UBC Theses and Dissertations

UBC Theses Logo

UBC Theses and Dissertations

Altruism and politics MacDermid, Robert Hugh 1985

Your browser doesn't seem to have a PDF viewer, please download the PDF to view this item.

Item Metadata

Download

Media
831-UBC_1985_A1 M29_6.pdf [ 11.07MB ]
Metadata
JSON: 831-1.0096574.json
JSON-LD: 831-1.0096574-ld.json
RDF/XML (Pretty): 831-1.0096574-rdf.xml
RDF/JSON: 831-1.0096574-rdf.json
Turtle: 831-1.0096574-turtle.txt
N-Triples: 831-1.0096574-rdf-ntriples.txt
Original Record: 831-1.0096574-source.json
Full Text
831-1.0096574-fulltext.txt
Citation
831-1.0096574.ris

Full Text

ALTRUISM AND POLITICS  by ROBERT H.  MACDERMID  B.A.(Horw), C a r l e t o n U n i v e r s i t y , 1978 M.A., U n i v e r s i t y Of Essex, 1980  THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILMENT THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY in THE FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIES P o l i t i c a l Science  We accept t h i s t h e s i s as conforming to the r e q u i r e d  standard  THE UNIVERSITY OF BRITISH COLUMBIA August 1985  ©  Robert H.  MacDermid, 1985  In  presenting  this  thesis  in  partial  fulfilment  of  the  requirements for an advanced degree at the U n i v e r s i t y  of  British  Columbia,  I  it  freely  available  for  permission  agree  for  purposes may or  her  that  the  Library  shall  reference  and  study.  I  extensive  allowed without my  Department of  written  Political  Head of my  It  p u b l i c a t i o n of t h i s t h e s i s  for  is  September 4,  1985  agree  understood  permission.  Science  gain  that  that  scholarly  Department or  financial  The U n i v e r s i t y of B r i t i s h Columbia 2075 Wesbrook P l a c e Vancouver, Canada V6T 1W5  Date:  further  copying of t h i s t h e s i s for  be granted by the  representatives.  make  by  copying  shall  not  his or be  ii  Abstract The liberal  growth  of  democracies has  exercise life.  of  decreasing  p a r t l y explained  by  Locke's  contention  coercion  of the  distinguish man  can  be  be  trusted  Locke and  The  to  see  individual authority  theorists',  beyond  argues  possible  life,  h i s own  and  that  in p u b l i c  he  if  not  prevalent  and  impose  In a  in  atrophies  formal  pressure on  between  subjects'  subjects the  two  constrained,  c h o i c e s i n two  i n the  two  order,  p r e s s u r e s were d e f i n e d  it  is  a  of  an  simple altruism  of games.  demonstrable  experiments.  experiments were r e q u i r e d  alternatives  different  of  shown to be a choice a l t e r n a t i v e i n only a m i n o r i t y i s not  welfare  willingness  analysis 2 x 2  a  in p u b l i c  the  the  is  upon the c h o i c e of  noncooperative games of the  where a l t r u i s m  produced  state.  Moreover,  constraints  cannot  altruism  manifest  while  Therefore,  motivation  altruistically.  course of a c t i o n . sum  or  the  which  For  life  be  John  justice  society.  benevolence  the o p p o r t u n i t i e s  situations  may  particularly  self-interest.  spread of s t a t e a u t h o r i t y  of  the  i n d i v i d u a l s cannot provide without  in p r i v a t e  i n d i v i d u a l s to behave  The  for  r i g h t s in p r i v a t e  consumed by a l l , must be p r o v i d e d by the  reduces  variable  But  that  of  and  s t a t e of nature from c i v i l  thesis  altruistic  is  liberal  benevolent  theoretically  kinds  i n a diminished scope  others concluded that p u b l i c goods, which are  The  of  sphere  s o c i e t i e s of modern  s t a t e , those p u b l i c goods such as  the  by many and  state,  resulted  i n the  individual obligations, duties  The  life.  state authority  to choose  a 2 x 2 game where d e c i s i o n  over the payoff values  of  the  matrix.  The  decision  pressures  benevolence, competition, pressures revealed  Pareto and  of as  upon the The capable  optimality,  individual  individual the  benevolence was  represented  gains  subjects'  i n h i g h l y competitive  of s u f f i c i e n t  benevolence to provide by the s t a t e .  to the c l a s s i c a l state.  were  rationality, While  competition  the were  regression analysis, strong  influence  decisions.  f i n d i n g supports the c o n t e n t i o n  supplied  and  surprisingly  even  now  games  maximization.  by a m u l t i p l e  shown to have a  the  collective  maximization  strongest  in  The  that  i n d i v i d u a l s may  be  albeit abstract situations, some of  the  public  findings therefore  l i b e r a l argument f o r a reduced i f  goods  lend weight not  minimal  i v  Table  of  Contents  Abstract L i s t of T a b l e s L i s t of F i g u r e s Acknowledgement  ii vi vii ix  Chapter I HUMAN NATURE AND POLITICS 1.1 The S t a t e And P u b l i c Goods 1.2 Human N a t u r e : C o n t r a s t i n g V i e w s 1.3 Some O t h e r E x p l a n a t i o n s 1.4 E x p e r i m e n t a l E v i d e n c e On The P r o v i s i o n Of Goods 1 . 5 Conclusion C h a p t e r II ALTRUISM 2.1 I n t r o d u c t i o n 2.2 D e f i n i n g A l t r u i s m 2.3 A l t r u i s m , E n l i g h t e n e d 2.4 E x p l a i n i n g A l t r u i s m 2.5 C o n c l u s i o n  Egoism,  1 1 16 21 Public  And C o o p e r a t i o n  Chapter III ALTRUISM AND CONTEXT 3.1 R e c a p i t u l a t i o n 3.2 C o n s t r a i n t s On A l t r u i s m 3.3 I n s t i t u t i o n s As C o n s t r a i n t s 3.4 A l t r u i s m And The W e l f a r e S t a t e 3.5 C o n c l u s i o n C h a p t e r IV ALTRUISM IN GAMES 4.1 I n t r o d u c t i o n 4.2 Games And Game T h e o r y 4 . 3 The 2 X 2 O r d e r Of Games 4.4 A l t r u i s m In 2 X 2 Games 4 . 5 Conclusion Chapter V THE MOTIVATIONAL CONTEXT OF CHOICE 5.1 The I n f l u e n c e Of C o n t e x t 5.2 O p e r a t i o n a l i z i n g The D e c i s i o n P r e s s u r e s 5.3 The R e s u l t s Of The Lendenmann And R a p o p o r t E x p e r iment 5 . 4 Comments 5 . 4 . 1 The D e f i n i t i o n Of The P r e s s u r e s 5 . 4 . 2 The Use Of V a r i a n t s Of Game 5 . 4 . 3 The C o n f i g u r a t i o n Of P r e s s u r e s 5 . 4 . 4 A g g r e g a t i o n Of R e s p o n s e s 5 . 4 . 5 Repeated Measures  24 27  37 37 38 45 49 61  68 68 69 77 79 86  91 91 91 100 110 128  134 134 139 145 146 146 152 155 157 158  V  C h a p t e r VI AN EXPERIMENT IN CHOICE 6.1 I n t r o d u c t i o n 6.2 Some E x p e c t a t i o n s 6 . 3 The Method 6 . 4 The R e s u l t s 6.4.1 Experiment I 6 . 4 . 2 E x p e r i m e n t II 6.5 D i s c u s s i o n 6.6 C o n c l u s i o n s  164 164 168 170 172 182 188 203 205  C h a p t e r VII CONCLUSION 7.1 P a t h s Not Taken 7.2 Time And A l t r u i s m 7.3 A l t r u i s m And Government 7.4 C o n c l u s i o n  209 209 212 214 217  BIBLIOGRAPHY  222  APPENDIX  A -  TEXTS OF INSTRUCTIONS TO SUBJECTS  230  APPENDIX  B -  RESULTS OF JACKNIFE PROCEDURE  234  vi  List  of  Tables  I.  The C o n d i t i o n s Which E l i m i n a t e E a c h Game Under Assumpt i o n s  II.  The V a l u e s F i g u r e 21  of  III.  The V a l u e s F i g u r e 22  of  the  Pressures  on Column f o r  IV.  The V a l u e s  of  the  Pressures  on Row P l a y e r  V.  Regression  Analysis  of  Experiment  I  VI.  Regression Analysis Elimination  of  Experiment  I U s i n g Backward  the  Pressures  on Row f o r  the  Initial 121  Games  in 154  the  Games  in 156 178 183  185  VII.  The D i f f e r e n c e i n the P r o b a b i l i t y of C h o o s i n g A When a V a r i a b l e Assumes V a l u e s a t the E x t r e m e s of i t s Range: Experiment I 188  VIII.  Regression  Analysis  of  Experiment  II  IX.  Regression Analysis Elimination  of  Experiment  II  190 U s i n g Backward 191  X.  The D i f f e r e n c e i n the P r o b a b i l i t y of C h o o s i n g A When a V a r i a b l e Assumes V a l u e s at the E x t r e m e s of i t s Range: E x p e r i m e n t II 192  XI.  Regression Analysis w i t h MX P r e s s u r e s  of  XII.  Regression Analysis w i t h MX P r e s s u r e s  of  Experiment  II  XIII.  R e g r e s s i o n A n a l y s i s of w i t h o u t MX P r e s s u r e s  Experiment  I E x c l u d i n g Games  XIV.  R e g r e s s i o n A n a l y s i s of w i t h o u t MX P r e s s u r e s  Experiment  XV.  An A n a l y s i s  XVI.  A C o m p a r i s o n of the A t t r a c t i v e n e s s of the A l t r u i s t i c A l t e r n a t i v e When B e n e f i c i a l and When B e n e f i c i a l and Costly 202  of  Experiment  I E x c l u d i n g Games 195 E x c l u d i n g Games 196  197  Hypothetical  II  E x c l u d i n g Games 197  Choice Patterns  200  vi i  List  of  of  Private  Figures  1.  The R e l a t i o n s h i p  and P u b l i c Goods  2.  The E x t e n s i v e  Form o f a Game W i t h C o m p l e t e  3.  The E x t e n s i v e  Form o f  a Game w i t h  6  Information. 94  Incomplete  I nf ormat i o n  96  4.  Two Games  in Extensive  and S t r a t e g i c  5.  The G e n e r a l S t r a t e g i c  Form of  6.  The G e n e r a l E x t e n s i v e  Form o f a 2 x 2 Game  7.  Game #22  102  8.  Game #13  105  9.  Game #31  106  10.  Game #64  1 07  the  Forms.  2 x 2  97  Game  100 101  1 1 . Game #61  108  12.  Two Games E x c l u d e d by C o n d i t i o n I  114  13.  A Game E x c l u d e d by C o n d i t i o n II  14.  Two Games E x c l u d e d by C o n d i t i o n I I I .  118  15.  Two Games E x c l u d e d by C o n d i t i o n I V . . . . "  120  16.  Games S u r v i v i n g E l i m i n a t i o n by A l l C o n d i t i o n s Under F i r s t Set of Assumptions  123  .....116  17.  A d d i t i o n a l Games S u r v i v i n g E l i m i n a t i o n by A l l C o n d i t i o n s Under F i r s t and S e c o n d S e t s of A s s u m p t i o n s 127  18.  A 2 x 2 Game w i t h  19.  T h r e e Games w i t h U n u s u a l P a r e t o Values  20.  An I l l u s t r a t i o n  21.  T h r e e V a r i a n t s E a c h o f Two Games from Lendenmann and Rapoport  22.  of  t h e Row P l a y e r  Indifferent Optimal,  t h e A d d i t i o n of  T h r e e Games w i t h D i f f e r e n t  Pressure  Payoff  (PO)  139 Pressure 149  Values.  Configurations.  ...151  153 .156  viii  23. C o r r e l a t i o n Matrix of Independent V a r i a b l e s  174  24. The  175  Experimental  Games and Aggregated  25. C r o s s t a b u l a t i o n of the MX in Experiment I  Pressure by  Choices  Subjects'Choices 179  26. C r o s s t a b u l a t i o n of Opposing Pressures by Choice in Experiment I  181  ix  Acknowledgement I would l i k e to thank my p r i n c i p a l advisor Richard Johnston f o r his many suggestions and c o r r e c t i o n s . The a d d i t i o n a l comments of Jean Laponce and George Feaver have a l s o helped to broaden the arguments found here and to r a i s e d i f f i c u l t questions about approaches to the t o p i c . I would a l s o l i k e to thank the members of the PhD seminar f o r t h e i r many c r i t i c i s m s and encouragement. My p e r i o d of d o c t o r a l s t u d i e s was supported by a D o c t o r a l Fellowship from the S o c i a l Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada. T h i s t h e s i s owes a great deal to the Council's f i n a n c i a l assistance.  1  I.  1 . 1 The State The  HUMAN NATURE AND POLITICS  And P u b l i c Goods.  great  sprawl  of  state authority  i n the s o c i e t i e s of  modern l i b e r a l democracies i s a marked c o n t r a s t scope  and  writers. so  powers  assigned  to  the  limited  the state by c l a s s i c a l  liberal  John Locke argued that men entered c i v i l  created  the s t a t e , to gain  s e t t l e d , known Law, r e c e i v e d  with A u t h o r i t y  Wrong" ;  "a  sense,  when r i g h t , and to give  the  state  known  and  indifferent  to determine a l l d i f f e r e n c e s according to  2  the p r o t e c t i o n of l i f e  and  and allowed by common consent to be  the e s t a b l i s h e d Law" ; and a "Power Sentence  society  the b e n e f i t s o f : "an e s t a b l i s h ' d ,  1  the Standard of Right and Judge,  to  and  should  to  back  and  support  i t due E x e c u t i o n . "  property,  considered  presumably  remain  3  But beyond  in  both  the  a  narrow  s i l e n t and  impotent. Most observers of t h i s recent focus  on  the  growth  of  expansion of s t a t e  government  participation  marketplace and the extent to which i t c o n t r o l s conditions extensive as  of  exchange  within  important  as  these  particular  a u t h o r i t y are, a s i m i l a r expansion which  i t . These  and well-known that they h a r d l y  do  not  directly  involve  need  the  have  always  been  i n the  terms  and  a c t i v i t i e s are so repeating.  But  extensions of governmental has  market  occurred  considered  over  behaviour.  t h i n k i n g of r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s , o b l i g a t i o n s , d u t i e s , which  authority  matters Here I am  even  rights  as part of an i n d i v i d u a l ' s  2  private  life.  duties  to  one's  These i n c l u d e most immediately,  one's family  citizen which  Traditionally,  extend  well  beyond  the  these  private  family.  The model  of c i v i c s t e x t s has c e r t a i n moral o b l i g a t i o n s or l i e outside  h i s or  obligations  under  only  to  i t s well-  of others'  to h i s or her own behaviour, but by being  as w e l l .  v o l u n t a r i l y contributes Despite  this  The  model  citizen  in  this  way  t o the p u b l i c good.  ideal-typical  these areas of p r i v a t e by  Each  defend i t s i n t e g r i t y , to ensure i t s o r d e r l i n e s s , not  through a t t e n t i o n  vigilant  duties  the law.  c i t i z e n has an o b l i g a t i o n to h i s community to ensure being,  and  - to one's parents and c h i l d r e n - and to  acquaintances.  responsibilities  obligations  citizen,  i n r e a l i t y , many of  r e s p o n s i b i l i t y have been s t e a d i l y  the extension of governmental a u t h o r i t y ,  so that  eroded  obligations  which we once owed to others and which i n the c i t i z e n model were given f r e e l y , are now owed not to others i n a general sense to  government  are  no longer f r e e to e x e r c i s e  but  are coerced by the s t a t e  scope  in  specifically.  which  we  can  s t e a d i l y been replaced and  duties  of  a moral r e s p o n s i b i l i t y to others, into  fulfilling  exercise  goodwill  t o government which then,  individual  s t a t e does not w i e l d  of  the  it.  Thus,  the  and benevolence has  f o r us.  with  the  responsibility some a u t h o r i t y .  individual  a i d of  taxes,  I t i s hard now to imagine any and  r i g h t s over which the  In a d i s c u s s i o n  a l l e g o r y on the emergence of the s t a t e , Robert some  we  by the expanding scope of our o b l i g a t i o n s  a f f e c t s these o b l i g a t i o n s area  As a r e s u l t , i n many instances  but  r i g h t s which at f i r s t  Nozick  or perhaps itemizes  persons s e l l to  3  o t h e r s , but which e v e n t u a l l y become vested  in the s t a t e :  ...the r i g h t to decide from which persons they could buy certain s e r v i c e s (which they c a l l o c c u p a t i o n a l l i c e n s u r e r i g h t s ) ; the r i g h t to decide what c o u n t r i e s they would buy goods from (import-control r i g h t s ) ; the r i g h t to decide whether or not they would use LSD, or h e r o i n , or tobacco, or calcium cyclamate (drug r i g h t s ) ; the r i g h t to decide what p r o p o r t i o n of their income would go to various purposes independently of whether they approved of these purposes (tax rights); the right to determine their permitted mode and manner of sexual a c t i v i t y ( v i c e r i g h t s ) ; the right to decide when and whether they would f i g h t a g a i n s t and k i l l whom ( d r a f t r i g h t s ) ; the r i g h t to decide the range of p r i c e s w i t h i n which they c o u l d make exchanges (wage-price-control rights); the right to decide what grounds were i l l e g i t i m a t e in h i r i n g or s e l l i n g or r e n t i n g d e c i s i o n s ( a n t i d i s c r i m i n a t i o n r i g h t s ) ; the r i g h t to force them to p a r t i c i p a t e in the o p e r a t i o n of a j u d i c i a l system (subpoena r i g h t s ) ; the r i g h t to r e q u i s i t i o n bodily parts for t r a n s p l a n t a t i o n in the more needy ( p h y s i c a l e q u a l i t y r i g h t s ) ; and so on. 4  Many  of  considered sense. freedom  the  rights  which  Nozick  cites  may  also  be  as goods in e i t h e r or both of an e t h i c a l or economic  Despite over  the f a c t that our  own  we  affairs,  yield few  a  certain  amount  of  would argue that c o n t r o l of  v i c e i s not a good t h i n g . Many of the goods which private  goods  exchanged  in  the the  state  provides  marketplace.  example r e q u i r e s that many, i f not a l l of us production. goods. the And  Such  goods  differ  from  Democracy, f o r  cooperate  in  its  are o f t e n termed p u b l i c or c o l l e c t i v e  J u s t i c e , Hobbes argued, was  the f i r s t  good  provided  commonwealth c r e a t e d by c o n t r a c t from the s t a t e of  by  nature.  only a f t e r the p r o v i s i o n of t h i s c o l l e c t i v e good are p r i v a t e  goods p o s s i b l e : ...where there i s no Own , that i s , no P r o p r i e t y , there is no Injustice; and where there i s no c o e r c e i v e Power e r e c t e d , that i s , where there i s no Common-wealth, there i s no P r o p r i e t y ; a l l men having Right to a l l t h i n g s : T h e r e f o r e  4  where there i s no Common-wealth, there nothing i s Unjust. So that the nature of J u s t i c e , c o n s i s t e t h i n keeping v a l i d Covenants: but the V a l i d i t y of Covenants begins not but with the C o n s t i t u t i o n of a C i v i l l Power, s u f f i c i e n t to compell men to keep them: And then i t i s also that Propriety begins. 5  The  commonwealth  or  government  p u b l i c or c o l l e c t i v e goods. that of  provides  many d i f f e r e n t  Indeed the f u n c t i o n  i s so pervasive  i t i s c o n s i d e r e d by some to be an government  itself.  c o l l e c t i v e goods as p r o v i d e d at a l l  6  It  is  security  or  important  generally  justification  supposed  national  that such  defence  cannot  be  or, at l e a s t not at optimal l e v e l s by the market  alone.  7  exist  to provide goods that the marketplace e i t h e r cannot supply  For  this  reason,  i t i s o f t e n argued that  governments  or  i s unable to supply i n s u f f i c i e n t q u a n t i t i e s to meet demand.  In  some instances the market may  because not  fail  to  every i n d i v i d u a l ' s s e l f - i n t e r e s t  provide  these  goods  w i l l d i c t a t e that they  c o n t r i b u t e to the p r o v i s i o n of the good even though they  value i t s consumption. could  value  a  good  T h i s apparent paradox, that yet  may  individuals  decide not to c o n t r i b u t e towards i t s  p r o v i s i o n can p a r t l y be e x p l a i n e d by the nature of the good. P u b l i c or c o l l e c t i v e goods as w e l l as p r i v a t e goods may defined  by  two  characteristics:  jointness  n o n r i v a l n e s s ; and noncontrol over e x c l u s i o n . jointness its  and  therefore  may  A  of  supply  good  be or  exhibits  be a p u b l i c or c o l l e c t i v e good i f  consumption by one i n d i v i d u a l or group does not  reduce  the  supply a v a i l a b l e f o r consumption by other i n d i v i d u a l s or groups. For  example, my enjoyment or consumption of my r i g h t to d i s s e n t  in a democracy does not r e s t r i c t  your  enjoyment  of  the  same  5  right,  or  reduce  the supply of that  r i g h t a v a i l a b l e to others  for t h e i r consumption or enjoyment.  Whereas, i f I  choose  some good we may be able to  to  corner  the  r e s t r i c t your a b i l i t y good that  would  be  market  in  to consume the good.  a p r i v a t e one.  this  others  case,  Noncontrol over e x c l u s i o n  the producer of a good, e i t h e r an  cannot  In  and  exclude, because of the c o s t s  individual involved,  or  the means  a  group  other persons or  groups from consuming the good once i t has been produced. Both p u b l i c and p r i v a t e goods a l i k e terms  of  the  characteristics. over  exclusion  degree  may  from  attribute  MCexclu.  marginal  be  defined  consumption  jointness "cost  which  Duncan S n i d a l has  individual  Similarly,  to  f o r the  they  the  described  fulfil  the  that  good."  marginal  8  cost  He of  calls  an  this  exclusion.  as MCext.  or the  of extending consumption of a given u n i t of the 9  E i t h e r of the c o s t s ,  may range between zero and i n f i n i t y . by  goods a r e defined  introducing  two  noncontrol  MCext. = 0  and  MCexclu.  "The i d e a l - t y p e  MCexclu. =«?;  by MCext. =co and MCexclu. = O"  complete range of both p u b l i c and p r i v a t e goods can be by  in  "the cost of e x c l u d i n g  of supply may be d e f i n e d  p u b l i c good i s d e f i n e d private  be  suggested  as  of  good to an a d d i t i o n a l consumer." or MCext.  can  10  pure The  described  a further" concept, MCprod., which i s the marginal  cost of producing a f u r t h e r u n i t of e i t h e r the p u b l i c or p r i v a t e good. be  The r e l a t i o n s h i p between p r i v a t e and p u b l i c goods can now  illustrated  i n Figure  1.  6  Figure  1 - The R e l a t i o n s h i p  of P r i v a t e and P u b l i c  Goods.  CO  MCext.  pure pr i v a t e good ZONE OF PRIVATE PROVISION  ZONE OF NO PRODUCTION  MCprod -pr i v a t e good ZONE OF PUBLIC PROVISION  ZONE OF MIXED GOODS public good  pure p u b l i c good >«ao  0  MCprod  MCexclu  Source: Duncan S n i d a l , "Public Goods, Property Rights, and Political Organizations", International Studies Quarterly, vol.23 (1979), p. 543. The two quadrants of g r e a t e s t and  lower  r i g h t which d e f i n e  and p u b l i c p r o v i s i o n . in the upper  left  counterproductive consumption)." include  11  private  "no attempt w i l l control  over  quadrant, (i.e.,  goods  goods that  production  only.  to  extend  net l o s e in  exclusion  i s more  as i t does goods  are  quadrant  will  exceeds MCprod.,  over the good  since  c o s t l y than p r o v i s i o n  of the  Therefore a l l p r o d u c t i o n provision."  left  i n u n i t s of t o t a l  this  Where MCexclu.  be made to exert  i s o f t e n argued, that create  a  upper  the zones of p r i v a t e  exceeds MCprod.  "attempts  entail  Therefore  be i n terms of p u b l i c It  respectively  Where MCext.  exclusion  u n i t s themselves.  i n t e r e s t are the  in t h i s  range  will  1 2  the p a r t i c u l a r q u a l i t i e s of p u b l i c  a problem f o r t h e i r p r o v i s i o n .  1 3  I f i t i s assumed  i n d i v i d u a l s are s e l f - i n t e r e s t e d , then i t w i l l  be i n no  one  7  person's  interest  good and  to  contribute  towards the p r o v i s i o n of the  in everyone's i n t e r e s t to " f r e e - r i d e " ,  s u c c e s s f u l l y provide i t , every person  will  without  of  hindrance.  provide  Or,  if a  number  f o r i f others  be able to consume i t persons  a true p u b l i c good, there i s no way  are  its  production.  Therefore,  rational  in an economic sense,  if  none w i l l  able  f o r them to  others from i t s consumption even though they d i d not towards  all  a  contribute  i n d i v i d u a l s are  c o n t r i b u t e towards  the Thus,  world of s e l f - i n t e r e s t e d a c t o r s the p a r a d o x i c a l s i t u a t i o n  a r i s e s i n which a l l p o s i t i v e l y value a c e r t a i n p u b l i c none  to  exclude  p r o d u c t i o n of c o l l e c t i v e goods and none w i l l be s u p p l i e d . in  do  are  w i l l i n g , by reason  anything  towards  its  of i n d i v i d u a l  provision.  From  p e r s p e c t i v e , the problem i s a f a m i l i a r  good  but  logic,  to c o n t r i b u t e  less  theoretical  a  one:  Two neighbours may agree to d r a i n a meadow, which they possess i n common; because ' t i s easy for them to know each others mind; and each must p e r c e i v e , that the immediate consequence of h i s f a i l i n g to do i s part, is, the abandoning of the whole p r o j e c t . But ' t i s very d i f f i c u l t , and indeed impossible, that a thousand persons shou'd agree in any such a c t i o n ; i t being d i f f i c u l t for them to concert so complicated a design, and s t i l l more d i f f i c u l t for them to execute i t ; while each seeks a p r e t e x t to free himself of the t r o u b l e and expence, and wou'd l a y the whole burden on others . " 1  Hume, l i k e "political  many  before  and  after  him,  s o c i e t y e a s i l y remedies both these  concluded  inconveniences."  Thus .far we have spoken only of p u b l i c goods. is  the  mirror  cannot cooperate all.  The  collective  that 15  A p u b l i c bad  image of a p u b l i c good i n the sense that people to r e s t r a i n behaviour  which i s  detrimental  to  same problem e x i s t s i n c u r t a i l i n g the p r o d u c t i o n of a "bad"  as e x i s t s in producing  a  collective  good.  A  8  common  example  l o g i c holds as "that  if  is restricting pollution.  But  exactly  in the p r o v i s i o n of a c o l l e c t i v e good.  all  individuals  refrained  from  But  refraining whereas greater  one  than the  the  implication not  it  How  can  we  explain  There  are  development  but  the e x p l a n a t i o n particularly, As  was  necessity  slight, gain  that  far  community."  16  i s to show that  authority  is  individuals  which must be  in  goods, either  supplied  t h i s t r a n s f e r of r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s from  potential  explanations  wish to concentrate on only  for one,  of c l a s s i c a l  such that  a  being  liberals  and  in John Locke's Second T r e a t i s e of Government. stated  in  the opening paragraph, Locke f i n d s  of government in the absence from the law,  comparison  place where men  very  state.  an  execute sentences p r e s c r i b e d  and  assumed  found in the w r i t i n g s  established  in  continue  state?  several I  certain  the p r o v i s i o n of p u b l i c  supply v o l u n t a r i l y but  i n d i v i d u a l to the  nature  is  every  a  doing A makes a personal  with is  through the agency of the  an  loss  i n c u r s as a member of the  concerned  A,  l e s s one  aimless spread of governmental  cannot or w i l l  of  individuals  community  individual l o s s he  primarily  which by  the  all  purpose of t h i s d e f i n i t i o n a l d i g r e s s i o n  the apparently fact  if  from doing A,  the  The  now  same  Suppose.,  doing  i n d i v i d u a l as a member of the community would d e r i v e advantage.  the  to  s t a t e of  i m p a r t i a l judge, and by the  law.  But  Hobbes' c h a o t i c  have " p e r f e c t Freedom to  dispose of t h e i r Possessions, and  order  nature  the power to  Locke's  fiction  the  state  of  is a bucolic  their  Actions,  Persons as they t h i n k f i t  9  w i t h i n the Laws of Nature, upon the w i l l a  state  without  of any other man."  of e q u a l i t y  r e c i p r o c a l , no one  "wherein  17  f o r he  himself,  and  leave,  18  But while man  freedom does not  i s bound by the law of nature "when  h i s own  license  first  of and  Mankind."  19  While most men  nature, some men ...  doing  punishment,  in accordance  hurt to one a n o t h e r . "  be Executioner  of  those  2 0  the  Law  of  Nature."  21  that  of  "Punishing 2 3  to  with the laws others  Rights  To preserve one's  R e s t r a i n t , and p r e v e n t i n g the l i k e O f f e n c e " , right  rest  life  hath a Right to punish the Offender,  the i n j u r e d p a r t y " , and  the  the  The  rights  "of t a k i n g r e p a r a t i o n , which belongs 2 2  any  P r e s e r v a t i o n comes not in  i n e v i t a b l y turn to " i n v a d i n g  and property "every Man to  live  self-preservation  is  to preserve  c o m p e t i t i o n , ought he, as much as he can, to preserve of  depending  T h i s s t a t e of freedom i s a l s o  having more than a n o t h e r . "  second,  or  a l l the Power and J u r i s d i c t i o n i s  f r e e i n the s t a t e of nature, t h i s behaviour  asking  and  second  the  and of  only to  crime  for  derive f i r s t  from  from  the  right  everyman has to preserve mankind. The c h i e f men  may  inconvenience of the s t a t e of nature  be judges of t h e i r own  i s that  all  t r a n s g r e s s i o n s s i n c e there i s no  common m a g i s t r a t e on e a r t h to appeal t o : To t h i s strange D o c t r i n e , v i z . That i n the S t a t e of Nature, every one has the E x e c u t i v e Power of the Law of Nature, I doubt not but i t w i l l be o b j e c t e d , That i t is unreasonable f o r Men to be Judges i n t h e i r own Cases, that S e l f - l o v e w i l l make Men p a r t i a l to themselves and their Friends. And on the other s i d e , that 111 Nature, Passion and Revenge w i l l c a r r y them too f a r i n p u n i s h i n g others. And hence nothing but Confusion and D i s o r d e r w i l l f o l l o w , and that t h e r e f o r e God hath c e r t a i n l y appointed Government to restrain the p a r t i a l i t y and v i o l e n c e of Men. I easily grant that C i v i l Government i s the proper Remedy f o r the Inconveniences of the State of Nature, which must c e r t a i n l y  OJ  1o be Great, where Men may be Judges i n t h e i r own Case, since ' t i s e a s i l y to be imagined, that he who was so unjust as to do h i s Brother an I n j u r y , w i l l scarce be so j u s t as to condemn himself f o r i t . . . " 2  Men  therefore  create  agree  to  a common a u t h o r i t y  enter  civil  to which they w i l l a l l submit.  While Locke does not s t a t e enter  civil  c l e a r that  s o c i e t y t o gain  an e s t a b l i s h e d  s o c i e t y by consenting to  clearly  that  the b e n e f i t s  that  civil  society,  goods  nature.  goods  which  We may i n f e r from t h i s that i n  individuals  which d i s t i n g u i s h c i v i l  into  providing  tendency  theory of the trend of  governments  goods from i n d i v i d u a l s .  to  we  the  s o c i e t y from the s t a t e of  Thus, we have at l e a s t the beginnings of an  in l i b e r a l  are  men grant t h e i r power to the s t a t e so  i t may be used to coerce  public  noted  at  the  explanation  outset:  take over the p r o v i s i o n  the  of p u b l i c  2 5  We may w e l l ask why Locke thought that men i n the s t a t e nature The the saw  were incapable of p r o v i d i n g  answer i s not c l e a r liberal  interest,  as  of human nature.  capable  of  moments.  goods. to  Locke as others,  benevolence  and  self-  For example, he quotes a p p r o v i n g l y  Hooker's d e r i v a t i o n of a n a t u r a l in private  inducement,  both  of  i f not i n equal measure on a l l o c c a s i o n s , at l e a s t at  c e r t a i n appropriate  charity  the necessary p u b l i c  i n Locke's w r i t i n g but i t i s r e l a t e d  interpretation  human nature  to  judge, and the power  to execute sentences under the law are p u b l i c  entering  consent  of p u b l i c goods, i t i s  law, an i m p a r t i a l  absent from the s t a t e of nature.  men  hath  life  based on  brought  i n c l i n a t i o n towards j u s t i c e and equality:  Men to know that  "The  like  natural  i t i s no l e s s t h e i r  Duty, t o Love others than themselves, f o r seeing  those  things  11 are  equal,  must needs a l l have one measure..."  26  But while  can be expected to be benevolent towards each other life,  in  public  life  they are presumably  beyond  punishment  l e g i t i m a t e bounds: "though the Law  be p l a i n and i n t e l l i g i b l e to a l l being b i a s s e d by t h e i r  rational  and  of Nature  Creatures;  yet  Men  I n t e r e s t , as well as ignorant f o r want of  study of i t , are not apt to allow of i t as a Law in  private  s e l f - i n t e r e s t e d , for  they cannot be t r u s t e d not to pursue c l a i m s f o r reparation  in  binding to them  the a p p l i c a t i o n of i t to t h e i r p a r t i c u l a r C a s e s . "  27  Or:  "Men  being p a r t i a l to themselves, Passion and Revenge i s very apt carry  them  too f a r , and with too much heat i n t h e i r own  as w e l l as n e g l i g e n c e , and unconcernedness, remiss, in other Mens." This  assertion,  is  make  Cases;  them  that  "How  opening  selfish  too  benevolence can only be expected i n i s to  be  expected  in  public  a l s o common to both David Hume and Adam Smith.  c o u l d w r i t e i n the that:  to  to  28  p r i v a t e l i f e while s e l f - i n t e r e s t life,  men  of  soever  the man  Smith  Theory of Moral Sentiments maybe  supposed,  e v i d e n t l y some p r i n c i p l e s i n h i s nature, which  there  interest  are  him  in  the  fortunes of o t h e r s , and render t h e i r happiness necessary to  him,  though he d e r i v e s nothing from i t , except the  seeing  it."  emphasized has it  almost  2 9  But  in  The Wealth of N a t i o n s ,  the primacy of s e l f - i n t e r e s t  over  p l e a s u r e -of he  repeatedly  benevolence:  "man  constant occasion f o r the h e l p of h i s b r e t h r e n , and  i s v a i n f o r him to expect i t from t h e i r benevolence o n l y .  w i l l be more l i k e l y love  to p r e v a i l  i f he can  interest  their  i n h i s favour, and show that i t i s f o r t h e i r own  He  self-  advantage  12 to  do f o r  him what  he  benevolence  of  expect  dinner,  our  interest." is the  3 0  the  David  an " i n s t i n c t love  public  of  is  of  butcher, but  them  the  from  an  to  important  It  is  or  the  regard  to  brewer,  agreed  implanted  and k i n d n e s s  ...  their  Hume l i k e w i s e  originally  life  life  requires  that  not  reason  3 1  for  ,  their  while  its  the  the  baker t h a t  i n our n a t u r e s  children"  from  we own  benevolence s u c h as  ...  absence  from  establishment  of  government: N o t h i n g i s more certain, than that men are, in great measure, govern'd by interest, and t h a t even when t h e y e x t e n d t h e i r c o n c e r n beyond t h e m s e l v e s , 'tis not to any great distance; nor i s i t u s u a l f o r them, i n common l i f e , to look farther than their nearest friends and acquaintance. 3  And u s e d  this  as  2  a justification  of  the  state:  Men a r e not a b l e r a d i c a l l y t o c u r e , e i t h e r i n t h e m s e l v e s or o t h e r s , the n a r r o w n e s s of s o u l , w h i c h makes them p r e f e r t h e present to the remote. They c a n n o t change t h e i r n a t u r e s . A l l t h e y can do i s change t h e i r s i t u a t i o n , and render the observance of justice the immediate interest of some p a r t i c u l a r p e r s o n s , and i t s v i o l a t i o n t h e i r more remote. These p e r s o n s , t h e n , a r e not o n l y i n d u c ' d t o o b s e r v e t h o s e r u l e s i n t h e i r own c o n d u c t , but a l s o t o c o n s t r a i n o t h e r s t o a l i k e r e g u l a r i t y , and i n f o r c e t h e d i c t a t e s of e q u i t y t h r o ' t h e whole s o c i e t y . And i f i t be n e c e s s a r y , t h e y may also interest others more immediately in the execution of justice, and create a number of officers, civil and m i l i t a r y , t o a s s i s t them i n t h e i r g o v e r n m e n t . 3 3  The  liberal  interpretation  b o t h S m i t h and Hume a n d l e s s second  order  explanation  clearly  of  the  the  p u b l i c goods w h i c h d i s t i n g u i s h  of  nat-ure.  public  life,  expected  to  Simply put, overcome contribute  the  their to  of  human n a t u r e , in  need  Locke, for  civil  argument  is  society  states  p r o v i s i o n of  evident a  government  own s e l f - i n t e r e s t  the  as  the  kind to  from the  that  state  cannot  necessary  of  provide  men c a n n o t  and t h u s  in  in be  public  13 goods. Whether Locke meant these arguments to form a for  justification  the expanding scope of s t a t e a u t h o r i t y , or whether they have  simply  been  taken  arguments may  as  still  a  be questioned  _..-F-irst, while Locke government clear  its  from The  goods  in  of  role  the  into c i v i l  property.  appears  upon,  find  a  justification  society.  One  public  such  example  is  the  to  right  to  that "Whatsoever then he removes left  i t i n , he  joyned to i t something  that  is  thereby makes i t h i s P r o p e r t y . " ' In the s t a t e of  "a Man  had a Right to a l l he  he had  no temptation  This l e f t  no  Title,  nor  a  carved to h i m s e l f , was  could  imploy  his  Labour  to labour for more than he c o u l d  room  for  Controversie  about  the  f o r Incroachment on the Right of o t h e r s ; what P o r t i o n e a s i l y seen; and  i t was  w e l l as d i s h o n e s t to carve himself too much, or take he  of  3  and  make use o f .  Man  grounds.  the S t a t e that Nature hath provided, and  so  the  s t a t e of nature p r i o r to man's consent  Locke w r i t e s of man,  own,  nature,  to  this action,  of p r o v i d i n g p u b l i c goods, i t i s a l s o  hath mixed h i s Labour with, and his  on two  for  Second T r e a t i s e that v o l u n t a r i l y provided  exist  enter  out  in  justification  needed."  35  The  uselessness  u s e l e s s as more  than  of a p p r o p r i a t i n g more property  from the common than one c o u l d use to s a t i s f y one's need l e d the  creation  of  a second p u b l i c good.  In a s o c i e t y where a l l  t r a n s a c t i o n s are i n the form of b a r t e r , accumulation by  spoilage.  "Now  is  limited  T h i s l i m i t a t i o n l e d to the agreement that a l l men  should f i x a value i n some p r e c i o u s currency:  to  objects,  or  to  of those good t h i n g s which Nature hath  create  a  provided  1 4  in  common, e v e r y  as  one had a R i g h t  he c o u l d u s e ,  with h i s  Labour:  from t h e  State  they  look  that  than  his  all  that  of  Money,  the  Goods as  lasting  and t h a t  truly  men  at  thing  great  public  good  is  from  voluntary  act:  "Voluntary  to  them i n t h e  Natural  Liberty,  and  puts  comfortable, in a secure  Security  against  appear  self-interested  safe,  might  keep in  that  3  Life." -  7  itself,  subsequent  goods  creation  for  the  public  of  justice state  gives  the  second,  Benefit of  of  bonds of  their  a r e not  their of  concern for p r o t e c t i o n  a  viz.  Subjects,  their Properties."  Civil  of  Society  living  one  3 8  his is  by for  amongst  P r o p e r t i e s and a g r e a t e r  it."  form c i v i l  are  as  i n t o a Community,  peaceable  the that  the  j o y n and u n i t e and  goods  of  and use  on t h e  men m i g h t  exchange  state  of  use  without  the  Enjoyment o f  any t h a t  more  came i n the  "The o n l y way whereby anyone d e v e s t s h i m s e l f  another,  first  took  c o e r c i o n of  Possession  a g r e e i n g w i t h o t h e r Men t o their  he  the  Agreement  Power t o G o v e r n o u r s  And a g a i n :  else  without  the  Political secure  to  other  the c r e a t i o n  Locke c l e a r l y sees  gathered  two  providing  the  alter  He was o n l y  Men would t a k e  of  to  gathered.  Men  consent  to,  affect  in  "And t h u s  that  length  which  he c o u l d  much  had t h e r e b y a P r o p e r t y  spoiled; 3 6  t o as  He t h a t  but p e r i s h a b l e S u p p o r t s of  a r e c a p a b l e of  The f i r s t  that  was h i s .  soon as they  by m u t u a l  useful,  state.  enabled.  in,  and r o b b ' d o t h e r s . "  Locke w r i t e s which  it  Acorns or A p p l e s ,  were h i s  some  in a l l  said)  Industry could extend  he u s e d them b e f o r e  spoiling, for  his  N a t u r e had put  share,  h a t h been  and had a P r o p e r t y  a Hundred B u s h e l s of them;  (as  3 9  While  society of  their  it  solely  may out  property,  at of  a in  15 doing  so,  they  "give  Power  they  had i n  the  Society,  to  be  so  society  shall  his  entry  civil  withdraw its  their  duty  to  revert ...  to  the  But  if  Legislative, Assembly, those  society,  consent  gave  reverts  to  the  is  at  Power  in  upon  and t h e  People  and c o n t i n u e  the  Legislative  new F o r m ,  o r under the  old  form p l a c e  g o o d . In  final  were  provision  of  capable  doing  the  of  second,  coercive  cannot is  public so p r i o r  they of  basis  were the of  be b e n e v o l e n t  correct  that  two  lasts their  Person,  or  Forfeiture the  of  Time s e t ,  a Right  to  in themselves, it  never  M i s c a r r i a g e s of  it  act  as  or e r e c t  a  i n new h a n d s ,  examples Locke c l e a r l y  capable  a  powers  On t h e  have  can  as  they  1  these  individuals  of  in  every  Society  the  Determination  it,  men  fails  D u r a t i o n of  when by the  good  up upon  that  any  of  when  which  the  the  given  into  the  forfeited;  as  Power  to  Supreme,  think  as  hands  as  regime  "The  Limits  Or e l s e  the  Society,  man has reclaim  long  Supreme  temporary:  or  also  Executive  the  Legislative  But what  as  and  into  when he e n t e r e d  set  the  it  by t h e  0  again,  have  and made  Rulers,  of  he may  Society,  they  Nature,  individual:  Individuals  in A u t h o r i t y ,  their  of  from a p a r t i c u l a r  the  the  only  Equality, Liberty,  require...""  protect  individual  State  far disposed  of  to  up t h e  of  voluntary  good. to  In  the  able  to  cooperation  the  creation  imagined  first of  provide  the the  that  in  case,  they  state,  the were  and  in  good d e s p i t e  the  state.  the  previous  in p u b l i c  points,  life  p u b l i c goods c a n n o t  the  view  seems i n c o r r e c t . be  provided  or  that For i f cannot  men it be  16 provided  in  adequate  amounts through s e l f - i n t e r e s t alone, then  no p u b l i c goods would e x i s t we  might  conclude  that  behaviour even i n p u b l i c arguments  i n the s t a t e of nature. men  are capable of n o n s e l f - i n t e r e s t e d  life.  Michael  that  the  about  human nature that have much in  interpretation. voluntarily the  lake  They  so  "coercion  on;  is  common  2  and  from k i l l i n g  This  seems  with  suggested assumptions  the  liberal  whales,  not  polluting  they w i l l not v o l u n t a r i l y abide by  T h i s assumption  necessary  leads to the  state.""  conclusion  (or that people w i l l agree to be  c o e r c e d ) , and that the only e f f e c t i v e means strong, c e n t r a l i z e d  has  assume, he w r i t e s , that "people w i l l  agreements to do so.'"' that  Taylor  of e n v i r o n m e n t a l i s t s r e l y upon  r e s t r a i n themselves and  Therefore,  of  coercion  is  a  3  a round about  way  of a r r i v i n g at a r e a l i z a t i o n  which others have made an assumption  about  human nature.  1.2 Human Nature: C o n t r a s t i n g Views.  The d i v i d e d theorists  conflicts  doctrines. charity,  Most  of with  religions  sympathy  o t h e r s who life;  view  and  a  human that hold  nature of  other  such  as  for  worthy  of  salvation  or  anarchism,  communism,  and  at And  liberal  and sacred actions  as  o t h e r s (or those  are b e l i e v e r s ) to be important f a c e t s of  that  by  secular  benevolent  consideration  C h r i s t i a n i t y abounds i n such t e a c h i n g s . such  espoused  the  proper  l e a s t of emulation. secular  socialism  all  doctrines recommend  1 7  v o l u n t a r y uncoerced exchange, compassion only  imaginable  society.  in  a  Moreover,  perfectly  the b e l i e f  as s e l f - i n t e r e s t e d as he has frequently  in  Utopian  nonegoistic,  or  altruistic  or perhaps hope that man  sometimes  literature.  s o c i e t y , Raphaell H i t h l o d a y e i n  and e q u a l i t y , which are  been In  More's  painted describing  Utopia  i s not  surfaces Utopian  emphasizes  the  n o n s e l f - i n t e r e s t e d m o t i v a t i o n s of i t s c i t i z e n r y : ... to go about to l e t another man of h i s p l e a s u r e , whiles thou p r o c u r e s t t h i n e own, that i s open wrong. Contrary wyse to withdrawe somethinge from the selfe to give to others, that i s a p o i n t of humanitie and g e n t i l n e s s : whiche never taketh awaye so muche commoditie, as i t b r i n g t h e agayne. For i t i s recompensed with the retourne of benefytes; and the c o n s c i e n c e of the good dede, with the remembraunce of the t h a n k f u l l love and benevolence of them to whom though hast done i t , doth br.inge more p l e a s u r e to thy mynd, than that which thou has withholden from thy s e l f e c o u l d have brought to thy bodye.""  This  yearning  for a society  the family extend beyond i t , literature experiment  and  it  limited  to  are  motivations.  stocked  frequent  theme  exotic.  with  and  appeals  to  frequently  their  intended to achieve e q u a l i t y . to  us  by  Interest  to buy domestic  claiming groups  or  some  particular  political  Governments that they are  are  constantly  r a t h e r than cheaper  goods, or to boycott some n a t i o n ' s products, or outlets,  good.  it  i n d i v i d u a l s are urged  f o r the good of the community. actions  of  nonself-interested  to exert themeselves  appealling  Utopian  communitarians,  But p o l i t i c s and  In times of n a t i o n a l c r i s e s ,  justify  in  If t h i s o p t i m i s t i c assessment Utopians  j u s t i f i a b l y be termed  rhetoric  a  almost c e r t a i n l y the aim of every b r i e f  i n communal l i v i n g .  human nature was might  is  is  i n which the bonds t y p i c a l of  some  imported company's  Clearly, this rhetoric is  1 8  based upon the assumption persuaded immediate  to  act,  in  that a  i n d i v i d u a l s can a c t ,  manner  which  and p o l i t i c i a n s a l i k e are no  be  c o n t r a r y to t h e i r  nature  than  are  the e x h o r t a t i o n s of Utopians  more  the  meaningful  bleak  not  submit  descriptions  assessments  provide of mens' motivations i n p u b l i c need  can  self-interest.  But a f t e r a l l i s s a i d , perhaps  human  is  or  life.  Hume and  of  Smith  Fortunately,  e n t i r e l y to e x h o r t a t i o n s to a r r i v e at  we  reasons  for a s o c i e t y based on n o n e g o i s t i c motives. Serge-Christophe Kolm" for  individuals  to  5  has advanced a c o n v i n c i n g  r e j e c t a s o c i e t y where a l l of i t s members'  a c t i o n s are based on s e l f - i n t e r e s t base  their  actions  individual's  society  upon  f o r one where a l l i n d i v i d u a l s  altruistic  concerns  choice  so  that,  "an  w i l l be c o n s i d e r e d e g o i s t i c or a l t r u i s t i c  i f a l l o t h e r s in i t are e g o i s t s or a l t r u i s t s . " " hypothetical  argument  experiment  where  6  He  imagines  a  a l l i n d i v i d u a l s whether  guided t o t a l l y by a l t r u i s m or egoism must choose between  living  in  or  a  society  where  all  others are wholly a l t r u i s t i c ,  where a l l others are wholly e g o i s t i c . altruistic  society  would be chosen  Kolm  reasons  that  the  by a l l i n d i v i d u a l s be,  they  e i t h e r e g o i s t s or a l t r u i s t s , because both e g o i s t s and  altruists  would probably secure a l a r g e r share of the goods produced altruistic  one  s o c i e t y than they would be assured of i n an  i n an  egoistic  society. Let us assume a c e r t a i n q u a n t i t y of goods to be divided between these a l t r u i s t s and egoists. On the whole, on average, and other t h i n g s being equal, the a l t r u i s t s tend to give more and the e g o i s t s tend to take more. For t h i s reason, e g o i s t s normally tend to have more than i f everyone were e g o i s t i c or i f they themselves were a l t r u i s t i c , and  1 9  altruists tend to have less than i f everyone were a l t r u i s t i c or i f they themselves were e g o i s t i c . Hence i f the i n d i v i d u a l i s a l t r u i s t i c among e g o i s t s , he tends to get a smaller share (and others a l a r g e r one) than he would i f he were an e g o i s t among e g o i s t s , an a l t r u i s t among altruists, or an e g o i s t among a l t r u i s t s . And i f the i n d i v i d u a l i s e g o i s t i c among a l t r u i s t s he tends to get a l a r g e r share (and the others a smaller one) than i f he were an e g o i s t among e g o i s t s , an a l t r u i s t among a l t r u i s t s , or an a l t r u i s t among e g o i s t s . " 7  The  expression of benevolence  in p u b l i c l i f e  t h e o r e t i c a l p o s s i b i l i t y or a Utopian dream. examples  of  behaviour both  charitable,  i n everyday  money  groups;  and  life.  time  political  philanthropic, For  example,  i s not just a  There a r e or  even  service  altruistic  individuals  to a wide range of causes: parties;  numerous  donate  environmental  clubs;  fraternal  organizations; hospital a u x i l i a r i e s ; public t e l e v i s i o n ;  cultural  groups; c h a r i t i e s ; blood banks; t r a d e s unions; campaigns a g a i n s t disease;  and  8  so on." American  Public Television  s t a t i o n s with  v o l u n t a r y c o n t r i b u t i o n s from some viewers, p r o v i d e a good is  very  nearly  wildlife public,  an  lobbies,  ideal  once  which  p u b l i c good; many environmental and  again  using  contributions  p r o v i d e a good which can be consumed by a l l ;  from  the  anyone who  has toured e i t h e r the B r i t i s h seacoast or B r i t i s h pubs w i l l know that  the  Royal  exclusively  National  Lifeboat  by p r i v a t e d o n a t i o n s .  Institution  is  financed  Even more f a m i l i a r are those  p u b l i c goods such as medical r e s e a r c h and the d o n a t i o n of for  transfusion.  vote  to  Perhaps  l e s s obvious i s the f a c t  citizens  support welfare payments f o r the poor, and can even be  convinced of the importance While  that  blood  many  of  these  of saving f o r f u t u r e  activities  generations."  9  may be e x p l a i n e d i n terms of  20  self-interest, always  this  convincing.  subscription enjoy  to  watching  counter give  of  always  that and  be  formal  case, you  is  I was  might  drama  the  series.  But I  be  simply  explained  able  that  to  my  because  still  hospital  argument  argue  self-interested,  I  could  I  would  indulge  my  worker's motives  in  desperate.  institutionalized  satisfactorily  is  really  a volunteer sounds  nor  self-interested  old British  would  Explaining  in  the  example,  if I  self-interest  Even  always  For  r e r u n s of  by s a y i n g  weaknesses.  not  Public Television  nothing,  terms  is  politics,  i n terms  of  behaviour  cannot  self-interest.  In p o l i t i c a l l i f e , noneconomic a n d / o r nonegoistic motives seem to be even more important. Self-interest cannot e x p l a i n even the v e r y b a s i c f a c t t h a t many p e o p l e c h o o s e t o vote at election time at the cost of some personal inconvenience, even though their chances of obtaining personal benefits, as a result of their voting are virtually nil. Likewise, for better or for worse, voluntary party workers often seem to be motivated primarily by ideological c o n t r a i n t s r a t h e r t h a n by s e l f i n t e r e s t (or even by t h e i r p a r t y ' s i n t e r e s t i n w i n n i n g the next e l e c t i o n ) . I n d e e d , even some p r o f e s s i o n a l p o l i t i c i a n s do not seem to be wholly immune t o the t e m p t a t i o n of sacrificing self-interest to i d e o l o g y . No l e s s o b v i o u s is the importance of noneconomic and n o n e g o i s t i c m o t i v e s i n social activities outside the economic and political fields. 5 0  The p a r a d o x o f defies  adequate  Howard  his with  explanation  Margolis  implausibility personal  5 1  assume t h a t  has  of  One  of  is  i n terms  written,  supposing  utility  millions  effort."  participation  gain  other  solution  that  one of  this  of  self-interest paradox  voters  i n d i v i d u a l s vote  the  to  vote  justifies failure  from a s e n s e  of  of  the  citizen  As  on  find  i n an  any  which  alone.  "turns  a r a t i o n a l man w i l l  from b o t h e r i n g  to  those problems  the that  election  significant theory duty.  is  to  But,  21  this  "kind of  predict  theorizing  nothing."  something  about  altruistic  "A  what  acts."  There  5 2  are  is  able  nontrivial  governs  the  that  small,  the  is  voting  to  other  costs  likely be  unrelated  the  to  of  1.3  is  provided interest  to  so  of  small  outweigh  will  or  getting  have  duty  to  but  to  say  perform  or,  a r o u n d the  is  to  one  any  however  benefit,  by a l l o w i n g  the  possible  to  explain  which a l l  of  can  act  wants  of  totally  p l e a s e my w i f e " ,  without  problem  self-interest:  self-interested  did it it  of  that  them;  of  "I  Finally,  o r some  voting us  in  would,  5  be worse  off. "  explain  temporarily  for  some k i n d of  Margolis  writes,  by  "back of  interested. altruism  to  by  motivation."  