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The role of Japan in United States strategic policy for Northeast Asia Solomon, Russell Keith 1985

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THE ROLE OF JAPAN IN UNITED STATES STRATEGIC POLICY FOR NORTHEAST ASIA by RUSSELL KEITH SOLOMON B.Juris.,  The U n i v e r s i t y Of Western A u s t r a l i a , 1976  LL.B., The U n i v e r s i t y Of Western A u s t r a l i a , 1977 B.A.  (Hons.), The U n i v e r s i t y Of Western A u s t r a l i a , 1982  A THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF MASTER OF ARTS in THE FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIES Political  Science Department  We accept t h i s t h e s i s as conforming to the r e q u i r e d  standard  THE UNIVERSITY OF BRITISH COLUMBIA January  ©  Russell  Keith  1985 Solomon, 1985  In  presenting  this  thesis  in  partial  fulfilment  of  the  requirements f o r an advanced degree at the U n i v e r s i t y  of  British  Columbia,  I  it  freely  available  for  permission  agree  for  purposes may or  her  that  the  Library  shall  reference  and  study.  I  extensive  It  p u b l i c a t i o n of t h i s t h e s i s allowed without my  Department of  written  Political  The U n i v e r s i t y of B r i t i s h 2075 Wesbrook Place Vancouver, Canada V6T 1W5  Date:  January  18,  1985  further  agree  that  copying of t h i s t h e s i s f o r s c h o l a r l y  be granted by the Head of my  representatives.  make  for  is  Department or  understood  financial  permission.  Science Columbia  gain  that  by  his  copying or  shall  not  be  ii  Abstract The  role  of  Japan  i n any U.S.  strategic  decided from the outcome of two debates. Japanese s e c u r i t y policy  policy  debate  and  points  of  The debates,  interaction,  problem of f o r e c a s t i n g perform  in  any  Northeast Asian  These two debates, the the  American  both  independently  illustrate  the kind  future  the  strategic  of  security  American  and  dynamic  strategic  at  Japan  policy  will  for  the  region.  and i n c r e a s i n g l y  s t r i d e n t American c a l l s  for  military Japan  build-up  to  defence c a p a b i l i t i e s , the Japanese debate s i g n a l s  consensus f o r an enhanced be  their  nature of the  role  Against a background of a S o v i e t r e g i o n a l  must  be  debate, have been conducted w i t h i n the l e a d i n g groups of  each c o u n t r y .  its  policy w i l l  severely  security  qualified  role.  However,  improve a growing  this  by the enduring impact of  constitutional,  p o l i t i c a l and economic c o n s t r a i n t s  policy-making.  The importance  that  certain  upon  leading  groups give to the domestic determinants of p o l i c y  trend certain  security Japanese  seems to have  been d i s c o u n t e d by many l e a d i n g Americans. Any  enhancement  must  be  accommodated by the Japanese domestic p o l i t i c a l environment;  an  environment  which  of  retains  recent movement towards a countries that  security  role  strong  pacifist  sentiments.  The  military  alliance  between  two  needs t o be balanced a g a i n s t the c o n t i n u i n g  a good p r o p o r t i o n of  public  Japan's  hold  for  American s e c u r i t y  a  leading  minimum  commitment,  Japanese  defence as  and  the  the  relevance Japanese  posture supported by the  embodied  in  the  U.S.-Japan  treaty. The  American s t r a t e g i c  main p o l i c y argument  arguments.  sees  p o l i c y debate i s concerned with two  The  unilateralist/maritime  the world i n e s s e n t i a l l y b i p o l a r  to augment American power  so  potential  through  enemy,  solely  as  to  be  able  supremacy  terms and seeks to  the use of U.S.  overcome power.  The  coalition/defence  argument views the world i n  and  d e t e r r e n c e a g a i n s t an enemy should s u f f i c e and  that  b e l i e v e s that this  can  best  be  achieved  management of a l l i e d as w e l l The debates  through the u t i l i z a t i o n and  as American  forces.  reveals  role  that  each  is  i n an i n s u f f i c i e n t l y developed  a s s i s t our p r e d i c t i o n s  i n any American s t r a t e g i c  as  easily  countered  direct security near  future.  by  equally  to  Japan's  policy.  Japan i s w i l l i n g to accept s p e c i f i c r e g i o n a l are  terms  examination of the p o l i c y arguments w i t h i n each of the  stage to g r e a t l y security  multipolar  a  future  Arguments  security  that  security  v a l i d ones which foresee no  r o l e w i t h i n any American s t r a t e g i c  p o l i c y of the  Table of Contents Abstract Acknowledgement  i i vi  Chapter I INTRODUCTION  1  Chapter II THE SOVIET THREAT: AMERICAN & JAPANESE PERCEPTIONS  19  A. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND  19  B. SOVIET AND AMERICAN MILITARY FORCES IN NORTHEAST ASIA .25 C. AMERICAN PERCEPTIONS OF THE SOVIET 'THREAT'  34  D. JAPANESE PERCEPTIONS OF THE SOVIET 'THREAT'  39  E. AN ASSESSMENT  47  Chapter I I I THE JAPANESE SECURITY POLICY DEBATE  54  A. THE UNITED STATES-JAPAN TREATY  55  B. THE JAPANESE SELF-DEFENSE FORCE  59  C. CHANGES TO JAPAN'S EXTERNAL ENVIRONMENT 61 D. JAPANESE VIEWS OF THE U.S.-JAPAN SECURITY RELATIONSHIP 63 E. JAPANESE CONCEPTS OF SECURITY 69 F. JAPANESE DOMESTIC CONSTRAINTS  75  G. JAPANESE RESPONSES TO AMERICAN CALLS FOR A MILITARY BUILD-UP  81  H. JAPAN'S FUTURE INTERNATIONAL  87  SECURITY ROLE  Chapter IV THE UNITED STATES STRATEGIC POLICY DEBATE & JAPAN  95  A. RECENT U.S. ADMINISTRATIONS' NORTHEAST ASIA  97  STRATEGIC POLICIES FOR  B. THE UNILATERALIST/MARITIME SUPREMACY ARGUMENT  106  C. THE COALITION/DEFENCE ARGUMENT  113  D. PROPOSED JAPANESE MISSIONS WITHIN AN AMERICAN STRATEGIC  V  POLICY E. THE AMERICAN  123 DEBATE ASSESSED  128  Chapter V CONCLUSION  133  BIBLIOGRAPHY  145  I. NEWSPAPERS  145  I I . OFFICIAL DOCUMENTS  145  I I I . SECONDARY SOURCES  145  vi  Acknowledgement  I would l i k e to express my a p p r e c i a t i o n of the c r i t i c a l and  suggestions  provided  me  comments  by P r o f e s s o r s K.J. H o l s t i and P.  Marantz. Dr Douglas Ross i s owed a s p e c i a l debt of g r a t i t u d e f o r not only h i s general  supervision  and  guidance  but  also h i s  f r i e n d l y encouragement and support. A  special  thank  you i s owed to my good f r i e n d s M. Ramesh  and John Fossum f o r the general support  and p a t i e n c e they showed  me d u r i n g the r e s e a r c h and w r i t i n g of t h i s paper.  1  I.  Japan and  and t h e U n i t e d  economic  Treaty  deal  a  anything,  of o p i n i o n  threat should  automatically was  exists  take  to  expect  and  important  issue of the Soviet the  Japanese  of the e x t e n t by  the  States  within and  i f such a  articulated.  environment  the United  Even  were  liberal  determinants of i t s s e c u r i t y  policy  This  States,  U.S.  if  identical,  paper w i l l  examine b o t h t h e  i twill  American  strategic  throw some l i g h t  on t o t h e  demands o f i t s d o m e s t i c  role  will  e n v i r o n m e n t and  policy  towards  the  Northeast  i t s g l o b a l p o l i c y , h a s been t h e s u b j e c t security  indecisiveness  h a s n o t been a b l e  strategic  own, even  will  security relationship.  strategic  as with  confusion  their  policy  t o w h i c h any J a p a n e s e s e c u r i t y  t h o s e o f t h e Japan-U.S. American  what, i f  is a  In so d o i n g ,  determined  and  Japan's s e c u r i t y  s e c u r i t y p o l i c y d e b a t e and t h e  subject  debate  security  ' t h r e a t ' and t h e i s s u e of the i n t e r a c t i o n of  debate.  region,  i s s u e s of  from  function.  policy  be  t h e two f u n d a m e n t a l  such a t h r e a t .  that  like  Japan-  i s a good  of the e x t e r n a l  d e m o c r a c y and t h e d o m e s t i c an  political  there  unequivocally  they a r e not, Japan,  have  many  i t prescribes,  Japan's  i t s lead  clearly  having  the parameters of the  over  be done t o meet  Japanese p e r c e p t i o n s which  Within  and t h e a r r a n g e m e n t s  Americans cannot  policy  while  i n common, do n o t n e c e s s a r i l y h o l d t h e  outlook.  of divergence  whether  States,  interests  same g e o s t r a t e g i c U.S.  INTRODUCTION  to  problems d e s p i t e  planning in  unravel  the  circles. late  Asian o f much  Beset  by  1970s, t h e U n i t e d  i t s global  and  regional  t h e c o m i n g t o power o f R o n a l d  Reagan  2  with h i s 'peace through  strength' solutions.  t u r n i n g p o i n t i n terms of allies  and  America's  the r e s t of the world.  relations  order  was  over  the  itself  Soviet  with  both i t s  Not only d i d many Americans  b e l i e v e that the United S t a t e s had l o s t superiority  The 1970s marked a  i t s strategic  nuclear  Union, but to them, "the postwar  breaking down d u r i n g these y e a r s " .  For many  1  i n f l u e n t i a l Americans, t h i s order had been l a r g e l y the c r e a t i o n of  the  United  S t a t e s and had depended f o r i t s sustenance  upon  America's continued m i l i t a r y , p o l i t i c a l and economic supremacy. I t had been r e p l a c e d by a new order which  required  the  United  S t a t e s to seek the c o o p e r a t i o n and c o l l a b o r a t i o n of i t s a l l i e s . The  classic  cold  war  scenario  had  ceased  to have any  relevance and America's a l l i e s were no longer prepared  t o accept  American l e a d e r s h i p as u n q u e s t i o n i n g l y as they had b e f o r e . world of l o o s e n i n g Western a l l i a n c e arrangements and instability  and  unpredictability,  attention,  i n c r e a s i n g l y , to those  interests  were  at  f o r c e s c o u l d have a notable candidate Northeast  2  began  regions where  increasing to t u r n i t s  vital  economic  r i s k and where the a d d i t i o n of her m i l i t a r y decisive  impact.  Northeast  Asia  was  a  f o r such a t t e n t i o n .  Asia  had  already  begun  to  importance,  both economically and m i l i t a r i l y ,  By the l a t e  1970s, U.S.  that a c r o s s the A t l a n t i c  1  America  In a  take on i n c r e a s e d i n American  trade a c r o s s the P a c i f i c 2  had  eyes.  exceeded  and many Americans were coming t o view  Robert W. Tucker, The I n e q u a l i t y of Nations (New York, p.47 Two-way U.S.-Japan trade i n 1982 surpassed $60 b i l l i o n .  1977)  3  Japan  as  both i t s g r e a t e s t t r a d i n g partner  Hemisphere as w e l l as Militarily,  i t s g r e a t e s t economic  the growth of S o v i e t  o u t s i d e the Western rival.  military  in  this  region  impelled America's l e a d e r s to c o n s i d e r a r e v i s e d s e c u r i t y  policy  f o r Northeast A s i a as an e s s e n t i a l i n g r e d i e n t of a g l o b a l  policy  to  region was global  match  pattern.  direct  of seeking  for  its  to answer any  but  America's  1950s,  security  Japan  interests  in  i n i t i a l l y formalised  the Japan-U.S.  suffered  s t r a t e g i c gains  in  one  i n t e r v e n t i o n , not  only  been  the most important of  Northeast in 1952  is  Asia.  Cooperation,  s e c u r i t y arrangements arose out  They  were a l s o l i v i n g  weakness and  American s t r e n g t h .  p r e s c r i b e d that the United  with  something more i n than  the case with most a l l i a n c e s and  situation.  This  became i n 1960,  the nature of a p o l i t i c a l / d i p l o m a t i c c o a l i t i o n As  overall  3  had  the Treaty of Mutual S e c u r i t y and  alliance.  the  Both superpowers e x h i b i t e d a tendency to embrace  the  relationship,  in  a l s o by c o u n t e r s t r i k e s i n other  a p o l i c y of h o r i z o n t a l e s c a l a t i o n . Since  place  by some kind of m i l i t a r y  counteractions  d i s t a n t areas.  To the Americans, each m i l i t a r y  L i k e i t s superpower r i v a l , the U.S.  r e g i o n , obtained by  the S o v i e t s .  p r i m a r i l y important  the temptation  3  power  of  a  military  coalitions, a  conflict  evidence of postwar Japanese  In essence, these  arrangements  S t a t e s would take an unequal share of  the  burden f o r Japan's defence and  f o r that of the  neighbouring  area  i n return f o r Japan's membership of the Western camp.  Kurt W. Radtke, "Global S e c u r i t y and Northeast Asia", Journal of Northeast Asian Studies Vol.2 No.1 (March 1983) p.59.  4  As Japan developed i n t o an economic power years,  its  leaders  overlapping  The commitment of  each  to  remained unequal but the arrangements appear to have  transformed  the  Paradoxically, postwar  postwar  i n t e r e s t s which they sought to p r o t e c t by  means of the s e c u r i t y arrangements. other  the  and America's l e a d e r s a c q u i r e d  s t r a t e g i c and economic  the  in  relationship while becoming  years,  Japan  into  a  "defensive  the economic  remained  under  the  alliance."  success s t o r y of the American  national  s e c u r i t y umbrella and e x h i b i t e d great r e l u c t a n c e t o p r o v i d e more than  the  minimum  for  her  own  defence.  Perhaps, as has been  suggested r e c e n t l y , there i s to be found some c a u s a l  connection  between low defence spending and high l e v e l s of growth." While  the Japan-U.S.  manifestations military crisis,  of  purpose  a  political/diplomatic  forces  of  deployed  potential on  and  security  and  only  the Japan-U.S. testing  In George L i s k a ' s words,  derivatively  In times of threats,  distinct  i n the decade of the  the  military  " a l l i a n c e s are a g a i n s t ,  f o r , someone or something."  relationship, Liska's  their  about Japan pursuant to the  Treaty would appear to give the " a l l i a n c e " a significance.  coalition,  was never f a r below the s u r f a c e .  or more commonly  military  s e c u r i t y arrangements were the prime  words  would  5  In terms of find  their  1970s.  " J.K.Galbraith suggested i n October 1981 that Japan should s t a t e publicly that high levels of military expenditure are incompatible with economic growth:Quoted in Kenneth Pyle,"Changing Conceptions of Japan's International Role"(Unpublished Seminar Paper, 1984) p.9 G.Liska, Nations i n A l l i a n c e : The L i m i t s of Interdependence (Baltimore, 1 962) p.12 5  5  The  1970s was a p e r i o d of c r i s i s and, i n the views of many  i n f l u e n t i a l Americans and  Japanese,  of  t h r e a t to Japan and the Northeast Asian witnessed  the  Sino^Soviet  split  a  potential  region.  The e a r l y years  and the Nixon "shocks", which  a f f e c t e d Japan d i p l o m a t i c a l l y and e c o n o m i c a l l y . crisis was  of o i l supply  the  massive  was to have security  serious  policy  qualitative capability In  and  thinkers.  lasting  i n t h i s p e r i o d which  effects  Soviet  military  theatre  to p r o j e c t  lanes  communication  which both the U.S. trade  political  threat  build-up.  which  a strong  includes maritime  While the S o v i e t Union has improved military  capabilities,  faces many l i m i t a t i o n s , i n c l u d i n g g e o g r a p h i c a l  now  their  and e s p e c i a l l y Japan, depend f o r e s s e n t i a l  and energy s u p p l i e s .  Union  and  which pass through the r e g i o n and upon  the e x e r c i s e of that power. Soviet  Japan's  i t s power and i n f l u e n c e over the v i t a l sea  both i t s s t r a t e g i c and c o n v e n t i o n a l still  upon  forces  of o p e r a t i o n s ,  Northeast A s i a , the Soviet Union has a c q u i r e d capability  the  However, i t  f o r f o r c e p r o j e c t i o n was p a r t of a g l o b a l Eastern  well,  In East A s i a , t h i s q u a n t i t a t i v e and  improvement of  i t s Far  of  As  and access h i t Japan d i r e c t l y .  Soviet m i l i t a r y b u i l d - u p  more  security  poses  6  a  I f , as some direct  writers  military  to Japan and to the r e g i o n ,  ones, upon  suggest,  and  the  an i n d i r e c t  then an examination  of both i t s enhanced m i l i t a r y c a p a b i l i t y and the p e r c e p t i o n s  6  it  of  E a r l Ravenal, "Perceptions of American Power" i n F r a n k l i n D. Margiotta (ed.), Evolving Strategic R e a l i t i e s t l m p l i c a t i o n s for U.S. Policymakers (Washington, D.C.: 1980) p.145 at 153.  6  l e a d i n g American and Chapter  Two  will  m i l i t a r y build-up, been p e r c e i v e d by  the  Japanese commentators i s i n o u t l i n e the extent  in both i t s r e g i o n a l and  by American and  respective  Soviet  Japanese commentators as well  as  as  constituting  Japanese i n t e r e s t s in the  demonstrate  that  the  region.  enhanced  a threat  The  chapter  Soviet  tensions  of that t h r e a t between the two between the two  to  will  military  tended to s o l i d i f y the U.S.-Japan " a l l i a n c e " ,  d i f f e r i n g perceptions exacerbated  to which t h i s  has  American and  c a p a b i l i t y has  7  g l o b a l contexts,  governments,  although  order.  the  nations  over the nature and  has  level  of Japanese c o n t r i b u t i o n s to the r e l a t i o n s h i p . The  Soviet  i n v a s i o n of Afghanistan  "hostage" a f f a i r prompted the United its  Pacific-based  Indian  Ocean i n 1979.  in the  Asian-Pacific  Contrasted provided eyes,  naval  to  the  the  need  States  to  As a r e s u l t , those U.S. theatre  were  growing S o v i e t  for  deploy  Iranian some  f o r c e s to the P e r s i a n Gulf and  f u r t h e r evidence, at l e a s t  of  coupled with the  Japan  left  forces  to  somewhat  depleted.  in some i n f l u e n t i a l increase  the  remaining  f o r c e s , these thinned  to  of  forces  American  its  defence  contributions.  as  The  calls  they  did  the United  increase  "worldwide war  i n Japanese c o n t r i b u t i o n s , coming  from a number of l e a d i n g groups in both Japan  S t a t e s , were being  Administration  7  f o r an  was  embarking  strategy".  made at on  a  what  time  when  the  and U.S.  J e f f r e y Record terms a  As Record p o i n t s out,  this  strategy  fails to reveal to i t s a l l i e s , i n c l u d i n g Japan, any l i s t of For example, Robert A. S c a l a p i n o (1982), J a c q u e l i n e K. Davis in Morrison (ed.) (1983), and James E. Dornan J r in Foster, Dornan e t . a l . ( e d s . ) (1979).  7  strategic recently  priorities.  As  8  two  American  commentators  have  noted:  " I n s o f a r as the A d m i n i s t r a t i o n seems t o have a grand strategy, i t appears to i n c o r p o r a t e requirements f o r f i g h t i n g wars of every kind, a l l at once—global conventional war against an unspecified range of adversaries, offensive conventional operations against the S o v i e t homeland, and a v i c t o r i o u s nuclear war a g a i n s t the S o v i e t s . " 9  The its  globalist  emphasis  assumption the  threat  than  upon  that  from the  t o meet  consensus",  threat  or  to  about  as  senior  the  how  escalation  and  the  Union  amongst  an  that  this  "ally"  partner,  i n the in  same l i g h t whatever  In as  should, the  the  same  Henry K i s s i n g e r  view  be  more  is  deemed  that  to  Union.  being  a s u p e r p o w e r , and  States  expects  i n h i s work on  a  countries,  Soviet is  this  regional  subordinated  Administration  United  bold  vein,  allied/aligned  with  will  and  way  assuming be  i s v i e w e d by  the  the  aligned countries  been c r i t i c i z e d least  makes  i n t e r n a t i o n a l s e c u r i t y i s the  contributions.  alliance  Reagan A d m i n i s t r a t i o n  challenge.  at  i t i s simply  explicit  allied  1 0  has  "strategic  Perhaps  9  the  can,  the  the  contribute,  conflicts  that  8  Soviet  to  ambiguous s t r a t e g y  of  horizontal  its allies  prepared  necessary,  approach  1 0  more that  uncritical the  Nato  o f f e r e d a s i m i l a r view:  Jeffrey Record, "Jousting with Unreality" in International S e c u r i t y V o l . 8 No.3 ( W i n t e r 1983/84) p.3 a t 5 Barry R.Posen and Stephen Van Evera, "Defense P o l i c y & the Reagan Administration: Departure from Containment" in I n t e r n a t i o n a l S e c u r i t y V o l . 8 No.3 ( W i n t e r 1983/84) p.3 a t 42 Jeffrey Record, " J o u s t i n g w i t h U n r e a l i t y " and B a r r y Posen and S t e p h e n Van E v e r a , " D e f e n s e P o l i c y & t h e Reagan A d m i n i s t r a t i o n " .  8  "There i s a tendency f o r a l l i e s to be c o n s i d e r e d by the superpower as f a c t o r s i n a s e c u r i t y arrangement and their utility i s measured i n terms of t h e i r c o n t r i b u t i o n to a common e f f o r t . " 1 1  The  security  arrangement  that  U n i t e d S t a t e s and Japan i s , i n  terms  benefits in  and  exists of  i t s distribution  o b l i g a t i o n s , l i t t l e changed  1960 with the s i g n i n g of  the  today between the of  from that e s t a b l i s h e d  revised  Treaty.  The  Treaty  e s t a b l i s h e d an asymmetrical r e l a t i o n s h i p between the two n a t i o n s ascribing  vastly  different  s e c u r i t y burdens to American  nuclear  each.  and  m i l i t a r y c a p a b i l i t i e s and n a t i o n a l Behind  the  protective  shield  c o n v e n t i o n a l defence c a p a b i l i t i e s ,  remained a p a s s i v e c l i e n t  s t a t e with only a minimal S e l f  of  Japan  Defense  Force. The s e c u r i t y system e s t a b l i s h e d operate  under  by  the  usual  alliance  c o l l e c t i v e defence.  As an  unequal-burden  S e c u r i t y and Cooperation to  come  to  the  Treaty  assumptions treaty,  does  not  of mutual and the  Mutual  Treaty e x p l i c i t l y o b l i g e s the Americans  the a i d of the Japanese should they be a t t a c k e d or  f i n d themselves s u b j e c t to any form of p o l i t i c a l c o e r c i o n .  The  Japanese, on the other hand, are p l a c e d under no such o b l i g a t i o n should the Americans be a t t a c k e d . do  arrangements  provide something of a q u i d pro quo f o r the U n i t e d S t a t e s i s  in the p r o v i s i o n of bases forces  1 1  Where the T r e a t y  as  Henry A. p.23  and  other  facilities  w e l l as i n g i v i n g i t permission  for  American  to s t a t i o n troops on  K i s s i n g e r , The Troubled P a r t n e r s h i p (New York,  1965)  9  Japanese In  territory. contrast  security"  to the 1951 accord which had been a " t r e a t y  f o r the  provision  s t r e s s e d m u t u a l i t y and c a l l e d political  and  economic  of  for joint  the  provide  the 1960 t r e a t y  defence  cooperation.  p r o v i s i o n r e q u i r i n g that the U.S. latter  facilities,  In  defend  of  as  well  addition  Japan  and  the former with bases and f a c i l i t i e s  as  to the that  the  t o support  American commitments both to Japan and throughout East A s i a ,  there a r e other important p r o v i s i o n s which d i r e c t l y nature  of  the  two  nations'  security  affect  the  relationship.  In  p a r t i c u l a r , Japan agreed to b u i l d a moderate-sized, c o n v e n t i o n a l defence establishment and to defend the jurisdiction;  the U.S.  agreed  to  territories  under i t s  c o n s u l t with Japan before  d e p l o y i n g any American troops (based i n Japan) t o combat o u t s i d e of  Japan and before i t made any major deployments  made  any  major  changes  to i t s combat equipment  Japan agreed to support American Rather  than  interpreted  security  in  such  these a  way  provisions  have  but  in  has  or  Korea.  for security in  as t o entrench that  burden which was o r i g i n a l l y p r e s c r i b e d  Japan  i n Japan; and  efforts  c r e a t e a mutual r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  Northeast Asian r e g i o n ,  to  i n the  fact  been  i n e q u a l i t y of ceased  t o be  necessary. The  unique  security  position  a f t e r the Second World War i s no reference  to  the  legal  i n which Japan found  better  prescription  illustrated f o r Japan's  d e m i l i t a r i s a t i o n which was i n c o r p o r a t e d i n A r t i c l e r e v i s e d Japanese C o n s t i t u t i o n .  itself  than  by  permanent IX  of the  T h i s A r t i c l e p r o c l a i m e d that the  10  Japanese the  people  n a t i o n and  "forever  the  r e n o u n c e war  t h r e a t o r use  i n t e r n a t i o n a l d i s p u t e s " and f o r c e s , a s w e l l as o t h e r This by  constitutional  of  asserts that  war  "land,  potential, will  ironically  elements i n Japan to f o r e s t a l l ,  right  f o r c e as a means of  p r o v i s i o n , while  t h e A m e r i c a n s , has  as a s o v e r e i g n  settling  sea,  not  be  and  i f not  used  by  prevent,  air  maintained".  i m p o s e d upon t h e  been  of  Japanese  the  pacifist  the expansion  of  Japan's defence f o r c e s . As great  the  r e g i o n where t h e  powers  theatre  of  S t a t e s and detached  converge, war  the  Northeast  should  Soviet Union.  from  the  stability There  United than  and  has  The  region,  has  States  a  security  terms.  global  rather  than  found a permanent l i n k security  interests.  sentiments maintain  1 2  and a  1 2  strong  U.S.  a  these  there  and  economic  interests  the  is  allies.  more i n  for  the  economic  for  a  r e g i o n a l v i e w , so t h e r e must  be  ranking  military  geographically  A d m i n i s t r a t i o n s , however,  between the U n i t e d  emphasise  United  i n the postwar y e a r s  t h a t j u s t as  High  between the  political  r e g i o n of t h e w o r l d  merely  vital  while  vital  four  a  i t s r e g i o n a l f r i e n d s and  Recent  h a v e come t o a p p r e c i a t e  arise  U.S.,  tendency  to view t h i s  c a p a b i l i t i e s of constitutes  C h i e f amongst  s e c u r i t y of been  Asia  hostilities  i n t e r e s t s to protect there. the  i n t e r e s t s and  need presence  is  a  States'  Congressmen for in  need  economic echo  the U n i t e d the  and these  States  region.  to As  Secretary of State George S c h u l t z r e i t e r a t e d t h i s view i n a speech given in early 1983: "The U.S. & East Asia: A Partnership f o r the Future" i n Department of S t a t e B u l l e t i n A p r i l 1983, p p . 3 1 - 3 5 .  11  Congressman  G.  W i l l i a m Whitehurst (Republican, V i r g i n i a ) of the  House Armed S e r v i c e s Committee r e c e n t l y  said:  "...I b e l i e v e that U.S. p o l i c y toward the region must include maintaining a strong m i l i t a r y presence, i n c o n j u n c t i o n with our East A s i a n a l l i e s , promoting the extension of democratic i n s t i t u t i o n s and p o l i t i c a l freedoms and encouraging c o n t i n u e d economic growth w i t h i n the framework of f r e e t r a d e . " 1 3  Japan's r o l e  the  maintenance  America's  military  in  economic  perspective>  and  a source of a i d f o r the l e s s developed c o u n t r i e s of the  region. to  i n two r e s p e c t s .  From an  Japan i s viewed as both a t r a d i n g  partner  From the s e c u r i t y p e r s p e c t i v e , Japan's r o l e  that of an "unsinkable a i r c r a f t  U.S. of  region i s emphasized  of  posture  as  the  in  can  from  which  relationship.  have  favoured  the  landmass.  recent years, s t r e s s e s and s t r a i n s have appeared i n  U.S.-Japan U.S.  1  likened  use i t s f o r c e s to p r o j e c t power around the perimeter  the E u r a s i a n In  carrier" "  is  experienced  Japan.  By  Since masive  1985,  the  the l a t e trade U.S.  the  1960s, Japan and the  imbalances  which  trade d e f i c i t  will  have have  reached between 30 and 40 b i l l i o n d o l l a r s and t h i s has sharpened concern i n the reluctance not U.S.  1 3  1 4  U.S.,  to open  especially  in  Congress,  i t s markets to American goods.  u n r e l a t e d to these trade d i f f i c u l t i e s ,  over  Japanese  As w e l l , and  l e a d i n g groups i n the  have accused the Japanese of having a " f r e e r i d e "  at  the  Letter from G. W i l l i a m Whitehurst t o the w r i t e r , dated August 13, 1984. Japanese Prime M i n i s t e r Yasuhiro Nakasone was f i r s t quoted as s a y i n g t h i s i n The Washington Post March 20, 1983 p.C5  12  expense  of the American  defence e f f o r t  i s of s p e c i a l concern, however, i s between  the  security  two  countries  relationship  misunderstandings  has  is  and  i n Northeast A s i a .  that  this  revealed  itself  friction  that the U.S.-Japan  based  diametrically  recent  What  on  opposed  paradoxes,  views of how  the  b e n e f i t s and c o s t s of the r e l a t i o n s h i p are d i s t r i b u t e d . Chapter Three w i l l analyze debate  i n an attempt  the  Japanese  security  t o assess the l i k e l i h o o d of Japan adopting  an enhanced defence posture e i t h e r  within  Japan-U.S.  T h i s study w i l l  security  policy  relationship.  or  outside  of  the  r e f e r to the  nature and m i s s i o n s of Japan's S e l f Defense F o r c e s , e f f o r t s made to  improve  their  capability,  and  the domestic p o l i t i c a l  and  other c o n s t r a i n t s upon such e f f o r t s . The Japanese  debate over i t s f u t u r e defence p o s t u r e and i t s  f u t u r e r o l e as an " a l l y " in  Northeast  Domestic  of the United S t a t e s , both g l o b a l l y  A s i a , occurs w i t h i n a complex domestic c o n t e x t .  political  o p i n i o n , both w i t h i n  influential  w i t h i n the g e n e r a l p u b l i c , has been e v o l v i n g greater  support  Forces.  However,  defence  capability  there are  a  for  both  this  groups  support  i s not without q u a l i f i c a t i o n and,  i n Japan,  well-entrenched  for  Defense stronger  of  in  and  i n the d i r e c t i o n of  the T r e a t y and Japan's S e l f  increase  1 5  a  number  expanded defence  1 5  and  constraints  upon  an  role.  P a r t i c i p a n t s i n t h i s debate i n c l u d e Yukio Satoh, "The E v o l u t i o n of Japanese S e c u r i t y P o l i c y " (1982), Masataka Kosaka, "Japan's Role i n the World" (1984), Osamu K a i h a r a , "Japan's Defense S t r u c t u r e & C a p a b i l i t y " (1981), Mike Mochizuki, "Japan's Search for S t r a t e g y " (1983-84).  13  Defeat bombing  i n World War II and the a c t u a l experience of nuclear  have  created  sentiments and have insular  outlook.  exceptionally  encouraged  the  strong  adoption  antimilitary  by  many  of  While the people have come to accept, and the  c o u r t s have r e c e n t l y a f f i r m e d , that f o r c e s f o r s e l f - d e f e n c e permitted  are  by the "peace" C o n s t i t u t i o n , a prudent fear of a p r e -  World War II m i l i t a r i s t force.  an  r e v i v a l remains over the use of m i l i t a r y  T h i s fear has been t r a n s l a t e d  i n t o strong o p p o s i t i o n  to  any use of the Japanese f o r c e s o u t s i d e of the home i s l a n d s . Increased  American  calls,  from both the C a r t e r and Reagan  A d m i n i s t r a t i o n s , f o r an enhancement of Japan's defence e f f o r t i n Northeast A s i a have met governments extent in  encouraging  responses  of Zenko Suzuki and Yasuhiro Nakasone.  t o which t h i s d e s i r e to be accommodating  increased  missions  military  spending  and  the  from  the  However, the  f i n d s substance  assignment  of  new  f o r Japan's S e l f Defense Force, i s c o n s t r a i n e d by the  o p p o s i t i o n of p o l i t i c a l and  with  groups to the presence of  U.S.  forces  bases on Japanese s o i l as w e l l as by the e x e r c i s e of f i s c a l  r e s t r a i n t by the powerful Japanese Finance M i n i s t r y . Since the l a t e assigned  the  1970s, Japan's S e l f Defense Force  mission  small-scale aggression. naval  and  a i r over  i n c r e a s e s i n manpower. the  Self  Defense  of  defending  Japanese  the  defence  has  been  home i s l a n d s a g a i n s t planners  emphasize  ground f o r c e s , and improved weaponry over In t h e i r view, the  primary  mission  Force i s to 'buy time' u n t i l American  of  forces  intervene to overcome the enemy. Within Japan, there are to be found v a r y i n g p e r c e p t i o n s  of  1 4  the  Soviet  opinions good  regional  over  what t h e  proportion  odds w i t h  the  strategic  views  expanded role  In  "ally"  and  many  general, of  the  so  military  its  as  opinion defence  should very  that  they U.S.  because  should  them a  This  to  developing  be  leading  role  continues, a  be  holds forces  A  much a t  current  security.  functions within  be.  the  w h i c h would g i v e  argument  differing  commentators,  o r members of  regional the  well  a p p e a r s t o be  American  U.S.,  as  posture  American  missions  Asian  Japan,  complementary  defence  legislators  assigned  in Northeast  enable  nation's  of  thinkers,  i s an  build-up  of J a p a n e s e o p i n i o n  Administration. Japan  military  would perform  strategic  design. Chapter American Japan the of  performing  the  may  will  examine  s t r a t e g i c d e b a t e and  debate.  the  Four  the  briefly  will  illustrate  Japanese S e l f Defense Force,  well  to  have  assess  those p a r t i c u l a r missions  T h i s assessment  extent  main  which American overwhelmed  a  but  arguments the  perceptions  not  realistic  only  the  of  for i t in the  limits  importantly, of  the  feasibility  prescribed  more  of  Soviet  consideration  show threat  of  the  Japanese p o s i t i o n . This 1970s.  I t has  strategic Chapter  American  debate  produced  p o l i c y b a s e d on Four  defence  strategy  Asia  t o the  and  been c o n d u c t e d  main a r g u m e n t s f o r  a conventional  will  unilateralist/maritime  and  two  has  examine supremacy  their  r o l e of A m e r i c a ' s  strategy  allies.  a  the  U.S.  warfighting  these  v a r i a n t s , as  since  global  capability.  arguments, and  the  they apply  early  the  coalition/ to  Northeast  15.  The with  proponents of each of  arguments  the g l o b a l Soviet m i l i t a r y b u i l d - u p and,  the unfavourable acknowledge the world, In  these  an  f o r c e trends  in  Northeast  increasing i n s t a b i l i t y  this  maintenance of a of  found  concern  certain  operations;  E u r a s i a n landmass; and The  both  in c e r t a i n v i t a l areas of the  Middle  East.  what each sees as the growing S o v i e t t h r e a t , the  particular,  theatre  see them,  Also,  p o l i c y arguments are concerned with common s t r a t e g i c In  concerned  as they  Asia.  p a r t i c u l a r l y the P e r s i a n Gulf and  addressing  are  relates  level  of  to  problems.  the achievement  deterrence  in  any  given  the a b i l i t y to p r o j e c t power on to the  the achievement of e s c a l a t i o n dominance.  u n i l a t e r a l i s t / m a r i t i m e supremacy  argument,  which  has  favour with the Reagan A d m i n i s t r a t i o n , p r e s c r i b e s that the  United as a  States maritime  concentrate instruments  take f u l l advantage of i t s g e o p o l i t i c a l power,  on  bordered  building  up  by  its  of f o r c e p r o j e c t i o n  friendly naval  neighbours,  forces  throughout  position  the  as  and  the prime  globe.  