attitude to the law: as the most rati o n a l creation of men with c i v i l aspirations. I f so, then the role of the Hobbesian sovereign i n providing the framework of coercion i s a precondition for the science of j u s t i c e and does not i n any sense exhaust i t . This i s so because teaching men their duties i s equivalent to giving a j u s t i f i c a t i o n for adherence to covenants, and t h i s i n turn, as we have seen, i s not simply to oblige through force. What then i s the significance of t h i s rejection of Gauthier's position on Hobbes' sovereign? Considerations of the kind just now raised suggest that Gauthier's model of the sovereign as the necessary curb on rampant egoism does considerable violence to the subtlety and elegance of Hobbes' account of vi r t u e , a part of which I have just now elaborated. So, i f th i s consequence of Gauthier's position i s as di s f i g u r i n g as i t appears, then perhaps the finger of -48-doubt should point back to his i n i t i a l premises. The obvious candidate for f a l s i t y i s his premise about the egoistic psychology of Hobbesian man, and i t i s to t h i s premise that I now address myself. 2.2 The Material - Basis In his Preface to The Logic of Leviathan Gauthier provides the following thumbnail sketch of his argument: Hobbes constructs a p o l i t i c a l theory which bases unlimited p o l i t i c a l authority on unlimited individualism. The conclusion requires the premiss; anything less than unlimited individualism would j u s t i f y only l i m i t e d p o l i t i c a l authority. But the premiss i s too strong for the conclusions; as I attempt to show, from unlimited individualism only anarchy follows. The theory i s a failure...He r e l i e s neither on the goodwill of men - t h e i r willingness to consider each other's interests for t h e i r own sake, and not as a means to s e l f - s a t i s f a c t i o n , nor on the efficacy of i n s t i t u t i o n s , as a means of both concentrating and l i m i t i n g p o l i t i c a l power...His refusal to r e l y on either of these explains the f a i l u r e of his theory. 9 Irrespective of i t s ultimate collapse, Gauthier thinks that Hobbes' theory i s a worthy object of study because, " i f we look upon t h i s argument as a l i m i t i n g case, an attempt to construct a p o l i t i c a l order on the least favourable assumptions, we s h a l l appreciate i t s value."'''0 What are the "least favourable assumptions"? Gauthier has one central assumption i n mind; namely that of essential and unrelenting egoism. There i s no reason to think that Gauthier entertains anything more than t h i s . However, i t i s arguable that Gauthier's assumption, rather than any Hobbes makes, turns out to be too strong. Hobbes cl e a r l y did -49-refuse to theorize i n the c l a s s i c a l s t y l e : he eschews the view that homo natu r a l i t e r est animal sociale. Equally, while accepting that men were capable of feeling sympathy and love for certain specified others, he did not believe that a universal form of either emotion guided human a f f a i r s . Lastly, while denying that goodwill was much evident among c i t i z e n s , Hobbes has given no indication that he believes them incapable of i t ; something that i s pretty close to Gauthier's understanding of what he did. So, while i t i s true to say that Hobbes theorized on a minimalist basis, one needs to be cautious about what "the least favourable assumptions" amount to. The substance of Gauthier's views about Hobbesian man are found i n chapter one of The - Logic of Leviathan; thereafter the materials are put to work. I turn now to that chapter, "The Nature of Man"."'"''' I said above that Gauthier, unlike most of his predecessors, has gone to the d e t a i l of Hobbesian psychology in order to substantiate a thesis about the nature of Hobbesian man. This i s no doubt a result of the fact that Gauthier treats Hobbes' systematic pretensions seriously. As a reader of the Vita Carmina Expressa would have noted, Hobbes took motion to be our key to the inner r e a l i t y of things. So i n demonstrating why Hobbes saw psychology as the essential basis for a science treating morals and p o l i t i c s , Gauthier naturally, and r i g h t l y , goes d i r e c t l y to the species of motion employed by Hobbes for the analysis of human action. Reporting the discussion of Leviathan Chapter 6, Gauthier l i s t s the two forms of motion common to a l l animals: v i t a l and voluntary. The former i s "maintained i n a l l l i v i n g beings without 12 interruption, from t h e i r generation to their death." Of the - 5 0 -l a t t e r we are t o l d that "human action i s voluntary motion; human passion i s the beginning of voluntary motion.""'"'5 However, since passion i s i t s e l f but a l i n k i n a longer chain, Gauthier goes on to discuss sensation and imagination. F i r s t l y , although we are t o l d that passion i s the beginning of voluntary motion, the o r i g i n must be traced back to "sense perception - i t s e l f , of course, a type of m o t i o n . T h e causal story i s r e l a t i v e l y uncontentious: the motions that are sense reception are relayed to the brain (creating a counter-pressure that i s sensation) before being continued to the heart i n the form of what Hobbes c a l l s "imagination". The heart, being the centre of v i t a l motion, i s either helped or hindered by the inflow of imagination and responds with an endeavour characterized by Gauthier as "the f i r s t beginnings of voluntary motion.""'"5 Since the heart's reactive endeavours are either appetitive or aversive reactions, and since these reactions are individuated as our passions, i t follows that a l l voluntary action i s derived from passion. Such i s Gauthier's case. There are then, two beginnings for voluntary motion i n t h i s account: one i n the o r i g i n a l event that constitutes sensation, and another i n the heart based endeavour which i s the beginning of our response to sensory imput. One could argue that sensation ought not to be considered as the beginning of voluntary motion, since a claim to that status i s more easily made for endeavour - always and everywhere a species of motion originating our actions. However, i t i s important not to be too r i g i d about the talk of beginnings, for the simple reason that when Hobbes t e l l s his own story about how - 5 1 -actions are generated, he stresses something quite different to the sensory or heart based motions considered thus f a r . Hobbes claims that, "because going, speaking, and the l i k e voluntary motions, depend always upon a precedent thought of whither, which way, and what; i t i s evident, that the imagination i s the f i r s t internal beginning of a l l voluntary motion." (E.W. I l l , 39) Imagination s t a r t s l i f e as an event i n the brain, and although Hobbes considers that i t travels to the heart, i t i s cl e a r l y d i s t i n c t from, and prior to, whatever i s i n i t i a t e d i n the heart. Imagination i s the f i r s t " i n t e r n a l " beginning of voluntary motion, and i s thus presumably contrasted with the "external" objects of sense whose impact decays to imagination. However, as the case i s described by Hobbes - i n terms of thoughts about the objects of sense - i t would seem reasonable to assign s i g n i f i c a n t cognitive content to that which originates action within us. And granted that t h i s move i s reasonable, one should be more inc l i n e d to consider the nature of the thoughts which i n i t i a t e action, and less inclined to see action as merely a product of the patently non-cognitive heart-based endeavours. However, more of t h i s i n section 2 . A. On the basis of what we have outlined thus far, Gauthier feels confident enough to draw the following rather s t a r t l i n g conclusion: From t h i s account of v i t a l and voluntary motion, i t follows that each man seeks, and seeks only, to preserve and to strengthen himself. A concern for continued well-being i s both the necessary and the s u f f i c i e n t ground of human action. Hence man i s necessarily selfish.-*-^ Gauthier's conclusion - that Hobbesian man i s "necessarily s e l f i s h " - i s a v a l i d inference from the premises he provides: men seek only -52-to preserve and strengthen themselves; no action occurs without a component of concern for the agent's well-being motivating i t . Taken together, and construed as saying that no man ever does anything he takes to be inconsistent with his preservation and well-being, these two premises amount to egoism. But the v a l i d i t y of the inference i s not the only relevant consideration. Are the premises an accurate account of what Hobbes r e a l l y holds? There has certai n l y not been enough argument from Gauthier thus far to convince me that they are. The most l i k e l y place to look for supporting argument would be i n what Gauthier understands Hobbes to have said about the nature of desire. 2.3 Desire I f , "a concern for continued well-being i s both the necessary and the s u f f i c i e n t ground of human action", then there could never be. an action which was directed to an end that was conceived to be ultimately i n c o n f l i c t with continued well-being. There are, c l e a r l y , respects i n which actions which ultimately subserve well-being can be inc l u s i v e of the interests of others. Not a l l concerns with the agents' private well-being need issue i n narrowly  privatized actions, not even within egoism (which as commonly understood contends only that the agent's basic concerns are for personal well-being). Gauthier i s quite clear that Hobbes has narrowed the scope of well-being down to personal well-being, and he expresses this by saying that for Hobbesian agents actions w i l l be "necessarily s e l f i s h " . However, without some further discussion of - 5 3 -what he means by " s e l f i s h " I cannot see how we might specify just how narrow the ambit of action i s meant to be. What then i s the evidence that Gauthier u t i l i z e s to establish t h i s necessary selfishness thesis? To begin with there i s what Hobbes says about desire. A l l passions were designated as species of either appetite or aversion. Since a l l appetites and aversions depend on the heart i n i t s role as the main-spring for action, there i s a clear enough sense i n which passions are a product of the autonomic system which maintains l i f e in the organism. Subsequently, actions are best understood as extensions of v i t a l motion: the system's method of a l t e r i n g the outside world as a means to r e a l i z i n g internal states of i t s e l f . Actions originate i n passion, but passions originate i n the system's fundamental preservatory mechanism. V i t a l motion i s so fundamental that i t cannot be analysed further; i t has no aims, although i t seems true to say that i t s functioning exemplifies the system's aim to cohere as a going concern. Passion subserves t h i s aim. Gauthier, holding to t h i s plausible and interesting view about what connects v i t a l and voluntary motion, thinks that a l l Hobbesian desires are more or less conscious, surface analogs for the workings of the deeper (heart-centred) system. This interpretation has the virtue of being clear, but i s i t true? Adopting i t e n t a i l s that we reject as motivations anything which openly and consciously mil i t a t e s against either preservation or private well-being. Hence we would i n agreeing with Gauthier, be accepting that Hobbes could never allow the sane abandonment of l i f e either i n order to avoid future suffering (granting that -54-preservation i s primary) or to save the l i f e of another. Furthermore, i f a l l action exemplifies a concern with our private well-being then actions which promote the well-being of others can only be doing so as a means to the agent's personal ends. In 4.5 the issue of suicide i s considered i n some d e t a i l , but my conclusion i s that Hobbes did not rule out the sane abandonment of l i f e . Nor did he deny that men might refuse certain means to preservation which they deemed to be disgraceful or contemptible. This matter i s discussed i n chapter 5. Thus whatever the Hobbesian account of motivation e n t a i l s i t i s not one that gives ultimate p r i o r i t y to preservation, nor to motivations that ignore the exercise of non self-regarding virtues. The relationship between virtues and conceptions of the s e l f i s another matter; but certainly one that i s not c l a r i f i e d by using egoism and altruism as polar conceptual tools i n the analysis. In the present instance the best strategy i s to explore what i t i s that Hobbes actually says about why men desire par t i c u l a r things. Hobbes gives a clear answer to th i s question i n one of his many comments on Thomas White's manuscript: FToperly, "good" and "bad" are applied to objects, [not to persons]; for something that pleases or delights a person or i s yearned for by him i s said to be "good" for him. On the other hand, something unpleasant i s e v i l ; and we c a l l "beautiful" that which contains the "signs" of good, and "shameful" that which lacks them. "Good", therefore, and " e v i l " are applied r e l a t i v e l y and ad personam. (T.W., 378) Hobbes has not said that men only yearn for or desire that which they take to be i n th e i r s e l f i s h i n t e r e s t s , or that which meets th e i r s e l f i s h longer term goals. What he does say i s that we c a l l -55-"good for him" that which someone yearns for or desires. We are no further advanced with the question of what i t i s that i s yearned for. Undoubtedly, Hobbes does often characterize that which i s sought after as "a goal, or self-bene f i t " , ( i b i d . , 400) and he does concentrate on the conception of the actor (his "mind-picture" ( i b i d . ) ) when discussing objects of desire, and he does talk about the thinking involved as being about the good or i l l that w i l l r e s u l t from the postulated action; but these imply nothing more than that we see benefit i n the r e a l i z a t i o n of our goals (whatever they are). Granting that a l l desiring i s a sign of enhanced v i t a l motion, what reason do we have for going further, with Gauthier, i n claiming that only a s p e c i f i c range of things can be desired; namely those things which we believe conduce to s e l f i s h well-being? We need to be moved to t h i s conclusion, because thus far we have only followed Hobbes i n agreeing that some conceptions (of the q u a l i t i e s of objects l e t ' s say) e l i c i t enhanced v i t a l motion, and that those conceptions involve an 'end' connected with s e l f - b e n e f i t . Nothing can be made of the ' s e l f i n self-benefit to advance an egoistic view, because i t i s simply equivalent to "desirable to oneself" as Hobbes uses i t , and that leaves the question of what i s desired wide open. The question of utmost importance i s thus, "Is there any single linkage between conceptions of what we conceive of as good and enhanced v i t a l motion?" Gauthier says that there i s , i n as much as a l l conceptions of what i s good reduce to conceptions of what i s for the agent's good, and a l l such goods serve to give v i t a l motion -56-increased enhancement or as l i t t l e diminution as possible. There i s then just one story about why we want whatever i t i s that we do want: i t s attainment i s envisaged as desirable, and to a degree even the contemplated attainment of i t occasions delight. To the extent that a l l desire i s enhanced v i t a l motion, and insofar as the conceptions involved are of what we take to have advantageous features, there is_ a single l i n k between conceptions of the good and enhanced v i t a l motion; but the linkage turns out to be a l o g i c a l one. We have not advanced one step toward egoism by accepting that " a l l objects of desire are objects which enhance v i t a l motion", and indeed we w i l l not u n t i l we accept the much stronger claim that " a l l objects of desire are sought because we experience them as, and hope that they w i l l turn out to be, an enhancement to our v i t a l motion". This l a t t e r view I take i t incorporates the idea that nothing would be desirable did i t not subserve the ultimate cause of enhancing one's v i t a l motion. The former however merely states a truism within Hobbes' mechanistic psychology. We are r e a l l y no closer to knowing why one man gains s a t i s f a c t i o n from what he seeks; a l l we know i s that his seeking i t i s equivalent to his enjoyment of heightened v i t a l motion. I f there i s no smooth passage to an ego i s t i c position, or at least none to be found on the surface of what Hobbes says about desiring at the physiological l e v e l , then there i s a rather serious consequence for Gauthier's analysis of "good" i n The Logic of Leviathan. What he claims i s as follows: I s h a l l say that, for Hobbes, the formal meaning of 'good' i s conveyed by the equivalence: 'this i s good' = 'this i s an object of desire'. The material meaning of 'good' i s conveyed by the equivalence: 'this i s -57-good1 M = 'this i s an object enhancing v i t a l motion'.I 7 The reason given for drawing t h i s d i s t i n c t i o n i s said to be i t s u t i l i t y i n illuminating the real connections between Hobbes' psychology and his ethics. The material d e f i n i t i o n s , and not their formal counterparts, are claimed to be the actual basis on which Hobbes t h e o r i z e d . 1 8 Since Gauthier believes that he has s a t i s f a c t o r i l y demonstrated that the material l e v e l i s the l e v e l of Hobbes' physiological account of human action, and since he assumes further that he has adequately shown why that l e v e l underwrites egoism, he feels confident i n the b e l i e f that his d i s t i n c t i o n w i l l bring a hitherto missing c l a r i t y to investigations of Hobbes. However, we are s t i l l without a s o l i d reason for moving away from the view that i n the material d e f i n i t i o n of good (in terms of an object enhancing v i t a l motion) we have an insight into Hobbes but no hint of "necessary selfishness". The relationship between conceptions and passion i s the subject matter of the following section, but i t might be worthwhile considering a complexity that has been largely ignored i n the debate about desire. The complexity i n question i s one that surrounds the Hobbesian notion of a conception. Going along with Gauthier, I have been happy to think of a conception or idea as a mental prefiguration of what some event might bring i n t r a i n . These consequences, assuming that they are wanted, appear to us as desirable, and because a l l desire i s enhanced v i t a l motion the conception i s experienced as desirable too. However, there i s an equally clear respect i n which desiring, or trying to get, i s to be -58-i d e n t i f i e d with the heart's endeavour motion, no doubt aroused by the intentional object of the b e l i e f . Looked at i n t h i s way, there i s at least the beginning of a view that could help us to hold apart the conception from a subsequent appetite. Hobbes says of course that, "whatsoever i s the object of any man's appetite or desire, that i s i t which he for his part c a l l e t h good"; (E.W. I l l , 41) and the temptation i s to see the appetite as flourishing before any considerations of goodness are i n play. That must be a mistake, since u n t i l there i s some conception of properties (as meeting or f a i l i n g to meet our needs say) there can be no appetite. The phenomenon of coming to have more appetites as a result of greater experience i s of course relevant as w e l l , as Hobbes noticed. (DeH., 46-7) Presumably then the point i s about the use of the word "good" being supervenient on appetite, since then i t simply expresses an appetite which i n i t s turn i s supervenient upon some conception or other. 2;4 Conceptions and Passion In the previous section some attempt was made to show that Hobbes' analysis of "good" rested as much on an understanding of conceptions as i t does on the role of the appetite o]$ aversion to which some conceptions give r i s e . Furthermore, i t was suggested that there i s nothing i n what he says about conceptions which commits him to egoism. Thus those l i k e Gauthier who are confident that Hobbes i s committed to egoism are almost certainly ignoring what he says about the nature of thoughts or conceptions i n favour -59-of concentrating on the passions that arise around the heart and cause action. In t h i s section I wish to take my case one step further by showing that there i s some evidence i n Hobbes to suggest that when he discusses complex human actions he gives a central causal role to conceptions or thoughts; and does so i n such a way that i t would be quite misleading to treat his account of the passions as simply a story about the non-cognitive behaviour of the heart. Hobbes' most general d i v i s i o n of human nature i s into two parts: the powers of the body and the powers of the mind. With respect to the l a t t e r he says that, "[o]f the powers of the mind there be two sorts, cognitive or imaginative or conceptive; and motive." (E.L., 2) While Hobbes talks about cognitive powers there i s no doubt that he sees cognition as i n one respect a passive power i n men, since representations are impressed on us by objects capable of impact on our sense organs: For the understanding of what I mean by the power cognitive, we must remember and acknowledge that there be i n our minds continually certain images or conceptions of the things without us....This imagery and representations of the q u a l i t i e s of things without us i s that we c a l l our cognition, imagination, ideas, notice, conception, or knowledge of them, (ibid.) But allowing for the fact that we are recipients of sense impressions, what Hobbes says in th i s passage indicates that the cognitive power i n question encompasses what we might c a l l our * capacity to size things up ("notice" i s the term of his which perhaps comes closest to what I mean). What we notice w i l l , i n the central cases Hobbes i s concerned about, be s i g n i f i c a n t because of "the signs of goodness" or the "signs of e v i l " ( i b i d . , 29) which we -60-attribute to the object on the basis of our interpretation of i t s q u a l i t i e s . It i s a standard Hobbesian doctrine that how things look to men who have an e x i s t i n g set of attitudes w i l l depend on how the things' putative properties are caught in the l i g h t projected by human interests. Thus "good" and " e v i l " are more expressive of the user's interests than of the q u a l i t i e s of that to which they ref e r . Turning to the motive power of the mind, i t i s defined as, "that by which the mind giveth animal motion to that body wherein i t existeth; the acts hereof are our affections and passions", ( i b i d . , 28) These "acts" of the mind which are examples of i t s motive power, are contrasted with the motive power of the body, the acts whereof exhibit the strength by which other bodies are moved, ( i b i d . , 27) So, conceptions (to use the portmanteau term), which are "nothing r e a l l y , but motion i n some internal substance of the head", ( i b i d . , 28) are causally linked to passions, which i n the i r turn are heart-based motions which Hobbes treats as consequences of the "motive power of the mind". I would submit that what Hobbes has succeeded in a r t i c u l a t i n g i s the d i s t i n c t i o n between the cognitive and purely physical aspects of what we refer to as the emotions. And that he l i n k s the mind and the affections i n the way that he does gives me some confidence i n suggesting that we do not follow his l i n e of argument i f we simply ignore the nature of conceptions and turn to the physiological story when treating his account of the passions. I f , as Hobbes claims, "our w i l l s follow our opinions, as our actions follow our w i l l s " , ( i b i d . , 63) and i f the opinions i n question are, as he says, about the "benefits" and "harms" possibly - 6 1 -attendant on certain courses of action, (ibid.) the interesting question at the centre of an investigation into motivation i s one about what particular men take to be be n e f i c i a l on the one hand and harmful on the other. Conceptions play the executive role i n so far as they motivate the heart, and u n t i l we have some decent account of what a person believes to be beneficial and harmful we are merely l e f t with the neutral generalization that men are moved to action by th e i r conceptions of what i s ben e f i c i a l and harmful. In one place Hobbes actually suggests that passions consist i n "the pleasure men have, or displeasure from the signs of honour or dishonour done unto them", ( i b i d . , 36) Now, while t h i s i s not a very plausible view of what causes a l l passions - and indeed i t i s hard to understand how anyone except a man thoroughly steeped i n a r i s t o c r a t i c practices could come out with i t - i t certainly states baldly that what dif f e r e n t i a t e s the passions i s the agent's conception of what i s being accorded or denied him i n the way of honour. This position, namely that the passions are to be distinguished i n terms of the thoughts that i n i t i a t e them, s t r i k e s me as correct. In saying that emotions are constituted by thoughts (jealousy i s just jealous thoughts) one would not be giving a modern version of what Hobbes believed, since patently he saw passions as endeavour motions around the heart, and thus would not agree that emotions were thoughts alone. However, while he gives a role to the motions around the heart, my claim i s simply that he does not ignore the place of conceptions i n the process. A l l too often readers of Hobbes f a i l to notice that he treats conceptions as executive. -62-2;5 Justice as a Virtue In section 2.1 an argument was sketched to throw some doubt on the truth of Gauthier's i n i t i a l premise about Hobbesian psychology. This argument sketch had the form of a reductio: i f Gauthier's thesis about Hobbesian man and his c i v i l sovereign i s adopted, we are soon led to an unacceptable consequence: that law i s but a framework of coercion and the sovereign simply an enforcer. This conclusion certainly d i s t o r t s what Hobbes says about the law, and indeed renders some of i t u n i n t e l l i g i b l e . The problem with Gauthier's position becomes acutely obvious when we turn, as we now s h a l l , to his version of what Hobbes has to say about j u s t i c e as a vir t u e . Gauthier i s committed to the view that Hobbes can not have both his theory of j u s t i c e as a virtue and his psychology. However, working on the assumption that he i s not inconsistent i n holding both together, I took Gauthier's conclusion as an indication that something had gone wrong i n his analysis. The faulty aspect was his reading of Hobbes' psychology and an alternative was put forward. However, we are now l e f t with only a thin theory of what Hobbes took j u s t i c e i n character to be. In pa r t i c u l a r , I have said nothing to the question of how t h i s virtue connects with the executive role of conceptions i n motivation, the subject of my l a s t section. As a beginning i t i s in s t r u c t i v e to review Gauthier's treatment of the difference between just acts and just men. The formal rendering of "X i s a just act" i s "X does not involve the breaking of covenant." Accordingly, "A i s a just man" i s given as "A i s disposed to perform acts which do not involve the breaking of -63-- 19 covenant." The material versions introduce d e t a i l s derived from Gauthier's analysis of Hobbesian psychology: "X i s a just act" becomes "X does not involve the breaking of a covenant undertaken i n accordance with the second law of nature." The second law of nature directs men to l i m i t t h e i r l i b e r t y as a means to maximizing their prospects of preservation; subsequently just acts are those which do not violate adherence to agreed points of l i m i t a t i o n . Since covenants mark such points of l i m i t a t i o n , the just act i s that which does not involve any breaking of covenant. Gauthier gives no material equivalence for "A i s a just man", but presumably i t would be, "A i s disposed to perform acts which do not involve breaking a covenant undertaken i n accordance with the second law of 20 nature." This equivalence does manage to capture the negative character of j u s t i c e which Hobbes favours: the virtue of j u s t i c e i s an i n c l i n a t i o n or proneness not to perform those acts which are vio l a t i o n s of covenant (and thus unjust), and whatever " i s not unjust, i s j u s t . " (E.W.III, 131) The formal mode i s deliberately designed to keep the de t a i l s of the just man's disposition as an open question. So, i t i s precisely i n t h i s respect that the material equivalences d i f f e r from the i r formal counterparts. In material equivalences the motivational question i s closed under Gauthier's reading of Hobbesian psychology. In general of course the laws of nature are j u s t i f i e d as the best available interdependent strategy for preservation. Consequently the second and t h i r d laws are s p e c i f i c directives to t h i s end; which argues that since the t h i r d law i s the "fountain and o r i g i n a l of JUSTICE", ( i b i d . , 130) then the disposition which -6.4-renders one capable of adherence to the covenant enjoined by the second law w i l l , for that reason, be r a t i o n a l l y j u s t i f i e d . As an example of someone who has the disposition i n question consider a somewhat unlikely candidate - Hobbes' Foole, or at least a reformed version of him. The Foole contends that whatever best serves his advantage i s not against reason; adding that, since vio l a t i o n s of covenant may often be advantageous i t i s not always r a t i o n a l to be j u s t . Many hold that Hobbes1 purely prudential form of response to the Foole i s feeble to say the l e a s t ; i t s g i s t being simply that no man can reasonably expect to preserve himself with a strategy dependent for i t s success on the mistakes of others, who "forbear him only out of ignorance of what i s good for themselves." ( i b i d . , 134) Whether or not t h i s i s a weak response i s not my concern at the moment, although i t should be pointed out immediately that Hobbes' reply to the Foole i s deliberately within the parameters set by by the l a t t e r ' s conception of r a t i o n a l i t y . The Foole i s of course the embodiment of that form of reasoning -indi v i d u a l maximization - which t y p i f i e s the state of nature, so even i f Hobbes does have other arguments to offer which might impugn the Foole"s form of reasoning, there i s s t i l l every reason to try and f i r s t persuade the Foole i n his own terms. Demonstrating int e r n a l inconsistency i n the views of one's opponent i s not a bad f i r s t move, especially i f there i s some reason to believe that he w i l l not be amenable to anything other than purely self-interested reasons for action. It would seem to be a wasted exercise to beat the Foole over the head with a conception of r a t i o n a l i t y a l i e n to his advantage model. -65-In any case, for the sake of argument l e t us assume that the Foole - being the archetypal purely prudential agent - accepts the Hobbesian position because i t i s couched i n terms of his s e l f i s h or private well-being. The Foole, r e a l i z i n g that he does not have anything akin to Gyges' r i n g , i s persuaded that there i s a road to preservation less fraught with danger than the one he has been following to date. However, there i s c l e a r l y more to being just than knowing what j u s t i c e requires, so the Foole must enter into a process of habituation which w i l l align his appetites with j u s t i c e and the remaining laws of nature. This process he seeks, because i t i s a means to what he desires most - his conservation. Successful habituation to the laws of nature w i l l mean that the Foole i s a f u l l y virtuous man, and hence a just man; unlike his former s e l f he i s now capable of being just as d i s t i n c t from doing what i s accidentally just but e s s e n t i a l l y advantageous. How close does t h i s scenario come to being a v a l i d elaboration of Gauthier's intimations about what a t r u l y just Hobbesian man would be? There i s an obvious way i n which the Foole's story cannot be consistent with Gauthier's ground rules. Gauthier, following Hobbes' d e f i n i t i o n of i n j u s t i c e i n Leviathan, i n s i s t s that "we cannot define j u s t i c e as the keeping of covenants. For Hobbes supposes that acts are j u s t , unless they involve the breaking of 21 covenants, as his account makes cl e a r . " He i s rig h t of course, because the Hobbesian d e f i n i t i o n of i n j u s t i c e as "no other than the not - performance of covenant" (E.W. I l l , 131) i s not an equivalent way of saying that j u s t i c e i s none other than performance of covenant. In saying that "whatsoever i s not unjust, i s j u s t " , T66-Hobbes has indicated a wider class of actions as just than merely those which are required to keep covenants. With respect to acts everything that Gauthier says i s both accurate and elegantly stated; the problem arises i n moving from acts to dispositions. Although i t i s correct to say that for Hobbes a l l acts which are not unjust are thereby j u s t , i t i s false to add that a l l dispositions which are not iniquitous are thereby j u s t . Hobbes seldom equates the virtue of j u s t i c e with the blanket motivation to do other than break covenant. Instead, he connects the virtue quite d i r e c t l y to the keeping of covenants: Justice therefore, that i s to say, keeping of covenant, i s a rule of reason, by which we are forbidden to do any thing destructive to our l i f e ; and consequently a law of nature, ( i b i d . , 134) One obvious reason for doing t h i s i s that he must keep d i s t i n c t those whose fear of punishment in c l i n e s them to obedience, and those whose mode of l i f e argues that they "taketh a l l the care [they] can, that [ t h e i r ] actions may be a l l j u s t . " ( i b i d . , 135) This l a t t e r i n d i v i d u a l , but not the former, has a w i l l that i s framed by j u s t i c e ; by which Hobbes means something other than a w i l l framed by the system of punishments that await transgressions. The reformed Foole, i n order to qualify as j u s t , must therefore be moved by considerations other than those connected with punishments. My suggestion was that i n being convinced by the Hobbesian argument he became newly aware of the role of the laws of nature as means to his preservation. Their exercise was sought as a means, the best means, to his overall well-being. In so far as his progress i s no longer a series of advantage calculations, but rather - 6 7 -conformity to the framework inherent i n Hobbes' laws of nature, he seems to f i t the character of the just man. Of course, i f the