Some  are  politics,  tempting  paradoxes  the  everything  Some O t h e r E x p l a n a t i o n s .  It  As  for  i n terms  m a i n t a i n i n g democracy,  presumably,  theory  taste  strategies  satisfaction  such e x p l a n a t i o n . terms  explain  5 3  and p r e s e r v i n g an e x p l a n a t i o n argue  to  to  But  the  the  is  not  at  wonders  explain  explanations  we  need not  the  existence  of  their  of  or  all  even  hard to  scope  whether  hand" w h i c h assumed  Moreover,  all  sufficient  public  assumption  group m o t i v a t i o n ,  "it  one  where  deserting  allowing  5 5  cases  this  do  not  self-  altruism. these  to fall  is  simply  be  self-  back upon  p u b l i c or c o l l e c t i v e  provision  are  altruistic  solution  necessarily  of  resolve  for  behaviour  goods  require  goods. that  22  altruistic best  motivations  known  of  contribute  toward  b e c a u s e of provided,  these  the but  attributed  is  the  benefit also  be  Olson's  provision they  b e c a u s e of  their  argument of  derive  to  that  a collective  from t h a t  other  providers.  individuals good not  good  selective  The  should  only  it  be  incentives.  Only a s e p a r a t e and " s e l e c t i v e " i n c e n t i v e -wi11 s t i m u l a t e a r a t i o n a l i n d i v i d u a l i n a l a t e n t group to act in a group oriented way. In such c i r c u m s t a n c e s g r o u p a c i o n c a n be obtained only through an incentive that operates, not indiscriminately, l i k e the c o l l e c t i v e g o o d , upon the g r o u p as a w h o l e , but r a t h e r s e l e c t i v e l y t o w a r d the individuals in the group. The i n c e n t i v e must be " s e l e c t i v e " so t h a t t h o s e who do not j o i n the organization working for the group's interests, or in other ways c o n t r i b u t e t o the attainment of the group's interest, can be treated differently from those who do. These "selective i n c e n t i v e s " may be e i t h e r n e g a t i v e or positive, in that they c a n e i t h e r c o e r c e by p u n i s h i n g t h o s e who f a i l t o bear an a l l o c a t e d s h a r e of t h e c o s t s of the group action, or they can be p o s i t i v e i n d u c e m e n t s o f f e r e d t o t h o s e who a c t i n the g r o u p interest. 5 6  A number of of  the  other  p r o v i s i o n of  writers  collective  entrepreneurs.  An  individuals  that  a public  worth t h e i r  u n d e r w r i t i n g the  if  the  goods,  p r o d u c t i o n of the  potential  the  entrepreneur  Entrepreneurs  converting  an  or c o e r c e A  good  is  is  be a b l e  cost good to  also  failure  g r o u p s may g r a n t  of  problem  political  convince  them t h a t  some it  production.  requires  some  employ  to  Or,  from  win t h e  supply  extortion,  thus  contribute  an e n t r e p r e n e u r  is  private  contributions  thereby  to  the  by  to  to  its  secure  hoping  may  overcome  so v a l u a b l e  entire  each  suggested that  may  public  individual's  individual  more  goods  may be a b l e  contractors,  Finally,  have  entrepreneur  contract.  bad.  5 7  the  into  a public  power  to  tax  free-riders.  speculative  theory  is  put  forward  in  Albert  23  Hirschman's  essay  Public  5  a  Act i o n .  pendulum  of  environmental  these  It  in turn  with  action  does  or  even p o s s i b l e , of  be  a  is  collective  the  to  tie  may v e r y w e l l exclusion  signal  of  paradox  of  the the for  is  very  private  questionable public  explain  these goods.  whether goods  supplies.  the  based  goods.  the  of  5 9  Showing  as  written  that  while  second  and p r i v a t e the  tied-in  example  a  but  assumption  explanation not  for  necessarily  contribute theories  to  may be  some p u b l i c g o o d s , the  of  advertisers.  these  it  p r o v i s i o n of  those  which  the  state  individuals  can  behave  justice, that  a  p u b l i c good  individuals  can e x p l a i n  such  such  of  the  A l t r u i s m need  But,  them a n d ;  for  good,  plausible  why  often  the  i m p l i c i t l y on t h e  a  of  from  p r o d u c t i o n of  of  each  disappointing.  has  a perfect  as  because  prohibitive,  He c i t e s  the  such  its  exclusion  not  p r o v i s i o n of  they  may be  like  as  of  undermines  incentives  collective  in understanding  meet  consumption  nearly  offers  p r o v i s i o n of  not  collective  possible."  actors,  to  is  pursuit  H a r o l d Demsetz  of  theories,  self-interest  presently  good  exist  is  which  these  self-interested  essential  cost  in  consumption  p r o v i d e d by the  helpful  if  such  maintained  the  corruption  produced p r i v a t e l y .  with  Each  is  is  the  television  replace  pattern  and  swing  and p u b l i c a c t i o n s ,  is  good b e c a u s e  the  public  Interest  concerns  interests,  once a t t a i n e d  incentives  the  The  disappointed  may be p o s s i b l e  product  private  or m a t e r i a l p u r s u i t s  goods t o  of  concerns.  Private  individuals'  welfare,  aspirations,  consumption  which  purely  involvements:  private  Involvements:  that  material  become  unrealistic  "it  He a r g u e s  between  enhancement  actors  8  Shifting  24  altruistically the  however,  provision  usefulness  of  of  offers  public  those  a more  goods,  theories  general  but  it  explanation  does not  discussed  in  for  diminish  the  the  preceding  paragraphs.  1.4  Experimental  The been  E v i d e n c e On The P r o v i s i o n  discussion  solely  at  of  the  nonegoistic  level  of  actions  aggregate  observed  that  certain collective  aid  of  the  state  this  that  goods  or g o v e r n m e n t ,  i n d i v i d u a l s were not  Of P u b l i c  has  Goods.  to  this  behaviour.  point  It  was  were p r o d u c e d w i t h o u t  and t h a t  behaving  in  we m i g h t a  infer  purely  the from  egoistic  manner. A of  number  of  experiments  p u b l i c - l i k e goods  directed  at  conditions the  the  and  subjects,  were p a r t  of  to  group that  was  level  6 1  for  of  the  level.  the  These  provision have  been  p r o v i s i o n u n d e r a number of  subjects  all  similar  instance,  contributed  toward  where  r e p o r t an e x p e r i m e n t  from e a c h o t h e r  were g i v e n  tokens  to  a  bank  the  p r i v a t e exchange  t o l d that  payoff  other  was  v a l u e and  upon  other  One  or r a t e  of  termed  a  c o u l d be s u b s t a n t i a l l y  contingent  in  they  two e x c h a n g e s .  where t h e  and t h e  payoff  yet  bearing a real  or d i v i d e them between  was a s s u r e d but m i n i m a l ,  exchange of  individual  isolated  a group,  invest  investigated  good.  Ames  which the  interest  have  and i n d i s c o v e r i n g why  Marwell  exchange  the  measuring the  p r o v i s i o n of  invited  at  6 0  above  members  of  25  the  group c o n t r i b u t i n g s u f f i c i e n t  provision the  point.  assumption  private group  In  of  exchange  exceeded the  contrast  egoism,  exchange,  the was  resources  that  to  the  what  to  r e a c h or e x c e e d a  would be e x p e c t e d  m a j o r i t y would i n v e s t  investigators  found that  in  investment  s u r p r i s i n g l y h i g h and n e a r l y  provision  under  always  the  in  the  met  or  point:  The mean i n v e s t m e n t i n the g r o u p exchange f o r a l l subjects is 127.6 tokens. F o r a t y p i c a l g r o u p of f o u r t h i s means that approximately 57% of the available resources are i n v e s t e d i n the p u b l i c good . . . t w o - t h i r d s of t h e s u b j e c t s invested more than half of their tokens i n the group e x c h a n g e , and 22% i n v e s t e d a l l of t h e i r t o k e n s . Only 13% contributed nothing. 6 2  that  In  a post-experiment  the  high  partly all  explained  subjects  more  of  public  felt good  agreement invested  with  felt  investment a norm of that  available  a fair  investing  all  was  the  thing  this  shared  norm d i d not  than  10% of  the  norm,  their  be c o n c e r n e d w i t h b e i n g  at  least,  Schneider discovered  subjects'  a collective  65  A "great  to  6 3  be  majority  resources  do."  found  could  required  one's  of  40%  or  of  the  in  the  general,  v a r y w i t h how much was  actually  public  good.  percent  of  in the  in  to  those  who  by  by  to  it  invested  "For t h e s e  not  people  6  greed." "  in vivo  not  abide  all  p u b l i c good c l a i m e d  investing.  i n an  was  While n e a r l y  willingness  willingness good  good  More t h a n a t h i r d  may be d r i v e n o u t  and P o m m e r e h n e  that of  fair'  fair  and Ames  And i n  resources  to  'being  of  their  Seventy-five  public  investment  resources.  fair  Marwell  fairness.  that  important.  provision  in the  by an i n d i v i d u a l i n the  subjects  less  of by  (88%)  their  subjects  proved  level  questionnaire,  experiment free-ride  nearly  so  on  marked  also the as  26  theory  alone  phases.  In  students) written  students special  the  the  first,  class  professor  for  an  was was  made  then met  the  Where i n t h e from  exclusion,  i n the of  b i d d i n g that  the  good  phase  good.  by  none  The  were  subjects  aggregated  bids  The s u b j e c t s  phases  phase,  that  and  a of  the  second the  book  the The  two  subjects  the  three  and  groups  had  This  final  were t h e n phase  could  make  of  the  were up  invited  from  told the  been  group's  excluded  and the  offered  have  the  that  a  difference  sum r e q u i r e d by  to  a clear  revise  their  incentive  to  bids.  As one m i g h t three  second  plus  virtue  students'  minimal  this  from a l l  had d e c i d e d  individuals  between  tender  in  bidders  In the  that  under t h e s e new c o n d i t i o n s  phase  public  final  once a g a i n .  ten  in  were t o l d  sum i n b i d s .  to  bids  helpful  involved  (subjects  had a g r e e d  publisher.  be  g a i n a copy  foundation  the  on a  students  philanthropic the  would  could  bids  bid  point.  second the  textbook  top  income  the  to  book.  raised a specified their  economic  publisher  groups  following  excluded  the  low  the  three  (university  were a l s o  the  three  provision  consumption  that  against  revise  told  of  all  groups)  were  copies  involved  The s u b j e c t s  and t h a t  all  fictitious  not  offer,  which  that  to  exam.  in  providing  invited  which  universities  were t o l d  biased  opportunity  upcoming  from_.two o t h e r  experiment  subjects  the  g r o u p s would g e t  offer  the  the  publisher's  auction  Their  given  subjects  were  predict.  were  by  preparing  three  would  but  expect,  the  average  f r e e - r i d i n g was  not  bid  declines  widespread.  across The  the  subjects  27  "voluntarily their  offered  estimated  offer  1).  true  Under the  specified  sum,  the  exclusion  6  resulted  more  and  needs t o other  than  (offer  2  percent  (offer  of  3 d i v i d e d by  the  35  when  that  the  estimated by  exclusion  about  of  offering  divided  individual  than  61  collectively  percent  factors  as  percent  true  offer  through of  possibility  a reasonable  next  the  be  to  alternative  in a public-good  of  is  1): group  the  true  was  ruled  to  perceived  behaviour  in  to  upon  such  communicate  the  public  experiments  explicitly  approaches situation."  of  and  e f f e c t i v e n e s s • of  of  from t h e s e test  findings  dependent  actors  salience  conclusion  step ' should  approach against behaviour  and  the  the  individuals'  much  ability  commitments,  contribution,  However,  the  in extending  to  Certainly  group s i z e ,  make known t h e i r their  be e x e r c i s e d  experiments  situations.  the  explaining  good.  is  that  economic  individual  6 7  Conclusion.  The argument that  Nozick. more  of  of  in r e v e a l i n g  everyday  to  more  6  these  1.5  96  possibility  Caution  "the  necessity  was o f f e r e d  willingness-to-pay out."  average  willingness-to-pay  about  willingness-to-pay i.e.,  on t h e  of  of  the  previous  anarchists  N o z i c k ' s argument upon  the  grounds  and for  s e c t i o n s has  libertarians  such  an u l t r a m i n i m a l  that  the  state  some as  similarity Taylor  state abrogates  is  and  based certain  28  individual forward the  rights  here  is  centrality  necessity mostly  of  the  interested  in  providing  the  chapter I  essential  into show  in  that  The question:  of  hand  and  public is  not  of  benevolent  or  goods  because is  abrogates  the  extent  a  that  of  of  t h r o u g h the in  is in  as  the  of  man's  that  certain  the  state,  and  state  authority  also  tried  nature  p r o v i d e d by men  as  he  cooperate  us  I have' state  far  benevolence.  persuades  the  the  concentrates  But c o o p e r a t i o n ,  extension  of  of  contains  without  operation the  to  case  the  of  some  of  men  society. explore  number of  what  least  is  individuals'  the in  must  be a  individuals  altruistic  insufficient  M o r e o v e r , as  upon  nature,  be p r o v i d e d by  without at  emphasis  interpretation  nature  either  put  he  of  a l t r u i s m or  Locke's  chapters  can a s u f f i c i e n t  there  goods.  o r by f o r m a l c o n s e n t civil  as  the  responsibilities.  state,  following  public  to  its  argument  explanation  state  the  goods w h i c h a r e  and l e a v i n g  benevolence. state  6 8  an  of  description  the  in  in  insofar  justifies  private  of  theoretical societies  turn  public  required necessary  state  Locke's  necessity  entering  the  that  Taylor  i n d i v i d u a l s can merely  describe,  argued  The  differs  Locke's,  necessary  of  goods  yet  that  immoral.  that  description  will  hitherto  invisible  to  p u b l i c goods can o n l y  this  examples  state,  than  in  itself  public  showing  have  condition  that  of  place  is  closer  on H o b b e s '  nastier  next  and so  actions state? present  scope  discussed  for  theoretical  exercise  the  to  provide  the  The  question  liberal  democratic  exercise  of  i n C h a p t e r T h r e e , as  the  responsibilities  the  is  and r i g h t s ,  so  it  29  weakens the  desire  individuals  come  to  to  exercise  the  few  be even more r e l i a n t  remaining upon the  ones,  actions  and  of  the  state. Nowadays, argument  for  increase  in  and t h e  the  proponent  conservative  one,  view.  of  of  makes state  labelled  argument  for  so  it  human  is  as  made a  much  authority  responsibilities,  being  The  potentialities  one  reduction  individual  conservative.  liberal  whenever  one  some here  statement  nature,  which  as and a  a  theoretical concommitant  r u n s the  undesirable is of is  risk  brand  certainly the  of  not  it of a  theoretical  fundamentally,  a  30  Notes.  1  John Locke, The Second T r e a t i s e of G o v e r n m e n t , Peter Laslett, e d . , (New Y o r k : New A m e r i c a n L i b r a r y and t h e C a m b r i d g e U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s , 1960), s e c t i o n 124, p . 396.  2  Locke,  Second  Treatise,  section  125,  p.  396.  3  Locke,  Second  Treatise,  section  126,  p.  396.  4  Robert Nozick, B o o k s , 1974), p .  5  Hobbes,  Basic  p.  Thomas 202-203.  Anarchy, 283.  Leviathan  State  (London: Penguin  6  Howard M a r g o l i s , Selfishness, (Cambridge: Cambridge U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s ,  7  But  see:  Nozick,  Anarchy,  and U t o p i a ,  State  (New  York:  Books,  1968),  A l t r u i s m and R a t i o n a l i t y 1982) , p^ 9~.  and  Utopia.  8  Duncan Snidal, "Public Goods, Property Rights, and Political Organizations", International Studies Quarterly, v o l . 2 3 (1979), p. 542.  9  "Public p. 535.  1 0  "Public Goods, p. 542.  Snidal, Organizations",  Snidal, Organizations",  1 1  Snidal, "Public Organizations", p. 542.  1 2  Snidal, Organizations",  1 3  public  Goods,  Property  Goods,  "Public Goods, p. 542.  Property  Rights,  Property  Property  Rights,  Rights,  Rights,  The d i s c u s s i o n w h i c h f o l l o w s f o c u s e s goods. There i s a n o t h e r p r o b l e m , the  and  and  and  and  Political  Political  Political  Political  on t h e p r o v i s i o n o f r e v e l a t i o n problem,  31  which focuses on ways of d e t e r m i n i n g the o p t i m a l q u a n t i t y of a public good when each individual has an incentive to underrepresent his or her preference for that good. For a g e n e r a l d i s c u s s i o n of demand revelation see Chapter Four in Dennis C. Mueller Public Choice (Cambridge: Cambridge U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s , 1979). I t can r e a s o n a b l y be assumed that if individuals were p u r e l y a l t r u i s t i c , b o t h the r e v e l a t i o n and t h e p r o v i s i o n p r o b l e m s would d i s a p p e a r .  1  " D a v i d Hume, A T r e a t i s e of U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s , 1 9 7 8 ) , pT 538.  1 5  Hume, A T r e a t i s e  1 6  Harcourt,  of  Human N a t u r e  Human N a t u r e  Vilfredo Pareto, B r a c e , 1935), v o l . 3 ,  , p.  (Oxford:  538.  The M i n d and S o c i e t y pp. 946-947.  1 7  Locke,  Second T r e a t i s e ,  s e c t i o n 4,  P-  309.  1 8  Loc k e , Second T r e a t i s e ,  s e c t i o n 4,  P.  309.  1 9  Locke,  Second T r e a t i s e ,  s e c t i o n 6,  P-  311.  2 0  Loc k e ,  Second T r e a t i s e ,  s e c t i o n 7,  P.  312.  2 1  Locke,  Second T r e a t i s e ,  s e c t i o n 8,  P-  313.  2 2  Loc k e ,  Second T r e a t i s e ,  section  1 1 , P..  314.  2 3  Loc k e ,  Second T r e a t i s e ,  sect ion  1 1 ,P-  314.  2V  Locke,  Second T r e a t i s e ,  sect ion  13,  316.  2  P.  Oxford  (New  York:  5  L o c k e of c o u r s e d i d not u s e the term public good or public goods in the way i t h a s been d e f i n e d h e r e . The term p u b l i c good was f i r s t i n t r o d u c e d i n t o t h e economics literature by P a u l A . Samuelson i n h i s a r t i c l e ; "The Pure T h e o r y of P u b l i c Expenditure", Review of E c o n o m i c s and S t a t i s t i c s , vol. 36 (1954), pp. 387-389.  for  L o c k e d i d however w r i t e example sections 156,  of t h e p u b l i c good f r e q u e n t l y : see 158, 160, and 1 6 4 - 1 6 6 . He d e f i n e s  32  p o l i t i c a l power as "a R i g h t of making Laws with Penalties of Death, and c o n s e q u e n t l y a l l l e s s P e n a l t i e s , for the R e g u l a t i n g and P r e s e r v i n g of P r o p e r t y , and of e m p l o y i n g the force of the Community, i n the E x e c u t i o n of s u c h L a w s , and i n the d e f e n c e of t h e Commonwealth from F o r e i g n I n j u r y , and a l l t h i s o n l y f o r the Public Good." S e c t i o n 13, p . 308. I t i s t e m p t i n g to say t h a t Locke's understanding of the public good is simply an aggregation of many public goods. However, u n l i k e Hume, he seems not t o have been aware of the p r o b l e m s of p r o v i s i o n or t h e r e v e l a t i o n of demand f o r p u b l i c goods. And L o c k e makes the u n d e r s t a n d a b l e e r r o r of d e s c r i b i n g l a n d as a p u b l i c g o o d : Nor was this appropriation of any parcel of L a n d , by i m p r o v i n g i t , any p r e j u d i c e to any o t h e r Man, since there was still enough and as good l e f t ; and more t h a n the y e t unprovided could use. So t h a t i n e f f e c t , t h e r e was never the less left for others because of h i s i n c l o s u r e f o r himself. F o r he t h a t l e a v e s as much as another can make use o f , does as good as t a k e n o t h i n g a t a l l . No Body c o u l d think himself injur'd by the drinking of a n o t h e r Man, t h o u g h he took a good D r a u g h t , who had a whole R i v e r of the same Water l e f t him t o quench h i s t h i r s t . And the Case of L a n d and W a t e r , where t h e r e i s enough of b o t h , i s p e r f e c t l y t h e same. Locke,  2  Second T r e a t i s e ,  6  section  33,  p.  333.  Locke,  Second T r e a t i s e ,  section  5,  2 7  Locke,  Second T r e a t i s e ,  section  124  2 8  Locke,  Second T r e a t i s e ,  section  125,  2  9  3  0  Adam Smith, The T h e o r y of Augustus M. K e l l y , 1966), p i K  Penguin,  Adam 1970),  Moral  Smith, The W e a l t h of p. 118-119.  p.  310.  396  p.  396,  Sentiments  Nations  Hume, A T r e a t i s e  of  Human N a t u r e  , p.  417.  3  2  Hume, A T r e a t i s e  of  Human N a t u r e  ,  p.  534.  3  3  Hume, A T r e a t i s e  of  Human N a t u r e  ,  p.  537.  * Locke,  Second T r e a t i s e ,  section  27,  p.  York:  (Harmondsworth:  3 1  3  (New  329.  33  3  5  Locke,  Second  Treatise,  section  51,  p.  3 6  Locke,  Second  Treatise,  s e c t i o n 46,  P.  342.  3 7  Locke,  Second  Treatise,  s e c t i o n 47,  P-  343.  3 8  Locke,  Second  Treat i se,  sect ion  3 9  Loc k e ,  Second  Treat i se,  s e c t i o n 95,  Locke,  Second  Treat i se,  sect ion  131,  P.  398.  Loc k e ,  Second  Treat ise,  s e c t i o n 243,  P.  477 .  <l  0  4 1  173,  344.  P-  374-375  P.  2  " M i c h a e l T a y l o r , A n a r c h y and C o o p e r a t i o n 1976), p. 3.  3  "  Taylor,  A n a r c h y and C o o p e r a t i o n ,  " Thomas More, P r e s s , 1956), p . 108.  5  " vol.  94  4  6  7  "  4  Utopia  S e r g e - C h r i s t o p e Kolm, (1983), pp. 18-65.  p.  (Cambridge:  430.  (London:  Wiley,  3.  Cambrige  University  " A l t r u i s m and E f f i c i e n c y " ,  Kolm,  " A l t r u i s m and E f f i c i e n c y " ,  p.  41.  Kolm,  " A l t r u i s m and E f f i c i e n c y " ,  p.  42-43.  Ethics,  8  Two conservative e s t i m a t e s of the v a l u e of productive v o l u n t e e r work i n t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s and Canada b o t h a r r i v e d a t a s i m i l a r f i g u r e of 3.5% of GNP. See: H . W o l o z i n , "The Economic Role and V a l u e of V o l u n t e e r . Work i n the U n i t e d S t a t e s " , J o u r n a l of V o l u n t a r y A c t i o n R e s e a r c h , v o l . 1-2 ( 1 9 7 5 ) , p p . 23-42; and, O l i H a w r y l s h y n , "The Economic Nature and Value of Volunteer A c t i v i t y in Canada", S o c i a l I n d i c a t o r s Research, v o l . 5 (1978), pp.1-71.  9  * Not characteristics  all public goods have either or d i f f i c u l t i e s in their p r o v i s i o n .  identical For a good  34  discussion of the d i f f e r e n t t y p e s o f c o l l e c t i v e goods and the p r o b l e m s t h e y p r e s e n t , see Chapter Four in Russsell Hardin, Collective Action (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s , 1982) .  5  0  Behaviour Politics,  John C. Harsanyi, "Rational Models of Political vs. Functional and Conformist Theories", World vol. 21 ( 1 9 6 9 ) , p . 519.  5 1  Howard M a r g o l i s , Selfishness, (Cambridge: Cambridge U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s ,  A l t r u i s m and R a t i o n a l i t y 1982), p. 12  5  2  Margolis,  Selfishness,  A l t r u i s m and R a t i o n a l i t y ,  p.  12.  5  3  Margolis,  Selfishness,  A l t r u i s m and R a t i o n a l i t y ,  p.  12.  5 U  F o r a d i s c u s s i o n of r a t i o n a l i t y and v o t i n g s e e : The P o l i t i c s of P r i v a t e D e s i r e s (Harmondsworth: 1981), c h a p t e r 4.  Laver, Books, 5 5  Margolis,  Selfishness,  A l t r u i s m and R a t i o n a l i t y ,  p.  21.  5 6  Public Harvard  5 7  Norman Frohlich, Joe Oppenheimer and Oran Young, L e d e r s h i p and C o l l e c t i v e Goods (Princeton: Princeton Press, 1971 ) ; Terry Moe, The O r g a n i z a t i o n of ( C h i c a g o : U n i v e r s i t y of Chicago Press, 1980); Joel "Can P o l i t i c a l Entrepreneurs Solve the Free Rider J o u r n a l of E c o n o m i c B e h a v i o u r and O r g a n i z a t i o n , v o l . pp. 357-66.  Mancur O l s o n , The L o g i c of C o l l e c t i v e A c t i o n . Goods and the T h e o r y of G r o u p s (Cambr i d g e , Mass.: U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s , 1 9 6 5 ) , pT 51.  Political University Interests Guttman, Problem?", 3 (1982),  5  8  5  9  Albert 0. I n t e r e s t and P u b l i c Press, 1982).  Goods",  6  Bohm,  Michael Penguin  0  Hirschman, Shifting Action (Princeton:  Involvements: P r i v a t e Princeton University  Harold Demsetz, "The Private Production of J o u r n a l o f Law and E c o n o m i c s , v o l . 13 ( 1 9 7 0 ) , p .  Public 306.  In addition t o t h o s e d i s c u s s e d b e l o w , see a l s o : P e t e r "Estimating Demand for Public Goods: An Experiment",  35  E u r o p e a n Economic Review , v o l . 3 (1972), pp. 111-130; John R. Chamberlin, "The L o g i c of C o l l e c t i v e A c t i o n : Some E x p e r i m e n t a l Results", Behavioural Science , v o l . 23 ( 1 9 7 8 ) , pp. 441-445; Robyn M. Dawes, Jeanne M c T a v i s h and Harriet Shaklee, " B e h a v i o u r , C o m m u n i c a t i o n and A s s u m p t i o n s About Other People's Behaviour in a Commons Dilemma Situation", J o u r n a l of P e r s o n a l i t y and S o c i a l P s y c h o l o g y , v o l . 35 (1977), pp.1-11; Gerald M a r w e l l and Ruth E . Ames, " E x p e r i m e n t s on t h e P r o v i s i o n of P u b l i c G o o d s . II. Provision Points, Stakes, Experience and the Free R i d e r P r o b l e m " , A m e r i c a n J o u r n a l of S o c i o l o g y , v o l . 85 ( 1 9 8 0 ) , p p . 9 2 6 - 9 3 7 ; Geraldine Alfano and Gerald Marwell, "Experiments on the Provision of Public Goods. III. Nondivisibility and Free Riding in 'Real' Groups", Soc i a l Psychological Quarterly , vol. 43 ( 1 9 8 0 ) , p p . 300-309; G e r a l d M a r w e l l and Ruth E . Ames, " E c o n o m i s t s R i d e Free, Does Anyone Else? Experiments on the Provision of P u b l i c Goods. IV", J o u r n a l of P u b l i c E c o n o m i c s , v o l . 15 (1981), pp. 295-310; John W. Sweeney, "An E x p e r i m e n t a l I n v e s t i g a t i o n of the F r e e Rider Problem", S o c i a l Science Research , v o l . 2 (1973), pp. 277-292; A. J. C. van de K r a g t , J . M . O r b e l l and R. M . Dawes, "The M i n i m a l C o n t r i b u t i n g Set as a Solution to Public Goods Problems", A m e r i c a n J o u r n a l of P o l i t i c a l S c i e n c e , v o l . 77 ( 1 9 8 3 ) , p p . 1 12-122.  6 1  G e r a l d M a r w e l l and R u t h E . Ames, "Experiments on the Provision of P u b l i c G o o d s . 1. R e s o u r c e s , I n t e r e s t , Group S i z e and the F r e e R i d e r P r o b l e m " , A m e r i c a n J o u r n a l of S o c i o l o g y , v o l . 84 ( 1 9 7 9 ) , p p . 1335-1360.  6  2  M a r w e l l and Ames, "Experiments Goods. 1.", p . 1349-1350.  3  Marwell and Goods. 1.", p .  a  M a r w e l l and Ames, "Experiments Goods. 1.", p . 1357.  Public  6  Public  6  Public  6  5  6  6  Ames, 1357.  on  "Experiments  the  on  on  Provision  the  the  Provision  Provision  of  of  of  Friedrich Schneider and Werner W. Pommerehne, "FreeR i d i n g and C o l l e c t i v e A c t i o n : an E x p e r i m e n t i n Microeconomics", Q u a r t e r l y J o u r n a l of E c o n o m i c s , v o l . 9 6 ( 1 9 8 1 ) , p p . 689-704.  Action:",  6  7  Schneider p. 697.  and  Pommerehne,  S c h n e i d e r and Pommerehne, A c t i o n : " , p. 702.  " F r e e - R i d i n g and  "Free-Riding  and  Collective  Collective  36  6  8  Anarchy,  See Nozick's argument about S t a t e and U t o p i a , p . 18.  the  creation  of  money  :  37  11.  2.1  Introduct ion.  If by  the  assumption  self-interest  instances  of  there to  be  be of  much u s e . the  motivation which  fundamental  We a l s o  potentially collective limited  to  of  of  sense say, need  capable goods. close  reciprocity.  investigated.  the  It  of is  other  of  the to  is  that  able  enlightened  know whether  of is  to  that  to  public  goods  altruism?  While  far  too  the  general  problem  an  must  of  the  at  of  by G a r r e t t  the  least  provision  s u c h b e h a v i o u r may upon t h e  be  between  and t h a t is  its  situations  distinguish  altruism  of  acceptable  distinguishes  egoist,  or be b a s e d expressed  addresses  explanation  problems  conceivable  a view  rival  and d e f i n e s  This  is  solving  behaviour,  uncovering  one  it  certain  many a r e  behaviours,  relationships This  But what  relevant. that  explain  provision  behaviour,  that  primarily  This chapter  equal d i f f i c u l t y  is  be  of  political  behaviour,  may  motivation  altruist.  of  the  i n the  thus  voluntary  And of  from t h a t it  satisfactorily  by a l t r u i s m .  concept of  always  be  the  are d e f i n i t i o n s  explanation  the  to  that  i n d i v i d u a l s are motivated  and  explained  defining  in  cannot  need  possibility  might  that  public  explanations the  ALTRUISM  of be  expectation Hardin:  Is pure a l t r u i s m p o s s i b l e ? Y e s , of c o u r s e i t i s on a s m a l l s c a l e , o v e r the s h o r t t e r m , i n c e r t a i n circumstances, and within small i n t i m a t e groups . . . When b o t h a l t r u i s t s a n d e g o i s t s a r e thrown together in large impersonal groups altruism has little chance to grow by an infectious p r o c e s s ; i t i s more l i k e l y t o be n i p p e d i n the b u d . 1  38  2.2  Defining  Altruism.  Altruism well-being Strictly That  is  of  a regard  others  speaking,  is,  altruism  benevolence welfare  is  or  this  others.  The  of  to  mean  that  another's  any  form of  particularly  An a l t r u i s t by  remains  derives  altruist.  or  negative.  of  is  that  competition,  someone of  others.  unaffected  neither  benefit  whose  by  By  that  nor harm  of from  for  others,  it  has  a c t i o n which d i m i n i s h e s p e r s o n a l w e l f a r e  2  is  increased,  belief  that  Altruistic  or,  someone  "any  else  be  i n the  form of  benefit  only take or  group  advantage  s u c h a c t i o n would have a f f e c t e d  so  behaviour  will  a c t i o n need n o t  g i v e n d i r e c t l y t o an i n d i v i d u a l  but may a l s o if  the  the  or the of  foregone, well-being  others. Any  of  it."  a benefit  individuals,  of  encompassing a l l  l i t e r a l l y a regard  welfare  by  of  the  others.  m o t i v a t e d m e r e l y by t h e harm  admission that  upon t h a t  affected  welfare  a l t r u i s m means  come  avoid  is  pure e g o i s t  well-being  or the  c o n c e r n may be p o s i t i v e  c a p a b l e of  well-being  an e g o i s t ' s  While  some e f f e c t  a n d even m a l e v o l e n c e .  contrast,  the  has  for others,  direct  a n o t h e r must  benefit involve  given some  dollar  donation  to  the  collect  donations  for  the  incurred  some  consumption else,  or,  to  cost.  foregone; the  free  or o p p o r t u n i t y f o r e g o n e cost.  Red  Cross  Red C r o s s ,  We  can  he  Smith  makes  or v o l u n t e e r s it  easily  he m i g h t have time which  When  is  clear  point  spent  to  his  that the  spends  favour a  ten  time he  to has  alternative  t h e money on  usually  in  something in  other  39  pursuits course  as  indications  there  may  altruistic  gesture  the  Flat  Earth  the  spherical  be as  but  attached  to  arises.  "The  Society  loses not  face  may  Another  the  which  is  of  the  within not  the  example, donation  regardless  theorists,  that  either  Some b e h a v i o u r be  certainly that  discussions "emitted  even  of  the  the  the  costs  especially shame,  suffering.  The  some c a s e s  action  behaviour  he  and or  or g r o u p  one  action towards  moment  the  intentions  justifying  the  inclusion  recipient.  which d i d  Smith,  makes a v o l u n t a r y  improve the  anyone  with  possibility  b e h a v i o u r any a c t i o n  hepatitis, not  his  be  are  and i n  the  would  apparently malicious  Smith  may  individual  for  in  for  welfare  altruistic  difficulty  altruistic  think  what  the  to  3  that  Discounting  well-being  this  is  i n an  who b e l i e v e s  his  victim's  of  I  of  a  Of  donation  h e l p may f e e l  nonintervener,  knowing he may have  maintaining  at  requirement  which w i l l  involved  when t h e  who d o e s n ' t  principal  the  recipient.  There  ..."  of  gesture.  mercilessly  nonintervention  the  we would have  friend,  diminishes  prosecution  scope  improve  him  criminal  directed.  in the costs  altruistically  of  recipient,  actor,  his  well.  distress  imposed by n e a r l y a l l benefit  future  Jones,  only  as  disapprove  face  it  but  bystander  and e m p a t h i c  involved  S m i t h may have made a  behaving  The  cost  ridicules  costs  psychological.  may even  well.  So S m i t h - n o t  donation  public  the  additional  theory,  foolishness.  guilt,  of  well-being have  act  a  of  hard  was  for blood the time  altruistic,  thought. of  altruism  voluntarily."  4  also  require  One can e a s i l y  see  that  the  why  this  40  stipulation donation to  to  Jones  cases  is  made.  the  voluntary  are  is  example,  Red C r o s s on the  who happens  which  For  to  less  to  g r o u p and t h a t  office  remember t h a t  questioning  w h i c h the  coworkers  make d o n a t i o n s . pressure  on S m i t h to  In  obligation may  be  not  situation  discussion  life  to  if  of  and  contributing  the  if  may have death  towards  sea  was  we  Such  as  well, in a  their  he large  of  his  coworkers of  social  donation  cannot  have  Most of his  people calm  might want  and if  not to  he have  would to  be  were s t r a n d e d and the the  sea  place  become  surprising implications.  p r o v i s i o n of  moral  us  boat  5  operation was  high  the  same  involved  Even d i s c u s s i n g  of  a  obligations  in  However,  obligation.  implications the  is  something  he behaves o t h e r w i s e ,  he happened  But I do not  moral  an a c t  Most  may  situations.  himself.  perilous,  upon S m i t h .  such o b l i g a t i o n s the  risk  most  archetypal  amount  final  Smith  leper.  and d e a t h  them though  in  voluntary.  moral  in l i f e  no g r e a t  the  and h i s  r o c k upon w h i c h a number of  rescue  strictures a  a  see  certain  altruistically:  as  force  a  involved and  behave  "donation"  gave  annually.  situations,  Smith a moral outcast  passing did  other  treated  particular label  to  a  do l i k e w i s e ,  d e s c r i b e d as  certain  be  our  something  workers  Smith's  However,  O r , S m i t h may work  and most  will  his  mother a l w a y s giving  her v a l u e s .  There  be u n r e s e r v e d l y  his  by not  donations  as  Smith,  H e a r t Fund c a n v a s s e s  make  place  d e t e r m i n i n g whether  impossible.  may  be  same f o o t i n g  clear-cut,  individual,  will  cannot  be b l a c k m a i l i n g h i m .  practicably  a certain  we  rules  In any  contributing some c o l l e c t i v e  in for  case,  or  not  good  are  41  often  remote. So  long  voluntary, to  be.  there  If  fruitless  into  to  of  importance  or  of  contributing, Setting not  raises  the  and so  question  "certain  any g i v e n  cannot  has  be  quite  wants,  wishes  acknowledgement one's  the  the  degree  his  the  needs  it  of  altruism about  recipient,  numbers  can  seems  convictions the  cost  of  of  the others  for  an a l t r u i s t i c any c o s t  how w e l l  self-interest  setting  an  No u p p e r is  the  levels  upper  limit  type  can  of  saints  behaviour  sacrifice  cannot  6  But  self-sacrifice  or  r e q u i r e d of which  from t h o s e  demands t h e  justify of  and  desires  that  another's  in  extend and  of to  heroes.  of  act  saints  individuals.  self-sacrifice of  renunciation  f a v o u r of  cost  be m o r a l l y r e q u i r e d  ordinary  a moderate  complete  the  the  superogatory  of  the  small  explain  sees a l t r u i s m of  gesture  however  bound f o r  practice  termed t h i s  processes  self-sacrifice  for  it  p r e s u m a b l y he  Once a g a i n  of  contentious,  of  expected  different  completely  how e x t e n s i v e  giving,  situation,  bound f o r  individual."  psychological  rules,  be  on.  which  James F i s h k i n  into  donation,  difficult.  self-sacrifice  not  of  deservedness  However,  is  may  question  Smith's  the  a lower  behaviour.  because  the  specific  particularly  altruism  altruism  g i v i n g a c e r t a i n amount.  discuss  effectiveness  of  remains  be a f u n c t i o n  the  is  Smith's  S m i t h can be p r e s s u r e d  be p r e s s u r e d  will  as  be  altruism.  For  of  own  one's  another's.  needs a r e g r e a t e r  must  The  or  It  is  the  superior  to  7  own. , Serge-Christophe  Kolm h a s  suggested d i s t i n g u i s h i n g  between  42  the  two b e h a v i o u r s  altruist  and  sentiment", himself the  the  (in  same  give  general  who d i v i d e s The not  coat  fact  nonvoluntary  to  the  possibility  that  he can be  any  the  as  sufficient  for  us  of  most  Finally, derived  by  require  altruist.  This  did  not  Less  but Or,  as  a k i n d of  pains,  a smile,  to  altruistic thinks  be a p r i o r i  else  and  Martin  in  the  the  of  acts  who d o e s  cold,  but  be p u r e l y v o l u n t a r y  does  that  Smith  to  the  away  the  ultimate  sense.  In  I am o n l y  arguing  that  to  i n some  he  were  for  being the  a l t r u i s m may be  responding  seems  crucial,  drain  altruistic,  political  and  which  is  governmental  societies. to  the  there  surely  as  is  the  enhanced  that  issue  absolutely  extreme  position from h i s  usual to he  and  action  outcome  of  entitled  self-esteem,  the  benefits  action. none  hard  which s t a t e s  w h i c h he was is  of  or her a c t i o n . be  an  the  windfall  believe  thorny  from h i s  that  it  of  person  Saint  admit  of  "good"  any b e n e f i t  treat  Smith might  But t o  reconsider  extreme  expect  any d i d not  if  is  not  not  altruist  definitions  position.  is  to  the  shivering  environment,  we come the  pauper  action  his  issue  c a s e of  anyone is  both  8  in  S m i t h can behave  which  as  concept.  and o n l y  arrangements  in  altruist  the  pressures  event,  that  a l t r u i s m need  from t h e  interests  c o u l d be made p r e c i s e )  two."  that  the  "The ' m a x i m a l '  perfect  away  in  of  importance  the  it  detract  "is  a way t h a t  his  basis  recipient.  he w r i t e s ,  accordingly... not  on the  and i f  for  to  fully  defend  that  Smith  he  of  received action  entitled.  something  or a l e t t e r  the  to  altruistic not  Some  for  thanks  his and  43  some  glossy  cost  of  it.  the  brochure, action,  Smith  attempt  to  extreme  simply  place  a value  position them,  position  to  on  but  take  that  that  property never  to  will  be  or  derive or  effective.  This  last  somewhat  S m i t h was not  he d i d not  they  he  or  the she  contribute  nothing derived  from  he  its  would d e r i v e  others'  from o t h e r s  or,  his  that  Smith  his  the  nor  from i t s  In the if  benefits Of  benefit  welfare,  no  the  for  is  his  found  altruism  is  because  in  these knowing  of  whether  she  benefit  that  cancer  nothing,  or  he  appears  simply  course  be  meantime,  of  regardless  interim of  such  forgets  a cure  is  when  of  a cure  one  would c o n t r i b u t e the  he  were  community  if  discovery.  in a  He c a n n o t  benefits  if  be  case  there  F u r t h e r m o r e , b e c a u s e he  First,  least  S m i t h hopes t h a t  mind"  of  any  The  defence  attacked.  scheme  t a k i n g advantage  characteristics.  if  with  that  that  the  the  In summary, a l t r u i s m may be r e c o g n i z e d four  is  society.  that  on  contribute  nonaltruist  or n o t .  is  defence  he be e x c l u d e d to  is  Moreover,  an i n s u r a n c e  contribute  of  found o r  position  r e q u i r e d to  circumstances, that  like  will  research  security  the  it.  He may even hope Such  the  equated  benefits  some "peace of  if  equal  and f e e l  destroy  them.  that  not  easily  gesture  of  them.  cancer  be  be  will  u n c e r t a i n and he may not  successful.  benefit,  discovered  are of  benefit  will  they  the  and o t h e r s  sounds  it  subject  to  cancer  certainly  the  the  a cure w i l l  contracts  he w i l l  on  the  cannot  enjoy  receive  a donation  arrangement,  certain  to  that  least  advantage  in a p o s i t i o n  Smith g i v e s an  or a t  may  expects  never  but  gains  would be  cure. by a l l  altruism describes  or  some  an a c t i o n  of  which  44  is  beneficial  to  the  recipient  behaviour  which  involves  foregone.  Third,  a l t r u i s m must  fourth,  altruism  synonymous  with  These viewed  constitute altruistic  two  possible  the  most  given  never  be e a s y  much  will  to  it  will is  altruist.  But  in  worse of  f o r m a l c r i t e r i o n of  of  extensive  the  First,  of  cases  way of  it  is  a  advantage  may  And  not  altruism  taken  be  definition  of  be d i f f i c u l t  of  a worst  from  I will  to  it  will  altruism  and  of  or  exclude  any  outcome  possible  another  and n o t  determine  selfby  outcome  still  it  given  describe  possible  a worst  emphasised  In a d d i t i o n ,  self-sacrifice  be they  s h o u l d be  voluntary.  can  together,  t h e s e c a s e s we may w i s h  to  be  may quite  admit  on the  the  basis  the of  self-sacrifice.  viewing  behaviour  is  definitions. definitions  literature  of  theoretical  than  being a l t r u i s t i c  all  definition  some s i t u a t i o n s ,  b e h a v i o u r as  alternative  many  in Chapter Four  In e i t h e r  altruistic  terms  p a r t i c u l a r circumstances  acceptable.  of  in  frequently  acceptance  marginally  Another  and  wholly  For example, the  the  Second,  be v o l u n t a r y and u n c o e r c e d .  the  distinguish  as  only  act.  The term t h e o r e t i c a l  act  sacrifice  be  in  ways.  depend upon the  situation.  cost  rigorous  behaviour.  a  the  self-sacrifice.  in p r a c t i c e  whether  not,  f o u r e l e m e n t s of  in  because  need  some  of  as  these a set  In t h i s of  on t h e  four  elements of  from which one  way we can  definition  can  construct  retrieve  probably  a l t r u i s m one might subject.  a  encounter  in  the  45  2.3  Altruism,  The  E n l i g h t e n e d Egoism,  foregoing  discussion  "enlightened  egoist",  these  I  terms.  prudence, or  her  behave  action  egoist  consume the  it  good if  from t h e  of  follow  cost  an  individual  for  his  the of  contributing.  an  hypothesized  egoist of  his  action. forego others.  apart  of  would  to  surpass  those  The a l t r u i s t on t h e more  advantageous  the  societies  from t h e a l t r u i s t .  actions  will  his  egoists  can  But of  the  of  w i t h some set  The e g o i s t  a  be a b l e  to  like  derive  public  good  not  offset  cares  behave prudent  collective  also  his  a prudent e g o i s t  not  or only  as  actions  hand, in  goods  which  altruists. the  expects  enlightened the  benefits  has made a d e c i s i o n order  an  egoists  from p u r s u i n g a n o t h e r c o u r s e  other  a  to  will  self-interest  society  future benefits  to  prudent e g o i s t  of  since  government would be d e v o i d o f  Expectations  is  outcome  or her c o n t r i b u t i o n w i l l  he or she  would be p r o d u c e d by s i m i l a r  they  the  provision  m o t i v a t e d by e n l i g h t e n e d  And  the  in  to  t o do s o .  w h i c h he or she  Therefore,  o r h e r own w e l f a r e ,  altruist.  knows t h a t  benefit  refers  w o u l d not c o n t r i b u t e  Moreover,  the  from h i s  nor i s  the  dismissed  doubt t h a t  self-interest  an a l t r u i s t ,  produced.  term  of  behave w i t h an eye  I do not  he or she  knows t h a t  the  without  is  question being  this  may o f t e n  A prudent e g o i s t  increased level  may  what  in t h e i r  not  for  it  altruist,  which  is  altruistic.  collective  is  the  sometimes  interests.  prudently: it  prudent  that  the e g o i s t  long-term  raises  altruism  believe  or t h a t  And C o o p e r a t i o n .  of to  to a v o i d harming  46  W h i l e we a r e d e f i n i n g be  made of  cooperation.  gains-maximizing secure  a  because  they  surpass  those  which  the  advantages  the  the  altruism,  expected  enforceable their time  of  p a r t of  action  foreign  g a i n can  never  contract  is  to  of  their  who  9  to  each  be  the  enforceable  assured.  And  actions.  of  there  provisions some to  and e s p e c i a l l y  fulfillment  problems is  arrangement.  bind p a r t i e s  even t h o u g h ,  be  by summing  involves  of  will  to  Initially,  stability  act  actions.  individual  altruism.  to  Individuals  advantage  arrangement  requires  the  together  individual  greater  r e q u i r e d to  exchange, between  those  to  individual  t h a n c o u l d be c r e a t e d  the  cooperation  may i n t e r v e n e  to  from  expect  ensuring  the  "acting  benefits  needs  of  are  benefit."  the  result  cooperative  completely  problem  Unlike  a  persons  that  and d i s a d v a n t a g e s  Maintaining which are  expect  joint  a species  individual  cooperators  by t h e i r  some m e n t i o n  unavailable  secure  cooperate  generated  where  benefit  to  Additionally,  Cooperation is  behaviour  mutual  independently  and e x c l u d i n g ,  two p a r t s  for  form  of  carry  out  because, of  the  contract. "For e x a m p l e , c o n s i d e r a f u t u r e s c o n t r a c t where i n d i v i d u a l A p a y s B a sum of money t o d a y , and B p r o m i s e s to d e l i v e r a quantity X of some commodity a t a l a t e r d a t e . We a l w a y s make t h e a s s u m p t i o n t h a t i n d i v i d u a l B w i l l i n f a c t deliver s i n c e t h e c o n t r a c t i s b i n d i n g and e n f o r c e a b l e . In d e f i n i n g altruistic behaviour individual A may g i v e i n d i v i d u a l B s o m e t h i n g , and i n d i v i d u a l B may . e l e c t t o give nothing in return. T h e r e may be an i m p l i c i t or unspoken u n d e r s t a n d i n g between the parties but individual B has no legal o b l i g a t i o n t o compensate A , and h i s d e c i s i o n not to repay would n o t c o n s t i t u t e a v i o l a t i o n of t h e l a w . " 1 0  C o o p e r a t i o n may a l s o  be v i e w e d  as  an e x c h a n g e of  restraints  47  on b e h a v i o u r . 'contingent  Cooperators are  upon  Cooperators are A),  or w i l l  do A i f  others' saying  restrict  you w i l l  restraints, each  of  for  divided.  The  bargaining  of  ensure  The  to  emphasizes  the  well-known  situation  1 2  outcome  the  other's  that  the  Should e i t h e r  individuals This  repeated  individuals  to  do  not  A  to  do of  (or  do  choose)  to  party  of  action,  should  require  1 1  be  lengthy  attempts  illustrates  two.  game to  who  but  as a  behave  an  to  To p r o d u c e  not  a  likely  these c o n d i t i o n s  between future hold,  choose a n o n g a i n s - m a x i m i z i n g a l t r u i s m but  of  for  of  the  is  the  may become r a t i o n a l  discount  employs  paradigm  which  if  superior  the  there  it  is  course course  at  it  is or,  a high  better of  of  short  individuals payoffs  or  both  policy in  is  same  in a r a t i o n a l  an a c t i o n  interaction  it  the  model  outcome  is  at  a  be  how  Axelrod  foresake  it  joint it  individuals  not  sounds v e r y much l i k e  by  will  each  sub-optimal.  however  rate.  as  between the  produce  term,  Axelrod argues,  restraints.  defection.  individuals  Such  the  conflict  Dilemma  gains-maximization.  if  (or  be g e n e r a t e d  considered  manner,  of  not  behaviour  end w i t h an e x c h a n g e  Robert A x e l r o d  and s o c i a l l y  expectation  do not  this  difference  which  the  will  choose  complexity  Prisoner's  requires  "I  a l t r u i s m with cooperation  the  gains-maximizing  similar  own v i e w s upon how  of  The game i s  in  individually  his  work of  confuse  cooperation.  have  against  of  upon  also."  resolution  time  to  should a surplus  recent  possible  other;  my freedom  increasing  itself  each  cooperation  individual will  restraints  acceptance  to  do so  The p r o b l e m s  trading  for  action. is  not  48  because  the  interested superior So  outcome  course  to  the  choosing  personally  of  the  is of the  i n the  Axelrod  unstable  benefits  because  cooperation  surplus  and  of  that of  better"  of  to  group  individually  of  or d e f e c t o r  to  manner.  action  maintained. to  with  is  a cooperative placed  by the  all  powers  other  surpass  future  is  in  fruits  of  only  be  continual generation opportunities' ; or by t h r e a t s  w h i c h can be used  to  and  which i s  to  reciprocate  He a l s o  senses  finds  using than  in a such  those  is  both  punish  the This  to  use  a  their  analysis,  a strategy who  He  cooperation  a c c o r d i n g to formal  -  the  arrangement.  promote c o o p e r a t i o n  of  costs  A x e l r o d ' s work on c o o p e r a t i o n .  individuals of  one  T h i s may  therefore  o r t o p u n i s h and r e w a r d o t h e r s  of  to  action.  the  from a c o o p e r a t i v e  b e s t way t o  cooperate.  Cooperation  arrangement  on can  from  breakdown whenever  individual  be g u a r a n t e e d  f i n d i n g of  be d i f f e r e n t  w i t h an o p p o r t u n i t y  Cooperation  coercive  i n a number  strategies.  is  subject  value  surpasses  the  it  two m e t h o d s :  tit-for-tat  defection  a  the  principal  willingness that  end of  w h i c h c a n never  noncooperator  strategy  nonself-  opposite  course  shows c o o p e r a t i o n  presented  the  which  maintenance  discovers  the  and  i n the  maximizing  being  declines.  m a i n t a i n e d by one  the  them c h o o s i n g  cooperation  sight  or  is  of  because  is  collectively  manner i n w h i c h  cooperators  something  is  non-gains  come a b o u t  a  of  i n d i v i d u a l s choosing  advantageous.  inherently the  all  action  result  Furthermore, altruism  of  employ  can  "do  other  49  2.4  Explaining  Because of  behaving  reason  I as  to  am o n l y a r g u i n g t h a t though  they  re-examine  authority), crucial  Altruism.  to  the  were a l t r u i s t i c  the  explaining  balance  why t h e y  argument.  the  diversity  of  approaches  how,  if  not  taken,  is  distinguish egoism.  In a d d i t i o n ,  altruistic behaviour  is  likely  Why would any welfare  in  w h i c h the  altruist  altruism  is  to  self-interest. which  b e c a u s e of  a special  suggested  explanation. altruistic complex  model He  individual  it,  and t o  that  way  is  to  more  appreciate  and t o  various  not  the  illustrate  difficult  compliance,  or  to even  explanations  set  of  of  of  frequently  to  in  the  fact  as  actor  o r of  the  a deviant is  a  who has  form of rational  it  a  Kurz  1 3  to  of  maximize  their  In  this  benefits  it  more has this  observed  equi1ibrium manifestations exchange.  in  adopted  similar  instances  own  a group  Mordecai  is  her  explaining  w h i c h made  egoism.  "all  or  way of  altruism  which  that  altruistic  participants  it  circumstances  altruism  his  another  consider  than o u t r i g h t of  reduce  The s i m p l e s t  dividends  writes  of  individual  become  fairness,  choose to  a member?  behaviour are  structure  and  of  i n d e t e r m i n i n g how  increase  pays  behaviour a  can  of  sufficient  some  subject  In t h e s e e x p l a n a t i o n s ,  behaviour  profitable  the  is  this  reviewed  capable  occur.  to  deny  to  aid  individual  is  state  act  s h o u l d be  s u c h as  will  to  order  should  a discussion  behaviour  between  altruism  from c o n c e p t s  (which  Nevertheless,  commonly a d v a n c e d e x p l a n a t i o n s  care  i n d i v i d u a l s may be  of  a  equilibrium and i n  this  50  narrow and  s e n s e our  thus  not  Although  the  it  rather  is  a  benefits ethics  individuals acting  in  fragile  and s o c i a l  it  is  system  of  the  rewards  for  participating  for  equilibrium  equilibrium  in  ...  individual optimality  ...  consequences  of  equilibrium  and b e c a u s e of  social  the  strategic  social  of  social  shadow  price and 1  the  of  deserting  norms and  the  penalties  'cheat'  because  their  to  formation  both  or t r y i n g to  individual  pure  due  by t h e  the  altruistically  the  compensated sense  provide and  socially  and  supplemented  norms w h i c h  behave  fact  altruistically  equilibrium provides  involved  Individuals  are  system." "  the  social  the  and  altruistic  ethics:  Suppose you a r e d r i v i n g i n a l i m i t e d - s p e e d zone w h i l e you are in fact in a h u r r y . A l s o assume t h a t y o u b e l i e v e that limited speeding is a d e s i r a b l e s o c i a l b e h a v i o u r and you a r e i n f a v o u r of s u c h l a w s . I f you assume y o u r s e l f to be negligible i n i n f l u e n c e your d e c i s i o n of how f a s t t o d r i v e w i l l o n l y depend upon the increased probability of an accident, the p r o b a b i l i t y of b e i n g c a u g h t , t h e c o s t of t h e t i c k e t and the v a l u e t o you of arriving earlier to your destination. However, the t r u t h of the m a t t e r i s t h a t even when you are a negligible agent in s u c h a market t h e i n t e r d e p e n d e n c e a s p e c t i s more t h a n the i n c r e a s e d danger t o o t h e r s on t h e r o a d due t o y o u r s p e e d i n g . That additional f a c t o r i s t h e s o c i a l s i g n a l of l e a d e r s h i p t h a t i n d i c a t e s to all other people on the r o a d t h a t t h e y may j o i n you i n speeding. Thus t h e s i g n a l i n many c a s e s i s more important t h a n y o u r own d i r e c t i n d i v i d u a l i s t i c influence. 