As  r e g i o n on the p e r i p h e r y of the Eurasian landmass, Northeast is  and  viewed  as  could  forward  Asia  a t h e a t r e of o p e r a t i o n s where a l l i e s can best  used as bases and  s t a g i n g p o i n t s from which  deploy  its  naval  p r o j e c t i o n on to the A s i a n c o n t i n e n t  and  air  in times  the  United  support of  a  be  States  f o r c e s for  emergency  or  conflict. Chief  among  S e c r e t a r y John F. "clear enable  maritime the U.S.  the  proponents  of  this  p o l i c y , U.S.  Lehman J r argues that the U.S. s u p e r i o r i t y " over  must  Navy  seek  a  the S o v i e t Union which would  to p r o t e c t the sea lanes of  communication  and  16  access  to  America's  f r i e n d s and a l l i e s .  s t r u c t u r e which emphasises and  offensive  combat,  flexibility,  Secretary  In advocating a f o r c e mobility,  Lehman  simultaneity  argues  that a U.S.  strategy: "..based on forward maritime defense i s e s s e n t i a l i n drawing down enemy forces, keeping p r e s s u r e on the enemy's i n t e r i o r l i n e s of communication, preventing his concentration of f o r c e s , and buying time f o r the c a p a b i l i t i e s of the i n d u s t r i a l democracies to m o b i l i z e and come i n t o d e c i s i v e p l a y . " 1 6  The  other  strategy.  policy  Robert W.  policy.  As p o s t u l a t e d by Komer, America's upon  a  acquiring would the  a  coalition 1 7  strong  one  coalition/defence  Under  Secretary  Soviet  of  strategy  be  i t s a l l i a n c e s coupled with the  defence  of  those  T h i s p o l i c y emphasizes consensus  should  amongst  areas the  around  the  importance  America's a l l i e s  of  which  against  Union. arguments  advocates of t h i s  conflict  of  of the l e a d i n g advocates of t h i s  then c r e a t e a p o t e n t i a l two-front t h r e a t - i n - b e i n g  Rebutting the  is  rejuvenation  Eurasian p e r i p h e r y .  the  Komer, a former U.S.  for Policy,  adoption of a  erupt  w a r f i g h t i n g would  1 7  is  Defense  based  1 6  argument  of the u n i l a t e r a l i s t / m a r i t i m e  strategic  between  the  policy  U.S.  argue  that  school,  should  a  and the S o v i e t Union, then  i n e v i t a b l y occur on the E u r a s i a n landmass  and  John F. Lehman J r , Testimony b e f o r e the U.S.Congress. House. Armed Services Committee, M i l i t a r y Posture Hearings 1982 (Washington, D . C , 1981) p.554 Robert W. Komer, "Maritime S t r a t e g y v C o a l i t i o n Defense", F o r e i g n A f f a i r s Vol.60 No.5 (Summer 1982) p.1127 at 1133  17  the  Soviets  f r o n t war allies.  c o u l d be more e f f e c t i v e l y c h a l l e n g e d i f a m u l t i p l e  i n both Europe and A s i a was e s t a b l i s h e d with America's In c o n t r a s t to the other s c h o o l ' s naval emphasis,  policy  stresses  the  use  of l a n d - o r i e n t e d and ground  S u f f i c i e n t number of these f o r c e s would be a c q u i r e d in  a  forward  defence-in-place  posture.  They  this  forces.  and  placed  would then be  i n c r e a s e d , more through a r a t i o n a l and e f f e c t i v e burden- sharing amongst the a l l i e s of  i t s military  than through a u n i l a t e r a l  American  build-up  forces.  The American d e s c r i p t i o n of the S o v i e t m i l i t a r y b u i l d - u p as a  threat  to Japan, as w e l l as to America's r e g i o n a l  i s not a r e a l i s t i c within  b a s i s upon  which  to  any American s t r a t e g i c p o l i c y .  examine  interests,  Japan's  role  T h i s b a s i s i s simply the  product of America's c o n c e p t i o n of i t s own  world r o l e and of the  p l a c e i t a s c r i b e s to Japan as an a l l y w i t h i n the performance that  role.  The purpose of t h i s study i s to show that any  advocated f o r Japan by any American s t r a t e g i c p o l i c y account  of  the  realities  Japan  security  arrangements  but  must  of  also  the  build-up  as  domestic p o l i t i c a l c o n t e x t .  a  threat,  and  the American debate.  role within a  broader  Within that the  roles  An examination of Japan's  American  policy,  the  Soviet  more p a r t i c u l a r l y , many  c o n s t r a i n t s upon Japan performing the kinds of within  U.S.-  reflect  c o n t e x t , one f i n d s both s k e p t i c i s m about p e r c e i v i n g military  take  environment.  i s not simply a d e r i v a t i v e  c o m p l e x i t i e s of i t s own  role  of Japan's g e o p o l i t i c a l p o s i t i o n as  w e l l as i t s domestic p o l i t i c a l Japan's s e c u r i t y  must  of  will  advocated security  illustrate  two  18  issues:  the importance  s e c u r i t y policy-making  of the domestic in a l i b e r a l  the power of a superpower client  state  i n that  protector  political  environment to  democracy; and the l i m i t s to (patron)  s e c u r i t y policy-making  over  process.  an  allied  19  II. A.  THE  SOVIET THREAT: AMERICAN & JAPANESE PERCEPTIONS  HISTORICAL BACKGROUND The  and  debate over a U.S.  s t r a t e g i c p o l i c y f o r Northeast A s i a  the r e l a t e d issue of Japan's r o l e in such a p o l i c y has  conducted w i t h i n the context the r e g i o n . since  1965  Soviets  realised  While there  r i v a l r y was  mainly  toward the S o v i e t  Union.  "..Soviet  was  part  of  plan...yet  an o v e r a l l s t r a t e g y .  policy  amounts  1 9  2 0  2 1  to  regional  a g l o b a l enhancement of  1 9  V.V.  something  Mao  to  whether  Aspaturian less  their  than  the  argues that a  master  i t i s something more than a sequence of responses to  t a r g e t s of o p p o r t u n i t y . "  1 8  not a l t e r e d  i s general agreement that t h i s S o v i e t  build-up  had  when the  1 8  m i l i t a r y c a p a b i l i t i e s , disagreement remains as Soviets  occurred  m i l i t a r i s e d and  that Khrushchev's removal had  Tse-Tung's h o s t i l i t y  military  of growing Soviet m i l i t a r y power i n  T h i s Soviet m i l i t a r y b u i l d - u p has when S i n o - S o v i e t  been  Jacqueline  Davis  argue that "Soviet p o l i t i c o e c o n o m i c  and m i l i t a r y p o l i c i e s  toward  Asian-Pacific  part  basin  2 0  states  Others,  form  such  as  of  a  global strategy  Harry Gelman, Testimony before the U.S.Congress, House Committee on Foreign A f f a i r s , Subcommittees on Europe and the Middle East and on Asian and P a c i f i c A f f a i r s , The S o v i e t Role i n A s i a (Washington, D.C: USGP0,1983) p.352 T h i s d i f f e r e n c e of opinion was revealed i n the 1981 U.S. National Security A f f a i r s Conference, The 1980s: Decade of Confrontation? p.6. V.V. A s p a t u r i a n , "Soviet Global Policies & C o r r e l a t i o n of Forces" in Problems of Communism Vol.29 No.3 (May-June 1980) p. 1 . Jacqueline K.Davis, "Soviet Strategy in Asia:A U.S. P e r s p e c t i v e " i n Charles E.Morrison (ed.), Threats to S e c u r i t y in East A s i a - P a c i f i c (Lexington, Mass.: 1983) p.23.  20  c h a r a c t e r i s e d by s e v e r a l broad o b j e c t i v e s . " By lost  the l a t e  1960s, l e a d i n g Americans b e l i e v e d the U.S.  i t s s t r a t e g i c nuclear  i t s a l l i e s had  contest at  both  global  balance now  and  and  levels.  The  2 2  theatre  military  or the Soviet Union to p r o j e c t power and  15 to 20 years,  qualitative  growth  ground combat f o r c e s .  extend  2 3  in  in  Soviet  military  expenditures  there has been both a q u a n t i t a t i v e the  S o v i e t Union's n a v a l , a i r and  T h i s growth and modernisation  has  so s u b s t a n t i a l , * that many were prepared to argue t h a t , i n 2  of  not...  one,  "the  exclusively  in  m i l i t a r y build-up  defensive modern  purposes." weaponry,  f o r c e s p o s i t i o n e d along  been the  i n East A s i a i s 25  the  For  example,  quality  the Chinese  and  frontier  W i l l i a m Hyland, "The S o v i e t Union i n the American Perspective: P e r c e p t i o n s and R e a l i t i e s " , i n Adelphi Papers No.174 p.52 at 59 James E. Dornan, J r . , "The Changing S e c u r i t y Environment in East Asia" i n Richard B. F o s t e r , James E. Dornan, J r . , and W i l l i a m M. Carpenter ( e d s . ) , Strategy and S e c u r i t y in Northeast A s i a (New York: Crane Russak & Co., 1979) p.5. " For example, i n the East Asian t h e a t r e , S o v i e t f o r c e s went from 20 d i v i s i o n s and 210 f i g h t e r - a t t a c k a i r c r a f t i n 1965 to w e l l over 40 d i v i s i o n s and more than 1000 such a i r c r a f t in 1978. For example, Ralph Clough, "The Balance of Power in East Asia and the Western Pacific During the 1980s: An American P e r s p e c t i v e " i n U. A l e x i s Johnson, et a l . , ( e d s . ) , The Common S e c u r i t y I n t e r e s t s of Japan, the United S t a t e s , and Nato (Cambridge, Mass.: 1981) p.27 at 29.  2 2  2 3  2  of S o v i e t  Soviet for  given China's weakness quantity  one  influence.  over the past  words  U.S.  geopolitical  the S o v i e t s became a m i l i t a r y  regional  With the steady i n c r e a s e  and  The  and  took on added importance i n terms of the c a p a c i t y of  e i t h e r the U.S. political  i n t e r e s t s of the  to be taken more s e r i o u s l y .  between the U.S.  had  s u p e r i o r i t y over the Soviet Union  r e g i o n a l t h r e a t s to both the s t a b i l i t y and and  2 1  2 5  21  appear  to be much stronger than would be needed to cope  with  a  Chinese a t t a c k . Since  the Second World War,  United States s t r a t e g i c  toward the A s i a n - P a c i f i c region has been motivated by to  contain  continent.  one  or  both  policy  a  desire  of the Communist powers on the Asian  In i t s e f f o r t s at containment,  the U n i t e d S t a t e s has  fought two wars on the Asian c o n t i n e n t and has  committed  U.S.  m i l i t a r y power, e i t h e r d i r e c t l y or through defence t r e a t i e s with a l l i e d / a l i g n e d n a t i o n s , on and around the c o n t i n e n t . Until  the  early  1970s, i t was  the Chinese who  as the primary t a r g e t of the U.S.'s containment Franz  Schurmann  points  influential political  or  out,  there  military  was  d i s c e r n e d an i n t i m a t e connection i n i t i a l l y North  this  the  by  means  of  U.S.naval  Richard  Nixon's  r e l a t i o n s with China i n 1972 military  who  regional security Union.  primary  global  requisite  Franz p.520.  who  between China and the Such f i g u r e s to  extend  a i r f o r c e s i n t o China  2 6  President  Soviet  and  as  U.S.  eager, almost to the end of the Vietnam War,  war,  itself.  2 6  in  and,  a shortage of  Koreans and then with the North Vietnamese.  remained  the  policy  never  figures  were viewed  establishment  of  impelled those i n Congress  and  had viewed China as the main t h r e a t to i n t e r e s t s , to  turn  their  attention  The  adoption  of the Soviet Union as  and  regional  opponent,  strategies  Schurmann,  friendly  to meet t h i s  'new  together  to  in  U.S. the  America's with  the  t h r e a t ' , understandably  The L o g i c of World Power  (New  York:  1973)  22  d i d not occur overnight  or without the a i d of e x t e r n a l f a c t o r s .  For example, the S o v i e t s ' achievement of nuclear U.S.  as w e l l as the attainment of  improvements Soviet  enabled those  27  t h r e a t as a g l o b a l  The  U.S.  who  a  number  so  also  the  to  picture  the  one.  nature  of  the  regional  to  forces required  f o r such  I t thus comes as no s u r p r i s e to f i n d b i t t e r  rivalry,  counter while  the  in e x i s t e n c e  by the p r o s e c u t i o n Members U.S.  of  Soviet  the  Navy, p e r c e i v e d  own  services  in  rivalry  up"  The  and  heightened  by  the powerful  the  increased to pursue  interest  of  the  the  armed  an e x t e r n a l t h r e a t , coupled with  view of the S o v i e t m i l i t a r y b u i l d - u p  2 8  I I , was  s t r a t e g i c p o l i c i e s for  vested  Soviet Union's p o l i c y of a c c e n t u a t i n g  2 7  interservice  i n the A s i a as an o p p o r t u n i t y views  be  28  the problems presented  power.  "playing  This  armed s e r v i c e s , p a r t i c u l a r l y  geopolitical  p r o j e c t i o n of U.S.  s i n c e WOrld War  of the Vietnam War.  Soviet m i l i t a r y b u i l d - u p their  challenge.  a  interests  between the d i f f e r e n t armed s e r v i c e s over which f o r c e s are to used  the  technological  s t r a t e g i c debate i s not only about developing  about  protection.  of  wished,  p o l i c y e f f e c t i v e l y to p r o t e c t worldwide and but  p a r i t y with  the  t h e i r power, r e s u l t e d i n a as a t h r e a t to U.S.  global  For example, at about t h i s time, the S o v i e t s demonstrated that they had mastered the technology of MIRV ( M u l t i p l e Independently Targetable Reentry V e h i c l e s ) . Morton H a l p e r i n and David H a l p e r i n , "The Key West Key," Foreign P o l i c y No.53 (Winter 1983/84) p.114. Of course, naval and army r i v a l r y does go back i n t o h i s t o r y .  23  and  regional i n t e r e s t s . As  Soviet  perceived threat  of both  a  direct allies  dependent  upon  concerned  and  be  a majority  to U.S.  America's  to  by  2 9  and  and  allied  an  of American commentators,  i n t e r e s t s i n Northeast A s i a i s  indirect  nature.  the  geographical  To  3 0  will  circumstances are For  remain  position  very  much  to  each  country  depend  such t h r e a t must  of m i l i t a r y upon  how  power  and  propitious  the  f o r i t s use.  the S o v i e t Union to be able to  be  some degree of  and  influence regional states.  realise  its  the  persuading and  coercing  Noel Gayler  Soviets Asian  In the may  potential  p a r t i c u l a r r e g i o n , there must  i n s t a b i l i t y or some o p p o r t u n i t y  commentators,  he  of  c r e d i b l e , any  for expanding i t s i n f l u e n c e i n any  Admiral  threat  the nature of the American and/or a l l i e d i n t e r e s t  protected.  itself  The  i s seen by American commentators to be l a r g e l y  u l t i m a t e l y be backed up by e f f e c t i v e use this  the  well  view use  of  f o r i t to a i d many  subtle,  allied/aligned  American means  states.  sums up t h i s view of the Soviet  of  U.S.  t h r e a t when  says t h a t : "we t h i n k of s e c u r i t y as p r o t e c t i o n both from e x t e r n a l m i l i t a r y aggression and from c o e r c i o n under the t h r e a t or i m p l i c i t t h r e a t of such aggression...[C]ommon to all [ s t a t e s of Asia] i s a general i n t e r e s t i n the u n i n t e r r u p t e d flow of commerce and resources." 31  2 9  3 0  3 1  S o v i e t M i l i t a r y Power o p . c i t . p.667. Examples in recent history of the S o v i e t s a c c e n t u a t i n g t h e i r power would i n c l u d e S o v i e t e f f o r t s to p l a y up the a l l e g e d bomber and m i s s i l e gaps with the U n i t e d S t a t e s . Robert A. Scalapino, "The Uncertain Future:Asian-Pacific R e l a t i o n s " i n Charles E. M o r r i s o n ( e d . ) , op. c i t . , p. 5. Admiral Noel Gayler, "Security Implications of the Soviet Military Presence in Asia," Richard H. Solomon (ed.), Asian S e c u r i t y i n the 1980s (Cambridge, Mass.: 1979) p.54.  24  Lacking build  close cultural  enduring  region,  i t has  attempt  to  There the the as  been a r g u e d  of  this  and  trade  the  region,  shipping energy  that  their  routes,  supplies  as  and  to  these  their  3 2  3 3  sea  rely  routes  have  are  prefer  to  power. forces  simply  the the  Northeast  lanes  of  as  well Asian  communication  and  its allies  in  interdiction.  so h e a v i l y both  3 2  extended  e c o n o m i c as  Soviet  for  the  military  U.S.  potential  trade  goods,  of  on  the  their  merchant essential  of particularly  Soviet  world  States)  the  not  only  s e c u r i t y , but  Soviets  capacity,  defence,  military  i t s energy  would  Japan's energy  w o u l d mean t h a t  collective  the  of  military  their  In  to  to  vulnerable  to  such  3 3  developed  United  West.  Japan, which  • ability  challenge  see  which  peoples  tend  of  power and  means t h a t  t h e m s e l v e s between J a p a n and the  use  so e s s e n t i a l t o t h e  along  manufactured interdict ion.  the  upon  s t a t e s and  Soviets  Soviets  the  subject  passing  the  means  a p p l i c a t i o n to challenge  extension  are  other  the  their  i n t e r e s t s of  such  The  the  component of  political  Countries  that  i n f l u e n c e by means of  dominant  region,  or  r e l a t i o n s h i p s with  i s evidence  area  ties  could  in a  to  s u p p l i e r s or indicate equally  challenge  through  to respond  forces  the  buyers  a capacity  importantly, West's  its principal coordinated  interpose  (read  instruments and  in to it the of  effective  Hiroshi Kimura, S o v i e t P o l i c y Toward J a p a n Working P a p e r #6 ( P r o v i d e n c e , Rhode I s . : 1983) p.5 F o r example, one e s t i m a t e has i t t h a t for every 50 nautical m i l e s between t h e M i d d l e E a s t and J a p a n , one f i n d s a s h i p t a k i n g goods t o or f r o m J a p a n .  25  fashion. " 3  B.  SOVIET AND If  the  AMERICAN MILITARY FORCES IN NORTHEAST ASIA rapid  Northeast Asian  growth  region can  in  Soviet  military  be viewed as c o n s t i t u t i n g  or at l e a s t a p o t e n t i a l t h r e a t , to the s e c u r i t y and United  States  and  and  a  threat,  stability  initially  In other  examining the nature and  words, one  should analyse  the  build-up  Soviet  military  world i s unmistakable. U.S.  Department  military total  forces,  of  3 5  Administration  capability  According Defense's  to the  been  over  i n t h i s region of 1984  edition  S o v i e t M i l i t a r y Power,  of  forces.  the S o v i e t s have now  3 6  The  turned  the world very much i n t h e i r prime  importance  U.S.  Administration  to  the the  of  b e l i e v e s that  the m i l i t a r y balance i n t h i s favour.  the  Soviet  f o r c e s i n the Far East c o n s t i t u t e approximately 30%  Soviet  Of  region.  concern of the c u r r e n t U.S. of  extent  then take account of these f o r c e s which have  deployed to the Northeast Asian The  of  increases  improvements the S o v i e t s have made to t h e i r m i l i t a r y  g l o b a l l y , and  i n the  Japanese i n t e r e s t s in t h i s region, then that  view must be t e s t e d by of that power.  power  part-of  3 7  the balance of f o r c e s i n the  Far  * J e f f r e y Record, "The G e o s t r a t e g i c C r i s i s " in Rethinking U.S. S e c u r i t y P o l i c y f o r the 1980s National Security Conference Proceedings (Washington, D.C: 1980) p.67 Paul Dibb, Soviet C a p a b i l i t i e s , Interests & Strategies (Canberra: 1982), p.4. Paul Dibb argues that Soviet power in this region must be viewed in m i l i t a r y terms f o r i t does not have p r o p o r t i o n a t e economic power or p o l i t i c a l i n f l u e n c e . S o v i e t M i l i t a r y Power (Washington, D.C: 1984) p.49 Caspar W. Weinberger, U.S. S e c r e t a r y of Defense, i n testimony before the U.S. Congress, House Committee on Armed Services, M i l i t a r y Posture Hearings 1982 (Washington, D.C: 1981) pp.382-3 5  6 7  26  East t h e a t r e Soviet  i s the  Pacific  increase  in  Fleet.  Department, t h i s f l e e t  numbers  According  i s now  to  Admiral  a  80  Robert  qualitative to  and  5%  submarines.  L.J.Long  i n c r e a s e of reduction  has  13%  quality  the  of  U.S.  39  3 8  15  missile  fleets  destroyers,  Commander-in-Chief-Pacific,  argued  that  this constitutes a  f o r the S o v i e t s s i n c e  in U.S.  the  Defence  the l a r g e s t of the 4 Soviet  with at l e a s t 86 major s u r f a c e s h i p s , 48 f r i g a t e s  and  Far East naval  1975  compared  f o r c e s for the same  period."° Over the p e r i o d of the l a t e appears to have been four major pacific  naval  forces.  The  nuclear-powered s u r f a c e powered  attack  The  U.S.  improvements  a new  Administration  a  new  new  the  classes  class  of  of  Soviets' first  nuclear-  nuclear-powered  c l a s s of amphibious a s s a u l t  ship."  Soviets'  ability  "a broad range of s o p h i s t i c a t e d s e a - d e n i a l missions  a n t i c a r r i e r operations communication.""  2  to  1  b e l i e v e s that these f o r c e improvements  have the combined e f f e c t of enhancing the pursue  in  S o v i e t s have deployed t h e i r  combatants;  submarines;  a i r c r a f t c a r r i e r ; and  1970s to the e a r l y 1980s, there  interdiction  According  to  the  of  the  American  sea  lanes  to from of  Government, the  ibid, p.383. T h i s f o r c e component i n c l u d e s one VTOL(Vertical Takeoff or Landing) a i r c r a f t carrier of the Kiev c l a s s , the Minsk . This force includes 19 nuclear-powered c r u i s e m i s s i l e submarines and 16 nuclear-powered attack boats. Admiral Robert L.J. Long, in testimony before the U.S.Congress, House Armed S e r v i c e s Committee, M i l i t a r y Posture Hearings 1982 o p . c i t . p.705 Both the new c l a s s e s of submarines (MIKE and SIERRA) and the new class of aircraft carrier have q u a l i t i e s that are p a r t i c u l a r l y u s e f u l in the T h i r d World. Caspar W. Weinberger, M i l i t a r y Posture Hearings 1982 pp.386-7  27  e f f e c t i v e f u l f i l m e n t of such m i s s i o n s would enable to gain  the  coupled  of 2,000  increase  with  constitute a  kilometers."  in the numbers of the S o v i e t  these  qualitative  potential  threat  Another  significant  force  improvements,  then  effective  land-based  missiles,  operate  In  that  be  support  can  s a i d to  threat  be  would  submarine  the  with  force.""  their  S o v i e t naval  come  highly  antiship  f o r c e s i n the  of  6  its  Pacific  s t r u c t u r e that  Fleet,  the S o v i e t Union  includes  anchorages o f f Taiwan and  an  f a c i l i t i e s on  has  Soviet  important base at  Cam  in Vietnam.  Viewed  on  a  believes  favourable  balance  worldwide that of  the  basis, U.S.  the and  U.S. its  Department of  allies  retain  maritime power over the S o v i e t  Apart from the advantages in naval  "  forces,  reckoned with i s the  which,  augment  naval  5  territory,"  Defense  bombers  to  developed a basing  Ranh Bay  to  Union  3  p r i m a r i l y from the S o v i e t s ' general-purpose  region."  Soviets  sea c o n t r o l of the waters contiguous to the S o v i e t  to a d i s t a n c e If  the  aviation  and  in  a  Union."  7  amphibious  The U.S. Department of Defense b e l i e v e s that to a s s i s t them in this role, the Soviets have committed themselves to l a r g e r displacement warships, and i n c r e a s e d sea-based a i r c a p a b i l i t i e s , g i v i n g them a l l g r e a t e r firepower, endurance and s u s t a i n a b i l i t y : Soviet M i l i t a r y Power o p . c i t . p.51 "" T h i s f o r c e , p a r t i c u l a r l y in the diesel-powered c l a s s e s , g r e a t l y outnumbers those of the U.S. They c o n s i s t of both torpedoattack and c r u i s e - m i s s i l e u n i t s . " The S o v i e t land-based bombers are of 3 modern and effective c l a s s e s : the BACKFIRE, the BADGER and the BLINDER. " These facilities include Nakhodka, Vladivostok and Petropavlovsk on the Kamchatka P e n i n s u l a . " S o v i e t M i l i t a r y Power o p . c i t . p.67 3  5  6  7  28  assault  forces,  the Defense Department a l s o c i t e s  improvements i n underway replenishment ships warfare.  The  4 8  i n t r o d u c t i o n of submarines  U.S. a  fleet  new  class  has of  been  modernisation of America's  antisubmarine  enhanced  frigates,  and a new c l a s s of h e l i c o p t e r s .  and  qualitative  4 9  a  with  new  class  maritime p a t r o l a i r c r a f t  air  improvements have been made i n U.S.  (land-based)  capability  U.S.  and  patrol  associated Together  attack  submarines,  31 amphibious  squadrons.  routinely  1  anti-  naval f o r c e s normally a s s i g n e d to the P a c i f i c t h e a t r e  diesel  submarine,  0  As  f o r c e s o p e r a t i n g i n the Northeast Asian r e g i o n .  i n c l u d e 6 a i r c r a f t c a r r i e r s , 87 s u r f a c e combatants,  9  for  5 0  warfare and f o r a n t i - s h i p warfare and these have been given  to those U.S.  8  of  There has a l s o been  as w e l l as improvements i n i t s c a r r i e r - b a s e d F-14 a i r c r a f t . well,  the  However,  51  assigned  ships  to  a i r wings  the and  1  and only  U.S.  fleet 12 2  nuclear  ballistic  missile  antisubmarine  warfare  aircraft  Pacific  accompanying  44  Fleet  surface  carriers with  are their  combatants.  these f o r c e s r e p r e s e n t approximately 30% of the a c t i v e  The underway replenishment s h i p s add to the long d i s t a n c e and endurance c a p a b i l i t y of the U.S. Navy and are important both i n the open oceans and f o r the p r o t e c t i o n of the sea lanes of communication: ibid. There have been 34 new FFG-7 f r i g a t e s , the new LOS ANGELES class attack helicopter as w e l l as the new LAMPS MK I I I helicopter added t o the f l e e t . The U.S. Defense Department b e l i e v e s that t h i s w i l l s u b s t a n t i a l l y i n c r e a s e i t s antisubmarine capability. Improved torpedoes and antisubmarine warfare r o c k e t s f o r these aircraft a r e now i n p r o d u c t i o n : S o v i e t M i l i t a r y Power o p . c i t . p.69 Admiral Robert L . J . Long i n testimony before the U.S. Congress. House. Committee on Armed S e r v i c e s , M i l i t a r y Posture Hearings 1982 o p . c i t . p.1001  29  operating  f o r c e of the U.S.Navy.  Soviet  ground  forces  p r i m a r i l y deployed along toward  the  the  Northeast Asian  the S i n o - S o v i e t  containment  c o n s i s t of tank and  in  52  of  the  Chinese.  in s i g n i f i c a n t  numbers.  r e c e n t l y developed T-80 chemical while  protection  its  and  upgrades  G l o b a l l y , the U.S.  it  sees  forces.  as 5 5  There  Corps to increase w e l l as  be  These f o r c e s which  nuclear,  emphasise  survivability.  in  deployed  firepower  recognizes  advantage  the  are d i r e c t e d  to  For example, the S o v i e t  enhanced  armaments, f l e x i b i l i t y and  However, the U.S.  to  tank f e a t u r e s  helicopter  quantitative  5 3  the  this  Union's  biological and  of  and  survivability  improvements  in  5 4  that the S o v i e t bloc ground  forces  it  has  a  deploys.  Department of Defense l a y s emphasis upon what qualitative has  been  superiority  own  ground  a r e s t r u c t u r i n g of the U.S.  Marine  both i t s firepower  and  of  its  tactical mobility,  improvements in i t s m i s s i l e s to enhance guidance and  penetration  are  motorized r i f l e d i v i s i o n s have been upgraded  s i n c e the mid-1960s, when they began region  border and  region  new  Soviet armour.  Emphasis has  5 6  as the  been l a i d upon  Report to the U.S.Congress.Senate Foreign Relations Committee by the Arms C o n t r o l and Disarmament Agency, Japan's C o n t r i b u t i o n to S t a b i l i t y in Northeast A s i a (Washington, D.C.: 1980) p.64 These S o v i e t ground f o r c e s c o n s i s t of 52 tank and motorized r i f l e d i v i s i o n s and 3 a r t i l l e r y d i v i s i o n s : Soviet M i l i t a r y Power op.cit. p.58 A new more a g i l e HAVOC c l a s s h e l i c o p t e r has been deployed i n the region i n support of i t s ground f o r c e s : i b i d , p.60 The U.S.'s l i g h t and heavy ground f o r c e d i v i s i o n s are being rearmed and r e s t r u c t u r e d to enable sustained, continuous combat operations: i b i d . ibid, p.61 : For example, a d d i t i o n a l TOW antitank missile platoons in each regiment.  30  improving the a n t i t a n k a b i l i t i e s helicopters with  its  and  improved  firepower. will  in  A  new  deploying mobility, fighting  of  the  the M-1  U.S.  survivability  and  is  about  53,000 and  v e h i c l e has been i n t r o d u c e d which  U.S.  has  in H a w a i i .  5 8  f o r c e with the deployment  FLOGGER a i r c r a f t .  Of the  division  Pacific,  has  modernized  of i t s late-model FENCER and  the Far E a s t , 40 are the h i g h l y e f f e c t i v e  Backfire  bombers.  The U.S.  170  Union  bombers  in  long  and  Department of Defense  the S o v i e t Union has some 1800 Japan.  calculates  that,  have  a  5 9  qualitative  advantage  by  7  8 9 0  1985,  f o r the Marine Corps  claims  over the S o v i e t s i n a l l the  c a t e g o r i e s of a i r c r a f t , weapons, p e r s o n n e l and t r a i n i n g . HARRIER a i r c r a f t  in  a i r c r a f t deployed a g a i n s t  In terms of i t s g l o b a l a i r power, the U n i t e d S t a t e s to  the  medium-range  deployed  China and  In the  force  i n Hawaii.  In the Far East t h e a t r e , the S o v i e t  total,  Army's combat  5 7  two b r i g a d e s of the Marine Amphibious Force i n Japan  and a t h i r d  air  Corps.  i s comprised of an i n f a n t r y  in South Korea as w e l l as one  tank  antiarmour  increase the m o b i l i t y and f i r e p o w e r of the Marine  level  attack  ABRAMS main b a t t l e  In the A s i a n - P a c i f i c t h e a t r e , the U.S.  its  Army's  i s due to  and the c u r r e n t l y deployed F-15  be  and F-16  6 0  A  new  operational aircraft  have  These v e h i c l e s are armed with 25mm automatic cannon machine guns and a n t i t a n k weapons. Admiral-Robert L . J . Long, o p . c i t . p.1002 S o v i e t M i l i t a r y Power o p . c i t . p.57 There are deployed on over 80% of the U.S. Navy's aircraft carriers, F-14 a i r c r a f t which have been designed f o r f l e e t a i r defence and a i r - t o a i r combat. ibid.  31  r e c e i v e d radar m o d i f i c a t i o n to enhance detection  ranges  range a i r - t o - a i r  plus  modifications  missiles.  of  F-4Es  and  South Korea, an F-15 and  an  F-4E  and  one A-10  tactical a F-4G  Robert  L.J.  capabilities  in  to c a r r y advanced medium  squadron  and  has  deployed  in  Okinawa,  62  aircraft.  According  U.S.  under  conventional  military  the Northeast A s i a n r e g i o n , i t i s important to  poses  the  greatest  Union  suffers  in  I f Soviet  ' t h r e a t ' , then we need to be  aware of c e r t a i n l o g i s t i c a l problems.In at  to  63  the p r o j e c t i o n of i t s m i l i t a r y power i n t o the r e g i o n . power  Okinawa  forward-based a i r c r a f t  note some of the l i m i t a t i o n s that the Soviet  naval  a  Japan,  i n the P h i l i p p i n e s .  Long, t o t a l  Soviet  U.S.  f i g h t e r wing  h i s P a c i f i c Command stands at 2 1 6 . Having sketched  target  c l o s e a i r support a i r c r a f t i n  a l s o bases a squadron of E-3A AWACs Admiral  air-to-air  6 1  In the Northeast Asian r e g i o n , the squadron  their  particular,  navigation  the p r i n c i p a l Soviet naval bases at V l a d i v o s t o k and  Nadhotka  i s hampered by i c e much of the year. Another l o g i s t i c a l problem faced by the S o v i e t s i s that f o r t h e i r naval f o r c e s to move out Pacific narrow  Ocean, straits  it  of  the  Sea  of  Japan  to  the  i s necessary f o r them to pass through three  over which Japan has c o n t r o l . "  p o i n t s ' were blocked, then S o v i e t naval f o r c e s  6  I f these trapped  'choke in  the  ibid, p.58 A i r b o r n e Warning and C o n t r o l A i r c r a f t . op.cit. p.1002 * The U.S. bases i n Japan and a t Guam and i n the P h i l i p p i n e s are much b e t t e r l o c a t e d f o r the purpose of d e p l o y i n g a i r and naval power i n t o the Western P a c i f i c : Ralph Clough, o p . c i t . p.30. 1  2  3  32  Sea  of Japan, while perhaps not  have d i f f i c u l t y power.  in being  used  vulnerable extensively  Peninsula  are  free  from  ice  year-round,  r e s u p p l i e d p r i m a r i l y from the sea and interdiction In  from U.S.  Northeast  and  Asia,  located  thus remain v u l n e r a b l e  to  the  Union, u n l i k e the  in  that  it  military  bases.  However,  its  4,000 mile The  China  67  potentially  regional  most  forces  is  of  dangerous  are  course of  United  territory i t with  the  Soviet  neighbours  and  ' t i e d down' checking these the  these  most  Department of Defense  powerful  neighbours and  long land border with the Soviet  U.S.  has  region which can provide  many  of  have  6 6  to contend with p o t e n t i a l l y t h r e a t e n i n g  neighbours.  and  shares a  Union.  acknowledges  an  American  s u p e r i o r i t y in f o r c e c a p a b i l i t y , a q u a l i t a t i v e advantage,  even i f not  a  quantitative  advantage  in  its  ground  combat  f o r c e s , and  a q u a l i t a t i v e advantage over the S o v i e t Union in a l l  categories  of  Administration moves  6 7  Soviet  be  Soviet  they  Union has  naval  project  to  forces.  favoured  within  domestic l o c a t i o n s for  6 6  allied the  i s geographically  centrally  6 5  to  While the base f a c i l i t i e s at Petropavlovsk on Kamchatka  65  States,  in themselves, would  in  East  air and  power.  Yet,  both  the armed s e r v i c e s  Asia  as  so  members  view  threatening  the  of the Reagan recent  Soviet  as to r e q u i r e both an  Richard L.Sneider, "U.S. I n t e r e s t s and P o l i c i e s i n A s i a and the Western P a c i f i c in the 1980s" in U.Alexis Johnson, o p . c i t . p.71. The land connection to Petropavlovsk by e i t h e r the TransSiberian or Omar-Baykal railways i s neither reliable nor efficient. Ralph Clough, o p . c i t . p.30.  33  American m i l i t a r y b u i l d - u p to  this  and  the l o g i s t i c a l and  the Soviet Union's a b i l i t y and  one  is  left  Union's f o r c e sufficient  other  force  improvements.  geographical  skeptical  improvements,  by  power  as  Add  l i m i t a t i o n s upon  to p r o j e c t i t s f o r c e in t h i s  highly  military  allied  region,  to whether the  themselves,  could  Soviet  constitute  as to pose a t h r e a t to American  and  a l l i e d interests. While i t i s beyond doubt that the S o v i e t Union has enhanced  its  projection capacity be  military  i n Northeast A s i a , the  than a b s o l u t e  reason to q u e s t i o n advantage', over  the United  whether  translated  particular  America and  translation be  should  States  particular, of  the  Soviet  presented by American and  of  this  f o r some, must  is insufficient military  be  or  the  Union's  Japanese  of the  to enable forces  To assess whether the  various  into  a  force  globe. one can  to be  Soviet  threat  to  certain intangible interpretations  military  observers.  