UBC Theses and Dissertations

UBC Theses Logo

UBC Theses and Dissertations

The role of Japan in United States strategic policy for Northeast Asia Solomon, Russell Keith 1985

Your browser doesn't seem to have a PDF viewer, please download the PDF to view this item.

Item Metadata

Download

Media
831-UBC_1985_A8 S66_6.pdf [ 7.48MB ]
Metadata
JSON: 831-1.0096516.json
JSON-LD: 831-1.0096516-ld.json
RDF/XML (Pretty): 831-1.0096516-rdf.xml
RDF/JSON: 831-1.0096516-rdf.json
Turtle: 831-1.0096516-turtle.txt
N-Triples: 831-1.0096516-rdf-ntriples.txt
Original Record: 831-1.0096516-source.json
Full Text
831-1.0096516-fulltext.txt
Citation
831-1.0096516.ris

Full Text

THE ROLE OF JAPAN IN UNITED STATES STRATEGIC POLICY FOR NORTHEAST ASIA by RUSSELL KEITH SOLOMON B.Juris., The University Of Western A u s t r a l i a , 1976 LL.B., The University Of Western Au s t r a l i a , 1977 B.A. (Hons.), The University Of Western A u s t r a l i a , 1982 A THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF MASTER OF ARTS in THE FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIES P o l i t i c a l Science Department We accept t h i s thesis as conforming to the required standard THE © UNIVERSITY OF BRITISH COLUMBIA January 1985 R u s s e l l K e i t h Solomon, 1985 In presenting t h i s thesis in p a r t i a l fulfilment of the requirements for an advanced degree at the University of B r i t i s h Columbia, I agree that the Library s h a l l make i t freely available for reference and study. I further agree that permission for extensive copying of t h i s thesis for scholarly purposes may be granted by the Head of my Department or by his or her representatives. It i s understood that copying or publication of this thesis for f i n a n c i a l gain s h a l l not be allowed without my written permission. Department of P o l i t i c a l Science The University of B r i t i s h Columbia 2075 Wesbrook Place Vancouver, Canada V6T 1W5 Date: January 18, 1985 i i Abstract The role of Japan in any U.S. strategic policy w i l l be decided from the outcome of two debates. These two debates, the Japanese security policy debate and the American strategic policy debate, have been conducted within the leading groups of each country. The debates, both independently and at their points of interaction, i l l u s t r a t e the dynamic nature of the problem of forecasting the kind of security role Japan w i l l perform in any future American strategic policy for the Northeast Asian region. Against a background of a Soviet regional m i l i t a r y build-up and increasingly strident American c a l l s for Japan to improve i t s defence c a p a b i l i t i e s , the Japanese debate signals a growing consensus for an enhanced security role. However, t h i s trend must be severely q u a l i f i e d by the enduring impact of certain c o n s t i t u t i o n a l , p o l i t i c a l and economic constraints upon security policy-making. The importance that certain leading Japanese groups give to the domestic determinants of policy seems to have been discounted by many leading Americans. Any enhancement of Japan's security role must be accommodated by the Japanese domestic p o l i t i c a l environment; an environment which retains strong p a c i f i s t sentiments. The recent movement towards a m i l i t a r y a l l i a n c e between the two countries needs to be balanced against the continuing relevance that a good proportion of leading Japanese and the Japanese public hold for a minimum defence posture supported by the American security commitment, as embodied in the U.S.-Japan treaty. The American strategic policy debate is concerned with two main policy arguments. The unilateralist/maritime supremacy argument sees the world in e s s e n t i a l l y bipolar terms and seeks to augment American power so as to be able to overcome a potential enemy, solely through the use of U.S. power. The coalition/defence argument views the world in multipolar terms and believes that deterrence against an enemy should s u f f i c e and that this can best be achieved through the u t i l i z a t i o n and management of a l l i e d as well as American forces. The examination of the policy arguments within each of the debates reveals that each i s in an i n s u f f i c i e n t l y developed stage to greatly a s s i s t our predictions as to Japan's future security role in any American strategic p o l i c y . Arguments that Japan is w i l l i n g to accept s p e c i f i c regional security security are easily countered by equally v a l i d ones which foresee no direct security role within any American strategic policy of the near future. Table of Contents Abstract i i Acknowledgement v i Chapter I INTRODUCTION 1 Chapter II THE SOVIET THREAT: AMERICAN & JAPANESE PERCEPTIONS 19 A. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND 19 B. SOVIET AND AMERICAN MILITARY FORCES IN NORTHEAST ASIA .25 C. AMERICAN PERCEPTIONS OF THE SOVIET 'THREAT' 34 D. JAPANESE PERCEPTIONS OF THE SOVIET 'THREAT' 39 E. AN ASSESSMENT 47 Chapter III THE JAPANESE SECURITY POLICY DEBATE 54 A. THE UNITED STATES-JAPAN TREATY 55 B. THE JAPANESE SELF-DEFENSE FORCE 59 C. CHANGES TO JAPAN'S EXTERNAL ENVIRONMENT 61 D. JAPANESE VIEWS OF THE U.S.-JAPAN SECURITY RELATIONSHIP 63 E. JAPANESE CONCEPTS OF SECURITY 69 F. JAPANESE DOMESTIC CONSTRAINTS 75 G. JAPANESE RESPONSES TO AMERICAN CALLS FOR A MILITARY BUILD-UP 81 H. JAPAN'S FUTURE INTERNATIONAL SECURITY ROLE 87 Chapter IV THE UNITED STATES STRATEGIC POLICY DEBATE & JAPAN 95 A. RECENT U.S. ADMINISTRATIONS' STRATEGIC POLICIES FOR NORTHEAST ASIA 97 B. THE UNILATERALIST/MARITIME SUPREMACY ARGUMENT 106 C. THE COALITION/DEFENCE ARGUMENT 113 D. PROPOSED JAPANESE MISSIONS WITHIN AN AMERICAN STRATEGIC V POLICY 123 E. THE AMERICAN DEBATE ASSESSED 128 Chapter V CONCLUSION 133 BIBLIOGRAPHY 145 I. NEWSPAPERS 145 II. OFFICIAL DOCUMENTS 145 II I . SECONDARY SOURCES 145 v i Acknowledgement I would l i k e to express my appreciation of the c r i t i c a l comments and suggestions provided me by Professors K.J. Holst i and P. Marantz. Dr Douglas Ross i s owed a special debt of gratitude for not only his general supervision and guidance but also his fri e n d l y encouragement and support. A special thank you i s owed to my good friends M. Ramesh and John Fossum for the general support and patience they showed me during the research and writing of th i s paper. 1 I. INTRODUCTION Japan and the United S t a t e s , while having many p o l i t i c a l and economic i n t e r e s t s i n common, do not n e c e s s a r i l y h o l d the same g e o s t r a t e g i c outlook. Within the parameters of the Japan-U.S. T r e a t y and the arrangements i t p r e s c r i b e s , there i s a good de a l of divergence of o p i n i o n over the two fundamental i s s u e s of whether a t h r e a t e x i s t s to Japan's s e c u r i t y and what, i f anything, should be done to meet such a t h r e a t . Americans cannot expect that Japan's s e c u r i t y p o l i c y w i l l a u t o m a t i c a l l y take i t s l e a d from t h e i r own, even i f such a p o l i c y was c l e a r l y and u n e q u i v o c a l l y a r t i c u l a t e d . Even i f Japanese p e r c e p t i o n s of the e x t e r n a l environment were i d e n t i c a l , which they are not, Japan, l i k e the United S t a t e s , i s a l i b e r a l democracy and the domestic determinants of i t s s e c u r i t y p o l i c y have an important f u n c t i o n . T h i s paper w i l l examine both the iss u e of the So v i e t ' t h r e a t ' and the is s u e of the i n t e r a c t i o n of the Japanese s e c u r i t y p o l i c y debate and the American s t r a t e g i c p o l i c y debate. In so doing, i t w i l l throw some l i g h t on to the subje c t of the extent to which any Japanese s e c u r i t y r o l e w i l l be determined by the demands of i t s domestic environment and those of the Japan-U.S. s e c u r i t y r e l a t i o n s h i p . American s t r a t e g i c p o l i c y towards the Northeast Asian r e g i o n , as with i t s g l o b a l p o l i c y , has been the s u b j e c t of much debate w i t h i n U.S. s e c u r i t y p l a n n i n g c i r c l e s . Beset by co n f u s i o n and i n d e c i s i v e n e s s i n the l a t e 1970s, the United S t a t e s has not been able to u n r a v e l i t s g l o b a l and r e g i o n a l s t r a t e g i c problems d e s p i t e the coming to power of Ronald Reagan 2 with his 'peace through strength' solutions. The 1970s marked a turning point in terms of America's relations with both i t s a l l i e s and the rest of the world. Not only did many Americans believe that the United States had lost i t s strategic nuclear superiority over the Soviet Union, but to them, "the postwar order was i t s e l f breaking down during these years". 1 For many i n f l u e n t i a l Americans, this order had been largely the creation of the United States and had depended for i t s sustenance upon America's continued m i l i t a r y , p o l i t i c a l and economic supremacy. It had been replaced by a new order which required the United States to seek the cooperation and collaboration of i t s a l l i e s . The c l a s s i c cold war scenario had ceased to have any relevance and America's a l l i e s were no longer prepared to accept American leadership as unquestioningly as they had before. In a world of loosening Western a l l i a n c e arrangements and increasing i n s t a b i l i t y and un p r e d i c t a b i l i t y , America began to turn i t s attention, increasingly, to those regions where v i t a l economic interests were at risk and where the addition of her m i l i t a r y forces could have a decisive impact. Northeast Asia was a notable candidate for such attention. Northeast Asia had already begun to take on increased importance, both economically and m i l i t a r i l y , in American eyes. By the late 1970s, U.S. trade across the P a c i f i c had exceeded that across the A t l a n t i c 2 and many Americans were coming to view 1 Robert W. Tucker, The Inequality of Nations (New York, 1977) p.47 2 Two-way U.S.-Japan trade in 1982 surpassed $60 b i l l i o n . 3 Japan as both i t s greatest trading partner outside the Western Hemisphere as well as i t s greatest economic r i v a l . M i l i t a r i l y , the growth of Soviet m i l i t a r y power in this region impelled America's leaders to consider a revised security policy for Northeast Asia as an essential ingredient of a global policy to match the Soviets. To the Americans, each m i l i t a r y region was primarily important for i t s place in the overa l l global pattern. Like i t s superpower r i v a l , the U.S. suffered the temptation of seeking to answer any strategic gains in one region, obtained by some kind of m i l i t a r y intervention, not only by di r e c t counteractions but also by counterstrikes in other distant areas. Both superpowers exhibited a tendency to embrace a policy of horizontal e s c a l a t i o n . 3 Since the 1950s, Japan had been the most important of America's security interests in Northeast Asia. This relationship, i n i t i a l l y formalised in 1952 became in 1960, with the Treaty of Mutual Security and Cooperation, something more in the nature of a p o l i t i c a l / d i p l o m a t i c c o a l i t i o n than a m i l i t a r y a l l i a n c e . As i s the case with most a l l i a n c e s and c o a l i t i o n s , the Japan-U.S. security arrangements arose out of a c o n f l i c t s i t u a t i o n . They were also l i v i n g evidence of postwar Japanese weakness and American strength. In essence, these arrangements prescribed that the United States would take an unequal share of the burden for Japan's defence and for that of the neighbouring area in return for Japan's membership of the Western camp. 3 Kurt W. Radtke, "Global Security and Northeast Asia", Journal  of Northeast Asian Studies Vol.2 No.1 (March 1983) p.59. 4 As Japan developed into an economic power in the postwar years, i t s leaders and America's leaders acquired overlapping strategic and economic interests which they sought to protect by means of the security arrangements. The commitment of each to the other remained unequal but the arrangements appear to have transformed the relationship into a "defensive a l l i a n c e . " Paradoxically, while becoming the economic success story of the postwar years, Japan remained under the American national security umbrella and exhibited great reluctance to provide more than the minimum for her own defence. Perhaps, as has been suggested recently, there i s to be found some causal connection between low defence spending and high levels of growth." While the Japan-U.S. security arrangements were the prime manifestations of a p o l i t i c a l / d i p l o m a t i c c o a l i t i o n , their m i l i t a r y purpose was never far below the surface. In times of c r i s i s , or more commonly of potential security threats, the m i l i t a r y forces deployed on and about Japan pursuant to the Treaty would appear to give the " a l l i a n c e " a d i s t i n c t m i l i t a r y s i g n i f i c a n c e . In George Liska's words, "alliances are against, and only d e r i v a t i v e l y for, someone or something." 5 In terms of the Japan-U.S. relationship, Liska's words would find their testing in the decade of the 1970s. " J.K.Galbraith suggested in October 1981 that Japan should state p u b l i c l y that high levels of m i l i t a r y expenditure are incompatible with economic growth:Quoted in Kenneth Pyle,"Changing Conceptions of Japan's International Role"(Unpublished Seminar Paper, 1984) p.9 5 G.Liska, Nations in A l l i a n c e : The Limits of Interdependence (Baltimore, 1 962) p.12 5 The 1970s was a period of c r i s i s and, in the views of many i n f l u e n t i a l Americans and Japanese, of a potential security threat to Japan and the Northeast Asian region. The early years witnessed the Sino^Soviet s p l i t and the Nixon "shocks", which affected Japan diplomatically and economically. As well, the c r i s i s of o i l supply and access h i t Japan d i r e c t l y . However, i t was the massive Soviet m i l i t a r y build-up in t h i s period which was to have more serious and l a s t i n g e f f e c ts upon Japan's security p o l i c y thinkers. In East Asia, t h i s quantitative and qu a l i t a t i v e improvement of Soviet m i l i t a r y forces and their c a p a b i l i t y for force projection was part of a global build-up. In i t s Far Eastern theatre of operations, which includes Northeast Asia, the Soviet Union has acquired a strong maritime c a p a b i l i t y to project i t s power and influence over the v i t a l sea lanes of communication which pass through the region and upon which both the U.S. and es p e c i a l l y Japan, depend for essential trade and energy supplies. While the Soviet Union has improved both i t s strategic and conventional m i l i t a r y c a p a b i l i t i e s , i t s t i l l faces many l i m i t a t i o n s , including geographical ones, upon the exercise of that power.6 I f , as some writers suggest, the Soviet Union now poses a dire c t m i l i t a r y and an indire c t p o l i t i c a l threat to Japan and to the region, then an examination of both i t s enhanced m i l i t a r y c a p a b i l i t y and the perceptions of 6 E a r l Ravenal, "Perceptions of American Power" in Franklin D. Margiotta (ed.), Evolving Strategic R e a l i t i e s t l m p l i c a t i o n s for  U.S. Policymakers (Washington, D.C.: 1980) p.145 at 153. 6 leading American and Japanese commentators i s in order. 7 Chapter Two w i l l outline the extent to which this Soviet m i l i t a r y build-up, in both i t s regional and global contexts, has been perceived by American and Japanese commentators as well as by the respective governments, as constituting a threat to American and Japanese interests in the region. The chapter w i l l demonstrate that although the enhanced Soviet m i l i t a r y c a p a b i l i t y has tended to s o l i d i f y the U.S.-Japan " a l l i a n c e " , the d i f f e r i n g perceptions of that threat between the two nations has exacerbated tensions between the two over the nature and l e v e l of Japanese contributions to the relationship. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan coupled with the Iranian "hostage" a f f a i r prompted the United States to deploy some of i t s Pacific-based naval forces to the Persian Gulf and to the Indian Ocean in 1979. As a r e s u l t , those U.S. forces remaining in the Asian-Pacific theatre were l e f t somewhat depleted. Contrasted to the growing Soviet forces, these thinned forces provided further evidence, at least in some i n f l u e n t i a l American eyes, of the need for Japan to increase i t s defence contributions. The c a l l s for an increase in Japanese contributions, coming as they did from a number of leading groups in both Japan and the United States, were being made at a time when the U.S. Administration was embarking on what Jeffrey Record terms a "worldwide war strategy". As Record points out, t h i s strategy f a i l s to reveal to i t s a l l i e s , including Japan, any l i s t of 7 For example, Robert A. Scalapino (1982), Jacqueline K. Davis in Morrison (ed.) (1983), and James E. Dornan Jr in Foster, Dornan et.al.(eds.) (1979). 7 s t r a t e g i c p r i o r i t i e s . 8 As two American commentators have r e c e n t l y noted: "In s o f a r as the A d m i n i s t r a t i o n seems to have a grand s t r a t e g y , i t appears to i n c o r p o r a t e requirements f o r f i g h t i n g wars of every kind, a l l at o n c e — g l o b a l c o n v e n t i o n a l war a g a i n s t an u n s p e c i f i e d range of a d v e r s a r i e s , o f f e n s i v e c o n v e n t i o n a l o p e r a t i o n s a g a i n s t the S o v i e t homeland, and a v i c t o r i o u s nuclear war a g a i n s t the S o v i e t s . " 9 The g l o b a l i s t approach of the Reagan A d m i n i s t r a t i o n with i t s emphasis upon h o r i z o n t a l e s c a l a t i o n makes the b o l d assumption that i t s a l l i e s and the a l i g n e d c o u n t r i e s w i l l view the t h r e a t from the Soviet Union in the same l i g h t and be more than prepared to c o n t r i b u t e , i n whatever way i s deemed necessary, to meet the c h a l l e n g e . In the same v e i n , t h i s ambiguous s t r a t e g y has been c r i t i c i z e d as assuming that r e g i o n a l c o n f l i c t s can, or at l e a s t should, be subordinated to a " s t r a t e g i c consensus", amongst the a l l i e d / a l i g n e d c o u n t r i e s , that the t h r e a t to i n t e r n a t i o n a l s e c u r i t y i s the S o v i e t U n i o n . 1 0 Perhaps i t i s simply that t h i s A d m i n i s t r a t i o n i s being more e x p l i c i t about how an " a l l y " i s viewed by a superpower, and that as the s e n i o r p a r t n e r , the U n i t e d S t a t e s expects u n c r i t i c a l a l l i e d c o n t r i b u t i o n s . Henry K i s s i n g e r i n h i s work on the Nato a l l i a n c e o f f e r e d a s i m i l a r view: 8 J e f f r e y Record, " J o u s t i n g with U n r e a l i t y " i n I n t e r n a t i o n a l  S e c u r i t y Vol.8 No.3 (Winter 1983/84) p.3 at 5 9 Barry R.Posen and Stephen Van Evera, "Defense P o l i c y & the Reagan A d m i n i s t r a t i o n : Departure from Containment" i n I n t e r n a t i o n a l S e c u r i t y Vol.8 No.3 (Winter 1983/84) p.3 at 42 1 0 J e f f r e y Record, " J o u s t i n g with U n r e a l i t y " and Barry Posen and Stephen Van Evera, "Defense P o l i c y & the Reagan A d m i n i s t r a t i o n " . 8 "There i s a tendency for a l l i e s to be considered by the superpower as factors in a security arrangement and their u t i l i t y i s measured in terms of their contribution to a common e f f o r t . " 1 1 The security arrangement that exists today between the United States and Japan i s , in terms of i t s d i s t r i b u t i o n of benefits and obligations, l i t t l e changed from that established in 1960 with the signing of the revised Treaty. The Treaty established an asymmetrical relationship between the two nations ascribing vastly d i f f e r e n t m i l i t a r y c a p a b i l i t i e s and national security burdens to each. Behind the protective s h i e l d of American nuclear and conventional defence c a p a b i l i t i e s , Japan remained a passive c l i e n t state with only a minimal Self Defense Force. The security system established by the Treaty does not operate under the usual a l l i a n c e assumptions of mutual and c o l l e c t i v e defence. As an unequal-burden treaty, the Mutual Security and Cooperation Treaty e x p l i c i t l y obliges the Americans to come to the aid of the Japanese should they be attacked or find themselves subject to any form of p o l i t i c a l coercion. The Japanese, on the other hand, are placed under no such obligation should the Americans be attacked. Where the Treaty arrangements do provide something of a quid pro quo for the United States i s in the provision of bases and other f a c i l i t i e s for American forces as well as in giving i t permission to station troops on 1 1 Henry A. Kissinger, The Troubled Partnership (New York, 1965) p.23 9 Japanese t e r r i t o r y . In contrast to the 1951 accord which had been a "treaty of security" for the provision of f a c i l i t i e s , the 1960 treaty stressed mutuality and c a l l e d for joint defence as well as p o l i t i c a l and economic cooperation. In addition to the provision requiring that the U.S. defend Japan and that the l a t t e r provide the former with bases and f a c i l i t i e s to support the American commitments both to Japan and throughout East Asia, there are other important provisions which d i r e c t l y a f f e c t the nature of the two nations' security r e l a t i o n s h i p . In pa r t i c u l a r , Japan agreed to build a moderate-sized, conventional defence establishment and to defend the t e r r i t o r i e s under i t s j u r i s d i c t i o n ; the U.S. agreed to consult with Japan before deploying any American troops (based in Japan) to combat outside of Japan and before i t made any major deployments to Japan or made any major changes to i t s combat equipment in Japan; and Japan agreed to support American security e f f o r t s in Korea. Rather than create a mutual r e s p o n s i b i l i t y for security in the Northeast Asian region, these provisions have in fact been interpreted in such a way as to entrench that inequality of burden which was o r i g i n a l l y prescribed but has ceased to be necessary. The unique security position in which Japan found i t s e l f a fter the Second World War i s no better i l l u s t r a t e d than by reference to the legal prescription for Japan's permanent d e m i l i t a r i s a t i o n which was incorporated in A r t i c l e IX of the revised Japanese Constitution. This A r t i c l e proclaimed that the 10 Japanese p e o p l e " f o r e v e r renounce war as a s o v e r e i g n r i g h t of the n a t i o n and the t h r e a t or use of f o r c e as a means of s e t t l i n g i n t e r n a t i o n a l d i s p u t e s " and a s s e r t s t h a t " l a n d , s e a , and a i r f o r c e s , as w e l l as o t h e r war p o t e n t i a l , w i l l not be m a i n t a i n e d " . T h i s c o n s t i t u t i o n a l p r o v i s i o n , w h i l e imposed upon the Japanese by the A m e r icans, has i r o n i c a l l y been used by the p a c i f i s t elements i n Japan t o f o r e s t a l l , i f not p r e v e n t , the e x p a n s i o n of Japan's defe n c e f o r c e s . As the r e g i o n where the i n t e r e s t s and c a p a b i l i t i e s of f o u r g r e a t powers converge, N o r t h e a s t A s i a c o n s t i t u t e s a v i t a l t h e a t r e of war s h o u l d h o s t i l i t i e s a r i s e between the U n i t e d S t a t e s and the S o v i e t U n i o n . The U.S., w h i l e g e o g r a p h i c a l l y d etached from the r e g i o n , has v i t a l p o l i t i c a l and economic i n t e r e s t s t o p r o t e c t t h e r e . C h i e f amongst the s e i n t e r e s t s i s the s t a b i l i t y and s e c u r i t y of i t s r e g i o n a l f r i e n d s and a l l i e s . There has been a tendency i n the postwar y e a r s f o r the U n i t e d S t a t e s t o view t h i s r e g i o n of the w o r l d more i n economic than s e c u r i t y terms. Recent U.S. A d m i n i s t r a t i o n s , however, have come t o a p p r e c i a t e t h a t j u s t as t h e r e i s a need f o r a g l o b a l r a t h e r than merely a r e g i o n a l view, so t h e r e must be found a permanent l i n k between the U n i t e d S t a t e s ' economic and s e c u r i t y i n t e r e s t s . 1 2 H i g h r a n k i n g Congressmen echo the s e s e n t i m e n t s and emphasise the need f o r the U n i t e d S t a t e s to m a i n t a i n a s t r o n g m i l i t a r y p r e s e nce i n the r e g i o n . As 1 2 S e c r e t a r y of S t a t e George S c h u l t z r e i t e r a t e d t h i s view i n a speech g i v e n i n e a r l y 1983: "The U.S. & E a s t A s i a : A P a r t n e r s h i p f o r the F u t u r e " i n Department of S t a t e B u l l e t i n A p r i l 1983, pp.31-35. 11 Congressman G. William Whitehurst (Republican, V i r g i n i a ) of the House Armed Services Committee recently said: "...I believe that U.S. policy toward the region must include maintaining a strong m i l i t a r y presence, in conjunction with our East Asian a l l i e s , promoting the extension of democratic i n s t i t u t i o n s and p o l i t i c a l freedoms and encouraging continued economic growth within the framework of free t r a d e . " 1 3 Japan's role in the maintenance of America's m i l i t a r y posture in the region i s emphasized in two respects. From an economic perspective> Japan i s viewed as both a trading partner and as a source of aid for the less developed countries of the region. From the security perspective, Japan's role is likened to that of an "unsinkable a i r c r a f t c a r r i e r " 1 " from which the U.S. can use i t s forces to project power around the perimeter of the Eurasian landmass. In recent years, stresses and strains have appeared in the U.S.-Japan relationship. Since the late 1960s, Japan and the U.S. have experienced masive trade imbalances which have favoured Japan. By 1985, the U.S. trade d e f i c i t w i l l have reached between 30 and 40 b i l l i o n d o l l a r s and t h i s has sharpened concern in the U.S., especially in Congress, over Japanese reluctance to open i t s markets to American goods. As well, and not unrelated to these trade d i f f i c u l t i e s , leading groups in the U.S. have accused the Japanese of having a "free ride" at the 1 3 Letter from G. William Whitehurst to the writer, dated August 13, 1984. 1 4 Japanese Prime Minister Yasuhiro Nakasone was f i r s t quoted as saying this in The Washington Post March 20, 1983 p.C5 12 expense of the American defence e f f o r t in Northeast Asia. What is of special concern, however, is that this recent f r i c t i o n between the two countries has revealed that the U.S.-Japan security r e l a t i o n s h i p i s i t s e l f based on paradoxes, misunderstandings and diametrically opposed views of how the benefits and costs of the relationship are d i s t r i b u t e d . Chapter Three w i l l analyze the Japanese security policy debate in an attempt to assess the l i k e l i h o o d of Japan adopting an enhanced defence posture either within or outside of the Japan-U.S. security relationship. This study w i l l refer to the nature and missions of Japan's Self Defense Forces, e f f o r t s made to improve their c a p a b i l i t y , and the domestic p o l i t i c a l and other constraints upon such e f f o r t s . The Japanese debate over i t s future defence posture and i t s future role as an " a l l y " of the United States, both globall y and in Northeast Asia, occurs within a complex domestic context. 1 5 Domestic p o l i t i c a l opinion, both within i n f l u e n t i a l groups and within the general public, has been evolving in the d i r e c t i o n of greater support for both the Treaty and Japan's Self Defense Forces. However, t h i s increase in support for a stronger defence c a p a b i l i t y i s not without q u a l i f i c a t i o n and, in Japan, there are a number of well-entrenched constraints upon an expanded defence r o l e . 1 5 Participants in t h i s debate include Yukio Satoh, "The Evolution of Japanese Security Policy" (1982), Masataka Kosaka, "Japan's Role in the World" (1984), Osamu Kaihara, "Japan's Defense Structure & Capability" (1981), Mike Mochizuki, "Japan's Search for Strategy" (1983-84). 13 Defeat in World War II and the actual experience of nuclear bombing have created exceptionally strong a n t i m i l i t a r y sentiments and have encouraged the adoption by many of an insular outlook. While the people have come to accept, and the courts have recently affirmed, that forces for self-defence are permitted by the "peace" Constitution, a prudent fear of a pre-World War II m i l i t a r i s t r e v i v a l remains over the use of m i l i t a r y force. This fear has been translated into strong opposition to any use of the Japanese forces outside of the home islands. Increased American c a l l s , from both the Carter and Reagan Administrations, for an enhancement of Japan's defence e f f o r t in Northeast Asia have met with encouraging responses from the governments of Zenko Suzuki and Yasuhiro Nakasone. However, the extent to which th i s desire to be accommodating finds substance in increased m i l i t a r y spending and the assignment of new missions for Japan's Self Defense Force, is constrained by the opposition of p o l i t i c a l groups to the presence of U.S. forces and bases on Japanese s o i l as well as by the exercise of f i s c a l r e s t r aint by the powerful Japanese Finance Ministry. Since the late 1970s, Japan's Self Defense Force has been assigned the mission of defending the home islands against small-scale aggression. Japanese defence planners emphasize naval and a i r over ground forces, and improved weaponry over increases in manpower. In their view, the primary mission of the Self Defense Force i s to 'buy time' u n t i l American forces intervene to overcome the enemy. Within Japan, there are to be found varying perceptions of 1 4 the S o v i e t r e g i o n a l m i l i t a r y b u i l d - u p as w e l l as d i f f e r i n g o p i n i o n s over what the n a t i o n ' s defence posture should be. A good p r o p o r t i o n of Japanese o p i n i o n appears to be very much at odds with the views of many American commentators, be they s t r a t e g i c t h i n k e r s , l e g i s l a t o r s or members of the c u r r e n t U.S. A d m i n i s t r a t i o n . In g e n e r a l , American o p i n i o n holds that because Japan i s an " a l l y " of the U.S., i t s defence f o r c e s should be expanded and a s s i g n e d missions which would g i v e them a l e a d i n g r o l e i n Northeast Asian r e g i o n a l s e c u r i t y . T h i s r o l e would enable Japan, so the argument con t i n u e s , to perform complementary m i l i t a r y f u n c t i o n s w i t h i n a d e v e l o p i n g s t r a t e g i c d e s i g n . Chapter Four w i l l examine the main arguments of the American s t r a t e g i c debate and b r i e f l y assess the f e a s i b i l i t y of Japan performing those p a r t i c u l a r missions p r e s c r i b e d for i t i n the debate. T h i s assessment w i l l i l l u s t r a t e not only the l i m i t s of the Japanese S e l f Defense Force, but more imp o r t a n t l y , show the extent to which American p e r c e p t i o n s of the Soviet t h r e a t may w e l l have overwhelmed a r e a l i s t i c c o n s i d e r a t i o n of the Japanese p o s i t i o n . T h i s American debate has been conducted s i n c e the e a r l y 1970s. I t has produced two main arguments for a U.S. g l o b a l s t r a t e g i c p o l i c y based on a c o n v e n t i o n a l w a r f i g h t i n g c a p a b i l i t y . Chapter Four w i l l examine these arguments, the u n i l a t e r a l i s t / m a r i t i m e supremacy s t r a t e g y and the c o a l i t i o n / defence s t r a t e g y and t h e i r v a r i a n t s , as they apply to Northeast A s i a and to the r o l e of America's a l l i e s . 1 5 . The proponents of each of these arguments are concerned with the global Soviet m i l i t a r y build-up and, as they see them, the unfavourable force trends in Northeast Asia. Also, both acknowledge an increasing i n s t a b i l i t y in certain v i t a l areas of the world, p a r t i c u l a r l y the Persian Gulf and the Middle East. In addressing what each sees as the growing Soviet threat, the p o l i c y arguments are concerned with common strategic problems. In p a r t i c u l a r , this concern relates to the achievement and maintenance of a certain l e v e l of deterrence in any given theatre of operations; the a b i l i t y to project power on to the Eurasian landmass; and the achievement of escalation dominance. The unilateralist/maritime supremacy argument, which has found favour with the Reagan Administration, prescribes that the United States take f u l l advantage of i t s g e o p o l i t i c a l position as a maritime power, bordered by friendly neighbours, and concentrate on building up i t s naval forces as the prime instruments of force projection throughout the globe. As a region on the periphery of the Eurasian landmass, Northeast Asia i s viewed as a theatre of operations where a l l i e s can best be used as bases and staging points from which the United States could forward deploy i t s naval and a i r support forces for projection on to the Asian continent in times of emergency or c o n f l i c t . Chief among the proponents of this policy, U.S. Navy Secretary John F. Lehman Jr argues that the U.S. must seek a "clear maritime s u p e r i o r i t y " over the Soviet Union which would enable the U.S. to protect the sea lanes of communication and 16 access to America's friends and a l l i e s . In advocating a force structure which emphasises f l e x i b i l i t y , mobility, simultaneity and offensive combat, Secretary Lehman argues that a U.S. strategy: "..based on forward maritime defense i s esse n t i a l in drawing down enemy forces, keeping pressure on the enemy's i n t e r i o r l i n e s of communication, preventing his concentration of forces, and buying time for the c a p a b i l i t i e s of the i n d u s t r i a l democracies to mobilize and come into decisive p l a y . " 1 6 The other policy argument i s the coalition/defence strategy. Robert W. Komer, a former U.S. Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, i s one of the leading advocates of t h i s p o l i c y . As postulated by Komer, America's strategy should be based upon a rejuvenation of i t s a l l i a n c e s coupled with the adoption of a c o a l i t i o n defence of those areas around the Eurasian p e r i p h e r y . 