UBC Theses and Dissertations

UBC Theses Logo

UBC Theses and Dissertations

Altruism and politics MacDermid, Robert Hugh 1985

Your browser doesn't seem to have a PDF viewer, please download the PDF to view this item.

Item Metadata

Download

Media
831-UBC_1985_A1 M29_6.pdf [ 11.07MB ]
Metadata
JSON: 831-1.0096574.json
JSON-LD: 831-1.0096574-ld.json
RDF/XML (Pretty): 831-1.0096574-rdf.xml
RDF/JSON: 831-1.0096574-rdf.json
Turtle: 831-1.0096574-turtle.txt
N-Triples: 831-1.0096574-rdf-ntriples.txt
Original Record: 831-1.0096574-source.json
Full Text
831-1.0096574-fulltext.txt
Citation
831-1.0096574.ris

Full Text

ALTRUISM AND POLITICS by ROBERT H. MACDERMID B.A.(Horw), Carleton University, 1978 M.A., University Of Essex, 1980 THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILMENT THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY in THE FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIES P o l i t i c a l Science We accept t h i s thesis as conforming to the required standard THE UNIVERSITY OF BRITISH COLUMBIA August 1985 © Robert H. MacDermid, 1985 In presenting t h i s thesis in p a r t i a l fulfilment of the requirements for an advanced degree at the University of B r i t i s h Columbia, I agree that the Library s h a l l make i t freely available for reference and study. I further agree that permission for extensive copying of this thesis for scholarly purposes may be granted by the Head of my Department or by his or her representatives. It i s understood that copying or publication of t h i s thesis for f i n a n c i a l gain s h a l l not be allowed without my written permission. Department of P o l i t i c a l Science The University of B r i t i s h Columbia 2075 Wesbrook Place Vancouver, Canada V6T 1W5 Date: September 4, 1985 i i Abstract The growth of state authority in the s o c i e t i e s of modern l i b e r a l democracies has resulted in a diminished scope for the exercise of individual obligations, duties and rights in private l i f e . The decreasing sphere of individual authority may be partly explained by l i b e r a l t h e o r i s t s ' , and p a r t i c u l a r l y John Locke's contention that individuals cannot provide without the coercion of the state, those public goods such as j u s t i c e which d i s t i n g u i s h the state of nature from c i v i l society. For while man can be benevolent in private l i f e , in public l i f e he cannot be trusted to see beyond his own s e l f - i n t e r e s t . Therefore, Locke and others concluded that public goods, which are produced by many and consumed by a l l , must be provided by the state. The thesis argues that benevolence or altruism i s a t h e o r e t i c a l l y possible i f not prevalent motivation in public l i f e . The spread of state authority manifest in the welfare state, reduces the opportunities and atrophies the willingness of individuals to behave a l t r u i s t i c a l l y . Moreover, different kinds of situations impose constraints upon the choice of an a l t r u i s t i c course of action. In a formal analysis of simple variable sum noncooperative games of the 2 x 2 order, altruism is shown to be a choice alternative in only a minority of games. But where altruism is not constrained, i t i s a demonstrable pressure on subjects' choices in two experiments. The subjects in the two experiments were required to choose between the two alternatives of a 2 x 2 game where decision pressures were defined over the payoff values of the matrix. The decision pressures represented in the games were benevolence, Pareto optimality, c o l l e c t i v e r a t i o n a l i t y , competition, and individual gains maximization. While the pressures of individual maximization and competition were revealed as the strongest by a multiple regression analysis, benevolence was shown to have a s u r p r i s i n g l y strong influence upon the subjects' decisions. The finding supports the contention that individuals may be capable even in highly competitive a l b e i t abstract situations, of s u f f i c i e n t benevolence to provide some of the public goods now supplied by the state. The findings therefore lend weight to the c l a s s i c a l l i b e r a l argument for a reduced i f not minimal state. i v T a b l e of Content s A b s t r a c t i i L i s t of T a b l e s v i L i s t of F i g u r e s v i i Acknowledgement ix Chapter I HUMAN NATURE AND POLITICS 1 1.1 The S t a t e And P u b l i c Goods 1 1.2 Human N a t u r e : C o n t r a s t i n g Views 16 1.3 Some Other E x p l a n a t i o n s 21 1.4 E x p e r i m e n t a l Ev idence On The P r o v i s i o n Of P u b l i c Goods 24 1 . 5 C o n c l u s i o n 27 Chapter II ALTRUISM 37 2.1 I n t r o d u c t i o n 37 2.2 D e f i n i n g A l t r u i s m 38 2.3 A l t r u i s m , E n l i g h t e n e d Egoism, And C o o p e r a t i o n 45 2.4 E x p l a i n i n g A l t r u i s m 49 2.5 C o n c l u s i o n 61 Chapter III ALTRUISM AND CONTEXT 68 3.1 R e c a p i t u l a t i o n 68 3.2 C o n s t r a i n t s On A l t r u i s m 69 3.3 I n s t i t u t i o n s As C o n s t r a i n t s 77 3.4 A l t r u i s m And The W e l f a r e S t a t e 79 3.5 C o n c l u s i o n 86 Chapter IV ALTRUISM IN GAMES 91 4.1 I n t r o d u c t i o n 91 4.2 Games And Game Theory 91 4.3 The 2 X 2 Order Of Games 100 4.4 A l t r u i s m In 2 X 2 Games 110 4 . 5 C o n c l u s i o n 128 Chapter V THE MOTIVATIONAL CONTEXT OF CHOICE 134 5.1 The I n f l u e n c e Of Context 134 5.2 O p e r a t i o n a l i z i n g The D e c i s i o n P r e s s u r e s 139 5.3 The R e s u l t s Of The Lendenmann And Rapoport Exper iment 145 5 . 4 Comments 146 5.4.1 The D e f i n i t i o n Of The P r e s s u r e s 146 5 .4 .2 The Use Of V a r i a n t s Of Game 152 5 .4 .3 The C o n f i g u r a t i o n Of P r e s s u r e s 155 5 .4 .4 A g g r e g a t i o n Of Responses 157 5 . 4 . 5 Repeated Measures 158 V Chapter VI AN EXPERIMENT IN CHOICE 164 6.1 I n t r o d u c t i o n 164 6.2 Some E x p e c t a t i o n s 168 6 . 3 The Method 170 6 . 4 The R e s u l t s 172 6.4.1 Experiment I 182 6 .4 .2 Experiment II 188 6.5 D i s c u s s i o n 203 6.6 C o n c l u s i o n s 205 Chapter VII CONCLUSION 209 7.1 Paths Not Taken 209 7.2 Time And A l t r u i s m 212 7.3 A l t r u i s m And Government 214 7.4 C o n c l u s i o n 217 BIBLIOGRAPHY 222 APPENDIX A - TEXTS OF INSTRUCTIONS TO SUBJECTS 230 APPENDIX B - RESULTS OF JACKNIFE PROCEDURE 234 v i L i s t of T a b l e s I . The C o n d i t i o n s Which E l i m i n a t e Each Game Under I n i t i a l Assumpt ions 121 I I . The V a l u e s of the P r e s s u r e s on Row for the Games in F i g u r e 21 154 I I I . The V a l u e s of the P r e s s u r e s on Column for the Games in F i g u r e 22 156 I V . The V a l u e s of the P r e s s u r e s on Row P l a y e r 178 V . R e g r e s s i o n A n a l y s i s of Experiment I 183 V I . R e g r e s s i o n A n a l y s i s of Experiment I Us ing Backward E l i m i n a t i o n 185 V I I . The D i f f e r e n c e in the P r o b a b i l i t y of Choos ing A When a V a r i a b l e Assumes Va lues at the Extremes of i t s Range: Exper iment I 188 V I I I . R e g r e s s i o n A n a l y s i s of Experiment II 190 I X . R e g r e s s i o n A n a l y s i s of Experiment II U s i n g Backward E l i m i n a t i o n 191 X . The D i f f e r e n c e in the P r o b a b i l i t y of Choos ing A When a V a r i a b l e Assumes Va lues at the Extremes of i t s Range: Exper iment II 192 X I . R e g r e s s i o n A n a l y s i s of Experiment I E x c l u d i n g Games wi th MX P r e s s u r e s 195 X I I . R e g r e s s i o n A n a l y s i s of Experiment II E x c l u d i n g Games wi th MX P r e s s u r e s 196 X I I I . R e g r e s s i o n A n a l y s i s of Experiment I E x c l u d i n g Games without MX P r e s s u r e s 197 X I V . R e g r e s s i o n A n a l y s i s of Experiment II E x c l u d i n g Games wi thout MX P r e s s u r e s 197 XV. An A n a l y s i s of H y p o t h e t i c a l Choice P a t t e r n s 200 X V I . A Comparison of the A t t r a c t i v e n e s s of the A l t r u i s t i c A l t e r n a t i v e When B e n e f i c i a l and When B e n e f i c i a l and C o s t l y 202 v i i L i s t of F i g u r e s 1. The R e l a t i o n s h i p of P r i v a t e and P u b l i c Goods 6 2. The E x t e n s i v e Form of a Game With Complete I n f o r m a t i o n . 94 3. The E x t e n s i v e Form of a Game wi th Incomplete I nf ormat ion 96 4. Two Games in E x t e n s i v e and S t r a t e g i c Forms. 97 5. The G e n e r a l S t r a t e g i c Form of the 2 x 2 Game 100 6. The G e n e r a l E x t e n s i v e Form of a 2 x 2 Game 101 7. Game #22 102 8. Game #13 105 9. Game #31 106 10. Game #64 1 07 1 1 . Game #61 108 12. Two Games E x c l u d e d by C o n d i t i o n I 114 13. A Game E x c l u d e d by C o n d i t i o n II . . . . . 1 1 6 14. Two Games E x c l u d e d by C o n d i t i o n I I I . 118 15. Two Games E x c l u d e d by C o n d i t i o n I V . . . . " 120 16. Games S u r v i v i n g E l i m i n a t i o n by A l l C o n d i t i o n s Under F i r s t Set of Assumptions 123 17. A d d i t i o n a l Games S u r v i v i n g E l i m i n a t i o n by A l l C o n d i t i o n s Under F i r s t and Second Sets of Assumptions 127 18. A 2 x 2 Game wi th the Row P l a y e r I n d i f f e r e n t 139 19. Three Games w i t h Unusua l P a r e t o O p t i m a l , (PO) P r e s s u r e V a l u e s 149 20. An I l l u s t r a t i o n of the A d d i t i o n of Payof f V a l u e s . . . . 151 21. Three V a r i a n t s Each of Two Games from Lendenmann and Rapoport 153 22. Three Games wi th D i f f e r e n t P r e s s u r e C o n f i g u r a t i o n s . .156 v i i i 23. Correlation Matrix of Independent Variables 174 24. The Experimental Games and Aggregated Choices 175 25. Crosstabulation of the MX Pressure by Subjects'Choices in Experiment I 179 26. Crosstabulation of Opposing Pressures by Choice in Experiment I 181 ix Acknowledgement I would l i k e to thank my p r i n c i p a l advisor Richard Johnston for his many suggestions and corrections. The additional comments of Jean Laponce and George Feaver have also helped to broaden the arguments found here and to raise d i f f i c u l t questions about approaches to the topic. I would also l i k e to thank the members of the PhD seminar for their many c r i t i c i s m s and encouragement. My period of doctoral studies was supported by a Doctoral Fellowship from the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada. This thesis owes a great deal to the Council's f i n a n c i a l assistance. 1 I. HUMAN NATURE AND POLITICS 1 . 1 The State And Public Goods. The great sprawl of state authority in the societies of modern l i b e r a l democracies is a marked contrast to the limited scope and powers assigned to the state by c l a s s i c a l l i b e r a l writers. John Locke argued that men entered c i v i l society and so created the state, to gain the benefits of: "an establish'd, settled, known Law, received and allowed by common consent to be the Standard of Right and Wrong"1; "a known and indifferent Judge, with Authority to determine a l l differences according to the established Law"2; and a "Power to back and support the Sentence when right, and to give i t due Execution." 3 But beyond the protection of l i f e and property, considered in a narrow sense, the state should presumably remain both s i l e n t and impotent. Most observers of th i s recent expansion of state authority focus on the growth of government p a r t i c i p a t i o n in the marketplace and the extent to which i t controls the terms and conditions of exchange within i t . These a c t i v i t i e s are so extensive and well-known that they hardly need repeating. But as important as these p a r t i c u l a r extensions of governmental authority are, a similar expansion has occurred over matters which do not d i r e c t l y involve market behaviour. Here I am thinking of r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s , obligations, duties, even rights which have always been considered as part of an individual's 2 private l i f e . These include most immediately, obligations and duties to one's family - to one's parents and children- and to one's acquaintances. T r a d i t i o n a l l y , these private r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s extend well beyond the family. The model c i t i z e n of c i v i c s texts has certain moral obligations or duties which l i e outside his or obligations under the law. Each c i t i z e n has an obligation to his community to ensure i t s well-being, to defend i t s i n t e g r i t y , to ensure i t s orderliness, not only through attention to his or her own behaviour, but by being v i g i l a n t of others' as well. The model c i t i z e n in this way vo l u n t a r i l y contributes to the public good. Despite t h i s i d e a l - t y p i c a l c i t i z e n , in r e a l i t y , many of these areas of private r e s p o n s i b i l i t y have been steadily eroded by the extension of governmental authority, so that obligations which we once owed to others and which in the c i t i z e n model were given f r e e l y , are now owed not to others in a general sense but to government s p e c i f i c a l l y . As a result, in many instances we are no longer free to exercise a moral r e s p o n s i b i l i t y to others, but are coerced by the state into f u l f i l l i n g i t . Thus, the scope in which we can exercise goodwill and benevolence has steadily been replaced by the expanding scope of our obligations and duties to government which then, with the aid of taxes, af f e c t s these obligations for us. It is hard now to imagine any area of individual r e s p o n s i b i l i t y and rights over which the state does not wield some authority. In a discussion or perhaps allegory on the emergence of the state, Robert Nozick itemizes some of the individual rights which at f i r s t persons s e l l to 3 others, but which eventually become vested in the state: ...the right to decide from which persons they could buy certain services (which they c a l l occupational licensure r i g h t s ) ; the right to decide what countries they would buy goods from (import-control r i g h t s ) ; the right to decide whether or not they would use LSD, or heroin, or tobacco, or calcium cyclamate (drug r i g h t s ) ; the right to decide what proportion of their income would go to various purposes independently of whether they approved of these purposes (tax r i g h t s ) ; the right to determine their permitted mode and manner of sexual a c t i v i t y (vice r i g h t s ) ; the right to decide when and whether they would fight against and k i l l whom (draft r i g h t s ) ; the right to decide the range of prices within which they could make exchanges (wage-price-control r i g h t s ) ; the right to decide what grounds were i l l e g i t i m a t e in h i r i n g or s e l l i n g or renting decisions (antidiscrimination r i g h t s ) ; the right to force them to part i c i p a t e in the operation of a j u d i c i a l system (subpoena r i g h t s ) ; the right to r e q u i s i t i o n bodily parts for transplantation in the more needy (physical equality r i g h t s ) ; and so on. 4 Many of the rights which Nozick c i t e s may also be considered as goods in either or both of an e t h i c a l or economic sense. Despite the fact that we y i e l d a certain amount of freedom over our own a f f a i r s , few would argue that control of vice is not a good thing. Many of the goods which the state provides d i f f e r from private goods exchanged in the marketplace. Democracy, for example requires that many, i f not a l l of us cooperate in i t s production. Such goods are often termed public or c o l l e c t i v e goods. Justice, Hobbes argued, was the f i r s t good provided by the commonwealth created by contract from the state of nature. And only after the provision of t h i s c o l l e c t i v e good are private goods possible: ...where there i s no Own , that i s , no Propriety, there i s no Injustice; and where there i s no coerceive Power erected, that i s , where there i s no Common-wealth, there i s no Propriety; a l l men having Right to a l l things: Therefore 4 where there is no Common-wealth, there nothing i s Unjust. So that the nature of Justice, consisteth in keeping v a l i d Covenants: but the V a l i d i t y of Covenants begins not but with the Constitution of a C i v i l l Power, s u f f i c i e n t to compell men to keep them: And then i t is also that Propriety begins. 5 The commonwealth or government provides many different public or c o l l e c t i v e goods. Indeed the function is so pervasive that i t is considered by some to be an important j u s t i f i c a t i o n of government i t s e l f . 6 It is generally supposed that such c o l l e c t i v e goods as security or national defence cannot be provided at a l l or, at least not at optimal levels by the market alone. 7 For this reason, i t is often argued that governments exist to provide goods that the marketplace either cannot supply or i s unable to supply in s u f f i c i e n t quantities to meet demand. In some instances the market may f a i l to provide these goods because every individual's s e l f - i n t e r e s t w i l l dictate that they not contribute to the provision of the good even though they may value i t s consumption. This apparent paradox, that individuals could value a good yet decide not to contribute towards i t s provision can partly be explained by the nature of the good. Public or c o l l e c t i v e goods as well as private goods may be defined by two c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s : jointness of supply or nonrivalness; and noncontrol over exclusion. A good exhibits jointness and therefore may be a public or c o l l e c t i v e good i f i t s consumption by one individual or group does not reduce the supply available for consumption by other individuals or groups. For example, my enjoyment or consumption of my right to dissent in a democracy does not r e s t r i c t your enjoyment of the same 5 right, or reduce the supply of that right available to others for their consumption or enjoyment. Whereas, i f I and others choose to corner the market in some good we may be able to r e s t r i c t your a b i l i t y to consume the good. In this case, the good would be a private one. Noncontrol over exclusion means that the producer of a good, either an individual or a group cannot exclude, because of the costs involved, other persons or groups from consuming the good once i t has been produced. Both public and private goods al i k e can be described in terms of the degree to which they f u l f i l the two c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s . Duncan Snidal has suggested that noncontrol over exclusion may be defined as "the cost of excluding an individual from consumption of the good." 8 He c a l l s this attribute MCexclu. for the marginal cost of exclusion. Similarly, jointness of supply may be defined as MCext. or the marginal "cost of extending consumption of a given unit of the good to an additional consumer."9 Either of the costs, MCexclu. or MCext. may range between zero and i n f i n i t y . "The ideal-type public good i s defined by MCext. = 0 and MCexclu. =«?; pure private goods are defined by MCext. =co and MCexclu. = O" 1 0 The complete range of both public and private goods can be described by introducing a further" concept, MCprod., which i s the marginal cost of producing a further unit of either the public or private good. The relat i o n s h i p between private and public goods can now be i l l u s t r a t e d in Figure 1. 6 Figure 1 - The Relationship of Private and Public Goods. CO MCext. pure pr ivate good ZONE OF PRIVATE PROVISION ZONE OF NO PRODUCTION MCprod -pr ivate good ZONE OF MIXED GOODS ZONE OF PUBLIC PROVISION public good pure public good 0 MCprod >«ao MCexclu Source: Duncan Snidal, "Public Goods, Property Rights, and P o l i t i c a l Organizations", International Studies Quarterly, vol.23 (1979), p. 543. The two quadrants of greatest interest are the upper l e f t and lower right which define respectively the zones of private and public provision. Where MCext. exceeds MCprod. as i t does in the upper l e f t quadrant, "attempts to extend goods are counterproductive ( i . e . , e n t a i l a net lose in units of t o t a l consumption)." 1 1 Therefore production in th i s quadrant w i l l include private goods only. Where MCexclu. exceeds MCprod., "no attempt w i l l be made to exert exclusion over the good since control over exclusion is more costly than provision of the units themselves. Therefore a l l production in t h i s range w i l l be in terms of public p r o v i s i o n . " 1 2 It i s often argued, that the p a r t i c u l a r q u a l i t i e s of public goods create a problem for their p r o v i s i o n . 1 3 If i t i s assumed that individuals are s e l f - i n t e r e s t e d , then i t w i l l be in no one 7 person's interest to contribute towards the provision of the good and in everyone's interest to "free-ride", for i f others do successfully provide i t , every person w i l l be able to consume i t without hindrance. Or, i f a number of persons are able to provide a true public good, there is no way for them to exclude others from i t s consumption even though they did not contribute towards i t s production. Therefore, i f a l l individuals are rational in an economic sense, none w i l l contribute towards the production of c o l l e c t i v e goods and none w i l l be supplied. Thus, in a world of s e l f - i n t e r e s t e d actors the paradoxical situation arises in which a l l p o s i t i v e l y value a certain public good but none are w i l l i n g , by reason of individual l o g i c , to contribute anything towards i t s provision. From a less theoretical perspective, the problem i s a familiar one: Two neighbours may agree to drain a meadow, which they possess in common; because ' t i s easy for them to know each others mind; and each must perceive, that the immediate consequence of his f a i l i n g to do is part, i s , the abandoning of the whole project. But ' t i s very d i f f i c u l t , and indeed impossible, that a thousand persons shou'd agree in any such action; i t being d i f f i c u l t for them to concert so complicated a design, and s t i l l more d i f f i c u l t for them to execute i t ; while each seeks a pretext to free himself of the trouble and expence, and wou'd lay the whole burden on others . 1" Hume, l i k e many before and after him, concluded that " p o l i t i c a l society e a s i l y remedies both these inconveniences." 1 5 Thus .far we have spoken only of public goods. A public bad is the mirror image of a public good in the sense that people cannot cooperate to restrain behaviour which i s detrimental to a l l . The same problem exists in c u r t a i l i n g the production of a c o l l e c t i v e "bad" as exists in producing a c o l l e c t i v e good. A 8 common example is r e s t r i c t i n g p o l l u t i o n . But exactly the same logic holds as in the provision of a c o l l e c t i v e good. Suppose., "that i f a l l individuals refrained from doing A, every individual as a member of the community would derive a c e r t a i n advantage. But now i f a l l individuals less one continue refraining from doing A, the community loss is very s l i g h t , whereas the one individual doing A makes a personal gain far greater than the loss he incurs as a member of the community." 1 6 The purpose of this d e f i n i t i o n a l digression i s to show that the apparently aimless spread of governmental authority i s in fact primarily concerned with the provision of public goods, which by implication i t is assumed that individuals either cannot or w i l l not supply v o l u n t a r i l y but which must be supplied through the agency of the state. How can we explain this transfer of r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s from the individual to the state? There are several potential explanations for such a development but I wish to concentrate on only one, that being the explanation found in the writings of c l a s s i c a l l i b e r a l s and p a r t i c u l a r l y , in John Locke's Second Treatise of Government. As was stated in the opening paragraph, Locke finds the necessity of government in the absence from the state of nature of an established law, an impartial judge, and the power to execute sentences prescribed by the law. But Locke's state of nature in comparison to Hobbes' chaotic f i c t i o n is a bucolic place where men have "perfect Freedom to order their Actions, and dispose of their Possessions, and Persons as they think f i t 9 within the Laws of Nature, without asking leave, or depending upon the w i l l of any other man."17 This state of freedom is also a state of equality "wherein a l l the Power and J u r i s d i c t i o n is reciprocal, no one having more than another." 1 8 But while man is free in the state of nature, this freedom does not license any behaviour for he is bound by the law of nature f i r s t to preserve himself, and second, "when his own Preservation comes not in competition, ought he, as much as he can, to preserve the rest of Mankind." 1 9 While most men l i v e in accordance with the laws of nature, some men inevitably turn to "invading others Rights and ... doing hurt to one another." 2 0 To preserve one's l i f e and property "every Man hath a Right to punish the Offender, and to be Executioner of the Law of Nature." 2 1 The rights of punishment, those "of taking reparation, which belongs only to the injured p a r t y " 2 2 , and that of "Punishing the crime for Restraint, and preventing the l i k e Offence" 2 3, derive f i r s t from the right to self-preservation and second from the right everyman has to preserve mankind. The chief inconvenience of the state of nature is that a l l men may be judges of their own transgressions since there i s no common magistrate on earth to appeal to: To this strange Doctrine, v i z . That in the State of Nature, every one has the Executive Power of the Law of Nature, I doubt not but i t w i l l be objected, That i t is unreasonable for Men to be Judges in their own Cases, that Self-love w i l l make Men p a r t i a l to themselves and their Friends. And on the other side, that 111 Nature, Passion and Revenge w i l l carry them too far in punishing others. And hence nothing but Confusion and Disorder w i l l follow, and that therefore God hath c e r t a i n l y appointed Government to r e s t r a i n the p a r t i a l i t y and violence of Men. I e a s i l y grant that C i v i l Government i s the proper Remedy for the Inconveniences of the State of Nature, which must c e r t a i n l y OJ 1 o be Great, where Men may be Judges in their own Case, since ' t i s e a s i l y to be imagined, that he who was so unjust as to do his Brother an Injury, w i l l scarce be so just as to condemn himself for i t . . . 2 " Men therefore agree to enter c i v i l society by consenting to create a common authority to which they w i l l a l l submit. While Locke does not state c l e a r l y that men consent to enter c i v i l society to gain the benefits of public goods, i t is clear that an established law, an impartial judge, and the power to execute sentences under the law are public goods which are absent from the state of nature. We may infer from this that in entering c i v i l society, men grant their power to the state so that i t may be used to coerce individuals into providing the public goods which di s t i n g u i s h c i v i l society from the state of nature. Thus, we have at least the beginnings of an explanation in l i b e r a l theory of the trend we noted at the outset: the tendency of governments to take over the provision of public goods from i n d i v i d u a l s . 2 5 We may well ask why Locke thought that men in the state of nature were incapable of providing the necessary public goods. The answer is not clear in Locke's writing but i t i s related to the l i b e r a l interpretation of human nature. Locke as others, saw human nature as capable of both benevolence and s e l f -i n t e r e s t , i f not in equal measure on a l l occasions, at least at certain appropriate moments. For example, he quotes approvingly Hooker's derivation of a natural i n c l i n a t i o n towards ju s t i c e and charity in private l i f e based on equality: "The l i k e natural inducement, hath brought Men to know that i t is no less their Duty, to Love others than themselves, for seeing those things 11 are equal, must needs a l l have one measure..." 2 6 But while men can be expected to be benevolent towards each other in private l i f e , in public l i f e they are presumably s e l f - i n t e r e s t e d , for they cannot be trusted not to pursue claims for punishment and reparation beyond legitimate bounds: "though the Law of Nature be p l a i n and i n t e l l i g i b l e to a l l rational Creatures; yet Men being biassed by their Interest, as well as ignorant for want of study of i t , are not apt to allow of i t as a Law binding to them in the application of i t to their p a r t i c u l a r Cases." 2 7 Or: "Men being p a r t i a l to themselves, Passion and Revenge is very apt to carry them too far, and with too much heat in their own Cases; as well as negligence, and unconcernedness, to make them too remiss, in other Mens." 2 8 This assertion, that benevolence can only be expected in private l i f e while s e l f - i n t e r e s t i s to be expected in public l i f e , i s also common to both David Hume and Adam Smith. Smith could write in the opening of the Theory of Moral Sentiments that: "How s e l f i s h soever man maybe supposed, there are evidently some p r i n c i p l e s in his nature, which interest him in the fortunes of others, and render their happiness necessary to him, though he derives nothing from i t , except the pleasure -of seeing i t . " 2 9 But in The Wealth of Nations, he repeatedly emphasized the primacy of s e l f - i n t e r e s t over benevolence: "man has almost constant occasion for the help of his brethren, and i t i s vain for him to expect i t from their benevolence only. He w i l l be more l i k e l y to prevail i f he can interest their s e l f -love in his favour, and show that i t i s for their own advantage 1 2 to do for him what he r e q u i r e s of them . . . I t i s not from the benevolence of the b u t c h e r , the brewer, or the baker tha t we expect our d i n n e r , but from t h e i r r e g a r d to t h e i r own i n t e r e s t . " 3 0 D a v i d Hume l i k e w i s e agreed that whi l e benevolence i s an " i n s t i n c t o r i g i n a l l y implanted in our n a t u res such as . . . the love of l i f e and k indness to c h i l d r e n " 3 1 , i t s absence from p u b l i c l i f e i s an important reason for the e s t a b l i s h m e n t of government: Noth ing i s more c e r t a i n , than tha t men a r e , in grea t measure, g o v e r n ' d by i n t e r e s t , and tha t even when they extend t h e i r c o n c e r n beyond themse lves , ' t i s not to any great d i s t a n c e ; nor i s i t u s u a l for them, in common l i f e , to look f a r t h e r than t h e i r n e a r e s t f r i e n d s and a c q u a i n t a n c e . 3 2 And used t h i s as a j u s t i f i c a t i o n of the s t a t e : Men are not a b l e r a d i c a l l y to c u r e , e i t h e r in themselves or o t h e r s , the narrowness of s o u l , which makes them p r e f e r the present to the remote . They cannot change t h e i r n a t u r e s . A l l they can do i s change t h e i r s i t u a t i o n , and render the observance of j u s t i c e the immediate i n t e r e s t of some p a r t i c u l a r p e r s o n s , and i t s v i o l a t i o n t h e i r more remote. These p e r s o n s , t h e n , are not on ly i n d u c ' d to observe those r u l e s in t h e i r own c o n d u c t , but a l s o to c o n s t r a i n o t h e r s to a l i k e r e g u l a r i t y , and i n f o r c e the d i c t a t e s of e q u i t y t h r o ' the whole s o c i e t y . And i f i t be n e c e s s a r y , they may a l s o i n t e r e s t o t h e r s more immediate ly in the e x e c u t i o n of j u s t i c e , and c r e a t e a number of o f f i c e r s , c i v i l and m i l i t a r y , to a s s i s t them in t h e i r g o v e r n m e n t . 3 3 The l i b e r a l i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of human n a t u r e , as e v i d e n t in both Smith and Hume and l e s s c l e a r l y in L o c k e , i s a k i n d of second o r d e r e x p l a n a t i o n of the need for government to p r o v i d e the p u b l i c goods which d i s t i n g u i s h c i v i l s o c i e t y from the s t a t e of nat-ure. S imply p u t , the argument s t a t e s t h a t men cannot i n p u b l i c l i f e , overcome t h e i r own s e l f - i n t e r e s t and thus cannot be expected to c o n t r i b u t e to the p r o v i s i o n of the necessary p u b l i c 1 3 goods. Whether Locke meant these arguments to form a j u s t i f i c a t i o n for the expanding scope of state authority, or whether they have simply been taken as a j u s t i f i c a t i o n for this action, the arguments may s t i l l be questioned on two grounds. _..-F-irst, while Locke appears to find a j u s t i f i c a t i o n of government in i t s role of providing public goods, i t is also clear from The Second Treatise that v o l u n t a r i l y provided public goods exist in the state of nature prior to man's consent to enter into c i v i l society. One such example is the right to property. Locke writes of man, that "Whatsoever then he removes out of the State that Nature hath provided, and l e f t i t in, he hath mixed his Labour with, and joyned to i t something that is his own, and thereby makes i t his Property." 3' In the state of nature, "a Man had a Right to a l l he could imploy his Labour upon, so he had no temptation to labour for more than he could make use of. This l e f t no room for Controversie about the T i t l e , nor for Incroachment on the Right of others; what Portion a Man carved to himself, was easily seen; and i t was useless as well as dishonest to carve himself too much, or take more than he needed." 3 5 The uselessness of appropriating more property from the common than one could use to s a t i s f y one's need led to the creation of a second public good. In a society where a l l transactions are in the form of barter, accumulation i s limited by spoilage. This l i m i t a t i o n led to the agreement that a l l men should f i x a value in some precious objects, or to create a currency: "Now of those good things which Nature hath provided 1 4 in common, every one had a Right (as hath been s a i d ) to as much as he c o u l d use , and had a P r o p e r t y in a l l that he c o u l d a f f e c t w i th h i s L a b o u r : a l l that h i s I n d u s t r y c o u l d extend t o , to a l t e r from the S t a t e Nature had put i t i n , was h i s . He that gathered a Hundred Bushe l s of Acorns or A p p l e s , had thereby a Proper ty in them; they were h i s Goods as soon as g a t h e r e d . He was only to look that he used them before they s p o i l e d ; e l s e he took more than h i s s h a r e , and r o b b ' d o t h e r s . " 3 6 "And thus came in the use of Money, some l a s t i n g t h i n g t h a t Men might keep without s p o i l i n g , and that by mutual consent Men would take in exchange for the t r u l y u s e f u l , but p e r i s h a b l e Supports of L i f e . " 3 - 7 Locke w r i t e s at great l e n g t h of two o ther p u b l i c goods which men are capab le of p r o v i d i n g without the c o e r c i o n of the s t a t e . The f i r s t i s the c r e a t i o n of the s t a t e i t s e l f , tha t p u b l i c good from which the subsequent goods of j u s t i c e are e n a b l e d . Locke c l e a r l y sees the c r e a t i o n of the s t a t e as a v o l u n t a r y a c t : "Vo luntary Agreement g ives the second, v i z . P o l i t i c a l Power to Governours for the B e n e f i t of t h e i r S u b j e c t s , to secure them i n the P o s s e s s i o n and use of t h e i r P r o p e r t i e s . " 3 8 And a g a i n : "The on ly way whereby anyone devests h i m s e l f of h i s N a t u r a l L i b e r t y , and puts on the bonds of C i v i l S o c i e t y i s by a g r e e i n g wi th o ther Men to joyn and u n i t e i n t o a Community, f o r t h e i r c o m f o r t a b l e , s a f e , and peaceab le l i v i n g one amongst a n o t h e r , in a secure Enjoyment of t h e i r P r o p e r t i e s and a g r e a t e r S e c u r i t y a g a i n s t any that are not of i t . " 3 9 W h i l e i t may at f i r s t appear tha t men might form c i v i l s o c i e t y s o l e l y out of a s e l f - i n t e r e s t e d concern for p r o t e c t i o n of t h e i r p r o p e r t y , i n 1 5 do ing so, they "give up the E q u a l i t y , L i b e r t y , and E x e c u t i v e Power they had in the S t a t e of N a t u r e , i n t o the hands of S o c i e t y , to be so far d i s p o s e d of by the L e g i s l a t i v e as the good of s o c i e t y s h a l l r e q u i r e . . . " " 0 But what man has g iven up upon h i s e n t r y to c i v i l s o c i e t y , he may a l s o r e c l a i m as when men withdraw t h e i r consent from a p a r t i c u l a r regime which f a i l s in i t s duty to p r o t e c t the i n d i v i d u a l : "The Power that every i n d i v i d u a l gave the S o c i e t y , when he e n t e r e d i n t o i t , can never r e v e r t to the I n d i v i d u a l s a g a i n , as long as the S o c i e t y l a s t s . . . But i f they have set L i m i t s to the D u r a t i o n of t h e i r L e g i s l a t i v e , and made the Supreme Power in any Person , or Assembly , on ly temporary: Or e l s e when by the M i s c a r r i a g e s of those in A u t h o r i t y , i t i s f o r f e i t e d ; upon the F o r f e i t u r e of t h e i r R u l e r s , or at the D e t e r m i n a t i o n of the Time s e t , i t r e v e r t s to the S o c i e t y , and the People have a Right to ac t as Supreme, and c o n t i n u e the L e g i s l a t i v e in themse lves , or e r e c t a new Form, or under the o l d form p l a c e i t in new hands, as they t h i n k g o o d . 1 In these f i n a l two examples Locke c l e a r l y imagined that i n d i v i d u a l s were capab le of v o l u n t a r y c o o p e r a t i o n in the p r o v i s i o n of a p u b l i c good. In the f i r s t c a s e , they were c a p a b l e of d o i n g so p r i o r to the c r e a t i o n of the s t a t e , and in the second, they were a b l e to p r o v i d e the good d e s p i t e the c o e r c i v e powers of the s t a t e . On the b a s i s of the p r e v i o u s p o i n t s , the view that men cannot be benevolent in p u b l i c l i f e seems i n c o r r e c t . For i f i t i s c o r r e c t tha t p u b l i c goods cannot be p r o v i d e d or cannot be 1 6 provided in adequate amounts through s e l f - i n t e r e s t alone, then no public goods would exist in the state of nature. Therefore, we might conclude that men are capable of nonself-interested behaviour even in public l i f e . Michael Taylor has suggested that the arguments of environmentalists rely upon assumptions about human nature that have much in common with the l i b e r a l i n t erpretation. They assume, he writes, that "people w i l l not v o l u n t a r i l y restrain themselves from k i l l i n g whales, polluting the lake and so on; and they w i l l not v o l u n t a r i l y abide by agreements to do so.'"'2 This assumption leads to the conclusion that "coercion is necessary (or that people w i l l agree to be coerced), and that the only e f f e c t i v e means of coercion i s a strong, centralized s t a t e . " " 3 This seems a round about way of a r r i v i n g at a r e a l i z a t i o n which others have made an assumption about human nature. 1.2 Human Nature: Contrasting Views. The divided view of human nature espoused by l i b e r a l t heorists c o n f l i c t s with that of other secular and sacred doctrines. Most r e l i g i o n s hold such benevolent actions as charity, sympathy and a consideration for others (or those others who are believers) to be important facets of the proper l i f e ; that worthy of salvation or at least of emulation. C h r i s t i a n i t y abounds in such teachings. And secular doctrines such as anarchism, communism, and socialism a l l recommend 1 7 voluntary uncoerced exchange, compassion and equality, which are only imaginable in a pe r f e c t l y nonegoistic, or a l t r u i s t i c society. Moreover, the be l i e f or perhaps hope that man is not as s e l f - i n t e r e s t e d as he has sometimes been painted surfaces frequently in Utopian l i t e r a t u r e . In describing Utopian society, Raphaell Hithlodaye in More's Utopia emphasizes the nonself-interested motivations of i t s c i t i z e n r y : ... to go about to l e t another man of his pleasure, whiles thou procurest thine own, that is open wrong. Contrary wyse to withdrawe somethinge from the se l f e to give to others, that i s a point of humanitie and gentilness: whiche never taketh awaye so muche commoditie, as i t bringthe agayne. For i t is recompensed with the retourne of benefytes; and the conscience of the good dede, with the remembraunce of the thankfull love and benevolence of them to whom though hast done i t , doth br.inge more pleasure to thy mynd, than that which thou has withholden from thy selfe could have brought to thy bodye."" This yearning for a society in which the bonds t y p i c a l of the family extend beyond i t , i s a frequent theme in Utopian l i t e r a t u r e and i t i s almost c e r t a i n l y the aim of every brief experiment in communal l i v i n g . If t h i s optimistic assessment of human nature was limited to Utopians and communitarians, i t might j u s t i f i a b l y be termed exotic. But p o l i t i c s and p o l i t i c a l rhetoric are stocked with appeals to nonself-interested motivations. In times of national c r i s e s , individuals are urged to exert themeselves for the good of the community. Governments frequently j u s t i f y their actions by claiming that they are intended to achieve equality. Interest groups are constantly appealling to us to buy domestic rather than cheaper imported goods, or to boycott some nation's products, or some company's outlets, or some pa r t i c u l a r good. Clearly, t h i s rhetoric is 1 8 based upon the assumption that individuals can act, or can be persuaded to act, in a manner which i s contrary to their immediate s e l f - i n t e r e s t . But after a l l is said, perhaps the exhortations of Utopians and p o l i t i c i a n s a l i k e are no more meaningful descriptions of human nature than are the bleak assessments Hume and Smith provide of mens' motivations in public l i f e . Fortunately, we need not submit e n t i r e l y to exhortations to arrive at reasons for a society based on nonegoistic motives. Serge-Christophe Kolm"5 has advanced a convincing argument for individuals to reject a society where a l l of i t s members' actions are based on s e l f - i n t e r e s t for one where a l l individuals base their actions upon a l t r u i s t i c concerns so that, "an individual's society w i l l be considered egoistic or a l t r u i s t i c i f a l l others in i t are egoists or a l t r u i s t s . " " 6 He imagines a hypothetical choice experiment where a l l individuals whether guided t o t a l l y by altruism or egoism must choose between l i v i n g in a society where a l l others are wholly a l t r u i s t i c , or one where a l l others are wholly e g o i s t i c . Kolm reasons that the a l t r u i s t i c society would be chosen by a l l individuals be, they either egoists or a l t r u i s t s , because both egoists and a l t r u i s t s would probably secure a larger share of the goods produced in an a l t r u i s t i c society than they would be assured of in an egoistic society. Let us assume a certain quantity of goods to be divided between these a l t r u i s t s and egoists. On the whole, on average, and other things being equal, the a l t r u i s t s tend to give more and the egoists tend to take more. For t h i s reason, egoists normally tend to have more than i f everyone were egoistic or i f they themselves were a l t r u i s t i c , and 1 9 a l t r u i s t s tend to have less than i f everyone were a l t r u i s t i c or i f they themselves were e g o i s t i c . Hence i f the individual is a l t r u i s t i c among egoists, he tends to get a smaller share (and others a larger one) than he would i f he were an egoist among egoists, an a l t r u i s t among a l t r u i s t s , or an egoist among a l t r u i s t s . And i f the individual is egoistic among a l t r u i s t s he tends to get a larger share (and the others a smaller one) than i f he were an egoist among egoists, an a l t r u i s t among a l t r u i s t s , or an a l t r u i s t among egoists." 7 The expression of benevolence in public l i f e i s not just a theoretical p o s s i b i l i t y or a Utopian dream. There are numerous examples of charitable, philanthropic, or even a l t r u i s t i c behaviour in everyday l i f e . For example, in d i v i d u a l s donate both money and time to a wide range of causes: environmental groups; p o l i t i c a l parties; service clubs; fraternal organizations; hospital a u x i l i a r i e s ; public t e l e v i s i o n ; c u l t u r a l groups; c h a r i t i e s ; blood banks; trades unions; campaigns against disease; and so on." 8 American Public Television stations with voluntary contributions from some viewers, provide a good which is very nearly an ideal public good; many environmental and w i l d l i f e lobbies, once again using contributions from the public, provide a good which can be consumed by a l l ; anyone who has toured either the B r i t i s h seacoast or B r i t i s h pubs w i l l know that the Royal National Lifeboat I n s t i t u t i o n i s financed exclusively by private donations. Even more f a m i l i a r are those public goods such as medical research and the donation of blood for transfusion. Perhaps less obvious i s the fact that c i t i z e n s vote to support welfare payments for the poor, and can even be convinced of the importance of saving for future generations." 9 While many of these a c t i v i t i e s may be explained in terms of 20 s e l f - i n t e r e s t , t h i s i s not always the c a s e , nor i s the argument always c o n v i n c i n g . For example, you might argue that my s u b s c r i p t i o n to P u b l i c T e l e v i s i o n i s s e l f - i n t e r e s t e d because I enjoy watching reruns of o l d B r i t i s h drama s e r i e s . But I c o u l d c o u n t e r by s a y i n g that i f I was r e a l l y s e l f - i n t e r e s t e d , I would g i v e n o t h i n g , and I would s t i l l be a b l e to indulge my weaknesses. E x p l a i n i n g a v o l u n t e e r h o s p i t a l w o r k e r ' s mot ives in terms of s e l f - i n t e r e s t sounds s imply d e s p e r a t e . Even in formal i n s t i t u t i o n a l i z e d p o l i t i c s , behaviour cannot always be s a t i s f a c t o r i l y e x p l a i n e d in terms of s e l f - i n t e r e s t . In p o l i t i c a l l i f e , noneconomic a n d / o r n o n e g o i s t i c mot ives seem to be even more i m p o r t a n t . S e l f - i n t e r e s t cannot e x p l a i n even the very b a s i c f a c t t h a t many people choose to vote at e l e c t i o n time at the cos t of some p e r s o n a l i n c o n v e n i e n c e , even though t h e i r chances of o b t a i n i n g p e r s o n a l b e n e f i t s , as a r e s u l t of t h e i r v o t i n g are v i r t u a l l y n i l . L i k e w i s e , f or b e t t e r or for worse, v o l u n t a r y p a r t y workers o f t en seem to be m o t i v a t e d p r i m a r i l y by i d e o l o g i c a l c o n t r a i n t s r a t h e r than by s e l f -i n t e r e s t (or even by t h e i r p a r t y ' s i n t e r e s t in winning the next e l e c t i o n ) . Indeed, even some p r o f e s s i o n a l p o l i t i c i a n s do not seem to be whol ly immune to the t emptat ion of s a c r i f i c i n g s e l f - i n t e r e s t to i d e o l o g y . No l e s s obvious i s the importance of noneconomic and n o n e g o i s t i c motives i n s o c i a l a c t i v i t i e s o u t s i d e the economic and p o l i t i c a l f i e l d s . 5 0 The paradox of p a r t i c i p a t i o n i s one of those problems which d e f i e s adequate e x p l a n a t i o n in terms of s e l f - i n t e r e s t a l o n e . As Howard M a r g o l i s has w r i t t e n , t h i s paradox "turns on the i m p l a u s i b i l i t y of suppos ing that a r a t i o n a l man w i l l f i n d tha t h i s p e r s o n a l u t i l i t y ga in from b o t h e r i n g to vote in an e l e c t i o n w i t h m i l l i o n s of o ther v o t e r s j u s t i f i e s any s i g n i f i c a n t e f f o r t . " 5 1 One s o l u t i o n to the f a i l u r e of the theory i s to assume that i n d i v i d u a l s vote from a sense of c i t i z e n d u t y . B u t , 21 t h i s "kind of t h e o r i z i n g i s ab le to e x p l a i n e v e r y t h i n g but p r e d i c t n o t h i n g . " 5 2 "A n o n t r i v i a l theory w i l l have to say something about what governs the t a s t e for or duty to perform a l t r u i s t i c a c t s . " 5 3 There are other s t r a t e g i e s of g e t t i n g around the problem and p r e s e r v i n g an e x p l a n a t i o n in terms of s e l f - i n t e r e s t : one can argue that the c o s t s are so smal l t h a t any b e n e f i t , however s m a l l , i s l i k e l y to outweigh them; o r , by a l l o w i n g the act of v o t i n g to be the s a t i s f a c t i o n of s e l f - i n t e r e s t e d wants t o t a l l y u n r e l a t e d to p o l i t i c s , "I d i d i t to p l ease my wi fe" , or some such e x p l a n a t i o n . F i n a l l y , i t i s p o s s i b l e to e x p l a i n v o t i n g in terms of m a i n t a i n i n g democracy, wi thout which a l l of us would, presumably , be worse o f f . 5 " 1 . 3 Some Other E x p l a n a t i o n s . I t i s t empt ing to e x p l a i n cases where p u b l i c goods are p r o v i d e d by t e m p o r a r i l y d e s e r t i n g the assumption of s e l f -i n t e r e s t f or some k i n d of group m o t i v a t i o n , or even a l t r u i s m . As M a r g o l i s w r i t e s , " i t i s not at a l l hard to r e s o l v e these paradoxes by a l l o w i n g s u f f i c i e n t scope for a l t r u i s t i c m o t i v a t i o n . " 5 5 But one wonders whether t h i s s o l u t i o n i s s imply the "back of the hand" which assumed a l l behaviour to be s e l f -i n t e r e s t e d . Moreover , we need not n e c e s s a r i l y f a l l back upon a l t r u i s m to e x p l a i n the e x i s t e n c e of p u b l i c or c o l l e c t i v e goods. Some e x p l a n a t i o n s of t h e i r p r o v i s i o n do not r e q u i r e t h a t 22 a l t r u i s t i c m o t i v a t i o n s be a t t r i b u t e d to t h e i r p r o v i d e r s . The best known of these i s O l s o n ' s argument that i n d i v i d u a l s c o n t r i b u t e toward the p r o v i s i o n of a c o l l e c t i v e good not on ly because of the b e n e f i t they d e r i v e from that good sh ou ld i t be p r o v i d e d , but a l s o because of o ther s e l e c t i v e i n c e n t i v e s . Only a s eparate and " s e l e c t i v e " i n c e n t i v e -wi11 s t i m u l a t e a r a t i o n a l i n d i v i d u a l in a l a t e n t group to act in a group o r i e n t e d way. In such c i r c u m s t a n c e s group a c i o n can be o b t a i n e d on ly through an i n c e n t i v e that o p e r a t e s , not i n d i s c r i m i n a t e l y , l i k e the c o l l e c t i v e good, upon the group as a whole , but r a t h e r s e l e c t i v e l y toward the i n d i v i d u a l s i n the group . The i n c e n t i v e must be " s e l e c t i v e " so that those who do not j o i n the o r g a n i z a t i o n working for the g r o u p ' s i n t e r e s t s , or in o ther ways c o n t r i b u t e to the a t ta inment of the g r o u p ' s i n t e r e s t , can be t r e a t e d d i f f e r e n t l y from those who do . These " s e l e c t i v e i n c e n t i v e s " may be e i t h e r n e g a t i v e or p o s i t i v e , in that they can e i t h e r coerce by p u n i s h i n g those who f a i l to bear an a l l o c a t e d share of the c o s t s of the group a c t i o n , or they can be p o s i t i v e inducements o f f e r e d to those who act in the group i n t e r e s t . 5 6 A number of other w r i t e r s 5 7 have suggested tha t the problem of the p r o v i s i o n of c o l l e c t i v e goods i s overcome by p o l i t i c a l e n t r e p r e n e u r s . An e n t r e p r e n e u r may be a b l e to c o n v i n c e some i n d i v i d u a l s t h a t a p u b l i c good i s so v a l u a b l e to them tha t i t i s worth t h e i r u n d e r w r i t i n g the e n t i r e cos t of i t s p r o d u c t i o n . O r , i f the p r o d u c t i o n of the p u b l i c good r e q u i r e s some p r i v a t e goods, the e n t r e p r e n e u r may be a b l e to secure c o n t r i b u t i o n s from p o t e n t i a l c o n t r a c t o r s , each hoping thereby to win the supply c o n t r a c t . E n t r e p r e n e u r s may a l s o employ e x t o r t i o n , thus c o n v e r t i n g an i n d i v i d u a l ' s f a i l u r e to c o n t r i b u t e i n t o a p u b l i c bad. F i n a l l y , groups may grant an e n t r e p r e n e u r the power to tax or coerce i n d i v i d u a l f r e e - r i d e r s . A more s p e c u l a t i v e theory i s put forward i n A l b e r t 23 H i r s c h m a n ' s essay S h i f t i n g Invo lvements : P r i v a t e I n t e r e s t and  P u b l i c Act i o n . 5 8 He argues that i n d i v i d u a l s ' concerns swing l i k e a pendulum between p u r e l y p r i v a t e i n t e r e s t s , such as the enhancement of m a t e r i a l w e l f a r e , and p u b l i c a c t i o n s , such as e n v i r o n m e n t a l c o n c e r n s . The p a t t e r n i s m a i n t a i n e d because a c t o r s become d i s a p p o i n t e d in t u r n wi th the p u r s u i t of each of these i n v o l v e m e n t s : p u b l i c a c t i o n does not meet i t s o f t en u n r e a l i s t i c a s p i r a t i o n s , or c o r r u p t i o n undermines them and; p r i v a t e or m a t e r i a l p u r s u i t s once a t t a i n e d may be d i s a p p o i n t i n g . I t i s even p o s s i b l e , i f the c o s t of e x c l u s i o n from the consumption of a c o l l e c t i v e good i s not p r o h i b i t i v e , f or such goods to be produced p r i v a t e l y . H a r o l d Demsetz has w r i t t e n that " i t may be p o s s i b l e to t i e in the consumption of a second product w i t h the consumption of the c o l l e c t i v e good, and p r i v a t e i n c e n t i v e s may very w e l l e x i s t f or the p r o d u c t i o n of the t i e d - i n good because e x c l u s i o n i s p o s s i b l e . " 5 9 He c i t e s the example of a t e l e v i s i o n s i g n a l which i s very n e a r l y a p e r f e c t p u b l i c good but which i s p r o v i d e d by the p r i v a t e i n c e n t i v e s of a d v e r t i s e r s . Each of these t h e o r i e s , based i m p l i c i t l y on the assumption of s e l f - i n t e r e s t e d a c t o r s , o f f e r s a p l a u s i b l e e x p l a n a t i o n for the paradox of c o l l e c t i v e goods. A l t r u i s m need not n e c e s s a r i l y r e p l a c e s e l f - i n t e r e s t to e x p l a i n why i n d i v i d u a l s c o n t r i b u t e to the p r o v i s i o n of these goods. B u t , whi l e these t h e o r i e s may be h e l p f u l i n u n d e r s t a n d i n g the p r o v i s i o n of some p u b l i c goods, i t i s q u e s t i o n a b l e whether they can e x p l a i n the p r o v i s i o n of those e s s e n t i a l p u b l i c goods such as j u s t i c e , which the s t a t e p r e s e n t l y s u p p l i e s . Showing tha t i n d i v i d u a l s can behave 24 a l t r u i s t i c a l l y however, o f f e r s a more g e n e r a l e x p l a n a t i o n for the p r o v i s i o n of p u b l i c goods, but i t does not d i m i n i s h the u s e f u l n e s s of those t h e o r i e s d i s c u s s e d i n the p r e c e d i n g p a r a g r a p h s . 1.4 E x p e r i m e n t a l Ev idence On The P r o v i s i o n Of P u b l i c Goods . The d i s c u s s i o n of n o n e g o i s t i c a c t i o n s has to t h i s p o i n t been s o l e l y at the l e v e l of aggregate b e h a v i o u r . I t was observed tha t c e r t a i n c o l l e c t i v e goods were produced wi thout the a i d of the s t a t e or government, and that we might i n f e r from t h i s t h a t i n d i v i d u a l s were not behaving in a p u r e l y e g o i s t i c manner. A number of e x p e r i m e n t s 6 0 have i n v e s t i g a t e d the p r o v i s i o n of p u b l i c - l i k e goods at the i n d i v i d u a l l e v e l . These have been d i r e c t e d at measuring the l e v e l of p r o v i s i o n under a number of c o n d i t i o n s and in d i s c o v e r i n g why s u b j e c t s c o n t r i b u t e d toward the p r o v i s i o n of the good. M a r w e l l and A m e s 6 1 for i n s t a n c e , r e p o r t an exper iment in which the s u b j e c t s , i s o l a t e d from each other ye t t o l d t h a t they were p a r t of a group, were g iven tokens b e a r i n g a r e a l v a l u e and i n v i t e d to i n v e s t a l l or d i v i d e them between two exchanges . One exchange was s i m i l a r to a bank where the p a y o f f or r a t e of i n t e r e s t was a s s u r e d but m i n i m a l , and the o t h e r was termed a group exchange where the payo f f c o u l d be s u b s t a n t i a l l y above tha t of the p r i v a t e exchange c o n t i n g e n t upon o ther members of 25 the group c o n t r i b u t i n g s u f f i c i e n t r e s o u r c e s to reach or exceed a p r o v i s i o n p o i n t . In c o n t r a s t to what would be expected under the assumption of egoism, that the m a j o r i t y would i n v e s t in the p r i v a t e exchange, the i n v e s t i g a t o r s found that investment i n the group exchange was s u r p r i s i n g l y h i g h and n e a r l y always met or exceeded the p r o v i s i o n p o i n t : The mean investment in the group exchange for a l l s u b j e c t s i s 127.6 tokens . For a t y p i c a l group of four t h i s means tha t a p p r o x i m a t e l y 57% of the a v a i l a b l e r e s o u r c e s are i n v e s t e d in the p u b l i c good . . . t w o - t h i r d s of the s u b j e c t s i n v e s t e d more than h a l f of t h e i r tokens in the group exchange, and 22% i n v e s t e d a l l of t h e i r tokens . Only 13% c o n t r i b u t e d n o t h i n g . 