good  a relative  other  translated  not  be seen in r e l a t i v e  i n t h i s region  Japan i t i s necessary to c o n s i d e r  variables--in perceptions  properly  for force  there would be appear to be  into a security threat.  Union's power can  potential  whether the S o v i e t Union has  Q u a n t i t a t i v e a n a l y s i s , alone, assess  i t may  Power i t s e l f  terms and  and  direct  i n t o a t h r e a t , tempting as  made p r e c i p i t o u s l y .  rather  capabilities  greatly  build-up,  or as  34  C.  AMERICAN  Over  PERCEPTIONS OF THE SOVIET 'THREAT'  the  have a c q u i r e d  period  a diminished  in both absolute During  of the 1970s, the United  the  terms and i n r e l a t i o n  same  Union, as given  period,  military  periphery  capability but  of the  activated  by  the  Soviet  U.S.'s p e r c e p t i o n  more t h r e a t e n i n g  reference  regionally,  the  to  of i t s own power  by most American commentators,  expanding and m i l i t a r i l y American  worldwide p e r c e p t i o n  to  i s made  of  the  their  Eurasian  the  not  increased  Union  Union.  6 8  of the S o v i e t  was  one  of  an  rival. only  Soviets,  landmass.  Soviet  States may w e l l  to  both  the  enhanced  globally  and  a t t e n t i o n t o areas on the This  taking  'threat'  will  be  advantage of r e g i o n a l  i n s t a b i l i t y as w e l l as by the use of i t s p o t e n t i a l to i n t i m i d a t e through the i n t e r d i c t i o n of the v i t a l trade and supply the U.S.  and i t s a l l i e s .  T e s t i f y i n g before Thornton  argued  place  the  U.S.  the  for Asia.  interests  i n t e r s e c t e d " , he b e l i e v e d the U.S. g l o b a l expansion and be prepared capabilities.  6 8 6 9  7 0  Congress,  Professor  Thomas  that there was no evidence of the Soviet  where  of  6 9  having a s p e c i f i c p o l i c y design "one  lines  Union  However, as A s i a  was  of the m i l i t a r y world powers should to  see t h i s as part of a  maintain  i t s own  global  7 0  E a r l Ravenal, "Perceptions of American Power", o p . c i t . p.145 Thomas Thornton, Hearings before the U.S. Congress, S o v i e t Role i n A s i a o p . c i t . p.11 Thomas Thornton, Hearings on the S o v i e t Role i n A s i a o p . c i t . p.25  35  While there appears to be growth  of  some American consensus over  S o v i e t m i l i t a r y power over the past  the  decade, there  none to be  found over the  i m p l i c a t i o n s of such  a  America's  security  other  Northeast A s i a .  and  interests  P i e r r e Hassner and W i l l i a m Hyland have various  'belief  systems'  leadership groups.  each  commented  or a t t i t u d e s p r e v a l e n t  Hassner r e f e r s  71  in  to  the  containment,  perceives issue:  two  contrary  those  who  every turn and nations, While  rollback  and  those who  that  cooperation.  the  definitive,  groupings  of  on  these  two  U.S.  the  Hyland the  same  r e s i s t e d at  USSR,  i s s u s c e p t i b l e to diplomacy, b a r g a i n i n g  the  the  contrasting  that the S o v i e t s must be  believe  on  to deal with  views amongst these groups  consider  for  amongst  three  views amongst American l e a d e r s h i p groups on how Soviets:  build-up  is  like  and  other  compromise.  w r i t e r s are of course  they i n d i c a t e the p o t e n t i a l d i v e r s i t y  of  not  views  of  the Soviet Union that are h e l d w i t h i n America's l e a d i n g  groups.  At  found to  any  given  time,  predominate and  will  a p a r t i c u l a r perspective have  a  s e c u r i t y policy-making at that Within  these  presented as to why dangerous, countering  and it  U.S.  specific  impact  upon  American  time.  leadership  a c e r t a i n Soviet  implicitly with  decisive  w i l l be  why  groups,  force  priority  U.S.  and  arguments  are  capability  is  should  given  allied  be  forces.  more to For  P i e r r e Hassner, "America's P o l i c y Towards the S o v i e t . Union in the 1980s: O b j e c t i v e s and Uncertainties" i n Adelphi Papers No.174 (Spring 1982) p.35; W i l l i a m Hyland, "The S o v i e t Union in the American P e r s p e c t i v e : P e r c e p t i o n s and R e a l i t i e s " i n i b i d . p.52  36  example,  prominent  specifically region and Other  the  increased  groups  are those who  deployment i n the Asian  emphasis  on  antisubmarine  i n c l u d e the deployment of SS-20s and  the basing  the Asian  these  to the S o v i e t naval  emphases  A s i a and  amongst  of the h i g h l y e f f e c t i v e B a c k f i r e  territory  and  emphasized  objective 7  probably  safety  of  'the Davis'  projection listing  encompasses c o n v e n t i o n a l  of  of  of b u f f e r s t a t e s along  Soviet  militarily,  the United  States  from i t s a l l i e s and  r e g i o n ; and(3)to extend Soviet  both  broad  and  i n f l u e n c e over  5  in  Soviet  i n academic and  testimony  and  objectives They a r e : network  politically friends in  strategically  7 5  found, a l b e i t  objectives  legislators'  i n v a r y i n g degrees  that  before  the  of  statements as w e l l as i n  the pronouncements of members of the Reagan  4  in  b a s i c a l l y h o s t i l e to American i n t e r e s t s .  T h i s American view i s to be intensity,  of  a  (2) to decouple,  T h i s l i s t i n g a s c r i b e s to the S o v i e t Union  3  bomber  American t h i n k i n g .  i t s borders;  important T h i r d World s t a t e s .  2  73  power  ( l ) t o enhance the s e c u r i t y of the USSR by developing  In  ICBMs  7 2  the development of S i b e r i a ' to the more commonly  i n f l u e n c e ' . * Jacqueline  are  warfare.  o b j e c t i v e s i n Northeast A s i a , as a t t r i b u t e d to them  by Americans, have ranged from ' i n s u r i n g the  the  Pacific  theatre.  Soviet  and  refer  Administration.  U.S.Congress  Richard L.Sneider, o p . c i t . p.71 Intercontinental B a l l i s t i c Missiles Ralph Clough, Testimony before the U.S. Armed S e r v i c e s Committee, o p . c i t . p.129 J a c q u e l i n e Davis, op. cit. p.23.  in  October  Congress.  1983,  House.  37  Professor  Donald Zagoria  military  build-up  were s a t i s f i e d of  all  their  S o v i e t Union. "USSR  hegemony."  same  the  adversaries."  hearing  Professor [as  were  Other  7 6  less  academics  charitable  to  the  Thomas Thornton, f o r example, s a i d that an  balance  Asian of  power] be  satisfied  power...[their]  goal  simply  by  must  be  77  Democratic  Senator  John  subcommittee on East Asian and the  Soviets  n e u t r a l i z e the m i l i t a r y combination  potential  cannot  manipulating  "Soviet  [ w i l l ] c e r t a i n l y increase . . . u n t i 1 the  that they can  t e s t i f y i n g at the  the  s a i d that he b e l i e v e d that the  Glenn,  Chairman  the  Senate  in r e f e r e n c e  to  response r e q u i r e d of the U.S.in Northeast A s i a , a l s o d i d  not  treat  l i g h t l y what he  saw  Pacific Affairs,  of  as a growing worldwide S o v i e t  threat:  "Wherever we t u r n , whether to A s i a , A f r i c a , or L a t i n America, we f i n d an i m p e r i a l i s t S o v i e t power a c t i v e l y seeking to e x p l o i t l o c a l ' t a r g e t s of o p p o r t u n i t y ' " . 7 8  Members of the Reagan A d m i n i s t r a t i o n in even more severe terms and responsibility  for  the Senate F o r e i g n Secretary  of  view S o v i e t  objectives  tend to a s s i g n Moscow a  pervasive  international Relations  State Walter J .  disorder.  Committee  in  Stoessel J r .  T e s t i f y i n g before June  1982,  made the  Deputy following  statement:  7 6  7 7 7 8  Donald Z a g o r i a , Testimony before the U.S. Congress. Armed S e r v i c e s Committee, o p . c i t p.51 Thomas Thornton, o p . c i t . p.14 John Glenn, "Defending the New Japan" i n Washington (Winter 1982) p.25 at 28  House. Quarterly  38  "The Soviet objective i n East Asia i s to seek positions of maximum g e o p o l i t i c a l s t r e n g t h from which to p r o j e c t power and i n f l u e n c e . . . S p e c i f i c Soviet o b j e c t i v e s i n the region i n c l u d e n e u t r a l i z i n g Japan i n any f u t u r e c o n f l i c t by i n t i m i d a t i o n and by undermining the U.S.-Japan a l l i a n c e , d i m i n i s h i n g the s e c u r i t y of the sea lanes by p o s i t i o n i n g f o r c e s t o i n t e r d i c t the shipment of petroleum and other key c o m m o d i t i e s . . . " 79  Even  critics  consensus'  such  of  as  this  Vladimir  appears to be c o n v e n t i o n a l build-up,  both  present Petrov,  thinking  as  the other  the United have  strategy.  Like  the U.S.,  allies  influence and  superpower.  to  For  the in  This  develop m i l i t a r y projected  Soviet  military  As a hegemonic  sees  has  made  Soviet  an  neutralise the  Soviet  i n e x t r i c a b l y t i e d to the maintenance .network.  the  power  superpower which shares the g l o b a l stage  i t s global  f r i e n d s and opposing  that  what  a  need  with to  f o r c e s capable of p r o j e c t i n g power f a r beyond i t s  own f r o n t i e r s . maximise  do not c h a l l e n g e  8 0  S t a t e s , the Soviet Union o b v i o u s l y  military  'confrontation  i n Northeast A s i a and g l o b a l l y , has gone beyond  the requirements of a d e f e n s i v e and  American  of  Union  seeks  attempt t o support those Union,  allied  to its  to the  i t s defence i s  i t s global  security  it. necessary f o r the S o v i e t Union to  f o r c e s of o f f e n s i v e  capability  which  can be  i n t o regions which o f f e r e i t h e r problems to be s o l v e d  or o p p o r t u n i t i e s to be e x p l o i t e d . The  7 9  8 0  American debate over the  Walter J. Stoessel Senate Committee on Focus on the P a c i f i c , V l a d i m i r Petrov, "New F r a n k l i n D. M a r g i o t t a  implications  of  the  Soviet  J r . , Testimony before the U.S.Congress. Foreign Relations, East-West R e l a t i o n s : (Washington, D . C : 1982) p.3 Dimensions of S o v i e t Foreign Policy" in (ed.), o p . c i t . p.13 at 14.  39  military  build-up  for  U.S.  s e c u r i t y can no longer be seen in  terms of P i e r r e Hassner's c o n t e s t of anti-Soviet  conservatives.  pro-detente  liberals  I t has moved to the r i g h t and  8 1  i s not so much over whether the b u i l d - u p c o n s t i t u t e s but  rather  over  the  Soviet  Union  c o n t e s t between  the  U.S.  now  threat, As an  and  the  f o r worldwide i n f l u e n c e , the tendency i n American  l e a d e r s h i p groups capabilities  a  nature and extent of that t h r e a t .  e x t e n s i o n of the p o l i t i c a l  and  appears particular  be  to  From  Americans  would  in  military  c a t e g o r i e s , and to then i n f e r motives to the S o v i e t Union. the  and  Soviet  force  assessment,  regions  assess  particular  this  in  to  then  draw  certain  c o n c l u s i o n s about the s t a t e of Western defences. D.  JAPANESE PERCEPTIONS OF THE SOVIET 'THREAT' In  the  recent y e a r s , the Japanese have engaged i n a debate over  implications  for  their  security  of  the S o v i e t  military  build-up.  T h i s debate, no l e s s vigorous than the American  has  part  been  of  a  much  l a r g e r debate over Japan's defence  p o l i c y and the i n t e r n a t i o n a l r o l e i t should adopt i n ahead. and  to  one,  the  years  Given Japan's g e o g r a p h i c a l p r o x i m i t y to the Soviet Union the A s i a n mainland, i t s m i l i t a r y weakness, i t s economic  vulnerability proportion  of  (in  particular,  the  importation  of  the  great  i t s energy and other n a t u r a l r e s o u r c e s ) , and i t s  h i g h p o p u l a t i o n d e n s i t y , i t w i l l come as no s u r p r i s e to d i s c o v e r that the Japanese debate has f o l l o w e d a d i f f e r e n t path of  1  the  American  debate.  P i e r r e Hassner, o p . c i t .  To  p.36  place  the  Japanese  to  that  debate i n  40  context,  a brief  Japan-U.S.  0  The On  review of the Soviet views  security r e l a t i o n s h i p i s in Soviet  the one  Union's p e r c e p t i o n  hand,  Soviet  scholars  improved r e l a t i o n s between the two hand, and  they  view  embracing an  Soviet  American  Latyshev's  c i r c l e s ' and  order.  and  commentators  one.  call  c o u n t r i e s , while on the  for other  f i r m l y w i t h i n the Western camp  policy  of  confrontation  between  with  Japan's  p u b l i c i s t y p i c a l of S o v i e t  the  favour  of Washington and  or by pressure  the  'ruling  commentary.  becoming  more  militarily  a l l i a n c e with the U.S. danger  from  both  and  region.  The  8  8 2  The  strategically  They argue that  this  the growth of Japan's own  from i t s c o n t r i b u t i o n to the  in the  to s o f t e n  from the Americans  h o s t i l e stance towards the S o v i e t U n i o n .  Japanese  to  discontent maintain  Soviets  presents  a  see Japan  involved  in a  an dual  military potential  " d e s t a b i l i s i n g U.S.  strategy"  3  S o v i e t w r i t e r s b e l i e v e that Japan's r u l i n g c i r c l e s view  the S o v i e t Union as the h y p o t h e t i c a l enemy and public  the  "threat  foist  upon  from the North" as the p r e t e x t  i n c r e a s i n g m i l i t a r y spending and  8 3  the  w r i t e r s argue that Japan's l e a d e r s are motivated by e i t h e r a  in the U.S."  8 2  and  of Japan i s a complex  differentiation  the general  d e s i r e to "win  and  Japan  Union.  Igor  The  Japan as being  of  for g i v i n g the SDF  an  the for  offensive  Igor Latyshev, "Soviet-U.S. D i f f e r e n c e s in t h e i r Approaches to Japan" in Asian Survey Vol.XXIV No.11 (November 1984) p.1163 Konstantin 0. Sarkisov, "Japan & the U.S. in A s i a " in Asian Survey Vol.XXIV No.11 (November 1984) p.1174  41  capability. "  The  8  which the proceed  ruling  to  In  circles  i m i t a t e and  Northeast  campaign a t t e m p t s carried local  out  by  troop  directed forces" to  "Soviet  adopt  present  Asia,  Soviet  armed  movement" as  within  the  8 5  seen as  policies.  Part the  Japanese The  to  Japan  of  the  Kurile  J a p a n e s e SDF  the is  economic,  "an  U.S.  and  and  combat of  role  the  security Soviet  performing  prescribes  the  an  and  and  preparations revanchist as  a  trick  to b r i n g  Chinese  the  foreign  i s what t h e  Soviets  claims"  writers  as  machinery"  of  the  Union.  integral,  and  In  the  and  As  well,  primarily  Soviet  a c e r t a i n degree of to maintain  becoming, designed,  Soviet  strategy.  i n order  treaty.  writers  war  t o combat  relations  and  territorial  Soviet  U.S.  i n America's Asian strategy  training  and  "threat"  weapons  8 6  i s s e e n by  as  campaign  groundless  propaganda of  war  "chauvinist the  then  public.  updating  w i t h American  Islands.  forces,  Soviet-Japanese U.S.-Japan  Americans  anti-Soviet  ordinary  using  propaganda  appendage of  viewed  t h i s American  The  this  "illegal  increasingly, like  something  Japan's e s c a l a t i n g m i l i t a r y b u i l d - u p p o l i c y more i n l i n e  as  the  "routine  The  i s s e e n as  Japanese  "fearsome evidence  country's  see  the  t o the  forces,  Japan."  Japan are  from  they argue,  to p o r t r a y  against  justify  m i l i t a r y threat"  view,  tension  in  justify  the  a u n i f i e d view e s p o u s i n g  the  8 7  present  p o s s i b i l i t y of e s t a b l i s h i n g b o t h g o o d n e i g h b o u r l y r e l a t i o n s with " N. N i k o l a y e v , "For G o o d - N e i g h b o u r l i n e s s & C o o p e r a t i o n Between the USSR & J a p a n " i n I n t e r n a t i o n a l A f f a i r s No.2 ( 1978) p.38 V. Dalnev, "Impediments to Soviet-Japanese Relations" in I n t e r n a t i o n a l A f f a i r s No.2 {1 981) p.49 a t 51/ N. Nikolayev, op.cit. p.40 D. Petrov, "Japan's Place in U.S. Asian Policy" in I n t e r n a t i o n a l A f f a i r s No.10 (1978) p.52 a t 58 5  6 7  ;  42  the Japanese and of e v e n t u a l l y  s i g n i n g a peace t r e a t y .  they  they see as the m i l i t a r i s a t i o n of  argue  that  with  what  Japan and i t s growing involvement i n America's they  think  i t unlikely  reciprocity.  Only  Constitution,  distancing  perception plans,  by  in  strategy,  the necessary  Japan  adhering  to  it's  itself  from  U.S.,  and  renouncing claims  S o v i e t s b e l i e v e that  Asian  that Japan w i l l provide  of the S o v i e t Union  and  in  the its  that  t h r e a t to obviously  the  military/strategic  to the K u r i l e I s l a n d s , do the  r e l a t i o n s can be s u b s t a n t i a l l y improved.  Soviet  Japan.  m i l i t a r y build-up  However,  discounted  p r e v a i l i n g opinion  by  the the  relevance Soviets  of  as  use i t as being  this  they  the  view  argue  is that  w i t h i n Japan's l e a d i n g c i r c l e s holds that the t h r e a t to Japan.  The predominant Japanese view, i n c o n t r a s t opinion,  hold  does not c o n s t i t u t e a  S o v i e t Union i s the major, i f not the only,  American  'peace'  i n both i t s  Many w i t h i n the l e a d i n g groups i n Japan may w e l l view  However,  to p r e v a i l i n g  sees m i l i t a r y c a p a b i l i t y and the i n t e n t i o n t o  of equal importance.  As  explained  by  Hisashi  Owada and Michael Nacht: "...in Japan there i s a marked tendency to s t r e s s the d i s t i n c t i o n between the p h y s i c a l c a p a b i l i t i e s and the intentions t o use them. Threat i s p e r c e i v e d to e x i s t only when these two elements of corpus and animus are present." 8 8  U n t i l the l a t e  1970s, the Japanese Government had sought to  Hisashi Owada and M i c h a e l Nacht, " S e c u r i t y Issues: A Broader Framework" i n Program on U.S.-Japan R e l a t i o n s (Cambridge, Mass.: 1981) p.27  43  f o l l o w what has  been  termed  'omnidirectional'  friendly  relations  political  c l i m a t e between Washington  too  with  an  a l l nations.  8 9  policy  of  So long as the o v e r a l l  and Moscow d i d not  involve  much c o n f r o n t a t i o n , Japan b e l i e v e d that i t c o u l d pursue i t s  i n t e r e s t s , that i s p r i m a r i l y economic, without  going  States.  For  described  against  the  example,  policy  while  the  with  the  objectives 1976  Soviet of  Defense  the United White  Paper  the S o v i e t Union as a ' p o t e n t i a l t h r e a t ' , Japan c o u l d  p o i n t out that there were other  strategic  considerations  had  the  impact  the  Union  effect  of  m i l i t a r y build-up. limitations  limiting  full  As two commentators  include  point  which  of the Soviet  out,  the  Soviet  the g e o p o l i t i c a l p o s i t i o n of the USSR, the  c l i m a t i c c o n d i t i o n s of  the  USSR  territory  found  within  the  r e g i o n , and the three s t r a t e g i c 'Japanese c o n t r o l l e d ' s t r a i t s . Prevailing  opinion  m i l i t a r y b u i l d - u p with being  in  Japan  appears  latter  view  Kimura,  an  adviser  power to  into the  r e p r e s e n t a t i v e of the Japanese view. Soviets  American  political  Japanese  9 0  This  have s e v e r a l d i s t i n c t p o l i t i c a l  leverage.  Government, i s  Kimura c o n s i d e r s  that  the  o b j e c t i v e s i n Northeast  A s i a , i n c l u d i n g the most obvious one of attempting  8 9  view.  i t as  appears to be much more prepared than the Japanese  to t r a n s l a t e S o v i e t m i l i t a r y Hiroshi  to view the Soviet  some concern, but does not p e r c e i v e  n e a r l y so menacing as the orthodox  9 0  to weaken  the  John K. Emmerson, " S e c u r i t y and Energy i n Northeast A s i a " i n Korean J o u r n a l of I n t e r n a t i o n a l Studies Vol.13 No.2 (Summer 1983) p.227 at 236-7 R.B. Byers and Stanley C.M. Ing, "Sharing the Burden on the Far Side of the A l l i a n c e " i n J o u r n a l of I n t e r n a t i o n a l A f f a i r s Vol.37 No.1 p.163 at 166  44  a n t i - S o v i e t a l l i a n c e system l e d by the U.S. eager  to  point  out  that the S o v i e t s have been unable to turn  t h e i r growing m i l i t a r y region,  and  warns  overestimating power.  the  power  to  against  political  advantage  in  e i t h e r the Japanese or the  importance of the  accumulation  of  Soviet  i n v a s i o n of A f g h a n i s t a n  i n t i m i d a t i o n of Poland of East  Soviets military  Asia  had,  1980  and  according  in 1979  increased  to  one  coupled with  Soviet  to an open d i s c u s s i o n of the echoed, though not refer  'greater  to  Japanese p r o f e s s o r ,  threat".  so s t r o n g l y , by P r o f e s s o r s  a  realism'  Soviet  'changed  This  9 3  Lee  and  While acknowledge  and  view  a t t i t u d e ' toward defence i n Japan,  communist p a r t i e s .  the  m i l i t a r y build-up lanes  of  9 2 9 3  9 4  9 5  in  and  9 5  Yukio  this Satoh,  the the  9 4  general, military  i n the area around Japan  communication,  military threat.  9 1  opinion,  political  is  Sato, when  i n s e c u r i t y d i s c u s s i o n s w i t h i n Japan, and  Japanese  "a  leading  adoption of a more pragmatic approach to Japan's s e c u r i t y by opposition  the  force l e v e l s  remarkable i n f l u e n c e on the Japanese people as a whole,  they  the  9 2  The  in  However, Kimura i s  91  is  not a  is  prepared  nature of the and  along  perceived  Japanese  to  Soviet  the  sea  as a d i r e c t  foreign  service  Hiroshi Kimura, S o v i e t P o l i c i e s i n the Asian P a c i f i c Region: A Japanese Assessment Seminar p r e s e n t a t i o n (Makaha, Hawaii, May 1984) pp.8-9 ibid, p.26 Shinkichi Eto, "Japanese P e r c e p t i o n s of N a t i o n a l T h r e a t s " i n Charles E. Morrison (ed.), o p . c i t . p.53 at 54 Chae-Jin Lee and Hideo Sato, U.S. P o l i c y Toward Japan and Korea (New York: 1982) p.131 H i r o s h i Kimura, o p . c i t . p.24  45  officer,  endorses  t h i s o p i n i o n and argues that the b u i l d - u p of  the S o v i e t s ' m i l i t a r y f o r c e s does not mean Japan  is  imminent.  in  a  much  wider  should  of whether the  attack  needs  to  be  than that of the narrow  96  be noted that a body of o p i n i o n  e x i s t s i n Japan  from the S o v i e t  and  the  such  Union  two  even  countries  as  former  Agency, Makoto Momoi.  says  would  T h i s argument in  conflict  of the 'unarmed  arguments  that  its  defense  Japanese  hopes  exists  make an armed S o v i e t  Director-General  Union  proposed  by  of the Japan Defense the  Soviet  military  to Japan and  to d i s c o u r a g e Japan from  capabilities  through  military  9 8  Japanese commentators  resulted  9 7  Momoi argues  "the S o v i e t  intimidation."  the  which  serious  i n Northeast A s i a does c o n s t i t u t e a t h r e a t  that  improving  no  f i n d s an opposing view  persons  build-up  that  remotely p o s s i b l e .  neutralists'  9 8  on  i s no r e a l i s t i c m i l i t a r y t h r e a t t o Japan  attack  9 7  attack  which argues that there  between  9 6  armed  context  m i l i t a r y balance around J a p a n . " It  an  In h i s view, "the q u e s t i o n  S o v i e t Union w i l l attempt a d i r e c t considered  that  defence  i n a change  agree that there has been a s h i f t  debate  i n recent  years.  in  T h i s s h i f t has  i n emphasis on how the S o v i e t s  are  viewed  Yukio Satoh, "The E v o l u t i o n of Japanese Security Policy" in Adelphi Papers No.178 (Autumn 1982) p.10 Mike M. Mochizuki, "Japan's Search for Strategy," International Security V o l . 8. No. 3 (Winter 1983-84) p.152 at 163 Mochizuki r e f e r s to t h i s group as the 'unarmed neutralists'. Makoto Momoi, " S t r a t e g i c Thinking i n Japan i n the 1970s and 1980s" i n Robert O ' N e i l l and D.M. Horner (eds.), New D i r e c t i o n s in S t r a t e g i c T h i n k i n g (London: 1981) p.169 at 176  46  and  i n c l u d e s the  a t t a c h i n g of g r e a t e r  of  i t s regional military  power.  No  s i g n i f i c a n c e to the longer  Japanese commentators merely t o d i s m i s s sizable  proportion  opinion  Soviet now  A  believes that  the  i n t o a c c o u n t and  taken  reply.  The  should  be.  'military  for  some  over  chiefly  realists'  presence  exactly  b e t w e e n two  and  the  what  that  to  the  'political  Soviet  p r e s e n c e and  that  their  In  terms  capabilities up  as  group, the  part  of p e r c e p t i o n ,  over of  which  view both the campaigns  a  global  Foreign Soviet  as  w i t h the U n i t e d  the  i n t e n t i o n and  includes  Japanese  e n d s and  'military  view the  and  threatening  and  need  realists'  begin.  emphasise  Soviet m i l i t a r y  Admiral  build-  build-up call  Okazaki,  Naotoshi  and  their  the  However,  r e g i o n a l threat to Japan.  M i n i s t r y and military  the  differences  Makoto M o m o i , " H i s a h i k o  as  Both  believe in  arrangements.  similarity  posture  realists'.  maintenance of the U.S.-Japan s e c u r i t y i s where t h e i r  in  groups, c l a s s i f i e d  i n f l u e n t i a l members, t h e y b o t h e n d o r s e  response  must  J a p a n must a d o p t an a c t i v e p o s t u r e  debate continues  become one  for  presence.  be  groups c o n t a i n  1 0 1  the  impact of the enhanced S o v i e t m i l i t a r y  the  1 0 0  Japanese  is i t sufficient  potential  I t has  9 9  of  growth  This 1 0 0  Sakonjo,  of 1 0 1  propaganda  for a j o i n t defence  strategy  States.  M a k o t o Momoi, "Are T h e r e Any Alternative Strategies for the Defense of J a p a n ? " i n F r a n k l i n B. W e i n s t e i n ( e d . ) , U.S.-Japan R e l a t i o n s and t h e S e c u r i t y o f E a s t A s i a : The N e x t D e c a d e ( B o u l d e r , C o l o r a d o : 1978) p.71 Hisahiko Okazaki, "Japanese Security Policy: A Time for S t r a t e g y " i n I n t e r n a t i o n a l S e c u r i t y V o l . 7 No.2 ( F a l l 1982) p.188 Naotoshi Sakonjo, " S e c u r i t y i n Northeast A s i a " i n J o u r n a l of N o r t h e a s t A s i a n S t u d i e s V o l . 2 No.3 ( S e p t e m b e r 1983) p.93  47  The  'political  'military  r e a l i s t s ' have a  realists'  and  sway  longer  history  than  the  that  opinion  which  is  represent  currently  holding  in  Japan.  Members  of  this  emphasise  the l i m i t a t i o n s of S o v i e t m i l i t a r y power and r e f e r to  the f a c t that as a land-based empire, the Soviet Union 'defensive' and  'internally vulnerable'.  This  1 0 2  i n c l u d e s prominent s c h o l a r s and government  group  is  group,  both which  a d v i s e r s such as Mike  Mochizuki, Yukio Satoh, H i s a s h i Owada, Masatake Kosaka, Yonosuke Nagai,  and  political policy.  1 0 3  Hiroshi and  Kimura,  domestic  While  is  primarily  implications  of  must be seen i n p o l i t i c a l they  security  that  this  rather than m i l i t a r y terms.  threat  Generally  b e l i e v e that the S o v i e t Union has the p o t e n t i a l  to take advantage of  internal  c o n f l i c t and i n s t a b i l i t y E.  Japan's  the Soviet m i l i t a r y b u i l d - u p i s seen as being  capable of c o n s t i t u t i n g a t h r e a t , they argue  speaking,  concerned with the  upheaval  as  well  as  regional  i n the T h i r d World.  AN ASSESSMENT The d i f f e r e n c e s i n p e r c e p t i o n between the U n i t e d States and  Japan  are  'political  not simply the d i f f e r e n c e s between the U.S. realists'.  emphasis on U.S.-Japan  While the ' m i l i t a r y r e a l i s t s '  and the  l a y greater  defence c o o p e r a t i o n and are c l o s e r to the  Yonosuke Nagai, "Beyond Burden-sharing" i n Program on U.S.Japan R e l a t i o n s (Cambridge, Mass.: 1983) p.17 Mike M o c h i z u k i , o p . c i t . , Yukio Satoh, o p . c i t . , H i s a s h i Owada, "Japanese P e r c e p t i o n s of the U.S.-Japan R e l a t i o n s h i p " i n Program on U.S.-Japan R e l a t i o n s (1980-81), and Masataka Kosaka, "Japan's Role i n the World: A Prospect f o r a L i g h t l y Armed Economic G i a n t " (1984).  1 0 2  1 0 3  48  American view i n seeing the Soviet which of  as  a  military  one  must be countered by m i l i t a r y means, they are not unaware  Japan's  'political sum  threat  own  geopolitical  vulnerabilities.They,  like  the  r e a l i s t s ' , do not view U.S.-Soviet r e l a t i o n s i n zero-  terms  and see no advantage to be gained from u n n e c e s s a r i l y  a n t a g o n i z i n g the Soviet Union. The  'political  realists',  whose  endorsed by the Japanese government, h i s t o r i c a l as w e l l as p o l i t i c a l  views  are  generally  stress certain c u l t u r a l  f a c t o r s which have a key r o l e i n  d e s i g n i n g a Japanese view of the S o v i e t m i l i t a r y b u i l d - u p . perspective and  is  security  accommodating  r e g i o n a l l y based and addresses Japan's  interests the  in  Soviet  and  Northeast  Union  as  economic  which  includes  an Asian power, a l s o with  i n t e r e s t s i n the area.  As a  chiefly  energy and other resource imports, i t i s  dependent  on  global  Asia,  This  economic  keenly aware of the p o t e n t i a l p o l i t i c a l through  the  Soviet  capability  to  threat  interdict  power,  that  and  is  one  posed  i t s sea lanes of  communication. Both of military  the  predominant  build-up  are  faulty.  Japanese  views  The m i l i t a r y  of  unwisely  tone believe  to  the  that  prevailing simply  American  interests,  opinion.  by Japan i n c r e a s i n g  f o r c e s , the American commitment to Japan and to  Soviet  r e a l i s t s tend to  equate S o v i e t m i l i t a r y power with a t h r e a t to Japan's in s i m i l a r  the  They  i t s defence  Northeast  Asia  w i l l be e f f e c t i v e l y maintained. On the other hand, the p o l i t i c a l  r e a l i s t s have f a i t h  i n the  potency of Japan's economic power and discount the e f f e c t of the  49  Soviet face  Union's  the f a c t  influence, extended on  if  the  Soviet  level  and  a  view  little  m i l i t a r y power  likewise  in their  perception  are  is  qualitative for  With  into  the  improvement  The  admit  and  trends  improvements  Americans  ignore  the  for  heeded.  e f f e c t s of  two  with  the  the S o v i e t  In  realists  dominant  premises as t o the  and  will  Union,  prevailing  that  the  then  American  Soviet  i t s military forces  increase of  American  o v e r a l l force  force  fully  calls  in  i t s forces  effective  numbers  which  Union  t o the  has  together  projection  of  has East  gone  a  have made its  power  t e n d s t o be p e s s i m i s t i c  about  region.  Prevailing the  defence e f f o r t s  political  If  States  evidence  the  t h e more e f f i c i e n t  unwisely  threat.  undoubted  region.  the  on d o u b t f u l  d e p l o y e d a s u b s t a n t i a l number o f Asian  is  American  not be  region.  problems  of the S o v i e t  There  that  of Japan,  of t h e U n i t e d  there  optimism  of American  need  c a p a b i l i t y to  more c o n c e r n f o r t h e p o s s i b l e  a t t i t u d e s are based  capability  the i n h e r e n t  assume  contributions  of the S o v i e t  have y e t t o a d e q u a t e l y  Their  cover the c o n t i n u a t i o n  show  Japanese and  intimidate.  Japanese  light  should  not  present  increased  They  t h a t m i l i t a r y power has  to  their  m i l i t a r y build-up.  its  relationship  Japan  the S o v i e t  with  releasing  t h e U.S.  Union's  weakness.  of t h e S o v i e t s ' into  and  believes  upset the r e g i o n a l  regional p o l i t i c a l  the magnitude  intimidate,  i n the r e g i o n  have  emphasise  opinion  failure itself  the  Soviet  b a l a n c e o f power.  military They  power  are reluctant  t o p e r s u a d e , or from  For the Americans,  and  the  its  to  even close  presumption  50  i s that the S o v i e t m i l i t a r y  build-up  c o n s t i t u t e a t h r e a t to American and they presume that America's a l l i e s terms  and  in  Northeast  allied  Asia  interests.  see the b u i l d - u p  w i l l be prepared to j o i n the U.S.  must  Likewise,  in i d e n t i c a l  i n countering  this  threat. The  American p e r c e p t i o n  g l o b a l one two  and  nations.  i s coloured  of the S o v i e t  by the  services.  the  T h i s view of the Soviet Union as a t h r e a t e n i n g  and  interest  and  intimidate  Commanding an  national  security  apparatus,  i f not  its  military  position  in  eliminated.  The  moves  for  an  accurately  it  military,  measured  conveniently been  American  the a i r f o r c e ,  m i l i t a r y build-up  ignore  only their  introduced  in own  into  political  or  relative  terms.  qualitative the  economic, The  can  improvements  Northeast Asian  political  and  s t r a t e g i c vacuum.  American  in Northeast A s i a , i t s important r e g i o n a l a l l i e s the  politically  S o v i e t s ' own w i t h i n the  to  important  logistical  Sino-Soviet  limitations  and  be  Americans which  threatre,  re,fer to the S o v i e t m i l i t a r y b u i l d - u p as though i t has a  must  Soviets.  Power, be  in  vested  p e r s i s t i n g r i v a l r y between  has  have  to  American  idea of an e x t e r n a l t h r e a t which  e s p e c i a l l y between the navy and  combat the  the  the armed s e r v i c e s have a  the s e r v i c e s , and intensified  power  i s encouraged by the American armed  important  in promoting the  be contained,  is primarily a  superpower r i v a l r y between  o p p o r t u n i s t i c power which seeks to use destabilise  threat  and  occurred  forces-in-place such as  Japan,  r i v a l r y as w e l l as political  r e g i o n , must a l l be taken i n t o account.  the  ineptitude  51  The  perception  of  the  J a p a n ' s l e a d i n g g r o u p s i s , on naive.  Given  capability to  their  and  the o t h e r  professed  Asia  hand, too o p t i m i s t i c  inclination  to  the obvious b u i l d - u p  g r o u p s have s i m u l t a n e o u s l y  in Soviet m i l i t a r y  i m p o r t a n c e of S o v i e t  power  and  by and  consider  i n t e n t i o n when a s s e s s i n g w h e t h e r a t h r e a t  Japan's s e c u r i t y , these  the  S o v i e t Union i n Northeast  both exists  downplayed exaggerated  statements that t h i s build-up  i s purely  also  America's  defensive. The  Japanese  are  unduly o p t i m i s t i c  o v e r r i d i n g commitment t o J a p a n ' s d e f e n c e . Japan e x h i b i t i n s u f f i c i e n t awareness American  attitudes  Administration's defence  force  must r e c o g n i z e  as  to  allotment  leading  t h i s new  groups on  the  r o l e of  its allies.  of  specific  missions  a t t i t u d e and  perceptions  are  defective.  be p r e p a r e d  of  both The  friendly  by a more r e a l i s t i c ,  to  as e l s e w h e r e . refer  to  Japan's Japan  adjust  its  Japan's  base  to  a l l  less optimistic  nations,  view.  they  gradually The  their  will  so  each  surplanted  Americans,  h a n d , e x a g g e r a t e S o v i e t m i l i t a r y power and  sinister  Reagan  a bel-ief system which n a i v e l y p r e s c r i b e s t h a t  T h i s view i s , however, being  they  to  Japanese  reciprocate.  