1 7 This policy emphasizes the importance of acquiring a strong consensus amongst America's a l l i e s which would then create a potential two-front threat-in-being against the Soviet Union. Rebutting arguments of the unilateralist/maritime school, the advocates of thi s strategic policy argue that should a c o n f l i c t erupt between the U.S. and the Soviet Union, then warfighting would inevitably occur on the Eurasian landmass and 1 6 John F. Lehman J r , Testimony before the U.S.Congress. House. Armed Services Committee, M i l i t a r y Posture Hearings 1982 (Washington, D.C, 1981) p.554 1 7 Robert W. Komer, "Maritime Strategy v C o a l i t i o n Defense", Foreign A f f a i r s Vol.60 No.5 (Summer 1982) p.1127 at 1133 17 the Soviets could be more e f f e c t i v e l y challenged i f a multiple front war in both Europe and Asia was established with America's a l l i e s . In contrast to the other school's naval emphasis, this p o l icy stresses the use of land-oriented and ground forces. S u f f i c i e n t number of these forces would be acquired and placed in a forward defence-in-place posture. They would then be increased, more through a r a t i o n a l and e f f e c t i v e burden- sharing amongst the a l l i e s than through a u n i l a t e r a l American build-up of i t s m i l i t a r y forces. The American description of the Soviet m i l i t a r y build-up as a threat to Japan, as well as to America's regional interests, i s not a r e a l i s t i c basis upon which to examine Japan's role within any American strategic p o l i c y . This basis i s simply the product of America's conception of i t s own world role and of the place i t ascribes to Japan as an a l l y within the performance of that role. The purpose of t h i s study is to show that any role advocated for Japan by any American strategic policy must take account of the r e a l i t i e s of Japan's g e o p o l i t i c a l position as well as i t s domestic p o l i t i c a l environment. Japan's security i s not simply a derivative of the U.S.-Japan security arrangements but must also r e f l e c t the complexities of i t s own domestic p o l i t i c a l context. Within that context, one finds both skepticism about perceiving the Soviet m i l i t a r y build-up as a threat, and more p a r t i c u l a r l y , many constraints upon Japan performing the kinds of roles advocated within the American debate. An examination of Japan's security role within a broader American policy, w i l l i l l u s t r a t e two 18 issues: the importance of the domestic p o l i t i c a l environment to security policy-making in a l i b e r a l democracy; and the l i m i t s to the power of a superpower protector (patron) over an a l l i e d c l i e n t state in that security policy-making process. 19 II . THE SOVIET THREAT: AMERICAN & JAPANESE PERCEPTIONS A. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND The debate over a U.S. strategic policy for Northeast Asia and the related issue of Japan's role in such a policy has been conducted within the context of growing Soviet m i l i t a r y power in the region. This Soviet m i l i t a r y build-up has mainly occurred since 1965 when Sino-Soviet r i v a l r y was m i l i t a r i s e d and when the Soviets r e a l i s e d that Khrushchev's removal had not altered Mao Tse-Tung's h o s t i l i t y toward the Soviet Union. 1 8 While there i s general agreement that t h i s Soviet regional m i l i t a r y build-up was part of a global enhancement of their m i l i t a r y c a p a b i l i t i e s , disagreement remains as to whether the Soviets had an overall s t r a t e g y . 1 9 V.V. Aspaturian argues that "..Soviet policy amounts to something less than a master plan...yet i t is something more than a sequence of responses to targets of opportunity." 2 0 Others, such as Jacqueline Davis argue that "Soviet politicoeconomic and m i l i t a r y p o l i c i e s toward Asian-Pacific basin states form part of a global strategy 1 8 Harry Gelman, Testimony before the U.S.Congress, House Committee on Foreign A f f a i r s , Subcommittees on Europe and the Middle East and on Asian and P a c i f i c A f f a i r s , The Soviet Role in  Asia (Washington, D.C: USGP0,1983) p.352 1 9 This difference of opinion was revealed in the 1981 U.S. National Security A f f a i r s Conference, The 1980s: Decade of  Confrontation? p.6. 2 0 V.V. Aspaturian, "Soviet Global P o l i c i e s & Correlation of Forces" in Problems of Communism Vol.29 No.3 (May-June 1980) p. 1 . 2 1 Jacqueline K.Davis, "Soviet Strategy in Asia:A U.S. Perspective" in Charles E.Morrison (ed.), Threats to Security in  East A s i a - P a c i f i c (Lexington, Mass.: 1983) p.23. 20 characterised by several broad o b j e c t i v e s . " 2 1 By the late 1960s, leading Americans believed the U.S. had lost i t s strategic nuclear superiority over the Soviet Union and regional threats to both the s t a b i l i t y and interests of the U.S. and i t s a l l i e s had to be taken more seriously. The g e o p o l i t i c a l contest between the U.S. and the Soviets became a m i l i t a r y one at both global and regional l e v e l s . 2 2 The theatre m i l i t a r y balance now took on added importance in terms of the capacity of either the U.S. or the Soviet Union to project power and extend p o l i t i c a l influence. With the steady increase in Soviet m i l i t a r y expenditures over the past 15 to 20 years, there has been both a quantitative and q u a l i t a t i v e growth in the Soviet Union's naval, a i r and ground combat f o r c e s . 2 3 This growth and modernisation has been so s u b s t a n t i a l , 2 * that many were prepared to argue that, in the words of one, "the Soviet m i l i t a r y build-up in East Asia i s not... exclusively for defensive purposes." 2 5 For example, given China's weakness in modern weaponry, the quality and quantity of Soviet forces positioned along the Chinese front i e r 2 2 William Hyland, "The Soviet Union in the American Perspective: Perceptions and R e a l i t i e s " , in Adelphi Papers No.174 p.52 at 59 2 3 James E. Dornan, J r . , "The Changing Security Environment in East Asia" in Richard B. Foster, James E. Dornan, J r . , and William M. Carpenter (eds.), Strategy and Security in Northeast  Asia (New York: Crane Russak & Co., 1979) p.5. 2" For example, in the East Asian theatre, Soviet forces went from 20 d i v i s i o n s and 210 fighter-attack a i r c r a f t in 1965 to well over 40 d i v i s i o n s and more than 1000 such a i r c r a f t in 1978. 2 5 For example, Ralph Clough, "The Balance of Power in East Asia and the Western P a c i f i c During the 1980s: An American Perspective" in U. Alexis Johnson, et a l . , (eds.), The Common  Security Interests of Japan, the United States, and Nato (Cambridge, Mass.: 1981) p.27 at 29. 21 appear to be much stronger than would be needed to cope with a Chinese attack. Since the Second World War, United States strategic policy toward the Asian-Pacific region has been motivated by a desire to contain one or both of the Communist powers on the Asian continent. In i t s e f f o r t s at containment, the United States has fought two wars on the Asian continent and has committed U.S. m i l i t a r y power, either d i r e c t l y or through defence t r e a t i e s with a l l i e d / a l i g n e d nations, on and around the continent. U n t i l the early 1970s, i t was the Chinese who were viewed as the primary target of the U.S.'s containment policy and, as Franz Schurmann points out, there was never a shortage of i n f l u e n t i a l p o l i t i c a l or m i l i t a r y figures in the U.S. who discerned an intimate connection i n i t i a l l y between China and the North Koreans and then with the North Vietnamese. Such figures remained eager, almost to the end of the Vietnam War, to extend thi s war, by means of U.S.naval and a i r forces into China i t s e l f . 2 6 President Richard Nixon's establishment of fr i e n d l y r e lations with China in 1972 impelled those in Congress and in the m i l i t a r y who had viewed China as the main threat to U.S. regional security interests, to turn their attention to the Soviet Union. The adoption of the Soviet Union as America's primary global and regional opponent, together with the requisite strategies to meet t h i s 'new threat', understandably 2 6 Franz Schurmann, The Logic of World Power (New York: 1973) p.520. 2 2 did not occur overnight or without the aid of external factors. For example, the Soviets' achievement of nuclear parity with the U.S. as well as the attainment of a number of technological improvements 2 7 enabled those who so wished, to picture the Soviet threat as a global one. The U.S. strategic debate is not only about developing a policy e f f e c t i v e l y to protect worldwide and regional interests but also about the nature of the forces required for such protection. It thus comes as no surprise to f i n d b i t t e r r i v a l r y between the d i f f e r e n t armed services over which forces are to be used to counter the Soviet challenge. This interservice r i v a l r y , while in existence since WOrld War II, was heightened by the prosecution of the Vietnam War. 2 8 Members of the armed services, p a r t i c u l a r l y the powerful U.S. Navy, perceived the problems presented by the increased Soviet m i l i t a r y build-up in the Asia as an opportunity to pursue their own g e o p o l i t i c a l views and strategic p o l i c i e s for the projection of U.S. power. The vested interest of the armed services in "playing up" an external threat, coupled with the Soviet Union's policy of accentuating their power, resulted in a view of the Soviet m i l i t a r y build-up as a threat to U.S. global 2 7 For example, at about t h i s time, the Soviets demonstrated that they had mastered the technology of MIRV (Multiple Independently Targetable Reentry Vehicles). 2 8 Morton Halperin and David Halperin, "The Key West Key," Foreign  Policy No.53 (Winter 1983/84) p.114. Of course, naval and army r i v a l r y does go back into history. 23 and regional i n t e r e s t s . 2 9 As perceived by a majority of American commentators, the Soviet threat to U.S. and a l l i e d interests in Northeast Asia is of both a d i r e c t and an indi r e c t nature. The threat to America's a l l i e s i s seen by American commentators to be largely dependent upon the geographical position of each country concerned and the nature of the American and/or a l l i e d interest to be p r o t e c t e d . 3 0 To remain credible, any such threat must ultimately be backed up by e f f e c t i v e use of m i l i t a r y power and th i s i t s e l f w i l l very much depend upon how propitious the circumstances are for i t s use. For the Soviet Union to be able to r e a l i s e i t s potential for expanding i t s influence in any p a r t i c u l a r region, there must be some degree of i n s t a b i l i t y or some opportunity for i t to aid and influence regional states. In the view of many American commentators, the Soviets may well use subtle, means of persuading and coercing Asian a l l i e d / a l i g n e d states. U.S. Admiral Noel Gayler sums up t h i s view of the Soviet threat when he says that: "we think of security as protection both from external m i l i t a r y aggression and from coercion under the threat or i m p l i c i t threat of such aggression...[C]ommon to a l l [states of Asia] i s a general interest in the uninterrupted flow of commerce and resources." 3 1 2 9 Soviet M i l i t a r y Power op.cit. p.667. Examples in recent history of the Soviets accentuating their power would include Soviet e f f o r t s to play up the alleged bomber and missile gaps with the United States. 3 0 Robert A. Scalapino, "The Uncertain Future:Asian-Pacific Relations" in Charles E. Morrison(ed.), op. c i t . , p. 5. 3 1 Admiral Noel Gayler, "Security Implications of the Soviet M i l i t a r y Presence in Asia," Richard H. Solomon (ed.), Asian  Security in the 1980s (Cambridge, Mass.: 1979) p.54. 24 Lacking c l o s e c u l t u r a l t i e s or other means upon which to b u i l d enduring r e l a t i o n s h i p s with the s t a t e s and peoples of the r e g i o n , i t has been argued that the S o v i e t s tend to p r e f e r to attempt to i n f l u e n c e by means of the use of m i l i t a r y power. 3 2 There i s evidence that the S o v i e t s see t h e i r m i l i t a r y f o r c e s as the dominant component of t h e i r power and have simply extended the area of t h e i r a p p l i c a t i o n to c h a l l e n g e the economic as w e l l as p o l i t i c a l i n t e r e s t s of the West. In the Northeast Asian r e g i o n , t h i s e x t e n s i o n means that the sea lanes of communication and trade r o u t e s , so e s s e n t i a l to the U.S. and i t s a l l i e s i n the r e g i o n , are subject to p o t e n t i a l S o v i e t i n t e r d i c t i o n . C o u n t r i e s such as Japan, which r e l y so h e a v i l y on the merchant s h i p p i n g p a s s i n g along these routes f o r both t h e i r e s s e n t i a l energy s u p p l i e s and t h e i r trade of manufactured goods, are p a r t i c u l a r l y v u l n e r a b l e to such i n t e r d i c t i o n . 3 3 The • a b i l i t y of S o v i e t m i l i t a r y f o r c e s to i n t e r p o s e themselves between Japan and i t s energy s u p p l i e r s or buyers i n the developed world would not only i n d i c a t e a c a p a c i t y to c h a l l e n g e Japan's energy s e c u r i t y , but e q u a l l y i m p o r t a n t l y , i t would mean that the S o v i e t s c o u l d c h a l l e n g e the West's (read the U n i t e d S t a t e s ) c a p a c i t y , through i t s p r i n c i p a l instruments of c o l l e c t i v e defence, to respond i n a c o o r d i n a t e d and e f f e c t i v e 3 2 H i r o s h i Kimura, Soviet P o l i c y Toward Japan Working Paper #6 (Providence, Rhode I s . : 1983) p.5 3 3 For example, one estimate has i t that f o r every 50 n a u t i c a l m i l e s between the Middle East and Japan, one f i n d s a s h i p t a k i n g goods to or from Japan. 25 fashion. 3" B. SOVIET AND AMERICAN MILITARY FORCES IN NORTHEAST ASIA If the rapid growth in Soviet m i l i t a r y power in the Northeast Asian region can be viewed as constituting a threat, or at least a potential threat, to the security and s t a b i l i t y of United States and Japanese interests in this region, then that view must be tested by i n i t i a l l y examining the nature and extent of that power. In other words, one should analyse the increases and improvements the Soviets have made to their m i l i t a r y forces, globally, and then take account of these forces which have been deployed to the Northeast Asian r e g i o n . 3 5 The concern of the current U.S. Administration over the build-up of Soviet m i l i t a r y c a p a b i l i t y in this region of the world i s unmistakable. According to the 1984 edition of the U.S. Department of Defense's Soviet M i l i t a r y Power, Soviet m i l i t a r y forces in the Far East constitute approximately 30% of t o t a l Soviet f o r c e s . 3 6 The U.S. Administration believes that the Soviets have now turned the m i l i t a r y balance in this part-of the world very much in t h e i r favour. 3 7 Of prime importance to the balance of forces in the Far * Jeffrey Record, "The Geostrategic C r i s i s " in Rethinking U.S.  Security Policy for the 1980s National Security Conference Proceedings (Washington, D.C: 1980) p.67 5 Paul Dibb, Soviet C a p a b i l i t i e s , Interests & Strategies (Canberra: 1982), p.4. Paul Dibb argues that Soviet power in t h i s region must be viewed in m i l i t a r y terms for i t does not have proportionate economic power or p o l i t i c a l influence. 6 Soviet M i l i t a r y Power (Washington, D.C: 1984) p.49 7 Caspar W. Weinberger, U.S. Secretary of Defense, in testimony before the U.S. Congress, House Committee on Armed Services, M i l i t a r y Posture Hearings 1982 (Washington, D.C: 1981) pp.382-3 26 East theatre i s the increase in numbers and quality of the Soviet P a c i f i c Fleet. According to the U.S. Defence Department, th i s f l e e t i s now the largest of the 4 Soviet f l e e t s with at least 86 major surface s h i p s , 3 8 15 missile destroyers, 48 f r i g a t e s and 80 submarines. 3 9 Commander-in-Chief-Pacific, Admiral Robert L.J.Long has argued that t h i s constitutes a q u a l i t a t i v e increase of 13% for the Soviets since 1975 compared to a 5% reduction in U.S. Far East naval forces for the same period."° Over the period of the late 1970s to the early 1980s, there appears to have been four major improvements in the Soviets' p a c i f i c naval forces. The Soviets have deployed their f i r s t nuclear-powered surface combatants; new classes of nuclear-powered attack submarines; a new class of nuclear-powered a i r c r a f t c a r r i e r ; and a new class of amphibious assault ship." 1 The U.S. Administration believes that these force improvements have the combined effect of enhancing the Soviets' a b i l i t y to pursue "a broad range of sophisticated sea-denial missions from a n t i c a r r i e r operations to i n t e r d i c t i o n of the sea lanes of communication."" 2 According to the American Government, the i b i d , p.383. This force component includes one VTOL(Vertical Takeoff or Landing) a i r c r a f t c a r r i e r of the Kiev class, the Minsk . This force includes 19 nuclear-powered cruise missile submarines and 16 nuclear-powered attack boats. Admiral Robert L.J. Long, in testimony before the U.S.Congress, House Armed Services Committee, M i l i t a r y Posture  Hearings 1982 op.cit. p.705 Both the new classes of submarines (MIKE and SIERRA) and the new class of a i r c r a f t c a r r i e r have q u a l i t i e s that are p a r t i c u l a r l y useful in the Third World. Caspar W. Weinberger, M i l i t a r y Posture Hearings 1982 pp.386-7 27 e f f e c t i v e fulfilment of such missions would enable the Soviets to gain sea control of the waters contiguous to the Soviet Union to a distance of 2,000 kilometers." 3 If the increase in the numbers of the Soviet naval forces, coupled with these q u a l i t a t i v e improvements, can be said to constitute a potential threat then that threat would come primarily from the Soviets' general-purpose submarine force."" Another s i g n i f i c a n t force to be reckoned with i s the highly e f f e c t i v e land-based bombers which, with their antiship missiles, operate to augment the Soviet naval forces in the region." 5 In support of i t s P a c i f i c Fleet, the Soviet Union has developed a basing structure that includes f a c i l i t i e s on Soviet t e r r i t o r y , " 6 anchorages off Taiwan and an important base at Cam Ranh Bay in Vietnam. Viewed on a worldwide basis, the U.S. Department of Defense believes that the U.S. and i t s a l l i e s retain a favourable balance of maritime power over the Soviet Union." 7 Apart from the advantages in naval aviation and in amphibious " 3 The U.S. Department of Defense believes that to a s s i s t them in th i s role, the Soviets have committed themselves to larger displacement warships, and increased sea-based a i r c a p a b i l i t i e s , giving them a l l greater firepower, endurance and s u s t a i n a b i l i t y : Soviet M i l i t a r y Power op.cit. p.51 "" This force, p a r t i c u l a r l y in the diesel-powered classes, greatly outnumbers those of the U.S. They consist of both torpedo-attack and c r u i s e - m i s s i l e units. " 5 The Soviet land-based bombers are of 3 modern and e f f e c t i v e classes: the BACKFIRE, the BADGER and the BLINDER. " 6 These f a c i l i t i e s include Nakhodka, Vladivostok and Petropavlovsk on the Kamchatka Peninsula. " 7 Soviet M i l i t a r y Power op.ci t . p.67 28 assault forces, the Defense Department also c i t e s q u a l i t a t i v e improvements in underway replenishment ships and antisubmarine warfare. 4 8 The U.S. f l e e t has been enhanced with the introduction of a new class of fr i g a t e s , a new class of submarines and a new class of h e l i c o p t e r s . 4 9 There has also been modernisation of America's maritime patrol a i r c r a f t (land-based) as well as improvements in i t s carrier-based F-14 a i r c r a f t . 5 0 As well, improvements have been made in U.S. c a p a b i l i t y for a n t i -a i r warfare and for anti-ship warfare and these have been given to those U.S. forces operating in the Northeast Asian region. U.S. naval forces normally assigned to the P a c i f i c theatre include 6 a i r c r a f t c a r r i e r s , 87 surface combatants, 44 nuclear and d i e s e l attack submarines, 1 f l e e t b a l l i s t i c m i s s i l e submarine, 31 amphibious ships and 12 antisubmarine warfare patrol squadrons. 5 1 However, only 2 a i r c r a f t c a r r i e r s are routinely assigned to the U.S. P a c i f i c Fleet with th e i r associated a i r wings and accompanying surface combatants. Together these forces represent approximately 30% of the active 8 The underway replenishment ships add to the long distance and endurance c a p a b i l i t y of the U.S. Navy and are important both in the open oceans and for the protection of the sea lanes of communication: i b i d . 9 There have been 34 new FFG-7 fr i g a t e s , the new LOS ANGELES class attack helicopter as well as the new LAMPS MK III helicopter added to the f l e e t . The U.S. Defense Department believes that t h i s w i l l substantially increase i t s antisubmarine c a p a b i l i t y . 0 Improved torpedoes and antisubmarine warfare rockets for these a i r c r a f t are now in production: Soviet M i l i t a r y Power op.cit. p.69 1 Admiral Robert L.J. Long in testimony before the U.S. Congress. House. Committee on Armed Services, M i l i t a r y Posture  Hearings 1982 op.cit. p.1001 29 operating force of the U.S.Navy. 52 Soviet ground forces in the Northeast Asian region are primarily deployed along the Sino-Soviet border and are directed toward the containment of the Chinese. 5 3 These forces which consist of tank and motorized r i f l e d i v i s i o n s have been upgraded since the mid-1960s, when they began to be deployed to t h i s region in s i g n i f i c a n t numbers. For example, the Soviet Union's recently developed T-80 tank features nuclear, b i o l o g i c a l and chemical protection and enhanced firepower and s u r v i v a b i l i t y while i t s helicopter upgrades emphasise improvements in armaments, f l e x i b i l i t y and s u r v i v a b i l i t y . 5 4 Globally, the U.S. recognizes that the Soviet bloc has a quantitative advantage in the ground forces i t deploys. However, the U.S. Department of Defense lays emphasis upon what i t sees as the q u a l i t a t i v e superiority of i t s own ground f o r c e s . 5 5 There has been a restructuring of the U.S. Marine Corps to increase both i t s firepower and t a c t i c a l m o b i l i t y , 5 6 as well as improvements in i t s missiles to enhance guidance and the penetration of new Soviet armour. Emphasis has been l a i d upon Report to the U.S.Congress.Senate Foreign Relations Committee by the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, Japan's Contribution  to S t a b i l i t y in Northeast Asia (Washington, D.C.: 1980) p.64 These Soviet ground forces consist of 52 tank and motorized r i f l e d i v i s i o n s and 3 a r t i l l e r y d i v i s i o n s : Soviet M i l i t a r y Power op.cit. p.58 A new more agil e HAVOC class helicopter has been deployed in the region in support of i t s ground forces: i b i d , p.60 The U.S.'s l i g h t and heavy ground force d i v i s i o n s are being rearmed and restructured to enable sustained, continuous combat operations: i b i d . i b i d , p.61 : For example, additional TOW antitank missile platoons in each regiment. 3 0 improving the antitank a b i l i t i e s of the U.S. Army's attack helicopters and in deploying the M-1 ABRAMS main battle tank with i t s improved mobility, s u r v i v a b i l i t y and antiarmour firepower. A new fighting vehicle has been introduced which w i l l increase the mobility and firepower of the Marine Corps. 5 7 In the Asian-Pacific theatre, the U.S. Army's combat force l e v e l is about 53,000 and is comprised of an infantry d i v i s i o n in South Korea as well as one in Hawaii. 5 8 In the P a c i f i c , the U.S. has two brigades of the Marine Amphibious Force in Japan and a t h i r d in Hawaii. In the Far East theatre, the Soviet Union has modernized i t s a i r force with the deployment of i t s late-model FENCER and FLOGGER a i r c r a f t . Of the 170 long and medium-range bombers deployed in the Far East, 40 are the highly e f f e c t i v e Backfire bombers. The U.S. Department of Defense calculates that, in t o t a l , the Soviet Union has some 1800 a i r c r a f t deployed against China and Japan. 5 9 In terms of i t s global a i r power, the United States claims to have a q u a l i t a t i v e advantage over the Soviets in a l l the categories of a i r c r a f t , weapons, personnel and t r a i n i n g . 6 0 A new HARRIER a i r c r a f t for the Marine Corps i s due to be operational by 1985, and the currently deployed F-15 and F-16 a i r c r a f t have 7 These vehicles are armed with 25mm automatic cannon machine guns and antitank weapons. 8 Admiral-Robert L.J. Long, op.ci t . p.1002 9 Soviet M i l i t a r y Power op.cit. p.57 0 There are deployed on over 80% of the U.S. Navy's a i r c r a f t c a r r i e r s , F-14 a i r c r a f t which have been designed for f l e e t a i r defence and a i r - t o a i r combat. i b i d . 31 received radar modification to enhance their a i r - t o - a i r target detection ranges plus modifications to carry advanced medium range a i r - t o - a i r m i s s i l e s . 6 1 In the Northeast Asian region, the U.S. has deployed a squadron of F-4Es and one A-10 close a i r support a i r c r a f t in South Korea, an F-15 t a c t i c a l fighter wing in Okinawa, Japan, and an F-4E and a F-4G squadron in the Philippines. Okinawa also bases a squadron of E-3A AWACs62 a i r c r a f t . According to Admiral Robert L.J. Long, t o t a l forward-based a i r c r a f t under his P a c i f i c Command stands at 216. 6 3 Having sketched Soviet and U.S. conventional m i l i t a r y c a p a b i l i t i e s in the Northeast Asian region, i t i s important to note some of the li m i t a t i o n s that the Soviet Union suffers in the projection of i t s m i l i t a r y power into the region. If Soviet naval power poses the greatest 'threat', then we need to be aware of certain l o g i s t i c a l problems.In p a r t i c u l a r , navigation at the p r i n c i p a l Soviet naval bases at Vladivostok and Nadhotka is hampered by ice much of the year. Another l o g i s t i c a l problem faced by the Soviets i s that for their naval forces to move out of the Sea of Japan to the P a c i f i c Ocean, i t i s necessary for them to pass through three narrow s t r a i t s over which Japan has c o n t r o l . 6 " If these 'choke points' were blocked, then Soviet naval forces trapped in the 1 i b i d , p.58 2 Airborne Warning and Control A i r c r a f t . 3 o p . c i t . p.1002 * The U.S. bases in Japan and at Guam and in the Philippines are much better located for the purpose of deploying a i r and naval power into the Western P a c i f i c : Ralph Clough, op.cit. p.30. 32 Sea of Japan, while perhaps not vulnerable in themselves, would have d i f f i c u l t y in being used extensively to project Soviet power. 6 5 While the base f a c i l i t i e s at Petropavlovsk on Kamchatka Peninsula are free from ice year-round, they have to be resupplied primarily from the sea and thus remain vulnerable to i n t e r d i c t i o n from U.S. and a l l i e d f o r c e s . 6 6 In Northeast Asia, the Soviet Union, unlike the United States, i s geographically favoured in that i t has t e r r i t o r y c e n t r a l l y located within the region which can provide i t with domestic locations for m i l i t a r y bases. However, the Soviet Union has to contend with p o t e n t i a l l y threatening neighbours and many of i t s regional forces are 'tied down' checking these neighbours. 6 7 China i s of course the most powerful and p o t e n t i a l l y most dangerous of these neighbours and shares a 4,000 mile long land border with the Soviet Union. The U.S. Department of Defense acknowledges an American naval superiority in force c a p a b i l i t y , a q u a l i t a t i v e advantage, even i f not a quantitative advantage in i t s ground combat forces, and a q u a l i t a t i v e advantage over the Soviet Union in a l l categories of a i r power. Yet, both members of the Reagan Administration and the armed services view the recent Soviet moves in East Asia as so threatening as to require both an 6 5 Richard L.Sneider, "U.S. Interests and P o l i c i e s in Asia and the Western P a c i f i c in the 1980s" in U.Alexis Johnson, op.cit. p.71. 6 6 The land connection to Petropavlovsk by either the Trans-Siberian or Omar-Baykal railways i s neither r e l i a b l e nor e f f i c i e n t . 6 7 Ralph Clough, op.cit. p.30. 33 American m i l i t a r y build-up and a l l i e d force improvements. Add to t h i s the l o g i s t i c a l and other geographical l i m i t a t i o n s upon the Soviet Union's a b i l i t y to project i t s force in t h i s region, and one i s l e f t highly skeptical as to whether the Soviet Union's force improvements, by themselves, could constitute s u f f i c i e n t m i l i t a r y power as to pose a threat to American and a l l i e d interests. While i t i s beyond doubt that the Soviet Union has greatly enhanced i t s m i l i t a r y c a p a b i l i t i e s and potential for force projection in Northeast Asia, the d i r e c t t r a n s l a t i o n of t h i s capacity into a threat, tempting as i t may be for some, must not be made pr e c i p i t o u s l y . Power i t s e l f should be seen in r e l a t i v e rather than absolute terms and there would be appear to be good reason to question whether the Soviet Union has a r e l a t i v e force advantage', over the United States in t h i s region of the globe. Quantitative analysis, alone, is i n s u f f i c i e n t to enable one to assess whether p a r t i c u l a r m i l i t a r y or other forces can be translated into a security threat. To assess whether the Soviet Union's power can properly be translated into a threat to America and Japan i t i s necessary to consider certain intangible v a r i a b l e s - - i n p a r t i c u l a r , the various interpretations or perceptions of the Soviet Union's m i l i t a r y build-up, as presented by American and Japanese observers. 34 C. AMERICAN PERCEPTIONS OF THE SOVIET 'THREAT' Over the period of the 1970s, the United States may well have acquired a diminished worldwide perception of i t s own power in both absolute terms and in rel a t i o n to the Soviet Union. 6 8 During the same period, the U.S.'s perception of the Soviet Union, as given by most American commentators, was one of an expanding and m i l i t a r i l y more threatening r i v a l . American reference i s made not only to the enhanced m i l i t a r y c a p a b i l i t y of the Soviets, both globally and regionally, but to their increased attention to areas on the periphery of the Eurasian landmass. This 'threat' w i l l be activated by the Soviet Union taking advantage of regional i n s t a b i l i t y as well as by the use of i t s potential to intimidate through the i n t e r d i c t i o n of the v i t a l trade and supply l i n e s of the U.S. and i t s a l l i e s . 6 9 T e s t i f y i n g before the U.S. Congress, Professor Thomas Thornton argued that there was no evidence of the Soviet Union having a s p e c i f i c p o l i cy design for Asia. However, as Asia was "one place where the interests of the m i l i t a r y world powers intersected", he believed the U.S. should see t h i s as part of a global expansion and be prepared to maintain i t s own global c a p a b i l i t i e s . 7 0 6 8 E a r l Ravenal, "Perceptions of American Power", op.cit. p.145 6 9 Thomas Thornton, Hearings before the U.S. Congress, Soviet  Role in Asia o p . c i t . p.11 7 0 Thomas Thornton, Hearings on the Soviet Role in Asia op.cit. p.25 35 While there appears to be some American consensus over the growth of Soviet m i l i t a r y power over the past decade, there i s none to be found over the implications of such a build-up for America's security and other interests in Northeast Asia. Pierre Hassner and William Hyland have each commented on the various 'belief systems' or attitudes prevalent amongst U.S. leadership groups. 7 1 Hassner refers to the three contrasting views amongst American leadership groups on how to deal with the Soviets: containment, rollback and cooperation. Hyland perceives two contrary views amongst these groups on the same issue: those who consider that the Soviets must be resisted at every turn and those who believe that the USSR, l i k e other nations, i s susceptible to diplomacy, bargaining and compromise. While the groupings of these two writers are of course not d e f i n i t i v e , they indicate the p o t e n t i a l d i v e r s i t y of views of the Soviet Union that are held within America's leading groups. At any given time, a p a r t i c u l a r perspective w i l l be found to predominate and w i l l have a decisive impact upon American security policy-making at that time. Within these U.S. leadership groups, arguments are presented as to why a certain Soviet force c a p a b i l i t y is more dangerous, and i m p l i c i t l y why p r i o r i t y should be given to countering i t with s p e c i f i c U.S. and a l l i e d forces. For Pierre Hassner, "America's Policy Towards the Soviet . Union in the 1980s: Objectives and Uncertainties" in Adelphi Papers No.174 (Spring 1982) p.35; William Hyland, "The Soviet Union in the American Perspective: Perceptions and R e a l i t i e s " in i b i d . p.52 36 example, prominent amongst these groups are those who refer s p e c i f i c a l l y to the Soviet naval deployment in the Asian P a c i f i c region and the increased emphasis on antisubmarine warfare. 7 2 Other emphases include the deployment of SS-20s and ICBMs 7 3 in Asia and the basing of the highly e f f e c t i v e Backfire bomber in the Asian theatre. Soviet objectives in Northeast Asia, as attributed to them by Americans, have ranged from 'insuring the safety of Soviet t e r r i t o r y and the development of Siberia' to the more commonly emphasized objective of 'the projection of power and influence'. 7* Jacqueline Davis' l i s t i n g of Soviet objectives probably encompasses conventional American thinking. They are: ( l ) t o enhance the security of the USSR by developing a network of buffer states along i t s borders; (2) to decouple, p o l i t i c a l l y and m i l i t a r i l y , the United States from i t s a l l i e s and friends in the region; and(3)to extend Soviet influence over s t r a t e g i c a l l y important Third World s t a t e s . 