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Land, community, corporation : intercultural correlation between ideas of land in Dene and Inuit tradition… Piddocke, Stuart 1985

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LAND, COMMUNITY, CORPORATION: INTERCULTURAL CORRELATION BETWEEN IDEAS OF LAND IN DENE AND INUIT TRADITION AND IN CANADIAN LAW by STUART MICHAEL PIDDOCKE M.A., The U n i v e r s i t y of B r i t i s h Columbia, I960 M.A., The U n i v e r s i t y of London, 1962 LL.B., The U n i v e r s i t y of B r i t i s h Columbia, 1975 A THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY i n THE FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIES Department of Anthropology and Sociology We accept t h i s t h e s i s as conforming to the req u i r e d standard THE UNIVERSITY OF BRITISH COLUMBIA January 19^ 5 © S t u a r t Michael Piddocke, 19^ 5 In presenting t h i s thesis i n p a r t i a l f u l f i l m e n t of the requirements for an advanced degree at the University of B r i t i s h Columbia, I agree that the Library s h a l l make i t f r e e l y available for reference and study. I further agree that permission for extensive copying of t h i s thesis for scholarly purposes may be granted by the head of my department or by his or her representatives. I t i s understood that copying or publication of t h i s thesis for f i n a n c i a l gain s h a l l not be allowed without my written permission. Department of The University of B r i t i s h Columbia 1956 Main Mall Vancouver, Canada V6T 1Y3 DE-6 (3/81) ABSTRACT The present enquiry i s a study of s p e c i f i c s o c i a l p o s s i -b i l i t i e s i n a c u l t u r e - c o n t a c t s i t u a t i o n , namely the encounter of the Dene and I n u i t of the Northwest T e r r i t o r i e s w i t h Cana-d i a n s o c i e t y ; and shows how by a n a l y z i n g the b a s i c content of two t r a d i t i o n s i n contact w i t h one another, the p o s s i b i l i t i e s f o r mutual adjustment of one t r a d i t i o n to the other, or the l a c k of such p o s s i b i l i t i e s , may be l o g i c a l l y d e r i v e d from that content. The study a l s o uses the p e r s p e c t i v e of c u l t u r a l eco-logy to devise and demonstrate a way i n which any system of land-tenure may be compared w i t h any other, without the con-cepts of one system being imposed upon the other. The p a r t i c u l a r problem of the enquiry i s to compare the t r a d i t i o n a l ideas of land and land-tenure among Dene and I n u i t w i t h the ideas of land and land-tenure i n Canadian law; and to d i s c o v e r a way whereby the Dene and I n u i t may use the concepts of the dominant Canadian system to preserve t h e i r own t r a d i -t i o n a l ways of holding l a n d . The a n a l y s i s begins by o u t l i n i n g the c u l t u r a l ecosystem of each people, t h e i r b a s i c modes of s u b s i s t e n c e , the resources used, the kinds of t e c h n i c a l operations a p p l i e d to those r e -sources, the work o r g a n i z a t i o n , and r e l e v a n t p a r t s of s o c i a l o r g a n i z a t i o n and world-view. Then, i n order, the i d e a of land which the people appear to be f o l l o w i n g , the kinds of l a n d - r i g h t s and p r i n c i p l e s of land-holding recognized by the" people, and the kinds of "persons" who may hold l a n d - r i g h t s , are desc r i b e d . The systems are then compared i n order to d i s c o v e r the p o s s i -b i l i t i e s f o r " r e c o n c i l i a t i o n " . The enquiry concludes t h a t the b a s i c premises and char-a c t e r s of the Dene and I n u i t systems of land-tenure are funda-mentally i r r e c o n c i l a b l e w i t h those of Canadian r e a l property law, but t h a t the Dene and I n u i t systems can be encapsulated w i t h i n the dominant Canadian system by means of the Community Land-Holding Corporation (CLHC). The CLHC as proposed i n t h i s enquiry would a l l o w the members of a community to hold land among themselves according to t h e i r own r u l e s , w h i l e the c o r -p o r a t i o n holds the land of the whole community against o u t s i d e r s according to the p r i n c i p l e s of Canadian law. - i v TABLE OF CONTENTS PAGE Abstract i i Table of Contents i v Acknowledgements v i i i I QUESTION AND CONTEXT 1 A The Problem 1 B Method 7 C Anthropological Perspectives 14 1. General Anthropological Perspectives 14 2. S p e c i f i c Theoretical and Topical C o n t r i -butions 18 3. S p e c i f i c Ethnographic or Descriptive Contributions 21 4. Contributions from Applied Anthropology 24 D The Logic of the Present Study 28 Notes to Chapter I 35 II DEFINITION OF LAND. PROPERTY, LAND-TENURE. AND PERSON IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 39 A Land 39 B Property, Ownership, and Possession 45 C Land-Tenure 59 D Person 74 Notes to Chapter II 80 - V -III DENE AND INUIT IDEAS OF LAND AND LAND-TENURE 86 A Dene 86 B Inuit 104 C A Summary 110 Notes to Chapter III 112 IV IDEAS OF LAND AND LAND-TENURE IN CANADIAN LAW 120 A. Contexts 120 B The Law of Real Property i n the Common Law 133 1. The Legal Concept of Land 133 2. The Idea of Estate 137 3. Other Interests i n Land 144 4. "Legal" and "Equitable" Interests; "Trusts" 149 5. Gaining and Losing Interests i n Land 152 6. Persons, or Who May Hold Rights to Land 156 7. Summary: Comparative C l a s s i f i c a t i o n of Land-Rights 159 8. Summary: The P r o p r i e t o r i a l System l 6 2 C The Second System: "Administrative" Elements i n the Canadian Law of Land-Tenure 164 D Canadian Law Concerning Native Rights to Land, including Aboriginal T i t l e 170 Notes to Chapter IV 178 V THE TWO SYSTEMS COMPARED 182 A Comparison 182 1. The Idea of Land 182 - v i -2. Ownership and Possession Regarding Land 183 3« Persons Holding Rights to Land 186 B Reconciling the Two Systems 188 Notes tb.eChapter V 196 VI THE IDEA OF THE COMMUNITY LAND-HOLDING CORPORA-TION (CLHC) 198 A What I t Is Not 198 1 . Not a J u r i d i c a l l y Sovereign Unit 199 (a) The Denendeh Proposal 199 (b) The Nunavut Proposal 202 2. Not a Share-Holding Corporation 206 (a) The Menomini Termination 207 (b) The Alaska Native Claims Settlement 213 3. Not a Municipal Corporation 219 4. Not a Band Under the Indian Act 220 B The Structure of the Proposed Community Land-Holding Corporation 223 C Probable Consequences of Becoming a Community Land-Holding Corporation 246 D The CLHC and Aboriginal Rights 251 Notes to Chapter VI 253 VII CONCLUDING ASSESSMENTS 255 A The Problem and Its Solution 255 B Methodological Assessment 267 C Implications f o r Anthropology 273 Notes to Chapter VII v» 275 - v i i -LIST OF SOURCES 276 Books, A r t i c l e s , and Pamphlets 276 Cases and Stat u t e s 289 Other Sources 290 - v i i i -ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS I should l i k e t o thank the f o l l o w i n g f o r permission t o reproduce copyright m a t e r i a l : U n i v e r s i t y of Hawaii Press, f o r excerpt from Henry P. Lundsgaarde, ed., Land Tenure i n Oceania, Honolulu: The U n i -v e r s i t y Press of Hawaii, 1974-• Doubleday and Co., I n c . , f o r excerpt from Asen B a l i k c i , The N e t s i l i k Eskimo, copyright (§) 1970 by Asen B a l i k c i . Oxford U n i v e r s i t y Press (Canada), f o r excerpts from (a) G. W. Paton, A Textbook of Jurisprudence, Oxford: Clarendon P r e s s , 1951* second ed.; and (b) Max Gluckman, ed., Ideas and  Procedures i n A f r i c a n Customary Law, London: Oxford U n i v e r s i t y Press f o r the I n t e r n a t i o n a l A f r i c a n I n s t i t u t e , 1969. M i n i s t e r of Supply and Services Canada, f o r excerpts from Hugh Brody, "Land Occupancy: I n u i t P e r c e p t i o n s , " i n I n u i t Land Use and Occupancy P r o j e c t , Report, Ottawa: Supply and Ser-v i c e s Canada, 1976, v o l . one. - i x The head c h i e f t o l d us t h a t there was not a f a m i l y i n t h a t whole n a t i o n t h a t had not a home of i t s own. There was not a pauper i n t h a t n a t i o n , and the n a t i o n d i d not owe a d o l l a r . . . Yet the defect of the system was apparent. They have got as f a r as they can go, because they own t h e i r land i n common . . . There i s no s e l f i s h -ness t which i s at the bottom of c i v i l i z a -t i o n . * T i l l " t h i s people w i l l consent to give up t h e i r l ands, and d i v i d e them among t h e i r c i t i z e n s so tha t each can own the land he c u l t i v a t e s , they w i l l not make much more progress. — U, S . Senator Henry L. Dawes, i n the e a r l y l8c30*s, a f t e r a v i s i t t o the Cherokee Nation i n Oklahoma, quoted i n Waters (1970: 1 2 5 ) . - 1 -I QUESTION AND CONTEXT A The Problem The purpose of t h i s enquiry i s to compare the ideas of land and land-tenure i n the " t r a d i t i o n a l " c u l t u r e s of the Dene and I n u i t of Canada's Northwest T e r r i t o r i e s w i t h the ideas of land and land-tenure i n Canadian law, s p e c i f i c a l l y the Common Law t r a d i t i o n ; and to d i s c o v e r a way, i f any i s p o s s i b l e , i n which Dene and I n u i t communities might use the l e g a l concepts of the dominant Canadian system of land-law to preserve t h e i r own ways of land-tenure without s e r i o u s d i s t o r t i o n . The enquiry i s an essay i n the a p p l i c a t i o n of anthropo-l o g i c a l understanding to a p a r t i c u l a r instance of a r e c u r r e n t problem i n the contact of c u l t u r e s . That problem i s , what happens when the system of land-tenure of a given s o c i e t y be-comes subordinate t o , i n law or i n p r a c t i c e , another s o c i e t y whose system of land-tenure i s r a d i c a l l y d i f f e r e n t i n kind? Must the subordinate s o c i e t y l o s e i t s own system of land-tenure (which w i l l now l i k e l y be l a b e l l e d " t r a d i t i o n a l " ) to the new and dominant system, or can the subordinate s o c i e t y somehow preserve ( i f i t d e s i r e s to) i t s own system of land-tenure and the p a r t i c u l a r i n t e r e s t s founded on t h a t system? C l e a r l y , f o r one system of land-tenure to become subord-i n a t e t o another, the dominant system must have both the power to dominate the other and the w i l l to al l o w the subordinate people some existence as a d i s t i n c t i v e c u l t u r e , i n c l u d i n g some maintenance of the subordinate people's own ways of d e a l i n g w i t h the l a n d . I f the would-be dominator l a c k s the power to dominate, the other s o c i e t y w i l l not become subordinate and the question of a s e r v i e n t land-tenure system s u r v i v i n g w i l l not a r i s e . (At t h i s p o i n t , l e t me adopt the usage of l e g a l w r i t e r s such as Hooker (1975:55) and Smith (1974:4) and l a b e l the subordinate l e g a l system or system of land-tenure the " s e r -v i e n t " one. The word "subordinate" . w i l l then be reserved f o r the people or s o c i e t y which i s thus being dominated.) On the other hand, i f the dominator refuses to recognize the other group as con t i n u i n g i n some measure to be a d i s t i n c t group hav-in g i t s own ways of d e a l i n g w i t h i t s own la n d , the subordinate group l o s e s i t s land anyway except as i t can persuade the dom-ina n t group to l e t the subordinate people hold land according to the ways of the dominant group; and so the people's o l d system of land-tenure i s a b o l i s h e d and swept away. I n other words, the s i t u a t i o n of a s e r v i e n t l e g a l system or a s e r v i e n t system of land-tenure, emerges where the c u l t u r a l and l e g a l d i f f e r e n c e between the two peoples or s o c i e t i e s i n contact i s maintained, w h i l e one of the peoples or s o c i e t i e s possesses the power to intervene to change the laws and p r a c t i c e s of the other. The problem of r e c o n c i l i n g d i f f e r e n t systems of land-tenure a r i s e s , t h e r e f o r e , i n the intermediate zone bounded by, on the one extreme, the meeting of independent s o c i e t i e s of equal power, and, on the other, the t o t a l domination and a s s i m i l a t i o n of one s o c i e t y by another."*" One v a r i e t y of t h i s intermediate c o n d i t i o n c h a r a c t e r i z e s the land i n t e r e s t s of Indian and I n u i t peoples i n Canada. A l -2 though p o l i t i c a l l y completely dominated by Canadian s o c i e t y , these peoples have nevertheless been recognized i n Canada as being m o r a l l y and l e g a l l y e n t i t l e d t o some s p e c i a l regard as the a b o r i g i n a l peoples of the country. They are recognized i n Canadian law as possessing v a r i o u s a b o r i g i n a l r i g h t s . One of these r i g h t s i s to the t r a d i t i o n a l use and occupancy of t h e i r l a n d , except i n s o f a r as they have given away t h i s r i g h t by t r e a t y w i t h or s a l e to the Crown, or except i n s o f a r as they have abandoned the l a n d , or perhaps have l o s t i t to the Crown by the Crown's conquering them i n war (which has not happened i n Canada). This r e c o g n i t i o n of a b o r i g i n a l t i t l e i s a r i g h t granted i n Canadian law, i . e . by the law of the dominant s o c i e t y , and r e s t s on various moral ideas and h i s t o r i c a l precedents w i t h i n both Canadian s o c i e t y p a r t i c u l a r l y and Western c i v i l i z a t i o n 3 g e n e r a l l y . As p a r t of i t s own notions about what i s and what i s not l e g a l l y proper, the Canadian government has been o b l i g e d to make t r e a t i e s w i t h the various Indian peoples i n order to e x t i n g u i s h the Indians' " a b o r i g i n a l t i t l e " (the l a s t v e s t i g e s of former Indian sovereignty) and property claims over the l a n d , and to c l e a r the way f o r the Crown l e g a l l y to d e a l w i t h the land as i t deems f i t . ^ " I n Canadian eyes at l e a s t , these t r e a t i e s i n -volved the r e c o g n i t i o n by the Indians t h a t u l t i m a t e l e g a l con-t r o l over the land had passed from the Indians and was now vested i n the Crown. T r e a t i e s No. 8, i n 1899» and No.11, i n 1921, supposedly extinguished a b o r i g i n a l t i t l e f o r the Indians of the Northwest T e r r i t o r i e s . No such t r e a t i e s were signed w i t h the I n u i t . However, the Dene, th a t i s , the Indian people of the Northwest T e r r i t o r i e s , i n t h e i r own eyes signed only t r e a t i e s of peace and f r i e n d s h i p . As they viewed, and s t i l l view, what happened, they d i d not give away t h e i r land to anyone. This f a c t was brought to l i g h t as a r e s u l t of i n t e r v i e w s conducted, s i n c e 1966, by members of the Company of Young Canadians, by the Indian Brotherhood of the N.W.T., and by a n t h r o p o l o g i s t s from the U n i v e r s i t y of Iowa (Fumoleau 1973:15), and was made more wid e l y known i n Fumoleau's book, As Long As This Land S h a l l  Last (1973)- The discrepancy between the Dene and Canadian i n -t e r p r e t a t i o n s of the t r e a t i e s persuaded Mr. J u s t i c e Morrow of the Supreme Court of the Northwest T e r r i t o r i e s , i n 1973» to decide t h a t T r e a t i e s 8 and 11 had not c l e a r l y extinguished the a b o r i g i n a l t i t l e of the Dene (Re P a u l e t t e et a l . and R e g i s t r a r of T i t l e s (No. 2) (1973), 42 D.L.R. (3d) 8, at p. 35). This f a c t i n f l u e n c e d the context of proposals to b u i l d p i p e l i n e s f o r gas and o i l t r a v e r s i n g the Mackenzie R i v e r v a l l e y from Alaska ( v i a the northern Yukon and the Mackenzie d e l t a ) to A l b e r t a and po i n t s f u r t h e r south. The f e d e r a l government i n March 1974 t h e r e f o r e appointed a Royal Commission under Mr. J u s t i c e Thomas R. Berger to i n q u i r e i n t o and repo r t upon the s o c i a l , environmental, and economic impacts of c o n s t r u c t i n g such p i p e l i n e s . P r e l i m i n a r y hearings began i n A p r i l 1974, f u l l f ormal hearings i n March 1975» community hearings began i n A p r i l 1975 and ended i n August 1976, hearings were held i n ten south-ern Canadian c i t i e s i n May and June 1976, and formal hearings concluded i n November 1976 i n Y e l l o w k n i f e , N.W.T.^  Dene and I n u i t l e a d e r s , i n the Denendeh and the Nunavut proposals ( t o be described i n chapter VI, s e c t i o n A, below), have s t r i v e n and are s t i l l s t r i v i n g f o r some form of land s e t -tlement which w i l l g ive them maximum c o n t r o l over the ways i n which the resources of t h e i r lands (as they regard these) w i l l be e x p l o i t e d . Through Denendeh and Nunavut, the Dene and I n u i t seek p o l i t i c a l c o n t r o l over the economic development of the North. I f they get what they seek, namely, something somewhat more autonomous than a province and a k i n to Home Rule ( P a t t e r -son 1976), they w i l l be able to maintain, i f they wish, a b o r i g -i n a l ideas of land-tenure i n l a r g e measure, or to change them, again i n l a r g e measure, as they see f i t . Someone coming from (the r e s t of) Canada to Denendeh or Nunavut would then be moving from a country w i t h one k i n d of land-law to a country w i t h an-other k i n d , and the problem of a d j u s t i n g one's expectations would be no d i f f e r e n t than i n passing from the j u r i s d i c t i o n of on sovereignty t o another. The problem of two d i s s i m i l a r ? systems of land-tenure being i n contact would be solved by p o l -i t i c a l l y and l e g a l l y s e p a r a t i n g the two systems so t h a t n e i t h e r could dominate the other. The present enquiry, on the other hand, envisages the l i k e l i h o o d t h a t the Dene and I n u i t w i l l not r e a l i z e t h e i r Denen deh and Nunavut proposals. The t e r r i t o r i e s would then remain under the j u r i s d i c t i o n of Canada ( o r perhaps become Common Law provinces) and the present land-law would p r e v a i l . I s there s t i l l any way, a more modest way, whereby such Dene and I n u i t as may wish t o , might preserve t h e i r own ways of regarding land and h o l d i n g i t ? Could the Dene and I n u i t use Canadian l e g a l ideas concerning land and land-tenure to preserve ideas and p r a c t i c e s concerning land which r i s e out of d i f f e r e n t e x p e r i -ences and c u l t u r a l t r a d i t i o n s and f o l l o w d i f f e r e n t premisses? This i s the problem addressed by t h i s enquiry. - 7 -B Method The problem i t s e l f d i c t a t e s the method of i t s s o l u t i o n . I f we could e x t r a c t , from r e l e v a n t sources, the ideas of land and land-tenure held r e s p e c t i v e l y by the Dene and I n u i t and i n Canadian law, and compare them, we should be able at once to perceive how they might ( o r might not) f i t together. The more s i m i l a r the two systems, the e a s i e r i t should be f o r the s e r v i e n t systems (those of the Dene and I n u i t ) to express and maintain themselves i n the terms of the dominant ( t h a t of Canada). E x t e n s i v e l y d e t a i l e d i n q u i r y i n t o e i t h e r s i d e of the com-p a r i s o n should not be necessary. We would be comparing the s t r u c t u r e s of each system, and e s p e c i a l l y the b a s i c p o s t u l a t e s or fundamental assumptions of each system, w i t h those of the other. The more r a d i c a l l y d i f f e r e n t the systems being compared, the sooner should these d i f f e r e n c e s d i s p l a y themselves, and the fewer d e t a i l s be necessary. As i t happens ( i f I may a n t i c i p a t e f o r a moment the r e -s u l t s of the e n q u i r y ) , when we compare the " t r a d i t i o n a l " Dene and I n u i t systems w i t h the Canadian system, we f i n d t h a t Dene and I n u i t approaches to land and land-tenure are c l o s e l y s i m i l a r v a r i e t i e s of a k i n d of land-tenure which might be l a b e l l e d (though awkwardly) " t r i b a l " , w h i l e the Canadian system belongs to a very d i f f e r e n t k i n d which may be l a b e l l e d " p r o p r i e t o r i a l " . (What " t r i b a l " and " p r o p r i e t o r i a l " systems are, w i l l be explained - 8 -i n the next chapter.) The two systems are so d i f f e r e n t , indeed, that they cannot be f i t t e d together without one system destroy-ing the other. There i s one way out, however. By means of the idea of "corporation," found i n Canadian law, a community of people following a t r i b a l system of land-tenure may encapsulate them-selves as a single property-holding person within a proprietor-i a l system. Something resembling t h i s s o l u t i o n i s , indeed, already followed within Canadian society by such groups as the Hutterites, and i s f a m i l i a r as a minor theme i n Western c i v i l -i z a t i o n generally. The argument w i l l therefore proceed i n four steps. F i r s t , I s h a l l describe the ideas of land and land-tenure which the Dene and Inuit of the Northwest T e r r i t o r i e s have. My data sources are ethnographic materials and the community hearings of the Berger Commission. The Dene of the N.W.T. belong to the wider family of Athapaskan-speaking peoples who dwell not only i n the western Northwest T e r r i t o r i e s (mostly i n the D i s -t r i c t of Mackenzie), but also i n northern Alberta, northern and central B r i t i s h Columbia, the Yukon, and Alaska. Although there are appreciable differences among the various Athapaskan regional groupings (see Jenness 1958:377-404; National Museum of Man 1974:20-37; Vanstone 1974:1-22), the peoples are never-theless s u f f i c i e n t l y s i m i l a r that the description of the Dene of the N.W.T. may be cautiously enlarged by data from other northern Athapaskan groups. Second, I s h a l l describe the ideas of land and land-tenure _ 9 -found i n Canadian law, s p e c i f i c a l l y those from the common-law t r a d i t i o n , s i n c e t h i s i s the l e g a l t r a d i t i o n which governs the Northwest T e r r i t o r i e s . My data sources are w r i t t e n l e g a l de-c i s i o n s , s t a t u t e s , and textbooks i n law and ju r i s p r u d e n c e , plus the advantage of a Bachelor of Laws degree. T h i r d , having described each system, I s h a l l then s e t them s i d e by s i d e so th a t they can d i s p l a y t h e i r own s i m i l a r i t i e s and d i f f e r e n c e s . From t h i s d i s p l a y , the d i f f i c u l t i e s of r e -c o n c i l i n g the two systems should appear q u i t e p l a i n l y . Fourth, I s h a l l o u t l i n e the idea of a community l a n d -h o l d i n g c o r p o r a t i o n which seems to be the only means of recon-c i l i a t i o n (and " r e c o n c i l i a t i o n " i n a somewhat s t r a i n e d meaning, at t h a t ) . I n doing so I s h a l l have not only to s p e c i f y the c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s which such a c o r p o r a t i o n must have, but a l s o to d i s t i n g u i s h i t from a number of other l e g a l e n t i t i e s (such as the share-holding corporation) w i t h which i t may be confused. F i n a l l y , I s h a l l draw the argument together i n a c o n c l u -ding assessment and there t r y to dea l w i t h any d i f f i c u l t i e s which may have emerged. Before I can begin to describe the Dene and I n u i t land systems, however, I s h a l l have to in t e r p o s e a chapter d i s c u s -s i n g the d e f i n i t i o n s of " l a n d " , "land-tenure", "property", "ownership" and "possession", and "person" f o r comparative purposes. This d i s c u s s i o n w i l l f o l l o w i n the next chapter. The same chapter w i l l a l s o d i s c u s s the three general types of land-tenure which ( f o r want of b e t t e r names) I s h a l l c a l l "Type A" or " t r i b a l " , "Type B" or " a d m i n i s t r a t i v e " , and "Type C" or - 1 0 -" p r o p r i e t o r i a l " • I n comparing systems of any k i n d , and not only systems of land-tenure, however, i t i s a great help to have i n mind a general p a t t e r n , appropriate to the k i n d of systems being com-pared, whereby the d e s c r i p t i o n s of the p a r t i c u l a r systems may be set out. Then the s i m i l a r i t i e s and d i f f e r e n c e s between the p a r t i c u l a r systems can stand out almost by themselves. For comparing the Dene and I n u i t land systems w i t h the Canadian l e g a l land-system, I s h a l l have i n mind the f o l l o w i n g i d e a l order. F i r s t , s i n c e ideas of land and of land-holding are p a r t of a mode of subsistence or of production r e l a t i n g the s o c i e t y t o i t s environment, each d e s c r i p t i o n begins w i t h a sketch of the c u l t u r a l ecology of the people whose ideas are to be d e s c r i b e d . This d e s c r i p t i o n covers, i n order, the e n v i r o n -ment and resources used by the people, the c h i e f techniques by which the people appropriate and use these resources, the work o r g a n i z a t i o n of the people, and f i n a l l y r e l e v a n t p o r t i o n s of the s o c i a l o r g a n i z a t i o n and (perhaps) world-view of the people. I n a word, the f i r s t step ( i d e a l l y ) i n c l u d e s d e s c r i b i n g the "use and occupancy" of the land by the people. The second step i s to describe the i d e a of land which the people have. How do they perceive or conceive the land on which they l i v e and the resources which they use? Is the land a blank on which they w r i t e whatever they d e s i r e , or i s i t something w i t h i t s own c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s which must be a p p r e c i -ated and cooperated with? Is i t something p a s s i v e , to be used as the people's own purposes d i c t a t e , or i s i t perhaps:a place of powers a c t i v e l y i n t e r a c t i n g w i t h the people? I s i t empty, or i s i t f u l l of meaning? Is i t bounded, and can i t be d i v i d e d and subdivided; o r i s i t perceived more as an i n d i v i s i b l e and interdependent whole? Are the people separate from the l a n d , or are they themselves a l s o p a r t of the land? And so on. While we may not be a b l e , given the data, to answer a l l such questions as these, s t i l l these questions i n d i c a t e the scope of what we should consider when searching f o r a people's i d e a of l a n d . T h i r d , then, come the r u l e s and p r a c t i c e s concerning who may and may not use what aspect or p o r t i o n of l a n d , and who may and may not enjoy what r i g h t s and d u t i e s , claims and l i a b i l i t i e s , concerning the l a n d . Such i s the general p a t t e r n which w i l l organize the de-s c r i p t i o n s of the p a r t i c u l a r land systems being compared i n t h i s enquiry. I s h a l l not t r y to manifest the whole p a t t e r n , however, but only so much of i t as i s needful f o r the argument. In d i s c u s s i n g the r i g h t s and d u t i e s connected w i t h l a n d , i t w i l l be e s p e c i a l l y u s e f u l to keep i n mind the d i s t i n c t i o n between sovereignty and property. Sovereignty concerns the r i g h t and power of the whole community to admit o u t s i d e r s to the land o r t o exclude them from the l a n d , and to determine, without o u t s i d e i n t e r f e r e n c e , what r u l e s and p r a c t i c e s the members of the community may p r o p e r l y have among themselves concerning the l a n d . Property concerns those r u l e s and pr a c -t i c e s themselves; i t i s the r i g h t s and d u t i e s which the mem-bers of the community e x e r c i s e between themselves concerning - 1 1 a -the l a n d . The d i s t i n c t i o n between sovereignty and ownership ( o r property) bears upon the problem of the enquiry as f o l l o w s . The question to be answered asks i f there i s any way i n which the Dene and I n u i t can use the ideas of land and land-tenure i n Canadian law to preserve t h e i r own t r a d i t i o n a l ideas of land and land-tenure. The question assumes ( f o r purposes of argu-ment) t h a t the Dene and I n u i t have l o s t sovereignty and must t h e r e f o r e secure t h e i r claims to the land by means of the con-cepts of Canadian law, i . e . the law of the dominant s o c i e t y . I f they had s o v e r e i g n t y , namely, i f they were recognized as the r u l e r s of the t e r r i t o r y on which they d w e l l , they could secure t h e i r claims according to t h e i r own law and would not need to use Canadian law concepts at a l l . Then the problem which t h i s essay seeks to r e s o l v e would not a r i s e , except as a p u r e l y h y p o t h e t i c a l problem. The problem presupposes t h a t the Dene and I n u i t have l o s t s o v e r e i g n t y , and so must defend themselves by means of Canadian l e g a l i d e a s . The very n o t i o n of " a b o r i g i n a l t i t l e " or of " a b o r i g i n a l r i g h t s " as a s p e c i a l b a s i s f o r land claims presupposes t h a t the " a b o r i g i n e s " have l o s t s o v e r e i g n t y . This i m p l i c a t i o n was made very c l e a r by Chief J u s t i c e M a r s h a l l of the U.S. Supreme Court, i n an argument which has been accepted as c o r r e c t by Canadian c o u r t s . The o r i g i n a l i n h a b i t a n t s (he s a i d ) . . . were admitted to be the r i g h t f u l occupants of the s o i l , w i t h a l e g a l as w e l l as j u s t c l a i m to r e t a i n pos-s e s s i o n of i t , and to use i t according to t h e i r own d i s -c r e t i o n ; but t h e i r r i g h t s to complete sovereignty« as independent n a t i o n s , were:/ rnecessarily diminished, and t h e i r power to dispose of the s o i l , at t h e i r own w i l l , - 12 -to whomsoever they pleased, was denied by the o r i g i n a l fundamental p r i n c i p l e , that discovery gave exclusive t i t l e to those who made i t . (Johnson v. Mcintosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 240 (1823) at p. 254; c i t e d i n Cum-ming and Mickenberg 1972:34) (Emphasis mine — S.P.) The Dene Declaration (McCullum and McCullum, n.d.; Wat-kins 1977:3-4) c a l l s f o r the recognition of the Dene Nation as a d i s t i n c t people, and says that "Nowhere i n the New World have the Native peoples won the r i g h t to self-determination and the r i g h t to recognition by the world as a d i s t i n c t people and as Nations." The Governments of Canada and of the Northwest Ter-r i t o r i e s , says the Declaration, "were not the choice of the Dene, they were imposed upon the Dene." In these words the Dene concede that they do not have sovereignty (and also that they have not v o l u n t a r i l y relinquished i t ) . The p a r t i c u l a r problem of the present enquiry therefore presupposes a s i t u a t i o n which i n f a c t exists at the time of the enquiry, even though some Dene and Inuit also desire and are working to change that s i t u a t i o n . The problem, that i s to say, i s not purely hypothetical, but i s one which the Dene and Inuit may themselves discover, and the s o l u t i o n proposed i s one which they might f i n d u s e f u l . I have referred above to " t r a d i t i o n a l " ways of land-7 holding. The word " t r a d i t i o n a l " has various meanings. I t may be used to characterize s o c i e t i e s which are i n some way not ".modern" and therefore are open to or perhaps r e s i s t a n t to "modernization". I t may be used to mean the society or culture as i t was p r i o r to contact with Western c i v i l i z a t i o n , or those elements i n the present society or culture which sup-posedly survive from pre-contact times. Or the word " t r a d i t i o n a l " may be used to name those items of s o c i e t y and c u l t u r e which the people themselves consider to be e s t a b l i s h e d as t h e i r own way of doing t h i n g s , whether these items be i n f a c t p r e -contact or recent i n o r i g i n . " T r a d i t i o n a l " i n the l a t t e r sense means "accepted" and i s contrasted w i t h "imposed from o u t s i d e " . A given b e l i e f o r behaviour may, of course, be " t r a d i t i o n a l " i n a l l f o u r of these meanings at once; and an item beginning as "imposed" may i n time become " t r a d i t i o n a l " . But the d i f f e r e n c e between these meanings i s important f o r our enquiry as regards the Dene and I n u i t . " T r a d i t i o n a l " i n the f o u r t h meaning now i n c l u d e s t r a p p i n g f o r f u r s to be s o l d f o r money or store-goods. Such t r a p p i n g f o r f u r s t o be s o l d e t c . , i s not a pre-contact p r a c t i c e , although i t i s p a r t l y s i m i l a r to s e t t i n g t r a ps as p a r t of hunting; and the word " t r a p p i n g " i s used to name both hunting f o r food and t r a p p i n g f o r f u r s . Hunting f o r food i s i t s e l f an a c t i v i t y continuous w i t h pre-contact p r a c t i c e s , and o l d techniques continue to be used; but the major hunting weapon i s th a t post-contact i n -strument, the gun. For the purposes of t h i s enquiry, t h e r e f o r e , I s h a l l mean by " t r a d i t i o n a l " those items of c u l t u r e o r s o c i e t y which have been accepted by the people as the people's own, and which whatever t h e i r o r i g i n s are now regarded as worthwhile parts of a way of l i f e thought worthwhile p r e s e r v i n g by the people. " T r a d i t i o n a l " i n t h i s meaning c o n t r a s t s w i t h "imposed by out-s i d e r s " • - 14 -C Anthropological Perspectives I described t h i s enquiry at the beginning as an essay i n the application of anthropological understanding. I could also have ca l l e d i t a test of the a p p l i c a b i l i t y of anthropo-l o g i c a l ideas. Every attempt to apply an approach or a set of ideas i s automatically also a test of whether those ideas can or cannot be applied; and there i s no way to test t h e i r a p p l i c a b i l i t y except by t r y i n g to apply them. In t h i s section of chapter one, I should l i k e to review b r i e f l y what anthropological ideas I have found to be a p p l i c -able to the p a r t i c u l a r problem of t h i s enquiry. I w i l l con-centrate on what has been p o s i t i v e l y h e l p f u l , because to re-view also what i s not applicable would be tantamount to a r e -view of the whole of c u l t u r a l and s o c i a l anthropology. As a f i r s t approximation, the anthropological perspect-ives used i n the present enquiry, may be sorted under four headings, namely, ( l ) general anthropological perspectives, (2) s p e c i f i c t h e o r e t i c a l and t o p i c a l contributions, (3) spec-i f i c ethnographic or descriptive contributions, and (4) con-t r i b u t i o n s from applied anthropology. General Anthropological Perspectives I f I were to try to sum up i n one phrase the golden thread, as i t were, which unites the perspectives of anthropology, I would say, "Cognizing human phenomena i n context•" There are - 1 5 -many contexts i n anthropology, and many ways of construing items i n these s e v e r a l contexts. A given event, custom, or datum (whatever i t may be) can be viewed as something w i t h i n an e v o l u t i o n , as an item of c u l t u r e learned and d i f f u s e d , as an expression of human nature, as part of an ecosystem, as an element i n a s t r u c t u r e , as having a f u n c t i o n i n a l a r g e r s y s -tem, as a t o o l of adaptation, as an e x e m p l i f i c a t i o n of a c u l -t u r a l theme, as something w i t h i n or having a h i s t o r y , as part of a process of some k i n d , as being caused and having e f f e c t s , as something w i t h i n a s p i r a l of feedbacks, as an element i n a system of meanings, as something r e l a t e d to various human mo-t i v e s , as pa r t of a sa n c t i o n system, and so on. I t can be view-ed against the background of the s o c i e t y or c u l t u r e i n which i t occurs, or against the background of other human s o c i e t i e s or c u l t u r e s (the comparative p e r s p e c t i v e ) , or w i t h i n a geo-g r a p h i c a l s e t t i n g , or w i t h i n the context of the whole p l a n e t . But whichever p a r t i c u l a r context may be chosen by the observer, s t i l l the p a r t i c u l a r matter being observed w i l l be observed i n context. Along w i t h t h i s sense of context, goes a sense t h a t the matter being recorded i n context i s somehow a part of a system, th a t there i s an order w i t h a s t r u c t u r e which can somehow be apprehended and desc r i b e d . This sense o f , or f e e l i n g f o r , system has t r a d i t i o n a l l y ( i n anthropology) expressed by saying t h a t s o c i e t y or c u l t u r e i s " i n t e g r a t e d " , i s some s o r t of a Vwhole". I would instance Kroeber ( 1 9 4 8 ) , Malinowski ( 1 9 4 4 ) , Radcliffe-Brown ( 1 9 5 2 ) , and F i r t h ( I 9 6 l ) as g i v i n g , each i n - 16 -his own way and from his own perspective, well-known exemplary statements of context, system, and structure; these p a r t i c u l a r works have also shaped my own basic anthropological perspect-ive very considerably (even when I do not agree with t h e i r p a r t i c u l a r assertions). (To say that society or culture i s a "whole" should not, however, be taken to mean that there i s no c o n f l i c t within so-ci e t y , or even that s o c i e t i e s or cultures are necessarily s e l f -maintaining systems. There are instances (e.g. Henry 1964 on the Kaingang of B r a z i l ) of s o c i e t i e s d r i v i n g p e l l - m e l l f o r de-st r u c t i o n . And yet even there, behind the appearance of de-st r u c t i o n some sort of order i s being realized.) Anthropological enquiry has, I think, two aspects which complement one another. One i s the nomothetic or law-seeking aspect, whereby the anthropologist "attempts to subsume part-i c u l a r facts or events under general rules or laws." (Nadel 1951:191) This i s sometimes c a l l e d the " s c i e n t i f i c " aspect of anthropology. The other i s the idiographic or (as i t i s sometimes called) the " h i s t o r i c a l " aspect, whereby the enquirer t r i e s to portray the p a r t i c u l a r i t y and uniqueness of what he i s observing. Nadel (1951:194) while.characterizing anthro-pology as science, wrote also that anthropology i s something more. I t reaches out to the " t o t a l i t y of experience" to touch something which the purely nomothetic cannot reach. The nomothetic and the idiographic, I think, depend upon one another. The universal must be sought f o r i n the p a r t i c u -l a r s , but the p a r t i c u l a r i s also (besides being i t s e l f ) the - 1 7 -coming together of many u n i v e r s a l s . In the general anthropo-l o g i c a l p e r s p e c t i v e , as I would l i k e to conceive i t , these two are j o i n e d . The h a b i t of mind which I am here d e s c r i b i n g as the gen-e r a l a n t h r o p o l o g i c a l p e r s p e c t i v e , informs the present enquiry from beginning to end. The ideas of land and of land-tenure of each s o c i e t y i n contact are seen as p a r t s of a l a r g e r s o c i o -c u l t u r a l and e c o l o g i c a l context. But the p a r t i c u l a r problem of the enquiry, and the method of s o l u t i o n , are such t h a t the context may be very much reduced and s t i l l the question f u l l y answered. The general a n t h r o p o l o g i c a l h a b i t of mind works here, p a r a d o x i c a l l y , i n d e c i d i n g what a n t h r o p o l o g i c a l t h e o r i e s and d e s c r i p t i o n s are r e l e v a n t and what i r r e l e v a n t to the problem — i n s e t t i n g , t h a t i s , c r i t e r i a f o r e x c l u s i o n . Having s a i d t h a t anthropology views s o c i a l phenomenon i n , context, I must immediately recognize t h a t f o r a given s o c i a l phenomenon not a l l parts of the context are e q u a l l y important. This i s f o r t u n a t e : otherwise a d e s c r i p t i o n of the context would be l o g i c a l l y bound to i n c l u d e the whole world present and past and p o s s i b l e . Context i s graded i n t o degrees of r e l e -vance. Degrees of relevance are defined by one's problem and purposes as w e l l as by the nature of the phenomenon being i n -v e s t i g a t e d . They are a l s o defined by one's n o t i o n of relevance or s i g n i f i c a n c e , and t h a t n o t i o n i s guided by one's t h e o r i e s o r , i n the absence of theory, by one's hunches or d e t e c t i v e ' s i n t u i t i o n . - 18 -2. S p e c i f i c Theoretical and Topical Contributions One d i v i s i o n of anthropology has proven immediately r e -levant and s p e c i f i c a l l y h e l p f u l . That i s the d i s c i p l i n e of c u l t u r a l ecology. Interpreted broadly, t h i s d i s c i p l i n e views human populations and cultures as l i v i n g i n environments which both a f f e c t and are affected by the humans; the people and t h e i r environment form a single system every part of which i s sooner or l a t e r a f f e c t i n g every other part. As I see i t , t h i s broad i n t e r p r e t a t i o n implies that each part (however defined) both has i t s own character which cannot be reduced to the ex-pression or r e s u l t of the other parts and also i s what i t i s pa r t l y because of i t s p o s i t i o n i n and i n t e r a c t i o n with the whole system. Each part conditions, but does not wholly determine, the other parts. This broad in t e r p r e t a t i o n accomodates both the narrower viewpoint which Asch (1979 :82-88), f o r instance, with the Dene i n mind, has l a b e l l e d the "ecological-evolutionary model" and c r i t i c i z e d as inadequate, and the "mode of production approach" (Asch 1979:88-90) which he himself prefers. In my view, the environment of a people should be construed to include not only the natural or non-human environment, but also the other human s o c i e t i e s and cultures with which the people i n t e r a c t . Thus the c o l o n i a l s i t u a t i o n , which the Dene and Inuit are i n (compare Watkins 1977; Brody 1975)> i s an ecological factor of f i r s t importance to which a people must adapt. C u l t u r a l ecology has usually been interpreted more narrowly as being concerned with the relationships between a people and - 19 -t h e i r n a t u r a l environment, c u l t u r e being regarded as the human means of adaptation, and the mode of subsistence as the c h i e f mode of adaptation ( f o r examples of t h i s approach see N e t t i n g 1977; Cohen 1968, esp. pp. 40-60), Other v a r i a t i o n s i n c l u d e concerns w i t h system and feedback and n a t u r a l s e l e c t i o n ( r e -peated themes i n the c o l l e c t i o n e d i t e d by Vayda 1969), and w i t h the c o n t r o l of energy by humans ( C o t t r e l l 1955; Vayda 1969). These various concerns inform my approach, even though they may not be e x p l i c i t l y a p p l i e d . The concept of adaptive s t r a t e g y a l s o informs Vanstone's (1974:121-126) summary of northern Athapaskan c u l t u r e , which has been a considerable help i n the present enquiry. Ideas of land and land-tenure f a l l very n e a t l y i n t o a c u l t u r a l e c o l o g i c a l framework, i n c l u d i n g a framework concerned w i t h adaptation and modes of sub s i s t e n c e . I n p a r t i c u l a r , J u l i a n Steward's (1955:40-42) "three fundamental procedures of c u l t u r a l ecology" have s p e c i f i c a l l y provided the model f o r the i d e a l order f o r comparing the Dene and I n u i t systems w i t h the Canad-i a n system, o u t l i n e d i n s e c t i o n B of the present chapter. The theory of a c c u l t u r a t i o n i s another d i v i s i o n of anthro-pology which bears on the present enquiry. I n p a r t i c u l a r , the elementary framework given by Dohrenwend and Smith (1962) has helped t o guide my perceptions and c o n s t r u c t i o n s of the Dene and I n u i t meeting the Canadians. S i g n i f i c a n t l y enough, Dohren-wend and Smith s i n g l e out as a major f a c t o r i n c u l t u r e - c o n t a c t s i t u a t i o n s the degree of power which one of the c u l t u r e s enjoys over the other. They q u i t e e x p l i c i t l y i n c l u d e the c o l o n i a l s i t u a t i o n as a v a r i a b l e a f f e c t i n g a c c u l t u r a t i o n . Apart from - 20 -t h e i r paper, however, the l i t e r a t u r e on a c c u l t u r a t i o n i s largely-marginal to the s p e c i f i c problem of the enquiry. The f o c i of a c c u l t u r a t i o n theory and of the present enquiry are d i f f e r e n t enough so t h a t the two e n q u i r i e s touch only o b l i q u e l y . I f power i s a concern of the enquiry, however, perhaps the d i s c i p l i n e of p o l i t i c a l anthropology has something t o o f f e r ? The proposal of the Community Land-Holding Corporation i s a proposal f o r a means whereby the Dene or I n u i t communities can ga i n or r e t a i n a measure of power w i t h i n a l e g a l system based on premisses a l i e n to t h e i r t r a d i t i o n a l c u l t u r e s . I t i s a way of u s i n g the dominant s o c i e t y ' s own r u l e s to p r o t e c t the subordinate s o c i e t y . Power i s s u r e l y at stake here. P o l i t i c a l anthropology may be sor t e d i n t o the study of p o l i t i c a l systems ( e x e m p l i f i e d by Fortes and Eva n s - P r i t c h a r d 1940) and the study of p o l i t i c a l processes ( e x e m p l i f i e d by B a i l e y 1969, and by Swartz, Turner, and Tuden 1966). Apart from being i n c l u d e d i n the general a n t h r o p o l o g i c a l p e r s p e c t i v e discussed above, the study of p o l i t i c a l systems as such has not been a p p l i c a b l e . The study of p o l i t i c a l processes adds not much more. I t does, however, emphasize t h a t r u l e s , such as laws, are resources to be used i n p o l i t i c a l c o n f l i c t ( N i c h -o l a s 1968), and so reminds me tha t the matters being i n v e s t i g a -ted i n the present enquiry occur against a ground of p o l i t i c a l a c t i v i t y . B a i l e y ' s (1969:144-185) d i s c u s s i o n of "encapsula-t i o n " gives a name to the s o l u t i o n provided by the proposed Community Land-Holding Corporation. But the enquiry i s not an enquiry i n t o process (we s h a l l - 21 -f i n d out f u r t h e r on j u s t what s o r t of enquiry i t i s ) , and so the minimal a p p l i c a b i l i t y of p o l i t i c a l anthropology i s not s u r -p r i s i n g . L e g al anthropology i s r e l e v a n t i n an.oblique s o r t of way. Hoebel*s (1954) suggestion t h a t the l e g a l systems of v a r i o u s c u l t u r e s can be summarized as s e t s of j u r a l p o s t u l a t e s and so compared, p a r a l l e l s what I am doing i n the present en-q u i r y . I am a b s t r a c t i n g the g u i d i n g ideas of two systems (name-l y the Dene and I n u i t ) and comparing them w i t h the g u i d i n g ideas of a t h i r d (namely, Canadian l a w ) , j u s t as Hoebel was doing i n h i s summaries of j u r a l p o s t u l a t e s . ( I would not, however, go so f a r as to c h a r a c t e r i z e my summaries as summaries of j u r a l p o s t u l a t e s . ) But otherwise, l e g a l anthropology i s not p r e c i s e l y 9 a p p l i c a b l e . These, then — c u l t u r a l ecology, a c c u l t u r a t i o n , p o l i t i c a l and l e g a l anthropology — , are the parts of the t h e o r e t i c a l s i d e of anthropology which have anything to c o n t r i b u t e to the s o l u t i o n of the s p e c i f i c problem of t h i s enquiry. Has the d e s c r i p t i v e s i d e anything to o f f e r ? 