1 5  Like rational  the if  equilibrium repeated. similar in  play  is  is  also  In K u r z '  role  1 7  Dilemma,  unlimited,  where  i n d i v i d u a l l y optimal  analysis  the  cooperation  But u n l i k e  the  latter  cooperation  adherence  "shadow  in two  the  to if  of  i n m a i n t a i n i n g an a l t r u i s t i c  maintaining  Taylor.  Prisoner's  the  the  the  altruistic  interaction  future"  e q u i l i b r i u m as  work  authors  of who  may be  plays  is a  it  does  1 6  and  Axelrod  suggest  that  51  cooperation argues  can be e n f o r c e d  that  the  e q u i l i b r i u m achieved  altruistically  is  which  to  appear  these and  social  being  stabilize  wife.  norm of  that  of  susceptible  to  by b e i n g  a d h e r i n g to social  them,  and e t h i c a l  attendant  upon not  Altruistic  behaviour  for  rewards,  and and  may be the simply  is  'fair  loyalty  of  reflects  a  the  should expect  chiefly  the  the for  is  so  norms,  behaving  Kurz,  superior  superior  unenforced,  recognize  punishment  efficiency  interprets  " s t a t e what  price  e q u i l i b r i a are  individual  optimality  shadow  He  norms  from  2 0  efficient  every  example  1 8  Kurz  behaving  upon " s o c i a l  what a p r o p e r r e w a r d a p e r s o n  'loyal*."  more  which  policy,  individuals  equilibrium."  prices  "An  The  While a l t r u i s t i c being  1 9  by a l l  and depends  this  shadow  conduct."  husband to h i s social  unenforceable,  norms as  proper'  by an " e y e - f o r - a n - e y e "  then  outcomes, rewards,  in  the  they  sense  do not  require  social  and  l o n g as  individuals  they  will  f a i r l y or  the  which  individual  recognize  are the  altruistically.  a consequence and  of  of  both  punishment follow  from  its and such  act ions. The  notion  explanation he d e f i n e s  of  of  fairness  also  altruism offered  a l t r u i s m as  possibly  features  prominently  by Howard M a r g o l i s . beneficial  to  the  in  Like  the Kurz,  actor:  What we mean by a l t r u i s m i n t h e t e c h n i c a l s e n s e used here is that the individual's allocation of resources is i n f l u e n c e d not o n l y by the b u n d l e of goods he obtains for himself but a l s o by the e f f e c t of h i s c h o i c e on o t h e r s o r on h i s s o c i e t y , q u a l i f i e d o n l y by t h e condition that the actor (not necessarily the recipients) regards this b e h a v i o u r as benign. An a l t r u i s t i c act need not have negative or zero value to the actor. What defines a l t r u i s t i c behaviour is that the actor could have done better for himself had he c h o s e n t o i g n o r e the e f f e c t of  52  his  choice  Howard suggests in  two ways.  the  goods  incorporates  a is  benefits  for  benefit acts."  to  for  is  "gains  having  altruism  by  others.  from resources  not  necessarily  Margolis different  proceeds  conceptions  S h a r e model w h i c h i s it  is  of  driven  t o have done o n e ' s  i m a g i n e an i n d i v i d u a l , G-Smith,  who  seeks  S m i t h who s e e k s Smith  is  in  always other  resources  between  these  a s e n s e of  the  these  altruism by e v e r y  in  on  fact  of  is  another  of  2 5  qualitatively the  Fair  i n d i v i d u a l ' s n o t i o n of  what  who i s  divided  asks into  the  reader  own  a pure a l t r u i s t ,  and S-  self-interest.  G-  and S - S m i t h , a p u r e  individual, persons  to  o r composed o f  to maximize group i n t e r e s t ,  internal  away  "based  what he t e r m s  Smith,  composite  as  i n c h a r a c t e r from a  two  He  two  actor  sheer  away  share.  words,  the  fulfil  combine  2 2  off."  benefits.  the  thus  cigars."  to maximize h i s  Smith,  is  fair  always  egoist.  to  to  better  for p a r t i c i p a t i o n in  different  f a n c y motor c a r s o r d o l l a r  increase function  observable sees  goods  "from g i v i n g r e s o u r c e s  benefits  Smith's  from an  people  altruism  "giving  of  utility  He has a t a s t e  and  for  his  other  or g a i n i n g u t i l i t y  notion  utility  contrast,  participation" "  taste  the  b a s e d on e x t e r n a l l y  psychic  tastes,  via  others:  Participation  2  A l t r u i s m and R a t i o n a l i t y  a l t r u i s t i c a c t i o n c a n be d e r i v e d  individual  thus  of  2 3  of  familiar  taste  deriving  internal  benefits  the  Participation  social  Selfishness,  available  Goods a l t r u i s m  the  2 1  in  The most  whereby  the  others.  Margolis  that  altruism in  on  allocates  his  i n s u c h a manner as  h a v i n g done what S m i t h p e r c e i v e s  to  be  his  53  "fair-share".  M a r g o l i s proposes  complied  results  larger more  with  the  share  weight  marginal  of  I  give  marginal  on t h e  2  to  my  On t h e  I have  rule  spent  selfish  S'  and  allocations Smith's  on  utility  G'  other  myself,  marginal  to  S-Smith of  S m i t h , but evaluates  hand,  the  to  and the  follows  may be' q u i t e  possess  unselfishly,  the  the  larger  benefit I  allocating benefit  from  will  G-Smith.  to  own  I  spending  tend  any  "we but  are  to  act  unconscious."  ethical  value:  utilities  from  s  of  society  weight  to 2 7  as  S  or  a whole  internal 2 8  So t h e it  is  (not  S m i t h ) ; and W is  G-Smith.  postulating  and g  evaluates  the  when d e c i d i n g whether  not  r a t h e r an  G  "G-utility  situation."  S-utility  and  following  situation  Smith's  cautions,  consciously Smith  utilities  m a r g i n a l d o l l a r on e i t h e r  Margolis  "The  the  more  g i v i n g no s p e c i a l  which Smith a t t a c h e s another  share:  fair  6  perception  excluding  when  in  S - S m i t h and G - S m i t h have c o r r e s p o n d i n g S and  which  interests  g r o u p compared w i t h t h e  resources  unselfishly."  following  i n S m i t h h a v i n g done h i s  my r e s o u r c e s  resources.  can c o n f e r  the  to  weight spend  Notice, a  S-  as  rule  Smith  of  which  mechanism model  is  not  intended  not  normative  but  descriptive. The  Fair  above,  means  dollar  to  greater the  that  the  one  benefit of  (FS) model  Smith's  G-Smith w i l l  benefit  likely  Share  f o r m a l i z e d from t h e  propensity  increase  with  one can c o n f e r  to the  allocate  be t o  act  on t h e  unselfishly.  a  given  marginal  r a t i o G ' / S ' because  spending marginal resources  will  rule  the  g r o u p compared w i t h  on o n e s e l f ,  the  The r a t i o G ' / S ' ,  more that  54  between Smith  the  marginal' u t i l i t y  and  to  S-Smith,  the  effect  half  the  formalized rule,  g/s,  meaning  that  weight  one w i l l  ratio  g/s  the  the  value  ratio  favour  of  g/s;  but  quite wish  thus  the  g/s  spend  is  between  Talk  more  that  participation selfishness,  to  increasing  achieve to  the  W  since  Smith g i v e s  value  ratio,  the to  G'/S',  only of  the  more  terms  the  " g i v e s the  between  is  function  Margolis  ratio  spending  pressures:  be more w i l l i n g  increase that  the  Smith  in to  to  if  already  he w i l l  Smith, . that  S-spending  of  G and  giving  increasingly  is  the  whole  (or, greater  goods  might  the  self-interest captures  to  "captures we  an  equals  the  when ratio  S-spending.  may c a u s e one and  in  ratio  an e q u i l i b r i u m when W = G ' / S ' o r  selfish  the  spend  participation is  group i n t e r e s t ,  function  altruism  ratio.  group spending,  two o p p o s i n g  he w i l l  -participation  weight  The  of  S-Smith.  f o r m a l models  two c o n c e p t i o n s  altruism."  on  "value"  to G -  2 9  marginal u t i l i t i e s of  an  spending.  meaning  i n the  he a c c o r d s  the  claims  high,  high,  will  weight  the  resources  subject  G ' / S ' is  individual, the  gives  his  S~uti1ity."  substantially to  for W is  G - S m i t h and t h e r e f o r e if  calls  resources  r a t i o on g r o u p s p e n d i n g  on s e l f i s h  allocated  maximize G v e r s u s is  value  extra  " p a r t i c i p a t i o n " r a t i o which  w h i c h S m i t h has  Smith  the  more one  place  allocating  Margolis  However, of  of  of  forget  the  altruism. an i n t u i t i v e say,  original Margolis sense  participation  participation ratio  the  at  And  the  margin).  intuitive  of  sense  of  more the goods  3 0  formal  character  of  Margolis'  work  gives  it  a  55  complexity is  not  which o u t s t r i p s  an e x p l a n a t i o n  theory  about  individual display  income.  to  do h i s  is  the  case.  of  h a v i n g done  does  not  all. act  it  people  of  his  the  about  as  as  is  well  s e n t i m e n t s of psychological neither  to  do o n e ' s  share,  o r do h i s to  3 1  T h i s may  they  do s o .  in,  not  an  fair  but  group i f  both  (such  that  duty,  or g a i n  He r e j e c t s being  the  of  and  motivation,  of  opposite a  sense  excellent  a free  Altruism  explanations of  but  and t h a t  of  agents  to  presents  to  and  to  account  they  for  for  an its  based  instances  the  ground  to which they  to  3 2  altruist.  which r e s o r t  us  : why do  altruism  the  "on the  is  those  it  creates  ride?"  ,  covering  benefit  enough  his  reasoning  principles  nor o b v i o u s  G'/S  psychic  the  real question  its  those e x p l a n a t i o n s  societal  =  group i n t e r e s t  can get  incapable  no p r o s p e c t  W  S m i t h has  allows  a  Smith  i n d i v i d u a l G-Smith w i t h i n  they  for  share.  an  or  derive  Margolis in effect  surprisingly,  interest,  between  they  prove  i n the  sympathy o r b e n e v o l e n c e  universal  altruistic  share."  a  altruistic  understand that  i n The P o s s i b i l i t y  claims.  self-interest  rejects  is  by p o s i t i n g  the  admirable  in which there  of  why  group  conservative on  because  how i n d i v i d u a l s g i v e  Thomas N a g e l argument  interest  essential  fair  behaviour  care  are  G i v e n an e q u i l i b r i u m a l l o c a t i o n ,  "Putting this in  fair is  explain  altruistic  it  but  resources  Individuals  group  what  The FS model  altruistic  allocate  "an e q u i l i b r i u m a l l o c a t i o n  Rather,  description  of  s e n s e of  assumptions.  why i n d i v i d u a l s a r e  individuals  degree  choose  order  basic  and g r o u p s p e n d i n g .  psychological  in  how  some  does not  of  its  3 3  He  general  that  the  appeal  are  the  are e v i d e n t l y  extent false  to  56  3  the  phenomena." " Nagel  criticizes  and s e l f - i n t e r e s t the  source  desire  is  writes, of is  that  them  advantage, specific  the  There  the  or  that  to  objective. related  a l t r u i s m (or  reasons  are  They a r e not reasons true."  for  3 8  version  action  rather  reasons  for  he none  which  which  about  is  social  operation  of  to  any  reasons  need not  not  for  of  choice."  its  action  always  a subjective  he on  3 6  be  follows  "yield distinct  but  of  3 7  they  Objective apply but  the  to.  simply  which they  be a l t r u i s t i c but 3 9  we  he  or  be w h o l l y e g o i s t i c  one."  taste,  subjective  individuals, things  argues  Instead,  should  individuals."  the  practical  recognition)  t o p r o m o t e what  need not  of  depend  possibility to  altruism  the q u e s t i o n ,  do  its  of  requirements  particular  occurrence  is  others  possibility  for d i f f e r e n t  reasons  of. e g o i s m  And  generality  T h e s e may be e i t h e r  f o r anyone  the  the  and u l t i m a t e  "reasons  reasons  the  motives  for a c t i o n .  Subjective  objective  the  our own b a r r i e r s  Subjective  ends of  for  as  that  "because  reflections  approaches  an a r b i t r a r y  from our r e a s o n s  desire  source.  absolute  require  of  other  overcome  an a l t r u i s t i c  important  simple,  i n a c o n s i d e r a t i o n of  sentiment,  sentiment  3 5  explanation  Unlike  of  are u n s a t i s f a c t o r y  not  " a l t r u i s m and r e l a t e d  insists  most  of  terms  behaviour, arguing instead,  complicated  and w h i c h does  reasoning.  in  a considerateness  of  sentiment."  originates  nor  type  is  reach  Nagel's  to  explanations  provides  beyond  able  only  these  both  simply p o s t u l a t i n g  motivation  the  required.  that  for  of  not  explanations  just  hold as  "central  57  Nagel action, one  contends  "the  only  operates  be a b l e same  to  back  for  a reason,  as  acting  for  one  are  conceived of  ones,  for  reasons  for  it  argues,  if  so  Altruism are  personal to  thus  subject  depends  is  for  of  that  must  to  in turn  the  Whenever one to  reasons  same  regard  of  to  and  be a b l e  to  "on t h e formal  on our a b i l i t y  fact  to  view  can  act  upon  avoid  this  when an  end  contain  the  subjective  interests.  Objective  self  as  merely  and t h i s  a question  and so  to  a reply,  standpoints,  and t o  p r a c t i c a l conclusions  from b o t h of  these  which a  action  objectivity,  engage  do  reasons.  for  ourselves.from  and i m p e r s o n a l  like  and t o  objective  our r e a s o n s of  one  conception  "How would you  formulate  condition  one  a  to  altruism.  that  are  about  while  reasons  of  is  action  which  in contrast  you?",  oneself  judgement  action  acts  objectively  for  understand  others'  an i m p e r s o n a l v i e w p o i n t depends  those  inhabitants,  a requirement  if  principle yielding  require a conception such  even  must  Objective they,  for  one  and p r o m o t i n g an  cannot  recognition  did  ones;  ones w h i c h w a r r a n t a c t i o n  a w o r l d of  altruist  requires  one  reasons  principle,  others.  the  impersonally.  action  someone  potential  make  of  objective  be p o s s i b l e  reason,  a l t r u i s m because  p e r s o n amongst Nagel  must  reasons  objective  the  types  and i m p e r s o n a l v i e w p o i n t s ,  only  of  possibility allow  it  own p a i n ,  The  incongruity  (presumably)  cannot  from p e r s o n a l  another's.  are  Furthermore, subjective  understand one's  is  as  an o b j e c t i v e  incongruous:  reasons  two  up w i t h an o b j e c t i v e  well  0  these  with a subjective  I maintain,  end.""  situation  it  as  of  acceptable  successfully  reasons  valuable  that  both  in  standpoints.  which the  reasoning These  58  are  forms of  to  renounce."" The  sense, If  thought  for action  altruism  able  to  Nagel  its the  which  a b y - p r o d u c t of  for  view  his  acceptance  it  necessary  it  may not  does not egoism,  rare),  fulfilled  its is  of  for  be  i n our  power  then as  the  altruism is  practical the  an  objectively.  preclude  This  as  to  p r a c t i c a l reasoning.  only  existence  requirements be  merely  the  reasoning.  argument  possibility  raises  its  universality  establishes are p r e s e n t .  in a  i n d i v i d u a l must  it  for  but  offers  be o b j e c t i v e ,  been  contrary  for  altruistic,  it  requirements  must  make a c a s e is  Nagel  own c o n d i t i o n  p r o b a b i l i t y of  believes  the  w i l l have  emphasizes,  argument  which  1  explanation  reasons  the  and a c t i o n  of  that If  and i n  cost  by  making  Neither  altruism the we a r e  fact  does  (Nagel  conditions not  often  because:  ...we are often weak, cowardly, self-deceiving, and insensitive to the reality of other persons. There i s n e v e r a l a c k of e x p l a n a t i o n s f o r human l a p s e s from ideally rational conduct, and when the stakes are high, the t e m p t a t i o n s of s o l i p s i s t i c d i s s o c i a t i o n a r e considerable. It is often a struggle to m a i n t a i n the c l e a r s e n s e of o n e s e l f as j u s t a p e r s o n among others. But I have not maintained t h a t human c o n d u c t i n v a r i a b l y a c c o r d s w i t h t h a t conception. I have o n l y t r i e d t o e x p l a i n our deep-seated s u s c e p t i b i l i t y t o n o n - e g o i s t i c r e a s o n s , and our c a p a c i t y t o recognize them as r e q u i r e m e n t s i f the i s s u e i s f o r c e d upon us w i t h s u f f i c i e n t c l a r i t y . " 2  It number  has  a l s o been  of  sentiments  susceptible. motivated act.  For 1. of  Under  suggested that to  which  certain  altruism is  but  i n d i v i d u a l s are  conditions,  by an u n d e r l y i n g s e n t i m e n t  to  an  engage  in  actor i n an  one  of  some  sense  will  a  be  altruistic  example:  Suppose one of  that his  a consumer w i s h e s f o r a n o t h e r t o consumption goods for reasons  have of  more pure  59  benevolence.* 2. in  3  Then it is a manifestation his preferences.*"  3. for  The b e n e v o l e n t s e n t i m e n t the o t h e r ' s ' h a p p i n e s s ' ,  of  an a l t r u i s t i c  sentiment  may be m o t i v a t e d by the d e s i r e however t h a t i s u n d e r s t o o d . " 5  4a. If a person p r e f e r s that a certain good which he p o s s e s s e s b e n e f i t a n o t h e r r a t h e r t h a n h i m s e l f , he w i l l make a gift of this good, so l o n g as t h i s i s m a t e r i a l l y and s o c i a l l y p o s s i b l e , and so l o n g as t h e gift is accepted. This behaviour presupposes t h a t h i s c o n c e r n i n f a v o u r of t h e o t h e r ' s c o n s u m p t i o n of t h i s good i s i n some sense more weighty than h i s g a i n from c o n s u m i n g i t h i m s e l f . In s u c h cases, altruistic sentiments bring about altruistic behaviour. But i f h i s c o n c e r n f o r t h e o t h e r ' s c o n s u m p t i o n i s t o o weak r e l a t i v e to his concern for his own, his altruistic sentiments do not lead to correspondingly a l t r u i s t i c behaviour." 6  4b. ...a person's altruistic sentiment (desiring that another have more) cannot t r a n s l a t e i n t o a l t r u i s t i c gift behaviour unless it is sufficiently powerful that its s a t i s f a c t i o n w i l l compensate him f o r t h e l o s s of t h a t w h i c h he has g i v e n . " 7  5. Sentiments and b e h a v i o u r may have s i m i l a r t r a i t s and l a b e l s ( " e g o i s t i c " or " a l t r u i s t i c " ) . Sentiments tend to give rise t o the c o r r e s p o n d i n g b e h a v i o u r . But i t i s w e l l known t h a t the c o n t r a r y a l s o o c c u r s : a certain behaviour may end up c r e a t i n g in the actor the corresponding sentiment. " 8  6. . . . t h e same p e r s o n may be a l t r u i s t i c ( i n sentiment in b e h a v i o u r ) toward one, e g o i s t i c toward another . . . so o n . In f a c t , this is generally, the case, and strength of all t h e s e v a r i a b l e s may d i f f e r d e p e n d i n g for example, the goods at stake, the people, or situation.""  or and the on, the  9  This article  explanation,  " A l t r u i s m and  sentiments, individual  to  from S e r g e - C h r i s t o p h e  Efficiency",  social-psychological assumes b e h a v i o u r  excerpted  explanations be m o t i v a t e d  attitudes, who b e h a v e s  traits,  has of  i n an a l t r u i s t i c  in  behaviour.  by one or  much  of  a  Kolm's  common This  approach  constellation  predispositions. manner  is  with  assumed  of An to  60  possess  an  motivates As that  antecedent  the  behaviour  explanation  of  explanation behaviour  desire  the  of  is  the  for  sentiment  other's  the  this  type,  itself.  benevolence  or a t t i t u d e  yet  5 0  happiness  At o t h e r  sentiments  self-reflection,  he w r i t e s  or an a c t  they  each  unanswered:  if  why i s  it  be e x p l a i n e d by s e l f - r e f l e c t i o n ,  altruism even  is  an a c t  less;  typically,  altruistically;  "test  to  say  undeniably  canot  be  granted that  through i m i t a t i o n or  is  case"  the  work  in genetic  .  will"  still  leave  5 1  taught?;  little  and  moral  first  many a c t s  say  that  explain  to  b e h a v i o u r may i n s t i l l the  these  quality,  required  fact, place,  or  necessarily  very  after  ,  ,  questions  to  a  5 2  E a c h of  egoistic?;  morally  but  behave  sentiment,  we  but why would by c h a n c e ,  by  explanations  of  what?  from t h e of  5 3  of  to  has  a l t r u i s t i c a l l y in the  One o b v i o u s o m i s s i o n altruism  is  the  individuals  why would t h i s  opposed  r a t i o n a l i z e our a c t i o n s  a p e r s o n behave mistake,  will  altruism we  frequently  of  as  which  that  but  be a l t r u i s t i c  the  motivated  a question  may have  to  step  what  explanations  one  Kolm pushes  through p a r e n t a l e d u c a t i o n  taught,  no  the  sentiment  lead  we have  may be m o t i v a t e d by  the  altruism is  accept  the  But  reasoning  some v a l u e  may  sentiment,  t h r o u g h b e h a v i o u r which i n s t i l l s  can  which  from  is  points  we  another  "sentiment  'happiness'."  may a c q u i r e a l t r u i s t i c  while  At f i r s t ,  back  the  other's  remains u n r e s o l v e d .  "through  of  m o t i v a t e d by t h e  by w r i t i n g t h a t  for  sentiment  behaviour.  i n many e x p l a n a t i o n s  the  desire  congruent  discussion  sociobiologists  theories  of  of  who t r e a t 5  behaviour. "  But  it  as even  the a  61  cursory  review  discussion take  us  while as  of  far  this  from t h e  life  central  A decision  focus  view  of  and  death  usually  to  involve  of  of  obvious  it  takes  usefulness instances  or  p r o v i s i o n of  immediate  Moreover,  c o n v i n c i n g when its  lengthy  w h i c h would  paper.  diminished in  less  a  evolution  situations,  the  our  require  this  altruism is  implications are  to c o n t r i b u t e  would  mechanics  human b e h a v i o u r a p p e a r s  and d e a t h  does not  literature  contentious  a gene's-eye  explaining  2.5  the  an example  life  of  indeed  most  in  where  absent.  public  goods  survival.  Conclusion.  It  will  altruism  be  reviewed  satisfactory perhaps  is  of  i n mind the at  the  some  of  the  pages  posit  i n Nagel  the  are  is  not  of  wholly  existence  there  of  a motivation  itself.  most  b e g i n n i n g of  theories  O n l y - N a g e l and  the  behaviour  i n a d e q u a c y of  the  of  behaviour.  than  And o n l y  independent  posed  that  preceding  rather  behaviour.  Bearing  now  the  explain  truly  questions  in  explanations  Kurz  altruistic which  apparent  the  explanations, chapter  can s t i l l  the be  answered. First, general  we wanted  behaviour  in p o l i t i c a l  that  situations  relationships Certainly,  to  between  there  is  know whether  it  c o u l d at  or,  altruism is  least  whether  it  acquaintances nothing  in  is  a  sufficiently  potentially limited or  either  be to  family  observed specific members.  definitions  or  62  explanations is  not  the  of  relevant  provision  describes specific  a  about  of  cost  but makes  practical  provision  of  to  to  goods  be t h e  case, public  is  not  the  good.  explanation  for  on  altruism  a  which presumably h o l d s  in  well  individuals'  accords with d e f i n i t i o n s f o r as  with  goods c a n n o t  entirely  as  has  been  relevant  to  the  p r o v i s i o n of  as  in  the  suggested  in t h i s  behaviour of  in  altruism.  altruism,  contributions  be c o e r c e d  and r e q u i r e a  r e c o u p e d by the  chapter,  p u b l i c goods,  goods p r o v i d e d on a v o l u n t a r y b a s i s government?  to  no r e s t r i c t i o n s  p u b l i c goods as  know whether  If,  of  altruism  relationships.  p r o v i s i o n of which  Nagel's  conditions  reasoning  contributions  public  goods.  the  that  and more s p e c i f i c a l l y  c o n d i t i o n which p l a c e s  we wanted  seems t o  situations  collective  personal  providing  the  of  of  Second,  to  political  situations  decisions  This  to  b e h a v i o u r w h i c h would s u g g e s t  general  requirement  context  the  without  benefits  from  the  a l t r u i s m may  be  why a r e the  not  more  coercive  such  actions  63  Notes.  1  View o f p. 26.  Garrett Hardin, The L i m i t s of A l t r u i s m : an E c o l o q i s t ' s S u r v i v a l (Bloomington: Indiana U n i v e r s i t y Press, 1977),  2  of A l t r u i s m ( O x f o r d : O x f o r d  3  P r o s o c i a l B e h a v i o u r : T h e o r y and R e s e a r c h P u b l i s h i n g , 1976), p . 102.  Thomas N a g e l , The P o s s i b i l i t y University Press, 1970), p . ]~6~.  Daniel Bar-Tal, (Washington: Hemisphere  4  Dennis L . Krebs, "Altruism an E x a m i n a t i o n of the C o n c e p t and a Review of t h e L i t e r a t u r e " P s y c h o l o g i c a l B u l l e t i n , vol. 73 ( 1 9 7 0 ) , p . 259.  5  See: James S. F i s h k i n , The L i m i t s of O b l i g a t i o n Yale University Press, 1979).  Haven:  6  F i s h k i n , The L i m i t s of O b l i g a t i o n  7  See: J . O . Melden, ed., Washington P r e s s ,  8  vol.  (1977),  14.  Urmson, "Saints and H e r o e s " , in A. Essays in Moral Philosophy (University 1958).  S e r g e - C h r i s t o p e Kolm, 94 ( 1 9 8 3 ) , p . 40.  9  , p.  David Gauthier, p. 199.  " A l t r u i s m and E f f i c i e n c y " ,  "Coordination",  (New  Dialogue  ,  I. of  Ethics  vol.  ,  14  1 0  Mordecai Kurz, " A l t r u i s t i c E q u i l i b r i u m " i n , Bela Belassa and R i c h a r d N e l s o n e d s . , Economic P r o g r e s s , P r i v a t e V a l u e s , and P u b l i c P o l i c y (Amsterdam: N o r t h - H o l l a n d , 1 9 7 7 ) , p p . 180-181.  1 1  Basic  R o b e r t A x e l r o d , The E v o l u t i o n of Books, 1984).  1 2  following  The P r i s o n e r ' s allegory:  Dilemma  game  Cooperation  takes  its  (New  York:  name from t h e  64  Two s u s p e c t s a r e taken in custody and separated. The district attorney is certain that t h e y a r e g u i l t y of a s p e c i f i c c r i m e , but he does not have a d e q u a t e evidence to convict them at a trial. He p o i n t s out t o e a c h p r i s o n e r t h a t e a c h has two a l t e r n a t i v e s : t o c o n f e s s t o t h e c r i m e the p o l i c e a r e s u r e t h e y have d o n e , o r not t o c o n f e s s . If they b o t h do not c o n f e s s , t h e n the d i s t r i c t a t t o r n e y states he will book them on some m i n o r t r u m p e d - u p c h a r g e s u c h as p e t t y l a r c e n y and i l l e g a l p o s s e s s i o n of a weapon, and they both will receive minor punishment; i f they both c o n f e s s t h e y w i l l be p r o s e c u t e d , but he w i l l recommend less than the most severe sentence; but i f one c o n f e s s e s and t h e o t h e r does n o t , then the confessor will receive lenient treatment for t u r n i n g s t a t e ' s e v i d e n c e whereas the l a t t e r w i l l g e t ' t h e book' s l a p p e d a t h i m . In t e r m s of y e a r s i n a p e n i t e n t i a r y , the s t r a t e g i c p r o b l e m might r e d u c e t o : Prisoner  Prisoner 1 Not Confess  Confess  2  Not Confess 1 year  Confess each  3 months 10 y e a r s  10 y e a r s 3 months  for 1 for 2  R. Duncan L u c e and Howard Y o r k : W i l e y , 1957), p. 95.  8 years  Raiffa,  for for  1 , 2  each  Games and D e c i s i o n s  (New  1 3  See: Mordecai K u r z , " A l t r u i s m as an Outcome of S o c i a l Interaction," American Economic A s s o c i a t i o n . P a p e r s and P r o c e e d i n g s , v o l . 9 0 ( 1 9 7 8 ) , p p . 2 1 6 - 2 2 2 , and Note 10 a b o v e .  1  * Kurz,  1 5  Kurz,  "Altruistic  Equilibrium"  , p.  179.  "Altruistic  Equilibrium"  , p.  184.  1 6  See Robert Axelrod, The E v o l u t i o n of C o o p e r a t i o n ; R o b e r t A x e l r o d , "The Emergence of C o o p e r a t i o n Among Altruists", A m e r i c a n P o l i t i c a l S c i e n c e Review , vol. 75 ( 1 9 8 1 ) , p p . 306318, and ; Robert Axelrod and W i l l i a m D. Hamilton, "The Evolution of Cooperation", Science , vol. 211 ( 1 9 8 1 ) , p p . 1390-1396.  1 7  1976),  Michael Taylor, pp. 28-83.  A n a r c h y and C o o p e r a t i o n ( L o n d o n :  Wiley,  65  1 8  Kurz,  "Altruistic  Equilibrium",  p.  179,  1 9  Kurz,  "Altruistic  Equilibrium",  p.  197  2  Kurz,  "Altruistic  Equilibrium",  p.  197  0  2 1  Howard Margolis, Selfishness, ( C a m b r i d g e : Cambridge U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s ,  2 2  Margolis,  Selfishness,  A l t r u i s m and R a t i o n a l i t y 1982), p i Y5~.  A l t r u i s m and R a t i o n a l i t y  ,  p.  21 .  2 3  Margolis,  Selfishness,  A l t r u i s m and R a t i o n a l i t y  ,  p.  21 .  2 «  Margolis,  Selfishness,  A l t r u i s m and R a t i o n a l i t y  ,  p.  27 .  2 5  Margolis,  Selfishness,  A l t r u i s m and R a t i o n a l i t y  , p.  21-22. 2 6  Margolis,  Selfishness,  A l t r u i s m and R a t i o n a l i t y  ,  p.  36.  2 7  Margolis,  Selfishness,  A l t r u i s m and R a t i o n a l i t y  ,  p.  38.  2 8  Margolis,  Selfishness,  A l t r u i s m and R a t i o n a l i t y  ,  p.  38-39.  2 9  Margolis,  Selfishness,  A l t r u i s m and R a t i o n a l i t y  ,  p.  38.  3 0  Margolis,  Selfishness,  A l t r u i s m and R a t i o n a l i t y  ,  p.  42. 31  60.  Margolis,  Selfishness,  A l t r u i s m and R a t i o n a l i t y  ,  p.  66  3 2  Andrew S c h o t t e r , "Review of S e l f i s h n e s s , Altruism, and Rationality", J o u r n a l of Economic L i t e r a t u r e , v o l . 21 ( 1 9 8 3 ) , p. 557.  3 3  .ty  ,  Press,  1970), P-  79.  3 «  The  Possibility  of  Altruism  ,  P-  79-80  3 5  The  Possibility  of  Altruism  ,  P-  82.  3 6  The  Possibility  of  Altruism  , P-  1 44 .  3 7  The  Possibility  of  Altruism  , P-  90.  3 8  The  Possibility  of  Altruism  , P-  91 .  3 9  The  Possibility  of  Altruism  ,  P-  96.  ao  The  Possibility  of  Altruism  ,  P-  96-97  u 1  The  Possibility  of  Altruism  ,  P-  1 44.  4 2  The  Possibility  of  Altruism  , P.  1 24.  3  " vol.  S e r g e - C h r i s t o p e Kolm, 94 ( 1 9 8 3 ) , p . 38.  " A l t r u i s m and E f f i c i e n c y " ,  4  4  Kolm,  " A l t r u i s m and E f f i c i e n c y " ,  p.  38.  4  5  Kolm,  " A l t r u i s m and E f f i c i e n c y " ,  p.  39.  4 6  Kolm,  " A l t r u i s m and E f f i c i e n c y " ,  p.  39.  4 7  Kolm,  " A l t r u i s m and E f f i c i e n c y " ,  p.  48.  4  Kolm,  " A l t r u i s m and E f f i c i e n c y " ,  p.  48.  8  Ethics  67  "  9  5  Kolm,  " A l t r u i s m and E f f i c i e n c y " ,  p.  40.  0  Kolm,  " A l t r u i s m and E f f i c i e n c y " ,  p.  39.  5 1  Kolm,  " A l t r u i s m and E f f i c i e n c y " ,  p.  45.  5 2  Kolm,  " A l t r u i s m and E f f i c i e n c y " ,  p.  45-46  Kolm,  " A l t r u i s m and E f f i c i e n c y " ,  p.  45.  5 3  5 a  F o r an o v e r v i e w of t h i s a r e a see: Edward 0 . Wilson, Soc i o b i o l o g y . The New S y n t h e s i s (Cambridge Mass.: Belknap P r e s s , 1975). Other important c o n t r i b u t i o n s are: Richard D. A l e x a n d e r , "The E v o l u t i o n o f S o c i a l B e h a v i o u r " , A n n u a l Review of E c o l o g y and S y s t e m i c s , vol. 5 (1974), pp. 325-383; Scott Boorman and P a u l R. L e v i t t , The G e n e t i c s of A l t r u i s m (New Y o r k : A c a d e m i c P r e s s , 1980); W i l l i a m D. Hamilton, "The Genetical Theory of Social Behaviour. Parts I and I I . " , J o u r n a l of Theoretical Biology, v o l . 7, ( 1 9 6 4 ) , p p . 1-16, 1732; and, Robert L . T r i v e r s , "The E v o l u t i o n o f R e c i p r o c a l A l t r u i s m " , The Q u a r t e r l y Review of B i o l o g y , v o l . 46 ( 1 9 7 1 ) , p p . 35-57; For a non-technical, t h o u g h o p i n i o n a t e d r e v i e w of t h e l i t e r a t u r e , see: Richard D a w k i n s , The S e l f i s h Gene ( L o n d o n : G r a n a d a , . 1 9 7 8 ) . One of t h e b e s t c r i t i q u e s i s : M a r s h a l l S a h l i n s , The Use and Abuse of Biology. An A n t h r o p o l o g i c a l C r i t i q u e o f S o c i o b i o l o g y (Ann A r b o r : U n i v e r s i t y of M i c h i g a n P r e s s , 1 9 7 6 ) .  68  III.  3.1  AND CONTEXT  Recapi t u l a t i o n .  Now that  briefly  back  to  some j u s t i f i c a t i o n s  influenced  by  prior  suggested that or  ALTRUISM  without  the  the  private  life  of  only. of  the  provision  of  irrational Still Chapter their  why  equally  for  public  does not  behaviour  to  situations. individuals  was  extend  It  was  the  that  state this  the  behaviour  in  altruism  C h a p t e r Two a l s o such  to  that  public  in  then  fit  suggested  into  be  benevolence  describe  may engage  may  entirely  assigns  and  suggested  government  goods o u t s i d e  which  goods,  was  human n a t u r e .  C h a p t e r Two i t  public  it  is  a  life  and  reviewed  some  an  apparently  behaviour. thinking  One,  note  provision,  provide  of  There  a l t r u i s m do seem t o  political of  about  intervention,  In  general  explanations  need  human n a t u r e  definitions  therefore  the  provision  usual  sufficiently  of  beginning.  beliefs  state's  characterization  the  the  the  that  and i n  good.  capable  of  of  example not  all  of  individuals  some i n s t a n c e s  Yet  if  public  we s u p p o s e  a l t r u i s m why do o n l y  goods  contribute  coercion that  cited  all  is  in  towards  required  to  individuals  are  some m a n i f e s t  it?  69  3.2  C o n s t r a i n t s On A l t r u i s m .  The answer differ. their  Some  first  will  be more a l t r u i s t i c  personality,  Krebs,  in a survey  writes:  Darley  sounds  the  experimental  as  a  subjects  2  did  not  responsibility,  In  similar  Korte  3  autonomous,  or  experimental irrelevant probably which  to  may  same t i m e ,  these  situation  to  findings  class,  likely  to  members of  elicit the  that  than course  1  unusual  also  roles  fit,  age,  potential  class  are  of  approval.  experimenter, deferential, These  personality  negative  is  findings situations  personality.  ordinal  to  those  nonhelpers.  the  be  example,  on measures  experimental  But a t  the  importance  of  writes  that  attributes  position,  "the of  social  a l t r u i s m . " " And " s e v e r a l  recipients  when t h e y  can  and  for  and d e m o g r a p h i c  sex,  Dennis  who r e s p o n d e d  less  Krebs a l s o  sometimes a f f e c t  same s o c i a l  The  emphasize  behaviour.  that  or  to  altruism,  For  mean t h a t  i m p o r t a n c e of  benefits  on  differ  were  the  demonstrated  suggest  of  more  the  social  and n a t i o n a l i t y  studies  no  behaviour.  findings  to  d i d not  But  conclusion  subjects  to  altruistic  relating  benefactors  were  do not  diminish  no g e n e r a l  according  i n v o l v i n g an a s t h m a t i c  submissive,  more  literature  those  individuals  on.  M a c h i a v e l l i a n i s m , or need  altruistic  relate  and so  benefactors."  respond,  helpers  results  that  h a v i n g an e p i l e p t i c  experiment  found t h a t  of  found t h a t  social a  traits  a confederate  who  whole,  is  than o t h e r s  of  Latane of  mind  characteristics  personality  and  comes to  social  "Considered  drawn about  the  that  are  friends,  and n a t i o n a l i t y  sometimes more ingroupers, as  and  benefactors.  70  Other  studies,  foreigners, altruism."  though,  and  5  But  relationship  of  not  the  altruism,  it  of  the of  or  people is  not  6  tend  to  who s h a r e  and  mentions  the  appeared  elicit social  view  roles  he  across  largely of  different  a the  amounts  differ  general  of  wants,  the  behaviour  along  trends  wishes,  degree  to  requires  desires  which those  In  or  sense,  a b e h a v i o u r may p r e - o r d a i n t h e  tastes  of  the  actors.  This  are  the  situational  is  not tastes  tastes  another  what  is  And " i n  s u r p r i s i n g that  the  sociological  altruism  . . . "  on  many e x p e r i m e n t s  trend  that  situations  situation.  behaviour  asking:  real  the  more  are  7  but a l s o  context  no  in  elicit  findings  frequently  or c o n t e x t  outgroupers,  classes  unclear  Krebs  indicate  explanation  of  social  the  situations  and t h a t  frequent."  context  to  specific  dimensions,  actor,  nonfriends,  higher to  that  different  consideration  the  fact  seems  of  Any  by  situation  "The  that  other  in contrast  of  experiments  fact  of  characteristics,  importance  function  members  that  between a l t r u i s m and d e m o g r a p h i c ,  personality  reviews:  suggest  are  the  only of  a an  affected  particular  which  govern  a r o u n d a b o u t way of  constraints  which  govern  altruism? That  a l t r u i s m or v o l u n t a r y g i f t - g i v i n g  or c o n s t r a i n e d However,  in  by  context  some  constrained  by  skills,  his  time  welfare  of  the  the  sounds  situations  altruistic  individual's  available; recipient;  by h i s by  almost  resources:  might  restricted  counter-intuitive. behaviour his  or her a b i l i t y the  be  will  wealth, to  expectations  improve of  be his the  others'  71  behaviour;  by t h e  behaviour;  and  the  succeeding  voluntary  chapter,  relationships,  for  the  choose.  the of  master  that of  giving  of  actions  will  individual  translate  that But  if  total  resources  it  is  nothing not  easy  possess  concern to  is  away. to  that  marginal to  be a l i n k to  giving  is  resources  i n the  group's  this  oneself the  interest.  the  the  a  gift  one  who  constraint  a w o r l d of  actors  an  in a p a r t i c u l a r  between how much one  a function  spend on o n e s e l f ,  as  behaviour:  of  by  so be a  actor's  situation,  important.  altruistic  on  may  potential  w h i c h may p o t e n t i a l l y  those a p p l i c a b l e  also  commits  imagine  be  extreme,  n a r r o w e d from d i s c u s s i o n  There w i l l  argues  the  So w o r d e d ,  nothing  may a p p e a r more  one  or  sentiment  constraint  much  or  altruistic  into  or member  be e x p l a i n e d  possess  In  this  altruist  individual  gift.  be  situations  n o t h i n g w h i c h may be g i v e n  they  gift.  a  not  Formally,  may f i r s t  another  as  these  would-be  must  in  i n which  will  possesses  may g i v e  rare for  bereft  which  construe  who  nothing  altruist  and  an a l t e r n a t i v e  the  such a c h o i c e  any w o u l d - b e  some of  not  which  in this  restricted.  impossible. is  social  altruism  In  is  a gift  from  something  recipient  sounds  gift-giving  govern  or s i t u a t i o n s  are q u i t e  or more r e a s o n s .  The a b s e n c e of  fact  cannot  one  be b e c a u s e  set  it  opportunities  or  of  has  the  which  be e x p l a i n e d  In many c o n t e x t s  that  this  As w i l l  possible  means  has  forth.  rules  is  will  the  so  or  gift-giving  possible it  institutions  of  action. the  more l i k e l y Russell  R e c a l l that  ratio  and on t h e  has  between  group.  one  Hardin  is  to  and  Margolis spending  The more spend  makes  how  a  one  some of similar  72  observation: has,  the  to  collective  gift  and  surpasses the  good.  An  willing  to  possible  the  it  as  ability  such.  also  a  does  or  actor  only  to  that  while  make a g i f t ,  one  moral desired  altruist have  it  the the  gift  gift  it is the  not  will  in  the  be b e c a u s e  of  are  to  them.  not  magnitude  not  is  be  of  well-  consider  an a c t o r  improve  to  can make a  recipient's  by  them  i m p r o v e the  that  it  the  will  actor  and t h e  of  relation  this  the  cannot  resources  making  useful  may not  constrained  but  still  i m p r o v e the  a gift  does s o ,  few  only  required  consumption  arguing that  be  indivisible  donors:  if  may  in  inclination  So t h a t  constraints  had  wishes  gift  or J o n e s  are a v a i l a b l e the  her  may be  the  is  But even  altruist  who n a t u r a l l y enough w i l l  the  recipient  it  heart  discussed  resources  a gift  totally  is  gift  i n s t a n c e s where  not  a  altruist  the  same t i m e .  Smith foresake example  or  of  S m i t h consumes the  his  magnitude  either  do so a t  would-be  would-be  For i n s t a n c e ,  recipient,  When a w o u l d - b e actor  of  So a l t r u i s m r e q u i r e s  but  of  the  the  situations.  the  the  In most being  that  can be accommodated,  of  a gift,  all  is,  else  one's  p r o v i s i o n of  the  give.  I have  in  gift  situation  p a r t w i t h the  that  being  that  far  everything  against  on the  manifest  resources  apposite  an a c t o r ' s  gift,  to  them c a n n o t  requires  trade  above,  not  fact  the  sense t h a t  Thus  described  could  by the  actor  b o t h of gift  so  either  to  more of  8  In a n o t h e r  constrained  the  the  m a r g i n a l impact  instance  behaviour.  in  a  good."  In t h e  of  obviously,  more one may be w i l l i n g  commitment  no  "Most  possess welfare.  the  well-  inappropriate.  insufficiency  for a g i f t .  the  But when an  73  individual which  is  may  b e i n g of  constrained  be  translated  another.  decrease  the  in  provide one.  times only  of  actor  the  the  increase gift  countries are  the  actually it  the  is  gifts  underdeveloped  inappropriate  without  well-  because  argued that  make to  the  may  recipient often  resources  affecting  because  they  a long  term  so  gift  and  inappropriateness  be  actor  b o t h of  rare.  token  gift  famine  relief  the  by  will  above  be  be  logically  related  inappropriate,  insufficiency  considered  or g i v e is  to a s o l u t i o n .  constraints  as  then  because  a gift  relief  nothing at  his  he  is  in  that  all.  skills  Smith's  be  even  that  the  individual  place, to  into  for  but  make  the  are  called  in  advice  resources  are  altruistic  action.  then  more common a c o n s t r a i n t . has  are  his  not  a  that of  skills  such  those  as  which  insufficient  to  Inappropriateness  For example, an  a his  even  problems  for  are  make  O r , S m i t h may b e l i e v e  which  i n whom S m i t h  they  to  w o r l d and would r a t h e r c o n t r i b u t e  But the  may  desire  unable  only a temporary s o l u t i o n  desire  a  i n some - f a r - o f f  a g r i c u l t u r a l , or e n g i n e e r i n g  possesses.  sound u n u s u a l ,  S m i t h may have  circumstances  underdeveloped  translate  constrained  has  famine  financial  medical,  gift  F o r example,  towards  present  also  altruist's  are  situation.  While  he  is  a temporary s o l u t i o n  will  particular  the  it  cannot  words, the  emergency  s h o u l d a would-be  nothing  not  gifts  the  9  that  the  of  developed  Insufficiency in  other  For example,  food which the  ones  In  inappropriateness, into  welfare  inappropriate. of  by  altruistic  it  may be interest  74  requires  sympathy,  incapable  of  basic  giving.  skill;  say  to  read,  start  with l e t t e r s ?  unable  or  but  is  not  translate  successful  behaviour.  recipient certain  because others,  it  For  example, a series  is  most  it  of  this  the  improve t h e of  the  welfare  altruist  which r e s u l t e d  i n the  produce  individual the  a  interfering  of  the  person  who  solicitous of  guards individual  these  the  his  at  who i s  examples  of  welfare  is or  of  the  needs.  In  players.  be one  possible by  In  result. will-  t o make  other  relationship  answer  will  not and  Or, not  an  thank thereby  a  blind  thank  assistance.  an o p t i m a l p o i n t  the  words,  For example,  himself.  offering  which  n o r by d e f i n i t i o n ,  learning will the  which  altruism  something  independence  is  he  actual  both  both a c t o r s .  forever  one  entire  a relationship  about  producing it  there  of  any o t h e r  provides  or  requires,  or a n o t h e r  of  (Does  or her  outcome.  process  or h e r  it  d i s t u r b an o p t i m a l  for  who  to  the  recipient  altered  young d a u g h t e r  an o p t i m a l e q u i l i b r i u m  who s a c r i f i c e d  altruist  enjoyment  to  brought  outcome  who c h e r i s h e s  diminishes his  both  worse  time  is a  into  welfare  outcome  one  a l t r u i s m may i n some s i t u a t i o n s , and  is  he  acquire  task  wish  what  i n the  outcome  another  may d e c r e a s e  may u p s e t  which  Syllables,  i n a p p r o p r i a t e to h i s  b a r g a i n s may a t  neither  gift  is  a gift  may be t h a t  from  of  about  w h i c h the  p r e f e r r e d by b o t h a c t o r s  welfare  go  altruistic  a decline  Any move  the  patience  his  a gift  b r i n g i n g about  all  who wants h i s  knowing how t o  situations  thus  is  a father  l a c k i n g the  some  love,  Consonants or vowels?  to  In  or  O r , S m i t h may w i s h t h a t  he  learn  words?)  patience  the In  beyond w h i c h  75  a i d may be c o n s i d e r e d only part  of  crossing  the  a  answer;  busy  requirements  will  Information to  objectionable:  make a g i f t  also  information  about  information  will  the  s h o u l d be a l l o c a t e d ,  the  the  to  annoyance  at  overlooked the  for  and  his  of  was  directed.  problems.  In p r a c t i c e ,  rational actor,  will  alleviate  as  taken  Hardin  the  or at  need  makes  to  amount  about how  the  who  is  resources take.  know w h i c h among and  which  are  others,  will  feel  of,  or  or  group  adopt  to a c q u i r e  will  at  large  satisfice rules  amounts  having  of  giving  easier  and  because  they  give  w h i c h would o t h e r w i s e  that  the  provide  sense  the  ease  these  as  will  thumb w h i c h information.  he  the  to  whom  1 0  of  on what  He s u g g e s t s in  at  certainly  certain  of  This  h a v i n g b a d l y matched a g i f t  notes a s i m i l a r c o n s t r a i n t  more e f f i c i e n t , opportunities  as  advantage  altruist  extrarational motivations.  organizations  just  of  should  genuine  Information w i l l  and w i l l  to  ability  welfare.  gift  wish  when these  welfare  some m i n i m a l  the  individual  the  upon t h e  s t a t e s of  will  only  recipient.  beneficence,  form  may w i s h  beyond  forming d e c i s i o n s  altruist  the  the  requires  Altruists,  behaviour  Russell  what  been  any  in  aid  improve t h e  recipients'  an o p p o r t u n i t y ,  requirements  of  or h e r a i d a r e  exploit. having  to  altruist's  potential  many demands  attempts  altruist  important  of  provide  help  a constraint  ability  potential be  as  problem s o l v e r person  welfare  act  and on t h e  A potential  Moreover,  To  d i m i n i s h the will  deserving  blind  street.  recipient.  most  the  the  describes  existence  that  of  it  may be  information  about  be c o s t l y  The institutionalization of organizations S i e r r a C l u b makes c o l l e c t i v e p o l i t i c a l a c t i o n  to  gather:  such as the much easier  76  f o r e n v i r o n m e n t a l i s t s t h a n i t would o t h e r w i s e be - not o n l y are extrarational contributions more likely g i v e n such o r g a n i z a t i o n s , but the c o n t r i b u t i o n s a r e a l s o l i k e l y t o be more efficiently spent. Someone who would a c t out of m o r a l i t y o r m i s u n d e r s t a n d i n g i s more l i k e l y to contribute money, o t h e r t h i n g s being e q u a l , i f the e f f o r t i n v o l v e d in making the contribution is made easy. The m o r a l or misunderstanding environmentalist need not survey all p o s s i b l e ways t o c o n t r i b u t e , but need only satisfice by sending in the membership amount r e q u e s t e d i n t h e m a i l i n g from t h e f i r s t e n v i r o n m e n t a l o r g a n i z a t i o n whose name he or she recognizes. In s u b s e q u e n t y e a r s members can s a t i s f i c e even more easily they need merely renew their memberships. 1 1  The  constraints  making of  a gift  and the  welfare  of  the  certain  situations  requirements discussed  the  will  In  that  have  the  either  fulfilled.  of  far  threats,  dealt  gift  both cases  prevent  being  effect  thus  requirement  recipient.  from  is  discussed  it  or  with  improve  the  was a r g u e d  that  both  of  these  A further constraint censure,  the  to  rewards and so  be on,  on a l t r u i s m . Some  experimental  w h i c h the  presence  altruism.  Batson  subjects  who  motivation those small  who  of et  evidence  shows t h a t  altruistic compatible  to  reward.  that  has  confirmed  rewards shown  to  has  i n two  of  appears  an e x t r i n s i c  threats  behaviour.  influence  self-reported  without  that  the  extrinsic  a l t r u i s m than  same t a s k  but w i t h  to  in  did some  1 2  threats of  on  perform a task  p e r f o r m the  the  experiments  s c o r e s on s e l f - r e p o r t e d  asked  The p r e s e n c e to  have  asked  had h i g h e r  extrinsic  analagous  external al.  were  were  research  tend  Since  with a l t r u i s t i c  to  work  reward.  Some  d i m i n i s h the  neither  behaviour,  threats  their  a  manner  experimental  likelihood  of  nor r e w a r d s  are  presence  in a  given  77  situation  reduces  the  likelihood  of  genuine  altruistic  behaviour. Another is  that  relying  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of  they  introduce  upon t h e  benevolence  employs  a  threat  position  to  improve h i s  altruism  of  a  or  situations way  of  In  3.3  to  be  Institutions  The  this  hierarchical  or  an e f f e c t  role  are  upon t h e is  territoriality,  a social  and  But  who  is  in a  r e l y i n g upon  the  the  victims  r a r e l y p o r t r a y e d , or  expressed  or  is  often  far  in s o c i a l  welfare  state,  altruistic  institution its  reputation  of  believe  in  is  are  arrangements, of  exchange,  by s t r u c t u r i n g  of  as  with  w h i c h imposes  all  in general the  t r y i n g to c u r r y  all  have  a whole  Deference,  hostile  to  through  altruism.  either  G i f t - g i v i n g to favour  or  set  status,  established  hierarchy  suspicion.  rather  behaviour.  occupants.  t o members of  treated  may be t h o u g h t  thus  The m a r k e t s y s t e m  and t h e  upon  hierarchy  gift-giving  above  often  l i k e l i h o o d of  Voluntary below  through,  i n d i v i d u a l s i n p a r t i c u l a r ways,  expectations  hierarchy.  respect,  altruism discussed  institutions.  between  Hierarchy of  on  organization,  relationships  without  actor  As C o n s t r a i n t s .  fashion  conventions,  are  it  The  without  altruistic.  constraints  disembodied  actor.  carries  own w e l l - b e i n g  others.  threats  improving welfare  another  actually  b l a c k m a i l e r s and e x t o r t i o n i s t s themselves  of  which c o n t a i n  above those  even  to  78  affect one  decisions  i n the  bribery.  h i e r a r c h y may be t r e a t e d  Hierarchy directly  through  then  removing  set  of  each  the  behaviour w i l l  In  this  constrains  the  the  of  individual  sense  be  choice member,  G i f t - g i v i n g to as  sexism  display  of  altruism  by making  i n t e r p r e t e d as  , hierarchy places  threat  by  action  probable  quite  of  not  from t h e  it  something  the  below  or p a t e r n a l i s m .  such behaviour  but  those  that  different.  censure  upon  the  act i o n . Another is  the  removes  example  market the  altruism  of  system  freedom  by  assigning  system,  giving. need to  to  balance  men  to  of  free  to  for  the  gift.  different  the  be  activities  sell  economists  all and  reduces  to  the  commodities  the  the  The  all  freedom -  to  it  is  they  1 3  a  whole."  in  general,  between  a moral  to  them  in  for  actions. within for  an  gift-  with  and to  process  unnamed  the  policy  market.  should  not,  on a s p e c i f i c these  view  is  the  destination -  policy  not  In  however,  claims  be a s o c i a l  should  strangers.  between decision;  and p o l i t i c a l d e c i s i o n  Titmuss' nor  argued,  from c o m m e r c i a l i z a t i o n .  give  men,  has  and  concerned  policy  b l o o d or d e c i d e choice  is  market w i t h government  that  choose  it  opportunities  particularly of  gift-giving  opportunity  placing  blood donation  free  their  words, as  effects  freedom o f  k i n d s of  other  to  thus  system,  be c o e r c e d o r c o n s t r a i n e d by t h e  the  be  society  a price  market  This  and  s e n s e we b e l i e v e  s h o u l d not  interests  in  give  voluntary  "In a c e r t a i n  They  the  upon v o l u n t a r y  exchange.  