7 5 This l i s t i n g ascribes to the Soviet Union objectives that are both broad and b a s i c a l l y h o s t i l e to American interests. This American view i s to be found, a l b e i t in varying degrees of intensity, in academic and l e g i s l a t o r s ' statements as well as in the pronouncements of members of the Reagan Administration. In testimony before the U.S.Congress in October 1983, 2 Richard L.Sneider, op.cit. p.71 3 Intercontinental B a l l i s t i c M i s s i l e s 4 Ralph Clough, Testimony before the U.S. Congress. House. Armed Services Committee, op.cit. p.129 5 Jacqueline Davis, op. c i t . p.23. 37 Professor Donald Zagoria said that he believed that the "Soviet m i l i t a r y build-up [ w i l l ] c e r t a i n l y increase ...unti1 the Soviets were s a t i s f i e d that they can neutralize the m i l i t a r y combination of a l l their potential a d v e r s a r i e s . " 7 6 Other academics t e s t i f y i n g at the same hearing were less charitable to the Soviet Union. Professor Thomas Thornton, for example, said that the "USSR cannot [as an Asian power] be s a t i s f i e d simply by manipulating the balance of power...[their] goal must be hegemony."7 7 Democratic Senator John Glenn, Chairman of the Senate subcommittee on East Asian and P a c i f i c A f f a i r s , in reference to the response required of the U.S.in Northeast Asia, also did not treat l i g h t l y what he saw as a growing worldwide Soviet threat: "Wherever we turn, whether to Asia, A f r i c a , or Latin America, we find an imperialist Soviet power a c t i v e l y seeking to exploit l o c a l 'targets of opportunity'". 7 8 Members of the Reagan Administration view Soviet objectives in even more severe terms and tend to assign Moscow a pervasive r e s p o n s i b i l i t y for international disorder. T e s t i f y i n g before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in June 1982, Deputy Secretary of State Walter J. Stoessel J r . made the following statement: 7 6 Donald Zagoria, Testimony before the U.S. Congress. House. Armed Services Committee, op.cit p.51 7 7 Thomas Thornton, op.cit. p.14 7 8 John Glenn, "Defending the New Japan" in Washington Quarterly (Winter 1982) p.25 at 28 38 "The Soviet objective in East Asia i s to seek positions of maximum g e o p o l i t i c a l strength from which to project power and influence...Specific Soviet objectives in the region include neutralizing Japan in any future c o n f l i c t by intimidation and by undermining the U.S.-Japan a l l i a n c e , diminishing the security of the sea lanes by positioning forces to i n t e r d i c t the shipment of petroleum and other key commodities..." 7 9 Even c r i t i c s of thi s present American 'confrontation consensus' such as Vladimir P e t r o v , 8 0 do not challenge what appears to be conventional thinking that the Soviet m i l i t a r y build-up, both in Northeast Asia and globally, has gone beyond the requirements of a defensive strategy. As a hegemonic power and as the other superpower which shares the global stage with the United States, the Soviet Union obviously sees a need to have m i l i t a r y forces capable of projecting power far beyond i t s own f r o n t i e r s . Like the U.S., the Soviet Union seeks to maximise i t s global influence in an attempt to support i t s friends and a l l i e s and to neutralise those a l l i e d to the opposing superpower. For the Soviet Union, i t s defence i s inextricably t i e d to the maintenance of i t s global security .network. This has made it. necessary for the Soviet Union to develop m i l i t a r y forces of offensive c a p a b i l i t y which can be projected into regions which offer either problems to be solved or opportunities to be exploited. The American debate over the implications of the Soviet 7 9 Walter J. Stoessel J r . , Testimony before the U.S.Congress. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, East-West Relations:  Focus on the P a c i f i c , (Washington, D.C: 1982) p.3 8 0 Vladimir Petrov, "New Dimensions of Soviet Foreign Policy" in Franklin D. Margiotta (ed.), o p . c i t . p.13 at 14. 39 m i l i t a r y build-up for U.S. security can no longer be seen in terms of Pierre Hassner's contest of pro-detente l i b e r a l s and anti-Soviet conservatives. 8 1 It has moved to the right and now is not so much over whether the build-up constitutes a threat, but rather over the nature and extent of that threat. As an extension of the p o l i t i c a l contest between the U.S. and the Soviet Union for worldwide influence, the tendency in American leadership groups appears to be to assess Soviet m i l i t a r y c a p a b i l i t i e s in p a r t i c u l a r regions and in p a r t i c u l a r force categories, and to then infer motives to the Soviet Union. From t h i s assessment, the Americans would then draw certain conclusions about the state of Western defences. D. JAPANESE PERCEPTIONS OF THE SOVIET 'THREAT' In recent years, the Japanese have engaged in a debate over the implications for their security of the Soviet m i l i t a r y build-up. This debate, no less vigorous than the American one, has been part of a much larger debate over Japan's defence policy and the international role i t should adopt in the years ahead. Given Japan's geographical proximity to the Soviet Union and to the Asian mainland, i t s m i l i t a r y weakness, i t s economic v u l n e r a b i l i t y (in p a r t i c u l a r , the importation of the great proportion of i t s energy and other natural resources), and i t s high population density, i t w i l l come as no surprise to discover that the Japanese debate has followed a dif f e r e n t path to that of the American debate. To place the Japanese debate in 1 Pierre Hassner, op.cit. p.36 40 context, a brief review of the Soviet views of Japan and the 0 Japan-U.S. security r e l a t i o n s h i p i s in order. The Soviet Union's perception of Japan i s a complex one. On the one hand, Soviet scholars and commentators c a l l for improved re l a t i o n s between the two countries, while on the other hand, they view Japan as being firmly within the Western camp and embracing an American policy of confrontation with the Soviet Union. Igor Latyshev's d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n between Japan's 'ruling c i r c l e s ' and the general public i s t y p i c a l of Soviet commentary. The writers argue that Japan's leaders are motivated by either a desire to "win the favour of Washington and to soften discontent in the U.S." or by pressure from the Americans to maintain a h o s t i l e stance towards the Soviet Union. 8 2 The Soviets see Japan becoming more m i l i t a r i l y and s t r a t e g i c a l l y involved in an a l l i a n c e with the U.S. They argue that this presents a dual danger from both the growth of Japan's own m i l i t a r y potential and from i t s contribution to the " d e s t a b i l i s i n g U.S. strategy" in the region. 8 3 The Soviet writers believe that Japan's r u l i n g c i r c l e s view the Soviet Union as the hypothetical enemy and f o i s t upon the Japanese public the "threat from the North" as the pretext for increasing m i l i t a r y spending and for giving the SDF an offensive 8 2 Igor Latyshev, "Soviet-U.S. Differences in their Approaches to Japan" in Asian Survey Vol.XXIV No.11 (November 1984) p.1163 8 3 Konstantin 0. Sarkisov, "Japan & the U.S. in Asia" in Asian  Survey Vol.XXIV No.11 (November 1984) p.1174 41 c a p a b i l i t y . 8 " The "Soviet m i l i t a r y t h r e a t " i s seen as something which the r u l i n g c i r c l e s adopt from the Americans and then proceed to i m i t a t e and present to the Japanese p u b l i c . In Northeast A s i a , they argue, the a n t i - S o v i e t propaganda campaign attempts to p o r t r a y the " r o u t i n e updating of weapons c a r r i e d out by S o v i e t armed f o r c e s , o r d i n a r y combat t r a i n i n g and l o c a l t r o o p movement" as "fearsome evidence of war p r e p a r a t i o n s d i r e c t e d a g a i n s t J a p a n . " 8 5 The " c h a u v i n i s t and r e v a n c h i s t f o r c e s " w i t h i n Japan are seen as using the " t h r e a t " as a t r i c k to j u s t i f y Japan's e s c a l a t i n g m i l i t a r y b u i l d - u p and to b r i n g the country's p o l i c y more i n l i n e with American and Chinese f o r e i g n p o l i c i e s . Part of t h i s propaganda campaign i s what the S o v i e t s see as the " i l l e g a l and groundless t e r r i t o r i a l c l a i m s " of the Japanese to the K u r i l e I s l a n d s . 8 6 The Japanese SDF i s seen by the S o v i e t w r i t e r s as becoming, i n c r e a s i n g l y , "an appendage of U.S. war machinery" designed, l i k e the U.S. f o r c e s , to combat the S o v i e t Union. As w e l l , Japan i s viewed as performing an i n t e g r a l , and p r i m a r i l y economic, r o l e i n America's A s i a n s t r a t e g y . In the S o v i e t view, t h i s American s t r a t e g y p r e s c r i b e s a c e r t a i n degree of t e n s i o n i n Soviet-Japanese r e l a t i o n s i n order to maintain and j u s t i f y the U.S.-Japan s e c u r i t y t r e a t y . 8 7 The S o v i e t w r i t e r s present a u n i f i e d view espousing the p o s s i b i l i t y of e s t a b l i s h i n g both goodneighbourly r e l a t i o n s with " N. N i k o l a y e v , "For Good-Neighbourliness & Cooperation Between the USSR & Japan" in I n t e r n a t i o n a l A f f a i r s No.2 ( 1978) p.38 5 V. Dalnev, "Impediments to Soviet-Japanese R e l a t i o n s " i n I n t e r n a t i o n a l A f f a i r s No.2 {1 981) p.49 at 51/ 6 N. N ikolayev, o p . c i t . p.40 7 D. Petrov, "Japan's P l a c e i n U.S. A s i a n P o l i c y " i n I n t e r n a t i o n a l A f f a i r s No.10 (1978) p.52 at 58; 42 the Japanese and of eventually signing a peace treaty. However, they argue that with what they see as the m i l i t a r i s a t i o n of Japan and i t s growing involvement in America's Asian strategy, they think i t unlikely that Japan w i l l provide the necessary r e c i p r o c i t y . Only by Japan adhering to it's 'peace' Constitution, distancing i t s e l f from the U.S., in both i t s perception of the Soviet Union and in i t s m i l i t a r y / s t r a t e g i c plans, and in renouncing claims to the Kurile Islands, do the Soviets believe that relations can be substantially improved. Many within the leading groups in Japan may well hold the view that the Soviet m i l i t a r y build-up does not constitute a threat to Japan. However, the relevance of thi s view i s obviously discounted by the Soviets as they argue that pre v a i l i n g opinion within Japan's leading c i r c l e s holds that the Soviet Union i s the major, i f not the only, threat to Japan. The predominant Japanese view, in contrast to pr e v a i l i n g American opinion, sees m i l i t a r y c a p a b i l i t y and the intention to use i t as being of equal importance. As explained by Hisashi Owada and Michael Nacht: " . . . i n Japan there i s a marked tendency to stress the d i s t i n c t i o n between the physical c a p a b i l i t i e s and the intentions to use them. Threat is perceived to exist only when these two elements of corpus and animus are present." 8 8 U n t i l the late 1970s, the Japanese Government had sought to Hisashi Owada and Michael Nacht, "Security Issues: A Broader Framework" in Program on U.S.-Japan Relations (Cambridge, Mass.: 1981) p.27 43 follow what has been termed an 'omnidirectional' policy of fri e n d l y relations with a l l n a t i o n s . 8 9 So long as the overall p o l i t i c a l climate between Washington and Moscow did not involve too much confrontation, Japan believed that i t could pursue i t s interests, that i s primarily economic, with the Soviet Union without going against the policy objectives of the United States. For example, while the 1976 Defense White Paper described the Soviet Union as a 'potential threat', Japan could point out that there were other strategic considerations which had the ef f e c t of l i m i t i n g the f u l l impact of the Soviet m i l i t a r y build-up. As two commentators point out, the Soviet l i m i t a t i o n s include the g e o p o l i t i c a l position of the USSR, the climatic conditions of the USSR t e r r i t o r y found within the region, and the three strategic 'Japanese controlled' s t r a i t s . 9 0 Prevailing opinion in Japan appears to view the Soviet m i l i t a r y build-up with some concern, but does not perceive i t as being nearly so menacing as the orthodox American view. This l a t t e r view appears to be much more prepared than the Japanese to translate Soviet m i l i t a r y power into p o l i t i c a l leverage. Hiroshi Kimura, an adviser to the Japanese Government, is representative of the Japanese view. Kimura considers that the Soviets have several d i s t i n c t p o l i t i c a l objectives in Northeast Asia,including the most obvious one of attempting to weaken the 8 9 John K. Emmerson, "Security and Energy in Northeast Asia" in Korean Journal of International Studies Vol.13 No.2 (Summer 1983) p.227 at 236-7 9 0 R.B. Byers and Stanley C.M. Ing, "Sharing the Burden on the Far Side of the A l l i a n c e " in Journal of International A f f a i r s Vol.37 No.1 p.163 at 166 44 anti-Soviet a l l i a n c e system led by the U.S. 9 1 However, Kimura i s eager to point out that the Soviets have been unable to turn their growing m i l i t a r y power to p o l i t i c a l advantage in the region, and warns against either the Japanese or the Soviets overestimating the importance of the accumulation of m i l i t a r y power.9 2 The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 coupled with the intimidation of Poland of 1980 and increased Soviet force levels in East Asia had, according to one Japanese professor, "a remarkable influence on the Japanese people as a whole, leading to an open discussion of the Soviet t h r e a t " . 9 3 This view i s echoed, though not so strongly, by Professors Lee and Sato, when they refer to a 'changed att i t u d e ' toward defence in Japan, 'greater realism' in security discussions within Japan, and the adoption of a more pragmatic approach to Japan's security by the opposition and communist p a r t i e s . 9 4 While Japanese opinion, in general, i s prepared to acknowledge the p o l i t i c a l and m i l i t a r y nature of the Soviet m i l i t a r y build-up in the area around Japan and along the sea lanes of communication, th i s i s not perceived as a d i r e c t m i l i t a r y t h r e a t . 9 5 Yukio Satoh, a Japanese foreign service 9 1 Hiroshi Kimura, Soviet P o l i c i e s in the Asian P a c i f i c Region: A  Japanese Assessment Seminar presentation (Makaha, Hawaii, May 1984) pp.8-9 9 2 i b i d , p.26 9 3 Shinkichi Eto, "Japanese Perceptions of National Threats" in Charles E. Morrison (ed.), o p . c i t . p.53 at 54 9 4 Chae-Jin Lee and Hideo Sato, U.S. Policy Toward Japan and  Korea (New York: 1982) p.131 9 5 Hiroshi Kimura, op.cit. p.24 45 o f f i c e r , endorses t h i s opinion and argues that the build-up of the Soviets' m i l i t a r y forces does not mean that an attack on Japan i s imminent. In his view, "the question of whether the Soviet Union w i l l attempt a dire c t armed attack needs to be considered in a much wider context than that of the narrow m i l i t a r y balance around Japan." 9 6 It should be noted that a body of opinion exists in Japan which argues that there i s no r e a l i s t i c m i l i t a r y threat to Japan from the Soviet Union and that no serious c o n f l i c t exists between the two countries which would make an armed Soviet attack even remotely p o s s i b l e . 9 7 This argument of the 'unarmed n e u t r a l i s t s ' finds an opposing view in arguments proposed by such persons as former Director-General of the Japan Defense Agency, Makoto Momoi. Momoi argues that the Soviet m i l i t a r y build-up in Northeast Asia does constitute a threat to Japan and says that "the Soviet Union hopes to discourage Japan from improving i t s defense c a p a b i l i t i e s through m i l i t a r y i n t i m i d a t i o n . " 9 8 Japanese commentators agree that there has been a s h i f t in the Japanese defence debate in recent years. This s h i f t has resulted in a change in emphasis on how the Soviets are viewed 9 6 Yukio Satoh, "The Evolution of Japanese Security Policy" in Adelphi Papers No.178 (Autumn 1982) p.10 9 7 Mike M. Mochizuki, "Japan's Search for Strategy," International Security Vol. 8. No. 3 (Winter 1983-84) p.152 at 163 Mochizuki refers to this group as the 'unarmed n e u t r a l i s t s ' . 9 8 Makoto Momoi, "Strategic Thinking in Japan in the 1970s and 1980s" in Robert O'Neill and D.M. Horner (eds.), New Directions  in Strategic Thinking (London: 1981) p.169 at 176 4 6 and i n c l u d e s the a t t a c h i n g of g r e a t e r s i g n i f i c a n c e t o the growth of i t s r e g i o n a l m i l i t a r y power. No l o n g e r i s i t s u f f i c i e n t f o r Japanese commentators merely t o d i s m i s s the S o v i e t p r e s e n c e . A s i z a b l e p r o p o r t i o n of Japanese o p i n i o n now b e l i e v e s t h a t the p o t e n t i a l impact of the enhanced S o v i e t m i l i t a r y p r e s e n c e must be taken i n t o account and Japan must adopt an a c t i v e p o s t u r e i n r e p l y . The debate c o n t i n u e s over e x a c t l y what t h a t p o s t u r e s h o u l d be. I t has become one c h i e f l y between two groups, c l a s s i f i e d as the ' m i l i t a r y r e a l i s t s ' and the ' p o l i t i c a l r e a l i s t s ' . Both groups c o n t a i n i n f l u e n t i a l members, they both endorse the need f o r some response t o the S o v i e t presence and b e l i e v e i n the maintenance of the U.S.-Japan s e c u r i t y arrangements. However, t h a t i s where t h e i r s i m i l a r i t y ends and t h e i r d i f f e r e n c e s b e g i n . In terms of p e r c e p t i o n , the ' m i l i t a r y r e a l i s t s ' emphasise c a p a b i l i t i e s over i n t e n t i o n and view the S o v i e t m i l i t a r y b u i l d -up as p a r t of a g l o b a l and r e g i o n a l t h r e a t t o Japan. T h i s group, which i n c l u d e s Makoto M o m o i , " H i s a h i k o O k a z a k i , 1 0 0 of the Japanese F o r e i g n M i n i s t r y and A d m i r a l N a o t o s h i S a k o n j o , 1 0 1 view b o t h the S o v i e t m i l i t a r y b u i l d - u p and t h e i r propaganda campaigns as t h r e a t e n i n g and c a l l f o r a j o i n t d e f e n c e s t r a t e g y w i t h the U n i t e d S t a t e s . 9 9 Makoto Momoi, "Are There Any A l t e r n a t i v e S t r a t e g i e s f o r the Defense of Japan?" i n F r a n k l i n B. W e i n s t e i n ( e d . ) , U.S.-Japan  R e l a t i o n s and the S e c u r i t y of E a s t A s i a : The Next Decade ( B o u l d e r , C o l o r a d o : 1978) p.71 1 0 0 H i s a h i k o O k a z a k i , "Japanese S e c u r i t y P o l i c y : A Time f o r S t r a t e g y " i n I n t e r n a t i o n a l S e c u r i t y V o l . 7 No.2 ( F a l l 1982) p.188 1 0 1 N a o t o s h i S a k o n j o , " S e c u r i t y i n N o r t h e a s t A s i a " i n J o u r n a l of  N o r t h e a s t A s i a n S t u d i e s V o l . 2 No.3 (September 1983) p.93 47 The ' p o l i t i c a l r e a l i s t s ' have a longer history than the 'military r e a l i s t s ' and represent that opinion which is currently holding sway in Japan. Members of th i s group emphasise the l i m i t a t i o n s of Soviet m i l i t a r y power and refer to the fact that as a land-based empire, the Soviet Union is both 'defensive' and 'i n t e r n a l l y v u l n e r a b l e ' . 1 0 2 This group, which includes prominent scholars and government advisers such as Mike Mochizuki, Yukio Satoh, Hisashi Owada, Masatake Kosaka, Yonosuke Nagai, and Hiroshi Kimura, i s primarily concerned with the p o l i t i c a l and domestic implications of Japan's security p o l i c y . 1 0 3 While the Soviet m i l i t a r y build-up i s seen as being capable of constituting a threat, they argue that t h i s threat must be seen in p o l i t i c a l rather than m i l i t a r y terms. Generally speaking, they believe that the Soviet Union has the potential to take advantage of internal upheaval as well as regional c o n f l i c t and i n s t a b i l i t y in the Third World. E. AN ASSESSMENT The differences in perception between the United States and Japan are not simply the differences between the U.S. and the ' p o l i t i c a l r e a l i s t s ' . While the 'military r e a l i s t s ' lay greater emphasis on U.S.-Japan defence cooperation and are closer to the 1 0 2 Yonosuke Nagai, "Beyond Burden-sharing" in Program on U.S.- Japan Relations (Cambridge, Mass.: 1983) p.17 1 0 3 Mike Mochizuki, op.cit., Yukio Satoh, op.cit., Hisashi Owada, "Japanese Perceptions of the U.S.-Japan Relationship" in Program  on U.S.-Japan Relations (1980-81), and Masataka Kosaka, "Japan's Role in the World: A Prospect for a Lightly Armed Economic Giant" (1984). 4 8 American view in seeing the Soviet threat as a m i l i t a r y one which must be countered by m i l i t a r y means, they are not unaware of Japan's own g e o p o l i t i c a l vulnerabilities.They, l i k e the ' p o l i t i c a l r e a l i s t s ' , do not view U.S.-Soviet r e l a t i o n s in zero-sum terms and see no advantage to be gained from unnecessarily antagonizing the Soviet Union. The ' p o l i t i c a l r e a l i s t s ' , whose views are generally endorsed by the Japanese government, stress c e r t a i n c u l t u r a l and h i s t o r i c a l as well as p o l i t i c a l factors which have a key role in designing a Japanese view of the Soviet m i l i t a r y build-up. This perspective i s regionally based and addresses Japan's economic and security interests in Northeast Asia, which includes accommodating the Soviet Union as an Asian power, also with interests in the area. As a global economic power, and one c h i e f l y dependent on energy and other resource imports, i t i s keenly aware of the potential p o l i t i c a l threat that i s posed through the Soviet c a p a b i l i t y to i n t e r d i c t i t s sea lanes of communication. Both of the predominant Japanese views of the Soviet m i l i t a r y build-up are faulty. The m i l i t a r y r e a l i s t s tend to equate Soviet m i l i t a r y power with a threat to Japan's inter e s t s , in similar tone to the prev a i l i n g American opinion. They unwisely believe that simply by Japan increasing i t s defence forces, the American commitment to Japan and to Northeast Asia w i l l be e f f e c t i v e l y maintained. On the other hand, the p o l i t i c a l r e a l i s t s have f a i t h in the potency of Japan's economic power and discount the e f f e c t of the 49 S o v i e t Union's m i l i t a r y b u i l d - u p . They have yet to adequately face the f a c t that m i l i t a r y power has the inherent c a p a b i l i t y to i n f l u e n c e , i f not i n t i m i d a t e . T h e i r optimism i s unwisely extended to cover the c o n t i n u a t i o n of American defence e f f o r t s on t h e i r present l e v e l and assume that American c a l l s f o r i n c r e a s e d Japanese c o n t r i b u t i o n s need not be f u l l y heeded. In the l i g h t of the S o v i e t view of Japan, the p o l i t i c a l r e a l i s t s should show a l i t t l e more concern f o r the p o s s i b l e e f f e c t s of S o v i e t m i l i t a r y power i n t h e i r r e g i o n . I f the two dominant Japanese a t t i t u d e s are based on d o u b t f u l premises as to the w i l l and c a p a b i l i t y of the U n i t e d S t a t e s and the S o v i e t Union, then l i k e w i s e there are problems with the p r e v a i l i n g American p e r c e p t i o n of the S o v i e t t h r e a t . There i s undoubted evidence that the S o v i e t Union has deployed a s u b s t a n t i a l number of i t s m i l i t a r y f o r c e s to the East A s i a n r e g i o n . With the i n c r e a s e i n numbers has gone a q u a l i t a t i v e improvement of i t s f o r c e s which together have made f o r the more e f f i c i e n t and e f f e c t i v e p r o j e c t i o n of i t s power i n t o the r e g i o n . P r e v a i l i n g American o p i n i o n tends to be p e s s i m i s t i c about the o v e r a l l f o r c e trends i n the r e g i o n and b e l i e v e s the S o v i e t f o r c e improvements have upset the r e g i o n a l balance of power. The Americans emphasise the S o v i e t Union's m i l i t a r y power and ignore i t s r e g i o n a l p o l i t i c a l weakness. They are r e l u c t a n t to admit the magnitude of the S o v i e t s ' f a i l u r e to persuade, or even i n t i m i d a t e , Japan i n t o r e l e a s i n g i t s e l f from i t s c l o s e r e l a t i o n s h i p with the U.S. For the Americans, the presumption 5 0 i s that the Soviet m i l i t a r y build-up in Northeast Asia must constitute a threat to American and a l l i e d i n terests. Likewise, they presume that America's a l l i e s see the build-up in i d e n t i c a l terms and w i l l be prepared to join the U.S. in countering t h i s threat. The American perception of the Soviet threat i s primarily a global one and i s coloured by the superpower r i v a l r y between the two nations. This view of the Soviet Union as a threatening and opportunistic power which seeks to use i t s m i l i t a r y power to d e s t a b i l i s e and intimidate is encouraged by the American armed services. Commanding an important position in the American national security apparatus, the armed services have a vested interest in promoting the idea of an external threat which must be contained, i f not eliminated. The p e r s i s t i n g r i v a l r y between the services, and e s p e c i a l l y between the navy and the a i r force, has i n t e n s i f i e d moves for an American m i l i t a r y build-up to combat the Soviets. Power, be i t m i l i t a r y , p o l i t i c a l or economic, can be accurately measured only in r e l a t i v e terms. The Americans conveniently ignore their own q u a l i t a t i v e improvements which have been introduced into the Northeast Asian threatre, and re,fer to the Soviet m i l i t a r y build-up as though i t has occurred in a p o l i t i c a l and strategic vacuum. American forces-in-place in Northeast Asia, i t s important regional a l l i e s such as Japan, the p o l i t i c a l l y important Sino-Soviet r i v a l r y as well as the Soviets' own l o g i s t i c a l l i m i t a t i o n s and p o l i t i c a l ineptitude within the region, must a l l be taken into account. 51 The p e r c e p t i o n of the S o v i e t Union i n N o r t h e a s t A s i a by Japan's l e a d i n g groups i s , on the o t h e r hand, too o p t i m i s t i c and n a i v e . Given t h e i r p r o f e s s e d i n c l i n a t i o n t o c o n s i d e r b oth c a p a b i l i t y and i n t e n t i o n when a s s e s s i n g whether a t h r e a t e x i s t s t o Japan's s e c u r i t y , t h e s e groups have s i m u l t a n e o u s l y downplayed the o b v i o u s b u i l d - u p i n S o v i e t m i l i t a r y power and e x a g g e r a t e d the importance of S o v i e t s t a t e m e n t s t h a t t h i s b u i l d - u p i s p u r e l y d e f e n s i v e . The Japanese a r e a l s o unduly o p t i m i s t i c about America's o v e r r i d i n g commitment t o Japan's d e f e n c e . The l e a d i n g groups i n Japan e x h i b i t i n s u f f i c i e n t awareness of the r e c e n t l y changed American a t t i t u d e s as t o the r o l e of i t s a l l i e s . The Reagan A d m i n i s t r a t i o n ' s a l l o t m e n t of s p e c i f i c m i s s i o n s t o Japan's defence f o r c e i s i n d i c a t i v e of t h i s change of a t t i t u d e . Japan must r e c o g n i z e t h i s new a t t i t u d e and be p r e p a r e d t o a d j u s t i t s view of the e x t e r n a l environment a c c o r d i n g l y . The ' t h r e a t ' p e r c e p t i o n s of b oth America's and Japan's l e a d i n g groups are d e f e c t i v e . The Japanese base t h e i r p e r c e p t i o n on a b e l - i e f system which n a i v e l y p r e s c r i b e s t h a t so l o n g as Japan i s f r i e n d l y t o a l l n a t i o n s , they w i l l each r e c i p r o c a t e . T h i s view i s , however, b e i n g g r a d u a l l y s u r p l a n t e d by a more r e a l i s t i c , l e s s o p t i m i s t i c view. The A m e r icans, on the o t h e r hand, e x a g g e r a t e S o v i e t m i l i t a r y power and a s c r i b e the most s i n i s t e r of m o t i v e s t o the S o v i e t Union i n N o r t h e a s t A s i a , as e l s e w h e r e . They a r e , however, i n c o n s i s t e n t i n t h a t w h i l e they r e f e r t o the q u a l i t a t i v e s u p e r i o r i t y of American f o r c e s , they r e f u s e t o admit t h a t these c o u l d p r o v i d e an e f f e c t i v e 52 counterweight to the Soviet m i l i t a r y forces in the region. Japanese m i l i t a r y forces are not inconsiderable, but the Americans likewise, do not place these on to the regional power scale. Evidence of a Soviet intention to harm American and a l l i e d interests in Northeast Asia is at best scanty. 1 0'' The Americans, who derive intention d i r e c t l y from Soviet m i l i t a r y c a p a b i l i t y and the Japanese who separate the two features, both f a i l to present a properly balanced view of the Soviet Union's present and potential impact upon the region. A more r e a l i s t i c assessment would seek to discover the r e l a t i v e c a p a b i l i t i e s of the Soviet and American m i l i t a r y forces in Northeast Asia and then add to the scales any other committed forces. Intention should neither be derived solely from nor be divorced from the Soviet Union's r e l a t i v e m i l i t a r y c a p a b i l i t y . Evidence of the Soviets's intention should be the product of a r e a l i s t i c assessment of Soviet c a p a b i l i t y in and statements about Northeast Asia. The Americans and Japanese have d i f f e r e n t b e l i e f systems which shape t h e i r perceptions of the outside world. Their countries have d i f f e r e n t g e o p o l i t i c a l positions and d i f f e r e n t h i s t o r i c a l and c u l t u r a l backgrounds. These aff e c t their respective views of the international environment and of the role that each w i l l seek to play in i t . If Japan i s to perform " With respect to Japanese inter e s t s , the Soviet occupation and p a r t i a l m i l i t a r i s a t i o n of the K u r i l e Islands would appear as the only probable evidence of such intention. 53 a role within an American strategic policy in Northeast Asia, then the differences in their perceptions of the Soviet Union's m i l i t a r y build-up must be noted along with an examination of various Japanese views of i t s security role in the region. It i s to t h i s examination that we now turn. 54 I I I . THE JAPANESE SECURITY POLICY DEBATE Japan undoubtedly has a part to play in ensuring the continued s t a b i l i t y and security of Northeast Asia. Its significance in the region is a d i r e c t r e f l e c t i o n of i t s global as well as regional economic power. This great economic power has not, however, been translated into m i l i t a r y power and despite a sizable Self-Defense Force, Japan remains t i e d to a low security posture, relying more on the deterrence provided by United States forces than on the defense value of i t s own forces. The 1970s and the early 1980s have witnessed in Japan a number of changes in the attitudes of both the leading groups and the general public. These changes have largely been in response to a number of external 'shocks' and c r i s e s , 1 0 5 and have i n t e n s i f i e d the Japanese debate over i t s security role. This chapter w i l l examine the contemporary debate in Japan by analyzing four interlocking issues: Japanese views of the U.S.-Japan Mutual Cooperation and Security Treaty; Japanese reactions to U.S. c a l l s for a Japanese defence build-up; Japanese views of 'security'; and Japanese views of the importance of the internal constraints upon such a build-up. The chapter w i l l also b r i e f l y discuss various views of Japan's future international role. Preliminary to examining the debate, i t i s necessary to 105 p o r example, the Nixon 'shocks' of 1971, the 1973 o i l c r i s i s , and the Carter proposal to withdraw troops from South Korea. 55 b r i e f l y analyze the nature of the Japan-U.S. Mutual Cooperation and Security Treaty and the defence contributions made by each country. A. THE UNITED STATES-JAPAN TREATY After the i n i t i a l postwar occupation period, which included U.S. e f f o r t s , from 1948 onwards, to r e m i l i t a r i z e Japan, Japanese Prime Minister Yoshida and U.S.President Truman signed a peace treaty in 1950. This treaty granted the U.S. the right to retain i t s armed forces and m i l i t a r y bases in and about Japan. The U.S. assumed, under the treaty, a de facto r e s p o n s i b i l i t y to protect Japan against external armed attack. A r t i c l e 1 of the Treaty gave U.S.-based forces an extensive b r i e f . It stated, inter a l i a : "...Such [U.S. land, a i r and sea forces] may be u t i l i z e d to contribute to the maintenance of international peace and security in the Far East and to the security of Japan against armed attack from without..." 1 0 6 Japan gained her independence in 1952, but coinciding as i t did with the Korean War and the U.S. adoption of a containment policy towards communist movements in Asia, the vestiges of the patron-client relationship persisted. Japan remained a u n i l a t e r a l and unconditional dependant of U.S. m i l i t a r y protection. The existence of American forces and f a c i l i t i e s upon Japanese s o i l i s arguably evidence of Japan's subservient 1 0 6 Quoted from Chae-Jin Lee and Hideo Sato, op. c i t . p. 1.8 56 r o l e . January 1960 saw the revision of the 1952 Treaty and the signing of the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security between the two countries. This Treaty, while quite overtly unequal in the r e s p o n s i b i l i e s i t delegated, did produce one notable success for Japanese Prime Minister Nobusuke K i s h i : i t required American-Japanese consultation on the deployment of U.S. forces and equipment into J a p a n . 1 0 7 The revised treaty of i960 was both a 'stepping stone' on the path to a true a l l i a n c e as well as a device to i n s t i t u t i o n a l i z e the p r o t e c t o r - c l i e n t relationship which had existed since the Second World War. While the new treaty better r e f l e c t e d , in T.B.Millar's words, "the formal p o l i t i c a l equality of the two s t a t e s , " 1 0 8 i t was not a mutual security agreement, as that term i s normally understood. A r t i c l e V commits the U.S. to defend Japan but Japan does not have a corresponding treaty obligation to defend the U.S. 1 0 9 The p o l i t i c a l price exacted from Japan for American extended deterrence i s that Japan must lend consistent support to U.S. p o l i c i e s and actions so that the U.S. security commitment w i l l retain i t s v i a b i l i t y . 