6 2 In a p o s t - e x p e r i m e n t q u e s t i o n n a i r e , Marwel l and Ames found that the h i g h l e v e l of investment in the p u b l i c good c o u l d be p a r t l y e x p l a i n e d by a norm of f a i r n e s s . A "great m a j o r i t y of a l l s u b j e c t s (88%) f e l t that a f a i r investment r e q u i r e d 40% or more of t h e i r a v a i l a b l e r e s o u r c e s . More than a t h i r d of the s u b j e c t s f e l t that i n v e s t i n g a l l of one's r e s o u r c e s in the p u b l i c good was the f a i r t h i n g to d o . " 6 3 And i n g e n e r a l , agreement w i t h t h i s norm d i d not v a r y w i t h how much was a c t u a l l y i n v e s t e d by an i n d i v i d u a l i n the p u b l i c good. Whi le n e a r l y a l l s u b j e c t s shared the norm, t h e i r w i l l i n g n e s s to a b i d e by i t proved i m p o r t a n t . S e v e n t y - f i v e p e r c e n t of those who i n v e s t e d l e s s than 10% of t h e i r r e s o u r c e s in the p u b l i c good c l a i m e d not to be concerned wi th be ing f a i r i n i n v e s t i n g . "For these people at l e a s t , ' b e i n g f a i r ' may be d r i v e n out by g r e e d . " 6 " S c h n e i d e r and Pommerehne 6 5 i n an in v i v o experiment a l s o d i s c o v e r e d that s u b j e c t s ' w i l l i n g n e s s to f r e e - r i d e on the p r o v i s i o n of a c o l l e c t i v e good was not n e a r l y so marked as 26 theory a lone would p r e d i c t . T h e i r experiment i n v o l v e d three phases . In the f i r s t , the s u b j e c t s ( u n i v e r s i t y economic s tudents ) were g i v e n the o p p o r t u n i t y to b i d on a textbook w r i t t e n by the c l a s s p r o f e s s o r which would be h e l p f u l in p r e p a r i n g for an upcoming exam. The s u b j e c t s were t o l d that s tudent s from_.two other u n i v e r s i t i e s were a l s o i n v o l v e d in t h i s s p e c i a l p u b l i s h e r ' s o f f e r , and tha t the top ten b i d d e r s from a l l three groups would get c o p i e s of the book. In the second phase, the s u b j e c t s were t o l d that the p u b l i s h e r had d e c i d e d that the a u c t i o n was b i a s e d a g a i n s t low income s tudents and a second o f f e r was made in which a l l c o u l d ga in a copy of the book p r o v i d i n g that a l l three groups ( s u b j e c t s p l u s the two f i c t i t i o u s groups) r a i s e d a s p e c i f i e d sum in b i d s . The s u b j e c t s were i n v i t e d to r e v i s e t h e i r b i d s under these new c o n d i t i o n s and were then t o l d f o l l o w i n g the b i d d i n g that the three groups had not met the p r o v i s i o n p o i n t . Where in the second phase i n d i v i d u a l s c o u l d have been exc luded from the p u b l i c good by v i r t u e of the g r o u p ' s e x c l u s i o n , i n the f i n a l phase none were exc luded from the consumption of the good. The s u b j e c t s were t o l d tha t a p h i l a n t h r o p i c f o u n d a t i o n had agreed to make up the d i f f e r e n c e between the s t u d e n t s ' aggregated b i d s and the sum r e q u i r e d by the p u b l i s h e r . The s u b j e c t s were then i n v i t e d to r e v i s e t h e i r b i d s once a g a i n . T h i s f i n a l phase o f f e r e d a c l e a r i n c e n t i v e to tender minimal b i d s . As one might e x p e c t , the average b i d d e c l i n e s a c r o s s the three phases but f r e e - r i d i n g was not w idespread . The s u b j e c t s 27 " v o l u n t a r i l y o f f e r e d on the average more than 61 percent of t h e i r e s t i m a t e d t rue w i l l i n g n e s s - t o - p a y ( o f f e r 3 d i v i d e d by o f f e r 1) . Under the n e c e s s i t y of c o l l e c t i v e l y o f f e r i n g the s p e c i f i e d sum, about 96 percent of the e s t i m a t e d t r u e w i l l i n g n e s s - t o - p a y was o f f e r e d ( o f f e r 2 d i v i d e d by o f f e r 1): i . e . , the p o s s i b i l i t y of i n d i v i d u a l e x c l u s i o n through group e x c l u s i o n r e s u l t e d in r e v e a l i n g about 35 percent of the t r u e w i l l i n g n e s s - t o - p a y more than when tha t p o s s i b i l i t y was r u l e d o u t . " 6 6 C a u t i o n needs to be e x e r c i s e d in e x t e n d i n g the f i n d i n g s of these and other exper iments to i n d i v i d u a l s ' behav iour in everyday s i t u a t i o n s . C e r t a i n l y much i s dependent upon such f a c t o r s as group s i z e , the a b i l i t y of a c t o r s to communicate and make known t h e i r commitments, the p e r c e i v e d e f f e c t i v e n e s s • of t h e i r c o n t r i b u t i o n , and the s a l i e n c e of the p u b l i c good. However, a reasonab le c o n c l u s i o n from these exper iments i s that "the next s t ep ' should be to t e s t e x p l i c i t l y the economic approach a g a i n s t a l t e r n a t i v e approaches to e x p l a i n i n g i n d i v i d u a l behav iour in a p u b l i c - g o o d s i t u a t i o n . " 6 7 1.5 C o n c l u s i o n . The argument of the p r e v i o u s s e c t i o n s has some s i m i l a r i t y to tha t of a n a r c h i s t s and l i b e r t a r i a n s such as T a y l o r and N o z i c k . N o z i c k ' s argument for an u l t r a m i n i m a l s t a t e i s based more upon the grounds tha t the s t a t e abrogates c e r t a i n 28 i n d i v i d u a l r i g h t s and so i s i t s e l f immora l . The argument put forward here i s c l o s e r to tha t of T a y l o r in i t s emphasis upon the c e n t r a l i t y of p u b l i c goods i n an e x p l a n a t i o n of the n e c e s s i t y of the s t a t e , yet d i f f e r s i n s o f a r as he c o n c e n t r a t e s mos t ly on Hobbes' d e s c r i p t i o n of the s t a t e of n a t u r e , a f a r n a s t i e r p l a c e than L o c k e ' s , and to the extent that he i s i n t e r e s t e d in showing that i n d i v i d u a l s can merely cooperate in p r o v i d i n g the necessary p u b l i c goods . But c o o p e r a t i o n , as the next chapter w i l l d e s c r i b e , i s not a l t r u i s m or benevo lence . I have argued that L o c k e ' s i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of man's c o n d i t i o n in the s t a t e of na ture persuades us tha t c e r t a i n e s s e n t i a l p u b l i c goods can on ly be p r o v i d e d by the s t a t e , and tha t t h i s i n t u r n j u s t i f i e s the e x t e n s i o n of s t a t e a u t h o r i t y i n t o h i t h e r t o p r i v a t e r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s . I have' a l s o t r i e d to show that L o c k e ' s d e s c r i p t i o n of the s t a t e of na ture c o n t a i n s examples of p u b l i c goods which are p r o v i d e d by men without the n e c e s s i t y of the s t a t e , e i t h e r through the o p e r a t i o n of some i n v i s i b l e h a n d 6 8 or by formal consent as in the case of men e n t e r i n g and l e a v i n g c i v i l s o c i e t y . The f o l l o w i n g c h a p t e r s e x p l o r e what must be a t h e o r e t i c a l q u e s t i o n : can a s u f f i c i e n t number of i n d i v i d u a l s e x e r c i s e the r e q u i r e d benevo lent or a l t r u i s t i c a c t i o n s to p r o v i d e the neces sary p u b l i c goods without the s t a t e ? The q u e s t i o n i s t h e o r e t i c a l because at l e a s t i n p r e s e n t l i b e r a l democrat i c s o c i e t i e s t h e r e i s i n s u f f i c i e n t scope for the e x e r c i s e of benevo lence . Moreover , as i s d i s c u s s e d in Chapter T h r e e , as the s t a t e abrogates i n d i v i d u a l s ' r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s and r i g h t s , so i t 29 weakens the d e s i r e to e x e r c i s e the few remain ing ones, and i n d i v i d u a l s come to be even more r e l i a n t upon the a c t i o n s of the s t a t e . Nowadays, whenever one makes so much as a t h e o r e t i c a l argument for the r e d u c t i o n of s t a t e a u t h o r i t y and a concommitant i n c r e a s e in i n d i v i d u a l r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s , one runs the r i s k of i t and the proponent be ing l a b e l l e d as some u n d e s i r a b l e brand of c o n s e r v a t i v e . The argument made here i s c e r t a i n l y not a c o n s e r v a t i v e one, for i t i s a statement of the t h e o r e t i c a l p o t e n t i a l i t i e s of human n a t u r e , which i s f u n d a m e n t a l l y , a l i b e r a l v iew. 30 Notes . 1 John L o c k e , The Second T r e a t i s e of Government, Pe ter L a s l e t t , e d . , (New Y o r k : New American L i b r a r y and the Cambridge U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s , 1960), s e c t i o n 124, p . 396. 2 L o c k e , Second T r e a t i s e , s e c t i o n 125, p . 396. 3 L o c k e , Second T r e a t i s e , s e c t i o n 126, p . 396. 4 Robert N o z i c k , A n a r c h y , S t a t e and U t o p i a , (New Y o r k : B a s i c Books, 1974), p . 283. 5 Thomas Hobbes, L e v i a t h a n (London: Penguin Books, 1968), p . 202-203. 6 Howard M a r g o l i s , S e l f i s h n e s s , A l t r u i s m and R a t i o n a l i t y (Cambridge: Cambridge U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s , 1982) , p^ 9~. 7 But see: N o z i c k , A n a r c h y , S t a t e and U t o p i a . 8 Duncan S n i d a l , " P u b l i c Goods , P r o p e r t y R i g h t s , and P o l i t i c a l O r g a n i z a t i o n s " , I n t e r n a t i o n a l S t u d i e s Q u a r t e r l y , v o l . 2 3 (1979), p . 542. 9 S n i d a l , " P u b l i c Goods, P r o p e r t y R i g h t s , and P o l i t i c a l O r g a n i z a t i o n s " , p . 535. 1 0 S n i d a l , " P u b l i c Goods, P r o p e r t y R i g h t s , and P o l i t i c a l O r g a n i z a t i o n s " , p . 542. 1 1 S n i d a l , " P u b l i c Goods, P r o p e r t y R i g h t s , and P o l i t i c a l O r g a n i z a t i o n s " , p . 542. 1 2 S n i d a l , " P u b l i c Goods, P r o p e r t y R i g h t s , and P o l i t i c a l O r g a n i z a t i o n s " , p . 542. 1 3 The d i s c u s s i o n which f o l l o w s focuses on the p r o v i s i o n of p u b l i c goods. There i s another p r o b l e m , the r e v e l a t i o n p r o b l e m , 31 which focuses on ways of d e t e r m i n i n g the o p t i m a l q u a n t i t y of a p u b l i c good when each i n d i v i d u a l has an i n c e n t i v e to u n d e r r e p r e s e n t h i s or her p r e f e r e n c e for that good. For a g e n e r a l d i s c u s s i o n of demand r e v e l a t i o n see Chapter Four in Dennis C . M u e l l e r P u b l i c C h o i c e (Cambridge: Cambridge U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s , 1979). It can r e a s o n a b l y be assumed that i f i n d i v i d u a l s were p u r e l y a l t r u i s t i c , both the r e v e l a t i o n and the p r o v i s i o n problems would d i s a p p e a r . 1 " D a v i d Hume, A T r e a t i s e of Human Nature ( O x f o r d : Oxford U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s , 1978), pT 538. 1 5 Hume, A T r e a t i s e of Human Nature , p . 538. 1 6 V i l f r e d o P a r e t o , The Mind and S o c i e t y (New Y o r k : H a r c o u r t , B r a c e , 1935), v o l . 3 , p p . 946-947. 1 7 L o c k e , Second T r e a t i se , s e c t ion 4, P- 309. 1 8 Loc ke, Second T r e a t i se , s ec t ion 4, P . 309. 1 9 L o c k e , Second T r e a t i s e , s e c t ion 6, P- 311. 2 0 Loc ke, Second T r e a t i se , s e c t ion 7, P. 312. 2 1 L o c k e , Second T r e a t i se , s e c t i on 8, P- 313. 2 2 Loc ke, Second T r e a t i s e , s e c t i o n 1 1 , P.. 314. 2 3 Loc ke, Second T r e a t i s e , s e c t ion 1 1 , P- 314. 2 V L o c k e , Second T r e a t i s e , s e c t i on 13, P . 316. 2 5 Locke of course d i d not use the term p u b l i c good or p u b l i c goods in the way i t has been d e f i n e d h e r e . The term p u b l i c good was f i r s t i n t r o d u c e d i n t o the economics l i t e r a t u r e by Pau l A . Samuelson i n h i s a r t i c l e ; "The Pure Theory of P u b l i c E x p e n d i t u r e " , Review of Economics and S t a t i s t i c s , v o l . 36 (1954), p p . 387-389. Locke d i d however w r i t e of the p u b l i c good f r e q u e n t l y : see for example s e c t i o n s 156, 158, 160, and 164-166. He d e f i n e s 32 p o l i t i c a l power as "a Right of making Laws wi th P e n a l t i e s of Dea th , and consequent ly a l l l e s s P e n a l t i e s , for the R e g u l a t i n g and P r e s e r v i n g of P r o p e r t y , and of employing the f o r c e of the Community, i n the E x e c u t i o n of such Laws, and in the defence of the Commonwealth from F o r e i g n I n j u r y , and a l l t h i s on ly for the P u b l i c Good ." S e c t i o n 13, p . 308. I t i s tempt ing to say that L o c k e ' s u n d e r s t a n d i n g of the p u b l i c good i s s imply an a g g r e g a t i o n of many p u b l i c goods. However, u n l i k e Hume, he seems not to have been aware of the problems of p r o v i s i o n or the r e v e l a t i o n of demand for p u b l i c goods. And Locke makes the u n d e r s t a n d a b l e e r r o r of d e s c r i b i n g l a n d as a p u b l i c good: Nor was t h i s a p p r o p r i a t i o n of any p a r c e l of L a n d , by improv ing i t , any p r e j u d i c e to any other Man, s i n c e there was s t i l l enough and as good l e f t ; and more than the yet unprov ided c o u l d use . So that in e f f e c t , there was never the l e s s l e f t for o t h e r s because of h i s i n c l o s u r e for h i m s e l f . For he that l eaves as much as another can make use o f , does as good as take n o t h i n g at a l l . No Body c o u l d t h i n k h i m s e l f i n j u r ' d by the d r i n k i n g of another Man, though he took a good Draught , who had a whole R i v e r of the same Water l e f t him to quench h i s t h i r s t . And the Case of Land and Water , where there i s enough of b o t h , i s p e r f e c t l y the same. L o c k e , Second T r e a t i s e , s e c t i o n 33, p . 333. 2 6 L o c k e , Second T r e a t i s e , s e c t i o n 5, p . 310. 2 7 L o c k e , Second T r e a t i s e , s e c t i o n 124 396 2 8 L o c k e , Second T r e a t i s e , s e c t i o n 125, p. 396, 2 9 Adam Smi th , The Theory of M o r a l Sent iments (New Y o r k : Augustus M. K e l l y , 1966), p i K 3 0 Adam Smith , The Wealth of Nat ions (Harmondsworth: P e n g u i n , 1970), p . 118-119. 3 1 Hume, A T r e a t i s e of Human Nature , p . 417. 3 2 Hume, A T r e a t i s e of Human Nature , p . 3 3 Hume, A T r e a t i s e of Human Nature , p . 3 * L o c k e , Second T r e a t i s e , s e c t i o n 27, p . 534. 537. 329. 33 3 5 L o c k e , Second T r e a t i s e , s e c t i o n 51, p . 344. 3 6 L o c k e , Second T r e a t i s e , s ec t ion 46, P . 342. 3 7 L o c k e , Second T r e a t i s e , s ec t ion 47, P- 343. 3 8 L o c k e , Second T r e a t i se , s ec t ion 173, P- 430. 3 9 Loc ke, Second T r e a t i se , s ec t ion 95, P . 374-375 <l 0 L o c k e , Second T r e a t i se , sect ion 131, P . 398. 4 1 Loc ke, Second T r e a t i s e , s ec t ion 243, P . 477 . " 2 M i c h a e l T a y l o r , Anarchy and C o o p e r a t i o n (London: W i l e y , 1976), p . 3. " 3 T a y l o r , Anarchy and C o o p e r a t i o n , p . 3. " Thomas More , U t o p i a (Cambridge: Cambrige U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s , 1956), p . 108. " 5 S e r g e - C h r i s t o p e Kolm, " A l t r u i s m and E f f i c i e n c y " , E t h i c s , v o l . 94 (1983), p p . 18-65. 4 6 Kolm, " A l t r u i s m and E f f i c i e n c y " , p . 41. " 7 Kolm, " A l t r u i s m and E f f i c i e n c y " , p . 42-43 . 4 8 Two c o n s e r v a t i v e e s t i m a t e s of the v a l u e of p r o d u c t i v e v o l u n t e e r work i n the U n i t e d S t a t e s and Canada both a r r i v e d at a s i m i l a r f i g u r e of 3.5% of GNP. See: H . W o l o z i n , "The Economic Role and V a l u e of V o l u n t e e r . Work in the U n i t e d S t a t e s " , J o u r n a l  of V o l u n t a r y A c t i o n Research , v o l . 1-2 (1975) , pp . 23-42; and, O l i Hawry l shyn , "The Economic Nature and V a l u e of V o l u n t e e r A c t i v i t y in Canada", S o c i a l I n d i c a t o r s R e s e a r c h , v o l . 5 (1978), p p . 1 - 7 1 . * 9 Not a l l p u b l i c goods have e i t h e r i d e n t i c a l c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s or d i f f i c u l t i e s i n t h e i r p r o v i s i o n . For a good 34 d i s c u s s i o n of the d i f f e r e n t types of c o l l e c t i v e goods and the problems they p r e s e n t , see Chapter Four in R u s s s e l l H a r d i n , C o l l e c t i v e A c t i o n ( B a l t i m o r e : Johns Hopkins U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s , 1982) . 5 0 John C . H a r s a n y i , " R a t i o n a l Models of P o l i t i c a l Behav iour v s . F u n c t i o n a l and C o n f o r m i s t T h e o r i e s " , World  P o l i t i c s , v o l . 21 (1969), p . 519. 5 1 Howard M a r g o l i s , S e l f i s h n e s s , A l t r u i s m and R a t i o n a l i t y (Cambridge: Cambridge U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s , 1982), p . 12 5 2 M a r g o l i s , S e l f i s h n e s s , A l t r u i s m and R a t i o n a l i t y , p . 12. 5 3 M a r g o l i s , S e l f i s h n e s s , A l t r u i s m and R a t i o n a l i t y , p . 12. 5 U For a d i s c u s s i o n of r a t i o n a l i t y and v o t i n g see: M i c h a e l L a v e r , The P o l i t i c s of P r i v a t e D e s i r e s (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books , 1981), c h a p t e r 4. 5 5 M a r g o l i s , S e l f i s h n e s s , A l t r u i s m and R a t i o n a l i t y , p . 21. 5 6 Mancur O l s o n , The L o g i c of C o l l e c t i v e A c t i o n . P u b l i c  Goods and the Theory of Groups (Cambr i d g e , M a s s . : H a r v a r d U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s , 1965), pT 51. 5 7 Norman F r o h l i c h , Joe Oppenheimer and Oran Young, P o l i t i c a l L e d e r s h i p and C o l l e c t i v e Goods ( P r i n c e t o n : P r i n c e t o n U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s , 1971 ) ; T e r r y Moe, The O r g a n i z a t i o n of  I n t e r e s t s ( C h i c a g o : U n i v e r s i t y of C h i c a g o P r e s s , 1980); J o e l Guttman, "Can P o l i t i c a l E n t r e p r e n e u r s Solve the Free R i d e r Prob lem?", J o u r n a l of Economic Behaviour and O r g a n i z a t i o n , v o l . 3 (1982) , pp . 357-66. 5 8 A l b e r t 0 . H ir schman , S h i f t i n g Involvements : P r i v a t e  I n t e r e s t and P u b l i c A c t i o n ( P r i n c e t o n : P r i n c e t o n U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s , 1982). 5 9 H a r o l d Demsetz, "The P r i v a t e P r o d u c t i o n of P u b l i c Goods", J o u r n a l of Law and Economics , v o l . 13 (1970), p . 306. 6 0 In a d d i t i o n to those d i s c u s s e d below, see a l s o : Peter Bohm, " E s t i m a t i n g Demand for P u b l i c Goods: An Exper iment" , 35 European Economic Review , v o l . 3 (1972), pp . 111-130; John R. C h a m b e r l i n , "The L o g i c of C o l l e c t i v e A c t i o n : Some E x p e r i m e n t a l R e s u l t s " , B e h a v i o u r a l Sc i ence , v o l . 23 (1978) , pp . 441-445; Robyn M. Dawes, Jeanne McTav i sh and H a r r i e t Shak lee , "Behav iour , Communication and Assumptions About Other P e o p l e ' s Behav iour in a Commons Dilemma S i t u a t i o n " , J o u r n a l of  P e r s o n a l i t y and S o c i a l Psychology , v o l . 3 5 (1977), p p . 1 - 1 1 ; G e r a l d Marwe l l and Ruth E . Ames, "Experiments on the P r o v i s i o n of P u b l i c Goods. I I . P r o v i s i o n P o i n t s , S t a k e s , E x p e r i e n c e and the Free R i d e r Problem", American J o u r n a l of S o c i o l o g y , v o l . 85 (1980) , pp .926-937; G e r a l d i n e A l f a n o and G e r a l d M a r w e l l , "Experiments on the P r o v i s i o n of P u b l i c Goods. I I I . N o n d i v i s i b i l i t y and Free R i d i n g i n ' R e a l ' Groups" , Soc i a l  P s y c h o l o g i c a l Q u a r t e r l y , v o l . 43 (1980), pp . 300-309; G e r a l d M a r w e l l and Ruth E . Ames, "Economists Ride F r e e , Does Anyone E l s e ? Exper iments on the P r o v i s i o n of P u b l i c Goods. I V " , J o u r n a l of P u b l i c Economics , v o l . 15 (1981) , pp . 295-310; John W. Sweeney, "An E x p e r i m e n t a l I n v e s t i g a t i o n of the Free R i d e r Problem", S o c i a l Sc i ence Research , v o l . 2 (1973), pp . 277-292; A . J . C . van de K r a g t , J . M. O r b e l l and R. M. Dawes, "The M i n i m a l C o n t r i b u t i n g Set as a S o l u t i o n to P u b l i c Goods Problems", American J o u r n a l of P o l i t i c a l S c i e n c e , v o l . 77 (1983), pp . 1 12-122. 6 1 G e r a l d Marwel l and Ruth E . Ames, "Experiments on the P r o v i s i o n of P u b l i c Goods. 1. R e s o u r c e s , I n t e r e s t , Group S i z e and the Free R i d e r Problem", American J o u r n a l of S o c i o l o g y , v o l . 84 (1979), pp . 1335-1360. 6 2 Marwel l and Ames, "Experiments on the P r o v i s i o n of P u b l i c Goods. 1.", p . 1349-1350. 6 3 Marwel l and Ames, "Experiments on the P r o v i s i o n of P u b l i c Goods. 1.", p . 1357. 6 a Marwe l l and Ames, "Experiments on the P r o v i s i o n of P u b l i c Goods. 1.", p . 1357. 6 5 F r i e d r i c h Schne ider and Werner W. Pommerehne, " F r e e -R i d i n g and C o l l e c t i v e A c t i o n : an Experiment in M i c r o e c o n o m i c s " , Q u a r t e r l y J o u r n a l of Economics , v o l . 9 6 (1981) , pp . 689-704. 6 6 Schne ider and Pommerehne, " F r e e - R i d i n g and C o l l e c t i v e A c t i o n : " , p . 697. 6 7 Schne ider and Pommerehne, " F r e e - R i d i n g and C o l l e c t i v e A c t i o n : " , p . 702. 36 6 8 See N o z i c k ' s argument about the c r e a t i o n of money : A n a r c h y , S t a t e and U t o p i a , p . 18. 37 11. ALTRUISM 2.1 I n t r o d u c t i o n . If the assumption t h a t i n d i v i d u a l s are mot iva ted p r i m a r i l y by s e l f - i n t e r e s t cannot always s a t i s f a c t o r i l y e x p l a i n c e r t a i n i n s t a n c e s of p u b l i c and thus p o l i t i c a l b e h a v i o u r , r i v a l e x p l a n a t i o n s need to be i n v e s t i g a t e d . T h i s chapter a d d r e s s e s the p o s s i b i l i t y that the v o l u n t a r y p r o v i s i o n of p u b l i c goods might be e x p l a i n e d by a l t r u i s m . But what i s a l t r u i s m ? W h i l e t h e r e are d e f i n i t i o n s of the b e h a v i o u r , many are f a r too g e n e r a l to be of much use . And of equal d i f f i c u l t y to the problem of d e f i n i n g the concept i s that of u n c o v e r i n g an a c c e p t a b l e e x p l a n a t i o n of the b e h a v i o u r , one tha t d i s t i n g u i s h e s i t s m o t i v a t i o n from that of o ther b e h a v i o u r s , and d e f i n e s s i t u a t i o n s in which i t may be r e l e v a n t . T h i s e x p l a n a t i o n must be fundamental in the sense that i t i s a b l e to d i s t i n g u i s h between the m o t i v a t i o n of say , the e n l i g h t e n e d e g o i s t , and that of the a l t r u i s t . We a l s o need to know whether a l t r u i s m i s at l e a s t p o t e n t i a l l y capab le of s o l v i n g problems of the p r o v i s i o n of c o l l e c t i v e goods. I t i s c o n c e i v a b l e that such behaviour may be l i m i t e d to c l o s e r e l a t i o n s h i p s or be based upon the e x p e c t a t i o n of r e c i p r o c i t y . T h i s i s a view expressed by G a r r e t t H a r d i n : Is pure a l t r u i s m p o s s i b l e ? Y e s , of course i t i s on a s m a l l s c a l e , over the s h o r t term, in c e r t a i n c i r c u m s t a n c e s , and w i t h i n s m a l l i n t i m a t e groups . . . When both a l t r u i s t s and e g o i s t s are thrown together i n l a r g e impersonal groups a l t r u i s m has l i t t l e chance to grow by an i n f e c t i o u s p r o c e s s ; i t i s more l i k e l y to be n ipped in the b u d . 1 38 2.2 D e f i n i n g A l t r u i s m . A l t r u i s m i s a r e g a r d for o t h e r s , or the admis s ion tha t the w e l l - b e i n g of o t h e r s has some e f f e c t upon that of the a l t r u i s t . S t r i c t l y s p e a k i n g , t h i s concern may be p o s i t i v e or n e g a t i v e . That i s , a l t r u i s m i s capab le of encompassing a l l of c o m p e t i t i o n , benevolence and even m a l e v o l e n c e . An a l t r u i s t i s someone whose w e l f a r e or w e l l - b e i n g i s a f f e c t e d by that of o t h e r s . By c o n t r a s t , an e g o i s t ' s w e l f a r e remains u n a f f e c t e d by tha t of o t h e r s . The pure e g o i s t d e r i v e s n e i t h e r b e n e f i t nor harm from the w e l l - b e i n g of o t h e r s . Whi le a l t r u i s m means l i t e r a l l y a regard for o t h e r s , i t has come to mean any a c t i o n which d i m i n i s h e s p e r s o n a l w e l f a r e so that a n o t h e r ' s w e l f a r e i s i n c r e a s e d , o r , "any behav iour m o t i v a t e d merely by the b e l i e f tha t someone e l s e w i l l b e n e f i t or a v o i d harm by i t . " 2 A l t r u i s t i c a c t i o n need not o n l y take the form of a b e n e f i t g iven d i r e c t l y to an i n d i v i d u a l or group of i n d i v i d u a l s , but may a l s o be in the form of advantage foregone , p a r t i c u l a r l y i f such a c t i o n would have a f f e c t e d the w e l l - b e i n g of o t h e r s . Any d i r e c t b e n e f i t g iven or o p p o r t u n i t y foregone i n favour of another must i n v o l v e some c o s t . When Smith makes a ten d o l l a r d o n a t i o n to the Red C r o s s or v o l u n t e e r s h i s time to c o l l e c t d o n a t i o n s for the Red C r o s s , i t i s c l e a r t h a t he has i n c u r r e d some c o s t . We can e a s i l y p o i n t to the a l t e r n a t i v e consumption foregone; he might have spent the money on something e l s e , o r , to the free t ime which he u s u a l l y spends i n o ther 39 p u r s u i t s as i n d i c a t i o n s of the c o s t i n v o l v e d in the g e s t u r e . Of course there may be a d d i t i o n a l f u t u re c o s t s i n v o l v e d in an a l t r u i s t i c g e s t u r e as w e l l . Smith may have made a d o n a t i o n to the F l a t E a r t h S o c i e t y but J o n e s , h i s f r i e n d , who b e l i e v e s in the s p h e r i c a l t h e o r y , r i d i c u l e s him m e r c i l e s s l y for h i s f o o l i s h n e s s . So Smith-not on ly d i m i n i s h e s h i s w e l f a r e w i th the d o n a t i o n but l o s e s face as w e l l . There may even be c o s t s a t t a c h e d to not behaving a l t r u i s t i c a l l y when the p o s s i b i l i t y a r i s e s . "The c o s t s of n o n i n t e r v e n t i o n are e s p e c i a l l y p s y c h o l o g i c a l . The bystander who d o e s n ' t h e l p may f e e l shame, g u i l t , and empathic d i s t r e s s a t a v i c t i m ' s s u f f e r i n g . The p u b l i c may d i s a p p r o v e the n o n i n t e r v e n e r , and in some cases he may even face c r i m i n a l p r o s e c u t i o n . . . " 3 Another p r i n c i p a l requirement of a l t r u i s t i c a c t i o n and one imposed by n e a r l y a l l t h e o r i s t s , i s that the behav iour or a c t i o n b e n e f i t the r e c i p i e n t , e i t h e r the i n d i v i d u a l or group towards which i t i s d i r e c t e d . D i s c o u n t i n g for the moment the i n t e n t i o n s of the a c t o r , we would have d i f f i c u l t y j u s t i f y i n g the i n c l u s i o n w i t h i n the scope of a l t r u i s t i c behav iour any a c t i o n which d i d not improve the w e l l - b e i n g of the r e c i p i e n t . S m i t h , for example, knowing he may have h e p a t i t i s , makes a v o l u n t a r y b l o o d d o n a t i o n which w i l l c e r t a i n l y not improve the w e l l - b e i n g of the r e c i p i e n t . I t h i n k that anyone would have a hard time m a i n t a i n i n g tha t t h i s a p p a r e n t l y m a l i c i o u s ac t was a l t r u i s t i c , r e g a r d l e s s of what Smith thought . Some d i s c u s s i o n s of a l t r u i s m a l s o r e q u i r e tha t the b e h a v i o u r be "emitted v o l u n t a r i l y . " 4 One can e a s i l y see why t h i s 40 s t i p u l a t i o n i s made. For example, we cannot p l a c e S m i t h ' s donat ion to the Red Cross on the same f o o t i n g as h i s "donation" to Jones who happens to be b l a c k m a i l i n g h im. However, in most cases which are l e s s c l e a r - c u t , d e t e r m i n i n g whether an ac t i s v o l u n t a r y i s p r a c t i c a b l y i m p o s s i b l e . Smi th , our a r c h e t y p a l i n d i v i d u a l , may remember that h i s mother always gave something to a c e r t a i n group and that by not g i v i n g something as w e l l , he w i l l be q u e s t i o n i n g her v a l u e s . O r , Smith may work in a l a r g e o f f i c e which the Heart Fund canvasses a n n u a l l y . Most of h i s coworkers make donat ions and most workers see t h e i r coworkers make d o n a t i o n s . There w i l l be a c e r t a i n amount of s o c i a l p r e s s u r e on Smith to do l i k e w i s e , and h i s f i n a l donat ion cannot be u n r e s e r v e d l y d e s c r i b e d as v o l u n t a r y . In c e r t a i n other s i t u a t i o n s , Smith may have a moral o b l i g a t i o n to behave a l t r u i s t i c a l l y : i f he behaves o t h e r w i s e , he may be t r e a t e d as a moral l e p e r . Such o b l i g a t i o n s have p a r t i c u l a r f o r c e in l i f e and death s i t u a t i o n s . Most of us would l a b e l Smith a moral o u t c a s t i f he happened in h i s boat to be p a s s i n g a rock upon which a number of people were s t randed and d i d not rescue them though the sea was calm and the o p e r a t i o n i n v o l v e d no grea t r i s k to h i m s e l f . However, i f the sea was h i g h and the s i t u a t i o n p e r i l o u s , we might not p l a c e the same s t r i c t u r e s upon Smi th . But I do not want to become i n v o l v e d in a d i s c u s s i o n of moral o b l i g a t i o n . Even d i s c u s s i n g r u l e s for such o b l i g a t i o n s may have s u r p r i s i n g i m p l i c a t i o n s . 5 In any c a s e , the l i f e and death i m p l i c a t i o n s of c o n t r i b u t i n g or not c o n t r i b u t i n g towards the p r o v i s i o n of some c o l l e c t i v e good are 41 o f t e n remote. So long as Smi th ' s a l t r u i s m may not be comple t e ly v o l u n t a r y , t h e r e remains the q u e s t i o n of how e x t e n s i v e i t needs to be . I f Smith can be p r e s s u r e d i n t o g i v i n g , presumably he can be p r e s s u r e d i n t o g i v i n g a c e r t a i n amount. Once aga in i t seems f r u i t l e s s to d i s c u s s s p e c i f i c r u l e s , for the degree of a l t r u i s m w i l l be a f u n c t i o n of S m i t h ' s s i t u a t i o n , h i s c o n v i c t i o n s about the importance or deservedness of the r e c i p i e n t , the e f f e c t i v e n e s s of the d o n a t i o n , the numbers of o t h e r s c o n t r i b u t i n g , and so on. S e t t i n g a lower bound f o r the cos t of an a l t r u i s t i c ges ture i s not p a r t i c u l a r l y c o n t e n t i o u s , for any c o s t however s m a l l r a i s e s the q u e s t i o n of how w e l l s e l f - i n t e r e s t can e x p l a i n the b e h a v i o u r . However, s e t t i n g an upper bound for the cos t of a l t r u i s m i s d i f f i c u l t . No upper l i m i t sees a l t r u i s m extend to s e l f - s a c r i f i c e which i s the p r a c t i c e of s a i n t s and h e r o e s . James F i s h k i n has termed t h i s type of behav iour superogatory because " c e r t a i n l e v e l s of s a c r i f i c e cannot be m o r a l l y r e q u i r e d of any g iven i n d i v i d u a l . " 6 But the s e l f - s a c r i f i c e of s a i n t s cannot be expected or r e q u i r e d of o r d i n a r y i n d i v i d u a l s . The p s y c h o l o g i c a l proces se s which j u s t i f y s e l f - s a c r i f i c e must be q u i t e d i f f e r e n t from those of a moderate ac t of a l t r u i s m . For s e l f - s a c r i f i c e demands the comple te r e n u n c i a t i o n of one 's own wants , wishes and d e s i r e s i n favour of a n o t h e r ' s . I t i s the acknowledgement that a n o t h e r ' s needs are g r e a t e r or s u p e r i o r to one ' s o w n . 7 , S e r g e - C h r i s t o p h e Kolm has suggested d i s t i n g u i s h i n g between 42 the two b e h a v i o u r s on the b a s i s of the i n t e r e s t s both of the a l t r u i s t and the r e c i p i e n t . "The 'maximal' case of a l t r u i s t i c sent iment" , he w r i t e s , "is tha t in which the person t h i n k s h i m s e l f ( i n a way tha t c o u l d be made p r e c i s e ) to be a p r i o r i of the same g e n e r a l importance as anyone e l s e and a c t s a c c o r d i n g l y . . . the p e r f e c t a l t r u i s t i s S a i n t M a r t i n who does not g ive h i s coat away to the pauper s h i v e r i n g i n the c o l d , but who d i v i d e s i t in t w o . " 8 The f a c t that a l t r u i s m need not be p u r e l y v o l u n t a r y does not d e t r a c t from the c o n c e p t . But to admit that a l t r u i s m may be n o n v o l u n t a r y and o n l y the a c t i o n of Smith r e s p o n d i n g to the p r e s s u r e s in h i s env ironment , seems to d r a i n away the p o s s i b i l i t y t h a t he can be "good" in some u l t i m a t e sense . In any event , the i s s u e i s not c r u c i a l , for I am o n l y a r g u i n g tha t Smith can behave as i f he were be ing a l t r u i s t i c , which i s s u f f i c i e n t f o r us to r e c o n s i d e r the p o l i t i c a l and governmental arrangements of most s o c i e t i e s . F i n a l l y , we come to the thorny i s sue of the b e n e f i t s d e r i v e d by the a l t r u i s t from h i s or her a c t i o n . a c t i o n . Some d e f i n i t i o n s r e q u i r e that there be a b s o l u t e l y none for the a l t r u i s t . T h i s i s s u r e l y an extreme and hard to defend p o s i t i o n . L e s s extreme i s the p o s i t i o n which s t a t e s that Smith d i d not expect any b e n e f i t from h i s a c t i o n and i f he r e c e i v e d any d i d not t r e a t i t as the u s u a l outcome of a l t r u i s t i c a c t i o n but as a k i n d of w i n d f a l l to which he was not f u l l y e n t i t l e d . O r , Smith might b e l i e v e that he i s e n t i t l e d to something for h i s p a i n s , a s m i l e , enhanced s e l f - e s t e e m , or a l e t t e r of thanks and 43 some g l o s s y b r o c h u r e , but that the b e n e f i t w i l l not equa l the cos t of the a c t i o n , or at l e a s t cannot be e a s i l y equated wi th i t . Smith may s imply enjoy the ges ture and f e e l that any attempt to p l a c e a va lue on i t w i l l d e s t r o y i t . The l e a s t extreme p o s i t i o n on the subjec t of b e n e f i t s i s tha t Smith expects them, but that they are u n c e r t a i n and he may not be in a p o s i t i o n to take advantage of them. He may even hope tha t he i s never in a p o s i t i o n to r e c e i v e them. Such i s the case when Smith g ive s a donat ion to cancer r e s e a r c h o r , i f there were such an arrangement , to the s e c u r i t y of h i s s o c i e t y . He cannot be c e r t a i n that a cure w i l l be found or that the defence of h i s p r o p e r t y w i l l be s u c c e s s f u l . Moreover , Smith hopes that he never c o n t r a c t s cancer or that he i s a t t a c k e d . In the meantime, he w i l l c e r t a i n l y d e r i v e some "peace of mind" i f a cure i s found and o thers b e n e f i t , or i f the defence of h i s community appears e f f e c t i v e . T h i s l a s t p o s i t i o n on the b e n e f i t s of a l t r u i s m sounds somewhat l i k e an i n s u r a n c e scheme i f one f o r g e t s that Smith was not r e q u i r e d to c o n t r i b u t e nor i f a cure for cancer i s d i s c o v e r e d w i l l he be e x c l u d e d from i t s b e n e f i t s s imply because he d i d not c o n t r i b u t e to i t s d i s c o v e r y . Of course in these c i r c u m s t a n c e s , the n o n a l t r u i s t would c o n t r i b u t e n o t h i n g , knowing t h a t he or she would d e r i v e the b e n e f i t r e g a r d l e s s of whether they c o n t r i b u t e or n o t . F u r t h e r m o r e , because he or she ga ins n o t h i n g from o t h e r s ' w e l f a r e , no i n t e r i m b e n e f i t would be d e r i v e d from o t h e r s t a k i n g advantage of the c u r e . In summary, a l t r u i s m may be r e c o g n i z e d by a l l or some of four c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s . F i r s t , a l t r u i s m d e s c r i b e s an a c t i o n which 44 i s b e n e f i c i a l to the r e c i p i e n t of the a c t . Second, i t i s a behav iour which i n v o l v e s some c o s t in terms of advantage foregone . T h i r d , a l t r u i s m must be v o l u n t a r y and uncoerced . And f o u r t h , a l t r u i s m need not , and in many cases may not be synonymous wi th s e l f - s a c r i f i c e . These four elements of the d e f i n i t i o n of a l t r u i s m can be viewed in two p o s s i b l e ways. F i r s t , taken t o g e t h e r , they c o n s t i t u t e the most r i g o r o u s t h e o r e t i c a l d e f i n i t i o n of a l t r u i s t i c b e h a v i o u r . The term t h e o r e t i c a l sh ou ld be emphasised because in p r a c t i c e i t w i l l f r e q u e n t l y be d i f f i c u l t to determine whether a g iven act i s whol ly v o l u n t a r y . In a d d i t i o n , i t w i l l never be easy to d i s t i n g u i s h s e l f - s a c r i f i c e from a l t r u i s m and much w i l l depend upon the p a r t i c u l a r c i r c u m s t a n c e s of any g i v e n s i t u a t i o n . For example, in Chapter Four I w i l l d e s c r i b e s e l f -s a c r i f i c e as the acceptance of a worst p o s s i b l e outcome by the a l t r u i s t . But in some s i t u a t i o n s , a worst p o s s i b l e outcome may be o n l y m a r g i n a l l y worse than another or s t i l l be q u i t e a c c e p t a b l e . In e i t h e r of these case s we may wish to admit the behav iour as be ing a l t r u i s t i c and not exc lude i t on the b a s i s of the formal c r i t e r i o n of s e l f - s a c r i f i c e . Another way of v i ewing these four elements of a d e f i n i t i o n of a l t r u i s t i c behaviour i s as a set from which one can c o n s t r u c t a l t e r n a t i v e d e f i n i t i o n s . In t h i s way we can r e t r i e v e p r o b a b l y a l l of the d e f i n i t i o n s of a l t r u i s m one might encounter i n the e x t e n s i v e l i t e r a t u r e on the s u b j e c t . 45 2.3 A l t r u i s m , E n l i g h t e n e d Egoism, And C o o p e r a t i o n . The f o r e g o i n g d i s c u s s i o n r a i s e s the q u e s t i o n of the " e n l i g h t e n e d e g o i s t " , a l t r u i s m sometimes be ing d i s m i s s e d in these t erms . I b e l i e v e tha t what t h i s term r e f e r s to i s prudence , or t h a t the e g o i s t may o f t e n behave wi th an eye to h i s or her l o n g - t e r m i n t e r e s t s . I do not doubt tha t e g o i s t s can behave p r u d e n t l y : i t i s in t h e i r s e l f - i n t e r e s t to do so . But a prudent e g o i s t i s not an a l t r u i s t , nor i s the outcome of h i s a c t i o n a l t r u i s t i c . A prudent e g o i s t would not c o n t r i b u t e to a c o l l e c t i v e good for he or she knows tha t they w i l l be a b l e to consume i t i f i t i s p r o d u c e d . M o r e o v e r , the prudent e g o i s t l i k e the a l t r u i s t , knows that the b e n e f i t which he or she w i l l d e r i v e from the i n c r e a s e d l e v e l of the p r o v i s i o n of the p u b l i c good which may f o l l o w from h i s or her c o n t r i b u t i o n w i l l not o f f s e t the cos t of c o n t r i b u t i n g . T h e r e f o r e , s i n c e a prudent e g o i s t or an i n d i v i d u a l mot iva ted by e n l i g h t e n e d s e l f - i n t e r e s t c a r e s o n l y for h i s or her own w e l f a r e , he or she would not behave as an a l t r u i s t . And an h y p o t h e s i z e d s o c i e t y of prudent e g o i s t s without government would be d e v o i d of the c o l l e c t i v e goods which would be produced by s i m i l a r s o c i e t i e s w i th some a l t r u i s t s . E x p e c t a t i o n s of f u t u r e b e n e f i t s a l s o set the e n l i g h t e n e d e g o i s t a p a r t from the a l t r u i s t . The e g o i s t expects the b e n e f i t s of h i s a c t i o n s to surpass those from p u r s u i n g another course of a c t i o n . The a l t r u i s t on the o ther hand, has made a d e c i s i o n to forego more advantageous a c t i o n s i n order to a v o i d harming o t h e r s . 46 Whi le we are d e f i n i n g and e x c l u d i n g , some mention needs to be made of c o o p e r a t i o n . C o o p e r a t i o n i s a s p e c i e s of i n d i v i d u a l g a i n s - m a x i m i z i n g behav iour where persons are " a c t i n g t o g e t h e r to secure a mutual b e n e f i t u n a v a i l a b l e to those who act independent ly to secure i n d i v i d u a l b e n e f i t . " 9 I n d i v i d u a l s coopera te because they expect that the b e n e f i t s to each w i l l surpass those which r e s u l t from i n d i v i d u a l a c t i o n s . A d d i t i o n a l l y , c o o p e r a t o r s expect g r e a t e r advantage to be generated by t h e i r j o i n t a c t i o n than c o u l d be c r e a t e d by summing the advantages and d i s a d v a n t a g e s of t h e i r i n d i v i d u a l a c t i o n s . M a i n t a i n i n g a c o o p e r a t i v e arrangement i n v o l v e s problems which are c o m p l e t e l y f o r e i g n to a l t r u i s m . I n i t i a l l y , there i s the problem of e n s u r i n g the s t a b i l i t y of the arrangement . U n l i k e a l t r u i s m , c o o p e r a t i o n r e q u i r e s e n f o r c e a b l e p r o v i s i o n s for the expected ga in can never be a s s u r e d . And some form of e n f o r c e a b l e c o n t r a c t i s r e q u i r e d to b i n d p a r t i e s to c a r r y out t h e i r p a r t of the exchange, even though, and e s p e c i a l l y because , t ime may i n t e r v e n e between the f u l f i l l m e n t of two p a r t s of the c o n t r a c t . "For example, c o n s i d e r a f u t u r e s c o n t r a c t where i n d i v i d u a l A pays B a sum of money today , and B promises to d e l i v e r a q u a n t i t y X of some commodity at a l a t e r d a t e . We always make the assumption that i n d i v i d u a l B w i l l in f a c t d e l i v e r s i n c e the c o n t r a c t i s b i n d i n g and e n f o r c e a b l e . In d e f i n i n g a l t r u i s t i c behav iour i n d i v i d u a l A may g i v e i n d i v i d u a l B something , and i n d i v i d u a l B may . e l ec t to g i v e n o t h i n g in r e t u r n . There may be an i m p l i c i t or unspoken u n d e r s t a n d i n g between the p a r t i e s but i n d i v i d u a l B has no l e g a l o b l i g a t i o n to compensate A , and h i s d e c i s i o n not to repay would not c o n s t i t u t e a v i o l a t i o n of the l a w . " 1 0 C o o p e r a t i o n may a l s o be viewed as an exchange of r e s t r a i n t s 47 on b e h a v i o u r . C o o p e r a t o r s are t r a d i n g r e s t r a i n t s upon behaviour 'cont ingent upon o t h e r s ' acceptance of s i m i l a r r e s t r a i n t s . C o o p e r a t o r s are s a y i n g to each o t h e r ; "I w i l l not do A (or do A ) , or w i l l r e s t r i c t my freedom to choose (or not to choose) to do A i f you w i l l do so a l s o . " The problems of c o o p e r a t i o n do not end with an exchange of r e s t r a i n t s , for should a s u r p l u s be generated by j o i n t a c t i o n , each i n d i v i d u a l w i l l have h i s own views upon how i t shou ld be d i v i d e d . The r e s o l u t i o n of t h i s c o n f l i c t w i l l r e q u i r e lengthy b a r g a i n i n g of i n c r e a s i n g c o m p l e x i t y as each p a r t y at tempts to ensure i t s e l f a g a i n s t the o t h e r ' s d e f e c t i o n . The recent work of Robert A x e l r o d 1 1 i l l u s t r a t e s how i t i s p o s s i b l e to confuse a l t r u i s m with c o o p e r a t i o n but at the same time emphasizes the d i f f e r e n c e between the two. A x e l r o d employs the wel l -known P r i s o n e r ' s Dilemma game as a paradigm for c o o p e r a t i o n . 1 2 The game i s c o n s i d e r e d to be a model of the s i t u a t i o n in which i n d i v i d u a l s who behave in a r a t i o n a l or g a i n s - m a x i m i z i n g manner, produce an outcome which i s both i n d i v i d u a l l y and s o c i a l l y s u b - o p t i m a l . To produce the s u p e r i o r outcome r e q u i r e s that the i n d i v i d u a l s foresake a p o l i c y of g a i n s - m a x i m i z a t i o n . Such an a c t i o n i s not l i k e l y i n the short term, A x e l r o d a r g u e s , however i t may become r a t i o n a l i f there i s the e x p e c t a t i o n of repeated i n t e r a c t i o n between i n d i v i d u a l s o r , i f the i n d i v i d u a l s do not d i s c o u n t f u t u r e p a y o f f s at a h igh r a t e . Should e i t h e r of these c o n d i t i o n s h o l d , i t i s b e t t e r for i n d i v i d u a l s to choose a n o n g a i n s - m a x i m i z i n g course of a c t i o n . T h i s sounds very much l i k e a l t r u i s m but of course i t i s not 48 because the outcome of a l l i n d i v i d u a l s choos ing the n o n s e l f -i n t e r e s t e d course of a c t i o n i s c o l l e c t i v e l y and i n d i v i d u a l l y s u p e r i o r to the r e s u l t of them c h o o s i n g i n the o p p o s i t e manner. So c h o o s i n g the non-gains maximiz ing course of a c t i o n i s p e r s o n a l l y advantageous . F u r t h e r m o r e , A x e l r o d shows c o o p e r a t i o n to be d i f f e r e n t from a l t r u i s m in the manner in which i t i s m a i n t a i n e d . C o o p e r a t i o n i s i n h e r e n t l y u n s t a b l e be ing s u b j e c t to breakdown whenever one of the c o o p e r a t o r s i s presented w i t h an o p p o r t u n i t y to surpass the b e n e f i t s of c o o p e r a t i o n w i t h i n d i v i d u a l a c t i o n . T h i s may come about because the end of a c o o p e r a t i v e arrangement i s in s i g h t or because the va lue p l a c e d on the f u t u r e f r u i t s of c o o p e r a t i o n d e c l i n e s . C o o p e r a t i o n can t h e r e f o r e o n l y be m a i n t a i n e d by one of two methods: by the c o n t i n u a l g e n e r a t i o n of a s u r p l u s which surpasses a l l o ther o p p o r t u n i t i e s ' c o s t s -something which can never be guaranteed ; or by t h r e a t s and the maintenance of c o e r c i v e powers which can be used to p u n i s h the noncooperator or d e f e c t o r from a c o o p e r a t i v e arrangement . T h i s i s the p r i n c i p a l f i n d i n g of A x e l r o d ' s work on c o o p e r a t i o n . He d i s c o v e r s that the best way to promote c o o p e r a t i o n i s to use a s t r a t e g y of t i t - f o r - t a t which i s to r e c i p r o c a t e both c o o p e r a t i o n and d e f e c t i o n or to punish and reward o t h e r s a c c o r d i n g to t h e i r w i l l i n g n e s s to c o o p e r a t e . He a l s o f i n d s in a formal a n a l y s i s , that a group of i n d i v i d u a l s u s i n g such a s t r a t e g y can "do b e t t e r " in a number of senses than those who employ other s t r a t e g i e s . 49 2.4 E x p l a i n i n g A l t r u i s m . Because I am only a r g u i n g that i n d i v i d u a l s may be c a p a b l e of behaving as though they were a l t r u i s t i c (which i s s u f f i c i e n t reason to re-examine the ba lance between s t a t e and i n d i v i d u a l a u t h o r i t y ) , e x p l a i n i n g why they should ac t t h i s way i s not c r u c i a l to the argument. N e v e r t h e l e s s , some of the more commonly advanced e x p l a n a t i o n s shou ld be rev iewed to a p p r e c i a t e the d i v e r s i t y of approaches to the s u b j e c t and to i l l u s t r a t e how, i f c a r e i s not t a k e n , a l t r u i s m can become d i f f i c u l t to d i s t i n g u i s h from concepts such as f a i r n e s s , c o m p l i a n c e , or even egoism. In a d d i t i o n , a d i s c u s s i o n of v a r i o u s e x p l a n a t i o n s of a l t r u i s t i c behav iour w i l l a i d in d e t e r m i n i n g how f r e q u e n t l y the behav iour i s l i k e l y to o c c u r . Why would any i n d i v i d u a l choose to reduce h i s or her own w e l f a r e in order to i n c r e a s e that of another or of a group in which the a l t r u i s t i s a member? The s i m p l e s t way of e x p l a i n i n g a l t r u i s m i s to deny i t , and to c o n s i d e r i t as a d e v i a n t form of s e l f - i n t e r e s t . In these e x p l a n a t i o n s , a l t r u i s m i s a r a t i o n a l behav iour which pays d i v i d e n d s to the a c t o r who has adopted i t because of a s p e c i a l set of c i r c u m s t a n c e s which made i t a more p r o f i t a b l e behav iour than o u t r i g h t egoism. M o r d e c a i K u r z 1 3 has suggested a model of a l t r u i s m which i s s i m i l a r to t h i s e x p l a n a t i o n . He w r i t e s that " a l l i n s t a n c e s of observed a l t r u i s t i c behav iour are in f a c t e q u i 1 i b r i u m m a n i f e s t a t i o n s of a complex s t r u c t u r e of a l t r u i s t i c exchange. In t h i s e q u i l i b r i u m i n d i v i d u a l p a r t i c i p a n t s maximize t h e i r b e n e f i t s and in t h i s 50 narrow sense our i n d i v i d u a l s are in f a c t s o c i a l l y compensated and thus not a c t i n g a l t r u i s t i c a l l y in the pure sense . . . A l t h o u g h the e q u i l i b r i u m p r o v i d e s for i n d i v i d u a l o p t i m a l i t y . . . i t i s a r a t h e r f r a g i l e e q u i l i b r i u m and due to the s o c i a l b e n e f i t s i n v o l v e d i t i s supplemented by the f o r m a t i o n of s o c i a l e t h i c s and s o c i a l norms which p r o v i d e both the shadow p r i c e system of the e q u i l i b r i u m and the s t r a t e g i c p e n a l t i e s and rewards for p a r t i c i p a t i n g or t r y i n g to ' c h e a t ' the s y s t e m . " 1 " I n d i v i d u a l s behave a l t r u i s t i c a l l y because of the s o c i a l and i n d i v i d u a l consequences of t h e i r d e s e r t i n g the a l t r u i s t i c e q u i l i b r i u m and because of s o c i a l norms and e t h i c s : Suppose you are d r i v i n g in a l i m i t e d - s p e e d zone whi le you  are in f a c t in a h u r r y . A l s o assume that you b e l i e v e tha t l i m i t e d speeding i s a d e s i r a b l e s o c i a l behav iour and you are in favour of such laws . I f you assume y o u r s e l f to be n e g l i g i b l e in i n f l u e n c e your d e c i s i o n of how f a s t to d r i v e w i l l o n l y depend upon the i n c r e a s e d p r o b a b i l i t y of an a c c i d e n t , the p r o b a b i l i t y of be ing caught , the cos t of the t i c k e t and the va lue to you of a r r i v i n g e a r l i e r to your d e s t i n a t i o n . However, the t r u t h of the matter i s that even when you are a n e g l i g i b l e agent in such a market the in terdependence a spec t i s more than the i n c r e a s e d danger to o t h e r s on the road due to your s p e e d i n g . That a d d i t i o n a l f a c t o r i s the s o c i a l s i g n a l of l e a d e r s h i p tha t i n d i c a t e s to a l l o ther people on the road tha t they may j o i n you in s p e e d i n g . Thus the s i g n a l in many cases i s more important than your own d i r e c t i n d i v i d u a l i s t i c i n f l u e n c e . 1 5 L i k e the P r i s o n e r ' s Dilemma, where c o o p e r a t i o n may be r a t i o n a l i f p l a y i s u n l i m i t e d , adherence to the a l t r u i s t i c e q u i l i b r i u m i s a l s o i n d i v i d u a l l y o p t i m a l i f the i n t e r a c t i o n i s r e p e a t e d . In K u r z ' a n a l y s i s the "shadow of the f u t u r e " p l a y s a s i m i l a r r o l e i n m a i n t a i n i n g an a l t r u i s t i c e q u i l i b r i u m as i t does i n m a i n t a i n i n g c o o p e r a t i o n in the work of A x e l r o d 1 6 and T a y l o r . 1 7 But u n l i k e the l a t t e r two a u t h o r s who suggest tha t 51 c o o p e r a t i o n can be e n f o r c e d by an " e y e - f o r - a n - e y e " p o l i c y , Kurz argues that the e q u i l i b r i u m a c h i e v e d by a l l i n d i v i d u a l s behaving a l t r u i s t i c a l l y i s u n e n f o r c e a b l e , and depends upon " s o c i a l norms which appear to s t a b i l i z e t h i s e q u i l i b r i u m . " 1 8 He i n t e r p r e t s these s o c i a l norms as shadow p r i c e s which "state what i s ' f a i r and p r o p e r ' c o n d u c t . " 1 9 "An example may be the l o y a l t y of a husband to h i s w i f e . The shadow p r i c e s imply r e f l e c t s the s o c i a l norm of what a proper reward a person shou ld expect from be ing ' l o y a l * . " 2 0 While a l t r u i s t i c e q u i l i b r i a are s u p e r i o r in the sense of be ing more e f f i c i e n t by be ing u n e n f o r c e d , they do not r e q u i r e tha t every i n d i v i d u a l r e c o g n i z e the s o c i a l and i n d i v i d u a l o p t i m a l i t y of a d h e r i n g to them, for so long as i n d i v i d u a l s are s u s c e p t i b l e to s o c i a l and e t h i c a l norms, they w i l l r e c o g n i z e the punishment a t t endant upon not behaving f a i r l y or a l t r u i s t i c a l l y . A l t r u i s t i c behav iour f o r K u r z , i s then a consequence of both i t s e f f i c i e n c y and s u p e r i o r outcomes, and the punishment and rewards , and c h i e f l y the rewards , which f o l l o w from such ac t i o n s . The n o t i o n of f a i r n e s s a l s o f e a t u r e s p r o m i n e n t l y i n the e x p l a n a t i o n of a l t r u i s m o f f e r e d by Howard M a r g o l i s . L i k e K u r z , he d e f i n e s a l t r u i s m as p o s s i b l y b e n e f i c i a l to the a c t o r : What we mean by a l t r u i s m in the t e c h n i c a l sense used here i s tha t the i n d i v i d u a l ' s a l l o c a t i o n of r e s o u r c e s i s i n f l u e n c e d not o n l y by the bundle of goods he o b t a i n s f o r h i m s e l f but a l s o by the e f f e c t of h i s c h o i c e on o t h e r s or on h i s s o c i e t y , q u a l i f i e d on ly by the c o n d i t i o n tha t the a c t o r (not n e c e s s a r i l y the r e c i p i e n t s ) regards t h i s behav iour as b e n i g n . An a l t r u i s t i c ac t need not have nega t ive or zero va lue to the a c t o r . What d e f i n e s a l t r u i s t i c behav iour i s that the a c t o r c o u l d have done b e t t e r for h i m s e l f had he chosen to ignore the e f f e c t of 52 h i s c h o i c e on o t h e r s . 