they  The  A m e r i c a ' s and  is  most  changed  accordingly.  l o n g as J a p a n  the other  recently  i s i n d i c a t i v e o f t h i s c h a n g e of a t t i t u d e .  'threat'  perception  of  l e a d i n g groups i n  the  v i e w of t h e e x t e r n a l e n v i r o n m e n t The  The  about  ascribe  on the  of m o t i v e s t o the S o v i e t Union i n N o r t h e a s t  Asia,  They a r e , h o w e v e r ,  while  the q u a l i t a t i v e  r e f u s e to admit  that  these  inconsistent superiority could  in  that  of A m e r i c a n  provide  an  forces,  effective  52  counterweight Japanese  to  the  military  Americans  Soviet  forces  military  are  not  f o r c e s i n the r e g i o n .  inconsiderable,  but  the  l i k e w i s e , do not place these on to the r e g i o n a l power  scale. Evidence of a Soviet  i n t e n t i o n to harm American and  i n t e r e s t s i n Northeast A s i a i s at best who  derive  and  the  present  intention directly Japanese  who  from  separate  scanty. ''  The Americans,  10  Soviet  allied  military  capability  the two f e a t u r e s , both f a i l to  a p r o p e r l y balanced view of the S o v i e t  Union's  present  and p o t e n t i a l impact upon the r e g i o n . A  more  realistic  assessment  would  seek to d i s c o v e r the  r e l a t i v e c a p a b i l i t i e s of the S o v i e t and American m i l i t a r y in Northeast A s i a and then add to the s c a l e s any other forces.  I n t e n t i o n should  divorced  realistic  assessment  committed  n e i t h e r be d e r i v e d s o l e l y from nor  from the Soviet Union's r e l a t i v e m i l i t a r y  Evidence of the S o v i e t s ' s  forces  i n t e n t i o n should  of  Soviet  capability.  be the product  capability  be  of  a  i n and statements  about Northeast A s i a . The Americans and Japanese have which  shape  their  perceptions  of  c o u n t r i e s have d i f f e r e n t g e o p o l i t i c a l historical  and  cultural  that each w i l l  the  seek to play  belief  These  environment  in i t .  systems  o u t s i d e world.  positions  backgrounds.  r e s p e c t i v e views of the i n t e r n a t i o n a l role  different  and  different  affect and  Their  their of  the  If Japan i s to perform  " With respect to Japanese i n t e r e s t s , the Soviet occupation and p a r t i a l m i l i t a r i s a t i o n of the K u r i l e I s l a n d s would appear as the only probable evidence of such i n t e n t i o n .  53  a r o l e w i t h i n an American then  strategic policy  in  Northeast  the d i f f e r e n c e s i n t h e i r p e r c e p t i o n s of the Soviet  m i l i t a r y b u i l d - u p must be noted along various  Japanese  with  an  Asia, Union's  examination  views of i t s s e c u r i t y r o l e i n the r e g i o n .  i s to t h i s examination that we now  turn.  of It  54  III.  THE JAPANESE SECURITY POLICY DEBATE  Japan undoubtedly has continued  stability  significance as  well  and  part  to  security  i n the region i s a d i r e c t  however, a  been  sizable  play  of  as r e g i o n a l economic power.  has not, despite  a  translated  in  ensuring  Northeast  the  Asia.  Its  r e f l e c t i o n of i t s  global  T h i s great economic power into  military  power  and  Self-Defense Force, Japan remains t i e d to a  low s e c u r i t y posture, r e l y i n g more on the d e t e r r e n c e p r o v i d e d by U n i t e d S t a t e s f o r c e s than  on  the  defense  value  of  its  own  forces. The  1970s  and  number of changes and  the  response  a  early  1980s have witnessed i n Japan a  i n the a t t i t u d e s of both  general to  the  public. number  These  the  leading  groups  changes have l a r g e l y been i n  of e x t e r n a l  'shocks' and c r i s e s ,  have i n t e n s i f i e d the Japanese debate over i t s s e c u r i t y  1 0 5  role.  T h i s chapter w i l l examine the contemporary debate i n by  analyzing  four  U.S.-Japan  Mutual  reactions  to  Japanese importance  interlocking Cooperation  U.S.  views of  of the  calls  'security';  a and  Security  Treaty;  Japanese  defence b u i l d - u p ;  Japanese  views  Preliminary  105  to  Japanese  of  the  i n t e r n a l c o n s t r a i n t s upon such a b u i l d - u p .  The chapter w i l l a l s o b r i e f l y d i s c u s s v a r i o u s views future international  Japan  i s s u e s : Japanese views of the  and  for  and  of  Japan's  role. examining  the  debate, i t i s necessary to  p example, the Nixon 'shocks' of 1971, the 1973 o i l c r i s i s , and the C a r t e r proposal to withdraw troops from South Korea. o r  55  b r i e f l y analyze the nature of the Japan-U.S.  Mutual Cooperation  and S e c u r i t y Treaty and the defence c o n t r i b u t i o n s made  by  each  country. A.  THE UNITED STATES-JAPAN TREATY A f t e r the i n i t i a l  U.S.  efforts,  postwar occupation p e r i o d , which remilitarize  Japan,  Japanese Prime M i n i s t e r Yoshida and U.S.President Truman  signed  a peace t r e a t y to  retain  Japan.  from  i n 1950.  i t s armed  The  U.S.  responsibility  1948  onwards,  to  included  T h i s t r e a t y granted the U.S. forces  assumed,  and under  the r i g h t  m i l i t a r y bases i n and about the  treaty,  a  de  facto  to p r o t e c t Japan a g a i n s t e x t e r n a l armed a t t a c k .  Article  1 of the Treaty  gave  brief.  It stated, inter  alia:  U.S.-based  forces  an  extensive  "...Such [U.S. land, a i r and sea f o r c e s ] may be utilized to c o n t r i b u t e to the maintenance of international peace and s e c u r i t y i n the Far East and to the s e c u r i t y of Japan against armed a t t a c k from without..." 1 0 6  Japan gained her independence in 1952, but c o i n c i d i n g as i t did  with the Korean War  and the U.S.  adoption of a containment  p o l i c y towards communist movements i n A s i a , the v e s t i g e s of patron-client unilateral protection.  relationship  and  unconditional  The  upon Japanese s o i l  1 0 6  Quoted  persisted.  existence  dependant of  Japan of  remained  U.S.  Japan's  from Chae-Jin Lee and Hideo Sato, op. c i t .  a  military  American f o r c e s and  i s a r g u a b l y evidence of  the  facilities subservient  p. 1.8  56  role. January  1960  saw  s i g n i n g of the Treaty the two the for  countries.  the  r e v i s i o n of the  of Mutual Cooperation and  This Treaty,  r e s p o n s i b i l i e s i t delegated, Japanese  Prime  The the  r e v i s e d t r e a t y of  path  to  a  true  i n s t i t u t i o n a l i z e the  Nobusuke  i960 was  states,"  as  defend  Japan  While  1 0 8  1 0 9  The  1 0 9  support to U.S.  as  a  success required forces  stone'  on  device  to  which  had  treaty better  political  security  equality  agreement,  A r t i c l e V commits the  political  p o l i c i e s and  s e c u r i t y commitment w i l l the  treaty  expected of the U.S.,  1 0 7  formal  f o r American extended deterrence  lend c o n s i s t e n t the U.S.  in  U.S.  Japan but Japan does not have a corresponding t r e a t y  o b l i g a t i o n to defend the U . S . from  it  relationship  not a mutual  as that term i s normally understood. to  well  While the new  words, "the  i t was  1 0 8  Kishi:  both a 'stepping  e x i s t e d s i n c e the Second World War.  of the two  the  1 0 7  protector-client  in T.B.Millar's  notable  the deployment of U.S.  alliance  reflected,  and  S e c u r i t y between  d i d produce one  Minister  equipment i n t o J a p a n .  Treaty  while q u i t e o v e r t l y unequal  American-Japanese c o n s u l t a t i o n on and  1952  spelled  it left  price  exacted  i s that Japan must actions  so  retain i t s v i a b i l i t y . out  i t open  fairly  clearly  as  how  to  that  1 1 0  what  Japan  was  would  Mike M. Mochizuki, o p . c i t . p.3 T.B. Millar, " A l l i a n c e s i n the 1970s and 1980s" i n Robert O ' N e i l l and D.M. Horner (eds.), o p . c i t . p.122 Yukio Satoh, o p . c i t . p.25 Paul F. Langer, "Changing Japanese S e c u r i t y P e r s p e c t i v e s " i n Richard H. Solomon (ed.), Asian S e c u r i t y in the 1980s (Cambridge, Mass.: 1979) p.72  1 1 0  57  contribute.  Perhaps  this  was because of Japan's then l i m i t e d  m i l i t a r y and economic c a p a c i t y . l t has remained, i n t h i s form, as the  l e g a l b a s i s f o r the two c o u n t r i e s ' c o n t r i b u t i o n s to  defence.  Let  us  now  examine what i n f a c t these m i l i t a r y and  r e l a t e d c o n t r i b u t i o n s have The U.S. constitute  air,  do  the mainstay  in  been.  f o r c e s based on  p r o t e c t Japan.  of  or the  near  Japan's  serve  two  home  islands  f o r c e s which a r e designed to  These f o r c e s , be they ground fact  Japan's  purposes:  combat,  not  naval  or  only are they so  s t a t i o n e d t o a s s i s t Japan defend i t s own t e r r i t o r y but they are the  c r u c i a l element of America's forward defence s t r a t e g y  East Asian r e g i o n . these  American  1 1 1  U.S.  forces f u l f i l  b u f f e r a g a i n s t North Korean Southeast  Senator  adventurism;  Asian f r i e n d s and a l l i e s ;  bases. Air  1 1 3  believes  that  protecting  America's  as w e l l as g i v i n g Japan the deterrence.  the beginning of the 1980s, U.S.  Japan t o t a l l e d  Glenn  the three f u n c t i o n s of p r o v i d i n g a  b e n e f i t of America's extended n u c l e a r At  John  i n the  troops  1 1 2  stationed  in  46,000 and were d i s t r i b u t e d at 118 f a c i l i t i e s and  P r i m a r i l y , these f o r c e s come under the command of the  Force and the Navy.  The 5th A i r Force Command maintains one  wing i n Okinawa and and has deployed E-3A a i r b o r n e e a r l y warning and c o n t r o l a i r c r a f t . Air  The 3rd Marine D i v i s i o n  and  1st Marine  Wing i n Okinawa and Iwakuni have combat- ready f o r c e s while  Mike M. Mochizuki and M i c h a e l Nacht, "Modes of Defense C o o p e r a t i o n " i n Program on U.S.-Japan R e l a t i o n s Annual Summaries 1980-81 Cambridge, Mass.: 1981)p.130. John Glenn, o p . c i t . p.27 T h i s compares with 260,000 U.S. troops i n Japan i n 1952.  1 1 1  1 1 2 1 1 3  58  at  the  Misawa  Air  Force  base,  antisubmarine and i n t e l l i g e n c e some  40  naval  facilities  Yokosuka complex  there  are  capabilities. in  aircraft The U.S.  Japan i n c l u d i n g the  which i s home to  the  U.S.  with  a l s o has significant  aircraft  carrier  Midway. • 11  The  bases and f a c i l i t i e s are not only the most v i s i b l e but  a l s o the most s i g n i f i c a n t arrangements.  They  provide  commitment to Japan's important  in  aspect  that  the  concrete  defence they  of  and,  perform  evidence  for  the  Asian-  Pacific  region.  Japanese commentators, role  Japan  plays  an  billion  contributing  annually  to  in  Status  in  the  whole  facilitating  f o r c e s : Japan  of  the  U.S.  spends forces,  the housing and f a c i l i t i e s as w e l l as to labor  c o s t s i n v o l v e d i n m a i n t a i n i n g the b a s e s . A  are  communications  important  support  they  to both American and  with respect to the Japan-based U.S.  over $1  U.S.,  forces  According  security  of the U.S.'s  l o g i s t i c s and  f u n c t i o n s f o r America's forward-deployed East  U.S.-Japan  of  Forces  Agreement  (SOFA)  between the U.S.  and Japan i s i n e f f e c t .  been  by  presented  some  Agreement's  p r o v i s i o n s have  favourable  to  the  U.S.,  Japanese been  1 1 5  to  for  cost-sharing  While arguments the  interpreted  effect in  a  that way  have the most  the o p e r a t i v e A r t i c l e , A r t i c l e XXIV,  p l a c e s l i m i t s on what Japan i s expected to c o n t r i b u t e but not on  1 1  ' Alvin Cottrell and Thomas Moorer, U.S. Overseas Bases: Problems of P r o j e c t i n g American M i l i t a r y Power Abroad (Beverly H i l l s : 1977) p.45 Yukio Satoh, o p . c i t . p.27 and W i l l i a m H. Ginn J r . , Testimony before the U.S.Congress. House F o r e i g n A f f a i r s subcommittee on Asian and P a c i f i c A f f a i r s , March 17, 1982  1 1 5  59  the share expected from the U.S. Agreement  has,  However, the o p e r a t i o n of the  so Yukio Satoh has argued, been most f a v o u r a b l e  to the U.S.  f o r i t r e q u i r e s Japan to f u r n i s h "without  the  a l l facilities  U.S."  forces. B.  and  cost  to  areas t o be used by the U.S.  1 1 6  THE JAPANESE SELF-DEFENSE FORCE Japan makes d i r e c t c o n t r i b u t i o n s to i t s own defence through  the o p e r a t i o n of i t s capabilities  of  this  Self-Defense Force  Forces.  have  remained  c o n t e n t i o n p a r t l y because of a lack of definition  of  what  was  meant  by  a  At effort the  issue  today  nature  and  a subject of some  clear  constitutional  " s e l f - d e f e n s e " , and p a r t l y  because the issue of defence and the use of very much an issue of domestic p u b l i c  The  1 1 7  military  force  is  debate.  with respect to t h i s l i m i t e d s e l f  i s not so much i t s acceptance by the Japanese  defence  people  as  c h a r a c t e r of and m i s s i o n or m i s s i o n s to be a s s i g n e d to t h i s  Force.  As Paul Langer p o i n t s out, the p r o h i b i t i o n  development  of  'war p o t e n t i a l '  scope f o r divergent opposed  to  against  i s so vague that there i s ample  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s over what i s 'defensive'  'offensive'.  1 1 8  D e s p i t e the apparent  one  of the l a r g e r m i l i t a r y  as  constitutional  r e s t r i c t i o n s and i t s l i m i t e d defence budget, Japan has possess  the  come  to  f o r c e s i n the world, having  Yukio Satoh, o p . c i t . p.27 These f o r c e s have e x i s t e d since 1954 and grew out of the Police Reserve Forces which U.S. General MacArthur e s t a b l i s h e d at the time of the outbreak of the Korean War.. Paul F. Langer, o p . c i t . p.72  1 1 6  1 1 7  1 1 8  60  approximately  a  According  one  to  quarter  of  Japanese  a  million  men  and  Japanese  of  meeting  what  N a t i o n a l Defense Program O u t l i n e c a l l e d  1 1 9  and the  "limited  s m a l l - s c a l e d i r e c t a g g r e s s i o n , " but are not w e l l c o o r d i n a t e d  to i n t e g r a t e t h e i r d i f f e r i n g s t r a t e g i c e m p h a s e s . while the A i r Self-Defense Force Soviet  military  the Maritime area  and  aircraft  is  able  encroaching  to  the  important  The  as  to  success  the  SDF's  upon  an  Ito,  development former  sea  of  'war  (SDF).  in  However,  1 2 1  scope  and  of Japanese governments i n l e a d i n g  acknowledgment  d e f e n s i v e f o r c e and does not contravene the  had developed  geographic  p u b l i c o p i n i o n i n t o a c c e p t i n g the expansion conditional  with  of working t o g e t h e r .  remains  capabilities.  been  well  s t r a i t s to the Sea of Japan, they have  of the need f o r the S e l f - D e f e n s e Force  question  cope  on Japanese a i r space and  By the 1980s, a near u n i v e r s a l acceptance Japan  For example,  120  Self-Defense Force covers d a i l y the p e r i p h e r a l  yet to f i n d a way  a  uniform.  commentator, the a i r , maritime  ground f o r c e s of the Japanese are capable 1976  in  potential'.  Secretary-General  of  of these f o r c e s that  it  the p r o h i b i t i o n  has  i s only a against  In the words of K e i i c h i  Japan's  National  Defense  Counc i 1 : "...[the] b a s i c defense p o s i t i o n . . . p l a c e s primary The Japanese defence budget i s almost $12 b i l l i o n , making i t the third l a r g e s t among the non-nuclear powers: W i l l i a m Watts, The U n i t e d S t a t e s and Japan : A T r o u b l e d P a r t n e r s h i p (Cambridge, Mass.: 1984) p.61 Masashi N i s h i h a r a , "Expanding Japan's C r e d i b l e Defense Role" in I n t e r n a t i o n a l S e c u r i t y Vol.8 No.3 (Winter 1983-84) p.180 at 187. A 1981 p u b l i c o p i n i o n p o l l found 77% i n favour of the SDF but only 24% i n favour of r e v i s i n g the C o n s t i t u t i o n to make i t more offensive oriented.  1 1 9  1 2 0  1 2 1  61  emphasis on a defense posture of 'exclusively defensive defense'. Although such a posture may not be advantageous from a m i l i t a r y standpoint, it is c o n s i d e r e d as the s o l e l y p e r m i s s i b l e defense s t r u c t u r e within the framework of the minimum necessary defense capability." 1 2 2  The  Japanese  public's  ambivalence over n a t i o n a l  and the s t r e n g t h of p a c i f i s t government nature  sentiment i n the country means that  l e a d e r s must tread very w a r i l y  and  security  in deciding  scope of the SDF*s m i s s i o n s .  in Japan's i n t e r n a t i o n a l environment  upon  D e s p i t e major  i n the 1970s,  the  changes  commentators  r e f e r to a lack of p u b l i c support f o r the adoption of a r e g i o n a l military  role  f o r the S D F .  1 2 3  These changes d i d , however, have  an impact upon the Japanese s e c u r i t y p o l i c y debate and should be b r i e f l y c o n s i d e r e d as they h e l p to e x p l a i n why  this  debate  has  'moved ground' i n recent y e a r s . C.  CHANGES TO JAPAN'S EXTERNAL ENVIRONMENT 1971  of U.S. that  was a benchmark year i n terms of Japanese p e r c e p t i o n s p o l i c y towards the Northeast Asian r e g i o n .  year, U.S.  President Nixon  In J u l y  'shocked' Japan by announcing,  without any p r i o r c o n s u l t a t i o n , h i s i n t e n t i o n to  visit  China.  One month l a t e r , Nixon suspended the c o n v e r t a b i 1 i t y of the dollar  bringing  with  imports i n t o the U.S.  it  the  of  imposition  of  U.S.  a 10% surtax on  and thereby f o r c i n g Japan to revalue  its  Keiichi I t o , "Japan's Defense Policy" in Asia P a c i f i c Community ( F a l l 1980) p.1 at 12 Paul F. Langer, o p . c i t . p.72 * Yuan-li Wu, U.S. P o l i c y and S t r a t e g i c I n t e r e s t s i n the Western P a c i f i c (New York: 1975) p.93 2  3  62  currency upward. " These  sudden  12  effect  initiatives  upon Japan, and as put by Fred  had  a  profound  Greene:  "...[they] i n t e n s i f i e d the u n c e r t a i n t y i n Japan about the durability of U.S. concern f o r Asia, the constancy and c o n t i n u i t y of U.S. p o l i c y , and the degree to which the U n i t e d S t a t e s , d e s p i t e i t s v e r b a l reassurances, a c t u a l l y values J a p a n . " 1 2 5  These shocks, coming as they d i d American  force  reductions  and  Peking.  on  the  heels  of  i n A s i a i n 1970-71, f o r c e d Japan to  begin a process of realignment i n Washington  close  its  Confusion  relations about  the  with  Moscow,  'common-enemy  t h e s i s ' arose i n Japanese t h i n k i n g , and i t became c l e a r to Japan that i t would no longer be able to take American granted.  patronage  1 2 6  As the 1970s progressed, Japan found i t s e l f even  more  challenges.  The  1973 o i l c r i s i s  economic v u l n e r a b i l i t y and dependence regions of the w o r l d . the  1 2 7  upon  u n d e r l i n e d Japan's o i l from  American  the  and  Administration  of the withdrawal of American ground combat  forces  reliability  of  commitment.  From another p e r s p e c t i v e , Japan's economic China's  unstable  As w e l l , the f a l l of South Vietnam  from South Korea) aroused m i s g i v i n g s about  with  c o n f r o n t e d with  withdrawal of American troops (and the C a r t e r  announcement  the  for  new  success combined  support f o r Japan's SDF and the growing sense  Fred Greene, S t r e s s e s i n U.S.-Japanese S e c u r i t y R e l a t i o n s (Washington, D . C : 1 975) p. 1 1 Yukio Satoh, o p . c i t . p.4 As Fred Greene argues, Japan's economy relies on an i n t e r n a t i o n a l base that i t cannot c o n t r o l : o p . c i t . p.14  1 2 5  1 2 6 1 2 7  63  in some i n f l u e n t i a l Japanese c i r c l e s , threat  a l l encouraged  With t h i s  greater  of  a  public  Soviet  'potential'  support f o r the S D F .  12 8  i n c r e a s e d support appeared renewed demands from w i t h i n  Japan that more be done to p r o t e c t the Japanese home i s l a n d s and the immediately surrounding sea and a i r space. need f o r i n c r e a s e d s e c u r i t y was again  accentuated  the  energy and s e c u r i t y : invasion  of  later  Afghanistan  Iranian  perceived  r e i n f o r c e d by events which  important l i n k  the  This  f o r the Japanese between  revolution  and  the  Soviet  i n 1979, and then l a t e r the I r a n - I r a q  war . A g a i n s t the background of the Japan-U.S. the  turbulent  T r e a t y and  given  nature of the 1970s, an a n a l y s i s of the Japanese  s e c u r i t y p o l i c y debate should begin with a d i s c u s s i o n of v a r i o u s views of the Treaty and i t s s e c u r i t y arrangements, as  expressed  by Japanese p r o t a g o n i s t s w i t h i n the debate. D.  JAPANESE VIEWS OF THE U.S.-JAPAN SECURITY RELATIONSHIP Categorizing  scholars  and  commentators i n t o  'camps' i s always a dangerous e x e r c i s e , and i t with  respect  to t h i s Japanese debate.  w r i t e r ' s views may efforts  will  be  accommodated  no  less  so  With the p r o v i s o that a  in  be made to l i n k w r i t e r s who  and t o draw the l i n e s of d i f f e r e n c e  is  'schools' or  when  more  than  one  express s i m i l a r these  are  camp, views  found  to  exist. Predominant  Japanese  opinion  seems  to  indicate  that  John K. Emmerson, " S e c u r i t y and Energy i n Northeast A s i a " i n Korean J o u r n a l of I n t e r n a t i o n a l S t u d i e s Vol.13 No.2 (Summer 1983) p.227 at 232 8  64  management of the Japan-U.S.  a l l i a n c e must remain an  dimension of Japanese s e c u r i t y p o l i c y  i n the 1980s.  important  Any e f f o r t s  to enhance Japan's i n t e r n a t i o n a l r o l e would thus have to be made w i t h i n the framework e s t a b l i s h e d by the T r e a t y . are  found  within  t h i s p e r s p e c t i v e and an examination of these  views of the U.S.-Japan Those  most  relationship expanded its  in  Yet, v a r i a t i o n s  in  security relationship w i l l  favour  of  retaining  the  Japan-U.S.  i t s present form and who see Japan adopting an  i n t e r n a t i o n a l r o l e , p r i m a r i l y through the  military  follow.  build-up  of  f o r c e s , a r e the ' m i l i t a r y r e a l i s t s ' .  For example,  Admiral Sakonjo argues that "...Japan i s not f u l l y  responding to  U.S.  requests that Japan assume a s u i t a b l e share of the defense  burden i n order to threat."  1 2 9  protect  Sakonjo  calls  free on  nations  against  particular,  i t s antisubmarine,  support c a p a b i l i t i e s .  13 0  the U.S.-Japan  security  system  I t o who  system  function  effectively.  1 3 1  argues  that  i s the core of Japan's  defence, i t must possess s u f f i c i e n t m i l i t a r y the  capability:  a i r defence and l o g i s t i c a l  T h i s view f i n d s support from K e i i c h i while  Soviet  Japan t o hold up i t s end of the  a l l i a n c e and improve c e r t a i n d e f e c t s i n i t s defence in  the  strength  Defense  analyst  to  make  Makoto  Momoi, i n d i s m i s s i n g the idea of an independent Japanese nuclear deterrent  (for primarily  g e o g r a p h i c a l reasons) b e l i e v e s Japan  has l i t t l e c h o i c e but to base i t s s e c u r i t y on a v a r i a t i o n of the  Naotoshi Sakonjo, o p . c i t . p.87 at 88 i b i d . p.96 Keiichi I t o , "Japan's Defense Concept and i t s 1981 Defense White Paper" i n A s i a P a c i f i c Community ( F a l l 1981) p.103 at 106  1 2 9  1 3 0 1 3 1  65  e x i s t i n g system and continue States.  Again,  1 3 2  Momoi,  on  the  Japan can play a g r e a t e r r o l e  to  the  ensure  enhanced  lays  simply  i t s defence  existing  r e a l i s t , agrees that  capability  Japan-U.S.  only  security  within  equity  capabilities.  and  reciprocity In  1 3 3  his  revised  so  to accommodate Japan's  view,these  i n c l u d e i n t e g r a t i o n of the Japanese and U.S. i n v o l v e the U.S.  the  arrangements.  However, he does suggest that these arrangements be as  United  the two previous w r i t e r s ,  T s u r u t a n i , another m i l i t a r y  Japan should expand of  heavily  i t s defence c a p a b i l i t i e s .  Taketsugu  context  rely  like  p a r t i c u l a r emphasis on how by i n c r e a s i n g  to  revisions  forces  so  must as  to  a u t o m a t i c a l l y i n the defence of Japan.  In seeking to strengthen Japan's defence posture w i t h i n the framework of the e x i s t i n g Japan-U.S. military  realists  are  joined  s e c u r i t y arrangements, the  by  the  s e c u r i t y thought i n Japan: the ' p o l i t i c a l  predominant realists'.  school of Members of  t h i s school p r o f e r general statements of support f o r  the  Japan  'alliance'  relationship  form the b a s i s  of  and argue that not only does the Japan's  security  but  it  Japan's p o s i t i o n i n the i n t e r n a t i o n a l a r e n a . For the  the  political  relationship  and  realists, to  also  U.S.-  stabilises  1 3 0  the issue i s one of managing  maintain  the  American  security  Makoto Momoi, "Are There Any A l t e r n a t i v e S t r a t e g i e s f o r the Defense of Japan" i n F r a n k l i n D. Weinstein (ed.) o p . c i t . p.71 at 83 Taketsugu T s u r u t a n i , Japanese P o l i c y and East A s i a n S e c u r i t y (New York: 1981) p.145 Masataka Kosaka, "Japan's Role"; Mike M. Mochizuki, o p . c i t . ; and Yoshio Okawara, "The U n d e r l y i n g Concept i n Japan's Defense P o l i c y " p.33, are r e p r e s e n t a t i v e of t h i s view.  1 3 2  1 3 3  1 3 4  66  guarantee, r a t h e r than simply one of c a l l i n g of  Japan's  the  Western  own  defence e f f o r t s .  alliance  1 3 5  but  political as  the  realists, result  of  the same time, many of t h e i r  commitment.  Japan  Japanese  the p o l i t i c a l  need  to  However, f o r the  Unlike  the  military  r e a l i s t s b e l i e v e that both the U.S.  increase  their  communication  so  As  the  scholars.  inheritors  of  and  c a p a b i l i t i e s , and i n doing so,  that  1 3 7  each  The can  importance understand  o p p o r t u n i t i e s and c o n s t r a i n t s that each faces i s endorsed number of American  not  defence ' f r e e - r i d i n g ' , but due to  communicate and c o n s u l t with each o t h e r . increased  136  the reduced American commitment i s seen  expanding American commitments elsewhere. realists,  improvement  They s t r e s s the importance of  at  number openly q u e s t i o n the U.S.  f o r the  of the  by  a  1 3 8  the  Yoshida  tendency w i t h i n the ranks of the p o l i t i c a l  D o c t r i n e , there i s a r e a l i s t s to  maintain  a low defence p r o f i l e and to s t r e s s the domestic i m p l i c a t i o n s of security  policy.  They  are  conscious  of the strong  sentiments w i t h i n Japanese p u b l i c o p i n i o n which view the U.S.  alliance  Japan's s e c u r i t y .  as  pacifist Japan-  s e r v i n g American g l o b a l i n t e r e s t s more than They c o n s i d e r that the basic domestic defence  Japanese t r i l a t e r a l i s t s , such as Nobuhiko Ushiba and Takakazu Kuriyama, are to be found w i t h i n t h e i r ranks. Masashi N i s h i h a r a , o p . c i t . p.180 at 182: The 1977 Japanese Defense White Paper openly expressed doubt about U.S. p r o t e c t i o n , endorsing t h i s view. Chae-Jin Lee and Hideo Sato, o p . c i t . p.145 For example, Robert A. Scalapino, op.cit. p.14; and Richard H. Solomon, "East A s i a and the Great Power C o a l i t i o n s " i n F o r e i g n A f f a i r s Vol.60 No.3 (1981) p.708  1 3 5  1 3 6  1 3 7  1 3 8  67  consensus remains l a r g e l y a matter of p o l i t i c a l As political  to  Japan's  should  f o r c e l e v e l s as o u t l i n e d are  appropriate  moderate the  139  defence c o n t r i b u t i o n s to the a l l i a n c e , the  r e a l i s t s diverge from the m i l i t a r y  that while the SDF  compromise.  be  improved  r e a l i s t s by arguing  qualitatively, " 1  i n the N a t i o n a l Defense Program  f o r Japan's present purposes.  its  Outline  They c a l l f o r a  defence b u i l d - u p w i t h i n the parameters  present C o n s t i t u t i o n .  0  established  by  In t h e i r view, p u b l i c o p i n i o n , while  s h i f t i n g very much i n favour of endorsing the c u r r e n t Japan-U.S. s e c u r i t y arrangements, has not gone so f a r as improvement capability. * 1  in  Japan's  1  The  implications  of  mutual p o l i t i c a l military  the  security  benefits  capabilities.  domestic p o l i t i c a l  that  emphasis  o b j e c t i v e s with the U.S. of  SDF  would  remains  give on  arrangements  rather  than  to  on  call  f o r an  i t a deterrent the  and  political  on enhancing  simply  increasing  They r e f e r to the working out of common t a k i n g i n t o f u l l account  adjustment. * 1  the  problem  2  'Unarmed n e u t r a l i s t s ' , who c o n s t i t u t e a m i n o r i t y view, seek an  end  to  the  and  to  the  Japan-U.S.  security  arrangements. * In r e f e r r i n g to a g l o b a l U.S. military Yonosuke Nagai, "Beyond Burden-sharing" i n Annual Review Harvard Institute 1982-83 (Cambridge, Mass.: 1983) p.19; Tadae Takubo, " P e r c e p t i o n s Gap Between Tokyo and Washington" i n Asia P a c i f i c Community No.17 (Summer 1982) p. 19 " ° For example, by p r o v i d i n g f o r an i n f r a s t r u c t u r e which would allow rapid mobilization i n times of emergency: Mike M. Mochizuki, o p . c i t . p.161 ibid. p.162 Hisashi Owada, "Japanese Perceptions of the U.S.-Japan Relationship" i n Program on U.S.-Japan R e l a t i o n s (Cambridge, Mass.: 1981) p.24 Examples of unarmed n e u t r a l i s t s are to be found i n the opposition Japanese Socialist Party and amongst s c h o l a r s of international relations. 1  1 3 9  1  Treaty  1 f l 1 1 4 2  1 4 3  3  68  s t r a t e g y , adherents of t h i s view argue that p o l i c y r e s t r a i n t s on a  defense  should  be  build-up  should  made  the  disarmament. " 1  appear  to  The  4  be  sentiment  in  in  that  population.  not be relaxed and g r e a t e r  direction  strength their  exists  control  and  of the unarmed n e u t r a l i s t s  would  ability in  a  of  to  good  arms  spearhead  the  Another  pacifist  percentage of the Japanese  They have been not n e a r l y so e f f e c t i v e  i n f l u e n c i n g government  efforts  in  directly  thinking.  m i n o r i t y group i s the ' g a u l l i s t s ' who  a l s o wish to  see a r e v o c a t i o n of the T r e a t y , but f o r q u i t e d i f f e r e n t reasons. L i k e the m i l i t a r y and p o l i t i c a l what they see as a new Japanese rather  and than  increasing calling  consultation  and  doubt that the gaullists would give  sense  genuine  an  the  i d e n t i f i e s as  independent  found  those  1  1  5  amongst  or  amongst  worth  the  However, political  capability  groups Japan's  values. " 1  pursuing.  of a m i l i t a r y  .Support f o r  emphasizing  r e s u r r e c t i o n of t r a d i t i o n a l  1  is  development  1  be  military  commitment,  p r o j e c t i o n and d e t e r r e n c e . " undoubtedly  self-confidence  identify  c o o p e r a t i o n with the Americans, the g a u l l i s t s  for  Japan  of  n a t i o n a l i s m i n the c o u n t r y .  for  American  call  r e a l i s t s , the g a u l l i s t s  the  for  The  f o r c e which both  power  gaullists  would  which  Kenneth  uniqueness  and  Pyle the  6  "" Quoted i n Mike M. Mochizuki, o p . c i t . p.165 * An example of the g a u l l i s t view can be found i n Kei Wakaizumi, "Passive Diplomacy Reconsidered" i n A s i a P a c i f i c Community (Winter 1978-79) p.41 " Kenneth B. Pyle, "Changing Conceptions of Japan's I n t e r n a t i o n a l Role", Unpublished Seminar Paper (University of Washington, 1984) pp.10-12 5  6  69  While  i t remains  doubtful  whether  able to channel Japanese d i s a f f e c t i o n with  the g a u l l i s t s w i l l be the  U.S.  security  guarantee i n t o an independent m i l i t a r y b u i l d - u p , at l e a s t  i n the  immediate  term, there i s some f e r t i l e ground i n the p u b l i c mood:  American  calls  f o r a Japanese defence b u i l d - u p may w e l l combine  with Japanese f e e l i n g s of movement  f o r such  economic  a build-up.  the  gaullists  could  resultant s h i f t E.  1  *  7  to  could  find  in public  a  f o r an  common  Should an e x t e r n a l t h r e a t  prove  promote  As w e l l , those who c a l l  independent Japanese f o r e i g n p o l i c y with the g a u l l i s t s .  superiority  ground  materialise,  to be a key r a l l y i n g p o i n t f o r any  opinion.  JAPANESE CONCEPTS OF SECURITY I n t e g r a l t o any d i s c u s s i o n of Japan's s e c u r i t y r o l e must be  an examination of what e x a c t l y the Japanese mean by ' s e c u r i t y ' . Just as we f i n d obvious d i v i s i o n s i n Japan over how U.S.  Treaty  and  security  d i v i s i o n s appear over with  this  issue.  'Comprehensive  i t s emphasis on economics and n o n - m i l i t a r y  military  security',  contributions,  r e a l i s t s and remains predominant.  The view of the m i l i t a r y r e a l i s t s , c l o s e r to the emphasising  Japan-  arrangements a r e viewed, so too do  i s supported by the p o l i t i c a l  and  the  security  American  i s , however,  gaining  view in  support. The Yoshida D o c t r i n e , which Japanese  Prime  Minister's  reflected  emphasis  on  the  first  economic  postwar  growth  Igarashi Takeshi, "Farewell to the P e a c e - l o v i n g S t a t e ? " Japan Echo Vol.X No.2 (1983)p.21 at 24 7  and  in  70  p o l i t i c a l p a s s i v i t y and which became Japan  until  different view  the  mid-1970s,  from that  was  more  diplomatic  the  predominant  view  produced a view of s e c u r i t y  shared by other Western  comprehensive  and  to  example was  the commissioning  Report  Comprehensive  on  by  and  While t h i s  rarely articulated.  Prime  National  This  economic  as w e l l as m i l i t a r y instruments of power.  view underlay government p o l i c y , i t was  quite  democracies.  referred  in  Minister  Security  Ohira  One of  i n the 1970s.  a  This  study, conducted by a group of o f f i c i a l s and academics concluded that  the s e c u r i t y of a nation  defence  and  security'  that  problems  and  important. " 1  'crisis  involves such  as  support  systems'  were  the  for  ranks  of  the  political  of  the  balance to r e g i o n a l energy and f o o d " . * 1  triad  t h i s view can a l s o be found w i t h i n  Japanese  security  understanding  of  stability 9  in  Asia  The comprehensive  and  that  to  9  as  "a  security military  international  assistance.  