Foole were con s t i t u t i o n a l l y unable to curb his desire for present advantage, then he would not be capable of the changes that take place i n my example. The transformation envisaged was one which took an individual out of the state of nature - conceived of as unrestrained maximization - and into a c i v i l state. The change was a profound one within an i n d i v i d u a l ; but such a change was precisely the one ruled out as impossible for Hobbesian man: he must remain i n the state of nature because he cannot move out of the independent 22 mode of action. On Gauthier's analysis one cannot elaborate "A i s a just man" i n the way suggested. What i s l e f t ? In l i g h t of the fact that Hobbes understands being just as, "to be delighted i n just dealing, to study how to do righteousness, or to endeavour in a l l things to do that which i s j u s t ; and to be unjust i s to neglect righteous dealing, or to think i t i s to be measured not according to my contract, but some present benefit", (E.W. I I , 33) i t would be foo l i s h to search for the virtue of j u s t i c e i n the avoidance of punishments. It i s cl e a r l y an appetite for just acts which characterizes the just man, and not an aversion to the penalties attendant on i n j u s t i c e : [F]or the unjust man who abstaineth from i n j u r i e s for fear of punishment, declareth p l a i n l y that the j u s t i c e of his actions dependeth upon c i v i l c onstitution, from whence punishments proceed; which would otherwise i n the estate of nature be unjust, according to the fountain from whence they spring. (E.L., 83) Since I can see no way i n which Gauthier can provide any disposition to j u s t i c e other than fear, and since that i s f l a t l y rejected by -68-Hobbes as indicat i v e of an iniquitous mind, i t must be concluded that Gauthier i s without an account of Hobbes1 just man. Of course t h i s might not come as any kind of shock to him; i t i s open to him to argue that t h i s i s the reason behind his f a i l u r e to offer a material d e f i n i t i o n of "A i s a just man". Perhaps he thinks that i t i s more candid to say that since there are no just - men i n Hobbes, there w i l l be a Hobbesian commonwealth of which i t w i l l be true to say that i t contains just acts without just men. In opposition to his friend Thomas White, Hobbes argued that "those who do the i r utmost to perform what the laws demand" (T.W., 475) are both passionate i n t h e i r appetite for j u s t i c e , and good. White seems to have held that such men must be e v i l ; or at least so Hobbes interprets him. Hobbes goes on to say that: On the contrary, the good are to be distinguished from the bad not by the vehemence but by the objects of th e i r passions. Hence an e v i l man i s one who s t r i v e s towards unlawful things, and a good man he who s t r i v e s for things only i f they are lawful, whether he do so vehemently or not. (ibid.) Since Hobbes has already asserted that, "'Good', therefore, and ' e v i l ' are applied r e l a t i v e l y and ad- personam", ( i b i d . , 378) the good men who are s t r i v i n g vehemently for lawful ends are being judged from the point of view of the state. In t h i s case the person involved i s a person only i n the sense of a l e g a l person: an entity with specifiable i n t e r e s t s . Furthermore, the excellences found i n c i t i z e n s are properties which relate them favourably to the interests of the state. Consequently, j u s t i c e i s not a property of natural men although perhaps honesty and charitableness might be. This i s Hobbes' o f f i c i a l view, but not his only view. (E.W. I I , 267, -69-E.W. I l l , 28-9, DeH., 69-70) In scattered places Hobbes seems to argue that the virtue of j u s t i c e might have a subrosa existence i n the state of nature. This view i s p l a i n l y evident i n the passage from The - Elements of - Law quoted above where i t i s asserted that a desire to injure others curbed by threats of punishment, would, i n the estate of nature, qualify someone as unjust. There seem to be two contexts i n which the propensity to harm others and something countermanding i t received Hobbes' attention: one i s his discussion of the relationship between divine, natural, and c i v i l law; the other i s connected with his analysis of the saying int e r arma s i l e n t  leges, and more generally with the i n foro interno existence of the laws of nature. What arises i n these two contexts may be one and the same idea discussed i n f i r s t a general, and then a s p e c i f i c form. In the discussion of the relationship between f a i t h and j u s t i c e on the one hand and salvation on the other, Hobbes says that "I require j u s t i c e also, or that obedience which i s due to the laws of God; that i s to say, a w i l l to l i v e righteously." (E.W. I I , 306n) The interesting thing about t h i s point i s that the virtue of j u s t i c e i s explained solely i n terms of the laws of nature. Supporting evidence could be derived from the claim that c i v i l law incorporates natural law, thereby i n h e r i t i n g the attitude due to i t s predecessor. (DeH., 69-70) under one interpretation j u s t i c e would reside i n one's attitude to the laws of God, and i n the f i n a l analysis relate back to one's attitude to the lawgiver himself. This interpretation puts a l l of the emphasis on "obedience" i n the quoted passage above. This i s not the position Hobbes adopts. Despite his stated b e l i e f that God i s the lawgiver, with respect to the above passage -70-Hobbes puts a l l of the emphasis on "a w i l l to l i v e righteously". The Hobbesian God admits the good to paradise because they are good, and the obedient only i n so far as they have f a i t h . When God looks upon men as candidates for salvation - so Hobbes says - his r e a l interest i s i n the i r possession of the virtue of j u s t i c e , "meaning s t i l l by j u s t i c e , not absence of g u i l t , but the good intentions of the mind, which i s ca l l e d righteousness by God, that taketh the w i l l for the deed." (E.L., 156-7) Since the w i l l i s "the l a s t appetite, or aversion, immediately adhering to the action, or to the omission thereof", (E.W. I l l , 48) the most searching analysis made of the character of a man i s one carried out i n terms of the quality of his desires and aversions. This account i s general, or rather formal, because we are t o l d only that a basal sense of j u s t i c e i s to be found i n the nature of human appetites and aversions; we are not t o l d anything about the objects of those appetites or aversions. For t h i s we must look to our second context: laws of nature i n the estate of nature. In the war of a l l against a l l the laws of nature have an existence within agents, or, more accurately, they take the form of a "readiness of mind". (E.W.II, 46) Someone adhering to the laws of nature i n the state of nature does so, Hobbes says, through the exercise of "the in t e r n a l court", or "the court of conscience", (ibid) Breach of the laws of nature i n the state of nature w i l l consist either in neglect or, more seriously, i n contempt. So, given that i n the state of nature each person has prerogative on questions of the i r preservation, to neither neglect nor contemn the laws of nature w i l l e n t a i l preserving oneself i n ways that involve neither flagrant nor unwitting v i o l a t i o n s . But what i s to count as a v i o l a t i o n i n conditions where, s t r i c t l y speaking, no act i s proscribed? The Hobbesian answer i s that although no act i s ipso  facto vicious, any disposition which makes peace among men more d i f f i c u l t to obtain i s vicious. Qualities of character which correspond to the laws of nature "dispose men to peace and obedience" (E.W. I l l , 253) whereas the corresponding vices are a l l examples of dispositions which aggravate the problems inherent i n human interactions. However, i n the circumstances t y p i f i e d by the metaphor of bellum- omnium - contra - omnes, there w i l l be precious l i t t l e room for the exercise of the cooperative virtues. There w i l l however, and t h i s i s a point of note, be no reason for the exercise of vices, since to the degree that viciousness becomes the tone of inte r a c t i o n , to that extent the state of nature i s made a terminal condition. I f the vices reign i n the state of nature then peace i s unprocurable; but equally, since the cooperative virtues cannot operate without rendering those who exercise them prey to others, what course do we take? Being virtuous i n the state of nature involves a principled avoidance of cruelty and i s available even i n situations where k i l l i n g and rapine are ways of l i f e . Hobbes' example of the man who exercises the requisite r e s t r a i n t and hence the most basic form of the virtue of j u s t i c e , i s his f i r s t employment of what Kenneth Minogue has referred to as a 23 "paragon" ; those generous natures so rarely found: And because fear can hardly be made manifest, but by some action dishonourable, that bewrayeth the conscience of one's own weakness; a l l men i n whom the passion of courage or magnanimity have been predominant, have abstained from cruelty....In one -7.2-word, therefore, the only law of actions i n war i s honour; (E.L., 101) In Leviathan of course t h i s i s the man who "scorns to be beholden for the contentment of his l i f e , to fraud, or breach of promise. This j u s t i c e of the manners, i s that which i s meant, where j u s t i c e i s c alled a vi r t u e ; and i n j u s t i c e a vic e . " (E.W. I l l , 136) There are c o n f l i c t i n g views about the significance of this chivalrous character for Hobbes* account of j u s t i c e as a virtue. Leo Strauss argued that since the ju s t i c e of the chivalrous man depends on his "proud s e l f - r e l i a n c e " , and since Hobbes' deepest intention was to contain such men, "not pride, and s t i l l less obedience, but fear of violent death, i s according to him the ori g i n of the just intention." From Strauss' point of view the chivalrous i n d i v i d u a l i s an obstacle to c i v i l l i f e , and one whose induction into i t requires some breaking of the w i l l by threats of death. Minogue's view of what he c a l l s Hobbes' "paragon" i s c l e a r l y d i f f e r e n t , and i t d i f f e r s e s s e n t i a l l y i n the stress he puts on the motivation of the indiv i d u a l i n question. Minogue claims that the best man i n Hobbes i s one whose w i l l i s not determined by the coercive state apparatus. Indeed Minogue may well hold that none of the three motivations that Strauss mentions: pride, obedience, or fear, i s much i n evidence i n the paragon. Perfectly good sense can be made of the claim that there i s another alter n a t i v e ; one which Minogue never spent much time i n elaborating, but another alternative nonetheless. What he does say i s contained i n the following: The Sovereign i s , i n this r a t i o n a l system, a figure performing the same function as a Platonic -73-philosopher-king: he supplies what i s defective i n  the • r a t i o n a l i t y of ordinary men. I f , rather than thinking of the sovereign as a single person or as a body of people, we instead see i t as the person; law, then Hobbes' remarks about right reason i n his exchange with John Bramhall take on a new significance. You w i l l r e c a l l that Hobbes said, "this right reason, which i s the law, i s no otherwise c e r t a i n l y right than by our making i t so by our approbation of i t and voluntary subjection to i t . " (E.W.V., 193) His point seems to be that i n the law we have an a r t i f a c t which embodies reason. This a r t i f a c t u a l reason arbitrates between individuals whose interests clash, rather than between appetites within a single i n d i v i d u a l . C i v i l l i f e requires the creation of an a r t i f i c i a l equivalent for what was a natural capacity i n the estate of nature: natural reason. Recognizing that the law i s an a r t i f i c i a l form of that which, i n individuals, was the guiding thread to th e i r preservation, one i s prompted to i n f e r that l e g a l directives are to c i v i l man what individual reason was to his p r e - c i v i l s e l f . I f the primary role of reason i s conservation, then the le g a l form of reason w i l l play the same role for s o c i a l , as d i s t i n c t from natural men. However, even i f such a chain of recognitions i s possible, there i s no compelling reason for believing that the r a t i o n a l direction of behaviour by an a r t i f i c i a l reason could ever simply replace punishment. Hobbes takes i t that certain of our passions "are i n f i r m i t i e s , so annexed to the nature, both of man, and a l l other l i v i n g creatures, as that t h e i r effects cannot be hindered, but by extraordinary use of reason, or a constant severity i n punishing them." (E.W. I l l , -74-284-5). My suggestion i s that an attitude to the law grounded on the recognition that i t i s the s o c i a l embodiment of reason, i s precisely what Hobbes would consider to be an "extraordinary use of reason", and Consequently a motivation to j u s t i c e quite d i s t i n c t from one based on fear. Cn t h i s reading there i s no special d i f f i c u l t y i n understanding the disposition of the j u s t man: he simply does what he believes there i s best reason to do. This man i s , i f any man i s , Hobbes' moral paragon. This i s , one must admit, a severely r a t i o n a l i s t i c account of the virtue of j u s t i c e . Neither the chivalrous individual mentioned i n Leviathan and elsewhere, nor the obedient c i t i z e n of De  Homine share his attitude. That fact poses no problem for Hobbes, since i t i s r e a l l y only t r a c t a b i l i t y i n c i t i z e n s that he presupposes, not j u s t i c e . Nonetheless, even though Hobbes does not require just men for the success of his argument, i t i s a mistake to think that he cannot embrace them within his psychological theory. That he did not put greater emphasis on them may i n part be due to his conviction that honour, and not knowledge, was the determining factor i n the character of his a r i s t o c r a t i c audience. When he rejected honour as a virtue the lat e r Hobbes was also rejecting honour and self-esteem as s o l i d foundations for the virtue of j u s t i c e . Yet with his allusions to the c h i v a l r i c virtues of the gallant, courageous man, Hobbes seems to be paying homage to those q u a l i t i e s of character which act as a brake on the descent into barbarism so evident i n the wasting of estates, the massacre of surrendered garrisons, and the "smoking" of v i l l a g e s . In taking t h i s l i n e Hobbes was of course not endorsing chivalry as such, but -75-at best the code which arose after the early feudal period i n Western Europe, that i s , after the chaos occasioned by petty lords whose attempts at f o r t i f i c a t i o n s "enable these men, constantly occupied with quarrels and massacres, to protect themselves from th e i r enemies, to triumph over t h e i r equals, to oppress the i r 26 i n f e r i o r s . " It i s precisely over such men as these that Leviathan was designed to r u l e , and against whom Hobbes' thoroughly c i v i l i a n theory of j u s t i c e i s directed. 2.6 Conclusion David Gauthier's analysis of Hobbesian man has been subjected to a number of c r i t i c i s m s , the intention of which has been to undermine what I take to be the most powerful and systematic development of the orthodox understanding of Hobbes' psychology. While f u l l y agreeing that Hobbes' account of v i t a l and voluntary motion i s the deepest l e v e l of his psychology I deny that i t commits him to egoism. The p l a u s i b i l i t y of Gauthier's case hinges on his interpretation of Hobbes on desire, and I have attempted to construct a more c o g n i t i v i s t version of Hobbes' theory of desire to show that conceptions of the good are not li m i t e d to anything resembling an egoistic basis. The most s i g n i f i c a n t example of the shortcoming inherent i n Gauthier's analysis derives from his treatment of j u s t i c e i n Hobbes. I have argued that what he says i s tantamount to a denial of the motivational basis that Hobbes u t i l i z e s when making out a case for j u s t i c e as a virtue. More w i l l be said i n 5.7 about the character of the just man, but what we must -76-turn to now i s an interpretation of the materialist basis of Hobbes1 psychology; one which, while learning much from the s p i r i t of Gauthier's investigation, i s very different i n i t s findings. -77-CHAPTER I I I CONATUS -78-3.1 Egoism and Materialism In 1966 F.S. McNeilly drew attention to what he c a l l e d , "an outbreak of agreement reaching epidemic proportions". Philosophers, he said, ..ere by and large convinced that Hobbes constructed an "egoistic psychology". 1 McNeilly was correct, and he was also correct i n saying that Bernard Gert had come out i n opposition to the main stream position. In some respects McNeilly's paper i s a c r i t i c i s m of Gert, yet despite t h e i r differences both philosophers argue, al b e i t for very different reasons, that Hobbes1 materialism plays no constructive role i n his account of human nature. Gert's position i s somewhat extreme. He proposes that since Hobbes treated human action at the physical l e v e l - i n terms of v i t a l and voluntary motions - and since the impressions of pain and pleasure i n an agent are epiphenomenal "appearances" generated by these physical events, Hobbes can have no theory e n t a i l i n g motives. Motives must e n t a i l thoughts, and since psychological egoism i s a theory about motives for action, Hobbes' denial of the efficacy of thoughts prohibits him from being considered as espousing psychological egoism. On Gert's reading Hobbes' materialism simply disallows the kind of explanations (intentional ones) that are essential for discussing motivational theories. McNeilly on the other hand, r i g h t l y rejecting Gert's position on thought and motives i n Hobbes, nonetheless agrees with his broadest conclusion: Hobbes i s not a psychological egoist. For reasons that I s h a l l not go into McNeilly thinks that i t i s a mistake to expect to fi n d consistency over the breadth of Hobbes' -79-work. Thus he i s dubious about finding any simple thesis - l i k e psychological egoism - consistently stated throughout Hobbes1 work. But on the question of the relationship between the materialism and the psychology McNeilly does think that one plain truth emerges. The materialism i s i n no way essential for the psychology: It i s impossible to exaggerate the unimportance of mechanistic materialism i n Hobbes' philosophy: i t i s the reddest of a l l the herrings that Hobbesian fisherman have caught i n the i r nets. For the postulated bodily motion has no r e a l part to play i n the d e f i n i t i o n or use of "endeavour". Nothing i n the analysis of the passions and nothing i n the p o l i t i c a l arguments which follow, depends on the assumption that endeavour i s an in t e r n a l bodily motion.3 McNeilly's conclusion i s that Hobbes' materialism does not put the stamp of egoism on his psychology because i t does not put any stamp at a l l on i t ; Hobbes' materialism i s u t t e r l y irrelevant to his psychology. The argument of t h i s chapter can very well be stated as a response to McNeilly, thanks largely to the c l a r i t y of his position. I s h a l l argue that Hobbes' materialism i s based on the notion of conatus or endeavour, and that Hobbes makes strenuous ef f o r t s to explicate t h i s notion i n terms of motions of two types: c i r c u l a r or e l l i p t i c a l motions on the one hand, and tiny more r e c t i l i n e a r ones on the other. Furthermore, t h i s account of the endeavour motions i s advanced by Hobbes as his explanation not just of tendencies i n inanimate objects, but of dispositions i n human beings as w e l l . However, t h i s chapter takes us only to the end of the purely physical story; i t s psychological continuation i s the subject of Chapter 4. But i n response to McNeilly's position I should say that not only i s Hobbes1 materialism the deliberate basis -80-of his psychology, but i t s nature i s such that the psychology w i l l have a particular cast. My claim i s that Hobbes' materialism aff e c t s his psychology i n such a way that Hobbesian men cannot be psychological egoists, although there i s no impediment to their being s e l f i s h , or nasty, or self-absorbed. 3;2 Conatus I "Endeavour" i s the term Hobbes chose to render the Latin conatus. The concept makes i t s formal appearance i n his system i n the t h i r d part of De-Corpore, where i t i s explained as: [M]otion made i n less space and time than can be  given; that i s , less than can be determined or assigned by exposition or number; thaF i s , motion made"  through the length of a point; and i n an instant or point ofTime. (E.W.I, 206) Hobbes i s c l e a r l y stressing that there i s actual movement and some short but s p e c i f i c duration involved, although "less than can be determined or assigned by exposition or number", (ibid) Later i n the same work Hobbes refers to motions and magnitudes that are "unspeakably l i t t l e " ( i b i d , 445) yet nonetheless measurable, even i f not by us. This note of insistence on the r e a l i t y of tiny measures i s s i g n i f i c a n t , since i n an e a r l i e r phase of his thought Hobbes had followed A r i s t o t l e i n his use of the notion of an instant. In addition, Hobbes was greatly i n awe of the power of microscopes, and waxed rather l y r i c a l on the very minute e n t i t i e s which, although hidden from our unaided gaze, were i n fact the structural elements of macroscopic e n t i t i e s , (ibid) The analysis of endeavour given i n De Corpore i s nested i n with others for the closely related concepts of pressure, force, impetus, resistance, and pulsion. A l l of these topics follow i n t r a i n as part of the discussion of causation which began i n Chapter 9, and continued through Chapter 10. In fact the completion of the discussion does not come u n t i l the end of Chapter 22 where, as I s h a l l note, the account of habit i s given i n terms of "iterated endeavours" ( i b i d . , 349), thus harking back to an e a r l i e r section of the book. Why Hobbes broke the sequence apart i n this way i s unclear. De Corpore did not appear u n t i l 1655; hence there i s every reason to distinguish the formal place of endeavour within Hobbes1 system - as a part of the f i r s t philosophy - from the s t i r r i n g s of the idea i n his thought. We know for instance that conatus plays a s i g n i f i c a n t part i n Hobbes1 c r i t i q u e of Thomas White's De• Mundo. This Latin manuscript dates from 1642-3, and would seem to represent Hobbes' reimmersion i n metaphysics after his work on De Cive. There i s also a modicum of evidence to suggest that sketches of what were to become chapters of De Corpore existed in the l a t e 1630's. 6 In any case, our f i r s t introduction to the idea i s through The  Elements - o f Law, a work that Hobbes had completed by May of 1640. The f i r s t thirteen chapters of t h i s manuscript cover topics i n morals and psychology (both cognitive and physiological). The pirate edition of these chapters which appeared i n 1649-50 was t i t l e d Human Nature, a perfectly apt description of the contents. The work was advertised as part two of Hobbes' system, and continued to f i l l that gap u n t i l De -Homine appeared i n 1658. S t r i c t l y speaking, The Elements of Law i s Hobbes' c i v i l philosophy, of which ^82-he says that i t " i s again commonly divided into two parts, whereof one, which treats of men's dispositions and manners, i s call e d ethics; and the other, which takes cognizance of th e i r c i v i l duties, i s c alled p o l i t i c s , or simply c i v i l philosophy." (E.W.I,11) Hobbes held that i n order to gain any "knowledge of the properties of a commonwealth, i t i s necessary f i r s t to know the dispositions, affections, and manners of men", (ibid) Thus i t i s as part of a p o l i t i c a l l y relevant psychology - one coextensive with ethics - that Hobbes introduces endeavour. In sections 3 and 4 of the previous chapter a sketch was given of the elements Hobbes included i n his analysis of human action; so those de t a i l s w i l l not be repeated here. However, what needs some further amplification i s the role of the brain and heart as centres of reaction. Hobbes believes that both of these organs have cha r a c t e r i s t i c modes of response to incoming sensation, either i n i t s raw form at the brain, or as imagination flowing to the heart. In both cases response takes the form of a counter-pressure: exerted by the brain t h i s gives us the impression of an external source for sensation, and by the heart, gives, us the feeling of either appetite or aversion. How the heart i s prompted to increased or decreased motion by the inflow of imagination we are never t o l d ! From what we can gather the "beginnings of animal motion" are themselves a species of motion, namely that species named by the word "endeavour". But that seems unhelpful i n the extreme. To get a better l i g h t on the origination of action as a species of motion we need to take a remark out of Hobbes' account of animal motion i n his De Corpore. There he says of the heart that: -83-Seeing, therefore , there i s i n the whole organ, by reason of i t s own internal natural motion, some resistance or reaction against the motion which i s propagated from the object to the innermost part of the organ. (E.W.I, 391) Presumably, given that i t i s an organ, the brain too w i l l have motions natural to i t . Now, the heart i s not always producing endeavours where endeavours are understood to be the minute f i r s t beginnings of motion, but nonetheless i t i s so constituted ("by reason of i t s own in t e r n a l natural motion") that given the inflow of imagination i t w i l l i n i t i a t e these fledgling motions which ramify into action. However, i n the case of the brain the story w i l l be more complicated. Hobbes assumes that a l l human beings have the same catalogue of emotions. We are individuated through the intentional objects on which the emotions focus. Presumably, some of those motions natural to the organ of conception - the brain -w i l l correspond to the f i r s t phase of our emotional response. For example, some s i g n i f i c a n t conception - that a dangerous object i s looming - w i l l be, i n a l l l i k e l i h o o d , executive i n moving us, because we are co n s t i t u t i o n a l l y capable of responses based on either fear or anger. Hobbes does not provide exact d e t a i l of how a sim i l a r response works, but that i s neither here nor there, since we can construct his framework for action from materials he does provide. We are now faced with what appear to be two d i s t i n c t things: endeavour as i n f i n i t e s i m a l motion, or the i n i t i a l motions a r i s i n g from the heart's ( d i a s t o l i c ? ) action, and that form of motion we are t o l d i s natural to the heart i n so far as i t - i s an organ. This l a t t e r one i s the form of motion which w i l l , i f anything w i l l , -84-qualify an organ as a centre of action or reaction. Both of these species of motion come into play i n Hobbes' analysis of human action, and i t i s plausible to suggest that t h e i r role i s c r u c i a l i n shaping what Hobbes took to be his personal contribution to a theory of the passions. But can both forms of motion be subsumed under the notion of endeavour? The- Elements of Law alone does not give us s u f f i c i e n t evidence for t h i s view: i t simply argues that endeavour i s to be understood as i n i t i a t i n g movement and that action begins with conception. Thus, i n so far as conception - our capacity to si z e things up - i s the f i r s t intra-bodily cause of human action, and endeavour i s the f i r s t step i n voluntary action, i t seems to follow that motion states of the organs and endeavour are intimately connected. To gain a better purchase on the matter we need to go more deeply into Hobbes' early work on optics; for then we can see a new dimension to the idea of endeavour which was l e f t underdeveloped i n The Elements of • Law. Yet despite the fact that i n t h i s l a t t e r work Hobbes does not assign the term "endeavour" to cover those states i n brain and heart which allow us to conceive (appreciate the significance of s t a t e - o f - a f f a i r s ) and i n i t i a t e bodily motion respectively, he has predicated his ethics (his theory of dispositions relevant to the s o c i a l project) on a physical story about the basis of dispositions. It i s after a l l that fact which makes his account unique. What remains as yet undeveloped i s the correct way of describing the basis. The Elements of Law may have been Hobbes' most notable early work, but i t was by no means his f i r s t . The Short Tract, was probably written seven years before the former book, that i s , around -85-1630. In one respect the Short Tract i s a precursor to The - Elements  of-Law, which i n i t s turn breaks up into De Homine and De•Cive. The l i n e of continuation that interests me however runs from t h i s early t r a c t , through the f i r s t thirteen chapters of The Elements of Law and on to De Homine alone. The subject matter of a l l three i s sensation (primarily vision) and human nature. Granted, the discussion i n the Short Tract i s austere, to say the l e a s t ; but there i s a certain elegance i n i t s geometric r i g o r . In any case t h i s work demands our attention because i t embodies some of the issues through which Hobbes worked on the way to a theory about in t e r n a l states. The major question moving Hobbes i n the Short Tract i s also the one Aubrey alludes to, namely "What i s Sense?" Working out an answer i n terms of visio n Hobbes specifies the following elements: ( i ) The agent or source of l i g h t . ( i i ) The species emitted by the agent. ( i i i ) The medium through which the species t r a v e l . (iv) The patient whose optic nerve i s affected. I f the Short Tract represents Hobbes1 opinion on the matter of sense, and i f , as seems to be the case, he brought a l o t of his ideas together i n t h i s piece, then i t might be the best place to discover what his major preoccupations i n the late 1620's were. From the four elements mentioned above, the second and the t h i r d are of l i t t l e i nterest. Hobbes did not think that l i g h t was transmitted instantaneously, and he had no conjecture to make about the nature of the medium through which species t r a v e l l e d . However, i n the f i r s t and the fourth we have the f i r s t and the f i n a l steps i n the - 8 6 -illumination story; moreover, we have the sun i n the role of archetypal agent, and the percipient as patient. There i s nothing new i n what Hobbes has to say about the more general notions of agent and patient, captured i n two of the principles from the Short  Tract: 3. Agent i s that which hath power to move. A. Patient i s that which hath power to be moved. (E.L., 193) Allowing that these are orthodox Aristotelianisms, the only lesson to be derived here i s that Hobbes1 conception of how to set out a genuine explanation of sensation (in t h i s case sight) involved the s p e c i f i c a t i o n of q u a l i t i e s i n the agent and patient via which they were able to mark and to register respectively. Hobbes does not ask the further question, namely "In terms of what do the agent and the patient have the power to act and be acted upon?"; or, stated d i f f e r e n t l y , "What i s i t that constitutes a thing as either agent or patient or, more often than not both?" The answer to these questions did not appear u n t i l 1655 i n De Corpore, as I s h a l l point out i n a moment. The Short Tract evidences a mind exercised about the nature of active and passive power, and i t gives some indication that Hobbes saw the next explanatory move as one u t i l i z i n g only l o c a l motion within bodies. (See E.L., 206 top) What was i t that enabled Hobbes to arrive at t h i s l a t e r position? The answer seems to be his confrontation with Descartes' work on the theory of l i g h t ; but there were some other factors that preceded t h i s confrontation. 1. In 1631 Hobbes resumed his role as secretary/tutor to the -87-Cavendish household at Chatsworth, taking r e s p o n s i b i l i t y for the care of William, Third Earl of Devonshire, who turned 14 i n that year. Hobbes t e l l s us that he designed courses i n rhetoric, l o g i c , geography, and Latin for the instruction of William, but there i s no reason to believe that he was at Chatsworth for the entire period between 1631 and 1634. Whilst passing through London on the way to Oxford i n January of 1634 Hobbes wrote to his Lord's uncle, William, F i r s t Earl of Newcastle, i n a way that makes i t clear they had spent some time together, presumably at Welbeck Abbey i n company with the Earl's brother Charles Cavendish the mathematician. Hobbes i t seems had undertaken to send Newcastle a copy of Galileo's Dialogues, but reported that none were to be found for sale i n London.7 2. In 1634 Hobbes accompanied the young Earl on his continental tour. This was to be Hobbes' t h i r d journey abroad, having been i n 1610 with the Second E a r l , and i n 1628 with S i r Gervase Clifton's son. A l e t t e r to Newcastle from Paris, dated August of 1635, reveals i n some d e t a i l the interests Hobbes shared with him. Hobbes comments on o p t i c a l matters that have arisen i n connection with the i r mutual friend Warner, and i n a way that makes i t pretty clear that he considers himself an authority on such things. On an en t i r e l y different matter, and one that I have already had occasion to mention, Hobbes advertises that he hopes to offer "good reasons for the facultyes and passions of the soule." 3. From June of 1636 u n t i l May of the following year Hobbes was i n Paris and resumed his aquaintance with Mersenne and his c i r c l e . A l e t t e r of Newcastle dated July of 1636 mentions that Hobbes had been i n discussion with Claude Mydorge, someone close to -88-Descartes, and also someone who spent a fortune on the construction of mirrors and lenses. Brandt t e l l s us that Mydorge's work de - l a  Lumiere i s more than l i k e l y the t r a c t that Hobbes alludes to i n t h i s l e t t e r . 