2 1 Howard M a r g o l i s in S e l f i s h n e s s , A l t r u i s m and R a t i o n a l i t y suggests tha t the b e n e f i t s of a l t r u i s t i c a c t i o n can be d e r i v e d i n two ways. The most f a m i l i a r i s v i a the n o t i o n of goods a l t r u i s m whereby the i n d i v i d u a l "gains u t i l i t y from an i n c r e a s e in the goods a v a i l a b l e to o t h e r s : h i s u t i l i t y f u n c t i o n i n c o r p o r a t e s a t a s t e for hav ing other people b e t t e r o f f . " 2 2 Goods a l t r u i s m i s thus based on e x t e r n a l l y o b s e r v a b l e b e n e f i t s . P a r t i c i p a t i o n a l t r u i s m by c o n t r a s t , sees the a c t o r as d e r i v i n g b e n e f i t s or g a i n i n g u t i l i t y "from g i v i n g r e s o u r c e s away for the b e n e f i t of o t h e r s . He has a t a s t e for p a r t i c i p a t i o n in s o c i a l a c t s . " 2 3 P a r t i c i p a t i o n a l t r u i s m i s thus "based on i n t e r n a l p s y c h i c b e n e f i t s from the sheer f a c t of p a r t i c i p a t i o n " 2 " and " g i v i n g r e s o u r c e s away i s another of S m i t h ' s t a s t e s , not n e c e s s a r i l y d i f f e r e n t in c h a r a c t e r from a t a s t e for fancy motor c a r s or d o l l a r c i g a r s . " 2 5 M a r g o l i s proceeds to combine these two q u a l i t a t i v e l y d i f f e r e n t c o n c e p t i o n s of a l t r u i s m in what he terms the F a i r Share model which i s d r i v e n by every i n d i v i d u a l ' s n o t i o n of what i t i s to have done one ' s f a i r s h a r e . He asks the reader to imagine an i n d i v i d u a l , Smi th , who i s d i v i d e d i n t o or composed of G - S m i t h , who seeks always to maximize group i n t e r e s t , and S-Smith who seeks always to maximize h i s own s e l f - i n t e r e s t . G -Smith i s in o t h e r words, a pure a l t r u i s t , and S - S m i t h , a pure e g o i s t . S m i t h , the composi te i n d i v i d u a l , a l l o c a t e s h i s r e s o u r c e s between these two i n t e r n a l persons in such a manner as to f u l f i l a sense of hav ing done what Smith p e r c e i v e s to be h i s 53 " f a i r - s h a r e " . M a r g o l i s proposes the f o l l o w i n g r u l e which when compl i ed w i t h r e s u l t s in Smith h a v i n g done h i s f a i r s h a r e : "The l a r g e r the share of my r e s o u r c e s I have spent u n s e l f i s h l y , the more weight I g ive to my s e l f i s h i n t e r e s t s in a l l o c a t i n g m a r g i n a l r e s o u r c e s . On the other hand, the l a r g e r the b e n e f i t I can c o n f e r on the group compared wi th the b e n e f i t from spending m a r g i n a l r e s o u r c e s on m y s e l f , the more I w i l l tend to ac t u n s e l f i s h l y . " 2 6 S-Smith and G-Smith have c o r r e s p o n d i n g S and G u t i l i t i e s and S' and G' m a r g i n a l u t i l i t i e s f o l l o w i n g from s and g a l l o c a t i o n s to S-Smith and G - S m i t h . " G - u t i l i t y e v a l u a t e s S m i t h ' s p e r c e p t i o n of the s i t u a t i o n of s o c i e t y as a whole (not e x c l u d i n g S m i t h , but g i v i n g no s p e c i a l weight to S m i t h ) ; and S-u t i l i t y e v a l u a t e s S m i t h ' s own s i t u a t i o n . " 2 7 W i s the weight which Smith a t t a c h e s to S - u t i l i t y when d e c i d i n g whether to spend another m a r g i n a l d o l l a r on e i t h e r S or G - S m i t h . N o t i c e , as M a r g o l i s c a u t i o n s , "we are not p o s t u l a t i n g a r u l e Smith c o n s c i o u s l y f o l l o w s but r a t h e r an i n t e r n a l mechanism of which Smith may be' q u i t e u n c o n s c i o u s . " 2 8 So the model i s not in tended to posses s any e t h i c a l v a l u e : i t i s not normat ive but d e s c r i p t i v e . The F a i r Share (FS) model f o r m a l i z e d from the r u l e g i v e n above, means that S m i t h ' s p r o p e n s i t y to a l l o c a t e a m a r g i n a l d o l l a r to G-Smith w i l l i n c r e a s e w i th the r a t i o G ' / S ' because the g r e a t e r the b e n e f i t one can c o n f e r on the group compared w i t h the b e n e f i t of spending m a r g i n a l r e s o u r c e s on o n e s e l f , the more l i k e l y one w i l l be to ac t u n s e l f i s h l y . The r a t i o G ' / S ' , t h a t 54 between the m a r g i n a l ' u t i l i t y of a l l o c a t i n g e x t r a r e s o u r c e s to G -Smith and to S - S m i t h , M a r g o l i s c a l l s the "value" r a t i o . However, the e f f e c t of the va lue r a t i o on group spending i s on ly h a l f of the f o r m a l i z e d r u l e , f or W i s an i n c r e a s i n g f u n c t i o n of g / s , meaning that the more one g i v e s to group spending , the more weight one w i l l p l a c e on s e l f i s h spend ing . M a r g o l i s terms the r a t i o g/s the " p a r t i c i p a t i o n " r a t i o which "gives the r a t i o in which Smith has a l l o c a t e d h i s r e s o u r c e s between spending to maximize G v e r s u s S ~ u t i 1 i t y . " 2 9 Smith i s thus the s u b j e c t of two oppos ing p r e s s u r e s : i f the v a l u e r a t i o G ' / S ' i s h i g h , he w i l l be more w i l l i n g to spend in favour of G-Smith and t h e r e f o r e i n c r e a s e the p a r t i c i p a t i o n r a t i o g / s ; but i f g /s i s h i g h , meaning that Smith i s a l r e a d y g i v i n g q u i t e s u b s t a n t i a l l y in the group i n t e r e s t , he w i l l i n c r e a s i n g l y wish to spend more on S - S m i t h . Smi th , . that i s the whole i n d i v i d u a l , w i l l ach ieve an e q u i l i b r i u m when W = G ' / S ' or when the weight he a c c o r d s to s e l f i s h S- spending equals the r a t i o between the m a r g i n a l u t i l i t i e s of G and S - s p e n d i n g . T a l k of formal models may cause one to forge t the o r i g i n a l two c o n c e p t i o n s - p a r t i c i p a t i o n and goods a l t r u i s m . M a r g o l i s c l a i m s that the W f u n c t i o n "captures an i n t u i t i v e sense of p a r t i c i p a t i o n a l t r u i s m ( o r , we might say , p a r t i c i p a t i o n s e l f i s h n e s s , s i n c e the g r e a t e r the p a r t i c i p a t i o n r a t i o the more weight Smith g i v e s to s e l f - i n t e r e s t at the m a r g i n ) . And the v a l u e r a t i o , G ' / S ' , c a p t u r e s an i n t u i t i v e sense of goods a l t r u i s m . " 3 0 The formal c h a r a c t e r of M a r g o l i s ' work g ive s i t a 55 c o m p l e x i t y which o u t s t r i p s i t s b a s i c a s sumpt ions . The FS model i s not an e x p l a n a t i o n of why i n d i v i d u a l s are a l t r u i s t i c but a theory about how i n d i v i d u a l s a l l o c a t e r e s o u r c e s between i n d i v i d u a l and group s p e n d i n g . I n d i v i d u a l s are a l t r u i s t i c or d i s p l a y some degree of group i n t e r e s t because they d e r i v e a p s y c h o l o g i c a l sense of what i t i s to do one's f a i r s h a r e . Smith does not choose "an e q u i l i b r i u m a l l o c a t i o n (such that W = G ' / S in order to do h i s f a i r s h a r e , or do h i s d u t y , or ga in p s y c h i c income. R a t h e r , i t i s e s s e n t i a l to unders tand that the o p p o s i t e i s the c a s e . Given an e q u i l i b r i u m a l l o c a t i o n , Smith has a sense of hav ing done h i s f a i r s h a r e . " 3 1 T h i s may prove an e x c e l l e n t d e s c r i p t i o n of how i n d i v i d u a l s g i v e in the group i n t e r e s t but i t does not e x p l a i n why they do so . M a r g o l i s in e f f e c t c r e a t e s a l t r u i s t i c behav iour by p o s i t i n g an i n d i v i d u a l G-Smith w i t h i n us a l l . " P u t t i n g t h i s i n , not s u r p r i s i n g l y , a l l o w s h i s agents to act i n the group i n t e r e s t , but the r e a l q u e s t i o n i s : why do people care about the group i f they can get a f ree r i d e ? " 3 2 Thomas Nagel in The P o s s i b i l i t y of A l t r u i s m , p r e s e n t s an argument admirab le both for i t s r e a s o n i n g and for i t s c o n s e r v a t i v e c l a i m s . He r e j e c t s e x p l a n a t i o n s of a l t r u i s m based on s e l f - i n t e r e s t as be ing i n c a p a b l e of c o v e r i n g those i n s t a n c e s in which there i s no p r o s p e c t of b e n e f i t to the a l t r u i s t . 3 3 He r e j e c t s as w e l l those e x p l a n a t i o n s which r e s o r t to the g e n e r a l sent iments of sympathy or benevolence "on the ground tha t the p s y c h o l o g i c a l and s o c i e t a l p r i n c i p l e s to which they appea l are n e i t h e r u n i v e r s a l nor obvious enough to account for the ex tent of a l t r u i s t i c m o t i v a t i o n , and that they are e v i d e n t l y f a l s e to 56 the phenomena." 3 " Nagel c r i t i c i z e s e x p l a n a t i o n s both in terms of sent iment and s e l f - i n t e r e s t for s imply p o s t u l a t i n g an a l t r u i s t i c d e s i r e as the source of m o t i v a t i o n to b e h a v i o u r , a r g u i n g i n s t e a d , that d e s i r e i s not the on ly nor most important s o u r c e . And he w r i t e s , that these e x p l a n a t i o n s are u n s a t i s f a c t o r y "because none of them p r o v i d e s the type of s i m p l e , a b s o l u t e g e n e r a l i t y which i s r e q u i r e d . There i s a c o n s i d e r a t e n e s s for o t h e r s which i s beyond the reach of c o m p l i c a t e d r e f l e c t i o n s about s o c i a l advantage , and which does not r e q u i r e the o p e r a t i o n of any s p e c i f i c s e n t i m e n t . " 3 5 N a g e l ' s e x p l a n a t i o n of the p o s s i b i l i t y of a l t r u i s m o r i g i n a t e s in a c o n s i d e r a t i o n of the requ irements of p r a c t i c a l r e a s o n i n g . U n l i k e o ther approaches to the q u e s t i o n , he argues tha t " a l t r u i s m and r e l a t e d mot ives do not depend on t a s t e , s e n t i m e n t , or an a r b i t r a r y and u l t i m a t e c h o i c e . " 3 6 I n s t e a d , he i n s i s t s that a l t r u i s m (or r a t h e r i t s p o s s i b i l i t y s h ou l d we be a b l e to overcome our own b a r r i e r s to i t s r e c o g n i t i o n ) f o l l o w s from our reasons for a c t i o n . These may be e i t h e r s u b j e c t i v e or o b j e c t i v e . S u b j e c t i v e reasons for a c t i o n " y i e l d d i s t i n c t but r e l a t e d ends of a c t i o n for d i f f e r e n t i n d i v i d u a l s . " 3 7 O b j e c t i v e reasons are "reasons for anyone to promote what they a p p l y t o . They are not reasons for p a r t i c u l a r i n d i v i d u a l s , but s imply reasons for the o c c u r r e n c e of the t h i n g s of which they h o l d t r u e . " 3 8 S u b j e c t i v e reasons need not be whol ly e g o i s t i c j u s t as o b j e c t i v e reasons need not always be a l t r u i s t i c but the " c e n t r a l v e r s i o n of. egoism i s a s u b j e c t i v e o n e . " 3 9 57 Nagel contends that of these two types of reasons for a c t i o n , "the o n l y a c c e p t a b l e reasons are o b j e c t i v e ones; even i f one opera te s s u c c e s s f u l l y w i th a s u b j e c t i v e p r i n c i p l e , one must be a b l e to back i t up wi th an o b j e c t i v e p r i n c i p l e y i e l d i n g those same reasons as w e l l as (presumably) o t h e r s . Whenever one a c t s for a r e a s o n , I m a i n t a i n , i t must be p o s s i b l e to r e g a r d o n e s e l f as a c t i n g for an o b j e c t i v e r e a s o n , and promot ing an o b j e c t i v e l y v a l u a b l e e n d . " " 0 F u r t h e r m o r e , s u b j e c t i v e reasons f o r a c t i o n are incongruous : one cannot make the same judgement about a s i t u a t i o n from p e r s o n a l and impersona l v i e w p o i n t s , whi l e one can unders tand one ' s own p a i n , one cannot unders tand and act upon a n o t h e r ' s . The on ly reasons for a c t i o n which a v o i d t h i s i n c o n g r u i t y are o b j e c t i v e ones which warrant a c t i o n when an end i s c o n c e i v e d of i m p e r s o n a l l y . O b j e c t i v e reasons c o n t a i n the p o s s i b i l i t y of a l t r u i s m because they , in c o n t r a s t to s u b j e c t i v e ones, a l l o w f o r the r e c o g n i t i o n of o t h e r s ' i n t e r e s t s . O b j e c t i v e reasons for a c t i o n r e q u i r e a c o n c e p t i o n of s e l f as merely one person amongst a wor ld of such i n h a b i t a n t s , and t h i s c o n c e p t i o n Nagel a r g u e s , i s a requirement of a l t r u i s m . "How would you l i k e i t i f someone d i d tha t to you?" , i s a q u e s t i o n to which a p o t e n t i a l a l t r u i s t must be a b l e to formula te a r e p l y , and to do so r e q u i r e s an impersona l v i e w p o i n t and so o b j e c t i v e reasons . A l t r u i s m thus depends "on the f a c t tha t our reasons for a c t i o n are s u b j e c t to the f o r m a l c o n d i t i o n of o b j e c t i v i t y , which depends in t u r n on our a b i l i t y to view o u r s e l v e s . f r o m both the p e r s o n a l and impersona l s t a n d p o i n t s , and to engage in r e a s o n i n g to p r a c t i c a l c o n c l u s i o n s from both of these s t a n d p o i n t s . These 58 are forms of thought and a c t i o n which i t may not be in our power to r e n o u n c e . " " 1 The e x p l a n a t i o n which Nagel o f f e r s for a l t r u i s m i s in a sense , a b y - p r o d u c t of the requirements of p r a c t i c a l r e a s o n i n g . I f reasons for a c t i o n must be o b j e c t i v e , then the requirements for a l t r u i s m w i l l have been f u l f i l l e d as an i n d i v i d u a l must be a b l e to view h i s own c o n d i t i o n o b j e c t i v e l y . T h i s argument as Nagel emphasizes , does not p r e c l u d e the p o s s i b i l i t y and in f a c t the p r o b a b i l i t y of egoism, i t merely r a i s e s i t s c o s t by making i t s acceptance c o n t r a r y to p r a c t i c a l r e a s o n i n g . N e i t h e r does the argument make a case for the u n i v e r s a l i t y of a l t r u i s m (Nagel b e l i e v e s i t i s r a r e ) , but o n l y e s t a b l i s h e s that the c o n d i t i o n s neces sary for i t s e x i s t e n c e are p r e s e n t . I f we are not o f t e n a l t r u i s t i c , i t i s because: . . .we are of ten weak, c o w a r d l y , s e l f - d e c e i v i n g , and i n s e n s i t i v e to the r e a l i t y of o ther p e r s o n s . There i s never a l a c k of e x p l a n a t i o n s for human lapses from i d e a l l y r a t i o n a l conduct , and when the s takes are h i g h , the t emptat ions of s o l i p s i s t i c d i s s o c i a t i o n are c o n s i d e r a b l e . I t i s o f t en a s t r u g g l e to m a i n t a i n the c l e a r sense of o n e s e l f as j u s t a person among o t h e r s . But I have not m a i n t a i n e d that human conduct i n v a r i a b l y a c c o r d s wi th that c o n c e p t i o n . I have o n l y t r i e d to e x p l a i n our deep- sea ted s u s c e p t i b i l i t y to n o n - e g o i s t i c r e a s o n s , and our c a p a c i t y to r e c o g n i z e them as requ irements i f the i s sue i s f o r c e d upon us w i th s u f f i c i e n t c l a r i t y . " 2 I t has a l s o been suggested that a l t r u i s m i s but one of a number of sent iments to which i n d i v i d u a l s are i n some sense s u s c e p t i b l e . Under c e r t a i n c o n d i t i o n s , an a c t o r w i l l be m o t i v a t e d by an u n d e r l y i n g sent iment to engage in an a l t r u i s t i c a c t . For example: 1. Suppose that a consumer wishes for another to have more of one of h i s consumption goods for reasons of pure 59 b e n e v o l e n c e . * 3 2. Then i t i s a m a n i f e s t a t i o n of an a l t r u i s t i c sent iment in h i s p r e f e r e n c e s . * " 3. The benevolent sentiment may be m o t i v a t e d by the d e s i r e for the o t h e r ' s ' h a p p i n e s s ' , however t h a t i s u n d e r s t o o d . " 5 4a. If a person p r e f e r s that a c e r t a i n good which he possesses b e n e f i t another r a t h e r than h i m s e l f , he w i l l make a g i f t of t h i s good, so long as t h i s i s m a t e r i a l l y and s o c i a l l y p o s s i b l e , and so long as the g i f t i s a c c e p t e d . T h i s behaviour presupposes tha t h i s concern in favour of the o t h e r ' s consumption of t h i s good i s i n some sense more weighty than h i s ga in from consuming i t h i m s e l f . In such c a s e s , a l t r u i s t i c sent iments b r i n g about a l t r u i s t i c b e h a v i o u r . But i f h i s concern for the o t h e r ' s consumption i s too weak r e l a t i v e to h i s c o n c e r n for h i s own, h i s a l t r u i s t i c sent iments do not l e a d to c o r r e s p o n d i n g l y a l t r u i s t i c b e h a v i o u r . " 6 4b. . . . a p e r s o n ' s a l t r u i s t i c sent iment ( d e s i r i n g tha t another have more) cannot t r a n s l a t e i n t o a l t r u i s t i c g i f t behav iour un le s s i t i s s u f f i c i e n t l y power fu l that i t s s a t i s f a c t i o n w i l l compensate him for the l o s s of that which he has g i v e n . " 7 5. Sent iments and behav iour may have s i m i l a r t r a i t s and l a b e l s ( " e g o i s t i c " or " a l t r u i s t i c " ) . Sent iments tend to g ive r i s e to the c o r r e s p o n d i n g b e h a v i o u r . But i t i s w e l l known that the c o n t r a r y a l s o o c c u r s : a c e r t a i n behav iour may end up c r e a t i n g in the a c t o r the c o r r e s p o n d i n g sent iment . " 8 6. . . . t h e same person may be a l t r u i s t i c ( i n sentiment or in behav iour ) toward one, e g o i s t i c toward another . . . and so on . In f a c t , t h i s i s g e n e r a l l y , the c a s e , and the s t r e n g t h of a l l these v a r i a b l e s may d i f f e r depending on , for example, the goods at s t a k e , the p e o p l e , or the s i t u a t i o n . " " 9 T h i s e x p l a n a t i o n , e x c e r p t e d from S e r g e - C h r i s t o p h e Kolm's a r t i c l e " A l t r u i s m and E f f i c i e n c y " , has much i n common w i t h s o c i a l - p s y c h o l o g i c a l e x p l a n a t i o n s of b e h a v i o u r . T h i s approach assumes behaviour to be m o t i v a t e d by one of a c o n s t e l l a t i o n of s e n t i m e n t s , a t t i t u d e s , t r a i t s , or p r e d i s p o s i t i o n s . An i n d i v i d u a l who behaves in an a l t r u i s t i c manner i s assumed to 60 possess an antecedent congruent sent iment or a t t i t u d e which m o t i v a t e s the b e h a v i o u r . As in many e x p l a n a t i o n s of t h i s t y p e , whi l e we may accept tha t the behav iour i s m o t i v a t e d by the s en t iment , we have no e x p l a n a t i o n of the sentiment i t s e l f . At f i r s t , Kolm pushes the e x p l a n a t i o n of benevolence back yet another s tep from the behav iour by w r i t i n g that the "sentiment may be mot iva ted by the d e s i r e for the o t h e r ' s ' h a p p i n e s s ' . " 5 0 But what mot iva ted the d e s i r e for the o t h e r ' s happiness i s a q u e s t i o n which s t i l l remains u n r e s o l v e d . At o ther p o i n t s he w r i t e s tha t i n d i v i d u a l s may a c q u i r e a l t r u i s t i c sent iments through p a r e n t a l e d u c a t i o n 5 1 , "through s e l f - r e f l e c t i o n , r e a s o n i n g or an ac t of w i l l " 5 2 , or through behav iour which i n s t i l l s the s e n t i m e n t 5 3 . Each of these e x p l a n a t i o n s may have some va lue but they each l eave q u e s t i o n s unanswered: i f a l t r u i s m i s t a u g h t , why i s i t t a u g h t ? ; many a c t s can be e x p l a i n e d by s e l f - r e f l e c t i o n , why would t h i s n e c e s s a r i l y l e a d one to be a l t r u i s t i c as opposed to e g o i s t i c ? ; to say tha t a l t r u i s m i s an act of w i l l i s to say very l i t t l e and e x p l a i n even l e s s ; a l t r u i s m u n d e n i a b l y has a moral q u a l i t y , but t y p i c a l l y , we canot be m o r a l l y r e q u i r e d to behave a l t r u i s t i c a l l y ; granted that behav iour may i n s t i l l s en t iment , we f r e q u e n t l y r a t i o n a l i z e our a c t i o n s a f t e r the f a c t , but why would a person behave a l t r u i s t i c a l l y in the f i r s t p l a c e , by chance , by m i s t a k e , through i m i t a t i o n or what? One obv ious omis s ion from the d i s c u s s i o n of e x p l a n a t i o n s of a l t r u i s m i s the work of s o c i o b i o l o g i s t s who t r e a t i t as the "test case" i n g e n e t i c t h e o r i e s of b e h a v i o u r . 5 " But even a 61 c u r s o r y review of t h i s l i t e r a t u r e would r e q u i r e a l engthy d i s c u s s i o n of the c o n t e n t i o u s mechanics of e v o l u t i o n which would take us f a r from the c e n t r a l focus of t h i s p a p e r . Moreover , whi l e a gene ' s -eye view of a l t r u i s m i s c o n v i n c i n g when i t takes as an example l i f e and death s i t u a t i o n s , i t s u s e f u l n e s s in e x p l a i n i n g human behaviour appears d i m i n i s h e d i n i n s t a n c e s where l i f e and death i m p l i c a t i o n s are l e s s obvious or indeed a b s e n t . A d e c i s i o n to c o n t r i b u t e to the p r o v i s i o n of most p u b l i c goods does not u s u a l l y i n v o l v e our immediate s u r v i v a l . 2.5 C o n c l u s i o n . I t w i l l be apparent now that some of the t h e o r i e s of a l t r u i s m reviewed in the p r e c e d i n g pages are not who l ly s a t i s f a c t o r y e x p l a n a t i o n s of the b e h a v i o u r . O n l y - N a g e l and perhaps Kurz e x p l a i n r a t h e r than p o s i t the e x i s t e n c e of a l t r u i s t i c b e h a v i o u r . And o n l y i n Nagel i s there a m o t i v a t i o n which i s t r u l y independent of the behaviour i t s e l f . B e a r i n g in mind the inadequacy of most e x p l a n a t i o n s , the q u e s t i o n s posed at the b e g i n n i n g of the c h a p t e r can s t i l l be answered. F i r s t , we wanted to know whether a l t r u i s m i s a s u f f i c i e n t l y g e n e r a l behav iour tha t i t c o u l d at l e a s t p o t e n t i a l l y be observed in p o l i t i c a l s i t u a t i o n s o r , whether i t i s l i m i t e d to s p e c i f i c r e l a t i o n s h i p s between a c q u a i n t a n c e s or f a m i l y members. C e r t a i n l y , there i s n o t h i n g i n e i t h e r d e f i n i t i o n s or 62 e x p l a n a t i o n s of the behav iour which would suggest that a l t r u i s m i s not r e l e v a n t to p o l i t i c a l s i t u a t i o n s and more s p e c i f i c a l l y to the p r o v i s i o n of c o l l e c t i v e goods. N a g e l ' s e x p l a n a t i o n d e s c r i b e s a g e n e r a l c o n d i t i o n which p l a c e s no r e s t r i c t i o n s on s p e c i f i c s i t u a t i o n s but makes the c o n d i t i o n s for a l t r u i s m a requirement of p r a c t i c a l r e a s o n i n g which presumably ho lds in d e c i s i o n s about c o n t r i b u t i o n s to p u b l i c goods as w e l l as in the contex t of p e r s o n a l r e l a t i o n s h i p s . Second, we wanted to know whether i n d i v i d u a l s ' behav iour in p r o v i d i n g p u b l i c goods a c c o r d s wi th d e f i n i t i o n s of a l t r u i s m . T h i s seems to be the c a s e , for as w i th a l t r u i s m , c o n t r i b u t i o n s to the p r o v i s i o n of p u b l i c goods cannot be c o e r c e d and r e q u i r e a c o s t which i s not e n t i r e l y recouped by the b e n e f i t s from the p r o v i s i o n of the good. I f , as has been suggested in t h i s c h a p t e r , a l t r u i s m may be r e l e v a n t to the p r o v i s i o n of p u b l i c goods, why are not more such goods p r o v i d e d on a v o l u n t a r y b a s i s wi thout the c o e r c i v e a c t i o n s of government? 63 N o t e s . 1 G a r r e t t H a r d i n , The L i m i t s of A l t r u i s m : an E c o l o q i s t ' s  View of S u r v i v a l (B loomington: Indiana U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s , 1977), p . 26. 2 Thomas N a g e l , The P o s s i b i l i t y of A l t r u i s m ( O x f o r d : O x f o r d U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s , 1970), p . ]~6~. 3 D a n i e l B a r - T a l , P r o s o c i a l B e h a v i o u r : Theory and Research (Washington: Hemisphere P u b l i s h i n g , 1976), p . 102. 4 Dennis L . K r e b s , " A l t r u i s m - an E x a m i n a t i o n of the Concept and a Review of the L i t e r a t u r e " P s y c h o l o g i c a l B u l l e t i n , v o l . 73 (1970), p . 259. 5 See: James S. F i s h k i n , The L i m i t s of O b l i g a t i o n (New Haven: Y a l e U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s , 1979). 6 F i s h k i n , The L i m i t s of O b l i g a t i o n , p . 14. 7 See: J . O . Urmson, "Sa in t s and Heroes" , in A . I . M e l d e n , e d . , Essays in M o r a l P h i l o s o p h y ( U n i v e r s i t y of Washington P r e s s , 1958). 8 S e r g e - C h r i s t o p e Kolm, " A l t r u i s m and E f f i c i e n c y " , E t h i c s , v o l . 94 (1983), p . 40. 9 D a v i d G a u t h i e r , " C o o r d i n a t i o n " , D i a l o g u e , v o l . 14 (1977) , p . 199. 1 0 Mordeca i K u r z , " A l t r u i s t i c E q u i l i b r i u m " i n , B e l a B e l a s s a and R i c h a r d Nelson e d s . , Economic P r o g r e s s , P r i v a t e V a l u e s , and  P u b l i c P o l i c y (Amsterdam: N o r t h - H o l l a n d , 1977), pp . 180-181. 1 1 Robert A x e l r o d , The E v o l u t i o n of C o o p e r a t i o n (New Y o r k : B a s i c Books , 1984). 1 2 The P r i s o n e r ' s Dilemma game takes i t s name from the f o l l o w i n g a l l e g o r y : 64 Two s u s p e c t s are taken in cus tody and s e p a r a t e d . The d i s t r i c t a t t o r n e y i s c e r t a i n tha t they are g u i l t y of a s p e c i f i c c r i m e , but he does not have adequate ev idence to c o n v i c t them at a t r i a l . He p o i n t s out to each p r i s o n e r that each has two a l t e r n a t i v e s : to confess to the crime the p o l i c e are sure they have done, or not to c o n f e s s . I f they both do not c o n f e s s , then the d i s t r i c t a t t o r n e y s t a t e s he w i l l book them on some minor trumped-up charge such as p e t t y l a r c e n y and i l l e g a l p o s s e s s i o n of a weapon, and they both w i l l r e c e i v e minor punishment; i f they both confes s they w i l l be p r o s e c u t e d , but he w i l l recommend l e s s than the most severe sentence; but i f one c o n f e s s e s and the o ther does no t , then the c o n f e s s o r w i l l r e c e i v e l e n i e n t treatment for t u r n i n g s t a t e ' s ev idence whereas the l a t t e r w i l l get ' the book' s l a p p e d at h i m . In terms of years in a p e n i t e n t i a r y , the s t r a t e g i c problem might reduce t o : P r i s o n e r 2 P r i s o n e r 1 Not Confess Confess Not Confess 1 year each 10 years for 1 , 3 months for 2 Confess 3 months for 1 10 years for 2 8 y e a r s each R. Duncan Luce and Howard R a i f f a , Games and D e c i s i o n s (New Y o r k : W i l e y , 1957), p . 95. 1 3 See: Mordecai K u r z , " A l t r u i s m as an Outcome of S o c i a l I n t e r a c t i o n , " American Economic A s s o c i a t i o n . Papers and Proceed ings , v o l . 9 0 (1978), pp .216-222 , and Note 10 above . 1 * K u r z , " A l t r u i s t i c E q u i l i b r i u m " , p . 179. 1 5 K u r z , " A l t r u i s t i c E q u i l i b r i u m " , p . 184. 1 6 See Robert A x e l r o d , The E v o l u t i o n of C o o p e r a t i o n ; Robert A x e l r o d , "The Emergence of C o o p e r a t i o n Among A l t r u i s t s " , American P o l i t i c a l Sc i ence Review , v o l . 75 (1981) , pp . 306-318, and ; Robert A x e l r o d and W i l l i a m D. H a m i l t o n , "The E v o l u t i o n of C o o p e r a t i o n " , Sc i ence , v o l . 211 (1981) , pp . 1390-1396. 1 7 M i c h a e l T a y l o r , Anarchy and C o o p e r a t i o n (London: W i l e y , 1976), pp . 28-83. 65 1 8 K u r z , " A l t r u i s t i c E q u i l i b r i u m " , p . 179, 1 9 K u r z , " A l t r u i s t i c E q u i l i b r i u m " , p . 197 2 0 K u r z , " A l t r u i s t i c E q u i l i b r i u m " , p . 197 2 1 Howard M a r g o l i s , S e l f i s h n e s s , A l t r u i s m and R a t i o n a l i t y (Cambridge: Cambridge U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s , 1982), p i Y5~. 2 2 21 . 2 3 21 . 2 « 27 . 2 5 21-22. 2 6 36. 2 7 38. 2 8 38-39. 2 9 38. 3 0 42. 3 1 60. M a r g o l i s , S e l f i s h n e s s , A l t r u i s m and R a t i o n a l i t y , p . M a r g o l i s , S e l f i s h n e s s , A l t r u i s m and R a t i o n a l i t y , p . M a r g o l i s , S e l f i s h n e s s , A l t r u i s m and R a t i o n a l i t y , p . M a r g o l i s , S e l f i s h n e s s , A l t r u i s m and R a t i o n a l i t y , p . M a r g o l i s , S e l f i s h n e s s , A l t r u i s m and R a t i o n a l i t y , p . M a r g o l i s , S e l f i s h n e s s , A l t r u i s m and R a t i o n a l i t y , p . M a r g o l i s , S e l f i s h n e s s , A l t r u i s m and R a t i o n a l i t y , p . M a r g o l i s , S e l f i s h n e s s , A l t r u i s m and R a t i o n a l i t y , p . M a r g o l i s , S e l f i s h n e s s , A l t r u i s m and R a t i o n a l i t y , p . M a r g o l i s , S e l f i s h n e s s , A l t r u i s m and R a t i o n a l i t y , p . 66 3 2 Andrew S c h o t t e r , "Review of S e l f i s h n e s s , A l t r u i s m , and R a t i o n a l i t y " , J o u r n a l of Economic L i t e r a t u r e , v o l . 21 (1983), p . 557. 3 3 3 « 3 5 3 6 3 7 3 8 3 9 a o u 1 4 2 .ty P r e s s , 1970), P- 79. The P o s s i b i l i t y of A l t r u i s m , P- 79-80 The P o s s i b i l i t y of A l t r u i s m , P- 82. The P o s s i b i l i t y of A l t r u i s m , P- 1 44 . The P o s s i b i l i t y of A l t r u i s m , P- 90. The P o s s i b i l i t y of A l t r u i s m , P- 91 . The P o s s i b i l i t y of A l t r u i s m , P- 96. The P o s s i b i l i t y of A l t r u i s m , P- 96-97 The P o s s i b i l i t y of A l t r u i s m , P- 1 44. The P o s s i b i l i t y of A l t r u i s m , P . 1 24. " 3 S e r g e - C h r i s t o p e Kolm, " A l t r u i s m and E f f i c i e n c y " , E t h i c s , v o l . 94 (1983), p . 38. 4 4 Kolm, " A l t r u i s m and E f f i c i e n c y " , p . 38. 4 5 Kolm, " A l t r u i s m and E f f i c i e n c y " , p . 39. 4 6 Kolm, " A l t r u i s m and E f f i c i e n c y " , p . 39. 4 7 Kolm, " A l t r u i s m and E f f i c i e n c y " , p . 48. 4 8 Kolm, " A l t r u i s m and E f f i c i e n c y " , p . 48. 67 " 9 Kolm, " A l t r u i s m and E f f i c i e n c y " , p . 40. 5 0 Kolm, " A l t r u i s m and E f f i c i e n c y " , p . 39. 5 1 Kolm, " A l t r u i s m and E f f i c i e n c y " , p . 45. 5 2 Kolm, " A l t r u i s m and E f f i c i e n c y " , p . 45-46 5 3 5 a Kolm, " A l t r u i s m and E f f i c i e n c y " , p . 45. For an overview of t h i s area see: Edward 0. W i l s o n , Soc i o b i o l o g y . The New S y n t h e s i s (Cambridge M a s s . : Be lknap P r e s s , 1975). Other important c o n t r i b u t i o n s a r e : R i c h a r d D. A l e x a n d e r , "The E v o l u t i o n of S o c i a l B e h a v i o u r " , Annual Review of  E c o l o g y and S y s t e m i c s , v o l . 5 (1974), pp . 325-383; S c o t t Boorman and Paul R. L e v i t t , The G e n e t i c s of A l t r u i s m (New Y o r k : Academic P r e s s , 1980); W i l l i a m D. H a m i l t o n , "The G e n e t i c a l Theory of S o c i a l B e h a v i o u r . P a r t s I and I I . " , J o u r n a l of  T h e o r e t i c a l B i o l o g y , v o l . 7, (1964) , pp . 1-16, 17- 32; and , Robert L . T r i v e r s , "The E v o l u t i o n of R e c i p r o c a l A l t r u i s m " , The  Q u a r t e r l y Review of B i o l o g y , v o l . 46 (1971), pp . 35-57; For a n o n - t e c h n i c a l , though o p i n i o n a t e d review of the l i t e r a t u r e , see: R i c h a r d Dawkins, The S e l f i s h Gene (London: G r a n a d a , . 1978). One of the best c r i t i q u e s i s : M a r s h a l l S a h l i n s , The Use and Abuse of  B i o l o g y . An A n t h r o p o l o g i c a l C r i t i q u e of S o c i o b i o l o g y (Ann A r b o r : U n i v e r s i t y of M i c h i g a n P r e s s , 1976). 68 I I I . ALTRUISM AND CONTEXT 3.1 Recapi t u l a t i o n . Now b r i e f l y back to the b e g i n n i n g . There i t was suggested tha t some j u s t i f i c a t i o n s of the need for government may be i n f l u e n c e d by p r i o r b e l i e f s about human n a t u r e . It was then suggested tha t the p r o v i s i o n of p u b l i c goods o u t s i d e the s t a t e or wi thout the s t a t e ' s i n t e r v e n t i o n , does not e n t i r e l y f i t t h i s c h a r a c t e r i z a t i o n of human nature which a s s i g n s benevolence to p r i v a t e l i f e o n l y . In Chapter Two i t was suggested that the u s u a l d e f i n i t i o n s of a l t r u i s m do seem to d e s c r i b e behaviour in the p r o v i s i o n of p u b l i c goods, and tha t a l t r u i s m i s a s u f f i c i e n t l y g e n e r a l behav iour to extend i n t o p u b l i c l i f e and t h e r e f o r e p o l i t i c a l s i t u a t i o n s . Chapter Two a l s o reviewed some e x p l a n a t i o n s of why i n d i v i d u a l s may engage in such an a p p a r e n t l y i r r a t i o n a l b e h a v i o u r . S t i l l t h i n k i n g of the example of p u b l i c goods c i t e d in Chapter One, note tha t not a l l i n d i v i d u a l s c o n t r i b u t e towards t h e i r p r o v i s i o n , and in some i n s t a n c e s c o e r c i o n i s r e q u i r e d to p r o v i d e the good. Yet i f we suppose that a l l i n d i v i d u a l s are e q u a l l y c a p a b l e of a l t r u i s m why do o n l y some mani fes t i t ? 69 3.2 C o n s t r a i n t s On A l t r u i s m . The answer that f i r s t comes to mind i s tha t i n d i v i d u a l s d i f f e r . Some w i l l be more a l t r u i s t i c than o t h e r s a c c o r d i n g to t h e i r p e r s o n a l i t y , s o c i a l c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s and so on . But Dennis K r e b s , in a survey of the e x p e r i m e n t a l l i t e r a t u r e on a l t r u i s m , w r i t e s : "Cons idered as a whole, no g e n e r a l c o n c l u s i o n can be drawn about p e r s o n a l i t y t r a i t s of b e n e f a c t o r s . " 1 For example, D a r l e y and L a t a n e 2 found that those s u b j e c t s who responded to the sounds of a c on fe de r a te hav ing an e p i l e p t i c f i t , and those s u b j e c t s who d i d not re spond , d i d not d i f f e r on measures of s o c i a l r e s p o n s i b i l i t y , M a c h i a v e l l i a n i s m , or need for a p p r o v a l . In a s i m i l a r experiment i n v o l v i n g an as thmat i c e x p e r i m e n t e r , K o r t e 3 found tha t h e l p e r s were no more or l e s s d e f e r e n t i a l , autonomous, or s u b m i s s i v e , than were n o n h e l p e r s . These exper imenta l r e s u l t s do not of course mean that p e r s o n a l i t y i s i r r e l e v a n t to a l t r u i s t i c b e h a v i o u r . The n e g a t i v e f i n d i n g s p r o b a b l y r e l a t e more to the unusual e x p e r i m e n t a l s i t u a t i o n s which may d i m i n i s h the importance of p e r s o n a l i t y . But at the same t ime , these f i n d i n g s a l s o emphasize the importance of s i t u a t i o n to a l t r u i s t i c b e h a v i o u r . Krebs a l s o w r i t e s that "the f i n d i n g s r e l a t i n g to s o c i a l r o l e s and demographic a t t r i b u t e s of b e n e f a c t o r s demonstrated that sex, age, o r d i n a l p o s i t i o n , s o c i a l c l a s s , and n a t i o n a l i t y sometimes a f f e c t a l t r u i s m . " " And " s e v e r a l s t u d i e s suggest that p o t e n t i a l r e c i p i e n t s are sometimes more l i k e l y to e l i c i t b e n e f i t s when they are f r i e n d s , i n g r o u p e r s , and members of the same s o c i a l c l a s s and n a t i o n a l i t y as b e n e f a c t o r s . 70 Other s t u d i e s , though, suggest t h a t n o n f r i e n d s , o u t g r o u p e r s , f o r e i g n e r s , and members of h i g h e r s o c i a l c l a s s e s e l i c i t more a l t r u i s m . " 5 But in c o n t r a s t to the u n c l e a r f i n d i n g s on the r e l a t i o n s h i p between a l t r u i s m and demographic , s o c i o l o g i c a l and p e r s o n a l i t y c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s , Krebs f r e q u e n t l y mentions the importance of s i t u a t i o n or c o n t e x t i n the many exper iments he rev iews: "The f a c t that no r e a l t r e n d appeared a c r o s s experiments seems to i n d i c a t e t h a t a l t r u i s m i s l a r g e l y a f u n c t i o n of the s p e c i f i c s i t u a t i o n s . . . " 6 And "in view of the fac t that d i f f e r e n t s i t u a t i o n s tend to e l i c i t d i f f e r e n t amounts of a l t r u i s m , and that people who share s o c i a l r o l e s d i f f e r a long other d i m e n s i o n s , i t i s not s u r p r i s i n g that g e n e r a l t r e n d s are not f r e q u e n t . " 7 Any e x p l a n a t i o n of b e h a v i o u r r e q u i r e s not on ly a c o n s i d e r a t i o n of the wants, w i shes , d e s i r e s or t a s t e s of an a c t o r , but a l s o of the degree to which those t a s t e s are a f f e c t e d by context or s i t u a t i o n . In another sense, the p a r t i c u l a r context of a behav iour may p r e - o r d a i n the t a s t e s which govern the behav iour of the a c t o r s . T h i s i s a roundabout way of a s k i n g : what are the s i t u a t i o n a l c o n s t r a i n t s which govern a l t r u i s m ? That a l t r u i s m or v o l u n t a r y g i f t - g i v i n g might be r e s t r i c t e d or c o n s t r a i n e d by context sounds a lmost c o u n t e r - i n t u i t i v e . However, i n some s i t u a t i o n s a l t r u i s t i c behav iour w i l l be c o n s t r a i n e d by the i n d i v i d u a l ' s r e s o u r c e s : h i s w e a l t h , h i s s k i l l s , h i s t ime a v a i l a b l e ; by h i s or her a b i l i t y to improve the we l fare of the r e c i p i e n t ; by the e x p e c t a t i o n s of o t h e r s ' 71 b e h a v i o u r ; by the i n s t i t u t i o n s or r u l e s which govern s o c i a l b e h a v i o u r ; and so f o r t h . As w i l l be e x p l a i n e d in t h i s and in the succeed ing c h a p t e r , the o p p o r t u n i t i e s or s i t u a t i o n s in which v o l u n t a r y g i f t - g i v i n g i s p o s s i b l e are q u i t e r e s t r i c t e d . In many c o n t e x t s or r e l a t i o n s h i p s , a l t r u i s m w i l l not be p o s s i b l e for one or more r e a s o n s . In some of these s i t u a t i o n s i t w i l l be because g i f t - g i v i n g i s i m p o s s i b l e . F o r m a l l y , t h i s means that the g i v i n g of a g i f t i s not an a l t e r n a t i v e or member of the set of a c t i o n s from which the would-be a l t r u i s t may choose . The absence of such a c h o i c e may f i r s t be e x p l a i n e d by the f a c t that any would-be a l t r u i s t must possess or be the master of something which another i n d i v i d u a l or p o t e n t i a l r e c i p i e n t w i l l c o n s t r u e as a g i f t . In the extreme, the i n d i v i d u a l who possesses n o t h i n g which may be g i v e n as a g i f t cannot t r a n s l a t e a l t r u i s t i c sent iment i n t o b e h a v i o u r : one who has noth ing may g ive n o t h i n g away. So worded, t h i s c o n s t r a i n t sounds r a r e f o r i t i s not easy to imagine a wor ld of a c t o r s so b e r e f t that they possess n o t h i n g which may p o t e n t i a l l y be a g i f t . But i f concern i s narrowed from d i s c u s s i o n of an a c t o r ' s t o t a l r e s o u r c e s to those a p p l i c a b l e i n a p a r t i c u l a r s i t u a t i o n , t h i s c o n s t r a i n t may appear more i m p o r t a n t . There w i l l a l s o be a l i n k between how much one has and how much one commits to a l t r u i s t i c a c t i o n . R e c a l l tha t M a r g o l i s argues that g i v i n g i s a f u n c t i o n of the r a t i o between spending m a r g i n a l r e s o u r c e s on o n e s e l f and on the group . The more one has to spend on o n e s e l f , the more l i k e l y one i s to spend some of i t in the g r o u p ' s i n t e r e s t . R u s s e l l H a r d i n makes a s i m i l a r 72 o b s e r v a t i o n : "Most o b v i o u s l y , the more of e v e r y t h i n g e l s e one has , the more one may be w i l l i n g to t rade a g a i n s t one's moral commitment to a m a r g i n a l impact on the p r o v i s i o n of a d e s i r e d c o l l e c t i v e g o o d . " 8 In the i n s t a n c e d e s c r i b e d above, the would-be a l t r u i s t had no g i f t and so c o u l d not mani fe s t h i s or her wishes in b e h a v i o u r . In another s i t u a t i o n the would-be a l t r u i s t may be c o n s t r a i n e d by the f a c t that the magnitude of the g i f t r e q u i r e d surpasses e i t h e r the r e s o u r c e s of the a c t o r or the i n c l i n a t i o n of the a c t o r to g i v e . For i n s t a n c e , a g i f t may be i n d i v i s i b l e i n the sense tha t e i t h e r Smith consumes i t or Jones does so , but both of them cannot do so at the same t ime . So tha t making the g i f t r e q u i r e s that Smith foresake t o t a l l y the consumption of the good. An a p p o s i t e example i s hear t donors : few of them are w i l l i n g to p a r t w i t h the g i f t w h i l e i t i s s t i l l u s e f u l to them. Thus far I have o n l y d i s c u s s e d c o n s t r a i n t s in r e l a t i o n to an a c t o r ' s a b i l i t y to make a g i f t , a r g u i n g that t h i s w i l l not be p o s s i b l e in a l l s i t u a t i o n s . But even i f the a c t o r can make a g i f t , tha t i s , the r e s o u r c e s are a v a i l a b l e and the magnitude of the g i f t can be accommodated, the g i f t may not improve the w e l l -be ing of the r e c i p i e n t , who n a t u r a l l y enough w i l l not c o n s i d e r i t as such . So a l t r u i s m r e q u i r e s not on ly that an a c t o r possess a g i f t , but a l s o that the g i f t improve the r e c i p i e n t ' s w e l f a r e . In most i n s t a n c e s where a g i f t cannot improve the w e l l -be ing of a r e c i p i e n t i t w i l l be because i t i s i n a p p r o p r i a t e . When a would-be a l t r u i s t i s c o n s t r a i n e d by i n s u f f i c i e n c y the a c t o r does not have the r e s o u r c e s for a g i f t . But when an 73 i n d i v i d u a l i s c o n s t r a i n e d by i n a p p r o p r i a t e n e s s , the re sources which may be t r a n s l a t e d i n t o g i f t s cannot i n c r e a s e the w e l l -be ing of a n o t h e r . In other words, the g i f t may a c t u a l l y decrease the we l fare of the r e c i p i e n t because i t i s i n a p p r o p r i a t e . For example, i t i s o f t e n argued that the g i f t s of food which the deve loped c o u n t r i e s make to the underdeve loped ones in t imes of emergency are i n a p p r o p r i a t e because they p r o v i d e o n l y a temporary s o l u t i o n wi thout a f f e c t i n g a long term o n e . 9 I n s u f f i c i e n c y and i n a p p r o p r i a t e n e s s are l o g i c a l l y r e l a t e d in that shou ld a would-be a l t r u i s t ' s g i f t be i n a p p r o p r i a t e , then the a c t o r w i l l a l s o be c o n s t r a i n e d by i n s u f f i c i e n c y because no th ing the a c t o r has w i l l be c o n s i d e r e d as a g i f t in that p a r t i c u l a r s i t u a t i o n . While bo th of the above c o n s t r a i n t s sound u n u s u a l , they are not so r a r e . For example, Smith may have a d e s i r e to make a g i f t towards famine r e l i e f in some - f a r - o f f p l a c e , but in h i s present f i n a n c i a l c i r c u m s t a n c e s he i s unable to make even a token g i f t or g i v e no th ing at a l l . O r , Smith may b e l i e v e that famine r e l i e f i s on ly a temporary s o l u t i o n for the problems of the underdeve loped wor ld and would r a t h e r c o n t r i b u t e h i s s k i l l s to a s o l u t i o n . But the s k i l l s which are c a l l e d f o r such as m e d i c a l , a g r i c u l t u r a l , or e n g i n e e r i n g a d v i c e are not those which he p o s s e s s e s . S m i t h ' s r e s o u r c e s are then i n s u f f i c i e n t to t r a n s l a t e h i s d e s i r e i n t o a l t r u i s t i c a c t i o n . I n a p p r o p r i a t e n e s s may be even more common a c o n s t r a i n t . For example, i t may be that the i n d i v i d u a l in whom Smith has an a l t r u i s t i c i n t e r e s t 7 4 r e q u i r e s sympathy, p a t i e n c e or l o v e , a l l of which he i s i n c a p a b l e of g i v i n g . O r , Smith may wish that another a c q u i r e a b a s i c s k i l l ; say he i s a f a t h e r who wants h i s young daughter to l e a r n to r e a d , but not knowing how to go about i t (Does one s t a r t wi th l e t t e r s ? Consonants or vowels? S y l l a b l e s , or e n t i r e words?) or l a c k i n g the p a t i e n c e which the task r e q u i r e s , he i s unable to t r a n s l a t e h i s a l t r u i s t i c wish i n t o a c t u a l or s u c c e s s f u l b e h a v i o u r . In some s i t u a t i o n s a g i f t may decrease the we l fare of the r e c i p i e n t because i t i s i n a p p r o p r i a t e to h i s or her needs. In c e r t a i n o t h e r s , a g i f t may upset what i s an o p t i m a l e q u i l i b r i u m thus b r i n g i n g about a d e c l i n e i n the we l fare of both p l a y e r s . For example, i t may be that the outcome of a r e l a t i o n s h i p which i s a s e r i e s of b a r g a i n s may at one time or another be one which i s most p r e f e r r e d by both a c t o r s to any o ther p o s s i b l e r e s u l t . Any move from t h i s outcome brought about by a l t r u i s m w i l l -n e i t h e r improve the we l fare of the r e c i p i e n t nor by d e f i n i t i o n , the we l fare of the a l t r u i s t who s a c r i f i c e d something to make the g i f t which r e s u l t e d in the a l t e r e d outcome. In o ther words, a l t r u i s m may i n some s i t u a t i o n s , d i s t u r b an o p t i m a l r e l a t i o n s h i p and produce a worse outcome f o r both a c t o r s . For example, an i n d i v i d u a l who c h e r i s h e s the p r o c e s s of l e a r n i n g w i l l not thank the i n t e r f e r i n g a l t r u i s t who p r o v i d e s the answer and thereby d i m i n i s h e s h i s enjoyment at p r o d u c i n g i t h i m s e l f . O r , a b l i n d person who guards h i s or her independence w i l l not thank the s o l i c i t o u s i n d i v i d u a l who i s f o r e v e r o f f e r i n g a s s i s t a n c e . In both of these examples there i s an o p t i m a l p o i n t beyond which 75 a i d may be c o n s i d e r e d o b j e c t i o n a b l e : the problem s o l v e r may wish on ly p a r t of the answer; the b l i n d person h e l p on ly when c r o s s i n g a busy s t r e e t . To p r o v i d e a i d beyond these requirements w i l l d i m i n i s h the w e l f a r e of the r e c i p i e n t . I n f o r m a t i o n w i l l a l s o ac t as a c o n s t r a i n t upon the a b i l i t y to make a g i f t and on the a b i l i t y to improve the w e l f a r e of the r e c i p i e n t . A p o t e n t i a l a l t r u i s t r e q u i r e s some min imal amount of i n f o r m a t i o n about p o t e n t i a l r e c i p i e n t s ' s t a t e s of w e l f a r e . T h i s i n f o r m a t i o n w i l l be important in forming d e c i s i o n s about who i s most d e s e r v i n g of the a l t r u i s t ' s b e n e f i c e n c e , how r e s o u r c e s should be a l l o c a t e d , and what form the g i f t s h o u l d t a k e . Moreover , the p o t e n t i a l a l t r u i s t w i l l wish to know which among the many demands for h i s or her a i d are genuine and which are at tempts to e x p l o i t . A l t r u i s t s , j u s t as o t h e r s , w i l l f e e l annoyance at hav ing been taken advantage o f , or at hav ing o v e r l o o k e d an o p p o r t u n i t y , or at h a v i n g badly matched a g i f t to the requirements of the i n d i v i d u a l or group at whom the behaviour was d i r e c t e d . I n f o r m a t i o n w i l l c e r t a i n l y ease these problems . In p r a c t i c e , the a l t r u i s t w i l l s a t i s f i c e 1 0 as w i l l any r a t i o n a l a c t o r , and w i l l adopt c e r t a i n r u l e s of thumb which w i l l a l l e v i a t e the need to a c q u i r e l a r g e amounts of i n f o r m a t i o n . R u s s e l l H a r d i n notes a s i m i l a r c o n s t r a i n t on what he d e s c r i b e s as e x t r a r a t i o n a l m o t i v a t i o n s . He suggests that the e x i s t e n c e of o r g a n i z a t i o n s makes g i v i n g e a s i e r in the sense t h a t i t may be more e f f i c i e n t , and because they p r o v i d e i n f o r m a t i o n about o p p o r t u n i t i e s to g i v e which would o therwi se be c o s t l y to g a t h e r : The i n s t i t u t i o n a l i z a t i o n of o r g a n i z a t i o n s such as the S i e r r a C l u b makes c o l l e c t i v e p o l i t i c a l a c t i o n much e a s i e r 76 for e n v i r o n m e n t a l i s t s than i t would o therwise be - not on ly are e x t r a r a t i o n a l c o n t r i b u t i o n s more l i k e l y g iven such o r g a n i z a t i o n s , but the c o n t r i b u t i o n s are a l s o l i k e l y to be more e f f i c i e n t l y spent . Someone who would ac t out of m o r a l i t y or mi sunders tand ing i s more l i k e l y to c o n t r i b u t e money, o ther t h i n g s be ing e q u a l , i f the e f f o r t i n v o l v e d in making the c o n t r i b u t i o n i s made easy . The moral or m i s u n d e r s t a n d i n g e n v i r o n m e n t a l i s t need not survey a l l p o s s i b l e ways to c o n t r i b u t e , but need on ly s a t i s f i c e by sending in the membership amount reques ted in the m a i l i n g from the f i r s t env i ronmenta l o r g a n i z a t i o n whose name he or she r e c o g n i z e s . In subsequent y e a r s members can s a t i s f i c e even more e a s i l y - they need mere ly renew t h e i r m e m b e r s h i p s . 1 1 The c o n s t r a i n t s d i s c u s s e d thus f a r have d e a l t w i t h the making of a g i f t and the requirement that the g i f t improve the w e l f a r e of the r e c i p i e n t . In both cases i t was argued that c e r t a i n s i t u a t i o n s w i l l prevent e i t h e r or both of these requ irements from being f u l f i l l e d . A f u r t h e r c o n s t r a i n t to be d i s c u s s e d i s the e f f e c t of t h r e a t s , c e n s u r e , rewards and so on , on a l t r u i s m . Some e x p e r i m e n t a l r e s e a r c h has c o n f i r m e d the i n f l u e n c e which the presence of e x t e r n a l rewards has on s e l f - r e p o r t e d a l t r u i s m . Batson et a l . have shown in two experiments tha t the s u b j e c t s who were asked to perform a task without e x t r i n s i c m o t i v a t i o n had h i g h e r scores on s e l f - r e p o r t e d a l t r u i s m than d i d those who were asked to perform the same task but w i th some s m a l l e x t r i n s i c r e w a r d . 1 2 The presence of t h r e a t s appears to work in a manner analagous to tha t of an e x t r i n s i c reward . Some e x p e r i m e n t a l ev idence shows tha t t h r e a t s tend to d i m i n i s h the l i k e l i h o o d of a l t r u i s t i c b e h a v i o u r . S ince n e i t h e r t h r e a t s nor rewards are c o m p a t i b l e w i t h a l t r u i s t i c b e h a v i o u r , t h e i r presence in a g i v e n 77 s i t u a t i o n reduces the l i k e l i h o o d of genuine a l t r u i s t i c b e h a v i o u r . Another i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of s i t u a t i o n s which c o n t a i n t h r e a t s i s tha t they i n t r o d u c e a way of improv ing w e l f a r e w i thout r e l y i n g upon the benevolence of another a c t o r . The a c t o r who employs a t h r e a t or a c t u a l l y c a r r i e s i t t h r o u g h , i s in a p o s i t i o n to improve h i s own w e l l - b e i n g without r e l y i n g upon the a l t r u i s m of o t h e r s . In t h i s r e s p e c t , the v i c t i m s of b l a c k m a i l e r s and e x t o r t i o n i s t s are r a r e l y p o r t r a y e d , or b e l i e v e themselves to be a l t r u i s t i c . 3.3 I n s t i t u t i o n s As C o n s t r a i n t s . The c o n s t r a i n t s on a l t r u i s m d i s c u s s e d thus f a r i n r a t h e r d i sembodied f a s h i o n are o f ten expressed i n s o c i a l arrangements , c o n v e n t i o n s , or i n s t i t u t i o n s . The market system of exchange, h i e r a r c h i c a l o r g a n i z a t i o n , and the w e l f a r e s t a t e , by s t r u c t u r i n g r e l a t i o n s h i p s between i n d i v i d u a l s in p a r t i c u l a r ways, a l l have an e f f e c t upon the l i k e l i h o o d of a l t r u i s t i c b e h a v i o u r . H i e r a r c h y i s a s o c i a l i n s t i t u t i o n which imposes a whole set of r o l e e x p e c t a t i o n s upon i t s o c c u p a n t s . D e f e r e n c e , s t a t u s , t e r r i t o r i a l i t y , and r e p u t a t i o n are a l l e s t a b l i s h e d through h i e r a r c h y . But h i e r a r c h y i s in g e n e r a l h o s t i l e to a l t r u i s m . V o l u n t a r y g i f t - g i v i n g to members of the h i e r a r c h y e i t h e r above or below i s o f t en t r e a t e d wi th s u s p i c i o n . G i f t - g i v i n g to those above may be thought of as t r y i n g to c u r r y favour or even to 78 a f f e c t d e c i s i o n s through b r i b e r y . G i f t - g i v i n g to those below one in the h i e r a r c h y may be t r e a t e d as sexism or p a t e r n a l i s m . H i e r a r c h y then c o n s t r a i n s the d i s p l a y of a l t r u i s m not by d i r e c t l y removing the c h o i c e of such behaviour from the a c t i o n set of each i n d i v i d u a l member, but by making i t p r o b a b l e that the behav iour w i l l be i n t e r p r e t e d as something q u i t e d i f f e r e n t . In t h i s sense , h i e r a r c h y p l a c e s the t h r e a t of censure upon the ac t i o n . Another example of a c o n s t r a i n t upon v o l u n t a r y g i f t - g i v i n g i s the market system of exchange. T h i s system, i t i s a r g u e d , removes the freedom to g i v e and thus the o p p o r t u n i t y for a l t r u i s m by a s s i g n i n g a p r i c e to a l l commodit ies and a c t i o n s . By c o m m e r c i a l i z i n g a l l a c t i v i t i e s and p l a c i n g them w i t h i n an exchange system, the market reduces the o p p o r t u n i t i e s for g i f t -g i v i n g . R i c h a r d Ti tmuss was p a r t i c u l a r l y concerned wi th the need to ba lance the e f f e c t s of the market wi th government p o l i c y to p r e s e r v e v o l u n t a r y b l o o d d o n a t i o n from c o m m e r c i a l i z a t i o n . "In a c e r t a i n sense we b e l i e v e that p o l i c y and p r o c e s s should enable men to be free to choose to g i v e to unnamed s t r a n g e r s . They shou ld not be c o e r c e d or c o n s t r a i n e d by the market . In the i n t e r e s t s of the freedom of a l l men, they shou ld n o t , however, be f r e e to s e l l t h e i r b l o o d or d e c i d e on a s p e c i f i c d e s t i n a t i o n for the g i f t . The c h o i c e between these c l a i m s - between d i f f e r e n t k i n d s of freedom - has to be a s o c i a l p o l i c y d e c i s i o n ; in o ther words, i t i s a moral and p o l i t i c a l d e c i s i o n for the s o c i e t y as a w h o l e . " 1 3 T i t m u s s ' view i s not a c c e p t e d by economists i n g e n e r a l , nor i n p a r t i c u l a r by Kenneth A r r o w ' s 79 c r i t i q u e of the book. He w r i t e s tha t "economists t y p i c a l l y take for g r a n t e d that s i n c e the c r e a t i o n of a market i n c r e a s e s the i n d i v i d u a l ' s area of c h o i c e i t t h e r e f o r e l e a d s to h i g h e r b e n e f i t s . Thus , i f to a v o l u n t a r y b l o o d donor system we add the p o s s i b i l i t y of s e l l i n g b l o o d , we have on ly expanded the i n d i v i d u a l ' s range of a l t e r n a t i v e s . I f he d e r i v e s s a t i s f a c t i o n from g i v i n g , i t i s a r g u e d , he can s t i l l g i v e , and noth ing has been done to impa ir that r i g h t . " 1 * A r r o w ' s comments miss the r e l e v a n t p o i n t and yet g ive an i l l u s t r a t i o n of i t s importance . By i n t r o d u c i n g the p o s s i b i l i t y of an e x t r i n s i c reward for an a c t i v i t y which has h i t h e r t o depended upon an i n t r i n s i c reward, the i n c i d e n c e of a l t r u i s m as exper iments have shown, w i l l be reduced . So in the case of b l o o d d o n a t i o n s , T i tmuss b e l i e v e s tha t a market for b l o o d , by i n t r o d u c i n g payment or an e x t r i n s i c m o t i v a t i o n , w i l l d i m i n i s h the l i k e l i h o o d of an i n t r i n s i c m o t i v a t i o n be ing e f f e c t i v e . Whereas, Arrow seems to have i n t e r p r e t e d T i t m u s s ' arguments a g a i n s t such a market as r e d u c i n g freedom without a d d r e s s i n g the q u e s t i o n of whether i t would reduce the o c c u r r e n c e of a l t r u i s m . 