1 1 0 While the treaty spelled out f a i r l y c l e a r l y what was expected of the U.S., i t l e f t i t open as to how Japan would 1 0 7 Mike M. Mochizuki, op.c i t . p.3 1 0 8 T.B. M i l l a r , "Alliances in the 1970s and 1980s" in Robert O'Neill and D.M. Horner (eds.), op.cit. p.122 1 0 9 Yukio Satoh, op.cit. p.25 1 1 0 Paul F. Langer, "Changing Japanese Security Perspectives" in Richard H. Solomon (ed.), Asian Security in the 1980s (Cambridge, Mass.: 1979) p.72 57 contribute. Perhaps t h i s was because of Japan's then limited m i l i t a r y and economic c a p a c i t y . l t has remained, in thi s form, as the legal basis for the two countries' contributions to Japan's defence. Let us now examine what in fact these m i l i t a r y and related contributions have been. The U.S. forces based on or near Japan's home islands constitute the mainstay of the forces which are designed to protect Japan. These forces, be they ground combat, naval or a i r , do in fact serve two purposes: not only are they so stationed to as s i s t Japan defend i t s own t e r r i t o r y but they are the c r u c i a l element of America's forward defence strategy in the East Asian r e g i o n . 1 1 1 U.S. Senator John Glenn believes that these American forces f u l f i l the three functions of providing a buffer against North Korean adventurism; protecting America's Southeast Asian friends and a l l i e s ; as well as giving Japan the benefit of America's extended nuclear d e t e r r e n c e . 1 1 2 At the beginning of the 1980s, U.S. troops stationed in Japan t o t a l l e d 46,000 and were d i s t r i b u t e d at 118 f a c i l i t i e s and b a s e s . 1 1 3 Primarily, these forces come under the command of the Air Force and the Navy. The 5th A i r Force Command maintains one wing in Okinawa and and has deployed E-3A airborne early warning and control a i r c r a f t . The 3rd Marine Division and 1st Marine Air Wing in Okinawa and Iwakuni have combat- ready forces while 1 1 1 Mike M. Mochizuki and Michael Nacht, "Modes of Defense Cooperation" in Program on U.S.-Japan Relations Annual Summaries 1980-81 Cambridge, Mass.: 1981)p.130. 1 1 2 John Glenn, op.cit. p.27 1 1 3 This compares with 260,000 U.S. troops in Japan in 1952. 58 at the Misawa Air Force base, there are a i r c r a f t with antisubmarine and in t e l l i g e n c e c a p a b i l i t i e s . The U.S. also has some 40 naval f a c i l i t i e s in Japan including the s i g n i f i c a n t Yokosuka complex which i s home to the U.S. a i r c r a f t c a r r i e r Midway. 1 1• The bases and f a c i l i t i e s are not only the most v i s i b l e but also the most s i g n i f i c a n t aspect of the U.S.-Japan security arrangements. They provide concrete evidence of the U.S.'s commitment to Japan's defence and, for the U.S., they are important in that they perform l o g i s t i c s and communications functions for America's forward-deployed forces in the whole East Asian- P a c i f i c region. According to both American and Japanese commentators, Japan plays an important f a c i l i t a t i n g role with respect to the Japan-based U.S. forces: Japan spends over $1 b i l l i o n annually in support of the U.S. forces, contributing to the housing and f a c i l i t i e s as well as to labor costs involved in maintaining the b a s e s . 1 1 5 A Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) for cost-sharing between the U.S. and Japan i s in e f f e c t . While arguments have been presented by some Japanese to the effect that the Agreement's provisions have been interpreted in a way most favourable to the U.S., the operative A r t i c l e , A r t i c l e XXIV, places l i m i t s on what Japan i s expected to contribute but not on 1 1 ' Alvin C o t t r e l l and Thomas Moorer, U.S. Overseas Bases: Problems of Projecting American M i l i t a r y Power Abroad (Beverly H i l l s : 1977) p.45 1 1 5 Yukio Satoh, op.cit. p.27 and William H. Ginn J r . , Testimony before the U.S.Congress. House Foreign A f f a i r s subcommittee on Asian and P a c i f i c A f f a i r s , March 17, 1982 59 the share expected from the U.S. However, the operation of the Agreement has, so Yukio Satoh has argued, been most favourable to the U.S. for i t requires Japan to furnish "without cost to the U.S." a l l f a c i l i t i e s and areas to be used by the U.S. f o r c e s . 1 1 6 B. THE JAPANESE SELF-DEFENSE FORCE Japan makes direct contributions to i t s own defence through the operation of i t s Self-Defense F o r c e s . 1 1 7 The nature and c a p a b i l i t i e s of thi s Force have remained a subject of some contention partly because of a lack of a clear c o n s t i t u t i o n a l d e f i n i t i o n of what was meant by "self-defense", and par t l y because the issue of defence and the use of m i l i t a r y force i s very much an issue of domestic public debate. At issue today with respect to t h i s l i m i t e d self defence e f f o r t i s not so much i t s acceptance by the Japanese people as the character of and mission or missions to be assigned to t h i s Force. As Paul Langer points out, the pr o h i b i t i o n against the development of 'war poten t i a l ' i s so vague that there i s ample scope for divergent interpretations over what i s 'defensive' as opposed to ' o f f e n s i v e ' . 1 1 8 Despite the apparent c o n s t i t u t i o n a l r e s t r i c t i o n s and i t s limited defence budget, Japan has come to possess one of the larger m i l i t a r y forces in the world, having 1 1 6 Yukio Satoh, op.cit. p.27 1 1 7 These forces have existed since 1954 and grew out of the Police Reserve Forces which U.S. General MacArthur established at the time of the outbreak of the Korean War.. 1 1 8 Paul F. Langer, op.cit. p.72 6 0 approximately a quarter of a m i l l i o n men in u n i f o r m . 1 1 9 According to one Japanese commentator, the a i r , maritime and ground forces of the Japanese are capable of meeting what the 1976 Japanese National Defense Program Outline c a l l e d "limited and small-scale d i r e c t aggression," but are not well coordinated to integrate their d i f f e r i n g strategic emphases. 1 2 0 For example, while the Air Self-Defense Force i s able to cope well with Soviet m i l i t a r y a i r c r a f t encroaching on Japanese a i r space and the Maritime Self-Defense Force covers d a i l y the peripheral sea area and the important s t r a i t s to the Sea of Japan, they have yet to find a way of working together. By the 1980s, a near universal acceptance had developed in Japan of the need for the Self-Defense Force (SDF). 1 2 1 However, a question remains as to the SDF's geographic scope and c a p a b i l i t i e s . The success of Japanese governments in leading public opinion into accepting the expansion of these forces has been conditional upon an acknowledgment that i t i s only a defensive force and does not contravene the prohibition against the development of 'war p o t e n t i a l ' . In the words of K e i i c h i Ito, former Secretary-General of Japan's National Defense Counc i 1 : "...[the] basic defense position...places primary 1 1 9 The Japanese defence budget i s almost $12 b i l l i o n , making i t the t h i r d largest among the non-nuclear powers: William Watts, The United States and Japan : A Troubled Partnership (Cambridge, Mass.: 1984) p.61 1 2 0 Masashi Nishihara, "Expanding Japan's Credible Defense Role" in International Security Vol.8 No.3 (Winter 1983-84) p.180 at 187. 1 2 1 A 1981 public opinion p o l l found 77% in favour of the SDF but only 24% in favour of revising the Constitution to make i t more offensive oriented. 61 emphasis on a defense posture of 'exclusively defensive defense'. Although such a posture may not be advantageous from a m i l i t a r y standpoint, i t i s considered as the solely permissible defense structure within the framework of the minimum necessary defense c a p a b i l i t y . " 1 2 2 The Japanese public's ambivalence over national security and the strength of p a c i f i s t sentiment in the country means that government leaders must tread very warily in deciding upon the nature and scope of the SDF*s missions. Despite major changes in Japan's international environment in the 1970s, commentators refer to a lack of public support for the adoption of a regional m i l i t a r y role for the SDF. 1 2 3 These changes did, however, have an impact upon the Japanese security policy debate and should be b r i e f l y considered as they help to explain why th i s debate has 'moved ground' in recent years. C. CHANGES TO JAPAN'S EXTERNAL ENVIRONMENT 1971 was a benchmark year in terms of Japanese perceptions of U.S. policy towards the Northeast Asian region. In July of that year, U.S. President Nixon 'shocked' Japan by announcing, without any pr i o r consultation, his intention to v i s i t China. One month l a t e r , Nixon suspended the convertabi1ity of the U.S. dol l a r bringing with i t the imposition of a 10% surtax on imports into the U.S. and thereby forcing Japan to revalue i t s 2 K e i i c h i Ito, "Japan's Defense Policy" in Asia P a c i f i c  Community ( F a l l 1980) p.1 at 12 3 Paul F. Langer, op.cit. p.72 * Yuan-li Wu, U.S. Policy and Strategic Interests in the  Western P a c i f i c (New York: 1975) p.93 62 currency upward. 1 2" These sudden i n i t i a t i v e s had a profound effect upon Japan, and as put by Fred Greene: "...[they] i n t e n s i f i e d the uncertainty in Japan about the d u r a b i l i t y of U.S. concern for Asia, the constancy and continuity of U.S. po l i c y , and the degree to which the United States, despite i t s verbal reassurances, actually values Japan." 1 2 5 These shocks, coming as they did close on the heels of American force reductions in Asia in 1970-71, forced Japan to begin a process of realignment in i t s relations with Moscow, Washington and Peking. Confusion about the 'common-enemy thesis' arose in Japanese thinking, and i t became clear to Japan that i t would no longer be able to take American patronage for granted. 1 2 6 As the 1970s progressed, Japan found i t s e l f confronted with even more challenges. The 1973 o i l c r i s i s underlined Japan's economic v u l n e r a b i l i t y and dependence upon o i l from unstable regions of the w o r l d . 1 2 7 As well, the f a l l of South Vietnam and the withdrawal of American troops (and the Carter Administration announcement of the withdrawal of American ground combat forces from South Korea) aroused misgivings about the r e l i a b i l i t y of the American commitment. From another perspective, Japan's economic success combined with China's new support for Japan's SDF and the growing sense 1 2 5 Fred Greene, Stresses in U.S.-Japanese Security Relations (Washington, D.C: 1 975) p. 1 1 1 2 6 Yukio Satoh, op.cit. p.4 1 2 7 As Fred Greene argues, Japan's economy r e l i e s on an international base that i t cannot co n t r o l : o p . c i t . p.14 63 in some i n f l u e n t i a l Japanese c i r c l e s , of a Soviet 'potential' threat a l l encouraged greater public support for the SDF. 1 2 8 With t h i s increased support appeared renewed demands from within Japan that more be done to protect the Japanese home islands and the immediately surrounding sea and a i r space. This perceived need for increased security was l a t e r reinforced by events which again accentuated the important l i n k for the Japanese between energy and security: the Iranian revolution and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979, and then l a t e r the Iran-Iraq war . Against the background of the Japan-U.S. Treaty and given the turbulent nature of the 1970s, an analysis of the Japanese security p o l i c y debate should begin with a discussion of various views of the Treaty and i t s security arrangements, as expressed by Japanese protagonists within the debate. D. JAPANESE VIEWS OF THE U.S.-JAPAN SECURITY RELATIONSHIP Categorizing scholars and commentators into 'schools' or 'camps' i s always a dangerous exercise, and i t i s no less so with respect to th i s Japanese debate. With the proviso that a writer's views may be accommodated in more than one camp, e f f o r t s w i l l be made to l i n k writers who express similar views and to draw the lines of difference when these are found to e x i s t . Predominant Japanese opinion seems to indicate that 8 John K. Emmerson, "Security and Energy in Northeast Asia" in Korean Journal of International Studies Vol.13 No.2 (Summer 1983) p.227 at 232 64 management of the Japan-U.S. a l l i a n c e must remain an important dimension of Japanese security policy in the 1980s. Any e f f o r t s to enhance Japan's international role would thus have to be made within the framework established by the Treaty. Yet, variations are found within t h i s perspective and an examination of these views of the U.S.-Japan security relationship w i l l follow. Those most in favour of retaining the Japan-U.S. relati o n s h i p in i t s present form and who see Japan adopting an expanded international role, primarily through the build-up of i t s m i l i t a r y forces, are the 'military r e a l i s t s ' . For example, Admiral Sakonjo argues that "...Japan i s not f u l l y responding to U.S. requests that Japan assume a suitable share of the defense burden in order to protect free nations against the Soviet t h r e a t . " 1 2 9 Sakonjo c a l l s on Japan to hold up i t s end of the a l l i a n c e and improve certain defects in i t s defence c a p a b i l i t y : in p a r t i c u l a r , i t s antisubmarine, a i r defence and l o g i s t i c a l support c a p a b i l i t i e s . 1 3 0 This view finds support from K e i i c h i Ito who argues that while the U.S.-Japan security system i s the core of Japan's defence, i t must possess s u f f i c i e n t m i l i t a r y strength to make the system function e f f e c t i v e l y . 1 3 1 Defense analyst Makoto Momoi, in dismissing the idea of an independent Japanese nuclear deterrent (for primarily geographical reasons) believes Japan has l i t t l e choice but to base i t s security on a variation of the 1 2 9 Naotoshi Sakonjo, op.cit. p.87 at 88 1 3 0 i b i d . p.96 1 3 1 K e i i c h i Ito, "Japan's Defense Concept and i t s 1981 Defense White Paper" in Asia P a c i f i c Community ( F a l l 1981) p.103 at 106 65 existing system and continue to rely heavily on the United S t a t e s . 1 3 2 Again, Momoi, l i k e the two previous writers, lays p a r t i c u l a r emphasis on how Japan can play a greater role simply by increasing i t s defence c a p a b i l i t i e s . Taketsugu Tsurutani, another m i l i t a r y r e a l i s t , agrees that Japan should expand i t s defence c a p a b i l i t y only within the context of the existing Japan-U.S. security arrangements. However, he does suggest that these arrangements be revised so as to ensure equity and r e c i p r o c i t y to accommodate Japan's enhanced c a p a b i l i t i e s . 1 3 3 In his view,these revisions must include integration of the Japanese and U.S. forces so as to involve the U.S. automatically in the defence of Japan. In seeking to strengthen Japan's defence posture within the framework of the existing Japan-U.S. security arrangements, the m i l i t a r y r e a l i s t s are joined by the predominant school of security thought in Japan: the ' p o l i t i c a l r e a l i s t s ' . Members of t h i s school profer general statements of support for the U.S.-Japan relationship and argue that not only does the 'all i a n c e ' form the basis of Japan's security but i t also s t a b i l i s e s Japan's position in the international a r e n a . 1 3 0 For the p o l i t i c a l r e a l i s t s , the issue i s one of managing the rela t i o n s h i p and to maintain the American security 1 3 2 Makoto Momoi, "Are There Any Alternative Strategies for the Defense of Japan" in Franklin D. Weinstein (ed.) o p . c i t . p.71 at 83 1 3 3 Taketsugu Tsurutani, Japanese Policy and East Asian Security (New York: 1981) p.145 1 3 4 Masataka Kosaka, "Japan's Role"; Mike M. Mochizuki, op.cit.; and Yoshio Okawara, "The Underlying Concept in Japan's Defense Policy" p.33, are representative of t h i s view. 66 guarantee, rather than simply one of c a l l i n g for the improvement of Japan's own defence e f f o r t s . They stress the importance of the Western a l l i a n c e 1 3 5 but at the same time, many of their number openly question the U.S. commitment. 1 3 6 However, for the p o l i t i c a l r e a l i s t s , the reduced American commitment i s seen not as the result of Japanese defence 'free-riding', but due to expanding American commitments elsewhere. Unlike the m i l i t a r y r e a l i s t s , the p o l i t i c a l r e a l i s t s believe that both the U.S. and Japan need to increase their c a p a b i l i t i e s , and in doing so, communicate and consult with each o t h e r . 1 3 7 The importance of increased communication so that each can understand the opportunities and constraints that each faces is endorsed by a number of American s c h o l a r s . 1 3 8 As the inheritors of the Yoshida Doctrine, there i s a tendency within the ranks of the p o l i t i c a l r e a l i s t s to maintain a low defence p r o f i l e and to stress the domestic implications of security p o l i c y . They are conscious of the strong p a c i f i s t sentiments within Japanese public opinion which view the Japan-U.S. a l l i a n c e as serving American global interests more than Japan's security. They consider that the basic domestic defence 1 3 5 Japanese t r i l a t e r a l i s t s , such as Nobuhiko Ushiba and Takakazu Kuriyama, are to be found within their ranks. 1 3 6 Masashi Nishihara, op.cit. p.180 at 182: The 1977 Japanese Defense White Paper openly expressed doubt about U.S. protection, endorsing this view. 1 3 7 Chae-Jin Lee and Hideo Sato, op.cit. p.145 1 3 8 For example, Robert A. Scalapino, op.cit. p.14; and Richard H. Solomon, "East Asia and the Great Power C o a l i t i o n s " in Foreign A f f a i r s Vol.60 No.3 (1981) p.708 67 consensus remains largely a matter of p o l i t i c a l compromise. 1 3 9 As to Japan's defence contributions to the a l l i a n c e , the p o l i t i c a l r e a l i s t s diverge from the m i l i t a r y r e a l i s t s by arguing that while the SDF should be improved q u a l i t a t i v e l y , 1 " 0 i t s force le v e l s as outlined in the National Defense Program Outline are appropriate for Japan's present purposes. They c a l l for a moderate defence build-up within the parameters established by the present Constitution. In their view, public opinion, while s h i f t i n g very much in favour of endorsing the current Japan-U.S. security arrangements, has not gone so far as to c a l l for an improvement in Japan's SDF that would give i t a deterrent c a p a b i l i t y . 1 * 1 The emphasis remains on the p o l i t i c a l implications of the security arrangements and on enhancing mutual p o l i t i c a l benefits rather than on simply increasing m i l i t a r y c a p a b i l i t i e s . They refer to the working out of common objectives with the U.S. taking into f u l l account the problem of domestic p o l i t i c a l adjustment. 1* 2 'Unarmed n e u t r a l i s t s ' , who constitute a minority view, seek an end to the Treaty and to the Japan-U.S. security arrangements. 1* 3 In ref e r r i n g to a global U.S. m i l i t a r y 1 3 9 Yonosuke Nagai, "Beyond Burden-sharing" in Annual Review Harvard Inst i t u t e 1982-83 (Cambridge, Mass.: 1983) p.19; Tadae Takubo, "Perceptions Gap Between Tokyo and Washington" in Asia P a c i f i c Community No.17 (Summer 1982) p. 19 1"° For example, by providing for an infrastructure which would allow rapid mobilization in times of emergency: Mike M. Mochizuki, op.c i t . p.161 1 f l 1 i b i d . p.162 1 4 2 Hisashi Owada, "Japanese Perceptions of the U.S.-Japan Relationship" in Program on U.S.-Japan Relations (Cambridge, Mass.: 1981) p.24 1 4 3 Examples of unarmed n e u t r a l i s t s are to be found in the opposition Japanese S o c i a l i s t Party and amongst scholars of international r e l a t i o n s . 68 strategy, adherents of t h i s view argue that policy r e s t r a i n t s on a defense build-up should not be relaxed and greater e f f o r t s should be made in the d i r e c t i o n of arms control and disarmament. 1" 4 The strength of the unarmed n e u t r a l i s t s would appear to be in their a b i l i t y to spearhead the p a c i f i s t sentiment that exists in a good percentage of the Japanese population. They have been not nearly so e f f e c t i v e in d i r e c t l y influencing government thinking. Another minority group i s the ' g a u l l i s t s ' who also wish to see a revocation of the Treaty, but for quite d i f f e r e n t reasons. Like the m i l i t a r y and p o l i t i c a l r e a l i s t s , the g a u l l i s t s i d e n t i f y what they see as a new sense of self-confidence amongst the Japanese and increasing nationalism in the country. However, rather than c a l l i n g for genuine m i l i t a r y or p o l i t i c a l consultation and cooperation with the Americans, the g a u l l i s t s doubt that the American commitment, i s worth pursuing. The g a u l l i s t s c a l l for the development of a m i l i t a r y force which would give Japan an independent c a p a b i l i t y for both power projection and deterrence. 1" 5 .Support for the g a u l l i s t s would undoubtedly be found amongst groups which Kenneth Pyle i d e n t i f i e s as those emphasizing Japan's uniqueness and the resurrection of t r a d i t i o n a l v a l u e s . 1 " 6 1"" Quoted in Mike M. Mochizuki, op.cit. p.165 1 * 5 An example of the g a u l l i s t view can be found in Kei Wakaizumi, "Passive Diplomacy Reconsidered" in Asia P a c i f i c Community (Winter 1978-79) p.41 1 " 6 Kenneth B. Pyle, "Changing Conceptions of Japan's International Role", Unpublished Seminar Paper (University of Washington, 1984) pp.10-12 69 While i t remains doubtful whether the g a u l l i s t s w i l l be able to channel Japanese d i s a f f e c t i o n with the U.S. security guarantee into an independent m i l i t a r y build-up, at least in the immediate term, there i s some f e r t i l e ground in the public mood: American c a l l s for a Japanese defence build-up may well combine with Japanese feelings of economic superiority to promote a movement for such a build-up. As well, those who c a l l for an independent Japanese foreign policy could find common ground with the g a u l l i s t s . 1 * 7 Should an external threat materialise, the g a u l l i s t s could prove to be a key r a l l y i n g point for any resultant s h i f t in public opinion. E. JAPANESE CONCEPTS OF SECURITY Integral to any discussion of Japan's security role must be an examination of what exactly the Japanese mean by 'security'. Just as we fin d obvious di v i s i o n s in Japan over how the Japan-U.S. Treaty and security arrangements are viewed, so too do divi s i o n s appear over th i s issue. 'Comprehensive security', with i t s emphasis on economics and non-military contributions, is supported by the p o l i t i c a l r e a l i s t s and remains predominant. The view of the m i l i t a r y r e a l i s t s , closer to the American view and emphasising m i l i t a r y security i s , however, gaining in support. The Yoshida Doctrine, which ref l e c t e d the f i r s t postwar Japanese Prime Minister's emphasis on economic growth and 7 Igarashi Takeshi, "Farewell to the Peace-loving State?" in Japan Echo Vol.X No.2 (1983)p.21 at 24 70 p o l i t i c a l p a s s i v i t y and which became the predominant view in Japan u n t i l the mid-1970s, produced a view of security quite d i f f e r e n t from that shared by other Western democracies. This view was more comprehensive and referred to economic and diplomatic as well as m i l i t a r y instruments of power. While this view underlay government po l i c y , i t was rarely a r t i c u l a t e d . One example was the commissioning by Prime Minister Ohira of a Report on Comprehensive National Security in the 1970s. This study, conducted by a group of o f f i c i a l s and academics concluded that the security of a nation involves much more than m i l i t a r y defence and that problems such as 'energy security', 'food security' and ' c r i s i s management systems' were also important. 1" 8 Adherents of the 'comprehensive security' view can be found predominantly within the ranks of the p o l i t i c a l r e a l i s t s . However, support for t h i s view can also be found within other groups. Yukio Satoh refers to t h i s concept of security as "a r e f l e c t i o n of the Japanese understanding that security requirements for Japan range broadly from the East-West m i l i t a r y balance to regional s t a b i l i t y in Asia and to international energy and food". 1* 9 The comprehensive security concept rests on the t r i a d of diplomacy, defence and economic assistance. The mixture of m i l i t a r y and nonmilitary i s viewed by some adherents as a necessary compromise between the need to have a substantial 8 The Comprehensive National Security Study Group, Report on  Comprehensive National Security (Tokyo: 1980) 9 Yukio Satoh, op.cit. p.7 71 defence c a p a b i l i t y and the need to acquiesce to co n s t i t u t i o n a l and domestic p o l i t i c a l constraints. Foreign economic assistance, for example, i s seen as a means of contributing to the economic and hence p o l i t i c a l s t a b i l i t y of Northeast Asia. Even m i l i t a r y r e a l i s t s such as former Director-General of Japan's National Defense Council, Takuya Kubo, have acknowledged i t s importance: "Security expenditures to be borne by Japan should not be limited to defense funds alone but should be considered as including funding for economic cooperation and technical development...stabi1ity in Asian nations i s based on internal peace, order and economic development, a major increase in Japanese economic assistance expenditures to these nations w i l l contribute to th e i r s t a b i l i t y and, in turn, to the s t a b i l i t y of the r e g i o n . " 1 5 0 One supporter of the comprehensive view of security, former Ambassador to the U.S., Nobuhiko Ushiba, has emphasised Japan's contribution to regional and global s t a b i l i t y through giving economic a i d . Writing in a T r i l a t e r a l Commission publication, Ushiba says that while Japan needs to do more in a l l a r e a s -economic, p o l i t i c a l and m i l i t a r y — i t s major share w i l l be economic, and other Western countries should be able to appreciate t h i s c o n t r i b u t i o n . 1 5 1 Masataka Kosaka, a p o l i t i c a l r e a l i s t , argues that the comprehensive security p o l i c y has arisen because power in the international system i s , i t s e l f , not based exclusively on 1 5 0 Takuya Kubo, "Security in Northeast Asia" in Richard H. Solomon (ed.), op.cit. p.93 at 107 1 5 1 Nobuhiko Ushiba, o p . c i t . p.5 72 m i l i t a r y c a p a b i l i t i e s . 1 5 2 However, Kosaka does acknowledge that the 'comprehensive security' view has attracted supporters amongst those who would increase not only Japan's economic aid but also i t s defence budget. 1 5 3 Other p o l i t i c a l r e a l i s t s such as Daniel Okimoto and Ambassador Yoshio Okawara argue that most Japanese believe that their security hinges more on economic relationships than on m i l i t a r y ones. 1 5" They further argue that Japan makes an appreciable contribution to international peace and security by means of i t s foreign economic a s s i s t a n c e . 1 5 5 Professors Lee and Sato see t h i s concept of security as a r e f l e c t i o n of domestic, and especially p o l i t i c a l , constraints upon the Japanese government to increase i t s defence spending 1 5 6 In their view, the concept thus represents more a p o l i t i c a l compromise than a determined economic p o l i c y . This view i s endorsed by two American commentators who see th i s concept as a mirror of the p o l i t i c a l r e a l i t y of what i s acceptable to the Japanese public. It provides the Japanese government with areas of a c t i v i t y (economic or diplomatic) where they can freely engage without either c o n s t i t u t i o n a l or p o l i t i c a l constraint or 1 5 2 Masataka Kosaka, op.cit. p.10 1 5 3 i b i d . pp.15-16 1 5 4 Daniel Okimoto, "Security P o l i c i e s in the U.S. and Japan: Ins t i t u t i o n s , Experts and Mutual Understanding" (1979) p.46 at 59 and Yoshio Okawara, "The Underlying Concept" (1981) p.33 1 5 5 O f f i c i a l Development Assistance from Japan more than doubled to $3.3 b i l l i o n in the 3 years to 1980: A Japanese Foreign Ministry o f f i c i a l , quoted in The New York Times June 30, 1981. 1 5 6 Chae-Jin Lee and Hideo Sato, op.cit. p.139 73 controversy. 1 5 7 Despite i t s p o l i t i c a l appeal, the 'comprehensive security' concept i s not viewed by a l l Japanese scholars and commentators as the most appropriate for the governing of Japan. Taketsugu Tsurutani rejects the notion of comprehensive security and argues that there can be no substitute for a security p o l i c y . In his view, Japan accepts that i t i s a major power and must accept the r e s p o n s i b i l i t y that goes with that. In doubting the American commitment, Tsurutani c a l l s for Japan to be able to defend i t s e l f m i l i t a r i l y . In his opinion, i t i s th i s which constitutes Japan's real s e c u r i t y . 1 5 8 Makoto Momoi, while less c r i t i c a l than Tsurutani of the American commitment, believes that Japan's m i l i t a r y c a p a b i l i t i e s are the most s i g n i f i c a n t aspect of i t s security e f f o r t s . Momoi refers to the m i l i t a r y and diplomatic means at Japan's disposal as being together the e f f e c t i v e recipe to prolong the 'holding time' u n t i l the U.S. can intervene to overcome an attack. However, his view of security c l e a r l y places the emphasis on the use of m i l i t a r y resources and accords an i n f e r i o r role to diplomacy to f o r e s t a l l an attack u n t i l certain inherent v u l n e r a b i l i t i e s can be overcome. 1 5 9 Another m i l i t a r y r e a l i s t , K e i i c h i Ito, argues that i t was only because defence issues became internal p o l i t i c a l problems, that the role of Japan's defence c a p a b i l i t y was deemphasized. 1 6 0 1 5 7 P h i l i p Trezise, "The Japan Relationship" in Asia P a c i f i c  Community No.8 (Spring 1980) p.1 at 10; John K. Emmerson, op.cit. p.227 at 235 1 5 8 Taketsugu Tsurutani, op.cit. p.184 1 5 9 Makoto Momoi, "Are There Any Alternative Strategies for the Defense of Japan" op.cit. p.91 1 6 0 K e i i c h i Ito, op.cit. p.113 74 By implication, Ito i s arguing that defence c a p a b i l i t y should be the most s i g n i f i c a n t ingredient of any Japanese recipe for security. He stresses the importance of defence awareness amongst the people and c a l l s for Japan to "assume a share of defense e f f o r t s appropriate to i t s s t r e n g t h . . " . 1 6 1 While the comprehensive concept of security remains the prevailing view in Japanese government c i r c l e s , there may well be a movement towards a more m i l i t a r y oriented view. The increasing influence of ' r e a l i s t s ' , and p a r t i c u l a r l y 'military r e a l i s t s ' may well r e f l e c t an increasing reliance on American concepts, including their concept of security which emphasises m i l i t a r y and strategic i s s u e s . 1 6 2 Current Prime Minister Yasuhiro Nakasone may well have recognized t h i s movement and he has already indicated that he i s prepared to reconsider the Yoshida Doctrine and to adopt a more active defence p o l i c y . Nakasone has recently referred to the need for Japan to alig n i t s security more c l o s e l y with that of the Western democracies. 1 6 3 Nakasone has also advocated a strengthening of Japan's own defence forces. At his f i r s t news conference, he c a l l e d upon Japan to defend "our own country with our own m i l i t a r y e f f o r t s , which have not been adequate." 1 6 4 Later statements by Nakasone such as his suggestion that Japan become 1 6 1 i b i d . p.114 1 6 2 Daniel Okimoto, op.cit. p.64 1 6 3 Shinichiro Asao, "Japan's Defense Policy" The New York Times February 29. 1984: Asao, Japan's Consul General in New York, refers to statements made by Nakasone at the 1983 Williamsburg economic summit. 1 6 4 Yonosuke Nagai, op.cit. p.17 75 "an unsinkable a i r c r a f t c a r r i e r " to combat Soviet backfire bombers, appear to confirm Nakasone's emphasis upon the m i l i t a r y as opposed to the nonmilitary contributions that Japan can make to global and regional security. Opponents of the comprehensive security concept believe they are in the ascendant. Not only do they have a receptive Prime Minister, but more importantly, public opinion has swung over in recent years in favour of a greater defence e f f o r t . The extent to which the comprehensive view w i l l be able to survive t h i s movement intact, i s hard to t e l l . What can be said, however, is that regardless of whether i t i s caused by an i n a b i l i t y of the Americans to appreciate Japanese economic or diplomatic contributions or a growing perception of Soviet 'potential' threat, opinion i s growing for a security concept which lays greater stress on m i l i t a r y contributions. F. JAPANESE DOMESTIC CONSTRAINTS An important and related issue in the Japanese security debate is the place that i s to be ascribed to the internal constraints upon the building-up of Japan's defence c a p a b i l i t i e s . These internal constraints, be they economic or p o l i t i c a l , continue to have an important influence upon Japanese security policy-making. Public opinion, i t s e l f a constraint, has moved, in recent years, in favour of greater defence e f f o r t s by Japan. However, th i s movement has been gradual and has not been without q u a l i f i c a t i o n . The p o l i t i c a l r e a l i s t s are the group who attach greatest importance to these domestic constraints. Professors Lee and 76 Sato express views t y p i c a l of this group when, in drawing out what they see as the " s i g n i f i c a n t differences between the defense consciousness of the public in Japan and the U.S.",they argue that the Japanese are less w i l l i n g to fight for their country and to pay more taxes for increased defence spending. 1 6 5 The devastating loss of World War II as well as postwar American protection conditioned the Japanese public to oppose increased defence spending. This has bred i n s u l a r i t y in Japanese society as well as emphasising the need for domestic harmony. Despite the fact that Japan has witnessed a more open and r e a l i s t i c discussion of security questions and growing support for i t s SDF, these factors remain s i g n i f i c a n t . 