9 4. In the Latin autobiography Hobbes gives us an indication of his consuming interest during t h i s tour of 1634-7: Whether on ship, or coach, or on horseback, my mind constantly pondered the nature of things; and i t seemed to me that in the whole world only one thing i s r e a l , f a l s i f i e d though i t be i n many ways. One thing only i s r e a l , but i t forms the basis of the things we f a l s e l y claim to be something, though they are only l i k e the f u g i t i v e shapes of dreams or l i k e the images I can multiply at w i l l by mirrors; fantasies, creatures of our brains and nothing more, the only inner r e a l i t y of which i s motion. (A., 25) This particular autobiography was written i n 1672 when Hobbes was 84, but i t s theme carries a note which Hobbes struck some 36 years e a r l i e r i n a l e t t e r to Newcastle from Paris. In that l e t t e r Hobbes had corroborated some point of Newcastle's, quoting the l a t t e r ' s remark that "the variety of things i s but variety of l o c a l motion i n the s p i r i t s or i n v i s i b l e parts of bodies."'''0 These i n v i s i b l e parts of bodies are not i n v i s i b l e simply i n as much as they are i n t e r n a l and hence not obvious on surface inspection; rather these parts are microscopically small, "so subtle as they are i n v i s i b l e " , ( i b i d . ) Hobbes' view i s that when we philosophize about a natural body the very best we can hope for i s plausible guesses. But no doubt we would hope that those guesses u t i l i z e the best views we have about the fine structure of bodies, (ibid.) This l e t t e r foreshadows the p r i n c i p l e from De Corpore quoted above, and predates Hobbes' f a m i l i a r i t y with Descartes' Dioptrics, a work i n which a -89-s i m i l a r view about method i s stated. 5. In another l e t t e r to Newcastle, again from Paris (October, 1636), Hobbes says he has abandoned the view that something i s emitted from the l i g h t source, and adopted the position that the propagation of l i g h t i s a function of the medium(s) l y i n g between illuminant and percipient. At t h i s stage i t i s clear that Hobbes does not yet know how to characterize the medium.1''" 6. Hobbes f i r s t came into contact with Mersenne i n 1634. Many in Mersenne's c i r c l e were concerned with optics, but probably none more so than Descartes. We know that Descartes had completed Le  Monde by t h i s time, but there i s no reason to think that i t s contents were known to anyone other than Mersenne. So, despite th e i r shared interest i n the nature and propagation of l i g h t , we have no evidence to connect Hobbes and Descartes up to and including the end of Hobbes' departure from Paris after his t h i r d continental journey, that i s , u n t i l May of 1637. 7. However, i n October of 1637 when Hobbes had returned to Chatsworth House, his friend Kenelm Digby wrote to him from Paris and enclosed a copy of Descartes' recently published (June, 1637) 12 Discourse on Method,- Optics,- Geometry, and - Meteorology. The foregoing h i s t o r i c a l material provides at best a sk e l e t a l image. There are no doubt many facets to Hobbes'interests not touched on. For example, the manuscript of The- Elements of Law was circ u l a t e d i n the middle of 1640 but obviously Hobbes had been thinking about the substance of that sizeable work for quite a while. The reason for concentrating on the physical speculation i s simply to explain the impact of the confrontation with Descartes, -90-occasioned by the a r r i v a l of his book. There i s nothing contentious i n the suggestion that Hobbes was much exercised by Descartes' work; th i s point was made p l a i n l y and e f f e c t i v e l y by Fr i j h o f Brandt i n 1928. What stands a much better chance of being contentious i s the claim that Hobbes discovered an idea i n that work of Descartes' which would give his own thinking about the nature of bodies a fundamentally new d i r e c t i o n . Most of those who have considered Descartes' physics at a l l have commented on his conception of a tendency, but none to date have linked Descartes' notion with Hobbes1 use of conatus or endeavour."''3 Before moving on to consider Descartes' notion of tendency i n a l i t t l e d e t a i l , i t might pay to b r i e f l y summarize the position on the nature of powers i n bodies that Hobbes had reached by the early part of 1637. You w i l l r e c a l l that i n the Short Tract the focus i s on agents and patients; i t also contains a discussion of what Hobbes c a l l s "necessary and s u f f i c i e n t causes", (E.L., 193-4) and some attempt to characterize the capacity of the brain to receive and retain impressions. Sensation i s said to be motion, and the action between the " q u a l i f i e d " brain and the animal s p i r i t s i s described i n terms of l o c a l motion: they have direct contact. There i s but one si g n i f i c a n t additional step taken during the period of the 1630's; and there i s a rea l question as to where the impetus for the step came from. As mentioned already Hobbes wrote to Newcastle i n 1636, apparently quoting back to the Earl an e a r l i e r remark of his own to the effect that "the variety of things i s but variety of l o c a l motion i n the s p i r i t s or i n v i s i b l e parts of bodies." For whatever reason, that idea, be i t o r i g i n a l l y from Hobbes, Newcastle, or - 9 1 -someone else, was to surface as the dictum from De Corpore about what distinguishes one body from another. Wondering about what makes a body the particular sort of body that i t i s , might well be connected with a second preoccupation that one can see i n Hobbes over the same period of the 1630's: his thought about the nature of causes. The two are connected, because one way of specifying an object i s i n terms of what i t does, or what can be done to i t . Its capacities and l i a b i l i t i e s are as important i n setting a thing apart as any other properties one could mention. Hobbes did introduce the notion of causes into the Short Tract, i n fact he brought i t under two heads: s u f f i c i e n t cause and necessary  cause. The former i s that which has everything requisite to producing an ef f e c t , and the l a t t e r , "that which cannot but produce the e f f e c t . " (ibid.) These two are, however, not d i s t i n c t . Hobbes goes on to say that "a s u f f i c i e n t cause i s a necessary cause", because "that cause which cannot but produce the effect, i s a Necessary cause (by the 13 P r i n . ) , but a s u f f i c i e n t cause cannot but produce the effe c t , because i t hath a l l things requisite to produce i t (by the 14 P r i n . ) . " ( i b i d . , 196) It i s not clear what Hobbes wants with the two ideas of cause, but there i s some reason to view his Necessary cause as a version of what he c a l l s the entire cause i n De Corpore: But a CAUSE simply, or an entire^ causey i s the  aggregate of a l l the accidents both of the agents, how  many soever they be, and of the patient, put together;  which when they are a l l supposed to be present,- i t  cannot-be understood but that the effect i s produced  at the same instant; and i f - any one- of them- be  wanting, i t cannot be understood but the effect i s not  produced. (E.W.I, 121-2) -92-This d e f i n i t i o n i s further broken down into the aggregate of accidents i n the agent: the e f f i c i e n t cause, and the aggregate of accidents i n the patient: the effect being produced, ( i b i d . , 122) I f you keep t h i s development i n mind and look back to the Short  Tract, you w i l l notice that i n the 15th conclusion of section one Hobbes refers to the "active power inherent" i n an agent to move some patient. (E.L., 197) It could be conjectured that with his idea of an "active power inherent" Hobbes i s prefiguring the notion of an e f f i c i e n t cause i n his l a t e r sense. His i l l u s t r a t i o n i s of an agent that can move three d i s t i n c t and well separated patients equally. 3.3 Descartes' Optics I s h a l l not attempt a reconstruction of the Cartesian physical theory, but look instead at just the one work with which Hobbes came into contact i n 1637, the Discourse on Method. The essay on optics included i n the work was not intended as a theoretical t r e a t i s e on l i g h t , and a l l three of the essays i n the book were proffered as examples of a new method i n action. The subject matter of the essay on optics i s avowedly p r a c t i c a l ; i t addresses the concerns of craftsmen engaged i n the design and manufacture of op t i c a l instruments, but i n part i c u l a r telescopes, "those marvelous telescopes which, i n use for only a short time, have already revealed a greater number of new stars i n the sky, and other new objects above the earth, than the sum t o t a l of those we have seen there before...carrying our sight much farther than the - 9 3 -. i c imagination of our fathers was used to going...." The main lesson taught i n the f i r s t part of the essay i s about the nature of l i g h t rays. The genuinely theoretical work, Le Monde - ou t r a i t e de l a  lumiere, was completed i n 1633 as planned, but l e f t unpublished by i t s author, and there i s reason to believe that the essay on optics was f i r s t written i n 1630 as an abstract of parts of Le Monde.16 A further summary of the theoretical work i s included i n part fi v e of the Discourse of Method, where, i n barest outline, we are introduced to the way i n which the cosmic vortex functions to give l i g h t to the sun. No r e a l d e t a i l of the three basic elements of the cosmology are given, but i t i s made plain that the transmission of l i g h t through the medium i s instantaneous."'"7 The weight Descartes placed on a theory of l i g h t can be appreciated from his remark to Mersenne i n 1630, that i t was "one of the most important and d i f f i c u l t subjects which I could undertake, because almost a l l 18 physics i s included i n i t . " Following up his promise to instruct through clear examples, i n imitation of astronomers, Descartes introduces his example of the blind man using a s t i c k to help him traverse rough ground. In order to draw a comparison from t h i s , I would have you consider l i g h t as nothing else, i n bodies that we c a l l luminous, than a certain movement or action, very rapid and very l i v e l y , which passes toward our eyes through the medium of the a i r and other transparent bodies, i n the same manner that the movement or resistance of the bodies that t h i s blind man encounters i s transmitted to his hand through the medium of his s t i c k . 1 9 At least four lessons are taught with the use of th i s example. F i r s t l y , that the transmission i s instantaneous, "for you know that -94-the action with which we move one of the ends of a s t i c k must thus 20 be transmitted i n an instant to the other end". Secondly, that our experience of l i g h t , or rather our experience of things as  coloured, i s a function of the way external objects affect our r e t i n a . This corresponds to the way different objects r e s i s t the s t i c k and thus exert d i f f e r i n g pressures on the man's hand. Thirdly, just as there i s a continuous extended object between hand and ground, with nothing making the journey from the second to the f i r s t , so there i s nothing t r a v e l l i n g through the medium of the a i r from the source of l i g h t to our eyes. Descartes understands his t h i r d point as directed against those who believed "intentional 2 1 species" to be "small images f l i t t i n g through the a i r " . Nonetheless, i t plays just as d i r e c t l y against Hobbes' early, and by then abandoned view, that species were to be read as material and not i n t e n t i o n a l . The f i n a l lesson i s less successfully taught than the f i r s t three, and t h i s has something to do with the magnitude of d i f f i c u l t y , but rather more to do with the p l a u s i b i l i t y of Descartes' conjecture. The suggestion i s that by keeping the example i n mind "you w i l l even easily be able to decide the question...concerning the o r i g i n of the action that causes the 22 sensation of sight." We are asked to consider two different ways i n which the s t i c k and an obstacle might be connected: the f i r s t i s simply impact caused by something leaping up to s t r i k e the walking-stick, whereas the second i s more l i k e the s t i c k being rested on firm ground with a constant pressure maintained by the hand. Sight for human subjects corresponds to the f i r s t case, -95-occurring "by means of the action which, being i n them, tends toward the eyes". But what does the second case argue by analogy? Descartes i s of the opinion that the action which causes sight can be i n i t i a t e d i n the eye of some creatures - cats for example I Since we are primarily concerned with "the action which comes from the 24 objects", our attention i s r e a l l y drawn to the question of what form the action of illumination takes. At t h i s juncture we are introduced to the second major example. We are asked to envisage (with the help of an i l l u s t r a t i o n i n the text) a vat f u l l of wine and half-crushed grapes. There are two holes i n the bottom of the vat marked A and B; these are plugged. On the surface of the l i q u i d Descartes has points marked C, D, and E. C i s d i r e c t l y above A, E i s d i r e c t l y above B, and D i s equidistant between the two holes. This model i s a re p l i c a of Descartes' solar system: the surface of the mixture i n the vat i s the interface between the sun and the medium which extends between i t and us. The holes A and B correspond to two eyes, and the intervening medium i s composed of s o l i d grapes (third element p a r t i c l e s ) and wine (second element pa r t i c l e s that f i l l a l l of the in t e r s t i c e s between bodies and transmit l i g h t ) . Each of the points on the surface i s joined to both holes by a straight l i n e , and we are asked to envisage what w i l l occur when the wine i s allowed to flow freely through the two drain holes at the bottom. The imaginary straight l i n e s from points on the surface are representative of rays of l i g h t . Descartes holds that despite the intervening medium being f u l l of obstructions, the wine at any one point on the surface w i l l , presumably, as rays w i l l , be connected by - 9 6 -a straight l i n e with each of the holes below. The model i s intended to represent a very large number of such straight l i n e s of course, so i t would have a lim i t e d number of points on the surface (those Descartes has drawn i n as C, D, and E for example) connected by an i n f i n i t e number of l i n e s to the bottom of the vat. Well, what does happen when the holes are unstopped? Descartes believes that wine at each of the surface points tends "to go down i n a straight l i n e through hole A at the very instant that i t i s 25 open, and at the same time through hole B". Moreover, none of these intersecting pathways constitutes an impediment to any of the others. We are now told that the tendency of the parts of the wine to go to A and B at precisely one and the same time i s an action, but "without any of these actions being impeded by the others, nor 26 by the resistence of the bunches of grapes i n this vat". The vat example has one main function: to explain the action of l i g h t rays. The d i f f i c u l t y , soon to be f e l t by many, was that rays of l i g h t considered as tending along an i n f i n i t y of pathways were also considered to be acting without movement. The account given i s as follows: And note here that i t i s necessary to distinguish between movement, and the action or i n c l i n a t i o n to move. For one can very easily conceive that the part i c l e s of wine which are for example near C, tend toward B and also toward A, notwithstanding that they cannot actually be moved toward these two holes at the same tim e . 2 7 When illumination i s under consideration we get the following: And i n the same way considering that i t i s not so much the movement as the action of luminous bodies that must be taken for their l i g h t , you must judge that the rays of t h i s l i g h t are nothing else but the l i n e s along which t h i s action tends. -97-And then again, i n a passage which comes shortly after t h i s : [ I ] t i s very easy to believe that the action or the i n c l i n a t i o n to move which I have said must be taken for l i g h t , must follow i n t h i s the same laws as does movement.28 It i s not clear to me what Descartes means by "action"; but i t i s clear that he wants to establish a firm d i s t i n c t i o n between movement and i n c l i n a t i o n . S i m i l a r l y , he treats i n c l i n a t i o n as a form of action. Some of his contemporaries were confused by his 29 terms, but Hobbes' reaction was d i f f e r e n t . 3.4 Conatus I I Hobbes wrote three d i s t i n c t works on optics: (1) The Tractatus Opticus, which was published as part seven of Marin Mersenne's Cogitata Physico-Mathematica i n 1644. Due e n t i r e l y to the research of Brandt, we now know that t h i s work o r i g i n a l l y formed part of an exchange that took place between Descartes and Hobbes i n the early months of 1641. 3 0 (2) A Minute or F i r s t Draft- of the Optiques, written i n two sections: one on v i s i o n , the other on illu m i n a t i o n , and completed i n 1646. Hobbes must have been pleased with t h i s t r e a t i s e i f his words from the conclusion are any indication: "I s h a l l deserve the reputation of havirrg been the f i r s t to lay the grounds of two sciences; t h i s of Optiques, the most curious, and the other of Natural Justice, which I have done i n my book DE CIVE, the most profi t a b l e of a l l others"; (E.W.VII, 471) (3) The Latin Optical Manuscript, an excerpt of which Tonnies added -98- . as an appendix to his edition of The Elements• of Law. Brandt, i n agreement with Kohler, dates t h i s work between 1644 and 1646.^ The most important of these three for my purposes i s the f i r s t : the portion from the Hobbes-Descartes exchange. One of the topics discussed i n the exchange was conatus, or the idea of a tendency that Descartes u t i l i z e d to explain the action of rays. In a l e t t e r Descartes wrote to Mersenne, we get some indication of what he and Hobbes had o r i g i n a l l y discussed: What the t h i r d proposition, on systole, contains i s completely overthrown by what I have already said, as i s what he says i n the corollary about i n c l i n a t i o n : he holds that t h i s i s a motion, and for the following b r i l l i a n t reason, 'because the beginning of motion i s motion'. But who has conceded to him that that i n c l i n a t i o n i s the beginning or f i r s t part of motion?32 We have no independent record of the remark from Hobbes that i s the object of Descartes' r i d i c u l e here, but an approximation can be found i n a fragment that Kohler reproduced from the Latin Optical  Manuscript. With respect to the propagation of l i g h t Hobbes claims that: This processure i s r e a l l y and actually...a l o c a l motion...and i s not...a mere i n c l i n a t i o n . For a l l i n c l i n a t i o n i f i t be pressure or endeavour i s actually a motion and progression of something out of i t s place, pressure cannot otherwise be conceived.33 Since t h i s excerpt comes from a l a t e r period than the exchange with Descartes, i t i s clear that Hobbes has stuck to his guns on the issue of tendencies or i n c l i n a t i o n s being actual motions. Remembering that Descartes believed i n c l i n a t i o n to obey the same laws as movement, and that both movement and i n c l i n a t i o n were actions, i t i s no surprise that Hobbes might have taken the path he -99-did i n responding to Descartes on i n c l i n a t i o n s . Descartes wants l i g h t rays to be conceived of as l i n e s , "along which...action tends"," 5 4 but Hobbes has read t h i s requirement as one about pressure (endeavour). Perhaps he was seeing the model as a f l u i d one, or more l i k e l y he just could not imagine a pressure to be anything other than a species of motion. It i s hardly surprising that Hobbes and Descartes would be at loggerheads on the question of illumination, especially since the direction of Hobbes1 thought since the Short Tract had been formed by the idea of a medium that was subject only to l o c a l motion. A f u l l y worked out account of the medium appears i n the Tractatus Opticus, where Hobbes considers the sun's operation i n terms of d i l a t i o n and contraction, thus going contrary to Descartes' b e l i e f s about i t s functioning. Descartes was prepared to characterize the sun as composed of p a r t i c l e s ( f i r s t element p a r t i c l e s ) , and he was sure that these minute p a r t i c l e s circulated rapidly and gave r i s e to l i g h t ; but he strenuously resisted the suggestion that l i g h t was caused by the i r pressing out into the medium constituted by the second element p a r t i c l e s . This model of pressing out and retracting i n was Hobbes* chosen one for the sun. Despite the fact that he did not publish his account of the sun's a b i l i t y to affect the adjacent medium u n t i l 1644, Hobbes must have discussed t h i s point with Descartes during t h e i r exchange, as a l e t t e r from the l a t t e r to Mersenne makes plain: The second proposition i s true, and my own, i f one replaced rejection i n i t by repulsio, so that impulsion alone, and not motion, can be understood.35 - 1 0 0 c My conjecture i s t h i s : Hobbes was provoked by Descartes' idea of a tendency because i t purported to explain an action without recourse to l o c a l motion. Hobbes' thought about illumination certainly took a leap forward due to his confrontation with Descartes. He was able to offer an explanation of how the sun operated on i t s adjacent medium, but he was s t i l l unable to understand how i t s internal functioning allowed i t to so operate. Witness his comment to Charles Cavendish when the l a t t e r had questioned him about the solar d i l a t i o n and contraction: "the cause of such reciprocation, i t i s hard to guess what i t i s . " (E.W.VII, 459) Nonetheless, Hobbes was able to make another step forward, but one which required him to reconceptualize the nature of conatus motions. In making t h i s step he looked to the pattern of particulate motion within bodies. Thus the i n c l i n a t i o n or tendency of bodies to either have cha r a c t e r i s t i c e f f e c t s , or to be marked i n certain ways, could now be explained i n terms of motions; where the motions i n question are of the particles out of which the objects are composed. Local motion i s s t i l l the base l i n e i n explanation, but there i s an expansion of the conatus idea's province to include the inner, i n v i s i b l e motions of the constituent p a r t i c l e s of bodies. In his C r i t i c i s m of Thomas White's De Mundo (1642-4) one can observe Hobbes somewhere between horses on the question of what conatus motions are; seemingly he wants to be able to keep his more basic conception of conatus as i n f i n i t e s i m a l motion, while using the same term to cover what i s c l e a r l y the internal motion state of an object. Chapter 34 contains the following d e f i n i t i o n of the term - 1 0 1 -"potential": [T]he act by which an act not yet produced w i l l be produced l a t e r . (T.W., 414) There has been a l o t written of l a t e on the question of dispositions. The discussion has centred around dispositional properties l i k e f r a g i l i t y , s o l u b i l i t y , e l a s t i c i t y , and the l i k e . Recourse i s often taken to a micro-structural story i n order to show why, for example, certain materials shatter when struck: th e i r molecular bonding i s said to explain th e i r f r a g i l i t y . I f the state of a thing's molecular bonding i s an i n t r i n s i c state, then some action of that thing might i n part be explained by reference to an i n t r i n s i c state. Hobbes' l i n e on "potential" i s very l i k e t h i s indeed. He directs attention to some actual state of a thing which i s responsible for qualifying that thing to either act or be acted upon i n some s p e c i f i c respect. Having no grasp of molecules, and being no atomist, Hobbes turns to e n t i t i e s and t h e i r motions. How t h i s concern manifested i t s e l f i n 1642-4 i s evident i n t h i s long passage from the c r i t i c i s m of White: I f someone s a i d , "The pri n c i p l e of motion i s the potential to motion, without the act [of motion]", i t w i l l follow that conatus i s not an action and does not achieve anything, whether the conatus be inward or outward. Conatus i s therefore motion i n a c t u a l i t y , even though the motion be very small and indistinguishable by the eye So conatus i s nothing but an actual motion, either of the whole body that tends, or of i t s inner and i n v i s i b l e parts. But, [I say] the presence of motion i n the inner parts of a l l hard bodies and of those whose v i s i b l e parts cohere and r e s i s t an agent i s argued from the fact that a l l resistance i s motion: for resistance i s a reaction; a reaction i s an action; and a l l action i s motion. (T.W., 148-50) Hard bodies are not continuously being put to the test of impact, - 1 0 2 -nor for that matter are people with perfectly normal knees and nervous pathways continuously being given reflex t e s t s . To make the behavioural claim that t h i s brick or that person w i l l react in specified ways to hammer blows rests, so Hobbes holds, on constitutional facts about the subjects which microscopic investigation could display. The claim i s put to the test i n action; the claims about the outcomes are stated i n hypotheticals; but the r e a l l y c r u c i a l physical question awaits the use of the microscope. In the passage quoted above Hobbes l i n k s conatus with actions that constitute an object's a b i l i t y to react. In The Elements of  Law he had given endeavour an employment much closer to the other sense of conatus found i n t h i s passage; namely the i n i t i a l stages of an internal motion which would ramify into a voluntary overt action. More importantly however, i n explaining reaction by reference to conatus Hobbes has subsumed the brain states occasioning perception under the conatus umbrella. On Hobbes' account our impression of sound as deriving from some external source i s a function of the reaction of the brain to the inflow of sensory information. With his new conception of conatus operating Hobbes i s obliged for the f i r s t time to postulate states of the brain which enable i t to react. These states are precisely those which characterize the organ as the organ that i t i s - they define i t s function. What I refer to here i s the "internal natural motion" from De Corpore. Hobbes was understandably vague about the minute p a r t i c l e s , but that he was reasonably confident about the direction of his conjecture i s no doubt connected with his f a i t h i n the - 1 0 3 -a b i l i t y of optics to create better microscopes: Nor i s there any doubt but by that augmenting the power of these microscopes (for i t may be augmented as long as neither matter nor the hands of workmen are wanting) every one of those hundred thousandth parts might yet appear a hundred thousand times greater than they did before. (E.W.I, 446) Since my claim i s that Hobbes emerged from his confrontation with Descartes armed with an expanded idea of conatus, and that t h i s new notion served as a foundation for a theory of dispositions, i t w i l l be useful to consider the application of the theory i n the realm of character. This task i s taken up i n chapter 4. What i s of immediate interest i s how the idea of conatus as i n t r i n s i c states was elaborated i n Hobbes' purely physical speculations. The works i n question are Seven Philosophical Problems (1662) and Decameron Physiologicum (1674) (EW. VII, 1-68 and 69-177). Chapter 5 of the Seven Problems i s concerned with hardness and softness, an issue that brings back into view matters which arose i n the 1641 exchange with Descartes. The work takes a dialogue form, with a novice _ posing a series of questions for his Hobbesian mentor B. My interest i n t h e i r discussion begins at the point where B claims that: For the cause therefore of hardness, I suppose the reciprocation of motion i n those things which are hard, to be very s w i f t , and i n very small c i r c l e s . (E.W. VII, 32) The degree of impenetrability and resistance to di s t o r t i o n i s put down to the speed and direc t i o n of the constituent elements i n a hard body (whatever they might be qua material). The explanation perplexes A, and by way of amplification B suggests that he envisage * 1 0 4 -a cross-bow that i s drawn ready to f i r e . J3 then puts the question, "do you think that the parts of i t s t i r ? " to which A's immediate answer i s that they do • not. The stage i s now set for B's further explanation, the s a l i e n t portions of which are as follows: B. How are you sure? You have no argument for i t , but that you do not see the motion. When I see you s i t t i n g s t i l l , must I believe there i s no motion i n your parts within, when there are so many arguments to convince me there i s . A. What argument have you to convince me that there i s motion i n a cross-bow when i t stands bent? B. If you cut the s t r i n g , or any way set the bow at l i b e r t y , i t w i l l have then a very v i s i b l e motion. What can be the cause? A. Well, grant that endeavour be motion, and motion i n the bow unbent, how do you derive from thence, that being set at l i b e r t y i t must return to i t s former posture? B. Thus there being within the bow a swift (though i n v i s i b l e ) motion of a l l the parts, and consequently of the whole; the bending causeth that motion, which was along the bow (that was beaten out when i t was hot into that length) to operate across the length i n every part i f i t , and the more by how much i t i s more bent; and consequently endeavours to unbend i t a l l the while i t stands bent. And therefore when the force which kept i t bent i s removed, i t must of necessity return to the posture i t had before, ( i b i d . , 33-34) At t h i s juncture A reminds B_ that, since endeavour is_ motion, and that since a l l motion produces some effect or other, i t follows that some change must be taking place whilst the cross-bow remains drawn. B agrees, adding that after a "long time" the new posture w i l l become permanent; the cross-bow l a t h w i l l then r e s i s t any attempt to return i t to the o r i g i n a l shape. The Hobbesian lesson being well learnt, A makes the f i n a l comment: - 1 0 5 -That i s true. For bows long bent lose th e i r appetite to r e s t i t u t i o n , long custom becoming nature, ( i b i d . , 34-35) There are two things to note i n t h i s f i n a l remark. F i r s t l y , a state i n a piece of s t e e l i s described i n terms of appetite. That might be passed o f f as mere anthropomorphism or as simply a harmless locution. It i s neither, and the reason w i l l become obvious when we turn to a p a r a l l e l discussion i n the Decameron- Physiologicum. Secondly, since the o r i g i n a l nature of the l a t h was created i n the forge and hammer process, something just as fundamental has occurred in the change which reverses the tension. Hobbes i s deliberately saying something stronger than would be captured with the term "second-nature". As mentioned above, there i s a period of twelve years separating the Seven Problems from Decameron Physiologicum, and for some intents and purposes they can be considered as mapping the one ground. However, i n the d e t a i l of the discussion of hardness some relevant and important changes take place. In t h i s l a t t e r work Hobbes puts his f i n a l touch on the theory of conatus by suggesting a change i n motion. The characters i n the dialogue are unchanged: B. I have t o l d you already, how the smallest parts of a hard body have every one, by the generation of hardness, a c i r c u l a r , or other compounded motion; such motion i s that of the smallest parts of the bow. Which c i r c l e s i n the bending you press into narrower figures, as a c i r c l e into an e l l i p s i s , and an e l l i p s i s into a narrower but longer e l l i p s i s with violence; which turns t h e i r natural motion against the outward parts of the bow so bent, and i s an endeavour to stretch the bow into i t s former posture. Therefore, i f the impediment be removed, the bow must needs recover i t s former figure. - 1 0 6 -A. It i s manifest; and the cause can be no other but that, except the bow have sense. B. And though the bow had sense, and appetite to boot, the cause w i l l be s t i l l the same. (E.W. VII, 135-6) In refusing to draw a l i n e between the tendencies of inanimate objects and creatures with sense, Hobbes makes i t plain that his theory of what a disposition amounts to i s u t t e r l y general. This should come as no surprise however, since conatus i s introduced as part of f i r s t philosophy, and thus i s applicable to human beings i n so far as they are natural bodies. That we have any particular disposition we do i s not an i n t r i n s i c fact about us, although that we are so constituted as to have a range of dispositions i s a fact about our nature as the p a r t i c u l a r kind of bodies that we are! A l l Hobbesian men are assumed to have the same repertoire of emotions; es s e n t i a l l y variants of the dominant passions of desire and aversion. However, "the nature of single men", (DeH., 47) that i s , the particular natures of i n d i v i d u a l men, comes through habituation to what might well be unique l i k e s and d i s l i k e s . In broaching the question of particular or idiosyncratic passions, we leave the province of Hobbes1 physics or f i r s t philosophy and enter that of his ethics. The argument of t h i s t h i r d chapter has been that within Hobbes' physics one can find a theory of dispositions. Clearly, i n order to trace the development of the ideas i n question I went into the account of human nature. However, as I mentioned above there i s reason to set apart the f i r s t appearance of the idea of endeavour from i t s place i n the system. It was claimed that Hobbes developed a theory of dispositions - 1 . 