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Plans, schemas and affect Snodgrass, Jacalyn D. 1984

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PLANS, SCHEMAS AND AFFECT By JACALYN D. SNODGRASS THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF MASTER OF ARTS i n THE FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIES (Department of Psychology) We accept t h i s t h e s i s as conforming to the r e q u i r e d standard THE UNIVERSITY OF BRITISH COLUMBIA December 1984 ©Jacalyn D. Snodgrass, 1984 In presenting this thesis in partial fulfilment of the requirements for an advanced degree at the University of British Columbia, I agree that the Library shall make i t freely available for reference and study. I further agree that permission for extensive copying of this thesis for scholarly purposes may be granted by the head of my department or by his or her representatives. It is understood that copying or publication of this thesis for financial gain shall not be allowed without my written permission. Department of The University of British Columbia 1956 Main Mall Vancouver, Canada V6T 1Y3 Date DE-6 (.3/81) i i A b s t r a c t : I t has p r e v i o u s l y been suggested t h a t a person's behavior i n a p l a c e i s mediated by h i s or her p l a n s , and by h i s or her emotional response t o the p l a c e ; but the p o s s i b l e i n t e r a c t i v e e f f e c t s o f these i n f l u e n c e s have not been e x p l o r e d . Not onl y may a p a r t i c u l a r mood be the goal o f a p l a n , but the process of p l a n n i n g may a l s o produce changes i n the pl a n n e r ' s mood. I t i s here argued t h a t a person's emotional response t o a p l a c e i s i n f l u e n c e d by the extent of the a l t e r a t i o n s the p l a c e r e q u i r e s be made i n h i s or her p l a n s . I t has been g e n e r a l l y assumed t h a t a person's l i k i n g o f a p l a c e i s decreased i f i t does not f i t h i s or her p l a n , but the experiments r e p o r t e d here i n d i c a t e t h a t some i n c o n g r u i t y may a c t u a l l y i n c r e a s e l i k i n g o f a p l a c e i f the person i s abl e t o modify the p l a n s . Three experiments examined the e f f e c t s o f p l a n n i n g on two dimensions of mood--pleasure and arousal--and f o r l i k i n g o f p l a c e s . In experiment one, s u b j e c t s who had j u s t completed p l a n n i n g a rou t e f o r completing a l i s t of errands r e p o r t e d higher a r o u s a l than s u b j e c t s who had judged the time r e q u i r e d t o complete the same err a n d s . In experiment two, s u b j e c t s who executed t h e i r own pl a n r e p o r t e d higher p l e a s u r e than s u b j e c t s who executed a i i i p l a n they had been g i v e n . In experiment t h r e e , s u b j e c t s who had t o a l t e r t h e i r p l a n s t o accommodate the unexpected f e a t u r e s of a p l a c e r e p o r t e d h i g h e r a r o u s a l and p l e a s u r e , ~ and i n c r e a s e d l i k i n g of the p l a c e over s u b j e c t s who d i d not have t o r e - p l a n . These r e s u l t s suggest t h a t the process o f p l a n n i n g has measureable e f f e c t s on mood and t h a t these e f f e c t s i n f l u e n c e p l a c e - l i k i n g . i v TABLE OF CONTENTS ABSTRACT. i i LIST OF TABLES v i LIST OF FIGURES v i i INTRODUCTION 1 EMOTION 5 SCHEMAS, PLANS & EMOTION 8 Schemes and Emotion 10 Plans as Schemas 16 Plan n i n g and Emotion 21 OVERVIEW 25 EXPERIMENT 1: PLANNING WITHOUT EXECUTION 27 Method 28 R e s u l t s . 30 D i s c u s s i o n 30 EXPERIMENT 2: PLANNING WITH EXECUTION. . .33 Method 33 R e s u l t s 35 D i s c u s s i o n 35 V EXPERIMENT 3: RE-PLANNING 38 Method . . . 38 Results 42 Discussion 44 GENERAL DISCUSSION 49 REFERENCES 57 APPENDIX 60 LIST OF TABLES TABLE l : MEAN PLEASURE AND AROUSAL SCORES v i i LIST OF FIGURES FIGURE l : MEAN MOOD RATINGS FIGURE 2! MEAN MOOD RATINGS FIGURE 3: MEAN MOOD RATINGS FOR EXPERIMENT 1 . . . .32 FOR EXPERIMENT 2 . . . .37 FOR EXPERIMENT 3 . . . .48 1 INTRODUCTION In t h e i r 1982 Annual Review a r t i c l e , R u s s e l l and Ward proposed a framework f o r environmental psychology t h a t i n c o r p o r a t e d a person's plans as a mediator i n environment-behavior i n t e r a c t i o n s . They made the p o i n t t h a t a person's response t o a p l a c e cannot be understood without c o n s i d e r a t i o n of why the person i s i n the p a r t i c u l a r p l a c e . Simply s t a t e d , t h i s means t h a t r a t h e r than assuming r e s t a u r a n t s cause e a t i n g behavior, one might want ,to c o n s i d e r t h a t people u s u a l l y go to r e s t a u r a n t s when they p l a n to e a t . The t o p i c t o be e x p l o r e d here i s the r o l e of p l a n s i n a person's emotional response t o a p l a c e . I t i s obvious t h a t the p l a n s a person b r i n g s t o a p a r t i c u l a r p l a c e w i l l i n f l u e n c e what the person does t h e r e ; but i t should a l s o be c l e a r t h a t p l a n s may i n f l u e n c e the person's emotional response t o the p l a c e . As an example, c o n s i d e r your r e a c t i o n s to the two v e r s i o n s of the f o l l o w i n g s c e n a r i o : Your f r i e n d has o f f e r e d you the use of h i s condominium i n New York f o r a month. A) You accept, t h i n k i n g i t w i l l be a good o p p o r t u n i t y to " h i b e r n a t e " and devote a l l your 2 energy t o completing some work you haven't been a b l e t o f i n i s h here. B) You accept, t h i n k i n g i t w i l l be a g r e a t chance to have some fun, and a n t i c i p a t i n g the n i g h t l i f e . On a r r i v i n g i n New York you d i s c o v e r t h a t the condominium i s p a r t of a " s i n g l e s " complex designed t o maximize o p p o r t u n i t i e s f o r s o c i a l i z i n g . I t i s d i f f i c u l t t o come and go without being drawn i n t o the v a r i o u s a c t i v i t i e s . You would expect to have very d i f f e r e n t emotional r e a c t i o n s i n cases A and B, and would probably l i k e the p l a c e more i n case B where i t f a c i l i t a t e s your p l a n than i n case A where i t d i s r u p t s your p l a n . Of course not a l l s i t u a t i o n s i n v o l v e such dramatic i n t e r a c t i o n s between the c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s of a p l a c e and the person's reasons f o r going t h e r e . Often the d i s c r e p a n c y between a person's e x p e c t a t i o n s about a p l a c e and i t s a c t u a l c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s i s much s m a l l e r . What are the e f f e c t s of these s m a l l e r d i s c r e p a n c i e s on the person's f e e l i n g s i n or about the place? A person's a f f e c t i v e response t o a p l a c e i s o f t e n a t t r i b u t e d t o v i o l a t e d e x p e c t a t i o n s about t h a t p l a c e . For example, the presence of a crowd has been named as both the most and l e a s t e n j o y a b l e aspect of the same p l a c e by people who a r r i v e t h e r e with d i f f e r e n t e x p e c t a t i o n s (Norasch, Groner & K e i t i n g , 1979). I t has 3 been suggested t h a t some e f f e c t s o f crowding, such as impaired task performance, are due not t o high d e n s i t y per se, but t o v i o l a t e d e x p e c t a t i o n s — t h a t i s , high d e n s i t y i n a s i t u a t i o n where i t i s not expected ( K l e i n & H a r r i s , 1979). Why should v i o l a t e d e x p e c t a t i o n s r e s u l t i n impaired performance and ne g a t i v e mood? I f people are f a c e d with circumstances they were not e x p e c t i n g , i t i s l i k e l y t h a t t h e i r c u r r e n t p l a n w i l l be d i s r u p t e d . T h i s may a f f e c t task performance e i t h e r because t h e r e i s no plan t o guide i t , or because a t t e n t i o n i s d i v e r t e d from the task t o form a new p l a n . I f a new pl a n cannot be formed q u i c k l y , they may be l e f t without a p l a n . T h i s s t a t e o f p l a n l e s s n e s s may then r e s u l t i n a n e g a t i v e mood s t a t e . M i l l e r , G a l a n t e r and Pribram (I960), i n f i r s t s u g g e s t i n g the importance of pl a n s i n s t r u c t u r i n g behavior, noted the emotional consequences of being without a p l a n : " I f the person becomes p l a n l e s s r a t h e r suddenly, marked mood swings are apt to occur: the person i s s a i d t o become "emotional."" (p. 114). I t i s suggested here t h a t t h i s emotional response t o being without a pl a n i s one end of a continuum of mood changes i n f l u e n c e d by the ongoing process o f a d j u s t i n g p l a n s t o meet environmental demands. At the end of the continuum where pl a n s a re completely d i s r u p t e d , d i s c r e p a n c i e s between the s t a t e of the world and the person's plans f o r i n t e r a c t i n g with i t are l a r g e , a r o u s a l i s hi g h , and 4 the experience i s n e g a t i v e . At the other end of the continuum are the s l i g h t changes i n mood t h a t may r e s u l t from s m a l l d i s c r e p a n c i e s between the person's e x p e c t a t i o n s and the a c t u a l environment. The changes i n mood along the contimuum d e f i n e d by degree of di s c r e p a n c y may range from s l i g h t i n c r e a s e s i n a r o u s a l t h a t may be experienced as e i t h e r p l e a s a n t or unpleasant, t o the unpleasant, high a r o u s a l s t a t e accompanying complete p l a n d i s r u p t i o n . To examine the i n f l u e n c e of pl a n s on emotional responses, the concept o f emotion must f i r s t be s p e c i f i e d i n more d e t a i l . In the f o l l o w i n g s e c t i o n , the n o t i o n o f a f f e c t i s d e f i n e d . In c l a r i f y i n g what i s meant by an emotional response t o a p l a c e , some qu e s t i o n s are r a i s e d r e g a r d i n g the p o s s i b l e i n f l u e n c e s of p l a n s on these responses. Those q u e s t i o n s w i l l be addressed i n the l a t e r s e c t i o n s o f the paper. 