3.4 A l t r u i s m And The Wel fare S t a t e . The development of the w e l f a r e s t a t e and s p e c i f i c a l l y of the many programmes des igned to remove the d i s a d v a n t a g e d from dependence on the p r e v i o u s l y inadequate c h a r i t y of o t h e r s , has a l s o had an important e f f e c t upon the o p p o r t u n i t i e s for 8 0 a l t r u i s t i c a c t i o n . But the e f f e c t i s not as s t r a i g h t f o r w a r d as i t would seem. Here there are two arguments to be f o l l o w e d : one that suggests that the we l fare s t a t e d i m i n i s h e s the o p p o r t u n i t i e s for the e x p r e s s i o n of a l t r u i s m by m e d i a t i n g n e a r l y a l l of an i n d i v i d u a l ' s r e l a t i o n s h i p s w i th o t h e r s , and; the second , which argues tha t the w e l f a r e s t a t e mani fes t as a c e r t a i n p o l i c y , i s an example of the o b j e c t i v i t y which a l t r u i s m r e q u i r e s , and so by i t s e x i s t e n c e , encourages more and d i f f e r e n t forms of a l t r u i s t i c b e h a v i o u r . I t has been argued by t h e o r i s t s of a l l p e r s u a s i o n s that the emergence and growth of the modern s t a t e i s d i r e c t l y l i n k e d wi th the d e c l i n e of smal l communities and f a c e - t o - f a c e s o c i e t i e s . A f t e r t h i s , t h e o r i s t s d i v e r g e : some admire the r e s u l t as the v i c t o r y of cosmopo l i tan l i b e r a l v a l u e s over p a r o c h i a l ones; wh i l e o thers have suggested tha t the p r o c e s s c r e a t e d .an unhea l thy dependency, where i n d i v i d u a l s look to the s t a t e to s o l v e problems and r e l i e v e burdens which p r e v i o u s l y had been managed on a p u r e l y l o c a l or i n d i v i d u a l b a s i s . For example, the a n a r c h i s t w r i t e r Peter K r o p o t k i n argued that the emergence of the s t a t e n e c e s s i t a t e d by the growth of commerce and the o r g a n i z a t i o n of de fence , served to break down s m a l l communities and s o c i e t i e s which in i t s absence had a n a t u r a l tendency to form in terdependent s e l f - a i d i n g u n i t s which f o s t e r e d v o l u n t a r y c o o p e r a t i o n and a l t r u i s m . K r o p o t k i n wrote that the " a b s o r p t i o n of a l l s o c i a l f u n c t i o n s by the S t a t e n e c e s s a r i l y favoured the development of an u n b r i d l e d , narrowminded i n d i v i d u a l i s m . In p r o p o r t i o n as the o b l i g a t i o n s towards the S ta te grew in numbers 81 the c i t i z e n s were e v i d e n t l y r e l i e v e d from t h e i r o b l i g a t i o n s towards one a n o t h e r . " 1 5 M i c h a e l T a y l o r has argued a long s i m i l a r l i n e s to K r o p o t k i n : Men who l i v e l o n g under government and i t s b u r e a u c r a c y , c o u r t s and p o l i c e come to r e l y on them. They f i n d i t e a s i e r (and in some cases are l e g a l l y bound) to use the s t a t e for the s e t t l e m e n t of t h e i r d i s p u t e s and for the p r o v i s i o n of p u b l i c goods, i n s t e a d of a r r a n g i n g these t h i n g s for t h e m s e l v e s , even where the d i s p u t e s , and the p u b l i c s for which the goods are to be p r o v i d e d , are q u i t e l o c a l . In t h i s way, the s t a t e mediates between i n d i v i d u a l s ; they come to d e a l w i th each o ther through the c o u r t s , through the tax c o l l e c t o r and the b u r e a u c r a c i e s which spend the t a x e s . In the presence of a s t r o n g s t a t e , the i n d i v i d u a l may cease to care f o r , or even t h i n k about , those i n h i s community who need h e l p ; he may cease to have any d e s i r e to make a d i r e c t c o n t r i b u t i o n to the r e s o l u t i o n of l o c a l prob lems , whether or not he i s a f f e c t e d by them; he may come to f e e l that h i s " r e s p o n s i b i l i t y " to s o c i e t y has been d i s c h a r g e d as soon as he has p a i d h i s taxes (which are taken c o e r c i v e l y from him by the s t a t e ) , f or these taxes w i l l be used by the s t a t e to c a r e for the o l d , s i c k and unemployed, to keep h i s s t r e e t s c l e a n , to m a i n t a i n " o r d e r " , to p r o v i d e and m a i n t a i n s c h o o l s , l i b r a r i e s , p a r k s , and so on . The s t a t e r e l e a s e s the i n d i v i d u a l from the " r e s p o n s i b i l i t y " or "need" to coopera te wi th o t h e r s d i r e c t l y ; i t guarantees him a "secure" environment in which he may s a f e l y pursue h i s p r i v a t e g o a l s , unhampered by a l l those c o l l e c t i v e c o n c e r n s which i t i s supposed to take c a r e of i t s e l f . 1 6 and, the more the s t a t e i n t e r v e n e s in such s i t u a t i o n s , the more "necessary" (on t h i s view) i t becomes, because p o s i t i v e a l t r u i s m and v o l u n t a r y c o o p e r a t i v e behav iour a trophy in the presence of the s t a t e and grow in i t s absence . . . We might say t h a t the s t a t e i s l i k e an a d d i c t i v e d r u g : the more of i t we have, the more we "need" i t and the more we come to "depend" on i t . 1 7 Both T a y l o r and K r o p o t k i n argue that the w e l f a r e s t a t e c o n s t r a i n s and removes the o p p o r t u n i t i e s for a l t r u i s m by making i n d i v i d u a l s dependent upon the impersona l a i d of the s t a t e . In terms of the c o n s t r a i n t s d i s c u s s e d i n the p r e v i o u s s e c t i o n , the s t a t e i n p r o v i d i n g a i d removes from i n d i v i d u a l s the o p p o r t u n i t y 82 for a l t r u i s m . V a r i o u s segments of s m a l l s o c i e t i e s which were once c a r e d for by l o c a l i n i t i a t i v e are now made dependent upon n a t i o n a l d e c i s i o n s and removed from dependence on l o c a l benevo lence . Both authors f u r t h e r suggest that t h i s p r o c e s s has the e f f e c t of p r o m o t i n g , in K r o p o t k i n ' s words, " u n b r i d l e d , narrowminded i n d i v i d u a l i s m . " They are not o n l y s u g g e s t i n g that s t a t e a c t i o n s c o n s t r a i n o p p o r t u n i t i e s for a l t r u i s m , but tha t they a trophy these sent iments and d i m i n i s h i n d i v i d u a l s ' d e s i r e to be a l t r u i s t i c as w e l l . T h i s p r o c e s s not only has an e f f e c t upon i n d i v i d u a l behaviour T a y l o r argues , but serves as a c o n t i n u i n g j u s t i f i c a t i o n f o r the s t a t e . For i f the s t a t e a f f e c t s the p r e f e r e n c e s of i n d i v i d u a l s over t i m e , "then c l e a r l y i t cannot be deduced from the s t r u c t u r e of p r e f e r e n c e s i n the absence of the s t a t e that the s t a t e i s d e s i r a b l e (as i s done in l i b e r a l t h e o r y ) ; f or the s t a t e m o d i f i e s , one might say , the assumpt ions from which i t s d e s i r a b i l i t y has been d e d u c e d . " 1 8 On the o t h e r s i d e of the argument to that of K r o p o t k i n and T a y l o r , R i c h a r d Ti tmuss in h i s c o n t r o v e r s i a l book The G i f t  R e l a t i o n s h i p , has argued that the w e l f a r e s t a t e may f o s t e r r a t h e r than d i m i n i s h a l t r u i s m by c r e a t i n g o p p o r t u n i t i e s for i t s e x p r e s s i o n . As an example, he compared the a v a i l a b i l i t y of b l o o d for t r a n s f u s i o n in E n g l a n d and Wales which have donor systems, w i t h the U n i t e d S t a t e s where 90% of the b l o o d supp ly i s p u r c h a s e d . In the former c o u n t r y , d o n a t i o n s have been a b l e to keep pace w i t h demand whi l e in the l a t t e r , demand has been c o n s i d e r a b l y ahead of s u p p l y . T i tmuss argues tha t the reason 8 3 for t h i s d i f f e r e n c e i s that American v a l u e s condone the presence of a p r i v a t e market in b l o o d for t r a n s f u s i o n which in t u r n d i s s u a d e s i n d i v i d u a l s from g i v i n g v o l u n t a r i l y , thereby promoting s e l f - i n t e r e s t and e r o d i n g a l t r u i s m . The c o r o l l a r y , he argues , i s e s p e c i a l l y t r u e : that the example of a l t r u i s m serves to encourage more of the same b e h a v i o u r . In these c o n t r a s t i n g c a s e s , the w e l f a r e s t a t e not o n l y c o n t r o l s the system of b lood c o l l e c t i o n in one and not in the o t h e r , but c e r t a i n governmental p o l i c i e s are i n s t r u m e n t a l in p r o h i b i t i n g the emergence of a p r i v a t e market in b l o o d . T i tmuss a l s o argues by way of r e f u t a t i o n of the arguments of T a y l o r and K r o p o t k i n , that a p o l i c y of the w e l f a r e s t a t e , in t h i s case mani fe s t as the B r i t i s h N a t i o n a l H e a l t h S e r v i c e , may encourage a l t r u i s m by a p p l y i n g the k i n d of u n i v e r s a l o b j e c t i v e s tandards which Nagel suggested were n e c e s s a r y . The N a t i o n a l H e a l t h S e r v i c e r e i n f o r c e s an a l t r u i s t i c ethos by making medica l care u n i v e r s a l and based on need r a t h e r than on c l a s s or other s o c i a l c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s . The N a t i o n a l H e a l t h S e r v i c e stands as a model of the o b j e c t i v i t y which i s r e q u i r e d for a l t r u i s m . In c o n c l u s i o n , T i tmuss wrote , " t h i s case study of b lood donor systems demonstrates the extent to which the p o l i c y va lues of the S e r v i c e are h e l d i n common by the i n d i v i d u a l donor in B r i t a i n . " 1 9 Faced w i t h these a p p a r e n t l y c o n t r a d i c t o r y arguments about the e f f e c t of the w e l f a r e s t a t e upon a l t r u i s m , (on the one hand T a y l o r and o t h e r s s u g g e s t i n g tha t i t a t r o p h i e s benevolence , whi le on the o t h e r , T i tmuss s u g g e s t i n g that i t f o s t e r s i t ) , 84 J e f f e r y O b l e r examined p r i v a t e g i v i n g in a smal l E n g l i s h v i l l a g e . H i s "case study focuses on how the development of the w e l f a r e s t a t e has impinged on d i f f e r e n t forms of p r i v a t e g i v i n g , and how the impact of the w e l f a r e s t a t e on g i v i n g has been tempered by s o c i a l r e l a t i o n s among v i l l a g e r e s i d e n t s . " 2 0 O b l e r ' s f i n d i n g s are s u p p o r t i v e of both s i d e s of the argument. As regards p r i v a t e p h i l a n t h r o p y , the T a y l o r s ide of the argument seems to have p r e v a i l e d : " A f t e r the N a t i o n a l H e a l t h S e r v i c e r e p l a c e d p r i v a t e m e d i c i n e , the v i l l a g e f e te s and bazaars tha t had been h e l d so o f t e n to support l o c a l , v o l u n t a r y h o s p i t a l s v i r t u a l l y d i s a p p e a r e d . " 2 1 He goes on to w r i t e t h a t : "In P e n r i d g e , the we l fare s t a t e (he lped by g r e a t e r p r o s p e r i t y ) has superceded p r i v a t e , i n f o r m a l w e l f a r e . Bes ides the a n a c h r o n i s t i c c h a r i t a b l e t r u s t s , which are unable to die- a n a t u r a l d e a t h , u n i l a t e r a l , p e r s o n a l g i v i n g to the v i l l a g e poor has faded a w a y . " 2 2 On the o ther hand, O b l e r found that two new c h a r i t i e s had been e s t a b l i s h e d w i t h i n the v i l l a g e d u r i n g the 1970's and that both of these were i n v o l v e d in supplement ing e x i s t i n g s t a t e a s s i s t a n c e . He a l s o d i s c o v e r e d tha t i n another i n s t a n c e , v o l u n t a r y c o o p e r a t i o n was a c h i e v e d and i n f a c t was a i d e d by the s t a t e : When i t became apparent to the people of Penr idge that the s t a t e would not p r o v i d e a decent p u b l i c meeting p l a c e , they took the c o n s i d e r a b l e i n i t i a t i v e and e f f o r t to r a i s e p r i v a t e l y s u b s t a n t i a l funds to b u i l d a v i l l a g e h a l l . The i n c o n t e s t a b l e p o i n t i s tha t the people of Penr idge d i d not behave as p a s s i v e charges of a s t i f l i n g s t a t e apparatus unable to h e l p themselves or to c o n t r o l t h e i r d e s t i n i e s . F u r t h e r m o r e , t h e i r p r i v a t e e f f o r t s were a b e t t e d by the s t a t e i n the form of generous government g r a n t s . S t a t e 85 o f f i c i a l s are a p p a r e n t l y anxious to keep a l i v e p e o p l e ' s c a p a c i t y to c o - o p e r a t e v o l u n t a r i l y . Once a g a i n , the form and purpose of a i d are p e r t i n e n t . Whi le s t a t e o f f i c i a l s may wish to ensure that the p o o r , aged and i n f i r m are no l onger dependent on p r i v a t e u n i l a t e r a l g i v i n g , they c e r t a i n l y do not want to d i s c o u r a g e community e f f o r t s to secure such " f r i l l s " as a v i l l a g e h a l l . They r e a l i z e tha t i f such p r i v a t e community e f f o r t s were to f a i l , the consequences would not be c a t a s t r o p h i c . They a l s o a p p r e c i a t e tha t not on ly do such c o l l e c t i v e s e l f - h e l p ^ .projec ts have few of the o b j e c t i o n a b l e f e a t u r e s of u n i l a t e r a l g i v i n g , but that they may have i n t r i n s i c worth i n the form of promot ing s o c i a l i n t e g r a t i o n and s e l f -r e l i a n c e as w e l l as t a p p i n g p r i v a t e sources to meet w o r t h w h i l e , i f not u r g e n t , p u b l i c n e e d s . 2 3 O b l e r ' s f i n d i n g s do not permi t us to judge which of the two c o n t e n d i n g arguments on the e f f e c t of the w e l f a r e s t a t e on i n d i v i d u a l s e l f - h e l p , c o o p e r a t i o n , and a l t r u i s m i s c l o s e r to r e a l i t y . I suspect that the shortcoming i s not so much i n O b l e r ' s r e s e a r c h but in the s i m p l i c i t y of the arguments be ing t e s t e d . There i s a l e v e l of g e n e r a l i t y in both the a n a r c h i s t argument and that of T i tmuss which makes them i g n o r a n t of s p e c i f i c s i t u a t i o n s . The degree to which the s t a t e i n t e r v e n e s , or i s a l lowed to i n t e r v e n e between i n d i v i d u a l s , must be a f u n c t i o n of a sense of community which we would expect to v a r y c o n s i d e r a b l y between s m a l l v i l l a g e s in the commuter b e l t of a l a r g e m e t r o p o l i s and urban s lums. T i t m u s s ' argument i s much more d i f f i c u l t to t e s t because i t s supposed e f f e c t s are so s u b t l e . Moreover , the example of b l o o d d o n a t i o n s may be a t y p i c a l of other s i t u a t i o n s because i t i s so v i t a l . There i s another way of u n d e r s t a n d i n g these two arguments on the e f f e c t of the we l fare s t a t e on v o l u n t a r y g i v i n g . That i s , not as c o n t e n d i n g p a r a l l e l arguments but r a t h e r as b e i n g a p p l i e d i n sequence. The a n a r c h i s t argument i s antecedent to 86 T i t m u s s ' in the sense t h a t the w e l f a r e s t a t e has d i m i n i s h e d the o p p o r t u n i t i e s for a l t r u i s m r e l a t i v e to those which e x i s t e d be fore i t s e s t a b l i s h m e n t . F o l l o w i n g t h i s development , some p o l i c i e s of the we l fare s t a t e e i t h e r w i t t i n g l y or n o t , have r e c r e a t e d some of the l o s t o p p o r t u n i t i e s because of the e f f e c t i v e n e s s of a l t r u i s m in p r o d u c i n g c e r t a i n p u b l i c goods which s e l f - i n t e r e s t a lone cannot adequate ly s u p p l y . For t h i s r e a s o n , i t w i l l be very d i f f i c u l t as Obler d i s c o v e r e d , to a p p r a i s e the a p p r o p r i a t e n e s s of the two t h e o r i e s . 3.5 C o n c l u s i o n . S o c i a l arrangements and c o n v e n t i o n s can and do have an e f f e c t upon a l t r u i s m . The t h e o r e t i c a l d i s c u s s i o n of c o n s t r a i n t s in s e c t i o n two has been s u p p o r t e d by examples d i s c u s s e d in the l a t e r s e c t i o n s of the c h a p t e r . In these examples i t was shown that s o c i a l i n s t i t u t i o n s can remove o p p o r t u n i t i e s for a l t r u i s t i c behav iour as i n the case of a market economy, or make them i n a p p r o p r i a t e as in the case of h i e r a r c h y . By a t t a c h i n g a p r i c e to a l l commodit ies exchanged, the market e s t a b l i s h e s an i r r e s i s t a b l e system of q u i d pro quos which g r a d u a l l y a f f e c t s a l l forms of a l t r u i s t i c g i v i n g . The r e s u l t , T i tmuss a r g u e s , i s a r e d u c t i o n in the l a t i t u d e and freedom to g i v e v o l u n t a r i l y wi thout c o n s i d e r a t i o n f o r c o s t s . To t h i s e x t e n t , such s o c i a l arrangements not on ly remove a l t r u i s t i c o p p o r t u n i t i e s from the a c t i o n se t s of i n d i v i d u a l s , but f u r t h e r , such exchanges become 87 i n c o m p r e h e n s i b l e by making them d e v i a t i o n s from the normal exchange r e l a t i o n s h i p . H i e r a r c h y by c o n t r a s t , makes a l t r u i s m i n a p p r o p r i a t e by c r e a t i n g an environment in which i t may be c o n s i d e r e d as e i t h e r b r i b e r y or p a t e r n a l i s m . A n a r c h i s t w r i t e r s have argued tha t l i k e the market system, the we l fare s t a t e removes o p p o r t u n i t i e s for a l t r u i s t i c g e s t u r e s by m e d i a t i n g r e l a t i o n s h i p s between i n d i v i d u a l s . The v a l i d i t y of such an argument i s d i f f i c u l t to a s s e s s . Whi le i t seems reasonab le to assume that many more o p p o r t u n i t i e s e x i s t e d for g i v i n g p r i o r to the e s t a b l i s h m e n t of the we l fare s t a t e , i t i s c l e a r that many, even most of these o p p o r t u n i t i e s were not a c t e d upon. And there are i n d i c a t i o n s that in s m a l l f a c e - t o - f a c e s o c i e t i e s where a l t r u i s m should f l o u r i s h , the exact o p p o s i t e i s the c a s e . 2 " Whether s o c i a l p o l i c y , as T i tmuss argu es , can be used to f o s t e r a l t r u i s m i s no l e s s d i f f i c u l t to prove than the a n a r c h i s t argument. A c o n v i n c i n g proof would r e q u i r e a c o n t r o l l e d d e s i g n wi th measures of the extent of a l t r u i s m both b e f o r e and a f t e r the i n t r o d u c t i o n of a s p e c i f i c s o c i a l p o l i c y . O b l e r ' s r e s e a r c h in a s m a l l E n g l i s h v i l l a g e does p a r t i a l l y support T i t m u s s ' c l a i m s , but i t a l s o f i n d s that the number of community c h a r i t i e s in tended to a i d the s i c k and l e s s w e l l - o f f have d e c l i n e d markedly s i n c e the i n t r o d u c t i o n of the e x t e n s i v e B r i t i s h w e l f a r e system. F o r t u n a t e l y , a c c e p t i n g one or other of these arguments i s not c r u c i a l , f or the e x i s t e n c e of the debate i t s e l f i s 88 s u f f i c i e n t to show that s o c i a l arrangements such as h i e r a r c h y , or i n s t i t u t i o n s such as the we l fare s t a t e can and p r o b a b l y do have some e f f e c t upon the extent of a l t r u i s m in any g iven soc i e t y . 89 Notes . 1 Dennis L . K r e b s , " A l t r u i s m - an Examinat ion of the Concept and a Review of the L i t e r a t u r e " , P s y c h o l o g i c a l B u l l e t i n , v o l . 73 (1970), p . 2 8 5 . 2 J . M. D a r l e y and B . L a t a n e , "Bystander I n t e r v e n t i o n in Emergenc ie s : D i f f u s i o n of R e s p o n s i b i l i t y " , J o u r n a l of  P e r s o n a l i t y and S o c i a l P s y c h o l o g y , v o l . 8 (1968) , p . 377-383. 3 C . K o r t e , "Group E f f e c t s on H e l p - G i v i n g in an Emergency", P r o c e e d i n g of the 77th Annual Convent ion of the  American P s y c h o l o g i c a l A s s o c i a t i o n ^ v o l . 4 (1969) , pp . 383-384. " K r e b s , " A l t r u i s m " , p . 291. Emphasis added. 5 K r e b s , " A l t r u i s m " , p . 294 6 K r e b s , " A l t r u i s m " , p . 291. 7 K r e b s , " A l t r u i s m " , p . 292. 8 R u s s s e l l H a r d i n , C o l l e c t i v e A c t i o n ( B a i t i m o r e : J o h n s Hopkins U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s , 1982), p . 1 1 9 . 9 G a r r e t t H a r d i n , The L i m i t s of A l t r u i s m : an E c o l o g i s t ' s  View of S u r v i v a l (Bloomington: I n d i a n a U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s , 1977). 1 0 An a g r e e a b l e s o l u t i o n to a problem not r e q u i r i n g the onerous c o s t of d e t e r m i n i n g an o p t i m a l one. See James G . March , "Bounded R a t i o n a l i t y , Ambigu i ty and the E n g i n e e r i n g of C h o i c e " , B e l l J o u r n a l of Economics , v o l . 9 (1978), pp .587 -607 . i 1 R u s s s e l l H a r d i n , C o l l e c t i v e A c t i o n , p . 1 2 0 . 1 2 C D . B a t s o n , J . S . Coke, M . L . J a s n o s k i , and M. Hanson "Buying K i n d n e s s : E f f e c t of an E x t r i n s i c I n c e n t i v e for H e l p i n g on P e r c e i v e d A l t r u i s m " , P e r s o n a l i t y and S o c i a l Psychology  B u l l e t i n , v o l . 4 (1978), pp . 86-91 . 90 1 3 R i c h a r d T i t m u s s , The G i f t R e l a t i o n s h i p : from Human Blood  to S o c i a l P o l i c y (London: A l l e n and Unwin, 1 970) , p~i 242 . — 1 4 Kenneth J . Arrow, " G i f t s and Exchanges", in Edmund S. P h e l p s , e d . , A l t r u i s m , M o r a l i t y and Economic Theory (New Y o r k : Sage Foundat ion^ 1975) , p~. i lf . 1 5 Pe ter K r o p o t k i n , Mutual A i d : a F a c t o r of E v o l u t i o n (New Y o r k : New York U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s , 1972), p.. 197. 1 6 M i c h a e l T a y l o r , Anarchy and C o o p e r a t i o n (New Y o r k : W i l e y , 1976), pp . 134-135. 1 7 T a y l o r , Anarchy and C o o p e r a t i o n , p . 134. 1 8 M i c h a e l T a y l o r , Community, Anarchy and L i b e r t y (Cambridge: Cambridge U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s , 1 982) , p~. 56~! 1 9 T i t m u s s , The G i f t R e l a t i o n s h i p , p . 238. 2 0 J e f f r e y O b l e r , " P r i v a t e G i v i n g in the Wel fare S t a t e " , The B r i t i s h J o u r n a l of P o l i t i c a l Sc i ence , v o l . 11 (1981), p . 31 . 2 1 O b l e r , " P r i v a t e G i v i n g i n the Wel fare S t a t e " , p . 46. 2 2 O b l e r , " P r i v a t e G i v i n g in the Wel fare S t a t e " , p . 46. 2 3 O b l e r , " P r i v a t e G i v i n g i n the Wel fare S t a t e " , p . 47-48. 2 " See for example: Edward C . B a n f i e l d , The M o r a l B a s i s of a  Backward S o c i e t y (New Y o r k : Free P r e s s , 19587"! 91 IV. ALTRUISM IN GAMES 4.1 I n t r o d u c t i o n . The p r e v i o u s c h a p t e r s ' a p p r a i s a l of the p o s s i b l e e f f e c t i v e n e s s of an a l t r u i s t i c i n c e n t i v e in s o l v i n g s o c i a l "problems" such as the p r o v i s i o n of p u b l i c goods, has c o n c l u d e d that a l t r u i s m may be c o n s t r a i n e d in many s i t u a t i o n s . I t w i l l be u s e f u l to know appprox imate ly how f r e q u e n t l y these c o n s t r a i n t s w i l l a p p l y . O r , how f r e q u e n t l y a l t r u i s m w i l l be a member of a set of c h o i c e a l t e r n a t i v e s in d i f f e r e n t s i t u a t i o n s . 4.2 Games And Game T h e o r y . A frequent approach to s t u d y i n g the w i l l i n g n e s s of s u b j e c t s to behave a l t r u i s t i c a l l y i s to c o n s t r u c t a s i t u a t i o n in which i t i s one of s e v e r a l p o t e n t i a l modes of b e h a v i o u r . Whi le t h i s may p r o v i d e some i n d i c a t i o n of the f a c t o r s which i n f l u e n c e the b e h a v i o u r , i t says l i t t l e about how frequent are these s i t u a t i o n s . At the extreme, a l t r u i s m may be an a l t e r n a t i v e in o n l y a very smal l subset of the s i t u a t i o n s which comprise a complete b e h a v i o u r a l s e t . The p r e v i o u s c h a p t e r c o n c l u d e d that a l t r u i s m was not p o s s i b l e in a l l s i t u a t i o n s , but s t i l l gave no i n d i c a t i o n of how l a r g e a p r o p o r t i o n of t o t a l behav iour these cases were. Another way of a d d r e s s i n g the q u e s t i o n i s to employ an analogue for b e h a v i o u r . But t h i s analogue w i l l have to possess 92 s p e c i f i c c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s . F i r s t i t w i l l have to be a f i n i t e set i f we are to determine the s i z e of the subset of s i t u a t i o n s in which a l t r u i s m i s a p o s s i b i l i t y , and second, the analogue w i l l have to share some of the q u a l i t i e s of behaviour i n p u b l i c l i f e or in p o l i t i c a l s i t u a t i o n s . Game t h e o r y i s a s e r i e s of recommendations c o n c e r n i n g how i n d i v i d u a l s s h o u l d behave in s i t u a t i o n s where c o n f l i c t , c o o p e r a t i o n , or c o o r d i n a t i o n are a l l p o s s i b l e . "The essence of a 'game' i n t h i s context i s t h a t i t i n v o l v e s d e c i s i o n makers wi th d i f f e r e n t g o a l s or o b j e c t i v e s whose fa t e s are i n t e r t w i n e d . The i n d i v i d u a l s are in a s i t u a t i o n in which t h e r e may be many p o s s i b l e outcomes with d i f f e r e n t v a l u e s to them. A l t h o u g h they may have some c o n t r o l which w i l l i n f l u e n c e the outcome, they do not have comple te c o n t r o l over o t h e r s . " 1 There a r e obvious s i m i l a r i t i e s between games and many d i f f e r e n t a s p e c t s of b e h a v i o u r . C o n f l i c t , c o m p e t i t i o n , and c o o p e r a t i o n a r e i n t e g r a l a s p e c t s of economic and p o l i t i c a l l i f e . The p l a y e r s or d e c i s i o n makers in games have c h o i c e s which are in e ssence s i m i l a r to those of a n a t i o n d e c i d i n g whether to coopera te w i t h a n o t h e r , or a p o l i t i c a l p a r t y d e c i d i n g whether to enter a c o a l i t i o n wi th a n o t h e r , or even an i n d i v i d u a l t r y i n g to secure some g o a l in the face of o t h e r s w i t h c o n f l i c t i n g a s p i r a t i o n s . A l l these a c t o r s , be they groups or i n d i v i d u a l s , have c e r t a i n g o a l s over which they have on ly p a r t i a l c o n t r o l and whose d e c i s i o n s about ways of p u r s u i n g them may r e s u l t i n more or l e s s a p p e a l i n g outcomes. For example, a p o l i t i c a l p a r t y may be f a c e d w i t h the d e c i s i o n of e n t e r i n g a a c o a l i t i o n to govern 93 w i t h o ther p a r t i e s . There may be advantages to c o o p e r a t i n g and e n t e r i n g the c o a l i t i o n : the p a r t y w i l l have some say in government l e g i s l a t i o n . But there may a l s o be d i s a d v a n t a g e s to c o o p e r a t i n g : the p a r t y ' s d i s t i n c t p l a t f o r m may become b l u r r e d by the compromises of c o a l i t i o n government, or i t may be thought that remain ing in o p p o s i t i o n w i l l i n c r e a s e the p a r t y ' s p r o f i l e in the v o t e r s ' minds . The e n t r y of the p a r t y i n t o the c o a l i t i o n w i l l a l s o be determined by the o ther c o a l i t i o n members who may d e c i d e that i t w i l l have too d i v i s i v e an i n f l u e n c e on the c o a l i t i o n and so exc lude i t from membership. D e c i s i o n s in such s i t u a t i o n s are extremely complex and take i n t o account a host of i n t a n g i b l e f a c t o r s . Many w i l l argue that i t i s these f a c t o r s which are the s t u f f of p o l i t i c s . I f t h i s i s so , i t i s an a d m i s s i o n of the hope lessness of a r r i v i n g at g e n e r a l s tatements about such b e h a v i o u r . By a p p l y i n g the recommendations of game theory to the a n a l y s i s of p o l i t i c a l b e h a v i o u r , we are a d o p t i n g the oppos ing view that g e n e r a l s tatements about behav iour a c r o s s s i m i l a r s i t u a t i o n s are p o s s i b l e . The cos t of a p p l y i n g such recommendations i s that we ignore the p o s s i b i l i t y tha t behav iour may be based on s t u p i d i t y , b i a s or e r r o r , a l l of which are most a s s u r e d l y i m p o r t a n t . I n d i v i d u a l s are not always the r a t i o n a l g a i n s - m a x i m i z i n g c r e a t u r e s which game theory assumes them to be , nor i s i t c e r t a i n that even i f they are c l e a r about what i s i n t h e i r s e l f - i n t e r e s t , do they always choose to ac t upon i t . Whi le there are d i sadvantages i n employing games as models of b e h a v i o u r , there are a l s o s e d u c t i v e advantages to an a b s t r a c t 94 model which c o n t a i n s normative p r e s c r i p t i o n s about behaviour which can be t e s t e d . But n a t u r a l l y , the f i n d i n g s from the a n a l y s i s of an a b s t r a c t model are not c o n c l u s i v e but o n l y i n d i c a t i v e of the proces se s which may occur in r e a l l i f e . With these c a v e a t s in mind , we now proceed to examine the o p p o r t u n i t i e s for the e x p r e s s i o n of a l t r u i s m in a c l e a r l y d e f i n e d set of games . 2 It i s easy when t a l k i n g of games to become confused over such terms as "p lay" , "game", " t u r n " , "choice" and o ther synonyms. In the f o l l o w i n g d i s c u s s i o n , a game i s meant as composed of any number of moves or d e c i s i o n p o i n t s . Each move c o n s i s t s of a number of d i f f e r e n t a l t e r n a t i v e s from which a p l a y e r i s r e q u i r e d to make a c h o i c e . A sequence of c h o i c e s made at each move and c u l m i n a t i n g in a f i n a l outcome or t e r m i n a t i o n p o i n t w i l l be c a l l e d a p l a y of the game. A l l games may be r e p r e s e n t e d i n both the s t r a t e g i c and the e x t e n s i v e f o r m s . 3 Whi le the e x t e n s i v e r e p r e s e n t a t i o n i s not always p r a c t i c a b l e , i t takes the form of a game t r e e or a connected graph which s t i p u l a t e s the number of p l a y e r s , moves, and c h o i c e s i n each p l a y of the game. For example, the t r e e for a very s imple game i s g iven in F i g u r e 2. F i g u r e 2 - The E x t e n s i v e Form of a Game With Complete Informat i o n . P l a y e r 1 a b c 95 In t h i s game, P l a y e r 1 who makes the f i r s t move, i s r e q u i r e d to make a c h o i c e from among three a l t e r n a t i v e s l a b e l l e d a , b , and c . The second move of the game, r e p r e s e n t e d by the second row of d e c i s i o n nodes, i s that of P l a y e r 2, who must choose between two a l t e r n a t i v e s depending upon how he or she b e l i e v e s or knows P l a y e r 1 has chosen . Of course most games are f a r more complex: i f the f i r s t move of some game i s some chance o p e r a t i o n such as the s h u f f l i n g of a deck of c a r d s , t h e r e w i l l be 52! p o t e n t i a l a l t e r n a t i v e s , or approx imate ly 8.07 x 1 0 6 7 branches stemming from the i n i t i a l d e c i s i o n node. In some games p l a y e r s w i l l know, that i s w i l l have p e r f e c t i n f o r m a t i o n about other p l a y e r s ' p r e v i o u s moves. In o t h e r s , such i n f o r m a t i o n w i l l be imperfec t or t o t a l l y absent . Chess for i n s t a n c e , i s a game where each p l a y e r has p e r f e c t i n f o r m a t i o n about both t h e i r own p r e v i o u s moves as w e l l as about those of the opposing p l a y e r . However, in many games the p l a y e r s w i l l have no knowledge of the c o p l a y e r ' s or c o p l a y e r s ' p r e v i o u s moves. The presence or absence of such i n f o r m a t i o n i s r e p r e s e n t e d on the game t r e e by e n c i r c l i n g d e c i s i o n nodes or moves, i n d i c a t i n g that a p l a y e r does not have complete i n f o r m a t i o n about h i s or her c h o i c e a l t e r n a t i v e s . 96 F i g u r e 3 - The E x t e n s i v e Form of a Game wi th Incomplete Informat i on . L a b c ( J V r -3 e d' s e' f ( x ,y ) In F i g u r e 3, as in the p r e v i o u s f i g u r e , P l a y e r 1 chooses between a , b , and c on the f i r s t move of the game. But in c o n t r a s t to F i g u r e 2, P l a y e r 2 does not know for c e r t a i n whether P l a y e r 1 has chosen a or b, but does know i f c has been chosen . So i f P l a y e r 1 chooses a for example, P l a y e r 2 w i l l not know whether he or she i s choos ing between d and e, or d' and e ! . The end p o i n t s of each branch i n the game t r e e d e s c r i b e an outcome unique to each p a r t i c u l a r sequence of c h o i c e s in a p l a y of the game. In F i g u r e 3, the r e s u l t of P l a y e r \x c h o o s i n g a and P l a y e r 2 c h o o s i n g d w i l l be the outcome at the t e r m i n a t i o n p o i n t of that b r a n c h , and p a y o f f s of x to P l a y e r 1 arid y_ to P l a y e r 2. In summary, the e x t e n s i v e form of the game d e s c r i b e s the number of p l a y e r s , the sequence of moves, the p o t e n t i a l c h o i c e s c o n f r o n t i n g each p l a y e r at every move, the i n f o r m a t i o n each p l a y e r has about the o ther p l a y e r ' s or p l a y e r s ' p r e v i o u s c h o i c e s , and the outcome of each s p e c i f i c sequence of c h o i c e s . The s t r a t e g i c or normal form of a game i s a r e d u c t i o n of the c o m p l e x i t y of the e x t e n s i v e form by means of s t r a t e g i e s . A s t r a t e g y has been l i k e n e d to a "book of i n s t r u c t i o n s tha t you 97 might l eave to a r e p r e s e n t a t i v e who i s go ing to p l a y a game for y o u . " " A l l games can be expressed in t h e i r s t r a t e g i c form i f both the number of c h o i c e a l t e r n a t i v e s at every move and the number of moves in the game are f i n i t e . The number of s t r a t e g i e s r e q u i r e d to d e s c r i b e complex games may be very l a r g e i n d e e d . F i g u r e 4 g i v e s examples of two games reduced to t h e i r s t r a t e g i c forms. F i g u r e 4 - Two Games in E x t e n s i v e and S t r a t e g i c Forms. A, ) V X (5 ,5) ( -5 ,10) (10 , -5) (0 ,0) A 2 B 2 5 10 A , 5 -5 -5 0 B, 10 0 98 A* A, 1 B 4 hi. B, (5,5) ( -5 ,10) (10 , -5 ) (0,0) 5 5 1 0 -5 10 -5 5 5 -5 1 0 0 0 -5 1 0 0 0 S t r a t e g i e s for P l a y e r 2: 1 . Always choose Aj. 2. Always choose Bj, 3. Choose Bi, i f P l a y e r 1 chooses A,; choose A z i f P l a y e r 1 chooses B,. 4. Choose A v i f P l a y e r 1 chooses A,; choose B*. i f P l a y e r 1 chooses B,. The e x t e n s i v e form of the two games i s s i m i l a r in that there are the same number of p l a y e r s , moves, c h o i c e a l t e r n a t i v e s at each move and i d e n t i c a l p a y o f f s . However, the i n f o r m a t i o n a v a i l a b l e to the p l a y e r s in Game II r e s u l t s in a d i f f e r e n t game. In the e x t e n s i v e form of Game I , the p l a y e r s choose independent ly or in ignorance of the o t h e r ' s c h o i c e . T h i s r u l e i s e s t a b l i s h e d by c i r c l i n g the d e c i s i o n modes of P l a y e r 2. When the e x t e n s i v e form of Game I i s reduced to i t s s t r a t e g i c form, i t can be d e s c r i b e d as a 2 x 2 game, meaning tha t there are two p l a y e r s , as i n d i c a t e d by the two f a c t o r s , and 99 that each of the p l a y e r s has 2 s t r a t e g i e s , e i t h e r to choose A or B. Game II in i t s e x t e n s i v e form i s governed by d i f f e r e n t r u l e s . The p l a y e r who chooses at the second move of the game does so wi th p e r f e c t i n f o r m a t i o n about how the other p l a y e r has chosen on the f i r s t move. The p l a y e r c h o o s i n g second now has four s t r a t e g i e s ; two i d e n t i c a l to Game I and a f u r t h e r two which are c o n d i t i o n a l or c o n t i n g e n t upon how P l a y e r 1 chooses at the f i r s t move. Thus the s t r a t e g i c form of Game II i s a 2 x 4 game. Two f u r t h e r important d i s t i n c t i o n s become obv ious when the games are reduced to t h e i r normal forms . In the s t r a t e g i c form of Game I , both p l a y e r s have dominat ing s t r a t e g i e s or ones which are unambiguously the best c h o i c e i n the sense of maximiz ing t h e i r p a y o f f s . P l a y e r 1 shou ld choose B, because the payof f at the B , A 2 c e l l ( that i s the outcome which r e s u l t s i f P l a y e r 1 chooses B, and P l a y e r 2 chooses A 2 ) i s g r e a t e r than A ^ , , and the payoff at B-iB2 i s g r e a t e r than A , B 2 . A s i m i l a r l o g i c h o l d s for P l a y e r 2. (That the r e s u l t of bo th p l a y e r s c h o o s i n g t h e i r best s t r a t e g i e s i s the outcome B}B2 which both p r e f e r l e s s than A-\h2l i s one of the a l l u r i n g a s p e c t s of the P r i s o n e r ' s Dilemma game.) However, in the s t r a t e g i c form of Game I I , P l a y e r 1 no longer has a dominat ing s t r a t e g y but P l a y e r 2 s t i l l does ( i t i s s t r a t e g y 2 ) . N o t i c e a l s o , tha t once the e x t e n s i v e form of Game II i s reduced to i t s s t r a t e g i c form i t becomes a game wi th d i f f e r e n t r u l e s un le s s the e x t e n s i v e form i s taken as the most b a s i c r e p r e s e n t a t i o n of the game. T h i s i s t r u e of a l l games i f p l a y e d 1 0 0 in t h e i r s t r a t e g i c f o r m . 5 4.3 The 2 X 2 Order Of Games. The remainder of the c h a p t e r w i l l d i s c u s s the 2 x 2 order of games which are those i n v o l v i n g 2 p l a y e r s , each hav ing 2 s t r a t e g y c h o i c e s , both c h o o s i n g one of these s t r a t e g i e s i n i gnorance of the other p l a y e r ' s c h o i c e , wi th the outcome be ing one of four p o s s i b i l i t i e s . The g e n e r a l s t r a t e g i c form of the 2 x 2 game i s g iven in F i g u r e 5 below. F i g u r e 5 - The G e n e r a l S t r a t e g i c Form of the 2 x 2 Game. Column A 2 B 2 a 2 k> 2 a 1 c , c 2 d 2 b, d , Row A , B , The p l a y e r s are now l a b e l l e d Row and Column. Row chooses between A , and B , and Column between A 2 and B 2 . The four outcomes, one for each p a i r of s t r a t e g y c h o i c e s , w i l l be w r i t t e n as A , A 2 , A T B Z , B , A 2 , and B ^ . The p a y o f f s c o r r e s p o n d i n g to each outcome are ( a , , a 2 ) , ( c 1 , b 2 ) , ( b 1 , c 2 ) , and ( d , , d 2 ) , where Row r e c e i v e s the payof f s u b s c r i p t e d by 1 and Column tha t s u b s c r i p t e d by 2. 101 F i g u r e 6 - The G e n e r a l E x t e n s i v e Form of a 2 x 2 Game. A, B, ( ) r i , b t ) ( b , , c . ) (d, The g e n e r a l e x t e n s i v e form of the game i s shown in F i g u r e 6. The game would of course be p r e c i s e l y the same i f the p l a y e r s p o s i t i o n s were r e v e r s e d so tha t Column chose between A , and B, and Row between A 2 and B 2 Two f u r t h e r a spec t s of these games need to be emphasized. F i r s t , these games are n o n c o o p e r a t i v e meaning tha t i f one t h i n k s of i n d i v i d u a l s p l a y i n g a game, there i s a r u l e which p r e v e n t s them from a r r i v i n g at an agreement to c o o r d i n a t e the s e l e c t i o n of t h e i r s t r a t e g i e s . "In a n o n c o o p e r a t i v e game a b s o l u t e l y no p r e p l a y communication i s p e r m i t t e d between the p l a y e r s . " 6 O r , n o n c o o p e r a t i v e games may be thought of as a p p r o p r i a t e models for s i t u a t i o n s in which b i n d i n g agreements cannot be made p r i o r to the game or en forced in the p l a y i n g of the game: a s i t u a t i o n encountered in the r e s o l u t i o n of d i s p u t e s through p o l i t i c s . And second , the games d i s c u s s e d are v a r i a b l e sum games, meaning that the i n t e r e s t s of the p l a y e r s are not always d i a m e t r i c a l l y opposed as they are in c o n s t a n t sum games where the "sums of the p a y o f f s to the two p l a y e r s are the same in a l l four e n t r i e s . " 7 Thus f a r I have d i s c u s s e d games without r e f e r r i n g in any way to the p r e f e r e n c e s of the p l a y e r s . L e t us assume that the 1 02 p l a y e r s can order the four outcomes of a 2 x 2 game so that one outcome, whatever i t may be, i s p r e f e r r e d to another and so on . F o r m a l l y , we w i l l assume that each p l a y e r has a complete and s t r o n g p r e f e r e n c e order meaning that a l l the outcomes are comparable so the l i s t i s comple te , and that between none of the outcomes i s the p l a y e r i n d i f f e r e n t . In p r a c t i c a l terms, each p l a y e r i s ab le to a s s i g n a p r e f e r e n c e o r d e r , say 4, to the most p r e f e r r e d outcome, 3 to the next to most p r e f e r r e d outcome, 2 to the next to l e a s t p r e f e r r e d outcome, and 1 to the l e a s t p r e f e r r e d outcome. Rapoport and G u y e r 8 have shown that for two p l a y e r s , both hav ing complete and s t r o n g p r e f e r e n c e o r d e r i n g s over four outcomes, there are 78 unique ways of a r r a n g i n g these in a 2 x 2 m a t r i x . F i g u r e 7 g i v e s one such arrangement where Row o r d e r s the outcomes so tha t A , A 2 > A , B 2 > B,h2 > B , B 2 , (where > means i s p r e f e r r e d to ) and Column o r d e r s the outcomes A , A 2 > A , B 2 > B , B 2 > B , A 2 . F i g u r e 7 - Game #22. A 2 B 2 4 4 3 3 1 2 2 1 Game #22 The number below the matr ix i s that a s s i g n e d by Rapoport and G u y e r 9 to the p a r t i c u l a r arrangement of p r e f e r e n c e s . I t i s important to unders tand that what p e r m i t s us to 1 03 d e r i v e a manageably f i n i t e number of games for a n a l y s i s from an o t h e r w i s e very l a r g e number of p o s s i b l e 2 x 2 games i s the i m p o s i t i o n of the requirement that the a c t o r s have a complete and s t r o n g p r e f e r e n c e order over a l l outcomes of each game. If we assumed that the p r e f e r e n c e order of one or both of the p l a y e r s was not s t r i c t , the t o t a l number of a d m i s s i b l e games c o u l d be as h i g h as 726, which i s the complete number of o r d i n a l 2 x 2 games. T h i s c h a p t e r t h e r e f o r e a n a l y z e s on ly a subset of the complete 2 x 2 order of o r d i n a l g a m e s . 1 0 One way of u n d e r s t a n d i n g these 78 games i s as the complete se t of a b s t r a c t i o n s of r e a l wor ld s i t u a t i o n s c o m p r i s i n g two a c t o r s , e i t h e r i n d i v i d u a l s or aggregates of i n d i v i d u a l s , both of whom have a s t r o n g and complete p r e f e r e n c e o r d e r . The important p o i n t i s not that these games are a b s t r a c t i o n s of a l l p o s s i b l e r e a l wor ld i n t e r a c t i o n s , but tha t they are the complete subset of one p a r t i c u l a r o r d e r . S ince i t can c o n f i d e n t l y be s t a t e d t h a t the complete subset of s i t u a t i o n s i s r e p r e s e n t e d , we can now proceed to e s t a b l i s h in which games a l t r u i s t i c c h o i c e i s c o n s t r a i n e d . Whi l e we have from Chapter Two the elements of a d e f i n i t i o n of a l t r u i s m which w i l l be a p p l i e d below, i t may be e a s i e r to b e g i n the a n a l y s i s by d e f i n i n g the s e l f - i n t e r e s t e d c h o i c e in each game and then c o n s i d e r i n g whether the a l t e r n a t i v e to that c h o i c e c o m p l i e s w i t h our most r i g o r o u s d e f i n i t i o n of a l t r u i s m . F o r t u n a t e l y , c o n s i d e r a b l e e f f o r t has been expended in d e t e r m i n i n g how a " r a t i o n a l " or s e l f - i n t e r e s t e d p l a y e r s h o u l d choose in such games. A r a t i o n a l p l a y e r , i s "one who, h a v i n g 1 04 taken i n t o account a l l the i n f o r m a t i o n a v a i l a b l e to him by the r u l e s of the game, makes h i s c h o i c e s i n such a way as to maximize the a c t u a l or the s t a t i s t i c a l l y expected p a y o f f to accrue to him ( and to him on ly ) i n the outcome of the g a m e . " 1 1 There are no c o m p l e t e l y s a t i s f a c t o r y s o l u t i o n s or unambivalent recommendations as to how r a t i o n a l p l a y e r s s h o u l d choose in nonconstant . sum, n o n c o o p e r a t i v e games wi th s t r i c t l y o r d i n a l p r e f e r e n c e s . However, game t h e o r e t i c i a n s have focussed on the concept of an e q u i l i b r i u m outcome which i s one from which n e i t h e r p l a y e r can secure a h i g h e r payo f f by s w i t c h i n g to an a l t e r n a t i v e c h o i c e were the game to be p l a y e d a g a i n . B u t , even t h i s idea has i t s problems for some games have more than one e q u i l i b r i u m outcome. How then can one determine how r a t i o n a l p l a y e r s should choose were a game to be p l a y e d on ly once? Rapoport , Guyer and Gordon i n t r o d u c e the concept of a n a t u r a l outcome "which i s c h a r a c t e r i z e d by a c e r t a i n s t a b i l i t y ; that i s , one expected to occur w i t h the g r e a t e s t frequency i n a game p l a y e d by r a t i o n a l p l a y e r s . . . " 1 2 To e x p l a i n the n a t u r a l outcome r e q u i r e s the i n t r o d u c t i o n of a few more game t h e o r e t i c c o n c e p t s . A s t r a t e g y i s s a i d to dominate an a l t e r n a t i v e i f i t i s the best c h o i c e r e g a r d l e s s of how the o ther p l a y e r chooses . For example, in F i g u r e 8 below, s t r a t e g y A 2 dominates B 2 f o r Column because A , A 2 i s more p r e f e r r e d than A , B 2 , and B , A 2 i s more p r e f e r r e d than B,B2. Thus by c h o o s i n g A 2 , Column w i l l ensure a more p r e f e r r e d outcome r e g a r d l e s s of how the o ther p l a y e r chooses . 1 05 F i g u r e 8 - Game #13. A 2 B 2 4 3 2 4 3 2 1 1 Game #13 So a f i r s t recommendation to a r a t i o n a l p l a y e r would be to choose the dominant s t r a t e g y every time a game makes t h i s p o s s i b l e . However, in some games on ly one of the p l a y e r s has a dominat ing s t r a t e g y . How under these c i r c u m s t a n c e s should the o ther p l a y e r choose? O b v i o u s l y , a r a t i o n a l response on the p a r t of the p l a y e r wi thout the dominat ing s t r a t e g y w i l l be to assume that the o ther w i l l behave r a t i o n a l l y and choose the dominat ing s t r a t e g y . So now the p l a y e r without the dominat ing s t r a t e g y need on ly f i g u r e out what i s the best response to the o t h e r ' s c h o i c e . For the game i n F i g u r e 9, Column has a dominat ing s t r a t e g y but Row does n o t . 1 06 F i g u r e 9 - Game #31. A 2 B 2 4 3 2 2 3 1 1 4 Game #31 A 2 dominates B 2 for Column, that i s , A , A 2 i s p r e f e r r e d to A , B 2 , and B , A 2 i s p r e f e r r e d to B\B2r so Row should assume tha t Column w i l l choose i t . If Row was not to take i n t o account Column's p r o b a b l e a c t i o n s , he or she might choose B, because tha t i s the s t r a t e g y which c o n t a i n s h i s or her most p r e f e r r e d outcome. However, because Row assumes Column w i l l choose A 2 , he or she w i l l be b e t t e r o f f choos ing A, which w i l l r e s u l t in the next to most p r e f e r r e d outcome as opposed to B , , which would r e s u l t i n the l e a s t p r e f e r r e d outcome. But we have not d e a l t w i t h a l l the p o s s i b i l i t i e s for t h e r e are s t i l l games in which n e i t h e r p l a y e r has a dominat ing s t r a t e g y . How should the r a t i o n a l p l a y e r choose in these c i rcumstances? 107 F i g u r e 10 - Game #64. A 2 B 2 4 3 1 2 2 1 3 4 Game #64 In Game #64, n e i t h e r of the p l a y e r s has a d o m i n a t i n g s t r a t e g y . One p o t e n t i a l r u l e for d e c i d i n g how to choose i s to p i c k the s t r a t e g y which guarantees the best of the worst outcomes. In one sense one can t h i n k of the p l a y e r be ing g u i d e d by the p r i n c i p l e of c h o o s i n g the l e s s e r of two e v i l s . T h i s p r i n c i p l e of c h o i c e i s u s u a l l y r e f e r r e d to as the maximin, or the c h o i c e of the s t r a t e g y a l t e r n a t i v e which c o n t a i n s the maximum minimum p a y o f f . In Game #64, i f the p l a y e r s choose t h e i r maximin s t r a t e g i e s , Column would choose A 2 and Row, A , , p r o d u c i n g the outcome A , A 2 . Having d e s c r i b e d how r a t i o n a l p l a y e r s s h o u l d choose , a d d i t i o n a l r e f l e c t i o n r e v e a l s t h a t the r u l e s do not h o l d f o r every game. 1 08 F i g u r e 11 - Game #61. A 2 B 2 4 4 3 1 1 3 2 2 Game #61 In Game #61 n e i t h e r p l a y e r has a dominat ing s t r a t e g y , so both shou ld employ t h e i r maximin p r i n c i p l e which would r e s u l t in Column c h o o s i n g B 2 and Row, B 1 f w i th the outcome B , B 2 , which i s f o r both p l a y e r s the next to l e a s t p r e f e r r e d . But t h i s i s o b v i o u s l y i r r a t i o n a l , f or t h e r e i s another outcome, A , A 2 , which i s p r e f e r r e d by both p l a y e r s . And A , A 2 i s a P a r e t o o p t i m a l outcome in tha t no other i s p r e f e r r e d by both p l a y e r s to i t . So another r u l e i s r e q u i r e d to guide r a t i o n a l p l a y e r s in games where one outcome i s most p r e f e r r e d by both p l a y e r s . Such games are o f t e n r e f e r r e d to as games of no c o n f l i c t or no o p p o s i t i o n . In the words of R a p o p o r t , Guyer and Gordon, we can now summarize the r u l e s which guide r a t i o n a l p l a y e r s ' s t r a t e g y c h o i c e s and d e s c r i b e the n a t u r a l outcome for a l l games of the 2 x 2 o r d i n a l c l a s s i f i c a t i o n : In no c o n f l i c t games, the outcome that a c c o r d s the l a r g e s t payo f f to both p l a y e r s shou ld c e r t a i n l y be d e s i g n a t e d as the n a t u r a l outcome. S i m i l a r l y , in a game where both p l a y e r s have a dominat ing s t r a t e g y , the outcome r e s u l t i n g from the c h o i c e of these s t r a t e g i e s by both p l a y e r s w i l l a l s o be d e s i g n a t e d as the n a t u r a l outcome. Next , i f on ly one p l a y e r has a d o m i n a t i n g s t r a t e g y , i t w i l l be assumed t h a t he w i l l choose i t and the o ther p l a y e r w i l l choose the s t r a t e g y which i s the "be t t er response" to the o t h e r ' s 1 0 9 dominat ing s t r a t e g y . T h i s p a i r of c h o i c e s w i l l be the n a t u r a l o u t c o m e . . . The n a t u r a l outcome of a 2 x 2 game wi thout dominat ing s t r a t e g i e s i s the i n t e r s e c t i o n of maximin s t r a t e g i e s . . . 1 3 While the d e f i n i t i o n of the n a t u r a l outcome g i v e n by Rapoport et a l . i s a p p r o p r i a t e in many games, in those where n e i t h e r p l a y e r has a dominat ing s t r a t e g y , the i n t e r s e c t i o n of the maximin s t r a t e g i e s does not always have a s t r o n g or u n c h a l l e n g e d c l a i m to be the n a t u r a l .outcome of the g a m e . 1 4 As was mentioned above, some games are c l a s s e d as games of no c o n f l i c t . Two other c l a s s e s of games w i l l be ment ioned: games of complete o p p o s i t i o n in which the p r e f e r e n c e s of the p l a y e r s are c o m p l e t e l y opposed, f or example, an outcome which i s most p r e f e r r e d by one p l a y e r w i l l be l e a s t p r e f e r r e d by the o t h e r , and; games of p a r t i a l o p p o s i t i o n or mixed-mot ive games in which no s i n g l e outcome i s most p r e f e r r e d by both p l a y e r s . To r e c a p i t u l a t e , the 2 x 2 order of games where both p l a y e r s have s t r i c t and complete o r d i n a l p r e f e r e n c e s over the outcomes can be t r e a t e d as a b s t r a c t i o n s of some r e a l wor ld s i t u a t i o n s and i n p a r t i c u l a r , of s i t u a t i o n s c u s t o m a r i l y r e s o l v e d through p o l i t i c s . Drawing upon game t h e o r y , the n a t u r a l outcome of each game, c o n t i n g e n t upon the p l a y e r s behaving r a t i o n a l l y , has been d e s c r i b e d . Now we must ask: i n how many of these same games i s i t p o s s i b l e for an i n d i v i d u a l to behave a l t r u i s t i c a l l y ? To p r o v i d e an answer r e q u i r e s an o p e r a t i o n a l d e f i n i t i o n of a l t r u i s m drawn from Chapter Two. 1 1 0 4.4 A l t r u i s m In 2 X 2 Games. Chapter Two d i s c u s s e d and assembled four elements of a d e f i n i t i o n of a l t r u i s m which when combined produce what was d e s c r i b e d as the most r i g o r o u s form of the d e f i n i t i o n . It was noted there that many r e s e a r c h e r s have been s a t i s f i e d or t h i n k a p p r o p r i a t e a l e s s s t r i n g e n t d e f i n i t i o n i n c l u d i n g some or on ly one of the e lements . We can now proceed to o p e r a t i o n a l i z e each of these elements in the c o n t e x t of the subset of 2 x 2 games d e f i n e d for a n a l y s i s in the p r e c e d i n g s e c t i o n s of t h i s c h a p t e r . For r e f e r e n c e , the e lements a r e : tha t the behav iour b e n e f i t or improve the w e l l - b e i n g of the r e c i p i e n t ; t h a t the behav iour r e s u l t in some cos t to the a l t r u i s t ; that i t be v o l u n t a r y or uncoerced; and that i t not be s e l f - s a c r i f i c i a l . Before o p e r a t i o n a l i z i n g and a p p l y i n g these c o n d i t i o n s to the games, a number of assumpt ions need to be made e x p l i c i t . F i r s t , a l l of the f o l l o w i n g d i s c u s s i o n w i l l be a p p l i c a b l e on ly to the extent that the game i s p l a y e d once . In o ther words, we are d i s c u s s i n g c h o i c e in a "one-shot" p l a y of the game. There are two reasons for a d o p t i n g t h i s n o n - i t e r a t e d a n a l y s i s . F i r s t , the i n t r o d u c t i o n of r e p e a t e d p l a y or c h o i c e when the same game i s repeated a l a r g e and unknown or even i n f i n i t e number of t i m e s , i n t r o d u c e s the added c o m p l i c a t i o n of d e c i d i n g how p l a y e r s may d i s c o u n t f u t u r e p a y o f f s . And second, w h i l e i t e r a t e d p l a y may have an e f f e c t upon how p l a y e r s choose in some games, i t i s not l i k e l y to have an e f f e c t upon how r a t i o n a l p l a y e r s would choose in a game of n o - c o n f l i c t , or in most games where one or 111 both of the p l a y e r s has a dominat ing s t r a t e g y (with the n o t a b l e e x c e p t i o n of the P r i s o n e r s ' Di lemma). Such games make up 81 percent of the 78 d e f i n e d as be ing 2 x 2 o r d i n a l games in which both p l a y e r s have a s t r i c t and complete p r e f e r e n c e order on the p a y o f f s . 1 5 The second assumption of the f o l l o w i n g a n a l y s i s i s tha t when d e t e r m i n i n g whether Row p l a y e r ' s (Column p l a y e r ' s ) c h o i c e a l t e r n a t i v e to the s e l f - i n t e r e s t e d one compl i e s w i th our r i g o r o u s d e f i n i t i o n of a l t r u i s m , i t w i l l be assumed that Column p l a y e r (Row p l a y e r ) w i l l always choose the s e l f - i n t e r e s t e d a l t e r n a t i v e . F i n a l l y , the r e a s o n i n g throughout the f o l l o w i n g d i s c u s s i o n i s r e l e v a n t on ly to n o n c o o p e r a t i v e games, or those i n which the p l a y e r s cannot enter i n t o b i n d i n g agreements p r e v i o u s to making t h e i r c h o i c e in ignorance of how the other w i l l choose . The f i r s t element of the d e f i n i t i o n of a l t r u i s m r e q u i r e d that any g i f t i n c r e a s e the w e l f a r e of the r e c i p i e n t ( i n t h i s case in terms of a more p r e f e r r e d outcome). Should the c h o i c e a l t e r n a t i v e to the s e l f - i n t e r e s t e d one for e i t h e r Row or Column p l a y e r , not r e s u l t i n a more p r e f e r r e d outcome for the c o p l a y e r , such a c h o i c e a l t e r n a t i v e cannot be d e s c r i b e d as a l t r u i s t i c . The second element of the d e f i n i t i o n r e q u i r e d tha t the a l t r u i s t i c ac t be c o s t l y . I f an a l t e r n a t i v e i s to be p r o v i s i o n a l l y termed a l t r u i s t i c , i t must mean that the outcome r e s u l t i n g from i t s c h o i c e i s of d i m i n i s h e d p r e f e r e n c e i n comparison to the outcome a s s o c i a t e d w i t h a s e l f - i n t e r e s t e d c h o i c e . I n t u i t i o n may suggest tha t t h i s w i l l always be t r u e . 