0 7 -u t i l i z i n g the notion of in t e r n a l motions. These internal motions were distinguished into two categories: those which give objects t h e i r particular character as the kind of objects that they are, and those that are the f i r s t s t i r r i n g s of voluntary action. The interesting form of motion from my point of view i s the former, since i t i s the physical basis of responses. I have taken the analysis of Hobbes on character t r a i t s down to t h i s l e v e l , because I believe that i f there i s to be some plausible story about the inexorable shape of character for Hobbesian individuals then i t would need to be found here, i n the most detailed account he gives. I can find no such story, and thus conclude that there i s nothing i n the d e t a i l of Hobbes' physiological psychology which would adequately ground egoism. The connecting l i n k between t h i s chapter and the next i s the idea of a disposition to act. In t h i s chapter the focus was on objects i n general, but i n the next i t i s human beings. I f the argument of t h i s chapter i s sound, then the character of individual men w i l l need to be explained by reference to certain factors other than the i r basic psychological make-up. I hold that Hobbes does a f a i r job of t h i s i n De Homine, where he str i v e s to create an account of how human dispositions are formed. He sees t h i s part of his theory as his ethics, and my suggestion i s that there i s ample material i n his ethics to ground his p o l i t i c a l theory without recourse to dubious notions about inevitable egoism; notions that i n my opinion Hobbes never espoused. - 1 0 8 -CHAPTER IV CHARACTER AND SELF-PRESERVATION - 1 0 9 -4.1 From Conatus to Character In Chapter 2 David Gauthier's account of Hobbes' view of psychology was c r i t i c i z e d But the c r i t i c i s m was of lim i t e d scope, and did not impugn Gauthier's more general thesis that Hobbes' psychology i s inseparable from his- p o l i t i c s . That I take to be true and important. But having rejected the connection that Gauthier suggests I must readdress the question of the relationship between Hobbes' p o l i t i c s and i t s psychological premises. How then are character and psychology related i n Hobbes? To begin with, Hobbes occasionally refers to something he c a l l s "the whole nature of man", or, when he sp e l l s i t out i n terms of human powers, "strength of body, experience, reason, and passion." (E.L., 70) He suggests that human nature i s best understood as the composite of these four powers. Then again there i s something closer to our conception of psychology appearing as part of Human  Nature (E.L., 1-69), and his theory of v i t a l and voluntary motion. A l l three of these: human nature as a set of powers and both the empirical and more speculative physiological psychology should be set to one side for the moment, since none of them plays a role of importance i n his theory of character. With respect to t h i s theory we need to address the issue of dispositions, and i n particular the passions. The passions, taken very generally, are "the same i n a l l men, desire, fear, hope, etc.;" (E.W. I l l , x i ) ; what tends to di f f e r e n t i a t e are the s p e c i f i c objects of the passions, since these depend on "the constitution i n d i v i d u a l , and particular education", (ibid.) Anyone who intends "to govern a whole nation" ( i b i d . , x i i ) - 1 1 0 - . w i l l need to understand the p o l i t i c a l significance of human passions; that i s , t h e i r impact on c i v i l order. He w i l l not attempt to read the more inscrutable d e t a i l of individual characters. That task i s possible only for "him that searcheth hearts", (ibid.) A r i s t o t l e remarked that: Moral virtue comes about as a result of habit, whence also i t s name ethike i s one that i s formed by a s l i g h t variation from the word ethos (habit). (1103a20f.) Simi l a r l y for Hobbes the treatment of our "dispositions and manners, i s c a l l e d ethics" (E.W.I, 11) and thus d i s t i n c t from the matter of our c i v i l duties which i s covered i n " p o l i t i c s , or simply c i v i l  philosophy", (ibid) Hobbes argues that i n order to have knowledge of the l a t t e r one must f i r s t "know the dispositions, affections, and manners of men".(ibid) Since character can f a i r l y be seen as the ensemble of affections, dispositions, and manners, i t i s reasonable to assume that a science of p o l i t i c s presupposes a firm grasp of the nature of character. More to the point, since i t i s true that Hobbes does so understand character, i t therefore follows that for him a theory of character i s the central part of ethics. We are now i n a position to answer the question about the relationship between character and psychology i n Hobbes. The l a t t e r i s based on a speculative physiological account: how the brain, heart, and nervous pathways operate with sensory imput. The former on the other hand i s concerned with just those dispositions which affect the l i f e of men i n groups; that i s , the manners or virtues and vices. The wider psychological basis i s presumably the physical prerequisite for any dispositions, but a concern with i t i s equivalent to a concern with man as a sentient creature. Character - I l l -i s of concern when we adopt the point of view of the p o l i t i c a l philosopher rather than that of the Hobbesian physicist. The physicist i s concerned with the physical conditions for dispositions, but the p o l i t i c a l philosopher takes manners as his point of departure. He does so because of the relevance that manners have for p o l i t i c a l order; thus certain human inc l i n a t i o n s require study from the p o l i t i c a l point of view. Hobbes assumes that the p o l i t i c a l point of view takes the success of cooperative forms of endeavour as fundamental. Subsequently the assessment of manners takes special account of t h e i r impact on c i v i l cooperation. Since the study of character or manners has the point that i t does, one might expect that Hobbes would distinguish between dispositions i n l i g h t of t h e i r known effects on the interaction of individuals. This i s exactly what he does. Hobbes makes a central cut, separating those i n c l i n a t i o n s which lead us to "accommodate ourselves, and to leave others as far as we can behind us", from those "by which we s t r i v e mutually to accommodate each other". (E.L., 85) Captured i n the gaze of c i v i l philosophy, that i s , from the p o l i t i c a l point of view, men w i l l appear as sets of p o l i t i c a l l y relevant i n c l i n a t i o n s . Thus when Hobbes remarks that "I ground the c i v i l right of sovereigns, and both the duty and l i b e r t y of subjects, upon the known natural i n c l i n a t i o n s of mankind" (E.W. I l l , 710) he i s saying at least two things of some importance. F i r s t l y , allowing that he has already distinguished the passions natural to a l l men from the desires which are idi o s y n c r a t i c , he i s asserting that his p o l i t i c a l philosophy rests only on an account of the common stock of human passions. Secondly, assuming that i f we were - 1 1 2 -e n t i r e l y other-accommodating a sovereign procedure would be pointless, and that i f we were t o t a l l y i n d i f f e r e n t to others i t would be impossible, Hobbes' claim i s that p o l i t i c a l science takes a middle ground i n basing i t s e l f on both our strengths and weaknesses. Our strengths make the whole project viable, whereas out weaknesses require the constraints that the created sovereign brings to bear. The largely overlooked fact i s that Hobbes says we are of mixed nature when analysed i n terms of aptitude for c i v i l l i f e . In De Homine a l l of the in c l i n a t i o n s manifesting our s e n s i t i v i t y to the plight of others are gathered together as "charity", (DeH., 69-70) whereas the absence of them i s taken to argue a "mind insensible to another's e v i l s " , (ibid.) In terms of the three different characterizations we have of psychology: ( i ) human nature considered as a generic term covering the four f a c u l t i e s ; ( i i ) physiological psychology; and ( i i i ) character; only the l a s t i s the object of scrutiny from the p o l i t i c a l point of view. Since I have presented Hobbes' account of conatus as the materialist background to a theory of character or human dispositions, his physiological theory stands intermediate between the physical theory of conatus and the theory of character. Thus on my reading there i s a reasonably clear sense i n which Hobbes did create a set of connections joining physics to p o l i t i c s . The connecting element i s the theory of dispositions: applicable to bodies per se i n De Corpore, to human beings i n De Homine, and f i n a l l y to human beings as c i t i z e n s i n De Cive. Looked at i n these terms each one of Hobbes' three books illuminates a different aspect of the human being. I t i s partly the f a i l u r e to separate the points - 1 1 3 -of view peculiar to each of them that has occasioned so many objections to Hobbes' project. I f we begin with the object of analysis described merely as a human being we can trace the movement between the different points of view. Physics constitutes one such point of view, since we are, among other things, material e n t i t i e s . Psychology, taken as Hobbes' physiological account of action, considers man as an animal with appetites, and p o l i t i c s or the science of the body p o l i t i c considers the role of the c i t i z e n and man's aptitude for i t . In addition to being the matter of the body p o l i t i c man i s also i t s maker, and Hobbes' p o l i t i c a l point of view i s intimately connected with the task of creating a context within which our appetites can be contained, p o l i t i c s i s the culmination of the e a r l i e r points of view, because there the matter of the body p o l i t i c i s also the self-conscious shaper of that matter. To be a s k i l l e d a r t i f i c e r one must have intimate knowledge of the matter upon which one's cra f t works. In the case of Hobbes' p o l i t i c s knowledge of human character counts as t h i s essential knowledge. I began th i s section with a question about the relationship between Hobbes' psychology and p o l i t i c s . It was then established that the more central question was one about the relationship between his theory of character and p o l i t i c s ; t h i s second question emerged once the p o l i t i c a l l y relevant aspect of Hobbes' psychology -his theory of character - had been located. In as much as Hobbes' theory of character, "the known natural i n c l i n a t i o n s of mankind", forms the basis of his accounts of both l i b e r t y and subjection, the most c r u c i a l r e l a t i o n between character and p o l i t i c s i s t h i s : -Un-certain aspects of character make the state necessary whereas others make i t possible. We turn now to Hobbes' detailed treatment of character. 4.2 On Dispositions and Manners Hobbes introduces his account of the determination of character with the remark that dispositions are "men's in c l i n a t i o n s toward certain things". (DeH., 63) This i s immediately followed by a statement of the ways i n which i n c l i n a t i o n s are acquired, and s i x sources are mentioned: the constitution of the body, experience, habit, the goods of fortune, self-estimation, and figures of authority. A l i s t of the t r a i t s that Hobbes actually discusses looks l i k e t h i s : t i m i d i t y , daringness, l i v e l i n e s s , dullness, stubborness, cautiousness, foolhardiness, impudence, ambitiousness, diffidence, vituperativeness, covetousness, censoriousness and jealousy. This l i s t reads l i k e a catalogue of s o c i a l l i a b i l i t i e s , almost ignoring the t r a i t s which f a c i l i t a t e s o c i a l l i f e . Why does Hobbes concentrate on these t r a i t s to the exclusion of others, and what does he say about the eradication of undesirable t r a i t s ? The answer to the f i r s t question i s surprising. Rather than, as one might expect, being given a mixture of t r a i t s , we are given most of the q u a l i t i e s of character which Hobbes was to pin-point as pre c i p i t a t i n g causes leading to the C i v i l War. In the f i r s t part of Behemoth Hobbes considers the vulnerable position of the king, and has one of the participants i n the - 1 1 5 -dialogue ask, "how came the people to be so corrupted? And what kind of people were they that could so seduce them?" By way of answer he i s given a l i s t of corrupting influences: Presbyterians; Papists; Sectaries; the c l a s s i c s of Greek and Roman antiquity; market c i t i e s ; and an incomplete grasp of what i s obligatory. These are precisely the elements that appear when Hobbes described those factors which are instrumental i n forming dispositions. Consider the following passages from De Homine: Therefore among a l l peoples', r e l i g i o n and doctrine, which everyone hath been taught from the i r early years, so shackle them forever that they hate and r e v i l e dissenters: as i s made manifest p r i n c i p a l l y from the books of theologians (for whom, of a l l people, i t i s least f i t t i n g ) , which are f u l l of the most atrocious abuse. The disposition of these men i s not suited to peace and society.( DeH., 65) Ancient n o b i l i t y makes the disposition affable, because i n bestowing honour on someone, they can be bountiful and kind to a l l , since under a l l circumstances they are secure enough about the honour due to themselves. The disposition of new n o b i l i t y i s more suspicious, l i k e those who, not yet certain enough of how much honour ought to be bestowed on themselves, often become excessively harsh toward i n f e r i o r s and excessively d i f f i d e n t toward equals, ( i b i d . , 66) From the opinion that one hath of oneself. Whence i t also happens that those who to themselves seem wise, and are not, have a disposition unsuited for correcting th e i r own f a u l t s . For they do not believe that anything i n them needs correcting. On the contrary, they are in c l i n e d either to correct others' deeds, or to be vituperative or scornful about them, l i k e those who believe that whatsoever they see being done contrary to their own opinion i s being done improperly. And so they judge a state to be badly governed which i s not governed as they themselves wish; and as a res u l t they are more suited than other men to new things. Those who to themselves seem learned have the same disposition; for to themselves they seem wise; for no man desires to be learned unless learning leads to wisdom. Whence i t happens that pedagogues are most frequently censorious and a n t i s o c i a l i n di s p o s i t i o n , l i k e those who, because - 1 1 6 -they see that they have been selected to regulate the manners of youths, scarcely abstain from censuring the manners of th e i r own fathers, even though dead, ( i b i d . , 66) Also those, who are called to regulate public morals by their teaching (especially doctors of the Church and they not knowing by whom they are called to so great a ministry), demand that kings themselves, the supreme governors of the Church, be ruled by them; yea, with the greatest danger to the state, they wish i t to seem that t h i s o f f i c e hath been granted to them, not by kings, and by those whom God hath commissioned for the care and safety of the people, but d i r e c t l y by God. ( i b i d . , 66-7) Sim i l a r l y , those who are elected by the state to interpret the laws cannnot but seem to themselves wiser than other men, so great i s the testimony that they have received from the state. And so they demand to use their o f f i c e not so much for declaring what i s ri g h t , that i s , for explaining the laws (that i s , the state's mandates), but often even for laying down what i s r i g h t , that i s , for commanding the highest, that i s , for compelling order i n the state: something that frequently i s wont to be the st a r t of c i v i l wars, especially when the rulers of the state are accused of in j u s t i c e by those who are considered to be most expert i n law, but who are in fact a most inexpert mob. ( i b i d . , 67) There are, however, books which were written by cit i z e n s of Rome, when democracy was flourishing or recently extinct (and also by Greeks, when the republic of Athens was fl o u r i s h i n g ) , that are f i l l e d with both examples and precepts that make people's disposition h o s t i l e to kings;...In trut h , the people's disposition hath up to now been greatly corrupted by the reading of books and the l i s t e n i n g to siren songs of those who want supreme power i n the kingdom to belong to an e c c l e s i a s t i c i n c i v i l form, ( i b i d . , 68) This material from De Homine appeared ten years before Charles I I refused permission for the publication of Behemoth. What i t suggests i s that Hobbes' detailed treatment of dispositions and manners i s central to his thoughts on the matter of c i v i l i t y and peace. The examples of the vices, p a r t i c u l a r l y diffidence, vituperativeness, censoriousness and covetousness, attach to - 1 1 7 -theologians, the new n o b i l i t y , pedagogues, and lawyers. So, at one l e v e l the answer to the question of why Hobbes introduced so many character flaws into his treatment of manners i n De Homine i s that, given his views about the relevance of character to p o l i t i c s , his introduction of examples allows him to preview the reasons he would ultimately offer to explain the public's propensity to abandon the Royal authority. With respect to the second matter - the alteration of dispositions - Hobbes i s fort h r i g h t . His claim i s that dispositions are subject to inculcation and change. Since he began his treatment with what were i n the main undesirable t r a i t s , i t i s no surprise that he goes on to the matter of change f i r s t : Men's dispositions are corrected by adverse events, namely a daring disposition by frequent misfortune, an ambitious one by repeated setbacks, and an impudent one by repeated coldness. (DeH., 65) It would hardly be unusual i f we found Hobbes agreeing that some of the dispositions he treats were open to change. After a l l , i f a love of democracy i s bred into the young through study of c l a s s i c a l p o l i t i c a l philosophy, then presumably the i n c l i n a t i o n to see i t as the best form of government i s a c u l t u r a l a r t i f a c t . Subsequently a different c u l t u r a l milieu would i n a l l l i k e l i h o o d produce a different predilection. But what Hobbes explains as open to a l t e r a t i o n are the more fundamental, t r a i t s , l i k e daringness and t i m i d i t y . These too are open to change through the impact of experience. Hobbes wants to distinguish between adverse experience as a mode of character change, and what he refers to as habit. In both - 1 1 8 -instances however the change effected seems to be quite fundamental: From habit: because of t h i s , that those things that offend when new (that i s , those things that man's nature i n i t i a l l y r e s i s t s ) more often than not whet that same nature when repeated; and those things that at f i r s t are merely endured soon compel love. (Ibid., 64-65) We face here, within the theory of human dispositions, the same issue about change of nature that was broached i n the example of the cross-bow l a t h . Hobbes i n s i s t e d that the alt e r a t i o n i n the bow that was l e f t drawn for a very long time be seen as fundamental; i n some sense al t e r i n g i t s very nature. Furthermore, he claimed that the lath's i n i t i a l i n c l i n a t i o n to spring back to the shape i t was cast i n , and i t s l a t e r aversion to that shape, was i n some sense paradigmatic: irrespective of the subject i n question being animate or not, the basic account of dispositions i s to be given i n precisely the same terms. Endeavour motions of constituent p a r t i c l e s are essentially what the dispo s i t i o n a l basis i s . Yet despite the d i s t i n c t i o n between experiences and habituation as modes of change, the key process at the basis of both i s the same. In the case of the long bent cross-bow the story i s to l d i n terms of iterated endeavours; i n the case of habit the important aspect seems to be re p e t i t i o n again. In both the end result i s an al t e r a t i o n toward reversal of some i n i t i a l bent. F i n a l l y , with adverse experiences changing a rash or impetuous person into a more cautious one, the i t e r a t i o n of an experience i s given the role of a l t e r i n g a nature that i s characterized as, i n i t i a l l y , daring. I postulate that the underlying basis for character change i n Hobbes' - 1 1 9 -theory i s the process of endeavour motion. What i s phenomenally a change from being impetuous to being cautious i s essentially an a l t e r a t i o n of endeavour motions i n sets of p a r t i c l e s . Human nature i s going to be properly thought of as fixed i f that nature i s understood i n one way that Hobbes describes i t , namely as the conceptual composite of reason, strength, passion, and experience. But when human nature i s looked at i n terms of our actual appetites and aversions, as d i s t i n c t from being simply appetitive, then human nature becomes more diverse: we are looking to the nature of p a r t i c u l a r human beings. Human nature, so taken, i s explored through an analysis of the forms that passions take i n individuals and groups of individuals. My claim i s that while Hobbes takes appetite and aversion as primitive, that i s , as a quite fixed basis, he sees a l t e r a t i o n at the l e v e l of particular desires as i n some respects equally fundamental. Witness what he says about habituation that a l t e r s our i n i t i a l appetites. Up to t h i s point very l i t t l e has been said about the role of reason v i s a v i s the dispositions. Reason only comes to the fore at that moment when Hobbes explains the relationship between dispositions and manners. "Manners" i s a defined term i n Hobbes' scheme. In Leviathan we are t o l d that "Manners" are not "the small  morals; but those q u a l i t i e s of mankind, that concern the i r l i v i n g together i n peace, and unity". (E.W.III, 85) S i m i l a r l y , i n De Cive, when discussing the r a t i o n a l assessment of q u a l i t i e s l i k e modesty, equity, t r u s t , humanity, and mercy, Hobbes c a l l s them "good manners or habits, that i s , v i r t u e s " . (E.W. I I , 48) Subsequently, any catalogue of laws of nature, i f read as recommending these q u a l i t i e s - 1 2 0 -and others as constituents of character, w i l l r i g h t l y deserve the t i t l e of moral law: The law therefore, i n the means to peace, commands also good manners, or the practice of v i r t u e ; and therefore i t i s called moral. (ibid) Good manners are those dispositions c r u c i a l for the success of the c i v i l enterprise, i f only i n the straightforward respect that t h e i r opposites - the vices - play the decisive role i n undermining i t . It i s the role of reason to assess which q u a l i t i e s conduce to, and which are destructive of, c i v i l accord. Hobbes takes even greater pains i n De Homine than he did i n Leviathan to accurately r e l a t e his p r i n c i p a l terms: Dispositions, when they are so strengthened by habit that they beget t h e i r actions with ease and with reason unresisting, are called manners. (DeH., 68) Thus manners are morally relevant q u a l i t i e s found i n the characters of individual human beings. Following both Hobbes' usage and the d r i f t of his argument we reach the conclusion that, "manners, i f they be good, are ca l l e d virtues, i f e v i l , vices." (ibid.) But i f manners are dispositions strengthened by habit "with reason unresisting", then whether or not someone has a certain virtue or vice w i l l be as r e a l and objective an issue as whether or not a certain metal i s malleable when heated to 100 degrees centigrade. This i s Hobbes' view. However, can Hobbes hold such a view about moral properties given his s u b j e c t i v i s t analysis of "good" and "bad"? The answer to t h i s question i s that Hobbes i s j u s t i f i e d , within the terms of his own theory, i n holding that moral q u a l i t i e s are objective i n character. To appreciate why t h i s i s the case we need -121-to return to the matter of perspective; i n particular the p o l i t i c a l  point of view. The p o l i t i c a l point of view i s synonymous with the position of the p o l i t i c a l philosopher who considers men's dispositions i n terms of the i r aptitude for c i v i l l i f e . It i s to be compared with what might be c a l l e d the natural point of view, from which men are considered not as prospective c i t i z e n s but as sentients. The natural point of view i s that of Hobbes' physicist. There are no moral properties from the natural point of view, since the object of c i v i l l i f e i s not given by nature; yet when that aim i s given by adopting the p o l i t i c a l stance, then q u a l i t i e s of character are assessable by reference to the p o l i t i c a l benchmark: "the goodness of actions to consist i n t h i s , that i t was i n order to peace, and the e v i l i n t h i s , that i t related to discord." (E.W..II, 48-9) Once again, t h i s point i s remade i n De Homine: So, condensing t h i s whole teaching on manners into the fewest words, I say that good dispositions are those which are suitable for entering into c i v i l society; and good manners (that i s , moral virtues) are those whereby what was entered upon can best be preserved. (DeH., 70) There i s nothing inconstant or subjective about the vices and v i r t u e s . They have t h e i r categorical basis i n neutral conatus. But there i s something chaotically inconstant about the evaluation of vices and virtues. The section of Leviathan chapter four ("Of Speech") dealing with "inconstant names" makes t h i s abundantly clear: And therefore i n reasoning a man must take heed of words; which besides the s i g n i f i c a t i o n of what we imagine of t h e i r nature, have a s i g n i f i c a t i o n also of the nature, d i s p o s i t i o n , and interest of the speaker; such as are the names of virtues and vices; for one man c a l l e t h wisdom, what another c a l l e t h fear; and one cruelty, wha~E another justice...And therefore such - 1 2 2 -names can never be true grounds of any r a t i o c i n a t i o n . (E.W.Ill, and see DeH., 68-9) This passage from Leviathan does not assert that vices and virtues are inconstant; nor does i t imply that no sound moral reasoning can u t i l i z e the notions of vice and v i r t u e . It says that the names can never be the s o l i d ground of such reasoning. As the previous quote from De Homine argues, and as other remarks i n De Cive suggest, the t r a i t s of character which have a dramatic impact on the tone of s o c i a l l i f e are constant: the virtues improve i t and the vices destroy i t . (E.W.II, A6) The judgments men make about these t r a i t s may well be personal and biased, but that i s neither here nor there with respect to the nature of the t r a i t s themselves (where thei r nature i s understood as t h e i r s o c i a l impact). His theory of character i s Hobbes1 moral psychology, and at the same time that aspect of his psychology relevant to his p o l i t i c s . But there i s another aspect of Hobbes1 psychology which i s generally thought to be of c r u c i a l importance to his p o l i t i c a l theory without necessarily being considered a part of his theory of character as we have begun to a r t i c u l a t e i t ; that i s , as a theory about manners. But there i s good reason to see self-preservation and character as parts of one account of dispositions i_f you believe that self-preservation i n Hobbes' work issues as a theory about motivation. Since many have understood Hobbes to be suggesting that self-preservation i s the most dominant motive (or the sole motive) i t i s appropriate to consider the role of self-preservation within h i s theory. In the section following I w i l l argue that self-preservation i s a more protean conception i n Hobbes than i s - 1 2 3 -usually acknowledged. Subsequently I s h a l l make a d i s t i n c t i o n between self-maintenance and self-preservation; the f i r s t being a property of a l l sentients, and the second a consideration that can take a number of forms i n humans: bodily self-preservation and the preservation of self-image are two such forms. It w i l l be argued that self-preservation does not stamp Hobbes1 ethics as e g o i s t i c a l , because i t does not affect his account of dispositions i n the required way. In other words what he says about self-preservation, i n a l l of i t s forms of interest to him, does not provide any uniform account of motivation, and such a uniform account i s needed to support the view that Hobbes' position i s e g o i s t i c a l . 4.3 Self-Preservation D.D. Raphael and T.A. Spragens are among the modern writers on Hobbes who see an i d e n t i t y between his views on self-preservation and what they label as "egoism". Here i s a passage from a recent work of Raphael's: If anarchy or war between men i s natural, i t i s l i k e l y , or at least possible, the causes l i e i n human nature. Hobbes thinks we know by experience that human nature i s predominantly e g o i s t i c . Men are mainly out for t h e i r own interests. That i s why they compete and f i g h t . But why i s human nature egoistic? Because the natural tendency of any organism i s to preserve i t s own l i f e . E a r l i e r i n the same discussion Raphael had gone into the question of natural tendencies i n a l i t t l e more d e t a i l : A l i v i n g thing does have the tendency to go on l i v i n g , and so i t behaves i n ways that w i l l assist t h i s tendency. In a conscious being, l i k e man, the tendency of the organism appears i n the mind as a desire for self-preservation...the desire for - 1 2 4 -self-preservation or aversion from death i s the fundamental motive of human conduct1-. This point about the human expression of the basic organic tendency i s succinctly stated by Raphael. However, the point, that humans have an innate motive to self-preservation, i s not one that Hobbes espoused. Further to t h i s , despite the fact that Hobbes did have a view about self-preserving mechanisms i n a l l organisms, his view on the matter does not e n t a i l that humans are inevitably e g o i s t i c . To begin with, consider the core of Raphael's position. It can be stated as two premises: (1) A l l l i v i n g organisms have a preservatory tendency; (2) In conscious organisms l i k e man a self-preservatory tendency operates as a•- desire (or a fundamental motive) for self-preservation. I have agreed that (1) states precisely what Hobbes believed, but (2) does not accurately represent a Hobbesian thesis. Raphael believes that because a l l men have preservatory mechanisms, and because the mechanism works as a motive, Hobbesian men are thereby a l l egoists. But the very way i n which Raphael introduces his argument milit a t e s against the conclusion he wants. It i s one thing to say, as he does, that men are "predominantly" or "mainly" e g o i s t i c , and quite another to say that t h e i r motivation i s innately e g o i s t i c . It i s undeniable that Hobbes saw a thick streak of egocentrism i n human nature, and Raphael i s aware of the fact. Yet the evidence he intends to present - the view that preservation i n humans exists as an ego i s t i c motivational structure - i s , i f correct, evidence for a much stronger conclusion: men are not mainly - 1 - 2 5 -e g o i s t i c , they are uniformly so. The argument of the next three sections i s designed to show that (1) i s true, and that (2) i s certainly not true i n the sense that Raphael intends. I f i t were merely intended to express the fact that men are by and large self-interested creatures I believe that i t would adequately capture Hobbes' point of view. The case that Spragens makes for an egoistic reading of Hobbes i s very similar to Raphael's: In Hobbes' world of i n e r t i a l motion, t h i s fundamental metaphysical postulate i s transformed from the perception of a universal tendency of a l l things to grow into a b e l i e f that a l l nature possesses a universal tendency to pe r s i s t . A l l nature fundamentally desires i t s self-preservation...Man, as a natural creature, i s no dif f e r e n t . He i s possessed by an overriding natural tendency to seek his self-preservation...This fundamental, irreducible natural desire to persist i n one's being, to preserve oneself...is the ontological foundation of natural r i g h t . 2 The statement of the position i s more grandiose than Raphael's, but the same point i s made. Men, consistent with being part of nature, have self-preserving mechanisms. In the human being t h i s mechanism takes the form of an unwavering desire for continued l i f e . Gauthier has argued for the same conclusion, captured i n the claim that, "self-preservation i s a necessary and basic motive of human action"." 5 A l l three of these writers recognize the importance of preservatory mechanisms within Hobbes' theory; but they believe that the presence of the mechanism results i n an egoistic mode of action. Egoism i s taken to be the nature of Hobbesian desiring. Their common error i s to have collapsed Hobbes1 account of - 1 2 6 -motivation into his account of appetite and aversion. The nature of human desire i s , for Hobbes, intimately connected with the mechanism for self-preservation, but that mechanism works at a l e v e l below that of reasons for action. Hence there i s no d i f f i c u l t y i n Hobbes allowing that men may have reasons for action that override considerations of bodily preservation. The tendency to underestimate the primacy of bodily self-preservation would, however, be just as much a mistake as to consider i t the single and overriding motivation i n Hobbesian men. Hobbes' b e l i e f that he could construct a stable c i v i l order presupposes that most men accept reasons of bodily self-preservation as s u f f i c i e n t . To deny th i s would be to f a i l to see a dominant thread i n his p o l i t i c s . The assumptions that Hobbes employs i n his p o l i t i c s are i n some respects exactly l i k e those of A r i s t o t l e , and indeed, l i k e those Homer alludes to i n the second book of his I l i a d . When Odysseus i s sent to halt the Achaian exodus he employs two styles of persuasion: "whenever he encountered some king, or man of influence, he would stand beside him and with soft words try to restrain him: 'Excellency! i t does not become you to be frightened l i k e any coward. Rather hold fast and check the rest of the people1.. .When he saw some man of the people who was shouting, he would s t r i k e him with his s t a f f , and reprove him also: 'Excellency! S i t s t i l l and l i s t e n to what others t e l l you, to those who are better men than you"".4 S i m i l a r l y , i n the Nicomachean Ethics A r i s t o t l e comments that: It i s the nature of the many to y i e l d to the suggestions of fear rather than honour, and to abstain from e v i l not because of the disgrace but the penalties entailed by not abstaining people are by and large readier to submit to punishment and compulsion than be moved by arguments and ideals. (1179b 11-13 and 1180a 3-4) Hobbes, l i k e A r i s t o t l e and Homer, was familiar with an a r i s t o c r a t i c society, whose conceptions of honour and reputation could easily e n t a i l disdain for physical destruction. His intimate knowledge of t h i s culture makes i t implausible to believe that he would simply f a i l to accommodate i t s motivations into t h i s theory of action. In summary then, I hold that i t i s best to frame a conception of Hobbes' theory of character and motivation which allows a place for those whose behaviour i s governed by "arguments and ideals". Most men may be unresponsive to considerations of honour, and perhaps some who are responsive need to be addressed i n other terms as w e l l ; but Hobbes' point of departure i s not accurately represented i f we take him to have thrown a blanket of coercion over the entire p o l i t i c a l domain. 