5 EMOTION In r e v i e w i n g the d i v e r s e l i t e r a t u r e concerned with the a f f e c t i v e q u a l i t i e s o f p l a c e s , R u s s e l l and Snodgrass ( i n press) make some u s e f u l d i s t i n c t i o n s among the terms a v a i l a b l e f o r d i s c u s s i n g emotion i n r e l a t i o n s h i p t o p l a c e s . They p o i n t out t h a t people o f t e n r e f e r t o d i f f e r e n t phenomena when they t a l k about emotion, and t h a t c o n f u s i o n i s best avoided by u s i n g d i s t i n c t terms f o r s e p a r a b l e s e t s of phenomena. Two of the terms d e f i n e d by R u s s e l l and Snodgrass w i l l be used here: mood and a f f e c t i v e a p p r a i s a l . A b r i e f d i s c r i p t i o n o f those terms w i l l h e lp c l a r i f y the f o l l o w i n g d i s c u s s i o n . MPQd At any p o i n t i n time a person's s u b j e c t i v e s t a t e has some a f f e c t i v e or emotion-tinged q u a l i t y . The person may be happy, sad, e x c i t e d , depressed, e t c . - - o r n e u t r a l . T h i s s u b j e c t i v e f e e l i n g i s r e f e r r e d t o here as mood. In case A o f the example of a t r i p t o New York, your mood would probably be f r u s t r a t e d or upset. In case B i t might be happy or e x c i t e d . Although i n t h i s example i t i s easy t o a t t r i b u t e a cause t o the mood s t a t e , t h i s i s not always the case. Mood can as e a s i l y be f e e l i n g good (or bad) f o r no known r e a s o n — p r o b a b l y because mood i s m u l t i p l y determined. 6 I t has been shown t h a t the v a r i o u s moods people e x p e r i e n c e (happy, sad, e x c i t e d , depressed, angry, e t c.) can be d e s c r i b e d by va l u e s on two u n d e r l y i n g d i m e n s i o n s — p l e a s u r e and a r o u s a l ( R u s s e l l , 1980, 1983; R u s s e l l & Ridgeway, 1983). For example, excitement c o n s i s t s o f p l e a s u r e and high a r o u s a l ; r e l a x a t i o n c o n s i s t s o f p l e a s u r e and low a r o u s a l ; d e p r e s s i o n c o n s i s t s o f d i s p l e a s u r e and low a r o u s a l . Although mood i s experienced as a u n i t a r y phenomenon, s t i m u l i i n the environment may i n f l u e n c e the u n d e r l y i n g dimensions independently, and i t i s u s e f u l t o speak of a change i n mood as a change i n one or both dimensions. But i t should be kept i n mind t h a t a change i n a r o u s a l or a change i n p l e a s u r e or changes i n both are a l l experienced as a s i n g l e change i n mood. A f f e c t i v e A p p r a i s a l Judgments of a p l a c e as p l e a s a n t , a t t r a c t i v e , l i k e a b l e , and so on are r e f e r r e d t o here as a f f e c t i v e a p p r a i s a l s . These are judgments about the a b i l i t y o f the p l a c e t o a l t e r mood. To a p p r a i s e a p l a c e as e x c i t i n g means one expects t o f e e l e x c i t e d t h e r e . To a p p r a i s e i t as p l e a s a n t means one expects t o experience a mood t h e r e high i n p l e a s u r e . Again u s i n g the p r e v i o u s example, your a f f e c t i v e a p p r a i s a l of the p l a c e i n case A would probably be t h a t i t i s unpleasant or u n s a t i s f y i n g . In case B, you would probably a f f e c t i v e l y a p p r a i s e the 7 p l a c e as p l e a s a n t or l i k e a b l e . Hood experienced i n a p l a c e and a f f e c t i v e a p p r a i s a l of the p l a c e are c l e a r l y i n t e r t w i n e d , but they need not n e c e s s a r i l y co-vary. A person can a p p r a i s e a v a r i e t y of p l a c e s ( f o r example a s e r i e s of photographs) without e x p e r i e n c i n g any change i n mood. But i s the converse t r u e ? Are a f f e c t i v e a p p r a i s a l s independent of the person's mood a t the time the a p p r a i s a l i s made? Probably not. G i f f o r d (1980) has shown t h a t people i n a p r i o r p l e a s a n t mood ap p r a i s e d p l a c e s as more p l e a s a n t . T h i s f i n d i n g r a i s e s a s e r i e s o f i n t e r e s t i n g q u e s t i o n s . How much i n f l u e n c e does mood a t the time of a p p r a i s a l have on p l a c e - l i k i n g ? Does present mood have the same e f f e c t on a p p r a i s a l whether or not the person i s i n the pla c e ? Must the mood be a t t r i b u t a b l e t o the p l a c e b e f o r e the a f f e c t i v e a p p r a i s a l w i l l be i n f l u e n c e d ? D i s t i n g u i s h i n g between mood and a f f e c t i v e a p p r a i s a l a l l o w s the f o r m u l a t i o n o f s p e c i f i c q u e s t i o n s concerning the r o l e o f pl a n s i n the person's experience with a p l a c e . For example, do pl a n s i n f l u e n c e mood and a p p r a i s a l independently, or does mood mediate the e f f e c t of plana on a p p r a i s a l ? 8 SCHEMAS. PLANS AND EMOTION The f o l l o w i n g s e c t i o n s w i l l o u t l i n e some of the ways i n which a person's plans might i n f l u e n c e mood or a f f e c t i v e a p p r a i s a l s of p l a c e s . A framework u t i l i z i n g the concept of a "schema" i s developed t o e x p l o r e the i n t e r r e l a t i o n s h i p s between a person's p l a n s and e x p e c t a t i o n s , the p l a c e s t h a t do or do not meet those e x p e c t a t i o n s , and the person's mood i n and a f f e c t i v e a p p r a i s a l s o f those p l a c e s . The ideas a re drawn from a v a r i e t y o f sources, most n o t a b l y M i l l e r , G a l a n t e r and Pribram's (I960) d i s c u s s i o n of p l a n s , R u s s e l l and Ward's (1982, 1983) use of pla n s i n d e s c r i b i n g person-place i n t e r a c t i o n s , and f i n a l l y Handler's work on the r o l e o f schemas i n a f f e c t i v e a p p r a i s a l (1984). I t i s argued t h a t r e s o l v i n g the d i s c r e p a n c i e s between the s t a t e o f the world and schema-driven e x p e c t a t i o n s can a l t e r mood, and t h a t p l a n s p l a y a key r o l e i n determining the r e s u l t a n t mood. F i r s t , the concept o f a schema i s in t r o d u c e d along with Mandler's argument t h a t schemas i n f l u e n c e a f f e c t i v e a p p r a i s a l . Secondly, the s t r u c t u r e of p l a n s i s d i s c u s s e d i n terms of schema systems. T h i r d l y , the r o l e o f plans i n determining the a f f e c t i v e outcome of person-place i n t e r a c t i o n s i s d i s c u s s e d . F o l l o w i n g these s e c t i o n s , some e x p l o r a t o r y r e s e a r c h i s r e p o r t e d i n d i c a t i n g t h a t t h i s i s a u s e f u l framework f o r 9 e x a m i n i n g t h e s e i n t e r r e l a t i o n s h i p s . 10 SCHEMAS AND EMOTION Mandler (1984) has presented the argument t h a t an emotional experience can a r i s e out of the di s c r e p a n c y between a person's e x p e c t a t i o n s and an event i n the world. T h i s emotional experience can be e i t h e r p o s i t i v e or n e g a t i v e , i n c o n t r a s t t o the view t h a t d i s c r e p a n c i e s a r e always experienced n e g a t i v e l y . In Handler's model, e x p e c t a t i o n s a re embodied by schemas--cognitive s t r u c t u r e s t h a t o r g a n i z e a person's knowledge about the world. A schema r e p r e s e n t s a s e t of r e l a t i o n s h i p s among the components of an o b j e c t or event. A b r i e f d e s c r i p t i o n o f schemas w i l l h e l p c l a r i f y t h e i r r o l e i n Mandler'a theory. Schemas are ec o n o m i c a l l y s t r u c t u r e d so t h a t a s i n g l e schema can be adapted t o f i t any i n a c l a s s o f s i m i l a r s i t u a t i o n s by changing d e t a i l s i n the schema. For example, a "room" schema c o u l d be adapted t o f i t any room by changing the dimensions and f u r n i s h i n g s s p e c i f i e d by the schema. The "room" schema i s an a b s t r a c t i o n o f the many d i f f e r e n t rooms t h a t have been experienced, and i t s f e a t u r e s have expected, or p r o t o t y p i c a l , v a l u e s t h a t may be r e p l a c e d by the a c t u a l v a l u e s d e t e c t e d i n a room t h a t a c t i v a t e s the schema. A schema s p e c i f i e s the r e l a t i o n s h i p among i t s component f e a t u r e s . These f e a t u r e s may be thought of as 11 tags t h a t s p e c i f y (or p o i n t to) subschemas. For example, the schema " o f f i c e " c o n t a i n s a t a g f o r "desk." A c t i v a t i o n of the " o f f i c e " schema generates e x p e c t a t i o n s l o r a desk t o be present, but the s p e c i f i c d e t a i l s o f desks are rep r e s e n t e d i n the "desk" schema. Any s i n g l e schema can probably s p e c i f y the r e l a t i o n s h i p s among approximately 7 +. 