R i c h a r d T i t m u s s was  preserve  enable  of  to  By c o m m e r c i a l i z i n g a l l exchange  a constraint  for  the  accepted  by  p a r t i c u l a r by K e n n e t h A r r o w ' s  79  critique for  of  the  granted  that  individual's benefits.  book. since  area  Thus,  possibility  the  of  if  of  individual's  He w r i t e s  it  been  impair that  to  Arrow's illustration of  an  comments of  its  extrinsic  depended  upon an  experiments  introducing  against  whether  it  dependence also  had  programmes on t h e an  of  the  leads  to  If  only  higher  he d e r i v e s give,  the  expanded  the  satisfaction  and  nothing  an  will  activity the  be  has  that  So  a market  the  hitherto  altruism  i n the for  motivation,  will  as  case  blood,  being  occurrence  an  of by  diminish  effective. arguments  addressing of  the  altruism.  State.  welfare  designed  important  of  freedom w i t h o u t  would r e d u c e  give  possibility  interpreted Titmuss'  reducing  previously  incidence  motivation  have  the  and y e t  w h i c h has  reduced.  an e x t r i n s i c  to  point  By i n t r o d u c i n g t h e  reward,  A l t r u i s m And The W e l f a r e  many  have  relevant  intrinsic  seems  The d e v e l o p m e n t the  for  or  s u c h a market as of  the  Titmuss b e l i e v e s  Arrow  question  3.4  miss  an  increases  1  shown,  l i k e l i h o o d of  Whereas,  we  importance.  payment  take  right." *  reward  have  market  typically  b l o o d donor s y s t e m we add  he can s t i l l  intrinsic  blood donations,  the  argued,  a  therefore  alternatives.  from g i v i n g , done  is  of  blood,  "economists  of  it  a voluntary  selling  range  creation  choice  to  that  to  state  remove t h e  inadequate  effect  and  upon  specifically disadvantaged  c h a r i t y of the  of from  others,  has  opportunities  for  80  altruistic it  action.  w o u l d seem.  that  all  Here t h e r e  suggests  opportunities of  an  certain  policy,  requires,  It  has  while  of  the of  the  the  have  objectivity  of  all  the  and;  the  manifest  as  a  which  altruism  more and  different  persuasions  is  directly  suggested where  values  that  burdens  which  anarchist  writer  Kropotkin  the  necessitated  Peter  organization  of  and s o c i e t i e s  which in  by  defence,  interdependent  its  individual  the  served  parochial  to  the  units  c o o p e r a t i o n and a l t r u i s m .  Kropotkin  of  by the  a  State  the  that  an  unbridled,  narrowminded  proportion  as  the  obligations  towards  the  state  and  tendency  been the of the  to  voluntary  "absorption favoured  individualism.  State  to  communities  the  necessarily  of  .an  emergence  commerce  natural  development  ones;  had  which f o s t e r e d  wrote  the  For example,  b r e a k down s m a l l had  as  created  previously  argued that  to  societies.  over  look  the  linked with  result  process  of  that  the  basis.  growth  absence  self-aiding  functions  the  individuals  or  social  one  diminishes  state  some a d m i r e  liberal  p r o b l e m s and r e l i e v e  all  followed:  others,  encourages  managed on a p u r e l y l o c a l  form  with  modern s t a t e  diverge:  dependency,  state  be  s m a l l c o m m u n i t i e s and f a c e - t o - f a c e  cosmopolitan  others  to  as  behaviour.  theorists  of  straightforward  a l t r u i s m by m e d i a t i n g n e a r l y  welfare  existence,  and g r o w t h of  unhealthy solve  that  as  state  relationships  by i t s  of  not  two a r g u m e n t s  been a r g u e d by t h e o r i s t s  this,  victory  is  welfare  an example  altruistic  decline  After  is  are  expression  argues  and so  emergence the  the  effect  the  individual's which  of  that  for  second,  forms  But t h e  grew  the In  i n numbers  81  the  citizens  were  evidently  towards  one  lines  Kropotkin:  to  another."  1 5  relieved  Michael  Taylor  from has  their  obligations  argued along  similar  Men who l i v e l o n g u n d e r government and its bureaucracy, courts and police come to rely on them. They f i n d i t e a s i e r (and i n some c a s e s a r e l e g a l l y bound) to use the state for the settlement of t h e i r d i s p u t e s and f o r t h e p r o v i s i o n of public goods, instead of arranging these things for themselves, even where t h e d i s p u t e s , and t h e p u b l i c s f o r w h i c h t h e goods a r e t o be p r o v i d e d , are quite local. In this way, the state mediates between i n d i v i d u a l s ; t h e y come t o d e a l w i t h e a c h o t h e r t h r o u g h the courts, through the tax c o l l e c t o r and t h e b u r e a u c r a c i e s w h i c h spend t h e t a x e s . In the p r e s e n c e of a s t r o n g state, the i n d i v i d u a l may c e a s e t o c a r e f o r , o r even t h i n k a b o u t , t h o s e i n h i s community who need h e l p ; he may c e a s e t o have any d e s i r e t o make a d i r e c t c o n t r i b u t i o n t o t h e r e s o l u t i o n of l o c a l p r o b l e m s , whether o r not he i s a f f e c t e d by them; he may come to f e e l that h i s " r e s p o n s i b i l i t y " to s o c i e t y has been d i s c h a r g e d as soon as he has p a i d h i s t a x e s ( w h i c h a r e t a k e n c o e r c i v e l y from him by the state), for these taxes will be u s e d by t h e s t a t e t o c a r e f o r t h e o l d , s i c k and u n e m p l o y e d , t o keep his streets clean, to maintain " o r d e r " , t o p r o v i d e and m a i n t a i n s c h o o l s , l i b r a r i e s , p a r k s , and so on. The state r e l e a s e s t h e i n d i v i d u a l from t h e "responsibility" or "need" to cooperate with others d i r e c t l y ; i t g u a r a n t e e s him a " s e c u r e " e n v i r o n m e n t i n w h i c h he may s a f e l y p u r s u e h i s p r i v a t e g o a l s , unhampered by a l l those c o l l e c t i v e c o n c e r n s which i t i s supposed to take c a r e of itself. 1 6  and, t h e more t h e s t a t e i n t e r v e n e s i n s u c h s i t u a t i o n s , t h e more "necessary" (on this view) i t becomes, b e c a u s e p o s i t i v e a l t r u i s m and v o l u n t a r y c o o p e r a t i v e b e h a v i o u r a t r o p h y i n t h e p r e s e n c e of t h e s t a t e and grow i n i t s a b s e n c e . . . We m i g h t say t h a t t h e s t a t e i s l i k e an a d d i c t i v e d r u g : the more of it we h a v e , t h e more we "need" i t and t h e more we come t o "depend" on i t . 1  Both T a y l o r  7  and K r o p o t k i n  constrains  and removes  individuals  dependent  terms state  of  the  the  that  opportunities  upon t h e  constraints  argue  i n the  welfare  state  f o r a l t r u i s m by m a k i n g  impersonal a i d of  discussed  i n p r o v i d i n g a i d removes  the  the  previous  from i n d i v i d u a l s t h e  state.  In  section,  the  opportunity  82  for  altruism.  Various  once c a r e d  for  national  decisions  benevolence. the  effect  by l o c a l  segments of initiative  and  of  further  promoting,  in  narrowminded  individualism."  state  actions  constrain  they  atrophy  to  these  be a l t r u i s t i c  as  This  process  behaviour  Taylor  justification preferences deduced state  for  of  that  theory);  the for  from w h i c h  its  On the Taylor,  Richard  Relationship, rather  for  systems,  not  only  has  argues,  but  state.  For  the  over  structure is  of  side  purchased.  In  keep  with  pace  considerably  the  ahead  upon  on  local  process  has  "unbridled,  suggesting  altruism,  that  but  individuals'  the  Titmuss  in  effect  serves if  that desire  his  that  in  he  is  to  demand of  while  supply.  it  say,  that  cannot  absence  done  in  the  the  of  be the  liberal  assumptions  1 8  Kropotkin  and  controversial  book The  Gift  welfare  compared  where  in  affects  of  the  former c o u n t r y ,  continuing  i n the  deduced."  England  United States  a  clearly  one might  argument  individual  state  "then  (as  been  upon as  the  preferences  has  of  argued  an  time,  state modifies,  transfusion the  only  for  desirable  As an e x a m p l e ,  with  this  words,  not  t h a n d i m i n i s h a l t r u i s m by c r e a t i n g  expression. blood  has  dependent  that  Kropotkin's  were  well.  desirability  other  suggest  They a r e  which  dependence  s e n t i m e n t s and d i m i n i s h  state the  societies  now made  from  opportunities  individuals  from t h e  are  removed  Both authors  small  state  may  opportunities the  foster for  its  availability  of  and Wales w h i c h have 90% of  donations the  the have  latter,  Titmuss argues  blood  donor  supply  is  able  to  been  demand has  that  the  been  reason  83  for  this  of  a  difference  private  dissuades  cases,  collection policies private  i n one  market  Taylor  this  encourage  care  in  model  which  as  the  other,  prohibiting  1  turn  promoting argues,  a l t r u i s m serves  In  but  in  he  these the  s y s t e m of  certain the  to  contrasting blood  governmental  emergence  Titmuss  a policy  British  of  a  are  held  of  the  of  the  in  National Health Service,  may  k i n d of  welfare  on need  universal  is  e t h o s by making  rather  t h a n on c l a s s  extent in  required  "this to  common  case  for  the  medical or  other  s t a n d s as  altruism.  study  w h i c h the by  objective  The N a t i o n a l  The N a t i o n a l H e a l t h S e r v i c e which  arguments state,  an a l t r u i s t i c  wrote, the  refutation  s u g g e s t e d were n e c e s s a r y .  and b a s e d  objectivity  Service  which  thereby  of  controls  by way of  the  reinforces  of  policy  a In  b l o o d donor values  of  i n d i v i d u a l donor  in  9  Faced with the  in  that  Nagel  systems demonstrates  Britain. "  i n the  argues  characteristics.  conclusion,  the  only  a l t r u i s m by a p p l y i n g t h e  Service  of  example  presence  blood.  also  universal  social  and not  manifest  standards Health  behaviour. not  transfusion  the  The c o r o l l a r y ,  same state  condone  voluntarily,  the  and K r o p o t k i n ,  case  for  that  instrumental  Titmuss of  blood  from g i v i n g  the  welfare  are  in  true:  more of  the  American v a l u e s  and e r o d i n g a l t r u i s m .  especially  encourage  that  market  individuals  self-interest is  is  effect  of  these apparently the  Taylor  and o t h e r s  while  on  the  welfare  state  suggesting  other,  Titmuss  contradictory  arguments  upon a l t r u i s m ,  (on  that  it  atrophies  suggesting  that  it  the  one  about hand  benevolence, fosters  it),  84  Jeffery  Obler  village. welfare  His state  and how the tempered  impact  study  of  the  findings  seems t o  been  hospitals  held  supportive  prevailed:  Penridge,  the  has  superceded  welfare  private,  the  often  to 2 1  state  informal  of  giving  both the  "After  village  which  are  natural  unilateral,  personal  giving  to  has  faded On  been  away." the  both  of  these  assistance. voluntary  He  of  the  side  of  bazaars  voluntary  write  that:  prosperity)  Besides unable  the  the  to  die- a  village  poor  2 2  other  established  to  welfare.  trusts,  2 0  and  by g r e a t e r  charitable  been  National Health  local,  He goes on  the  has  sides  fetes  support  of  giving,  Taylor  the  anachronistic death,  English  private  residents."  of  (helped  small  development  on  philanthropy,  virtually disappeared."  "In  state  medicine,  so  a  forms  among v i l l a g e  are  have  in  on how t h e  welfare  relations  replaced private  had  giving  focuses  As r e g a r d s p r i v a t e  argument  that  private  i m p i n g e d on d i f f e r e n t  by s o c i a l  argument.  Service  "case has  Obler's  the  examined  hand, O b l e r  within were also  cooperation  the  found t h a t  village  involved  during  two new c h a r i t i e s the  1970's  in supplementing  discovered was a c h i e v e d  that and i n  in  existing  another  fact  and  had that  state  instance,  was a i d e d by  the  state: When i t became a p p a r e n t t o the p e o p l e of P e n r i d g e t h a t the s t a t e would not p r o v i d e a d e c e n t p u b l i c m e e t i n g p l a c e , t h e y took the considerable initiative and effort to raise p r i v a t e l y s u b s t a n t i a l funds to b u i l d a v i l l a g e hall. The incontestable p o i n t i s t h a t the p e o p l e of P e n r i d g e d i d not behave as p a s s i v e c h a r g e s of a stifling state apparatus u n a b l e t o h e l p t h e m s e l v e s or t o c o n t r o l t h e i r destinies.  state  F u r t h e r m o r e , t h e i r p r i v a t e e f f o r t s were a b e t t e d in the form o f g e n e r o u s government g r a n t s .  by the State  85  o f f i c i a l s are apparently anxious to keep alive people's capacity to co-operate v o l u n t a r i l y . Once a g a i n , t h e form and p u r p o s e of a i d a r e p e r t i n e n t . While state officials may wish to e n s u r e t h a t the p o o r , aged and i n f i r m a r e no longer dependent on private unilateral giving, they certainly do not want t o d i s c o u r a g e community e f f o r t s to s e c u r e such " f r i l l s " as a v i l l a g e h a l l . They r e a l i z e that if such private community efforts were to fail, the consequences would not be catastrophic. They also appreciate that not only do such collective self-help ^.projects have few of the objectionable features of unilateral giving, but t h a t t h e y may have i n t r i n s i c w o r t h i n the form of promoting social integration and selfreliance as well as tapping private sources to meet w o r t h w h i l e , i f not u r g e n t , p u b l i c n e e d s . 2 3  Obler's contending  arguments  individual reality.  findings  Obler's  research  tested.  There i s  specific or  is  and  but  of  judge the  and  generality  Titmuss  which  intervene  to  is of  in  makes  small  villages  i n the  and u r b a n s l u m s .  Titmuss'  more  difficult  to  its  of  There on t h e is,  is  effect  not  applied  other  as  test the  example  situations  another of  because  the  contending  in sequence.  because  way of  welfare  of  the them  it  is  so  understanding  state  on  The a n a r c h i s t  argument  state  on  closer  to  much  in  being  ignorant  of  intervenes, must  be a  to  vary  commuter b e l t  of  argument  much  is  effects  donations  are may  a  so be  vital. these  voluntary  p a r a l l e l arguments  two  anarchist  state  supposed blood  the  arguments  individuals,  metropolis  atypical  the  so  community w h i c h we w o u l d e x p e c t  between  Moreover,  not  both  large  subtle.  welfare  which the  between  w h i c h of  a l t r u i s m is  simplicity  The d e g r e e  a s e n s e of  considerably  of  to  shortcoming  i n the  of  situations.  of  us  effect  the  a level  to  permit  cooperation,  that  that  allowed  function  on the  self-help, I suspect  argument  do not  but is  two  arguments  giving.  That  r a t h e r as  being  antecedent  to  86  Titmuss'  i n the  opportunities before  its  policies  for  of  the  appraise  3.5  of  will  the  to  state  either  lost  altruism  in  alone very  has  this  wittingly  producing  the  or  certain  as two  some  not,  have  of  the  public  supply.  Obler  the  existed  because  adequately  difficult of  which  development,  opportunities  cannot  diminished  those  Following  the  be  state  goods  For  this  discovered,  to  theories.  Conclusion.  effect  that  arrangements  upon a l t r u i s m .  section  later  two has  sections social  i n the  inappropriate all  forms of  as  the  arrangements  not of  In t h e s e  remove  of  a  market  case  of  hierarchy.  for  costs.  but  it  in was  shown  for  altruistic  or  make  By a t t a c h i n g  market  the  them  a price an  which g r a d u a l l y a f f e c t s  all  Titmuss  freedom To t h i s  remove a l t r u i s t i c  individuals,  constraints  discussed  examples  an  establishes  The r e s u l t , and  of  economy,  the  q u i d p r o quos  latitude  and do have  opportunities  exchanged,  only  can  discussion  can  giving.  consideration  sets  chapter.  case  s y s t e m of  in  conventions  s u p p o r t e d by e x a m p l e s  the  i n the  altruistic  reduction  action  been  commodities  irresistable  without  of  and  The t h e o r e t i c a l  institutions  b e h a v i o u r as  to  of  welfare  relative  appropriateness  Social  in  welfare  self-interest it  the  altruism  some  effectiveness  reason,  that  establishment.  recreated  which  sense  further,  to  argues, give  extent,  a  voluntarily such  opportunities such  is  exchanges  social from  the  become  87  incomprehensible exchange  creating  by  or  s u c h an  to  that  is  makes  altruism  it  from  the n o r m a l  inappropriate  may be c o n s i d e r e d  the  many,  between  that  even most are  like  opportunities  the  as  by  either  market  system,  for a l t r u i s t i c  gestures  individuals. to  The v a l i d i t y  assess.  While  many more o p p o r t u n i t i e s  establishment  there  where  argued that  difficult  assume  to  And  societies  have  relationships  prior  upon.  deviations  in which  removes  argument  reasonable  the  writers  state  by m e d i a t i n g  clear  them  paternalism.  welfare  giving  contrast,  an e n v i r o n m e n t  Anarchist the  making  relationship.  Hierarchy  bribery  by  of  of  these  the  that  flourish,  seems  existed  state,  opportunities  indications  a l t r u i s m should  welfare  it  it  were not  in  small  the  exact  of  for is  acted  face-to-face opposite  is  can be u s e d  to  2  case. " Whether  foster  altruism  argument. with  social is  as  of  the  the  i n t r o d u c t i o n of  in  a  small but  intended  to  markedly  since  also  aid the  extent  the  of  that  sick  prove  than  the  a l t r u i s m both before  social  village  finds  to  anarchist  would r e q u i r e a c o n t r o l l e d  a specific  English it  Titmuss argues,  no l e s s d i f f i c u l t  A convincing proof  measures  claims,  policy,  does the  and  i n t r o d u c t i o n of  policy.  and  Obler's  less the  community  well-off extensive  after  research  p a r t i a l l y support  number of  design  Titmuss' charities  have British  declined welfare  system. Fortunately, not  crucial,  for  accepting the  one  existence  or other of  the  of  t h e s e arguments debate  itself  is is  88  sufficient or  to  institutions  have  some  soc i e t y .  show t h a t such as  effect  upon  social  the  arrangements  welfare  the  state  extent  of  can  such and  as h i e r a r c h y , probably  a l t r u i s m i n any  do  given  89  Notes.  1  Dennis L. Krebs, C o n c e p t and a Review of the vol. 73 ( 1 9 7 0 ) , p . 2 8 5 .  "Altruisman Examination of the Literature", Psychological Bulletin,  2  J. M . D a r l e y and B . L a t a n e , "Bystander I n t e r v e n t i o n in Emergencies: Diffusion of Responsibility", J o u r n a l of P e r s o n a l i t y and S o c i a l P s y c h o l o g y , v o l . 8 (1968), p. 377-383.  3  C. Korte, "Group Effects on Help-Giving in an Emergency", P r o c e e d i n g of t h e 7 7 t h A n n u a l C o n v e n t i o n of the American P s y c h o l o g i c a l A s s o c i a t i o n ^ v o l . 4 (1969), pp. 383-384.  " Krebs,  "Altruism",  p.  291.  5  Krebs,  "Altruism",  p.  294  6  Krebs,  "Altruism",  p.  291.  7  Krebs,  "Altruism",  p.  292.  8  Russsell Hardin, Hopkins U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s ,  9  View of  Emphasis  added.  Collective Action 1982), p . 1 1 9 .  (Baitimore:Johns  Garrett Hardin, The L i m i t s of A l t r u i s m : S u r v i v a l (Bloomington: Indiana U n i v e r s i t y  an E c o l o g i s t ' s Press, 1977).  1 0  An a g r e e a b l e s o l u t i o n t o a p r o b l e m not r e q u i r i n g the onerous cost of determining an optimal one. See James G . March, "Bounded R a t i o n a l i t y , A m b i g u i t y and t h e E n g i n e e r i n g of Choice", B e l l J o u r n a l of E c o n o m i c s , v o l . 9 (1978), pp.587-607.  i  1  1 2  Russsell  Hardin,  Collective  Action  ,  p.120.  C D . Batson, J . S . C o k e , M . L . J a s n o s k i , and M . Hanson "Buying Kindness: E f f e c t of an E x t r i n s i c I n c e n t i v e f o r H e l p i n g on Perceived Altruism", P e r s o n a l i t y and S o c i a l P s y c h o l o g y Bulletin , vol. 4 (1978), pp. 86-91.  90  1 3  to  R i c h a r d T i t m u s s , The G i f t R e l a t i o n s h i p : from Human B l o o d S o c i a l P o l i c y ( L o n d o n : A l l e n and U n w i n , 1 970) , p~i 242 .  —  1 4  Kenneth J . A r r o w , " G i f t s and E x c h a n g e s " , i n Edmund S. P h e l p s , e d . , A l t r u i s m , M o r a l i t y and Economic T h e o r y (New York: Sage F o u n d a t i o n ^ 1975) , p~. ilf.  1 5  Peter Kropotkin, New Y o r k U n i v e r s i t y  York:  1 6  Wiley,  1 7  Michael 1976), p p .  Taylor,  1 8  (Cambridge:  1 9  2  The 31 .  2  Taylor, Anarchy 134-135.  Anarchy  Michael Cambridge  Titmuss,  0  M u t u a l A i d : a F a c t o r of P r e s s , 1 9 7 2 ) , p.. 197.  Taylor, University  (New  (New  York:  Community, A n a r c h y and P r e s s , 1 982) , p~. 56~!  Liberty  and C o o p e r a t i o n  The G i f t  Jeffrey Obler, B r i t i s h J o u r n a l of  and C o o p e r a t i o n  Evolution  Relationship  , p.  , p.  "Private G i v i n g in P o l i t i c a l Science  134.  238.  the Welfare State", , vol. 11 ( 1 9 8 1 ) , p .  2 1  Obler,  "Private Giving  in  the  Welfare  State",  p.  46.  2  2  Obler,  "Private Giving  in  the  Welfare  State",  p.  46.  2  3  Obler,  "Private Giving  in  the  Welfare  State",  p.  47-48.  " See f o r e x a m p l e : Edward C. Backward S o c i e t y (New Y o r k : F r e e  Banfield, The M o r a l B a s i s P r e s s , 19587"!  of  a  91  IV.  4.1  ALTRUISM IN GAMES  Introduct ion.  The  previous  effectiveness "problems" that  of  an  such as  chapters'  appraisal  altruistic  incentive  the  p r o v i s i o n of  a l t r u i s m may be c o n s t r a i n e d  useful will  to  know a p p p r o x i m a t e l y  apply. of  choice  alternatives  4.2  Games And Game T h e o r y .  A frequent to  behave  altruistically  is  one  several  of  provide  some  behaviour, situations. only  complete altruism  the  small  was  not of  of  subset  of  set.  possible how  large  concluded It  will  be a member of  construct  a situation  i n which  behaviour. factors how  subjects  While t h i s  which  influence  frequent  are  situations  The p r e v i o u s in a l l  which  chapter  situations,  a p r o p o r t i o n of  but  the  these  total  comprise  concluded still  it may  a l t r u i s m may be an a l t e r n a t i v e  the  a  situations.  of  about  be  constraints  willingness  the  extreme,  social  the  modes of  little  behavioural  indication cases  says At  a very  potential  indication  it  to  has  these  altruism will  possible  solving  goods,  how f r e q u e n t l y  studying  is  in  public  in d i f f e r e n t  approach to  the  i n many s i t u a t i o n s .  O r , how f r e q u e n t l y  set  of  a  that  gave  behaviour  in  no  these  were. Another  analogue  way o f  addressing  for behaviour.  the  But t h i s  question analogue  is will  to have  employ to  an  possess  92  specific if  characteristics.  we a r e  which have or  to  determine  altruism to  share  'game'  in  this  may not  behave  have  are  are  obvious of  The p l a y e r s  or d e c i s i o n similar  some  certain  whose or be  less  over  set  subset  of  situations  in  the  behaviour  analogue  will  in public  life  possible.  it  involves  in  goals  over about  appealing  makers  of  between Conflict,  economic  intertwined. may be many  Although outcome,  they  they  do  games  and  many  competition,  and p o l i t i c a l  and life.  which  deciding  whether  to  party deciding  whether  to  trying  to  a nation  of  makers  choices  others  have  groups  with or  individuals, control  p u r s u i n g them may r e s u l t  entering  are  conflicting  only p a r t i a l  For example, of  are  of  1  be t h e y  which they  decision  decision  o r even an i n d i v i d u a l  face  ways of  the  i n games have of  "The e s s e n c e  them.  influence  or a p o l i t i c a l  the  to  how  conflict,  in which t h e r e  others."  those  outcomes.  the  whose f a t e s  values  aspects  concerning  where  all  similarities  A l l these a c t o r s ,  with  be a f i n i t e  situations  that  with another,  goal  decisions  faced  to  with another,  aspirations. have  integral  a coalition  secure  in  behaviour.  are  cooperate  of  in a s i t u a t i o n  cooperation  enter  is  control  aspects  essence  to  and s e c o n d ,  g o a l s or o b j e c t i v e s  complete  different  have  recommendations  some c o n t r o l which w i l l  There  in  of  outcomes with d i f f e r e n t  have  the  qualities  a series  context  individuals  possible  of  or c o o r d i n a t i o n a r e  with d i f f e r e n t The  the  is  should  cooperation,  size  will  situations.  theory  individuals  the  it  a possibility,  some of  in p o l i t i c a l Game  a  is  First  a political a a coalition  i n more  party to  and  may  govern  93  with  other  entering  parties. the  government  T h e r e may be a d v a n t a g e s  coalition:  legislation.  cooperating:  the  distinct  the  compromises  that  remaining in opposition  in  the  will  voters' also  decide  coalition  minds.  it  will  coalition  and so e x c l u d e  situations  are  intangible  factors.  are  admission about  analysis view  the of  such By  extremely  of  that  of  the  be d i s a d v a n t a g e s  to  or  it  the  party  politics. of  arriving  coalition  members who may  Decisions account is  on  the  in  such  a host  these  this at  profile  influence  it  If  the  by  thought  party's  into  that  blurred  may be  into  an  and t a k e  argue  about  are  it  recommendations  statements  possible. is  that  we i g n o r e  self-interest, there  bias  that  the  is  of  factors  so,  general  game  adopting  it  is  an  statements  of  do t h e y  if  they  always  are a l s o  the  not  all  of  always  opposing similar  that  such  behaviour  which are the  most  rational  about  to a c t  what  upon  advantages  to  an  is  be, in  it.  i n e m p l o y i n g games a s  seductive  the  assumes them t o  are c l e a r  choose  to  applying  possibility  w h i c h game t h e o r y  even  theory  behaviour across  or e r r o r ,  are disadvantages  there  of  cost  I n d i v i d u a l s are  creatures  certain  behaviour,  The  on s t u p i d i t y ,  important.  While  in  coalition  general  gains-maximizing  their  other  we a r e  be b a s e d  is  the  p o l i t i c a l behaviour,  recommendations  nor  say  from m e m b e r s h i p .  hopelessness  applying  assuredly  of  complex  of  increase  and  behaviour.  situations  may  it  some  p l a t f o r m may become  divisive  Many w i l l  stuff  the  too  cooperating  have  may a l s o  will  The e n t r y  have  will  government,  be d e t e r m i n e d by t h e  that  which  party  But t h e r e  party's of  the  to  models abstract  94  model  which  contains  w h i c h can be analysis  tested.  of  indicative these  of  opportunities set  It  is  such  composed  the  a  player  r e q u i r e d to  will  following  number  All  forms.  g r a p h which  and c h o i c e s  a play  Figure  game i s  a  but  only  life.  With  examine in  a  the  clearly  become c o n f u s e d  "turn",  "choice"  different  the  it  the  stipulates of  given  the  points.  outcome  other  meant  as  move  from w h i c h a  or  choices  made  termination  game. i n both  the the game.  in F i g u r e  2 - The E x t e n s i v e Form o f Informat i o n .  b  over  Each  A sequence of  extensive  takes  and  game i s  alternatives  in a f i n a l of  a  the  strategic  and  the  is  not  a game t r e e  or a  representation  form  of  number of  players,  For example,  the  moves, tree  2.  a Game W i t h  Complete  Player 1  the  games t o  discussion,  represented  i n each p l a y  simple  to  altruism  moves or d e c i s i o n of  While  practicable,  connected  a very  3  proceed  of  make a c h o i c e .  games may be  extensive always  be c a l l e d  of  "game",  each move and c u l m i n a t i n g  point  in r e a l  from  2  any number of  of  now  expression  "play", the  are  we  when t a l k i n g  consists  at  mind,  games.  In  is  conclusive  which may o c c u r  as  of  not  processes  easy  synonyms.  findings  the  for  behaviour  the  model  in  about  naturally,  abstract  of  terms  But  prescriptions  an  caveats  defined  normative  c  for  95  In  this  required a,  b,  row  choose  of  or  knows P l a y e r if  such as  be  potential  52!  branches  stemming  1 has  initial  the  is  both  opposing  have moves.  no  represented moves,  their  of  presence on  the  about  the or  game that  his  is  cards,  some  or h e r c h o i c e  chance  is  has  of  does  will x  10  6 7  node.  or t o t a l l y  as  she  games a r e  will  have  absent.  perfect well  as the  others,  Chess  about  those  players  alternatives.  have  of  will  previous  information  not  for  information  or c o p l a y e r s ' such  perfect  In  by e n c i r c l i n g d e c i s i o n  player  or  there  p r e v i o u s moves.  coplayer's  tree a  some game  the  who must  he  most  i n many games  absence  how  Of c o u r s e  that  each p l a y e r  However,  by  P l a y e r 2,  upon  decision  know,  imperfect  of  is  labelled  or a p p r o x i m a t e l y 8.07  own p r e v i o u s moves  player.  indicating  information  be  move,  represented  a deck of  players'  a game where  knowledge The  will  other  information w i l l  instance,  of  first  alternatives  that  move of  alternatives,  from t h e  about  is  chosen.  shuffling  the  game,  depending  first  In some games p l a y e r s information  the  nodes,  the  the  makes  from among t h r e e  decision  operation  about  who  The s e c o n d move of  more c o m p l e x :  such  1  between two a l t e r n a t i v e s  believes far  Player  t o make a c h o i c e  and c .  second  game,  is  nodes o r complete  96  Figure  3 - The E x t e n s i v e Form o f a Game w i t h Informat i on.  Incomplete  L  a  b  c  J  (V r -  s  3  e  d'  e'  f  (x,y)  In  Figure  between  a,  contrast Player So  b,  as  3,  and c on t h e  to F i g u r e  Player  whether  a or b ,  is  The end p o i n t s outcome of  the  Player of  unique to game.  In number  of  player choices,  about  and t h e  c o m p l e x i t y of has  extensive the  the  i n the  or n o r m a l the  form o f  every  other  of  move,  player's  the or  "book o f  know !  e . an  in a play  x  termination point P l a y e r 2.  describes  potential  players'  is  a  of  the  choices  information  form by means o f  l i k e n e d to a  not  \ c h o o s i n g a and  sequence  a game  whether  describe  choices  game the  in  chosen.  and  1 arid y_ t o  the  each s p e c i f i c  extensive  of  the  moves,  form of  But  been  or d '  Player  Player  of  c has  game t r e e  sequence  x to  game.  Player 2 w i l l  outcome a t  sequence  outcome o f  been  of  1 chooses  know f o r c e r t a i n  d and e,  result  be t h e  each p l a y e r at  The s t r a t e g i c  strategy  3, t h e  Player  the  know i f  between  each branch  and p a y o f f s  players,  has  of  example,  each p a r t i c u l a r  summary, t h e  confronting  the  of  In F i g u r e  branch,  figure,  move  but d o e s  choosing  2 choosing d w i l l  that  first  chooses a for  1  he o r she  previous  2, P l a y e r 2 d o e s not  1 has c h o s e n  if  in the  each  previous choices.  reduction strategies  i n s t r u c t i o n s that  of .  A you  97  might  leave  you.""  All  both the number  to  a representative  games  can  number of of  strategies  required  indeed.  Figure  strategic  forms.  Figure  in  going  be e x p r e s s e d  choice  moves  who i s  game  to d e s c r i b e  4 gives  in t h e i r  alternatives  the  t o p l a y a game  at  are  strategic  every  finite.  move The  of  A, )  V  X  (-5,10)  (10,-5)  A  B  2  5 A,  5  10  2  10 -5  -5 B,  and  0 0  (0,0)  Forms.  if the  number  two games r e d u c e d t o  4 - Two Games i n E x t e n s i v e and S t r a t e g i c  (5,5)  form  complex games may be v e r y  examples  for  of  large their  98  A,  A*  1  B  (5,5)  (-5,10)  5 5  at  are  the  each  available In  the  to  0  extensive  form  the  of  that  are  there  it  form  can  two p l a y e r s ,  of  results I,  the  indicated  that  alternatives  the  information  players choice.  modes of I  in  in a d i f f e r e n t  the  be d e s c r i b e d a s as  choice  other's  Game  A,; B,. A,; B,.  similar  However,  decision of  is  moves,  payoffs.  Game  by c i r c l i n g the  form,  games  i n Game II  is  strategic  two  players,  ignorance  extensive  0  v  or  When the  0  z  independently established  in  -5  f o r P l a y e r 2: c h o o s e Aj. c h o o s e Bj, Bi, i f P l a y e r 1 c h o o s e s A i f P l a y e r 1 chooses A i f P l a y e r 1 chooses B*. i f P l a y e r 1 c h o o s e s  form of  players  5  1 0  and i d e n t i c a l  the  5  -5  same number of  move  (0,0)  10  0  Strategies 1 . Always 2. A l w a y s 3 . Choose choose 4. Choose choose  there  (10,-5)  -5  1 0  B,  hi.  1 0  -5  The e x t e n s i v e  4  is  choose This  Player reduced  a 2 x 2 game,  by the  two  game.  rule  2. to  its  meaning  factors,  and  99  that  each  of  the  players  has  2 strategies,  either  to  choose A or  B. Game II rules. does  The  so  are  its  player  on  the  conditional  two  important  are  to  both p l a y e r s  their the  payoffs. B,A  payoff  for  Player  at  the  2.  i  (That  best  strategies  A-\h  is  2l  game.) longer  one  the  However, has  strategy  the  the  B,  of  player  has  }  2  a l l u r i n g aspects strategic but  two  Player  form of  ones  which  maximizing  the  payoff if  than  Player 1  logic  Game I I ,  their  less  Prisoner's  and holds  choosing  2 still  at  A ^ , ,  A similar  f o r m of  the  games  results  the  at  when t h e  which both p r e f e r of  which  game.  or  greater  has  a 2 x 4  s e n s e of  which  now  strategic  both players  BB  strategy  game  second  is  because  2  outcome  the  the  than A , B .  result  the  1 chooses  Game II  in  is  2  the  in  choosing  In  outcome  2 chooses A ) greater  other  strategies  choice  the  different  move of  become o b v i o u s  dominating  is  a dominating  than  Dilemma  Player does  1 no  (it  is  2).  Notice reduced to rules  of  is  form of  1 should choose  is  2  how the  upon how P l a y e r  best  (that  B- B  second  normal f o r m s .  have  c h o o s e s B , and P l a y e r the  the  by  Game I and a f u r t h e r  distinctions  Player  cell  2  to  strategic  their  unambiguously  governed  The p l a y e r  or c o n t i n g e n t  Two f u r t h e r  Game I ,  move.  identical  Thus the  reduced  is  i n f o r m a t i o n about  move.  are  form  who c h o o s e s a t  first  strategies;  first  extensive  with perfect  chosen four  in  also, its  unless  representation  that  strategic the of  once form i t  extensive the  the  game.  extensive  form of  becomes a game  form This is  is true  taken of  with as  all  the  Game II  is  different most  games i f  basic played  1 00  in  their  4.3  strategic  The 2 X 2  The of  strategy  which  of  four  x 2 game  is  Figure  the  are  choices,  ignorance  5  O r d e r Of Games.  r e m a i n d e r of  games  one o f  form.  those  both  the  chapter w i l l  one  of  these  player's choice,  possibilities.  The g e n e r a l  given  5 below.  in Figure  5 - The G e n e r a l  the  2 x  involving 2 players,  choosing  other  discuss  Strategic  strategies  strategic  the  order  each h a v i n g 2  with the  Form of  2  outcome form of  2 x 2  in  being the  2  Game.  Column  Row  a  A ,  A  2  a  2  c,  between  players  as  A , A  2  one ,  Row  ATBZ,  receives  subscripted  by  B , A  ,  2  of  and  (a,,a ),  the 2.  d,  Column  f o r each p a i r  e a c h outcome a r e  2  a r e now l a b e l l e d Row and C o l u m n .  A , and B , and  outcomes,  d  2  b,  B,  2  k> 2  1  c  The  B  2  payoff  B  between  A  strategy  choices,  ^  .  (c ,b ), 1  2  2  and  The p a y o f f s (b ,c ), 1  subscripted  2  by  and 1  B  Row c h o o s e s 2  .  will  The  four  be w r i t t e n  c o r r e s p o n d i n g to (d,,d ), 2  and  Column  where that  101  Figure  6 -  The G e n e r a l  E x t e n s i v e Form of  B,  A,  (  r  6.  )  ,b )  i  (b,,c .)  t  form of  the  game i s  The  course  be  precisely  game  would  positions  of  were r e v e r s e d so  and B , and Row between Two First,  further  these  A  from  their  of  arriving  at  noncooperative  the  Column c h o s e  games need t o  be e m p h a s i z e d .  selection  game  p e r m i t t e d between  absolutely  the  players."  Thus way t o  far  for  agreements  c a n n o t be made  prior  to  i n the p l a y i n g  r e s o l u t i o n of  of  players  in constant  disputes  are  the  game: a s i t u a t i o n  not  same  have d i s c u s s e d games  the p r e f e r e n c e s  of  the  through p o l i t i c s .  always  sum games where t h e  two p l a y e r s a r e t h e I  Or,  models  games d i s c u s s e d a r e v a r i a b l e sum games,  the  6  as a p p r o p r i a t e  second,  to  no  of  i n the  payoffs  thinks  c o o r d i n a t e the  enforced  are  one  to  is  rule  if  encountered  they  A,  an agreement  or  o p p o s e d as  between  prevents  "In a n o n c o o p e r a t i v e  the  the  which  games may be t h o u g h t  of  if  a  the  interests  same  is  in which b i n d i n g  the  Figure  there  situations  the  in  2  these  a game,  communication  game  that  shown  games a r e n o n c o o p e r a t i v e meaning t h a t  strategies.  preplay  and B  2  aspects  individuals playing  them of  (d,  The g e n e r a l e x t e n s i v e  players  of  a 2 x 2 Game.  players.  in a l l without  four  And  meaning t h a t diametrically "sums of  the  entries."  7  referring  L e t us assume  i n any  that  the  1 02  players  can o r d e r  outcome,  whatever  Formally, strong  player  so  is is  to  preferred  outcome,  the  to  next  preferred players,  outcomes,  orders  (where 2  the  > means  > A,B  2  is  > B,B  2  t o most  there Figure  strong  so  preferred  to  one  that  It  is  the  outcome, to  the  shown t h a t  preference  such A,A  2  > A,B  2  to  least for  two  orderings  arranging  2  most  > B,h  2  these where  >B,B , 2  outcomes  2  7 - Game  Game  the  1  to  each  > B,A .  2  to  4,  ) and Column o r d e r s t h e  the  particular  important to  #22.  B  2  2  3 3  1  9  terms,  arrangement  4  Guyer  the  7 gives  4  below  have  none of  of  A  number  and  8  are  a r e 78 u n i q u e ways  outcomes  Figure  The  say  and  outcomes  between  preferred  outcome,  and  the  one on.  complete  practical order,  R a p o p o r t and G u y e r  a  all  In  a preference next  has  and t h a t  indifferent.  both having complete  four  t o a n o t h e r and so  that  complete,  the  a 2 x 2 game so t h a t  each p l a y e r  preferred  outcome.  of  preferred  meaning  is  3 to  least  is  that  assign  a 2 x 2 matrix.  Row  A,A  list  player  able  outcomes  may b e ,  order  the  the  four  assume  preference  outcomes  in  it  we w i l l  comparable  over  the  2 1 #22  matrix is  that  a r r a n g e m e n t of understand  assigned  by R a p o p o r t and  preferences.  that  what  permits  us  to  1 03  derive  a manageably f i n i t e  otherwise  very large  imposition  of  number of  the  strong preference  we  assumed  players could  was not  be as  2 x 2 the  2 x 2  of  either  over a l l  the  total  which i s  order  of  is  real  world  of  not  the  that  real  these  of  the  order.  complete  but t h a t Since  subset  establish  of  it  i n which  e a c h game.  the  games ordinal of  1 0  of  as  the  complete  c o m p r i s i n g two  i n d i v i d u a l s , b o t h of order.  The i m p o r t a n t  of  all  they  are the  can  confidently is  games  If  only a subset  situations  situations  complete  number of  analyzes  preference  the  admissible  78 games i s  world  is  one o r b o t h o f  complete  games.  have a  of  games a r e a b s t r a c t i o n s  interactions,  now p r o c e e d t o  number  i n d i v i d u a l s or a g g r e g a t e s  one p a r t i c u l a r  that  of  ordinal  whom have a s t r o n g and c o m p l e t e point  outcomes  from an  games  actors  order  understanding these of  2 x 2  the  chapter therefore  abstractions  actors,  possible  preference  726,  This  One way of set  the  h i g h as  complete  order  strict,  games.  games f o r a n a l y s i s  requirement that  and  that  number of  possible  complete be  represented,  altruistic  subset stated we can  choice  is  constrained. W h i l e we have of  altruism  begin  the  each  game  choice  from C h a p t e r Two t h e  which  analysis  will  be a p p l i e d b e l o w ,  by d e f i n i n g  considerable  d e t e r m i n i n g how a " r a t i o n a l " choose  in  the  such  games.  it  the  or  has  been  self-interested  A rational  player,  choice  alternative  r i g o r o u s d e f i n i t i o n of effort  a definition  may be e a s i e r  self-interested  and t h e n c o n s i d e r i n g w h e t h e r  c o m p l i e s w i t h our most  Fortunately,  elements of  is  to  to in  that  altruism. expended  player "one who,  in  should having  1 04  taken  i n t o account  rules  of  maximize accrue  the the  all  game,  actual  information available  makes  or  his  the  are  unambivalent  no  in  ordinal  preferences.  on t h e  nonconstant.  concept  neither  of  player  alternative  choice  this  has  idea  equilibrium players  natural  its  should choose  is,  secure  to  the  how r a t i o n a l  one e x p e c t e d  Gordon  requires  solutions players  is  one  or  strictly focussed  from w h i c h to  But,  how  be p l a y e d o n l y  even  To  i n t r o d u c t i o n of  of  a  stability;  frequency  explain  a few  one  rational  concept  c h a r a c t e r i z e d by a c e r t a i n  1 2  an  once?  the  greatest  1 1  should  have  determine  to o c c u r w i t h the  the  game."  by s w i t c h i n g  introduce  to to  some games have more t h a n  were a game t o  "which i s  the  be p l a y e d a g a i n .  How t h e n c a n one  and  which  the  payoff  games w i t h  a higher payoff  game p l a y e d by r a t i o n a l p l a y e r s . . . " outcome  of  satisfactory  game t o  by  s u c h a way as  outcome  outcome  him  expected  noncooperative  problems f o r  Guyer  outcome  in  to  However, game t h e o r e t i c i a n s  were  outcome.  Rapoport,  sum,  an e q u i l i b r i u m can  i n the  completely  recommendations as  choose  choices  statistically  t o him ( and t o him o n l y )  There  that  the  the  in a  natural  more game  theoretic  concepts. A strategy best  choice  is  s a i d t o d o m i n a t e an a l t e r n a t i v e  regardless  of  example,  in Figure  8 below,  because  A,A  more  preferred more  2  t h a n B,B .  preferred  chooses.  is 2  how t h e strategy  preferred  other A  2  is  the  player chooses.  For  dominates  than A , B  2  if  B  2  it  for  , and B , A  Thus by c h o o s i n g A , Column w i l l  outcome  2  regardless  of  how  the  Column 2  is  more  ensure  other  a  player  1 05  Figure  8 - Game  A  B  2  3  4 1  3 2  1  Game  choose  the  possible.  However,  dominating other of  the  that  the  strategy. need  Obviously,  will  figure  choice.  For the  strategy  but  the  player  out  what  game i n  Row does  not.  a  of  game makes  the  players  the 9,  response  strategy  without  Figure  one  a rational  rationally  is  time  would be  these circumstances  dominating  behave  So now the  only  every  How under  without  other  a rational player  i n some games o n l y  choose?  player  to  strategy  strategy.  player  #13  recommendation  dominant  2  2  4  So a f i r s t  #13.  will  and c h o o s e the  best  the  has  to a  a the  part  assume  dominating  dominating  response  Column  on the to  this  has  should  be  to  strategy  the  other's  dominating  1 06  Figure  9 - Game  A  B  2  2  3  1  3 1  4  Game  2  dominates  and B , A will  2  is  B  f o r Column,  2  preferred  choose  it.  probable  actions,  strategy  which  However,  because  will most the  least But  are  still  strategy.  How  c i rcumstances?  2  is  preferred  so Row s h o u l d assume  his  to  take  or  2  into account  B, because  her most  Column w i l l  to A , B ,  that  preferred  choose  A ,  result  is  the  outcome.  he  2  Column Column's  that  or  i n the  opposed to B , , which would  she  next  result  to in  outcome.  we have not d e a l t in  A,A  c h o o s i n g A , which w i l l  outcome as  games  is,  might choose  Row assumes  preferred  that  2r  he or she  off  #31  Row was not  contains  be b e t t e r preferred  t o B\B  If  2  2  4  A  #31.  which  should  the  with a l l  the  neither rational  possibilities  player player  has  a  choose  for  there  dominating in  these  107  Figure  10 - Game  A  B  2  2  3 2  3  1  4  Game  strategy. pick  One  the  the  In one  which  of  choice  choice  of  of  maximin  producing  the  Having additional every  game.  of  the  rule  for  players  is  the  usually strategy  the  the  a  best  the  lesser  of  alternative #64,  if  dominating choose  of  player  r e f e r r e d t o as  In Game  strategies,  has  d e c i d i n g how t o  guarantees  choosing  maximum minimum p a y o f f . their  #64  s e n s e one can t h i n k of  principle  principle the  potential  strategy  outcomes. by  neither  2  1  4  In Game #64,  #64.  is  to  the  worst  being  guided  two e v i l s .  This  the  maximin,  or  which  contains  the  the  players  Column w o u l d c h o o s e A  2  choose  and Row, A , ,  outcome A , A . 2  described reflection  how  rational  reveals  that  players the  rules  should do not  choose, hold  for  1 08  Figure  11  - Game  A  B  2  4 1 1  2 2  3 Game  both  s h o u l d employ  Column for  choosing  player  the  next  irrational,  has  in that  B  another where  rule  one  often  outcome  summarize  words the  is  of  rules  and d e s c r i b e  x 2 ordinal  is  most  is And  strategy,  outcome  so  A,A  2  But  outcome, is  to  guide  a  which  and  Pareto  n a t u r a l outcome  for  optimal  to  it.  So  i n games  Such games  or no o p p o s i t i o n  Gordon,  rational  is  2  rational players  no c o n f l i c t  guide  this  A , A , which  p r e f e r r e d by b o t h p l a y e r s . games of  is  2  preferred. another  in  B , B , which  p r e f e r r e d by b o t h p l a y e r s  R a p o p o r t , Guyer  the  the  least  there  required  r e f e r r e d t o as  In the  choices  is  dominating  with  1 f  to  for  no o t h e r  a  maximin p r i n c i p l e w h i c h w o u l d r e s u l t  and Row,  2  #61  p r e f e r r e d by b o t h p l a y e r s .  outcome  are  their  B  both p l a y e r s  obviously is  neither  2  3  4  In Game #61  #61.  we  can  players' all  games of  .  now  strategy the  2  classification:  In no c o n f l i c t games, the outcome t h a t a c c o r d s t h e l a r g e s t payoff to both p l a y e r s should c e r t a i n l y be designated as the natural outcome. Similarly, in a game where b o t h p l a y e r s have a d o m i n a t i n g s t r a t e g y , the outcome resulting from the choice of t h e s e s t r a t e g i e s by b o t h p l a y e r s w i l l a l s o be d e s i g n a t e d a s t h e n a t u r a l outcome. Next, if only one player has a d o m i n a t i n g s t r a t e g y , i t w i l l be assumed t h a t he w i l l c h o o s e i t and t h e o t h e r p l a y e r w i l l c h o o s e the s t r a t e g y w h i c h i s the "better response" to the other's  1 09  dominating strategy. This pair of c h o i c e s w i l l be t h e natural outcome... The n a t u r a l outcome of a 2 x 2 game without dominating strategies is the intersection of maximin s t r a t e g i e s . . . 1  While Rapoport neither the  the et  definition al.  is  3  of  maximin  strategies to  conflict.  games of players  Two  complete  does  be t h e  other,  other  by  one  in which  To r e c a p i t u l a t e ,  the  players  have  outcomes  c a n be t r e a t e d  situations  strict  each  game,  will  f o r an i n d i v i d u a l  provide  an  a l t r u i s m drawn  answer  requires  from C h a p t e r Two.  1 4  games  of  be m e n t i o n e d : of  the  preferred  by  is the  games  in  games  where  of  some  the  over  real  customarily natural  both the  world  resolved outcome  players behaving r a t i o n a l l y ,  games To  as  preferences  Drawing upon game t h e o r y ,  possible  game.  or  an outcome w h i c h  of  situations  upon t h e  of  by b o t h p l a y e r s .  abstractions of  where  strong  preferences  ordinal  Now we must a s k :  it  the  be l e a s t  order  and c o m p l e t e as  the  preferred  2 x 2  contingent  a  games w i l l  example,  has been d e s c r i b e d . is  have  o p p o s i t i o n or m i x e d - m o t i v e  most  and i n p a r t i c u l a r ,  through p o l i t i c s .  for  player  is  of  by  intersection  .outcome of  classes  given  in those  some games a r e c l a s s e d  partial  outcome  the  always  natural  opposition  a n d ; games o f  w h i c h no s i n g l e  of  not  are completely opposed,  preferred  outcome  a p p r o p r i a t e i n many games,  As was m e n t i o n e d a b o v e ,  most  natural  p l a y e r has a d o m i n a t i n g s t r a t e g y ,  unchallenged claim  no  the  an  i n how many of  these  same  t o behave a l t r u i s t i c a l l y ? o p e r a t i o n a l d e f i n i t i o n of  11 0  4.4  Altruism  In 2 X 2 Games.  Chapter definition  Two d i s c u s s e d of  d e s c r i b e d as noted  altruism  the  there  most  that a less  one  elements.  of  the  these elements  defined For  rigorous  i n the  the  some  the  to  all  the  a  the is  of  the  not  that  choose  be  of  future  an e f f e c t to  i n a game of  been  It  satisfied  or  think  i n c l u d i n g some  or  only  operationalize  subset  of  2  sections  of  this  the  altruist;  x  behaviour that  that  2  games  chapter. benefit  the  it  each  or  behaviour  be v o l u n t a r y  or  conditions  to  self-sacrificial. and a p p l y i n g  is  these  need  to  will  be made  be  played once.  this  repeated  unknown  or  or c h o i c e even  added c o m p l i c a t i o n payoffs.  an e f f e c t  no-conflict,  First,  when  the  same game number  how  i n most  iterated  some games,  games where  of  players play  it  upon how r a t i o n a l p l a y e r s or  we  analysis.  while  in  words,  There  deciding  And s e c o n d ,  only  game.  infinite  of  choose  applicable  the  non-iterated  play  explicit.  In o t h e r  " o n e - s h o t " p l a y of  upon how p l a y e r s  have  definition.  recipient;  discussion  game  in a  and  the  was  that  assumptions  for adopting  a large  discount  likely  not  the  choice  introduces  may have  it  the  following  introduction  times, may  reasons  repeated  to  number of  extent  two  the  operationalizing  are d i s c u s s i n g are  cost  and t h a t  games,  First,  of  are:  a  the  the  preceding  of  was  have  of  elements  c o m b i n e d p r o d u c e what  definition  elements  result  Before  form of  context  in the  well-being  uncoerced;  when  four  We c a n now p r o c e e d t o  improve the in  which  stringent  for a n a l y s i s  reference,  assembled  many r e s e a r c h e r s  appropriate of  and  is  would  one  or  111  both  of  the  exception percent  players  of of  the the  both p l a y e r s payoffs.  has  Prisoners' 78 d e f i n e d  Dilemma). as  have a s t r i c t  being  Such  2 x 2  and c o m p l e t e  (with  games  ordinal  the  notable  make  up  games i n  preference  81  which  o r d e r on  the  1 5  The  second  assumption  when d e t e r m i n i n g whether alternative rigorous player  a dominating strategy  to  the  definition (Row  of  the  following  Row p l a y e r ' s  (Column  self-interested  of  player)  altruism, will  it  one  will  always  analysis player's)  complies  be assumed  choose  is  the  that  choice  with  that  our  Column  self-interested  alternat ive. Finally, is  relevant  players their  case  choice  in  any g i f t  to  enter  first  in  reasoning  only  cannot  The that  the  how t h e  element  of  the  of  player,  result  The  provisionally resulting  from  comparison choice.  to  other  welfare  of  the  one  for  of  element be  termed its the  of  costly.  an  altruistic, choice outcome  I n t u i t i o n may s u g g e s t  is  it of  that  Row o r  for  the  choice Column  coplayer,  required that  diminished with a will  this  altruistic.  is  must mean t h a t  this  (in  Should the  alternative  associated  making  altruism required  either  definition  If  to  the  choose.  