1 6 6 Public attitudes have indeed been changing, but there remains a core of pacifism in Japan which does not appear to have been seriously e r o d e d . 1 6 7 Even m i l i t a r y r e a l i s t K e i i c h i Ito i s prepared to acknowledge this a n t i m i l i t a r i s m . He states that " . . i t i s a fact that the Japanese people today dread the resurgence of Japan's mili t a r i s m even more than the foreigners did ,.." 1 6 8 According to another m i l i t a r y r e a l i s t , Masashi Nishihara, the constituencies for increasing m i l i t a r y spending are weak and t h i s i s c l e a r l y i l l u s t r a t e d by the poor public support shown for 1 6 5 Chae-Jin Lee and Hideo Sato, op.cit. p.133 1 6 6 Masataka Kosaka, "Japan's Role in the World:A Prospect for a L i g h t l y Armed Economic Giant", op.cit. p.2 1 6 7 An Asahi Shinbun survey of March 1981 indicated that only 22% of respondents favoured the then government's proposed scale of development of the SDF. Quoted in Nishihara, op.cit. p.192 1 6 8 K e i i c h i Ito, op.cit. p.1 at 2 77 any increase in either the c a p a b i l i t i e s or geographical scope of the SDF. 1 6 9 Nishihara is joined by Tadeo Takubo who says that for any defence policy to be c a r r i e d , there must be an appreciation of i t s importance by people across the nation. 1 7 0 Since the Second World War, Japan's defence policy has not only been a sensitive domestic issue but also a partisan p o l i t i c a l one. There has been greater p o l i t i c a l distance between the governing Liberal-Democratic Party and the l e f t i s t opposition over the retention of the Treaty, than between the Government and the people. While the opposition p o l i t i c a l parties have recently moved over to giving q u a l i f i e d support to the Treaty and the SDF, there remains firm opposition to any defence build-up. For example, the Japanese S o c i a l i s t Party (JSP) and the Komeito Party now state that while the Treaty would be abrogated, should they come to power, t h i s would be done "without damaging fr i e n d l y relations between the U.S. and Japan". 1 7 1 In the view of one prominent government adviser, t h i s firm opposition, and the s i g n i f i c a n t proportion of public opinion which supports i t , has impelled government leaders to make any increases to the defence forces very c a r e f u l l y and g r a d u a l l y . 1 7 2 The 1946 'peace' Constitution with i t s important A r t i c l e I X 1 7 3 has been used as a constraint upon any e f f o r t to enhance 1 6 9 Masashi Nishihara, op.cit. p.192 1 7 0 Tadeo Takubo, op.cit. p.22. 1 7 1 Quoted from Lee and Sato, op.cit p.131 1 7 2 Masataka Kosaka, "Japan's Role", op.cit. p.2 1 7 3 This A r t i c l e forbids Japan from developing an offensive force c a p a b i l i t y . 78 the role of Japan's SDF. It has served as something of an 'ideological flagpole' around which the 'unarmed n e u t r a l i s t s ' and sections of the public could gather to oppose any increase in Japan's defence forces. The importance of the Constitution, in t h i s capacity, has not been missed by either the m i l i t a r y or p o l i t i c a l r e a l i s t s . Tsurutani, a m i l i t a r y r e a l i s t , comments with some concern on the impact of the Constitution when he says "..the pacifism of the postwar Constitution and ...[the] i d e a l i s t i c l i b e r a l view of international r e l a t i o n s b e c a m e v i r t u a l l y i n t e r n a l i z e d in the c o l l e c t i v e national psyche." In his view, the Constitution has encouraged t h i s ' p o l i t o p h o b i a ' . 1 7 4 In operational terms, he believes the Constitution has also been e f f e c t i v e in keeping out of Japan's SDF, "bombers, c r u i s e r s , battleships, a i r c r a f t c a r r i e r s and everything else that could be construed as possessing offensive capacity." As well, he considers that i t has constituted the basis upon which the Three Non-Nuclear Pr i n c i p l e s were established. It should be noted that the m i l i t a r y r e a l i s t s believe that these three p r i n c i p l e s serve no relevant purpose and should be a b o l i s h e d . 1 7 5 The p o l i t i c a l r e a l i s t s , on the other hand, believe that the Constitution r e f l e c t s enduring Japanese public opinion which only endorses the use of m i l i t a r y forces for self-defence. The 1 7 4 Taketsugu Tsurutani, op.cit p.3 1 7 5 i b i d , p.75. The Three Non-Nuclear Pr i n c i p l e s are that Japan not possess, not produce and not permit the introduction of nuclear weapons into the country. They were enunciated by Prime Minister Sato in 1967. 79 continuing public support for the Constitution indicates the unwillingness of the Japanese public to see Japan become a m i l i t a r y power. However, opinion i s divided amongst the p o l i t i c a l r e a l i s t s as to whether U.S. t a c t i c a l nuclear weapons should be introduced into Japan for the purposes of both deterrence and d e f e n c e . 1 7 6 While the late 1970s and early 1980s witnessed dramatic changes in Japan's external environment which aided those advocating a m i l i t a r y build-up, economic problems were appearing which were to impact upon the government's f i s c a l p o l i c y . Economic growth had slowed down and there was a r i s i n g national debt in Japan. Together with the longstanding budgetary practice of l i m i t i n g defence spending to a maximum of 1% of Gross National Product (GNP), these economic circumstances added weight to the arguments of those who c a l l e d for f i s c a l r e s t r a i n t and for the giving of no special treatment to the defence budget. P o l i t i c a l r e a l i s t s refer to the Japanese Government as being "faced with an unprecedented challenge to i t s f i s c a l p o l i c i e s " 1 7 7 and "facing mounting domestic pressure to control the country's d e f i c i t f i n a n c i n g " . 1 7 8 In th i s economic climate, the public perception of an external threat was not s u f f i c i e n t to counter the power of ' the Finance Ministry to allow the government to increase i t s defence expenditure by any sizable 1 7 6 Yukio Satoh, op.cit. p.2 1 7 7 Yoshio Okawara, op.cit. p.32 1 7 8 Lee and Sato, op.cit. p.135 80 amount. The 1981 defence budget increase of 9.7% must be seen as an exceptional achievement of the Defence Ministry and was not repeated in the 1982 or 1983 budgets, evidencing the effectiveness of the Finance Ministry's policy of f i s c a l r e s t r a i n t . 1 7 9 Even the m i l i t a r y r e a l i s t s acknowledge the importance of f i s c a l r e s t r a i n t as a constraint upon increasing defence spending. Admiral Sakonjo, in r e f e r r i n g to the 1983 budget d e f i c i t as t o t a l l i n g the equivalent of two years of m i l i t a r y budgets, argues that there must be f i s c a l r e s t r a i n t . 1 8 0 K e i i c h i Ito refers to the "government's f i n a n c i a l state" as one of the factors restraining the execution of the then Suzuki government's defence policy and one which was in need of a t t e n t i o n . 1 8 1 Given what appears as the public's continuing s e n s i t i v i t y to defence spending, i t i s unlikely that the 1% barrier w i l l be overcome in the f u t u r e . 1 8 2 The Nakasone government has a weak position in the Japanese Diet and i s unlikely to be so bold as to increase defence expenditures above that l e v e l . Both p o l i t i c a l and m i l i t a r y r e a l i s t s seem to agree that in a climate of f i s c a l r e s t r a i n t the chances of there being an increase, whether desirable or not, appear highly unlikely. American 1 7 9 The 1981 increase of 9.7% compared to a 7.5% increase for general expenditure. In 1983 the defence budget had returned to 0.98% of GNP.Refer: Masashi Nishihara, op.cit. p. 192 1 8 0 Naotoshi Sakonjo, op.cit. p.88 1 8 1 K e i i c h i Ito, op.cit. p.115 1 8 2 Defence expenditure has not risen above 1% of GNP since the mid-1 960s. 81 commentators endorse th i s view that budgetary r e s t r a i n t serves as a powerful domestic constraint upon any government moves to spend more on the m i l i t a r y . 1 8 3 The combined in t e r n a l constraints reveal themselves as formidable obstacles to any movement toward an' increase in Japanese defence spending. Whether viewed as one side of the "tightrope that the Government of Japan must walk between Japan's domestic p o l i t i c s and i t s Japan-U.S. a l l i a n c e p o l i t i c s " , 1 8 " or as "exceedingly convenient pretexts for avoiding d i f f i c u l t decisions that ought to be made", 1 8 5 they retain a strong influence over Japanese defence policy-making. G. JAPANESE RESPONSES TO AMERICAN CALLS FOR A MILITARY BUILD-UP With the i n s t a l l a t i o n of the Reagan Administration in 1981, U.S. c a l l s for increased Japanese defence spending became louder and more f r e q u e n t . 1 8 6 A central issue in the Japanese security debate i s the nature of the responses which these c a l l s have produced in Japan. In recent years, not only members of the U.S. Administration but also prominent members of the U.S. Congress have expressed concern at the rapidly widening trade d e f i c i t between the U.S. and Japan and at the i n a b i l i t y of U.S. 3 For example, Richard N. Cooper and P h i l i p B. Jones, "The Long-Term Outlook for United States-Japan Cooperation" (1983) p.31 at 38 and John K. Emmerson, op.cit. p.234 " Lee and Sato, op.ci t . p.194 5 Taketsugu Tsurutani, op.cit. p.76 6 The c a l l s were also q u a l i t a t i v e l y d i f f e r e n t in that the new Administration stressed the roles and missions that Japan's defence forces could play. 82 exports to penetrate the Japanese market. With the economic recession, the link between Japan's low defence spending and i t s economic success was one which many Americans f e l t impelled to make. As to be expected, Japanese responses to these c a l l s have been mixed. They r e f l e c t varying perceptions of the external environment, the nature of the U.S.-Japan relationship, and of the a b i l i t y of the Japanese p o l i t i c a l system to respond in the manner desired by the U.S. The Suzuki and Nakasone governments have most assuredly indicated their willingness to accommodate these renewed c a l l s . 1 8 7 However, the Japanese government i s yet to produce on these statements and when we examine the debate, we fi n d much Japanese opinion not nearly so accommodating. The p o l i t i c a l r e a l i s t s are wary of acceding wholeheartedly to U.S. demands for a Japanese defence build-up. Yukio Satoh, for example, while admitting inadequacies in Japan's SDF and a general need to increase defence spending, believes that the U.S. must be more understanding of the Japanese domestic c o n t e x t . 1 8 8 In his opinion, to do otherwise and apply too much pressure for a m i l i t a r y build-up might well provoke a negative public reaction. Another p o l i t i c a l r e a l i s t , Yoshio Okawara, argues that "many Japanese, while increasingly convinced of the need for the steady expansion of the country's defence c a p a b i l i t i e s , have considerable reservations about the pace of 1 8 7 Suzuki's pledge to improve Japan's defence c a p a b i l i t i e s and Nakasone's statement that he would make Japan into an "unsinkable a i r c r a f t c a r r i e r " have impressed the Americans. 1 8 8 Yukio Satoh, op.ci t . p.39 83 such expansion.." 1 8 9 Satoh, Okawara and M o c h i z u k i 1 9 0 are a l l concerned that American impatience with Japan's 'steady expansion' may prevent the formation of a national consensus, which they believe is already underway and which they deem necessary to enable the Japanese to work this expansion out for themselves. Mochizuki, together with Michael Nacht, writes elsewhere that he believes this question of pace of expansion to be the real issue in dispute between the U.S. and Japan. 1 9 1 Another concern of the p o l i t i c a l r e a l i s t s i s that U.S. pressure could damage the a l l i a n c e by encouraging the adoption of a more independent and m i l i t a r i s t i c foreign policy by Japan. In the words of Professors Lee and Sato: "..highly v i s i b l e U.S. attempts to pressure Japan into undertaking greater rearmament that disregard that country's de l i c a t e domestic and regional p o l i t i c a l environment may backfire and produce a more n a t i o n a l i s t i c Japanese defense policy,...possibly divorced from the United States-Japan security system." 1 9 2 The need for the U.S. to be subtle and persuasive in i t s endeavours to have Japan increase i t s defence spending i s seen by a number of Japanese writers as imperative for, in their view, i t i s the Japanese public and not just the Japanese 1 8 9 Yoshio Okawara, op.cit. p.32 1 9 0 Mike M. Mochizuki, op.cit. p.177 1 9 1 Mike M. Mochizuki and Michael Nacht, "Modes of Defense Cooperation" in Program on U.S.-Japan Relations Annual Report 1981-82 p.129 at 137. 1 9 2 Lee and Sato, op.cit. p.191 84 government who must see American requests as being f a i r and reasonable. For example, Takakazu Kuriyama of Japan's foreign ministry, refers to America's persuasiveness as the determinant of Japan's future p a r t i c i p a t i o n in t r i l a t e r a l cooperation with the U.S. and Western Europe. 1 9 3 Another p o l i t i c a l r e a l i s t , Hisashi Owada, argues that the U.S. and Japan need to keep in mind their fundamentally d i f f e r e n t p o l i t i c a l cultures. He believes that the U.S. should be made aware that in Japan there is a gap between "..what has to be accepted on the international front and what t a c i t l y p revails as consensus on the domestic scene..". 1 9" Yonosuke Nagai joins these writers and together counsel the two nations to pay greater attention to the larger interests of the rel a t i o n s h i p so as to prevent their d i f f e r i n g perceptions about the other from causing a schism in the a l l i a n c e . 1 9 5 The e a r l i e r , almost unanimous, c r i t i c i s m of the Americans by the p o l i t i c a l r e a l i s t s for their perceived i n a b i l i t y c l e a r l y to communicate to Japan what they wanted in terms of a defence build-up, has at least p a r t i a l l y been overcome. The Reagan Administration's requests have been more s p e c i f i c and less equivocal than those of i t s predecessors. C r i t i c i s m remains as to both a lack of s p e c i f i c i t y over what the U.S. expects and i t s habit of frequently changing the demands i t presents to the 1 9 3 Takakazu Kuriyama, "Sharing Global R e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s ^ Japanese View" in Trialogue Special (Summer/Fall 1981) p.14 at 16 1 9 4 Hisashi Owada, op.cit. p.25 1 9 5 Yonosuke Nagai, op.cit. p.28 1 9 6 Tadeo Takebo, op.cit. p.22 8 5 Japanese. 1 9 6 F u j i Kamiya argues that t h i s problem i s exacerbated by what he sees as an enduring lack of consensus in the U.S. over what is a c t u a l l y wanted from J a p a n . 1 9 7 This lack of consensus is a d i r e c t r e f l e c t i o n of the American p o l i t i c a l system which, by i t s very design, involves a number of disparate groups in i t s security policy-making process. This view is endorsed by some American commentators who add that the U.S. should recognize that the Japanese have made some progress in the dir e c t i o n s o u g ht. 1 9 8 One American writer, in p a r t i c u l a r , c a l l s on the Reagan Administration to present Japan with a clearer strategic p o l i c y with respect to the Northeast Asian r e g i o n . 1 9 9 Recent American c a l l s for a greater Japanese defence e f f o r t have been accompanied by accusations that Japan i s taking a 'free ride' with regard to i t s defence. These , c a l l s , many of which have come from members of the U.S. Congress, imply that Japan's economic success can be largely ascribed to i t s low m i l i t a r y spending. However, as Yonosuke Nagai points out, these accusations could themselves provoke a backlash in Japan because the l i n k i n g of economics and defence spending may encourage a view in Japan that American motives are based, not on c o l l e c t i v e 1 9 7 F u j i Kamiya, "U.S.-Japan Relations in Retrospect and Future Challenges" in U. Alexis Johnson et. a l . (eds.), op.cit. p.131 at 140 1 9 8 For example, Richard L. Sneider, U.S. Security Relations: An  H i s t o r i c a l Perspective :quoted in T. Hasegawa, "Japanese Defense" in Journal of International A f f a i r s Vol.37 No.1 (Summer I983)p.196 at 198. 1 9 9 Norman Levin, "In Search of Strategy: The Reagan Administration and Security in Northeast Asia", James C. Hsuing (ed.), U.S.-Asian Relations (New York: 1983) p.19 at 29 86 defence c a l c u l a t i o n s , but rather on s e l f i s h economic o n e s . 2 0 0 It would be d i f f i c u l t to say with any certainty whether American c a l l s are based on security or economic motives. To be f a i r , strident American c a l l s for an increased Japanese defence e f f o r t cannot in themselves be c l a s s i f i e d solely as the results of American economic grievances. In any event, the Japanese, and especially the p o l i t i c a l r e a l i s t s , should be made aware of the increasingly intense feelings of Japanese ingratitude which have been surfacing in the United States. The lack of s p e c i f i c i t y in the American message would seem to encourage the view that U.S. pressure for a Japanese defence build-up has not, i t s e l f , promoted any of the d i v i s i o n s that have appeared in the Japanese security policy debate. The nature of the American p o l i t i c a l system encourages a d i v e r s i t y of views as to the role Americans wish Japan to perform in regional, and even global, a f f a i r s . The Reagan Administration has c l e a r l y indicated that i t wants Japan to increase i t s defence spending to f u l f i l certain s p e c i f i e d tasks such as a i r surveillance, mine laying in the s t r a i t s leading from the Sea of Japan, i f necessary, and the protection of the sea lanes of communication to a distance of 1000 miles from the Japanese home islands. However, leading groups in the United States remain ambivalent as to whether they want the Japanese to greatly increase their defence expenditure. There i s obvious concern that Japan not become a m i l i t a r y power and provoke i n s t a b i l i t y 2 0 0 Yonosuke Nagai, op.cit. p.26 87 in the Northeast Asian region. The m i l i t a r y r e a l i s t s , who have used the American c a l l s to add weight to their arguments for a defence build-up, ascribe greater importance to e x t e r n a l i t i e s such as the Soviet 'threat' and the U.S. defence posture, and pay less attention to what the p o l i t i c a l r e a l i s t s stress as the internal constraints. The differences in the nature and extent of the responses between the two groups would seem obvious. However, both groups share a common concern that for lack of s p e c i f i c i t y and consistency, these c a l l s may well prove, in the long term i f not the immediate term, to be counterproductive for the U.S.-Japan security relationship. H. JAPAN'S FUTURE INTERNATIONAL SECURITY ROLE The discussion of Japanese perceptions of American c a l l s for a defence build-up leads us inevitably to a consideration of the larger issue of Japan's global and regional role. The Japanese debate over Japan's future role would seem to exist between three separate groupings of Japanese writers: those, c h i e f l y the m i l i t a r y r e a l i s t s , who believe Japan needs to expand i t s international role, primarily through m i l i t a r y means; those who believe that the role needs to be expanded, but primarily in a nonmilitary and more limited manner; and those who adhere to Japan's present passive role and argue that an expansion of that role is neither desirable nor necessary. M i l i t a r y r e a l i s t s such as Tsurutani and Momoi stress the need for Japan to establish closer coordination with the U.S. and to continue to rely heavily upon the U.S. for i t s national 8 8 s e c u r i t y . 2 0 1 In their view, Japan should undertake a " s i g n i f i c a n t and sustained expansion of i t s defence spending.." and play a larger role in supplementation, but not in substitution, of the American role in Japan's d e f e n c e . 2 0 2 Other m i l i t a r y r e a l i s t s argue that Japan should develop a capacity to be able to defend i t s e l f and not withdraw back into i t s present passive defence r o l e . 2 0 3 Of the m i l i t a r y r e a l i s t s , Makoto Momoi has a somewhat more limited view of Japan's wartime role for he believes that i t would simply be to deny and r e s i s t and 'buy time' u n t i l the U.S. can intervene. Thus, the expansion of Japan's defence forces would only be necessary to the extent required to prolong this holding time. 2 0'' K e i i c h i Ito, on the other hand, takes a broader view of Japan's defence role and argues that Japan's defence e f f o r t s must r e f l e c t i t s strength so as to keep the U.S.-Japan security system e f f e c t i v e l y o p e r a t i n g . 2 0 5 Momoi and Ito argue for an enhancement of Japan's m i l i t a r y role, a l b e i t within the U.S.-Japan security framework, from a global perspective. On the other hand, Tsurutani, who also c a l l s for an enhanced m i l i t a r y role, emphasises Japan's contribution to the security of the East Asian region. For 2 0 1 Taketsugu Tsurutani, op.cit. pp.141-2; Makoto Momoi, op.cit. p.91 2 0 2 Tsurutani, i b i d . p.143; Momoi, i b i d . 2 0 3 Sase Masamori and Fukuda Tsuneari: quoted in Kenneth B. Pyle, op.cit.p.21 2 0 4 Momoi, o p . c i t . p . 9 1 2 0 5 Ito, op.cit. p.114. Ito c a l l s on Japan to tackle the task of acquiring an appropriate l e v e l of high q u a l i t y defence c a p a b i l i t y . 89 Tsurutani, Japan should focus i t s attention on i t s own region and make i t s contribution to international s t a b i l i t y through a regional m i l i t a r y r o l e . 2 0 6 M i l i t a r y r e a l i s t s who argue for a global contribution from Japan find a kindred s p i r i t in t r i l a t e r a l i s t s , such as Nobuhiko Ushiba, who c a l l for Japan to share global r e s p o n s i b i l i t y with other members of the 'Western camp'. 2 0 7 However, Ushiba, unlike the m i l i t a r y r e a l i s t s , advocates an expansion of Japan's role which would lay emphasis upon economic and p o l i t i c a l rather than m i l i t a r y contributions. Other t r i l a t e r a l i s t s such as Takakazu Kuriyama, while r e f e r r i n g to the need for Japan to take a more active role through enhanced economic, p o l i t i c a l and m i l i t a r y contributions, express concern that increased m i l i t a r y contributions not be of such a magnitude as to encourage neighbours' fears of renewed Japanese m i l i t a r i s m . 2 0 8 Where the t r i l a t e r a l i s t s are c l e a r l y distinguished from the m i l i t a r y r e a l i s t s is in their emphasis upon cooperation with-the other Western i n d u s t r i a l democracies for positive mutual benefit rather than in terms of joining in a common defence against the Soviet 'threat'. Masataka Kosaka i s another advocate of an expanded international role for Japan. A p o l i t i c a l r e a l i s t , he believes that t h i s role should have a limited m i l i t a r y dimension. While Japan i s a large economic power, he argues that t h i s should not 206 Tsurutani. o p . c i t . p.184 2 0 7 Nobuhiko Ushiba, op.cit. p.5 208 Kuriyama, op.cit. 16. Nobuhiko Ushiba vents a similar concern: op.cit.5. 90 mean that i t should acquire a large m i l i t a r y c a p a b i l i t y for such a c a p a b i l i t y w i l l "revive (the) unpleasant memories and suspicions of i t s neighbours". 2 0 9 In Kosaka's opinion, Japan's global contribution must be in economical and technological terms. He believes that the l i m i t s of public opinion w i l l be applied much more readily in the area of m i l i t a r y expansion than in that of economic expansion. 2 1 0 Another p o l i t i c a l r e a l i s t , Hisashi Owada, refers to the Japanese p o l i t i c a l environment as i n s u f f i c i e n t l y i n t e r n a t i o n a l i s t for there to be a ready acceptance of an enhanced international role. Owada makes reference to a to a l i k e l y gap between the domestic consensus and what i s acceptable i n t e r n a t i o n a l l y . 2 1 1 Mike Mochizuki also stresses the problems to be found in having a markedly d i f f e r e n t domestic and international p o l i t i c a l environment. In his view, the Japanese government w i l l inevitably find i t s e l f having to play down i t s defence policy domestically so as not to provoke widespread public opposition, while at the same time playing up i t s e f f o r t s to the U.S. to maintain the l a t t e r ' s willingness to defend Japan. Mochizuki questions whether a larger m i l i t a r y establishment could be p o l i t i c a l l y stable in this sort of environment, and he says that the Japanese leadership together 0 9 Rosaka, "Japan's Role" p.18 1 0 i b i d . p.23 and 28 1 1 Owada, op.cit. p.25. Daniel Okimoto endorses t h i s view and refers to the problem of an underdevelopment of the infrastructure seen necessary for a t r u l y international role: "Security P o l i c i e s in the U.S. and Japan" p.58. 1 2 Mochizuki, op.cit. p.179 91 with the people must decide the dire c t i o n that w i l l be t a k e n . 2 1 2 Apart from the m i l i t a r y r e a l i s t s , the ' t r i l a t e r a l i s t s ' and the p o l i t i c a l r e a l i s t s , there i s a fourth group which must be b r i e f l y considered. Yonosuke Nagai, a representative of thi s group, argues that while Japan needs to take a more active role, both p o l i t i c a l l y and in terms of increasing i t s foreign economic aid, i t should desist from any expansion in i t s defence r o l e . 2 1 3 Nagai i s joined by another scholar, Miyazawa K i i c h i who advocates that Japan's passive role be continued as Japan can make her own unique contribution as a c o n s t i t u t i o n a l l y decreed 'special s t a t e ' . 2 1 f t The Japanese security debate i s obviously a complex one of many strands and many vari a t i o n s . There are to be found divergences within each of the groupings discussed just as there are s i m i l a r i t i e s between writers within di f f e r e n t groups. Amongst" the writers who advocate an expanded international role for Japan, general agreement appears to the ef f e c t that any such role must be undertaken within the framework established by the Japan-U.S. security arrangements. Whether due to habit or because of a view of commonly accepted p o l i t i c a l and economic interests, or because of a fee l i n g of i n s u l a r i t y and insecurity, or perhaps because of a combination of a l l three, there was no serious discussion of Japan adopting an independent world role. 2 1 3 Quoted in Kenneth B. Pyle, op.cit. p.2 0 : Nagai i s quoted as referrin g to the maintenance of a 'moratorium state' on defence policy which he believes i s even more appropriate in a world dominated by nuclear weapons. 2 1 " i b i d . 9 2 Within the ranks of the m i l i t a r y r e a l i s t s who sought an increase in Japan's defence c a p a b i l i t y , there was a difference of opinion over whether any expanded international role should be on a global or regional basis. D i v i s i o n also appeared over whether Japan should increase i t s c a p a b i l i t y to such an extent as to be able to defend i t s e l f or whether i t should only acquire s u f f i c i e n t forces as to be able to hold off an enemy u n t i l the U.S. came to the rescue. The p o l i t i c a l r e a l i s t s , likewise do not present themselves as a u n i f i e d bloc. Obvious d i v i s i o n s of opinion appeared over the emphasis that should be given to any 'shared r e s p o n s i b i l i t y ' with the Western i n d u s t r i a l democracies. As well, differences surfaced over the weight to be attached to the domestic and p o l i t i c a l constraints upon Japan adopting an enhanced international role and whether the domestic p o l i t i c a l environment was at a l l conducive to such a development. The extent to which the U.S. could influence Japanese domestic p o l i t i c a l opinion in favour of Japan adopting an enhanced international role with a concomitant defence build-up appears l i m i t e d . While p o l i t i c a l r e a l i s t s , as expected, c a l l e d attention to the need for the Americans to be more subtle and persuasive in making their requests, even the m i l i t a r y r e a l i s t s , who generally endorse the U.S. c a l l s , expressed concern over the lack of s p e c i f i c i t y and consistency in what the Americans were saying. The Japanese security p o l i c y debate and the discussion of an enhanced international role for Japan are s t i l l in their 9 3 formative stages and much uncertainty remains as to the d i r e c t i o n which Japan should take. Even greater uncertainty and hence controversy exists over how passionately Japan should embrace a new international role once i t has embarked in that di rect ion. The Japanese security policy debate i s unfortunately plagued by generality. Writers and adherents of p a r t i c u l a r positions are reluctant to specify ways in which Japan should or could enhance i t s role, either regionally or as part of a global American strategic p o l i c y . The m i l i t a r y r e a l i s t s appear to have embraced the Reagan Administration's s p e c i f i c requests, but the p o l i t i c a l r e a l i s t s and other groups are reluctant to advocate unequivocal acceptance of these d i r e c t tasks for Japan's defence forces. This reluctance seems to be based not so much on how much defence spending would need to be increased to meet these requests, but on a fear that acceptance of the tasks themselves may lead to a rapid m i l i t a r i s a t i o n of Japan. In recent years, the U.S. has made no secret of i t s heightened concern over what i t sees as a global Soviet threat. Ah equally public fact i s the eagerness with which the U.S. has pursued the issue of increasing a l l i e d defence contributions, both global l y as well as regionally. Just as the Americans have tended to see power in terms of m i l i t a r y c a p a b i l i t y , so the a l l i e d contributions they have sought have been predominantly m i l i t a r y . It may indeed be the case that in order to gain some increase in a l l i e d contributions, the Americans have f e l t i t necessary to ask for much more than they believed would be 94 forthcoming. These c a l l s for increased defence e f f o r t s from i t s a l l i e s have in fact been part of a much larger debate in the U.S. This debate, over a strategic policy to secure and maintain U.S. and a l l i e d interests, has exposed arguments as to the role which a l l i e s should perform in the 'common defence'. The following chapter w i l l discuss the chief arguments in this debate with p a r t i c u l a r reference to the Northeast Asian region and to the contributions sought from Japan to secure U.S. and a l l i e d interests in that region. 95 IV. THE UNITED STATES STRATEGIC POLICY DEBATE & JAPAN Many prominent strategic thinkers have made reference in recent years to what they see as the f a i l u r e of the United States to develop a coherent and e f f e c t i v e strategic p o l i c y . If strategy can be defined "as a set of guiding p r i n c i p l e s by which means are related to e n d s " 2 1 5 then many have argued that the U.S. has no strategic policy to bridge the gap between the U.S.'s commitments and i t s declining m i l i t a r y power. 2 1 6 Samuel Huntington 2 1 7 and Paul N i t z e 2 1 8 have both argued that U.S. strategic thinking of the 1970s has been dominated by the ideas of yesteryear when the U.S. enjoyed nuclear superiority and before the Soviet Union had massively b u i l t up i t s conventional m i l i t a r y forces. The nuclear deterrent remains important today, but there have been increasing c a l l s for the development of the U.S.'s conventional m i l i t a r y as well as nonmilitary c a p a b i l i t i e s . The emphasis upon conventional forces and the giving of high p r i o r i t y to the a l l o c a t i o n of resources to their development i s linked to the issue of the direct involvement of a l l i e s in the execution of a global and regional U.S. strategic 2 1 5 Carl H. Builder, Commentary to The C a l i f o r n i a Seminar on  International Security and Foreign Policy (January 1984) p.17 2 1 1 5 Robert E~. Osgood, "American Grand Strategy: Patterns, Problems and Prescriptions" in Naval War College Review (September/October 1983) p.5 2 1 7 Samuel P. Huntington (ed.), The Strategic Imperative (Cambridge, Mass.: 1982) p.3 2 1 8 Paul H. Nitze, "Policy and Strategy from Weakness" in W.Scott Thompson (ed.), National Security in the 1980s: From Weakness to  Strength (San Francisco : 1980) p.443 96 po l i c y . Even the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff appear to stress the importance of the deployment of conventional forces and the cooperation of a l l i e s . In a recent statement they said: "The effectiveness of the U.S. strategy depends not only on a system of forward-deployed forces but also on close cooperation with regional a l l i e s . . ..these a l l i e s provide basing and ove r f l i g h t r i g h t s , f a c i l i t y arrangements and support personnel to a s s i s t U.S. f o r c e s . " 2 1 9 While the rhetoric has shifted to attaching greater importance to both the development of conventional forces and the involvement of a l l i e s , the execution of U.S. global strategic p o l i c y , or rather what passes for pol i c y , indicates that attention has been to the f i r s t but not so much to the second of these two issues. In general terms; U.S. strategic 'policy' toward Northeast Asia through the 1970s and into the 1980s, was marked by two developments: f i r s t the withdrawal and then the reaffirmation of the U.S. commitment to the region's security. These general policy s h i f t s were d i r e c t r e f l e c t i o n s of the American domestic mood and the varying l e v e l s of concern over the threat potential of i t s chief adversary, the Soviet Union. They were not prompted by any concern for America's a l l i e s . This chapter w i l l i n i t i a l l y examine those p o l i c i e s the U.S. has pursued towards Northeast Asia over th i s period, whether as a regional or part of a global strategic p o l i c y . This brief 2 1 9 Joint Chiefs of Staff, U.S. M i l i t a r y Strategy Report to U.S. Congress on M i l i t a r y Posture for FY 1985 p.42 97 discussion w i l l concentrate on the 'strategic designs' of the U.S. Administrations of the period as they attempted to meet what they saw as l i k e l y global and regional threats to the security of U.S. interests. A. RECENT U.S. ADMINISTRATIONS' STRATEGIC POLICIES FOR  NORTHEAST ASIA American security policy toward Northeast Asia in the early 1970s was dominated by e f f o r t s to extricate the U.S. from the Vietnam War. Aware of the loss of nuclear superiority and responding to "appropriate perceptions of power in the absence of s u f f i c i e n t actual m i l i t a r y force", 2 2 0 President Nixon announced the Guam Doctrine. This heralded the m i l i t a r y retrenchment/political engagement policy that was to dominate U.S. policy towards East Asia in the early 1970s. In essence, i t c a l l e d for self-help from America's a l l i e s to deter threats below the nuclear l e v e l . The Nixon Doctrine, while permitting U.S. policy to remain premised on the postwar policy of containment and forward deployment of forces, sought to preserve the U.S.'s international status intact, but at a reduced cost. While the U.S. may have had no intention of disavowing American interests in Asia, the policy contained an inherent contradiction. As Richard Sneider states: " . . . i t raised doubts as to U.S. willingness to f u l f i l defense commitments for nations unwilling to help themselves. As a prod to the Asian nations, there was a deliberate, calculated ambiguity with respect to 2 2 0 E a r l Ravenal, op.cit. p.147 98 U.S. preparedness to l i v e up to i t s commitments." 