2 components--the number of p i e c e s of i n f o r m a t i o n t h a t can be h e l d i n consciousness a t one time. Related schemas may be org a n i z e d i n a schema system. For example, schemas f o r s p e c i f i c types o f rooms such as a l i v i n g room or o f f i c e have p o i n t e r s t h a t l i n k them t o the g e n e r i c room schema. Schemas are a l s o hooked tog e t h e r i n an i n f o r m a t i o n - r e t r i e v a l network. I f the incoming sensory s t i m u l i do not f i t the schema t h a t i s a c t i v a t e d , t h i s network w i l l p r o v i d e a replacement schema. Such network l i n k s may e i t h e r be through g e n e r i c schema p o i n t e r s , or p o i n t e r s t o schemas t h a t c o n t a i n s i m i l a r f e a t u r e s . For example, i f sensory s t i m u l i do not match the " o f f i c e " schema t h a t i s a c t i v a t e d when you go i n t o a room, i t may f i t the " l i b r a r y " schema, a r r i v e d a t through the g e n e r i c room schema. According t o Handler, t r y i n g t o f i t sensory i n f o r m a t i o n i n t o a schema can g i v e r i s e t o an emotional s t a t e . T h i s happens because schemas are a b s t r a c t i o n s of many p r e v i o u s e x p e r i e n c e s , and w i l l r a r e l y f i t incoming 12 i n f o r m a t i o n e x a c t l y . Handler argues t h a t the f a i l u r e o f incoming s t i m u l i t o f i t a schema i n t e r r u p t s ongoing c o g n i t i v e p r o c e s s i n g and as such causes an i n c r e a s e i n autonomic nervous system arousal--one component of h i s d e f i n i t i o n o f emotional e x p e r i e n c e . (In R u s s e l l and Snodgrass's terms, i f the a r o u s a l i s s u b j e c t i v e l y p e r c e i v a b l e , than a change i n mood i s experienced.) A r o u s a l i s a f u n c t i o n o f the degree o f d i s c r e p a n c y between the schema and the incoming s t i m u l i . I f the di s c r e p a n c y i s s l i g h t , and incoming s t i m u l i can be a s s i m i l a t e d t o the schema, a r o u s a l i s i n c r e a s e d o n l y s l i g h t l y . I f the d i s c r e p a n c y i s l a r g e r , but the schema can be a l t e r e d t o f i t the incoming s t i m u l i , a r o u s a l i s hi g h e r . I f the d i s c r e p a n c y can o n l y be r e s o l v e d by f i t t i n g the incoming s t i m u l i t o a d i f f e r e n t schema, then a r o u s a l i s high e r s t i l l . There i s no easy way t o y q u a n t i f y degree of d i s c r e p a n c y , but one way t o t h i n k o f i t i s as the search time r e q u i r e d t o f i n d or a l t e r a schema t o match sensory i n p u t . P l e a s a n t n e s s - - t h e o t h e r component of emotional e x p e r i e n c e - - v a r i e s with, among oth e r t h i n g s , the r e s o l u t i o n o f the d i s c r e p a n c y . A f a i l u r e t o r e s o l v e the di s c r e p a n c y i s experienced as n e g a t i v e . When t h e r e i s a r e s o l u t i o n , the schema t h a t i s f i n a l l y f i t t e d t o the incoming s t i m u l i has a value t h a t may be e i t h e r p o s i t i v e o r n e g a t i v e . For example, suppose you've been t o l d by a busin e s s a s s o c i a t e t h a t a messenger i s on the way to 13 d e l i v e r a c o n t r a c t f o r you t o look over. A messenger a r r i v e s and hands you an envelope t h a t doesn't look l i k e the c o n t r a c t you are e x p e c t i n g . I f the d i s c r e p a n c y from your e x p e c t a t i o n s i s r e s o l v e d by d i s c o v e r i n g you have j u s t r e c e i v e d a check f o r a l a r g e sum of money, the val u e o f the r e s o l u t i o n w i l l probably be q u i t e p o s i t i v e . On the oth e r hand, i f the envelope c o n t a i n s n o t i f i c a t i o n t h a t you are being sued f o r a l a r g e sum of money, the va l u e w i l l be q u i t e n e g a t i v e . As a l r e a d y demonstrated i n the p r e v i o u s example of a t r i p t o New York, t h e r e i s not n e c e s s a r i l y an a b s o l u t e v a l u e attached t o a schema; i t may be p o s i t i v e i n one context and ne g a t i v e i n another. Handler (1984) a l s o assumes t h a t the i n t e n s i t y of i p l e a s u r e v a r i e s with the a r o u s a l produced by di s c r e p a n c y . Thus, the o v e r a l l mood change r e s u l t i n g from the process o f r e s o l v i n g d i s c r e p a n c i e s i s a combined f u n c t i o n o f the degree of d i s c r e p a n c y and the meaning of the f i t t e d schema. F i r s t , a r o u s a l v a r i e s with degree of d i s c r e p a n c y . The ple a s a n t n e s s o f the experie n c e depends upon the value o f the f i t t e d schema and on the a r o u s a l . I f a r e s o l u t i o n i s not achieved ( i . e . , evidence i n the world does not f i t any accessed schema), a r o u s a l i s very high and the q u a l i t y o f the experie n c e i s ne g a t i v e because t h e r e i s no meaning to e v a l u a t e . I f t h e r e i s a r e s o l u t i o n , a r o u s a l i s l e s s high and the q u a l i t y o f the experience depends on the 1 4 value of the f i t t e d schema. An example might help t o i l l u s t r a t e the p o s s i b l e outcomes of t h i s p r o c e s s . I f you were ex p e c t i n g a telegram from a good f r i e n d you haven't seen f o r a long time, the r i n g i n g of your d o o r b e l l would a c t i v a t e your schema f o r r e c e i v i n g telegrams (presuming o f course t h a t you have formed such a schema from p r e v i o u s e x p e r i e n c e ) . T h i s schema i n c l u d e s e x p e c t a t i o n s f o r the person a t your door t o look l i k e your s t e r e o t y p i c a l telegram d e l i v e r y person. I f , when you answer the door, t h e r e i s no one t h e r e , you w i l l l i k e l y experience a mood high i n a r o u s a l and low i n p l e a s u r e . T h i s i s an example of f a i l u r e t o achieve schema c o n g r u i t y ; you are unable t o f i n d a schema t h a t f i t s t h i s s i t u a t i o n of a r i n g i n g d o o r b e l l with no one a t the door. I f , when you answer your door, you see a vacuum c l e a n e r salesman, you are again l i k e l y t o e xperience a r o u s a l and low p l e a s u r e ( u n l e s s you're i n the market f o r a vacuum c l e a n e r ) . T h i s time you've found a schema t h a t f i t s the s i t u a t i o n , but i t has n e g a t i v e v a l u e i n c o n t e x t . I f , on the* other hand, you open your door and see your f r i e n d i n person, your experience w i l l be high i n a r o u s a l and high i n p l e a s u r e . T h i s i s an example of a r e s o l u t i o n t h a t has a p o s i t i v e v alue w i t h i n the context of your c u r r e n t p l a n (communicationg with your f r i e n d ) . I t should be emphasized t h a t because of the heightened a r o u s a l from v i o l a t e d e x p e c t a t i o n s , you should experience a more 15 intense positive feeling at an unannounced vs. an announced v i s i t of your friend. 16 PLANS AS SCHEMAS Ward and R u s s e l l (1983) have o u t l i n e d how p l a n s can be u s e f u l l y d e s c r i b e d as a h i e r a r c h i c a l o r g a n i z a t i o n of schemas. Ward and R u s s e l l ' s concept of schema i s based l a r g e l y on Minsky's (1975) d i s c u s s i o n of how to r e p r e s e n t knowledge i n computer models of problem s o l v i n g . B u i l d i n g on the f o u n d a t i o n s e s t a b l i s h e d by Ward and R u s s e l l , a d e s c r i p t i o n of the s t r u c t u r e of p l a n s i s presented here t h a t w i l l a l l o w some a n a l o g i e s t o be drawn between p l a n n i n g and schema-structured p e r c e p t i o n . These a n a l o g i e s form the t h e o r e t i c a l background f o r some p r e d i c t i o n s about emotional r e a c t i o n s t o p l a c e s on the b a s i s of how d i s c r e p a n t the p l a c e s are with a person's p l a n s . Schemas as used by Ward and R u s s e l l are separated i n t o s e v e r a l types, t h r e e of which are of present concern: p l a c e schemas, a c t i o n schemas, and state-change schemas. Each of these types of schemas w i l l be d e s c r i b e d , and then used t o present a f a i r l y d e t a i l e d d e s c r i p t i o n of a p o s s i b l e s t r u c t u r e f o r p l a n s . P l a c e Schemas A p l a c e schema r e f e r s t o a p l a c e or type of p l a c e . Any type of p l a c e with which a person i s f a m i l i a r w i l l be r e p r e s e n t e d as a g e n e r i c schema i n the person's 17 memory. For example, the "room" schema d i s c u s s e d e a r l i e r i s a g e n e r i c schema r e p r e s e n t i n g the p r o t o t y p i c a l room a b s t r a c t e d through experience with rooms. There are a l s o more s p e c i f i c p l a c e schemas such as an " o f f i c e " schema or even "Mr. Smith's o f f i c e . " The number o f s p e c i f i c p l a c e schemas a person has depends on h i s or her e xperience. The o f f i c e worker would have more s p e c i f i c o f f i c e schemas than would a sm a l l shopkeeper. A c t i o n Schemas An a c t i o n schema s p e c i f i e s the components of an a c t i o n : a sequence of a c t s , an a c t o r , and a r e s u l t . I t may a l s o s p e c i f y p r e r e q u i s i t e c o n d i t i o n s and r e q u i r e d o b j e c t s or p l a c e s . As with the o b j e c t s and f e a t u r e s i n a p l a c e schema, the a c t o r , o b j e c t s , and s u b a c t i o n s i n an a c t i o n schema may be r e p r e s e n t e d as tags i d e n t i f y i n g (or p o i n t i n g to) the r e l e v a n t schemas f o r each t a g . S i m i l a r l y , the r e s u l t of the a c t i o n i s s p e c i f i e d by a p o i n t e r t o the schema or schemas t h a t r e p r e s e n t the p o s s i b l e changes i n s t a t e t h a t r e s u l t from t h i s a c t i o n . For example, the a c t i o n schema " h i t " has as i t s p o s s i b l e r e s u l t s the changes i n s t a t e from "no p a i n " t o " p a i n " or from " i n t a c t " t o "broken." These changes are r e p r e s e n t e d as state-change schemas. 