i s viewed by some  as a necessary compromise between the need to have a  The Comprehensive National Comprehensive N a t i o n a l S e c u r i t y Yukio Satoh, o p . c i t . p.7  other  s e c u r i t y concept r e s t s on  diplomacy, defence and economic  mixture of m i l i t a r y and n o n m i l i t a r y  8  also  realists.  requirements f o r Japan range b r o a d l y from the East-West  the  'food  s e c u r i t y ' view can be found  Yukio Satoh r e f e r s to t h i s concept of  reflection  military  8  predominantly w i t h i n  groups.  than  'energy s e c u r i t y ' ,  management  Adherents of the 'comprehensive  However,  much more  The  adherents substantial  S e c u r i t y Study Group, Report on (Tokyo: 1980)  71  defence and  capability  domestic  and the need to a c q u i e s c e to c o n s t i t u t i o n a l  political  constraints.  assistance,  for  the  and hence p o l i t i c a l  Even  economic  military  example,  realists  Foreign  economic  i s seen as a means of c o n t r i b u t i n g to  such  stability as  former  of  Northeast  Asia.  Director-General  Japan's N a t i o n a l Defense C o u n c i l , Takuya Kubo, have  of  acknowledged  i t s importance: " S e c u r i t y e x p e n d i t u r e s to be borne by Japan should not be l i m i t e d to defense funds alone but should be considered as including funding for economic c o o p e r a t i o n and t e c h n i c a l development...stabi1ity in Asian nations i s based on i n t e r n a l peace, order and economic development, a major increase i n Japanese economic a s s i s t a n c e e x p e n d i t u r e s to these n a t i o n s w i l l contribute to t h e i r stability and, i n t u r n , to the s t a b i l i t y of the r e g i o n . " 1 5 0  One  supporter of the comprehensive view of s e c u r i t y ,  Ambassador  to the U.S.,  Nobuhiko Ushiba, has emphasised  c o n t r i b u t i o n to r e g i o n a l and economic  aid.  Writing  global  stability  in a T r i l a t e r a l  Commission  Ushiba says that while Japan needs to do  more  economic,  political  major  economic,  and  appreciate t h i s Masataka  other  and  military—its  Western  contribution. Kosaka,  a  countries  system  is,  1 5 1  Japan's giving  publication, all  share be  areaswill  able  be to  1 5 1  political  realist,  itself,  not  Takuya Kubo, " S e c u r i t y i n Northeast Solomon (ed.), o p . c i t . p.93 at 107 Nobuhiko Ushiba, o p . c i t . p.5  1 5 0  in  should  comprehensive s e c u r i t y p o l i c y has a r i s e n because international  through  former  based  Asia"  argues power  that the in  exclusively  in  Richard  the on  H.  72  military c a p a b i l i t i e s . the  'comprehensive  amongst those who but  However, Kosaka does acknowledge  1 5 2  security'  would  has  attracted  i n c r e a s e not only Japan's  a l s o i t s defence b u d g e t . Other  view  political  that  supporters  economic  aid  Okimoto  and  1 5 3  realists  such  as  Daniel  Ambassador Yoshio Okawara argue that most Japanese b e l i e v e their  security  military  hinges  ones. "  They  1 5  appreciable  more  on economic  further  argue  r e l a t i o n s h i p s than on that  Japan  makes  assistance.  1 5 5  P r o f e s s o r s Lee and Sato see t h i s concept of s e c u r i t y of  domestic,  and e s p e c i a l l y p o l i t i c a l ,  upon the Japanese government In  t h e i r view, the concept  compromise  than  a  of  the  thus  determined  Japanese p u b l i c . of  activity  engage  political  represents economic who  more  policy.  or  a  constraints  a  1 5 6  political  T h i s view i s  see t h i s concept as  a  r e a l i t y of what i s a c c e p t a b l e to the  I t p r o v i d e s the Japanese government  (economic  as  to i n c r e a s e i t s defence s p e n d i n g  endorsed by two American commentators mirror  an  c o n t r i b u t i o n to i n t e r n a t i o n a l peace and s e c u r i t y by  means of i t s f o r e i g n economic  reflection  that  diplomatic)  where  they  without e i t h e r c o n s t i t u t i o n a l or p o l i t i c a l  with areas can  freely  c o n s t r a i n t or  Masataka Kosaka, o p . c i t . p.10 ibid. pp.15-16 D a n i e l Okimoto, " S e c u r i t y P o l i c i e s i n the U.S. and Japan: Institutions, E x p e r t s and Mutual Understanding" (1979) p.46 at 59 and Yoshio Okawara, "The U n d e r l y i n g Concept" (1981) p.33 O f f i c i a l Development A s s i s t a n c e from Japan more than doubled to $3.3 billion i n the 3 years to 1980: A Japanese F o r e i g n M i n i s t r y o f f i c i a l , quoted i n The New York Times June 30, 1981. Chae-Jin Lee and Hideo Sato, o p . c i t . p.139  1 5 2  1 5 3 1 5 4  1 5 5  1 5 6  73  controversy. Despite concept  1 5  7  i t s p o l i t i c a l appeal,  the 'comprehensive  i s not viewed by a l l Japanese s c h o l a r s and  as the most a p p r o p r i a t e Tsurutani  rejects  f o r the governing of  the  notion  of  his  accept  view,  Japan  accepts  comprehensive  commitment,  calls  In h i s  Momoi,  while  less  In doubting  it  is  refers  this  which  critical  than T s u r u t a n i of the capabilities  of i t s s e c u r i t y e f f o r t s .  Momoi  to the m i l i t a r y and d i p l o m a t i c means at Japan's d i s p o s a l  as being time'  the  1 5 8  American commitment, b e l i e v e s that Japan's m i l i t a r y are the most s i g n i f i c a n t aspect  policy.  f o r Japan to be able to  opinion,  c o n s t i t u t e s Japan's r e a l s e c u r i t y . Makoto  s e c u r i t y and  that i t i s a major power and must  Tsurutani  defend i t s e l f m i l i t a r i l y .  Taketsugu  security  the r e s p o n s i b i l i t y that goes with t h a t .  American  commentators  Japan.  argues that there can be no s u b s t i t u t e f o r a In  security'  together  until  the  the e f f e c t i v e r e c i p e to prolong U.S.  can  the  'holding  intervene to overcome an a t t a c k .  However, h i s view of s e c u r i t y c l e a r l y p l a c e s the emphasis on the use of m i l i t a r y  resources  and  diplomacy  forestall  an  to  v u l n e r a b i l i t i e s can be Another  military  accords attack  overcome.  an  until  inferior certain  role  to  inherent  159  realist, Keiichi  I t o , argues that i t was  only because defence i s s u e s became i n t e r n a l p o l i t i c a l  problems,  that the r o l e of Japan's defence c a p a b i l i t y was d e e m p h a s i z e d . Philip T r e z i s e , "The Japan Relationship" in Asia P a c i f i c Community No.8 (Spring 1980) p.1 at 10; John K. Emmerson, op.cit. p.227 at 235 Taketsugu T s u r u t a n i , o p . c i t . p.184 Makoto Momoi, "Are There Any A l t e r n a t i v e S t r a t e g i e s f o r the Defense of Japan" o p . c i t . p.91 Keiichi Ito, op.cit. p.113 160  1 5 7  1 5 8  1 5 9  1 6 0  74  By i m p l i c a t i o n , the  most  significant  security. amongst  I t o i s arguing that defence c a p a b i l i t y  He  ingredient  stresses  the  people  the  and  of  any  importance  calls  Japanese r e c i p e f o r  of  defence  While the comprehensive concept view  be a movement increasing  influence  r e a l i s t s ' may concepts,  a  more  security circles,  military  remains  the  there may  well  oriented  w e l l r e f l e c t an i n c r e a s i n g  including  view.  reliance  strategic  Yasuhiro  Nakasone may  issues.  1 6 2  Current  and  to  is  prepared  to  of  called  upon  military statements  more  closely  Nakasone  efforts,  to which  with  that  to  the  align Western  has a l s o advocated a s t r e n g t h e n i n g of  defence f o r c e s . Japan  the  adopt a more a c t i v e defence p o l i c y .  its  Japan's own  Minister  reconsider  Japan  1 6 3  emphasises  Prime  Nakasone has r e c e n t l y r e f e r r e d to the need f o r  democracies.  American  w e l l have recognized t h i s movement and he  has a l r e a d y i n d i c a t e d that he  security  The  'military  on  t h e i r concept of s e c u r i t y which  and  Doctrine  1 6 1  of ' r e a l i s t s ' , and p a r t i c u l a r l y  military  Yoshida  of  i n Japanese government  towards  awareness  f o r Japan to "assume a share of  defense e f f o r t s a p p r o p r i a t e to i t s s t r e n g t h . . " .  prevailing  should be  At h i s f i r s t  defend have  "our not  own been  news  conference,  country with our adequate."  1 6 4  he own  Later  by Nakasone such as h i s suggestion that Japan become  ibid. p.114 D a n i e l Okimoto, o p . c i t . p.64 S h i n i c h i r o Asao, "Japan's Defense Policy" The New York Times February 29. 1984: Asao, Japan's Consul General i n New York, r e f e r s to statements made by Nakasone at the 1983 Williamsburg economic summit. Yonosuke Nagai, o p . c i t . p.17  1 6 1  1 6 2  1 6 3  1 6 4  75  "an  unsinkable  aircraft  carrier"  bombers, appear to confirm as  are  in  comprehensive  the ascendant.  over i n recent to  Not  years i n favour  security  only do they have a public opinion  of a g r e a t e r  is  that  is  hard  to  tell.  believe receptive  has  swung  defence e f f o r t .  What  regardless  of  whether  i n a b i l i t y of the Americans to a p p r e c i a t e diplomatic  contributions  or  ' p o t e n t i a l ' threat, opinion which l a y s g r e a t e r F.  concept  which the comprehensive view w i l l be able to  t h i s movement i n t a c t , however,  backfire  c o n t r i b u t i o n s that Japan can make  Prime M i n i s t e r , but more i m p o r t a n t l y ,  extent  Soviet  regional security.  Opponents of the they  combat  Nakasone's emphasis upon the m i l i t a r y  opposed to the n o n m i l i t a r y  to g l o b a l and  to  a  it  can  a  be  said,  economic  perception  i s growing f o r  survive  i s caused by  Japanese  growing  The  security  of  an or  Soviet concept  s t r e s s on m i l i t a r y c o n t r i b u t i o n s .  JAPANESE DOMESTIC CONSTRAINTS An  important  and  debate i s the place that  related is  the  to  i s s u e in the Japanese s e c u r i t y be  ascribed  building-up  the  internal  Japan's  defence  constraints  upon  capabilities.  These i n t e r n a l c o n s t r a i n t s , be they  p o l i t i c a l , c o n t i n u e to have an security  policy-making.  has moved, i n recent years, by Japan.  Public  i n favour  economic  or  i n f l u e n c e upon Japanese  opinion,  However, t h i s movement has  been without The  important  of  to  itself  a constraint,  of g r e a t e r defence e f f o r t s been gradual  and  has  not  qualification.  political  realists  are  the group who  importance to these domestic c o n s t r a i n t s .  attach  Professors  greatest Lee  and  76  Sato  express  what they defense  views  see  as  t y p i c a l of t h i s group when, i n drawing out the  "significant  consciousness of the p u b l i c  argue that the Japanese are l e s s  differences  devastating  American  loss  willing  of  protection conditioned  increased Japanese  defence  to  World War  This  for  has  public bred  their  spending.  II as w e l l as  s o c i e t y as w e l l as emphasising the  harmony.  fight  defence  the Japanese  spending.  the  i n Japan and the U.S.",they  country and to pay more taxes f o r i n c r e a s e d The  between  postwar  to  oppose  insularity  need  for  1 6 5  in  domestic  D e s p i t e the f a c t that Japan has witnessed a more open  and r e a l i s t i c  discussion  support f o r i t s SDF,  of  security  questions  and  these f a c t o r s remain s i g n i f i c a n t .  growing 1 6 6  Public  a t t i t u d e s have indeed been changing, but there remains a core of pacifism eroded.  i n Japan which does not appear  to have  been  1 6 7  Even  military  realist  Keiichi  acknowledge t h i s a n t i m i l i t a r i s m .  Ito  is  He s t a t e s that  militarism  even  another  more than the f o r e i g n e r s d i d , . . "  military  realist,  increasing  Masashi  military  prepared  "..it  that the Japanese people today dread the resurgence  to  seriously  i s a fact  of 1 6 8  to  Japan's According  Nishihara,  the  constituencies  for  spending are weak and  this is clearly  i l l u s t r a t e d by the poor p u b l i c support shown f o r  Chae-Jin Lee and Hideo Sato, o p . c i t . p.133 Masataka Kosaka, "Japan's Role i n the World:A Prospect f o r a L i g h t l y Armed Economic G i a n t " , o p . c i t . p.2 An Asahi Shinbun survey of March 1981 i n d i c a t e d that only 22% of respondents favoured the then government's proposed s c a l e of development of the SDF. Quoted i n N i s h i h a r a , o p . c i t . p.192 K e i i c h i I t o , o p . c i t . p.1 at 2  1 6 5 1 6 6  1 6 7  1 6 8  77  any  increase  the S D F . for  Nishihara  1 6 9  any  in e i t h e r the c a p a b i l i t i e s or geographical  defence  i s j o i n e d by Tadeo Takubo  policy  to  be  carried,  who  there  scope of  says must  that be  a p p r e c i a t i o n of i t s importance by people across the n a t i o n . Since only  the Second World War,  been  a  political between  sensitive  one. the  has  issue  been  but  greater  governing L i b e r a l - D e m o c r a t i c  and  the  people.  While  also  Party and  the  than  Treaty  and  the  defence b u i l d - u p . (JSP)  and  the  SDF,  there  For example, Komeito  Party  would be abrogated, should done  between  opposition  opposition,  and  the  which  make any  i n c r e a s e s to the  gradually. The  1 6 9 1 7 0 1 7 1 1 7 2 1 7 3  1 7 3  support  power,  this  to  to  Socialist  s t a t e that while  they come to  In the view of one  1 7 1  opinion  IX  now  Japanese  the  political  remains f i r m o p p o s i t i o n the  leftist  any  Party  the  Treaty  would  be  "without damaging f r i e n d l y r e l a t i o n s between the U.S.  Japan". firm  distance  the  p a r t i e s have r e c e n t l y moved over to g i v i n g q u a l i f i e d the  not  a partisan  political  o p p o s i t i o n over the r e t e n t i o n of the Treaty, Government  1 7 0  Japan's defence p o l i c y has  domestic  There  an  has  supports  prominent government a d v i s e r , significant  i t , has defence  proportion  of  and this  public  impelled government l e a d e r s forces  very  carefully  to and  1 7 2  1946  'peace'  C o n s t i t u t i o n with  i t s important  been used as a c o n s t r a i n t upon any  effort  Article  to enhance  Masashi N i s h i h a r a , o p . c i t . p.192 Tadeo Takubo, o p . c i t . p.22. Quoted from Lee and Sato, o p . c i t p.131 Masataka Kosaka, "Japan's Role", o p . c i t . p.2 T h i s A r t i c l e f o r b i d s Japan from developing an o f f e n s i v e capability.  force  78  the  r o l e of Japan's SDF.  'ideological  It  flagpole'  has  around  served  as  which the  something  s e c t i o n s of the p u b l i c c o u l d gather to oppose  in  Japan's defence f o r c e s .  in t h i s c a p a c i t y , has political  been missed by e i t h e r the m i l i t a r y  a  impact of the C o n s t i t u t i o n when he says  international  ...[the]  relationsbecame  encouraged t h i s  idealistic  virtually  1 7 4  l i b e r a l view  i n t e r n a l i z e d in  In h i s view, the  'politophobia'.  pacifism  Constitution  In o p e r a t i o n a l terms, he  a l s o been e f f e c t i v e i n keeping  of  cruisers,  Japan's  SDF,  "bombers,  carriers  and  possessing  offensive capacity."  everything  constituted  P r i n c i p l e s were military  the  The  else  basis  realists  political  battleships, could  be  construed  As w e l l , he c o n s i d e r s  It  which  should  be  that  be  abolished.  endorses the use  Japanese  as it  the Three Non-Nuclear  should  r e a l i s t s , on the other  out  aircraft  noted  that  the  b e l i e v e that these three p r i n c i p l e s serve  C o n s t i t u t i o n r e f l e c t s enduring only  that  upon  established.  r e l e v a n t purpose and  no  1 7 5  hand, b e l i e v e that public  opinion  of m i l i t a r y f o r c e s f o r s e l f - d e f e n c e .  the  which The  Taketsugu T s u r u t a n i , o p . c i t p.3 ibid, p.75. The Three Non-Nuclear P r i n c i p l e s are that Japan not possess, not produce and not permit the i n t r o d u c t i o n of nuclear weapons i n t o the c o u n t r y . They were enunciated by Prime M i n i s t e r Sato in 1967.  1 7 4 1 7 5  "..the  b e l i e v e s the C o n s t i t u t i o n has  has  or  m i l i t a r y r e a l i s t , comments with some concern  the c o l l e c t i v e n a t i o n a l psyche." has  increase  importance of the C o n s t i t u t i o n ,  of the postwar C o n s t i t u t i o n and of  any  realists.  Tsurutani, on the  not  an  'unarmed n e u t r a l i s t s '  and  The  of  79  c o n t i n u i n g p u b l i c support f o r unwillingness military  of  power.  the  the  Japanese  However,  Constitution public  opinion  is  political  r e a l i s t s as to whether U.S.  should be  introduced  d e t e r r e n c e and While changes  defence.  the  in  into  late  Japan  see Japan become a  divided  amongst  were  to  for  the  purposes  and e a r l y  in  external  impact  Japan.  environment  upon  Together  the  which  weight and  with  the  the  giving  both  those  were appearing policy.  a rising  national  longstanding  budgetary  a  maximum  of  1%  of  (GNP), these economic circumstances added  to the arguments of those who  for  aided  government's f i s c a l  p r a c t i c e of l i m i t i n g defence spending to Gross N a t i o n a l Product  of  1980s witnessed dramatic  Economic growth had slowed down and there was debt  the  t a c t i c a l n u c l e a r weapons  advocating a m i l i t a r y b u i l d - u p , economic problems which  the  1 7 6  1970s  Japan's  to  indicates  of  no  called  for f i s c a l  restraint  special  treatment to the defence  to  Japanese  budget. Political being  "faced  policies" the  1 7 7  r e a l i s t s refer with  an  the  unprecedented  challenge  country's  deficit  financing".  1 7 8  counter  the  power  of ' the  1 7 7 1 7 8  Yukio Satoh, o p . c i t . p.2 Yoshio Okawara, o p . c i t . p.32 Lee and Sato, o p . c i t . p.135  to  control  In t h i s economic c l i m a t e ,  Finance  not  sufficient  M i n i s t r y to allow the  government to i n c r e a s e i t s defence expenditure  1 7 6  as  to i t s f i s c a l  and " f a c i n g mounting domestic p r e s s u r e  the p u b l i c p e r c e p t i o n of an e x t e r n a l threat was to  Government  by  any  sizable  80  amount.  The  1981  defence budget  i n c r e a s e of 9.7%  as an e x c e p t i o n a l achievement  of the Defence  not  or  repeated  in  the  1982  effectiveness  of  the  Finance  restraint.  restraint  spending. deficit  budgets,  Ministry's  as  a  Admiral Sakonjo, as  totalling  refers  factors  restraining  attention.  constraint in  the  the  upon  referring  of  fiscal  importance  increasing to  the  of  defence  1983  budget  e q u i v a l e n t of two years of m i l i t a r y  defence  the  execution  restraint.  policy  and  of  one  Keiichi  1 8 0  the  which  then  Suzuki  in  need of  was  1 8 1  Given what appears as the p u b l i c ' s  continuing  sensitivity  defence spending, i t i s u n l i k e l y that the 1% b a r r i e r w i l l  overcome position to  was  to the "government's f i n a n c i a l s t a t e " as one of the  government's  to  and  e v i d e n c i n g the  policy  r e a l i s t s acknowledge  budgets, argues that there must be f i s c a l Ito  Ministry  1 7 9  Even the m i l i t a r y fiscal  1983  must be seen  in  the  future.  1 8 2  The Nakasone government has a weak  i n the Japanese D i e t and i s u n l i k e l y to be so  increase  defence  expenditures  above  that  r e a l i s t s seem to agree that i n a  of  the  restraint  whether d e s i r a b l e or  not,  chances appear  of there being an highly  bold  level.  p o l i t i c a l and m i l i t a r y fiscal  be  unlikely.  as Both  climate increase, American  The 1981 increase of 9.7% compared to a 7.5% i n c r e a s e f o r general e x p e n d i t u r e . In 1983 the defence budget had r e t u r n e d to 0.98% of GNP.Refer: Masashi N i s h i h a r a , o p . c i t . p. 192 Naotoshi Sakonjo, o p . c i t . p.88 Keiichi Ito, op.cit. p.115 Defence expenditure has not r i s e n above 1% of GNP since the mid-1 960s.  1 7 9  1 8 0 1 8 1  1 8 2  81  commentators  endorse  t h i s view that budgetary r e s t r a i n t  as a powerful domestic c o n s t r a i n t upon any government spend more on the m i l i t a r y . The  combined  Japanese  defence  " t i g h t r o p e that Japan's  domestic  politics", avoiding  1 8  "  constraints  any  movement  spending. the  Government  as  difficult  to  reveal  toward  themselves as  an'  increase  in  Whether viewed as one side of the  politics  or  moves  1 8 3  internal  formidable o b s t a c l e s to  serves  of  Japan  and  "exceedingly decisions  must  walk  i t s Japan-U.S. convenient  that  between alliance  pretexts  ought to be made",  for  185  they  r e t a i n a strong i n f l u e n c e over Japanese defence p o l i c y - m a k i n g . G.  JAPANESE RESPONSES TO AMERICAN CALLS FOR A MILITARY BUILD-UP With the i n s t a l l a t i o n of the Reagan A d m i n i s t r a t i o n  U.S.  calls  louder  and  for  increased  more  frequent.  Japanese 1 8 6  defence  A central  i n 1981,  spending  became  i s s u e i n the Japanese  s e c u r i t y debate i s the nature of the responses which these c a l l s have produced i n Japan. In  recent  Administration  years,  not  the  members  of  the  but a l s o prominent members of the U.S.  have expressed concern at the between  only  U.S.  and  Japan  rapidly and  widening at  trade  U.S. Congress deficit  the i n a b i l i t y of  U.S.  For example, Richard N. Cooper and P h i l i p B. Jones, "The Long-Term Outlook f o r U n i t e d States-Japan C o o p e r a t i o n " (1983) p.31 at 38 and John K. Emmerson, o p . c i t . p.234 " Lee and Sato, o p . c i t . p.194 Taketsugu T s u r u t a n i , o p . c i t . p.76 The calls were a l s o q u a l i t a t i v e l y d i f f e r e n t i n that the new A d m i n i s t r a t i o n s t r e s s e d the r o l e s and m i s s i o n s that Japan's defence f o r c e s c o u l d p l a y . 3  5 6  82  exports to penetrate the Japanese  market.  r e c e s s i o n , the l i n k between Japan's economic  success  was  With  the  economic  low defence spending and i t s  one which many Americans  felt  impelled to  make. As to be expected, Japanese been  mixed.  They  environment, the  of the Japanese p o l i t i c a l  we  and  of  system to respond i n the  The Suzuki and Nakasone  governments  a s s u r e d l y i n d i c a t e d t h e i r w i l l i n g n e s s to accommodate  these renewed c a l l s . to  have  r e f l e c t v a r y i n g p e r c e p t i o n s of the e x t e r n a l  manner d e s i r e d by the U.S. most  calls  the nature of the U.S.-Japan r e l a t i o n s h i p ,  ability  have  responses to these  produce  1 8 7  However, the Japanese government i s  yet  on these statements and when we examine the debate,  f i n d much Japanese o p i n i o n not n e a r l y so accommodating. The p o l i t i c a l  to  U.S.  r e a l i s t s are wary of acceding  wholeheartedly  demands f o r a Japanese defence b u i l d - u p .  Yukio Satoh,  for example, while a d m i t t i n g  inadequacies i n Japan's SDF  general  defence spending, b e l i e v e s that the  U.S.  need  must  context.  1 8 8  to  be  increase  more  In  understanding  of  the  Japanese  reaction.  domestic  Another  political  a  negative  r e a l i s t , Yoshio Okawara,  argues that "many Japanese, while i n c r e a s i n g l y convinced of need  for  the  a  h i s o p i n i o n , to do otherwise and apply too much  p r e s s u r e f o r a m i l i t a r y b u i l d - u p might w e l l provoke public  and  steady  expansion  of  the  country's  c a p a b i l i t i e s , have c o n s i d e r a b l e r e s e r v a t i o n s about the  the  defence pace  of  Suzuki's pledge to improve Japan's defence c a p a b i l i t i e s and Nakasone's statement that he would make Japan into an "unsinkable a i r c r a f t c a r r i e r " have impressed the Americans. Yukio Satoh, o p . c i t . p.39  1 8 7  1 8 8  83  such e x p a n s i o n . . " Satoh, American the  1 8 9  Okawara  and  Mochizuki  impatience with Japan's  formation  of  a  a l l concerned  'steady expansion' may  necessary  to  question  of  pace  of  d i s p u t e between the U.S.  expansion  and  Japan.  could  the  Mochizuki, he  believes  to be the r e a l  issue i n  1 9 1  Another concern of the p o l i t i c a l pressure  prevent  enable  to work t h i s expansion out f o r themselves.  together with Michael Nacht, w r i t e s elsewhere that this  that  n a t i o n a l consensus, which they b e l i e v e i s  a l r e a d y underway and which they deem Japanese  are  1 9 0  realists  is  that  U.S.  damage the a l l i a n c e by encouraging the adoption  of a more independent and m i l i t a r i s t i c  f o r e i g n p o l i c y by  Japan.  In the words of P r o f e s s o r s Lee and Sato: " . . h i g h l y v i s i b l e U.S. attempts to pressure Japan into undertaking g r e a t e r rearmament that d i s r e g a r d that country's delicate domestic and regional political environment may b a c k f i r e and produce a more nationalistic Japanese defense policy,...possibly divorced from the U n i t e d States-Japan security system." 19  The need endeavours  to  2  f o r the U.S. have Japan  by a number of Japanese view,  it  is  the  to be s u b t l e and p e r s u a s i v e  in  its  i n c r e a s e i t s defence spending i s seen  writers  Japanese  as  public  imperative and  for,  not j u s t the  in  their  Japanese  Yoshio Okawara, o p . c i t . p.32 Mike M. Mochizuki, o p . c i t . p.177 Mike M. Mochizuki and M i c h a e l Nacht, "Modes of Defense Cooperation" i n Program on U.S.-Japan R e l a t i o n s Annual Report 1981-82 p.129 at 137. Lee and Sato, o p . c i t . p.191  1 8 9  1 9 0 1 9 1  1 9 2  84  government who reasonable.  must see American For  requests  as  being  Japan's  the U.S. Hisashi mind  future p a r t i c i p a t i o n  and  Western  Owada,  their  argues  Europe.  Another  1 9 3  different  political  what  scene..". " 19  counsel  political  cultures.  tacitly  alliance. The by  1 9  international  p r e v a i l s as consensus on the these  writers  domestic  and  together  two n a t i o n s to pay g r e a t e r a t t e n t i o n to the  i n t e r e s t s of the r e l a t i o n s h i p so as t o prevent perceptions  about  the  other  from  causing  their a  differing  schism  e a r l i e r , almost  unanimous, c r i t i c i s m of  the  i n the  Americans  r e a l i s t s for their perceived i n a b i l i t y  to communicate to Japan what they wanted i n terms of  a  build-up,  The  has  at  least  A d m i n i s t r a t i o n ' s requests  partially have  been  been overcome. more  than those of i t s p r e d e c e s s o r s .  to both a lack of s p e c i f i c i t y over what the its  larger  5  the p o l i t i c a l  equivocal  He  should be made aware that i n Japan there  Yonosuke Nagai j o i n s  the  realist,  and Japan need to keep i n  i s a gap between "..what has to be accepted on the and  determinant  i n t r i l a t e r a l c o o p e r a t i o n with  that the U.S.  fundamentally  b e l i e v e s that the U.S.  front  and  example, Takakazu Kuriyama of Japan's f o r e i g n  m i n i s t r y , r e f e r s to America's persuasiveness as the of  fair  h a b i t of f r e q u e n t l y changing  specific  clearly defence Reagan  and  less  C r i t i c i s m remains as U.S.  expects  and  the demands i t presents to the  Takakazu Kuriyama, "Sharing G l o b a l R e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s ^ Japanese View" in T r i a l o g u e S p e c i a l (Summer/Fall 1981) p.14 at 16 H i s a s h i Owada, o p . c i t . p.25 Yonosuke Nagai, o p . c i t . p.28 Tadeo Takebo, o p . c i t . p.22  1 9 3  1 9 4 1 9 5  1 9 6  85  Japanese.  1 9 6  F u j i Kamiya argues that t h i s problem i s exacerbated by what he sees as an enduring lack of consensus i n the U.S. is  actually  direct  wanted  from J a p a n .  security  policy-making  American commentators the  sought.  a  Japanese  1 9 8  One  number  of  process.  who  American  made  system which, by i t s  disparate  groups  U.S.  some  writer,  should  recognize  progress i n the d i r e c t i o n  in  p a r t i c u l a r , c a l l s on the  Reagan A d m i n i s t r a t i o n to present Japan with a c l e a r e r p o l i c y with respect to the Northeast Asian Recent American c a l l s have been accompanied 'free  ride'  by a c c u s a t i o n s  that  which have come from members of the U.S. economic  military  spending.  success  region.  strategic  1 9 9  f o r a g r e a t e r Japanese defence e f f o r t  with regard to i t s defence.  Japan's  in i t s  T h i s view i s endorsed by some  add that the  have  what  T h i s lack of consensus i s a  r e f l e c t i o n of the American p o l i t i c a l  very d e s i g n , i n v o l v e s  that  1 9 7  over  can  be  Japan These  is  taking  a  , c a l l s , many of  Congress,  imply  that  l a r g e l y a s c r i b e d to i t s low  However, as Yonosuke Nagai p o i n t s out, these  a c c u s a t i o n s c o u l d themselves provoke a backlash i n Japan because the l i n k i n g of economics and defence spending  may  encourage  a  view i n Japan that American motives are based, not on c o l l e c t i v e  Fuji Kamiya, "U.S.-Japan R e l a t i o n s i n Retrospect and Future C h a l l e n g e s " i n U. A l e x i s Johnson et. al. (eds.), op.cit. p.131 at 140 For example, Richard L. Sneider, U.S. S e c u r i t y R e l a t i o n s : An H i s t o r i c a l Perspective :quoted i n T. Hasegawa, "Japanese Defense" i n J o u r n a l of I n t e r n a t i o n a l A f f a i r s Vol.37 No.1 (Summer I983)p.196 at 198. Norman Levin, "In Search of S t r a t e g y : The Reagan A d m i n i s t r a t i o n and S e c u r i t y i n Northeast A s i a " , James C. Hsuing (ed.), U.S.-Asian R e l a t i o n s (New York: 1983) p.19 at 29  1 9 7  1 9 8  1 9 9  86  defence c a l c u l a t i o n s , but r a t h e r on s e l f i s h economic would  be  difficult  ones.  2 0 0  It  to say with any c e r t a i n t y whether American  c a l l s are based on s e c u r i t y or economic motives.  be  fair,  s t r i d e n t American c a l l s  f o r an i n c r e a s e d Japanese defence  effort  cannot  be  in  themselves  American economic especially  the  increasingly  classified  grievances.  In any event, the  political realists,  i n the U n i t e d  The l a c k of s p e c i f i c i t y  has  of  defence  pressure f o r a Japanese defence  security  Americans  wish  even g l o b a l , a f f a i r s .  indicated  spending  that  certain  communication  Japan  Japan  The  to  perform i n  to  increase i t s  s p e c i f i e d tasks such as a i r  i n the s t r a i t s  Japan, i f necessary, and the p r o t e c t i o n  l e a d i n g from the Sea of of  the  sea  lanes  of  t o a d i s t a n c e of 1000 m i l e s from the Japanese home  However,  leading  groups i n the U n i t e d S t a t e s remain  ambivalent as to whether  they  increase  expenditure.  their  defence  want  the Japanese  Yonosuke Nagai, o p . c i t .  p.26  to  greatly  There i s obvious concern  that Japan not become a m i l i t a r y power and  2 0 0  debate.  The Reagan A d m i n i s t r a t i o n  i t wants  to f u l f i l  s u r v e i l l a n c e , mine l a y i n g  islands.  policy  the American p o l i t i c a l system encourages a d i v e r s i t y  and  has c l e a r l y  seem  promoted any of the d i v i s i o n s that  the Japanese  views as to the r o l e  regional,  and  should be made aware of the  i n the American message would  not, i t s e l f ,  have appeared i n of  Japanese,  States.  to encourage the view that U.S.  nature  s o l e l y as the r e s u l t s of  i n t e n s e f e e l i n g s of Japanese i n g r a t i t u d e which have  been s u r f a c i n g  build-up  To  provoke  instability  87  in the Northeast Asian The add  region.  m i l i t a r y r e a l i s t s , who  have used the American c a l l s  weight to t h e i r arguments f o r a  greater and  defence posture,  political  two  common  and  extent  groups would seem obvious. concern  these c a l l s may immediate  pay  r e a l i s t s s t r e s s as the  d i f f e r e n c e s in the nature and the  build-up,  importance to e x t e r n a l i t i e s such as the  the U.S.  the  defence  that  for  well  prove,  term,  to  be  less  Soviet  attention  the  'threat' to  responses  what The  between  However, both groups share a  l a c k of s p e c i f i c i t y and in  ascribe  internal constraints. of  to  the  long  counterproductive  term for  consistency, if  not  the  the U.S.-Japan  security relationship. H.  JAPAN'S FUTURE INTERNATIONAL SECURITY ROLE The  d i s c u s s i o n of Japanese p e r c e p t i o n s  f o r a defence b u i l d - u p the  larger  issue  leads us  of  Japan's  three  separate  American  global  groupings  c h i e f l y the m i l i t a r y r e a l i s t s , who  and  regional role.  would  seem  to  who  b e l i e v e that the r o l e needs to be expanded, but and  Japan's present  more l i m i t e d manner; and  passive  r o l e and  r o l e i s n e i t h e r d e s i r a b l e nor Military need and  for  The exist  b e l i e v e Japan needs to expand  i n t e r n a t i o n a l r o l e , p r i m a r i l y through m i l i t a r y means;  nonmilitary  of  of Japanese w r i t e r s : those,  its  a  calls  i n e v i t a b l y to a c o n s i d e r a t i o n  Japanese debate over Japan's f u t u r e r o l e between  of  those  primarily in  those who  adhere to  argue that an expansion of  that  necessary.  r e a l i s t s such as T s u r u t a n i  and  Momoi  Japan to e s t a b l i s h c l o s e r c o o r d i n a t i o n  to continue to r e l y h e a v i l y upon the U.S.  stress  with the  for i t s  the U.S.  national  88  security.  In  2 0 1  their  view,  Japan  should  undertake  a  " s i g n i f i c a n t and s u s t a i n e d expansion of i t s defence spending.." and  play  a  larger  substitution,  role  in  of the American  supplementation, role  but  not  i n Japan's d e f e n c e .  in Other  2 0 2  m i l i t a r y r e a l i s t s argue that Japan should d e v e l o p a c a p a c i t y be  able to defend i t s e l f and not withdraw back  p a s s i v e defence  role.  i n t o i t s present  2 0 3  Of the m i l i t a r y r e a l i s t s , Makoto Momoi has a somewhat limited  view  of  Japan's  wartime  would  only  must  reflect  calls  contribution  forces this  that  Japan's  operating.  defence  U.S.-Japan  2 0 5  and I t o argue f o r an enhancement of Japan's m i l i t a r y w i t h i n the U.S.-Japan  perspective. for  argues  i t s s t r e n g t h so as to keep the  s e c u r i t y system e f f e c t i v e l y  global  defence  U.S.  I t o , on the other hand, takes a broader  view of Japan's defence r o l e and  role, albeit  Japan's  the  be necessary to the extent r e q u i r e d to prolong 20  Momoi  'buy time' u n t i l  Thus, the expansion of  holding time. '' K e i i c h i  efforts  more  r o l e f o r he b e l i e v e s that i t  would simply be to deny and r e s i s t and can i n t e r v e n e .  to  an  On  enhanced to  the  the  other  military  security  security  of  framework,  from  hand, T s u r u t a n i , who  role,  emphasises  a  also  Japan's  the East A s i a n r e g i o n .  