4;4 Self-Maintenance On at least two occasions Hobbes draws attention to humans as just one species of sentient creature. The most important i s the section of De Corpore dealing with animal sensation, and the other a reference i n De Cive. By looking to these two places we can see that Hobbes goes some way toward distinguishing the natural urge in a l l sentients (something that I s h a l l designate as self-maintenance), from conscious motivation. In De Cive he says that, "from thei r f i r s t b i r t h , as they are merely sensible creatures, they have t h i s disposition, that immediately as much as - 1 2 8 -i n them l i e s they desire and do whatever i s best pleasing to them...." (E.W.II, xvi) Since a new born has no ideas about what does and does not conduce to i t s preservation, whatever the disposition i t manifests might be, i t i s c l e a r l y not one that depends on the operation of reasons. Presumably then the infant's appetite/aversion mechanism is_ i t s mode of accommodation to the world. In De Corpore Hobbes uses the example of a foetus to make the same point: And i n animal motion t h i s i s the very f i r s t endeavour, and found even i n the embryo; which while i t i s i n the womb, moveth i t s limbs with voluntary motion, for the avoiding of whatsoever troubleth i t , or for the pursuing of what pleaseth i t . (E.W.I, 407) Human beings are correctly thought of as self-maintaining because they have the appetite/aversion mechanism. In t h i s they are not unique, but merely one among the group of sentient creatures. So, Hobbes' remark that l i f e i s "but a motion of limbs, the beginning whereof i s i n some pr i n c i p a l part within", (E.W.Ill,ix) applies equally to a l l creatures with hearts and limbs; the heart being that "principal part within" acting as the prime mover. The conatus of the heart, " i t s own internal natural motion", (E.W.I, 391) enables i t to receive and respond to the inflow of sensory imput. But there are r e a l l y two species of conatus motion here and not one: the conatus of the heart i n and of i t s e l f ( i t s natural motion), and the conatus or endeavour that i s the f i r s t stage i n action. The f i r s t of these two forms of conatus motion characterizes the heart as the kind of organ that i t i s , while the second connects d i r e c t l y with the characterization of actions. A self-maintaining system acts to preserve i t s e l f , but i f I am right - 1 2 9 -about Hobbes, then we should l i m i t the range of self-maintenance to the autonomic functions of the heart. The heart i t s e l f acts, and i t s action i s the p r i n c i p a l part i n the self-maintaining system; but i t s actions cannot be characterized i n the way that the agent's actions can. Our interest i n human motivation i s not advanced or rewarded by details of the heart's endeavour motions. Obviously a man i s appetitive, and equally obviously he i s guided by his conception of what i s good and serves his purposes. But what are his purposes and what i s his conception of the good? Hobbes does not try to answer a l l of these questions with an account of self-maintenance. In order to see that he does not, we can turn to a comparison of the Hobbesian conatus with the s t r i k i n g l y s i m i l a r theory of Spinoza. In the t h i r d book of his Ethics Spinoza asserts the following: Everything, i n so far as i t i s i n i t s e l f , endeavours to persist i n i t s own being. (Prop. VI) He adds immediately that "the endeavour, wherewith everything endeavours to persist i n i t s own being, i s nothing else but the actual essence of the thing i n question." (Prop. VII) Both of these propositions f i t quite well with Hobbes' understanding of bodies as characterized by thei r conatus, and moreover, as persevering through the continuation of t h i s form of motion. Going further however, Spinoza says that the endeavour to pe r s i s t , "when referred solely to the mind, i s cal l e d WILL, and when referred to the mind and the body i n conjunction i t i s c a l l e d APPETITE." (Prop. IX,note) Desiring i s thought by Spinoza to be the conscious r e a l i z a t i o n of appetite and - 1 3 0 -thus i t would seem to follow that man i s i n essence a desiring creature; again a perfectly good Hobbesian doctrine. However, that i s where the s i m i l a r i t y ends, for i n explaining the relationship between opinions and desires Spinoza reverses the order that Hobbes gives them: It i s thus plain from what has been sai d , that i n no case do we s t r i v e f o r , wish for, long f o r , or desire anything, because we deem i t to be good, but on the other hand we deem a thing to be good, because we s t r i v e for i t , wish for i t , long for i t , or desire i t . (Ibid) Spinoza appears to be saying that s t r i v i n g f o r , seeking, or desiring something, are inseparable from the mechanics of bodily appetite. We take i t that he would be equally opposed to seeing these as either caused by some bodily states or causing the bodily states i n their turn. The mental aspect, w i l l , and the physical aspect, appetite, are presumably separable only for the sake of a thought experiment. Now, since Hobbes believes that conceptions are reducible to the motion of pa r t i c l e s i n the brain., and that appetite i s a systemic matter centring on the heart, he i s not distinguishing between w i l l and appetite i n a dualist way. Indeed, i n so far as w i l l i s merely the l a s t appetite before action, he seems to deny the sense of the d i s t i n c t i o n at a l l . But that denial i s misleading. Hobbes gives conceptions a causal role i n the determination of action; the claim being that opinions govern the w i l l , and thus that opinions govern appetites: "consequently, our w i l l s follow our opinions, as our actions follow our w i l l s . . . t h e world i s governed by opinion." (E.L., 63) In the Anti-White manuscript Hobbes commented that, "in God the w i l l does not follow the reason, as i n men: that - 1 3 1 -men w i l l something because the reason keeps saying that [this thing] i s good." (T.W., 393) Reason might select on the basis of appetite's stated c r i t e r i a , but on occasion i t may pronounce a course that requires habituation contrary to existing taste. Spinoza appears to treat w i l l and appetite i n a way more akin to the way i n which Hobbes treats God's w i l l ; that i s , as coextensive with opinion. Unlike Spinoza then, Hobbes does not allow self-maintenance to swallow the role of opinions about the desirable. If these opinions are the element we seek i n order to explain particular human actions, then a considered view about the predominant opinions governing actions w i l l be essential knowledge for a Hobbesian statesman. But why a l l opinions about the desirable or worthwhile should be generated from concerns with bodily self-preservation i s not clear. I f the autonomic, heart based system i s the self-maintaining mechanism i n Hobbesian sentients, that argues nothing of interest about human motivation. There may be real point i n expecting most men to adopt strategies that are not i n flagrant opposition to preservation, but that expectation for Hobbes i s based on knowledge of what most people cherish most, and i s not derived from the story he t e l l s about sensation. In order to make t h i s contrast between self-maintenance and opinion-governed-actions that affect preservation l e t us consider the Hobbesian position on suicide. 4:5 Natural Necessity and Suicide There i s a passage i n De Cive which appears to fuse the urge to - 1 3 2 -self-maintenance and the motive of self-preservation: For every man i s desirous of what i s good for him, and shuns what i s e v i l , but c h i e f l y the chiefest of natural e v i l s , which i s death; and t h i s he doth by a certain impulsion of nature, no less than that whereby a stone moves downward. (E.W.II,8) Hobbes i s usually taken to be saying that avoidance of death i s as omnipresent a motive as gravity i s a force. I f that were genuinely his position, then i n company with his claim that, "of two e v i l s i t i s impossible not to choose the l e a s t " , ( i b i d . , 26) we would have enough material to v a l i d l y i n f e r on his behalf that i t i s impossible to ever choose death before dishonour. This conclusion seems inevitable i f death i s everywhere and always the worst eventuality. I take i t that t h i s conclusion suggests one of two things: either Hobbes has constructed a theory which f a i l s to account for a portion of human motivation, or the interpretation assumed above i s fault y . The l a t t e r i s the case. Without denying for a moment that death i s "the t e r r i b l e enemy of nature... from whom we expect both the loss of a l l power, and also the greatest of bodily pains i n the lo s i n g " , (E.L., 71) i t i s patent that some deaths are worse than others. In p a r t i c u l a r , death after torture seems worse than a painless death without i t . Hobbes, l i k e any sane person, was well aware of t h i s and said as much i n De  Homine: [T]he greatest of goods for each i s his own preservation. For nature i s so arranged that a l l desire good for themselves. Insofar as i t i s within t h e i r capacities, i t i s necessary to desire l i f e , health, and further, insofar as i t can be done, security of future time. On the other hand, though death i s the greatest of a l l e v i l s (especially when accompanied by t o r t u r e ) , the pains of l i f e can be so great that, unless the i r quick end i s foreseen, they - 1 3 3 -may lead men to number death among the goods. (De.H., 48-49) There i s every reason to believe that De - Homine i s Hobbes1 most considered work on psychology and ethics. So we are faced with the question of whether i t s pronouncements on death are, or are not, consistent with the passage from De Cive with which t h i s section began. I hold that the two are perfectly consistent and hence that self-preservation i s i n no sense a necessary motive. To begin with, the De Cive passage i s open to at least two renderings. F i r s t l y , there i s the one I have considered already where death i s the worst of a l l possible e v i l s and i t s avoidance i s paramount. On t h i s interpretation there can be no rat i o n a l seeking of death, even where one death i s preferable to another. Secondly, and rather obviously, we could take Hobbes to be saying that men shun what they take to be e v i l , and that death i s almost always seen as an e v i l . On the f i r s t reading avoidance of death has the status of a natural necessity, whereas on the second avoidance of e v i l has that status. Furthermore, t h i s second reading allows us to entertain the p o s s i b i l i t y that death, while perhaps never chosen for i t s own sake, i s capable of being chosen. Saying that i t may rank among the goods i s to say no more than that i t may be the lesser of two e v i l s . Consequently, i f we accept the second reading and combine i t with the point about the necessity of choosing the lesser e v i l , we avoid the conclusion that death i s necessarily never choiceworthy. That we should accept the second reading i s argued for by the fact that Hobbes begins the passage from De Homine with precisely the same remarks about the arrangements of nature that he - 1 3 4 -captured i n the a l l u s i o n to gravity found i n the De Cive passage. Thus he_ obviously wants to allow a sense of natural necessity (attaching to the choice of lesser e v i l s ) that does not c o n f l i c t with death sometimes being r a t i o n a l l y sought. Further evidence for our position derives from the statement that what i s good, "follows from the nature of circumstances", (ibid.,47) Admittedly the circumstances are not normal, but i n Hobbes1 England torture was a feature of the j u d i c i a l system, despite i t s dubious l e g a l i t y . Of course Hobbes' l i f e gives us further evidence of his views about death and suffering. Anthony a Wood, in his Athenae  Oxonienses, reports the following story about Hobbes: Being t o l d that a cure for the bladder ulcer was impossible, Hobbes replied "I s h a l l be glad then to find a hole to creep out of the world at", seeming then to be more a f r a i d of the pains he thought he would endure before he died, than of death.5 This anecdote relates to the end of Hobbes' l i f e , but much e a r l i e r , when he was i n Paris, he was treated by Guy Patin for kidney stones. Patin reports that Hobbes said he would prefer to die than go through another bout of the pain involved i n passing stones. 6 But having laboured to support a position that nobody would find exceptionable with respect to any philosopher except Hobbes, I am faced with a famous remark by Hobbes which threatens to undo my case. In his Dialogue Between a Philosopher and a Student of the Common Law, Hobbes says that nobody k i l l s himself voluntarily unless his mind i s unhinged (he i s not compos mentis): I conceive not how any Man can bear Animum felleum, or so much Malice towards himself, as to hurt himself v o l u n t a r i l y , much less k i l l himself; for naturally and necessarily the Intention of every Man aimeth at somewhat, which i s good to himself, and tendeth to his - 1 8 5 -preservation: And therefore, methinks, i f he k i l l himself, i t i s to be presumed that he i s not compos  mentis, but by some inward Torment or Apprehension of somewhat worse than Death, Distracted. (D., 116-117) The problem i s t h i s : i f men are c o n s t i t u t i o n a l l y unable to inten t i o n a l l y hurt themselves, leave aside k i l l themselves, then how could they ever take t h e i r own l i v e s to avoid a painful alternative, or throw their l i v e s away over t r i f l e s ? The only answer, on one reading of the above passage, would be that they are temporarily insane. But this passage argues nothing of the kind. As i t happens the case of the suicide comes into prominence because Hobbes i s considering the general question of felonious intent, and the suicide i s c l a s s i f i e d as felo de se. The Philosopher i n the Dialogue signals Hobbes' interest when he says that, "[n]or i s i t the manner of punishment that distinguisheth the nature of one Crime from another; but the mind of the Offender and the Mischief he intendeth, considered together with the Circumstances of Person, Time, and Place." (D., 112) In the cases considered prior to suicide: murder, manslaughter and accidental k i l l i n g , the inquiry was into the malice evident i n the mind of the accused. In contrast with accidental k i l l i n g , but i n concert with murder and manslaughter, suicide i s inten t i o n a l ; yet i n l i g h t of his firm conviction that no man can w i l l f u l l y embrace what he takes to be the worse of two e v i l s , Hobbes i s r e a l l y forced to say that the motivation of the suicide cannot p a r a l l e l that of the murderer toward his victim. Thus, since no man can maliciously destroy himself, no one i n his ri g h t mind could suicide i f suicide were genuinely a felony. Subsequently, Hobbes suggests that the suicide - 1 3 6 -be treated as not compos mentis and thus not a candidate for the status of felon. But once th i s much i s i n the open i t i s obvious that the suicide i n question (one who apparently intends harm to himself) shares l i t t l e i n common with the person who concludes that i n the circumstances death i s a good. Presumably "hurt" means wanton damage and not simply causing pain: someone who cuts o f f a gangrenous thumb to save his arm causes pain but does no hurt i n t h i s sense. Equally, someone who takes his own l i f e to avoid a crueler death i s not thought of as hurting himself i n Hobbes1 sense. His intention to save himself from suffering, i s precisely the reverse of the intention Hobbes assumes when he looks at the l e g a l c l a s s i f i c a t i o n of the felo de se. A l l that the passage from the Dialogue shows i s that Hobbes steadfastly refuses to believe that men can desire what they perceive to be bad for them. This of course i s what I have been arguing, and thus I conclude that the section on suicide taken from the Dialogue i s of no use to those who would wish to argue that Hobbes thought self-preservation an unshakable motive i n men. So, by way of conclusion to t h i s section, the mechanism within creatures that works for t h e i r self-maintenance does not surface i n men as the motive to self-preservation. P l a i n l y enough, when Hobbes talks about the arrangement of nature and draws an analogy with gravity he intends us to see the s t r i v i n g for self-preservation as powerfully effective i n human behaviour; and indeed i t i s . However, to confuse the u t t e r l y common with the unavoidable seriously d i s t o r t s Hobbes1 theory. Not only does suicide become necessarily - 1 3 7 -i r r a t i o n a l (a f a i r l y minor issue), but we lose our a b i l i t y to grasp the motivations of those Hobbes describes as being more concerned about honour and reputation than about l i f e i t s e l f . Consider for example a case that Hobbes mentions just prior to his treatment of suicide: If two meeting i n the Street chance to s t r i v e who s h a l l go nearest to the Wall, and thereupon Fighting, one of them k i l l s the other, I believe v e r i l y he that f i r s t drew his Sword did i t of Malice forethought, though not long forethought.... (D., 114) Hobbes doubts that "felon" i s the right descriptive term for one who "for a word, or a t r i f l e s h a l l draw his sword", (ibid) but that i s beside the point. The example simply serves to reinforce the fact that Hobbes was confronted by a society that contained a l o t of violence which was not brought about by struggles over physical s u r v i v a l . Walking to the road side of the sidewalk hardly constitutes grave r i s k to l i f e , whereas duelling c l e a r l y does. To the question of what lay behind the propensity to duel we must now turn. 4.6 The Preservation of the Self To argue, as I have, that Hobbesian individuals are not i n t r i n s i c a l l y and inevitably self-preserving i s one thing. To argue that they are moved by reasons other than those based i n the i r own conceptions of good and e v i l i s another. I assert only that Hobbes allowed for the fact that a few individuals would embrace physical destruction i n preference either to a more horrible death, or to dishonour. I am therefore committed to the view that death i s not - 1 3 8 -uniformly shunned. Nothing asserted so far implies that Hobbes allowed for a l t r u i s t i c reasons for action. I f altruism involves acting on someone else's conception of the good, then Hobbes does not recognise i t as a p o s s i b i l i t y . The motivation of those who seek a less gruesome end, or who prefer death to dishonour, i s openly s e l f - r e l a t e d . But the two cases are importantly di f f e r e n t . To begin with, sui c i d i n g to avoid the torturer's grasp i s simply prudent. To carry out the act would require courage c e r t a i n l y , but perhaps fear of bodily dismemberment might, depending on available means, be enough to render only a l i t t l e courage necessary. Refusing unjust means required for preservation, or r i s k i n g l i f e over a matter of honour i s not prudent i n any obvious sense; quite the reverse. Men who adventure t h e i r l i v e s over what Hobbes thinks of as t r i f l e s may not see the matter as t r i f l i n g , but that hardly effects the r i s k y , uncertain, dangerous and imprudent nature of t h e i r course. Thus as prudence requires taking the course with least r i s k of death then these individuals are, i f r a t i o n a l , u t i l i z i n g a different calculus to reach the i r decisions. Consider the case of the person who i s above being "beholden for the contentment of his l i f e , to fraud, or breach of promise." (E.W. 111,136) The principled avoidance of dishonesty and s t r i c t adherence to one's word are hardly l i k e l y to be expedient i n the chase for simple material advantage. Hence the character of the in d i v i d u a l with these q u a l i t i e s operative w i l l not at a l l be l i k e those Hobbes describes as seeking "present benefit" or " p r o f i t " . (E.W.11,33 & 45) But nor need he be thought of as practising honesty because of some commitment that i s imposed from outside - 1 3 9 -himself. I f his commitment to j u s t i c e i s a moral one, i t i s moral without being s o c i a l l y derived. In other words his action need not be guided by the b e l i e f that he ought to bring about the good of others for their sakes, or for the improvement of things i n general. Why he acts as he does i s presumably to be understood i n l i g h t of who he takes himself to be, and what that image of himself requires for i t s development and care. There i s nothing to stop such an individual from trying to r e a l i z e the good of others; being active i n the interests of others i s merely one of the ways i n which a person might be principled. Furthermore, following through with action might involve s a c r i f i c e s or even s e l f - s a c r i f i c e . The point to grasp i s that the guidance i s internal and by reference to an ideal of behaviour which renders some reasons for action unavailable. There i s some reason for keeping the character of the just man (Minogue's paragon) separate from the other examples that Hobbes uses when he wants to ty p i f y a principled imprudence. When he mentions the son who would "rather die than l i v e infamous and hated of a l l the world" (E.W. I I , 83), he does not elaborate on the nature of the son's reasoning other than to say that having an infamous reputation s t r i k e s most as worse than death. He says neither that for a son to execute his father would be impossible, nor unbearable; rather he claims that no one would act i n th i s way because of the dishonour involved. There i s nothing at a l l high-minded about t h i s , and i t i s not clear that the son, as compared with the just man, i s polishing a model of excellence. S i m i l a r l y , those who "would rather lose their lives...than suffer slander" ( i b i d . , 38) put a higher price on reputation than physical safety. Honour, as w i l l be argued .-140-i n the following chapter, i s a powerful motive force that Hobbes does not ignore. Indeed i t would be extraordinary i f he did not allow for actions disdai n f u l of death, especially given his role as mentor to the young Cavendishes and the advice he gave about young men being too easily led to chance thei r l i v e s over minute points of honour. 7 What the just man and those who believe dishonour to be worse than death have i n common i s a degree of esteem for the i r self-image that goes beyond thei r preservatory i n s t i n c t s . The s e l f they aim to preserve through action i s a persona rather than a body I Like Cassio, they account reputation everything. They are akin to those "generous" individuals whose q u a l i t i e s are "too rarely found to be presumed on, especially i n the pursuers of wealth, command, or sensual pleasure; which are the greatest part of mankind." (E.WI I I I , 128-9) In distinguishing them from those preoccupied with wealth and command Hobbes i s , thereby, setting them apart from the general class of those whose conception of honour would lead them to duel over matters of deference and innuendo. Thus I am not treating the whole class of those whose self-image i s paramount as homogeneous. It contains the best and the worst of the characters Hobbes considers: those who are just men and those whose pride i s the very thing which makes the state essential. 4.7 Preservation and - Reason When Hobbes says, as he often does, that "of the voluntary acts of every man, the object i s some good to himself", (E.W..111, 120) - 1 4 1 -he has not thereby l i m i t e d an agent's conception of the good to the preservation of l i f e . The establishment of t h i s has been the burden of the present chapter. Nonetheless i t i s clear that Hobbes intended to give openly prudential reasons for observing s o c i a l duties; recognizing that while few would be just most could, with encouragement, act j u s t l y . For the l a t t e r the laws of nature are offered as guidelines. I t i s an open question as to whether Hobbes thought that adherence to the guidelines would a l t e r character. On t h i s matter Hobbes, l i k e Elizabeth 1, seems in d i f f e r e n t to opening windows into men's minds. So the main purpose of the laws of nature i s to bring about s o c i a l l y cohesive behaviour that i s appreciated to be prudentially based: [T]he law • of - nature, that I may define i t , i s the dictate of ri g h t reason, conversant about those things which are either to be done or omitted for the constant preservation of l i f e and members, as much as i n us l i e s . (E.W.11,16) As maxims for the guidance of action the laws of nature "concerning those actions of h i s , which may either redound to the damage or benefit of his neighbours", come with the proviso that the consequences of these actions are important because of the impact they have on the agent's "own conservation". (Ibid., I6n) I f the laws of nature are the r a t i o n a l response to the dangers of the state of nature, and i f most men feel themselves to be vulnerable, then reason, f i r e d by passion, has provided a way out of the dilemma. Further, i f men can adhere to the maxims they are prepared to endorse as the best answer, then peace i s a r e a l p o s s i b i l i t y for the individuals Hobbes describes. If adherence i s impossible, as Gauthier has argued, then there i s no way out. My - 1 4 2 -argument has sought to show that since Hobbesian individuals are not i n t r i n s i c a l l y maximizers of s e l f i s h advantage i n the short term, they might well be capable of guiding t h e i r actions i n terms of goals only realized by adherence to a course of long term or overall i n t e r e s t . This does not a l t e r the cast of t h e i r reasoning; i t i s s t i l l openly and unashamedly prudential. The point i s after a l l to encourage c i v i l i t y , not moral excellence. But why i s c i v i l i t y a problem? One might expect that since Hobbes writes from within a c i v i l context, and since his u t i l i z a t i o n of the state of nature i s as a threat, that he simply took c i v i l i t y for granted. He did not. I f the laws of nature are looked at not as external dictates, but rather as internalized modes of operation, then while c i v i l l i f e might i n some respects presuppose that some of them are operative i n character i t s t i l l makes excellent sense to recommend them as v i r t u e s . C i v i l i t y would be a problem i f most of the virtues were not being exercised. Crawford Macpherson has offered an account of why Hobbes was preoccupied with c i v i l i t y , and i n doing so invoked the relevance of Hobbes' so c i a l context. Macpherson's attention to the society within which Hobbes l i v e d proved penetrating since he succeeded i n demonstrating that there were forces affecting the tone of interaction over the society as a whole. However, I believe that Macpherson missed the most c r u c i a l dimension of s o c i a l discord, and the very one that most exercised Hobbes. An investigation of this dimension occupies us i n the following chapter, but summarily, Macpherson took Hobbes' concern with c i v i l i t y to be a response to the centrifugal forces of a newly emerging c a p i t a l i s t economy, whereas I see i t as a response to an aristocracy torn over competing conceptions of honour. =143-CHAPTER V  HISTORY AND INTERPRETATION I I - 1 4 4 -Introduction In the f i r s t chapter i t was asserted that Quentin Skinner's work had served to reinstate Hobbes i n two of the contexts within which he functioned as a thinker. The f i r s t was the s t r i c t l y p o l i t i c a l context referred to as the Engagement Controversy. The second was the c i r c l e of philosophers formed loosely around Mersenne i n Paris. I t was then suggested that despite the presence of much new information, Skinner chose to accept the characterization of Hobbes' theory of human nature that was current i n England during the l a s t h a l f of the seventeenth century. My argument began from the observation that Skinner's research had provided at least the clue to a new interpretation of Hobbes; one based on the surmise that his French d i s c i p l e s may have been responding to a different view of his work than the one that was the object of so much c r i t i c i s m i n England. In o u tlining Hobbes' account of character and i t s connections with his physical theory I have stayed close to the texts 1 In particular I have argued for the importance of De Homine's treatment of human dispositions and manners. In t h i s chapter I propose to come at the question of dispositions and manners i n a different way; namely by the introduction of a t h i r d context for Hobbes. So, alongside the p o l i t i c a l events of 1649-1651 and the i n t e l l e c t u a l c i r c l e around Mersenne, i s placed a debate: the debate about the nature of n o b i l i t y , honour, value, and worth. This debate was central to what Mervyn James has call e d the honour culture. My proposal i s that an appreciation of what was at stake i n t h i s - 1 4 5 -primarily a r i s t o c r a t i c debate i s c r u c i a l for understanding the import of Hobbes1 remarks about human nature and the nature of human inter a c t i o n . Hobbes1 l i f e long connection with the Cavendish family i s well known; but what i s less well known are his views on the nature of n o b i l i t y and i t s s o c i a l r o l e . When considered as a contributor to t h i s debate Hobbes looks less l i k e a man making broad generalizations about human nature, and rather more l i k e someone who was mounting a c r i t i q u e of the manners common among the Jacobean and Caroline aristocracy. As has been claimed, Hobbes treated the dispositions of c i t i z e n s as the basic units i n his p o l i t i c a l science; consequently his c r i t i q u e of the aristocracy takes the form of an analysis of the dispositions most prevalent among i t s members. I f the suggestions about Hobbes1 milieu are correct, i t would seem that certain central features of C.B. Macpherson's well known interpretation must be mistaken. Macpherson holds that Hobbes presented models of man and interpersonal behaviour that were r i c h i n d e t a i l absorbed from the bourgeois society within which he l i v e d . Moreover, Hobbes unwittingly presented these s o c i a l l y derived details as i f they were timeless truths about men, universal aspects of the human condition. Macpherson seeks to enlighten us about Hobbes by demonstrating the h i s t o r i c a l s p e c i f i c i t y of his models. There are at least three things wrong with t h i s stance. F i r s t l y , I argue that Hobbes' s o c i a l d e t a i l i s derived from his observations of a predominantly a r i s t o c r a t i c milieu. Secondly, that Hobbes was f u l l y conscious of the difference between h i s t o r i c a l l y s p e c i f i c and universal claims about human nature, and that he was not g u i l t y of conflation here. F i n a l l y , that what Hobbes says about -446-the h i s t o r i c a l l y s p e c i f i c i s intended as c r i t i c i s m , and not put forward as a merely gloomy objective account of human behaviour i n the abstract. The significance of saying that Hobbes put forward c r i t i c i s m s i s simply t h i s : c r i t i c i s m s are intended to educate, and Hobbes' p r i n c i p a l aim was to educate i n the direction of c i v i l i t y . In Collingwood's sense Hobbes was endeavouring to c i v i l i z e the a r i s t o c r a c y . 1 The structure of t h i s chapter i s as follows: ( i ) a b r i e f account of the 'Macpherson thesis; ( i i ) a reminder of what Keith Thomas urged against Macpherson and a statement of what my position owes to both; ( i i i ) a consideration of Hobbes' claims about human nature i n l i g h t of the universal/particular d i s t i n c t i o n ; (iv) a discussion of the state of nature; (v) an analysis of Hobbes on honour, value, and worth; (vi) a look at the character of Hobbes' gallant or magnanimous man - his positive account of n o b i l i t y . 5.2 The-MacphersonThesis In one of the most i n f l u e n t i a l interpretations of Hobbes, CB. Macpherson claims to have discerned an embedded model i n the 2 Hobbesian discussion of "power, honour, and value." This model i s , so Macpherson says, one that Hobbes never e x p l i c i t l y formulated, unlike his deliberate models of man and man's natural condition. 3 The embedded model i s composed of s o c i a l d e t a i l s taken "from the - 1 4 7 -behaviour of men towards each other i n a s p e c i f i c kind of s o c i e t y " . 