1 1 2 But as w i l l become a p p a r e n t , in some games i t i s i m p o s s i b l e for an i n d i v i d u a l to make a c h o i c e which c o n t a i n s an outcome which i s l e s s p r e f e r r e d than the s e l f - i n t e r e s t e d one, always assuming that the r e c i p i e n t chooses to maximize h i s or her p r e f e r e n c e o r d e r . The t h i r d , element of the d e f i n i t i o n r e q u i r e d that the act be v o l u n t a r y and uncoerced . In some games, as w i l l become apparent below, one of the p l a y e r s may have a l a t e n t t h r e a t which c o u l d p o s s i b l y f o r c e an i n d i v i d u a l i n t o making an a l t r u i s t i c c h o i c e . As was argued in Chapter Two, such a l t e r n a t i v e s cannot be unambiguously d e s c r i b e d as a l t r u i s t i c . F i n a l l y , in some games one or both of the p l a y e r s w i l l have an a l t e r n a t i v e to the p r e f e r e n c e maximiz ing one which w i l l r e s u l t in an outcome which i s p r e f e r r e d l e s s , but a l s o happens to be the outcome which i s p r e f e r r e d l e a s t . Because Chapter Two argued that a l t r u i s m i s not s e l f - s a c r i f i c e , and tha t c h o o s i n g a l e a s t p r e f e r r e d outcome' w i l l i n g l y i s tantamount to s e l f -s a c r i f i c e , such a l t e r n a t i v e s w i l l be exc luded here from c o n s i d e r a t i o n as a l t r u i s t i c ones . Of course there may be some s i t u a t i o n s where a l t r u i s m may take the form of a l e a s t p r e f e r r e d outcome and t h e r e f o r e appear to be s e l f - s a c r i f i c i a l . T h i s may depend upon the s p e c i f i c c o u r s e s of a c t i o n presen t in any s i t u a t i o n . For example, i f a worst outcome i s l i t t l e d i f f e r e n t from a best outcome, a c c e p t i n g the l e a s t p r e f e r r e d one may not appear to be s e l f - s a c r i f i c i a l . In o ther s i t u a t i o n s , the on ly a l t r u i s t i c c o u r s e of a c t i o n may be a p o t e n t i a l l y s e l f -s a c r i f i c i a l one; as when Smith must r i s k h i s l i f e to rescue a 1 1 3 drowning swimmer. Having acknowledged the p o s s i b i l i t y that a l t r u i s m may at t imes r e q u i r e s e l f - s a c r i f i c e , we now exclude t h i s type of a l t r u i s m from f u r t h e r a n a l y s i s on the grounds that the s i t u a t i o n s in which we wish to examine the importance of a l t r u i s m - those of the p r o v i s i o n of p u b l i c goods - r a r e l y r e q u i r e such d r a s t i c a c t i o n . These four elements of the d e f i n i t i o n can be r e s t a t e d as separate c o n d i t i o n s which when a p p l i e d s e q u e n t i a l l y to each of the 78 games w i l l r e v e a l those in which one or both of the p l a y e r s have a genuine a l t r u i s t i c a l t e r n a t i v e to the s e l f -i n t e r e s t e d one. The f i r s t requirement of a l t r u i s m i s that i t improve the w e l f a r e of the r e c i p i e n t . I t ' is at l e a s t l o g i c a l l y p o s s i b l e for a g i f t to d i m i n i s h w e l f a r e . Such may be the case when a g i f t i s unknowingly i n a p p r o p r i a t e or when i t i s knowingly so, but the r e d u c t i o n of p r e f e r e n c e i s f or some other reason such as c o m p e t i t i v e advantage , m a l e v o l e n c e , or s p i t e . But when a g i f t , unders tood here as the c h o i c e of an outcome which the a l t r u i s t p r e f e r s l e s s than the n a t u r a l one, i s not p r e f e r r e d more by the r e c i p i e n t the r e s u l t i s c l e a r l y not a l t r u i s m . C o n d i t i o n I . The s e l e c t i o n of an a l t e r n a t i v e to the g a i n s -maximiz ing one which does not produce an outcome more p r e f e r r e d by the c o p l a y e r cannot be j u s t i f i e d by a l t r u i s m . Two of the games which can be exc lu d ed on the b a s i s of t h i s c o n d i t i o n from those which o f f e r a l t r u i s t i c c h o i c e a l t e r n a t i v e s are #26 and #31 . 1 1 4 F i g u r e 12 - Two Games Exc luded by C o n d i t i o n I . A 2 B 2 A 2 B 2 4 3 4 2 A , 4 2 A 1 3 2 1 2 3 1 B, 3 1 B, 1 4 Game #26 Game #31 Game #26 i s a n o - c o n f l i c t or n o n c o m p e t i t i v e game because both p l a y e r s most p r e f e r the A , A 2 outcome. Now shou ld one of the p l a y e r s wish to behave a l t r u i s t i c a l l y , he or she might choose B, or B 2 which would i n v o l v e some c o s t in terms of reduced p r e f e r e n c e . However, the outcome ( e i t h e r B , A 2 or A , B 2 ) would be one which i s l e s s p r e f e r r e d by the c o p l a y e r . So the would-be a l t r u i s t can o n l y d i m i n i s h and not improve the o t h e r ' s w e l f a r e . C l e a r l y , in such games a l t r u i s t i c c h o i c e i s not p o s s i b l e . N o t i c e that as C o n d i t i o n I exc ludes Game #26 from those in which a l t r u i s m i s p o s s i b l e , so i t a l s o exc ludes a l l games of n o - c o n f l i c t (21 of 78) because they a l l f e a t u r e a n a t u r a l outcome which i s most p r e f e r r e d by both p l a y e r s . Whi le the cho ice of B by e i t h e r p l a y e r in Game #26 cannot be e x p l a i n e d by a l t r u i s m , i t might be e x p l a i n e d by a d e s i r e for c o m p e t i t i v e advantage . I f Row chooses B, and Column, A 2 , Row ga i ns h i s or her next to most p r e f e r r e d outcome w h i l e Column ends up w i t h h i s or her l e a s t p r e f e r r e d one. Whi le C o n d i t i o n I exc ludes a l l games of n o - c o n f l i c t , i t a l s o exc ludes o ther games from the f i n a l subset in which 1 1 5 a l t r u i s t i c c h o i c e i s p o s s i b l e . Game #31 i s one of p a r t i a l c o n f l i c t . Column has a dominat ing s t r a t e g y to which Row shou ld choose the best response , the r e s u l t of which i s A , A 2 , the n a t u r a l outcome. Row cannot be a l t r u i s t i c because the c h o i c e of B, would b r i n g about h i s or her l e a s t p r e f e r r e d outcome ( C o n d i t i o n I V ) . Column can b r i n g about an outcome by c h o o s i n g B 2 which he or she p r e f e r s l e s s than A , A 2 but does not p r e f e r l e a s t . However, even though Column can i n c u r the c o s t of a g i f t , i t r e s u l t s in an outcome which i s p r e f e r r e d l e s s by Row than i s the n a t u r a l one. So as w i t h Row, though for a d i f f e r e n t r e a s o n , Column's a l t r u i s m i s c o n s t r a i n e d by the s t r u c t u r a l f e a t u r e s of the game. The second element of the d e f i n i t i o n of a l t r u i s m r e q u i r e d that the behav iour be c o s t l y to the a l t r u i s t . So we have e x c l u d i n g C o n d i t i o n I I : C o n d i t i o n I I . The s e l e c t i o n of an a l t e r n a t i v e to the g a i n s - m a x i m i z i n g c h o i c e which does not r e s u l t in an outcome which i s p r e f e r r e d l e s s by the p l a y e r cannot be j u s t i f i e d by a l t r u i s m . An example of the c h o i c e set d e s c r i b e d by C o n d i t i o n II i s g i v e n below in Game #68 in F i g u r e 13. 1 1 6 F i g u r e 13 - A Game Exc luded by C o n d i t i o n I I . A 2 B 2 2 2 4 3 3 4 1 1 Game #68 I f both p l a y e r s choose r a t i o n a l l y , the n a t u r a l outcome w i l l be the c e l l A , A 2 which i s next to l e a s t p r e f e r r e d by both p l a y e r s . Both p l a y e r s i n choos ing A w i l l be employing t h e i r maximin s t r a t e g i e s . Suppose now that Row wished to be a l t r u i s t i c . I f Row p l a y e r chooses B , , and assuming that Column chooses the maximin s t r a t e g y - the outcome w i l l be B , A 2 . At t h i s outcome the r e s u l t of Row's c h o i c e i n c r e a s e s the payof f to Column, but Row p r e f e r s t h i s outcome more than A , A 2 , or a l t e r n a t i v e l y , choos ing i t has cos t n o t h i n g . One i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of Row c h o o s i n g B, i s that the p l a y e r i s p u r s u i n g a more p r e f e r r e d outcome: something which i s h a r d l y c o m p a t i b l e with a l t r u i s m as i t has been d e s c r i b e d . We t h e r e f o r e w i l l wish to exc lude Row p l a y e r ' s c h o i c e a l t e r n a t i v e to the ga ins maximiz ing one from be ing d e f i n e d as a l t r u i s t i c on the b a s i s of C o n d i t i o n I I . I f we now examine Column p l a y e r ' s c h o i c e a l t e r n a t i v e to the g a i n s maximiz ing one, we f i n d that t h i s a l t e r n a t i v e i s s i m i l a r l y ex c luded from be ing a l t r u i s t i c on the b a s i s of C o n d i t i o n I I . As i s the case in Game #68, those games which v i o l a t e C o n d i t i o n II do not a l l o w p l a y e r s the o p p o r t u n i t y to behave 1 1 7 a l t r u i s t i c a l l y even were they d i s p o s e d to do so . T h e r e f o r e , Game #68 as w e l l as other games e l i m i n a t e d by t h i s c o n d i t i o n p l a c e a c o n s t r a i n t upon the m a n i f e s t a t i o n of a l t r u i s m . T h i r d l y , a l t r u i s m was a l s o d e f i n e d as be ing v o l u n t a r y and u n c o e r c e d . Whi le in r e a l i t y i t i s o f t e n d i f f i c u l t to d i s t i n g u i s h genuine a l t r u i s m from behaviour which may f o l l o w from s o c i a l or i n d i v i d u a l o b l i g a t i o n , or behav iour which i s in tended to enhance esteem, in s imple games the task i s somewhat e a s i e r . A l t h o u g h what can be unders tood as c o e r c i o n i n these games i s not as r i c h as the p o s s i b i l i t i e s in r e a l l i f e , i t i s at l e a s t i l l u s t r a t i v e . What i s meant by c o e r c i o n in t h i s c o n t e x t i s the presence of a t h r e a t which f o r c e s a p l a y e r w i t h an a l t r u i s t i c a l t e r n a t i v e to choose i t not because of genuine a l t r u i s t i c i n t e n t i o n s , but r a t h e r as a submiss ion to the t h r e a t . So f i n a l l y t h e r e i s , C o n d i t i o n I I I . The s e l e c t i o n of an a l t e r n a t i v e to the g a i n s - m a x i m i z i n g one which produces an a p p a r e n t l y a l t r u i s t i c outcome but which may be c o e r c e d by means of t h r e a t s or f o r c e d by the c o p l a y e r cannot be j u s t i f i e d by a l t r u i s m . I t w i l l be h e l p f u l to have an example of games e x c l u d e d on the b a s i s of C o n d i t i o n IV . F i g u r e 14 g i v e s two such games. 1 18 F i g u r e 14 - Two Games Exc luded by C o n d i t i o n III A 2 B 2 A 2 B 2 4 3 4 3 A , 3 4 A , 3 4 2 1 1 2 B, 2 1 B , 1 2 Game #20 Game #50 In n e i t h e r Game #20 nor Game #50 does Row have an a l t r u i s t i c a l t e r n a t i v e . In Game #20 i f Row chooses i t b r i n g s about an outcome which Column p r e f e r s l e s s than A , A 2 . T h e r e f o r e , Row in Game #20 i s e x c l u d e d from the subset of a l t r u i s t i c games by C o n d i t i o n I . S i m i l a r l y , the c h o i c e of B, by Row in Game #50 a l s o d i m i n i s h e s the c o p l a y e r ' s w e l f a r e and f u r t h e r m o r e , r e q u i r e s that Row b r i n g about h i s or her l e a s t p r e f e r r e d outcome. Because the former c o n d i t i o n i s a p p l i e d f i r s t , Row's c h o i c e a l t e r n a t i v e to the g a i n s maximiz ing one in Game #50 i s exc luded from the subset of a l t r u i s t i c games by C o n d i t i o n I . Column has i n both games what appears to be an a l t r u i s t i c c h o i c e in B 2 . In both i n s t a n c e s , i f Column chooses B 2 he or she w i l l produce an outcome which i s l e s s p r e f e r r e d than the n a t u r a l one but i s more p r e f e r r e d by the Row p l a y e r . However, the s e l e c t i o n of B 2 by Column may be the r e s u l t of the t h r e a t a v a i l a b l e to Row and not of a l t r u i s m . The presence of a t h r e a t i s obv ious in Game #50. In t h i s game Row has a dominat ing s t r a t e g y i n A , and Column's best response i s a p p a r e n t l y A 2 which 1 19 produces the n a t u r a l outcome A , A 2 . Now we must imagine how Column might reason before a c h o i c e i s made without knowledge of how Row has chosen . Column's f i r s t i m p r e s s i o n might be to choose A 2 thus p r o d u c i n g A , A 2 . On r e f l e c t i o n however, Column may r e c o g n i z e tha t at the n a t u r a l outcome Row i s d i s g r u n t l e d , he or she p r e f e r s another outcome more, which i n t h i s case i s A , B 2 . Column may w e l l b e l i e v e that Row c o u l d choose B, b r i n g i n g about both p l a y e r s ' l e a s t p r e f e r r e d outcome at B , A 2 . To a v o i d t h i s u n d e s i r a b l e outcome, Column may reason that i t i s b e t t e r to choose B 2 to beg in w i t h , thus b r i n g i n g about A 1 B 2 . Now, where we p r e v i o u s l y may have c o n s i d e r e d Column's c h o i c e a l t e r n a t i v e as a member of the subset of games in which a l t r u i s m i s p o s s i b l e , i t i s obv ious t h a t such a c t i o n may w e l l be taken not because of a wish to be a l t r u i s t i c , but i n response to a t h r e a t on the par t of Row to choose B , . 1 6 The same r e a s o n i n g a p p l i e s to Column's c h o i c e a l t e r n a t i v e in Game #20. The r e a s o n i n g f o l l o w e d to e x p l a i n the presence of c o e r c i o n in both of these games w i l l appear at f i r s t to be more a p p l i c a b l e to repeated p l a y s of a game where the l a t e n t t h r e a t may be e x e r c i s e d . However, such a l i n e of reasonong c o u l d a l s o be f o l l o w e d by a p l a y e r in a one shot p l a y of the game. Now the o n l y c o n d i t i o n not a p p l i e d i s tha t where the c h o i c e of the a l t e r n a t i v e to the s e l f - i n t e r e s t e d one i s s e l f -s a c r i f i c i a l , or b r i n g s about the outcome which i s p r e f e r r e d l e a s t . R e c a l l tha t such i n s t a n c e s have been termed superogatory and s e l f - s a c r i f i c i a l , and so are exc luded from be ing i n s t a n c e s of a l t r u i s t i c b e h a v i o u r . So: 1 20 C o n d i t i o n I V . The s e l e c t i o n of an a l t e r n a t i v e to the g a i n s - m a x i m i z i n g one which r e s u l t s in an outcome which i s l e a s t p r e f e r r e d cannot be j u s t i f i e d by a l t r u i s m . Two examples of games exc luded by C o n d i t i o n IV are g iven in F i g u r e 15. F i g u r e 15 - Two Games E x c l u d e d by C o n d i t i o n IV . A 2 B 2 A 2 B 2 3 1 3 1 A, 3 4 A , 2 4 4 2 4 2 B, 1 2 B, 1 3 Game #9 Game #11 In both games Row and Column have dominat ing s t r a t e g i e s which i f chosen produce the n a t u r a l outcome A , A 2 . Moreover , i n both games the p l a y e r s in c h o o s i n g e i t h e r B, or B 2 can b r i n g about an outcome (assuming that the other p l a y e r f o l l o w s a g a i n s - m a x i m i z i n g s t r a t e g y ) which they p r e f e r l e s s , but which the c o p l a y e r p r e f e r s more than the n a t u r a l one. But in do ing so , they are c h o o s i n g to accept an outcome which i s l e a s t p r e f e r r e d and t h e r e f o r e s e l f - s a c r i f i c i a l . For example, i f Row i n Game #9 chooses B , , he or she i n c u r s a cos t in terms of reduced p r e f e r e n c e by a c c e p t i n g an outcome l e s s p r e f e r r e d than A , A 2 , which i s p r e f e r r e d next to most. F u r t h e r m o r e , such a c h o i c e i n c r e a s e s the we l fare of Column by b r i n g i n g about h i s or her most p r e f e r r e d outcome as opposed to the n a t u r a l outcome, which i s on ly next to most p r e f e r r e d . However, wh i l e t h i s c h o i c e compl i e s w i th t h r e e elements of the d e f i n i t i o n of a l t r u i s m , i t 121 contravenes the o ther by r e q u i r i n g tha t the a l t r u i s t accept a l e a s t p r e f e r r e d outcome. T a b l e I summarizes which c o n d i t i o n s e l i m i n a t e the Row and Column p l a y e r ' s c h o i c e a l t e r n a t i v e to the ga ins maximiz ing one from the set of a l t r u i s t i c ones . The c o n d i t i o n s were a p p l i e d s e q u e n t i a l l y I through IV so t h a t the f i r s t c o n d i t i o n which exc ludes i s i n d i c a t e d for both Row and Column. T a b l e I - The C o n d i t i o n s Which E l i m i n a t e Each Game Under I n i t i a l Assumpt ions . GAME ROW COL. GAME ROW COL. GAME ROW COL. 1 I I 27 I I 53 I I l l 2 I I 28 I I 54 I I II 3 I I 29 I I 55 I I II 4 I I 30 I I 56 I I II 5 I I 31 I I 57 I I I I 6 I I 32 I I 58 I I 7 33 I I 59 I I 8 IV 34 I I 60 I I 9 IV IV 35 I 61 I I 1 0 IV 36 I IV 62 I I 1 1 IV IV 37 I I 63 I I 1 2 IV IV 38 I I 64 I I 1 3 I 39 .1 I I I 65 I IV 1 4 I 40 I IV 66 I I 1 5 I IV 41 I IV 67 I 11 16 I IV 42 I IV 68 II II 17 I 43 I IV 69 II II 18 I IV 44 I IV 70 I I 1 9 I I I I 45 IV 71 I I ' 20 I I I I 46 IV IV 72 II I 21 I I I I 47 I IV 73 I IV 22 I I 48 IV IV 74 I IV 23 I I 49 I I I I 75 I IV 24 I I 50 I I I I 76 I IV 25 I I 51 I I I I 77 II IV 26 I I 52 I I I I 78 II IV The p r o c e s s of e l i m i n a t i o n can be g r e a t l y s i m p l i f i e d by the 1 22 f o l l o w i n g a l g o r i t h m : Step 1. Does the n o n s e l f - i n t e r e s t e d c h o i c e r e s u l t in an outcome which i s more p r e f e r r e d by the c o p l a y e r than the n a t u r a l one? If n o t , exc lude i t on the b a s i s of C o n d i t i o n I . I f so , go to Step 2. Step 2. Does the c h o i c e of the n o n s e l f - i n t e r e s t e d a l t e r n a t i v e by e i t h e r Row or Column r e s u l t in an outcome p r e f e r r e d l e s s than the n a t u r a l one? I f n o t , exc lude i t on the b a s i s of C o n d i t i o n I I . I f so , go to Step 3. Step 3. Can the c h o i c e of the n o n s e l f - i n t e r e s t e d a l t e r n a t i v e be coerced? If i t c a n , exc lude i t on the b a s i s of C o n d i t i o n I I I . I f i t cannot be c o e r c e d , go to s t ep 4. Step 4. Does the n o n s e l f - i n t e r e s t e d c h o i c e r e s u l t in an outcome which i s the l e a s t p r e f e r r e d ? I f so , exc lude i t on the b a s i s of C o n d i t i o n IV . I f no t , the c h o i c e a l t e r n a t i v e i s one which can be j u s t i f i e d by a l t r u i s m . The a l g o r i t h i m produces on ly e i g h t games i n which e i t h e r Row, Column, or both have a n o n s e l f - i n t e r e s t e d c h o i c e a l t e r n a t i v e which can be j u s t i f i e d by a l t r u i s m . These games are #7, #8, #10, #13, #14, #17, #35, and #45. They are g iven i n F i g u r e 16. 1 23 F i g u r e 16 - Games S u r v i v i n g E l i m i n a t i o n by A l l C o n d i t i o n s Under F i r s t Set of Assumpt ions . A 2 B 2 A 2 B 2 A 2 B 2 A, 3 3 4 2 A, 3 3 4 2 A , 2 3 4 2 B, 2 4 1 1 B, 1 4 1 2 B, 1 4 3 1 Game #7 Game #8 Game #10 A 2 B 2 A 2 B 2 A 2 B 2 A, 3 4 4 2 A, 3 4 4 2 A , 2 4 4 2 Bi 2 3 1 1 B, 1 3 2 1 B 1 1 3 3 1 Game #13 Game #14 Game #17 1 24 B-A, B 4 2 2 3 3 1 1 4 A , B, 2 3 1 4 3 2 4 1 Game #35 Game #45 Whi le the c o n d i t i o n s have been a p p l i e d in a s p e c i f i c o r d e r , a d i f f e r e n t order of a p p l i c a t i o n where the cos t c o n d i t i o n i s a p p l i e d f i r s t , the s e l f - s a c r i f i c e c o n d i t i o n a p p l i e d second, the b e n e f i t c o n d i t i o n a p p l i e d t h i r d , and the v o l u n t a r y c o n d i t i o n a p p l i e d f o u r t h r e s u l t s in p r e c i s e l y the same games be ing e l i m i n a t e d , though not n e c e s s a r i l y by the same c o n d i t i o n s where more than one c o n d i t i o n i s a p p l i c a b l e to a p a r t i c u l a r game. A c l o s e r look at T a b l e I r e v e a l s the r e l a t i v e importance of the e x c l u d i n g c o n d i t i o n s and f u r t h e r , how many games would be admi t ted i n t o the subset of a l t r u i s t i c ones as the requirements of the most r i g o r o u s d e f i n i t i o n of a l t r u i s m are r e l a x e d . The f i r s t p o i n t worthy of comment and one tha t can h a r d l y be m i s s e d , i s the number of games or a l t e r n a t i v e s exc luded by C o n d i t i o n I . T h i s c e r t a i n l y u n d e r l i n e s and j u s t i f i e s the importance which many d e f i n i t i o n s g ive to a s s u r i n g tha t an a l t r u i s t i c act b e n e f i t the r e c i p i e n t . The o ther c o n d i t i o n s by compar i son , opera te i n f r e q u e n t l y under t h i s order of a p p l i c a t i o n . I f the number of c o n d i t i o n s an a l t e r n a t i v e must meet i s reduced by dropping the f o u r t h , s e l f - s a c r i f i c i a l c o n s t r a i n t , t h i s would admit a f u r t h e r 22 games to the subset where one or both of the p l a y e r s has a 1 25 c h o i c e a l t e r n a t i v e to the ga ins maximiz ing one which i s a l t r u i s t i c . Dropping the v o l u n t a r y c o n d i t i o n , I I I , would admit a f u r t h e r 13 games to the subset b r i n g i n g the t o t a l to 43, or 55 percent of the 78 games. F i n a l l y , i f the c o s t c o n d i t i o n i s dropped another 4 games are a d m i t t e d to the s u b s e t . Depending upon the s t r i n g e n c y of the d e f i n i t i o n a p p l i e d we can now say that the percentage of games of t h i s order which a l l o w a l t r u i s t i c c h o i c e by one or both of the p l a y e r s ranges between a h i g h of 60 percent where o n l y the b e n e f i t requirement i s a p p l i e d , and a low of 10 percent when a l l four c o n d i t i o n s are a p p l i e d . One important q u e s t i o n needs to be p u t : i s i t p o s s i b l e that the s m a l l number of games i n which a l t r u i s m i s v i a b l e i s not o n l y a r e s u l t of our four c o n d i t i o n s but a l s o of the assumptions e x p l i c i t l y s t a t e d at the b e g i n n i n g of the s e c t i o n ? R e c a l l that f i r s t we assumed in d e t e r m i n i n g whether Row p l a y e r ' s (Column p l a y e r ' s ) c h o i c e a l t e r n a t i v e to the s e l f - i n t e r e s t e d one compl i ed w i t h the d e f i n i t i o n of a l t r u i s m , tha t the Column p l a y e r (Row p l a y e r ) w i l l a lways choose the s e l f - i n t e r e s t e d a l t e r n a t i v e . Second, we assumed that Row or Column p l a y e r c o u l d not be a l t r u i s t i c i n choos ing the a l t e r n a t i v e which produced the n a t u r a l outcome and so l ooked on ly a t the o ther a l t e r n a t i v e . R e l a x i n g one of these assumpt ions r e q u i r e s tha t both be r e l a x e d . So now we broaden our assumpt ions a d m i t t i n g two p o s s i b i l i t i e s : f i r s t , tha t the r e s u l t of a s e l f - i n t e r e s t e d c h o i c e may be a l t r u i s t i c ; and second, tha t where we are a p p l y i n g the c o n d i t i o n s to Row (Column) we w i l l now assume tha t Column (Row) 1 26 w i l l not n e c e s s a r i l y choose the g a i n s - m a x i m i z i n g s t r a t e g y . A l l we are r e a l l y a d m i t t i n g here i s that the r e c i p i e n t of the p o t e n t i a l a l t r u i s m may be a b l e to e x e r c i s e a k i n d of second order r a t i o n a l i t y , and thereby determine the c o p l a y e r ' s r a t i o n a l course of a c t i o n and choose so as to take advantage of i t . I t may at f i r s t be d i f f i c u l t to accept that a s e l f -i n t e r e s t e d c h o i c e c o u l d a l s o be a l t r u i s t i c . But of course here we are not i n t e r e s t e d i n the m o t i v a t i o n of the p l a y e r s but on ly in the r e s u l t of t h e i r a c t i o n s . F u r t h e r m o r e , i t w i l l become more r e a d i l y apparent in the f o l l o w i n g two c h a p t e r s how a s i n g l e c h o i c e c o u l d be i n t e r p r e t e d as be ing m o t i v a t e d by both s e l f -i n t e r e s t and a l t r u i s m . When under both the f i r s t and second set of assumptions a l l four of the c o n d i t i o n s are a p p l i e d to a l l 78 games, a f u r t h e r 9 games are r e v e a l e d as hav ing a l t r u i s t i c p o s s i b i l i t i e s . Now Column p l a y e r ' s c h o i c e of the s e l f - i n t e r e s t e d a l t e r n a t i v e in games #66, #67, #70, #71, #72, #73, #74, #75, and #76, and Row p l a y e r ' s s e l f - i n t e r e s t e d c h o i c e in game #66 may l e a d to an a l t r u i s t i c outcome i f the c o p l a y e r chooses the n o n s e l f -i n t e r e s t e d a l t e r n a t i v e . Whi le under the f i r s t and second set of assumptions the number of games not e l i m i n a t e d by the four combined c o n d i t i o n s d o u b l e s , the number of a d m i s s i b l e games i s s t i l l on ly 22 p e r c e n t of the complete subset of 2 x 2 games. One f i n a l p o i n t to note i s tha t of the seventeen games, o n l y two permit both p l a y e r s an a l t r u s i t i c c h o i c e a l t e r n a t i v e . F i g u r e 17 shows the a d d i t i o n a l 9 games a d m i t t e d under the r e l a x e d as sumpt ions . 1 27 F i g u r e 17 - A d d i t i o n a l Games S u r v i v i n g E l i m i n a t i o n by A l l C o n d i t i o n s Under F i r s t and Second Sets of Assumpt ions . A 2 B 2 3 3 4 2 2 4 1 1 Game #66 A 2 B 2 3 2 4 3 2 4 1 1 Game #67 A 2 B 2 4 3 1 2 2 4 3 1 Game #70 A 2 B 2 3 3 1 2 2 4 4 1 Game #71 A 2 B 2 2 3 1 2 3 4 4 1 Game #72 A 2 B 2 4 2 1 4 2 3 3 1 Game #73 1 28 A 2 B 2 A 2 B 2 A 2 B 2 4 1 3 1 3 1 A, 2 3 A, 2 4 A 1 2 3 2 3 2 4 2 4 Bi 4 1 B, 3 1 B , 4 1 Game #74 Game #75 Game #76 F i n a l l y , we can drop the c o n d i t i o n s as i n the a n a l y s i s made under the f i r s t set of assumptions to de termine how many games enter the subset of a l t r u i s t i c ones under s u c c e s s i v e l y l e s s s t r i n g e n t d e f i n i t i o n s . I f C o n d i t i o n IV i s dropped 18 games en ter the subse t . Dropping C o n d i t i o n s I I I and II r e s u l t in a f u r t h e r 13 and 2 games r e s p e c t i v e l y e n t e r i n g the subset of a l t r u i s t i c ones . The t o t a l number of games in the subset under both the second and f i r s t set of assumpt ions w i t h on ly the one c o n d i t i o n a p p l i e d i s 50, which i s on ly an i n c r e a s e of 7 over those in the subset under the o r i g i n a l set of a s sumpt ions . 4.5 C o n c l u s i o n . The a n a l y s i s of t h i s c h a p t e r c o n f i r m s some of the p o s i t i o n s of p r e v i o u s ones . Most important i s the f i n d i n g tha t a l t r u i s t i c a c t i o n i s c o n s t r a i n e d by the s t r u c t u r e of c h o i c e a l t e r n a t i v e s . Whi le t h i s f i n d i n g says n o t h i n g about whether i n d i v i d u a l s can behave a l t r u i s t i c a l l y i t does show tha t even s h o u l d they wish t o , the s i t u a t i o n or contex t of c h o i c e w i l l have a c o n s i d e r a b l e e f f e c t on whether they are a b l e t o . T h i s may e x p l a i n N a g e l ' s 129 comment that a l t r u i s m i s r a r e , add ing the q u a l i f i c a t i o n that i t may not be because i n d i v i d u a l s cannot be mot iva ted by i t , but because the s i t u a t i o n s in which i t i s p o s s i b l e are r e l a t i v e l y r a r e . The l i m i t e d a p p l i c a b i l i t y of a l t r u i s m f i n d s support i n a complementary f i n d i n g of Norman F r o h l i c h ' s . In a formal a n a l y s i s u s i n g the example of a l l i e s d i v i d i n g the c o s t s of a d e t e r r e n t , he f i n d s that whi l e a l t r u i s m may narrow the area of d i sagreement , i t does not e n t i r e l y remove c o n f l i c t and , "even when a l t r u i s t i c behav iour i s present on a l l s i d e s in a p o l i t i c a l s i t u a t i o n s , a residuum of p o l i t i c a l problems r e m a i n s . " 1 7 In the example he d i s c u s s e s , "the model i n d i c a t e s that a l t r u i s m may l i m i t the number of areas over which c o n f l i c t may be expected but does not e l i m i n a t e a l l c o n f l i c t over s h a r i n g of the b u r d e n s . " 1 8 The f i n d i n g s of t h i s chapter a l s o s u b s t a n t i a t e d the e a r l i e r comment about the asymmetry of a l t r u i s m . R e c a l l that Chapter Three noted tha t where a l t r u i s m i s p o s s i b l e i t i s u s u a l l y l i m i t e d to one or a subset of a c t o r s i n v o l v e d in the s i t u a t i o n . T h i s was borne out by the f i n d i n g t h a t in on ly 2 of the 78 games d i d both of the p l a y e r s have a l t r u i s t i c c h o i c e a l t e r n a t i v e s . A c c e p t i n g these games as a b s t r a c t i o n s of p o l i t i c a l s i t u a t i o n s l e a d s to an i n t e r e s t i n g c o n c l u s i o n about the p o t e n t i a l importance of a l t r u i s t i c m o t i v a t i o n . C l e a r l y , a l t r u i s m i s not a panacea for p o l i t i c a l c o n f l i c t . Even a s o c i e t y where a l l i n d i v i d u a l s are g u i d e d i n a l l of t h e i r a c t i o n s by a l t r u i s m would s t i l l have i t s d i f f i c u l t i e s , for in some 1 30 c o n f l i c t s g o o d w i l l and benevolence would not be p o s s i b l e . What has been accompl i shed so f a r i s a formal d e f i n i t i o n and d e s c r i p t i o n of the s i t u a t i o n a l c o n s t r a i n t s upon a l t r u i s m . However, we s t i l l have no c l e a r a p p r e c i a t i o n of how f r e q u e n t l y i n d i v i d u a l s may choose to behave a l t r u i s t i c a l l y when such an o p p o r t u n i t y i s p r e s e n t . The f o l l o w i n g two c h a p t e r s i n v e s t i g a t e t h i s q u e s t i o n . 131 Notes . 1 M a r t i n Shubik , ( ed) , Game Theory and R e l a t e d Approaches  to S o c i a l Behaviour (New Y o r k : W i l e y , 1964) , p~. 8~. 2 For a d i s c u s s i o n of the r o l e of game theory i n a n a l y z i n g p o l i t i c a l b e h a v i o u r , see: Hayward R. A l k e r , Mathematics and  P o l i t i c s (New York: M a c m i l l a n , 1965), chapter 7; R. B . B r a i t h w a i t e , The Theory of Games as a T o o l f o r the Mora l  P h i l o s o p h e r , (Cambridge: Cambridge U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s , 1955); Stephen J . Brams, Game Theory and P o l i t i c s (New Y o r k : Free P r e s s , 1975). A n a t o l Rapopor t , F i g h t s , Games and Debates , (Ann A r b o r : U n i v e r s i t y of M i c h i g a n P r e s s , 1960) ; Thomas C . S c h e l l i n g , The S t r a t e g y of C o n f l i c t (Cambridge, M a s s . : H a r v a r d U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s , 1960); M a r t i n S h u b i k , ( ed) , Game Theory and  R e l a t e d Approaches to S o c i a l Behaviour (New Y o r k : W i l e y , 1964). The a p p l i c a t i o n s of game theory to the a n a l y s i s of i n t e r n a t i o n a l r e l a t i o n s are too numerous to c i t e h e r e , but see R. H a r r i s o n Wagner, "The Theory of Games and the Problem of I n t e r n a t i o n a l C o o p e r a t i o n , " American P o l i t i c a l Sc i ence Review, v o l . 77 (1983), pp . 330-346, for a p a r t i a l b i b l i o g r a p h y and c r i t i c a l d i s c u s s i o n . 3 A game may a l s o be r e p r e s e n t e d i n c h a r a c t e r i st i c form. "The c h a r a c t e r i s t i c f u n c t i o n i s a set f u n c t i o n which d e s c r i b e s the amount that any subset of p l a y e r s can guarantee for i t s e l f . " M a r t i n S h u b i k , "Game T h e o r y , B e h a v i o u r , and the Paradox of the P r i s o n e r ' s Dilemma: Three S o l u t i o n s , " J o u r n a l of C o n f l i c t  R e s o l u t i o n , v o l . 1 4 (1970), p . 182. The c h a r a c t e r i s t i c form i s most a p p l i c a b l e to b a r g a i n i n g s i t u a t i o n s or c o o p e r a t i v e games. The d i s c u s s i o n in t h i s c h a p t e r focuses on n o n c o o p e r a t i v e games in which , by d e f i n i t i o n , b a r g a i n i n g i s p r e c l u d e d . For an i n t e r e s t i n g experiment and use of the c h a r a c t e r i s t i c form of a game see: W i l l i a m H . R i k e r , " B a r g a i n i n g i n a Three Person Game", American J o u r n a l of P o l i t i c a l Sc ience , v o l . 61 (1967), pp . 642-56. 4 S h u b i k , "Game T h e o r y , B e h a v i o u r , and the Paradox of the P r i s o n e r s Dilemma: Three S o l u t i o n s " , p . 183. 5 For a good d i s c u s s i o n of the r e l a t i o n s h i p between s t r a t e g i c and e x t e n s i v e game forms, see Wagner, "The Theory of Games and the Problem of I n t e r n a t i o n a l C o o p e r a t i o n " . 6 R. Duncan Luce and Howard R a i f f a , Games and D e c i s i o n s (New Y o r k : Wi l ey & Sons, 1957), p . 89. 1 32 7 A n a t o l Rapoport , M e i v i n J . Guyer , and D a v i d G . Gordon, The 2 x 2 Game (Ann A r b o u r : M i c h i g a n U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s , 1976), p . 8. 8 A n a t o l Rapoport and M e i v i n J . Guyer , "A Taxonomy of 2 x 2 Games", G e n e r a l Systems , v o l . 11 (1966), pp . 203-214. 9 See: Rapoport and Guyer , "A Taxonomy of 2 x 2 Games". These numbers a p p l y on ly to the subset of 2 x 2 games where the p l a y e r s are assumed to have a complete and s t r o n g p r e f e r e n c e o r d e r over the outcomes of the game. 1 0 The complete set of 2 x 2 o r d i n a l games can be d e s c r i b e d a c c o r d i n g to each p a i r of o r d i n a l payo f f s e t s . The f i g u r e below g i v e s the number of d i f f e r e n t games for each of the combinat ions of p a y o f f s e t s . Number of D i f f e r e n t Games for Each P a i r of Payof f Sets 4321 3321 3221 321 1 221 1 222 1 2111 1111 4321 78 72 72 72 36 27 27 6 3321 21 36 36 18 12 1 2 3 322 1 21 36 18 1 2 1 2 3 321 1 21 18 1 2 1 2 3 221 1 8 6 6 3 222 1 3 4 1 2111 3 1 1111 1 SOURCE: M e i v i n Guyer and Henry Hamburger, "A Note on 'A Taxonomy of 2 x 2 Games'", G e n e r a l Systems, v o l . 13 (1968), pp . 205-209. 1 1 R a p o p o r t , Guyer and Gordon , The 2 x 2 Game , p . 4. 1 2 R a p o p o r t , Guyer and Gordon , The 2 x 2 Game , p . 17 1 3 R a p o p o r t , Guyer and Gordon , The 2 x 2 Game , p . 17-18. 1 * Rapoport et a l . are aware of t h i s d e f i c i e n c y and e x p l a i n the compromise i n the f o l l o w i n g terms: The " s o l u t i o n " of cons tant - sum games of t h i s type i s g iven i n terms of s o - c a l l e d mixed s t r a t e g i e s . . . S i n c e the s o l u t i o n i n terms of mixed s t r a t e g i e s i n v o l v e s the concept 1 33 of a s t a t i s t i c a l l y expected p a y o f f , i t f o l l o w s tha t such s o l u t i o n s can be d i s c u s s e d on ly i f the s t a t i s t i c a l e x p e c t a t i o n of a payof f can be d e f i n e d . In c l a s s i c a l game t h e o r y , p a y o f f s are supposed to be g i v e n on an i n t e r v a l s c a l e which p e r m i t s the d e f i n i t i o n of s t a t i s t i c a l e x p e c t a t i o n . In the present c l a s s i f i c a t i o n of games, however, we assume on ly a o r d i n a l s c a l e for the p a y o f f s . S t a t i s t i c a l e x p e c t a t i o n , hence a s o l u t i o n in terms of mixed s t r a t e g i e s , has no meaning in t h i s c o n t e x t , and the n a t u r a l outcome of a game wi thout dominat ing s t r a t e g i e s cannot be d e f i n e d in terms of mixed s t r a t e g i e s . R a p o p o r t , Guyer and Gordon , The 2 x 2 Game , p . 18. For another approach to c l a s s i f y i n g games of t h i s o r d e r , see: Stephen Brams and Marek P H e s s e l , "Absorbing Outcomes in 2 x 2 Games", B e h a v i o u r a l S c i e n c e , v o l . 27, (1982)" pp . 383-401. 1 5 See Chapter 7 i n Rapopor t , Guyer and Gordon , The 2 x 2  Game , for ev idence which support s t h i s c o n t e n t i o n . 1 6 For a s i m i l a r d i s c u s s i o n of t h r e a t s u s i n g the same order of games though based on a d i f f e r e n t e q u i l i b r i u m c o n c e p t , see: Steven J . Brams and Marek P. H e s s e l , "Threat Power in S e q u e n t i a l Games", I n t e r n a t i o n a l S t u d i e s Q u a r t e r l y , v o l . 28 (1984) , pp . 23-44. 1 7 Norman F r o h l i c h , " S e l f - i n t e r e s t or A l t r u i s m , What D i f f e r e n c e ? " , J o u r n a l of C o n f l i c t R e s o l u t i o n , v o l . 1-8 (1974), p . 58. F r o h l i c h , " S e l f - i n t e r e s t or A l t r u i s m " , p . 68. 1 34 V. THE MOTIVATIONAL CONTEXT OF CHOICE. 5.1 The In f luence Of C o n t e x t . Throughout the p r e c e d i n g c h a p t e r s , the i n f l u e n c e of context or s i t u a t i o n on a l t r u i s t i c c h o i c e has been r e p e a t e d l y emphas ized. Thus f a r i t has on ly been d i s c u s s e d in terms of the presence or absence of a c h o i c e a l t e r n a t i v e which can be d e s c r i b e d as a l t r u i s t i c . Now we need to broaden and add d e t a i l to our a p p r e c i a t i o n of c o n t e x t . The importance of context l i e s not only in the o p p o r t u n i t y to pursue a c e r t a i n b e h a v i o u r , though t h i s c o n s t r a i n t i s o b v i o u s l y paramount, but a l s o i n the way in which c e r t a i n e lements of a g i v e n s i t u a t i o n i n f l u e n c e the c h o i c e of one from among s e v e r a l p o s s i b l e b e h a v i o u r s . Take for example the case of a s p o r t i n g e v e n t , an i ce hockey game say . Each p l a y e r has open to him a number of p o s s i b l e b e h a v i o u r s w i t h i n the c o n t e x t of the game. The most c o m p e l l i n g element of the s i t u a t i o n w i l l of course be c o m p e t i t i o n , as i t i s i n a l l games. But even the e f f e c t s of t h i s m o t i v a t i o n are not s t r a i g h t f o r w a r d , f o r a s i d e from the two teams of i n d i v i d u a l s competing a g a i n s t each other as teams, there w i l l a l s o be a c o m p e t i t i o n between the members of each team to o u t s h i n e t h e i r teammates even though t h e i r team may l o s e the game. The p l a y e r s , that i s the i n d i v i d u a l s on both teams, are a l s o s u b j e c t to o ther m o t i v a t i o n a l p r e s s u r e s . I f the match i n v o l v e s p r o f e s s i o n a l hockey p l a y e r s who are c h i e f l y 1 3 5 e n t e r t a i n e r s , they w i l l have a c o l l e c t i v e m o t i v a t i o n to make "the match as e x c i t i n g as p o s s i b l e for the s p e c t a t o r s . (Needless to say , i f they are u s u a l l y s u c c e s s f u l in p r o d u c i n g e x c i t i n g matches which draw f u l l houses , i t w i l l be b e n e f i c i a l for each i n d i v i d u a l come s a l a r y n e g o t i a t i o n t i m e . ) I f the p l a y e r s are a b l e to produce a very e x c i t i n g match, that p a r t i c u l a r game may go down in hockey l o r e as one of the b e s t , and a p l a y e r w i l l have the s a t i s f a c t i o n of r e c o u n t i n g h i s r o l e in i t for the r e s t of h i s days . F i n a l l y , each p l a y e r may choose to be a l t r u i s t i c or benevolent i n t h i s s i t u a t i o n . He may t r y not to i n j u r e another p l a y e r d e l i b e r a t e l y , or not to run up the score i f tha t p l a y e r ' s team has a l r e a d y routed the o t h e r . N a t u r a l l y , the presence of o ther p r e s s u r e s in t h i s s i t u a t i o n w i l l tend to outweigh the p r e s s u r e to be b e n e v o l e n t . Once we beg in to examine c l o s e l y a s i t u a t i o n or c o n t e x t , something as a p p a r e n t l y s imple as a s p o r t s match, the number of m o t i v a t i o n a l p r e s s u r e s on a p l a y e r ' s d e c i s i o n s i n c r e a s e s . In the example of the i c e hockey game, each p l a y e r has an i n d i v i d u a l i n c e n t i v e to e x c e l and so improve h i s p o s i t i o n when s a l a r i e s are n e g o t i a t e d . Each p l a y e r i s a l s o under some p r e s s u r e to compete r a t h e r than cooperate because of the s p e c t a c l e which c o m p e t i t i o n w i l l p r o d u c e . Set a g a i n s t these p r e s s u r e s or m o t i v a t i o n s b u i l t i n t o the game s i t u a t i o n , was a p r e s s u r e to be b e n e v o l e n t , to t r e a t every opposing p l a y e r as he would wish to be t r e a t e d . We would not expect a l l s i t u a t i o n s to c o n t a i n a l l of the p r e s s u r e s mentioned above, nor that they w i l l work wi th equa l 1 36 f o r c e , d i r e c t i o n , or number, on i n d i v i d u a l s who are i n t e r a c t i n g w i t h i n some c o n t e x t . But c l e a r l y the number of p r e s s u r e s , whether they are opposed or r e i n f o r c i n g , w i l l have an important e f f e c t upon the c h o i c e of a course of a c t i o n . Remember the P r i s o n e r ' s Dilemma game d i s c u s s e d p r e v i o u s l y . In t h i s s i t u a t i o n each of the p l a y e r s has a c h o i c e of f o l l o w i n g h i s or her own s e l f - i n t e r e s t or i n d i v i d u a l r a t i o n a l i t y , which i f they do so , w i l l l e a d to a poor outcome for b o t h , o r , choos ing the c o l l e c t i v e l y r a t i o n a l s t r a t e g y , which i f they do so , l eads to a b e t t e r outcome for b o t h . The q u e s t i o n to be addres sed in t h i s and the succeed ing c h a p t e r i s : Under what c o n d i t i o n s and how f r e q u e n t l y w i l l i n d i v i d u a l s choose to behave a l t r u i s t i c a l l y when such a c h o i c e i s p o s s i b l e ? Whi le t h e r e are many examples of gaming exper iments i n which one can a r g u a b l y observe a l t r u i s t i c b e h a v i o u r , h a r d l y any of them are who l ly d e d i c a t e d to s y s t e m a t i c a l l y examining the i n f l u e n c e of a l t r u i s m on c h o i c e . For example, there are hundreds of exper iments which r e p o r t the use of the P r i s o n e r ' s Dilemma game. Whi le the a l l e g o r y urges us to b e l i e v e tha t the o n l y i n t e r e s t i n g aspect of t h i s game i s the problem of a c h i e v i n g c o o p e r a t i o n and t h e r e f o r e views any other outcome but the c o o p e r a t i v e one as a " f a i l u r e " of one or both of the s u b j e c t s to see past t h e i r i n d i v i d u a l l y r a t i o n a l course of a c t i o n to the c o l l e c t i v e l y r a t i o n a l c o u r s e , one may a l s o view some of these n o n c o o p e r a t i v e outcomes as e x p r e s s i o n s of a l t r u i s m . In f a c t , i n exper iments where s u b j e c t s must p l a y the game r e p e a t e d l y , a 1 37 p a t t e r n of r e c i p r o c a l a l t r u i s m i s not u n u s u a l . 1 Another example of what might a r g u a b l y be d e s c r i b e d as a l t r u i s m o c c u r s in R i k e r ' s c o a l i t i o n format ion e x p e r i m e n t s . 2 In these exper iments three s u b j e c t s had to b a r g a i n amongst themselves to a r r i v e at a c o a l i t i o n of two and so secure a payof f to each of the c o a l i t i o n members...— The three formable c o a l i t i o n s of two p l a y e r s each had three d i f f e r e n t v a l u e s of t o t a l p a y o f f s . A mathemat ica l s o l u t i o n d e r i v e d from game theory d e s c r i b e d the expected payof f which each p l a y e r sh ou ld ga in i f a c o a l i t i o n i s formed and the p l a y e r s behave r a t i o n a l l y . R i k e r found t h a t the s u b j e c t s ' behav iour conformed almost f u l l y w i th the game t h e o r y s o l u t i o n to the b a r g a i n i n g p r o b l e m . However, one d e v i a t i o n which was common i n many b a r g a i n i n g s e s s i o n s was the s t r a t e g y of "shaving the quota" where one p l a y e r agrees to accept a l e s s than o b t a i n a b l e p a y o f f and thereby i n c r e a s e s the payof f of the other c o a l i t i o n member. Riker i n t e r p r e t s t h i s behav iour as an attempt to purchase the other p l a y e r ' s agreement to form the c o a l i t i o n . But i t i s a l s o p o s s i b l e to see i t as a l t r u i s t i c b e h a v i o u r , a l t h o u g h o b v i o u s l y t h i s i s not so in a l l c a s e s . These two examples 3 of what might p o s s i b l y be a l t r u i s t i c behav iour from exper iments des igned to examine c o n f l i c t and c o o p e r a t i o n u n d e r l i n e the d i f f i c u l t i e s of q u a n t i f y i n g and d i s t i n g u i s h i n g the v a r i o u s d e c i s i o n p r e s s u r e s from each o t h e r . But t h i s i s p o s s i b l e i f we c o n t i n u e to use the s imple games a n a l y z e d in the p r e v i o u s c h a p t e r . But now, to o p e r a t i o n a l i z e the d e c i s i o n p r e s s u r e s , s l i g h t l y d i f f e r e n t games w i l l have to be 1 38 used . S p e c i f i c a l l y , to r epresen t m a t h e m a t i c a l l y the p r e s s u r e s the payof f s w i l l now have to be c o n s i d e r e d as c a r d i n a l va lues r a t h e r than as o r d i n a l i n d i c a t o r s , as was the case i n the l a s t c h a p t e r . In a d d i t i o n , i t w i l l a l s o be u s e f u l to observe the d i f f e r e n c e i n how i n d i v i d u a l s choose when they are i n d i f f e r e n t between t h e i r own c h o i c e a l t e r n a t i v e s but when t h e i r c h o i c e has an e f f e c t upon the p a y o f f s of another p l a y e r , as opposed to the same s i t u a t i o n but where the p l a y e r has a s e l f - i n t e r e s t e d c h o i c e . To a f f e c t these p o s s i b i l i t i e s , some of the games to be d i s c u s s e d w i l l impose a weak r a t h e r than a s t r o n g and complete l i n e a r order on the p a y o f f s . In other words, a p l a y e r or p l a y e r s may be i n d i f f e r e n t over the outcomes of a game. To c o n s t r u c t games in which one or both of the p l a y e r s may be i n d i f f e r e n t over the p a y o f f s in two or more than two of the outcomes r e q u i r e s that we sw i t ch our a n a l y s i s to subse t s of 2 x 2 games other than those d i s c u s s e d in the p r e v i o u s c h a p t e r . Put d i f f e r e n t l y , none of the games to be d i s c u s s e d in the f o l l o w i n g two chapters w i l l be members of the subset of 78 games where both p l a y e r s have s t r i c t and complete p r e f e r e n c e o r d e r s over the four outcomes. The games to be a n a l y z e d are t h e r e f o r e drawn from the ba lance of (726 - 78 = 648) the 2 x 2 o r d e r of games. The a n a l y s i s of Chapter Four cannot t h e r e f o r e be c o n s i d e r e d as a f i l t e r for the games a n a l y z e d i n the remain ing c h a p t e r s , but o n l y as an i l l u s t r a t i o n of the s t r u c t u r a l c o n s t r a i n t s p l a c e d upon a l r u i s t i c a c t i o n . " 1 39 5.2 O p e r a t i o n a l i z i n q The D e c i s i o n P r e s s u r e s . K a r l Lendenmann and A n a t o l R a p o p o r t 5 d e v i s e d an experiment to determine the r e l a t i v e importance of v a r i o u s d e c i s i o n p r e s s u r e s in 2 x 2 games i n which the p r e f e r e n c e order on a set of p a y o f f s was a weak as opposed to s t r o n g o r d e r . 6 For example, observe the arrangement of the p a y o f f s in the f o l l o w i n g m a t r i x : F i g u r e 18 - A 2 x 2 Game wi th the Row P l a y e r I n d i f f e r e n t . A 2 B 2 4 5 2 1 2 5 3 1 The Row p l a y e r , who chooses between A , and B, i s i n d i f f e r e n t as f a r as h i s own p a y o f f s are c o n c e r n e d . No matter which Row chooses , he or she w i l l get a p a y o f f of e i t h e r 5 or 1. However, the Row p l a y e r may be i n f l u e n c e d in h i s or her c h o i c e by the arrangement of the p a y o f f s of the Column p l a y e r . I f Row f e l t that Column would choose A 2 i n t h i s game, he or she would be l e f t w i th the d e c i s i o n to choose e i t h e r A, and i t s r e s u l t i n g payof f of 4 to Column, or B , and the s m a l l e r payo f f of 2 to Column. The arrangement of the p a y o f f s in F i g u r e 18 bears a m o t i v a t i o n a l i n t e r p r e t a t i o n as w e l l . I f Row p l a y e r chooses A 1 r we c o u l d d e s c r i b e him or her as behav ing b e n e v o l e n t l y , because that c h o i c e c o n t a i n s the c e l l w i t h Column's h i g h e s t p a y o f f . In 1 40 a d d i t i o n , the sum of the p o s s i b l e p a y o f f s to Column i f Row chooses A, i s g r e a t e r than i f he or she chooses B, (4 + 2 > 2 + 3 ) . So for another r e a s o n , tha t i s the d e s i r e to maximize the o t h e r ' s p a y o f f , the a l t e r n a t i v e can be thought of as the benevolent c h o i c e . I t i s important to emphasize that the p r e s s u r e towards benevolence i s a s t r u c t u r a l aspec t of the game. D e s p i t e the f a c t tha t the commentary speaks of p l a y e r s be ing m o t i v a t e d or d i s p l a y i n g a m o t i v a t i o n in t h e i r c h o i c e , the important p o i n t i s that on ly c e r t a i n games of s t r u c t u r a l arrangements of outcomes permi t such m o t i v a t i o n s . How do we i n t e r p r e t the c h o i c e of B, by Row? T h i s c h o i c e can be r e a d i l y e x p l a i n e d by a d e s i r e to minimize the payo f f of the Column p l a y e r . O r , to i n c r e a s e the r e l a t i v e advantage of Row p l a y e r ' s payof f over t h a t of Column. More s i m p l y , we can say that B, r e p r e s e n t s a c o m p e t i t i v e p r e s s u r e on the Row p l a y e r . The Column p l a y e r in F i g u r e 18 i s not i n d i f f e r e n t wi th r e s p e c t to h i s p a y o f f s between the two a l t e r n a t i v e s A 2 and B 2 . Column p l a y e r , speaking p u r e l y in terms of i n d i v i d u a l r a t i o n a l i t y , can r e a s o n a b l y be expected to choose A 2 because t h i s i s the a l t e r n a t i v e which maximizes h i s or her expected payo f f (4 + 2 > 2 + 3 ) . The arrangement of Column's p a y o f f s t h e r e f o r e d i f f e r s from tha t of Row because Column has presen t a p r e s s u r e or i n c e n t i v e produced by i n d i v i d u a l r a t i o n a l i t y , which i s the d e s i r e to p i c k the a l t e r n a t i v e which ensures the maximum reward p o s s i b l e . But l i k e Row, Column's c h o i c e i s a l s o i n f l u e n c e d by the arrangement of the o ther p l a y e r ' s p a y o f f s . Column's c h o i c e of A 2 maximizes the expected payof f of the Row 141 p l a y e r as 5 + 5 > 1 + 1. So Column's c h o i c e of A 2 i s not o n l y i n f l u e n c e d by i n d i v i d u a l r a t i o n a l i t y but by the a d d i t i o n a l p r e s s u r e of benevolence as w e l l . L i k e Row's c h o i c e of B 1 f Column's c h o i c e of B 2 can be e x p l a i n e d by the presence of a p r e s s u r e toward c o m p e t i t i o n . I f Column chooses A 2 h i s or her c o m p e t i t i v e advantage over Row w i l l be e i t h e r -1 or -3 depending upon Row's c h o i c e . I f however Column chooses B 2 , the c o m p e t i t i v e advantage w i l l be e i t h e r 1 or 2 depending upon how Row chooses . Thus Column's c h o i c e i s the s u b j e c t of two d i f f e r e n t k inds of p r e s s u r e s , those of i n d i v i d u a l r a t i o n a l i t y and those o r i g i n a t i n g in s o c i a l c o n s i d e r a t i o n s . In t h i s p a r t i c u l a r game, benevolence r e i n f o r c e s the i n d i v i d u a l l y r a t i o n a l c h o i c e whereas, c o m p e t i t i v e advantage opposes i t . We have thus f a r spoken of the " d i r e c t i o n of m o t i v a t i o n a l p r e s s u r e s " without e s t a b l i s h i n g a r e f e r e n c e p o i n t . As in the p r e v i o u s chapter the concept of a n a t u r a l outcome w i l l s u f f i c e . Once such an outcome i s d e f i n e d , p r e s s u r e s can be manipu la ted so as to r e i n f o r c e or oppose the s e l e c t i o n of the a l t e r n a t i v e which c o n t a i n s the n a t u r a l ou tcome . 7 For c l a r i t y ' s sake , a l l of the games w i l l be w r i t t e n so that the n a t u r a l outcome i s in the upper l e f t hand c e l l or that which i s the r e s u l t of both p l a y e r s c h o o s i n g the A a l t e r n a t i v e . As the games to be d i s c u s s e d w i l l be d i f f e r e n t from those i n the p r e v i o u s c h a p t e r in which both the p l a y e r s had a s t r o n g l i n e a r order of p r e f e r e n c e s over the four outcomes, a s l i g h t r e d e f i n i t i o n of the dominance concept i s r e q u i r e d . Because p l a y e r s may now be i n d i f f e r e n t over some outcomes, s t r i c t dominance d e f i n e d as A,-over B t - i f a< > b t - ; ct-> d<_ 1 42 now g ive s way to weak dominance where a,- > b t -; cc-> d t-and one of these i n e q u a l i t i e s i s s t r i c t . A p a i r of p a y o f f s (x ,y ) not n e c e s s a r i l y (ai ,c^ ) or ( b t - , d i ) , w i l l be d e s c r i b e d as weakly dominat ing another p a i r ( w , z ) , i f x > w ; y > z and one of these i n e q u a l i t i e s i s s t r i c t . Thus the p a i r (x ,y ) weakly dominates (w,z) i f x > w and y = z , or i f , x = w and y > z . I f x > w and y > z , the p a i r (x ,y ) i s s a i d to dominate ( w , z ) . The f i r s t set of m o t i v a t i o n a l p r e s s u r e s which Lendenmann and Rapoport d e f i n e are those due to s e l f - i n t e r e s t , or i n d i v i d u a l r a t i o n a l i t y . T h i s p r e s s u r e can be expres sed in two d i f f e r e n t ways. F i r s t , i f a p l a y e r has an a l t e r n a t i v e which e i t h e r weakly or s t r o n g l y dominates the o t h e r , we w i l l say that that a l t e r n a t i v e r e p r e s e n t s a c h o i c e of i n d i v i d u a l r a t i o n a l i t y , and i t s e x i s t e n c e , a p r e s s u r e towards i n d i v i d u a l r a t i o n a l i t y . S trong dominance i s a s p e c i a l case of the second way of f o r m u l a t i n g the p r e s s u r e towards i n d i v i d u a l r a t i o n a l i t y ; termed the m a x i m i z a t i o n of expected p a y o f f . For i f one a l t e r n a t i v e dominates another e i t h e r s t r i c t l y (a t > b^ ; ct" > dt) , or weakly (at> b^  ; C i > dj. and e i t h e r a >^ bt- or ct-> d^ , then a { + c<> b« + d t-and A i s the a l t e r n a t i v e which maximizes the expected p a y o f f . Lendenmann and Rapoport d e f i n e the m a x i m i z a t i o n of expected payo f f p r e s s u r e MX as : MXL= 1 /2{(a t ;+ a) - (b.'+ d<-)} (i= 1 , 2 ) . I f MX i s p o s i t i v e , i t w i l l r e p r e s e n t a p r e s s u r e towards the c h o i c e of A which c o n t a i n s the n a t u r a l o u t c o m e . 8 The second set of p r e s s u r e s d e f i n e d by Lendenmann and 143 Rapoport are termed the s o c i a l p r e s s u r e s . They are s o c i a l in the sense that they e x i s t on ly in the c o n s i d e r a t i o n of both p l a y e r s ' p a y o f f s as opposed to the MX p r e s s u r e , which was the r e s u l t of c o n s i d e r i n g one i n d i v i d u a l ' s p a y o f f s and i g n o r i n g the o t h e r ' s . The a u t h o r s d e f i n e four s o c i a l p r e s s u r e s : c o l l e c t i v e r a t i o n a l i t y , P a r e t o o p t i m a l i t y , benevolence and c o m p e t i t i o n . C o l l e c t i v e r a t i o n a l i t y , as the term sugges t s , i s the c h o i c e of an a l t e r n a t i v e which maximizes the expected sum of both p l a y e r s ' p a y o f f s whi le assuming tha t the c o p l a y e r has an equa l p r o b a b i l i t y of c h o o s i n g e i t h e r of h i s or her a l t e r n a t i v e s . Once a g a i n , the p r e s s u r e of c o l l e c t i v e r a t i o n a l i t y (CR) i s o p e r a t i o n a l i z e d so that when i t i s p o s i t i v e i t r e p r e s e n t s a p r e s s u r e to choose the A, a l t e r n a t i v e or that which c o n t a i n s the n a t u r a l outcome . A c c o r d i n g l y , CR(-= 1/4 {(a(+ aj+ ct-+ b," ) - ( b<- + cy + d,.- + dy ) } . P a r e t o - o p t i m a l i t y i s a c h a r a c t e r i s t i c of an outcome such that no other i s p r e f e r r e d by both p l a y e r s to i t . In games w i t h weak p r e f e r e n c e o r d e r s , a P a r e t o - o p t i m a l outcome may be one which one of the p l a y e r s s t r i c t l y p r e f e r s but which the o ther p l a y e r i s i n d i f f e r e n t t o , meaning t h a t some o ther outcome has a p a y o f f which i s e q u a l l y p r e f e r r e d by that p l a y e r . Games may have more than one Pare to o p t i m a l outcome. Lendenmann and Rapoport c o n s i d e r on ly those s i t u a t i o n s where a "Pareto o p t i m a l outcome i s compared wi th the nonPareto o p t i m a l outcome tha t r e s u l t s from double d e f e c t i o n , hence i s d i a g o n a l l y o p p o s i t e . " 9 Thus , the P a r e t o o p t i m a l p r e s s u r e (PO) i s based on the 1 44 comparison of the A , A 2 and B , B 2 outcomes. So, PO£ = 1/2 { (a t- + aj ) - (d c + dy ) } . I f a p l a y e r i s m o t i v a t e d by benevolence ( B ) , he or she w i l l tend to choose the A a l t e r n a t i v e over the B a l t e r n a t i v e i f the sum of the expected p a y o f f s of the o ther p l a y e r i s l a r g e r when A i s chosen . T h u s , Bi = 1/2 { (a; + bj ) - (cj + dj)} i f (ay ,b,- )' (cy , d; ) or (c j , dj ) > (a; , by ) = 0 o t h e r w i s e . The f i n a l p r e s s u r e measured by Lendenmann and Rapoport i s tha t due to c o m p e t i t i o n . " I n t u i t i v e l y , c o m p e t i t i o n w i l l be unders tood as a p r e f e r e n c e for outcomes tha t y i e l d a l a r g e r payo f f to s e l f than to the c o p l a y e r . . . That i s , the p l a y e r maximizes the expected a l g e b r a i c d i f f e r e n c e between h i s own and the c o p l a y e r ' s p a y o f f s , assuming e q u i p r o b a b l e c h o i c e s by the c o p l a y e r . " 1 0 Thus the c o m p e t i t i o n p r e s s u r e (C) can be o p e r a t i o n a l i z e d as ; Ct- = 1/4 {(-a;- a,-) + (ct- - bj ) - ( bt- - cy ) - (d t- - d j ) } As wi th a l l the p r e s s u r e s , C i s q u a n t i f i e d so as to be a p o s i t i v e p r e s s u r e to choose A, the a l t e r n a t i v e which c o n t a i n s the n a t u r a l o u t c o m e . 