2 2 1 Despite the premise in the Doctrine that "geography makes [the U.S.] an Asian power", 2 2 2 the Doctrine c l e a r l y appeared to America's Asian a l l i e s as evidence of i t s 'Europe f i r s t ' strategic outlook. Even the second aspect of Nixon's strategic p o l i c y , the balancing of China against the Soviet Union could be viewed as a means of drawing some of the Soviets' forces away from the European theatre. With the Nixon breakthrough to China in 1972, the U.S. found i t s e l f able to redesign i t s strategy from one premised on the fighting of 'two and a half wars' simultaneously to one based on only fight i n g 'one and a half wars'. America's policy advocated the development and deployment of a conventional force capable of fighting a major war on the 'Central Front' in Europe against the Soviet Union and i t s Warsaw Pact a l l i e s , and a minor 'half war' simultaneously elsewhere in the world, possibly in Asia. The Ford Administration of 1974-1977 continued the Nixon Administration's policy of c a l l i n g upon the a l l i e s to help themselves. This Administration reaffirmed former Defense Secretary Laird's ' t o t a l force' concept which emphasized m i l i t a r y assistance to a l l i e s so as to expand their own c a p a b i l i t y . 2 2 3 Ford did, however, attempt to assuage some Asian concerns with the promulgation of his 1975 'Paci f i c Doctrine'. 2 2 1 Richard L. Sneider, op.cit. p.63 at 66 2 2 2 Richard H. Solomon, "American Defense Planning and Asian Security: Policy Choices for a Time of Transition" in Richard H.Solomon (ed.) op.cit. p.3 2 2 3 Yuan-li Wu, op.cit. p.13-14 99 While th i s 'doctrine' emphasized U.S. t i e s with i t s a l l i e s in the region, i t f a i l e d to present the sort of change of policy required to remove the anxieties caused by the e a r l i e r Nixon d e c l a r a t i o n . 2 2 4 The Nixon-Ford-Kissinger strategy of retrenchment, while compromised by the collapse of detente and the Soviet m i l i t a r y build-up, was continued and in fact i n t e n s i f i e d in the early years of the Carter Administration. For example, soon after taking o f f i c e , Carter c a l l e d for the phased withdrawal of U.S. troops in South Korea over a period of four to five y e a r s . 2 2 5 As with the Nixon 'shocks' of 1971, Carter did not believe i t was necessary to consult with a l l i e s , e s p e c i a l l y Japan, before making such an announcement. Like the Nixon 'shocks', the Carter move resulted in intense feelings of anxiety throughout Japan. As with the two previous Administrations, the Carter Administration did not expect Japan to play a bigger m i l i t a r y role in Asia and c a l l s for increased defense expenditure were simply so "Japan should have a balanced force that could support the American m i l i t a r y commitment in [East A s i a ] . " 2 2 6 The emphasis upon a l l i e d contributions and encouragement for them to be s e l f - s u s t a i n i n g , continued through the early Carter years u n t i l a series of c r i s e s prompted the Administration to change 2 2 4 Richard H. Solomon (ed.), op.cit. p.3 2 2 5 George P. Jan, "The United States, China and Japan" in Sam C. Sarkesian (ed.), Defense Policy and the Presidency: Carter's  F i r s t Years (Boulder, Colorado: 1979) p.292 2 2 6 i b i d . pT289 100 i t s policy and c a l l for an o v e r a l l increase in U.S. m i l i t a r y forces. The Soviet Union's intervention in Ethiopia in 1977, the Soviet treaty with Vietnam in 1978, the 1979 Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the Iranian hostage a f f a i r of the same year, encouraged a view within the Administration that there was a Soviet global threat which required the closure of the gap between U.S. power and i n t e r e s t s . In l i n e with a reversal of the decade-long decline in real defense expenditures, Carter announced in January 1980, 2 2 7 that the U.S. would f i g h t , i f necessary, to preserve i t s access to the Middle E a s t . 2 2 8 While the U.S. continued to c a l l on a l l i e s to support i t s security e f f o r t s in the Middle East and elsewhere, t h i s change of p o l i c y was based on the deployment and forward projection of U.S. forces alone (primarily naval), and did not c a l l for a m u l t i l a t e r a l force to be established. As Earl Ravenal notes, in likening t h i s Doctrine to America's strategic p o l icy of the 1960s, i t was: "planning for more s u f f i c i e n t direct U.S. inputs, seeking ' r e a l ' a l l i e s , . . . e s t a b l i s h i n g regional bases for the deployment of American forces., and generally discounting l o c a l f r i e n d l y c a p a b i l i t i e s . " 2 2 9 The effect of the implementation of t h i s policy has in fact been a cause for concern for America's a l l i e s in Northeast Asia. As 2 2 7 State of the Union Address to the U.S. Congress. 2 2 8 The 'Carter Doctrine' stated that "an attempt by any outside force to gain control of the Persian Gulf region w i l l be regarded as an assault on the v i t a l interests of the United States " 2 2 9 E a r l Ravenal, op.cit. p.148 101 the U.S. Commander-in-Chief of P a c i f i c Forces has t e s t i f i e d , one c a r r i e r battle group has been deployed from the A s i a - P a c i f i c region to the Arabian Gulf and there i s a continuing requirement to support the Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force (RDJTF) in Southwest Asia in a contingency. 2 3 0 The focus of the Carter Administration remained primarily on the European theatre. For example, Defense Secretary Brown was reported in 1978 as saying the "defense budget f i r s t places p a r t i c u l a r emphasis on weapons systems in support of the Nato a l l i a n c e . " 2 3 1 The Administration continued to endorse the "one-and-one half wars" concept but modified i t to improve the combat capacity of Nato and to provide for a Rapid Deployment Force(RDF) to cope with contingencies, p a r t i c u l a r l y in the Middle East and Persian Gulf. O f f i c i a l s were quoted as saying that the Administration had abandoned the 'swing s t r a t e g y ' 2 3 2 because of the need to increase American naval presence in the Indian Ocean along with countering the Soviet m i l i t a r y build-up in East A s i a . 2 3 3 Statements that the U.S. would consider s h i f t i n g Pacific-based forces to the Indian Ocean and the Persian Gulf rather than to Western Europe were of l i t t l e 3 0 Admiral Robert L.J. Long, Testimony before the U.S. Congress. House. Committee on Armed Services, M i l i t a r y Posture  Hearings 1982 pplOOO-1001 3 1 Richard Burt, "U.S. Defense Debate Arises Over Whether Focus on Europe Neglects Other Areas" in The New York Times March 24, 1978 p.A3 3 2 This strategy, originating in the 1950s, prescribed that forces would be swung from the P a c i f i c to the European theatre should the need a r i s e . 3 3 Richard Burt, "U.S. Strategy Focus S h i f t i n g from Europe to P a c i f i c " in i b i d . May 25, 1980 p.3 1 02 comfort to America's a l l i e s in East Asia, for in either case they represented the retrenchment of U.S. power and commitment in their r e g i o n . 2 3 4 United States strategic policy under the Reagan Administration, while premised on the same threat perception as the Carter Administration, of 1979-1980, appears to have departed from a policy of containment and has sought to blend deterrent and combative (warfighting) strategies into one posture. This Administration's 'war-widening' strategy prescribes a disproportionate response by the U.S. which goes beyond mere di r e c t defence and displays a potential to escalate any c o n f l i c t . 2 3 5 This policy i s captured in Defense Secretary Caspar W. Weinberger's f i r s t Defense Posture Statement: "..even i f the enemy attacked at only one place, we might choose not to r e s t r i c t ourselves to meeting aggression on his own immediate front...A wartime strategy that confronts the enemy, were he to attack, with the risk of our counteroffensive against his vulnerable points strengthens deterrence and serves the defensive peacetime s t r a t e g y . " 2 3 6 The Reagan Administration, while endorsing the Carter Doctrine, has c a l l e d for what some c r i t i c s refer to as a 'three-4 One Pentagon o f f i c i a l was quoted, at the time, as saying that "we may have to keep our forces in the P a c i f i c , move them into the Indian Ocean or send them to Western Europe. It w i l l depend on the circumstances." Refer Richard Burt, i b i d . 5 Joshua M. Epstein, "Horizontal Escalation:Sour Notes of a Recurrent Theme" in International Security Vol.8 No.3 (Winter 1983-84) p.19; Jeffrey Record, "Jousting with Unreality: Reagan's M i l i t a r y Strategy" in i b i d , p.3 6 Annual Report to the U.S. Congress for F i s c a l Year 1983 (Washington, D.C: 1982) p.1-16,1-17 1 03 and-one-half war' strategy in which, in the words of Secretary Weinberger, "...our long-range goal is to be capable of defending a l l theaters simultaneously." 2 3 7 The strategy's emphasis is on counteroffensives against the Soviet Union's 'vulnerable points', and in recognizing a gap between strategy and c a p a b i l i t y , i t attempts to f i l l that gap by c a l l i n g for the development of a 600 ship, 15 c a r r i e r battle group navy. 2 3 8 According to Navy Secretary John Lehman, the U.S. Navy w i l l seek to 'prevail' simultaneously over the .combined m i l i t a r y threats of i t s adversaries in the P a c i f i c , A t l a n t i c , and Indian Oceans and in the Norwegian S e a . 2 3 9 Pentagon o f f i c i a l s have been quoted as saying that t h i s increase in naval strength i s necessary because the U.S. needs to place greater emphasis on protecting the sea lanes and in meeting the Soviet threat in regions (such as the Persian Gulf) which are far from American m i l i t a r y bases. 2" 0 In envisaging a protracted non-nuclear war, this policy of 'space-time escalation' would, with i t s naval emphasis, mean that the U.S. would take the war to the enemy by striki-ng with overwhelming conventional force at the Soviet Union. 2" 1 This p o l i c y appears to ignore the geostrategic advantage the Soviet 2 3 7 i b i d , p. 111-91 2 3 8 To an extent, t h i s does represent a continuation of a Carter Administration policy of having a carrier-centered navy. 2 3 9 John Lehman Jr.,Testimony before the U.S.Congress. House. Armed Services Committee, M i l i t a r y Posture Hearings 1982 97th Congress, 2nd Session, pp.561-562 2 4 0 George C. Wilson, "In Policy S h i f t s , Pentagon Seeks Naval Supremacy" in Washington Post December 14, 1981, p.A1 2 " 1 Gerald Garvey, Strategy and the Defense Dilemma (Lexington, Mass.: 1984) p.104 104 Union has in any conventional ground war around the Eurasian rimland. Not only does the Soviet Union have preponderant m i l i t a r y power on the Eurasian landmass, but i t could also move i t s forces from one front to another more quickly than the U.S. 2" 2 If the U.S. was unable to divert the Soviets to other fronts, then i t may well f i n d i t s e l f with the problem of having to choose between humiliation and nuclear e'scalation. 2 4 3 > Despite i t s arguments to the contrary, the Reagan Administration has accepted some of the 'strategic baggage' of i t s predecessor. It has endorsed the swing p o l i c y for P a c i f i c -based forces and has placed heavy emphasis on the enhancement of the RDF, p a r t i c u l a r l y for use in the v o l a t i l e Southwest Asian region. As for i t s East Asian a l l i e s , and in p a r t i c u l a r Japan, the Reagan Administration appears to embrace a strategic policy which requires l i t t l e in terms of di r e c t contributions to global security but much in terms of i t s role within the Northeast Asian region. In contrast to i t s predecessors who simply requested increased defence contributions, i t has assigned p a r t i c u l a r missions (such as sea lane and a i r space surveillance and control of the s t r a i t s ) to Japan. The Reagan policy has rejected the f e a s i b i l i t y of c o a l i t i o n defence and has opted for a more unilateralist/maritime based strategy. E s s e n t i a l l y , a l l i e s are to perform enhanced s e l f -defence and regional security roles which w i l l allow U.S. 2 4 2 Jeffrey Record, "A 3-War Strategy" in Washington Post March 22, 1982 2 4 3 Joshua Epstein, op.cit. p.26 1 05 forces to move from one region to another to meet par t i c u l a r contingencies. Members of the Administration may well refer to a l l i e s joining together in a common defence cause, but the a l l i e s appear to have been l e f t wondering exactly what that e n t a i l s 2 * " If the Nixon, Ford and Carter Administrations can be said to have endorsed a policy of containment, and with that, an acknowledgment of a direct security role for i t s a l l i e s , then the implementation of that policy did not meet i t s objectives: the Soviet Union was not 'contained' and the a l l i e s were not brought into a cooperative security arrangement with the United States. The Reagan Administration gives no pretense of involving a l l i e s as integral components of any strategic design, and while c a l l i n g for greater sharing of the defence burden by the a l l i e s , appears to accord them the role of convenient f a c i l i t a t o r s of the forward-deployment of exclusively U.S. forces. A discussion of the unilateralist/maritime supremacy argument, which has found much favour with the present Administration, w i l l serve as an introduction to the continuing U.S. strategic policy debate. " Richard Halloran, "Weinberger Urges Japan to take More Responsibility For Its Defense" in The New York Times A p r i l 29, 1981 p.A7 106 B. THE UNILATERALIST/MARITIME SUPREMACY ARGUMENT The unilateralist/maritime supremacy argument draws extensively on former Admiral and h i s t o r i a n A l f r e d Thayer Mahan. Mahan saw the sea as 'a great highway' and advanced the thesis of the strategic advantage of sea power. 2 4 5 He believed that no nation could be a great power unless i t made e f f e c t i v e use of the sea, for both commercial and m i l i t a r y purposes. 2* 6 John F. Lehman, current U.S. Navy Secretary, i s much influenced by Mahan. In Mahanian terms, he argues that "a navy must aim f i r s t and always at depriving an opponent of sea movement in i t s broadest sense." 2* 7 In c a l l i n g for a countervailing strategy which w i l l give the U.S. 'command of the seas', Lehman believes t h i s can be achieved by means of a mobile and f l e x i b l e naval force adopting a warfighting rather than a defensive, posture. Lehman, the chief proponent of the unilateralist/maritime supremacy argument, has stressed the necessity of a forward maritime defence for the U.S. In testimony before the House Armed Services Committee, he has stated that such forces are necessary to draw down enemy forces in order to prevent them concentrating and posing an even greater threat to U.S. security i n t e r e s t s . 2 * 8 The role and contributions of a l l i e s i s 5 A. T. Mahan, The Influence of Seapower upon History 1660- 1783 (London : 1965) chpt.I 6 Hedley B u l l , "Sea Power and P o l i t i c a l Influence" in Adelphi  Papers No.122 (Spring 1 976) p. 1 at 2 7 John F. Lehman J r . , "Rebirth of a U.S. Naval Strategy" in Strategic Review vol.8 (Summer 1981) p.9 at 11 John ¥~. Lehman J r . , Testimony before the U.S.Congress. House. Armed Services Committee, M i l i t a r y Posture Hearings 1982 p.554 1 07 s t r e s s e d by Lehman, but he f a i l s to p o i n t out e x a c t l y what would be r e q u i r e d by America's a l l i e s under such a s t r a t e g y and what would be t h e i r c o n t r i b u t i o n s to " a c t u a l w a r f i g h t i n g c a p a b i l i t y . " 2 " 9 The s t r a t e g y i t s e l f i s premised on the use of U.S. f o r c e s e x c l u s i v e l y and one can only assume that what would be r e q u i r e d of a l l i e s would be i n the nature of t h e i r own enhanced s e l f - d e f e n c e and i n the p r o v i s i o n of bases and f a c i l i t i e s f o r the U.S.'s forward-deployed f o r c e s . Lehman views t h i s p r o p o s a l i n g l o b a l terms and b e l i e v e s that the r e a l i t y of the S o v i e t t h r e a t makes the design of a g l o b a l s t r a t e g y a n e c e s s i t y . As he has been r e c e n t l y quoted as s a y i n g , the r a p i d growth of S o v i e t naval power has " e l i m i n a t e d the o p t i o n of p l a n n i n g f o r a r e g i o n a l l y l i m i t e d naval war with the S o v i e t U n i o n . " 2 5 0 As a g l o b a l s t r a t e g y which aims at the use of naval power to enforce a balance of power with i t s c h i e f adversary, which c o n t r o l s the ' h e a r t l a n d ' of E u r a s i a , i t makes l i t t l e r e f e r e n c e to any p a r t to be played by a l l i e s who occupy the rimland. I t appears t h a t , at most, these a l l i e s are expected to play an i n d i r e c t r o l e through the instrument of t h e i r a l l i a n c e s with the U n i t e d S t a t e s . In recent years, a number of v a r i a t i o n s to the u n i l a t e r a l i s t / m a r i t i m e supremacy argument have appeared. On two p r i n c i p a l counts, these v a r i a t i o n s depart from the l i n e of argument advanced by Lehman: on the i s s u e of the most a p p r o p r i a t e f o r c e s t r u c t u r e , and on the r o l e to be a s c r i b e d to 2 4 9 John F. Lehman J r . , o p . c i t . p.12 2 5 0 The New York Times A p r i l 11, 1982 108 America's p r i n c i p a l a l l i e s i n p a r t i c u l a r r e g i o n s . J e f f r e y Record c r i t i c i z e s the s t r a t e g y advocated by Weinberger and Lehman f o r encouraging h o r i z o n t a l e s c a l a t i o n of any c o n f l i c t between the U.S. and the S o v i e t Union. He expresses concern that the a d d i t i o n of a 3 c a r r i e r b a t t l e group, as proposed by Lehman, would not meet the requirements of a prolonged m u l t i f r o n t war, as envisaged by that s t r a t e g y . In h i s view, the gap between U.S. m i l i t a r y commitments and c a p a b i l i t i e s would i n f a c t be w i d e n e d . 2 5 1 Record a l s o advocates a m a r i t i m e - o r i e n t e d s t r a t e g y which c a l l s f o r a l a r g e r navy of between 600 and 800 s h i p s . However, as d i s t i n c t from Lehman, he recommends investment i n s m a l l e r , l e s s expensive, v e s s e l s r a t h e r than i n the c o n s t r u c t i o n of a i r c r a f t c a r r i e r s . Emphasis i s a l s o p l a c e d upon the development of a s m a l l e r , more t a c t i c a l l y capable sea-based i n t e r v e n t i o n f o r c e to r e p l a c e the RDF. 2 5 2 In h i s view, the U.S. should have a f o r c e s t r u c t u r e which both e x p l o i t s America's seapower advantage and i s designed towards meeting non-Nato c o n t i n g e n c i e s . While a c c e p t i n g a need f o r s u b s t a n t i a l ground f o r c e s i n t h i s s t u c t u r e , Record b e l i e v e s that a new maritime-based s t r a t e g y should a v o i d " l a r g e - s c a l e s u s t a i n e d i n l a n d combat on the E u r a s i a n landmass a g a i n s t f i r s t - l i n e S o v i e t f o r c e s . " 2 5 3 Rear Admiral Robert Hanks(ret.) a l s o advocates a maritime 2 5 1 J e f f r e y Record, "A 3-War S t r a t e g y " i n Washington Post March 22, 1982 p.Al5: Record r e f e r s to a statement by Undersecretary of Defense I k l e which notes the p o s s i b l e widening of t h i s gap. 2 5 2 Robert J . Hanks and J e f f r e y Record, U.S. S t r a t e g y at the  Crossroads: Two Views (Cambridge, Mass.: 1982) p.36 2 5 3 i b i d . pTW. 1 0 9 s t r a t e g y . Hanks i s c r i t i c a l of the Reagan A d m i n i s t r a t i o n ' s defence funding and says that while i t appears to recognize a maritime imperative, i t i s too ambiguous to represent a fundamental s h i f t i n s t r a t e g y . He c a l l s f o r a s t r a t e g y and an accompanying f o r c e s t r u c t u r e which w i l l enable the U.S. to p r o t e c t i t s v i t a l i n t e r e s t s i n p a r t s of the world other than j u s t those i n Western Europe. He proposes a f o r c e s t r u c t u r e which p l a c e s heavy emphasis on "high performance a i r c r a f t launched from sea-based p l a t f o r m s . . " 2 5 " These sea-based p l a t f o r m s , h i s s u p e r c a r r i e r s , should have l a r g e docks and be nuclear-powered. While the s u p e r c a r r i e r s form the core of any enhanced f o r c e - p r o j e c t i o n c a p a b i l i t y , Hanks a l s o argues f o r an i n c r e a s e i n the number of f r i g a t e s . These f r i g a t e s , so he says, are " i d e a l l y s u i t e d f o r . . . t h e low t h r e a t areas..and f o r antisubmarine p r o t e c t i o n of the sea l a n e s . . " . 2 5 5 In essence, Hanks' v a r i a n t c a l l s f o r the development of a f o r c e which would enable the U.S. to e f f e c t i v e l y i n t e r v e n e i n a p a r t i c u l a r r e gion when necessary, rather than seek any form of sea c o n t r o l . M o b i l i t y and s u s t a i n a b i l i t y appear to be the two key c r i t e r i a upon which Hanks would base h i s f o r c e . B e l i e v i n g f o r e i g n bases to be p o l i t i c a l l y too p r e c a r i o u s , he argues that the super-c a r r i e r s g i v e the U.S. assured p l a t f o r m s from which to p r o j e c t i t s t a c t i c a l a i r f o r c e . 2 5 6 2 S " Robert J . Hanks i b i d , p.65 2 5 5 i b i d , p.67 2 5 6 i b i d . p.64: In the v o l a t i l e Southwest A s i a n r e g i o n , Hanks c i t e s Oman, Somalia and Kenya as g i v i n g access which cannot be assured i n times of c r i s i s . 1 10 Admiral Stansfield Turner and George Thibault have j o i n t l y attacked Hanks' advocacy of the large-scale a i r c r a f t c a r r i e r . They have argued that "there is not an overwhelming requirement for large c a r r i e r s to perform the a i r superiority r o l e " 2 5 7 and that "for simple survival our naval forces must be distributed over more s h i p s . " 2 5 8 In their view, the supercarriers are vulnerable and too expensive and they recommend that rather than having a few supercarriers, the investment be made in a greater number of smaller c a r r i e r s . Turner and Thibault's maritime-based strategy i s for sea control and, for them, manoeuvrability i s more important than firepower in any force structure that i s developed. 2 5 9 Sea control i s seen as e s s e n t i a l to give the U.S. the "capability for f o r c i b l e entry" because of the uncertainty as to where the U.S. w i l l next need to turn to protect i t s i n t e r e s t s . Like Robert Hanks, they discount foreign bases as being too unreliable for future missions of intervention. Turner has argued elsewhere that against a multithreat scenario (which he believes to -exist), U.S. m i l i t a r y preparations must be more f l e x i b l e than can be provided by fixed bases with their prepositioned f o r c e s . 2 6 0 The authors pay close attention to Third World 5 7 S t a n s f i e l d Turner and George Thibault, "Preparing for the Unexpected: The Need for a New M i l i t a r y Strategy" in Foreign  A f f a i r s Vol.61 ( F a l l 1982) p.122 at 130 5 8 i b i d . p. 126 5 9 In summary, their strategy c a l l s for forces for sea control, amphibious force projection and follow-on ground and a i r forces. 6 0 S t a n s f i e l d Turner, "Toward a New Defense Strategy" in The New  York Times May 10, 1981 p.VI15 111 c o n t i n g e n c i e s and s t r e s s the need t o r e s t r u c t u r e the M a r i n e Corps and t o r e g r o u p the amphibious l a n d i n g c r a f t i n t o s m a l l e r groups; t o improve the a i r l i f t c a p a b i l i t y ; and t o r e s t r u c t u r e the army and a i r f o r c e so as t o make them more f l e x i b l e and manoeuvrable f o r "worldwide i n t e r v e n t i o n " . 2 6 1 J u s t as f o r e i g n bases a r e not g i v e n a prominent r o l e by t h e s e a u t h o r s , so too do they a s c r i b e l i t t l e importance t o America's a l l i e s . W h i l e Turner has argued t h a t the a l l i e s s h o u l d be encouraged t o c o n t r i b u t e t o a q u i c k - r e a c t i o n f o r c e , he and T h i b a u l t b e l i e v e t h a t "our d e c l a r i n g an i n t e n t t o s h i f t over time t o a m a r i t i m e s t r a t e g y . . . c o u l d p r o v i d e the impetus t o the Europeans t o take t h e i r r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s more s e r i o u s l y " . They a r e , of c o u r s e , a d d r e s s i n g t h e i r v e r s i o n of a m a r i t i m e s t r a t e g y . 2 6 2 I m p l i c i t i n t h i s s u g g e s t i o n i s a p o l i c y of retrenchment of American f o r c e s i n Western Europe. One must be somewhat s k e p t i c a l about how such a p o l i c y w i l l n e c e s s a r i l y impel i t s Nato a l l i e s t o enhance t h e i r m i l i t a r y c a p a b i l i t i e s . The same c o u l d be s a i d , w i t h even g r e a t e r f o r c e , about Japan. In the absence of s p e c i f i c d e t a i l s as t o how a l l i e s w i l l supplement U.S. f o r c e s , one must c o n c l u d e t h a t the a u t h o r s do not b e l i e v e the a l l i e s p l a y any e f f e c t i v e r o l e i n t h e i r s t r a t e g i c p o l i c y . Not a l l proponents of a m a r i t i m e - b a s e d s t r a t e g y b e l i e v e t h a t f o r e i g n bases a r e u n r e l i a b l e , i f n e c e s s a r y a t a l l . A d m i r a l H a r r y T r a i n , Nato Commander f o r the A t l a n t i c , has been quoted as 2 6 1 Turner and T h i b a u l t , o p . c i t . p.130 2 6 2 i b i d . p.133 1 1 2 saying that for intervention in the Third World, bases are necessary: "For a credible deterrent, we've got to have the base and we've got to have the a b i l i t y to expand the forces there rapidly from the U.S. or from Europe." 2 6 3 The proponent of a maritime-based strategy who comes closest to advocating a role for America's a l l i e s in such a strategy i s Admiral Robert L.J. Long, U.S. Commander-in-Chief P a c i f i c . He argues, in general terms, of the need for the c o l l e c t i v e resolve of the U.S. and i t s a l l i e s in the East Asian- P a c i f i c region to counter what he sees as numerous separate challenges in the r e g i o n . 2 6 ' While Long refers to improvements in U.S.-Japan b i l a t e r a l planning and the in s t i g a t i o n of combined m i l i t a r y exercises, increases in Japan's cost-sharing of U.S. bases, and i t s provision of economic assistance to other c o u n t r i e s , 2 6 5 he does not indicate how Japan would play more than a general f a c i l i t a t i n g role in any U.S. strategy. His statement that "we are dependent on support from our friends and a l l i e s " rings hollow when one realizes that there i s no d i r e c t role required of a l l i e s in the "multinational strategy" of which he speaks. 2 6 6 6 3 Drew Middleton, "Navy's Plight: Too Many Seas to Cover" in The  New York Times February 1, 1981 p.3: Train i s also quoted as stressing the importance of having land-based forces in the Persian Gulf. 6 4 Admiral Robert L.J. Long, Testimony before the U.S.Congress. House. Armed Services Committee, M i l i t a r y Posture Hearings 1981 p.999 6 5 i b i d . p.1003 6 6 i b i d . p.1002 1 1 3 The unilateralist/maritime supremacy policy, as advocated by Navy Secretary Lehman and others in the Reagan Administration, ascribes l i t t l e i f any role for America's a l l i e s . The U.S. i s seen primarily as a naval power and this policy lays heavy emphasis on force projection around the periphery of the Eurasian landmass. Japan, as an "island nation" on the periphery of the Eurasian landmass would seem to be a prime candidate for a s s i s t i n g the U.S. in the projection of force on to and around the landmass. However, the Lehman policy f a i l s to s p e l l out tasks required of America's a l l i e s beyond their being simple f a c i l i t a t o r s of U.S. power projection. The only reference to Japan performing a role in such a strategy i s merely in terms of i t providing for i t s own defence and in the sharing of the cost of U.S. bases on i t s t e r r i t o r y . Other variants of t h i s policy ascribe no role to the U.S.'s a l l i e s and view them as unreliable in the execution of any global strategy. Where a unilateralist/maritime supremacy policy does refer to the importance of the a l l i e s , there i s no accompanying reference to a s p e c i f i c and d i r e c t role in the strategy to indicate what the " a l l i e d contributions" might be. C. THE COALITION/DEFENCE ARGUMENT The c o a l i t i o n defence argument, the other side of the debate, found greater favour with the Nixon and Carter Administrations than with the current Administration. In contrast to the previous argument, i t c a l l s for a direct and 114 sequential application of force on the Eurasian landmass. This application of force would be done primarily through the use of U.S. ground f o r c e s . 2 6 7 While th i s description of the argument may now be somewhat dated and appear a l i t t l e s i m p l i s t i c , the current c o a l i t i o n defence strategy does in fact view i t s central objective as being the maintenance of e f f e c t i v e c a p a b i l i t i e s on land. The chief proponent of a c o a l i t i o n defence strategy i s Robert W. Komer, Defense Undersecretary for Policy in the Carter Administration. Komer has c a l l e d for p r i o r i t y to be given to a, c o l l e c t i v e e f f o r t based on c o a l i t i o n conventional burden-sharing. 2 6 8 In rejecting what he c a l l s the 'ambitious strategy' of the Reagan Administration, Komer believes that for a deterrent strategy to be viable, America's a l l i a n c e s must be rejuvenated and i t must be based upon a c o a l i t i o n defense posture on the Eurasian p e r i p h e r y . 2 6 9 Komer acknowledges the r e a l i t y of the U.S. g e o p o l i t i c a l position as an island nation and accepts the need to acquire maritime supremacy. However, he says t h i s can only be achieved through the development of a naval force which aims at sea control rather than offensive force projection against the Soviet U n i o n . 2 7 0 In his view, the presently e x i s t i n g twelve 6 7 John M. C o l l i n s , Grand Strategy (Annapolis, Maryland: 1973) p. 1 5. 6 8 Robert. W. Komer, "Maritime Strategy v C o a l i t i o n Defense" in Foreign A f f a i r s Vol.60 No.5 (Summer 1982) p.1127 6 9 i b i d . p.1133 7 0 Robert W. Komer, Maritime Strategy or C o a l i t i o n Defense? (Cambridge, Mass.: 1984) p.36 1 1 5 modern c a r r i e r battle groups would be a s u f f i c i e n t naval force for his defensive 'sea control' m i s s i o n . 2 7 1 In arguing against the Reagan Administration's stress on offensive c a r r i e r operations against land targets, Komer refers to the Soviet Union's g e o p o l i t i c a l advantages as a land power with i t s internal l i n e s of communication and the a b i l i t y to change i t s theatre of operations more rapidly than the U.S. He believes that the only strategy to counter t h i s e f f e c t i v e l y i s a sequential one based on a force structure which emphasises manoeuvrability over f i r e p o w e r . 2 7 2 For example, Komer says that simply "bottling up the Soviet P a c i f i c Fleet and a few c a r r i e r strikes at Soviet naval bases could not seriously damage Soviet war p o t e n t i a l " . To e f f e c t i v e l y challenge Soviet power projection the U.S. must be able to swing forces from one area to another to meet p a r t i c u l a r contingencies. This would involve, as with.the u n i l a t e r a l i s t / maritime supremacists, the f l e x i b l e use of sea and a i r power rather than ground forces. However, where Komer d i f f e r s from them i s in his argument that these forces be seen as complementary to the ground forces which are required to protect the U.S.'s core interests outside the Western hemisphere: Japan, and e s p e c i a l l y , Western Europe. In l i k e tone, General Donn Starry of the U.S. Army, has c r i t i c i z e d the Reagan Administration's force expansion plans and says that "...by emphasizing warships, Marines and Army airborne forces at 2 7 1 In Komer's opinion, additional a i r c r a f t c a r r i e r s would starve the other armed services: i b i d . p.58 2 7 2 i b i d . p.63 1 16 the expense of current developments, they could end up s a c r i f i c i n g the U.S. mi l i t a r y control in Europe and South K o r e a . " 2 7 3 The other prong of the c o a l i t i o n defence strategy i s i t s advocacy of a policy placing high p r i o r i t y on the contributions of a l l i e s in the common defence. Komer sees U.S. reference to i t s a l l i e s as both necessary and d e s i r a b l e . 2 7 " Due to what he sees as the presently inadequate U.S. defensive c a p a b i l i t i e s , the addition of a l l i e d contributions would be necessary in order to gain greater conventional strength at p o l i t i c a l l y acceptable cost. As well, because of the fact that many areas "lying under the Soviet threat" are important to America's a l l i e s , they should be contributing to a system of c o l l e c t i v e defence, as of r i g h t . 