be d e s c r i b e d as  the  i n which  recipient  i n a more p r e f e r r e d outcome cannot  discussion  previous  will  definition  self-interested  alternative  act  or those  a more p r e f e r r e d o u t c o m e ) .  the  second  altruistic  the  following  b i n d i n g agreements of  to  such a c h o i c e  into  the  games,  ignorance  alternative not  noncooperative  increase  terms  throughout  to  the  the be  outcome  preference  in  self-interested  always  be  true.  11 2  But an  as w i l l  become a p p a r e n t ,  individual  is  less  that  t o make a c h o i c e  p r e f e r r e d than the  the  i n some games i t  recipient  which c o n t a i n s  self-interested  chooses to maximize  is an  outcome  one,  his  impossible  always  or  her  for  which  assuming  preference  order. The  third,  element  of  the  be v o l u n t a r y and u n c o e r c e d . apparent which  below,  could  one  possibly  altruistic  choice.  alternatives  cannot  Finally,  to  in  be t h e  to  As  outcome  such  consideration situations  situation.  appear  a  was  not  outcome'  the  specific  outcome,  course one;  Chapter  if  the  one  preferred less,  is  will ones.  but a l s o  there  a worst  of  outcome  the  least  In o t h e r may  a s when S m i t h must  action  be  risk  is  will  happens  choosing  a  to  self-  here  from  may be  some  preferred This  present  little  have  C h a p t e r Two  a least  be s e l f - s a c r i f i c i a l .  courses  action  form of  an such  which  excluded  Of c o u r s e the  Two,  tantamount  be  threat  players will  maximizing  willingly  accepting  of  become  altruistic.  and t h a t  t o be s e l f - s a c r i f i c i a l .  sacrificial  in  act  making  self-sacrifice,  appear to  For example,  best  altruistic  argued  into  Because  altruistic  the  will  preferred least.  alternatives  as  as  individual  preference  which i s  outcome and t h e r e f o r e  from  an  where a l t r u i s m may t a k e  upon  games,  be u n a m b i g u o u s l y d e s c r i b e d as  altruism is  sacrifice,  some  that  p l a y e r s may have a l a t e n t  force  the  preferred  depend  the  an outcome w h i c h i s  argued that least  In  required  i n some games one o r b o t h of  an a l t e r n a t i v e result  of  definition  may  i n any  different  p r e f e r r e d one may not situations, a  his  the  potentially life  to  only self-  rescue  a  11 3  drowning  swimmer.  a l t r u i s m may a t this the  type  of  require  -  separate  those  four  have  interested The  a  of  the  of  now  on the  examine  the  of  w h i c h when a p p l i e d  reveal  those  genuine  in  that  exclude  grounds  that  importance  public  goods -  can  be  of  rarely  restated  sequentially  which  altruistic  of  recipient.  It 'is  preference advantage,  less  one  or  to  both  alternative  to  as  each of  the  of the  self-  the  as  the  t h a n the result  is  altruism is at  least  Such may be or  is  when for  malevolence, choice  of  it  the is  not  case  other  or  spite.  not  improve  the  possible  for  when a g i f t  knowingly  some  is  it  logically  an outcome  n a t u r a l one, clearly  that  so,  reason  but  the  such  as  But when a  which  the  is  gift,  altruist  p r e f e r r e d more by  the  altruism.  Condition I. The s e l e c t i o n of an a l t e r n a t i v e m a x i m i z i n g one which does not produce an p r e f e r r e d by t h e c o p l a y e r c a n n o t be j u s t i f i e d  t o the g a i n s outcome more by a l t r u i s m .  Two of  basis  condition are  we  analysis  definition  requirement  understood here  recipient  to  the  inappropriate  competitive  prefers  self-sacrifice,  provision  diminish welfare.  unknowingly reduction  possibility  one.  first  to  the  the  action.  conditions  players  a gift  of  e l e m e n t s of  78 games w i l l  welfare  require  i n w h i c h we w i s h  such d r a s t i c  These  the  times  acknowledged  a l t r u i s m from f u r t h e r  situations  altruism  Having  #26  the  games w h i c h can be e x c l u d e d  from t h o s e w h i c h o f f e r  and #31 .  altruistic  on t h e choice  of  this  alternatives  11 4  Figure  A  12 - Two Games E x c l u d e d  B  2  A  1  Game #26  both the  is  players players  choose  most  or  prefer  to B  which  2  be  would-be  one  altruist  Clearly,  possible.  Notice  that  those  which  altruism  games of natural  no-conflict outcome  While  in as  (21  choice  of most of  If  While also  Condition  excludes  t o most  other  least I  might  or  because  she  some c o s t (either  i n terms  B , A 2 or  improve t h e  so  it  also  they  player  from  all the  the  other's is  #26  not from  feature  i n Game #26  all a  cannot  by a d e s i r e  Row c h o o s e s B , and C o l u m n ,  preferred  So  players.  be e x p l a i n e d  preferred  2  excludes  all  of  A,B )  choice Game  of  might  coplayer.  p r e f e r r e d by b o t h  excludes  games  he  excludes  because  B by e i t h e r  advantage.  or her  I  game  Now s h o u l d one  altruistic  possible,  78)  competitive  ends up w i t h h i s  outcome  games  is  it  o r h e r next  involve  Condition  by a l t r u i s m ,  his  outcome.  d i m i n i s h and not  be e x p l a i n e d  gains  2  p r e f e r r e d by t h e  such  which i s  the  the  less  can o n l y  noncompetitive  A,A  would  welfare.  in  4  altruistically,  However,  which i s  or  the  behave  reduced p r e f e r e n c e . would  1  Game #31  a no-conflict  wish  B,  2  1  B,  2  2  3  1  Game #26  B  2  3  1  2  3  I.  4  2  4  B,  A  2  3  4 A,  by C o n d i t i o n  outcome  while  for  A , Row 2  Column  one. games of final  no-conflict,  subset  in  it  which  11 5  altruistic  choice  conflict.  Column has  choose  the  natural  outcome.  B,  would  2  best  least. gift, than  about  However, it  is  results the  Column's  features  of  that  the  excluding  prefers even  strategy result  her  than  though  Column which  So as  with  is  is  2  of  which  is  2  the  choice  preferred  not  incur  preferred though by  the  choosing prefer  cost  less for  a  the  of  outcome  but  does  should  A , A , the  by  constrained  partial  w h i c h Row  an outcome  can  Row,  one  because  least  A,A  is  to of  b r i n g about  less  altruism  #31  altruistic  or  i n an outcome  reason,  The s e c o n d  be  his  n a t u r a l one.  the  the  Column can  she  Game  a dominating  Row c a n n o t  IV).  which he o r  possible.  response,  bring  (Condition B  is  by  of  a  Row  different structural  game. element  behaviour Condition  of  be  the  definition  costly  to  of  the  altruism  altruist.  required So we  have  II:  Condition II. The selection of an alternative to the g a i n s - m a x i m i z i n g c h o i c e w h i c h does not r e s u l t i n an outcome which is p r e f e r r e d l e s s by t h e p l a y e r c a n n o t be j u s t i f i e d by a l t r u i s m . An example given  below  of  the  i n Game #68  choice  set  in Figure  described 13.  by C o n d i t i o n  II  is  11 6  Figure  13 - A Game E x c l u d e d  A  by C o n d i t i o n  B  2  2 3  1  3 1  4 Game  be  both p l a y e r s  the  cell  A,A  2  rationally,  which  is  Both p l a y e r s  maximin  strategies. If  chooses the the  result  Column,  but  Row  Row  outcome:  altruism  as  II.  If  gains  it  B,  it  Row  the  case  II  do  is  as  in not  the  than  is  hardly  to  the  to  A,A ,  or  2  p u r s u i n g a more compatible will  gains basis  Column p l a y e r ' s  choice  alternative  Game allow  this  on t h e #68,  alternative  basis  those  players  the  of  of  wish  to  is  Condition to  the  similarly  Condition  games  with  maximizing  on the  that  this  payoff  altruistic  we f i n d  Column  interpretation  We t h e r e f o r e  alternative  be  At  2  One  to  that  be B , A .  more  player  their  wished  increases  nothing.  the  which  from b e i n g a l t r u i s t i c  Condition  employing  will  outcome  will  p r e f e r r e d by b o t h  be  that  choice  has c o s t that  choice  being defined  is  will  been d e s c r i b e d .  m a x i m i z i n g one,  As  n a t u r a l outcome  least  outcome  this  something has  the  Row's  is  we now examine  excluded  now  of  Row p l a y e r ' s  from  Suppose  prefers  choosing  one  A  choosing  preferred  exclude  to  in choosing  maximin s t r a t e g y -  alternatively,  next  the  Row p l a y e r c h o o s e s B , , and a s s u m i n g  outcome  of  #68  choose  players.  altruistic.  2  4  2  If  II.  which  o p p o r t u n i t y to  II. violate behave  11 7  altruistically  even were they  disposed  Game  #68  well  games e l i m i n a t e d  place  a constraint  as  Thirdly, uncoerced. distinguish from  as  upon the  While  is  in  or  individual  enhance  easier.  A l t h o u g h what  games i s  not  esteem,  rich  least  illustrative.  is  presence  altruistic  of  it  a l t r u i s m from  to  as  reality  threat  intentions,  So f i n a l l y  there  to but  meant which  choose rather  as  in  task  may  forces not  a  in  in t h i s player  a submission  to  is  somewhat  life,  because  to  follow which  is  coercion real  and  difficult  or b e h a v i o u r  by c o e r c i o n  it  condition  voluntary  which  games t h e  possibilities  What i s  alternative  altruistic  the  by t h i s  often  obligation,  Therefore,  altruism.  behaviour  in simple  so.  being  can be u n d e r s t o o d as  as  a  do  of  as  intended  the  manifestation  a l t r u i s m was a l s o d e f i n e d  genuine  social  other  to  these  it  is  at  context with  an  of  genuine  the  threat.  is,  Condition III. The s e l e c t i o n of an alternative to the gains-maximizing one which produces an apparently a l t r u i s t i c outcome but w h i c h may be coerced by means of threats or forced by the c o p l a y e r c a n n o t be j u s t i f i e d by altruism. It  will  basis  of  be h e l p f u l  to  Condition IV.  have an example Figure  of  14 g i v e s  games e x c l u d e d two  such  games.  on  the  1 18  Figure  14 - Two Games E x c l u d e d  A  B  2  4  1  1  Game  alternative.  about  outcome Row  altruistic  furthermore, preferred first,  Row's  has  the  from t h e  less  to  the  his  gains  of  brings 2  subset of  or her is  of  B , by  welfare  and least  applied  m a x i m i z i n g one  altruistic  an  A,A .  choice  condition  the  subset  from t h e  about  former  it than  coplayer's  bring  alternative  i n b o t h games what a p p e a r s  p r o d u c e an outcome is  which i s  more p r e f e r r e d  selection  of to  obvious  strategy  the  Row  have  Row c h o o s e s  Similarly,  In b o t h i n s t a n c e s ,  2  available  I.  Row  games  in by  I.  in B .  one but  is  choice  if  excluded  diminishes that  does  #50  prefers  is  #20  Because  excluded  Column  will  also  requires  Game #50 i s  choice  Game  outcome.  Condition  Column  games by C o n d i t i o n  Row i n Game #50  Game  In Game #20  which  in  nor  #20  altruistic  Therefore,  2  Game #50  neither  an  2  1  B,  Game #20  In  4  1  2  2  3  3  A,  III  B  2  4  4 2  B,  A  2  3  3  A,  by C o n d i t i o n  B  2  by  Game  less  Row  Column  may  be  #50.  altruism. In  i n A , and C o l u m n ' s b e s t  this  2  he or  p r e f e r r e d than the  the  of  be an a l t r u i s t i c  Column c h o o s e s B  by  Row and not in  if  to  player. the  result  The p r e s e n c e  natural  However, of of  she  the  the  threat  a  threat  game Row has a d o m i n a t i n g  response  is  apparently A  2  which  1 19  produces  the  n a t u r a l outcome  Column might how  Row  choose A  2  reason  she  thus  producing A , A .  prefers  Column  both p l a y e r s '  at  least  begin  outcome  it  is  the  obvious  a wish of  of  to  Row  choice  with,  that  to  choose B , .  alternative  both  of  applicable may be  the  only  Recall  or  altruistic  To  2  plays  of  that  it  brings such  to  the  appear  1  the about  shot  of  better  on t h e  self-interested the  outcome  have  been  part  of  coercion  to  be more threat  could  also  game.  where  the  one  is  which termed  from  of  to Column's  reasonong  that  as  possible,  latent  the  to  where  because  first  p l a y of  applied is  instances  not  the  this  alternative  presence  a game where  i n a one  So:  he 2  Now,  2  a threat  at  and so a r e e x c l u d e d  behaviour.  is  A B .  be t a k e n  such a l i n e  c o n d i t i o n not to  to  is A , B .  avoid  reasoning applies  explain  will  However,  that  B,A .  reason  may w e l l  The same  games  and s e l f - s a c r i f i c i a l , of  6  to  alternative  at  i n response  followed  repeated  sacrificial, least.  1  by a p l a y e r  Now t h e of  but  be  Column  case  games i n w h i c h a l t r u i s m i s  #20.  be e x e r c i s e d . followed  which i n t h i s  b r i n g i n g about  i n Game  these  to  may  such a c t i o n  be a l t r u i s t i c ,  of  disgruntled,  c o n s i d e r e d Column's c h o i c e of  knowledge  however,  Row i s  how  Row c o u l d c h o o s e B , b r i n g i n g about  thus  subset  The r e a s o n i n g in  that  imagine  i m p r e s s i o n might  reflection  more,  Column  we p r e v i o u s l y may have member  On  must  made w i t h o u t  first  p r e f e r r e d outcome  choose  a  is  we  n a t u r a l outcome  believe  outcome,  to  the  another  undesirable 2  Column's 2  may w e l l  B  a choice  chosen.  that  Now  2  has  may r e c o g n i z e or  before  A,A .  is  choice self-  preferred  superogatory  being  instances  1 20  Condition IV. The selection of an a l t e r n a t i v e to g a i n s - m a x i m i z i n g one w h i c h r e s u l t s i n an outcome which l e a s t p r e f e r r e d c a n n o t be j u s t i f i e d by a l t r u i s m . Two examples of Figure  games e x c l u d e d  by C o n d i t i o n IV a r e  15 -  A  Two Games E x c l u d e d by C o n d i t i o n I V .  B  2  3 A,  B,  A  2  1  3  both  Row  produce  and Column have  which  if  both  games  about  an outcome  (assuming  gains-maximizing  strategy)  coplayer  the  the  players  prefers  they are choosing therefore  more to  preference  by  accepting  she  only  complies  next with  the  to  welfare  to three  most  other  player  which  cost  outcome  most.  of as  B , or B  less,  is  in  less  follows  the  in doing  so,  of  preferred.  e l e m e n t s of  the  the  reduced  p r e f e r r e d than A , A , 2  such  Column by b r i n g i n g a b o u t to  preferred  Row i n Game #9  terms  Furthermore,  opposed  a  which  least if  in  can b r i n g  2  but  But  For example, a  Moreover,  2  n a t u r a l one.  an outcome  an  A,A .  strategies  either  which they p r e f e r  incurs  p r e f e r r e d next  most p r e f e r r e d outcome is  the  self-sacrificial. or  the  that  #11  dominating  outcome  in choosing  accept  he  increases  natural  than  chooses B , ,  is  3  Game  games  chosen  2  1  B,  Game #9  In  4 4  2  2  1  2  A, 2  1  B  2  3  4 4  which  in  15. Figure  and  given  the is  a his  n a t u r a l outcome,  However, definition  while of  this  choice or  her  which choice  altruism,  it  121  contravenes least  the  preferred Table  Column from t h e  sequentially  I  GAME 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 0 1 1 1 2 1 3 1 4 1 5 16 17 18 1 9 20 21 22 23 24 25 26  The  is  which c o n d i t i o n s  choice  alternative  altruistic through  indicated  I -  the  altruist  accept  a  outcome.  player's of  Table  by r e q u i r i n g t h a t  I summarizes  set  excludes  other  ones. IV  for  so  to  eliminate the  the  Row  and  gains maximizing  The  conditions  that  the  first  were  one  applied  condition  which  b o t h Row and C o l u m n .  The C o n d i t i o n s Which E l i m i n a t e E a c h Game Under I n i t i a l Assumptions.  ROW  COL.  I I I I I I  I I I I I I  IV IV IV IV IV I I I I I I I I I I I I I I  process  IV IV IV  IV IV IV III III III I I I I I  of  GAME 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52  ROW  COL.  I I I I I I I I I I I I .1 I I I I I  I I I I I I I I  IV I IV I I I I  elimination  IV I I III IV IV IV IV IV IV IV IV IV III III III III  c a n be  GAME 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78  greatly  ROW  COL.  I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I II II I I II I I I I II II  Ill III III III III I I I I I I I IV I 11 II II I I ' I IV IV IV IV IV IV  simplified  by  the  1 22  following  algorithm:  S t e p 1. Does the n o n s e l f - i n t e r e s t e d c h o i c e result in an outcome which is more p r e f e r r e d by t h e c o p l a y e r t h a n the n a t u r a l one? I f n o t , e x c l u d e i t on the b a s i s of Condition I. I f s o , go t o S t e p 2. Step 2. Does the choice of the nonself-interested a l t e r n a t i v e by e i t h e r Row or Column r e s u l t in an outcome p r e f e r r e d l e s s than t h e n a t u r a l one? I f n o t , e x c l u d e i t on the b a s i s of C o n d i t i o n I I . I f s o , go t o S t e p 3. Step 3. Can the choice of the nonself-interested a l t e r n a t i v e be c o e r c e d ? I f i t c a n , e x c l u d e i t on t h e b a s i s of C o n d i t i o n I I I . I f i t c a n n o t be c o e r c e d , go t o s t e p 4. S t e p 4. Does the n o n s e l f - i n t e r e s t e d c h o i c e result in an outcome w h i c h i s t h e l e a s t p r e f e r r e d ? I f s o , e x c l u d e i t on the b a s i s of C o n d i t i o n I V . I f n o t , the c h o i c e a l t e r n a t i v e i s one w h i c h can be j u s t i f i e d by a l t r u i s m . The a l g o r i t h i m p r o d u c e s o n l y e i g h t Row,  Column,  alternative #7,  #8,  Figure  #10, 16.  or  both  have  a  games  in  which  either  nonself-interested  choice  w h i c h can be j u s t i f i e d by a l t r u i s m . #13,  #14,  #17,  #35,  and #45.  They  T h e s e games a r e are  given  in  1 23  Figure  A  16  B  2  3 A,  3  A,  Game #7  B  2  2  4 A,  3  4 3  Bi  2  Game  3  1 1  #13  #8  B  2  1  Game  1  3  A  2  2 4  2  #14  B  2  2  4 A,  2  1  3  B,  1  Game #10  4 A,  4 4  B,  2  2  2  A,  2  A  2  B  2  3  1  1  Game  A  2  4 4  B,  Conditions  2  3  1 1  A  B  2  3  4  2  E l i m i n a t i o n by A l l of Assumptions.  A  2  2  4  B,  - Games S u r v i v i n g Under F i r s t Set  4 1  3 B  1  1  Game  3  #17  2  1 24  B4  2  2  A,  3  3  4  Game  different  applied  conditions order  first,  the  benefit  condition  applied  fourth  eliminated,  A closer excluding  admitted of  the  first is  point  This  the  at  in  necessarily is  and one  underlines give  to  assuring  other  under t h i s  an a l t e r n a t i v e  subset  and  conditions  o r d e r of  is  constraint, one  same  how many ones as  games  that  being  the  relaxed.  o r b o t h of  act  comparison, the  I.  which benefit  operate number  dropping  would a d m i t a the  missed,  importance  If  be  The  by C o n d i t i o n  r e d u c e d by this  would  of  requirements  an a l t r u i s t i c by  where  game.  can h a r d l y be  excluded  the  importance  the  is  condition  games  are  application.  must meet  where  voluntary  relative  justifies that  second,  same c o n d i t i o n s  altruism  games o r a l t e r n a t i v e s  The  the  of  order,  condition  a particular  the  altruistic  comment  self-sacrificial  22 games t o  and f u r t h e r ,  to  cost  applied  the  by the  applicable  of  the  and the  Table I reveals  subset  in a s p e c i f i c  condition  precisely  worthy of  recipient.  fourth,  not  where  third,  definition  certainly  conditions  applied  rigorous  number of  infrequently  been a p p l i e d  self-sacrifice  conditions  many d e f i n i t i o n s the  have  results  look  #45  application  condition  into  most  the  of  though  more t h a n one  the  1  Game  the  4  2  B,  #35  While a  4  1  1  1  3  A,  3 B  2  players  of the  further has  a  1 25  choice  alternative  to  the  Dropping  the  voluntary condition,  13 games t o  the  subset  altruistic. a  further  percent  of  the  dropped another  can  games.  upon the  now  that  say  altruistic  between  b r i n g i n g the  Finally,  stringency  the  choice  a h i g h of  applied,  maximizing  if  4 games a r e a d m i t t e d t o  Depending  allow  is  78  gains  of  percentage by one  60 p e r c e n t  and a low of  the  of  10 p e r c e n t  total cost  definition  of  only  which  is  would  admit  to  or  55  condition  is  applied  we  43,  subset.  games of  or both where  III,  the  the  one  this  the  the  players  benefit  when a l l  order which ranges  requirement  four c o n d i t i o n s  are  applied. One the  important question  s m a l l number of  only  a result  explicitly first  stated  the  at  will  Second,  we  altruistic  always  of  that  choosing  natural  outcome  Relaxing  one  of  is  and  so  the  altruism, the Row the  of  the  viable  of  the  section? Row  self-interested that  the  Column  that  self-interested  altruistic; conditions  and to  second,  of that  a  where  Row (Column) we w i l l  we  one  that  (Column complied  produced  (Row  two  are  now assume  be the  alternative.  b o t h be  first,  result  Recall  alternative.  other  admitting  the  assumptions  Column p l a y e r  which  the  requires  not  p l a y e r c o u l d not  alternative  looked only at  that  is  player's  So now we b r o a d e n our a s s u m p t i o n s that  possible  self-interested or  these assumptions  it  is  but a l s o  whether  to  choose  assumed in  beginning  alternative  definition  player)  the  in determining  choice  be p u t :  games i n w h i c h a l t r u i s m  our f o u r c o n d i t i o n s  we assumed  player's) with  of  needs to  relaxed.  possibilities: choice applying  that  Column  may be the (Row)  1 26  will we  not  necessarily  are  really  potential order  action may  interested  in  are the  first  choice  not  result  of  more r e a d i l y a p p a r e n t choice  could  interest  be  of  games  the  revealed  as  of  kind  second  advantage  to  But of the  it. a  self-  course  here  players it  motivated  the  rational  that  two c h a p t e r s  being  of  of  accept  of  All  recipient  coplayer's  Furthermore,  following  #66,  choice  #67,  first  as  #70,  interested  alternative.  combined  the  One f i n a l  point  to  both p l a y e r s the  assumptions.  of  note  #73,  but  only  will  become  how a  single  by b o t h  in  is  not  the  self-  that  9  assumptions  of  games  #66  the  and #76, may  first  lead  by  2  x  an  set  the  2  games,  alternative. under  in  nonself-  admissible  seventeen  admitted  Now  to  and s e c o n d  of  9  and Row  the  eliminated  choice  a further  alternative  chooses  subset  all  possibilities.  #75,  number of  complete  an a l t r u s i t i c  additional  game  coplayer  games  the  of  78 games,  #74,  W h i l e under the  doubles,  22 p e r c e n t  all  altruistic  #72,  the  number of  set  self-interested  choice if  conditions  only  the  #71,  self-interested  assumptions  and s e c o n d  having  of  outcome  shows  take  are a p p l i e d to  altruistic  permit  the  motivation  interpreted  conditions  are  player's  still  a  strategy.  and a l t r u i s m .  Column p l a y e r ' s games  to  actions. i n the  the  be a l t r u i s t i c .  i n the  When under b o t h t h e four  determine  difficult  could also  their  that  exercise  so a s  be  interested  is  to  and t h e r e b y  and c h o o s e  at  gains-maximizing  here  a l t r u i s m may be a b l e  of  It  we  admitting  rationality,  course  choose the  the  of  four  games  is  games. only Figure  two 17  relaxed  1 27  F i g u r e 17 Conditions  A  B  2  3  2  Game  #66  B  2  3 3  2  2 3  4 1  #71  2  4  Game  #72  B  2  1  4 2  4 1  #70  A  2  1  3  1  Game  B  2  3  4  #67  A  2  1  2  Game  Game  2 2  1  4 2  3  Game  2  1  3 1  4  B  2  4  3 2  1  A  2  4  2 1  4  B  2  3  2  A  A  2  4  3  4  A d d i t i o n a l Games S u r v i v i n g E l i m i n a t i o n by A l l Under F i r s t and Second S e t s of Assumptions.  3 1  #73  2  1 28  A  B  2  1  4 2  A,  Game #74  the  enter  first  the  stringent enter  4.5  If  applied  i n the  is  subset  set  50,  under t h e  as  i n the  determine  analysis  made  many  games  how  ones u n d e r s u c c e s s i v e l y IV  is  dropped  Conditions III  and II  entering  number of of  #76  games  assumptions  which i s  set  in a  subset subset  with only  of  of  under  the  increase  of  games  result  the  in the  o n l y an  original  18  less  one  7 over  assumptions.  Conclusion.  p r e v i o u s ones.  of  this  Most  is  While  this  behave  a l t r u i s t i c a l l y it  the  effect  chapter confirms  important is  action  to,  to  respectively  The t o t a l  1  Game  Condition  Dropping  s e c o n d and f i r s t  The a n a l y s i s of  altruistic  games  ones.  condition those  of  subset.  13 and 2  the  assumptions  4  4  B,  conditions  of  definitions.  altruistic both  set  subset  the  further  we can d r o p t h e  3 2  1  2  1  2  1  Game #75  Finally, under  A 4  3  B,  B  2  3  4 2  1  A  2  1  2  A, 3  4  B  2  3  3 2  Bi  A  2  c o n s t r a i n e d by t h e finding  situation  on whether  s t r u c t u r e of  does show t h a t of  are able  choice to.  the  f i n d i n g that choice  even will  This  altruistic  i n d i v i d u a l s can  should have  may  positions  alternatives.  says n o t h i n g about whether  or c o n t e x t they  the  some of  they  wish  a considerable  explain  Nagel's  129  comment  that  may not  altruism is  be b e c a u s e  because  the  rare,  adding  i n d i v i d u a l s cannot  situations  in which  the  qualification  be m o t i v a t e d  it  is  possible  that  by are  it,  it but  relatively  rare. The l i m i t e d a p p l i c a b i l i t y of complementary analysis  finding  using  deterrent,  the  he  disagreement,  when a l t r u i s t i c situations, example limit but  number  does  not  about  to  was  of  one  on a l l  sides  problems  a  area  of  "even  in a p o l i t i c a l  that  over  of  and,  1 7  remains."  which c o n f l i c t  conflict  b o r n e out the  players  potential  importance not  where  altruism  all  a  of  In  altruism may be  the may  expected  sharing  of  the  of  i n d i v i d u a l s are still  have  Chapter  it  is  in the  choice  2 of  situation. the  of  conclusion  guided  usually  78 games  alternatives.  abstractions  political about  motivation.  political  its  R e c a l l that  in only  altruistic for  earlier  involved  that  as  the  possible  interesting  panacea  would  is  altruistic  games an  substantiated  altruism.  actors  finding  have  these to  of  also  altruism  by the  leads  is  chapter  or a s u b s e t  situations  by  formal  costs  conflict  indicates  over  asymmetry  where  Accepting  society  model  all  this  the  that  b o t h of  altruism  present  areas  the  a  a  1 8  Three noted limited  "the  of  remove  political  eliminate  findings  comment  is  dividing  In  in  a l t r u i s m may n a r r o w the  entirely  behaviour  support  Frohlich's.  allies  while  a r e s i d u u m of  the  The  did  does not  Norman of  that  he d i s c u s s e s ,  burdens."  This  example  finds it  of  a l t r u i s m finds  Clearly,  conflict.  in a l l  of  their  difficulties,  the  for  Even  a  actions i n some  1 30  conflicts  goodwill  What has and  we s t i l l  individuals opportunity this  been a c c o m p l i s h e d  description  However,  and b e n e v o l e n c e would not  may is  question.  of  the  have  present.  far  situational  no c l e a r  choose  so  to  is  a  possible.  formal  constraints  appreciation  behave  be  of  upon a l t r u i s m . how  altruistically  The f o l l o w i n g  definition  two c h a p t e r s  frequently when  such  an  investigate  131  Notes.  1  to  Martin S h u b i k , ( e d ) , Game T h e o r y and R e l a t e d S o c i a l B e h a v i o u r (New Y o r k : W i l e y , 1964) , p~. 8~.  Approaches  2  F o r a d i s c u s s i o n of the r o l e of game t h e o r y i n analyzing political behaviour, see: Hayward R. A l k e r , M a t h e m a t i c s and Politics (New York: Macmillan, 1965), chapter 7; R. B. Braithwaite, The T h e o r y of Games as a T o o l f o r the M o r a l Philosopher, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1955); Stephen J. Brams, Game T h e o r y and P o l i t i c s (New York: Free P r e s s , 1975). A n a t o l R a p o p o r t , F i g h t s , Games and D e b a t e s , (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1960) ; Thomas C . Schelling, The S t r a t e g y of C o n f l i c t (Cambridge, M a s s . : H a r v a r d University Press, 1960); M a r t i n S h u b i k , ( e d ) , Game T h e o r y and R e l a t e d A p p r o a c h e s to S o c i a l B e h a v i o u r (New Y o r k : W i l e y , 1 9 6 4 ) . The a p p l i c a t i o n s of game t h e o r y t o t h e a n a l y s i s of international r e l a t i o n s a r e t o o numerous t o c i t e h e r e , but see R. Harrison Wagner, "The Theory of Games and the P r o b l e m of International Cooperation," American P o l i t i c a l S c i e n c e Review, vol. 77 (1983), pp. 330-346, f o r a p a r t i a l b i b l i o g r a p h y and c r i t i c a l di scussion.  3  A game may a l s o be r e p r e s e n t e d i n c h a r a c t e r i st i c form. "The characteristic f u n c t i o n i s a set f u n c t i o n which d e s c r i b e s the amount t h a t any s u b s e t of p l a y e r s can g u a r a n t e e f o r i t s e l f . " M a r t i n S h u b i k , "Game T h e o r y , B e h a v i o u r , and the P a r a d o x of the Prisoner's Dilemma: Three Solutions," J o u r n a l of C o n f l i c t R e s o l u t i o n , v o l . 1 4 (1970), p. 182. The c h a r a c t e r i s t i c form is most a p p l i c a b l e t o b a r g a i n i n g s i t u a t i o n s or c o o p e r a t i v e games. The d i s c u s s i o n i n t h i s c h a p t e r f o c u s e s on noncooperative games in which, by definition, bargaining is precluded. F o r an i n t e r e s t i n g e x p e r i m e n t and use of t h e c h a r a c t e r i s t i c form of a game see: William H. Riker, "Bargaining in a Three Person Game", A m e r i c a n J o u r n a l of P o l i t i c a l S c i e n c e , v o l . 61 (1967), pp. 642-56.  4  Shubik, "Game T h e o r y , B e h a v i o u r , and t h e P r i s o n e r s Dilemma: Three S o l u t i o n s " , p . 183.  Paradox  of  the  5  For a good discussion of the relationship between strategic and e x t e n s i v e game f o r m s , see Wagner, "The T h e o r y of Games and t h e P r o b l e m of I n t e r n a t i o n a l C o o p e r a t i o n " . 6  R. (New Y o r k :  Duncan L u c e and Howard W i l e y & Sons, 1957), p .  Raiffa, 89.  Games and  Decisions  1 32  7  The 2 x 2 8.  Anatol Rapoport, Meivin J . G u y e r , and D a v i d G . Gordon, Game (Ann A r b o u r : M i c h i g a n U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s , 1 9 7 6 ) , p .  8  A n a t o l R a p o p o r t and M e i v i n 2 Games", G e n e r a l Systems , v o l .  J. 11  Guyer, (1966),  "A Taxonomy of pp. 203-214.  2  x  9  See: Rapoport and G u y e r , "A Taxonomy of 2 x 2 Games". T h e s e numbers a p p l y o n l y t o the s u b s e t of 2 x 2 games where the players are assumed to have a c o m p l e t e and s t r o n g p r e f e r e n c e o r d e r o v e r t h e outcomes of the game.  1 0  The c o m p l e t e s e t of 2 x 2 o r d i n a l games can be d e s c r i b e d a c c o r d i n g t o e a c h p a i r of o r d i n a l p a y o f f s e t s . The f i g u r e below g i v e s t h e number of d i f f e r e n t games f o r e a c h of the c o m b i n a t i o n s of p a y o f f s e t s . Number of Each P a i r  4321 3321 322 1 321 1 221 1 222 1 2111 1111  Different of P a y o f f  Games Sets  4321  3321  3221  321 1  221 1  78  72 21  72 36 21  72 36 36 21  36 18 18 18 8  for  222 1 2111 27 12 1 2 1 2 6 3  27 1 2 1 2 12 6 4 3  1111 6 3 3 3 3 1 1 1  SOURCE: M e i v i n Guyer and Henry H a m b u r g e r , "A Note on of 2 x 2 G a m e s ' " , G e n e r a l S y s t e m s , v o l . 13 (1968), 209.  'A Taxonomy pp. 205-  1 1  R a p o p o r t , Guyer and G o r d o n ,  The 2 x 2  Game , p .  4.  1 2  R a p o p o r t , Guyer and G o r d o n ,  The 2 x 2  Game , p .  17  Rapoport,  The 2 x 2  Game , p .  17-18.  1 3  1  Guyer and G o r d o n ,  * Rapoport et e x p l a i n t h e compromise  al. are aware i n the f o l l o w i n g  of this terms:  deficiency  and  The " s o l u t i o n " of c o n s t a n t - s u m games of t h i s t y p e i s given in terms of so-called mixed strategies ... S i n c e the s o l u t i o n i n terms of m i x e d s t r a t e g i e s i n v o l v e s the concept  1 33  of a statistically expected p a y o f f , i t f o l l o w s t h a t such solutions can be discussed only if the statistical expectation of a p a y o f f can be d e f i n e d . In c l a s s i c a l game t h e o r y , p a y o f f s a r e s u p p o s e d t o be given on an interval scale which permits the definition of statistical expectation. In the present classification of games, however, we assume o n l y a o r d i n a l s c a l e f o r t h e p a y o f f s . S t a t i s t i c a l e x p e c t a t i o n , hence a s o l u t i o n i n terms of mixed strategies, has no meaning i n t h i s c o n t e x t , and t h e n a t u r a l outcome of a game w i t h o u t d o m i n a t i n g s t r a t e g i e s cannot be d e f i n e d i n terms of mixed s t r a t e g i e s . Rapoport, Guyer and G o r d o n , The 2 x 2 Game , p. 18. For another approach to classifying games of this order, see: Stephen Brams and Marek P H e s s e l , " A b s o r b i n g Outcomes i n 2 x 2 Games", B e h a v i o u r a l S c i e n c e , v o l . 27, (1982)" p p . 383-401.  1 5  Game  ,  See C h a p t e r for evidence  7 i n R a p o p o r t , Guyer and Gordon, which s u p p o r t s t h i s c o n t e n t i o n .  The  2 x 2  1 6  F o r a s i m i l a r d i s c u s s i o n of t h r e a t s u s i n g t h e same o r d e r of games t h o u g h b a s e d on a d i f f e r e n t e q u i l i b r i u m c o n c e p t , see: Steven J. Brams and Marek P. Hessel, "Threat Power in Sequential Games", International Studies Quarterly, vol. 28 (1984), pp. 23-44.  1 7  Norman Frohlich, "Self-interest or Altruism, What Difference?", J o u r n a l of C o n f l i c t R e s o l u t i o n , v o l . 1-8 ( 1 9 7 4 ) , p. 58.  Frohlich,  "Self-interest  or A l t r u i s m " ,  p.  68.  1 34  V.  5.1  THE MOTIVATIONAL CONTEXT OF CHOICE.  The I n f l u e n c e  Throughout or  situation  emphasized. presence  Of C o n t e x t .  the on  altruistic  Thus  or  preceding chapters,  far  it  absence  has  of  d e s c r i b e d as a l t r u i s t i c . to  o u r a p p r e c i a t i o n of The  to  a  obviously e l e m e n t s of  a given  among s e v e r a l  a  also  situation  an i c e  to  him a number of  possible  course  be  effects  of  from as  the  teams,  there  of  e a c h team t o  may  lose  teams, match  the  will  involves  of  the  detail  only  this way  the  Take  in the  constraint  choice  it  is  of  f o r example  the  their  The p l a y e r s ,  that  is  even the  will  of  But even  the  for  aside  each  other  the  hockey  players  members  though t h e i r  team  i n d i v i d u a l s on b o t h  to other m o t i v a t i o n a l p r e s s u r e s .  professional  open the  situation  between  of  of  straightforward,  teammates  from  case  context  i n a l l games.  be a c o m p e t i t i o n  one  E a c h p l a y e r has  the  is  in which c e r t a i n  b e h a v i o u r s w i t h i n the of  opportunity  i n d i v i d u a l s competing a g a i n s t  also  subject  i n terms  b r o a d e n and add  h o c k e y game s a y .  as  outshine  game.  are a l s o  of  repeatedly  can be  the  influence  m o t i v a t i o n a r e not  two teams  not  in  c o m p e l l i n g element  competition, this  context  which  though  behaviours.  sporting event,  The most  to  of  been  alternative  lies  behaviour,  a  game.  choice  Now we need  but  possible  has  o n l y been d i s c u s s e d  context  certain  paramount,  choice  influence  context.  i m p o r t a n c e of  pursue  the  who  are  If  the  chiefly  1 35  entertainers, match say,  as if  will  exciting they  matches  as  are  which  individual able  they  usually  come  salary  for  the  his  houses,  negotiation  recounting his  Finally, in  of  outweigh  the  Once  we as  begin  examine  the  incentive  on ice to  pressure  to  spectacle  which c o m p e t i t i o n or to  We pressures  be b e n e v o l e n t , to  would  be  are  will  it  for  rest  be  the  altruistic to  score  other.  injure  if  that  Naturally, will  a situation  a sports  and so  each  is  tend  produce.  built  into  treat  the  every  or  the to  context,  number  increases. player  Set  has  some  of  against  game s i t u a t i o n ,  an when  under  because  of In  position  also  cooperate  will  to  the  improve h i s  player  than  match,  decisions  game,  Each  rather  motivations  players  player  situation  a player's  negotiated. compete  as  excel  are  each  may t r y not  the  closely  hockey  salaries  for  a  run up t h e  this  to  of  to  exciting  benevolent.  a p p a r e n t l y simple  example  pressures  in  be  the  He  routed  to  pressures  individual  or not  already  motivational  and  to  situation.  to  p a r t i c u l a r game may  e a c h p l a y e r may c h o o s e  pressures  pressure  best,  the  in  deliberately,  other  If  role  this  has  the  (Needless  producing  that  of  team  would w i s h  match,  t o make "the  be b e n e f i c i a l  time.)  satisfaction  presence  pressure  will  one of  player  something  in  as  benevolent  player's  it  motivation  spectators.  lore  days.  another  the  successful  to produce a very e x c i t i n g  have  or  possible  draw f u l l  go down i n h o c k e y  of  have a c o l l e c t i v e  the these was a  o p p o s i n g p l a y e r as  he  treated. not  expect  mentioned above,  all  situations  nor t h a t  they  to c o n t a i n a l l  will  work  with  of  the  equal  1 36  force,  d i r e c t i o n , or number, on i n d i v i d u a l s who a r e  within  some c o n t e x t .  whether effect  they  each  of  the  lead  to  chapter  is:  which  a  poor  for  of  of  action.  of  Remember  In t h i s  following  his  r a t i o n a l i t y , which i f  outcome  for  both,  which i f  pressures,  have an i m p o r t a n t  previously.  a choice  they  situation or h e r own  they  or,  the  do  so,  choosing  the  do s o ,  leads  to  a  both. to  be  Under  what  choose  to  addressed  in t h i s  conditions behave  and  and the  how  succeeding  frequently  a l t r u i s t i c a l l y when s u c h a  there  a r e many  examples  one c a n a r g u a b l y o b s e r v e  them a r e w h o l l y d e d i c a t e d  influence  of  h u n d r e d s of Dilemma only  altruism  experiments  game.  While  interesting  aspect  cooperation  and  cooperative  one a s  see  has  number  will choice  possible? While  of  course  individual  question  individuals is  a  rational strategy,  outcome  The  of  players or  collectively better  choice  the  reinforcing, will  Dilemma game d i s c u s s e d  self-interest will  clearly  a r e o p p o s e d or  upon t h e  Prisoner's  But  interacting  past  collectively  allegory this  a " f a i l u r e " of individually  outcomes  where  as  is  any  of  p r o b l e m of outcome  r a t i o n a l course  must  of  play  view  the of  altruism. the  that  the  achieving but  the  subjects  action  some  are  Prisoner's  believe  one o r b o t h of  the  there  the  us t o  other  one may a l s o  examining  example,  the  any  expressions  subjects  behaviour, hardly  use  urges  game  views  rational course,  noncooperative experiments  of  in  For  which r e p o r t the the  experiments  systematically  choice.  therefore  their  gaming  altruistic  to  on  of  of  to  to the  these  In f a c t ,  game r e p e a t e d l y ,  in a  1 37  pattern  of  r e c i p r o c a l a l t r u i s m is  Another altruism these  example  occurs  payoff  to  to  total  coalition  is  found  one the  deviation  a  payoff  of  of  the  behaviour  as  to  the  altruistic  players  subjects' solution  coalition  of  "shaving  members...—  solution  the  the  to  In  and so  secure  three  formable  payoff  rationally.  if  member.  with  However,  But i t  although  the is  one p l a y e r  Riker other  this  to  increases  the  interprets player's  is  was  agrees  also possible  obviously  a  Riker  fully  problem.  of  theory  should gain  and t h e r e b y  a  values  from game  conformed almost  q u o t a " where  purchase  coalition.  behaviour,  behave  2  amongst  different  derived  as  common i n many b a r g a i n i n g s e s s i o n s  coalition  an a t t e m p t  The  bargaining  than o b t a i n a b l e  other  two  which each p l a y e r  behaviour  described  bargain  had t h r e e  players  to  be  formation e x p e r i m e n t s . to  each  payoff  w h i c h was  less  form  a  1  arguably  had  coalition  expected  theory  accept  at  A mathematical  the  strategy  might  subjects  formed and t h e  that  game  the  two  payoffs. the  the  of  of  described  three  arrive  each  coalitions  what  unusual.  in R i k e r ' s c o a l i t i o n  experiments  themselves  of  not  agreement  to  not  this  see  so  it  in  as all  cases. These behaviour  two  examples  from e x p e r i m e n t s  cooperation  underline  distinguishing  the  But  possible  this  analyzed the  3  is in  decision  the  the  of  what  designed  previous  pressures,  to  possibly  be  examine  conflict  and  quantifying  and  difficulties  various decision if  might  pressures  we c o n t i n u e  chapter. slightly  of  But  to  different  from e a c h  use  now,  altruistic  to  the  other.  simple  games  operationalize  games w i l l  have  to  be  1 38  used. the  Specifically,  payoffs  rather  will  than  chapter.  as  in  between t h e i r effect  represent  now have ordinal  In a d d i t i o n ,  difference  an  to  how  same s i t u a t i o n  it  To a f f e c t  discussed  will  will  a weak  on  the  players  may be  indifferent  rather  useful  to  player, has  payoffs. over  over  the  In the  that  payoffs  we s w i t c h  as  outcomes of  our a n a l y s i s  none  of  be d i s c u s s e d  games t o  have  strict  four  outcomes.  from the  The  balance  The a n a l y s i s  of  filter  the  for  of  78 = 648)  games  action."  analyzed of  the  of  2 x 2  therefore  i n the  players  or  may  two of of  chapter.  Put  where  over  therefore  o r d e r of  the  drawn  games.  be c o n s i d e r e d  constraints  x  following  games  orders  the 2  remaining chapters,  structural  be  a player  subsets  78  preference  the  the  complete  i n the  be a n a l y z e d a r e  Chapter Four cannot  o n l y as an i l l u s t r a t i o n upon a l r u i s t i c  -  to  to  game.  previous  subset  and c o m p l e t e  games  (726  the  has  games to  and  the  to  differently,  both p l a y e r s  choice  i n two or more t h a n  i n the  be members of  indifferent  the  a  o r b o t h of  those d i s c u s s e d  will  the  words,  than  two c h a p t e r s  observe  self-interested  some of  2 games o t h e r  the  last  opposed  a  other  values  i n the  are  than a s t r o n g  games i n w h i c h one  outcomes r e q u i r e s  case  player  pressures  cardinal  but when t h e i r  another  the  the  was the  these p o s s i b i l i t i e s ,  order  indifferent  of  where  linear  be  be  alternatives  payoffs  impose  To c o n s t r u c t  also  as  as  i n d i v i d u a l s c h o o s e when t h e y  but  choice.  be c o n s i d e r e d  indicators,  own c h o i c e  upon t h e  to  mathematically  as a but  placed  1 39  5.2  O p e r a t i o n a l i z i n q The D e c i s i o n  Karl to  Lendenmann and A n a t o l  determine  the  relative  Pressures.  Rapoport  importance  pressures  i n 2 x 2 games i n w h i c h t h e  of  was a weak  payoffs  observe  the  Figure  as  arrangement  18 -  opposed of  the  to  the  B  2  chooses, the  he o r  Row  that left  of  Column with  payoff  4  be  choice  a payoff  influenced  payoffs  of  choose  decision  to  the A  Column,  the  For  set  example,  following  matrix:  Indifferent.  2  of  the as  cell  of  is  indifferent  No  matter  either  5 or  in his  this  A,  and the  payoffs well.  in If  behaving  1.  If  he o r and  smaller  she  the felt be  resulting  18  of  2  to  bears  a  chooses A  benevolently,  w i t h Column's h i g h e s t  by  would  payoff  Row p l a y e r  Row  However,  Row  its  Figure  as  which  or her c h o i c e  game,  either  or B ,  him o r h e r as  contains  6  Column p l a y e r .  in  2  choose  interpretation  we c o u l d d e s c r i b e  i n the  concerned.  get  The a r r a n g e m e n t  motivational  that  may  the  to  order.  o r d e r on a  1  are  will  would  the  of  Column.  she  player  arrangement  preference  who c h o o s e s between A , and B ,  own p a y o f f s  decision  3  5  his  various  1 2  as  experiment  2  5  far  of  an  Row P l a y e r  4  Row p l a y e r ,  devised  strong  payoffs  A 2 x 2 Game w i t h  A  The  5  1  r  because  payoff.  In  1 40  addition,  the  chooses  A,  (4  sum of is  the  of  benevolent  the  other's  pressure  game.  Despite  being  motivated  important  the  How  choice.  of  do  fact  is  that  outcomes  player.  Row p l a y e r ' s say  that  B,  The respect  payoff  Column  his  is  payoff  (4  pressure is  the  reward  over  payoffs  in  Column's c h o i c e  such choice  the  But  the  Column.  2  maximizes  the  thought that of  of  in t h e i r  the  players  choice,  of  relative More  pressure 18 i s  the  structural  This  to  the  A  of  with B . 2  individual A  because  or her  expected  Column's  payoffs present  rationality,  which ensures  expected  and  2  Column has  other  can  2  his  Column's  of  Row p l a y e r .  choose  of  we  indifferent  terms  of  advantage  on the  two a l t e r n a t i v e s in  choice  payoff  simply,  not  Row b e c a u s e  of  to  can be  speaks  maximizes  Row,  desire  t o m i n i m i z e the  alternative  like  B,  emphasize  games  arrangement of  chooses  the  B , by Row?  be e x p e c t e d  arrangement A  of  increase  which  Row  motivations.  purely  The  is  p r o d u c e d by i n d i v i d u a l  the of  certain  of  she  if  a s t r u c t u r a l aspect  Figure  from t h a t  to p i c k  possible. by  that  commentary  between t h e  alternative  incentive  desire  influenced  that  speaking  differs or  is  a competitive  + 2 > 2 + 3).  therefore  the  can r e a s o n a b l y  the  or  important to  by a d e s i r e  player  player,  rationality, this  permit  O r , to  represents  Column to  the  Column  alternative  is  only  we i n t e r p r e t  Column  the It  that  he  reason,  benevolence  can be r e a d i l y e x p l a i n e d the  if  to  or d i s p l a y i n g a m o t i v a t i o n  point  arrangements  payoff,  towards  payoffs  than  So f o r a n o t h e r  maximize the  possible  greater  + 2 > 2 + 3).  as  the  which  t h e maximum  choice player's payoff  a  of  is  also  payoffs. the  Row  141  player  as  5 + 5 > 1 + 1.  influenced pressure  by  individual  of  upon  If  advantage Thus  kinds  those  rational  game,  choice  We have pressures" previous Once as  thus  far  without  chapter  reinforce  contains games upper  the  the  choosing  the  the  players  is  the  from  Because strict  pressures  which  the is  As t h e i n the  linear  may  dominance d e f i n e d  now  will  as  it.  As i n  the  suffice.  alternative  sake,  all  result be  of  the  is  the  in  the  players  discussed  will  i n which both over  the  dominance c o n c e p t indifferent  A,-over B - i f t  so  which  of  both  preferences  be  this  motivational  point.  previous chapter  of  two  In  n a t u r a l outcome  o r d e r of  of  individually  of  the  games t o  redefinition  players  of  the  upon how  can be m a n i p u l a t e d  For c l a r i t y ' s  or t h a t  a slight  "direction  the  rationality  opposes  a reference  that  those  advantage  selection 7  the  her  depending  subject  a n a t u r a l outcome  defined,  or  2  individual  1 f  a  B ,  considerations.  the  of  of  the  reinforces  so  had a s t r o n g  outcomes,  outcomes,  concept  A alternative.  different  of  or -3  B  of  his  2  chooses  is  those  establishing  written  hand c e l l  be  required.  spoken  -1  only  of  presence  1 or 2 d e p e n d i n g  choice  competitive  o r oppose  be  be e i t h e r  not  additional  Column c h o o s e s A  social  n a t u r a l outcome.  will left  in  is  2  the  the  Column  pressures,  whereas,  by  however  Column's  A  Row's c h o i c e  be e i t h e r  benevolence  s u c h an outcome  to  four  of  Like  If  of  by  Row w i l l  will  originating  particular  well.  competition.  choice.  Row c h o o s e s .  but  can be e x p l a i n e d  2  over  competitive  different  B  as  advantage  Row's  and  of  toward  competitive  rationality  benevolence  Column's choice pressure  So C o l u m n ' s c h o i c e  over  is  some  a< > b - ; c -> d<_ t  t  1  now  gives  these  way t o weak dominance where a,- > b - ; c -> t  inequalities  necessarily  is  inequalities if  y > z,  the  The and  strict.  ( a i ,c^ )  dominating another  (w,z)  is  pair  first  (x,y) set  different  ways.  and  Strong  strongly  represents  is  a  maximization another  of  and A i s  the  Lendenmann payoff  and  p r e s s u r e MX as  MX =  If choice  MX i s  Lendenmann  individual  of  payoff.  define  we w i l l  individual  in  two which  say  that  rationality. second  way of  rationality;  termed  t  t  or  rationality,  one  alternative  b^ ; c " > d ) ,  t  the  the  For i f  (a > t  a)  -  positive,  it  will  of A w h i c h c o n t a i n s set  x > w and  or  t  weakly  d^ , t h e n a + c<> {  the  expected  m a x i m i z a t i o n of  b« + d t  payoff. expected  :  t  The s e c o n d  of  a ^> b- o r c ->  1/2{(a ;+  L  If  self-interest,  other,  which maximizes  Rapoport  dominates  which  to  case  strictly  alternative  the  these  (w,z).  individual  expected  either  of  can be e x p r e s s e d  towards  towards  either  b^ ; C i > dj. and  due  weakly  a p l a y e r has an a l t e r n a t i v e  special  pressure  not  weakly  pressures  a choice  dominance the  dominate  dominates  a pressure  dominates (at>  or  (x,y)  payoffs  (x,y)  This pressure if  of  t  x = w and y > z .  those  existence,  formulating the  are  d -and one  be d e s c r i b e d as  pair  if,  s a i d to  First,  alternative its  or  c  x > w ; y > z and one  Thus t h e  define  rationality.  weakly  if  motivational  individual  that  (w,z),  of  will  t  is  of  pair  (b ,di),  x > w and y = z , pair  A -  or  strict.  Rapoport  either  42  of  the  (b.'+  d<-)}  (i=  represent natural  pressures  1,2) .  a pressure  outcome.  defined  by  towards  the  8  Lendenmann  and  143  Rapoport  are  termed  the  that  they  sense  exist  players'  payoffs  result  considering  of  other's.  The  rationality,  as  Pareto  again,  of  the  natural  to  so  CR -= (  .  no o t h e r  weak  preference  w h i c h one player  is  payoff have  of  more  is  MX p r e s s u r e ,  social  the  when  and  sum  it  the  competition.  expected coplayer  the  choice  of  has  both  an e q u a l  or h e r a l t e r n a t i v e s .  collective  rationality  is  positive  or t h a t  the  collective  the  his  both  and i g n o r i n g  pressures:  the  in  w h i c h was  is  that  of  of  term s u g g e s t s ,  A, a l t e r n a t i v e  {(a +  aj+  (  is  c -+ t  b," ) -  it  Once  (CR)  is  represents  a  which c o n t a i n s  the  ( b<- + cy + d,.- + dy ) } .  a characteristic  of  p r e f e r r e d by b o t h p l a y e r s  to  players  a  Pareto-optimal  strictly  to,  meaning  prefers that  is  equally  than  one  Pareto  only  those  situations  with  the  Rapoport c o n s i d e r outcome  as  either  that  indifferent  which  consideration  benevolence  assuming  orders,  the  four  social  Accordingly,  1/4  is  the  They a r e  i n d i v i d u a l ' s payoffs  of  Pareto-optimality that  the  maximizes  while  choose the  outcome  to  optimality,  pressure  pressures.  in  define  choosing  operationalized pressure  one  which  payoffs  probability  only  rationality,  an a l t e r n a t i v e  players'  social  opposed  authors  Collective of  the  compared  results  from d o u b l e  Thus,  the  Pareto  p r e f e r r e d by  hence  is  optimal  pressure  In games  with  where  may be the  Games  has  a  may  Lendenmann and  a "Pareto  optimal  o p t i m a l outcome  diagonally is  one  other  outcome  player.  outcome.  (PO)  such  which  some o t h e r  nonPareto  defection,  it.  outcome  outcome  but  that  optimal  an  that  opposite."  based  on  9  the  1 44  comparison  of  the  PO£  If tend  sum of is  = 1/2  a player  to choose the  A,A  is  the  { (a -  +  t  outcomes.  2  aj ) -  (d  So,  + dy ) } .  c  m o t i v a t e d by b e n e v o l e n c e A alternative  expected  chosen.  and B , B  2  payoffs  of  over  the  the  other  (B),  he or she  B alternative player  is  will  if  the  l a r g e r when A  Thus,  Bi  = 1/2  { (a;  (ay  + bj ) -  ,b,- )'  (cj  + dj)}  if  (cy , d ; ) o r  (c j , d j ) > ( a ; , by ) = 0  The that  final  otherwise.  p r e s s u r e m e a s u r e d by Lendenmann and R a p o p o r t  due t o c o m p e t i t i o n  understood payoff  as  a  .  "Intuitively,  preference  self  maximizes  the  expected  algebraic difference  coplayer's  payoffs,  assuming  coplayer."  