4 Presumably, i n claiming that t h i s model, or mass of s o c i a l d e t a i l , was not a deliberate construction, Macpherson intends us to believe that Hobbes was i n some sense unaware that he was d e t a i l i n g the mores of "a s p e c i f i c kind of society." This surmise i s made more credible by Macpherson's claim that Hobbes was not reporting the surface facts of s o c i a l l i f e , but trying to get "at the 'natural' p r o c l i v i t i e s of men by looking just below the surface of contemporary society." In attempting to present an abstract account Hobbes l o s t sight of the h i s t o r i c a l l y s p e c i f i c nature of his material. What i s the significance of the embedded model? Macpherson believes that the e x p l i c i t models of man and the natural condition are created from elements found i n the embedded model. Consequently, when an adjustment i s made for Hobbes' f a i l u r e to distinguish between the universal and the h i s t o r i c a l l y p a r t i c u l a r , we can appreciate his work as a " b r i l l i a n t dissection of men's behaviour in contemporary s o c i e t y . " 5 So, i f the embedded model does consist of s o c i a l d e t a i l derived from a particular s o c i a l milieu, and i f t h i s d e t a i l serves as the substance for both of Hobbes' most important models, then Macpherson i s warranted i n asserting that Hobbes i s best understood by reference to the society his work so accurately represents. The s o c i a l milieu referred to i s a possessive market society, or capitalism i n i t s nascent form. Macpherson's case rests on two pieces of evidence. F i r s t l y there i s the discussion of honour and power which i s taken to display the s o c i a l d e t a i l of English capitalism. Secondly there i s - 1 4 8 ^ De Cive, and i n particular the Preface and f i r s t chapter of that book. From th i s book Macpherson derives Hobbes1 models of man (the psychological p o r t r a i t ) and the state of nature (human int e r a c t i o n ) . The idea that Hobbes' propositions about men and t h e i r interaction can be "reduced to an h i s t o r i c a l measure"6 i s very much the idea that Hobbes has given us an anatomy of bourgeois man under the mistaken b e l i e f that he i s anatomizing man as such. But of course the force of Macpherson's argument depends on the p l a u s i b i l i t y of his i n i t i a l interpretation, and thus to convince us that Hobbes' account is_ predicated on bourgeois man he must demonstrate that power, honour, and value are best explained as bourgeois notions. The argument of sections 5.4 - 5.7, i f convincing, w i l l show that Macpherson's i n i t i a l interpretation i s flawed. However, I am not entering into a point by point refutation of Macpherson. To do so would leave us with a welter of small points, whereas , aim to give the broader l i n e s of a unified interpretation. Subsequently Macpherson's thesis i s mentioned for two major reasons. F i r s t l y because there are s i m i l a r i t i e s between his approach and my own, and debts to be acknowledged. Secondly because there i s a serious point of divergence between our positions; one so stark that i t allows a clear formulation of my positive thesis by a comparison with Macpherson's. Macpherson believes that we are i n a better position to grasp the significance of Hobbes' theory than he himself was. We can do t h i s because we are more aware of the forces that shaped his society than he. Further, Hobbes made general claims about human nature -149-which he hoped would gain acceptance by " a l l honest contemporary observers", 7 and these claims were at best general assumptions conditioned by his society. Hobbes' treatment of power, honour and value i s not an unwitting.dissection of behaviour within a possessive market; i t i s part of a f u l l y conscious attempt to analyse and c r i t i c i z e the dominant concerns of one s o c i a l class: the aristocracy. Any propensity we might feel to interpret his words i n l i g h t of modern theories should be held i n check pending consideration of his own intentions. I f we are ignorant of the context within which Hobbes discusses a concept l i k e honour we are unlikely to appreciate the significance of his remarks. Hobbes' concern i s seldom with society broadly conceived, although his Behemoth counts as an exception here. In general, and certainly when his object i s honour and value, his attention i s fixed on one part of English society. Whether Hobbes had any conception of what moves the society i n general i s irrelevant to just how well he understood the problems inherent in the smaller group. The view argued for here i s that Hobbes did not make universal claims about the character of members of his society, but that his comments were, and were intended to be, s p e c i f i c . So, far from believing that Hobbes informs us obliquely about the manners of a possessive market society, I hold that he deliberately addresses us on the question of a r i s t o c r a t i c behaviour. - 1 5 0 -5.3- Keith Thomas Keith Thomas' "The Social Origins of Hobbes's P o l i t i c a l Thought" (1965) sets out to "identify some of the actual elements i n seventeenth century society from which Hobbes derived his assumptions and to which his recommendations were l i k e l y to have appealed." Thomas believes that Macpherson has misidentified these elements, and amasses a staggering amount of evidence to show that i f there was a s o c i a l imprint on Hobbes' conception of men and t h e i r interaction i t was one "reminiscent of feudal society, or at least of one i n which status i s a l l important."'1"0 An express aim of Thomas' paper was to discourage future writers from "automatically characterizing Hobbes's thought as bourgeois and thereby over-simplifying what i s a highly complex p o s i t i o n . 1 , 1 1 When making out his case for t h i s complexity Thomas argues for two important points. The f i r s t concerns the character t r a i t s one finds commonly alluded to by Hobbes: "these men who take i n s u l t s so heinously, who resent obligations to t h e i r equals (E.W.Ill, 87), and who even care for th e i r children out of hope to receive posthumous honour from them, (E.W.II, 123) are not obviously...the denizens of 12 a commercial world." The second arises from Thomas' remark that Hobbes "had a whole theory of h i s t o r i c a l change, according to which e t h i c a l codes change to r e f l e c t the changing basis of power i n society.""'"'5 Hobbes' i n s i g h t , according to Thomas, was into the tensions created within the aristocracy by c o n f l i c t i n g notions of n o b i l i t y ; moreover he cleaved to the "old Renaissance principle that v i r t u e rather than b i r t h constituted true n o b i l i t y " , 1 ^ and -151-opposed the claim that n o b i l i t y rested either i n lineage or " v i r t u e military".''' 5 Both of Thomas' points are taken up and elaborated i n t h i s chapter. The f i r s t provides the occasion to discuss Hobbes1 state of nature. It w i l l be suggested that the state of nature or the natural condition i s constructed by Hobbes as a caricature of the a n t i - s o c i a l exchanges i n t r i n s i c to the old, m i l i t a r i l y based, honour culture. His lesson being that no stable society i s possible where t h i s ethic i s predominant. The second allows us to investigate the context of Hobbes' discussion of honour and value. Following Thomas I hold that Hobbes i s making a point i n an ongoing debate, and i n the same s p i r i t as was Montaigne when he gave the following advice to Princes who might have been too impressed by the archaic models of m i l i t a r y virtue: We see merchants, v i l l a g e j u s t i c e s , and artisans keeping up with the n o b i l i t y i n valour and mi l i t a r y knowledge. They do honourably i n both public and private combats; they f i g h t , they defend c i t i e s i n our wars. A prince's d i s t i n c t i o n i s smothered among t h i s crowd. Let him shine with humanity, truthfulness, l o y a l t y , moderation, and especially j u s t i c e , marks that are rare, unknown, and banished. It i s only by the w i l l of the people that he can do his job, and no other q u a l i t i e s can f l a t t e r t h e i r w i l l as much as these, which are much more useful to them than others. Nothing i s so popular as goodness (Cicero).16 Thomas does not stop at the claim that Hobbes contributed to a contemporary debate about the nature of honour, he goes on to suggest that we can see i n Hobbes a preferred model of nobility."'' 7 In 2.5 I considered some t r a i t s of Hobbes' "gallant", "noble", or just man, and his features are merely part of Hobbes' - 1 5 2 -more Inclusive p r o t r a i t of the gallant i n d i v i d u a l . We must turn to t h i s individual again, because the characteristics of pride and glorying that Hobbes attributes to him raise interesting questions about the t e n a b i l i t y of my view of Hobbes. This i s the subject matter of 5.7. So, Macpherson's thesis, with i t s insistence on the h i s t o r i c a l dimension to Hobbes' model of man and the state of nature, and Thomas' learned reb u t t a l , have both deeply influenced the direction taken i n t h i s f i n a l chapter. Like them I believe that reference to the context of Hobbes' theorizing helps i n understanding the theory i t s e l f ; but unlike Macpherson I do not hold that the power of Hobbes' insights awaited a twentieth century audience. I f anything, Hobbes may have been speaking more d i r e c t l y to a generation that was almost past when he wrote. I f Lawrence Stone i s correct, the forces which were i n the process of p u l l i n g the Caroline aristocracy apart - 1 8 were only partly perceived by Hobbes. However, his lack of insight into these forces does not i n any sense suggest that he conveyed them at a deeper l e v e l , a l e v e l that was not obvious to him. That aspect of Macpherson's view i s e n t i r e l y rejected. 5.4. Human Nature In 4.1 I distinguished four things that might a l l rank as aspects of Hobbes' theorizing about psychology. The f i r s t was what Hobbes called "man's nature" (E.L., 2) or simply human nature. The second was physiological psychology (the mechanics of our sensory and cognitive c a p a c i t i e s ) ; the t h i r d descriptive psychology - 1 5 3 -(accounts of dreaming, remembering e t c . ) ; and the fourth his theory of character. The t h i r d of these i s of no relevance to our project, and the second and fourth have played t h e i r parts i n chapters two, three and four. The f i r s t w i l l occupy us now. It was Hobbes1 interest i n c i v i l order which motivated his inquiry into human nature, and his conclusions about what form that order must take were supported by the premises which detailed his views on human nature. However, the argument to date has been that Hobbes' assumptions about human nature are found i n what he says regarding character or dispositions and not i n what he says at the abstract l e v e l about human nature as such. What Hobbes says about human nature i n general i s deliberately circumscribed; both by the desire to be ut t e r l y uncontentious and by the desire to avoid the p i t f a l l he thought he discerned i n c l a s s i c a l p o l i t i c a l philosophy: the assumption that aptitude for c i v i l (as d i s t i n c t from mere so c i a l ) l i f e was i n t r i n s i c to human nature. These two desires are connected, since i n aiming to establish a p o l i t i c a l theory on an uncontentious basis Hobbes was thereby rejecting any strategy which rested on one or more contentious theses. A r i s t o t l e ' s p o l i t i c s i s rejected for precisely t h i s reason. (E.L.,88) Our nature as human beings, consistent with our status as material e n t i t i e s , i s given i n terms of powers or capacities. In the precedent chapters hath been set forth the whole nature of man, consisting i n the powers natural of his body and mind, and may a l l be comprehended i n these four: strength of body, experience, reason, and passion. (E.!_.,70) - 1 5 4 -This i s the bare account of human nature i n terms of the f a c u l t i e s which compose i t . In i t s e l f t h i s account would hardly do to found a p o l i t i c a l theory, and i n De Cive Hobbes indicates how i t must be enriched to accomplish that task: The fa c u l t i e s of human nature may be reduced unto four kinds; bodily strength, experience, reason, passion. Taking the beginning of t h i s following doctrine from these, we w i l l declare, in the f i r s t place, what manner of i n c l i n a t i o n s men who are endued with these fac u l t i e s bear towards each other, and whether, and by what faculty they are born apt for society, and to preserve themselves against mutual violence (E.W. I I , 1-2). Passion i s Hobbes1 primary concern, and his attention to the forms of human emotion i s designed to show i n general which i n c l i n a t i o n s are, and which are not, conducive to c i v i l amity. The treatment of passions as in c l i n a t i o n s i s fundamental to Hobbes' account of human character. I have considered the matter i n chapter four and w i l l return to i t at 5.7. But why does Hobbes begin his major p o l i t i c a l t r e a t i s e (De Cive) with a sustained attempt to show that none of the fa c u l t i e s of human nature - as described - make man f i t for society? I believe that i t i s because Hobbes wants to reverse, rather that just neutralize, the assumptions of c l a s s i c a l p o l i t i c a l theory. Immediately after mention of the facult i e s constituting human nature Hobbes proposes to s e t t l e "whether, and by what faculty they [ i . e . , men] are born apt for society," ( i b i d ) . This endeavour has a s p e c i f i c aim: to demolish the assumption that human beings are p o l i t i c a l animals. Hobbes' attack i s important less for what i t t e l l s us about the c l a s s i c a l position than what we learn about - 1 5 5 -Hobbes' concern with c i v i l association and i t s necessary conditions. Men, we are t o l d , are discerned to be "desirous of congress and mutual correspondence" ( i b i d . , 2n); so i t i s c r u c i a l not to confuse our s o c i a l nature, captured i n the remark that "men (even nature compelling) desire to come together" ( i b i d . ) , with our c i v i l nature. The former i s , as Hobbes states, as natural to us as anything could be, whereas the l a t t e r i s not. Precisely the same point i s made in Hobbes' comparison of human beings with the ants and bees; creatures whose "natural i n c l i n a t i o n " (ibid.,66) i s s u f f i c i e n t to create peace and well-being within the i r communities. Ants and bees are equipped by God, via nature, with i n c l i n a t i o n s that put communal aims above personal projects; but i t i s what they lack (thoughts of pre-eminence, private judgements about right and wrong etc.) that allows t h e i r s o c i a l i n c l i n a t i o n s to be coordinated without f r i c t i o n . So, whatever one may say about s o c i a l impulses, something above and beyond natural concord must be created i n order to. reach the c i v i l form of l i f e . Hobbes makes the same case i n a somewhat different way; t h i s time i n terms of friendship, love, and sociableness. His point i s that while men have deep personal attachments to some others, t h i s form of love cannot be the basis of c i v i l society. He c l e a r l y wants to combat the view that humans are p o l i t i c a l animals who "come together, and delight i n each other's company" ( i b i d . , 3) naturally, as the outcome of some t r a i t common to a l l . Hobbes i s legitimately able to deny t h i s l a t t e r view without thereby endorsing the claim that nobody loves anybody but himself. In Be Cive, the source I am now relying on, Hobbes explains the target thesis - the view above -- 1 5 6 -i n terms of a form of i n d i f f e r e n t love for a l l . I f society were based on the love of man, then everyone would love everyone. That form of indifferent love for members of our species does not e x i s t , and Hobbes says that i t does not e x i s t . In those places where he deals with love, and especially i n The Elements of Law, he i s anxious to distinguish "the love men bear to one another, or pleasure they take i n one another's company; and by which men are said to be sociable by nature", (E.L., 43) from the passion which binds one person to another. Hobbes point i n De Cive was that society i s not based on some generalized form of t h i s l a t t e r species of love, transferable from one person to another ad -infinitum. He i s s t i l l endorsing the view that men are sociable, since that amounts to no more than t h a t s o c i a l i z i n g can be. a "present good"! (ibid.) So, we must avoid the temptation to interpret Hobbes as saying that there i s r_o natural dimension to the s o c i a l nature of c i v i l l i f e . Family, lineage and friends are a l l within the s o c i a l world, but the nature of those interactions i s to be contrasted with those that operate i n the c i v i l aspect of the s o c i a l world. C i v i l association i s a network of deliberately contrived relationships between strangers. In his The - Table-Talk, and under the t i t l e "Charity", Selden writes: CHARITY to strangers i s enjoined i n the text. By strangers i s there understood those that are not of our own k i n , strangers to our blood; not those you cannot t e l l whence they come: that i s , be charitable to your neighbours whom you know to be honest poor people.I 9 Assuming, as seems to be Selden's intention, that strangers are - 1 5 7 -those with whom we have no family or emotional t i e s , then "strangers" i n his sense w i l l cover a l l of the others with whom one interacts i n s o c i a l l i f e . Cur relations with strangers, unlike our friendships, are assumed by Hobbes to be instrumental and thus perfectly captured by the idea of contractual r e l a t i o n s . Hobbes' conclusion i s that our human nature (those four f a c u l t i e s of reason, passion, strength and experience) provides no assured basis for the success of c i v i l association. But worse than t h i s , when we turn to an examination of the in c l i n a t i o n s found i n creatures with t h i s p a r t i c u l a r faculty endowment we find the elements of discord rather than concord. To that extent Hobbes reverses the assumption he claims to find i n c l a s s i c a l p o l i t i c a l theory. But i n going to the d i v i s i v e i n c l i n a t i o n s Hobbes begins where he believes a remedy i s most needed. His strategy i s to buil d up a theory of the a r t i f i c i a l space called c i v i l society by observing the actual motivations which explain why unconnected individuals (Selden's strangers) associate with each other. When attention turns to those instrumental interactions outside of love and a f f i n i t y there i s an undeniable ring of truth i n the remark that: We do not therefore by nature seek society for i t s own sake, but that we may receive some honour or p r o f i t from i t ; these we desire primarily, that secondarily. (E.W. i l , 3 ) I f i t i s correct to think that Hobbes sees nothing c i v i l , as d i s t i n c t from s o c i a l , i n human nature, i t might be worth considering just how c i v i l Hobbes considered c i v i l society to be. This query brings us to a consideration of the state of nature. It also gives us cause to reconsider the apparently s o c i a l examples that Hobbes -158-uses when d e t a i l i n g the i n c l i n a t i o n s of men who are, so i t seems, supposed to be i n the state of nature. There i s no reason to be much surprised at Hobbes' account of the state of nature, since i t s u t i l i z a t i o n of s o c i a l or c i v i l examples allows him to explain which i n c l i n a t i o n s and modes of behaviour manifest the d i v i s i v e and a n t i - s o c i a l manners. The state of nature i s ever present i n character. Hobbes' reasons for using the device are no doubt complex, but i t certa i n l y allows him to address men who are currently i n a society without necessarily having any aptitude to be c i t i z e n s . He says that the "laws of nature" are the "conditions of society", ( i b i d . , 2) and, since he agrees that his audience i s part of a society he must agree that the conditions of society hold to some degree there and then. So, consistent with the state of nature operating as a warning, i t would seem to follow that Hobbes saw his audience i n terms of mixed characters: men within whom there were the seeds of both c i v i l amity and discord. Subsequently we can appreciate that the state of nature can be described i n terms of s o c i a l examples because i t s presence i n the character of men i s perfectly consistent with t h e i r being s o c i a l , but imperfectly c i v i l creatures. 5.5-- The State of Nature (a) The state of nature as a state of mind Most writers on Hobbes would agree that his state of nature i s not intended as an h i s t o r i c a l account of what men were l i k e prior to - 1 5 9 -the creation of states. The importance of the notion i s less for what i t t e l l s us about p r e - c i v i l man than what i t shows us about i t s opposite: the c i v i l condition. Construed as an analytic device Hobbes' state of nature i s a graphic account of what we are l e f t with once the sovereign departs and men are forced to manage interactions i n the absence of law. To the extent that we are impressed by the nastiness of the natural condition we are expected to support those precepts which Hobbes offers as the conditions of c i v i l l i f e , the natural laws. This position on Hobbes' state of nature i s informative about how to understand his project, but i t s view i s li m i t e d . We are cautioned not to read Hobbes as either history or anthropology, and we are directed to the l o g i c a l point of his employment of the concept. The argument of th i s sub-section (5.5 (a)) w i l l be that Hobbes' state of nature should also be construed as an account of certain character t r a i t s and t h e i r consequences for the development of c i v i l amity. The emphasis i s on the state of nature as a condition within men rather than as a condition within which men find themselves. Subsequently, the move out of the state of nature might be thought of as a change within men rather than merely a change i n their environmental circumstances. Hobbes thought that De Cive, "this l i t t l e work of mine", (E.W.II, v i i ) contained a demonstration of "the absolute necessity of leagues and contracts", (ibid.) The conclusion demonstrated i s , i n Leviathan, referred to as an "inference, made from the passions", (E.W.Ill, 114) and there i s a tendency to look back to chapter s i x of that work - the chapter on the passions - as the basis for the inference; but that i s an error. The clear and, at least to Hobbes, - 1 6 0 -obvious truth which allows the inference i s that human nature contains properties which are responsible both for precipitating men into discord (the "concupiscible part, which desires to appropriate to i t s e l f the use of those things i n which a l l others have a j o i n t i n t e r e s t " , ( E . W .II, v i i ) ) and for showing them the way out again ("the r a t i o n a l , which teaches every man to f l y a contra-natural d i s s o l u t i o n , as the greatest mischief that can arrive to nature:" ( i b i d ) ) . A perfectly plausible way to take t h i s passage i s as blaming the passions and commending the role of reason i n human a f f a i r s . It i s t h i s reading, plausible though i t i s , that can obscure the more subtle point that Hobbes i s actually making. Using an image that appears elsewhere, Hobbes writes of his method i n c i v i l philosophy as follows: For everything i s best understood by i t s constitutive causes. For as i n a watch, or some such small engine, the matter, figure, and motion of the wheels cannot well be known, except i t be taken insunder and viewed in parts; so to make a more curious search into the rights of states and the duties of subjects, i t i s necessary, I say, not to take them insunder, but yet that they be so considered as i f they were dissolved; that i s , that we r i g h t l y understand what the quality of human nature i s , i n what matters i t i s , i n what not, f i t to make up a c i v i l government, and how men must be agreed amongst themselves that intend to grow up into a well-grounded state, ( i b i d . , xiv) This method of "feigning...annihilation 1 ( E i w . l j 91) or "privation", once applied to c i v i l philosophy, requires that we dissolve the state into i t s constituent parts - human beings - and see how they are naturally related (that i s , related i n terms of the q u a l i t i e s of th e i r bare untutored f a c u l t i e s ) . The state of nature (our star t i n g point) i s a dissolved state. But that i s merely the beginning, for - 1 6 1 -the method requires further that we look at the constituent elements i n terms of their aptitude for c i v i l government. This further step takes us into the psychological dimension of the state of nature, suggesting that i t i s particular formations of the passions that Hobbes i s concerned to investigate. Put i n another way, although Hobbes' conception of sovereign rule i s "an inference drawn from the passions", i t i s an inference drawn from passions embodied as manners. Consequently i t i s no accident that i n the three chapters of Leviathan which immediately precede the thirteenth's account of the natural condition, Hobbes treats a r i s t o c r a t i c preoccupations with honour and worth, manners that are of special concern to the success of c i v i l l i f e , and r e l i g i o n . These features of s o c i a l l i f e are discussed i n terms of attitudes and dispositions, and the inference to "some coercive power" (E.W.II, xiv) i s premised on that discussion, not the e a r l i e r account of the passions. A further reason for accepting that Hobbes' argument rests on his account of manners, rather than the treatment of the passions as such, arises from what he says about the origins of contention and fear of one another. He believes that a l l men have the same repertoire of emotions, but different objects for those emotions. He also holds that c i v i l peace i s d i f f i c u l t to obtain because of t h i s "diversity of passions, i n divers men". (E.W.III. 85) Thus the question of s u i t a b i l i t y for c i v i l l i f e i s not one revolving about the passions i n general, but about something more idiosyncratic, "MANNERS...those q u a l i t i e s of mankind, that concern the i r l i v i n g together i n peace and unity." (ibid.) The image i n De Cive of the - 1 6 2 -stones collected for a building conveys Hobbes' concern with aptitude: There i s i n men a d i v e r s i t y of dispositions to enter into society, a r i s i n g from the d i v e r s i t y of t h e i r affections, not unlike that which i s found i n stones, brought together i n the building, by reason of the di v e r s i t y of t h e i r matter and figure. (E.W.II, 36) Someone who, "for the harshness of his disposition i n retaining s u p e r f l u i t i e s for himself, and detaining of necessaries from others", (ibid.) i s as unsuitable for c i v i l l i f e as are "sharp and angular" stones for the purposes of building. It i s noteworthy that the character singled out by Hobbes as a poor candidate for c i v i l l i f e i s someone on whom "alone there lay no necessity of contending", (ibid) This angular stone contends for things for reasons other than need; his position within society puts him beyond questions of mere s u r v i v a l , but nonetheless he w i l l destroy others regardless of whether t h e i r destruction safeguards his preservation. The vice alluded to within t h i s character i s analysed i n 5.7. The metaphor of building materials reappears i n Leviathan, and i t would seem from what Hobbes has to say there that he had the noble and pre-eminent i n mind as the angular stones. The passage i n question comes right at the s t a r t of Chapter XXIX:, "Of Those Things That Weaken, Or Tend To the Dissolution of A Commonwealth". (E.W.Ill, 308-322) Men, he says, w i l l eventually t i r e of the "irregular j o s t l i n g , and hewing one another, and desire with a l l t h e i r hearts to conform themselves into one firm and l a s t i n g e d i f i c e : . ! . " , ( i i b i d . , 308) However, Hobbes claims that they w i l l - 1 6 3 -lack either "the art of making f i t laws, to square their actions by", or "humility and patience, to suffer the.rude and cumbersome points of th e i r present greatness to be taken o f f . . . " , (ibid) As a res u l t of t h i s double d i s a b i l i t y they w i l l need some "very able a r c h i t e c t " i f they wish to "be compiled into any other than a crazy building,...", (ibid..) Since Hobbes i s describing what he sees as one of the causes of the commonwealth's dis s o l u t i o n , and indeed a cause springing from some flaw i n what he c a l l s the " i n s t i t u t i o n " of the commonwealth, i t would appear to be reasonable to assume that he i s pointing to what he takes to be real flaws i n existing p o l i t i c a l formations. Looked at i n t h i s way, that i s , considered as a comment about the "imperfect I n s t i t u t i o n " of (I assume) England's p o l i t i c a l order, Hobbes' point i s that the major elements i n the p o l i t i c a l nation are neither wise enough nor humble enough to allow the governance of the i r action necessary for s e t t l e d order. I believe that even f a i r l y recent English history would have convinced Hobbes that t h i s was true. That Hobbes' p o r t r a i t of an u n c i v i l character was drawn from an a r i s t o c r a t i c ethos seems clear enough, but i t i s certainly not essential for his argument that the u n c i v i l be a r i s t o c r a t i c . What the argument requires i s that some man, "supposing himself above others, w i l l have a license to do what he l i s t s , and challenges respect and honour, as due to him before others; which i s an argument of a f i e r y s p i r i t . " (E.W.11,7) This individual puts the more moderate on t h e i r guard, and creates that state of anticipated combat which Hobbes c a l l s "war". But while the argument does not require that t h i s violent man be a r i s t o c r a t i c - examples of base -164-v i l l i a n s w i l l s u f f i c e - the actual descriptions Hobbes gives of his behaviour are replete with reference to a culture that holds honour, esteem and status as supreme. Perhaps the most serious character flaw i n men, the one which puts "perpetual jealousies and suspicions" into moderate men, i s the vice of vainglory. Now, i f the state of nature i s a state of war, indeed "a war of a l l men against a l l men", ( i b i d . , 11) and the psychological dimension to th i s condition i s perpetual fears and suspicions, then the cause of the war (as a psychological r e a l i t y ) i s none other than the character of the f i e r y s p i r i t . These people are the most dangerous things i n a Hobbesian world, because i t i s th e i r character which threatens to precipitate a f a l l into the natural condition with i t s attendant loss of c i v i l i z a t i o n : "that savage ignorance, which those men are i n that have not, or have not long had laws and commonwealth, from whence proceedeth science and c i v i l i t y . " (E.W.V, 304) In Leviathan, "vainglory" i s defined as a "foolish over-rating of th e i r own worth". (E.W.Ill, 283) The worth of the vainglorious, which i s p r i n c i p a l l y a creation of their own opinion, i s often based on the false assumption that "riches, or blood, or some other natural q u a l i t y " (ibid.) confer i t . There i s l i t t l e doubt that Hobbes i s pinpointing one element within the n o b i l i t y , the same group who argue thei r superiority to the law in claiming that punishments "ought not to be i n f l i c t e d on them, with the same rigour they are i n f l i c t e d on poor, obscure, and simple men, comprehended under the name of the vulgar." (ibid.) Being so preoccupied with questions of deference and status these men are prone to anger that - 1 6 5 -streams into action, ( i b i d . , 28A-5) When writing of men l i k e t h i s Bacon said that these "self-lovers w i l l set a man's house on f i r e , though i t were but to roast their eggs." 2 0 The temperament alluded to i s very close to that of Hobbes' vainglorious i n d i v i d u a l who believes that he has a "license to do what he l i s t s . " (E.W..II, 7) Now, i n i t s very f i r s t formulation, Hobbes' righ t of nature i s defined as follows: Every man by nature hath right to a l l things, that i s to say, to do whatsoever he l i s t e t h to whom he l i s t e t h , to possess, use, and enjoy a l l things,he w i l l and can. (E.L., 72) Clearly then, the vainglorious i n d i v i d u a l , the man whose state of mind i s a trigger to the state of nature (whose other psychological h a l f i s the precautionary fear of the moderate), i s an embodiment of the untramelled right of nature. In The Elements of- Law Hobbes gives the impression that i n the state of nature anything goes; i f there are any constraints then they arise from considerations of honour alone. This r a d i c a l position i s abandoned i n De Cive where there i s a requirement of self-preservation placed on the exercise of the right of nature: "a right to make use of, and to do a l l whatsoever he s h a l l judge requisite for his preservation." (E.W.II, lOn) However, the character of the f i e r y s p i r i t i s outlined by reference to the more ra d i c a l version of the righ t of nature; the inference being that he i s more intractable than someone whose destruction of others was motivated by a genuine concern with preservation. In t h i s sub-section I have deliberately concentrated attention on the psychological dimension of the natural condition. I., did - 1 6 6 -t h i s to show that the war of a l l against a l l i s precipitated by a certain kind of i n d i v i d u a l , and that there are rather a l o t of clues i n Hobbes as to the character type of t h i s i n d i v i d u a l . I take i t that one of the most s i g n i f i c a n t points that Hobbes makes about the f i e r y s p i r i t i s that he has no constraints of conscience which debar him from wanton uses of power. This i s s i g n i f i c a n t because Hobbes' model of the s o c i a l contract - obligations as self-imposed l i m i t a t i o n on action - i s e x p l i c i t l y the introduction of a metaphor for t i e s i n conscience. This i s made abundantly clear i n Hobbes' discussion of groups who form for reasons of self-defence, "temporal leagues" that are "entered into by each man for his private i n t e r e s t , without any obligation of conscience." (E.W.V, 184) These protective associations l i e somewhere between t o t a l chaos and c i v i l l i f e , but the state of mind which characterizes their members i s , for Hobbes, symptomatic of the former and not the l a t t e r . The core of c i v i l i t y i s adherence to the pathways l e f t open by self-imposed l i m i t a t i o n s on freedom, for reasons to do with "the council and conscience of the actor" rather than threat of punishment. (E.W.II, 46n and 33) One h a l f of the state of nature's psychological dimension demonstrates a lack of t h i s capacity. (b) De Cive's "Of the State of Men Without C i v i l Society" Turning now from the nature of individuals to the nature of t h e i r i n t e r a c t i o n , we need to consider the f i r s t chapter of De Cive, since here above a l l other places i s Hobbes' treatment of meetings within the public domain. There i s no doubt that Hobbes' mood -167-changed between the d i s t r i b u t i o n of The Elements of Law (May, 1640) and the f i r s t edition of De Cive (1642) The e a r l i e r work contains a model of the state of nature, but i t i s schematic and quite lacking i n those examples from l i f e which make De Cive's opening chapter so s t a r t l i n g . The e a r l i e r model i s , for reasons outlined i n the preceding sub-section, more permissive and hence a more ra d i c a l natural condition, but that has usually gone unseen. 