2 7 5 The a l l i e d contributions that Komer has in mind include the provision of greater l o g i s t i c s and other host nation support of U.S. forces; the payment of a l l peacetime stationing costs of U.S. forward-deployed forces. In the case of Japan, Komer says that i t should take f u l l r e s p o n s i b i l i t y for ground and a i r defence as well as protection of the nearby sea lanes to a range of 1000 miles. 2 7 6 While Robert Komer sees d e f i n i t e advantages in the c o a l i t i o n defence approach, including the expansion of the 2 7 3 George C. Wilson, "In Policy S h i f t , Pentagon Seeks Naval Superiority" in The Washington Post December 14, 1981 p.A1 2 7 4 Robert W. Komer, Maritime Strategy or Co a l i t i o n Defense? p.77 2 7 5 i b i d , p.71 2 7 6 i b i d , p.99 1 1 7 c o l l e c t i v e U.S. and a l l i e d defence e f f o r t , the r a t i o n a l i s a t i o n of defence missions, and cooperation on research and development, he recognizes a number of c r i t i c a l flaws. In p a r t i c u l a r , he believes that a c o a l i t i o n posture has yet to be developed which could be implemented at " p o l i t i c a l l y acceptable cost" to either the U.S. or i t s a l l i e s . 2 7 7 As well, the a l l i e s are yet to r e a l i z e , so he says, the need for a strong conventional deterrent. Such a posture must also contend with the powerful forces of nationalism which advocate individual national f o r c e s . 2 7 8 The c o a l i t i o n defence strategy finds both m i l i t a r y and c i v i l i a n support in the United States. In recent testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee, Admiral J.T. Howe argued that the U.S. did not have the choice of "going i t a l o n e " . 2 7 9 In supporting the argument of a l l i e d contributions in supplementation rather than in substitution of U.S. forces, he said that, as to Japan, the "setting of an end strength for U.S. forces...would...be u n f o r t u n a t e . " 2 8 0 Likewise, Admiral Harry Train, Nato At l a n t i c Commander has been quoted as stressing the importance of a l l i e d bases and the positioning of U.S. army units in c r i t i c a l a r e a s . 2 8 1 Harold Brown, the former U.S. Secretary of Defense, c a l l s 2 7 7 i b i d , p.77 2 7 8 i b i d , p.94 2 7 9 Admiral J.T.Howe, Testimony before the U.S.Congress. Senate. Armed Services Committee. Hearings, International Security  Issues (Washington, D.C: 1981) p.23 2 8 0 i b i d . p.25 2 8 1 Drew Middleton, "Navy's P l i g h t : Too Many Seas to Cover", op.cit . p.3 1 18 for a c o a l i t i o n strategy which would emphasise manoevrability and f l e x i b i l i t y . While rejecting the idea of any major increase in U.S. forces in the East Asian region, Brown believes that Japan and the U.S. must decide on what constitutes a " f a i r d i v i s i o n of r e s p o n s i b i l i t y " in the r e g i o n . 2 8 2 He considers that the present d i v i s i o n of security r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s as u n r e a l i s t i c and unhealthy and argues that Japan must take r e s p o n s i b i l i t y for those "functional and geographic areas most immediate to i t s needs". 2 8 3 Another writer to endorse the c o a l i t i o n i s t strategy is P h i l i p Van Slyck. While r e f e r r i n g to America's ultimate r e s p o n s i b i l i t y for maintaining the global power balance, Van Slyck advocates the establishment of an "open-ended machinery for closer continuing consultation and contingency planning" between America's p r i n c i p a l a l l i e s . 2 8 ' ' This proposal is predicated on the existence of both the "capacity and the w i l l (of the a l l i e s ) to expand and project contributions to the common defense." As to Japan, Van Slyck argues that i t has already accepted certain special obligations such as the provision of external assistance to aid in the economic modernisation programs being undertaken in China, South Korea and the ASEAN c o u n t r i e s . 2 8 5 8 2 Harold Brown, Thinking About National Security (Boulder, Colorado: 1983) p.140 8 3 i b i d , p.131 Brown refers to a i r defence, ASW, and control of the nearby a i r space and seas as well as 1000 miles of the sea lanes of communication. 8 t t P h i l i p Van Slyck, Strategies for the 1980s (Westport, Conn.: 1981) p.89 8 5 i b i d , p.86 119 While Van Slyck envisages a series of b i l a t e r a l a l l i a n c e s rather than the establishment of a grand a l l i a n c e , other writers do see the p o s s i b i l i t y of setting up such a grand a l l i a n c e between the U.S., the Nato countries and Japan. For example, the A t l a n t i c Working Group c a l l s on the U.S. and a l l a l l i e s (who have the m i l i t a r y and p o l i t i c a l c a p a b i l i t y ) to immediately strengthen their defence c a p a b i l i t i e s so that U.S. forces could be deployed to c r i t i c a l areas such as the Middle E a s t . 2 8 6 This Group considers t h i s ' i n d i r e c t ' a l l i e d contributions option to be the most feasible but also advocates a 'direct contributions' option as a means of implementing a multitheatre strategy. Under the exercise of th i s option, the Group envisages the deployment of a m u l t i l a t e r a l force to c r i t i c a l areas of the w o r l d . 2 8 7 In recent years, c r i t i c i s m s of both the unilateralist/maritime supremacy and c o a l i t i o n defence strategies have appeared in the United States. One example i s the a r t i c l e by Dunn and Staudenmaier who have proposed an alt e r n a t i v e to the above two schools. It i s their view that both schools r i s k nuclear escalation: the unilateralist/maritime supremacy school by adopting a war-widening posture; and the c o a l i t i o n defence school by threatening the use of nuclear weapons to compensate for a lack of adequate or appropriate 2 8 6 U. Alexis Johnson, et a l . (eds.), The Common Security  Interests of Japan, the United States and Nato (Cambridge, Mass.: 1981 ) p.15 2 8 7 i b i d . 120 conventional forces( the ' t r i p wire'). The alt e r n a t i v e which Dunn and Staudenmaier present i s based upon the maintenance of superpower c o n f l i c t avoidance. They advocate transferring defence funds from Western Europe to a s t r a t e g i c a l l y mobile force with Third World missions. Signa l l i n g a close resemblance to the c o a l i t i o n defence strategy, of which they would not approve, the authors c a l l for a clear d i s t i n c t i o n between America's v i t a l and secondary interests and for the adoption of a c o a l i t i o n warfare approach. 2 8 8 As to Japan, Dunn and Staudenmaier specify that their approach would mean that Japan would be required to play a greater defence role. Once Japan had accepted greater r e s p o n s i b i l i t y , the U.S. would be able, emphasising sea control rather than maritime supremacy, to swing i t s forces in that region and in the P a c i f i c across to meet p a r t i c u l a r c o n t i n g e n e i e s 2 8 9 There are to be found in this a l t e r n a t i v e proposal many s i m i l a r i t i e s with Robert Komer's c o a l i t i o n defence strategy. Both advocate enhanced strategic mobility forces; both c a l l for sea control rather than maritime supremacy; and both emphasise the use of a l l i e s in meeting threats to the security of the U.S.'s global interests. However, one should not overlook the differences in approach: Komer advocates a 'balanced force 8 Keith A. Dunn and William 0. Staudenmaier, "Strategy for Survival" in Foreign Policy No.52 ( F a l l , 1983) p.22 at 38-39 9 i b i d . p.40 121 structure' as the means by which the U.S. adequately protects i t s interests and those of i t s a l l i e s , while Dunn and Staudenmaier see the development of a feasible, suitable and acceptable strategy coming from an emphasis not on the force structure but on the p o l i t i c a l ends to be a c h i e v e d . 2 9 0 Accepting that the U.S. has limited resources, Dunn and Staudenmaier's strategy c a l l s on the U.S. to c l e a r l y d i s tinguish between v i t a l and other interests and avoid both superpower confrontation and c o n f l i c t escalation unless a v i t a l interest impels such a p o l i c y . 2 9 1 It i s a policy which draws from both of the other schools and c a l l s for a blending of both force structures in such a fashion as to encourage mobility and f l e x i b i l i t y . Nuclear deterrence i s an important part of the strategy, but the authors f a i l to c l a r i f y just exactly where and when reliance s h i f t s from non-nuclear to nuclear deterrence. The strategy's hybrid q u a l i t y may well be one of i t s appealing c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s but, at the same time, i t r e f l e c t s an obvious uncertainty about the global policy and concomitant force structure that should be adopted. Another broad c r i t i c i s m of the chief policy arguments of the debate i s given by Michael Vlahos. In his view, the construction of the debate into opposing camps of "extreme schools of thought" i s specious and produces a misleading 2 9 0 These differences are exposed in an exchange of l e t t e r s between Dunn and Staudenmaier and Komer: Foreign Policy (Winter 1983-84) pp.176-178 2 9 1 op.cit. p.40 122 c h o i c e . 2 9 2 Vlahos gives general support to the c o a l i t i o n defence approach and argues that while the U.S. must dire c t i t s attention away from Western Europe, the U.S. must not withdraw a l l i t s standing forces from Nato. In Vlahos' opinion, the essential need that must be addressed in designing a strategy for the U.S. i s that no region of the world be abandoned. In order to meet th i s need, he argues that the armed services must be integrated in such a way as to provide a "combined-arms army with global m o b i l i t y . " 2 9 3 Whether one focusses on the unilateralist/maritime supremacy argument or any of i t s variants or for that matter the c o a l i t i o n defence appraoch, one rarely finds reference to s p e c i f i c tasks or missions for a l l i e s to perform within the execution of that poli c y . This may well be by deliberate design in the case of the former school but in the case of the c o a l i t i o n defence argument. one wonders whether the proponents are s u f f i c i e n t l y concerned with the f e a s i b i l i t y and s u i t a b i l i t y of the s p e c i f i c tasks and missions that could be assigned to the U.S.'s a l l i e s . A brief examination of cer t a i n tasks and missions, either already being performed or recently requested of Japan, w i l l follow. 2 9 2 Michael Vlahos, "Maritime Strategy versus Continental Commitment" in Orbis ( F a l l 1982) p.583 at 587 2 9 3 i b i d . p.588 1 23 D. PROPOSED JAPANESE MISSIONS WITHIN AN AMERICAN STRATEGIC  POLICY The most important task which various U.S. strategic thinkers and pr a c t i t i o n e r s seek from Japan i s the protection of the sea lanes of communication which extend to the east and west of Japan's home islands. In 1981. Prime Minister Suzuki suggested that Japan would provide "naval protection for a perimeter of several hundred miles around Japan and in commercial sea lanes extending 1,000 nautical miles from the s h o r e l i n e " . 2 9 * Current Prime Minister Nakasone has also suggested that Japan's SDF undertake such a task. However, prominent Japanese scholars have pointed out that Japan's SDF i s incapable of performing such a task on i t s own and w i l l require the assistance of the U.S. 2 9 5 The major threats to the sea lanes of communication would probably come from submarines and a i r c r a f t , and on both counts, the SDF would be in some d i f f i c u l t y in attempting to meet such threats. The Japanese National Defense Program Outline of 1976 only c a l l e d for the possession of one combat-ready escort f l o t i l l a to undertake a sea lanes of communication mission. Given the distances involved, both American and Japanese writers concede the d i f f i c u l t y of providing such protection against submarines, even in peacetime. 2 9 6 As to countering a i r attacks, 2 9 * Quoted in The New York Times May 9, 1981 2 9 5 Okumiya Masatake, op.cit. p.18; and Yonosuke Nagai, quoted in Osamu Kaihara, op.cit. p.56 2 9 6 Paul Nitze, Securing the Seas op.cit. p.313; and Osamu Kaihara, op.c i t . p.59 1 24 most Japanese destroyers do not carry the a i r defence c a p a b i l i t i e s essential to r e s i s t a i r attacks on convoys. As well, there are no Japanese a i r c r a f t with the long-range c a p a b i l i t i e s to cover the distances r e q u i r e d . 2 9 7 It should also be noted that the Japanese do not have any contingency plans for providing merchant ships with self-defence and mobilization c a p a b i l i t i e s which one study has suggested as the most ef f e c t i v e means of protecting convoys in times of war. 2 9 8 The blockade of the three Japanese controlled s t r a i t s between the Sea of Japan and the Western P a c i f i c Ocean has also been suggested as a mission for the Japanese to perform in times of U.S.-Soviet Union confrontation. Apart from probable domestic Japanese protests at such action, the m i l i t a r y force does not seem to be adequate to perform the task. The present Japanese surveillance and minesweeping ca p a b i l i t y of the SDF consists of only one d i v i s i o n of three submarines in each of the three s t r a i t s . 2 9 9 According to a recent U.S. report, the Japanese force operating in the s t r a i t s would need to be doubled i f i t was to survey adequately a l l naval t r a f f i c passing through the s t r a i t s . 3 0 0 While the Japanese Defense Agency appears keen to improve the SDF's mining c a p a b i l i t i e s and to block the s t r a i t s 2 9 7 Mike M. Mochizuki and Michael Nacht, op.cit. p.133 2 9 8 The A t l a n t i c Council Working Group: Paul Nitze et a l . , op.  c i t . p.318. 2 9 ^ This d i v i s i o n is accompanied by antisubmarine warfare helicopters and two minesweeper f l o t i l l a s . 3 0 0 Report of U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency to U.S. Congress, Japan's Contribution to M i l i t a r y S t a b i l i t y in Northeast Asia (Washington, D.C: 1980) p.33 125 should circumstances demand i t , i t appears just as eager to ensure that such action is only done with the cooperation of the U.S., and then only after Japanese t e r r i t o r y has been a t t a c k e d . 3 0 1 The importance of the task of blocking the s t r a i t s very much depends upon what proportion of the Soviet P a c i f i c Fleet becomes 'bottled up' in the Sea of Japan at the beginning of h o s t i l i t i e s . 3 0 2 Japanese reluctance to commit themselves too strongly on t h i s issue i s no doubt the product of both a fear of Soviet r e p r i s a l s and a fear of being drawn into expanding i t s Maritime SDF beyond what i t considers i t s prime mission of defending the sea approaches and coastal waters of Japan. Regardless of which policy argument comes to dominate U.S. strategy, the U.S. would seek to have Japan increase i t s share of the costs of the U.S. bases and f a c i l i t i e s presently on Japanese t e r r i t o r y . Should h o s t i l i t i e s break out between the U.S. and the Soviet Union, these bases would, understandably, take on added importance in aiding the projection of U.S. force in the region as well as contribute to the security of Japan i t s e l f . For both reasons, but p a r t i c u l a r l y for the l a t t e r reason, American writers have c a l l e d on Japan to enhance i t s f i n a n c i a l contributions to the running of the bases in peacet ime. 3 0 3 3 0 1 Mike M. Mochizuki and Michael Nacht, op.cit. p.133 3 0 2 S e i i c h i r o Onishi, "Japan's Self-Defense Requirements & C a p a b i l i t i e s " in U.Alexis Johnson e t . a l . (eds.), op.cit. p.160 3 0 3 William R. Feeney, "The P a c i f i c Basing System & U.S. Security" in William T. Tow and William R. Feeney, (eds.), (1982) p.171 1 26 The value of these bases and f a c i l i t i e s to the U.S. cannot be overestimated. Not only do they substantially reduce America's 'reaction time' and the costs of bringing in available assets, but they permit the U.S. to undertake conveniently, missions in either the Western P a c i f i c or in Southeast Asia. As well, Japan's proximity to the Asian mainland and to the Korean Peninsula in p a r t i c u l a r is very useful for the projection of either a i r power or the u p l i f t of U.S. ground forces. The Japanese role in this regard would only be a f a c i l i t a t i n g one, but a c r i t i c a l one a l l the same. For the Japanese, the U.S. bases and f a c i l i t i e s may well be evidence of a U.S. commitment to their security, but they also hold a dual v u l n e r a b i l i t y in the minds of these people. They represent the Japanese 'repayment' for the American security guarantee as well as make Japan a potential target of Soviet aggression. For either reason, Japanese public opinion may well seek, p a r t i c u l a r l y in a time of c r i s i s , to l i m i t i f not end the current basing arrangements. If these current arrangements are to remain substantially unaltered, then the U.S. needs to recognize that Japan's provision of them and contributions to their maintenance i s e s s e n t i a l l y a trade-off against taking greater r e s p o n s i b i l i t y for i t s own defence. The c o a l i t i o n defence s t r a t e g i s t s argue that Japan could take responsibiIty for regional security in Northeast Asia. If t h i s were done, so the policy goes, then U.S. forces could be freed and sh i f t e d to more urgent theatres of operation. Quite obviously, for Japan to adopt such a role there would need to be 127 a substantial build-up of i t s SDF. In p a r t i c u l a r , the Japanese would have to give attention to developing a force to perform counterforce missions. R e a l i s t i c a l l y , the l i k e l i h o o d of the Japanese adopting such a defence posture, in the short or medium term, i s very low indeed. The presence of the U.S. forces in the region, the public mood which gives only q u a l i f i e d support to the SDF, and the low Japanese estimation of a Soviet threat a l l argue against the adoption of t h i s role. Former U.S. Defense Secretary Brown can argue that the Japanese should make a "series of m i l i t a r y improvements" in the event of U.S. forces in Northeast Asia being sent elsewhere, 3 0" but the l o g i c a l extension of the argument must be that for Japan to so improve i t s SDF, i t would be i n v i t i n g the use of this v a r i a t i o n of the 'swing strategy' by the U.S. This brief examination of some of the important roles and missions that have been presented in the U.S. debate has revealed that the U.S. w i l l face problems, in some cases almost insurmountable ones, in having the Japanese adopt them in any e f f e c t i v e fashion. The Americans cannot simply present the Japanese with a l i s t of tasks that i t wants undertaken and expect that i t s SDF w i l l be automatically improved to meet these demands. Such an expectation would be f a i l i n g to take account of the nature of the Japanese domestic p o l i t i c a l environment and the impact that i t has had and w i l l continue to have on Japanese security policy-making. 3 0 4 Harold Brown, op.cit. p. 122 1 28 The focus of t h i s chapter has been upon the continuing debate over a U.S. strategic policy and the role that a l l i e s such as Japan are expected to perform in the execution of that p o l i c y . Understandably, the missions and tasks expected of a l l i e s have concentrated on m i l i t a r y contributions. Any non-m i l i t a r y contributions that Japan may make, such as in the areas of economics or diplomacy have either been dismissed as a n c i l l a r y or ignored in the American po l i c y arguments. Japan's policy of m i l i t a r y r e s t r a i n t and i t s contributions to economic s t a b i l i t y , while lauded in some American q u a r t e r s , 3 0 5 have gone largely ignored by the debate. E. THE AMERICAN DEBATE ASSESSED Protagonists within the debate have been keen to expose what they perceive as differences between the i r proposals and those of others. There i s , however, a good deal of common ground between the arguments and both reveal similar f a i l i n g s of analysis. The unilateralist/maritime variants are more concerned with how the U.S. w i l l be able to project i t s power most e f f e c t i v e l y , either around the rimlands of Eurasia or f l e x i b l y into troublesome regions. This would be done almost exclusively with American forces which would rely heavily upon their naval components. A l l i e s are either ignored or discounted into a f a c i l i t a t i n g r o l e . U.S. bases on a l l i e d t e r r i t o r y are viewed 3 0 5 Report of the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, o p . c i t . 1 2 9 as no more than staging points for U.S. forces. The c o a l i t i o n defence variants give greater mention of the role a l l i e s can play as integral components of a U.S. strategic p o l i c y . However, proponents of this p o l i c y , as a rule, do not move beyond g e n e r a l i t i e s to document s p e c i f i c tasks and missions for a l l i e s . The s p e c i f i c tasks ascribed to Japan are designed to r e l i e v e U.S. forces of these missions rather than to give Japan a d i r e c t role within a U.S. strategic p o l i c y . Only one argument refers to the d i r e c t contributions of the a l l i e s to a m u l t i l a t e r a l force. The c o a l i t i o n i s t s ' mix of forces appears, at least on the surface, to be a more sensible alternative to the u n i l a t e r a l i s t s ' concentration on the navy. Their c a l l for a naval force that would be s u f f i c i e n t for defensive 'sea control' is seen as complementary to a need for U.S. ground forces to protect the 'core' interests (that i s , non-Western Hemisphere) of Western Europe and Japan. The unilateralist/maritime supremacy argument emphasises manoeuvrability over firepower. The Lehman variant, which favours large a i r c r a f t c a r r i e r s as the central component of a f l e x i b l e battle group, aims at the projection of U.S. power from the sea rather than from fixed land bases. Seeking to s t r i k e the Soviet Union anywhere and everywhere where they are vulnerable, these proponents believe that c r i s e s w i l l most l i k e l y occur away from the European theatre. The c o a l i t i o n defence argument also places importance on the need to have a f l e x i b l e and mobile force. However, i t s focus i s on, what one supporter c a l l e d , g e o p o l i t i c a l strength rather than g e o p o l i t i c a l 1 3 0 p r i o r i t y . 3 0 6 Its basic postulate i s that i t i s both necessary and desirable that the U.S. develop a strategy that wholeheartedly embraces i t s a l l i e s . Both sides of the debate agree that U.S. commitments are outpacing i t s resources to meet them and that t h i s i s occurring at an accelerating rate. As to the role that a l l i e s can perform in the implementation of the p o l i c y , the two main arguments are based on quite d i f f e r e n t assumptions: the u n i l a t e r a l i s t s believe that a l l i e s are unreliable and are susceptible to accommodation to the Soviet Union; while the c o a l i t i o n defence proponents view the a l l i e s as p o t e n t i a l l y e f f e c t i v e partners in a global defence design. In the l a t t e r ' s view, the a l l i e s simply require greater U.S. s e n s i t i v i t y to their needs and better a l l i a n c e management. Given their assumptions, the u n i l a t e r a l i s t s prescribe and expect no a l l i e d involvement in a U.S. global strategy. P r i n c i p a l a l l i e s are considered to be tentatively r e l i a b l e to the extent that they can provide staging points for U.S. forward-deployed forces. The c o a l i t i o n i s t s , somewhat more optimistic about potential a l l i e d contributions, believe that a cooperative security framework of direct a l l i e d defence contributions can be erected. The two sides of the debate d i f f e r markedly on where they consider the focus of U.S. forces should be: the u n i l a t e r a l i s t s on the 'arc of c r i s i s ' in Southwest Asia, and the c o a l i t i o n i s t s on continental Europe. However, one should not make too much of 3 0 6 Michael Vlahos, op.cit. p.587 131 this for they both lay some emphasis on the mobility and f l e x i b i l i t y of American forces and recognize the need to check what i s commonly seen as Soviet expansion on and around the Eurasian landmass. If one i s to discover a philosophical difference between the two arguments, then perhaps one should look to the unilateralist/maritime supremacists' rejection of a containment policy in favour of a more offensive countervailing posture. In the force structure that each proposes, there i s a s i g n i f i c a n t area of overlap. Both lay some emphasis on manoeuvrability and c a l l for the enhancement of a f l e x i b l e and mobile force to be used in p a r t i c u l a r contingencies. Both believe that sea power provides America's greatest m i l i t a r y potential but disagree as to what proportion of defence resources should be devoted to America's naval forces. There are, however, important differences in the force structures advocated and these relate to both the apportionment of resources amongst the services and between the various theatres of operation. The u n i l a t e r a l i s t s , with t h e i r emphasis on the navy, seek to have resources s h i f t e d to augment forces around the rimlands, and p a r t i c u l a r l y those in Southwest Asia. The c o a l i t i o n i s t s , on the other hand, c a l l for a mix of forces and for the emphasis to remain on land-based forces in Western' Europe, p a r t i c u l a r l y , and in East Asia. The discussion of the debate over a U.S. strategic policy has e s s e n t i a l l y been about i t s global p o l i c y . The r e a l i t y of America's world role demands that any policy for Northeast Asia 1 32 be considered a subset of a global p o l i c y . As we have seen, a global strategic policy i s not only about devising a plan to protect security interests and to deter or meet potential threats, but also involves establishing a force structure that is both appropriate to the plan and economically and p o l i t i c a l l y f e a s i b l e . On a regional basis, a superpower i s naturally concerned that a l l i e s perform roles that are capable of e f f e c t i v e integration into i t s global plan. Japan in Northeast Asia would be no exception. If the strategic debate has revealed anything about possible roles that Japan could perform in i t s region, i t is that the proponents of the various policy arguments find i t d i f f i c u l t , and perhaps inappropriate to specify the sorts of functions that they expect their a l l i e s to perform, be they within an a l l i a n c e structure or simply as security partners of the United States. With respect to Japan, where s p e c i f i c tasks or missions have been mentioned, there has obviously been l i t t l e e f f o r t made to examine the f e a s i b i l i t y of these proposals or to appreciate the potential resistance that they w i l l face from within the Japanese community. As one looks beyond these s p e c i f i c tasks and seeks to understand the broader issue of the nature of Japan's future international role, we fin d ourselves considering the impact of the American strategic debate upon the Japanese security policy debate, and to a much lesser extent, the possible influence of the l a t t e r debate upon the former. In the course of concluding, t h i s interaction and i t s ramifications w i l l be considered. 1 3 3 V. CONCLUSION The Japan-United States security relationship, l i k e a l l others, has both formal and informal c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s . While reference has been made to the Mutual Security and Cooperation Treaty between the two countries, t h i s paper i s more concerned with the dynamic and informal processes of the rel a t i o n s h i p . This 'a l l i a n c e ' can be understood in terms of the changing p o l i t i c a l relationship between the two countries as they seek to aggregate their power and increase their security while retaining their autonomy and i n d i v i d u a l i t y . In seeking to understand the nature of this dynamic relationship, t h i s paper has examined three issues: the threat perceptions within both countries; the ongoing domestic debate over the security policy that Japan should adopt; and the American debate over a strategic policy, both globally and for the Northeast Asian region. In general terms, while ignoring their own q u a l i t a t i v e force improvements, the Americans have emphasized those quantitative improvements of the Soviet Union. An apparent tendency also exists for the Americans to expand the notion of 'threat' and to view the Soviet Union as taking advantage of i n s t a b i l i t y in various regions of the world, and esp e c i a l l y the Third World. As a product of i t s own global view and perceived r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s , the Americans argue that the Soviet Union's force improvements in Northeast Asia are part of a global b u i l d -up and an extension of their p o l i t i c a l contest for worldwide influence. For the Americans, the issue i s not whether the 1 34 S o v i e t m i l i t a r y b u i l d - u p c o n s t i t u t e s a t h r e a t , but r a t h e r what i s the nature and extent of that t h r e a t . Japanese o p i n i o n , on the other hand, appears more o b v i o u s l y d i v i d e d . There are those who support the American p o s i t i o n , represented by the ' m i l i t a r y r e a l i s t s ' and the ' g a u l l i s t s ' , and those, represented by the ' p o l i t i c a l r e a l i s t s ' , who h o l d that i t i s not s u f f i c i e n t that the S o v i e t Union merely hold the m i l i t a r y c a p a b i l i t y to pose a t h r e a t , but that there must be some evidence of an i n t e n t i o n to use that c a p a b i l i t y to harm Japan and i t s i n t e r e s t s . The i s s u e of the S o v i e t occupation of the K u r i l e i s l a n d s i s an exception i n so f a r as l e a d i n g groups i n Japan have argued that while i t does not n e c e s s a r i l y c o n s t i t u t e a t h r e a t , i t i s evidence of some malevolent i n t e n t of the S o v i e t Union towards Japan. Another Japanese view, and one app a r e n t l y l o s i n g favour with the Japanese p u b l i c , i s that represented by the 'unarmed n e u t r a l i s t s ' which holds that the Soviet Union does not c o n s t i t u t e a t h r e a t to the Japanese and that i t i s the ' a l l i a n c e ' with the U.S. that p l a c e s Japan at r i s k . P r e v a i l i n g o p i n i o n appears to c a l l f o r a balanced view of S o v i e t m i l i t a r y t h r e a t p o t e n t i a l i n Northeast A s i a a g a i n s t i t s g e o s t r a t e g i c l i m i t a t i o n s . U n l i k e the Americans, the Japanese are not as prepared to t r a n s l a t e S o v i e t m i l i t a r y power i n t o a t h r e a t to Japanese s e c u r i t y . T h i s i s d e s p i t e the f a c t that o f f i c i a l S o v i e t o p i n i o n would appear to view the Japan-U.S. Treaty and any i n c r e a s e i n Japan's m i l i t a r y c a p a b i l i t y as a t h r e a t to the S o v i e t Union and i t s i n t e r e s t s . 1 3 5 The nature of the changing Japan-U.S. security r e l a t i o n s h i p i s to be found, not merely in analysing responses to external s t i m u l i , such as the regional and global Soviet m i l i t a r y build-up, but also in examining changes in the domestic p o l i t i c a l attitudes in each country. In assessing the l i k e l i h o o d of Japan adopting a more assertive regional security role, reference has been made to the continuing Japanese security p o l i c y debate. Analysis of the debate has been conducted through a discussion of four important interlocking issues. Two of the four issues (Japanese views of the Treaty and Japanese responses to U.S. c a l l s for a m i l i t a r y build-up) d i r e c t l y relate to the Japan-U.S. security relationship. The discussion . of these issues indicated that pr e v a i l i n g opinion sees no reason for Japan to adopt a defence posture independent of the existing U.S.-Japan relationship. However, sharp d i v i s i o n s exist over whether Japan should increase i t s defence spending in " response to ever more insi s t e n t American demands that Japan do so. The other two issues canvassed in th i s review of the debate, while not d i r e c t l y concerned with the U.S.-Japan security relationship, reveal much about the Japanese p o l i t i c a l system and.provide evidence of why Japan has been so reluctant to enhance i t s international role m i l i t a r i l y . Japanese opinion over what i s meant by 'security' i s divided. While a more m i l i t a r i l y - o r i e n t e d view may well be in the ascendant, the 'comprehensive' view, with i t s emphasis upon economic security and other nonmilitary contributions, continues to hold 1 3 6 substantial weight in i n f l u e n t i a l Japanese c i r c l e s . The outcome of t h i s aspect of the debate remains uncertain. The fact that i n f l u e n t i a l Japanese opinion adopts a view of security quite at odds with that of the Americans encourages the view that the mix of Japanese perceptions of their international environment may well be s u b s t a n t i a l l y d i f f e r e n t from those coming from the U.S. Should the U.S. seek to r e d i s t r i b u t e security r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s between i t s e l f and Japan without an appreciation of these d i f f e r e n t conceptual bases, then the l i k e l y result may well be increased stress and tension in the security relationship. Japanese opinion is divided over what kind of security role Japan can and should adopt. These d i v i s i o n s are starkly exposed in the discussion of the i n t e r n a l constraints upon an enhanced m i l i t a r y posture. The m i l i t a r y r e a l i s t s , taking their lead from what they perceive as external pressures (the Soviet m i l i t a r y build-up and the U.S. c a l l s for increased defence spending), believe that c e r t a i n domestic constraints (such as the 'peace' constitution, the public - p a c i f i s t sentiment, and f i s c a l r e s t r a i n t ) can and should be overcome. The p o l i t i c a l r e a l i s t s , while endorsing some increase in defence spending and the adoption of a more assertive international role, emphasise the importance of certain domestic determinants of security p o l i c y -making . P o l i t i c a l r e a l i s t s argue that a Japanese security policy must r e f l e c t the desires of the Japanese people and attempt an accommodation of external and internal demands. American c a l l s 1 37 for increased defence spending must be at least p a r t i a l l y met so as to retain the U.S. commitment, while at the same time, the insular and p a c i f i s t sentiments within domestic public opinion must not be t o t a l l y neglected by the policy-makers.' It i s not so much that the p o l i t i c a l r e a l i s t s believe that security policy-making be made solely with reference to these internal constraints as i t i s seen necessary to balance the internal and external determinants of p o l i c y . In determining the nature of Japan's future international role, the real d i v i s i o n s are not over whether Japan should enhance i t s m i l i t a r y posture but over the extent of and pace at which i t should occur. The predominant Japanese groups agree that any future enhanced m i l i t a r y posture must be discovered by the Japanese people themselves and not be imposed by an external power, such as the United States. To accept that any future Japanese security role w i l l be performed within the general parameters of the U.S.