3. S p e c i f i c Ethnographic or D e s c r i p t i v e C o n t r i b u t i o n s . The short answer to the question, "What ethnographies ( ;in a broad sense) are r e l e v a n t to the present study?" i s , "None, unless they d e s c r i b e Dene, I n u i t , or Canadians." But t h i s short answer r e q u i r e s e x p l a n a t i o n and q u a l i f i c a t i o n . The problem and the method compare two c u l t u r e s (Dene and I n u i t on the one s i d e , Canadian on the other) and examine the - 22 -l o g i c a l - s t r u c t u r a l c o m p a t i b i l i t y of the two. This l o g i c a l -s t r u c t u r a l c o m p a t i b i l i t y depends on the characters of the c u l -t u r e s being compared, and not on anything e l s e . I t i s t h e r e -f o r e methodologically c o r r e c t to compare the two c u l t u r e s as i f nothing e l s e e x i s t e d i n the world. While i t may be i n t e r -e s t i n g to note congruent o r non-congruent phenomena elsewhere i n the wo r l d , those phenomena do not r e v e a l the characters of the Dene or I n u i t or Canadian s o c i e t i e s . The present enquiry i s i d i o g r a p h i c and not nomothetic. We are i n v e s t i g a t i n g the p o s s i b i l i t i e s inherent i n one p a r t i c u l a r s i t u a t i o n , namely the encounter of Dene and I n u i t w i t h Canada, and not anywhere e l s e . We are not proposing a general law, not even a general law about the encounter of s o c i e t i e s l i k e the Dene and I n u i t w i t h s o c i e t i e s l i k e Canada. Of course, data about what has happened elsewhere can throw l i g h t on the p a r t i c u l a r encounter which we are c o g n i z i n g . But t h a t l i g h t depends on our f i r s t c o g nizing the encounter. Before I can decide, f o r example, i f happenings i n (say) Oceania help me t o understand what i s happening i n the Northwest T e r r i -t o r i e s , I must f i r s t c l e a r l y know what i s happening i n the Northwest T e r r i t o r i e s . And of course I must a l s o know what i s happening i n Oceania. Otherwise I am simply comparing un-known w i t h unknown. I can use the b e t t e r known to help me d i s c o v e r more about the l e s s e r known, provided I assume at l e a s t h y p o t h e t i c a l l y t h a t the l e s s e r known i s s i m i l a r to the b e t t e r known. Then I can propose hypotheses about the l e s s e r known and use them - 23 -as guides to experience the l e s s e r known. The r e s u l t of these experiencings w i l l then r e v e a l to me whether or not my hypo-theses were tru e and whether my assumption of s i m i l a r i t y was t r u e . I f I were t r y i n g to e x p l a i n something about the p a r t i c -u l a r s i t u a t i o n , and were developing a general law to do so, t h i s procedure would be a p p l i c a b l e . But the present enquiry i s not t h a t s o r t of enquiry. The general p r i n c i p l e here i n v o l v e d i s t h a t the p a r t i c u -l a r f a c t s must be e s t a b l i s h e d l o . g i c a l l y p r i o r to the general law, and t h a t comparisons presuppose t h a t the o b j e c t s to be compared have already been s e p a r a t e l y cognized (whether tem-p o r a l l y beforehand or c o n c u r r e n t l y ) . More s p e c i f i c a l l y , before I can decide whether other s i t u a t i o n s are r e l e v a n t to the Dene-Inuit-Canadian encounter, I must f i r s t know the character of t h a t encounter. And s i n c e the problem of the present enquiry asks only about a p o s s i b i l i t y w i t h i n t h a t encounter, other hap-penings are n e i t h e r d i r e c t l y r e l e v a n t nor p a r t i c u l a r l y h e l p f u l i n my construing t h a t encounter f o r what i t i s i d i o g r a p h i c a l l y . M e t h o d o l o g i c a l l y , thertfore, the problem of the enquiry can be answered without reference to any ethnographies except those about the Dene, the I n u i t , or the Canadians. These l a t t e r a r e, of course, i n d i s p e n s a b l e . Other ethnographic evidence would become r e l e v a n t , how-ever, once I have concluded the enquiry and proposed the Com-munity Land-Holding Corporation. Then one may p r o p e r l y ask, " W i l l the CLHC r e a l l y work? What d i f f i c u l t i e s might i t have to face? Perhaps the experience o f . s i m i l a r corporations e l s e -- 24 -where i n s i m i l a r s i t u a t i o n s w i l l shed l i g h t on these questions." Indeed, not only s i m i l a r i t e s but a l s o d i f f e r e n c e s would then be r e l e v a n t . (See s e c t i o n A of chapter VI f o r examples.) Co-v a r i a t i o n s between d i f f e r e n c e s i n context and d i f f e r e n c e s i n outcome would al l o w us to propose nomothetic hypotheses about implementing CLHC's which we could then apply to the Dene-Inuit-Canadian s i t u a t i o n i n order t o a n t i c i p a t e p o s s i b l e outcomes t h e r e . But t h a t a p p l i c a t i o n already presupposes t h a t we have done what the present enquiry does. 4. C o n t r i b u t i o n s from A p p l i e d Anthropology I n s o f a r as a p p l i e d anthropology i n v o l v e s the t h e o r e t i c a l and d e s c r i p t i v e s i d e s of anthropology, i t s a p p l i c a b i l i t y to the present enquiry has already been assessed above. But there i s something more to consider. The present enquiry i s i t s e l f a work of a p p l i e d anthropology. Even i f the extent of a n t h r o p o l -ogy's a p p l i c a b i l i t y be thought to be not l a r g e , the i n g r e d i e n t i s present and e s s e n t i a l . By " a p p l i e d anthropology" I understand the a p p l i c a t i o n of a n t h r o p o l o g i c a l ideas and methods towards the achievement of purposes and goals other than a c q u i r i n g a n t h r o p o l o g i c a l data or making and t e s t i n g a n t h r o p o l o g i c a l t h e o r i e s . I n other words, a p p l i e d anthropology uses anthropology to achieve ends out s i d e anthropology i t s e l f . Those ends, of course, may or may not be consonant w i t h the aims of anthropology. Let me presume, f o r the purposes of argument, t h a t the aim of anthropology i s t o understand, both n o m o t h e t i c a l l y and i d i o g r a p h i c a l l y , the nature of humankind and human culture and society, and i s not, qua anthropology, to change the world. (This i s what Bastide (1974:170) c a l l s the " l i b e r a l " conception of anthropology.) Then the attempt to change the world, or to r e s i s t changes i n i t , w i l l be another sort of a c t i v i t y , and when i t uses anthropology as a means may be c a l l e d "applied anthropology"• As a f i r s t approximation, the ends, or values and purposes, which applied anthropology serves, may be characterized as either l i b e r a t i n g (promoting autonomy) or dominating (promoting heteronomy) (Barclay 1968:5; Bastide 1974:8, 158). Libera-t i o n or autonomy i s the determination of an act by the uncoerced w i l l s of the actors themselves;• domination or heteronomy i s the determination of an act by purposes or actors other than the actors a c t u a l l y performing the act and against the unpress-ured choice of the l a t t e r . The d i s t i n c t i o n between the two i s not i n practice always so simple, but i t w i l l serve as a general note f o r the present enquiry. The tasks of the applied anthro-pologist may be divided into i n t e l l i g e n c e gathering and imple-menting ends. In " i n t e l l i g e n c e gathering", the anthropologist simply gathers facts and analyzes p o s s i b i l i t i e s , but the facts which he seeks to gather and the p o s s i b i l i t i e s which he analyzes are set f o r him by the requirements of others and w i l l be used by those others f o r t h e i r purposes (or by the anthropologist himself to r e a l i z e his non-anthropological purposes). Thus the facts and analyses produced by the anthropologist have f a i r l y d i r e c t implications f o r s o c i a l action. - 26 -A review of a n a t i v e land c l a i m i s an example of such " i n t e l -l i g e n c e gathering" and a n a l y s i s . I n "implementing ends", the a p p l i e d a n t h r o p o l o g i s t uses h i s a n t h r o p o l o g i c a l knowledge to d i r e c t people's a c t i v i t i e s to achieve c e r t a i n g o a l s . He may seek to educate them, or he may be an a d m i n i s t r a t o r or even a p o l i t i c i a n . Indeed, as soon as the a n t h r o p o l o g i s t communicates h i s f i n d i n g s beyond the e s o t e r i c c i r c l e of h i s f e l l o w anthro-p o l o g i s t s , he i s ^educating" or " i n f l u e n c i n g by words" and so at l e a s t beginning to implement ends. " A c t i o n anthropology" (Tax 1964: 256-7), f o r example, i s l i b e r a t o r y education. How do these remarks bear on the present enquiry? The problem of the enquiry i s t o compare the Dene and I n u i t ideas of land and land-tenure w i t h the ideas of land and land-tenure i n Canadian law i n order to d i s c o v e r i f the two sets of ideas are " r e c o n c i l a b l e " and i f the Dene and I n u i t can use the ideas  of Canadian land-law to preserve t h e i r own t r a d i t i o n a l ways of  l a n d - h o l d i n g . I am, t h a t i s to say, e x p l o r i n g two t r a d i t i o n s t o d i s c o v e r i f they a l l o w c e r t a i n kinds of a c t i o n to be r e a l i z e d . The enquiry i s an enquiry i n t o s o c i a l p o s s i b i l i t i e s , i n t o the p o t e n t i a l i t i e s f o r a p a r t i c u l a r k i n d of a c t i o n permitted by the t r a d i t i o n s . This k i n d of enquiry i s i t s e l f a type of a p p l i e d anthropology. To search out a s o c i a l p o s s i b i l i t y i s to d i s c o v e r a p o s s i b i l i t y e i t h e r f o r domination or f o r l i b e r a t i o n ; to pub-l i s h one's f i n d i n g i s a p o l i t i c a l act open-endedly r e l e v a n t to i n c r e a s i n g e i t h e r ( o r both) domination and l i b e r a t i o n . (Know-ledge i s always two-edged.) But, and not p a r a d o x i c a l l y , t h i s i s the nature of the a n t h r o p o l o g i c a l e n t e r p r i s e i t s e l f . The study of human s o c i a l and c u l t u r a l phenomena, and of the connections among them, by i t s e l f r e v e a l s p o s s i b i l i t i e s f o r human a c t i o n , and the communi-c a t i o n of those f i n d i n g s bears d i r e c t l y on human domination and human l i b e r a t i o n . The present enquiry i s t h e r f o r e anthro-p o l o g i c a l at i t s very r o o t , where the d i f f e r e n c e between "pure" and " a p p l i e d " anthropology disappears and the terms "pure" and " a p p l i e d " become meaningless. "^ The records of a p p l i e d anthropology c o n t a i n s t u d i e s made f o r v a r i o u s purposes, and s t o r i e s of i n t e r v e n t i o n s a c t i v e l y i n v o l v i n g a n t h r o p o l o g i s t s . I n p a r t i c u l a r we may note the f i e l d of community development. S t o r i e s of success and f a i l u r e i n community development are ethnographic m a t e r i a l r e l e v a n t to the question whether a Community Land-Holding Corporation might f a i l o r succeed. Most p a r t i c u l a r l y , they remind us th a t com-munities e x i s t i n l a r g e r p o l i t i c a l systems, and must cope w i t h these p o l i t i c a l environments. The s t o r y of Vicos i n Peru i s exemplary (Dobyns, Doughty, and L a s s w e l l , eds., 1971). The very act of forming a c o r p o r a t i o n i s p o l i t i c a l . But these questions, as I have already noted, a r i s e beyond the s t r i c t bounds of the problem set out at the beginning of t h i s enquiry. - 28 -D The Logic of the Present Study This enquiry i s a study of s o c i a l p o s s i b i l i t i e s , but of a very s p e c i f i c s o r t of p o s s i b i l i t i e s . The question i s whether one normative t r a d i t i o n , namely the land-law of the dominant Canadian s o c i e t y , can be used to defend and preserve another normative t r a d i t i o n , namely the ideas and p r a c t i c e s concerning l a n d of the subordinate Dene and I n u i t s o c i e t i e s . We are com-pa r i n g c u l t u r a l " p a t t e r n s " e x i s t i n g i n the form of e x p l i c i t and i m p l i c i t r u l e s about how to dea l w i t h l a n d , and ass e s s i n g the l o g i c a l c o m p a t i b i l i t y of these two " p a t t e r n s " . On the Canadian s i d e , we have a t r a d i t i o n of r u l e s and precedents whose adherents are aware th a t they are f o l l o w i n g and a p p l y i n g a t r a d i t i o n of r u l e s and precedents. The law, th a t i s to say, i s an e x p l i c i t system. I t i s what E. T. H a l l (1977:106-107) has c a l l e d a "low-context system". That i s , the l e g a l t r a d i t i o n leans towards making i t s r u l e s and prece-dents e x p l i c i t , and towards, as i t were, s p e l l i n g matters out. A l s o , i t tends t o t r y to be s e l f - c o n t a i n e d , separated and s p e c i -a l i z e d from the r e s t of the c u l t u r e . As such, the t r a d i t i o n becomes a body of knowledge which can be used as resources f o r i n f l u e n c i n g and s a n c t i o n i n g people's behaviours. The knowing and u s i n g of t h i s t r a d i t i o n becomes something which p a r t i c u l a r persons can s p e c i a l i z e i n . That i s to say, the t r a d i t i o n be-comes the object of atechnic or c r a f t , and p r a c t i t i o n e r s , namely lawyers, become t e c h n i c i a n s . Because the Canadian land-law i s a normative t r a d i t i o n which has been e x p l i c i t l y c r y s t a l l i z e d or e x t e r i o r i z e d i n docu mentary form, namely i n s t a t u t e s , the records of j u d i c i a l de-c i s i o n s , textbooks, and commentaries, we can d i s c o v e r i t s con-t e n t and s t r u c t u r e f a i r l y e a s i l y . Because Canadian s o c i e t y i s the dominant s o c i e t y , Canadian land-law i s the t r a d i t i o n i n t o which the ideas of land and of l a n d - h o l d i n g of the sub-or d i n a t e Dene and I n u i t s o c i e t i e s must be cast i f they are to be defended. (Note how the p r a c t i c a l or pragmatic concern be-hind the problem i s shaping the l o g i c of problem and method.) Therefore, we must construe the Dene and I n u i t ideas of land and l a n d - h o l d i n g as i f they are, or could become, as e x p l i c i t a normative t r a d i t i o n as the Canadian law; and we must, i f the t r a d i t i o n s permit, t r y to express the Dene and I n u i t ideas of land and land-tenure as i f they were a body of r u l e s and p r i n c i p l e s and c a t e g o r i e s . ( I n so doing, we are a l s o i m p l i c i t l y a s s e s s i n g the p o t e n t i a l i t y of the Dene and I n u i t t r a d i t i o n s to g i v e r i s e t o a body of law d i f f e r e n t i n content and s t r u c t -u r a l form from Canadian law, perhaps, but s t i l l r e c o g nizably a l e g a l order.) Thus the o v e r a l l p o l i t i c s of the s i t u a t i o n , namely a concern to help the Dene and I n u i t g a i n or r e t a i n a measure of s e l f - d e t e r m i n a t i o n i n t h e i r p o s i t i o n of s o c i e t a l s u b o r d i n a t i o n to Canadian s o c i e t y , s e t s Canadian law as the t a r g e t - f o r m (as i t were) w i t h reference to which and towards which the Dene and I n u i t t r a d i t i o n s are to be t r a n s l a t e d . Having n o t i c e d t h i s d i r e c t i o n of t r a n s l a t i o n , we can of course ask ourselves i f we could or should a l s o t r a n s l a t e i n the othe - 30 -d i r e c t i o n ; and we s h a l l t h e r e f o r e d e s i r e a method which allows t r a n s l a t a b i l i t y (where such i s p o s s i b l e ) i n e i t h e r d i r e c t i o n . When we examine Dene and I n u i t s o c i e t i e s , however, we f i n d there no t r a d i t i o n which i s an e x p l i c i t and s p e c i a l i z e d normative t r a d i t i o n l i k e the Canadian l e g a l t r a d i t i o n . The c l o s e s t to such i s the body of "mythology" (as we c a l l i t ) c o l l e c t e d by ethnographers and others from Dene and I n u i t . This "mythology" i s drawn from the s t o r i e s which the people t e l l from generation to generation. The s t o r i e s are accounts of the remembered past and a l s o paradigms f o r a c t i o n and j u s t i -f i c a t i o n s of present p r a c t i c e s . Some s t o r i e s are a l s o about what ought not to be done, and what ought not to have been done. They express and p o r t r a y an order of l i v i n g . . (The c l o s e -est p a r a l l e l to them i n the Canadian l e g a l t r a d i t i o n would be the c o l l e c t i o n s of law re p o r t s which c o n t a i n the statements d e l i v e r e d by judges when they made t h e i r d e c i s i o n s . The court records r e l a t e what happened at the t r i a l s ; the j u d i c i a l de-c i s i o n s , on the other hand, j u s t i f y the judges' d e c i s i o n s i n terms of the l e g a l t r a d i t i o n , and have thereby a c e r t a i n near-mythic q u a l i t y about them. Both law — even a d m i n i s t r a t i v e r e g u l a t i o n s — and mythology are c o l l e c t i v e r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s m a i n t a i n i n g the "mechanical s o l i d a r i t y " (Durkheim 1964:130) of a s o c i a l order.) Furthermore, Dene and I n u i t s o c i e t i e s were a b o r i g i n a l l y , and s t i l l are, n o n - l i t e r a t e c u l t u r e s . They are t r a n s m i t t e d by example of behaviour and by word of mouth. The s t o r i e s are heard, not read. The ideas of land and land-tenure which - 31 -the Dene and Inuit have, are communicated i n the practices of Dene and Inuit regarding t h e i r use and occupancy of the land and i n the s t o r i e s they t e l l which reveal the meaning of the land to them. This i s very clear, f o r instance, i n the materials contained i n the Report of the Inuit Land Use and Occupancy Project (1976). We must therefore transform the ideas of the Dene and Inuit v i a t h e i r o r a l and behavioural expression into written materials corresponding to the written materials of the Canadian l e g a l t r a d i t i o n . Fortunately, t h i s task has been done f o r us, at l e a s t s u f f i c i e n t l y f o r our purpose, by ethnographers and other writers describing the Dene and Inuit; and t h i s written material has been further digested and summarized into some he l p f u l and u s e f u l surveys. Many Dene and some Inuit have also t o l d t h e i r s t o r i e s at the community hearings of the Mackenzie Valley Pipeline Inquiry, and the t r a n s c r i p t s of these hearings provide another source of written data. The ethnographic l i t e r a t u r e and the community-hearings t r a n s c r i p t s , on the side of the Dene and Inu i t , and the statutes, law reports, textbooks, and commentaries, on the side of Can-adian law, provide therefore the two deposits of t r a d i t i o n upon which we may draw f o r our comparisons. From these two deposits of t r a d i t i o n , these sets of w r i t -ten words, we then draw out the guiding themes or p r i n c i p a l ideas, and express these, again i n words, as a d e s c r i p t i o n of the o v e r a l l structure, or s t r u c t u r a l form (to borrow and trans-pose a notion from Radcliffe-Brown 1952:192-193), of each trad-- 32 -i t i o n . These ' s t r u c t u r a l forms' are then compared and t h e i r l o g i c a l c o m p a t i b i l i t y i s a s c e r t a i n e d . I f the two s t r u c t u r e s are l o g i c a l l y compatible, then one t r a d i t i o n may be cast i n t o the form of the other without being d i s t o r t e d or destroyed, and i t should be p o s s i b l e to defend Dene and I n u i t ideas of land and l a n d - h o l d i n g by means of Canadian land-law i d e a s , both i n theory and i n p r a c t i c e . Let us now look at t h i s problem i n a somewhat d i f f e r e n t manner. We have construed the problem as one of comparing two t r a d i t i o n s , v a r i o u s l y expressed i n deeds, spoken words, and writ-t e n words, and have t r a c e d how these two t r a d i t i o n s can be transposed or transformed i n t o the same medium of w r i t t e n words and t h e r e f o r e made l o g i c a l l y comparable. Now l e t us con-s i d e r b r i e f l y the r e l a t i o n s h i p between these t r a d i t i o n s , thus construed and compared, and the " s o c i a l processes" or " s o c i a l a c t i o n s " from which they have been, as i t were, a b s t r a c t e d . Ideas of land and of l a n d - h o l d i n g occur i n contexts. They are p a r t of the dealings which human beings have w i t h land and w i t h one another. Ideas are models, w i t h i n human minds, "of" and " f o r " ( c f . Geertz 1966:7) the world and human ac t i o n s w i t h i n the world. A system of land-tenure i s , i n a l l i t s f u l l n e s s , people a c t i n g upon the land and upon one another, and v a r i o u s l y coping w i t h the e f f e c t s of t h e i r doings. Actions f o l l o w one another i n sequences, and sequences of a c t i o n s i n t e r -s e c t one another i n interwoven s t r a n d s . This f o l l o w i n g and interweaving of a c t i o n s i s what we c a l l "process", and the - 33 -shape of the f o l l o w i n g and interweaving i s what we c a l l the " s t r u c t u r e " of the "process". This s t r u c t u r e may be viewed as a p a t t e r n or form p e r s i s t i n g through time, much as the shape of a human body p e r s i s t s through the incessant biochemical and b i o p h y s i c a l a c t i v i t i e s of l i f e . Such a form may be l a b e l l e d " synchronic". Or the s t r u c t u r e of the process may be the form or shape of i t s changes through time, namely such changes as are l a b e l l e d "growth", "development", " e v o l u t i o n " , " o s c i l l a -t i o n " , and "feedback". Such forms may be l a b e l l e d " d i a c h r o n i c " . Both synchronic and d i a c h r o n i c s t r u c t u r e s may be perceived by the' a c t o r s i n v o l v e d i n them, as w e l l as by outside a c t o r s , and mentally modelled a c c o r d i n g l y . The mental models of these s t r u c t u r e s can then enter the processes of a c t i o n as models f o r the a c t o r s t o f o l l o w , models which blend w i t h and transform the models f o r and of behaviour which the a c t o r s are already f o l l o w i n g . I n t h i s enquiry, however, we are not d e s c r i b i n g s o c i a l processes. We are seeking to d i s c o v e r and to summarize and to compare the general c h a r a c t e r of the mental models used w i t h -i n t h a t k i n d of s o c i a l process which may be c a l l e d " l a n d - h o l d i n g " . Process i s the ground against which we s h a l l make our observa-t i o n s , but ideas and the s t r u c t u r a l forms of ideas are the f i g u r e s which we s h a l l be d e s c r i b i n g and comparing. The s t r u c -t u r e s which we s h a l l seek out, furthermore, are synchronic r a t h e r than d i a c h r o n i c . I n t h i s way, the problem of the enquiry becomes manage-a b l e . That problem i s Cl repeat) to compare the ideas of land - 34 -and l a n d - h o l d i n g t r a d i t i o n a l l y h e ld by the Dene and I n u i t of the Northwest T e r r i t o r i e s w i t h the ideas of land and land - h o l d -i n g i n Canadian law, and to d i s c o v e r a way ( i f there i s a way) whereby Dene and I n u i t might use the ideas of land and l a n d -h o l d i n g i n Canadian law to preserve t h e i r own way of regarding and u s i n g and hol d i n g l a n d . The method f o l l o w s from the prob-lem, and has already been o u t l i n e d . The method has i t s own elegant s i m p l i c i t y . I t i s , as I have already noted, i d i o g r a p h i c i n t h a t i t r e q u i r e s no compara-t i v e m a t e r i a l from s o c i e t i e s other than the s o c i e t i e s whose p o s s i b i l i t i e s are a c t u a l l y being assessed. I n order to demon-s t r a t e the s i m p l i c i t y of the method, I s h a l l i n the f o l l o w i n g chapters confine the d i s c u s s i o n s t r i c t l y t o what i s d i r e c t l y r e q u i r e d by the method o u t l i n e d . I n t h i s way, the nature and l o g i c of the i d e a t i o n a l s t r u c t u r e s of the three t r a d i t i o n s of lan d - h o l d i n g which we are comparing, should be p l a i n l y evident, and the p o s s i b i l i t i e s or i m p o s s i b i l i t i e s of r e c o n c i l i n g them eq u a l l y p l a i n l y evident. - 35 -Notes to Chapter I 1 Hooker (1975:56) writes concerning the d i s t i n c t i o n be-tween dominant and servient: I t should be stressed at t h i s point that the sys-tems which we designate 'dominate* a l l operate and were or are e f f e c t i v e from a p o s i t i o n of p o l i t i c a l superior-i t y i n any p a r t i c u l a r area. In both p r a c t i c a l and the-o r e t i c a l terms t h i s means that the l e g a l system of the dominant p o l i t i c a l culture possesses absolute and un-q u a l i f i e d power on i t s own terms to admit, a l t e r , or suppress any exis t i n g indigenous laws. These powers were or are exercised wholly i n terms of the dominant l e g a l p o l i c y or p o l i c i e s as to what i s f e l t to be d e s i r -able f o r the indigenous population. In many cases, of course, the po l i c y i t s e l f often varied either i n time or i n space, allowing f o r changes i n l e g a l attitude t o -wards the ( p o l i t i c a l l y ) i n f e r i o r systems. However, "absolute and unqualified power" overstates the matter. The power i s "absolute and unqualified" i n a l e g a l sense. The dominator i s l e g a l l y sovereign. But i n a p o l i t i c a l sense the power i s not absolute and un-q u a l i f i e d . I t must be exercised with some awareness of the s e n s i b i l i t i e s of the subordinate people, who are, a f t e r a l l , being l e f t i n some measure to follow t h e i r own ways. The power i s there, nonetheless. I f the dominant society has both the w i l l and the power to assimilate the subordinate society, and has s u f f i c i e n t time to do so, the subordinate people's l e g a l system w i l l not long be servient — i t w i l l disappear. Where the w i l l to assimilate i s lacking, or the power i s i n s u f f i c i e n t to accomplish t h i s goal, then the subord-inate people w i l l survive as a d i s t i n c t people and t h e i r s o c i a l system w i l l survive a l b e i t i n a servient r o l e . - 36 -Dohrenwend and Smith (1962:31-32) recognize the power r e l a t i o n s h i p s between c u l t u r e s as a major d i f f e r -e n t i a t i n g c haracter i n a c c u l t u r a t i o n , 2 Dohrenwend and Smith (1962:31-32; 1957:80) use the f o l l o w -i n g three c o n d i t i o n s , combined, as the c r i t e r i a of domin-ance. C u l t u r e A dominates c u l t u r e B, i f A can (1) r e -c r u i t members of B i n t o i t s a c t i v i t i e s i n p o s i t i o n s of low s t a t u s , (2) exclude members of B who wish admission to i t s a c t i v i t i e s i n p o s i t i o n s of high o r equal s t a t u s , and (3) g a i n admission to a c t i v i t i e s of B i n p o s i t i o n s of high s t a t u s . By these c r i t e r i a , as w e l l as by the c r i t e r i o n suggested by Hooker (1975:56) i n note 1, above, the Indians and I n u i t of Canada are c l e a r l y subordinate to Canadian s o c i e t y . The Canadian power to dominate i s not always e x e r c i s e d , but i t i s nonetheless always t h e r e . The h i s t o r y of r e l a t i o n s h i p s between the Indians and the I n u i t , on the one s i d e , and Canadian s o c i e t y , on the other, i s w e l l documented by Brody (1975)» Hawthorn (1966-67), Knight (1978), P a t t e r s o n (1972). 3 These statements about a b o r i g i n a l r i g h t s are based espec-i a l l y , on Cumming and Mickenberg (1972:13-50) and on Calder et a l . v. Attorney-General of B.C. [1973] S.C.R. 313. 4 With the exception of most of the Indians of B r i t i s h C o l -umbia. For a d i s c u s s i o n of the law r e l a t i n g to Indian t r e a t i e s , see Cumming and Mickenberg (1972:53 -62). The e a r l y t r e a t i e s , to Treaty No. 7, are given, together w i t h a s s o c i a t e d documents, i n Morris (1880). A h i s t o r y of T r e a t i e s Nos. 8 and 11 i s given by Fumoleau (1973: the t e x t of the t r e a t i e s at pp. 70-73, 165-168). The Commission's re p o r t i s Berger (1977), w i t h a note at p. 203 of v o l . one on the h i s t o r y of the i n q u i r y . Background on Indian land c l a i m s , w i t h s p e c i f i c r e f e r -ence to the Berger Commission, and from a viewpoint sym-p a t h e t i c to the Indi a n s , i s i n McCullum and McCullum (1975)* A c o l l e c t i o n of m a t e r i a l supporting the Dene cl a i m and r e v i s e d from m a t e r i a l o r i g i n a l l y presented at the i n q u i r y , i s given i n Watkins.(1977). A short account of the hearings, a l s o sympathetic to the Indians' cause, and c o n t a i n i n g p o r t i o n s of the Indians' t e s t i m o n i e s , i s provided by O'Malley (1976). Background on the P i p e l i n e debate, s e v e r e l y c r i t i c a l of Berger's approach, may be found i n Peacock (1977). These people are v a r i o u s l y c a l l e d "Athapaskan" or "Atha-bascan". "Athapaskan" seems to be the accepted anthro-p o l o g i c a l usage (e.g., as i n Jenness 1958:377; Vanstone 1974; and N a t i o n a l Museum of Man 1974), and I w i l l f o l l o w i t , except where my sources use a d i f f e r e n t s p e l l i n g . Brody (1975:141-142, 214) d i s t i n g u i s h e s between the " c l a s -s i c a l s o c i a l a n t h r o p o l o g i s t ' s " d e f i n i t i o n of " t r a d i t i o n a l " as "the customs of pre-contact c u l t u r e " and the I n u i t view of " t r a d i t i o n " as what i s "now regarded as t r a d i -t i o n a l by contemporary Eskimos." An e x c e l l e n t summary h i s t o r y of the l i t e r a t u r e on a c c u l -t u r a t i o n i s provided by Voget (1975:721-785). Voget does not, however, c i t e Dohrenwend and Smith (1962). - 38 -9 One problem I do not need to canvass i s whether the Dene and I n u i t systems of land-tenure are " l e g a l " , or whether s or not Dene and I n u i t had "law", I am comparing systems of land-tenure, not l e g a l systems as such. I t i s ( i n a sense) c o i n c i d e n t a l t h a t one of those systems ( i . e . , the Canadian) i s part of a system of law. My approach i n the present enquiry does not depend upon f i r s t a s c e r t a i n i n g , or even assuming, whether a given r u l e or p r a c t i c e or system i s or i s not "law", 10 This i s a l s o the place where anthropology becomes p h i l o -sophy. - 39 -II DEFINITION OF LAND, PROPERTY, LAND-TENURE, AND PERSON IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE A Land Land, i n the widest meaning of the word, i s the space which an i n d i v i d u a l human being or a group of humans"'" inhabits (occupies, exists in) and uses ( e x p l o i t s ) . But by "space" here we should not mean merely an empty void to be f i l l e d or a frame of reference, but rather a stage or scene f o r human a c t i v i t i e s which i s comprised of phenomena and powers relevant 2 to those a c t i v i t i e s . So defined, "land" does not mean merely dry land, but includes water and things i n water; and i t i s three-dimensional as we l l , going above and below the surface of the earth on which humans dwell (Crocombe 1974:1; Paton 1951:411). So defined, furthermore, land becomes land (and not merely space or material universe) because i t i s i n a cer-t a i n general relationship to human beings. Barlowe (1958, as ci t e d and summarized i n Clawson 1968: 551) has distinguished seven major meanings to the word "land": ( l ) space, or room and surface, where l i f e occurs; (2) natural environment, including sunlight, r a i n f a l l , wind, and other c l i -matic conditions, s o i l , and natural vegetation; (3) a fac t o r of production, along with labour and c a p i t a l ; (4) a consump-t i o n good, used, f o r example, as a s i t e f o r dwellings and parks; - 40 -(5) a s i t u a t i o n or l o c a t i o n w i t h regard to markets, geograph-i c a l f e a t u r e s , other resources and other c o u n t r i e s ; (6) pro-p e r t y , e n t e r i n g i n t o l e g a l r e l a t i o n s between i n d i v i d u a l s and between governments; and (7) even c a p i t a l i n an economic sense. These d i f f e r e n t meanings themselves r e f l e c t the d i f f e r e n t r e -l a t i o n s h i p s which members of one s o c i e t y , namely Barlowe's own, can take up towards la n d . Bohannan (1963:222) d i s t i n g u i s h e s between land as " s i t e " and land as " f a c t o r of production". Though s i t e and f a c t o r of production are connected, they can be examined independent-l y of one another. In some s o c i e t i e s , he says, land as a f a c -t o r of p r o d u c t i o n , and w i t h i t "land-tenure", are defined p r i -m a r i l y i n r e l a t i o n to land as s i t e . Thus i n a s o c i e t y based on p r i n c i p l e s other than c o n t r a c t , some e x i s t i n g s o c i a l groups l i v e together and so make a community. The members of these groups e x p l o i t the land on which they f i n d themselves as mem-bers of those groups, and exert t h e i r r i g h t s to e x p l o i t i t be-cause they are members of those groups. In other s o c i e t i e s , namely s o c i e t i e s based on c o n t r a c t , such as Western s o c i e t i e s , where land enters the market, " l o c a l groups come i n t o existence because land has been p a r c e l l e d out i n a c e r t a i n set of ways i n order to maximize production, and then s o l d . " (Bohannan 1963:223) This happens, Bohannan says, "only i n a contract s o c i e t y . " Thus land comes to be viewed p r i m a r i l y not as a place where people l i v e , but as a set of resources which can be used. These c o n t r a s t s are shown i n the " f o l k geography" which the members of a s o c i e t y have. Bohannan (1963:223-226) con-t r a s t s the Western idea of a r i g i d g r i d e s t a b l i s h e d by c e l e s -t i a l reference p o i n t s , w i t h the T i v " g e n e a l o g i c a l map" of t h e i r country and the Pl a t e a u Tonga system of overlapping neighbour-hoods focussed on r a i n s h r i n e s which acted as " r a l l y i n g p o i n t s " . In n o t i n g t h a t , apart from names f o r r i v e r s and h i l l s , T i v place names are the names of lin e a g e s l i v i n g i n c e r t a i n areas, Bohannan int i m a t e s t h a t place names r e f l e c t the folk-geography and the view of land which i s part of i t . Bohannan's d i s c u s s i o n i m p l i e s t h a t l a n d , qua l a n d , has a dual c h a r a c t e r . I t i s something w i t h i t s own inherent nature, w i t h which the people 1 who l i v e on i t ( o r i n i t ) must cope; and i t i s a l s o what i t i s because of the people's view and a c t i v i t i e s and, g e n e r a l l y , r e l a t i o n s h i p to i t . Land as s i t e and land as f a c t o r of production are both elements i n the a c t i o n of the people i n the wor l d . The ideas of "land" proposed by Barlowe and by Bohannan, but e s p e c i a l l y by the l a t t e r , are a n a l y t i c a l ^ c o n c e p t s proposed w h i l e viewing the r e l a t i o n s h i p s between a people and the world from o u t s i d e , from the p o s i t i o n of the detached observer, f o r the purpose of comparing these r e l a t i o n s h i p s w i t h the r e l a t i o n -ships between other peoples and t h e i r worlds. The people's own'view of the "land" i s p a r t of t h e i r r e l a t i o n s h i p to the worl d , namely what Bohannan would c a l l a " f o l k concept". But the d i s t i n c t i o n between land as s i t e and land as a f a c t o r of production i s a l s o i n f l u e n c e d by the economists' ideas of l a n d , la b o u r , c a p i t a l , and e n t e r p r i s e (Bohannan p r e f e r s the term - 42 -" i n g e n u i t y " ) as the f a c t o r s of production, and the economists themselves are working w i t h i n a c u l t u r e devoted to the produc-t i o n of goods f o r s a l e on a market. The idea of f a c t o r s of production, t h a t i s to say, i s i t s e l f a f o l k - c a t e g o r y of Euro-3 pean^ c u l t u r e , s u b - c u l t u r a l v a r i a n t 'economics 1. Bohannan has thus begun, but not accomplished, the t r a n s i t i o n to a t r u l y c r o s s - c u l t u r a l a n a l y t i c a l n o t i o n . He has given us a d i r e c t i o n to f o l l o w . F i r s t , we have land as p l a c e , s i t e , or scene. I t i s a regi o n i n the world where the people are placed or s e t , against which t h e i r a c t i v i t i e s can appear as f i g u r e against ground, and something to which they must r e l a t e . As scene, land has i t s own c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s . I t i s not empty, but a place of powers, a source of experiences f o r people, any people, who encounter i t . We can disentangle land thus d e f i n e d , furthermore, i n t o land as the p o s s i b i l i t y f o r experience,^*" a p o t e n t i a l i t y w a i t i n g t o be evoked by some human observer encountering i t ; and land as experienced, the encounter made a c t u a l . This l a t t e r i s scene i n the s t r i c t sense. Land as p l a c e , s i t e , or scene i s s t i l l , however, a l s o p a r t of an i n t e r a c t i o n between i t s e l f and the people. Land, i n t h i s f i r s t meaning, i s place i n t e r a c t i n g w i t h people. A p a r t i c u l a r land i s what i t i s , t h a t i s to say, because of a p a r t i c u l a r place and a p a r t i c u l a r people w i t h t h e i r p a r t i c u l a r i n t e r a c t i o n s . Second, we have land as an element i n a t e c h n i c a l opera-t i o n . This i s land as (a) the s i t e of the o p e r a t i o n , (b) the raw m a t e r i a l s transformed by the op e r a t i o n , and (c) the f u e l - 43 -or energy used to e f f e c t the tr a n s f o r m a t i o n . This i s land as a f a c t o r of production where we are t h i n k i n g of production as human a c t i o n shaping the w o r l d , o r the la n d , i n accordance w i t h human purposes. T h i r d , we have land as property, namely as the object of r i g h t s and d u t i e s , or claims and l i a b i l i t i e s , between people. Fourth, we have land as a commodity, namely something which can be bought and s o l d on the market. Commodity i s prop-e r t y , but property i s not n e c e s s a r i l y commodity. The econ-omists' f a c t o r s of production combine land as an element of a t e c h n i c a l o p e r a t i o n w i t h land as a commodity: production i s f o r s a l e on the market. Of these f o u r notions of l a n d , the f i r s t three w i l l be found i n a l l human c u l t u r e s i n one way or another. They are, as r e f l e c t i o n w i l l show, a l l necessary aspects of* human eco-l o g i c a l r e l a t i o n s h i p s w i t h the non-human world. But land as commodity depends upon a p a r t i c u l a r way of d e a l i n g w i t h l a n d , and t h e r e f o r e upon a p a r t i c u l a r kind of human c u l t u r e . Fifth*,we have land as an element i n a moral order, namely something towards which people may regard themselves as having d u t i e s o r o b l i g a t i o n s . As an element i n a t e c h n i c a l o p e r a t i o n , land i s merely a means to human ends. As an element i n a moral order, land i s recognized as an end i n i t s own r i g h t . (The con t r a s t between t e c h n i c a l o p e r a t i o n and moral order f o l l o w s R e d f i e l d * s (1957:20-21) d i s t i n c t i o n between " t e c h n i c a l order" and "moral order".) Land as an element i n a moral order need not be found i n a l l human c u l t u r e s . - 44 -A l l of these f i v e notions of " l a n d " view land as p a r t of the r e l a t i o n s h i p between land and people, and d e f i n e land according to the kind of r e l a t i o n s h i p . "No land without people, no people without l a n d , " i s i m p l i e d . Land without people i s merely p o t e n t i a l l y l a n d , and does not become land u n t i l people a r r i v e . But when the people do a r r i v e , what happens next de-pends on both what the land i s and what the people are. Land i s an element i n the i n t e r a c t i o n between people and the l a n d . This i n t e r a c t i o n i n c l u d e s not only the " o b j e c t i v e " , " m a t e r i a l " behaviours which an outside observer might p e r c e i v e , but a l s o the ways i n which the people perceive and construe the l a n d . Land i s not only something e x i s t i n g apart from the people, but a l s o something construed by the people i n t h e i r world-view and something constructed by the people through 5 t h e i r a c t i o n s upon i t . I t therefore f o l l o w s t h a t the concep-t i o n of land which a people have i s an important p a r t both of t h e i r ecosystem, i . e . t h e i r r e l a t i o n s h i p s w i t h t h e i r e n v i r o n -ment, and of t h e i r c u l t u r e . - 45 -B Property , Ownership, and Possession The word "property" u s u a l l y means both the things "owned" ( i n a wide meaning) and the various r i g h t s which the owner or owners and other persons have concerning the t h i n g s owned. Even w r i t e r s who i n s i s t t h a t property i s r e a l l y the r i g h t s which people have over the t h i n g o f t e n f a l l back i n t o language de-s c r i b i n g property as the t h i n g s . I t seems be s t , t h e r e f o r e , to accept t h a t "property" may mean one or more elements of a given complex, and to use s p e c i a l words to r e f e r to these spec-i f i c elements. That s a i d , we may f o r comparative purposes simply define "property" as anything concerning which persons have r i g h t s and d u t i e s , or claims and l i a b i l i t i e s , among them-s e l v e s . "Own", "owner", and "ownership" have wider and narrower meanings a l s o . I n the widest sense, they mean no more than having some r i g h t of property; i n the narrower sense, they mean having the r i g h t to complete and e x c l u s i v e c o n t r o l over the t h i n g of property (see Paton 1951:419-425). For compara-t i v e purposes, the idea of ownership may p r o p e r l y be wider 7 than i n English-speaking or A n g l i c a n law. We should d i s -t i n g u i s h , t h a t i s to say, between "ownership" as an a n a l y t i c a l concept (Bohannan 1963:10-13) i n the anthropology of law or of p r o p e r t y , and "ownership" as a f o l k - c a t e g o r y ( I b i d . ) of an English-speaking l e g a l order. On the other hand, i t i s con-v e n i e n t , and reduces confusion, i f the two meanings can be - 46 -c l o s e o r even the same. A system of property e x i s t s where we f i n d the f o l l o w i n g : (a) Things, or r e s , which are the objects of property r i g h t s . (b) Property r i g h t s , o r recognized claims to the r i g h t -f u l use of and c o n t r o l over the t h i n g s ( r e s ) . (c) Persons who c l a i m property r i g h t s and whose claims are recognized by the community. (d) A community, or group of people, which i n c l u d e s the r i g h t - h o l d e r s , and which recognizes and supports the holders' c l a i m s . (e) A-set of p r a c t i c e s and/or r u l e s , a r i s i n g from the community's r e c o g n i t i o n of c l a i m s , which defines property r i g h t s . ( f ) A set of sanctions and procedures f o r e n f o r c i n g property r i g h t s , which comes i n t o p l a y when recognized claims are breached or not met. (g) Persons who i n f r i n g e upon property, or who make counter-claims, and so provoke the emergence of sanctions and procedures and the d e f i n i t i o n of r i g h t s i n r u l e s and p r a c t i c e s . By " p r a c t i c e " I mean a be h a v i o u r a l mode which i s taken to provide an example both of what i s done and of what ought to be done. A " p r a c t i c e " i s thus both a mode of behaviour and a model of behaviour, even i f i t i s not s t a t e d i n a formal r u l e . Of the seven c r i t e r i a , ( a ) , ( b ) , ( c ) , and (d) are l o g i c a l -l y necessary f o r property to e x i s t . - 47 -A good d e s c r i p t i o n of the nature of a t h i n g or res as the object or matter of a l e g a l r e l a t i o n s h i p i s given i n Paton, A Textbook of Jurisprudence (1951:409-410), from which I quote: . . . 'A t h i n g i s , i n law, some p o s s i b l e matter of r i g h t s and d u t i e s , conceived as a whole and apart from a l l o t h -e r s , j u s t as, i n the world of common experience, whatever can be se p a r a t e l y perceived i s a t h i n g . ' I n t h i s sense every l e g a l r i g h t has a res as i t s o b j e c t . According to the c l a s s i c a l a n a l y s i s , a r i g h t - d u t y r e l a t i o n s h i p con-cerns two persons, r e l a t e s to an act or forbearance, w i t h regard to some p a r t i c u l a r r e s . Thus the object of,' a r i g h t of ownership may be Bla c k a c r e , the object of my r i g h t not to be defamed i s my r e p u t a t i o n . In t h i s sense, res concerns much more than i s covered by the law of property, but as the a n a l y s i s of a res i s so bound up w i t h t h i s s u b j e c t , i t i s more convenient to discuss i t a t t h i s p l a c e . U n f o r t u n a t e l y , however, l e g a l usage i s not c o n s i s t e n t , and there are r e a l l y many d i f f e r e n t elements of thought. A t h i n g may mean: 1. A t h i n g i n the m a t e r i a l sense which i s corpor-e a l and t a n g i b l e and has an organic or p h y s i c a l u n i t y , e.g. a horse or a block of marble. 2. A t h i n g which i s co r p o r e a l and t a n g i b l e , but c o n s i s t s of a c o l l e c t i o n of s p e c i f i c t h i n g s , e.g. a f l o c k of sheep. 3. A t h i n g which e x i s t s i n the p h y s i c a l world but i s not m a t e r i a l i n the popular sense, e.g. e l e c -t r i c i t y . 4. A t h i n g which i s n e i t h e r m a t e r i a l , c o r p o r e a l , nor t a n g i b l e but i s an element of wealth, e.g. a copyright o r a patent.... 5. A t h i n g which i s not m a t e r i a l and which i s not d i r e c t l y an economic asset or element of wealth, e.g. r e p u t a t i o n . I f every r i g h t concerns a r e s , then we must admit t h i s wider conception. The law of defamation binds others by a duty not u n j u s t i f i a b l y to i n t e r f e r e w i t h the t h i n g i n question, my r e p u t a t i o n . Some German w r i t e r s suggest t h a t a t h i n g i s 'a l o c a l l y l i m i t e d p o r t i o n of v o l i t i o n l e s s nature*. This may be true of the popular usage, but i t i s not t r u e of the l e g a l . A s l a v e may be a r e s , an i d o l may be a l e g a l person. Law d i s t i n g u i s h e s not between those who possess v o l i t i o n and t h i n g s which do not, but between l e g a l persons to whom the law imputes a w i l l (John Smith or an i d o l ) and thi n g s which cannot hold r i g h t s but can merely be the obje c t s t h e r e o f . Law i n t h i s instance has r e f i n e d common usage. - 4$ -Again, i t i s inconvenient to say t h a t a res n u l l i u s i s not a t h i n g u n t i l i t has been acquired by someone. I t may be t h a t , i f the law s p e c i f i c a l l y refuses some res to be i n any circumstances the object of a r i g h t , i t should f a l l o u tside the d e f i n i t i o n of a r e s . But whatever i s a p o t e n t i a l object of l e g a l r i g h t s should be considered a r e s . A l i o n i s a res even before i t i s caught. I t f o l l o w s from t h i s t h a t anything may become a t h i n g or a res to the law of a community, whether or not t h a t t h i n g have any c o r p o r e a l existence or even be recognized as a r e a l i t y by the observer from outside the community. So l i k e w i s e f o r the res of a p r o p e r t y - r i g h t . Anything whatsoever, c o r p o r e a l or i n c o r p o r e a l , v i s i b l e or i n v i s i b l e , phenomenal or noumenal, may be t r e a t e d as a t h i n g of property by a l e g a l system, and be the object of l e g a l r e l a t i o n s h i p s . The res i s a res because i t i s conceived so by the l e g a l system, and not otherwise. 