2 1 De Cive's state of nature u t i l i z e s p o r t r a i t s from l i f e , s o c i a l scenes with which Hobbes was no doubt familiar i n the days when he acted as a 22 secretary to William Cavendish (2nd Earl of Devonshire). In saying that there i s a change of mood or tone from one work to the next the claim i s simply that Hobbes becomes more cynical and b i t t e r , as exemplified i n his p a r t i c u l a r l y gloomy por t r a i t of the natural condition. But t h i s claim i s open to challenge. Surely, i t might be suggested, the image i n The Elements of Law of l i f e as a race i s no less cynical or b i t t e r than the l a t e r work. That image comes at the end of a chapter devoted to the passions, but i t i s a chapter that does l i t t l e other than offer definitions of the passions; the image of the race i t s e l f being a mnemonic device, and one that strikes a note of agreement with Ulysses' advice to Achilles i n Shakespeare's Troilus and Cressida: Take the instant way; For honour travels i n a straiit." ! so narrow Where one but goes abreast: keep, then, the path; For emulation hath a thousand sons That one by one pursue: i f you give way, Or hedge aside from the direct forthright, Like to an entered tide they a l l rush by And leave you hindmost; ( I I I , i i i , 152-160) - 1 6 8 -The comparison of l i f e to a race looks l i k e a deliberate attempt to remind his audience of the scramble for honour and preferment that so many of them were engaged i n . Indeed the whole treatment of the passions i n Hobbes' early work i s framed i n terms of t h i s a r i s t o c r a t i c preoccupation, as his f i n a l words i n the chapter preceding the one on the passions demonstrate: "In the pleasure men have, or displeasure from the signs of honour or dishonour done unto them, consisteth the nature of the passions i n p a r t i c u l a r , whereof we are to speak i n the next chapter." (E.L., 36) Hobbes' image of the state of nature became more v i v i d and closer to a terminal condition as his analysis of the coming c r i s i s began to widen, and as his appreciation of the character t r a i t s symptomatic of the state of nature increased. The Elements of Law account of "the estate of h o s t i l i t y and war" ( i b i d . , 73) i s an e x p l i c i t l y martial one where s t r i v i n g for eminence comes down to strength i n b a t t l e , (ibid) This comes out c l e a r l y i n Hobbes' argument for the rectitude of pre-emptive violence i n the state of nature: "much more reason i s there, that a man prevent such equality before the danger cometh, and before there be necessity of battle...;We manifestly contradict that our intention, i f we w i l l i n g l y dismiss such a one, and suffer him to gather strength and be our enemy." ( i b i d . , 73-4) De Cive, when making the same point, avoids a l l reference to martial might, speaking of p r o f i t a b i l i t y instead. In a l l , the l a t e r work i s more deeply psychological, deliberately creating a state of nature from the dispositions of men who meet as strangers i n the public space. - 1 6 9 -Hobbes* strategy i s to build a theory of the a r t i f i c i a l condition he c a l l s c i v i l society by looking to the actual reasons for which unconnected individuals (Seldenian strangers) associate with one another. He picks out four examples of "free congress" (E.W.11,4) to investigate; ( i ) " i f they meet for t r a f f i c " , ( i b i d . , 3) that i s , i f they meet for commercial purposes of exchange; ( i i ) " i f to discharge some o f f i c e " , (ibid.) by which he presumably means the f u l f i l l m e n t of obligations attaching to one's position; ( i i i ) " i f for pleasure and recreation of mind"; (ibid. ) (iv) " I f they meet to talk of philosophy", ( i b i d , 4) Hobbes' conclusions, whatever they might turn out to be, w i l l , i f v a l i d l y arrived at, t e l l us something about the t r a i t s t y p i c a l l y found i n a limited range of human interactions. They cannot, by thei r very choice, t e l l us about the tone of human interaction as such. The four examples divide into two: men seek one another out for trade and the execution of o f f i c e i n order to benefit themselves i n a straightforward material sense; they seek p r o f i t . However, they meet for recreation and philosophy as a means to gaining honour, reputation, and increased self-esteem. Summarizing, Hobbes says that, " a l l free congress ariseth either from mutual poverty, or from vain glory." ( i b i d . , 4-5) The examples chosen are from a r e l a t i v e l y narrow range of human experience; but granted that they are narrow by design, and granted further that Hobbes i s speaking from considerable first-hand experience of corporate, sporting, and i n t e l l e c t u a l c i r c l e s , there i s l i t t l e reason to doubt his s i n c e r i t y . To some extent of course the more v i v i d the image of vanity and greed, the more compelling w i l l Hobbes' resolution to the problem of -170-public peace be. In "A Review and Conclusion" to Leviathan Hobbes canvasses the suggestion that wild courage and timidness p u l l so hard i n opposite directions, that a settled and secure peace among a population composed of men with these t r a i t s w i l l be impossible. He then adds: And to consider the contrariety of men's opinions, and manners, i n general, i t i s , they say, impossible to entertain a constant c i v i l amity with a l l those, with whom the business of the world constrains us to converse: which business consisteth almost i n nothing else but a perpetual contention for honour, riches, and authority. (E.W.Ill, 702) The response that Hobbes offers to t h i s suggestion ("they say") i s simply that, "these are indeed great d i f f i c u l t i e s , but not i m p o s s i b i l i t i e s : for by education, and d i s c i p l i n e , they may be, and are sometimes reconciled." (ibid) This statement of the p o l i t i c a l problem, plus Hobbes' considered response to i t , show quite p l a i n l y that the four examples chosen for consideration i n De Cive are central to his stated concerns and th e i r resolution. I f , as seems evident, Hobbes i s defining his task i n terms of motives l i k e p r o f i t and honour as they operate i n the public space, we might well look to see i f there are any s i g n i f i c a n t p a r a l l e l s between the character of the individual who t y p i f i e s the state of nature, and the s o c i a l gatherings which typi f y i t . In the f i r s t place, the causes of quarrel i n Leviathan: competition, d i s t r u s t , and glory, are never i l l u s t r a t e d with reference to simple necessities. Competition i s not over scraps of food i n the primeval forest, but over major goods, "a convenient seat", (E.W.Ill, 111) that i s , a pr i n c i p a l dwelling or tra c t of land. Equally, the - 1 7 1 -contest for riches i s conducted among those who "contend... for s u p e r f l u i t i e s " , (E.W.II, 36). These contestants are those "least troubled with caring for necessary things", ( i b i d . , 160); men who might reasonably be expected to " l i v e at ease without fear of want." (E.L., 169). Once again, Hobbes1 argument on the question of what causes disorder does not require a r i s t o c r a t i c contention; competition over goods necessary for mere preservation would do. The point i s simply that the examples Hobbes uses indicate that s o c i a l group within which the competition had dramatic s o c i a l implications. For instance, when Hobbes discusses the "Foole" his character i s not that of an i n s i g n i f i c a n t freeloader, but of someone who i s contending for a kingdom. (E.L., 176) Hobbes distinguishes between p r o f i t and honour as motives that move men to c i v i l association, but we need hardly believe that he thought of them as u t t e r l y d i s t i n c t . Thomas Fuller's wry comment on the privateering exploits of George C l i f f o r d , 3rd Earl of Cumberland probably captures an attitude toward the two motives that Hobbes shared: "His f l e e t may be said to be bound for no other harbour but the port of honour, though touching at the port of p r o f i t i n passage 23 thereunto." Lawrence Stone has adequately documented the extent to which the n o b i l i t y of Hobbes' time were enmeshed i n f i n a n c i a l ventures, and we know that Hobbes' friend and patron William Cavendish, 2nd Earl of Devonshire, managed the family's involvement 24 i n the Southhampton sponsored V i r g i n i a Company. Hobbes attended meetings of the Company Court over the seven years of i t s l i f e and was witness both to both i t s factional fights and i t s open h o s t i l i t i e s . The Company was dissolved after royal intervention i n - 1 7 2 -1623, and at one stage during i t s operation Devonshire and the Earl of Warwick clashed and departed for Holland to fight a duel. When Hobbes remarks that " i f they meet for t r a f f i c , i t i s plain every man regards not his fellow, but his business; i f to discharge some o f f i c e , a certain market-friendship i s begotten, which hath more of jealousy i n i t than true love, and whence factions sometimes may a r i s e , but good w i l l never", (E.W. I I , 3) there i s l i t t l e doubt that he i s speaking from f i r s t hand experience on the internal p o l i t i c s of the V i r g i n i a Company. Thus far i n t h i s sub-section I have considered the detailed examples Hobbes employs to make his case for a coercive force to govern the c i v i l domain. Agreeing with Macpherson on t h i s point I hold that Hobbes is_ u t i l i z i n g the behaviour of men i n a society to underscore his position on that which undermines c i v i l i t y . However, there i s an undeniable respect i n which Hobbes seems to be ta l k i n g much more generally about human beings; that i s , at a l e v e l general enough to embrace remarks about the desires of men wherever they might be found. Consider his comment on the desire to gain dominion: But though the benefits of t h i s l i f e may be much furthered by mutual help; since yet those may be better attained to by dominion than by the society of others, I hope nobody w i l l doubt, but that men would much more greedily be carried by nature, i f a l l fear were removed, to obtain dominion, than to gain society, ( i b i d . , 5) Elsewhere Hobbes says that men, "from t h e i r very birth...would have a l l the world, i f they could, to fear and obey them." (E.W. VII, 73) As stated, the w i l l to dominate i s as natural as the desire to preserve ourselves from harm: an almost innate aspect of human - 1 7 3 -belngs! Hobbes may have believed t h i s , but a l l that he says i n the systematic treatment of human nature i s that some men are so constituted. Within the context of the examples taken from Be Cive his point i s that i f the goods sought through c i v i l association could be had more eas i l y (via a dominant w i l l ) , then we should assume that men would take the f r u i t s of s o c i a l l i f e while gladly avoiding the costs of cooperation. Glaucon's use of the story about Gyges the Lydian shepherd makes the same point i n Plato's Republic. Hobbes, i f i n fact he believed that a l l men shared a l u s t for domination, was cer t a i n l y not alone. Guazzo, i n his The- C i v i l  Conversation, notes that because a man of honour i s expected to assert his pre-eminence, the company of equals i s fraught with danger. Thus i t would be far better to seek the company of known i n f e r i o r s ; with them "he s h a l l be the chief man...and rule the company as he l i s t ; neither s h a l l he be forced to favour or do anything contrary to his mind: which l i b e r t y i s seldom allowed him 25 among his equals." S i m i l a r l y , S i r Edward Waller commented that the i n f l a t i o n of honours had increased the tensions inherent i n the meetings of notables. The Jacobean practice had "introduced a parity i n conversation; which considering English dispositions 26 proved of i l l consequences, familiarity...begetting contempt." Once again Hobbes imputes to human beings per se what may be true of the n o b i l i t y with which he was f a m i l i a r ; which i n turn raises the question of his intended audience. Given his view that, "the beginning of a l l Dominion amongst Men was i n Families", (D., 159) Hobbes could be quite happy with the idea that patriarchalism was the correct view about the o r i g i n of dominion, yet deny that the - 1 7 4 -patriarchal attitude among Seldenian strangers i s a desirable c i v i l q u a l i t y . I f Hobbes' intention i s to address the p o l i t i c a l l y important heads of fami l i e s , then he might well be advising them about the nature of the a t t i t u d i n a l change necessary for the creation of a c i v i l order. That an a t t i t u d i n a l change i s essential i s argued for by the i n s t a b i l i t y inherent i n any s o c i a l formation that i s based on desire for p r o f i t and honour. Hobbes takes i t as obvious that commercial and professional transactions were undertaken for pecuniary gain, and while he has no love for those who seek riches he believes that t h e i r endeavours must be safeguarded. However, he i s far more scathing i n his treatment of one mode of honour seeking: "no society can be great or l a s t i n g , which begins from vain glory". (E.W. I I , 5) In order to maintain s o c i a l s t a b i l i t y i n a society where these motives are operative there i s need for what he referred to i n Leviathan as " d i s c i p l i n e " . Discipline works through fear, and fear i s the element i n human nature to which Hobbes a l l o t s the role of creating the c i v i l realm. The fear i n question i s , as Hobbes indicates, a certain " p o l i t i c prudence" or "foresight of future e v i l " , not panic, ( i b i d . , 6n.) So the attitude one i s encouraged to have toward reciprocally agreed upon li m i t a t i o n s does not bear great weight i n the construction of c i v i l society through agreement. Fear w i l l do i n such circumstances, but the other element Hobbes mentioned i n his "Review and Conclusion" to Leviathan would s u f f i c e as w e l l ; namely "education". For those who see the reasonableness of abandoning certain attitudes i n order to mutually sustain a c i v i l condition, fear might work as a perfectly good supporting reason to - 1 7 5 -avold c o n f l i c t , but i t need not be the only reason for which c o n f l i c t ridden courses are avoided. Since the educative aspect of Hobbes' task i s not directed toward changing men's attitudes about p r o f i t , then with respect to the examples i n De Cive he must be concentrating on honour. Recall that those who meet to philosophize or for recreation seek to "be esteemed masters", or, more generally, "to leave behind them that same eudokimein, some esteem and honour with those, with whom they have been conversant." ( i b i d . , 4-5) Hobbes attacks the conception of honour i m p l i c i t i n t h i s example, and i n doing so offers a counter-interpretation: Neither doth the society of others advance any whit the cause of my glorying i n myself; for every man must account himself, such as he can make himself without the help of others, ( i b i d . , 5) For reasons that w i l l be discussed i n the next section Hobbes has begun to question the dominant seventeenth century conception of honour; a conception that i s perfectly captured by James Cleland: "Honour i s not i n his hands who i s honoured, but i n the hearts and 27 opinions of other men." The tension between two conceptions: one of the man capable of conducting his own survey and basing his self-esteem on his own estimation of his virtues, the other of a man whose self-esteem was c r u c i a l l y dependent on the attitudes, and more ambiguously, on the behaviour of others, i s central to Hobbes' concern with the world of honour. - 1 7 6 -5.6~ Power j Honour, and Value I remember about 1660 there was a great difference between him and S i r Hierome Sanchy, one of Oliver's knights. They printed one against the other: t h i s knight was wont to preach at Dublin. The knight had been a s o l d i e r , and challenged S i r William to fight with him. S i r William i s extremely short sighted, and being the challengee i t belonged to him to nominate place and weapon. He nominates, for the place, a darke c e l l a r , and the weapon to be a great carpenter's axe. This turned the knight's challenge into r i d i c u l e , and so i t came to nought. From the account of Hobbes' friend William Petty as given by John Aubrey i n Brief Lives. It i s no exaggeration to say that Hobbes was preoccupied with the notion of power. It plays a role i n his metaphysics, his psychology, and of course his p o l i t i c s . The desire for power as a means to achieving ends i s an ineradicable force i n Hobbesian men: "in the f i r s t place, I put for a general i n c l i n a t i o n of a l l mankind, a perpetual and restless desire of power after power, that ceaseth only i n death." (E.W. I l l , 85-6) The smooth acquisition of power after power i s , so Hobbes says, f e l i c i t y , and given that our natures are ba s i c a l l y appetitive, power and pleasure are at the centre of l i f e . These remarks about power and pleasure would be as true of s o l i t a r y individuals as of s o c i a l ones, but Hobbes alludes to the s o c i a l role of power when he comments on the comparative nature of the notion: "because the power of one man resisteth and hindereth the effects of the power of another: power simply i s no more, but the excess of the power of one above that of another." (E.L., 34) Equally, and i n the same work, he explains f e l i c i t y i n terms of exceeding others: "[c]ontinually to out-go the next - 1 7 7 -before, i s f e l i c i t y . " ( i b i d . , 48) To out-do i s f e l i c i t y ; to be out-done, misery. While there i s no denying that Hobbes conceived of c i v i l l i f e i n terms of competing powers, there i s a serious question about the id e n t i t y of the s o c i a l milieu manifest i n his examples. In th i s section i t i s argued that Hobbes" conceptions of power, honour, and value are demonstrably a part of his c r i t i q u e of a r i s t o c r a t i c i n t e r a c t i o n . Thus i f there i s a s o c i a l milieu which informs Hobbes1 theorizing on these matters i t i s one that i s well captured i n 28 Mervyn James' terms: "the honour culture". This la b e l attaches to the members of the governing class, men whose p o l i t i c a l culture included a dominant concern with honour. Thus i t could as easily include the lawyers and bureaucrats as the old and new members of the n o b i l i t y . This c l a s s , while united i n terms of i t s concern with honour, was deeply divided i n respect of i t s understanding of what honour entailed. What Hobbes says about power and honour i s to be seen as his contribution to t h i s debate. Even Hobbes' d e f i n i t i o n of power i n De Corpore has a strong s o c i a l flavour: [T]he agent - has- power, i f i t be applied to a patient;  and the patient has power,- i f i t be applied to- an  agent; otherwise neither of them have power, nor can the accidents, which are i n them severally, be properly called powers. (E.W. I, 129) The accidents which are i n men: bodily f a c u l t i e s , riches, authority, friends, or the favour of the mighty, are powers precisely because they enable t h e i r owner to move others at his w i l l . In.this respect Hobbes' conception of power i s a mirror image -178-of A r i s t o t l e on p r i o r i t y , which again i s , i n one of the senses he gives i t , a s o c i a l notion: "for that which exceeds i n power, i . e . , the more powerful, i s p r i o r ; and such i s that according to whose w i l l the other - i . e . , the posterior - must f o l l o w . " 2 9 In his commentary on t h i s passage Kirwan notes that the things "arranged i n order of p r i o r i t y i n respect of capacity are (although A r i s t o t l e expresses himself i n the neuter) more and less powerful men."30 Both philosophers seem to have a status society i n mind, although whereas A r i s t o t l e sees the ordered hierarchy as natural, Hobbes emphatically says that i t i s conventional and not rooted i n the order of things: Nobility i s power, not i n a l l places, but only i n those commonwealths, where i t has pr i v i l e g e s : for i n such p r i v i l e g e s , consisteth t h e i r power. (E.W. I l l , 75) However, his point goes further than the claim that n o b i l i t y i s power only when accorded pr i v i l e g e s . Prior to making the above remark Hobbes had said that n o b i l i t y , l i k e eloquence, prudence, and l i b e r a l i t y , was a "natural power", ( i b i d . , 74) and presumably one of those he counts among powers of the mind. As such, n o b i l i t y might be eminence of certain virtues and those who are given privileges within a commonwealth a meritocratic n o b i l i t y and not one based sol e l y on lineage. If t h i s i s Hobbes' position, and reasons w i l l be forthcoming to suggest that i n part i t i s , then his adversaries would be those who argued that n o b i l i t y was an endowment of the blood. Why Hobbes might be i n direct and strenuous c o n f l i c t with that position i s not hard to see. The b e l i e f that honour was inherited gave the kinship - 1 7 9 -group a hold that was prior to, and more powerful than, any contractual obligation that one might take on. In situations where the honour of the i n d i v i d u a l or the kinship group was at stake then c i v i l discord - the dissolving of the bond between noble and sovereign - was highly l i k e l y . Furthermore, those who saw lineage as c r u c i a l i n the matter of n o b i l i t y would often hark back to a period when the honour culture was self-authenticating and free from the heraldic v i s i t a t i o n s that were an aspect of the Tudor attempt to make the monarch the "fount of honour", as James 1 was to say. Hobbes was i n t o t a l agreement with the Tudor policy, and the reasons he gave for i t are quite revealing: Lastly, considering what value men are naturally apt to set upon themselves; what respect they look for from others; and how l i t t l e they value other men; from whence continually arise amongst them, emulation, quarrels, factions, and at l a s t war, to the destroying of one another, and diminution of t h e i r strength against a common enemy; i t i s necessary that there be laws of honour, and a public rate of the worth of such men as have deserved, or are able to deserve well of the commonwealth...To the sovereign therefore i t belongeth also to give t i t l e s of honour. (E.W. I l l , 167) These honours granted by the sovereign are c i v i l honours, and thus distinguishable from those which might accrue outside of any c i v i l context, as he remarks when discussing the " l i t t l e lords" who "continually" had wars one with another. ( i b i d . , 82 and EW. VI, 259) In t h i s feudal embodiment of the state of nature martial virtues attract honour, and remnants of t h i s view were v i s i b l e i n Hobbes1 time."5"1" The connection between power and honour i s , to Hobbes' mind, perfectly clear, "the acknowledgement of power i s called HONOUR; and -180-to honour a man (inwardly i n the mind) i s to conceive or acknowledge, that that man hath the odds or excess of power above him that contendeth or compareth himself." (E.L., 34) Moreover, the natural capacities or acquired means which constitute Hobbesian powers are "honourable" because they are "an argument and sign of power". (E.W. I l l , 79) Our honouring of a person i s "the manifestation of the value we set on them"; (ibid.) which i n turn i s a consequence of the opinion we hold about thei r power. In a l l of t h i s Hobbes i s close to Cleland. As noted above, Cleland had commented that "honour i s not i n his hands who i s honoured, but i n the hearts and opinions of other men", a view that was taken straight from A r i s t o t l e : "honour...is thought to depend on those who bestow honour rather than on him who receives i t " . (I095b25f.) Irrespective of our subjective estimations, our self-esteem, or our assertiveness, the response of the world, public esteem, was required to give honour. To that extent honour and reputation are one and the same, as Cassio's lament about losing his "immortal - 3 2 part" t e s t i f i e s . Hobbes makes the point about public evaluation as well: For l e t a man, as most men do, rate themselves at the highest value they can; yet t h e i r true value i s no more than i t i s esteemed by others. (E.W. I l l , 76) This i s patently not a point about wealth, since we are very l i k e l y i n a uniquely good position to evaluate our own. It i s a point about what others believe can be accomplished with our endowments, and on that matter we are not so well situated. Value, as the measure of the degree to which our powers are esteemed i s - 1 8 1 -other-centred, being the creation of others' opinions and not our own. Opinion plays a c r u c i a l role i n the honour culture, since the value or worth of a man i s measured i n terms of others' opinions about what his power w i l l give them access to. Hobbes held that, "our w i l l s follow our opinions, as our actions follow our w i l l s . In which sense they say t r u l y and properly that say the world i s governed by opinion." (E.L., 63) Honour then i s a creature of mere opinion. There i s ample room for error here. Others may, through either mistake or f l a t t e r y , provide the signs of honour which give men the confidence to act rashly. Or, as with the case of the vainglorious men Hobbes i s so concerned about, t h e i r false image of t h e i r own powers might lead them to imprudent action. In his discussion of the vainglorious Bacon commented that, " l i e s are s u f f i c i e n t to breed opinion, and opinion brings on substance"; 3" 5 and i t i s plausible to view Hobbes' condemnation of vainglorious men who demand pre-eminence as i n l i n e with Bacon's observations. However, Hobbes' analysis of t h i s character type - the f i e r y s p i r i t - puts more emphasis on the sources of self-esteem than does Bacon's, and i n t h i s respect Hobbes goes close to Montaigne for reasons I s h a l l now discuss. Hobbes' f i r s t p o l i t i c a l t r a c t , The Elements of Law (1640), was circulated among his acquaintances i n the Tew c i r c l e around Falkland. As one might expect, and as we have noted, t h i s work addresses questions of peculiar interest to the aristocracy., and i t s analysis of honour i s more reportage than c r i t i c i s m . Hobbes says that honour derives from the estimations of others, and then, i n the - 1 8 2 -best t r a d i t i o n of in s t r u c t i o n manuals for young nobles, details the behaviour appropriate to the acknowledgement of power. His account i s devoid of c r i t i c i s m . However, i n De Cive and Leviathan Hobbes attacks the conventional understanding of honour, and does so i n two ways. To begin with, i n De Cive Hobbes argues as follows: Neither doth the society of others advance any whit the cause of my glorying i n myself; for every man must account himself, such as he can make himself without the help of others. (E.W. I I , 5) Presumably the glorying i n oneself which counts as worthwhile i s that "well grounded confidence" (E.W. i l l , 45) which i s based on the knowledge of our past actions. The claim seems to be that we must make our own survey; and i f that i s what Hobbes intends then he i s i n direct opposition to the popular b e l i e f that the state of mind of the honoured should be a r e f l e c t i o n of the high esteem i n which they are held by others; witness Du Vair's d e f i n i t i o n of honour: True honour i s the g l i t t e r i n g and beaming brightness of a good and virtuous action, which rebounds from our consciences unto the sight of them with whom we l i v e , and so by a r e f l e c t i o n i n ourselves, brings us a testimony from others of the good opinion which they have of us, which makes us enjoy great comfort of mind.34 When i t was claimed that Hobbes, i n his c r i t i c i s m of the standard conception of honour, was close to Montaigne, the intention was to suggest that l i k e Montaigne, who, quoting Perseus with approval, said "seek not thyself o u t s i d e " , 3 5 Hobbes was suggesting that self-esteem be disentangled from the mirror-world of opinion. There was nothing new i n t h i s suggestion, Hobbes being but one among a - 1 8 3 -throng of writers who had extolled the role of virtue as that which merited honour, in contrast with m i l i t a r y prowess, lineage, or archaic notions of valour. However, we might well wonder why Hobbes f e l t i t necessary to reiterate a position that was commonplace. Part of an answer emerges when we consider the second of Hobbes' points against the conventional view of honour. When defining honour and power Hobbes u t i l i z e s the opportunity to distinguish that which i s honourable (in the conventional sense) from what warrants moral, l e g a l , or c i v i l approval. His point i s that i t does not "alter the case of honour, whether an action, so i t be great and d i f f i c u l t , and consequently a sign of much power, be just or unjust." (E.W.III.80) Standard accounts of what i s honourable do- not - alter- t h e i r nature i n the tr a n s i t i o n from the state of nature into c i v i l l i f e . In the former "the only law of actions i n war i s honour", (E.L., 101) and the men Hobbes most feared were those whose conception of honour was martial i n o r i g i n , and such as to make them covet positions of supreme dominance. Hobbes' f i r s t version of his famous prudential argument against the "Foole" i s directed at one who might unsettle a nation i n the fight for sovereignty: For i f he consider and take his experiences aright, concerning the success which they have had, who have been the movers and authors of sedition, either i n thi s or any other state, he s h a l l f i n d that for one man that hath thereby advanced himself to honour, twenty have come to a reproachful end. ( i b i d . 176) But i f some look to the archaic c r i t e r i a of martial prowess as the bench-mark for honour, and hence carry into the c i v i l state what i s - 1 8 4 -i n one respect the code of the state of nature, then what i s Hobbes1 alternate position? As was said above, Hobbes' position i s one that gives weight to the idea of self-esteem based on self-examination, where the objects of examination are v i r t u e s . The r e a l question of course i s about which virtues the survey i s over, since the martial conception of honour might, i n one of i t s forms, endorse the same self-authentication - consistent with i t s s t r i v i n g for autonomy -just so long as the virtues at stake were m i l i t a r y virtues. Were Hobbes to reject the m i l i t a r y virtues i n favour of the c i v i l v i r t u e s , then i t would be f a i r to say that he had a thoroughly c i v i l i a n conception of how esteem was to be based; however, were he to give q u a l i f i e d endorsement to the m i l i t a r y virtues as part of his account, then he would have a mixed-conception. That he did have a mixed-conception i n mind i s argued for i n the section following. We now have part of the answer to my query as to why Hobbes should feel i t necessary to restate the case against martial conceptions of honour, a case that had been elaborated over the previous two centuries. The reply i s that Hobbes believed that there were s t i l l English men who worked within the martial t r a d i t i o n , and that t h e i r archaic conception of honour was inconsistent with c i v i l l i f e . Barber has argued that precisely t h i s martial notion of honour was appluaded by the a r i s t o c r a t i c , theatre-going public of Hobbes' period, and i n particular that the years between 1610 and 1620 saw i t s pinnacle of p o p u l a r i t y . 3 7 1610 to 1620 i s the period of Hobbes' attendance at the council of the V i r g i n i a and Somer Island companies; i t i s also his period of - 1 8 5 -intimate contact with the 2nd Earl of Devonshire, whose entry into the House of Lords came a l i t t l e l a t e r than the period i n question. I s h a l l complete the reply to the query by showing why Hobbes thought a new threat to c i v i l peace was coming forward under the banner of ancient p r i v i l e g e and martial honour. I mentioned above that Hobbes attended meetings of both the V i r g i n i a and Somer Island Companies i n his capacity as secretary to the 2nd Earl of Devonshire. These companies were launched by the Earl of Southampton, and when Devonshire entered parliament i n 1628 he was to j o i n the faction around Southampton who headed an a r i s t o c r a t i c opposition to the Stuarts. The other s i g n i f i c a n t members of t h i s group were the 3rd Earl of Essex, the Earl of Warwick, B r i s t o l and Arundel. These peers championed "old English honour", they argued that the nobles and th e i r dependents and property should be exempt from arrest and attainder; they refused to use obligatory oaths i n place of honour i n legal proceedings of the privy council; they claimed that honours are won on the b a t t l e f i e l d and not bought (an open attack on the Stuart policy of s e l l i n g t i t l e s ) ; they subsidized research into t i t l e s , notions l i k e honour, and plays which extolled martial v i r t u e ; they claimed that the English constitution was a mixed-monarchy; and f i n a l l y that the t i t l e d n o b i l i t y had the ancient right to act as the p r i n c i p a l counsellors of England. Arundel, i n a speech to the Lords i n 1621, denounced the loss of ancient noble p r i v i l e g e s , referring to the assembled peers as "the Great Councell of the Kingdome, and t h i s i s hereditary to us. " ^ - 1 8 6 -With the exception of a l e t t e r from Robert Mason, l a t e r secretary to Buckingham, we know nothing of Hobbes' p o l i t i c a l concerns from the early 1620's. However, the l i s t of characteristic opinions of the opposition peers detailed above reads l i k e a l i s t of Hobbes' p o l i t i c a l targets. I have already pointed out that Hobbes attacked those who sought a status above the law, who f o o l i s h l y over-rated "their own worth", and were contemptuous of the common people. (E.W.111,283) But Hobbes' most trenchant c r i t i c i s m of t h i s noble faction i s directed at t h e i r claim to hereditary authority as counsellors. Hobbes refers to them as those who claim "to have place i n the highest council of state by inheritance." ( i b i d . , 340) Hobbes' response i s that t h i s b e l i e f i s merely a feudal prejudice deriving from the ancient German confederations of "absolute lords", (ibid . ) whose jealously guarded autonomy i s inconsistent with any l a s t i n g sovereignty. He also has a more considered argument based on the assumption that counsel requires expert knowledge and the a b i l i t y to put aside the passions that promote self-interested advice: Good counsel comes not by l o t , nor by inheritance; and therefore there i s no more reason to expect good advice from the r i c h or noble, i n matter of state, than i n delineating the dimensions of a fortress. (Ibid.) Hobbes' f i n a l word on the matter of hereditary right to the role of counsellor i s incorporated i n his Leviathan discussion of power, honour and worth. The background to his position i s best glimpsed i n what CB. Watson t e l l s us about the "Renaissance d e f i n i t i o n of ' d i s t r i b u t i v e j u s t i c e ' referred to so frequently by - 1 8 7 -the moralists". Watson suggests that i t "came from the Nicomachean Ethics; i n the words of Hurault, ' i t consisteth c h i e f l y i n d i s t r i b u t i n g honour and promotion unto (the King's subjects) according to every man's desert'." 