-Japan relat i o n s h i p does not, in th e i r view, mean that the policy d i r e c t i o n i s to be dictated by U.S. strategic and security needs. The security relationship between the U.S. and Japan can no longer be viewed as a pro t e c t o r - c l i e n t state relationship. There i s a growing body of opinion in both countries that neither can be taken for granted and that i f Japan is to be delegated greater security duties, at least in i t s own region, then i t s position v i s - a - v i s the U.S. w i l l most surely have been enhanced. Within the Japanese debate, there is no sizeable body of opinion advocating acquiescence to American demands and l o c a l 1 38 c a l l s for a defence build-up appear motivated by a sincere be l i e f that t h i s i s the road that Japan must inevitably take in the interests of i t s own security. That the Japan-U.S. security r e l a t i o n s h i p may well be evolving into a m i l i t a r y a l l i a n c e becomes apparent when we review a number of recent developments. The Japanese security debate has moved to the right and i s now over the extent of m i l i t a r y contributions that Japan should make and how quickly a more assertive m i l i t a r y posture should be adopted. Recent American c a l l s for increased defence spending have become more s p e c i f i c and have c a l l e d upon Japan to f u l f i l c ertain regional missions. As well these c a l l s appear to have been tempered by an acknowledgment that Japan i s in a similar security position v i s - a - v i s the U.S. as i t s Nato a l l i e s : a p r i n c i p a l a l l y with key regional security r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s for the West. American e f f o r t s to r e d i s t r i b u t e security r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s in Northeast Asia through Japan have, however, encountered resistance through the operation of Japan's Constitution and the Japan-U.S. Treaty. To date, the Americans remain wary about promoting any great change in these for fear of prompting an overreaction in Japan. If Japan i s becoming an a l l y of the U.S. and ceasing to be a security c l i e n t - state, then the role that i s expected of i t within U.S. global and regional strategy w i l l be decided by reference not only to i t s own c a p a b i l i t i e s and to i t s geostrategic p o s i t i o n , but to the r e l a t i v e importance that the U.S. ascribes to i t s a l l i e s in the implementation of i t s 1 3 9 strategic p o l i c y . The examination of the U.S. strategic policy debate has been concerned with U.S. conventional forces and has confined i t s e l f to an analysis of the various policy arguments presented in the debate. It has been concerned with substantive analysis and not with the value judgments that may well underlie the arguments that have been made. The debate's chief p o l i c y arguments are the unilateralist/maritime supremacy argument and the coalition/defence argument. Each has a number of variants and advocates a d i f f e r e n t approach in securing America's global and regional interests and in deterring or meeting potential threats. However, i t i s necessary to distinguish the p o l i c y or approach of each from the force structure i t adopts. To use the force structure as a guide to the p o l i c y argument w i l l only lead us into generalisation and o v e r s i m p l i f i c a t i o n : certain force structures may well appear similar but the p o l i c y approaches upon which they are based may be quite d i f f e r e n t . A difference of emphasis between sea-based and land-based forces c e r t a i n l y exists, but a l l arguments ascribe some importance to manoeuvrability of deployed forces and c a l l for a sea-based mobile and f l e x i b l e force. The policy arguments of the debate do not exhibit e s s e n t i a l l y d i f f e r e n t world views: a l l see a Soviet threat and argue that the U.S. must be able to muster the c a p a b i l i t y to project power worldwide. The e s s e n t i a l difference between the two main schools of thought l i e s in the fact that while the 1 4 0 unilateralist/maritime supremacists see the world b a s i c a l l y in bipolar terms, the coalition/defence proponents believe that the world i s multipolar and the U.S. needs a feasible policy which would include i t s a l l i e s . The former school sees the role of a l l i e s as being merely f a c i l i t a t i v e of' the projection of U.S. power while the l a t t e r school shows a greater readiness to involve a l l i e s d i r e c t l y in the policy implementation process. However, a word of caution i s required. It i s a dangerous exercise to draw these d i s t i n c t i o n s too starkly for what we are examining i s emphasis and tendencies. What may be said for one variant of a p a r t i c u l a r school may well not apply to another variant of the same school. For example, to say that the unilateralist/maritime supremacists advocate the projection of American power from large a i r c r a f t c a r r i e r s would be applicable to John Lehman J r . and Robert Hanks but not to Jeffrey Record or Stansfield Turner, even though a l l belong to that school. In dismissing any d i r e c t role for the a l l i e s , the unilateralist/maritime supremacists argue for a substantial increase in America's own force c a p a b i l i t y so that i t w i l l have the a b i l i t y to e f f e c t i v e l y challenge the Soviet Union in many regions of the globe, simultaneously. Implicit in the policy argument i s the desire to build-up America's forces to such an extent as to be able to overcome those of the Soviet Union in any p a r t i c u l a r theatre at any given time. To them, America's m i l i t a r y posture must be based upon the U.S. acquiring s u f f i c i e n t g e o p o l i t i c a l power to not merely deter the Soviet Union but to win should the forces of each be engaged. 141 The coalition/defence proponents show a greater i n c l i n a t i o n toward containment of the Soviet Union and, rather than seeking to achieve escalation dominance over the Soviets, argue that the U.S. should, by sharing the burden of c o l l e c t i v e defence with i t s a l l i e s , acquire a deterrent c a p a b i l i t y . For them, there are s u f f i c i e n t m i l i t a r y resources already existing between the U.S. and i t s a l l i e s and emphasis should be placed upon the e f f e c t i v e combination and management of these resources rather than upon augmentation. In t h i s sense, the coalition/defence policy i s a much more conservative and orthodox one than that presented by the unilateralists/maritime supremacists. Neither policy argument of the American debate advocates a role for a l l i e s in the formulation of America's strategic p o l i c y . As to the implementation of any such policy, the u n i l a t e r a l i s t s assume that the U.S. has the sole r e s p o n s i b i l i t y . The assistance of.America's a l l i e s i s not an integral component in the implementation of the policy but i s expected to merely make America's deployment and projection of i t s forces more e f f e c t i v e . The coalition/defence proponents argue for the dir e c t involvement of America's a l l i e s in the implementation of i t s strategic policy ascribing roles for them which are i d e n t i c a l in nature to those performed by U.S. forces. The emphasis here i s upon c o l l e c t i v e defence with a recommendation for the integration and coordination of U.S. and a l l i e d forces. Regardless of which policy argument pr e v a i l s , there seems l i t t l e doubt that increased pressure w i l l be put on Japan to 142 augment i t s defence c a p a b i l i t i e s , to adopt a more offensive based force and to take greater r e s p o n s i b i l i t y for Northeast Asian security. The strategic debate i s , in essence, about e f f e c t i v e l y matching resources to commitments and includes the issue of whether the U.S. alone, or with i t s a l l i e s , w i l l have s u f f i c i e n t resources to meet the perceived threat. Even i f a l l i e s are not given direct and independent roles within the adopted strategy, they w i l l be expected to perform at least a n c i l l a r y and f a c i l i t a t i v e roles for the U.S. Northeast Asia does not figure highly in any of the policy arguments of the debate. The coalition/defence proponents admittedly see an important role for ground forces-in-place such as at the U.S. bases and f a c i l i t i e s in Japan, but accept that s h i f t i n g U.S. forces away from the region to meet contingencies elsewhere i s a real p o s s i b i l i t y . While a l l policy arguments recommend an increase in U.S. forces, p r i o r i t y l i e s in theatres of operation other than Northeast Asia and i t i s these which w i l l benefit from any increase in the forces globa l l y deployed by the U.S. Japan i s a consensual democracy where the involvement of the people in the making of the broad policy decisions i s generally promoted by the government. Public opinion i s important on a l l issues and t h i s i s p a r t i c u l a r l y so in the area of security policy-making. Since the Second World War, defence issues have been part of an ongoing domestic debate and have become partisan p o l i t i c a l issues. A new consensus favouring increased defence spending and a more assertive international 1 4 3 role for Japan has developed. However, the trend should not be exaggerated and the U.S. should remain sensitive to the di v i s i o n s that continue to exist in Japanese p o l i t i c a l c i r c l e s and in Japanese society as a whole. The U.S.-Japan relationship may well be evolving, by accident or design, into a m i l i t a r y a l l i a n c e which w i l l encourage a more equitable d i v i s i o n of defence r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s in Northeast Asia. However, the U.S. Administration should not presume, as the debate's protagonists appear to do, that there i s a unity of perception within the a l l i a n c e about the international environment and about how to protect interests within i t . Centrifugal tendencies in th i s ' a l l i a n c e ' , as in other Western a l l i a n c e s , could well be aggravated by not being d i r e c t l y addressed by the United States. This paper has examined two domestic p o l i t i c a l debates which, while not conducted within the executive • or l e g i s l a t u r e of either country, have a capacity to a f f e c t i f not determine, certain aspects of security policy-making in each country. On the issue of the security role that Japan w i l l perform in Northeast Asia, the two debates f i n d a point of intersection. Inevitably, at t h i s point, each debate w i l l interact with the other and in so doing, provoke certain responses from protagonists in the other debate. The debates are s t i l l in the i r formative stages and while there seems l i t t l e doubt that Japan i s enhancing i t s international role, i t would be premature to make any predictions about the security role Japan would perform within any U.S. strategic policy for Northeast Asia. 1 4 4 While predictions are d i f f i c u l t to make, i t can be argued, with some confidence, that Japan must develop a coherent regional security p o l i c y . Such a policy must s t r i k e an acceptable balance between Japan's domestic constraints and the American demands. To reach a point of equilibrium, Japan w i l l need to increase i t s m i l i t a r y spending and develop a defence force capable of at least performing those missions recently requested by the United States. 1 45 BIBLIOGRAPHY I . NEWSPAPERS 1. The New York Times 2. The Washington Post I I . OFFICIAL DOCUMENTS 3. Congressional Quarterly (Washington, D.C.: USGPO) 4. Department of State B u l l e t i n (Washington, D.C: USGPO) 5. Joint Chiefs of Staff, U.S. M i l i t a r y Posture FY 1985 (Washington, D.C: USGPO, 198T) 6. U.S.Congress. Senate. Hearings before the Committee on Foreign Relations, East-West Relations: Focus on the Pa c i f i c (Washington, D.C: USGPO, 1982) 7. U.S.Congress. Senate. Report prepared for the Subcommittee on East Asian and P a c i f i c A f f a i r s of the Committee on Foreign Relations, Japan's Contribution to  M i l i t a r y S t a b i l i t y in Northeast Asia (Washington, D.C: USGPO,1980) 8. U.S.Congress. House. Committee on Armed Services, M i l i t a r y Posture Hearings 1982 (Washington, D.C: USGPO,1982) 9. U.S.Congress. House. Committee on Armed Services, Report of the Deleaation to East Asia (Washington, D.C: USGPO,1983) 10. U.S.Congress. House. Committee on Foreign Relations, Hearings before the Subcommittees on Europe and the Middle East and on Asian and P a c i f i c A f f a i r s , The Soviet Role in Asia (Washington, D.C: USGPO, 1983) 11. U.S.Congress. Senate. Report to the Committee on Foreign Relations, The U.S.,China and Japan (Washington, D.C: USGPO,1979) II I . SECONDARY SOURCES 12. Abrahamson, James L., America Arms For a New Century (New York: The Free Press, 1981) 13. Adelman, Kenneth L.,"Japan's Security Dilemma:An American View" in Survival 23 (March/April 1981) p.77 14. Aspaturian, V.V., "Soviet Global Policy & Correlation of 146 Forces" in Problems of Communism Vol.29 No.3 (May-June 1980) p.l 15. Betts, Richard K. "Conventional Strategy: New C r i t i c s , Old Choices" in International Security Vol.7 No.4 (Summer 1983) p.140 16. Betts, Richard K.,"Thesis, Antithesis, Synthesis?" in International Security Vol.8 No.3 (Winter 1983-84) p.180 17. Blaker, Michael, "The Future of U.S.-Japan Relations" in The Program on U.S.-Japan Relations Harvard Seminar Summaries 1982-83 (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Center for International Affairs,1983) 18. Blechman, Barry M. e t . a l . , The Soviet M i l i t a r y Buildup  and U.S. Defense Spending (Washington, D.C: The Brookings Institution,1977) 19. Brown, Harold, Thinking About National Security Defense and Foreign Policy in a Dangerous World (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press,1983) 20. Brown, Seyom, "Confronting the Soviet Union:Why, Where and How?" in The 1980s: Decade of Confrontation? National Security A f f a i r s Conference 1981 (Washington, D.C: National Defense University,1981) 21. Brzezinski, Zbigniew, "East Asia and Global Security" in Journal of International A f f a i r s Vol.37 No.1 (Summer 1983) p. 6 22. B u l l , Hedley, "Sea Power and P o l i t i c a l Influence" in Adelphi Papers No.122 (Spring 1976) p. 1 23. Byers, R.B. and Ing, Stanley CM.,"Sharing the Burden on the Far Side of the A l l i a n c e " Japanese Security in the 1980s, Journal of International A f f a i r s Vol.37 No.1 (Summer 1983) p.163 24. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Carnegie Panel on U.S. Security and the Future of Arms Control, Challenges for U.S. National Security and Future of Arms  Control The Strategic Balance and Strategic Arms Limitation (Washington, D.C: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace,1981) 25. Clough, Ralph N., East Asia & U.S. Security (Washington, D.C: The Brookings I n s t i t u t i o n , 1975) 26. C o l l i n s , John M., Grand Strategy P r i n c i p l e s and Practices (Annapolis, Maryland: Naval Institute Press,1973) 27. Cooper, Richard N. and Jones, P h i l i p B., "The Long-Term 147 Outlook for U.S.-Japanese Cooperation" in U.S.-Japan  Relations; Towards a New Equilibrium Annual Review 1982-83 (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Center for International A f f a i r s , 1983) p.31 28. Cordesman, Anthony H.,"Deterrence in the 1980s: Part I American Strategic Forces and Extended Deterrence" in Adelphi Papers No.175 (Summer 1982) 29. C o t t r e l l , Alvin J. and Moorer, Thomas H., U.S. Overseas  Bases:Problems of Projecting American M i l i t a r y Power  Abroad The Washington Papers:47 (Beverly H i l l s : Sage Publications,1977) 30. Curtis, Gerald L., "Japan and the United States:Alliance P o l i t i c s in the Eighties" in Trialogue No.27 (Summer/Fall 1 981) p.7 31. Dalnev, V., "Impediments to Soviet:Japanese Relations" in International A f f a i r s No.2 (1981) p.49 32. Dellums, Congressman Ronald V., Defense Sense. The Search  for a Rational M i l i t a r y Policy (Cambridge, Mass.: Ballinger Publishing Co., 1983) 33. Dibb, Paul, Soviet C a p a b i l i t i e s , Interests and Strategies Working Paper No.45 The Strategic & Defence Studies Centre (Canberra: Australian National University, 1982) 34. Dunn, Keith A. and Staudenmaier, William 0., "Strategy for Survival" in Foreign Policy No.52 ( F a l l , 1983) p.22 35. Emmerson, John K.,"Security and Energy in Northeast Asia" in Korean Journal of International Studies Vol.13 No.2 (Summer 1983) p.227 36. Endicott, John, "The P o l i t i c s of Japanese Decision-Making" in The Program on U.S.-Japan (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Center for International A f f a i r s , 1982-83) 37. Epstein, Joshua M.,"Horizontal Escalation:Sour Notes of a Recurrent Theme" in International Security Vol.8 No.3 (Winter 1983-84) p.19 38. Foster, Richard B., Dornan, James E.Jr, and Carpenter, William M.(eds.), Strategy and Security in Northeast Asia (New York: Crane,Russak & Co. Ltd,1979) 39. Garvey, Gerald, Strategy and the Defense Dilemma Nuclear P o l i c i e s and Alliance P o l i t i c s (Lexington, Mass.: D.C.Heath & Co.,1984) 40. George, Alexander L. and Smoke, Richard, Deterrence in  American Foreign Policy: Theory and Practice (New York: 1 48 Columbia University Press, 1974) 41. George, Alexander L., Managing U.S.-Soviet Rivalry.Problems of C r i s i s Prevention (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press,1983) 42. George, Alexander L., H a l l , David K. and Simons, William E., The Limits of Coercive Diplomacy. Laos, Cuba, Vietnam (Boston: Little,Brown & Co.,1971) 43. Gibert, Stephen P., Northeast Asia in U.S. Foreign Policy The Washington Papers:71 (Beverly H i l l s : Sage Publications,1979) 44. Glenn, John, "Defending the New Japan" in Washington  Quarterly (Winter 1982) p.25 45. Goldman,Stuart, Soviet Policy Toward Japan and the  Strategic Balance in Northeast Asia (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service ,February 27,1984) 46. Goldstein, Donald (ed.), Energy and National Security Proceedings of a Special Conference (Washington, D.C.: National Defense University Press, 1981) 47. Gray, Colin S., The Geopolitics of the Nuclear Era:Heartlands,Rimlands and the Technological Revolution (New York: Crane,Russak & Co. Inc.,1977) 48. Greene, Fred, Stresses in U.S.-Japanese Security Relations (Washington, D.C: The Brookings I n s t i t u t i o n , 1 975) 49. Halperin, Morton H., Defense Strategies-for the Seventies • (Boston: Little,Brown & Co.,1971) 50. Hanks, Robert J., The P a c i f i c Far East: Endangered  American Strategic~Position Special Report (Cambridge, Mass.: Inst i t u t e for Foreign Policy Analysis Inc.,1981) 51. Hanks, Robert J. and Record, Jeffrey, U.S. Strategy at  the Crossroads: Two Views (Cambridge, Mass.: Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis Inc., 1982) 52. Hanrieder, Wolfram F.(ed.), Arms Control and  Security:Current Issues (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press,1979) 53. Hasegawa, Tsuyushi, "Japanese Defense" Book Review in Journal of International A f f a i r s Vol.37 No.1 (Summer 1983) p.196 54. Hassner, Pierre, "America's Policy Towards the Soviet Union in the 1980s: Objectives and Uncertainties" in Adelphi Papers No.174 (Spring !982)p.35 1 49 55. Heyns, Terry L. (ed.), Understanding U.S. Strategy:A  Reader (Washington, D.C: National Defense University Press, 1983) 56. Hofheinz, Roy Jr and Calder, Kent E., The Eastasia Edge (New York: Basic books Inc,l982) 57. H o l s t i , Ole R.,Hopmann, P.Terrence and Sulli v a n , John D., Unity and Disintegration in International  Alliances:Comparative Studies (New York: John Wiley & Sons,1973) 58. Horelick, Arnold L.,"Soviet Policy Dilemmas in Asia" in Asian Survey Vol.XVII No.6 (June 1977) p.499 59. Hsuing, James C. and Winberg, Chai (eds.), Asia and U.S.  Foreign Policy (New York: Praeger Publishers,1981) 60. Hsuing, James C.(ed.), U.S.-Asian Relations The National Security Paradox (New York: Praeger Publishers,1983) 61. Huntington, Samuel P., "Conventional Deterrence and Conventional Retaliation in Europe" in International  Security Vol.8 No.3 (Winter 1983-84) p.32 62. Huntington, Samuel P., The Common Defense Strategic Programs in National P o l i t i c s (New York: Columbia University Press,1961) 63. Huntington, Samuel P. (ed.) The Strategic Imperative New P o l i c i e s for American Security (Cambridge, Mass.: Ballinger Publishing Co.,1982) 64. Hyland, William, "The Soviet Union in the American Perspective: Perceptions and R e a l i t i e s " in Adelphi Papers No.174 p.52 65. Ishikawa, Hironuhu, "Security in East Asia and the P a c i f i c " in Asia P a c i f i c Community No.23 (Winter 1984) p.1 66. Ito, K e i i c h i , "Japan's Defense Concept and i t s 1981 Defense White Paper" in Asia P a c i f i c Community ( F a l l 1981) p. 103 67. Ito, K e i i c h i , "Japan's Defence Policy" in Asia P a c i f i c  Community ( F a l l 1980) p.1 68. Johnson, U. Alexis et a l . , (eds.), The Common Security  Interests of Japan , the United States and Nato (Cambridge, Mass.: Ballinger Publishing Co.,1981) 69. Johnson, Stuart E. and Yager, Joseph A., The M i l i t a r y  Equation in Northeast Asia (Washington, D.C: The 1 50 Brookings I n s t i t u t ion,1979) 70. Jordan, Amos A.,Taylor, William J.Jr and Associates, American National Security Policy and Process (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press,1981) 71. Kaihara, Osamu, "Japan's Defense Structure and Capability" in Asia P a c i f i c Community (Spring 1981) p.52 72. Kimura, Hiroshi, Soviet P o l i c i e s in the Asian P a c i f i c  Region:A Japanese Assessment Seminar Presentation (Makaha, Hawaii, May 1984) 73. Kimura, Hiroshi, Soviet Policy Toward Japan Working Paper No.6 (Providence, Rhode Island: The Center for Foreign Policy Development,Brown University,August 1983) 74. Komer, Robert W., Maritime Strategy or 'Coalition Defense? (Cambridge, Mass.: Abt Books, 1984 j 75. Komer, Robert W., "Maritime Strategy v C o a l i t i o n Defense" in Foreign A f f a i r s Vol.60 No.5(Summer 1982) p.1127 76. Kosaka, Masataka, "Japan's .Role" Unpublished Seminar Paper, (University of Washington, 1984) 77. Kosaka, Masataka, "Japan's Role in the World:A Prospect for a Ligh t l y Armed Economic Giant" in Continuing Regional  Colloquium on International A f f a i r s (University of Washington, A p r i l 12,1984) 78. Kuriyama, Takakazu, "Sharing Global R e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s ^ Japanese View" in Trialogue (Special Summer/Fall 1981) p. 1 4 79. Larsen, Joyce E.(ed.), New Foundations for Asian and  P a c i f i c Security (New York: National Strategy Information Center,1980) 80. Latyshev, Igor, "Soviet-U.S. Differences in their Approaches to Japan" in Asian Survey Vol.XXIV No.11 (November 1984) p.1163 81. Lee, Chae-Jin and Sato, Hideo, U.S. Policy Toward Japan  and Korea A Changing Influence Relationship (New York: Praeger Publishers,1982) 82. Leepson, Marc, "Tensions in U.S.-Japanese Relations" in Congressional Quarterly E d i t o r i a l Research Reports Vol.VII (Washington, D.C: USGP0,1982) pp.251-272 83. Lehman, John F.Jr, "Rebirth of a Naval Strategy" in Strategic Review (Summer 1981)p.11 151 84. Lunn, Simon, Burden-sharing in Nato Chatham House Papers 18 (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul,1983) 85. Luttwak, Edward N., Strategy and P o l i t i c s Collected Essays (New Brunswick, New Jersey: Transaction Books,1980) 86. Luttwak, Edward N., " A t t r i t i o n , Relational Maneuver and the M i l i t a r y Balance" in International Security Vol.8 No.3 (Winter 1983-4)p.176 87. Margiotta, Franklin D. (ed.), Evolving Strategic  R e a l i t i e s : Implications for U.S. Policymakers (Washington, D.C: National Defense University Press, 1980) 88. Martin, Laurence, "U.S. Strategic Concerns and C a p a b i l i t i e s " in Adelphi Papers No.174 (Spring 1982) p.8 89. Masataka, Okumiya, "Why We Should Defend Sea Lanes" in Japan Echo Vol.X No.2 1983 p.15 90. Masuyama, Eita r o , "Nakasone's Foreign Policy" in Asia  P a c i f i c Community No.19 (Winter 1983) p.116 91. M i l l a r , Tom, "America's Alliances:Asia" in Adelphi Papers No.174 (Spring 1982) p.27 92. Mochizuki, Mike M. , "Japan's Search for Strategy" in International Security Vol.8 No.3 (Winter 1983-84) p.152 93. Mochizuki, Mike M. and Nacht, Michael, "Modes of Defense Cooperation" in Program on U.S.-Japan Relations Annual Report 1981-82 (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Center for International A f f a i r s , 1982) p.129 94. Morrison, Charles E.(ed.), Threats to Security in East  Asia-Pac i f ic National and Regional Perspectives (Lexington, Mass.: D.C.Heath & Co.,1983) 95. Nagai, Yonosuke, "Beyond Burden-sharing in U.S.-Japan  Relations: Towards a New Equilibrium Annual Review 1982-83 (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Center for International A f f a i r s , 1983) p.17 96. Nikolayev, N., "For Good-Neighbourliness & Cooperation Between the USSR & Japan" in International A f f a i r s No.2 (1978) p.46 97. Nikolayev, N. , "Tokyo's P o l i t i c a l Zigzags" in International A f f a i r s No.11 (1981) p.37 98. Niksch, Larry A., "Japanese Defense Policy:Suzuki's Shrinking Options" in Journal of Northeast Asian Studies Vol.1 No.2 (June 1982) p.79 152 99. Nishihara, Masashi, "Expanding Japan's Credible Defense Role" in International Security Vol.8 No.3 (Winter 1983-84) p.180 100. Nishijima, Ryochi, "Par t i c i p a t i o n of Maritime Self-Defense Forces in Rimpac" in Asia P a c i f i c Community (Winter 1980) No.7 p.43 101. Nitze, Paul H., Sullivan, Leonard J r . et a l . , Securing  the Seas The Naval Challenge and Western A l l i a n c e Options (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1979) 102. Okawara, Yoshio, "The Underlying Concept in Japan's Defense Policy" in Asia P a c i f i c Community No.13 (Summer 1981) p.28 103. Okazaki, Hisahiko, "Japanese Security Po l i c y : A Time for Strategy" in International Security Vol.7 No.2 ( F a l l 1982) p. 188 104. Okimoto, Daniel, "Security P o l i c i e s in the U.S. and Japan:Institutions, Experts and Mutual Understanding" in The A t l a n t i c Community Quarterly Vol.17 No.1 (Spring 1979) p.46 105. O'Neill, Robert and Horner, D.M.(eds.), New Directions in  Strategic Thinking (London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd,1981) 106. Osgood, Robert E., Alliances and American Foreign Policy (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press,1968) 107. Osgood, Robert E., "American Grand Strategy: Patterns, Problems & Prescriptions" in Naval War College Review (September/October 1983) p.5 108. Osgood, Robert E., "Re v i t a l i z a t i o n of Containment" in Foreign A f f a i r s Vol.60 No.3 (1981) p.465 109. Osgood, Robert E., Retreat From Empire (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press,1973) 110. Owada, Hisashi, "Japanese Perceptions of the U.S.-Japan Relationship" in Program on U.S.-Japan relations (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Center for International Affairs,1981) Annual Report 1980-81 111. Owada, Hisashi and Nacht, Michael, "Security Issues:A Broader Framework" in Program on U.S.-Japan relations (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Center for International A f f a i r s . 1981) Annual Report 1980-81. 112. Petrov, D., "Japan's Place in U.S. Asian Policy" in International A f f a i r s No.10 (1978) p.52 1 53 113. Poole, Robert W., Defending a Free Society (Lexington, Mass.: D.C.Heath & Co.,1984) 114. Posen, Barry R. and Van Evera, Stephen, "Defense Policy and the Reagan Administration:Departure from Containment" in International Security Vol.8 No.3 (Winter 1983-84) p.3 115. Pyle, Kenneth B., "Changing Conceptions of Japan's International Role" Unpublished Seminar Paper (University of Washington, 1984) 116. Radtke, Kurt W., "Global security and Northeast Asia" in Journal of Northeast Asian Studies Vol.2 No.1 (March 1983) p.59 117. Record, Jef f r e y , "Jousting With Unreality:Reagan's M i l i t a r y Strategy" in International Security Vol.8 No.3 (Winter 1983-84) p.3 118. Ropelewski, Robert R., "R e v i t a l i z a t i o n E f f o r t Sparked New Theater Defense Concepts" in Aviation Week and Space  Technology Vol.38 (February 7,1983) p.38 119. Sakonjo, Naotoshi, "Security in Northeast Asia" in Journal  of Northeast Asian Studies Vol.2 No.3 (September 1983) p.87 120. Sarkesian, Sam C. (ed.), Defense Policy and the  Presidency: Carter's F i r s t Years (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1979) 121. Sarkisov, Konstantin 0., "Japan & the U.S. in Asia" in Asian Survey Vol.XXIV No.11 (November 1984) p.1174 122. Satoh, Yukio, "The Evolution of Japanese Security Policy" in Adelphi Papers No.178 (Autumn 1982) 123. Scalapino, Robert A., "The U.S. and East Asia:Views and P o l i c i e s in a Changing Era" in Survival Vol.24 No.4 (July/August 1982) p.146 124. Schurmann, Franz, The Logic of World Power (New York: Pantheon,1973) 125. Seabury, Paul, America's Stake in the P a c i f i c (Washington, D.C: Ethics & Public Policy Center, 1981) 126. Sinha, Radha, Japan's Options, for the 1980s (London: Croom Helm, 1982) 127. Sklar, Holly(ed.), T r i l a t e r a l i s m (Boston: South End Press,1980) 154 128. Solomon, Richard H.(ed.), Asian Security in the 1980s Problems & P o l i c i e s for a Time of Transition (Cambridge, Mass.: Oelgeschlager,Gunn & Hain Publishing Co.Inc,l979) 129. Solomon, Richard H., "East Asia and the Great Power Coa l i t i o n s " in Foreign A f f a i r s Vol.60 No.3 (1981) p.686 1982) p.55 130. Stuart, Douglas T. and Tow, William T.(eds.), China, the  Soviet Union and the West Strategic and P o l i t i c a l Dimensions in the 1980s CBoulder, Colorado: Westview Press,1982) 131. Sutter, Robert G., Far East:Dealinq with Japan Congressional Research Service Review Vol.3 (October 1982) 132. Sutter, Robert G. and Niksch, Larry A., Japan-U.S.  Relations Congressional Research Service Issue Brief NO.1B81026 (March 6,1983) 133. Takeshi, Igarashi, "Farewell to the Peace-loving State?" in Japan Echo Vol.X No.2 (1983) p.21 134. Takubo, Tadae, "Perceptions Gap Between Tokyo and Washington" in Asia P a c i f i c Community No.17 (Summer 1982) p.22 135. Thomas, Raju G.C., The Great-Power Triangle and Asian  Security (Lexington, Mass.: D.C.Heath & Co.,1983) 136. Thompson, W.Scott (ed.), National Security in the  l980s:From Weakness to Strength (San Francisco: Fnstitute for Contemporary Studies, 1980) 137. Tow, William T. and Feeney, William R.(eds.), U.S. Foreign Policy and Asian-Pacific Security:A Transregional  Approach (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press,1982) 138. Trezise, P h i l i p , "The Japan Relationship" in Asia P a c i f i c  Community No.8 (Spring 1980) p.1 139. Tsurutani, Taketsugu, Japanese Policy and East Asian  Security (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1981) 140. Tsurutani, Taketsugu, "Old Habits, New Times: Challenges to Japanese-American Security Relations" in International  Security Vol.7 No.2 ( F a l l 1982) p.175 141. Turner, Stansfield and Thibault, George, "Preparing for the Unexpected: The Need for a New M i l i t a r y Strategy" in Foreign A f f a i r s Vol.61 ( F a l l 1982) p.122 142. Ushiba, Nobuhiko, "Exploring Japan's International Role" in Trialogue (Special Summmer/Fall 1981) p. 3 1 55 143. Van Slyck, P h i l i p , Strategies for the 1980s Lessons of Cuba, Vietnam and Afghanistan (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press,1981 ) 144. Vasey, Lloyd R.(ed.), P a c i f i c Asia and U.S. P o l i c i e s : A  P o l i t i c a l - Economic-Strategic Assessment (Honolulu, Hawaii: P a c i f i c Forum,1978) 145. Vlahos, Michael, "Maritime Strategy versus Continental Commitment" in Orbis ( F a l l 1982) p.583 146. Vogel, Ezra F., "American Perceptions of the U.S.-Japan Relationship" in Program on U.S.-Japan Relations (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Center for International A f f a i r s , 1981) Annual Report 1980-81. 147. Walters, Robert E., Sea Power & the Nuclear Fallacy (New York: Holmes & Meier, 1975) 148. Watts, William, The United States and Asia (Lexington, Mass.: D.C. Heath & Co.,1982) 149. Watts, William, The United States and Japan: A Troubled  Partnership (Cambridge, Mass.: Ballinger Publishing Co.,1984) 150. Wheelock, Thomas R., "U.S. Conventional Forces" in Adelphi Papers (Spring 1982) p.40 151. Wu, Yuan-li, U.S.Policy and Strategic Interests in the  Western P a c i f i c (New York: Crane, Russak & co. Inc.,1975) 

Cite

Citation Scheme:

        

Citations by CSL (citeproc-js)

Usage Statistics

Share

Embed

Customize your widget with the following options, then copy and paste the code below into the HTML of your page to embed this item in your website.
                        
                            <div id="ubcOpenCollectionsWidgetDisplay">
                            <script id="ubcOpenCollectionsWidget"
                            src="{[{embed.src}]}"
                            data-item="{[{embed.item}]}"
                            data-collection="{[{embed.collection}]}"
                            data-metadata="{[{embed.showMetadata}]}"
                            data-width="{[{embed.width}]}"
                            async >
                            </script>
                            </div>
                        
                    
IIIF logo Our image viewer uses the IIIF 2.0 standard. To load this item in other compatible viewers, use this url:
http://iiif.library.ubc.ca/presentation/dsp.831.1-0096516/manifest

Comment

Related Items