'j'There are a number of d i f f e r e n t ways of c l a s s i f y i n g r e s . Paton (1951:410-419) instances the f o l l o w i n g d i s t i n c t i o n s : c o r p o r e a l v s . i n c o r p o r e a l ; chose i n a c t i o n v s . chose i n pos-s e s s i o n ; res mancipi vs. res nec mancipi; movable vs . immov-abl e ; r e a l v s . personal; f u n g i b l e vs. non-fungible; those consumed by use vs. those not consumed by use. But the bound-a r i e s between these c l a s s e s vary according to the l e g a l system and are o f t e n a f f e c t e d by h i s t o r i c a l a c c i d e n t s . Thus the t y p -i c a l immovable i s land and the t h i n g s attached to i t . But land as m a t e r i a l may c e r t a i n l y be moved. Houses are o f t e n considered as immovables i n law, but are movable i n f a c t . I n some l e g a l systems ships are -immovable i n law, though as Paton remarks, "a v e s s e l t h a t i s immovable i n f a c t i s of very l i t t l e - 49 -use." S i m i l a r v a r i a t i o n s occur f o r the other d i s t i n c t i o n s . I n g e n e r a l , says Paton (1951:419), The main l e g a l reason f o r c l a s s i f y i n g t h i n g s i s t h a t dealings i n them may be f a c i l i t a t e d by the growth of such s p e c i a l r u l e s as are necessary f o r each c l a s s . But the methods of d i v i s i o n vary so much i n each system th a t i t i s impossible to do more than i n d i c a t e some of the more important methods of c l a s s i f i c a t i o n . Note again t h a t what determines the c l a s s i f i c a t i o n i n a given l e g a l system i s not alone the ch a r a c t e r of the t h i n g i t s e l f , but the way i n which the t h i n g i s viewed and used by the community whose l e g a l system i s being examined. To say t h i s i s not to say t h a t the character of the t h i n g i s i r r e l e -vant. There are fe a t u r e s about l a n d , f o r i n s t a n c e , which make i t d i s t i n c t i v e and the r e c u r r e n t core i n the c l a s s of immovable r e s . I t i s more enduring than personal p r o p e r t y , and hence f u t u r e i n t e r e s t s i n i t have a r e a l v a l u e . I t i s not, as space at l e a s t , movable and so may be used as a s e c u r i t y . I t can be subdivided without n e c e s s a r i l y l o s i n g i t s v a l u e . I t can-not be s e c r e t l y s t o l e n and hidden. I t remains the same, and does not m u l t i p l y by n a t u r a l i n c r e a s e , and i s thus the o r i g i n a l scarce good (Paton 1951:416). I t can become e a s i l y encumbered w i t h a l l s o r t s of c l a i m s , so t h a t there i s no guarantee t h a t the possessor of land i s i t s owner (Cheshire 1962:5-6, c i t e d i n Gluckman 1972:114 -116). And f i n a l l y , because of i t s r e l a t i v e i m m o v a b i l i t y , i t can provide a f i x e d framework f o r s o c i a l con-t i n u i t y which movable property does not. Gluckman (1972 :116-117) w r i t e s : I propose to suggest t h a t i n t r i b a l s o c i e t y at l e a s t - 50 -. . . immovable property and c h a t t e l s have d i f f e r e n t f u n c t i o n s i n the maintenance, through time, of a s o c i a l system as an organized p a t t e r n of r e l a t i o n s . Immovable property provides f i x e d p o s i t i o n s which endure through the passing of generations, through q u a r r e l s , and even through invasions and r e v o l u t i o n s , and many s o c i a l r e l a -t i o n s h i p s are s t a b i l i z e d about these p o s i t i o n s . Movables e s t a b l i s h l i n k s between i n d i v i d u a l s occupying d i f f e r e n t immovable p r o p e r t i e s , and t r i b a l p r a c t i c e a r t i f i c i a l l y a c c e l e r a t e s movement of these goods. The two kinds of property t h e r e f o r e acquire d i f f e r e n t symbolic values i n the law and r i t u a l of t r i b a l s o c i e t y . The d i f f e r e n c e i n s o c i a l f u n c t i o n i s based on the obvious f a c t t h a t a l l s o c i a l systems, i n c l u d i n g those of nomads, are s e t t l e d on land which changes but s l o w l y , w h i l e the l i v i n g person-n e l of the system and t h e i r i n t e r r e l a t i o n s change compara-t i v e l y r a p i d l y . These a t t r i b u t e s may help to account f o r the f a c t t h a t the d i s t i n c t i o n i s so sharp i n t r i b a l s o c i -ety, although t h e i r ownership of c h a t t e l s , u n l i k e ours, was not g e n e r a l l y f r e e or unencumbered by demand-rights held by others than the producer or possessor. I n Ba-r o t s e l a n d , as i n other A f r i c a n s o c i e t i e s , any c h a t t e l may be subject t o a number of r i g h t s h e l d by d i f f e r e n t persons. Pursuing Gluckman's suggestion f u r t h e r , and t h i n k i n g too about Bohannan's d i s c u s s i o n of f o l k geography and the import-ance of land as s i t e , we may d i s t i n g u i s h between people f o r whom the land i s not j u s t a resource to be e x p l o i t e d but i s a l s o an e x t e r i o r i z a t i o n , as i t were, of t h e i r personal and s o c i a l i d e n t i t i e s , and people who may use land but regard i t merely as a resource to be e x p l o i t e d and discarded when i t has served i t s purpose. In the former, we might expect a sharp d i s t i n c t i o n between land and c h a t t e l s ; and i n the l a t t e r , not. For the l a t t e r people, d i s p o s s e s s i o n from the land i s an inconvenience and an offence against property, but does not s t r i k e at t h e i r i d e n t i t y and s e l f - r e s p e c t . For the former people, d i s p o s s e s s i o n from the land i s a d i s a s t e r which s t r i k e s at t h e i r very being both as i n d i v i d u a l s and as a group, and may lead to - 51 -anomie, d e s p a i r , and s u i c i d e . The former people may be ex-pected to have an a t t i t u d e of stewardship to t h e i r l a n d , to regard i t as put there not merely f o r themselves to use but a l s o f o r t h e i r unborn descendants, and to regard i t as some-t h i n g to be cherished and not wantonly destroyed. People of the l a t t e r s o r t , on the other hand, may be expected to have a much more u t i l i t a r i a n and e x p l o i t a t i v e view of the l a n d , and to have no great o b j e c t i o n to the d e s t r u c t i o n of the lan d , e s p e c i a l l y i f such d e s t r u c t i o n i s economically p r o f i t a b l e to them. When people of the one k i n d meet people of the other s o r t , misunderstandings are very l i k e l y as each imputes to the other i t s own view of the l a n d . But even i f no such misunder-standing occurs, there w i l l s t i l l be c o n f l i c t . To people of the l a t t e r s o r t , the former people w i l l appear to be cautious and backward, r e f u s i n g to e x p l o i t t h e i r lands f u l l y , and per-haps being r a t h e r s o p p i l y sentimental about i t . To people of the former s o r t , the l a t t e r people w i l l appear as a horde of l o c u s t s devouring the land and passing on to leave d e v a s t a t i o n behind. Having drawn the c o n t r a s t so s t a r k l y , I must a l s o say that i n r e a l i t y the two a t t i t u d e s occur i n v a r i o u s mixtures. In a s o c i e t y where the l a t t e r a t t i t u d e predominates (such as Canada, i f I may t r u s t my own impressions and a l s o s t u d i e s such as G u t s t e i n 1975), r e s i s t a n c e to urban e x p r o p r i a t i o n and to r e -zonings which permit and even encourage land "development" i s motivated by "sentimental" attachments to place as w e l l as con-cerns to preserve one's "investment". Zoning laws are them-- 52 -s e l v e s p a r t l y to p r o t e c t attachments t o la n d , as w e l l to pro-t e c t amenities and the characters of neighbourhoods and the values of r e a l e s t a t e . But the law which r e q u i r e s compensa-t i o n f o r e x p r o p r i a t i o n sets the compensation as a money pay-ment based on the market value of the property, and does not recognize attachment to the la n d , or i t s involvement i n one's sense of i d e n t i t y , as monetarily compensible. So much f o r the nature of things or r e s . Now l e t us look at the r e l a t i o n s h i p c a l l e d "ownership", and at the v a r i e t y of r i g h t s which persons may have v i s - a - v i s one another w i t h regard to the r e s . Pa r t of the d i f f i c u l t y of d e f i n i n g "ownership" f o r com-p a r a t i v e purposes i s t h a t ownership, even i n E n g l i s h , i s not an a l l - o r - n o t h i n g r e l a t i o n s h i p . I t admits of degrees, and i t s c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s vary from l e g a l system to l e g a l system and even w i t h i n l e g a l system. The "owner" f o r one purpose may not be the "owner" f o r another purpose. Furthermore, there i s neces-s a r i l y a complementary t e n s i o n between the r i g h t s of the i n d i -v i d u a l and the r i g h t s of the community as a whole. The i n d i -v i d u a l owner i s always an owner because he i s supported by the s a n c t i o n and a u t h o r i z a t i o n by the community, namely h i s f e l -lows. But he may t r y to use h i s owner's r i g h t s and p r i v i l e g e s to the detriment of h i s f e l l o w s , and so the community may i n some sense have to modify h i s e x e r c i s e of those r i g h t s and p r i v i l e g e s . I n some s i t u a t i o n s t h i s m o d i f i c a t i o n may go so f a r t h a t the community or i t s l e a d i n g r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s are de-s c r i b e d as the "owner". We can d e a l w i t h these u n c e r t a i n t i e s , however, by s p e c i -f y i n g what the f u l l r i g h t s of an owner would be, and a l l o w i n g t h a t these r i g h t s might be considerably diminished by any p a r t -i c u l a r property system before we became r e l u c t a n t to d e s c r i b e the property r e l a t i o n s h i p as "ownership". The f u l l r i g h t s of an owner, according to Paton (1951:420), are: (a) the power of enjoyment (e.g. the determination of the use to which the res i s to be put, the power to deal w i t h produce as he p l e a s e s , the power to d e s t r o y ) ; (b) possession which i n c l u d e s the r i g h t to exclude others (c) power to a l i e n a t e i n t e r v i v o s , or t o charge as sec-u r i t y ; (d) power to leave the res by w i l l . Where these are, there i s no doubt t h a t ownership e x i s t s . The most important of these powers.is the r i g h t to exclude o t h e r s . Indeed, t h i s c r i t e r i o n ' could be taken as the one wheieby the owner i s determined. I f one i n d i v i d u a l alone has the power, he i s the owner and ownership i s i n d i v i d u a l . I f he can do so only i n conjunction w i t h o t h e r s , the whole group of h i m s e l f and those others i s the owner, though he may be the group's o f f i c i a l r e p r e s e n t a t i v e and spoken of as the "owner". Where t h i s power i s l a c k i n g , the other powers w i l l be s e r i o u s l y r e s t r i c t -ed a l s o . Even where ownership as so defined i s s u b s t a n t i a l l y p r e -sent, there are various q u a l i f i c a t i o n s . The powers of the owner may be r e s t r i c t e d by law or by agreements which he has made, f o r b i d d i n g him from e x e r c i s i n g h i s powers i n p a r t i c u l a r ways. Then, again, he may grant away a l l h i s r i g h t s of enjoyment u n t i l a l l t h a t i s l e f t i s "a magnetic core • . . which a t t r a c t s - 54 -to i t s e l f the various elements t e m p o r a r i l y held by others as they lapse." (Paton 1951:421, c i t i n g Noyes, I n s t i t u t i o n of Prop-e r t y , 310) Paton (1951:422) t h e r e f o r e d i s t i n g u i s h e s between: (a) u l t i m a t e ownership, where but the r e s i d u a l core i s l e f t to the owner, the r i g h t s of present enjoyment being held t e m p o r a r i l y by others; (b) complete or b e n e f i c i a l ownership, where the owner enjoys a l l the r i g h t s and p r i v i l e g e s which i t i s l e g a l l y p o s s i b l e f o r an owner to have; (c) f r a c t i o n s s p l i t o f f from ownership, some or a l l of which may be h e l d by persons other than the owner, so long as the 'magnetic core' remains i n the owner. Property systems may thus i n p r i n c i p l e be arranged along a continuum, ranging from those where i n d i v i d u a l ownership i s given an absolute value and l e a s t r e s t r i c t e d by communal or p u b l i c i n t e r e s t s to those where i n d i v i d u a l ownership disappears so t h a t the community or the s t a t e must be spoken of as the s o l e owner. Even i n the l a t t e r i n s t a n c e , there w i l l be a d i s -t i n c t i o n between r i g h t f u l and wrongful possession. Even i n the former, there w i l l be a community i n t e r e s t as w e l l as the i n -d i v i d u a l i n t e r e s t s of the owners. Defined i n the narrower sense, ownership i s only one form of arranging property r i g h t s ; and we then need another term f o r the general r e l a t i o n s h i p between the res and the holder of the r i g h t s . " P r o p r i e t o r " and " p r o p r i e t o r s h i p " might do, i f they d i d not mean (as they do) owner and ownership i n the nar-rower sense. "Tenure" and "tenant" on the other hand, e s p e c i a l l y the l a t t e r , suggest r e l a t i o n s h i p s l e s s than ownership, and i n any event apply s p e c i f i c a l l y to l a n d . At l e a s t , t h a t i s to say, we do not u s u a l l y r e f e r to someone who has rented a motor - 55 -car as the "tenant" of the car . We need terms which w i l l name the holder of p r o p e r t y - r i g h t s whether these be the r i g h t s of ownership o r of tenancy or of stewardship or of whatever: perhaps f o r the time being, "property-holder" w i l l do. Another d i s t i n c t i o n between property systems concerns the r e l a t i o n s h i p between ownership and possession. I s own-er s h i p to be defined i n terms of r i g h t f u l p ossession, or i n terms of a bundle of l e g a l r i g h t s and r e l a t i o n s seperable from the land and c h a t t e l s which are the objects of the l e g a l r i g h t s and r e l a t i o n s ? Modern l e g a l systems c l e a r l y opt f o r the l a t t e r Q view. An estate i n A n g l i c a n land law i s not the land i t s e l f but the bundle of r i g h t s a s s o c i a t e d t o the l a n d . But i t has been asserted by some l e g a l w r i t e r s (see, e.g., Smith 1974*6; 1976:213-216) t h a t i n p r i m i t i v e and a r c h a i c l e g a l systems pos-s e s s i o n and ownership are not thus d i s t i n g u i s h e d . I n disputes over possession ( i t i s s a i d ) , the question was not, "who owns the o b j e c t ? " but "does the present possessor hold i t r i g h t f u l l y , or has a wrong been done to the p r i o r possessor?" (Smith 1976: 214)• I am not myself convinced t h a t ownership and possession are not d i s t i n g u i s h e d i n p r i m i t i v e or a r c h a i c systems. The a c t -u a l s i t u a t i o n s i n these s o c i e t i e s are too complex to be so sum-m a r i l y dismissed. The case s t u d i e s of Oceanian land-tenure c o l l e c t e d i n Lundsgaarde (1974) show t h i s f a c t very c l e a r l y . The i d e a of "ownership", i n the meaning given t h a t word i n E n g l i s h , i s r e a l l y too crude to describe adequately these s y s -tems, and perhaps i s b e t t e r l e f t u napplied. Nevertheless, once a given system has the ide a of ownership i n i t , or of some near - 56 -e q u i v a l e n t , the question does come up concerning the r e l a t i o n -s h i p between ownership and possession. Furthermore, the degree to which r i g h t s can become abs t r a c t e d from p h y s i c a l o b j e c t s i s s t i l l important i n d i s t i n g u i s h i n g property systems ( c f . Cap-pannari 1960:140-141, i n h i s essay on property among the Sho-shone) • What, then, are we to mean by "possession"? Here i s another concept which we are t a k i n g from a p a r t i c u l a r l e g a l t r a d i t i o n (namely, the E n g l i s h common law t r a d i t i o n ) i n order to use i t f o r a n a l y z i n g and comparing other property systems. As before, i t i s convenient i f the comparative meaning and the meaning i n the o r i g i n a l t r a d i t i o n are the same or very s i m i l a r . A n a l y z i n g the i d e a of possession i n E n g l i s h law, P o l l o c k and Wright (1888 :26-27) d i s t i n g u i s h three separable aspects to possession: i . P h y s i c a l c o n t r o l , d e t e n t i o n , or de f a c t o pos-s e s s i o n . . . . i i . Legal possession, the s t a t e of being a posses-s o r i n the eyes of the law . . . . i i i . Right to possess or to have l e g a l possession. This i n c l u d e s the r i g h t to p h y s i c a l possession. P h y s i c a l possession or p o s s e s s i o n - i n - f a c t occurs when the human a c t o r e f f e c t i v e l y occupies or c o n t r o l s the o b j e c t , so t h a t he can exclude others from i t s enjoyment, and intends i f neces-sary so to exclude those others ( P o l l o c k and Wright 1888:12-14; Paton 1951:454)• I t i s t h e r e f o r e p o s s i b l e f o r a possessor to l o s e possession e i t h e r by accident (as when I l o s e my watch) or by wrongful possession (as when my watch i s s t o l e n ) without the consent of the possessor; w h i l e an owner cannot i n general l o s e ownership without h i s consent (Paton 1951:453-454), except - 57 -by the d e c i s i o n of the community. Legal possession occurs when de f a c t o possession i s recognized by the law. The r i g h t t o possess i s a normal i n c i d e n t of ownership or property ( P o l -l o c k and Wright 1888 :27), and i s separable from both possession i n f a c t and l e g a l possession. But though ownership normally e n t a i l s the r i g h t to possess, the r i g h t to possess does not n e c e s s a r i l y e n t a i l ownership. P u t t i n g these and other c o n s i d e r a t i o n s together, and pre-f e r r i n g to mean by "possession" s i m p l i c i t e r "possession i n law", Paton (1951:455) sums up the p o s s i b l e r e l a t i o n s of a person to an object as f o l l o w s : (a) Custody — where the holder e i t h e r l a c k s f u l l con-t r o l or e l s e has no animus t o exclude o t h e r s , e.g. a customer examining a r i n g i n the presence of the j e w e l l e r . (b) Detention — possession i n f a c t which f o r some reason i s not regarded as possession i n law. (c) Possession — l e g a l possession. I n most cases the l e g a l n o t i o n i s b u i l t on the popular n o t i o n , but each l e g a l system has c e r t a i n anomalous cases e i t h e r where a possessor i n f a c t i s denied possession i n law or where one who does not possess i n f a c t i s given the r i g h t s of possession. (d) Ownership. Paton's summary shows, as indeed does P o l l o c k and Wright's d i s -c u s s i o n , t h a t the idea of "possession" i n E n g l i s h has i t s pen-umbras of u n c e r t a i n a p p l i c a t i o n as much as does "ownership". Also (and P o l l o c k and Wright discu s s t h i s t o o ) , "possession" f o r the purposes of c r i m i n a l law i s not the same as "possession" f o r the purposes of the law of property, although the various meanings are s t i l l l i n k e d . The u n c e r t a i n t i e s i n the idea of "possession" are prob-ably inherent i n the s i t u a t i o n . There i s a constant t e n s i o n - 58 -between " p o s s e s s i o n - i n - f a c t " and " p o s s e s s i o n - b y - r i g h t " , because a person's de f a c t o c o n t r o l over an object depends not only on whether he or she has the p h y s i c a l , b o d i l y c o n t r o l over i t , but a l s o on whether other persons recognize h i s or her r i g h t to ex-e r t t h a t -physical c o n t r o l . I f they do not recognize that r i g h t , they w i l l (when t h e i r powers permit and t h e i r i n t e n t i o n s so i n -c l i n e them) f o r c e the possessor to r e l i n q u i s h c o n t r o l . F u r t h e r -more, r i g h t f u l possession may be hedged about w i t h q u a l i f i c a -t i o n s and contingent upon the performance of various d u t i e s . Perhaps we might put the matter t h i s way. Possession i s immedi-ate c o n t r o l over the o b j e c t , but, humans being s o c i a l a c t o r s , t h a t c o n t r o l i s n e c e s s a r i l y conditioned by a l l the s a n c t i o n s , p o s i t i v e and negative, to which the possessor i s s u b j e c t . With t h i s q u a l i f i c a t i o n , we may then say t h a t property and possession, as c o r r e l a t i v e s of each other, are found i n one form or another n e c e s s a r i l y i n a l l human s o c i e t i e s ; but t h a t ownership, i n the s t r i c t meaning of t h a t word i n A n g l i c a n law, need not be."^ 11 Any i n s t i t u t i o n of property must have r u l e s or accepted p r a c t i c e s p r o v i d i n g f o r c r e a t i n g or f o r r e c o g n i z i n g p r o p e r t y -r i g h t s , r u l e s or accepted p r a c t i c e s p r o v i d i n g f o r t r a n s f e r r i n g p r o p e r t y - r i g h t s from one member of the community to another, and r u l e s or accepted p r a c t i c e s determining how a given proper-t y - r e l a t i o n s h i p may be ended so t h a t other persons may acquire the res ( t h i s l a s t set of r u l e s i s e s p e c i a l l y r e q u i r e d where the property r i g h t s are to ownership or e x c l u s i v e c o n t r o l ) . The content of these r u l e s w i l l vary according to the p a r t i c u l a r s o c i a l system. - 59 -C Land Tenure Land tenure comes i n t o being when l a n d , as defined i n s e c t i o n A, becomes a res f o r a property system, as defined i n s e c t i o n B. B r i e f l y d e f i n e d , land tenure i n a s o c i e t y i s the c o l l e c t i o n of r u l e s and p r a c t i c e s d e f i n i n g who has the r i g h t -f u l use and c o n t r o l of the use of land (compare Crocombe 1974:1; Biebuyck 1968:562; M o r r i s 1964:376). This i n c l u d e s ownership as one form of tenure, but much more besides (see Clawson 1968: 552). Crocombe (1974 :5 -6) l i s t s s i x c l a s s e s of r i g h t s r e l a t i n g to land: 1. Rights of or claims t o d i r e c t use, which i n c l u d e the r i g h t s t o p l a n t , to harvest, to gather, or to b u i l d . I t should be noted t h a t various r i g h t s of d i r e c t use may be h e l d by various persons i n respect of the same p a r c e l of l a n d . For instance one person may have r i g h t s to c o l l e c t wild- f r u i t s , another to p l a n t short-term cash crops, and another to harvest t r e e crops. Apart from the above r i g h t s which govern production from the l a n d , we may recognize s u b s i d i a r y r i g h t s of u s e r s , which i n -clude r i g h t s of access and r i g h t s to the use of water. 2. Rights of i n d i r e c t economic gain such as those to t r i b u t e or to r e n t a l income. 3. Rights of c o n t r o l . Rights of use are almost i n -v a r i a b l y l i m i t e d by r i g h t s of c o n t r o l , which are held by persons other than the u s e r . For i n s t a n c e , a man w i t h the e x c l u s i v e r i g h t to p l a n t land may nevertheless be r e q u i r e d to p l a n t a s p e c i f i c crop or to conform to c e r -t a i n t e c h n i c a l requirements of husbandry or to erect a s p e c i f i c type of house. On the other hand, the c o n t r o l may be negative, r e s t r a i n i n g the user from a l l o w i n g the land to be used f o r such purposes as the growth of nox-ious p l a n t s . . . . 4. Rights of t r a n s f e r , which are the e f f e c t i v e power to transmit r i g h t s , e i t h e r those i n the land i t -s e l f or those i n other property attached to the l a n d , by w i l l , s a l e , mortgage, g i f t , or other conveyance. 5. R e s i d u a l r i g h t s i n c l u d e the r e v e r s i o n a r y i n t e r -est acquired i n the event of death of the former r i g h t holders without descendants or c o l l a t e r a l h e i r s ; of non-compliance w i t h s p e c i f i e d c o n d i t i o n s , as when persons are e v i c t e d f o r breaches of s o c i a l norms; and of extreme need by the holder of the r e s i d u a l r i g h t s , such as the power of eminent domain which i s held by governments. 6. Symbolic r i g h t s o r r i g h t s of i d e n t i f i c a t i o n . I n many s o c i e t i e s there are c l e a r l y recognized r e l a t i o n -ships between men and land which have no apparent eco-nomic or m a t e r i a l f u n c t i o n , though they may serve import-ant p s y c h o l o g i c a l o r s o c i a l f u n c t i o n s . So pervasive i s land tenure to a s o c i e t y , t h a t a c l a s s -i f i c a t i o n of land tenure systems i s a c l a s s i f i c a t i o n of whole s o c i e t i e s from the viewpoint of land tenure. This i s c l e a r not only from Crocombe's l i s t of land r i g h t s , but a l s o from such surveys as the a r t i c l e on "Land Tenure" i n the Encyclo-paedia of the S o c i a l Sciences (Brinkmann et a l . 1963:73-127)» and the many s t u d i e s of land tenure s i n c e t h a t time. Biebuyck (1968:566) could i n the mid 1960 ,s s t i l l note t h a t "a t h e o r e t i c a l , p r e c i s e framework f o r d e a l i n g w i t h land-tenure systems and a c r o s s - c u l t u r a l l y v a l i d and a p p l i c a b l e method of i n v e s t i g a t i o n was badly needed. Nonetheless, a beginning of a c l a s s i f i c a -t i o n was made e a r l i e r , from an agronomist's p e r s p e c t i v e , by Liver s a g e (1945)* (The p i c t u r e presented i n b r i e f by Liversage i s s u s tained at leng t h country by country by Meek 1949•) L i v e r s a g e d i s t i n g u i s h e d eight v a r i e t i e s of a g r i c u l t u r a l land tenure, of which the f i r s t two are founded on s t a t u s , and the r e s t on con t r a c t (Liversage 1945:1): ( l ) T r i b a l tenure, - 6 l -(2) Feudal tenure, (3) Labour tenancy, (ZjJ). Share tenancy, (5) Produce-rent tenancy (Liversage 1945 :36). (6) Cash tenancy, (7) Emphyteusis, and (8) Owner-occupancy. In a given society, more than one of these v a r i e t i e s may co-exist, though one perhaps i s l i k e l y to dominate. T r i b a l tenure (Liversage 1945:2-18; compare Meek 1949: 11-31) i s marked, f i r s t , by the claim of the whole group, be i t family, clan, or t r i b e , to land developed or undeveloped, cul t i v a t e d or uncultivated, within the group's area of control. This claim i s analogous to the t e r r i t o r i a l claims of sovereign-ty by state systems, or as Liversage (1945:4) puts i t , "We may look upon claims based on t h i s consideration either as a de-l i n e a t i o n of p o l i t i c a l boundaries or as something equivalent to the schoolboy's 'bags I'." Within t h i s group claim, the i n d i v i d u a l members of the group have the right to take undev-eloped land f o r t h e i r use, and to keep i t so long as they use i t , and to d i s t r i b u t e the produce as they see f i t , subject to the group's rules as to how3 produce should be d i s t r i b u t e d . Sometimes the ri g h t established by use i s permanent, i n other instances the ri g h t lapses when use ceases. These rights pass from an i n d i v i d u a l to his h e i r s , who hence can claim recognition of these ri g h t s f o r themselves. These rights to use the land and to dispose of i t s produce are variably subject to control by family and clan heads, councils of elders, c h i e f s , and kings or paramounts, who represent the authority of the community and may d i r e c t the allotment of land and control production. Land therfore i s not saleable or devisable by w i l l , and can be alienated from the community only by the community as a - 62 -whole or by it's acknowledged r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s . (This i s pre-c i s e l y analogous to the ces s i o n of land by one sovereign s t a t e to another.) But t h i s does not prevent an o u t s i d e r from ac-q u i r i n g , w i t h the community's consent, the r i g h t to use the community's l a n d . W i t h i n these general l i m i t s , t r i b a l tenures are q u i t e v a r i o u s ; the degree of c o n t r o l by the community v a r i e s from strong c o n t r o l by the highest c h i e f to an inchoate s o r t of p u b l i c o p i n i o n ; land r i g h t s o v e r l a p , and may be con-s i d e r a b l y f r a c t u r e d . In these s o c i e t i e s , an i n d i v i d u a l gets land r i g h t s because of who he i s i n the s o c i a l s t r u c t u r e of the group, who h i s parents, f a m i l y , or spouses are; or i n a word, fundamentally because of h i s s t a t u s i n the group. This s t a t u s i s not n e c e s s a r i l y f i x e d or purely a s c r i b e d , however, and land tenure arrangements are o f t e n q u i t e f l e x i b l e . Thus f a r Liversage's account. Some comment i s needed. C l e a r l y " t r i b a l tenure" i s a d i s t i n c t type of land tenure, notwithstanding the v a r i a t i o n w i t h i n i t , a s s o c i a t e d w i t h r e -l a t i v e l y s m a l l - s c a l e s o c i e t i e s mostly but not e x c l u s i v e l y w i t h -out the s t a t e as a p o l i t i c a l i n s t i t u t i o n . I t i s not w e l l de-s c r i b e d e i t h e r as " p r i m i t i v e communism" or as "communal tenure", f o r the communal element i s the equivalent of sovereignty or eminent domain i n s t a t e p o l i t i e s . Nor, as Gluckman (1972:85-86, 100) has noted, i s "u s u f r u c t a r y " r e a l l y a s a t i s f a c t o r y name f o r the r i g h t s of i n d i v i d u a l s under " t r i b a l tenure", f o r the i n d i v i d u a l s have more than j u s t a r i g h t to the f r u i t s of t h e i r labour on the land . - 6 3 -The term " t r i b a l tenure" i s a l s o i n e x a c t . I t suggests t h a t t h i s k i n d of land-tenure i s that c h a r a c t e r i s t i c of " t r i b e s " . But what are " t r i b e s " ? The term " t r i b e " has a wide range of meanings. For example, i n S e r v i c e ' s (1962; 1978:4-9) c l a s s -i f i c a t i o n , " t r i b e " i s a p a r t i c u l a r l e v e l of s o c i a l o r g a n i z a t i o n more evolved than "bands" and l e s s so than "chiefdoms". But both "bands" and " t r i b e s " , so d e f i n e d , show " t r i b a l tenure". "Chiefdoms," on the other hand, commonly show a type intermed-i a t e between " t r i b a l tenure" and " f e u d a l tenure". F r i e d ( i n Helm, ed., 1968:5) has described the word " t r i b e " as f i g u r i n g "prominently on the l i s t of p u t a t i v e t e c h n i c a l terms ranked i n order of degree of ambiguity as r e f l e c t e d i n m u l t i f a r i o u s d e f i n i t i o n s . " But perhaps s i n c e the term has so many meanings, and i n l i e u of a b e t t e r , we can leave t h i s f i r s t type of l a n d -tenure l a b e l l e d " t r i b a l " without the term " t r i b e " having to mean anything i n p a r t i c u l a r . Feudal tenure (Liversage 1945:19-27) i s marked by the existence of an a r i s t o c r a c y e x i s t i n g between the k i n g or para-mount and the r e s t of the people, the f o c u s s i n g of governmental and e s p e c i a l l y m i l i t a r y r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s i n the a r i s t o c r a c y , and the d i s t i n c t i o n between the producers and the a r i s t o c r a c y . In r e t u r n o s t e n s i b l y f o r p r o t e c t i o n by the a r i s t o c r a c y , the producers pay dues i n produce and labour, as a s o r t of t i t h e or t a x a t i o n . These s e r v i c e s may be commuted to customary pay-ments of money. In r e t u r n f o r m i l i t a r y s e r v i c e , the k i n g or paramount grants governmental powers i n v a r y i n g degrees to the members of the a r i s t o c r a c y , whose domains are thus s i m u l t a n - • - 64 -eously both u n i t s of a d m i n i s t r a t i o n and groupings of u n i t s of production. The king or paramount s t i l l i n theory represents the w e l f a r e and sovereignty of the e n t i r e community; though i n the l a r g e r systems, t h i s may be more i d e a l than a c t u a l as f a r as the l o c a l producers are concerned. The various payments between the s t r a t a of the s o c i e t y are g e n e r a l l y i n s e r v i c e or i n k i n d r a t h e r than i n money, and are customary r a t h e r than c o n t r a c t u a l . Liversage i n c l u d e s A f r i c a n kingdoms, such as the Barotse* and t r a d i t i o n a l I n d i a under t h i s heading. On the one s i d e , t r i b a l tenure blends i n t o f e u d a l tenure as t r i b a l s o c i e t i e s become l a r g e r and the p o l i t i c a l stratum of s o c i e t y becomes d i s t i n c t . On the other hand, as the cus-tomary element d e c l i n e s and s e r v i c e s and products are replaced by money payments, f e u d a l tenures t u r n i n t o landowner-tenant r e l a t i o n s h i p s , f o r example the z a m i n d a r - c u l t i v a t o r r e l a t i o n s h i p i n B r i t i s h I n d i a . Feudal tenure, as Liversage describes i t , i s thus charac-t e r i s t i c of a g r a r i a n s t a t e s where money i s e i t h e r absent or not a major o r g a n i z i n g medium of s o c i e t y , and n e i t h e r market nor contract appear except i n s p e c i a l i z e d contexts. "Feudal t e n -ure" i s not the best term f o r t h i s type of tenure (Gluckman (1965:40-41; 1972:88), f o r i n s t a n c e , considers f e u d a l terms i n a p p r o p r i a t e f o r t r a d i t i o n a l A f r i c a . ) , but we are again c l e a r l y d e a l i n g w i t h a d i s t i n g u i s h a b l e type of s o c i a l order and tenure system, notwithstanding the existence of s o c i e t i e s t r a n s i t i o n a l to other systems as w e l l . Again we have a problem of l a b e l l i n g . However, rsince _ 65 -the existence of higher a d m i n i s t r a t i v e l e v e l s o s t e n s i b l y regu-l a t i n g the use of the land i n the i n t e r e s t s of the whole s o c i -ety i s a d e f i n i n g c h a r a c t e r i s t i c of t h i s type, i t might be c a l l e d " a d m i n i s t r a t i v e " . The system i s p o t e n t i a l l y or a c t u -a l l y b u r e a u c r a t i c . Feudal s o c i e t y i n the s t r i c t sense (as i n mediaeval Europe) i s a s p e c i a l v a r i a n t of t h i s type. An import-ant f e a t u r e of any p a r t i c u l a r instance of t h i s type would be the degree to which the higher l e v e l s a c t u a l l y regulate or i n t e r f e r e w i t h l o c a l i n i t i a t i v e s , or are "merely" recognized by l o c a l people as r i g h t f u l l y due r e c o g n i t i o n . This i s the general type under which Gluckman's (1965: 40-41; 1972:89-92) d i s t i n c t i o n between "estates of production" and " e s t a t e s of a d m i n i s t r a t i o n " a r i s e s . This d i s t i n c t i o n roughly p a r a l l e l s Crocombe's d i s t i n c t i o n between " r i g h t s of d i r e c t use" and " r i g h t s of c o n t r o l " . The next v a r i e t i e s of tenure are described by Liversage as c o n t r a c t u a l . They are not t o t a l systems of tenure, u n l i k e the two preceding, but are r e l a t i o n s h i p s which i n va r y i n g de-grees can c o e x i s t w i t h one another, w i t h t r i b a l or w i t h admin-i s t r a t i v e tenure, and w i t h contract-based money-and-market s o c i -e t i e s . But perhaps i f we look at them as a whole, we w i l l get an i n t i m a t i o n of a t h i r d great type of land-tenure system, which we can put beside t r i b a l tenure and a d m i n i s t r a t i v e tenure and which we can c a l l " p r o p r i e t o r i a l " . Labour tenancy i s described by Liversage (1945:28-30) as an arrangement o b t a i n i n g i n Kenya and South A f r i c a whereby n a t i v e l a b o u r e r s , i n r e t u r n f o r a c o n t r a c t u a l l y defined m i n i -- 66 -mum of labour, are allowed to r e s i d e w i t h t h e i r f a m i l i e s on farms operated by Europeans. In share tenancy (Liversage 1945:31-36. This i s a l s o c a l l e d metayage.), land i s l e t not f o r a f i x e d rent but f o r a share of the produce. Liversage c i t e s instances from I n d i a , Europe, the United S t a t e s , Argentina, South A f r i c a , B r a z i l , the Sudan, and the West I n d i e s . Many v a r i a t i o n s are found i n the d e t a i l e d arrange-ments of share tenancy. I n the most common form the l a n d l o r d provides the land and i t s permanent equipment; the tenant provides the labour and the implements of hus-bandry and the produce i s shared e q u a l l y between the two p a r t i e s . I n other cases, the l a n d l o r d provides oxen and implements, and even advances the tenant money f o r h i s personal expenses u n t i l the crops are marketed, deduction i n t e r e s t and repayment from the tenant's share. Some-times l i v e s t o c k e n t e r p r i s e s are shared as w e l l as crops, the l a n d l o r d p r o v i d i n g h i s share of the breeding stock. (Liversage 1945:35) Most of Liversage's examples, but not a l l , are concerned w i t h the production of crops f o r s a l e . Produce-rent (Liversage 1945:36) i s d i s t i n g u i s h e d from share tenancy i n tha t i n produce-renting the tenant i s o b l i g e d t o pay a f i x e d q u a n t i t y of the crop r a t h e r than a share pro-p o r t i o n a t e to the t o t a l crop. I t d i f f e r s from cash tenancy only i n t h a t the money value of the f i x e d q u a n t i t y of produce v a r i e s w i t h the market. I t d i f f e r s from share tenancy i n tha t the tenant bears a l a r g e r p r o p o r t i o n of the r i s k s and the op-p o r t u n i t i e s • Cash-tenancy (Liversage 1945:37-50) occurs,where the tenant rents the land f o r cash, and occupies and uses the land g e n e r a l l y as he sees f i t and keeps the produce to s e l l as he - 67 -w i l l . The agreement between l a n d l o r d and tenant may s p e c i f y other c o n d i t i o n s of tenancy as w e l l ; the tenant who f u l f i l l s these c o n d i t i o n s and pays h i s rent then remains on the land as long as he w i l l . Depending on the l e n g t h of the lease and the s e c u r i t y of tenure, cash-tenancy grades i n t o emphyteusis or l e a s e - h o l d tenure. Emphyteusis or l e a s e - h o l d tenure ( l i v e r s a g e 1945*.41-43) occurs where the c o n d i t i o n s of lease and occupancy give the occupier a long-term i n t e r e s t i n the land which shades i n t o the i n t e r e s t s of an owner-occupier. Thus i n former times, E n g l i s h tenancies might run f o r a term of years, the l i f e of the occupant, a:term of three l i v e s , and sometimes f o r ever. Other instances are c i t e d from Kenya, I n d i a , and H o l l a n d . Owner-occupancy (Liversage 1945*44) i n c l u d e s both f r e e -h old and a l l o d i a l tenure. I t i s the dominant form of farm tenure i n the g r e a t e r p a r t of Northern Europe, North and South America, A u s t r a l i a , New Zealand, and South A f r i c a ( B r i t a i n being a notable e x c e p t i o n ) . The tenant i s an owner i n the f u l l sense defined i n the preceding s e c t i o n . Standing back from Liversage's c l a s s i f i c a t i o n and view-in g i t i n the l i g h t of the previous s e c t i o n s , we can see the o u t l i n e s of a t h i r d general type of land-tenure system, which we may c a l l the " p r o p r i e t o r i a l " . I n t h i s , land i s normally owned i n the s t r i c t sense by i n d i v i d u a l s and c o r p o r a t i o n s . The land-owner may r e s i d e on the land h i m s e l f or he may rent i t to some tenant or tenants i n r e t u r n f o r l a b o u r , produce, or money. Gen e r a l l y the purpose of production i s s a l e r a t h e r than consumption, and t h i s system t h r i v e s i n a money-and-market economy. The powers of the s t a t e v i s - a - v i s the land may be reduced to general p o l i t i c a l s o v e r e i g n t y , the power of eminent domain, and t a x a t i o n , p r e f e r a b l y i n money. People d i f f e r i n the amount of land which they own, and there may be c l a s s e s of great p r o p r i e t o r s , l i t t l e p r o p r i e t o r s , persons who do not own land but rent i t , and persons who n e i t h e r own nor rent l a n d . Land may be s o l d on the market, j u s t as labour and pro-duce are. The emphasis on ownership, w i t h i t s c l a i m to e x c l u s -i v e c o n t r o l , promotes an emphasis on sharp boundaries and the d i v i s i o n of land i n t o t i d y p a r c e l s . At the same time, these p a r c e l s may become the objects of d i f f e r i n g kinds of r i g h t s , encumbering the s t r i c t powers of the owner. The essence of the p r o p r i e t o r i a l system of land tenure, however, whether the land be d i v i d e d i n t o s m a l l t r a c t s owned by many or l a r g e t r a c t s owned by a few, i s that ownership i n the narrow sense i s the normative p a t t e r n of tenure and t h a t t h i s ownership i s d i s t r i b u t -ed throughout the s o c i e t y and not confined to the s t a t e as a whole. Liversage*s review of land-tenure systems thus p o i n t s the way to a t r i p a r t i t e c l a s s i f i c a t i o n . We might l a b e l these types r e s p e c t i v e l y " t r i b a l " , " a d m i n i s t r a t i v e " , or " p r o p r i e t o r i a l " , although the term " t r i b a l " i s misleading and the term "admin-i s t r a t i v e " i s only weakly d e s c r i p t i v e . (The term " f e u d a l " i s even more inadequate than " t r i b a l " . ) Or we might p r e f e r simply to l a b e l them "A", "B", and "C". - 69 -The three types can be thought as occupying the three angles of a t r i a n g l e , w i t h the pure types at the v e r t i c e s , and combinations and intermediate types occupying the area i n be-tween. The change from one type to another then i s a movement from one corner to another, and there are s i x such movements where the change i s from one pure type to another. Type A c h a r a c t e r i z e s r e l a t i v e l y s m a l l communities without a d i s t i n c t i o n between r u l e r s and r u l e d , and c e r t a i n l y without a s t a t e type of p o l i t i c a l system. The community as a whole c o n t r o l s the l a n d , and the members of the community (be i t v i l l a g e or l i n e a g e or other k i n d of group) a l l have a say i n the d i s p o s i t i o n of the l a n d . I f there i s a head to the com-munity he ( o r more r a r e l y , she) c o n t r o l s the land c l e a r l y on behalf of the community. A l l members of the community have the r i g h t to use the land to meet the needs of themselves and t h e i r dependents, and the community assures t h i s r i g h t . But the land cannot be a l i e n a t e d without the express consent of the community. I n such a s o c i e t y , e x c l u s i v e c o n t r o l belongs to the community as a whole, which i s a l s o the p o l i t i c a l sov-e r e i g n . Thus ownership and sovereignty belong to the same s o c i a l u n i t , which i s , of course, the community. But admin-i s t r a t i o n and production are nevertheless i n the same persons' hands. I n types B and C, these u n i t i e s are separated, but i n d i f f e r e n t ways. The " a d m i n i s t r a t i v e " and " p r o p r i e t o r i a l " types are opposite ways of h o l d i n g land i n s o c i e t i e s which have be-come l a r g e enough to be s t r a t i f i e d , t hat i s , to have d i s t i n c t -- 70 -ions between r u l e r s and r u l e d or between r i c h and poor. They are thus opposed both to each other and to type A. In pure type B, ownership and sovereignty are s t i l l fused. The s t a t e , or the head of s t a t e , has ( o f f i c i a l l y ) e x c l u s i v e c o n t r o l over the l a n d , and the members of the s o c i e t y hold r i g h t s over and o b l i g a t i o n s concerning the land dependent on t h e i r p o s i t i o n i n the s t a t e ' s a d m i n i s t r a t i v e system. The people who a c t u a l l y work and l i v e on the land need not have much, i f any, say i n c o n t r o l l i n g or a d m i n i s t e r i n g the l a n d . Thus we can speak ( i f we wish) of "est a t e s of production" and "est a t e s of a d m i n i s t r a t i o n " . I n type C, ownership and sovereignty are c l e a r l y separated. The s t a t e ' s land-laws set the frame w i t h i n which ownership may be e x e r c i s e d ; but the p r o p r i e t o r enjoys otherwise the e x c l u s i v e c o n t r o l over h i s or her l a n d . The p r o p r i e t o r may be an i n d i v -i d u a l or ( i n some v a r i e t i e s ) a c o r p o r a t i o n . The p r o p r i e t o r may use the land d i r e c t l y and l i v e on i t , or may not. In the l a t t e r event, some tenant uses the land and l i v e s on i t , i n r e t u r n f o r rent or some other c o n s i d e r a t i o n p a i d to the owner. S t r a t i f i c a t i o n may be minimal, as i n a community of independent but roughly equal p r o p r i e t o r s ; o r i t may be maximal, w i t h great p r o p r i e t o r s , p e t t y p r o r i e t o r s , and no n - p r o p r i e t o r s . The r i g h t to tax land i s not p r e c i s e l y the same as the r i g h t to c o n t r o l the use of la n d , even though the f a i l u r e to pay taxes may lead to the l o s s of the r i g h t to c o n t r o l the use of l a n d . The existence of t a x a t i o n , and the degree of t a x a t i o n , however, provide one measure of the importance of the adminis-t r a t i v e element i n land-tenure systems. Taxation of land amounts to a payment made by the owner or tenant to the sov-e r e i g n i n r e t u r n f o r the r i g h t to use the l a n d . A purely pro-p r i e t o r i a l system would not tax land as such. Taxation l i e s between the sovereign and the land-holder. Rent s i m i l a r l y l i e s between the owner or s u p e r i o r land-holder and the tenant or i n f e r i o r land-holder. The i n f e r i o r pays rent i n r e t u r n f o r the r i g h t to use the l a n d , and l o s e s t h a t r i g h t when he ceases to pay the r e n t . Rent i s c o n s i s t e n t w i t h pure p r o p r i e t o r i a l systems. Where there are both land-taxes and r e n t , however, and a complex arrangement of sub-tenancies, the r e s u l t i n g system w i l l be e i t h e r an a d m i n i s t r a t i v e system or a system p a r t l y adminis-t r a t i v e and p a r t l y p r o p r i e t o r i a l . Perhaps the most s i g n i f i c -ant f e a t u r e a f f e c t i n g such systems, i s the extent to which taxes and rent are p a i d i n goods or s e r v i c e s or i n money. Each of these three types as o u t l i n e d here i s a pure type, s i g n i f i e d by a corner of the t r i a n g l e . By changing the degree of s t r a t i f i c a t i o n w i t h i n the system, and by changing the degree of s e p a r a t i o n between ownership and sovereignty, one pure type 12 can be transformed i n t o another. A c t u a l systems may partake of more than one type. So viewed, the three types exhaust the l o g i c a l p o s s i b i l -• • 13 l t i e s . Any a c t u a l tenure system can be placed w i t h i n the t r i -angle, at some p o s i t i o n between the three p o i n t s , depending on i t s combination of characters of types A, B, and C. One - 72 -need not t h i n k of the a c t u a l system as occupying a p o i n t ; i n s t e a d , t h i n k of i t as occupying an area w i t h i n the t r i a n g l e , depending on the r e l a t i v e importances of the various elements. A land-tenure system need not be wholly l o g i c a l l y c o n s i s t e n t , so long as i t possesses w i t h i n i t some means of s e t t l i n g i n p a r t i c u l a r instances which r u l e s govern those i n s t a n c e s . Furthermore, the c l a s s i f i c a t i o n of land-tenure systems as " t r i b a l " , " a d m i n i s t r a t i v e " , or " p r o p r i e t o r i a l " , turns out to be not merely a c l a s s i f i c a t i o n of land-tenure systems, but of whole s o c i a l systems from the p o i n t - o f - v i e w of land-tenure. Each type of land-tenure goes w i t h a d i s t i n c t set of p o s s i b i l i -t i e s f o r p o l i t i c a l systems; and as these systems change so a l s o must the land-tenure which goes w i t h them. Viewing land-tenure systems as thus l o c a t e d w i t h i n t h i s t r i a n g l e , we can then ask what c o n d i t i o n s of p r o d u c t i o n , or ' e c o l o g i c a l c o n d i t i o n s , cause them to be i n such and such a p o s i t i o n or t o move from one p a r t of the t r i a n g l e to another. Thus the type A character of the t r a d i t i o n a l Dene or I n u i t s y s -tem, as we s h a l l d i s c o v e r below, f o l l o w s q u i t e l o g i c a l l y from the Dene or I n u i t mode of subsi s t e n c e . Were tha t mode to change, t h e i r land-tenure would be changed a c c o r d i n g l y . • E c o l o g i c a l c o n d i t i o n s ' , however, in c l u d e s not only h a b i -t a t and s u b s i s t e n c e , but a l s o the p o l i t i c a l and m i l i t a r y e n v i r o n -ments w i t h i n which a community must l i v e and w i t h which i t must cope. For the Dene and I n u i t , f o r example, t h a t p o l i t i c a l and m i l i t a r y environment today c o n s i s t s of Canada and the pressures towards northern resource e x p l o i t a t i o n . The Dene and I n u i t land-holding system must today help the people to cope w i t h t h i s s o c i a l environment as w e l l as w i t h the non-human e n v i r o n ment; or at l e a s t i t must not g r e a t l y hinder t h e i r coping. - 74 -D Person I f we are to construe property and land-tenure as i n v o l v -i n g r i g h t s , or claims made by human i n d i v i d u a l s and recognized as r i g h t by the community, then we must construe property and land-tenure as i n v o l v i n g persons. By "person" I mean not a human i n d i v i d u a l perceived through the senses as such, but a human i n d i v i d u a l or other e n t i t y conceived as the bearer of r i g h t s and du t i e s and the r e c i p i e n t of others' d u t i e s . Things (re s ) as the objects of r i g h t s and d u t i e s imply persons who perform these r i g h t s and d u t i e s v i s - a - v i s one another concern-i n g the t h i n g s . I f one i s going to t h i n k i n terms of property or of r i g h t s and d u t i e s one i s t h e r e f o r e l o g i c a l l y i m p e l l e d , whether i m p l i c i t l y or e x p l i c i t l y , to t h i n k about persons i n the sense of "right-and-duty-bearing u n i t s " . " Legal p e r s o n a l i t y , " w r i t e s Paton (1951:315), i s an a r t i f i c i a l c r e a t i o n of the law. Not a l l human beings n e c e s s a r i l y possess l e g a l p e r s o n a l i t y : thus i n e a r l y systems s l a v e s were regarded as mere c h a t t e l s and a l i e n s were not permitted to sue i n the c o u r t s . Many human beings may possess a r e s t r i c t e d l e g a l p e r s o n a l i t y , such as i n f a n t s and l u n a t i c s . Legal p e r s o n a l i t y may be granted to e n t i t i e s other than i n d i v i d u a l human beings, e.g. a group of human beings, a fund, an i d o l . . . . Twenty men may form a c o r p o r a t i o n which may sue and be sued i n the corporate name. An i d o l may be regarded as a l e g a l persona i n i t s e l f , or a p a r t i c u l a r fund may be in c o r p o r a t e d . I n these two cases i t i s c l e a r t h a t the i d o l and the fund cannot c a r r y out the a c t i v i t i e s i n c i -d e n t a l to l i t i g a t i o n or the s i g n i n g of a c o n t r a c t , and, of n e c e s s i t y , the law i s fo r c e d to set up c e r t a i n human agents as r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s of the w i l l of the i d o l and the fund. But the acts of such an agent ( w i t h i n l i m i t s set by the law) would be imputed to the l e g a l persona of the i d o l , and would not be j u r i s t i c acts of the human - 75 -agent. This i s no mere academic d i s t i n c t i o n , f o r i t would be the l e g a l persona of the i d o l t h a t would be bound, not tha t of the agent. Legal p e r s o n a l i t y i s a p a r t i c u l a r device by which the law creates u n i t s to which i t a s c r i b e s c e r t a i n powers. Hence j u s t as the law can recognize anything as a r e s , i n c l u d i n g t h i n g s i m p e r c e p t i b l e to the senses, so the law can recognize anything as a l e g a l person, i n c l u d i n g beings imper-c e p t i b l e to the senses. Legal p e r s o n a l i t y i s a t h e o r e t i c a l e n t i t y , or an e n t i t y by p o s t u l a t i o n , to borrow a term from F.S.C. Northrop (1959:83). Legal p e r s o n a l i t y i s t h e r e f o r e defined i n terms of the b a s i c concepts of a l e g a l order or a l e g a l system, and there i s no guarantee t h a t what i s reckoned as a l e g a l person i n one system w i l l be reckoned as one, or even one of the same k i n d , i n another. Nevertheless, we may, as i n E n g l i s h law, d i s t i n g u i s h be-tween " n a t u r a l persons" and " a r t i f i c i a l persons" (though these terms taken l i t e r a l l y import metaphysical judgments which other l e g a l systems need not s h a r e ) . By " n a t u r a l person" I mean a l e g a l person e p i s t e m i c a l l y c o r r e l a t e d (See Northrop 1959:119) w i t h a s i n g l e human organism as a p e r c e i v a b l e e n t i t y (See d i s -c u s sion i n Paton 1951:316-319). An " a r t i f i c i a l person" i s any l e g a l person not e p i s t e m i c a l l y c o r r e l a t e d w i t h a s i n g l e human organism; i t t h e r e f o r e r e q u i r e s the law a r t f u l l y to recognize some n a t u r a l person to act as i t s agent (Paton 1951:3l6)."^ The way i n which t h i s agency i s conceived may, of course, vary from one l e g a l system to another. We might a l s o d i s t i n g u i s h "aggregate persons" where the l e g a l person i s e p i s t e m i c a l l y c o r r e l a t e d w i t h a group of human beings who are t h e r e f o r e as - 76 -a whole spoken of as the person; i n such an i n s t a n c e , any act by any member of the group could be imputed to the whole group and so to the other members as w e l l ( f o r example, as i n the blood fe u d ) . (An aggregate person i s not the same as a "c o r p o r a t i o n " i n E n g l i s h law.) As w i t h the d i s t i n c t i o n between ownership and possession i n respect to t h i n g s , so i n respect to persons there i s the d i s t i n c t i o n between l e g a l p e r s o n a l i t y recognized as d i s t i n c t from s e n s o r i l y apprehended human i n d i v i d u a l s , groups, e t c . , and l e g a l p e r s o n a l i t y fused w i t h s e n s o r i l y apprehended human i n d i v i d u a l s , groups, e t c . Legal p e r s o n a l i t y i s a s p e c i a l instance of something which we might c a l l "moral p e r s o n a l i t y " , t h a t i s , the q u a l i t y of being recognized as a person, or a c t o r , i n a moral order, i . e . someone recognized as having r i g h t s and d u t i e s i n respect to the rec o g n i z e r or observer. Operating w i t h i n the t e c h n i c a l order, one t r e a t s others as t h i n g s , means to one's own ends; but w i t h i n the moral order, one t r e a t s others as ends i n t h e i r own r i g h t , and not merely as means to s a t i s f y one's own pur-poses. There can be no l e g a l p e r s o n a l i t y except i n a system of law; and i t i s at l e a s t arguable t h a t law i s not found i n a l l c u l t u r e s , , ( t h e argument depends p a r t l y on one's d e f i n i t i o n of law as w e l l as upon the ethnographic f a c t s ) . But there can be moral p e r s o n a l i t y without l e g a l p e r s o n a l i t y , and there are ( I venture to say) no human groups whose members do not regard at l e a s t themselves as moral persons, t h a t i s , as "human". The i s s u e i s both p h i l o s o p h i c a l and a n t h r o p o l o g i c a l , and I do not want to get i n t o i t i n the present enquiry. But f o r com-p a r a t i v e c r o s s - c u l t u r a l purposes, a "person" may be defined as some being recognized by the people of a given c u l t u r e as a source of a c t i o n who can be communicated w i t h i n ways analog-ous to the ways of communicating w i t h someone who speaks one's own language, who can meaningfully be described as having r i g h t s and d u t i e s of some s o r t , and who i s i n some sense t r e a t e d as someone who must be reasoned and argued w i t h . Not a l l human organisms need be "persons" i n t h i s meaning; nor need a l l "persons" be human organisms. Personhood i s a s t a t u s conferred upon some being by the members of a c u l t u r e . That c o n f e r r a l depends upon the people's world-view and purposes, i n c l u d i n g t h e i r own ideas of who and what they themselves are. And some-one might be reckoned a person f o r some purposes and not f o r others . Viewed from outside the c u l t u r e , personhood i s a st a t u s "read i n t o " or "imposed upon" a given being; viewed from i n s i d e the c u l t u r e , personhood i s a st a t u s "given t o " the e n t i t y , or "recognized" j u s t as the e n t i t y ' s existence i s recognized. H a l l o w e l l ' s (1964) study of Ojibwa ontology and the Ojibwa ide a of person i l l u s t r a t e s the importance of moral p e r s o n a l i t y as a c r o s s - c u l t u r a l category, provided we take i n t o account how each c u l t u r e (and w i t h i n complex c u l t u r e s , each sub-culture) recognizes persons i n i t s w o r l d . I n Western psychology and s o c i a l s c i e n c e s , observes H a l l o w e l l , persons and human organisms are c a t e g o r i c a l l y i d e n t i f i e d . But to the Ojibwa, t h i s i s not so. The Ojibwa t r e a t as persons not only human beings but a l s o a v a r i e t y of s p i r i t u a l beings, c e r t a i n stones and s h e l l s , thunder, - 78 -beings who appear i n myths (" atxso fkanak " r e f e r s both to the beings t o l d about i n the n a r r a t i v e s and to the n a r r a t i v e s as they are being t o l d ) , the sun, c e r t a i n a r c h e t y p a l animals, animals sometimes, and dream-personages. The Ojibwa goal of l i f e i s plmadazlwin, l i f e i n the f u l l e s t sense, i n the sense of l o n g e v i t y , h e a l t h , and freedom from misfortune. This goal cannot be reached without help and cooperation from both human and other-than-human persons as w e l l as by one's own e f f o r t s . Some of these other-than-human persons are, i n Ojibwa ontology, communicated w i t h i n dreams and v i s i o n quest, and are p r o p e r l y addressed as "grandfathers". These personal r e l a t i o n s h i p s mesh one i n a network of mutual o b l i g a t i o n s . This i d e a i s expressed i n the e c o l o g i c a l r e l a t i o n s h i p s of the Ojibwa. H a l l o w e l l (1964: 77) w r i t e s : The Ojibwa are hunters and food gatherers. Since the various species of animals on which they depend f o r a l i v i n g are b e l i e v e d to be under the c o n t r o l of "masters" or "owners" who belong to the category of other-than-human persons, the hunter must always be c a r e f u l to t r e a t the animals he k i l l s f o r food or f u r i n the proper manner. I t may be necessary, f o r example, to throw t h e i r bones i n the water or to perform a r i t u a l i n the case of bears. Otherwise, he w i l l offend the "masters" and be threatened w i t h s t a r v a t i o n because no animals w i l l be made a v a i l a b l e to him. C r u e l t y to animals i s l i k e w i s e an offense t h a t w i l l provoke the same ki n d of r e t a l i a t i o n . And, accord-in g to one anecdote, a man s u f f e r e d i l l n e s s because he t o r t u r e d a fabulous windlgo a f t e r k i l l i n g him. A moral d i s t i n c t i o n i s drawn between the k i n d of conduct demanded by the primary n e c e s s i t i e s of s e c u r i n g a l i v e l i h o o d o r defending oneself against aggression, and unnecessary acts of c r u e l t y . The moral values i m p l i e d document the consistency of the p r i n c i p l e of mutual o b l i g a t i o n s which i s inherent i n a l l i n t e r a c t i o n s w i t h "persons" through-out the Ojibwa world. The Ojibwa do have a term, anicinabek, f o r humans as d i s t i n c t from other-than-human persons. In the Ojibwa world-view, the Western d i s t i n c t i o n between " n a t u r a l " and "s u p e r n a t u r a l " i s meaningless. The terms "nat-u r a l p e r s o n a l i t y " and " a r t i f i c i a l p e r s o n a l i t y " taken l i t e r a l l y would t h e r e f o r e a l s o be misleading a p p l i e d to the Ojibwa. The at i s o r k a n a k are c e r t a i n l y not a r t i f i c i a l persons i n the way a co r p o r a t i o n i s i n Anglic a n law. They are much more l i k e n a t u r a l persons, except t h a t they do not o r d i n a r i l y appear as human bodies i n d a i l y , sensory l i f e (but they might!). They do appear t h i s way, however, sometimes i n s t o r i e s and i n dreams. Ordinary human beings, or anicinabek, are n a t u r a l persons i n the s t r i c t meaning. There are t e c h n i c a l problems i n communi-e a t i n g w i t h a t i s o kanak which are absent i n communicating w i t h anicinabek, and the d i s t i n c t i o n between the two p a r a l l e l s i n t h i s respect the d i s t i n c t i o n between a r t i f i c i a l and n a t u r a l persons. - 80 -Notes to Chapter I I 1 To enlarge the meaning f u r t h e r , "organisms" may be sub-s t i t u t e d f o r "humans". But I s h a l l be d i s c u s s i n g human land and land-tenure, and what I s h a l l w r i t e may not be a p p l i c a b l e to other organisms besides humans. 