4 0 The claim of the dissident nobles was that honour and promotion were theirs by ancient r i g h t ; but Hobbes' rejoinder i s that to merit something does certainly presuppose a r i g h t , although t h i s right must be based on something promised. Power and worth, that i s , the powers of men and thei r valuation by others, do not confer any right and thus no desert. The claim to o f f i c e through lineage i s thus rebutted. It i s not the worth or value of a man that counts, but rather his worthiness, "a particular power, or a b i l i t y for that, whereof he i s said to be worthy, which particular a b i l i t y , i s usually named FITNESS, or aptitude." (E.W.111,84) Nothing that Hobbes argues entails that the n o b i l i t y w i l l not be the most apt counsellors to the sovereign, but simply that i t i s not t h e i r s o c i a l position which constitutes t h e i r aptitude. What makes a good counsellor occupies Hobbes i n chapters 25 and 30 of Leviathan. This section has provided a context for Hobbes' position on honour, power, and worth. This has been accomplished by drawing attention to the nature of the seventeenth century debate about honour, and to Hobbes' reasons for taking the debate seriously. When locating Hobbes within the debate I said that he held a mixed-conception of honour. Although he was a stern c r i t i c of the older c h i v a l r i c t r a d i t i o n Hobbes did not abandon i t entirely for a meritocratic view. The best way to appreciate Hobbes' own model of - 1 8 8 -a r i s t o c r a t i c virtue i s to see which virtues he recommends as the psychological r e a l i t y of his laws of nature. 5.7 The Magnanimous Man Hobbes had a preferred model of a r i s t o c r a t i c character; one which derived i t s features from both old and new sources: from older c h i v a l r i c sources and from more recent Renaissance sources. In as much as his model combined these features i t i s correctly thought of as a mixed-model; one capable of functioning as a c r i t i c a l tool especially when i t i s compared with the archaic conception. That Hobbes might also be c r i t i c a l of the unmixed meritocratic model i s less clear. I believe that his sympathies were, despite his connections with a martial image of gallantry, strongly behind a conception of n o b i l i t y that could be elaborated e n t i r e l y i n terms of the moral virtues. Hobbes1 noble, gallant, j u s t , or magnanimous ind i v i d u a l i s i n important respects a concession to the past, since his thoroughly c i v i l i a n view of what constitutes moral excellence depends i n no way upon either blood or martial prowess. Nor does i t depend upon a r e l i g i o u s consciousness, a point that was not l o s t on those of Hobbes' contemporaries who drew a d i s t i n c t i o n between the c i v i l i a n s - those concerned with c i v i l righteousness - and the devout. 4 1 However, t h i s section w i l l not deal with those who attacked the merely c i v i l . Instead, I s h a l l develop a characterization of Hobbes' preferred model as he himself did, through a consideration of the laws of nature understood as excellences: - 1 8 9 -The laws of nature are immutable and eternal: what they forbid, can never be lawful; what they command, can never be unlawful. For pride, ingratitude, breach  of -contracts...inhumanity, contumely, w i l l never be lawful, nor the contrary virtues to these ever unlawful, as we take them for dispositions of the mind, that i s , as they are considered i n the court of conscience, where only they oblige and are laws. (E.W.II, 46) By reference to the content of these laws I hope to show that Hobbes1 noble i n d i v i d u a l , his magnanimous man, i s , while certainly embodying elements of an old c h i v a l r i c code, modified and refined i n terms of the virtues Hobbes saw as c i v i l . As might be expected, given Hobbes' worry about self-esteem and honour as other-centred, his magnanimous man enjoys a state of mind, "arising from imagination of a man's own power and a b i l i t y " . (E.W.. I l l , 45) This state of mind i s referred to either as "joy" (ibid.) or "glorying", (ibid.) and consistent with the b e l i e f that power i s preeminence of power ( a l l equality of power being contention), t h i s joy or glorying i s symptomatic of favourable comparison: Glory, or in t e r n a l g l o r i a t i o n or triumph of the mind, i s that passion which proceedeth from the imagination or conception of our own power, above the power of him that contendeth with us. (E.L., 36-37) The magnanimous man, as d i s t i n c t from those who f a l s e l y value t h e i r own capacities, i s able to make a correct estimate of his power based on his "experience of his own former actions", (E.W.Ill,45) and proceed to act i n what Hobbes refers to as an "open manner". (E.L., 47) The man we are dealing with i s superior either i n knowledge, wealth, or status (more l i k e l y the l a t t e r two) and his superiority i s marked by how he treats his i n f e r i o r s . Unlike the - 1 9 0 -man who laughs at the misfortune of others (E.W. 11,3-4) or the one who lords i t over common men, scoffing and jeering at thei r weakness, Hobbes' noble does neither. He does not laugh at the fa i l u r e s of others, "because i t i s affectation of glory from other men's i n f i r m i t i e s " , (E.L., 47) and not from any a b i l i t y of h i s . Nor does he treat i n f e r i o r s with scorn or contempt. Indeed those among the more potent subjects who are singled out for praise by Hobbes, are singled out because of their role i n safeguarding the interests of the i r s o c i a l i n f e r i o r s : The honour of great persons, i s to be valued for the i r beneficence and the aids they give to men of i n f e r i o r rank, or not at a l l . (E.W.Ill, 333) This i s tantamount to saying that only some among those who are r i c h and potent - and thereby the recipients of conventional honour - have anything about them which i s r e a l l y worthwhile. We are safe to conclude t h i s because Hobbes says f i r s t l y that, "[tjhere be some signs of honour, both i n attributes and actions, that be naturally so; as amongst at t r i b u t e s , good, j u s t , l i b e r a l , and the l i k e " ; ( I b i d . , 349) and secondly that the "greatest part of mankind" are either ground down by need or driven by greed, or abandoned to sensual pleasure, ( i b i d . , 331) L i b e r a l i t y presupposes superfluity, and thus those who conform to Hobbes' ideal are men of substance whose endeavours are framed i n part by the concerns of others. Since Hobbes has c l e a r l y asserted that conventional honour i s a pure function of the reception one's power receives, and that great but infamous acts can be sources of great honour, his own ideal of the q u a l i t i e s worthy of the t i t l e of natural honour i s a c r i t i c a l - 1 9 1 -i d e a l : an ideal capable of pointing to a lack of r e a l n o b i l i t y among the n o b i l i t y and others of great power. Magnanimity, considered as a state of mind, i s pride; pride i n our capacities, where the evaluation of those capacities i s carried out i n terms of past actions. Hobbes states unequivocally that pride i n t h i s sense i s desirable: Proper self-esteem...is not a perturbation, but a state of mind that ought to be. Those who estimate t h e i r worth c o r r e c t l y , do so on the basis of th e i r past deeds. (DeH, 60-61) But of course Hobbes invokes the image of the mythical Leviathan precisely because he wishes to emphasize that c i v i l peace requires the presence of coercive constraints on the "children of pride". (E.W.Ill, 307) There i s no c o n f l i c t here however, since Leviathan i s not invoked to contain self-confidence or self-esteem, but rather to constrain those whose pride denies " c i v i l amity" to " a l l those, with whom the business of the world constrains us to converse...", ( i b i d . , 702) The problem i s the individuals who, following A r i s t o t l e , hold that they "by nature are made worthy to command, others only to serve...". (E.W.II, 38) Their superciliousness i s , as the opening argument of De Cive posits, one of the chief reasons why c i v i l i t y without coercion i s unrealizable. As a corrective the f i r s t eleven laws of nature i n De Cive extol virtues which are the positive content of c i v i l character; they are also the properties of Hobbes' magnanimous man. In De Cive Hobbes refers to the f i r s t law of nature as "fundamental", (E.W.II, 16) and suggests that those laws of nature - 1 9 2 -which follow are "derived" from i t . ( i b i d . , 17) The " f i r s t and fundamental law of nature" i s stated thus: [T]hat peace i s to be sought after,- where i t may be  found; and where not, there to provide ourselves for  helps'of war, (ibid.) The derivative laws said to follow from t h i s fundamental one "direct the ways either to peace or self-defence." (ibid) Looked at purely as dictates or d i r e c t i v e s , the laws of nature which follow the f i r s t might well be taken as par t i c u l a r means for accomplishing what i s prescribed i n the double-barrelled f i r s t and fundamental law. But although Hobbes does c a l l the laws of nature "dictates of right reason", ( i b i d . , 16-17) he also refers to the content of the derived laws of nature as virtues and vices: [R]eason i s s t i l l the same, and changeth not her end, which i s peace and defence, nor the means to attain them, to wit, those virtues of the mind which we have declared above, and which cannot be abrogated by any custom or law whatsoever, ( i b i d . , 47) Furthermore, i t i s by reference to t h i s content that Hobbes gives one account of the obligatory nature of the laws: The laws of nature are immutable and- eternal: what they forbid, can never be lawful; what they command, can never be unlawful. For pride, ingratitude, breach  of contracts (or i n j u r y ) , inhumanity, contumely, w i l l never be lawful, nor the contrary virtues to these ever unlawful, as we take them for dispositions of the mind, that i s , as they are considered i n the court of conscience, where only they oblige and are laws, ( i b i d . 46) Since Hobbes considers "manners" to be those q u a l i t i e s which "concern...living together i n peace, and unity", (E.W.Ill, 85) i t would seem plausible to look upon his detailed treatment of the rl93-. derived laws of nature as an extended analysis of the character t r a i t s he took to be most relevant to c i v i l l i f e . Yet, there i s one respect i n which the fundamental law of nature i t s e l f encapsulates a v i r t u e , namely tractableness. I t s exercise also seems to require courage along both i t s pathways: courage to seek peace when the circumstances are uncertain, and courage to defend oneself through combat or "helps of war". (E.W.II, 16) Courageousness plays a prominent role i n Hobbes1 f i r s t model of magnanimity. In his discussion of the relationship between fear and dishonour Hobbes refers to "the passion of courage or magnanimity" (E.L., 101) as that which kept some from wanton k i l l i n g . I cannot see any reason for believing that Hobbes ever abandoned the view that people of the best kind would be courageous, and i t i s precisely his allegiance to what might properly be thought of as the martial aspect of his model that gains expression i n the formulation of the f i r s t law. The grimmer, more martial side to t h i s f i r s t law comes out very c l e a r l y when Hobbes considers the role of conscience i n the application of the laws of nature. What reciprocity requires depends on what others are doing, and Hobbes i s e x p l i c i t about our required behaviour i n the event that others are predatory: I f perhaps some, more humble than the rest, should exercise that equity and usefulness which reason dictates, the others not practising the same, surely they would not follow reason i n so doing...the keepers of the law become a mere prey to the breakers of i t . (E.W.11,45) There are those whose conception of n o b i l i t y of mind would embrace the turning of the other cheek i n t h i s s i t u a t i o n . Hobbes' - 1 9 4 -conception of the magnanimous man i s dismissive of abnegation as a decent quality, without i n any way impugning i t s c i v i l counterpart: the propensity to allow to other men what we demand on the pretext that i t i s necessary to l i f e , ( i b i d . , 39-40) To be meek and humble to one's detriment, " i s dejectedness and poorness of s p i r i t , and a betraying of one's s e l f , i n the time of war." ( i b i d . , 45n) The q u a l i t i e s of character emerging i n t h i s discussion of reciprocity are steadfastness, courage, and might: "doing a l l things against those who do a l l things". Hobbes' paragon "plunders plunderers." ( i b i d ) . Hobbes' treatment of revenge and cruelty has an equally martial tinge. It i s a v i r t u e , so Hobbes says i n De Cive, to carry out punishments or i n f l i c t damage only when we direct "our eye not at  the e v i l past, but the future good". (E.W.11,37) To damage gratuitously, that i s , without l i k e l i h o o d of future good, i s "called cruelty ", (ibid.,38) The viciousness of cruelty i s explained i n terms of i t s propensity to compound enmity, but when Hobbes i s forced to explain the relationship between cruelty and honour -especially i n those situations where the right of nature would appear to be u t t e r l y permissive - the re s t r a i n t against cruelty exists as the operation of self-consciousness: "that bewrayeth the conscience of one's own weakness". (E.L.,101) What could keep the magnanimous man from wanton forms of damage i s concern with his honour, based i n t h i s instance on his b e l i e f that others w i l l interpret cruelty as fear-generated. Destroying enemies through j u s t i f i e d fear of their regeneration i s one thing; doing i t as an exercise i n dominance - woe to the vanquished - i s another. K i l l i n g - 1 9 5 -some that are unlikely dangers i s pusillanimous and base, and i s , i n terms of Hobbes' understanding of psychic structure, a demonstration of dependence: that you are i n some way dependent on them for your safety. Being beholden i n any way i s inimical to the proud s e l f - r e l i a n c e that marks Hobbes' noble man, and the mark i t leaves him with i s ch a r a c t e r i s t i c of the autonomy so jealously guarded by those petty lords who were prominent among the German conquerors of an e a r l i e r period. (E.W..III, 81-83, 340 and VI, 259-60) Commentators have not taken much note of Hobbes' references to the past. Where they have i t has usually been seen as merely further g r i s t to the state of nature m i l l : America here and now and Europe i n the distant past. But i f I am correct i n the b e l i e f that Hobbes feared the fragmenting effect of a r i s t o c r a t i c dissidence because i t threatened to return his nation to an e a r l i e r stage of i t s development (more powerful nobles and a less powerful monarchy), then the image of the German lords associated merely for conquest i s more s i g n i f i c a n t . Hobbes, l i k e Hooker, understood the c i v i t a s or commonwealth as the united w i l l s of a multitude "in one person", (E.W.Ill, 158) and emphatically not the mere concurrence of w i l l s that might well be true of a group of tribes i n search of conquests. Hooker noted that, "a multitude should...concurre i n the 42 doing of one thing (for t h i s i s c i v i l l y to l i v e ) " , and Hobbes' endeavour i s to defend a model of i n d i v i s i b l e sovereignty completely at odds with the s p i r i t of the German t r i b e s , (see E.W. VI, 259) Turning back to the virtues i n De Cive, gratitude i s described i n terms that i l l u s t r a t e an important dimension of a r i s t o c r a t i c l i f e : the court. The t h i r d law states: -196-[T]hat- you suffer not him to be worse for you,- who,  out - of the confidence he had i n you, f i r s t did you a  good turn; - or that you accept not a gift-, but with a  mind - to endeavour that- the giver s h a l l have- no just  occasion -to repent him -of his g i f t . (E.W.11,35) This precept, l i k e most of those that Hobbes of f e r s , i s urged on us i n order to avoid the consequences attendant on the flourishing of i t s e v i l counterpart. I f ingratitude reigns, then "there would be aught of mutual assistance among them, nor any commencement of gaining grace and favour." (ibid. ) In a society where success and s o c i a l prominence were c r u c i a l l y dependent on the good of f i c e s of others who might intercede on one's behalf, anything which had a potential to halt the flow of influence was dangerous. Grace and favour were bestowed by s o c i a l superiors on those below, but mediated by those i n the middle, those whose power was valued for what i t could get one access to. Bacon's comment on Fulke G r e v i l l e brings t h i s point out admirably: "Sir Fulke Grevil had much and private access to Queen Elizabeth, which he used honourably, and did 43 many men good." Lawrence Stone i s an excellent guide to the s o c i a l context assumed by Hobbes' account of gratitude as a virtue: Attendance at court was more than a duty and a pleasure: i t was also a necessity. So wide a range of g i f t s and favours flowed from the Prince that i t was essential for every nobleman to have some influence at Court, which with the decline of the overmighty subject developed into the unique market-place for the d i s t r i b u t i o n of an enormous range of o f f i c e s , favours, and t i t l e s . 4 4 Hobbes expected the growth of ingratitude to have roughly the same effect on l i f e at Court that c i v i l war had on the enjoyment of the f r u i t s of knowledge. -197-Hobbes' magnanimous man bears his own survey, an ineradicable element of which i s comparative; he understands his excellences i n r e l a t i o n to those of others. However, within an honour culture that has contention as an i n t r i n s i c part, insolence and contempt may be used as deliberate strategies to deflate the honour of others. So, men who feel themselves superior must be schooled to avoid showing scorn i n public l i f e . This i s partly accomplished, as already mentioned, by magnanimity being defined as a propensity to help those of i n f e r i o r status, not to r e v i l e them. At t h i s point of his analysis of the laws of nature Hobbes i s c l e a r l y being c r i t i c a l of the reigning model of honour which drives men to "rather lose t h e i r l i v e s (that I say not, the i r peace) than suffer slander". (E.W.11,38) The men he i s familiar with k i l l each other "for t r i f l e s , as a word, a smile, a different opinion, and any other sign of undervalue." (E.W.111,112) Most men i n seventeenth-century England had no honour to lose, so the injunction against what he c a l l s the vice of contumeliousness i s a Hobbesian counsel against insolence and p r i c k l y pride among the n o b i l i t y . True n o b i l i t y , his argument implies, i s inconsistent with disparaging, r i d i c u l i n g or jeering at one's i n f e r i o r s . Witness his comment on "present gallantry": Fine clothes, great feathers, c i v i l i t y towards men that w i l l not swallow i n j u r i e s , and injury towards them that w i l l , i s the present gallantry. (E.W. VI, 211) F i n a l l y , there i s a virtue which Hobbes refers to as "usefulness", or, stated as a precept, "that every man render himself useful unto others". (E.W.11,36) The importance of t h i s - 1 9 8 -quality i n making my case i s that i t once again draws our attention to that segment of the n o b i l i t y whose wealth and position allow them ease, but whose pretensions to power, and whose arrogance, render them unable to confront c i v i l strangers in the way that Hobbes argues i s needed for peace. Such men w i l l , while perfectly well supplied with preservation's needs, "contend on the other side for s u p e r f l u i t i e s " , while on them "alone there lay no necessity of contending", (ibid) Hobbes noted that Cicero called t h i s vice "inhumanity" (ibid.) and i t figures i n Hobbes' thought as part of a complex of dispositions making i t d i f f i c u l t for a man to "accommodate himself to others" ( i b i d ) ; i n t h i s instance because he i s i n d ifferent to the needs of others, and i n other instances where he i s either too proud to allow equality or too greedy to. (E.W.II, 39-40) These are not a l l of the virtues and vices that Hobbes treats as part of his account of the laws of nature; quite a few are devoted to the properties of a good arbitrator or judge. However, from those we have looked at two things at least emerge. F i r s t l y , Hobbes accepted some of the virtues more t y p i c a l of the c h i v a l r i c past, encapsulated i n the idea that magnanimity was courageousness. Secondly, he cl e a r l y d i s l i k e d much of the impact that the older conception had on the tenor of s o c i a l l i f e . Hence the other h a l f of his mixed-conception i s supplied by q u a l i t i e s that are c i v i l i a n : the virtues of a c i t i z e n who can interact peacefully with those whom the business of the world brings him into contact with. Hobbes' magnanimous man i s perhaps an odd amalgam of two l i n e s of influence; but i f so, that might show us something important about the - 1 9 9 -h i s t o r i c a l stance that Hobbes adopts. In t h i s aspect of his thought - the creation of a model of a r i s t o c r a t i c character - Hobbes i s neither thoroughly archaic, nor i s he thoroughly modern. His position i s t r a n s i t i o n a l . Hobbes was both philosopher and h i s t o r i a n , but these roles tend to intermingle when he considers the nature of the n o b i l i t y . At both the personal l e v e l , where Hobbes was tutor and counsel to two of the Earls of Devonshire, and at the l e v e l of theory, where Hobbes1 analysis of the plight of the aristocracy under the Stuarts p a r a l l e l s that of his friend and patron the Duke of Newcastle, the degree of Hobbes1 concern with t h i s s o c i a l class seems profound. 4 5 Yet the remedies that Hobbes suggests, and i n part i c u l a r his model of noble character, derive t h e i r features from Hobbes1 constant reference to a feudal and pre-feudal past. His f i n a l observation would seem to be that the n o b i l i t y were working with conceptions of character that derived from the warrior culture of the old Germans, and that the role of an aristocracy within a monarchy was poorly grasped by the Stuarts. There were of course other s i g n i f i c a n t forces at work, as Stone has demonstrated, but these two were predominant i n Hobbes' analysis. -200-NOTES Notes for the Introduction. 1. These words come from a l e t t e r that Hobbes, then at Chatsworth and no doubt engaged i n writing The Elements of Law, wrote to his l a t e s t charge, William Cavendish, 3rd Earl of Devonshire. Cavendish would have been 21 and had presumably stayed i n Paris after Hobbes returned i n 1637. The l e t t e r i s reprinted i n Miriam Reik's The Golden- Lands of- Thomas Hobbes, (Detroit, 1977), pp. 197-8. Notes for Chapter 1 1. Quentin Skinner, "Conquest and Consent: Thomas Hobbes and the Engagement Controversy" i n G.E. Aylmer (ed.), The Interregnum:  The Quest for Settlement 1646-1660 (London, 1972), p. 98. This book also has a bibliography that d e t a i l s a l l of the Skinner a r t i c l e s on Hobbes. 2. Quentin Skinner, "Hobbes's Leviathan", The H i s t o r i c a l Journal, VII, 2 (1964), pp. 321-333, but especially pp. 324-5. In his "Ideological Context of Hobbes's P o l i t i c a l Thought", The  H i s t o r i c a l Journal, XI, 3 (1966), Skinner claims that "Although the Patriarchal discussion of man's nature was ch a r a c t e r i s t i c a l l y i n s c r i p t u r a l terms, there was a curious p a r a l l e l even here between their invocation of f a l l e n man and Hobbes's assumption of innate wickedness as a p o l i t i c a l premiss." (p. 300). 3. See E.W. I l l , 710 and E.L., xv-xvi. 4. The suggestion was made by Peter Remnant i n correspondence. 5. For Hobbes's own account of The Elements of Law i n manuscript form see E.W. IV, 414; for Robertson's account of the publication/printing of De Cive see his Hobbes (London, 1886), pp. 50-58. 6. See S t i r l i n g Lamprecht's Introduction to his edition of Hobbes's De Cive (New York, 1949), p. x v i i i . 7. Anthony Quinton, The P o l i t i c s of Imperfection (London, 1978), p. 32. 8. See especially E.W. I l l , 308. - 2 0 1 -9. Quentin Skinner, "Thomas Hobbes and his Disciples i n France and England", Comparative - Studies i n Society and History, VIII, (1965-1966), p. 154. 10. i b i d . , p. 163. 11. Skinner i s of course aware of t h i s and does mention early reactions to De Cive, or at least who read i t . See Ibid., p. 167. 12. i b i d . , p. 163-4. 13. In H i s t o r i c a l Manuscripts Commission, 13th • Report-, Appendix;  Pa r t - I I , The Manuscript of His Grace the Duke of Portland; 2:126. 14. From the Latin Verse Autobiography (L.W.I., Ixxxv-xciv) as translated by Benjamin Farrington, Rationalist Annual (1958) p. 26. 15. Quoted from John Bowie's Hobbes - and His C r i t i c s : A Study i n  Seventeenth Century Constitutionalism (London, 1951), p. 71. 16. See Skinner's "Conquest and Consent..." op.cit, pp. 94-98. 17. For details of t h i s debate see Victor Harris, A l l Coherence Gone (Chicago, 1949). 18. See Bowie, Hobbes and His C r i t i c s . . . , op.cit., pp. 77 and 79i 19. Plato, The- Republic (London, 1955), especially the f i r s t two sections of Bk. I I (354-367), pp. 87-99 of the Penguin ed i t i o n . 20. See Bowie, Hobbes and His C r i t i c s . . . , op.cit., p. 80. 21. i b i d . , p. 121. 22. i b i d . , p. 194. 23. Aubrey reports that "I have heard him say that A r i s t o t l e was the worst Teacher that ever was, the worst P o l i t i c i a n and Ethick - a Country-fellow that could l i v e i n the world would be as good: but his Rhetorique and Discourse - on Animals was rare." Brief  Lives (Penguin edition of 1976), p. 318. 24. Dennett of course did not introduce hard wiring as a term of a r t , but he does use i t with respect to t r o p i s t i c behaviour i n creatures l i k e the Sphex wasp. See Brainstorms (Sussex, 1979), p. 76-77. 25. John Eachard, Mr. Hobbes's State of Nature Considered (London, 1672), p. 7. -202-26. i b i d . , pp. 12 and 60-61. 27. This i s the substance of Hobbes's "rule, by which the laws of nature may be easily examined." (E.W. I l l , 144) 28. In Benjamin Whichcote, Works, Vol., I l l , Sect, i v (Aberdeen, 1751). 29. John Passmore, Ralph Cudworth (Cambridge, 1950), p. 11. 30. Ralph Cudworth, True I n t e l l e c t u a l - System of • the Universe (London, 1845), p. 496. 31. Anthony, Earl of Shaftesbury, Characteristics (London, 1900). The - Inquiry from which I quote was f i r s t published i n 1699, and l a t e r included i n the 1711 edition of the former work. 32. G.C. Robertson, Hobbes (Edinburgh, 1886), p. 135-6. 33. Ferdinand Tonnies, Community and Society (New York, 1963), p. 134. The f i r s t German edition appeared i n 1887. 34. Leslie Stephen, Hobbes (Ann Arbor, 1961), p. 23. 35. i b i d . , pp. 141-2. 36. i b i d . For the essay i n which Stephen does offer more discussion of materialism, see "What i s Materialism?" i n An Agnostic's  Apology London, 1893). Notes for Chapter 2 1. David P. Gauthier, The Logic of Leviathan (Oxford, 1969), p. 98. 2. David P. Gauthier, "Thomas Hobbes: Moral Theorist", The Journal  of-Philosophy, LXXVI, No. 10, October 1979, pp. 547-59, p. 548. 2a. i b i d . , p. 547. 2b. i b i d . , p. 548. 3. David P. Gauthier, P r a c t i c a l Reasoning (Oxford, 1963), p. 85. 4. i b i d i , p. 189. 5. i b i d . , p. 90. 6. David P. Gauthier, "Morality and Advantage", Philosophical  Review, LXXVI, October 1967, pp. 460-475, p. 471. -203-7. David P. Gauthier, "Reason and Maximization", Canadian Journal  of Philosophy, Vol. 4, 1975, pp. 411-33, p. 424. 8. i b i d l , p. 431. 9. D.P. Gauthier, The Logic of Leviathan, op. c i t , p. v i . 10. i b i d . 11. i b i d . pp. 1-26. 12. D.P. Gauthier, The Logic of Leviathan, op. c i t . p.5. 13. i b i d . , p. 6. 14. i b i d . 15. i b i d . 16. i b i d . , p. 7. 17. i b i d . , p.8. 18. i b i d . 19. i b i d . , p. 45. 20. i b i d . , p. 61. 21. i b i d . , p. 45. 22. See 8 above. 23. K.R. Minogue, "Hobbes and the Just Man" i n Hobbes and- Rousseau:  A Collection of- C r i t i c a l Essays edited by M. Cranston and R.S. Peters (New York, 1972), pp. 66-84. See p.82. 24. Leo Strauss, The P o l i t i c a l Philosophy of Hobbes: Its Basis and  Its Genesis (Chicago, 1963), p. 24 and 25 for the next. 25. "Hobbes and the Just Man", op.cit., p.78. 26. Quoted from the Vita Johannis- ep. Teruanensis by Marc Bloch i n his Feudal Society (Chicago, 1974) pp. 300-301. Notes for Chapter - 3 1. F.S. McNeilly, "Egoism i n Hobbes", The Philosophical Quarterly, Vol. 16, No. 64 (July, 1966), pp. 193-206, p. 193. -204-2. Bernard Gert's paper, "Hobbes, Mechanism, and Egoism" appeared i n The - Philosophical - Quarterly, Vol. 15, No. 61 (October, 1965), pp. 341-349. 3. F.S. McNeilly, op.cit., pp. 200-201. 4. H i s t o r i c a l Manuscript Commission^ 13th Report, Appendix, Part  I I , The Manuscripts of His Grace the Duke of Portland, 2: 126. 5. A r i s t o t l e , De Anima (translated by J.A. Smith) i n The- Basic  Works of A r i s t o t l e , edited by Richard McKeon (New York, 1941), p. 537. The l i n e reference i s 403a 29f. 6. R.I. Aaron, "A Possible Early Draft of Hobbes' De Corpore", Mind, Vols. 52-3 (1944-5), pp. 342-355. 7. H i s t o r i c a l Manuscript Commission etc., 2: 124. 8. i b i d . , 2: 126. 9. For Hobbes' l e t t e r i b i d . , 2: 128. For Brandt's conjecture see his Thomas Hobbes' Mechanical Conception of Nature (Copenhagen, 1928), p. 391. 10. H i s t o r i c a l Manuscript Commission etc., 2: 128. 11. i b i d . , 2: 130. 12. This l e t t e r , among others, i s to be found i n E.G. Jacoby's edition of, Studien zur Philosophie und ;Gesellschaftslehre i n  17-Jahrhundert (Stuttgart, 1974), p. 147. 13. See A.I. Sabra, Theories of Light from Descartes - to- Newton (London, 1967), especially chs. 1-3; Richard Westfall, Force i n  Newton's Physics (New York, 1971), ch. 2; Alan Shapiro, "Light, Pressure, and Rectilinear Propagation: Descartes' C e l e s t i a l Optics and Newton's hydrostatics", i n Studies i n the History and  Philosophy of Science, Vol. 5 (1974), pp. 239-296. 14. Descartes, Discourse on Method, Optics; Geometry, and  Meteorology, translated By Paul Olscamp (Indianapolis, 1965), p. 34. 15. i b i d . , p. 65. 16. Descartes - Philosophical Letters, translated and edited by A. Kenny (Oxford, 1970), pp. 18-19. 17. Descartes, Discourse on Method etc., p. 36. 18. From Oeuvres de Descartes, Vol. 1, p. 194; the translation i s that of Alan Shapiro at page 242 of his a r t i c l e cited i n note 13 above. - 2 0 5 -19. Descartes, Discourse - on - Method etc., p. 67. 20. i b i d . 21'. i b i d . , p. 68. 22. i b i d . 23. i b i d . 24. i b i d . 25. i b i d . , p. 69. 26. i b i d . 27. i b i d . , p.70. 28. i b i d . 29. Qeuvres de Descartes, Vol. 1, pp. 542-543. 30. F. Brandt, op.cit. 31. i b i d . 32. For th i s l e t t e r see Hobbes' Latin Works, Vol. V, pp. 294-298. The translation was made by Peter Remnant. 33. From Max Kohler, "Studien zur Naturphilosophie des Th. Hobbes", Archiv fur Geschichte- der- Philosophie, Vol. 16 (1903), pp. 59-96; quote comes from page 72. 34. Descartes, Discourse on Method etc., p. 70. 35. L.W.V, 295. Once again, the translation i s that of Peter Remnant. Notes for Chapter-4 1. D.D. Raphael, Hobbes: Morals and P o l i t i c s (London, 1977). The f i r s t passage appears on page 30, the second on page 26. 2. T.A. Spragens, The P o l i t i c s of Motion (Lexington KY, 1973), p. 189. 3. D.P. Gauthier, The Logic of Leviathan (Oxford, 1969), p.7. 4. Homer, The I l i a d , translated by R. Lattimore, (Chicago, 1971), p. 81. -2-06-5. Anthony a Wood, Athenae Oxonienses (Oxford, 1680), p. 482. 6. See I. D'Israeli, Literary Miscellanies (London, 1840), p. 309. 7. See Hobbes' l e t t e r of 1638 to the young 3rd Earl of Devonshire, reprinted i n M. Reik, The Golden - Lands- of Thomas Hobbes (Detroit, 1977), pp. 197-198. Notes for Chapter 5 1. R.G. Collingwood, The - New Leviathan (New York, 1971). In particular Part I I I . 2. CB. Macpherson, The P o l i t i c a l Theory - of Possessive  Individualism: Hobbes to Locke (Oxford, 1962), p. 47. 3. i b i d . 4. i b i d . , p. 13. 5. i b i d . , p. 26. 6. i b i d . , p. 13. 7. i b i d . 8. i b i d . , pp. 16-17. 9. Keith Thomas, "The Social Origins of Hobbes's P o l i t i c a l Thought", i n Hobbes Studies, edited by K.C Brown, (Cambridge, MA, 1965), pp. 186-236. ThTs quotation i s from pp. 186-7. 10. i b i d . , p.189. 11. i b i d . , p. 187. 12. i b i d . , p. 190. 13. i b i d . , p. 199. 14. i b i d . , p. 192. 15i i b i d . 16. Montaigne, Essays I, 31, p. 217 in Donald Frame's translation (Stanford, 1957). The essay i n question i s e n t i t l e d "On Presumption". 17. i b i d . , pp. 202-3. -207-18. L. Stone, The C r i s i s of the Aristocracy 1558-1641 (New York, 1974). 19. John Selden, Table Talk (London, 1887), p. 40. 20. F. Bacon, Essays (New York, no date), p. 422. 21. It was not missed by Richard Tuck however, and chapter 6 of his Natural Rights Theories;•- - Their Origin - and - Development (Cambridge, 1979) discusses the question i n d e t a i l . 22. The period i n question was between 1610 and 1628. 23. Quoted by Lawrence Stone, op.cit., p. 174. 24. Details of Hobbes1 involvement are to be found i n Noel Malcolm's "Hobbes, Sandys, and the V i r g i n i a Company", The H i s t o r i c a l  Journal, 24, 2 (1981), 297-321. 25. Quoted by Mervyn James i n his English P o l i t i c s and the Concept  of Honour 1485-1642, Past and Present Supplement T, (Oxford 1978), p. 5. 26. Quoted by Lawrence Stone, op.cit., p. 350. 27. From James Cleland, Propaideia, or the I n s t i t u t i o n of a Young  Noble Man, quoted by Mervyn James, op.cit., p. 4. 28. Mervyn James, op.cit. 29. A r i s t o t l e , Metaphysics, 1018b 22f. 30. Christopher Kirwan, i n his notes to A r i s t o t l e ' s Metaphysics,  Books Gamma; Delta, and Epsilon (Oxford, 1970). 31. See i n particular Vernon Snow's "Essex and the A r i s t o c r a t i c Opposition to the Early Stuarts", Journal of Modern History, 32 (1960), 224-233. 32. Cassio: "Reputation, reputation, reputation! 0, I Have l o s t my reputation! I have l o s t the immortal part of myself, and what remains i s b e s t i a l . " (Othello 2.3. 257-259). 33. Bacon, op.cit., p. 219. 34. Du Vair's d e f i n i t i o n i s quoted by CB. Watson i n Shakespeare and  the Renaissance Concept of Honour (Princeton, 1960), p. 386. 35. Montaigne, op. c i t . , volume 2, p. 203. 36. For de t a i l s of those who put t h i s case see James op.cit. -208-37. C.L. Barber, The Idea of Honour i n the English Drama,T591-1700, Gothenberg: Gothenberg Studies i n English VI, 1957; pp. 271-2. 38. See Snow op.cit. 39! Quoted by Snow, op. c i t . , p. 227. 40. Watson, op.cit., p. 418. 41. See Samuel Rutherford, T r i a l s and Triumphs of- Faith (London, 1654), p. 102. 42. Richard Hooker, E c c l e s i a s t i c a l P o l i t i e 1,15. 43. Bacon, op.cit., p. 408. 44. Stone, op.cit., p. 191. 45. 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