1 0  Thus  operationalized  Ct  the  ...  that  That  be  yield a larger the  player  between h i s  own and  equiprobable  competition  will  is,  choices  pressure  by  (C)  the  can  be  as;  + (c t  -  the p r e s s u r e s ,  pressure  natural  coplayer  the  = 1/4 {(-a;- a,-)  As w i t h a l l positive  the  outcomes  to  the  than to  for  competition  is  to  outcome.  1 1  bj ) -  C is  choose A, the  ( b - - cy ) t  (d - -  q u a n t i f i e d so as alternative  dj) }  t  which  to  be  a  contains  1 45  5.3  The R e s u l t s  Of The Lendenmann And R a p o p o r t E x p e r i m e n t .  Lendenmann and R a p o p o r t c o n s t r u c t with  a  structurally  pressures. than  A l l but  one  subjects  one  variant:  equivalent  but  In  the  order  motivational  of  two  with  p l a y e d each  and t w i c e as  unique  the  results,  to  assess  pressures  they  2  times,  relate  Row p l a y e r ' s  aggregated  the  a  game  the  being  payoffs.  t w i c e as  analyses  relative  separate  them  MX, has  1 2  ,  the  each  decision by  more  ordinally The  Column  by the  multiple the  2  A is  1  f  are  the  following  subjects  70  player  that  the  as  dependent  these  analyses  variables.  coefficient  taken  of  , Lendenmann  regression  dependent  indicate  choices,  by the  importance  a significant  and MX and SR when A  the  of  represented  numerical  p e r c e n t a g e s as  pressure  explain  of  on d e c i s i o n s  rationality  variable,  four  was  games,  Row p l a y e r .  A T and A as  games  variants  game  2 x 2  arrangement  different  and R a p o p o r t p e r f o r m two with  the  eight  the  The  individual when  the  dependent  variable.  They  comments:  ...the stepwise precedure r e v e a l e d C o l u m n ' s d e c i s i o n s as s i g n i f i c a n t l y influenced only by individual rationality, namely maximization of expected gain and second o r d e r rationality. O t h e r p r e s s u r e s , s u c h as Pareto optimality, collective rationality, benevolence, and competition a p p a r e n t l y p l a y e d no i m p o r t a n t p a r t . The result is not surprising. Except in game I , Column i s not i n d i f f e r e n t between h i s a l t e r n a t i v e s . He would be e x p e c t e d to invoke decision rules t h a t have a b e a r i n g on t h e m a x i m i z a t i o n of h i s own p a y o f f s . In games V I I and V I I I , where Row has dominating strategies, Column may have p a i d a t t e n t i o n t o Row's p a y o f f s i n f i g u r i n g out h i s own maximizing choice, and this i s r e f l e c t e d i n the s i g n i f i c a n c e of s e c o n d o r d e r r a t i o n a l i t y i n Column's d e c i s i o n s . . . . w e a l s o see t h a t for Row, the pressure appears t o be MX. The s o c i a l  only significant p r e s s u r e s , PO, CR,  1 46  and B were not significant factors in the regression equation. Yet our data on the f i r s t s i x games show a different picture. In t h e s e games individual rationality pressures (MX, MN, and SR) are entirely absent. Row p l a y e r s a p p e a r t o be r e s p o n s i v e t o the social pressures, which a r e a l l p o s i t i v e and f a v o u r A , . In f a c t , A , c h o i c e s r a n g e from 72% to 88% in these games. However, the f r e q u e n c y of A , c h o i c e s i s not m o n o t o n i c a l l y r e l a t e d t o t h e quantitative measures of t h e s o c i a l p r e s s u r e s , as we have d e f i n e d them, w h i c h accounts for the failure of these factors to appear as significant in the regression equation. The s t r o n g p r e f e r e n c e for A, by Row players (when t h e y a r e i n d i f f e r e n t between h, and B , w i t h r e g a r d t o their own p a y o f f ) i s i n s h a r p c o n t r a s t t o t h e i n d i f f e r e n c e between A and B of Column p l a y e r s i n game I , where Column i s i n d i f f e r e n t w i t h r e g a r d t o h i s own p a y o f f s . 2  2  1 3  5.4  Comments.  5.4.1  The D e f i n i t i o n Of The  Pressures.  Lendenmann and R a p o p o r t ' s d e f i n i t i o n s contain First  a  is  number the  of  example, for If  the CR i s  problem  between  the  high  These over  are the  following  greater  t  greater  than  C£+  than  correlation necesarily same  the  c o r r e l a t e d by  payoff  relationships  MX, CR, and C p r e s s u r e s .  ( a + aj +  and C i s  the  pressures  of  defined  observe  decision  discussion.  variables. "  being  the  p r o b l e m s w h i c h r e q u i r e some  1  independent virtue  of  of  values.  between t h e  For values  1 5  zero,  by)  -  zero,  (b -+ c/+ d;+ t  dj)  > 0  ,  5.1  1 47  (a --aj)  + (c -bg)  t  t h e n MX must a l s o  (a - + c -) t  CR c a n be  t  t  ci)  than  -  d )  > 0 .  dc)  > (cj+  -  (bi+  The  left  right 5.5  hand s i d e  hand s i d e  is  then  ct ) -  equal MX > 0  to  of B.  must  z e r o c a n b o t h 5.4  (bi+  t  of  a  problem.  5.4  correlated, form  5.2  5.3  equal  Therefore, also  (a; + b, )  ,  5.4  + d;)  .  5.5  to  - B and t h e  be t r u e ,  for only  be  (CJ  a r e e q u a l t o MX w h i l e  b o t h 5.1  the  r i g h t hand s i d e  and if  5.2  MX i s  are  of  true,  greater  than  true. for  even  dealing  widely  with  where  regression  that  problem  values there  two v a r i a b l e s a r e  infinite  combinations  the  acknowleged  which would i n d i c a t e  extreme,  linear  making the  -  if  rules  or  the  dj)  and 5.5  s a m p l i n g e r r o r s become  arbitrary  equations,  is  coefficient In  ,  zero,  > (a; + bj ) -  b o t h 5.4  and 5.5  multicollinearity,  > 0  t  as  (b<; + d -)  T h e r e a r e no s e t  correlation  t  (d --dj)  as  and C c a n be r e w r i t t e n  (a{+  (bi-cj ) -  be g r e a t e r  rewritten  (a -+  -  £  of  because the  coefficients  two  for is  of the such  perfectly "  we  can  simultaneous  indeterminate."  1 6  1 48  Or,  the  multicollinearity  singular the  matrix with  f o r m a t i o n of  coefficients, Y  will  "  an  zero."  identification  indefinite  1 7  This  one  in  definition  of  the  mathematical  and  substantive  Pareto  the  the  number  and  of  of  results  making [such]  coefficients referred  to  Pareto  of  optimal  the  in a  possible sets  of  of  X and  as  the  was d e f i n e d  aj ) -  there  pressures.  pressure  difficulties.  Rapoport j u s t i f y  Prisoner's  multicollinearity,  definition  = 1 / 2 • {(a i +  POi  to  columns,  usually  problem  optimal pressure  Lendenmann  case,  problem. the  basic  worst  i n w h i c h the is  from  more  its  l i n e a r l y dependent  including sets  be  Apart  in  causes  Recall  that  is  a  The both the  as:  (d - + d j)} t  this  .  definition  with  reference  Dilemma game:  . . . i n p r i s o n e r ' s dilemma w i t h ' c o o p e r a t i v e ' alternative C and ' u n c o o p e r a t i v e ' a l t e r n a t i v e D, a l l o u t c o m e s a r e P a r e t o o p t i m a l e x c e p t D , D . However, i n p r i s o n e r ' s dilemma, the . t e n d e n c y t o c h o o s e C i s u s u a l l y a t t r i b u t e d t o an a t t e m p t t o bring about t h e c o o p e r a t i v e outcome 0,02 i n p r e f e r e n c e t o t h e n o n P a r e t o o p t i m a l outcome D , D ( w h i c h i s the natural outcome o f t h a t game a c c o r d i n g t o our d e f i n i t i o n ) . In our games, we w i l l speak of P a r e t o optimality pressure as a t e n d e n c y t o b r i n g about an outcome t h a t d o m i n a t e s the o t h e r outcome in the same diagonal of the game m a t r i x (as i n prisoner's dilemma). 2  2  1 3  As none  of  Dilemmas, the  the this  payoffs  seems a weak  i n the  mathematical the  games c o n s t r u c t e d  pressure.  cells  of  definition O b s e r v e the  by the  authors  justification  the  for  are  considering  only  Moreover,  this  main d i a g o n a l .  can produce following  some m i s l e a d i n g three  Prisoner's  games:  values  for  1 49  Figure  A  19 -  T h r e e Games w i t h U n u s u a l P a r e t o O p t i m a l , Pressure Values.  B  2  3  2  4  A,  Game  1  1,  {(4  -  + 3)  pressure Pareto  in  to  + 1)},  of  So  PO  2  both  PO i s  really  is  PO i s  each  Row's a l t e r n a t i v e s .  pressure  not  a  in t h i s  positive  the  gain  This  In Game 3, 5.  2  some true their  in  this  but  there  are  and  B,A ,  one  2  suggests  PO as  fact,  that  defined  But f o r Column In  2,  by  player,  there  are  no  game.  definition  t  19.  is  2,  A,A  P a r e t o o p t i m a l outcome.  PO;= Max { ( a +  even t h i s  outcomes  s h o u l d be a b s e n t .  players  positive  with  A better  in F i g u r e  19,  But,  a negative pressure  optimal  s u c h outcomes  but  where  2  positive  may be under  B^h  Pareto of  is  Row p l a y e r  two  Lendenmann and R a p o p o r t , A!B  the  pressure  optimality.  In Game 2 i n F i g u r e  associated  PO  Pareto  is  to  1  Game 3  the  indicating  c h o o s e A , due  payoffs.  fact  the  (2  value  o p t i m a l outcome  highest game.  the  3  4  B,  Game 2  In Game  1 4  3  2  1  7  A, 3  5  B,  B  2  2  4 3  2  A  2  1  5  Ai 1  5  B  2  3  4 4  B,  A  2  (PO)  ay)  would not  of  ,  the  (c<+  solve  PO p r e s s u r e  by)}  the  would be  - Max { ( b  t  + cy)  problem i l l u s t r a t e d  ,  (dt+  dj)}  by Game  3  1 50  In  substantive  contains  choice  using  contains choosing  policy  this  his  strategy  or  her  pressure  There  is  assumption  but  case  of  for  all  B, t h a t  of  the  may be t r u e  and R a p o p o r t , observe  the  it  payoff.  potential  game  of  selecting the  true  in F i g u r e  20.  of  to  r a i s e d about  the  one.  calculation payoff  of  values  for  alternative.  games c o n s t r u c t e d  the in  example  either  them.  for or  an a l t r u i s t i c  of  A  social  of  all  a  which  motivation  to_.a  be  assumes  recipient  of  alternative  be due  i n the  pressures  result  So t h e  question  which  self-interested.  the  The a d d i t i o n of  these  not  be t h e  rather a self-interested  i n some o f is  an a l t e r n a t i v e  primarily  equiprobable choice  an e q u i p r o b a b l e c h a n c e this  may a l s o  would not  a more s u b s t a n t i a l  of  of  would c h o o s e  highest  CR, and PO p r e s s u r e s .  formulae  choice  which i s  s u c h an a l t e r n a t i v e  altruistic  C,  the  a P a r e t o o p t i m a l outcome  "maximax" player  terms,  B, the  in  the  act  has  While  by Lendenmann For  example,  151  Figure  20  -  An I l l u s t r a t i o n of Values.  A  the  B  2  5  Payoff  2  1 1  1 1  5  Bi  of  1  5 A,  Addition  Game IV - 1  Let  us  first  look  at  Row p l a y e r ' s  and R a p o p o r t c a l c u l a t e  the  l/2[(5  = 4/2.  + 1)  -  an a l t r u i s t i c  (1  result  c h o o s e between A Column has  + 1)]  seems  benevolence. pressure  of  A,  A,B  appropriate.  is  pressure  Row's A c h o i c e  is  not  the  case,  Now we c a n  8/2  to  as  make may  far  as  A  appear  to  the  look  his  own p a y o f f s  into  f o r Row i s  and B p r e s s u r e s the  choice.  2  the  himself  subject  present  in  authors'  data  the  at  choose  Column  support  will  indeed  A  choice game  choice  2  of  of  B  player's B is  Row  between  indifference  this  for  the  assumption  in this  A,  to  definition  for  equiprobable  lead  Column  are concerned  But Row's  be  consideration  The  reasonable  alternatives.  translate  Interestingly,  the  to  very d e f e n s i b l e  i n the  2  will  that  i n dominance  and B,B  2  Lendenmann  Under Lendenmann and R a p o p o r t ' s d e f i n i t i o n ,  alternative, CR,  this  this  But a s s u m i n g  incentive  in c e l l s  and B , , c h o i c e  necessarily  of  equiprobably  strong  equiprobability indifferent  Or,  Column.  2  Because  Column's p a y o f f s hardly  and B  2  a very  alternative.  for  strength  benevolence.  does  a of is  the not  of  either  to  t h e PO,  alternative.  c r i t i c i s m for  in  1  this  game 83 p e r c e n t  played  5.4.2  the  game as  of  the  52  subjects'  choices  Row p l a y e r .  and  Rapoport  include  in t h e i r  generally  m o t i v a t i o n a l s t r u c t u r e of  were  left  included  across  a game a l l is  of  of to  Figure  1 9  differences  For example,  pressures increase  subjects the  in almost  pressures  effect  all  was  choice  of  reponses  choosing of  that  i n the  also in  configuration  the of  vary a c c o r d i n g to  how two  variants,  the  the  the  game u n a l t e r e d , frequencies  "quantitative  indicators  across  three  v a r i a n t s of  little games,  pressures  of  A  alternative  such  three the  subjects.  For  each  of  variants  v a r i a t i o n occurs are,  as  in  on Row, e s s e n t i a l l y  the magnitude of  the  pressures.  terms  in  find the  Lendenmann frequency each  shown  i n the  the  instance,  the of  that  could.be  variation  pressures  which  in  The a u t h o r s  N o t e how l i t t l e  the  while  then any change  variants  and I I I .  values  to  which  choice  one p r e s s u r e .  from  A, varies across  changes  Note  or d e c r e a s e ,  show t h r e e  R a p o p o r t ' s Games II  v a r i a n t s of  but one a r e h e l d c o n s t a n t  forthcoming II  These  i n the  if  c a s e s no r e s p o n s e  21 and T a b l e  despite II.  the  a l l o w e d to  attributed  of  that  pressures."  percentage  and  so  v a r i a n t s c o u l d be c o n s i d e r e d as  these  that  the  experiment.  a number of  e v e r y game but one  one  they  The Use Of V a r i a n t s Of Game.  Lendenmann  of  were A , when  in  game Table  subjects' of  similar  the though  1  Figure  21  -  53  T h r e e V a r i a n t s E a c h of Two Games Lendenmann and R a p o p o r t .  from  B-  1  2 (79) A,  1  1 1  B,  1  11-1  1  1 1  (27) B,  11-2  Game  1  1 1  1  8 (73) A,  1 1  (22) B,  1  Game  1  1  (21 )  1  5 (78) A,  1  1 1 11-3  Game  B-  1  5 (78) A,  1  1  1 Game  SOURCE:  111.  1  1  -2 (22) B,  1 111-3 Lendenmann  1  5 (77) A, .  1  1  1  -5 (23) B,  1  5 (79) A,  1 1  -8  (21 ) 1 Game  and R a p o p o r t ,  1 111-4 "Decision  B,  1 Game  Pressures",  1 111-5 pp.  110-  54  Table  II  - The V a l u e s of t h e P r e s s u r e s i n F i g u r e 21 .  GAME 11,1  11,2 11,3 111,3 111,4 111,5  MX  CR  PO  B  0 0 0 0 0 0  1/4 4/4 7/4 7/4 10/4 1 3/4  1/2 4/2 7/2 4/2 4/2 4/2  1/2 4/2 7/2 7/2 10/2 1 3/2  *MN and SR e q u a l  zero  "Evidently",  authors  the  the  magnitude  changes  in  variants)." pressures in  where those  2 0  I  2 1  the  values  to  and t h e  pressures  (especially  as for  between  can be  on  suggest  the  of  from  social  these  observed."  of  varying  the  in connection  with  games,  structure  not  (i.e.,  that  in  across the  r a t i o n a l i t y are absent  (as  A,  basis  r e l a t i o n s h i p between is  "for  the  qualitative  ("all  a  matrices  set  individual are  ),  more  pressures  of  or  r a t i o n a l i t y and  both p o s i t i v e  pressures  social 2 2  of  concerns  include  games.  "when  the  that  social to  the  up o n l y  this  frequency  Games  -1/4 -4/4 -7/4 -7/4 -10/4 -13/4  effects  same  individual  issuing  from so  the  inclusive),  They go on t o  relationships  "turn  within  with  of  the  the  C  structure  conclude  IV,  arising  frequencies  payoffs  motivational  They  systematically,  variants  conclude,  differences  pressures  none")."  in a l l  the  associated  games  social  of  the  quantitative  on Row f o r  varied and  more  negative  quantitative and  choice  1 55  5.4.3  The C o n f i g u r a t i o n  As  was  noted  in  motivational  pressures  As was  i n the  shown  effect And  upon t h e  in g e n e r a l ,  another occurs  choice  a self-interested  at  the  where  choice  of  able  These  k i n d s of  common,  such  business  p r a c t i c e which  added  as,  interest  absent,  say  altruistic two t y p e s  of  will  most  be  contexts  use  while  while  the  of  entails  of  i n which the  interesting  f r e q u e n t l y found i n  because  if  incentives  to  instance,  income,  which  be a l t r u i s t i c will  be  some p o i n t i n g t o w a r d s  the  are  support the  likely  deceiving  rational  and  pressures  interest  considerations  situations  of  In t h i s  most  choice  choice  is  far  more  oppose  some  sharp  customer.  possible  one  of  be  Of  some p r e s s u r e s  study of they  to  the  where  o p p o s e d by a c o m p e t i t i v e  situations  tax  taxable  others  situations  subjects.  surprising  appearing to  split,  little  socially  Such a c o n f l u e n c e  reduce t h e i r  are  a be  to  no c o l l e c t i v e l y choice  would  situations  be  be  a good e x a m p l e .  when e t h i c a l  will  it  to  is  pressures  one a l t e r n a t i v e  a second.  one,  incentive,  But t h e  the  chapter,  i n one d i r e c t i o n , as when  happens  though the  giving  is  this  m a g n i t u d e had v e r y  are a l l  also  in r e a l i t y ,  are often  of  Lendenmann arid R a p o p o r t ' s  were c h o s e n .  charitable  those  of  when p r e s s u r e s  same t i m e .  section  c a n d i s p l a y b o t h m a g n i t u d e and d i r e c t i o n .  advantageous  rarely  individuals  opening  previous section,  alternative  induce  the  choices  a self-interested competitively  Of P r e s s u r e s .  is.  It  but is  altruistic  closely  parallel  are an  these choice those  reality.  The Lendenmann and R a p o p o r t  experiment  explored only  eight  1  unique  configurations  players  in the  Row and Column  which  frequency  only, A,  of  variation.  reveals  was  A  2  experiment. the  chosen  choices  widest by  i n the  The d i f f e r e n t  the three  pressure  III.  22 - T h r e e Games w i t h D i f f e r e n t Conf i g u r a t i o n s .  Pressure  B (02)  A (56)  B (44)  A (62)  B (38)  2  1  2  1  5  1  2  1  1  2  A,  1  1  B,  III  GAME II , 1 111,1 VI , 6  In t h e fully  -  2  1  1  A  1  B,  1  5  Game V I - 6  "Decision Pressures",  The V a l u e s of t h e P r e s s u r e s Games i n F i g u r e 22.  on Column  MX  MN  CR  PO  B  0 -3 -9  1/4 -2/4 3/4  1/2 1/2 8/2  0 0 8/2  games g i v e n a b o v e , opposed,  split,  the  decision  and f u l l y  1  -8  Game 111-1  1/2 -2/2 -5/2  2  1  5  1 1  Lendenmann and R a p o p o r t ,  Table  2  -2  Game 11 — 1 SOURCE: 111.  1  1  1  time  on t h e  A (98) 2  B,  structures  with  the  in Table  pressures  games i n c l u d e d i n t h e  22 show g r e a t  are given Figure  A,  frequency  For example,  games i n F i g u r e values  of  these unique  i n the  subjects.  the  28 v a r i a n t s  A c o m p a r i s o n of variation  of  56  pp.  for  C 1/4 -2/4 -13/4  110-  the  A 98% 56% 62%  pressures  are at  one  reinforcing.  Where  the  1  pressures  are  percent  of  the  motivational CR  and  C  and r e i n f o r c i n g , as  subjects  pressures are  percentage are  positive  are  choosing A  CR p o s i t i v e ,  Interestingly, the  as  individual for  which  opposed  Nonthelesss,  the  the  A g g r e g a t i o n Of  form of  individual fallacy  2 3  analysis of R  2  of  evidence  n a t u r e of  The d a t a  ,  but  it  using  and  who  of  chose  regression  the  A  PO, is  2  the  62. chose  social  according  are other  B  to  explanations  Lendenmann and R a p o p o r t show, choice  of  games  A  2  is  in  Game  VI-6.  suggestive  of  the  pressures.  response  data  totals.  not  an  does have  two  effects  regression (in  this  equation  example  procedures. instance  to  the  upon First,  only  an m i s l e a d i n g data.  are  Such an a g g r e g a t i o n  is  cases  the  pressures  from the Lendenmann and R a p o p o r t e x p e r i m e n t  level  98  Responses.  v a l u e w h i c h may c r e a t e the  the  choosing  direction  there  from t h e s e  these  aggregated  aggregated  upon t h e  when  Game V I - 6 , 62 p e r c e n t  the  as  when  negative  subjects  percent  Trust,  ,  and B a b s e n t ,  Finally,  of  in  11 — 1  However,  2  positive  Doubtless,  some a f f e c t  A .  Game  i n Game 111 — 1 where MX, MN,  56.  example,  38  o b v i o u s l y has  5.4.4  to  was  to  results.  qualitative  PO  in  MX, MN and C a r e  last  rationality.  these  and  percentage  i n the  alternative  pressures  as  falls  2  the  chose  split  negative,  f_ul-ly o p p o s e d so t h a t  and  57  28)  of  the the  the leads  of  ecological subsequent  s m a l l number to  impression about And s e c o n d ,  in  a  large the  fit  because  the  1 58  sample  is  small  some of  non-significant  may,  basis,  to  is  turn  the  out  result  coefficients number of to  be  5.4.5  have  when t h e  have  of  t  degrees  of  was  noted  a n a l y z e d on an  individual  coefficients.  large  values  freedom f o r any g i v e n  earlier,  pressure  Rapoport  effect  pressures  had upon the  intepret  configurations  as  28  This  for  level  a  of  effect that  the  declining  significance  variation subjects'  variants repeated  of  the  behavioural  these  measurement  e r r o r . " " , The  measures  is  2  to  regression  attenuated subjects'  will  give  coefficient,  because responses  of  which  mind  the  of  the  totals,  unique  Such r e p e a t e d  for  they  to  for  for deal  each  will error."  measurements rare  present  the  r e d u c i n g random with  repeated  repeated measure.  estimate no l o n g e r 2 5  we  pressure  t h o u g h an e x c e e d i n g l y  a "much b e t t e r  measurement  i n the  eight  way  compute a mean s c o r e  Blalock writes,  response  simple device  proper  in  the eight  magnitude  aggregated  sciences,  with a " r e l a t i v e l y  the  in  only  Bearing  in  measures.  researcher  included  represented  b e h a v i o u r c a n be a v e r y v a l u a b l e , in  games  experiment  which  the  the  configurations.  negligible  true  which are  Repeated Measures.  different  This  coefficients  d i s t r i b u t i o n which r e q u i r e s  increasingly  and  tool  data are  significant  the  Lendenmann  of  regression  attained.  As  might  the  To  of be  the  highly  treat  Lendenmann and R a p o p o r t e x p e r i m e n t  the as  1 59  repeated to  the  measures  individual  repeated cases that  one  of  would r e q u i r e t h a t level.  from the the  coefficient,  reported  analysis,  pressures.  2  7  A next  best  analysis.  social  regression  2 6  PO  and  in MX  d a t a be  solution  This  pressures whereas  the  is  to  was done w i t h the  (CR) had t h e Lendenmann were  disaggregated  the  exclude result  only  significant  and  Rapoport's  only  significant  1 60  Notes.  1  S e e : A n a t o l R a p o p o r t and A l b e r t M. Chamrrtah, Pr i s o n e r ' s Dilemma: A S t u d y i n C o n f l i c t and C o o p e r a t i o n (Ann Arbor: U n i v e r s i t y of M i c h i g a n P r e s s , 1 9 6 5 ) , C h a p t e r 5.  2  See: W i l l i a m H . Riker, "Bargaining in a Three Person Game." A m e r i c a n J o u r n a l of P o l i t i c a l S c i e n c e , v o l . 61 ( 1 9 6 7 ) , pp. 642-56 a n d ; W i l l i a m H . Riker and William J. Zavoina, "Rational Behaviour in P o l i t i c s : E v i d e n c e from a T h r e e P e r s o n Game" i n J e a n A . L a p o n c e and P a u l Smoker ( e d s ) , E x p e r i m e n t a t i o n and S i m u l a t i o n i n P o l i t i c a l S c i e n c e , (Toronto: University of T o r o n t o P r e s s , 1972), p p . 132-161.  3  There are other examples of gaming e x p e r i m e n t s not reviewed here, particularly, the voluminous literature on cooperation and the Prisoner's Dilemma game. In a d d i t i o n , M c C l i n t o c k et a l . have a t t e m p t e d t o examine t h e importance of several of the motivations to be examined i n the s u c c e e d i n g c h a p t e r s , but i n t h e c o n t e x t of decomposed games w h i c h l a c k the strategic qualities or a normal game. See: Charles G. M c C l i n t o c k ; D a v i d M . M e s s i c k ; D a v i d M . Kuhlman; and F r a n c e s T . Campos, " M o t i v a t i o n a l Bases of C h o i c e i n T h r e e - C h o i c e Decomposed Games," J o u r n a l of E x p e r i m e n t a l and S o c i a l P s y c h o l o g y , v o l . 9, (1973) p p . 572-590.  4  See  footnote  10 i n C h a p t e r I V .  5  Karl W. Lendenmann and Anatol Rapoport, Pressures in 2 x 2 Games", Behaviourial Science , (1980), pp. 107-119.  "Decision vol. 25  6  As was n o t e d i n t h e l a s t c h a p t e r , t h e r e a r e o n l y 78 2 x 2 games with a strong and complete preference order on the payoffs. Guyer and Hamburger have shown that there are 726 structurally unique games i f t h e p r e f e r e n c e o r d e r on a s e t of p a y o f f s f o r b o t h p l a y e r s i s a weak o r d e r , or one which permits ties o r i n d i f f e r e n c e between some o r even a l l of the o u t c o m e s . E a c h of t h e s e games r e p r e s e n t s a d i f f e r e n t s e t of motivational pressures. S e e : M e l v i n Guyer and Henry H a m b u r g e r , "A N o t e on 'A Taxonomy of 2 x 2 G a m e s ' " , G e n e r a l S y s t e m s , v o l . 1 3 ( 1 9 6 8 ) , p p . 205-209.  7  Lendenmann and R a p o p o r t d e f i n e the x 2 game i n w h i c h t h e p l a y e r s have weak  n a t u r a l outcome of a 2 preference orders as  161  follows: 1. If the game is a "no c o n f l i c t game" l a r g e s t p a y o f f s of b o t h p l a y e r s a p p e a r i n the t h a t c e l l c o n t a i n s the n a t u r a l o u t c o m e . 2. If both players have a i n t e r s e c t i o n of t h e s e s t r a t e g i e s  i.e., same  i f the cell,  dominating strategy, the i s the n a t u r a l o u t c o m e .  3. I f o n l y one player has a dominating strategy, intersection of that strategy and the strategy m a x i m i z e s t h e o t h e r ' s p a y o f f i n t h a t row (column) is n a t u r a l outcome. 4. If game i s maximin  n e i t h e r p l a y e r has a d o m i n a t i n g s t r a t e g y not a no c o n f l i c t game, t h e i n t e r s e c t i o n s t r a t e g i e s i s t h e n a t u r a l outcome .  the that the  and i f of t h e  the two  Lendenmann and R a p o p o r t , " D e c i s i o n P r e s s u r e s " , p. 108. Note t h a t t h e d e f i n i t i o n of the n a t u r a l outcome d i f f e r s s l i g h t l y from t h a t g i v e n i n C h a p t e r 4 because dominance i s d e f i n e d d i f f e r e n t l y where p l a y e r s have weak p r e f e r e n c e o r d e r s .  8  The fractional mulitpliers i n c l u d e d i n t h i s and o t h e r d e f i n i t i o n s a r e " i n t e n d e d t o n o r m a l i z e the v a r i a b i l i t y " of the pressures. See: Lendenmann and R a p o p o r t , " D e c i s i o n P r e s s u r e s " p.115.  9  1 0  Lendenmann and R a p o p o r t ,  "Decision Pressures",  Lendenmann and R a p o p o r t ,  "Decision Pressures",  p.  p.  112.  112.  1 1  Lendenmann and R a p o p o r t d e f i n e two a d d i t i o n a l p r e s s u r e s : s e c o n d o r d e r r a t i o n a l i t y (SR) and t h e maximin pressure (MN). The maximin pressure is t h a t to choose the a l t e r n a t i v e which c o n t a i n s the largest of the two smallest payoffs. MN i s represented as: MN " = M i n ( a ^ , t  c<)  -  Min(b -,d -) t  v  Second order rationality (SR) is a pressure which i s g e n e r a t e d by a t t r i b u t i n g i n d i v i d u a l r a t i o n a l i t y t o a coplayer. So: SR i = {ai~ b{) if = ( c f - d<-) i f = 0 otherwise  (ay, (bj, .  c;) > ( b j , dj ) (a;,  d;) cj )  1 62  1 2  The authors incorrectly calculate the v a r i a n t s of Game VI which results in significant regression coefficients.  1 3  Lendenmann and R a p o p o r t ,  "Decision  the MX  MX p r e s s u r e f o r and PO h a v i n g  Pressures",  p.  116-  117.  1  " Correlation Exper iment.  Matrix  for  the  Lendenmann  and  Rapoport  Column MX MX 1.00 MN SR PO CR B C  MN .75 1.00  SR .23 .60 1 .00  PO .09 -.40 -.58 1 .00  CR .47 .24 -.27 .70 1 .00  CR .35 .61 1 .00  B .30 .62 .93 1 .00  C -.25 -.58 -.79 -.96 1 .00  B -.23 -.29 -.47 .71 .75 1 .00  C .71 .62 .46 -.46 -.28 -.85 1 .00  Row MX PO MX 1 .00 .47 PO 1 .00 CR B C Source:  Lendenmann and R a p o p o r t ,  1 5  pressures  1 6  The f r a c t i o n s used t o have been d r o p p e d f o r  Hubert. M. Nonexperimental Research C a r o l i n a P r e s s , 1961), p p .  1 7  extensive Johnston, 201-207.  p.  115  .  n o r m a l i z e the v a r i a b i l i t y of t h i s example.  Blalock, (Chapel Hill: 88.  the  Causal Inferences in University of North  Blalock, Causal Inferences, p. 89. For a more d i s c u s s i o n of the p r o b l e m of m u l t i c o l l i n e a r i t y s e e : J . E c o n o m e t r i c Methods (New Y o r k : M c G r a w - H i l l 1 9 6 3 ) , p p .  Lendenmann and R a p p o p o r t  "Decision  Pressures",  p.  112.  163  1 9  Lendenmann and R a p o p o r t ,  "Decision  Pressures",  p.  114.  2  Lendenmann and R a p o p o r t ,  "Decision  Pressures",  p.  114.  0  2 1  Lendenmann and R a p o p o r t ,  "Decision  Pressures",  p.  117-  118,  2 2  2  Lendenmann and R a p o p o r t ,  "Decision  Pressures",  p.  J.-V8.  3  The e c o l o g i c a l fallacy is the making of inferences "about c o r r e l a t i o n s between v a r i a b l e s , t a k i n g p e r s o n s as u n i t s , on t h e b a s i s of c o r r e l a t i o n a l d a t a b a s e d on g r o u p s as units." p. 97 in Hubert M. Bla-lock, Causal Inferences in Nonxperimental Research. In this instance, individual level data is simply being aggregated and a n a l y z e d at a "higher" level. The s e m i n a l work on t h i s p r o b l e m i s : W. S. Robinson, "Ecological Correlations and the Behaviour of I n d i v i d u a l s , " American S o c i o l o g i c a l Review, v o l . 15 (1950), pp. 351-357. For a more e x t e n s i v e t r e a t m e n t of the s u b j e c t s e e : M i c h a e l T . Hannan, A g g r e g a t i o n and P i s a g r e q g a t i o n i n S o c i o l o g y (Lexington, M a s s . ; L e x i n g t o n B o o k s , 1971 ) .  2 4  p.  2  p.  Causal Inferences  in Nonexperimental  Research,  5  Blalock,  Causal Inferences  in Nonexperimental  Research,  160.  2  are  Blalock,  158.  6  T h i s was given.  2 7  not  possible  as  only  The reader should note r e d u c i n g t h e number of c a s e s and so problem d i s c u s s e d in s e c t i o n 5 . 4 . 4 .  aggregated  response  totals  that t h i s procedure i n v o l v e s runs into the very same  1 64  6.1  VI.  AN EXPERIMENT IN CHOICE  and  Rapoport's  Introduct ion.  Lendenmann i m p o r t a n c e of While  social  individual  influence social and  the  pressures  rationality  when t h e i r  pressures  d a t a were  had  establish  the the  was  a  more  quantitative  suggestive  in  clearly  corrected,  suggest,  pressures  are  on c h o i c e  some i n f l u e n c e  Rapoport themselves  manipulates  findings  simple  the  at  most  least  similar  important of  the  As Lendenmann  experiment  systematically relationships  the  games.  one  on c h o i c e .  of  which  may be a b l e between  to  these  pressures. The  comments  Rapoport's  pressures  choices, games  with  same the  significant  effect  the  e a c h of  pressures  of are  example,  Pareto optimal  a  included.  .the  fact  (PO),  but  not  all  i n which the and  i n the upon  of  magnitude  of  the  subjects'  the  number of  below  can used  for  the  trivial  The s m a l l  configurations  (B)  all  of  possible  case number are  be the  a unique arrangement  collective  benevolence  and  number  configurations  described  same d i r e c t i o n . that  a  15 games r e p r e s e n t e d  pressures  i n the  game  pressure  which r e p r e s e n t e d These  Lendenmann  Accordingly,  experiments  pressures.  be e x p l a i n e d by t h e For  be  decision  B o t h of  configurations all  no not  on  suggest variations  unique  decision  design  5.4,  because  had  15 games,  section  First,  t h e s e need  increased.  in  experimental  modifications. the  made  where can  unique.  r a t i o n a l i t y (CR),  pressures  are  all  1 65  positive  and  competition  motivationally,  as  positive.  In  addition,  impossible  to  all  negative  one where  form,  (or  (C)  some  for  pressure  instance,  positive)  Pareto optimal pressure,  In  the  two e x p e r i m e n t s  previous  pressures those  of  second  rationality stemming two  games  those  the  zero  the  in  B o t h the  MN  the  number of  t o -reduce  the  definition  m a x i m i z a t i o n of In  and t h e these  discussing  for  the  the  first  element  the  altruist  incur  benevolence.  That  experiments,  also  where  payoff  the some is,  last  or  were of  rationality  benevolence  as  all was  in two  experiment; Second o r d e r pressure in  only  MX p r e s s u r e  in  excluded  to  pressures,  and  to  between v a r i o u s altruism  of  in  a possible  d e s c r i b e d below  definition,  in  as  omitted  while  temporarily obscured.  cost  chapter.  that  of  alone.  elements  experiments  of  games,  combinations  are  particularly  redefined  minimax.  pressures  relationships  become  i n the  games  individual  the  and C i s  c r i t e r i o n was p r e s e n t  SR  benevolence  pressures,  a l t r u i s m may have constructed  pressures,  is  the  same  negative).  c o r r e l a t e d w i t h the  possible  the  i m p o r t a n c e of other  of  and  expected  (or  Lendenmann and R a p o p o r t  all  of  the  C , CR, and B a r e  pressure  15  minimax d e c i s i o n  simplify  the  this  The  and was p e r f e c t l y  two.  the  o r d e r r a t i o n a l i t y and t h e  was  from  below,  in  of  positive  was q u e s t i o n e d  discussion.  included  is  arrangements  a game where  and MX i s  the  negative,  CR, PO, and B a r e n e g a t i v e  The m a t h e m a t i c a l d e f i n i t i o n  the  is  of  result the  a  relation  to  definition  of  A l l of  the  games  d i d conform with  and some a l s o a  pressures  of  required his  or  games i n c l u d e d i n  non-zero  pressure,  that her the the  1 66  choice the  of  that  coplayer.  #12,  #13,  the  Of the  #14,  definition  #13,  alternative  #14,  #15)  games  and #15  of  also  All most  of  the  rigorous  #11,  have  required that  pressured  the  the  an  of  in  was  choice  a least  permitted  alternative  preferred  #2,  #3,  the  these  the #7,  #8,  first  advantage  (#8,  incur in  to #11,  element  games  altruist  payoff  of #12,  some  cost,  choosing  the  the  third  altruism  of  the  in  In  requirement  of  the  that  of  the  some  altruistic  games,  might  games,  equally  the  have  notably  alternative  p r e f e r r e d outcome. in these  none  However, choice  resulted  might  because  of  the  in a  MX  least  outcome.  No s y s t e m a t i c final  two  alternative  for  combinations  of  attempt  difficulties  in  three  testing  effect  cardinal is  final  payoffs likely  of  and these  with to  incentive  choice  and to  convincing  small  of  altruistic resulting  the  number of  increased  imaginary  the  motivational  reason  that  for  i n the values,  not  context self-  meaning.  Rapoport experiment the  the  have  is  effect  the  with c e r t a i n  requirements  little  of  increased  would  games  only  have  it  most  the  First,  would have  and s e c o n d ,  Lendenmann  competitive  upon t h e  constructing  The  observe  reasons.  requirements  structures. the  was made t o  requirements  games c o n s i d e r a b l y ,  The  forego  definition  and #12,  sacrifice  A number of  outcomes c o u l d be c o e r c e d .  indifference  of  24,  complied with  games c o m p l i e d w i t h  resulted  these  all  increasing  alternative.  altruistic #8,  in  in Figure  altruism.  or more a p p r o p r i a t e l y , altruistic  resulted  subjects  in  provided a  strong  the  of  form  a  1 67  participation (the do  payoffs the  the  to  a of  incentive  a  repetition  relationship  Repeating  the  the  games  but were  inclinations. external the  there the  only  slight  reliable  choices  measure  repetition well. which  appropriate  If  a  independent v a r i a b l e s across  true  i n the  a  very  though  not  an e n t i r e l y variables.  an i d e a l measure  of  f o r d e t e r m i n i n g whether of  in  The  v a r i a t i o n and w i t h  the  subjects'  some  games a r e a b l e  actions  s h o u l d be some c o n s i s t e n c y  not  permits  the  are  revealed  independent  a  of  no i n d i c a t i o n of  the  is  choice  offered  of the  was p r e s e n t .  possible,  have  done b e l o w ,  but  as  .  is  p r o v i d e s some b a s i s  The  about  is  with  experiment,  action,  it  choices  opportunity  below  it  v a l i d i t y as  subjects  beliefs  as  might  their  r e i n f o r c e d the  where  It  between  experiment  subjects  reliability,  of  subjects  t h e i r measure.  different  different  course  described the  the  and R a p o p o r t ' s e x p e r i m e n t gave  r e l i a b i l i t y of that  to  of  Their  offered  alternative  two e x p e r i m e n t s  Lendenmann  likely,  described,  maximizing the  results  a monetary v a l u e ) .  nonself-interested  mild c o l l e c t i v e  the  be  on t h e  a monetary r e w a r d p r o b a b l y  gains  s e c o n d of  based p a r t l y  were g i v e n  ones  selecting presence  fee  assessment to  .indication real  world  relative  experiments.  true  elicit of  of from  their  situations,  importance  of  1 68  6.2  Some E x p e c t a t i o n s .  - Specifying  in  advance which p r e s s u r e s  i n any g i v e n c o n f i g u r a t i o n dichotomies previous  are  chapters  chapters  One  one  choose  there  to  an  Rapoport for  the  is  which i s  found Row  was t h e  when c o m p e t i t i o n  in  altruistic  The  alternative  with d i f f e r e n t we  would  not  games, expect  the  ones  ameliorating  influence.  the  positive have  games  in  any  where  never  a  i n the  the  other  u n d o u b t e d l y made t h e  it  was  altruistic  subjects  even  of  the  t h a n 70 p e r c e n t ,  and  factors  make  i n an  one  experiment  First,  pressures  to  a  priori  dominate  t h o u g h t h e y may have  the  the  as  and  the  and s u b j e c t s .  absent,  will  choosing  s i m i l a r outcome  situation,  was  the  of  opposed  selection  Two  altruistic  is  in  that  subjects  subjects  less  80 p e r c e n t .  and c o m p e t i t i o n n e g a t i v e ,  This  believe  Lendenmann  games,  of  simple  evidence  was a b s e n t  the  which  discussion  m a j o r i t y of  towards  And s e c o n d ,  MX  only  one t o  m a j o r i t y of  featured negative  probably resulted  payoff.  the  conditions,  competitive  of  of  was h i g h ,  predicting  Rapoport's experiment  leads  the  percentage  i n many games i n e x c e s s of about  The  alternative.  of  was a p r e s s u r e  alternative.  cautious  a large  most  choice  If  sufficient  when t h e MX p r e s s u r e  player  dominate  individually rational  altruistic,  that  task.  outcome.  individually rational  alternative  other  forecast  is  through Three c e r t a i n l y  which the  a difficult  discussed,  where an a l t e r n a t i v e by  is  will  some  games i n Lendenmann and payoffs. the  altruistic  choice  player  choice  In a l m o s t  of  the  of  that  pressures B,  receiving a  all  would  negative  alternative  1 69  more  difficult  loss  extent  that  its  The r e m a i n i n g d i c h o t o m y ,  that  where  upon the  choice one  to  between  than the  advantage  an  will  a relative  have  which  competitive  is  not  the  in  opponents'  w o r k i n g on t h e score  down,  case  accumulating a greater  score  all  of  the  outcome  is  and  are  B  positive) found the  all  what w i l l in  positive negative subjects. and  payoff is  the  this  individually  It  are  positive  c e r t a i n l y easy  (or n e g a t i v e ) (or  B  are  it  outcome to  is  predict  A,  will  be c h o s e n  absent  to  be  gains  keep  my  chance  of  in p a i r s .  of  the  When  p r e d i c t i n g an MX,  and C i s  CR,  PO,  negative  (or  and  Rapoport  subjects  because  chose  of  the  probably unusual. that  be  of  when MX and and C a r e PO,  chosen  by more o r l e s s  altogether?  others  than  can  where  Again,  and some o r a l l  positive),  But w i l l  all  alternative.  the  I  Lendenmann  almost  The  the  better  pressures  be?  less  she.  negative)  situation  values,  a  F o r example,  (or  and  competitive  choice if  a  experiments,  considered together,  outcome  rational  have  the  is  w i n n e r s were  better  t h a n he or  a formidable task.  that  negative  CR,  pressures  a  will  So f a r I have o n l y d i s c u s s e d  Is  these  assumption that I  action,  c o n f i g u r a t i o n of But i f  be  have  maximization?  influence.  might  of  forecast.  gains  and t h e  subjects  course  some  advantage  maximization,  inflicting a  o v e r an opponent  to  than  these pressures  the  rational  advantage  attractive  obviously  declared,  individually  previous dichotomies  more  m a g n i t u d e of  c h o i c e meant  coplayer.  which secures  easy  the  CR, by  or  B  are  most  of  the  than  And we have not  when  PO,  begun  to  1 70  explore  the  e a c h of  these  We  c o m b i n a t i o n s of  at  least  Rapoport's  findings,  pressures  either  effeet-when  absent.  But w i l l report Many o f  Lendenmann  it  would  the  these  situations the  rule,  or  the  ' L e t the  other  even have n o t i c e d  effect  was  6.3  social  have  their  r a t i o n a l i t y are  as  the  required  the the  "malevolent" the  subjects  since  strategy."  we may be a b l e  1  "in  may have makes  'carried  of  the  that  it  i n the  presence  subjects  in  by no means a l l )  benefit  and  t o make had no  suggest  r u l e may have been of  subjects  authors  (but  Lendenmann  over'  role  of  no into Row,  a l a r g e r payoff  in  By r e d u c i n g t h e number  were  to e s t a b l i s h  indifferent whether  between  a carry  over  present.  The M e t h o d .  The decisions  experiments  involved  the  subjects  in  t h a n d i d the Lendenmann and R a p o p o r t d e s i g n  experiments, only  This  by some  i n which  strong  the  will  individual  which  The  majority  who may not  payoffs,  of  e x p e r i m e n t were  own p a y o f f s .  me.'  their  combination  112 d e c i s i o n s  least  decisions  that  a r e o p p o s e d by a g a i n s m a x i m i z i n g  these  game V I I a t  of  expected  when  to  dominating  in  b a s e d on Lendenmann and  be as  difference  the  be  pressures  and R a p o p o r t  upon t h e i r  that  their effect  the  effect  adopted  hypothesize  singly  greatest  choice?  in  situations.  can  Rapoport  CR, PO, and B w h i c h a r e p o s s i b l e  the  subjects  were  required  15 m o t i v a t i o n a l l y u n i q u e games.  While  far .  fewer In b o t h  t o make d e c i s i o n s in  the  in  Lendenmann  171  and  Rapoport experiment  each  game  as  both  the  Row  subjects  and  chose  Column  experiments,  no v a r i a n t s of  games were  chose  once  Row  only  as  p l a y e d e a c h game as natural each to  outcome  were  told  other  subjects  between  that  or c o l u m n s )  led  the  games were  the  the  wished." attached attracted  believe the  the  the  their that  class.  gains  o r any o t h e r  payoffs Even to  the  payoffs,  to p a y o f f s  to  have  values  were u s e d The  score  there  f o r the  2  is  (either deception  likely  The s u b j e c t s value  specific that  the  numerical values winning.  and t h e s e  for using  subjects  the  either A,  were  for told  which  they  monetary  value  subjects  were  and c o n s i d e r e d small  almost  always  were  small decision  effect  but  Generally,  pressures  had no s i g n i f i c a n t  of  r e w a r d s nor p r i z e s  a n y t h i n g of no  of  3  of  the  those  columns  no one c h o i c e  neither  was  payoffs  to  subjects  t h e i r c o p l a y e r was a r e a l  one.  in  The  This mild  that  the  appeared  payoff.  i n t e r m s of  justification  instructions  subjects  they  alternative  was Lendenmann and R a p o p o r t ' s f i n d i n g t h a t  The  the  other  values the  subjects  subjects  that  game.  achieved.  with higher  meaning  so  the  of two  w r i t t e n with  The rows and  offered  it  is  50% of  the  maximizing  could represent though  these  would be matched a g a i n s t  between  two e x p e r i m e n t s  these  positive.  choices  r a n d o m l y i n t e r c h a n g e d so  highest  that  to  game  cell,  c o l u m n s of  determine  member of  was a l w a y s The  to  subjects  unspecified  2  their  While a l l  games t r a n s p o s e d  the  choosing  rows  or A  had the  in  i n c l u d e d and the  player.  upper l e f t  in variants  player,  Row p l a y e r when t h e  i n the  experiment  be c h o o s i n g  the  twice  the  pressure magnitude  upon  choice.  did  not  mention  the  1 72  obvious from  game q u a l i t y of  the  were  were  of  that  scores  for  their  participation  their  play.  In the  the  average  achieved  faculties. see  The o b j e c t  if  The  class  by two o t h e r  the  score  to  the  The  choices  subjects after  experimenter. instructions 67  Political  Each before  subjects  s t u d e n t s at  the  the  of  were  given  the  the  U n i v e r s i t y of  on  the  incentive.  subjects  those  classes  from  collective  different  incentive  as  v a l i d i t y of  were  in  greater  neutral or all  minutes  read to had  the  possible  to  complete  them  by  the  text  of  the  The  first  second  74.  A l l subjects  Columbia  as  altruistic  reference. had  was  rational.  were  fifteen  British  the  would be compared t o  subjects  experiment were  taking courses  in  Science.  The R e s u l t s .  The e x p e r i m e n t a l games a r e therefore the  subjects  partly  self-interested  instructions  them f o r and  the  experiment  subjects  a c t i o n and e m p h a s i z i n g t h e  choices.  departure  would r e s p o n d by c h o o s i n g  courses  of  where  based  w h i c h were c o l l e c t i v e l y  instructions  a  were  the  a v o i d i n g any m e n t i o n of  their  was  They  fictitious  possible,  6.4  This  second  in providing  subjects  numbers a l t e r n a t i v e s  had  5  provided with a very mild c o l l e c t i v e  told  to  experiment.  Lendenmann and R a p o p o r t e x p e r i m e n t  rewarded  results  the  is  meaning of  important to  abstract  know w h e t h e r  these a b s t r a c t i o n s .  representations. the  subjects  Obviously, it  It  understood  cannot  be  said  173  for  certain  present  in a l l  However, the  that  it  subjects  games,  comprehended  and c h o s e  seems l i k e l y  pressures  pretest  all  that  intentionally  many of  and c h o s e a c c o r d i n g t o  version  questionnaire.  of  the  the  were  included  asked  experiment  investigate.  were  able  to  maximizing stated very have that to  one,  close  to  and  their  stating  the  p u r p o s e was dominate  Figure independent are  adopted  guess at  what  the  usually  the  gains-  with  the  subjects  the  purpose  the  experiment:  one  wrote,  while  another  whether  or not  individuals  would  be  willing  to  also  accept  the  subjects  instances,  "To see  or  debriefing  corresponded well  of  of  An e a r l i e r  they  A l l of  choice,  choices  In s e v e r a l  c o m p a s s i o n " was what  conditions."  the  a p r i n c i p l e of  principle.  totally  some  state  to  and t o  instance.  were aware  a  whether  choices,  designed  pressures  in every  subjects  some p r i n c i p l e i n making t h e i r was  the  some p r i n c i p l e .  experiment  The s u b j e c t s  all  this came  "Do you  suggested prefer neutral  6  23  displays  variables quite  same p a y o f f  used  h i g h due values.  the i n the  to  the  correlation experiment. fact  that  they  matrix  for  the  As  is  evident,  are  defined  over  1 74  Figure  23  MX  - Correlation  Matrix  of  Independent  MX  CR  PO  1.000  .119 1.000  CR PO  Variables.  B  C  -.416  -.156  .293  .369  .821  -.902  1.000  .705  -.502  1.000  -.862  B C  1.000  N o t e : The c o r r e l a t i o n m a t r i x i s i d e n t i c a l f o r b o t h e x p e r i m e n t s I and I I . The v a l u e s of t h e d e p e n d e n t v a r i a b l e s do not change across experiments. The games c o n s t r u c t e d the  form of  brackets the  aggregated  in Figure  arrangements  again  the  each  game.  24. of  percentage  experiments.  The  for  the  experiment  choices  for  both experiments  Following Figure pressures  of  subjects  pressure  24,  f o r e a c h of choosing  values  were  and t h e  Table the  the  results  in  are given  in  IV  displays  games and shows A,  identical  response for  the  in two  175  Figure  24 - The E x p e r i m e n t a l Games and A g g r e g a t e d  A  B  2  1 (I) (II) (61)(71) A,  1  4  (64)(58) B,  2  B  2  3 4  6  (41)(40) 5  4  B,  4  #3  A  B  2  5  3  #4  3  A  2  -1  B  2  0 (I) (II) (76) (68) A,  2 2  (36M42) B,  2  4  4  4  (48)(53)  (I) (II) (64)(58) A,  B  2  6 (I) (II) (59)(60) A,  4 3  B,  A  2  1  5  2  #2  3 (I) (II) (52)(47) A,  3  3-  #1  A  2 3  (39)(29)  2  4  3  1  4  B  2  5 (I) (II) (36)(42) A,  2 1  B,  A  2  Choices  2  3  0  5 0  0  (23)(32) 5  2  #5  B,  4  2  #6  2  1 76  B4 (I) ( I I ) (61)(61 ) A,  A  3  1 (I) ( I I ) (68)(62) A,  2  4 2  2  (32)(34) 2  3  A  B,  1  B  2  A  2  -2  1  2  3  1  3  (20)(24)  B  2  2 (I) ( I I ) (77)(77) A,  2  4  2  #8  3  B,  1 2  #7  (I) (II) (80)(76) A,  2  1  3  3  (39)(39)  B,  B  2  3 4  2  (23)(23) 2  3  . B,  2  #9  1  #10  A  B  2  1 (I) (II) (58)(69) A,  (I) ( I I ) (88)(82) A,  1  1  2 2  (42)(31)  ( 1 2) (1 8 ) B, 1  B, #11  1  1  #12  2  1 77  A  B  2  2 (I) (II) (82)(80) A,  -1  2 ( 18) (20) B,  2  #13  (I) (II) (91)(75) A,  (09)(25) B,  #15  2  3  2  B  2  2 (I) ( I I ) (76)(76) A,  2  3  A  2  3  2 4  (24)(24) Bi  2  3  1  #14  2  1 78  Table  IV - The V a l u e s of  the  Pressures  Game #  MX  PO  CR  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 0 1 1 1 2 1 3 1 4 1 5  0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1  0 3/2 0 1/2 3/2 0 2/2 0 1/2 0 2/2 0 0 "1/2 "1/2  0 3/4 -3/4 0 -3/4 0 3/4 -1/4 -2/4 0 3/4 0 -3/4 -1/4 0  on Row P l a y e r .  B  Exper iment: I II A% A%  C  0 3/2 -3/2 0 0 0 2/2 -2/2 0 0 2/2 "1/2 -4/2 -2/2 -1/2  0 -3/4 3/4 0 3/4 1/4 -1/4 3/4 4/4 1/4 -1/4 2/4 5/4 3/4 2/4  71% 42 47 60 58 68 61 62 76 77 69 82 80 76 75  61% 36 52 59 64 76 61 68 80 77 58 88 82 76 91  MX = m a x i m i z a t i o n of e x p e c t e d p a y o f f ; PO = P a r e t o o p t i m a l i t y ; CR = c o l l e c t i v e r a t i o n a l i t y ; B = b e n e v o l e n c e ; C = c o m p e t i t i o n  The games  first  is  been  to  step  in a n a l y z i n g the  state  implicitly  and t e s t  and  subjects'  some of  explicitly  the  choices  assumptions  discussed  in  in  these  which  the  have  foregoing  chapters. Recall  that  a self-interested these account games was  in  tossing  games. of to  their  subjects  choice  was  If  others' be  i n Games 1 t h r o u g h 5 t h e alternative;  individuals welfare,  random.  we  would  O r , in the  self-interest,  a c o i n and c h o o s i n g  Such a p a t t e r n of  were  choice  was  pure  whichever case  of  would  always  egoists  expect  absence  choice  the  MX  d i d not zero  who took  choice  in  an a l t e r n a t i v e be  alternative  have  i n o n l y Game #3,  no  these which  equivalent was  in  to  face-up. where  52  1 79  percent  of  contrast  to  the the  subjects first  a self-interested  chose  five  A , , and 48 p e r c e n t c h o s e  games,  alternative.  Games #6 t h r o u g h #15  Once a g a i n ,  individuals  were moved by s e l f - i n t e r e s t  to  i n t h e s e games  find  chose  that  the A , a l t e r n a t i v e .  although,  in  two  of  d i d choose  the  precise  rendering  of  choice  to  But t h i s  the  subjects  classifying  close  100 p e r c e n t  more  hypothesis  the  presence  offer  assumed  that  we s h o u l d of  was  In  did  the  not  expect  subjects the  t h a n 85 p e r c e n t  self-interested  by  we  alone,  clearly  games  this  if  B,.  alternative.  case of  A  the more  can be g a i n e d by c r o s s or  absence  of  the  MX  pressure. Figure  25 -  C r o s s t a b u l a t i o n o f t h e MX P r e s s u r e by S u b j e c t s ' Choices i n Experiment I .  A,  B,  0  54.5 ( 181 )  •45.5( 151 )  33.4 (332)  1  75.8 (501 )  24.2 (160)  66.6 (661 )  MX  1 00 (993) X  Figure  25  is  game as  the  unit  between  the  of  analysis.  presence  of  perfect,  o r even  subjects  = 45.52  p r o d u c e d by t a k i n g  selection  the  2  that  of  choice. the  a  each s u b j e c t ' s  Clearly,  there  is  self-interested  But  the  near p e r f e c t  took account o n l y of  choice a  relationship  choice  relationship  in every  is  and  the  not  the  one we would have e x p e c t e d self-interest.  if  180  A second approach  to  the  pressures  a r e of  equal  assigned  equal  importance  pressures  pressures.  or  negative,  this  the  percentage  of  For  as  pressures,  of  the  in  choosing  to  where  are present equal should  be  assumpt i o n s .  to  all  Such  an  positive  find  of  a  these  is  roughly  pressures  oppose  of  B,  in B  1 f  pressures random.  