2 Thus Paton (1951:411-412) regards, land as being both space and m a t e r i a l , even though some l e g a l systems and w r i t e r s define land as three-dimensional space. 3 I use "European" to i n c l u d e c u l t u r e s h i s t o r i c a l l y d erived from Europe si n c e the l 6 t h century; so Canadian c u l t u r e i s i n c l u d e d . 4 " P o s s i b i l i t y f o r experience" echoes J.S. Mill's d e f i n i -t i o n of matter as "the permanent p o s s i b i l i t y of s e n s a t i o n " . 5 Compare Hyams, S o i l and C i v i l i z a t i o n (1976). 6 Here are some of the d e f i n i t i o n s of property and owner-sh i p o f f e r e d by j u r i s t s , a n t h r o p o l o g i s t s , and other s o c i a l s c i e n t i s t s : Property i s the name f o r a concept t h a t r e f e r s to the r i g h t s and o b l i g a t i o n s and the p r i v i l e g e s and r e s t r i c t i o n s t h a t govern the behaviour of man i n any s o c i e t y toward the scarce objects of value i n t h a t s o c i e t y . . . . What i s owned i s property. (Beaglehole 1968:590) The concepts of property and ownership are c l o s e l y l i n k e d . Ownership i s best d e f i n e d as the sum t o t a l of r i g h t s which v a r i o u s persons or groups of persons have over t h i n g s ; the t h i n g s thus owned are property. (Royal A n t h r o p o l o g i c a l I n s t i t u t e 1951:148) - 81 -Property i n i t s most general usage denotes ownership or the t h i n g owned. (Floud 1964:549) As an i n s t i t u t i o n , property may be described as the set of r i g h t s and o b l i g a t i o n s which define the r e l a t i o n s between i n d i v i d u a l s or groups i n r e -spect of t h e i r c o n t r o l over m a t e r i a l t h i n g s ( o r per-sons t r e a t e d as t h i n g s ) . (Ginsberg 1934:181-182; c i t e d i n Floud 1964:550) Property i s a euphonious c o l l o c a t i o n of l e t t e r s which serves as a general term f o r the m i s c e l l a n y of e q u i t i e s t h a t persons hold i n the commonwealth. . . . I n essence property i s a c o n d i t i o n a l equity i n the valuables of the community. (Hamilton and T i l l 1962:528-529) "Property" i s a word of d i f f e r e n t meanings. I t may mean a t h i n g owned (my watch or my house i s "my p r o p e r t y " ) ; i t may mean ownership i t s e l f as when I speak of "my property" i n my watch which may pass to the person to whom I s e l l the watch before I a c t u a l l y hand the watch over. . . ; or i t may even mean an i n t e r e s t i n a t h i n g l e s s than ownership but nevertheless c o n f e r r i n g c e r t a i n r i g h t s . • . . In E n g l i s h law, t h e r e f o r e , "property" comprehends t a n g i b l e s and i n t a n g i b l e s , movables and immovables; i t means a t a n g i b l e t h i n g ( l a n d or a c h a t t e l ) i t s e l f , or r i g h t s i n respect of t h a t t h i n g , or r i g h t s such as c o p y r i g h t , i n r e l a t i o n to which no t a n g i b l e t h i n g e x i s t s . (Vaines 1962:3) '•' The term 'property' . . . sometimes means own-ers h i p or t i t l e and sometimes the res over which ownership may be e x e r c i s e d . (Paton 1951:408) Property i s a s o c i a l i n s t i t u t i o n whereby people r e g u l a t e the a c q u i s i t i o n and use of the resources of our environment according to a system of r u l e s . (Smith 1974:2) Property i s not wealth or possessions, but the r i g h t to c o n t r o l , to e x p l o i t , t o use, or to enjoy wealth or possessions. (Maclver, c i t e d i n Lowie 1948:129) Though Lowie c i t e s Maclver's d e f i n i t i o n and r e f l e c t s upon i t , he soon f a l l s back i n t o r e f e r r i n g to the goods them-se l v e s as property. This i s the same usage as i n h i s e a r l i e r work, P r i m i t i v e S o c i e t y (Lowie 196l: 205-256), which showed that p r i m i t i v e s o c i e t i e s had simultaneous communal and i n d i v i d u a l ownership. I n tha t work, however, Lowie d i d not e x p l i c i t l y d e f i n e "property". I n modern law the term 'property' has two mean-i n g s , land or c h a t t e l s , and the l e g a l r e l a t i o n s through which human behaviour i s c o n t r o l l e d i n regard to them. (Smith 1976:213) The word "property" f u r n i s h e s a s t r i k i n g ex-ample. Both w i t h lawyers and non-lawyers t h i s term has no d e f i n i t e or s t a b l e connotation. Sometimes i t i s employed t o i n d i c a t e the p h y s i c a l object to which various l e g a l r i g h t s , p r i v i l e g e s , e t c . , r e l a t e ; then again — w i t h f a r g r e a t e r d i s c r i m i n a t i o n and accuracy — the word i s used to denote the l e g a l i n t e r e s t ( o r aggregate of l e g a l r e l a t i o n s ) apper-t a i n i n g to such p h y s i c a l o b j e c t . Frequently there i s a r a p i d and f a l l a c i o u s s h i f t from the one meaning to the other. At times, a l s o , the term i s used i n such a "blended" sense as to convey no d e f i n i t e meaning whatever. (Hohfeld 1966:28) Wigmore (1936) has used the term "A n g l i c a n " to name the f a m i l y of l e g a l systems i n c l u d i n g the E n g l i s h common law and a r i s i n g from t h a t common law, such as the l e g a l s y s -tems of the United S t a t e s , Canada, A u s t r a l i a , and New Zealand. I t i s a good term f o r them because " E n g l i s h law" does imply the l e g a l system of England and Wales. New Zealand, A u s t r a l i a , Canada, and the United S t a t e s , e s p e c i a l l y the last-named, have long gone t h e i r separate ways and we can no longer take i t f o r granted t h a t what i s law i n one i s law i n the other. Yet there i s a strong f a m i l y r e l a t i o n s h i p and c o n t i n u a l i n t e r c o u r s e between the systems. They a l s o a l l use E n g l i s h as the c h i e f language of the law. Compare Smith (1974:2), who s p e c i f i e s t h a t a property - 83 -system must have at l e a s t : 1 a community 2 a qu a n t i t y of l i m i t e d or scarce resources 3 a set of r u l e s r e g u l a t i n g the a c q u i s i t i o n , access t o , and use of these resources. This set of r u l e s w i l l be made up of at l e a s t the f o l l o w i n g subsets: A a set of r u l e s which provides the manner i n which the property r e l a t i o n i s created. B a set or r u l e s which provides f o r the t r a n s -f e r of t h i s r e l a t i o n from one member of the com-munity to another. C a set of r u l e s which determines how and when the property r e l a t i o n i s terminated so that the resources are open to a c q u i s i t i o n by others. 4 a set of possessive pronouns such as 'mine,' 'yours,' ' h i s , ' 'hers,' and ' t h e i r s , ' e t c . whereby t h i s r e l a t i o n can be expressed. 5 a set of r u l e s p r o t e c t i n g the property r e l a t i o n by, f o r i n s t a n c e , p r o v i d i n g sanctions when i t i s wr o n g f u l l y i n t e r f e r e d w i t h . 9 See note 7, above. 10 Compare, e.g., Cappannari's (i960) d i s c u s s i o n of the con-cept of property among Shoshoneans. 11 G e n e r a l i z i n g from and modifying Smith (1974:2), who r e f e r s to ownership as much as property, and to r u l e s r a t h e r than r u l e s and p r a c t i c e s . 12 Regarding these c r i t e r i a as two dimensions, we a c t u a l l y get a f o u r - f o l d c l a s s i f i c a t i o n , thus: D i v i s i o n i n t o Separation of Sovereignty and Rulers and Ownership: Ruled: NO YES NO Type A " T r i b a l " Type C l P r o p r i e t o r i a l II I " YES Type B "Adminis-t r a t i v e " Type C2 " P r o p r i e t o r i a l I I " - 84 -13 A further complexity would be to have one type obtaining between land-holding u n i t s , and another within the units; e.g., a corporate p r o p r i e t o r i a l type with the corpora-tions following administrative or t r i b a l patterns within themselves. 14 The phrase i s from Buckland and McNair, Roman Law and Com-mon Law (I952:54f)> c i t e d i n A l l o t t , Epstein, and Gluck-man 1969:39n. 15 The terms "natural" and " a r t i f i c i a l " persons used here as v a r i e t i e s of l e g a l person follow Paton. A l l o t t (1969: 183-184) uses "natural personality" to mean i n d i v i d u a l human personality i n contrast to " l e g a l personality": Recognition of an i n d i v i d u a l as a l e g a l person i s usually the co r o l l a r y of his recognition as a human being. The model f o r i n d i v i d u a l l e g a l person-a l i t y i s provided by natural personality. S i m i l a r l y , the recognition of a r t i f i c i a l l e g a l personality i s by extension from the recognition of natural person-a l i t y . . . . J u r i s t i c personality i s attributed, and i t i s attributed by_ analogy with human personal-i t y . The p e r s o n i f i c a t i o n of natural forces and the recognition of group personality do not imply a t o t a l (and hence necessarily absurd) i d e n t i f i c a t i o n between such e n t i t i e s and natural persons; they mean that f o r c e r t a i n l i m i t e d purposes the l e g a l system and those who operate i t treat the entity as i f i t pos-sessed l e g a l personality. Thus . . . Ibo law w i l l accept the agent of a deity as being an agent f o r someone; Akan law w i l l permit someone claiming to speak f o r a 'family* to i n i t i a t e l e g a l proceedings; Nuer law w i l l recognize that the wife i n a ghost-marriage i s lawfully married to her dead husband. In each case we have a l o g i c a l f i c t i o n . In each case both law and common sense recognize the l i m i t s of the f i c t i o n : the Ibo deity must be represented by a p r i e s t ; the l i v i n g members of the Akan family are c o l l e c t i v e l y e n t i t l e d to bind the dead members and those who are yet to be born; the wife i n a Nuer ghost-marriage enjoys normal r e l a t i o n s with a pro-husband who performs a l l the usual marital o f f i c e s 1 - 85 -which the ghost-husband i s incapable of doing. . . . The a t t r i b u t i o n of p e r s o n a l i t y i s a device used to implement a mental or s o c i a l r e a l i t y . The f a m i l y members f e e l s o l i d a r i t y , both w i t h one another and w i t h t h e i r departed ancestors, which they wish to express i n u n i t y of a c t i o n . The d e i t y i s conceived of as a r e a l person, though of a d i f f e r e n t order of r e a l i t y from persons on e a r t h . The departed husband may have d i e d , but he i s not s o c i a l l y n on-existent. In the same way, a l i m i t e d l i a b i l i t y company such as I m p e r i a l Chemical I n d u s t r i e s , the Crown, or the U n i -v e r s i t y of London do not ' e x i s t ' ; but we behave, f o r l i m i t e d purposes, as i f they d i d . Thus A l l o t t . But I wonder. Did the Ibo, the Akan, and the Nuer r e s p e c t i v e l y r e a l l y regard the d e i t y , the f a m i l y or the ghost-husband as f i c t i o n s ? Or d i d they not r a t h e r p erceive them as r e a l i t i e s which being what they were had to work through agents? The l i m i t e d l i a b i l i t y company was thought of from the beginning of the idea as a f i c -t i o n , but not the d e i t y , f a m i l y , or ghost-husband. A l l o t t ' s analogy, I suspect, there misrepresents the ideas of l e g a l p e r s o n a l i t y as seen from i n s i d e those l e g a l systems. - 86 -I I I DENE AND INUIT IDEAS OF LAND AND LAND-TENURE A Dene The Dene of our enquiry belong to the f a m i l y of peoples known to e t h n o l o g i s t s as the Athapaskan-speaking peoples of northwestern North America. According to Vanstone (1974:9-20), the northern Athapaskans are d i v i d e d i n t o f i v e e c o l o g i c a l zones, namely, A r c t i c Drainage Lowlands, C o r d i l l e r a n , Yukon and Kusko-kwim R i v e r Basins, Cook I n l e t — S u s i t n a R i v e r B a s i n , and Copper R i v e r B a s i n . W i t h i n these zones, the people are d i v i s i b l e i n t o groups d i s t i n g u i s h e d by t h e i r own v a r i a n t s of the Athapaskan languages. The Dene of the Northwest T e r r i t o r i e s comprise the f o l l o w i n g such groups: • A. A r c t i c Drainage Lowlands: 1. Chipewyan (o v e r l a p p i n g i n t o Manitoba and Sask-atchewan) ; 2. Slave (o v e r l a p p i n g i n t o A l b e r t a ) ; 3. Dogrib; 4. Bear Lake; and 5. Hare; B. C o r d i l l e r a n : 6. Kutchin (extending westward across northern Yukon T e r r i t o r y i n t o A l a s k a ) ; 7. Mountain; and - 87 -8. Kaska (extending i n t o southeastern Yukon T e r r i -t o r y and northeastern B r i t i s h Columbia). The c l i m a t e of the A r c t i c Drainage Lowlands i s c o n t i n e n t a l and r e l a t i v e l y uniform. Winters are severe. In the Mackenzie b a s i n , snow i s on the ground from October u n t i l l a t e A p r i l or e a r l y May. The Mackenzie R i v e r u s u a l l y freezes i n e a r l y Novem-ber, and stays f r o z e n u n t i l May. The Great Slave Lake l i k e -wise freezes i n e a r l y November, and i s not f r e e of i c e u n t i l mid-June. Mean d a i l y temperatures f o r December, January, and February, have been -12*F/-24.5*C, - l S ' F / ^ . S ' C , and - l l ' F / -23.9*C r e s p e c t i v e l y ; and temperatures from -40*F/-40*C to -60*F/-51.1*C are not at a l l unusual during these months. The short summer, on the other hand, can be q u i t e warm, w i t h con-s i d e r a b l e v a r i a t i o n w i t h i n a s i n g l e day. Vanstone (1974:11) noted t h a t on one J u l y day i n 1958 at F o r t Good Hope the temper ature v a r i e d from 83^/26.3*0 to 40*F/4.5*C. The v e g e t a t i o n of the a r c t i c drainage lowlands i s mostly c o n i f e r o u s . The commonest t r e e i s white spruce, and there i s almost no p i n e . I n swampy pa r t s of the country, are black spruce, tamarak, w i l l o w , and a l d e r . P o p l a r occurs i n clumps i n b e t t e r drained areas. At the east of the r e g i o n , t r e e s are s m a l l and s c a t t e r e d , concentrated i n s h e l t e r e d v a l l e y s ; but the f o r e s t d e n s i t y increases as one goes westward. There i s heavy ground cover, bush i n uncleared areas, and grass i n c l e a r e d areas and near human settlements. E d i b l e b e r r i e s , such as b l u e b e r r i e s , c r a n b e r r i e s , and s t r a w b e r r i e s , are p l e n t i f u l i n season. During e a r l y summer, w i l d roses, fireweed, Labrador - 88 -t e a , and other f l o r a bloom p r o f u s e l y . The animal l i f e i s t y p i c a l l y northwestern Canadian. The Dene hunt and use moose, c a r i b o u , black and brown bear, foxes, muskrat, beaver, porcupine, hare, marten, l y n x , w o l v e r i n e , o t t e r , f i s h e r , wolf,--.and red s q u i r r e l . They f i s h f o r w h i t e f i s h , gray-l i n g , northern p i k e , lake t r o u t , s h e e f i s h , suckers, and burbot. S e a s o n a l l y , ducks and geese appear i n l a r g e numbers. Loons are very common. (Vanstone 1974:14) The b a s i c mode of subsistence i n a b o r i g i n a l times was hunting, and e s p e c i a l l y the hunting of caribou and moose — caribou p a r t i c u l a r l y i n the north and east of our area, where the s u b - a r c t i c f o r e s t or t a i g a meets the tundra; and moose p a r t i c u l a r l y i n the more mountainous southwestern p o r t i o n . Other animals were a l s o hunted, and f i s h were caught i n lakes and r i v e r s , w i t h which the area i s l i b e r a l l y s u p p l i e d . Caribou were most notably hunted by i n t e r c e p t i n g them at key p o i n t s on the caribou m i g r a t i o n r o u t e s , and s t e e r i n g them by means of a combination of beaters and caribou fences to places where they could be conveniently caught and k i l l e d . Barren Ground caribou move to the tundra i n s p r i n g and r e t u r n to the edge of the f o r e s t s i n l a t e f a l l . The Chipewyan i n t e r -cepted the caribou by means of caribou d r i v e s i n open country i n l a t e f a l l o r e a r l y w i n t e r . The animals were urged between two long rows of wooden s t i c k s converging towards a l a r g e en-cl o s u r e of branches. W i t h i n the enclosure were set snares of babiche (hal f - t a n n e d caribou or moose h i d e ) , and the caribou were caught i n these. Then the hunters k i l l e d the animals by - 89 -means of bows and arrows. Another way of catching caribou was to d r i v e them i n t o l a k e s , and there lance or stab them w i t h knives from canoes. (Vanstone 1974:24) Moose, l i v i n g i n heavier f o r e s t country, and not being herd animals, were hunted d i f f e r e n t l y . The Slaveys snared them and hunted them w i t h bows and arrows. In the w i n t e r , a hunter coming upon f r e s h moose-tracks i n the snow, would make wide s e m i - c i r c l e s to leeward of the t r a c k , one a f t e r the other l i k e t h i s , f ~~\ u n t i l the moose-tracks disappeared. The hunter would then know that the animal had doubled back and was stopping to feed or l i e down. He would then himself double back i n s m a l l e r s e m i c i r c l e s u n t i l he found the moose. This type of hunting was best done by hunters as i n d i v i d u a l s or i n p a i r s . (Vanstone 1974:25; the technique i s described i n d e t a i l f o r the Western Kutchin of northern Alaska by Nelson 1973:102-106.) Both f i s h i n g and the hunting of s m a l l game were a l s o im-portant to the A r c t i c drainage lowland people, such as the Chipewyan and the Slave. F i s h i n g was done i n bothe summer and w i n t e r (through the i c e ) , f i s h being speared from canoes, caught i n w e i r s , o r caught by g i l l n ets. Animals ranging from black bears and w o l v e r i n e s , through beaver and musk-rat, to hare, ptarmigan, and porcupine, were caught both as food and f o r f u r Wind Moose Hunter - 90 -(except the ptarmigan, of course) by a v a r i e t y of methods, such as t r a p p i n g w i t h d e a d f a l l s , shooting w i t h bow and arrow, c a t c h -i n g i n nets, spearing a f t e r being d r i v e n from t h e i r homes, and s n a r i n g . While the hunting of caribou and moose was primary, hunting of other animals and f i s h i n g were e s s e n t i a l when the numbers of caribou and moose d e c l i n e d , or when these beasts were u n a v a i l a b l e because of season or weather. Game numbers f l u c t u a t e d both r e g u l a r l y and i r r e g u l a r l y . I t was impossible f o r the people to be completely assured of any one p a r t i c u l a r source of food. There were o c c a s i o n a l periods of s t a r v a t i o n , and sometimes during such times there was cannibalism. (Van-stone 1974:25-27) T r a v e l was by f o o t e x c l u s i v e l y during w i n t e r , and some-times a l s o by canoe during the summer. Snowshoes made w i n t e r t r a v e l much e a s i e r than i t would otherwise have been. Sleds seem not to have been used u n t i l post-contact times. (Vanstone 1974:26) Corresponding to the requirements of s u b s i s t e n c e , the people were grouped i n t o r e g i o n a l bands, l o c a l bands ( o r l o c a l groups), f a m i l i e s , and a number of task groups which came t o -gether as necessary. Slobodin (1962:73-74; compare Vanstone 1974:37-41; Helm 1965:34; 1968:118), f o r example, d e s c r i b i n g the P e e l R i v e r Kutchin, d i s t i n g u i s h e s the f o l l o w i n g groups: (a) w i n t e r t r a p p i n g party of some 4 to 8 f a m i l i e s , concerned to t r a p marten and fox and to hunt f o r meat; (b) l o c a l group, of some 4 to 8 f a m i l i e s , l a s t i n g one to two generations, and concerned w i t h t r a p p i n g , hunting, c o l l e c t i v e h o s p i t a l i t y , and - 91 -some c o l l e c t i v e t r a d i n g ; (c) meat camp, of some 15 to 20 f a m i l i e s , l a s t i n g p a r t or a l l of w i n t e r , and concerned w i t h caribou hunting and withsceremonies; (d) f i s h camp, comprising 10 to 30 f a m i l i e s , l a s t i n g a l l or p a r t of the summer season and sometimes being r e -c o n s t i t u t e d from season to season, concerned w i t h f i s h i n g , cere-monies, and games; (e) t r a d i n g p a r t y (now o b s o l e t e ) , f a i r l y l a r g e , o c c u r r i n g i n w i n t e r or e a r l y summer, and concerned w i t h t r a d i n g , ceremonies, and games; and ( f ) band assembly, c o n s i s t - • in g of 50 to 70 f a m i l i e s and being short i n d u r a t i o n , concerned w i t h ceremonies, games, and (formerly) t r a d i n g . In a d d i t i o n , where groups were l a r g e ( c , e, and f ) , men might form s p e c i a l -i z e d war p a r t i e s (now obsolete) or hunting p a r t i e s . Reconstinucting the ways i n which the groupings of the a b o r i g i n a l Chipewyan corresponded to the demands of s u b s i s t -ence, J.G.E. Smith (1975:391) concludes: The major s o c i o - t e r r i t o r i a l groupings, denoted by names and minor d i a l e c t d i s t i n c t i o n s , were r e l a t e d to the ex-p l o i t a t i o n of the three major caribou herds i n t h e i r t e r r i t o r y ; the r e g i o n a l bands to the seasonal migratory paths and-major f o r a g i n g ranges, and l o c a l bands to more l i m i t e d areas w i t h i n the w i n t e r and summer f o r a g i n g ranges. He continues (Smith 1975:445): Hunting and t r a p p i n g t e r r i t o r i e s do not correspond, i n the t a i g a , to the well-known Algonkian patterns of the b o r e a l f o r e s t . The migratory herds of caribou do not lend themselves to a f a m i l y owned hunting t e r r i t o r y , nor without the modern repeating r i f l e , to hunting by i n d i v i d u a l s o r very s m a l l groups. The other l a r g e game animal, the moose, i s a l s o tracked wherever the t r a i l l e a d s , although the caribou eaters have never apparently been o v e r l y concerned w i t h t h i s animal. Trapping t e r r i t o r i e s d i d develop, but not to the degree found f u r t h e r south among the T h i l a n o t t i n e and - 92 -the Cree. Among the trappers of the Barren Lands band, throughout the t w e n t i e t h century, a man was f r e e to e s t a b l -i s h h i s t r a p l i n e i n any area not i n use. I f a t r a p l i n e should not be used, i t was open to any other t r a p p e r . Among the Chipewyan, the r e g i o n a l bands had no c l e a r l y defined t e r r i t o r i a l i t y . The u n p r e d i c t a b i l i t y of the movements of the caribou precluded the development of concepts of t e r r i t o r i a l i t y and ownership (Smith 1975:453). Given t h a t land as such i s important c h i e f l y as th a t which supports the animals which provide food, c l o t h i n g , and m a t e r i a l , and th a t the animals are g e o g r a p h i c a l l y mobile, demo-g r a p h i c a l l y v a r i a b l e , and not e n t i r e l y p r e d i c t a b l e , e x c l u s i v e land-tenure between members of the same r e g i o n a l or l o c a l group, i s c o n t r a - s u r v i v a l . Access to the animals on the land must be maximized f o r the whole l o c a l community. Each member of the community must be f r e e to move over the land i n search of food, to s et traps wherever he ( o r she) w i l l s , and to combine w i t h other members i n pursuing and catching animals. At the same time, other members* t r a p s , w e i r s , and caribou fences must not be destroyed or damaged. I f these: are abandoned, they may be r e b u i l t and used again, by anyone, without f u s s . Once animals have been caught, they belong to the person who has caught them. At t h i s p o i n t the idea t h a t game should be shared enters to increase the e f f e c t i v e n e s s of the property system. The f l u c t -u a t i o n s i n game supply cause hunters to d i f f e r from time to time and place to place i n t h e i r success. One who i s success-f u l now may be, probably w i l l be, u n s u c c e s s f u l l a t e r ; and one who i s u n s u c c e s s f u l now, s u c c e s s f u l l a t e r . I f food i s shared between them, the s u r v i v a l chances of both are enhanced. W i t h i n the l o c a l community, t h e r e f o r e , we have a property system which emphasizes both the i n d i v i d u a l ownership and r e -s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r t o o l s and m a t e r i a l ( i n c l u d i n g food) a p p r o p r i -ated from nature, and the advantages and goodness of sh a r i n g these t o o l s and m a t e r i a l ( e s p e c i a l l y f o o d ) , but which emphasizes common and not e x c l u s i v e i n d i v i d u a l access to the land and i t s resources The e f f e c t i v e l a r g e s t l o c a l community among the Dene was the r e g i o n a l band, which tended to e x p l o i t the resources of a given t e r r i t o r y . What happened when members of d i f f e r e n t com-munities met? For the Dene of the Northwest T e r r i t o r i e s , there seems to have been no p a r t i c u l a r advantage to excluding members of other communities, provided they recognized t h a t they were coming where the home community u s u a l l y hunted. Indeed, i n times of famine at home i t would be u s e f u l to be able to v i s i t ' neighbouring communities and share both t h e i r h o s p i t a l i t y and t h e i r resources. So boundaries between the t e r r i t o r i e s of r e g i o n a l bands were not always sharply d e f i n e d . S t i l l , each r e g i o n a l band seems to have exercised a sense of sovereignty over the land over which i t s members customarily hunted. This c l a i m could be construed by us as a s o r t of communal ownership over the land; p a r t l y i t was so, p a r t l y i t was a p o t e n t i a l i t y f o r becoming so. I n t h i s c l a i m , sovereignty and ownership of 2 land are blended but n e i t h e r are c l e a r . I n a b o r i g i n a l times, they d i d not need to be. Warfare, under the l e a d e r s h i p of i n d i v i d u a l s possessing the appropriate personal q u a l i t i e s of f i g h t i n g prowess and ag-- 94 -g r e s s i v e behaviour, was q u i t e widespread among the Athapaskans. G e n e r a l l y , i t c o n s i s t e d of r e t a l i a t i o n f o r offences committed by r e l a t i v e s t r a n g e r s , and took place t h e r e f o r e between groups near enough to i n t e r a c t o c c a s i o n a l l y but not f r e q u e n t l y enough to permit other ways of r e s o l v i n g d i s p u t e s . Warfare between Athapaskan groups and t h e i r non-Athapaskan neithbours was com-mon. W i t h i n the area of the present enquiry, the Chipewyan fought I n u i t (and outside the area, the fought Cree). The Athapaskans who fought I n u i t d i d so to capture t h e i r possess-ions as t r o p h i e s (Vanstone 1974:48-50).^ F a c i l i t i e s , such as caribou fences, which r e q u i r e a measure of cooperation i n order f o r them to be b u i l t and maintained, were under the formal s u p e r v i s i o n of r e s p o n s i b l e i n d i v i d u a l s w i t h i n ^ t h e community. For example, W i l l i a m I r v i n g reports about the Vunta Kutchin of Old Crow i n the northern Yukon:^ The question of land tenure i n p r e h i s t o r i c times cannot be approached d i r e c t l y w i t h the evidence t h a t we now have. However i t i s c l e a r from our ethnographic data drawn from such informants i n Old Crow as Joe K i k a v i c h i k , now deceased; C h a r l i e P e t e r C h a r l i e and o t h e r s , t h a t i n d i v i d u a l s held such important f a c i l i t i e s as the caribou c o r r a l s i n t r u s t as i t were f o r the community t h a t de-pended on them. This I b e l i e v e i m p l i e s the r e c o g n i t i o n of the r i g h t of u s u f r u c t . The f o r m a l i z a t i o n of t h i s r e l a t i o n s h i p between the people and the land i s e x e m p l i f i e d by a s e r i e s of "owners" and t h a t should be put i n quotes, of the Thomas Creek caribou c o r r a l reported to me by K i k a v i c h i k . The c o r r a l was downed" by s i x named i n d i v i d u a l s p r i o r to i t s aban-donment i n about 1899. Now, I estimate t h a t each owner or perhaps he should be c a l l e d a custodian, served i n t h i s c a p a c i t y f o r an average of t e n years and t h a t the fence was i n o p e r a t i o n continuously from at l e a s t as e a r l y as 1840. . . . The a b o r i g i n a l p e r i o d turned i n t o the e a r l y contact p e r i o d a f t e r 1700 when trade goods of European o r i g i n (meaning thereby a l s o Russian and American) began to appear i n the Athapaskan country (Vanstone 1974:90-96). I r o n c h i s e l s , k n i v e s , and axes were among these trade goods. I n 1778, Pet e r Pond e s t a b l i s h e d a post near Lake Athabasca and traded w i t h the Chipewyan (as w e l l as w i t h the Cree). The 1780's saw the i n t r o d u c t i o n of European di s e a s e s , such as smallpox, and the beginning of con-5 sequent depopulation. The Chipewyan, Beaver, and l e l l o w k n i f e peoples were the f i r s t to get firearms from the t r a d e r s . I n 1821 r i v a l r y between f u r t r a d e r s east of the Rockies ceased when the Hudson Bay Company absorbed the Northwest Company. A f t e r 1821, the f u r trade s t a b i l i z e d and the missions entered and spread through the country. Contacts of whites w i t h Dene were l i m i t e d to few r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s of t r a d i n g company and church. However, over time the Indian standard of l i v i n g s h i f t e d towards g r e a t e r and g r e a t e r dependence on items of European manufacture (Vanstone 1974:96-97; Asch 1977: 49-52). The people had d i r e c t access to trade goods, but t h i s access depended d i r e c t l y upon t h e i r a b i l i t y to produce f u r s . The t r a d i n g monopoly enjoyed by the Hudson's Bay Company u n t i l 1900 allowed a s t a b l e c r e d i t r e l a t i o n s h i p to grow between t r a d e r and t r a p p e r . The people were f r e e on the l a n d , but became q u i c k l y dependent on the t r a d i n g post f o r c l o t h i n g and t o o l s . While w i l d game and f i s h remained important f o r food, European foods were a l s o d e s i r e d . Housing and t r a n s p o r t a t i o n d e v i c e s , however, continued to be made of l o c a l m a t e r i a l s . - 96 -I n 1899, the Chipewyan and the S l a v e , among the Athapask-ans, signed Treaty No. 8 w i t h the Canadian government; and i n 1921, the Slave, Dogrib, Hare, Loucheux (Bear Lake), and other Athapaskan groups i n the Mackenzie D i s t r i c t signed Treaty No. 11 (Cumming and Mickenberg 1972:118; Slobodin 1962:40, on the P e e l R i v e r K u t c h i n ) . Vanstone (1974:101-102) summarizes the e f f e c t s of the dependence on the f u r t r a d e , and of the increase i n t r a p p i n g , i n the f o l l o w i n g words: Trapping i s e s s e n t i a l l y an i n d i v i d u a l a c t i v i t y , and although a trapper may work w i t h one or more p a r t n e r s , the traps he sets are h i s own, as are the proceeds from the s k i n s t h a t he t r a d e s . We have noted t h a t i n d i v i d u a l -ism was a s i g n i f i c a n t aspect of Athapaskan adaptation, ,'-J and thus the i n t r o d u c t i o n of commercial t r a p p i n g d i d not create as much d i s r u p t i o n as i t might i n a c u l t u r e t h a t s t r e s s e d communal subsistence a c t i v i t i e s . Those coopera-t i v e p u r s u i t s t h a t d i d e x i s t , such as the caribou d r i v e , d e c l i n e d i n importance, and some changes i n patterns of sharing a l s o occurred, but the sharing of b i g game and other resources i n the environment, a deeply rooted con-cept i n t r a d i t i o n a l Athapaskan c u l t u r e , has continued to be s i g n i f i c a n t . A b o r i g i n a l subsistence a c t i v i t i e s d i d not i n v o l v e extensive t r a p p i n g and most of the f u r b e a r i n g animals d e s i r e d by the f u r trade were not s u i t a b l e f o r food. Only the beaver was important a b o r i g i n a l l y as a source of both food and s k i n s f o r c l o t h i n g . I t was the need to procure food to support l i f e d uring periods when animals without food value were being hunted t h a t e v e n t u a l l y bound the Indians c l o s e l y to the posts where they traded. Trapping e f f e c t i v e l y s i g n a l e d the end to e x p l o i t a t -i o n of the t o t a l environment. S p e c i a l i z e d knowledge of animal behaviour was s t i l l an important adaptive s t r a t e g y , but i t s emphasis s h i f t e d c o n s i d e r a b l y . Knowledge of the h a b i t s of f u r b e a r i n g animals and t h e i r environment was now of g r e a t e r importance than a s i m i l a r knowledge of l a r g e game animals and f i s h . This s h i f t of emphasis and i t s commercial i m p l i c a t i o n s a l s o d i s t u r b e d the balanced r e c i p -r o c a l r e l a t i o n s h i p between the hunter and h i s animal s p i r i t h e l p e r s , thus undermining a b a s i c aspect of the t r a d i t i o n a l r e l i g i o u s b e l i e f system. - 97 -Did t h i s change a f f e c t land-holding p r a c t i c e s among the Dene of the Mackenzie region? Data to answer t h i s question d i r e c t l y are not apparent e i t h e r i n the ethnographic record of i n the Berger Commission t r a n s c r i p t s . However, Nelson's (1973:156-159 e s p e c i a l l y ) study of hunting, g a t h e r i n g , and t r a p p i n g among the Western Kutchin of Alaska suggests what l i k e l y happened elsewhere as t r a p p i n g i n -creased i n importance. Among these people, t r a p l i n e s are areas i n which i n d i v i d u a l s or f a m i l i e s have e x c l u s i v e r i g h t s to a l l f u r - b e a r i n g animals (and only to f u r - b e a r i n g a n i m a l s ) . A t r a p -l i n e i s a c i r c u i t o u s complex of t r a i l s , p l u s surrounding t e r r i -t o r y and bodies of water along t h e s e n t r a i l s . T r a p l i n e s are e s t a b l i s h e d by use, and i f l e f t unused f o r s e v e r a l years, may be claimed by someone e l s e . T r a p l i n e s are acquired by (a) c l e a r i n g or reopening t r a i l s , (b) r e c e i v i n g them by g i f t or i n h e r i t a n c e , and (c) by purchasing them. People avoid using other persons* t r a p l i n e s , even i f p o s s i b l e a v o i d i n g t r a v e l l i n g upon them; they do not set traps on other persons' t r a p l i n e s ; and they do not s t e a l f u r s from one another's t r a p s . Trap-l i n e s are thus i n d i v i d u a l or f a m i l y property. Stager (1974:40, 42) describes a s i m i l a r happening f o r the Vunta Kutchin of Old Crow, Y.T.: Trapping introduced and encouraged the concept of i n d i v i d u a l entrepreneurship, and property. Granted t h a t the o l d c o r r a l s and f i s h t r a p s "belonged" to c e r t a i n f a m i l i e s or i n d i v i d u a l s and were handed down, but there was then a strong s h a r i n g and cooperative e t h i c i n Kutchin c u l t u r e . The beginning of trade by i n d i v i d u a l s r e q u i r e d i n d i v i d u a l t r a p l i n e s and t e r r i t o r i e s . The l o c a t i o n of t r a p l i n e s v a r i e d from year to year, so t h a t "ownership" of an area a p p l i e d to the time t h a t a person a c t u a l l y - 98 -trapped t h e r e . Decisions as to which trapper would oc-cupy which area seem to have been e s t a b l i s h e d i n f o r m a l l y , e i t h e r through conversation or on a f i r s t - c o m e f i r s t -served b a s i s , or by repeated use so t h a t the "owner" of a l i n e was common knowledge. There was ah e s t a b l i s h e d code th a t whoever breaks t r a i l f i r s t had r i g h t to t r a p t h a t t r a i l ; he could delegate the use to any p a r t of h i s t r a i l . This i s a l o g i c a l response to the o p p o r t u n i t i e s provided by the f u r t r a d e , and f i t s the i n d i v i d u a l i s t i c s i d e of Atha-paskan c u l t u r e . ^ I t would a l s o be encouraged by the Canadian government's p r a c t i c e of t r a p - l i n e r e g i s t r a t i o n , though t h i s does not come about u n t i l the mid-1940's. Thus among the P e e l R i v e r Kutchin t r a p - l i n e r e g i s t r a t i o n was introduced i n 1946. A f t e r 1947, t r a p p i n g was p r o h i b i t e d by the government on t e r r i -t o r y not r e g i s t e r e d i n the name of the t r a p p e r or h i s f a m i l y , or without the trapper's express permission (Slobodin 1962:41). R e g i s t r a t i o n was supposed to provide a s t a t i s t i c a l b a s i s f o r a n a l y z i n g muskrat p r o d u c t i v i t y (Stager 1974*50). A f t e r 1946-47, and e a r l i e r i n some p l a c e s , the f u r trade d e c l i n e d as a major source of income f o r the Dene, and both government and e x t r a c t i v e i n d u s t r y moved i n upon the north country (Vanstone 1974:107; Asch 1977:52). Welfare s e r v i c e s f o r the Indians were introduced and enlarged. The e x t r a c t i v e s i n d u s t r i e s which entered the country gave only l i m i t e d opportun-i t i e s t o the Indians. The f i r m s p r e f e r r e d to use imported labou r . I n most i n s t a n c e s , furthermore, the Indians had n e i t h e r the education nor the s k i l l s to take advantage of such employ-ment o p p o r t u n i t i e s as d i d a r i s e . I n some p l a c e s , Indians d i d f i n d jobs i n f i s h i n g , s m a l l - s c a l e lumbering, and some mining and c o n s t r u c t i o n work. - 99 -As the tra p p i n g d e c l i n e d , the t r a d i n g post became a com-m e r c i a l s t o r e , s e l l i n g manufactured goods to the Indians i n r e t u r n f o r cash. Nevertheless, h u n t i n g , s f i s h i n g , and t r a p p i n g continued t o be important to the l i v e l i h o o d of the people, f a r more im-portant than most White observers thought. By the 1970's, however, the " t r a d i t i o n a l " mode of subsistence was s e r i o u s l y threatened by the increase i n prospecting f o r o i l , by an es-panding network of roads, by the p i p e l i n e proposals, and by the f u r t h e r resource e x t r a c t i o n which these portended. Accord-i n g l y i n 1973 s i x t e e n c h i e f s r e p r e s e n t i n g the various Dene bands i n the Northwest T e r r i t o r i e s a p p l i e d to lodge a caveat w i t h the R e g i s t r a r of (Land) T i t l e s c l a i m i n g a b o r i g i n a l t i t l e to some 400,000 square miles of the Northwest T e r r i t o r i e s . The caveat sought to f o r b i d the r e g i s t r a t i o n of any t i t l e except subject to the c l a i m . The R e g i s t r a r r e f e r r e d the question to the N.W.T. Supreme Court. The f e d e r a l government objected. Mr J u s t i c e Morrow of t h a t court nevertheless h e l d t h a t a prima f a c i e case was made out t h a t the Dene had a b o r i g i n a l r i g h t s i n the la n d , t h a t these r i g h t s c o n s t i t u t e d an i n t e r e s t which might be pro-t e c t e d by caveat, and tha t the R e g i s t r a r had the duty to record and lodge t h i s caveat (Re P a u l e t t e et a l . and R e g i s t r a r of T i t l e s (No._2) (1973), 42 D.L.R. (3d) 8 ) . During the proceedings va r i o u s Dene t e s t i f i e d concerning the nature of t h e i r use and occupancy of the land, and the judge's d e c i s i o n summarizes and quotes t h a t testimony. Testimony was a l s o given by anthropolo-g i s t s Mrs. B e r y l G i l l e s p i e and Dr. June Helm, and by Father Rene Fumoleau. Concerning t r a d i t i o n a l ideas of land and lan d - h o l d i n g , - 100 -the testimony revealed that the band, i . e . the regional band, was the land-holding e n t i t y , that the people of each band knew what places were part of the t e r r i t o r y of t h e i r band and what part of some other band's t e r r i t o r y , that people "respected" other bands' areas but f e l t free to cross into them i f neces-sary, and conversely that people allowed persons from other bands to come onto t h e i r t e r r i t o r y to hunt. Dene "did not con-s i d e r that each of them owned small parcels of land to the ex-clusion of others" (Ibid.:14). Then i n 1974 came the Mackenzie Valley P i p e l i n e Inquiry. The Dene took the opportunity given by Mr. Justice Berger to set out e s p e c i a l l y at the community hearings t h e i r claims to the land and something of t h e i r way of l i f e on the land and t h e i r ideas about the land and i t s dwellers. The testimony focussed on the facts that the Dene had used and occupied the land before the Whites came, and that they were s t i l l using and occupying i t . While the ways i n which they used i t were described, there was no description as such of the ways i n which they held land among themselves. The thrust of the testimony was directed out-wards, against the claims and pressures of White society, rather g than inwards, towards the analysis of Dene society. But nonetheless some p r i n c i p l e s about land and land-tenure among the Dene can be extracted from the testimonies: ( l ) Land belongs to the people, i n d i v i d u a l l y and c o l l e c t -i v e l y , who l i v e on the land and who therefore have the right to use that land and to claim i t s products accordingly. Residence - I d -as a member of the community of people l i v i n g on tha t land confers the r i g h t t o use t h a t l a n d . ^ (2) Land i s a whole, i n c l u d i n g the e a r t h , the p l a n t s , the animals, and even the people who l i v e on i t . I t i s a part of a whole way of l i f e , and supports t h a t way of l i f e . To t h i n k of the land i s to t h i n k of a l l these t h i n g s . Land i s food i s l i f e . 1 0 (3) Going along w i t h t h i s wholeness of la n d , i s an e t h i c of stewardship or p a r t n e r s h i p w i t h the land and the animals. Though t h i s c e r t a i n l y does not prevent u s i n g the animals and p l a n t s f o r human w e l l - b e i n g , the r e l a t i o n s h i p between people 11 and land i s a moral as w e l l as a t e c h n i c a l one. (4) The moral order b i n d i n g land and people, binds the people not only w i t h t h e i r land today, but both of these w i t h 12 the ancestors of the people and w i t h f u t u r e generations. (5) The products of the l a n d , e s p e c i a l l y food, and access to resources, are t o be shared among the members of the commun-13 i t y , so t h a t no one may be i n want when another person i s r i c h . ^ Thus i n 1975 the Dene of the Mackenzie V a l l e y were s t i l l f o l l o w i n g much the same ideas of land and land-tenure as t h e i r ancestors had followed when the Whites f i r s t a r r i v e d . At the r i s k of some r e p e t i t i o n , l e t me now t r y to sum up those i d e a s . Land "belongs' 1 to the whole community of people who l i v e on the la n d . This "belonging" has i n i t the p o s s i -b i l i t y of both sovereignty and property. The community has the r i g h t and power to exclude from the land persons who are not - 102 -members of the community. Any member of the community has the r i g h t to l i v e on the land and to use i t s resources to maintain h i m s e l f / h e r s e l f and h i s / h e r dependents. Membership i s recog-n i z e d by the community on the b a s i s of k i n s h i p and residence. F a c i l i t i e s , such as caribou fences, which enhance the use of the land and i t s animals and which r e q u i r e some cooperation to b u i l d and maintain, are under the c u s t o d i a n s h i p , as i t were, of s p e c i f i c leaders of the community, and the passage of t h i s custodianship f o l l o w s the succession of l e a d e r s h i p . T r a p l i n e s , however, belong to the i n d i v i d u a l trapper and h i s f a m i l y , and he has the r i g h t to exclude other persons from h i s t r a p l i n e . These t r a p l i n e s , however, are only f o r catching f u r - b e a r i n g animals, whose p e l t s w i l l be s o l d to t r a d e r s . Food animals are not a f f e c t e d by t h i s r u l e . There i s a l s o a general o b l i g -a t i o n of h o s p i t a l i t y , food-sharing, and mutual a i d i n times of t r o u b l e . I f the c r i t e r i o n of ownership of land be taken to be the r i g h t or the power to exclude other persons from access to and use of the l a n d , then the Dene land-owner i s c l e a r l y the com-munity, w i t h the important p a r t i a l exception of t r a p l i n e s , which are i n d i v i d u a l or f a m i l y property. What i n d i v i d u a l s pos-sess i s the r i g h t to catch game f o r c l o t h i n g and food and to appropriate other resources f o r s h e l t e r and f u e l . Even t r a p -l i n e s are of t h i s k i n d : what the trapper has i s not the l a n d , but the e x c l u s i v e r i g h t to set traps along the path of the t r a p l i n e . - 103 -The data do not i n d i c a t e , i n t h i s system, a c l e a r d i s -t i n c t i o n between ownership and possession regarding l a n d . Given the freedom of access to resources f o r community mem-bers, and the r e l a t i v e ease w i t h which members of other com-munities could e s t a b l i s h residence i n the community, there was perhaps no need to develop such a d i s t i n c t i o n . Other c r i t e r i a of ownership, at l e a s t concerning l a n d , are absent. N e i t h e r i n d i v i d u a l s nor the community were c o n s i d -ered to have the power to a l i e n a t e the land — the question d i d not a r i s e — ; and the power to leave land by w i l l does not apply to the community, and d i d not e x i s t f o r i n d i v i d u a l s . Furthermore, the Dene d i d not have any i n t e n t i o n to g i v e away the land when they signed the T r e a t i e s . As Rene Fumoleau ([1973]*• 307) has w r i t t e n , The Indian d i d not see himself as owner of l a n d , nor 'as empowered to bestow ownership on another. He considered t h a t the land and i t s animals, the water and i t s f i s h e s , were f o r h i s use. He would never refuse to share them, compelled by c o n v i c t i o n to do so. Nor d i d he consider t h a t the act of s h a r i n g deprived him of h i s own r i g h t to f r e e l y use the land as he had p r e v i o u s l y done. - 104 -B I n u i t The I n u i t of the Northwest T e r r i t o r i e s belong to three of the f o u r e c o l o g i c a l types i n t o which the Danish e t h n o l o g i s t Kai B i r k e t - S m i t h d i v i d e d the Eskimo. 