1 1 1 45 5.3 The R e s u l t s Of The Lendenmann And Rapoport Exper iment . Lendenmann and Rapoport c o n s t r u c t e i g h t 2 x 2 games, each wi th a s t r u c t u r a l l y unique arrangement of the d e c i s i o n p r e s s u r e s . A l l but one of the games was r e p r e s e n t e d by more than one v a r i a n t : two v a r i a n t s of a game be ing o r d i n a l l y e q u i v a l e n t but w i th d i f f e r e n t n u m e r i c a l p a y o f f s . The 70 s u b j e c t s p l a y e d each game four t imes , twice as the Column p l a y e r and twice as the Row p l a y e r . In order to assess the r e l a t i v e importance of these m o t i v a t i o n a l p r e s s u r e s on d e c i s i o n s by the s u b j e c t s , Lendenmann and Rapoport per form two separate m u l t i p l e r e g r e s s i o n a n a l y s e s wi th the AT and A 2 percentages as the dependent v a r i a b l e s . The r e s u l t s , as they r e l a t e t h e m 1 2 , i n d i c a t e that the i n d i v i d u a l r a t i o n a l i t y p r e s s u r e MX, has a s i g n i f i c a n t c o e f f i c i e n t when the Row p l a y e r ' s aggregated c h o i c e s , A 1 f are taken as the dependent v a r i a b l e , and MX and SR when A 2 i s the dependent v a r i a b l e . They e x p l a i n the a n a l y s e s by the f o l l o w i n g comments: . . . t h e s tepwise precedure r e v e a l e d Column's d e c i s i o n s as s i g n i f i c a n t l y i n f l u e n c e d on ly by i n d i v i d u a l r a t i o n a l i t y , namely max imiza t ion of expected g a i n and second o r d e r r a t i o n a l i t y . Other p r e s s u r e s , such as P a r e t o o p t i m a l i t y , c o l l e c t i v e r a t i o n a l i t y , benevo lence , and c o m p e t i t i o n a p p a r e n t l y p l a y e d no important p a r t . The r e s u l t i s not s u r p r i s i n g . Except in game I , Column i s not i n d i f f e r e n t between h i s a l t e r n a t i v e s . He would be expected to invoke d e c i s i o n r u l e s that have a b e a r i n g on the max imiza t ion of h i s own p a y o f f s . In games VII and V I I I , where Row has dominat ing s t r a t e g i e s , Column may have p a i d a t t e n t i o n to Row's p a y o f f s in f i g u r i n g out h i s own maximiz ing c h o i c e , and t h i s i s r e f l e c t e d in the s i g n i f i c a n c e of second o r d e r r a t i o n a l i t y i n Column's d e c i s i o n s . . . . w e a l s o see that for Row, the on ly s i g n i f i c a n t p r e s s u r e appears to be MX. The s o c i a l p r e s s u r e s , PO, CR, 1 46 and B were not s i g n i f i c a n t f a c t o r s in the r e g r e s s i o n e q u a t i o n . Yet our data on the f i r s t s i x games show a d i f f e r e n t p i c t u r e . In these games i n d i v i d u a l r a t i o n a l i t y p r e s s u r e s (MX, MN, and SR) are e n t i r e l y a b s e n t . Row p l a y e r s appear to be r e s p o n s i v e to the s o c i a l p r e s s u r e s , which are a l l p o s i t i v e and favour A , . In f a c t , A , c h o i c e s range from 72% to 88% in these games. However, the frequency of A , c h o i c e s i s not m o n o t o n i c a l l y r e l a t e d to the q u a n t i t a t i v e measures of the s o c i a l p r e s s u r e s , as we have d e f i n e d them, which accounts for the f a i l u r e of these f a c t o r s to appear as s i g n i f i c a n t in the r e g r e s s i o n e q u a t i o n . The s t rong p r e f e r e n c e for A, by Row p l a y e r s (when they are i n d i f f e r e n t between h, and B, w i t h r e g a r d to t h e i r own payof f ) i s in sharp c o n t r a s t to the i n d i f f e r e n c e between A 2 and B 2 of Column p l a y e r s in game I , where Column i s i n d i f f e r e n t wi th regard to h i s own p a y o f f s . 1 3 5.4 Comments. 5.4.1 The D e f i n i t i o n Of The P r e s s u r e s . Lendenmann and R a p o p o r t ' s d e f i n i t i o n s of the d e c i s i o n p r e s s u r e s c o n t a i n a number of problems which r e q u i r e some d i s c u s s i o n . F i r s t i s the problem of the h i g h c o r r e l a t i o n between the independent v a r i a b l e s . 1 " These are n e c e s a r i l y c o r r e l a t e d by v i r t u e of b e i n g d e f i n e d over the same payof f v a l u e s . For example, observe the f o l l o w i n g r e l a t i o n s h i p s between the v a l u e s for the MX, CR, and C p r e s s u r e s . 1 5 I f CR i s g r e a t e r than z e r o , (a t + aj + C£+ by) - (bt-+ c/+ d;+ d j ) > 0 , 5.1 and C i s g r e a t e r than z e r o , 1 47 (a t - -a j ) + ( c £ - b g ) - ( b i - c j ) - (d t - -d j ) > 0 , 5.2 then MX must a l s o be g r e a t e r than z e r o , (at- + c t-) - (bi+ d t ) > 0 . 5.3 CR can be r e w r i t t e n as (at-+ c i ) - (bi+ dc) > (cj+ d j ) - (a; + b, ) , 5.4 and C can be r e w r i t t e n as (a{+ ct ) - (b<; + d t-) > (a; + bj ) - ( C J + d;) . 5.5 The l e f t hand s i d e of both 5.4 and 5.5 are e q u a l to MX w h i l e the r i g h t hand s i d e of 5.4 i s e q u a l to - B and the r i g h t hand s i d e of 5.5 i s equa l to B . T h e r e f o r e , i f both 5.1 and 5.2 are t r u e , then MX > 0 must a l s o be t r u e , for on ly i f MX i s g r e a t e r than zero can both 5.4 and 5.5 be t r u e . There are no set r u l e s for d e a l i n g wi th the problem of m u l t i c o l l i n e a r i t y , or even wide ly acknowleged v a l u e s f o r the c o r r e l a t i o n c o e f f i c i e n t which would i n d i c a t e that there i s such a p r o b l e m . In the extreme, where two v a r i a b l e s are p e r f e c t l y c o r r e l a t e d , sampl ing e r r o r s become i n f i n i t e because " we can form a r b i t r a r y l i n e a r combinat ions of the two s imul taneous e q u a t i o n s , making the r e g r e s s i o n c o e f f i c i e n t s i n d e t e r m i n a t e . " 1 6 1 48 O r , the m u l t i c o l l i n e a r i t y in i t s worst c a s e , r e s u l t s in a s i n g u l a r matr ix wi th l i n e a r l y dependent columns, making p o s s i b l e the f o r m a t i o n of " an i n d e f i n i t e number of [such] se t s of c o e f f i c i e n t s , i n c l u d i n g s e t s in which the c o e f f i c i e n t s of X and Y w i l l be z e r o . " 1 7 T h i s i s u s u a l l y r e f e r r e d to as the i d e n t i f i c a t i o n prob lem. A p a r t from the problem of m u l t i c o l l i n e a r i t y , there i s a more b a s i c one in the d e f i n i t i o n of the p r e s s u r e s . The d e f i n i t i o n of the P a r e t o o p t i m a l p r e s s u r e causes both mathemat ica l and s u b s t a n t i v e d i f f i c u l t i e s . R e c a l l that the P a r e t o o p t i m a l p r e s s u r e was d e f i n e d as : POi = 1 /2 • {(a i + a j ) - (d t- + d j)} . Lendenmann and Rapoport j u s t i f y t h i s d e f i n i t i o n wi th r e f e r e n c e to the P r i s o n e r ' s Dilemma game: . . . i n p r i s o n e r ' s dilemma w i t h ' c o o p e r a t i v e ' a l t e r n a t i v e C and ' u n c o o p e r a t i v e ' a l t e r n a t i v e D, a l l outcomes are Pare to o p t i m a l except D , D 2 . However, in p r i s o n e r ' s di lemma, the . tendency to choose C i s u s u a l l y a t t r i b u t e d to an attempt to b r i n g about the c o o p e r a t i v e outcome 0,02 i n p r e f e r e n c e to the nonPareto o p t i m a l outcome D , D 2 ( which i s the n a t u r a l outcome of that game a c c o r d i n g to our d e f i n i t i o n ) . In our games, we w i l l speak of P a r e t o o p t i m a l i t y p r e s s u r e as a tendency to b r i n g about an outcome that dominates the o ther outcome i n the same d i a g o n a l of the game matr ix (as in p r i s o n e r ' s d i l e m m a ) . 1 3 As none of the games c o n s t r u c t e d by the authors are P r i s o n e r ' s Dilemmas, t h i s seems a weak j u s t i f i c a t i o n for c o n s i d e r i n g on ly the p a y o f f s in the c e l l s of the main d i a g o n a l . Moreover , t h i s mathemat ica l d e f i n i t i o n can produce some m i s l e a d i n g v a l u e s for the p r e s s u r e . Observe the f o l l o w i n g three games: 1 49 F i g u r e 19 - Three Games wi th Unusual P a r e t o O p t i m a l , (PO) P r e s s u r e V a l u e s . A 2 B 2 A 2 B 2 A 2 B 2 3 2 3 1 2 1 A, 4 4 Ai 5 4 A, 7 1 4 1 3 3 4 3 B, 5 2 B, 5 3 B, 4 1 Game 1 Game 2 Game 3 In Game 1, the va lue of the PO p r e s s u r e i s p o s i t i v e 2, {(4 + 3) - (2 + 1)}, i n d i c a t i n g the Row p l a y e r may be under some p r e s s u r e to choose A, due to Pare to o p t i m a l i t y . B u t , the t r u e P a r e t o o p t i m a l outcome i s B^h2 where both p l a y e r s ga in t h e i r h i g h e s t p a y o f f s . So PO i s r e a l l y a n e g a t i v e p r e s s u r e in t h i s game. In Game 2 in F i g u r e 19, PO i s p o s i t i v e 2, but there are in f a c t two Pare to o p t i m a l outcomes A , A 2 and B , A 2 , one a s s o c i a t e d wi th each of Row's a l t e r n a t i v e s . T h i s suggests tha t the PO p r e s s u r e shou ld be a b s e n t . In Game 3, PO as d e f i n e d by Lendenmann and Rapopor t , i s p o s i t i v e 5. But for Column p l a y e r , A ! B 2 i s not a Pare to o p t i m a l outcome. In f a c t , there are no such outcomes in t h i s game. A b e t t e r d e f i n i t i o n of the PO p r e s s u r e would be PO;= Max {(a t + ay) , (c<+ by)} - Max {(b t + cy) , (dt+ dj )} but even t h i s would not s o l v e the problem i l l u s t r a t e d by Game 3 in F i g u r e 19. 1 50 In s u b s t a n t i v e t erms , the c h o i c e of an a l t e r n a t i v e which c o n t a i n s a P a r e t o o p t i m a l outcome may a l s o be the r e s u l t of a "maximax" c h o i c e p o l i c y which i s p r i m a r i l y s e l f - i n t e r e s t e d . A p l a y e r u s i n g t h i s s t r a t e g y would choose the a l t e r n a t i v e which c o n t a i n s h i s or her h i g h e s t p a y o f f . So the m o t i v a t i o n f o r c h o o s i n g such an a l t e r n a t i v e would not be due t o _ . a s o c i a l or a l t r u i s t i c p r e s s u r e but r a t h e r a s e l f - i n t e r e s t e d one. There i s a more s u b s t a n t i a l q u e s t i o n to be r a i s e d about the assumption of e q u i p r o b a b l e c h o i c e in the c a l c u l a t i o n of the B, C , CR, and PO p r e s s u r e s . The a d d i t i o n of payof f v a l u e s in the formulae for a l l of these p r e s s u r e s assumes for example in the case of B, that the p o t e n t i a l r e c i p i e n t of an a l t r u i s t i c act has an e q u i p r o b a b l e chance of s e l e c t i n g e i t h e r a l t e r n a t i v e . W h i l e t h i s may be t r u e in some of the games c o n s t r u c t e d by Lendenmann and Rapopor t , i t i s not t r u e of a l l of them. For example, observe the game in F i g u r e 20. 151 F i g u r e 20 - An I l l u s t r a t i o n of the A d d i t i o n of Payoff V a l u e s . A 2 B 2 5 1 A, 5 1 1 1 Bi 5 1 Game IV - 1 Let us f i r s t look at Row p l a y e r ' s benevo lence . Lendenmann and Rapoport c a l c u l a t e the s t r e n g t h of t h i s p r e s s u r e to be l / 2 [ ( 5 + 1) - (1 + 1)] = 4 /2 . O r , Row's A c h o i c e w i l l l e a d to an a l t r u i s t i c r e s u l t for Column. But assuming that Column w i l l choose between A 2 and B 2 e q u i p r o b a b l y i s not very d e f e n s i b l e for Column has a v e r y s t r o n g i n c e n t i v e in dominance to choose the A 2 a l t e r n a t i v e . Because t h i s i s the c a s e , the c o n s i d e r a t i o n of Column's p a y o f f s i n c e l l s A , B 2 and B,B2 i n the d e f i n i t i o n of B h a r d l y seems a p p r o p r i a t e . Now we can look at Column p l a y e r ' s benevo lence . Under Lendenmann and R a p o p o r t ' s d e f i n i t i o n , B i s a p r e s s u r e of 8/2 to make the A 2 c h o i c e . The assumption of e q u i p r o b a b i l i t y may appear reasonab le for indeed Row i s i n d i f f e r e n t as f a r as h i s own p a y o f f s are concerned between the A , and B , , c h o i c e a l t e r n a t i v e s . But Row's i n d i f f e r e n c e does not n e c e s s a r i l y t r a n s l a t e i n t o the e q u i p r o b a b l e c h o i c e of e i t h e r a l t e r n a t i v e , f o r Row i s h i m s e l f s u b j e c t i n t h i s game to the PO, CR, and B p r e s s u r e s presen t in the A , c h o i c e a l t e r n a t i v e . I n t e r e s t i n g l y , the a u t h o r s ' data support t h i s c r i t i c i s m for in 1 52 t h i s game 83 percent of the s u b j e c t s ' c h o i c e s were A, when they p layed the game as Row p l a y e r . 5 .4 .2 The Use Of V a r i a n t s Of Game. Lendenmann and Rapoport i n c l u d e a number of v a r i a n t s of every game but one in t h e i r exper iment . These v a r i a n t s , which g e n e r a l l y l e f t the m o t i v a t i o n a l s t r u c t u r e of the game u n a l t e r e d , were i n c l u d e d so that d i f f e r e n c e s in the c h o i c e f r e q u e n c i e s a c r o s s v a r i a n t s c o u l d be c o n s i d e r e d as " q u a n t i t a t i v e i n d i c a t o r s of these p r e s s u r e s . " 1 9 For example, i f a c r o s s t h r e e v a r i a n t s of a game a l l of the p r e s s u r e s but one are h e l d c o n s t a n t whi le that one i s a l l o w e d to i n c r e a s e or d e c r e a s e , then any change in the percentage of s u b j e c t s c h o o s i n g the A a l t e r n a t i v e c o u l d . b e a t t r i b u t e d to the e f f e c t of that one p r e s s u r e . The authors f i n d that in almost a l l cases no response to such v a r i a t i o n in the p r e s s u r e s was for thcoming from the s u b j e c t s . For i n s t a n c e , F i g u r e 21 and T a b l e II show three v a r i a n t s each of Lendenmann and R a p o p o r t ' s Games II and I I I . Note how l i t t l e the frequency of c h o i c e of A , v a r i e s a c r o s s the three v a r i a n t s of each game d e s p i t e changes in the v a l u e s of the p r e s s u r e s as shown in T a b l e I I . Note a l s o how l i t t l e v a r i a t i o n occurs in the s u b j e c t s ' reponses in the two games, which a r e , in terms of the c o n f i g u r a t i o n of p r e s s u r e s on Row, e s s e n t i a l l y s i m i l a r though vary a c c o r d i n g to the magnitude of the p r e s s u r e s . 1 53 F i g u r e 21 - Three V a r i a n t s Each of Two Games from Lendenmann and Rapopor t . B-(79) A , (21 ) B, 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 (78) A, (22) B, 5 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 (73) A , (27) B, 8 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 Game 11-1 Game 11-2 Game 11-3 B-5 1 5 1 (78) (77) A , 1 1 A, . 1 1 -2 1 -5 1 (22) (23) B, 1 1 B, 1 1 (79) A, (21 ) B, 5 1 1 1 -8 1 1 1 Game 111-3 Game 111-4 Game 111-5 SOURCE: Lendenmann and Rapopor t , " D e c i s i o n P r e s s u r e s " , pp. 110-111. 54 T a b l e II - The V a l u e s of the P r e s s u r e s on Row for the Games in F i g u r e 21 . GAME MX CR PO B C 11,1 0 1/4 1/2 1/2 -1/4 11,2 0 4/4 4/2 4/2 -4/4 11,3 0 7/4 7/2 7/2 -7/4 111,3 0 7/4 4/2 7/2 -7/4 111,4 0 10/4 4/2 10/2 -10/4 111,5 0 1 3/4 4/2 1 3/2 -13/4 *MN and SR equal zero in a l l v a r i a n t s of the games. " E v i d e n t l y " , the a u t h o r s c o n c l u d e , the e f f e c t s of v a r y i n g the the magnitude of the p a y o f f s " turn up on ly i n c o n n e c t i o n wi th changes in the m o t i v a t i o n a l s t r u c t u r e of games, not in q u a n t i t a t i v e d i f f e r e n c e s w i t h i n the same s t r u c t u r e ( i . e . , a c r o s s v a r i a n t s ) . " 2 0 They conc lude on t h i s b a s i s that "when the p r e s s u r e s a s s o c i a t e d wi th i n d i v i d u a l r a t i o n a l i t y are absent (as in games I to I V , i n c l u s i v e ) , the r e l a t i o n s h i p between the s o c i a l p r e s s u r e s and the frequency of A , i s q u a l i t a t i v e ( " a l l or n o n e " ) . " 2 1 They go on to suggest tha t "for a set of m a t r i c e s where the p r e s s u r e s i s s u i n g from i n d i v i d u a l r a t i o n a l i t y and those a r i s i n g from s o c i a l concerns are v a r i e d more s y s t e m a t i c a l l y , so as to i n c l u d e both p o s i t i v e and n e g a t i v e va lues ( e s p e c i a l l y for the s o c i a l p r e s s u r e s ) , more q u a n t i t a t i v e r e l a t i o n s h i p s between these s o c i a l p r e s s u r e s and c h o i c e f r e q u e n c i e s can be o b s e r v e d . " 2 2 1 5 5 5 .4 .3 The C o n f i g u r a t i o n Of P r e s s u r e s . As was noted in the opening s e c t i o n of t h i s c h a p t e r , m o t i v a t i o n a l p r e s s u r e s can d i s p l a y both magnitude and d i r e c t i o n . As was shown i n the p r e v i o u s s e c t i o n , magnitude had very l i t t l e e f f e c t upon the c h o i c e s of Lendenmann arid R a p o p o r t ' s s u b j e c t s . And in g e n e r a l , when p r e s s u r e s are a l l in one d i r e c t i o n , as when a s e l f - i n t e r e s t e d c h o i c e a l s o happens to be a s o c i a l l y and c o m p e t i t i v e l y advantageous one, i t would be s u r p r i s i n g i f another a l t e r n a t i v e were c h o s e n . Such a c o n f l u e n c e of p r e s s u r e s occurs r a r e l y in r e a l i t y , though the use of tax i n c e n t i v e s to induce c h a r i t a b l e g i v i n g i s a good example. In t h i s i n s t a n c e , i n d i v i d u a l s are o f t en a b l e to reduce t h e i r t a x a b l e income, which i s a s e l f - i n t e r e s t e d i n c e n t i v e , wh i l e a p p e a r i n g to be a l t r u i s t i c at the same t i m e . But the s i t u a t i o n s of most i n t e r e s t w i l l be those where the p r e s s u r e s are s p l i t , some p o i n t i n g towards the c h o i c e of one a l t e r n a t i v e w h i l e the o t h e r s support the c h o i c e of a second. These k inds of s i t u a t i o n s are l i k e l y to be f a r more common, such a s , when e t h i c a l c o n s i d e r a t i o n s oppose some sharp b u s i n e s s p r a c t i c e which e n t a i l s d e c e i v i n g the customer . Of added i n t e r e s t w i l l be s i t u a t i o n s where some p r e s s u r e s are a b s e n t , say no c o l l e c t i v e l y r a t i o n a l c h o i c e i s p o s s i b l e but an a l t r u i s t i c c h o i c e opposed by a c o m p e t i t i v e one i s . I t i s these two types of s i t u a t i o n s i n which the s tudy of a l t r u i s t i c c h o i c e w i l l be most i n t e r e s t i n g because they c l o s e l y p a r a l l e l those c o n t e x t s f r e q u e n t l y found i n r e a l i t y . The Lendenmann and Rapoport experiment e x p l o r e d o n l y e i g h t 1 56 unique c o n f i g u r a t i o n s of the p r e s s u r e s on the Row and Column p l a y e r s in the 28 v a r i a n t s of games i n c l u d e d in the exper iment . A comparison of these unique s t r u c t u r e s o n l y , r e v e a l s the widest v a r i a t i o n in the frequency wi th which A, was chosen by the s u b j e c t s . For example, the frequency of A 2 c h o i c e s in the three games in F i g u r e 22 show great v a r i a t i o n . The d i f f e r e n t p r e s s u r e v a l u e s are g i v e n in Table I I I . F i g u r e 22 - Three Games w i t h D i f f e r e n t P r e s s u r e Conf i g u r a t i o n s . A 2 B 2 A 2 B 2 A 2 B 2 (98) (02) (56) (44) (62) (38) 2 1 2 1 5 1 A, 1 1 A, 1 1 A 1 5 1 1 1 -2 1 -8 1 B, 1 1 B, 1 1 B, 5 1 Game 11 — 1 Game 111-1 Game V I - 6 SOURCE: Lendenmann and Rapoport , " D e c i s i o n P r e s s u r e s " , pp . 110-111. T a b l e III - The Values of the P r e s s u r e s on Column for the Games in F i g u r e 22. GAME MX MN CR PO B C A II , 1 1/2 0 1/4 1/2 0 1/4 98% 111,1 -2 /2 -3 -2 /4 1/2 0 -2 /4 56% VI , 6 -5 /2 -9 3/4 8/2 8/2 -13 /4 62% In the games g iven above, the d e c i s i o n p r e s s u r e s are at one time f u l l y opposed, s p l i t , and f u l l y r e i n f o r c i n g . Where the 1 5 7 p r e s s u r e s are p o s i t i v e and r e i n f o r c i n g , as in Game 11 — 1 , 98 percent of the s u b j e c t s chose A 2 . However, when the m o t i v a t i o n a l p r e s s u r e s are s p l i t as i n Game 111 — 1 where MX, MN, CR and C are n e g a t i v e , and PO p o s i t i v e and B a b s e n t , the percentage c h o o s i n g A 2 f a l l s to 56. F i n a l l y , when the p r e s s u r e s are f_ul-ly opposed so that MX, MN and C are n e g a t i v e and PO, B and CR p o s i t i v e , the percentage of s u b j e c t s c h o o s i n g A 2 i s 62. I n t e r e s t i n g l y , in the l a s t example, Game V I - 6 , 62 p e r c e n t chose the a l t e r n a t i v e which was in the d i r e c t i o n of the s o c i a l p r e s s u r e s as opposed to 38 percent who chose a c c o r d i n g to i n d i v i d u a l r a t i o n a l i t y . D o u b t l e s s , t h e r e are o t h e r e x p l a n a t i o n s for these r e s u l t s . T r u s t , as Lendenmann and Rapoport show, o b v i o u s l y has some a f f e c t upon the c h o i c e of A 2 i n Game V I - 6 . N o n t h e l e s s s , the evidence from these games i s s u g g e s t i v e of the q u a l i t a t i v e na ture of these p r e s s u r e s . 5 .4 .4 A g g r e g a t i o n Of Responses . The data from the Lendenmann and Rapoport exper iment are in the form of aggregated response t o t a l s . Such an a g g r e g a t i o n of i n d i v i d u a l l e v e l data i s not an example of the e c o l o g i c a l f a l l a c y 2 3 , but i t does have two e f f e c t s upon the subsequent a n a l y s i s u s i n g r e g r e s s i o n p r o c e d u r e s . F i r s t , the s m a l l number of aggregated cases ( in t h i s i n s t a n c e o n l y 28) l e a d s to a l a r g e R 2 va lue which may c r e a t e an m i s l e a d i n g i m p r e s s i o n about the f i t of the r e g r e s s i o n equat ion to the d a t a . And second , because the 1 58 sample i s s m a l l some of the r e g r e s s i o n c o e f f i c i e n t s which are n o n - s i g n i f i c a n t may, when the data are a n a l y z e d on an i n d i v i d u a l b a s i s , t u r n out to have s i g n i f i c a n t c o e f f i c i e n t s . T h i s e f f e c t i s the r e s u l t of the t d i s t r i b u t i o n which r e q u i r e s that the c o e f f i c i e n t s have i n c r e a s i n g l y l a r g e v a l u e s for a d e c l i n i n g number of degrees of freedom for any g iven l e v e l of s i g n i f i c a n c e to be a t t a i n e d . 5 . 4 . 5 Repeated Measures . As was noted e a r l i e r , the 28 games i n c l u d e d i n the Lendenmann and Rapoport experiment r e p r e s e n t e d on ly e i g h t d i f f e r e n t p r e s s u r e c o n f i g u r a t i o n s . B e a r i n g in mind the n e g l i g i b l e e f f e c t which v a r i a t i o n in the magnitude of the p r e s s u r e s had upon the s u b j e c t s ' aggregated response t o t a l s , we might i n t e p r e t the v a r i a n t s of these e i g h t unique p r e s s u r e c o n f i g u r a t i o n s as repeated measures. Such repea ted measurements of behav iour can be a very v a l u a b l e , though an e x c e e d i n g l y r a r e t o o l i n the b e h a v i o u r a l s c i e n c e s , f or they present the r e s e a r c h e r w i t h a " r e l a t i v e l y s imple d e v i c e for r e d u c i n g random measurement e r r o r . " 2 " , The proper way to d e a l w i t h repeated measures i s to compute a mean score for each repeated measure. T h i s B l a l o c k w r i t e s , w i l l g i v e a "much b e t t e r e s t imate of the t r u e r e g r e s s i o n c o e f f i c i e n t , which w i l l no longer be h i g h l y a t t e n u a t e d because of measurement e r r o r . " 2 5 To t r e a t the s u b j e c t s ' responses in the Lendenmann and Rapoport experiment as 1 59 repeated measures would r e q u i r e t h a t the data be d i s a g g r e g a t e d to the i n d i v i d u a l l e v e l . 2 6 A next best s o l u t i o n i s to exc lude repea ted cases from the a n a l y s i s . T h i s was done w i t h the r e s u l t tha t one of the s o c i a l p r e s s u r e s (CR) had the o n l y s i g n i f i c a n t r e g r e s s i o n c o e f f i c i e n t , whereas in Lendenmann and R a p o p o r t ' s r e p o r t e d a n a l y s i s , PO and MX were the on ly s i g n i f i c a n t p r e s s u r e s . 2 7 1 60 Notes . 1 See: A n a t o l Rapoport and A l b e r t M. Chamrrtah, Pr i soner ' s  Dilemma: A Study i n C o n f l i c t and C o o p e r a t i o n (Ann A r b o r : U n i v e r s i t y of M i c h i g a n P r e s s , 1965), Chapter 5. 2 See: W i l l i a m H . R i k e r , " B a r g a i n i n g in a Three Person Game." American J o u r n a l of P o l i t i c a l S c i e n c e , v o l . 61 (1967), pp . 642-56 and; W i l l i a m H . R i k e r and W i l l i a m J . Z a v o i n a , " R a t i o n a l Behaviour in P o l i t i c s : Ev idence from a Three Person Game" in Jean A . Laponce and P a u l Smoker ( e d s ) , E x p e r i m e n t a t i o n  and S i m u l a t i o n in P o l i t i c a l S c i e n c e , ( T o r o n t o : U n i v e r s i t y of Toronto P r e s s , 1972), pp. 132-161. 3 There are o ther examples of gaming exper iments not reviewed h e r e , p a r t i c u l a r l y , the voluminous l i t e r a t u r e on c o o p e r a t i o n and the P r i s o n e r ' s Dilemma game. In a d d i t i o n , M c C l i n t o c k et a l . have at tempted to examine the importance of s e v e r a l of the m o t i v a t i o n s to be examined in the succeed ing c h a p t e r s , but i n the context of decomposed games which l a c k the s t r a t e g i c q u a l i t i e s or a normal game. See: C h a r l e s G . M c C l i n t o c k ; D a v i d M. M e s s i c k ; D a v i d M. Kuhlman; and F r a n c e s T . Campos, " M o t i v a t i o n a l Bases of C h o i c e in T h r e e - C h o i c e Decomposed Games," J o u r n a l of E x p e r i m e n t a l and S o c i a l P s y c h o l o g y , v o l . 9, (1973) pp . 572-590. 4 See foo tnote 10 in Chapter I V . 5 K a r l W. Lendenmann and A n a t o l Rapopor t , " D e c i s i o n P r e s s u r e s in 2 x 2 Games", B e h a v i o u r i a l S c i e n c e , v o l . 25 (1980), pp . 107-119. 6 As was noted in the l a s t c h a p t e r , there are on ly 78 2 x 2 games wi th a s t r o n g and complete p r e f e r e n c e order on the p a y o f f s . Guyer and Hamburger have shown t h a t there a r e 726 s t r u c t u r a l l y unique games i f the p r e f e r e n c e order on a set of p a y o f f s f or both p l a y e r s i s a weak o r d e r , or one which p e r m i t s t i e s or i n d i f f e r e n c e between some or even a l l of the outcomes. Each of these games r e p r e s e n t s a d i f f e r e n t set of m o t i v a t i o n a l p r e s s u r e s . See: M e l v i n Guyer and Henry Hamburger, "A Note on 'A Taxonomy of 2 x 2 Games'", G e n e r a l Systems, v o l . 1 3 (1968) , pp . 205-209. 7 Lendenmann and Rapoport d e f i n e the n a t u r a l outcome of a 2 x 2 game i n which the p l a y e r s have weak p r e f e r e n c e o r d e r s as 161 f o l l o w s : 1. I f the game i s a "no c o n f l i c t game" i . e . , i f the l a r g e s t p a y o f f s of both p l a y e r s appear in the same c e l l , tha t c e l l c o n t a i n s the n a t u r a l outcome. 2. I f both p l a y e r s have a dominat ing s t r a t e g y , the i n t e r s e c t i o n of these s t r a t e g i e s i s the n a t u r a l outcome. 3. I f o n l y one p l a y e r has a dominat ing s t r a t e g y , the i n t e r s e c t i o n of that s t r a t e g y and the s t r a t e g y that maximizes the o t h e r ' s payof f in tha t row (column) i s the n a t u r a l outcome. 4. I f n e i t h e r p l a y e r has a dominat ing s t r a t e g y and i f the game i s not a no c o n f l i c t game, the i n t e r s e c t i o n of the two maximin s t r a t e g i e s i s the n a t u r a l outcome . Lendenmann and Rapopor t , " D e c i s i o n P r e s s u r e s " , p . 108. Note that the d e f i n i t i o n of the n a t u r a l outcome d i f f e r s s l i g h t l y from that g i v e n i n Chapter 4 because dominance i s d e f i n e d d i f f e r e n t l y where p l a y e r s have weak p r e f e r e n c e o r d e r s . 8 The f r a c t i o n a l m u l i t p l i e r s i n c l u d e d in t h i s and o ther d e f i n i t i o n s are " intended to n o r m a l i z e the v a r i a b i l i t y " of the p r e s s u r e s . See: Lendenmann and Rapopor t , " D e c i s i o n P r e s s u r e s " p . 1 1 5 . 9 Lendenmann and Rapoport , " D e c i s i o n P r e s s u r e s " , p . 112. 1 0 Lendenmann and Rapopor t , " D e c i s i o n P r e s s u r e s " , p . 112. 1 1 Lendenmann and Rapoport d e f i n e two a d d i t i o n a l p r e s s u r e s : second o r d e r r a t i o n a l i t y (SR) and the maximin p r e s s u r e (MN). The maximin p r e s s u r e i s that to choose the a l t e r n a t i v e which c o n t a i n s the l a r g e s t of the two s m a l l e s t p a y o f f s . MN i s r e p r e s e n t e d a s : MNt" = Min (a^ , c<) - M i n ( b t - , d v - ) Second o r d e r r a t i o n a l i t y (SR) i s a p r e s s u r e which i s generated by a t t r i b u t i n g i n d i v i d u a l r a t i o n a l i t y to a c o p l a y e r . So: SR i = {ai~ b{) i f (ay, c ; ) > ( b j , d;) = ( c f - d<-) i f ( b j , dj ) ( a ; , c j ) = 0 o therwise . 1 62 1 2 The authors i n c o r r e c t l y c a l c u l a t e the MX p r e s s u r e for the v a r i a n t s of Game VI which r e s u l t s in MX and PO having s i g n i f i c a n t r e g r e s s i o n c o e f f i c i e n t s . 1 3 Lendenmann and Rapoport , " D e c i s i o n P r e s s u r e s " , p . 116-117. 1 " C o r r e l a t i o n M a t r i x for the Lendenmann and Rapoport Exper iment . Column MX MN SR PO CR B C MX 1.00 .75 .23 .09 .47 - . 2 3 .71 MN 1.00 .60 - . 4 0 .24 - . 2 9 .62 SR 1 .00 - . 5 8 - . 2 7 - . 4 7 .46 PO 1 .00 .70 .71 - . 4 6 CR 1 .00 .75 - . 2 8 B 1 .00 - . 8 5 C 1 .00 Row MX PO CR B C MX 1 .00 .47 .35 .30 - . 2 5 PO 1 .00 .61 .62 - . 5 8 CR 1 .00 .93 - . 7 9 B 1 .00 - . 9 6 C 1 .00 S o u r c e : Lendenmann and Rapoport , p . 115 . 1 5 The f r a c t i o n s used to n o r m a l i z e the v a r i a b i l i t y of the p r e s s u r e s have been dropped for t h i s example. 1 6 H u b e r t . M. B l a l o c k , C a u s a l I n f e r e n c e s in  Nonexper imenta l Research (Chapel H i l l : U n i v e r s i t y of North C a r o l i n a P r e s s , 1961), pp . 88. 1 7 B l a l o c k , C a u s a l I n f e r e n c e s , p . 89. F o r a more e x t e n s i v e d i s c u s s i o n of the problem of m u l t i c o l l i n e a r i t y see: J . J o h n s t o n , Econometr ic Methods (New Y o r k : M c G r a w - H i l l 1963), pp . 201-207. Lendenmann and Rappoport " D e c i s i o n P r e s s u r e s " , p . 112. 163 118, 1 9 Lendenmann and Rapopor t , " D e c i s i o n P r e s s u r e s " , p . 114. 2 0 Lendenmann and R a p o p o r t , " D e c i s i o n P r e s s u r e s " , p . 114. 2 1 Lendenmann and Rapopor t , " D e c i s i o n P r e s s u r e s " , p . 117-2 2 Lendenmann and Rapopor t , " D e c i s i o n P r e s s u r e s " , p . J.-V8. 2 3 The e c o l o g i c a l f a l l a c y i s the making of i n f e r e n c e s "about c o r r e l a t i o n s between v a r i a b l e s , t a k i n g persons as u n i t s , on the b a s i s of c o r r e l a t i o n a l data based on groups as u n i t s . " p . 97 in Hubert M. Bla- lock , Causa l I n f e r e n c e s i n  Nonxper imenta l R e s e a r c h . In t h i s i n s t a n c e , i n d i v i d u a l l e v e l data i s s imply be ing aggregated and a n a l y z e d at a "higher" l e v e l . The seminal work on t h i s problem i s : W. S. R o b i n s o n , " E c o l o g i c a l C o r r e l a t i o n s and the Behaviour of I n d i v i d u a l s , " American S o c i o l o g i c a l Review, v o l . 15 (1950), pp. 351-357. For a more e x t e n s i v e treatment of the s u b j e c t see: M i c h a e l T . Hannan, A g g r e g a t i o n and P i s a g r e q g a t i o n in S o c i o l o g y ( L e x i n g t o n , M a s s . ; L e x i n g t o n Books, 1971 ) . 2 4 B l a l o c k , C a u s a l I n f e r e n c e s i n Nonexperimental R e s e a r c h , p . 158. 2 5 B l a l o c k , C a u s a l I n f e r e n c e s in Nonexperimental R e s e a r c h , p . 160. 2 6 T h i s was not p o s s i b l e as on ly aggregated response t o t a l s are g i v e n . 2 7 The reader s h o u l d note tha t t h i s procedure i n v o l v e s r e d u c i n g the number of cases and so runs i n t o the very same problem d i s c u s s e d in s e c t i o n 5 . 4 . 4 . 1 64 V I . AN EXPERIMENT IN CHOICE 6.1 I n t r o d u c t i o n . Lendenmann and R a p o p o r t ' s f i n d i n g s are s u g g e s t i v e of the importance of the s o c i a l p r e s s u r e s on c h o i c e in s imple games. Whi l e i n d i v i d u a l r a t i o n a l i t y was c l e a r l y the most important i n f l u e n c e when t h e i r data were c o r r e c t e d , at l e a s t one of the s o c i a l p r e s s u r e s had some i n f l u e n c e on c h o i c e . As Lendenmann and Rapoport themselves sugges t , a s i m i l a r experiment which manipu la te s the p r e s s u r e s more s y s t e m a t i c a l l y may be a b l e to e s t a b l i s h the q u a n t i t a t i v e r e l a t i o n s h i p s between these p r e s s u r e s . The comments made in s e c t i o n 5 .4 , on Lendenmann and R a p o p o r t ' s e x p e r i m e n t a l des ign suggest a number of m o d i f i c a t i o n s . F i r s t , because v a r i a t i o n s in the magnitude of the p r e s s u r e s had no s i g n i f i c a n t e f f e c t upon the s u b j e c t s ' c h o i c e s , these need not be i n c l u d e d . A c c o r d i n g l y , the number of games wi th unique d e c i s i o n p r e s s u r e c o n f i g u r a t i o n s can be i n c r e a s e d . Both of the exper iments d e s c r i b e d below used the same 15 games, each of which r e p r e s e n t e d a unique arrangement of the d e c i s i o n p r e s s u r e s . These 15 games r e p r e s e n t e d a l l p o s s i b l e c o n f i g u r a t i o n s of .the p r e s s u r e s but f o r the t r i v i a l case where a l l p r e s s u r e s are i n the same d i r e c t i o n . The smal l number can be e x p l a i n e d by the f a c t tha t not a l l c o n f i g u r a t i o n s are u n i q u e . For example, a game i n which the c o l l e c t i v e r a t i o n a l i t y (CR) , P a r e t o o p t i m a l (PO) , and benevolence (B) p r e s s u r e s are a l l 1 6 5 p o s i t i v e and c o m p e t i t i o n (C) i s n e g a t i v e , i s the same m o t i v a t i o n a l l y , as one where CR, PO, and B are n e g a t i v e and C i s p o s i t i v e . In a d d i t i o n , some p r e s s u r e arrangements are i m p o s s i b l e to form, for i n s t a n c e , a game where C , CR, and B are a l l n e g a t i v e (or p o s i t i v e ) and MX i s p o s i t i v e (or n e g a t i v e ) . The mathemat ica l d e f i n i t i o n of the p r e s s u r e s , p a r t i c u l a r l y the P a r e t o o p t i m a l p r e s s u r e , was q u e s t i o n e d in the l a s t c h a p t e r . In the two experiments below, t h i s p r e s s u r e i s r e d e f i n e d as in the p r e v i o u s d i s c u s s i o n . The 15 games a l s o omi t t ed two p r e s s u r e s i n c l u d e d in the Lendenmann and Rapoport exper iment ; those of second order r a t i o n a l i t y and the minimax. Second order r a t i o n a l i t y was zero in a l l of the games, wh i l e p r e s s u r e stemming from the minimax d e c i s i o n c r i t e r i o n was presen t in on ly two games and was p e r f e c t l y c o r r e l a t e d wi th the MX p r e s s u r e in those two. Both the MN and SR p r e s s u r e s were exc luded to s i m p l i f y the number of p o s s i b l e combinat ions of p r e s s u r e s , and to -reduce the d e f i n i t i o n of i n d i v i d u a l r a t i o n a l i t y to that of the m a x i m i z a t i o n of expected p a y o f f a l o n e . In d i s c u s s i n g the r e l a t i o n s h i p s between v a r i o u s p r e s s u r e s and the importance of benevolence or a l t r u i s m in r e l a t i o n to these o ther p r e s s u r e s , the e lements of a p o s s i b l e d e f i n i t i o n of a l t r u i s m may have become t e m p o r a r i l y o b s c u r e d . A l l of the games c o n s t r u c t e d f o r the exper iments d e s c r i b e d below d i d conform wi th the f i r s t element of the d e f i n i t i o n , and some a l s o r e q u i r e d that the a l t r u i s t i n c u r some c o s t as a r e s u l t of h i s or her benevo lence . That i s , i n a l l of the games i n c l u d e d i n the e x p e r i m e n t s , where benevolence was a non-zero p r e s s u r e , the 1 66 c h o i c e of t h a t a l t e r n a t i v e r e s u l t e d i n i n c r e a s i n g the payof f to the c o p l a y e r . Of the games in F i g u r e 24, #2, #3, #7, #8, #11, #12, #13, #14, and #15 a l l c o m p l i e d wi th the f i r s t element of the d e f i n i t i o n of a l t r u i s m . A number of these games (#8, #12, #13, #14, #15) a l s o r e q u i r e d tha t the a l t r u i s t i n c u r some c o s t , or more a p p r o p r i a t e l y , forego an advantage in choos ing the a l t r u i s t i c a l t e r n a t i v e . A l l of the games compl i ed wi th the t h i r d requirement of the most r i g o r o u s d e f i n i t i o n of a l t r u i s m in that none of the a l t r u i s t i c outcomes c o u l d be c o e r c e d . In some games, n o t a b l y #8, #11, and #12, the c h o i c e of the a l t r u i s t i c a l t e r n a t i v e might have r e s u l t e d in a l e a s t p r e f e r r e d outcome. However, because i n d i f f e r e n c e was p e r m i t t e d i n these games, the c h o i c e of the MX p r e s s u r e d a l t e r n a t i v e might e q u a l l y have r e s u l t e d in a l e a s t p r e f e r r e d outcome. No s y s t e m a t i c attempt was made to observe the e f f e c t of these f i n a l two requ irements upon the c h o i c e of the a l t r u i s t i c a l t e r n a t i v e f o r three r e a s o n s . F i r s t , the r e s u l t i n g combinat ions of requ irements would have i n c r e a s e d the number of games c o n s i d e r a b l y , and second, i t would have i n c r e a s e d the d i f f i c u l t i e s i n c o n s t r u c t i n g games wi th c e r t a i n m o t i v a t i o n a l s t r u c t u r e s . The f i n a l and most c o n v i n c i n g reason for not t e s t i n g the e f f e c t of these requ irements i s that in the contex t of c a r d i n a l p a y o f f s wi th o n l y s m a l l imaginary v a l u e s , s e l f -s a c r i f i c e i s l i k e l y to have l i t t l e meaning. The Lendenmann and Rapoport experiment p r o v i d e d a s t r o n g c o m p e t i t i v e i n c e n t i v e to the s u b j e c t s i n the form of a 1 67 p a r t i c i p a t i o n fee based p a r t l y on the r e s u l t s of t h e i r c h o i c e s (the p a y o f f s were g i v e n a monetary v a l u e ) . T h e i r exper iment , as do the ones to be d e s c r i b e d , o f f e r e d the o p p o r t u n i t y of s e l e c t i n g a n o n s e l f - i n t e r e s t e d course of a c t i o n , but the presence of a monetary reward p r o b a b l y r e i n f o r c e d the c h o i c e of the ga ins maximiz ing a l t e r n a t i v e where i t was p r e s e n t . The second of the two exper iments d e s c r i b e d below o f f e r e d a very m i l d c o l l e c t i v e i n c e n t i v e to the s u b j e c t s . Lendenmann and R a p o p o r t ' s experiment gave no i n d i c a t i o n of the r e l i a b i l i t y of t h e i r measure. I t i s p o s s i b l e , though not l i k e l y , that a r e p e t i t i o n might have r e v e a l e d an e n t i r e l y d i f f e r e n t r e l a t i o n s h i p between the independent v a r i a b l e s . Repeat ing the experiment wi th on ly s l i g h t v a r i a t i o n and wi th d i f f e r e n t s u b j e c t s as i s done below, i s not an i d e a l measure of r e l i a b i l i t y , but i t p r o v i d e s some b a s i s for d e t e r m i n i n g whether the games were a r e l i a b l e measure of the s u b j e c t s ' t r u e i n c l i n a t i o n s . The r e p e t i t i o n p e r m i t s some assessment of e x t e r n a l v a l i d i t y as w e l l . I f the games are a b l e to e l i c i t from the s u b j e c t s c h o i c e s which are a t rue . i n d i c a t i o n of t h e i r b e l i e f s about a p p r o p r i a t e a c t i o n s in r e a l wor ld s i t u a t i o n s , there shou ld be some c o n s i s t e n c y in the r e l a t i v e importance of the independent v a r i a b l e s a c r o s s e x p e r i m e n t s . 1 68 6.2 Some E x p e c t a t i o n s . - S p e c i f y i n g in advance which p r e s s u r e s w i l l dominate which in any g iven c o n f i g u r a t i o n i s a d i f f i c u l t t a s k . I f o n l y s imple d i chotomies are d i s c u s s e d , there i s s u f f i c i e n t ev idence in p r e v i o u s c h a p t e r s to f o r e c a s t an outcome. The d i s c u s s i o n of c h a p t e r s One through Three c e r t a i n l y l e a d s one to b e l i e v e that where an a l t e r n a t i v e which i s i n d i v i d u a l l y r a t i o n a l i s opposed by one which i s a l t r u i s t i c , a l a r g e m a j o r i t y of s u b j e c t s w i l l choose the i n d i v i d u a l l y r a t i o n a l a l t e r n a t i v e . Lendenmann and Rapoport found tha t when the MX p r e s s u r e was absent as i t was for the Row p l a y e r in most of the games, the a l t r u i s t i c a l t e r n a t i v e was the c h o i c e of the m a j o r i t y of the s u b j e c t s even when c o m p e t i t i o n was a p r e s s u r e towards the s e l e c t i o n of the o ther a l t e r n a t i v e . The percentage of s u b j e c t s c h o o s i n g the a l t r u i s t i c a l t e r n a t i v e was h i g h , never l e s s than 70 p e r c e n t , and in many games in excess of 80 p e r c e n t . Two f a c t o r s make one c a u t i o u s about p r e d i c t i n g a s i m i l a r outcome in an experiment w i t h d i f f e r e n t games, c o n d i t i o n s , and s u b j e c t s . F i r s t , a p r i o r i we would not expect the a l t r u i s t i c p r e s s u r e s to dominate c o m p e t i t i v e ones in any s i t u a t i o n , though they may have some a m e l i o r a t i n g i n f l u e n c e . And second, the games in Lendenmann and R a p o p o r t ' s experiment f e a t u r e d n e g a t i v e p a y o f f s . In a lmost a l l of the games where MX was a b s e n t , the a l t r u i s t i c p r e s s u r e s p o s i t i v e and c o m p e t i t i o n n e g a t i v e , the c h o i c e of the B, would have p r o b a b l y r e s u l t e d in the o t h e r p l a y e r r e c e i v i n g a n e g a t i v e p a y o f f . T h i s undoubtedly made the c h o i c e of that a l t e r n a t i v e 1 69 more d i f f i c u l t to the extent t h a t i t s c h o i c e meant i n f l i c t i n g a l o s s upon the c o p l a y e r . The remain ing d ichotomy, t h a t where the s u b j e c t s have a c h o i c e between an i n d i v i d u a l l y r a t i o n a l course of a c t i o n , and one which secures a r e l a t i v e advantage over an opponent i s l e s s easy than the p r e v i o u s d i c h o t o m i e s to f o r e c a s t . Is c o m p e t i t i v e advantage more a t t r a c t i v e than ga ins maximizat ion? The magnitude of these p r e s s u r e s and the c o n f i g u r a t i o n of the o t h e r s w i l l o b v i o u s l y have some i n f l u e n c e . But i f winners were to be d e c l a r e d , which i s not the case in these exper iment s , c o m p e t i t i v e advantage might be a b e t t e r c h o i c e than ga ins m a x i m i z a t i o n , working on the assumpt ion that i f I can keep my opponents ' s c o r e down, I w i l l have a b e t t e r chance of a c c u m u l a t i n g a g r e a t e r score than he or she. So f a r I have on ly d i s c u s s e d the p r e s s u r e s in p a i r s . When a l l of the p r e s s u r e s are c o n s i d e r e d t o g e t h e r , p r e d i c t i n g an outcome i s a f o r m i d a b l e t a s k . F o r example, where MX, CR, PO, and B are a l l p o s i t i v e (or n e g a t i v e ) and C i s nega t ive (or p o s i t i v e ) what w i l l the outcome be? Lendenmann and Rapoport found that i n t h i s s i t u a t i o n a lmost a l l of the s u b j e c t s chose the i n d i v i d u a l l y r a t i o n a l a l t e r n a t i v e . A g a i n , because of the n e g a t i v e payof f v a l u e s , the outcome i s p r o b a b l y u n u s u a l . I t i s c e r t a i n l y easy to p r e d i c t that when MX and and C are p o s i t i v e (or n e g a t i v e ) and some or a l l of PO, CR, or B are n e g a t i v e (or p o s i t i v e ) , A , w i l l be chosen by most of the s u b j e c t s . But w i l l i t be chosen by more or l e s s than when PO, CR, and B are absent a l t o g e t h e r ? And we have not begun to 1 70 e x p l o r e the combinat ions of CR, PO, and B which are p o s s i b l e in each of these s i t u a t i o n s . We can at l e a s t h y p o t h e s i z e that based on Lendenmann and R a p o p o r t ' s f i n d i n g s , i t would be expected that the s o c i a l p r e s s u r e s e i t h e r s i n g l y or in combinat ion w i l l have t h e i r g r e a t e s t e f fee t -when the p r e s s u r e s of i n d i v i d u a l r a t i o n a l i t y are a b s e n t . But w i l l t h e i r e f f e c t be as s t r o n g as Lendenmann and Rapoport r e p o r t when these are opposed by a g a i n s maximiz ing c h o i c e ? Many of the 112 d e c i s i o n s which the s u b j e c t s in the Lendenmann and Rapoport experiment were r e q u i r e d to make had no e f f e c t upon t h e i r own p a y o f f s . The a u t h o r s suggest that " in these s i t u a t i o n s the m a j o r i t y (but by no means a l l ) may have adopted the r u l e , ' L e t the o ther b e n e f i t s i n c e i t makes no d i f f e r e n c e to me.' T h i s r u l e may have been ' c a r r i e d o v e r ' i n t o game VII at l e a s t by some of the s u b j e c t s i n the r o l e of Row, who may not even have n o t i c e d the presence of a l a r g e r payof f in the dominat ing "malevolent" s t r a t e g y . " 1 By r e d u c i n g the number of d e c i s i o n s in which the s u b j e c t s were i n d i f f e r e n t between t h e i r p a y o f f s , we may be a b l e to e s t a b l i s h whether a c a r r y over e f f e c t was p r e s e n t . 6.3 The Method. The exper iments i n v o l v e d the s u b j e c t s in f a r fewer d e c i s i o n s than d i d the Lendenmann and Rapoport d e s i g n . In both e x p e r i m e n t s , the s u b j e c t s were r e q u i r e d to make d e c i s i o n s in on ly 15 m o t i v a t i o n a l l y unique games. Whi le in the Lendenmann 171 and Rapoport experiment the s u b j e c t s chose twice in v a r i a n t s of each game as both Row and Column p l a y e r , in these two exper iments , no v a r i a n t s of games were i n c l u d e d and the s u b j e c t s chose on ly once as the Row p l a y e r . Whi le a l l the s u b j e c t s p l a y e d each game as Row p l a y e r when the game i s w r i t t e n wi th the n a t u r a l outcome i n the upper l e f t c e l l , 50% of the s u b j e c t s in each experiment had the games t r a n s p o s e d so that they appeared to be choos ing between the columns of the game. 2 The s u b j e c t s were t o l d tha t t h e i r c h o i c e s would be matched a g a i n s t those of o ther s u b j e c t s c h o o s i n g between the o ther a l t e r n a t i v e ( e i t h e r rows or columns) to determine t h e i r p a y o f f . T h i s m i l d d e c e p t i o n l e d the s u b j e c t s to b e l i e v e tha t t h e i r c o p l a y e r was a r e a l but u n s p e c i f i e d member of the c l a s s . The rows and columns of the games were randomly i n t e r c h a n g e d so tha t no one c h o i c e e i t h e r A , or A 2 was always the ga ins maximiz ing o n e . 3 The two exper iments o f f e r e d n e i t h e r rewards nor p r i z e s for the h i g h e s t or any other score a c h i e v e d . The s u b j e c t s were t o l d that the p a y o f f s c o u l d r e p r e s e n t a n y t h i n g of va lue which they w i shed ." Even though there was no s p e c i f i c monetary va lue a t t a c h e d to the p a y o f f s , i t i s l i k e l y tha t the s u b j e c t s were a t t r a c t e d to p a y o f f s wi th h i g h e r n u m e r i c a l v a l u e s and c o n s i d e r e d these to have meaning i n terms of w i n n i n g . G e n e r a l l y , s m a l l v a l u e s were used for the p a y o f f s and these were a lmost always p o s i t i v e . The j u s t i f i c a t i o n for u s i n g s m a l l d e c i s i o n p r e s s u r e v a l u e s was Lendenmann and R a p o p o r t ' s f i n d i n g that the magnitude of the p r e s s u r e s had no s i g n i f i c a n t e f f e c t upon c h o i c e . The i n s t r u c t i o n s to the s u b j e c t s d i d not mention the 1 72 o b v i o u s game q u a l i t y of the e x p e r i m e n t . 5 T h i s was a d e p a r t u r e from the Lendenmann and Rapoport experiment where the s u b j e c t s were rewarded for t h e i r p a r t i c i p a t i o n based p a r t l y on the r e s u l t s of t h e i r p l a y . In the second experiment the s u b j e c t s were p r o v i d e d with a very m i l d c o l l e c t i v e i n c e n t i v e . They were t o l d that the average c l a s s score would be compared to those s c o r e s a c h i e v e d by two o ther f i c t i t i o u s c l a s s e s from d i f f e r e n t f a c u l t i e s . The o b j e c t in p r o v i d i n g the c o l l e c t i v e i n c e n t i v e was to see i f the s u b j e c t s would respond by c h o o s i n g in g r e a t e r numbers a l t e r n a t i v e s which were c o l l e c t i v e l y r a t i o n a l . The i n s t r u c t i o n s to the s u b j e c t s were as n e u t r a l as p o s s i b l e , a v o i d i n g any mention of s e l f - i n t e r e s t e d or a l t r u i s t i c c o u r s e s of a c t i o n and emphas iz ing the v a l i d i t y of a l l p o s s i b l e c h o i c e s . The s u b j e c t s were g iven f i f t e e n minutes to complete t h e i r c h o i c e s a f t e r the i n s t r u c t i o n s were read to them by the e x p e r i m e n t e r . Each of the s u b j e c t s had the text of the i n s t r u c t i o n s be fore them for r e f e r e n c e . The f i r s t experiment had 67 s u b j e c t s and the second had 74. A l l s u b j e c t s were s t u d e n t s at the U n i v e r s i t y of B r i t i s h Columbia t a k i n g c o u r s e s i n P o l i t i c a l S c i e n c e . 6.4 The R e s u l t s . The e x p e r i m e n t a l games are a b s t r a c t r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s . I t t h e r e f o r e i s important to know whether the s u b j e c t s unders tood the meaning of these a b s t r a c t i o n s . O b v i o u s l y , i t cannot be s a i d 173 for c e r t a i n that a l l s u b j e c t s comprehended a l l the p r e s s u r e s present in a l l games, and chose i n t e n t i o n a l l y in every i n s t a n c e . However, i t seems l i k e l y that many of the s u b j e c t s were aware of the p r e s s u r e s and chose a c c o r d i n g to some p r i n c i p l e . An e a r l i e r p r e t e s t v e r s i o n of the experiment i n c l u d e d a d e b r i e f i n g q u e s t i o n n a i r e . The s u b j e c t s were asked whether they adopted some p r i n c i p l e in making t h e i r c h o i c e s , and to guess at what the experiment was des igned to i n v e s t i g a t e . A l l of the s u b j e c t s were ab le to s t a t e a p r i n c i p l e of c h o i c e , u s u a l l y the g a i n s -maximiz ing one, and t h e i r c h o i c e s c o r r e s p o n d e d w e l l w i th t h i s s t a t e d p r i n c i p l e . In s e v e r a l i n s t a n c e s , the s u b j e c t s a l s o came very c l o s e to s t a t i n g the purpose of the exper iment : "Do you have compassion" was what one wrote , whi l e another suggested that the purpose was "To see whether or not i n d i v i d u a l s p r e f e r to t o t a l l y dominate or would be w i l l i n g to accept n e u t r a l c o n d i t i o n s . " 6 F i g u r e 23 d i s p l a y s the c o r r e l a t i o n m a t r i x for the independent v a r i a b l e s used in the e x p e r i m e n t . As i s e v i d e n t , some are q u i t e h igh due to the f a c t that they are d e f i n e d over the same payo f f v a l u e s . 1 74 F i g u r e 23 - C o r r e l a t i o n M a t r i x of Independent V a r i a b l e s . MX CR PO B C MX 1.000 .119 - . 416 - . 156 .293 CR 1.000 .369 .821 - .902 PO 1.000 .705 - .502 B 1.000 - .862 C 1.000 Note: The c o r r e l a t i o n matr ix i s i d e n t i c a l for both experiments I and I I . The v a l u e s of the dependent v a r i a b l e s do not change a c r o s s e x p e r i m e n t s . The games c o n s t r u c t e d for the experiment and the r e s u l t s in the form of aggregated c h o i c e s for both exper iments are g iven in b r a c k e t s in F i g u r e 24. F o l l o w i n g F i g u r e 24, T a b l e IV d i s p l a y s the arrangements of p r e s s u r e s for each of the games and shows a g a i n the percentage of s u b j e c t s choos ing the A , response in each game. The p r e s s u r e v a l u e s were i d e n t i c a l for the two exper iment s . 175 F i g u r e 24 - The E x p e r i m e n t a l Games and Aggregated C h o i c e s A 2 B 2 A 2 B 2 (I) ( I I ) (61)(71) A , (39)(29) B, (I) ( II ) (52)(47) A, (48)(53) B, (I) ( II ) (64)(58) A, ( 3 6 M 4 2 ) B, 1 4 1 2 1 4 1 2 #1 A 2 B 2 3 5 1 4 3 5 4 4 #3 A 2 B 2 3 5 -1 2 2 5 3 2 (I) ( I I ) (36)(42) A , (64)(58) B, (I) ( I I ) (59)(60) A, (41)(40) B, (I) ( I I ) (76) (68) A , (23)(32) B, 5 3 4 2 3 3-3 2 #2 A 2 B 2 6 4 4 3 4 4 6 3 #4 A 2 B 2 0 2 0 5 0 4 0 2 #5 #6 1 76 B-(I) ( II ) (61)(61 ) A , (39)(39) B, (I) ( I I ) (80)(76) A, (20)(24) B, (I) ( I I ) (58)(69) A, (42)(31) B, #9 4 4 3 2 2 2 3 3 #7 A 2 B 2 3 4 -2 2 1 2 3 3 (I) ( II ) (68)(62) A , (32)(34) B, (I) ( II ) (77)(77) A , (23)(23) . B, (I) ( II ) (88)(82) A , ( 1 2 ) ( 1 8 ) B, A 2 B 2 1 1 3 1 2 2 1 2 #8 A 2 B 2 2 3 1 3 4 2 2 1 #10 A 2 B 2 1 1 1 2 2 1 1 1 #11 #12 1 77 A 2 B 2 A 2 B 2 (I) ( I I ) (82)(80) A, 3 2 2 - 1 (I) ( II ) (76)(76) A, 2 2 2 3 2 3 4 3 ( 18) (20) (24)(24) B, 2 2 Bi 2 1 #13 (I) ( I I ) (91)(75) A, (09)(25) B, #14 #15 1 78 Tab le IV - The Va lues of the P r e s s u r e s on Row P l a y e r . Exper iment: I II Game # MX PO CR B C A% A% 1 0 0 0 0 0 61% 71% 2 0 3/2 3/4 3/2 -3 /4 36 42 3 0 0 -3 /4 -3 /2 3/4 52 47 4 0 1/2 0 0 0 59 60 5 0 3/2 -3 /4 0 3/4 64 58 6 1 0 0 0 1/4 76 68 7 1 2/2 3/4 2/2 -1 /4 61 61 8 1 0 - 1 / 4 -2 /2 3/4 68 62 9 1 1/2 -2 /4 0 4/4 80 76 1 0 1 0 0 0 1/4 77 77 1 1 1 2/2 3/4 2/2 -1 /4 58 69 1 2 1 0 0 "1/2 2/4 88 82 1 3 1 0 -3 /4 -4 /2 5/4 82 80 1 4 1 "1/2 -1 /4 -2 /2 3/4 76 76 1 5 1 "1/2 0 -1 /2 2/4 91 75 MX = m a x i m i z a t i o n of expected p a y o f f ; PO = P a r e t o o p t i m a l i t y ; CR = c o l l e c t i v e r a t i o n a l i t y ; B = benevolence; C = c o m p e t i t i o n The f i r s t s t ep in a n a l y z i n g the s u b j e c t s ' c h o i c e s in these games i s to s t a t e and t e s t some of the assumptions which have been i m p l i c i t l y and e x p l i c i t l y d i s c u s s e d in the f o r e g o i n g c h a p t e r s . R e c a l l t h a t in Games 1 through 5 the s u b j e c t s d i d not have a s e l f - i n t e r e s t e d c h o i c e a l t e r n a t i v e ; MX was always zero in these games. I f i n d i v i d u a l s were pure e g o i s t s who took no account of o t h e r s ' w e l f a r e , we would expect c h o i c e in these games to be random. O r , in the absence of an a l t e r n a t i v e which was in t h e i r s e l f - i n t e r e s t , c h o i c e would be e q u i v a l e n t to t o s s i n g a c o i n and choos ing whichever a l t e r n a t i v e was f a c e - u p . Such a p a t t e r n of c h o i c e was the case in on ly Game #3, where 52 1 79 percent of the s u b j e c t s chose A , , and 48 percent chose B , . In c o n t r a s t to the f i r s t f i v e games, Games #6 through #15 d i d o f f e r a s e l f - i n t e r e s t e d a l t e r n a t i v e . Once a g a i n , i f we assumed tha t i n d i v i d u a l s were moved by s e l f - i n t e r e s t a l o n e , we shou ld expect to f i n d that in these games c l o s e to 100 percent of the s u b j e c t s chose the A , a l t e r n a t i v e . But t h i s c l e a r l y was not the case a l t h o u g h , in two of the games more than 85 percent of the s u b j e c t s d i d choose the s e l f - i n t e r e s t e d a l t e r n a t i v e . A more p r e c i s e r e n d e r i n g of t h i s h y p o t h e s i s can be g a i n e d by c r o s s -c l a s s i f y i n g c h o i c e by the presence or absence of the MX p r e s s u r e . F i g u r e 25 - C r o s s t a b u l a t i o n of the MX P r e s s u r e by S u b j e c t s ' C h o i c e s i n Exper iment I . A , B , MX 0 54 .5 •45.5- 33.4 ( 181 ) ( 151 ) (332) 1 75 .8 24.2 66.6 (501 ) (160) (661 ) 1 00 (993) X 2 = 45.52 F i g u r e 25 i s produced by t a k i n g each s u b j e c t ' s c h o i c e in every game as the u n i t of a n a l y s i s . C l e a r l y , there i s a r e l a t i o n s h i p between the presence of a s e l f - i n t e r e s t e d c h o i c e and the s e l e c t i o n of t h a t c h o i c e . But the r e l a t i o n s h i p i s not the p e r f e c t , or even the near p e r f e c t one we would have expected i f the s u b j e c t s took account o n l y of s e l f - i n t e r e s t . 180 A second approach to the da ta i s to assume that a l l p r e s s u r e s are of e q u a l importance . In other words, the s u b j e c t s a s s i g n e d equal importance in t h e i r d e c i s i o n s to each of the p r e s s u r e s r e g a r d l e s s of t h e i r n u m e r i c a l v a l u e . Such an assumption would have c h o i c e be ing the r e s u l t of a b a l a n c i n g of the p r e s s u r e s . When a l l are in one d i r e c t i o n , e i t h e r p o s i t i v e or n e g a t i v e , t h i s c h o i c e should be overwhelmingly p o p u l a r , and the percentage of s u b j e c t s choos ing any one a l t e r n a t i v e w i l l decrease as the p r e s s u r e s are s p l i t and opposed to one a n o t h e r . For example, assuming that equa l weight i s g iven to the p r e s s u r e s , we would expect to f i n d a roughly random response p a t t e r n in games where two p r e s s u r e s oppose two o t h e r s r e g a r d l e s s of what e i t h e r of these two p a i r s may be. To t e s t such an assumption we can s p e c i f y an order of c o n f i g u r a t i o n s by descending frequency w i t h which the p r e s s u r e d c h o i c e i s s e l e c t e d by the s u b j e c t s . For i n s t a n c e , we would expect the c h o i c e of A , to be more f requent than that of B, where two p r e s s u r e s are p r e s e n t in the f i r s t a l t e r n a t i v e and none that we have d e f i n e d in the second. In a d d i t i o n , we would expect t h a t the c h o i c e of A , w i l l be f a r g r e a t e r than in a s i t u a t i o n where two p r e s s u r e s are presen t in A , and two in B 1 f which i f the s u b j e c t s g i v e equa l weight to a l l p r e s s u r e s r e g a r d l e s s of n u m e r i c a l v a l u e , shou l d be a p p r o x i m a t e l y random. F i g u r e 26 t e s t s these assumpt i o n s . 181 F i g u r e 26 - C r o s s t a b u l a t i o n of Opposing P r e s s u r e s by Choice in Exper iment I . A , B, 2:0 76.9 23. 1 1 :0 59. 