18 State-change Schemas A change i n s t a t e may have s e v e r a l p o s s i b l e causes. For example, breakage may r e s u l t from the o b j e c t i n q u e s t i o n being h i t , dropped, p u l l e d a p a r t , e t c . A l l of the a c t i o n frames t h a t have as t h e i r r e s u l t t h i s change i n s t a t e w i l l have p o i n t e r s t o the " i n t a c t / b r o k e n " state-change schema. The state-change schema, i n t u r n , p o i n t s back t o c a u s a l a c t i o n schemas. T h i s a l l o w s the person t o both p r e d i c t the consequences of h i s or her a c t i o n s and t o f ormulate a p l a n with a p a r t i c u l a r change o f s t a t e as i t s g o a l . P l a n s A person's p l a n s can be thought of as a h i e r a r c h i c a l o r g a n i z a t i o n of a c t i o n schemas l i n k e d t o g e t h e r through state-change schemas. Each state-change schema r e p r e s e n t s a g o a l . A d e s i r e d change i n s t a t e - - t h e g o a l - - p o i n t s t o the v a r i o u s a c t i o n schemas t h a t may be s e l e c t e d t o achieve t h a t s t a t e . The p r e r e q u i s i t e c o n d i t i o n s i n a s e l e c t e d a c t i o n schema may generate a subgoal. The p o s s i b l e a c t i o n s f o r a c h i e v i n g t h i s subgoal are again a v a i l a b l e through the p o i n t e r s from the state-change schema a s s o c i a t e d with t h i s s u bgoal. For example, you may be s i t t i n g i n your o f f i c e when you suddenly become aware t h a t you are hungry. Your " s t a t e - o f - h u n g e r " schema p o i n t s t o the a c t i o n schema " e a t " as one r e s u l t i n g i n a change from hunger to 19 s a t i a t i o n . Your " e a t " schema has as a r e q u i r e d o b j e c t "•food." T h i s generates a subgoal of " a c q u i r e food." Your "have f o o d " state-change .schema p o i n t s t o the schemas f o r the p o s s i b l e a c t i o n s t h a t change the s t a t e "have f o o d . " You might go t o a r e s t a u r a n t , go home, go to the supermarket, e t c . Each of these a c t i o n schemas has i t s own s e t of p r e r e q u i s i t e c o n d i t i o n s and necessary o b j e c t s t h a t may generate f u r t h e r subgoals. Obviously p l a n s can have many l e v e l s . The p a r t of the o v e r a l l s t r u c t u r e of which the person i s aware a t one time--the immediate p l a n - - i s represented as a s i n g l e schema. Subplans are represented i n t h i s schema as p o i n t e r s t o s t a t e change schemas t h a t i n t u r n have p o i n t e r s t o an a c t i o n schema or s e v e r a l a c t i o n schemas t h a t may p o t e n t i a l l y be used t o achieve the d e s i r e d s t a t e . Metaplans, or the higher l e v e l p l a n s t h a t generated the immediate g o a l , are l i n k e d t o the immediate p l a n through the state-change schema a s s o c i a t e d with t h a t g o a l . U n t i l f u l f i l l e d , both the hig h e r l e v e l metaplans and the lower l e v e l subplans can be thought o f as i n t e n t i o n s , f o l l o w i n g the usage of M i l l e r , G a l a n t e r & Pribram (1960). I n t e n t i o n s c o n s t i t u t e p a r t o f the o v e r a l l p l a n s t r u c t u r e , but are beyond the scope of awareness. The a c t i o n schema r e p r e s e n t i n g the c u r r e n t p l a n s p e c i f i e s the r e l a t i o n s h i p s between the g o a l , the r e s u l t s , the v a r i o u s 20 subplans, and necessary c o n d i t i o n s . These components are a l l r e p r e s e n t e d as tags which are r e l a t i v e l y hazy, and merely p o i n t t o t h e i r r e s p e c t i v e schemas. To examine the d e t a i l s of a subplan, the person must change l e v e l s . Then the d e t a i l s of the subplan become more c l e a r as the h i g h e r l e v e l p l a n becomes more hazy. In t h i s way, p l a n s can be formed and m o d i f i e d as g o a l s and environmental r e s t r i c t i o n s a r i s e . For example, i f your goal i s to be a s u c c e s s s f u l w r i t e r , your " s u c c e s s f u l w r i t e r " state-change schema would p o i n t t o a " s e l l books" a c t i o n schema. Among the antecedent c o n d i t i o n s f o r t h i s schema i s the " w r i t e books" schema which may e v e n t u a l l y l e a d you back t o a "sharpen p e n c i l " subplan. I f you now f i n d y o u r s e l f without a p e n c i l sharpener, you can go from the "sharp p e n c i l " s t a t e change schema t o other a c t i o n schemas t h a t r e s u l t i n the c o n d i t i o n "sharp." 21 PLANNING AND EMOTIONS E x p e c t a t i o n s about a p l a c e are re p r e s e n t e d i n plans as p r e r e q u i s i t e c o n d i t i o n s or r e q u i r e d o b j e c t s s p e c i f i e d by the a s s o c i a t e d a c t i o n schema. These e x p e c t a t i o n s may be e x p l i c i t or i m p l i c i t , t h a t i s a person may have developed a p l a n i n such d e t a i l t h a t he or she c o n s c i o u s l y expects c e r t a i n f e a t u r e s t o be present i n the p l a c e , o r , the person may a r r i v e a t the p l a c e with o n l y a g e n e r a l s t r a t e g y and become aware of h i s or her e x p e c t a t i o n s o n l y on d i s c o v e r i n g the p l a c e doesn't f i t the s p e c i f i c a t i o n s o f any of the a v a i l a b l e a c t i o n schemas t h a t have as t h e i r r e s u l t the d e s i r e d s t a t e . In e i t h e r case, i f these e x p e c t a t i o n s are not met the person must r e p l a n . For example, what do you do i f t h e r e i s n ' t a p i c n i c t a b l e where you expected one? You a l t e r your p l a n somehow--by l o o k i n g elsewhere f o r a p i c n i c t a b l e , by d e c i d i n g t o have your p i c n i c on the ground, or by d e c i d i n g not t o have a p i c n i c . The e x p e c t a t i o n s i n h e r e n t i n a plan form the b a s i s of the analogy between p l a n n i n g and the process of r e s o l v i n g schema d i s c r e p a n c i e s . Planning i s r e q u i r e d any time ongoing behavior i s i n t e r r u p t e d by e x p e c t a t i o n s t h a t are not met. In i d e n t i f y i n g an o b j e c t , e x p e c t a t i o n s are used as the s t a r t i n g p o i n t i n a search f o r a schema t h a t matches, or can be adapted t o match. 22 events i n the world. Sensory i n p u t a c t s as a c o n s t r a i n t on schema s e l e c t i o n , and a r o u s a l i n c r e a s e s as a f u n c t i o n of the f a r t h e r a matching schema i s from the s t a r t i n g p o i n t . In p l a n n i n g , the c u r r e n t p l a n ( i n the form of an a c t i o n schema with i t s a s s o c i a t e d e x p e c t a t i o n s ) a c t s as a s t a r t i n g p o i n t i n a search f o r a schema t h a t w i l l i n t e g r a t e a c t u a l c o n d i t i o n s with the c u r r e n t g o a l . As with o b j e c t i d e n t i f i c a t i o n , schema s e l e c t i o n i s a p a r t i a l l y s t i m u l u s - d r i v e n process, and a r o u s a l i n c r e a s e s as a f u n c t i o n o f the d i f f i c u l t y i n f i n d i n g a s u i t a b l e schema. As an example r e l e v a n t t o the present purpose, c o n s i d e r what t y p i c a l l y happens when you a r r i v e a t a p a r t i c u l a r p l a c e . You come t o a p l a c e with a p l a n . T h i s p l a n i s i n the form of an a c t i o n schema t h a t s p e c i f i e s c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s o f the p l a c e necessary f o r the a c t i o n t o occur. As you look about the p l a c e you've come t o , you t r y t o f i t the c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s o f t h a t p l a c e t o your a c t i o n schema or an atta c h e d p l a c e schema. I f the c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s don't f i t , you have the same a l t e r n a t i v e s as i n o b j e c t i d e n t i f i c a t i o n . You can adapt your a c t i o n schema t o the a c t u a l c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s o f the p l a c e and, f o r example, have your p i c n i c on the ground; or you can use your a c t i o n schema as a s t a r t i n g p o i n t i n the search f o r another a c t i o n schema t h a t w i l l r e s u l t i n the a c q u i s i t i o n o f your g o a l - - f o r example, go to a r e s t a u r a n t . Here the major c o n s t r a i n t s on schema 23 s e l e c t i o n are t h a t i t must l e a d t o the s p e c i f i e d state-change schema a s s o c i a t e d with