1^" The High A r c t i c type, represented only by the P o l a r I n u i t , depended upon sea-mammal hunting, £rom the i c e (they had l o s t the knowledge of boat-b u i l d i n g ) , w i t h b i r d - c o l l e c t i n g i n the short summer. The A r c t i c type, represented by most of the other I n u i t i n Canada, depended c h i e f l y on sea-mammal hunting a l l year round, from the i c e i n w i n t e r , from boats i n summer. The1 Caribou I n u i t , d w e l l i n g i n -land on the tundra of Keewatin d i s t r i c t , depended on the c a r i -bou f o r s u r v i v a l ; t h e i r i n t e r e s t s clashed w i t h the Chipewyan f o l l o w i n g the caribou onto the tundra. The S u b a r c t i c type, found i n South Greenland and southwestern Alaska (no Canadian r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s ) , depended c h i e f l y on sea-mammal hunting by means of boats. W i t h i n these f o u r general types, there were v a r i a t i o n s . For example, the N e t s i l i k who occupied the northern p a r t of Keewatin d i s t r i c t used both s e a l and car i b o u ; the caribou reached the N e t s i l i k country by m i d - A p r i l and departed i n Sept-ember. The N e t s i l i k a l s o hunted musk-oxen and p o l a r bears, and caught a l s o various kinds of f i s h ( B a l i k c i 1 9 7 0 : x v i i i - x i x ) . The N e t s i l i k could hunt s e a l s only from the i c e , and t h e r e f o r e only i n w i n t e r ( B a l i k c i 1970:23). - 105 -Hunting was extensive, r a t h e r than i n t e n s i v e , as the a n i -mals tended to be dispersed over the country. Some kinds of hunting and c o l l e c t i n g were done by i s o l a t e d i n d i v i d u a l s . Other kinds r e q u i r e d teams. B a l i k c i ' s (1970:127-128) summary of N e t s i l i k p r a c t i c e s i l l u s t r a t e s the v a r i e t y which could occur: N e t s i l i k subsistence a c t i v i t i e s may be c l a s s i f i e d by the extent and nature of collaboration they e n t a i l . F i r s t , of course, come the purely i n d i v i d u a l a c t i v i t i e s i n v o l v i n g the e f f o r t s of an i s o l a t e d , s i n g l e i n d i v i d u a l : s t a l k i n g the s e a l i n s p r i n g , t r a p p i n g sea g u l l s , c o l l e c t -i n g eggs, f i s h i n g f o r lake t r o u t , some bow-and-arrow c a r i -bou hunting, e t c . Second, there are the non-simultaneous but s i m i l a r a c t i v i t i e s of people r e s i d i n g together, f o r example, autumn f i s h i n g f o r salmon t r o u t through the r i v e r i c e . In t h i s case an extended f a m i l y may camp together and every a d u l t w i l l have a f i s h i n g h o l e . The men w i l l go back and f o r t h f i s h i n g whenever they d e s i r e , and no c o - o r d i n a t i o n of e f f o r t i s necessary. T h i r d are those a c t i v i t i e s i n v o l v i n g the co-operation of i n d i v i d u a l s i n a synchronized manner without any d i v i s i o n of t a s k s . Stone-weir f i s h i n g r e q u i r e d a group e f f o r t to b u i l d the dam, a s u b s t a n t i a l undertaking. And i t was imperative f o r a l l present to enter the c e n t r a l b a s i n simultaneously i n order t o e q u a l i z e f i s h i n g r e t u r n s . Breathing-hole s e a l i n g .in w i n t e r was a c o l l e c t i v e a c t i v i t y because of the n e c e s s i t y to c o n t r o l simultaneously the l a r g e s t pos-s i b l e number of br e a t h i n g h o l e s . I n both cases a l l the members of the f i s h i n g or hunting p a r t y performed e x a c t l y the same tasks simultaneously. Fourth, a c t i v i t i e s r e -q u i r i n g d i v i s i o n of l a b o r and c o o r d i n a t i o n . Such was the case of caribou hunting from kayaks, where beaters d i r e c t e d the caribou toward a c r o s s i n g p o i n t i n the lake to be ambushed by kayakers, who d i d a l l the a c t u a l k i l l i n g . Land f o r the I n u i t was, and i s , a place to l i v e on and hunt over. Weyer (1932:173), summing up the e a r l i e r ethno-graphies, wrote: The Eskimos have very l i t t l e conception of ownership of land simply as l a n d . T h e i r i n t e r e s t , as i s t y p i c a l of hunting peoples, l i e s c h i e f l y i n the animals r a t h e r than i n t e r r i t o r i e s apart from t h e i r f a u n a l l i f e . Hence t h e i r land laws are r e a l l y game laws. - 106 -Among the Copper I n u i t , land belonged to the community which used i t as a hunting and f i s h i n g ground. Strangers were not allowed to hunt there unless the community accepted them as members at l e a s t t e m p o r a r i l y , and they conformed to the customs of the community. Among the Caribou I n u i t , no i n d i v i d u a l or community was supposed to l a y c l a i m to any p a r t i c u l a r hunting t e r r i t o r y . Wood, soapstone, and other m a t e r i a l s , l i k e game, belonged to the person who f i r s t took possession of them. This a t t i t u d e was a l s o f o l l o w e d by the Greenland Eskimo. The Alaskan Eskimo, on the other hand, sometimes regarded the more productive places as being p r i v a t e l y owned. (Weyer 1932:174-5) Weyer (1932:188) ex t r a c t e d three p r i n c i p l e s from the ethnographies: (1) Hunting grounds, or r a t h e r , the p r i v i l e g e of hunting on them, i s a communal r i g h t , except i n r a t h e r r a r e i n -stances . (2) The hunter or hunters almost always have the p r e f e r -e n t i a l share i n the game secured, but p a r t of each catch i s g e n e r a l l y d i v i d e d among the community or among those present at the a p p o r t i o n i n g . (3) Stored p r o v i s i o n s are normally the property of the f a m i l y or household; but i n time of s c a r c i t y t h e r i s a tendency towards communalism. H o s p i t a l i t y i s s t r e s s e d under a l l circumstances. I n Weyer's (1932:189) o p i n i o n , i n t h i s property regime: . . . i n d i v i d u a l i n t e r e s t s r a t h e r than group i n t e r e s t s are dominant. The group serves as an insurance o r g a n i z a -t i o n , towards which thei« i s l i t t l e f e e l i n g of righteous r e s p o n s i b i l i t y , save i n t h a t k i n s h i p among i t s members makes the p r o s p e r i t y of one member the concern of another. Fundamentally, i t i s not s o l i c i t u d e toward the group as a group t h a t prompts the i n d i v i d u a l to f o r f e i t h i s p r e -mium; r a t h e r i t i s the c o n v i c t i o n t h a t unless he does so he w i l l not d e r i v e the b e n e f i t s when h i s personal or f a m i l y i n t e r e s t s are at stake. - 107 -Houses belonged to f a m i l i e s or to heads of f a m i l i e s , but o f t e n when these houses were no longer used, property r i g h t s i n them lapsed. T o o l s , c l o t h e s , r i t u a l o bjects be-longed to i n d i v i d u a l s (Weyer 1932:193-194). These l a t t e r could be i n h e r i t e d (Weyer 1932:201). The I n u i t went through stages of contact w i t h White s o c i e t y s i m i l a r to the stages passed through by the Dene. F i r s t came whalers and t r a d e r s , then m i s s i o n a r i e s , and f i n -a l l y policemen. The I n u i t became i n c r e a s i n g l y dependent on the f u r t r a d e , which c o l l a p s e d i n the 1940's l e a v i n g the I n u i t in.i,a s t a t e of d e s t i t u t i o n i n the 1950*s, and dependent on gov-ernment w e l f a r e . I n the 1950's, the government increased i t s concern f o r the I n u i t , and increased i t s p e n e t r a t i o n of the ; nor t h . One move was to e s t a b l i s h cooperatives which would produce a r t i f a c t s and a r t objects f o r outside markets. By the 1970's the search f o r petroleum was reaching the I n u i t country. (Brody 1975:14-15, 2 1 - 3 1 ) 1 5 No t r e a t i e s were signed by Canada w i t h any I n u i t . I n 1973 the I n u i t T a p i r i s a t of Canada proposed t o the M i n i s t e r of Indian and Northern A f f a i r s t h a t research be done to produce "a comprehensive and v e r i f i a b l e record of I n u i t land use and occupancy i n the Northwest T e r r i t o r i e s of Canada." I n 1976, t h i s research was published as the Report of the I n u i t Land Use and Occupancy P r o j e c t . This study covered every com-munity of I n u i t i n the N.W.T. I t l i s t s the fauna hunted, trapped, or f i s h e d , the places and seasons where and when fauna - 108 -are caught, the changes from olden to modern times, and the various t e r r i t o r i e s occupied by the I n u i t . The study i n c l u d e s a s p e c i a l d i s c u s s i o n , by Hugh Brody, of how the I n u i t perceived t h e i r occupation of the l a n d . Brody's observations are h i g h l y r e l e v a n t to the present enquiry. He notes t h a t throughout the Canadian A r c t i c , the I n u i t fought the Indians whenever they found these l a t t e r on I n u i t hunting lands. The I n u i t feared the Indians. "This one simple f a c t e s t a b l i s h e s t h a t I n u i t d i d have a strong sense of the r i g h t of occupancy, even though t h a t r i g h t was enjoyed by every Inuk and i t crossed every l o c a l c u l t u r a l boundary." ( I n u i t . . . P r o j e c t 1976:224) The I n u i t language d i s t i n g u i s h e s between r e s i d i n g , u s i n g , having, and owning t h i n g s , i n c l u d i n g land: There are two main ways of asking where a person i s from: "Nani nunagarpit?" "Where do you have land?" and " N a n i r -m i u t a u v i t ? " "Where are you o f ? " The key i n f i x i n the f i r s t case i s qaq, which means "having i n one's possess-i o n " , though i t does not imply anything as f o r c e f u l as ownership. Although n e i t h e r of the "where do you l i v e " questions i s e x p l i c i t l y d i r e c t e d to the i d e a of ownership, i t i s p o s s i b l e to discu s s ownership i n the I n u i t language. The word f o r owning i s nangminiq t which, l i k e most I n u i t words, can be used i n both v e r b a l and noun forms. As a noun, i t takes conventional possessive endings: nangminira, my own, or nangminit, your own, e t c . And i n i t s v e r b a l form, i t can, l i k e a l l verbs, be conjugated: nanminiung-i t u q , i t i s not my property, or nangminingitara» I do not own i t . Nangimiq i s opposed to atuq, merely u s i n g . A Pond I n l e t man, t a l k i n g about Qallunaat i n the A r c t i c , s a i d , "Nangminingitanga a t u r t u i i n a t a n g a " , "He doesn't own i t , he j u s t used i t . " When I n u i t ask, '.Whose are these?" they do so i n a way t h a t leaves open the question of owner-s h i p . The form of such questions and answers i s — Q: " K i a ukka?" "Whose these?"; A: "Ukkua uvanga", "These - 109 -mine"; o r Q: "Puaaaluruukka takkua?, "My r o t t e n o l d gloves those?" Such questions and answers do not incl u d e a v e r b a l root that i n d i c a t e any r e l a t i o n s h i p to the o b j e c t s . They suggest a tendency toward non-designation of owner-s h i p . But t h i s tendency i s not, contrary to widespread b e l i e f , a r e s u l t of there being no sense of ownership among the I n u i t . Here the term nangminiq has i t s p l a c e . A s s e r t i o n of ownership i s l i k e l y to a r i s e when the r i g h t s of ownership are not being respected, or when the b e n e f i t s of ownership are threatened. ( I n u i t • . . P r o j e c t 1976: 1:234 Thus the I n u i t do have an ide a of ownership, and words to express t h a t i d e a . That id e a was u s u a l l y a p p l i e d to personal goods, but could be a p p l i e d to land . A b o r i g i n a l l y , the ide a of land ownership d i d not a r i s e very o f t e n , because those r i g h t s were customarily respected. But today, faced w i t h the l o s s of t h e i r land t o the Whites or Qallunaat« the idea t h a t the I n u i t own t h e i r land has come c l e a r l y to the f o r e . The I n u i t sense of i d e n t i t y both as a people and as i n d i -v i d u a l persons i s bound up w i t h t h e i r f e e l i n g f o r the la n d , f o r hunting as a way of l i f e , and f o r I n u i t t r a d i t i o n a l customs. As w i t h the Dene, though w i t h a d i f f e r e n t s t y l e and f l a v o u r , the land and the people are to the I n u i t i n d i v i s i b l e . Separate them, or destroy the la n d , and the I n u i t d i e . In summary, land among the I n u i t belongs to the community whose members make use of the resources, e s p e c i a l l y game, found on or i n t h a t l a n d . The community c o n s i s t s of the people who dwe l l on the land and use i t . Once a resource i s caught or appr o p r i a t e d , i t becomes the property of the person who has so caught o r appropriated. But there i s an o b l i g a t i o n to share t h i s resource among the members of the community. As Weyer wrote, the land laws of the I n u i t are b a s i c a l l y game laws. - 110 -c A Summary Let us now, i n c o n c l u s i o n t o t h i s chapter, apply the set of s i x c l a s s e s of l a n d - r i g h t s d i s t i n g u i s h e d by Crocombe (1974: 5-7) and quoted i n chapter I I , s e c t i o n C, of the present enquiry to land-tenure among the Dene and I n u i t . (1) U s e - r i g h t s : among the Dene and I n u i t both, r i g h t s to use the fauna and f l o r a of the community's land f o r food, c l o t h i n g , and s h e l t e r f o r on e s e l f and one's f a m i l y were granted to members of the community. A member of the community was any-one who had r e s i d e d there long enough to be accepted as a member. V i s i t o r s had a s i m i l a r g u e s t - r i g h t , provided they were accepted as such by some member of the community. K i n s f o l k of members were r e a d i l y accepted as welcome v i s i t o r s and e a s i l y became members. (2) Rights of " i n d i r e c t " economic g a i n , e.g. t r i b u t e and rent: t h i s category was not a p p l i c a b l e i n a b o r i g i n a l times, and i s not p a r t of t r a d i t i o n a l i d e a s . But i n modern c o n d i t i o n s , Dene and I n u i t are prepared to argue th a t r o y a l t i e s from resource-e x p l o i t a t i o n by mining companies, o i l companies, and so on, should be p a i d to the communities which i n Dene and I n u i t ideas own the l a n d . (3) C o n t r o l r i g h t s : these were held by the community, whose l e a d e r s , w i t h popular support, could deny access to persons from outside the community, and sometimes (among the Dene) de-f i n e d c e r t a i n areas as reserves closed to hunting. - I l l -(4) Rights of t r a n s f e r : u s e - r i g h t s were not t r a n s f e r r e d , being acquired by residence (as member or guest) i n the comm-u n i t y . C h i l d r e n acquired them by being born to members of the community; they d i d not a c t u a l l y i n h e r i t them from t h e i r par-ents. Only the community could a l i e n a t e l a n d , and a l i e n a t i o n was not an important a b o r i g i n a l concern. Rights to t r a p l i n e s , a post-contact phenomenon, could on the other hand be t r a n s -f e r r e d by g i f t , purchase, or i n h e r i t a n c e . (5) R e s i d u a l r i g h t s : t h i s category was not r e a l l y ap-p l i c a b l e i n a b o r i g i n a l c o n d i t i o n s . I f such r i g h t s had had to be recognized, the community would presumably have been the holder. (6) Symbolic r i g h t s or r i g h t s of i d e n t i f i c a t i o n : these were not described i n my sources. - 112 -Notes to Chapter I I I Compare summary statement i n D r i v e r (1964:250-251): In the Mackenzie Sub-Arctic most t e r r i t o r i a l r i g h t s were controoled by loose and f l u i d bands r a t h e r than by i n d i v i d u a l s or f a m i l i e s . The k i n s h i p s t r u c t u r e of these bands f o l l o w e d no r e g u l a r p a t t e r n and they seem to have in c l u d e d members from a number of u n r e l a t e d f a m i l i e s . Trap l i n e s , however, were owned and operated by i n d i v i d u a l s and f a m i l i e s i n the western p a r t of the area. This kind of property system i s described c l e a r l y by Guedon (1974:52, 129, 140, 147, 149) f o r the Upper Tanana of T e i t l i n , i n west c e n t r a l A l a s k a . Here the band u s u a l l y l i v e d i n i t s own t e r r i t o r y , but was not bound t o i t . Boundaries between band t e r r i t o r i e s were not permanently f i x e d . T e r r i t o r i e s were not e x c l u s i v e , f o r band members only, but the dwe l l e r s theron had some r i g h t t o l i m i t o t h e r s . A person could move f r e e l y wherever he or she had k i n . Sharing and h o s p i t a l i t y were h i g h l y valued. V i l l a g e s were meeting places f o r the people of the band. Each v i l l a g e was l i n k e d to a h i l l which stood as a l a n d -mark as w e l l as symbol. There was only one such h i l l per v i l l a g e , whether t h i s " h i l l " was a mountain, a s m a l l h i l l , or even j u s t a r i v e r bank. A person could hunt anywhere w i t h i n the l i m i t of h i s band's t e r r i t o r y . On another band's t e r r i t o r y , one had to go w i t h someone be-long i n g to th a t band. People might r e s i d e f o r a long time i n a given v i l l a g e , but were expected to remember the v i l l a g e where they were r a i s e d " o r where t h e i r parents - 113 -came from. The people of T e i t l i n are outside the t e r r i t o r i e s of the Dene of the N.W.T,, and are to the west, where property seems to have been a g r e a t e r concern and where property r i g h t s were more s p e c i f i c a l l y demarcated. Unless my memory misleads me (as w e l l i t might), Kai B i r k e t - S m i t h i n The Eskimos (note 14 below) says t h a t Dene and I n u i t fought over access to land and caribou and the use of caribou fences, such f i g h t i n g t a k i n g place i f the two peoples should happen to meet during t h e i r seasonal rounds. Dr. I r v i n g , d e s c r i b i n g h i s research i n t o the p r e h i s t o r i c way of l i f e of the ancestors of the people of Old Crow, was t e s t i f y i n g at the formal hearings of the Berger Com-mission i n Y e l l o w k n i f e . The quotation i s from T r a n s c r i p t s pp. F23052-23053» I r v i n g ' s complete testimony occupies pages F23042-23081. The passage c i t e d i s the only passage concerning n a t i v e Indian and I n u i t t r a d i t i o n a l land-tenure p r a c t i c e s which can be r e t r i e v e d from the formal hearings u s i n g the index provided. The i n f o r m a t i o n indexed under land-tenure and land-use mostly concerns Canadian l a n d -tenure or land-tenure i n other p a r t s of the w o r l d . The Y e l l o w k n i f e group has s i n c e disappeared. Guedon (1974:129), r e f e r r i n g to the Upper Tanana i n Alaska noted t h a t there the o l d balance between strong i n d i v i d -u a l i s m and the f e e l i n g of s o l i d a r i t y w i t h i n the community had been l o s t . I n d i v i d u a l i s m was accentuated by new - 114 -hunting weapons and by the cash economy. Nonetheless (p. 140), sharing and h o s p i t a l i t y remain h i g h l y valued. 7 Slobodin (1962:36) dates what he c a l l s the Musk-Rat P e r i o d of P e e l R i v e r Kutchin h i s t o r y from 1917 to 1947. 8 T r a n s c r i p t s of Mackenzie V a l l e y P i p e l i n e I n q u i r y Hearings, henceforth i n these notes c i t e d simply as T r a n s c r i p t s . The community hearings are contained i n volumes CI to C77. Since p a g i n a t i o n i s continuous from volume to volume, c i t a t i o n s w i l l be by page number o n l y , prededed by the c a p i t a l l e t t e r C, thus: T r a n s c r i p t s , p. C886 Since p a g i n a t i o n i s continuous a l s o f o r the formal hearings, c i t a t i o n s from the formal hearings w i l l a l s o be by page number o n l y , thus: T r a n s c r i p t s , p. F21917 There is_ an index. But u s i n g the index (as already remarked i n note 4, above), one can r e t r i e v e only one passage concerning t r a d i t i o n a l Indian and I n u i t l a n d -tenure. 9 The f u l l l i s t of s p e c i f i c testimonies f o r t h i s p r i n c i p l e from the f i r s t t h i r t e e n volumes of the community hearings, i s as f o l l o w s : (The people, meaning the whole community and i t s leaders) " . . . are the owners of the land and t h a t what they decide should happen on the land." Joe Naedzo, at F o r t F r a n k l i n , 24 June 1975, Trans-c r i p t s , p. C605 "He says the n a t i v e people are on t h i s land before the whitemen came by r i g h t , and when we say we own t h i s l a n d , he says i t s ours becouse we're the f i r s t one t h a t was here before the white man." W i l l i a m M a r t e l , at New Indian V i l l a g e , Hay R i v e r , 30 May 1975, T r a n s c r i p t s , pp. C510-511 - 115 -"We were born i n one world. The Almighty d i d not b u i l d t h i s world to f i g h t over i t . I don't t h i n k i t i s f a i r f o r e i t h e r of us to say i t i s your land or my land because nobody owns i t . " Louis Blondon, at Fo r t Norman, 2 7 June 1 9 7 5 , T r a n s c r i p t s , p. C 9 6 7 . A f u l l l i s t of s p e c i f i c testimonies f o r t h i s p r i n c i p l e , from the f i r s t t h i r t e e n volumes of the community hearings, i s as f o l l o w s : "Native people f i n d meaning i n the l a n d , and they need i t and they love i t . They love not only the land but the things God put on i t . . . . I n the w i n t e r you see f l o w e r s , t r e e s , r i v e r s and streams covered w i t h snow and f r o z e n . I n the s p r i n g i t a l l comes back to l i f e . This has a strong meaning f o r my people and me, and we need i t . " Ray Sonfere, at New Indian V i l l a g e , Hay R i v e r , 30 May 1 9 7 5 , Tran-s c r i p t s , p. C 5 5 2 . ". . .When they r e f e r to food, i t means the land." Joe Naedzo, at Fort F r a n k l i n , 24 June 1 9 7 5 , T r a n s c r i p t s , p. C 6 0 4 "My f a t h e r r e a l l y loved h i s land and he says t h a t we too loved our land . The grass and the tre e s are our f l e s h , the animals are our f l e s h . He says we do not have any money, we w i l l never be r i c h , but the animals that eat o f f the gr a s s , the animals th a t eat o f f the birc h e s and the barks and s t u f f l i k e t h a t , that we l i v e o f f . . . . " Suza Touchou, at F o r t F r a n k l i n , 25 June 1975, T r a n s c r i p t s , p. C684» "This land i s our blood. We were born and r a i s e d on i t . We l i v e and s u r v i v e by i t . " Joe B i s t a p e , at F o r t F r a n k l i n , 25 June 1 9 7 5 , T r a n s c r i p t s , p. C 7 6 l "We c a l l t h i s land our grub." Fred Wido, at Bra c k e t t Lake, 26 June 1975, T r a n s c r i p t s , p. C855. "This land i s your food bank. . . . " Terry Blond at Willow Lake, 26 June 1975, T r a n s c r i p t s , p. C867 The land i s compared to a bank. The Indians go to the land to get food, j u s t as the white people go to the bank to get money. Various people, T r a n s c r i p t s , pp. C 8 9 1 f C 9 5 2 , C 9 9 0 , C 1 1 2 9 , CI263. - 116 -"To the Indian people our land r e a l l y i s our l i f e . Without our land we cannot or we could no longer e x i s t as people," Richard Nerysoo, at F o r t McPherson, 10 J u l y , 19-75* T r a n s c r i p t s , p. C11&4. "Why we t a l k about the land so much i s because we can grow more animals," Charles Koe, at F o r t McPherson, 10 J u l y 1975, T r a n s c r i p t s , p. C1236. "Here, we. too, the Crow F l a t , i s j u s t l i k e a farm or a land t h a t we own, where we can go and make a l i v i n g from," John Moses, at Old Crow, Y.T., 11 J u l y 1975, T r a n s c r i p t s , p. C1337 A f u l l l i s t of s p e c i f i c t estimonies f o r t h i s p r i n c i p l e , from the f i r s t t h i r t e e n volumes of the community hearings, i s as f o l l o w s : P a r t s of the countryside were set aside as game reserves where there would be no hunting or t r a p p i n g . Chief T. Somfere, at New Indian V i l l a g e , Hay R i v e r , 30 May 1975, T r a n s c r i p t s , pp. C522-523. The woods were the Indians* f u e l , and the Indians d i d n ' t have to destroy the woods. Jim Lamalice, at New I n d i a n V i l l a g e , Hay R i v e r , 30 May 1975, T r a n s c r i p t s , P.C565. " . . . you must always keep your food good. I f you t r e a t your food good, the food i n r e t u r n w i l l t r e a t you good. . . . When they r e f e r to food, i t means the l a n d . . . . Whatever the animals eat, the brushes, the bushes, the mud, anything t h a t the animal eats, they themselves eat of i t too. L i k e i t i s a s o r t of c y c l e . . . . always keep your food good. P r o t e c t i t from any f i r e s t h a t might occur. Because the f i r e s destroys the food f o r the animal, and t h e r e f o r e you wouldn't have anyaanimals to feed o f f . " Joe Naedzo, at F o r t F r a n k l i n , 24 June 1975, T r a n s c r i p t s , pp. C604-605 The o l d people passed on the words, " i f you keep your land good, the land w i l l t r e a t you good." Joe Naedzo, T r a n s c r i p t s , p. C64I " . . . respect the l a n d . . . . " Lucy V a n e l t s i , at F o r t McPherson, 10 J u l y 1975, T r a n s c r i p t s , p. C1154. - 117 -"Being an Indian means being able to understand and l i v e w i t h t h i s world i n a very s p e c i a l way. I t means l i v i n g w i t h the l a n d , w i t h the animals, b i r d s and f i s h as though they were your s i s t e r s and b r o t h -e r s . I t means saying the land i s an o l d f r i e n d and an o l d f r i e n d t h a t your f a t h e r knew, your grandfather knew, indeed your people have always known." Richard Nerysoo, at F o r t McPherson, 10 J u l y 1975» T r a n s c r i p t s , p. C1183. "We w i l l always see ourselves as p a r t of nature." Richard Nerysoo, T r a n s c r i p t s , p. C1188 "We love our l a n d , because long before us, f o r many years, our ancestors they have been l i v i n g on t h i s land and made t h e i r l i v i n g on t h i s land and t h a t i s the reason why we t a l k so much about our land now-a-days." C h a r l i e A b e l , at Old Crow, Y.T., 11 J u l y 1975, T r a n s c r i p t s , p. C1331. The d i s t i n c t i o n between moral and t e c h n i c a l orders i s , of course, from R e d f i e l d (1957:20-21). A f u l l l i s t of s p e c i f i c t estimonies f o r t h i s p r i n c i p l e , from the f i r s t t h i r t e e n volumes of the community hearings, i s as f o l l o w s : "We have l i k e , our f a t h e r s have helped us s u r -v i v e u n t i l today. Then we must i n t u r n help our c h i l d r e n f o r the f u t u r e . " Joe Bayah, at F o r t Frank-l i n , 24 June 1975, T r a n s c r i p t s , p. C657. When the people go out f i s h i n g , hunting, t r a p -p i n g , "we don't t r y and clean the country, we always leave [a] l i t t l e f o r next year. . . . " We want to keep the land undestroyed f o r f u t u r e generations. Chief John C h a r l i e , at F o r t McPherson, 8 J u l y 1975, T r a n s c r i p t s , p. C990. "For thousands of years, we have l i v e d w i t h the l a n d , we have taken care of the l a n d , and the land has taken care of us. . . .We have l i v e d w i t h the l a n d , not t r i e d to conquer or c o n t r o l i t , or rob i t of i t s r i c h e s . That i s not our way. . . . We have been s a t i s f i e d to see our wealth as ourselves and the land we l i v e w i t h . I t i s our g r e a t e s t wish to be able to pass t h i s on, t h i s land to succeeding gen-e r a t i o n s i n the same c o n d i t i o n t h a t our f a t h e r s have given i t to us. We d i d not t r y to improve the land and we d i d not t r y to destroy i t . That i s not our way." P h i l l i p Blake, at Fort Mcpherson, 9 J u l y 1975, T r a n s c r i p t s , pp. CIO84 -85 . - 118 -A f u l l l i s t of s p e c i f i c testimonies f o r t h i s p r i n c i p l e , from the f i r s t t h i r t e e n volumes of the community hearings, i s as f o l l o w s : Food i s shared among the community, w i t h those i n need. Rosie S a v i , at Fort F r a n k l i n , 24 June 1975, T r a n s c r i p t s , p. C6l4. "He says when you go to a d i f f e r e n t community the n a t i v e people there r e c e i v e you and they r e a l l y welcome you. They give you t e a and the give you food. . . ." Suza Touchou, at F o r t F r a n k l i n , 25 June 1975, T r a n s c r i p t s , p. C684. H o s p i t a l i t y i s p r a c t i c e d among a l l the n a t i v e people of the no r t h . This was taught by the ancest-o o r s . Joe Naedzo, at Fort F r a n k l i n , 2 6 June 1975, T r a n s c r i p t s , pp. C810-811. "In them days people used to go a l l over where-ever they know t h e r i s caribou and they go a l l over the country l i v i n g o f f the land." Chief Johnny Kay, at F o r t McPherson, 8 J u l y 1975, T r a n s c r i p t s , p. C1008. Kai B i r k e t - S m i t h , The Eskimo. Since the book i s not pres-e n t l y a v a i l a b l e to me, I cannot give p u b l i c a t i o n data; and my account i s given from memory. On cooperatives, Paterson (1976:49) wrote: The f i r s t attempt to assess the economic s i t u a -t i o n of the Canadian I n u i t , w i t h d e c l i n i n g f u r fox pop u l a t i o n and low market p r i c e s , was i n 1946. The report proposed (a) to a s s i m i l a t e the I n u i t where they l i v e d c l o s e to white s e t t l e m e n t s , (b) where game was abundant, to encourage the I n u i t to con-t i n u e t h e i r o l d hunting and t r a p p i n g e x i s t e n c e , and (c) where l o c a l resources were i n s u f f i c i e n t , to r e -s e t t l e the I n u i t i n areas where game was more abunds-ant. Brody (1975) describes present-day White and I n u i t s o c i e t i e s i n the North. I n u i t Land Use and Occupancy P r o j e c t (1976), 3 v o l s . , - 119 -henceforth referred to as Inuit * . . Project (1976). The study of Inuit perception of land i s Hugh Brody, "Land Occupancy: Inuit Perceptions," i n v o l . one, pp.185-242. - 120 -IV IDEAS OF LAND AND LAND-TENURE IN CANADIAN LAW A Contexts The method set out i n the f i r s t chapter of the present enquiry proposes t h a t i n d i s p l a y i n g the ideas of land and of land-tenure of a s o c i e t y i n order to compare them w i t h the co r -responding ideas i n another, one should begin w i t h a sketch of the c u l t u r a l ecology of the s o c i e t y . That sketch begins w i t h the environment and resources used by the people, and then pro-ceeds to t h e i r techniques and work o r g a n i z a t i o n and f i n a l l y to the re l e v a n t parts of t h e i r s o c i a l o r g a n i z a t i o n and wo r l d -view. Such a sketch was e a s i l y enough done f o r the Dene and the I n u i t . T h e i r s o c i e t i e s a b o r i g i n a l l y depended upon hunting and f i s h i n g and gathering from the immediate l o c a l environments of the communities of people, d i d not depend upon t r a d e , and d i d not have a long chain of a c t i v i t i e s mediating between the raw m a t e r i a l and the f i n a l good to be consumed or enjoyed by the people. The coming of the f u r - t r a d e and l a t e r of wage labour and welfa r e s e r v i c e s and the cooperatives added to t h i s a b o r i g i n a l system ( i n the main) r a t h e r than e n t i r e l y d i s p l a c i n g i t : the people were drawn i n t o the economic system of Canada and became a subordinate p a r t t h e r e o f , but d i d not give up t h e i r former mode of subsiste n c e . A l l t h i s could be r e l a t i v e l y - 121 -simply d e s c r i b e d . But to sketch the c u l t u r a l ecology of Canada would at f i r s t glance seem a much d i f f e r e n t t a s k . Canadian s o c i e t y i s p a r t of a world-wide system. L o c a l communities i n Canada do not depend f o r t h e i r subsistence merely on l o c a l r e -sources, but must i n t e r a c t w i t h other communities both i n s i d e and outside Canada. Org a n i z a t i o n spans the country, and there i s a complex economic d i v i s i o n of labour as w e l l as a complex s t r u c t u r e of government q u i t e d i f f e r e n t from the s o c i e t i e s of the Dene and I n u i t . Among the Dene and I n u i t , one l o c a l com-munity was much the same as another. In Canada, l o c a l commun-i t i e s d i f f e r i n s i z e from s m a l l camps to l a r g e m e t r o p o l i s e s . To describe t h i s simply might seem an impossible t a s k . Upon a second look, however, the c u l t u r a l ecology of Canada turns out to be r e l a t i v e l y simple. The complexity of the system i s r e a l , but may s t i l l be simply c h a r a c t e r i z e d . . Canadian s o c i -ety may be l a r g e l y understood from a c u l t u r a l e c o l o g i c a l view-p o i n t as a system f o r e x t r a c t i n g primary resources, processing them i n a p r e l i m i n a r y manner, and s e l l i n g the r e s u l t s of the processes outside the s o c i e t y . In r e t u r n f o r the goods exported, goods are imported which are e s s e n t i a l to the c o n t i n u a t i o n of the system, or which can be used to expand the system, or which meet other wants of the people. The people, t h a t i s to say, l i v e o f f a process of converting Canadian land-as-the-resource-f a c t o r - i n - p r o d u c t i o n and d i s p a t c h i n g those resources outside the l a n d - a s - t e r r i t o r y . Energy, drawn from the land i t s e l f as h y d r o e l e c t r i c i t y , petroleum, n a t u r a l gas, c o a l , wood, and animal - 122 -and vegetable c a l o r i e s ( i . e . f o o d ) , or imported as petroleum and food, i s used to power and maintain the humans, machines, and t e c h n i c a l operations which transform the raw m a t e r i a l s of animals ( f u r , hides, bones, meat, m i l k ) , f i s h , wheat and other a g r i c u l t u r a l products, s o i l (used up i n a g r i c u l t u r a l produc-t i o n , water (used i n food production and a l s o as an i n d u s t r i a l m a t e r i a l , t r e e s (lumbering being Canada's most widespread i n -d u s t r y ) , and minerals ( i n c l u d i n g not only metals and i n d u s t r i a l m a t e r i a l s such as sulphur and potash but a l s o petroleum (source of both f u e l s and m a t e r i a l s f o r p l a s t i c s ) and uranium) i n t o products some of which w i l l be used to maintain the system d i -r e c t l y (e.g. being eaten by Canadians) but a s i g n i f i c a n t amount of which i s s o l d ( l a r g e l y — some i s given i n a i d ) abroad i n Europe ( i n c l u d i n g U.K.), the United S t a t e s , and, i n c r e a s i n g l y , eastern A s i a . Some of the machinery used to e x t r a c t and process these resources i s made i n Canada; much t h a t i s e s s e n t i a l , how-ever, i s made outside and imported. Though the system and pro-cesses which I sketch here c e r t a i n l y do not exhaust what goes on i n Canada, they have stamped themselves so much on Canada as to give i t a major part of i t s d i s t i n c t i v e s t r u c t u r e . That s t r u c t u r e may f i r s t be seen i n the c u l t u r a l and eco-nomic geography of Canada (e.g. T a y l o r 1950; Camu, Weeks, and Sametz 1965; Putnam and Putnam 1979; Horwood 1966, f o r B.C.; a l s o see Cartographic Department of the Clarendon Press 1967, esp. pp 7 6 f f ) . The l a r g e s t p o p u l a t i o n centre i n Canada i s the S t . Lawrence lowland, running, say, from Quebec C i t y i n - 123 -the northeast to Windsor, Ont., i n the southwest. Secondary-centres of p o p u l a t i o n occur at Winnipeg, Edmonton, and Calgary on the P r a i r i e s , and i n the southwestern corner of B r i t i s h C o l -umbia. Elsewhere p o p u l a t i o n t h i n s out, but s t i l l i s mostly found i n the southern parts of the country, away from the Canadian S h i e l d and the Boreal f o r e s t . P o p u l a t i o n i s s c a t t e r e d f a i r l y evenly over the P r a i r i e s , which are the l a r g e s t a g r i c u l t u r a l area i n Canada. Railways and roads l i n k these areas of popula-t i o n from east to west, and from these main communication l i n e s , roads and a few r a i l w a y s reach north l i k e f i n g e r s reaching to grasp. Roads form a f a i r l y dense c r i s s - c r o s s network only i n the S t . Lawrence lowland and i n the a g r i c u l t u r a l p r a i r i e s ; otherwise such networks are confined to the p o p u l a t i o n centres and the lands immediately around them. (Logging roads form an a d d i t i o n a l network.) The a g r i c u l t u r a l p a r t s of Canada are, f o r e -most, the P r a i r i e s and the S t . Lawrence lowland, w i t h secondary areas i n southwestern B.C. and the Okanagan v a l l e y , P r i n c e Edward I s l a n d , and some parts of New Brunswick and Nova S c o t i a . ( A g r i -c u l t u r e i s found, however, even as f a r north as Hay R i v e r , N.W.T.) F o r e s t r y , producing lumber and pulpwood, i s found c h i e f l y i n New Brunswick, p o r t i o n s of Ontario and Quebec north of the a g r i c u l t u r a l lowlands, i n the woodlands north of the P r a i r i e a g r i c u l t u r a l lands, and over most of B r i t i s h Columbia. Timber i s more important i n B.C., pulpwood more important i n eastern Canada. Manufacturing i s concentrated i n the S t . Law-rence lowland area, w i t h some l e s s e r centres i n Winnipeg, Ed-- 124 -monton, Calgary, and southwestern B.C. Thus the p o p u l a t i o n centres of Canada appear l i k e base-camps from which from time to time expeditions are made i n t o the h i n t e r l a n d to forage f o r resources. (The maps of the Canada Land Inventory are p r e c i s e l y a survey and assessment of those resources and of t h e i r e x p l o i t -a b i l i t y . ) The biggest camp of a l l , as i t were, i s s t i l l the p o p u l a t i o n centre of the S t . Lawrence lowlands, the centre of what the h i s t o r i a n Creighton (1956; 1972:157) c a l l e d "the empire of the S t . Lawrence". The k i n d of economy which t h i s c u l t u r a l geography r e f l e c t s , i s what Canadian economic h i s t o r i a n s s i n c e the 1920*s have c a l l e d "the s t a p l e s economy" (see papers c o l l e c t e d i n par t one of Easterbrook and Watkins 1967, esp. t h a t by Watkins at pp. 49-73). Such an economy i s devoted to the production and export of a few m a t e r i a l s , such as f i s h , f u r , timber, wheat, and miner-a l s i n the Canadian i n s t a n c e . Manufacturing i s , i n such an eco-nomy, c h i e f l y devoted to processing these m a t e r i a l s f o r export. As a c o r o l l a r y , the p r o f i t s from the s a l e of these m a t e r i a l s abroad are used to buy other goods from abroad, thus reducing the need f o r the p o p u l a t i o n to devote t h e i r energies to s u b s i s t -ence as such and a l l o w i n g them to s p e c i a l i z e i n producing s t a p l e s f o r export. Improvements i n communication and r e f r i g e r a t e d t r a n s -p o r t a t i o n f a c i l i t a t e such s p e c i a l i z a t i o n . The development of l o c a l i n d u s t r i e s i n such an economy depends very much on the costs of imported goods, because the cheaper the imported goods are , the g r e a t e r i s the temptation to r e l y on imports and not - 125 -produce them at home (Herein i s the dilemma of Canadian t a r i f f p o l i c i e s ; c f . the arguments f o r and against t a r i f f s i n B e l l a n 1967:292-312.); but the more the s o c i e t y r e l i e s on imports, the more i t s p e c i a l i z e s as a producer of s t a p l e s and the more i t be-comes dependent on buyers abroad. Such an economy i s not a sub-s i s t e n c e economy, and cannot be understood except as part of a l a r g e r system. I t i s at the mercy of i n t e r n a t i o n a l markets. Should those f a l t e r , p r o f i t s w i l l d e c l i n e , and the people w i l l be f o r c e d (on the average) t o reduce t h e i r standard of l i v i n g a c c o r d i n g l y , or to develop cheaper ways of e x t r a c t i n g and pro-cessing the s t a p l e s , or e l s e to move to a d i f f e r e n t k i n d of economy. From the beginnings of Canadian h i s t o r y (see E c c l e s 1969; Easterbrook and Watkins 1967), the s t a p l e s economy has been the dominant choice of Canadians. Canadians have chosen, as a net e f f e c t of a l l t h e i r a c t i o n s , to e x t r a c t and process the resources of the country f o r s a l e abroad, f i r s t to France and B r i t a i n , l a t e r to the United S t a t e s , now i n c r e a s i n g l y a l s o to Japan and A s i a and the r e s t of the wor l d . This choice was probably very much i n f l u e n c e d but not wholly determined by the r e l a t i v e s c a r c -i t y and d i f f i c u l t y of a g r i c u l t u r e i n Canada. A l a r g e popula-t i o n could arguably not s u b s i s t i n Canada except by processing resources and s e l l i n g them abroad."'" But the west of Canada, f o r in s t a n c e , was s e t t l e d i n order to produce wheat f o r s a l e to the growing populations of Europe and the United S t a t e s , and so ev e n t u a l l y to pay o f f the b u i l d e r s and organizers of the Can-adian P a c i f i c Railway (see, e.g., Fowke 1957:59-61). - 126 -From the o u t s e t , Canadians were e x p l o i t i n g resources f o r s a l e i n a money-and-market economy. Land was not merely a place to l i v e on — although i t was t h i s too — , but i t was a place of commodities. I t was i t s e l f something which could be bought and s o l d . Land s p e c u l a t i o n i s a well-entrenched p a r t of Canadian c u l t u r e (e.g. Berton 1974:269-285 on the Manitoba land-boom of 1881-1882; G u t s t e i n 1975, on the r o l e of land s p e c u l a t o r s and developers i n shaping Vancouver). This p a t t e r n of the s t a p l e s economy i s r e i n f o r c e d when we look at the kinds of communities to be found i n Canada. Marsh (1970) has assembled sources d e s c r i b i n g these communi-t i e s , and has c l a s s i f i e d them under f i v e headings. Under ( l ) f r o n t i e r communities, he mentions I n u i t and I n d i a n settlements; dispersed r u r a l communities and ranches; and one-industry resource-e x t r a c t i n g settlements or towns. Under (2) r u r a l or farming communities, he mentions dispersed farming communities w i t h a centre where s c h o o l , community h a l l , and the l i k e are to be found; v i l l a g e - b a s e d communities; the p a r i s h e s of former r u r a l Quebec; and the p o s t - f i f t i e s depopulation of r u r a l areas. Under the heading of (3) small towns, Marsh describes a P r a i r i e town; u r b a n i z a t i o n i n Quebec; and resource towns i n Newfoundland, On t a r i o , A l b e r t a , and B.C. Under the heading of (4) c i t y and suburbs, he has m a t e r i a l s on suburbs; urban renewal; d e t e r i o r -ated neithbourhoods i n the " i n n e r c i t y " ; housing p r o j e c t s ; and town centres: the common theme running through a l l these might be c a l l e d the urban and suburban neighbourhood. Under - 127 -the heading of (5) m e t r o p o l i s , Marsh looks at l a r g e c i t i e s and m e t r o p o l i t a n areas; u r b a n i z a t i o n ; and m e t r o p o l i t a n planning: the s c a l e i s l a r g e r than the neighbourhood. C l e a r l y we are d e a l i n g w i t h a s i n g l e system i n which the country i s d i v i d e d e f f e c t i v e l y i n t o o t h r e e zones: centres where p o p u l a t i o n i s con-centrated and where the e x p l o i t a t i o n of the other zones i s organ i z e d ; farming zones, producing food f o r the people i n the urban areas and f o r export, and becoming i n c r e a s i n g l y e x t r a c t i v e and c a p i t a l - i n t e n s i v e ; and the resource zone, marked by one-indus-t r y r e s o u r c e - e x t r a c t i o n centres and temporary communities. The resource zone occupies the g r e a t e r p a r t of Canada. These zones a l s o c o n t a i n remnants of e a r l i e r kinds of human occupation and use of Canada. Along w i t h t h i s p a t t e r n of resource e x p l o i t a t i o n , namely, the e x t r a c t i o n , p r o c e s s i n g , and s a l e abroad of s t a p l e products, p a r t i a l l y supported by a domestic economy protected by t a r i f f s and a determination not to be absorbed by the growing American economy and p o l i t y (a r e c u r r e n t theme i n Canadian h i s t o r y ) , has grown up an economy marked by an i n c r e a s i n g d i v i s i o n of labour or s p e c i a l i z a t i o n of occupations and a r e c u r r e n t tendency to be dominated i n each sphere of production by a few l a r g e f i r m s (on tendencies to monopoly and o l i g o p o l y , see Hardin 1974:173-224; Fowke 1957:256-278). Both p u b l i c e n t e r p r i s e s ( c o n s t i t u -ted and supported by p r o v i n c i a l and f e d e r a l governments) and p r i v a t e e n t e r p r i s e s e x i s t i n Canada; sometimes the d i s t i n c t i o n between the two i s b l u r r e d — thus, e.g., a p r i v a t e l y owned - 128 -f i r m i n a monopoly p o s i t i o n w i l l have i t s fees and p r i c e s and i t s s e r v i c e s regulated by some government i n s t r u m e n t a l i t y (e.g. B.C. Telephone Co.). Along w i t h t h i s d i v i s i o n of labour, and a multitude of d i f f e r e n t f i r m s , goes a property system s u i t a b l e t o the e x t r a c t i o n , p r o c e s s i n g , and s a l e of products on both domestic and f o r e i g n markets. So much, t h e r e f o r e , f o r the e c o l o g i c a l context of the Canadian system of land-tenure. Much more could be w r i t t e n , and the sketch I have given i s n e c e s s a r i l y incomplete. One could, f o r i n s t a n c e , view Canadian l i t e r a t u r e as pa r t of the people's coming to terms w i t h and -exploring t h e i r r e l a t i o n s h i p s between themselves and the land ( c f . Atwood 1972). The h i s t o r y of immigration p o l i c i e s , s o c i a l s t r a t i f i c a t i o n , and the ethnic i n t e r a c t i o n s w i t h i n Canada are part of the whole which should be recognized ( c f . P o r t e r 1965, and some of the m a t e r i a l s c o l -l e c t e d i n B l i s h e n , Jones, Naegele, and P o r t e r 1 9 6 l , and i n Ramu and Johnson 1976). But enough has been s a i d to o u t l i n e a c u l t u r a l e c o l o g i c a l i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of Canada, and to show t h a t m a t e r i a l s already e x i s t f o r such an^'iinterpretation. (A c u l t u r a l e c o l o g i c a l i n t e r p r e t a t i o n , p r o p e r l y conceived, i s not one of environmental determinism, nor indeed of any mono-causal r e d u c t i v i s m . Rather, i t i n s i s t s on the i n t e r a c t i o n be-tween land and people, and between the people and t h e i r s o c i o -c u l t u r a l environment as w e l l as t h e i r n a t u r a l environment. The approach a l s o has to be h i s t o r i c a l , emphasizing human choices as w e l l as the c o n s t r a i n t s on those choices and the consequences - 129 -of those choices. Each party to the i n t e r a c t i o n both has i t s own character and i s what i t i s because of the i n t e r a c t i o n . ) The Canadian system of land-tenure i s governed by r u l e s and precedents contained w i t h i n the l e g a l t r a d i t i o n of Canada. "Law" i s a f o l k - c a t e g o r y of Canadian c u l t u r e , and a l s o c o r r e s -ponds to a sub-system of Canadian s o c i e t y whech i s concerned to r e g u l a t e the a f f a i r s of the whole s o c i e t y . That sub-system i s s u f f i c i e n t l y complex t h a t few Canadians (perhaps none, even p r o f e s s i o n a l s ) have a f u l l y d e t a i l e d knowledge of the e n t i r e t r a d i t i o n . Even lawyers s p e c i a l i z e i n branches of the law, and p a r t of "knowing the law" i s knowing, not n e c e s s a r i l y the p a r t i c u l a r content of the law i n any p a r t i c u l a r i n s t a n c e , but where to look to f i n d the p a r t i c u l a r content when one needs to know i t ; another part of "knowing the law" i s knowing the s o r t of t h i n g s one needs to look up. I t w i l l not be necessary, how-ever, i n the present enquiry to t r y to describe even c u r s o r i l y the whole of the Canadian l e g a l system; i n s t e a d , only those p a r t s of the t r a d i t i o n concerned w i t h r e g u l a t i n g the use of and claims to land w i l l be r e q u i r e d , and of those only the general s t r u c t u r e . (A u s e f u l d e s c r i p t i o n of the Canadian l e g a l system, as seen from w i t h i n by a lawyer, i s provided by G a l l (1977).) With the exception of Quebec p r o v i n c i a l law (sometimes c a l l e d "the c i v i l law" i n c o n t r a s t to the E n g l i s h - d e r i v e d "com-mon law" ), the l e g a l t r a d i t i o n of Canada i s der i v e d from the law of England (not of B r i t a i n , f o r Scotland has i t s own d i s -t i n c t l e g a l t r a d i t i o n ) . Each of the c o l o n i e s which l a t e r be-- 130 -came the s e v e r a l provinces and t e r r i t o r i e s of Canada developed i t s own l e g a l t r a d i t i o n d i s t i n c t from but having a f a m i l y r e -semblance to the law of England. The date at which a p a r t i c u -l a r c o l o n i a l t r a d i t i o n becomes d i s t i n c t from the law of England, and the colony becomes a d i s t i n c t i v e l e g a l e n t i t y w i t h i t s own j u r i s d i c t i o n , i s known as the date of " r e c e p t i o n " of the E n g l i s h Common Law ( c f . G a l l 1977:37-51, from which the f o l l o w i n g account i s t a k e n ) . At t h a t same date, E n g l i s h law up to t h a t date became the l e g a l l y recognized foundation of the l e g a l t r a d i t i o n of the colony. Quebec, of course, was e s t a b l i s h e d o r i g i n a l l y as the French colony of New France, and took i t s l e g a l t r a d i t i o n from France. A f t e r Quebec was conquered by the B r i t i s h , E n g l i s h c i v i l ( p r i v a t e ) law and c r i m i n a l law were introduced by the Royal Proclamation of 1763« In 1774, however, the Quebec Act r e i n s t a t e d French c i v i l law. In 1866, Quebec (then Lower Canada) adopted i t s own code of laws modelled c l o s e l y upon the French C i v i l Code or Code Napoleon. The c r i m i n a l law, however, continued to f o l l o w the E n g l i s h t r a d i t i o n . I n 1791 the C o n s t i t u t i o n a l Act d i v i d e d Canada i n t o Upper Canada ( l a t e r to be c a l l e d Ontario) and Lower Canada (Quebec). A l e g i s l a t u r e was duly created i n Upper Canada and i n 1792 i t s f i r s t s t a t u t e made E n g l i s h c i v i l law a p p l i c a b l e i n Upper Canada. The date f o r the r e c e p t i o n of E n g l i s h law i n Ontario i s t h e r e -f o r e 15th October 1792. The Maritime provinces were e s t a b l i s h e d by settlement, and t h e r e f o r e the date f o r the r e c e p t i o n of E n g l i s h law i s the - 131 -date at which each of the c o l o n i a l l e g i s l a t u r e s was i n s t i t u t e d . For New Brunswick and Nova S c o t i a , t h i s was 1758; and f o r New-foundland, 1832. In P r i n c e Edward I s l a n d , though the c o l o n i a l l e g i s l a t u r e was i n s t i t u t e d i n 1773» E n g l i s h law was actually-received i n 1763 pursuant to a r o y a l proclamation. For the P r a i r i e provinces and the t e r r i t o r i e s the date of r e c e p t i o n of E n g l i s h law i s 15th J u l y 1870. In t h a t year, unde the combined e f f e c t of the Rupert's Land A c t , 1868, the Mani-toba A c t , 1870, and the Ord e r - i n - C o u n c i l of 23rd June 1870, the HudsonlssBay Company surrendered Rupert's Land and the North-western T e r r i t o r y to the Dominion of Canada and the province of Manitoba was created. I n 1905 the provinces of A l b e r t a and Saskatchewan were formed, and they continued the E n g l i s h law e s t a b l i s h e d i n the t e r r i t o r i e s from 1870. B r i t i s h Columbia acquired E n g l i s h law by settlement. The E n g l i s h Law Act (R.S.B.C. I960, c. 129) provides f o r the r e c e p t i o n of E n g l i s h law as i t e x i s t e d on 19th November 1858. By the terms of the B r i t i s h North America A c t , 1867, now the C o n s t i t u t i o n Act, 1867, which e s t a b l i s h e d Canada as a f e d -e r a l s t a t e , "Property and C i v i l Rights i n the Province" (by sec. 92, sub. sec. 13) were inc l u d e d among those concerns over which the p r o v i n c i a l l e g i s l a t u r e s were given e x c l u s i v e j u r i s -d i c t i o n . Since Canada now has ten provinces and two t e r r i t o r -i e s (the t e r r i t o r i e s being under f e d e r a l j u r i s d i c t i o n ) , there are now twelve p o s s i b l e d i s t i n c t t r a d i t i o n s of land-tenure i n Canada, none of which are n e c e s s a r i l y l e g a l l y bound by any othe Eleven are based on the E n g l i s h law as t h a t was fo r m e r l y . The - 132 -other, Quebec, as already noted, has i t s own v a r i a n t of European or Napoleonic C i v i l Law. One cannot simply assume th a t the pre-c i s e content of one province's land-law i s always the same as another's. But i n