1 40.9 4: 1 59.4 40.6 3: 1 36.4 63.6 2: 1 70.7 29.3 3:2 51 .5 48.5 2:2 76.3 23.6 If the assumption of equa l weight i s s u b s t a n t i a t e d by the d a t a , we shou ld see a rough ly d e c l i n i n g percentage of A , ' s chosen . T h i s p a t t e r n i s c e r t a i n l y not e v i d e n t . Even the one case that seems to comply w i t h t h i s a s sumpt ion , that of the three p r e s s u r e s opposed by two, which i s the c o n f i g u r a t i o n of games #9 and #14, i s m i s l e a d i n g . For in Game #9, 80 percent of the s u b j e c t s chose the a l t e r n a t i v e in accordance w i t h the three p r e s s u r e s , wh i l e in Game #14, 76 percent chose the a l t e r n a t i v e in accordance wi th the two p r e s s u r e s . O b v i o u s l y , there i s very l i t t l e ev idence to support the assumption that the s u b j e c t s t r e a t e d each of the p r e s s u r e s e q u a l l y in t h e i r d e c i s i o n s . We now must c o n s i d e r the assumption that a l l p r e s s u r e s are not e q u a l . O r , that the s u b j e c t s p a i d more a t t e n t i o n to some than to o t h e r s , or tha t the magnitude of these p r e s s u r e s had some e f f e c t upon t h e i r c h o i c e . In the p r e v i o u s d i s c u s s i o n of the importance of s e l f - i n t e r e s t , a r e l a t i o n s h i p between i t and c h o i c e was apparent in the d a t a . However, there may be other p r e s s u r e s such as c o m p e t i t i o n which w i l l be of e q u a l importance . 182 The r e l a t i v e importance of each of the p r e s s u r e s can be assessed through m u l t i p l e r e g r e s s i o n . 6.4.1 Exper iment I . The f i r s t s tep in the a n a l y s i s of experiment I i s to determine which , i f any, of the independent v a r i a b l e s are ab le to e x p l a i n a s i g n i f i c a n t amount of the v a r i a t i o n in the dependent v a r i a b l e when a l l of the independent v a r i a b l e s are i n c l u d e d in the r e g r e s s i o n e q u a t i o n . I f none are s i g n i f i c a n t , there are two p o s s i b l e c o n c l u s i o n s : e i t h e r c h o i c e was random, and as such independent of the m a n i p u l a t i o n of the p r e s s u r e s ; o r , as emphasized, that the i n t e r c o r r e l a t i o n of p r e s s u r e va lues has r e s u l t e d in each of the p r e d i c t o r v a r i a b l e s e x p l a i n i n g on ly a s m a l l p a r t of the v a r i a t i o n in our s u b j e c t s ' c h o i c e s . As the second c o n c l u s i o n i s a r e a l p o s s i b i l i t y , a next s tep in the a n a l y s i s w i l l be to reduce the number of independent v a r i a b l e s in the e q u a t i o n through backwards e l i m i n a t i o n , to the p o i n t where i t i n c l u d e s on ly those which are a b l e to e x p l a i n a s i g n i f i c a n t amount of the v a r i a t i o n i n the dependent v a r i a b l e . At t h i s p o i n t , we w i l l want to d e s c r i b e and e x p l a i n the p a t t e r n of r e l a t i v e s t r e n g t h s of the independent v a r i a b l e s and determine whether the p a t t e r n f i t s our e x p e c t a t i o n of the pre-eminence of c o m p e t i t i o n and m a x i m i z a t i o n . T a b l e V below g i v e s the f u l l r e g r e s s i o n i n c l u d i n g a l l independent v a r i a b l e s in the p r e d i c t i o n e q u a t i o n , and t a k i n g a case to be each s u b j e c t ' s c h o i c e i n every game. 1 83 T a b l e V - Regres s ion A n a l y s i s of Exper iment I . U n s t a n d a r d i z e d Coef f i c i e n t S tandard E r r o r t Constant C MX PO B CR . 19 . 22 . 1 4 . 1 1 .04 .61 . 1 9 . 1 9 .04 .05 .18 .04 1 .00 1.16 - 3 . 2 2 * 2.34* - . 2 0 16.75* R 2 = a d j . R 2 = .07 .07 F=16.35 N = 993 * S i g n i f i c a n t at the .05 l e v e l . Only two of the p r e s s u r e s , B and PO have a s i g n i f i c a n t i n f l u e n c e upon the dependent v a r i a b l e over and above the e f f e c t s of the o ther v a r i a b l e s . In o ther words, knowledge of the va lues of the PO and B p r e s s u r e s i s s u f f i c i e n t f o r an a c c u r a t e p r e d i c t i o n of the dependent v a r i a b l e . At the very l e a s t , i t can now be s a i d tha t benevolence was a s i g n i f i c a n t p r e s s u r e on our s u b j e c t s ' c h o i c e s in the f i r s t exper iment . Were t h i s the e n t i r e s t o r y , the f i n d i n g would c e r t a i n l y be s u r p r i s i n g for i t i n d i c a t e s tha t the s u b j e c t s ' c h o i c e s were not i n f l u e n c e d s i g n i f i c a n t l y by the p r e s s u r e s of e i t h e r m a x i m i z a t i o n of expected payo f f or c o m p e t i t i o n i n a s i t u a t i o n which c l e a r l y condoned and even encouraged such b e h a v i o u r . At l e a s t two f a c t o r s c o n t r i b u t e towards t r e a t i n g the unusual r e s u l t produced by the a n a l y s i s of the f u l l e q u a t i o n wi th some c a u t i o n . F i r s t , d e t e r m i n i n g whether an independent v a r i a b l e has c o n t r i b u t e d s i g n i f i c a n t l y towards an a c c u r a t e p r e d i c t i o n i n v o l v e s c a l c u l a t i o n of the t va lue which i s a r r i v e d at by d i v i d i n g the 1 84 value of the u n s t a n d a r d i z e d r e g r e s s i o n c o e f f i c i e n t by i t s s tandard e r r o r . T h e r e f o r e , the l a r g e r the s tandard e r r o r the l e s s l i k e l y the v a r i a b l e i s to be s i g n i f i c a n t . The c a l c u l a t i o n of the s t a n d a r d e r r o r i s in t h i s case dependent upon the v a r i a n c e of the independent v a r i a b l e . For as the N i s the same throughout , the sum of squared d e v i a t i o n s from the mean of X, which appears in the denominator of the c a l c u l a t i o n of the s tandard e r r o r of the r e g r e s s i o n c o e f f i c i e n t , i s s imply a known p r o p o r t i o n of the v a r i a n c e . The l a r g e r t h i s v a r i a n c e , the more l i k e l y the v a r i a b l e i s to prove s t a t i s t i c a l l y s i g n i f i c a n t . T h i s r a t h e r dry d i g r e s s i o n e x p l a i n s the seemingly u n l i k e l y n o n s i g n i f i c a n t r e g r e s s i o n c o e f f i c i e n t s for the MX and C p r e s s u r e s , for these two independent v a r i a b l e s have both s m a l l e r v a r i a n c e s and c o e f f i c i e n t s w i t h l a r g e r s t a n d a r d e r r o r s than do the PO and B p r e s s u r e s . The second reason for t r e a t i n g the a n a l y s i s of the f u l l equat ion wi th c a u t i o n stems' from the p o s s i b l e e f f e c t s of " the c o r r e l a t i o n between the independent v a r i a b l e s . I f a number of h i g h l y c o r r e l a t e d independent v a r i a b l e s are a l l i n c l u d e d in the r e g r e s s i o n e q u a t i o n they may a l l f a i l to a t t a i n s i g n i f i c a n c e because each i s e x p l a i n i n g o n l y a s m a l l p a r t of a l a r g e r common e f f e c t . We know from F i g u r e 23 that the system of independent v a r i a b l e s i s n e c e s s a r i l y c o r r e l a t e d , so i t may be that w i th the removal of one or a number of them from the p r e d i c t i o n e q u a t i o n , the remainder w i l l become s i g n i f i c a n t . One way of examining t h i s p o s i b i l i t y i s through backward e l i m i n a t i o n which , f o l l o w i n g t e s t s f o r s i g n i f i c a n c e , removes v a r i a b l e s from the p r e d i c t i o n 1 8 5 e q u a t i o n and thereby a r r i v e s at an o p t i m a l and pars imonious e x p l a n a t i o n of the v a r i a n c e in the dependent v a r i a b l e . 7 T a b l e VI g i v e s the r e s u l t s of t h i s a n a l y s i s on the data from experiment I . Tab le VI - Regres s ion A n a l y s i s of Experiment I Us ing Backward E l i m i n a t i o n U n s t a n d a r d i z e d Standard C o e f f i c i e n t E r r o r t C .23 .06 3.56* MX .19 .08 2.37* PO - . 1 4 .04 -3 .40* B .11 .05 2.41* CR -Constant .61 .03 17.21* R 2 = .07 F = 20.45 a d j . R 2 = .07 N = 993 * S i g n i f i c a n t at the .05 l e v e l . Backward e l i m i n a t i o n removed o n l y one v a r i a b l e , CR, from the p r e d i c t i o n e q u a t i o n . T h i s removal had next to no a f f e c t upon the o v e r a l l accuracy of the p r e d i c t i o n as i s i n d i c a t e d by the s i m i l a r a d j u s t e d R 2 v a l u e s 8 i n T a b l e s V and V I . With h i n d s i g h t , t h i s v a r i a b l e seems a l i k e l y c a n d i d a t e for removal as i t i s h i g h l y c o r r e l a t e d wi th both C and B . In a d d i t i o n , the CR p r e s s u r e ' s p a r t i a l c o r r e l a t i o n , which i s a measure of the amount of v a r i a t i o n e x p l a i n e d by CR a f t e r MX, C , PO, and B have e x p l a i n e d the remainder , i s very s m a l l . Both of these f a c t o r s i n d i c a t e tha t c o l l e c t i v e r a t i o n a l i t y was not a very important p r e s s u r e on our s u b j e c t s ' d e c i s i o n s , and when i n c l u d e d in the f u l l e q u a t i o n succeeded i n masking the e f f e c t s of the remain ing independent v a r i a b l e s . 1 86 The backward e l i m i n a t i o n produces a p r e d i c t i o n e q u a t i o n wi th c o e f f i c i e n t s much c l o s e r to e x p e c t a t i o n s of t h e i r r e l a t i v e i m p o r t a n c e . The u n s t a n d a r d i z e d r e g r e s s i o n c o e f f i c i e n t s of T a b l e VI t e l l us the p r e d i c t e d i n c r e a s e in the p r o b a b i l i t y of a s u b j e c t choos ing A i f a l l the v a l u e s of the independent v a r i a b l e s but one are h e l d cons tant and that one i n c r e a s e d by one u n i t . So, i f the s u b j e c t s p l a y e d h y p o t h e t i c a l game G, and then p l a y e d the same game aga in wi th e x a c t l y the same p r e s s u r e v a l u e s for MX, PO, and B, but wi th C i n c r e a s e d by one u n i t , the p r e d i c t e d p r o b a b l i t y of any one s u b j e c t c h o o s i n g A would i n c r e a s e in the second game, G 2 , by .23 or 23%. In s i m i l a r l y h y p o t h e t i c a l s i t u a t i o n s , a change of one u n i t i n the v a l u e s of MX, PO, and B would i n c r e a s e the p r o b a b i l i t y of c h o o s i n g A by .19 , - . 1 4 , and .11 r e s p e c t i v e l y . Pehaps the on ly s u r p r i s e here i s the n e g a t i v e c o e f f i c i e n t for the PO p r e s s u r e . A p r i o r i , we would have expec ted P a r e t o o p t i m a l i t y , which i s a c h a r a c t e r i s t i c of an outcome t h a t i s best for both p l a y e r s , to be a t t r a c t i v e r a t h e r than r e p e l l a n t . But the n e g a t i v e s lope i n d i c a t e s that the s u b j e c t s d i s p l a y e d a tendency to choose the a l t e r n a t i v e which d i d not c o n t a i n the P a r e t o o p t i m a l outcome. As an h y p o t h e t i c a l example , i f a l l o ther p r e s s u r e s were c o n t r o l l e d for and the PO p r e s s u r e i n c r e a s e d from say 1 to 2, the p r o b a b i l i t y of c h o o s i n g the A response would d e c l i n e by .14 or 14%. One p o s s i b l e e x p l a n a t i o n of t h i s e f f e c t i s the c o m p e t i t i v e q u a l i t y of the e x p e r i m e n t . S i n c e the P a r e t o o p t i m a l outcome c o n t a i n s the h i g h e s t p a y o f f f or each p l a y e r , by choos ing i t the s u b j e c t would be c o n t r i b u t i n g 187 towards the h y p o t h e t i c a l other p l a y e r ' s best outcome. If c o m p e t i t i o n was a s t r o n g m o t i v a t i o n in a p l a y e r ' s d e c i s i o n , we would expect him or her to choose an a l t e r n a t i v e which secured a r e l a t i v e advantage over the c o p l a y e r . Another e x p l a n a t i o n i s found in the arrangement of these two p r e s s u r e s . In f i v e of the seven games where the PO and C p r e s s u r e s were both p r e s e n t , one was n e g a t i v e and the o ther p o s i t i v e . So the c o n s i s t e n t c h o i c e of the c o m p e t i t i v e a l t e r n a t i v e over the PO p r e s s u r e d a l t e r n a t i v e l eads to the second p r e s s u r e hav ing a n e g a t i v e s l o p e . The f i r s t i m p r e s s i o n ga ined from T a b l e VI i s that both C and MX are c o n s i d e r a b l y s t r o n g e r than B. Any o ther r e s u l t , t a k i n g i n t o account the na ture of the exper iment , would have to have been t r e a t e d wi th g r e a t c a u t i o n . One p o s s i b l e method of comparing the magnitudes of these c o e f f i c i e n t s i s to c a l c u l a t e the beta w e i g h t s . (The reader w i l l r e c a l l that the d e f i n i t i o n s of the p r e s s u r e s i n v o l v e d m u l t i p l i c a t i o n by d i f f e r e n t f r a c t i o n s to n o r m a l i z e the v a r i a n c e . ) T h i s method of a s s e s s i n g the r e l a t i v e s t r e n g t h s of the independent v a r i b l e s has the d i s a d v a n t a g e of a c c e n t u a t i n g t h e i r d i f f e r e n t v a r i a n c e s . 9 Another method of comparison e n t a i l s c o n t r o l l i n g for a l l v a r i a b l e s but one and o b s e r v i n g the change in p r e d i c t e d p r o b a b i l i t y of a s u b j e c t s e l e c t i n g A as t h a t v a r i a b l e moves a c r o s s i t s range . To take an example , C has a range of - 3 / 4 to 5 /4 . What w i l l be the d i f f e r e n c e between the p r e d i c t e d p r o b a b i l i t y of a s u b j e c t c h o o s i n g A when C e q u a l s -3 /4 and when C e q u a l s 5 /4 , assuming t h a t a l l o t h e r v a r i a b l e s a r e a s s i g n e d t h e i r mean v a l u e s ? As T a b l e VII below shows, the d i f f e r e n c e w i l l be . 3 9 . 188 T a b l e VII - The D i f f e r e n c e in the P r o b a b i l i t y of Choos ing A When a V a r i a b l e Assumes V a l u e s at the Extremes of i t s Range: Experiment I . V a r i a b l e Pr (High) Pr (Low) Pr(H) - P r ( L ) C .85 .46 .39 MX .83 .61 .22 PO .51 .80 - . 2 9 B ' .86 .48 .38 CR .65 .71 .06 The p a t t e r n of r e l a t i v e s t r e n g t h s of the independent v a r i a b l e s which emerges from T a b l e VII i s somewhat d i f f e r e n t from that of the u n s t a n d a r d i z e d r e g r e s s i o n c o e f f i c i e n t s g iven in T a b l e V . The B p r e s s u r e now appears much more important and the MX p r e s s u r e much l e s s so . O b v i o u s l y , p a r t of t h i s r e v e r s e d p a t t e r n i s due to the l a r g e r range of the f i r s t p r e s s u r e . But how important t h i s e f f e c t i s we cannot say for s u r e . However, Lendenmann and Rapoport found that the magnitude of the p r e s s u r e s had r e l a t i v e l y l i t t l e impact upon c h o i c e . A c c o r d i n g l y , i t may be that the magnitude of the range in t h i s case had l i t t l e a f f e c t upon these s u b j e c t s . 6 .4 .2 Exper iment 11. The second exper iment , whose aggregated response t o t a l s are g i v e n under the roman numeral II in F i g u r e 24, i n t r o d u c e d a very m i l d c o l l e c t i v e i n c e n t i v e in tended to c o u n t e r a c t the c o m p e t i t i v e i n c e n t i v e p r e s e n t in the game s i t u a t i o n . The s u b j e c t s were of course d i f f e r e n t , but the games i d e n t i c a l , the o n l y d i f f e r e n c e 1 8 9 be ing that in the second experiment the s u b j e c t s were t o l d tha t t h e i r average c l a s s score would be matched a g a i n s t average c l a s s s cores from other c l a s s e s supposedly p a r t i c i p a t i n g in the exper iment . The i n s t r u c t i o n s were an i n v i t a t i o n to compete c o o p e r a t i v e l y or c o l l e c t i v e l y , p l a c i n g the va lue of h i g h p a y o f f s for both p l a y e r s ahead of the va lue of a h i g h payof f for s e l f a l o n e . In one sense , the i n s t r u c t i o n s were not in tended so much as to reduce c o m p e t i t i v e n e s s but to r e d i r e c t i t towards a c o l l e c t i v e g o a l . I f the s u b j e c t s responded to the c o l l e c t i v e i n c e n t i v e , e x p e c t a t i o n s were that the magnitude of the r e g r e s s i o n c o e f f i c i e n t s for the C and MX p r e s s u r e s would d e c l i n e w h i l e those of the PO and CR p r e s s u r e s would i n c r e a s e in i m p o r t a n c e . The r e a s o n i n g was s i m p l e , perhaps too s i m p l e : g i v e n the i n c e n t i v e to succeed as a group , the s u b j e c t s should be more w i l l i n g to choose a l t e r n a t i v e s which c o n t a i n e i t h e r a P a r e t o o p t i m a l outcome or the a l t e r n a t i v e wi th the l a r g e r sum of p a y o f f s to the p l a y e r s . I f they were more w i l l i n g to choose these a l t e r n a t i v e s they would p r o b a b l y be l e s s l i k e l y to choose a l t e r n a t i v e s where the MX and C p r e s s u r e s were p r e s e n t . To a c e r t a i n e x t e n t , these e x p e c t a t i o n s w i l l depend upon the p a r t i c u l a r payof f va lues in any game. For example, where a s u b j e c t ' s payof f based upon h i s e x p e c t a t i o n of an opponent ' s c h o i c e i s on ly s l i g h t l y s m a l l e r than he might expect were he or she to choose s e l f i s h l y , the c o l l e c t i v e l y r a t i o n a l c h o i c e w i l l p r o b a b l y be e a s i e r . S i m i l a r l y , i f the c o p l a y e r ' s p a y o f f s are much g r e a t e r in the c e l l s of the c o l l e c t i v e l y r a t i o n a l a l t e r n a t i v e than in the o t h e r , we might expect the s e l e c t i o n of 190 the f i r s t a l t e r n a t i v e to aga in be e a s i e r . An i n t e r e s t i n g f ea ture of the payof f va lues a c r o s s those games where row and column had an MX p r e s s u r e d a l t e r n a t i v e was that i f two h y p o t h e t i c a l p l a y e r s both chose that a l t e r n a t i v e , they c o u l d a c h i e v e a s l i g h t l y l a r g e r combined score than i f they both chose the c o l l e c t i v e l y r a t i o n a l a l t e r n a t i v e t h r o u g h o u t . The l a t t e r p a r t of t h i s s e c t i o n d i s c u s s e s t h i s a spec t of the games as p a r t of an e x p l a n a t i o n of the s u b j e c t s ' c h o i c e s . The a n a l y s i s of experiment II proceeds in the same manner as that of exper iment I . But in a d d i t i o n to d e t e r m i n i n g the r e l a t i v e importance of the p r e d i c t o r v a r i a b l e s , we wish to compare the o r d e r of precedence w i t h the p a t t e r n of experiment I to determine what e f f e c t s can be a s c r i b e d to the i n f l u e n c e of the c o l l e c t i v e i n c e n t i v e . Tab le V I I I - R e g r e s s i o n A n a l y s i s of Experiment I I . U n s t a n d a r d i z e d Coef f i c i e n t S t a n d a r d E r r o r t C MX PO B CR .21 . 1 2 . 10 . 08 .08 .61 .19 .18 .04 .05 .18 .03 1 .08 .66 -2 .50* 1 .69 .43 17.23* Constant R 2 = a d j . R 2 = .04 .03 F N 9.27 1110 * S i g n i f i c a n t a t the .05 l e v e l . When the v a r i a n c e in the dependent v a r i a b l e in the second experiment i s e x p r e s s e d as a f u n c t i o n of a l l of the independent v a r i a b l e s , o n l y PO has a s i g n i f i c a n t r e g r e s s i o n c o e f f i c i e n t and 191 once a g a i n , t h i s was negat ive i n d i c a t i n g that the s i m i l a r r e s u l t in the f i r s t experiment was not a unique c h a r a c t e r i s t i c of those s u b j e c t s . Comparing these r e g r e s s i o n c o e f f i c i e n t s w i th those in T a b l e V shows tha t C has remained at the same magnitude , MX, B, and PO d e c l i n e d s l i g h t y , and CR i n c r e a s e d somewhat. Be fore drawing too many c o n c l u s i o n s , the e q u a t i o n shou ld a g a i n be reduced through backward e l i m i n a t i o n . T a b l e IX - R e g r e s s i o n A n a l y s i s of Experiment II U s i n g Backward E l i m i n a t i o n U n s t a n d a r d i z e d Standard C o e f f i c i e n t E r r o r t C -MX .27 . 06 4. 23* PO - . 0 7 .02 - 2 . 6 9 * B -CR -Constant .60 .03 20.42* R 2 = .03 F = 20.95 a d j . R 2 = .03 N = 1110 * S i g n i f i c a n t at the .05 l e v e l . The backward e l i m i n a t i o n removes B, CR, and C from the e q u a t i o n l e a v i n g s i g n i f i c a n t c o e f f i c i e n t s for on ly MX and PO. D e s p i t e the removal of the three independent v a r i a b l e s the a d j u s t e d R 2 v a l u e i s reduced o n l y m a r g i n a l l y i n d i c a t i n g t h a t very l i t t l e was l o s t in terms of the a b i l i t y to e x p l a i n the v a r i a n c e i n the dependent v a r i a b l e by t h e i r e x c l u s i o n from the e q u a t i o n . Whi l e the backward e l i m i n a t i o n g i v e s the most p a r s i m o n i o u s e x p l a n a t i o n of v a r i a n c e in the dependent v a r i a b l e , at t h i s s tage we are i n t e r e s t e d in comparing the r e l a t i v e importance of a l l of the v a r i a b l e s a c r o s s the two e x p e r i m e n t s . 1 92 So we r e t u r n to the f u l l e q u a t i o n of T a b l e VIII and compare i t wi th the a n a l y s i s i n T a b l e V . Once aga in to enhance the compar i son , the i n c r e a s e i n p r o b a b i l i t y which each v a r i a b l e produces as i t moves a c r o s s i t s range , a s s i g n i n g the mean v a l u e to a l l o ther v a r i a b l e s , can be d e s c r i b e d . T a b l e X - The D i f f e r e n c e in the P r o b a b i l i t y of Choos ing A When a V a r i a b l e Assumes V a l u e s at the Extremes of i t s Range: Experiment II V a r i a b l e Pr (High) Pr (Low) Pr(H) - P r ( L ) -C .83 .41 .42 MX .72 .60 .12 PO .51 .72 - .21 B .78 .50 .28 CR .73 .61 .12 Comparing the .above t a b l e w i th T a b l e VII r e v e a l s some changes which may be a r e s u l t of the i n t r o d u c t i o n of the c o l l e c t i v e i n c e n t i v e in the second exper iment . - The C p r e s s u r e produces about the same change in the p r o b a b i l i t y of choos ing A as i t moves a c r o s s i t s range as i t d i d i n the f i r s t exper iment . As i n d i c a t e d above, t h i s shou ld have decreased i f the s u b j e c t s behaved a c c o r d i n g to the r e a s o n i n g set out t h e r e . The e f f e c t of the MX p r e s s u r e on the p r o b a b i l i t y of c h o o s i n g A d i d decrease a c c o r d i n g to e x p e c t a t i o n s wh i l e PO became m a r g i n a l l y l e s s r e p e l l a n t . In the case of PO, the s u b j e c t s favoured the a l t e r n a t i v e f e a t u r i n g t h i s outcome s l i g h t l y l e s s n e g a t i v e l y . N a t u r a l l y , we would have expected tha t t h i s c o e f f i c i e n t would become p o s i t i v e w i th the i n t r o d u c t i o n of the c o l l e c t i v e i n c e n t i v e . The CR p r e s s u r e as expected does i n c r e a s e a c r o s s the 1 93 two exper iments by as much as 100 p e r c e n t , but the i n c r e a s e i n the p r o b a b i l i t y of c h o o s i n g A on ly goes up by 6 p e r c e n t , which i s h a r d l y the magnitude of i n c r e a s e expec ted . The i n f l u e n c e of the B p r e s s u r e d e c l i n e s as expec ted , f or i f the s u b j e c t s are more concerned with c o l l e c t i v e m a x i m i z a t i o n , they w i l l be l e s s concerned wi th maximiz ing the ga in of a c o p l a y e r at the expense of t h e i r own. Why were the e x p e c t a t i o n s of the e f f e c t s of the i n t r o d u c t i o n of a c o l l e c t i v e i n c e n t i v e on ly p a r t i a l l y met? There are at l e a s t two p l a u s i b l e e x p l a n a t i o n s , as to why these s u b j e c t s d i d not submit to c o l l e c t i v e r a t i o n a l i t y when exposed to the m i l d i n c e n t i v e in the second exper iment . The f i r s t and s i m p l e s t e x p l a n a t i o n i s tha t the c o l l e c t i v e i n c e n t i v e was s imply not s t r o n g enough to produce a s i g n i f i c a n t e f f e c t f o r the CR p r e s s u r e . The second e x p l a n a t i o n i s more c o m p l i c a t e d . A group goa l may be pursued in two f a s h i o n s . One i s for the members to coopera te between themselves and to ensure that t h e i r combined s cores are the maximum p o s s i b l e , thereby r a i s i n g the o v e r a l l c l a s s average . T h i s e x p l a n a t i o n would l e a d one . t o b e l i e v e that both the CR and PO p r e s s u r e s sh ou ld become more important and the MX and C p r e s s u r e s l e s s so . But an e q u a l l y v a l i d method of p u r s u i n g a group goa l in t h i s e x p e r i m e n t a l s i t u a t i o n i s to choose the ga i n s maximiz ing s t r a t e g y more o f t e n , thus e n s u r i n g a h igher s core for o n e s e l f and so p o s s i b l y a h i g h e r score for the c l a s s . Such a l o g i c would l e a d to the i n c r e a s e d importance of MX, and decreased C and CR r e g r e s s i o n c o e f f i c i e n t s , which i s p r e c i s e l y the p a t t e r n which has been 1 94 r e v e a l e d . We shou l d a l s o remember that d e s p i t e the i n t r o d u c t i o n of the c o l l e c t i v e i n c e n t i v e , the c o m p e t i t i v e q u a l i t y of the games s t i l l remained . A r a t i o n a l way of s e r v i n g both the the i n t e r e s t s of g a i n i n g the h i g h e s t i n - c l a s s s c o r e , and the h i g h e s t c l a s s average score would be to choose the ga in s maximiz ing s t r a t e g y . How robust are the f i n d i n g s ? One way of c h e c k i n g t h i s i s by a m o d i f i e d " j a c k n i f e " procedure which drops a d i f f e r e n t game ad s e r i a t i m from the r e g r e s s i o n p r o c e d u r e . I f the o r i g i n a l f i n d i n g s are r o b u s t , the c o e f f i c i e n t v a l u e s sh ou ld be r e l a t i v e l y s t a b l e across the p r o c e d u r e . The r e s u l t s g iven in Appendix B, show that the c o e f f i c i e n t s for the f i r s t experiment are r e l a t i v e l y s t a b l e and the same p a t t e r n i s repeated throughout the s e r i a l e x c l u s i o n of each game. The u n s t a n d a r d i z e d r e g r e s s i o n c o e f f i c i e n t s vary somewhat more under the j a c k n i f e procedure c a r r i e d out on the second exper iment . The check for robus tness suggests some f u r t h e r a n a l y s i s . At the b e g i n n i n g of t h i s s e c t i o n we s i n g l e d out the e f f e c t of the presence or absence of the MX p r e s s u r e upon the s u b j e c t s ' c h o i c e s . Whi le i t was found that MX was not the o n l y important p r e s s u r e , i t s presence or absence may have an i n d i r e c t e f f e c t upon the r e l a t i v e importance of the o ther p r e s s u r e s . For example, we might expect tha t the benevolence p r e s s u r e w i l l be more i n f l u e n t i a l when p r e s s u r e o r i g i n a t i n g wi th the m a x i m i z a t i o n of payof f i s a b s e n t . I t i s more d i f f i c u l t to p r e d i c t whether the s lope of B w i l l be unchanged when MX i s removed from the e q u a t i o n as i t i s when we observe those games where i t was 1 95 a b s e n t , or present as a c o n s t a n t in the remain ing games. The f o l l o w i n g t a b l e s d i v i d e the o b s e r v a t i o n s i n t o those where MX i s presen t and those where i t i s a b s e n t , r e p e a t i n g the a n a l y s i s as b e f o r e . T a b l e s XI and XII d i s p l a y the r e g r e s s i o n a n a l y s i s of exper iments I and II w i th the games where MX was presen t e x c l u d e d . A backward e l i m i n a t i o n procedure produces i d e n t i c a l r e s u l t s in both c a s e s . T a b l e XI - R e g r e s s i o n A n a l y s i s of Experiment I E x c l u d i n g Games wi th MX P r e s s u r e s U n s t a n d a r d i z e d S tandard C o e f f i c i e n t E r r o r t C .45 .16 2.85* MX -PO - . 2 3 .10 - 2 . 3 0 * B .29 .13 2.27 CR -Constant .64 .06 10.99* R 2 = .03 F = 3.84 a d j . R 2 = .03 N = 332 * S i g n i f i c a n t at the .05 l e v e l . 1 96 T a b l e XII - Regres s ion A n a l y s i s of Experiment II E x c l u d i n g Games w i t h MX P r e s s u r e s U n s t a n d a r d i z e d S tandard C o e f f i c i e n t E r r o r t C .51 .15 3.42* MX -PO - . 3 5 .09 - 3 . 8 0 * B .41 .L2— 3.47* CR -Constant .73 .05 13.30* R 2 = .04 F = 5.04 a d j . R 2 = .03 N = 369 * S i g n i f i c a n t at the .05 l e v e l . The r e g r e s s i o n procedure exc ludes the CR p r e s s u r e from the equat ions of both exper iments because most of i t s v a r i a n c e i s e x p l a i n e d by the remaining independent v a r i a b l e s . T a b l e XI shows that the r e l a t i v e magnitudes of the r e g r e s s i o n c o e f f i c i e n t s i s s i m i l a r to that in T a b l e V where a l l the games are i n c l u d e d . The PO p r e s s u r e aga in has a nega t ive s lope i n d i c a t i n g tha t t h i s i s not s imply an a r t i f a c t of the presence or absence of the MX p r e s s u r e . A s l i g h t d e v i a t i o n from the normal p a t t e r n of c o e f f i c i e n t s t r e n g t h s i s apparent in T a b l e XII where the B c o e f f i c i e n t i s c o n s i d e r a b l y s t r o n g e r in r e l a t i v e and a b s o l u t e terms than in T a b l e V I I I . In f a c t the B c o e f f i c i e n t appears s t r o n g e r in both T a b l e s XI and XII than i t does in T a b l e s V and V I I I . T h i s i s not p a r t i c u l a r l y s u r p r i s i n g as we would expect that a l t r u i s m w i l l be "eas ier" when a s e l f -i n t e r e s t e d course of a c t i o n i s a b s e n t . T h i s . seems to c o n f i r m the argument that a l t r u i s m w i l l be more p r e v a l e n t where a c l e a r l y s e l f - i n t e r e s t e d c o u r s e of a c t i o n i s not p o s s i b l e . T h i s 1 97 was T i t m u s s ' argument in support of m a i n t a i n i n g a v o l u n t a r y b lood donor system and p r o h i b i t i n g a p r i v a t e market in b l o o d . The argument ga ins f u r t h e r s t r e n g t h from a n a l y s i s of games where MX i s p r e s e n t . Here B d e c l i n e s in importance as i s ev ident in the f o l l o w i n g two t a b l e s . T a b l e XIII - R e g r e s s i o n A n a l y s i s of Exper iment I E x c l u d i n g Games without MX P r e s s u r e s U n s t a n d a r d i z e d Standard C o e f f i c i e n t E r r o r t C .16 .19 .828 MX -PO - . 1 6 - . 0 5 - 3 . 1 1 * B .07 .04 1.44 CR .00 .18 .05 Constant .73 .08 9.19* R 2 = .04 F = 6.51 a d j . R 2 = .03 N = 661 * S i g n i f i c a n t at the .05 l e v e l . T a b l e XIV - R e g r e s s i o n A n a l y s i s of Exper iment II E x c l u d i n g Games without MX P r e s s u r e s U n s t a n d a r d i z e d Standard C o e f f i c i e n t E r r o r t C - .02 .14 - . 130 MX -PO - .04 .05 - . 7 6 5 B -CR - . 0 7 .16 - . 4 4 9 Constant .74 .06 11.83* R 2 = .01 F = 2.05 a d j . R 2 = .00 N = 741 * S i g n i f i c a n t at the .05 l e v e l . T a b l e XIII c o n f i r m s the same g e n e r a l p a t t e r n of r e l a t i v e magnitude of the c o e f f i c i e n t s . But T a b l e XIV i s a t o t a l 1 98 d e p a r t u r e from the p r e v i o u s t a b l e s . H e r e , none of the r e g r e s s i o n c o e f f i c i e n t s i s s i g n i f i c a n t and the a d j u s t e d R 2 va lue i s very s m a l l i n d i c a t i n g tha t these v a r i a b l e s are ab le to e x p l a i n o n l y the s m a l l e s t f r a c t i o n of the v a r i a n c e in the dependent v a r i a b l e . In a d d i t i o n , a l l of the v a r i a b l e s have sha l low n e g a t i v e s lopes i n d i c a t i n g tha t they have a s l i g h t l y d e p r e s s i n g e f f e c t upon the p r o b a b i l i t y of a s u b j e c t choos ing A when a l l o ther v a r i a b l e v a l u e s are h e l d c o n s t a n t . I f a n y t h i n g , t h i s f i n d i n g r e i n f o r c e s the e a r l i e r c o n c l u s i o n that the c o l l e c t i v e i n c e n t i v e a c t u a l l y encouraged the s u b j e c t s to be more s e l f - i n t e r e s t e d than the s u b j e c t s in the f i r s t experiment where a s i m i l a r i n c e n t i v e was a b s e n t . Because t h i s e x p l a n a t i o n now appears more c o n v i n c i n g we shou ld e x p l o r e the v a l i d i t y of the s t r a t e g y of p u r s u i n g a group goa l through i n d i v i d u a l m a x i m i z a t i o n i n these games. U n f o r t u n a t e l y , we cannot say for c e r t a i n whether the s u b j e c t s responded to the MX p r e s s u r e more r e a d i l y i n the second experiment because they b e l i e v e d i t would i n c r e a s e the average group payo f f s c o r e . Nor can we say f o r c e r t a i n how they thought those o t h e r s who they were l e d to b e l i e v e were c h o o s i n g as a c o p l a y e r , would choose . But they were encouraged in the i n s t r u c t i o n s to c o n s i d e r how the oppos ing p l a y e r might choose . N e i t h e r can we e s t a b l i s h tha t those p a i r s of i n d i v i d u a l s who both chose the ga ins maximiz ing s t r a t e g y most f r e q u e n t l y a c h i e v e d a h i g h e r average score than those who d i d n o t , for none of the s u b j e c t s a c t u a l l y chose between the columns of the games where they were expressed w i t h the n a t u r a l outcome i n the upper 1 99 l e f t c e l l . We can however, w i th the a i d of a number of a s sumpt ions , determine whether c h o o s i n g the s e l f - i n t e r e s t e d response c o n t r i b u t e s to group ga in in these h y p o t h e t i c a l s i t u a t i o n s . F i r s t , we w i l l l i m i t o u r s e l v e s to l o o k i n g on ly at those games where row p l a y e r has a s e l f - i n t e r e s t e d c h o i c e . T h i s exc ludes games 1 through 6. Next we can set up four d i f f e r e n t s c e n a r i o s and compare the t o t a l s core f o r both p l a y e r s in a l l of the remain ing games. F i r s t , what would be the t o t a l payo f f i f both h y p o t h e t i c a l p l a y e r s always chose t h e i r s e l f - i n t e r e s t e d a l t e r n a t i v e ; second, what would be the t o t a l payof f to both p l a y e r s i f both chose the c o l l e c t i v e l y r a t i o n a l a l t e r n a t i v e ; t h i r d , what would be the t o t a l payo f f to both p l a y e r s i f row always chose the s e l f - i n t e r e s t e d a l t e r n a t i v e and column always chose the c o l l e c t i v e l y r a t i o n a l a l t e r n a t i v e ; and f o u r t h , what would be the combined score i f row always chose the c o l l e c t i v e l y r a t i o n a l a l t e r n a t i v e and column always chose the s e l f - i n t e r e s t e d a l t e r n a t i v e . In order to a r r i v e at these t o t a l s , some q u a l i f i c a t i o n s are r e q u i r e d : where column does not have a s e l f -i n t e r e s t e d c h o i c e a l t e r n a t i v e , we assume our h y p o t h e t i c a l p l a y e r w i l l choose h i s best response to row's s e l f - i n t e r e s t e d c h o i c e ; when column i s i n d i f f e r e n t between h i s own a l t e r n a t i v e s he w i l l not choose the a l t e r n a t i v e which g i v e s the c o p l a y e r the s m a l l e r payo f f o r , column i s not m a l i c i o u s ; and where n e i t h e r of the a l t e r n a t i v e s i s c o l l e c t i v e l y r a t i o n a l , we assume the p l a y e r s w i l l choose e i t h e r the MX or PO p r e s s u r e d a l t e r n a t i v e . The r e s u l t of the a n a l y s i s of h y p o t h e t i c a l c h o i c e p a t t e r n s 200 i s g iven in T a b l e XV below. T a b l e XV - An A n a l y s i s of H y p o t h e t i c a l Choice P a t t e r n s . Column's Row's Choice Cho ice S e l f - C o l l e c t i v e l y I n t e r e s t e d R a t i o n a l S e l f -i n t e r e s t e d 53 52 C o l l e c t i v e l y Rat i o n a l 47 49 As i s e v i d e n t from the T a b l e , a s e l f - i n t e r e s t e d c h o i c e by both p l a y e r s would have maximized the score f o r both in the games a n a l y z e d . It i s d i f f i c u l t to b e l i e v e that the s u b j e c t s c o u l d have r e a l i z e d t h i s a r t i f a c t of the p a y o f f va lues and chosen so as to take advantage of i t . N o n e t h e l e s s , i t may be that the s u b j e c t s reasoned that the best way for them to ensure a h i g h group average r e g a r d l e s s of whether the o t h e r imaginary p l a y e r chose the c o l l e c t i v e l y r a t i o n a l a l t e r n a t i v e or the s e l f -i n t e r e s t e d a l t e r n a t i v e , would be to choose the s e l f - i n t e r e s t e d one themse lves . And i f they d i d reason in t h i s f a s h i o n , they were q u i t e c o r r e c t in t h i s c a s e . Without being a b l e to answer, t h i s f i n d i n g begs the q u e s t i o n of what would have happened had the combined sums of the p a y o f f s to row and column from the c o l l e c t i v e l y r a t i o n a l a l t e r n a t i v e been n o t i c e a b l y g r e a t e r than 201 that from the max imiza t ion a l t e r n a t i v e . One f i n a l p o i n t remains to be d i s c u s s e d . At the b e g i n n i n g of the c h a p t e r we s t a t e d that a l l of the games where a l t r u i s m was p o s s i b l e r e q u i r e d tha t the a l t r u i s t ' s a c t i o n b e n e f i t the r e c i p i e n t or c o p l a y e r . In a d d i t i o n , some of these games a l s o r e q u i r e d tha t the p l a y e r forego an advantage in c h o o s i n g to improve the payof f of the c o p l a y e r . D i d the f a c t that an a l t r u i s t i c ac t r e q u i r e d f o r e g o i n g an advantage make i t l e s s a p p e a l l i n g than when no cos t was i n v o l v e d in a i d i n g the c o p l a y e r ? The q u e s t i o n cannot be answered w i t h any a s s u r a n c e . A m u l t i p l e r e g r e s s i o n a n a l y s i s would be m i s l e a d i n g because u l t i m a t e l y , we would be comparing the two d i f f e r e n t d e f i n i t i o n s of a l t r u i s m in d i f f e r e n t c o n t e x t s , for not on ly was a cos t a t t a c h e d to a l t r u i s m in some games where i t was p o s s i b l e , but in a d d i t i o n , the m o t i v a t i o n a l s t r u c t u r e of the remain ing p r e s s u r e s changed as w e l l . What we can do however, i s s imply compare the f r e q u e n c y wi th which the a l t e r n a t i v e under B p r e s s u r e was chosen f i r s t when i t i n v o l v e d a b e n e f i t to the c o p l a y e r but no c o s t to the p l a y e r , and second when i t i n v o l v e d a b e n e f i t to the c o p l a y e r and a cos t to the p l a y e r . 202 T a b l e XVI - A Comparison of the A t t r a c t i v e n e s s of the A l t r u i s t i c A l t e r n a t i v e When B e n e f i c i a l and When B e n e f i c i a l and C o s t l y B B e n e f i c i a l 51 M-7'" ( 1 3 5 ) Experiment 1 A l t e r n a t i ve Non-B Experiment 2 B e n e f i c i a l 19 & C o s t l y (63) 49 (131 ) 81 (270) 1 00 (266) B 56 (166) 1 00 (333) 24 (90) Non-B I 44 (133) 76 (281 ) 1 00 (296) 1 00 (371 ) As i s e v i d e n t i n the t a b l e , the a l t r u i s t i c a l t e r n a t i v e was f a r more f r e q u e n t l y chosen when i t i n v o l v e d no c o s t to the s u b j e c t . T h i s i s c e r t a i n l y as e x p e c t e d . However, t h i s ev idence s h o u l d be t r e a t e d wi th extreme c a u t i o n because the a t t r a c t i v e n e s s of the a l t r u i s t i c a l t e r n a t i v e i s d o u b t l e s s r e l a t e d to the c o n f i g u r a t i o n of the o ther . p r e s s u r e s . For example, p a r t of the reason that the a l t r u i s t i c a l t e r n a t i v e was chosen more f r e q u e n t l y when no c o s t was a t t a c h e d to i t (as in games #2, #3, #7, and #11) was because the MX p r e s s u r e was absent in two of the games. Thus the a l t r u i s t i c a l t e r n a t i v e was made even more a p p e a l i n g by the absence of a s e l f - i n t e r e s t e d c h o i c e . 203 6.5 P i s c u s s i o n . Whi le the two experiments have not shown that a l t r u i s m i s the dominant p r e s s u r e in the s u b j e c t s ' c h o i c e s , benevolence was a demonstrable p r e s s u r e in the f i r s t of the two e x p e r i m e n t s . From the o p p o s i t e p e r s p e c t i v e , i t would have been very s u r p r i s i n g and indeed q u e s t i o n a b l e i f benevolence or even c o l l e c t i v e r a t i o n a l i t y or Pare to o p t i m a l i t y had dominated the p r e s s u r e s of i n d i v i d u a l max imiza t ion of expected payo f f or c o m p e t i t i o n . There can be no a v o i d i n g the f a c t that as s imple as these games a r e , they are an i n v i t a t i o n to the s u b j e c t s to compete. To t h i s e x t e n t , the games represen t a s t e r n t e s t of the s u b j e c t s ' a l t r u i s m , for i f such behaviour i s p o s s i b l e in t h i s env ironment , where c o m p e t i t i o n i s l e s s obvious or l e s s r e l e v a n t i t i s r easonab le to assume that the a l t r u i s t i c p r e s s u r e s w i l l p l a y an even l a r g e r r o l e in i n d i v i d u a l s ' c h o i c e s . A c o r o l l a r y to the importance of both the c o m p e t i t i v e and the a l t r u i s t i c p r e s s u r e s i n the two exper iment s , i s the weakness of the ga ins maximiz ing s t r a t e g y r e l a t i v e to t h e o r e t i c a l pronouncements on the s t r e n g t h of t h i s m o t i v a t i o n . Based on these s tatements we would have expected tha t MX would be the dominant p r e s s u r e in both experiments r e g a r d l e s s of the i n - b u i l t c o m p e t i t i v e env ironment . That such was not the. case i s a c l e a r i n d i c a t i o n of the f a c t tha t these s u b j e c t s were capable of be ing moved by m o t i v a t i o n s o ther than s e l f - i n t e r e s t . In a d d i t i o n , the experiment p r o v i d e d no sympathet ic cues for the s u b j e c t s i n the way tha t many experiments on a l t r u i s m do; there was no " v i c t i m " 204 to arouse sympathy, empathy, or to a c t i v a t e e t h i c a l norms. The s u b j e c t s d i d not know p r e c i s e l y who t h e i r c h o i c e s would be matched a g a i n s t , a l t h o u g h they d i d know i t would be a c l a s s m a t e . The exper iments t h e r e f o r e at tempted to keep the p o t e n t i a l r e c i p i e n t of any one s u b j e c t ' s a l t r u i s m anonymous, yet i d e n t i f i a b l e as a member of a p o s s i b l y s i g n i f i c a n t r e f e r e n c e group . At l e a s t to t h i s e x t e n t , the experiments cannot be s a i d to have c o n s p i r e d to e l i c i t the s u b j e c t s ' a l t r u i s m . The e f f e c t of the e x t e r n a l c o l l e c t i v e i n c e n t i v e i n t r o d u c e d in the second experiment was unexpected but in one sense r a t i o n a l . Rather than p u r s u i n g c h o i c e s which were c o l l e c t i v e l y r a t i o n a l or P a r e t o o p t i m a l , the s u b j e c t s appeared to pursue the c o l l e c t i v e g o a l , a h i g h average c l a s s s c o r e , by c h o o s i n g the MX p r e s s u r e and so a t t a i n i n g h i g h e r i n d i v i d u a l and thus a h i g h e r c l a s s average s c o r e . I f some of the s u b j e c t s d i d reason in t h i s manner, they were a t t e s t i n g to a b e l i e f in S m i t h ' s i n v i s i b l e hand which c r e a t e s group weal th from i n d i v i d u a l i n t i a t i v e : "The n a t u r a l e f f o r t of every i n d i v i d u a l to b e t t e r h i s own c o n d i t i o n , when s u f f e r e d to e x e r t i t s e l f w i th freedom and s e c u r i t y , i s so powerfu l a p r i n c i p l e , that i t i s a l o n e , and without a s s i s t a n c e , not on ly c a p a b l e of c a r r y i n g on the s o c i e t y to weal th and p r o s p e r i t y , but of surmounting a hundred i m p e r t i n e n t o b s t r u c t i o n s w i t h which the f o l l y of human laws too o f t en encumbers i t s o p e r a t i o n s . . . " 1 0 205 6.6 C o n c l u s i o n s . I t i s apparent both from the approach in t h i s paper and from those d i s c u s s e d b r i e f l y in the c o n c l u s i o n , tha t the problems of measuring the extent of a l t r u i s t i c behav iour both e x p e r i m e n t a l l y and through the o b s e r v a t i o n of everyday behav iour are g r e a t . The c h i e f problem in e x p e r i m e n t a l measures i s in d i s e n t a n g l i n g p e o p l e ' s e t h i c a l sense of what i s the r i g h t behav iour in any p a r t i c u l a r s i t u a t i o n from behav iour m o t i v a t e d by genuine a l t r u i s m . Any u s e f u l experiment r e q u i r e s grea t cunning in s e t t i n g up a s i t u a t i o n which i s d e v o i d of e t h i c a l e x p e c t a t i o n s . Where an exper imenter does not d i s g u i s e s u f f i c i e n t l y w e l l any . r e l e v a n t e t h i c a l c o n s i d e r a t i o n s , the behav iour e l i c i t e d from s u b j e c t s may t u r n out to be s imply a t e s t of t h e i r compl iance wi th e t h i c a l norms. Employing games to examine a l t r u i s m has the great advantage of be ing whi l e perhaps not f ree o f , a t l e a s t r e l a t i v e l y u n c o m p l i c a t e d by e t h i c a l c o n s i d e r a t i o n s on the p a r t of the s u b j e c t s . The v a l u e of game theory to p o l i t i c a l a n a l y s i s l i e s a l s o i n i t s a b i l i t y to f o r m a l i z e the major e lements of a c o n f l i c t of i n t e r e s t s i t u a t i o n , to make recommendations about r a t i o n a l c h o i c e s , and to g e n e r a l i z e these to a wide range of s i t u a t i o n s . T h i s paper has adopted normat ive e lements of game theory i n order to t e s t i n d i v i d u a l s ' compl iance w i t h them. I t i s d o u b t f u l whether any o ther e x p e r i m e n t a l d e s i g n i s a b l e to r e p r e s e n t so c l o s e l y the v a r i a b l e s which are of i n t e r e s t . However, t h e r e are some d i s a d v a n t a g e s i n v o l v e d i n moving from the use of game 206 theory as an a b s t r a c t a n a l y t i c a l t o o l to gaming which measures s u b j e c t s ' c h o i c e s a g a i n s t the recommendations of game t h e o r y . The major d i f f i c u l t y i s that game m a t r i c e s are so a b s t r a c t and s i m p l i f i e d t h a t the s u b j e c t s may not r e a l i z e the s i m i l a r i t y between the r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s and r e a l s i t u a t i o n s , and so not behave in s i m i l a r f a s h i o n . T h i s problem i s o f t en r e f e r r e d to as that of e x t e r n a l v a l i d i t y . N a t u r a l l y , i t i s not unique to gaming exper iments but i s common to a l l in v i t r o e x p e r i m e n t a t i o n wi th human s u b j e c t s . On the o ther hand, the use of games o b v i a t e s the need to c o n t r i v e a p o s s i b l y meaningless c o m p e t i t i v e s i t u a t i o n . And there seems l i t t l e doubt that the s u b j e c t s who p a r t i c i p a t e d i n t h i s experiment r e c o g n i z e d the c o m p e t i t i v e e lements of the s i t u a t i o n s . To t h i s e x t e n t , the experiment p r o b a b l y d i d not induce any a r t i f i c i a l d i s p l a y s of a l t r u i s m . The exper iments d i s c u s s e d in t h i s c h a p t e r have at tempted to t e s t w i t h a b s t r a c t s i t u a t i o n s , our p r e c o n c e i v e d n o t i o n s about the w i l l i n g n e s s of i n d i v i d u a l s to behave a l t r u i s t i c a l l y i n what are models of p o l i t i c a l s i t u a t i o n s . Us ing these games we have been a b l e to show that i n the most e x a c t i n g of c o m p e t i t i v e environments a l t r u i s m was a s i g n i f i c a n t i n f l u e n c e upon c h o i c e . I f games can be looked upon as t h e o r e t i c a l r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s of some of the common elements of c h o i c e in r e a l - l i f e p o l i t i c a l s i t u a t i o n s , and i t has been argued tha t they c a n , and s i n c e i t has been demonstrated tha t a l t r u i s t i c m o t i v a t i o n s can have an a f f e c t upon c h o i c e i n such s i t u a t i o n s , we shou ld perhaps begin to examine the r e l e v a n c e of such m o t i v a t i o n s to the c o m p l e x i t y of r e a l - l i f e p o l i t i c s . 2 0 7 Notes . 1 K a r l W . Lendenmann and A n a t o l Rapopor t , " D e c i s i o n P r e s s u r e s in 2 x 2 Games", B e h a v i o u r i a l S c i e n c e , v o l . 2 5 ( 1 9 8 0 ) , pp. 1 1 7 . 2 The two games below i l l u s t r a t e how Row's and Column's c h o i c e s are i d e n t i c a l a f t e r t h e i r p o s i t i o n s are i n t e r c h a n g e d . A 2 B 2 A 2 B 2 2 1 4 3 A, 4 2 A, 2 3 3 4 2 1 B, 3 1 • Bi 1 4 s t a n d a r d form t r a n s p o s e d form 3 The i n t e r c h a n g i n g of the rows and columns of a game has no e f f e c t upon i t s s t r a t e g i c q u a l i t i e s . " See Appendix A for the t ex t of the i n s t r u c t i o n s . 5 IOt has been suggested tha t imaginary p a y o f f s such as those used i n these experiments may l a c k s u f f i c i e n t m o t i v a t i n g f o r c e to make s u b j e c t s c o n s i d e r t h e i r a l t e r n a t i v e s s e r i o u s l y . Whi l e t h i s would not be s u r p r i s i n g , i t does not seem to have been a problem i n these exper iments because the d i f f e r e n t s u b j e c t s in the two experiments chose each a l t e r n a t i v e wi th very s i m i l a r and i n some cases i d e n t i c a l f r equency . I f the p a y o f f s had no m o t i v a t i n g f o r c e , such a r e s u l t would h a r d l y be e x p e c t e d . 6 The s m a l l number of s u b j e c t s i n the p r e t e s t p r e c l u d e s any d e t a i l e d a n a l y s i s . 7 See: Norman R. Draper and Harry S m i t h , A p p l i e d  Regres s ion A n a l y s i s , Second e d i t i o n , (New Y o r k : W i l e y , 1 9 8 1 ) p p . 3 0 5 - 3 0 7 . 208 8 The a d j u s t e d R 2 i s an R 2 which takes i n t o account the number of independent v a r i a b l e s i n the equat ion and the number of cases in the a n a l y s i s . I t i s a more c o n s e r v a t i v e e s t imate of the percentage of v a r i a n c e e x p l a i n e d than i s the u n a d j u s t e d R 2 . I t i s g iven by the f o l l o w i n g f o r m u l a : a d j u s t e d R 2 = R 2 - (K - 1 ) /N - k)(1 - R 2 ) where K i s the number of independent v a r i a b l e s and N i s the number of c a s e s . 9 To c a l c u l a t e a beta weight the u n s t a n d a r d i z e d r e g r e s s i o n c o e f f i c i e n t i s m u l t i p l i e d by the r e s u l t of d i v i d i n g the s t a n d a r d d e v i a t i o n of the independent v a r i a b l e by the s t a n d a r d d e v i a t i o n of the dependent v a r i a b l e . A l l o t h e r t h i n g s be ing e q u a l , the l a r g e r the s t a n d a r d d e v i a t i o n of the independent v a r i a b l e the l a r g e r w i l l be the beta w e i g h t . So the beta c o e f f i c i e n t accentuates any a l r e a d y e x i s t i n g d i f f e r e n c e s in the v a r i a n c e s of the independent v a r i a b l e s . In t h i s c a s e , the beta for MX has a va lue which i s a f r a c t i o n of t h a t of B h a r d l y a c r e d i b l e r e s u l t . 1 0 Adam S m i t h , The Wealth of N a t i o n s , E . Cannan e d . , (New Y o r k : Modern L i b r a r y , 1937), I V . v . b . p . 43. 209 V I I . CONCLUSION 7 . 1 Paths Not Taken . The a l l u r i n g q u a l i t y of a l t r u i s m i s such that s e v e r a l academic d i s c i p l i n e s have judged i t a que.st-ion worth examin ing . Even some economis t s , impressed wi th the ev idence of a l t r u i s t i c b e h a v i o u r , have at tempted to i n c o r p o r a t e a l t r u i s m i n t o economic models of b e h a v i o u r . 1 But economists have not been much i n t e r e s t e d i n p r o v i n g the p o s s i b i l i t y , or the c i r c u m s t a n c e s under which a l t r u i s t i c behav iour may be f o r t h c o m i n g . P s y c h o l o g i s t s and s o c i o l o g i s t s have, however, focussed e n t i r e l y on the q u e s t i o n s of who, and in what c i r c u m s t a n c e s . They have examined the i n f l u e n c e of a wide range of p e r s o n a l i t y and c o n t e x t u a l v a r i a b l e s upon a l t r u i s t i c b e h a v i o u r . Not on ly are there a t t i t u d i n a l a p p r o a c h e s 2 , but a myriad of e x p e r i m e n t a l ones as w e l l . 3 The problems of i n f e r r i n g behav iour from a t t i t u d i n a l measures are w e l l known. I n d i v i d u a l s may o f ten i n d i c a t e a l t r u i s t i c i n t e n t i o n s on an a t t i t u d i n a l measure but ac t d i f f e r e n t l y when c o n f r o n t e d wi th an o p p o r t u n i t y to behave a l t r u i s t i c a l l y . There i s no b e t t e r i l l u s t r a t i o n of the gap between i n t e n t i o n and a c t i o n than S t a n l e y M i l g r a m ' s r e v e a l i n g e x p e r i m e n t s . " E x p e r i m e n t a l approaches have u s u a l l y s a c r i f i c e d g e n e r a l i z a b i l i t y for s p e c i f i c i t y . For example, i t i s not c l e a r how much one can assume about the everyday behaviour of a male m o t o r i s t who s t o p s , or does not s top on a freeway to a i d a 210 female whose car has a f l a t t i r e . 5 The ones who do s top may do so for o ther than a l t r u i s t i c r e a s o n s . Sexism and p a t e r n a l i s m are two a l t e r n a t i v e e x p l a n a t i o n s , but there are a l s o p o t e n t i a l e t h i c a l c o m p l i c a t i o n s . Moreover , many of these e x p e r i m e n t a l s i t u a t i o n s t e s t the w i l l i n g n e s s of i n d i v i d u a l s to g i v e a i d to o t h e r s i n some n e e d f u l or d i s t r e s s i n g s i t u a t i o n . Such s i t u a t i o n s produce emot iona l or empathic a r o u s a l in i n d i v i d u a l s which we would expect to be l a c k i n g i n p o l i t i c a l s i t u a t i o n s such as the case of the p r o v i s i o n of p u b l i c goods. In these i n s t a n c e s , there w i l l be no e a s i l y i d e n t i f i e d i n d i v i d u a l towards whom benevolence can be d i r e c t e d , or whose need can awaken sympathy or empathy in the g i v e r . Whi le what one can i n f e r from s p e c i f i c s t u d i e s of a l t r u i s m i s o f t e n l i m i t e d , that i s not to say that the range of v a r i a b l e s examined i s s i m i l a r l y l i m i t e d . Exper iments have encompassed the e f f e c t s of s i t u a t i o n a l f a c t o r s such as : p o s i t i v e and n e g a t i v e a f f e c t i v e s t a t e s of the a l t r u i s t ; s t a t e s induced by the o b s e r v a t i o n of- models; i n f o r m a t i o n about a p p r o p r i a t e n e s s ; and i n f o r m a t i o n about consequences of a l t r u i s m . The f i n d i n g s of these s t u d i e s are r a r e l y r e p l i c a t e d or p u r s u e d . T h i s u n d e r l i n e s one r e a l advantage of i n v e s t i g a t i n g a l t r u i s m wi th gaming t e c h n i q u e s : the exper iments can be e a s i l y r e p l i c a t e d and are r e l a t i v e l y f ree from exper imenter e f f e c t s . S o c i a l p s y c h o l o g i s t s have a l s o i n v e s t i g a t e d the q u e s t i o n of an a l t r u i s t i c p e r s o n a l i t y . Both K r e b s 6 and S c h w a r t z 7 are d o u b t f u l of the m e r i t of such s t u d i e s . 8 Schwartz w r i t e s tha t the 21 1 data from one such study "impels one to conc lude that the e f f e c t s of person v a r i a b l e s on h e l p i n g depend upon the p r e c i s e mesh between the nature of the s i t u a t i o n , the p e r s o n , and the h e l p r e q u i r e d . " 9 O b v i o u s l y , f or our purposes t h i s r e s e a r c h has l i m i t e d u s e f u l n e s s . Even were i t e s t a b l i s h e d tha t say, 20 percent of the p o p u l a t i o n possessed a l t r u i s t i c p e r s o n a l i t i e s , we c o u l d not conc lude that p u b l i c goods would not t h e r e f o r e be p r o v i d e d in the absence of c o e r c i o n , f or t h i s f i g u r e would be s i t u a t i o n a l l y dependent . A l t r u i s m has a l s o been d i s c u s s e d as a s o c i a l norm a c t i v a t e d by p a r t i c u l a r s i t u a t i o n s . These norms are s o c i o l o g i s t s ' i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s of moral o b l i g a t i o n s which s h o u l d govern our behaviour w i t h re spec t to o t h e r s . But moral o b l i g a t i o n s do not always extend t o , or are u n c l e a r in d e s c r i b i n g our d u t i e s towards a l l o t h e r s . For example, in G a r r e t t H a r d i n ' s . 1 0 a l l e g o r y on the d e s t r u c t i o n of the commons, i s the farmer who e x p l o i t s the common p a s t u r e to i t s r u i n by p l a c i n g more c a t t l e on i t than g r a z i n g l i m i t s a l l o w be ing immoral? Or i s the farmer who r e s i s t s c o n t r i b u t i n g to the r u i n be ing a l t r u i s t i c ? Or do we even t h i n k of the q u e s t i o n in these terms? But i t i s in these s i t u a t i o n s , e i t h e r the p r o v i s i o n of a p u b l i c good (the manitenance of the common), or the c u r t a i l m e n t of a p u b l i c bad (the r u i n of the common), i n which we are i n t e r e s t e d in o b s e r v i n g the e f f e c t i v e n e s s of a l t r u i s m . 