which  if  regardless Figure  to  the  response  two  be.  others To  test  c o n f i g u r a t i o n s by  pressured choice  where  will  another.  random  we w o u l d e x p e c t  of  one given  two p a i r s may an o r d e r  and  alternative  weight  the  a b a l a n c i n g of  the  two  of 26  selected  choice  we have  that  the  is  of A ,  pressures  t h a n i n a s i t u a t i o n where  approximately  subjects  either  one  In a d d i t i o n , we w o u l d e x p e c t  i n A , a n d two  weight  of  a l t e r n a t i v e a n d none t h a t  be f a r g r e a t e r  the  all  t o e a c h of  and opposed t o  equal  two  than that  first  that  value.  result  any  are s p l i t  For instance,  the  second.  will  the  f r e q u e n c y w i t h which the  be more f r e q u e n t  decisions  i n one d i r e c t i o n ,  that  what e i t h e r  subjects.  present  A,  games  words,  numerical  being  assume  s h o u l d be o v e r w h e l m i n g l y p o p u l a r ,  subjects  pressures  to  In o t h e r  an a s s u m p t i o n we c a n s p e c i f y  by t h e  in  choice  assuming  in  descending  to  are  is  their  their  we would e x p e c t  regardless such  When a l l  the  example,  pattern  of  in  would have c h o i c e  the  decrease  importance.  regardless  assumption  data  the two  are  defined  choice  of  pressures  subjects numerical tests  give value, these  181  Figure  26 - C r o s s t a b u l a t i o n of O p p o s i n g P r e s s u r e s i n E x p e r iment I .  A,  2:0 1 :0 4: 1 3: 1 2: 1 3:2 2:2  If data,  the  we s h o u l d see  a  roughly  This  case  seems t o comply w i t h  three  pattern  pressures  the  subjects  pressures, in  chose  while  evidence  treated  e a c h of  We  to  to  others,  or  upon t h e i r  importance  choice  of  was a p p a r e n t  pressures  the  s u c h as  A,'s  Even t h e that  of  the  that  in t h e i r that  p a i d more  In t h e  three  alternative  the  is  very  subjects  all  pressures  attention  to  there  discussion  be of  may  equal  be  are some  these pressures  a r e l a t i o n s h i p between  c o m p e t i t i o n which w i l l  of  decisions.  previous  However,  one the  80 p e r c e n t  Obviously, there  t h e m a g n i t u d e of  data.  of  the  c o n f i g u r a t i o n of  chose  assumption  self-interest,  by  in accordance w i t h the  equally  choice.  i n the  the  assumption  subjects  that  evident.  F o r i n Game #9,  the  the  percentage  which i s  76 p e r c e n t  pressures  substantiated  assumption,  two p r e s s u r e s .  support  the  this  alternative  i n Game #14,  O r , that  some e f f e c t  c e r t a i n l y not  misleading. the  is  declining  by two,  now must c o n s i d e r  equal.  than  the  is  a c c o r d a n c e w i t h the  little  not  is  opposed  games #9 and #14,  23. 1 40.9 40.6 63.6 29.3 48.5 23.6  e q u a l weight  chosen. that  B,  76.9 59. 1 59.4 36.4 70.7 51 .5 76.3  a s s u m p t i o n of  by C h o i c e  it  had of and  other  importance.  182  The r e l a t i v e  i m p o r t a n c e of  each  through m u l t i p l e  regression.  6.4.1  I.  Experiment  The determine to  first  step  which,  if  explain  a  in  any,  the of  dependent  v a r i a b l e when a l l  included  in  there  two p o s s i b l e  and or,  are as  as  has  such  resulted  a small part second  that  the  is  a  will  in  equation  through  includes  only  where  it  significant At  this  of  relative  whether  amount of  point,  the  competition  we w i l l  case to  the  pattern  fits  either  number of  the  significant, was  the  pressures;  our e x p e c t a t i o n  choices. a next  the  in  the  variables  to  the  point  explain  dependent  the  only  As  step  to  variables of  values  explaining  and e x p l a i n  independent  random,  pressure  able  i n the  able  are  independent  are  to d e s c r i b e  are  to  variables  elimination,  which  is  the  choice  possibility,  I  in  none a r e  m a n i p u l a t i o n of  variation  want of  If  assessed  variation  independent  backwards  the  the  in our s u b j e c t s '  those  strengths  a  variable.  the  pattern  and d e t e r m i n e  pre-eminence  of  including  all  and m a x i m i z a t i o n .  T a b l e V below independent  reduce  variables  predictor variables  real  can be  experiment  i n t e r c o r r e l a t i o n of  the  analysis the  be t o  the  the  variation  conclusion  of  of  equation.  of  the  i n e a c h of of  of  conclusions:  independent  pressures  independent  amount  regression  emphasized,  the  analysis  the  significant  the  of  gives  variables  be e a c h  the  in the  subject's  full  regression  prediction equation,  choice  in every  game.  and t a k i n g a  1 83  Table V -  Regression  Unstandardized Coef f i c i e n t  adj.  2  = =  2  .07 .07  two  influence of of  the the  prediction  of  the  the  and  of  now be s a i d subjects'  at  the  that  the  indicates  dependent  variable  i n the  expected  payoff  or c o m p e t i t i o n  condoned  and  by  analysis  the  encouraged  of  the  d e t e r m i n i n g whether  an  significantly calculation  of  t  an which  were  an  with  arrived  which  for  it  has  of  clearly  At l e a s t  result  by  our  entire  maximization  two  produced First,  contributed  prediction at  can  influenced  some c a u t i o n .  variable  it on  the  not  values  accurate  least,  behaviour.  accurate is  the  surprising  unusual  effects  pressure  situation  the  equation  independent  value  a  of  very  either  such  treating  full  towards the  in  the  Were t h i s  be  of  significant  for  At t h e  choices  pressures  towards  knowledge  experiment.  subjects'  a  and above  sufficient  certainly  by  contribute  words,  is  first  significantly  even  over  have  was a s i g n i f i c a n t  would  the  PO  variable.  benevolence  the  and  In o t h e r  dependent  factors  B  pressures  finding  that  level.  pressures,  B  choices  story,  .05  variables.  PO  1 .00 1.16 -3.22* 2.34* -.20 16.75*  F=16.35 N = 993  upon t h e  other  I.  t  . 1 9 . 1 9 .04 .05 .18 .04  . 22 . 1 4 . 1 1 .04 .61  * Significant  Only  Experiment  Standard Error  . 19  C MX PO B CR Constant R R  A n a l y s i s of  involves  dividing  the  1 84  value  of  standard less of  the error.  likely  the  unstandardized Therefore,  the  variable  standard  variance  of  throughout, which  error  the the  standard error  of  proportion  the  likely  the  rather  pressures,  the  significant.  this  case  denominator  regression  variance. is  these  standard  the  variable.  to  prove  two  the  is  this  the  upon  the  the  same  N is mean  of  X,  of  the  simply a  variance,  known  the  significant.  for  variables  larger  the  seemingly  coefficients  with  error  calculation  statistically  independent  and c o e f f i c i e n t s  the  coefficient,  explains  its  dependent  from t h e  of  by  The c a l c u l a t i o n  F o r as  The l a r g e r  regression  for  larger be  in  digression  nonsignificant  variances  the  coefficient  squared d e v i a t i o n s  the  variable  dry  to  independent  in  of  is  is  sum of  appears  the  regression  This  unlikely  the have  more  MX both  standard errors  and  C  smaller than  do  PO and B p r e s s u r e s . The  second  equation  with caution  correlation highly  reason  between  correlated  regression  effect.  We  variables  is  removal  of  is  independent  they  variables  may  all  this  posibility  is  are  fail  all  to  correlated,  become  so  the it  If  the  full  of " the  a number of  included  in  the  significance  a larger  s y s t e m of  common  independent  may be t h a t  with  the  them from t h e  prediction  equation,  significant.  One way of  examining  through backward e l i m i n a t i o n  significance,  of  effects  attain  o n l y a s m a l l p a r t of  o r a number of will  for  variables.  necessarily  remainder  analysis  the  know from F i g u r e 23 t h a t  one  the  possible  explaining  the  tests  treating  stems' from t h e  independent  equation  because each  for  removes  variables  from  which, the  following prediction  1 85  equation  and  explanation gives  the  thereby  of  the  results  arrives  variance of  this  at  i n the  an o p t i m a l  and  parsimonious  dependent v a r i a b l e .  analysis  on the  data  7  from  T a b l e VI experiment  I . T a b l e VI -  R e g r e s s i o n A n a l y s i s of E x p e r i m e n t Backward E l i m i n a t i o n  Unstandardized Coefficient C MX PO B CR Constant R R  adj.  2 2  .23 .19 -.14 .11 .61  = .07 = .07 at  Backward  the  the  hindsight, it  is  highly  of  explained  that  pressure  on  equation  independent  2  .03  17.21*  of  the  values  with  by  collective  variables.  8  is  one  had  prediction in  Tables  which  MX,  was  decisions,  i n masking  the  as  is  V  and  CR, from  no  affect  indicated VI.  for  C,  PO,  Both of not  a  removal  of  have  factors  important  included the  amount B  these  as  the CR  the  and  very  and when effects  of  by  With  In a d d i t i o n ,  a measure  small.  rationality  to  candidate  is  after very  variable,  next  b o t h C and B .  CR  subjects'  succeeded  only  seems a l i k e l y  remainder,  our  removed  correlation,  explained  indicate  full  R  correlated  the  3.56* 2.37* -3.40* 2.41*  T h i s removal  variable  partial  variation  .06 .08 .04 .05  level.  accuracy  adjusted this  pressure's  .05  equation.  overall  similar  the  elimination  prediction  upon  t  F = 20.45 N = 993  * Significant  the  Standard Error  I Using  in  the  remaining  1 86  The  backward  with c o e f f i c i e n t s importance. VI  tell  the  but  one  So,  unit.  played  values  increase  A  if  the  i n the  same game a g a i n  the  and  second  tendency  game,  only  players,  or  is  we would  the  were  that  of  the  alternative As  an  controlled  for  and  by  .14  or  the  14%.  competitive  P a r e t o o p t i m a l outcome by  would  the  values  choosing  choosing  it  negative  hypothetical  would d e c l i n e  player,  the  similarly  A  of by  of  expected that  of  contains  the  subject  Pareto is  best  repellant.  But  displayed contain  example, the  PO  choosing  One p o s s i b l e  quality  the  coefficient  w h i c h d i d not  response  each  and  In  subjects  probability  the  in  by  pressure  A  r a t h e r than  the  Since  same  an outcome  2,  is  G,  choosing  have  1 to  effect  game  unit,  unit  the  from say  this  increased  by one  23%.  one  increased  of  the  a  independent  one  p r o b a b i l i t y of  be a t t r a c t i v e  indicates  choose  pressures  the  of  a characteristic  o p t i m a l outcome.  other  a change  s u r p r i s e here  to  slope  to  the  and t h a t  .23  Table  of  subject  2  of  p r o b a b i l i t y of  with exactly  G , by  A priori,  which i s  negative  values  one  relative  respectively.  PO p r e s s u r e .  both  their  the  with C increased  any  increase  .11  the  optimality,  Pareto  of  equation  coefficients  in  held constant  situations,  Pehaps  the  the  of  subjects played hypothetical  probablity  -.14,  for  all  are  PO, and B would  for  if  one  the  hypothetical  .19,  a prediction  expectations  increase  f o r MX, PO, and B , but  predicted  MX,  to  predicted  choosing  variables  then  much c l o s e r  produces  The u n s t a n d a r d i z e d r e g r e s s i o n  us  subject  elimination  the  the all  pressure the  A  explanation experiment.  highest  would be  if  a  payoff  for  contributing  187  towards  the  hypothetical  competition  was  would e x p e c t  him or her  relative found seven was of  a strong  advantage  i n the  over  games where  the  leads  the  and the  competitive to  the  The  first  the  taking have  into  been  other  the  beta  of  the  to  normalize  variance.) of  accentuating  comparison e n t a i l s  one  observing  subject take  selecting  an e x a m p l e ,  difference choosing that  all  T a b l e V I I below  one  alternative  is  that  other  experiment,  that  the  shows,  in  result,  is  method to  the  of  -3/4  -3/4  definitions  difference  fractions  varibles  has  variances. all  of  calculate  assessing  9  the the  Another  variables  to  across 5/4.  probability  their will  be  its  range.  What w i l l  and when C e q u a l s  are assigned  the  of  to  but  p r e d i c t e d p r o b a b i l i t y of  v a r i a b l e moves  predicted  C equals  variables  different  c o n t r o l l i n g for  change  that  method  both C  would have  possible  coefficients recall  choice  slope.  Any  independent  their  C has a r a n g e  when  other  the  A as  between A  both present, consistent  B.  is the  PO p r e s s u r e d  One  This  the  method of and  five  i n v o l v e d m u l t i p l i c a t i o n by d i f f e r e n t  the  of  these  (The r e a d e r w i l l  strengths  disadvantage  the  caution.  of  In  from T a b l e VI  than  n a t u r e of  magnitudes  pressures  relative  gained  stronger  the  the  we  of  having a negative  with great  weights.  over  So t h e  decision,  explanation  two p r e s s u r e s . were  If  which secured a  Another  positive.  pressure  account  the  these  impression  treated  comparing  coplayer.  of  outcome.  in a p l a y e r ' s  PO and C p r e s s u r e s  and MX a r e c o n s i d e r a b l y  best  c h o o s e an a l t e r n a t i v e  alternative  second  player's  motivation  to  arrangement  negative  other  mean .39.  of  a  5/4,  be  a To  the  subject assuming  values?  As  188  T a b l e V I I - The D i f f e r e n c e i n t h e P r o b a b i l i t y of When a V a r i a b l e Assumes V a l u e s a t t h e E x t r e m e s of Experiment I .  Variable  Pr  (High)  C MX PO B ' CR  The  .85 .83 .51 .86 .65  pattern  of  w h i c h emerges  from t h a t  of  Table V.  The B p r e s s u r e  the  pressure  pattern how  is  due  to  important  Lendenmann  and  pressures  had  Accordingly,  it  c a s e had l i t t l e  6.4.2  this  given  under the  mild collective incentive course  VII  of  is  so.  larger effect  r a n g e of is  relatively  affect  the  we c a n n o t that  little the  upon t h e s e  different  say the  given  i m p o r t a n t and  first  this  for  reversed  sure.  the  But  However,  magnitude  of  in the  pressure.  impact  magnitude  independent  coefficients  O b v i o u s l y , p a r t of  found  may be t h a t  the  somewhat  now a p p e a r s much more  Rapoport  Experiment  The s e c o n d  from T a b l e  less the  .39 .22 -.29 .38 .06  strengths  unstandardized regression  much  Pr(H) - P r ( L )  .46 .61 .80 .48 .71  relative  variables  MX  Pr (Low)  Choosing A i t s Range:  of  the  upon  choice.  range  in  this  totals  are  subjects.  11.  experiment,  whose a g g r e g a t e d  roman n u m e r a l II incentive  present  different,  i n the but  the  in Figure  intended  response  24,  introduced a very  to c o u n t e r a c t  game s i t u a t i o n . games i d e n t i c a l ,  the  competitive  The s u b j e c t s the  only  were  of  difference  1 89  being  that  their  i n the  average  scores  second experiment  class  from  score  other  classes  supposedly  The  cooperatively  or c o l l e c t i v e l y ,  In one  as  reduce  to  collective  importance.  to  the  to  succeed  to  or  the  of  but  subjects were the  and  If  they  where  t h e MX and C p r e s s u r e s  To  certain  subject's choice she  is  to  payoff only  based  greater than  in  these  the  i n the  cells other,  collective  his  expectations  expectation  of  the the  the  decline  increase simple:  given  a Pareto  larger  sum  likely  to  of  choose choose  present. will  depend upon  of  an  where  coplayer's  were he  payoffs  collectively the  a  opponent's  r a t i o n a l choice  we m i g h t e x p e c t  in  s h o u l d be more  For example,  collectively if  of  would  s m a l l e r t h a n he might e x p e c t  Similarly, the  were  i n any game.  upon  selfishly,  be e a s i e r .  alternative  values  slightly  choose  probably much  payoff  the  would  the  self  towards a  were more w i l l i n g t o  alternatives  particular  it  magnitude  would p r o b a b l y be l e s s  extent,  for  which c o n t a i n e i t h e r  they  the  to  subjects  with  the  i n t e n d e d so much  perhaps too  these a l t e r n a t i v e s  a  not  the  the  alternative  players.  high  payoff  C and MX p r e s s u r e s  as a g r o u p ,  in  payoffs  of  redirect  pressures  class  value  were to  simple,  average  that  compete  a high  that  CR  told  i n v i t a t i o n to  responded  alternatives the  an  instructions  for  PO  choose  outcome  payoffs  value  The r e a s o n i n g was  incentive  optimal  the  coefficients  t h o s e of  willing  the  were  competitiveness If  were  participating  p l a c i n g the  the  expectations  regression while  sense,  goal.  incentive,  the  instructions  b o t h p l a y e r s ahead of  alone.  subjects  would be matched a g a i n s t  experiment.  for  the  or will are  rational  selection  of  190  the  first An  alternative interesting  games where that  if  they  the  latter  games as  of  relative  of  the  of  of  o r d e r of  determine  the  collective  what  experiment  effects  *  = =  -  Regression  II  proceeds  alternative, than  if  aspect  they  of  same  manner  i n a d d i t i o n to d e t e r m i n i n g variables,  w i t h the  the  choices.  i n the  p a t t e r n of  A n a l y s i s of  the  Standard Error  we  the  wish  to  experiment influence  I of  the  variance  .05  t  is  expressed  variables,  only  PO has  1 .08 .66 -2.50* 1 .69 .43 17.23*  level.  i n the  experiment  II.  9.27 1110  F N  S i g n i f i c a n t at  Experiment  .19 .18 .04 .05 .18 .03  .04 .03  When t h e  subjects'  was  throughout.  this  can be a s c r i b e d t o  .21 . 1 2 . 10 . 08 .08 .61  C MX PO B CR Constant  2  the  predictor  precedence  Unstandardized Coef f i c i e n t  adj.  of  But  the  that  alternative  discusses  those  alternative  both chose  section  I.  across  incentive.  Table VIII  2  values  l a r g e r combined score  an e x p l a n a t i o n  experiment  to  R R  payoff  rational  this  i m p o r t a n c e of  compare the  players  a slightly  part  p a r t of  that  feature  collectively  The a n a l y s i s as  easier.  hypothetical  could achieve  The  be  row a n d column had an MX p r e s s u r e d  two  both chose  to again  as  dependent  a function  a significant  variable of  all  of  regression  in  the  the  independent  coefficient  second  and  191  once a g a i n , in  the  this  first  subjects. Table  was  experiment  and PO d e c l i n e d too  reduced  was  Comparing these  V shows t h a t  drawing  negative  C has  slighty,  many  IX -  not  adj.  R R  2  conclusions,  adjusted very  R  little  variance equation.  at  this  importance  .03  20.42*  at  the  .05  removes  significant  reduced only  was  lost  the While  three  i n terms  dependent the  we  are  all  of  of  of  Using  and  for  ability by t h e i r  variables  in  in  the  the  indicating  that  to  explain  gives dependent  the  the  variables  comparing  across  from  exclusion  elimination  variance  C  o n l y MX and P O .  marginally  the  interested the  CR,  independent  variable  backward  explanation  B,  coefficients  is  of  be  level.  value  stage  II  4. 23* -2.69*  the  parsimonious  should again  . 06 .02  of  in  Before  t  removal 2  in  MX, B ,  somewhat.  equation  those  those  same m a g n i t u d e ,  increased the  with  of  F = 20.95 N = 1110  leaving the  the  Standard Error  The b a c k w a r d e l i m i n a t i o n  Despite  characteristic  result  elimination.  .27 -.07 .60  * Significant  equation  similar  R e g r e s s i o n A n a l y s i s of E x p e r i m e n t Backward E l i m i n a t i o n  = .03 = .03  2  CR  the  coefficients  remained at  Unstandardized Coefficient C MX PO B CR Constant  that  a unique  regression  and  t h r o u g h backward  Table  indicating  two  the  from  the  the the most  variable, relative  experiments.  1 92  So we r e t u r n t o with  the  produces all  full  analysis  comparison,  to  the  the  as  in  Table  increase  it  other  equation  moves  in  across  variables,  of  Table VIII  V.  and  compare  it  enhance  the  Once  again  to  probability  which  each  its  can be  range,  assigning  the  variable mean  value  described.  T a b l e X - The D i f f e r e n c e i n t h e P r o b a b i l i t y of C h o o s i n g A When a V a r i a b l e Assumes V a l u e s a t t h e E x t r e m e s of i t s Range: E x p e r i m e n t II  Variable  Pr  (High)  C MX PO B CR  which  collective produces  may  about  the  as  it  across  As  i n d i c a t e d above,  MX  pressure  according repellant.  to  its  this  reasoning  on t h e  featuring  Naturally,  we  positive  incentive.  the  the  would with  it  the  this have the  The CR p r e s s u r e  while of  PO,  outcome expected  PO  C  that  of  does  experiment. subjects  A did  less  favoured  increase  the  negatively.  coefficient the  of  decrease  marginally  less  this  choosing A  The e f f e c t  subjects  slightly  the  pressure  the  there.  became  the  expected  if  choosing  introduction as  The  first  decreased out  some  i n t r o d u c t i o n of  d i d i n the  set  reveals  p r o b a b i l i t y of  p r o b a b i l i t y of  case  VII  experiment.-  i n the  Pr(L) -  .42 .12 -.21 .28 .12  Table  of  s h o u l d have  expectations In  with  second  r a n g e as  Pr(H) -  .41 .60 .72 .50 .61  result  same change  alternative  become  a  i n the  behaved a c c o r d i n g to the  table  be  incentive  moves  (Low)  .83 .72 .51 .78 .73  C o m p a r i n g t h e .above changes  Pr  would  collective across  the  1 93  two  experiments  by as  much as  the  p r o b a b i l i t y of  is  h a r d l y the  magnitude  the  B pressure  declines  more  concerned  choosing  A only  of as  expected,  with c o l l e c t i v e  their  were  introduction  the  of  subjects  first  to  the  least did  mild  was  s i m p l y not  the  CR p r e s s u r e .  not  strong  The s e c o n d  cooperate  combined  scores  overall  class  believe  that  important  situation  both  and t h e  is  ensuring score  increased  are  the  the  which of  subjects  they at  are  will  be  the  expense  of to  i m p o r t a n c e of  coefficients,  which  is  the  less  two  is  a  group  gains  class.  as  to  why  rationality  when  collective  One  thereby  in t h i s  and  precisely  the  C  for that  so  an  their  pattern  CR  the  one  .to more  equally  experimental more  often,  possibly  would l e a d t o  and  A the  raising  lead  But  Such a l o g i c  MX, and d e c r e a s e d  for  s h o u l d become  so.  oneself  effect  ensure  maximizing strategy  for  incentive  is  would  goal  The  more c o m p l i c a t e d .  t h e m s e l v e s and t o  less  the  experiment.  fashions.  explanation  of  met?  produce a s i g n i f i c a n t  explanation  score  the  second  CR and PO p r e s s u r e s  choose the  for  collective  maximum p o s s i b l e ,  pursuing  effects  only p a r t i a l l y  that  MX and C p r e s s u r e s  a higher  the  explanations,  the is  to  This  the  to  in  in  between  average.  method  submit  enough  members  to  of  incentive  explanation  may be p u r s u e d  higher  if  a coplayer  two p l a u s i b l e  group g o a l  thus  of  in  The i n f l u e n c e  maximization,  gain  incentive  and s i m p l e s t  valid  for  increase  percent,  expected.  expectations  a collective  There are at  exposed  the  own.  Why  these  but  goes up by 6  increase  concerned w i t h maximizing the of  100 p e r c e n t ,  a the  regression  w h i c h has  been  1 94  revealed. of  the  games  We s h o u l d a l s o  collective still  interests class  remember  incentive,  remained.  of  gaining  average  score  that  the  despite  competitive  A r a t i o n a l way of  the  highest  would be  the  in-class  to  quality  serving  score,  choose  introduction  the  both  and the  gains  of  the  the  the  highest  maximizing  strategy. How  robust  by a m o d i f i e d  are  from  findings  robust,  stable  across  show  that  relatively the  the  the  and the  for  beginning  of  or  its  for  of  on t h e  second  robustness this  was  found t h a t  presence  is  more  out  MX p r e s s u r e MX was  not  the  example,  we  expect  the  benevolence  the  is  slope  equation  as  absent. of it  B is  It  will  is  other  o r i g i n a t i n g with  more d i f f i c u l t  to  be unchanged when MX i s  when we  observe  are  jacknife  those  the  analysis. effect  only  important  games  effect  pressures. pressure the  of  subjects'  an i n d i r e c t  the  payoff  the  upon t h e  of  when p r e s s u r e  B,  throughout  some f u r t h e r  importance  influential  relatively  experiment.  o r a b s e n c e may have  that  original  unstandardized  under  relative might  is  game  experiment  The  upon t h e  of  this  Appendix  repeated  we s i n g l e d  the  in  first  suggests  section  the  s h o u l d be  game.  v a r y somewhat  If  given  the  each  a b s e n c e of  While i t  values  same p a t t e r n  exclusion  presence  more  checking  procedure.  The r e s u l t s  coefficients  coefficients  pressure,  One way of  coefficient  procedure.  the  check  choices.  regression  the  c a r r i e d out  The At  the  serial  procedure  the  stable  regression  findings?  " j a c k n i f e " procedure which drops a d i f f e r e n t  ad s e r i a t i m are  the  For  will  be  maximization  predict  whether  removed from where  it  the was  1 95  absent,  or p r e s e n t  The  following  where MX i s analysis  as  present  as  a constant tables  before. experiments  results  in both  backward  2  absent,  with  the  games  elimination  Standard Error  .45 -.23 .29 .64  = .03 = .03  * Significant  F = N = at  the  .05  MX  .16  2.85*  .10 .13  -2.30* 2.27  .06  10.99*  3.84 332  level.  was  produces  Excluding  t  the  regression  procedure  R e g r e s s i o n A n a l y s i s of E x p e r i m e n t I Games w i t h MX P r e s s u r e s  those  repeating  cases.  Unstandardized Coefficient  adj.  is  into  where  A  2  it  observations  I and II  excluded.  R R  the  the  present  C MX PO B CR Constant  r e m a i n i n g games.  T a b l e s XI and XII d i s p l a y  of  T a b l e XI -  divide  and t h o s e where  analysis  identical  i n the  1 96  T a b l e XII -  R e g r e s s i o n A n a l y s i s of E x p e r i m e n t II Games w i t h MX P r e s s u r e s  Unstandardized Coefficient C MX PO B CR Constant R R  adj.  2  .51 -.35 .41 .73  of  explained shows  that  or  normal  similar The this  of  the  p a t t e r n of  where t h e  terms  appears  stronger  interested the  is  because  that  MX  in  that of  that  is  strengths  is  XI  action  absent.  is  altruism course  will of  be  be  action  the  the  slope  presence from  B  the  coefficient  and X I I t h a n i t  does  in  as  we  surprising  "easier" T h i s . seems more is  games  i n r e l a t i v e and  the  particularly will  XI  apparent in T a b l e XII  In f a c t  Tables  is  regression  deviation  considerably stronger  not  Table  a negative of  the  variance  the  has  A slight  altruism  self-interested  its  of  s i m p l y an a r t i f a c t  both  This  of  from  variables.  again  pressure.  is  most  i n T a b l e V where a l l  pressure  not  CR p r e s s u r e  magnitudes  than i n T a b l e V I I I .  course  argument  clearly  PO  the  independent  coefficient  T a b l e s V and V I I I . expect  13.30*  level.  to  B coefficient  absolute  would  .05  relative  that  absence  .05  remaining  included.  indicating  -3.80* 3.47*  experiments  the is  .09 .L2—  procedure excludes  both  by t h e  coefficients are  the  regression  equations  3.42*  F = 5.04 N = 369  * S i g n i f i c a n t at  The  t  .15  = .04 = .03  2  Standard Error  Excluding  not  when to  a  self-  confirm  p r e v a l e n t where a possible.  This  1 97  was  Titmuss'  b l o o d donor  argument  support  argument  MX  is  the  following  gains  present.  XIII  two -  further  strength  Here B d e c l i n e s  C MX PO B CR Constant  adj.  2 2  = .04 = .03  T a b l e XIV -  adj.  2  2  in  of  as  voluntary blood.  games where  is  evident  in  I Excluding  t  .19  .828  -.05 .04 .18 .08  -3.11* 1.44 .05 9.19*  F = 6.51 N = 661 at  the  .05  level.  Standard Error  -.02 -.04 -.07 .74  = .01 = .00  II  Excluding  t  .14  -.130  .05  -.765  .16 .06  -.449 11.83*  F = 2.05 N = 741 at  the  .05  Table XIII confirms of  importance  R e g r e s s i o n A n a l y s i s of E x p e r i m e n t Games w i t h o u t MX P r e s s u r e s  * Significant  magnitude  from a n a l y s i s  Standard Error  Unstandardized Coefficient C MX PO B CR Constant  in  a  market  R e g r e s s i o n A n a l y s i s of E x p e r i m e n t Games w i t h o u t MX P r e s s u r e s  .16 -.16 .07 .00 .73  * Significant  R R  maintaining  tables.  Unstandardized Coefficient  R R  of  system and p r o h i b i t i n g a p r i v a t e  The  Table  in  the  level.  the  same g e n e r a l  coefficients.  But  pattern Table  XIV  of is  relative a  total  1 98  departure  from  regression  coefficients  is  very  explain  small only  dependent shallow  the  t h a n the  of  maximization  in these  Unfortunately, subjects  responded to  experiment  because  group payoff  score.  those  who t h e y  others  coplayer,  would  instructions Neither both  chose  achieved of  can  the  where  to we the  they  were  R  the  they  encouraged i n the  was a b s e n t .  variables  have  a  group  a  slightly choosing A  If  anything, that  subjects  the  goal  to  the  be more  experiment  this  to the  conclusion  Because  value  in  have  first  2  are able  a subject  the  the  where  explanation  validity through  now  of  the  individual  games. we  cannot  the they  say  would i n c r e a s e  l e d to But  it  expressed  f o r c e r t a i n how t h e y  thought  were  were  choosing  encouraged  o p p o s i n g p l a y e r might t h o s e p a i r s of  maximizing  strategy  c h o s e between t h e  as in  a the  choose.  i n d i v i d u a l s who  most  frequently  t h a n t h o s e who d i d n o t ,  w i t h the  second average  believe  that  score  i n the  the  the  they  how t h e  establish  actually  whether  believed  choose.  gains  certain  more r e a d i l y  were  consider  for  MX p r e s s u r e  Nor c a n we say  a h i g h e r average subjects  adjusted  variance  of  earlier  subjects  pursuing  the  all  a p p e a r s more c o n v i n c i n g we s h o u l d e x p l o r e strategy  of  are h e l d constant.  the  actually  incentive  of  none  variables  p r o b a b i l i t y of  reinforces  self-interested  and t h e  i n d i c a t i n g that  upon t h e  incentive  Here,  these  addition,  variable values  finding  similar  that  fraction  In  slopes  tables.  significant  smallest  effect  other  collective  a  is  indicating  negative  when a l l  previous  variable.  depressing  this  the  columns of  n a t u r a l outcome  for the  i n the  none games upper  1 99  left  cell.  We  assumptions, response  can  however,  determine  with  whether  contributes  to  the  aid  choosing  the  group  gain  ourselves  to  in  of  a number of  self-interested  these  hypothetical  situations. First, games  we w i l l  where  row  e x c l u d e s games scenarios the  player  and compare the games.  both h y p o t h e t i c a l alternative; players  if  third,  what  always  chose  chose  the  second,  would the  In  not  choice  column choose  payoff  the  or,  alternatives will  is  result  arrive  response  alternative is  of  the the  at  payoff  if  payoff  to  if  and  always  column  row's  the  the  collectively  totals,  some  have  a  selfplayer  self-interested  choice;  own a l t e r n a t i v e s  he  the  coplayer  and where  rational,  we  MX or PO p r e s s u r e d of  what  self-interested  these  malicious;  analysis  row  and f o u r t h ,  we assume our h y p o t h e t i c a l to  both  alternative;  column does not  which g i v e s  not  of  both p l a y e r s  chose  chose  between h i s  collectively  choose e i t h e r The  to  indifferent  is  row a l w a y s  and column a l w a y s  alternative,  column  total  to  in a l l  self-interested  rational  payoff  This  different  total  their the  those  choice. four  would be the  be  at  both p l a y e r s  alternative  r e q u i r e d : where  best  for  chose  total  if  only  up  rational alternative;  order  are  choose h i s  when  the  self-interested  alternative  interested  what  set  collectively  combined score  qualifications  score  would  the be  we c a n  always  what  looking  self-interested  Next  First,  collectively  alternative.  a  total  players  both chose  would be the  will  has  1 t h r o u g h 6.  remaining  rational  limit  the  neither  assume  the  will  smaller of  the  players  alternative.  hypothetical  choice  patterns  200  is  given  i n T a b l e XV b e l o w .  Table  XV -  An A n a l y s i s o f  Column's Choice  H y p o t h e t i c a l Choice  Row's  Choice  SelfInterested  As both  is  53  52  Collectively Rat i o n a l  47  49  players  from t h e  would  games a n a l y z e d .  It  have is  could  have  realized  chosen  so as  to  that  the  subjects  chose  interested one  this  difficult this  correct  finding  in t h i s  collectively  it. the  of  the  rational  best  rational  d i d reason  case.  Without  to  alternative  for  that  both  the  the p a y o f f  way f o r the  values may  them t o  other  the  in  by the  subjects  it  alternative  they  payoffs  choice  Nonetheless,  whether  begs the q u e s t i o n of  t h e c o m b i n e d sums of  of  w o u l d be t o c h o o s e if  score  to b e l i e v e  of  regardless  And  the  artifact  reasoned that  alternative,  a self-interested  maximized  the c o l l e c t i v e l y  themselves.  were q u i t e  Table,  take advantage  a h i g h group average player  Collectively Rational  Selfinterested  evident  Patterns.  and be  ensure  imaginary  or the  self-  self-interested  in t h i s  fashion,  being able  to  they  answer,  what would have happened had row  and  column  been n o t i c e a b l y  from  the  greater  than  201  that  from One  the  maximization  final  of  the  was  possible  point  chapter  recipient  remains  we s t a t e d  required that  or that  the  improve  the  payoff  act  appealling  to  be d i s c u s s e d .  that the  coplayer.  required  altruistic  alternative.  all  In a d d i t i o n ,  player  forego  of  when  the  altruist's  the  an  no  cost  action  Did  advantage  was  involved  altruism  benefit  these  advantage  an  beginning  games where  some of  coplayer.  required foregoing  than  of  At the  the  games  also  in  choosing  to  the  fact  an  that  make in  it  less  aiding  the  coplayer? The q u e s t i o n multiple  regression  ultimately, of  to  addition, changed  first the  answered  analysis  with  would  different  motivational  contexts,  well.  player,  alternative  involved a benefit  to  and  it  and a c o s t  be  second to  the  when  player.  assurance.  misleading  of  for it the  What we c a n do h o w e v e r ,  w i t h w h i c h the it  structure  any  two d i f f e r e n t  a l t r u i s m i n some games where  as  when  coplayer  in  the  frequency  be  we would be c o m p a r i n g t h e  altruism  attached  cannot  not  only  is  definitions was  coplayer  involved  a  a  but  cost  but  in  pressures  s i m p l y compare  under B p r e s s u r e the  because  was p o s s i b l e , remaining  A  was  chosen  no c o s t  benefit  the  to  to the  202  T a b l e XVI - A C o m p a r i s o n of t h e A t t r a c t i v e n e s s of the A l t r u i s t i c A l t e r n a t i v e When B e n e f i c i a l and When B e n e f i c i a l and Costly  Experiment 1  Experiment  2  Alternat ive B Beneficial  51  7  M- '"  (  Beneficial & Costly  As far  1 3 5  )  19 (63)  is  evident  more  This be  is  B  56 (166)  44 (133)  1 00 (296)  81 (270)  1 00 (333)  24 (90)  76 (281 )  1 00 (371 )  i n the  table,  chosen  with  related  configuration  part  of  the  more f r e q u e n t l y  games  #2,  absent  i n two o f  #3,  expected.  of  that  #7,  and  the  games.  #11)  alternative  i n v o l v e d no c o s t However,  this  caution  the  other  Thus t h e  is  altruistic  the  the  doubtless For  alternative  in  the  MX p r e s s u r e  was  altruistic  alternative  was  absence  of  a  it  was  (as  because  to  was  evidence  .pressures.  was a t t a c h e d  was  to  because  alternative the  when no c o s t  made even more a p p e a l i n g by the choice.  it  altruistic  reason  chosen  altruistic  extreme  of  example,  the  the  when  c e r t a i n l y as  treated  the  I  1 00 (266)  attractiveness to  Non-B  49 (131 )  frequently  subject. should  Non-B  self-interested  203  6.5  Piscussion.  While the a  the  two e x p e r i m e n t s  dominant p r e s s u r e demonstrable  From  the  pressure  opposite  surprising  in the  and  have not  subjects'  in the  indeed  choices,  first  perspective,  shown t h a t  it  of  the  would  questionable  if  altruism  benevolence two  have  been  benevolence  r a t i o n a l i t y or P a r e t o o p t i m a l i t y  had  pressures  of  expected  competition. as  these  are,  To t h i s  they  extent,  the  altruism,  games r e p r e s e n t  subjects'  this  e n v i r o n m e n t , where c o m p e t i t i o n it  pressures  is  will  the  the  gains  to  the  statements  dominant p r e s s u r e competitive indication  the  fact  way t h a t  other  relative  this  these  or  subjects  in  altruistic choices.  the  and  weakness  theoretical on  t h a t MX would be  the  of  the. c a s e  the is  in-built a  were c a p a b l e o f  than s e l f - i n t e r e s t .  on a l t r u i s m d o ;  to  of  less  competitive is  to  Based  regardless  p r o v i d e d no s y m p a t h e t i c c u e s  many e x p e r i m e n t s  the  or  simple  possible  motivation.  s u c h was not  the  test  in i n d i v i d u a l s '  have e x p e c t e d  That  that  that  even  subjects  obvious  both the  strategy  would  the  as  stern  two e x p e r i m e n t s ,  in both experiments  moved by m o t i v a t i o n s experiment  i n the  s t r e n g t h of  we  less  assume  i m p o r t a n c e of  environment. of  to  is  or  payoff  that  a  very  dominated  such behaviour i s  larger role  maximizing  p r o n o u n c e m e n t s on t h e these  if  reasonable  a l t r u i s t i c pressures  of  for  p l a y an even  A corollary  fact  a r e an i n v i t a t i o n t o  the  relevant  of  T h e r e can be no a v o i d i n g t h e  games  compete.  maximization  was  experiments.  collective  individual  is  for the there  clear being  In a d d i t i o n , subjects was no  in  the the  "victim"  204  to  arouse  subjects  sympathy,  d i d not  know  matched a g a i n s t , The  of  one  as  a  group.  At l e a s t  to  to  conspired  have The  in  the  effect second  rational. rational  class  goal,  and so  optimal,  score.  they  the  were  If  higher  attesting  to  natural  every  suffered  powerful not  of  to  a principle,  only capable  prosperity, obstructions encumbers  exert  its  but  of  w i t h which  from  itself that  with it  operations..."  be  in  appeared to  score,  one  alone,  on  the  and  collectively pursue  thus  in Smith's  of  in  this  invisible "The  own c o n d i t i o n ,  and w i t h o u t to  hundred human  higher  intiative:  his  the  the MX  a  d i d reason  society a  sense  by c h o o s i n g  better  is  said  introduced  freedom and s e c u r i t y ,  folly 1 0  cannot  but  individual to  yet  reference  incentive  subjects  surmounting the  anonymous,  which were  a belief  individual  carrying of  the  potential  altruism.  individual  some of  group wealth  effort  class  be  classmate.  the  experiments  subjects  The  would  significant  unexpected  a high average  attaining  keep  collective  was  hand w h i c h c r e a t e s  when  to  subjects'  external  experiment  or P a r e t o  average  manner,  the  choices  altruism  the  norms.  would be a  a possibly  extent,  elicit the  of  ethical  their  d i d know i t  subject's  this  of  who  attempted  member  to  activate  Rather than p u r s u i n g c h o i c e s  collective pressure  they  therefore  any  identifiable  or t o  precisely  although  experiments  recipient  empathy,  laws  is  so  assistance, wealth  and  impertinent too  often  205  6.6  Conclusions.  It from  is  apparent  those  problems  discussed  of  great.  by  The c h i e f  in s e t t i n g  behaviour  examine not  well  their  of,  at  to  whether closely  of  the to  any  other  to  some d i s a d v a n t a g e s  involved  in  is  is  the  in  right  motivated  requires of  great  ethical  not  disguise  considerations, out  norms. of  to  Employing being  the  be s i m p l y a games  while  uncomplicated  a wide  analysis of  to  perhaps  by  of  ethical  is  of  interest. from  It to  of  rational  theory is  in  doubtful  represent  However, the  in  situations.  game  able  also  conflict  about  w i t h them.  design  moving  of  lies  a  range  elements  compliance  which a r e  measures  recommendations  experimental  variables  behaviour  subjects.  adopted normative individuals'  both  does  may t u r n  political  these  behaviour  devoid  major e l e m e n t s  make  generalize  test  the  of  the  to  is  advantage  the  behaviour  ethical  relatively  game t h e o r y  situation, and t o  great  part  formalize  from  ethical  that  what  experimenter  with  and  everyday  experiment  subjects  least  on the  to  T h i s p a p e r has order  the  of  of  which  .relevant  from  a l t r u i s m has  ability  choices,  any  compliance  The v a l u e  interest  sense  useful  an  altruistic  experimental  up a s i t u a t i o n  elicited  free  Any  Where  considerations  its  of  paper  conclusion,  observation  ethical  altruism.  sufficiently  of  the  extent  problem in  people's  expectations.  test  in  approach in t h i s  i n any p a r t i c u l a r s i t u a t i o n  genuine  cunning  the  and t h r o u g h t h e  disentangling behaviour  from the  briefly  measuring  experimentally are  both  use  there of  so are  game  206  theory  as  subjects' The  an a b s t r a c t choices  major  between behave that  that  the in  of  against  difficulty  simplified  the  similar  external  human  obviates  the  subjects  but  And t h e r e  e l e m e n t s of  in the  the  models  been a b l e  of  of  To  the  been  affect  real-life  unique  hand,  the  doubt  the  that  the  recognized this  in t h i s  to  use  games  competitive  subjects  the  extent,  of  competitive  the  d i s p l a y s of  who  experiment  altruism.  c h a p t e r have a t t e m p t e d  to  what  common  upon c h o i c e  of  not  as  behave a l t r u i s t i c a l l y i n  has  demonstrated  examine  is  to  i n d i v i d u a l s to  political  and i t  to  it  referred  about  situations.  in  the  most  elements of  that  relevance  of  of  influence  choice  been a r g u e d t h a t  t h e s e games we have  exacting  theoretical  competitive upon c h o i c e .  representations  in r e a l - l i f e  they  can,  and  of  political since  it  a l t r u i s t i c m o t i v a t i o n s can have an  i n such s i t u a t i o n s ,  politics.  Using  was a s i g n i f i c a n t  games c a n be l o o k e d upon as  situations,  often  not  our p r e c o n c e i v e d n o t i o n s  altruism  of  is  and so  situations,  environments  some  similarity  in v i t r o experimentation  other  experiment  discussed  show t h a t  has  the  i n d u c e any a r t i f i c i a l  to  If  common t o a l l  the  situations,  problem  seems l i t t l e  abstract  willingness  are  real  theory.  so a b s t r a c t and  realize  Naturally,  situations.  d i d not  with  not  and  This  On  this  The e x p e r i m e n t s test  is  game  game m a t r i c e s a r e may  validity.  gaming w h i c h measures  recommendations of  that  fashion.  to  need t o c o n t r i v e a p o s s i b l y m e a n i n g l e s s  participated  probably  is  subjects.  situation.  the  representations  gaming e x p e r i m e n t s with  analytical tool  we s h o u l d  such m o t i v a t i o n s  to  perhaps the  begin  complexity  207  Notes.  1  Karl W. Pressures in 2 (1980),  2  choices  pp.  x  Lendenmann and Anatol Rapoport, 2 Games", Behaviourial Science,  117.  The two games below i l l u s t r a t e how are i d e n t i c a l a f t e r t h e i r p o s i t i o n s A  B  2  3  B,  A  2  3  A,  Bi  standard form  1  1  4  transposed form  3  The i n t e r c h a n g i n g o f t h e rows and columns no e f f e c t upon i t s s t r a t e g i c qualities.  " See  3 2  •  2  3  2  4 1  B  2  4  2  4  Row's and Column's are interchanged.  1  2  A,  "Decision vol. 25  Appendix A for  the  text  of  the  of  a game  has  instructions.  5  IOt has been s u g g e s t e d t h a t imaginary payoffs such as those used i n t h e s e e x p e r i m e n t s may l a c k s u f f i c i e n t motivating f o r c e t o make s u b j e c t s c o n s i d e r t h e i r alternatives seriously. While this would not be s u r p r i s i n g , i t does not seem t o have been a problem in these experiments because the different s u b j e c t s i n t h e two e x p e r i m e n t s c h o s e e a c h a l t e r n a t i v e w i t h v e r y similar and i n some c a s e s i d e n t i c a l f r e q u e n c y . I f the p a y o f f s had no m o t i v a t i n g f o r c e , s u c h a r e s u l t would h a r d l y be e x p e c t e d .  6  The s m a l l number o f detailed analysis.  7  See: Norman Regression A n a l y s i s , pp.305-307.  subjects  i n the  R. Draper and Second edition,  pretest  precludes  any  Harry Smith, Applied (New York: W i l e y , 1 9 8 1 )  208  8  2  2  The a d j u s t e d R i s an R w h i c h takes into account the number of i n d e p e n d e n t v a r i a b l e s i n t h e e q u a t i o n and t h e number of c a s e s i n t h e a n a l y s i s . I t i s a more c o n s e r v a t i v e e s t i m a t e of the p e r c e n t a g e of v a r i a n c e e x p l a i n e d t h a n i s the u n a d j u s t e d R . I t i s g i v e n by t h e f o l l o w i n g f o r m u l a : 2  adjusted  R  2  = R  2  where K i s t h e number of number of c a s e s .  -  (K -  1)/N -  independent  k)(1  -  variables  2  R ) and N i s  the  9  To c a l c u l a t e a b e t a w e i g h t t h e u n s t a n d a r d i z e d regression coefficient i s m u l t i p l i e d by t h e r e s u l t of d i v i d i n g t h e s t a n d a r d deviation of t h e i n d e p e n d e n t v a r i a b l e by the s t a n d a r d d e v i a t i o n of t h e dependent v a r i a b l e . A l l other things being equal, the larger the standard d e v i a t i o n of t h e i n d e p e n d e n t v a r i a b l e the larger w i l l be the beta weight. So the beta coefficient a c c e n t u a t e s any a l r e a d y e x i s t i n g d i f f e r e n c e s i n t h e v a r i a n c e s of the independent v a r i a b l e s . In t h i s c a s e , t h e b e t a f o r MX has a v a l u e w h i c h i s a f r a c t i o n of t h a t of B hardly a credible result.  1 0  York:  Adam S m i t h , The W e a l t h o f N a t i o n s , E . Modern L i b r a r y , 1 9 3 7 ) , I V . v . b . p . 43.  Cannan e d . ,  (New  209  VII.  7 . 1 P a t h s Not  Taken.  The a l l u r i n g academic Even  quality  disciplines  models  have  of  interested  of  have  some e c o n o m i s t s ,  behaviour,  CONCLUSION  altruism  judged  it  impressed  attempted  behaviour. in proving  to  1  with  the  sociologists  They  have  examined the  and c o n t e x t u a l are ones  who,  influence  variables  of  well.  3  The  altruistic  differently  when  are  intentions confronted  There  between  and a c t i o n  intention  is  of  altruistic  not  the  economic been  in  however,  what  a wide  of  personality  behaviour.  known.  focussed  circumstances.  range  inferring  Not  no  an  better  than  behaviour  from  I n d i v i d u a l s may  opportunity  to  i l l u s t r a t i o n of  Stanley  only  experimental  on an a t t i t u d i n a l measure with  much  circumstances  but a m y r i a d of  of  well  altruistically.  several  forthcoming.  upon a l t r u i s t i c  problems  measures  or  have,  and  attitudinal approaches ,  attitudinal indicate  of  2  there as  questions  have  possibility,  Psychologists on t h e  evidence  economists  b e h a v i o u r may be  entirely  that  a que.st-ion w o r t h e x a m i n i n g .  under w h i c h a l t r u i s t i c and  such  incorporate altruism into  But  the  is  Milgram's  often  but  act  behave the  gap  revealing  experiments." Experimental generalizability how  much  motorist  one  for  approaches  have  specificity.  For example,  can assume  who s t o p s ,  about  o r d o e s not  the stop  usually  everyday on  a  it  sacrificed is  not  clear  b e h a v i o u r of  a male  freeway  aid  to  a  210  female so  whose  for  are  other  two  ethical  c a r has  than a l t r u i s t i c  alternative  willingness  The ones who do s t o p may do  reasons.  explanations,  many of  of  Sexism  but  there  arousal  lacking  in  in  public  identified  directed,  or  give  a i d to  and are  paternalism  also  potential  situations  goods.  others  such  In t h e s e  i n some  would as  the  needful  whom  expect  the  instances,  need can awaken  test  produce emotional  we  i n d i v i d u a l towards  whose  situations  Such s i t u a t i o n s  i n d i v i d u a l s which  political  of  experimental  to  situation.  empathic  provision  these  individuals  distressing  easily  5  tire.  complications.  Moreover,  or  a flat  to  case  there  of  will  benevolence  sympathy  or be the  be  no  can  be  in  the  o r empathy  giver. W h i l e what is  often  one  limited,  examined  is  effects  of  affective  can  that  infer is  similarly limited. situational states  of  observation  of-  models;  information  about  these  s t u d i e s are  one  real  techniques: relatively Social an  the free  of  say  altruist;  states  can be  from e x p e r i m e n t e r  of  variables  encompassed and  The  negative by  the  findings  This  altruism  the  and of  underlines  with  replicated  gaming and  are  effects.  have a l s o  personality.  altruism  appropriateness;  or p u r s u e d .  easily  of  induced  altruism.  investigating  experiments  range  positive  i n f o r m a t i o n about  of  of  the  such as:  rarely replicated  merit  that  studies  E x p e r i m e n t s have  factors  the  psychologists  the  to  c o n s e q u e n c e s of  advantage  altruistic  doubtful  not  from s p e c i f i c  Both  investigated Krebs  such s t u d i e s .  8  6  and  the  question  Schwartz  Schwartz w r i t e s  7  that  of are the  21 1  data  from one  effects  of  such  nature 9  required."  usefulness.  percent  of  the  not  provided  conclude  i n the  the  Even  that  a b s e n c e of  been  interpretations  of  behaviour  respect  with  or  others.  the  the  common p a s t u r e  resists  to  allow  contributing  even t h i n k of  the  situations,  either  manitenance  of  (the  of  ruin  observing  the  for  discussed  precise and  the  research  that  has  say,  20  personalities,  this  to  others.  are  of  we  therefore  figure  would  being to  question  the the  the  common),  in  the  be be  govern  is  the  Hardin's.  ruin  being  f a r m e r who  is  of  But a  curtailment which  altruism.  the  we  it  is  public of are  a  not  duties allegory exploits  on i t  than  farmer  who  altruistic?  terms?  provision  in  Or  1 0  our  do  our  by p l a c i n g more c a t t l e  o r the  activated  sociologists'  should  in Garrett  in these  of  are  describing  immoral?  common),  effectiveness  norms  norm  But m o r a l o b l i g a t i o n s  commons,  ruin  a social  which  unclear  the  its  as  These  For example,  destruction  limits  this  goods would not  moral o b l i g a t i o n s  to,  on  grazing  person,  the  dependent.  situations.  all  the  established  coercion,  particular  towards  it  that  depend upon the  our p u r p o s e s  public  also  extend  for  conclude  possessed a l t r u i s t i c  A l t r u i s m has  always  to  situation,  were  population  situationally  by  of  one  on h e l p i n g  Obviously,  limited  could  "impels  person v a r i a b l e s  mesh between t h e help  study  Or do we in  these  good  (the  public  bad  interested  in  212  7.2  Time And A l t r u i s m .  The d i s c u s s i o n  of  a l t r u i s m throughout  largely  ignored  parlance,  our t r e a t m e n t  What  happens  time? in  to  Does t h e  one  the  behaviour  the  altruistic  one  of  of  time.  subject  has  to  of  contagion  same  individual  passage  of  group  same s i t u a t i o n  Does  or  the  one.  i n d i v i d u a l or  i n d i v i d u a l o r g r o u p i n one  the  static  with  i n the  thesis?  has  model-building  been a  one  others  chapters  In  relationship  behaviour  spread  s u g g e s t e d by T i t m u s s ' of  of  an a l t r u i s t i c  situation  behaviour  effects  these  the  as  altruistic  situation  infect  the  individuals  in  other  plausible  answers  situations? Lacking  evidence,  these q u e s t i o n s . relationship  Over a l o n g  which  continued  in the  altruism  becomes  becomes more  a  habitual,  and g u i l t y  prompted continue  the  Titmuss' take  into  their  own,  but  the  the  end.  has  of  the  the  at  the  As so  becomes  behaviour thought  becomes  of  ending  sentiment  built  up  it  more  which  such a r e l a t i o n s h i p  behaviour  a  and  qualities.  