the main, the s t r u c t u r e or b a s i c p r i n c i p l e s , and much of the content, of one E n g l i s h Common Law province's land-law c l o s e l y resembles t h a t of another's. E n g l i s h s t a t u t e s and cases before the dates of r e c e p t i o n w i l l be b i n d i n g on Canadian c o u r t s , unless countered by Canadian l e g i s l a t i o n or the d e c i s i o n s of courts of higher a u t h o r i t y ; and cases decided a f t e r are f r e q u e n t l y accepted as persuasive though not b i n d i n g . Therefore E n g l i s h cases, as w e l l as Canadian, may be used as i l l u s t r a t i o n s i n the present enquiry. The account which f o l l o w s w i l l be based upon the law of B r i t i s h Columbia, which i s the law I st u d i e d at the U.B.C. law school i n 1972-75• But except where otherwise noted, the same p r i n c i p l e s apply to the law of the Northwest T e r r i t o r i e s , where the Dene and I n u i t l i v e . - 133 -B The Law of Real Property i n the Common Law "Real Property" i s a category w i t h i n the Common Law t r a d i -t i o n . I t covers l e s s than an a n t h r o p o l o g i s t would want t o i n -clude under the heading of "Canadian land law" (see below, sees. C and D), but nonetheless a f f o r d s a convenient place to begin. The d e s c r i p t i o n which f o l l o w s w i l l be p a r t l y based upon Todd and McClean (1968),^ which was i n 1972-73 used f o r the f i r s t -year course i n r e a l property at the U.B.C. law s c h o o l . The chapter headings of t h i s casebook show how two teachers of law considered i t most h e l p f u l to organize m a t e r i a l s i n order to teach f i r s t - y e a r law students. They d i s c u s s i n t u r n ( I ) the l e g a l concept of la n d , ( I I ) the general p r i n c i p l e s of land law, ( I I I ) the c r e a t i o n of i n t e r e s t s i n la n d , (IV) the fee simple e s t a t e , (V) the l i f e e s t a t e , (VI) co-ownership and concurrent e s t a t e s , ( V I I ) f u t u r e i n t e r e s t s , ( V I I I ) i n c o r p o r e a l i n t e r e s t s , ( I X ) l i c e n c e s , (X) f a m i l y property, and (XI) the r e g i s t r a t i o n of t i t l e . (Merely recording such a t a b l e of contents t e l l s us at once t h a t we are i n a very d i f f e r e n t thought-world from those of the Dene and the I n u i t . ) Let us f o l l o w t h e i r o u t l i n e ( m o s t l y ) , although i n c l u d i n g m a t e r i a l s (such as Blackstone) which they d i d not. 1. The Legal Concept of Land. "Land", i n the Common Law, i s (a) l a n d , and (b) anything which the law agrees to t r e a t as la n d . Blackstone's d e f i n i t i o n - 134 -of " l a n d " , though now a r c h a i c i n f l a v o u r ( i t was published f i r s t i n 1766), gives the idea c l e a r l y ( E h r l i c h 1959:1:123-124): For land comprehendeth i n i t s l e g a l s i g n i f i c a t i o n any ground, s o i l , or earth whatsoever; as a r a b l e mead-ows, pastures, woods, moors, waters, marshes, and heaths. I t l e g a l l y i n c l u d e t h a l s o a l l c a s t l e s , houses, and other b u i l d i n g s : f o r they c o n s i s t of two t h i n g s ; l a n d , which i s the foundation, and s t r u c t u r e thereupon: so t h a t , i f I convey the land or ground, the s t r u c t u r e or b u i l d i n g passeth t h e r e w i t h . I t i s observable t h a t water i s here mentioned as a species of l a n d , which may seem a k i n d of s o l e c i s m ; but such i s the language of the law: and t h e r e f o r e I cannot b r i n g an a c t i o n to recover possession of a pool or other piece of water, by the name of water only; e i t h e r by c a l c u l a t i n g i t s c a p a c i t y , as, f o r so many c u b i c a l yards; o r , by s u p e r f i c i a l measure, f o r twenty acres of water; or by general d e s c r i p t i o n , as f o r a pond, a watercourse, or a r i v u l e t ; but I must b r i n g my a c t i o n f o r the land t h a t l i e s at the bottom, and must c a l l i t twenty acres of land covered by water. For water i s a movable, wander-i n g t h i n g , and must of n e c e s s i t y continue common by the law of nature; so t h a t I can only have a temporary, t r a n s i e n t , property t h e i d n ; wherefore, i f a body of water runs out of my pond i n t o another man's, I have no r i g h t t o r e c l a i m i t . But the land which t h a t water covers i s permanent, f i x e d , and immovable: and t h e r e -f o r e i n t h i s I may have a c e r t a i n , s u b s t a n t i a l property; of which the law w i l l take n o t i c e . Land hath a l s o , i n i t s l e g a l s i g n i f i c a t i o n , an i n -d e f i n i t e extent, upwards as w e l l as downwards. He who owns the ground possesses a l s o t o the sky, i s the maxim of the law, upwards; t h e r e f o r e no man may erect any b u i l d i n g , or the l i k e to overhang another's land; and downwards, whatever i s i n a d i r e c t l i n e between the s u r -face of any land and the centre of the e a r t h , belongs to the owner of the s u r f a c e ; as i s every day's experience i n mining c o u n t r i e s . So t h a t the word "land" i n c l u d e s not only the face of the e a r t h , but everything under i t , or over i t . Therefore, i f a man grants a l l h i s lands, he grants theaby a l l h i s mines of metal and other f o s s i l s , h i s woods, h i s waters, and h i s houses, as w e l l as h i s f i e l d s and meadows. The p a r t i c u l a r names of the t h i n g s are e q u a l l y s u f f i c i e n t to pass them, except i n the i n -stance of water; by a grant of which, nothing passes but a r i g h t of f i s h i n g ; but the c a p i t a l d i s t i n c t i o n i s t h i s ; t h a t by the name of a c a s t l e , messuage, t o f t , c r o f t , - 135 -or the l i k e , nothing e l s e w i l l pass, except what f a l l s w i t h the utmost p r o p r i e t y under the term made use o f , but by the name of l a n d , which i s the most general name, everything t e r r e s t r i a l w i l l pass. The conception of land represented by t h i s passage i s s t i l l the b a s e l i n e f o r the idea of land i n the law today, even though modern developments, such as a i r c r a f t (which the law i n Blackstone's time d i d not have to worry about), have compelled m o d i f i c a t i o n of the landowner's c l a i m to own a l l above h i s land to the heavens and below to the earth's centre. This r i g h t i s q u a l i f i e d by s t a t u t e s which reserve mineral r i g h t s to the Crown, by r u l i n g s which decide t h a t a i r c r a f t passing overhead are not committing t r e s p a s s , and the l i k e . But these are s t i l l modi-f i c a t i o n s on the bas i c i d e a . I n summary, " l a n d " i n c l u d e s ( l ) the surface of the ea r t h , (2) the s o i l beneath the surface and the r i g h t t o the air s p a c e above the s u r f a c e , (3) b u i l d i n g s and c h a t t e l s which have by s u f f i c i e n t attachment to the s o i l or to b u i l d i n g s , become f i x t u r e s , and (4) f r u c t u s n a t u r a l e s ( o r n a t u r a l c r o p s ) , i n co n t r a s t to f r u c t u s i n d u s t r i a l e s ( o r i n d u s t r i a l grow-in g crops) (Harwood 1975:21). The term "land" may a l s o be extended to i n c l u d e any i n t e r e s t i n land which i s t r e a t e d as a property i n t e r e s t (Harwood 1975:21). Land so conceived comes w i t h boundaries. These boundaries ought not to be crossed without the owner's permission. But persons and th i n g s do enter upon the land without permission. Thus there a r i s e s the wrong or t o r t of trespass to land or t r e s -pass quare clausum f r e g i t ("breaking the close") (Blackstone, i n E h r l i c h 1959:11:129-134; Salmond 1969:48-63). Since land thus - 136 -comes i n p a r c e l s w i t h boundaries, there come a l s o to be lands which a d j o i n one another, and the people who r e s p e c t i v e l y own and use these lands may, without t r e s p a s s i n g , s t i l l act so as to i n t e r f e r e w i t h the adjacent land-owner's use and enjoyment of h i s l a n d . Thus there a r i s e s the wrong of nuisance to land (Blackstone, i n E h r l i c h 1959:11135-136; Salmond 1969:64-115). Land, i n t h i s conception, i s a s i t e f o r productive a c t i v -i t i e s ( o r i g i n a l l y a g r i c u l t u r a l ) , i s a p o s s i b l e f a c t o r of pro-d u c t i o n (again o r i g i n a l l y a g r i c u l t u r a l ) , i s a piece of bounded space to whose contents the owner i s prima f a c i e e n t i t l e d , and i s something the r i g h t s to which may be bought and s o l d or o t h e r -wise a l i e n a t e d . Of these various meanings, the elements of s i t e and space come to the f o r e when i t i s necessary to d e f i n e what piece of property the land-owner owns, the element of space comes i n t o f o r e when the concern i s to p r o t e c t whatever a c t i v i t i e s the owner i s doing upon and waith the l a n d , and the element of land as the subject of a t r a n s a c t i o n comes to the f o r e when land r i g h t s are t r a n s f e r r e d from one person to another. The common law of r e a l property does not concern i t s e l f d i r e c t l y w i t h land as a f a c t o r of production; although t h a t concern i s always i n the background. I f land has to be valued, however, the value w i t h which the law w i l l be c h i e f l y concerned, i s the market-value of the l a n d . To make a long s t o r y s h o r t , the law i s not p r i m a r i l y con-cerned w i t h the upward or downward extension of the land-owner's r i g h t s , but w i t h the p r o t e c t i o n of the land-owner's f u l l "use and enjoyment" of h i s property (see Jack E. Richardson, " P r i -- 136a-vate Property Rights i n the A i r Space at Common Law," Canadian  Bar Review, February 1953, c i t e d and a p p l i e d by Fo u r n i e r , J . , La C r o i x v. The Queen, 1954 Ex C R , 69, 4 D.L.R. 470, at pp. 474-5, i n t u r n excerpted i n Todd and McClean 1968:1-10). He i s e n t i t l e d to extend h i s use and occupancy of the land as f a r up or down as he can. (That i s why the Canadian Parliament i n the Aeronautics A c t , R.S.C. 1952, c. 2 (am R.S.C. 1952, c. 302), sec 4 ( j ) , had s p e c i f i c a l l y to give the M i n i s t e r of Transport the power to re g u l a t e the height of b u i l d i n g s near a i r p o r t s ( c i t e d i n Todd and McClean 1968:1-13).) The landowner's h o r i -z o n t a l boundaries are p r o t e c t e d . His neighbour may not under-mine h i s l a n d ; nor may he by removing s o i l from h i s own l a n d , cause h i s neighbour's land to c o l l a p s e (see the cases excerpted i n Todd and McClean 1968:I -40f f). Other persons may not enter h i s land without h i s permission ( t o do so would be t r e s p a s s ) , nor act on t h e i r own land so as to i n t e r f e r e w i t h h i s a c t i v i t i e s on h i s ( t o do so would be nuisance), nor al l o w p o t e n t i a l l y dan-gerous substances ( o r other t h i n g s ) to escape from t h e i r lands onto h i s and do mis c h i e f there (the r u l e i n Rylands v, F l e t c h e r , see Salmond 1969:401-430). At common law, the landowner owned the standing water and minerals (excepting gold and s i l v e r ) on the l a n d , and owned the bed of streams of water f l o w i n g across h i s property; i n Canada, these r i g h t s have been e x t e n s i v e l y changed: thus i n B.C., Crown grants of land have reserved base metals other than c o a l s i n c e 1897, c o a l and petroleum s i n c e 1899, and n a t u r a l gas s i n c e 1951 (Todd and McClean 1968:1-17), and sin c e 1892 the r i g h t to use water i s vested i n the Crown and - 137 -must be acquired by obtaining or holding a water licence (with the exception of using "unrecorded" water f o r domestic purposes) (Todd and McClean 1968:I-21ff). For our purposes, the key idea i s that land i s something which can be parcelled and bounded and (as we s h a l l see) made the object of complex bundles of alienable r i g h t s . Even space can be so divided and owned ( f o r example: Strata T i t l e s Act, S.B.C. 1966 c. 46 (am 1968 c. 54; 1970 c. 58 s. 17); and A i r  Space T i t l e s Act, S.B.C. 1971 c.2, but s t i l l not yet proclaimed i n f o r c e . ) • This i s quite d i f f e r e n t from the idea of land among the Dene and Inuit, 2. The Idea of Estate The concept of "land" i n the common law l i n k s the actual earth, the actual land, with the land as an object f o r " r e a l pro-perty" r i g h t s . In other words, the concept of "land" i n the l e g a l t r a d i t i o n l i n k s the the l e g a l t r a d i t i o n to the land. The concept of "estate" categorizes the rights of the property holder within the l e g a l t r a d i t i o n i t s e l f , and l i n k s " r i g h t s " and " r e -medies" to the " t i t l e " to the given portions of land. A l l "estates" are groups of " r i g h t s " concerning land, but not a l l rights concerning land f a l l (as we s h a l l discover) within "es-tates" . Nevertheless, the idea of "estate" i s a key concept to understanding the common law of r e a l property. (The account of tenure and estate which follows i s taken from Todd and McClean 1968; Cheshire 1972; Megarry and Wade 1966; Potter 1948: - 138 -470-549.) The land law, w r i t e s P o t t e r (1948:470-471), i s not very much concerned w i t h l a n d , but w i t h i n t e r e s t s i n land t h a t have only a n o t i o n a l e x i s t e n c e . No man ever saw a fee simple, which i s the g r e a t e s t i n t e r e s t which any c i t i z e n can hold and i s u s u a l l y described as owner-ship of the l a n d . In f a c t , what i s owned i s not the land but the l e g a l estate i n fee simple. Again, the same piece of land may be subject to a number of d i f f e r e n t i n t e r e s t s owned by d i f f e r e n t persons. Thus, Blackacre may be owned i n fee simple by Jones, but h i s i n t e r e s t may be subject to a lease of Blackacre to Smith f o r n i n e t y - n i n e years who may i n t u r n have u n d e r l e t the premises to Robinson f o r twenty-one years. Here are three people who w i l l t a l k of Blackacre as " h i s " . I n f a c t each i s an owner, but each owns an i n t e r e s t and does not own the l a n d . Each has an " e s t a t e " . But Blackacre may a l s o be subject to a r i g h t of way, i n favour of the owner and occupiers of the a d j o i n i n g property of Greenacre and subject to a r i g h t to l i g h t enjoyed over Blackacre by the owner and occupiers of Yellowacre. This r i g h t of way and r i g h t of l i g h t are i n t e r e s t s , forming p a r t of the "land law", enjoyed i n Bl a c k a c r e . Consequently, the land law must be looked upon not as the law r e l a t i n g to l a n d , most of which i s concerned w i t h the r i g h t s of user and enjoy-ment and forms p a r t of our law of t o r t and c o n t r a c t , but as the law of i n t e r e s t s i n land which may confer r i g h t s over the l a n d . We are concerned, t h e r e f o r e , mainly w i t h the f a c t s of t h e i r c r e a t i o n and t r a n s f e r and t r a n s m i s s i o n on death. Todd and McClean (l968:II-4f) remind us a l s o t h a t the law r e l a t i n g to land i s very wide, wider than the law concerning i n t e r e s t s i n l a n d . "The study of land law could thus encompass c o n t r a c t , t o r t , t a x , the law of w i l l s and succession, m u n i c i p a l by-laws and s t a t u t e s regulating,. the use and even the e x p r o p r i a -t i o n of l a n d . " The law of e s t a t e s , however, i s concerned c h i e f l y w i t h "conveyancing", namely the c r e a t i o n and t r a n s m i s s i o n of i n t e r e s t s i n l a n d . Todd and McClean d i s t i n g u i s h f o u r main ba s i c p r i n c i p l e s , namely ( l ) tenure, (2) c o r p o r e a l and i n c o r p o r e a l i n t e r e s t s , i n c l u d i n g the concept of the e s t a t e , (3) l e g a l versus - 139 -e q u i t a b l e i n t e r e s t s , and (4) freedom of a l i e n a t i o n (1968:11-6 f f ) . (Corporeal i n t e r e s t s e n t i t l e a person to possession of land; i n c o r p o r e a l i n t e r e s t s e n t i t l e a person to some r i g h t s concerning a piece of land but f a l l short of a c l a i m to possess-i o n . ) In l e g a l theory, the only owner of land i n Canada, as i n England, i s the Crown. Everybody e l s e holds l a n d , again i n theory, from the Crown on c o n d i t i o n of s e r v i c e or payment. This goes back to medieval feuda l i s m . But through E n g l i s h h i s -t o r y , and l a t t e r l y Canadian h i s t o r y , the number of c o n d i t i o n s , or tenures, on which land might be held has been reduced to one alone, namely f r e e h o l d tenure, and the c o n d i t i o n s themselves have vanished as w e l l . Thus the fee simple tenant of today holds f o r a l l p r a c t i c a l purposes i n u n c o n d i t i o n a l ownership; t h a t i s to say, h i s h o l d i n g i s not contingent on h i s performing s p e c i f i c s e r v i c e s . (Yet the advent of land taxes, zoning laws, and the l i k e has taken away the promise of n e a r - a l l o d i a l owner-sh i p which the r e d u c t i o n of tenures seemed to g i v e . P o t t e r (1848:488) dubs E n g l i s h planning l e g i s l a t i o n "the new tenures"; I s h a l l n o t i c e b r i e f l y the Canadian equivalents i n s e c t i o n C.) The importance of the i d e a of tenure i s t h a t i t led:.too the idea of e s t a t e . I f one holds land from the Crown — and when the d o c t r i n e of estates was developed, the k i n d of tenure and i t s a s s o c i a t e d d u t i e s were important c o n s i d e r a t i o n s — , but i s not the owner, what does one have? The answer of the lawyers was t h a t one held an e s t a t e , or a time i n the l a n d . One held not the l a n d , but c e r t a i n r i g h t s to the land; and these r i g h t s - 140 -would run f o r an i n d e f i n i t e time. Today i n Canada the estates are c h i e f l y of three kinds: the fee simple, the l i f e e s t a t e , and the l e a s e h o l d . A f o u r t h k i n d , fee t a i l , i s not important, and has been abo l i s h e d i n some j u r i s d i c t i o n s . A fee simple estate i s an i n t e r e s t i n the land which w i l l be i n h e r i t e d by the h e i r s of the "owner" i f he does not o t h e r -wise dispose of the land by grant or s a l e or by making a w i l l . A fee simple absolute i s one i n which no c o n d i t i o n would te r m i n -ate the i n t e r e s t before the f u l l p e r i o d of time f o r which i t might p o s s i b l y continue. A determinable fee simple i s one which could come to an end before the f u l l p e riod of time (example: a grant of premises to a s o c i e t y f o r so long as the premises are used s o l e l y f o r the purposes of the s o c i e t y ) . The l i f e e s t a te i s a time i n the land granted f o r the l i f e -time u s u a l l y of the holder of the e s t a t e , and i t ends when the l i f e ends. A v a r i e t y of the l i f e e state i s the estate pur  autre v i e , where the time i s measured by the l i f e of some person other than the holder of the e s t a t e . Both fee simple estates and l i f e estates are f r e e h o l d e s t a t e s , and t h e i r d u r a t i o n i s i n d e f i n i t e : t h a t i s , there i s no way of saying u n t i l the event i t s e l f i n what year the estate w i l l end. Leasehold estates are i n t e r e s t s i n land which run f o r a s p e c i f i e d i n t e r v a l of time, u s u a l l y i n r e t u r n f o r a s p e c i -f i e d r e n t . Non-payment of rent then gives the grantorof the lease good reason f o r ending the grant. Next, there are what are c a l l e d " f u t u r e i n t e r e s t s " , or - 141 -" i n t e r e s t s i n expectancy". These are i n t e r e s t s which convey the possession of the property not now but at some f u t u r e time. For example, A. might convey Blackacre to B. f o r l i f e and then on B.'s death to C. i n fee simple. C.'s i n t e r e s t i s an example of a f u t u r e i n t e r e s t . C. w i l l g a i n c o n t r o l of Blackacre a f t e r B. d i e s , but i n the meantime C. cannot enjoy or use or do any-t h i n g w i t h the property, except ensure t h a t B. does not "waste" or unduly d i m i n i s h the value of the property before i t comes to C. However, C's i n t e r e s t i s s t i l l a d e f i n i t e one which C. can convey or mortgage and which w i l l pass ( i f C. s t i l l has i t ) to C's h e i r s a f t e r C.'s death. The l i f e e s t a t e , l e a s e h o l d e s t a t e , and the f u t u r e i n t e r e s t s i f these l a t t e r are l e s s than the fee simple absolute, are a l l carved out, as i t were, from the unencumbered fee simple abso-l u t e e s t a t e , and the holder of t h a t o r i g i n a l estate i s the per-son to whom as the other estates e x p i r e the i n t e r e s t s thus granted r e t u r n . Let us take Blackacre again. J . acquires Blackacre i n fee simple absolute — perhaps he purchased i t , or was given i t , or i n h e r i t e d i t , or obtained i t as a Crown grant. He leases one-quarter of Blackacre to K. f o r ninety-nine years, and gives a second quarter to L. f o r l i f e . He then s e l l s h i s e n t i r e i n -t e r e s t i n Blackacre to M., and disappears from the s t o r y . M. has purchased, t h e r e f o r e , a present fee simple absolute estate f o r h a l f Blackacre plus the r i g h t s of r e v e r s i o n f o r the other two q u a r t e r s . The s a l e does not e x t i n g u i s h K.'s l e a s e h o l d nor L.'s l i f e e s t a t e . M. then draws up h i s w i l l . In i t he provides - 142 -th a t when he d i e s , Blackacre w i l l go to h i s w i f e N. f o r l i f e and thence i n fee simple absolute to h i s son, or i f M. should d i e without a son, then to P. At t h i s time, M. has no son. At t h i s p o i n t n e i t h e r N. nor P. has any i n t e r e s t i n Blackacre. I t i s s t i l l p o s s i b l e f o r M. to change h i s w i l l or to convey Blackacre i n any way he pleases. M. then d i e s , l e a v i n g h i s w i f e N. but no son. At t h i s p o i n t , N. receives the l i f e estate i n B l a c k a c r e , and P. rec e i v e s a f u t u r e i n t e r e s t , v i z . the fee simple absolute i n expectancy. L. d i e s . T i t l e to the one quarter of Blackacre which he had enjoyed then r e v e r t s t o , not P., but N. N. duly d i e s , and P. enters i n t o possession of Blac k -acre, except f o r the one quarter which i s s t i l l leased to K. (the n i n e t y - n i n e years are not yet concluded). Suppose M. when he died had had a son. Then Blackacre would have gone f i r s t to N. f o r l i f e and then to M.'s son, who u n t i l N. died would have had the fee simple absolute, estate i n expectancy. P.'s i n t e r e s t would have terminated s t i l l - b o r n , as i t were. I f M.'s son died before N., the estate would go not to P. but to M.'s son's h e i r , whoever th a t might have been, unless M.'s son had already con-veyed h i s i n t e r e s t , say, to R., who would then duly take B l a c k -acre. And so Blackacre's h i s t o r y continues. Though the d i s c u s s i o n so f a r has spoken of the owner or est a t e - h o l d e r i n the simgular, i t i s p o s s i b l e under the common law and frequent i n p r a c t i c e , f o r two or more l e g a l persons to have simultaneous r i g h t s to possession of the same l a n d . They are then known as co-owners, and are s a i d to have concurrent i n t e r e s t s (Todd and McClean 1968:VT-lff, X-4). The common law - 143 -d i s t i n g u i s h e d f o u r kinds of co-ownership: coparcenary, j o i n t tenancy, tenancy by e n t i r e t i e s , and tenancy i n common. Coparc-enary was the sharing j o i n t l y by the deceased estate-holder's daughters i n the property. I t occured when the deceased owner had no male h e i r s (who would have taken the p r o p e r t y ) , and has been abolished by s t a t u t e s which changed the r u l e s of i n h e r i t -ance. J o i n t tenancy i s having a common r i g h t to possession subject to the .jus accrescendi or r i g h t of s u r v i v o r s h i p . I f A and B own Blackacre j o i n t l y , then i f A d i e s , B becomes auto-m a t i c a l l y the s o l e owner of Blackacre, provided t h a t n e i t h e r A nor B has acted i n h i s or her l i f e t i m e to "sever" the tenancy and t u r n i t i n t o a tenancy i n common. Tenancy by e n t i r e t y arose when a j o i n t tenancy was created between a husband and w i f e . Tenants by the e n t i r e t y could mutually agree to dispose of the property during the marriage but n e i t h e r could u n i l a t e r a l l y sever the tenancy and destroy the r i g h t of s u r v i v o r s h i p . Var-ious s t a t u t e s concerning the f a m i l y and the r i g h t s of married women have probably made tenancy by e n t i r e t i e s obsolete today. The f o u r t h k i n d of co-ownership i s tenancy i n common. Here the co-owners each have the r i g h t to possession, but there i s no r i g h t of s u r v i v o r s h i p . A co-owner i n a tenancy i n common may without c o n s u l t i n g the other co-owners s e l l or give or ot h e r -wise a l i e n a t e h i s estate i n whole or i n part to a t h i r d person who then becomes co-owner w i t h e r i n place of or i n a d d i t i o n to the a l i e n a t o r , depending on the d e t a i l s of the conveyance. Thus according to the common law of r e a l property, the owner of land may so s p l i t up h i s fee simple absolute i n t e r e s t - 144 -that ownership (of the land) i n the sense of f u l l exclusive control with right of a l i e n a t i o n i s reduced almost to nothing, and the land becomes the object of a c o l l e c t i o n of rights some of which are presently exercised and others of which are, as i t were, waiting i n the wings u n t i l t h e i r time comes to step on stage. And (thinking of time) notice the role of time and of contingency or hypothesis ( i f . . . then) i n t h i s complex of r i g h t s . The doctrine of estates separates land from rights to the land, and allows these r i g h t s , even future i n t e r e s t s , to be conveyed. Ownership and possession are c l e a r l y separated i n t h i s system. The land becomes the object, or even merely the occasion, f o r a network of notions about r i g h t s , including hypothetical r i g h t s , which can be created and alienated even though the persons involved never see or step onto the land. (Thus K., i n the example e a r l i e r , could be an absentee lessee, putting S. i n actual possession of the quarter leased; and P., once his estate i n expectancy became an estate i n possession, could have decided to lease that out too.) A l l t h i s i s very d i f f e r e n t from Dene and Inuit ideas about land-holding. 3. Other Interests i n Land The name "incorporeal i n t e r e s t s " i s used to l a b e l i n t e r -ests i n the land of another person f a l l i n g short of a claim to possession ( c f . Todd and McClean 1968, c. VIII; Cheshire 1972, Book I I ; Megarry and Wade 1966). Examples of such incorporeal - 145 -i n t e r e s t s are: easements, p r o f i t s a prendre, and covenants. Each of these deserves some d e s c r i p t i o n . Easements may be defined as p o s i t i v e or negative easements. P o s i t i v e easements gove the owner of the land b e n e f i t e d (known as the "dominant tenement") the r i g h t to enter the land burdened (the " s e r v i e n t tenement") f o r a purpose which must f a l l short of t a k i n g away from the burdened land anything of value and which w i l l enhance the use and enjoyment of the dominant tenement. The commonest example i s a r i g h t of way. Negative easements (which are sometimes hard to d i s t i n g u i s h from r e s t r i c t i v e covenants) do not convey a r i g h t of entry on t o the s e r v i e n t tenement, but r e s t r i c t the owner's use of th a t tenement i n a way which b e n e f i t s the dominant tenement. The r i g h t to l i g h t enjoyed over Blackacre by the occupiers of Yellowacre, i n the quotation from P o t t e r at the beginning of s e c t i o n B2, i s an example. Among the c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s of an easement are t h a t the burden on the s e r v i e n t tenement must have a "necessary connexion" w i t h the normal use and enjoyment of the dominant tenement; and th a t the burden does not compel the owner of the s e r v i e n t tenement to do anything, but r a t h e r to a l l o w something to be done o r him-s e l f to r e f r a i n from doing something. Easements are created by "grant", but the "grant" may be "express" ( i . e . conveyed to the owner of the dominant tenement by a deed), " i m p l i e d " ( i . e . n e c e s s a r i l y f o l l o w i n g from what the owner of the s e r v i e n t tene-ment does t r a n s f e r to the owner of the dominant tenement), or •'presumed" ( i . e . e s t a b l i s h e d by " p r e s c r i p t i o n " , or continuous and unquestioned use f o r not l e s s than a c e r t a i n set p e r i o d of - 146 -tim e ) ; they may a l s o be created by s t a t u t e , but t h i s i n t r o -duces another set of concerns i n t o the r e a l property law. A p r o f i t a prendre i s Va r i g h t to enter on the land of another person and take some p r o f i t of the s o i l such as miner-a l s , o i l , stones, t r e e s , t u r f , f i s h or game, f o r the use of the owner of the r i g h t . I t i s an i n c o r p o r e a l hereditament, and u n l i k e an easement i t i s not n e c e s s a r i l y appurtenant to a dom-inent tenement but may be held as a r i g h t i n gross, and as such may be assigned and d e a l t w i t h as a va l u a b l e i n t e r e s t according to the ordin a r y r u l e s of property. I t i s i n e f f e c t a grant of the ownership of such p o r t i o n s of the land as are conveyed." (Walls J . , i n Cherry v. Petch. [1948] O.W.N. 378, at p. 380, quoted i n Todd and McClean 1968:VIII-43) A covenant i s a deed under s e a l , and as such i s considered a contract enforceable i n the courts as such between and by the covenanting p a r t i e s . Under some circumstances, a covenant be-tween a land-owner and someone el s e ( u s u a l l y but not n e c e s s a r i l y another land-owner) to do or to r e f r a i n from doing something concerning the la n d , may be passed on to the subsequent owners of those pieces of land to bind these l a t t e r . The covenant i s then s a i d "to run w i t h the la n d " . For example, S. owns land subject to f l o o d i n g , and covenants w i t h D. tha t D. would prevent the f l o o d i n g and tha t S. would c o n t r i b u t e to the cost of the work. S. conveys t i t l e to J.S. The land i s badly f l o o d e d . J.S. sues D., contending t h a t D. has breached the agreement. D. argues t h a t there i s no covenant running w i t h the land and th a t J.S. has no standing on which to sue. The court decides - 147 -t h a t the o r i g i n a l covenant d i d b e n e f i t the la n d , t h a t i t was understood and intended by the o r i g i n a l covenantors to b e n e f i t the l a n d , and t h a t the covenant thus ran w i t h the l a n d . J.S. th e r e f o r e has standing to sue D. ( S i m p l i f i e d from Smith and  Snipes H a l l Farm L t d . v. R i v e r Douglas Catchment Board, [1949] ... 2 K.B. $00 (C.A.); [1949] 2 A l l E.R. 179; as excerpted i n Todd and McClean 1968:VIII - 4 6 f f.) A covenant r e s t r i c t i n g use of a p o r t i o n of land may be imposed f o r the b e n e f i t of adjacent lands, and the owners of such other lands then have the r i g h t to have the covenant enforced by the courts on the other owners' b e h a l f . Another c l a s s of i n t e r e s t s r e l a t i n g to land i s t h a t l a b e l -l e d " l i c e n c e s " (Todd and McClean 1968:ch. IX; Cheshire 1972, Book I I ; Megarry and Wade 1966). The l i c e n s e e i s a person who occu-p i e s and uses land w i t h the permission of the owner or l i c e n s o r . This i s not considered to be i n law an i n t e r e s t i n l a n d , s i n c e the l i c e n c e as such does not grant permission to the l i c e n s e e t o appropriate any part of the land as property; and the l i c e n s o r may at any time revoke the l i c e n c e . One example of a l i c e n c e i s permission to enter upon land i n order to watch some entertainment or other s p e c t a c l e (but i f the l i c e n s e e has purchased a t i c k e t t o do so, then the l i c e n s o r has a l s o entered i n t o a con t r a c t w i t h the l i c e n s e e to l e t the l a t t e r watch the entertainment, and s i n c e the l i c e n c e i s necessary to the performance of the c o n t r a c t , the l i -censor may not revoke i t u n t i l the entertainment p a i d f o r i s over — see the s e v e r a l cases excerpted i n Todd and McClean 1968:IX-l f f ) . Other examples are permission to enter on land and hunt over i t f o r game; or a r i g h t to a d v e r t i s e on the w a l l s of a - 148 -b u i l d i n g ; or the manager of a shop being allowed (but not required) by the owner of the shop to l i v e i n a f l a t above the shop. The l i c e n c e may sometimes permit e x c l u s i v e posses-s i o n , but u s u a l l y i t does not. Another k i n d of i n t e r e s t i s the mortgage. I n t h i s s i t u -a t i o n , A., the owner of the l a n d , t r a n s f e r s the t i t l e to the land to another person, B., u s u a l l y i n r e t u r n f o r a sum of money which A. undertakes to pay back by a c e r t a i n date. In r e t u r n , B. undertakes to r e t u r n the property to A. when A. pays back the money. I f A. f a i l s to pay back the money w i t h i n the s t i p u l a t e d time, t i t l e remains i n B.'s hands and A. loses the r i g h t to "redeem" h i s property. Thus a mortgage i s a t r a n s f e r of land as s e c u r i t y f o r a loan ( o r other purpose), w i t h the r i g h t to reg a i n the land by repaying the loan ( o r whatever other c o n s i d e r a t i o n might be arranged). The loan need not, of course, a c t u a l l y be money; but money i s by f a r the common-est t h i n g so loaned. Easements, p r o f i t s a prendre, covenants running w i t h the la n d , l i c e n c e s , and mortgages are thus d i f f e r e n t kinds of i n t e r -e s t s , besides e s t a t e s , which may be attached to a piece of l a n d . P r o f i t s a prendre and mortgages may be a l i e n a t e d by the holder of them to another person. B. i n the above example may t r a n s f e r the mortgage to C , who thus becomes the holder of the l e g a l t i t l e t o the la n d . Easements and covenants, on the other hand, go w i t h the la n d . For our purposes i n the present enquiry, i t i s s u f f i c i e n t to note t h a t these kinds of i n t e r e s t s e x i s t , t h a t i n the Canadian - 149 -l e g a l t r a d i t i o n land can be made the object of the various kinds of r i g h t s contained under these terms. The r i g h t s to use and occupy the community's land which the member of a Dene or I n u i t community has, most c l o s e l y resemble a l i c e n c e , except t h a t these r i g h t s are not revocable so long as he or she i s a member of th a t community — but the Dene and I n u i t would not themselves conceive t h e i r r e l a t i o n s h i p to land i n terms of l i -cences and r i g h t s . 4. " L e g a l " and " E q u i t a b l e " I n t e r e s t s ; " T r u s t s " The Common Law a l s o d i s t i n g u i s h e s between " l e g a l " estates amd " e q u i t a b l e " e s t a t e s , e s p e c i a l l y infethe l e g a l r e l a t i o n s h i p known as a t r u s t (on t r u s t s , see Maudsley 1969; Megarry and Baker 1973; McClean 1970). The t r u s t i s a d i s t i n c t i v e l y Common Law device, a r i s i n g out of the sep a r a t i o n i n mediaeval and e a r l y modern E n g l i s h law between courts of law ( i n a narrow sense) and courts of e q u i t y . While modern E n g l i s h and Canadian law now fuses the two systems, courts being simultaneously courts of "law" and of " e q u i t y " , the d i s t i n c t i o n remains i n the t r a d i t i o n . A good d e f i n i t i o n of the t r u s t i s given i n Hanbury's Modern Equit y (Maudsley 1969:85-86): A t r u s t i s a r e l a t i o n s h i p recognized by equity which a r i s e s where property i s vested i n (a person or) persons c a l l e d the t r u s t e e s , which those t r u s t e e s are ob l i g e d to hold f o r the b e n e f i t of other persons c a l l e d c e s t u i s que  t r u s t or b e n e f i c i a r i e s . The i n t e r e s t s of the b e n e f i c i a r -i e s w i l l u s u a l l y be l a i d down i n the instrument c r e a t i n g the t r u s t , but may be i m p l i e d or imposed by law. The b e n e f i c i a r i e s ' i n t e r e s t i s p r o p r i e t a r y i n the sense t h a t i t can be bought and s o l d , given away or disposed of by w i l l ; but i t w i l l cease t o e x i s t i f the l e g a l estate i n the property comes i n t o the hands of a bona f i d e purchaser f o r value without n o t i c e of the b e n e f i c i a l i n t e r e s t . The - 150 -subject-matter of the t r u s t must be some form of property. Commonly, i t i s l e g a l ownership of land or of invested funds; but i t may be of any s o r t of property — l a n d , money, c h a t t e l s , e q u i t a b l e i n t e r e s t s , choses i n a c t i o n , e t c . There may a l s o be t r u s t s where there are no a s c e r t -a i n a b l e b e n e f i c i a r i e s . There i s no d i f f i c u l t y where such t r u s t s are f o r c h a r i t a b l e purposes; such t r u s t s are en-f o r c e d at the. s u i t of the Attorney-General. But there i s much doubt?1, and u n c e r t a i n t y as to the s t a t u s and v a l i d -i t y of t r u s t s f o r n o n - c h a r i t a b l e purposes. . . . Let us see how these d i s t i n c t i o n s would work w i t h Blackacre. A. , the owner of B l a c k a c r e , suddenly l e a r n s t h a t he has only a l i t t l e time longer to l i v e . He has two s m a l l c h i l d r e n , B. and C , to provide f o r a f t e r h i s death. He t h e r e f o r e i n h i s w i l l devises Blackacre to D. i n t r u s t f o r B. and C , and s h o r t l y t h e r e a f t e r d i e s . The l e g a l owner of Blackacre thus becomes D., but D. i s bound to use Blackacre f o r the w e l f a r e of B. and C. who are the b e n e f i c i a r i e s . I n t h i s p a r t i c u l a r i n s t a n c e , when B. and C. reach t h e i r m a j o r i t y , they can request t h a t the t r u s t be ended and the property, B l a c k a c r e , be turned over to them; and i f nothing i n A.'s w i l l prevents t h i s , then t h e i r request w i l l - b e granted. I f D. s e l l s Blackacre to E. (whether or not A.'s w i l l allows him to do s o ) , D. w i l l be r e s p o n s i b l e to B. and C. f o r the money or other c o n s i d e r a t i o n which he received by the s a l e ; and i f B. and C. are the l o s e r s i n the end, D. w i l l be o b l i g e d , when the t r u s t ends, to make up the l o s s . I f E. purchases Blackacre without knowing of B.'s and C.'s e q u i t a b l e claims to i t , and could not reasonably be expected to have known, then E. gets Blackacre f r e e and c l e a r of the t r u s t upon i t . But i f E. knew of the t r u s t , or reasonably ought to have known about i t , then E. i s h e l d to have purchased only the l e g a l t i t l e to B l a c k a c r e , and B. and C. s t i l l have t h e i r e q u i t a b l e i n t e r e s t i n - 151 -i t , and when they reach t h e i r m a j o r i t y may request E. to t r a n s -f e r the l e g a l t i t l e to them j u s t as D. would have been o b l i g e d t o do. ( I f E. then f e l t t h a t he had been hard done by, he would have to sue D. f o r compensation.) A l t e r n a t i v e l y , A. might have been c h i l d l e s s , and have de-cided i n s t e a d t o set up a c h a r i t a b l e purpose t r u s t f o r the edu-c a t i o n of poor c h i l d r e n . He would then have w i l l e d Blackacre to D. i n t r u s t f o r t h a t purpose, and D. would have been o b l i g e d t o use Blackacre to support the education of poor c h i l d r e n ; i f Blackacre were s o l d , the proceeds of the s a l e would have to be a p p l i e d by D. to t h a t c h a r i t a b l e purpose. I n t h i s a l t e r n a t i v e , there would be no b e n e f i c i a r i e s , no B. and C , who could sue i f they thought th a t D., as t r u s t e e , was not u s i n g the property f o r i t s intended purpose; however, the Attorney-General, r e -p r e s e n t i n g the p u b l i c i n t e r e s t i n the c h a r i t a b l e purpose, could sue D. And of course, one of D.'s o b l i g a t i o n s as t r u s t e e would be to see t h a t a f t e r h i s death someone e l s e c a r r i e d on the t r u s t . The d u t i e s and r i g h t s ( w i t h emphasis on the former) are q u i t e c l o s e l y s p e c i f i e d i n the common law ( i n c l u d i n g e q u i t y ) . The device of a t r u s t provides one way i n which a single prop-e r t y may be managed f o r the b e n e f i t of s e v e r a l persons whether or not these l a t t e r are considered f u l l y l e g a l l y r e s p o n s i b l e . However, the b e n e f i c i a r i e s ' e q u i t a b l e i n t e r e s t s , may be a l i e n -ated by the b e n e f i c i a r i e s once thes persons reach t h e i r l e g a l m a j o r i t y . (Much, though, would depend on the p r o v i s i o n s of the instrument s e t t i n g up the t r u s t . ) Thus B. and C. could have s o l d t h e i r e q u i t a b l e i n t e r e s t s to F., who then i f he chose could - 152 -have perhaps sought to end the t r u s t . The t r u s t e e ' s r o l e i n the common law bears only a s u p e r f i c i a l resemblance to tha t of the Dene leader who might be described as custodian or steward of the common f a c i l i t y of a caribou fence; or to the r o l e of and A f r i c a n " t r i b a l " c h i e f or of a Polynesian c h i e f o r li n e a g e head who might be described as the c h i e f steward of the land f o r h i s people. To describe the l a t t e r as " t r u s t e e " and import i n t o the d e s c r i p t i o n the common-law notions of t r u s t e e , would be misleading and would cause d i s t o r t i o n s of the A f r i c a n or P o l y -nesian or Dene i d e a s . The n o t i o n of t r u s t e e s h i p w i l l not help to r e c o n c i l e Dene and I n u i t ideas of land and land-tenure w i t h those of Canadian law. Though there i s an o v e r a l l moral s i m i l -a r i t y , the l e g a l n i c e t i e s connected t h e r e w i t h are too d i f f e r e n t to a l l o w t r a n s l a t i o n of one i n t o the other without d i s t o r t i o n . ( I f the p o s s i b i l i t y of d i s t o r t i o n i s kept i n mind, however, then perhaps Dene and I n u i t could c a u t i o u s l y use t r u s t s , or other e q u i t a b l e i d e a s , as a means of p r o t e c t i n g p a r t i c u l a r i n -t e r e s t s ; but f o r the s t o r y of how the device f a i l e d to p r o t e c t the Menomini, see below i n chapter V I , s e c t i o n A2.) 5. Gaining and Losing I n t e r e s t s i n Land L o g i c a l l y and comparatively considered, there are f i v e ways i n which any community as a whole, or any person w i t h i n a community, can gain property i n l a n d , or conversely l o s e i t . (These ways are l o g i c a l s l o t s which may or may not be f i l l e d by a p a r t i c u l a r s o c i a l system.) These are((a) by a p p r o p r i a t i n g land which nobody already owns ( i t may never have been owned, - 153 -or the previous owner may have abandoned i t ) ; (b) by t a k i n g land already owned from an owner without h i s consent; (c) by being given the land by the previous owner; (d) by i n h e r i t -i n g land from i t s previous owner ( i n h e r i t i n g i t i m p l i e s t h a t one has some r i g h t to receive i t because of one's r e l a t i o n s h i p to the previous owner); and (e) by buying the land from the previous owner (buying i t i m p l i e s g i v i n g somethin5of value i n exchange f o r the land) ( c f . Smith 1974:3). Conversely, the ways of l o s i n g t i t l e are: (a) by abandoning the l a n d , so t h a t i t becomes unowned land; (b) by having i t taken from one; (c) by g i v i n g i t away; (d) by dying, so t h a t i t passes to one's h e i r s ; and (e) by s e l l i n g i t . Which of these ways are recog-nized by the system of r e a l property law which I have j u s t been o u t l i n i n g ? (a) A p p r o p r i a t i o n : In Canada, a l l land not owned by p r i -vate persons i s l e g a l l y owned by the Crown. (This i n c l u d e s lands reserved to the Indians, as w e l l as lands over which " a b o r i g i n a l t i t l e " has not been exti n g u i s h e d . A b o r i g i n a l t i t l e i s a p r o p r i e t a r y r i g h t , but i t i s not ownership. See below, s e c t i o n D.) I f there were land outside Canada not claimed by any other sovereignty, the Crown could c l a i m t h a t land by ex-tending i t s sovereignty over t h a t l a n d , as indeed i t has done so r e c e n t l y by extending i t s claims over the c o n t i n e n t a l shelves adjacent to Canadian shores, beyond the t r a d i t i o n a l three-mile l i m i t . W i t h i n Canada, t h e r e f o r e , there i s i n theory no unowned land f o r p r i v a t e persons to a p p r o p r i a t e . Squatting on and using otherwise unoccupied and unused lands under the Crown's - 154 -sovereignty does not give a p r i v a t e person t i t l e . P r i v a t e persons must acquire the land by grant, f o r example when Crown land i s thrown open f o r homesteading. (b) Taking: The Crown, as the sovereign a u t h o r i t y i n the p o l i t y , may take land from previous land-holders (whether own-ers or occupiers) without t h e i r consent. There are two p o s s i -b i l i t i e s : the previous holders are outside the p o l i t y , or they are i n s i d e the p o l i t y . I f they, are outside the p o l i t y , then the land i s taken over as an i n c i d e n t of the extension of sov-er e i g n t y by the Crown over t e r r i t o r y ; and there are again two p o s s i b i l i t i e s . The f i r s t i s the Crown's r e c o g n i t i o n of the o r i g i n a l occupiers* r i g h t t o the continued use and occupancy of the lands i n question: one v a r i e t y of t h i s i s a b o r i g i n a l t i t l e , and w i l l be examined i n s e c t i o n D. The second i s by conquest. Taking land by conquest, the Crown may expropriate those lands and e x t i n g u i s h the occupiers' and owners' t i t l e s , or i t may confirm those t i t l e s , as i t sees f i t . However, the proper l e g a l d o c t r i n e i s th a t the Crown w i l l respect the pro-perty r i g h t s of the people, and i f property i s expropriated, w i l l pay compensation t h e r e f o r . (See statements by Lord Den-nin g , Oyekan v. Adele, [1957] 2 A l l E.R. 785, at p.788, and by Chief J u s t i c e M a n s f i e l d , Campbell v. H a l l (1774), 1 Cowp. 204, 98 E.R. 1045, at p. 1047, both quoted by Mr. J u s t i c e H a l l , Calder et a l . v. A.-G. B.C., [1973] S.C.R. 313, at pp. 402-3 and 388 r e s p e c t i v e l y . ) Once the Crown has extended i t s sover-eignty over the land , the Crown's t a k i n g becomes equivalent to the t a k i n g of land from previous owners w i t h i n the p o l i t y . - 155 -Such e x p r o p r i a t i o n by the Crown i s then c o n t r o l l e d by the common law which says t h a t e x p r o p r i a t i o n should be compensated f o r by s u i t a b l e payments, unless the l e g i s l a t u r e has s p e c i f i c a l l y en-acted t h a t no compensation be p a i d . P r i v a t e persons may not take land from other persons w i t h i n the p o l i t y . That i s t h e f t . P r i v a t e persons may not take lands from people who are not subject to the Crown unless the Crown p r e v i o u s l y or concurrently acquires these lands and gives them to the a c t u a l t a k e r ( o f . Cumming and Mickenberg 1972:29)-(c) Being given: Both the Crown and p r i v a t e persons may give land and r e c e i v e g i f t s of land from previous owners without hindrance. (d) I n h e r i t a n c e : At one time, the Crown, being i d e n t i -f i e d w i t h kings or queens who were n a t u r a l persons, could i n h e r i t l a n d . Today, however, the Crown i s not a n a t u r a l person, but a c o r p o r a t i o n s o l e and does not d i e , so does not i n h e r i t l a n d . Of p r i v a t e persons, only n a t u r a l persons and not a r t i f i c i a l persons (such as corporations) can i n h e r i t l a n d . Land owned by a n a t u r a l person who dies without h e i r s and otherwise has not disposed of h i s l a n d , "escheats" to the Crown. (Todd and McClean 1968:11-37) ( A r t i f i c i a l persons can, of course, be given land by a n a t u r a l person's w i l l ; t h i s i s not what I mean by i n h e r i t a n c e . ) (e) Buying land: Both the Crown and p r i v a t e persons may buy and s e l l land w i t h l i t t l e or no hindrance. This i n -cludes mortgaging one's l a n d . Thus as f a r as the o r d i n a r y law of r e a l property i s con-- 156 -cerned, the p r i v a t e person may acquire land only by g i f t ( i n -c l u d i n g Crown g r a n t ) , i n h e r i t a n c e , or purchase. He may los e i t by g i f t , i n h e r i t a n c e (as i t were, seen from the deceased's s i d e ) , s a l e , o r t a k i n g ( e x p r o p r i a t i o n ) by the Crown. He may n e i t h e r appropriate i t nor take i t . (For a b o r i g i n a l t i t l e , see s e c t i o n D., below.) 