your g o a l , and i t must e i t h e r f i t the c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s of the p l a c e you're i n or some other p l a c e you can get t o . I f you are unable t o c o n s t r u c t a pl a n t o achieve your c u r r e n t g o a l , you must then attempt t o r e v i s e the high e r l e v e l plan t h a t generated t h a t p a r t i c u l a r g o a l , and so on u n t i l you have e l i m i n a t e d the d i s c r e p a n c y . The h i e r a r c h i c a l o r g a n i z a t i o n l e a d s t o the type o f bottom-up r e p l a n n i n g noted by M i l l e r e t a l . "When i n the exe c u t i o n o f a Plan i t i s d i s c o v e r e d t h a t an intended subplan i s not r e l e v a n t or i s not f e a s i b l e , the s m a l l e s t p o s s i b l e s u b s t i t u t i o n s of a l t e r n a t i v e t a c t i c a l subplans are t o be attempted f i r s t , and the change i n s t r a t e g y i s t o be postponed as long as p o s s i b l e . " (p. 114) As with o b j e c t i d e n t i f i c a t i o n , a r o u s a l i n c r e a s e s with the d i f f i c u l t y of f i n d i n g a schema t o f i t the c o n s t r a i n t s . Whether the experience i s p o s i t i v e or ne g a t i v e depends on the outcome of the f i t t i n g p rocess. In the case of o b j e c t , person or event i d e n t i f i c a t i o n , t h i s depends upon the context--how the i d e n t i f i c a t i o n f i t s i n t o c u r r e n t p l a n s . In the case of p l a n n i n g — s i n c e p l a n s are h i e r a r c h i c a l o r g a n i z a t i o n s of s u b p l a n s — i t depends on how w e l l the pl a n f i t s i n t o the l a r g e r p l a n h i e r a r c h y o f which i t i s a p a r t . Thus, both p l a n n i n g and i d e n t i f y i n g events i n the world can have an e f f e c t on a person's mood. Both 24 processes can be c h a r a c t e r i z e d as a search through s t o r e d schemas f o r one t h a t f i t s or can be adapted t o f i t g iven c o n s t r a i n t s . T h i s process o f s e a r c h i n g and adapting r e q u i r e s e f f o r t and c o n t r i b u t e s t o the a r o u s a l dimension of mood. Once a schema has been found t h a t s a t i s f i e s the c o n s t r a i n t s , i t can be ev a l u a t e d i n the context o f higher l e v e l p l a n s . T h i s e v a l u a t i o n c o n t r i b u t e s t o the q u a l i t y or ple a s a n t n e s s dimension of mood. With t h i s analogy some p r e d i c t i o n s can be made about the p l a n n i n g p r o c e s s . As long as the pl a n n i n g process r e s u l t s i n a p l a n c o n s i s t e n t with the person's g o a l s , the a c t of pl a n n i n g w i l l leave the person with a p o s i t i v e f e e l i n g . Within these c o n s t r a i n t s , the more mental e f f o r t i n v o l v e d i n making a p l a n (or r e v i s i n g one), the high e r the a r o u s a l component of mood. That i s , p r ovided t h e r e are no time c o n s t r a i n t s or other o v e r r i d i n g f a c t o r s , when you f i n a l l y f i n d a s u i t a b l e p i c n i c t a b l e you are apt t o enjoy your p i c n i c more than i f your p l a n was immediately s u c c e s s f u l . T h i s i s p r e d i c t e d because the e f f o r t o f t h i n k i n g of another p l a c e t o f i n d a p i c n i c t a b l e i n c r e a s e s your a r o u s a l , and f i n d i n g a s u i t a b l e t a b l e causes us to experience t h i s a r o u s a l as p o s i t i v e . 25 OVERVIEW The experiments r e p o r t e d here are the f i r s t s t e p s i n an e x p l o r a t i o n o f the r e l a t i o n s h i p s between p l a n , p l a c e and a f f e c t . The hypothesized i n t e r a c t i o n can be broken down i n t o two t e s t a b l e hypotheses: 1) the process of pla n n i n g or r e p l a n n i n g has measurable e f f e c t s on mood, and 2) the mood induced by pl a n n i n g w i l l i n f l u e n c e l i k i n g o f the p l a c e t h a t r e q u i r e s the p l a n n i n g . S p e c i f i c a l l y , based on the framework developed here, i t was p r e d i c t e d t h a t having t o pl a n would i n c r e a s e the a r o u s a l component of mood, and the form a t i o n of a s a t i s f a c t o r y p l a n would cause t h i s a r o u s a l t o be experienced as p o s i t i v e . I t was a l s o p r e d i c t e d t h a t , as long as a s a t i s f a c t o r y p l a n c o u l d be formed, an unexpected p l a c e would be l i k e d more than an expected p l a c e . The f i r s t two experiments t e s t h y p o t h e s i s 1, and the t h i r d t e s t s one c o n d i t i o n o f hyp o t h e s i s 2--the case where a person i s a b l e t o form a p l a n . Experiment 1 compared the s e l f - r e p o r t e d mood r a t i n g s o f s u b j e c t s who had j u s t completed a pl a n n i n g task with the r a t i n g s of s u b j e c t s who had j u s t completed an e v a l u a t i o n task u s i n g the same m a t e r i a l s . Experiment 2 compared the mood r a t i n g s of s u b j e c t s who had completed a task by making and f o l l o w i n g t h e i r own p l a n with the mood' r a t i n g s of 26 subjects who had completed the same task by following a plan they were given. These two experiments separate the effects on mood attributable to planning from those attributable to execution of the plan. Experiment 3 traced the mood of each subject through the stages of planning and executing the plan, and compared subjects who are forced to re-plan with those who were not on measures of mood and place liking. 27 EXPERIMENT 1 PLANNING WITHOUT EXECUTION Experiment 1 was designed t o t e s t whether p l a n n i n g , i n the absence of ex e c u t i o n o f the p l a n , causes measureable changes i n mood. According t o the present framework, the a c t u a l . p l a n n i n g ^ process i t s e l f even without e x e c u t i o n of the pl a n should cause an i n c r e a s e i n a r o u s a l . S i m i l a r l y , the p l e a s u r e dimension of the r e s u l t i n g mood should vary with how w e l l the person expects the pl a n t o achieve h i s or her g o a l s . By a l l o w i n g each s u b j e c t t o work u n t i l he or she has developed a s a t i s f a c t o r y p l a n , p l e a s u r e should be p o s i t i v e i n a l l cases. To t e s t the e f f e c t s o f pl a n n i n g on mood, two t a s k s were r e q u i r e d t h a t were as s i m i l a r as p o s s i b l e i n a l l r e s p e c t s , except t h a t one should be p r i m a r i l y a pl a n n i n g t a s k , while the other should r e q u i r e e q u i v a l e n t e f f o r t with a minimal p l a n n i n g component. The pl a n n i n g task chosen was adapted from a task developed by Hayes-Roth f o r s t u d y i n g human p l a n n i n g (Hayes-Roth & Hayes-Roth, 1978; Hayes-Roth, Hayes-Roth, Rosenschein, & Cammarata, 1979; G o l d i n & Hayes-Roth, 1980; Hayes-Roth, 1980a, 1980b, 1980c; Hayes-Roth & Thorndyke, 1980). T h i s task i n v o l v e d p l a n n i n g a rou t e f o r accomplishing a l i s t of 28 errands. Subjects in the planning condition were given a map with pictures of various types of shops on i t and asked to plan the order of doing a series of everyday-type errands (such as "pick up medicine for the dog at the vets") by drawing a route on the map. Subjects in the non-planning condition were asked to decide whether the same l i s t of errands could be accomplished in two hours by following a route already drawn on their maps. METHOD SubTacts Subjects were 40 students enrolled in undergraduate psychology courses who received course credit for partipating. Materials Subjects were each given a map of a fi c t i c i o u s town with various shops marked on i t , and a l i s t of ten errands. Both the map and the errand l i s t were taken from Hayes-Roth (1980c). Rating Scales Mood ratings were made on a set of 12 9-point 29 bipolar adjective scales, half comprising the arousal scale and half comprising the pleasure scale (Mehrabian & Russell, 1974). Procedure Subjects participated individually, and were told the purpose of the study was to investigate the f e a s i b i l i t y of the plans that people make. Planners Twenty subjects were given a map and l i s t of errands, and told to plan the most efficient route they could to accomplish a l l the errands on their l i s t and to draw i t on the map. Raters Twenty other subjects were given the same l i s t of errands and a map with a route drawn on i t by a planner. They were instructed to estimate how long i t would take to complete the errands using their own experience as a guideline, and to judge whether or not they could accomplish a l l the errands on the l i s t in two hours by following the route on the map. Both groups were allowed to work on the task as long as they wished. Planners and raters spent approximately the same amount of time (30 minutes) completing their respective tasks. After completing the task a l l subjects were asked to f i l l out a mood scale. 