212 7.2 Time And A l t r u i s m . The d i s c u s s i o n of a l t r u i s m throughout these c h a p t e r s has l a r g e l y i g n o r e d the e f f e c t s of t ime . In m o d e l - b u i l d i n g p a r l a n c e , our treatment of the s u b j e c t has been a s t a t i c one. What happens to an a l t r u i s t i c r e l a t i o n s h i p w i t h the passage of t ime? Does the a l t r u i s t i c behav iour of one i n d i v i d u a l or group in one s i t u a t i o n spread to o t h e r s in the same s i t u a t i o n as suggested by T i t m u s s ' c o n t a g i o n t h e s i s ? Does the a l t r u i s t i c behav iour of one i n d i v i d u a l or group in one s i t u a t i o n i n f e c t the behav iour of the same i n d i v i d u a l or i n d i v i d u a l s in o ther s i t u a t i o n s ? L a c k i n g e v i d e n c e , we can o n l y suggest p l a u s i b l e answers to these q u e s t i o n s . Over a long p e r i o d of t i m e , one would expect a r e l a t i o n s h i p which began wi th an a l t r u i s t i c ge s ture and c o n t i n u e d in the same form to d e v e l o p n o r m - l i k e q u a l i t i e s . As a l t r u i s m becomes a r e g u l a r f e a t u r e of the r e l a t i o n s h i p so i t becomes more d i f f i c u l t to e n d . The a l t r u i s t becomes more f a m i l i a r w i t h the r e c i p i e n t , h i s or her behav iour becomes h a b i t u a l , and g u i l t y f e e l i n g s d e v e l o p at the thought of ending the unequal exchange. Long a f t e r the a l t r u i s t i c sent iment which prompted the o r i g i n a l ac t has f a d e d , such a r e l a t i o n s h i p may c o n t i n u e prompted by the norms of behav iour b u i l t up over the p e r i o d and g u i l t at ending i t . T i t m u s s ' c o n t a g i o n t h e s i s i m p l i e s that i n d i v i d u a l s not o n l y take i n t o account the e f f e c t s of the r e c i p i e n t s ' w e l f a r e upon t h e i r own, but the e f f e c t s of o t h e r a l t r u i s t s ' a c t i o n s as w e l l . 213 If the example of another be ing a l t r u i s t i c can i n f l u e n c e me to be a l t r u i s t i c , i t must a f f e c t how I p e r c e i v e or g i v e weight to the s e v e r a l m o t i v a t i o n a l i n f l u e n c e s on my behaviour in any g iven s i t u a t i o n . T h i s of course makes any a p p r e c i a t i o n of a l t r u i s t i c behav iour enormously more c o m p l i c a t e d by i n t r o d u c i n g weights on the v a r i o u s p r e s s u r e s i n c l u d e d in the c o n f i g u r a t i o n of any s i t u a t i o n . Presumably , these weights w i l l vary a c c o r d i n g to s e v e r a l c r i t e r i a such a s , the anonymity of b e h a v i o u r , how many o t h e r s are observed a c t i n g a l t r u i s t i c a l l y , how much i n f l u e n c e these o thers have upon me, and so on . A l l of these f a c t o r s would have to be taken i n t o account i n t e s t i n g such a t h e s i s . I f I am a l t r u i s t i c in one s i t u a t i o n w i l l i t i n c r e a s e the l i k e l i h o o d of my being a l t r u i s t i c in another at another time? T h i s q u e s t i o n i s e q u a l l y d i f f i c u l t to r e s o l v e . On the b a s i s of the d i s c u s s i o n of p r e v i o u s c h a p t e r s , the answer would seem to be no. I f I g i v e precedence to a l t r u i s m over c o m p e t i t i v e advantage in one s i t u a t i o n , i t does not mean t h a t I w i l l g i v e precedence to i t over Pare to o p t i m a l i t y in a n o t h e r . O r , as many of the s u b j e c t s who p a r t i c i p a t e d in our exper iments showed, s e l f -i n t e r e s t w i l l not always dominate c o m p e t i t i o n or even a l t r u i s t i c m o t i v e s . Much w i l l depend upon the arrangement , presence or absence , and p o s s i b l y s t r e n g t h of the o ther m o t i v a t i o n s . 214 7.3 A l t r u i s m And Government. What are the i m p l i c a t i o n s of the f i n d i n g s of these experiments for government p o l i c y ? We need to b a c k t r a c k somewhat to answer the q u e s t i o n . The core of T i t m u s s ' argument i s that s e l f - i n t e r e s t d i m i n i s h e s the l i k e l i h o o d of a l t r u i s m be ing an- e f f e c t i v e m o t i v a t i o n to a c t i o n . Where a s e l f - i n t e r e s t e d course of a c t i o n i s p o s s i b l e , i t w i l l n e a r l y always be chosen over an a l t r u i s t i c one. T h i s m o t i v a t i o n a l " f l i p - f l o p " argument i s a l s o put forward by Robert G o o d i n . 1 1 He suggests that moral i n c e n t i v e s can only be u s e f u l i f they are " s e r i o u s l y " h e l d . But even though they are s e r i o u s l y h e l d , they w i l l s t i l l be s e n s i t i v e to c o n t a m i n a t i o n by baser m a t e r i a l i s t i c m o t i v e s : I f o ther ( e . g . , e g o i s t i c ) c o n s i d e r a t i o n s are in p l a y at a l l , then the o p p o r t u n i t y for t a k i n g a moral s tand i s l o s t : where a l l mot ives mix, the formal d i s t i n c t i o n s a s s o c i a t e d wi th t a k i n g morals s e r i o u s l y must be m i s s i n g . Far from always p r e v a i l i n g over more mundane m o t i v e s , as a l e x i c o g r a p h i c a l o r d e r i n g would sugges t , then , moral p r i n c i p l e s drop out of c o n s i d e r a t i o n a l l toge ther . . . when more o r d i n a r y mot ives are i n v o k e d . 1 2 The i m p l i c a t i o n of t h i s argument for the des ign of p o l i c i e s in tended to take advantage of moral i n c e n t i v e s a r e , Goodin w r i t e s , that i f "we are r e a l l y to take advantage of s e r i o u s l y -h e l d moral p r i n c i p l e s for enforcement of s o c i a l p o l i c i e s , t h e n , we must de s ign our schemes in such a way as to a v o i d t h i s p o l l u t i o n and the m o t i v a t i o n a l f l i p - f l o p i t e n t a i l s . " 1 3 T h i s r e s t r i c t e d view of the u s e f u l n e s s of moral i n c e n t i v e s , or a l t r u i s m , tha t mat ters i n which they may be e f f e c t i v e must be 215 s t r i c t l y p a r t i t i o n e d ' o f f from more mundane and by i m p l i c a t i o n , s e l f - i n t e r e s t e d concerns i s not supported by the exper iments in Chapter S i x . Here i t was found that a l t r u i s m in i t s s e v e r a l forms, d i d have a s i g n i f i c a n t e f f e c t upon the c h o i c e of the s u b j e c t s even though other motives were p r e s e n t . Moreover , i t has been argued throughout that the presence or absence of c e r t a i n m o t i v a t i o n s i s not as important for c h o i c e as i s the p e c u l i a r c o n f i g u r a t i o n of these m o t i v e s . G o o d i n ' s argument i s a r e a c t i o n to "the most p o p u l a r approaches to s o c i a l e n g i n e e r i n g from Hume's t ime t o w a r d . " 1 " T h i s argument, e x e m p l i f i e d in Hume's a d v i c e , ' d e s i g n i n s t i t u t i o n s for k n a v e s ' , contends that moral or a l t r u i s t i c i n c e n t i v e s can e x i s t s i d e - b y - s i d e wi th s e l f - i n t e r e s t e d ones wi thout debas ing them. Frances Hutcheson , a contemporary of Hume's, s u p p o r t e d t h i s p o s i t i o n : As a l l men have s e l f - l o v e , as w e l l as benevo lence , these two p r i n c i p l e s may j o i n t l y e x c i t e a man to the same a c t i o n ; and then they are c o n s i d e r e d as two f o r c e s i m p e l l i n g the same body to mot ion; sometimes they c o n s p i r e , sometimes are i n d i f f e r e n t to each o t h e r , and sometimes are i n some degree o p p o s i t e . Thus , i f a man have such s t r o n g b e n e v o l e n c e , as would have produced an a c t i o n wi thout any views of s e l f -i n t e r e s t ; that such a man has a l s o i n view p r i v a t e advantage , a long wi th p u b l i c good, as the e f f e c t of t h i s a c t i o n does no way d i m i n i s h the benevolence of the a c t i o n . 1 5 Both of these approaches to s o c i a l e n g i n e e r i n g o v e r l o o k important p o i n t s that have been noted throughout the p r e v i o u s c h a p t e r s . The view that benevolence and s e l f - i n t e r e s t can c o e x i s t wi thout i n t e r f e r e n c e , and that s o c i a l i n s t i t u t i o n s s h o u l d t h e r e f o r e be c o n s t r u c t e d to c o e r c e the few who by n a t u r e have a preponderance of s e l f - l o v e , o v e r l o o k s the i m p l i c a t i o n s 2 1 6 suggested by T a y l o r and K r o p o t k i n . They can agree wi th t h i s argument to the extent that s e l f - i n t e r e s t need not dominate benevo lence . But the c r u c i a l p o i n t i s the recommendation of c o e r c i v e measures for the few who l a c k benevolence a l t o g t h e r . These measures do not a f f e c t the benevolence of the m a j o r i t y d i r e c t l y but i n d i r e c t l y , by r e s t r i c t i n g the o p p o r t u n i t i e s for the e x e r c i s e of such b e h a v i o u r . So p o s s i b l y , the e f f e c t of such s o c i a l e n g i n e e r i n g w i l l be as Goodin has d e s c r i b e d , though working through a d i f f e r e n t process than he has sugges t ed . The o ther c o n t e n d i n g recommendation for the e n g i n e e r i n g of s o c i a l i n s t i t u t i o n s proposes tha t moral i n c e n t i v e s w i l l on ly be e f f e c t i v e where the domain of t h e i r r e l e v a n c e i s s t r i c t l y p a r t i t i o n e d o f f or " s a n i t i z e d " of the p o l l u t i n g e f f e c t of the baser e g o i s t i c m o t i v e s . T h i s recommendation has shortcomings as w e l l . F i r s t , i f s e r i o u s l y h e l d moral i n c e n t i v e s can o n l y be e f f e c t i v e in such a " d e s e n s i t i z e d " env ironment , one must q e s t i o n the meaning of " s e r i o u s l y h e l d " . I f such m o t i v a t i o n s cannot be e f f e c t i v e when faced w i t h the s l i g h t e s t o p p o s i t i o n from s e l f -i n t e r e s t , then they are u n l i k e l y to be r e l e v a n t in many s i t u a t i o n s . R e c a l l that in Chapter Two, we u n d e r l i n e d how d i f f i c u l t i t was to ensure that a l t r u i s t i c b e h a v i o u r was not m o t i v a t e d by s e l f - i n t e r e s t . I t w i l l almost always be p o s s i b l e for an o b s e r v e r to a t t r i b u t e some s e l f - i n t e r e s t e d mot ive to any a p p a r e n t l y a l t r u i s t i c a c t . More important i s t h a t the moral i n c e n t i v e s and e x h o r t a t i o n s to a l t r u i s t i c a c t i o n o n l y have power i n s o f a r as they are a b l e to overcome s e l f - i n t e r e s t . T h i s i s the assumption upon which they are o p t i m i s t i c a l l y i n v o k e d . But i f 2 1 7 moral i n c e n t i v e s app ly o n l y to sympathet ic s i t u a t i o n s , then they have l i t t l e i n f l u e n c e and cannot be expected to be e f f e c t i v e in environments of c o n t e n d i n g m o t i v a t i o n s such as the p r o v i s i o n of p u b l i c goods . The p r e v i o u s c h a p t e r s have taken the p o s i t i o n that n e i t h e r of these recommendations about the arrangement of s o c i a l i n s t i t u t i o n s i s a p p r o p r i a t e . Both are too r e s t r i c t e d and u n c o m p l i c a t e d . They are r e s t r i c t i v e because they e i t h e r c o m p a r t m e n t a l i z e m o t i v a t i o n s or remove o p p o r t u n i t i e s for the m a n i f e s t a t i o n of them. They are uncompl i ca ted because they o v e r l o o k the presence o f , and c o m p e t i t i o n between m o t i v a t i o n s in many of the s i t u a t i o n s i n which a l t r u i s m may be p o s s i b l e . T h i s paper has a r g u e d , and to a degree s u b s t a n t i a t e d the t h e s i s that a l t r u i s m i s at l e a s t i n p a r t a f u n c t i o n of s i t u a t i o n and of the c o n f i g u r a t i o n of m o t i v a t i o n s which are c o n t a i n e d in i t . As the exper iments showed, we cannot say that s e l f - i n t e r e s t where present w i l l always be p r e f e r r e d to a l t r u i s m . T h i s w i l l depend upon how naked i s the s e l f - i n t e r e s t , how r e l e v a n t are e t h i c a l norms to a p a r t i c u l a r s i t u a t i o n , the presence of c o m p e t i t i v e i n c e n t i v e s , the e x i s t e n c e of c o l l e c t i v e s t r a t e g i e s , the r e l a t i v e s t r e n g t h of a l l these m o t i v a t i o n s , and so on . 7.4 C o n c l u s i o n The p r e c e d i n g c h a p t e r s have addressed p r o g r e s s i v e l y l e s s g e n e r a l q u e s t i o n s . Chapter One set the most g e n e r a l of q u e s t i o n s : whether a l t r u i s m c o u l d be a f f e c t i v e i n the p r o v i s i o n 218 of p u b l i c goods. No c o n c l u s i v e answer can be g iven to t h i s q u e s t i o n , for as c h a p t e r s Two and Three emphasized, much w i l l depend upon the nature of the good, the c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s of those who may p o t e n t i a l l y p r o v i d e i t , t h e i r views as to i t s importance , the presence or absence of o ther m o t i v a t i o n s which may c o n f l i c t w i t h the a l t r u i s m r e q u i r e d in the p r o v i s i o n of the good, and so on The l a t e r c h a p t e r s c o n c e n t r a t e d on d e v i s i n g a s u i t a b l e method for t e s t i n g i n d i v i d u a l s ' w i l l i n g n e s s to behave a l t r u i s t i c a l l y under d i f f e r e n t s e t s of m o t i v a t i o n s . H e r e , w i th the use of s imple games i t was found that the m a n i f e s t a t i o n of a l t r u i s m may a c t u a l l y be l i m i t e d by c e r t a i n c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s of a s i t u a t i o n . The subsequent c h a p t e r s pursued one s p e c i f i c element of s i t u a t i o n ; the c o n f i g u r a t i o n of m o t i v a t i o n a l p r e s s u r e s . Here i t was .found that across a wide range of d i f f e r e n t m o t i v a t i o n a l c o n f i g u r a t i o n s r e p r e s e n t e d aga in by games, a l t r u i s m was a s i g n i f i c a n t m o t i v a t i o n i n the s u b j e c t s ' c h o i c e s . These games r e p r e s e n t e d a severe t e s t of the s u b j e c t s ' w i l l i n g n e s s to behave a l t r u i s t i c a l l y : they had a c o m p e t i t i v e i n c e n t i v e b u i l t in to the game s i t u a t i o n , t h e i r behav iour was anonymous, the b e n e f i c i a r y of any p o t e n t i a l a l t r u i s m was not f u l l y s p e c i f i e d , and the s i t u a t i o n was not one where need was obv ious or empathy a r o u s e d . Under these c o n d i t i o n s , i t i s s u r p r i s i n g that any benevolence was f o r t h c o m i n g . The f i r s t chapter jux taposed two views of human n a t u r e : those of the l i b e r a l t h e o r i s t s , who viewed man's benevolence i n p u b l i c l i f e as be ing extremely l i m i t e d , and those who for 2 1 9 v a r i o u s r e a s o n s , e i t h e r out of i d e a l i s t i c u t o p i a n i s m or m i l l e n a r i a n b e l i e f s , saw human nature as be ing capab le of a l t r u i s m i n even these s i t u a t i o n s . The debate i s r e a l l y u n r e s o l v a b l e and p r o b a b l y unimportant for our purposes , f or the s i g n i f i c a n c e l i e s not i n the views of such an i l l - d e f i n e d concept as human n a t u r e but in the recommendations which flow from a g i v e n a s s u m p t i o n . I f i t i s assumed that i n d i v i d u a l s w i l l not v o l u n t a r i l y c o n t r i b u t e towards the w e l f a r e of o thers and of s o c i e t y as a whole , then there w i l l be l i t t l e g a i n in m a i n t a i n i n g such o p p o r t u n i t i e s . Of course t h i s argument i s c o m p l e t e l y s e l f - f u l f i l l i n g : i f i t i s assumed that people cannot be a l t r u i s t i c , then t h e r e i s no reason to g ive them the o p p o r t u n i t y . But i f there are no o p p o r t u n i t i e s to be a l t r u i s t i c , then i t w i l l c e r t a i n l y be i m p o s s i b l e to mani fes t the b e h a v i o u r . U n f o r t u n a t e l y , t h i s l eaves us at an impasse . Whi le we have observed that some p u b l i c goods are p r o v i d e d by v o l u n t a r y a c t i o n and wi thout governmental c o e r c i o n , we cannot say for sure whether p u b l i c goods now p r o v i d e d by the s t a t e would be s u p p l i e d at a l l or i n s u f f i c i e n t q u a n t i t i e s to meet demand were the s t a t e to cease p r o v i d i n g them. We can however s p e c u l a t e that i f the s t a t e withdrew from the p r o v i s i o n of some p u b l i c goods, thus i n c r e a s i n g the scope f o r v o l u n t a r y p r o v i s i o n , a l t r u i s m might be an important m o t i v a t i o n i n t h e i r p r o v i s i o n . We have shown tha t i t can be s i g n i f i c a n t i n a b s t r a c t p o l i t i c a l s i t u a t i o n s . With the a d d i t i o n of r e a l c o l l e c t i v e i n c e n t i v e s , i t may become even more so . 220 N o t e s . 1 For examples , see: D a v i d C o l l a r d , A l t r u i s m and Economy.  A Study in N o n - S e l f i s h Economics (Oxford: M a r t i n R o b e r t s o n , 1978); Bruce B~. F i t z g e r a l d , " S e l f - I n t e r e s t or A l t r u i s m ? C o r r e c t i o n s and E x t e n s i o n s , " J o u r n a l of C o n f l i c t R e s o l u t i o n , v o l . 19 (1975) p p . 462-479; Norman F r o h l i c h , " S e l f - i n t e r e s t or A l t r u i s m , What D i f f e r e n c e ? " , J o u r n a l of C o n f l i c t R e s o l u t i o n , v o l . 18 (1974), p . 53-65; H . M. Hochman and J . D. Rodgers , " P a r e t o - O p t i m a l R e d i s t r i b u t i o n , " American Economic Review, v o l . 59 (1969), pp . 542-557; Edmund S. P h e l p s , e d . , A l t r u i s m ,  M o r a l i t y , and Economic T h e o r y , (New Y o r k : Sage F o u n d a t i o n , 1975); Lee P r e s t o n , " U t i l i t y I n t e r a c t i o n i n a Two-Person W o r l d , " J o u r n a l of C o n f l i c t R e s o l u t i o n , v o l . 5 (1961), pp . 354-365; S t e f a n V a l a v a n n i s , "The R e s o l u t i o n of C o n f l i c t When U t i l i t i e s I n t e r a c t , " J o u r n a l of C o n f l i c t R e s o l u t i o n , v o l . 2 (1958), pp . 156-169. 2 J . Sawyer, "The A l t r u i s m S c a l e : A Measure of C o o p e r a t i v e , I n d i v i d u a l i s t i c and C o m p e t i t i v e I n t e r p e r s o n a l O r i e n t a t i o n , " American J o u r n a l of S o c i o l o g y , v o l . 71 (1966), pp 407-416. 3 These a r e reviewed i n : Dennis L . K r e b s , " A l t r u i s m - an Examinat ion of the Concept and a Review of the L i t e r a t u r e " P s y c h o l o g i c a l B u l l e t i n , v o l . 73 (1970), p . 258-302; and , Shalom H . S c h w a r t z , "Normative I n f l u e n c e s on A l t r u i s m " , in L . B e r k o w i t z , e d . , Advances in E x p e r i m e n t a l S o c i a l P s y c h o l o g y , v o l . 10, (1977), pp . 221-280. " S t a n l e y M i l g r a m , Obedience to A u t h o r i t y , (New Y o r k : Harper and Row, 1975) 5 J . H . Bryan and M. A . T e s t , "Models and H e l p i n g : N a t u r a l i s t i c S t u d i e s i n A i d i n g B e h a v i o u r , " J o u r n a l of  P e r s o n a l i t y and S o c i a l P s y c h o l o g y , v o l . 6 (1967) pp . 400-407. 6 K r e b s , " A l t r u i s m - an Examinat ion of the C o n c e p t , " p . 296. 7 Schwartz , "Normative I n f l u e n c e s on A l t r u i s m " , p . 273. 8 E . S t a u b , " H e l p i n g a D i s t r e s s e d P e r s o n : S o c i a l , P e r s o n a l i t y , and S t i m u l u s D e t e r m i n a n t s , " i n L . B e r k o w i t z , e d . , 22 1 Advances i n E x p e r i m e n t a l and S o c i a l P s y c h o l o g y , v o l . 7 (1974), pp. 294-341. 9 Schwartz , "Normative I n f l u e n c e s on A l t r u i s m " , p . 273. 1 0 G a r r e t t H a r d i n , "The Tragedy of the Commons," Sc i e n c e , v o l . 162 (1968), pp.1243-1248. 1 1 Robert G o o d i n , "Making M o r a l I n c e n t i v e s Pay ," Po l i c y  S c i e n c e s , v o l . 1 2 (1980), pp . 131-145. 1 2 G o o d i n , "Making Mora l I n c e n t i v e s Pay ," p . 139. 1 3 G o o d i n , "Making Mora l I n c e n t i v e s Pay ," p . 140. 1 4 G o o d i n , "Making M o r a l I n c e n t i v e s Pay ," p . 140. 1 5 F r a n c e s Hutcheson, "An I n q u i r y Concern ing M o r a l Good and E v i l , " in D. D. R a p h a e l , e d . , B r i t i s h M o r a l i s t s , 1650-1800 v o l . 1. ( O x f o r d : C larendon p r e s s , 1969) , p~! 319. 222 BIBLIOGRAPHY A l e x a n d e r , R i c h a r d D. "The E v o l u t i o n of S o c i a l B e h a v i o u r . " Annual Review of E c o l o g y and S y s t e m i c s , v o l . 5 (1974), pp . 325-383. A l f a n o , G e r a l d i n e , and M a r w e l l , G e r a l d . "Experiments on the P r o v i s i o n of of P u b l i c Goods. I I I . N o n d i v i s i b i l i t y and Free R i d i n g in ' R e a l ' G r o u p s . " S o c i a l P s y c h o l o g i c a l  Q u a r t e r l y , v o l . 43 (1980), pp .300-309 . _ , -A l k e r , Hayward R. Mathematics and P o l i t i c s . New Y o r k : M a c m i l l a n , 1965. Arrow, Kenneth J . " G i f t s and Exchanges ." In Edmund S. P h e l p s , e d . , A l t r u i s m , M o r a l i t y and Economic T h e o r y . New York: Sage F o u n d a t i o n , 1975. A x e l r o d , R o b e r t . " E f f e c t i v e Choice in the P r i s o n e r ' s Dilemma." J o u r n a l of C o n f l i c t R e s o l u t i o n , v o l . 24 (1980), pp. 3-25. A x e l r o d , R o b e r t . "More E f f e c t i v e C h o i c e in the P r i s o n e r ' s Dilemma." J o u r n a l of C o n f l i c t R e s o l u t i o n , v o l . 24 (1980), pp . 379-403. A x e l r o d , R o b e r t . "The Emergence of C o o p e r a t i o n Among E g o i s t s . " American P o l i t i c a l S c i e n c e Review, v o l . 75 (1981), pp. 306-318. A x e l r o d , R o b e r t . The E v o l u t i o n of C o o p e r a t i o n . New Y o r k : B a s i c Books, 1984. A x e l r o d , R o b e r t , and H a m i l t o n , W i l l i a m D. "The E v o l u t i o n of C o o p e r a t i o n . " S c i e n c e , v o l . 211 (1981), pp . 1390-1396. B a n f i e l d , Edward C . The M o r a l B a s i s of a Backward S o c i e t y . New Y o r k : Free P r e s s , 1958. B a r - t a l , D a n i e l . P r o s o c i a l B e h a v i o u r : Theory and R e s e a r c h . Washington: Hemisphere P u b l i s h i n g , 1976. B a t s o n , C . D . ; Coke, J . S . ; J a s n o s k i , M. L . ; and Hanson, M. "Buying K i n d n e s s : E f f e c t of an E x t r i n s i c I n c e n t i v e for H e l p i n g on P e r c e i v e d A l t r u i s m . " P e r s o n a l i t y and S o c i a l  Psychology B u l l e t i n , v o l . 4 (1978) , pp . 86-91 . B e c k e r , G a r y . The Economic Approach to Human B e h a v i o u r . C h i c a g o : U n i v e r s i t y of Chicago P r e s s , 1976. B l a l o c k , Hubert M. C a u s a l I n f e r e n c e s i n Nonexper imental R e s e a r c h . Chapel H i l l : U n i v e r s i t y of North C a r o l i n a P r e s s , 1 961 . 223 Bohm, P e t e r . " E s t i m a t i n g Demand f o r P u b l i c Goods: An E x p e r i m e n t . " European Economic Review , v o l . 3 (1972), pp . 111-130. Boorman, S c o t t , and L e v i t t , Paul R. The G e n e t i c s of A l t r u i s m . New Y o r k : Academic P r e s s , 1980. Brams, Steven J . Game Theory and P o l i t i c s . New Y o r k : Free P r e s s , 1975. Brams, Steven J . , and H e s s e l , Marek P . , "Absorbing Outcomes i n 2 x 2 Games". B e h a v i o u r a l S c i e n c e . v o l . 27, (1982), pp . 383-401. Brams, Steven J . , and H e s s e l , Marek P. "Threat Power in S e q u e n t i a l Games." I n t e r n a t i o n a l S t u d i e s Q u a r t e r l y , v o l . 28 (1984), pp . 23-44. B r a i t h w a i t e , R. B . The Theory of Games as a T o o l for the M o r a l  P h i l o s o p h e r . Cambridge: Cambridge U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s , 1955. B r y a n , J . H . , and T e s t , M. A . "Models and H e l p i n g : N a t u r a l i s t i c S t u d i e s in A i d i n g Behaviour" J o u r n a l of  P e r s o n a l i t y and S o c i a l P s y c h o l o g y , v o l . 6 (1967) pp . 400-407. C h a m b e r l i n , John R. "The L o g i c of C o l l e c t i v e A c t i o n : Some E x p e r i m e n t a l R e s u l t s . " B e h a v i o u r a l S c i e n c e , v o l . 23 (1978), pp . 441-445. C o l l a r d , D a v i d . A l t r u i s m and Economy. A Study in N o n - S e l f i s h  Economics• O x f o r d : M a r t i n R o b e r t s o n , 1978. D a r l e y , J . M . , and L a t a n £ , B. "Bystander I n t e r v e n t i o n in Emergenc ie s : D i f f u s i o n of R e s p o n s i b i l i t y . " J o u r n a l of  P e r s o n a l i t y and S o c i a l P s y c h o l o g y , v o l . 8 (1968) , p . 377-383. Dawes, Robyn M . ; M c T a v i s h , Jeanne; and Shak lee , H a r r i e t . "Behav iour , Communication and Assumptions About Other P e o p l e ' s Behaviour i n a Commons Dilemma S i t u a t i o n . " J o u r n a l of P e r s o n a l i t y and S o c i a l Psycho logy , v o l . 35 (1977) , p p . 1 - 1 1 . Dawkins , R i c h a r d . The S e l f i s h Gene. London: G r a n a d a , 1978. Demsetz, H a r o l d . "The P r i v a t e P r o d u c t i o n of P u b l i c Goods ." J o u r n a l of Law and Economics , v o l . 13 (1970) , p . D r a p e r , Norman R. and S m i t h , H a r r y . A p p l i e d R e g r e s s i o n  A n a l y s i s . Second e d i t i o n . New Y o r k : W i l e y , 1981. F i s h k i n , James S. The L i m i t s of O b l i g a t i o n . New Haven: Y a l e U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s , 1979. F i t z g e r a l d , Bruce D. " S e l f - I n t e r e s t or A l t r u i s m ? C o r r e c t i o n s and E x t e n s i o n s . " J o u r n a l of C o n f l i c t R e s o l u t i o n , v o l . 19 (1975), pp . 462-479. F r o h l i c h , Norman.; Oppenheimer, Joe A . ; and Young, Oran R. P o l i t i c a l L e a d e r s h i p and C o l l e c t i v e Goods. P r i n c e t o n : P r i n c e t o n U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s , 1971. F r o h l i c h , Norman. " S e l f - i n t e r e s t or A l t r u i s m , What D i f f e r e n c e ? " J o u r n a l of C o n f l i c t R e s o l u t i o n , v o l . 18 (1974) , p . 55-73. 224 " R a t i o n a l C o o p e r a t i o n " Nous. v o l . 8 (1974), G a u t h i e r , D a v i d , pp . 53-65. G a u t h i e r , D a v i d , p . 195-221. "Coord inat i o n . " D i a l o g u e . v o l . 14 (1977), G o o d i n , Robert E . "Making M o r a l I n c e n t i v e s Pay ." Po l i c y  S c i e n c e s , v o l . 12 (1980) , pp . 131-145. Guttman, J o e l . "Can P o l i t i c a l E n t r e p r e n e u r s So lve the Free R i d e r Problem?" J o u r n a l of Economic Behaviour and  O r q a n i z a t ion , vol"! 3 (1982), pp . 357-66. Guyer , M e l v i n J . , and Hamburger, H e n r y . "A Note on 'A Taxonomy of 2 x 2 Games' ." G e n e r a l Systems, v o l . 1 3 (1968), pp . 205-209. H a m i l t o n , W i l l i a m D. "The G e n e t i c a l Theory of S o c i a l B e h a v i o u r . P a r t s I and I I . " J o u r n a l of T h e o r e t i c a l B i o l o g y , v o l . 7, (1964), pp . 1-16, 17-32 Hannan, M i c h a e l T . A g g r e g a t i o n and D i s a g g r e g a t i o n in S o c i o l o g y . L e x i n g t o n , M a s s . : L e x i n g t o n Books , 1971. H a r d i n , G a r r e t t . The L i m i t s of A l t r u i s m : an E c o l o g i s t ' s View of  S u r v i v a l . B loomington: Ind iana U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s , 1977. H a r d i n , G a r r e t t . "The Tragedy of the Commons," S c i e n c e , v o l . 162 (1968), pp.1243-1248. H a r d i n , R u s s s e l l . C o l l e c t i v e A c t i o n . B a l t i m o r e : Johns Hopkins U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s , 1982. H a r s a n y i , John C . " R a t i o n a l Models of P o l i t i c a l Behav iour v s . F u n c t i o n a l and C o n f o r m i s t T h e o r i e s . " World P o l i t i c s , v o l . 21 (1969) , p . 513-538. Hawry l shyn , O l i . "The Economic Nature and V a l u e of V o l u n t e e r A c t i v i t y i n Canada ." S o c i a l I n d i c a t o r s R e s e a r c h , v o l . 5 (1978)> p p . 1 - 7 1 . Hirschman, A l b e r t 0. S h i f t i n g Involvements : P r i v a t e I n t e r e s t 225 and P u b l i c A c t i o n . P r i n c e t o n : P r i n c e t o n U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s , 1 982. Hobbes, Thomas. L e v i a t h a n . E d i t e d by C . B. Macpherson. London: Penguin Books, 1968. O r i g i n a l l y p u b l i s h e d 1651. Hochman, H . M . , and Rodgers , J . D . " P a r e t o - O p t i m a l R e d i s t r i b u t i o n . " American Economic Review, v o l . 59 (1969), pp . 542-557. Hume, D a v i d . A T r e a t i s e of Human N a t u r e . E d i t e d by L . A . S e l b y - B i g g e and P. H . N i d d i t c h . O x f o r d : Oxford U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s , 1978. O r i g i n a l l y p u b l i s h e d 1740. Hutcheson , F r a n c e s . "An I n q u i r y C o n c e r n i n g M o r a l Good and E v i l . " B r i t i s h M o r a l i s t s , 1650-1800 v o l . 1. E d i t e d by D. D. R a p h a e l . O x f o r d : C l a r e n d o n P r e s s , 1969. J o h n s t o n , J . Econometr ic Methods. New Y o r k : M c G r a w - H i l l 1963. Kolm, S e r g e - C h r i s t o p h e . " A l t r u i s m and E f f i c i e n c y . " E t h i c s , v o l . 94 (1983) , pp. 18-65. K o r t e , C . "Group E f f e c t s on H e l p - G i v i n g in an Emergency." P r o c e e d i n g of the 77th Annual Convent ion of the American  P s y c h o l o g i c a l A s s o c i a t i o n , v o l . 4 (1969), pp . 383-384. K r e b s , Dennis L . " A l t r u i s m : an Examinat ion of the Concept and a Review of the L i t e r a t u r e . " P s y c h o l o g i c a l B u l l e t i n , v o l . 73 (1970), pp . 258-302 K r o p t k i n , P e t e r . Mutual A i d : A F a c t o r of E v o l u t i o n . New Y o r k : New York U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s , 1972. O r i g i n a l l y p u b l i s h e d 1914. K u r z , M o r d e c a i . " A l t r u i s t i c E q u i l i b r i u m . " Economic P r o g r e s s ,  P r i v a t e V a l u e s , and P u b l i c P o l i c y . E d i t e d by Be la B e l a s s a and R i c h a r d N e l s o n . Amsterdam: N o r t h - H o l l a n d , 1977. pp . 177-200. K u r z , M o r d e c a i . " A l t r u i s m as an Outcome of S o c i a l I n t e r a c t i o n . " American Economic A s s o c i a t i o n . Papers and P r o c e e d i n g s , v o l . 9 0 (1978), pp .216-222 . L a v e r , M i c h a e l . The P o l i t i c s of P r i v a t e D e s i r e s . Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1981. Lendenmann, K a r l W. , and Rapopor t , A n a t o l . " D e c i s i o n P r e s s u r e s in 2 x 2 Games." B e h a v i o u r i a l Sc i ence , v o l . 25 (1980), pp . 107-119. L u c e , R. Duncan, and R a i f f a , Howard. Games and D e c i s i o n s . New Y o r k : W i l e y , 1957. 226 M a r c h , James G . "Bounded R a t i o n a l i t y , Ambigui ty and the E n g i n e e r i n g of C h o i c e . " B e l l J o u r n a l of Economics , v o l . 9 (1978), pp .587-607 . M a r g o l i s , Howard. S e l f i s h n e s s , A l t r u i s m and R a t i o n a l i t y . Cambridge: Cambridge U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s , 1982. M a r w e l l , G e r a l d , and Ames, Ruth E . "Experiments on the P r o v i s i o n of P u b l i c Goods. 1. Resources , I n t e r e s t , Group S i z e and the Free R i d e r P r o b l e m . " American J o u r n a l of  S o c i o l o g y , v o l . 84 (1979), pp . 1335-1360. M a r w e l l , G e r a l d , and Ames, Ruth E . "Experiments on the P r o v i s i o n of P u b l i c Goods. I I . P r o v i s i o n P o i n t s , S takes , E x p e r i e n c e and the Free R i d e r Prob lem." Amer ican J o u r n a l  of S o c i o l o g y , v o l . 85 (1980), pp.926-937 M a r w e l l , G e r a l d , and Ames, Ruth E . "Economists R i d e F r e e , Does Anyone E l s e ? Experiments on the P r o v i s i o n of P u b l i c Goods. I V . " J o u r n a l of P u b l i c Economics , v o l . 15 ( 1 981 ) , pp. 295-310. M c C l i n t o c k , C h a r l e s G . ; M e s s i c k , D a v i d M . ; Kuhlman, D a v i d M . ; and Campos, Frances T . " M o t i v a t i o n a l Bases of C h o i c e in T h r e e - C h o i c e Decomposed Games". J o u r n a l of E x p e r i m e n t a l  and S o c i a l Psycho logy . v o l . 9, (1973) pp . 572-590. M i l g r a m , S t a n l e y . Obedience to A u t h o r i t y . New Y o r k : Harper and Row, 1975. Moe, T e r r y M. The O r g a n i z a t i o n of I n t e r e s t s . C h i c a g o : U n i v e r s i t y of Chicago P r e s s , 1980. More, Thomas. U t o p i a . Cambridge: Cambrige U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s , 1956. O r i g i n a l l y p u b l i s h e d 1516. M u e l l e r , Dennis C . P u b l i c C h o i c e . , Cambridge: Cambridge U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s , 1979. N a g e l , Thomas. The P o s s i b i l i t y of A l t r u i s m . O x f o r d : Oxford U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s , 1970. N o z i c k , R o b e r t . Anarchy , S t a t e and U t o p i a . New Y o r k : B a s i c Books, 1974. O b l e r , J e f f r e y . " P r i v a t e G i v i n g i n the Wel fare S t a t e . " The B r i t i s h J o u r n a l of P o l i t i c a l S c i e n c e , v o l . 11 (1981) , p . 17-48. O l s o n , Mancur . The L o g i c of C o l l e c t i v e A c t i o n . P u b l i c Goods  and the Theory of G r o u p s . Cambridge , M a s s . : H a r v a r d U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s , 1965. P a r e t o , V i l f r e d o . The Mind and S o c i e t y . New Y o r k : H a r c o u r t , 227 B r a c e , 1935. P h e l p s , Edmund S . , e d i t o r . A l t r u i s m , M o r a l i t y , and Economic  T h e o r y . New Y o r k : Sage F o u n d a t i o n , 1975. P r e s t o n , L e e . " U t i l i t y I n t e r a c t i o n in a Two-Person W o r l d . " J o u r n a l of C o n f l i c t R e s o l u t i o n , v o l . 5 (1961), pp . 354-365. R a p o p o r t , A n a t o l . F i g h t s , Games and D e b a t e s . Ann A r b o r : U n i v e r s i t y of M i c h i g a n P r e s s , 1960. R a p o p o r t , A n a t o l , and Chammah, A l b e r t M. P r i s o n e r ' s Dilemma: A  Study in C o n f l i c t and C o o p e r a t i o n . Ann A r b o r : U n i v e r s i t y of M i c h i g a n P r e s s , 1965. R a p o p o r t , A n a t o l ; Guyer , M e i v i n J . ; a n d G o r d o n , Dav id G . The 2 x  2 Game. Ann A r b o u r : M i c h i g a n U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s , 1976. R a p o p o r t , A n a t o l , and Guyer , M e i v i n J . "A Taxonomy of 2 x 2 Games." G e n e r a l Systems , v o l . 11 (1966) , pp . 203-214. R i k e r , W i l l i a m H . " B a r g a i n i n g in a Three Person Game." American J o u r n a l of P o l i t i c a l S c i e n c e , v o l . 61 (1967), pp. 642-56. R i k e r , W i l l i a m H . , and Z a v o i n a , W i l l i a m J . " R a t i o n a l Behaviour in P o l i t i c s : Ev idence from a Three Person Game", in Jean A . Laponce and Paul Smoker ( e d s ) . E x p e r i m e n t a t i o n and  S i m u l a t i o n in P o l i t i c a l S c i e n c e . T o r o n t o : U n i v e r s i t y of T o r o n t o P r e s s , 1972. pp . 132-161. R o b i n s o n , W. S. " E c o l o g i c a l C o r r e l a t i o n s and the Behaviour of I n d i v i d u a l s . " American S o c i o l o g i c a l Review, v o l . 15 (1950) , pp351-357. S a h l i n s , M a r s h a l l . The Use and Abuse of B i o l o g y . An A n t h r o p o l o g i c a l C r i t i q u e of S o c i o b i o l o g y . Ann A r b o r : U n i v e r s i t y of M i c h i g a n P r e s s , 1976. Samuelson, P a u l A . "The Pure Theory of P u b l i c E x p e n d i t u r e . " Review of Economics and S t a t i s t i c s , v o l . 36 (1954) , pp . 387-389. Sawyer, J . "The A l t r u i s m S c a l e : A Measure of C o o p e r a t i v e , I n d i v i d u a l i s t i c , and C o m p e t i t i v e I n t e r p e r s o n a l O r i e n t a t i o n . " American J o u r n a l of S o c i o l o g y , v o l . 71 (1966) , pp 407-416. S c h e l l i n g , Thomas C . The S t r a t e g y of C o n f l i c t . Cambridge , M a s s . : H a r v a r d U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s , 1960. S c h n e i d e r , F r i e d r i c h , and Pommerehne, Werner W. " F r e e - R i d i n g and C o l l e c t i v e A c t i o n : an Experiment i n M i c r o e c o n o m i c s . " 228 Q u a r t e r l y J o u r n a l of Economics , v o l . 9 6 (1981), pp . 689-704. S c h o t t e r , Andrew. "Review of S e l f i s h n e s s , A l t r u i s m , and R a t i o n a l i t y . " J o u r n a l of Economic L i t e r a t u r e , v o l . 21 (1983), p . 556-558. Schwartz , Shalom H . "Normative I n f l u e n c e s on A l t r u i s m . " Advances in E x p e r i m e n t a l S o c i a l P s y c h o l o g y , v o l . 10, (1977), pp . 221-280. Sen, Amartya K. " R a t i o n a l F o o l s : A C r i t i q u e of the B e h a v i o u r a l F o u n d a t i o n s of Economic T h e o r y . " P h i l o s o p h y and P u b l i c  A f f a i r s , v o l . 6 (1977), pp. 317-344. Shubik , M a r t i n . E d i t o r . Game Theory and R e l a t e d Approaches to  S o c i a l B e h a v i o u r . New York: W i l e y , 1964. Shubik , M a r t i n . "Game T h e o r y , B e h a v i o u r , and the Paradox of the P r i s o n e r ' s Dilemma: Three S o l u t i o n s " , J o u r n a l of C o n f l i c t  R e s o l u t i o n , v o l . 1 4 (1970), p . 181-194. S m i t h , Adam. The Theory of Mora l S e n t i m e n t s . New Y o r k : Augustus M. K e l l y , 1966. O r i g i n a l l y p u b l i s h e d 1759. Smi th , Adam. The Wealth of N a t i o n s . E d i t e d by E . Cannan. New Y o r k : Modern L i b r a r y , 1937. O r i g i n a l l y p u b l i s h e d 1776. S n i d a l , Duncan. " P u b l i c Goods, P r o p e r t y R i g h t s , and P o l i t i c a l O r g a n i z a t i o n s . " I n t e r n a t i o n a l S t u d i e s Q u a r t e r l y , v o l . 2 3 (1979) , p . 532-566. Somit , A l b e r t 0. "Human Nature as the C e n t r a l Issue in P o l i t i c a l P h i l o s o p h y . " S o c i o b i o l o q y and Human P o l i t i c s . E d i t e d by E . W h i t e . L e x i n g t o n , M a s s . : L e x i n g t o n Books, D. C . H e a t h , 1981. S taub , E . "He lp ing a D i s t r e s s e d P e r s o n : S o c i a l , P e r s o n a l i t y , and S t i m u l u s D e t e r m i n a n t s , " in L . B e r k o w i t z , ed . Advances  in E x p e r i m e n t a l and S o c i a l P s y c h o l o g y , v o l . 7 (1974), pp . 294-341 . Sweeney, John W. "An E x p e r i m e n t a l I n v e s t i g a t i o n of the Free R i d e r P r o b l e m . " S o c i a l Sc i ence Research , v o l . 2 (1973), pp . 277-292. T a y l o r , M i c h a e l . Anarchy and C o o p e r a t i o n . London: W i l e y , 1976. T a y l o r , M i c h a e l . Community, Anarchy and L i b e r t y . Cambridge: Cambridge U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s , 1982. T i t m u s s , R i c h a r d . The G i f t R e l a t i o n s h i p : from Human Blood to  S o c i a l P o l i c y . London: A l l e n and Unwin, 1971. 229 T r i v e r s , Robert L . "The E v o l u t i o n of R e c i p r o c a l A l t r u i s m . " The  Q u a r t e r l y Review of B i o l o g y , v o l . 46 (1971), pp . 35-57 Urmson, J . O . "Saints and H e r o e s . " Essays in M o r a l P h i l o s o p h y . E d i t e by A . I . Melden . U n i v e r s i t y of Washington P r e s s , 1958. V a l a v a n n i s , S tephan . "The R e s o l u t i o n of C o n f l i c t When U t i l i t i e s I n t e r a c t . " J o u r n a l of C o n f l i c t R e s o l u t i o n , v o l . 2 (1958), pp . 156-169. Van de K r a g t , A. J . C ; O r b e l l , J . M . ; and Dawes, R. M. "The M i n i m a l C o n t r i b u t i n g Set as a S o l u t i o n to P u b l i c Goods Prob lems ." American J o u r n a l of P o l i t i c a l S c i e n c e , v o l . 77 (1983) , pp . 112-122. Wagner, R. H a r r i s o n . "The Theory of Games and the Problem of I n t e r n a t i o n a l C o o p e r a t i o n . " American P o l i t i c a l Sc i ence  Review, v o l . 77 (1983), pp . 330-346. W i l s o n , Edward 0. Soc i o b i o l o g y . The New S y n t h e s i s . Cambridge M a s s . : H a r v a r d U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s , 1975. W o l o z i n , H . "The Economic Role and Value of V o l u n t e e r Work in the U n i t e d S t a t e s . " J o u r n a l of V o l u n t a r y A c t i o n R e s e a r c h , v o l . 1-2 (1975), pp . 23-42. 230 APPENDIX A - TEXTS OF INSTRUCTIONS TO SUBJECTS. I n s t r u c t i o n s to S u b j e c t s for Exper iment One. You a r e b e i n g asked to take p a r t in an experiment about p e o p l e s ' a c t i o n s in p o l i t i c a l s i t u a t i o n s . These are s i t u a t i o n s in which r e w a r d s , r e s o u r c e s , or b e n e f i t s must be d i v i d e d a c c o r d i n g to some p r i n c i p l e . I w i l l r e f e r to these rewards as p a y o f f s . You may th ink of them as r e p r e s e n t i n g a n y t h i n g of v a l u e . You w i l l be r e q u i r e d to make d e c i s i o n s in a number of s imple yet i n t e r e s t i n g s i t u a t i o n s . Each d e c i s i o n problem r e q u i r e s t h a t you choose one of two a l t e r n a t i v e s . Some of your c las smates w i l l be choos ing between the two other a l t e r n a t i v e s in the same p r o b l e m . Your c h o i c e s w i l l be matched a g a i n s t another c l a s s m a t e ' s to determine th r e s u l t of your d e c i s i o n s and those of the e n t i r e c l a s s . An example of the problems you w i l l f i n d in the b o o k l e t i s g iven below: X Y 3 5 1 1 2 5 3 1 Some of you w i l l choose between ROWS A and B i n each of the problems w h i l e o t h e r s w i l l choose between COLUMNS X and Y in each of the same problems . As you can see, there are four s m a l l e r boxes or c e l l s w i t h i n the l a r g e r one. Each of these s m a l l e r c e l l s has two numbers in i t . The upper l e f t - h a n d c e l l has 5 and 3 i n i t , the upper r i g h t - h a n d c e l l , 1 and 1, and so on . The numbers i n the lower l e f t - h a n d corner of each c e l l , that i s 5, 1, 5, and 1 are the p o s s i b l e p a y o f f s f or a person choos ing between ROWS . The numbers i n the upper r i g h t - h a n d corner of each c e l l , 3, 1, 2, and 3, a re the p o s s i b l e p a y o f f s 231 for a person c h o o s i n g between COLUMNS . In each of the problems you must d e c i d e which of the two a l t e r n a t i v e s to choose . For example, i f you have been s e l e c t e d to choose between ROWS and have d e c i d e d in the problem above to choose B and the o ther person chose X , you would get 5, the p a y o f f in the lower l e f t - h a n d corner of that c e l l , and the o ther person would get 2, the payof f in the upper r i g h t - h a n d c o r n e r of the c e l l . O r , i f you chose A and the o ther person chose Y, you would get 1 and the o ther person would get 1. As shou ld be c l e a r , your f i n a l payof f depends p a r t l y upon how the o ther person chooses , so you w i l l p r o b a b l y want to c o n s i d e r how he or she might choose before making your f i n a l d e c i s i o n . On both s i d e s of the f o l l o w i n g pages you w i l l f i n d two unique d e c i s i o n problems . P l ease CIRCLE the a l t e r n a t i v e which you have chosen . The d e c i s i o n s are not a t e s t . There are no r i g h t or wrong answers . You w i l l be a b l e to t h i n k of s e v e r a l good reasons f o r your c h o i c e whatever i t maybe. I f you choose not to p a r t i c i p a t e or to withdraw at anyt ime from the exper iment , you cannot be p e n a l i z e d in any way. I f you complete the book le t i t w i l l be assumed tha t you have consented to p a r t i c i p a t e in the exper iment . P l e a s e do not p l a c e your name on the b o o k l e t . T h i s w i l l ensure that your c h o i c e s cannot be i d e n t i f i e d wi th you in any way. 232 I n s t r u c t i o n s to S u b j e c t s for Experiment 2. You are be ing asked to take p a r t in an experiment about how d i f f e r e n t k inds of people make d e c i s i o n s in p o l i t i c a l s i t u a t i o n s . By k inds of p e o p l e , I mean those who are s t u d y i n g d i f f e r e n t s u b j e c t s at u n i v e r s i t y . These p o l i t i c a l s i t u a t i o n s are ones in which rewards , r e s o u r c e s , or b e n e f i t s must be d i v i d e d a c c o r d i n g to some p r i n c i p l e . I w i l l r e f e r to. these rewards as p a y o f f s . You may t h i n k of them as r e p r e s e n t i n g a n y t h i n g of v a l u e . You w i l l be r e q u i r e d to make d e c i s i o n s in a number of s imple yet i n t e r e s t i n g s i t u a t i o n s . each d e c i s i o n problem r e q u i r e s that you choose one of two a l t e r n a t i v e s . Some of your c l a s s m a t e s w i l l be c h o o s i n g between the two other a l t e r n a t i v e s in the same prob lem. An example of the problems you w i l l f i n d in the b o o k l e t i s g iven below: X Y 3 5 1 1 2 5 3 1 Some of you w i l l choose between ROWS A and B in each of the problems wh i l e o t h e r s w i l l choose between COLUMNS X and Y in each of the same prob lems . As you can see, there are four s m a l l e r boxes or c e l l s w i t h i n the l a r g e r one. Each of these s m a l l e r c e l l s has two numbers in i t . The upper l e f t - h a n d c e l l has 5 and 3 in i t , the upper r i g h t - h a n d c e l l , 1 and 1, and so on . The numbers in the lower l e f t - h a n d c o r n e r of each c e l l , tha t i s 5, 1, 5, and 1 are the p o s s i b l e p a y o f f s for a person c h o o s i n g between ROWS . The numbers in the upper r i g h t - h a n d c o r n e r of each c e l l , 3, 1, 2, and 3, are the p o s s i b l e p a y o f f s for a person c h o o s i n g between COLUMNS . In each of the problems you must dec ide which of the two 233 a l t e r n a t i v e s to choose . For example, i f you have been s e l e c t e d to choose between ROWS and have dec ided in the problem above to choose B and the o ther person chooses X, you would get 5, the payof f i n the lower l e f t - h a n d c o r n e r of that c e l l , and the other person would get 2, the payof f in the upper r i g h t - h a n d c o r n e r of the c e l l . O r , i f you have been s e l e c t e d to choose between COLUMNS and d e c i d e to choose Y and the o ther person chooses A, you would get 1 and the o ther person would get 1 . As s h o u l d be c l e a r , your f i n a l payof f depends p a r t l y upon how the o ther person chooses , so you w i l l p r o b a b l y want to c o n s i d e r how he or she might choose be fore making your f i n a l d e c i s i o n . Your d e c i s i o n s in every problem w i l l be entered i n t o the computer and matched a g a i n s t those of h a l f of your c l a s s m a t e s who chose between the o ther two a l t e r n a t i v e s in the same prob lem. F i f t y percent of you w i l l choose between COLUMNS X and X in each problem and f i f t y percent w i l l choose between ROWS A and B in each p r o b l e m . For example, i f you have been s e l e c t e d to choose between ROWS A and B , your c h o i c e s w i l l be matched a g a i n s t each of your c la s smates who chose between COLUMNS X and Y . T h i s w i l l determine each p e r s o n ' s average score on the prob lems . The average c l a s s score w i l l then be compared wi th that from c l a s s e s in the E n g i n e e r i n g and A c c o u n t i n g departments to determine how s tudents in d i f f e r e n t c l a s s e s choose in the same problems . On both s i d e s of the f o l l o w i n g pages you w i l l f i n d two unique d e c i s i o n prob lems . P l ease CIRCLE the a l t e r n a t i v e which you have chosen . The d e c i s i o n s are not a t e s t . There are no r i g h t or wrong answers . You w i l l be a b l e to t h i n k of s e v e r a l good reasons for your c h o i c e whatever i t maybe. I f you choose not to p a r t i c i p a t e or to withdraw at anytime from the exper iment , you cannot be p e n a l i z e d in any way. I f you complete the b o o k l e t i t w i l l be assumed that you have consented to p a r t i c i p a t e i n the exper iment . P l ease do not p l a c e your name on the b o o k l e t . T h i s w i l l ensure tha t your c h o i c e s cannot be i d e n t i f i e d wi th you in any way. 234 APPENDIX B - RESULTS OF JACKNIFE PROCEDURE. R e s u l t s of J a c k n i f e Procedure on Experiment One. Game #1 Removed Game #2 Removed A l l Backward A l l Bac kward Var i a b l e s E l i m i n a t i o n Var i a b l e s E l i m i n a t ion c . 19 . 2 3 * C . 18 . 2 2 * ( . 9 5 ) ( 3 . 5 5 ) ( .91 ) ( 3 . 1 4 ) MX . 2 3 . 1 9* MX . 2 2 . 1 8 * ( 1 . 1 2 ) ( 2 . 0 5 ) ( 1 . 1 5 ) ( 2 . 3 2 ) PO - . 1 4 * - . 1 4 * PO - . 1 3 * - . 1 3 * ( - 2 . 7 1 ) ( - 2 . 9 4 ) ( - 2 . 9 6 ) ( - 3 . 1 1 ) B . 1 1 * . 1 1 * B . 1 1 * . 1 1 * ( 2 . 2 0 ) ( 2 . 3 1 ) ( 2 . 2 3 ) ( 2 . 2 9 ) CR - . 0 4 - CR - . 0 4 -( - . 2 2 ) ( - . 2 0 ) Con . 6 0 * . 6 1 * Con . 6 1 * . 6 2 * ( 1 2 . 6 0 ) ( 1 3 . 2 1 ) ( 1 6 . 3 3 ) ( 1 6 . 7 9 ) N=926 N=927 Game #3 Removed Game #4 Removed A l l Backward A l l Backward V a r i a b l e s E l i m i n a t ion Var i a b l e s E l i m i n a t ion C . 1 3 . 2 5 * C . 2 0 . 2 4 * ( . 6 8 ) ( 4 . 2 3 ) ( 1 . 0 1 ) ( 3 . 6 9 ) MX . 2 0 - MX . 2 6 . 2 1 * ( 1 . 0 3 ) ( 1 . 3 3 ) ( 2 . 6 1 ) PO - . 1 3 * - . 1 7 * PO - . 1 3 * - . 1 4 * ( - 3 . 0 4 ) ( - 4 . 8 2 ) ( - 3 . 1 6 ) ( - 3 . 3 5 ) B . 0 7 . 1 1 B . 1 1 * . 1 2 * ( 1 . 5 1 ) ( 2 . 3 9 ) ( 2 . 4 1 ) ( 2 . 4 9 ) CR - . 0 7 - CR - . 0 4 -( - . 4 0 ) ( - . 2 4 ) Con . 6 4 * . 6 9 * Con . 5 9 * . 5 9 * ( 1 6 . 6 7 ) ( 2 9 . 9 5 ) ( 1 5 . 0 0 ) ( 1 5 . 4 3 ) N=926 N=927 235 Game #5 Removed Game #6 Removed A l l Backward A l l Bac kward Var i a b l e s E l i m i n a t ion Var i a b l e s E l i m i n a t i o n c .20 - C .20 .24 (1.04) ( .80) (3 .53)* MX .21 .37 MX .22 . 1 9 (1.09) (5 .49)* ( .88) (2 .34)* _ , -PO - . 1 8 - . 1 5 PO - .14 - . 1 4 ( -3 .79)* ( -5 .38)* ( -3 .21)* ( -3 .31 )* B .09 - B . 1 1 . 1 1 ( 1 .80) (2 .33)* (2 .37)* CR .06 - CR - . 0 3 -( .33) ( - .13) Con .61 . 59 Con .61 .61 ( 16.97)* (19 .53)* (16.70)* (16 .96)* N=927 N = 928 Game #7 Removed Game #8 Removed A l l Backward A l l Bac kward Var i a b l e s E l i m i n a t i o n Var i a b l e s E l i m i n a t i o n c .19 .23 C .21 .22 ( .99) (3 .43)* (1.09) (3 .29)* MX .22 . 1 9 MX .22 . 22 (1.18) (2 .24)* (1.17) (2.71 )* PO - . 14 - . 1 4 PO - . 1 3 - . 1 3 ( -3 . 12)* ( -3 .23 )* ( -2 .98)* ( -3 .08 )* B . 1 1 . 1 1 B .09 .09 (2 .33)* (2 .39)* (1.94) (1 .97)* CR - . 0 3 - CR - . 0 0 -( - .19) ( - .02) Con .61 .61 Con .60 .60 (16 .68)* (17 .01)* (16 .65)* (17 .03)* N=926 N=927 236 Game #9 Removed Game #10 Removed A l l Bac kward A l l Bac kward Var i a b l e s E l i m i n a t i o n V a r i a b l e s E l i m i n a t i o n c .44 .48 C .20 .24 (1.89) (5 .53)* ( .80) (3 .53)* MX .09 - MX .22 .19 ( .45) ( .88) (2 .34)* PO - . 1 8 - . 22 PO - . 14 - . 14 ( -3 .73)* ( -6 .33)* ( -3 .21)* ( -3 .31)* B .21 .27 B . 1 1 . 1 1 (3 .03)* (4 .89)* (2 .33)* (2 .37)* CR .05 - CR - . 0 3 -( .28) ( - .13) Con .61 .65 Con .61 .61 (16.76)* (27.30)* (16.70)* (16 .96)* N=928 N=928 Game #11 Removed Game #12 Removed A l l Bac kward A l l Bac kward Var i a b l e s E l i m i n a t ion Var i a b l e s E l i m i n a t i o n C .21 .22 C . 1 3 .24 ( 1 .08) (3 .24)* ( .64) (3 .64)* MX .22 .22 MX .27 . 1 6 (1.18) (2 .55)* (1.36) (1 .97)* PO - . 1 3 - . 1 3 PO - . 1 3 - . 14 ( -2 .93)* ( -3 .00)* ( -3 .06)* ( -3 .35 )* B . 1 1 .11 B . 1 1 .12 -(2 .25)* (2 .27)* (2 .38)* (2 .51)* CR - . 0 0 - CR - .11 -( - .03) ( - .59) Con .60 .60 Con .60 .61 (16.61)* (16 .91)* (16.36)* (16 .93)* N=927 N=927 237 Game #13 Removed A l l Backward Var i a b l e s E l i m i n a t ion c .26 .33 (1.29) (5 .84)* MX . 1 3 -(.66) PO - . 1 9 - . 24 ( -3 .48)* ( -6 .36)* B . 1 7 .23 (2 .76)* (5 .03)* CR - . 02 -( .09) Con .63 .67 (15.55)* (29 .46)* N = 926 Game #14 Removed A l l Backward V a r i a b l e s E l i m i n a t i o n C .27 m 24 ( 1 . 31 ) (3. 63)* MX . 1 6 1 9 ( .83) (2. 37)* PO - . 16 1 5 (-3 .50)* ( -3 . 64)* B . 1 2 1 2 (2 .48)* (2. 50)* CR - . 03 -(- .14) Con . .62 62 (16 .61 )* (17. 16)* N= 926 Game #15 Removed A l l Backward V a r i a b l e s E l i m i nat ion c .06 — ( .29) MX .34 • .42 (1.66) (6 .73)* PO - . 0 9 -(-1.93) B .08 -( 1 .63) CR - . 1 5 - . 1 3 (- .76) ( -4 .55)* Con .58 .52 (14.58)* (20 .60)* N = 926 238 R e s u l t s of J a c k n i f e • P r o c e d u r e on Experiment Two. Game #1 Removed A l l Bac kward V a r i a b l e s E l i m i n a t ion c . 1 0 .07 ( .53) (2 .60)* MX .33 .38 (1.62) (5 .86)* PO - . 0 4 -( - .83) B .04 -( .79) CR - . 0 0 -( - .04) Con .53 .50 (11 .32)* (18.49)* N= 1 037 Game #2 Removed A l l Backward Var i a b l e s E l i m i n a t ion c . 19 — (.98) MX . 10 .28 ( .56) (4 .40)* PO - . 0 9 -( -2 .12)* B .07 -(1.50) CR .09 -( .49) Con .62 .59 (17 .00)* (22.12)* N = 1 036 Game #3 Removed A l l Backward V a r i a b l e s E l i m i n a t ion c . 1 3 .07 ( .71 ) (2 .40)* MX .08 -( .46) PO - . 0 9 - . 0 9 ( -2 .26 )* ( -3 .68)* B .03 -( .68) CR .04 -( .21 ) Con .65 .69 (17 .33)* (31.51)* N= 1 036 Game #4 Removed A l l Backward Var i a b l e s E l i m i n a t ion c .21 — (1.09) MX . 1 5 .29 (.79) (4 .14)* PO - . 1 0 - . 0 6 ( -2 .45)* ( -2 .63)* B .08 -( 1 .73) CR .07 -(.39) Con .60 .59 (15.53)* (18.35)* N= 1 036 2 3 9 Game #5 Removed Game #6 Removed A l l Backward Var i a b l e s E l i m i n a t ion c . 2 1 . 2 9 C ( 1 . 1 0 ) ( 4 . 2 7 ) * MX . 12 - MX ( . 6 4 ) PO - . 1 2 - . 10 PO ( - 2 . 7 0 ) * ( - 2 . 8 5 ) * B . 0 7 - B ( 1 . 4 0 ) CR . 12 . 3 0 CR ( . 6 7 ) ( 4 . 1 5 ) * Con . 6 1 . 6 1 Con ( 1 7 . 3 6 ) * ( 2 0 . 6 4 ) * N= 1 0 3 6 A l l Var i a b l e s . 02 ( . 0 7 ) . 3 1 (1 . 3 0 ) - . 1 0 ( - 2 . 5 1 ) * ( - 2 . 7 8 ) * . 0 8 ( 1 . 6 9 ) - . 1 1 ( - . 4 7 ) . 6 1 . 6 0 ( 1 7 . 2 6 ) * ( 2 0 . 4 9 ) * N=1036 Backward E l i m i n a t ion . 2 8 ( 4 . 3 8 ) * - . 0 7 Game #7 Removed A l l Var i a b l e s Bac kward E l i m i n a t ion Game #8 Removed A l l Var i a b l e s Backward E l i m i n a t ion C . 2 3 - C . 2 2 -( 1 . 1 9 ) ( 1 . 1 6 ) MX . 1 2 . 3 1 MX . 1 2 . 2 9 ( . 6 6 ) ( 4 . 4 7 ) * ( . 6 6 ) ( 4 . 4 2 ) * PO - . 0 9 - . 0 5 PO - . 1 0 - . 0 7 ( - 2 . 2 0 ) * ( - 1 . 9 0 ) * ( - 2 . 2 9 ) * ( - 2 . 8 0 ) * B . 0 7 - B . 0 6 -( 1 . 5 7 ) ( 1 . 3 5 ) CR . 1 1 - CR . 1 1 -( . 6 2 ) ( . 5 9 ) C o n . . 6 0 . 5 9 Con. . 6 1 . 6 0 ( 1 7 . 0 2 ) * ( 1 9 . 5 1 ) * ( 1 7 . 1 2 ) * ( 2 0 . 5 2 ) * N= 1 0 3 6 N= 1 0 3 6 240 Game #9 Removed A l l Backward V a r i a b l e s E l i m i n a t ion c . 33 . 39 ( 1 .45) (4 .28)* MX . 06 -( .28) PO - . 1 2 - . 1 3 ( - 2 . 6 8 ) * ( -3 .39 )* B . 1 3 . 1 4 (1 .87) (2 .31)* CR . 1 2 . 1 7 ( .67) (2 .29)* Con .61 . 62 (17 .19)* (19 .96)* N = 1 036 Game #11 Removed A l l Bac kward V a r i a b l e s E l i m i n a t ion C . 1 9 . 26 ( 1 .00) (3 .84)* • MX . 1 2 -( .65) PO - .11 - . 0 7 ( - 2 . 6 5 ) * ( -2 .60 )* B .08 -( 1 .78) CR .05 -( .25) Con .61 . 60 (17 .20)* (19 .86)* N= 1 036 Game #10 Removed A l l Backward Var i a b l e s E l i m i n a t ion c .40 .30 (1.61) (4 .39)* MX - . 0 6 -( - .27) PO - . 1 0 ' - . 0 5 ( -2 .49)* ( -1 .97)* B .08 -(1.68) CR .27 .27 (1.13) (3 .97)* Con . .61 .59 (17.14)* (18 .93)* N= 1 036 Game #12 Removed A l l Bac kward Var i a b l e s E l i m i n a t ion C . 1 6 -( .81 ) MX . 1 5 .26 ( .82) (3 .91)* PO - . 1 0 - . 0 6 ( -2 .39)* ( -2 .54 )* B .08 -(1.73) CR .02 -( .11) Con .61 .60 (16.93)* (20.13)* N= 1 036 241 Game #13 Removed Game #14 Removed A l l Bac kward A l l Backward Var i a b l e s E l i m i n a t ion Var i a b l e s E l i m i n a t ion c . 2 9 . 2 4 C . 2 3 . 3 3 (1 . 5 0 ) ( 4 . 3 1 ) * ( 1 . 1 8 ) ( 4 . 6 3 ) * MX - . 0 0 - MX . 1 0 -( - . 0 1 ) ( . 5 3 ) PO - . 1 8 - . 2 1 PO - . 1 1 - . 1 2 ( - 3 . 3 8 ) * ( - 5 . 7 6 ) * ( - 2 . 5 4 ) * ( - 3 . 2 6 ) * B . 1 7 . 2 1 B . 0 8 . 0 9 ( 2 . 7 8 ) * ( 4 . 7 0 ) * ( 1 . 7 3 ) ( 2 . 1 0 ) * CR . 1 0 - CR . 1 0 . 1 9 ( . 5 5 ) ( . 5 4 ) ( 2 . 5 4 ) * Con . 6 5 . 6 8 Con . 6 1 . 6 2 ( 1 6 . 3 7 ) * ( 3 0 . 3 5 ) * ( 1 6 . 8 4 ) * ( 2 0 . 1 9 ) * N= 1 0 3 6 N = 1 0 3 6 Game #15 Removed A l l Bac kward Var i a b l e s E l i m i n a t ion C . 2 7 . 3 4 ( 1 . 3 4 ) ( 4 . 7 0 ) * MX . 0 6 -( . 3 2 ) PO - . 1 3 - . 1 3 ( - 2 . 6 4 ) * ( - 3 . 3 8 ) * B . 0 9 . 1 0 ( 1 . 8 9 ) ( 2 . 2 6 ) * CR . 1 3 . 1 9 ( . 7 0 ) ( 2 . 5 4 ) * Con . 6 2 . 6 3 ( 1 6 . 2 9 ) * ( 1 9 . 9 7 ) * N= 1 0 3 5 

Cite

Citation Scheme:

        

Citations by CSL (citeproc-js)

Usage Statistics

Share

Embed

Customize your widget with the following options, then copy and paste the code below into the HTML of your page to embed this item in your website.
                        
                            <div id="ubcOpenCollectionsWidgetDisplay">
                            <script id="ubcOpenCollectionsWidget"
                            src="{[{embed.src}]}"
                            data-item="{[{embed.item}]}"
                            data-collection="{[{embed.collection}]}"
                            data-metadata="{[{embed.showMetadata}]}"
                            data-width="{[{embed.width}]}"
                            async >
                            </script>
                            </div>
                        
                    
IIIF logo Our image viewer uses the IIIF 2.0 standard. To load this item in other compatible viewers, use this url:
http://iiif.library.ubc.ca/presentation/dsp.831.1-0096574/manifest

Comment

Related Items