altruistic  faded,  gesture  relationship  her  to  would e x p e c t  altruist  or  develop  one  norm-like  The his  norms o f  may  over  the  not  only  welfare  upon  it.  thesis  implies  effects  effects  an  feature  act  ending  contagion  account  altruistic  Long a f t e r  p r o m p t e d by t h e at  with  develop  feelings  original  p e r i o d and g u i l t  time,  recipient,  exchange.  the  to  suggest  p e r i o d of  regular  difficult  with  unequal  began  same form to  familiar  the  we can o n l y  of  of  other  the  that  individuals  recipients'  altruists'  actions  as  well.  213  If  the  example  of  be  altruistic,  the  several  the  it  must  motivational  situation. behaviour  another  This  of  others  are  observed  others  would have  have  to  I  likelihood  no.  influences  Presumably,  c r i t e r i a such a s ,  the  be  am of  these the  acting  upon me, taken  in  altruistic  on.  account i n one  situation, over  difficult  precedence it  Pareto  subjects  who  participated  interest  will  not  absence,  Much  will  and p o s s i b l y  to  the  in  our  dominate  depend strength  will at  answer  I will  of  the  factors  thesis.  another On t h e  the  time? basis  of  would seem t o  be  advantage precedence  many of  showed,  or even  arrangement,  other  to  many  increase  give  experiments  upon t h e  it  O r , as  competition  any  influence  these  competitive  in another.  of  how  such a  resolve.  mean t h a t  optimality  always  in testing  to a l t r u i s m over  does not  of  in another  previous chapters,  motives.  given  vary a c c o r d i n g  how much  All  situation  of  it  to  altruistic  behaviour,  altruistically,  my b e i n g a l t r u i s t i c  I give  will  a n o n y m i t y of  discussion  to  to  weight  configuration  weights  and so  into  the  equally  one  me  i n any  makes any a p p r e c i a t i o n of  is  in  or g i v e  on my b e h a v i o u r  question  If  influence  how I p e r c e i v e  included  several  This  can  e n o r m o u s l y more c o m p l i c a t e d by i n t r o d u c i n g w e i g h t s on  situation.  If  affect  course  various pressures  these  being a l t r u i s t i c  the  self-  altruistic presence  motivations.  or  214  7.3  A l t r u i s m And G o v e r n m e n t .  What  are  experiments somewhat  for  core  diminishes  one.  it  are  Titmuss'  will  useful  if  contamination  need  of  is  of  to  that  altruism  these  backtrack  n e a r l y always  He s u g g e s t s  held,  be c h o s e n argument  that  moral  will  course  effective of  action  o v e r an a l t r u i s t i c is  also  put  forward  can  only  But even t h o u g h  still  by b a s e r m a t e r i a l i s t i c  an-  incentives  "seriously" held.  they  self-interest  being  Where a s e l f - i n t e r e s t e d  they are  seriously  findings  We  argument  This motivational " f l i p - f l o p " 1 1  the  question.  to a c t i o n .  possible,  of  policy?  likelihood  by R o b e r t G o o d i n . be  the  of  the  motivation  implications government  t o answer  The  is  the  be  they  sensitive  to  motives:  If other (e.g., egoistic) c o n s i d e r a t i o n s are in p l a y at a l l , then the o p p o r t u n i t y for t a k i n g a moral stand i s l o s t : where a l l m o t i v e s m i x , t h e f o r m a l distinctions associated with taking morals seriously must be m i s s i n g . F a r from always p r e v a i l i n g over more mundane motives, as a lexicographical ordering would suggest, then, moral p r i n c i p l e s d r o p out of c o n s i d e r a t i o n a l l t o g e t h e r . . . when more o r d i n a r y m o t i v e s a r e i n v o k e d . 1 2  The  i m p l i c a t i o n of  intended to writes,  take  that  if  this  advantage  argument f o r of  moral  "we a r e r e a l l y t o  must  pollution This  design  our  schemes  in  incentives  of  such  social  or a l t r u i s m ,  that  matters  of  the  of  usefulness  are,  Goodin  seriouslythen,  to a v o i d  entails." of  policies  policies,  a way as  and t h e m o t i v a t i o n a l f l i p - f l o p i t r e s t r i c t e d view  design  take advantage of  h e l d moral p r i n c i p l e s for enforcement we  the  moral  this  1 3  incentives,  i n w h i c h t h e y may be e f f e c t i v e  must  be  215  strictly  p a r t i t i o n e d ' off  self-interested Chapter  Six.  forms,  did  subjects has  been  certain  concerns  Here i t have  even  argued  is  not  argument  to  social  argument,  institutions incentives  a  can  in  choice  of  the  Moreover,  it  or a b s e n c e  of  as  "the  most  is  the  contends  that with  toward." "  advice,  moral  popular 1  time  Hume's  Frances  supported t h i s  in  several  choice  Hume's  them.  Hume's,  for  from  side-by-side  debasing  its  presence  to  exist  without  in  present.  reaction  engineering  knaves',  experiments  motives.  exemplified  for  implication,  upon t h e  the  important  these is  were  that  as  altruism  effect  motives  throughout  by  s u p p o r t e d by t h e  significant  c o n f i g u r a t i o n of  approaches  not  found t h a t  though other  Goodin's  This  is  was  a  motivations  peculiar  from more mundane and  or  'design altruistic  self-interested  Hutcheson,  a  ones  contemporary  of  position:  As all men have s e l f - l o v e , a s w e l l as b e n e v o l e n c e , these two p r i n c i p l e s may j o i n t l y e x c i t e a man t o t h e same a c t i o n ; and t h e n t h e y a r e c o n s i d e r e d as two forces impelling the same body t o m o t i o n ; sometimes t h e y c o n s p i r e , sometimes a r e i n d i f f e r e n t t o e a c h o t h e r , and sometimes a r e i n some d e g r e e opposite. T h u s , i f a man have s u c h s t r o n g b e n e v o l e n c e , as w o u l d have p r o d u c e d an a c t i o n w i t h o u t any views of selfinterest; that such a man has also in view private a d v a n t a g e , a l o n g w i t h p u b l i c g o o d , as t h e effect of this action does no way diminish the benevolence of the action. 1 5  B o t h of  these approaches  important  points  chapters.  The  coexist should have  a  that  view  have  that  to been  interference,  therefore  be c o n s t r u c t e d of  noted  benevolence  without  preponderance  social  and to  throughout and  that  coerce  self-love,  engineering the  overlook previous  self-interest social  the  few  overlooks  can  institutions who by  the  nature  implications  216  suggested  by T a y l o r  argument  to  the  benevolence. coercive  and K r o p o t k i n . extent  But t h e  measures  that  crucial  for  the  These measures  do not  directly  indirectly,  the  but  exercise  social  of  working  social  other  where  partitioned  off  baser  egoistic  well.  First,  effective  in  the or  if  effective  when  faced  interest,  then  they  situations. difficult motivated for  Recall it  was  by  an o b s e r v e r  apparently  to  are  the  ensure  in  Chapter  will  act.  More  and e x h o r t a t i o n s  to  insofar  they  overcome  assumption  are able  to  upon w h i c h t h e y  is  strictly of  one must  the as be  qestion  cannot  be  from  self-  in  many  relevant  we u n d e r l i n e d how behaviour  almost  important  always  was  be  that  not  possible  motive  is  action  to  any  the  moral  o n l y have  power  self-interest.  are o p t i m i s t i c a l l y  of be  can o n l y  opposition  Two,  altruistic  only  shortcomings  incentives  be  such  though  effect  some s e l f - i n t e r e s t e d  incentives as  relevance  altruistic It  will  such m o t i v a t i o n s  to  of  engineering  incentives  slightest  that  attribute  the  environment, If  effect  for  suggested.  polluting  unlikely  that  for  h e l d moral  w i t h the  altruistic  t h a n he has  their  of  held".  majority  opportunities  recommendation has  self-interest. to  has  moral  of  seriously  "seriously  the  the  described,  such a " d e s e n s i t i z e d "  meaning of  of  of  altogther.  Goodin  that  This  recommendation  the  recommendation  "sanitized"  motives.  the  this  dominate  So p o s s i b l y ,  process  domain  with  need not  benevolence  as  proposes  agree  who l a c k b e n e v o l e n c e  the  be  contending  institutions  effective  the  will  is  by r e s t r i c t i n g  through a d i f f e r e n t  The  point  such b e h a v i o u r .  engineering  can  self-interest  few  affect  They  This  invoked.  is  the  But  if  217  moral  incentives  have  little  influence  environments public  of  sympathetic  and c a n n o t  these  chapters  recommendations is  They  compartmentalize manifestation  to  such as  them.  They  the  presence  many  the  situations  p a p e r has  argued,  altruism  is  at  configuration  of  then  they  be e f f e c t i v e  the  in  provision  least  present  always  how  norms t o  naked  is  Both  or  a degree  too  of  neither  of  social  restricted  because  they  and  either  opportunities  uncomplicated  for  because  we  say  be p r e f e r r e d t o the  they  incentives,  the  existence  strength  all  these m o t i v a t i o n s ,  that  the  collective  in  As  self-interest This  how r e l e v a n t presence  of  strategies,  and so  that  and of  it.  in  This  thesis  situation  altruism.  self-interest,  of  of  the  which a r e c o n t a i n e d  cannot  the  between m o t i v a t i o n s  substantiated  in part a function  a particular situation,  of  are  remove  are  that  arrangement  and c o m p e t i t i o n  motivations  showed,  the  position  i n w h i c h a l t r u i s m may be p o s s i b l e .  and t o  experiments will  of,  the  restrictive  motivations  of  taken  about  are  overlook of  have  appropriate.  uncomplicated.  7.4  situations,  be e x p e c t e d  contending motivations  previous  institutions  upon  to  goods.  The of  apply only  the the  where  will  depend  are  ethical  competitive the  relative  on.  Conclusion  The general  preceding questions.  questions:  whether  chapters Chapter  have  addressed  progressively  One  set  most  the  a l t r u i s m c o u l d be a f f e c t i v e  general  i n the  less of  provision  218 of  p u b l i c goods.  question,  for  as  depend upon t h e who  may  No c o n c l u s i v e chapters  n a t u r e of  potentially  presence  may c o n f l i c t  with  the  good,  on  The method  later for  the  use  of  situation. of it  the  configurations significant represented  motivation  game  their  situation, any  potential  situation  was  not  of  much w i l l those  to  its  motivations  which  views  other  on  this  of  as  p r o v i s i o n of  devising  willingness  the  the  a  suitable  to  behave  motivations.  Here,  with  manifestation  p u r s u e d one motivational  range  again  in of  of  by  games,  choices.  the  subjects'  willingness  was  not  fully  one where need was o b v i o u s it  is  surprising  to  built  a  games behave  i n to  the  beneficiary  or empathy any  was  These  specified,  that  Here  motivational  subjects'  the  a  element  altruism  incentive  of of  pressures.  different  b e h a v i o u r was anonymous,  altruism  specific  the  had a c o m p e t i t i v e  Under t h e s e c o n d i t i o n s , was  a wide  test  they  of  found that  chapters  represented  a severe  to  be l i m i t e d by c e r t a i n c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s  across  altruistically:  of  was  sets  c o n f i g u r a t i o n of  was .found t h a t  their  individuals'  games i t  given  characteristics  concentrated  The s u b s e q u e n t  situation;  it,  under d i f f e r e n t  a l t r u i s m may a c t u a l l y  the  or a b s e n c e  chapters  simple  be  a l t r u i s m r e q u i r e d in the  testing  altruistically  good,  provide  the  can  Two and T h r e e e m p h a s i z e d ,  the  importance,  and so  answer  and  the  aroused.  benevolence  forthcoming. The  t h o s e of public  first the life  chapter  liberal as  juxtaposed  theorists,  being  two v i e w s of  human n a t u r e :  who v i e w e d man's b e n e v o l e n c e  extremely  limited,  and  t h o s e who  in for  219  various  reasons,  millenarian altruism  either  beliefs,  in  even  unresolvable  saw  lies  concept  human  as  from a g i v e n  these  nature  situations.  not  in  nature  assumption.  as  a  the  views  but  i n the  If  whole,  it  is  then  such o p p o r t u n i t i e s .  completely  self-fulfilling:  if  it  be a l t r u i s t i c ,  then  there  opportunity.  But  if  it  will  certainly  Unfortunately,  this  leaves  then  is  Of is  no  there  of  be  debate  such  is  an  welfare will  really the  flow  individuals  will  others  and  of  gain  in  argument  is  little  course  this  assumed  that  no  for  which  of  be  of  ill-defined  recommendations that  or  capable  our p u r p o s e s ,  reason  are  being  The  the  there  utopianism  as  assumed  towards  maintaining  altruistic,  idealistic  human  voluntarily contribute  society  of  and p r o b a b l y u n i m p o r t a n t f o r  significance  not  out  to  people  give  them  opportunities  impossible  cannot the  to  be  to manifest  the  behaviour.  observed  that  and w i t h o u t whether at  all  to  or  coercion,  the  from t h e scope  it  can  be  significant  the  a d d i t i o n of  real  W h i l e we  we  cannot state  say  We can however some  have  action  for  would be  t o meet demand were  p r o v i s i o n of  for  an i m p o r t a n t m o t i v a t i o n  so.  quantities  p r o v i d i n g them.  withdrew  impasse.  goods a r e p r o v i d e d by v o l u n t a r y  governmental  in s u f f i c i e n t  increasing  more  an  p u b l i c goods now p r o v i d e d by t h e  cease  state  some p u b l i c  us a t  sure  supplied the  speculate  that  public  goods,  state if  the thus  v o l u n t a r y p r o v i s i o n , a l t r u i s m might  in their  provision.  in abstract  collective  We have  political  incentives,  it  shown  be  that  situations.  With  may  even  become  220  Notes.  1  F o r e x a m p l e s , s e e : D a v i d C o l l a r d , A l t r u i s m and Economy. A Study in N o n - S e l f i s h Economics (Oxford: Martin Robertson, 1978); Bruce B~. Fitzgerald, "Self-Interest or Altruism? Corrections and Extensions," J o u r n a l of C o n f l i c t R e s o l u t i o n , vol. 19 (1975) p p . 4 6 2 - 4 7 9 ; Norman F r o h l i c h , " S e l f - i n t e r e s t or Altruism, What Difference?", J o u r n a l of C o n f l i c t R e s o l u t i o n , vol. 18 ( 1 9 7 4 ) , p . 53-65; H . M . Hochman and J . D. Rodgers, " P a r e t o - O p t i m a l R e d i s t r i b u t i o n , " A m e r i c a n Economic R e v i e w , v o l . 59 ( 1 9 6 9 ) , p p . 542-557; Edmund S. Phelps, ed., Altruism, M o r a l i t y , and E c o n o m i c T h e o r y , (New York: Sage Foundation, 1 9 7 5 ) ; Lee P r e s t o n , " U t i l i t y I n t e r a c t i o n i n a T w o - P e r s o n W o r l d , " J o u r n a l of C o n f l i c t R e s o l u t i o n , v o l . 5 (1961), pp. 354-365; Stefan Valavannis, "The R e s o l u t i o n of C o n f l i c t When U t i l i t i e s I n t e r a c t , " J o u r n a l of C o n f l i c t R e s o l u t i o n , v o l . 2 (1958), pp. 156-169.  2  J. Cooperative, Orientation," 407-416.  Sawyer, "The Altruism Scale: Individualistic and Competitive A m e r i c a n J o u r n a l of S o c i o l o g y , v o l .  A  Measure of Interpersonal 71 ( 1 9 6 6 ) , pp  3  These a r e reviewed i n : Dennis L . K r e b s , " A l t r u i s m - an E x a m i n a t i o n of t h e C o n c e p t and a Review of the Literature" Psychological Bulletin , vol. 73 (1970), p. 258-302; and, Shalom H . S c h w a r t z , " N o r m a t i v e I n f l u e n c e s on A l t r u i s m " , i n L. B e r k o w i t z , e d . , Advances in E x p e r i m e n t a l S o c i a l P s y c h o l o g y , vol. 10, ( 1 9 7 7 ) , p p . 221-280.  " Stanley Milgram, H a r p e r and Row, 1975)  Obedience  to  Authority,  (New  York:  5  J. H. B r y a n and M . A. Test, "Models and Helping: Naturalistic Studies in Aiding Behaviour," J o u r n a l of P e r s o n a l i t y and S o c i a l P s y c h o l o g y , v o l . 6 (1967) p p . 400-407.  6  Krebs,  7  Schwartz,  "Altruism -  an E x a m i n a t i o n o f  the  Concept,"  p.  296.  8  E. Personality,  "Normative  Influences  on A l t r u i s m " , p .  Staub, "Helping a Distressed and S t i m u l u s D e t e r m i n a n t s , " i n L .  273.  Person: Social, Berkowitz, ed.,  22 1  Advances i n E x p e r i m e n t a l pp. 294-341.  9  Schwartz,  and S o c i a l  "Normative  Influences  1 0  G a r r e t t H a r d i n , "The T r a g e d y 162 ( 1 9 6 8 ) , p p . 1 2 4 3 - 1 2 4 8 .  vol.  1 1  Sciences,  Robert Goodin, v o l . 1 2 (1980),  Psychology,  vol.  (1974),  on A l t r u i s m " , p .  of  "Making M o r a l pp. 131-145.  the  Commons,"  273.  Sc i e n c e ,  Incentives  Pay,"  1 2  Goodin,  "Making M o r a l  Incentives  Pay,"  p.  139.  1 3  Goodin,  "Making M o r a l  Incentives  Pay," p.  140.  1 4  Goodin,  "Making M o r a l  Incentives  Pay,"  140.  1 5  7  p.  Pol icy  F r a n c e s H u t c h e s o n , "An I n q u i r y C o n c e r n i n g M o r a l Good and E v i l , " in D. D. Raphael, ed., B r i t i s h M o r a l i s t s , 1650-1800 vol. 1. ( O x f o r d : C l a r e n d o n p r e s s , 1969) , p~! 319.  222  BIBLIOGRAPHY  A l e x a n d e r , R i c h a r d D. A n n u a l Review of 325-383.  "The E v o l u t i o n o f S o c i a l B e h a v i o u r . " E c o l o g y and S y s t e m i c s , v o l . 5 (1974),  pp.  A l f a n o , G e r a l d i n e , and M a r w e l l , G e r a l d . " E x p e r i m e n t s on the P r o v i s i o n of of P u b l i c G o o d s . III. N o n d i v i s i b i l i t y and Free R i d i n g in ' R e a l ' Groups." Social Psychological Quarterly , vol. 43 ( 1 9 8 0 ) , p p . 3 0 0 - 3 0 9 . _,A l k e r , Hayward R. Mathematics Macmillan, 1965.  and P o l i t i c s .  Arrow, Kenneth J . " G i f t s and E x c h a n g e s . " e d . , A l t r u i s m , M o r a l i t y and Economic Sage F o u n d a t i o n , 1975. Axelrod, Robert. " E f f e c t i v e C h o i c e i n the J o u r n a l of C o n f l i c t R e s o l u t i o n , v o l .  New  York:  In Edmund S. Phelps, Theory. New Y o r k :  Prisoner's 24 ( 1 9 8 0 ) ,  Axelrod, Robert. "More E f f e c t i v e C h o i c e i n the Dilemma." J o u r n a l of C o n f l i c t R e s o l u t i o n , pp. 379-403.  Dilemma." pp. 3-25.  Prisoner's vol. 24 ( 1 9 8 0 ) ,  Axelrod, Robert. "The Emergence of C o o p e r a t i o n Among E g o i s t s . " American P o l i t i c a l S c i e n c e Review, v o l . 75 ( 1 9 8 1 ) , p p . 306-318. Axelrod, Robert. The E v o l u t i o n Books, 1984.  of  Cooperation.  New Y o r k :  Basic  A x e l r o d , R o b e r t , and H a m i l t o n , W i l l i a m D . "The E v o l u t i o n of Cooperation." Science, v o l . 211 ( 1 9 8 1 ) , p p . 1390-1396. B a n f i e l d , Edward C . The M o r a l York: Free Press, 1958. Bar-tal, Daniel. Washington:  Prosocial Hemisphere  Basis  of  a Backward S o c i e t y .  B e h a v i o u r : T h e o r y and Publishing, 1976.  New  Research.  Batson, C. D . ; Coke, J . S . ; J a s n o s k i , M . L . ; and H a n s o n , M . " B u y i n g K i n d n e s s : E f f e c t of an E x t r i n s i c I n c e n t i v e f o r H e l p i n g on P e r c e i v e d A l t r u i s m . " P e r s o n a l i t y and S o c i a l Psychology B u l l e t i n , v o l . 4 (1978), pp. 86-91. Becker, Gary. Chicago:  The Economic U n i v e r s i t y of  A p p r o a c h t o Human B e h a v i o u r . Chicago P r e s s , 1976.  B l a l o c k , Hubert M. C a u s a l I n f e r e n c e s i n Nonexperimental Research. C h a p e l H i l l : U n i v e r s i t y of N o r t h C a r o l i n a 1 961 .  Press,  223  Bohm,  Peter. " E s t i m a t i n g Demand f o r Experiment." European Economic pp. 111-130.  Public Review  G o o d s : An , vol. 3  Boorman, S c o t t , and L e v i t t , P a u l R. The G e n e t i c s New Y o r k : Academic P r e s s , 1980. Brams, S t e v e n J . Game T h e o r y and P o l i t i c s . Press, 1975. Brams, S t e v e n J . , and H e s s e l , Marek P . , x 2 Games". Behavioural Science. 383-401. Brams, S t e v e n J . , and H e s s e l , Marek P . S e q u e n t i a l Games." International 28 ( 1 9 8 4 ) , p p . 23-44.  of  (1972),  Altruism.  New Y o r k :  Free  " A b s o r b i n g Outcomes i n 2 vol. 27, (1982), pp.  " T h r e a t Power i n Studies Quarterly  B r a i t h w a i t e , R. B. The T h e o r y of Games as a T o o l Philosopher. Cambridge: Cambridge U n i v e r s i t y  ,  vol.  f o r the M o r a l Press, 1955.  Bryan, J . H . , and T e s t , M. A . "Models and H e l p i n g : N a t u r a l i s t i c S t u d i e s i n A i d i n g B e h a v i o u r " J o u r n a l of P e r s o n a l i t y and S o c i a l P s y c h o l o g y , v o l . 6 (1967) p p . 407.  400-  C h a m b e r l i n , John R. "The L o g i c of C o l l e c t i v e A c t i o n : Some Experimental Results." Behavioural Science , v o l . 23 (1978), pp. 441-445. Collard, David. Economics•  A l t r u i s m and Economy. A Study i n Oxford: Martin Robertson, 1978.  Darley, J . M . , and L a t a n £ , Emergencies: D i f f u s i o n P e r s o n a l i t y and S o c i a l 383.  Non-Selfish  B. "Bystander I n t e r v e n t i o n in of R e s p o n s i b i l i t y . " J o u r n a l of Psychology, v o l . 8 (1968), p.  377-  Dawes, Robyn M . ; M c T a v i s h , J e a n n e ; and S h a k l e e , H a r r i e t . " B e h a v i o u r , C o m m u n i c a t i o n and A s s u m p t i o n s A b o u t O t h e r P e o p l e ' s B e h a v i o u r i n a Commons Dilemma S i t u a t i o n . " J o u r n a l of P e r s o n a l i t y and S o c i a l P s y c h o l o g y , v o l . 35 (1977) , p p . 1 - 1 1 . Dawkins,  Richard.  The S e l f i s h  Gene.  London: G r a n a d a ,  Demsetz, H a r o l d . "The P r i v a t e P r o d u c t i o n of P u b l i c J o u r n a l of Law and E c o n o m i c s , v o l . 13 ( 1 9 7 0 ) ,  1978.  Goods." p.  D r a p e r , Norman R. and S m i t h , H a r r y . Applied Regression Analysis. Second e d i t i o n . New Y o r k : W i l e y , 1981. F i s h k i n , James S. The L i m i t s of University Press, 1979.  Obligation.  New H a v e n :  Yale  224  F i t z g e r a l d , Bruce D. " S e l f - I n t e r e s t or A l t r u i s m ? Corrections and E x t e n s i o n s . " J o u r n a l of C o n f l i c t R e s o l u t i o n , v o l . 19 (1975), pp. 462-479. F r o h l i c h , N o r m a n . ; O p p e n h e i m e r , Joe A . ; and Y o u n g , Oran R. P o l i t i c a l L e a d e r s h i p and C o l l e c t i v e G o o d s . Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1971. F r o h l i c h , Norman. " S e l f - i n t e r e s t or A l t r u i s m , What D i f f e r e n c e ? " J o u r n a l of C o n f l i c t R e s o l u t i o n , v o l . 18 ( 1 9 7 4 ) , p . 55-73. Gauthier, pp.  David, 53-65.  Gauthier, David, p. 195-221. Goodin, Robert Sciences,  "Rational  C o o p e r a t i o n " Nous.  "Coordinat i o n . "  Dialogue.  vol.  vol.  E. "Making M o r a l I n c e n t i v e s P a y . " vol. 12 ( 1 9 8 0 ) , p p . 131-145.  8  14  (1974),  (1977),  Pol icy  Guttman, J o e l . "Can P o l i t i c a l E n t r e p r e n e u r s S o l v e the F r e e R i d e r Problem?" J o u r n a l of Economic B e h a v i o u r and O r q a n i z a t i o n , vol"! 3 (1982), pp. 357-66. G u y e r , M e l v i n J . , and H a m b u r g e r , H e n r y . of 2 x 2 G a m e s ' . " G e n e r a l Systems, 205-209.  "A Note on ' A Taxonomy v o l . 1 3 (1968), pp.  H a m i l t o n , W i l l i a m D. "The G e n e t i c a l T h e o r y of S o c i a l B e h a v i o u r . P a r t s I and I I . " J o u r n a l of T h e o r e t i c a l B i o l o g y , v o l . 7, (1964), pp. 1-16, 17-32 Hannan, M i c h a e l T . A g g r e g a t i o n and D i s a g g r e g a t i o n L e x i n g t o n , M a s s . : Lexington Books, 1971.  in  Sociology.  Hardin, Garrett. The L i m i t s o f A l t r u i s m : an E c o l o g i s t ' s View Survival. Bloomington: Indiana U n i v e r s i t y Press, 1977. Hardin, Garrett. 162 ( 1 9 6 8 ) ,  "The T r a g e d y pp.1243-1248.  Hardin, Russsell. Collective University Press, 1982.  of  the  Action.  Commons," S c i e n c e ,  Baltimore:  Johns  vol.  Hopkins  H a r s a n y i , John C . " R a t i o n a l M o d e l s of P o l i t i c a l B e h a v i o u r F u n c t i o n a l and C o n f o r m i s t T h e o r i e s . " World P o l i t i c s , 21 ( 1 9 6 9 ) , p . 513-538.  vs. vol.  Hawrylshyn, O l i . "The E c o n o m i c N a t u r e and V a l u e o f V o l u n t e e r A c t i v i t y in Canada." S o c i a l Indicators Research, v o l . 5 (1978)> p p . 1 - 7 1 . Hirschman,  A l b e r t 0.  Shifting  Involvements:  Private  of  Interest  225  and P u b l i c 1 982.  Action.  Princeton:  H o b b e s , Thomas. Leviathan. London: Penguin Books,  Princeton  University  E d i t e d by C . B. Macpherson. 1968. O r i g i n a l l y published 1651.  Hochman, H . M . , and R o d g e r s , J . D. "Pareto-Optimal Redistribution." American Economic Review, v o l . (1969), p p . 542-557. Hume,  Press,  59  David. A T r e a t i s e of Human N a t u r e . E d i t e d by L . A. S e l b y - B i g g e and P . H. Nidditch. Oxford: Oxford U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s , 1978. O r i g i n a l l y published 1740.  Hutcheson, F r a n c e s . "An I n q u i r y C o n c e r n i n g M o r a l Good and Evil." B r i t i s h M o r a l i s t s , 1650-1800 v o l . 1. E d i t e d by D. D. Raphael. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1969. Johnston, Kolm,  J.  Econometric  Methods.  New Y o r k :  McGraw-Hill  Serge-Christophe. " A l t r u i s m and E f f i c i e n c y . " vol. 94 (1983) , p p . 18-65.  1963.  Ethics,  Korte, C. "Group E f f e c t s on H e l p - G i v i n g i n an E m e r g e n c y . " P r o c e e d i n g of the 77th A n n u a l C o n v e n t i o n o f t h e A m e r i c a n P s y c h o l o g i c a l A s s o c i a t i o n , v o l . 4 (1969), pp. 383-384. Krebs, Dennis L . " A l t r u i s m : an E x a m i n a t i o n of Review of the L i t e r a t u r e . " Psychological 73 ( 1 9 7 0 ) , p p . 258-302 Kroptkin, Peter. Mutual A i d : A F a c t o r New York U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s , 1972. 1914.  the C o n c e p t and a Bulletin , vol.  of E v o l u t i o n . New Y o r k : O r i g i n a l l y published  Kurz,  Mordecai. " A l t r u i s t i c E q u i l i b r i u m . " Economic P r o g r e s s , P r i v a t e V a l u e s , and P u b l i c P o l i c y . E d i t e d by B e l a B e l a s s a and R i c h a r d N e l s o n . Amsterdam: N o r t h - H o l l a n d , 1977. pp. 177-200.  Kurz,  Mordecai. " A l t r u i s m as an Outcome of American Economic A s s o c i a t i o n . Papers v o l . 9 0 (1978), pp.216-222.  Laver, Michael. The P o l i t i c s of P r i v a t e Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1981.  Desires.  Lendenmann, K a r l W . , and R a p o p o r t , A n a t o l . i n 2 x 2 Games." Behaviourial Science pp. 107-119. Luce,  R. Duncan, York: Wiley,  and R a i f f a , 1957.  Howard.  Social Interaction." and P r o c e e d i n g s ,  "Decision Pressures , vol. 25 ( 1 9 8 0 ) ,  Games and D e c i s i o n s .  New  226  M a r c h , James G . "Bounded R a t i o n a l i t y , A m b i g u i t y and the E n g i n e e r i n g of C h o i c e . " B e l l J o u r n a l of E c o n o m i c s , 9 (1978), pp.587-607.  vol.  M a r g o l i s , Howard. S e l f i s h n e s s , A l t r u i s m and R a t i o n a l i t y . C a m b r i d g e : Cambridge U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s , 1982. M a r w e l l , G e r a l d , and Ames, R u t h E . " E x p e r i m e n t s on t h e P r o v i s i o n of P u b l i c G o o d s . 1. R e s o u r c e s , I n t e r e s t , Group S i z e and the F r e e R i d e r P r o b l e m . " A m e r i c a n J o u r n a l of Sociology, vol. 84 ( 1 9 7 9 ) , p p . 1335-1360. M a r w e l l , G e r a l d , and Ames, R u t h E . " E x p e r i m e n t s on t h e P r o v i s i o n of P u b l i c G o o d s . II. Provision Points, Stakes, E x p e r i e n c e and the F r e e R i d e r P r o b l e m . " American Journal of S o c i o l o g y , v o l . 85 ( 1 9 8 0 ) , p p . 9 2 6 - 9 3 7 M a r w e l l , G e r a l d , and Ames, R u t h E . " E c o n o m i s t s R i d e F r e e , Does Anyone E l s e ? E x p e r i m e n t s on t h e P r o v i s i o n o f P u b l i c Goods. IV." J o u r n a l of P u b l i c E c o n o m i c s , v o l . 15 ( 1 981 ) , p p . 295-310. M c C l i n t o c k , C h a r l e s G . ; M e s s i c k , David M . ; Kuhlman, David M . ; and Campos, F r a n c e s T . " M o t i v a t i o n a l B a s e s of C h o i c e i n T h r e e - C h o i c e Decomposed Games". J o u r n a l of E x p e r i m e n t a l and S o c i a l P s y c h o l o g y . vol. 9, (1973) p p . 572-590. Milgram, Stanley. Row, 1975.  Obedience  to  Authority.  New Y o r k :  Moe,  T e r r y M . The O r g a n i z a t i o n of I n t e r e s t s . U n i v e r s i t y of C h i c a g o P r e s s , 1980.  More,  Thomas. Utopia. C a m b r i d g e : Cambrige U n i v e r s i t y 1956. O r i g i n a l l y published 1516.  M u e l l e r , Dennis University  C. Public Choice., Press, 1979.  N a g e l , Thomas. University  The P o s s i b i l i t y Press, 1970.  Nozick, Robert. Anarchy, Books, 1974.  State  of  Chicago:  Cambridge:  Altruism.  and U t o p i a .  H a r p e r and  Press,  Cambridge  Oxford: Oxford  New Y o r k :  Obler, Jeffrey. " P r i v a t e G i v i n g i n the W e l f a r e B r i t i s h J o u r n a l of P o l i t i c a l S c i e n c e , v o l . 17-48.  Basic  State." The 11 ( 1 9 8 1 ) , p .  O l s o n , Mancur. The L o g i c of C o l l e c t i v e A c t i o n . P u b l i c Goods and t h e T h e o r y of G r o u p s . Cambridge, M a s s . : Harvard University Press, 1965. Pareto,  Vilfredo.  The M i n d and S o c i e t y .  New Y o r k :  Harcourt,  227  Brace,  1935.  P h e l p s , Edmund S . , e d i t o r . Altruism, Morality, Theory. New Y o r k : Sage F o u n d a t i o n , 1975.  and  Economic  Preston, Lee. " U t i l i t y I n t e r a c t i o n in a Two-Person W o r l d . " J o u r n a l of C o n f l i c t R e s o l u t i o n , v o l . 5 (1961), pp. 354365. Rapoport, A n a t o l . U n i v e r s i t y of  F i g h t s , Games and D e b a t e s . Michigan Press, 1960.  Ann A r b o r :  R a p o p o r t , A n a t o l , and Chammah, A l b e r t M. P r i s o n e r ' s Dilemma: A S t u d y i n C o n f l i c t and C o o p e r a t i o n . Ann A r b o r : U n i v e r s i t y of M i c h i g a n P r e s s , 1965. Rapoport, A n a t o l ; Guyer, Meivin J . ; a n d Gordon, David G. The 2 x 2 Game. Ann A r b o u r : M i c h i g a n U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s , 1976. R a p o p o r t , A n a t o l , and G u y e r , M e i v i n J . "A Taxonomy of 2 x 2 Games." G e n e r a l Systems , v o l . 11 ( 1 9 6 6 ) , p p . 203-214. Riker, William H. "Bargaining in a Three Person A m e r i c a n J o u r n a l of P o l i t i c a l S c i e n c e , v o l . 642-56.  Game." 61 ( 1 9 6 7 ) ,  pp.  R i k e r , W i l l i a m H . , and Z a v o i n a , W i l l i a m J . "Rational Behaviour i n P o l i t i c s : E v i d e n c e from a T h r e e P e r s o n Game", i n J e a n A . L a p o n c e and P a u l Smoker ( e d s ) . E x p e r i m e n t a t i o n and Simulation in P o l i t i c a l Science. T o r o n t o : U n i v e r s i t y of T o r o n t o P r e s s , 1972. pp. 132-161. R o b i n s o n , W. S. "Ecological Correlations Individuals. " American S o c i o l o g i c a l (1950), pp351-357.  and the Review,  Behaviour vol. 15  Sahlins, Marshall. The Use and Abuse of B i o l o g y . An A n t h r o p o l o g i c a l C r i t i q u e of S o c i o b i o l o g y . Ann A r b o r : U n i v e r s i t y of M i c h i g a n P r e s s , 1976. Samuelson, Paul A . "The Pure T h e o r y of P u b l i c Review of E c o n o m i c s and S t a t i s t i c s , v o l . 387-389.  Expenditure." 36 ( 1 9 5 4 ) , p p .  Sawyer, J . "The A l t r u i s m S c a l e : A M e a s u r e of Cooperative, Individualistic, and C o m p e t i t i v e Interpersonal Orientation." A m e r i c a n J o u r n a l of S o c i o l o g y , v o l . 71 ( 1 9 6 6 ) , pp 4 0 7 - 4 1 6 . S c h e l l i n g , Thomas C . The S t r a t e g y of C o n f l i c t . Mass.:Harvard University Press, 1960.  Cambridge,  S c h n e i d e r , F r i e d r i c h , and Pommerehne, Werner W. "Free-Riding and C o l l e c t i v e A c t i o n : an E x p e r i m e n t i n M i c r o e c o n o m i c s . "  of  228  Quarterly 704.  J o u r n a l of  Economics,  vol.96  (1981),  pp.  689-  S c h o t t e r , Andrew. "Review of S e l f i s h n e s s , A l t r u i s m , and Rationality." J o u r n a l of Economic L i t e r a t u r e , v o l . (1983), p. 556-558.  21  S c h w a r t z , Shalom H . " N o r m a t i v e I n f l u e n c e s on A l t r u i s m . " Advances in E x p e r i m e n t a l S o c i a l Psychology, vol. 10, (1977), pp. 221-280. Sen,  Amartya K. " R a t i o n a l F o o l s : A C r i t i q u e of t h e B e h a v i o u r a l F o u n d a t i o n s of Economic T h e o r y . " P h i l o s o p h y and P u b l i c Affairs, vol. 6 (1977), pp. 317-344.  Shubik, M a r t i n . Editor. Game T h e o r y and R e l a t e d S o c i a l Behaviour. New Y o r k : W i l e y , 1964. Shubik, M a r t i n . Prisoner's Resolution S m i t h , Adam. Augustus  Approaches  to  "Game T h e o r y , B e h a v i o u r , and the Paradox of the Dilemma: T h r e e S o l u t i o n s " , J o u r n a l of C o n f l i c t , v o l . 1 4 (1970), p. 181-194.  The T h e o r y of M o r a l S e n t i m e n t s . New Y o r k : M . K e l l y , 1966. O r i g i n a l l y published 1759.  S m i t h , Adam. The W e a l t h of N a t i o n s . E d i t e d by E . Cannan. Y o r k : Modern L i b r a r y , 1937. O r i g i n a l l y published 1776.  New  S n i d a l , Duncan. " P u b l i c G o o d s , P r o p e r t y R i g h t s , and P o l i t i c a l Organizations." International Studies Quarterly, vol.23 (1979), p. 532-566. Somit, A l b e r t 0. "Human N a t u r e as t h e C e n t r a l I s s u e i n P o l i t i c a l Philosophy." S o c i o b i o l o q y and Human P o l i t i c s . E d i t e d by E . White. L e x i n g t o n , M a s s . : Lexington Books, D. C. Heath, 1981. Staub, E . "Helping a D i s t r e s s e d Person: S o c i a l , Personality, and S t i m u l u s D e t e r m i n a n t s , " i n L . Berkowitz, ed. Advances i n E x p e r i m e n t a l and S o c i a l P s y c h o l o g y , v o l . 7 (1974), pp. 294-341 . Sweeney, J o h n W. "An E x p e r i m e n t a l I n v e s t i g a t i o n of the F r e e Rider Problem." S o c i a l Science Research , v o l . 2 (1973), pp. 277-292. Taylor,  Michael.  A n a r c h y and C o o p e r a t i o n .  London: W i l e y ,  Taylor, Michael. Community, A n a r c h y and L i b e r t y . Cambridge U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s , 1982.  1976.  Cambridge:  Titmuss, Richard. The G i f t R e l a t i o n s h i p : from Human B l o o d Social Policy. L o n d o n : A l l e n and U n w i n , 1971.  to  229  T r i v e r s , Robert L . "The E v o l u t i o n of R e c i p r o c a l A l t r u i s m . " The Q u a r t e r l y Review of B i o l o g y , v o l . 46 ( 1 9 7 1 ) , p p . 35-57 Urmson, J . O . " S a i n t s and H e r o e s . " Essays in Moral Philosophy. E d i t e by A . I. Melden. U n i v e r s i t y of W a s h i n g t o n P r e s s , 1958. V a l a v a n n i s , Stephan. "The R e s o l u t i o n of C o n f l i c t When U t i l i t i e s Interact." J o u r n a l of C o n f l i c t R e s o l u t i o n , v o l . 2 (1958), pp. 156-169. Van de K r a g t , A . J. C ; Orbell, J . M . ; and Dawes, R. M. "The M i n i m a l C o n t r i b u t i n g S e t as a S o l u t i o n t o P u b l i c Goods Problems." A m e r i c a n J o u r n a l of P o l i t i c a l S c i e n c e , v o l . 77 (1983) , p p . 112-122. Wagner, R. Harrison. "The T h e o r y of Games and t h e P r o b l e m o f International Cooperation." American P o l i t i c a l Science Review, v o l . 77 ( 1 9 8 3 ) , p p . 330-346. W i l s o n , Edward 0 . Soc i o b i o l o g y . The New S y n t h e s i s . M a s s . : H a r v a r d U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s , 1975.  Cambridge  Wolozin, H. "The Economic R o l e and V a l u e of V o l u n t e e r Work i n the U n i t e d S t a t e s . " J o u r n a l of V o l u n t a r y A c t i o n R e s e a r c h , vol. 1-2 ( 1 9 7 5 ) , p p . 23-42.  230  APPENDIX A - TEXTS OF INSTRUCTIONS TO SUBJECTS.  Instructions  to  Subjects  f o r E x p e r i m e n t One.  You a r e b e i n g a s k e d t o t a k e p a r t i n an e x p e r i m e n t a b o u t peoples' a c t i o n s in p o l i t i c a l s i t u a t i o n s . These a r e s i t u a t i o n s i n w h i c h r e w a r d s , r e s o u r c e s , or b e n e f i t s must be d i v i d e d a c c o r d i n g t o some p r i n c i p l e . I w i l l r e f e r to t h e s e r e w a r d s as payoffs. Y o u may t h i n k of them as r e p r e s e n t i n g a n y t h i n g of value. You w i l l be r e q u i r e d t o make d e c i s i o n s i n a number of simple yet i n t e r e s t i n g s i t u a t i o n s . Each d e c i s i o n problem r e q u i r e s t h a t y o u choose one of two a l t e r n a t i v e s . Some of y o u r c l a s s m a t e s w i l l be c h o o s i n g between t h e two o t h e r a l t e r n a t i v e s i n the same p r o b l e m . Your c h o i c e s w i l l be matched a g a i n s t a n o t h e r c l a s s m a t e ' s t o d e t e r m i n e t h r e s u l t of your d e c i s i o n s and t h o s e of t h e e n t i r e c l a s s . An example of the p r o b l e m s you w i l l f i n d i n the b o o k l e t i s given below:  X  Y  3  1  1  5 2  5  3  1  Some o f y o u w i l l c h o o s e between ROWS A and B i n e a c h of t h e p r o b l e m s w h i l e o t h e r s w i l l c h o o s e between COLUMNS X and Y i n e a c h of t h e same p r o b l e m s . As you c a n s e e , t h e r e a r e f o u r s m a l l e r boxes or c e l l s w i t h i n the l a r g e r one. Each of these s m a l l e r c e l l s h a s two numbers i n i t . The upper l e f t - h a n d c e l l has 5 and 3 i n i t , t h e upper r i g h t - h a n d c e l l , 1 a n d 1, and so on. The numbers i n t h e l o w e r l e f t - h a n d c o r n e r o f e a c h c e l l , t h a t i s 5, 1, 5, and 1 a r e t h e p o s s i b l e p a y o f f s f o r a p e r s o n c h o o s i n g b e t w e e n ROWS . The numbers i n t h e u p p e r r i g h t - h a n d c o r n e r of e a c h c e l l , 3, 1, 2, and 3, a r e the p o s s i b l e p a y o f f s  231  for  a person  choosing  between COLUMNS  .  In e a c h of t h e p r o b l e m s you must d e c i d e w h i c h of t h e two a l t e r n a t i v e s to choose. F o r e x a m p l e , i f you have been s e l e c t e d t o c h o o s e between ROWS and have d e c i d e d i n t h e p r o b l e m above t o c h o o s e B and t h e o t h e r p e r s o n c h o s e X , y o u would get 5, t h e p a y o f f i n t h e l o w e r l e f t - h a n d c o r n e r of t h a t c e l l , and t h e o t h e r p e r s o n would g e t 2, t h e p a y o f f i n t h e upper r i g h t - h a n d c o r n e r of the c e l l . O r , i f you c h o s e A and t h e o t h e r p e r s o n c h o s e Y , y o u w o u l d g e t 1 and t h e o t h e r p e r s o n would g e t 1. As s h o u l d be c l e a r , y o u r f i n a l p a y o f f depends p a r t l y upon how t h e o t h e r p e r s o n c h o o s e s , so you w i l l p r o b a b l y want t o c o n s i d e r how he o r she m i g h t c h o o s e b e f o r e making y o u r f i n a l d e c i s i o n . On b o t h s i d e s of t h e f o l l o w i n g pages you w i l l f i n d two unique d e c i s i o n problems. P l e a s e CIRCLE t h e a l t e r n a t i v e w h i c h you have c h o s e n . The d e c i s i o n s a r e not a t e s t . T h e r e a r e no r i g h t o r wrong a n s w e r s . You w i l l be a b l e t o t h i n k of s e v e r a l good r e a s o n s f o r y o u r c h o i c e whatever i t maybe. I f you c h o o s e not t o p a r t i c i p a t e o r t o w i t h d r a w a t a n y t i m e from t h e e x p e r i m e n t , you c a n n o t be p e n a l i z e d i n any way. I f you c o m p l e t e the b o o k l e t i t w i l l be assumed t h a t you have c o n s e n t e d t o p a r t i c i p a t e i n the e x p e r i m e n t . Please ensure that way.  do not p l a c e your c h o i c e s  y o u r name on t h e b o o k l e t . This w i l l c a n n o t be i d e n t i f i e d w i t h y o u i n any  232  Instructions  to  Subjects  f o r E x p e r i m e n t 2.  You a r e b e i n g a s k e d t o t a k e p a r t i n an e x p e r i m e n t a b o u t how d i f f e r e n t k i n d s of p e o p l e make d e c i s i o n s i n p o l i t i c a l situations. By k i n d s of p e o p l e , I mean t h o s e who a r e s t u d y i n g d i f f e r e n t subjects at u n i v e r s i t y . These p o l i t i c a l s i t u a t i o n s a r e ones i n w h i c h r e w a r d s , r e s o u r c e s , or b e n e f i t s must be d i v i d e d a c c o r d i n g t o some p r i n c i p l e . I w i l l r e f e r to. t h e s e r e w a r d s as p a y o f f s . You may t h i n k of them as r e p r e s e n t i n g a n y t h i n g of v a l u e . You w i l l be r e q u i r e d t o make d e c i s i o n s i n a number of simple yet i n t e r e s t i n g s i t u a t i o n s . each d e c i s i o n p r o b l e m r e q u i r e s t h a t you c h o o s e one of two a l t e r n a t i v e s . Some of y o u r c l a s s m a t e s w i l l be c h o o s i n g between t h e two o t h e r a l t e r n a t i v e s i n t h e same p r o b l e m . An example of the p r o b l e m s you w i l l find in the b o o k l e t i s g i v e n below:  X  Y  3  1  1  5 2  5  3  1  Some of y o u w i l l c h o o s e between ROWS A and B i n e a c h of t h e p r o b l e m s w h i l e o t h e r s w i l l c h o o s e between COLUMNS X and Y i n e a c h of t h e same p r o b l e m s . As you c a n s e e , t h e r e a r e f o u r s m a l l e r b o x e s or c e l l s w i t h i n t h e l a r g e r o n e . E a c h of t h e s e s m a l l e r c e l l s has two numbers i n i t . The upper l e f t - h a n d c e l l has 5 and 3 i n i t , the upper r i g h t - h a n d c e l l , 1 and 1, and so on. The numbers i n t h e lower l e f t - h a n d c o r n e r of e a c h c e l l , t h a t i s 5, 1, 5, and 1 a r e t h e p o s s i b l e p a y o f f s f o r a p e r s o n c h o o s i n g between ROWS . The numbers i n t h e upper r i g h t - h a n d c o r n e r of e a c h c e l l , 3, 1, 2, and 3 , a r e the p o s s i b l e p a y o f f s f o r a p e r s o n c h o o s i n g between COLUMNS . In  each of  the  p r o b l e m s you must d e c i d e  w h i c h of  the  two  233  a l t e r n a t i v e s to choose. F o r e x a m p l e , i f y o u have been s e l e c t e d t o c h o o s e between ROWS and have d e c i d e d i n the p r o b l e m above t o c h o o s e B and t h e o t h e r p e r s o n c h o o s e s X , you would get 5, t h e p a y o f f i n t h e l o w e r l e f t - h a n d c o r n e r of t h a t c e l l , and t h e o t h e r p e r s o n would get 2, the p a y o f f i n the upper r i g h t - h a n d c o r n e r of the c e l l . O r , i f you have been s e l e c t e d t o choose between COLUMNS and d e c i d e t o c h o o s e Y and t h e o t h e r p e r s o n c h o o s e s A , you would get 1 and t h e o t h e r p e r s o n would get 1 . As s h o u l d be c l e a r , y o u r f i n a l p a y o f f depends p a r t l y upon how the o t h e r p e r s o n c h o o s e s , so you w i l l p r o b a b l y want t o c o n s i d e r how he or she m i g h t c h o o s e b e f o r e making y o u r f i n a l d e c i s i o n . Your d e c i s i o n s i n e v e r y p r o b l e m w i l l be e n t e r e d i n t o t h e computer and matched a g a i n s t t h o s e of h a l f of y o u r c l a s s m a t e s who c h o s e between t h e o t h e r two a l t e r n a t i v e s i n the same problem. F i f t y p e r c e n t of you w i l l c h o o s e between COLUMNS X and X i n e a c h p r o b l e m and f i f t y p e r c e n t w i l l c h o o s e between ROWS A and B i n e a c h p r o b l e m . F o r e x a m p l e , i f you have been s e l e c t e d t o c h o o s e between ROWS A and B , your c h o i c e s w i l l be m a t c h e d a g a i n s t e a c h of y o u r c l a s s m a t e s who c h o s e between COLUMNS X and Y . T h i s w i l l d e t e r m i n e e a c h p e r s o n ' s a v e r a g e s c o r e on t h e problems. The a v e r a g e c l a s s s c o r e w i l l t h e n be compared w i t h t h a t from c l a s s e s i n the E n g i n e e r i n g and A c c o u n t i n g d e p a r t m e n t s t o d e t e r m i n e how s t u d e n t s i n d i f f e r e n t c l a s s e s choose i n t h e same p r o b l e m s . On b o t h s i d e s of t h e f o l l o w i n g pages you w i l l f i n d two unique d e c i s i o n problems. P l e a s e CIRCLE t h e a l t e r n a t i v e w h i c h you have c h o s e n . The d e c i s i o n s a r e not a t e s t . T h e r e a r e no r i g h t or wrong a n s w e r s . You w i l l be a b l e t o t h i n k of s e v e r a l good r e a s o n s f o r y o u r c h o i c e w h a t e v e r i t maybe. I f you c h o o s e not t o p a r t i c i p a t e or t o withdraw a t a n y t i m e from t h e e x p e r i m e n t , you c a n n o t be p e n a l i z e d i n any way. I f you c o m p l e t e t h e b o o k l e t i t w i l l be assumed t h a t you have c o n s e n t e d to p a r t i c i p a t e i n the e x p e r i m e n t . Please ensure that way.  do not p l a c e y o u r name on t h e b o o k l e t . This w i l l y o u r c h o i c e s c a n n o t be i d e n t i f i e d w i t h you i n any  234  APPENDIX  Results  Game  of  #1  Jacknife  MX PO B CR Con  RESULTS OF J A C K N I F E  Procedure  on  PROCEDURE.  Experiment  . 19 ( .95) .23 (1.12) -.14* (-2.71) .11* (2.20) -.04 (-.22) .60* (12.60)  Game  Backward Elimination .23* (3.55) . 1 9* (2.05) -.14* (-2.94) .11* (2.31)  .61* (13.21)  All Var i a b l e s C  . 18  MX PO B CR Con  .22 (1.15) -.13* (-2.96) .11* (2.23) -.04 (-.20) .61* (16.33)  C MX PO B CR Con  Removed  Bac kward E l i m i n a t ion  -  .62* (16.79) N=927  Removed  All Variables  #2  .22* (3.14) .18* (2.32) -.13* (-3.11) .11* (2.29)  ( .91 )  N=926  Game #3  One.  Removed  All Var i a b l e s c  B -  Game #4  Backward E l i m i n a t ion  . 1 3 .25* ( .68) (4.23) .20 ( 1 .03) -.17* -.13* (-4.82) (-3.04) .07 . 1 1 (1.51) (2.39) -.07 (-.40) .64* .69* (16.67) (29.95) N=926  -  -  All Var i a b l e s C MX PO B CR Con  .20 (1.01) .26 (1.33) -.13* (-3.16) .11* (2.41 ) -.04 (-.24) .59* (15.00)  Removed  Backward E l i m i n a t ion . 24* (3.69) .21 * (2.61) -.14* (-3.35) . 1 2* (2.49)  -  .59* (15.43) N=927  235  Game #5 Removed All Var i a b l e s c  MX PO B CR Con  Game #6 Removed  Backward Eliminat ion  .20 (1.04) .21 .37 (1.09) (5.49)* -.18 -.15 (-3.79)* (-5.38)* .09 ( 1 .80) .06 ( .33) .61 . 59 ( 16.97)* (19.53)* N=927  -  All Var i a b l e s C MX PO B CR Con  Game #7 Removed All Var i a b l e s c  MX PO B CR Con  .20 .24 ( .80) (3.53)* .22 . 1 9 ( .88) (2.34)* -.14 -.14 (-3.21)* (-3.31)* . 1 1 . 1 1 (2.33)* (2.37)* -.03 (-.13) .61 .61 (16.70)* (16.96)* N = 928  _,-  -  Game #8 Removed  Backward Elimination  .19 .23 ( .99) (3.43)* .22 . 1 9 (1.18) (2.24)* -.14 -.14 ( - 3 . 12)* (-3.23)* . 1 1 . 1 1 (2.33)* (2.39)* -.03 (-.19) .61 .61 (16.68)* (17.01)* N=926  Bac kward Elimination  All Var i a b l e s C MX PO B CR Con  Bac kward Elimination  .21 .22 (1.09) (3.29)* .22 . 22 (1.17) (2.71 )* -.13 -.13 (-2.98)* (-3.08)* .09 .09 (1.94) (1.97)* -.00 (-.02) .60 .60 (16.65)* (17.03)* N=927  236  Game #9 Removed All Var i a b l e s c MX PO B CR Con  All Var i a b l e s C MX PO B CR Con  Bac kward Elimination  .44 .48 (1.89) (5.53)* .09 ( .45) -.18 -.22 (-3.73)* (-6.33)* .21 .27 (3.03)* (4.89)* .05 ( .28) .61 .65 (16.76)* (27.30)* N=928  Game #11  Game #10 All Variables C MX PO B CR Con  Removed  .21 .22 ( 1 .08) (3.24)* .22 .22 (1.18) (2.55)* -.13 -.13 (-2.93)* (-3.00)* . 1 1 .11 (2.25)* (2.27)* -.00 (-.03) .60 .60 (16.61)* (16.91)* N=927  Bac kward Elimination  .20 .24 ( .80) (3.53)* .22 .19 ( .88) (2.34)* -.14 -.14 (-3.21)* (-3.31)* . 1 1 . 1 1 (2.37)* (2.33)* -.03 (-.13) .61 .61 (16.70)* (16.96)* N=928  Game #12  Bac kward Eliminat ion  All Var i a b l e s C MX PO B CR Con  Removed  Removed  Bac kward Elimination  . 1 3 .24 ( .64) (3.64)* .27 . 1 6 (1.36) (1.97)* -.13 -.14 (-3.06)* (-3.35)* . 1 1 .12 (2.38)* (2.51)* -.11 (-.59) .60 .61 (16.36)* (16.93)* N=927  237  Game #13 All Var i a b l e s c  MX PO B CR Con  All Variables  MX PO B CR Con  Game #14  Backward Eliminat ion  .26 .33 (1.29) (5.84)* . 1 3 (.66) -.19 -.24 (-3.48)* (-6.36)* . 1 7 .23 (2.76)* (5.03)* -.02 ( .09) .67 .63 (15.55)* (29.46)* N = 926  Game #15  c  Removed  Removed Backward E l i m i nat i o n  — .06 ( .29) .34 • .42 (1.66) (6.73)* -.09 (-1.93) .08 ( 1 .63) -.15 -.13 (-.76) (-4.55)* .58 .52 (14.58)* (20.60)* N = 926  All Variables C  Removed  Backward Elimination  .27 ( 1 . 31 ) (3. MX . 1 6 (2. ( .83) - . 16 PO (-3 . 5 0 ) * (-3. B . 1 2 (2 . 4 8 ) * (2. - . 03 CR (- . 1 4 ) Con. .62 (16 .61 )* (17. N= 926  m  -  24 63)* 1 9 37)* 1 5 64)* 1 2 50)*  62 16)*  238  Results  of J a c k n i f e • P r o c e d u r e  on E x p e r i m e n t Two.  Game #1 Removed All Variables c  MX PO B CR Con  -  PO B CR Con  All Var i a b l e s c  MX PO B CR Con  #3 Removed  All Variables  MX  Bac kward Eliminat ion  . 1 0 .07 ( .53) (2.60)* .33 .38 (1.62) (5.86)* -.04 (-.83) .04 (.79) -.00 (-.04) .53 .50 (11.32)* (18.49)* N= 1 037  Game  c  Game #2 Removed  — . 19 (.98) . 10 .28 ( .56) (4.40)* -.09 (-2.12)* .07 (1.50) .09 ( .49) .62 .59 (17.00)* (22.12)* N = 1 036  -  Game #4 Removed  Backward Eliminat ion  . 1 3 .07 ( .71 ) (2.40)* .08 (.46) -.09 -.09 (-2.26)* (-3.68)* .03 ( .68) .04 ( .21 ) .65 .69 (17.33)* (31.51)* N= 1 036  Backward Eliminat ion  All Var i a b l e s c  MX PO B CR Con  Backward Eliminat ion  — .21 (1.09) . 1 5 .29 (.79) (4.14)* -.10 -.06 (-2.45)* (-2.63)* .08 ( 1 .73) .07 (.39) .60 .59 (15.53)* (18.35)* N= 1 036  239  Game  #5  Removed  All Var i a b l e s c MX PO B CR Con  Backward E l i m i n a t ion  .21 .29 (1.10) (4.27)* . 12 ( .64) -.12 - . 10 (-2.70)* (-2.85)* .07 ( 1 .40) . 12 .30 ( .67) (4.15)* .61 .61 (17.36)* (20.64)* N= 1 0 3 6  -  Game  #7  All Var i a b l e s C MX PO B CR Con  Removed  All Var i a b l e s C  Game  .23 (1.19) .12 MX .31 ( .66) (4.47)* PO -.09 -.05 (-2.20)* (-1.90)* B .07 (1.57) CR . 1 1 (.62) Con. .60 .59 ( 17.02)* (19.51)* N= 1 0 3 6  Backward E l i m i n a t ion  . 02 ( .07) .31 .28 (1 . 3 0 ) (4.38)* -.10 -.07 (-2.51)* (-2.78)* .08 (1.69) -.11 (-.47) .61 .60 (17.26)* (20.49)* N=1036  Game  Bac kward E l i m i n a t ion  #6 Removed  All Var i a b l e s  #8 Removed Backward E l i m i n a t ion  .22 (1.16) MX . 1 2 .29 ( .66) (4.42)* PO -.10 -.07 (-2.29)* (-2.80)* B .06 (1.35) CR . 1 1 (.59) Con. .61 .60 (17.12)* (20.52)* N= 1 0 3 6 C  240  Game #9 Removed All Variables c  MX PO B CR Con  MX PO B CR Con  All Var i a b l e s c  MX PO B CR Con  .40 (1.61) -.06 (-.27) -.10 (-2.49)* .08 (1.68) .27 (1.13) . .61 (17.14)* N=  #11 Removed  All Variables C  Backward E l i m i n a t ion  . 33 . 39 ( 1 .45) (4.28)* . 06 ( .28) -.12 -.13 (-2.68)* (-3.39)* . 1 3 . 1 4 (1 . 8 7 ) (2.31)* . 1 2 . 1 7 ( .67) (2.29)* .61 . 62 (17.19)* (19.96)* N = 1 036  Game  Game #10 Removed  .30 (4.39)*  -  '-.05 (-1.97)*  -  1  .27 (3.97)* .59 (18.93)* 036  Game #12 Removed  Bac kward E l i m i n a t ion  . 1 9 . 26 ( 1 .00) (3.84)* • . 1 2 ( .65) -.11 -.07 (-2.65)* (-2.60)* .08 ( 1 .78) .05 ( .25) .61 . 60 (17.20)* (19.86)* N= 1 036  Backward E l i m i n a t ion  All Var i a b l e s C  Bac kward E l i m i n a t ion  -  . 1 6  ( .81 ) MX PO B  . 1 5 ( .82) -.10 (-2.39)* .08  .26 (3.91)* -.06 (-2.54)*  -  (1.73) CR Con  .02 (.11) .61 (16.93)* N=  1  .60 (20.13)* 036  241  Game  # 1 3 Removed  All Var i a b l e s c MX PO B CR Con  -  -  # 1 5 Removed  All Var i a b l e s  MX PO B CR Con  Bac kward E l i m i n a t ion  .29 .24 (1 . 5 0 ) (4.31 )* -.00 (-.01) -.18 -.21 (-3.38)* (-5.76)* . 1 7 .21 (2.78)* (4.70)* . 1 0 (.55) .65 .68 (16.37)* (30.35)* N= 1 0 3 6  Game  C  Game  Bac kward E l i m i n a t ion  .27 .34 (1.34) (4.70)* .06 (.32) -.13 -.13 (-2.64)* (-3.38)* .09 .10 (1.89) (2.26)* . 1 3 .19 (.70) (2.54)* .62 .63 (16.29)* (19.97)* N= 1 0 3 5  -  All Var i a b l e s C MX PO B CR Con  #14  Removed  Backward E l i m i n a t ion  .23 .33 (1.18) (4.63)* . 1 0 (.53) -.11 -.12 (-2.54)* (-3.26)* .08 .09 (1.73) (2.10)* . 1 0 . 1 9 (.54) (2.54)* .61 .62 (16.84)* (20.19)* N=1036  -  

Cite

Citation Scheme:

        

Citations by CSL (citeproc-js)

Usage Statistics

Share

Embed

Customize your widget with the following options, then copy and paste the code below into the HTML of your page to embed this item in your website.
                        
                            <div id="ubcOpenCollectionsWidgetDisplay">
                            <script id="ubcOpenCollectionsWidget"
                            src="{[{embed.src}]}"
                            data-item="{[{embed.item}]}"
                            data-collection="{[{embed.collection}]}"
                            data-metadata="{[{embed.showMetadata}]}"
                            data-width="{[{embed.width}]}"
                            async >
                            </script>
                            </div>
                        
                    
IIIF logo Our image viewer uses the IIIF 2.0 standard. To load this item in other compatible viewers, use this url:
http://iiif.library.ubc.ca/presentation/dsp.831.1-0096574/manifest

Comment

Related Items