30 RESULTS If planning influences mood by increasing arousal, subjects in the planning group should report moods with a higher score on the arousal dimension than subjects in the non-planning group. Pleasure scores should be above the neutral point (pleasant as opposed to unpleasant) for both groups since both groups should experience success on their respective tasks. Figure 1 shows the mean pleasure and arousal scores for the two groups. Planners had a significantly higher arousal score than raters (t=3.45, p<.01), but there was no significant difference on the pleasure scale (t=.13, n.s.). DISCUSSION These results support the prediction that the activity of planning increases the arousal component of mood relative to a similar task that does not involve planning. It i s possible that this increase in arousal was due to greater evaluative apprehension among the planners, but every effort was made to make the-two conditions equivalent in this respect. Both groups were told that we were interested in the amount of agreement among people about the f e a s i b i l i t y of plans. 31 Although the effects of planning on the pleasure dimension of mood was not specifically tested in this experiment, ratings were consistent with predictions. Since no one could f a i l on the task, a l l pleasure ratings would be expected to be positive. Such was found to be the case. 32 9 8 7 6 5 A 3 2 1r 0 P L A N N E R ^ RATER to AROUSAL PLEASURE gure 1. Mean mood ra t i n g s f o r Experiment 1, 33 EXPERIMENT 2 PLANNING WITH EXECUTION Experiment 2 was designed to explore the effects on mood of forming and executing a plan. The task for this study involved constructing a "building" out of interlocking building blocks. Subjects in the planning group designed and constructed a building and subjects in the non-planning group constructed a building by following a diagram they were given. METHOD Subjects Subjects were 40 students enrolled in undergraduate psychology courses who received course credit for participating. Rating Scales Mood ratings were made on the same set of 12 9-point bipolar adjective scales as used in Experiment 1. Procedure Subjects participated individually and were told the purpose of the study was to investigate how people 34 follow instructions. They were randomly assigned to either the planning or non-planning group and given the following instructions: "Some subjects w i l l be given very loose instructions for doing this task, and some wil l be given very specific instructions. Then I ' l l ask some questions about the task after you've finished." Subjects were seated before a set of building blocks and given a demonstration of how the pieces could be fi t t e d together. Planners Half the subjects were instructed to make a "building with a tower: You can make i t any way you want, but once you've joined two pieces together you can't take them apart again, so you might want to plan i t out before you begin." Followers The buildings made by the subjects in the planning group were diagramed, and given as instructions to the followers. Each follower was given a plan from his or her counterpart planner in a yoked design. They were instructed to build a building with a tower by following the diagram. Subjects in both groups were allowed to work as long as they wished, and spent approximately the same amount of time (20 minutes) on their respective tasks. Both groups f i l l e d out mood scales after completing the task. 35 RESULTS Figure 2 shows the mean pleasure and arousal scores for the two goups. Again, mean pleasure scores were above the neutral point for both groups. Planners scored higher on pleasure than followers, but this difference was only marginally significant (t=1.79, p<.10, two-tailed). There was no significant difference in arousal ratings. DISCUSSION The difference in pleasure ratings suggests that completing one's own plan may increase pleasure relative to completing a plan one has been given. Experiments 1 and 2, taken together, seem to indicate that planning increases arousal whereas completing one's plan increases pleasure. No differences were found in the arousal scores in experiment 2, presumably because sufficient time had elapsed after the planning for arousal levels to return to baseline. In experiment 1, mood ratings were made immediately after planning, while in experiment 2 a plan was formed and executed before any ratings were made. Therefore, i t i s impossible to determine whether arousal increased and declined again 36 for the planners, or whether pleasure increased independently of arousal. 37 9 8 7 < 3 2 11-0 PLANNER [\^  FOLLOWER 33 3 AROUSAL PLEASURE Figure 2. Mean mood ra t i n g s f o r Experiment 2, 38 EXPERIMENT 3 RE-PLANNING Experiment 3 was designed to investigate what happens to mood when a person has to change a plan, and what effect this change has on liking of the place. In this experiment, subjects were asked to pretend to be secret agents. Their task was to hide five cassette tapes in a room as quickly as possible. A l l subjects were given the opportunity to plan, but some were given accurate information about the room where they would hide the tapes, and some were given inaccurate information. It was hypothesized that subjects who had to re-plan because of inaccurate expectations would experience higher arousal than subjects with accurate expectations. Since no one could f a i l on this task, pleasure should be above the neutral point for both groups (a pleasure score below the neutral point would indicate displeasure), but pleasure should be more intense for the group that experiences higher arousal. METHOD Subjects Subjects were 40 students enrolled in introductory 39 psycholgy courses who recieved course credit, for participating. Rooms Subjects hid the tapes in one of two rooms. The rooms were identical in size and shape, but one was set up as an office and the other as a store room. The contents of the two rooms were adjusted to provide approximately the same number of hiding places in each room. Pretest ratings of task d i f f i c u l t y showed the rooms to be approximately equal. Rating Scales Hood ratings were made on Russell's Affect Grid (1983), a 9 by 9 grid defined by two orthogonal dimensions—pleasure and arousal. Russell's work has shown mood ratings made on this grid to be reliably correlated with mood ratings obtained on the 12 bipolar adjective scales used in experiments 1 and 2. The grid was used for this experiment because i t i s faster for making multiple ratings. Procedure Subjects again participated individually, and were told the purpose of the study was to investigate how working under time pressure affects people's mood. On arriving for the experiment, subjects were given the 40 instruction booklet for the Affect Grid, and asked to rate their mood. They were then asked to imagine that they were applying for a 3 0 b as a secret agent. They were given a code name (Agent 1 ) , and told they would receive further instructions from a hidden agent. They were then l e f t alone in the room and were read the following instructions over an intercom from the adjoining observation room: "Al l right Agent 1. To test your aptitude for this job, we're going to see how you handle a hypothetical situation. Please imagine that you've been successfully carrying out an assignment to collect certain information in a foreign country when you suddenly find out your cover's been blown. You have to get out of the country quickly, but before you go you want to pass along the information you have gathered to another agent--in case you don't make i t . The information you have gathered i s on the five tapes you'll find before you on the desk. It's been arranged that you'll hide these tapes in a certain room, and another agent wi l l come later and find them. In the envelope under the tapes i s some information about the room where you will hide the tapes. Please open i t now." 41 In the envelope were two pictures of one of the two rooms used for hiding the tapes, and the following instructions: "Here are some pictures of the room in which you'll be hiding the tapes. It i s a storeroom (office) that i s not used very much, but people do come in unexpectedly, so you'll need to work as fast as you can. There are sufficient hiding places for a l l five tapes. Please hide them in five different places. "Take a few minutes to study the pictures and plan your strategy. When you are ready to proceed, replace the pictures in the envelope and wait for further instructions." After the subjects had looked at the pictures, they were asked to make a rating of how well they expected to do (confidence rating), and another mood rating. They were then instructed to go to the appropriate room and hide the tapes. Subjects were randomly assigned to one of two groups. Half the subjects (the planners) carried out their plan in the expected room. The other half of the subjects (the replanners) were told there was a change in plans, and they would have to hide the tapes in a 42 room they hod no information about. Within each of the two groups of subjects, half hid the tapes in the "office" and half in the "storeroom." After hiding the tapes, they again rated their mood, and also rated how well they thought they had hidden the tapes and how much they liked the room in which they hid them. In sum, the experiment was a two-factor repeated measures design with three levels of "Time" (time 1=baseline ratings, time 2=after i n i t i a l planning, time 3=after task completion), and two levels of "Group" (planners and replanners). The room used for hiding the tapes was counterbalanced. Half the subjects in each group hid the tapes in the "storeroom" and half in the "office." Within the replanning group half the subjects saw pictures of the "storeroom" and actually went to the "office", and half saw pictures