6* Persons, or Who May Hold Rights to Land. As discussed i n chapter I I , any land-tenure system p r e -supposes some d e c i s i o n as to who may hold r i g h t s to la n d . Such r i g h t - b e a r e r s may be c a l l e d "persons", and the idea of "person" as a r i g h t - b e a r e r i s a l s o e s s e n t i a l to any l e g a l system. The common law of r e a l property i s no exception. I n chapter I I , I d i s t i n g u i s h d " n a t u r a l persons" and " a r t i f i c i a l persons". Both kinds are recognized by the common law. In t h i s system, the persons who may hold r i g h t s to land are (a) n a t u r a l per-sons, (b) a r t i f i c i a l persons, such as c o r p o r a t i o n s , and (c) the Crown, which i s a s p e c i a l k i n d of a r t i f i c i a l person. N a t u r a l persons have t o be d i s t i n g u i s h e d i n t o persons w i t h f u l l l e g a l r i g h t s — a l l a d u l t men and women who have reached the age of m a j o r i t y (which can v a r y ) , and who are n e i t h e r insane nor c r i m i n a l s — ; and persons who f o r some r e a -sons are under the guardianship of others — e.g. minors (under p a r e n t a l or other g u a r d i a n s h i p ) , the insane, and c r i m i n a l s . Of the p o s s i b l e kinds of a r t i f i c i a l persons, the two kinds recognized i n Canadian law are the co r p o r a t i o n and the Crown. By " c o r p o r a t i o n " , however, I mean something wider than the cu r -- 158 -The f i r s t d i v i s i o n of corporations i s into aggreg-ate and s o l e . Corporations aggregate consist of many-persons united together into one society,.and are kept up by a perpetual succession of members, so as to con-tinue forever: of which kind are the mayor and common-a l t y of a c i t y , the head and fellows of a college, the dean and chapter of a cathedral church. Corporations sole consist of one person only and his successors i n some p a r t i c u l a r s t a t i o n , who are incorporated by law, i n order to give them such l e g a l capacities and advan-tages, p a r t i c u l a r l y that of perpetuity, which i n t h e i r natural persons they could not have had. In t h i s sense the king i s a sole corporation: so i s a bishop: so i s every parson and v i c a r . Since Blackstone wrote, corporations sole have disappeared into the background, to become survivals of an older age, and corporations aggregate have expanded i n numbers and kinds to become one of the c h a r a c t e r i s t i c a l l y modern kinds of organiza-t i o n s . Corporations aggregate i n Canada today include such e n t i t i e s as Crown corporations, municipal corporations, pre-vate companies of diverse kinds, non-profit s o c i e t i e s , trade unions, professional associations, as well as u n i v e r s i t i e s and some r e l i g i o u s bodies. Some are created by charters or by statutes s p e c i f i c a l l y and d i r e c t l y , some by powers conferred on people generally by empowering statutes, and some by con-t r a c t u a l agreement among persons. (Cf. the section "Corpora-tions" i i n Halsbury 1954:1-107 or 1974:713-823 f o r a comprehensive but compact summary of the English law on corporations.) For our purposes, however, we need c h i e f l y to remember the following: (a) corporations l a s t across the generations of natural persons and do not die natural deaths; (b) corpora-tions can hold property i n land, including estates, incorporeal 9 / \ and other i n t e r e s t s , and equitable i n t e r e s t s ; (c) corporations - 159 -can give to t h e i r members such r i g h t s over the co r p o r a t i o n s ' p r o p e r t i e s as those members, i n accordance w i t h the c o n s t i t u -t i o n or a r t i c l e s of the c o r p o r a t i o n , may decide; and (d) co r -p o r a t i o n s must have w r i t t e n c o n s t i t u t i o n s or a r t i c l e s s t a t i n g how the corporations make d e c i s i o n s and appointing the o f f i c e r s of the c o r p o r a t i o n s . Furthermore, when we come to chapters V and VI and to the idea of the community land-holding corpora-t i o n as a means f o r " r e c o n c i l i n g " Dene or I n u i t ideas w i t h Can-adian i d e a s , we should have i n mind something of Blackstone's understanding of corporations r a t h e r than the more s p e c i f i c modern a p p l i c a t i o n s . 7» Summary: Comparative C l a s s i f i c a t i o n of Land-Rights In chapter I I , on the ide a of land-tenure, I quoted Cro-combe 's (1974:5-6) l i s t of s i x cl a s s e s of r i g h t s r e l a t i n g to la n d . Which of these c l a s s e s of r i g h t s are represented by the r i g h t s of r e a l property which we have j u s t described? ( l ) U s e - r i g h t s : Any estate which confers upon i t s holder the r i g h t to present possession of the land s p e c i f i e d i n the e s t a t e , confers r i g h t s to use the l a n d . Future i n t e r e s t s ( e -s t a t e s i n expectancy) do not. E q u i t a b l e i n t e r e s t s may permit the b e n e f i c i a r y to use the l a n d , or they may not. Trustees, as holders of the l e g a l t i t l e , have the r i g h t s to use the land i f the estates are i n possession, but t h a t use i s circumscribed by the i n t e r e s t s of the b e n e f i c i a r i e s . Easements ( e s p e c i a l l y p o s i t i v e easements) and sometimes covenants confer u s e - r i g h t s on persons r e l a t i v e to the land; or easements (negative ease-- 160 -ments) and covenants may p r e v e n t c e r t a i n uses o f t h e l a n d . P r o f i t s a p r e n d r e a r e a p a r t i c u l a r k i n d o f u s e - r i g h t . L i c e n c e s a r e a n o t h e r , and a v e r y weak, k i n d o f u s e - r i g h t . S t a t u t e s may c o n f e r upon t h e Crown o r i t s agents o r o t h e r p ersons r i g h t s t o use t h e l a n d i n s p e c i f i c ways even i f t h e l a n d i s a l r e a d y p r i v a t e l y "owned". (2) R i g h t s t o " i n d i r e c t " e conomicegain: The l e s s o r ' s r i g h t t o r e c e i v e r e n t from a l e s s e e , o f a l e a s e h o l d e s t a t e , i s an. example h e r e . I t depends on t h e c o n t r a c t between l e s s o r and l e s s e e . The b e n e f i c i a r y o f a t r u s t may have s i m i l a r r i g h t s , depending on t h e terms o f t h e t r u s t . The Crown, o r a s u b o r d -i n a t e agency such as a m u n i c i p a l c o r p o r a t i o n , may, depending on empowering s t a t u t e s , c l a i m t a x e s on t h e l a n d ( t h i s i n t r o -duces a n o t h e r s e t o f c o n c e r n s , w h i c h w i l l be d e a l t w i t h below i n s e c t i o n C . ) . ~(3) R i g h t s o f c o n t r o l ( h e l d by p e r s o n o t h e r t h a n t h e p e r s o n who h o l d s t h e u s e - r i g h t s ) : The h o l d e r o f a f u t u r e i n t -e r e s t may have some r i g h t s o f c o n t r o l . Thus i f A has a l i f e -e s t a t e r e B l a c k a c r e , and B h o l d s a f e e s i m p l e e s t a t e i n e x p e c t -ancy r e B l a c k a c r e , B may i n t e r v e n e t o p r e v e n t A " w a s t i n g " B l a c k -a c r e so t h a t B would r e c e i v e n o t h i n g o f v a l u e . The b e n e f i c i a r -i e s o f a t r u s t can l i k e w i s e i n t e r v e n e ( i . e . ask t h e c o u r t s t o i n t e r v e n e ) t o p r e v e n t t h e t r u s t e e , t h e h o l d e r o f t h e l e g a l e s t a t e , f r om w a s t i n g t h e p r o p e r t i e s i n v o l v e d . N e g a t i v e ease-ments and r e s t r i c t i v e covenants c o n f e r r i g h t s o f c o n t r o l o v e r t h e use o f t h e l a n d , upon p e r s o n s who do not p o s s e s s t h e l a n d . The Crown o r i t s a g e n c i e s may, by s t a t u t e , e n j o y some c o n s i d e r a b l e - 161 -c o n t r o l over the l a n d , f o r example, by way of zoning by-laws, planning r e g u l a t i o n s , p o l l u t i o n c o n t r o l r e g u l a t i o n s , and so on. (4) Rights of t r a n s f e r : The holder of an estate can f r e e l y t r a n s f e r by g i f t or s a l e between l i v i n g persons or by w i l l , the whole or a pa r t of h i s e s t a t e , whether t h a t estate be " i n possession" o r " i n expectancy", " l e g a l " or " e q u i t a b l e " . I f the land i s burdened by easements or p r o f i t s a prendre or covenants, these w i l l normally bind the successor i n t i t l e . J o i n t tenancies are e a s i l y severable, and tenancies i n common ( s e v e r a l t y ) are e a s i l y a l i e n a b l e by the holder. E s t a t e s , unless l i m i t e d i n time so as to prevent i n h e r i t a n c e , are u s u a l l y i n h e r i -t a b l e . (5) R e s i d u a l r i g h t s : When a l e s s e r estate i s carved out of a fee simple absolute e s t a t e , the holder of the remain-der possesses the re v e r s i o n a r y r i g h t . I f the holder of a fee simple estate d i e s without h e i r s and i n t e s t a t e , the estate escheats, or r e v e r t s , to the Crown (whence i n theory i t o r i g -i n a l l y came). (6) Symbolic r i g h t s o r r i g h t s of i d e n t i f i c a t i o n : These are not recognized nor at a l l considered i n the common law of r e a l property. In t h i s w e l t e r of r i g h t s , we can determine two sets of i n t e r e s t s at work and p o t e n t i a l l y i n c o n f l i c t . F i r s t , there are the i n t e r e s t s of p r i v a t e p r o p r i e t o r s . Second, there are the i n t e r e s t s of the Crown. The Crown can be both a p r o p r i e t o r among p r o p r i e t o r s , and a sovereign a u t h o r i t y r e p r e s e n t i n g i n some sense the whole s o c i e t y and a c t i n g on tha t b a s i s . As - 162 -s o v e r e i g n , t h e Crown o v e r r i d e s t h e more p a r t i c u l a r i n t e r e s t s o f t h e p r o p r i e t o r s . To each o f these two s e t s o f i n t e r e s t s , c o r r e s p o n d d i s t i n c t s e t s o f l a n d - t e n u r e r u l e s . The Crown's i n t e r e s t w i l l be d i s c u s s e d i n t h e nex t s e c t i o n . The i n t e r e s t c h i e f l y r e f l e c t e d i n t h e law w h i c h we have j u s t r e v i e w e d i s p r o p r i e t o r i a l . 8. Summary: The P r o p r i e t o r i a l System To sum up, t h e n , t h e Common Law c o n c e r n i n g l a n d and l a n d -t e n u r e was d e v e l o p e d i n and s u i t s a s o c i e t y whose c h i e f modes o f s u b s i s t e n c e a r e a g r i c u l t u r e , t r a d i n g , and m a n u f a c t u r i n g . Land i s r e g a r d e d c h i e f l y as a r e s o u r c e t o be u s e d , and i t i s p a r c e l l e d and bounded among owners e n j o y i n g t h e r i g h t s t o use i t ( i n t h e main) as th e y see f i t and t o e x c l u d e o t h e r s from p o s s e s s i o n , i n o r d e r t h a t t h e l a n d may be e f f i c i e n t l y used both^, f o r p r o d u c t i v e purposes and as s e c u r i t y f o r commercial e n t e r -p r i s e s . R i g h t s t o l a n d a r e a c r e a t i o n o f t h e w i l l o f t h e s o c i -e t y , r e p r e s e n t e d by Crown and P a r l i a m e n t ( B l a c k s t o n e , i n E h r l i c h 1959:L'55> 57), w h i c h i n t u r n has r e c o g n i z e d o r c o n f e r r e d upon p r i v a t e p e r s o n s t h e r i g h t t o a c q u i r e and t r a n s f e r and s u b d i v i d e l a n d - r i g h t s , and i n d e e d t o c r e a t e them t h r o u g h t h e a b i l i t y t o make a c o n t r a c t . N a t u r a l p e r s o n s have a l s o been g i v e n t h e power t o c r e a t e a r t i f i c i a l p e r s o n s , o r c o r p o r a t i o n s , w h i c h may i n t u r n h o l d r i g h t s t o l a n d . The f o u n d a t i o n o f t h e s e l a n d - r i g h t s i s comprehended i n t h e i d e a o f e s t a t e . The i d e a o f e s t a t e s e p a r a t e s l a n d r i g h t s from t h e l a n d s t h e m s e l v e s , and a l l o w s l a n d - t e n u r e t o be a c o n s i d e r a b l y a b s t r a c t r e l a t i o n s h i p . - 163 -The conception of "land" i n the Common Law of today, though not f o r m a l l y d e f i n e d , serves to l i n k the land law, w i t h i t s a b s t r a c t n o t i o n of e s t a t e s , w i t h the p h y s i c a l or corporeal land i t s e l f . This concept, too, has a measure of a b s t r a c t i o n i n i t , s p e c i f y i n g that land can extend i n t o a i r - s p a c e and even a l l o w i n g today t h a t space to be s u b d i v i d e d . 1 0 The land-holding u n i t i s a l e g a l person, whether the Crown, a n a t u r a l person, or a c o r p o r a t i o n , whom we may c a l l a " p r o p r i e t o r " . A l l land i s held by one or more of these pro-p r i e t o r s , who have.in p r i n c i p l e the r i g h t (unless they have given i t away) to exclude a l l other persons, i n c l u d i n g pro-p r i e t o r s , from t h a t l a n d . ( T h i s r i g h t i s q u a l i f i e d by various r i g h t s conferred upon Crown agents (and sometimes others) by Parliament d i r e c t l y and i n d i r e c t l y to enter upon p r i v a t e prop-e r t y ; but the p r o p r i e t o r i a l b a s i s of land-law remains.) The system t h e r f o r e a l s o i m p l i e s a d i s t i n c t i o n between p r o p r i e t -o r s , who hold l a n d , and non - p r o p r i e t o r s , who do not. - 164 -C The Second System: " A d m i n i s t r a t i v e " Elements i n the  Canadian Law of Land-Tenure The r e a l property law j u s t described arose from the t r a n s -formation of a f e u d a l system of land-tenure i n t o a p r o p r i e t o r i a l system very n e a r l y completely p r o p r i e t o r i a l . In such a system the r o l e of the Crown, or of s o v e r e i g n t y , i s t o provide the framework of law which supports the r i g h t s of property, and to organize the c o l l e c t i v e defences against o u t s i d e r s who would i n t r u d e and take away property... Otherwise the r o l e of the gov-ernment i s ( i d e o l o g i c a l l y at any rate) to leave people alone, to l e t them do as they wish. This ideology (along w i t h others) i s present i n Canada today. But there i s another system of land-law a l s o operating i n Canada today. This system r e s t s upon two p r i n c i p l e s , F i r s t i s the idea t h a t Parliament (which i n Canada in c l u d e s p r o v i n c -i a l l e g i s l a t u r e s ) as the sovereign a u t h o r i t y can change both case-law and s t a t u t e law as Parliament i n i t s wisdom as the r e p r e s e n t a t i v e i n s t i t u t i o n of the whole s o c i e t y sees f i t . The Crown i n t h i s respect i s the executive arm of Parliament, and i t s agents act according to the a u t h o r i t y granted them by Par-liament. I n s o f a r as those agents act w i t h i n t h e i r a u t h o r i t y , t h e i r a c t s cannot be challenged. (But there i s a d i v i s i o n of law concerned w i t h reviewing the acts of Crown agents to a s c e r t -a i n i f they have acted w i t h i n t h e i r a u t h o r i t y : c f . de Smith (1973) f o r the E n g l i s h law on such, and Laux (1973) f o r a Canad-- 165 -i a n casebook therean). I n a d d i t i o n , Parliament may make laws, and set up bodies w i t h powers t o make by-laws and r e g u l a t i o n s which c o n t r o l the uses which p r i v a t e owners may make of t h e i r l a n ds. ( I n B.C., m u n i c i p a l i t i e s and r e g i o n a l d i s t r i c t s provide examples of t h i s . Planning and zoning by-laws are s p e c i f i c a l l y d i r e c t e d t o land-use c o n t r o l . I n B.C. the o l d m u n i c i p a l i t y of Po i n t Grey enacted the f i r s t Canadian zoning by-law i n 1926. P o i n t Grey was subsequently absorbed by the C i t y of Vancouver i n 1929 (Todd 1971:XI-4.) Environmental care laws and regu-l a t i o n s , i n c l u d i n g p o l l u t i o n c o n t r o l , are another k i n d of law which r e s t r i c t s the uses to which a land-owner may put h i s l a n d . The second p r i n c i p l e i s the idea t h a t a l l land i n Canada not expressly owned by p r i v a t e persons i s owned by (not merely under the sovereignty of) the Crown. The ownership-power may i n p a r t i c u l a r instances be very l i g h t l y e x e r c i s e d , but i t i s there to be used when the Crown or i t s agents deem i t necessary. Together, these two p r i n c i p l e s prevent the Canadian law of land from being t h a t of a pur e l y p r o p r i e t o r i a l system, and al l o w Canadian land-tenure to be moved away from the t r a d i t i o n a l Common Law system ( n e a r l y p u r e l y p r o p r i e t o r i a l ) to a system i n which land-holders or land-users are i n e f f e c t ( a t l e a s t ) s e r -vants of Crown or Parliamentary p o l i c i e s , enjoying t h e i r lands j u s t so long as they s a t i s f a c t o r i l y serve these p o l i c i e s . The l a t t e r system would be an ••administrative" type (Type B ) , and would belong i n the same o v e r a l l c l a s s as the f e u d a l system from which the Common Law emerged ( c f . P o t t e r 1948:488-489 f o r a comment on modern E n g l i s h planning laws. - 166 -A p e r u s a l of any c o l l e c t i o n of cases and m a t e r i a l s con-cerning n a t u r a l resource law i n Canada w i l l r e v e a l what has happened ( f o r example, Lucas 1970; see a l s o Todd and McClean 1968:1-21 t o l - 4 0 ; and E l l i o t t 1978). F i r s t , i n g r a n t i n g land t o s e t t l e r s , Canadian governments i n c r e a s i n g l y r e t a i n e d water, m i n e r a l , o i l and gas, and f o r e s t r i g h t s f o r the government. Since the land-owner no longer enjoyed the f u l l sub-surface r i g h t s granted by t r a d i t i o n a l Common Law d o c t r i n e , he would have t o permit persons, p r o p e r l y a u t h o r i z e d by the Crown, to enter upon h i s land t o e x p l o i t those resources t o which the Crown had r e t a i n e d r i g h t s . At the present day, i n f a c t , the Crown, whether f e d e r a l or p r o v i n c i a l , seems t o be r e l u c t a n t t o grant fee simple estates t o s e t t l e r s , and i n s t e a d p r e f e r s t o grant l i m i t e d leases and l i c e n c e s to e x p l o i t Crown l a n d . Second, as the country grew more and more s e t t l e d , and indus -t r i a l a c t i v i t i e s grew more and more p e r v a s i v e , complicated, and interc o n n e c t e d , the need f o r r e g u l a t i o n (as w e l l as bu r e a u c r a t i c d e s i r e s for ' more r e g u l a t i o n ) increased and indeed a c c e l e r a t e d . Zoning regulations, i n m u n i c i p a l i t i e s , water law, a i r t r a f f i c r e g u l a t i o n s , p o l l u t i o n c o n t r o l r e g u l a t i o n s , game laws and regu-lat i o n s : , may a l l be c i t e d as examples. Thus the p r o p r i e t o r — who could never i n law do everything w i t h h i s land which he wished to do — can do s t i l l l e s s than before, and i s more and more bound by r e g u l a t i o n s . The l a t t e r changes are, of course, not unique to Canada, but occur i n other Common Law j u r i s d i c t i o n s , and beyond. Together, the r e s e r v a t i o n of Crown r i g h t s to land, and the - 167 -i n c r e a s i n g r e g u l a t i o n of the uses of land imply a change i n the r e s p e c t i v e r o l e s of government and p r o p r i e t o r . The p r o t e c t i o n of property and the p r o v i s i o n of an economic and s o c i a l e n v i r -onment wherein, p r o p r i e t o r s may .pursue t h e i r own ends, becomes l e s s and l e s s the r a t i o n a l e of government. Instead, the govern-ment becomes the d i r e c t o r of the whole purpose of the whole s o c i e t y (as the government sees i t ) , and the p r o p r i e t o r becomes a s o r t of servant or agent implementing th a t purpose and allowed t o have ..property as an a i d to or a reward f o r h i s work. Canadian law and p r a c t i c e have not reached the extreme described i n the l a s t sentence of the preceding paragraph. They may never do so. But the p o t e n t i a l i t y f o r t h i s i s present i n the s o c i a l s t r u c t u r e . Another aspect of the " a d m i n i s t r a t i v e " order i s t a x a t i o n . There are two chief.problems. F i r s t , there are taxes on land as such — f o r example, mun i c i p a l and p r o v i n c i a l taxes. I f these taxes are not p a i d , the government i s allowed to s e i z e the property and s e l l i t to r e a l i z e a l l or p a r t of the taxes owed. Second, there are c a p i t a l gains taxes and income taxes l e v i e d by the f e d e r a l and p r o v i n c i a l governments. These bear upon the p r o f i t s , a c t u a l or deemed, r e a l i z e d by the vendor when land i s s o l d : the government wants i t s share. They a l s o bear upon the uses to which the land-holder may want to put h i s land: the taxes which he must pay, add to the costs of what-ever e n t e r p r i s e i n v o l v e s h i s l a n d . I n terms of the s i x c l a s s e s of l a n d - r i g h t s d i s t i n g u i s h e d by Crocombe, t h i s second or " a d m i n i s t r a t i v e " system comes out - 168 -as f o l l o w s : (1) U s e - r i g h t s : Users may be Crown agents a c t i n g on Crown land or on p r i v a t e l y owned land according to a u t h o r i t y conferred upon them by Parliament;, or they may be l i c e n s e e s and lessees u s i n g Crown l a n d according to the terms l a i d out i n the l i c e n c e s and l e a s e s . (2) Rights to " i n d i r e c t " economic g a i n : The Crown and some of i t s subordinate agencies, such as mu n i c i p a l c o r p o r a t i o n s , have the r i g h t to tax l a n d . (3) Rights to c o n t r o l : By means of planning laws and other laws, made by the l e g i s l a t u r e or w i t h i t s a u t h o r i t y , the Crown and i t s agencies can c o n t r o l whatever use land-holders make of the l a n d . (4) Rights of t r a n s f e r : The Crown has the r i g h t to pur-chase or t o expropriate p r i v a t e l a n d , and to grant l i c e n c e s , l e a s e s , o r even f r e e h o l d estates out of i t s own lands. I t can a l s o t r a n s f e r sovereignty over i t s t e r r i t o r y to another sovereign. (5) R e s i d u a l r i g h t s : P r i v a t e l y owned land which has no h e i r o r other p r i v a t e person to take up i t s ownership, escheats to the Crown. The Crown has the u l t i m a t e r i g h t of r e v e r s i o n . (6) Symbolic r i g h t s or r i g h t s of i d e n t i f i c a t i o n : Not considered i n the law. For completeness' sake, we should n o t i c e the e s t a b l i s h -ment of land t i t l e r e g i s t r a t i o n (e.g. Land R e g i s t r y A c t , R.S.B.C. I960, c. 208). This i s a way of s i m p l i f y i n g the rec o r d i n g of t i t l e and the a s c e r t a i n i n g of j u s t what ki n d of l a n d - r i g h t s , - 169 -and charges upon the l a n d , which a p a r t i c u l a r landowner has, or which are attached to a p a r t i c u l a r piece of l a n d . I t s main change i s to provide t h a t r e g i s t e r e d t i t l e s p r e v a i l over un-r e g i s t e r e d t i t l e s , f o r the most p a r t . - 170 -D Canadian Law Concerning Native Rights to Land. i n c l u d i n g A b o r i g i n a l T i t l e Canadian land-law i s f u r t h e r complicated by the existence w i t h i n i t of law r e l a t i n g to Indian and I n u i t l a nds. This law f o l l o w s somewhat d i f f e r e n t p r i n c i p l e s than the law of r e a l prop-e r t y , or than the a d m i n i s t r a t i v e elements j u s t o u t l i n e d ; and yet these s e v e r a l s o r t s of law are connected to and int e r p e n e -t r a t e one another. E x c l u s i v e l e g i s l a t i v e a u t h o r i t y over "Ind-i a n s , and lands reserved f o r the Indians" i s assigned by the B r i t i s h North America A c t , 1867, now C o n s t i t u t i o n A c t , 1867.. sec. 91, sub-sec. 24, t o the f e d e r a l government. The Supreme Court of Canada has r u l e d t h a t the word "Indians" i n the B.N.A. Act i n c l u d e s I n u i t (Re Eskimos, [1939] S.C.R. 104; Sigeareak El-22 v. The Queen, [1966] S.C.R. 645, 57 D.L.R. (2d) 536). As Lysyk (1967:515) has pointed out ( i n an a r t i c l e which w e l l shows the complexity of Canadian law r e l a t i n g to I n d i a n s ) , "Indians" and "lands reserved f o r the Indians" are separate concerns. I n the present enquiry, I s h a l l be d i s c u s s i n g only the second concern. Native l a n d - r i g h t s i n Canada depend c h i e f l y on two sets of ideas: f i r s t , the law of " a b o r i g i n a l t i t l e " or " a b o r i g i n a l r i g h t s " , and second, the t r e a t i e s signed between Canada and vari o u s I n d i a n peoples. There are other complicating elements which e n t a i l t h a t i n any matter concerning Indian l a n d - r i g h t s the s p e c i f i c h i s t o r i e s of the s p e c i f i c peoples and j u r i s d i c t i o n s - 1 7 1 -involved must be taken into account (of. Lysyk 1967; Cumming and Mickenberg 1 9 7 2 : 6 5 f f ) ; but aboriginal t i t l e and t r e a t i e s form, as i t were, the two chief f o c i . The t r e a t i e s were intend-ed by the Canadian government to cede Indian lands or interests i n land to Canada, and to extinguish aboriginal t i t l e on (at least) lands other than those included i n Indian reserves. Much depends on the s p e c i f i c terms of the s p e c i f i c t r e a t i e s , and the circumstances of t h e i r signing, as to how much of the aboriginal t i t l e survives. As I noted i n the f i r s t chapter of th i s enquiry, there i s serious doubt as to whether Treaties 8 and 1 1 a c t u a l l y did extinguish aboriginal t i t l e f o r the Dene of the Northwest T e r r i t o r i e s ; and no t r e a t i e s were signed with the I n u i t . So f o r the purpose of the present enquiry, I s h a l l con-centrate on the law.of aboriginal t i t l e . This was u s e f u l l y reviewed and summarized by Cumming and Mickenberg ( 1 9 7 2 : 1 3 -1 2 50); and shortly thereafter the question of the extinguish-ment of aboriginal t i t l e was dealt with at considerable length by the Supreme Court of Canada i n Calder et a l . v. Attorney-General of B.C., [ 1 9 7 3 ] S.C.R. 3 1 3 , ( 1 9 7 3 ) , 3 4 D.L.R. ( 3 d ) 1 4 5 . In that case, three judges held that the Nishga had had and s t i l l had aboriginal t i t l e to t h e i r land, three judges held that the Nishga had had aboriginal t i t l e but that t h i s had been extinguished, while the seventh judge rejected the Nishga*s appeal f o r procedural reasons and made no comment on aboriginal rights. 1-^ The account of aboriginal t i t l e which follows i s based c h i e f l y on these two sources. - 172 -The t o p i c s of a b o r i g i n a l r i g h t s and a b o r i g i n a l t i t l e (the two should not be confused) are more complex than my use of only two sources might suggest, and the l i t e r a t u r e i s now a p p r e c i a b l y l a r g e r ( c f . Asch 1984:141; Indian Claims B i b l i o -graphies 1975, 1979). But i n the present enquiry, the two sources chosen s u f f i c e to s t a t e the concept of a b o r i g i n a l t i t l e as i t i s expressed i n Canadian law. Furthermore, the present enquiry i s not a d i s c u s s i o n of a b o r i g i n a l t i t l e , much l e s s of a b o r i g i n a l r i g h t s , and t o pursue these i n t o the d e t a i l which they i n t r i n s i c a l l y deserve would be much too d i g r e s s i v e . The present enquiry focusses on the Common Law of r e a l property r a t h e r than the law of a b o r i g i n a l t i t l e , although both, from a wider p o i n t of view, have to be regarded as p a r t of Canadian land-law. In summary, a b o r i g i n a l t i t l e as i t i s recognized i n Can-adian law i s the r i g h t possessed by a n a t i v e community and i t s members, to contiue to occupy and use the land which they and t h e i r ancestors were u s i n g when the sovereign a u t h o r i t y of the Crown v i s - a - v i s other dominant (mainly European or Euro-American) s o c i e t i e s was extended over t h a t l a n d . A b o r i g i n a l t i t l e i s a l e g a l r i g h t , p a r t of the common law, r e c o g n i z i n g the moral r i g h t of the people t o t h e i r lands and l i v e l i h o o d . . . . the r i g h t s of the o r i g i n a l i n h a b i t a n t s were, i n no i n s t a n c e , e n t i r e l y disregarded; but were, neces-s a r i l y , to a considerable extent, impaired. They were admitted to be the r i g h t f u l occupants of the s o i l , w i t h a l e g a l as w e l l as a j u s t c l a i m to r e t a i n possession of i t , and to use i t according to t h e i r own d i s c r e t i o n ; but t h e i r r i g h t s to complete sovereignty, as independent n a t i o n s , were n e c e s s a r i l y diminished, and t h e i r power to dispose of the s o i l , at t h e i r own w i l l , to whomsoever - 173 -they pleased, was denied by the o r i g i n a l fundamental p r i n c i p l e , t h a t d i s c o v e r y gave e x c l u s i v e t i t l e to those who made i t . ( C h i e f J u s t i c e M a r s h a l l of the United S t a t e s Supreme Court, i n Johnson v. Mcintosh. 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 240 (1823), at pp. 253-254; quoted i n Cumming and Micken-berg 1972:18, and by Mr. J u s t i c e H a l l , i n Calder et a l . v. A.-G. B.C., [1973] S.C.R. 313, at p. 3 8 2 . ) ^ I n S t . Catherine's M i l l i n g v. The Queen (1887), 13 S.C.R. 577, s e v e r a l judges of the Supreme Court of Canada expressed the view t h a t the law of a b o r i g i n a l t i t l e described i n the e a r l y American cases a p p l i e d e q u a l l y i n Canada (see d i s c u s s i o n i n Cumming and Mickenberg 1972:33-34, 39-41). This view was f o l l o w e d by the J u d i c i a l Committee of the P r i v y C o u n c i l , i n S a i n t Catherine's M i l l i n g v. The Queen (1889), 14 App. Cas. 46 ( P . C ) , which, at p. 54, described the t i t l e of the Indians as a "personal and u s u f r u c t u a r y r i g h t dependent upon the good w i l l of the sover-eign." This meant th a t under Canadian c o n s t i t u t i o n a l c o n d i t i o n s , when a b o r i g i n a l t i t l e i s extinguished w i t h i n a p r o v i n c e , the p r o p r i e t a r y r i g h t i n the land goes to the Crown i n the r i g h t of the p r o v i n c e , not to the f e d e r a l Crown. There are two great l i m i t a t i o n s on a b o r i g i n a l t i t l e : (a) a b o r i g i n a l lands can be a l i e n a t e d only to the Crown, and (b); a b o r i g i n a l t i t l e can be extinguished by the Crown (see Cumming and Mickenberg 1972:39-40). A b o r i g i n a l t i t l e (as w e l l as t i t l e to reserve lands) has been t r e a t e d as belonging t o communities or groups of Indians, however, and i s not personal i n the sense of belonging to i n d i -v i d u a l s ; although by ceasing to belong to the community, i n d i -v i d u a l s can g i v e up t h e i r r i g h t s t o b e n e f i t from a b o r i g i n a l t i t l e . Mr. J u s t i c e Morrow, i n Re P a u l e t t e and R e g i s t r a r of - 174 -T i t l e s (No. 2) (1973), 42 D.L.R. (3d) 8, at pp. 27-28, summed up the l e g a l i n c i d e n t s of a b o r i g i n a l t i t l e as: (1) Possessory r i g h t — r i g h t to use and e x p l o i t the l a n d . (2) I t i s a communal r i g h t . (3) There i s a Crown i n t e r e s t u n d e r l y i n g t h i s t i t l e — i t being an estate h e l d of the Crown. (4) I t i s i n a l i e n a b l e — i t cannot be t r a n s f e r r e d but can only be t r a n s f e r r e d to the Crown. (Cumming and Mickenberg (1972:41) are wrong, t h e r e f o r e , i n say-in g t h a t "with the exceptions noted above, Indian t i t l e should be viewed as having a l l the i n c i d e n t s of a fee simple e s t a t e . " The exceptions make the co n c l u s i o n meaningless.) Calder et a l . v. A.^C-. B.C. was concerned c h i e f l y w i t h extinquishment of a b o r i g i n a l t i t l e by means of u n i l a t e r a l gov-ernment a c t i o n . Mr. J u s t i c e Judson, f o c u s s i n g e s s e n t i a l l y on the dependence of a b o r i g i n a l t i t l e upon "the g o o d w i l l of the Sovereign" ( a t p. 328), concluded t h a t ( a t p. 344) . . . the sovereign a u t h o r i t y e l e c t e d to e x e r c i s e com-p l e t e dominion over the lands i n question, adverse to any r i g h t of occupancy which the Nishga T r i b e might have had, when, by l e g i s l a t i o n , i t opened up such lands f o r settlement, subject to the reserves of land set aside f o r occupation. Mr. J u s t i c e H a l l h e l d (p. 352) t h a t the Nishga,claim was not a c l a i m to t i t l e i n fee but was i n the nature of an e q u i t a b l e c l a i m or i n t e r e s t , "a usu f r u c t u a r y r i g h t and a r i g h t to occupy the .lands and to enjoy the f r u i t s of the s o i l , the f o r e s t and of the r i v e r s and streams," and as such could be extinguished without compensation only by "express words to t h a t e f f e c t i n an enactment." He continued ( a t p. 402): The a p p e l l a n t s r e l y on the presumption t h a t the B r i t -i s h Crown intended to respect n a t i v e r i g h t s ; t h e r e f o r e , when the Nishga people came under B r i t i s h sovereignty . . . - 175 -they were e n t i t l e d to a s s e r t , as a l e g a l r i g h t , t h e i r Indian t i t l e . I t being a l e g a l r i g h t , i t could not t h e r e -a f t e r be extinguished except by surrender to the Crown or by competent l e g i s l a t i v e a u t h o r i t y , and then only by s p e c i f i c l e g i s l a t i o n . There was no surrender by the N i s h -gas and n e i t h e r the Colony of B r i t i s h Columbia nor the P r o v i n c e , a f t e r Confederation, enacted l e g i s l a t i o n s p e c i -f i c a l l y p u r p o r t i n g to e x t i n g u i s h the Indian t i t l e nor d i d Parliament at Ottawa. The d i v i s i o n of the court i n Calder et a l . v. A-.-G. B.C. meant that the Nishgas l o s t t h e i r appeal, but t h a t the question whether or not t h e i r a b o r i g i n a l t i t l e had been extinguished was s t i l l wide open. I n summary, a b o r i g i n a l t i t l e can be extinguished (a) by t r e a t y , i n which t i t l e i s surrendered to the Crown f o r such com-pensation as may be agreed; (b) by s a l e to the Crown (thus i n e f f e c t much the same as by t r e a t y ) ; and (c) by appropriate l e g i s l a t i o n . (The Supreme Court of Canada d i v i d e d on the ques-t i o n of what l e g i s l a t i o n was appropriate.) A b o r i g i n a l t i t l e can be a l i e n a t e d only to the Crown, and not d i r e c t l y to p r i v a t e s u b j e c t s of the Crown. Looking over the judgments i n Calder. I t h i n k t h a t i f one f o l l o w e d H a l l ' s l i n e of argument, conquest would not n e c e s s a r i l y e x t i n g u i s h a b o r i g i n a l t i t l e . Conquest would e n t a i l l o s s of sov-e r e i g n t y , as f a r as the conquered were concerned, but t h e i r property r i g h t s , t h e i r o r i g i n a l r u l e s and p r a c t i c e s of use and occupation, would s t i l l be e n t i t l e d to p r o t e c t i o n , and to compen-s a t i o n f o r e x p r o p r i a t i o n , unless l e g i s l a t i o n were passed which expressly a b o l i s h e d those r i g h t s and expressly d e c l a r e d t h a t no compensation was due. Judson*s argument i s c o n s i s t e n t w i t h t h i s , except t h a t he would not r e q u i r e express mention of abor-- 176 -i g i n a l r i g h t s , and would a l l o w extinguishment by l e g i s l a t i o n which was merely i n c o n s i s t e n t w i t h the r e c o g n i t i o n of a b o r i g -i n a l t i t l e . As the law of a b o r i g i n a l t i t l e has so f a r been a p p l i e d i n Canada, t h a t law does not r e q u i r e the Crown to recognize and uphold a b o r i g i n a l land-law ( o r i t s a b o r i g i n a l e q u i v a l e n t ) , whatever i t may be, e i t h e r among the abo r i g i n e s or n a t i v e s them-s e l v e s , or between n a t i v e s and non-natives. Yet l o g i c a l l y , r e c o g n i z i n g t h a t the n a t i v e s or ab o r i g i n e s have a r i g h t to the pe a c e f u l use and occupancy of the lands which they have used and occupied, i m p l i e s r e c o g n i z i n g t h e i r r i g h t t o use those lands according to t h e i r own r u l e s , and t h e r e f o r e r e c o g n i z i n g t h e i r r i g h t e i t h e r to enforce those r u l e s i n t h e i r own way, or to seek redress i n the courts of the dominant s o c i e t y . This " r e -c o g n i t i o n of n a t i v e law" (as we might l o o s e l y term it" ' " ' ' ) , except f o r recent r e c o g n i t i o n s of Dene and I n u i t adoption customs ( f o r example, Re Wah-Shee (1975), 57 D.L.R. (3d) 743), has not occurred i n Canada; nor i s i t c o n s i s t e n t w i t h the a s s i m i l a t i o n i s t t h r u s t of the f e d e r a l I ndian Acts ( c f . Tobias 1976; T r e a t i e s and H i s t -o r i c a l Research Centre 1978). S t i l l another problem emerges when we consider the l e g a l nature of the i n t e r e s t which Indian groups and i n d i v i d u a l s have i n the lands reserved to them a f t e r they have signed t r e a t i e s and surrendered a b o r i g i n a l t i t l e . How much of t h e i r former r i g h t s continues on the reserves s e t up under the Indian Act? What t i t l e s or i n t e r e s t s do they have i n these reserves? The Supreme Court has apparently concluded t h a t the Crown holds - 177 -both reserve lands and Indian funds f o r the "use and b e n e f i t " of the bands. This i s a t r u s t r e l a t i o n s h i p , and i f the Crown breaches t h i s t r u s t , i t i s l i a b l e to the Indian b e n e f i c i a r i e s ( M i l l e r v. The King, [1950] S.C.R. 168; discussed i n Cumming and Mickenberg 1972:237-238). I n h i s paper on "The concept of n a t i v e t i t l e , " Smith (1974: 15) argues t h a t we need t o d i s t i n g u i s h . . . between the i n t e r - s o c i e t a l property i n s t i t u t i o n i n c o r p o r a t e d w i t h i n i n t e r n a t i o n a l law and d e a l t w i t h i n terms of sove r e i g n t y , the i n t r a - s o c i e t a l property i n s t i -t u t i o n of the dominant s o c i e t y incorporated w i t h i n i t s l e g a l system and d e a l t w i t h i n terms of ownership, and the i n t e r - s o c i e t a l i n s t i t u t i o n of property which was e s t a b l i s h e d , a l b e i t i n a l e s s formal and s t r u c t u r e d way, between the dominant and s e r v i e n t s o c i e t i e s . I f we accept these d i s t i n c t i o n s , the concept of a b o r i g i n a l t i t l e i s t h a t p a r t of the Common Law which enters the t h i r d of these r e l a t i o n s h i p s , as viewed through the l e g a l eyes of the dominant s o c i e t y . The f a c t t h a t n a t i v e i n s t i t u t i o n s of property are not ( p r e s e n t l y ) j u s t i c i a b l e i n the courts of the dominant s o c i e t y , takes a b o r i g i n a l t i t l e out of the second c l a s s d i s t i n g u i s h e d . The f a c t t h a t a b o r i g i n a l t i t l e can be extinguished by the sover-eign takes i t out of the f i r s t c l a s s . Only the t h i r d i s l e f t . - 178 -Notes to Chapter IV 1 Note the c o n c l u s i o n of the B.C. L e g i s l a t i v e Assembly's S e l e c t Standing Commitee on A g r i c u l t u r e (1978:186) r e -p o r t on Land P r o d u c t i v i t y i n B r i t i s h Columbia t h a t , "Enough a g r i c u l t u r a l land e x i s t s i n the Province to produce the volume of food r e q u i r e d to meet current l e v e l s of consump-t i o n , but such an undertaking would r e q u i r e the i n t e n s i v e development of almost a l l the Province's a g r i c u l t u r a l land resources." But B.C. of course has i t s own s p e c i a l c o n d i t i o n s . Other parts of Canada d i f f e r , some being more favourable to a g r i c u l t u r a l production (e.g. A l b e r t a ) and some l e s s (e.g. Newfoundland). 2 The term ' ! c i v i l law" has more than one meaning. I t may mean the Quebec C i v i l Law t r a d i t i o n , based on the Euro-pean C i v i l Law t r a d i t i o n , i n c o n t r a s t to the "Common Law" or A n g l i c a n t r a d i t i o n ( t o use Wigmore's u s e f u l l a b e l ) . W i t h i n the Commom Law t r a d i t i o n , however, the term " c i v i l law" i s used i n c o n t r a s t to " c r i m i n a l law". " C i v i l law" i n t h i s l a t t e r usage i s the law governing disputes between p r i v a t e persons, f o r example, suing one another i n what i s c a l l e d a " c i v i l s u i t " (not a " t r i a l " ) . " C r i m i n a l law", on the other hand, governs persons being " t r i e d " before the court f o r "crimes", and the p r o s e c u t i o n i s done by the s t a t e r a t h e r than by a p r i v a t e i n d i v i d u a l . One speaks of a " c r i m i n a l t r i a l " and not of a " c r i m i n a l s u i t " . I n a c i v i l s u i t , one speaks of " p l a i n t i f f " and "defendant", but i n a c r i m i n a l t r i a l of "prosecutor" and "accused". - 179 -To complicate t h i s neat d i s t i n c t i o n , however, there are offences against f e d e r a l and p r o v i n c i a l s t a t u t e s which are not reckoned i n law as "crimes", although the s t a t e ' s r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s prosecute the accused before the cou r t s ; and there are a l s o a v a r i e t y of matters which are "heard" and "decided" not i n the "law cour t s " but before "adminis-t r a t i v e t r i b u n a l s " . The contrast between c i v i l law, or the law of t o r t s and wrongs a g i n s t p r i v a t e i n d i v i d u a l s and groups, and c r i m i n a l law, or the law of crimes or offences against the whole community, i s used by Radcliffe-Brown (1952: 212-219) to c h a r a c t e r i z e p r i m i t i v e law according to the mode of i n t e r v e n t i o n by the whole community i n s e t t l i n g d i s p u t e s . However, i n both c i v i l and c r i m i n a l law so de f i n e d , the dispute i s s e t t l e d according to r u l e s and p r i n c i p l e s g e n e r a l l y adhered to by the whole community. These r u l e s and p r i n c i p l e s are c o l l e c t i v e r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s of the values and world-view of the whole community, and maintain s o l i d a r i t y by g i v i n g each member of the s o c i e t y the same mental map, as i t were, to f o l l o w . This i s , I t h i n k , s t i l l one of the f u n c t i o n s of law i n Canada. This q u a l i f i c a t i o n i s necessary. Not only have the Canad-i a n provinces each made t h e i r own a d d i t i o n s and emenda-t i o n s t o E n g l i s h t r a d i t i o n , but E n g l i s h land law was thoroughly r e v i s e d i n 1926, and the new E n g l i s h land l e g i s l a t i o n i s "completely i r r e l e v a n t to Canadian lawyers" (Todd and McClean 1968:11-38). Harwood (1975) on E n g l i s h land law has a l s o been u s e f u l . - 180 -5 Casebook m a t e r i a l s have to be used w i t h d i s c r e t i o n . Sometimes cases are inc l u d e d not because they are auth-o r i t a t i v e precedents, but because they pose h o r r i b l e ex-amples, as i t were, and arguments f o r debate. 6 But the problem of a i r c r a f t was being discussed i n 1815, when Lord Ellenborough i n P i c k e r i n g v. Rudd (1815), 4 Cowp. 219, 171 E.R. 70, at p. 71, questioned whether "an aeronaut i s l i a b l e to an a c t i o n of trespass quare clausum f r e g i t , at the s u i t of the occupier of every f i e l d over which h i s b a l l o o n passes i n the course of h i s voyage." 7 Fructus n a t u r a l e s are the n a t u r a l products of the s o i l , e.g. g r a s s , timber, f r u i t from f r u i t t r e e s , which do not re q u i r e annual labour to produce a crop. Fructus indus-t r i a l s , e.g. wheat and potatoes, r e q u i r e annual labour f o r t h e i r production and are not as such regarded as part of the land (Harwood 1975:22). 8 Smith (1974:15): conquest recognized by most property systems as a way i n which t i t l e to land may be ext i n g u i s h e d . 9 W i t h i n l i m i t s r e gulated by s t a t u t e s , depending on the p a r t i c u l a r j u r i s d i c t i o n s . Blackstone ( E h r l i c h 1959:1: 107), f o r i n s t a n c e , r e l a t e d c e r t a i n l i m i t s , i n the 1750*s, on the powers of corporations to acquire l a n d . But these l i m i t s do not remove the general p r i n c i p l e s enunciated i n the body of the present enquiry; and the p r i n c i p l e s are what we are a f t e r . 10 E.g. S t r a t a T i t l e s Act and A i r Space T i t l e s A c t , i n B.C., as already noted i n t e x t , above. - 181 -11 Lysyk's remarks on t h i s s e p a r a t i o n were a p p l i e d by the Supreme Court of Canada, per Beetz J . i n Four B Manufact-u r i n g L t d . v. United Garment Workers of America and Ontario Labour R e l a t i o n s Board. [1980] 1 S.C.R. 1031, at p. 1050. 12 See a l s o S l a t t e r y 1983. 13 A h i s t o r y of the Nishga land claims i s given by Raunet (1984). Thomas R. Berger, who was the Nishga's counsel i n the Calder case, has given something of h i s view of the case i n Berger (1982:219-254). 14 Johnson v. Mcintosh i s described by Mr. J u s t i c e H a l l , [1973] S.C.R. 313, at p.380, as "The case most f r e q u e n t l y quoted w i t h approval d e a l i n g w i t h the nature of a b o r i g i n a l r i g h t s . • • . the locus c l a s s i c u s of the p r i n c i p l e s govern-i n g a b o r i g i n a l t i t l e . " 15 Compare a South A f r i c a n d e f i n i t i o n of "Native law" as "those p a r t s of the indigenous system of customary j u r i s -prudence e x i s t i n g among the various Bantu t r i b e s of South A f r i c a , which are recognized by the South A f r i c a n Courts." ( W h i t f i e l d 1948:1) - 182 -V THE TWO SYSTEMS COMPARED A Comparison The Dene and I n u i t systems of land-tenure are about as c l o s e as one can get to having no system of land-tenure w h i l e s t i l l having one. But they c l e a r l y belong i n the c l a s s l a b e l l e d " t r i b a l " (Type A) r a t h e r than those l a b e l l e d " a d m i n i s t r a t i v e " (Type B) or " p r o p r i e t o r i a l " (Type C). The Canadian system, on the other hand, i s c l e a r l y p r o p r i e t o r i a l , although w i t h ad-m i n i s t r a t i v e elements. 1. The. Idea of Land In the Dene and I n u i t systems, land i s the scene or stage of which humans and animals l i v e , and which feeds the animals which i n t u r n feed and c l o t h e the humans. I t i s a l s o a source of f u e l and m a t e r i a l s f o r s h e l t e r and t o o l s . C r i s s - c r o s s e d by t r a i l s and migration-routes and streams, i t i s a place on which happenings are; and i t has w i t h i n i t places of s p e c i a l s i g n i -f i c a n c e where memorable events happened, where people l i v e , or where f a c i l i t i e s such as caribou fences may be s e t up. The most important resource i s , however, the animals on the l a n d . These move over the land i n r e g u l a r but v a r i a b l e routes and numbers. Some, such as the c a r i b o u , r e q u i r e coopera-t i v e teams f o r t h e i r c a t c h i n g . Others can be caught by i n d i v i d -* 183 " u a l s or by p a i r s of hunters or t r a p p e r s . Except f o r the boundaries between the t e r r i t o r i e s claimed by d i f f e r e n t but neighbouring communities, land i s not bounded nor d e l i n e a t e d . The only l a n d - l i n e s are t r a p - l i n e s , and these are r a t h e r pathways and not boundaries e n c l o s i n g l a n d . Land i s , i n a word, not p a r c e l l e d . I n s h o r t , to the Dene and I n u i t land i s a f i e l d f o r a c t i -v i t i e s , perhaps even a f i e l d of a c t i v i t i e s . I n Canadian law, land i s something which can be used as a s i t e f o r productive and other a c t i v i t i e s , or as a resource i n productive a c t i v i t i e s . These a c t i v i t i e s are d i v e r s e , and land i s an object of competition and of ownership. I t i s d i v i d e d i n t o p a r c e l s , and made the subject of a multitude of c l a i m s . I t i s thought of as a m a t e r i a l subject to various t e c h n i c a l processes and s o c i a l r e l a t i o n s h i p s . I t i s not a f i e l d f o r a c t -i v i t i e s , so much as an element i n a c t i v i t i e s , and (as people t h i n k i t ) a pass i v e element at t h a t . 