For  Taketsugu T s u r u t a n i , o p . c i t . pp.141-2; Makoto Momoi, o p . c i t . p.91 Tsurutani, i b i d . p.143; Momoi, i b i d . Sase Masamori and Fukuda T s u n e a r i : quoted i n Kenneth B. Pyle, op.cit.p.21 Momoi, o p . c i t . p . 9 1 Ito, op.cit. p.114. I t o c a l l s on Japan to t a c k l e the task of acquiring an a p p r o p r i a t e level of high quality defence capability.  2 0 1  2 0 2 2 0 3  2 0 4 2 0 5  89  Tsurutani,  Japan should focus i t s a t t e n t i o n on  and  i t s c o n t r i b u t i o n to i n t e r n a t i o n a l s t a b i l i t y  make  regional m i l i t a r y r o l e . Military Japan  Ushiba, who other  call  in t r i l a t e r a l i s t s ,  f o r Japan to share g l o b a l  members of the 'Western  which would  through a  camp'.  207  upon economic  such as Nobuhiko  of  Japan's  and p o l i t i c a l  Kuriyama,  while r e f e r r i n g to the need f o r Japan to take through  contributions, contributions neighbours'  Western rather Soviet  is  enhanced  express not  be  fears  trilateralists realists  Other t r i l a t e r a l i s t s  concern of  such  political  that a  such as  clearly  distinguished  t h e i r emphasis  industrial  Takakazu a  increased  magnitude  as  from  more  military  to encourage Where the  2 0 8  the  military  upon c o o p e r a t i o n with-the other  democracies  for  positive  mutual  benefit  than i n terms of j o i n i n g i n a common defence a g a i n s t  the  'threat'.  Masataka international  Kosaka  is  another  r o l e f o r Japan.  advocate  A political  of  an  realist,  expanded he  that t h i s r o l e should have a l i m i t e d m i l i t a r y dimension. Japan  than  and m i l i t a r y  of renewed Japanese m i l i t a r i s m .  are in  economic,  role  rather  contributions.  role  with  However, Ushiba, u n l i k e  military  active  from  responsibility  advocates an expansion  l a y emphasis  region  argue f o r a g l o b a l c o n t r i b u t i o n  spirit  the m i l i t a r y r e a l i s t s ,  own  2 0 6  r e a l i s t s who  f i n d a kindred  its  i s a l a r g e economic  believes While  power, he argues that t h i s should not  206  Tsurutani. op.cit. p.184 Nobuhiko Ushiba, o p . c i t . p.5 208 Kuriyama, op.cit. 16. Nobuhiko concern: o p . c i t . 5 . 2 0 7  Ushiba  vents  a  similar  90  mean that a  i t should a c q u i r e  capability  suspicions  will  of  "revive  He  (the)  i t s neighbours".  g l o b a l c o n t r i b u t i o n must terms.  a l a r g e m i l i t a r y c a p a b i l i t y f o r such  believes  be  2 0 9  in  unpleasant  memories  In Kosaka's o p i n i o n ,  economical  and  and  Japan's  technological  that the l i m i t s of p u b l i c o p i n i o n w i l l  be  a p p l i e d much more r e a d i l y i n the area of m i l i t a r y expansion than in that of economic e x p a n s i o n . Another p o l i t i c a l Japanese  political  internationalist enhanced likely  Hisashi  Owada,  environment  f o r there  international  to  be  role.  refers  as  a  ready  to  the  insufficiently acceptance  Owada makes r e f e r e n c e  of  an  to a t o a  gap between the domestic consensus and what i s a c c e p t a b l e  internationally. be  realist,  2 1 0  found  2 1 1  in  Mike Mochizuki a l s o s t r e s s e s the problems  having  international p o l i t i c a l government  will  a  markedly  environment.  inevitably find  defence p o l i c y d o m e s t i c a l l y  so  different  In h i s view, the  itself  as  domestic  not  to and  Japanese  having to play down i t s to  provoke  widespread  p u b l i c o p p o s i t i o n , while at the same time p l a y i n g up i t s e f f o r t s to  the  Japan.  U.S.  to  Mochizuki  establishment environment,  could  maintain questions be  the l a t t e r ' s w i l l i n g n e s s to defend whether  politically  a  larger  stable  and he says that the Japanese  in  this  leadership  military s o r t of together  Rosaka, "Japan's Role" p.18 ibid. p.23 and 28 Owada, o p . c i t . p.25. D a n i e l Okimoto endorses t h i s view and refers to the problem of an underdevelopment of the i n f r a s t r u c t u r e seen necessary f o r a t r u l y international role: " S e c u r i t y P o l i c i e s i n the U.S. and Japan" p.58. Mochizuki, o p . c i t . p.179  0 9  1 0 1 1  1 2  91  with the people must decide the d i r e c t i o n that w i l l Apart  from the m i l i t a r y  the p o l i t i c a l briefly  realists,  considered.  realists,  which  must  both p o l i t i c a l l y and i n terms of i n c r e a s i n g i t should d e s i s t  Nagai  is  joined  i t s foreign  from any expansion i n i t s defence  by  another  scholar,  Miyazawa  advocates that Japan's p a s s i v e r o l e be c o n t i n u e d make  her  'special  as  role,  economic role.  2 1 3  Kiichi  who  Japan  can  own unique c o n t r i b u t i o n as a c o n s t i t u t i o n a l l y decreed state'.  The Japanese many  be  Nagai, a r e p r e s e n t a t i v e of t h i s  group, argues that while Japan needs to take a more a c t i v e  aid,  2 1 2  the ' t r i l a t e r a l i s t s ' and  there i s a f o u r t h group Yonosuke  be t a k e n .  strands  2 1 f t  s e c u r i t y debate i s o b v i o u s l y a complex  and  many  variations.  There  are  to  one of be found  divergences w i t h i n each of the groupings d i s c u s s e d j u s t as there are s i m i l a r i t i e s between w r i t e r s w i t h i n d i f f e r e n t Amongst" the w r i t e r s who advocate an expanded r o l e f o r Japan, general agreement  groups. international  appears to the e f f e c t that any  such r o l e must be undertaken w i t h i n the framework e s t a b l i s h e d by the  Japan-U.S.  s e c u r i t y arrangements.  because of a view of commonly accepted  Whether due to h a b i t or political  and  economic  i n t e r e s t s , or because of a f e e l i n g of i n s u l a r i t y and i n s e c u r i t y , or  perhaps  because of a combination of a l l t h r e e , there was no  s e r i o u s d i s c u s s i o n of Japan adopting an independent world r o l e .  Quoted i n Kenneth B. P y l e , o p . c i t . p . 2 0 : Nagai i s quoted as referring t o the maintenance of a 'moratorium s t a t e ' on defence p o l i c y which he b e l i e v e s i s even more a p p r o p r i a t e i n a world dominated by nuclear weapons. " ibid.  2 1 3  2 1  92  Within the ranks of the m i l i t a r y increase  in  realists  who  on  a g l o b a l or r e g i o n a l b a s i s .  whether Japan  U.S.  forces  a  D i v i s i o n a l s o appeared over an  extent  or whether i t should only a c q u i r e  as to be a b l e to h o l d o f f an enemy u n t i l the  realists,  unified bloc.  the emphasis  surfaced  over  political  international  i n d u s t r i a l democracies. the  weight  role  to  upon and  As  Japan  adopting  whether  political  the  opinion  well,  differences  be a t t a c h e d t o the domestic and  the  was at a l l conducive t o such a  The extent t o which domestic  themselves  Obvious d i v i s i o n s of o p i n i o n appeared over  constraints  environment  l i k e w i s e do not present  that should be given to any 'shared r e s p o n s i b i l i t y '  with the Western  U.S. in  an  enhanced  domestic  political  development.  could  favour  influence  of  Japan  i n t e r n a t i o n a l r o l e with a concomitant defence  appears  limited.  While p o l i t i c a l  generally  endorse  to be  more  subtle  r e q u e s t s , even the m i l i t a r y  the U.S.  build-up  r e a l i s t s , as expected, c a l l e d  a t t e n t i o n t o the need f o r the Americans p e r s u a s i v e i n making t h e i r  Japanese  adopting an  enhanced  who  should  came t o the rescue. The p o l i t i c a l  as  role  should i n c r e a s e i t s c a p a b i l i t y to such  as to be a b l e t o defend i t s e l f sufficient  an  Japan's defence c a p a b i l i t y , there was a d i f f e r e n c e  of o p i n i o n over whether any expanded i n t e r n a t i o n a l be  sought  calls,  the lack of s p e c i f i c i t y and c o n s i s t e n c y  and  realists,  expressed concern over  in  what  the  Americans  were s a y i n g . The  Japanese  an enhanced  s e c u r i t y p o l i c y debate and the d i s c u s s i o n of  i n t e r n a t i o n a l r o l e f o r Japan  are  still  in  their  93  formative  stages  and  much  d i r e c t i o n which Japan should hence c o n t r o v e r s y embrace  a  new  exists  uncertainty take.  over  remains  Even g r e a t e r  how  to  uncertainty  passionately  i n t e r n a t i o n a l r o l e once i t has  as  Japan  the and  should  embarked i n that  di rect ion. The  Japanese  plagued  by  security  generality.  p o s i t i o n s are  policy  Writers  debate and  is  unfortunately  adherents of p a r t i c u l a r  r e l u c t a n t to s p e c i f y ways in which Japan should  or  c o u l d enhance i t s r o l e , e i t h e r r e g i o n a l l y or as p a r t of a g l o b a l American s t r a t e g i c p o l i c y .  The  m i l i t a r y r e a l i s t s appear to have  embraced the Reagan A d m i n i s t r a t i o n ' s political  realists  and  other  specific  much  This reluctance  defence  requests, may  but  the  f o r Japan's defence  seems to be based not  spending would need to be  so  much  increased  on  how  to meet these  on a fear that acceptance of the tasks  themselves  l e a d to a r a p i d m i l i t a r i s a t i o n of Japan. In  recent  years,  the  U.S.  has  made  no s e c r e t of i t s  heightened concern over what i t sees as a g l o b a l S o v i e t Ah  but  groups are r e l u c t a n t to advocate  unequivocal acceptance of these d i r e c t tasks forces.  requests,  equally public fact  pursued the  i s the eagerness with which the U.S.  i s s u e of i n c r e a s i n g  allied  both g l o b a l l y as well as r e g i o n a l l y . tended  to  see  power  in  increase necessary  It may  ask  for  much  more  has  contributions,  Just as the Americans have  have  indeed be the case that  i n a l l i e d c o n t r i b u t i o n s , the to  defence  terms of m i l i t a r y c a p a b i l i t y , so  a l l i e d c o n t r i b u t i o n s they have sought military.  threat.  been  predominantly  in order  Americans  the  to gain some  have  felt  than they b e l i e v e d would  it be  94  forthcoming. These c a l l s  f o r i n c r e a s e d defence  e f f o r t s from  its  allies  have i n f a c t been p a r t of a much l a r g e r debate i n the U.S. debate,  over a s t r a t e g i c p o l i c y to secure and maintain U.S.  allied  interests,  allies chapter  has  should perform will  particular  discuss  exposed  in the the  sought  from  i n t e r e s t s i n that r e g i o n .  and  arguments as to the r o l e which  'common  defence'.  The  following  c h i e f arguments i n t h i s debate with  r e f e r e n c e to the Northeast Asian region  contributions  This  Japan  to  secure  U.S.  and and  to  the  allied  95  IV.  THE  UNITED STATES STRATEGIC POLICY DEBATE & JAPAN  Many prominent s t r a t e g i c t h i n k e r s have recent  years  to  S t a t e s to develop  what  they  a coherent  see and  made  reference  in  as the f a i l u r e of the United  effective strategic policy.  If  s t r a t e g y can be d e f i n e d "as a set of g u i d i n g p r i n c i p l e s by which means  are  U.S.  has  related  to  Samuel H u n t i n g t o n that U.S.  of  s u p e r i o r i t y and  important  bridge  the  and Paul  2 1 7  yesteryear  today,  nonmilitary  Nitze  when  2 1 8  gap  between  power. have  216  both  but  forces.  1970s has been dominated by the  U.S.  enjoyed  The  nuclear built  up  nuclear d e t e r r e n t remains  there have been i n c r e a s i n g c a l l s  U.S.'s  argued  conventional  military  as  f o r the well  as  capabilities.  emphasis  priority  development  the  before the S o v i e t Union had massively  development of the  allies  the  i t s declining military  i t s conventional m i l i t a r y  high  then many have argued that  s t r a t e g i c t h i n k i n g of the  ideas  The  2 1 5  no s t r a t e g i c p o l i c y to  U.S.'s commitments and  the  ends"  to  upon the  conventional allocation  of  f o r c e s and resources  i s l i n k e d to the i s s u e of the d i r e c t  i n the execution  of a g l o b a l and  the g i v i n g of to  their  involvement  r e g i o n a l U.S.  of  strategic  Carl H. B u i l d e r , Commentary to The C a l i f o r n i a Seminar on I n t e r n a t i o n a l S e c u r i t y and Foreign P o l i c y (January 1984) p.17 Robert E~. Osgood, "American Grand S t r a t e g y : Patterns, Problems and Prescriptions" in Naval War C o l l e g e Review (September/October 1983) p.5 Samuel P. Huntington (ed.), The S t r a t e g i c Imperative (Cambridge, Mass.: 1982) p.3 Paul H. N i t z e , " P o l i c y and S t r a t e g y from Weakness" i n W.Scott Thompson (ed.), N a t i o n a l S e c u r i t y i n the 1980s: From Weakness to Strength (San F r a n c i s c o : 1980) p.443  2 1 5  2 1 1 5  2 1 7  2 1 8  96  policy. the  Even the U.S.  J o i n t C h i e f s of S t a f f appear  importance of the deployment  c o o p e r a t i o n of a l l i e s .  to  stress  of c o n v e n t i o n a l f o r c e s and the  In a recent statement they  said:  "The e f f e c t i v e n e s s of the U.S. s t r a t e g y depends not only on a system of forward-deployed f o r c e s but a l s o on c l o s e c o o p e r a t i o n with r e g i o n a l allies.. ..these allies provide basing and o v e r f l i g h t r i g h t s , f a c i l i t y arrangements and support personnel to a s s i s t U.S. forces." 2 1 9  While  the  rhetoric  has  shifted  importance t o both the development the  involvement  of  allies,  the  of  attention  has  been  to  attaching  conventional  execution  s t r a t e g i c p o l i c y , or r a t h e r what passes that  to  of  greater  forces  U.S.  for policy,  and  global indicates  the f i r s t but not so much t o the  second of these two i s s u e s . In  g e n e r a l terms; U.S.  strategic  ' p o l i c y ' toward Northeast  A s i a through the 1970s and i n t o the 1980s, developments: the  U.S.  was  marked  by  two  f i r s t the withdrawal and then the r e a f f i r m a t i o n of  commitment  t o the r e g i o n ' s s e c u r i t y .  p o l i c y s h i f t s were d i r e c t  American  domestic  mood and the v a r y i n g l e v e l s of concern over the t h r e a t  potential  of  i t s chief  adversary,  r e f l e c t i o n s of the  These general  the  Soviet  prompted by any concern f o r America's T h i s chapter w i l l  Union.  They  were not  allies.  i n i t i a l l y examine those p o l i c i e s the U.S.  has pursued towards Northeast A s i a over t h i s p e r i o d , whether a  regional  or  part  of a g l o b a l s t r a t e g i c p o l i c y .  as  This brief  J o i n t C h i e f s of S t a f f , U.S. M i l i t a r y S t r a t e g y Report to U.S. Congress on M i l i t a r y Posture f o r FY 1985 p.42  2 1 9  97  discussion U.S.  w i l l concentrate on  Administrations  what they saw security A.  as  likely  of U.S.  RECENT U.S.  of  the  the  'strategic  period  global  and  designs'  of  the  as they attempted to meet regional  threats  to  the  interests. ADMINISTRATIONS' STRATEGIC POLICIES  FOR  NORTHEAST ASIA American s e c u r i t y p o l i c y toward Northeast A s i a 1970s  was  dominated by e f f o r t s to e x t r i c a t e  Vietnam War.  Aware of  responding of  to  of  nuclear  the  actual  military  force",  Guam  Doctrine.  This  retrenchment/political U.S.  loss  the U.S.  2 2 0  superiority  p o l i c y towards East A s i a  i n the  early  below U.S.  the  nuclear l e v e l .  policy  to  containment and the  remain  U.S.  interests  in  contradiction.  on  forward deployment of  may  have had  Asia, As  status no  the  Nixon military  to  dominate  1970s.  In essence,  deter  threats  Nixon D o c t r i n e , while p e r m i t t i n g  premised  U.S.'s i n t e r n a t i o n a l  While the  The  and  the  was  i t c a l l e d f o r s e l f - h e l p from America's a l l i e s to  the forces,  i n t a c t , but intention  policy  Richard Sneider  postwar  policy  E a r l Ravenal, o p . c i t .  p.147  of  sought to preserve at a reduced  cost.  of disavowing American  contained  an  inherent  states:  " . . . i t r a i s e d doubts as to U.S. w i l l i n g n e s s to f u l f i l defense commitments for nations unwilling to help themselves. As a prod to the Asian n a t i o n s , there was a deliberate, calculated ambiguity with respect to  2 2 0  the  absence  President  heralded  engagement p o l i c y that  early  from  "appropriate p e r c e p t i o n s of power i n the  sufficient  announced  the  in the  98  U.S.  preparedness  Despite  the  to l i v e up to i t s commitments."  221  premise i n the D o c t r i n e that "geography makes  [the U.S.]  an Asian p o w e r " ,  America's  Asian  allies  s t r a t e g i c outlook.  the D o c t r i n e c l e a r l y appeared  222  as  evidence  of  its  'Europe  Even the second aspect of Nixon's  to  first'  strategic  p o l i c y , the b a l a n c i n g of China a g a i n s t the S o v i e t Union c o u l d be viewed  as  a  means of drawing some of the S o v i e t s ' f o r c e s away  from the European t h e a t r e . With the Nixon breakthrough found  in  1972,  i t s e l f able to r e d e s i g n i t s s t r a t e g y from one  the f i g h t i n g of 'two based  to China  and a  on only f i g h t i n g  advocated  half  'one  wars'  the  premised  simultaneously  and a h a l f wars'.  U.S.  to  on one  America's p o l i c y  the development and deployment of a c o n v e n t i o n a l f o r c e  capable of f i g h t i n g a major war a g a i n s t the Soviet Union and 'half war'  on the  ' C e n t r a l F r o n t ' i n Europe  i t s Warsaw Pact a l l i e s ,  simultaneously elsewhere i n the  world,  and a minor possibly  in  Asia. The  Ford  Administration  A d m i n i s t r a t i o n ' s p o l i c y of themselves. Secretary military  This Laird's  assistance  capability. 2 2 1  concerns Richard Richard Security: H.Solomon Yuan-li  2 2 2  2 2 3  2 2 3  of  1974-1977 continued the Nixon  calling  Administration 'total to  force' allies  upon  the  reaffirmed concept  so  allies  as  to  to  former  help  Defense  which  emphasized  expand  their  Ford d i d , however, attempt to assuage some  own Asian  with the promulgation of h i s 1975 ' P a c i f i c D o c t r i n e ' . L. Sneider, o p . c i t . p.63 at 66 H. Solomon, "American Defense Planning and Asian Policy Choices f o r a Time of T r a n s i t i o n " i n R i c h a r d (ed.) o p . c i t . p.3 Wu, o p . c i t . p.13-14  99  While t h i s the  ' d o c t r i n e ' emphasized U.S.  region,  it  f a i l e d to present  t i e s with  the  The  by  strategy  was  continued  and  in f a c t  of the C a r t e r A d m i n i s t r a t i o n .  taking  o f f i c e , Carter c a l l e d  troops with  the  earlier  Nixon  of retrenchment,  compromised by the c o l l a p s e of detente and  years  the  Soviet  intensified  For  example,  while  military  i n the e a r l y soon  after  f o r the phased withdrawal of  U.S.  in South Korea over a p e r i o d of four to f i v e y e a r s . the  in  2 2 4  Nixon-Ford-Kissinger  build-up,  allies  s o r t of change of p o l i c y  r e q u i r e d to remove the a n x i e t i e s caused declaration.  its  Nixon 'shocks' of  necessary to  consult  making  an  such  with  1971,  C a r t e r move r e s u l t e d i n intense  As  C a r t e r d i d not b e l i e v e i t was  allies,  announcement.  2 2 5  especially  Like  the  f e e l i n g s of  Japan,  before  Nixon 'shocks', anxiety  the  throughout  Japan. As  with  Administration role  in  simply the  Asia  the  two  Administrations,  d i d not expect Japan to p l a y and  calls  so "Japan should  American  previous  military  bigger  2 2 5  2 2 6  military  have a balanced f o r c e that c o u l d commitment  in  s e l f - s u s t a i n i n g , continued  [East  Asia]."  were  support 2 2 6  The  encouragement f o r them to  through  the e a r l y C a r t e r  u n t i l a s e r i e s of c r i s e s prompted the A d m i n i s t r a t i o n  2 2 4  Carter  f o r i n c r e a s e d defense expenditure  emphasis upon a l l i e d c o n t r i b u t i o n s and be  a  the  to  years change  Richard H. Solomon (ed.), o p . c i t . p.3 George P. Jan, "The U n i t e d S t a t e s , China and Japan" in Sam C. Sarkesian (ed.), Defense P o l i c y and the Presidency: C a r t e r ' s F i r s t Years (Boulder, Colorado: 1979) p.292 ibid. pT289  100  its  policy  forces.  The  and  call  for an o v e r a l l i n c r e a s e  Soviet Union's i n t e r v e n t i o n in  the Soviet t r e a t y with Vietnam in 1978, of  Afghanistan  and  the  global  1979  between U.S.  which  required  the  in  Soviet  the I r a n i a n hostage a f f a i r of the  threat  military  Ethiopia  encouraged a view w i t h i n the A d m i n i s t r a t i o n Soviet  in U.S.  that  1977,  invasion  same year,  there  was  c l o s u r e of the  the U.S.  expenditures,  C a r t e r announced i n January 1 9 8 0 ,  would f i g h t ,  the Middle E a s t . to  support  i f necessary, to preserve i t s  While the U.S.  2 2 8  its  security  continued  efforts  elsewhere, t h i s change of p o l i c y was forward p r o j e c t i o n of U.S. did  not  call  gap  power and i n t e r e s t s .  In l i n e with a r e v e r s a l of the decade-long d e c l i n e i n defense  a  for  E a r l Ravenal notes,  in  the  real  227  access  to c a l l Middle  on  East  (primarily naval),  a m u l t i l a t e r a l f o r c e to be e s t a b l i s h e d . in  likening  s t r a t e g i c p o l i c y of the  1960s, i t  this  Doctrine  to  to  allies  based on the deployment  f o r c e s alone  that  and and and As  America's  was:  "planning f o r more s u f f i c i e n t d i r e c t U.S. inputs, seeking ' r e a l ' a l l i e s , . . . e s t a b l i s h i n g regional bases for the deployment of American forces., and g e n e r a l l y discounting l o c a l friendly c a p a b i l i t i e s . " 2 2 9  The  e f f e c t of the  implementation of t h i s p o l i c y has  a cause for concern f o r America's a l l i e s  2 2 7 2 2 8  2 2 9  i n f a c t been  in Northeast A s i a .  As  State of the Union Address to the U.S. Congress. The 'Carter D o c t r i n e ' s t a t e d that "an attempt by any o u t s i d e f o r c e to gain c o n t r o l of the Persian Gulf region will be regarded as an assault on the v i t a l i n t e r e s t s of the United States " E a r l Ravenal, o p . c i t . p.148  101  the one  U.S.  Commander-in-Chief  c a r r i e r b a t t l e group has  of P a c i f i c Forces  been deployed from the  region to the Arabian Gulf and to support  The  Joint  contingency.  Task  the  European t h e a t r e .  was  reported  particular  in 1978 emphasis  alliance."  2 3 1  The  Nato  and  Force(RDF) to  cope  with  Middle  East  and  weapons systems i n support  to  provide  of  contingencies,  Persian Gulf.  shifting  of the Nato  to endorse the  "one-  a  Rapid  Deployment  particularly  in  the  'swing  the  saying  strategy'  2 3 2  the need to i n c r e a s e American naval presence i n the  Asia.  2 3 3  Statements  Pacific-based  P e r s i a n Gulf  places  O f f i c i a l s were quoted as  Indian Ocean along with c o u n t e r i n g in East  primarily  i t to improve the combat for  that the A d m i n i s t r a t i o n had abandoned because  remained  "defense budget f i r s t  A d m i n i s t r a t i o n continued  of  in  For example, Defense S e c r e t a r y Brown  and-one h a l f wars" concept but m o d i f i e d capacity  (RDJTF)  2 3 0  as saying the on  requirement  Force  focus of the C a r t e r A d m i n i s t r a t i o n  on  testified,  Asia-Pacific  there i s a c o n t i n u i n g  the Rapid Deployment  Southwest A s i a in a  has  rather  than  the S o v i e t m i l i t a r y  that  the  U.S.  forces  to  the  Indian  to  Western  Europe  build-up  would  consider  Ocean were  of  and  the  little  Admiral Robert L.J. Long, Testimony before the U.S. Congress. House. Committee on Armed S e r v i c e s , M i l i t a r y Posture Hearings 1982 pplOOO-1001 Richard Burt, "U.S. Defense Debate A r i s e s Over Whether Focus on Europe Neglects Other Areas" i n The New York Times March 24, 1978 p.A3 This strategy, originating i n the 1950s, p r e s c r i b e d that f o r c e s would be swung from the P a c i f i c to the European t h e a t r e should the need a r i s e . Richard Burt, "U.S. S t r a t e g y Focus S h i f t i n g from Europe to P a c i f i c " in i b i d . May 25, 1980 p.3  3 0  3 1  3 2  3 3  1 02  comfort they  to  America's  represented  in t h e i r  region.  United  allies  in East A s i a , f o r i n e i t h e r case  the retrenchment of U.S.  power and  commitment  2 3 4  States  strategic  policy  under  the  Reagan  A d m i n i s t r a t i o n , while premised on the same t h r e a t p e r c e p t i o n the  Carter  departed  Administration,  of  1979-1980,  from a p o l i c y of containment and  deterrent  and  combative  posture.  This  prescribes  a  (warfighting)  Administration's  has  appears sought  to  conflict.  'war-widening'  Caspar W.  This p o l i c y  i s captured  in  Weinberger's f i r s t Defense Posture  Defense  one  strategy  d i s p r o p o r t i o n a t e response by the U.S.  2 3 5  blend  into  which goes  beyond mere d i r e c t defence and d i s p l a y s a p o t e n t i a l to any  have  to  strategies  as  escalate Secretary  Statement:  "..even i f the enemy a t t a c k e d at only one p l a c e , we might choose not to restrict ourselves to meeting aggression on h i s own immediate f r o n t . . . A wartime s t r a t e g y that c o n f r o n t s the enemy, were he to attack, with the risk of our counteroffensive against his v u l n e r a b l e p o i n t s strengthens deterrence and serves the d e f e n s i v e peacetime s t r a t e g y . " 2 3 6  The  Reagan  Administration,  D o c t r i n e , has c a l l e d  while  f o r what some c r i t i c s  endorsing  the  Carter  r e f e r to as a  'three-  One Pentagon o f f i c i a l was quoted, at the time, as saying that "we may have to keep our f o r c e s i n the P a c i f i c , move them into the Indian Ocean or send them to Western Europe. I t w i l l depend on the circumstances." Refer R i c h a r d Burt, i b i d . Joshua M. Epstein, " H o r i z o n t a l E s c a l a t i o n : S o u r Notes of a Recurrent Theme" in I n t e r n a t i o n a l S e c u r i t y Vol.8 No.3 (Winter 1983-84) p.19; Jeffrey Record, "Jousting with U n r e a l i t y : Reagan's M i l i t a r y S t r a t e g y " i n i b i d , p.3 Annual Report to the U.S. Congress f o r F i s c a l Year 1983 (Washington, D . C : 1982) p.1-16,1-17 4  5  6  1 03  and-one-half  war'  Weinberger,  "...our  defending  all  emphasis i s on 'vulnerable and  s t r a t e g y i n which, in the words of S e c r e t a r y long-range  theaters  capability,  and  ship,  According  Secretary  threats  15  simultaneously  Soviet  by c a l l i n g  for  group  quoted as  saying  necessary  because  that  this  the U.S.  regions  (such  military  bases. "  2 3 9  Navy w i l l  the .combined  military Indian  Pentagon o f f i c i a l s have been  increase  in  naval  strength  is  needs to place g r e a t e r emphasis on i n meeting  the  Soviet  threat  in  0  e n v i s a g i n g a p r o t r a c t e d non-nuclear  'space-time e s c a l a t i o n ' would, with  overwhelming  2 3 8  as the P e r s i a n G u l f ) which are f a r from American 2  the U.S.  the  navy.  of i t s a d v e r s a r i e s i n the P a c i f i c , A t l a n t i c , and  p r o t e c t i n g the sea lanes and  would take the war conventional  force  its  war,  naval  t h i s p o l i c y of emphasis,  mean  to the enemy by striki-ng  with  at  This  the S o v i e t U n i o n . "  p o l i c y appears to ignore the g e o s t r a t e g i c advantage  2  the  1  Soviet  ibid, p. 111-91 To an extent, t h i s does represent a c o n t i n u a t i o n of a C a r t e r A d m i n i s t r a t i o n p o l i c y of having a c a r r i e r - c e n t e r e d navy. John Lehman Jr.,Testimony before the U.S.Congress. House. Armed S e r v i c e s Committee, M i l i t a r y Posture Hearings 1982 97th Congress, 2nd S e s s i o n , pp.561-562 George C. Wilson, "In P o l i c y Shifts, Pentagon Seeks Naval Supremacy" in Washington Post December 14, 1981, p.A1 " Gerald Garvey, S t r a t e g y and the Defense Dilemma (Lexington, Mass.: 1984) p.104  2 3 7  2 3 8  2 3 9  2 4 0  2  Union's  between s t r a t e g y  battle  over  of  strategy's  John Lehman, the U.S.  i n the Norwegian S e a .  that  capable  The  2 3 7  the  that gap  carrier  Oceans and  In  be  in r e c o g n i z i n g a gap  development of a 600  seek to ' p r e v a i l '  to  against  i t attempts to f i l l  Navy  is  simultaneously."  counteroffensives  points',  to  goal  1  104  Union  has  in  any  conventional  rimland.  Not only  military  power on the Eurasian  its  does  the  f o r c e s from one f r o n t  U.S. " 2  I f the U.S.  2  fronts,  to  ground war around the Eurasian  Soviet  Union  landmass, but i t c o u l d a l s o move another  more  itself  i t s arguments has  i t s predecessor.  quickly  than  accepted  to  to  the other  with the problem of having  to choose between h u m i l i a t i o n and nuclear  Administration  preponderant  was unable to d i v e r t the S o v i e t s  then i t may w e l l f i n d  Despite  have  the  e'scalation.  24 3 >  contrary,  the  Reagan  some of the ' s t r a t e g i c baggage' of  I t has endorsed the swing p o l i c y f o r  Pacific-  based f o r c e s and has p l a c e d heavy emphasis on the enhancement of the  RDF,  region. the  particularly  As f o r i t s East Asian a l l i e s ,  Reagan A d m i n i s t r a t i o n  which r e q u i r e s l i t t l e  to  and  Japan,  i n terms of d i r e c t c o n t r i b u t i o n s t o g l o b a l  Asian  region.  Asian  appears to embrace a s t r a t e g i c p o l i c y  i t s role  In  contrast  increased  defence  p a r t i c u l a r missions  within  the  i t s predecessors  contributions,  Northeast who  i t has  simply  assigned  (such as sea lane and a i r space s u r v e i l l a n c e  c o n t r o l of the s t r a i t s ) to Japan. The  defence strategy. defence  2 4 3  and i n p a r t i c u l a r  s e c u r i t y but much i n terms of  requested  2 4 2  f o r use i n the v o l a t i l e Southwest  Reagan p o l i c y has r e j e c t e d the f e a s i b i l i t y of c o a l i t i o n and  has  opted f o r a more u n i l a t e r a l i s t / m a r i t i m e based  E s s e n t i a l l y , a l l i e s are and  regional  security  to  roles  J e f f r e y Record, "A 3-War S t r a t e g y " 22, 1982 Joshua E p s t e i n , o p . c i t . p.26  perform which  enhanced  self-  w i l l allow U.S.  i n Washington Post March  1 05  f o r c e s to move from one contingencies. allies  joining  allies  appear  region to  another  to  meet  Members of the A d m i n i s t r a t i o n may together to  in  have  a  common  been  defence  particular  well refer  cause,  but  to the  l e f t wondering e x a c t l y what that  entails *" 2  If the Nixon, Ford and C a r t e r A d m i n i s t r a t i o n s can to  have  endorsed  a  policy  acknowledgment of a d i r e c t the  implementation  The  and  not  Reagan  involving a l l i e s while  calling  forces. argument,  of  'contained'  then  and  the  allies  were  gives  no  United  pretense  strategic  not  of  design,  for g r e a t e r sharing of the defence burden by to  accord  them  the  forward-deployment  A d i s c u s s i o n of which  allies,  s e c u r i t y arrangement with the  Administration  the  Administration, w i l l U.S.  its  as i n t e g r a l components of any  the a l l i e s , appears facilitators  of containment, and with t h a t , an  s e c u r i t y r o l e for  into a cooperative  States.  said  of that p o l i c y d i d not meet i t s o b j e c t i v e s :  the S o v i e t Union was brought  be  has  the  role of  of  convenient  exclusively  unilateralist/maritime  found  serve as an  much  favour  with  i n t r o d u c t i o n to the  U.S.  supremacy  the  present  continuing  s t r a t e g i c p o l i c y debate.  " Richard Halloran, "Weinberger Urges Japan to take More Responsibility For I t s Defense" i n The New York Times A p r i l 29, 1981 p.A7  106  B.  THE  UNILATERALIST/MARITIME SUPREMACY ARGUMENT  The  unilateralist/maritime  e x t e n s i v e l y on Mahan saw  supremacy  former Admiral and  the sea as  the  could  sea,  be  'a great highway' and  a great power unless  for both commercial and  Lehman, c u r r e n t U.S. Mahan. and  Navy  broadest  at  sense." * 2  In  7  be achieved  is  Lehman,  the  maritime  the  for  concentrating  draw and  F. by  first  of sea movement i n i t s  for a countervailing  strategy  seas', Lehman b e l i e v e s  mobile  down posing  interests. * 2  8  The  the  U.S.  Armed S e r v i c e s Committee, he has to  opponent  of  and  flexible  naval  posture.  c h i e f proponent of the u n i l a t e r a l i s t / m a r i t i m e stressed  necessary  no  influenced  rather than a d e f e n s i v e ,  supremacy argument, has defence  much  John  6  "a navy must aim  'command of the  f o r c e adopting a w a r f i g h t i n g  security  2  by means of a  thesis  b e l i e v e d that  military purposes. *  calling  which w i l l give the U.S. t h i s can  an  He  the  i t made e f f e c t i v e use  Secretary,  depriving  advanced  245  In Mahanian terms, he argues that  always  draws  h i s t o r i a n A l f r e d Thayer Mahan.  of the s t r a t e g i c advantage of sea p o w e r . nation  argument  necessity  a  In testimony before stated  that  such  enemy f o r c e s i n order an  of  even  r o l e and  greater  forward the House  forces  are  to prevent them  threat  c o n t r i b u t i o n s of  to allies  U.S. is  A. T. Mahan, The I n f l u e n c e of Seapower upon H i s t o r y 16601783 (London : 1965) chpt.I Hedley B u l l , "Sea Power and P o l i t i c a l Influence" in Adelphi Papers No.122 (Spring 1 976) p. 1 at 2 John F. Lehman J r . , " R e b i r t h of a U.S. Naval Strategy" in S t r a t e g i c Review vol.8 (Summer 1981) p.9 at 11 John ¥~. Lehman J r . , Testimony before the U.S.Congress. House. Armed S e r v i c e s Committee, M i l i t a r y Posture Hearings 1982 p.554 5  6  7  1 07  stressed be  by  Lehman, but  required  would  by  be 2  U.S. be  forces required  The  9  strategy  e x c l u s i v e l y and of  allies  would  self-defence  facilities  f o r the  global  reality  strategy  saying,  the  the  Soviet  Union."  of  naval  power  the  their  to  to  play  an  recent  unilateralist/maritime principal argument  counts, advanced  appropriate  2  5  0  J o h n F. The New  own  provision  of  bases  and  force  the  in  As  by  terms  threat  he  has  naval  power has  strategy  of  naval  Eurasia, by  most,  allies  war  as  with  the  use  i t s chief it  makes  who  occupy  allies  are  the  instrument  of  States. of  variations  to  supremacy argument have a p p e a r e d . variations on  s t r u c t u r e , and  Lehman J r . , o p . c i t . York T i m e s A p r i l 11,  a  these  r o l e through  number  Lehman:  of  "eliminated  power w i t h  played  at  design  w h i c h aims a t  a b a l a n c e of  that,  believes  r e c e n t l y quoted  regionally limited  t o be  and  makes the  been  'heartland'  would  forces.  