of the "office" and went to the "storeroom." RESULTS A repeated-measures analysis of variance was performed on the mood ratings at times 1 and 2 to examine the effects of i n i t i a l planning on mood. There was a main effect of Time on arousal (F=S1.15, df=l/38, p<.001), but not on pleasure. As expected, there was no significant interaction between Time and Group for 43 either mood dimension—the two groups were treated identically up to this point. A second repeated-measures analysis of variance was performed on the mood ratings at times 2 and 3 to examine the effects of re-planning on mood. There was a marginal effect of Group on pleasure (F=3.201, df=l/38, p=.08), but no significant effect on arousal, and no significant interaction between Time and Group for either mood dimension—although a weak pattern i s discernable. Figure 3 summarizes the changes in mood. I n i t i a l ratings of pleasure and arousal were similar for the two groups (replanners mean arousal=4.8, planners mean arousal=4.95, mean pleasure=6.2 for both groups). After the i n i t i a l planning, arousal increased for both groups (replicating the pattern of experiment 1), and pleasure remained approximately the same (as also happened in experiment 1). After performing the task, arousal increased again . for the replanners, but decreased slightly for the planners. Pleasure increased for both groups, but more so for the replanners. After the i n i t i a l planning, confidence ratings of how well the subject expected to do were similar for the two groups (replanners mean confidence=4.33, planners mean confidence=4.37), indicating there were no differences between the groups in the expected success of plans before the treatment was applied. These 44 confidence ratings were correlated with pleasure at time 2 (r=.28, p=.04, one-tailed)--as expected—and with arousal at time 2 (r=.32, p=.02, one-tailed). Success ratings taken at time 3 were significantly higher for the planners than for the replanners (replanner mean success-3.45, planner mean success=4.15, t=2.43, p<.05, two-toiled). Success ratings for the combined groups were not correlated with pleasure or arousal at time 3, or with changes in arousal and pleasure. However, tests for within group correlations between success ratings and pleasure and arousal changes showed a correlation between success rating and increase in arousal from time 1 to time 3 for the replanners (r=.39, p=.04, one-tailed), and a marginally significant correlation between success rating and increase in pleasure from time 2 to time 3 for the replanners <r=.31, p=.09, one-tailed). There were no significant correlations between success rating and changes in arousal or pleasure for the planners. As predicted, liking of the room was significantly greater for those subjects who went to a room they were not expecting (t=2.59, p=.01). DISCUSSION The results from the third experiment support 45 several of the predictions made here. Subjects who were forced to alter their plans to accommodate the unexpected features of a place reported increased arousal, increased pleasure, and increased liking of the place over subjects who were able to carry out their plans unaltered. The pattern of mood changes in experiment 3 was similar to the pattern found in experiments 1 and 2. Arousal increased after planning the f i r s t time--as in experiment l--although i t should be kept in mind that part of the increase in arousal in experiment may have been due to time pressure. More important, arousal sincreased again between time 2 and time 3 for the group who had to replan during execution. Pleasure increased after execution as in experiment 2, especially for the replanners. The larger increase in arousal for the replanners i s consistent with the hypothesis that changing plans increases arousal, and the corresponding increase in pleasure supports the hypothesis that this arousal intensifies pleasure. It i s somewhat surprising that pleasure did not increase at time 2 with the f i r s t increase in arousal, but an increase in pleasure only after execution i s consistent with the findings of experiments 1 and 2. In experiment l--planning without execution—no change in pleasure was found. In experiment 2—planning with execution—pleasure 46 increased after exectution for those who executed their own plan. Although the mean pleasure scores did not increase at time 2, pleasure was correlated with the confidence ratings made at time 2. This suggests that pleasure may have increased for those subjects who thought they had a good plan. The mean pleasure scores probably reflect the fact that many subjects were not satisfied with their plans at time 2. This i s not surprising since the task was beyond the realm of most people's everyday experience, and plans would be expected to be correspondingly d i f f i c u l t to evaluate. In further support of the hypothesis that plan evaluation influences pleasure, increase in pleasure was found to be correlated with success ratings only for those subjects who had to re-plan as they executed their plan. For those subjects the success ratings probably were the evaluations of their plans. It seems that when planning and execution of the plan are separated in time, the expected success of a plan influences pleasure. However, when planning occurs during execution, expected success and actual outcome may not be separable. Nost important, experiment 3 showed that violated expectations about a place do not necessarily result in decreased liking of the place. Liking of the experimental rooms actually increased for those subjects 47 who went t o a room t h e y w e r e n ' t e x p e c t i n g . 48 9 8 7 6 5 3 2 -1 -0 A R O U S A L P L E A S U R E P L A N N E R O O © - - * R E P L A N N E R • • • B B A S E L I N E A F T E R A F T E R P L A N N I N G E X E C U T I O N Figure 3. Mean mood ratings f o r Experiment 3. 49 GENERAL DISCUSSION The results of these three experiments showed a consistent pattern of effects of planning on mood over a variety of tasks. These effects thus demonstrate the fe a s i b i l i t y of pursuing the framework presented here. Three different planning tasks were a l l found to have measurable effects on mood and. in the case tested, on affective appraisal of a place. The planning tasks used were found to increase the arousal dimension of mood, while executing the plan showed a tendency to increase the pleasure dimension. Table 1 summarizes the results of the three experiments. In experiments 1 and 3, mood ratings were taken immediately after planning. Both show an increase in arousal immediately after planning, with experiment 3 suggesting an additional increment in arousal as a result of re-planning. No increase in arousal was found for the planners in experiment 2, perhaps because of the duration of the task (approximately 20 minutes). No mood ratings were obtained in this experiment until after completion of the task--sufficient time for the arousal caused by planning to dissipate. Comparison of arousal ratings in experiment 2 with the baseline measures in experiment 3 shows the arousal ratings for both planners and followers are quite close to the 50 arousal ratings of subjects on entering the experiment. The difference in pleasure between planners and followers in experiment 2 i s suggestive. Completing one's own plan seems to increase pleasure, whereas completing a plan one has been given does not. This trend i s supported by a comparison with the baseline measures of pleasure obtained in experiment 3--the mean pleasure rating for planners i s significantly higher than this baseline measure (t=2.35, p<.05), but the difference for followers i s nonsignificant <t=.65), indicating that pleasure increased for the planners rather than decreased for the followers. Pleasure also increased after plan execution in experiment 3, but only for the replanners. An intriguing explanation of the differential increase in pleasure between planners and replanners in experiment 3 i s suggested by the tendency of planners in experiment 2 to plan as they built, even though they were instructed to plan their buildings before they began. Host subjects immediately started putting the pieces together, and paused occassionally as they completed a segment. The increase in pleasure under these conditions, and in experiment 3 where subjects had to re-plan as they were executing the plan, may reflect something especially pleasurable about adjusting plans during execution. For some tasks, planning while executing the plan may have the advantage that the 51 constraints on subplan selection are more obvious and hence i t i s easier to choose plan segments that are likely to be positively evaluated. Future studies should examine the differences in mood between subjects who must f i r s t plan and then execute the plan, and subjects who must plan the same task as. they do i t . According to experiment 2, pleasure increases only for those subjects who execute their own plan; those subjects who completed the same plans without forming the plan themselves gave pleasure ratings similar to baseline conditions. This finding sheds some light on Miller, Galanter, and Pribram's (I960) observation regarding people's objections to motion-study engineering: "Unfortunately, workers may not acquire the strategies possessed by the engineers--they frequently object to being so tightly regimented and seem to feel that the