2. Ownership and Possession Regarding Land. I f we take ownership to mean the r i g h t , recognized w i t h i n the s o c i e t y , to e x c l u s i v e c o n t r o l over the land or p o r t i o n of l a n d , subject only to whatever sovereign which the s o c i e t y may recogni z e , we can h i g h l i g h t a major d i f f e r e n c e between the two systems• I n the Dene and I n u i t systems, the only such u n i t c l a i m -i n g the r i g h t to exclude others from the land i s the l o c a l com-munity. Among the Dene, t h i s would be the r e g i o n a l band r a t h e r - lSk -than the l o c a l bands w i t h i n the former. Among the I n u i t , t h i s would be a more vaguely defined group which Weyer c a l l e d the " a s s o c i a t i o n u n i t " . A b o r i g i n a l l y , these were a l s o the s o c i a l groups which could be s a i d to possess p o l i t i c a l s o vereignty, i n at l e a s t an inchoate sense. Among the Dene, furthermore, f o l l o w i n g the coming of the f u r - t r a d e , t r a p - l i n e s were, f o r the l i m i t e d purpose of catching f u r - b e a r i n g animals, under the e x c l u s i v e c o n t r o l of i n d i v i d u a l trappers and t h e i r immediate f a m i l i e s . They could thus be r e -garded as a s p e c i a l form of l a n d - r i g h t s . F a c i l i t i e s , such as caribou fences, among the Dene, were taken care o f , on behalf of the whole community, by l e a d i n g persons i n the community. The p a r t i c u l a r l a n d - r i g h t s ( a l l u s e - r i g h t s ) which the members of the Dene or I n u i t communities enjoyed, were acquired by membership i n the community, and were not t r a n s f e r a b l e , but expired w i t h t h e i r holders (though c h i l d r e n could c l a i m a par-e n t s t r a p - l i n e when the l a t t e r no longer used i t , and the holder of a t r a p - l i n e could give or s e l l i t to whomever i n the community he chose). In the Canadian system, on the other hand, owners are l e g i o n , ranging from n a t u r a l persons through a r t i f i c i a l p er-sons such as corporations to the Crown i t s e l f . Sovereignty i s c l e a r l y d i s t i n g u i s h e d from ownership, though the Crown i s both sovereign and owner. In a d d i t i o n , by means of estates of l i m i t e d d u r a t i o n , e x c l u s i v e c o n t r o l can be l i m i t e d i n time. In the Canadian system, because the ownership of land - 185 -can be s p l i t i n t o the d i f f e r e n c e between h o l d i n g a l i m i t e d e s t a te (wheter i n possession or i n expectancy) and hold i n g a r i g h t t o the residue a f t e r l i m i t e d estates have been carved out of the fee simple e s t a t e , i t makes sense to d i s t i n g u i s h between ownership, r i g h t f u l possession, and possession simply. To own something i s to have r i g h t s e n t i t l i n g one to r i g h t f u l posses-s i o n , even i f one i s not enjoying t h a t r i g h t f u l p o s s i s s i o n at the time one has the e n t i t l i n g r i g h t s . (Of course, the mem-ber of a Dene or I n u i t community a l s o enjoyed r i g h t f u l posses-s i o n of h i s community's land: what he d i d not have was the index of f u l l ownership, namely the r i g h t t o exclude other persons from the same community.) The d i s t i n c t i o n between the ownership and the r i g h t f u l possession of land d i d not a r i s e i n the Dene and I n u i t systems simply because a b o r i g i n a l l y ownership and sovereignty were com bined and he l d by the whole community. But the n o t i o n of own-er s h i p as d i s t i n c t from wrongful possession was at l e a s t found among the I n u i t , and became important w i t h regard to land a f t e r sovereignty was taken away from them by Canada. I n the Canadian system, i n t e r e s t s i n land are f r e e l y t r a n s f e r a b l e , and indeed "freedom of a l i e n a t i o n " i s a c a r d i n a l p r i n c i p l e of Canadian land-law. This i s a n a t u r a l c o r o l l a r y (though not an i n e v i t a b l y l o g i c a l one) of the d i v i s i o n of land i n t o p a r c e l s and the m u l t i p l i c a t i o n of p a r t i c u l a r l a n d - r i g h t s . - 186 -3. Persons Holding Rights to Land The d i s t i n c t i o n between n a t u r a l and a r t i f i c i a l persons i s fundamental to Canadian law. I t i s not part of Dene or I n u i t i d e a s . The community among the Dene or I n u i t i s not something d i s t i n c t from the p a r t i c u l a r members of the community. The Dene and I n u i t community i s the people, and both Dene and I n u i t sought consensus among community members to express the d e c i s -i o n of the community. In other words, the Dene and I n u i t com-munities are "aggregate persons" and not a r t i f i c i a l persons, even though i n Dene and I n u i t ideas they i n c l u d e persons not yet born as w e l l as those p r e s e n t l y l i v i n g . The c l o s e s t equivalent i n the common-law t r a d i t i o n to the aggregate person of the Dene and I n u i t community i s perhaps the u n l i m i t e d p a r t n e r s h i p (which i s not a corporation) where each pa r t n e r i s the agent of a l l the other partners and each p a r t -ner i s l i a b l e f o r the acts of a l l the othe r s . There i s a l s o a l e s s e r resemblance and a s i g n i f i c a n t d i f f e r e n c e between the Dene and I n u i t community and the c o r p o r a t i o n aggregate of the common law. Both community and c o r p o r a t i o n make d e c i s i o n s b i n d i n g the whole. But the c o r p o r a t i o n aggregate i s an a r t i -f i c i a l person d i s t i n c t from the n a t u r a l ( o r the separate a r t i -f i c i a l ) persons of i t s members. There i s a corresponding d i s -t i n c t i o n between the members i n t h e i r c a p a c i t i e s as members of the c o r p o r a t i o n and the members i n t h e i r c a p a c i t i e s as p r i v a t e i n d i v i d u a l s other than members. The c o r p o r a t i o n i s a postu-l a t e d e n t i t y , matched by what F.S.C. Northrop c a l l e d a "concept by p o s t u l a t i o n " , and i t i s e p i s t e m i c a l l y c o r r e l a t e d w i t h the - 187 -members, i n the aggregate, by means of such devices as a mem-bership l i s t , a general meeting, r u l e s of procedure, and motions expressing the w i l l of the c o r p o r a t i o n . I n the common law, indeed, corporations and other a r t i f i c i a l persons may, v i a t h e i r r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s , be members of a c o r p o r a t i o n . Such a p o s s i b i l i t y was qu i t e outside the Dene and I n u i t conceptions of the community. A f u r t h e r p o i n t to remember i s t h a t , a b o r i g i n a l l y at l e a s t , the community among the Dene and I n u i t was a l s o the sovereign p o l i t i c a l group, o r as clo s e to such as might be i d e n t i f i e d . The c o r p o r a t i o n of the common law i s , on the other hand, not a sovereign u n i t but i s the dependent c r e a t i o n of a sovereign l a r g e r and more i n c l u s i v e than the c o r p o r a t i o n . - 188 -B R e c o n c i l i n g the Two Systems We come now to the problem of r e c o n c i l i n g the two s y s -tems. Is i t p o s s i b l e f o r communities l i v i n g according to the t r a d i t i o n a l Dene and I n u i t land-ways to be embodied i n t o the Canadian l e g a l system without s e r i o u s d i s t o r t i o n to those t r a d -i t i o n a l ways? Put more a b s t r a c t l y , i s i t p o s s i b l e f o r the s e r v i e n t " t r i b a l " or Type A system, mobile hunting v a r i a n t , to be f u l l y taken i n t o the dominant p r o p r i e t o r i a l or Type C system of land-tenure without the s e r v i e n t system being destroyed? The problem a r i s e s from a combination of d i s t i n c t f a c t o r s . F i r s t , f o r both Dene and I n u i t , though not i n p r e c i s e l y the same ways, hunting, the p r o t e c t i o n of the game, and the c o n t r o l of the lands over which the game animals move, are considered by the two peoples to be e s s e n t i a l t o . t h e i r s u r v i v a l as peoples c o n t r o l l i n g at l e a s t p a r t of t h e i r own d e s t i n i e s . Second, t h i s system of land-tenure i s p a r t of a l a r g e r system of f a m i l y s t r u c t u r e , community cooperation, consensual a u t h o r i t y (coupled w i t h i n d i v i d u a l e n t e r p r i s e ) , and i d e a l s of i d e n t i t y , which would be weakened i f the system of land-tenure were to change. T h i r d , the Dene and I n u i t are the subordinate systems, power-l e s s a g a i n s t the dominant system i f the l a t t e r should choose to e x e r c i s e i t s power. The Dene and I n u i t have i n p r a c t i c e l o s t s o v e r e i g n t y . I f they are to preserve t h e i r ways of l i f e , they must e i t h e r r e g a i n s o v e r e i g n t y , or they must f i n d a way of t r a n s l a t i n g t h e i r systems i n t o Canadian law concepts w i t h -- 189 -out d e s t r o y i n g those systems. (This enquiry explores the sec-ond a l t e r n a t i v e . ) The problem i s both p o l i t i c a l and l e g a l . The p o l i t i c a l problem i s f o r the people to r e t a i n , o r r e g a i n , c o n t r o l over t h e i r own l i v e s , and to have t h i s c o n t r o l recognized and sup-ported by Canadian law and p o l i t y . The l e g a l problem i s to f i n d a way i n which Dene and I n u i t conceptions of r i g h t and property ( o r t h e i r e quivalents) can be matched w i t h Canadian conceptions so tha t the Dene and I n u i t s t r u c t u r e s w i l l be main-t a i n e d by the Canadian l e g a l s t r u c t u r e . I f they can f i n d such a matching, the e f f o r t of maintenance w i l l be much e a s i e r , f o r they would then be b e t t e r able to use the Canadian courts to defend themselves against encroachments. One of the purposes of the common law i s , a f t e r a l l , the defence of property. I f the matching i s not c o r r e c t l y made, however, t r a n s -l a t i o n of Dene and I n u i t s t r u c t u r e s i n t o Canadian law concepts would destroy those s t r u c t u r e s . The courts w i l l n e c e s s a r i l y i n t e r p r e t cases according to the ideas of Canadian law, and t h e i r d e c i s i o n s w i l l impose the corresponding s t r u c t u r e s . So unless the Dene and I n u i t have already a n t i c i p a t e d the imposi-t i o n s by a l i g n i n g Canadian law s t r u c t u r e s w i t h t h e i r own, the divergence could press the s e r v i e n t s t r u c t u r e s out of shape. However, i f the t h r u s t of the Canadian law, whether by case o r s t a t u t e , i s to break up the communal land-tenure ( o r so we may c a l l i t ) of the Dene and I n u i t , to i n d i v i d u a l i z e i t , and so to f o s t e r i t s a l i e n a t i o n , then i n order to preserve - 190 -t h e i r i n t e r e s t s i n the l a n d , the Dene and I n u i t must f i n d Can-adian law concepts which they can use to block the fragmenta-t i o n and l o s s of t h e i r land and t h e i r i n t e r e s t concerning i t . There i s a s u b s t a n t i a l c o n f l i c t of purpose between most Canadians, on the one s i d e , and Dene and I n u i t , on the other, concerning the l a n d . 1 For Dene and I n u i t , the land i s a means of c u l t u r a l and economic s u r v i v a l . They do not want to l o s e i t , though they do not object to "developing" the resources of the land i n order to improve t h e i r l i v i n g c o n d i t i o n s , as they view them. Land i s not something e a s i l y to be bought and s o l d , but r a t h e r i s something g e t t i n g i n persons' i d e n t i t i e s and sense of s e l f . For most Canadians, however, land i s some-t h i n g fundamentally to be bought and s o l d and used as a f a c t o r of p roduction i n p r o f i t - m a k i n g e n t e r p r i s e s . Only the wealthy can a f f o r d t o take much land out of the economy. Other per-sons must e i t h e r use i t as an element i n a money-earning ent e r -p r i s e , o r have a monetary income or savings i n order to pay the taxes which governments w i l l c l a i m on t h i s l a n d , or e l s e they w i l l l o s e t h e i r lands, even the houses i n which they d w e l l . The question posed i n t h i s enquiry asks i f i t i s p o s s i b l e to preserve Dene and I n u i t concepts of land and land-tenure by means of l e g a l concepts from a l e g a l t r a d i t i o n whose concepts of land and land-tenure are, as we have now seen, very d i f f e r e n t from the Dene and I n u i t concepts. Or, would the attempt to defend the t r a d i t i o n a l system by means of Canadian law concepts i n e v i t a b l y change the t r a d i t i o n a l system? - 191 -How might such change occur? The f i r s t p o s s i b i l i t y i s d e f e c t i v e t r a n s l a t i o n . On the assumption t h a t there are equivalences i n the two t r a d i t i o n s , those equivalences might s t i l l not be c o r r e c t l y i d e n t i f i e d . I f , f o r example, the land-owning u n i t i n the Dene/lnuit system were considered to be the n a t u r a l i n d i v i d u a l , and these persons were considered t o have fee simple e s t a t e s , then e i t h e r the land would have to be cut up i n t o p a r c e l s each i n d i v i d u a l l y h e l d , or the land would have to be held e i t h e r j o i n t l y or s e v e r a l l y i n common. I f the i n d i v i d u a l ' s i n t e r e s t i s held j o i n t l y w i t h o t h e r s , on h i s or her death t h a t i n t e r s t disappears i n t o t h a t of the s u r v i v o r s , and i s not i n h e r i t e d . New members can e a s i l y be given correspondingly new i n t e r e s t s held j o i n t l y w i t h the i n t e r e s t s of the members already i n the community. This p a t t e r n . of j o i n t tenure would then resemble the t r a d i t i o n a l p a t t e r n . On the other hand, i f the i n t e r e s t i s held i n s e v e r a l t y w i t h o t h e r s , t h a t i n t e r e s t can be i n h e r i t e d and does not automatic-a l l y disappear on i t s holder's death. Furthermore, an ..estate held s e v e r a l l y can be a l i e n a t e d by i t s h o l d e r . I t would t h e r e -f o r e be p o s s i b l e f o r i n d i v i d u a l s to s e l l t h e i r i n t e r e s t s to other i n d i v i d u a l s e i t h e r i n s i d e or outside the community, w i t h -out the community's consent, and i n t h i s way the community could be dispossessed against the w i l l of a s i z e a b l e p o r t i o n of the community. (An attempt to prevent such a l i e n a t i o n by, e.g., r e s t r i c t i v e covenants, would go against the general p o l i c y of the common law i n favour of freedom of a l i e n a t i o n . ) The p o s s e s s - 192 -s i o n of i n t e r e s t s i n s e v e r a l t y would thettby tend to d i s s o l v e the community's bonds, but j o i n t tenure would be l e s s l i k e l y to do so. However, si n c e j o i n t tenures i n the common law are easy to sever, i . e . to change i n t o tenures i n severalty, any attempt to equate Dene/lnuit i n d i v i d u a l u s e - r i g h t s w i t h j o i n t estates would have t o c l e a r l y declare t h i s e s s e n t i a l d i f f e r e n c e : Dene and I n u i t " j o i n t tenures" could not be "severed". Another form of d e f e c t i v e t r a n s l a t i o n would be t o recog-n i z e the community as the land-holding c o r p o r a t i o n indeed, but to regard each member's i n t e r e s t as being l i k e a share i n the c o r p o r a t i o n . These shares could then be s o l d or otherwis a l i e n a t e d , so th a t once again an o u t s i d e r could g a i n c o n t r o l of the community against the w i l l of a s u b s t a n t i a l m i n o r i t y , or perhaps even a m a j o r i t y , of the o r i g i n a l community. Even an o p t i o n c l a u s e , r e q u i r i n g shares f i r s t to be o f f e r e d to the c o r p o r a t i o n o r to i t s members, would not s u f f i c e . Both shares and fee simple estates held by i n d i v i d u a l n a t u r a l persons, are means wheisby land-owning can be i n d i v i d -u a l i z e d and r e a l i z e d f o r marketing. The second p o s s i b i l i t y i s d e l i b e r a t e r e - i n t e r p r e t a t i o n . The e f f e c t s are s i m i l a r t o those of d e f e c t i v e t r a n s l a t i o n ; the c h i e f d i f f e r e n c e i s the presence of a d e l i b e r a t e p o l i c y to induce change. The causes of the d i s t o r t i o n of one system by another may be s o r t e d out as f o l l o w s . F i r s t , i f the two systems are b u i l t on d i f f e r e n t p r i n c i p l e s , t r a n s l a t i o n of one i n terms of - 193 -the other must n e c e s s a r i l y pose the t h r e a t of d e f e c t i v e t r a n s -l a t i o n . Therefore, the nature of the d i s t o r t i o n depends on the i d e a t i o n a l and l o g i c a l characters of the two systems; and on the care taken i n t r a n s l a t i o n . Second, the d i s t o r t i o n depends on the power r e l a t i o n s h i p s between the two systems. The more powerful system can i n t e r -vene i n the subordinated system and impose i t s concepts on the other. The l e s s powerful system s i l l have a constant s t r u g g l e to have i t s own concepts even understood, l e t alone accepted, by the other. Furthermore, the power of the dominant system becomes a resource to be used, v i a the t h r e a t of i t s i n t e r v e n -t i o n s , i n power s t r u g g l e s among the members of the subordinate s o c i e t y . T h i r d , the d i s t o r t i o n depends on the ways i n which the various persons and groups i n the dominant s o c i e t y s e l e c t i v e l y enforce and emphasize those p a r t s of t h e i r l e g a l system which 2 reward t h e i r i n t e i e s t s . I f the subordinate s o c i e t y does not have strong a l l i e s w i t h i n the dominant s o c i e t y , then those persons who want i t s lands w i l l get them. To meet t h i s pressure, the subordinate s o c i e t y must be able to express i t s i n t e r e s t s i n the l e g a l concepts of the dominant s o c i e t y , i n - o r d e r t h a t the menace to those i n t e r e s t s appear c l e a r l y i l l e g a l i n the dominant system's own concepts. In the s t r i c t sense of the word, the Dene/lnuit and the  Canadian systems of land-tenure cannot be " r e c o n c i l e d " . The two systems simply cannot be matched piece by piece and t r a n s -- 194 -l a t e d one i n t o the other. T h e i r b a s i c s t r u c t u r e s are too d i f f e r -ent. There i s , however, one p o i n t of contact. The Dene or I n u i t community, which holds the property r i g h t to land i n t r a d i t i o n a l i d e a s , can be matched w i t h a c o r p o r a t i o n i n Canad-i a n law, and t h i s c o r p o r a t i o n can hold the land of the community v i s - a - v i s the l a r g e r s o c i e t y according to the ideas of the dom-ina n t land-tenure system, w h i l e the members of the community continue to r e g u l a t e the access to land among themselves accord-i n g to t h e i r t r a d i t i o n a l p a t t e r n s . The community land-holding c o r p o r a t i o n thus encapsulates the Type A systems of the Dene and I n u i t w i t h i n the Type C system of Canada. This encapsul-a t i o n by means of the community land-holding c o r p o r a t i o n (CLHC) might be c a l l e d " r e c o n c i l i a t i o n " of a s t r a i n e d s o r t . I t i s the only way a v a i l a b l e w i t h i n the concepts of l a n d - h o l d i n g i n the Common Law — and even then i t depends not on the ideas or land or of ownership, but on the i d e a of person. This c o n c l u s i o n does not mean tha t there i s no other way i n which Dene and I n u i t ideas of land and land-tenure might not be f i t t e d i n t o the Canadian l e g a l system as a whole. The con-s t i t u t i o n a l d i v i s i o n of powers allows each province t o develop i t s own land-law, and e s p e c i a l l y Quebec to preserve i t s own c i v i l law t r a d i t i o n . A s i m i l a r s o l u t i o n could be a p p l i e d to the Dene and I n u i t , and has indeed been asked f o r i n the Denen-deh and Nunavut proposals ( t o be sketched i n the next chapter, s e c t i o n A l ) . These proposals set up separate j u r i s d i c t i o n s w i t h i n Canada wherein Dene and I n u i t would preserve t h e i r own - 195 -ways of d e a l i n g w i t h l a n d , or change these ways as they deem f i t . The community land-holding c o r p o r a t i o n t r i e s to achieve a s i m i l a r r e s u l t , but on a s m a l l e r s c a l e and by u s i n g the com-mon-law ide a of the c o r p o r a t i o n w i t h i n a common-law j u r i s d i c -t i o n . I n the next chapter, I s h a l l t r y to d e t a i l the charac-t e r i s t i c s of t h i s community land-holding c o r p o r a t i o n (abbr. CLHC), and a l s o to d i s t i n g u i s h i t from a number of p o s s i b i l i -t i e s f o r which i t must not be mistaken. - 196 -Notes to Chapter V So much, indeed, i s i n t i m a t e d by the t i t l e of Berger's (1977) r e p o r t , Northern F r o n t i e r . Northern Homeland. The c o n f l i c t came out r a t h e r n i c e l y i n the co n t r a s t between white and I n d i a n testimonies before the Berger Commission at Hay R i v e r and Hay R i v e r New Indian V i l l a g e : T r a n s c r i p t s , pp. C180-C595. The kinds of pressures against which the Canadian Indians have had t o contend, and t h e i r responses t o these, are tr a c e d i n the h i s t o r y by P a t t e r s o n (1972). The various Canadian p o l i c i e s towards I n d i a n s , and t h e i r expression i n the Indian A c t , have been put together i n T r e a t i e s and H i s t o r i c a l Research Centre (1978). The Maori of New Zealand a f f o r d an instance of a " t r i b a l - a d m i n i s t r a t i v e " type (intermediate between t r i b a l and a d m i n i s t r a t i v e corners of the t r i a n g l e but i n the t r i b a l r a t h e r than the a d m i n i s t r a t i v e p a r t ) meeting a p r o p r i e t o r i a l type, indeed one belonging to the same t r a d i t i o n as the Canadian. However, the idea of land among the Maori i s c l o s e r to the Canadian i d e a than i s th a t of the Dene and I n u i t . For a d e t a i l e d h i s t o r y of the encounter between the two systems, see Ward (1974). For t h o l d Maori system, see F i r t h (1959), e s p e c i a l l y chapters 10 and 11. A s h o r t e r summary of 19th century contact between Maori and whites i s M i l l e r (1940), and - 197 -( i n the same volume) of Maori land-holding v i s - a - v i s the w h i t e s , Ngata (1940). The law concerning Maori lands, as t h a t law was developed by New Zealand c o u r t s , i s author-i t a t i v e l y g i ven i n Smith (i960). A very short summary of the p o s i t i o n of the Maori i n New Zealand law i s given by Hooker (1975:331-338). As a means of countering the e f f e c t s of fragmenta-t i o n of Maori f r e e h o l d tenure, the Maori A f f a i r s Act of 1953 provides t h a t f o u r or more owners may i n c o r p o r a t e . The body corporate holds the land i n fee simple i n t r u s t f o r the incorporated owners. I t has the power to a l i e n -ate l a n d , subject t o c o n f i r m a t i o n by the Maori land c o u r t . The law i s conveniently summarized i n Smith (1960:158-174), ch. 13. This i s not a community land - h o l d i n g c o r p o r a t i o n as I propose i n the present enquiry, but s t r i c t l y a c r e a t i o n under the s t a t u t e , and i t s objects or purposes may be v a r i e d at the d i s c r e t i o n of the Court. Note t h a t the owners who have j o i n e d together to form the c o r p o r a t i o n are described as having e q u i t a b l e i n t e r -e s t s . Hooker (1975:345), d e s c r i b i n g the encounter of Aust-r a l i a n law w i t h t r a d i t i o n a l ways i n Papua New Guinea, noted t h a t there was r e c e n t l y proposed there' "the i d e a of s e t t i n g up bodies which are corporate i n the common law sense and i n the n a t i v e sense based i n t r a d i t i o n a l o b l i g a t i o n . . . . " At t h a t time, however, the i d e a was s t i l l embryonic. - 198 -VI THE IDEA OF THE COMMUNITY LAND-HOLDING CORPORATION (CLHC) A What I t I s Not The b a s i c i d e a before us i s simply s t a t e d . I f the Dene or I n u i t l o c a l community as the land-holding e n t i t y can be matched w i t h the common-law c o r p o r a t i o n , the r e s u l t i n g l a n d -h o l d i n g c o r p o r a t i o n can hold the land of the community on behalf of the members of the community against persons and i n t e r e s t s i n the l a r g e r s o c i e t y , and the members of the community can arrange among themselves the use and h o l d i n g of t h e i r land i n whatever ways they consider r i g h t . As the d i s c u s s i o n i n the preceding chapter i n t i m a t e s , however, not any c o r p o r a t i o n w i l l serve the purpose of support-i n g Dene and I n u i t t r a d i t i o n a l ideas of land and land-tenure. The community land-holding c o r p o r a t i o n , or ( f o r short) "CLHC", must have c e r t a i n s p e c i f i c c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s i f i t i s to achieve i t s purpose, and must c a r e f u l l y avoid f a l l i n g i n t o other kinds of c o r p o r a t i o n recognized by Canadian law. We can gain a c l e a r e r i d e a about what the CLHC i s i f we f i r s t explore some of what i t i s not. - 199 -1. Not a J u r i d i c a l l y Sovereign U n i t As proposed here, the CLHC i s not a j u r i d i c a l l y sovereign u n i t . I t i s not an independent government, s e t t i n g i t s own laws and r e g u l a t i o n s u n s c r u t i n i z e d by a s u p e r i o r a u t h o r i t y . I t i s an attempt to come as c l o s e t o t h i s as Canadian law w i l l a l l o w a subject of the Crown to go. In the a b o r i g i n a l p r a c t i c e and the t r a d i t i o n a l i d e a l , the l o c a l community (not always p r e c i s e l y defined) was and i s both the p o l i t i c a l l y sovereign u n i t and the main land-holding u n i t . Given the ways of subsistence of the people, such a com-b i n a t i o n was a p r a c t i c a l n e c e s s i t y f o r t h e i r s u r v i v a l . With the coming of the Canadians, however, p o l i t i c a l •sovereignty passed away from the I n u i t and Dene to the Canadian government. As f a r as the n a t i v e people were concerned, there was now a new presence i n t h e i r country, and t h a t presence s t e a d i l y increased i t s power over the country, and i t s i n t e r -ference i n t h e i r l i v e s . Some of t h i s i n t e r f e r e n c e was welcomed, and some of i t was not. Whether the i n t e r f e r e n c e was or was not welcomed, the people f e l t t h a t c o n t r o l of t h e i r own existences was s l i p p i n g away from them as the whites increased t h e i r p r e -sence on the l a n d . (a) The Denendeh Proposal Matters were brought to a head w i t h the i n c r e a s e of p e t r o -leum e x p l o r a t i o n i n the north and the p r e s e n t a t i o n of proposals to b u i l d o i l and gas p i p e l i n e s along the Mackenzie v a l l e y from - 200 -the A r c t i c to southern Canada. This was i n the l a t e 1960's and early 1970's. In 1970, the treaty Indians of the Northwest T e r r i t o r i e s formed the Indian Brotherhood of the N.W.T., and inl973 the Metis and Non-Status Native Association was formed to represent Dene not covered by the Indian Act. This was be-fore the Mackenzie Valley Pipeline Inquiry Commission was com-missioned i n 1974. In 1973, some of the Dene chiefs applied f o r permission to f i l e a caveat on the lands i n the Mackenzie d i s -t r i c t used as t r a d i t i o n a l hunting grounds by the Loucheaux and Slavey. I f t h i s caveat were granted, i t would prevent any trans-mission of land without Dene permission, except as subject to the Dene claims. This a p p l i c a t i o n was heard by Mr. Justice Morrow i n the N.W.T. Supreme Court. He ruled that the Dene had not l o s t t h e i r aboriginal rights beyond doubt and that the caveat might be f i l e d . The Crown appealed, and the Appeal court, without r u l i n g on the question of aboriginal r i g h t s , reversed Mr. Justice Morrow's decision on the caveat. The chiefs ap-pealed to the Supreme Court of Canada. In July, 1974, Dene leaders met and declared that the Dene, both treaty and non-treaty, would make one land claim f o r a l l the Dene. In July, 1975, the leaders met again and issued the Dene Declaration. The Declaration claimed that the Dene are a d i s t i n c t people within Canada and have the ri g h t to self-determination within Canada. In October, 1976, another meeting proposed a new settlement between the Dene and the Canadian government, and stated that there should be "within Confederation, a Dene gov-ernment with j u r i s d i c t i o n over a geographical area and over - 201 -subject matters now w i t h i n the j u r i s d i c t i o n of e i t h e r the Gov-ernment of Canada or the Government of the Northwest T e r r i t o r -i e s . " 1 By 1981, Dene ideas matured t o proposing a governmental s t r u c t u r e f o r a new p o l i t i c a l e n t i t y occupying the Dene areas i n the N.W.T. and t o be known as Denendeh. The Denendeh gov-ernment would have those powers possessed by e x i s t i n g Canadian p r o v i n c i a l governments p l u s some powers now h e l d by the f e d e r a l government. W i t h i n Denendeh, the Dene people would have a s p e c i a l p r o t e c t e d p o s i t i o n . They would have e x c l u s i v e owner-s h i p , use, c o n t r o l , occupancy, and resource ownership over l a r g e areas w i t h i n Denendeh. E x i s t i n g p r i v a t e property r i g h t s would be maintained, but f u t u r e property i n t e r e s t s would be by way of long-term leaseholds g r a n t i n g occupancy and use r i g h t s but not resource ownership. There would be two l a y e r s of govern-ment, namely p r o v i n c i a l and l o c a l community. While any r e s i -dent c o u l d speak at l o c a l community meetings, v o t i n g and e l i g i -b i l i t y f o r o f f i c e would be r e s t r i c t e d t o Canadian c i t i z e n s who (1) had r e s i d e d i n Denendeh f o r at l e a s t ten y e a r s , (2) pledged to uphold the Charter of Founding P r i n c i p l e s , and (3) had r e -side d i n the l o c a l community f o r two years. The " p r o v i n c i a l " government would be i n the hands of a n a t i o n a l assembly e l e c t e d by Denendeh v o t e r s . Only persons could vote and hold o f f i c e p r o v i n c i a l l y who were Canadian c i t i z e n s who (1) had r e s i d e d i n Denendeh f o r at l e a s t t e n years and (2) pledged t o uphold the Charter of Founding P r i n c i p l e s . The assembly would i n s t r u c t the e x e c u t i v e . Both assembly r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s and the execu-- 202 -t i v e s might be chosen by various ways. (CJL Foundation 1982) In t h i s way, the Dene consider t h a t they could p r o t e c t themselves from resource e x p l o i t a t i o n by southerners which would both destroy t r a d i t i o n a l values and t h r u s t the Dene f u r -t h e r i n t o dependence and poverty. This p r o p o s a l , i f accepted by Canada, would give the Dene power to maintain t h e i r own ideas of land and land-tenure on a t e r r i t o r i a l o r r e g i o n a l s c a l e as w e l l as on a l o c a l s c a l e . (b) The Nunavut P r o p o s a l 2 I n February 1976, i n advance of the Dene t e r r i t o r i a l pro-p o s a l s , the I n u i t T a p i r i s a t of Canada presented t o the f e d e r a l government a d e t a i l e d proposal f o r s e t t l i n g the I n u i t land c l a i m s . The proposal i n c l u d e d e s t a b l i s h i n g a new t e r r i t o r y t o be c a l l e d Nunavut. i n which the I n u i t would predominate. The proposal s t a t e d t h a t each I n u i t community should organize as a n o n - p r o f i t c o r p o r a t i o n , whose members are to be determined by the a r t i c l e s of i n c o r p o r a t i o n . These community corporations should then combine i n t o r e g i o n a l n o n - p r o f i t c o r -p o r a t i o n s . These l o c a l and r e g i o n a l corporations would hold r e a l property i n t e r e s t s , but would be exempt from t a x a t i o n . Each l o c a l c o r p o r a t i o n would have the power to determine i t s own membership. Voting i n l o c a l and t e r r i t o r i a l e l e c t i o n s i n Nunavut would be l i m i t e d to persons who had r e s i d e d f o r at l e a s t ten years i n Nunavut. Several s e c t i o n s of the proposal provide f o r t e r r i t o r i a l - 203 -and I n u i t c o n t r o l over hunting and t r a p p i n g , w i t h conservation as a c h i e f g o a l . Lands would be d i v i d e d between I n u i t lands and p u b l i c lands. I n u i t lands would be held by the l o c a l community and r e g i o n a l corporations " i n fee simple, i n c l u d i n g the s u b s o i l except f o r any rocks, o i l and gas or minerals or any other r e -sources s i t u a t e d more than 1,500 f e e t v e r t i c a l l y below the s u r -f a c e " ( s e c . 601 of Nunavut proposal: see Kupsch 1976). These lands would be protected from encroachment and exempted from property t a x e s . There would a l s o be e s t a b l i s h e d "as a business corpora-t i o n pursuant to the laws of Canada" an I n u i t Development Cor-p o r a t i o n ( s e c . 801). The v o t i n g shares would be l i m i t e d to I n u i t Community Corporations, one share to each community c o r -p o r a t i o n . P u b l i c lands would be owned by "Her Majesty i n Right of Canada" and c o n t r o l l e d by a Land Use Planning and Management Committee d i r e c t e d by r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s from the Government of Canada, the Nunavut government, n a t i o n a l environmental and con-s e r v a t i o n a s s o c i a t i o n s of Canada, and the I n u i t T a p i r i s a t of Canada. The s e c t i o n s on e x i s t i n g a l i e n a t i o n s provide f o r e x i s t i n g leases f o r o i l , gas, and m i n e r a l s , and e x i s t i n g land-use per-mits to continue except where these a f f e c t I n u i t l a n d s , where they may be extinguished or continued subject to c o n d i t i o n s set by the l o c a l community c o r p o r a t i o n s . I n u i t who have pur-chased from governments any i n t e r e s t i n lands i n the N.W.T., - 204 -would have t h e i r purchase p r i c e s refunded; but the land r i g h t so obtained would be r e t a i n e d by the I n u i t . P r e v i o u s l y ex-i s t i n g fee simple ownership of land by non-Inuit i s not men-t i o n e d i n the proposals, presumably because such ownership i s i n s i g n i f i c a n t i n the t e r r i t o r y . The land-tenure system thus proposed by the I n u i t T a p i r i -s a t of Canada amounts to a communal-administrative type ( o r Type AB), w i t h ownership held c h i e f l y by l o c a l communities and r e g -i o n a l corporations or by the government ( o r more e x a c t l y the Crown)• Leases f o r r e s o u r c e - e x p l o i t a t i o n and land-use permits are contemplated, but not fee-simple ownership by i n d i v i d u a l s or by corporations other than the l o c a l community or r e g i o n a l c o r p o r a t i o n s . The r e s u l t i s a departure from the p r o p r i e t o r i a l concepts of the common law towards a much more a d m i n i s t r a t i v e system. Both Nunavut and Denedeh proposals c l a i m a degree of p o l i t i c a l s overeignty over the l a n d , and move i n the d i r e c t i o n of a s o r t of communal-administrative system of land-tenure r a t h e r than a p r o p r i e t o r i a l one. C l e a r l y , both the Denendeh and the Nunavut Proposals a l l o w the Dene and I n u i t to keep t h e i r t r a d i t i o n a l ideas of land and land-tenure, and a l s o to change these ideas as the peoples see f i t . The t e r r i t o r i e s or j u r i s d i c t i o n s which are thus proposed, namely Denendeh and Nuna-vut, would be very l i k e provinces under the B.N.A. Ac t , but w i t h perhaps somewhat more autonomy i n the instance of Denen-deh. Under the B.N.A. Act matters of land-tenure are already p r o v i n c i a l matters, as sec. 92, sub.sec. 13, "Property and C i v i l - 205 -Rights i n the Province," s t a t e s . Quebec, as we have already n o t i c e d , has i t s own c i v i l law, stemming from the c o n t i n e n t a l European l e g a l t r a d i t i o n and not the E n g l i s h Common Law. The Denendeh and Nunavut proposals, i f accepted by the f e d e r a l government, could be made law and Denendeh and Nunavut e s t a b l i s h e d by Parliament j u s t as A l b e r t a and Saskatchewan were e s t a b l i s h e d i n 1905. Appropriate l e g i s l a t i o n at t h a t time could define what p a r t i c u l a r laws of land-tenure were to apply. A b o r i g i n a l r i g h t s , whatever they might then be deemed to be, could be secured or provided f o r by the same l e g i s l a t i o n . Thus Canadian c o n s t i t u t i o n a l law allows f o r Dene and I n u i t ideas of land and land-tenure t o be recognized and preserved by mens of the "Prop-e r t y and C i v i l R i ghts" subsection i n the B.N.A. Act 1867, now C o n s t i t u t i o n Act 1867, s. 91 (13), by means of such j u r i s d i c -t i o n s as Denendeh and Nunavut umply, and by means of the s e l f -same a d m i n i s t r a t i v e elements i n Canadian law described i n chapter IV, s e c t i o n C From the viewpoint of Dene and I n u i t , indeed, Denendeh and Nunavut are the best s o l u t i o n , combining l o c a l c o n t r o l w i t h membership i n and p r o t e c t i o n by the l a r g e r sover-eignty of Canada. The Community Land-Holding Corporation which I am pro-posing here, however, i s a more modest p r o p o s a l . I t does not suppose that] Denendeh and Nunavut come i n t o being. I t supposes tha t the r e a l property law of the t e r r i t o r y continues to be the p r o p r i e t o r i a l system ( w i t h a d m i n i s t r a t i v e elements, admit-t e d l y ) described i n chapter IV, s e c t i o n s B and C. I t does not suppose t h a t a b o r i g i n a l t i t l e as such i s , indeed, e i t h e r recog-- 206 -ni z e d o r extin g u i s h e d , provided only t h a t the community i s recognized as having some l a n d - r i g h t s which i t or i t s members may e x e r c i s e . The CLHC as here proposed i s not p r i m a r i l y a device f o r pr e s e r v i n g a b o r i g i n a l r i g h t s or a b o r i g i n a l t i t l e . I t would, I hope, a s s i s t communities having such r i g h t s t o preserve them; but i t i s a p p l i c a b l e even i f such r i g h t s are l o s t . The CLHC i s a device f o r a l l o w i n g a community of people t o f o l l o w among themselves a p a t t e r n of land-holding d i f f e r e n t from t h a t of the l a r g e r , m a j o r i t y s o c i e t y among which the people f i n d them-s e l v e s . I t i s a device f a i r l y conformable w i t h t r a d i t i o n a l Dene and I n u i t i d e a s , and yet a l s o conforming t o the ideas of Canadian law. However, i f the Denendeh and Nunavut proposals are prob-ab l y the best a l t e r n a t i v e f o r the Dene and I n u i t , b e t t e r than the CLHC, the next a l t e r n a t i v e , the share-holding c o r p o r a t i o n , i s probably the worst — a v e r i t a b l e highroad to d e s t r u c t i o n . 2. Not a Share-Holding Corporation The community la n d - h o l d i n g c o r p o r a t i o n proposed i n the present enquiry i s not a share-holding c o r p o r a t i o n i n the modern sense. I t s purpose i s to conserve the land f o r the community and t o enable the people among themselves to f o l l o w , i f they so choose, a system of land-tenure and a conception of land d i f f e r e n t from those of the common-law t r a d i t i o n . The share-holding c o r p o r a t i o n , on the other hand, i s p r i -m a r i l y a device f o r accumulating c a p i t a l and app o r t i o n i n g con-- 207 -t r o l i n order to c a r r y out a business e n t e r p r i s e f o r p r o f i t . I t can a l s o be used as a device to l i m i t the l i a b i l i t y of share-holders to the extent of t h e i r investment i n the company. I f the e n t e r p r i s e i s r i s k y , the share system allows the rewards of s u c c e s s f u l e n t e r p r i s e to be apportioned according to the s i z e of the c a p i t a l which a shar-holder i s prepared to r i s k i n the e n t e r p r i s e . The modern business c o r p o r a t i o n , as a l e g a l e n t i t y , i s a s p e c i a l i z e d development of the common-law c o r p o r a t i o n . J The CLHC of the present enquiry harks back t o the o l d e r idea of the c o r p o r a t i o n , t o the more general mediaeval and eighteenth cen-t u r y sense s e t out i n Blackstone's Commentaries and ( t h e r e f o r e ) quoted above i n chapter f o u r , s e c t i o n B6. What might happen to a group of people, whether Dene, I n u i t , or o ther, who adopt the j o i n t - s t o c k company as t h e i r l a n d - h o l d i n g e n t i t y , i s c l e a r l y shown i n the s t o r y of the Men-omini Termination. (a) The Menomini Termination The s t o r y and s t r u c t u r e of the t e r m i n a t i o n i s set out i n L u r i e (1972), from whom t h i s summary i s l a r g e l y taken. Further i n f o r m a t i o n on the Menomini, s h o r t l y before the t e r m i n a t i o n , i s g i ven by S p i n d l e r and S p i n d l e r (1971), who a l s o d i s c u s s b r i e f l y the e f f e c t s of t e r m i n a t i o n . L u r i e describes the Menomini t e r m i n a t i o n as r e s u l t i n g i n an exact r e p l i c a t i o n of a c o l o n i a l s i t u a t i o n , w i t h the Menomini as the dependent people and the State of Wisconsin as the c o l o -- 208 -n i a l power. The f e d e r a l Bureau of Indian A f f a i r s had at l e a s t provided a b u f f e r p r o t e c t i n g the Indians from an unmanageable p e n e t r a t i o n by White i n t e r e s t s . The Bureau gave some p r o t e c t i o n to the Indian land base and i t s resources. With t e r m i n a t i o n , t h i s p r o t e c t i o n , even though imperfect, was completely withdrawn. Termination of the Menomini r e s e r v a t i o n i n northeastern Wisconsin was l e g i s l a t e d by the U.S. Congress i n June 1954, against Menomini o p p o s i t i o n and i n s p i t e of Menomini f e a r s . O r i g i n a l l y scheduled f o r 1958, t e r m i n a t i o n f i n a l l y occurred i n 1961, Because of Bureau of Indian A f f a i r s * m i s c a l c u l a t i o n s and the d e c i s i o n of Congress t h a t the Menomini should pay the costs of l e g a l experts and h a l f the expenses i n v o l v e d i n term-i n a t i o n , the t r i b a l t r e a s u r y was i n d e f i c i t when t e r m i n a t i o n became f i n a l . At t e r m i n a t i o n the r e s e r v a t i o n became a county and the t r i b e ' s land and assets were converted i n t o a c o r p o r a t i o n , Menomini E n t e r p r i s e s Incorporated ( o r MEI). At the beginning of t e r m i n a t i o n , the new county, the s m a l l e s t i n the s t a t e i n p o p u l a t i o n as w e l l as area, was owned e n t i r e l y by a singlevecorporation (MEI) w i t h one major i n d u s t r y t h a t was i n s e r i o u s f i n a n c i a l a t r a i t s . . • • I t comprised, however, a l a r g e and v a l u a b l e stand of timber and undeveloped l a k e s , creeks, and bosky d e l l s i n the heart of an important summer r e c r e a t i o n a l area. Wisconsin's view was t h a t i f t h i s new county could not put more money i n t o the s t a t e c o f f e r s than i t r e c e i v e d (a p o s s i b i l i t y a c t u a l l y contemplated at the beginning of t e r m i n a t i o n ) , i t should at l e a s t pay i t s own way. The tax schedule was s e t a c c o r d i n g l y . ( L u r i e 1972:262-263) The c o r p o r a t i o n , MEI, as the owner of the l a n d , was of course r e s p o n s i b l e f o r paying the taxes. These taxes were the county's c o n t r i b u t i o n towards e d u c a t i o n a l , law-enforcement, - 209 -and w e l f a r e s e r v i c e s which were provided by the s t a t e govern-ment or were expected to be provided by the county government. MEI was set up both t o manage the Menomini land and other assets and to p r o t e c t the Menomini from t h e i r own r e l a t i v e i g -norance of f i n a n c i a l matters. Each of the 3»280 Menomini, en-r o l l e d i n the t r i b e as of 1954, r e c e i v e d a bond w i t h a face value of $3,000 paying h1° i n t e r e s t and reaching m a t u r i t y i n the year 2000, and 100 shares of common stock. The bonds were negot i a b l e w i t h MEI having the f i r s t o p t i o n to buy them, and the stock was non-negotiable u n t i l 1973 and ne g o t i a b l e t h e r e a f t e r . However, there were two c l a s s e s of stock h o l d e r s . There were the i n d i v i d u a l a d u l t c e r t i f i c a t e h o l d e r s , and there was the l a r g e block of stock c e r t i f i c a t e s h e ld i n t r u s t by the F i r s t Wisconsin Trust Company on behalf of Menomini minors and incom-petents. At the beginning of MEI, the Trust company c o n t r o l l e d over 40% of the st o c k h o l d e r s ' vote, and by 1971 had s t i l l 15$• Because of deaths and i n h e r i t a n c e s , the 100 shares per a d u l t have become l e s s evenly d i s t r i b u t e d , some persons having more, and some l e s s , and some of the stock coming to be he l d by non-Menomini spouses. The stockholders d i d not vote d i r e c t l y f o r the Board of D i r e c t o r s , but r a t h e r f o r the MEI Common Stock and Voting Trust which t e c h n i c a l l y held the shares on behalf of the st o c k h o l d e r s . The Voting Trust e l e c t e d the Board of D i r e c t o r s who manage the c o r p o r a t i o n . The Trust became i n c r e a s i n g l y Menomini as time went on, and was set to ex p i r e i n the year 2000. The s t o c k -holders a l s o could vote at ten-year i n t e r v a l s t o a b o l i s h the - 210 -Voting T r u s t . MEI was faced at the outset w i t h severe f i n a n c i a l d i f -f i c u l t i e s . The t r i b a l t r e a s u r y had been operating at a d e f i c i t . Taxes had to be p a i d . The bonds c o n s t i t u t e d a debt which would e v e n t u a l l y have to be p a i d t o the bondholders, as w e l l as r e -q u i r i n g annual i n t e r e s t payments to the bondholders. The county's major i n d u s t r y , the s a w - m i l l , had been l e f t dangerously a n t i -quated by the BIA, and expert advice could suggest only t h a t the m i l l ' s labour f o r c e be reduced. But to reduce the labour f o r c e increased the number of people on w e l f a r e and the tax burden on the county. In order to r e d i s t r i b u t e the tax burden, and to r e t i r e the bonds w i t h a l e s s e r cash o u t l a y , MEI encouraged people to buy t h e i r homesites from the c o r p o r a t i o n . But as unemployment rose, the people who d i d t h i s could no longer pay t h e i r taxes and faced f o r e c l o s u r e . They s o l d t h e i r bonds. In a d d i t i o n , s t a t e law f o r c e d w e l f a r e r e c i p i e n t s to f o r f e i t t h e i r bonds. The r e s e r v a t i o n had had i t s own u t i l i t y company and hos-p i t a l . F o l l o w i n g the change to county s t a t u s , MEI got r i d of the t r i b a l l y owned u t i l i t y because i t was u n p r o f i t a b l e , and c l o s e d the h o s p i t a l because the c o r p o r a t i o n d i d not have the money to b r i n g the h o s p i t a l up to s t a t e requirements. F i n a l l y , i n order to meet tax requirements, MEI leased and l a t e r s o l d land to non-Menomini. Some of the l a k e s i n the area were to be developed as r e c r e a t i o n a l and home-sites and s o l d h o p e f u l l y at a p r o f i t to both- MEI and the developer. This a l s o was supposed to draw more taxpayers i n t o the county. - 211 -There were, c i r c a 1971, about 500 Menomini f a m i l i e s i n the county. The proposed land development would draw as many as 2,500 non-Menomini f a m i l i e s , w i t h decidedly higher expecta-t i o n s concerning government s e r v i c e s and t h e r f o r e comprising a pressure towards increased t a x a t i o n , thus compelling the MEI to s e l l more of the Menomini l a n d . Development t h e r e f o r e t h r e a t -ened to make the Menomini, or most of them, an impoverished m i n o r i t y d w e l l i n g on fragments of the land which had once been t h e i r s . This experience provoked the emergence, by 1970, of DRUMS, or Determination of Rights and U n i t y f o r Menomini Stockholders. This p r o t e s t movement sought to r e t u r n Menomini County to f e d e r a l j u r i s d i c t i o n , to r e s t o r e Menomini e l i g i b i l i t y f o r BIA s e r v i c e s , to rearrange the p o l i t i c a l and economic i n s t i t u t i o n s so t h a t Menomini could r u l e t h e i r own a f f a i r s , and to stop the land development and the l o s s of land to non-Menomini. As of 1972, there were prospects of q u a l i f i e d success f o r these purposes. There are a number of lessons which we may draw from the Menomini s t o r y . The most obvious, of course, concerns the r o l e of t a x a -t i o n . Once the r e s e r v a t i o n became a county and subject to the tax laws of the S t a t e of Wisconsin, a burden was placed on the people r e g a r d l e s s of whatever system of land-tenure they f o l -lowed. Taxation f o r c e d both the c o r p o r a t i o n and i n d i v i d u a l land-holders to seek money-making a c t i v i t i e s . Lack of c a p i t a l f o r c e d the c o r p o r a t i o n to f a l l back on the only resource i t had, namely l a n d , and to s t a r t s e l l i n g land t o non-Menomini as w e l l - 212 -as to i n d i v i d u a l Menomini. Lack of jobs f o r c e d Menomini who had bought land from the c o r p o r a t i o n to give up t h e i r land again t o o t h e r s . Nevertheless, the corporate ownership of the land was b e t t e r able to meet t h a t tax burden, than were the i n d i v i d -u a l homesite owners. Another f a c t o r i s the p l a c i n g of c o n t r o l of the corpora-t i o n ' s assets i n the hands of a s m a l l group of people only p a r t l y Menomini. This was done o s t e n s i b l y i n order to p r o t e c t the Meno-mini from t h e i r own ignorance of the f i n a n c i a l ways of the l a r g e r s o c i e t y . But i t s e f f e c t was t o take away from most of the Meno-mini the d e c i s i o n s over how the land was to be used, and to subject the land to non-Menomini purposes. Given f u l l Menomini c o n t r o l from the o u t s e t , the s t o r y might have been d i f f e r e n t , although the S t a t e ' s tax demands would have been much the same. The assignment of bonds and stocks to i n d i v i d u a l Menomini i n d i v i d u a l i z e s the c o r p o r a t i o n as a land-holding d e v i c e , not at the l e v e l of c o n t r o l over the land i t s e l f , but at the remoter l e v e l of c o n t r o l over the c o r p o r a t i o n . Bonds from the outset and stocks a f t e r 1973 could be s o l d t o non-Menomini as w e l l as to other Menomini. Persons who s o l d t h e i r bonds, l o s t t h e i r c l a i m t o i n t e r e s t ; persons who s o l d t h e i r stock (although the account given by L u r i e does not r e l a t e t h a t any Menomini d i d s e l l t h e i r s t o c k s ) , l o s t v o t i n g r i g h t s i n the c o r p o r a t i o n . Thus the assignment of bonds and stocks provided a way f o r u n f o r t u -nate or f i n a n c i a l l y i n e p t Menomini to l o s e t h e i r shares of the corporation's a s s e t s . - 213 -(b) The Alaska Native Claims Settlement The n o t i o n of the c o r p o r a t i o n was used a l s o i n the Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act of 1971 (Baker 1982:26ff, from whom the f o l l o w i n g account of the Settlement i s taken). The Act extinguished a l l outstanding Native claims to land or to compensation a r i s i n g e i t h e r from previous t r e a t i e s and s t a t u t e s or from a b o r i g i n a l t i t l e based on land use and occupancy, i n r e t u r n f o r a grant of money and a grant of land to p r o t e c t the ways of l i f e and f u t u r e prospects of the Native people. In p a r t i c u l a r , the Act provided the f o l l o w i n g : F i r s t , a non-taxable grant of $962.5 m i l l i o n was to be made to the Alaska N a t i v e s , p a r t l y from the f e d e r a l t r e a s u r y , and p a r t l y from a 2f? r o y a l t y on s t a t e and f e d e r a l m i n e r a l - r e -venues • Second, 40 m i l l i o n acres of land not already otherwise owned or a l l o c a t e d to s t a t e and f e d e r a l purposes, were to be granted i n fee simple ownership to Native r e g i o n a l c o r p o r a t i o n s , v i l l a g e c o r p o r a t i o n s , and i n d i v i d u a l n a t i v e s . ( I n a d d i t i o n , v i l l a g e s on e x i s t i n g reserves could r e c e i v e f u l l t i t l e to such reserves by g i v i n g up reserve s t a t u s and foregoing a l l other b e n e f i t s under the Settlement. Seven v i l l a g e corporations on f i v e reserves chosato do t h i s , and gained t i t l e t o 3«7 m i l l i o n acres•) T h i r d , twelve Native r e g i o n a l p r o f i t corporations were e s t a b l i s h e d . These r e g i o n a l corporations received sub-surface r i g h t s t o a l l the land received under the Settlement, plus f u l l - 214 -t i t l e t o more than l 6 m i l l i o n acres. The money received under the Settlement was given d i r e c t l y to the r e g i o n a l corporations on a per c a p i t a b a s i s , and these corporations were o b l i g e d ( f o r the f i r s t f i v e years) to d i s t r i -bute at l e a s t 10$ of the claims money/directly to i n d i v i d u a l s and at l e a s t 45$ to the v i l l a g e c o r p o r a t i o n s , a l s o on a per c a p i t a b a s i s . T h e r e a f t e r , 50$ or the income of the r e g i o n a l corporations was to go to the v i l l a g e c o r p o r a t i o n s . These r e g i o n a l corporations were to be set up as business c o r p o r a t i o n s , and each Native member was to r e c e i v e 100 shares. These shares could not be s o l d or t r a n s f e r r e d u n t i l December 1991. The r e g i o n a l corporations were to share w i t h other r e g i o n a l corporations 70$ of the revenues which they would r e c e i v e from timber and subsurface r i g h t s , again to be d i s t r i b u t e d on the b a s i s of per c a p i t a enrollment. These revenues were t a x a b l e . Regional corporations were i n t u r n o b l i g e d to d i s t r i b u t e 50$ of t h e i r timber and subsurface r e c e i p t s to the v i l l a g e corpora-t i o n s w i t h i n t h e i r r e g i o n s . For Natives not r e s i d i n g i n any of the twelve r e g i o n s , a t h i r t e e n t h c o r p o r a t i o n was set up. This would r e c e i v e S e t t l e -ment monies, but no l a n d . The only Natives who would not belong to a r e g i o n a l c o r -p o r a t i o n , were those who l i v e d on the reserves which received f u l l t i t l e to those reserves i n r e t u r n f o r foregoing a l l other b e n e f i t s under the Settlement. - 215 -Fourth, over 200 v i l l a g e corporations were e s t a b l i s h e d , and they r e c e i v e d a surface estate of approximately 20 m i l l i o n a c r e s . The number of acres to which a v i l l a g e was e n t i t l e d depended on the number of Natives r e s i d e n t i n the v i l l a g e . Some of t h i s land was then t o be t r a n s f e r r e d t o i n d i v i d u a l s f o r r e -sidences, businesses, and the l i k e , to p r i v a t e groups such as churches, and t o f e d e r a l , s t a t e , and muni c i p a l governments. U n t i l 1992, the v i l l a g e r s were to pay no property taxes on l a n d , unless i t were leased or developed. P a r t of the money rec e i v e d i n the Settlement by the v i l l a g e c orporations was to be f u r t h e r d i s t r i b u t e d to the i n d i v i d u a l members of the v i l l a g e c o r p o r a t i o n . Some Natives l i v e d outside the v i l l a g e s and were not members of the v i l l a g e c o r p o r a t i o n s . They were l a b e l l e