global  Soviet  United  these  of  their  part  a  use  of  indirect  years,  the  nature  the  appears  on  the  enforce  t o any  It  i s premised  in  a global  a l l i a n c e s w i t h the In  2 4 9  As  which c o n t r o l s  rimland.  expected  2 5 0  warfighting  be  Soviet  for a  what  what  proposal  planning  reference  "actual  and  assume t h a t  r a p i d growth of  of  strategy  would  only  in  the  what  can  a necessity.  option  little  such a  to  itself  exactly  one  and  of  the  adversary,  under  out  U.S.'s f o r w a r d - d e p l o y e d  Lehman v i e w s t h i s the  to point  contributions  enhanced  that  fails  America's a l l i e s  their  capability." "  he  depart the  on  p.12 1982  the  issue  from of  r o l e t o be  the the  the On  two  line  of  most  ascribed  to  108  America's  principal allies  Jeffrey Weinberger any  Record and  conflict  criticizes  between  proposed  by  the  the  gap  capabilities Record calls as  of  also  advocates  carriers.  smaller,  force  to  more  replace  advantage  and  contingencies.  based on  the E u r a s i a n  that  strategy.  In h i s  600  2 5 1  and  recommends than  800  2  5  ships.  investment  in  the  i s also placed  RDF.  in  smaller,  construction  upon t h e  capable sea-based In h i s v i e w ,  2  However,  of  development intervention  t h e U.S.  should  both  exploits  America's  seapower  designed  towards  meeting  non-Nato  accepting  stucture,  should avoid landmass  group,  a need  Record  believes  "large-scale  against  for  substantial that  a new  sustained  first-line  Soviet  Admiral Robert H a n k s ( r e t . ) a l s o advocates  ground  maritime-  inland  combat  forces." a  2 5 3  maritime  Jeffrey Record, "A 3-War S t r a t e g y " i n W a s h i n g t o n P o s t M a r c h 22, 1982 p . A l 5 : R e c o r d r e f e r s t o a s t a t e m e n t by U n d e r s e c r e t a r y of D e f e n s e I k l e w h i c h n o t e s t h e p o s s i b l e w i d e n i n g o f t h i s gap. Robert J . Hanks and Jeffrey Record, U.S. S t r a t e g y at the C r o s s r o a d s : Two V i e w s ( C a m b r i d g e , Mass.: 1982) p.36 ibid. pTW.  2  5  1  2  5  2  2 5 3  this  strategy  Rear  While  battle  He  which  tactically  which  Union.  a maritime-oriented strategy  widened.  rather  is  of a 3 c a r r i e r  military  o f between  the  Soviet  and  be  Emphasis  structure  in  by  commitments  Lehman, he  have a f o r c e  forces  advocated  n o t meet t h e r e q u i r e m e n t s of a  U.S.  in fact  from  the  as e n v i s a g e d by  between  expensive, vessels  a  would  war,  f o r a l a r g e r navy  aircraft  strategy  and  the a d d i t i o n  would  distinct  less  U.S.  Lehman,  prolonged m u l t i f r o n t view,  the  regions.  Lehman f o r e n c o u r a g i n g h o r i z o n t a l e s c a l a t i o n of  expresses concern that as  in particular  109  strategy. defence  Hanks  f u n d i n g and  maritime  shift  accompanying protect  says that  its vital in  places  it  Western heavy  too He  emphasis  from  platforms,  his supercarriers,  sea-based  on  Hanks'  variant  e n a b l e t h e U.S.  calls  and  to e f f e c t i v e l y  be  carriers its  "  politically give  tactical  than  base  too  t h e U.S. air force.  a  to  represent  a  and  an  e n a b l e t h e U.S.  to  world  low  any  appear  performance  aircraft  "  These  large  his force.  sea-based  docks  and  be  form the c o r e of  any  argues  frigates,  lanes..".  for  so he  In  2 5 5  of  sea  t h e two  Believing he a r g u e s  region  criteria  foreign  a s s u r e d p l a t f o r m s from w h i c h  would  control.  key  that  for  essence,  in a particular  form  an  says,  areas..and  of a f o r c e which  t o be  than  structure  threat  intervene  other  force  2 5  These  precarious,  recognize  Hanks a l s o  sea  seek  sustainability  upon w h i c h Hanks would to  capability,  of t h e  to  proposes a  f o r the development  when n e c e s s a r y , r a t h e r Mobility  the  "high  for...the  antisubmarine protection  of  the s u p e r c a r r i e r s  i n t h e number of f r i g a t e s . suited  will  s h o u l d have  increase  Administration's  for a strategy  platforms.."  force-projection  "ideally  calls  He  enhanced  are  ambiguous  which  Europe.  While  t h e Reagan  in parts  launched  nuclear-powered.  2 S  is  structure  interests  of  while i t appears  in strategy.  force  those  which  critical  imperative,  fundamental  just  is  bases  the superto  project  2 5 6  Robert J . Hanks i b i d , p.65 ibid, p.67 ibid. p.64: In t h e v o l a t i l e Southwest A s i a n r e g i o n , Hanks c i t e s Oman, S o m a l i a and Kenya as g i v i n g a c c e s s w h i c h cannot be a s s u r e d i n t i m e s of c r i s i s .  2  5  5  2  5  6  1 10  Admiral attacked They  S t a n s f i e l d Turner and  Hanks' advocacy of the  have argued that "there  George T h i b a u l t have  large-scale  aircraft  "for  simple s u r v i v a l our  over more  ships."  vulnerable  and  having  a few  their  and, in  the  forcible  U.S.  they recommend that  for  them, m a n o e u v r a b i l i t y  any  force  they  structure  sea  i s more important  than  that  elsewhere  than  prepositioned The  can  foreign  missions  that a g a i n s t  be  forces.  authors  protect  discount  b e l i e v e s to - e x i s t ) , U.S. flexible  greater  for  of  its  the  provided  as  fixed  too  Turner  has  must  bases  Like  being  scenario  preparations  Sea  "capability  interests.  intervention.  by  2 5 9  as to where the  bases  a multithreat  military  is  is developed.  entry" because of the u n c e r t a i n t y  u n r e l i a b l e for future argued  than  carriers.  T h i b a u l t ' s maritime-based s t r a t e g y  Hanks,  are  rather  investment be made i n a  w i l l next need to turn to  Robert  and  2 5 7  supercarriers  c o n t r o l i s seen as e s s e n t i a l to give the U.S. for  role"  f o r c e s must be d i s t r i b u t e d  view,  s u p e r c a r r i e r s , the  Turner and  firepower  naval  too expensive and  number of smaller  control  In  2 5 8  carrier.  i s not an overwhelming requirement  for l a r g e c a r r i e r s to perform the a i r s u p e r i o r i t y that  jointly  (which he be  more  with  their  Third  World  2 6 0  pay  close  attention  to  S t a n s f i e l d Turner and George T h i b a u l t , "Preparing for the Unexpected: The Need f o r a New M i l i t a r y S t r a t e g y " i n Foreign A f f a i r s Vol.61 ( F a l l 1982) p.122 at 130 ibid. p. 126 In summary, t h e i r s t r a t e g y c a l l s f o r f o r c e s f o r sea control, amphibious f o r c e p r o j e c t i o n and follow-on ground and a i r f o r c e s . S t a n s f i e l d Turner, "Toward a New Defense S t r a t e g y " i n The New York Times May 10, 1981 p.VI15  5 7  5 8 5 9  6 0  111  contingencies Corps  and  and  s t r e s s the  army  to  to regroup the amphibious  groups; t o improve the  need  and  manoeuvrable  the a i r l i f t  air  force  restructure landing  capability;  f o r "worldwide  authors,  so  America's a l l i e s .  too  intervention".  s h o u l d be e n c o u r a g e d and T h i b a u l t time  to  they  Turner  of  believe that  course,  strategy.  2 6 2  retrenchment  in  of American  i t s Nato a l l i e s  The  same c o u l d  In  the  supplement not  U.S.  believe  the  of  little  argued  restructure and  role  this  that  the  allies  force,  intent to s h i f t  version  i n Western  such  a  of  is  policy  greater  details  will  force, as  to  f o r c e s , one must c o n c l u d e t h a t allies  play  any  a  Europe.  t o enhance t h e i r m i l i t a r y  specific  he  over  p r o v i d e the impetus t o the  suggestion  forces  by  importance to  to a quick-reaction  their  be s a i d , w i t h even  absence  to  r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s more s e r i o u s l y " .  addressing  Implicit  smaller  prominent  " o u r d e c l a r i n g an  somewhat s k e p t i c a l a b o u t how impel  has  to contribute  to take t h e i r  into  2 6 1  a  ascribe  a maritime strategy...could  Europeans are,  do  While  and  Marine  so as t o make them more f l e x i b l e  J u s t as f o r e i g n bases a r e not g i v e n these  craft  the  effective  a  They  maritime  policy  of  One  be  must  necessarily  capabilities. about how  the  Japan.  allies  will  authors  role  in  do  their  strategic policy. Not a l l p r o p o n e n t s of that  a  maritime-based  f o r e i g n bases are u n r e l i a b l e , i f n e c e s s a r y a t a l l .  H a r r y T r a i n , N a t o Commander f o r t h e A t l a n t i c ,  2 6 1 2 6 2  strategy  T u r n e r and T h i b a u l t , o p . c i t . ibid. p.133  p.130  believe Admiral  has been q u o t e d  as  11 2  saying  that  for  intervention  in  the  T h i r d World, bases are  necessary: "For a c r e d i b l e d e t e r r e n t , we've got to have the base and we've got to have the a b i l i t y to expand the f o r c e s there r a p i d l y from the U.S. or from E u r o p e . " 2 6 3  The  proponent  of  c l o s e s t to advocating  a  maritime-based  strategy  a r o l e for  America's  strategy  i s Admiral Robert L . J .  Long, U.S.  Pacific.  He  collective Asian-  argues, i n general resolve  Pacific  separate  of  region  challenges  improvements  in  the to  in  terms,  U.S.  counter  what  the  region. '  U.S.-Japan  bilateral  assistance  of  U.S.  to other  bases,  countries,  and 2 6 5  its  facilitating  strategy.  "we  our  His statement that  f r i e n d s and  there  allies"  rings  speaks.  need  hollow  when  a  sees  While  for  the  in the  East  as  numerous  Long r e f e r s to  planning increases  and  the  in Japan's  p r o v i s i o n of economic i n d i c a t e how  role  in  any  are dependent on support  i s no d i r e c t r o l e r e q u i r e d of a l l i e s  s t r a t e g y " of which he  the  he does not  would play more than a general  such  Commander-in-Chief  he  2 6  comes  in  its allies  i n s t i g a t i o n of combined m i l i t a r y e x e r c i s e s , cost-sharing  allies  of  and  who  one in the  realizes  Japan U.S. from that  "multinational  2 6 6  Drew Middleton, "Navy's P l i g h t : Too Many Seas to Cover" in The New York Times February 1, 1981 p.3: T r a i n i s a l s o quoted as s t r e s s i n g the importance of having land-based forces in the Persian Gulf. Admiral Robert L . J . Long, Testimony before the U.S.Congress. House. Armed S e r v i c e s Committee, M i l i t a r y Posture Hearings 1981 p.999 ibid. p.1003 ibid. p.1002  6 3  6 4  6 5  6 6  113  The by  unilateralist/maritime  Navy  Secretary  Administration, allies.  The  policy  lays  periphery  ascribes  U.S. heavy  emphasis  others if  on  force  nation"  would  seem  to  of  U.S.  However,  the  on  the  the  of  U.S.  be  a  f o r i t s own  bases on  defence and  its territory.  execution  of  any  there  d i r e c t r o l e i n the  C.  COALITION/DEFENCE ARGUMENT  debate,  c o a l i t i o n defence found  Administrations contrast  to  the  greater than  this  around  the  of  with  previous  the  around  to s p e l l being  only  out  simple  reference  to  i s merely i n terms of  i n the s h a r i n g  of the  cost  and  view them as u n r e l i a b l e strategy.  policy  does  Where  refer  to  i s no accompanying reference  c o n t r i b u t i o n s " might  The  and  candidate f o r  their The  global  "allied THE  America's  Other v a r i a n t s of t h i s p o l i c y  supremacy  importance of the a l l i e s , s p e c i f i c and  prime  beyond  power p r o j e c t i o n .  unilateralist/maritime  a  Reagan  periphery  Lehman p o l i c y f a i l s  a s c r i b e no r o l e to the U.S.'s a l l i e s in  for  projection  Japan performing a r o l e i n such a s t r a t e g y i t providing  role  the  in the p r o j e c t i o n of f o r c e on to and  r e q u i r e d of America's a l l i e s  facilitators  any  in  landmass.  "island  landmass  landmass.  tasks  little  of the Eurasian  a s s i s t i n g the U.S. the  and  i s seen p r i m a r i l y as a naval power  Japan, as an Eurasian  Lehman  supremacy p o l i c y , as advocated  s t r a t e g y to i n d i c a t e what  a the to the  be.  argument, favour the  the  with current  other  the  Nixon  side  of  and  Administration.  argument, i t c a l l s  the  Carter In  f o r a d i r e c t and  114  s e q u e n t i a l a p p l i c a t i o n of f o r c e on the Eurasian application U.S. may  This  of f o r c e would be done p r i m a r i l y through the use  ground now  landmass.  forces.  of  While t h i s d e s c r i p t i o n of the argument  2 6 7  be somewhat dated and  appear a  little  simplistic,  the  c u r r e n t c o a l i t i o n defence s t r a t e g y does i n f a c t view i t s c e n t r a l objective  as being  the maintenance of e f f e c t i v e c a p a b i l i t i e s  on  land. The Robert  c h i e f proponent of W.  Komer,  Defense  Carter Administration. given  to  In  2 6 8  coalition  called  deterrent  rejuvenated posture  rejecting  and  it  must  be  what  the  Soviet  is  P o l i c y i n the  priority  to  be  conventional  he c a l l s the  'ambitious  Komer b e l i e v e s that  supremacy.  rather Union.  upon  a  for  than 2 7 0  In  coalition  defense  2 6 9  r e a l i t y of the U.S.  i s l a n d n a t i o n and accepts  acquire  However, he says t h i s can only be  achieved  naval  offensive his  view,  the  force  force  need  geopolitical to  through the development of a control  based  periphery.  acknowledges  p o s i t i o n as an maritime  for  strategy  s t r a t e g y to be v i a b l e , America's a l l i a n c e s must be  on the Eurasian  Komer  for  e f f o r t based on c o a l i t i o n  s t r a t e g y ' of the Reagan A d m i n i s t r a t i o n , a  defence  Undersecretary  Komer has  a, c o l l e c t i v e  burden-sharing.  a  which  projection  aims  at  against  sea the  the p r e s e n t l y e x i s t i n g twelve  John M. C o l l i n s , Grand S t r a t e g y (Annapolis, Maryland: 1973) p. 1 5. Robert. W. Komer, "Maritime Strategy v C o a l i t i o n Defense" i n Foreign A f f a i r s Vol.60 No.5 (Summer 1982) p.1127 ibid. p.1133 Robert W. Komer, Maritime S t r a t e g y or C o a l i t i o n Defense? (Cambridge, Mass.: 1984) p.36  6 7  6 8  6 9  7 0  11 5  modern c a r r i e r b a t t l e groups would be a s u f f i c i e n t for h i s defensive In arguing offensive  'sea c o n t r o l '  against  mission.  the Reagan  c a r r i e r operations  naval  2 7 1  Administration's  against  force  stress  on  land t a r g e t s , Komer r e f e r s  to the S o v i e t Union's g e o p o l i t i c a l advantages as  a  with  the a b i l i t y  its  internal  change i t s theatre  lines  of  communication and  of o p e r a t i o n s  one  based  manoeuvrability simply  "bottling  potential".  another  force  to  s t r u c t u r e which emphasises  P a c i f i c F l e e t and  bases c o u l d not  To  effectively  use  of  a few  challenge  that  carrier  s e r i o u s l y damage  Soviet  Soviet  power  must be able to swing f o r c e s from one  meet  particular  contingencies.  i n v o l v e , as with.the u n i l a t e r a l i s t / maritime flexible  is a  For example, Komer says  2 7 2  up the S o v i e t  p r o j e c t i o n the U.S. to  a  sea and  to He  to counter t h i s e f f e c t i v e l y  over f i r e p o w e r .  s t r i k e s at Soviet naval war  on  power  more r a p i d l y than the U.S.  b e l i e v e s that the only s t r a t e g y sequential  land  area  This  would  supremacists,  the  a i r power r a t h e r than ground f o r c e s .  However, where Komer d i f f e r s  from them i s in h i s  argument  that  these f o r c e s be seen as complementary to the ground f o r c e s which are  required  to  protect  the U.S.'s core  Western hemisphere: Japan, and  e s p e c i a l l y , Western  l i k e tone, General Donn S t a r r y of the U.S. the  Reagan A d m i n i s t r a t i o n ' s  2 7 2  Europe.  Army, has  f o r c e expansion plans and  "...by emphasizing warships, Marines and  2 7 1  i n t e r e s t s outside  Army a i r b o r n e  the In  criticized says that f o r c e s at  In Komer's o p i n i o n , a d d i t i o n a l a i r c r a f t c a r r i e r s would the other armed s e r v i c e s : i b i d . p.58 ibid. p.63  starve  1 16  the  expense  sacrificing Korea."  the  other  advocacy  U.S.  developments, military  they  control  could  in  end  up  Europe and South  prong  of the c o a l i t i o n defence s t r a t e g y i s i t s  of a p o l i c y p l a c i n g high p r i o r i t y on the  allies  its  current  2 7 3  The  of  of  allies  i n the common defence. as  Komer sees U.S.  contributions r e f e r e n c e to  both necessary and d e s i r a b l e . " Due to what he 2 7  sees as the p r e s e n t l y inadequate U.S.  defensive  capabilities,  the a d d i t i o n of a l l i e d c o n t r i b u t i o n s would be necessary i n order to  g a i n g r e a t e r c o n v e n t i o n a l s t r e n g t h at p o l i t i c a l l y a c c e p t a b l e  cost.  As w e l l , because of the f a c t that many areas " l y i n g  the S o v i e t t h r e a t " should  are  important  to  America's  under  allies,  they  be c o n t r i b u t i n g to a system of c o l l e c t i v e defence, as of  right.  2 7 5  The a l l i e d c o n t r i b u t i o n s that Komer has i n mind i n c l u d e the p r o v i s i o n of g r e a t e r l o g i s t i c s and other host n a t i o n support U.S. U.S. that  forces;  the payment of a l l peacetime  forward-deployed f o r c e s . i t should take  full  of  s t a t i o n i n g c o s t s of  In the case of Japan, Komer says  responsibility  f o r ground  and a i r  defence as w e l l as p r o t e c t i o n of the nearby sea lanes to a range of 1000 m i l e s . While  27 6  Robert  c o a l i t i o n defence  Komer approach,  sees  definite  including  the  advantages  i n the  expansion  of the  George C. Wilson, "In P o l i c y Shift, Pentagon Seeks Naval S u p e r i o r i t y " i n The Washington Post December 14, 1981 p.A1 Robert W. Komer, Maritime S t r a t e g y or C o a l i t i o n Defense? p.77 i b i d , p.71 ibid, p.99  2 7 3  2 7 4  2 7 5  2 7 6  11 7  collective of  U.S.  defence  and a l l i e d defence  missions,  development,  he  and  e f f o r t , the  cooperation  recognizes  a  number  of  rationalisation  on  research  c r i t i c a l flaws.  p a r t i c u l a r , he b e l i e v e s that a c o a l i t i o n posture has yet developed  which c o u l d be  implemented at " p o l i t i c a l l y  c o s t " to e i t h e r the U.S. are  yet  to  realize,  or i t s a l l i e s . so  conventional deterrent. the  powerful  forces  national f o r c e s . The  he  the  of  alone".  2 7 9  in  the  need  strong  for  strategy  the  United  finds  contend  States.  both  U.S.  did  rather than  forces...would...be  not  military  and  testimony  J.T.  Howe  have the c h o i c e of "going i t c o n t r i b u t i o n s in  i n s u b s t i t u t i o n of U.S.  unfortunate."  2 8 0  f o r c e s , he  strength for  Likewise,  Admiral  U.S. Harry  Nato A t l a n t i c Commander has been quoted as s t r e s s i n g  importance of a l l i e d units in c r i t i c a l  bases and  areas.  the  positioning  of  U.S.  the army  2 8 1  Harold Brown, the former U.S.  S e c r e t a r y of Defense,  calls  ibid, p.77 ibid, p.94 Admiral J.T.Howe, Testimony before the U.S.Congress. Senate. Armed S e r v i c e s Committee. Hearings, International Security Issues (Washington, D.C: 1981) p.23 ibid. p.25 Drew Middleton, "Navy's P l i g h t : Too Many Seas to Cover", op.cit. p.3  2 7 7 2 7 8  2 7 9  2 8 0 2 8 1  with  individual  In recent  s a i d t h a t , as to Japan, the " s e t t i n g of an end  Train,  a  n a t i o n a l i s m which advocate  In supporting the argument of a l l i e d  supplementation  acceptable  2 7 8  support  that  be  allies  before the Senate Armed S e r v i c e s Committee, Admiral argued  to  In  As w e l l , the  Such a posture must a l s o  c o a l i t i o n defence  civilian  says,  2 7 7  and  1 18  for and  a  coalition  flexibility.  in U.S. Japan  While r e j e c t i n g the  f o r c e s in the East Asian and  division  the  U.S.  must  Van  writer Slyck.  responsibility  believes  that  decide on what c o n s t i t u t e s a  "fair  closer  between predicated  He  considers  most  to  coalitionist  endorse  While  for  the  America's  the  that  unrealistic  immediate  to  its  already provision  accepted  of  principal  to  an  2 8  and  special  of  external  assistance  modernisation  programs  being  the ASEAN c o u n t r i e s .  contingency  allies. ''  As to Japan, Van certain  America's  "open-ended  and  of both the  expand  to  strategy i s ultimate  g l o b a l power balance,  consultation  on the e x i s t e n c e allies)  the  referring  maintaining  continuing  common defense."  and  2 8 2  geographic areas  Slyck advocates the establishment  (of  increase  2 8 3  Another  for  Brown  major  argues that Japan must take r e s p o n s i b i l i t y for  those " f u n c t i o n a l and  Philip  region,  manoevrability  d i v i s i o n of s e c u r i t y r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s as  unhealthy and  needs".  idea of any  of r e s p o n s i b i l i t y " i n the r e g i o n .  the present and  s t r a t e g y which would emphasise  This  machinery planning"  proposal  " c a p a c i t y and  Van  the  is will  p r o j e c t c o n t r i b u t i o n s to  the  Slyck  argues  that  it  has  obligations  such  as  the  to  aid  in  the  economic  undertaken in China, South Korea  2 8 5  Harold Brown, T h i n k i n g About N a t i o n a l S e c u r i t y (Boulder, Colorado: 1983) p.140 ibid, p.131 Brown r e f e r s to a i r defence, ASW, and c o n t r o l of the nearby a i r space and seas as w e l l as 1000 m i l e s of the sea lanes of communication. P h i l i p Van Slyck, S t r a t e g i e s f o r the 1980s (Westport, Conn.: 1981) p.89 ibid, p.86  8 2  8 3  8tt  8 5  119  While Van Slyck envisages r a t h e r than the establishment do  see  the  possibility  a s e r i e s of  Atlantic  Working  of  setting  up such a grand a l l i a n c e  Group  Japan.  For  c a l l s on the U.S.  be  t h e i r defence c a p a b i l i t i e s so that U.S.  deployed  to c r i t i c a l areas  Group c o n s i d e r s t h i s  example,  and a l l a l l i e s  (who have the m i l i t a r y and p o l i t i c a l c a p a b i l i t y ) to strengthen  alliances  of a grand a l l i a n c e , other w r i t e r s  between the U.S., the Nato c o u n t r i e s and the  bilateral  immediately forces could  such as the Middle E a s t .  'indirect' a l l i e d contributions  2 8 6  option  This to  be the most f e a s i b l e but a l s o advocates a ' d i r e c t c o n t r i b u t i o n s ' option  as  a  means  of  Under the e x e r c i s e of deployment world.  of  a  implementing a m u l t i t h e a t r e s t r a t e g y .  this  option,  multilateral  force  the  Group  envisages  to c r i t i c a l  the  areas of the  2 8 7  In  recent  years,  unilateralist/maritime  criticisms  supremacy  and  of  both  coalition  the defence  s t r a t e g i e s have appeared i n the United S t a t e s .  One  the  have proposed an  article  by  Dunn  and  Staudenmaier  a l t e r n a t i v e to the above two s c h o o l s .  It  who is  their  example  view  is  that  both schools r i s k nuclear e s c a l a t i o n : the u n i l a t e r a l i s t / m a r i t i m e supremacy  school  by  adopting  c o a l i t i o n defence school weapons  to  compensate  by  a war-widening posture; and the  threatening  for a  the  use  of  nuclear  lack of adequate or a p p r o p r i a t e  U. A l e x i s Johnson, et a l . (eds.), The Common S e c u r i t y I n t e r e s t s of Japan, the United S t a t e s and Nato (Cambridge, Mass.: 1981 ) p.15 ibid.  2 8 6  2 8 7  120  c o n v e n t i o n a l f o r c e s ( the ' t r i p The a l t e r n a t i v e which based  upon  the  wire').  Dunn  maintenance  and  Staudenmaier  of superpower  present  is  c o n f l i c t avoidance.  They advocate t r a n s f e r r i n g defence funds from Western Europe a  strategically  Signalling strategy, a  a  close  force  distinction  interests  and  approach.  between  for  the  to  Third the  America's  coalition  adoption  vital  of  a  to  Japan,  Dunn  and  defence  and  secondary  coalition  Staudenmaier  defence  role.  would  Once  be  warfare  Japan  had  region  across  contingeneies  in  the  Pacific  with  Robert  Both advocate enhanced control  play  accepted  a  greater  i t s forces to  meet  in  that  particular  2 8 9  There are to be found i n similarities  to  their  would be a b l e , emphasising sea c o n t r o l swing  and  s p e c i f y that  required  r a t h e r than maritime supremacy, to  this  alternative  proposal  global  s t r a t e g i c m o b i l i t y f o r c e s ; both c a l l  differences in  i n meeting t h r e a t s  interests. approach:  many  Komer's c o a l i t i o n defence s t r a t e g y .  r a t h e r than maritime supremacy; and both  the use of a l l i e s U.S.'s  missions.  2 8 8  r e s p o n s i b i l i t y , the U.S.  sea  World  not approve, the authors c a l l f o r  approach would mean that Japan greater  with  resemblance  of which they would  clear  As  mobile  to  to  the  for  emphasise  security  of  the  However, one should not overlook the Komer  advocates  a  'balanced  force  K e i t h A. Dunn and W i l l i a m 0. Staudenmaier, "Strategy f o r S u r v i v a l " i n F o r e i g n P o l i c y No.52 ( F a l l , 1983) p.22 at 38-39 ibid. p.40 8  9  121  structure' its  as  the means by which the U.S.  interests  Staudenmaier  and see  those the  of  adequately p r o t e c t s  its allies,  development  while  of a f e a s i b l e ,  a c c e p t a b l e s t r a t e g y coming from an emphasis s t r u c t u r e but on the p o l i t i c a l Accepting  that  Staudenmaier's distinguish  the  strategy  between  not  on  the  force  2 9 0  has l i m i t e d r e s o u r c e s , Dunn and  calls  on  and  the  U.S.  to  clearly  other i n t e r e s t s and a v o i d both  superpower c o n f r o n t a t i o n and c o n f l i c t e s c a l a t i o n u n l e s s a interest  impels  such  a  policy.  vital  I t i s a p o l i c y which draws  2 9 1  from both of the other schools and c a l l s f o r a b l e n d i n g of force  s t r u c t u r e s i n such a f a s h i o n as t o encourage  flexibility.  Nuclear deterrence i s an  s t r a t e g y , but the authors f a i l when The  reliance  shifts  important  to c l a r i f y  from non-nuclear  uncertainty  but,  about  at  the  both  m o b i l i t y and part  of  the  j u s t e x a c t l y where and to n u c l e a r d e t e r r e n c e .  s t r a t e g y ' s h y b r i d q u a l i t y may w e l l be one of  characteristics  and  s u i t a b l e and  ends to be a c h i e v e d .  U.S.  vital  Dunn  i t s appealing  the same time, i t r e f l e c t s an obvious  global  policy  and  concomitant  force  s t r u c t u r e that should be adopted. Another the debate  is  construction schools of  criticism  given of  the  thought"  by  Michael  debate is  of the c h i e f p o l i c y arguments of  into  specious  Vlahos. opposing and  In  h i s view,  the  camps of "extreme  produces  a  misleading  These d i f f e r e n c e s are exposed i n an exchange of l e t t e r s between Dunn and Staudenmaier and Komer: F o r e i g n P o l i c y (Winter 1983-84) pp.176-178 op.cit. p.40  2 9 0  2 9 1  broad  122  choice.  Vlahos  2 9 2  approach and attention all  g i v e s general support  argues  that  while  the  must  away from Western Europe, the U.S.  Vlahos'  addressed  in  opinion,  designing  the a  essential  strategy  region of the world be abandoned.  way  U.S.  defence  direct  its  must not withdraw  i t s s t a n d i n g f o r c e s from Nato. In  he  to the c o a l i t i o n  argues as  mobility."  provide  a  one  be  i s that no this  need,  army  with  global  defence tasks  or  in the case of  the  defence  are s u f f i c i e n t l y of the s p e c i f i c allies.  on  the  unilateralist/maritime  of i t s v a r i a n t s or f o r that matter  appraoch,  one  rarely  missions  for  a l l i e s to perform  execution of t h a t p o l i c y .  U.S.'s  In order to meet  "combined-arms  focusses  supremacy argument or any  coalition  the U.S.  must  2 9 3  Whether  specific  for  that  that the armed s e r v i c e s must be i n t e g r a t e d i n such a  to  coalition  need  T h i s may  former  school  argument.  concerned  one  finds  reference  the to  w i t h i n the  w e l l be by d e l i b e r a t e design but  in  the  case  of  the  wonders whether the proponents  with the f e a s i b i l i t y and  suitability  t a s k s and m i s s i o n s that c o u l d be a s s i g n e d to the A  brief  examination  of  m i s s i o n s , e i t h e r a l r e a d y being performed or  certain  tasks  recently  and  requested  of Japan, w i l l f o l l o w . 2 9 2  2 9 3  Michael Vlahos, "Maritime S t r a t e g y versus Commitment" i n O r b i s ( F a l l 1982) p.583 at 587 ibid. p.588  Continental  1 23  D.  PROPOSED JAPANESE MISSIONS WITHIN AN AMERICAN STRATEGIC  POLICY The  most  important  task  which  various  U.S.  strategic  t h i n k e r s and p r a c t i t i o n e r s seek from Japan i s the p r o t e c t i o n  of  the  sea lanes of communication which extend t o the east and west  of  Japan's  home  islands.  suggested that Japan perimeter  of  In  would  several  provide  hundred  commercial sea lanes extending shoreline". * 2 9  1981.  Current  suggested that Japan's SDF  "naval  miles  1,000  Prime  Prime  protection  around  nautical  Minister  undertake  such  M i n i s t e r Suzuki  Japan miles  Nakasone a  for a and i n  from  the  has  also  task.  However,  prominent Japanese s c h o l a r s have p o i n t e d out that Japan's SDF i s incapable the  of performing such a task on i t s own and w i l l  a s s i s t a n c e of the U . S .  295  The major t h r e a t s to the sea lanes of probably the  come from submarines and a i r c r a f t ,  SDF would be i n some d i f f i c u l t y  threats.  communication  would  and on both counts,  i n attempting to  meet  such  The Japanese N a t i o n a l Defense Program O u t l i n e of 1976  only c a l l e d flotilla  require  to  f o r the undertake  possession a  of  one  combat-ready  sea lanes of communication  escort  mission.  Given the d i s t a n c e s i n v o l v e d , both American and Japanese w r i t e r s concede the d i f f i c u l t y  of  providing  submarines, even i n p e a c e t i m e .  2 9  2 9 6  such  protection  against  As t o c o u n t e r i n g a i r  attacks,  * Quoted i n The New York Times May 9, 1981 Okumiya Masatake, o p . c i t . p.18; and Yonosuke Nagai, quoted i n Osamu Kaihara, o p . c i t . p.56 Paul N i t z e , Securing the Seas o p . c i t . p.313; and Osamu K a i h a r a , o p . c i t . p.59  2 9 5  2 9 6  1 24  most  Japanese  capabilities well,  do  not  e s s e n t i a l to r e s i s t a i r  there  capabilities  destroyers  are  no  Japanese  carry  the  attacks  aircraft  air  on  with  to cover the d i s t a n c e s r e q u i r e d .  2 9 7  defence  convoys. the  As  long-range  I t should  also  be noted that the Japanese do not have any contingency plans f o r providing  merchant  capabilities  ships  with  self-defence  which one study has suggested as the most  means of p r o t e c t i n g convoys i n times of w a r . The  and m o b i l i z a t i o n  blockade  of  the  three  Japanese  effective  2 9 8  controlled  straits  between the Sea of Japan and the Western P a c i f i c Ocean has  also  been suggested as a m i s s i o n f o r the Japanese to perform i n times of  U.S.-Soviet  Union  confrontation.  Apart  domestic Japanese p r o t e s t s at such a c t i o n , does  not  c o n s i s t s of only one d i v i s i o n three s t r a i t s .  in  3 0 0  of  the  SDF  of three submarines i n each of the  U.S.  report,  the  Japanese  While  a l l naval the  traffic  passing  force  through  the  Japanese Defense Agency appears keen to  improve the SDF's mining c a p a b i l i t i e s and to block  the  straits  Mike M. Mochizuki and M i c h a e l Nacht, o p . c i t . p.133 The A t l a n t i c C o u n c i l Working Group: Paul N i t z e et a l . , op. cit. p.318. ^ This division i s accompanied by antisubmarine warfare h e l i c o p t e r s and two minesweeper f l o t i l l a s . Report of U.S. Arms C o n t r o l and Disarmament Agency to U.S. Congress, Japan's C o n t r i b u t i o n to M i l i t a r y S t a b i l i t y i n Northeast A s i a (Washington, D . C : 1980) p.33  2 9 7 2 9 8  2 9  The present  the s t r a i t s would need to be doubled i f i t was to  adequately  straits.  capability  force  2 9 9  According to a recent operating  probable  military  seem to be adequate to perform the task.  Japanese s u r v e i l l a n c e and minesweeping  survey  the  from  3 0 0  125  should  circumstances  demand  i t , it  appears j u s t as eager to  ensure that such a c t i o n  i s only done with the c o o p e r a t i o n of the  U.S.,  after  and  attacked.  then  Japanese  territory  has  been  3 0 1  The  importance  much depends becomes  only  of  the  task of b l o c k i n g the s t r a i t s  upon what p r o p o r t i o n of the  'bottled  hostilities.  3 0 2  up'  in  Japanese  Soviet  Pacific  very Fleet  the Sea of Japan at the beginning of reluctance  to  commit themselves too  s t r o n g l y on t h i s i s s u e i s no doubt the product of both a fear of S o v i e t r e p r i s a l s and a fear of being drawn  into  Maritime  i t s prime mission of  SDF  beyond  what  it  considers  expanding  its  defending the sea approaches and c o a s t a l waters of Japan. Regardless of which p o l i c y argument  comes to dominate  U.S.  s t r a t e g y , the U.S.  would seek to have Japan i n c r e a s e i t s share  of  the  the  costs  of  Japanese t e r r i t o r y . U.S.  and  U.S.  bases and f a c i l i t i e s p r e s e n t l y on  Should h o s t i l i t i e s break  importance i n a i d i n g the p r o j e c t i o n of U.S.  in the region as w e l l as c o n t r i b u t e to For  both  reasons,  but  financial  contributions  to  the  the  security  particularly  reason, American w r i t e r s have c a l l e d on  peacet ime.  between  the  the Soviet Union, these bases would, understandably,  take on added  itself.  out  Japan  running  Japan  f o r the l a t t e r to  of  of  force  enhance the  bases  its in  30 3  Mike M. Mochizuki and M i c h a e l Nacht, o p . c i t . p.133 Seiichiro Onishi, "Japan's Self-Defense Requirements & C a p a b i l i t i e s " i n U . A l e x i s Johnson e t . a l . (eds.), o p . c i t . p.160 William R. Feeney, "The Pacific Basing System & U.S. Security" in William T. Tow and W i l l i a m R. Feeney, (eds.), (1982) p.171  3 0 1  3 0 2  3 0 3  1 26  The value of these bases and f a c i l i t i e s be  overestimated.  Not  only  do  they  to the U.S.  substantially  America's ' r e a c t i o n time' and the c o s t s of b r i n g i n g assets,  but  they  permit  the U.S.  cannot reduce  in available  to undertake c o n v e n i e n t l y ,  m i s s i o n s i n e i t h e r the Western P a c i f i c  or i n Southeast A s i a .  