boss i s trying to exploit them unfairly." (p. 85) Giving workers explicit plans for doing their job may well remove their major source of enjoyment of the work. The present experiments only tested a subset of the pos s i b i l i t i e s of plan-affect relationships, but the results suggest this as a f r u i t f u l line of inquiry. The planning tasks were found to have strong effects on the arousal component of mood, and somewhat more complex effects on the pleasure dimension of mood. It i s not surprising that the pleasure dimension i s 52 more complex, since i t i s dependent, in the present framework, on the individual's a b i l i t y to form a satisfactory plan and on how the plan f i t s into larger plans. Subjects do not completely give up their own ongoing plans for the duration of the psychology experiment. It i s relatively easy to manipulate expectations, and thus force subjects to change their plan; but i t i s less easy to predict their evaluation of the resultant plan since the evaluation depends on how the revised plan f i t s into each person's own ongoing plans. In this set of experiments, subjects were allowed to work at each task as long as they wished (although in experiment 3 they were encouraged to work as quickly as possible). Presumably, this allowed a l l subjects to form a satisfactory plan, and hence to experience the planning induced arousal positively. However, a subject who comes into the experiment with the plan to get i t over with as quickly as possible may evaluate his or her plan for hiding tapes differently than a subject who comes in with the plan to do whatever is asked as well as possible. The obvious test of the effect of planning on pleasure i s to present subjects with a task for which they will be unable to form a satisfactory plan. A success-failure comparison in a planning task would obviously show differences in the evaluative dimension of mood, d i f f i c u l t to find in the more subtle 53. manipulation used here where mean pleasure ratings were a l l positive. Asking subjects to perform a task for which they are unlikely to formulate a satisfactory plan should produce pleasure ratings below the neutral point on the scale. The present framework would predict that this unpleasant mood would result in decreased liking of the place about which the planning failure occurs. An alternate explanation of the present results that cannot be ruled out at this point i s that the mood changes in these experiments were due to the particular tasks chosen rather than to the common planning component. More work i s needed with s t i l l different planning tasks before this possibility can be eliminated. However, i t must be emphasized that a similar pattern of results was found with three quite different types of planning tasks. This similarity suggests that i t is. the common planning component that i s responsible for the findings. Although concern with being evaluated on task performance probably contributed to arousal increases, some such motivation i s integrally related to any plan. The goal of being favorably evaluated would have been equally likely to be part of the plans of subjects in any condition of the three experiments reported here, and so should not be responsible for differential increases in arousal. Perhaps the most interesting finding in this set of studies i s that unexpectedness may increase liking of a 54 place--a finding inconsistent with the general implications of Klein and Harris's (1979) interpretation of violated expectations as producing uniformly negative results. The assumption that negative effects are produced by incongruity between people's plans or expectations and the situation in which they find themselves seems to be f a i r l y widespread. Stokols and Novaco (1981) define well-being as "the degree of f i t (or congruence) between human goals and act i v i t i e s , and the environmental context in which they are pursued." (p. 97) Although this may certainly sometimes be the case, and may always be the case at some high level of the person's plan, a certain amount of incongruity may actually enhance well-being. Strong conclusions must await further research, but the results of the present research are promising. Increased liking of the slightly unexpected i s consistent with Berlyne's two-factor theory of aesthetic judgment (1974), but that theory lacks an explanation of why only intermediate degrees of unexpectedness are valued. The present view predicts that a person will positively evaluate the unexpected place as long as he or she i s able to adapt the current plan to f i t the place, or adjust the place to f i t the plan. Thus plans 'may supply the missing definition of "intermdiate" unexpectedness. Unexpectedness i s beyond the intermediate range when the person can no longer adjust 55 h i s or her plans t o accommodate i t . 56 TABLE 1 MEAN PLEASURE EXPERIMENT 1 Planner Rater EXPERIMENT 2 Planner Follower EXPERIMENT 3 Replanner Baseline After Planning After Execution Planner Baseline After Planning After Execution AND AROUSAL AROUSAL 5.9 5.0 5.0 5.1 4.8 6.8 7.6 5.0 6.9 6.9 SCORES PLEASURE 6.1 6.4 7.0 6.4 6.2 6.3 7.1 6.2 5.8 5.9 57 REFERENCES Bartlett, F.C. Remembering. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1932. Berlyne, D.E. Studies in the New Experimental Aesthetics: Steps Toward an Objective Psychology of Aesthetic Appreciation. New York: Halsted Press, 1974. Gifford, R. Environmental dispositions and the Evaluation of architectural interiors. Journal of Research in Personality. 1980, 14. 386-399. Goldin, S. & Hayes-Roth, B. Individual Differences in Planning Processes. N-1488-0NR, The Rand Corporation, June, 1980. Hayes-Roth, B. F l e x i b i l i t y in Executive Strategies. N-1170-0NR, The Rand Corppration, September, 1980. Hayes-Roth, B. Estimation of Time Requirements During Planning; Interaction Between Motivation and Cognition. N-1581-0NR, The Rand Corporation, November, 1980. Hayes-Roth, B. Human Planning Processes. R-2670-0NR, The Rand Corporation, December, 1980. Hayes-Roth, B. & Hayes-Roth, F. Cognitive Processes in Planning. R-2366, The Rand Corporation, December, 1978. 58 Hayes-Roth, B. & Thorndyke, P.W. Decisionmaking During the Planning Process. N-1213-0NR, The Rand Corporation, October, 1980. Hayes-Roth, B., Hayes-Roth, F. Rosenschein, S.J., & Cammarata, S. Modeling Planning as an Incremental. Opportunistic Process. N-1178-0NR, The Rand Corporation, June, 1979. Klein, K. & Harris, B. Disruptive effects of disconfirmed expectancies about crowding. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology. 1979, 37, 769-777. Mandler, G. Mind and Body: Psychology of Emotion and Stress. New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1984. Mehrabian, A. & Russell, J.A. An Approach to Environmental Psychology. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1974. Miller, G.A., Galanter, E., & Pribrim, K.H. Plans and the Structure of Behavior. Holt, Rinehart and Winston, Inc., 1960. Minsky, M.A. A framework for representing knowledge. In P.H. Winston, The Psychology of Computer Vision. New York: McGraw H i l l , 1975. Morasch, B., Groner, N., & Keating, J.P. Type of activity and failure as mediators of perceived crowding. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin. 1979, 5, 223-226. 59 Russell, J.A. A circumplex model of affect. Journal  of Personality and Social Psychology. 1980, 39. 1161-1178. Russell, J.A. The affect grid: A single item mood scale. Unpublished manuscript, 1983. Russell, J.A. & Ridgeway, D. Dimensions underlying children's emotion concepts. Developmental Psychology. 1983, 19, 795-804. Russell, J.A. & Ward, L . M . : Environmental psychology. Annual Review of Psychology. 1982, 33, 651-688. Stokols, D. & Novaco, R.W. Transportation and Well-being: An ecological perspective. In I. Altman, J. Wohlwill, & P. Everett (Eds.), Human Behavior and Environment: Advances in Theory and Research. Volume 5: Transportaion Environments. New York: Plenum Press, 1981. Ward, L.N. & Russell, J.A. Frames, plans and scripts in environmental psychology. Unpublished manuscript, 1983. 60 APPENDIX PLANNER'S INSTRUCTIONS You have just finished working out at the health club. You have to pick up your car at the Maple Street garage, but f i r s t you have several errands to do. Plan the most efficient route you can for accomplishing a l l these errands on the way to pick up your car. Here's your errand l i s t . Draw your route on the map. RATER'S INSTRUCTIONS You have just finished working out at the health club. It's 11:00 a.m., and you have several errands to do before you pick up your car at the Maple Street garage at 2:00 p.m. Assuming i t takes about 15 minutes to walk across town in either direction, decide whether or not you can complete the following l i s t of errands in the allotted time by following the route marked on the map. Here's your errand l i s t . 61 ERRAND L I S T pick up medicine for dog at the veterinary office 45 buy fan belt for refrigerator at appliance store 12 buy fresh vegetables at grocery 9, 87 check out two of the three luxury apartments 73, 91, stop at one of the restaurants for coffee 31, 39 buy toy for dog at pet store 28 pick up watch at watch repair 88 special order book at bookstore 86, 32, 14 buy gardening magazine at newsstand 100 send flowers to friend in hospital at flower shop 24 

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