w e l l , Japan's p r o x i m i t y to the Asian mainland and to the Peninsula  in  particular  is  but  of  U.S.  ground  forces.  i n t h i s regard would only be a f a c i l i t a t i n g  the Japanese, the U.S.  evidence  of  a U.S.  They  represent  the  bases and f a c i l i t i e s  commitment to t h e i r  a l s o h o l d a dual v u l n e r a b i l i t y  one,  i n the minds  Japanese  Soviet  aggression.  of  'repayment'  For e i t h e r  w e l l seek, p a r t i c u l a r l y  end  the  current  arrangements U.S.  are  basing to  these  for  arrangements.  needs to recognize that  contributions  to  their  the  If  Japan's  maintenance  these  of  opinion i f not current  of  them  and  i s e s s e n t i a l l y a trade-off f o r i t s own defence.  responsibiIty for regional security  that  Japan  could  i n Northeast A s i a .  t h i s were done, so the p o l i c y goes, then U.S. and  target  to l i m i t  provision  The c o a l i t i o n defence s t r a t e g i s t s argue  freed  American  s u b s t a n t i a l l y u n a l t e r e d , then the  against taking greater r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  take  well  people.  reason, Japanese p u b l i c  i n a time of c r i s i s ,  remain  may  s e c u r i t y , but they  s e c u r i t y guarantee as w e l l as make Japan a p o t e n t i a l  may  The  a c r i t i c a l one a l l the same. For  be  role  Korean  very u s e f u l f o r the p r o j e c t i o n of  e i t h e r a i r power or the u p l i f t Japanese  As  forces  could  s h i f t e d to more urgent t h e a t r e s of o p e r a t i o n .  If be  Quite  o b v i o u s l y , f o r Japan to adopt such a r o l e there would need to be  127  a s u b s t a n t i a l b u i l d - u p of i t s SDF. would  have  to  In p a r t i c u l a r , the  Japanese  give a t t e n t i o n to developing a f o r c e to perform  counterforce missions.  Realistically,  the  likelihood  of  the  Japanese adopting such a defence posture, i n the short or medium term,  is  very low indeed.  The presence of the U.S.  the r e g i o n , the p u b l i c mood which g i v e s only to  the  SDF,  a " s e r i e s of m i l i t a r y in Northeast A s i a  i t s SDF, 'swing  adoption  of  this  role.  Former  sent  elsewhere, " 30  but  the  logical  brief  examination been  ones,  effective fashion. with  a  expect that i t s SDF demands.  presented will  in  The list will  of some of the important in  the  face problems,  U.S.  Americans  cannot  of  that  tasks  roles  debate  i n some cases  having the Japanese adopt simply  the  Such an e x p e c t a t i o n would be f a i l i n g  to  political  and has  almost  them i n any present  i t wants undertaken  be a u t o m a t i c a l l y improved  the nature of the Japanese domestic  the impact  of  U.S.  r e v e a l e d that the U.S.  Japanese  forces  the argument must be that f o r Japan to so improve  s t r a t e g y ' by the  insurmountable  U.S.  that the Japanese should make  improvements" i n the event of U.S.  being  m i s s i o n s that have  the and  to meet these take  account  environment  and  that i t has had and w i l l continue to have on Japanese  s e c u r i t y policy-making.  3 0 4  support  i t would be i n v i t i n g the use of t h i s v a r i a t i o n  This  of  of  S e c r e t a r y Brown can argue  extension  qualified  and the low Japanese e s t i m a t i o n of a S o v i e t t h r e a t  a l l argue a g a i n s t the Defense  forces in  H a r o l d Brown, o p . c i t .  p. 122  1 28  The  focus  of  this  debate over a U.S. such  as  policy.  chapter  allies  Japan are expected to perform i n the execution  of that  have  concentrated  missions  economics  ancillary  or  have  while  lauded  ignored by the debate.  E.  AMERICAN DEBATE ASSESSED  Protagonists  expected Any  make, such as i n the  either  been  i t s contributions  within  the  debate  non-  as  Japan's  to 3 0 5  of  areas  dismissed  i n some American q u a r t e r s ,  largely THE  tasks  in the American p o l i c y arguments.  p o l i c y of m i l i t a r y r e s t r a i n t and stability,  and  role  on m i l i t a r y c o n t r i b u t i o n s .  diplomacy  or ignored  the  continuing  that  m i l i t a r y c o n t r i b u t i o n s that Japan may of  been upon the  s t r a t e g i c p o l i c y and  Understandably, the  allies  has  economic have gone  have been keen to expose  what they p e r c e i v e as d i f f e r e n c e s between  their  those  a good d e a l of common  of  others.  There  is,  ground between the arguments and  however,  proposals  and  both r e v e a l s i m i l a r f a i l i n g s of  analysis. The how  the  u n i l a t e r a l i s t / m a r i t i m e v a r i a n t s are more concerned U.S.  effectively,  will either  be  able  to  project  around the rimlands  i n t o troublesome r e g i o n s .  its  of E u r a s i a or  facilitating  3 0 5  Allies role.  are U.S.  most  flexibly  T h i s would be done almost e x c l u s i v e l y  with American f o r c e s which would r e l y h e a v i l y upon components.  power  with  either  ignored  bases on a l l i e d  their  naval  or d i s c o u n t e d  into a  territory  are  viewed  Report of the U.S. Arms C o n t r o l and Disarmament Agency to the Senate Foreign R e l a t i o n s Committee, o p . c i t .  129  as no more than s t a g i n g p o i n t s The  for U.S.  forces.  c o a l i t i o n defence v a r i a n t s give greater  r o l e a l l i e s can policy.  play as i n t e g r a l components of a U.S.  allies.  The  to r e l i e v e U.S. Japan  a  specific  do  missions  tasks a s c r i b e d to Japan are  designed  f o r c e s of these m i s s i o n s rather  than  to  strategic policy.  at l e a s t on the  The  surface,  coalitionists'  to be a more  the u n i l a t e r a l i s t s ' c o n c e n t r a t i o n naval is  f o r c e that would be  seen  protect  as the  'core'  large  the  sea  over  firepower.  aircraft  rather  these  argument  f l e x i b l e and supporter  to  for a  'sea c o n t r o l '  ground f o r c e s to Hemisphere)  The  also  argument emphasises  Lehman  variant,  which  c a r r i e r s as the c e n t r a l component of a  than  projection  the  U.S.  everywhere where  believe  European  places  mobile f o r c e .  of  from f i x e d land bases.  proponents  l i k e l y occur away from defence  Their c a l l  non-Western  supremacy  s t r i k e the S o v i e t Union anywhere and vulnerable,  a  Japan.  f l e x i b l e b a t t l e group, aims at the from  alternative  for defensive  i n t e r e s t s (that i s ,  unilateralist/maritime  manoeuvrability favours  sensible the navy.  sufficient  to  one  of f o r c e s appears,  complementary to a need f o r U.S.  of Western Europe and The  on  mix  give  Only  argument r e f e r s to the d i r e c t c o n t r i b u t i o n s of the a l l i e s force.  not  tasks and  d i r e c t r o l e w i t h i n a U.S.  multilateral  the  strategic  However, proponents of t h i s p o l i c y , as a r u l e ,  move beyond g e n e r a l i t i e s to document s p e c i f i c for  mention of  that theatre.  crises The  power  Seeking to they  are  w i l l most coalition  importance on the need to have a  However, i t s focus  c a l l e d , g e o p o l i t i c a l strength  i s on,  what  one  r a t h e r than g e o p o l i t i c a l  1 30  priority. and  Its  3 0 6  desirable  basic  that  postulate  the  U.S.  i s that  i t i s both necessary  develop  a  strategy  that  wholeheartedly embraces i t s a l l i e s . Both  sides  outpacing at  of the debate agree that U.S.  i t s resources  to meet them and  an a c c e l e r a t i n g r a t e .  in  the  As to the  commitments are  that t h i s  is  occurring  r o l e that a l l i e s can  implementation of the p o l i c y , the two  main arguments are  based on q u i t e d i f f e r e n t assumptions: the u n i l a t e r a l i s t s that a l l i e s are u n r e l i a b l e and  are  perform  s u s c e p t i b l e to  believe  accommodation  to the S o v i e t Union; while the c o a l i t i o n defence proponents view the a l l i e s as p o t e n t i a l l y e f f e c t i v e p a r t n e r s design. U.S.  In the  l a t t e r ' s view, the a l l i e s  s e n s i t i v i t y to t h e i r needs and Given  their allied  involvement  Principal  allies  are  the extent  that  they  in  can  The  be  global  staging  points  coalitionists,  strategy.  for  more  c o n t r i b u t i o n s , b e l i e v e that  framework  of  direct  allied  to  U.S.  somewhat  two  s i d e s of the debate d i f f e r markedly on  consider  the  focus of U.S.  the  and  a  defence  erected.  'arc of c r i s i s '  on c o n t i n e n t a l Europe.  3 0 6  U.S.  The  on  greater  to be t e n t a t i v e l y r e l i a b l e  provide  forces.  security  c o n t r i b u t i o n s can  require  b e t t e r a l l i a n c e management.  a  considered  o p t i m i s t i c about p o t e n t i a l a l l i e d cooperative  simply  assumptions, the u n i l a t e r a l i s t s p r e s c r i b e  expect no  forward-deployed  i n a g l o b a l defence  f o r c e s should  be:  i n Southwest A s i a , and However, one  Michael Vlahos, o p . c i t .  p.587  should  the the  where  they  unilateralists coalitionists  not make too much of  131  t h i s f o r they flexibility  both of  lay  some  emphasis  American f o r c e s and  what i s commonly seen as Soviet Eurasian  landmass.  If  one  d i f f e r e n c e between the two look  to the  on  recognize  expansion is  the  to  and  the need to check  on  and  discover  arguments, then  mobility  around  the  a philosophical  perhaps  one  should  u n i l a t e r a l i s t / m a r i t i m e supremacists' r e j e c t i o n of a  containment p o l i c y in favour of a more o f f e n s i v e  countervailing  posture. In  the  force  significant  area  structure of  manoeuvrability  and  mobile f o r c e to  be  believe  that  potential  but  resources  should  overlap. call used  sea  power  disagree be  and  each  Both  proposes, there  lay  some  in  particular  emphasis  on  provides to  contingencies.  what  differences relate  to  Both  proportion  of  defence  forces.  There  in  the  force  structures  both  the  apportionment  resources amongst the  s e r v i c e s and  of  u n i l a t e r a l i s t s , with t h e i r emphasis on  operation.  The  between the v a r i o u s  navy, seek to have resources s h i f t e d to the  rimlands,  and  particularly  the  emphasis  to  remain  Europe, p a r t i c u l a r l y , and The has  on  i n East  augment  f o r a mix  been  theatres  forces  of  land-based f o r c e s  the  around The  forces  and  in Western'  Asia.  d i s c u s s i o n of the debate over a U.S.  essentially  of  those i n Southwest A s i a .  c o a l i t i o n i s t s , on the other hand, c a l l for  and  America's g r e a t e s t m i l i t a r y  devoted to America's naval  these  is a  f o r the enhancement of a f l e x i b l e  as  are, however, important advocated  that  strategic  about i t s g l o b a l p o l i c y .  America's world r o l e demands that any  The  policy  reality  p o l i c y f o r Northeast  of  Asia  1 32  be  considered  a subset of a g l o b a l p o l i c y .  g l o b a l s t r a t e g i c p o l i c y i s not only about protect  security  interests  and  to  As we have seen, a  devising  deter  or  t h r e a t s , but a l s o i n v o l v e s e s t a b l i s h i n g a f o r c e i s both a p p r o p r i a t e a  On  concerned  that  effective  integration into i t s global plan.  If  the  possible  regional  allies  that  functions within  and  debate Japan  the U n i t e d  a  perhaps  has  within specific nature  that  various  policy  inappropriate  capable  of  Japan i n Northeast  anything  about  arguments  i t is  find  it  to s p e c i f y the s o r t s of  allies  to  States.  With respect  perform,  be  to Japan, where s p e c i f i c has o b v i o u s l y  they  the p o t e n t i a l r e s i s t a n c e  the  Japanese  tasks of  community.  that As  the p o s s i b l e  tasks  been  little  of these p r o p o s a l s or to they one  will  looks  face  from  beyond these  and seeks t o understand the broader i s s u e of the  Japan's f u t u r e  i n t e r n a t i o n a l r o l e , we f i n d  ourselves  the impact of the American s t r a t e g i c debate upon the  Japanese s e c u r i t y p o l i c y debate, and to a  much  lesser  extent,  i n f l u e n c e of the l a t t e r debate upon the former.  the course of c o n c l u d i n g , be  are  a l l i a n c e s t r u c t u r e or simply as s e c u r i t y p a r t n e r s of  considering  will  that  i s naturally  perform i n i t s region,  made to examine the f e a s i b i l i t y  appreciate  structure  revealed  or m i s s i o n s have been mentioned, there effort  meet p o t e n t i a l  superpower  roles  could  that they expect t h e i r  an  to  exception.  that the proponents of the difficult,  basis,  perform  strategic  roles  plan  to the plan and economically and p o l i t i c a l l y  feasible.  A s i a would be no  a  considered.  In  t h i s i n t e r a c t i o n and i t s r a m i f i c a t i o n s  133  V. The  Japan-United  States  o t h e r s , has both formal reference  has  CONCLUSION  and  security informal  relationship, characteristics.  This  the  dynamic  concerned  understood  in  terms  of  the  changing  r e l a t i o n s h i p between the two c o u n t r i e s as they seek to  aggregate  power  and  increase  retaining their  autonomy  and  individuality.  understand  nature of t h i s dynamic  their  the  has examined countries; that  more  and informal p r o c e s s e s of the r e l a t i o n s h i p .  ' a l l i a n c e ' can be  political  While  been made to the Mutual S e c u r i t y and Cooperation  T r e a t y between the two c o u n t r i e s , t h i s paper i s with  like a l l  three i s s u e s : the t h r e a t  their  security In  seeking  strategic  should policy,  adopt; both  and  perceptions  globally  the  to  r e l a t i o n s h i p , t h i s paper within  the ongoing domestic debate over the s e c u r i t y  Japan  while  American  and  debate  both policy  over  a  f o r the Northeast Asian  region. In force  g e n e r a l terms,  while  improvements,  the  q u a n t i t a t i v e improvements tendency  also  of  ignoring Americans the  T h i r d World.  have  Soviet  own  as  qualitative  emphasized  Union.  e x i s t s f o r the Americans to expand  ' t h r e a t ' and to view the Soviet Union instability  their  taking  An  apparent  the n o t i o n of advantage  of  i n v a r i o u s regions of the world, and e s p e c i a l l y the As a product of i t s own Americans  g l o b a l view and  perceived  responsibilities,  the  f o r c e improvements  i n Northeast A s i a are part of a g l o b a l  up and an extension of t h e i r influence.  those  For  the  argue that the S o v i e t Union's  political  Americans,  the  contest  for  build-  worldwide  issue i s not whether  the  1 34  Soviet is  m i l i t a r y build-up  t h e n a t u r e and e x t e n t Japanese  divided.  those, is  opinion,  There  represented  by t h e  not s u f f i c i e n t  its  that  pose  e v i d e n c e of an and  those  The  Kurile  islands  Japan  have a r g u e d t h a t  Union  issue  i s an e x c e p t i o n  the  constitute 'alliance'  public,  which a  holds  threat  with  to  t h e U.S.  opinion  appears to c a l l  threat  potential  in  Unlike  prepared  translate  any  security. opinion  increase  Soviet  'gaullists', who  hold  and  that i t  Union merely hold  the m i l i t a r y  but  must be  that  there  capability  of the S o v i e t  to  harm  leading  some Japan  occupation  of t h e  groups  not n e c e s s a r i l y  in  constitute  i n t e n t of t h e  one  apparently  i s that  represented  that the  the  that  places  Soviet  and  Soviet  This  is  appear  Union that  against  the  the  fact  it  i t s interests.  'unarmed  is  not the  Prevailing military  i t s geostrategic are  not  into a threat that  t h e Japan-U.S.  as to  official Treaty  i n J a p a n ' s m i l i t a r y c a p a b i l i t y as a t h r e a t  U n i o n and  favour  does  Soviet  Japanese  m i l i t a r y power  t o view  the  Japan a t r i s k .  Asia  despite  losing by  f o r a b a l a n c e d view o f  the Americans,  would  Soviet  Japanese  Northeast  limitations. to  position,  Japan.  Japanese  neutralists'  Soviet  the  realists',  i t does  A n o t h e r J a p a n e s e v i e w , and  Japanese  and  i n so f a r as  while  what  obviously  the American  i t i s e v i d e n c e of some m a l e v o l e n t  towards  with  support  'political  threat,  rather  hand, a p p e a r s more  i n t e n t i o n t o use t h a t  interests.  threat,  who  the S o v i e t a  but  threat.  'military realists'  represented  to  of t h a t  on t h e o t h e r  are  by t h e  capability  a  constitutes a threat,  to  and the  1 35  The  nature  of  the  changing  Japan-U.S.  r e l a t i o n s h i p i s to be found, not merely i n to  external  stimuli,  such  as  security  analysing  responses  the r e g i o n a l and g l o b a l Soviet  m i l i t a r y b u i l d - u p , but a l s o i n examining changes  i n the domestic  political  assessing  attitudes  likelihood role,  in  each  country.  In  of Japan a d o p t i n g a more a s s e r t i v e r e g i o n a l  reference  security policy Analysis  has  been  made  to  the  to  U.S.  of  issues  the  debate  has  been  conducted issues.  indicated  relationship.  that  The  prevailing  Japan to adopt a defence posture relationship.  security  other while  two not  issues  of  in  concerned  'comprehensive' other  'security' view  may  the  existing  i n " response  this  with  review of the  the  Japan has been  is  U.S.-Japan  well  be  in upon  contributions,  so  political reluctant  Japanese  divided.  view, with i t s emphasis  nonmilitary  these  sharp d i v i s i o n s e x i s t over  enhance i t s i n t e r n a t i o n a l r o l e m i l i t a r i l y .  militarily-oriented  and  responses  r e l a t i o n s h i p , r e v e a l much about the Japanese  over what i s meant by  the  demands that Japan do so.  system and.provide evidence of why to  a  sees no reason f o r  independent  canvassed  directly  of  d i s c u s s i o n . of  opinion  However,  to ever more i n s i s t e n t American  debate,  through  r e l a t e to the  whether Japan should i n c r e a s e i t s defence spending  The  Japanese  Two  for a m i l i t a r y build-up) d i r e c t l y  security  U.S.-Japan  continuing  (Japanese views of the T r e a t y and Japanese calls  Japan-U.S.  security  debate.  d i s c u s s i o n of four important i n t e r l o c k i n g four i s s u e s  the  While  opinion a  more  the ascendant, the economic continues  security to  hold  136  substantial  weight in i n f l u e n t i a l Japanese c i r c l e s .  of t h i s aspect of the The  f a c t that  security quite view that  the  environment may coming  from  security  likely  i n f l u e n t i a l Japanese o p i n i o n adopts a view of  well  of  be  substantially  U.S.  Should  these  r e s u l t may  well  Japan can  and  different be  is divided  U.S.  seek to and  from  conceptual  those  redistribute  Japan  without  bases,  an  then  the  in  the  of s e c u r i t y  role  tension  discussion  of the The  build-up  and  the  over what kind  These d i v i s i o n s are internal constraints  military realists,  what they p e r c e i v e as e x t e r n a l U.S.  pressures  calls  for  r e s t r a i n t ) can  the and  endorsing  public should be  some  (the  adoption of a more a s s e r t i v e importance  exposed enhanced  t h e i r lead Soviet  from  military  i n c r e a s e d defence spending),  - pacifist overcome.  increase  starkly upon an  taking  that c e r t a i n domestic c o n s t r a i n t s  constitution,  while  international  different  i n c r e a s e d s t r e s s and  should adopt.  m i l i t a r y posture.  believe  the  the  relationship.  Japanese o p i n i o n  the  Americans encourages  r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s between i t s e l f  security  in  of the  of Japanese p e r c e p t i o n s of t h e i r  the  appreciation  outcome  debate remains u n c e r t a i n .  at odds with that mix  The  in  (such as  the  sentiment, The  international  and  political  defence  fiscal realists,  spending  role,  of c e r t a i n domestic determinants of  'peace'  and  emphasise  the the  security  policy-  security  policy  making . Political must  reflect  r e a l i s t s argue that the  desires  accommodation of e x t e r n a l  of the and  a  Japanese  Japanese people and  i n t e r n a l demands.  attempt  American  an  calls  1 37  for  i n c r e a s e d defence  as  to  r e t a i n the U.S.  i n s u l a r and p a c i f i s t must  spending must be at l e a s t p a r t i a l l y met  not  so much  commitment, while at the same time,  sentiments  w i t h i n domestic  be t o t a l l y n e g l e c t e d by the policy-makers.' that  policy-making  the  political  be  made  realists  e x t e r n a l determinants determining  are  to balance the i n t e r n a l  not  over  The predominant  themselves  and  whether  Japan  should  Japanese  Japanese  security  role  will  To  be  accept  performed  parameters of the U.S.-Japan r e l a t i o n s h i p mean that the p o l i c y d i r e c t i o n  s t r a t e g i c and The  agree  future  w i t h i n the g e n e r a l  does  not,  in  their  i s to be d i c t a t e d by  be viewed as a p r o t e c t o r - c l i e n t s t a t e  can  any  U.S.  s e c u r i t y needs.  There i s a growing be  body taken  of for  opinion  in  granted and  both  i t s p o s i t i o n v i s - a - v i s the U.S. Within the Japanese debate,  of o p i n i o n advocating acquiescence  and  Japan  can  relationship. countries  that  that i f Japan i s to be  d e l e g a t e d g r e a t e r s e c u r i t y d u t i e s , at l e a s t  enhanced.  that  s e c u r i t y r e l a t i o n s h i p between the U.S.  longer  neither  groups  and not be imposed by an e x t e r n a l  power, such as the United S t a t e s .  then  internal  f u t u r e enhanced m i l i t a r y posture must be d i s c o v e r e d by  the Japanese people  no  security  i t s m i l i t a r y posture but over the extent of and pace at  any  view,  that  the nature of Japan's f u t u r e i n t e r n a t i o n a l  which i t should occur. that  I t i s not  of p o l i c y .  r o l e , the r e a l d i v i s i o n s enhance  believe  the  opinion  s o l e l y with r e f e r e n c e to these  c o n s t r a i n t s as i t i s seen necessary  In  public  so  in i t s  own  region,  w i l l most s u r e l y have been there i s no s i z e a b l e body  to American demands and  local  1 38  calls  for  belief  that t h i s i s the  the  a  defence  build-up  evolving review  Japan-U.S.  into a  military  alliance  relationship becomes  developments.  r i g h t and  is  now  c o n t r i b u t i o n s that Japan should  more a s s e r t i v e American  security  number of recent  debate has moved to the military  calls  s p e c i f i c and missions.  military  posture  f o r increased  should  The  key  the  to  the  make and be  well when  how  quickly a Recent  defence spending have become more certain  regional  as  security  i t s Nato a l l i e s : a p r i n c i p a l a l l y West.  redistribute security responsibilities  operation  Treaty.  of  Japan's  Constitution  and  with  American  in Northeast  the  through  Japan-U.S.  To date, the Americans remain wary about promoting  great change i n these f o r fear of prompting an  by  position  A s i a through Japan have, however, encountered r e s i s t a n c e the  of  w e l l these c a l l s appear to have been tempered  U.S.  be we  extent  adopted.  r e g i o n a l s e c u r i t y r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s for the  efforts  in  Japanese s e c u r i t y  over  an acknowledgment that Japan i s i n a s i m i l a r vis-a-vis  may  apparent  have c a l l e d upon Japan to f u l f i l As  sincere  security.  the  a  motivated by a  road that Japan must i n e v i t a b l y take  i n t e r e s t s of i t s own That  appear  overreaction  any in  Japan. If Japan i s becoming an a l l y of the U.S. a  security  w i t h i n U.S. reference geostrategic U.S.  c l i e n t - s t a t e , then the g l o b a l and not  only  regional strategy to  p o s i t i o n , but  ascribes  to  r o l e that  its  its to the allies  own  will  and  ceasing  to  be  i s expected of i t be  capabilities  decided and  by  to  its  that  the  relative  importance  in  implementation of i t s  the  1 39  strategic policy. The been  examination of the U.S.  concerned  itself  with U.S.  strategic  conventional  to an a n a l y s i s of the v a r i o u s  in  the debate.  and  not  I t has  policy  debate  f o r c e s and  has  p o l i c y arguments  confined presented  been concerned with s u b s t a n t i v e  with the value judgments  that  may  well  has  analysis  underlie  the  arguments that have been made. The  debate's  chief  unilateralist/maritime coalition/defence  policy  supremacy  argument.  arguments argument  Each has  threats.  interests  and  in  and  deterring  America's g l o b a l or  meeting  force structure  generalisation  s t r u c t u r e s may upon  and  i t adopts.  which they are based may  but  all  but  arguments  The  flexible  force.  policy  arguments  policy  land-based ascribe  m a n o e u v r a b i l i t y of deployed f o r c e s mobile and  the  be q u i t e d i f f e r e n t .  of emphasis between sea-based and exists,  that  the  U.S.  p r o j e c t power worldwide.  of  and  the  two  main  schools  of  must be a b l e The  only  for  debate  do  lies  force  certainly  a  to  sea-based  not  exhibit  threat  and  to muster the c a p a b i l i t y to  essential difference  thought  lead  importance  call  the  approaches  forces  some  or  A difference  e s s e n t i a l l y d i f f e r e n t world views: a l l see a Soviet argue  and  To use  oversimplification: certain  w e l l appear s i m i l a r  and  potential  force s t r u c t u r e as a guide to the p o l i c y argument w i l l into  the  However, i t i s necessary to d i s t i n g u i s h the p o l i c y  approach of each from the  us  the  a number of v a r i a n t s  advocates a d i f f e r e n t approach i n s e c u r i n g regional  are  i n the  between  f a c t that while  the the  1 40  u n i l a t e r a l i s t / m a r i t i m e supremacists see  the world  basically  b i p o l a r terms, the c o a l i t i o n / d e f e n c e proponents b e l i e v e that world  i s multipolar  would include allies  as  and  its allies.  being  allies  The  directly  the  a  greater  required.  It  readiness  is  a  of  a  tendencies.  particular  v a r i a n t of the  same  school may  school.  unilateralist/maritime  For  supremacists  Lehman J r .  and  be  In  dismissing  any  unilateralist/maritime increase  ability  any  role  not  is  for  the  argue  for  e f f e c t i v e l y challenge  Union but  school.  allies, a  the  substantial i t will  have  Implicit  in  the  policy  the d e s i r e to b u i l d - u p America's f o r c e s to such an  particular  sufficient  applicable  the S o v i e t Union i n many  as to be able to overcome those of the  military  the  to J e f f r e y Record  f o r c e c a p a b i l i t y so that  of the globe, s i m u l t a n e o u s l y .  argument extent  to  that  c a r r i e r s would be  supremacists  i n America's own  one  advocate the p r o j e c t i o n of  Robert Hanks but  direct  are  to another  say  or S t a n s f i e l d Turner, even though a l l belong to that  regions  process.  said for  to  to  dangerous  w e l l not apply  example,  American power from l a r g e a i r c r a f t John  What may  of  U.S.  to draw these d i s t i n c t i o n s too s t a r k l y f o r what we  variant  the  role  of' the p r o j e c t i o n of  shows  is  examining i s emphasis and  to  sees  in the p o l i c y implementation  However, a word of c a u t i o n exercise  former school  school  the  needs a f e a s i b l e p o l i c y which  merely f a c i l i t a t i v e  power while the l a t t e r involve  the U.S.  in  posture  theatre  at any  must  be  geopolitical to win  should  based  power  the  given  to  time.  upon  the  Soviet  Union  in  To them, America's U.S.  not merely deter  f o r c e s of each be engaged.  acquiring the  Soviet  141  The c o a l i t i o n / d e f e n c e proponents toward containment  show a g r e a t e r i n c l i n a t i o n  of the S o v i e t Union and,  rather than  seeking  to achieve e s c a l a t i o n dominance over the S o v i e t s , argue that the U.S.  should,  by s h a r i n g the burden  of c o l l e c t i v e defence with  i t s a l l i e s , acquire a deterrent c a p a b i l i t y . sufficient military and  For them, there are  resources a l r e a d y e x i s t i n g between the  i t s a l l i e s and emphasis should be p l a c e d upon the  combination  and  augmentation. much  more  U.S.  effective  management of these resources r a t h e r than upon  In t h i s sense, the c o a l i t i o n / d e f e n c e p o l i c y  c o n s e r v a t i v e and orthodox  is  a  one than that presented by  the u n i l a t e r a l i s t s / m a r i t i m e supremacists. Neither p o l i c y argument of the American role  for  policy.  allies  As to  the  unilateralists  the  formulation  implementation  assume  responsibility. integral  in  that  the  component  forces  argue  more  in  The  the  the  sole  has  is  not  projection  America's  allies  in  emphasis  nature here  to  those  performed  in  the  by  U.S.  i s upon c o l l e c t i v e defence with a and  forces.  Regardless of which p o l i c y argument p r e v a i l s , little  of  proponents  recommendation f o r the i n t e g r a t i o n and c o o r d i n a t i o n of U.S. allied  an  of the p o l i c y but i s  deployment and  of  strategic  policy,  The c o a l i t i o n / d e f e n c e  involvement  a  of i t s s t r a t e g i c p o l i c y a s c r i b i n g r o l e s f o r them  which are i d e n t i c a l forces.  such  U.S.  the implementation  effective.  f o r the d i r e c t  implementation  any  America's  The a s s i s t a n c e of.America's a l l i e s  expected to merely make America's its  of  of  debate advocates  doubt  that  increased  there  seems  pressure w i l l be put on Japan  to  142  augment i t s defence c a p a b i l i t i e s , based  force  and  Asian s e c u r i t y . effectively  to The  to  adopt  a  more  take g r e a t e r r e s p o n s i b i l i t y strategic  matching  debate  is,  in  offensive  f o r Northeast  essence,  resources to commitments and  about  i n c l u d e s the  issue of whether the U.S.  alone, or with i t s a l l i e s , w i l l  sufficient  meet  resources  to  the  a l l i e s are not given d i r e c t and adopted  strategy,  a n c i l l a r y and  they  independent  will  facilitative  perceived threat.  be  of  the  r o l e s f o r the  debate.  The  within  the  U.S. i n any of the  coalition/defence  admittedly see an important r o l e f o r ground as at the U.S.  Even i f  expected to perform at l e a s t  Northeast A s i a does not f i g u r e h i g h l y arguments  roles  have  policy  proponents  forces-in-place  bases and f a c i l i t i e s i n Japan, but  such  accept  that  s h i f t i n g U.S.  f o r c e s away from the r e g i o n to meet c o n t i n g e n c i e s  elsewhere  a  is  real  possibility.  recommend an i n c r e a s e i n U.S. of  forces, p r i o r i t y  o p e r a t i o n other than Northeast A s i a and  will  benefit  by the  it  lies is  i s a consensual democracy where  people  in  the  making by  the  of  the  the  which  deployed  important  on a l l i s s u e s and t h i s i s p a r t i c u l a r l y  security policy-making. have  been  part  become p a r t i s a n p o l i t i c a l increased  defence  involvement  government.  Public  opinion  of an ongoing domestic  spending  A  new  is  so i n the area  Since the Second World War,  issues.  of  broad p o l i c y d e c i s i o n s i s  promoted  issues  these  from any i n c r e a s e i n the f o r c e s g l o b a l l y  generally  of  in theatres  U.S.  Japan the  While a l l p o l i c y arguments  defence  debate and have  consensus  and a more a s s e r t i v e  favouring  international  143  r o l e f o r Japan has developed. exaggerated  and  the  U.S.  However, the trend should not should  d i v i s i o n s that c o n t i n u e to e x i s t  be  remain  sensitive  to  the  i n Japanese  political  circles  and i n Japanese s o c i e t y as a whole. The  U.S.-Japan  accident  or  encourage  relationship  design,  into  a  may  well  military  be  evolving,  alliance  which  However, the U.S.  Administration  presume, as the debate's p r o t a g o n i s t s appear to do, a  unity  of  perception  within  i n t e r n a t i o n a l environment and about within  it.  Centrifugal  the how  tendencies  alliance to  in this  d i r e c t l y addressed by the U n i t e d This  paper  has  examined  protect  two  of  the  security  role  that  other  and  at in  protagonists their  this so  in  p o i n t , each debate w i l l  doing, the  other  provoke  certain  debate.  any  predictions  perform w i t h i n any U.S.  about  debates  legislature  i f not determine, country.  of  On  intersection.  i n t e r a c t with the responses  formative stages and while there seems l i t t l e  make  being  from  The debates are s t i l l i n  Japan i s enhancing i t s i n t e r n a t i o n a l r o l e , to  not  Japan w i l l perform i n  Northeast A s i a , the two debates f i n d a p o i n t Inevitably,  the  interests  domestic p o l i t i c a l  c o u n t r y , have a c a p a c i t y to a f f e c t  issue  about  States.  c e r t a i n a s p e c t s of s e c u r i t y p o l i c y - m a k i n g i n each the  there  ' a l l i a n c e ' , as i n  which, while not conducted w i t h i n the e x e c u t i v e • or either  should not that  other Western a l l i a n c e s , c o u l d w e l l be aggravated by  of  will  a more e q u i t a b l e d i v i s i o n of defence r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s  i n Northeast A s i a .  is  by  doubt  that  i t would be premature  the s e c u r i t y r o l e Japan would  s t r a t e g i c p o l i c y f o r Northeast A s i a .  1 44  While p r e d i c t i o n s are d i f f i c u l t with  some  regional  security  acceptable American need  to  confidence,  that  policy.  Japan Such  balance between Japan's  demands. increase  to make, i t can be  To reach a p o i n t  must a  develop  policy  must  a  argued, coherent  strike  an  domestic c o n s t r a i n t s and the of e q u i l i b r i u m ,  Japan  will  i t s m i l i t a r y spending and develop a defence  f o r c e capable of at l e a s t requested by the United  performing  States.  those  missions  recently  1 45  BIBLIOGRAPHY I.  NEWSPAPERS 1.  The New York Times  2.  The Washington Post  II.  OFFICIAL  DOCUMENTS  3.  Congressional Quarterly  4.  Department  5.  J o i n t C h i e f s of S t a f f , U.S. M i l i t a r y (Washington, D . C : USGPO, 198T)  6.  U.S.Congress. Senate. Hearings before the Committee on F o r e i g n R e l a t i o n s , East-West R e l a t i o n s : Focus on the P a c i f i c (Washington, D . C : USGPO, 1982)  7.  U.S.Congress. Senate. 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